Religious Factor in Russia's Foreign Policy

The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy

This book examines how religion interacts with Russian foreign policy, arguing that religion is an important but often overlooked factor in shaping Russia’s outlook towards international relations. It surveys the importance of religion in Russian social life – both historically and in the present – and considers a wide range of Russian attitudes which are affected by religion – such as Russian nationalism, notions of Slavic solidarity, the divine mission of Russian Orthodox civilization, Russian imperialism, and Russia’s special attitude to Islam. The book discusses how religious organizations, especially the Russian Orthodox Church, operate in international relations, pursuing, through “religious diplomacy”, their own interests and those of the Russian state. It also explores how religious ideas and culture linked to religion impinge on Russian attitudes and identity, and thereby affect policy, and it demonstrates how policy influenced by religion impacts on Russian foreign policy in practice in a wide range of examples, including Russia’s relations with other orthodox countries, non-orthodox Western countries, Muslim countries, Israel and the Vatican. Alicja Curanovic´ is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland.

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The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy

Alicja Curanović

This English language edition published 2012 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 The Work is a revised edition of the book originally published in Polish under the title: Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej, Warsaw 2010, © Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2010. Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2012 Alicja Curanović The right of the author to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or used in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN 13: 978-0-415-68831-4 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-13327-9 (ebk) Typeset in Baskerville by Sunrise Setting Ltd, Torquay, UK

For religion, after all, is the serious business of the human race Arnold J. Toynbee (Civilization on Trial, 1949)

Contents

Introduction

1

PART I

The religious factor in Russian politics: past and present

11

1 Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state

13

2 Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation

60

3 Religion in Russian views on foreign policy

106

PART II

Religious diplomacy of the Russian Federation

139

4 Characteristics of Russian “religious diplomacy”

141

5 Russia’s Orthodox brotherhood with Belarus and Serbia

151

6 The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships with Ukraine, Estonia and Georgia

162

7 Occasional community: Russian Policy on Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro

181

8 The long shadow of Byzantium: Russian–Greek relations in the face of rivalry between two churches

187

9 Between fear and the necessity of cooperation: Russian policy on Muslim countries

195

10 Among us, the chosen nations: Tendencies in Russian– Israeli relations

214

11 Neighbourhood of giants: The place of the Russian Federation in Asian cultural space between India and the People’s Republic of China

221

x

Contents

12 There can be only one Rome: Russia’s traumatic relationship with the Vatican

227

13 The Antichrist lives in the West: The ideological burden of Russia’s policy on the United States of America

235

Conclusion

239

Notes

250

Bibliography

324

Index

342

Introduction

Matters which cannot be unambiguously described and expressed in words often prove to be the most important for humanity. Such is the case with religion, which eludes research and precise definitions. At the beginning of the last century, it was acknowledged to be a “relic” gradually disappearing from the life of society under the pressure of modernization. This approach began to change by the end of the 1970s. The “return” of religion to politics first drew attention in the Middle East, where after the so-called Six-Day War (1967), members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization more and more frequently stressed the religious dimension of their fight against Israel and began to call the suicide bombers religious martyrs (shahids). Another important signal was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as a result of which Shahanshah Reza Pahlavi was overthrown and Shiite clergy took power, transforming Iran into a theocratic state. Religion also figured in the war in Afghanistan (1979–89), where the conflict with the Soviet Union took on the tone of an international jihad and the final withdrawal of the USSR’s armed forces was perceived by the Islamic world as a symbolic victory of the faith-fighters (mujahedin) over what was at the time a superpower. Gilles Kepel called this clear manifestation of the religious factor in international relations “the revenge of God”, who returned to politics in defiance of proclamations of the inevitable end of religious influences. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, fewer and fewer political scientists, sociologists and specialists in religious studies question the growing importance of the religious factor in politics – both as a premise of decisions undertaken by states, as well as an instrument used by them. The choice of topic for this book was dictated by the desire to analyse and present contemporary foreign policy of Russia in a new light. In accordance with the thesis discussed in this book, at the beginning of the twenty-first century the significance of the religious factor in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation is growing. The Kremlin ever more successfully conducts “religious diplomacy”, which is an element in building Russia’s “soft power”. Manifestation of the religious factor in Moscow’s policy is connected with the political elite’s search for a new identity. The religious factor thus has influence on the determination of the Russian Federation’s place in the international arena.

2

Introduction

The religious factor has two aspects: institutional (activity of religious institutions) and ideological (religious ideas relating to policy). The analysis of contemporary policy has been assisted by research on Russian culture and history, revealing certain similarities in the use of the religious factor in Russian policy in the past and present. It is important to notice, that the study of the religious factor does not relate only to Orthodoxy (although, due to the role it plays, most attention is naturally devoted to it), but also to Islam, Buddhism, Judaism (the so-called “traditional religions”) and other Christian faiths (Catholicism and Protestantism). This work is divided in two main parts, reflecting the research method. Part I presents an overview of determinants, past and present, of modern Russian “religious diplomacy”. It consists of Chapters 1–3. Chapter 1 presents the evolution of the role of the religious factor in Russian history, including the process of forming confessional relations characteristic of Russian tradition, on which the current relation between the political elite and representatives of “traditional religions” is partly modelled. The next two chapters are devoted to the two aspects of the religious factor – the institutional and the ideological. Chapter 2 deals with the characteristics of the status of religious institutions: the religious law in force in Russia, the demographic potential, possessions and infrastructure of the most important religious institutions, their relation to the authorities and their relations among each other – in other words, everything that determines their activity at home and abroad. Chapter 2 also covers the relationship between Russians’ religiosity and political preferences, indicating how Russians view the Orthodox Church and what they expect of it in the public sphere. Moreover, analysis of documents published by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the muftiates reveals the goals of Russia’s most influential religious institutions within and without Russia’s borders. Chapter 3 is devoted to the influence of religion on Russian views of foreign policy. The function of religion was researched in the context of the following intellectual trends: Imperialism, Neo-Eurasianism, Islamism, Nationalism and Slavic solidarity. An analysis of particular views relates mostly to four problems: Russian identity, the vision of the global order, Russia’s place in it and its mission. Also considered is the notion “Orthodox civilization”, which reflects concurrence of the views of the Russian state and the Moscow patriarchate. Part II, dedicated to the analysis of the religious factor in Russian foreign policy, consists of Chapters 4–13. Chapter 4 deals with the characteristics of Kremlin’s “religious diplomacy”. The other nine chapters present detailed analysis of the manifestation of religion in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards particular states, the main point of reference being the function, which the religious factor fulfils in a given context. Among these countries, three groups can be distinguished: states of faith “close” to Russia’s (Orthodox and Muslim), religiously indifferent ones (China and India) and those of a “foreign faith” (the USA and the Vatican). There are also two particular cases: Estonia (combined with Georgia and Ukraine) and Israel. In order to illustrate the religious specificity of Russia’s relations with other countries, the chapter titles use metaphors such as: “Orthodox brotherhood”, “Betrayal syndrome”, “There can only be one Rome” or “the Antichrist lives in the West”. Analysis of these cases occurs as follows: definition of

Introduction 3 Russia’s interests in relation to a given state, indication of the trend of political thought (among those mentioned in Chapter 4) related to a particular situation and presentation of the activity of religious institutions and a description of the function that the religious factor (both in the ideological and institutional aspects) fulfils. I would like to thank Philip Walters for his kindness and support. I owe a debt of gratitude to the always inspiring Professor Andrzej Kojder. Thanks are also due to Professors Alicja Stępień-Kuczyńska and Wojciech Jakubowski for their insightful advices and to Professor Edward Haliżak for organizational support. I am sincerely grateful for the help I have received from my colleagues from the Institute of International Relations of the University of Warsaw. Lastly, I would like to extend my thanks and appreciation to Professor Stanisław Bieleń for his perceptive mentorship, patience and understanding – this book would not have been possible without him. *** Attempts to define religion face the challenge of expressing, through a limited stock of concepts, a notion which defies research, for it refers (in expressions of various thinkers) to something supra-natural, supra-empirical or transcendent.1 This paradox is not eliminated by the two most widespread research approaches: the substantive approach – endeavouring to describe the substance of what religion is – and the functional approach – characterizing “what religion does”. Émile Durkheim understood religion as a “system of beliefs and practices … which unite into a single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”.2 In this definition, three elements can be discerned: faith, beliefs and values referring to the supra-empirical sphere (sacrum); cult (practice) and community (the church).3 In later definitions the relation to the transcendental remains an essential criterion of distinction between religious faith and convictions of another nature. Religion was most often described as a system of symbols, beliefs, values and activities, while the main object of interest was its function. Clifford Geertz described religion as a “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”.4 Peter L. Berger perceives religion as a world of meanings and symbols created by humanity and which humanity then transforms into a sui generis reality (“the sacred cosmos”). Humanity creates this world so that it can assimilate the events of everyday life and protect itself from chaos.5 For John Milton Yinger, religion is a “system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with the ultimate problems of human life”.6 Robert N. Bellah takes a similar position, defining religion as a “set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence”.7 Władysław Piwowarski proposed an understanding of religion as a “system of beliefs, values and activities connected with them, that are shared and followed by a group

4

Introduction

of people and which result from the distinction between empirical and supraempirical reality and subordination of the significance of the former to that of the latter”.8 The difficulties with the precise definition of the essence of religion have directed researchers’ attention to its nature and effects, differentiated in accordance with their meaning for the individual (personal function) and society (social function). É. Durkheim claimed that the idea of religion is inseparable from the idea of the Church [community], from which he drew his conclusion regarding the nature of religion as an “eminently collective thing”.9 The French scientist perceived beliefs and rituals related to the sacrum as the main organizing force of society – as an integrating and community-building institution. Talcott Parsons and Yuri Levada emphasized its regulatory and normative functions. Geertz stressed the motivational effect of religion in the life of an individual, while Berger, Bellah and Yinger stressed its influence in building a feeling of security and usefulness in interpretation of existential questions. Thomas Luckmann recognized religiosity as an intrinsic trait of humanity. In the opinion of this sociologist in religion humanity transcends its biological nature and only in this way becomes human.10 Niklas Luhmann questioned most of these functions of religion, including the integrative function11 and suggested that religion should be understood principally as a system of communication. Beyer formulated this as follows: “religion is a type of communication based on the immanent–transcendent polarity, which functions to lend meaning to the root indeterminability of all meaningful human communication, and which offers ways of overcoming or at least managing this indeterminability and its consequences.”12 It seems, however, that even this formulation of the function of religion does not negate its integrative potential, because a defined model of communication necessarily also establishes the boundaries of a given community. Professing the same values and beliefs and participating in the same rituals generates a sense of closeness and solidarity. As Danièle Hervieu-Léger states, religion is an ideological, practical and symbolic determinant that encourages the creation, development and control of one’s awareness of belonging to a particular line of belief13 – to a certain community. The presence of religion evokes contrasting effects – on one hand, it can act as a catalyst in society while on the other it determines a line of division between those who belong to the community and those that do not. This sense of separateness, along with the sense of continuity is an essential aspect of identity – “the collection of notions, judgments and convictions, which a given social subject constructs when facing the task of defining itself.”14 Without attempting to resolve the question as to whether “the ability to transcend” is the essence of mankind it should be stated that the relation of the individual to the supra-empirical, the interpretation of events of everyday life and the approach to the challenge of existence have an influence on the process of its self-identification. And because relation to the transcendental is one of the essential components of an individual’s identity, religion can take on the function of identification, not only in the case of an individual subject, but also in the collective, the best examples of which are religious organizations (institutions).15

Introduction 5 The activity of institutionalized communities plays an important role in the acculturation of a specific belief system and the imagination of the transcendence of a certain collective, which can often be much larger than, for example, a nation. Religion, to which Durkheim attributed the significance of the root cause of social behaviour (everything that is social originates from the relation to the sacrum),16 is an inseparable element of culture, having an influence on the understanding of moral, aesthetic, legal and political categories and the functioning of public institutions and, in connection with this, also on national and state identity. In each case, however, regardless of the selection and hierarchization of key factors for the process of self-identification of nations, the significance of religion is beyond question. Religion is a factor that influences the process of self-identification, not only of individuals, religious organizations and nations, but also of the enormous geocultural community that is civilization.17 Arnold J. Toynbee saw religious systems as axes, around which great systems arise. This British historical philosopher compared religion to a vehicle that enables the preservation and later the grafting of that which is most valuable in a dying civilization onto the stalk of a new civilization that is only beginning to form.18 If we take this assumption as a premise, religion could be seen as one of the main determinants of the global order.19 Referring to the theory of Niklas Luhmann in such context, it could be described as a system of communication of a given civilization – or, as suggested by Thomas O’Dea, a source of ideology in societies, states or civilizations in transition.20 As mentioned at the beginning, until the 1970s, the connection between modernization and secularization was not actually questioned in humanistic science. It was assumed that technological progress and revolutions in means of communication – and the socio-economic transformation these brought about – would lead to the secularization of society. However, with the historical developments mentioned above, this assumption has become increasingly challenged. The premise of the new, so-called transformative, approach was the assumption that religion, in the face of modernization and globalization does not disappear, but takes on new forms. Luckmann claimed that two opposing processes occur simultaneously in the world: the contraction of transcendence and the widening of religion. In post-industrial societies, the sacrum has not vanished, but has only shifted from the public sphere (a space with a neutral worldview) to the private sphere, often elusive for sociological research. The tendency to replace forms of institutionalized religions with deinstitutionalized (“invisible”) forms is what Luckman defined as “privatization of religion”. Niklas Luhmann pointed out the role of globalization as a factor that forces change in the context of communication (religion), which leads to marginalization of traditional value systems. As one of the manifestations of such transformation of the role of religion, Jean Séguy recognized the phenomenon of using religious concepts in a metaphorical way (“metaphorization of religion”), while Danièle Hervieu-Léger argues that this process can just as well be a symptom of structuralization of the modern element of religion, which in the face of modernity does not disappear, but is subject to dislocation.21

6

Introduction

Globalization, modernization, religious pluralism – all of these pose a challenge for the identity of both the individual and entire communities. The universally felt pressure makes ground for a “global rebellion” of religion. Berger abandoned the “secularization paradigm”, claiming that what had after the Second World War been considered a sign of the inevitable process of secularization of society, in reality refers to only a very small elite in the scale of the world – the heirs of Enlightenment ideals. In his view, secular Europe is an anomaly in what is still a very religious world.22 Berger distinguished three forms of “religious response” towards the processes of modernization: deductive (defence of tradition), reductive (reinterpretation of tradition in modernistic secular language) and inductive (a return to mysticism as the source of religious convictions). Meanwhile, Beyer created a dichotomous division of religions into those that undertake an attempt at modernistic adaptation (the liberal/pro-system option), and those that negate the changes occurring (the conservative/anti-system option).23 José Casanova draws attention to the phenomenon of “deprivatization” of the public sphere.24 According to him, religion is returning to public debate most of all in order to defend freedom and liberty (as a counterbalance to authoritarian power), to contest the autonomy of secular spheres or to safeguard traditional moral values.25 Patrick Michel connected the phenomenon diagnosed by Casanova with a “political deficit”,26 while Georges Corm connected it with the institutional weakness of the nation-state and the church.27 Analysing the return of religion to politics, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd proposes an interesting thesis: that secularization is not a historical process but rather a constructed paradigm that was accepted in the age of Enlightenment. She distinguishes, moreover, two trends of secularization – laicism and Judeo-Christian secularism. The first recognizes the presence of religion in the public sphere as a threat, which should be unconditionally eliminated. The second accepts the separation of church and state, but considers religion the source of values that lay at the foundations of the existing system. It is in this trend where one finds politicians who maintain that the separation of church and state is a phenomenon tightly connected to Judeo-Christian culture and thus impossible to repeat in other civilizations. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd stresses that the observed strengthening of religion in international relations should not be interpreted exclusively as a manifestation of socio-economic problems or as a desperate fight for the survival of anachronistic religious institutions, but also as an attempt to force a new definition of relations between what is “political” and what is “religious”.28 We can conclude that modernization affected religion and religious life on various levels: the effects of this process have been, inter alia, secularization, privatization and politicization of religion. The move towards “privatization” was forced by religious pluralism, which gained the status of one of the foundations of a democratic system. In other cultures, where there is no such categorical separation of “religious” and “secular”, the tendency towards neutralization of the worldview of public space causes many tensions. The resistance of religion and the forming of “privatization ghettos” found its echo also in Europe: Amsterdam (the murder of Dutch director Theo van Gogh in 2004), London (terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005), the French sub-

Introduction 7 urbs (the riots in the autumn of 2005 also had a religious dimension). The “revenge of God”29 has very serious consequences for the international political system. An analysis of the influence of religion on international relations requires the establishment of concrete parameters of a phenomenon which is probably indefinable by its very nature. In this context, the object of study has to be a measurable aspect of religious influence. This can be either institutional activity of religious communities (actors) or – unfortunately less-easily measured – influence of religious ideas related to policy (ideas). Presentation of the actual state of things should serve as the point of departure for reflections on the function that organizations and ideas perform in contemporary politics.30 The activity of religious institutions (organizations) and the influence of religion on the conceptualization of the policy of a given state – this is how the concept of the religious factor should be understood.31 Religious organizations are not only churches (as “compulsorily, coercive, monopolistic sacramental grace institutions”32) but also institutionalized expressions of a religious community, accepted by the majority of members of this community as its representatives, possessing a structure in which an important role is played by the clergy (e.g. the Council of Muftis of Russia, the traditional Buddhist Sangha or the Federation of Jewish Organizations of Russia). In A Theory of Religion, Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge wrote: “religious organizations are social enterprises whose primary purpose is to create, maintain, and exchange supernaturally-based general compensators”.33 A church or religious organization is a “specific type of organized human community, possessing a defined internal system, capable of creating organs of power, fulfilling internal and representative functions and defining the obligations and rights of its believers”.34 In this book, concepts such as “religious institution/religious organization”, “church institution” and “church” are used synonymously. A church, as well as the institutions associated with it and the clergy, all have the possibility of influencing policy of states. The activity of religious institutions is conditioned by many factors. Depending on the regulations of religious law, which defines the status of the organizations and their relations to secular authority, the state may be bound by a unified religious–political authority, a system of subordination of one institution to another or a division of these two structures, which may take on different forms – from radical separationism to various systems of cooperation.35 Apart from the legal regulation of the system, the actual power relations among particular religious organizations and the power apparatus are also a factor. The position of a given church is furthermore determined by, among other things, the number of its faithful, its organization, the property it owns, its ability to effectively mobilize members of the community, the role of the church in the history of a given country and the traditions of forming relations between the church institution and the state. In the times of crisis, transformation or situations when politics loses credibility, the influence of religious organizations grows and “competition” from other religious organizations intensifies. A church is a particular community of ideas, which are mostly universal and aspire to regulate all spheres of life. From its point of view, the church – an organi-

8

Introduction

zation which considers itself as the depository of faith – bears responsibility also for the public sphere. It can transform this responsibility into action above all through its adherents – by influencing their worldview, mobilizing them to action against or in support of the interests of the rulers, persuading them to actively participate in politics in general, to vote at elections or create parties. Moreover, the church influences the public sphere as an institution around which citizens (the potential electorate) gather, an institution which acts as an independent, detached unit, often having status of a legal subject and as a specific, more or less influential, interest group, possessing its own administration and a disciplined, devoted staff (the clergy). In the context of foreign policy, a challenge for the state may be the international activity of the church – a transnational subject, in other words, a nonsovereign, non-territorial, non-governmental unit that undertakes relatively free trans-border activity influencing relations within and among states.36 Some church institutions of global religions fulfil the three criteria of trans-border agency indicated by Brian Hocking and Michael Smith:37 they represent a defined social group, possess freedom of action and are in a state to exercise – in a limited scope and on a particular level – a certain influence on the international environment. Depending on the relationship between secular power and church authority, the church’s trans-border activity can reinforce or weaken the state’s foreign policy. Apart from the institutional aspect outlined above, the second aspect of religious influence in politics is manifest through religious ideas which relate to politics and influence the public sphere. Among these, we can distinguish concepts directly related to the doctrine of a concrete religion (theocratic ideas) and concepts drawn primarily from tradition, from the common, “folk” notions of religious teachings, which can often differ from or even contradict more canonical thinking. This dichotomy is connected with the differentiation between using politics for religious purposes, such as creating the kingdom of God on earth (theologization of politics)38 or using religious motifs for realizing political projects, for example, characterizing a conflict as a battle between good and evil (politicization of religion). In the second case, religious myths and symbols are subject to reinterpretation and adaptation for political aims and, as a result of the process of politicization, they become the foundation of an ideological hybrid,39 which can take on various forms, such as the so-called civil religion,40 a common ideological orientation of a religious nature of all members of a given political collective, expressed in symbols, myths and rituals, which fulfil above all the functions of integration, identity-formation, legitimization, mobilization and upbringing. This is connected with the problem of creating a typology of religious influence; sociologists recognize its role, inter alia, in worldview formation, integration, communication, regulation, legitimization and creation of culture. From the perspective of a state-participant in international relations, the function of identity formation is especially relevant. Both aspects of the state’s international identity41 are specifically influenced by the religious factor. In the case of co-creation of “internal identity”, religion fulfils an integrative function; at the same time, it is also one

Introduction 9 of the factors creating the state’s image – it defines its place in the religiously differentiated international space (“external identity”). If religion is a component of the identity of a nation or state, it may serve as a source of legitimization of the foreign policy or as a mobilizing factor. Moreover, one must not forget about the numerous operative functions (services) of religious institutions, which can act as mediator, arbiter, organizer and so on. The unexpected collapse of the USSR marked the end not only of an empire, but also of the multi-ethnic “Soviet nation”. When particular republics abandoned the federation, emphasizing the need to protect and develop their separateness, Russians – as the most strongly attached to the Soviet Union – faced the challenge of defining their own identity and that of a new, multi-national, multi-confessional state – the Russian Federation. The time of transformation was marked by the search for a sverkhidea – a universal formula to integrate society, which could become the basis of the system of communication (as understood by Luhmann) corresponding to the new Russia. What is important is that religion – and most of all, Orthodoxy – has been, since the beginning, one of the identity-forming options considered. The clericization of the public sphere, observed in contemporary Russia, is inspired by the authorities themselves. The Kremlin maintains good relations with the representatives of all “traditional religions” (Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism) and uses religious symbols and motifs in the public sphere, which is seen by many anti-clerics as an element of the formation of a “civil religion” of the Russian Federation. Sergey Filatov, contemplating the nature of the process (politicization of religion or spiritualization of politics) taking place in Russia, draws attention to the religious component of Russian identity as a source of the current tendencies. Anastasia Mitrofanova, who is inclined towards the thesis of “politicization of religion”,42 emphasizes the exceptional nature of the Russian case – religious myths and symbols effectively used by politicians in a society which, as Dmitriy Furman aptly notes, is reminiscent of the Middle East as far as the extent of identification with the church is concerned, yet is similar to Europe when one considers the percent of people who declare their faith in God within a concrete religious system.43 In the opinion of Danièle Hervieu-Léger, it is characteristic of religion that it draws legitimacy from the authority of tradition, understood as a collection of notions, images, theoretical and practical knowledge, behaviours and attitudes which society accepts for the sake of the necessary continuity between the past and present.44 Every religion implicates its own sort of mobilization of collective memory and structuralizes the symbolic religious universe.45 Thanks to this, religion can serve in the reconstruction of collective memory in modern times and enables a nation to identify itself with a given tradition (historical origins). Religion is thus a useful instrument for creating and regenerating national identity.46 The years after the October Revolution abounded in violent social, political and economic changes which seriously violated the continuity of the Russian tradition, which is why at the end of the twentieth century, there was a huge need in Russia to compensate for the loss of collective identity brought about by the

10

Introduction

collapse of the USSR and the reconstruction of the common memory of Russians on the basis of historical religious tradition. It is in this context that one should read the changes occurring in the Russian Federation – the top-down policy of “controlled resacralization” of the public sphere or – according to Shakman Hurd – the formation by the authorities of a religious system according to the paradigm of JudeoChristian secularism. These changes are occurring in accordance with historical models; it is therefore in history that we should seek explanation as to why religion can be an attractive identity option for a modern state, in which atheism had been, until recently, the dominant religion.

Part I

The religious factor in Russian politics Past and present

1

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state

The statement that “history is written by the victors” conveys the difference between an actual event in the past and the historical record concerning it, which undergoes subjectivization, and often ideologization, mythicization and mystification. The lack of agreement among historians regarding the evaluation of breakthrough events is nothing unusual, but the extreme divergence of judgments, particularly among Russian researchers, sometimes gives the impression that one or another stance towards their native history is almost a consequence of their chosen worldview. Tendencies to idealize (or demonize) also concern the role of religion in Russian history and the evaluation of events such as the Christianization of Russia, the role of the Mongols in the formation of samoderzhavie (autocracy), the raskol (schism) brought about by Patriarch Nikon or the reforms of Peter I. Myths and notions about the past often seem to have greater significance than facts – in this case for reconstructing the influence of the religious factor. *** If one accepts that political community is a determining factor in the formation of a “community cult”,1 then it is no exaggeration to claim that the system of power in Byzantium had an enormous influence on the Orthodox Church – its structure, doctrine, liturgy and functioning. Christianity in the eastern empire lasted almost a millennium longer than in the West, which caused the formation of a particular system of relations between secular and church authority.2 The principle of symphony had fundamental significance for the forming of state–church relations.3 In accordance with this model, God entrusted the emperor and patriarch – joined in perfect harmony – with certain functions: the emperor’s power is a reflection of God’s power over the world, and for this reason he is to be treated with divine honour. The emperor is the patron of the church on earth, its leader and helmsman, although he is not a theologian and does not hold power over the church, he fulfils a religious function in the liturgy and – together with the church hierarchy – is responsible for the fate of the church and the people.4 The emperor and the patriarch of Constantinople jointly represented Christians of the entire oikumene and cared for the church in the material and spiritual domains.5

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Byzantium was managed in the political sphere by the emperor and in the religious sphere by the patriarch.6 The principle of symphony left its mark on the Eastern church’s understanding of the essence of state and law. It was accepted that a Christian state is the second element – after the church – necessary for humanity’s salvation. The empire was considered the earthly image of the heavenly kingdom,7 in which the order corresponding to the cosmic hierarchy was binding: God, emperor in cooperation with the patriarch, and then believers. As John Meyendorff aptly observed, this charismatic understanding of the state obviously lacked political realism and efficiency; provincial usurpation was a common phenomenon, while political stability was the exception. In political categories, the Byzantine imperial system really was a utopia and, understood as the universal equivalent of the universal church, the empire never gained a universal nature.8 The clergy in Byzantium were often de facto imperial civil servants, who would also carry out missionary activities in the interest of the earthly Christian empire.9 Evangelization was equivalent to the expansion of Constantinople, which during the Middle Ages was in a rivalry with Rome for supremacy in Christianizing people living to the east of the Elbe. Widening the influence of the empire was seen in Byzantium in terms of the realization of “God’s plan”, tightly connected with humanity’s salvation. The growth of the empire thus had an eschatological dimension – Pax Romana was the same as Pax Christiana. Dimitri Obolensky draws attention to the particular nature of the Byzantine commonwealth – a community of ideas, concentrated around the two institutions – the church and the emperor.10 Recognition by the princes of Rus of the superiority of the autocrat’s power was, in Obolensky’s opinion, one of the most important factors in the development of Russian statehood. Besides questions connected with religious dogma, church organization, liturgy or religious art, Kiev also borrowed from Byzantium the eschatological nature of the state, governed by a ruler by God’s grace. The thought expressed near the end of the fourteenth century by Patriarch Anthony on the indissolubility of the institutions of church and empire was taken up and creatively developed in the following centuries in Russia.

Identity-building role of Orthodoxy in the history of Rus Few periods in the history of Russia became an object of such idealization as the history of Rus. Existing around four hundred years (from the ninth to thirteenth century), the political structure of eastern Slavs with its centre in Kiev11 plays – particularly in the tradition of Russian Orthodoxy – the role of a legendary “Golden Age”,12 represented by four myths. The first of these concerns the Christianization of Rus, the residents of which supposedly en masse, voluntarily and spontaneously13 converted to the new faith after the example of Prince Vladimir, who, following the footsteps of his grandmother Olga,14 was probably christened in the year 988.15 This idyllic notion

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 15 about the conversion of Rus is supplemented by a legend that emphasizes the sovereignty of the decision of Kiev’s ruler, who, looking for a new religion for his state, invited representatives of various confessions and from among the “offers” presented to him ( Judaism, Islam, and Western and Eastern Christianity) chose Christianity of the Greek rite.16 Another motif, particularly exhibited by the ROC, is the presentation of Kievan Rus as the only state in which the ideal of symphony of secular and church authority was fully realized. The Social Concept approved in 2000 by the tenth general sobor of the ROC, mentions that Kiev, in regard to symphony, surpassed Constantinople because, among other reasons, the pagan tradition of pontifex maximus17 was unknown to the Slavic rulers. Moreover, apologists of Kievan Rus emphasize the high moral standards and humanism of the rulers, appealing to the fact that the death penalty was abolished for being contradictory to the teachings of Christianity.18 The idea of Rus also contains the thesis of the unusual tolerance that reigned in the Slavic state.19 While it is true on one hand that in the lands of Rus mixed marriages between Slavs and Khazars or Volga Bulgarians were not rare and Christian Slavs were not averse to making alliances with neighbouring peoples of a different faith, it is also true, however, that in thirteenth century Kiev, “nonOrthodox” people were considered “foreign”. Anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic sentiments could be felt: the pogrom and exile of Jews in 1113 and the expulsion in 1233 of Dominicans from Kiev20 and the order by Vladimir IV Rurikovich for the demolition of all existing Catholic churches and monasteries.21 Religious tolerance is often mentioned not only as a phenomenon of Old Rus, but also as a distinguishing feature of Russian civilization. But attention must be drawn to a certain detail: tolerance concerns, above all, relations between the dominant religions of Russia – Orthodoxy and Islam, Buddhism or local cults and to a decidedly lesser degree relations with other branches of Christianity and Judaism. The answer to the question as to why Russian history has more Jewish pogroms and crackdowns on “Latinists” than, for example, anti-Tatar campaigns, can be found in the difference in social and financial status or the rate of assimilation of particular minorities, but the significance of the religious factor should also not be neglected. The image of Rus living the “Word of God”, where under the harmonious rule of the prince and metropolitan tolerance reigned and high moral standards were binding, was created and then spread mainly due to the efforts of the Russian church, which from the beginning influenced the process of identity-formation of the eastern Slavic state. Religion was, next to language, the most important determinant of identity for Kievan Rus. Some researchers even claim that Rus was mainly a religious community,22 a Christian civilization administered by the clericalized power apparatus.23 Identifying with Orthodoxy was, for the elite of Kiev, the source of their sense of separateness from neighbouring pagan peoples, a determinant of their belonging to the Byzantine commonwealth (the universal Christian empire), and also the factor forming their unfavourable attitude towards Western Christianity.24

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The religious factor in Russian politics

Acceptance of baptism was a modernizing impulse, giving rise to a new type of social and political organization. It was in the interest of the fledgling institution of the Russian church, which was still new in the beginning of the tenth century, to raise the prestige of the prince and to increase the centralization of the state – its most importantally in the efforts to ensure effective and enduring Christianization. The authority of secular power grew thanks to the new source of legitimization provided by monotheistic religion. The Kievan princes who, in accordance with Christian teachings, held office by the will of God, significantly strengthened their position against the council. The prestige of their power was intensified by the splendour of Byzantine rituals, and also suggested the kinship with the Christian basileus.25 The highest manifestation of sacralization of power was the canonization of members of the royal family (Olga and Vladimir the Great, Gleb and Boris). The latter two, according to the common telling of the story, voluntarily gave themselves up to their executioners, sent by their brother Sviatopolk I, preferring death to the shedding of a brother’s blood. The history of the martyrdom of the first saints of Rus,26 which, among others, led to the establishment of the ethos of self-sacrifice in Rus culture, was largely prepared by the young church, which used the princes’ death as an instrument in the fight for political influence.27 With the help of canonization, the church institution effectively bound the dynasty and Kievan state with Christianity. The Orthodox Church itself played an essential role in the centralization of the state, creating a parallel, uniform structure, of which particular units that were not strictly religious fulfilled other functions as well – among other things, they established schools, supported the development of written language28 and were the most important centres of art. The church was the main institution ensuring connection between Rus and Constantinople – the bishopric in Kiev29 since around the year 103730 had been administratively subordinated to Constantinople. As a result, the Kiev metropolitans – a decided majority of whom were Greek – were picked by the patriarch of Constantinople.31 Strengthened by the “Greek factor”, the direct dependency on Byzantium (the Kiev metropolitan was first and foremost a vassal of the emperor) was a premise for a certain independence of the Kievan church from the prince’s authority. At the same time, the strong position of Greeks influenced the significance of the Orthodox Church as the main centre disseminating Byzantine culture. The church also fulfilled a political function – the metropolitan of Kiev often assumed the role of arbitrator between the prince and his vassals, or between particular claimants to the throne.32 In these circumstances, the church’s favour was worth its weight in gold and was won by, among other things, granting the clergy specific privileges and the strengthening of the position of church institutions. A source of special prerogatives for the clergy in the economic–jurisdictional sphere was the statute on tithes, courts and the clergy issued by Vladimir the Great and the Sudebnik of Yaroslav the Wise, concerning church courts. In accordance with the decisions included in the document, the clergy were freed from customs fees,33 the Orthodox Church was granted the right to one tenth of the prince’s income (from cultivation of the prince’s lands, trade and court fees),34 and entire

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 17 villages – together with their residents and financial burdens – could be sold to monasteries.35 Moreover, episcopal courts had exclusive jurisdiction in examining not only disputes involving clergy, but also matters of secular individuals in the sphere of family and morals. From the time Vladimir accepted baptism until the Mongol invasion of 1240, the ROC managed to create a structure including 16 bishoprics and more than 60 monasteries (including the most important – the Kiev–Pechersk Lavra), and had at its disposal a clergy several tens of thousands strong.36 The Christian religion and the institution connected with it fulfilled in the state of eastern Slavs the role of identity building, legitimization and the creation of culture in the widest sense. Combined with the myth of Boris and Gleb’s martyrdom, state and church became two central political symbols, constructing the identity first of Rus and later of Russia.37 The idealized image of the Kievan period became, for Russian historical memory, equally important as facts. The myth of Orthodox Rus served in the fifteenth century as a point of reference for the rulers of the new Russian state, as they appealed to the tradition of the “Golden Age”, interrupted by the Mongol invasion.

The Orthodox Church under the “Mongol yoke” The role of the Mongols in Russian history inspires many controversies. There are ongoing disputes over how long their rule actually lasted and what exactly was its nature: a brutal occupation or a tolerable dependency in which the khan replaced the Byzantine emperor.38 Whether the pejorative description of the period between 1240 and 148039 as the “Mongol yoke” is justified, or if, as some historians suggest (e.g. Lev Gumilyov40), the arrival of the Mongols was in reality the next “civilizing impulse” after Christianity for the eastern Slavs. Equally ambiguous was the attitude of the Orthodox Church which, no longer operating under a central government, was the strongest, most influential non-Mongol institution on a national scale in Russia. During more than 250 years, the Orthodox Church, first under the supremacy of a pagan, and then an Islamic sovereign,41 enjoyed its greatest independence from the state in its history. Regardless of the evaluation of Mongol influences on the development of the lands of Rus, the strengthening of the church’s position in this period is beyond doubt. Hardly a decade after42 the destruction of Kiev, the Orthodox Church gained many economic and jurisdictional privileges. The metropolitan received from the khan, on equal footing with the princes, a iarlik; the clergy, monasteries and also secular individuals connected with church institutions were freed from paying taxes and tributes;43 exclusive jurisdiction of church courts in matters concerning the clergy was maintained. A guarantee of the inviolability of property enabled the Orthodox Church to gain, with time, the status of the largest landholder in the state.44 Towards the end of the thirteenth century, the number of eparchies (bishoprics) grew to 19; among them was also the prestigious diocese Sarai, established in 126145 in the capital of the Golden Horde on the initiative of the khan.46 Mongol rulers did not interfere in the religious activity of the Orthodox

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The religious factor in Russian politics

Church, which enjoyed full freedom of cult. Berke Khan allowed evangelization of the Tatars, and Uzbeg Khan in 1313 forbid – under threat of the death penalty – insulting religion.47 Numerous privileges were also the Orthodox Church’s reward and encouragement for legitimizing the supremacy of the horde. Church hierarchs played the role of mediators between the khan and the princes, using their authority usually with the aim of mitigating conflicts and forestalling the threat of an anti-Mongol rebellion.48 Acting against the authority of the khan was treated by the Orthodox clergy as a transgression against the order of God, because God himself gave Rus to the reign of the “Tatar tsar”, for whose health and prosperity one should pray.49 The Mongol yoke, free of the stigma of paganism, was seen as a necessary suffering for redemption and took on an eschatological nature, which gave religious sanction to the obligation of obedience towards the ruler.50 Accepting such a point of view enabled the Russian church to identify to a certain extent with the Tatar tsar and to represent his interests towards Byzantium.51 Robert Landa draws attention to the significance of the anti-Western resentment which brought the Orthodox Church closer to the horde.52 The resolution of the dilemma of “the turban or the tiara” in favour of the former was made in Rus not without the influence of Balkan monks who, having left their homeland after the defeat at Kosovo Field,53 reinforced the strong dislike of Rome and Catholicism in the Slavic east.54 Being wealthy, taking advantage of its significant freedom of action and remaining in direct contact with the rulers (the significance of the diocese in Sarai), the Orthodox Church became an important political institution whose support had consequences for the balance of power among particular princes. One of the essential premises of the growth of Moscow’s position was the transfer of the metropolitan’s headquarters to this city (from Vladimir on the Klyazma) between 1326 and 1328. The presence of the highest rank of the spiritual hierarchy, with the title Metropolitan of Rus (not only of Moscow), raised the prestige of the entire duchy. Subsequent metropolitans more and more often took active part in politics, usually as arbitrators and truce-makers among particular princes or between rulers and their subjects: Metropolitan Cyril I, at the request of Prince Yaroslav, prevented a rebellion in Novgorod by threatening the rebels with excommunication, and Metropolitan Pyotr supported the Muscovian princes in their rivalry with Tver.55 The political role of the Orthodox Church (and Moscow) grew significantly during the times of Metropolitan Alexy,56 who was in large part responsible for the success of Ivan Kalita, distinguished in 1328 by the khan with the title of Prince of All Rus and a yarlik allowing him to collect tribute ( yasak) from the remaining princes.57 After the death of Kalita in 1340, Metropolitan Alexy assumed for 10 years the role of regent – guardian of his descendants – of his son Ivan II the Fair and grandson Dmitry Donskoy. The clergyman, in the interest of Moscow, did not hesitate to expel from the church his political rivals – Prince Mikhail of Tver and Prince Sviatoslav of Smolensk.58 In the middle of the fourteenth century, the church’s new approach to the supremacy of the horde became apparent. Together with the strengthening of

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 19 Moscow, distant Sarai lost its attractiveness in the eyes of the Orthodox hierarchs.59 The change in attitude of the highest dignitaries occurred to some degree under pressure from the monasteries, which during this time had begun to win the position of substantial political centres. Revival of monastic life in the fourteenth century was the consequence of the activities of monasteries such as that founded by Sergey Radonezhsky in 1337 (or 1339),60 the Trinity Lavra of St Sergey (Sergiyev Posad), the Moscow Chudov monastery (1366), the St Cyril–Belozhersk monastery (1397), the Solovetsky monastery (1436),61 the Simonov monastery in Moscow, or the monastery of Boris and Gleb (Borisoglebsky, near Rostov, 1363).62 The dynamically developing community63 undermined the metropolitan’s monopoly in the sphere of legitimizing the ruling power or resolving disputes between princes. In 1380 there came to a significant clash of authorities, when the monk Sergey Radonezhsky blessed Dmitry Donskoy before the Battle of Kulikovo, despite the burden of anathema declared on him by Metropolitan Cyprian. The victory of the Muscovite prince – cursed by the metropolitan, blessed by the monk – is accepted as a symbolic moment in the change of the church’s attitude, as it began more and more to clearly support Moscow in its efforts to unite the lands of Rus and cast off the Mongol yoke.64 While in the thirteenth century the church endeavoured to mitigate the hostile climate with regard to the khans, in the fourteenth century the Orthodox Church gradually assumed the role of an institution mobilizing Orthodox believers in defence of the lands of Rus. Evaluation of the significance of the church’s action to unite Rus divides historians. Some, such as James Billington,65 emphasize the importance of the metropolitan’s support of Moscow’s efforts and its delegitimization of the khans’ authority. Others, such as Larisa Andreeva, claim that the Orthodox Church, fearing the loss of its numerous privileges, did not play any significant role in the “gathering of lands”, and the image of the church as the main force of opposition in face of the horde is a creation of later political mythologization.66 It is must be remembered that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, changes occurred in the way the Mongol reign was perceived – paradoxically the Orthodox Church had a large part in the devaluation of the image of the horde’s rule. One of the instruments of creating the myth of the Mongol yoke was the canonization of the martyrs of faith from the times of the horde. Among those brought to the altar were Prince Roman of Ryazan (d. 1270), Prince Mikhail of Tver (d. 1318), Prince Basil (Vasilko) of Rostov (Vasilko Konstantinovich, d. 1238), Prince Mikhail Chernikhovsky and boyar Fyodor (d. in 1246).67 At the same time, the church emphasized its own merits, canonizing metropolitans Pyotr, Alexy and Cyprian – in this way it maintained a balance between the two institutions that were political symbols: secular authority and the church. During the Mongol reign, Orthodoxy began to notice more acutely the presence of a second monotheistic religion.68 From 1312 Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school was the official religion of the Golden Horde, which did not influence, however, the change in the khans’ policy of religious tolerance. Of far greater significance for the formation of tradition of relations between Orthodox princes and Muslim rulers was the existence of the Qasim khanate. In 1446 the khan’s

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The religious factor in Russian politics

son, Ulug Muhammad, joined the side of Muscovite ruler, Vasily II the Blind, from whom he received title to land on the shore of Oka, which in 1446 was called Kasimov. Rulers of the buffer kingdom, which existed for more than 200 years (until 1681) between north-eastern Rus and the khanates of Astrakhan and Kazan, supported Moscow in its struggles against the horde (among other things, they held up the troops of Said Ahmed Muhammad and took part in the Battle of the Ugra in 1480). In a later period they made up the core of the Russian army, conquering Astrakhan, Kazan and Siberia, and were active in diplomatic service.69 Some historians claim that thanks to their close contacts with the Muslim Kasimov khanate, “Russia became an empire, not a state programmed to assimilate nations and unify faith”.70 In the opinion of many scholars (e.g. Robert Landa, Larisa Andrieyeva, Nicholas Riasanovsky), it was during the reign of the Golden Horde, in fact, that there arose a model of religious policy, encouraging the assimilation of ethnicities. The Mongol rulers observed the principle of religious freedom and non-interference in the activity of religious institutions – besides Orthodox eparchies, there were also the Armenian and Latin bishoprics, while on the other hand it should be noted that tolerance and numerous privileges extended to church institutions by the Mongols did not concern the Jewish religious community.71 Moreover, in the horde, a specific system of confessional relations was formed, with secular authority in the dominant position, fulfilling the role of initiator, creator, administrator and arbitrator among particular religious institutions. Tolerance, enabling the coexistence of different religious confessions, did not mean, however, that the role of religion in identity building was reduced. The proximity of two monotheistic systems led to the association of Orthodoxy with Slavs and Islam with Tatars.72 The victorious princes in the struggles with the horde made Eastern Christianity and Byzantine tradition the main source of legitimization for their power and one of the key components of identity for the Grand Duchy of Moscow.

Byzantinization of Russian culture as a factor forming samoderzhaviye The debate as to which of the two traditions – “Genghiskhanization” or “Byzantinization” – had the deciding influence in shaping of the power system of Moscow Rus (fifteenth to seventeenth centuries),73 opens the next “great dispute” of Russian history. Researchers who attribute the key role to the Mongols demonstrate the adoption by Moscow of models characteristic of the horde, which was a centralized, hierarchized power apparatus, dominated by the khan – “heaven’s chosen one”, distinguished by the particular charisma that marks the members of the ruling dynasty.74 After the liberation of Rus from the Mongol yoke, the khan’s place was assumed by the “white tsar” – the Muscovite prince, who, in strengthening his position made use of the “blessings” of the horde’s sacralization of power. The princes’ use of the title White Tsar is invoked as an argument supporting the idea that Muscovite rulers considered themselves the heirs of the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 21 khans’ state – the White Horde from which they took over not only its solutions in the military, administrative and fiscal spheres, but also customs of the court, such as the prince’s selection of a co-ruler/advisor of lower social rank.75 One of the most important effects of Genghiskhanization was the undermining of the supremacy of the basileus of the universal Christian empire,76 which in the twelfth century had to yield his position in Rus to the khan. Over two hundred years of the Mongol yoke certainly had an influence on the form and functioning of the Moscow state, whose rulers had managed to unite the lands of Rus and ultimately gained independence from the horde near the end of the fifteenth century. Perhaps the final political product in the form of Russian samoderzhavie was in reality closer to the tradition personified by Genghis Khan than Constantine. However, the Muscovite rulers, creating the foundations of their power, consciously referred, above all, to the legacy of Byzantium – its customs, rituals, symbols or religious relations. Modelling itself on the eastern Roman Empire was the source of the Byzantinization of the Muscovite state observed in the fifteenth century. At the same time, a Russification of Byzantine tradition was also occurring, for as Boris Uspensky aptly noted, those holding power – both in the state and in the church – did not so much fathom the essence of Byzantine culture as they imitated forms and rituals which they often knew from secondary sources and which in the process of acculturation were often reinterpreted and endowed with new meaning. The Muscovite princes, who were glad to gain full sovereignty at a time when Constantinople fell under Turkish pressure, began to see themselves as the successors to the emperors and continuers of the tradition of the Christian empire. The Muscovite state, even if it derived, in its political essence, from the horde, had an identity that was Orthodox and Byzantine. The crown of the princes – and later of the tsars – the characteristic hat lined with fur and inlaid with gems, could be seen as an illustration of the Byzantinization of the Mongol elements present in the Russian tradition. According to historians, Ivan Kalita received this hat from Uzbeg Khan;77 however, according to common belief, it had been a gift from Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos for the Kievan prince, Vladimir II, son of the Byzantine Princess Anastasia and Prince Vsevolod. In this way the khan’s reward to his faithful vassal was included as the “hat of Monomachos” in the Russification of Byzantine tradition legitimizing the right of the Muscovite princes – heirs of Byzantine and Kievan Rus – to hold power over all of Rus (Russia) and to use the title Tsar.78 There are other examples of the Muscovite rulers’ conscious appeal to the legacy of the Christian empire: Ivan III, who ultimately defeated the Mongols in the standoff on the Ugra in 1480 had, eight years earlier, taken for his wife Zoe Palaiologina – the niece of the last basileus, Constantine XI, which justified the placing of the Byzantine two-headed eagle on the family coat-of-arms. The ruler also used the title Tsar, appealing to his kinship with Vladimir the Great, who had married Princess Anna Porphyrogeneta.79 The falsified genealogy strengthened the prestige of the Muscovite princess – descendents of Rurik, who according to fabricated texts from the sixteenth century was a relative of the fourteenth generation governing the lands from the Vistula of the mythological Prussia – the brother

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of the Emperor Augustus himself.80 The higher esteem for kinship with Roman emperors than for family ties to the khans speaks in favour of the thesis of the Byzantinization that strengthened the significance of Orthodoxy for Muscovite Rus (its identity, political system, culture), which had specific consequences for both secular authority and for the church itself. Adopting from Byzantine tradition the principle of parallelism of the power of God and the emperor, which became the premise for the sacralization of power in Russia, had important consequences for the Russian state. The coronation ceremony, during which the metropolitan used cross and chrism to bless the ruler, played a particular role. This act was quasi-sacramental and emphasized the grace of God with which the ruler was favoured. The monarch thus became “God’s regent” on earth, and his will was the source of law and justice, which he guarded in the name of Christ.81 This religious character distinguished the coronation of Ivan III,82 but of truly exceptional significance was the ceremony marking Ivan IV’s rise to power in 1547, when he was crowned Tsar of All Russia by Metropolitan Makary, which was later officially sanctioned by Constantinople. In 1562 Patriarch Joasaphus II confirmed the right of Ivan the Terrible to use the title Tsar.83 Under the influence of the teachings of Metropolitan Makary on the divine origins of the monarch’s power, Ivan IV believed that he had received directly from God the “sword of justice”, with the help of which he must establish order – also in the church, which received “only” the “sword of the spirit”.84 Granting secular authority in Russia the status of sacrum,85 gave obedience to the monarch a religious nature and possible rebellion against the autocrat the sanction of sin. This was reflected in, inter alia, legislation: in the sixteenth century subjects, before being administered the death penalty, were obligated to report any criticism made against the tsar.86 The process of sacralization of secular authority influenced the reduction of the church’s role as an institution legitimizing the monarchy – the metropolitan’s anointing only confirmed the special charisma of the ruler, of which dynastic succession eventually became a premise as well.87 Meanwhile, the secular “regents of Christ” all the more often and decisively interfered in matters of the church – also in questions of doctrine, which was against the principle of symphony. The precedent was set by Vasily II, who in 1441 ordered the imprisonment of Metropolitan Isidore of Kiev for ecclesiastical reasons: betraying the Orthodox faith by accepting the Florence Union in the name of the Orthodox Church. The ruler’s opposition, supported by some of the clergy in the face of Constantinople’s decision to renew its union with Rome, was a step on the way to independence for the Orthodox Church in Russia. There were also exceptionally brutal instances of the Russian rulers’ interference in church matters, such as the murder in 1568 of Metropolitan Philip on the orders of Ivan IV,88 but very sophisticated instances as well, as for example the legislative activity of Tsar Alexy, who ordered his subjects to observe religious fasts (1646), forbid monks from the Solovetsky monastery to possess alcohol (1647), and ordered the rooting out of all pagan amusements and superstitions (1648).89 The tsar gave vent to his ambitions of equalling the Byzantine emperor–codifiers in his Code of Law of 1649 (Sobornoye Ulozhenie/Соборное уложение), which included entries penalizing blasphemy and recognizing the tsar

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 23 as the main defender of Orthodox faith.90 During the reign of Alexy, the Byzantinization of Russian culture clearly gained in strength91 – among other things, the custom of the ruler’s endorsement of the choice of church hierarchs was consolidated,92 although one must admit that even earlier in the ceremony of ordaining the metropolitan (introduced in 1495), the role of the monarch was increased: he presented the newly selected highest member of the church hierarchy with a crosier, after which he led him to the metropolitan’s headquarters, where he officially introduced him to the remaining bishops.93 Gradually, secular power came to dominate over the church, and relations between these two structures evolved in the direction of caesaropapism.94 This process was not reversed even by the events during the so-called “Times of Troubles” (Smutnoye Vremya, 1584–1613).95 The “throne” and the “altar” were brought even closer at the end of Mongol rule on the initiative of the Muscovite princes who needed the support of the church to strengthen their position against the rulers of the remaining lands of Rus. The Orthodox Church, particularly the monasteries which had earlier, thanks to the goodwill of the khans, become very wealthy and influential institutions, assisted Moscow in extending its power over the entire state and became an important centre shaping the ideology of the Muscovite state in the sixteenth century.96 Religion and church institutions played a key role in the process of selfidentification of united Rus. At the same time as the endeavours to unify secular power were taking place, the church standardized the cult of saints. The period of regional fragmentation encouraged canonization on a local scale, as a result of which representatives of princely families of the other lands of Rus were usually raised to the altar. Regional pantheons of saints strengthened the tendency of decentralization, which is why they were initially questioned by Moscow. Only after consolidation of Moscow’s domination, the hierarchs began to create an all-Russian pantheon of saints, which symbolized the unity of the new state.97 While the princes of Rus gradually reduced their dependence on the khans, the church was still formally subordinate to the patriarch of Constantinople. Analogous to the deeds of the monarchs, who in their desire to strengthen their position appealed to ancient genealogy, the Orthodox church also began an attempt to raise its prestige, attributing to Saint Andrew (the so called “Rus Apostle”) the foundation of the first Christian communities on the northern shore of the Black Sea and even the foundation of Kiev – the “mother of all Russian towns”.98 The Orthodox Church’s emancipation was accelerated by events in western Europe. The one-page de facto announcement of autocephaly in 1448, the selection of Jonah by the bishops as metropolitan of All Rus without the sanction of Constantinople, came as a consequence of the rejection of the 1439 Florence Union by both the Russian clergy as well as secular authority. The act signed by Pope Eugene IV and Emperor John VIII, with the aim of ending the schism between the two Christian churches, was seen by Moscow as apostasy. In the conviction of its believers, the validity of the Orthodox Church’s position was confirmed by Providence itself – as a reward for remaining faithful to the true faith, Rus cast off the Mongol yoke, while heretical Constantinople fell to Muslims.

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The fall of the first-ranked Orthodox church made it easier for the Russian church to gain the status of a patriarchate. When it turned out that Rome was in no condition to organize an effective rescue of the former capital of the eastern empire, the hierarchs of the Eastern church began to put their hopes in the liberation of Constantinople through the policy of the Slavic tsars. They, in turn, mobilized by the strengthening of their western neighbours, which was reflected in the conclusion of the Union of Lublin in 1569, needed additional trump cards to raise their state’s position. The rulers perceived the establishment of a patriarchate in Russia as being in the interest of the power apparatus and were therefore active in achieving this goal. A success of the diplomatic “offensive” of Boris Godunov was the visit of Patriarch of Antioch Joachim to Moscow in 1586, who promised to support the matter of a Russian patriarchate, and the arrival of Patriarch Jeremias I of Constantinople in 1588. In January 1589 a ceremonial establishment of the patriarchate and the selection of Metropolitan Job as the patriarch of Moscow and All Russia took place. The act was confirmed two years later by a decision of the sobor of the remaining hierarchs of the universal Orthodox Church. The positive decision of the clergy did not completely satisfy Moscow, which was disappointed that the church was placed fifth instead of third in the hierarchy of patriarchates.99 However, regardless of the rank of the new patriarchate, its appearance evoked a reaction from Rome and neighbouring Catholic countries, the best example of which was the establishment of the Union of Brest on the lands of the Polish– Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1596, resulting in the foundation of the Greek Catholic Church. A result of the ecclesiastical advance of the Russian church was the appearance in the state (besides the autocratic tsar) of one more dignitary endowed with special charisma – the patriarch.100 The role of the highest hierarch grew during the Times of Troubles and then during the reign of Mikhail Romanov, who particularly at the beginning had been obedient towards his father – Patriarch Philaret Romanov. The clergyman, thanks to the endeavours of his crowned son, returned in 1619 from Polish captivity and was soon appointed to the highest clerical position and over the next 14 years (until 1633) held de facto power in Russia, using the title “great gosudar”.101 Philaret strove to maintain the tightest possible connection of secular and church authority, emphasizing at the same time the concurrence of the mission of the ROC as the unquestioned leader of the universal church, and of the Russian state as the universal Christian empire. In this way, the patriarch caused the strengthening of samoderzhavie,102 and thus the fortification of the “throne” at the cost of the “altar”. The establishment of the patriarchate did not safeguard the Russian church against interference from the monarchs. Constantinople’s marginalization in reality facilitated the rulers’ influence on the church, which lost its backing in the external centre of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.103 Moreover, the church was all the more weakened by internal disputes, especially those between the “white” and “black” clergy,104 but also the rivalry between particular monasteries. The question of the monasteries’ property ownership divided the clergy at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries into those who stressed the appropriateness of

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 25 accumulating goods – the so-called possessors (styazhateli) – and those who condemned the church’s growing riches – the “non-possessors” (nestyazhateli). Superimposed on these two opposing positions in the matter of property ownership were also two different visions of monasticism, represented by Nil Sorsky (whose supporters were called Nilists) and Joseph Volotsky (whose supporters were called Josephites). For the former, the ideal was the life of a hermit and severe ascetism as the only source of the mystic experience of divine energy (clear influences of hesychasm). The latter did not reject the monastic vow of poverty, but considered possession of material goods to be a condition sine qua non for fulfilling the church’s earthly mission – care of the sick and the impoverished, teaching and raising the faithful. The sobor’s resolution of this dispute in 1503 in favour of the “possessors” increased the church’s dependence on secular power.105 The increasing tendency towards caesaropapism was not unconnected to the different views of the Nilists and Josephites towards heresy. While older individuals concentrated around Nil did not demand active fighting against apostasy, the monks from Volokolamsky monastery considered heresy a great danger, which could be effectively fought only with the engagement of the state. Joseph, seeking to bring secular power closer, became an important propagator of political absolutism and the sacral nature of the monarchy – from the perspective of the monk, the tsar was the most important ally of the church and of Orthodox faith.106 This view found expression in the so-called Hundred Chapters Synod (Stoglavy Sobor) of 1551 which, among other things, emphasized the necessity of maintaining a tight bond between church and state (institutions exercising two God-given authorities) and imposed on the monarchs the duty of fighting paganism.107 The greatest blow for the Russian church was the raskol, provoked in the middle of the seventeenth century by the reforms of Patriarch Nikon. Guided by the desire to strengthen and increase the independence of the church, which was to be the unquestioned leader of the Eastern Christian oikumene, Nikon undertook its reorganization and standardization, in accordance with the Greek canon of liturgy of Old Rus that was in force. Among the most important changes were the introduction of crossing oneself with three fingers (instead of two), turning around the direction of processions (opposite to the sun’s apparent direction of movement), abolishment of the custom of bowing during the Easter mass of Saint Ephrem the Syrian, reduction of the number of prosphoras108 (from seven to five), the correction of the invocation to God in the Lord’s prayer and the written form of the name Jesus (from Isus to Iisus).109 The reform, which concerned above all forms and rituals, provoked deep resistance in society. The specific nature of the Russian raskol of 1655, in which part of the clergy and faithful, headed by archpriest Avvakum, rejected Nikon’s programme, is expressed in the conservative, anti-modernistic character of the schism. In contrast to the rebellion of Luther, Avvakum’s schismatics declared themselves not “in favour of” but “against” any change whatsoever. The modification of rituals which was to abolish the differences between the Old Rus and Greek liturgies (which resulted in part from isolation and the destruction of many books during the time of Mongol invasion) was seen as an assault on the truth of faith, protected in the forms and rites that were

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established by God and thus unchangeable. The support given to Nikon’s efforts by the remaining eastern patriarchs110 did not save the hierarch himself 111 and his reforms only halfway. The sobor deliberating in 1666 and 1667 (the so-called Great Council of Moscow) accepted most of the changes proposed by Nikon and declared anathema on all opponents of the reforms. Despite the threat of excommunication, some of the clergy rejected these decisions and, remaining true to the Hundred Chapters Synod and the old rites (from which the name Old Believers derives). As James Billington noted, the predominant part of Nikon’s corrections in the rite of the church were formally confirmed by the synod of 1667, however the essence of his programme – the attempt to establish a theocratic state, governed by a powerful and disciplined clergy – was definitively rejected.112 Instead of strengthening the church, the sobor of 1666–67 sealed its dependence on secular power, which in the following years took active part in executing the anathema in its persecution of the Old Believers. A specific mechanism was set into motion: the hierarchs in face of external threat or crisis in the church itself, anticipated help in the resolution of the dispute – in short, the intervention of secular authority. Support from the state apparatus of repression was an essential premise for the pacification of numerous groups of schismatics and sects.113 The church could still compensate for its reduced influence on policy with its strong financial position. Near the end of the seventeenth century, the Orthodox Church owned 16 per cent of all arable land (of which 61 per cent was situated in the centre of the state), inhabited by 1.4 million people (16 per cent of the population of Russia at the time).114 However, the disproportion between the economic and political potential of the church gradually dissolved also due to the leaders, who were interested in confiscating church property and limiting the privileges of the clergy. In 1530 Vasily III prohibited the sale of land to monasteries, and although at the Hundred Chapters Synod a certain compromise had been worked out regarding this question (the leaders could no longer undermine the financial inviolability of the church, but they were also not to grant new privileges or preferential treatment); in the Sobornoye Ulozhenie, a ban on church acquisition of feudal lands appeared again.115 Moreover, a state organ was called up – Monastirsky Prikaz,116 which oversaw the estates of the church and the people who worked and lived on them. The establishment of this secular office, which also had court jurisdiction with regards to the clergy, meant the significant thinning of the jurisdictional immunity of the clergy.117 The patriarchate became an institution strongly connected with the power apparatus, due to which it perceived reality all the more often through the prism of the Russian state, rather than the universal Orthodox Church. The religious factor manifested itself in the foreign policy of Muscovite Rus in times of war and encouraged territorial expansion. There is no doubt it affected Moscow’s contacts with the West, and with Rome in particular, which in turn influenced the process of self-identification of the Russia. In the case of international conflicts between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries in which, for various reasons, Russian rulers were involved, religion was used to dehumanize the enemy and mobilize people against him. In the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 27 fourteenth century Metropolitan Alexy convinced the faithful that struggling with Lithuania would fulfil their sacred duty to fight paganism.118 In the sixteenth century some of the clergy contributed to inspiring Ivan the Terrible’s conquest of the khans of Kazan (1550–51) and Astrakhan (1556).119 Making the expedition to the lands of the Tatars a quasi-crusade, the church facilitated the tsar’s achievement of a strategic goal – the liquidation of the “Genghiskhan” dynasties.120 The church carried out a missionary campaign on the conquered terrain. The clergyman Sylvester, supported by Metropolitan Makary, was the main ideologue of the Christianization of Muslim “trouble-makers”,121 which was accompanied from the beginning by the destruction of mosques, forced conversion to Orthodoxy, confiscation of property and – in many cases – by deportation of the local aristocracy. In this way, while the church perhaps did not gain crowds of loyal followers,122 but it did facilitate the secular authorities’ exchange of the khanate elite, from which it profited, receiving part of the confiscated land.123 In the following years, the church’s activity led to consolidation of the Russian state’s influence in the Volga region. These terrains were embraced by the church administration – in 1555 the eparchy in Kazan was established;124 moreover, this region was annexed to the Orthodox cultural space, promoting the cult of the icon of the Mother of God of Kazan.125 It is worth noting that the ROC’s attitude towards the Tatars contradicted the official image created by the ROC at that time as a Christian church that had lived for centuries in harmony with Islam. After annexing the Muslim khanates, the Orthodox hierarchs, similarly to the Catholic priests in South America, considered the Christianization of local peoples – also brutally – as the church’s duty. Orthodox clergy at the same time guarded the clean conscience of their own believers, supporting state punishment for conversion to Islam (by the decision of the Sobornoye Ulozhenie).126 It should, of course, be emphasized that the scale of forced conversions in Russia was decidedly smaller than in the New World, but this was the result of a lack of enthusiasm on the part of secular authorities, rather than a shortage of fervour on the side of the clergy. The state was often an agent that restrained the church’s “evangelizational” efforts, and after the initial phase of “destruction of mosques”, despite certain later episodes,127 there were no more serious conflicts based on religious confession in the Volga River region. The third “crusade” was carried out in 1612 by Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, who drove the Poles from the Kremlin, putting an end to the disgraceful Times of Troubles, when Russia was plundered by “Latinists, Jesuits and other agents of the Vatican”.128 The Polish–Russian war, including two years of the Polish army’s occupation of Moscow, strengthened the anti-West resentment and negative stereotypes already present of “Latinist heretics” and “hypocritical Jesuits” who wanted to bring about the doom of Orthodox Russia. Identifying the activity of the Catholic Church with the military expansion of the Polish– Lithuanian Commonwealth effectively displaced from collective memory the earlier, better moments between the two churches, when in the second half of the fifteenth century Moscow established diplomatic relations with Rome, and when the pope, in a letter to Prince Ivan III, allowed its envoys to “stay in Rome until the end of the world.”129 The anti-Catholic sentiment that was very much alive at

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the beginning of the seventeenth century was sensed by Metropolitan Filaret, who in 1619 ordered all Catholics to be re-christened. In turn, in the 1630s the secular authorities ceased recruiting Catholic mercenaries.130 In 1672 reading and selling of “Latin books” was banned,131 and the Monastirsky Prikaz recognized proselytizing as a crime of state, punishable by death.132 The opening of the first Catholic church in Moscow, in 1698,133 did not improve relations between the patriarchate and Rome. The participation of the Orthodox Church in the expansion of the Russian state had mainly two aspects – integration of territories inhabited by Orthodox believers and missions in the lands of non-Orthodox peoples. In the latter case, church institutions participated in building infrastructure, established schools, spread Russian culture, taught the language, and so on. Extending the church administration onto the conquered territories was seen as a strengthening of the influence of the Russian state, for which reason missionaries were regular participants in expeditions to the Far East.134 This mechanism was also visible in Russian–Lithuanian relations, the axis of which had been for 200 years the rivalry over south-western Rus and also disputes in the sphere of jurisdiction of particular churches. In 1317, after the headquarters of the metropolitans of Rus were moved from Kiev to Vladimir on the Klyazma, Teofil, residing in Navahrudak, was appointed Metropolitan of Lithuania.135 Despite the efforts of the Moscow hierarchs, the metropolis of Rus had by the end of the fourteenth century already disintegrated into the Galician,136 Kievan–Lithuanian and Vladimir–Muscovite metropoles. Religious closeness was one of the factors that facilitated the shift of the Russian sphere of influence towards the west. Despite the establishment in 1458137 in Kiev of a separate metropolis subordinated to Constantinople, the Russian church endeavoured to extend its jurisdiction onto this territory, which played into Moscow’s aspiration to subordinate to itself the south-western lands of Rus. Nikon’s reforms, in unifying the liturgy and some customs, laid the groundwork for taking over the structures of the Kievan church. In 1658, four years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, on the authority of which the tsars annexed Zaporozhia, Patriarch Parthenius of Constantinople, prompted by the persuasion and reward paid by the Russian hierarchs, ordained the Muscovite metropolitan of Kiev. The sobor convened in 1685 by Ukrainian clergy sympathetic to Russia decided to abandon Constantinople and come under the auspices of the patriarchate of All Russia, which ultimately took over the Kievan metropolis in 1686,138 although Constantinople did not officially acknowledge this act.139 One of the arguments that convinced the Ukrainian clergy, and also a significant fraction of the people, to renounce obedience to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and become subjects of the Russian tsar was the Orthodox faith that Kiev and Moscow had in common.140 The fact of religious closeness also convinced the elite of other Orthodox states (particularly in the face of the Turkish threat) to seek closer relations with Russia: Metropolitan Gideon turned to the tsar in 1656 with a request that care be extended to Moldavia and in 1658 the Georgian prince Teymuraz I was interested in concluding an alliance of Orthodox rulers.141

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 29 Religion was one of the most important factors shaping the identity of the Russian state following its liberation from the horde. The growing Muscovite Rus absorbed Muslim khanates to the east, contended with the expansion of its Catholic neighbours to the west, and after the Ferrara–Florence Union, its contacts with Constantinople weakened. In these circumstances, Russia became antiGreek, anti-West and increasingly imperialistic. Belonging to Christianity of the Greek rite began to play a determinant role in “Russianness”. “Orthodoxy” was more and more often equated with the “Russian state”, a manifestation of which was the introduction of the requirement that candidates to the throne of Moscow must be of the Orthodox faith142 and capital punishment for individuals accused of proselytism, which was considered to be action harmful to the “Holy Rus”. After the Muslim population of the annexed khanates numbering two-and-ahalf million143 came under the rule of the tsars, there was a stronger the tendency to define nationality in terms of religious divisions: “Orthodox–Russian” and “Muslim–Tatar”. The Orthodox clergy helped spread this dichotomy to a large degree: the first metropolitan of Kazan, Hermogen, ordered a census in 1593, dividing the population into three groups: Orthodox, Muslims and pagans. The census decided the question of identity according to religious criteria and by the command of the metropolitan, christened Tatars were resettled in separate villages.144 Even deeper lines of division were apparent with relations to Russia Christian neighbours. After the Times of Troubles, when in the feelings of the Orthodox people and clergy, the presence of a Catholic army shamed Moscow, in the Kremlin cathedrals sacrilegious masses were conducted in the Latin rite and “Latinists” became the personification of evil in Russia. This negative image worsened still more after the conclusion of the Union of Brest. The ROC and secular authorities took upon themselves the task of protecting their believers (subjects) from the sin of contact with heretics. Contacts with “Latinists” were considered inadvisable. It was stressed that an Orthodox believer could not be a servant of a non-Orthodox person and even such attributes of Western culture as the Latin language and philosophy were condemned.145 Besides anti-Western sentiments, from the middle of the fifteenth century, an anti-Greek resentment appeared among Russian clergy, mainly due to the Ferrara–Florence Union. From the perspective of the Russian church, Greeks who made an agreement with Rome had committed treason, were guilty of the sin of heresy and by that token had lost their legitimacy as the leaders of the universal church, the fate of which was henceforth entrusted to the Slavs. It was seen as no coincidence that Orthodox Slavic rulers ultimately defeated the Muslim khans, while Greek Constantinople fell under the Turkish onslaught. Russia – ruled by the tsars, appealing to kinship with Emperor Augustus, and supported from the end of the sixteenth century by the authority of the patriarchs – was predestined to continue the idea of a Christian empire guided by an emperor (tsar) and patriarch, who were joined in harmony. The idea of Russian rulers’ special mission entrusted to them by Providence was first proclaimed in the fifteenth century by a

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Serbian monk from Mount Athos, Pakhomy Logofet, who foresaw the rule of the Russian dynasty in the Byzantine capital and who called Moscow the “new city of Constantinople”.146 More than half a century later Maximos the Greek zealously encouraged Vasily III to rescue Constantinople from the hands of the Turks and ascend to the throne of the Byzantine basileus.147 While the actual defeat of the Turks seemed at the time unfeasible, the indication of a successor, a continuer of the Christian empire, did not entail any problems. At the end of the sixteenth century, Russia was the largest and strongest state ruled by Orthodox monarchs and in which there existed a patriarchate. The concept of translatio imperii (transfer of rule), derived from Byzantine tradition, in which it had earlier served Constantinople when it took over the capital splendour of Rome, created an ideological basis for legitimizing subsequent “embodiments” of the empire. In Russia, the concept of translatio imperii found its reflection in Poviest’ o Belom Klobuke (Legend of the White Cowl) according to which the titular white klobuk – the head covering of Pope Sylvester I – was transferred by Providence to Constantinople (the “New Rome”) and from there to the land of Russia. The appearance in the east of the white klobuk – the symbol of a bishop’s authority,148 which since the times of Metropolitan Makary had adorned the head of each representative of the highest office of the hierarchy of All Russia – confirmed the status of the Russian church as the repository of Christian truth. The clergy’s conviction as to the Russian church’s assumption of the mission and glory of Rome by the will of God was manifested, for example, upon the establishment of the patriarchate of Moscow and All Russia, when the hierarchs demanded third position in the Christian pentarchy, after Byzantium and Alexandria, and before Antioch and Jerusalem, although the latter two were historically older than the Russian church. Here the clergy appealed precisely to the “inheritance” of the rank of “bishopric of Peter”.149 Metropolitan Zosima the Bearded wrote of the “New Rome” in Moscow in 1492 in Izlozhenie Paskhalii, but it was the letters of the monk Philotheus to Prince Vasily III and his son Ivan (the Terrible) that achieved greatest publicity; in them the hegumen presented a vision of the Russian state – the third and final Rome in the history of salvation, which after the downfall of the two first embodiments of the empire, Rome and Constantinople, must assume the burden of keeping the Christian faith. Many books and dissertations have been dedicated to the interpretation of this idea – some researchers claim that the “Third Rome”150 was a reaction to the Ferrara–Florence Union, and that Philoteus was concerned mainly with the succession of churches, not of states.151 Others draw attention to the context of events in sixteenth-century Rus: perhaps the author saw in a universal Christian empire a strength capable of attaining the lasting unification of the lands of Rus under Moscow’s authority;152 maybe in showing the close connection between the mission of the church and the secular power, Philotheus wanted to win over the monarchs in the fight against heretics and to impede plans of confiscating monastery landholdings.153 However, regardless of his intentions, his idea became a source of religious–national idealism which influenced the identity of the Russian state. This eschatological, theocratic concept had a distinctly anti-Greek character which

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 31 influenced the weakening of the Russian church’s contacts with the Hellenic Orthodox community and the exhibition of native Orthodox tradition, unfortunately at the cost of awareness of belonging to a universal church.154 In the geopolitical sphere, recognizing Russia as the Third Rome obliged the rulers to realize the ideal of a universal Christian empire, expanding its influence for the glory of God. The “chosen people” living in “Holy Rus” were destined for great things – great suffering, deification and salvation of humanity. Boris Uspensky defined the idea of the Third Rome as a theocratic eschatology in which “Moscow is the last Orthodox empire, and the tasks of the Russian tsar take on a messianistic nature”. Russia, as the last bastion of Orthodoxy, is contrasted with the rest of the world and this determines its negative attitude to external cultural influences.155 The concept of the Third Rome thus contains all the key components of the identity of sixteenth-century Russia: Orthodox, anti-West, anti-Greek and imperial (Byzantine) elements. The idea of the monk Philoteus reflected the ambitions of both the tsars and the patriarchs of the Russian state in the sixteenth century, in which religion fulfilled functions of identity, legitimization, mobilization and integration.

Instrumentalization of religious issues by secular authority in the Russian empire In the eighteenth century, the growing predominance of secular authority over the Orthodox Church was increasingly used by rulers. Peter I subjected the state and his subjects to modernization inspired by Western models. Reforms did not bypass the church either, which according to the plan of the ambitious ruler, was supposed to become – like Protestant churches – a modern church institution in service of the country. After the death of patriarch Adrian in 1700, Peter took advantage of his rights and delayed the calling of the sobor, which would choose a new head of the church. A year later, the monarch restored the Monastirsky Prikaz156 with Metropolitan Stefan Yavorsky at the head. However, as a result of conflict, Yavorksy was replaced in the role of the tsar’s advisor for church affairs by the rector of the Kiev–Mohyla Academy – bishop Feofan (Theophan) Prokopovich – the initiator of later transformations of the church. In 1711 the senate was established and the church was subordinated to it. This new organ had influence on the nomination of archimandrites and hegumens, and had certain court jurisdiction with regard to the clergy.157 The greatest changes were introduced by the Spiritual Regulation (Dukhovny Reglament)158 published in the beginning of 1721: in place of the patriarchate, the Spiritual Collegium, later transformed into the Holy Synod (the Most Holy Synod), was called into being; a condition set for clergymen who aspired to membership in the synod was the taking an oath of loyalty to the monarch. In 1722 the office of the oberprocurator was established, intended for secular individuals, mainly higher officers, who were obliged to inform the ruler about the course of sessions of the synod, which had assumed supervision of church properties after the liquidation of the Monastirsky Prikaz. The acceptance of these steps from the church’s viewpoint was determined by the patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremias III, who in 1723 recognized the replacement

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of the patriarchate with the Holy Synod as being canonically correct.159 Peter I, in turn, described by some historians as a deeply believing anti-cleric,160 sealed the work of subordinating the “altar” to the “throne” by giving himself, in the autumn of 1721, the title Emperor. The record of this act was clear – while the tsar became emperor, the patriarchate was replaced by the collegiate synod – the church’s degradation was accompanied by the elevation of the prestige of secular authority. Peter I’s reforms were deep: the first large-scale nationalization of church properties was carried out and from then on all income generated by monasteries went to the State Treasury;161 a regiment commanded by the head of the Monastirsky Prikaz was called up to control the finances of monasteries; monks were forbidden to change monasteries; moreover, the monarch himself decided on the ritual head-shaving of monks; monasteries were obligated to run hospitals and shelters; the Spiritual Regulation freed priests from the seal of confession in the case of “sins of bad thoughts” directed against the ruler.162 The course of limiting church privileges was maintained by the successors of Peter the Great: Catherine I, in 1726, reorganized the synod and reduced the role of the clergy in it,163 Elizabeth, in 1757, transferred management of church properties to officers,164 and Catherine the Great dotted the “i” in the matter of the subordination of Orthodoxy. In 1764 the empress confiscated church properties,165 gave the clergy yearly salaries and granted the secular courts jurisdiction over deacons.166 Her grandson, Alexander I, limited the rights of the synod, the members of which since 1802 could contact the government offices only through the agency of the oberprocurator,167 who was subordinated (from 1803) directly to the tsar.168 Secular authority not only changed the structure of the church and took over its properties, but also created a de facto state system of clergy education. In the years 1817–24 this role was performed by the Ministry of Religion and Education, directed by the former oberprocurator Alexander Golitsin. Monarchs, through the agency of the ministry, founded schools, established the number of seminarians,169 and through the synod, dominated by secular individuals, named the rectors of religious seminaries (since 1884).170 The cadre of priests educated at the expense of the state was presented with concrete tasks: the church was expected to legitimize the regime, raise the subjects in the spirit of unlimited obedience towards the ruler, maintain the ethos of service and form patriotic attitudes, bring about the unification (Russification) of the expanding empire through missionary work, mobilize the people to defend the homeland, ease conflicts and mediate between believers and the ruler in the case of rebellions,171 and finally to fulfil various social functions such as running hospitals, shelters and parish schools. A mechanism for effective subordination and control of religious institutions was created: the state monitored the system of educating clergy, and members of the clergy – maintained by and for the service of the state – became de facto imperial civil servants – this concerned not only Orthodoxy, but also all other major religions. The changes in the religious map of Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were influenced by its expansion and the new religious policy of the monarchs.172 In 1702 Peter I issued a toleration ukaz173 (similar ukazes were issued by Catherine II) encouraging foreigners from the west to settle in Russia (1762)

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 33 and guaranteeing newcomers religious freedom (1787). The promise of free choice of religious rites was not unconditional, however, non-Orthodox clergy had to take an oath of loyalty to the empress.174 Church institutions could thus fulfil – without any greater obstacles – their functions as a repository of faith, as long as they were loyal and useful. The opening of Russia to the world – particularly Europe – begun by Peter the Great, the war with Sweden, the conquest of Courland and the Duchy of Livonia, then the partition of Poland and annexation of Finland influenced the growth in number of Protestants, Catholics and Jews, while the expansion into the heart of Asia in turn increased the Buddhist and Muslim populations of the empire. After years of marginalization of Muslims – treated as second-class subjects, who were every so often the subject of attacks by the Orthodox Church175 – Catherine II decided to “restore” them to society and make them useful for the state. First, Muslim merchants were allowed to trade over the entire territory of the empire (1763), and then with the tolerance ukaz of 1773, the Orthodox Church was forbidden to interfere in matters of Islamic communities,176 to which part of the earlier confiscated properties were returned. Also, permission was given for communities of at least 300 (male) Muslims to build mosques177 and schools, and mullahs began to receive regular salaries from the State Treasury.178 In pulling the Tatars out of their “religious margin” of sorts, Catherine II was guided by pragmatism. In order to take advantage of the Muslim factor, at least to assimilate the conquered territories inhabited mainly by Muslim believers, she needed institutions capable of realizing the monarch’s intentions. The muftiates acted as a means of control over the scattered Muslim communities. The first was created in 1788 in Ufa, from where it was moved to Orenburg (for Siberia); the second in Bakhchisaray in 1831 (for Crimea); the third in Baku in 1872 (for Muslims of the Caucasus region). Members of the muftiates were named by the Minister of Internal Affairs and these institutions were also subordinate to him. The muftiates, as in the case of the Orthodox bishoprics and monasteries, were maintained by the state, which put certain obligations on them, such as running schools and hospitals.179 Moreover, the muftiates were opinion-making institutions, which upheld the loyalty of Muslims towards the emperor and undertook mediation between local communities and representatives of the authorities. As with Orthodoxy, in the case of Islam the state became the main creator of the education system, also in the sphere of religion. Already in 1716, at the order of Peter the Great, the Koran was translated into Russian,180 and at the end of the eighteenth century Tatar schools began to appear in Kazan. In 1870 mandatory lessons in the Russian language were introduced; four years later supervision of education in the Volga–Ural region was taken over from the Orenburg muftiate by the Ministry of Education.181 Cooperation with loyal muftiates turned out to be so fruitful that the secular authority decided to recognize the jurisdiction of sharia courts182 in select matters, and importantly – in 1886 Muslims were made equal under the law with the rest of the population,183 and a year later the freedom of cult granted earlier was confirmed again for Muslims. When mentioning the subsequent decisions of Russian rulers aimed at reducing the political “handicap” of Muslims, one should remember the serious limitations

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still existing in those times. The main beneficiaries of change were the Tatars, Bashkirs and Azeris. It was they, who from 1864 had their own representatives in zemstvos (local governments) and were equalized before the law in 1886. In the northern Caucasus, where since 1825 a gazavat (holy war) had been going on against the Slavic invaders, Muslims were perceived as disloyal, intractable and rebellious, in connection with which until 1887 they did not have the right to serve in the Russian army.184 Thus the only chance Muslims of the Caucasus had for social advancement remained inaccessible. Central Asia, in turn, was treated as a strategic buffer separating Russia from the British Empire. Turkistan was directly subordinated to the Governor General, and the nature of development of this region was largely determined by the army and its needs. The military did not consider the introduction of local government or creation of a muftiate for Muslims of this region a requirement for ensuring the security of the Russian state.185 Realization of the main assumptions of the religious policy of Russian emperors – the nationalization of religious institutions – in the case of Buddhism required creating a centralized structure and weakening the influence of Buddhist centres outside Russia’s borders – mainly in Tibet, Mongolia and China – among the Buryats and Kalmyks.186 In 1728 instructions were issued, requiring the authorities of Irkutsk to hold back the influx of lamas from neighbouring countries; moreover, steps were undertaken to form a sangha that would be loyal and dependent on the state apparatus. In 1741 Empress Elizabeth gave a legal and institutional framework to the religious faith of the Buryats – state positions were created for 150 lamas.187 In 1853 the Senate sanctioned the founding of an office for lamaic clergy of eastern Siberia, established a limit on the number of clergy (285) and monasteries – datsans (34).188 The head of the hierarchy – Pandido-Hambo Lama – was confirmed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, and control over the activity of monasteries, in turn, was overseen by the head of the Office of Foreign (non-Orthodox) Religions, and approval of the Governor General was required for building new temples.189 The state played an active role in the creation of the sangha. The secular authorities purposely strengthened local lamas who, like Orthodox clergy and mullahs during the time of Catherine II, began to receive financial support from Petersburg and became less and less connected with the monasteries of Mongolia and Tibet. A similar process of institutionalization of Buddhist communities took place in Kalmykia. In the nineteenth century under the influence of the policy of the Russian state, a sangha was formed there, which since 1847 was led by a lama appointed by the senate. Clergymen, of whom there could be no more than 1530, received salaries and could only attend to matters of cult. The relations between Petersburg and other Christian faiths were far more complicated, mostly because Catholicism and Protestantism were in direct competition with the main ideological institution of the state, the Orthodox Church in the period of the synod. Besides this, the clergy of both religions were strongly associated with centres abroad. Russian emperors were inclined to tolerate the activities of the Catholic Church, under the condition of complete political loyalty. Nine years after the opening of

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 35 the church of Peter and Paul, the Poselsky Prikaz announced the monarch’s approval of the Catholic faith.190 Rulers consistently endeavoured to subordinate the structures of the Catholic Church on Russian territory – for example, Catherine II established a bishopric, Mogilev, in 1773 without consulting Rome, and then later named its leader, Stanislav Bogush-Sestrentsevich, the head of all Catholics living in her empire.191 “Latin” clergy was required to take an oath of loyalty to the Russian sovereign, was subject to observation by state organs, had limited freedom to travel in the country, and their sermons were censored. The formation of relations between the Catholic Church and the Russian state, particularly the appearance of the stereotype of “treacherous Latinists” was influenced by the activity of Jesuits, who were expelled several times by the Orthodox autocrats – in 1700 the monks opened their first school on Russian land, but 19 years later, Peter I ordered them to leave Russia. Alexander I allowed the Jesuits to open centres in Siberia (1809), Crimea (1811)192 and Polotsk (1812), but in 1815 the monks were once again forced to leave. Despite different sorts of tensions, Petersburg and Rome signed a concordat in 1847, which was broken in 1865 by Russia and renewed in 1894.193 The pope decided to normalize relations with rulers of the Eurasian empire despite the noncanonical (from Rome’s point of view) liquidation of the Uniate Church. Two years after it was subordinated to the oberprocurator, the Greek Catholic Church was then integrated, by an ukaz of Nicholas I, into the Moscow patriarchate, which thus gained one and a half million new believers. The situation of the Uniate believers improved somewhat only after 1905, when they were permitted to celebrate the Catholic mass in the Greek rite, and four years later a Uniate church was opened in Petersburg.194 Although the Protestant communities have been present on Russian lands since the mid-sixteenth century,195 from the perspective of the development of this branch of Christianity in Russia, the policy of Peter I was of key significance. The ruler ordered the Russian translation of the catechisms of Lutherans and Calvinists (and also Catholics) and took steps with the aim of facilitating marriage between Orthodox believers and Protestants – for example, he allowed mixed marriage without requiring the Protestants to convert to Orthodoxy, and he successfully intervened so that the patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremiah II, would abolish the condition of re-christening Protestants who wanted to convert to Orthodoxy.196 In 1711 Peter the Great personally appointed Pastor Bertold Vegetsya197 to the office of superintendent of Lutherans in Russia. Less than 100 years later, in 1810, the office of superintendent was established as the central organ for matters of all nonOrthodox Christian faiths, and in 1819 Alexander I gave the highest of the Evangelical–Lutheran Church hierarchs the title Bishop. The legal basis of this institution’s functioning was the charter issued by Nicholas I in 1832, which established the creation of consistorial districts which were led by consistories subordinate to the General Commissariat. Secular individuals and clergymen who were members of the highest organ – the General Consistory, convened twice a year for proceedings in Petersburg.198 The Protestant Church, just as other religious institutions, was under the control of the Russian state.

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Judaism benefited the least from the greater openness and new religious policy of the Russian rulers. The tolerance ukaz of Peter I did not concern Jews. Catherine I ordered them to be removed from Russia, setting the requirement of conversion to Orthodoxy as a condition for remaining. A similar ukaz was issued by Empress Elizabeth.199 It was only the rule of Catherine II that brought improvement to the situation of the Jewish population. She allowed them to create their own local governments (kahals), granted limited religious freedom and the right to register as townsmen.200 In accordance with the decision of 1791, Jews could enjoy these freedoms only in the so-called Pale of Settlement, present-day Belarus and parts of present-day Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine.201 In the process of assimilation of Jewish believers, the proverbial “carrot” in the form of privileges and favourable norms (e.g. the 1817 ban on accusing Jews of ritual murder202), was soon replaced with a “stick” – in 1827 Nicholas I decreed the conscription of Jewish recruits,203 in 1844 Jews were taxed for wearing traditional clothing, and in that same year the kahals were abolished. In 1882 Jews were banned from settling in villages and their access to institutions of higher education was limited, while eight years later the Jewish minority was denied the right to vote or run in elections to the city council (Duma) – this decision was accompanied by a wave of pogroms which occurred across Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century.204 From the time of Peter the Great secular authority dominated religious relations. Rulers founded religious institutions, financed the clergy, decided on the filling of church positions, organized the system of religious education, and so on. As a result, in the nineteenth century the majority of religious institutions in the Russian Empire were dependent on the state. Territorial expansion brought with it a growth in the number of non-Orthodox subjects and the transformation of the relatively uniform, in terms of religion, Orthodox Rus into multiethnic and multiconfessional Russia. Subsequent rulers thus faced the challenge of the appropriate formation of religious relations, which would allow them to maintain the unity of the Russian Empire and avoid religious conflicts. Orthodox, Muslims, Buddhists, Catholics Protestants and Jews were forced to coexist peacefully in the face of the might of the Russian state. The strength and unquestioned superiority of secular authority over all religious institutions was to be a guarantee of stabilization. The state demanded from representatives of all religions loyalty and involvement on behalf of the state. Communities that did not cooperate with the authorities were liquidated or pushed to the margins. Churches with the status of state institutions, and clergy as a class of quasi-civil servants led to the formation of religious identity as a certain sub-category in the framework of an overriding state identity, which emphasized the belonging to a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, Russian-speaking empire of Orthodox samoderzhavets (autocrats). In this religious system, the vassalized Orthodox Church was a key state institution, raising subjects in the spirit of obedience and patriotism, legitimizing the authority of the tsars and providing the empire with an integrating idea. Rulers took care to ensure the superiority of the Orthodox Church under their control over all other churches – for example, all religious communities, even after the issuing of edicts guaranteeing religious freedom, still needed the approval of the local Orthodox clergyman to establish a

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 37 new temple and the ban on building churches, mosques and synagogues near an Orthodox church was still in force.205 The state was engaged in the missionary work of the Orthodox Church, suggesting privileges and freedoms for believers of other faiths who decided to convert to Orthodoxy. With the decision of Peter I (from 1720), a convert was entitled to a tax reduction and exemption from military service for three years from the moment of christening.206 Empress Elizabeth ordered that the newly christened be given a one-time award and that any obligations – whether tax or related to military service – weighing on them were to be transferred to the remaining members of the non-Orthodox religious community to which the newly christened person had belonged. Catherine II, in turn, promised an award of three roubles and something significantly more valuable – freedom – for Turks and Tatars who decided on conversion. A symbol of the close cooperation between the state and church was the activity of the Commission for the Newly Christened created in 1731 in Sviazhesk in the Kazan guberniya, which (with the great support of the tsars) carried out a Christianization campaign in the Volga region.207 Besides this, Orthodox clergy actively participated in the Russification of other ethnicities by establishing schools and propagating the Russian language everywhere where Orthodox churches were built – on the Caspian Sea, in Siberia or Kamchatka. It may seem strange that the authority, treating the missionary activity of the church as an element of its own policy, decided (in 1773) to forbid the synod to interfere in matters of Tatar Muslim communities. However this was due to the fact that loyal Tatars turned out to be exceptionally useful in assimilating Muslims from Central Asia. Catherine II had (in 1786) allowed the construction of a network of mosques and caravanserais along the trade routes on the Bashkir and Kazakh steppes, so that Tatars could exert Russian influence on the population of these territories.208 After years of repression, Russian rulers in the eighteenth century tried to draw schismatics and sectarians out of the “religious grey area”. Peter I took an important step when, in 1716, he permitted Old Believers to settle in cities under the condition that they pay double taxes. Despite this, publically professing their faith was still an illegal act and holding mass was punishable by exile to forced labour camps. Old Believers could not perform any public functions or serve as witnesses in trials of Orthodox believers.209 The position of “religious dissenters” improved during the reign of Catherine II, who issued a toleration ukaz with regard to raskolniks (1764), allowed them to act as witnesses (1769), agreed to the establishment of a cemetery for Old Believers in Moscow (1771), abolished the double taxation introduced by Peter I (1782) and admitted schismatics to serve in certain public offices (1785).210 From 1883 raskolniks enjoyed freedom to travel and the right to trade and own land, but the ban on publically conducting their rites was still in force. Only with the ukaz of 1906 were Old Believers made equal to foreigners – non-Orthodox people – before the law.211 The process, in which secular authority had taken control of religious institutions and managed to harness religion for the realization of its own policy, led to a paradoxical situation: churches and clergy (particularly Orthodox) gradually lost

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regard in the eyes of society, even though the rulers did not resign from religious legitimization of their power. In Russia there occurred a specific “declericalization” of the public space,212 perhaps even a sort of “desacralization” of the church itself, which nevertheless did not entail a desacralization of power. In the opinion of Boris Uspensky, Peter I’s liquidation of the patriarchate made the monarch the head of the Orthodox Church in the eyes of subjects, and the phenomenon of sacralization of power gained in strength during the eighteenth century. Uspensky quotes more than a dozen examples confirming the specific status of the Russian monarchs after 1721: Catherine II called herself the “head of the church” “only” in private correspondence with European monarchs,213 while Tsar Paul, during his coronation, took this title officially and administered the holy communion to himself,214 and Nicholas II, in turn, presented the synod with his candidacy for the position of patriarch in case of the restoration of the patriarchate. Treatment of the ruler as the principal of the church is confirmed by many customs: the monarch appointed bishops,215 as a sign of respect clergymen would kiss the tsar’s hand, in the church there were so-called festive days celebrated in connection with birthdays, anniversaries, and so on of members of the ruling dynasty,216 and from the time of Peter the Great, clergymen were obliged to take an oath of loyalty to the emperor in the name of God.217 Together with the progression of nationalization of religious institutions, their alienation from society deepened, which was particularly evident in the case of the Orthodox Church. A distance similar to that between the rulers and their subjects arose between the faithful and the church that legitimized the tsars’ power. The authority of the church weakened, but religious ferment was still present in society.218 A reflection of this state of affairs was a dualism, characteristic of religious life in Russia during the modern era: on one side were the official church institutions – supported by the state and keeping watch on behalf of samoderzhavie, and on the other side, non-institutionalized communities negating the existing order, such as sects, discussion groups, Masonic lodges and hermitages. The dichotomy of religious life influenced the differentiation of religiously inspired ideas, which either legitimized the absolute power of the tsars, or quite the opposite – called for change. Postulates of spiritual renewal, seeking mystic experience or a return to the sources of Christianity appeared in the works of Vladimir Solovyov, Lev Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoyevsky and many other thinkers. Religious philosophy played a significant and an unusual role in shaping the worldview of Russian society in the nineteenth century. However, taking into consideration the tsars’ policy, there were three significant trends referring to religious motifs: strengthening of samoderzhavie, the debate on the identity of the Russian state and presentation of a vision of a new world order. The first trend is represented by two triads: “God, state, samoderzhavets”219 of Teofan Prokopovich and “Pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost”220 (“Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality”) of Sergey Uvarov, which emphasize the sacral nature of the tsars’ power and the indivisible, sacred union between the state and the church, Russianness and Eastern Christianity. Religion was used to legitimize an increasingly anachronous Russian absolutism, and was the source of ideology for

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 39 a multi-national and multi-confessional empire. In the state of the Russian tsars, Orthodoxy was to fulfil the sort of role that Christianity did in the Byzantine Empire. This relationship towards the church was not foreign to opponents of samoderzhavie either – in the plans of one of the leaders of the Decembrists, Pavel Pestel, the Orthodox Church was to become an organ of government administration, integrating the state.221 Slavophiles, contending with Occidentalism over the history and future of Russia, recognized Orthodoxy as a determining factor of Russian identity. Accepting Christianity in the Greek rite weakened the influence of the highly rationalized Roman legal tradition in Russia, thanks to which the Orthodox Church – as it perceived itself – managed to guard the truth of faith and keep the people of Rus in a state of moral purity. To this notion of the role of the church, Eurasians eagerly added the thesis of what basically amounts to the positive influence of the Mongol invasion, which protected Rus from Roman expansion. Slavophiles and Eurasians agreed that Orthodoxy is a living religion, which the Russian people keep in their hearts,222 and as such is predestined to great things – to finding a different path of development than that proposed by the demoralized West. In their view, Russia was a separate civilization which was entrusted with a historic mission of creating an earthly empire – a Slavic one, according to the Slavophiles, and a Slavic–Turanian one, according to the Eurasians. In this way, Russian imperialism acquired in the nineteenth century two messianic ideas – the pan-Slavism of Nikolai Danilevsky and the Byzantinism (Eurasianism) of Konstantin Leontiev. Leontiev believed that annexing other Orthodox states to Russia would be a valuable impulse strengthening “Russian Byzantinism” and advocated the idea of a Slavic–Asiatic civilization, founded on two pillars: Orthodoxy and samoderzhavie.223 Danilevsky considered the most important goal to be the creation of a powerful state capable of expansion, that in the future would be crowned with the capture of Constantinople – the capital of a new, Slavic empire.224 Danilevsky explained the presence of non-Slavic people in the future Slavic empire, in the case of Romanians and Greeks, by their professing the Orthodox faith and, in the case of Hungarians and Finns, simply by their location on a territory of natural Slavic expansion. Danilevsky very strongly associated Slavicness with Orthodoxy, writing that “the Russian nation and the majority of other Slavic peoples have been given such a fate by history, that they should, along with Greeks, become the main guardians of living religious truth – Orthodoxy – and in this way continue the great work which earlier had been the lot of Israel and Byzantium: being the chosen people”.225 For this reason, he excluded Poles from the Slavic community, or at most referred to them as the “vile Slavs”, remarking that “the highly degenerative influence of Latinism on the Polish national character proves that religious doctrine is not something superficial”.226 In the face of the concepts attributing an exclusively Orthodox identity to the Russian Empire, Russia’s Muslim elite in the process of self-identification could choose mainly between pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism or Jadidism. The first idea227 was propagated by the Ottoman sultans, who were counting on the re-creation of

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the ummah and gaining the Muslims who lived under the rule of the “infidels”.228 The second concept assumed the existence of a Turkish nation – a community of language and faith, which should be joined under one state – Great Turkistan.229 However, the Jadidists and Kadmists, who recognized the authority of the tsars, demanded recognition of Muslim tradition as part of the national heritage of an Orthodox–Islamic empire and creation of conditions within its framework for the development of the Turkish community, which brought them closer to the Eurasians. In Petersburg’s foreign policy, the religious factor was used mainly for legitimizing the state’s activities abroad, for widening its sphere of influence and mobilizing society against external threats. During Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812, the church played an important role in convincing subjects, who suffered oppression at the hands of their rulers, to defend the homeland and the tsar. The clergy effectively used the pulpit to present the conflict to the faithful as a “holy war” against the Antichrist, and the fight for “Holy Rus” as the religious obligation of every Orthodox person. Borodino became a symbol of victory of Good over Evil, of Christ’s regent, Alexander I over the Antichrist, Napoleon, on whom the Orthodox Church had already declared anathema in 1806.230 The establishment in 1815 of the Holy Alliance – a coalition of the rulers of the ancien régime with the goal of maintaining the status quo in Europe and suppressing social unrest – was, in the opinion of James Billington, an alternative concept of social order, represented by the conservative Christian elite in face of the changes postulated by the French Revolution.231 Among the monarchs, Alexander I was the greatest enthusiast of the Holy Alliance. The emperor was convinced that Russia, which had freed Europe from the rule of the Antichrist, had a special role in the salvation of humanity and had the duty of forming international relations in accordance with the will of God.232 Many historians stress that the Holy Alliance was treated most seriously in Russia, which in the nineteenth century used religious motifs to present its participation in wars as the fulfilment of its obligation to protect Christians suffering from the repression and persecution by people of other faiths. Russian rulers, as the protectors of the Christians of the Caucasus,233 had been waging war with Persia since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the direct cause of which was the Manifest of Paul I from 1801, confirming the annexation of Georgia, which the Georgian tsar, George XIII, had himself requested, as his predecessor, Heraclius II, had earlier in 1783.234 The necessity of protecting Christians was also stated as one of the main reasons for the war against Turkey in 1853. The conflict, which lasted three years and went down in history as the “Crimean War”, ended with a defeat of the Russian army. It was to have brought the Russian samoderzhavets closer to fulfilling their mission of winning back Constantinople from Turkey’s hands, and helping to realize the goals determined by pan-Slavism – creation of a Slavic empire or at least the formation of a camp of allied Orthodox states in the Balkans. It is worth noting that Russia’s use of the religious factor in the Crimean War was paid back in kind by Turkey. The Sublime Porte partly neutralized the subversive activity of the Armenians who sympathized with

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 41 Petersburg by granting them certain cultural autonomy, guaranteeing their clergy certain state rights and giving the Armenian Greek patriarch of Constantinople the title Head of the Armenian Nation, which evoked protests on the Russian side.235 It should also be noted that the Russian rulers were not irreconcilable enemies of the sultans,236 and twice – in 1833 and 1839 – supported Turkey against the Egyptian Mamluks.237 After their subordination of the church, the tsars treated the missionary activity of the Orthodox clergy as an instrument for widening the sphere of influence of the Russian state. Two institutions were created in 1860 which were to coordinate all the missions of the Russian Church – the Orthodox Missionary Society238 (with headquarters in Petersburg) and the Society for the Restoration of Orthodox Christian Renewal in the Caucasus.239 The missionary activity of the Orthodox Church in the territories annexed by Russia was different than that carried out abroad. In the first case, Orthodox clergy mainly had the task of assimilating people of different faiths, often understood as Christianization and Russification. In schools run by missionaries, obedience and loyalty to the Russian state, Russian language and customs were emphasized.240 In the Volga region, Siberia and Kamchatka241 or in Kalmykia Orthodox churches were built, in which masses were held in the local languages,242 and Orthodox brotherhoods were established, which in accordance with the plan of secular authorities were bastions of Russianness in territories dominated by non-Orthodox people. A particular example of the usefulness of the Russian church for the realization of the state’s political goals within the empire was the absorption of the separate Kievan metropolis by its structures and the liquidation of the Uniate Church. Both events led to the consolidation of Russian influence in the territories of today’s Ukraine and Belarus. A similar manoeuvre was applied to Orthodox Georgia. Several years after its annexation in 1801, the autocephalous local church – historically predating the Russian church – was liquidated.243 The foundation for these changes was prepared in good time. In 1783 the Georgian princes received Russian titles of prince and nobleman,244 and the Georgian katolikos became a member of the Holy Synod. Against the Orthodox clergy of the Caucasus, the synod used the strategy of Peter I – after the retirement of Katolikos Anthony in 1811, the Georgian bishops were incorporated into the structure of the Russian church. From then on, the highest of the hierarchs of Georgian clergy was the exarch,245 who led the institution called up by the synod – the Georgian–Imeretian Office of the Synod.246 Although the removal of the Georgian church’s independence was contrary to canonical law, this state of affairs was maintained until 1917.247 This had specific consequences for both churches – among other things, the Russian church, which appointed missions to Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1814, adjoined these two regions to its own jurisdiction, thus weakening the influence of the Georgian administration there. Beyond the borders of the Russian Empire, the church carried out missionary activities mainly in Palestine, East Asia and North America. The first Russian mission was opened in Jerusalem in 1847. After an interruption caused by the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1857, the mission renewed its activity, which

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involved not only evangelization and care for Russian pilgrims, but also academic work, translation of old books and conducting excavations. This centre in the Middle East was supported from the mid-nineteenth century by the Palestine Committee founded in Petersburg, which collected means to assist pilgrims travelling to the Holy Land. Funds sent from the homeland were well used by the head of the mission, Bishop Kirill, who managed to convert the majority of Arabic Uniates, tightened contacts with the Jerusalem patriarchate and brought the Russian church closer to the Copts and the Ethiopian church. Moreover, the hierarchy gained important real estate for the mission, among which was the land around Hebron containing the Oak of Mamre, which was considered sacred.248 The Archimandrite Antonin, who directed the Middle East mission during the years 1865–94, founded a women’s convent (1871) and created hostels in Jericho and Tiberias.249 The mission of the Russian church in the Holy Land was supported in its activities from 1882 by the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, funded by Tsar Alexander III.250 The evangelization campaign initiated in East Asia by the synod began unsuccessfully with the Chinese emperor’s order forbidding entrance to the country to Orthodox missionary Innocent, who after several years on the border of the Middle Kingdom returned in resignation to Irkutsk. It was only in 1858 that the Russian clergy gained freedom to act in Chinese territory.251 Two years later, the monk Nikolai arrived in Japan, where he founded the first Orthodox community in Hakodate, which in 1912 numbered 33,000 believers.252 In 1897 Russian missionaries began activities in Korea.253 Much earlier – near the end of the eighteenth century – Orthodox monks reached the Aleutian Islands, where in 1799 a vicariate was established. The building up of the Orthodox Church’s infrastructure in North America – above all on the Aleutian Islands and Alaska – occurred with the support of the Russian– American Company, which was obligated by Alexander I in 1821 to erect a certain number of churches and monasteries on the territory under its control. The mission sent by the synod to Alaska three years later resulted in two bishoprics – of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska.254 In the period of the synod, the church had to fulfil a civilizing mission to further the unification of the empire. It became an instrument for maintaining the system’s status quo (samoderzhavie and serfdom), it legitimized, indoctrinated, mobilized, raised, educated and in part even evangelized in the interest of the Russian state. The effectiveness of the religious policy carried out by the emperors, involving greater dependency of religious institutions on the power apparatus, was confirmed after 1905. In a society where the revolutionary intelligentsia ever more boldly demanded changes and was increasingly decisive in its questioning of the tsars’ mandates, official religious institutions turned out to be loyal to the absolute monarchy right up to the end. In face of the conservative, royalist attitudes displayed by the top hierarchs, divisions arose within the clergy itself.255 In the Orthodox Church, dignitaries from the monasteries, who in a changing context permitted only a return to the idyllic harmony of secular and church authority from the times of Kievan Rus, were opposed by the impoverished

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 43 “white” clergy, who benefitted from the state apanage the least. Some of the priests from Petersburg, later called Group 32, formed the Alliance of Church Renewal, which criticized the synod’s administration, nationalization of the Orthodox Church and the excessively strong position of the bishops, in connection with which it postulated democratization of church structures. “Traditionalists” and “renovationists” came into conflict at the assembly in 1906, which had been called together with the aim of preparing the All Russian sobor, which ultimately began proceedings in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in August 1917. Successes of the supporters of the church’s democratization, such as the holding of elections among the clergy and delegates of secular centres for dignitaries of particular bishoprics, did not increase their influence in the hierarchy. The All Russian assembly of Orthodox clergy and laity in June 1917, accepted the resolution which defined the church’s position towards secular authority: the possibility of separation of church and state was ruled out. Orthodoxy was recognized as the most important religion of the empire, and the government should guarantee the church a privileged position; heads of state and ministers of religious affairs were required to belong to the ROC; moreover, it was expected that the freedom of other religious institutions would be limited.256 The anti-modernization postulates contained in the declaration show how detached the Orthodox clergymen were from the faithful at the beginning of the twentieth century, and how erroneously the hierarchs read the signs of the times. The Orthodox Church – the most powerful of all churches in Russia – approached the new authority and the unlimited religious freedom introduced in 1905 with great mistrust. It recognized the overthrow of tsardom as a curse and democracy as a satanic invention. The restoration of the patriarchate near the end of 1917 was, in the expectations of the hierarchy, to be the beginning of the rebuilding of the church’s position as the most important partner of secular authority and to lead to a renewal of the “Orthodox imperative”257 in politics. The October Revolution, however, brought dramatic changes for all religious institutions.

Religion in the Soviet state: between constraint and opposition In October 1917 the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, staged a coup in Petersburg with the conviction that their uprising would precede a world revolution of the proletariat. In Russia, the first classless society in history was to be formed, fascinated by technological progress and the virtually limitless potential of humankind. In their eyes, the establishment of Communism in the world, crowning the history of humanity’s development, required the destruction of all remnants of the old order – laws, customs, institutions and the people connected with them. Lenin and his comrades viewed the clergy and religious institutions as one of the founding blocs of the ancien régime, by their very nature inimical to the cause of revolution in Russia and averse to progress. Moreover, these institutions were depositories of a truth that competed with the vision of the world presented by the “builders of Communism”. For this reason, the Bolsheviks took steps to weaken the influence

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of the clergy and church structures immediately after taking power by, among other things, adopting legislative changes, state propaganda representing religion as superstition and a sign of backwardness, physical demolition of churches and religious schools, persecution of the clergy and – what was arguably most dangerous for religious communities – providing support and sometimes inspiration for schisms within church institutions. In the new legislative framework, a decree was issued on 8 November 1917, by force of which church properties were nationalized; on 23 January 1918, the principle of secularization of the state was introduced, establishing a separation of the state and educational system from the church, thereby officially guaranteeing freedom of professing any religion or atheism. In February 1918 religious institutions were banned from legally acquiring new properties, and four years later, in face of the spreading famine, confiscation of church property was announced in order to meet the needs of the starving population. Finally in 1923 two decrees were issued, legalizing the seizure of liturgical articles remaining in possession of the clergy for the needs of the state.258 The impressive catalogue of guarantees and religious freedoms contained in the Constitution of 1936 in no way influenced the improvement of the situation of religious institutions. The goal of state anti-church propaganda was to strike at the authority of religious institutions, most of all of the Orthodox Church. Serving this end were, for example, the public autopsy of the remains of Orthodox saints carried out on the recommendation of the competent Narkomat259 – the most important exhumations were those of Sergey Radonezhsky (April 1919) and Seraphim Sarovsky (December 1920),260 which were to prove to believers the false holiness of people whose remains in reality were subject to the same decomposition as those of sinners. Such actions of the Bolsheviks, aimed at discrediting the rival “truth”, are reminiscent of the Peter I’s initiative to organize in Petersburg a sacrilegious “false-patriarch” and the “All-Joking, All-Drunken Synod of Fools and Jesters”. However, the Bolsheviks undoubtedly went much farther in fighting religious institutions than the first Russian emperor did. The activity of the “Society of the Godless”, established in 1925, became emblematic and in 1932 it adopted an ambitious, five-year plan to completely remove religion from the lives of Russians: in the first year most religious schools were to be closed and the clergy was to be denied food rations; in the second year – mass closing of places of cult was to take place; in the third – forced emigration of all clergy; in the fourth – completion of the liquidation of churches; and in the fifth – consolidation of the successes already achieved.261 It is estimated that in the years 1929–36, 50,000 Orthodox believers were arrested, of whom 5,000 were killed, while the years 1937 and 1938 marked the peak of persecution of the church – 200,000 believers were held captive and 100,000 lost their lives.262 The greatest danger for religious institutions in the new Russia, however, was the schisms which most of the major religions experienced in the 1920s and 1930s – Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism. The splits came about against the backdrop of the clergy’s relations with the new authorities and the changes they introduced. Among religious leaders, a collision of attitudes occurred: the “liberal” one, which before 1917 had minimally profited from privileges, and the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 45 “pro-monarchical” one, which had functioned before the October Revolution within the framework of nationalized religious institutions. Among Muslims, the kadmists, who during the reign of the tsars had dominated in the muftiates, in large part remained distrusting of the Bolsheviks; however, reformers from the dzhydidites either joined the White Guard, emigrated or allied themselves with nationalists, but there also appeared clergymen who declared their loyalty to the new authorities. These so-called “red mullahs” who included, among others, Babakhan (Turkestan), Rasulov (Tatarstan), Takko-Kakhadzhiy (Dagestan), Kachanov (Kabardia), Ali Mitayev (Chechnya), even created a group called For the Soviet Rule, For the Sharia.263 Among Buddhist monks there were also “red lamas” who, supported by the Bolsheviks, dominated Buddhist assemblies (Buryat 1922, 1925; Kalmykia 1923), where they decided on structural reforms that supported infiltration of the religious community by communists. Buryat Buddhists called up a spiritual sobor, to be led by the hambo lama, established councils of datsans which were to make decisions based on majority rule and increased the influence of believers from beyond the sangha.264 “Red lamas”, who convinced the remaining monks to renounce the goods they possessed, resigned once and for all from private property, transferred valuable objects in possession of the sangha to the new authorities and facilitated the Bolsheviks’ nationalization of the datsans, which took place in the years 1923–24.265 The revolutionaries liquidated Jewish settlement zones and withheld all permissions for building synagogues in Moscow. Some Jews adopted Lenin’s ideas and formed a movement called the Living Synagogue, which professed loyalty to the Bolsheviks.266 The most dramatic divisions in the 1920s were experienced by the Orthodox Church. In contrast to the hierarchs coming from the “black” clergy and connected with the Holy Synod before 1917, the impoverished “white” clergy accepted the new authorities with hope. The milieu concentrated around Group 32 called into being – still during the provisional government – the All Russian Democratic Union of Clergy and Believers, which was active in many cities (among others, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Novgorod and Kharkov) until 1919 and gave the impetus for new groups that brought together renovationists (obnovlentsy) of the church, for example Religion in Face of Life of Joan Yegorov and Friends of Church Reformation of Alexander Boyarsky.267 Of key significance was the announcement by the obnovlentsy in May 1922 of the founding of the Living Church, at the head of which stood protorey Vladimir Krasnitsky. Recognized in the so-called Memorandum of Three268 as the only canonical Orthodox Church in Russia – the Living Church – broke down into subsequent communities: the Church of Revival with Bishop Antonin, the Union of Communities of the Ancient Apostolic Church with Alexander Vvedensky269 and Alexander Boyarsky. In the interim, protorey Belkov founded the Union of Religious Work Communes. The Puritan Revolutionary Party of Clergy and Believers was established in Saratov and in Penza the Free Church of Work.270 At the sobor of obnovlentsy,271 which took place in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in May 1923, the closing of monasteries was confirmed, priests of the “white” clergy were ordained as bishops

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against the canon, and it was agreed that clergymen should be allowed to enter a second marriage. Importantly, Tikhon, who at the time was under house arrest,272 was deprived of the position of patriarch. In 1925 Archbishop Grigoriy stood at the head of a new structure – the Provisional Higher Church Council. The activities of the Grigorianists, who in contrast to obnovlentsy emphasized their faithfulness to Patriarch Tikhon, were legalized by the Bolsheviks, who could easily control the dispersed Orthodox communities that were at variance with each other.273 In mentioning the division affecting the ROC in the first half of the twentieth century, it is worth drawing attention to particular schisms resulting from the strengthening of nationalism of neighbouring nations, which in striving for liberation from Russian dominance, supported the independence of local Orthodox Churches from the superiority of the Moscow patriarchate. The first example of such a split occurred in Georgia, where in March 1917 the selfdesignated sobor of bishops, representatives of the clergy and believers deliberating in Mtskheta, against the will of the Exarch Platon, announced the restoration of autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church, and then in September of the same year, Katolikos Kirion was elected.274 It was not until the Second World War, in November 1943, that the community was renewed.275 However, the Georgian Church managed to officially keep its autocephaly in the Soviet Union, which the Ukrainian clergy in turn was not able to do. The question of granting the Ukrainian Orthodox structures wider autonomy in the framework of the patriarchate was taken up by the sobor, which gathered in January 1918 in Kiev; however, the proceedings were interrupted by the Red Army’s arrival in the city. Supporters of Symon Petliura, who managed to recapture Kiev for a short time, arrested Metropolitan Antonin in December 1918 and announced the establishment of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church276 with the highest power held by the Holy Synod, led by Archbishop Agapit. After the Red Army’s ultimate victory in Ukraine, the synod ceased to function, and Archbishop Agapit recanted before Patriarch Tikhon. Another announcement of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church by part of the clergy and the faithful occurred in 1920, to which Tikhon reacted decisively by abolishing the autocephaly and restoring the status of exarchate to the local structures.277 In the autumn of 1921 the Bolsheviks got involved in the church conflict in Ukraine, giving their support to the schismatics, who elected Metropolitan Vasil (Lipkivsky) at a sobor in October of the same year; he – together with another hierarch – rukopolozhil (ordained)278 the new bishops279 of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church. In 1941 a new structure was created – the Autonomous Ukrainian Church with Archbishop Alexy (chosen subsequently as the exarch of Ukraine). However, in contrast to the “autocephalists”, the “autonomists” did not officially break all canonical ties with the patriarchate, although the latter never recognized the declaration of autonomy.280 The Russian church, after normalizing relations with the Soviet authorities, managed to gain control over the Ukrainian structures – this took place in 1930, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was forced to dissolve itself and return under the administration of the patriarchate. Moreover, the ROC again subordinated the Uniate Church to

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 47 itself – in March 1946 in Lviv, the sobor of Greek Catholics announced its breaking of the Union of Brest and recognition of the superiority of the Russian patriarch.281 After gaining independence in 1918, the authorities of the Polish state were interested in making the local Orthodox Church independent of Russian influence. Within the borders of the Second Republic there were 4½ million citizens of the Orthodox faith,282 making it the second largest religious community and as such was treated by the state authorities as a potential “Russian fifth column”. In order to prevent manipulation of the Polish Orthodox Church, the government actively supported the efforts of the hierarchs to gain autocephaly. These efforts ended successfully in 1924 upon gaining independence from Constantinople. However it was only in June 1948 that the Moscow patriarchate, which was the mother church, granted the Polish church canonical autocephaly, which determined the establishment of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church (PAOC).283 During the Second World War, the superiority of the Russian church was undermined in territory occupied by Germans, with whom local nationalists – the greatest enthusiasts of the independence of local churches – cooperated. Besides Ukraine, announcements of autocephaly appeared also in Belarus and Estonia. In 1942 a group of Belarusian clergy announced the establishment of the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church; however, most of the “autocephalists” emigrated after Germany’s withdrawal.284 In Estonia, which had achieved independence following the overthrow of tsardom, Bishop Alexander of Tallinn turned to the ecumenical patriarch with a request for the local Orthodox Church to come under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, to which Meletios IV agreed in July 1923, granting the Estonian church autonomy. After the annexation of Estonia by the USSR in 1940, the autonomy was repealed and the local structures were included in the Russian church. The official unification of the churches was accomplished in March 1945,285 and in 1978 the patriarch of Constantinople, upon the official application of the ROC, denied the legality of the 1923 decision of Meletios IV.286 After the end of the war, the Moscow patriarchate managed to subordinate to itself the rebellious clergy in the territory of the USSR. It is worth emphasizing that this “canonical reconquest” was achieved with the support of the communists who, after the pacification of the Russian church and the testing of its loyalty during the Great Patriotic War, began to use the Orthodox Church as one of its policy instruments. From the point of view of those in power, the unification of the canonical territory of the ROC helped the centralization of the Soviet Union. Characteristically, the problem of schisms which appeared in the first half of the twentieth century reappeared after the collapse of the USSR. The religious policy of the Bolsheviks between 1917 and 1942 underwent clear change. At the very beginning, they attempted to differentiate their approach to particular communities – the Orthodox Church was attacked most strongly, while somewhat milder treatment was directed towards Catholics,287 Protestants and especially Muslims, possibly due to the idea promoted by Tatar Communists regarding a correlation between Islam and socialism.288 At the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, an aggressive anti-religious campaign was carried out on a nation-wide

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scale, as a result of which, among other things, official structures of the Catholic Church ceased to exist in the USSR and a registered sangha289 and the Jewish population were subject to forced assimilation. In the face of the actual threat of extermination, religious institutions stood before a dramatic choice: put up a resistance until the end, despite their predictable defeat, or recognize the Soviet authority and undertake cooperation with it on its own terms. After the Bolshevik victory the hierarchs of the ROC counted on the idea that neutrality would ensure their safety and the possibility of carrying out their priestly services: for example, during the civil war Patriarch Tikhon refused to give an official blessing to the White Army.290 However, with the increasing repression of clergy, they increasingly emphasized their loyalty to the new government. In the autumn of 1919 Patriarch Tikhon appealed to the archbishops not to take any position with regard to current political events. In 1923 the patriarch categorically cut himself off from the counterrevolutionaries, and in the beginning of 1924 a patriarchal ukaz was issued on praying for the state authority.291 A propaganda success for the Bolsheviks was the letter of Solovetsky monks to the government of the USSR in June 1926 (Pamyatnaya zapiska Solovetskikh episkopov, obrashchyonnaya k Pravitelstvu SSSR/Памятная записка Соловецких епископов, обращенная к Правительству СССР), in which they emphasized the non-involvement of the church in political matters, declared their loyalty towards the authorities and recognized the lawfulness of the decree on the separation of church and state.292 At the same time, the document takes a critical stance towards the government for not observing the principle of a neutral worldview in its religious policy.293 In that same year Metropolitan Sergey, acting as head of the church during the patriarch’s absence, turned to the NKVD with an official request for the legalization of the church administration. The hierarch renewed the appeal in May 1927, after which, together with other bishops, he called a provisional patriarchal Holy Synod. After the so-called Declaration of 1927, in which the hierarchs assured the church’s apolitical nature and its loyalty towards the Soviet authorities, the Narkomat registered the synod in August of that same year.294 This recognition of the church’s legality divided the clergy and believers in the country and abroad – those Orthodox believers living in the USSR who rejected the “Sergianism,” created the so-called “Catacomb Church”,295 and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, that was called into life in 1921 by emigrant bishops gathered at a sobor in the Serbian town of Sremski Karlovci, announced in September 1927 the breaking off of canonical ties with the ROC.296 The Bolsheviks, in forming their religious policy, returned to methods used by the Russian emperors – instead of fighting religion and persecuting its believers, thanks to which the churches won themselves new martyrs, the Soviet government decided to legalize loyal religious institutions and created effective mechanisms of control over these institutions, which in result became instruments in the hands of the communist party. An event which inclined Soviet decision makers towards a change in the previous religious policy was the Great Patriotic War. In the face of the quick movement of the German army into Russia’s interior, Joseph Stalin needed additional instruments for mobilizing the people to fight

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 49 against the enemy, and took the example of Alexander I, who defeated Napoleon partly by presenting him to the Orthodox people as the Antichrist desecrating “Mother Russia”. Stalin’s historic meeting with three of the hierarchs – metropolitans Sergey, Alexy and Nikolai – came about in the presence of Vyacheslav Molotov and Colonel Georgiy Karpov in the Kremlin on 4 September 1942. Stalin not only agreed to the calling of the sobor, the election of a new patriarch with the title “Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia”,297 but also offered logistical assistance, including use of aeroplanes, to organize the sobor. Moreover, he agreed to the reopening of religious seminaries and the release of priests from prisons and prison camps. Only four days after this meeting the sobor met at the Kremlin and summoned the people to fight against the invader and to support the Soviet authority, categorically condemned collaborators, established the synod and elected Metropolitan Sergey the first patriarch after the death of Tikhon in 1925.298 Making this compromise with Stalin strengthened the position of the patriarchate with regard to other Orthodox structures, which inclined many of them to seek an agreement with the “official church” – in the years 1943–45, the majority of obnovlentsy and grigorentsy returned to the structures of the ROC.299 At the beginning of 1945, the sobor met again and in February a new patriarch, Alexy I,300 who led the church until 1970, was elected. Moderation of religious policy after the September meeting at the Kremlin in 1942 meant that the Soviet decision makers gave the church, in exchange for its loyalty, some freedom of action. In October 1943 at the Council of the People’s Commissars of the USSR, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was created, in which the government’s side was represented by a colonel of the state security service – Georgiy Karpov.301 Stalin charged Karpov with supervision of the Orthodox Church within the framework of the new religious policy, the so-called concordat policy.302 Although no agreement between the government of the USSR and the church was ever signed, the church had to strictly observe the principle of loyalty in order not to provoke the next wave of anti-church propaganda. The council created in 1943 was, in a way, the Holy Synod called up by Peter the Great, but for the Soviet Empire, with Georgiy Karpov fulfilling the function of oberprocurator. This “concordat” set the framework for the ROC’s service for Soviet diplomacy.303 The method of “pacification–legalization–control” was also used on Muslim structures. To ensure the support of the Islamic clergy in the face of German aggression, Stalin agreed in 1943 to legalize the institutions – besides the muftiate in Ufa for Central Russia and Siberia (Dukhovnoye upravlenie musulman Evropeyskoy chasti SSSR i Sibiri, DUMES/Духовное управление мусульман Европейской части СССР и Сибири, ДУМЕС) three more muftiates were established: Buynak (Dagestan) for the Caucasian Sunnis, Baku for the Caucasian Shiites, and Tashkent (Dukhovnoye upravlenie musulman Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana, SADUM/Духовное управление мусульман Средней Азии и Казахстана, САДУМ). The latter enjoyed the greatest support of the Soviet authorities and with time the three remaining structures were subordinated to it.304 As in the case of the Orthodox Church, so too in the case of the muftiates, on one hand, the government made concessions – in 1945 it allowed its Muslim

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citizens to take part in the hajj – the pilgrimage to Mecca – and financially supported the Islamic administration; on the other hand, the authorities improved the mechanisms of control and infiltration of religious communities, establishing in 1944 the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. In 1965, two institutions were joined together – the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Council for Affairs of Religious Cults, creating a new organ – the Council for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The first chairman of the council was Vladimir Kuroyedov, who was replaced in 1970 by Vasily Furov.305 This state of affairs was maintained until the mid-1980s – the Soviet authorities tolerated the functioning of religious institutions that had been subordinated to them, from time to time deciding to intensify anti-church propaganda for the needs of domestic policy. An example of this is the anti-religion campaign begun by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 or the secret instructions issued in 1961, recommending an increase of control over the church by using clergymen recruited by the security service.306 In these harsh times, the church was forced to keep much of her activity under-cover; this was the reason, for example, for the phenomenon of sacrament and prayers celebrated by mail.307 Remarkably, the first permission to build new churches in the USRR was issued only in 1978.308 Despite the anticlerical and antireligious campaign of the Soviet state, Russian Orthodoxy provided a certain ground for social action and opposition movement. Dmitry Pospielovsky describes the “battle for Pochaiv”, when between 1960 and 1966 Orthodox believers stood up, despite the harassment by the militsiya, in order to save the holy sanctuary.309 Jane Ellis presents the characteristics and evolution of the dissident movement in connection to the Orthodox environment.310 Two main camps formed: the nationalistic (the so-called Christian patriots, e.g. Vladimir Osipov, Dmitry Dudkov) and democratic movement and human rights activists (e.g. Anatolij Levitin, Andrei Sakharov). The common cause which had brought all the groups together was rebellion against lies and hypocrisy in the Soviet public sphere. Confronted with the grass-roots activity of the intelligentsia the ROC faced a dilemma. On one hand, the church (at least part of the hierarchy) sympathized with the dissidents, especially with their appeals for respect of freedom of religion. On the other hand, the ROC was forced by the Soviet authorities to deny all accusations that the dissidents made in the international area. By denying that religious prosecutions were taking place in the USSR, the Moscow patriarchate weakened the credibility and legitimacy of oppositionists, including those who were members of the church. A well-known example is the reaction of Metropolitan Juvenaly who condemned the open letter by Gleb Yakunin and Lev Regelson addressed to the participants of the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Nairobi in 1975.311 The significance of institutional backing is obvious in the case of the Jews in the USSR. After 1948 the Soviets took a negative approach to Jewish emigration to Israel. As a result, some Jews (called otkaznicy)312 were denied jobs, faced political persecution and were prohibited to leave the USSR. This repressed group turned

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 51 to the international community, the UN and UNESCO calling upon them to pay attention to their difficult situation. Unfortunately for the Soviet authorities, they did not have at their disposal a loyal and credible Jewish organization which could efficiently discredit the accusations made by the otkaznicy. Because of this, organizations such as the World Jewish Congress had legitimate ground to press the authorities of the USSR to improve the status of its Jewish citizens.313 One of the best-know results of the anti-Soviet pressure created by the Jewish community is the Jackson–Vanik amendment to US federal law from 1974, which inter alia denied most-favoured nation status to the Soviet Union. The role of the ROC as an institution adding credibility to the USSR’s image brings us back to foreign policy. Despite the fact, that the Soviet decision makers did not hide their dislike of religion in public life, the religious factor continued to play a role in the policy of the USSR. The Second World War reminded the elites of the large potential of faith for mobilizing society; however, after 1945 the Communist Party used religious institutions mainly in its foreign policy. Contacts of the clergy served the Soviet state as an additional diplomatic channel. Their missionary activity and involvement in the ecumenical movement helped to create a positive image of the Soviet Union – a peacefully inclined empire of the proletariat, bringing help to peoples exploited by the vile capitalists of the West. The criterion of usefulness for policy determined the extent to which the authorities tolerated a given religious institution. The possibility of using a church’s or muftiate’s contacts abroad inclined Soviet political figures to support the activities of these institutions beyond the borders of the USSR; however, following this criterion there was no real basis for improving the status of Buddhists, Catholics or Jews.314 Referring to the latter, William C. Fletcher remarked: “The Jewish community in the USSR has not been permitted the facilities of a central organisation, and has had very few opportunities indeed for joint action with the State in foreign affairs”.315 Professionalization of the international activity of the Moscow patriarchate required the creation of an appropriate organ, which occurred in 1946 when the Department of External Contacts was created, which was first led by Metropolitan Nikolai.316 William C. Fletcher argued “these antireligious policies, effectively executed, ... have led to the present incongruous partnership of Church and State in foreign affairs”.317 The religious factor in the foreign policy of the USSR was used to strengthen the unity of the Eastern Bloc, keep up good relations with Greece and ensure the presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, in contact with Muslim states and in relations with the Vatican. Stalin wanted to forge the defeat of the Third Reich’s army into the founding myth of the Eastern Bloc, singing the praises of the historic victory of the heroic and righteous Slavs over aggressive Germans. To this end, he used motifs of Russian slavophilia – this nineteenth century idea was invoked by Stalin in order to strengthen his newly founded society, with the difference that, as Adam B. Ulam aptly notes, pan-Slavism in the nineteenth century was to be a method of getting Russia out of isolation and including it in the European Slavic world, while after 1945 the Slavic idea guaranteed the hermetic closure of the system – it welded

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the socialist community together and safeguarded it against the “capitalistic drain”.318 In order to symbolically cut itself off from the “reactionary” nature of the pan-Slavic idea, the term “Slavic solidarity” was used, and the expression of this “solidarity” was, among other things, the conclusion of treaties “on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid”. The culmination of pan-Slavic sentiments was the All-Slavic Congress organized in Belgrade in December 1946 by Josip Broz Tito319 and the creation in 1947 of the Cominform – a structure established for coordinating the foreign policy of the Eastern Bloc.320 In the framework of integration proceeding under Slavic slogans, the Moscow patriarchate had the task of bolstering the sense of solidarity among Orthodox nations in democratic nations. With Moscow’s agreement, a renewal of the ROC’s contacts with “brotherly Churches” – Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian – was accomplished. In 1945 a delegation of the ROC met with the hierarchs in Bulgaria. Bulgarian Exarch Stefan went to Moscow the same year and his visit was returned by patriarch Alexy I in 1946.321 During the visit to Belgrade in 1945, the representatives of the ROC tackled the issue of reconciliation between some of the Russian bishops living in emigration and the Moscow patriarchate. In 1945 representatives of the ROC came to Romania to renew cooperation with the local clergy and to help ease tensions resulting from Bucharest’s siding with the Nazis during the war. Paradoxically, Orthodoxy was to be a factor convincing the Romanian people that their place was in the Slavic socialist camp.322 Patriarch Alexy I visited Bucharest in 1947 and on this occasion the staff of the Soviet Embassy took part in liturgy in the Rumanian patriarchal cathedral.323 In the autumn of 1945 there was an occasion for the Moscow patriarchate to extend its administration onto the territory of Czechoslovakia. As a result of an agreement between the Serbian and Russian churches, the Orthodox communities of Czechoslovakia came under the jurisdiction of the ROC, which effected a change in the position of local Uniates, who less than a year later – in April 1946 – “returned” to the Moscow patriarchate. In the name of building trust between particular nations of the Eastern Bloc, the Russian church also agreed to grant several local Orthodox churches autocephaly. The Moscow patriarchate ultimately accepted the canonical separation of the Orthodox Church in Poland (June 1948), the Church in Czechoslovakia (1951) and the Orthodox Church in Finland (1957). Foreign contacts of the Moscow patriarchate turned out to be valuable for forming relationships between the USSR and Greece – a European Orthodox state which was outside the Eastern Bloc and in 1952 joined the NATO. In Greece, Orthodoxy was the state religion and the clergy formed an influential centre with an unfavourable attitude towards the West. Although the “unsubtle attempts [of the ROC] to intervene on behalf of the Communist partisans in the civil war were not especially welcome in Greece”,324 later Greek priests, many of whom received scholarships to study at the Leningrad Religious Academy,326 often showed goodwill towards the USSR. In the context of Inter-Orthodox relations, one of the most interesting aspects of the ROC’s diplomacy in the 1940s were the efforts to gain the status of the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 53 leader of the entire Orthodox community. In 1947 the ROC proposed to hold the Eighth Ecumenical Council, the first since the Council of Nicaea (787). Because of the reluctance of the other churches, the Moscow patriarchate put forward another initiative, namely the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of the ROC. According to the plan, after the official part, the heads of the churches would participate in an ecumenical conference. The intentions of the ROC failed to materialize. The meeting was held but did not receive the needed support from the ancient patriarchates,326 despite various efforts by the ROC, such as significant donations to the Antioch patriarchate.327 Generally, the space to manoeuvre for the ROC’s diplomacy in the West was limited. However, a certain potential existed: after the Second World War in France, which had a sizeable community of Russian émigrés, there was a relatively favourable ground for exploiting two factors: temporary enthusiasm among emigrants for the USSR – the vanquisher of fascism – and the popularity of the Communist Party. Pospielovsky speculates that had Communists succeeded in taking over in France, the ROC would have “served as a most welcome adjunct to future Soviet relations with the country”.328 The ROC also turned out to be useful in the manifestation of the Soviet Union’s presence in the Middle East. From the beginning, Bolsheviks were interested in winning the Arab population for the cause of the proletarian revolution. In December 1917 they addressed a proclamation to “Muslims of the East, Persians and Turks, Arabs and Hindus”, arguing for the need to link the Islamic uprising with the proletariat’s fight against the capitalist West. In an attempt to undermine the system of mandates forced on the region by France and Great Britain, the USSR concluded a “treaty of friendship and brotherhood” with Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran, and was the first non-Muslim state to establish diplomatic relations with Hejaz (from 1932: Saudi Arabia).329 In allowing the ROC to renew its missionary activity in the Middle East, the Soviet government was guided by state interest – in this way, it gained an additional diplomatic channel and an institution forming a positive image of the Soviet Union among Arabs. In 1945 Moscow allowed Patriarch Alexy I to go on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, during which he held various meetings in Palestine. From there he travelled to Cyprus and then to Egypt and Lebanon, then further to Syria, Iraq and Iran.330 On that occasion Alexy met with the remaining patriarchs of the Eastern Church – Christopher II of Alexandria and Alexander III of Antioch. The patriarch headed for the Holy Land a second time in 1960, while his successor went on a pilgrimage in 1972.331 The activities of the ROC in the Middle East were written into Soviet policy towards Islamic countries, for which revolutionary slogans were attractive. In order to win the favour of Muslim leaders, the USSR presented itself as an unusually tolerant state, which respects religious freedom and “takes care of its own Muslims”. As proof of the undisturbed cooperation between Soviet Muslims and the Communist Party, representatives of the former were added to official delegations sent to Islamic countries, in order to convince Muslims in other states of the community of interests linking the USSR and Arab nations. Usually, it was

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members of the muftiates that took part in diplomatic missions. Zia al-Din Babakhanov was one of the most prominent Muslim clerics in Soviet diplomacy.332 The Islamic factor was used by Moscow also with regard to governments that persecuted Islamic believers. For example, Soviet decision makers criticized communist China for its persecution of Muslim Uygurs and Kazakhs.333 The USSR tried to use its “Islamic asset” also in policy towards non-Arabic countries, such as Indonesia. For instance, in 1956 president Sukarno met in Tashkent with the chief mufti of central Asia and Kazakhstan. Later Soviet delegates took part in Muslin gatherings in Indonesia.334 This Soviet policy broke down after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which had negative consequences for the image of the Soviet state in the Arab world and its relations with Arabs. The conflict also antagonized Soviet Muslims, particularly those living in the Caucasus. Even the muftis who were loyal to the Soviet authorities found it difficult to justify an aggression against another Islamic nation, let alone a nine-year invasion. After the Second World War the ROC was involved in campaigns for peace.335 After the conference in Wrocław, Poland, the World Peace Council (WPC) was established in 1949 and henceforth became an important platform for the ROC’s international activity. In connection with the WPC the Moscow patriarchate convened conferences of religious leaders who supported Soviet initiatives for peace and condemned the aggressive policy of the West. The ROC’s involvement was particularly noticeable during the Korean War, when hierarchs were publicly accusing “American fascists” of “cannibalistic extermination of the inferior Korean race”.336 One of the most significant initiatives was the All-Christian Peace Assembly and the Prague Christian Peace Conference held in 1961, 1964 and 1968, which contributed to the revitalisation of the peace campaign and the strengthening Soviet propaganda of “peaceful coexistence”.337 It is worth stressing also that Muslim clerics supported the peace campaign and took part in international conferences on disarmament.338 In contacts with the Vatican which – despite the fact “that it had no armed divisions” – caused trouble for the Soviet Union, the Russian church was involved for obvious reasons.339 Its representatives participated as observers in sessions of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65), which enabled the USSR to gain insight into the work of the Catholic clergy. During the course of the council, Pope Paul VI had an audience with a metropolitan of the ROC – Nikodim – in 1963. This meeting began a conversation on, among other things, the topic of a possible visit of the pope to the USSR.340 The Soviet authorities fulfilled the request of Pope John Paul I and allowed the previously persecuted Uniate Archbishop Josyf of Lviv to leave the USSR. A symbol of the new openness in relations between the Vatican and the USSR was the meeting of Pope John Paul II with the General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, in December 1989; however, even then tensions between the two churches were becoming increasingly obvious, mainly in connection with the controversy over the status of the Uniate community in Ukraine and accusations against Catholic missionaries of proselytism in the canonical territory of the Russian church.

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 55 Establishment of contacts with the Vatican at the beginning of the 1960s was connected with a change in the approach of the Moscow patriarchate towards the ecumenical movement. In the beginning the ROC distanced itself from the dialogue between different Christian churches, in which the patriarchate of Constantinople, for example, had been taking part since the 1920s. As late as 1948 the ROC stated in a resolution that modern ecumenism was not a means of achieving Christian unity. In 1959, on the initiative of the Moscow patriarchate, the Confederation of European Churches341 was organized as an alternative to other ecumenical institutions. The ROC decided to join the World Council of Churches (WCC) in New Delhi in 1961,342 and in 1975 a hierarch of the Russian church, Metropolitan Nikodim, was elected leader of the WCC.343 By engaging in the ecumenical movement, the ROC built its position among the remaining churches, and the influence of the Russian clergy grew, particularly within the universal Orthodox Church. The church’s diplomacy was increasing and had the task of presenting the USSR as a democratic state that respected the freedom of its citizens – an image which the Communist Party valued and effectively used to its advantage. It is worth emphasizing that the activity of the Moscow patriarchate abroad during the time of the Soviet Union was not limited only to Europe and Arabic countries. In the 1970s the church took part in the gradual normalization of the USSR’s relations with Japan, and was active in North America: for example, in 1970 Patriarch Alexy I granted the American Orthodox Church autocephaly.344 Moreover, the ROC tried to develop relations with African countries: for example, the Moscow patriarchate exchanged visits with religious leaders of Ethiopia, Uganda, Madagascar and Kenya. The ROC also joined other churches in condemning apartheid.345 In the 1970s the diplomatic activity of the ROC gained new dynamics with the Patriarch Pimen. In 1972 he visited the Holy Land where he held a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Office of Israel. The same year he travelled to Greece and was granted a meeting with the Prime Minister Georgios Papadopoulos. Three years later he returned to Greece and visited Rumania and Yugoslavia. In 1977 Pimen met with the patriarch of Constantinople.346 It is impossible not to notice that the Soviet authority used religious institutions mainly in foreign policy, while – besides the mobilization during the years of the Great Patriotic War or the use of the church’s structures to infiltrate social groups – the religious factor played a small role in domestic affairs. In comparison with the Russian Empire, in the USSR, religion was not a source for legitimization of power or a founding block of the identity of its citizens. Religion was deprived of operational social functions, as the well-being of the working people was looked after by the state, which had a monopoly in every domain – education, law, social care, health care, production, and so on. The place of the sverkhideya, regulating all aspects of life, was taken over by Communist ideology. Many researchers point out that the authority and system of the USSR had a gnostic nature – the teachings of Marx were transformed in Russia under the influence of its own tradition of secular messianism. Uvarov’s triad of Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost was replaced with a new one: “Atheism, Communism and Sovietness”. According to

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James Billington, the changes which took place in Russia after 1917 actually had the character of a change in decoration – icons were replaced with portraits of Lenin, the place of Orthodox saints was taken over by geroy truda (heroes of labour) – stakhanovites347 – and the Third International corresponded to the idea of the Third Rome.348 Jarosław Bratkiewicz seems to share Billington’s opinion when he claims that the Bolsheviks, despite slogans proclaiming modernization, created a traditional empire, anti-modern in its nature, in which power was not separated from property.349 The genesis of Soviet Union’s system remains a subject of discussion among researchers – was the USSR the effect of applying Marx’s theories, or did a “Russification/Byzantinization” of Marxism take place? Supporters of the latter view emphasize the noticeable influence of the samoderzhavie tradition in the Soviet system, manifested in, among other things, the centralization of power, the cult of the leader, hypertrophy of state structures, domination of the military factor in formation of foreign policy, the system of invigilation and repression,350 collectivism and anti-Occidentalism. From the onset, the vision of “newness” presented by the Bolsheviks was contradictory. They completely rejected the old order and sought the creation of a system which was the direct opposite of the tsarist empire. Moreover, this vision had an utopist, gnostic nature – as a conflict between the embodiment of evil (the ancien régime) and the ideal good (Communism). However, after the victory of the revolution, Communist ideology took the place of the sverkhideya, which earlier had been occupied by samoderzhavie. The ideology, which determined all spheres of social life in the Bolshevik state, took on a mystical and eschatological character as the Communist system, in the convictions of Russian revolutionaries, was the ultimate stage of humanity’s development. Taking into consideration the dominant role of ideology, the USSR should be recognized as an example of an ideocracy. The Soviet Union, in a certain sense, was the continuator of the Russian Empire – just as Rus, Muscovy and tsarist Russia, it was a civilizational formation imbued with a mystical element. Although Orthodoxy was replaced by Communist ideology, the authority of those holding power still derived from their particular charisma. Residents of the USSR were, to a large extent, believers of – rather than citizens of – the Soviet state: they had no real influence on the exercise of power, and could thus only believe in it. Subsequent secretaries of the Communist Party took the place of the “Orthodox autocrat– tsar” in society’s consciousness. The new, secular religion had its prophets (Kropotkin), priests (Lenin, Stalin), saints (stakhanovites), martyrs (those who fell fighting the White Guard) and inquisitors (the NKVD). Professional, elite cadres of revolutionaries had to, in Lenin’s convictions, stand in for the masses in the realization of Communism on earth. Revolutionaries had to devote themselves completely to the cause and renounce their personal “I”. The party was to be reminiscent of a holy order – an exclusive community of egalitarian “monks-revolutionaries”,351 who, thanks to their involvement and self-sacrifice would save humanity (messianism) and attain the grace of building a Communist heaven on earth. In the case of the cult of Lenin and Stalin, whose remains were mummified and displayed as relics for public viewing in a mausoleum on Red Square, the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 57 association with religion and sacralization of power speaks for itself. In the Soviet Union, ideology fulfilled the functions that had earlier been attributed to Orthodoxy – it became a source of legitimization of power and sacralization of the new order and the main determinant of identity for more than 290 million citizens of the USSR. However, it is worth stressing that, all in all, the forced policy of atheisation did not turn out to be very successful considering the efforts invested into supporting it. According to the official data, 18 per cent of the population were declared atheists in the USSR in 1970.352 Paul Froese, who has analysed the dynamics and consequences of atheisation in the USSR, argues that the Soviet campaign failed because the Communist Party did not fully understand and therefore neglected the nonempirical aspect of religion which could not be replaced with scientific atheism.353 It can be argued, that the break-up of the Soviet Union was, among others things, caused by exhaustion of the ideological legitimization, thus sharing the fate of the idea of samoderzhavie in 1917. The loss of faith in the sverkhideya hastened the revival of nationalism and separatist tendencies in particular republics. Mikhail Gorbachev – the last secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – in the face of the “ideological bankruptcy” of Communism instinctively sought an understanding with the Orthodox Church, which represented a definite ethos. The festive celebration of the millennial anniversary of the baptism of Rus in June 1988 was supposed to unite Russians. Two months before the beginning of the millennial celebrations, a meeting took place between Patriarch Pimen and members of the Holy Synod with Gorbachev, who acknowledged the earlier antichurch policy as a mistake and promised to enact a new law on religion.354 In the same year a sobor was called which took steps aimed at reorganizing the church, and when in the beginning of the final decade of the twentieth century the changes taking place in the USSR picked up speed, the ROC was directed by the successor of the deceased (May 1990) Patriarch Pimen – Alexy II. The Soviet Union’s new law on religion, enacted on 1 October 1990, was well received by the ROC. Religious institutions were granted status as legal entities, the Council on Religious Affairs’ direct influence on churches was reduced, and the possibility of religious education for children was created. In the bill accepted a month later by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the council was replaced by a Commission on Matters of Religious Freedom, the rigorous separation of church and state was mitigated, and optional religious lessons were allowed.355 Moreover, the Soviet authorities began to return previously confiscated churches, including those within the Kremlin, to the church, and in 1991 – at the request of the patriarch – Christmas was declared a public holiday. This was the last year of the USSR’s existence, and its unexpected break-up became a challenge for both the Russian state and the church. *** Analysis of the significance of the religious factor in Russian history highlights the prominent role of the Orthodox Church. Throughout centuries, the church

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was the second most important political symbol of Russia, after the state, and the evolution of their mutual relations marks the stages of Russian history. The models of relations between sacerdotium and imperium were drawn from Byzantium, where the church, developing under the auspices of the emperor – the regent of Christ – served the state in the realization of “God’s plan”. The Byzantine legacy, encompassing the sacralization of secular power and its predominance over the church, the ideal of a universal Christian empire and the sense of having a mission were assumed by the Russian state. Initially, in Kievan Rus, the church was an independent institution, whose favour, support or mediation was sought by rulers struggling among themselves. In the period of subjugation to the Golden Horde, the Orthodox Church received many land grants and privileges, which significantly strengthened its position with regard to the princes of Rus. Historians emphasize that the “Mongol yoke” was a time when the church knew greater freedom in relation to native authority, while at the same time the khans, who at the beginning of the fourteenth century converted to Islam, introduced the principle of freedom of cult in exchange for the unconditional loyalty of religious institutions. When the Muscovite princes, not without the help of the church itself, united Rus and broke free from dependency on Sarai, the initiative in the relations between the church and secular authority was on the side of the monarch. Even the Smuta at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not reverse this tendency. Nikon – the last church leader who strove to subordinate the monarch to the patriarch – lost in the sobor of 1666. As a result of the expansion into the heart of the Asian interior, beginning with the victories of Ivan the Terrible over the Volga khanates, the tsars ruled over an increasingly large, multi-ethnic and multi-confessional empire. A condition for maintaining the integrity of the state was a strong central authority, capable of controlling religious conflicts, administrating religions, and deciding on the legalization or marginalization of a given religious institution. In the eighteenth century, the emperors became the main creators of religious structures. Churches, which from the perspective of state interests, fulfilled the criteria of loyalty and usefulness (or the minimum requirement – harmlessness), were de facto absorbed by the apparatus of the tsarist administration. The most important religions became “nationalized”, which enabled the rulers to use the churches both in domestic and foreign policy, a good example of which is the Orthodox missionary activity, treated as part of the tsarist diplomacy. Instrumentalization of religion caused the growth of anti-clerical sentiments. The church lost its status as the repository of truth, while sacralization of the state gained in strength. An important source of sanctification of secular authority in the history of Russia were its military victories: the triumph of Alexander Nevsky over the army of the Livonian Brothers of the Sword, the defeat of the Mongols when Byzantium was about to fall, the victory of Peter I over the Swedes and the two “Patriotic Wars” – were events that confirmed the conviction of the rulers and the ruled as to the special mission entrusted to Russia by Providence. In the history of the Russian state, the religious factor fulfilled roles of identity-formation, legitimization, integration, creation of culture, social functions and in foreign

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 59 policy – diplomatic and civilizing functions. From the point of view of those holding power in the Russian Federation such potential of religious institutions had to be used. The first years following the collapse of the USSR – defined by Russians themselves as a new Smuta, a time when the power of state is weak and cannot neutralize decentralizing tendencies, avert economic collapse and changes in society – forced religious institutions to define their position in the new order that was forming. In thinking about the form of religious relations in the Russian Federation, both the majority of politicians as well as clergy looked towards proven models from the past.

2

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation

The religiosity of Russian society and its influence on the political preferences of citizens Religiosity is an element of social consciousness, a conglomerate of various ideas, worldviews and attitudes characterizing a certain group of people. This consciousness resembles a multi-dimensional structure in which particular elements are interconnected in every possible way, some of them interpenetrating each other, others being in largely independent of one another, while yet others are activated only during confrontation (under the influence of an event, a strong experience). In contrast to religion, which can be seen as an objectified phenomenon, religiosity is understood as a collection of ideas, values, convictions and attitudes towards non-empirical reality, as well as opinions about humanity’s relationships with this reality and the consequences of this worldview for a person’s functioning in empirical reality. It has a subjective character and is strongly grounded in the socio-cultural context and connected with religious institutions. When first approaching this concept, researchers usually used frequency of religious practice and the role of an individual within the framework of religious institutions as a measure of religiosity.1 They began to devise scales of religiosity, taking into consideration different parameters (dimensions). A significant contribution to the field was made by Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark: using their work we can distinguish seven dimensions: overall relation to faith (combining an individual’s self-declaration of faith with the individual’s own assessment of the degree of intensity of his or her religiosity), religious feelings (concerning the intensity of the experience of religious emotions: for example, the sense of God’s presence, the experience of “heavenly intervention”), religious practice (e.g. the frequency of participation in Mass, receiving the Eucharist, reading the Gospels), agreement of the individual’s beliefs with those postulated by his or her professed faith (e.g. his or her notion of God, acceptance of the dogma of the Holy Trinity, the immaculate conception, resurrection, life after death), familiarity with the principles of faith (e.g. knowledge of the main figures of the Gospels, the Four Evangelists), membership in a community or religious organization (e.g. involvement in parish affairs) and the effects of the individual’s religious worldview on his behaviour in “secular” reality. Based on this, seven parameters of religiosity have

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 61 been formulated: self-identification (overall relation to faith), intellectual (religious knowledge), ideological (religious ideology), experiential (religious feelings), ritual (religious practice), community (religious community) and consequential/ethical (religious morality) parameters. One of the effects of the fall of the USSR and the “ideological fiasco” of the scientific atheism forced on society was the religious revival noticeable over the entire post-Soviet area in the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century – concerning both traditional religions and new religious movements. The thesis of a “religious renaissance” found, to some extent, reflection in sociological studies, which at the same time revealed the specificity of religiosity of Russian society.2 On the level of self-identification, the phenomenon of religious revival is the least problematical. The first studies conducted by Sergey Filatov, Ludmila Vorontsova and Dmitriy Furman, show that in the years 1990 to 1993 the fraction of the “believing” population grew from 29 to 40 per cent, while the group defining themselves as atheists halved – from 16 to 8 per cent.3 A real “religious boom” concerned mostly Orthodoxy: according to information published by the Levada Centre from 1989 to 1994, the number of believers increased by 26 per cent and, although a weakening of this tendency was later noted, in the course of the decade 1997–2007 the fraction of individuals identifying with Orthodoxy rose from 45 to 66 per cent (70 per cent in 2008). During this same period, other religions barely managed to maintain their numbers; however, the group of declared non-believers noticeably decreased from 45 to 23 per cent. According to the latest studies conducted by the Levada Centre in February 2008, among 1600 respondents representing 130 localities, 71 per cent were Orthodox, 5 per cent Muslim, 1 per cent each Catholics and Protestants, less than 1 per cent Buddhists and Jews, and 5 per cent atheists.4 On the basis of this information, Russian society should be classified as very religious, but studies show that in 2008, 5 per cent of respondents considered themselves “very religious”, 37 per cent “religious to some extent”, 33 per cent “rather non-religious” and 20 per cent “not religious at all”.5 Taking into consideration the ritual parameter makes the specificity of the Russian “religious renaissance” stand out. The clear growth in the number of people declaring themselves as believers only insignificantly influenced an increase in “church attendance”. According to surveys, only 6–8 per cent of Orthodox believers and 4 per cent of Muslims participate in a religious service at least once a month. Importantly, this result has been maintained without major changes since 1991.6 The number of believers who do not go to church at all has decreased, although they still make up the largest group – 38 per cent (compared to 65 per cent in 1991). Moreover, 78 per cent of Russian Orthodox believers never take communion (in 2007); 34 per cent never pray (2008). In the case of Muslims, the frequency of participation in religious ceremonies appears slightly worse: 12 per cent declare their participation to be once a month, 14 per cent several times a year or less, and 50 per cent do not participate in ceremonies at all.7 The large disproportion between the self-identification and ritual parameters is the most characteristic feature of the religiosity of Russian society, mainly of Orthodox believers. Nikolai Mitrokhin distinguishes two groups among them: the

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minority, not exceeding 10 per cent, of votserkovlennie (воцерковленные) – those who regularly practice – and the decided majority of zakhozhani (захожани), coming to church sporadically, usually for the purpose of “praying” for the fulfilment of a specific request (Mitrokhin defines them as “those who come to light a candle”).8 The low indicators for the ritual parameter have been questioned by scholars from the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Vyacheslav Lokosov and Yulia Sinelina, who in May 2008 estimated the fraction of practising Orthodox believers at 34 per cent. This result – high for Russia – was achieved thanks to the use of a wide definition of “practising” individuals, among whom are counted: votserkovlennie (воцерковленные: 10 per cent) and (semi-) poluvotserkovlennie (полувоцерковленные: 24 per cent), and also a separate group (14 per cent) of Orthodox believers who are “on their way to the church”.9 The Moscow patriarchate reacted enthusiastically to the information above, but most sociologists discredited it, questioning the rationale for creating the category of “semi-practising”.10 If this criticism is accepted, the number of “practising” drops to a level nearly consistent with the earlier established average: 6–8 per cent. The discrepancy between the aspects of self-identification and practice is considered a manifestation of religion’s functioning in Russian society primarily as a determinant of membership in a given community, with only secondary significance as a determinant of personal worldview. The “attribution” of a religious confession to specific nations, deriving from the times of the tsars, has led to the consolidation in society’s consciousness of stereotypes of “traditional” Catholics (Poles and Lithuanians), Protestants (Germans, Finns, Estonians and Latvians), Buddhists (Kalmyks, Buryats, Tuvinians) and Muslims (Tatars, Bashkirs, peoples of the Caucasus, Azeris and nations of central Asia).11 It is worth recalling that in tsarist Russia only the Orthodox Church had the right to conduct missionary activities outside its “traditional ethnic milieu”. Proselytism of other religions, perceived as subversive and anti-state activity, was banned. In the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Russian Empire, the functioning of the Orthodox Church as a state church, and Orthodoxy as a legitimizing source for power and the basis of identity for the dominant nation (eastern Slavs) led to the formation of so-called Russian Orthodoxy,12 which through its tight connection – de facto, identification – with the essence of Russianness, in many respects resembles Jewish or Armenian religion. This phenomenon is still universal in Russian society. For many people in twenty-first century Russia, baptism is an act of identification, and Orthodoxy is an essential component of national identity. Respondents, when asked whether they are “Orthodox”, give their answer for the most part thinking, “Yes, I am Russian”. Mikhail Mchedlov emphasizes the ethnic homogeneity of the two most important religious communities – 88.8 per cent of Orthodox believers are Russians and 1 per cent are ethnicities that have “traditionally” been Islamic. In turn, among Muslims, believers of “traditional” ethnicity make up more than 90 per cent, Russians 2 per cent, and other “non-Islamic” ethnicities 4 per cent.13 Attributing religion to specific ethnicities is well reflected in the statement of the mufti of Tatarstan – Gusman Iskhakov – who asserted that he did not support the

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 63 conversion of ethnic Russians to Islam because of the irrevocable incompatibility between the Russian mentality and the truth of Islam. Moreover, in the opinion of Iskhakov, Russian converts are usually aggressive.14 The primary significance of religion as a factor of identity is confirmed by other aspects of Russian religiosity. Particularly interesting is the ideological parameter in the context of the phenomenon of “Orthodox atheism”. The justifiability of this seemingly absurd phrase, which Alexander Lukashenka used in his first presidential campaign,15 is confirmed by studies, according to which among Russian believers indicating their belonging to a specific religion, there exists a group of “non-believers in God”. In the year 2000 these individuals represented 17 per cent, in 2001 21 per cent,16 and in 2008 16 per cent.17 Looking at this data, it is worth referring to the especially apt diagnosis of Dmitriy Furman concerning the paradox of Russian religiosity – with regard to the number of individuals identifying with a specific religion, Russian society resembles those in the Middle East, with regard to declaration of belief in God, citizens of the Russian Federation are situated lower than the average level of a secular Western European state.18 The functioning of religion mainly as a symbol of mass identification and moral and political unity, as well as an idea welding together the secular community is most visible in the case of Orthodoxy. Nikolai Mitrokhin proposed differentiation between declared Orthodox “believers” and those “belonging to Orthodox culture”, which could include, for example, atheists who celebrate religious holidays.19 The formula “Russian Orthodoxy” encompasses not only Orthodox monarchists or nationalists, but also Communists who consider outstanding service to the Russian state as the most important (and maybe only) criterion of “holiness”. In their convictions, Ivan the Terrible was the first tsar, and thus the first anointed one who revived Rus; Rasputin fulfilled the role of John the Baptist, who prepared Nicholas II – the regent of Christ – to redeem Russia with his own blood; Stalin, in turn, was the “father of nations who gathered up the lands of Rus, drove out foreigners and created a social minimum”.20 Perception of Orthodoxy exclusively in categories of native tradition makes it difficult for many “belonging to the Orthodox culture” to understand why a Christian church cannot grant sainthood to Kosmodemyanskaya,21 an atheist who gave up her life for Communism, or to Morozov,22 a boy who denounced his own father. Attempts to force the canonization of these figures signal the low intellectual parameter of religiosity of Russian believers. In the case of nearly every world religion, it is possible to distinguish the official trend, formed by religious institutions and the clergy, and the so-called popular trend, which is related to notions of faith and rituals widespread among the faithful, but not always in agreement with the dogma in force. In Russian society, the popular trend is very strong, and religious institutions usually place the blame for this state of affairs – not without a reason – on the brutal, Soviet anti-religious policies, which for seven decades interrupted the natural process of “inheritance” of religiosity by subsequent generations, destroyed the system of religious education and eliminated clergy from the life of society. In religious communities which survived the USSR, functions

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previously reserved for priests had been assumed by the faithful – conducting Mass, issuing the sacraments, and so on. The popular trend in Russia has a conservative and syncretic character. The influences of pagan traditions are apparent in it, and great significance is attached to the proper way of conducting ceremonies – what counts is the faithful re-creation of the “old” or “true” rituals. Due to shallow acquaintance with the ritual and its relative abstruseness the prayers which are not completely understood take on the character of spells, and religious symbols become talismans. Applying Durkheim’s perspective brings us to the conclusion that in the Russian Federation in the twenty-first century, religion has in many cases been degraded to the role of “utilitarian magic” which has no ambition to soothe existential dilemmas or tackle transcendental issues, but to multiply happiness, ensure good health and luck, or protect against evil charms.23 The magical nature of Russian religiosity is confirmed by data concerning Russians’ relationship to astrology and the occult. Studies reveal that belief in horoscopes, witches, charms, talismans and spells by citizens of the Russian Federation are matched only by inhabitants of Latin America. What is curious is that the fraction of those interested in astrology among individuals with a higher education and skilled workers is higher in the case of Russian respondents than believers in Latin America. Moreover, in Russia the fascination with the occult is manifested decidedly more often among believers than atheists.24 With the exception of self-identification, the remaining parameters of the religiosity of Russian society are not impressive. The low intellectual, ideological and ritual aspects also influence the low level of activity of the faithful on behalf of their religious community: in 1998 93 per cent of interviewed were not involved in any way in the life of their church during the last 12 months (the community parameter).25 The impression that the religiosity of Russian society is superficial, reflected in the low parameter of consistency, cannot be avoided. For the majority, religion is mainly a question of national identity and does not determine their system of values. In 2007 religion did not have any significance or played only a small role in the lives of 65 per cent of respondents, and only 12 per cent would want to inculcate in their children a belief in God.26 Russians, asked in 2008 about the place of religious institutions in the public sphere, for the most part indicated their educational function (formation of social morality, 46 per cent), social work (helping the poor, 30 per cent), protecting the national culture (29 per cent), functions strictly connected with cult (29 per cent), integration (building a national community, 22 per cent), while in the opinion of 15 per cent, religious institutions should not be active at all in the public sphere.27 The relatively high social acceptance of a role as “educators” for religious institutions does not mean, however, agreement to religious education – in the question of religious lessons, Russians are divided,28 and one fifth consider that in “school there is no place for religion”. Even in the formation of moral attitudes, respondents assess the influence of religious institutions much lower than family (72 per cent) or school (15 per cent).29 Russians do not believe in the effectiveness of the most influential religious institution – the

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 65 Moscow patriarchate. The solutions to difficult problems proposed by the ROC appear to be less convincing than state intervention: for example, 18 per cent believe that introducing the institution of military chaplains will help to eliminate the phenomenon of dedovshchina (hazing) in the Russian army, while more than half of respondents put their stakes in the military police and one fifth in psychologists.30 The majority of Russian citizens dislike the political activity of religious institutions, including the ROC. Sixty-one per cent do not agree that the church should influence decisions made by state organs; 58 per cent consider that decision makers should not be guided by their own religious worldview; 70 per cent are against privileging Orthodox believers; 68 per cent do not want to pay a tax in support of their church,31 and more than 75 per cent would not vote for an “Orthodox party”.32 From the data quoted above, it follows that Russian society is laicized, against clericalization of the public sphere and the dismantling of the secular state. In sum, the religious factor does not have great influence on political preferences of citizens; however, the high indicator of trust that Russians – including nonbelievers – have for the Orthodox Church allows one to make the assumption that the ROC can influence the political scene. Since the collapse of the USSR, in the face of the chaotic Russian transformation, the Moscow patriarchate has remained the leader in the ranking of institutions enjoying the greatest trust of society and was “dethroned” only by Vladimir Putin in 2007, 86 per cent of those questioned declared they trusted the president, while the church came second with 64 per cent.33 In the yearly ranking of the hundred most influential Russian politicians, Patriarch Alexy II was found in the top 15. Patriarch Kirll’s public position is even stronger – in the ranking of most trusted polititians (sic!) of 2011 he held 6th place, ahead of Sergey Lavrov, Sergey Ivanov, Sergey Sobyanin, Yevgeny Primakov or Viktor Zubkov.34 Moreover, in 2007, in the ranking of the most influential political activists, in every subject of the federation, bishops of the ROC took fourth place, right after representatives of the executive and legislative powers and the mayor of the capital city, and before the director of the FSB subdepartment and the Inspector General – such a high position means a huge advance for the Orthodox hierarchs, who occupied eighteenth place in the first studies done in 2003.35 The expectations of a large group of citizens that the head of state must reckon with could testify as to the specific position of the Moscow patriarchate in the public sphere. More than half of the respondents require the president to show particular respect for the ROC in consideration of its exceptional significance for the Russian people, and 45 per cent consider that even if the president is not a religious person, he should foster close relations with the ROC and celebrate church holidays, including Christmas and Easter.36 In other words, the religiosity of the head of state is not significant as long as the president emphasizes his adherane to the Russian national community – that he is “Russian” or “ours”. Thus, the influence of the religious factor on politics is not connected with religiosity, but is a consequence of the role that the religious component plays in the formation of Russian identity. The quality of the relationship between the rulers and religious

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institutions (mainly the ROC) and the nature of the religious policy they carry out influences the political preferences of citizens,37 and one could therefore argue that while a tight alliance with the church does not bring a growth in popularity in politics, it also true that it is not advisable to have a declared adversary in the Moscow patriarchate. After all, the Kremlin, which attempts to use the church and Orthodox tradition to rebuild Russian collective memory (Danièle HervieuLéger’s concept of religion), is not set on antagonizing the church. Russians rely on the might of the state to solve their problems:38 reform of the army, alleviation of social tensions and tackling the problem of low birth rate. They expect religious institutions to tend to the spiritual needs of believers; however, they attribute a special position to the Orthodox Church, which for most citizens is a national symbol. Russian law on relations between church and state is formed under the influence of two postulates, reflecting the scheme above: a secular state that guarantees freedom of conscience and safeguards the national tradition of Russian Orthodoxy.

Interfaith relations in the Russian Federation in light of the legal regulations in force Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic established a new law on religion in October 1990: the Law on Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations was accepted, corresponding to the standards of a democratic state: guaranteeing the neutrality of the state’s worldview, equality of all religious associations39 and freedom of religious activity. Liberal regulations led to a growth in activity of foreign missionaries and the dynamic development of new religious movements, which soon roused the misgivings of “native” religious institutions (above all, the ROC and the muftiates), which began to lobby for a more stringent law and strengthening of their position with respect to “foreign” religions. The struggle to change the law on religion went on for four years in the state Duma. The first initiative appeared in February 1993. Patriarch Alexy II himself tried to persuade the deputies to support it, but the bill was vetoed by the president. Boris Yeltsin did not hesitate to reject the revised document again in August 1993 and promised to do so a third time, when in July 1997 a new initiative in this matter was announced in the Duma. Ultimately, the president did not risk a spectacular defeat in parliament and on 26 July 1997 signed the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.40 The present act, together with constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience, is the foundation of the Russian law on religion. In accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution, “the Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one. Religious associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the law”.41 The constitutional neutrality of worldview of the Russian state was confirmed by Art. 4 of the 1997 law.42 Moreover, the state guarantees equality of rights and freedoms of person and citizen independently of his or her religious beliefs, and forbids any form of limitation of the rights of citizens due to religious affiliation

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 67 (Art. 19 of the Constitution).43 Freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess any or no religion and the right to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious views, and also the right to receive religious instruction are confirmed in the Constitution (Art. 28) and in the 1997 law (Art. 3 and 5). For religious associations44 the legislature establishes two forms: religious groups and religious organizations. In contrast to organizations, groups are not required to register and are not legal entities, which limits their activity.45 Organizations, in turn, are divided into local46 and centralized47 and are required to undergo state registration.48 The Law on Freedom of Conscience also introduces the idea of foreign religious organizations – those organizations that were founded outside Russia’s borders in accordance with the laws of another state. Such an organization can open a representative body on the territory of the Russian Federation without the right to conduct religious activity, and is subject to special registration.49 These norms do not differ from the standards of religious pluralism in a state governed by rule of law: separation of church and state, constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, equality of all religious associations and a registration system. However, some points in the 1997 law have evoked protests – not without reason – both in Russia and abroad. In the preamble to the law, there is a point distinguishing those religions which, according to lawmakers, “are an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia”. Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism50 and Judaism are mentioned directly,51 while Orthodoxy is attributed a special historical role and contribution to the spiritual and cultural development of Russia. This formulation gave rise to the idea of “traditional religions” in Russian law on religion. The next weakening of the principle of equality of all religious associations was the reservation of the right to use the word “Russia” or “Russian” in an association’s official title only for those centralized religious organizations that have had legal structures on the territory of the Russian Federation for at least 50 years.52 Only a few of the religious communities can meet this condition. The establishment of registration norms exclusively for those local religious organizations that could present proof of the existence of their own structures on a given territory for at least 15 years had even more serious consequences.53 The final deadline for registration was 31 December 1999; after that, associations which to that point had not been able to legalize their status were to be eliminated by force of law.54 In the face of dramatic reactions from the majority of religious associations, which in December of 1999 were still unable to meet the legal requirements of registration, and under pressure from protests and the insistence of the “international community”,55 Vladimir Putin extended this deadline to the end of 2000.56 The de facto differentiation of religious associations was intended. The main purpose of the 1997 law was to restrain the influx of foreign missionaries to Russia and to limit the activities of religious associations that maintain intensive contacts with foreign religious communities. Together with the new regulations, there appeared a problem with the interpretation of the concept of “traditional religions”, left undefined by the legislature, which in turn motivated some politicians to take steps with the aim of giving the term “traditional religions” the status of a

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legal category. Some of the hierarchs of the Moscow patriarchate began to appeal to the special role of Orthodoxy, indicated in the law, as an argument for introducing a mandatory school subject – “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” (Osnovy pravoslavnoy kultury / Основы православной культуры, ОПК).57 Although many experts stress that the distinction or the de facto privileging of select religious organizations by the secular state is against the Constitution,58 in 2001 the Russian Ministry of Justice prepared two bills, the adoption of which would sanction the special relationship between the state and the ROC. Neither proposal (“The Basis of State–Church Relations in the Russian Federation” and “The Concept of State Policy Regarding Relations with Religious Associations in the Russian Federation”)59 was accepted, however, by the president’s administration. The introduction of a tax for the support to religious institutions also failed.60 A year later, three initiatives were announced concerning the regulation of relations between the state and the “historic religions of Russia”: two were presented by deputy Alexander Chuyev, “On Traditional Religions of the Russian Federation” (February 5) and “On the Social Partnership of the State and Traditional Religious Organizations in the Russian Federation” (March 21), while the third, “On the Social Partnership of the State with Traditional Religions for the Protection of National Spiritual Tradition and the Maintenance of Social Welfare for the Russian Population” (May 14), was promoted in the Duma by Sergey Glazev.61 These bills foresaw the introduction of legal criteria for defining “traditional religions”,62 the establishment of a central organ to coordinate religious policy and the formation of a “social partnership” between the state and the favoured religious institutions that assumes cooperation in the sphere of education and the media, strengthening of national security, law and foreign policy. There were also proposals for granting special status to the Orthodox Church as the church of the majority of citizens, and for signing of a “concordat” (agreement on bilateral cooperation) between the state and the “traditional religions”.63 Even before his election as patriarch of the ROC, Kirill Gundyayev argued that the status of the four “traditional religions” should be modelled after the religious legislation in Greece or Georgia, guaranteeing each of these denominations special status either in the Constitution or else in a separate agreement.64 The second issue after traditional religions which is central to the debate on Russian law on religion is the problem of the state’s “spiritual security”65 (dukhovnaya bezopasnost / духовная безопасность), connected with the fight against religious extremism. On 27 July 2002 a Law on Counteracting Extremist Activity was passed increasing the rights of the authorities with respect to religious institutions, such as introducing the possibility of the prosecutor suspending an organization’s activities until a court decision is reached.66 A year earlier, in the Law on Political Parties (11 July 2001), it was forbidden to establish a party based on a certain profession, race, ethnicity or religious affiliation. Also significant are regulations in force on the territories of particular federal subjects – often going further than the federal law, for example, in Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino–Balkaria, where “wahhabist activity” was explicitly outlawed.67 In 2004, in turn, the authorities of

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 69 the Republic of Adygea tried to introduce a ban on propagating religious content through literature and audio-video materials in pre-schools and schools and on visiting homes in connection with religious activity.68 Within the context of counteracting extremism, attempts were undertaken to legally limit the activity of religious sects and proselytism by foreigners. In 2006 the Ministry of Justice produced an initiative, “The Struggle with Unlawful Missionary Activity”, proposing, among other things, the criminalization of acts which were earlier only a basis for eliminating religious organizations, widening the definition of missionary activity and introducing special visas for missionaries.69 A similar idea was announced by Dmitry Medvedev, suggesting that a special mode of naturalizing foreign missionaries would be worked out, so that most of them would have Russian citizenship and be subject to Russian law.70 In 2008 the Duma discussed the two further bills, foreseeing more severe penalties for extremist activity and striking directly at religious institutions, such as giving local authorities the powers to eliminate organizations without a court order after issuing a second official warning.71 The bill proposals foresaw more severe penalties for organizing extremist groups – up to three years imprisonment – and the obligation of state registration for groups numbering more that ten people.72 Another noteworthy initiative in 2008 was the bill proposed by Alexander Chuyev, a Duma member, which would give an act of violence committed against a clergyman the status of an attack on a civil servant; however, despite the support of Communists and nationalists, the parliamentary majority rejected this initiative, as well as the one proposed by a member of the Federation Council, Issa Kostoeva73 concerning the restoration of the Julian calendar (used by the ROC) in Russia. On the day of voting (11 April 2008) the only the person who voted in favour of the bill was the individual who sponsored it, while 446 deputies refrained.74 Russian law on religion evolved from granting religious associations equal status and full freedom of action to the gradual introduction of restrictions and differentiation of the state’s relations with particular religious institutions. The formation in Russia of a “model of cooperation”75 between the state and religious associations is encouraged by the role of state organs in forming relations with confessional organizations. Among the most important of these are the Council on Cooperation with Religious Associations with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation (established in 1995), led by the chair of the presidential administration;76 the State Duma Committee on Social Organizations and Religious Associations; the Commission on Religious Associations of the Government of the Russian Federation; the Federation Council Commission on National Policy and Relations between the State and Religious Associations; the Department on Rights of Freedom of Conscience with the Office of Ombudsman of the Russian Federation; and the less well-known Social Council77 of the Federal Registration Service.78 Analysis of law on religion shows the de facto privileging of “traditional religions”. Despite the constitutional guarantees of equality of all religious communities, their positions in the Russian religious system significantly differ.

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Status of the most important religious institutions in the Russian Federation The status of religious institutions in Russia is determined mainly by the number of members, their infrastructure, property and relations with the authorities and other religious confessions. In January 2007 there were nearly 23,00079 registered religious organizations of 59 confessions and denominations in the Russian Federation, more than half of which are parishes of the ROC.80 According to information from 2007,81 around 100 million citizens of the Russian Federation consider themselves Orthodox, and the number of Muslims fluctuates between 14 and 23 million; taking into account present demographic trends, this proportion will change in favour of Islamic believers, who by 2015 should be the largest group in the Russian army and by 2020 make up one fifth of the entire population.82 Currently there are more than 2 million Protestants living in Russia, almost 2 million Buddhists, around 600,000 Jews and the same number of Catholics. The most developed infrastructure belongs to the ROC, which has 196 archbishoprics, 156 bishoprics, 29,141 parishes, 769 monasteries and 30,544 chapels83 (chasovni) in the territory of the Russian state. The structures of the remaining Orthodox churches are almost negligible, representing around 1 per cent of the institutions of the ROC: more than 200 parishes belong to the Old Believers, including 146 of the Russian Orthodox Old-Rite Church (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Staroobryadcheskaya Tserkov / Русская Православная Старообрядческая Церковь),84 74 of the Old Orthodox Church (Drevlepravoslavnaya Tserkov / Древлеправославная Церковь) and 42 of the Pomorian Orthodox Church (Pomorskaya Tserkov / Поморская Церковь).85 Moreover, 41 parishes are subject to the ROC Outside Russia, 36 to the Russian Autonomous Orthodox Church (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Avtonomnaya Tserkov / Русская Православная Автономная Церковь), 19 to the True Orthodox Church (Istinno-Pravoslavnaya Tserkov / Истинно-Православная Церковь), 14 to the Free Russian Orthodox Church (Rossiyskaya Pravoslavnaya Svobodnaya Tserkov / Российская Православная Свободная Церковь), 8 to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Ukrainskaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov / Украинская Православная Церковь) and 26 to the Orthodox Church of the Holy Mother Derzhavnaya (Pravoslavnaya Tserkov Bozhiey Materi Derzhavnaya / Православная Церковь Божией Матери Державная).86 In terms of the development of infrastructure, neither the Catholic Church (with 235 registered parishes87), nor the Greek Catholic Church (5), nor the Armenian (57) can match the ROC. However, Protestant Churches occupy second place after the ROC in terms of registered organizations (4,708), thus surpassing Islamic institutions. Among the Protestant communities in Russia, one can distinguish autochthonous trends (e.g. the Molokans, Dukhobors, or the Etika Povedenia Movement that arose in the early 1990s (important, not 1980s!) led by Sergey Ustyuzhanin”88), early Protestantism (e.g. Lutherans, Anglicans and Calvinists) as well as neo-Protestantism/late Protestantism (e.g. Pentecostals, Seventh-Day Adventists, Baptists, Methodists, Mormons, the Salvation Army, Jehovah’s Witnesses). The number of believers, particularly in

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 71 neo-Protestant churches, is growing in Russia each year – these communities are developing so dynamically that in Siberia or the Far East they are beginning to equal “traditional religions” in number.89 Considering their lack of a uniform, centralized structure, it is difficult to determine precisely the number of Protestant institutions, especially since more and more of them stop trying to register for fear of the trouble that local governments might give them. There exists, however, the Consultation Council of Representatives of Protestant Churches in Russia, created by the four strongest organizations – the Union of Evangelical ChristiansBaptists of Russia (over 100,000 members, 922 communities), the Russian Union of Christians of the Evangelical Pentecostal Faith (over 300,000 members, 1,398 communities), the Russian Union of Christians of the Evangelical Faith (1200 communities)90 and the Church of Seventh Day Adventists (620 communities). It is estimated that the churches united in the Consultation Council bring together 85 per cent of all Russian Protestants. In discussing Protestant communities in Russia, it is worth drawing attention to the Lutheran Church – it has had the longest presence on Russian land and had been perceived until the 1990s as the church of an ethnic minority, mainly of Germans and Finns. In 1992 its headquarters were moved from Riga to St Petersburg, and two years later its name was changed from the German Evangelical Lutheran Church to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Most of the clergy are Germans, who see as their primary aim not so much the spread of faith among all citizens of the Russian Federation, as religious revival among Russian Germans. Over the years, pastors have received financial support from the German government, but despite this their efforts have not brought the expected results. The problems with the idea of rebuilding the Lutheran Church in Russia as the church of the German minority became apparent after four fifths of believers emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany after simplification of the visa procedures.91 In 2007, in the Russian Federation, there were 202 registered Lutheran communities; apart from the German Lutheran Evangelical Church, there are three other significant institutions of Lutheran denomination: the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia, founded in 2006 and led by Vladimir Pudov (a schismatic from the Evangelical Church in Germany);92 the Church of Ingria, owing its revival to the involvement of Pastor Arvo Survo;93 and the Biblical Lutheran Church founded in Novosibirsk by Russian Vsevolod Lytkin.94 Observing the Lutheran institutions in the Russian Federation, one may notice a rivalry between the German and American clergy (the Lutheran Church of Missouri). This rivalry intensified a previous division resulting from the presence of two traditions – the German and the Scandinavian (Church of Ingria). Lutheran Churches are gradually losing the character of national institutions of German and Finnish minorities. The generations born in the USSR for the most part do not know the language of their parents, which has necessitated replacing German with Russian in the liturgy, and this in turn helped draw Russians into the church. The Lutheran community is being Russified and taking on its own characteristics; a Russian Lutheran Church is being formed, conservative, opposed to female clergy and liberal treatment of homosexuality,95

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and claiming inspiration from Orthodox liturgy and strong connections with Russian tradition. In second place with regard to the number of believers, Islam is in third place with regard to the number of legalized organizations – the total of 3,600 Muslim communities make up 17 per cent of all registered communities. As in the case of Protestantism, Russian Islam does not have a centralized structure. The Spiritual Board of Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia (Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Evropeyskoy Chasti Rossii i Sibiri/Духовное управление мусульман Европейской части России и Сибири, ДУМЕС), having maintained a monopoly in the USSR, was undermined by the muftiates that arose in the beginning of the 1990s in particular republics (Bashkortostan, Tatarstan) and large cities (Moscow, Saratov, Omsk and Penza, among others). In 1998 independent muftiates ceased their destructive rivalry and established a division of their spheres of influence, reflected in the formation of two larger structures – the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Inner Russia (Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Evropeyskoy Chasti Rossii/Духовное управление мусульман Европейской части России, ДУМЕР, with mufti Rawil Gaynetdin as chairman) and the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Asiatic Russia (Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Aziatskoy Chasti Rossii/Духовное управление мусульман Азиатской части России, ДУМЧАР, with mufti Nafigulla Ashirov as chairman, and headquarters in Tobolsk).96 Several institutions presently claim the title of representative of all Russian Muslims, but their influence is limited on a nationwide scale by regional institutions that function on the territories of nearly every federal subject. Fifty-nine significant structures are distinguished,97 among which the most important are the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia (Tsentralnoye Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Rossii/Центральное духовное управление мусульман России, ЦДУМР, 900 communities, with Sheik-ul Islam Talgat Tadzhuddin as chairman, and headquarters in Ufa),98 the Council of Muftis of Russia (Soviet Muftiyev Rossii/ Совет муфтиев России, СМР, 700–800 communities, with mufti Rawil Gaynetdin as chairman, and headquarters in Moscow, founded in 1996),99 the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Asiatic Russia (ДУМЧАР), the Coordination Centre of Muslims of the Northern Caucasus (Koordinatsionniy Tsentr Musulman Severnogo Kavkaza/Координационный центр мусульман Северного Кавказа, numbering more than 1000 communities, with mufti Ismail Hadzhi Berdiyev as chairman, and headquarters in Moscow,100 founded in 2001) and the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan (Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Respubliki Tatarstan/Духовное управление мусульман Республики Татарстан – ДУМРТ, 1000 communities, with mufti Ildus Faizov as chairman and headquarters in Kazan, founded in 1998). According to information from the Ministry of Justice, there are 180 registered Buddhist communities in Russia, concentrated in ten organizations. The visit of the fourteenth Dalai Lama to Elista, the capital of Kalmykia, in 1991 was an event that dynamicized the rebuilding of the sangha. The centres arising in Russia initially attempted to establish relations with monasteries in Tibet and India, and later sought possibilities for closer contact with monks from Japan and South Korea.101

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 73 The Traditional Buddhist Sangha of Russia (Traditsionnaya Budiyskaya Sangkha Rossii / Традиционная Будыйская сангха России – ТБСР), representing the Gelug school, was registered relatively late, in 1999, due to internal rivalry and divisions. This organization, led by the Pandito Hambo Lama, Damba Ayusheyev, represents mainly the Buddhists of Buryatia. Ayusheyev is also the vice-chairman of the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (Азиатская буддийская конференция за мир). The conference is held every four years and serves as a platform for Asian Buddhists with participants from Vietnam, Cambodia, China and Mongolia.102 In Tuva, Buddhists are concentrated around the Kamba Lama, Lopsan Tupten (the headquarters of the office restored in 1997 are located in Kyzyl), while the Union of Buddhists of Kalmykia (Obyednenie Buddistov Kalmykii / Объеднение буддистов Калмыкии, ОБК, registered in 1991, with headquarters in Elista) is led by the Shadzhin Lama, Telo Tulku Rinpoche.103 Moreover, in 1998 in Ulan-Ude, the Spiritual Board of Buddhists, currently the Central Spiritual Board of Buddhists of Russia (Tsentralnoye Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Buddistov Rossii / Центральное духовное управление буддистов России) was registered with Nimazhap Ilyukhimov as the leader, and in 2001 on the initiative of Damba Ayusheyev the All Russian Coordinating Council of Buddhist Organizations (Vserossiyskiy Koordinatsionniy Soviet Buddiyskikh Organizatsiy/Всероссийский координационный совет буддийских организаций) was founded.104 Ayusheyev and Ilyukhimov present two streams of Buddhism in Buryatia. The former is a conservative, member of the old nomenclatura, loyal to the Kremlin, who favours Buddhism as the basis for local nationality; the latter stresses the religious aspect of Buddhistic revival. As Yevgenya Ostrovskaya has noticed, it is “national Buryiat” versus “poli-ethnic Buddhism”.105 Disputes between these two leaders casued a split in the Buryiat community. Important spiritual Buddhistic centres of Buryatia are Ivolginsky and Aginsky Datsans. In the 1990s institutions representing the Kagyu school appeared, such as the Buddhist Centre of the Diamond Way106 founded in 1994, and the “new Buddhism” (e.g. the “Green Tara” community registered in Ulan Ude in 1999)107 or the Aum Shinrikyo “Aleph” (which began its activities in Russia in 1992). Buddhism is counted among the “traditional religions”, but in reality this distinction applies only to the Gelug school. The state supports the Traditional Buddhist Sangha, which counteracts the spread of other schools (Kagyu and Dzogchen) in Russia. Importantly, as in the case of Lutheranism, Buddhism is slowly losing its character as the exclusive religion of three ethnicities (Buryats, Kalmyks and Tuvans), and since the end of the 1990s, ethnic Russians have dominated its adherents. Interestingly, another characteristic feature of the revival was a considerable political activity of lamas after 1989. Among those, who tried their luck in regional elections, were Erdem Tsybikdjapov, Dordjodjap Markhaev or Nimadjar Ilumkhimov.108 Two-hundred and fifty-six Jewish communities109 are subordinated to two central institutions – the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (Federatsia Evreyskikh Obshchin Rossii / Федерация еврейских общин России, ФЕОР, with Rabbi Berel Lazar as chairman) and the Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Communities of Russia (Kongress Evreyskikh Religioznikh Organizatsiy i Obshchin Rossii / Конгресс еврейских религиозных организаций и общин

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России, КЕРООР, with Rabbi Adolph Shayevich as chairman).110 Both organisations struggle with each other for the title of representative of all Russian Jews, however in face of the activeness of the Orthodox Church and Islamic communities, initiatives to merge into one central organization have appeared.111 Against such a background, the ROC stands out among religious organizations as the unquestioned leader, followed by the remaining “traditional religions” and the minority religions, among which we can distinguish historical churches (e.g. the Armenian, Catholic, Lutheran and Anglican Churches) and the new religious movements (such as the Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Zen Buddhists and Hare Krishna). A similar division is noticeable when taking into consideration the financial situation of religious institutions. Despite guarantees in the Constitution of the Russian Federation as to the neutrality of the state’s worldview and equality of all religious organizations, the “traditional religions” are in a far better material situation than other communities, largely thanks to the favourable treatment by the authorities, which decided on the return of nationalized properties (including land), grant financial support and tax relief, as well as radio and television concessions.112 For all “traditional religions”, not excluding the ROC, regaining properties confiscated by the Bolsheviks is a priority. President Putin understood this perfectly when he described the seizure of church goods as a “deeply immoral” act113 and assured that the “state will make every effort to return the properties of the ROC and other traditional religions as quickly as possible”.114 The greatest controversy is stirred up by the return of landholdings, because full restitution would mean that the ROC would inevitably become the largest land owner in the Russian Federation. The solution supported by the Moscow patriarchate (creation of a special legal category of “church land”) is far from realization, however the “Land Code” enacted in 2001 enables religious organizations to lease land on favourable terms. Moreover, in October 2007, under the influence of the “church lobby”, a change was made to the code, which extended the period of favourable regulations until 1 October 2010.115 In February 2009 a new “Land Code” bill appeared in the Duma, foreseeing, among other things, the transfer to the ROC of property leased by it to date (in the years 2004–2009, the federal authorities transferred 76 sites to the ROC).116 In fact, the government only takes into consideration the claims of “traditional religions” to confiscated property, and only these denominations can count on financial support from the authorities (on the central and local levels), which assist the churches in their programmes for rebuilding and protecting the national heritage. The biggest beneficiary of subsidies is the Russian Orthodox Church: in 2004 the state earmarked 200 million roubles for the renovation of 50 Orthodox churches, three years later for the same purpose 1½ billion roubles were spent from the national budget (364 sites were restored), and President Medvedev announced that in the years 2008 to 2010 the state would hand over 2 billion roubles a year for the protection of the Orthodox national heritage.117 Local authorities also allot means for religious organizations from their budgets. For example, they co-finance the celebration of religious festivities, and they help renovate old and cooperate in building new places of worship.118 The mayor of Moscow Sergey Sobyanin

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 75 decided to hand over to the ROC 60 lots for new churches in the capital. This decision obviously contrasted with the refusal of a new mosque.119 The ROC is supported also by state enterprises. In the 1990s, with the consent of political decision makers, the ROC became a shareholder in certain companies. Nikolai Mitrokhin indicated that in this period, the ROC controlled 20–40 per cent of stocks of the oil company RAO MES (РАО МЭС),120 which meant that the church received 8 per cent of the company’s profits from the sale of oil. The ROC also generated income from the import of raw materials from Iraq and the harvesting of rare species of fish in the Far East.121 One of the state enterprises supporting the ROC is the Russian railways, the president of which is Vladimir Yakunin – the leader of the Centre for National Glory and the St Andrew Foundation. In 2003 the railway spent US$70,000 on the introduction of “chapel wagons”, used by the ROC in its evangelization activities. Two years later the railway and the Moscow patriarchate signed an agreement on the creation of railway station chasovni (chapels). On this occasion, both institutions issued a statement regarding the forming of an alliance against sects that “recruit Russian citizens travelling by train”.122 In 2006 the railway was involved in a project for rebuilding the Marfo-Mariinsky Shelter of Mercy, established by Princess Elisabeth Romanova in Moscow. Moreover, it became customary for the Russian railways to organize a special fleet each year before Easter to transport the “blessed flame” from Moscow to Jerusalem, accompanied by a representative of the government, usually the Minister of Culture.123 The activity of the Association of Orthodox Patrons, composed of Russian state companies, is noteworthy. In the context of the social responsibility of business, promoted by the Kremlin, the association finances the construction of schools, pre-schools, repair of public buildings and so on. In 2007 a project (supported by the patriarchate) was announced to build as many as 300 churches each year in various cities of Russia.124 In the 1990s the Moscow patriarchate, thanks to the goodwill of those holding power, took advantage of tax relief. It was revealed, for example, that the church imported – for trade purposes – poultry, which the authorities gave the status of humanitarian aid in order to free the merchandise from the customs duty required by law. In 1994 the government Commission on Humanitarian Aid gave the ROC permission for duty-free trade of tobacco as part of the church’s aid to the needy (the so-called “tobacco scandal”). It is estimated that the patriarchate imported around 10,000 tonnes of tobacco without paying tax, which cost the Russian government around US$40 million.125 The new draft of the tax law in 2002 did little to limit the special status of religious organizations: cult objects remain untaxed, and activities connected with cult, considering the very wide and imprecise definition of this notion, allow religious institutions a lot of discretion in their interpretation of the regulations.126 There were also proposals to create special tax relief or even complete exemption from taxation for “traditional religions” and for the introduction of a church tax.127 Of all the “traditional religions”, the ROC is most dynamically developing its own economic activity.128 One of the manifestations of this are the attempts to

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create an “Orthodox Brand” (pravoslavniy brend / православный бренд), such as the socalled pravoslavniye konfeti (Orthodox candies)129 and a group of food products marked with the logo “Orthodox Rus” – 10 per cent of the proceeds from the sale of these products go to the ROC.130 In 2005 the Russian media reported on an agreement reached between the Moscow patriarchate, the church firm Sofrino131 and the Old Bank on the opening of ten small shops on land belonging to the ROC, near churches, where among others “Orthodox” goods would be sold.132 The Russian Orthodox Church is gradually building its media backing. In 2002 the Moscow patriarchate revealed plans to create its own media holding, concentrating on television stations, radio broadcasting and the press. In applying for concessions, the ROC argued that 70 per cent of citizens in the country are Orthodox, and so the church should get 70 per cent of air time.133 In 2005 the Orthodox television channel Soyuz began broadcasting. It was created by the bishopric of Yetakerinburg with support by the local government.134 In the same year, another private television station, Spas (directed by Alexander Batanov), was created. It cannot be ruled out that in the near future a federal Orthodox channel will be created. This was also announced by the new Patriarch Kirill, who enjoys support in this matter from the Federation Council and some deputies of the Duma.135 The ROC publishes several magazines, the most important of which are Zhurnal Moskovskoy Patriarkhii (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), Moskovsky Tserkovny Vestnik (The Moscow Church Messenger), Tserkov i Vremya (The Church and the Times), Pravoslavny Palomnik (The Orthodox Pilgrim), Pravoslavnaya Beseda (The Orthodox Word), Prikhod (The Parish), Rus Derzhavnaya (Imperial Rus) and Radonezh.136 The clear predominance of the ROC over other “traditional religions”, and in turn their predominance over the remaining religions is connected with state policy. The extent to which the authorities favour and support a given institution determines its status. There can be little doubt that, in accordance with the legal formula, those who govern Russia take special notice of the ROC and other “traditional religions”. These institutions are privileged in the public sphere, with the support assuming various forms, depending on the rank of the state structure – the office of the president, particular ministries – with a distinct role for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Duma, local authorities, the security service (Federal Security Service and the public prosecutor), and also other state institutions (e.g. institutions of higher education). The Russian head of state sets the tone for religious policy, so his goodwill towards the “traditional religions” is the most valuable. Boris Yeltsin, who as the first president of the Russian Federation had influence on how this office functions, restored the custom of church inauguration after the swearing in of the head of state: a solemn Mass, during which the patriarch of the ROC blesses the newly elected leader.137 Moreover, during the Yeltsin administration, the patriarch of the church was granted sixth place in the list of state dignitaries, and the church hierarchs began to participate in public celebrations (e.g. the dedication of newly opened buildings, solemn Masses, the blessing of politicians).138 Struggling with economic collapse, social crisis and opposition in parliament, the first president of the Russian Federation, in moments of weakness, appealed to the church: for

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 77 example, during the political crisis in 1993, he agreed to mediation by the patriarch,139 and during the election campaign in 1996, he effectively solicited the support of Alexy II, which he later had to “pay back” with concessions concerning reform of the law on religion (1997). Vladimir Putin – the only politician who Russians trust more than they do the ROC – was in a decidedly more comfortable situation than this predecessor and did not need ostentatious support from outside institutions.140 The public statements of the president concerning religious questions were usually well thoughtout and politically correct – when he emphasized the special role of the Russian church, he also added that Russia is a “multi-ethnic and multi-confessional” state. It is worth pointing out how skilfully Putin forged his image. Raised by non-believing parents, he was an atheist during his many years of KGB service, but – as he indicated – he was christened by his grandmother without his parents’ knowledge. After a visit to Jerusalem, Putin began to wear a cross from the Holy Land. It is also no secret that the Russian president has his own “spiritual guide” in the person of Archmandrite Tikhon Shevkunov from the Sretensky Monastery in Moscow.141 Twice after inauguration to the office of president, Putin took part in a solemn Mass, but, as commentators have noted, in contrast to Yeltsin, he did not publicly accept the patriarch’s blessing, although the “Union of Orthodox Citizens” demanded the presence of Alexy II during the inauguration as “a perennial element of Russian tradition”.142 During the eight years of his tenure as president, Putin carried out a balanced and effective religious policy which allowed him to use the ROC as a special institution of public trust, while at the same time he managed not to antagonize the remaining “traditional religions”. At one of his conferences in September 2003, Putin admitted that “in Russia there are four traditional religions, but the ROC is the most numerous and I should take this into account”.143 In September 2005, during “telemost”,144 the president described the Russian church as the only opposition during the Soviet times. In a speech on 19 May 2007, on the occasion of the restoration of canonical unity of the ROC and the ROC Outside Russia, Putin indicated that the ROC in the USSR had protected the “national culture, language and soul of Russia”.145 He spoke in a similar spirit in January 2008, asserting that the state has a debt of gratitude to the ROC, which for centuries had protected Russian culture and promised to lead to Russia’s moral rebirth. During the festive celebration of the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Russia on 29 June 2008, the Russian prime minister emphasized that Orthodoxy “played a historical role in the formation of the Russian state, culture and identity” and in the tradition of the dialogue between civilizations.146 Putin thanked the ROC for its “enormous contribution to the unification of the russkiy mir147 and for its efforts on behalf of religious peace in Russia”, for it is precisely “the historical tolerance of the ROC towards other religions that allowed Russia to become a multiconfessional superpower”, in which Orthodoxy “indissolubly bound the fates of the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian nations”.148 Putin several times presented a “catalogue” of roles the Moscow patriarchate should play in the interest of the Russian state: a social function, an educational

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function, carrying out constructive dialogue with the other “traditional religions” and upholding the ties of the Russian diaspora with the homeland.149 During his two terms in office, Putin met many times with Patriarch Alexy II and other hierarchs and spoke at ceremonial meetings of the Orthodox clergy. The president’s administration gave the church regular financial aid: during the 2004 meeting with members of the Council of Archbishops, he answered complaints of the clergy over the lack of funds for building new parishes abroad: “I am not going to comment on anything now, I’ll only say this: we’ve helped you before, and we’ll help you now”.150 Putin won himself the gratitude and loyalty of the church for his involvement in discussions of the ROC with the Vatican and the process of restoring the canonical unity of the ROC and the ROC Outside Russia. In the years 2002–2003, during official visits to Washington, the president met with hierarchs of the non-canonical structure and invited them to Russia in the name of Alexy II.151 The result of Putin’s diplomatic efforts was the arrival in Moscow, in May 2004, of Metropolitan Lavr, the first dignitary in the history of the ROC Outside Russia to visit the Russian Federation. After this, Putin met with clergymen of the ROC Outside Russia in September 2005.152 When on 17 May 2007 the unity of both churches was restored, the president stated that “renewal of the Church’s unity is the basis for the unity of the entire russkiy mir”.153 One should remember that thanks to the economic boom and his enormous popularity, Putin never became a political hostage to the church’s support. Testimony to this independence of the head of state includes the decision in 2008 to abolish the clergy’s exemption from mandatory military service. This was illreceived by the Moscow patriarchate, which considered it an “offense against the Church”.154 With Dmitry Medvedev’s assumption of the office of the president of the Russian Federation the ROC has kept its privileged position. Both Dmitry Medvedev and his wife, Svetlana,155 emphasize their memberships of the church. After the president’s swearing in on 7 May 2008, Dmitry Medvedev took part in a solemn Mass and received blessing from the patriarch.156 During the inauguration, the new president announced: “the special relationship of trust that binds the state and church will be maintained and deepened for the good of the homeland and the people who live in it”, which was a bit disconcerting for the representatives of the other “traditional religions”.157 This was taken as a promise to strengthen the already privileged position of the ROC, increasing the distance between it and the other three “traditional confessions”.158 The first decisions of Dmitry Medvedev confirmed his goodwill towards the Orthodox Church: for example, the president granted generous subsidies for the reconstruction of the New Jerusalem Monastery,159 supported the idea of granting the graduates of religious seminaries the right to pursue a degree at state institutions of higher education (the state will recognize the seminary diploma)160 and opted for the “Land Code” bill, which foresees the transfer to the ROC of all its property held by the state.161 Considering their lack of a centralized structure, and the rivalry taking place between particular institutions of the same religion, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 79 must face the Kremlin’s “divide and rule” policy on them. Regardless of who is head of the Russian Federation, the mechanism remains the same – the authorities favour the most loyal structure that acts in the interests of the country. An institution that enjoys the goodwill of the power elites must constantly confirm its willingness to cooperate, otherwise it loses the support of the authorities, which then bestow their sympathy upon another organization. The former favourite falls into disfavour, which means a drastic reduction of its influence, the fall of its prestige, cuts in state subsidies, its absence at important festivities and marginalization in the public sphere. Who will be the de facto representative of all Russian Muslims, Buddhists or Jews is decided by the Kremlin, which is why particular structures compete with each other for its favour, trying to prove their own loyalty and undermine the credibility of their competitors. Such a situation only makes it easier for the Kremlin to play on internal animosities, to subordinate and control the organizations of the traditional religions and to create, in the end, a system in which each of them will be represented by one structure that is completely devoted to and dependent on the state. This specificity of the religious policy of the presidential centre is noticeable in the example of Islam. Boris Yeltsin favoured Rawil Gaynetdin and the Council of Muftis of Russia. In face of the rivalry between Gaynetdin and Tadzhuddin, Vladimir Putin put his stakes from the beginning in the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and weakened Rawil Gaynetdin, supported by the mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov.162 After controversial statements of Tadzhuddin in 2003, the president did another about-face, this time strengthening the muftis of the northern Caucasus, led by Ismail Berdiyev. A big success of Vladimir Putin’s religious policy should be recognized in the fact that, despite the privileging of the ROC (the time of his presidency is often described as the “Orthodoxization” of the state) and despite the brutal pacification of Chechnya, he is perceived as a politician who supports inter-confessional dialogue in Russia, and enjoys the respect and recognition of most Russian Muslims. When making an appearance in 2005 in Kazan on the occasion of the city’s 1,000th anniversary, Vladimir Putin received a standing ovation for making part of his speech in the Tatar language. The president acknowledged Kazan as one of the key centres of Eurasian civilization, and emphasized the exceptional role played by the Tatars in creating the Russian ethnos and making Russia a “bridge” between Europe and Asia – a civilization built on a foundation of interconfessional tolerance and harmonious cooperation of the Muslim and Orthodox clergy.163 Opening the proceedings of the Chechen parliament in 2005, Vladimir Putin called Russia “the most dependable defender of Islam”,164 and during a meeting in November 2007 at the Kremlin with Muslim community leaders, the president noted that “Russian Muslims have always made a big contribution to the state’s development into a great power … today they play a very positive role, taking part in the moral education of citizens”.165 Muslims remembered that during Putin’s administration, the Islamic holiday of K