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HANS REICHENBACH AND LOGICAL EMPIRICISM IN TURKEY* It has been really significant and a real pleasure for me to make a presentation at the Institute Vienna Circle within the framework of its ongoing activities, and this for more than one reason – firstly because it is a Society for the Advancement of the Scientific World Conception to which I am a sincere adherent; secondly because, and complementary to the first point, we are evidently so much in need, nowadays, of such a conception in the so-called “post-modernist” world of ours; third, because I, as a logical empiricist, have been given the chance of expounding my views on the state of logical empiricism in Turkey, and on philosophy in general; in the fourth place, I see myself as sort of “geographical” as well as methodological follower of Hans Reichenbach, apparently the foremost leader of scientific philosophy; fifthly and lastly, though not in the least to be sure, Vienna has been the city of the Circle, the beginning of that philosophical movement which, in my view, represents a true revolution, one of the greatest revolutions indeed, in the whole course of philosophical evolution. Understandably, all these points, my own involvement excepted, are interrelated as well as important because of their general relevance. I NTRODUCTION : A C RITICAL AS WELL AS D ESCRIPTIVE P RESENTATION Myself being, on the whole, a logical empiricist, and a critical follower of Hans Reichenbach in my particular way as a scientific philosopher, the present topic has expectedly been in my mind for some time. But the title here only occurred to me when I read that of Paolo Parrini’s talk in the same series about a year ago: “Italian Philosophy and Neopositivism”. I was not here during the activity, but judging by the short summary sent to the members of the Institute, it seems that my talk will be more or less parallel to his, with certain necessary modifications due to the special socio-historical if not a whole space-time setting. And although my title is apparently less comprehensive, to be able to give a more or less complete picture as regards my topic I will discuss the philosophical developments in Turkey not in a limited but interrelated, contextual manner; this is obviously reflected in the section headings of the presentation. Temporally or historically speaking, we might divide the period I will consider into three: before nineteen thirties, between thirties and seventies, and the last two decades. As we shall see, and however roughly, these periods are not arbitrary divisions but represent meaningful stages concerning my overall topic. As 189 M. C. Galavotti (ed.), Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle, 189–211. © 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
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such, a short account of the first period will be followed by a consideration of what has traditionally come to be known as the University Reform in Turkey, actually at the time of Reichenbach’s arrival in østanbul; this will certainly go hand in hand with a discussion on his achievements during his stay, and, also, afterwards. I shall then give an account of Nusret Hızır, his assistant, academic interpreter, and follower. The latter’s academic life coincides with most of our second period here, whose last two decades include a real interest in dialectical materialism in this country. Thirdly, as far as time or temporality is concerned, I will talk about the “rise” of scientific philosophy in Turkey, basically focusing on my work and philosophical conception as a close follower of Reichenbach, even if not in a temporally direct way. While doing all these, I will both present a more or less descriptive, historical account, in particular in the first parts of my talk, and discuss the overall topic later on in a methodologically evaluative, critical manner, particularly insofar as my own methodological comprehension of philosophy is concerned. P HILOSOPHICAL I NSTITUTIONS IN T URKEY IN THE LAST AND EARLIER IN THIS C ENTURY From a socio-professional point of view, we see that the first institution dedicated to scientific and philosophical studies was founded in 1820, that is, early in the last century in the Ottoman times; it was called, after the main district of the imperial capital østanbul at the time, The Scholars’ Group of Beúiktaú. This is also the first laic and national organisation in this country, using the latter word in a historically broad sense. In time, however, and not unexpectedly, this society was abolished, possibly having the fate of similar organisations earlier in the socio-political life of other countries in different times. And, again, as elsewhere I think, the intellectual and academic vacuum left in this sphere was later filled by other similar institutions under the impact of Westernization. In the period of roughly a quarter of a century in the beginning of the present one, until the time of the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the intellectual milieu was under the impact of French thought, American pragmatism and the work of Ziya Gökalp, apparently the most renowned Turkish sociologist in the first half of the century (with his more or less ideologically (“nationalistically”) tainted approach to social problems). Around 1920, it was Bergson’s élan vital and similarly dynamic “psychological” currents that had their sway on philosophy in this country. (Kaynarda÷ 1994) In the first years of the Turkish Republic, too, we see a similar if not the same tendency: this time, of combining the study of sociology and philosophy, a current reflected in the work of Hilmi Ziya Ülken, a leading sociologist and teacher of philosophy at Galatasaray Lyceum in østanbul (which, with French as its teaching language, is still one of the leading high schools in the country; and there is now a Galatasaray University). His attempts led to the foundation, in
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1928, of the first society of philosophy in the Republican era. Due mainly to what one might call “inner strife”, it was abolished, to be founded again in 1931 as the Philosophical Society. Ziya Ülken, the leading founder of this organisation as well, later made two interesting observations. On the one hand, he regards the Sociological Society, which he founded years later, in 1949, as a continuation of its philosophical counterpart of the early thirties. On the other hand, and more relevantly for us here, he sees the seminars and colloquia held in the Philosophy Department of østanbul University and begun by Reichenbach in 1933 as the continuation of the activities of the Philosophical Society. The latter, however, came to an end, ironically perhaps, with the University Reform realized in the same year, its active members having been appointed to other places. The attempt to found another society in 1934 was successful; unfortunately, however, all its papers were destroyed in a fire, apparently soon after its foundation. And Ülken’s renewed attempt in 1943 became abortive. (Kaynarda÷ 1994) T HE U NIVERSITY R EFORM AND R EICHENBACH My emphasis on “institutionalization” in the course of the development of philosophy in Turkey depends both on the incidental or specific fact that a related principal reference has been devoted to this aspect of our topic; and on the general fact that in principle it would apparently represent a significant part of the discipline’s evolution in any social setting. From what we might perhaps call a deeper academic point of view, however, apparently it is the university environment rather than the related socio-professional milieu, generally speaking, which seems to be worth studying; particularly, of course, so far as its education is concerned. There have been certain other radical attempts, following Atatürk’s death in 1938 and until recently, to realize significant changes in the structure and functioning of the Turkish universities, and these “for good or evil purposes” so far as the direction of the political intervention is concerned. However, it is the transformation in østanbul University in 1933, the only one at the time as a fullfledged institution of higher education, which comes to mind first in this country as the University Reform. I will make use of certain sources as references, which tell us, besides other related points, the background to this event. One is the “Atatürk University Reform”, actually the Turkish translation of a book in German, Exil und Bildungshilfe, written by a German professor of pedagogics, Horst Widmann, in 1973 (Widmann 1981). I am sure that this work is really worth reading for anyone interested in the history of higher education in the Turkish Republic. In the present context, I will briefly mention, so far as they concern us here, the main points of a report on the subject dated 29 May 1932 (Ataünal 1993, 175) and prepared by Albert Malche, a Swiss professor of pedagogics from Geneva (Hirsch 1997, 210). I intend to do so together with a very short
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consideration of the basic expectations of Kemal Atatürk of the university as a modern educational and research institution of utmost significance. Atatürk so frequently emphasized the importance of science, both basic and applied, as an indispensable activity in our time, the relationship between science and civilisation, and the significance of this activity as well as education for human life as a whole. And it was in compliance with his wish and directives that Professor Malche, who had also had administrative experience as a rector, was invited to Turkey to study the state of the østanbul House of Sciences, as it was called at the time (and expressed in the Ottoman language, “Darülfünun”). The latter had been founded in 1846 as an institution, with European universities of the time having been taken as examples. Due to the reactions on the part of the established religious schools, however, it took seventeen years for it to be an active institution; and, moreover, it was closed and re-opened twice later on, in 1871 and 1874, finally assuming a stabilised structure in 1880. In addition to this institution with an expected university function, there were schools of higher education founded in the last century as independent professional institutions in medicine, law, administration, fine arts, and so on, which were later incorporated into the structure of østanbul University. (And a school of engineering later formed the nucleus of the Technical University of østanbul.) (Ataünal 1993, 35) The House of Sciences was not able to follow the radical educational, political, economic reforms and great scientific, intellectual, social changes realized under the leadership of Atatürk in the first years of the Republic, in its first decade roughly speaking. Also, there was no indication that the teaching staff there could appreciate, for one thing, the new conception of history widely accepted in the country. And there were real complaints about this state of affairs coming from different sections of the society, above all, and as would be expected, from the intellectuals. This educational institution was, as it were, in a state of MiddleAge isolation from the rest of the society. And its 1932 budget was approved with the proviso that a foreign expert would be given the task of preparing a reform plan for it. Albert Malche was the expert mentioned in a related speech by the Ministry of National Education; he was invited to Turkey by Atatürk in person in 1932. (Ataünal 1993) The report of Professor Malche consisted of sixteen headings. One may classify these critical points as regards the insufficiencies and deficiencies of the House of Sciences in accordance with its duties, structure and functioning. And from among the main points of his overall and radical criticisms, we may mention here the following aspects/areas in relation to this institution, which was the counterpart of a university as it existed at the time: education-teaching, research, publications, the teacher-student interaction, academic cooperation, the relationship among the members of the teaching staff, their attitude toward their duties, and so on. It seems that the university or academic freedom with its scientific and administrative autonomy existing at the time (and already given in 1925) was not properly appreciated and observed by the teachers, with their continual strives and cliques. In Professor Malche’s view, no problem was more important
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for the future of the university than the choice and appointment of the professors. (Ataünal 1993, 37-38) Atatürk’s own views were quite in agreement with the criticisms mentioned by Malche in his report. He stressed the necessity of radical moves for the university as in the case of other projects of the Republic. And a year after the report, in June 6, 1933, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a law abolishing the “House of Sciences” and giving the Ministry of National Education the task of founding of a new university. Shortly afterwards, another one came into force which has been known as the University Law (the first of its kind since then). (Ataünal 1993, 38 and 508) (We might possibly omit here the consideration of two somewhat distantly relevant points, one being historically and the other indirectly related to the foundation of østanbul University in what we might call a formal manner. Speaking in terms of history, some people take the beginning of østanbul University, doubtfully if not quite unjustifiably I think, to the early times of the Ottoman settlement in the City when a religion-based school was founded. And at the time of the Republic, secondly, different single institutions of higher education have been founded in Ankara: the School of Law (1925), the Institute of Education (1926), the Higher Institute of Agriculture (1933) (Ataünal 1993, 38), and the Faculty of Medicine (1945). They were later brought together, except the second one mentioned in their historical order, to form the University of Ankara (1946).) Seen in a more comprehensive educational perspective, the 1933 university reform in Turkey was complementary to what had already been achieved so far in accordance with the Republic’s principle that at all its levels the national education should be unified, and all the religious and/or scholastic elements, a serious relic of the Ottoman Empire, should be eliminated from the educational domain. And this was the sine qua non or necessary condition for a social order and the conception of individuality to be based on rationality rather than belief, on scientific thinking and not on dogma. It is obvious that these are also necessitated, inevitably, by the ideas of Enlightenment, laïcism/secularism, and humanism, namely, the very foundations of the Republic from an ideological point of view. It seems interesting to me that Ernst E. Hirsch, a professor of trade law, and who came to Turkey in the same year as Reichenbach and spent almost twenty years in østanbul and Ankara, does not mention his name in his Memoirs on his Kaiser, Weimar and Turkey times. For the information I am going to share with you briefly here as regards Hans Reichenbach’s professional life and work, overall achievements, and contributions to Turkish philosophy and academic life, I have chiefly made use of the following sources: (a) the work of Horst Widmann, which I mentioned before; (b) the related texts of Arslan Kaynarda÷, a Turkish philosopher who has specifically been working on the history/evolution of philosophy in this country;
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(c) and the information material from the University of Pittsburgh’s Hans Reichenbach Collection, to which I had access some years ago through its parallel texts in the Philosophy Department of Konstanz University. I will begin with the latter reference. Reichenbach was forty-two years old when he came to østanbul. As some of you could possibly know, he had first studied engineering, but became interested, later on, in mathematics, physics, and philosophy; received his doctoral degree from the University of Erlangen; worked in the army, and then in the radio industry; attended Einstein’s first lectures on special and general relativity; taught philosophy of science, radio, and surveying in Stuttgart. In 1926, he received a professional appointment at the University of Berlin, with support from Einstein. During this time Reichenbach produced a series of works which deal with the problems of space and time as they are represented in the new physics, the best known of them being The Philosophy of Space and Time (1928); in this work, he sets out to reconstruct the related concepts from their most elementary counterparts, and relates them to the relativity theory. (Hans Reichenbach Collection) While in Berlin at the time of the rise of Nazism, Reichenbach had considered accepting a position at the German University in Prague, but decided to accept a more attractive teaching offer at the University of østanbul. This later proved to be less than satisfactory because it isolated him for five years from travelling or having important discussions with colleagues (outside Turkey). (I will touch on this point later on.) It was during this period, however, that he produced his major work on the problem of induction, namely, The Theory of Probability (1935), and his major epistemological work, Experience and Prediction (1938). After his term in Turkey was completed, Reichenbach accepted an offer from the University of California at Los Angeles, where he remained until his death in 1953. He produced here, two years before his death, his most popular work, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1951). And at this time, he had nearly completed his book, Direction of Time, published posthumously (1956), like his many other works, by his wife, Dr. Maria Reichenbach. (Hans Reichenbach Collection) As for an account of his time in østanbul, and as seen from within, so to say, I may summarize here the main points of an as yet unpublished article by Arslan Kaynarda÷; this is the text of his presentation at the meeting held in Ankara on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of Reichenbach’s birth. Kaynarda÷ speaks of Reichenbach, in this text as well as elsewhere, as “the famous German philosopher” who was among the group of about 200 German and Austrian cultural and scientific refugees fleeing from the Nazi regime. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) He also describes him as one of the most important members of the Vienna Circle; but I wonder if this is a correct observation, my reason being the difference in philosophical approach rather than because Reichenbach was teaching in Berlin and not in Vienna. Widmann, too, mentions Reichenbach as the internationally most renowned among the refugee philosophers, and, together with Rudolph Carnap and Carl Hempel, as one of the leading members of logical
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empiricists in general. (Widmann 1981) All three of them had been neo-positivists or logical positivists, to be sure, but in differing degrees as shown with their different degrees of contact and relationship with the Circle. Both Kaynarda÷ and Widmann point to the fact that Reichenbach was also a physicist, and the second author writes that he was invited to Turkey as a professor of positivist philosophy and mathematics. (Kaynarda÷ 1991; Widmann 1981) Reichenbach was apparently not known in Turkey at the time, and was noticed by the Turkish authorities because his name was among the Germanspeaking professors persecuted by the Nazis. There were, at that time, two main streams of philosophy in østanbul University clashing with each other: a predominantly metaphysical one which was under the impact of Islamic philosophy and the religious tradition in education; and the other having a Western direction with the positivism of August Comte predominating. And a philosophical language had not yet been sufficiently developed to meet the demands of philosophising. One could only expect, on the part of the traditional philosophical circles at the University, a reaction to the Berlin philosopher who had been appointed as ordinarius professor and head of the Philosophy Department – we must just think of his adherence to the new philosophical current, that is, neopositivism and logical empiricism. In defiance of the established non-discursive tradition and in spite of the rather poor quality of the academic work together with the low educational level of the students, Reichenbach showed efforts in his lectures, from the very beginning, to found his teaching on his scientific philosophy; expectedly, to the total exclusion of metaphysics and the traditional philosophical approaches generally speaking, and with great emphasis on logical analysis and the use of mathematical or symbolic logic. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) He gave lectures on logic, epistemology, and the history of philosophy, notably on Descartes, Hume and Kant. Kaynarda÷ has found out, thanks to his direct contacts with some students of his later on, that Reichenbach considered philosophical doctrines from the perspective of his scientific philosophy and with a critical attitude towards them. It seems that he was giving his lectures on the history of philosophy unwillingly, and after some time he suggested that Professor (Ernst) von Aster should be invited for this purpose. The latter came to østanbul in 1936, and in an article he wrote later, apparently at the time of Reichenbach’s departure, he was speaking with admiration about his contributions to mathematical logic and the philosophy of science in general terms, and to the teaching of philosophy in Turkey. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) (Von Aster assumed most of Reichenbach’s duties after his departure (Widmann 1981, 87-88).) Although most of Reichenbach’s students took notes in his lectures, these are not available today. Apparently, he has made use of the content of his lectures he gave in østanbul as the material of certain works that were published later. We may mention among them his Logistics, published and then translated into Turkish while he was there, and also the two major works I mentioned earlier in this section. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) Judging by the list of his overall works (Schriften), we see that so far as the publication of articles and other works is
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concerned, he was apparently no less productive during his stay in østanbul than before or after; these have appeared in Erkenntnis and other journals of philosophy and the philosophy of science. His presentations at the international congresses of philosophy in Prague, 1934, and in Paris, 1937, have been published in the respective proceedings of these meetings, as well as the one he delivered in the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy held in Paris in 1935 (Schriften). Interestingly, I think, we observe that in the 1937 Paris Congress Reichenbach made his presentation in French; and he wrote two articles, which were published in French journals of philosophy in the same year. Not less interestingly, perhaps, I may point out the fact that Reichenbach learned French in østanbul. And another interesting point might be that Reichenbach was the head of the Turkish delegation in the Prague Congress. (Kaynarda÷ 1991). He was active in the philosophical life of østanbul in other ways as well. He was one of the founding members of “The Turkish Society of Physical and Natural Sciences” (1934), which had a periodical of its own. He made several presentations on philosophy in the meetings of this society, and gave conferences at the University, which aroused great interest. The colloquium as a type of academic activity has been begun in this country by Reichenbach organised every three months, most of the professors in the University participated in them, as well as students in philosophy and some students from other departments selected by Reichenbach himself. All of them were eager; it seems, to take part in these discursive meetings. It was evidently a new phenomenon, a new sort of educational interaction in the University. And in his lectures, he was really trying to inculcate scepticism upon the students who were so much under the influence of the traditional learning by heart, and who had not been properly educated for discussion and research. The term “discipline” in the sense of academic / professional field had been introduced to the academic terminology at the time of the University Reform, and it was Reichenbach who particularly insisted on the requirement that the philosophy student should take courses from among the disciplines in the Faculty of Sciences. Philosophy could not do without the sciences. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) Hilmi Ziya Ülken, the sociologist-philosopher whose achievements I mentioned in the preceding chapter, was lecturing in the Philosophy Department as an associate professor when Reichenbach arrived. Ülken seems to have had a great admiration for the philosopher. He always expressed this; it seems, in his writings and activities, by pointing out his contributions, particularly to logical empiricism (Kaynarda÷ 1991) and the probability or multi-value logic (Widmann 1981, 86). He also attended Reichenbach’s lectures. It may be interesting to note that (Rudolf) Nissen, a professor of surgery, wrote that it was difficult for many people to understand what Reichenbach was talking about and that it was professors rather than students who made real use of his lectures. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) Reichenbach advised one of his female students, Nezahat Nazmi, to work on Carnap for her thesis, because the latter’s philosophy represented a midway position in logical positivism; and knowing that she was interested in psychology
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from the very beginning of her education, Reichenbach told her also to choose a subject related to this field. The final title of her thesis was “The Interpretation of Logical Behaviorism according to Carnap and Reichenbach”, possibly the last dissertation he supervised. (He also tried for the realisation of the appointment of (Wolfgang) Köhler as professor of psychology in østanbul; but for various reasons, the latter could not come. However, Reichenbach’s second attempt was successful, and (Wilhelm) Peters came and stayed in østanbul for years.) One of the main references of Miss Nazmi’s thesis was Experience and Prediction, published in America in 1938, the year Reichenbach went there. The doctoral thesis of Neyyire Arda, another female student of Reichenbach, had the following title: “The Concept of Problem in Different Sciences”. The topic had been chosen within the context of Reichenbach’s philosophy, and she had taken her related notes to America where the thesis was written. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) There may be a correlation between Reichenbach’s inclination to psychology and his pedagogics, the principles of which he apparently applied both to his students in the University and to his son and daughter (Kaynarda÷ 1991). His approach was the then rather new one of giving youth much more autonomy, respecting them as individuals, or candidates of individuals. His wife was a teacher, but there is no mention in Kaynarda÷’s reference whether or not she taught in østanbul; so far as one can judge by his text, she probably did not. Reichenbach was also active in sports. He took the university students to sportive activities; particularly fond of mountaineering and skiing, it was he who discovered the skiing opportunities at Mount Olympus, near Bursa, and not far from the Southern coast of the Marmara Sea. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) Evidently, he loved Turkey and the people. So, why did he not stay? The main reason seems to be that he could not get his right to retirement, this being due to hard-to-believe bureaucratic formalities. Although he was apparently paid well, there was no guarantee for his and the family’s future. So, he saw no choice but accept the invitation from the University of California at Los Angeles. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) At all events, and overall, his earlier choice as regards østanbul may not perhaps have proved “less than satisfactory”, as is mentioned in the historical note on his life and work in the Pittsburgh University’s Library (Hans Reichenbach Collection), and which I referred to above. It must be true, however, that the Turkish philosophical and scientific atmosphere in his time was apparently not ripe enough for a wider or full appreciation of his work; and, also, that he and his colleagues did indeed contribute to the development of a scientific and cultural atmosphere during their stay (Kaynarda÷ 1994). So far as human contact is concerned, and leaving aside the unjustifiable obstacles of bureaucracy, what Reichenbach experienced seems to have been, possibly, more than satisfactory. As recounted by Nezahat Arkun, a lady who knew him well as a psychology student at the time, he donated his personal library to his Department in østanbul where he had worked five years. He wanted, following his departure, to continue his contacts with his students, and to know what they were doing; but the
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intervening war years, particularly, did not give him this possibility. And it seems that while in America, Turkey was not infrequently in his mind. (Kaynarda÷ 1991) A N I MMEDIATE F OLLOWER : N USRET H IZIR , AND HIS R OLE IN L ATER D EVELOPMENTS In an earlier study, which is on the evolution of Turkish philosophy, Kaynarda÷ has more systematically considered the contributions of Reichenbach to this process generally, as well as his direct, more specific role he played in the University during his stay in østanbul. In my attempt to give here a short account of Nusret Hızır’s role as his closest follower, I will rather make use of both of his related texts, one published in 1983 and the other presented in 1991, together with his 1994 work on the institutional development of philosophy in this country. Both in accordance with my own philosophical methodology and in terms of a general and/or “neutral” analysis, the superlative adjective “closest” used in this context signifies a direct continuity in time rather than similarity in philosophical approach between the two thinkers, the teacher and the student. I think this point will be clear as we proceed in this section. Reichenbach has been particularly influential on later developments in the philosophy of science in Turkey (Akdo÷an 1994). So far as Hızır is concerned, and although he was not a philosopher of science in the more or less technical sense of the term, he was apparently closer to Reichenbach in understanding in this field than he was in philosophy generally speaking. We shall see this when I give here a short account of his two published works. I will also consider, later on and rather briefly, how he saw his position in philosophy as well as his role in relation to Reichenbach and the Vienna Circle. The two hard-working women students of Reichenbach I mentioned above later became his assistants, as well as interpreters in his lectures. There were also male assistants who were at the same time his interpreters. And among them, we see Nusret Hızır (1899-1980), who was seen in Turkish academic life as the person who carried the scientific philosophy of Reichenbach, together with mathematical logic, to Ankara University and the philosophical circles in Ankara. From 1942 until his retirement in 1968, and with the exception of a two-year break between 1960 and 1962, he lectured at the Faculty of Language and History-Geography of Ankara University (Hızır 1985, 11). As Ziya Ülken writes, he was the most capable of Reichenbach’s students (Widmann 1981, 86), and later became one of the leading figures among the first-generation of philosophers in (the Republican) Turkey (Kaynarda÷ 1991 and 1994, 14-15). He gave lectures on philosophy at the Ecole Normal Superior in Paris in 1963; and, following his retirement, he taught philosophy and logic in different faculties of three universities in Ankara for short periods of time, notably in the Middle East Technical University (for two and a half years). From 1971 until his death that is
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for about ten years he continued to give courses in his home to small groups interested in philosophy (Hızır 1985, 11), and in his overall and immense cultural background; I was an occasional participant in these non-formal but professionally interesting activities. And one may say that overall, Hızır has been more influential on the general, enlightened public eager to learn more about philosophy and science by direct contact, so to say, than within the philosophical circles of the university, that is in a basically academic atmosphere. Nusret Hızır had studied physics, mathematics and philosophy in Germany, and, returning home, became an assistant in the Philosophy Department of østanbul University in 1934, one year after Reichenbach’s appointment there (Hızır 1985, 11; Kaynarda÷ 1983, 773). Further among his non-university activities, Hızır worked as an “expert” in the Turkish Historical Society between 1937 and 1942; he was involved, between 1941 and 1948, in the translation activity of classical works of philosophy (carried out by the Ministry of National Education), and himself made translations from different philosophers such as Erasmus, Leibnitz and Nietzsche (Hızır 1985, 11). As for Hızır’s own productivity in philosophy, the most striking fact to be mentioned about him is that he was always an oral person, so to say, rather than a writer. In a way, this is perhaps to be expected, given, for one thing, his inclination to teach in an informal manner rather than with an academic concern in mind; and, also, his fondness for “philosophical chatting” while considering the problems of philosophy and trying to give his own answers to them, rather than discussing their solutions in a multidimensional context through writing. At all events, and to the best of my knowledge, he has two books, one of them having been published four years before his death and the other five years thereafter. Their titles are, respectively, “Philosophical Writings” and “Philosophy in the Light of Science”. The former consists of completed notes or texts of presentations, edited by two “friends” as Hızır calls them, one of them being an earlier female assistant. The latter is a compilation of his articles published in different journals and/or texts of presentations made on different occasions, edited, again, by the same female philosopher. From an academically formal point of view, none of his writings, perhaps, is a “scientific” article, with a true systematization of the material and a satisfying list of references, and so on; they may possibly be regarded as philosophical essays, in the more or less traditional sense of this form of writing. So far as their content is concerned, however, they do reflect Hızır’s philosophical views in a clear, and what we might call undiluted manner. His posthumous work truly sounds “positivistic” or “logical positivistic”, or, more justifiably perhaps, logical empiricistic. And indeed, in the foreword of his earlier book, he gives a short, personal account of his philosophical stance. He says that during his years of assistantship in østanbul he was very close to Hans Reichenbach and the Scientific Philosophers of the Vienna Circle. He was, years later, still rather close to them in understanding. And he adds, interestingly, that he owes to Reichenbach and to the Circle the ability to see philosophy as an analytical activity and to cherish certain theses of the Anglo-Saxon analytical
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philosophy, which are not in conflict with dialectics. (I will discuss these two points, namely the relation of dialectics to his philosophy and the term “analytical philosophy”, in the penultimate and last sections, respectively.) However, many views of the Vienna Circle seemed to him, later, as too narrow and stiff; and his writings in his book were significant for him because they showed that he turned away from a rather orthodox Viennese position to a more moderate and more liberal “logical empiricism”. On the other hand, the aim of the publication of his book was to help people think rather than to inform them on various topics of logic and philosophy. (Hızır 1976, 6-7) As for the topics in this work, I may mention here such titles as the following: “Romanticism in Philosophy”, “The Meaning and Significance of the Philosophy of Science Today”, “Pascal – one of the Messengers of Existentialism”, “A Christian Existentialist: G. Marcel”, “Is Existentialism a Philosophy?”, “Phenomenology and Logic”, “The Young Nietzsche”, “Fichte and the Thinking of our Time”, “The Personality of Machiavelli”, “Kant and Einstein”, “A View in Vogue in Science: Structuralism”, “The Importance of the Concept of Probability for Knowledge”, “Natural Science and History”… (Hızır 1976) As we see, Hızır was, as a thinker in general and a philosopher in particular, a person of wide interests; and reading the texts will reveal that he has an originality in the elaboration of the topics he treats. So far as professional depth in philosophy and philosophising are concerned, however, we see that he somewhat lacks logical rigour, conceptual dynamism, and the academic dimension of giving rationales at the conceptual level, so far as can be done, as supports for one’s arguments. On the other hand, in my view, some of the titles show us that the variety in his choice of topics go beyond the usual, philosophically or methodologically “formal” limits of neo-positivism. We observe that from the viewpoint of logical empiricism and scientific philosophy, his analyses are not sufficiently systematic and critical, and somehow represent a “colourfully” original personal approach to certain classical or traditional philosophical and near-philosophical topics. Thus, his writings obviously show intuitive insight but not sufficient logical analysis. Among the writings/essays in his second and posthumous work, he discussed such topics of interest in our context as “Philosophy vis-à-vis Sciences”, “On the Evolution of Science and Scientific Disciplines”, “Classical Physics and Heisenberg”, “For Albert Einstein”, “Thoughts on the Formalisation of Logic”, “The Concept of Laïcism in the West”, “German Universities and National Socialism”, and so on (Hızır 1985). As is the case in his first work, this book’s title does not correspond to that of any essay in it. My main points of concern and criticism as regards his earlier work are equally or, perhaps, almost equally valid for the second one as well. We may say that as a university teacher and thinker Hızır was indeed instrumental in the propagation, so to say, of rationality in general as well as in philosophical thought in this country, and so far as a scientific conception of the world is concerned. It seems that, interestingly, he was also influential, perhaps
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to a lesser extent though, in the development of philosophy in this country in another channel as well, which will be discussed in the very beginning of the next section. Lastly in this one, and in relation to our overall topic, I may mention that Reichenbach’s wish as to the continuation of his philosophy in his own Department in østanbul could not be realised – his colleague to whom he suggested this, (Richard E.) von Mises, professor of mathematics in østanbul at the time, did not accept this proposal. And Hızır appears to be the philosopher who realised this in another academic setting in Turkey, although he was not the only young person within the academic circle close to Reichenbach in østanbul. His colleagues who stayed there were active in one or more particular area, perhaps above all in modern logic. S IXTIES AND S EVENTIES , AND THEREAFTER : D IALECTICAL M ATERIALISM ON THE S CENE The other channel through which Nusret Hızır has had an influence on the intellectual and philosophical life of Turkey is dialectical materialism. So far as I can make a judgement, this was particularly the case in his activities following his retirement. And in so far as both my own observations and the opinion of certain other observers are concerned, he was far from being a “true” or “typical” Marxist, using the term in an unbiased manner. One might say that his philosophical approach was to a certain extent materialistic, and even dialectical materialistic in some respects. At least, one aspect of his philosophy and overall intellectual conception of the world was Marxist in a general way. And although he was certainly not a “street” Marxist with a methodologically superficial conception, and too pragmatic an approach to philosophy, science and the society, I think that here, too, he had the same difficulty of an insufficient consideration of the related conceptual and scientific (and ideological) points in depth. Possibly, from an overall technical-academic point of view, and to repeat, his influence in this area may not have been so powerful when compared with his role in the development of logical empiricism in this country. The political scene in Turkey in the sixties and seventies seems, generally speaking, to have had real similarities to what the Western Europe also experienced during this period; the student activists of 1968 had basically the same kind of demands in the political and socio-economic area as well as in the field of university education. That the most recent Turkish Constitution, that of 1961, had opened the way to a more comprehensive democracy would understandably be worth mentioning here as a socio-political factor in this country so far as our topic is concerned. In the present context, however, what really concerns us is certainly the philosophical scene itself and the relationship of dialectical thought to the development of philosophy in this country; and this, however politically oriented and founded the Marxist philosophy may be.
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On this matter, it is in Kaynarda÷’s paper on the Evolution of Philosophy in Turkey (Kaynarda÷ 1983) that I have found, personally, the most relevant information. Interestingly, and not quite coincidentally I think, it is roughly the same period, which he considered, in the way I have done here, to be the most representative one for the fruition of Marxist philosophy in Turkey. As he wrote quite justifiably, for a long time certain philosophical circles in this country behaved as if Marxism and the philosophy of Historical Materialism did not exist; they have even abstained from pronouncing the word “dialectics”. In reality, however, the beginning of the studies in historical and dialectical materialism goes back too much earlier decades in this country, with the publication of books and articles on related topics. What we might call the classic works of Marx and Engels has been translated in a growingly intensive manner until the time of the conservative, rightist military coup in 1980. The overall efforts in this area also included, expectedly, the works of contemporary Marxist authors such as Lukacs, Garaudy, Althusser and others, not to mention the seemingly classic work of Georges Politzer on the (so-called) principles of philosophy. And overall, among the philosophical currents, it is on Marxism that the highest number of publications in philosophy has been made since the very first years of the Republic. And there has been a general tendency in these works, essays, books, dissertations and so on, to consider dialectical thought since its beginnings in Herakleitos and others in Antiquity. (Kaynarda÷ 1983) For the rest of this chapter, I intend to make use of an unpublished and not too short letter of mine, which I sent, more than a year ago, to the bimonthly periodical, Radical Philosophy. Published in Britain and run by an editorial collective of sixteen members working on a voluntary basis, it is evidently a serious and respectable philosophical journal. Whether, or to whatever extent, it may also be regarded, as an academic journal would certainly depend on how you would define the adjective “academic” with special reference to philosophical periodicals, and to publications in philosophy generally speaking. I shall make here, basically from my own logical empiricist perspective to be sure, a critical evaluation of the contents of the 86th issue of this journal published in November/December 1997. It must be understandable that the reason why I do so is my observation and belief that the material of such an analysis would be quite representative of the Marxist approach to philosophy in Turkey as well, for the past forty years or so; and this must indeed be the case in the world at large. One should certainly add, however: “though with certain modifications in place as well as in time”. Let me now give you a brief description of my observations and impressions on the issue of the journal in question. The more or less complete eye in the upper part of a human face, to which most of its front cover has been dedicated, has evidently a message – the message, it seems, of deep thoughtfulness and serious concern about human affairs. And considered together with some photographs and one or two drawings dispersed in the texts, the cover design seems to be an introduction, as it were, to the overall understanding underlying the concept of
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radical philosophy, at least as it is represented by the visual contents (of this issue) of the journal – a pistol divided into two, diseased and/or tortured human legs, a naked black man drinking milk, two young naked black men sitting side by side and with one eye covered with one of their hands… And a picture showing busts of Karl Marx meaningfully completes the picture, not just as a visual device representative of an ideology and doctrine, but so far as philosophical methodology is concerned as well. Understandably, Radical Philosophy is first and foremost if not exclusively devoted to a Marxism-oriented political philosophy, which is certainly in keeping with its textual content. I may just touch upon another basic point here without elaborating it: What is “Radical Philosophy”, from a methodological standpoint, as the concept underlying this publication? The subtitle of the journal has more than an implication in this regard, if not, possibly, a full answer to this question: “a journal of socialist and feminist philosophy”. The inside of the front cover is a Call for Papers on the theme of “evil”. Interestingly, and contrary to what we would ordinarily expect perhaps, but evidently in compliance with the basic approach of the Journal, no mention is made, in that context, of the so-called “religious studies” among the related disciplines invited for the investigation of this basically religious moral concept. On the other hand, and quite in keeping with the main orientation of Marxist philosophy as well, one would be reminded here of the “humanities” approach to philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon universities. As is shown in the latter’s academic division and activities generally, this evidently reflects the widespread conception of philosophy, not only in these countries but in the world at large – that philosophy is a humanisticly oriented activity; and this, in spite of the enormous development in this century in the philosophies of logic and mathematics, and those of physics, geology, biology, and so on. Marxist philosophy, and the Marxist doctrine in general, are certainly man-centered in their very essence, however “materialistically” they may have been founded. At all events, generally speaking and so far as one can judge by the content of just one issue, Radical Philosophy appears to be a professionally reasonable journal with its apparently balanced emphasis on political philosophy and technical philosophising. And this makes it more vulnerable, in a positive sense, to methodological criticisms of the sort I have in mind as a scientific philosopher; and, on the face of it, the expectations of critical readers from it in general would necessarily be high. Marxism is a philosophically based, historically oriented, socio-political, and, most characteristically perhaps, self-sufficient doctrine. It begins with materialistic philosophy as its overall conceptual framework; proceeds with dialectical materialism as an allegedly scientific basis; comes to a climax with historical materialism as a socio-economically based political ideology. As we all know, it has a very strong commitment to the undertaking of power to revolutionize all the states of affairs in human societies, mainly by putting an end to socioeconomic and, apparently derivatively, every sort of exploitation. It is “self-sufficient”, in the sense that it allows no other philosophical (or any other) school,
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view, or approach for a critical evaluation of its claims, and this from almost any point of view, philosophical, scientific, historical, moral… This is just because, obviously, it is, in the first and last analysis, a political doctrine; the attitude and behaviour of Marxist/socialist thinkers, or socialists in general, are almost always political – just like in political life in general, they would never really be “beaten” by their opponents in any debate, except, possibly, by force. And just like any belief system, whether heavenly or worldly, it is holistic, however materialistic, non-idealistic, and secular it may claim itself to be. In this sense, and as a particularly relevant point in philosophy and in the present context, it seems to be quite justifiable to compare it to the speculative philosophical systems of rationalist thinkers, above all Plato, Descartes, and Kant, as has been very aptly discussed by Reichenbach in The Rise (27-49, 71-72, 121-122). Even further, a young Marxist wrote to me in one of his letters from prison that you would or could either accept Marxism in its totality, or otherwise you should reject it altogether; there could be no other way, or, as it were, a mid-way, in its consideration. In accordance with the doctrine’s greatly pragmatic aspect, the whole truth is on your side if you are a Marxist; if you are not one, what you would have is the whole non-truth, so to say, apparently in almost all the possible senses of such a term. In other words, an absolute belief both in his own rightness and in the wrongness of his debaters and opponents seems to be inevitable for the ordinary or orthodox Marxist, who appears to be actually a believer so far as a “universal” and “all-knowing” doctrine is concerned. In his work on Power, Russell devotes a chapter to “Power Philosophies” and gives the philosophy of Fichte, pragmatism in some of its forms, Bergson’s Creative Evolution and the ethics of Nietzsche as more or less typical examples (Russell 1960, 172-177). And Marxist philosophy is certainly a “power philosophy” in this sense; not only, however, because it is strongly pragmatic in its essence but also, and more directly, as it constitutes the philosophical component and the conceptual ground of a basically political doctrine to be actualized, ultimately, through “revolutionary power” (which Russell discusses in a separate chapter; pp. 72-81). I will not, understandably, consider Marxist philosophy or dialectical materialism in any detail here (and I am not in a position to do so without preparation specifically for such a purpose). As for the situation in Turkey, and to repeat by way of emphasis, it is quite possibly not too different from what one would witness elsewhere in the world, both in philosophical outlook and political thought, and as an ideological tool. Under what I would call the democratic pressure of the 90’s, Marxist philosophy (side by side with Marxist politics) is seemingly being “revised” now in the intellectual milieu of the society at large. I do wonder, however, to what extent the ideological, political-international and intellectual atmosphere created by the so-called New World Order would allow this, as an extreme situation, and challenging the doctrine.
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T HE L AST TWO D ECADES : S CIENTIFIC P HILOSOPHY AND THE “T RADITIONAL ” R EACTIONS Interestingly in my view, in two publications of the UNESCO on philosophy which appeared within the same decade, Turkey was regarded among the Asian and Pacific countries in one and as a European country in the other (Kuçuradi 1986 and 1993). The author of the related sections in these publications is among the third generation of the philosophers in Republican Turkey (together with A. Kaynarda÷), and has been the Chairperson of the Turkish Philosophical Society for years, became the Secretary General of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, and is now the latter’s President. On the other hand, during the concluding session of the conference held in Ankara in 1991 on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of Reichenbach’s birth, she commented on his philosophy by saying that they organised the meeting not because of any real merit of his work but because he had spent some time in Turkey. I am just referring to this observation here without making any comment on it. The only point that I can add in the present context would be that we must see such remarks as regards scientific philosophy not as exceptional evaluations but as “ordinary” reactions on the part of traditional philosophers (as has been aptly emphasized by Reichenbach in The Rise). Philosophy as an academic activity has developed, essentially, along Western lines in Turkey, with all its ramifications having been represented (Örs 1998b). And as admitted by a Turkish historian of science who is highly critical of logical positivism, Reichenbach “started a new and revolutionary movement within Turkish philosophical circles” (and) “found a following in Turkey”, particularly, of course, in the philosophy of science (Akdo÷an 1994). At this point of my presentation, I think I may be entitled to give a short account of my own development and contributions in scientific philosophy, for it seems that as far as Turkey is concerned I am apparently the only one in this area whose name can be mentioned. For about twenty years following my graduation from the medical faculty in 1960, I read philosophical texts, above all Russell. Seen retrospectively, this was basically an unsystematic reading on the part of an intellectual interested in the general, abstract, conceptual aspects of human endeavour, and a quest to know the world in its general outline. From roughly 1980 onwards, I began to get involved in philosophy in a more academic and, if you like, professional way. The institutional academic milieu for this was the Philosophy Department of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara (where the teaching language is English). And following a one-semester term as a special student, I began, in 1982, my doctoral studies there, which I completed in 1991, after all the possible extensions, with the defence of a dissertation on the topic: “Is the ‘Biological’ Reducible to the ‘Physical’ – An overall critical analysis of the concept of reduction in biology”. Cemal Yıldırım, who translated The Rise in 1981 (see Reichenbach 1966), was my advisor during the period of special studentship, and Teo Grünberg has been my supervisor throughout the whole
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course of my doctoral studies. Being among the 3rd generation of philosophers in Turkey, they have been retired for some years now; and both have been regarded more or less as followers of Reichenbach, particularly so far as the philosophy of science is concerned. I think, however, that in actual fact I am, as their student, more closely related to him from the viewpoint of philosophical conception and methodology than they really are. The opponents of neo-positivism and logical empiricism are inclined to see the followers of these philosophical currents in Turkey as “the disciples” of Hans Reichenbach. This must be an established attitude in the traditional philosophical circles all over the world, particularly, I think, in the West, to scientific philosophers, and to logical empiricists in general. But it is not a right and justifiable attitude, I believe, because contrary to most currents in philosophical evolution, above all the rationalist systems, the “new philosophy” of the Vienna Circle and the new empiricism as a whole is not comparable to a tenet, or creed, as it were; it has, as one of its great characteristics, the quality of being open to criticism and self-criticism, hence, in principle, to change. This is due, first of all, to the fact that, like science, it is performed as a piecemeal activity. And it is nondoctrinal. It does not aim, as has been frequently emphasized by Reichenbach, towards the attainment of absolute knowledge, or towards anything absolute indeed. A disciple in any area is as a rule a “true”, basically uncritical follower of the master or the “great” man, as is readily observable in philosophy in the case of Plato, Kant, Marx, for instance, and many others. A follower of scientific philosophy, and the new empiricism generally speaking, is in principle equally critical of every philosophical work, including his own, and whether it is close to or distant from the latter. The reason why such an attitude cannot be appreciated by the traditionally-minded majority in the philosophical arena must arise, above all, from the fact that they cannot see one of the most essential points in the new philosopher’s approach to philosophical activity – that philosophy should, and can, be freed, to a great extent, from its traditional or established man- and individual-centeredness. My position in the new philosophy, and in philosophy generally speaking, is certainly very much related to my intentions and aims, to my “academic mission” if you like. To put it briefly, I have been trying to develop scientific philosophy in a certain direction – that of an overall methodology. The term “methodology” used in the present context signifies an endeavour, a quest for an answer, or rather answers, to the three basically simple but interrelated and rather comprehensive questions – “What?”, “Why?”, and “How?”. (At least two others, perhaps, may be added to these, namely, “How did it develop?” and “What is its overall significance?”.) I think these questions must be asked, and answered in however a tentative manner, in the case of all the major human activities, such as science and sciences; the applied fields of medicine, health professions in general, and branches of engineering; architecture, the arts, and so on. The quest for an answer to the first question would be directed to the subject matter (or “whatness”) of any serious human activity; the second one to its overall purpose or aim
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(and differently from a personally teleological “What for?” question); and the third question to the problem of what relates the first to the second, that is, the method and/or techniques to be applied while working on the subject matter in question for the purpose specified – this is usually what is meant by the term “methodology” in a narrow sense. In the light of such a “methodological” quest, the core phrase of my definition of philosophy will be: “a critically logicosemantic and conceptually analytical activity, an interpretation, aimed at contributing to the understanding and explanation of the world (in an indirect manner)”. There are, of course, so many different philosophical conceptions due to the widely differing methodologies or basic meta-philosophical approaches concerning this activity. So, this is what and/or how philosophy should be in accordance with my methodological view, rather than reflecting a generally accepted definition, let alone one widely agreed upon. My own and possibly more or less special emphasis as regards the basic points or properties of philosophy mentioned in this context would be on its conceptuality and semantic aspect. Philosophy thus becomes, in my view and in its essence, a critically semantic conceptual activity. The basic question a scientific philosopher has to ask in connection with his/her activity would then be, “What do I, you, or they mean by this or that expression?”, as the case may be. But this must not taken to be either a linguistically oriented or rationalistically philosophical question – the semantic aspect or core involved here assumes its function and significance within a framework which is at one and the same time conceptual and prepositional / judgemental. And this is the case whether the expressions in question are synthetic propositions, as in sciences for instance, or analytic propositions, as in pure mathematics and symbolic logic, or, still, judgemental and similar utterances, as we see in the case of moral and aesthetic evaluations. There could also be an overall methodological question, which we could justifiably ask in the case of philosophical activity as well: “What sort of an activity is it?” This should apparently be dividable or analysable into the three questions, at least, mentioned above. In all events, if philosophical activity is scientific, it should be self-corrective like science, and opposed to metaphysics and speculation. And it should also be functional in the sense that it must throw some light on a “philosophical”, or scientific, social, moral, aesthetic, or similar issue in a way that philosophers and non-philosophers alike could in principle see the point, however complex and specifically technical the underlying concepts and terminology may be. So far in this area, what I have been able to realize, in its main outline and worth mentioning in the present context, is the following: Twelve articles on Philosophy, published consecutively in Felsefe Tartıúmaları (Philosophical Discussions) between 1990 and 1996, and later compiled in one volume, In the Light of Scientific Philosophy (Örs 1998a). More recently, I began to write a book in English in the beginning of last year, The Limits and Limitations of Philosophy, with a subtitle, An inquiry into philosophical power; unfortunately, however, my intervening activities, though mostly philosophical in a general sense, have not
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given me the possibility of continuing that work for more than six months now. While it would not be possible for me to undertake the second enterprise if I did not write, above all, those twelve articles earlier, the work in English has been planned, developed, and written, in part, as an entity on its own. Among other activities of mine worth mentioning in the present context is a text, which I prepared upon a call from a lady philosopher in østanbul University (namely, in the Department Reichenbach worked). She has been working, apparently with her younger colleagues, on a three-year project entitled “Philosophy in Turkey”, supported by her University and expected to be completed by the end of this year. Part of the project has been devoted to first-hand information on the part of the philosophers, teachers of philosophy in the universities and the historians of the field in Turkey. What they were expected to do to contribute to the idea is mainly to write a text stating their academic background and work, their conceptions of philosophy and their views as to the state of philosophy as an academic discipline with its research/inquiry aspects and teaching. My own text bears the title “From Science and Philosophy to Scientific Philosophy”. We are expected to update our texts and give further information on later significant developments in our academic life. I shall do so, and send an additional text to her, hopefully soon, on further developments in my philosophical career. I would like to mention two more points at the end of my talk, one on my most recent areas of interest, and the other as regards certain meta-philosophical issues which I see as important from my own methodological stance. In the nineties, we have witnessed the development of the inter- or cross-disciplinary field of Philosophy and Psychiatry, whose number-one responsible person is Professor K.W.M. Fulford. A Fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, he is teaching, mainly in the philosophy and ethics of mental health, in the Medical Faculty of Oxford University and the Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick. It is now an internationally developing academic field thanks to his efforts and certain others in the United States, Italy, France, Germany, and so on. I may be said to represent this new academic and inter-professional movement, if you like, in Turkey, above all in the psychiatric circles of Ankara. The new discipline is methodologically based on the intersections between philosophy, abnormal psychology and medicine, in particular, of course, psychiatry. Vienna, as the City of Freud as well as the Circle’s, could be, in my view and potentially speaking, one of the most convenient venues for its further development. I have also begun to take a real interest in the Ethics of Philosophizing as a so far unduly neglected and almost non-existent subdiscipline of the field of ethics. It is methodologically to be related to how, or on what grounds, philosophers do philosophize. It must be regarded as a field possibly comparable to the ethics of any of the academic activities in general, with responsibility being its core moral concept. What is significant for us in this regard is whether the philosopher is capable of giving the logical, semantic, definitional and/or other rationales in whatever he/she produces as a philosopher; this would apparently have the same
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methodological status as the empirical or empirico-mathematical operations in the sciences. (See Örs 1996). Besides, I have been more and more involved, in recent years, in the Concept of Evolution, a topic I have been working on, not continuously though, for about twenty-five years now. I am also a member of a small, interdisciplinary group of academics, mostly in Ankara, who have to give a fight, so to say, on both the scientific and ideological fronts, for the defence of the evolutionary theory against the reactionary circles in Turkey with their connections abroad, predominantly in the States. (One is inevitably reminded here of the most perfect conceptual or philosophical analysis of Reichenbach, who has devoted a chapter to Evolution in The Rise (Reichenbach 1966, 191-214).) If I had time to consider certain key concepts in the meta-philosophical domain, I could perhaps discuss, from a methodological-definitional-semantic point of view, such terms as “analytical philosophy”, “metaphysics”, or “the history of philosophy”. Now, I might perhaps do so during our discussion. At all events, such terms seem to be important within the context of the activities of the Institute Vienna Circle as well, because they are frequently mentioned in its programs, activities, calls, and so on, as well as in similar texts by other philosophical institutions such as university departments. This would be of great conceptual value, because methodological analysis would always be the first and foremost means to clear the “philosophical” ground. As just one example, let me quote here a sentence from the Hans Reichenbach Collection text in the University of Pittsburgh’s Libraries I referred to several times above: “During this time (at the University of California) he produced The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (l951), in which he recounts the evolution of philosophy as viewed by a logical empiricist.” If someone who does not know the work of Reichenbach reads this sentence, he/she would take it to mean that this logical empiricist philosopher wrote a dynamically oriented book on the overall evolution of philosophy. Actually, however, Reichenbach has written a superb, unmatched book on the methodological-conceptual clarification of philosophy with its evolution as a comparative background for a developmental analysis of the activity. I think we should all be as brave as Reichenbach for a radical reckoning with the traditional ways of thinking in philosophy. Then, I think, we will be mostly free from making such obvious “meta-philosophical” (or, in my terminology, “methodological”) mistakes. Acknowledgements. I am thankful to Prof. Dr. Ayhan O. Çavdar, President of the Turkish Academy of Sciences, for giving me a copy of the text of her presentation, “Atatürk and Science”, held at Ankara University on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of Atatürk’s death, 10 November 1998; and to Prof. Dr. Süleyman Çetin Özo÷lu, one of her chief advisers at the Academy, for his sincere help in providing me with the basic material and a summary of the 1933 Turkish University Reform and thereafter. I also owe thanks to Hafize Öztürk, M.D., a capable third-generation doctoral student at her thesis stage in
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Deontology and Medical History; thanks to her observations on my philosophical work and her suggestions to me, she has been influential, however indirectly, in the realisation of the present text.
N OTE *
Based on the text of a presentation made at the Institute Vienna Circle with the same title, on 12 April 1999.
R EFERENCES Akdo÷an, Cemil 1994. The Philosophy of Science in Turkey; Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium of Philosophy of the Balkan Countries: Philosophy in Balkan Countries Today, Athens, pp. 247-251. Ataünal, Aydo÷an 1993. Cumhuriyet Döneminde Yüksekö÷retimdeki Geliúmeler (Developments in Higher Education in the Republican Era); Directorate General of Higher Education (of the Ministry of National Education), Ankara, pp. 27-52; 176-229. Hans Reichenbach Collection, in the Special Collections Department of the University of Pittsburgh Libraries. Hirsch, Ernst E. 1997. Anılarım. Kayzer dönemi, Weimar dönemi, Atatürk ülkesi, transl. into Turkish from the German original, Aus des Kaisers Zeiten durch die Weimarer Republik in das Land Atatürk’s – eine unzeitgemäße Autobiographie; Schweitzer Verlag, München, 1982, by Fatma Suphi, and publ. by TÜBøTAK, the Scientific and Technical Council of Turkey. Hızır, Nusret 1976. Felsefe Yazıları (Philosophical Writings); Ça÷daú Yayınları, østanbul. Hızır, Nusret 1985. Bilimin Iúı÷ında Felsefe (Philosophy in the Light of Science); writings compiled by Füsun Akatlı; Adam Yayınları, østanbul. Kaynarda÷, Arslan 1983. Türkiye’de Felsefenin Evrimi; Felsefe Çalıúmaları; Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi. (The evolution of philosophy in Turkey; Philosophical Studies, in: The Turkish Encyclopaedia of the Republican Era), øletiúim Yayınları, østanbul, vol. 3, pp. 762-774. Kaynarda÷, Arslan 1991. Filozof Hans Reichenbach’ın Türkiye’deki yılları ve etkileri. (Philosopher Hans Reichenbach’s years and influences in Turkey.) Paper presented at the commemorial meeting on the occasion of his one-hundredth anniversary, organised jointly by the German Cultural Center and the Turkish Philosophical Society, Ankara, 11-12 November 1991. (I thank the author for sending me his manuscript upon my request, to be referred to particularly for the present occasion. As the text was not yet complete with its references and so on, I have only given Kaynarda÷’s presentation as reference.) Kaynarda÷, Arslan 1994. Bizde Felsefenin Kurumlaúması ve Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu’nun Tarihi (The Instıtutionalization of Philosophy in Turkey and the History of the Turkish Philosophical Society); Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu, Ankara. Kuçuradi, Ioanna 1986. Turkey, in: Teaching and Research in Philosophy: Asia and the Pacific; UNESCO, pp. 298-322. Kuçuradi, Ioanna 1993. Turquie, in: La Philosophie en Europe, R. Klibansky and D. Pears (eds.); in coop. with UNESCO, Gallimard, pp. 467-484. Örs, Yaman 1996. The Irresistible Rise of Scientific Philosophy – Philosophism and the Ethics of Philosophizing; Synthesis Philosophica 22: 447-460. Örs, Yaman 1998a. Bilimsel Felsefenin Iúı÷ında (In the Light of Scientific Philosophy); Öteki Yayınevi, Ankara. Örs, Yaman 1998b. Psychiatry and Philosophy in Turkey – Godotian Expectations? (Regional Report); Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 5: 267-271.
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Reichenbach, Hans (1951) 1966. The Rise of Scientific Philosophy; University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. (Bilimsel Felsefenin Do÷uúu (1981); transl. by Cemal Yıldırım, Remzi Kitabevi, østanbul). Russell, Bertrand (1938) 1960. Power; Unwin Books, London. (Die) Schriften Hans Reichenbachs, the list at the Philosophy Department of Konstanz University. Widmann, Horst 1981. Atatürk Üniversite Reformu, transl. into Turkish from the German original, Exil und Bildungshilfe – die deutschsprachige akademische Emigration in die Türkei nach 1933, mit einer Bio-Bibliographie der emigrierten Hochschullehrer im Anhang; Herbert Lang, Bern and Peter Lang, Frankfurt/M., 1973, by Aykut Kazancıgil and Serpil Bozkurt, and publ. by Cerrahpaúa Medical Faculty of østanbul Univ., on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of Atatürk’s birth.
Department of Deontology Akdeniz un. Medical Fac. Dumlupinar Bul., Kampüs Antalya, 07070 Turkey
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