Ralph Cudworth: A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality: With A Treatise of Freewill (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy)

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CAMBRIDGE TEXT S IN THE HISTOR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

RALPH CUDWORTH

A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality with A Treatise oj Freewill

C JPYnghied ~

CAMBRIDGE TEXT S IN TH E HIST O RY OF PHILO SOPH Y

KARL AMER1KS !'..f..... of PkliMDl"Y> u,,",",iIy of N",,, Do_

DESMOND M. CLARKE !'..flUM of P!.iiMD",y. UoiDmily c.l1q, c.".j. Th< "",in objcdiv. of Cambridr< Tum in II>< Hiiro'y of PIIilooophy ill ,,, up.ond th< 1'Uf<. vori< hill."..,. of tcit ...... tho hist..., of ,1>< history oCideoo.

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RALPH CU DWORTH

A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality WITH

A Treatise of Freewill ED1HD 8Y

SA RAH HUTTON

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A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Mor:ality A Treatise ofFrecwill

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Acknowledgements Then: are three parricul~r debts of gratitude "'hich I ",ould like to express: fitst TO Erik-Jan Dos, for his .... istance in preparing the tut of Fr(tlflill; s«ond ly to rhe Uniyen;ity of Utrecht, for il "'lIS during my tenun: of rhe Belle 'Ian Zuykn Visiting ProfCMOrship rhlt the mllin groundwork for this edition "015 done. l2sl, bue IH){ leost, I am grateful 10 rhe Uni,·en;;ty of Hcnfordshirc for 3llo.. ing me 1ea.e TO rake up rhe Belle.an Zuylcn ChaiT.

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Introduction Ralph Cudworth is a philosopher who spans the Renaissance and the Enli,htenment. In an age of intellectual ferment, when the strident new philosophies of the seventeenth cmtury announced theiT modernity by repudiating the past, Cudwonh. i. a figure uf continuity. This i. symbolized by the fact thl! One of his major pbilosophical ...url. f
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£u",./ and J_ldk Morolily, tt.en:by ensuring a European-wide diffusion for Tlct TrtallM alongside Cudwonh's Trw h/lt/krNal S)'IlntI.l Selections from his works wen: published in French tranwtion in Jran J..., Qen;'. BiblulIlliqut (},ouit, when", they became the cemrc-piea of a delute ber.o.·...,n J..., Qen; and Bayle. Cudwonh's doctrine of 'Plastic Nature' continued to be discussed in France through the Enligtllmmem and well into the nineu:enth century.J An Italian tran.~tion of Cudworth', works by Luigi Benedetti was publislM:d in Italy in ,g23" Continuing interest in Cud"..".th in nincttenth-«ntury Britain can be gauged from tile publication of an ed ition of hi. Sy.um ond TU.IIM by John Harrison in ,8,,5, ond the priming of one of his unpublished monuscripts as A TmlllM of Fru JPiIl by J . Allen in , 838. Ever since: Marti~u's discussion of Cudwonh in [886, there has been a sua:eKsion of shan discussio", of ond extracts from £Im",/ .,..1 J"""Mla~k Mor./jly . The mOSt imponam study of Cudwonh this antury,j.A. Passmore's Ralph C"","TlII: An I"urpmaI;"" ('95 ' ) focu.sa on tI\osc writings not published in hi. lifetime, A Trt.'iu c....«",i"l Eu",.1 ani J"u".udlt M or./iry and tile unpublished manuscripts on free will.~ Cudwonh is chiefl y remembered today as a kading mc:mbu of the group of sevmteenth-ccntury philosopher theologians now known ... the Cambridge Platonist.. This group indud es such figu res as Nathaniel Culver"'ell (d. ,65'), John Smith ( ,618-52) and Peter Sterry (d. 1672), as well ... the Olher philosopher of the "",,up .fter Cudwonh, Henry More ( ,6, ..-81). Their sobriquet deri,·es from the fact th.t they "-ere all educated at Cambridge ond they all, to diffen:m degrees, dre'" on the philosophy of Plato and his followers in preference to the AristotcIi.nism of the schools. As a group they are characterized more by a common OIItlook thon a rigid set of doctrines. Their liberal theological temper was malched by a broadly syncretic approach to phiJosophy. Their insiSI(n~ on the importance of reason in malre,.. of relip,.. was I

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hamess«llo a lokrant religious outlook. While meir academic learning ran deep. it w~m hand in h,..,d with an emphasis on practical monliry and SCTViceoble knowledge. Cudworlh: life and " 'rilings Cudwonh was born in Aller, Somerset, in r617. where his father, als
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she became a fmnd of John Locke and proponent of his phiJosophy.! It was Lady Masham's amnectioo with Locke that led indirectly to the: hippy accident of Cudworth's manlUCripts being mistaken for pipers of John Locke'l. As ~ result they were acquired by the British Mu..,um (now the British Library)! According to Edward o,andler, the first editor of.lf TrtaliH c.,,..-.,m,,r £1< ..... IIm"Mldk M.r.lily, it was It the behut ofWy Masham'l son, Fnncis Cudworth Masham, that the trelti.., was published in 1731. The one work which Cudworth published in his lifetime, his maJisterial Trw IImlkr"..1 Sysum .fl~ U"iwtlt. is an anti-detenninist tlUlise, which ..,eks an acoommodation of theology and philosophy. It is in luge part devoted 10 a philosophical n:futation of atheism, and a demonstration of the true idea of GOO as essenriaJly good and wise. This ..... originally conceived as a ......k containing three hooks, of which th.e 5ea}IId and third wen: to dell, respecri,·e1y, with the: existence in nalUre of moral absolutes, and with freedom of the will _ the subject maner of lhe two treltises in the present edilion, A TrtaliH c.,,,unti,,, Eunt.1 .
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eviden« that he thought his work hm been undcnnined by Henry More's publication of his ethical trc:ItiSt: EftrkiriJiDN nkinmoY And the manuscript eviden« of his work 00 F"tlPiJlsuKlle5U that he could nOl decide on a suitable formal for presenting his argument: the thrtt manuscript trellises on the subject overlap considerably with one mother, md could nOl have been intended for publication logether. wk of industry was certainly not the problem. In addition 10 the writings mentioned, he also prepared a monumental commentary on Ihe Book of Dmic!, which hu still nOl been published." So busy was he with his studious projects that the ecclesiastical visitors of the Parish where he hm a li ving complained in 1686 that he neglected his Henfordshill' living.llit is sometimes suggested that it was Cudworth's duties u Muter of Grist'. College which dim·acted him from completing his projects. But public duties did not pll'vent other contemporaries of his from publishing books. On the other hand, accordiog 10 his friend and ooUCCU>tH.l .olumc in 1&]8." ), i. nuL l>c,u",1 tI,C \"..""h ur !",,>i!Jili', tI"'" • combination of nauve caution along with political and ecclesiastical flctors served 10 nacerbale hi. pain~taking md prolix mmncr of argument, md thereby delay publication. Although he enjoyed the palJ"(>rulgl' of the influemw Finch &mily (his S)'fIt1tf is dedicated to the Lord OunceUor, Heocagl' Finch), and retained his mastership of Grist'S College al Ihe Restoration, his links with the Il'publican repme of the ioterregnum well' nOl forgonen. I J Furthermore, his libe",] thcologK:al temper was one which was Out of lune wilh Ihat of the Restoration ecclesiutical regimen: although he remained a member of the rc-established GuTCh of Englmd, his utrcmc b.tirudin1rianism, his theological lemings towards the hu. " So< J. c.....IeJ "'" R.C. au-;,,;. (eds.~ 1l< 1M?' ,oJ

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erodox ame-Nicent f.llhu, Crigen, and his strong millenarian ism proNbly did not endur him ro his peers in the Church hierarchy. While his anti-Hobbism may have counter-baJm=l his latitudinarianism in the eyes of Restontion Qurch hienrchy, his hisroria>philosophical method was soon 10 Ix regarded as ounnoded. 16 Whalever the Ihwlogical politics of Cudworth's position, in philosophical Ierms, CUd ...·orth kepI his finger on the pulse of new developments ;n philosophy: in addilion 10 addressing the philosophy of Dcsl:artcs and Hobbes, Tlu Trw I"ttlktl~dl SYIINff contains a n-Jutation of Spinoza's T.dUdIJU Ihtolo:in-JHllilirIU (t67o). Although A Trtdliu: Om ..,."i,,: EUntdl.nJ /tnltlllldk 1010r.lily "'";IS not published until l73t. it proNbly cirClllated in manuscripl bcfon: then. Its publication history Iherefon: ""es ;t a somc"'hat unusual posilion ;n relation to the hisrory of philoi;oph y because il was published io a "err diffe...,nl conleXI from that of ;tS original production. It was retmved from manuscript obscurity by [d,,-ard Qand1cr. Bishop sU("(:CS5ivcJy of Lichficld and of Durham, and published at a time of )i"ely dcNte on ethical ntionalism. Ihe natun: of moral obligation and the foundations of moral ""minry•• deb'le which was sparked by SiUIlucl Clarke. Boyle lectures.1< Whm Cudworth wrotc EUrndf ''''ltIIIldk M.rdlily. the OlUrch of England had still not rnched a satisfactory accommodation ...;th religious disstnt. It had nOI worked OUI the I.ticudinarian compromise, which took it inro the eighteenth century. The political uphe..u of the Civil W.r and interregnum Wen: fresh in people'. memories, as were the theological debotcs oca.sioned by tIte predestinarian Calvinism which cha!"l\Clerized establishment Puritanism of those years. On the philosophia l front, Cartcsianism "'as still a ...,lalively ne'" phenomenon, as was the philowphy of Thomas Hobbes, who already bore the brand of atheist materialiR The Royal

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'"lrodlUlum Socic1y, founded in 1660, ,,';IS in its infancy. john Locke had not yet made his mork as. philosoph~r, and l.uc Newton (Tf4~J737) was still a young Cambridge don. When £Ie",a' a~d Immutable Morality was eventuaUy published, the Hanov~rian su~ion ,,·as already imo t~ second ~n(T"ation, mon=hical gov~rnment and Protestant oscendancy thereby 5Kured. Thinking thrologians had had to face 3 new phiJoso.. phical challenge in the form of Locke, whose EJuoy COllu",illX HUMilII Utukntl$1lditlX (T6o}o) had swept aside the tradiJion31 grounds of religious apolQgetics and the innatist episJemology thaI underpinned it. Newton was assured a plo"" in th pamheon of the great and the good, his sciemific theories having been put to the ..,TV;'" of Anglican apologetics in the face • new ...,em y, deism. Cudworth, the rational apologist for religion who was con,·inced overwhelmingly of the importance of philosophy for theology, re.appeared 3t a time ,,·hen the philosophers seemed to luve succ<:ssfull)· undermined religious belief. Cudworth, who had sh.,.pened his arguments on the l1intslOn~ of Hobbes in the t67os, re-cmeTiw into debates that could be traced bad to the chalknge of Hobbist relotivism. H~ emerged alongside the elhical rationalists, a.rke, Balguy and Pri"", that is, as a posthumous participant in the debncs on the foundations of morality whose terms he had helped to shape. His first wilor, [dw.,.d Chandkr, indicated the relevance oflhe TrtahY to cighltt1llh-ttntury issues, as h~ observed in his Pref."" 10 the '731 witian: It is _II kno"n, ,lut !he: Ioooe principJes, with regard 10 mo ..lity, tho, .rt oppoocl in th is book, are defendtd by '00 nuny in our time. It is hoped .1!KI that the ne... CO
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In ordu 10 und~"'tand how £lnTlal alld lmmutabk Morality could find a place in such a different "'"GrId, il is important to recognil:e tha, the Cambridge PlatOni5T laMI which attaches to Cud ,,·orth does not denote I mystical movement isolated from the pressures of the time, nOIStalgically taking refu~ in 'he idealism of Plato and the arcana of Plotinus. On the contrary, the Platonism of the IiObriquet extends 10 the philosophical rore of Pllto's dialogues and represents only On~ aspect af the philosophical formation af th~ group "ith which Cudworth is "

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..!lp<:jated. 1M Cambridge PlatOllists were well acquaimed with d(vcloplTK'nts in seventeenth~tI,..y philosophy and science. They were whole-hnrted Copernican&, who had read Ibc:on and respceted Galilro and Harvey. It ,,"1$ a Cambridge Platonist (H(nty More) who _ the first proponent of Canesianism in England. Cudwonh read and criticized no!: JUS! Descmes, bUI Hobbes and SpillOZi as well. The philosophy of spirit which More and Cudworth fonnulated was not a rerreat from modemi[)" but a comribution (0 comemporuy .:kbaln about the viability of the meclwlical philosophy.' 9 Cudworth'li arguments for the ""tural basis of morality are directed againS! the materiali"", and ethical relativism of Hobbes. Although he denied that the mind was a I.hla Tau, his epistemology contains SOITK' striking parallels to John Locke. When reading Cudwonh i( is imponant 10 recognize that h( _ • theologian as well as I philosopher. For Cudworth philosophy and theology are intimately interconnected. His theological priorities imerxl with his philosophy in a number of ..... )"S. First of all, like the orheT Cambridge PluonislS, he accorded reason a liignificant role in religion. As a reliPouIi apologist he employed philosophical arwument in .uppon of the fundamnllals of religjous belief. Secondly, he was profoundly aware of the theological implication. of philosophical I""'ition. - for insance, he argued that materialism undermines morality and leads to lthel"",. Conversely, he saw that theological doctrines had implications for philosophy: he was especially critical of voluntarism, Ihat i. the doctrine that the divine will is the fundammtal determinant in God's government of the world. Against tile voluntarists he ntaintained that 'there is. n'Nre of goodnHS, and a natUre of wisdom ant«:edent to the will of God, which is the rule and measure of it' (p. ,87). To subordinate divine wisdom to God'ii win among the di,·ine arnibutes destroys oertainty and leads to scepticism. This was a position which Cudwonh ntaintained agaim:r theologians and philosophers alike . Apan: from a minor figure mentioned in £1"",,/ uJ bfflfluldk Mo.,luy, Joanne!; Szydlovius, he does flO! name his Calvinist opponents; but he cou ld weU have had in mind Cambridge theologians like William

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Pukins ( 1 558-160~) and Anthony Tuckney (1599-1670), The phiJoso... pher whom he crilicizes for amibuting tOO much to the divine will is Descartes, The concomitutt of Cudworth's theological anti-voluntarism is his insistence on ~ fll'l)l\om of ~ will. 20 This ill a tenet ",hich he sh:m:s with the other Cambridg<' Pl:atonists, and otber liberal opponents of han:I-line Calvinists, in particular the Dutch Anninians. This emphasis on freewill is probably indebted to Ensmus. It also accounts for Cudworth's admiration for Ori~n. Furthmnore, Cudwonh's ronccm with ,,",ventecnth-ccntury theological issues explains not just his intc:rcsl in the problem of freewill, but the fact that hi, writings on the subjea address the issue in scholastic terms, debating topics such as indifferency of will, and whether it is the will or understanding that decides how ..... should act. The dominant themes of Cudworth's writings a«: ones which racked the Church in England in his youth: debates .bout freewill and predestination had been such hot topics mat they Were proscribed by royal proclamation in t636. The apparemly inmlClable theological ,,·i,h tlle app.:ar.Ul~"1: of challenging new philosophical forms of determinism: the mechanical prubk"''> uf 'he p...,...ci.il War "':'1uin;:"] a new

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philosophy of Hobbes and Descartes, and the mOlenal pantheism of Spinoza. For Cudworth, philosophical determinism was the counterpart of predestinarian voluntarism in theology. Not only did he, like Henry More, sec these: philosophies as h"';ng atheistical implications, but also as having implications for moral conduct. Against the rel.tivism of Hobbes he argued that goodness and the principles of morality are abwlute:. As he put it in one of his unpublished tmtises on frttwil!, 'one of y' greatest Arcanums bolh in Phylosophy and Morality' is 'y' then: ill in Nature on mir,; dyaOov ond Ipsum Bonum an absolute: good ond l"'rfection which is y' stutdard and measure both of Power ond Liberty and al.., wisdomc' (Add. MS 4979, fol. 38). One difficulty in reading Cudworth ond ass<:ssing his philosophy is that he oflen prcs<:Ttts his philosophical arguments in anliqw: dn:ss, citing precedents from anciem philosophy ond arguinS against particular classical philosophers. None the less, it is also important not to be •

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b'/TIN/url",,, deceived 1010 lhillkingli1al Cudworth _ .....,.., mliqllarim, or al bat I doxognphu. To 1",* inducted ill t'A·entic.>th-cmlllry approaches to philoiophy, il K>em5 strm~ to discuss issues in conlemponry philoIOphy by "&mining ancienl pbibophy _ yel mis is p.ccisdy ... hal Cudworth does in lhe c:uc, for insun«, of PnxalJOfU, ... hom he pramf5 as I materialist relatiri$! md 1m115 in ElmuJ .lfi !",_uk M.,./ity as a kind of stalking hone (or Thomas Hobbes_ linderlying Cudwonh'. approach is his co.wicrion lhal trum is one md that philosophy is I IInifin! l)"Item through ... hid! to afTi'-e It knowledJ( of Ihe trum: 'il is bill (If\( muh and Itno..-ledge lhat is in all lhe unda-swtdinp;n the ... orld ' .-hen innumcnblc crnud und.".l2ndinp direC1 1hmIoe1... to .he ...... emplation 01 tbc 511ft< uniyn.) Ind immullblc lruo/u., tbcy do all 01 them hut I I il -.en: 11) . . . . and tbc same: qin.oI ,.,.;"., of the tmn>1 ..*10m .hal is nner ..... nl. and tht Itttnl COI'I«plions of thole truths in Iheir minds, ...., 10,.. lilLe K>mol «hoa of the ...... -'I,is [.......,prionIJ of .... di";ne inlellcct raoundinl in """"- (_ belo .... p , 'la).

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'h" milh. ohangt thtir rwne. or milhl imp""'" thti, 'eohnicallppanl.... bullhcy .....1d noIltriously modify.he fulKbmmtal OInIcturc of thtir UJUm""lI, He .... impreucd hy Ihe recu....,noe of t:CIUin of philoeopltal ..... tm, .... y; ht "'1$ not impr<:&$CCl by .he eb;m of hi' conlmlporarico thaI they had "'aken ,httniclvcs r_ (rom l.-..dillon in ...-der to tmboarl upon ... m,erpriK quile !IO.-et. ;n • ...... nn unlJ2mJn(llod by the .,IIHi or.he pat. In . . . . .hi<:-h inrmcd ~ all "pGn oricinali'Y. he inIiolcd "pGn the imponanoe of tndition." .... conlOiranll

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. . . . . ., . . _ , ...

..,n

••

.•,'- ." h • •

1~lroJuclioN

sucettding ~ncr.uions of philosophers. Also important for constructing this pnIigrtt of ancient wisdom "'as the third-cenIUr)' historical doxography of phil"""l'hy, o;.,g.,nts Laertius' Liut. of thr Phi"""phm, the Grcd text ofwhiclt had bttn rero,·e,."d and translated by Ambrogio Traversari in t47:1. In addition to offering a model for the histoT)' of philosophy, this was an important SOurce of Epicurian thought and Stoicism. Besides using Diogcnes Lacrtius as a source, Cud "'orth also draws on Sextus Empiricus, whom he uses both as a soum: of sceptical argumenu; and as • means of supplementing his kno,..led~ of ancient philosophy from sources other than Aristotle and Pla!G. It is CUd ...·orth '. treatment of all philosophies as participanu; in plrilowpJt;d p..-uit thOl enabled him to write about Cartesianism in £urndl nil Imm",dir MO.dlily as. modem mrnifc:station ofDemocritean atomism . Like""ise, in 11r T""I..,elleu,,"i Sysum, Hobbes is seen as . materialist after the model of Anaximander. and Spino"" as a hylozoisl. In £Irrn"' "tUI ImmUluk MO.dliry the debate with Hohbes i. set up, through • discussion ofPbto's Thurm ... , in which Protagoras figures as rn ethical ,."lativist and matcria~st to boot. It might be added that Cudworth interprets P10lu wilh (IIIe eye (III Sextus Empiricus, a f.etor which distinguishes his reading of Plato from that (I( his Renaissance fo,."bears. Cudworth was conscious ofth. difference between his imerpretuion of Platonic philosophy and th.t of the g,."at translatOf"S and rditors of Plato in the Renaissance, Monilio Ficino rnd Jean de Serres, ",ho, he notes, wrmc befon: the ,""coveT)" of corpuscular philosophy.u Another important dement in Cudworth'. philosophy is Stuicism. Although he was highly critical of many aspecfS of Stuicism (such as the docnine of ,."peated cycles of existence of the "'orld), CUd ...·onh is indebted 10 the Stoies for key terms in his conceptual HlCabulary. Thi, is mQSt strikingly evident in the t ....o treatises ""produ~ he,.", that is 10 say, in his epistemology rnd his moral psychology. Three examp~ might be singled OUt ror particular mention: first of an his use of the Stoic concep! of the common n<>lion. (hi"di ~.."ou.,) or innate principles of knowledge in the soul. He also adopts the Stuic term p,."kpsis, or 'anticipation', for the innale prolX'nies uf the mind .... hc,."by it is predisposed to understand the ....orld. The key concept in his a<:count !If freewill is that of the autonomy of the indi"idual soul to

.i. 'I'

ate

din:cr its actions towards the good, The term he adopts w npress this concept of 'sdf-po"-er' is the Stoic IItttmON;i-,,", denoong the ruling principle: of the soul.lJ In Cudworth Stoicism is blended with Platonism: for enrnple, he integrates the Stoic common notions with the Platonic theory of rca.>1lection (Ud""'t''''''); in his account of the oper:nions of the !IOUI he deplo)'5 the terminology of Plotinus; and it was from Plato that he dni~ed his term u~ 10 '""press the rebtionship of the phYlical order 10 the intdkctual. Cud wonh undoubtedly foun d a precedent for combinin, Stoicism and PlalOnism in the early Qun:h Fathers, notably Origcn. Hi. debt 10 Patristic thought is borne out by his LI.5<' of the term a key term in his epistemology, which he uses in the Patristic sense of 'relation' rather than the ancient Greek sense of 'condition' or 'habit '.

"linn,

A TrtllliM Conuming Ellmai and [",,,,utllik M orality In I~ Cud worth told John WorthinSlon that he ""35 working on • treatise of 'Natural Ethich ... which I ~n abo\"(. year aKOl".Z4 Thi, infomution suggests that A TrrlllUt Ca.,um;"t Eltm"I".,,' /",,,,,,Idk M".,,/ily was probably begun around 1661. The ethical position .... hich Cudworth takes in the treatise is strongly an ti-rdativist. At the bepnning he afIUe5 for the nistence of monI absolutes, that good and CYil, jumce and injustice, 15 "'elll5 'Wisdom, knowledge, an d understanding are eternal and self..,.ubsistent things', existing indepen dently of the mind and of the physical world . This is • position which Cudworth had main tained from an carly point in his oadetllic career. (In I~ he had defended the thesis that the principles of good and evil are etcmal and ind isp"nsable.YS The main emphasis of A TrtalUt One(",,;", EI""II/lINd /"'IfUII"hlt M or. 1ily is, ho,,-enr, cpistcmolo., AIt'-Jh ~'. '" i" ....... s-. .. ror ...... ''''0
"""' . .. .... nbooool ~.- h. I t iy Philip Md...d"..... T1Icir ooutOt .... pt'IIOobiy Gcono. s..: J.E. l'i0ii. Rq.,.J 1looP< "'" St h" , . ... !LtidotI. '98.~ In ......"', Sooi< " 'n was ..... up b, ... en! ohloe _1'10 ........ """' .. (b. 'JO .... 1. See J. DilIoa, 1lor .
'il

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'Don_ ....... ...r; "",,,_ .... . _ .....' •.,..;;..'.', ", "I1l00, , T ....... ).

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IlflrNlUliDIf

gicil: the treatise contains the fullest discussion (If innatist epistemulugy to ="""te from England in the ..,venleenth century. The treatise is divided imo f(lur books. 1bc fi~t of these poses me fundamental 'Iuestion asked by Socrates in Plato's EfI,ltyplt",: whnher God wills things because they are good, or whether things a..e sood because God wills them. CIIdwonh's position is that God, being sup. eutely sood, wiUs things because they are good . After a brief history of the opposing view, where he groups Hobbes with Protagoras md Epicurus, he denies tNt right and WTOng a..e relati,-e nl)(ions, and tNt the principles of right and wrong are conventional in meir basi •. He al ... atKUes aga;JIllt Ih.,.., who, like Descanes, found the principles of right and wrong, as weU as trulh and falsehood, in the will of God. IJIlltead, he argues that moral principles are: such by nature: md n(lt by audwrity; tNt they arc: founded io the goodness and wisdom of God, not the will of God. The serond book continues the argument for the immutable nature of all thiogs by dealing with the scepticil issues implicit in the philosophy of Protagoras as represented in Plato's TlttlJtlnou. Cudwonh argues that Prou.goras' sense-based epistemology and his subiective priociple thlt 'man is Ihe measure: of all things' dC5troy all certainty and undermines the basis of morality. He then gives ao account of the 'mechanical or atomical philosophy' of Drscanes and Gassendi, which he sees as a revivaiof ancient doctrines, and which explains all things in tenns of the primary properties of corporeal extension (shape, size, posioon and Ri>iHility), deduced by reason and not from ..,n.., impresrioo •. In CIIdwonh's view, the mechanical philosophy gives an intel~gible account of the natural world, because it is coherent and accessible to ~" In the third book Cudwonh commences the acrouot of hi. epistemology with a discussion of sense knowledge. Here his debt to Descartes is most app.>re:m, particularly in his distinction beN"«n sen.., and intellect, in tools account (If the relation of wul to body, and in his discus&ion of sense ])t'r«ption. Cudworth's reservations about sen.., knowledge: are consistent with the undulying PJatooism (If this thinking. He argues that knowledp' derived from the seoses is not true knowledge:. Sense impressions a..e rea:ived passively. The data acquired in mis WlIy can only furnish US with particularities and superficial appear.mces. Moreover, the senses do not pcraive enemal objects as

bIINWi,,{/io~

they are, but, acoording to the mtthmical hypothesi" they ",presl:n1 them as mo"emrnts or impressions of one kind Or another. Such data ha,·t 10 be p~ by the mind before they can be understood. Knowledge is produced octi"el y from within the mind, nOt received pass-i"ely from ,,·ithout. A sen.. tion is 'a pusion in the soul', the result of wrporeal nlO"emems, md perceptible by vinue of the 'natural s)"mpath{ "'hich the soul has for the body. Such impressions ""' in" oluntal)': that is, the ""ul has no wntrol o,'er them. At best ..,nsation is 'a ~rtai n kind of drowsy and somnolent pr!occption' of the soul (p. 56). Although Cudwonh ",~rds sense-knowledge as inferior to knDwln!1>" generatn! by the mind. his position is nOI mtHmpiricist. On the contrary, he spttifically acknnwledges the adequxy Df the Knses for pro"iding koowledge Dr Ihe utemal world and of the bod y, as well as for assistin g the mind in framing hypotMscs (see below, p. 57)· Book tV is the longest of the treatise, Ionl>'" thm the first th,,,,, put together. In it Cudworth elaborates his theol)' of knowled l>" in order, he says, 'to COnfUle Sttplicism or fmtaSticism' (Ihe II1e ,"ul, which reflects on itself and its own ideas, and oompares the intelligible oomponmts of data rettived via the I;CnKS (what he calls the 'Khescs' Df external ob~). AU kno"'ledge, he argu es, in"(>Ives the acti"ily of mind; 'knowledge is an inw.rd and attin energy of the mind itselr (p. 73). The mind i. furnished "';Ih the conttpts ("O<"ma{,,) ~ded fDr arri";ng at knowledge. 'The mind', Cudworth writa, 'cannO{ know anything, but b)" somothing of its own, that is natin, domeslie and familiar to it' (p. 74) . Cognition ent";ls anticipation: Cudworth employs the Stoic term profrpJu but link. it with Plato's theory of e mind i,""lf. Knowledge is acqui..w deducti"dy, not inducti,·ely: the mind, to use Cudworth's expression, UJu~1h toward s particulars; and, in compre-

oc rogntea IT

nal

hending the enemal world, the mind pera:ives not the uternal appcar:mce of things but the n:lationol constants whi<.:h n:"eal their immutable es5eJ1ce5. To illustnte the activity of the mind, as opposed to the pauiviry of the senses, Cudworth employ. several key images: fiBt I dod reflected in I mirror, seen by on eye, Ind o;ccn hy an eye attached !O the mind (p. 85). In the fiTS! iI is merely reRected; in the second case, the eye registeTli the COIOUB as well. But it is the mind which registers the disJlO'ition of tM pam and their function. By perceiving tM n:lationship between them (for which Cudworth uses the: Greek term sfh'sit), the mind can recognize the obj.:ct IS I clock and nO! j... t lo;onglomerate of o;olours and rnttaIs. Similarly, words on a pl~ of I book are just inky senwl. to on oninul or to on illitente (p. 99), but to IIOmeOnfc who knows how to sad, the words have meaning. 1bc: ar-gumc:nt has on aesthetic dimension: to an animal music is mere sounds, to the rational listener thnt' sounds Ire harmonious. The beaury of a beauriful land _ scape or picture is lost on animals, but apparent to the human mind . Knowledge of the utemol world is poi&ible bKiu&c the world is intelligible, it bears ',he stamp of intdlectuolity'. Cud ...·orth ill ...trates this by extending his book anllogy to become the metaphor oft~ book of natun:: the Hterate mind could not read meanings in • book unless t~y had first been put then:. Likewise, the natural world, in its orderliness and in the disposition of illl parts, contain. meaningful signatures, the meaning h..-ing bttn placed there by the creator. Another analogy which Cudworth employs for this is .~hitectural (p. 92): a pallce is not a pile of hri<.:u but an architecturally designed edifia:. The order and rci.nionship of the pOTU which make it a structure rather than a fonuitous heap of rubble an: both evidence tlult then: "'-as a designer and are what makes it identifiable IS a building to the observer_This uample also illuilrates the general P~tonic principle at the heart of Cudworth's philosophy, tbat mind pre<;:cdes the world, and that reality and tTUC being belong !O t~ metaphysical rather 'han the physical order of things. Cudworth exp=ses the re~tionship of tnle being to me created "'orld, the world of sense, in clusically Platonic term. ofarchrypc and ectypc, form and copy. Th~ vie .... that mental or inteUccru.tl being is more real than materia! bein, is consim:nt with Descartes' assertion that the soul is more kno .....bk than body. It does, of course, raise th~ question or th~ HUI

'I'

ate

onlolo(ical stalUS ofllle idcu, or 'conotptions of Ihe mind'. Cudworth insists Ihal IIIey are not derivw from hody. Nor do they elist indcpendendy; ralher, they are modificationli of mind or intellect. He denies thaI they are ~Iy fipnenlS ofthc hullW\ brain, and rnanJW •• number of arguments, drawn chiefly from s""",eo" 10 demonstrate the independence of oonaplli from Ihe physical world and senlie experience. For example, he arJUCS thaI il iii possible 10 deduce the nalure of a uiangle wilhoot seeing one, by the .ppli<;ation of ElIClidean principb. Such con<>:ptual entities are not the products of individu.1 minds, bul are the same in all minds. So absolute is their independence of the human mind and of the ph y"'=:aJ world , that th ey " ""Id be the same wcre the world 10 be destroyed and created anew. The mind of which conceptual mtiria may truly be said to be modifications is the di.·ine mind, ""hence they derive their veracity, consrmcy, ctcmity and uni\"CT"S.lity, and whence the human mind deri,·a; its capacity for knowledge. It is in thil; senliC, th erefore, that the human mind ean be described as parric:ipating in the divine mind. And our knowledge of the external world entails. projection of ideas on 10 the world , lead ing Cudworth 10 the proto-Berkc1cian formulation, IJut 'oorpo1"Cal qualities' an: nothing more than '001 own shado""s' and the vital passive energies of our own lOuis' (p. 148). Furthermore, if COfIaprual cntities belong to true being, C'Wcry clear conception is true, and nothing which is fallie can be cJcarly conceived II nisting. Thus the n~ of trulh is eltar intelligibility. Although Cudworth in Ihis way .dopts the Cartnian principle of the cbrity and diotincmess of ideas as the criterion of cutainty. he rejects &5 scepticaJ Desartcs' supponing argument based on the truth of our f:acuhles. It would, he argues be impossible even for God to construct Ihe human mind 50 that il percci.·cs fahiily as trt.lC jWiI as il would be impossible for God to make contradiciions true. The ethical purpose of A T""tiu C-umml £umll/ " NJ J_u/dk M o,."h"1y resides in the fllCt thai il su pplies t.. o major aspects of the theory of mind which underpin Cudworth's cthici. As he put ii, 'the narure of monJily Cl/loot be understood wilhout some' knowledge of the narure of the soul' (p. (45). First of all, his metaphysical realism enabb him to argue for a funrlamcntal connection betwttn Ihe principles of mor.dity and the principles of knowledge. If mind and intellect arc 'fi"l in the order of nature', conceplual entities musl have more rcalil)' than nuterial ones, and justice and morality, IS modifications of mind, arc

more 'real and ",,!>stanoal things than the modifications of mere IitllliCless maner'. SeI;ondly, with regard 10 epistemology, Cudworth denies that the principks of monli(y can be deduced from SCAR knowledge. Acwrdingly he rejccn; the model of the mind as r"s", and argllCS thai only an innarist epistemology can provide knowledge of 1I00d and evil, just and unjllSt. There is alhird, psychological, aspect of Cudworth's theory of mind, which is nOi dealt with in this work, but is treated in his writings on freewill. Cudworth prepares for this at the end of:1 TrtllIlst Qno,mo;", EIt""'! uJ I".".",dk M"rdf;,y whm M asserts thai moral principles arc, like immutable ideas, 'anticipations', and thai these are nOI 'men intellecluol forms', hut derive from Whal he calls '~other more inward and vital principle'. He does not elaborate on what this principle might be beyond describinll il as 'a nalural determination to do 5OfT\C thinp and avoid others' (p. 145). This is a formulalion which aIlTCSponds ro his a1nctpt of the will as "tl "",,";hll in A T"_riu ,,[Frttfp;!I. where il is ~nked 10 the life-sustaininll function of the soul. This underlines Ihe continuity between both treatises, and ronfirms that Elmo,,/ uJ I".",,,ldk MOT"Hty is more of 1 prologue: 10 a larger untise on ethics than the discussion of ethics that the otle implies.

,,,bill,,

A Tuatist of FrulPifl The three draft treatises on 'Liberty and Necessity' conlinue: the ~ projca as Elmo,,/ ",.J 1_ldft M orality hy takinll the discussion fo .....vd to more oh,musly ethical questions. They all deal with the problem of monl ruponsibilily, and with the psycholOJY of auton<.>moIlS action. They can be described as psychological both in the old Sal.., of living In account of the soul, and in the more: modem sense of discussing mmtal &ctors which .ffect beha,·iour. For the will is the ruling principle which co-ordiru.les the functions of the soul and direc:ti the action. of the individual beinll. The only one of these treaoses to be published, that printed here: as:1 TrtI.l;u o[ Frttfpiff, is 1M shortest of the three. A5 in the casc of the olher two, much of it is taken up with technical discussion, theological as ....,ll as philosophical. ChaPICTS 13-27 deal with the ohjcaions of detenninists to the freedom of the will, especially those of Hobbes but also of Pomponazzi and various unnamed ~hers. And chapter 3 raises

'VI

ate

difficulties connected "ith a d~terministic position _ many (If them drawn from Origt:n. In his cOr>a:pt of freewill os a power of the soul, combining the functions of intelkct and vo~tioo., Cud".-onh di$penses with traditional fllClllcy psycholugy, which divided the will from intelLect os separate f....... lries of the soul. He is thus abk t(l sidestep the two main opposing traditions concerning the relationship of reason and will in Western thw1ogy: the Thornist vje .... , IIIXXIrding to which the will foll<>_ the din:ctin, (If the intellect, and the voluntarist positioo. of Scows and Odham which subordinates intelkct to will. In his critique of the doctrine of the indifference of the will he und()IJbtedly h.d Suarez and his follow"rs in mind, although he does not nante his thwlogialopponents. For Cudwonh, moral behaviour is r>(II shaped by external incentives and disincenti~es, but is founded on the principles of ,·inue innate to the soul. Cudwonh conai,·es of the will os the ..,If-d~termining power of the .... ul which predisposes it towards the good . This dri,·" to ...&rds the good is the spring and moti'";Ition of all action. In FruJPill it is described os a kind of premonition, '. anain vaticirullion, prtSage, scent. and odour of one IN''''''''''' H",,,,,. One supreme highest good transcendin, all
'VI

ate

{t,/""iu(/j(j" (p. ,6J). The Ir'XmIONih" indi"iduates not only by diffen:ntia,ion from oth~l"S, but by ctI-()I"dinaring the functions of tM soul. Cud ....orth ronceives of the "";11 as I uniti"e po"'U of the soul. It is 'the soul IS rcdupliclled upon itRlf, and sclf-oomprehensi.-e' (p. 185). As c0ordinator and din:cmr of the '"lIOoUS appetiles and functions of the soul, tbe ....ill is the ,,·hole perwn. As he puts it in one of the manuKTipt t""'"tises 'On Liberty and Necessity', it is the unifying soul .... hich constitules the .df, 'denominates the .... hole man as slIch', and 'determines all y' passi"e capability of every man's nalUre, and malt.,. every man such as he is' (Add. M'l 4979, fol. 6) . 11te ..ill is especially identifiable "";th Ihe individual I"'l"$On in the ""n"" that il is the indelible mark of QUr humanity. Since it is Ihat .... hich predisposes Ihe soul towards tM good, it is the.-efore the means 10 improve the &Oul, to increase the pcrf«tion oftM soul: it is '. KIf-promoting, Rlf_impro"ing po .... er' (p. 185) . Although, for Cudworth, f''''''''il! is then:fore a crowning attribute of human beings, as he argues in chpter '3, it i. none the less a mark of human imperfttlion, since OfTly imperfttl beings Taluin: perfecting (5« chapter 17). for this reason, since God is perfttl, fretWill ClnnO! properly be ascribed 10 Him . A TmJliK of FruJrlill i. the shonest ofCud .... onh'. three .... ritings on free .... ill. These elabome a number of important clements that an: only implicit ben:, in particular the pnactical and social aspects of his ethics. 11te unpublished manuscripts make clearer the practical dimension of CUd ....orth's moral theory, that il is 'Action that gi"es denomination to a Persone' (Add. MS 41)81, fol. 16). In all thn:e tTellises the <=tral element is goodnt'SS rather than duty. And goodnt'SS is a disposition of the .... hole person, 'ye inward disposilions of ye Mind & Will' (4980, fol. 10). 11te good as such i. nO! defined hen:, Ihal h"'ing been done in 171. T "'. hflrll.rl""/ Syslrm. Then: Cudwonh "Tites unequivocally that the good is God. God i., he ... )'5 referring to Plalo, 'TIl. Ivy Idr. ~r &snu. of Goo4' (TIS, p. ~). This is a definition tlut Cudwonh repeats else .... here, for example in the scnnan he preached before the House of Commons in 16.t7, ,,·here he Slates 'Thai God is aJso God, because he is the high.,.1 and most pcrfttl good', and that 'he iii FncntiaJly the mosl perfttl GooJ'."' In identifying the good with God, Cudwonh underlines the n:ligious dimension of his philosophy. In ,.. """"'" PI'

I ...... .

XlIvii

'I'

ate

reli,;o.. as in morals, he: adY'I)Qted a liwtl goodness, not a theoretical goodness: 'the Lifo of divine U\ltM is ~ler exprcssro in Actions than in Words,.n The good wncrived by Cudwonh is not merely a metaphysical moty. Even when defined in tcnTlS of the deity, it unfolds into moral principles tMt entail the idea of practical action. This goodness, 'in which the Essence of the Deity princip.olly consisu', comprises on the Of1e hand 'Benignity' and 0f1 the other hand the fountainhead of morality:

N.,."

it romprehmdo Eminently all Vm ...""J",/iu, the Dit·;'" being the Fi", P."",, hereof; for which cause V...., .... is dcfiMd to bo, An A";""I4I"~ ,. 1M Dtily. ;",/itt and I/o.only are no F. "i/;'", Ihinp, m:a
common.

Cudwonh', philosophy is onen treated as a historical curiosity, even among th.,.., wt.o have taken the In>Uble 10 rad him. It is lemptinglO argue that he had no appreci1ble impact, on Ihe grounds that his S)'Jlt1fI wu never completed and bis other writings were either neVeT printed or were published postbumously. The a!"fllmeRt that the conlcnt of Eft..... / ,,," I_Mldk Morality and FrurPill "'... no{ available 10 Cudwonh'. rontemporvics or immediate succcsson mighl seem compelling until one IlCkno"·Icd~ the possibility of manuscript circulation of Cudwonh's .... ritings. and also the fact that the basics of Cud .... position in these: treatises "'-ere available in the wrilings he published in his lifClime. Although Cudwonh is prone 10 wordinCliS, he is a Ihoroughly self-consislent Ihink .... , .... h.,.., poslhumou,ly published wrilings devclop I"Chles IUld position. enunciated in earlier writings. In his TrIM hudlertul S)'Jlt1fI he anticipatcs the ethical position he elaborates In Elllffa/ . " 1_lule M~r.lity IUld ,,"ves IUl indication of the main

onh·.

n

ioOI .• p. ,0/1.

points of his account of ,,-ill. For example, in the 5)"",,,, he &SS(rts Ihal 'the Differmcu of J/lJ1 and UNjom, HauJI , and DU~allnt, are grater R~IJfiliN in N.tun: than the Difft rntm of HIJ" and S.ft, J/~t and CAUl, M~ul and Dry' (TIS, p. 8S8). His second sermon preached Ixr~ the House of Commons attaCks n-ternalist accounts of moral obliption in terms which anlicipllte the phraseology of £,..,.,.,,1 ",,4 1".".ul"ltk M . ,,,lily, 'as if tlHHl and roil, ftm and u"juJI (as SOme philosophers dreamed) " ere nm I/JOOll but vO!I(j) and JoXg only, had no rc:aIity in nature, but depend on certain laws, enfofted by outward. punishments or mere opinions'. In the last pan of the Sym ... , Cudworth adumbrates I", ..."tdlt MIH'/J/ity. th e epistemolosl· more fully stated in EI.",,,I thai Imo .... kdJ<' is elmW (TIS. p. 826) and thaI mind precedes things (po 859). He talks in tenns of trly~ and ."~/y~ (p. 853) and denies that the mind is a/d"l" ,e" (p . 86t )_ He arnlCks 'a Modem Atheistick Pretender to Wit' (i.e. Hobbes) for reducing mental processes to local motion of oorporc:al p... ticl ...., and refutes Protagoras' claim that man is the measure of all things, and that all kno,,-kdge is sense-knowledge (TIS, p. 85a). Cu
an"

Mmtal CMt'11;"" [canl be ..id to be the Amon of BoJin wiihau[ and th~ mur p_;,,~ ~/IM n;~ktr; . nd least of all [."'1 voli,;"... ouch. th= bein, plainly here, ...".,mini t.p. ~Jl1V, /. ONr o"'~ P~INr, by mea""

.tK,wf. "-e MOliK' Pmmtk./ Actio. ,. oecoo-dinll)- o;Le,trvina 00 .... -..lot;'" or Blo_, that;" oomrthing of S'if-A,,"-.;ry_ (TIS, p. 851) Over fony y....1"$ ag
n"

right. By making imporum Statemenlll of his phibophy a",iLabIe in a readable modem edition, I I>ope 10 incre~ the likelihood of Cudworth being read on hi. own terms, as well as to lay the ground for I redra ...ing of tile historical accoum in such a ...oay as 10 <e-integnte Cud"·onh into the phibophical cW,·elopIMm.. of the early Enlightenment.

•

Chronology 1617 163> 16]5 1637 1639 16.41 11">4~

born in AlloT, Sorn<'rKl. ent~rs 1M Uni •• rsity of CambridV >$ a ",ud.nl a! Em .... nud Collt:gt-. gradual.. BA. lks<2rtH, DiMoo ..., J. "",• .,u. grad,,"I" MA and is appoinled 10 a fellowship al Emnunu.l College.

Dnartes, Mi";'.,~. outbreak of Civil Wor.

I~ lbo~tion of th~ ClIurch of EnsJand.

11">47 11">49 1651 1652 • 653 165-4 1655 ,660 166-;

ejtction of ~bridg<: dons "'ho r<:fu .. d 10 subscribe to Ihe co'·en.nl imposed by P.rliornenl. Dnartes, Pri..np;. ,MIDl8pkiM. Ippointed M .... ' of Cbre Hln and Rtgi~' Professor of Hebu ...~ preach.,. • ...-mon 10 lh~ Hou.. of Common • . am.nion of Charles I. Cudwonh becomes DO. Hobbes, lLvi.o'.a~. Hobbu. Dt '0'1"" 101i,itt>. OIiv~r Cromwell becomes Lord Proleclor. appoinled Mas .. r of ClIris,', CoII
1&7"

Spinozo, nat/allIS lilto"'ti<~IOIi'inn. 16"]8 Tilt T rIU J~u1lu....1Sy<''''' O[liIt U~it"nt published. CUd ..... th ;"'lrJled prd>endary of G iouccoter.

'Popish PIoI:'. 1b88 dies. nxi

'II

ate

Further reading (All items publi5hed in Lond(ln , unbs othe ..... ise inditated)

y"(""int E/"",,'

41111 ',","lif/l~1t MQrlllily and A Trtll/Ut ~f FrulI1ill ",en: first printed posthumously. The former appcon:d in '73 I, edited by Edward Ooandler (facsimile reprin l, Ne.... York, t976). It IO"U reprinted in the third volume of Harrison 's edition of 1lt I"ttl/mllil/ SYSleM .[IM UIfivnu ( , 845). A Latin tnnslation , fA IImm" " mm...ldifiMu iw/i tI "~IOmi IOI)/uII,ibou ri..,lI14m, by the German scholar J.L. Mosheim, _ prinled with his manslation of Cudwonh', Syslm< (see below). Thm: is now a Frendlttanslation by J.L. Bretau (Paris, 1995). The Trtll/itt is the "wk of CUd ....orth most often reprinted in nccrpt: L.A.s. Bine, BritWt M~rlllim (Oxford, ,!Ion), G.R. Cragg (ed.), TIt, P14"".ist. (Ne.... York, 1\118), D.O . Raphael, TIlt BrilisJI M~flllisll (Oxford, (969) and J .B. Schnttwind 'i ancho~, M~fIIl Phiilmlphy ft~". MOIIIIIll"t I. Kt1Il (Cambridge, 1990). A Trtillitt .[ FrmPiI/, ed. J. Allen ( 18J8), is the shortest of three treati&eS on liberty and n«usily in the British Library, London (Add. MSS 4!J78-8l). Then: exist5 one other unpublished manU$Cript, Cud+ wonh's 'Commentary on the Seven ty Weeks of Daniel' (British Library, Add. MSS .w86-7). The original manuscripts of both the SyJtttll and the Tr,.'ise UmunWol El'TllIlI I_tdft M",.lily an: no longer ntant . In his own lifetime Cud.'orth published a number of sermons: TIlt Ulli." ~fC1tml fM Cbrt"h (.6.p:), A Disullflt Umr,TllUoI/M Trw Notio" of 1M ~rll 'l SOIPIN' ( .6.p:), A Sm.."" PrtllrMIL Hfort 1M H""oll,dft HoWl! of c.,""""1U ( .6,.7), If &"...,,, PrtIl'MIL kfore 1M H4IIollrdft Somly ~f Li",.bur-JII"' ( 16,.7). He also published the thesis

If TrtillM

T,...,

c..mMJ"

II""

/I""

he defended when he graduated BD in 16+4, Dil"IIi' ,"liDllts "'"i II lIIali ••1""", .1 mJispnlJdi!N (16S1). Hi. maior philosophical work, Tlu Trw 11lIdk(I",,1 SysuIII of I~t UII,vmt (1678), "":os rq>ubliihed by Thomas Birch ( ' 743, rpL 1839) and by J. Harrison (.145) (with Il(>tcs from Mosheim'. tnnslatiOIl). II ""35 tnn.bted into Utili by J.L. Mo&heim, RI"I"lp~j CruI,."m~, 'YII,,,,,, ;"Idfuln/is ~"jus Ii"j,...m {jena, 1733, rq>r. Lciden, 1773) md ill10 Itllim by Luigi BellCdetti SUit",,, i"ltlltl/l4lf. de/1II0NiO, 5 vols. (Pavia, [823). His Sysum was reprinted in facsimile (SlImpn-Bad Cann.tan, 1<)64), and in m abbreviated form by Thomas Wise, wilh Ihe title A C"'folario" of Iltl RIIJS()II .1Ui P~ibn.plty.fA,~tism H;"S a" Abrils ,mnol or all ImprtlW"'l1f1 of",h", Dr Qu/fII(),IA Offimi ill Au "Trut 1"llIltrl""f Sysl,,,,' (1706, repro (732). The """"I important modem study of Cud"'orth i. j.A. PlISSmore, Ralpll C""fII()rtA, U 1"lerp"'''';'''' (Cambridge, 1951), which focuses on A T'l"tiK Collumills E""",/ allii {",mli,abl, Morality and the thrcc treatises 011 libc:ny Ind necenily. Th is has now bc:en supplemen ted by Stephen Darwall's dupler 011 Cudwonh in H. Bri,islt Mora/islJ alUi lit. JIlIn"~1 0", .. , (c..",l>.idge, [99~), ch~ple, S. A T".I;;'; 0,"'''";118 EI"""I alld 1_~ldlt Mo.ality is discussed in j. Manineau, TyPN of Elltie,,1 ThIOry, 2 vots. (Oxford, .&!IS), L .A.S. Bigge, BritiJJo Moralis,., 2 vats. «(hfard, 11197), E.M. Austin, Tit. ElltiN of 1M C ..1IhrUJ,1 PlalOllim (Philadelphia, 1935), A.N. Prior, usie and Iltt B",is of ElltiN (Oxford, 1949), D.O. RJphael, Bnl"It Alo,,,/isl,, ,650-,800, 1 "015. (Oxford, [<)69), J.B. Schnccwind, AlDr,,1 Pki/o,opAy /rom Mo~I"ltn. /0 K""I (Cambridge, t990). For J survey of Cudwonh'i philosophy _ S. Hutton, '£cj " ... rd, Lord Herixn of Dlerbury md Iht Cambridge PlalonislS', in S. Bro,..n (ed.), Brilislt Pllilosoplly ",,11M Enlillt/nomenl, R~"lltd,t Hislory of Pkj!rJlOplly, vol. v (London, .91)6). For bibliogn.phy prior to '9M, _ G .A.]' Rog"'s, 'Die Cambridge Pbtoniker' md 'RJlph Cudwonh', U'N1'IHJJ GnlllJrisI ur GescltieAI' ur Plti/owplt~: J~ Pllifo/(Jpltir u, 17. J.ltrIlWldtm, ,vI. 3. ' (lb5lc, 19M). Sec also G. Giglioni, 'Automata Com~: Boyle, Leibniz and the D.:bale on the Notion of Life md Mind', Bnlislr ]ollru/ for Iltt History ~f PlliklJOplly, 3 ([995), 14M8; S. HullOn, 'Cudworth, Boelhius and Ihe Scale of Nature" in G.A.J. Ragen, J.-M. Viennt and Y.-C Zatb (eds.), Tltt CambriJt( Pf"I'."11 (Dordrcchl, [996); S. Hutton, 'Ralph Cudwor!h, God, Mind and Nature', in R. Crocker (ed.), RlI"'''', Rdi, itm "nJ Nat/Itt (forthromillg); J[J[XII1

G. Musca, " 'Omne genus animalium". Antichiti e Medioe.·o in una biblioteca privata ingJese del Seicemo', !b<"Ih",i M dirotoli, l5 (rC}88), ZS- 76 (on Cudworth's library); R.H. Popkin, 'Cudworth', in his Tlu Third FDru in Srontr~mrll-<mrllry Plrih""phy (I.eiden, 199z) (on Cud~ worth and Scepticism); D. Scott, ' Platon~ Recollection and Cambridge Platonism', Hmrrarlru/ll, 149 (t99O), 71-97; L. Simonuni, 'Bayle and I.e Clc:rc as Readers of Cudwonh: Elements of the DeNte on Pfalrit Nan.rI in the Dutch Lamed Journals', Gmlritlh,.is ""If Ih W.jskt ttrrt i" N~tkrl4ttd, 4 (r991), 147-05 (which discu"",," Cud worth'sflrrlll"" in the Enlightenment ); Udn Thiel, 'Cudworth and s.,.·.,me.:nth-e.,ntury Theories ofConsciou~ness', in S. Gaukroger (ed.), Th~ Um ofA"hfUiry (Dordrecht, Boston and London, 1991).

ryr

ate

A note on the text My aim in preparing this edition is to make available CudvlO.th's philosophy in an accessible (onn. Rt_appraisal of the philosophical canon plus increasing nnph ... is on a more historial approach to the philosophy of the p... t h... resulted in rno..., ronsidention being given, of late, to me less famous figura in the history of philosophy. E,·en in this moK favounble dimate, Cudwonh is disoldvantaged by the fact that, unlike those of his fellow-<XIumrymen, Locke and Hobbes, his writinl{S aTe not ",,,itable in ~ible modem editions. Bom Cudwonh's Trt~IUe Qm(tnlmg EuNl/S[ ,.uJ Imtmltd/r Mar,{ily and T,e,IUe ~f F,TT",illaTe ...,btiHly f= of the weight of classial learning which encumbers TM True 1"lelk(/~,1 Syslml, and (or that relSOIl, me:sc writings oK ...,lath·ely mo..., accessibk to modem readers. In p...,paring this edition, I h.,·e .lIempted to pro,·ide enough notes to m.ke the tnt wmp...,hensible without m·er-burdening it with erudition. I have followed Chandler nther than Harrison in consigning original-bnguage quotlltions to the footnotes, retaining only Cudworth's rnnsl.tions in the main text. This will, I hope, make reading easier in an .ge when a knowJcd~ of classical JanguagCli can no lon~. be men for granted. The exception to this prxtice is whe..., Cudwonh 11. ... not provided his own translations . In such cascs I have kept the original in the teIT, and given a modem English tnnsIation in "'!uare brackets afterwards. The OtM. C:Jtception is wheK Cud",vnh uses Greek and Latin tmninology in apJ>Oll'ition to the English terminology. These terms are taken from his cJassical sources but are not, strictly, quotations from Greek or Roman philosophy. Sin~ tlte readability of the English is disrupted by repetition of such terms, and since Cudworth's habit of inserting Greek

A

1I~1t ~III'" Uri

tcnns dues not amount to a QOI1sistent philosophical vocabulary, I have normally n:a.ined ~I.u:t. terms only on meir fiTst appc:aran« in a puricubr ~gc 2nd have deleted what Sttnt to Ix otiose exotSli. On a few ocasions I hne inserted an English Innslation after a tenn not explained by Cudwonh. Cudwonh clearly observed I different sWldard in quowions from thOK normally observed today. I have tried to indicate in the now me QCCIsions when: he has nO( been entin:ly faithful to the original Latin or Greek. This is sometimes nplicable in tenns of his lOur=, bill often he mUtII wholesale adjustments to 5u;t the: pmnmatical flo .... of his argument. All such interpolations.,.., placed in square brackcu. I have based my edition of Fm",;f/ on the Allen edition of t838, ch«ked against the manuscript (BL, Add. MS 4978). In me case of A Tn.l. Ctnu:.m;"f £1"""I ...d I"""wahl. M~r.1ily I have used me OundltT lim edition. Unfortunately there is no num manuscript apinst which to ch«k it. Spelling and punctu.;n;on have been modemi%ed mrougl>out . Finally, in me interests of Jl('l"Spicuit y, I ho"e on QCCIsion taken libenies with CudwOl"th'l baroque sentences, subdividing me lengthier on.., when this can be done wimout distorting his meaning.

,.

A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality

Copyrighted material

Contents Book, Tht there have b«n some in ~ll ages, who il2ve maintained that good. and evil, jU51 and unjust, wen: nIK naturally and immutably so, but only by human laws and ~PPQintmem. An account of the most ancient of them from Plato and Ari!itode; as also from Diogcnes ~nius and Pluwch. Also in this lOIter age """"" have affirmed that there is no incorporeal substance nOr any natural difference of good and evil, just and unjust. The opinion of some modem theologcn proposed, with its n~ry con~uences, o",ned by some of them, by otben disowned; bur all a]!'fting in this, tbat things morally good. and evil, jU$! and unjust, arc nOi so by n>lure, and antecedent to the di,-inc command, but by the divine command and institution_ CHAPTER I I That good and evil , just and unjust, honest and dishonest, cannot be arbitrary things without nature made by will . Everything must by its own nature be what it is, and nothing else. That even in positi'-e laws and commands, it is not mere will that obligcth, but the natures of good. and evil, just and unjust, rc:aIly existing. The distinction betwixt things naturally and positively good. and evil, more clearly explained. No positive command mal<es any thing moraHy good or evil, just or unjust; nor can oblige othetwisc than by vinue of wil2t is Nlturally just. CHAPTER III Thot the opinion of those who affirm that moral good and evil, just and unjUS!, depend upon the arbitrary will of God, implies a contradiction. The essences of things not convenibll: into nnc annther. Panicular essences depend not on the arbitrary will of God. That there is in God a nature of gooo:lnes& CHAPTU I

,

,.

superior to ",isdom, which measures and detennines hi. ,,-Isdom, as this does his ,,-ill. A mystical or mipnatical representation of the nature of God.

Book

II

I Thai, to a"aid the foroe of "'hat is above demonstratw, ....... philosophers h... e dtoiN that there "'as any immutable nllun: or esKnoe, affirming all being and knowledgtc to be fantastical and relative, of wllom Prougoras, the Abderite, ""as the chief: ... hose inlenl in proposing it, and a tonscquto« thefe(lf " 1lS, lhe destroying of all moralilY, and 10 di5appmve the absolule and immutable nature of good and evil, jUst and unjust. C IIAP TU II 1lIe pretenoetl or groundi for this opinion considered. That il was grounded on the Heratlitical philosophy, which intmduced a moveoble essen«, affirming that nothing stood, but aU things moved. Proll~"'" infen:n« from hence, ... ho to the Heraditical added the old IlonUal Phoenician phibophy, and by this mixture nude up his o"'n. C UAPTU III That the alornical or mechanical philosophy " "as known to ProugDnlS, who Ii"ed before Dt:mocritu5. A brief aa:ount of il. That by the motion of panicla all things are gmerated and corrupted is asserted by him, and thai all sensible qUlllities are nothing without us, but ooly pusions and sc:nsa110m in u... CIlAPTEl IV That the alomical phiboph y is more ancit:nl Ihan the Trojan war, and ,,
•

o",U"""'1
Bookm I What sense is, and th.1 il is not knowledge. How sensation is puformed. Th( soul is passivc in sensation, though not altogether so. Various kinds of sensations. CHAPTU II That sense is a Cotlfused pu ceprion obtruded un the ... ul from ",;dlOut, but knowledge the active energy of an unpassinn.te power in the sou~ which is vitaUy uniled 10 thc body. Th( differttlce oowixi sensin,·c and intellectual cogitllioo, and thcir different uses in lC'neral. CHAPTER III The difference ooween ICfISC ur sensalion and intellection of knowledge, described ItKlre =r.udy in Ii,·e particulan., with a funher nplication and demonstration from Platu. CHAPTU II' A further proof that sense is not science, illustrated by ••,,·eral insrances. Sense is otlly a seeming ur .ppearance of things corporeal existing, which may be thQUgh the things have nlM a real nistellce. Reasons of this. Phantasms and sensible ideas .,.., reaJJy ur materially the same things. Phan~ms vu!untary and in~olunwy. That Phanusms may become sensations, and. con(ra. CHAPTER

Book IV I That knowledge is an inword active energy of the mind, not arising from things acting from without. Sense is not a mere passiotl, bur a passive ptrc:ept>on of the soul, ha,·ing something of vital energy, and is a cogitation. The immediate ooject:S of intellection not things without the mind, but the ideas of the mind itself, which is not weakened by the most radiant and illustrious truths, as the sense is by what is nteedingly sensible. Hath a criterWn in itself whcuby to koow whttl it hath fuund what it sought. Two kinds of perceptivc cogitations in the !IO\II, the one passive, which ore cilher aiufJrjp.afa, 'sensations', QT o/IavrtitTp.afll, 'inugin.alions'; the other kind.,.., glkd 1'O~p.afa. ThaI thc vo'ip.ara .,.., 1101 raised oul of the phUllI'lftIIl1I by the mldltrllU 1I1tM. CIIAP TU II Tha' 1""'" ideas of the mind proceed not from oulW3rd sensible oojects, but arise from the inward activity of the mind itself. The cause of men's misule herein. How fill" the passion of sense reaches, and wherc lhe mind's activity begins. Sense 110 comptlnlt C IUPTER

judge of Ihe reality of relative ideas, ..... hich though the)' .... en: men: notions of the mind or modes of concei"ing, yet it follows not that they ha"c no reality. They are nOl diSligreeable to the realiry of things, and so flO! false:. The beauty, the smngth, and ability of natural and corporeal things depend upon th...., rel.nom .nd proportions. Instances pi oposed to illustrate this maner. All the ideas of things artificial h"'e something in them that neyer came from sense. This true of plants and animals. No essential diffeTmtt Ntwixt natunl compounded and artificial things. Sen.., has no idea of the rogit:lli"e being joined to rational animal., nOr of the uniye ..... as it is one corporeal f~, much less of the ideas or modes of thinking beings. CIIAPTER III That cven simple: corporeal things, passively perceived by sense, Ire known or understood only by the active power of the mind. That senSlition is not knowledge of th...., things, much Ic:ss any secondJry result from sense. Besides /llJf~1fUI14 and pJo411//U"'M4, there mUlit be 1IotmQIQ Or intelligible: ideas coming from the mind itself. This confirmed and illust"'tw by "" 'eral insflIInces and similitudes. TIut then: i. an intelligible idea of a triangle inwardly exerted from the mind, distinct from the phantasm or sensible idea; boIh [nl] which nuy be in the mind together. Some sensible ideas not im!," se1 on the !iOul by Ihings without. Th.t SCllse is a kind of speech of ou",-ard nalure con.-ening with the mind. Two kinds of perceptiye po"'en in the soul. Knowledge does not begin but cnd in individuals. A double error of vulgar philosophers. Immediate obia:ts of all geometrical science on: the intelligible and universal ideas of I triangle, &C. cacned from the mind, and romprchended in it. CHAPTE~ IY TIut individual lIl.aterial things cannot be the immediate obj«u of intellection and knowledge, besides which there must be some other kind of beings or <:ntiti.,., as the immediale objects of them, such thin gs as do not flow, but renuin immutably the same. The immutable: <:ntitics, what they are, from wh<:ntt, and when: they exist. That there is an eternal mind, from which all created understandings are constantly furnished with ideas. Conclusion, that wisdom, U1owledge, and understanding, arc C1ernal and sclf-Iubsist<:nt things, superior to malleT, and aU sc:nsiblc things. CIIAI'TU v That the intelligible notions of things, though existing only in the mind, are not figm<:nfS of the mind, but havc an immutable naWrc. The criteriM of truth . The opinion that nothing can be dcmonm-ated to be true absolutely, but ooly hypothetically, refuted. Whatever i. clearly intelli-

,

COIfUnt;"g ,Until! arul immlllahk morality

gible, is absolutely true . Though men are oflen deceived, and think they clearly comprehend what they do not; it follows 1M){ that they an never be certain WI they clearly comprehend any thing. The conclusion with Crigen, that science and knowledge is the only 6rm thing in tM world. CHAPTU Vt In what sense the essences of things are CiemaJ and immutable. Every thing is whO! it is, to science or knowled ge whethu absolutely or reiati,..,ly, unchangeable by any mind. So WI if moral good and e,-iI, just and unjust, in things so denominated, as the acrions Or souls of men, the)' mUS! have o;omc ceruin natures unaJten.ble by any will or opinion. ThaI lhe soul is not a mm: '/ISII lilbul.i. That it is in order of natUre before the body and maner, does not result out of it, but commands, governs, and rules it, The whole COTJIOrcal world a he:op of dust and ato"",. 1"I>ere an he no luch thing as morality unless there be a God . The commend.tion of the atomicaJ philosophy successfully revived by Cartesius. Epicurus taxed for his lIonishness.

, ,.

Copyrighted material

Boo" Chapter I l.

As the vulgar galcralJy look no higher for (he original of monI good

and evil, jus, and unjust, than the codes and pandectll, the tables and ta .... of their country an d re~gion, so there have not W3I1tcd pretended ph;Ioaop~ .. in all ages who assu«d nothing to be good and evi\, jun and unjust, ... turaUy and immutably (.pUaI:l I(tli M,v.fTWC); b.,1t th.at aU these: things were )XISiti,-c, arbiu-uy, and &clitia .... only (Oefl/ai, IIOflIP" 'f'liJ>'opIJ.rt:iJ&t). Such Plato mentions in his tenth. book lk ~ljb... [t... ....], who maintained ,

It.'"

llLal nothins a, . 0 ..... "oll"".lly jW;! but men ch.nKing !hcir opinion, mnceming ' hem po:rpe,WIlly, som.";,,,..,!Il1de onc thing j ... l, S
And again his TMamr..s: As to thinp just and unjus!, holy and unholy, nOf only the PnKagOr""" (of whom ..., ""'" treat aft ...... rd), bUI many oilier philosoph....Iso confid .... tly aflinn, tho. n.onc: of .ltH< thinp ha •• in naru"" any _n« of me;, own, but ..hal5oa
TT .................. IIy ;" d.............., ........... _...nr. i" .............. _ ... 01 ... ,A, o>oP ;, _ ......- .. '" ond Ii>< b .... ODOI _ WI -r _ .. _ . t ......

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is trUly $uth ... httht. ;t is so d""reed, and for so long time,

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unjUSl, halyo. unholy. 1

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more than once Iak,,", r>Otice of,his opinion in his Elh;a-.

Thinp honest and full, ,,·hie!> po~tics I •• conv.,.",n! .bou! ha, • .., JH>! • Vl riety .nd unotl1.linly in !httn, thai ,hey $<:aIl Ie bo: only bl·la,,·, and no, by natu",'

And afterwards, Book S, ch. 7, after he had divi
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Calterrn;,,/!, rurnal"tId immutdk morality

and dishonest a", nOl: so by nature but by law,;1 and (as I mlll:.,i¥~) Democritus,9 fOT after he had set down his opinion mnoeming happiness, or the chief end, he adds this os ~rt of the Democrirical philosophy, 7!011f1thing else but this 'that there i. n<>thing good OT shlltlCful, JUSt Or unjust, and so likewise os to all things, tlut there is nUlhing SO in truth, but that men do aU things acooTdin( 1<1 law and custom,.!4 1. After these suca:eded Epieurus, IS the ""'i,'eT of the Democririal • Te _ < I .... mJ ,,) ~ "" "",,,,u.!O ~ (Dqu"" u.,,;.., u... •.'&. 1-'> ......_ by RoO. Ibo<TI and of An... "_ • ...t .

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,.

philoiophy. the frame of whose principles must n«di lead him to deny justice and injustice to be nllural things. And the~fore he dClennines thai they ariK wOOUy from mutual pacu and covenants of men made fOf" their own ronven;"na: and utility. and 1:1.... .-.:suIting from thence. Thost: li .. in, c:tt:I'u .... tha, couJd nor make munw C6venanll '"",1M' no! 10 hurt, nor 10 be hUrl by one Inmher. could not (or ,his cau.. ha •• any ....,h rhing os juI' or unj .... , amongst th.tm. And ,here "' the same ""'""" for thoK nlrion. tlu.t elrh.,. ,,;\1 nm. DO" <2nnot make !IUd. murual wmpo<:!l no! \OJ hUrl on. an
ha,·. m,md to(!:ethcr in,o "".mlnl not to hUrl """ another. "

1be btc compile.- oflhe Epicurean meaning after this manne.-'

s)~lem

upresses Ihis philosopher's

1"here ore IiOITK tlu.t think rhot ,,,,- rhinp that ore jUlI Iim'.i. ore j.... lCOlI"ding.o their pr. tl

Afle.- Epicurus. Cameades, the author of the Ne"· Academy .. ~tius leslilieth ....... also • ualou5 I.$SCrtor of the ...... doctrine. 11 4. And .inee in Ihis laner age Ih-e physiological hypoIhCKI of DemocriIUS and Epicurus havc been revived, and successfully applied 10 the 50Iving of some of the phenomena of the visible world, Ih-ere hay. not wanted tllnK that have endeavoured to ,·ml also Ihose other pandou$ of the same philosoph ..... viz. 'That there is nO incorporeal ..... IIw tho _101

"

"

-,-, ., u.c-.... «.......... J ..~

..

"

&ubstance, nor any natum difference of good and evil, just and unjU5f,;l~ and to recommend the .arne under a show of wisdom, as the deep and profound mysteries of tile atomical Of corpuscular philosophy. As if senseless mailer and aloms "'eTt the original of all things, lOCO.ding to that song of old Siknus in the poet:

H. sung th. secret ....d. of nl1ure', fr.un<; How sns, and cum, and air, and act;". flame, Fell thrnup. the nli8h,y void, .nd in Ihtir foil W~ blindly g:lth.rtd in this roodly halL lO

Of this SOt1 is that late writer of ethics and politics, ·.,ho a=rts, tNtthtre ar. no authmtic dOClrintS COfI<:ttning jUst and uni""', good and •• ;1, • • ctpllht la.... ,.hid>.", eslablished in tony city: and that;1 concem. """" '0 inquire ,"'h<1h.,. an oction ohan be ",puled i\lSl or unju.t, ..,00 or evi~ n<:<:pt .uch only whnm the community Iu.,'e .~ntod «> be the int.rpr." .. of their I.....',

And again, 'Even a Cllrisrian government hath power to determine what is rightwus, and what is the transgression of il.'/.1 And h. gives Ihe same o •• r again in English 'In the stale ofmllu", nothing can be unjust; the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice hne no pla.ce; when: then: is nO common pow.r, th.re is no law; where no law, no transgression.' 'No law can be unjust,.Zl Nay, temperance is no more natural (4'00-1'1), according to this civil (or rather uncivil) philosopher, than justice. 'Sensuality in that sense in which it is rondemned, hath no place tillthcTt be laws'?~ .. Not . """"'"". 1><00 .1UIIMIMtJ' of .... ptincipleo of.1I mo,", ' In .. "'" ,..loIi...., M",riooI of. d
...col """""'" oIIud
rn."".", "... ......

Nomq.. canebo,";
•

Omnia, .. '-...,., ",uooli """"" .... ortOo,

(V;,pl, Edopt .,)

" "Do
ir ....... hono ...............

""""

ir ...."'."4'..
.... ouIaI: .. u"",,, 06q .. Ktio iu>to .01 ini ...... too... "'I .... ",,"" Iit,. lI,a . ""q,." 011 iii. od quos Iosum """"" io" ...." ........ I _ I 6emondo .... ' (lUI ,EJt.t ~ ... ~d r"" "'.......... "m:., .. ~ HoNn

.. ~

.

i""",,,,,,,,, _ .....

\(0100_.

l.!

Mel , Do .... .".. ,Mi., ,I,•• _ /ow.m,.;. .-. ed. W.• ! .. (I, ' " ••• 1l9->4!~ .01, ... p. ' oS), Cud_ .. ....,.,.. ... '.muI. ...., " ; ..!'.. .....- . ...... ~"'rioh~;.d6rio ",,01 io;" . - .Ii.. "...,....... ...."" ;.

' ;."~.

(iMoI., p. }II,). Soc . . . 1M E...W

"
W_ of:r.-,

H-.,
...t. ... p_.to-J_ 11 I"'...... r. ' ., .1Iool'.m_'loir ' .'. ... E... WW_ ...... OI.P,"J. W. A'-b-

,I~f!~

.. boI .• p_ ...

., 'I'

ate

s · But whatsoever W;li the true meaning of Ihese philosophers, Ihar affirm jU$tice and injustice to be only by law, and not by nalUre (of which I shall discoUTK afterwardli),'--! tt!Uin it is that divers modem theol<>gers do not only seriously, but zealously, contend in like manner, that there is nothing absolutely, intrinsically, and natuntlly good and evil, JUSt and unjust, antecedently to an y positi'e command Or prohibi tion of God; but that the arbitrary will and pleasure of God (that is, an omnipotent Being devoid of all essential and natural justice), by its commands and prohibitions, is me first and only rule and measure therwf. l6 When"" it follo ...·s una"oidably that nothing can be imagined so grossly wicked, Or SO foully unjust or disl\onest, but if it were supposed to be commanded by this omn ipotent !kity, must needs upon that hypothesis fonhwith become holy, just, and righteous. For though the ancient fillhers of tile Gristian chur<:h ...-ere very aboorrent from this doctrine (as shall be sho ...·ed hereafter),27 yet it crept up afttrw..rd in the scholastic age, Ockham being among the first that mainwned 4(/"", "'Q/u'" eSJe ~is; qIIQ/e1/ ... " t:k~ prollibiru .... ClIjI/; """ pG";/ jim H1II<j. si ~ t:k~ p,unpi,,/w,: (t ( (o"VC'no, 'that there is no act evil but os it is prohibited by God, and which cannot be made good if it be: commanded by God. And 110 on the other hand as to good.'18 And herein PetruS Alliacus and Andreas de Novo Castro, with others, quickly followed him.211 But this doctrine hath been since chieRy promoted and advanced by such as think nnming 50 essential to the !kity os unoontrollabk power and arbitnry will, and therefore mat God could nO)1 be God if there should be anylhing evil in its own natUre which he could not do; and who impute such dark counsels and dismal :actions unto God, as cannot he justified otherwise than by 5a)-u.g that whauoe"cr God can be:

""1/",,,

" So. -... Book • • .. O. TIS. Pnf...,. " CaoI_ ..... _ _ _ .... _, c, ... at .... F ' - ' ' ' £1.'1. Ik ..... dn .. 's .... otly on .... opinions at~ .. f....;JI. So. -... pp. Ijl. ,6, _l. '75. ,Il. ,. WiOiom atOrl ..... (,...!5-I JoI7/9~F"' · 0:+:0' s..".who, .... O"'Soonor_~ .... ' ' ' _ ' ' ' ' ... ' ...101".... di.... ..;/l...J .... - . . . 6 , r .oIGod. I'wi,· _ .. _ cio:d by Cud_ ... to be bind ;" h. $ _ ,.. _ _ ...... ,,;,_ "J ·r ' • T, --... __ s', s"" .. d-lJ~ . , .". .c." s..... 'I- '91ft. JO. F.. Orl ......... P. Boehner. cw • . f'* 'r pl ' 01 W,;,;.,,<E<>I I ~"""""'" Nooo NNr.:w..... )
c..uo,..........

.. p""".- (.......

"

supposed to do Or will, will be for that reason good Or juSt, beause he wills it. Now the nettssary and un ..·oid.ble conse<juences oflhis opinion ore such as these: That; to \O'e God is by ",tu",.n indifferent thing. and is moral1y pxI only, beau.. it is commanded by God; that to prohibit the 10,·. afGod, ar command 'he hatred of God, is not inron,istrnt .nth the n.tu", of God, but only with his fl'ft will; th.t it is not inconsistent .nth tM natural equity of God 10 command bwpkmy, perjury, lying, &C. l1t.a, God may <:Ommand ... Iu, is "'n,rary, 2$ to .11 tile p"""pts of tM Decalogue. so especially to ,h. first, second, third; rut holiness is nOf. ronformi,y with the natu", "fGod; th.t God may oblige nun to ,,·h.t is impO$libk; th'l God hath no rutunl inclination to 1M good of tho """tures; th.t God can justly doom .n innocent <•.,lUre to "'.r",,1 torment:'·

All which propositions. with <>then of like kind, are word for word asserted by some late authors. Though I think not fit 10 menrion the name of any of them in this place, excepting only one, Joannes Szydlovius, who in a book published at Franeke.,!1 hath profcs...wJy avowed and maint:tined the grossest of them. And )'ot neither he, nor the resl, are to be thought an y mOf"e blameworthy herein than many Others, that holding th e ""me premisses h,'-e either dissembled or di!iOwntd those conclusions which unavoidably follow therefrom: but rather to be commended for their openness, simplicity, .nd ingenuity, in representing their opinion n.kedly to the world, .uch as indeed it i., withoul any veil or mask. Wherefore since there are so many, both philosophers and thwlogeri, .. •...mar<

o.w. ........... ~ ............., bo,,,,,,, """""""'. """

","'d..

_;p:..

• Doo iIIbtt,

'tl .. Dei ootNm, ...... "".......... Dei ...... ~...t ......... ""'" " ..... .. hbno...."...,.. b~ ~r..m. ......t.rium. ""'_ o.w. ..- prxrip< .. ronOHriwn •• , ' - pot - _ powno, ' • "-' ON' . . . '" _ _ _F', . . . .. __ non _ 01 ;"'t *'*'; o.w.-... ..-. .,.Ntolan indfttionero .. boo .... o:m~ 0...... ju .. . . - """"""" .......... mocioo_ obnuoo«: TIo .... . uunmoo"J ...- til. ....... d .......... SZ .... I0 .... (00< "'"" ...... ). 1"h
........-. Dei

.,

.... _iu"'"

" ....

.......

..

.

__...

_~

_ot' ...

"""'dd

SzydIo>waiI.}oonn
V_ _ _ _

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UuonIu., .•

;" ...i ... .,,...... - . ,' ....... . _..... ,_ .. ....,. ",,",",,_ k an... _ _ .r ,..."." a;;" S~ ( F _ . 'I>oJ) . ... I'0I0 ....... , .. .... N ...... 1oaoIa, Szy.llo>wai ~ JoMnn .. 1>1>«0 ...... WiIIWn T ..... uooIP_.

..........,.JoUmr. .. _

,; 'I'

ate

tbat seemingly and verbally acl,"(lwkd~ sucb tbinp:as moral good and evil, j\lSt and unjust, tMt contend n(){Withstanding that these a", not by na!\l", (.pVatl), but mmNtM:>n (8wtl), and that the", is nothing naNrally (IT inunutably JUSt or unjust; I shaJJ from bence felch the rise of this ethical disalurse OT enquiry concerning things good and evil, just and unjulil, budabk and mamc:ful 1Upi nov o:)'UOWv "(lI(WV, &"aiwv ...ai dQi"wv (for so I find these: words frequ~ntly used :as synonymous in Plato and othcr ancient authors): demonstrating in the fil'llt plaa::, that if the", be anything It all good Or cvil, JUSt Or unjUSt, the", must of necessity be something naturally and immutably good and JUSt (&tuov ~1Ki!v "ai .iori"'1TOv). hnd from thence I st"U prC>Cff
,,"i

Chapler II Wherefo", in the fi"'t place, it is a thing whicb "" C shall vcry euily demonstrate, that moral good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest (if they be not me", names without any signification, or names for nathiog else but willed and commanded, but ba.·c a ",alily in respttl of the penons oblired to do and avoid them) canDO! possibly be a.bill'ary things, made by will without natu",; because it iii univenally true, that things a", whal they a"" not by will but by natu"" As for exampk, things ,.,." white by whitcness. and blad: by blackness, nimgular by triangulariry, and round by rotundity, like by likeness, and equal by equality, tbat is., by such certain natures ofthcir own. Neither can Omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) by mere will make a thing white or black without whiteness OT blackness; that is, withoul such c:cnain na!\lres, whether 'Oie consider them :as qualities in the objects without U$ acrording to the Peripatetical philosopby, or :as ceruin disposioons of pam in respect of nutgnitude, figure, site, and motion, which belt't those sen5lloons or pbantaSms of white and black in U5. J.Z Or, 10 inst:aru:e in geoli~triClI figures, omnipotence itself cannot by mere win make a body uimguLu without having the naNre and I.

u

s...for ..... pk.D

,... ,..,......,''1>."' ..... ..,100 ... ,.,,,..,

"

propenies of a triwgle in it; that is, without having th...., wgles eqwJ [0 two right OOCI nor circular without .he n.mre of a circle:; that is, without having a cireumfen:n~ equidistant e""'Y where from the Centre or middle point. Or wtly, [0 ins~ in things relative only: omnipotent win annot make things like or equal one to '!lOthe!', without the natures oflikencss and equality. The reason whcnof is plain, be<;ause all these things imply a manifest rontradiction: that things should be whal they arc not And thili is a truth fundamentally nCO""sary to all knowledge, that contradictories cannot be true; f(lr otherwise nothing would be ~nly true (lr false. N(lw things may 3S well be made white (lr black by mere "ill, wimoul whiteness or blllCkness, equal and unequal, without equality and inequality, 3S morally good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest (debi,,, and iliff;',,), by mere will, without any ruotu"' of goodness, justi«, honesty. For though Ihe will of God be the supreme efficient cause of all things, and an produce inm being or existence, or reduce into !lOthing whal it plC3SCth, yel il is nOI the formal cause of any thing besides itself, 3S Ihe schoolmen have determined, in these ","Oro5, 'That God hitnKlf cannot supply the pbce of I formal cause' (De"", ip",,,, 11011 pont tIIppk.t l~fII'" f""S# JDmuJliJ); and thenfore il cannO( supply the f(lrmal cause, ()I" nature of justice or injustice, honcsty or di.honCllty. N(lw aU that We have hitherto said amounts [O!lO more than this, thaI it is impossible any thing should be by will only, that is without a .... rnre or entity, or that the narnre and essence of any thing should be arbitrary. ~. And since a thing cannot be made any thing by mere will ",i!hout. being or rnlture, every thing must be n........·.rily and immutably determined by its own nature, and the natu", of things be that which it is, and !lOthiog elK. For though the will and power of God have an absolute, infinite, and unlimited command upon the existences of all CJ'CIted things to make them to be, or not to be at pleasure; yel when things exist, they are ,,·hat they are, this Or that, absolutely or relari""ly, not by will or arbim')" command, but by the necessity of their own nature. Then: is no sud! ming as an arbitJU10US essence, mode, or ",brion, that may be made indifferently any thing II pleasure. For an arbiuarious essence is a being without a nature, I conmdiction, and therefore I nonentity. Wherefore tile natum; of justice and injustice cannot be arbitruioU5 things, thai may be applicabk by will indifferently to any actions or dispositions whatsoever. For the modes of all

"

,.

subsistent beings, and the relations of Ihings to one another, are immutable and necessarily whal lhey are , and nol arbilrary, being not by will but by nature. J. Now Ihe nea .... ry COflse<;Juence of that which we have hithcno said is this, that it is so far from being true that all mo~1 good and evil, jusl and unjU'lt arc mere arbitn.ry and factitious things, that are created wholly by will, th.t (if "'c should spnk properly) we must needs say that nothing is mo~lIy good Or evil, just or unjU'lt by mere will without noture, because everything is what it is by nature, and not by will. For though it ,,;ll be obiected here, thaI when God, or civil powers command a thing to be done, that ""30 not before obliptory or unlawful, (
.,

require thill others should ~ obliged or bound to obey him, everyone would think such J law ridiculous and absurd. For if they wen: obli(ed before, then thillaw would ~ in vain and to no PUIPOS('. And ifthf,y were not before obliged, then Ihey could nO! ~ obliged by any positive law, becauK they ...·ere not previously bound to obey 5uch a pelWll'$ commands. So Ihat obliption to obey all posilive law.; i5 older than all laws, and previous or anlecedenl to them. Neither i. il a lhing thz is arbitrarily made by will, or can be Ihe obj-ecl of command, but that which either is Or is IlOI by nillure. And if thili were not I11oOr.IIly good and just in its own nature befon: any positive command of God mat God $hould be obeyed by his creatures, the bare will of God himself could not beget an obliption upon an)" to do .... h31 he willed wd corttnunded, beauS(' the naturc5 nf things do not depend upon ...m, being nO! things that arc arbitr:l.rily made (Yll'vOJ.I£"'"-I) but things thlt are (5VTU). To conclude therefore, even in positive la .... and commands II is not mere will that obligcth, but the ""tures of good and evil, JUSt and unju! the intellectual nature, do for the time berome ..Jeh things as ought to be d~ Of omitted (ubi" or iIIicil,,), being "",de "

,....

"111.;' ""' ~ I ,_<>I; rO., - " .. "" .... Ul"~ Cood _ _ ""' ..... qo 0.. .. h.s..- _ W .. _oFC. "'(,r.,,~ So. TIS .. !""" p.~.

t- ....

"

,.

luch not by wiU but by "'"ture. Iu for uample, to keep faith and perform covenantll i5 that which natural justice obligcth to absolutely. Therefore. upon supposition (tX J,y~rlltn) that any om mUcth a promise, which is a voluntary act of his 0\\11, to do something which ~ W;\S not hl:fonc obliged to by natural jUStitt, upon t~ imn'iemion of this voluntary act of his own, that indifferent thing promised falling now under oomc:thing absolutcly good and becoming the maner of promi.., and covenanl, modeth for the present in a new relation to the rational nature of the promiSCT, and becometh for the rime a thing which ought to hi: done by him, or wllich he is obliged to do. Not as If the mere will or \\'ords and breath of him that coYenameth had any pown to change the moral natures of things, or any ethical virtue of obliging, but bec:au.., natural jU5tioe and equity obligc!h to keep faith and perfonn COVenallli. In lilr.e mannn IUturai justice, that is the rational or imelkctual nature, obUgcth not only to obey God, but also civil poweR, that havc lawful authority of commanding, and to obsc"'c political order amongst men. Aod theref"", if God or civil powers command any thing to be done that is not unlawful in itself, upon the intervention of tills voluntary act of theirs, those things that were befonc indifferen t bI:<:ome by accident (Of" the time obligatory, such things as ought to be done by us, not for rheiT own sakes, but for the sake of that which natural justice absolutely obligcth to. And these are the things that are commonly called po..livt/y good and evil, JUSt Of" unjust, such as though they arc adiaphoTOUs or indifferent in themselves, yet natural justice obligclh to accidentally, on supposition (~;r 1ty,.,llIIn) of the voluntary actioo of oome other person rightly qualified in commanding, whereby they fall into sometbing absolutely good. Which things are not made good or Ju~ by the mere will of the commander, but that rultUral justitt which gives lIim right and authority of oommanding, md obligeth O{hCl"S to oI>I:y him, ,.;thout whid! oatural justice, neither COVCJWItIl nor commands, could possibly oblige anyone. For the will of another doth no more oblige in commands, than our own will in promises and covenmts. To rondude, therefore. things called nlturally good and due arc such things as the intellecrual nlture obliges to immediately, absolutely, md perpetually, and upon no condition of any voluntary action Wt may be done Or amine.:! intervening. But those thinp Wt an: caUcd positivciy good and due arc such as narural justice or the infl!:lIcctua1 nltun: obligeth to accidentally md hypothetically,

'I'

ate

upoo condition of ~ voluntary act of another pt:TSOn invested with lawful authority in romrrwK!ing. And that it is not the tnerrc will of the COIIUlW1dcr that makes Ihese positive things to oblige or bcrorne due but the nature of things appean evidaldy from hence because it is not the volition of every one that obligeth, but of a pt:rson rightly qualified and invested with lawful aumority. And because the libmy of commanding is circumscribed wimin arttin bounds and limits, so mal if any commandCT go beyond the sphere and bounds mat nature IiCI$ him, which an: indifferent things, his commands will nOI al all oblige. s. But if we would speak yet more ac<;uratdy and precisely, we might rather say, that no positive COI11ITW\ds whaliOCver do make any thing morally good and evil, just and unjust, which nature had not nude !uch before. For indifferent things commanded, considered malerially in themselves., remain snil whalthey WCre before in their own nature, that is indifferent, because, as Aristotle spcah, 'wiU cannot change narure' (ro rPiJolll t1Ki"'Tl"Ov). And those things that are by nalure indiffclCDt (tJ>V
'U,,""

"

,.

~vil.

j....1 and unju.1 (if Ih~y be any thing) are made by mere will and arbitrary tomJIWld5 (as many ton<;cive), Ihat il ;5 not posiiible tNt any command of God Or man should oblige otherwise than by vinue of [hal ...hich is narurally jusl (4)tiou &Kmov). And though particular promisa and commands be made by will yet il is no! will but oalUre tNt obligcth 10 Ihe doing of things promiKd and commanded, or makcs Ihem ouch things as oughl 10 be do~ (demQ). For mere "iU cannot change the moral nature of actions, nor the nature of intellectual beings. And therefORe, if there Wert no natur.tl j ....ticc, that is, if the rational or illlellectlJ.;ll natURe in itself were indetermined and uoobliged to any thiog, and so destilU te of all morality, il were not posiiibk that any thing should be ma(\(, mor.tlly good or evil, obliptory or unLawful (dentll'" or j/ljdlll,.,), or [NI any moral obliption should be begonen by any will or command whatso<:ver.

Chapter III But oomc: [here are thai wiU .[iU contend , dUll though i[ should be vanted that moral ,000 and evil, JUSt and unjust, do nOl depend upon any created will, yet notwithlitandin, they must n«ds dc-pmd upon the arbitrary will of God, because the narnre and essc:nca of all thiogs. and ton5e<juendy all Vcr1lies and falsities depend upon the same. For if the natura; and essences of things should IlOI depend upon the will of God, it would follow from hence that something that was not God was independent upon God. M 2 . And this is plainly asserted by Ihal ingenio .... philo&ophu RenltuS Descartes, who in his answer to the Sinh Objector apim;t his Metaphysical Meditations, writes th ....: I.

11 is • contradiction 1<1 say that the wiD of God wu not from eternity indifferalllo.1I things ,..hid> .... or e'·a ....11 be don<; ber;:auoe no toad or evi~ nothing 10 be belie,-ed, or done, or omilled, con be fixed upon, the id.. w~f '""" in the divine in,dlect befou his will

,ho,

detennined itself 10 effect Wt such a thing ohould be. Neither do I speak this COI>C<:ming the: pnori,y of time, bu, .,..,n "'ere wu nothing prior in

ord~ it is brn.,. than if he IwI created it fTom eternity; and beatuse: he: would that the three ."gI.. of I trian~1e .hould n........ rily be equal 10 ,,.0 right angle$, therefore Ihis is lrUe lnd no otherwise; [ ... ] and so of oth ... 'hinp. And thUI the great.. t indifference in God is Ihe " .. tes, I1F'm..." of his omnipo"""""

.... nd again afterward: To him thll cotllOider1,he imm .... ity of God ;. i. manifm ,hat th.,.. can be "",hinll a, all which doth not depend upon him, "'" only nothing oubsisting, but .150 no ord ... , no b .. , no rasan of truth and goodneu. " And when he

was again urged by the Sia.h Objector,

Could"", God couse: that the natu~ or. triangle should not be Iud, and how, I pray thee, could he fmm eternity couse: that i, should not be true, that twice four arc eight>" H e conf~h inJelluously thai ,hose things were "

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jMo hoc ............. fieri _ ... poI"",,,_;u do .. ~ .. t, .. l r.. ............ ...wr..en... .. Doo _ or ....... "" -s - ".... (Do '0, M.~ . • M ,.;ph' Ih, ........... _ ....... ..,.., ', ... .. _ '''I' ' ...... _ (Am, [400,. ,&71). _ . 6. Po >9[ . AT .... oIJ''''~ to· ' '" EoJljoll ..........., ... CSM ...... ,Il". "Th< .. . . . ; ,. ..... _ ,I"' .";.... v~ - ill or 01" 0 ... ' M .... ,;oo" " r ...... :.~.:.,,;..:.;.~ .. f ... f" 'f '1.,)"",,0[...... b u _ _ """"' ........ _" 'loci ..,. Marin Ma .. 'Au ',oi ad 0.; io .., • [a" """ifaoum .... ni1141 """'....... _ . quod'" ipoo-. "'" '-n. ......... oUh~ ..I . otd etiono HIkuw .. d........... n.m ....... ....n..n" .. iUnan "';etboni'(O,i'l .... Mt&........ -., I,AT .....15. CSM .. ... ' ~ " ."'~ ...... (Oe.ot) ponMt
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but notwithstanding they must be: so beaUM:, 'Nothing in any son of bring an be, which doth not deJl(nd upon God. ,le Which docU"ine of Cartesiu. is greedily , wallowed down by some servile foUo.,...,,.. of his that have lately wrilten ofthe old philosophy (it prilrw p"jl~S()p"i4). J9 3. Perhaps some may make l question fOf all this, whether Cartesiul were any more in carnest in thi., than when he el"where goes about to defend the doctrine of tnnSUbswniation by the principles of his new philosophy beaUK, in his Meditations upon the old philo&ophy [MIdi/.rioN. ) (where it i. probable he would set down the genuin(: ""n"" of his own mind more und isguisedly, before he ...·os assaulted by these objecw,.., and thereby fol"ttd to tum himself into "Vern lihapes) he dlirmetb that the essences of things .,...,re eternal and immutable. But afterward urged by Gasscndus with this inconvenience, thallhen some-Ihing would be clernal and inunutablC' besides God, and SO independent upon God, he doth in a manner unsay il again, and bewes himself 10 Ihis pitiful evasion, AI'''' poets feign ,har ,he fa,a were ind~ fi>cd by Jupi,er, bu"hal .. hen they ..ere fixed, he had obliged himoclfro the pi · 'vlng of, ....... , so I do nat think tha, 1M asenc:u of things, and ,I>ow: rnaIMrnati(:ol lnlths which can be kno"", of I........ arc independen' on God. Bu, I think nc •• n:hcleu, that beca ..... God 10 willed and 10 ordered . ther.fore they.,.. immutable and e,ernal.-

Which is plainly to make them in Iheir own nature muuble. BUI whether CaTlesius were in jest or earnest in Ihili business. it matters not, for his ban: authority ought to be no more valued by us lhan the .. 'N;Wiolollo _ _ _ _ _ quod'O"'-, ' "(o..a.-,M..,.......-lT .... 4J6. C5.\I ... >6, ), n.. loy I'im< C , .... i ...... ~I
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of Aristotk ~nd other ancient philosophers was by him, whom he &0 fncly dissents from. 4. For though the names of things may be changed by any one ~t plcasure:, os thai a sqll1f'l: may be called a cirde, or a cube a sphere:, yel thai the nature: of a square should not be necessarily wlut it is, but be arbitrarily oonvenible into the nalure: of a cin:le, and &0 Ihe essence of a cin:k into the essence of a spbcre, Of tlut the self same body, which is ""rfeedy cubical without any physical alleralion nude in it, should by this mcuphysical WlIy of tr.uufonnation of essences, by mere: will and C1)fI'UtWId be made spherical or cylindrical; this doth most plainly imply a contradiction, and Ihe compossibilily of oontndiaions deslrOYS all knowlcd~ and the definite natures (raIKws) or notions Oflhings. Nay, thaI which implies. contradiction is a nonentity and therefore cannot be the object of di.ine power. And the reason is the same for all other things, OS just and unjust; for evtr)' thing is what it is immutably by the necessity of its own nature. Neither is it any derogation al aU from the power of God to sa)·, Ihal he cannot make a thing 10 be Ihal which it is nQ{. Then there mighl be no such thing as knowledge in God him..,lf. God mighl will that there should be no such thing os kno.... Ied~. ). And as to the being or not being of particular essences, as th.:.t God might, ifhe pleased, h.ve willed llul there .hould be no such thing as a mangle or circle, and therefore nothing demonstrable Or knoWllbk of either of them. Which is likewise asserted by Cmesius, and tOOse that make the essences of things dependent upon an arbitrary will in God. This is all one as if onc should say thot God could hoH willed, ifhc had pleu..... , that neither his own po ....er nor kno .... ledge should be infinile. 6. Now it is certain that if the natures and essences of aU things., lIS 10 their being such or such, do depend upon a will of God that is essentially arbitrary, there can be no such thing as lICM:nce Of demonstration, nor the ITUth of any mathematical or metaphysical proposition be kllOWn by any otherwise, than by a certain enthusiastic or fanatic faith and persuasion thcrcupon, Wt God would hn'c such. thing 10 be truc Or false at such a lime Or for so long. And so nothing would be lTUe Or false rullurally (tjlOOI:I), bUI positi"ely (Owa) only, all truth and science being mete arbilnriou5 things. Truth and falsehood would be only names. Neither would there be any more certainty in the knowledge of God himself, since it must whoUy &""nd upon the mutability ofa will in him essentially indifferent and undetennined. And if we would speak:

~uthority

" 'VI

ate

pro~rly

according to this hypothesis, God himsdf would nOl: know or be wise by knowledge or by wisdom, but by will." 7. WiH:TefOK as for that UJUmcnt. that unless the esseII<:a of things and all ~erities .nd falsiries depend upon me arbiuary will of God , then would be something that was not God, independ""t upon God. Ifit will be wdl consideral, it will pro~e a men mormo, bugbear, and nothing SO tmble and formidable: as Canellius seemed to think it.· 2 For there is no othu genuine oonscqurnce deducible from this assertion, that the CSRn<:a and veritiell of things arc independent upon the will of God, but tb.u then is an etemil and immutable wi.dom in the mind of God, and thence particip,ated by CIl'ated beings inde~ndent upon tt.c will of God. Now the wisdom of God is as much God as the will of God. And whet""r'] ofth_ two things in God, thn is, will or wisdom, should de~nd upon the other, will be beSl detennin.cd from the "",·era! n.turell of them. For wisdom in itself hath the natUre of a rule and mnsun, it being a IT>OSI detcnninate and inflexible thing. But will being not only a blind and dark thing as consideral in itself, but also indefinite and indetenninatc, h.th thcnfon the natun of • thing regubbk and measurable. Whenfon it is the perfection of will, as such, to be I"ided and determined by wisdom and !ruth. But to make wisdom, knowkdge, and trUth to be arbitruiJy determined by ...ill, and to be regulated by such I plumbean and flexibk rule (Ka...:iw /loA.iJPJ.W>I;) as tha! is, is quite to destroy the n.ature of it. For science or knowledge is the rompreIH:nsion uf that which necessarily is ("atdh7\1"~ tOO 01'1"(1(,;), and there can be nothing moll' oontradicriou. than truth and hlse:hood arbitrary. Now all the knowledge and "iOOom tMt is in creatur.., whether angels or men, is nOfhing else: but a p;lTlicip;ltion of that OIle eternal, immutable, and increated wisdom of God, or ""ve.... l signotu"," of that one archerypoJ seal, or like so many multiplied nflection. of one and the same face, made in ""veral glossn, ...·hereof!iOl11e all: clearu, some obscuru, somc: standing neanr, SOIlX further off. 8. Moreuvet", it was the opinion of me ...isnt philosophers (as we shall show arterward) that there is also in the scale of being a natUre of goodness su~rior to wisdom, which therefore measures and determines the wisdom of God, as his wisdom measures and determines his will, and which the ancient cabalists wen wont to call .,n~ crown, as being ., ~Tls.P' ¥' "

... ""KII .

,6

'V'

ate

the top or crown of the Deity, of which more afterward. When:fore allhoulI'li ....,..., no,"elist!;i i nuke a romncted ide.! of God ronsisrin, of nothing else but will and power, yet his Mture is bettC'!" expressed by some in this mystical or enigmatical representation of an infinitc circle, whose inmost centre is sim ple ~ness, the radii [or} ray. and expanded area (plat) thereof all compre hen ding and immutable wisdom, the extenOr periphery or interminate circumference, omnipotent will or activity by which every thing without God is brought forth into existena:. Whcn:fore the will and po·.... er of God havinl!' no command inwardly (imjlt""m 4Ii jlflri') either upon the wisdom and knowledge of God, Or upon the ethical and moral disposition of his nature whid is his GKntial gondna;,;, but the sphere of its activity is without God (afT/! Dt-um), when: it hath an absolute command upon the exisTences of things, and is always free, though oot 3lways indifferent, since it i, its rrcatcst perfection to M determined by infinitc wisdom and infinite gondna;,;. But this is to anticipate what ac<:ording to t~ laws of method should follow afterward in anothu pbcc .

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., ,.

Copyrighted material

Book II Chapler I No .. me demon.move .trenlflh of our cau"" lying plainly i. Ihis, Ihll ;t is nol possible thaI anything should be without ..... IUn:, and the nalUra or e!;Sena:5 of all things being immutable, then:fore upon su pposition that men: is any thing really just or unjust, due or unb ..ful (Uhl#IfI or iIJililum), thue must of nca:ssity be something so both nalUra/ly and immutably, which no la .., decrtt, will, nor custom can aller. Ther(: have not wanted some :unong the old philosophcn that ",ther than they would acknowledge any thing immutably jusl or unjust, would nO{ stick to shake the very foundations of all things, and 10 deny lhat men: was any immutable nalUr(: or 1:$SeTla: of any thing, and by tonKqUalce any absolute ccn:ointy of truth or knowledge, maintaining this 11l'1IIlge panodOl, that both all being and know ledge was fanwtial and reluive only, and Ihorefore lhal nOlhing was good or evil, jusl or unjust, true or false, white or bbck, absolutely and immutably, bUI relatively 10 every privale person's humour or opinion. 2. The principal assertor of this enravagant opinion was Protagonl$ the Abderite, who, IS Pbto instructs us in bis 1'IIl~eltlru, held l.

thaI nothing ..... any thing in itself Ibsolutely, but wu II .... ys made 10 ro oomc thing else, and ew:nc:e or being .,.. '" be mnnvcd from tvtry

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In which position of his then: sccms to be these t,,·o things asiCTted: 6rsl WI ollthinp were in pe'perual motion and nothing had any bo:ing (n:u-) bm a possibilily !O be (jim"), which thc said Protoguru thus cxpressed: AU !hingo are made by motion and m"tun: of Ihings together, :and !herdOr. are AM riJhdy said to hIi:. Por II01hin, ;. bul thin, ;. l al .... ys mode.

.,.tty

S«ondly, Ih.u nothing i. mode ahsoluldy, but only n:lalh'cJy 10 someIbing clse, Ifany ........ y lha, ony thing rido ... is or is ",.,de. h. mUSt say, ...! il i..,o '0 oomct/oin" or in ,espee! oho,.... body for we Cln_ .lIirm thalony thing rither ill or ill made absolul.1y in itselfbu! mali"e1y to ........,hinS .Ise.'

3. Now from hence proceeded those known aphorisms of his, n:cordcd both in Plato and AriSlotk, '1 ....1 those thinp ...·hieh appear 10 cve,), one, arc !O him 10 whom they 'pr:u·. And .gain, 'thar eve,), fancy or opinion of c"cry body ""as rrue'. And again, 'ThaI man is the measure of all things whether existing 01" not cxisling.'~ Which sentence sccmcd so prell:y and orgule to him Ih.1 he placed it in thc "cry r""'l of his book, as Ploto tells us.' And indud i. ocnnpriscs in it all the singubriry of his philosophy, the true meaning thereof being this: n(M only that man taken generaUy is the measure of all things (which in ""'"'" sen.., might be affirmed that our o.... n human faculoo are the mca5urc of all things unlO us), but also th •• 'c"cry indiyidual lTlIn is the measure of all bo:ing and truth' respccti"cly to himselr. f or IiO the following words in PIaIO uplain it: You, meaninJ (..ilh Socrates) is .his. 1"'1 .. e"o"ery IhinJ lppcars to!roe. ouch K is to !roe. And .. it oppears to you, such il i. 10 you. both of \IS being oIik ...... n.' • '£0:
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Wherefore it is elsewhere up""''''' after this IJWIner, 'dUlt every IJWl is the measure of what is and is MIt, that is t(l himself, and 'tlut every on<: il the measure of his own wisd"", to himself." Sextus Empiricul gives a short account of this Proul{Orean philosuphy in a few word. thus, 'He assoeru that which sums to every one to be, and so makes all thinp rebtive." Now this was a hi&her strain of madness than the Pyrrhonian scepticism, which was not SO ucn.vagant as m affirm thaI all things were fantastical and relative only, but that we could not affirm what thinp absolutely were in their own nature, but only what they S«med to us. 4. But that all this was intended chidly "" a bantry Or assault against monJity, and principally levelled by ProUI{Ora.s against the absolute and immutable natures of I{OOd and evil, ju!tt and unjust, appearrth also from sundry p~ of that learned dialogue called n~iUU/I<J, Tell me therefore, dust thou in Jood camost think Ihot nothinl is or honest, but i!t always made SO?IO

Jood

And .ftefWllrds Prougoras affirms, be Jood ."d jU$> 10 every cily or commonwealth, the ..me are so to that city or commonwealth SO long >$ they....."..,." wh.~ver

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ruth

thaI city. And in lu
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Ludy,lO name no II1I'ln: places, TIle !hing!hat "'" "tre .hout to $how wu!his that they which made the natures and cuenca of all things, Rowin3 and mUlOblt, and which heLd !hat what sctl.ltd to (vttY body, _ !hat 10 whom it so It ",ltd, II they do maintain this cona:J hinK aU other things, 10 ronct. "ing nothinB mort thm iu .. and unilUt, II bring unqlteJ.ioMbly tr\te of these, that .. hllSOe'ler any oi.y Ihink. to be good and ju.. and dta !hem Iud>, theso thing> arc 10 to that city, 10 long IS they on 10 dca I • d .IJ

Chapter It , . Wherefo~ sinct in order to the wing ''''ay of the immutable natures of good and evil, just and unjust, and the ItKInl differences of humane actions, there was so strange an attempt made by these philosophen 10 ovenhrow the absolute essences and truths of all things, let uS in the ntx. place consider what pretences Or grounds they could po5Sibly have for maintaining 10 wild a pa .... dox as .his. First, therefore, it is evident from Plato's wrirings that Protlgoru laid his foundation in the Heraclitical philosophy, at that time in 1fTC'I' vogue and request in the world, which did, as thll philosopher writes, 'bring in a IIooiring and movable tsSellce', and maintained, 'that nOlhing Rood, bu. all things moved and 110"'«1'." An opinion which IOO5t of the ancients were inclining '0, as appears from .he poets, who made 'all things to be the offspring ofnu and motion',u in SO much that Homer himself (as Piaro observes) deriviol the pedigree of the gods, made the 0ctatI their fllher and Tethys their moth .... '· And there were not any philosophers ofnole besides Parmenidn and /A7f-. """""" t.wre, m.u. KG! Ii_ """ """",. 1IociK.. """

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Me1issus., that opposed it, woo also rul into another cxtmne,17 And therd'ote the fonntr of these Plato facetiously calls 'the flowing phiLosophers' (f~ .6io»f~) and Ihe Illter, the 'sunders' (01"<1"lWf~).lB Now the trUe meaning of this Hem:litical philosophy was plainly this, that there is no other heing in the world besilks individual body or matter, and no such thing as sunding intelligible forms (dm7), tmot is no intellecntal heing. Which matter or corporcal heing ... il i. liable 10 motion and mutation because of ;IS divisibility, eyery part orit btUlg aeparable from anoihet", SO by the mutation tmot we find in all corporcal things, we may «UOI1ably conclude thll ;1 is throughout perpetwlly moved and agitaICd by streamS and subtle matter passing the pores of all bodies. Whena it was that they affirmed 'that all things flowed like a stream', 19 and lmol there WI$ no .tability either of essence or knowledge any where to he found. For that Cratylus and Heraclitus endcoyoured to destroy the cenainty of all sclena from this principle is uident in Ihat !hey maintained that rontmiict(lrK:s might he true rooaming the same thing, and at the same rime. And indeed if there were no other heing in the world bUI individual matter, and all knowl_ ed,e p,oa:t21 a. But Protagons Went further, and made a superstructure upon lhis Hem:litical phiLosophy out of the old alOlIlical or Phoenician phiJo...

...

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5Ophy, which clearly asserted that all those sensible qualities, as they arc called, of heat and cold, light and oolours., 5Oundli, odours and saIlOrs., fonnally conside...,d arc no( things really and absolutely eximng "ithout Uli, but only passions, sensations, and phanwms in us, occasioned by certain local motions made upon the otpns of ..,nse from the obittts without us, and SO ind«d, but ...,llItive and fantastical things. And thus Prooogoru made up hi. busin.,. complete from this mixtu..., of Ihe Heraclirical and alOmical philosophy tDg"ther. For taking it for granTed aca.>rding [0 Heraclitus' doctrine, that knowledj(e iii nothing else but sense, and acrording to the Phoenician or acomical philosoph y, [hat the ..,nsible qualit~ arc nO{ things ...,ally and absolutely uimng witboul us, but appearances Or sensations in us, t.e concluded, 'all sensible and intelligible things' not 10 N absolute essences, but things mc...,ly rdative, nnwtical, and i=ginary.u

Chapter III , . Now that thili otomic:a1, oorpusculllr, Or rnechanic:a1 philosophy, that solves all the phenomena of Ihe corporal world by those imelligible principles of magnitude, fip'''''' sitt, and molion, and Ihe...,by makes sensible lhings imelligible, banishing away those unintelligible oorporeal forms and sensible qualities, 1J _ kno",.., to Protagoras, who li"ed not only befon: Plato and Arislode, but a1so Nfo..., Democrirus himself, as Plutarch testifies (though he abused i, in grounding SO slrange a paradox upon il), I shall make it undeniably evident from ""'era! testimonies out of Plalo', ThtMlrtus. For besides that passage afo..., mentioned, 'ThaI all things arc made by local molion and mixtu..., with one anotheT'li and what follows after, 'That motion iii that which makes every thing to seem 10 be, or to be generated',ll he plainly describes the nalU", of oolours according to this hypomesis, the sense whereof iii thili, 1>

,,,r

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LeI: UJ begin first "'illI the ey... or _;v.t. That which is called ...... i!fc mIour .. IlOl: .ny real quality ... isting eith.,. without the eyes or in the eyes; for thm il .....,..)d not consist ""Iy in motion and BeJKnrion. But lIkinl it for """"ted thai rot> ..,,';ble thing .. Judi absolulely in illClf, we musl lOy thai • white and bbd colour, and every other coklur iI "'.......ted by certain motions mad. and impressed upon the eye, and ~ colour .. ndther that which mal.. the imp .. :: in" nor thol ... hich rea1vcth il (that ii, neither ony Ihing in the eye nor in the ob;'CI absolutely), but I ecruin middle thing between them both.'"

Which can be nothing else but a passion or _rion in us. Elsewhere in mil dialogue he pro .... Ihis assenion, that colours md the like sensible things ate no real and absolute qualities either in the sentienl or in the obitcl because the same obiect seems to ka,·c different qualities to differenl persons as, The same wind blowing ootmI cold to OM and ........... 10 Inocher. And the """'" wine .... hich 10 OM ;" health oecms ......... , wiD 10 the """'" person .ppear bin", ond disl2$lcful ifhe be ,ici n

Whence he concluded thai lleat and col d, , weel and biner, were nOl: things really md abwlulcly existing in the objects ";lhoul, but relative things, being passions or sensations that may be diversified by til<: different tempers and complexions of the body. ~. Afterward, we have the sum of this atomicaJ or mechanical philosophy, more copiously set down afler this manner, The beginning upon which all 'hingo dq>end iI; this, that the .mole world if motion and nothing .Ise ba;d .... Now of mo,ion there on: ,wo kind" each of which containcth innumerable branch.. under K. lIul the """.r of one .. oc:rion, of !he other I"";"n. From ,he mutwol congress and

contrition of both ....icb togflh .... , .re begottm innumonbic offJprinp "'hid> may all he reduced 10 th..., 1"·0 gmeral heads, .. h....cof the one [is] the oa>';ble, ,J-.. other ......, which is .1 .... )". ;o;ncd """ther with !he .. Ell.

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.. nsible. 'The ocrues han ....,h rwntt • these, .;ght, hcarinl, tastinz, l<>UChinl, pleuura, pains, desires, fcars, Ind others innumcn.bIt without names, bul lIWIy lhat h... nama. The SCIUib~ kind doth INwer and COI",espond to nory OM of ...... To .....ipn.u IIWIner of roIou ..... 10 tM MarinI roundl, and to the other om... other oensibleo, th.,...., ofkin tv !hem . . . Whm theref= the .ye, and oomc other thinK .n:oJosoo.H to it, meet together, they bqet whiten, lItd • <:CJUin senu propoo tiooo ..ble thcmJnlO, neither of which would have bern made, if either oft ..... had 1101 mt1 with ,he other. Thm lhese thinp heinz carried rapectively, sis!" to tbc eyes, and whit ....... to the object, ..hich did actively bqt1 it, tM <"ye bccorllotS fuU of .ipo l. lItd - . and is not made oisht in lhe .bstract, but lit oyc -mI. And thlt .... hich did aonsmerate the colour is fined with .. hit ....., and is made noI: .mite"... in the absmoct but a thing ...hit., ... hether ......,.) or KOIW:. The arne is 10 be c:oncciYod of 011 other sensible thinl" .... Iwd and hot, and the like. that nothinl ito by itself ."""luloly on,. of thctc thinp, but they...., 011 mode &om • mutual aonvus oftbc ""twud object and tM ......, by mans of mOOon." 3. Here we &« it plainly IOU led, that the .... hole ....,rld is mad. by nothing else but Ihe ~ioo of particles, by 1I1oeaI15 of which all th;np are lencTaled and conupled. Neither did Protagon< ..,knowlHlge any other motion bUI loal, as is plainly inrimated. And thJl all sensible qualities which .... e tal. norice of by the sevual senses., as oolou~ sounds, upon, odours and the like, arc not thinp really existing without Uli, but passions or sens;nioos in us, caused by seYeral local

).

motions upon the organs of sense. Which if that be not sufficient that I have already alleged, is )'et t1'IOI'e plainly expressed after this tlWlner: Nothing is absolutely In y one thing by ilKlf, neither the agent nor the patient, but from both of these mcering tog"""'<, an: p .... ttd at onOl: both the senses ond the ..-nsib~ thinp." 4, These passages which I have cited an: so dear and evident, mat mey cannot possibly be capable of any other sense. than what I havc expressed. And merefore diose [WO Latin interpreters, Ficinus and Scrnnus,JO mat h ed before the restitution of mi. mechanical philosophy, and therefore understood it not, yet expound them .fter the same manner. The first thus: Colour is neither the ,i,h, of the eyes, nor the marion of bodies, but a c:cruin middle thing !"<:SUhing (rom tM . ight and motion, that is ",ell I pm;"" about the eyes."

The otheT in this manner, That from the different disposition of me beholder, and so the different affection of the intermedi....: otnSlbl<: orpn, the nriou. wIoun arc both made ond seen, but 110 as that they arc all fanu.stical, nor have ony ",bsistellOl: but in the mind, an: varied by the different conJl"CSO of motion, ....hich is 10 be concludtd conc:erning all the sen ..... Il

Only Protagoras, in order to his scq>ticaJ design, made these sensible thinK" not only relative to animals in general, but also to individuals, because it is impossible 10 demonstrate, as he u'1lcs, mat all brute basIS, nay, thaI any two men have the vay same phantaSms or ideas of

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red Or green, these being idiopathies, and because uJl(rK:nce shows, Ihal nOI only Ihe I"Ilefuirress and unl"llefulnes& of tastes and smdls, bUI also Ihal heat and cold aK relative 10 individuals.

Chapter IV t. Wherefon: we have made il evidenl Ihal Ihal very rne<.:hanical or atomical philosophy Ihal halh bttn bldy reslored by Cartesius and Gusendus, as to the main substance of it, was not only elder than EpicuTWl, but olso than Pbto and Aristotle, nay than ~mocrituS and Leutipp us also, the cummonly Kputed fathers of iL And themore we hove"" reason to discredit the report of Posidonius the Stoic, wlto, as Strabo lells us, affirmed Ihis atomic:al philosophy 10 have been ancienler than the times of the Trojan war, and fim to hove bttn brought imo Grccoe out of Phoenicia. If we may believ. P",idonius the St<Mc, the doctrine of.toms is .ncient... th.., the timeo of the Trojan WH and ""'" fin" invented &rid ddivcml by one MOKhus. Sidonian." Or rather Phoenician, as SextUS Empiricus cites the testimon y of Posidonius:

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Oa'_Tiruo and Epic:uru. inv.nted the doctrine of un,"" we nW:.c thaI physiology '" be ancient.., and dcri,·. it, IS P""idonius the Stoic doth, (n>m """ MOKhus,. P'-niciln.:H And since it is ""ruin from what we ha"e shown, that neither Epicuruo nor yel Democritus wen: Ihe first inventors of this physiology, this testimony ofPosidoniusth. Sioic ought in reason to be admined by us . ~. Now what can be more prob.ble than that this Moschus the Phoenecian, that Posidonius speUs of, is the very same penon with

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that Moschus the physiologer, that Iamblichus mentions in the Life of Pythagoras, whefe he affirms that Pythagoras, Jiving some time at Sidon in Phocnecia, convened with Ihe prophetS that were the sua:o:uon of Mochus Physiologer, and was instI'\Icted by them. 'He converwd with the Prophets thaI were the sUCQ"Ssors of Mochus lOd other Phoenician pricsu;.'lJ And "'hat can be more certain than thai both Mochus and Moschus the Ph~ician and phiJosop~ "'lOS no other than Moses, the Jewish lawgiver, as Aroc-rius rightly guesses: 'It seems that it ought 10 be read Moschu .. unless they h.ad rather Tad it Mochus or Moses.'lIi Wherefm-e according 10 the ancient mdition, Moschus or M()I;CS the Phoenician being the first aUlhor of the atomical philosophy, it ought to be calLed neither Epicurian nor Democritica.l, but Moschical or MOSltica1. J. It must be acknowledged that neilhn of Ihese IWO flUTlOll. and renowned philosophe .... Plato and Aristotle, had the good hap to be righlly and thoroughly instructed in this ancient Ph~ician lOd Moschical or Mouical philosophy. Protagoras so much abusing il to Kepticism and the tlking aw;ly of the natural discrimination of good lOd evil, might probably beget a prejudia: in PlalO against it, though he doth rIIH confule Ihe physiological part of it in all his Tlu:QtUrvs, ...t.ere good occasion was offered him. And yet in his 71",.. .... he hath a little smallering of it/' where he endc::.'·ours 10 resolve the differenca of the fOllr dements, fire, air, wa ter, earth, into the different geometrical figures of their inocnsible p:ms, making the small panicles of the earth 10 be cubical, by rcuon of their solidity and mobilily, bUI Ihe ~re, pyramidal, 'It is reasonable that thaI figute which hath the smalest basis, should be attributed 10 that body which is ID05t moving, cutting and piercing,.lI And tl\;ll he doth not mean mystically in this bUI physically, appcan from his own explication of it concerning the insensible parts, 'These cubes and pyramids in the earth and the fire can only be pcroci ..ed by the mind and understanding, sina:: the single

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those sensible qualities into figures, siu, and motion of particles, nIX only attributing il to Democrilus, but also making it lh~ ITI05I g~ly reOOvtd physiology before his time: Democriru5 and lII05I of the Phy.ioIogon commit. 1""" absurdity in this, in that they moIr.~ all omlll: to be ..... th, ..hid> is. thinl at 61'SI oishI plainly impoa>blc. Mo.."","Cf, thcy do no! dininpish belw;"t the ubjcclJ ~

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Aristotlol: there: roncludes this di5<XIurse with twO general arguments >.pinS! Iha1 philosophy (that made the Knlible qualities 10 be propcorly senurions in us, and nlXhing else in the oo)ects without us bUI nu.gnirude, filS"re. sile of pam and motion) in mis manner: Th:at there: ;. <:O
Whidl arguments. though !hey be handsome and ingenious {Ihal 15

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Aristotclical) to prove tlut Ihere are such entities as qualities "isible, ungible, ClSleable and the like, really u i5ting in the obiects without u•. Yet as thc). will nOI counterbalance: the weight of thOS<" OIher argulTl(nts Ihat militate on lhe conlr-uy side, so Ihal they ..·mwithout any difficulty be an.wered by the a5SCrtors of this No,·antique philosophy. s. BUI after Plato's and Aristotle's time. this old ph ysiology was .gain revived by Epicurus, but so blended with immor:>.!ity and imp~y as th.t it soon sunk .gain, there being nmhing left of.ll those voluminous IrcatiliCS of Epicurus concerning it, sa,·ing .... hat is preserved in ~nes Lacrtius.... nor no other system thuwf transmined to posterity but "'hat is comprised in the poem of Lucmius CaruSo 4j So that the ..·orld was S"nerally seized .... ilh • detp and profound obhion of this ph~iology, there being only SOme obscure fomsleps and dark intimations of it now and thm found in Ihe .... ritings of some learned .uthors. & ",hcn Senus tells us that some of thc Stoics hdd 'thaI sensiti,'e things ..·ere rclati,·c to animals and depended upon our sensation' and 'thaI nO! lhe things themscl,·es "'ere comp rehended by sense. but only our p;wions from them';" and .... hen the Pyrrhonian SttptK:s themselves offirmed, 'thot all things are rclati"e, thot is, to that "'hich judges of them, and cverything appears to be acmrding to sense . And .... hen Plotinus makes a doubt ,,-hether sensible things did really uist in the objects .... ilhoul us. or were only passions .... i'hin us,

."

it may be ..... n doubted concerning .. nlible Ihings then, .. h'co. lhal .. e Sttm '" h ..,( 'he Jr<:I'cst _ uran<'e of. ",h., htt ,hey mlly u i;n in III< obje
6. BUI in this laSt age it hath been so successfully restored by the writings of SOll"\tc learned authors. and the ,ruth thereof SO convincingly evidenced by many Olher cxpc:riments bc'lides tlul of the glassy prism

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and rainbow, that men is link doubt left cooCffTling il." And indeed unler.s mi. phibophy be acknowkl\gW to be trut, Wt must of neassiry .ffi.nn, tltat the oensiblt: and corporeal world is ahogethu uninttlligiblt. For as Timaeus Locrus long ago om.,n·ed, that sensible things (ra aitrlhrr6.) could nOl be apprehended :lI1). oth~r wa)· than 'by sense:ll1d • certain kind of lipurioos reason',5O so it iii most certainly true tltat we cannot po$
Chapter v 1. But though this uld OIomi,,"1 philooophy be mosl solidly and subsTantially lrue, the paradu~es thaI Protagol&S and uthcn cndeavoured tU ground upon it, are nOI only ridiculously absurd and rontradicrious in thcrnsdvcs, bUI also altogether inoonscquent Crom the urn!.

For as for those ~rtions, th.! whate,-cr seems is, and thot C\"CI)" f.mcy is [rue, though th ey seem ridiculously absurd, yet those t..m learned philosophers, plato and AriOlotic , ,-ouch$lCe Ihem a serious confutation. Plato from hence in his Tht'UItIMS, because thaI Ihe Cancics of them that drcorn would be as true and real as the sensations of those thOl arc ...ne, and thOl all men would be alike Vl-ise, and the opinions of the most mitente idiots in gtthnetry as true as any grometrical theorems, and all predictions of future things alike true, and Ih.t in lhe actions of human life it would be indifferenl ,,·hat any man did in order to any end, and so all deliberation and ronsulution ttlSt. But Arinotlc, in his metaph ysics, with some mi~lUre of facetiousness .. I'n>bol>ly . "k,u,," .. D "eo, iM,orito, ... . ,"J Diotoursco ...... s ...... M""",,-

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also writes aCter this manner: 'To those: that PUt their finger under their sight Of between their eyn, it will be both two and one'.' ! But SeXIUS Empiricus bestows Il10TC subtlety upon it th1n eithn of them, If "try fancy be true. thm WMn one fancies that every fancy ;. no!. tnK, Ihll must be true IIso, Ind 10 then this proposilion tNl every fancy is trW, will be fw .... Ihe meaning of Ihese assertions, that whate-·er seems is, and e,·ery fan~y is true, W"Ii no other than this, that nothing was absolutely true at aU., but that all truth and koowlcd~ "'el"l: but occm.inll", fantastical and reLative thinp. And beau"" one occm.inll" or appearance ;5 IS true IS another, therefol"l: they "'el"l: all equally true, that is 10 say, none of them true at all. This Aristotle elsewhere rightly apprehended, 'He that soith that allthinp;s Ih31 appear.,..., true, makes aU beinSS 10 be l"I:1.ui,· • .'1) But if nothing be absolutely true, but only reLath·ely to him that thinks 50, then thi5 very opinion of Protagoras, th."I1 nothing _ absolutely true, and thai IT\3n ""U the measure of aU things, was oot itself absolutely true, but only seemingly and r.latively to Protagoras. Whereas this is asserted for an absolute truth by him, that nothing is absolutely true. And what a ridiculous foUy was this in one that "ould be acooumed a philosopher, to take a great deal of pains in "Titing • IorJC volume, and to endeavour industriously to convince the "'orld, that nothing was absolutely, but only rcJati,·ely and fantastically true. Sin"" it must needs follow from thence that this very thing itself """OS oot absolutely tru., but only relatively to those that thought 10, and the COnlnry alt.ther IS true to thosc: that thought other,,·isc. For it would 00 more concern the world to know that this ,,""os reLatl,·ely and nntastlcally true to Protagoru that noI:hinll" """os Ibsolutely true, than to know what Protago\"2S dreamt of the Wt night. For since according to him, 3. Whertt~

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'thlt every ITllIn does bUI Ihink'>i his o"n trutbs, it cannot concern my man 10 know mother'i opinions any m()~ than bis dreams. And thc...,fore Prougoras had done mo..., wisely if he b.d spared his pains md kept thllK pri>"ate rellitive trulhs of bis own, th.1 is his dream or imagination, wholly to himself. But by this industrious endeavouring to con,·ince the ,,·oTld of this, Ihal nothing _ .bsolutely true, but only ...,llItively, he plainly confuted his own doctrine in asserting tho! this was absolutely true, tbat nothing was absolutely true, wbich is a ITllInifest contradiction. The~ need be the less pains taken in confuting sapticism md flntasticism, since it always too cas;l)· oonfutes itself. 3. For if nothing be absolutely true, then not so much as tbis oould be absolu tely true, Ihat ;t &eCmed to Protagons that nothing ""as absolutely true. And it could only &eCm to be true. Nay, it could not be absolutely true that Protagoras, to ,,·hom III truth &eCmW to be relative, had any real existence, much less thai the..., are my obicc'" without from whence the impressions or motions are made upon our senses; Or thai there is my such Ihing as magnitude, motion, figu..., and .ite of part&, or 'that maTter is floating' md that 'the reason. afall appearances llfl' faunded the~in,.i! Which things, as Plato and Sextus tell us., we~ dogmaticallyaffinned by Protagaras.

Chapter Vt Again, as this scepticism Or fant3Slicism af Protl.goras is most absurd md oonlradictious in itself, so there is not my foundation for it al aU in the aid atomical pbil()S()phy, but oontrari wise, notbing doth mo~ effectuaUy md dClI .....lstrltivcly overthrow both these assertions, tbat knowl!:dge is sense, md tbat all truth md knowledge is but fmtastical and relative, Ihm Ihis "Iamical pbilosophy dotb. For first, since no sense can judge of itself, or its o"n appearances, much less make any judgcmeOis of the appearances belonging 10 another SCl\se for, I.

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those: thing< which an pc:rtti.'td hy one of our P''''"eR, i, is ;mpoosibk '" pc:..mv. ,hem by another, .. ,h~ objn:.. of hear;ng by I;ghl. or ,Ite objms of sighl by htmnl and
The sight cannot judge of lIOunds which belong to the hearing nor Ihe hearing of light and eolours. Wherefore thaI which judges of all the senses and meir sevenl objects. cannOt be ilSelf any s.ens.e. but s0mething of a superior nature. ~. Moreover, that wh ich judges mal appeMOl1cl$ of all the senSotS have someming fanla5tical in them, cannot possibly be ilSelffanlDticol, but it mU", be something ...·hich hath a power of judging what really and absolutely is Or is not. This being not a relat;"e, but an absolute truth, mat :oensible appeMOl1ca have something fantasrical in them. Neither could p~ ever ha,~ arrived to the knowledge of this truth if he had not h:ld some faculty in him superior to s.ense, that jud~th of what is and is not absolutely. Now Ihis same ntiona! faculty, that disco"en. acwrding to the atomical philosophy, that there is liOIllething in our sensations that is merely fanla5tical and rdati.'e, doth lSSUI"C us alSQ not only mat men: .re absolutely and really such ]>#SWnl, affectionl, and seerninp in UI, but mat they that do percei"e (Wlnrrj, h"'e an ab50lute and re
.,

oorporeallhings Ihemsdves, only liut colour and such OIher things are relative. Therefore all being and truth ~c<:ording 10 PnMagoras himself, i. not fanwtical and relalive, bUI there is some absolute. J. Wherefore, tile propeT and genuine result of Ihis old alomical philosophy, which ;s Ihe triumph of reason O,'er sen"', is nothing .1.., but this, that..,n.., alone is nOllhe criterion or judge of what does redly and absolulely e xist without us, but that there is • highu and superior intellectual beulty in U' that judges of our ..,noes, which disco"en; "hat is fallacious and fantastical in them, and pronounces what absolutd~ is and i. not. And Democ:ritus, " 'ho did more thoroughly and perfectly understand this atomical philosophy Ihan Protagor:lS, nukes this to be the proper result and ron..,quencc of iI, the in"alidoting the judgement of sense oonceming bodies themSl:I\'es, and the assening • higt.er facully of reason in uS to delennine whot is absoluldy Irue and f;>ls<:, which is wonh nOI;ng. For so SeXIUS, Ih" philosopher. wriles ron_ cerning Democrirus, Democritus dOlh discndil om"", altributing oot lrulh to it but onl~ appearance and that r..lly nothing exis" in the co'l"',.,al ....,rld bw atom&:and vacuum." And Democritus' o,,'n words concerning it.,., these, Swttt and biner, hot and cold, colours and the like, arc by Jaw and opinion, atoms and vacuum ,.,ally. Tn .. ,,-hieh ;. suppo
" "'IJWo'''''''' 16« /1<'1 M.....poI fi "'''''''''" ,01; ~"'''' . '''; , ........ .
u l ....,;-,.(ibio1).

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other d .. k and obscure, To the duI: kind of k........ ledge ..e referred .....mg, hearing, smcm"", wtinl, rouching. Bur the lenuine knowledge it more hidckn:and """""",ir.than t!oio'"

Now, this concerning Der ..octilus I note the rather more carefully, breausc Epicurus aftmo>llTd do!:ingly fumbling about the s:ame philosophy, matk senses to be the only criterion oftrulh and falsellood, and consequmtly abused this old atomic:al philosophy to atheism and immorality. Whereas, if rightly understood, it is the most impregnabk bul"'llrk apinll both . For this philosophy, discovering lhat the ideas of sense anc fantaslical, must needs oL'P P""'C another principle in UI superior 10 sense, which judges what is absolutely and not fantastically or reiari,'ely only tr\Je or false .

>:0""" """

.. •f:> .Ii .-; ~. u..u , - .n;. ,,,. ,.;. 60i .... old~,_, '''' .Ii 60i ' ok 6oi ...... , ... ..;. ,.;. ioi "" 6oi ...... ".r..", :v-~ 06T, TO ••,,6. d; . ! j ' . • qiIn., TIj • .It 60i ..... ok Bid...........,. 6",..10: ... d;"'P"·j . "'1" ....t;; TO oi»; oW;> ""JOT ,oil ~ ........ .u,a It iJ/.... r.dJjJ.,..Ii IW """' "llIw. oj ,.;. )"IIrif• .oj .li _ "', Koi """"iop;- i>h' nI It ...... mI -v,.... nM, rdlon;, ..-_ .. ~ .Ii """" b ......,.,\ h~ .Ii"""'(_'. ", )8).

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Book III Chapter I I. Now, ahhough whall have a1n:ady said may possibly seem a sufficient confUtalion of PrQIlIgor2S' objections apinst the immutable and absolute natures Of esscna:s of a1! things, from Ihat \"cry atomical physiology which he appeals 10, which, if rightly understood is the mosl rompliable with true metaphysics and Ihe most liubservient 10 i[ of any; yet notwithstanding, I think i[ "ery proper to Ihe busine.<S which I ha\"e in hand, 10 l'unch out further into [his argumenl, 10 show Ihe different natures of sense and intellection, or knowledge, nol only Iha[ I may thereby Ihe mon: fully confute Ihis scepliosm, Qr rather fanwricism Qf Prolagoras, and also assert Ihe immutable natures Qr essences of things, but a1 ... for other purposes, which I shall give an lCC()unl of in Ihe ck>se of this discourse, and I hop<: then 10 mne it app""r lha[ this was nQ impertinent digression. a. I shall begin with SCOIie, 10 sho ..· what it is, and that il is not knQwlcdge. First mcn:fQTC it is acknQwlcdgw by all, thai senlie is p;w;inn. And then: is in a11_rion without dispute, 61"Sia p31iSion in the body oflhe sentient, which bodily passion is nothing else but Ioc:al morion impressed upon the lIff'Ies from the obj«u without, and thence propapted and communicated [0 the brain, when: alllieMarion is nude. For then: is no other action of one body upon another, nor other change or mutation of bodies COllOI'i,"bk or intelligible besides local molion. Which mQ(ion in thai body which mQves anomer, is called action, in tha[ which is mo\"cd by anmher, p3SSion. And therefore, "'hen a

corpornlobject ,·ery remotdy distant is perceived by us, since it is by SOITIt passion nude upon our body, theK must of necessity be a continued pr~gation of some: local motion or pressure from thence unto the "'"Pn. of Our ""n... , or nt"·...,:and ~ unto tht b .... in . As .... hen Wt Stt many fixed 5ta1""5 5parlding in a clear night, though they be .n of them ~ nun )" thousand ""mi-di:amt ttn of the earth distant from us, ytt it muSt of necessity be granted, that there are local motions or pressures from them, wh ich we oil the light of them, propagated continuedly Or uninterruptedly through the Auid hn'·ens unto our optic ne,,·n;, or cl"" In (ould n01 set them. And that motion or pressure by which I.'e...., all other opaque bodies, is nmhing but the pushi ng (avrtpt,apaj against each other of the (,hCKal globulous panicles C8I~/,,) &tTi,·ing to mo'·c outward fr"Ofn the cent", of the mniccs "",i§lcd or ",jected from the ~~d superficies of tllem. In Ihc same nunncr as we f~l things at a distance in thc dark by thc resistaney which tlley nukc upon the further end of the staff that .... e hold in our hands.' And ,,·hen .... e hear the sound of a bell or <;:annon a , .......t way ofT, the t",mulous ,·ib .... tion5 of tht air, likt tht (irclin gs of the water ,,·hen a stone is Aung into it, .'" from thence continually propagated to OUr ean; Or acoustic nencs, the undul>tions still growing the wider and ,,·.. ker, tht further they go. J. But for.wnuch as ""n"" is not mere local rn<Xion impr.....,d from one body upon another, or a body's bare rtaCfion or resistance to thaI rn<Xion of anmher body, as ..""e hnt fondly ronceited , but a cogitation, rtalgnition, or vital perception :and consciousnnos of th(I;C motions or passions of the bod y, therefore, there muSt of necessi ty be .nmher kind of passion al~ in the ~ul Or principle of life, which is ,·itally un ited to Ihc body, to make up !;Cnsation. Which passion tlOXwith5tandiog is of a different kind or species from the former. For the soul, thot is a cogitati>·c being, is su pposed to be such a thing as <;:an penetratc a body, and therefore cannm be conai,·cd to be m<wed by the local motion of the body. For we Stt that light which 1'C".. d... lhe air, though it be .. corpornl motion, yet it is not mo,·ed or shalen by the agitations of the air, because: il is nm a body far I1""II:IK subtle than the air, that runs through the spon gy pores of it. Wherefore the soul, though it be conceived to be an nlended substance, yet being penctrative of body, Dcocon .............. kIcY 0( find .......', So. ,IT..., 4; 0.\1 ~ 'll.

"'r in ,lit 0.<\ by ,lit aid 0(, ..' " in M. 0,,;'"

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nOl by filling up the pores of ii, bUI co-exisling in the same place with it, canlJO{ be locally mo~ed by the motions of it. Neimer is mis passion of lhe soul in sensation a mere naked passion or suffering, because il is a rogitiloon Or perception which hath something of active vigour in it. For Ihose ideas of heat, light, and 00100.., and olher sensible things, being nOl qualities really existing in me bodies withoul us, as me atomicol philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively swnped or imprinted upon me GOul from without in the same manner Iha[ • sign.ture i. upon a piece of wax, must needs arise parll y from some inward vital energy oflhe soul itself, being phmtaSms of the soul, or se.-ef1ll mode:'! of cog>r.otion or pe"",ption in it. For which couse some of the PLatonists would nol allow sensations 10 be passions in [he ooul, but only ac[iye knowledges of me passion. of [he body (lIa8oi>v y""","",). 4. BUI as I said before, sense is a JnSsion of the soul also, viz., such. passion as • vila! md COJi[a[i,'c being i. cop.ble of, because we find by experience: rut il is no! elicited from the soul itself, bUI obtruded upon ;1 from widlOUI. So that the soul cannOl cboose but have such sensatlons, rogitiltions, or affections in it when such or such enemal objccrs are presenled ro [he oUlWlrd seJISCI. The soul receiving its inform'"ion from without by sympo.thizing with the passions of its own body concerning wh.1 indi"idual bodies exisl round aboul iI, and the general modes of them; which no innale reason of ilS own could possibly discover 10 it. And therefore the soul being ntttSsarily determined to exc" such rogitillions within itself when such 10<::01 motions are impl"eSsed upon ~ body which she is ,;la!ly united to, these sensations are cemin kind. of passive encrPcs of the soul. For the GOul and body, by reason of Ihat vitll union which i. betwixl them making up one compound «(~'"lOsill"'l) or animal, do of ll«USity mutually suffer from each other. the body being variously moved by the soul, and [he soul apin ,=iously affecred from the body, or the motions .... hich are made upon il . Neithn doth Ihe soul s ufTer indifTc",ndy from any body, bu. all sense arises from that natural symp~lhy Of compassion which the soul hath with that individual body with which it is vila!ly united. And had no! the soul such a passive principle in it, it could nor ",,"ibly be vitally united to any body, neither could there: be any such thing OS on animal or living creature. MOTeO""r Ihese sensitive COJiutions, OS we shall .how afterward, do

,. 'I'

ate

pbinly differ, in the mode of them, from those pur<: cogitations that aK the actions of the soul itself; then: being a '-ast differ<:n", ~tWttn the ~ of hunger and thirst, and mere "olitions in the soul to eat and drink, likewUc ~rwixt that grief and ... dness that arises from some ill ridinp told and understood by the mind (though then: ~ something of OOIpOieal passion consequent or concomitant here also) and befwilt a sense of pain when the body is hurt. And in lih manner in tlloR otmr sensations of light and colours, heat and rold, the lIOul doth not mer<:ly know or un
"

Lastly, the soul is frequently SO affected by Ihe motions of tllose 6~e olher oonjuptions ofnenes, os IhOi by n.lUral inmnci it mes notice of some COrporeallhings existing witlloul our bodies, whence llut motion upon Ihe nerves comes, os light, colours, sound, he'll :and rold, liard. nes&, sormes&, gTlI~itr, levily, odours, 5'lPO"'. The objecu being many times TemQ(ely di.mlll from us; though il does nol pcrcci,·e them in the same manner ,.. tlley absolutely e:Ost withoul us. No .. thougll all these three kinds mentioned be equall y passions and sen5'l00ns in Ihe soul, yet tile u~ of spccclt Iutll appropri.ted tile denomination or passions only to the former, and styled the two laneT by tile nome of sensations, [he first of Ihem being rorrunonly called internal corporeal senses, tile scrond cxtemil. Wherefore corporeal scnses in general !Ny be thus defined, to be .fftctions in the soul caused by certain local motion. mode upon SOfTIe parts of tile body, by reoson of the viml symp.thy betwixt tile !IOUI and body, whereby the soul seems 10 pttcci'·c rorporcal tllings u isting without itself, either in its own body, or else at. distance from it.

Chapter

tl

Wherefore, ""nSC being. passion in Ihe ..... 1, Or a compassion with its own body, wllkll it ;5 ~itally united to, that is di~ersified ac:oording to the diffcrcncc both of local motions ... d of bodily organs through which those motions arc ronveyed. There being a necesSary ... d faml ronnection between ""m.in rootion. in some parts of the en~vened body, and certain affections or sympathies of the soul, which Ocmocritus seem. to intinute in those words, 'By law a thing is rold, or by law hO["ltMt hot and cold, and the like werc pas:&ions or ph ... fatally connected with ecrtain local motions in the body. S<:nSl: is a kind of dull, confused, ... d stupid perception obtruded upon the soul from without, wllercby it ptlecives the alterations and motions within its own body, ... d mes cognizance: of individual bodies uisting round about ii, but doth not dearly comprchend what they arc, noT penetrate inlo the naturc of them, it being intended by naNrc npix; l.pQav. 00 7fpix; yvWo"w as I.

=

Plotinu& &pc:aks,J not so ProIXTly for knowledge as for the use of the body_ For th e soul suffering under that ,,-hicb it perceives by way of passion, I:2nnot master or conquer it, that is to say, rno '" or understand iL Fo r SO AnaxagolOS in Aristotle .-ery fid)' upresses tbe n.tu.., of knowledgtc and intellection under the notion of conquerinl\" (Kpatelv). Wh • ..,fo..,;t is n=-,y, .in~ the: mind understand. In thing>', thlt ic should bc: fTtt from mixtu.., Ind pas$ion. for thi. end, .. Anaugo","
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nukes up onc .ninul witk it. Or else tkey may be said to be tke rogit:nions of Ihe wkok compound «Dmpositum) or .nimol which is the reason th~ are so cloudy and confoundtd, beau.., they ori.., from the "ery millUre (6silum) wilh il. Wheuforc though all COJitalions of Ihe soul, as of lhe m;xtd (TO IlIKTO~) or both t~ther ((1V'Wi4WT~PO~), as Plorinus calls ;1, the compound of soul and hod)', or as thaI philosopher will h"'e it, of the 'body and • certain "iviliclting light imparted from the soul to il'. !"nd therefore, u he obsl:rveth out of Aristotle, 'As it is .bsurd to say the soul we",-eo,7 (or indeed the bod)" either, wea,;ng ~ing a mixtd acrion of the man and ..-ea'·'ng ,nstrumen15} so i, is absurd to say that the soul alone doth co,-et, grieve,

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memselves:ue [0 the sight. H Nay, undoubtedly so long as we consider these thinp no othuwist: than ~ represents Ihem, mal is as really uisting in the objects without us, they:ue and must neros be eternally unintdligible. Now when ill .... n narul"2lly enquire what m.,.., mings . re, what is light, and what,.,.., colours, me meaning her...,f is nothing elsl: but this, thai men would fain know or comprehend mem by som.ething of Iheir own which is native and domestic, OOt foreign to them, some acti,'c nenion Or alllicipalion of their 0"'" minds, as T shall show aflerwards. Wherefore though sense be adeqll1le and sufficient for mat end which naNre hath designed it [0, viz. 10 give ad"ertisemclll of corporeal things uisting without us, and their motions for the usc and conco:mment of the body, and such general intimations of me modes of them, as may give the understanding suflicielll hints by its ol"n ggacilY to find OUt their natu...,., and inl'em intelligible hypotheses to solve those appeanntu by (for omerwise reason alone withOllt sense could nOi a""luaint us wim indi,;dual uistent mings wimout us, Or assure us of the existence of any thing besides God, ",'ho is the only necessarily existent being). Yet notwithstanding sense, as sense, is not knowledge or intdlection. Which I shall stili nu.ke funher appear by th.,.., following more particular considerations.

Chapler III I . For first, sense only suffering and rcaiving from without, and having no active principle of its own, to take acquaintance with what it reaives, it must needs be a stranger to that which is altogemer adventitious to it, and mere fore cannot know or understand it. For to know and under_ stand a ming is nothing else but by some inward anticipation of the mind, mat is native and domestic, and SO familiar to it, to take acquaintance with it; of which I shall spn1 rnore afterward. 1. Sc"", is but the offering or presenting of some obiect 10 the mind ,

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COMurn;"g rurnal aM jmmllldl~ moraluy gi •.~ il an occasion 10 exe..,ise it!; 0 ...." in"'
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mistaken for one and the &aTJ"M: Ihing, >s if it .... ere all noth ing but men: sensalion Or passion from Ih e body. When:as sense i!Self is bUI the passi,'c pcr~ption of some individual malc,;,:!! forms, but to know Of understand, is actively to compn:hend 3 Ihing by somc .bt;rracl, flft, and uni'-ersal reasonings ('ario"n) from when the mind, 'as il wen: looking down'. >s Rocthius cxpresseth il. 'upon the indi" muals below iI, ,-iews and understands them '.'o But sense wh ich 1;0 flal and gro'-elling in the ind i,·iduals. and is stupidly fixed in the maler;"l form, is not able to rise up or os«nd 10 an .bt;lract uni"ersal nOlion _ For which ause ;1 ne,-er affirms or denies any thing of its object, beause (os Aristotle obsfnCi) in all affirmation and negalion al leasl, lhe predicate is .l ......y. uni,·ersol. The eye which is plac>:d in a level with the se;t, and touches Ihe sur&cc of iI, Clnnot take any brg~ prospect upon lhe sea, much less see the whole amplitude of iL But an eye elevaled to a hi gher station, and from Ihen~ looking down, may comprehcll5i'dy "iew the whole sea al on~, or al least ... much of il IS is within our horkon. The .bstract uni,-crsal reasons ( ralj~" .. ) .n: 1n.1 higher "'Iion of Ihe mind from ...·hence looking down upon individual things, il hath. commanding yin' of Ihem. and IS it were a prion' comprehends or knows Ihern. But sense which eith .... lie:!; in the same Ie "d wilh thaI p:lrlicular .runerial obj.ect ,,-h ieh ;t pcrcci,-cs, o r rather under it and bo:neath ;1, cannol emerge 10 any knowledge or trulh cooccming;1. 3. Sense is bUI • sl;ghl and 5up<:rficiol p<:m:pcion of the outside and :accidenlOls of a <>Jrpon:al subslana, it doth nOl p<:nClrale into lhe profundilY Or in""arC! csscocc of il. For a body may be changed as to aU the several senses., and rem.in really the same Ih. 1 il was before. When:fore, Ihough men .re <>Jmmon!y s;aid to know Ihings when thty ,.

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... (b, SJ _T ..... ~ •• p< . .. ..... '>1"-'''' ' tho .... n;p.c:..• ~ ....., Ioobn, .so..-. fmm ""'''. b)" ~... !'..... diotioopiohH all til< ,h'" aoIoi
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;' 'VI

ate

o.II((1'"i"l (/(ntll/II11/ immulahk morillity

sec and fer] them, yet in truth by their bodily sen",. they pe...,.,i,-e nothing but their outsides and external indumcnts. JUSt iii when a IlUn looking down OUt of a window into the strttts, is said to "'" r:ten walking in the IIIrttU, when indttd h. """",i,'es nothing but haUl md cioxhes, under which, for au~ht he knows, there may be Daedabn statues walking up and down.! Neither is this spoken onl y in ~pea o f tlut d efect of'ight (to omit the mher senses) which is a lillie ulie,'ed by microscopical glasses, )-et it cannm pe""'i"e the figures and contextures of those minute particles oot of wh ich bodies a~ compounded, nor penetnte beyond the su""rficies into their corporeal profundity, For though our sight were SO much mo~ than Lyncean , that it coold discover the "cry po~ in glass through which the light posses, as Aristmle romplain. it cannot, nay though it rould diSttm the ""rticuLor globulous partides I.Ilobut.) in th. motion of which light consisteth, md the triangular spaca between them through which the smallest IIId most subtle .triated mailer passes, yet not.... ithstmding it ,,'oold not reach to the essential profundity either of body or sphcrical ness, or triangularity, .... hich nothing but the subtle sharpnC5S (.. , ....,) of the mind can penetrate into, SO as to romp~hcnd the immutable reason (rMio) of an y of them, And therefore it is rightly pronounced b y that .~cellent restorer of the old atomical and Moschical philosophy, That ."en bod ies Ih ...... ],-es.rc nIX proptrly pcrrnvnl b)' the SCfIse:< or by th. imarination, bUI b)' tM understanding alone; nor arc th.",f..... p",c.ivnl b.c>us. th.y aK !t>ulid comp~hcnd it. BUI knowl.dge and intellcction doth not merdy look 0111 (jrtl,piuu) upon a thing al • distance, bUI mol<es an inward "

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rdkction upon the thing it knows, and alWrding!o the etymon of the word, Ihe intellect (illulkmu) doth read inward characters ... nnen wilhin i!$elf (u. u.ltri~rib/U kXfft), and intellectually OOtnpuhend ilS object within itself, and is the saJTIf: .... ilh it. For though this may be conceived 10 be true of individual things known (although the mind understands them also under abstne! nOlions of illl own) yet at least in Arim>tlc'li seme, it is unquestionably true, 'In abstraet things themselves', which are t~ primary obiects of scienoe, 'the intellect and the thin, known are really one and the same'.1l For those ideas or objects of intellectioo are nothin!!" doc but Ihe modifications of the mind i!$elf. Dut sense is tlut which is without (al<1lhtal>: toil £.:'«1), sense wbolly puo and pds abroad, and therefore doth no! know and comprehend itA object, b«:ause it is different from it. 'Sense is a line, the mind is a circle.''' Sense is like a line which is the f1ul ofa point runnin!!" oul from itself, but intellect like a circle thot keeps wilhin iw:lf. 5. Sense apprdlends individual bodies without by IOmethin!!" derived from them and SO • IOlln'iori, 'The senses being WI arc the images of the thinp,.I S The sensible ideas of things are bUI umbr.ltile and evanid images of the sensible thinp like shadow. projecled from them; bUI knowledge is a comprehension of a thin!!" proleptically, and as it ,,'ere,' prWri. But now, to lay aside metaphysics, and speak plainly, all that .... hich comes from the individ ual object of sense from witoout (as we lu"e already declared) is nothing at all but local motion or pressure, when an enli\-ened body is inned nr thruSt upon by ~ mher body wilhoul. BUIIO receive or fecI a jog", knock, or thru§! from withoul made upon Ihe body which Ihe soul is uniled 10, this is nIH 10 know, no nol so much as what local rnlHion is, much less 10 know all mher things. For knowledge i. not a knock or thrust from witoout, but it romISlelh in the aWllkening and uciting of the in,,-anI active powe .... of the mind. 6. This poinl which I luve hitherto insisted upon concerning the slullowncss, dullness, and blunrncss of sense, in thai il cannol pcnetnte 10 the essences of things, is very ingeniousl y and philosophic:aUy hand led by Plato, in his T,"UItIIU, where he dcmonstntes against Prougons, that science is not senK, bue tlut there is anmher power in "

'£<.1 (pO')"O.o1 '''''"~ .... ....,. ,~ .... 'JOO5~

'; "lotio .. " r~ .. ~oj

/m-, nl - . Koi'~ _ •.,'•• .... , (....-... Ll< .....

ow; .......... ~ PIoo..... c-u.. " .;.7.1 and ' .";;.(1.. '0.

, 7....,... ........ ofo'i: ,,, ........... Compo .. E_......

,.,"I-,..

60

'I'

ate

the soul besides that of scosc or passion, to which scientc', knowJcdge, and intellection is to be referred after this manner, Fim, ~ta obeains this from ll~IJ(I(IW, that scnsc i. when the soul, by or through several organs of the body, rakes wgnizantc' of corporeal things without . And se<:ofIdly, that ooe serue or orpnical pelixprion canna( We cognizantc' of the object of anoth~, as sight cannot sec sounds, nor the hearing hear ~ght and colours. And therefore, where we think of the objects of sever3J senses comparing them together, and considering of some things common to them all, this cannot be sense or orpnical pcloeprion, be<:ause one sense annot consider the object of another sensc, 'If :any thing contc'ms both, it cannot percei.·e it by either organ.'l. As ..·heo we coosider sound :and colour together II once, :and attribute sevcnlthings to them in common, as, fint of all essence, and then that in each of them is identity with itsclf, and diversity to the other, that both of them,.,.., two :and each of them one; that they arc: oot like but unlike to one another. What 5Cn5C or organ is there by which the soul pc=ives all these things., viz. essence :and non-ascnce, identity, diversity, unity, duality, similitude, dissimilitude, things common both 10 sound and colour? Surely it cannot be neither by the senses of sight or of hearing, be<:ausc these cannot consider one anotl>.r's objects. Neither can we find any other organ in the body by which the soul nuy passively W e cognizance of all these things, :and consider the objects of both those other scnses of sight and hearing. Wllercby he nukes Thcactetus confess that these things the soul doth nOl organially perttive by an y sense, but by itself alone witt.out any bodily orpn. And therc:fore, 'Some things the soul perceives by itself, or by its own active po .... CT',17 as essence, similitude, dissimilitude, identity, alterity, p><>d and evil, honest and dishonest. Other things it perceives by and through the orpn. of the body: as for example:, by the sense of loucb the soul percci~es nDlhing but the hardness ofthlt which is hard, and the softness of that which is soft, and the like. But essence, and what hardness and softness is, and their contrariety to one another, and again, the CSSCTlce of contrariety itself, the soul alone by itself discoursing endeavours to judl{C of. Wherefore there is this difference " f1" yo •

~.;,n/pw> 6tto .... <>i« ~ . . . '" ,.0 ........ ~ oIrii_ 4. (.........

_""5-<1,

" T. ~.,;q.. "'. ,..;,;); l""ll"'ri> b""KD""". ,. oIi ,o..,~ .....'''' """""""" (.........

n,u",,,, "1').

6.

'I'

ate

Ixfw«n those Ihings Ihal rome: into lilt &QuI by Ihe passion& of Ihe body, and thQ5( things Ihat aris<: from lhe ntiocinO!ive power of the soul i[«lf.

""t both men and bcws do n.atunlly pe.cei"e .. lOOn .. they

he born u..... things that"""'" into the: _I by the paS<;""s of the body. But n tiocinations "",cemin! these things .. to the natu .... Ind ..... nces of them, ond !hei, urilitia, are llowly by labour and help or inotitution a".in
Now, that which dOlh not ruch 10 th essence of anyth in g, cannot meh trut h or knowledge. Wh=ro~, he concludes thaI th= ;. no kno .... dg. or scion« in pusion. but in th. discou .... of the mind upon them. ror in {his Ian • • way it is possible to reach to !he ....... "" and tl'Uth or thinp, but imp<>i<Sib .. in the f"""",,,

And tho! we oughl not to .... k kno .... dge ""y mo,.., in ......., but in th1t of the 5Oul, .. h.atsOC"tt it he called, " 'hich doth alon<: by inc:lf ""'t<mplate th inp th.at a,.." ..

Chapter

{V

I. But I have still something more 10 add concerning this ill"gutnent befo~ Tdililttiss it . Wherefore in the nexl place:, I shall mab il funhe. appear, that sense is nO{ science or inl.lI~ion, because the $(luI by sen .. doth not percein Ihe things lhelTlUl,''''', or the absolute narur"" of Ihem, bUI only her own passions from them. Thi& &xtus the philosopher took notice of: 'The 5m!it'S do nOt reach 10 the obittts that an plaoxd without bullO their own passions alone.oM And this is that which " 111 "'" _

,"' ,.'0;

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,",1"'''''''''' .......

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- a. _ !tw. 11<11 .....,.,..,...,""..,. ,~ &,,'" tb,l.,

*..,.

79,

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dr, """

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6,

HIIr!

Prougoru M much insisted on, that all our sensible ideas (ra aioOt,ra) afligllf and colouB, IiIHJndli, odouT'li, sapan, heat and cold, and the like, are 1'10'1 absolute but relative things. For neither ,s ..ensarion (aToOt,OIC) any thing of the MU] considered absolutely in ,tself: ,t being no pure and sincere cogit:uion of the soul alone, neither is the ..ensib!e idea (n; a/"ihtrov) any absolute quality of the object without, but both th= (viz. sense and sensible) are amin middle thiogs begoI:ten betwixt the agent and the patient, and resulting from the activity of the object without and the passion of the mind withio and se ,·eraUy respecting each of them. Or, as he expressed it, F""" the congrns or collision of these '''·0 toreth .... a", generated at once both ........, and the ...... ib\e. For the scnsible (fonnally considered, occonliflg I<> that 'd.. !h.t ".., h.... of it) halh no ""Istence btof\), • ....... rion, but is bcgoll"" with it."

And therefore, 'Colour and the rest is neither an)"thing in the Mul itself, but a middle thing betwixt both',2l that ,s a passioo. Which is the ,·ery same with that which Aristode imputes to 'he ancient physiologers as a paradox, that hlack and white were n<M without the sight. The truth of which iii so evident in SOme instances, that none can possibly gainsay it . For when the body is either pricked with a n~dle or wounded with • sword, no nun can im.gine that those paimi that result from thence were such real and .bsolute qualities existing in the needk or sword before our sensation, hut that they are OUr own passions, and so relati ,·e things to us, or perceptions of the motions of the needle or Iword relati,·ely to the enlivened body, and as they are hunfuJ to it . And the same is vuJprly acknowledged in those coloun that are therefore called fantaStical, as in the .,.;nbo...· (im) and the prism, whereas in reality all rolours are as fanwtical as the ooloun of the "';nbow, and the coloun of the "';nbow as real as any other. And it is likewise true of the <Mher proper objects of the se'·eral scrues. For as 5exlU5 the philosopher obu;,." .., ' Honey not the same thing with my being .wectcncd, nor wormwood the same with my ha,·ing sense ofbillemcss.,ll That whi,h

'$

" .& (_1 ' .... ,_.,;;",; .. ~ , ,..,""'" IlpIJi; 4W,"" ,;r-... (·..1'A .... oIog",ol •. ~ do .... 0' .,,,: ...... ,",icIo ... <>I - . ...... in _ . .,., ............ _ ""pi"""..... ,.....bido ;. impios
6,

'I'

ate

we know by Soense concerning honey and wormwood, is Qnly mat our taste is so affected from than. But what absolute mode or disposition of parts in them [which] causes these different sensations in us, bekmp 10 IKMtlC olhef" faculty of the soul to discover. And hence it comes 10 pass, that though the natures or tsSCnces of things be simpk, yer one and the same thing perceived by ou r se,·enJ senses begetS se'·eral pusions and phanta5m5 in U$. Flame, which is norhing bur a ,;oleOl agitltion of the small panicles of a body by the rapid subtle: matter; the sarno< fT1
'''"P

from .. hal il ...... lhen il ~'U quite another Wk than formerly, for it .... , .... to a very different patient. Q!lile diffcrmt thinp an: pTOdw:ed by the person ond ,he drinking of II>< wiM. Rapcc1ing the 1O
'J_',.".

,. -Qt•• {oIil - - -'_ ~ I"" [ ... ·"'..1ni 1.......· (.. .J.£-,<. it , rY oIj {. . ·1 ,~ '" _ _ """ ~ -I'>' , ........,..; n: •• ~" ..... Iv\ ' .... AA4>O<..,..

.(.oi",...

When:fon since by sense the soul dOlI! not pl'rco:i,"c oorporeal obj<:<:ts as they Ire truly, really. and abs.Jlutely in tl\cm5Ch"cs, but under some: fanwtical «t'rao:nlOlion. and dt.!Ui.u, ..,n.., canl1{){ be knowledge, which oomprehends a thing as it is. And indeed if the soul had no ocher power in it bo,u only this of possion or sensation (as Protagoras suppo;>:SCd), then there could be no such thing al all as any absolute truth (IT knowledge. BUI that hypothesis of his, as we have a1rndy showed, plainly OOntndicts and confutes itself. FOT that which pronounces WI our sensible ideas of things ~ fantulical and relative, must n...ds M somc1hing in US superior to sen"', that is, nO{ relative or

r""tastical,

bUI

that judges what rally md absolutely is and is not.

l . BUI w strike this buriness horm, I sllall in the Ills! place funher observe that sense <=no! be knowledge, nor the certainty of a11thinp ultimately resolvable imo sense, as m:my men beside: Protagoras conceil"C, for this reason, becauSt: the nature of ieI\S( consists in noching elK but men: Sttming or appeannce. This _ intimated before in that de6nition that "'-e gave of Ile'nlle', thn is a passion or affection (iv up OoKfiv Or iv rfj! ¢aivwOas) in me soul whereby it RmUi to pcraive some corporeal things existing. That is, sense is when the soul is so affected as ifmere were such a corporeal thing existing. So mat all me reality mat is Il......suil}· required to Ile'nlle' is only this., that there be rcallya passion in the lOul, nr that the lOul be rcally so affected as if there wue such a thing. That is., thot it ha"e rcally such a """"'ing or appearance, but not thot the thing . ... lIy be, as it appeaR. For as to a thing's being such or such, its hl,;ng such a mode Or quality, "'-e have already demonstrated by reason, that in this respect most of our sensible ideas are fantastical things. And the same may be evinced and made evident also by senile' itself. For it is as true and real a sensation when a man looking upon a staff mat is partly in the air, and partly in me WIICT, sees it crooked (though it be really straight), as when he looks upon it all in me air, and sc:es it straight as =lly it is. For we an: as Teally affected

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thr~.r"';'q . n

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and there is as much a S«IIling in one as in the otOO. And innumenble instantts might bC' given in this kind, to pro'·c thaI as to thinp bC'inll" such or such, the~ is no other truth or =Iily necessarily requi~d in sensation, but only tbat of appeannce. Buttbis is nOl: :all, for I sh.tll observe in the nUl pl~ Ihatthe~ is not so much as tbe reality of boing or exi",en~ of the obiect necessarily Tequi~ to senAOOn, buttbe~ may bo a true sensation, though there bC' no object at all really existing without the 5OIJ1. A known IUld appro,·ed instance whereof"", han in th"", thOl, after they had tbeir arms and legs cut off, ha'l1: boen sensible, .... ben they .... ere awake, of a slrong violenl pain in their fingen and toes, tllough really mer had no such members. And .... e have all constant experience of the same in our drnms, whicb are as true ..,nsations, as th"", which we have when ....e are awake, and .... hen the objects are reall)· existent without us. Bcc:ouse thc soul is as really affccted, and hatb as lively imal{CS, ideas, and phantasms of sensible Ihings as nistenl [things] thm, as whm .... e are awake, and many limes is really sensible of ,·iolenl IUld exquisite pain, which is a real sense, though it be but a fantasli""l thing, and immedialely ,·anish .......... y Upor1 Our awakening. Becousc there " .... nothing =lIy in the body, that by Ihe motions of the OCrvCS could beget a real pain. 3. Now the reason of this, that the soul may be passively affected in Ibis msnncr, wben there iii no object al all =lIy uisting witbout iI, is from hena:: because b)· §IOnse the 5OIJ1 dotb not suffer immedialdy from Ibe objects them..,lvcs, but onl)" from its own body, by reason oftha! narural and vital sympalh y whicb it hath with ii, neilher dOlb it suffer from its own bod)" in every pan of iI, or from tbe OUtward organs of sense immediatdy - as from the eye when We sec, Ihc tongue ,,·hen "'e taste, or the exterior parts of the body wben we fed, bUI only in tbe bnin, or from me motions of the spirits tbere.l1 But so as that it doth not uke immediate cognizance of those ,·cry motions immediately •• they are in thernsd,'cs, but by thc S«rct inlitinct of nature doth by means of Ihem uke cognizance of those corporeal things existing without us, from whence the origin:al of the motion C(lmcs: as for eurnplc of the litars tmat are so vastly distanl when we look upon the heavens. Wbence;t coma; to pus tbat iftbat body from which tbe soul immediately suffers, and that is the .pirits in tbe brain, be so mo"cd as " o.mp... D .............. , . I.')! ' •• P.... .. _ .... '1Io1[ c..d_ «
(CS.\\ ~ ',,"_J.

aT...rr..!

it would be mo~ed by the ne.,-es .... hen any out ....ard obj«u make their se:~eral imprnsions upon the organs of se:nse:, the soul must neab ha~e the same passions, affectiom, and sensations in it, as if the objcl;l5 ""n: really existing without. No .... this may ~ to pas:< either by the fonuitous motions or agitations of the spirits themselves, casually falling into the same figurations, that tbe motions of the ner~es .... nuld imp,ess upon them from some outw:aro objects, or else: by the spirits rushing against certain printo, traces, or marks in the brain made by fOlTlCr sensation. when we ....ere awake, .... hereby their motions an: determined. Or, lastly, by the fantwical power of the soul itself, .... hich as it suf:"ers from the body, so it can liltwise ace upon it, and according to our customary actions or inward affections, inclinations, or desi res may move the spirits variously, and bc¥t di,-ers phmtasms in us. And that dn::ams are ..... ny times thus begQuen or excited by the fantastical power of the soul in itself, is evident from the orderly connection and coherence of imaginations, .... hich many limes are continued in a long chain or series; ..-ith the fiction of interlocutory disrouTSCll and dialogues consisting of apt answers and replies made interclu.ngcably to one anOll>er, and contain such thingli as ne"cr "en: befon: printed upon the brain in such a series or order. Which therefon: could no{ proceed either from the fonuitous dancings or liuMullllti:ll1S of the spirits, or from the determination of their motion, by antecedent prints or tnces made by former sensationli in the substance orthe brain. of. And the dre:ams that we ha"e in our sleep are really the same kind of things ...·jth those imaginations that .... e hive many times when we are a"''lIIke, when tile fancy, being nOl comlTWlded or determined by the will, ro,'es and ....anders and runli at random, and spins out a lnng th read or concatenated se:ries of imaginations or phantasms nf corporeal things, quite different from those things .... hich our out ...... d sc:nses at the Arne time take norice of. And some persons then: are to whom these waling dreams are vcry ordinary and f.m il iar. And there i$ linle doubt to be made but if ...... n should suddenly fall asleep in the midst of one of these ..-a1
,.

Whereas these imaginations that we ha" e of individual rorporeal things .. hen ..e all' awake, and our outward smlit:ll employed upon their sevm objects, do lIOI!;et:m to be sensations oflhings ruJly uisting and pr~nt as Our drums do, but (O be certain faint, cnnid, shado"),, and umbrarile thinp in comparison of those ... nsations which we ha"e at the same time with then when we awake, that is, !Wt as things ex'Slent without us, but as our own cogitations. The reason whereof is, beau... tllough they be both of the Ame kind, yet th""" motion. of the spirits wh ich all' caused by the nenu, from the objects ,,·;thou! when we are .wake, being more vig(lTOul, durable, conSlant, and pre'1Iient, do naturally obscure or extinguish those OI:hcr weaker phanla!im. or imaginations which we have at the same time. And reason interposing, brings in its vmlict for tllose stron~r phantasmli also whose objects are durable and pelll"\allent, by means whereof the iaue, only seem to be real sensations, the former counterfeit and ficlitious imaginations or mere picture and landscape in the soul. And this Aristotle long agn obsc:r¥ed in this manner:

=

In tho: d.y they are shut <>lit and disappn •• tho: oenses and undt:ntanding ...... kin ....... ~ ~,. is ma
'0

an:.,

In the day-rime when we are a"'1Ike, those more fleeting &ncies and imaginations which proceed !Wt from the motinns of the nerves callSCd by the objects ""ithout must needs yicld and gi"e place:, as being harned and confuted by those stronger, more durable and lasting motions that come from the nerves, caused by permanent obiecrs. reason also carrying it clearly for Ihe latter, by means whereof the former cannot appear as real things or """,,"lions. But when we are asleep, the"AlRC' phmtasms and imaginations are more strong, vivid, and lively. beau... lhe nerves are relaxated , there are often no motions transmined by them from the outward objects inlo the brain, to confound those !lXJ(ions of the spirits within, and disrract the soul's anemion to them. JUSt as the same loudness of a voice in a sriU evening will be hcard a great dtal further and clearer, than in the day-rime ...·1Ien the air is ,gialed wilh ..

}.II~. iu...,... ....... ~ , .... ok ~i' .... n ; ,ok _ ....... w ~.;c......... ....... ...,.. ~... """ u., ..... q j ....... ...; ~ ~IK"; .pqjl.oi;. ••""1/ ' .... ,
"'",.J.«a nI "''''""''" r," '

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many conlrary motions crossing and confounding one anolher. But 0010' there are no OIher motions of Ihe spirits besides these which cause d=ms to compare ...·ith IlIem, an d disgrace them, or PUI them OUt of countenance, and, as it "·ere, by their louder noise and clamours, so 10 pcmss I~ animadven;ve put of the SO\l!, that tht weaka- murmun of the olhcr cannot <>buin to be heard, as il is when .... e are a....ake, or in the day-time. And themore in sleep the mind naturally admits these phantasms as sensations, there appearing nOne other to contradict tlll1 verdict. s. When:fore, phantasms an d sensible ideas are =lIy or materially the s:arM thing, .... hicll Aristotlc intimates, affirming tllal fancy is a weak kind of se~ (f/Javruoiu is aiofhtoir; nr; do6~,*) and tllat phantasms are as sensation. (f/JavrMpata are oia uloOJipumj." For both phantums and 5CTIsation. are passions or sufferings in the soul from the body. And yet notwilhstanding e..ery pllamasm d011l nO'! seem 10 be a corporeal Ihing realJy existing .... i,houl Ihe soul, as a imSation (uTolhtIlO) doth. Wherefore Ihere arc 1....0 cases in which a phan tasm doth n1H Kem to be a sensation. First ...·hen a phanlasm is raised Or excited purposely and ,·(,]untarily, by the Imre imperium, command, or empire of O\Ir own will, as by experience we find il often is. For il is in O\Ir po .... er 10 fancy what corporeal thing or person (formerly known to us) .... e please, though ;1 be absenl from us. Nay, and to compound such things as we never saw before, as a golden mountain, a centaur, a chimera.. Now in th is ClSI:, when Ihe soul is conscious to itself; that Ihese phantasms arc arbitrarily raised by it, or by its own activity, il cannot look upon them as sensations, Or things really existing without itsoC lf, bUI only as evanid im;IJes, pictures and Ildumbmions of Ihings w;lhin itself. And sucll phantasms as thc:sc: do usually KWmpany most of our OIha- cogitationl. Wherefore phantasms (P';QII/_Q/Q) do nn! seem to be sensations or pem:ptio"" of things as really existing ...;thoul the soul, when they are volunwy, or when the soul is ;n ....ardly conscious Ihal they arc raised up by 1($ own llCIivity. Snxmdly, neither doth cvery in volun tary phantasm, or luch II Ihe soul is not conscious 10 itself to MVC purposely excited or nised up within itself, 5eeITI to be a sensalion or pe=plion of the thing as cristing without us. For lhere may be straggling phantasms which come into the

'I'

ate

mind "'e know noc how and bubble up ofthemseh'es, which )'el the soul may distin,uish from sensalKms or IloeI\%PtionS of things as existing rally without it, because of some other phantasms the s:ame time in the soul, whose vigoun and lustre do clood and eclipse them.. for when the"" are phantasrT15 of se"eral kinds at the s:ame time in the soul, or such as arise from different motion. of the spirits, the soul silently com!»ring both IOgethn naturally looks upon Ihe more vigorous, Siron" and pamanent of those phantasms only as real existences, but the more faint, flining, and transitory, as iINginary things. Now there arc Iwo kind. of involuntary pmnlasms, as I hU'e alrudy inlimalro , in the soul when we are a.... ke. One thaI proceeds from such motion. of the spirits as are olJS(d by the nnves ffiO"ed from the obiects without Another that proceeds from Ihe spirits of Ihe brain, otherwiso: moved Ihan by Ihe ner.·es. And the""fore ilt VWfu., when we are arue, and have phantasms that arise from lhe mOlian. orthe neT'l<:S causnl by the obicw wilhout, appearing "ery diffcn:nt from lhose mher phantasms Ihal arise from the spirits olherwise moved than by the nerves, both in Iespu::t of their vigour and consrancy, do thercfore 10 aU such persons, as arc not dinempercd cither in body or in mind, naturally seem 10 be real, or things existing without the soul, but the latter iINginary. Whereas in sleep, when lhe nen'es bein, reb u ted, mmmunicalC no mIltion 10 lhe spirits, the "ery same phantasms (there being now no olhn and sO'Onger to compare ",jlh Ihem and discredit or disgrace them) do naturally appear to the soul as sensations of things really exisling without the soul. 6. No .... the lrulh oflhis maIle r dOlh evidently appear from hence, in Ihal by reason of some disease either of body or mind, men's spirits may be IiO furiously, violendy, and ,",onpy agit:lled tml th"", phanlOrT15 which do not arise from the motion of the nerves, being mosl prevalent and predominant, e\'tn when they are aW
,. 'VI

ate

baffle and confule imaginations and fancy, that is, those: phantasms thaI arise from Ihe spirits othu wisc moved Ihan by Ihe nel"'CS, SO likewise imaginations growing wild, rampant, md exorbi(ant, may in 1M same manner baflk and confute all our &en ..... 7. Which exorbitanc)' of fmcy or imaginalion pre"ailing o\"er ocnse, Or those phan tasms which arise fonn the morian conununicaled to tm brain from Ihe objects wilbout by tM nen'es, may either procttd originally from IiOfI1C distaSC: in the body, when:by Ihe animal spirits ~ing furiously he,ued and agitated may ~ carn..d wilh so pat. force: and career, as th.1 the motions caused from 'he obiters by the nerves ~ing weakened, may yidd md give pl.", to them, and their phmtasms be in a manner siknt vmquist.ed md obliter.lted by Ihem. Thosc: SITOIIger ph.ntasms tha! ari..., from lhe agil;u)on of Ihe spirits Ihrnl...,h·es., POS- iSing the place of them, the affection or .nimadversion of Ihe .....1 being ab....y. " '011 by Il\osc: phmtasms that make the loude!lt no;"", or have the gn:'at""t vigour. Or else .he same .hing may plOCtOt permitting the soul to .uIT.r from, or ~ passi". to the action of the objects: upon it, nor '1uiet\y to recci"e the impressions of them, witllaut ruffling and confounding them. And this is th., sad md lamentable condition ,hat Ih. soul of man is liable and obl>Oxious to, by its o\"crmuch indulgm<:e to that pass;". and irrational and corporeal part in which the affections, appetites, and desires ~ seated - a condition which, if it contin ue 0.1 ..... )"5, is worse: thm death il$Clf, or perfect annihilation. To ha'·. not only n:ason dtgnded and dethroned, but "'en sense itself pen·etted or extinguished, and in the room thermf boistcrollS phantasms protruded from the irrational appetites, passions, and affections (now grown monstrous and enor_ mous) to becotm 'he "ery sensations ofir, by means whereofit is easy 10 conoo\"e that 'he divine "engeancc (nemesis) may make Ihe &Qui its own tormentor, though thet"C wet"C no orher hdl without it, not only by

,. 'I'

ate

",pres.enting mo&t Joamsomc: and affri,htful, dismal, and tragical """ Li es of minp to i!Self, but also by cruciating i!Self with exquisite and oensiblc pains. And the RnouS oonsidemion hereof should make us very CI.",ful how we let the reins loose to that passive irntional pIn of Our soul which knoW!! no bounds nor measures, lest thereby we unawarea prropiute and plun~ ourselves headlon, into the most Ad and deplorable condition that is imaginable. 8. I shall not discourse here of that po"'er also which evil !>pirits ose that have eimer mancipated them§clves into them, or otherwise forfeited that ordinary protection which divine providena: commonly affordem tQ all, by acting immediately upon the .pirits of the brain, and thereby endeavour to !;ive an account of those phenomena of wizards and ",itclln ~ulgarly tall;«I or, their Keming transportations in the air, nocturnal ronventides and jun keting&, and odM:r such like things, u seem plainly rontradictious and irreroocilablc to philosophy.lS But we have already J;Oi.d enough to prove that Rnse is nothing but IIttming appearance. And therefore we can ha\"e no a:nainty by sen§c alooe eimer coneeming the absolute naturea of individual corporeal thinp without us, nor indeed of their existence. But all the assurance that we have thereof arises from reason and intcll«t judging of the phantasms of appearanoe:s of §Cn..:, and determining in which of mem there is an absolute reality, and which of them are but me",ly relative Dr fantaStical . .. H• .-... ..... _pho _ _ _ .... "'... iowir
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Book

IV

Chapler I I. Having hirh~rro showed IMrsen"" or passion from corporeal thinp exislenl "ithoul the soul ill nO!: inlellection Or knowledge, SO IMI bodies Ihemsel" 6 an nOI kno"" or understood by sense, il must needs follow from hence that knowledge is an inward and active energy of the mind iw:lf, and the dillpbying of its own inruol~ ,igour from within, wheTeby il doth conquCT (Kpouiv). masler. and command its ob;ecu. and 50 begetS a clear, senne, victorious, and satisfactory sense wilhin iw:lf. Whm:fon though it be vulgarly conceived thot kno,.-Iedge :arises from Ihe force of Ihe rhing known ,cling upon thaI which kno ..'s from without, yel contrariwise il ill most cemin, 10 UK Bocthius' "pression, that inrd1enion and knowledre do nol arise (rom 1M fOftt and acti",;'y of !he thing known from w;rhour. upon thar which knows. bul from the innrd po"""'. """"r and O
it,'

So tha, knnwkdlJ" i. n<>t. pas
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mind, displaying i!Self from within, and the imelligible fonns by .... hich things are understood or known are not stamps or impressions pass;'·ely primed upon the liOul from witoout, but ideas ,·itally protended or .eli,·ely exerted from wilhin i!Self. ~ . A Ihing which is merely passive from Wilhoul, :and ( .. hieh] doth only rreei..., foreign :and ,uh·cnlilious forms, cannot J>OO5ibly know, understand, Or judgc of Ihill which il rreeins bUI must n..,ds be a strangcr 10 ii, having nothing wilhin itself 10 know il by. The mind annOI kno .... :an ylhing, but by SQrnelhing of its o .... n, Ihat is native, d<>mesIK:,:and familiar to il. "''hen in a great throng Or cro ....d of people, a man looking round about, ......,15 with innumc ... ble Sll":l.nl!" f~ IhOi he neyer sa,,· before in all hi. life :and at 1""1 ch:anccslo espy the f:ace of one old friend or acquaintance, which he had not !ittn or thought of nuny y~ before, he would be said in Ihis """" to h..·c known Ihat one, and only that one face in aU thOi cum",ny, because he had no in""rd previous or anticip.ucd form of any other face, that he looked upon in his mind. BUI U soon as ever he beheld that one face, immcdilltc1y lhere re,;ved and started forth a former anliei",lcd form or idu of il treasured up in his mind, thOl, os il "·ere laking acquainlance .... ilh rhat newly ~ved form, made him know it or remember it. So when foreign, '!nIlge, and adventitious forms arc exhibited to the mind by sense, the liOul cannox oxheT'o\;se know Or understand them, but by something domestic of its own, some active :ant,ci",tion or prolepsis ..;thin itself, that occasionally revi,;ng and meeling ...·ith iI, makes it kno ..· it or take acquaintance .... ith il . And this ;s Ihe only true and allowable sense of that old assertion, that knowledg<: is reminiscence, I not Ihat it is the rememb ... nce of something which the liOul had some time before actually known in a prc-existent state, but because it is the mind's cotnprcllending of things by &OmC in ..-ard anticipolions of its o .... n, SQmet:hing nOlive and d<>meslic [0 ,t, or IiOmcthing acriycly e xerted from within itself. And thus Plotinus, when he coda,·ours to pro'·e that the irnnM:diate objects of knowledge and imclltttion arC not things ,

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".

,. 'I'

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withom th~ mind .<:ring upon ;t .t a distance, but contained and comprehended ..ithin the mind itself, Other"A_ how should the mind know ,IT judg<' when it Iud ,.,.1Iy IWrehend
""'" ,II o;ai I ~ : '

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o;ai ~ l{.. o;ai'; 4Lj !I", /',d (1'Iooinus, ~ ., . " , >t-J ) ~

'I'

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objective idea or con~ption of SOIDelhin, kno ...." included in iI, or Ihal the intellection (vOI/O,';) should be in one &culty, and the con<:eplion (>'6,,~a) in another, OI1e in Ihe intellect:, and the other in lhe fancy. That knowledge shoold be actively produ~d from ...·ilhin. and the conception or objecti'·e idea passively recei,·ed from without, that the mind shwld exe" an.ct: ofkno .... ledge or intelkct:ion without an object, or upon an ob;ea without i_If, and not compn::hended by it, that the idea of the thin, known should n.oI be compKhwded in Ihe kno .... ledge of it. W~rns, as Aristotle hi~lf Iuth obse ..·ed, ' Acrual knowledge is in realilY the Iial1"Ioe with I~ thing kno .... n, or the idea of it': and therefore insepanble: from it. It heing nothing but the mind's being conscious of some intel~giblc: idea within itself. 4. And t~rd"OK, whueas the only objects of sense are individual corporeal things aisting ...-ithoul t~ mind, which the soul percei,·es by looking OUt from itself upon Ih.1 from whil:h it suffers, not actively compKhended within itself; the primary and immediate objew of intellection and knowledge, an' not things existing wilhout the mind, but ideal of t~ mind i_If activel y aened, that is the intdligible: rnsonl (.4/U1...-s) of things. 'The in~lleclion is nol of what ;....·ithout, as sense is.' And 'the immediate objects of in~ll«tion oK not without the mind that understands'.! 1lley an' assertions Ihat PIOlinus al large demonstrates. And Arililotle frequently asserts the s:amo:: 'In abstracted things thaI .... hich understand. and tlut ...·hich is unde ... tood an' the s:amo:',6 for Ihe theoretial science and the kno ..... ble: (Kihil~) or ob;ea of knowledge are all OI1e.7 And 'Ihe mind altogether is that which understands things'." Thc:sc being all but several modifications of intelled. For as hard and SO", hIM and cold, and the like corpoTelI qualities aK but several modifications of maner, so the several objective ideal of t~ mind in scientifial specul.ation an' but se,·eral modifications of the mind knowing. Whffefore individual things aisling without the '-'luI, are but the secondary objects of knowledge and intellection, ...·hich [~ mind unden;W1ds oot hy Iookiog out from itself OS sense doth, but by •

, ,

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reflecting inwardly upon itself and comprehendin~ them under those inteUigible ideas or reasonings (r..I;" ..... ) of its own, which it prolTUdcs from within itself. So that the mind or intellect may well be caJled (though in another sense than Prot:l.goru meant il) 'the measure of all things' (TO pirpo~ I'!tivrwv) , s. For tke soul having an innate cognosciti~e po~r unin naUy (which is nmhiog else but a pow"r of raising objective ideas .. ithin itself; and intelligible reasons of any thin!!") it must need. be IfJ"Inr..
a_ .......

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n 'VI

ate

Knse is in perceiving that which is exettdingly sensibt.. (<1"'oopa aio/l1rrov),'o as the brighrness of the 5un; but contr.ariwise the more invigorated Ihel"(by, and thc better enabled to compl"(hend lesser and smaller tnlthS; beau"" though KnK is passion and organical, yet knowledge is inorganical and an iIClivc power and strength of the mind, which the I1'lOIl' it is exerted, iii the mol"( thereby invigorated and enlarged. From hence likewise it is, as the IiamC Aristoo:le hath observed, 'ThaI thoK knowledges which al"( mOl"( abstract and I"(mote from matter, are mOl"( accurate, intel~gible, and demonstrable, than th""", "'h ieb are oon,"ersant about concrete and material things, as arithmetic than harmonics',11 which arC numben conCI"(IC .... ith sounds; and so likewise geometry than astronomy, or the mixed mathematics. Whereas if an knowledge did arise from oorporcal things by way of sense and passion, il must needs be COIlmri"ise [rIlC, that thc mOl"( concretc and sensible things were, the more knowable they would be. Mo~ver, from hence it is also as experience tells us, Ihat scienritical knowledge is best acquired by Ihe soul'. abslraction from Ihe outward objects of sense:, and retiring into it<elf,lZ ,hat so it may the better attend to its own inward notions and ideas. And therefore it is many limes observed, that ovcr-much I"(ading and bearing of ocher men's discourses, thougb lnmed and elaborate, doth not only distract the mind, but also debilitates the intellectual powers, and males the mind passI"e and sluggish, by calling it 100 much ou\lO--ards. For which cause that Wlsc philosopber Socrates altogethcr shunned that dictating and dogmatical ,,-ay of teaching usal by tbe sophisters of that age and ehose rather an aporetical and obstctricious method. Becau"" knowledge was noo: to be poured into the soul like liquor, bUI rather to be invited and gendy drawn forth from it; nor the mind so much to be tilled therewith from ,,;thout, ~ke ;l >'CSI'I:1, as to be kindled and awakened. Ludy, from hence is that strange parturiency that is often observed in the mind, when il is solicitously oct upon the in"""tigation of SOme [rIlth, whereby it doo:h

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,8

'VI

ate

cndea~our,

by ruminating and revol~ing within it~lf as it ,"'ere to conceivc it within itself, to bring ;t (onh out of;B own ""omb (jkorlurirt). By which it is c"idenl, that the mind is naturall y con!icious of its own acD"C fecundity, and al.., that ;t hath a mtcrion within i~lf, which will enable;t to kllOw when it hath found that "'hid, it sought. 7. When:fore it is evident from whot we ha"e dedarcd. thl tlKre are two kinds of perceptive cogitations in the soul: thc One passive when the soul ptr"CC'ives by ~uffcring from it. body. and the objects without; the other activc, when it percei,'''' by excning its own nati,'c "igour from within itself. The passi"e perccption. of the soul ha"e two ~"cnl name-; gi~ UItfO them. For when Ihe soul, by symp>thizing ,,;th the body, seems to perceive corporeal things, as prestnt and rcally existing witbout it, then the)" are ailed sensations (aiuOri/lara). But when the passin afftaion. of Ihe soul are Iookw upon nOI as things really existing without Ihe mind, bU I only as pictures of sensible thin]{S in the mind, or more crass or corporeal cogitalions, then Ihey arc called phantasms (,pavtM/oIara) or imaginations. But these phantasms and iCltsarions being =ll y Ihe same thin]{S, as " 'e ... id before, both of them being passions or afftnions in lhe 50\11, cau~d by SOme local motions in the body. and the difference bctwttlt them being only accidental. insomuch thot phantasms may be: changw into iCltsarions. and sometimes also sensalions into phantaSms, Ihcrcforc allthc:sc passi,'c perccptions of Ihe soul may be: called in general phanwms (4'avtaopara). But the Icti"e pcrccptions "'hich ri.., from the mind it..,lf without the body, are commonly ailed cona:plions of thc mind (V()~/lara). And so we have the !'1m species of pcm:pti"e cogit:ltions. the one phanwms and Ihe other conceptions of the mind. S. Now Ihat all Our pcrccpti"e cogit:l1ions are not ph.ntasms, as many contend. but Ihlt then: is another species of perccpti,'c cogit:llions distilKl from them, arising from tile acti"e vigour of the mind itself, which we thercforc call conceptions of the mind, i. dcmonsuably cvidml from hence; because phantosJru are nothing else: but sensible ideos, images o. pictures of out" ",rd obiccts, such as .re cau""d in the soul by sense. Whence it (0110,,'5, Ih>1 nothing is the object of fmcy (
" 'I'

ate

Ihe...,fo..., we can have no sensible pictu"", or ideu (If them, drawn by the pencil of th~1 in .... rd limncr or painter which borrows all his ooloun from sense, which we coli fancy. And if we reflect on OUr own cogitation. oflhcw things. we shall KTlsibly perai", thaI they a..., not fanwric:al, but noematical. I\s for exampk, justitt. equity, dUly and obligation, cogitation, opinion, inlellection, volition, memory. verity, falsity, COLW:, efTa;t, genus, species, nullity, Cl)ntinllerK:)', possibility, impossibility, and innumerabk more such there are that will occur 10 anyone that shaU tum over the vocabularies of any language. none 0 which can h.ye any scnsibk picture dra,,'n by the IXncil of the fancy. And there ~ many whole propositions likewise, in which there is not anyone \V()rd or notion that we can h.,·c any genuinc phanwrn. of, much less can fancy reach to an apprehension of the necessily of the connection of Ihe terms. I\s for example. N~tlr;"t (a~ ... a",1 ~ot ... at tlr. ,a_ too (NiAil poWt tnt tt 'WI tnt toit", ItMport). What proper and genuine phantasms can any percei"e in his mind either of'nothing', or 'can' or 'be' Or 'and', nr 'not be', or 'at the same', or 'time'l u 9. Neither was ;1 asserted by 1\';510tk, as some: have taken fOT granted , Ihat all our percepli,'c cogitations are phanlasmll (<#J
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'I'

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superficial cogitations, which sometimes go befo~, and invit~ or call in, meanwhiJ~, the pelceptions of the mind, and sometimes follow and attend upon the conception. of the mind, as tbe shadow upon the lubsrance, but never wmpreltend the thing. And indeed, as we oUr&oClves cons;st of soul and body natul'lllly united logethu, so are the rogitations that "" hn·e of corpo~a1 things usually both noemarical and phantasmatital together, the one being as it were the IOUI and the other th~ body of them. For wben a geometrician considers a triangle, being about to demottstNte that il hath Ih~e angles equal to two right angles, no doubt but he win have the pha[n]tasmatical pictu~ of some triangle in his mind . And yel notwithmnding he hath also a ooematical perception or int~llectual idea of it too, as appears from hence, br:cause every express picru~ of a triangle mUSt of necessity be eilher olllusangubt oT rtttangular, or aCluangulu, but that which in his mind is the subi«t of this proposition thought on is the reason (,,,,;'') of a triangle undetermined to any of these .pecIes. And the like might be observed also of the word angles in the same proposition. In like manner, whenevu We think of a phantasmatieal univenal, or universalized phantasm, or a thiog which "" han no clear intellection of _ as for example of tbe nalU~ of a rose in general - the~ i. a complication of something nocmatical, and something phantasrrtatical rogcther. For phantasms in themselves alone, as weU as sensations (aluOIjpara) are al ..... ys individual things. And by a rose we mean a thing which so affects our sen.., in <e;pec1 of figun: and colour. 10. But as for thO&( mher objects of cogitation which "" affirmc:d hefon: to be io themselves neither the objects of 5CTISC (alt1B1tni) oor the objects of &ncy (,fIavraoTci), but only things understood (l'Olfrci), and the~fo~ can have no nalUnl and genuine phantasms properly belonging to them; yet it is true notWithstanding that the fmastic ]lOwer of the soul, whicb would never willingly be altogether idle or quile excluded, will busily intend irsclf here also. And the~fo~ many times wben the intellect or mind above is e%Crcised in ab$tractcd intellections and contemplation... the fancy will at the same time busily employ itself below, in making some kind of apish imillltions, counterfeit iconisms, Iymbolical adumbntions, and ruemblances of thO&( intellectual cogitations of sensible and c:orpornl things. And hence it comes to pass, that in speech, mcuphors and allegories do so exceedingly pk:asc, because they highly gratify this fantastical power of passive and corporeal

•• 'I'

ate

cogitation in the !iOul, and !i«ill thereby also """"'thing to ra;'" and ITfll'Sh the mind itself, othnwisc lazy and ready to £ain! and be tired by o'-erlong abmaeted cogitations, by taking its old companion the body to go along with it, as it were to rest upon, and by affording to it certain crass, palpabk, and corporeal images, to incorporate those abstl'llCled cogitations in, that it may be able thereby to see those still more silent and subtk notions of its 0"-", sensibly refle<;ted to itself from the corporeal glass of the fancy , Sometimes also thelT are other spurious phantaSms tlUli do link or not:hing s)'mbolu.e with the noctiol cogitation ... that yet are arbitrarily Or cw;tQm.1rily anne<;ted to them, melTly h«:ause the fantastic power would not sland wholly idle and unemp loyed. So tbat when the mind thinks of such an intelligible idn, the fancy will presenlly hold fonh such • customary phantasm before it, 'as those that use artificial memory, make oenain phanwms at pleasure,16 to signify certain ros itarions, But lastly, rather than the fancy shall quite stand OUI and do ju", no'hin!! .t

..n.

it .. ill sometime. cucci>c itsc:lf (c'p«u.l1 y in 'p«ch) in nising phantasms of the '-cry sounds and namrs, by which the notions

of the mind arc signified l'CSpe<:linly. So that it is vcry true both that there are active coginllions of the mind distinct from phantasms; and such of which there an be no natural and genuine phantasms or sensible picrures; and yet, according to Aristotle's opinion, that frequently those coru;cptions of the mind 0 nevcr dreamed of any such ch imerial agent intelligence, as appears from the Greek in(c1l'rctcrs that best understood him, !iO il is "ery like to that other .. ""'- 01 I. TM; ~""",,""'oI; To!/Iii<,_ nJ _ , •• 'I I, [Ii (OIl ..
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opinion called peripatetical, that asserts the eduction of immaterial forms OUt of the power of m
Dlapter II t. That Ihe~ are some idCOIS of the mind which ~~ not stamped Or imprinted upon it from the sensible objects without, and Ihe~fo~ must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself, is e vident, in that the~ are, first, ideas of such things as neither arc affections of bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by an y local motions, nor can be pictu~d at all by Ihe fancy in any sensible colours (sucb as are Ihe ideas of wisdom, folly, prudmce, imprudence, knowledge, ignorance, verity, falsity, virtue, vice, honC5ly, dishonesty, justice, injustice, volition, cogitation, nay of sense itself, which is • species of cogitation, and which is nol p"''''priblc by any senoc, and many other such like notions as include something of cogitation in tllem) or refer to cogitative beings only. Which ideas must needs spring from the active po ....er and innate fecundity of the mind itself, because the corporeal objecrs of serue can imprint no such things upon it. Secondly, in that Ihe~ are many ~lative notions and ideas, attributed as wdl to corporeal as incorporeal things that ptocecd whoUy from the activity orthe mind

'J 'I'

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comparing one thing with anothe.-. Such IS ue au.." effect, mean., rod, order, proposition, similitude, dissimi~tude, equality, inequality, aptitude, inaptitude, Iymm«ry, asymmetry, whole and pan, genus and ,pecics. and the like. z. But that which imposes upon men 's judgements here, '" as [0 make them think, that theK are all passi~e impressions IruIde upon the soul by the objects of ... n..., is nO(hing else but this, Bcausc the nOlions both of t"'- relative ideas, and also of those O(her imlrulteri.al things (as virtue, wisdom, the 50\1[, God) an: InO$t commonly excited and .wakened occasionally from the appuJsc of outward obj.ects knocking at the doon of OUr 1tTI5CI. And the.., men nOl: d islinguishing bet .... ixt the oU",'ud oc....ion or inviution of those rogiurion" and the immedi.lte active or productive eauso: of them, impute them therefore all alike, as well these intelliliblc, lIS the>:c othcT ... n,ible ideu, or phantasms, to the efficiency or activity of the outward obj.ects upon us. Wherefore that ....e lruIy the bcm:r undenbnd ho,,' fu the passion of sense reaches, and when the activity of the mind beg1ru;, ... e will compare these three things together: lim, a mirror, looIting-slass or crysul globe; secondly, a living eye, that is. KCing or pem:ptive mirror (If Iooking-Slass; thirdly, a mind (If intellect .upendded to this living eye or seeing mirror. J. F iBt therefore, when the same ooieas ore equally exposed or held before a crysul gIoIx Or looking-glass, and a living eye, there are all the ume impwdons IruIde upon the erYlwglobc, that there ore upon the living eye. Which appears from hence, heauso: the eye looking upon the crysul globe or mirror, wiD see all the same ilrulges rellected to itself from tbence, that it perceived before immediately from the objects themselves. The moI:1on and pressure of the ethereal globulous particles, in which the n.ture of ~ght is (XIn~"ed [0 con.in from every opaque obiea, bearinl alike e"ery ""'y upon that .... hich resists, and therefore as much upon the mirror as the eye: '" th.ac there is e~ery jot as much COl poreal passion in the mirror or crysul globe, as in the glassy part of the living eye; for, as ...e said befon:, the corporeal part of the eye is indeW nothing ebe but a mirror or Iooking-Slass. And yet notwithstandinl' tbe mirror or crystal globe doth not _ or perceive anything as the eye doth; from whence ..e learn, Ii ..t thai things are never perceived merely by their Own force and activity upon the percipienl, but by the innate force:, poWU, and ability of that which PClce;'·es. And then:fon:, secol1dly, thai sense itself is not I men: corporeal passion, bUI

C",,,:,,,,i,,, ~u"",1 ~ItJ imltluldle mo,alily I perception of the bodily passions procttding from sorm: pnwer and ability supposed 10 reside in a ICI1sitivc soul, vitally united to that I especlivc body. Which perception, though it ha,"e something of cneTg)' in iI, as being I cogitation, )..,t it is rightly ClUed. passion of the soul, because it is nOl: I clear intellective or cognoscitive per~ption of the motions of the body, bUI a passi\'C or sympatherial perceplion only. WheTeby, ICCOTding to nllu~'s instinct, it hath sevcral s«mings or IppcarviCCS begonm in it of those miisting objects without it at a distan~. in respect of colour, magnitude, figull', and local motion; by rnIiOn of tlte diffcrcn~ of those rectilinear motions communicated from them by the intermediate globulnus particles, .nd impTCSSCd upon the optic nerves. Whcll'foll' the living eye immediately perttives nothing but these corpnreal passions ...·hich .,., nude ~ually upnn it, and the mirror or crystal globe alikc, by the motion of that intermediate or subde body which Cluselh ~ght; which oorporcal passions being also passively pet~ivcd by thaI vital principk called the sensitive pnwer residing in the eye, all passion from the outward object thell' ceaseth, and goes no fulther. BUI thaI power of the soul that nUt fullo .....,th, which is the Ihird thing thlt we mentioned befo~, the intellect begins immediately 10 exert and display its acth'ity upnn thc object passively perce;'·cd by sense. 4. But the bener to iUustnte the business in hand, leI us .gain suppose some ingenious piece of mechanism, or artificial ""'~ltIaIO~, as for example, an horologe or Wltch,11 at on~ held before the mirror or crystal globe, and aim exposed to the p:anicular view of the living or sentient eye, both in the outside and interior fabric of iI, so thlt as e\'Cry pan in it is ~nCCled from the mirror, so it nuy be oonsciously per~h-ed also by the sentient eye, in a particular successive view. Now the KIItXnI eye "ill be conscious or perceptive of Mthing in all this, but only itll being variously affected from different colours, figures, protubenncies, Clvities, sculprurcs, local motions one .ftcr another, aU the wnc things which well' impressed on the crym.1 globe or mirror, and reflected from it, there being no diffcrcn~ at all betwixt the one and the "st_ll1.tridl_ .... _ ..."" ....... "'''I\IUti
•

! ... ...

•

Cud "'to.s.. .... !.. ',,· ,.'TkQ,d~....!P"'I'!'= , !lorInl_"'~ ... f.n;IioIo M.d I .. ,0 .1 Tloou;Ioo ,""-,6IIJ".A_ ofs.v.u ... ('066), 1l-''''

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ate

other, bUI Ihal tile eye was conscious or perccpli,'c of ,,-hal il suffe..,d, but Ihe mirror not, nUt now tile mind or intellect being supcndded fa tllis sentient cye and exening its acti,'c and mo.., comp..,hensiy. power upon all mat wllicll "'lL'l reflected from the mirror, and passi,-dy percei,-ed by the sentient eye as it doth actw.lly and intellectually comprehend the same things oyer .pin which sen.., had perceived before in an(){her "",nner (of which "'e muO! speak afterward), SO) it proceeds (unher, and compares all the several pans of this ingenious machine or self-mo"er one with an.other, taking notitt first ohhe spring as the original and cause of all motion in it, of the cllain or lilring by Ihe medialion of .. hich mat motion is rommunicaled to the fusee, of the balance 11111 rrciprocating moderales the motion of Ihe &e"em wh""ls !iOTOe greater, some lesser, prop.gating the motion from one to anotheT, of Ihe horary circle di,-ided into equal pans, and lastly of the indcx l9 moving round abou1 the cin:le through "lual space in equal time, all thest in their &e,'m ..,lllion. (Ith'ln) to one anIKher and the whole. Whe..,upon the intellect besides figure, oolour, magnirude, and motions raiotS and ncitts with itself the intdligible ideas of caU&e, effect, mean., end, priority and posteriority, equality and inequality, order and proportion, symmetry and asymmetry, aplitude and in"p'irude, sign and thing signified, whole and pan, in a manner all the logical and ..,lative notions that arc. Whereas the &entient o)'e by which this whole m«hanism "-as rcpresenled 10 Ille intellcct perceived none of all tllest things. ndther "'us/: nor effect, nor equality nor irrcgubrity, nor ordanor proponions, nor symmetry nor asYTtUT>, sed from the object W1'l by the sentient eye faithfully tr.Insmitted to it, and the intellect recti,-ed all its intelligence 0.informalion from it. And to make lIS cause good, sense: would appeal 10 the mirror or crystal gJobe standing by, in which Illere WffC no images of an y of those invisible ideas 01" logical n(){ions reflected. Wh~,..,fo.." since sense doth freely concein:and ingenuously own tbat non~ ofthesc "

Tho, ;"

_of""' _ _n.. r... .. "'" _

of , ...1dI .. do
_od....! "" wII;do ,II< P"W"' of"'" ~J;' ~.

"

ideas are passi~ely md phantasmatically stamped upon it from the objects without, be: they ",hallhey "'ill. real or nOI real, certain it is that Ihey are the objects of the inlellect, md they must of necessity be nised in il by its own innate vigour md :acrivity. S. Indeed though it should be gnnted thaI Ihe relations (schem) of cause md effect, whole md pam;,."d the like. "''CCre mere: notions of the mind md modes of concei"in, in us Ihat only signify ..,hat things are reLllively 10 intellect, yet it would not follow from hence that they had no lU~ty at all but were ,"""lute non-entitics beause intellect, being a rcaJ thing md thaI which indttd hath more of entity in it thm matter. or body. the modifications of intellect must needs be as real things as the modificalions of maner. And therefore cause and efftct, whole and part, sYlIUIlCtry and asymmetry and all the otller logical nOl:ions would have as much reality in them as hanl md soft, moist md dry, hot md cold, which though but modifications ofnuner arc looked upon as very real things, and such intelltctuals as ""cre relati¥c to intellect be as real as thOR sensible phantasms which are relative to sense. But this muSI not be granted. that the modes of conception in the understanding (where: all truth is) are disagTeCable to the reality of the Ihings conoei"ed by them and so, being unconformable, arc thereforc false. Wherefore, that these relations (schem) arc nOI (though sense doth not perceive them) mere notions or figments of the mind, ",-ithoul any fundamental reality in I~ things themseh-cs without us corresponding to them, appears from hence: because an and wisdom arc most rcalthings which beget real effects of the greatest moment md consequence: in n.ture md human life of m y thing, md yet arc conversont aoout nothing else but only ~ relations, proportion s, aptitudes of things to one mothcr, md to ce:rtain ends. No",- if these were all mere figments and nothing but logical nOl:ions or beings of reason (e~liII ,a/wllis), then there could be no such realities produced OUI of them. Nay. Ihen art and wisdom themselves mUSI need be figments md fancies. And likewise il ""ould be indifferent whOlever a man did in order to my end or effect. And all men (as Protagons held) W1)uld be really alike wise and skilful. Then theTc would be no other cxmmiical causality of my effect: but that of efficiency, force, or power, which, in oorporeal things, is nothing else but Ioal motion. And no s uch thing as the causality of dill md an (thol is commonly called ~ enmpw-y cause) discinct from force, power, md blind impetuoSity. N.y, tltcn virtue. justice. hontSty muSt of

'7

necessil)' be fig",enes also, lxause: rnor:tI good and e vil are schetical and relatiye thinp, and, whi<.:h is more yct, ntemal convenience and inconvCl1itl'lcc, utiliI)' and inutility thcms.eh·cs, be nothing else but fancies also. 6. But though the venlict and testimony of SCnSC oUlI'ht to be admitted IS luthentic in this porricular, as to ",-hat is or is not passively imprCSKd upon us from wilhou[, beausr: it i. not possible that anything should be impressed upon the intellect from sensible things, but it must needs pISS through the medium of RnR, and 110 be tf3n.mi ned thcn:hy umo the undermmding, which cannot be, unles& Rnse be conscious thereof. Yet, notwithstand ing, sense is not.t all to be heard as to the reality 01' non-reality of these relative ideas, it being no mmpctcnt jud~ in that controversy. BeeauR since the knowlcd~ of things doth not arise from the activity, enel'JY, and radiation of the objects without upon us passively received by ~, but from the active and comprehensive energy or activity of the mind itself, as we have already om.,rved,

Th' in knowing all things it rather ""'th il$ 0'"'" po • ..,r thon that of things .. hich arc mown. For sina: all judg<:lhent is II>< OCt of him that

iud,..", must be pc1'form the po ..... of anoch .... but by his o.. n bculty,1O it

n«d.

tkat every one

h .. 0 ..........k ...... by

as the aforc-commended Boethius uprcsseth it. We ought not to oonclulk that thosr: relative ideas arc therefore mere figmenes or modes of conceiving in us because: sr:nsr: is not oonscious of any such things passively impressed upon it from wimout, and because thl' lower and narrow faculty tonlprehcnds them nor, but ... ther acquicscc[s] in the oenriment of thai larger and more comprehcnsi,'c faculty the intellect that judges of things by nening its own active po...-"r upon them. 7. Wherefore, if We w. U consider it, we s1toIl find ,hat not only the beauty and pulchritude, but also 'he strength and Ibili,y of natur.ol md corporeal things thcmsch'cs depend upon these relalions m d proportions of one thing '0 mother. For what is pulchritude in visible objects, Of' harmony in sounds, but the proportions, symmetry, md commensuration of figures :and wunds 10 one mother, whereby infinity is r... _ _ ...- _

:i :" "" ... , ori, Coon: ..... _j04' io..,ion ... """' ....... :............ "";:1"• ....,.". """ ........ 0001 ....... io&cu........ r.: .. Dr, • . "'( ,..-....... O..-;(;a,d_'. u" t .... ). Cod _ _ .......... rpur ........ ...-..ivdy;" TIS :,;. . ..... ;., p. Ssfi, 1M _ _ .... _ _ 018: c';'._.PI'.s!moIn

.. '["

I·

h """'"- .... pobuo

·<_....

88

,.

measured and detemtined, and multiplicity and VlIriety ,..anquished and lriumphed o\'C:r b)' unity, and by thai means Ihey bcrofTlC' grateful and pleasing objeclS to the ear and e)'e of intellectual auditors and spectators, dlCre being as ;t "'eTc cenain ludicrous imf100ni and iymoolial resemblances of an and wisdom, nay, and vinue tOO (as "l: shall show afterward) th.t is of inteUecruality in genenl appearing in them, whereby the mind behold. as it "'ere ilS own foce and image rdlccred to itself from • corporeal glass. But because: many will be rndy to say here that beauty is nothing but a fancy neither, and therefore annot :argue any reality in these sehetial things. I add thot even the strength and ability of corporeal thinp thcm..,lvcs depend upon the mutual relations (...IIlsn) and proportion. of one thing to anolher. And this all mom "ill be &ensible of as sofTlC'thing. And the truth hereof evidently appears from the mechanical powers. Nay the health and strength of the body of animals:ui..,. from the configuration nf the orpnical pans and the fil cootempcn.tion of humours and insensible parts with one another. So tJut if this harmonicaltemperature (
consid~red

formally as con ceptions ofth~ mind (WI/flam) be only in th~ intellect itsdf (as the ideas and co"","ptions of all other things likeww, art), yet, OOIwithstanding, the intellect doth not forg~ or falsify an ything in apprthendin g of them in that ma.eri:ll sdf-mo" er (4fUI ..... """M) rq>re&emed to it by sen&e, bec:ausc .ll the several rt!at;""s (leA...,,) are fund""",ntally and rc~lly in the same, though they could not be stamped upon scnse materillly, and uui"ed passively from it. An d t~TTf~ that the: true natUTT, formal rtoson (,,,,';'), t"SSCnce, and idea of this self-mover (UIU''''OIf), watch or horologe, is really compounded and mad e up ofthosc several rtbtions (trlmtl) as ingredienlll into it, SO that it cannOf possibly be understood without them, though &ense could nOl rtach to the comprehension of ony one of them, much less of this "'hole logical sy$lem or oolkcrion (eo",p"Krs) of them. It Ming impo$sible that the nature of a ""If_mover (aulo",al ... ), horologe, or "'atch should M OIherwi&e understood thon by th~ comprthcnsion of these relative ideas, ond by such a logical uniti"e, comprehensive pow"r ond activity as can fram" oU! oftMm one id.,. oftM whole. For an oorologc or w",ch is !>Of meTT si!>·e. or gold, brass and "ttl any way jumbkd, mingled, or oonfound ed togeth"r. But it is such an apt ond proportion_ able disposition of certain quantities of tOOse sevenl ""'terials in to several parts of such «rtain figures, contemperated together, .. may harmoniously OOIlspirt to rruo.kc up one equal and un ifonn motion . Which running as it Wert paralkl with the motion (If tilM. and passing round the h(lnny circle, and being mcasu rtd in that horary circle. may also measure out and distinguish the quantity of that silent IlIld successive fiux, whi<:h, like a stillllIld deep ri"cr, carries down atlthing. along with it indi5Cemible, and witooU! Iny noi.." and ...·hieh in its progressive motion trtads SO lightly and softl y thlt il leaves no traa:5, prints, Or footsteps at all behind it. 9. WheTTfore the eye of..,n.." though it M fixed never so much upon the material outside of this self-mover (.u/O",,,lon), yet it never comprehends the formal nature of it within itsclf, as it is a whole (/olllm) made up of se"eral parts, un ifcd not SO much by corporeal OOIlfatl or continuifY, as by their TTbti" e conspintion to on~ «'lUin end. Sense, being like one ofthosc narrow telescopes by which the ~)"~ looking upon the moon, can nucr vicw it all at once IlIl d see the site and configuration of all the several mountains and valkys and seas in it, IlIld Iu"e one comprehensi,"e idea of the whole, but uking it in the l'ie«'mcal pan

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after pcr by amsent Or OOnlract under one government, to be regulated by SOme amin laws os it were by one .... ill for the good of the whole; where though the eye may sec the particular persons (or at least

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thcir outsides) that are IDe res)XCrive members thereof, yel it can ncitll(,r K(: the bond which unites them together, which is nothing but relation, nor comprehend the whole (1~l1t"') that is made up of them, that is a polity Or amunonweaJth, according to the formal nature of it, which is an idea that procttds merely from the unitive POWeT and activity of the mind itself. In a word, all the ideas of things called artificial or mechanical contain something in them that never c:ame from sense, nor InS eYer Stamped upon Ihe soul from the objects without, which, though it be not merely notional or imaginary, but n:ally belongs to the nature of that thing, yet i~ no otherwise than intellectually comprehendcd. As for eumplc, an house or paba: is not onl)· stone, brick, mortar, timber, iron, glass heaped together, but the very essence and formal reason (.alw) of it is made up of relath·e or schctial notion., it being a cemin disposition of tho5c "",·cnol materials into a whole (IDI ..IIf) Or coUection (n!1II"K~')' consistinf of several pans, rooms, stail"5, passag .... dOOf"S, chimneys, windows convmient for habitation, and fit for the ""veral uses of men; in ..·hich there i. the Iogie of whole and p;lrtS, order, proportion, sytnIJlCtry, aptitude.. roncinnity, all compliCl.ted with wood, Stone.. iron, and glass, :as it weu informing and adorning the rude and ronfu~ mas.s of malter, and making it both beautiful and ""rviceable. And therefore, for thi. cause, no man that is in hi. wits ....iII Ay Ihat I Stately and royal p;lbce hath therefore less reality, entity, and substantiality in it than an heap of rubbish confusedly cast t"!ethu, becaU5C fOrsQO(h the idea of it pardy consists oflogieaJ notions, which are thoufhtto be men: imaginary thinf', whcrus thc wbole is all solid mmer without this notional form. For this logical form (which is til(, pasoivc stamp or print of inlcl~ality in it, the lirst archetypes contained in the idea or skiU of the architect, and thence introduced into the rude mattCT, SUccessively with much pains and labour) is the only thinf that distinguishes it from mere din and rubbilih, and givcs it the essence of an house or palace. And it hath therefore the more of entity in il because it partakes of art or intdlcctualiry. But til(, cye or sense of a brute, though it ha,·c IS much passively imp,' 'I'd upon it from without IS the soul of man hath, whm it look. upon the most TOYII and magnificent palace, if it sh(luld see all the inside also as well:as the ouc.idc, aMlld nn! comprehend from thence the formal idea and naturc of an haUl'<' or paba:, which nothing but an active intellectual principle can reach unto.

II. Neither is this trl)( of such things only as are commonly caned artificW, but also of nalural compounded things, such as planlS and animols lIT. And indeed. if we ron.ider things philosophically, we slu.1I nIX find any such c:ssenn..1 diffen:nce as is commonly suppo&(d, oowixt things called artificial and nalural. For Ihen is a natun: in all artificial things and again, an artifice in all rompounded things. Plan", and animols being nOlhing elso: bUI artifici.1 mechanisms, the Ialler of .. hich especially are contrived wilh infinitely mon: ";1, ,·ariet)·, and curio:>ity lhan any mechanisms or ••M-movers (au/""",/SI) that ,,1:1"( e\'ff y(1 produttd by human an. Wherefore the true form of an animal, if "'e a[[end only t(l the mechanism of the body (for we must ocknowlclge so"",thing clso: not only in men but also in brutes, if they ha"e ""y cogiurioo besides mechanism. which is a substance of another nature, or I cogiutive being united {(I the body)" is an idea that includes mlny rel.ti"e and 1<>gicallK>ti(lns in it, and thcrefort could never be sumped upon the soul by sen& intell«t. The same is to be affirmed of th.l hUy and vast aUlo_IM, w~ich some will h.."" to be an animollike"'ise/ the visible " 'orld or mot.,.,.1 univene, the world, commonly called ro.mOJ or l1UI~d",. from the beauty of it. Whether we mean thereby that one single "on"", {(I which our planeury earth belon~, or I system of as nuny "ortices as We!lCC fi.ed staMi in the heavens, J their central SunS and circumferential plnets mo,-ing round about them respectively. Now sense looking round " C>ct_, Iik< Iknty Mo... 6m;.d

110. Co ...... _ _ _ ....... b ............ """"I

.-......... Iocb>!: . ..... 1.

U A ","uO« .. rho ........ .,of ..... I01.,.,r. Sr< PIa!D, T_)Ob I. ...... Wo I. In c..-... , .. ..,.. 110. ........ " t.o.t;.. ..... ..-ft...t _ mo .... io • ...;.. of , .. "",u ~ h• ......tm., C>ct_ . !I........... dftrtl, to ~ - . . .

"

...

!pn.,._.

,.

.bool, and making many p,trticular views, s«s now one fixed liur, and Ihen another; now the moon, then thc sun; hcre a mounuin, Ihere a vancy; al (lIIC lime: a river, al aoothcr a sea. particular ~egclablcs and animals One after aoother, But it <:mnO{ Sum up or unite altogelher, nor riK ro an y oomprchensi" e id... of the "'hole at once, as it is one or many mechanical sdf-mo"ers most curiously and artificially framed of innumcr.o.blt p.rts; in which Ihere are all manner of logical relolions (,drtlls) possible offered to the mind, but . Iso fitly proportioned wilh such .dmirable symmetri.,. . nd rorrcspondencies in respect of (lilt another and the whole, that they perfectly conspire into (lilt most orderly and harmonious fonn. Hitherto therefore we han setn that thc rel.t i,·c ideu that wc h"t in OIJr mind arc nOf passions impressed upon t he soul from thc obiects wi"IOUt, but .ri.., from the innate activity of thc mi nd it..,lf. And tM refore, becau"" the =cnas or ideas of all thin gs thems.,],·"" whether artificial 01' n.lural, that is whethcr madc by the artifice of men or n.ture, always necessaril y include tt.esc logiel1 reutions in them. We hl"e demonSlrati vely proved from thence, that 1\0 corpor<:al oompounded thing what....,,·~r is understood by stn"", nor 1M idn of it passively stamped upon th~ mind, from the objecu wilhout, but comprehended only by the !orge uniri"e po"-cr of thc intellect, and uerled from the innatc acth'ity thereof. 12. But the case is still d"arer con""",ing th!151: other ideas Mforementioned, of the "",·...1 modes of cogitari,-c Mings, o r such iii in"o['-c Of include some relation w them; that these arc not by the passi"c impresses from out"'al'd objn:u by sen..,; .lthough they are often occasionally invited and drawn forth by them. Which we shall illustrate by the former instancc of an .rtificial ""If-mover exhibited fiTS{ ro thc view of sense, and afterw:...l acti"ely comprehended by the understanding. After the mind hath framed a clear idea of this ..,If-mo,·cr within icsclf, the end Or design whereof is 10 measure the equal motion either of the sun and hea,-ens. Or emh (according w different astronomical hypothesis)" by the equal motion of Ihis sdf-mo,·cr. and so to distinguish or mark out to us tM quantities of th.t silent and undi!iCCmed flux of timc; an d ,,-hen it hath considered how apdy conduClbk e"CT}' pan of this IT\eChanism is to that dmp!, and how

there is ndlher the leasl redundancy nor deficiency in any thing in oroeT thereunto, and oflhe Mauty and elegancy of the fabric, making a further and a more inw:ard reflection upon the same, il plainly pera:ivt\< Ihis lIXunle oontri'.nce to be but a passive print or s~mp of some .cri"e and lirinl{ arl or skill upon iI , Wherefore the ide:as of art and skill ue upon this ocasion natuully nerted from it , Neither doth it rut in oonsidering of art and skill absn'actedly, bUI bcause tllese are modes of an existent cogitali"e being, il think.. presently of some particular intelligent being, the artificer or author of this curious fabric, and lookinl{ further into it, finds his name also enl{ra,'cn in ICl{ible ch.racten upon the same, wllereupon he forthwith pronounces the sound of it. When::as the hing eye, thaI is, sense alone in its antecedent "jew, :as it could nO{ espy any logic:al .,dalions or notions there, so neithr can it perceive any ideas of art or skill in it, they ha"ing neither figure nor oolour in them, nOr of author and artificer, an y more than ;t could _ the sound of the artificer's name in the cngra"en sculptu res or clu.racrers of it , For Ihe eye could sec no more Ih.n ..-:as represented in Or renecled from Ih crys~1 globe or mirror, Wherefore the ideas of art and sk ill, aUIIlo. and artificer were not passi"ei y imprinted upon the intellect from the matcrillJ self-mover (Qu/omQlon), but only occasionally invited from the mind itself, :as the figuus of the engra,'en Icuel'S did not p:assiveiy impress the sound of the artificer's nome upon him, but only ocasion 111m to exert from II;' OWn .cri"ity, lJ. Just in the same nunne.;1 happen s many times in the contemplation of that great self-mo,'cr ("II/om.. i6n) of the nuterial uni,'erse, which is the artifice of GOO (Oroii t eXvaujlo), lhe artifi ce of the best mechanist, tllough then: M nO more pa..i,·e1y impressed upon u. from iI, than there is upon the diapllanous air, Or liquid meT oontigunus to all solid bodies by local motion, of which only scnsiti,'c beings ha"e a oonscious pereeption; yet there is a wonderful scene of various thoughts and motions ....i~ in the mind t~reupon, which are only ocasionaUy invited by those: stamps and impressions made from tile nuleriaJ f.r.bric, and its "ariow: furniture ",llIout, but Owc thdr true original and efficiency to nothing else but the innate "igour and activity orthe mind itself. Some of which ..e ha,'e already inst:ln""d in {he ideas of those: relalive considerations (,,"~u.) of corpousl things themsch'os and their pam 10 one anmher; by means of which the intellect riSCl; up to {hat comprehensive view of thc na!\lus of panicular corpousl rhings, and

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ate

CoNumiN! ,Untlll uti immlllllbk 1fIOrillily t~ uni>'~

mundan<: system within its<:lf all at once; which KIl&e ptlce;vin, only by link an d link, and luing in as il "l'~ point .fler poinl, arlnO( sum up its partial pe=ptions inlo the tnrin idea of any ont whole (IDlllm). But Ihe intellect doth ROt rest here, but upon N'C"Km of those corporeal things thus comprehended in Ihem&et.'cs, natunlly rioes hi,her to tht framin, and exciting of cerain ideas from within itielf, of OIlier things nOi ni~ng in thost KIlsible obieru, but absolutely incorporeal. For being ravished ,,;th the contemplalion of this admirahle mechanism and mificial conrri~ of the material uni,'CTSC, forthwith it narurally conceives it to be nothing el&e but the pass;"e Slamp, prim, and signature of lOme living m and ...isdom, as the ponem , archdype, and 5tal of iI, and so exciles from within itself In idea of that di"ine an and ,,·isdom. Nay, considering funber, how all things in thili greal mundane machine or animal (illi the ancients would h,,'e it) are COIIlti,·ro, nOl only for the bnuty of lhe whole, bUI also for the good of e,'ery pan in it, thll i. endued ,,-ith life and sense, it exertS another idea, v'z. of coodneu and Mni",ity from ..ithin its.elf, beside!; that of IlrI and wisdom, as Ihe queen regent and empress of art, w~reby an is employed, regulated , and determined . Now both these things whermf the fif!;t is m, wisdom, and knowledge, the oe(:Ond, goodness, benignity, and morality, Ming looked upon as modes of some intellecTual being Or mind in which lhey exist, il from hence presently makes up an idea of God, as the luthor or architect of this great and boundless machine, a mind infinitely cood and wi"" and so as it "'C~ resounds and rc echoes back the greal creator's nill'll<:, which from thost yisible characren impressed upon the nulerial Uni,·CTSC, had piet"a!d loudly inlO its ears, but in ,uch an indi'C:C from Thence of the exemplary 0< archetypal ClU2, one infinite and eternal mind setting his,;cal upon all. Fo<:as he that hears I conson of musicians playing a lesson consisting of six 0< eighl sevenl portS, all conspiring to make up one h.armony ..... iII immediately conclude that there wu some OI:her ClU2 of Ihat harmony besides those oc,'ua] panicular efficit:nt5, thaI struCk the 5tven.l insuumenlS, for every one of them could be bUI a ClU2 of his 0"11 pan .... hich

C"'l(tnri~llttnr"/

aTld il1/1tlulablt IfIor./ity

But th~ unity of th~ whol~ harmon y, into which all th~ RV~r.ol putS conspire, must ntt..!s proct:ed from th~ art and musical skill of~ one mind, the CI~mpLary and archetypal cause of mat vO<.

pb)~.

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upon it. And therc:fore when it finds or meets with insensible obiens any foot5teps Or resl:mblan<:es thc~f, anything that luth cognation with intellectuality, as proportion, s)'mnmry, and order Iu'·e, Ming the pusive stamps and impresses of art and skill {which are intelle<:tual thinp) upon maner, it must needs M highl y gr:l[ificd with the sarno. But the soul of a brute having 1>0 intdle<:tual anticipations in it. but barely suffering from the corporC

C"tr'nt;Ng ,Until! ~nd immuluk """,,lily the", arises immedineiy an innrd grnerul sense and sympathy from the conupondence and analogy that is hetwilt them, art and skill in the mind of the musical ht'all'r, finding &Om<:!hing akin (<1t»')'tv~ ,,) 10 i!SOlf in those harmonious airs, oomc: footsteps and • ,ambiance of iuclf ~tefully dosing .... ,h them. Of whi~h vial sympathy the", is vulgarly thought to he some resemblance in nature, when upon the striking of. string on one viol, another SI, ing, Ih~t is in unison to it in a dist:ln! .101, will dance and leap, and that not from any mechanial cause (as oome roncci,..,) p;!ssiveiy only, but from a ,·ial acti,·e principle in nature, "'hi~h is affected .... ith concord . nd harmony .:! No'" there is )·n a pulchritude of another kind, a mort' imerior symmetry and harmony in the ",lations, proportions, aptitudes, and corrc:spondencic:s of things to one another in the great mundane system, or .·ital machine of the un;'·t'I"St', .... hich is.1\ mltsical1y and harmonically romposed. For which cause the ancients made Pan, that is natu"" 10 play upOll an harp. But the sense, which only passi,·cly ~n.'ein.. particular out".,.,.d objects, doth here, like the brute, hear nothing hut me", ooise and sound md ebner, but nl) music Or harmony at all, h.ving nl) active principle md mticipation within itselflO comprehend it by md correspond or vitally sympathiu wilh it, whereas the mind of a rational and intellectual b
of ....,.....,. be«. "The ...... of ................. """-"' - . ...........""" io ' ."inc'- bJ. "i"-, any _ _ - . .......•... _ _ catfJ .... ...... - . .... 1Irint:

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~~'~ ... "iI!! .... _ pbroiClbo<.

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he,...en, canh, sun, moon and stars, comets, meteors, elemenUl in those inky deline:uion •. He win read profound theorems of phiJo.ophy, gcomwy, asrronomy in Ihem, \cam J gRal de.al of new knowledge from them Ihat he neve, under5100d bcf"ore, and u..,reby jUSlly admire Ihe wisdom of the CDmJKIRr of them. NOf thai .11 this .."os passively swnpcd upon his lIOul by sense from those characters. For sense, lIS I aid hefore, can pem:ive nothing here bUI inky .,,,,,,,·15, and the intelligent reader will many tilTlCli oorrect his copy, finding errataS in iL BUI because his mind was before furnished with certain in..,.,d anticipation. that such cha""'ters signify the ele ..... nts of t<:rt:lin sounds, those sounds certain notions OJ" cogitations of the mind, and because he hath an active pown of exciting any such cogitations within himself, he reads those sensible cogitl.rion., the pa...i,·e mmps or prints of another man's wisdom or knowledge upon them, and also learns knowledge and inslTUction from them, nOt as infused into h;,; mind from those sensible chuxtel1, but by reason of thoscc hints and signification. thereby proposed to it, accidentally kindled , awakened, .nd excited in it. For all btu the phanwrnII of black inky SU"Okes and fiwures arises from the in ....rd activity of his own mind. Whcn:fore this insWlce in itself &h ..... how the activity of the mind may OOtnprehend more in and from ..,n.ible objecu than is passively imprinted by them upon sense. But no ..., in the room of this artificial book in volumes, let uS .ubstitute u.., hook of nature, the whole visible and matmal universe, printed aU Over .... th the passive characters and impressions of divine wisdom and goodness, but legible only to an intellectual eye. For to the senx both of nun and bOlte there appears nothing else in it but as in the other, so many inky ocrawk, i.~. nothing but filJUTCS and colours. But the mind or intellect, which hath an in .... rd and act1'·c participation of the sa ..... divine wisdom mat made it, and being printed.lI o,..,r wim tile same uchel)'pal 1Jea1, upon occasion of those seMible delineations represenled to it, IlIId laking notice of ... ha!SOCvcr is rogn.:lle to it, enning its OWn in .... rd activity from thena:, will nOf ha~e only a wonderful ittfle and large prospect of other thoughts laid open before ii, and variety of knowledge, logical, mathematical, ..... taphysical, moral displayed, but tho dearly read the divine ..·isdorn and goodness in e.·ery page of this gre:at \"Olu ....., as it "l're writtcn in large and legible characters. set:

Chapter 11\ We have hitm.to showed that then: an: many ide2s of the mind whieh, though the cogitations of them 'tw: oftcn ocasionaUy invitro from the motion or appulsc of sensible objects ,,-jthout made uJXm our bodies, yet 1KM,,;\hsandinlf the ideas them..,h-es could not po5Iiibly 'tw: stamped or impressed upon the soul from them, because sense takes no cognizance at all of any such things in th05C roqKIrcal objects, and therefore they mu" needs arise from the intute vigour and acti,-ity of the mind i_If. Such IS arc, tint, the n:l.tive ideas or the ""veraJ ../..... or respeCts ...·hieh Ire betwixt corporeal things themselves compared with one anoI:her. Which rclllti,'c ideas 'tw:ing not compn:hcnded by sen.." and yt'l not .. ithsanding the natures of all compounded OOI"porcaI thinp, wlmher artificial Or natural, that is whether made by the arrifiet: of men or nature, consisting of them, we havc dcmonstrativdy proved from thenet:, that the natures of no compounded corpon:al things can possibly be kno"'"lI or compn:hended by sense. And again the ideas of oogiul.li ,-c bcinp, and tm " '-craJ modes of them, logctmr wilh all such notions as invoh-e IIOtnC Inpccl or n:b.tion to them. For although these: also be often """"'s""'ally invited and elicited by the objects of sen.." when the mind, in Ihe comempllltion of them by its 0"''11 active strcngth, pera:ives Ihe sigrultures of arl, coun..,ls, conrri,.... et:, ...·isdom, nay, IrId goodness also o ...., that e,'cn Ih"'" simple corporeal things themsc:h-cs, which by sense: wc havc a p"ssive perception of, in individual bodies without us, IrC also known and underslood by the act;'-c power of the mind excrling its 0 ..."11 inte11i~ble ideas upon diem. a. That ocn.. tion is not knowlcdlfc of those corporeal things that we sensibly perceive, ...-e h;a"e befon: largely showed. And indeed it sufficiently appears from hence, because upon the seeing of light IrId colours, though never w clearly, the feding of heat and cold smarlly, the hearing of loud sounds and noises, ....., nalurally enquin: further, what this lilfhl and colou"" heat and cold, and sounds IrC, .. hieh is an undoubted acknowledgement that we have nOi a clear and satisfactory I.

comprehension of Ih.,.., Ihings which nuke", suong a "TOke IlIld impression upon Our scmes. And Ih en:fore Ihe mind desires 10 ItU5ler IlIld conquet" mem by ilS own active mmph and power IlIld 10 comprehend them by some ideas of ilS own , which are not foreign, but native, domestic, and intrinsical to it. Now if sense itself~ nO{ knowledge, much less can any serondary or deri,...ti,·e result from sen.., be kno ...·!edg<', for this would be a more obscure shadowy and ennid thing tiwl sense i_If is. & when the ilTl1g<' of a man's &ce, recei"ed in a mirror Or IDlKing-glass, is reflected from thence imo a seamd mirror, IlIld so fO","lIrd into a mird, srill further it goes, the more obscu re, ronfused, IlIld imperfect it grows, till at b$t it br<:omes altogethu imperceptible. Or as in the cirdinp and undulations of wate!", aused by Ihe falling of a slone into ii, that an: suc:cessi"e!y propagllled from one to 1lIl00her, the further IlIld wider they go, the ......,.1:$ an: still the less, slower and wuker, till at length they become quile undi""ernible. Or as a secondary echo, that is, me echo of an echo, falls as much shon of the primary echo in proporuon, as that doth ofthe original in proponion, as lhl! dOlh of the original voicc'. Or, lastiy, if we oould supPQ&e a shadow to cast a shadow, Ihis secon dary shadow, or project:ion of a shadow, ...·ould fall :IS much shon of the prilTl1ry shadow as that did of the substance itself. So if lhe knowledge of corporeal things ...-ere but a secondary IlIld derivative resuli from sense (though it cannot be conceived that the passion of seo.., should ray upon the iotellc<;t, so :IS to ~t a secondary passion there, any man: mllIl one shadow should ast another) then kno .... ledge would ~ much a weaker pe.ceplion of them than sense itself is, and nothing but as ;1 " 'ere the secondary reflection of an inuge, or Ihe remote cirdings IlIld undulations of the nuid wate!", or the mere echo of the echo of IlIl original voice. Or, lastly, nothing but the sharlow of the shadow of a sub\;tance. Whereas it is a far more ruJ, sub.tantw, and satisfactory, man: penetn.tive IlIld comprehmsi"e pen:qltion than ..,nSC is, reaching 10 me vcry inward CSKnce of the mings perceived. And Iherefore ;1 must of n.......;ty proceed from lhe active po"'er of the mind it..,lf, exerting irs own intelligible ideas upon mil which is passI"e!y perceived IlIld so comprehending il by someth ing of irs own that is native and domeslic to it. So that besides the ..,nsahoRs (a(ulhiflala) OK phllIl wms (.;avniupafal me SC115ible ideas of oorporcal thinp p;u.s;'·dy impressed upon us from without, then: must ~ al50 conceptions OK inlt lligible

'"

CONurn;ng ,urn~/lInJ ;",,,,Jllab/, WUl'II/;ly

ideas of them (volj/mra) actively exerted from the mind itself, or otherwise Ihey could ne~er be understood. 3- Wherefore. th'l we rnay the bener illustr.ue this business, let lIS sUpP'JSC' some indi"idual body, ,.. for example, a ",hite or block triangular superficies. or • solid four-squ.re (U/r~J",JnI"') induded all within. triangul .. supcrficies, ex""",d first to the view of sense Ill" • livinl!" eye, .nd then aften..rd considered by th~ intellect, that ".~ rnay see the difference ~twixt Ihe pass;,'e perceplion of;1 by sense, and the act;"c comprehcnsion of it by the understanding. Now sense, that is a living eye or mirror. as soon as e.-er il is colwened toward this obiect. will here passively perceive an .ppearance of an individual thing, as existing without it, ",hite and triangular, without any distinction concrt:tely and confusedly together. And it will pcrai..~ no more than this, thoul!"h il dwell nevcr so long upon this object. For it pcrcci,·ts no more than is impressed upon it. And here the pass.lon of sense cnd& and goe5 no funher. But the mind or intellect rtsiding in the same ""ul that hath I power of sensation 01"", then beginning to make. judgement upon that which iii thuli pass;,'cly pcrech'cd, exerts its own innatc vigour and acti.-ity, and displ.)·, iuclf gndually after this manncr. For, first, with its subtle divisi "e powcr, it will analyse and r<'SOh'c this ronc,..te phamllsrnalial ""hole (IOIJI",) and take nmice of ""..eraJ distinct intcl~«­ tuaJ obj«u in it For considering that C"CI)' while or black thing is not necessarily triangular, nor c"cry triangular thing white or black, it finds here two distinct intcllrctual objects. thc onc ,,·hite. the other (riongul ... And then again, because that which is nothing can ha\"e no affe<:tiom, it rondudts. that hCTt is !iOII1cthing as a rommon sub;ect (subm·.I ..",) to both these affections Or modifialions which it ails a corporeal substanec, which being one and Ihe same thing is here both white and triangular. Wherefore it finds at least Ihrtt distinct objects of intcllttnl
.,

,.

some donv:sti", ideas (If its (lwn IU understand these genen.l natures by, that so from thence with • descending ,;ew it may comprehend under them those individuals that now a/Te<;l lhe sense. 4- FirS( therefore, for corporeal substance in ~er.d, ",lIicli is the subject (".hfmllMm) both of colour and figu"" nO{ to pursue any long and ledious PI'O"'ffS il quickly concludes that essence of it to be this: a thing utended impenetrably, {If which hath impenetrable longitude, latitude, and profundity. And because it is nO{ he'" considered mc",ly as I notion or objective cogitation, but as a thing actuIUy existing without the mind, tlle",fore it exerts another nO{ion ('Drill) of existence Or singularity also, Which added to the fortTICT makes it up I thing thlt IIlth impenetrable cltension existing_ Now none of these ideas, neither of cs.sence nor elistence, nor thing, nor substan"'", nor oomething, nor nothing, nor impenetrability, nor extension, nOT longitude, latitude, and profundity, we", impressed or Stamped upon Ihe mind, either from this individual, or an y otller 5Cnsible object. f or they can be neit her secn nor peraived by any corporeal sen5C, but a", me",]y tIdted from tht innate activity of the mind itself, that same po"..,r by ,,-hid. the mind i. enabled to conceive of nO{hing (nihil) as weU as something ("/i'l"Ui) and ceruin il is lhat the idea of nothing was ne"Cr imp ressed from any thing. And if the essence of body, or rorporeal liubstance itself, be only romprehended and understood by the act:i,'c ideas of the mind (for 5Cn5C here ""reci"ed no such thing, but only ",as affeo:ted from the exterior induments thereof, rolour and figure), then tile several modes of it, such as whiteness and triangularity, which are but oenain modes of an exlended liubiitance. mUSI needs be understood in like manner, rw>I by passive ideas and phantasms, but the noem.:ltical or inte1~gible ideas ofthc mind. s. Wherefore in the next pI""", as for white colour or whitcness, here is a plain and »
,

.

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'I'

ate

""!>stan"'", as mis sensibl~ idea of whit~ is, formally consid~ll'd, for Ihis very r=n, boldly and confid~ndy concludes that this is no real quality in mat body itsdf absolutely considered, because no such thing is intelligible by it, In which opinion, it iii confirmed by sense itsc:lf, in that the lower ends of the ninbow that reach to the eanh do nO'! stain or dye any thing with the ",nral coloura of it; and mat me same drops of de'" Or rain to eyes at sevenl distances have 011 those several colours of the rainbow in mem and none ot 011. And by OIher uperiments it appears that these things are only passions or affections in the sentient itself, caused by some peculiar modificatiofl of the superficies of tlut materiol object in resp«l of the figure, site, and di&pOSition of its insensible p.rts, whereby the light or intermediate globulous pnticles are in a peculiar manner ",flected upon the eye, .nd that probably me difference betwixt. white and a black object consists in this, that in on e the small particles are polite and solid, and therefore vividly reflect the lighter gLobulous panicles, but in the other, being differentl y disposed, me ~ght, 15 I ball flUng against a heap of sand, is not so smanly ",fltc'!ed from it, but 15 it "'ere sinks into it, and its motion is stifled and smothered in the caverns of it. Wherefore the intelligibk ide. of. white colour is mis, that it is a ""min passion Or sense in me soul, caused by a peculiar modification of the object wimout, in Il'Sp«I of the disposition of its insensible parts, whereby the lighl Or globulous panicles are more smartly and vividly reflected upon the eye. Which is anothCT kind of comprehension of it, than the sensibk idea or phantasm of while is, which i. no intelligible idea, but a cogitotive passion, mIt is, anOther species of cogitation, or an halfa...,.kened pel ception. Neither a", these intelligible ideas of passion and ",nsc: impressed upon the liOul from the sensible objects without, for the eye sees neithCT passion nor sense, but they are actively exened from the mind itself, ond Ihe",fore ml5tCTed and conquered, and comprehended by il. 6. I nllW procttd 10 the Il5t intellectual obicct comprehended in this individual body, "'hich is triangularity, or some one panicular species of a triangle, 15 for example, an equilateral, or • m:tangular triangle. For there <;an be no individuol triangle but musl be of one detenninote species or another. Now because the phantasm of such a triangle dOlh not only bear a resemblance of the outwllird maleri~1 object, which the phantasms of '1uolity in

~X1ended

'II

ate

colours and the like do not, hut also of the true imelligible ideo I triangle itself, and because when men think never SO abstractedly .Ijd mathematically of a mangle, they h.ve ronur..;>n ly some rude ph. ntuln or picture of it before them in their imagination, thueru", m;ufy confidently persuade themselves that then: is no other ideo of a triariaie or other fiJU"' beside the bare phanlaSm or sensi ble idea impr~d upon the soul from some individual object without - thai is, nO act~e nocmarical ida inwardly t uned from the mind itself. Which indeed ill all one as to say, that there is no in tellection or knowled ge of. al .ll, forasmuch as neither sense noT rancy, which a", but supcrfiC~I~ imperfect, and incomplete ""rapt;'"c cogitations, reach 10 the romp hension of the nOlKm or CSSCnce of any thing. Whuefore now 10 m C the contrary .ppnT, we will again view this material trian!!"Je, or S<Ju= (w,//rtdl'llm) before our eyes, I11
{'''nllk

roJ.

,,'

irngulae figures of I5()tm corporeal things, the mind upon this ......... sion excite!; from within itself the ideas of a peMed triangle, squa~, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, and tM like, whose ~nces a", so indivis,ble that they are not C2l"'ble of the least additions, dotraction, or ..... riation without the destruction (If them, becallSC' there was ".",... rude and bungling raernblana of these regular figures ;n mose material obtOme other individ!W triangle which I had d"where _n, just in the .. me manncr as when I ""'ked upon a piaure, that idea of. man'. face in gencral, Or of thai particular friend, that was occasionally excited Ihereby, "'lIS not my innlte idea, .... an idea thlt sprung wholly from the activity oflhe mind, bur was formerly impressed upon the soul, from individ .... l sensible objects no'" !"elmmbered or C1lled 10 mind. I "r Ihat mis C1nnot possibly be true, becallSC' Ihcr. nc'"cr was any material Or sensible straight line, triangle, cin:le, that we .. w in all our li,'es, that was mathematically exact, but even "n" it"lf, "' least by the help (If mi<:rosoo~ might plainly disconr mum unevenness, ruggedn0$5, nexuosity, angulosity, irregularity, Ind defomliry in them, as " 'ill appear 10 anyone thl1 !ihall make a Iriangle upon the mosl accurate lines that wit or art of man C1n make. And then:fore no material lin. could stamp or impress upon the !IOul in a Imre pusive ""'y those uact ideas that we now hove of. triangle or of. straight line, whif;:h is the shortest possible betwttn tIO-U points, or a circle th.t is every where equidistant from an illdividu.al centre, &e. Alld if it should be again replied, that not ..ith_ stlllding there being many weh lines and circles as commcm sense tannot disarn the least irregularity in them, howSOC:"er they would be in the Iman rime rcaJly irrc-gular to a peMed and Iyncean sight, )"ct ac<:OTding to their apl"'arance might impress thOSl: ideas that we havt of

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a straight line or circle. I answer tIlat this annot be neither, there being • vast differenc:e betwixt the confused indistinction of sense and fancy, by reason ofthcir bluntness md imperfection and the express :><:curacy, preciseness, and indivisibility of thOllC' intelligible ideos th.t we ha"e of a nn.ight line, circle, trUngk, four-squa~, and other geometrical figures. And then:fore tIl.t imperfect, confused, indistinction of sense could ne'"cr impress my such accun.te ideas upon the mind, but only OCC'.inn Ihe mind actively to excn them from within itself. 8. N.y, mough it should be granled that then were material lines mathematically enet, perf~ triangles, iquarn, pyn.mids, cubes, sphera, md tile ~ke, such as gcomelr)' suppo5eS, os no doubt but the divine power an make such in fining maner, yet sen.., OOtIld not .t.1I reach to the diKerning of the mathematical aocun.cy of these things, nO more than it doth 10 the absolute equality of any quantities _ os of lines, superfici<:s, bodies, mgles - which is found and determined only by the undentanding in tIlat intelligible maner (",.uri4 ;~ltlliri;iJiJ) ...·hkh gromctry is ronverf>ant about. So that sense could not be oble to determine whlltriangk and what four-squan: (m,.Iu",.,IIn) ..... mothc_ matically uact. and wh.t not. From whence it is demonstrably evidenl thOl neither the nOlion ('4Iio) of perfect equality, nor tile perfecl m.thematical ideas of figura, trimgle, square. circk, pyramid, cube, sphere, &c., ...·erc impressed upon the liOul from without by sense, sense nOl at all reaching to Ihe discernmenl oflhem. 9. But, Judy, if there were matmal lines, triangles, pyramids, perfectly and mechanically enet, yclthal which m.de lhem such, and thereby 10 differ from other irregular lines, imperfect triangles and cubes, could be nOlhing but a conformity to an antecedent intellectual idea in the mind, as tile rule and exemplar of them. for otherwise an irregular line and an imperf~ triangle, pyramid, tul:oe, arc os perfectly that Ihat they #C, as the other is, only they #c not .grttable to thOllC' mticipated and prcconc:ci"ed ideas Qf regular lines and figures actively cxened in the mind, or intellect, which the mind natun.lly fonneth 10 itself, and de~ghteth to exercise itself upon tIlem, as the proper obiect of an and scima:, wh ich the other irregular figures Ire 11(1(. WhercfOf'C .... he"""er. man looking upon matmal objects judges of the figures of th."" and says this;' a Slraight line, this is a perfect triangle, that a perfect circle, but tIl
,oS

from lhoso. individual malmal objectS from without upon the sense of the beholder, the OI'her actively ncrtro from his inword mind or intellect. Wh ich btter busy anticipation of it is the rule, pattern, and exempbr when:by he judges I)f those sensible ideas or phanwms. For otherwise, if Ihen: ....en: nl) in ...··n d anticipations or mental ideas, the spectator would not judge at all, but only suffer, and every irregular and imperf~ triangle bcing os perfectly like to Iml, which i. Ihe mosl perfect triangle, the mind now having no inw:...1 panern of its 0\\11 be:fon: ii, to distinguish and put a difTen:nce, would tlOI' say one oftmm was man: imperfect than ;mother; but only comparing them one with another, [the mind) would say tm! this individual figun: waS not perfectly like 10 Imt. Upon which aca:mnl the perfect lriangle would be: os imperfectly the imperfect triangle os the imperfect was the perfect. roo Wherefon:, os I said be:fore. this is iust in Ihe same manner os when a man looks upon the picture of;m absent friend or famili.ar acquainunoe, and presently judges of iI, he hath plainly tWO seve~ ideas in his mind al the same time: one outwardly impressed from the present picture, the other pn:-existent in his mind be:fon:. By one of .... hich he makes a judgement upon the other, and finds many faullS in ii, sa,·ing that ~ both Ihe ideas wen: {,,",igo and adventitious, the preexislent idea h.,·ing bttn lOme time formerly imp., .sed from an oUlward material object, and thence retained in the memory or fancy. But in the other case, .... hen a man looking upon a malerial triangle, square, circle, cube:, sphen:, in which Ihere an: some palpable irregularities, which he judges of by oompating them wilh some inward preuis!Cnt ideas that he hath in his mind of a perfect individuallriangle, square:, circle, cube:, and also ooncei'·Q; some dislike and displeasun: at Ihe disoonformily of the one 10 the Olher. The pn:-existent ideas here wen: no fore:igo or adventitious things, bUI .... Iive and dom""tic 10 him, nor at any time (WCTC they] fOrm<:rly possivdy """,i,·ed from any matmal objects without, bUI actively exerted from the mind itself. And l lhin k there: is no doubt to be nwle but if a perfect adull man, that was immroialdy framro out of the earth, having a ne .... ly created soul infuwl os the prolopbsl had, should look upon IwO several kinds of objects at the lWT\e time, whereof one was a perfect circle Or sphere:, equilateral triangLe, four-squan:, square:, or cube:, Ihe other having some resemblances of the same, had notWithsunding apparent irregu larity in some partS of them, but notwith5tanding apparent iTl·~gularity in some

". 'I'

ate

Co/ftm,m, tlt".",,1 ~"d i."",,,,dlt ",orality pam ofthem, but that at 6rst sight he would be mon: pleased with the one than with tile: other. Which rould not be unkss he had some: native or acti"e idea of his own within hilT\SClf to compon: them both with, to which one was mon: conformable than the other. For then: could be no luch thing as pulchritude and deformity in matcriill obi«ts, if tlm'e wen: no ani,'C power in the soul of framing ideas of rcguln, propor' tionate, and symmetrical 6g1.1res within itself, but which it might put a diffen:na: bet"'ccn outwud ob~crs, and make a judgement of them; but that it only n:oeived Stamps and impn:ssions from ..;tho\l1, for then it must needs be equally or indifferently affected with all alib, and not more plcuW or displcased with one than with another. Now the judgcmt:nt that men have of pulchritude and deformity in !>tnsible things il not merely ani6cial from institution or instruction, or of "'ught thingo, butluch as ..,rings originally from natun: itself. II . BUI thai there is an intell igible idea of a mangle inwardly uencd from Ihe mind itself, distinct from the phantasm or sensible idea that is oUlwvdly impressed from the maleriill obj.ect, ..ill yel funhc:r appear from lhat .. hich f"UO ..... For the mind ronsiders firsl thc gmerieal ",lIure of iI, thaI it is a plain figun:, and Ihot 0 plain figun: is the termino!i<Jn "f 0 plain superficirs. Which superficies is nothing dse but mc:n: latitude without profundity, for plain figures an: no OIheno'ise ronceived by geometricians. Now, it is «rlain that this idea of 0 l uper6cies, which geornetricians have, ..... ne,'cr imprimed upon their minds by Gense from any malerial obiects, then: being no such thing any when: existing without the mind, as latitude "'ilhout profundity. And therefon: it must needs arise: from tile: act;'·;ty ofllle: mind itself. And the idea of a plain IUperficies, that is, such a superficies 1$ to all whose pan. a str:aight line may be acc:ommodaled as well as the idea "r. s""ight line, must needs be activdy ucited from the mind also. Apin, il considers the differcna: betwixt 0 triangle and other plain figures, that it is included in and terminated by Ihree s""ight lines jDined togt:ther in three poinlS. Wh ich s""ight lines ioined together being the extremities of lhose lines, ha"e neither longitude, latitude, nor profundilY in them. Whith nuthemaUcaI ideas., in lib manner of a line ..ithout lalitude or profundity, " 'en: never imprnscd upon Eu<:~d, or any other geometrician from without, as is evident without further proof. Moreo"er, thi. intdligiblc idea of ~ triangle, as it includes some numerical ronsider:ations in it, .. hich R'nR' hath no idea of, perceiving only one and one and one: SO

'"

thell'in sides and angles are Il'lali,-ely consider«l also 10 one another. Nay the "ery nO{Ion of an angle, and Ihe quantilY IherMf, is • Il'lnive Ihing, as Produs hath obsc.nxl, and Iherefoll' not impressed by sense, Again, the mind considering rhe ideo of ils own, as ir ""n find out Ihe several properties of a triangle by mere cogiution wilhout any thing of sense (as that the gT'tater side al w:a)'s sublends the greater .ngle, ""y and that the thrtt angles are alw.ys equal to Iwo righl .ngles, as ,,'e .hall show afte ..... rdsj SO il.lso, by its own strength, is able to find OtJI all the species Ihat.re possible in • plain triangle, in respect of Ihe diffell'nces bolh of sides and angles. As in respect of the sides. that it is either equilateral or CVffi·lcrg«l (iMluio) or ha.-ing unequal sid es ~u"/....u",j or blunt-<x>mcred ("",MytON;""') or sharp-corncred (O';'r;WVlov) triangle, and thallhen: an be no individual rriangle but must ofntttSsity belong to one of the Ihrtt species of either sort . So that this is not gathered from sense, but ucrtcd from the active power of the mind . 12. The mind an clearly undersund a triangle in genenl without determining its thnught to an y pmicuLar species, and yet there can be no distinct phantasm of any such thing. For c,'cry distinct phantasm or limsible picture of a tri.ngle nlUS! of n~sity be either equiLate... l or equicrun.l or inequil.te ... l, uneven-legged (l(dkN"",j. And 50 as we can in like manner dearly understand in our minds a thing with a thousand comers (difwID~Il"') or one wirh len thou$2lld oorn~rs (...yrioID~""'), though "l' annot possibly h••-e a distinct phanwm of either of them. But for those particular species of triangles which w( may h..,( distinct phanWm5 of, this doth not at all hinder but th.r we h..,c, nON-irh· standing, intelligible ideas of the same besides, .cti'-cly exm«l from th<: mind itself. And so there is • phantasm (~Vf(lOp(lj and • conception (vOt,pa) at the same time concurring together, an octivc and a ~ive cogitation. The cona:ption or intelligible ideo being as it were embodied in the phantasm, which alone in itself is but an incomplete peru-pri"e cogiution of the soul half .wahncd and doth not oompnr:hend Ihe ;ndi,-isible and ;mrnuublc notion (rQ/w) or CSSCnce of an y Ihing. Which thing to those that cannot belleT undentand it by ...-hat we h..-e already declared , might be illust1"3tcd in this manner: when an IlS{ronomer, thinking of Ihe sun, demonstrates thaI it is a hundred and siXly times bigger than the globe of the earth. he hath all the while • phantasm Or imagination oflhe sun in his mind, but as a circle of. foot diameter (cixrnEp 1f000iov) nay he annot for his life h.ve a true

'" 'I'

ate

phantasm of any sud! magnitude which conlains Ihe bigness of the canh so many times, nOr indeed fancy the tanh a hundmhh part so big as il is. Now, as the aslronomer halh an inlelligible ide~ of the magnitude of the SUn very diffcrenr from the plwuasm Ortt.c same, SO in like manner M."e we intelligible ideas of COI'pOrnJ things, when "1: undel"SWld mem, besides me ph.;mtasms of memo The phantasm oong as il were It.c crasser indumenl (;"vo/urn/III) Or corporeal vehicle of the inlelligible idea (..0'1#0) of the mind. 13. Hitherto, by the inSWl'" of an indi,;dual and malerial triangle, we have , ho""lI how the soul, in undcn;t:anding corporeal things, doth nOl: memy suffer from ..ilhoul from the body, but actively exeru intelligible ideas of its own, and from y,.ithin irself. Now, I absene that il is so far from being lrue, that .11 our obioeti'·e cogitations or ideas are corporeal emUleS or rnIialiOln from corporeal things without, Of imprcmd upoo the soul from Ihem in a gross corporeal manner, as a signarure or.ramp i. imprinred by a oeal upon a piett of wax or day, that (as I have before hinted) this is not true sometimes of Ihe liellsible ideas Ihemselves. For all pc,"cption whatsOeyer i. a vital energy, and not a mere de.d passion. And as the ..ornical philosophy instructs uo, there is nothinll oommunicated in sensation from the nutmal objeas withOUI, but only certain local motion. thar a", propapted from them by Ihe nerves inro the brain. n Which morian. cannot propapte thernsc.lyes corporeally upon the soul also, becausc it pcnerr.nes and run. throullh all the pam of its own body. BUlthe soul, by reason of that vital and magical union whieh is t...twc:en il .nd the body, sympathizing with Ihc scvcral motions of it in the brain, doth thereupon exe" sensible ideas or phantasms within itself, whereby it pcr""i ...,:!! or takes notioc of objeas distant from the brain, either with or w;thootthe body. Many of which ""timeolS and phantasms ha.·c no similirudc at .U, either "ith those local motions made in the brain, or with the obfctts without, such ;as .re the sentiments of pain, pleuure, and titillorion, hunlltT, thint, heat, and cold, ,w,CC1 and bincr, ~lIht and coloots, &c. Wherefore the truth is thOl sense if we well considcr it, is but a kind of s~h (/Dfl't14), if I may so tall iI, nature as it ..·cre talking to us in the sen.ible obi«nl without, by ecruin mtMion, as signs from thence communicated to the br.lin. For, u in spcedt, ... hen men talk 10 onc

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another, they do but nuke certain motions upOn the air, which C&nrKII impress their thoughts upon ooe mother in a passive mmner, but it being fint consented to md agreed upOn, that such ceruin sounds shall signify such ideas and cogitations, he that hean those sounds in discourse, doth not fix his thoughts UpOn Ihe sounds themseh'ts, but presendy Ue'TtS from within himsc:lf such ideas and cogitations as those sounds by consent signify, though there be no similitude at all betwin those sounds and thoughts. Just OS in the!;m'le nunner na[Ure doth os it were talk to us in the ou",'Ud objects of sense, and import vlrious sentiments, ideas, phantallms, and cogitations not by stamping or imprusing them push'ely upon the soul from without, but only by C01'tain local motions from them, os it were dumb signs made io the brain; it ha"ing been first constituted and appointed by nature's La,,', that such local motions shall signify such sensible ideas and phantasms, though there can be no similitude at all betwi~t them. For what simili[Ude can there be betwixt any local motions and the sensa of pain or hun~r, and the like, OS there is no similitude bet .... ixt many words and sounds, and the thoughts "'hich they signify. But the soul, as by a artaio _ret instinct and OS it were by compact «(I f~JI""~JfI tI <~JflP~
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iw:Jf, e~enS from within the intelligible i'e po ...-er, that are uni'-ersal and abstract norions (r.I'.~'J) from which as it ""ere looking downward (1",,'1".'" M'"pt' S;tfl"~S) it oornprehe:nds individual things_I' Now, because thc:R laner which are pure active energies of the wu l, are many rimes nerted upon occasion of those ~he:r passive or Ii)'mpat hetical perceptions of individual things antcceding, it i:< therefore rono:ived b)' man)' Wt they are nothing else bUI thin and CVlInid inuges of tl105e 5CfIsible ideu, and therefore that aU intellection and knowledge ascends from ",n"" and intellection i:< nothing but the: impro"ement or result of sen",. Yet, notwithstanding it is ...... t ""nainly true thot they prt.><:ttd from a quite different PO"'-CT of the: 5001, ,,-hereby it aai,-eLy prtXrudes itli own immediate objttts from within itself, and oornprchccnds individuals .. ithout it, r>O( passively or consequentially, but as it were prOIeptically, and not with an ISOI:nding, but .... ith a descending pelocption. Whereby the mind first reflening upon iw:lf and its own ideas. vinual1y comained in itli own omniform cognoscitivc po .... er, and thence descending OO .. n...'ard, comprehen
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CoNumUrr ruru l ud imm~laMr morality intelligible ideas, the ~bstra<.:t and universal notions of the mind to be made out ofthCK sensible idell5 md phmtaSms impressw from without in a atrporeal I1W1ner likewise by abstnction or scpu,nion of the individuating circumsWlc.... as it were by the he .... ing of certain chips from them, or by hammering, beatin!!". or .nvillin!!" of them out into min intelligible ideas, as if solid and massy gold should be beaten out into min "'af_gold. To .... hich purp<.>Sl: they have ingeniously contrived and oct up an active undenWlding (i8Ullu/UJ Ql.IU),){J ~ke a smith o r carpentcr, with his shop Or forge in mc bnin, furnished with all nc.:css:ary tools and instruments for such .... ork. When: J would only demand of IhCK philosophers ..... hether this t~ir so «pert smith ffolwr) or architect, th<: actin undersWlding, when he goes about his work, doth knn'" .... hat he is to do .... ith these phanl1SlTU beforehand, what he is 10 male of them, and UntO " 'hat shape to bring them? Jf he do nno: he must needs be a bungling workman . But ifhe do, he is prevented in his design and un
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and aw:l.kened energy,:1S intellections are, ~hould be raiKd out of dull, slugJish, and dro ... y passion or sympathy. And this opinion is bUllike thlt IlI:her of the sam< philosopher's con~ing the eduction or raising of substantial and immaterial forms oUl of lhe J'USive maner, boI:h of them plOtteding from ont and the sam< sonishn= of mind that indoca them to think thaI dull, stupid, and se:nsdcss mailer is the 6rsl original SOUrce of aU activily and perfection, all form and pulchrifude, all wisdom and kno .... ledge in lhe world. And Ihings being rightly oonsidered, this opinion doth in truth and reality auribUle:lS much activity 10 the soul, Ihat saith it halh a power of noising or educing of inlelligible idea!; or uni,·ersal and abstract notions (r.I;",,~.) OUt of phantasms as that other that affinns it hath a po ..·er of cxemn, Ihem from itself, as it would attribute as much activity to the sun 10 say thaI he had a power of raisin, or educing light of the day OUf of nighl and darkness, as 10 say thaI he had a po ....,r of cxeniog it nul of his o..·n body. IS. Wherefore others of this kind of phibophers thaI will not ICknowledge any immaterial substance that hath any active power of iUl own in if, OT anythio, in the soul buidn imptnlion[ sl from corporeal objects without, h.,·c found OUf a!\Other device, and that is this: plainly to deny that there...., any universal norions, ideas, or reasons (rGI;""n) in thc mind at aU, but that those things which are called universal...., oothin, else: but namH applio:d to se:,·cno] individuab. Which opinion as if ""lIS formerly held by th05e that " ·ere therefore called nominalists ("~"';"GIn), so it hath been laTely re,·ived and taken up by IOIIlC of these strenuous impugners of immaTerial and incorporeal sub&tanCC$. There is nothin, in the ...orId (..ith alaTe luthor)lZ uni'·ersal, but names. For The things named are cvery one of them individual and sin,ular. Now ind«d this is tl"lX, and nobody deolcs it, uf things nisEin, without the mind. BUT this author's meaning herein is 10 deny all uni,·ersaI conceptions (,.."r~,",,) and reasonin" (r~I;" ....r) of the min d, :IS appears hy his brtIcr explication of The .arne opinion dse:whe,..,: This universal is the name not of anythiniJ oistinl in lhe nllu,.., of thinp, ...... of any idOl Dr phantUm f""".d in The mind, but 01 ....11 the name or..,.". .........J or name; .., thaI .. hen an animal or "one, .... a 'PC:<:"e. or anythin,,1sc is
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Om".,,;"g (ll."iSl iSltd imlfluldk IfID,,,lity common to more things;:and the conccptionl .n. .... ring to them in the mind ... the imares and phoneasms of singular lJlimals or OIhtf things, And themore to undmtand the meanin3 of an uni>"tfRl, th.cn is no need of Iny other faculty than that of the imari""tion, whereby"", ... minded t"'t ....mi. of th.. ..,.t h...., -..ttimcs .x~itcd on" thing • L~ ' • _In 9<11J><.,lI
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_ _ .... """,in;' nomen. jq . ' """ d",,,,, ........ ",I .-.! aIiooI 'I'" 1" 01 _ ",,;"""'1< ..... D·" ,',,'" homin ..... ,.,. ..... &c. I'aioot. _ ... , _ .. oed un, .... YOl;..."" ....... "",;ioes" 1~ ....... _ ad ... .. . ,,, So in"Wid du, tI .. ran. ..... _ in", . .. ,;.. q<>IlI.Lldoo_ ...... <jll Ii . - ........... . - .... in .. _ (0,.... pI'! yht ....... pp, ' 7-,1: d. Eo,rW W..... YOI. • I' >0). " c..!-.h~".-,,,""'o/'1)eeca ,...~;d " " _... oifone"'_._~ 'Iiud""_ ; ,Iorio .. .-..enttio _in ... .;,.. sppd\ttiotI ..... pa- _ hoc, lJo. U..... ""I·i .,... . . - .iII~ _ino do fIIIN'" tttllOI. oed do _ _ Ii tb. " . oinI ...... "'""" "I .... ....... """'... --.1_ poca. I . ,,~ Y
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_ _ _ .. '"" - . . .... 0600d ........ "''1... "''''''' .. ....- ... _ 1M;' ...,..uc;' (AT .... '11). To. 'thu objtaoo> .... ""'"""" 11 t ••• "Ill;';' h;' fount< ubjo:iliot., ((:SM ... 1111

H;

anything" tQ Knse,"" nxh any fun he. in the knm.-le:dge Qf the nature of thin", but only in makinS Ulie of commoo nama to express !iCveral individ""l. by ~t oncc_ t6. Whell'forc, a1th<>ugh there be alrcad)' ellQUgh said to pnwe that in the: undcnl2nding of individual ~nalthings, besides IieT1K and the Knsible phantasms from them, thell' all' a~ intelligible: ideas and uni>'ersal notions ("'I ...." .. ) exened from the mind itself, by .. hich alone they arc compll'hended. Yft otillto make this business delll" , and also to demoom-ate that the knowledse of universal axiomatical truth and scimrifial theorems is a thing ",h;"b doth nOl passi>'ely result from sense, but from the :H:IU11 rtrength and vil""r of the intelk-ct il$l:lf comprehending i(5 Q..-n intelligible ideas, we will hen: propo:o;e that one JeOOlCtrical theorem COIlcc:ming l triangle:; that it hath three angles equal 10 t1O'O right angles, and oon~ide .... hat the subject Qf il is lcicnrifically (btl
,,'

found that is mathematically exact and accurale, neither is Ihe indi,·idual form of a material lri""lIk immutable. And if there ... ere:my mathematically exact, our could be no criterion (Kpmip"'~) or rule to judge of it, nor discern when anything ..·ere i",·isibly such, nor judge of the absolute and mathemarical e<juality of the three material angles of it, wilh IWO olhrr angular superficies. Wherdon: the iubittts of thii gto;....elrical IhtOrnn an: no s<:nsible individual bodies, but the notions (r.ri",.~.) of the mind itsdf, in ..·hieh alone mathenutical accuracy is to be found, :md the exact equality of one thing to mother ccnainly and infallibl)· known. t8. Nay if we should suppose that there were some individ .... J malerial triangles and angles. a~lutdy and mathematically exact, and that our .. n.. did infallibly p."cci,·e the indi,·isib!e points of them, or thaI we had an in fallible pair of compaq .. , ",·hose lOps (rJupiJn) ... ere mathematical points, whereby "'·e could measure the s<:'·cral angles of the triangle and right angk in a I"'rfe<:1 circl., accurately divided into infin ite pans; or els<: cuning off those ..,,·eral angles of the ujanglci and bying them t~ether upon an a~lute plane we shou ld thus mechan;" cally find them e<jual 10 the two malerial right angles - Ihis ,,·ould r>OI amount to the knowledge of this Iruth, th.t • triongle as such hath of necessity three angles equal to two right angles, thus considering them only as material individuals, and Ihings existW1g withoutlh. mind by corporeal 5mSC. For though we had now found tlul these indi,·idual material lriangles ...·en: e<jual to those two indi.idu.l nuteriol right angle., yet looking no funher than .. lUe detem,ined to indi,·;duals, "'·e could nOt ten ""minly that it wllS SO with an individual triangles. much less understand any lI«CSSity of its being so, or allain to anything of the fftSIKl (&on) of it, in ,,·hieh alone c,·cry true scimce consisleth. And Ihis Aristotle hllh ,·cry I"'nincntly to our purpose:

sen'"

w.

ohse,,·w

N.ith.r is it ..... my to understond by ....,~. but II pCI ""i<e. lIut this ,..,gord •• p..llktolar thins ond mann ... and 'he p"""n' ,ime. Bu, i, .. impossible w perce;'·. b)· ~nsc: ",·hot ttb1C:S '0 enrything, and in ,II rtSpecIO. For /1is and "". relate not an universal. For of an uni.·nul "-e lOy th.tt it is .1...).. and .'-ery_"",..,. Sine<: then demonsl""io ... ,n: or an univCi"Sal. il is plain that th(1"( is no kno,,·lcdge .... 'he uni.·¢r"I:al theorems of JtOmCIry by .. n.... t·.". il is manifest, ,hat if "-e could p< ".io·. by ........ that the three anpes of. tNn,1< ..-ere e<juol 10 two ",ht ""sles., yet ohould " .. no! res! .. tistied in 'hii, .. having ,I>c"fon: a

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The mind would not be satisfied herewith, but would still further require I demoru;tn tion of it, which demonsmuions are noI of individuals p"'CLived by <en.." but on ly of t~ universal notion. (r.n....... ) rompuhmded in the mind. Knowledge, as I uid before, being a descending comprehension of I thing from the universal ideas of the mind and IKM an ISCLnding pelCLption of them from individual. by ~K.

'9. Wherefon: the apodicrical knowledge of this truth is nO( otherwise to be anained than by the mind'. UCCIlding above liCn"", and elevating itself from individuals to the compuhension of the univcrul notions (•• riDNtJ) and ideas of things within itself, making the object of iii enquiry and contemplation IKM this nor that material indi"idual triangle without itself, but the indivisible and inunutllble IKMion of I triangle. And thus it finds sc,·cral .... ys thot a triangle, IS such, must ofn"",,"sity have its three angles equal to TWo right anglcs. For lil"$t. if one will consider any triangle as made out of a parallelognm (though thi. be the more compounded fi~re) dirided by a diaxonalline into TWO equaltriangJes, it is pJain in e"ery parallelogram there are four angles eq ....l to four right angles, beausc "'hm • straight line cull! TWO parallel lines, the TWO interior angles must of neoessity be equi,"IIent to two right angks., one of lhem being the complement of the other to I semicircle. But when the parallclognm is divided into 1\0"0 equal triangles by I diagonal line, the quantity of the three angles in each must of necessity be half the quantity of the four angles in the parallelogram.

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Or if a man will ronsider the fummiun (sr~wi) of a pl.in triangle in this manner, 6rst by a straight line cuning two parallcllines, and then one of these parallels moving upon itll ""ntre in the straight line out of iu; parallelism, and inclining tOW;lrds the other line, if it move ne,'er &0 linlc OUt of its parallelism towards the other panllel, the continuuion of it must needs CUt the other line, and make a triangle. And so much as the interior angle, ""hich "';Ih the other opposite, made up two right angles, so much is the third angle. And therefore all three mne up two right anglts. zo. No ..' here is a gross error of the vulgar 10 imagine, because geometricians demonstrating such thcon:ms commonly m:alr.e use of such ""nsible sehemes or di.gruns, thai therefore the knowledge of this rruth doI:h result from ""nse, or Ihat the ~elricians themselves have no other id ... in Iheir minds of straighl lines, parallels, right, acute, and obtu"" angles, triangles, equ;tlity of angles, than what are impressed upon thcir fancy from th""", sehern... Whereas th""", ore only made u"" of to enteruin the ranC)' in the mean lime, ",hilsl Ihe mind being intent upon the demonstn.tion, ocli,ely exertS other intelligible ideas of these things from "'ithin il!iClf, and from Ihence comprehends the apodictical necessilY of the Ihwle",. Neither is the true and proper knowledge of one theorem or uni"ersal and n"Cl"S"ry lruth, either in geomerry OT metaphysics, passi"ely impressed upon the 80ul from individuals exisring withoul, or the result of mere sen"", but it proceeds from the acti"e strength and vigour of the mind, comprehending the intelligible ideas and universal notions (rat;olfa) uf things within itsc:lf. ~ I . Wherefore we conclude, that the immediate objects uf gcometrica.l science, properly 80 called, an: not individual bodies or superficies but the intelligible and uni,'crsa! ideas of. triangle, square:, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, actively exened from the mind and comprehended in it. For Ihe mind doth nOl: seek illl ob)ect:ll of kno ...·ledgc abroad .... ithout itself, but must needs aai,'ely comprehend them within itsc:lf. Which al§O, as we shall show in the follo ...;ng chapter, ore immutable things, and always the same.

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OJapter Iyl'> 1. No indi"idual matenal thing is al ...... ys n~ril)· the same ...;th iuclf, but mutable and changeable. And our sensible pe=prinns nf them an: nOlhing but passions or affections in the soul from !iO/11e local motinns in our body caused by them. Which passions also are a kind of motinns in 11,,: soul, when:by we do not oompn:hend ttle immutable ".tiD or C'Nna of any thing. But intelle<:tion and knowledge an: the ;>Ctive comprehmsion of something that is fixed .nd immuub1c, and hath al ...ys a necessary identity with iuclf. For Ih.t which is nOI one steady and immutable thing annO{, .s such. M an objKt of intellection Or kno ...·ledl!", ndther can the mind fil itself upon it. For il mUSt needs mock and delude the undersunding, I""1"'tually gliding and roUing away from it whm il mdeavnurs 10) grasp or compn:hend it. Nnlher can it M the basis or subi«! of any sciemificalthcon:m nr proposition. For how an . ny thing M a:rtainly. oonstantly. and immutably affirmed of Ihal which is no nne anain thing, nor alwa)'s immuubly Ihe same with itself. Whwce il plainly follows lhal Ihe immediate obiects of intellretion and knowledge cannot N These individual material things as such which nur senses I n: passively affected from, bUI must of necusily M somelhing else. 2. For which caUse rhose f1owin~ philosophe... bernn: mentioned, Heraclitus. Cnlylus. and Prougoras, 7 rh.t maintained that then: "'ere no other Mings Ihat could M Ihe nb~as nf oogiurion besides Ihese individual and maleriallhings, which they supposed a1 ....ys 10) flow, and never 10 stand still, did, consentancously In this hypothesis nf theirs, asocn that rhere was nn knowledge but sense, and no cenain or immutable oompreMminn nf an y thing. For thor this assertion of theirs was grounded merely upon this hypothesis thar there was no OIher being or object of the mind besides indi"idual malerial things as . "",h. ....'hich they signified .fter this manner, by saying that all things flowed , fDr these material things dOl so. ArillDde plainly instructs us in his Metaphysics: _

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The sround of this opinion, ,,'hich denied .11 ceNin and imm~t.blc koowledg<: " '3S from hence, beause truth . nd kno ... ledge mer to beings or entities, :and the)" suppostd thot tM'" ..·.r. no oth.r beings beoid.. thCK indi .iIlU11 scnsibies only. In .. hich th= is ,-cry much of undcterminateness ... And whicllth.y percej"ed to be liable to pcr;>etuol moI:ion or mutation . No ... eoo>«:ming that " 'hich &I ....)". chongc:o, nothinJ (::In be .ffirmcd OS COOStantiy and immutably true. And from this proposition sprung the highest oecI of tOOse which .... called He..di,ical philooophtn, and those that follow Cntylu~, " 'ho at b.n cam. to th is, that be only mo'-cd his hnge', hut thought that nothing at.1I ought to be affirmed, .nd ... pr<Mndcd Heraclitus for saying thot one cannot twice ent ... into lbe .. me ri,.... beau.. I>c tMughl thot one could not so much as on"" do il.).O Thot is, tMt nl) mat.ria1 thing remain.d on. mom<:nt the same. J. Wherefore if th .... be any such thing as intdlcction, sci ....."" ond knowledge, di5linct from ertemal sense, and any immutable truths, th .... there must I)f ~eiSity be som<: other kind of hcings or .ntities, besides these individ"..l nuteriolthings., os the immedi.te objtns or subjtns of th.m, such things as do not floW but 'oIw.)"s ",nuin immutably the ume' or ·pctlitan .... t'. and 'hal'ing oIl.-.ys the som<: noture',19 as Plato expresscth these immediate objttts of knowledge. Or else in Arilltotl.'s langltlge, ·.n immutable essence' (dKi'1/fQ( oooio). Who therefore confut •• boTh these sects of philosoph • .,.. whercof one ""lIS cxtrentdy met.physical, that nude 011 things to stand still. Whom [ oonf~ I understand not, the other too grossly mn.rial and addicted to sense, that made nothing to stand still but all things to flow art.r this mann.r:

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And both he and Plato compounded that a,mtroyen;y thus, by :acknowledging two soru of entities, the one mutable, or subie<;t to flUI and motion, such as are esperully individual oorporl:al things, the other immutable, that always rest or stand still, which are the proper objcet5 of certain, constant, and immutable knowledge, th.t therefore emnot be "",re nothings, non-entities. Which latter kind of being, that is, the immutable CSSCnce (ru.:;'n/t~ oOO;a) as a distinct thing from individual scnsibles, Aristotle plainly asscru :>gainst Heraclitus and those omer flowing philosophers in these words: 'We would have these philosophers to know thatlxsides sensible things', that are always muuble, 'there is another kind of being Or entiry of such things as are neither subjtct: to motion, corruption nor ",nention'." And elsewhere he tells us that this immoveable essence is the objtct: of theorctial knowledge of the 6rst philosophy and of the pure m.thematics. 4. Now these immutable entities .re me uniHrsal '~IW"~" Or intelligible natures and CSSCnces of all mings, which IiOme oomp;lre to unities, but Aristotle to numbers, which fonnally considered .re indivisible. Saith he 'essences .re like to numbers" l b«:ausc if but the least thing be added to any number or subtracted from it, the number is destroyed. And mese are the objects of all ceruin knowledge:. As for eomple, the objects of geometry are not any individual material triangles, squncs, circles, pyramids, cubes, spheres, and the like. Wh ich b«:ause they are always mutable, nothing em be immutably affirmed of them, but they are those indivisible and unchangeable '~lio ..(S of a triangle, squarc, circle, which are ever the same to .11 geoll"'lIio.ns in all ages and places of which such imm utable theorems IS these are demonstrated as that a triangle hu necessarily three angles equal to two right angles:] But if anyone demand here, where these immutable entities do exist, I answer first that as they are considercd form.lIy, they do nOI properly e%ist in the individuals without us, as if they were from them imprinted

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upon the: understandinl (.. hich some ha"e tarn to be Aristode'. opinion) because no indi,~dual material thing i5 either univ~ or immutable. And if these thinp were only lodged in the: indi vidual oensiblCl, then they .. ould be unavoidably obno~ioui 10 the tluctuninl ....... es of the same reciprocating EUMPUS," in ...·hich all individual material Ihinp all' pcrpHUally whirled. Bur bca.UIII: tho:y ptrish not tosether wilh tMm, it iI a oenain arJUmem that the:y exiSi indcpcn~ dently upon them. Neither in the nnt place do Ihey nisI somewhere else apart for the individual xnsiblc:s. and without the: mind . Which is that opinion that Aristode justly wndemru;, bur either ;ustly or unskiJ.. fully anributes to PLaIO. For if the mind looked abrood for ill objecll wholly "iu.o...l itself, then all ill kno,,-Iedge ,,-ould be nothing bUI wn2 and pilSSioo. For to know a thing is nothing but 10 comprehrnd it by some inward ideas that a", do!l"w:sti<: to Ihc mind, and acti"dy CJc"ffl from i1. Wherefore these inlelligible ideas or eSSelu:a of thinp, tl\or;c fonns by which we understand alllhings, exisl nowM", bUI in Ihc mind itself. For it was "ery ...-ell determined long ago by Socrates in Plato's P."""..uKs thaI these things arc nothinl elsc but N"""'~I •. 'Thc:K species or ideas a", all of them nothing bul ,,"""'Q/Q 01" notions that exist nowhere bUI in the soul itself."! Whe",fo", to say th.1 the", are immutable natures and 1:SSe1>CCl, and r.,UJMI of Ihings, distilKt from the individuals thai exist ...·ithmJl us, is all one IS if one should say that there is in the uni .. trse above the orb ofma!ltt and body, anotlle. superior orb of intellectual beinr, thai oomp",hends its o...·n immediaTe objects, that is the immutable "'MMI and ideas of things with itself, by ... hich il understands and knows all thinp without itself. S." And yet, notwithstandinl, though these things nisi only in the mind, they arc not lherc:fore mtf"C firmrnlS oflhc undcl"$tandinr. For if the subjects of all ~ntifica1lhrorems ...·c"' nothinl bUI figmrnts, then aU m.nh and knowkdge that is built upon Ihem .... ould be a mm: fictitious thing. And if truth itself and the intdlecmal nalu", be fictitious things, then what can be real o r solid in the worldl BUI it is C\'idrnt that thourh the mind think. of thrsc things at plcasu,"", )'CI Ihcy are not .. no_,",w'OLB •• ia_H'

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arbitrarily framed by the mind. but ha,"e certain, determinate. and immutable Il1tures of thei r own. which all' indepmdent upon th.e mind and which all' blown away into !lOthing at the plasull' of the same Iking that arbitrarily made them. But we all nnunUy wnceive that th()I;C things have nOl only an ctemal. bur alm a nca:ssary uistencc. SO that they could nOl eVeT bur be such and so many as they all', and can nc,·cr possibly peri~h or cease to be, but aa absolutely undestroyable. Which i$ • thing frc<juently acknnwledged in the writings of both thooc famous philosophers, P~to and Aristotle. The former of them ys all" and caUing tho&c things., 'Things that wcre nc,·cr made, but 'things that were never made, nOr can be destroyed· .' 1 'Things ingcnerable and unperishable', 'fUiU PIMa ~<S"I pgm. Mil Mm"r <su' {as T ully npresseth it)." And Philo, the Platonical Jew, calls the fa '"Ql)fa, 4'1 which are the same things we spe. k of, 'the most nea:sury essences' (amYKa.Ur(lHlI ooo-iw), that is such things as could not but be, and cannot possibly not be. And Aristotle himself calls the r4liolUJ of th ings in hi$ metaphysics not only 'things separate from !lUller and immutable' uwpurra and oiKi...,,(I). but al ... eternal (a~Itible, and eterml. Which immutable and eternal objeclll of science in the place before quoted he described thus: 'Such a kind of entity of things as has neither motion. nor generation, nor COfTuption',SCl that is, such

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things IS were never rrulde, and can n(yeT bC' destroyed. To which he ...ith IDe mind is n.....s'"'rily determined. For scien~ or knowledge has nothing either of fienon Or of arbitrariness in it. but is 'the comprehension of tha[ which immutably 01'. (II;(lrdh)'fI, roo o\'n:><;) 6. Moreover, these things han a consistent bC'ing, when our particular created minds do not actually think of them, and therefore they = immutable in another sen&e likewise, not only bca""" they are indivisibly the same when we think of them. bUI also bcauSC' they ha"e a constant and never-failing entity, and always =, whether OUT particulu minds think of them OT not. FaT the intelligible natures and es,sc,nca of a triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cUN, sphere, &e. and all the n......... ry geometrical "entia Ixloflging to these several figures, were not the creatures of Archimedes, Euclid. or Pythagoras. or any OI:her inventors of geomcuy, nor did then first begin to lx, but all these .,IiO~N and "erities had a real and actual entity bC'fore, and ,,'Ould continue still, mough all the geometricians in [he world wen: quite extinct, and no man knew them OT thought of them. Nay, though all the rrulterial world were quite .wept away, and .Iso all particular created minds annihilated together with it, yet then: is no doubt but the inteUigible natures or cssenca of all geometrical figures, and the necessary verities Nlonging to them, would notwithstanding remain safe and sound. Wherefore these mings had a Ixing also Nfon: me matetial world and aU particulu intcUecIlI wen: crearcd. For it is not at all con~ivable thaI ever then: lYaS. time when there "u no intelligible nature of a triangle, nor any such thing cogitabk at all, and when il was not yel actually true m.t a triangle hu thrtt .ngles equal 10 111'0 right angles, but \hal these things ..-ere aflerward arbilrarily rrulde and brought into Ixing out of an amttedcnr nothing or nOn-enDty, SO lhat mc Ning ofthcm bore some certain .ute, and had a }'oungness in them, and so by Ihe same rcoson might wax old, and decay again. Which notion he often hups upon when he spc:>k. offmm. (w,,) ofthinr' IS when he says 'There i. no generation of the essence ofa sphere',J that is, it is • thing [hOI is not made, but always is. And d&ewhen: he pronounce. uni"cf$Zlly of the uo", 'The forms of mater~1 things ue without generation and corrup[ion',S< and, 'That none makes the form u "'" ~""". _""" l
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of any thing, for il is Ile\·U genetaled.·jJ Oi~en; ha'·e censured ArisuKk in some: of such passageltoo much to confound physics and m«aphylics tozetJtc,r. For ind""d these thinp II"( nO' true in a physical, but onl)· in a m«aphysiOilI s(n5e. llIat is, tlu: immedi.at1: objccn of inlell«tion and science (ni IIOlfTti), are etmlt l, neoess:arily nistem, and incorruptibk. 7. Now tM plain maning of all this i. nothing clsr, b ... t that th~ is an eternal wisdom and know~", in the "",rid, necaarily existing which _ m:ver made, and can n('.·(1 aue w 1M: or 1M: destroyed . Or, which is all Ont:, that tMl"( is an infinite (lemal mind necnsarily nisting, and that xtually compl"(hend. himself, tlu: possibility of all Ihings, and Ihe verities clinging 10 them. In a wonI, th.1 there i. I God, or an omnipotent and omoiscient Being, nec;"<'H?rily eristinl. who thef(fore cannot desU"Oy his own oong Or naIUf(, thai is, hi. infinile powc:r and wisdom. For.rna the intdligibk CS5eTICa (r~ rio ....) and ~eritie.s of things, as we obsc,... ed IM:(ore 01,11 of Plalo, are nothin, b... t 1t«ffUI/~, thai is ub;c.;tiv~ IlUtiU'''' ur knuwk:oJ5"'" . .. hio.:h "'" thi"p !.h at "",,,,ut ~IiM alone, but .""""her "';,h ,hot ocnuol knowled", in which lhey ...., rompl"(henrled , they al"( the modification. of some: mind or imellw:. It is .11 one to affirm thai there are ("(mill ' ./;"lfn, esKnccs of Ihinp, and verities nfl' sorily nisling, and to say that there is an infinitf, omnipotent, and eternal Mind, neassarily existing that Iho·.)'5 acnWly comprellendeth himS(lf, lhe essences of all things, and their '·erities, or, rather, which is the ..."iMon, euen<:U, md verities of.ll thinp. Fot' the and essences of things are not dead things, l.ike 1<1 many l tatues, images, ot" pictures h... nl up somewhere by themseh·es alone in I wwld . Neither arc truths I!lf"re sentences and propositions written do""n with ink "'polI • book, but they are hing thinp md nothing but modifi<:alions of mind or intellect. And therefol"( the fin;t intelk<;t is essentially and archetypally all r.N·~"'" and ~erities, and all particubr clUt1:d intellects .re but dcri~riYf participations of it, Ih.t are primed by it with the ume tttypal signatures upon them. And ore: may ... ndoubtedly conclude, lhat it is a thinl a1tosnhtt IS certain, thl! the,.., is an infinile and (lemal Mind (thl! is, I God) necnsarily existing in the ..·orld, as thll thel"( e,·er ..·os the r~/iD or

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intelligibk essence of a triangk, or circle, of unity and du:ility, and that it was ever acrually true that a triangk hath th= angles equal to tWO right angles, or thatlUfW'h'. QdJil/J 1U'I"alibus ~ffifi""1 Qtl{ll_1i4 [eq UJls added [0 equals make equals] Or the like. S. Neimer does this hinder or COntradict the truth of mi. assertion, that many thai: doubt concerning the existence of a God, yet notwimstanding confidently bd~ve the necessary etemity of these things, and persuade themselves that, though then: ,...,re no mind nor inteUect, and 50 no God in the world, nay though there was no malleT neither and no substantial entity at all, yet notwithstanding these ralilmts and verities of things would necessarily be as they~. 9. For thell' is an a1;l$olule impossibility in this assertion that mese esscnc:es of things and verities shou ld be, though then: were no substaniUl mtlty or no mind existing. For thC5C' things th......,l,·cs must of necessity be either substances or modifications of substance. For what is neither substance nor modification of a substance is I pUll' non-<:ntity; and if they be modifications of substance they cannot: possibly exiS!: without that substance whose modification. they all'. Which must eimeT be mailer or mind. But they all' not the modification. of malleT as such, beau"" they are uni,·erUI and immutabk. Therefore they arc the modifications of 50rmc mind or inlel1«1, so thot these cannot be eternal without an eternal Mind. And these rmcn do but deOO,·e themselves in the hypothetical IU!IIioo, that then: would have been th= rQliOlU' :and uni,·crsai verities, though there had ne'·er been a God or inlellect. Neither considering Whll the nature of God is, whose existence they would question Or doubt of, nor whal those T/JI;O~N and verities are, which they would make so neceliSarily nistent, by means whereof they do at once assert and question the same thing. For that which bcgClll so strong a persuasion in their minds that the TIlIWflt1i of things and universal verities arc so necessarily eternal, though they do IlO'I peraive it, is nothing else: but an inward invincible prepo'p-,ion of the necessary nistence of God, or an infinitc eternal omnipotent and omniscient mind (that ahny' OCtuaUy comprehend. himself, and the extenl of his Own power, or the ideas of all possible things), so deeply radicated 1nd infixed in their minds, 15 that they cannot possibly quit themselves of it, though they endeavour i\ never 50 much but it will unawares adhere: to them, even when they fora Ihemsrlvcs 10 suppose

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the noo-e~islena of God u " "",non, wt.o.c idea they do not ck:arIy compnhend. Thai is, ,he fora: Ofn"IUre is 50 mung in them as 10 make them acknowled~ the thing when they deny the ""'rd. So thallhe true ~ins of this phenomenoo is nothing else but Ihili, that God is a being 50 necessarily exislfllt, tNt tOOugh men will su ppose the noo+ exiaena of him, and deny Ihe name. yet notwithstanding they cannot but confute themselves, and ronf. . the IhinS. 10. Nay, il is clearly and mathematia.Uy demonstrable from what we have already pro,·ed, INt then: is some elemal mind. For as il is unq1.lC$tionably artain ,hal SOITI(lhinS in the world "-.5 eternal, merely from hence, bccoll$l: Ihere is beinS which rould nOi spring OUt of IlOIhing, and therefore, if lhere were no God, nuner of nox:usily must be eternal. So because theTe is mind and unden tanding and acnaal knowlcd", in the ""rid, and Ihese Ihinp could not spring OUI of mallu, wisdom and knowled", muot needs be elernal thinII', and there must be of necessity some eternal mind. For, U; .y~fIuSl, tNI once there had b«n no knowled~, no intellipble r./iDlfN or r5$enCCII of lhing&, no mind or intellect in the "",rld, it would N~e been absolutely impoosible INI ever there should hne been an y such thins. bccoll$l: il rould neither sprins oot of nIMhing, nor, which is all one, OUt of senseless and unknowinll manu.$/! I I. Now because e'·cry thins th.t is im"",nect must nceds depend upoo something that is perfect in the WTIe kind, our panicular imperfect undentandinp whid! do not alway. actuall)· COIlllin the '.';"110 of thinp and their vcritie5 in them, which arc many limes ignorvtt, doubting. cTrins, and oIo ... ly proutd by discourse and ratiocination from one thins 10 &BOther, must needs be deri,.. tivc particilMDonS of I perfect, infin itt:, and etemal in tellect, in which is the: "riImn of all thinp, and all uni'·ersal ,·mlies arc always actually comprehcnokd.. Whidt consideration is 50 obvious and unavoidable, tn.t Aristode himself rould not miss of it. FOI'" he lells US Ihat sina our undcrsundinp arc bUI p<Mentially all thinp (OOvcYI£I lIavra), thaI is have: not an lCIUaI but potential omniformity only, then: must of M'N'Ssity be;" 114/'''. [in narurel another inttllea that is aauaJly all knowledge, and is the same 10 our undtrStandings, 'Ihlt a.cti,·t an is

m,,,"

.. F... Cood_~..,........ _ ! ·'I._TISnlfr.

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CONurnml rurn~1 ud i",,,,,,,dlr !fUtralil), to passive maner' and, 'that th~ light is tl) our eyes',:md tru.t "'hieh does not, 'sometimes understand and sometimes not underst:md' bur is a1W;1Ys eternal, :oc:tu..! knowledge.~7 A sun that never ... tIl, an eye tru.t ne'-er winh. Wherefore thoogh all our knowledges be not stamped Or impresKd upoo our lII)uls from the matter, they are 011 as it were ectypal prints (<141payi<1para) and deli"otive signatures (iKpa,para) from one archetypal intellect, that is essentially the rat;o~rs of all things and all verities. tz. And from he:nlX it corn=; to pus, that all understandings are not only constandy furnished with forms and ideas to concei"e allrhinp by, and thereby enabled to understand all the clear conceptions of one another, being prinTed all O,'CT at once wilh lhe: seeds of univenal knowledge, but oIso have c:cacdy the: same ideas of the same things . Whereu if these things were impressed upon our !iOuls from the maTtCT wiThout, all men would not be readily furnished with the idl2S to conCC"ivc all things by II e"ery rime, it being merely euual and contingent "'hlt things OCCur 10 men'. se,'enl senses. Neither could their ideas be c:cactly alike to one another, 1xnuse no individual obtecrs are so. And therefore when one spoke of one thing, """ther would mean Inomer. Much less could men so promptly and c:cpcditely neTt them upon all ocasions, if they were dead fontls passiHly received only and not all virtually contained in some one :accive and vital principle that had a poHential omnifontlity in it. Wherefore, OS ThcmistiU!l ob",,,-6, men could nOl: possibl)' confer and disooul"K together in thai manner os they do, presently percei";ng One anlMher's meaning, and h"';ng the very 5
" 0/0,.+ 'Q"I qiJ;, '''' ...... ' (A - . t:k ._ 4)001» . O/O,'~ ~ lilid., 4JOO'J~ .,t~ _ . ok.!.!< OIl ""'._ "'" It , _ . .. n.", - , - (ft_' -J':)-< JUt d I'~ n ,; ",d;; "";;"';"';"'0; i>110_0,;. "'" m,bld.

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,

truth and knowledgc that is in all the undenlandinss in the world. JUSt u when a thousand eyn look upon the sun at ona, they all S« tM WllC' individual objed:. Or as when a gmt crowd or throog of people ho:ar one IlIld thc rwnc orator speo.king to tliem all, it is one and the IW1lI; voict, that is in the ~,.r:n.l "'1"$ of alltOOse III'vera! auditol"$. So in like manner, when innumerable CTCI!ed undersWldings direct themseh·c:s to the contemplation of the Amc uni,·ersalllIld immulwle truths, they do all of Ihem but u it wen listen to one and Ihe IilIl'\( original voice of tM eternal wisdom that is never silent, and the 1II',.era! rontcp(ions of those truths in their minds an: bill like s.,..era! echoes ohM same VtrH ",nom [conceprionll] of the divine intelkct ruounding in them. 14. From what We h.,·c already declared, it is evident that wisdom, knowledge, IlIld understanding arc (lema! IlIld self-subsi stent thinp, superior to '"""Iter and all ""nsible beings, IlIld indcpc:ndcnt upon them. Which mySiery is thus acknowledged both in Ouutianity IlIld Platonism, in that wisdom IlIld intellw HC nude the cternalllIld fil"$tbegonen offspring of the first ""iginal goodness, the founlain of all things. 'The Lord possessed mc in 1M bqinning of his WlIy, before hi. worb of old. I "'"U set up from ('·crluting, from the beginning, or ever the eat"lh was. &c.' (Proverbs 8.H- 3). And indeed that opinion that knowledge, wisdom, IlIld undemanding [uc] in [their] 0""" natUre posterior to sensible IlIld matmal things, IlIld do-th result O\It of tliem, or procttd ooly from thc radiation IlIld acti,·ity of the nuUer 01\ that which undel"$t:lnds, is nothing else but do ...... right atheism. For if this wen: lrue, that wisdom, knowledge, and intellection were in illi own nature postmar 10 smsible and corporeal things, as being nothing but the sump or impress oflhcm, then it must needs follow that this corporeal world was nOl made or framed by llIly IlIltccedent wisdom or knowledge, but that it sprang up of i~lf from the blind, fonuilous, and giddy motions of eternal atoms., from whence all thai knowledge that is in the world did afterward res.ult. Which is aU one as to say that then is no God at all. But if llIly will here pretend that there is indeed I knowledge in God IlIltea:dent to all rorpon:al being, IlIld therefore no passion but. thing independent upon nuner IlIld self-originated, but yet notwimstanding, the knowledge of aU CTCIted undemandings is not a thing immediately derived from thence, but only taken up It the rebound or second-hand from sensible and ror,,"1 eaI things; this is just u if one should say that

'J'

there is inden! • brigh tness or lucidity in the sun, btlt yet /lOI:withstanding the ti,ht which is in the air, iii no!: deri" ed from that light which i$ in the body of the i un, hut liprin gs ilTlll\edilltc1y out of the po"'U of the dark air. Which heinl I thinl sppllmnly sb§urd, it may be p!awned that thi. asKnion i~ nothin, but I ~erbal and p"'tenckd acknolO'led gement of a God, that has an antecedent and an independent knO"'lcdge made by such as deny the same. Fot otherwise to wlla! purpo5C should they 110 ~iokntly IlIId distortedly pen'eTl Ihe nalural ordeT IlIId ckpen&ncy of thinl' in the uni,'ctV, and cut off that rugn.tion and oonnection which is belwixt thin", im perfcci Ilnd thin", perfect of the same: kind, ~i%t crated minds and the in<:mlted mind, which is the inteUectul1 scaIc or ladder by whieh " 'e dimb up 10 God, if they did re:aJly belie"e and acknowledge an}" such thing. But he that can belie~e that all human knowledge, wisdom, and prudence has no other soun:e and ori"ntl than the radilltions .nd impresses of the dan maltCT, and the fortuitous and tumultuous jumblinp t""r...,f, it i. justly to be 5Uopecttd Ilia! he is too ncar akin to those ancient th...,logucs th,t Aristotle: speaks uC .lL.. , f~lcltai
=

t. We formerly showed thllt the perception of external sense all such is a mn-e relative and fantalltial thinl, there bein]!: IlOI:hin]!:llbwlutc1y InIC and re:aJ in it, but only this., that the soul twh . uch I [mSion, Ilffection, phan tasm, appcannae, or S«IIlinl in it . But iC1ISC being but .n idiopathy, " 'c cannot be absolutely certain by it thlll C\'cty other person or animallw the same: passion or Ilffection or phantasm in it from the same cool""uJ object that We "''''"h'~ have. 'Are yvu certai n thll C\'ery <XlM:r animallw; the same !\CnS( or phantasm of every colour Itw you haye', llith Soc:rucs, IoCCOrdiD]!: to Prougoras' sefliC, 'Day that every lKhe:r man has the same. Or, lastly, an you be so much IS 5U", thllt yourxlf shall iIlWll)'S have the same phantasm from the: IW11C object,

'"

wMn you a", not aho'ays the &aim with yoursdf?.oo and passions are dh-ersilied by th~ k5IO(11)'Kpaoia fidios)'71cruy) of the patient. Wherefore we cannlK be: su"' Im",ly by the passions of sense, what the absolute n.:Ilurc of a corpon:al obje<;t is without us, our pctUpUon bdng only reLnivc to ourselves, and our several organs and bodily muu. Nay, we cannot be: sure IhallMre is any objecr al all be:fo", us, ...·hen we ha>'e a phantaSm of sens:alion of somelhing. Forasmuch as not only in our drnms, but also when .... e a", ...... ke we have phantasms and ..,nsatiom in Ull of Ihings Wt h.n no ",ality. The ",.son nf all which is, because by exlernal sense we do bUI suffer from corporcollhings existing withoul, and SO do not comprehend tM nature of the Ihing as it is absolutely in itself; but only our own passion from il. Neilher i. our sense a passion immediatdy from Ihe Ihing itself Ihal is pcrcei"ed, for IMn il .... ould "'" be: altogelher SO uncemin as il is, bUI only from certain local motions in thaI bod y which the soul is vitally uniled to, by the mediation whereof it pcroeivCi other things al a distance, which local motions and passions may be: produced when IhCTC a", no such objects. So thaI if rher1: ....ere no other pt,ceplive po ....er or faculty distinct from external sense, . 11 0\11' perceptions would be merely relative, se<:ming and fantaStical, and nOl reach 10 the absolule and cemin truth of .ny Ihing . And every on. would but, as Protagoras expounds it, 'thin k his 0"''71 pri>'lt. and ",lath'e thoughts truths,,~1 and all our cogitations being nothing but appearances, would be indiffCTCndy ali ke true phantasms and one as anlKhcr_ 2. BUI we ha~e since .Iso demonsrrated Ihlol the", is another percepti>'e power in the soul superior to outward sense, and of a distinct nature from iI, which i. the power of knowing or und erstanding, Wt is, an .cti~e exertion from the mind itself. And therefore hu this gnnd P"' elll,nence abm-. sense, thaI it is no idiopath y, nOl a Imr. pri>'lI!., a rel.live, seeming, and fantaStical thing, but the romp",hension of thlot which absolulely IS and IS NOT . .. "H ri

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For whereas the ob~cts of external sense (ui aiulhtui) au nothing but indi~idl,lal corporeal things existing without us, from which by lense "'C receivc onl)' idols, images, and passions, of which, as Plorinus observes, 'that which is known by sense, is but an image of that individual body esisting without, which sense suffm; from. But the objKt of sense i. a being not in"''ardl y oomp,."hended, but ,."maining without<6Zand , 'for this elIuse the truth of the thing is no! in sense, but only opinion'.6J Yttthe proper and immediate obitcts of science: righdy so-alled and intellection (ul vol/ni), being th e intelligible essences of things and their necusary verities, thai exist nowhere but in the mind i!Stlr, the understanding by i\5 acri"e power is fu1ly master of them, and comprehends 'not idols or images of them','" but the very things themselves within itself. 'Knowledge is not tM peraption of things abroad without the mind',·' but is the mind's comprehending i!Stlf. 'The mind, in con. iderin, things, will not apprehend the thin gs themselves, but only their images, &c .Mi Wheufo,." it is most true as Aristotle often observeth, 'that the knowled", of any sclentifical th.......,m is one and the self-same thing with the thing knO""n',67 'that "'hich knows and that ",-hich is known are ,."a1ly the ilUTIe thing"M 'The knowledge of any metaphysical Or mathematical truth is the '"try thing', Vi 'or truth itself known ' and not any pauion or picture of il. w And though the same philosopher writts elsewhtu thot sense is the .. me wilh sensible things and understanding the soarm: with the things understood,71 yet the difftTtnce: bttwixt thooe

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ate

lOrD is '-err greal, for lhe se:nsible Ihinp rally exisl wit/wul, and sense: Jus only a passive and phantasmarial representation of mem. But imtlleawl conceptions propuly so-aJlcd, the primary obj«u of science and intdltttion, thaI is the 'sep;lrate eternal and immutable Nlitmn of things',n ex;,1 no..1ien: bUI in the mind i!Klf, being its own ideas. FClT the soul is IS ArislOIIe opcaks, 'Ihe pl:aoe of fornu and ideas,,'l and they have no 0I.11u enrity a! all 001 only in beinl kno1\'Tl or und=tood. And by and thf"OlJlh these inward ideas of Ihe mind itself, .. hich an: ilS primary objccB, doe5 il kno.. and understand all enemal individuallhinp., which are lhe seoondary obj«u of 1r.oo..1ed1C only . 3. Morwver, tltJl Ihe inte1kction and knowinl perception of the soul is nOl relllh'e and fanlUtital IS the sensiri,'c, is evident from hence, because il il liable ro false:hood, which il could not be, if il had nOl a power of oomprehtlldinl absoIule truth. For external sense:, for this very reuon, is nOI capable of falsehood, because as ,uch il does not comprehend 1M abwlult trulh of any thinl. heinl only a phantasm (fal'T(loi(l) or appearance, and all appearances as >1IC1t ~ alike true. So in ]ike manner, if the noc'lical perceptionl of the soul Were only fantasrital, and did not extend to lhe comprehension of lite absolule truth of thinp, then e"ery opinion would of nec:c:ssity be alike trut, neither could tlien: be any absolute falscltood in any, because: '''''cry fancy is uue,,74 Ilta! is., every fancy is a fancy Or an appeannce, and nothinl more i. re<juired 10 il. For absoIutl: 1r1,lth bclonp not to the naNre of iL BUI it i. evidenl 10 all that an: nOl lunk and delentraled below men ;nro brutish sottlshness, Ihal there an: false: opinionl. WIw:nce il folio ... un
",

figments of the mind, b«ausc then every opinion or cogitation would be alike true, that is a true figment h ..;ng no other truth but relari"t to that particular mind wt..;,s., figment it is. But these things MVt an absolute and immul3ble nature in themsel,'es, an d their mutual res~ to one another are alike immutable. And therefore those opinions and cogillltions of the mind ...·hich arc not conformable to the immutable reality of Ih""" objective idns have an absolu te falsehood in them. As for example, the nature of a triangle is an immutable thing, and this is demonstrable of it as imm utabl y an d necessarily true thai il hath Ihr~ anglel equal to tWO tight ones. Ncithff can any man's opinion or thinking make it otherwise. For it is a false opinion, unless it be agreeable to the immutable nature of a triangk So likewise the ploin regular gCQl1letrical ..,lids as such h..·c an immutable natUre or essencc. And it is demonstrable nf them that there are five such bodies, and that there can be nn more. And any opinion to thc contrary will be an absolutc falsehood. Wherefore every opinion or thinking is not knowledge, but only a right opinion. And therefore knowledge is not reilltive (lIpOt TO KpiVOV), as sense is. Truth is the most unbending and incompatible, the IllOSt nl'"C""'qry, firm, immutable, and adamantine thing- in the world. ,.. Moreover, because these intelligible ~n CCS of things, as before was observed, are like unities indi"isible, SO that if the least be added to them, or detracted from them, they are not the same, but something else. Whenever the same things are rightly undentood by any minds, they muSt of necessity have all the same truths belonging to them every where. Nay, these truths are not all multip lied , as we obse" 'ed before, by the multiplicity of minds that apprehend them, but are as one and the same indi,;d..."l truths in thoo;e several minds, forasmuch as wisdom, truth, and knowledge are but one and the same eternal original light shining in all cn:ated understandings. T o conclude therefore, whenever any theoretical proposition is rightly undcl"itood by any onc panicular mind whatsoc,·u, and whereiIOCver it be, the truth of it is no privlte thing, nor relative to that particular mind only. But it is a catho~c and universal truth (d).l/Oi.:.; KaOo-uKov), as the Stoics speak , throughout the whnle "" orld. Nay, it wou ld nn! &il to be a truth throughout infinite worlds, iftbcrc were.., many, to.lI such minds, as shnu ld rightly understand it. s. BUI probably it may be hen: demanded, how a man shalJ know

'" 'I'

ate

whm his cona:plions are conformed 10 Ihe absolute and immutable natures or essences of things and Iheir unch.npble relOlions to ont another? Sina: the immediate objN."tS of inrdlection uist in the mind iw:lf, we must nm go about 10 look for Ihe criterion of truth wilhout ourselvr:s, by consulting individual sensibles, as the exemplanl of our ideas, and measuring Our conceptions br them. And how is it possible to know by measuring of ..,nsibl< squares, thOl the di:lmeter of e.'tTy square is incommensurable ",-ith Ihe sides! Nay, as was observed before, the nea:ssary truth of no geometrical Iheorem can e'-cr be eXlJ11ined , pro,'ed, or delermined by ..,nsible things mtchanically, And though the cternal di"ine intellect be the archetypal rule of trulh, we cannot consult thO! neither to s« whether OUr conceptions be commen surale wilh il . [ answer therefore, Ihat the criterion of Irue knowledge is not to be looked for an y where abroad wilhoul our own minds, neilher in the height above, nor in lhe depth beneath, but only in Our knnwledge and cona:ptions themselves. For the entitr of all thromical truth is nothing else b.ul dear intelligibility, and whatever is dearly ooncei,-ed is an entity and a truth . But thot which is false, di~ine power itself cannot make il 10 be o1"",.ly and distinctly und~,ood because falsehood i. a non-entity, and a dear rona:ption is an entity . And omnipore""" itsolf cannot make a non-enrity to be an mtity_ Wherefore no man ever was or can be dtcei,·e.,l in taking that for an epistemonical trulh which he clearly and distinctly app",hends, bur only in assenting 10 things not clearly opp",hended by him, which is the only true original of all error. 6. But there is anmher opinion t .... t "::ems tn have goined the countenana: of some very learned philosophers, whi<;h diff~ hut a little from the Protagortan doctrine. Though for my pan [ ooncei '-e it nOi to be an opinion, but only a certain scheme of modesty and humility, which they Ihought decorous to take upon thelllSC'h'cs that t~· might nOi seem to arrogate too much either 10 them5elvtS, or to their exa:lIent perfomtllnces, by nOi 50 much as p"'tending to dffi'lOOSirate any Ihing to be absolutely true, but only hypothetically, or upon supposition t ....1 our faculties are rightly made. For if we cannot otherwise possibly be certain of the truth of any thing, but onlr~" 4YPOf4ts; that our lilculties are rightly made, of which none can h"'e any ceruin assurana: but only he that made them, lhen all created minds whatsoever mUJI of necessity be condemned 10 an

.,s

elem~1

supsis_ Neilher ought t""y ever to assent to any thing as a:minly

O'Ue, since ~II their truth ~nd knowkdge as such is but relalive to their faculties arl!it",rily made, that may pos.ibly be false, and their clearest apprehensions nothing bUI perpetual delusions. Wherefore according 10 Ihis dOCIrine, we having no absolute certainty of the firsl principles of all our knowkdge, as that ""oJ rog;/al. W [whatever thinks, is). 14."",./;,. ,.dJ;/,. ,.,,,,,,lib... 4firiull/ ,.,,,,,IIIUi [Equals added to ,""uals make ,""ualsJ, OmIlU lIumu... m wi {JIlT wi ;"'PIIT [Every number is either even or odd1_ We can ntither be sure of any mathtmati<::al or metaphysical truth, nor of the uistr:nce of God, nor of ourselves. For whereas ...me would endtavour 10 prove the truth of their intellectual faculties from hena:, Ixcause there i•• God, whose nature al ... is such as thai he cannot deceive,7! it is plain th.t this is nothing but a cill:k, and rn.okes no pl'OJT"SS at all, forosmuch as all the cenainty which they have of the existence of God, .nd of his nat un:, depends wholly upon the arbitrary make ofthtir faculties, which for aught they know may be false. N.y, according to this doctrine, no man can cenainly know that then: is any absolute O'Uth in the world al all, Ixcause it is nothing but his faculties which makes him think there is, which possibly may be false. Wherefore upon this supposition, all created knowledSt' as such is a mere famasti<::al thing. Now this is very stranSt' to assert, thO! God cannot make a creature which shall be able ccrtlinly to know either the existence of God, or of himself, or whether the'" be any absolute truth or no. 7. It is evidem that this opinion plainly sup]XJSeS that intellwual faculties may be so made, as dearly and distinctly to understand that to be O'Ue which is absolutely ralse and impossible (for unless they did acknowledSt' that we do dearly understand some things, they could not undertake so much as hypothetically to demonsl"'te any thing). As for example, th.t the whole is not grealer than one of irs parts, or that the th= angles of a tri:angk a", nner "
'"

knowkd~

or scimce which exists nowhtre but in ~ mind ilKlfhas no o~r Imtiry at aU besides intell igibility, ond therefore, wh.n soenr is clearly intelligible is absolutely true.. Hena: it comes to pass th.t bolh phiJosophtrs ond divines have without scrupJc measured the divint omnipolencc itself, ond the possibiliry of things by their o"'n dnr inldJ«tionII ronccrnin, tltem, ond SO pl'Oflouna th., God hill15Clf (:II1nol make ronrradictioos to be tnJc II lhe Arne time, WI>enas il wc"' • high and unpardonable pruumption thus 10 "emu", 10 measu", the divine omnipolena, if then ~"' nOl: on absolule aruinty of~ truth of clear intellection., .. beinl nodting else bUI the immutable wisdom of God participated and imparted 10 us, And if il be absolutely impossible even to omnipolena:, that ronrradictories should be true logether, then omnipoltna: illiClf a nnot make any liuch faculrics as drall dearly understand tltat which if false to be true, sina: tlte essence offalschood ronliisu in nothing ebe but non-intelligibiliry. But if they wiU say that il is not impossible Ihat ronrradictories should be true, because our faculties, ...·hich nuke us Ihink so, may be fabc 0.",,1 ,Jeu:iyc us in ncry Lhin~, the ,tnT,.,..,ry U>l' '''''IUCIlt;C flUm hena: will be
So that if then: wc", • world of men anted either in

~

moon or elsewhere, that lhould affirm tlte contradictories to all tlte theorems in gromcrry, forasmuch u we certainly know that ...·c clnrly undCT5land tltem to be tntc:, and thaI faJso:hood an never be clearly understood, We oulht not in ~ \ea$t to question from hence whether our bcuttics or thein ...·cre made true, or to suspect that truth ond knowlcd~ were such whimin, things, as that they merely depended upon an arbitrary make of faculties. But [wc ought] to rondudc without any rontroycny that this was but. bedlam world of mad, &lnric, lAd disll'lCIed sou ls,

...

that Ju.d no dear apprehensions of any thing, and either by men: chance or humour hlpp<:nw to ~nttO every thing Ihal lOU false as lJ'Ue. 9. But yet ifany nne will still pcrtinaciou.sly u'F lrul1 it is nothing bUI our faculties which instruct uS thus, thlt every dear conception is an entity, and that the entity of truth is nothing but dear intelliJibility, thlt contradictions cannot be true, or if they could, then there were no possibility of any cemin knowlwge, that all Ihis is from Our faculties, but that still our faculties themselves may be false - nay it is not reasonable to think that the intellectual faculties of any creatures .t.ould be absolutely infallible in any thing, because this Seen" to be the peculiar privikge and sok prerogative of the Deity. I answer that this is the thing we contend fOT, that the ultimate resolution of thcon:ticol truth and the only criterion (Kpm;plO~) of it is in the cleamess of the apprehensions themsclvr:s, and not in any supposed blind and unaccounuble make of faculties. So thai the cen:ainty of clear apprehensions is not to be derivw from the contingent truth offaculties, but the goodness of faculties is only to be tried by the dcamcss and distinctness of apprehensions. For be these faculties what they will, clear intdkCl1.lll conceptions must of n~ity be truths, beause they are real enrities. And to suppose that faculties may be.50 made, as to beget clear apprehensions of things that are nOH, lIS if knowledge were an arbitrary fictitious thing, is much like thlt opinion of somo:, IMt all the new celestial phenomena. as of the jovial planets,7li I11d the mountains in the moon, and the like, are no real things, but that the dear diaphanous cryual of the telescopes may be.50 artificially cut, ground, polished, as to male all those, and any other pheno",ena, clearly to .ppcar to sense, when there is no such thing. Nay, it is more absurd and ridiculous to imagine, thot that more than c.)'Stlllin., JXllucid inteUectual f&culry, by which...., pc"",ive the truth of things, can be arbitrarily so made Or polished as III rcpTelOCTTt any non-cntitic:s wh.tsoevcr, as clear and real obiects of intellecrion. to. Nay, 10 make the ccrtainry of all truth and knowledJ" , nO{ to be determined by the cleamess of opprehensions thcmJclvCi, but a supposed unaccountable truth and rectitude of faculties, and 50 by the uncertainty thereof quile to baffle all our dearest inteUections, is quite III pervert the nature ofkno .... ledJ", which is the 'comprehension ortMI ,. .,.......,,( jo><,

" .1"p""· n.;, ..... """',;.",,( """"'............ __

CidiIto·, d....... ;".

io on a/Iuoioo ..

'.'

,.

which absolutely is' (KnTIilIII"'" TOO 51"1"..... ), which is not terminated in appearance (TO O'~ 4>ru1'6J1tI'O V) only, as sense is, but in that which is (TO ov) and 'whose evidence and certainty is no extrinsical and bolTOwed thing, but .... tive and intrinsical to itsc:lf'. For ifknowledge have no inward KPIT~PIOV [criterion] of its own, but the cenalnty of aU truth and knowledge depend. upon an arbitrary peculiar make of faculties, which is not a thing knowable in itself, neither can wre be any assurance of it given but ",'hat is extrinsical by testimony and revelation (inartificial argum<:nts), there will he no such thing iI$ koowledge, but all will be mere credulity and helief. t I . It is a fond imagination for any to sUPP'* that it is derogatory to the glMy of God to besro,,' or import any such gift upon hi. creatures iI$ knowledge is, which hath an intrinsical evidence within itsc:lf, Or that creatures should have a certainty of the first principles which all men are conscious that they do so clcarly understand, that they cannot dOtlbt of them, as that Nilli/ ""I/a m ,jJmio [No elTed results from noth ing], Atlf'U'li4 tuidj,,, "tfl'a/i#su tJ]ineNI (Ut) atqu"liiJ {Equals. added to tquals make equals], without which they can know nothing at all, though they be notwithstanding ignorant, doubting, and erring in many things, and slowly proceed in their ntioci .... rions (rom one thing to another. WherC2S, on the a>ntrary, it is plainly derogatory to it to SUPP'* that God cannot make any creature that can possibly ha" e any analn knowledge of God's 0"'''' existence, or any thing more than a bare credulity of the same , t,.. Wherefore sina it cannot he denied but every clear apprehension is an entity, and the es.cna of truth is nothing but dur intelligibility,n those philosophers mUSt I<\y the streSS of their cause here, thlt intellectual faculties may be so made as that men can never cenainly tell when they have clear apprehensions but may think they ha"e them when they have not. And it annot he denied but that men are oftentimes dcaiyed and think they clearly comprehend what they do not. But it does not follow from hena, because men sometimes think that they clearly comprehend what they do not, that therefOJ'C they can neyer be certaio thl t Wy do clearly comprehend any thing. Which is JUSt as if ... e should argue that because in (lur dreams we think we have cleat sens:ations, We cannol

then:fore be ever ,ure, when,..., are ...-n e, th.t we sec. things that roally are. I shall conclude thil; discou,"", with thot of Ori gen .g.inst Gelsu ...

'Science and knowledge ;. the only firm thing in the world',7J without • participation of " 'hieh communicated to them from God, all creatu"", would be Imre luiibria [plaything.) and ,·anity.

Chapler VI We hove now .bund.ntly confuted the pr<){agore~n philosophy, "'hieh, thot it might be sure fa destroy the immut.ble natures (If just and unju.t, ....ould destroy all science (If lno .... ledgc, and make it relati"e and fantastical. Hoving shu .... n th.t this tenel is nOt (lnly most absurd and cont",dictio)w: in itself, hut als<> Trulnifesdy repugnant t(l thot "err alomical physiology on which ProragOlOS endca,-oured to found it , and, than which nOlhing can more dr.ctually confut. and destroy it' as also [having] largely demonstrated, thot though sense be ind~d a mer. rel.ti,·. and fantaStical JXrteption as Protagm.. s thus far rightly supposes. Yet nmwith.lllnding th.r. is a ,uJXrior pol,,-.r of intellectron and kno .... ledge of a different natUre from sense, whieh i. nOt terminated in mere seeming .nd 'ppnran'" only (tv ~Iii gical sct.ools ha" e constantly avouched) this i. ""I y to be understood of the intelligible essences .nd YlJtio~. of things, as they ore the obie
'"

,.

r.~,

of all thin" and their vtriri.e$, from which all particular intellects arc dnlvw, and 011 which they do depend . Bill nO( that the ronsnwtivt e5KfICa of all individU.11 created thin" wen: et ........ l and Unatlted, II if God in aatinlthe world did nothinl elM: but nlOme sarnstinlly upte$$ it, 'S."ri Uuf., ~ tunI'!,,' wstirr tmlnlW', oo]y do!he ~ <:ternal, increutd and anteeedeni eiKnca ofdUn" with a nnr outside prmrn! of uistm~, and no! crate Ihe whole of them. And u if the consriwli~e -U-nQCS of thin" could nist apart KpaJately from the thin" thanKh·u, which absurd con"';! Amtotlc: f~uendy and no lea deKfVwly chast:ises. 3. Wherefon: ~ result of 01] that we ha,~ hitherto said is this, that the in!d\isI"b1e Mtura and _ces of thin" arc ..... thcr arbiu....y nor fanwtial, thu is, ..... thu oIlo:n.ble by any ..ill WlutllOeYU, nor ctw.~ able by opinion. And the~rore every thinl is nt' ,.,,;Iy and immutably 10 Kience and !mo... led.,. what it is, whether -,*>lutely or rela!i\"C]y, U) all mind. and intellects in the world. So that if moral g.-I and evil, jusl and unjtW, signify any realilY, eittKr absolute or relative, in the things .., denominated, as tMy mtW han some certain nWira .. hich arc the :actio... or IOU" of mm , they a~ neit her alterable by InC"I"C: will nor opinion. Upon which ground that wise philotopho:r Plato, in his Minos., detcrminCi that a law (..oJlO(") is no! any .rbitrary deeree of a cily or ,uprcme lovernors CMrI'II ItO~) bcauliC thefe may be unjUSt decrees which Ih,.ref~ :o.rc no I..... bUI the invention of that which it (roo OI'fO(" i{Q)panc) or .. h.t i, .bsolutely or immuabl)· JUSt in its 0'0.... nalure .79 Thoulh it be very [n.Ie .lso that the arbit ...... y constitutions of thoR that have 1.... ful authority of commandinl, ..hm they an: nO( materially \Il1jU5t, arc laws abo in I Kalndary M:nse, by vinue of that nuural and immutable JUStice or law that ~uira political order to be obKf\'ed . .. BUI I have no! wen ,II the$e ",inl only U) confute MXpti..:ism or fantnlici'iI~ Of Im:~ly 10 dd'cnd and o(llTobonlle our UfUmc:nt for the immuable natllra of just and unjust. But also for some «her ..eig:bty PU11'( t I thaI ""' vet)' much conducinltO the business that ,,~ ha,·,. in hand. And tim of all that ~ toul is nor a mere nsked and passi~ thinl, , rIU4 , ....111, which Iw no innate fUmitu", or activit)· of its own, nor

,~

••

any thing at all in it, but what was impressed upon it [from[ witllout. For if it wen SO then tJ.en, coold not possibly be any such thing as moral good and evil, JUSt and unjust, forasmuch as theK differ<:nces do not arise merely from the outward objects or from the imprelSell which they make upon u. by ..,n"", then: being no such thing in them. In ""hich "'n'" it is ttuly affirmed by the author of the uWl,IIa1l, 'That then: is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the natun: of the obitcts themsdves',.... that is either comiden:d absolutely in them..,Iv...., or n:latinly to external ..,n"" only, but according to some other interior analogy which things have to a cemin inward determination in the soul i!Self, from whence the foundation of all this differ<:nce must needs ari5e, as I shall lihow afterwards. Not that the anticipations of morality spring merdy from intellectual forms and notional ideas of the mind, or from certain rules Or propositions arbitnrily printed upon the soul as upon a book, but from some other mon: inward and vital prineiple, in intellectual heinp as such, when:by they have a natund determination in them to do some things and to a"oid others, which wuld not be, if they were "",n: naked passive things . Wherefon: since the natun: of morality cannot be. understood, without some knowledge of the natun: of the soul, I thought it seasonable and requisite here: to take this occasion offered and to pn:P'l«' the way to our following discourse"' by showing in general that the soul i. not a mere passive and receptive thing, which hath no innate acti"e principle of its own, btaU5e upon this hypothesis there: could be. no such thing as morality. s. Again, I ha"e the rather insisted upon this argument also, btause that which nukes men SO indinable 10 think that justice, honesty, and morality ~ but thin, airy, and fanrastical things., that have linle or no entity or reality in them beiides sensuality, is a certain opinion in philosophy which doth usually accompany it, that matter and body are the first original and source of all things; that there: is no incorporeal su\l$nmce superior to maner and independent upon it; and therefore that sensible things are the only real and subsWltial things in nature; but """Is and mind. springing secondarily out of body, that inu.Uec_ tuality and morality be.long unto them, ~ but thin and evanid shadows • 1 _. u,-;...... P'" '. dI. 6... no I1"lirJo W "., of n-., H_ . .... W~ _ _ . ..... " ;, LfF" ~ fr Ji.u ohM lot ......... "'" ,~,_~UtW_

,lit. "fo"..., "' .... 0(,"" ~"'~~.~ .. r......m. bo' ... . - to< =- whido.;r ...,.0(,"" th, ....... , 'u ' ., ... '" ioIlow"•

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of sensibk 1nd corpon:ll things, and no! natural, but artificial and factitious things that do as it were border upon th" confines of non-

entity.

6. Thi. is a thing excellently ,..en obse...·ed b)' Plato, and th"..,fore I shall sel do"'n his word. lllaIP concerning il: "These men making !hi> distribution of Ihings, Ihal allthinp that ~, are ci'.... by na.ure. or art. or chance, Ihey imagine thaI the crea.eu. and rnD<1 ""ooJIm, thinl' thaI . ... in .h. "","d. ~ fO be .rtribuN:d to na.lIrt and chaoo.; ... hid! -...orkinr upon Ihosco creater Ihinl' whid! are mode by na,ure, docs form and fabricate oertain smaller thinp af,......."'. ",'hid! _ commonly call onilkial'hingo.. To speak more plainly, fin:, .... ' .... .br and earth. ,hey attribute wholl)' natun: and chan.ce. but flO{ to any on or ,.iWom. In Jike """nna , ...... hod;" of .... arth, .... lun. moon and ...... 'hey wiD ha,.., to be nude OIl' of them fOrlui,ously agitated; and 10 by chana: causing both di"" .. system. Ind com.pages of things. Thu • •hory ",,,,,LeI han the ...holt ha~.ns made, and .1I 'he earth and &nimols. and .11 ,he _ . of the J""'. not by ony mind, in",llttt or God. no. by any art or wisdom. bu. all by blind rulure and oluncoo_ But art and mind If, ....... 'pringin, up "'" oftheoc. to ha,.., begotten certain ludicrou. 'hinp, ..hich han ~"k truth and .-aJity in them, bu. an like imasa in I ,!au, luch .. pittur. and mu.it produces. Wherefore thno mon l!tribute all ethics and politics, monlity and 10.... not to ... tu ... but to ar., ........ prod""non. .... not real and subotan.;"I.u

'0

,d.

7. Now ,his philosopher. thot he may evintt that ethics, politics, and

,q"" ,.".,..... ,oIC_

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,,6

morality are a:s real and SUbsWlliaI things, and a:s !TU1)· narural a:s those things ..·hich belong to nutter. M mde:lvours to show that souls and minds do not: spring secondarily om of nutter and body, but that tM)" are real things in nature, .upc:rior and antecedent to body and maner. His words are th=, ll>eoe men I ...J Ire

.u ;ponn, concern;n, the no,,,,,, of mind ...d 50111,

in otMr regank. SO especially in '0l'"t of its original... i, is in order ofnoture bef_ matter:and body, ... d does not result out ont, but does COII1l1W1d I', ,",vern;!, ond rule ;,."' OS

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And lherd'ore more real II1d substantial things. f"OT ,inIX mind and intdkct are I higher, more real and substancial thing chan senseless body and !ruInu, and what hath fu the more vigour, acti"icy, and entity in it, modifications of mind and intelkct, ouch as justiIX and mor:!.lity, must of necessity be more =1 and substantial things than the modifications of mere scnsdclis !ruiner, soch as hud and soft, lhick and thin, hot: and cold, and the like are. And thtrcforc thilt gra"e philosopher txctllcndy well concludes: the JTCllat and fim 0I'0ri::1 and ocrionJ If" of Irt or of mind, which ,.-ere before body; but those thinp whid! .... Mid II) be by nature (in ,,-hith they abu.., tbt word ... CUre appropriating it only to ..,n..,IOSI and inanimate mantt) an. .ficnnrd. btinl ""....ned by mind and

.rt."

9.

W~refore

I thought our fOllTlCr discourse: sca!iOnabk to confute

the dullness and grossness orlhose philosophut."" that mab rorpo'cal things uisting without the soul, to be the only ootid IlIld substantial things and make their grossest cxternal senses the ooly judges of Ithe] reality of things, 'llIld SO conclude n
.,.

Whucas notwithstanding it is mosl [rue th.t those corpo=1 qualities,

which they think to be such real things existing in bodies without tMm, arc for the most: put fantastic and imaginary things, and ha~c no more reality than the colour-. of the ninbow, and, as Plotinus cxprcsscth it, 'h"'e no reality at all in me objects without us, but only a sec:ming kind of entity in our own fancies',- and thCf'tfore are not ab50lutely any thing in themselves. but only relative to aninu!s. So that they do in • manner mock us, whm we conceive of them as things really exisling withoul us, being nothing but OUT own shado,"'s, aDd the vital passive entT¥ics of Our own souls. Though it ..-as nO! Ihe incention orGod or nature to abu"" us herein, but a most wisc conmvllIlIX tbus to beautif)' IlIld adorn the visibk and !ruItcriai world, to add lusu-c or embellishment to it, that it might have .. "

T;,~

ni.,...;m.

En< .... "1«'", ri.t:..,.;~. ~'Q.!""!.Jtp6J ....... ~ _

...... ; 1a-"...,..I{....,"..t<6 ,0&.., ....'1'" ni ~"' " . . <..... 19-~ ....... o..I·_r,h .... 0/ _ ol.U<> 0/01;0<_
.q..,.; '" .-.1

...,;..: .oh J':YD" '4' 600. No< 1'Tuo ' ,oo, but

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dwms, relishes, and allurements in it, U, gratify our 'ppetites. Whe<eas otherwi~

really in itself, the .... hole corporeal world in its naked hue, is IIO!hing el~ but a l>eap of dust or atoms, of several figures and magnitudes, variously agitated up and down. So d"l1 these things which we look upon as such real things .... ithoU! us, ore IIO! properly Ihe modifications of bodies themselves, but several mod;fica!ions, passions, and affections of our own souls. 10. Neither ore lhese passive and sympathetical energies of the ...... 1, when it acts confusedly with the body and the pleasures resulting from them, such real and substantial things as those thaI orise from the pure noetical energies of the soul itself intelleclually and morally. For since the mind and intellccr is in itself a more real and substantiallhing, and fuUer of entity than maner md body, those things which arc the pure offipring of the mind (voii ycvYl/l'0roj and sprout from the soul iuclf, mUSI needs be more real and subsllmial than tMK Ihings w~.ich blo!i!iom from the body, or from the soul enfeebled by it, and &lumbering in it. II . Whenforc tlul phiLosopher professing md understanding 10 c;onfutc Atheists, and Ul show, 'that all Atheists, though they pretend 10 wit never SO much, are but bunglers at reason and sorry phiLosophers'." He nOI wilhuul ause fetches his discourse from hence, that 'They that thus infccl men'. minds with impiety and atheism, make that "'hiell is the first ause of all ~nel'llrion and corruption to be the last thing in the universe, and that which is the 1asltU be the first. From hence proc«ds Iheir error concerning the being of God.'''' That is, Ihey make mind and soul IU be the laslthing, md body and mallCT to be Ihe first. This therefore is the ooly course and method which this philosopher p.ooccds in 10 confute the atheists, to show, 'that mind and soul,;n thee order of the uni.·crse. arc hcfure body, and nO! postemr to ii, mind Ind IOu] being that which rule in the universe and body that which is rlJlcd md ordered by il'."' And Ihen is no phenomenon in the world bUI my be solved from this hypothesis. Nuw Ihis he demunsrnt.tcs, nen flOm local mutiun, because body and matter has no oclf-moving power, lIld therefore it is nlO.-.,d IIld dctennined in its motion by a higher principle, .......1 or mind. Which ;argument is further improved by the author of Wt e~ceUent philosophical treatise, BooIr; 11, chapter 2. 92

.. A" .."I,.r-".t"'lo(u""I9.... .. h io _

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11. Now, for the self-&ame: cause I h..·e ende ..·oured to demonstrate in the foregoing discourse, that kno ...·ledgt' and intellection cannOt possibly &pring from sense, nor the ndiation Or impresses of mancr and body upon that which knows, but from an active power of the mind, as a thing antecedent to maner, and independent upon it, whereby it ;5 enabled from within to exert intelligible ideas of all things. [3. Lastly, I Iuve insisted the n[her so largely upon this :u"flunent for this further reason also, because it is not possible that the", should bC' any such thing as morality, unless there bC' a God, that ii, an in6nitl: eternal mind that is the 6rsl original and soura: of all things, whose nature is the first rule and exemplar of morality. For otht-....·ise it is not """",,i.·able when"" any luch thing should be deri'·ed to particular intellectual beings. Now there ean be no such thing :IS God, if stupid and sensele.. nutter be the first original of all things, and if all being and perfection that is found in the world, nuy spring up and arise out of tht- dark "'"Gmb of unthinking mailer. But if knowledge and understanding, if soul, mind, and wisdom may result and tmCrge out of ii, then doubtless everything that appears in the world may. And so ni,ht, maner, and chaos mUSt needs be tht-lim and only original of.1I thin". [4. Wherefore Plato,:IS lluve already intimated , taking noti"" of the opinion of dh·ers pretenders to philosophy, 'that first water, air, and earth are Ihe lirsl beings of all, to whid! senseless and inanimate things they appropriate ~ title of nature. But tlut soul did spring up aftCTWllrd out of these :IS • secondary thing,9l and :IS • me", shadow of them, he immediately adds concerning it, 'We h.,·e here found and discovered the true fountain of .11 athdstical madness thai posscssa most of those that dnl in physiology or questions of natural philosophy','" vi~., that they are.1I pv:Sses'ed ,,·ith this ..,ttishn.,.., that mailer and body is the lirst original of all thingll. And therefore it is obKrved by the some author, that the same persons that held all things were derived from body, blind n.tu"" and chan"", did both deny the existen"" of God, and, which is consentanwus thereunto, asserted tlut justi"" and morality h..·e no nature or entity at all. saying, they were

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'SO

flj • ..",,,~,

nothing but ~ from corpornl things, without the sentient or the rcnitence, or the reocrion made upon Iocol nKItion in a body dul y mixed and tempered. ThaI is, if IiO\II and mind, knowledge and wisdom may thus ariK from 1M rontemplation of me", snl$Cless matter, and ndiation or impreuion that is the me", local nKItion of rorporul obieas without, then as we said hefo"" the", cannot possibly be the last shadow of argument left to prove a Deity by. Since not: only tile souls of men, but also all that wisdom, oounsel, and contrivance that apJlCU" in the frune of the wholl: visible world , might first arise in like manner from the me", casual concourse and contempcntion of tM whole maner, either in those particular bodies of the sun and stars, Or else in the whole system and compagcs of the material world itse lf. IS- Wherefo« we have not: Oflly showed tN.t all intell~ion and knowledge does not: emerge or cmane out of sensc, but also that ..cnSC itself is not a men: passion or I'KCption of corporeal imprt'SSCS [from) without, but tN.t it is.n active energy and vigour though sympathctical in the senUcnt. And it is nO....,..., possibll: that this should arisc out of KnSClcss matter and atoms, by reason of any peculiar oontempcntion or tontntu", of them in l"e$pc<:t of filfU"', site, and mlMion, than thOl which all atheists stoutly deny, th.t something should arise out of nmhing. And he", we can never sufficiently applaud that ancient alOmicol philosophy, so successfully ",v;"ed of latc by Cartcsius,95 in that it shows distinctly "'hat maoer is, and whot it can anKIunt unto, nMrICly nmhing e1sc but what may be produced from me", magnitude, figure, site, local motion, and rest. From when ce it is demonstnbly evident, and mathematically certain, that no cogitation can possibly arise out of the power of mat[c.; whereas that otl>er philosophy which brings in • dul unintelligible maner that i. nothing and c"cry\hing, out of whose poienw.lity nO! Oflly innumcnble qu.litics, but also substantial forms and sensitive !;Ou\s (and the",fo", why not nllunal.lso, since all reason emerges oul of scnsc?) may he educed , mUSl of necessity perpetually brood and hatch athei",", Whereas we cannot but ntrcme1y .dmi", tha[ monstrous dotage and son;shnCSll ofEpicurus, and SOme other spurious ..... . tho ......, 0( _ _ ......... "loA , '1 tho .......... Gro
.. Cud ... iIo., tiU Homy M.......... <1«1 D "'"' hod _

u..... ..

",i,d • .,. ... _ D,

;= ..pbkoo 001 .. ' ""riooI "'"'" 8r ... n Q,006ria ............... :

., .

prc:tenden to this atomical philosophy, that notwithstanding they acknowledge nothing else in matter besides magnitude, figure, si te, and motion, yer WQ\Ild make IlQt only the power of Sl:nsation, bur alw of imellectioo and ntiocination, and therer~ all human souls to al'iK from the men: COntUtun: o( corporeal atoms, and utterl y uplodc all inoorpornJ substances. Than which tWO assertions IlQthing can be more tontm!ic!ious. And this is (ar more absurd, to make reason and intclkcrion to arise from magnitude, figure, and motion, than to attribute thO$( unintelligible qu.alities to matter which they explode .

."

A Treatise of Freewill

Copyrgnted matarlal

Chapl~r

I

_m dearly 10 be l~d by Ihe illSli~(11 of ~alurt 10 Ihink Ihal Ihere is ""meming £4>' ~!,iv,\ in nostra pofeslate, i~ ~ur 0"'" poflltr (though dependently upon God Almighty), and thaI We = not alt<>gl'ther pass;,'e in our acling:>. nor determinffi b), inevitable necessity in .. hatsoe"er we do. 1kcallSC' we prai"" and disprai"", commend lI1d blam~ mon for th~ir actings, much omerwi"" Ihan We do inanimate beings or brute animals . Wilen "'e blame or commend • dock or IUlOmaton, we do ;t so as not imputing 10 thaI . U1QtlUton its being th~ cm"" of its 0"'" mo"ing well or ill, agreeably or disagreeably to the end it was design~d for, this being ascribed by us only to the anificer. But when we blame a man for .ny wiekffi actions, as for taking .ny another man's life, either by perjury or by wilful murdCT, we blame him not only as doing otherwi"" than ought to h..'e been dooe, but at"" th.n he might have done, and that it was possible f(lr him 10 ha,'~ .,-oidcd iI, SO thaI he was himself the cau"" oftbe evil thc"",f. We d(l nut impute the evil of aU men 's wicked actions 10 God the creator and "",ktr (If them, after the 5allIe manner as we d(lthe f.ults (If. clock or " .. teh .. hony to the .... tchm.ker, All men's words at least free God from the blame of wickffi actions, pronouncing (/ OW<; d.wmx;. God is ClllSC'less and guiltless of them, and we casl the bl:une of them wholly on the men lhernseh·es, as principles of action; .nd the true causes of the moral defects of them,: So also do we blame men'li acting viciously and imll1Ol'llll)' in another SCfl"" than we blame a halting or a srumbling horse; or than we blame the natural and necessary infinnities, of men Ihernseh'es when unrontractffi by ,'ia:. For in this «I"" we SO blame the w~

'''''''''''''''IiIJ,

Thio io ....... otl ApIo .... ' · ,0. F_• ...... Il.w . SI.upi« (1_ . ''IiII~ TIl< bl,'y _"" "" do" _ ~ .... _ of ... ~ ... "' ~'. (Latin ..I< 0. ,,;.. ~ .. ) .... " "illia ..,..... ow.,.... 1""''' to _ ............. Iif.-.thy <>lpn;,. Of <>l","",,'. Oritrn omplor> tho s.,.,~, '110 ....... (;. - . _ I I ). s.. J.P. .'01;"". ,..,~ """" ~""- smn G""'..... DIeol pnioe tOt ~hor ... _ II', do 001 ........ "' ............ tOt """"'""'" pn>ducms ....... _ _ to ""fotrto. \>oa" ...... p,cd . ,of ...... b. .. ,,""""'"' ,.. ru,-. I, ~ do<' .,'. . . . . .. pnio
"m ",,_

,

,m. """..

....s. .",Ku· Ccs.." . ~ "S)·

'S>

OfftulDill infirmities as to pity the men themsd,'es, looking upon them as unfortunate but nQ{ os faulty. But we blame men's "icc:s, with a displeasun against the persons themselves. The same sense of nature's instinctS appean; yet more pbinly, from men'. bbminS, accusing, .nd condemning them..,h·es for their Own actions, when done either r.lShly, inconsiderately, and imprudently, to their own private disadvantll!"", or else immonlly In d viciously, and .pi... t the dictate of honesty. In which latter CISC men have an inward sense of guilt (besides shlme), remorse (If conscience, with horror, confusion, and ostonishment; and they repent of those their :actions afterward with I kind of self-deteStlUon, and wmnimc:s r,ot withO!Jt txeTCising revenge upon themsdves os being a pm of justioe due. No man aa:uses or condemns himself, nor looks upon himself as guilty for having had I fcnr, the stone, or the gout, ...·hen unCOlltJ"ICted by ,·ice. And if all human actions "'eTC nC"T'sary, men would be said no mote to repent of them than of di .... scs, or that they .....,re not born prinoes, or heirs 10 I thousand poun<4 I y=. Lastly, ...., have also a sen.., of retriburi"e, punitive, vindictive justice, I I n.ot ......... r.ney. but. rhinl ...... Uy uisting in n. ru ......... h"" punish_ ments are inflicted upon malefaClOrs for their unjUSt and illcgal actions post, by civil ,"""gistra[.,. in porticuw commonwealths. For though it be true [hat these ci,;1 punishments do in p.n look forward 10 pre,..,nt the like for the future, by terrifyinS othen from doing the same, or to hinder these malefactors themseh-I:$ from doing the ~ke mischief .gain by cutting them off by dC
. ..."'" '*"".to "" oIu; '

Mrio;; "',,... apin IdII;; tl'f'd1> ""' _ _ Au' " . ' 11".

,;,

,.

. ,.

' ....."' 9 " ......... (Plo-. M_

"".Ii . . . ,'" ¥

~. '0. ............ .

." 'VI

ate

Off·ulIJill

mankind hov~ ah""ys had a strong presage of punishments 10 be inflicted by Ihe Deily afTer deaTh. And Th~ ScripTUre assures us that there is a oolemn day of judgement appointed, in ,,-hich God "in conspiCllously, palpably, and notoriously rend~r to ~very one IttOrding to his work. or actions pasl. And mat th~se punislumnts in Hell, after death, .... iII respect only me fUlure, and arc no otherwise designed tkan 15 illrical and medicinal, in ordn to the curing or r«Ov~rinJ of the deceased souls pWlished, as some have imagined (from ",h~nce Ih~)" infer that mere can be no eternal punishments) i!I neither agreeable to Scripture nor sound reason. But if all actions be necessary, Ihere SttIIlS to be no more reason why there should be a day of judge men I appointed. to punish men for murders and adultery, injustice and intrmperancc, than for agues and fe~ers, palsies and lethargies. Hence it is mat mo~lis(S., loolcing upon men's free and voluntary actions as bJamc,worthy in I peculiar sense, have called. th~ evil of Ihem "'diu", OI/p#l, an evil of fault, in way of dislinction from tIwse other n........"')· evils which ore withoul fault, thaI is of " 'hich me doer him§clf was not prop¢rly t~ cause. Con«ming which G«ro mus _ HIK lilli Ptrv
• ..., ' ...,.co.-., EfittolMfo_m v,1rttn " . - 5. ,

·p""iohmmll .. . 1ibtny fr<>m

.........,. .... __ .c 1""''"'- _;" ....

."

,.

OffrmPilI

Chapler n NIK ....idwanding which, there ha,-e nf pttuliar only to God Almighty - 110 that he i. the only Klf-determining Being, and tIM: actions of all crealUres "~re by his d ecrees from all eternity made Il"O""SJry" The reasons a1Jegttl why there should be no lueh Ihing in nature uisling anywl\en:, IS a oonlingentliberty or freewill, are cl1iefly such IS these. First, because nothi ng con mo'''' itself, bul quU:flliJ """"fJ.. ,"~wl'" ,.;u, [whatever is ""'vw iI; """-w by oornething eisel, tlM: ..ero.., wluuoever is n..,,'eII is moved by something el"., which mo,-eth nc:c,mrily. Secondly, because though it should be gnnted that tlM:re i. something self-active, or moving from itself, yo-l nmhing can change itself, or act upon itself, or determine its o .... n action_ Since the same thing conn
u

• :!:

.5 • •""_~j~

_boo, -.. .. ' II

."

'" pop, atMI _ _ 1I)"1ooc pnPl'-.d

Offru~i!l

necessarily c:onnecled boch ""ilh lluil which wem before, and Ihal which follows after, according 10 lluil in Ennius:

Utirwn M ;n netM •• Petia KcUribus..

c - «rid;"'nl obiqna ad ternm T ribes. ['Would thaI in P.~us· slade the: pine-tret t..arru Hod ""..... fallon'" anh by &:1<$ Io<".""t 10 ""hich

Ciaro adds,

Lieuit HL Ih;u", uti....", n. in P.lio nata uLta unqulM ...... arbor; .... m OIl""" ufin .... "" 0SSd moo. U11Ul PeLiu .. hmiLi, ...que IUpttion. rq>e~nl"" '"8",

Nu. Ind. n..·is ir.r.hoond.., uQrdium co
p.-..et.rit:a? quia oequifur i11OO.

Nom numquam H... e!nltS mea 00rn0 c:d.rra pedtTn M ......nimo oegro,.."..... [Saucia].

".,'0

['He misht hs,'c ""'" c...... (,,<1M.- bod,

I""'''' on

Pdius t "

~W",,1d

th., "" ,_

hod '''.r

and •• m further, "Would thO! no Mount Pd' ... hod

erismlH and similarly one .... y JO on Nor tt.ena, had maok inception of Ih.1ad Ofloyins do"", • ship.

Wlut is ,he point of......,untinllh<5c pUt ev.nts? beau.. For wer. it $0, my rov;ng royal mismso;. Medea, from he. home had ",,' •• Jet forth Hnr. sid and by Io.·.'serud "'copan "'wnded'j'

TIIou,h Ihis, as the Ame Ciaro obKnelh, is only lhe cluiin 0. scrietl of causes.w fU4 "M [r,t«SSa.y causes). For though there we", Ile\'ff SO many .hi~ rndy al hand in Medea', lime, )~I "'"IS thue lheTefo", no neoessiry thaI ,he ohould c:ommit h.rwlfto sea, 0. be tr:ulsponed in any on. of them. But M r Hobbes carries Ihe business much funher, .... hen he dogmalizes in Ihi. manner: 'Th.1 IN:", ;. no one :acrion, how casual 1OC'~r it seem, to the causing_hereof /XlnCUr nQ( ",-hauoevcr is '" ""'... • F... f.nrUw.. s-.-o. !ina .....,. in l ......, ,.... ~ 001. J. V_Ito (1.ftcItft. '""ll. A• . , - .. 0.-.. n. foJo. '5.JJ. Trw.:.';'" br II . • ," ," ao-. n. _ ..... .

,.. ,. , __ -_· c·"1,, ·. . .. ·-..-.,'9)'1

...................... :

· .. _

... r,

·t"1

".

.M....

orrrmPil/ /la/Mm' [in the nature of things],' o which he saith truly i. a great paradoI, md which d~~s upon many mt«edent speculations. So that a/XOfding to him every action doth no\: only depend upon OIIe single chain, bur is implned md entangled ..ith infinite chains. 1 , But the reasons assigned why though there be such I thing IS contingent Jibe"y in nature, yet the curcis<: thereof must nttds be peculiar to the Deity, are commonly such IS these: first, beause to suppose any creatUre determine itself, is to make it indepcndenl upon il$ Creator, which is COIltndictious to the ide. of God, from whena: it wi!! follow th:lt God must be the sole determiner of all actions in the uni"en;e, and indeed properly the only IClor. Secondly, beause if lbere be contingent Jiben)" in my creaturely agent., there could be no Divine prescience: of such fUlure CVel\l$. Thirdly, neve"heless, if it should be supposed that there is a prescience nOlwithslanding contingency of men'. wills, yet: this prcscienu itself will ronsequently infer neassity of lhem.'l because if lhere be any libeny of w ill IS to ..-.1 things., Ihi. wi!! be a ground of Pelagianisrn,ll a denying Ihe ne«:ssity of Divine grace being taken .... y by this so much cried up am~otl<1lov, selfpowc:r, or f=wilL Lastly, il S«1t1S absurd and unjust too, thlt men should be damned 10 all Clemity for I rontingent tum of their own will. (This wes a... y the reason of il, men may IS well be damned for wh:lt they were necessitoted to by Di vine Ottrt:C!l.)

Chapter III If there were nothing i ¢i'';p/v, in our o ...·n power, no wil~OOu/OV or u.i /H>1tJ/U, 00 self-power, 00 contingent libe"y of acting, but everylhins whlllSOC\'er acted r=arily. Then upon supposition that God Al.mighty should, .fter the confbgration of this eanh, put the whole frame ofth;' ...mld apin euctly in the ,'ery!WmC posture th31 it ""'" in at the

oI.,.,_.,.. .. ... .......... ..... "" i'N111. ,, ...",,,,... O'-·,._" "

....

:Of~._N.,...)'." "-'''''. M_-.h, .u. p. J67. ~ 0000000dlmo·, • ....... ;, ............ oI r • ._ .. .... Pd ; " A.tho....,.""'h_~ _ _ _ oI ..h-_Io,-_ ...... dIiorto., , , ; _ "" ..., 00.-... GnOOI. M....,- ......... ......"

,. 1" :

01

c-.. ......

..conpws...

.M

01,...;.-_ ......

""'r....

r.- ""

OffrmPiI/ beginnin, of this mundane rewolution; and make anOlher Adam and ano!her E,"e perfecdy like the fortner, without Ihe least diffeTellce either of body or mind, and !hey propapling or muhiplying in successive ~nerations, it should ronlinllC' or run out such another period of time :as this world hath lasted hefore, ocy..., thousand yean or more; th..., would eyerything, every motion and action in it he the ,·ery same thO! had b«n in the fortTlel" periodic revolution without the least difference or variation. Another liuch like Cain and Ahel, anOlher Enoch, and another Noah, another Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, another Moses, another Pythagons, another Socrates, ano!her Jesus Olrist, another Pontius Pilate, another Caiaphas," another e,·erything, and anOlher e'"ery person, exa.ctly the same, wearing all Ihe sanK clothes, dwelling all in lhe owne or like t.ousa, sitting upon lhe same stools, making all the ume motions, writing all the safllC' boob, speaking all !he safllC' ""OTd., and doin, all the AfIlC' actions 0\..... again. This was the doctrine of the Stoia, that then had b«n and should be infinite such worlds or mundane periods, and circuits from eternity '" e'er"i.y, CxaL:']y .Jikc '" .,IIC """lh~r.1J 11,<:y .""IJUS'ng God AlmighlY himself 10 be a necessary a~nt tOO, and, therefore, that after the several conflagrations, he must needs put things in !he ,·ery ume posture he had hefore. And then oil acting necessarily, there muSt he oil along the same or like men, doing 011 the safllC' things encdy. Celsus, who for the mDlit pan per50rutes a Platonist, Ita,·ing ,·...,ted this Stoical dogma, the k:amed Origen aninud,·ens upon him afier !his manner: I kroow 1"101 why Cc:lsus, writinl againll u. On;ilians. should think it IKC "ry to USC"!h1$ Stoical doIma, ,hot Ius no< so much as .seemin! or probable demonstration. That from tM I:>qinnin! to the tnd (or rather without beJinnin! or end) thn<: should be Ilw.Y" the same pt,iodJ or circuits of mooul thingS., ..,d ,hat of nttnsiry in ttrt:ain

.ppointed re\"Olutions, 011 things that h:I,·c been, are,:and shall be, should be ,be very same agsin repea,edly. From wbenee it will follow, that of ...... ;ty SocntCS sh.ll al_yt be about to philosoph i.e, ond to be ICICuscd for holding new ~ and corrupting of the youch, and AnytUs ,. St.""''!'

11 ... '_on.ao.c......~

ca- ",.17 ...........

•. b
wt.cre he ""I.. "'" Ii
I''''' .;

. no....". toNal.

....... 0..;,.... 1), " oJ, • • " Co "a,b - . . .. oM s..;., .... " Ok d
_rea...

.,.

, ,I

tho .......

Offru";f! and M~~nu be al .... Y" aboul 10 bear"';!I>CSS Ipin.' him. and .he ..,n.'~ of Arc:opogll$ 100.1( to cond~n him to drink poison" And all." .hI: AmC manner (uith .his ...... Orig~n) will;. be n<sc Stoics, indeed, pre,end ,hot they sluJll'IDI be all numerically the .. me. but ol,apoiKtou;;, ClIactly alike in ..cryth;ng. So thl! noI'lIe ...... nume.ol Socrates shan be apin but one in aU Ihings tDCIly alike !O Socra'... ...-ho .tu.1111WT)' OtIC in ,nthinp •• o<,ly .Iike '0 Xanthip~, " and ohsU "" accustd by , ..." ~ronn .. in all Ihinp Ilik~ '0 An)1us and M.~,UI. Bu, I undenund no! th;. (Aith Origt-n). ho ... Ii""" the ....... Id is .I.... y. numemUy lhe ...... , .nd no! """,her onctly alih '0 .nother, lhe thingo in iI .oould noI "" numc-rical!y the ...... roo, .nd MOl e:
,6, 'VI

ate

O//m",;11 But tile cas<: "'ill ~ the same, sllould we supposo: two numerically distinct "'orlds, made by God Almighty, at the same: or contemporary limc:. u:l(:dy alike 10 Ont another, two Ad:uns :lnd 110'0 E.'a; indislin!"id... bly lhe same, both in !IOU1 and body. multiplying them,d,'es by propagation for se'-eral thousands of years. If there "
DIopter IV Now thatlllis is not true, quod nmrfd /fur"" ;/firJt;/fum hdH~/ft ['thot III . '] " or t hat not h"mg lit ' "rum /f~IUri' l J can Ih ·mgs h ."e·Intema I nettssny. possibly act omer"'-;5/: than ;t suffers or is acted upon; but tlllt, on the conn-ary, there i. wmc contingent libeny in n.tun:. and thot men. and otOO rational creatures, can add or casl in somc:thing of their 0 ...... to tum the scales which e..-en may, I think, sufficiently Ippear from hence. Because it Clnnot be denied but th31 then: arc, Ind nul' be, nuny cases in wllich senral objects propounded to OUr choice at the same time, arc so equal, or euctly alike, as thot there cannot posIlibly be any reason or mori"e in the understanding neoe5Sllrily to detennine the choice to one of them ralller than to anotller of them. As for uample, supposo: one

" ·8o''''''''''' ......... . ....·... _ o ( ... , · . ... _in .... " nil appears .. lie . ......, .. ..... , . on. D< _ " . _, ...· 1 ,a. -...I .. ""'" ipro -.n ,ioin_ ',·io· !""""l....., ... ·n

· ....

,", . , Uhinilin.u"';""1. II ..... ......... IIoIoIxo., I)f u..., .011 N~. in

,"

11'' '''.''1. MoI.._• .-01 " . p. >67_

OffrUrDiII man should offer 10 anoIher, OUI of twenly suina pieoes of gold, 01' golden balll., or silver Slobulites, iO exactly alike in bipleK. fiSUre. colour, and weisht, as tlull lie' could discc:m no manner of diff=noe between them, to male his choice of one and no nIOn:. Add also tlull tItcsc JUinas or golden baUs may be 50 placed circularly as to be equidimnl from the chooser's hand . Now it cannot be doubted bUI thll, in this case, any man would certainly choooe one, and not stand in ....pcruc or demur beau ... he could no{ leU which 10 prefer or choose before another. But if beinS necessitated by no moth·e or reason mteadcnt to choooe this T2ther tlw> that, he must determiM himself conlinrmtly, or fonuilously, or ausclcssly, il heinl all one 10 him which he look, n-or could there be my knowledse u ".IUI. [from causest· befOKhand which of tItcsc twenty ..·ould =tainly be tUen. BUI if)"ou will soy lhere was some hidden, nm .. nly detenninltinll in this case, then if the nial should be milk I hundred times oVer and Over apin, or by I hundred se,·era) pl'rsons, there is no re;liOII why We mUSI not allow that all of them must needs take the some SUi""" every time, lhal ill ather the fi ....t, or »e<:<>nd, or third, &~., "f them, ali they lie in or«umily determined by a u$C5 anlccedcnL Here is, therefun:, I great difference between corporeal md incotpooeal thinp. Bodies thlt cannot move themsel,·es, can nt'·er act further tlw> they suffer, md thcrc:fore if causes of moIion. or impulsions made upon them be "f equal force or strensrh, they cannot move at all, neither one ..oay IKJI" I'other. If two equallCllcs in a balance hive equal weillhu put intG lhem, they will rest tOo eternity, and neither Gf them be .ble 10 move up or down. But T2tiooal beinp and human 50uls itandins in equipoise as 10 mohve reasons, and hayinll the ..... Ics cquiponderant, from the ..eight of the objects themselves without them, will not pl'rpctually of necessity always thus hml in suspense, but may themselves add Or cut in some grains into one scak nther than the other, 10 make that preponderant, 10 that the
=

Offrut;if/ nea .... rily linked with wlul wem before. Here, therefore, is a sufficienl caUiiC which i5 nm r,h' wry. Here i5 something dunging itseIf, or acting upon i_If, a thing which, though indifferent as to reason, yet can delermine i_If and take away llul passh·e indiff[ ercnoe]. BUI it canoot be denied by an y theist, but Ihat this liberty, al least, must be ..dnowlod",d to belong to God Almighty. There being many thin.. in the frame and cofllltitution of the ..·orld for which no rcuon could possibly be liven, why they should be of na:essity so :as they are and nIX <Xherwioc, and , merefore, mUllt be determined by his arbitnry will and pleasure. AI for example, the ...... ld being supposed IIIX to be infinite, mere could not be any necessity in lbe ming i_If, wh y il should be just so big as il is, and not an inch nor an hairbrcadm biggu or Io:sscr. There could be IlO n«U5ity wh y the numbeT of SI2TS should be even or odd, whereas one of them it mU5t need. be, and is SO :as il seemeth good 10 him to appoint. So like ..ise Ouisrianity assUIU us that God halh appointed a day in .,,·hich he will judge IIt.e world. Ofwhich it is &a,d, Mark '3.3:1, 'But oftha' day and hour, knowem no man, no not the angels which are in hea'·en, neither the Son, but the Father. ' In which word" it i, imp~ed that thi, is a thing detennined. by rite arbitrary soodwill and ploasure of God the Falher. There being no nl:CC$Sity in the nature of me thing i_If, why it should be ast at such a precise rime, and IIOt an hour nOr a moment SOOnu Or later. Nay, it is oommonly conoeh·ed Ihat th is whole created world, wilh a1llhings in it, having no ne<:essary Uisto:1UX, but prroanous both, might IIIX Iuve been, and apin is destroyable, was made by Ibe arbimry ..;u and pleasure of God, iICOOrding to that, Rev.•. 1I, 'Thou Lord hast created all things, and for my pleasure they are and were created.' The creation beingllOt a natural and n~y emanation, as the word :and me Son i. from the Father, but a free and iiClf-dctennined. emanation, it being as it were bUI the Aork 1!~IK&; of God Al[mightyJ. 'He spake the word, and they were made.' nUl this arbiml)" and contingent libeny of Ihe Deily is carried on much 100 rar by mose who extend it to the necessitating or all creaturely actions and volitions, by a Di,·inc predetermination of evfl)'lhing, with • CQnsequent irTcsililibk influence; and 10 the rcprob\lting of r.... rite KJ"Cll1:r part of mankind, by absolute
,. _J~'tk""""~ __ .· """'''.j.. 't''~ '''' rhcy ..... _· TIS, PI'. 57< .... m. s.. A""" Mipo, 1'9 ..... n , p. J"":' ~

;'r' ;"

,6, 'VI

ate

any req>ea 10 IOOr o..'n ao.:tions, aIJo, lhe futun: neanion u-" Ioof, by damnin, of lhem for " 'hll lhey 1I't11: ~itatcd un,,·oidably to d o by Gfod) A,mi,hIY) himself. 'TIS, indm, an aWurd Dyin, of _ IMI Dr... r~I'" Ai.,u-..., God is bound to do the bat. For God Mlh no law 001 the p.. f« li... nf his 0011\ Mllin:. N~Jesa, il lTiIIIy be .. en c:o ndudcd. that God an ao.:t noIhin, conlrary 10 lhe DfI'M: law of his 0 ..1\ perfeuions, IMI is, an do i"IOIhin, either foolishly or unjustly. And it may be piously belie..·cd, that when he did CTnU. ttw: world. he mack lhe whok ~fter the: best n'WIMT that (all thinp corui(" wone .

In,·,

BUI Ihil conrinStnI liberty of ..,If.dft...",i .... lion, which ..." h.,·, hi.heno spokm of (a iled by iOnM: of the Greek phibophers epeleu· Jlick liheny), when thce " I perfect equalilY in objects and a men: fon uil0W; ~lf-dctenni .... rion, it not tlul tWTt(otiuIO_. IMI Ii"",,,, , ,IIi,n,,,,,•...·hich is the foundation of p..ise or di.pn;.." commendation or bLanw:. For when two ob~, pcrfectly equal and uattl,. olike, ue propounded to a 1TWl', choice, as IWO 'gp, or IWO ,uincas, or I...., IOLdm mils., of equal bi,OC'iI.. and wei,h l,and n iue, he cannoc be justl)· blamed by any orhe. or hi,..lf, for chooAn, 01>(" of lhem n .bet- than anorher. And lhe case mU$l nttdl be the same in aU other objeas of choia:. lhal have I perfect equality of iood in tho:m, or arc means equally .mdin, and conducin, 10 the same md . Then: an be no jw;t blame or dispnise. 00. only ..·hce the objects, brin, in tJ..,uose!vos rally unequal, the one better. the otMT man rtfuscth the ben.". and chooic:th lhe WOfW. As in lhe differma: hmo'em the dica.1I: of horJ lIy or consciena:, and .he "'IIMiou of the lO'Au appmus, indioin, eitho:r 10 ImJUiI pleuun: or privale utility. He that n:sisrin, thea low"," an.d WOIIC. inclinaOOn$, finnly :odhemh 10 the better p rinciple or dica.tc of honuty and ¥in~, hath in aU 'KU and places in

WOI..,,'

,M

Off,wnl! the world bct:n acwumed hm"l:1"D.;, praisewonhy, as being KpeiHWV ia!lf4l. superior 10 himself, or a sclf-omquel'Of. But he thai yieldeth up himself as vanquished or succumbcth under the 10"'er affections, called the law of the membcn, in opposition to that superior dict:l.tt: of honesty, or law of the mind, is ac:rounted blamccwonhy as being ;;crurov tavr4l. inferior to himself, or conquc",d by his worser pan. Now that the", is such an atrrt:
r...... il>< Sbri< .....i _ i. "",...., ,.";,,,... or . 0"<"".on,... IuIto, " c..I_,,-...........m.. .. The """"Pi 01,, ;, ..

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So T'Ioornu

,.,

OffrttlPill unkno..,, '~ U lhere an be no desi.., nM no ...ill of thaI which i.

unknown. And, KCOIldly, they conclude Ihal lhe undemanding 1C1eU! necessarily upon its seven! objeets, withoul an)·thing of will 10 deu:rminc either iu exercise or &peci6c:ation of !hem (which nrussity some aU a uain of Ihou.ghuf9 bccaux t"" wiD being blind, lhertfore annex delemUne t"" uOOenWlding, eimer ro exOTCi§c or speci6c:ation of object. Thirdly, that the undersunding judgelh necessarily of all Ihings, nex only as to the U"\nh or falsehood of speculari"e things, bUI also as to eligibility ofpracticals, wlut is 10 be done or not done. Lastly, Ihat lhe blind faculty of will always ~y follows ~ last practital judgwltM oft"" neceuary understanding. BUI others mere are, who, in order ro lhe AI>;nl o{mis phenomenon oflibeny of will, think it nw iry to IUJlPOS'!', thaI first of all, the: will, lhough blind, yet determines the understandin" bcxh ro euoc"e, and specification of obied.. And though lhe undemanding, being neoessary in its judgements, doth only propound to the blind ..ill what he thinks ought ro be dOf1<', or hi. last practical judgemeM in the case, and no more, only ro allure and in>;te the will mcreumo. BUI dial mis lO~e"';sn qUw-l, or empreu of the 10\11. the blind will •• till remainelh as free. and indifferent to do or nOithis Or that, as if the undemanding had given no judgement at all in the case, and doth at last fortuitously determine i!Self " 'ithout 1"Qpcct: to the same either way. Which i. the me:aning of that definition of ~bcrty of will commonly given, thaI V./.. ~la., ",.itis 6""'ihu lUI ",nuiwtf rtf"uitis. ~USI aftrt. wi ,,0tI IIftTt, that the " 'ill after all things put, ~ last dkt:
Ot.aplcr VI But, lAY, ,fthis psychology be true, then either an then: be no liberty It all, no frttdom from necessity, or else no omer than Iu<;h as is ab$urd .. 00i0I • .-I .. _ ........ W/. ,0 .,. _ .. d.... •· • • .no. .. "" ",,"= ID I klta, ................... J .

,,"

,.

°ffrm"ifl and ridiculous or monstrous_ For, firit, if the blind will do aI"'-a)1sj n«,1"5 rily follow a necessary dictate of the undcn;tanding anteceden t, then mull all volitions and actions nttds be. nec... ry _ that pretence which some here make 10 salve libe.rty of will, notwithstanding, from the amplitude of the undentanding, lIS having a "''lICT scope and prospect be.fon: it; these fancies and JoOr'7Mt [impulses, desires], each whereof is dctcnnined 10 one, signifying nothing at all, so long as the understanding in its approtntions and judgements, concerning the difference of d\osc obi<:<:ts, aClll altogether ncoe:surily. But whereas some otheri of those philooopheri, who rontend thot the will must, therefore, of necessity foJlow the last dieme or practical judgement of the necessary understanding, becaUK it is in itself a blind faculty, do nevertheless, in order 10 maintain liberty, :l.SS<'rl th.t Ihis blind f;>culty of will doth first of all move and determine the undCTStanding, both lIS to its nercise and obi<:<:ts, this is a manifcst contradiction in itsClf. Besides, they are here forced 10 run round in an cndle.. eirele: they maintaining t!tou the will an will nothing, but as reprcscnted to it first by the undcn;tanding (";Il~' other .."" it TIl..,t will it know~ not ,,-hat), alld apll that the understanding cannO{ :oct about this or thot bue as it is mo,-cd and so that there mUst be both an action detennined thereunto by the of the understanding going be.fore every :oct of the will, and also an :oct of the will going be.for-e c'·cry act of the understanding, whieh is furtlter comradictiou. and impossible. But if the blind wiU do not n......s...ily follo..-lO the last dictate of practical judgement of the necessary undcn;tanding, but still remains i"diffeTCTtt and doth fortuitously determine itsClf eith •• in compliance with the Arne or othtTwisc, then will liberty of will be men: irn.tionaliry, and madness itsClf acting or dC'lennining an human :octions. Nor is this all, bUltMI ,,·hich wiJl"h in every man " ill perpetually will nOl: only it knows not why, but :also it knon not what. Thcn is all Qlnsid.",tion and deliberation of the mind, all counKl and .d,·icc from others, all uhortation and persuasion, nay the mully of reason and undemanding itsClf, in a man, altogether useless, and 10 no purpose al alL Then can then: be no habits either of virtue or vice, that nUllmng unoenainty and fortuitous i"differentt, which is iUpposcd to be. tsSCntiai 10 this blind

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wilt, being ut[(rly unc:apable of either. Nor, aftcr ~n, could this hypolhesis salve thc phrnomcna of commendation and blome, re"",rd and punishment, praise and dispraise. For no praise, commendation, or blame, could belonS 10 men for their f"",willed Ktions ncith~, since when they did weU they acted but fonuitously and ternerariously and by ~hance, and when they did ill their wills did but ~fij~rt II#>, use thei, own narural right and essentiol privilel{e, or property of acring 1m6rt.{XJ~ tnryXaw;r U it happmeth, Or any way, without ruson. Lastly, as for this schobstic definition of f""''''iII, rio:. that it is, after 011 things put, bnides the mlilion iw.lf, even the lUI practical jud",ment in the lI0II1 roo, an indifferency of not doing or of doing this or lhat. This is . n UpsWI thing, which the ancient peripatCtics, U Alennder ll and othen, "'eTc unacquainted Wilh, their aa:o<Jnl thermf being Ihis, 1M! amo~ 1UpIWTWuI the same Ihinp being circumStlnt, lhe Arne impressions being ..... de upon men from withoUI, 011 IMI they ~ passive 10 being lhe same, yet Ihey may, T1<XWilhSlllnding, ael differenlly. The losl practical judgement also, u according 10 these, being that which u men .re not merely passive 10, so is it really the same thing with the /kNMwIr;, the " 'ill, or volition.

Chapter \'ll But this scholaslic philosophy is nunifestly absurd, and mere ..::holastic jargon. For 10 atlributc the act of intellection and perception to the facully ofunder1tanding, and acts of volil;"" to Ihe faculty of will, or 10 say th., it is the understanding that understandeth, and the wil1tlult wil!eth - Ihis is 011 onc as if one should say that thc faculty of walking ""'lketh, and the faculty of speaking spea.keth, or IMI the musical facullY pl.yeth • Ie....., upon the lute, or sings this or that tune. More.,,·cr, since it is generally agreed upon by 011 philosophers, tMI MI~"n S""/ I"P!Osisonlm, whatsoever actS is. SUbsiSlenllhing, Iherefore by this kind of Language Ire th~ twO faculties of understandinS and will nude 10 be two SlipfWnl~, two subsistent things, two agenu, and 110'0

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'VI

ate

OflrurDill

persons, in the ...... 1. Agreeable to ",'hieh are these forms of speech commonly u5ed by scholastics, that the understltnding propounds to the wil~ represents to the will, ollurQ and invites the will, and the wiU eitht:r follows the understanding, or else refuses to comply with its dictates, ncrcising its own libcny. Whence is thai inexuiable confusion and unintelligibk nonsense, of the will's both firsl moving the understanding, and also the understanding first moving thc will, and Ihis in an infinite and endless circuil. So that this facully of ...ill must needs be suppoocd to mo,·c understandingly, (lr knowingly of ",hal it doth, and Ihe foculty of undemanding to move wiUingly, OT not wilhout ..ill. Wh<:reas to intellect as such, or as a faculty, belonp nothing but nM:re intellection or pen:cplion, without anything of will; and to will as luch, OT [as] a faculty, nothing but mere volilion, withoul an)1hing of intellection. But all this while it is really Ihe man Or soul that understands, and the man or soul that wills, as il is the man Ihat ..... lks and thc man that speaks or talks, and the musician that pla)·s 2 lesson on the lute. So that it is one and the 5an1C subsiilent thing, OflC and the samc: soul that both undemandcth and willeth, and the s.ame agent only that actcth di'·crRly. And thus may it .... ell be concei,·ed that onc and tbe 5an1C reasonable soul in us may both ...;11 understandingly, or knowingly of what it wills; and understand or think oflhis or thai object willingly. It is not denied but thai the raTional soul is If(IA.OOQl'tlJIO<;, halh many po .... ers or faculties in it, that is, that il can and doth dispby itself in se'·cn! kind. of energies, .. the same air or breath in a Pncumatic inmum[ent],JI passing through several pipes, makes several notes. BUI then: is a certain ordff or method tM m.y be conceived wbertoin the soul pUIll itself forth in Ihese illl &e,·cral operalions and affections, of which I shall plocced to treat in the ncxt place.

Chapter VIIl

It is • ,·ery material question which Aristotle stanelh, Ti Ttl 1fpWfax; K'I'OiiV _ whOl is that thai first mo'·Clh in the soul and senClh all the

.,. 'II

ate

Ojj.u..u/ othe:r wheels on work? ThaI is, .. hal is Ihal '·;lal po ...·u, and OlUX)', whieh thc: SOIII firsl dispbycth itldf in, and wtu.;h in order of nature pr«cdes all ill other powc:n., it implyin, lhem, or ..mn, t:hnn on worI; ~ Fin!., tht:re~, I say lhe outward obsefvalions of CX>tpDical _ are not 1M only be,;u,,;nJ and firM lnO\·cn; or "'"IlKS of all COJitlDon. in us, • thc Epicunans, Hobbians. and Atheists IUppose ....110, inded, make aU (:O(itltion 10 be nothinl but IocaIII"IIXions in the: brain; IheR brinll inlel"CUrnnl they only occ..iomIly raisinl a nrioety of CO(itacionl. BUI there is • thrnd of" Iik always sp inninl OUI, and a ~vin, sprin, or foo.Intain or c:ositation in 11M: _I itJI:lf. dj,·m; of 11M: schobotia, II we 5:lid before, Itil UI lhat it is no other than an indiffcrall or blind will whK:h lim movelh 11M: undtmandin" and aUlelh deliberation, and )·CI .ne. th is, ilKlf blindly chcx.eth and deltmUMth III human -.;lions. Whueu., if 11M: 6,"" m(ncr be pcrl"caly blind, then musl ;1 mo'·e to il knows not .....1, and il knows not why. And be perftctly indiffcm>1 1O move any OM Ihing DIMr than another. MOft(Ivcr il is not c:onc;e-i...,ble thaI mere indetermination and indilfn-en(:)" should be the lint monT of all -.;lions.. Iksidcs which, 11« ' " try nalure must be the bqinnc. and . prin, of.n -.;lion?' Whereas, i( lhere wtrC any lu,h faculty of the soul ;Ii a blind will (.. hi, h is impossibk) knowled", mull of n«eftity go before if, to rep rcscm thinp to ii, and 10 hold I loreh 10 light it and sho .. it ill ...... y, and th il mu&t come affer it, it must folio .. i( I I its guidc. Wherefore kno ..1ed,le and understandinl, coun~1 and rel$l)n, Ind deliberation, Rtf11 to bid Ihe rains! for the first moVe-!" in the: 5Oul, and Ih.t ...·hich leads the vangul1d. Nevertheless il is ttrtain I"'t neither Ihilt Ipccubti.-c nOr delibtnti~c undemandin, dOlh al ...... y(.) -.;I in "C(hUrily of itsdf and ""i"telTUplCdly, but we are iClUible thaI OIl' minds are cmplo)·ed and set nrork by tomelhing elit, lhal we apply tMm both in CDnIt:mpbtioll and d~~berarioo 10 this or that object, and c:ontinUot 01" a.U lhem ofT al pitasun, as mudt iii 1111' open and mUI our C)·es, and by movinl our C)ti do1crmiM our sij:hl fO Ihis or thaI objea: of siKhI. Wen: our souk in I constanl Pzc 01" 5ludy, a1 .... ysspulIling OUII neuihry thread or ..-ria ofuninltmlpled _Ienlle IhouJhts; then could 1II"e ne\·U ha,-,: any pI ' n« of mind, no Inenrioo 10 paAing OCDI[ionaI) occur{rcna:s),

No..-w

II,

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Offrml!i/I alWlIYS thinking of something el&e, or h"'ing our wits running out a wool-p~hmng, and so ~ rotally inap~ for ac~ion. Or, COtlld ",.~ do oorhing at all, bm aft~r studin! ddib(ration, th~o should W~ ~ oft~o in I puzzle, al a stand, demur, and fumble a loog time ~fore We could act or "" iIl any Ihing. Anstorle him&elf d(!crmines that fJovhj, roun&el, c:annor ~ th~ fi",t mo";ng prin.ciple io Ih~ soul, beaux th~n ...." mUSI consider, 10 ron~ider. to consider infinildy. Again, thc principlc of all a.crions, and Iherefore im~lIection itself is ends and good. E,'cry thing acting for the sal:~ of SOfIl( cnd and good. And ron«rning ~nd., tM same Aristotle hoth righlly OOser-.·ed, Ihat they are 0tlK aifJaipt:rQ. q,ii>"(ll 6t:l, Ihal they are IHX chosen, . Iudin! OUl, or devised by us, bUI e xist in nature, and pre"cmi,'c1y obtrude Ihem&eh'cs upon u•. Wherefore, w~ rondude that Ihe .0 ffpWroJo; K'voiiv, thll which firsl mov(!h in us, and ;s Ihe spring and principle of all dclibcrari"e action, c:an ~ no other than a ronSlllm, restless, unimerruptn! desire, or 10"e of good IS such, and happiness. This is an e,'er bubbling fountain in Ihe «nITe of the soul, an ell ter or .pring of molion, bmh a pri",,,,,, and ~~IUU'" ",obil. [fi .. t and pcrpernal mo"er[ in us, the fi .. t wheel that &e1S ill the Olller "'heels ;n mOlion, and an e"erlasting and incessant mo'·CT. J6 God , an absolutely perfect being, is nol Ihis lo¥e of indigent desire, but a 10"e of o"(\"flowing fuln= an d redundancy, communicating itself. BUI imperfect b(ings, as human souls, npecillily llps.ed, by rca50n of the pori. [needJ which is in Ihem, are in continual inquest, restl= desire, and liCUeh, alWllYS pursuing a secnt of good before them and hunting after ;1.)1 Th~re are &e"eral thinp which hl\'c a fa« and mien, Or . lluring show, and promising aspect of good to us. As pleasure, joy, and case, in opposition to p;nn, and sorrow, and disquiet, and labour, and lurmoil. Abundance, plenty, and sufficiency of all things, in oppos;l;on to p!I\"Crty, stra;tneu, $eanliness, and penury. Pow(\", nOi only IS it can remo,'e "'"lm, and command p!.enty, and supply pleasures, but also in Ihc &en5C of Ihe thing itself. Honour, worship, and ¥enCTation, ;n opposition to cvil$ of dis~, contempt, and scorn. Prai&e, commend.tion, and Ipp1aU&e, in opposirion 10 ce... ur~ of OIhers, ignominy, and infamy. Darity, and celebrity, >0

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'VI

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ate

Offtufl'ill in opposition 10 pri"~le obscurily, and hing in cornel'S. P~xcdlen'y o~u others, superiority, viclory, and SUCttSS - in opposition to being worsled or foiled, left behind, outdone, and djgppoinled . Securily. in opposition (0 anxiety, and fear of losing whatsoevu;"" pulchrilude, in opposition to ugliness., and deformity. Knowlcd"" and lruth, in opposilion 10 the evil. of ignonncc, folly, and error. since nO man would willingly be foo~sh, nO man would err or be mistaken. Liberty, in opposirion to restraint, bondll"" sc:rvility, to be subje(:1 10 oonunand5 and prohibitions. l • BUI above all th=, and such like Ihings. Ihe soul of man h~th in il pavtw;ta fl, a certain ~Iicinatioo, presage, ~m, and odour of one _mllm !
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O[[mrgil/ lions talkd roncupisciblc and irascible, whose first assaults pre,'enl our will, inttndtd by nature as spurs to ac:1ion, and the quichntn of lifc, which dse without thcm ""ould grow dull and Lanlluid, and o;ometimes, as it wcrc, fall asleep; these are natural too, comc upon us unawares, inv..:]e us, and surprisc uS with thtir suddm foree, and wc havt no absol ute, despotic, easy, undisputed power o,'er them, notwithstanding ""hich the hegemonic of the soul may by COI\ativcs and endeavours &<>:Iuire more and more po....,r o"cr them. Abovc all theR: is the dictate of honesty, commonly called thc dictatc of consclcnce - which orten majestically controls them [and) cluhes with the (oth"" , This is necessary nature too, whm here the hell"llIunic, SOII'Ktimca joins its assistance 10 the beller onc, and SOtTM:tirnes takes pan with the worser against it. Lastly, the understanding, both spccubtive understanding, or the 5Oul, as considcrinll the truth and falsehood of things, and the practical, considering thcir good and evil, or what is to be done and not done, botll of tllem inferring conscqumccs from prcmi!l5cS in way of discursi"c reason , The p""ceptions or whkll, arc all natu ral and ncccssary, .ubject <0 no <X>flUTWId of will , though both the exercise, and their specification of objects, be determinable by ourseh'es.

(]upte. IX The next grand enquiry is, what is TO 'iyqW>'IICOV, the ruling, I{Ovcming, commanding, determining principle in us. For here, or nowhere else:, is to be found the TO i",' 'ill"" and the TO alh~0tl<1I0V, wi />DIm,.., Kif-power, or such a libeny of will as whereby men deser.'e pmK Or dispraise, commendation or blame. Th i. hcg", ilonic of the 50ul is a thing that was much taken nOli« or by the Greek philosophers. after Aristotle, and to th is is ascribed by them the original of thooic moral evils thaI dcscrvc blame and pun ishment, Thus the learned Origcn, Na", fila (uil{l
",./itiar,

I{I<" til

"hich result from it. In our view nothing else: is strictly spcal:ing

'"

OffrUIl!;U evil.J,i l where the fO buiuwv tTr4l0VIKOV is rendeTtd by .ery man's own reason, itS if th is ",ere the thing whereby he is the (::aU$( nf mnral evil. He laking it for granted that Origm'l hegemonic, in every man, is uasQn; which is ~ thing commonly s.upposcd to be natural and necessary in ilS peruption, when:a neccH3ry nature can be no foundation for bWne and punishmeTII. And if monI evil were to be imputed wholly to n«essary nature, then must Ihat, and lhe blame of it, needs be imputed In God himself, as the (::aUSl' the ......f. Whereas Origen'. design here, and e[sewhere, is 10 free both God and nature from the blame of mnral evils, and cast it upon men lhemselves, itS being SOITI<:thing, besides necesnry nature, loose and It their own di.posal, and therefore apxai lrpci("twv, principles of action, and Ihus, toCCOrd;ng to Origm, every man', own hegemnnic, or thai which rules or commands in his ......1, is the ooly (::aU$( of moral evil, via, or wickedne55, which is truly evi l, as abo are the act",ns that proc EE d from il. And in strictness or UlClnUi of philosophy (..ith he) lhere is rKMhing else evil 10 • man; Ihal is nOt:hing besides Ihe evil of sin and flIult. But I know p ith he th'l this g • mailer of greal subtlety and nice'Y, and the..,(o", i. would be an OIJC'TOSe thing to e~plain ii, &c. and require longer ambages of disa.>urse than would be proper for this place. Now the herd of modem philosophers and lheologers, who ~ealously maintain the phenomenon of liN"'''' "rbilri~"" nr freewill, think there is nO othet" way In do il bm only 10 make an indifferent lnd blind will fortuilously determining itself, to be both lhe first movt'r, and the h~monic or rulin, principle in the soul 100. Nevertheless they themselves acknowl edge that there is 110 much of neees" ry nature (Val in this blind and fOltUitnu5 will, thai it is norwithstandin, Ilways determined 10 good, or SOITI<: appearance of it, and can never po5Sibly choose evil when represented In it by the undemanding as wholly such. But wilhin that latitude and com]nSS of apparent good in the understanding, the wiU to them is free to determine i!$tlf tn either greater or les ....., and SO to any of the lowest degrec:s and appearances thereof. Nay, though a thing Mve never SO much mon: of good than e,,;1 appearing in it. yet

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Ojjrwpill Ihe Least glimpse of pKl glimmering in iI, i. enough for the blind will to e~ercise its lordly and unaCl.XM.lntabk libo:rty in preferring iI, before such another good as hath nOf any the leait shadow of evil apprehmded in it. And " 'hen any great end is proposed, and upon deliberation concerning means, it clearly appears 10 lhe underslanding thaI there is one me ....... "'hich, if cho5en, cannot fail but rach. and anain to Ihat end; but aJMXher, "'hich is only not impossible to do it, but hath ten thousand to one odds apins! it . In this case (they say) it i. the perfection of the blind indifferent wiU to be able to determine itselffonuitously that " ""Iy as ....ell as the other. But as it is very absurd fO make acti"e indiffererta: blindly and fortuitously determining itself. Ihat is acti"e irrationality and nonsense, to he the hegemonic and ruling priociple in e'"Cry man; and as il i. ind~ impossible, there should be any sudl thing in natUre as a blind faculty of will, which does nothing else but ....ill, acting temerariously or fortuitously, "'here there are different d~glL ,5 of good and evil in the objeas such IS shaU be petfectly indifferent, 10 never so mudl greater or lesser good; a ....ill that is noehing else but will, mere impetus fora: and activity without any thins of light or understandins - a will .... hich acts both it knows noe ....hy or .... ~fore, and e,'en it kno",-s no{ .... hat _ 50 could not such a blind , indifferent, Ind fortuitous will ruling sal"e the phenomenon of man! good and e"il of commendation or blame, bo:<:ause this bo:ing supposed to bo: the petfection of this .... ill's own nature, and a man's essentiallibcrty and pri"il~ to act thus, there an be no fault nOr blame in him for his eUTI:isi ng the same. and acting ac:wrding to his nature - no nature bo:inl sin. Wherefore il cannot be supJlOO"d thlt the hegemonic. or ruling principle in a ITLJn is unerly dnoid of all light, and perception, or understanding. Noc,,;thsunding .... hi<:h, in pecable bo:inp nason, understanding, and kno .... lwge, as such, or as ne«ssary nature canno{ be me only hegemonic Or rulinS principle. Beau.., reason, u such, can never act unreasonably, understanding, IS such, and clear VC'ra:ptiom, can never err. There is no such thing IS false kno"'kdge, nor el' .... ,touS understanding, nor can .in e.·cr be the result of reason, undemanding, clear pera:pl""'.. and knowledge, any more than error.
'n :yl

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is:. But the hegemonic of created .,uls may tn, and judge r.Jseiy, and lin. MomI,·e:r ..e knt\w, by otIUin u.,menoe, that speculation or deb~ion about particular thinp is determined by ouncha both as to obj.ecu: and ueii:ise:; _ an c;aJ1 ;t ofT from one. Ibing, ami anploy il Of KI il I ...-ork opon IlII(J(her, and ..., an 'UI" H, Sl.lSpend, and lIop the Utl , is:<: of it ( .. hen we plaK) too, diverting ound~a into action. From wilma it is: plain IIw Ihue is: SOi,"'thing in us supuitw lha"tunto, _hing mort universal Ind compKhm.ive, ami )~ withal more simpk, which is: hegemonic 10 ii, and doth ~ and determine theamt .

GapleT x I say, theufore, thai the TO ';,'qWVtIl'OW [hq:unonironl in cvery man, and indeed that which is: properly w, uurKlva (we rather tuo~;ng thosoe "'h, r thinp of nee:' nature than Mini them), is the IOU] as wmprehmding itself, all ill concerns and intuc:lII, its abilities ami capacities. .... d holding itself, IS il .... en: in its own hand, II it were redoubled upon luclf, having a power of ,nUn dong Or uming ;tself more or less in conlider:ation .... d deli btr:ation , in ra;&ting the Io....er appetites that oppose iI, both of utility, reason, .... d I">onnly; in Klfn:colkction and anention , and .igillnt circumspcc!Ion , or standinl upon OUr ",ani; in pU'l"'l" and raolutions, in diligence in arrying on Steady dnigns and acti,·c cndelivou,", _ thilt in order, to Kif-improvement and the Klf-ptomOlinl of ill 0"'''' 1fOOd, the IiIinl and QOIlIervinl itself in the Wrte. llootogh by aecidcnt and by abUK, il often pro\"a . self-impairinl POWC1", the original of ";n, vi«, and wickedness, whemry men to thenutlva the ClU$CI ofthcir own evil, blame, puni5hment, and mixry . Wh=fore this l\'I'mooicon Iwl aJ"""YI derelUcina the ptiSivc Clpability of men', .... ture one """y Of other, mher for better or for .INK. And (it] h", I Klf-fomting ami K if-framing po"''''r, by which ""Cr)' man is Kif-mode. into ..ha, he i5. And ......,dingly d~a either praise or dispraise, r1:Wlird or punishment. Now I say, in the lim pba:, that, man', $OU.II$ tw:p;cmouicaJ o~er

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0//ruII'ill i!Klf, having a power of inlending and exerting itself lOOn: or less in considel'lltion and delibr;r.r.tion, wh(11 differ(111 objttu, or ends, or mroiums, [an:J propounded 10 his clloi~, Illat an: in IlIemiClv« really b«ter and WOlU, may, upon liliglll oomider.uionli and immarun: deliberations (he attending to IIOnscqucntly the", was somothing of a:>ntingcncy in the choice. From "",'hat has been declo",d it appears that though pccrccption ~ nllure or n«usary understanding in us, yet for all that, we are nOI morely passive 10 our own pncrical judgam-nts and to the appcarant:C1i of good, but contribute somothing of our own t(l Ihem, to make them such as they lTe. Bccausc thest may ~ vny different &CCOrdingJy as ae do more or kso in.cnsely con.ider or ddiben..c, which i•• 'hins U, liPiv in our 0"'11 power. A man who docs but sliShlly consider, may hasuly choose that IS better, which upon mon: IICrious and leisurely consideration, lie would judge sllould be refused as what is much the worser. The AmC motives and reasons p.opounded rutve not always the AmC force and efficacy upon differ(11t persons, nor yel upon the RTl1C' person_, neither at several timco, but more or Io:s.s IS tht:y are differently

".

O[[m"';l1 appll:hended, or more or Itsi anended 10, pondell:d or considered, whidl ",e are 001 mell:l)" passive 10, bUI delermined by ourse),'e5. Besides which, il is cemin, thaI in our practical judgements ,,'e often ulend ourseh'n or [ourl assents funher than our undersWldin" as nl:«~y n.nure ,oes, lhat is, further than our clear and diRinct: perceplions. For when upon a sUghlff oonsiderarion we all: sometimes become doublful which oft\O."O 01" moll: Ihings &hould be prefe'll:d, not clearly discerning allhat time any gre:uer eligibility in one than anotM' of them, though in reality tMIl: ,,-ere much diffell:nce, "'e a.., nOl hereupon nl:«n iult"i to arresl and stop and .uspornd aclionn, bUI may and orren do proo;:ttd to making. judgement in 'M cas<: one way or other, stochastically or conjecrunlly (which it$l:lf is nOl "ilhout """'" contingency ntither) and IiO go fO''''';l.d 10 action. It halh seemed very &trangc 10 1iOm<:, what Cartesiu& halh wrillen, Ihal il is not the undersw.ding but 1M "ill thaI judgelh:' and Ihal this is Ihe cause: of error as well as of sin. And indeW Ihis may well ,"m Stl'2llge aa.>ording to that nOlion, which men rommonly ha,'c of will, as a mere: blind faculty. B... i. is """'. cer ... in th.t cyen in 'pc<: .. l.tivc .hinp, about \nuh and fa(s(:hood, as well as [in) praclical [lhingsJ. the tlq;cmonic of the soul (wtlich is Itle lilOul sclf-romprehensive, and having the conduct: and managemen. of it$l:lf in its own hand) doth IilOmetimrJi ""lend itself funher in way of assent than tM ncas.:ary understanding goes, or beyond cleat and distinct: pcrttplioo. Ttull is ...·hen we tll"e no clear and dislinct: ~ption of the truth of a propooirion (which is the kno ...·ledge of it and can nc,'cr be false) ,,'c may nolwithstanding, ulend Our assents further and judge "ochastically, Ihat is opine, this way 0. thai " "Y concerning iI, and thai lilOlIlelimes with a greal deal of confidenee and assuranee too. And this is undoulKedly th e original of all error in spe<: .. lati,e thin gs also, which canllOl be imputed 10 nl:« nry nalUll: in us ...·ilhoul casting the blame: of them upon God Ihe maker of it. The understand;n, as necessary nalUIl: in us, or clea. distinct con«pl>on, can ne",r ur b«:ause there cannOI pouibly Ix any clear COfICCption of falsehood in cternalthings :15 geometry and mctaphJ$ics. ac ... oonccptibiliry is thc .....,nee of mn~ and clear distinct conception is knowledge, which can nc",r be ral..,. Wher-efoll: if we did al ...';I.YS suspend Our assents, when we had no dear .. o..c.n..,M .............. CSM,· •• H · .. P.,.. 0...:..... ' .. _ ... 0("' • .. ' " h. _ .... ,.,."., '.JO- S« £IM."" . ...............

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Offrull1ill distinct ooncqlrions of the oonneaion be:tWttll the prnlicate and subject of a propo!ition, we should never err. But we do oflen opine and jud~ stodlllStically, CC>rK:eming truth and falsehood even in speculative things, beyond OUr clear conceptions and cntai n knowled~. That of Aristode,'; "aKia 4>opTl"'; rW. dpxw." and the common opinion thai interest and vicious inclinations bribe the judgement, sbo... that the judging power in us is IlOl the understanding or n«X I arr natu", in Wi, for then il could not be: bribed, oomlpted, and ..... ycd . And indeed the naxs .. ry understanding that ,s our clear conception and knowledge going so liule way, there is need and UK of tbis SlodillStical judging and opining be:yond it ronceming truth and falsehood, going furthn and be:yond ii, in human life, our :actions and volition" depending much upon our speculative opinions concerning the truth and falKhood of tbings. The weakness of human understanding is such that there are very few thinp which men do SO certainly know as thar no manner of doubt may be raised in their minds ap,ns' tbern, either by oophistica] arguments Of bigotry in ",Iigion. Hence is it, that divine filith Is so mucb conunc:nded 10 uS in the Gospd, whicb is undoubtedly an :lSS<:nl 10 tbings be:yond clear concqllion and certain nea:ssary knowledge. The helief of Ihe ""i!
0' 0

OfIm""fI OSSI:nts and iudge.rrw:nts beyond our cle.\r conception, understanding, Or knowledge., without suffic;'n! grounds. And then may be "cry sufficient grounds sometimes to bel;'ve beyond knowlo:dg<', as well as beyond KnK and y« notwithstanding is this di"ine faith a vimlt or gnce.

Otapler XI Apin in that contest betwixt the dictate of I>onesty or of conscienoe, and the sugestion of the Jo,.'er appetites urging and impelling to plcasun or pll'Knt good or profit, T say in this contest: there is no necessary understanding ime l posing and coming in to umpin between, that does unavoidably and irresistibly determine on. way or mMr. But the maner wholly depends upon the soul'. hegr:J"l"oOfiic or power 0\'« itself, its utning itself ,.i!h more or leu fora: and vigour in ",,;mng theK lower affections, or hindering the gratification of them, according to which the issue or event of ocrion will be determined. But this is no( one single hattie Or combat only. but commonly. long Lasting or continued W3T land] collua:ation betwixt the higher and the lower principle, in which thcrt are many vicissitudes, re..iprocationl, and alternation. upward:and downW3Td, OS in the stales of a poi. ofhalanoes., before there come to be a perfect conqUtSl on either side, or fixation and Stltling of the soul either in the bener Of" the ""orse. Ouring "'hieh struggling and rollucration was that pronounced. 'the good that I "'ould do 1 do not, the ""il that 1 would not do that do 1'.49 And then according to tht issue of!his intestine war will men either nttive pnise from God or dcscrvc blame and punishment from him, "orr and honour to him tJut doth "'ell, but 'tribulation and :anguish to every soul that doth evil,.50 And 'I h.ave fought a good fight and nOW there is bid up for rrw: a crown of life.,11 And that we ha~e a power more and less to extTt ourscl~a to resist the lower inc~nations, or hinder the gntifications of them, and to comply with the diewc of ronscienoe or Itonaty, We being not wkolly dt!ermined !hemn by necusary causes an!eceden!, but having something at least of it bj/ ~J<w, in our own power, e.·cry man'. own conscience bears wilne..s, in accusing and condemning him when.. R....M'1.' ..

,', 'Y'

ate

Of[ruw;1I ever he does amiss. Whereas it is plain tim if we be determined by necess;1y of natUre here, men is dlere rwthing in OUr m\-Tl power, nor .;:an ..ie be hlameWOTlhy or desc:ne punishment. Moreover ....., an: cen::ain by inlemol "'""''''', Ihat our !lOUIs as c:omprehending themselves, and hegemonial Or having a rulin, po .... er over dlem""lves., .;:an exert themseh'cs more or kss in ""If-rerolkaion, "If-attention, httdfulna:s, and animad"ertenee, in ~ipl.l.nt cimtmspection, in fortifying themseh'es in firmness of purpo5C' and re5(llurion beforehand, in aT!"),ing and pursuing steady designs of life, in exciting endeavours, in activity and diligence of execution. No,,' when men an: commended for diligence, indu5uiousness, studious endel\'ours, firmness and steadiness of resolution in good, vigilant circumspection, and blame ror the ammry, viz. _ negligence, remissness, supineness, irultention, carelessness, &c. These thinl!" are imputed to the men thetttSClves., as the causes of things, and as n04: being determined by ne"'''Sary callses as milch as the notions ofa watch Or clock are.

Chapter XII Bill besides imemal "'""''''' and common norions, the Iiaffi(: thing is ronfirmed by the Scriptures, not only apocryphal, bUI canonic:al olso. The genuine ""n" of me ancient Jewish church herein, appearem from this ofJesus Ihe son of Sirach, ch. xv. It. Say not K is through Ihe Lord lhal I f.lI .way. For lhou oughlest not to do 1M things du.1 he hum. Say nol thoo lie halh caused me 10 CtT, fDr he hath no .....d of 1M sinful man. The Lm-d ha.Nh all abomination, and they thai feor God 10,·. it nM. Hiftts,olf made man frnm 1M beginning, and Id't him in 1M hand "f his rounse!. If ,hou .n1l 10 keep ,h. rommandmenll [Ind 10 perform aca-ptlble hithfuinessJ, he hath oct fire and "'"... ~ore thee, otrctcb forth thy hand unlo ...""ther tl>ou .n11. Before man is lift ond death and "'hother him liketh shall be gi •• n him. l '

Whidl latter pusagc seems 10 refer to that of Moses, ~1I1. JO. 'Stt I hlIve set before thee this day life and good, death and evil. In that I command thee to k...e me Lord my God, 10 ..-:alk in his ways and keep "Eat ' " " 'PH1.

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Offrm,;/1 his ronunandments. ,il 'I caU hea'·en and earth to reo;:ord this day apinJt you, that I ha"e set before you life and dath, blessing and cuning. Therefore choose life that thou and thy ~ may li'·e.'l-i Here by leaving man in the hand of his own col.lllsel is plainly asKrted an llIht{oti(1I0~, or Illi pDUII", a power of detcnnining himself towards the better Or the wone, life or death . With which agreeth Solomon himself, Prov. 16.)2. ' He that ruleth his [OWII] spirit is tnOJ"t: mighty than he that taketh a city.' He that is "pdO(1QJ~ b:wrcP, superior to himself, or a conqueror over his inferiiorJ pass(ioos~ irascible and concupiscible. This implies a kind of duplicity in the human SOIIl: one. that which is ruled, another, that which mleth, or the lOul 10 be as il were reduplicated upon itself and 10 hegemonical over itsdf; having a power to intend itself n>OI"e or less in resisting the lower appetites, which anl1O'l be without something of contingency or non-n.,....·ity. W~ the lOul net"'$ .. rily and essentially good and impeccable, he would be above this self-power _ were he nothing but lusl, appetite, and Aontct, he would be below it. Now he: is 'in a middle stale I perfection betwixt boih. He hath some po ...·cr to keep under his body and bodily lusts' (, Cor. 9.17).1) To mortify his memben thalllTe upon the earth (Col. l.S). To gird up the Ioinl of hi 1 mind (, Pel. I. I) . To add IOmCthing ro himself(a Pet . I.S}. 'Add ro your faith ,;rtue, [and to virtuc) knowledge.' To improve these talents which he hath n::aived from God, and to return to him hisown with urury (Malt. 15).56 To pUl'le himsclf(a Tim. I.Zt): 'Ira man [therefore] purge himselffrom these he shall be • vessel ofhonour.' To 'dt;lIl$( ounch'es from filthiness of [the} flesh and spirit', • Cor. 7. ' . To keep himself pure (I Tim. s.n). 'To keep himself unspotted from the world' lJam. U7). 'To keep ourselves in the love of God' Oude a l ). To keep himself thaI 'thaI wicktd one touch him nol' ( I Joh. $.18). 'To O"eTaHIlC' (Apoe. ;1.7).17 In thGl: places it is pbin that the 5IM.l1 of man hath • reciprocal energy upon itself, Or of acting upon itself - so that il is not: IMTdy passive to that which it n:cei,'cs from God - I power orbeing. (oo-workuJ .... ith God, a power of

" 0.. .. ,", , l""',- ,6. .. ibOI., ..... ,9" '11011 to"", ..... -ylo:N!y .... IIriooJ;, ..... 'j boo,' (, c.:... 9-'7~ .. "" .. . l"Ihs ........ (1II .... . , . , ...)O."'I'.>7). " 'To"",, _ ooa",,, .... willi ~,.. .. taI.e .... _ at !d.' (Kro. '"7). '"'- .hhs 101, . , _ _ """' ....... ;1 DO_ 1;(' .;·.. 110... _ ... _ _ ... _ _ 4 " , -..... ,"u,OIod ....... _"" .. . h· , ..to...;'d;'" ... '1 .• .• ,.a,.-

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Offm1llil1

improving itsdffurtmr and further, and ofkeeping and conserving itself in good, all which gnnOl be witl>out a non-necessity Or contingency.

Chapter xm This faculty of o.tiT~oti<7l0~, or ",j powun, or power o"er oulKlvc:s, which belongs 10 the hegemonioon of Ihe soul, or the soul as reduplicated upon itself, and self-comprehensive, wher-eby il can acr upon itself, inlend and uen itself more or less, and by reason Ihemlf jud~, ond will, and act differently, is intended by God and IUIIUre for good, as a self-promoting, self_improving po,,'cr, in good, and also a ~-con..,rving power in the .. me, whereby men [receive] prailie of God, and Iheir persons being justified and sins pardoned through the merits and true propitiatory ..crifice, Mve • reward graciously bestowed on them by God, even 0 cro ...-n of life, NOIwiths!:!.nding which by accident and by the abuse of it, it pro"cs that, whereby men olso come 10 be unto themselves the causes of their own sin, of guilt, blame, and punishment - the objecu of God's vindicative justice, thai which will especially be displayed in thai !PUt day of judgement which is to come, The justice of which day of jud~ment to punish men for the past actions of their wicked livc:s can no otherwilie be defended than by """rting _ IUch an he~monioon in the soul, as ",'hereby it has a power over iuclf or a freedom from necessity.

Chapter XlV It appears from what I have declared that this liHrum lI,mln'IIm Or freewill, which is properly an ruh~OOuIOV or sui 101tl11lJ, I power o,'cr oneself, either of intending Or rem;"ing and consequvuly of deter_ mining ourselvc:s betler or worse; .... hich is the foundation of commen dation or blame, praise or dispraise, and the object of retributive jumcc, remunerative or ,udicative, re ....... ding or punishing; i. not a pure perfection (as many boast il to be) bUI hllh a mixture of imperfection in il. So thaI il cannol belong 10 God Or a perfect being to

.8,

I

O/fruwill

have a sdf-imending and sclf-~milting power,s. a sclf-improvin, arod sclf-impairin, power, a sclf-advancing and sclf-.dcprcssing, to deser.e p"'~, c:ommendation and ~ward on the one hand {it being obscnr:d by AristotLe that it does nm: properly belong to God bralVl:r,Jru p.(lJ(api(ta8a.tr much less to deserve blame and pun ishment. I)ur 10 be mutable Or chanl{CllbLe in .....y of diminuOOn, lapsable or peccabJe, is an essmtial property of a rational crn!U~. MoTCOvC1 a per~C{ being <:anr>Ol have any such power of stretching its iudgcflll:nt beyond ceruin kno ..·lcdgc, or of ekinl{ oul the defect of knowledge or undencanding, and supplying or lengthenin g it OUt, by faith I\ld probable opinion. A perfect beinl{ Cln neither be more nor Less in inlmOOn or beinl{ I pure act, il Cln hive no such thinl{ os selfrecollection, vigilant circumspection or diligence in CXttUtion, bu t it is immutable or unehlnl{Cllble goodnoss, and wiWorn undcf~l iblc. Anus and his followcn maintaining the Logos, the word and Son of God by whid! all things ~re made, to be a crnturc, did conscntancously thereumo assert, that he was endowed with this kind of liHru", arbitris."" whereby he was mutable, lapsable, and pccg.ble 00 BUI the N;';""e fathers, defmdinl{ the true Godh"d Or di"in i,y of the Logos, deereed on the contrary that being not lapsable, ...... p«eable, he was nOt endowed with tlull liN",,,, ,,,bllriu,,, which is In essential property of every ... tional or intelligent creature. Acrordinlly IS Origcn 61 had before declared llult the Logos, beinl{ essentially "'_ inlellect itself, could therefore never deJt11e ... te inlO folly. And the Holy Ghost, being essentially holiness itself could nm: degenerate intO unholiness, and 50 neither of them could haye tbat liN",,,, IJrhi,..."", which is tbe original of lapoability and pc<:ability. And Ihus 5t Jerome, S~hu Dtw ~((.u 11011 1D,nt. (ult'IJ, 1[11;" Iihnt. IJrbitrio p'lUllillJ J~III. IDSSIIIII ;" ~I'IJ1fU{Ut p.rl~'" " f1«I~". [Only God Clnnol .. ' .. be . . . . .....,. oM ......
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Offrwnll sin. Sin~ all O(he. thinp are endo,,-ed with fne .... ill, they can lum either ""3y],(>2 But""'"'" there are who persuade lhemsc:h'cs tMllhe ~.fo:-crion of the Deity consistelh in being indirrerent to all thinp, altogether undetermined b y any ant«:went moti,'''' or rraons of ,oodneu, wisdom, or troth, and ilStlfl0 he the sole determiner of alltMse by an indirrerent, :ubilnt)', COIltin",nt Ind fortuitous ... ill. And this is that monstrous and prodiz:;ous idea or portraiture of God ",hich Can ... ius hath drawn out in hi. ""'tlphysics,·J That there is If Nil. 'QIN "'n' aNI HIf; {no principle of tnlth or goodnessl in nature Intt«1 .... ,...., , .. _ . ... ,,_ . .... .. ..,~ ... s.._I'0_..., 1,1+ .. $00 _ TfS. p ..... _ _ Cud • .,do 1 _ 0 '1' , ",,' ............. cohIJ ~ioo. ""'" • 1U,.... wol n-. Of l'" ,~ Iftd DoCt-' "'Arioo

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O/frterrill Athanasius and Ute oth.,. catholic flthers in OppOSllJon hereunto, maintoined thot God the Flther begot I Son mil by arbitnry free....iIl, but by way of TIlItural emanation incu. pon:al and yet nOl therefore unwillingly IMlr yet ""i1hou[ will neitlln, but his will and nature here concurring and being the IiOIIl'Oe. it being both a natural will and willing TIlIture. So that the Son begon m thus from eternity by the es5CTItW ftcundity of the Father and h;s o~erflo"'-ing Jl(rfection (which is no n«essity impostd l,lpon him, nor yet • blind and OIupid natur." as thot of fire bl,lming or the .l,In shining), this di~ine "piluK'''''''', or oUt shining splendour of God the Father hath no prearious, but a necas:ary uista>ec:, and is I,Il\deslroyabLe.~ WherelS all crtatl,lru, having once had • beginn ing, cannoK possihly ha,'" a ntteSSal"y Hislena:, wen: it only for Ihis n:ason, beaiUR Ihey ona: W(Te nOI. But besides Ihis lhere can be no repugnana:, bl,lt that wh.t ona: was not, might not be again; Or be reduoed to non-existena: by that ",-hich sa"e it a being 01,11 of nothing. Wherefore thol,lgh it should be affil'nM'd thai creatures also did proceed by way of emanation from the Ddt)', os being a kind of .Ui~ lfpo4>tiP'KOI; of God Almighty, yet was this emanation of anCKber kind from thot natural and nec' ' I)' emanation of the Son. n~ly I voluntary emanltion sl,lspettdible. Nor can it be denkd but that God Almighty might by his absolute power .nnihiLote this ...·hole creo.tion. A. suppose, if aU .. tional creatures s.hOlJld dexctlenle, (os. greal Jm'f ha"e done), and continue obstinately in their apostasy (as a late ~ wpposcth the annihilation of wicked men's &001., arter the day of judgement, ronduding this 10 be the 5CCOnd death threatened), and then instead thereof crtate alWlther world of rational creatures, which conceit of other worlds created before th is from eternity, hat h not only been o,.-ned by the Stoics asserting an infinite viciuirudc and revolution of ...·CKIds, one after another, all new ill> to the ntional creatures in them, but also hath been . l,Irmiscd by some of the Christ(ianJ profe:ss[ion], Origen himsdfhoving IIOfTIC umhng<' of it." All will is genenlly ackno .. lcdged to hove this naturally or necessarily belonging to it, to be determioate
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Offrmpjlf it seems blMh rational and pious to concei,'c lhal the best: of all beings. who is tumtlally good md ~,should always act aJrttably to its o ...·n nalure, md !herefnre ...ill !he besl, md OO1lsequendy make Ihe world in thc best: manner that it was capable or. Some indeed will needs p~nd"1 Ih.1 God does nIlt always do Ihe besl, becou"" IMY suppose Ihis to be m essential freedom and libeny in him, 10 be indiffemu 10 will atm the better or !he WOrR:r. Which is all one as to !Oay he is indiffc rent to act either, acrordinl to his own wisdom and goodnCS!l, or not . But none ofthesc men, nor my alheists neither, were e'-cr yet able to show how the workmanship of God in m y part of !he world, or in their own bodies, could have been mended in the least thing that is. Nor can God's providtntt in the govemnmlt of rational creatures be suspected nnlto be tM best, by m y wl\o belie'-e that M hath appointed a day wherein he will judlt' the "" orld in righTeousness, and without respect of pers[on,j "'nder to evfery] man accordjing] to hi, works. When M<>scs tells us of God pronouncing of everything thaI he made, that it was 'IC~ ~1t1 vtry IOH (Gen. 1.31 ), we aJ"C to undcntand the meaning to be, thO! it"'0\5 the besl, the Hebrews having no olher W;ly 10 express the superlative. Notwithstanding which, arbitrary md contingenl liberty is not quite excluded from !he Deily by us, there beinl many cases in which there is no besl, bUI a gmt scope and latitude for Ihings to be detmnined either this w'y, or that ..... y, by the arbitrary will and pleasure of God A.lmighty. A.. for instana:, !he world being s upposed to be finite (as it ean nil moll: be infinite than it could be eternal), that it should be just of sucb a bigness, and nIlt a jot less or bigger, i. by the arbitrary appoinlment of God, since nil man can with reason affirm Ihat il was absolutely best that it sl\ould h[a]ve been so much as an inch or hair'sbreod!h bigger or lesser !hm it is. The number of the stan musl need s be either even or odd, bue il cannot be said that either of them is absolutely in ilKlf the besl nOr yet Ihat the number of those nebulose .tllkl( [Staf1;j, that appear to our sight as.mall as pind ust, sl\ould be just so many as they arc, and neither one more or Jess. So likewU;c the number of created angds and human soul., or that every One of uS had a being and I consciousness of ou rselves, must needs be delennJn.ed by the arbitrary will and pleasure of the Deity , wl\o can obliterate and blot "

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O/ftmAlI anyone of us Out again OUt of being, and yet the world nol be a jol Ihe kss perfect by it. Howevet' we may readily bear a p;lrI and join wilh Ihe four and twenty elders in the apocalypse falling down before Ihe throne, in that 500g of thei,.,., 'Thou an worthy 0 Lord to reaive glory and 1Km000r and power; for thou hasl crealed all things, Kru r~v BiJ.Jtalv !TOO, f(ll" thy will (or pleasure) they are and Were crealed.o6II Though all things in the unive"" had not betn arbitrarily nude 5uch as tbey '""', but according to the best an and wisdom, yet "'ere they not therefon leu for Ihe will of God; il being his wiU 10 nuke them according to his wisdom; or to order aU things in number, measure, and wcight {Wisd.

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Chapler xv The instanoes of Ihe Ta iv&X';!l£"" ,r;J.w.; lXtlv, as the Gm:ks call them, such things as • ..., contingent or unnt=ry, h"'e been f...,_ quentiy given in inanimate bodies thO! hI,'c no ""If-moving nor ""Ifchanging power, and the...,fo..., can ncver be moved nor changed but, as to Ihem",,!>'cs, ne<:cssarily. As for eumple, that il may eilher rain or nO! rain tomorrow; that the wind may then blow either from the nonh, or from the south. 'These and such like inferences h,,·c been conuno.l1y given by ancient writers (as well as modem) who assen contingency againlit the Dcmocritictl or Stoical f.Ite Or necessity of all actions; but, as I conceivc, "cry improperly, for though the..., be in JUltu..., a possibility of eithet' of these, and the..., is an unartaint)" to uS which of them will be, yet which§OCver of them al any time com ... to pass, COITloOlh nOi 10 pass by any contingent libcriy of its own, but is determined rvcess·rily by natural ClUSQ antcadent, or without. As for thot OIher ""mman instana: of the casl of. die,70 he,.., is no contingency or non-nea:ssity neither in the motion of the die after it be out of the CISter', hand, though it be uncenain to U5 which side will fall uppermost. But there may be an antecedent contin!:cncy in the postu,.." and fora:, or impulse of the thrower, which is to be distinguished from the motion of the die itself. No body that is by nat"..., tu;poKi""mv, oJ""'ys moved by .. Rndo_ •.". • , _ T _ o{

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Offrw;il/ ....... thing elsc, and never originally from itself, can have a contingency or non-necessiry in its own motion, its such, though it may hi: contingently movw by something else, having a power o"er its own action, to determine the same, Wherefore there canoot pos5ibly hi: anything more scnse\e$s and absurd than the doctrine of Epicul'US, ...·ho asserting a amtingent ~berty of willing in all animals, frtt from Dte and necessity, den"ed the original thereof from. a contingent de.:lination of senseless atoms from the perpendicular, more or less, and unartainly this wa)' or thu way, ipsa ~ n=um inte!ltinum habcat ptu. rerre, patique, id facit e.iguum ditwnen principiorum ,..., rqione loci ecru, n« temp"'" <=10. ord ne

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['Wherefore you must admit !he ........ exis .. in the seed. aloo, tho, moOOn' hI,' .... me COUSl: OIhtr than blo.... and ... oiShlS, (TOrn which th" PO-' is born in us, since "'" 1ft thot nothing can be produced (TOrn nothing'.fZ

Wherefore for the avoiding contingent libcny coming from nothing, Or Ming without a cauoe, he ..,igo.;t an impoo.siblc cauoe, for oothing can he mon: impossible than this, Wt a sc:nst"less atom which hath no sc:lfmoving power, should have in it a contingem liberty of moving Ihis way or Wt way.71

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O[[rttIDil/ Ntvcnhc1ess il may wen be questioned whether there may mil: be 50mething of oonlingcnq or non-nea:ssiry in Ihe actions of brute animals, though it be out of ql.lelition thaI they have nothing of monliry or monl freewill in them. We did before: we notice of a certain kind of libeny from necnsity, wltere blame or commendation had no plxc, called by some of tile ancients epeleuslic, where thcre being an equal eligibility in sev ..... l obittu widlOUt the leasl difference, we can determine ourseh·e. fonuilOusly to either of them. Now il is no\: easy 10 exclude brute animals from such a oontin~cy as this, bcause then: may be obj«u proposed 10 thrnt (as of meat and drink) 50 e:nedy equal, and placed at such equal di.unccs for. considcnblc time; as thaI it cannOl be ooncei,'cd what ph)"Sical cause then: .hould be neces5ll"ily to detennine them at last to dtller of Ihrnt, or to this ntlleT than that. And yctthey "'ill not hang in suspense but certainly do one or Olller. So again when: tMY an: dimacted betwixt an equal fear and I\'enation on one side, and equal hOf><' or desire on the other, at the same lime, as • dog bel"'ixI a whip and a bonc, they will not alway. continue in demur and au.pen", 'hoU5h 'h" ..,.1.,. bco u"",,,ly even, and a perfee< U~.,..,~ .. 10 motives and causes. SUI tlteff will .fter a detennination, 5Omelimc. one way, sometimes anolher, which cannOl ....en be lhought ne<:essary without anything of fortuitous contingency. Motto"er Epicurus " 'OS of opinion, lhat ... ,,"ell brute animal., as men, had a po,,"er o ,'cr themsch'cs, of intending themseh'cs more 01" less to their sensual or animal~, fancied hy them: n""ne vida etiam poltfact;' tempore puncto, oarttribus, nan pn<SC: wnen [prorumpttc <'Quorum vim <:upidam tam de rubito, q ...m .... ns ..·et ipsa]. ['Do you not sec also .. hon ""Ils.re thrown o~n at a li.·on moment, that nc"crthclao the ager force of the hones connOl burst forth so wddmly .. the mind i..tlf <:no· ... ,']"

Wh«c he CO/ltth'cd that brutes "'en: nO! mc~ly passi~e to their own rancies and .Qnlfat' but that they could add S01TICthing of lheir own to them mo~ or less, and actively intend themscl~cs beyond what they suffered or what W2S by naru~ impressed upon Ihem; which, ifit be so, lhen must then: be 50mcthing in brutes superior to their ~MftUU, some .. l, "";... ~.,.... ....... ~-4. Tho "'" .... and .... 1I"1i........ "'" io llIc .. ;Poa1 ...

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Offrullli/l one thing, whio;h, taking notice both of OUiw",d objects by sense, and of its own fancies and ~o"""" em intend them more or kss, and add more or less to them. And there may seem to be some funher pn.>bobiliry of thi. from hence, becolJJ;C we find by experience that brutes are man y of them dociblc, and can acquire habits, to do many tllings even to admintlon. Now fmcics and Mmult as liuch are nlM capabk oflulbits, no more than orrrttwiU. And thuc:fore that which thc:so: habits ore: in, and which thUIi dcttnnines their moUon5 (and their ~o""". too) must be a kind of h~moni(: in the acting probably not witMut some contingenq. However it is not easy 10 belie,·c WI e,·try wagging of a dog's tail, every morion of a wanton kiding sportfully playing and toying, or of a II... skipping, hath such a necessary cause, as thai it could none of them possibly hIve been otherwise.71

Chapter xvt But whatever be the <:asc: of brute animals as to this particular, whose in5ides we cannot enter into, yet we being in the inside of ouRCI.eli do know certainly by inward sense tllat there is in us some OM hegemonical, wh ich romprehending aU the other powcrs, enefiles, and capacities of our soul (in which d\"IlKfofJa).asl'O(}tw they ore: recollected IlIld as it were summed up) luI,·ing a power of intending IlIld exerting itself TTI01l' or less, dctennineth, not only actions, but also the whole passive cap
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OfftttlNII utility, which disco'-enng inamven~nces prucnt and fut\ln: anending them, often amtradicu these apJl(rires of a present semu.al good, Apin, the 5uJl(rior dictate of honesty, which many times is inconsistent both wilh !he apJl(tite!; of pleuure and the n::uon of private utility. Besides then:, a s)l«ulative power of contemplating it 9"",'- '"'Ie d '"0'" mle, of whatsoever is and is nlM in IWUn:, and of the IrUth and falsehood of things univenal, whence it obtr\ldes upon us the nOllce of. God and His existence IS the objca of religion, the substantiality or pennanem subsistence of our own soulsafter me body's droly. Lastly a demxming powt'T of what is to Ix done in life in order to the promoting of our own good and upon emergent occ:asions, I say then: being so many wheels in thili machine of our souls, unless they Ix all aptly knit and PUt togt:ther, so IS to conspin: into one, and unless then: be. some one thing prniding Over them, imending itself more or less, directing, and ordering, and Jiving me fiat for actioo, it could nOl go forwards in motion, but there must be. a confusion and dismction in it, and we must needs be perpetually in puzzle. We should Ix like to a disjointed machine or aUtomatOn all whOliC wheels are nne well ""I togt:ther, which therefore will be either at a stand continually, or c1"" go on very siowly, heavily, and cumbe.rsormJy_ It could never arry on evenly any stead y designs, nnr manage itself orderly and agrenbly in undenaking, but would be. altogether a thing inap! for action. If apJXtites and passion rise necessarily from ob~ witllout and the n::uon of private utility did necessarily suggest something amtrary to them from the consideration of other present inoonveniences or future ill consequences, wen: there nne some middle thing here to interpo5e or to umpire bet"Nttn them WC' must of neoessity be nonphrssed and at a stand. But if either of these by superiority of strength did alW;t~ necessarily prevail OVer the other, then would that other be altogether useless and supufluous, and so the wholl:. bungle in natun:. The case il the same IS to the clashing and discord betwixt the SliJl(t lot dicate of honesty and conscience and that ohensual pleasure or private utility. If these two be ~uipondennt IS scales in a balance, and there be no hand to rum or ClSt in grains of advantage either ....y, then must the machine of me 5(>IJ1 be at I stand. But if one of them do alW;tyl necessarily preponderate the other, men is the lighter altogt1hu idle and to no pUrpo5e. Again, if s)l«ulative and delibe.r.ariwe thought be always necessary in

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°ffrm"iI/ us, both "" 10 exercise and spccifionion , Ih~n mllSI il be ~ilh~r boau.., they aR all ~ly produced ilI1d detennined by objeClS I)f'len.., from without, according ro !he docIrin~ 1)( Oemocritus II1d Hobbian alheislS, or ~lse because the understandin, ah'"lI)'S necessarily " 'orketh I)f itself upon this .,.. 111:01 object, and pusclh fmm one object 10 anocher by a nec:esury ..,rics or train II1d concalenation of thoughts. Upon supposition ofmc, fOl " "'r,...., rould "",vcr think of anythin" I>(W spuJo: • ....,..d at any time but wlut obiern of IICT1se wilhrnil did obtrud~ upon us unavoidably. We roold never divest our I)"-n thrnighu, noT stop the inundation of lhem flowing in I strnrn from ooj«u nor mtenain Illy conSWlt desi~ I)f lite, nor carry on any projects for the fUlure; ,",'e bein, ooly pus;"e tl) lhe present obj«u of lICT1iC before UIi, all our Ihoughts bein, .]1 scribbled I)r sumped up<:>n our 5I)uls by them as upon a shec:1 <>f paper. But if the latter of these be supposed. then rould we never 1I:o"e Illy p,ek""" of mind , no n:o.dy attention 10 ... """,nl Dttur'u ....... or occuionl, but our minds would be always royin, .,.. rambling out, w~ having no p<:>wcr o,'cr them 10 calilhem back from Iheir straRlings, or fix them and ducnninc them on any ""nain objoects. Lastly, if we could not intend ourseh-es in dili"'l1<% of activily and endca"ours, mort' or kg ~ ourseh'cs 10 pursue any puTpOSe' or design, fonify our minds with rnoiution, ncit~ ourulvcs ro ""'Ichfuiness and circumspection, recoIlea ourselves more and less in considering.1I our interests and concerns, if we oould nol from ourselves exc" any acl of yi"uc or tk~ion f.,.. which we should tntly deserve praiK, nor anI act of.in for which '"'c .""uk! justly dcsen'~ blame, for ...., shmold be1 bUI dead machines mo,-cd by Kinuners and "ira; (I"~fII'"'' MrvU .Iit".. m~t Ii""",,) . To conclutk, God Almighty roukl not make such I rational creature u this is, all whose joinlS, 'prings, and whec:1s of tn(l(ion ...-ere ,........ .. rily tied I~r, which had no .df-p<:>nr. no Ite1!;cmonic or ruling principle, nothing 10 knil and runi'''1 ,he: multiforiou. ]W'tS of "I~ IlUChine into one, to JlecT and IIWI.Igc lhc conduct of i"",lf no _ than he WlJld havc made a1lthc bird. ofth~ air OfIly ";Ih one wing, all th" basts of th" 6eld. hones, and other canle "ith Ihrec: legs, for the idea ofthne Ihings is nothing 50 unap! u that of an imperfect rational

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beinl, aU w!loK POWttl and wheell of ~ an: ~Iy tied ~, which hath no ~ thinl preaKlinl and JO~inl in it, havinl • 5elf-inll:lldinJ, and self~mnininl, and self-promurinl poWl:r. Wherdore m il ark&{oWlO~. ,..; self-poWl:T, commonly called liberty of wi11, ;. no arbitnry contrinna:, or appo;nuncnt of Deity, rno:rdy by will anne.ud to mional aaturu, bill a thinl which of n'" 3'ily bdonp to die idea or nuliR of an impel I'«t ntionaI beinJ. Whaula pttfect beinr. _tially sood and ......, ;. lIbo\'e mil f, «wiD or self-poNts, it beinr impolS>'ble that it should enr improve i(K1f, much leu impair itself. BUI an impcrf(taJ ntiorW heinl, which is without m. K lf-powcl , . an iMp! rnonl"'1 and rnonwous minJ,1Ind therdon, .uct. • minr .. God could not mate. Bul if ho: 1I'OUkI male any imptifKt n:lionaI CI'CIllIl'ft, ho: mUSt of ne<;CSSily endue: lhem with an iotrr-IIitP or self-tulinr po ...~r. WheRfore thaI wbich by a.;cidenl follows from abide of' lhit; powo:r tmnoI M imputed to God Almi,bty _ a5 tho: COIIK of it, vic. sin, and vK:c. and wid
,.,t1fu,

Ch;pter XV1I I haVt now bUT one: mini moR 10 add, and ,hat is 10 take notice of. er with tIM: aaisbnoet: of Divine I''''', he is habitually fixed in monJ sood, or ....:h a fOliC of mind, .. lhal he doth frttly. readily, and caaily comply Wh the law of the: Divine life. taking • pleasun: in

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complattna IMrt:unlo; and hlvin, an l\~nalion 10 Ihe rontnry; or ..hen lhr b .. oflht; 'Pirit oflife halh madc: him frtt from thc b .. of sin. which ;.; 1M dalh of 11M: IOU!. Bul ..hen, by 1M abuse of lhal nuul'lll faeulty of frttwill, men COIt"Oe habinWly bed in c.il and sinful inclirwiona, then an: they, as Boethi", ..ell Hpl " I it, Ii.,,,;, 1iMr1./t (.,tit;o.• knowinl good and nil, 'made apti' 'C, and broulf'ol in ~ by their ooom f.cewill,'7'1 and obno.riowo 10 di~ jllilice and displcuure for the iIamC. Who....uo:r C\IIiomarily convnineth &in,• .. hidl;'; by h.ii 0"1I frttwillllbwed or t>U .... sdy UKd. contnry 10 the deliilP'l of God. and nalure in bestowin, lhr ume upun 14, is lherroy made the Jo:rYant of it. and dcpri.,cd of WI 1n>C' mlC of liberty, .. hidl is man 'l po:rfection. The flC\llty offrttWiU is good. .. he.wy men lin' adnnccd abo~c ,he low condition of brute animals. ,,'1'10 a", under I """ i~y of foIlowin, lIM:ir fancies..., ,, '., and appetiles 10. JeftIWII good only, 0' a good of pri""'tC ..elfish utility, lhey hlvin, no JCIIK of thll good of honesty, and .ilf'oICOllinal whidl is of I diffcm. t kind from il. Bin this flClllty bein, thaI which ill pro~. 10 crcalUru, and 10 im~rfttl beinp only, hath I mi;nU1'( of creamrely "ukMtl Ind im~.fection, in it; and therefore is liable 10 be abused, 10 all lhereby 10 beCOlrlC 10 OUrKh'H the Clu"" of 1Hl' own bond~ and servitude. Whereas lrue liberty, wh ich is I state of vin"", holme., and rightnl\lsneu (a communiClted Divine ~rfttlion or panieipation of lhe Divine na!U re) can llC\'o:r be abused .

Q UpltT X\'III

I now pro< .d 10 _,,'Cr all lhe argumcnu or objections made aplnsl this I'ac:uIly of the ~' rjJI'~ or aUreoeOOaIO ~, thil; P# ,.m/.I, or pD'<'fer over oonelV5, .. hidl in (ns • contingency oc ~ity, and is

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Offt..",ill d"';lrapK'!'ov, a thing which hath no existeD« in nalUre, but in iuclf [is] unimdligible and absolutely impossibk. TM first whereof is mis that nothing can move OJ" act an y ""'y, but os it is mo,-ed nr acted upon by ~hing else with",,! iL This argument is thus ridkulnusly PT!>pounded by Mr Hobbes, 'I con~ive tbat nothing lakem beginning from itself, but from t~ actinn nf some other immediate . 0 1 witlwlu! itKlr.,*1 But mis meaning, if he had an y meaning, could be nn other tlwl this, that no..:tion taketh beginning from the agtnt iuclf, but from the action of ~ other agtnt without it. Which i. all one as if he slwluld say that no .gent acteth from iuclf, not omerwise than as it is pOS1li"" 10 ""me other . 0 1 without it. That is, Ihere is nothing selfmoving Or self-lICting in the world, nothing that actem other.riM: tlwl as it suffererh, or is made to act by somt:lhing else: without.""' Now if mis proposition be true, il must ,,"d. be granted that there an be no contingtnt ~berty or freedom from n«es:silY in nature, but all thinp will d~nd upon a chain of causa ucb link of which is ne«nrily connecled, both wim what went before, and whal follow5 after, from eternity. But it is ~rtain Ihat mis argument makes no more sense againsl conlingencyor non -necessily, than il doth apinS! the exislence of a God, or an unmoved mover md finl ause of all tbings _ It is of equal force bolh ""'Y' and meufore ifit do substanlially and effectually prove Ihe ne«ssily of all actioru, men doth il as firmly evince Ihat Iherr is no firsl unmoved O'T uncauoed cause, that is, no God. And I do not question, but thaI Ihis is the Ihing which Mr Hobbes aimed at, though he disguises his design as much as he could in his book ~ ~rpq", ch. ~6, 'Eui~" ~o (5c. '. Ahhoogh from hence thaI nothm, can mo.e i...,lf, il is rilhtly enough inr.e"ed lhe ... is. tinl mover thaI wu eternal; yet ne>"mhdeSf il cannot be inferred from thf:nct, .. it mmmonly is, Ihal tlterc is ""Y
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Off.trll>iJl In which words ~ doth It once cndo:>"our 10 t:r.uuIUK and ronve:y the poison of .theism, and yn 10 to do it cnJii]y, as that if he be charJaI with it, he might have some lftITIinr iublmu"" or ~.I4ioo1. He aith fil'$( WI it is rirhd y infCfKd tMe is lOme fil'$( ttemal mover, which Ioob vtry wtLL, but then he doth not stand 10 this, but contradicts it immcdiau.ly af~rWll'd in denyinl that lhen: ;. any nemal immoveahlc mover, or any other nemal mover, t!un iuc:h as was itKlfbefore R'IO\-~ by IOIM'thinr tlte, which is all one as to Sly that then: was no first mo'"er. But one thinr moved another fivm nernity, without any hqinninr, any fint mo~er, any unmo,'ed stlf-mo~ed movu." For the fim mover, if then: be indttd any such, must n«ds be an unmoved mo"er, .. hich .,.. not ilSt]f before ....,..ed or acted by anothtt, but a stlf-movinr mClVu. BUI Ihis wt..ok Irlument th", at OIK'C. Slnkinl apinst: contingttlCy, and the: heinl of a God boI:h toStthtr, and which pretends 10 be III malhc:marial dcmonOlr.uion iI evidently the ~ cI"IioWi piece of rid~1ous nonstnK that cvc:r .... wrinen . For if then: be moIion in the corporal world, as there is, and no pari of il could eVer move itself, then must there of MC$ity be some unmoved or stlf-moving thin, as the fil'$t ClUIit thenof, IOmcthing which cuuld mo'"< or ~ from itself wilhout beinll' moved or ao;led upon by I rI01her. BecaUK if nothinll" al aLL could move: Or &CI by il$tlr, bUI only u il Willi moved or acted upon by another then could not motion or IClion ever lx-gin, or ever have romc into the world . BUI since then: is motion in the corporeal world. and no part of it could moVc ;tRlf, it mUit nffds eithcr ori,inal!y pto(led from a fint unmoved or IItlf-moving mo,'er and ClUK. or else: .LL of il ...... "e from lIOlhinl, and be produced without a ClUIit. Bullhc tnlth is Ihis, liuollhc:se unlikilful phiJosophers apply that 10 all heinl wiuot:50tvu, .. h ich is the property of body only, tlw il QUlnot moVe itldf, nor othc ....isc mo,'e t!un as it is Clused 10 move by IOmtlhin, dst without it; as it ClllIIOI $lOp it$ motion neither, "'hm it ;. ......,. ;"'PI d upon il (it brinl wholly of. paNive natun:), and from hmcc il afforded an undeniable demonstration 10 us., that ~ is mmc incorporaJ heinl. and IOrntIhinl unmovo:>ble. or Itlf-m.ovii1g and sdflaing, u tht firsl aUK of all moI:ion and action , ...hich in iuelf nor

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being moved nor aaed by mod'leT, can cause body to move locally, md did at first imprus such quantity of motion upon m. oorpornJ universe as oow theR' is in it. u

Chapter

XIX

Apin, it is obj«ted, that though it should be granted there was 50melhing ""If-mo"ing md ""If-acti"e, and which ,,";os not merely passive to another thing without it, acting upon it, yet (or all that, it is noc pos.sibk that anything should determine itself, act;"eIy chmge itself, or act upon itselfbeause one and the gme thing cannot be both agent and ~tient at onoe. To "'hich I reply, first thll there is no necessity rut .. hal actcth from itself should al"lI)"S act uniformly, Or without any diffen:nce or change. Thai in U5, which moves lhe members of our body by cogitarion or will, doth not alway. do it alike, but determinelh illlelf diffen:ndy Ihen:in, acting somerimts on One member IiOffiClim"" on anotlteT, moving SOI1lC-+ times this "";IY sometimes that ""y md with roon: or less oelerity md strength, md sometimes arresting motion apin . So that nothing can be moR' pbin thilll rut, by determining illlelf differendy, it doth a.=rd+ ingly detcmline the motion orthe body. And it is t'Omrary to the verdict of our inward sense 10 affi rm that, when we thu. mon ou r body and members arbitrarily and at pleasure, no onc motion of our finger, no nicUlion of our eyelids, no word spoken by our tongutc could ~CT possibly h....: been otherwise than it "-as at that time, but that it "-as necessarily so determined, by a succ:cssi,'c chain of caUKS, from an eternity, or at least from the beginning of the world, much Jess, as Mr Hobbes further dogmatizes, that theR' is no one action, how casual or contingent .... ver il ..,.,m, 10 the au.ing whereof did not II onoe concur L• • 16 WI1"tsOever IS .n 'tntm "'"",,•. That which determineth itsdf and changeth itself may be said to act upon itself, and consequenrly to be bolh agent and ~tient. Nuw though this cannot poUibly belong tu a body which nen . moves itself, but is

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'VI

ate

Offrw»ill es5mlially trCPOKivrrrov, al .....ys mo,'cd by ~thing elK widlO\J! ii, yet: nothing hinde~ but that what is by naNre amo-Ki",/rov, selfmoving and Klf-aai"e, may also dctermine its own motion or acti,;ty. and 00 the ".me be ".id 10 be both agmt and patK:n!. We arc: CMcious of itself, and reflni"c upon itself, may also as ..;ell act upon itself, either as fortuitously dClermining its own activit)" or else as intending and exerting itself more or less in order 10 the promoting of its Own good.

Olapter XX But it is still further obittted thai' thing which is indifTc ... nt as such can ncyer determine itself 10 mo"e or act any way, but must needs conlinue in suspense without action, 10.11 eternity. Thill i. an argument which Pompon.tiu." 7 relic. much upon to destroy contingent liberty of will, and establish a fatal nec:cssit)" of.1I aaions. And her<: we must again observc thot what belonr;eth 10 bodies only, is hy these philosopher-. unduly ntended to all beings whacsoe'·er. 'Tis true thai a body which is unable to mo,'e itself, bUI passively indifferent 10 recei,'c any motion impressed upon it, ona resti ng must ne.:d. continue to Test 10 all eternity, unless il be delermincllo Ihis or that motion by oomcthing elK wilhout. And if it 5hould be impelled different ., ,....",!'m.,. ".; (htnd P'" , ....... ), lk j.,.. .. , . , . . _ " .. " ......... -, <>I. btIonI L<mt1 (!.uooo, 19m p ..... Bcd .. -.. I . •y ........ ipoo ....... _ .. , _ _ _ ......... ""110 ..., _ .......... "",ilFt " -_' ... A.. ,; ' ~ . . . . .; • u. .. ~ ,~.o o,. So< M. I'W><, 1'0.", " , .. ..0 of ""

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OffrmPilI -.nys al onCe by IV"O equal fon::es, it an never be .ble of iuclf 10 move either -.ny. Two saks put into a perfect equal poise an neither oflhem move upward or downward . But it will not therefore folio ... that if equal mtMives to action, equal appeuances of good offer themselves to a man, he- must the-rdofe stand for ever in an ~"or equilibrium, and can nc:va- detnminc himself to act one way or OIher. Nn·crthelcss m is is a great mistake of Pomponatius and many others, 10 mink that mat liberty of will, which is 1M foundation of pmse Or dispraise, must consist in. man's having a perfect indiffermc:y after all moti'·es and rcuon, of action propounded and after the last prattial judgemenl too, to do Ihis or Ihat, 10 choo&e me bern:r or ,,"Oowr, and to determine himself fonuitously eitm way. for the contingency of freewill doth not consist in such blind indiffcrency os mis is ana- the Wt judgellient and all motives of action conside~: but il is antca:den t tllenunto, in a man', intending or exerting himself more or less, bodl in toIlsideralion and in IftOlution, 10 ruiSI thc: inferior appetites and indi~tions to the worser.

Chapter XXI i\nothe-r argument used to prove th.t contingc:nt frttwilt is a thing that an have not existcna: in nature is because it il reasonable 10 think that all elections and volitions are determined by me reasons of good, and by the .ppearance of the greater good. Now the reasons and .ppearance. of good ate in me understanding only, and theref~ are not arbitrary but II... ' .. I)'. Whence it wilt follow that aU eJection. and volitions mUlit needs be n«.lIT1oQ; 10 pass Wt the same motives

,.

OffrurPilI

and reasons have not the same effect upon different men, nor yet upon the $lime man at different times. Wherefore thi. is but one of the vulgw errors; that men are merely passi"e to the ap~annces of good, :and to their own practical judgements.

Ch~pter XX II

Aoother argu"",n t for the natural necessity of ill actions much used by the Stoia was this, that OOOllV avaiTlOv, nothing can be ...·;thout. calISe, and wha~ver hath a callSC: must of neor:ssiry co"", to ~. Mr Hobbes think. to improwe this argu""'nt into a demonslntion afler this manner . Nothing can come to pass withou t a sufficient cause, :and • sufficient callSC: is that to which nothing is needful [{} prod uce the effect, wherefore every sufficient callSC: must needs be: a necns:uy cause, or produce the effect necessarily." To .... hich chiWish argumentation the reply is easy, that a thing may have sufficient power, or ..... m nothing of POWCT IleCCSSary to emble it to produce an effect, which yet may ha"e power also or freedom not to produ<:t il. Nothing is produced ...;Ihout an efliciem Clusc,:and such :an effic(iem1 cause as had a sufficiency of po ...·er to enable it to produce il. BUI yet ,hat person, who had sufficienl po .... er to produce an effect might notwithstanding will not 10 produce it. So thai Ihen: an: two kinds of sufficienl causes. One is such as acteth necessarily and an ne;lhCT sus~nd nor determine its o...·n action. Another is such lS o.cteth contingently or arbitnrily, :and hal h a power o,'er its own :action, either to suspend it or determine it lS it plnsc:th. I shall subjoin 10 this :another argumenl, "'hieh Mr Hobbes glories or, as being the ""Ie invenlor of. From the nec:asiry of a disjunctive proposition notbing CIJ1 be ... conti ngent but that it WlS ~ly lTUe of ;1 beforehand thaT it will either come to pass Of not come to pass .... Therefore, says he, ifthere be a necessity in the disjunction, the", must be a nCV'SSily in one or other of the two parts thereof o.lone by itself. If .. B!!

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Of[.uflIiJl thell' be no IItXXssity that il shll awTH: to pass, th~n must it be nccns:ary thai il shall not rome 10 pass, u if t!>'re a.>Uld noI be no nc:casity in the disjunction thoogh both memben of it ... ell' contingent, :and neit!>'r of them nectsSarJ . This is a IOOSl shameful igrn>rance in top:, especially for on~ ...110 pretends 10 much to gcomerrical d~mon'lrarion. And ~ Ihis childish and riditulou. nonoen.., and ooph istry of his was stolcn from IDe Stoics too, ..ho playcd thc fools in loP: aflcT thc wt"M: manne!". Every proposition, said lhey, concerning a supposed fUl\lre contin~t, thlt it will rome to pass, was cit!>'T ~ or faL.., beforehand and from ettrnity. If it wert: tru~ then it must of rteCeSSity come 10 pas&, if false then was it neassary it should not rome to pus. 9 .... nd )"et this ridiculous ooph istry puuled not onl)" Cittro ' but also .... risllll:lctl himself OIl much U to makc IDem IIoId that pn.>p05itions concerning fUNrt: contingents ""enc 10 be neither true nor false.

Gapter XXIIJ I now come to ans ....e.- the IrplmeRlS of those, for the fleaSsity of action, ...110 suppose that though COf1tin~ t lilxny do indent naturally belong to all rational beings :os such, yet norwithstanding thc nercise thereof i. peculiarly TeKrved to God .... lmighty himself only. He from all eternity determining all action. and events wluttsoevcr according to his arbitrary .... ill and plcuure, and so by hi. irresistible d=ec$ and influx making them neccsury, though Olhe ......;.., in theiT o.. n naturt: they woukllut.-e been contingent. The: first ground of which opinion is th is, for a Clfttun: to excrcise a contingent arbitrary (,,,, .. ill ;. alL one :os for it 10 ICI independently upoo God, wherefore Ihis mllR n«do be rcse ...-ed 10 thc Deily, as hii peculiar privilege and pn:ropti.·c, arbitrarily and cootingently \0 determine alilhinp.. and Iherefore to make all actions nux pry to WL God would not be God, if he did n<X arbitraril y detnmlne aU things. "

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O//.mI1iIl BUI first,thii ii 10 ~ ..... llo .. Up all things into God, by making him tht solo!: X'tOr in Iht un;vax, all Ihinp dse bt-ing- _rdy pusive 10 him, and dettnnincd in tOO • b)' h im . This .t kasl is, u Plorinus intimates, 10 m:akt God Iflc, il1lJlXdiatc hi!iiliKlllic, and soo[ 0( lhi! " 'holol: ..orld.'J Ap;n, this is flO( the JIIprnne pcl"ffCIion 0( lhi! DeilY, to dClmnint allthinp and actiona ubitrarily, eontinlC"d y, and lOrtuilDUdy. BUI 10 loCI ......... dinl lO sood- and "'isdom, God bein, infinile disinlCT"i!5lrd kM displaying illiltlf wisely, thercfon: producing from his ft:cundil)" all thinp lhat could b( madt: and .. rrc fill<.> be made. liufft:Tinllht:m 10 oct accordin, 10 tMir own n11Um. himself presidinl 0>'(1' aU, and ucrcisilt, his jusrice;n lhi! man ...."'.nl .nd ptmmo:nl 0( tM ..hok. And sintI' all rational crururn h1vt H$(nlially lhis propeTt}' of liNn"" ....·rriv1ll, tM 10 a..l1t{otl.JIQ~ se[f-po"'i!! belongin, to than, 10 suppose that God A[m{;,hl)'] could nol Ihe " 'orld withou, offering . consnnl yio[ence 10 ii, ~"i!r luffaing ,h.m 10 OCI according 10 their own natlln, is >'t ry absurd." This powtr 0( conring.nl frttwill II !lOI independenl upon God, bUI conlroJlabloe by him II ploeuurt, as aI50 il is obnoxious 1l1d ICCOUnNh[c to hi!; juslice in punishi nl Ihe uoroil1nCC!!! of ;1. And " 'cre il nOl for Ihis, th. Div;n. jlUtkc ",lribUI;v., dispensing ",ward. and puni.h_ mtntl., could have no place ;n thi! world, nor no obiecl to exercise il5
.mons

"",·.m

Oupli!r

XXIV

Apin ;1 ii objeclO:d dw if all hum(anJ aaion5, be neither nccessuil)' in thcmseh'es, IMM" yn ma.ok.uch by Divine dtucu, Ihey annox pxsibl)'

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foreknown by God, u..refore we must n~. either deny the Divine omniprescience, or deny rontingency. Whe..., in the first plxe wc gnnt, that vo~tions purely coming."t in their O... n nar[urej (as when the objects or mean. are p«fecdy equal, and have no differences of bent"!" and worse, ~ing nOl made n~ ....rJily by Divinc de... L:S, Or influence neither) are not ceminly foreknowable nt (~ ...U. Since that catUI<X ~ certain ly fotekno ..·n t.f f alUU [from causes] which has no ncc'IS "Y causcs. And if contingent vo~tions ~ neitheT ceminly fordmo"Olble t.f (dlUU, nor any way else but are absolutely unforeknowablc, then ..·ould it be not more derogatory from the Di.·ine omniprescicnce, that it cannot know things unknowable, than IQ the Divine omnipmence. that it cannot do things that an: nOl doable, Qr that are impossible to be don:. However, these things ...Quld nm be so many as i. oomm<mly supposed. For all voluntary actions are nm contingent - man' ....ill being alway. nece·.. rily determined III good, and the Ivenation of eviL, so that there are innumerable cases in human life, in whidl We may certainly knll"'· befQrehand what any man in hi. wits ....... Id do, as.ts.;, many other[.j wherein there can be no doubt but that a good man would do one way, and a man Qfviciouli corrupt principles ar>(I{her ""y. NQlWithstanding which, thllugh future contingents be nm foreknowable or 'SJ,"", nor we [be] able to comprehend how they shlluld be foreknown odterwlse, yet WQuld it ~ great pruumptiQn in lI$ then:fQre flady to deny Divine prescienee in them. he<:ausc the Divine nature and perfecions surp... our human comprehension. We do ~lieve in Div[ine] eternity without ~ginning, and therefore withQut successive flux (fQr we clearly conceive that whatsoever hath a successive duntion must have had a ~ginn[ingl) tt.ough we cann.o:t romprellend this eternity. And we ~1it-vL the Divine omniprescnce QT ubiquity, mough "·e do not understand the manner of it, since "'.• cannot conceive God to be extended Qver paru (or". /Mrtn) numerically distioct and infinite., wherefore;t would ~ pious III believe [orJ ronee"·. likewise that God foreknows all future contingent events, thQugh we canllO{ understand the manner how this should be. But many learned men and good philosophers h..·e satisfied themKlves here, that though events perfecdy contingent be not ccoru.inly

'VI

ate

Offm",ilf foreknown tX <<1M,,:', )'1:1 they are seen and known 10 God by an anticipation of fUlurity . The divine du .... lion of etemily, which i. withoul ,ucceui"e nux, being present CO Ihe past and fUlure, as "'ell as CO the instant now. He that caUs Ihjn~s lhal all: mX as iflhey ","ell:;95 He WOOK name is (\ cOv. (, ';v. Kal (\ Cpx0p.ewx;, is and was and will \)(;9(0 He who is bolh pasl and fueure, !iUS all future conlingent even '" in I~
Chapter xxv BUI i, is still further urged Ihat, upon a supposition of Ihe ttnain pl"C5cientt of fulure contingencies, it will follow una" oidably that they will nroc rily come 10 pus. This is Ihe constant ery ofSocinus and his follow,,",'" bUI withoul Ihe least 5h.tdow of reason, for if the presci<:ntt "" true: they

lJIust

Lx: r"'~~"'''''n

IV

be: """Iilllle"''', •."') t11en:furc Iu

~

to pass not necessarily but contingently. Morro"cr, they do not therefore oome 10 pus becallSC' they are foreknown , but they are fOll:known because Ihe)' will come 10 pass, the certain pl"C5ciena: is not the cause ofthei, fUlure coming CO pus. BUllheir fueure comin~ to pass is the cauK oCthei, being foreknown . Theil: is no more nrocssity arisin~ from the prescience, than there would have bttn from thcir futurity, bad they not been foreknown. For that which now i., though ne"cr SO contingent, yet since i, is, ""as fulUre from all elernilY, bUI it WlIS not therefore nroc'S?rily fumre, bm contingently only. Here i. no ncc;r:ssi,y but tX 11)'1"1""', or hypothetical. Upon .upposition lhat il will be, il i. neees"rily future, bUI there i. nO absolule necessity in lhe thing ilSClf. When a contingent thing hath bttn, and is now pasl, il is lhen nrocssary thot it should have been; or it could not possibly nOi ha"e been a lIy",tfmi. aUI il doth not therefore follow thaI il ""as neee' -anly caused, Of" that it was impoloSibk not to have been . .. "God, ~ ho ~ tile _

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Offrtt~1

Apin ir is objeaed mar me suppollirion oflibeny of will is inconsi.nem wim Divine graa: and will nea:ssarily infer PeLogianism.91 Bur rhe falsiry of mis may appear from hence, mlr rhose I ngels which by rheir right use of liberty of win stood ...·hen others by the abuse of il fell, toough by that ~ ~beny of will they might slill possibly continue wimout falling, yet for all mit it would not be impossible for them 10 fall, unless IDey had aid and assistance of Divine gnce to secure them from it. Wht-""fore it is commonly con~ved thlt IS, notwithstanding that liberty of will by which it is """"ible for them ne ,-cr to foil, they had need of Divine graa: to sccu.., them agains! a possibility of falling, and that they a.., now by Divine grate 6xed and con6rmed in such a sute as that they can never faU . Much mo.., is the aid and assistance of o;,-ine gnce necessary bolh for the reoo"cry of lapsed souls and for their pcrsuer.mce. The uR of their own freewill is necessarily mjuired, for God, who made uti ""itoout oul1ltlv,,", will not ... '-c US witoout oul1lth· ... _ We ."" to 'strive to enter in It the straight gate','111 '0 fight me good fight,,"10 and 10 run I good nce,101 we a", to purge ourselves from .n unclnnlleSS of flesh and spirit, to.! ..e a"" 10 'keep ourselves in the "we of God,.!OJ He was an unregcnerlted JXTiOIl who in rhe parable had but One IIknt giHn him and is condemned for a slothful sen.. nt, beca~ he did not by the use of his frttwill impro'-e thlt rakn! which he had reaived and ""tum to his IlWiter his own with usur)', which had he done mO"" would hIve been superadded. Our own endeavours and activity of freewiU • .., insufficienr withoul Ihe addition and ilSSistanee of Divine grace, for it is God ...·hieh worhlh in US both to will and to do,l00 'by grace ye are ""ved',lDI 'and by me grace of God I om wh.t I ,m,

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'I'

ate

Offruwill

Chapter XXVlI Then: is :mmher witty objection nude by a modem writer asserting a fatal nKUSity of all aetions, that whtn:os libtrty of will is introduced to sal"e a phenomenon of a d.y of judgement, and the justice of God in inflicting punishment upon men after this life for their actions p.1St, this will by no mans ..,...·e their tum. I Gay continlC'ncy will no mon: sal"e th is pherK>l1M:non than n«usit)', For it is no more just that men should bt damnw to all eternity for. mere chance or contingency, th:m th.t they should for necessity. T o damn men for their continlC'nt frecwilled actions is aU OOe OS if one should bt damned for throwing such. CIst of a die. Men could no more help contingency th:m necusity. Whcn:f""" the matter can be resoh'w into nothing c\sl: but God's absolute po ...er, and his arbitr:lry :md u=untable will, ... hi ch by n:ason of bis omnipotence malt •• tlut to bt JUSt whatsOC"er he will do. It seems he thinl« not 6t to damn men to eternity but &uch os wen: necessitated to do wicked actions before, bill he might h"'e done OI.herwi..: if he had thought good by hi. ab!;olute po ...er. To :mSWer this, no nun shall bt damned for the contingency of any action ... here thcfC' YI'U no diffen:nce of ben.r or wor.." a pc:rfect ~""lity :md one thing os much eligible os tile other; then: can be no fault nor blame in this cose OS YI'U Gaid btfon:, But where there is an in~ua1il)' ofbtncr or WOrK, • divcrsity of gwd, honesty, and duty on one h:md, :md "'05",,1 pin :md pleosure on Ihe other, men having. power hcfC' Oyer thcmseh'cs to intend :md exen themsch-es in resisting their ..,nsual appc:titcs:md cnden'ouring more :md more by degrees to comply with the dicutes of conscience opposed to them. If at the end of their livC$ they bave run their course OS that they have suffered them..,lves.t lost to be quite foilw and vanquished by the ..."....,r, it is jun that th~ should fall lihort of the priu SCI before them, that they should lose. the em ..... :md receive shame, disgracc, and punishment . Men shall not bt damned for the cost of a die or such a fonuitous contingency. But for their not using rut power which they ha"c oVer themselves to promote themselves towards the good of honesty :md also for their abusing that power, by actively determining :md fixing the"""l.·.,. in vicious habits.

".

Glossary This glotsary lisllI Cudwonh's unfamiliar I~rminology and U5a"",. BUI il i.....onh noting thaI sonM: of the earliest recorded usages of 00. conlemporary conceplual vocabulary occur in Cud .... onh (I~rms such as consciousness, r~tributin, p"yc!\ology, ..,If-determinalion).' a.c:ucangular ambage angulo.silY annected anvilling .podictical .poretical appulse aplitude alJut~

a"ersalion Canesius celerity circumslant COJiubility CUf'lJlion COJII05citi,'~

acutc-angkd (triangle) circumlocution; obscure bngw~ angularity linked working at an anvil ('an.-il' u..,d as "erb) dtmonslJ~ble, cenain full of doobu and objections pressure. impaa, dri"ing against fimess, suitability slurp, subtle .,..,. .I0Il

o..an_

,,,,,d

incidental; circumjacent capable of being t!\ought affinity. connection cogniti,'~

T_ ..
So. _ HoI.,'s... W........ An" I ,. 'J> _ •• ~ ('9foo) . ... ,..l.; ........ "Cud_.\Ion,

CuoI_~

1

1

~-

'"

ClosUl,),

colluctation compages compbccl\tt complicated rompossibilily conative concinni!y concupiscibk conscnWleously comemperlled con!emperation conlradict:iws con!risution

-,

opposition, conflict: solid smtclures complaisance:, agreeableness folded together, involved possible ClH'xislencc: striving, ende;",vur (also plural: conatiycs) elcpncc, nearness arousing vehement desire in agreement blended blending COI1tradict:ory ~~.

the combination of elements or hUllMlUn in the animal body; comti!Ution. On p. 89 Cudworth calls muis the 'hannonicol rml/Wr~I"r~ of the whole body'

<.TUcialing depinntiori disconfonnily docible ~Yl"

""~ eduction

crucifying lenn from alchemy, nQl found, but probably equiva_ kill to 'tincrure' lKlII-confonnily capable of being mush! imprint, Stlmp, copy (hence, «typal) draw out, produce drl"ing OUI, production

~,

CITW\.iI!e

epo:lcustil.{k) epistemonicol equicrural

adventitious epistemological equilaleral (triangle) printing erron the true or primiti,'e fonn of a word

=w

"""""

evanid eJttrinsccol nexuO/lily .~

giobulite graleful ,"p

hegemonicon

p.'

extrin.ic, ulernal

nelibilily hinge, joinl tiny globule p"",",

Iud, fortune ruling principle of Ihe soul

." 'VI

ate

;'0""",'

;"lrial icterical id~llly

indument ,~"""

kiding bpsobilily Limner ludibria l,~

make (II.) nunci!",led ~~

nebuloK nict':l!ion noemata noenuticaL noetial novarui'lue obnoxious 10 Obo1~tridous

ob1l1SanlP'br OpelOSC

!""turiencr pc:a:abili1Y pea:abLe peri!",1erial phantaSmatical phanwma1ically phrene1ical pLmic polile prea=lkncy prep0:5u..,on

prokp.is pro1ended proloplasl

impulses, desires medicinal jaundiced ~nsalion or r~lin, peculiar 10 an indiyidual pnnen1, clothing e'luilibrium, balance kinen I;"bilily 10 fall dnughLSman, illuminator baubles, obiects of ridicule (ohighl) penClnling, dear male-up (Mla"ed hobsOO lin nebulous blinking, winking I;On""pts, obj«ts of intellection iruellcaual, mental irueU«"1u.o! new and old !i.-oblc 10 puni.hm~nt by prod ueth'e, 'mid-"i fd r' wilh an obtu~ angle (gwmetry) laborious parturient state, being in labour li.-ohility 10 sin liable 10 sin peripatetic .mapnary by Ihe .enSCS fl1ll\1ic, mad shaping, producti>".. smooth, polished excel~ng, surpassing JlOSSe"ion in advance anticipation protrUded first-made thing, origin.:ol, archetype

'II

ate

pui ...... t pukhrirude

.,

radicatW rectangular ~;tence

."'"

~". u/Jnu

schetical oottishness

spermatic

litochastically streperous litriated liublimation subsultations liUpcrfiCie:s therical umbruilc undefectible vaticim.tion whiffiing

powerful

"""" ~"d

radiate, shine right-angled (triangle) resistance "..·our doubt relation of schcses, relatin foolWlness gcner.ltive, shaping by coniecturc, probabilistic:ally harsh-sounding, lacking harmony or music:ality thinly drawn out process of colwerling a solid imo a vapour by meanS ofhnt leaps, bounds surface positi,"e, arnin-ary, dogmatic s~owy

witt.out defect premonition trifling

'" 'I'

ate

Index M ' " f". Alo_' .. A....,f' " _ ' ..... . ,., .., .. A.. • ' "'" 0.- " ""........ _ ' Ii> }, A " , _ .IO A'" ,. ", .......... " ,' M ' ' .. Milo....... "",,b . ok N,mI'" , (Anr!nM do Now Coot ...)

........

"

....... ..... "'.;

. .........

"

,

A'd'

_r..,..;".; BoIp!,J""'" IIo,te,

,

"0, " ..

., .. ,.0.0.,.,...

e;w. ... ,.1, ' 1"-...fip
,6'_0, til. ,." NoooIo ,6" __ ..... "',

nJ

'_'''''''''l'

.1.0 ' , .. C".... " .1.0' .. ,. " tIi ~ .. ,;<, l1.!!tl'!.lt.~.IO=.So ~ ~ 10,'0, ~ "50 , .. -6, ' JO. '150 ' ''' '1', '150 '150 ,16; Do _ Io!!. S4f1 • • _ ~!lI. ~ nw.. 7fa" 10,'.0. 'l50 ,Jl, '1" Do .... 'F ' " ,--.:M"""","" ... ,u-50

51 ,....... . CrwW·

"

On\l

, ', · .... ,150 ' ... '9J"·,

,....... ".. ...... 10-1 ... , ... . . - ,...

,"-'.... _,... "1"" . ..... p,.,uiN 'J', ' ........ ' ... ' ... ,,.. ...... l _

" ..""

Au • • • " ... ... .,.9>-"50 ... --.;_ . . ~ AoIKnt!, K. ... .. A.......... '~,II I oiou !lr..IO=.So f".. U. iI:J> I'· !oL ' " , ' 450

, ..... C

'" ••, .... J_, ... .-,... ''', J....

,,_aw.

A .... ' ..

. _ , COOO , - • , ... ~rii,

-''I,I50, ... r

',.. 1:91

, ... ..",aI,'))"jt; ,y;,' !!> ". ,.., ,,, ; ......... .i" ~" , ,1, 0. 0..- fII: ~_ I!o. "'; Do .... i!

. ~"

' .... L •• ' '0-

,1>.-..

....... . T_, ,' ·.'to

fIG<, I.A.S. uUi, . . . . , - . T'oomooo D . ....

bod,- !!. u,lIo. S!::lo ~ ~ ~ ~ 1s. ... , ....... ...~',.,'6<.'" ,. 01; AM' ,. . . . ' "" ~_~ • ,. ,,_c'_So 'U .. ' "' ",Ilo •• ___ . _••

''''

..... '" _.VJ."""""" _H_ .... "

'.'''' Auorio, UrI. " .

_ _ (...._ ) ,., ',""", ,I,. ,to-$.

....

"*" .

"...,.,. (po •• ;, ,M) .. ", 11-9..,.., ." e '", ..... 0 , . .rii 1Ioodoy, • • , d u. L

.1.001.' • " .. A ..... '

.. ,

a.-...s. ....

.,

,1

, " '''''''''' -=t. . 50 ... ,"" ..... ,

'"

f

Col •• '

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,.

••

" ,!:Mi• ................. ',.

Ca ... ·' •• Oorioo:".GoIItte.IIi, • ., Clote lUll ,i. Eo

....

;"

Ca.

"

~

. ... .........

c.rq.n

r......... " . ... )1 .... . ! •• '., ... ~

I".w;r'" '1'1".

oiou ........ . ,;. ...... ']0. . . . . ...

,... !to!1,!!.~!l. '!t..l!::oL tio.to lIotL ~ ... 9 ...... ... ............. ..,.. " ' . ",..' .. '»-$. ' >7. !..!to 43 .... [odd ' '7 "

,"- 11 c... ..........

C

p . .. .... . ri

I

.w·.... ,no. •'..... _. ,_..

OoodwKlo . b

I ) " . UowoI .... no. " . "' ... " , 0 0wIa 1 "'; a..."....;...J_ (J
o

0.-;,0 •• , .......... ,6~ 00ri0D0. l C. Hi d.

o "'...., ,$1.

,10-,. 'Il

'_7

pi", .. ~.... jotoo -

1Mt<._.;.. ..

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c,

I"", ·; ..

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-

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........ _

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i-';;; _ ...L, .•

r.....;o I........ ..... _ 1......... .... u ri. ' si. ,60, '6). 'Of.... . ,... ,,., ,Is-OJ. ~

..,....

c-o c..-...... .. Q;"'. ....... ...,;

CooI_

,...

_ ,..1..... "... ,,':- ... _ ....

Cna.G ....... Coo, .... "" ....., ~

' ... "J.

.--. .......... •... ·;.. n ........s .. .",. F""""

_) 1.it Tl."~'" , .....1.. ' .......

""

0J7.,~ • •,

Jooq 110 ti.~1!. ~ 1'O-l'). 17 ....... ,. ,"'- ''''" "'. ,oS, "So '0). '97: ... .....

0-.. _-r.a;.. ..... ,"'- '!"I. '!'It ... ~"

' !l. ... I).".

hi I

•. J... ..

~

........

..... J.. "" _. Pun .......... A. , ri

Ph

0wIa,;

I

~O-";'_M_

c ,.,"", l>IpIo ~h Cool_I>. LlooIpIo ;.... • ..; _ . _b ol

Gobk,.A . • "; ..

....... ................................. ,_MiS,.,.... ....... ... .... " ...... c.m.-. s.,. ... '-1".

c_ e·"

.. _

... -.0/ •••11

o.w.;. ()dioo ...... , ..

, " .II .....,.

','., J.•;;; ..

oil. I'\ono -m. " n.. -!to ~ c_, .... ,5 . . ....

"'''' r_ofT....,.;' . ................

C 1;""5·, · . ...... ,,.

" " . &n", J>w

- . . . !!.

,;

o,r

.0"'.. ,..

,""n ... 4""1 . .....

G . .... .

GIooo .... J-I>Io, ....

God ... 0,;, ...... ..... !J:!.lo ~ """1, U. 7J, ,-••J-4.

"" "'""ll,

'B"i'.'''' ,..,

•.a-!•. 'J'. 'J"""~'Iot-&. !1J, ,,., .110, II., ,, - _ '_~._

p:ooI. ad

-

',""11,

....

, ,

.i. ..... ... '';' ..... " ...

"" ,!10 J.!, l!o ,64, '1l .... 'Il, .9),

.•.....,._ ......... ..-iI"."" '" '7" 7'>""1, "'Yl

...... ....... ....... GnIIon. no ..

-

,

A. a..p,.. T . ,,.; ..

Gr.....,u' 1i ..... ~ .1l . ....

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"'no ....... •,;.. 17. 'I' n

, " I " •.

EI,t.~"L

~

h . n, ...... oHo", .,,....

.~

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,.

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J< _ ..... ... dIo.Id"

.-

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, ., GooIfrird L.moo,.,. _ _ _

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.-,,....;,., ... " , . ", ..... our. u.,.

'.J< ......

'.s;lk_ !JO Dt.--,ol.>o" LnWu-

C

- "

, ".

~""';" .II"'''''''''

""-". Mal,' • J. ", " ..

~(;",

"")'''''''' s. ...... ;. ... .ruo.J<'''''''' ,... '''''

Mw

la,r'_ l1 ..... (_ ''') .... !!t. "" I!i.:a..:n-I.I,.'" 16,

"""' '.'. ,.,..,,, "" " J< ' J', '. J:

..... . 11.,......,"' .., "... ... .... _ I,· ..... "';"' " ....... "' ..,. ,,,, -

, " __ .." "",,,,,1,, ....,;

.... _,ooIo;.j

_ .l!i_. . . __

_ ... ~ 1L _

• __ ~ 'b!e __

M '"""

.-

... ''''' '''' 'J: .... 'd""'

~

• .,.

,)o,

......

,_ _ W.,,..'. ... 0 ... _ " po -, ' ... "...,.., l!"'-lto h,u. I,...., .,...., t!.~ ' ...... . so. 'JJ< ,~ ' 1S, '" 'n. ,I-), 'fl. >OJ

10'_.1""" •.

rii, ..;, . ... " ' " -..-.;, 7 ....

' ' ' .• 'JII .. '101' .•

's'"

~M'= ~

,'dooIfto.JoI- !.ornu ". , . _. ..... "';;; M_.(l. , ..

,,., :~':'J """" '" I,., ,... ,I, : ,,.. ...._. ' - ..

--.I ........ f _ ... """"') JJ. ~ Is,

J.... ' .. '110""""'" , ....., ~-... ... I" ' ..,s, ''''

'fl''''''''''''' 'SI. II), 'fl. ;,.;-;OO,-.,ls,_s

.,

", ....

v ' " ni, n ;', J!.!lI..:u..u.tio""'u.!!t.~ ... u .... h4. ........ ~ " .. .....

,

' )0->, '1J-4. , jI, ' ........ , .... 'SO-', . ,.

~-

... S. ,6,

II ... " ' _ _

'<J. '''' ........ GooI", .... '" • .-

J-.,....

K"

•

_10: ........ .....

'... '... '».'1'.... .)1, '5>. '1" ......... - - ...... ..1 _&"...... (_ .....')"'1" " I

KnoI, l. . ;. ..

"'*" ....

16--<,'. N-7, ,_,~ " f-II , "s, "1-)0, 'J<. ,,... IjI, ' .... ,,6-•• , _ _ I'. ~ ~ n. 100 IJ'~ I-) ..... ~ ...... ' ' ... '-l!.. 'J" . - .......... '100 _?t-f.,I .... "';

.eo

,-a,

•

M....... J P. 'Sl. 1110-

wo •• " ... !.I. Slo.li. ~ lJ::L ...... ' ... " "

"-<. r

•

........ .... ........ ~ ~u..~ 1'fz4

90"', .......... ' ... ' ... KI90 " I, " ?-)o, , . . . . , , . . . _ . , •• )-<, '03

)

I'

Mcnmno.,Y .... U

• ~;L' ;". ~ ~ :It; _ . .' ,'~~~~ w...., ''''''''' ""!.I."'" 11::1. 1" ......

'JO, ' - . .I!, _ _ ",I,

... '100"1

o..w;o . ; ~ F""";' Cod_ ••

'...... ,... ,,,· ,' ..I...·, ,,·"V· _

_ _ ....J-<., ... ,." ..

~

~," ,'OIdOW .., ,Y • boa ......... ;

... , l l l _ .. _ .Ito "s,"I,,>O, ' ...... s, ' .... p.; ............ Ib,'''50''''' •• '"z"t! """ .....,.... 'J s, !.1lt ~ '"i" .... !J.1I::1. "' ... 16--)-, . ,. ,ao.

n;

,l,.., '9'"

:":::';_0;;"::':: ".tl.

1 - . , _ •.,.-

_

,, ·.H._u..... .......

l.oo
"""7, " J< ''''OFIAPfy '- '''~ 'lk, , ... t . JO., , _ , ,ot. _, >OJ: 'lilt

. ,, ~

1.<, ' 1$

11u ....... .l!::i. , ..... 1' .. ~ n--.;., ..,."' ........... u.,ui,

W""" u

"1-""""'100 '"

-, 'll. ,l)-.. ,90. ..,..., •• ,_ _, , _ .r • " .... '1

" ~,;;; ,,

_ " _ "s,,,,, ,ol, 'JJ< _ " _

- " !l.!it,., 1-). ,.J.... ,.., ,oa. ""'",

.," - ' " " " 1;-",,,,;,

~"

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1.1...

I.< Oor<.Joan .

,_-"1>-"

u. "'., " .. ... J< •••, ..,;'U""' ...... ~ " ... '.,

16, ... .

""',,

". "

••

!"du: (lKky. F . • ri

,.

,....-.'

O
,..,

PrnI>o ' ~

T, '" .. _""" 1',.' ..... s ,

o.;p.. ,,,,,-..... ,.;;. ... "";' ... '''' 'I" ,i._•.

Pl"*'

Orid ,61

' , ' " , 0 ,0 . ..... ,,,.

_ "'- "7. ,6,

"""', ,.... ...

-_I."'.To_

_ iL~lh 97, " .. 'tj. !.!o ......... '01; .....

........ ,1, •• ', .

..

'7t--7,

: 1 _ .. _

... ....

"" '," -,,;_ lad. Thooow;, .Ito " .. "I,

'00, " ' . " .. ' ... . ]1<

",.d. uoI .... H.... d ,,6-) •• ,., 'll"- " t,

,1.-.. ,"..... ,.,...... ...

t;""lM ... ... . " iloc
ra "' ,J_ .. eo.... ~ J7"

s .

Sc<po""",, ''-;' ""'';;' '1.Jt" ... .s" ... ',",

."

"' ....... I' e'

.) ....... .... a.. ~_'.',

,.., " .. ,,,, _

_

10,1,_,, '.,"

_ _ .............s.,., So'

• """"- ' .. .

Sdono<_.J.B . .........

' ..... , " '-'0 . )0-.

s..n. D. •un-

... ..,... , ',....,

~

,

,' ;'. IlL ..';"

P .,

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......... ;

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,,01-,.,,1'1

Prio<.ItKhoroI;z. IV I'rioo. A.N. .. riO

........." . ... .....,.-.,

......... 1-· " ,.,) ........ n.~1!o. .,...., ...

'0"1"'''7""40 '" ...... . ;. . .... ~:at.l::loiL

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tt. ... ~ 170117. ' li. "'. !ll. !..Wo ~

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ili

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T'o .....

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s....,.._ .

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5 · . . .... ...... O' B . J7 • •IJn, 'J1•••• ' .. ..J ..... ' ' ............ .".... •• ••• ""

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" oJ. "'-')0. '.!.i. ... · .. F _ IF........ s..;" ..J..., S. -, ,,,,-,, ,,, Sc ' . _ Uo, n i, . ... U<, ....

...... 1 _ ...... ) ~ ( mI ......) n ....,1· .. .. StonItJ. n..- ..

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........... '1' n-';

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,10, ,III.

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~ .... (J>__ Soyd ... iw.)m, ~

..

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. . . . ... . ... . ......... I]..I'>=iL ,. . . . ". " • .."

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t ; t . . ....

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\I ....... ....... ~' "

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.,

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.

..

Cambr id gr Tex,s in ,he HislOr y of P hilO5Op h ~­ Tilin ,u~H.lml i~ I~ >trW. Ih,!uT Antoine Arnauld .nd PicNe Nicole

V....,., Bu""' ...) Boyle A Fry( £~,.iry

u". 1M

lAtir #r I~t Arl ./ 11Iidi.., (wi",d

11)- Jill

V"". ,1y RmiwJ N.I .... •/ N.", .. (edited b)"

Edward B. D .... ond Miduocl H unte,) eon ..:ay 1U J>rT.n,ln ./Ikt Mf1l Arilol . d M WrJI Pk,l.,.,.; (tdi«d by Allison P. Couder, and Taylor Cont) Cudworth A T".,iM E'mul • ..J '_toik AI.nlU; (edited by 52r.1h H ullOn) D' wnes M uil.iN.... Fins Pka....,ky, ..ith from the ()jjt" .... .,.J R"oo (rili,riI.ru. an introduction by john Conin","",) Kant 1U M#.,.yoin ./ M ...1t (edited by Mory G . CSO!" ";th I n introduction b)' Rose. Sulijnrl) La MClIn. M ......... AI.- ul OIj ... II'ril"',. (editril by Ann Thorn ..... ) Leibni>. N.", £SUp ... 11. __ U""",,.J;., (edi,ed by P.... Rfmmn' ond jonathan Hennen) NictzSdM: 11_•. All T.. H .... _ (n:aru;b,ed by R_1- Hollinrd>l< " ith on introd....:non by R>eIwd &hlclll) Schlei.. ",ochcr 0" R.Iit....: S,.«At1 I. ill C..(u",1 o..,itm (rilited by Richard Ctooter)

e""",,,,;..,

..,Icction.

'VI

ate

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Copyrighted material

CAMJlRIDGE UN IYE Il S ITV PR ESS