THE QUISTCLOSE TRUST: CRITICAL ESSAYS
The decision of the House of Lords in Twinsectra v Yardley has refocused attention on the Quistclose trust. Although accepted by insolvency lawyers as a convenient tool for corporate rescue, the precise basis of the trust has always been in doubt. The purpose of these essays is to explore the foundations of the trust and subject them to a searching analysis.
The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays
Edited by
William Swadling
OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2004
Hart Publishing Oxford and Portland, Oregon Published in North America (US and Canada) by Hart Publishing c/o International Specialized Book Services 5804 NE Hassalo Street Portland, Oregon 97213-3644 USA © The editor and contributors severally 2004 The Editor and Contributors have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, to be identified as the authors of this work Hart Publishing is a specialist legal publisher based in Oxford, England. To order further copies of this book or to request a list of other publications please write to: Hart Publishing, Salter’s Boatyard, Folly Bridge, Abingdon Road, Oxford OX1 4LB Telephone: +44 (0)1865 245533 or Fax: +44 (0)1865 794882 e-mail:
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Contents Foreword Preface List of Contributors Table of Cases Table of Legislation
vii ix xi xiii xxi
1. Rolls Razor Ltd Robert Stevens
1
2. Orthodoxy William Swadling
9
3. Lord Millett’s Analysis James Penner
41
4. Understanding the Power Lionel Smith
67
5. Restrictions on the Use of Money Robert Chambers
77
6. Retrieving Tied Money Peter Birks
121
7. Commerce Ewan McKendrick
145
8. Insolvency Robert Stevens
153
9. Scotland George Gretton
167
Index
187
Foreword The so-called Quistclose trust probably represents the single most important application of equitable principles in commercial life. It has been well established for some two hundred years, at least in relation to insolvency, though it is now seen to be of more general application. Yet it has resisted attempts by academic lawyers to analyse it in terms of conventional equitable doctrine. Even that modern master of equity Sir Robert Megarry V-C was inclined to think that it was an aberrant creation of common law judges. It was too much to hope that a single decision of the House of Lords would put an end to controversy. The nature of the trust and the location of the beneficial interest remain elusive and continue to be debated by distinguished academic lawyers. They demand to know whether the Quistclose trust is a form of express, implied, constructive or resulting trust. If the mere author of a foreword may venture to intrude in a private dispute (at the risk of exposing himself to derisive comment from all sides), I would say that it may be any of them, depending on the facts of the particular case and the boundaries between these various forms of trust, on which not everyone is agreed. From a commercial point of view, however, the trust is simply a mechanism by which one person may allow the use of his money by another for a stated purpose without losing his right to the money more than necessary to achieve the purpose. The commercial need for such a mechanism is obvious. The problems which will face the courts are not likely to derive from any difficulty in analysing the nature of the trust, but from the need to distinguish the case where it arises from the ordinary case of the lender who naturally wishes to know why the borrower wants the money. Lord Millett House of Lords 27th October 2003
Preface On October 31st, 1968, the House of Lords handed down its decision in Barlcay’s Bank Ltd v Quistclose Ltd. Their Lordships there held that money lent for a purpose was held by the borrower on trust for the lender should that purpose not be achieved. It was therefore not available to satisfy the debts of the borrower in the event of his insolvency. The decision was immediately seen as controversial, for, as Meagher and Gummow noted, it gave the lender the best of both worlds. As beneficiary, it could stand outside the liquidation and recover the loan in full, yet if the company had remained solvent, but, without fault on its part, the fund had disappeared, the lender . . . could have recovered the money at law as a debt.
The case was also doctrinally difficult. Who, for example, owned the beneficial interest while the purpose could still be attained? And what of the fact that the relationships of debtor and creditor on the one hand and trustee and beneficiary on the other are normally considered to be mutually exclusive? Though attracting attention from some of the leading trusts lawyers around the Commonwealth, the controversy over the correctness of Quistclose has never been satisfactorily resolved. One with a long-held fascination with the case is Lord Millett, who, as PJ Millett QC, appeared as counsel in one of the post-Quistclose cases and who immediately wrote a penetrating analysis of the doctrine for the Law Quarterly Review. It came as no surprise to find, therefore, that when the first case to reach the House of Lords since Quistclose which raised questions of how the doctrine was to be understood, Lord Millett seized the opportunity to provide an expanded discussion of the case. It was the handing down of the decision in Twinsectra v Yardley, and Lord Millettís speech in particular, which persuaded the essayists in this book to take a fresh look at the doctrine. The chapters which follow were all delivered as papers at a small conference held in All Souls College, Oxford in late 2002. They are not intended to give a textbook account of the subject, nor even to be in agreement with each other. They are simply the views of eight different people on various aspects of the Quistclose trust, both as it was seen in 1970, and how it has been reinterpreted in Twinsectra. The authors would like to thank those who attended the conference for their astute criticisms. And most of all, they would like to thank Dr Arianna Pretto, now a fellow of Brasenose College, for the huge amount of work she put in to the administrative side of the conference. William Swadling Oxford 23rd November 2003
List of Contributors Peter Birks QC, LLD, FBA is Regius Professor of Civil Law and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford Robert Chambers is Professor of Law at the University of Alberta George Gretton is Lord President Reid Professor of Law at the University of Edinburgh Ewan McKendrick is Professor of English Law and Fellow of Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford James Penner is Reader in Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science Lionel Smith is Professor of Law at the University of McGill Robert Stevens is Fellow in Law at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford William Swadling is Fellow in Law at Brasenose College, Oxford
Table of Cases A-G v Alford (1855) 4 De GM & G 843 ........................................................81 A-G v Blake [1998] Ch 439 ...........................................................................18 A-G for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 ..................11, 19–20, 23, 119, 133 Abbott, Re [1900] 2 Ch 326 ........................................................................139 Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 491....................................................................118 Adams & Kensington Vestry, Re (1884) 27 Ch D 394....................................13 Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399 ....................................52, 137 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 ...........................................................95 Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 676...................................................................................179 Ames’ Settlement, Re [1946] Ch 217 ...........................................................116 Andrew’s Trust, Re [1905] 2 Ch 48...............................................................14 Anstis, Re (1885) 31 Ch D 596 ......................................................................24 Anthony v Wright [1995] 1 BCLC 237 ........................................................146 Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold [1989] 1 Ch 1..................................................31, 48 Astor’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1952] Ch 534 ......................................29, 46, 81 Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust, Re (1991) 102 ALR 681....................153 Bacon (MC), Re [1990] BCC 78 ..................................................................162 Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2), Re [1973] Ch 9 .................................................57 Bain, Petitioner 2002 SLT 1112 ...................................................................174 Baird v Murray’s Crs 1744 Mor 7737...................................................170, 181 Bank of Scotland v Hutchison Main 1914 SC 1 ...........................................177 Bank of Scotland v Macleod Paxton Woolard & Co 1998 SLT 158..............174 Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 .....................................i, 4–6, 9–25, 27–30, 32–4, 36–9, 41–58, 60–5, 67–9, 71–9, 87, 91, 96–8, 112, 115, 118, 124, 127, 145–57, 159–62, 164–7, 169–72, 176, 180, 182, 184 Barclays Bank plc v Weeks Legg & Dean [1999] QB 309 .............................105 Barker v Strickney [1919] 1 KB 121 .........................................................25, 31 Barrett, Re (1914) 6 OWN 267 .....................................................................87 Bartlett v Bartlett (1845) 4 Hare 631 .............................................................98 Bateman’s Will Trusts, Re [1970] 1 WLR 1463............................................108 BCCI (No 8), Re [1998] AC 214..................................................................165 Beatty, Re [1990] 1 WLR 1503......................................................................70 Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161 .............................................................21 Belmont Finance Corp v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393.............................................................................................96 Berry, Re (1906) 147 F 208 ..........................................................................116
xiv Table of Cases Bird v Luckie (1850) 8 Hare 301....................................................................57 Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] Ch 183 ...................117 Bond Worth, Re [1980] Ch 228...................................................................166 Bowes, Re [1896] 1 Ch 507....................................................................14, 122 Box v Barclays Bank plc The Times, 30 April 1998......................................147 Boyes, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 531.....................................................................110 Bristol & West Building Society v May, May & Merrimans (a firm) [1996] 2 All ER 801.................................................................................147 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 ..................18, 105, 136 British Linen Company v Kansas Investment Co (1895) 3 SLT 183; aff’d without reasons (1895) 3 SLT 202........................................................181–2 Brook’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1939] Ch 993 .....................................45, 69, 71 Brown v Burdett (1882) 21 Ch D 667 ............................................................57 Brown v Kempton (1850) 19 LJ NS CP 169 ...................................................26 Browne, Re [1944] IR 90.............................................................................108 Burnett’s Tr v Grainger 2002 SLT 699 ........................................................179 Burroughs v Philcox (1840) 5 Myl & Cr 72 .................................................128 Burt v Claude Cousins & Co Ltd [1971] 2 QB 426.......................................147 Cameron v Neil 1926 SLR 56 ..................................................................182–3 Car & Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525...............117, 136 Carreras Rothman Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch 207 ..................29, 62, 77, 86, 91, 93, 99, 147, 149, 151–3, 159, 162–4, 166 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639.................................................................141 Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105 ..........................................................21, 116, 135–7, 141, 159 Chelsea Cloisters, Re (1981) 41 P & CR 98 .................................................158 Chichester Diocesan Fund v Simpson [1944] AC 341.....................................72 Chillingworth v Esche [1924] 1 Ch 97 .........................................................114 City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd, Re [1930] 2 Ch 293 ...........................157 Clapman v Edwards [1938] 2 All ER 507 ......................................................94 Clark Taylor & Co Ltd v Quality Site Development (Edinburgh) Ltd 1981 SC 111............................................................................................179 Cleveland Shoe Co Ltd v Murray Book Sales (Kings Cross) Ltd [1973] EGD 335 ................................................................................................147 Collings v Lee [2001] 2 All ER 332 ..............................................................136 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Livingstone [1965] AC 694...................................................................................................152 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Broadway Cottages Trust [1955] Ch 20 .....................................................................................72, 128 Conservative & Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1982] 1 WLR 522.............................................................................77, 93, 95, 129 Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 ..................................................................................................96
Table of Cases xv Cook v Hutchinson (1836) 1 Keen 42 ..........................................................100 Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch 270....................................................................90 Croome v Croome (1888) 59 LT 582...........................................................100 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353 ..........................................................................................135 De Mattos v Gibson (1859) 4 De G & J 276 ..................................................96 Denley’s Trust Deed, Re [1969] 1 Ch 373 ..................................................28–9 Dibbens (E) & Sons Ltd, Re [1990] BCLC 577 ..............................................26 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337 ......................................................117 Diplock, Re [1948] Ch 465..........................................................................117 Dixon & Wilson v McIntyre (1898) 6 SLT 188 ............................................182 DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1982) 149 CLR 431 ................................................................................116 Douglas, Re (1887) 35 Ch D 472...................................................................57 Dow Corning Corporation, In re (1996) 192 Bank Rep 428 .........................159 Drucker (No 1), In re [1902] 2 KB 55; aff’d [1902] 2 KB 237 ............................................................25, 30, 78, 91, 153, 155, 160 Duke of Northumberland v IRC [1911] 2 KB 343; rev’d on another point [1911] 2 KB 1011 ......................................................................................71 Dumas, Ex parte (1754) 2 Ves Sen 582 ..........................................................95 Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox 92 ........................................................................12 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 ................................................36 Edwards v Glyn (1859) 2 El & El 29........................................25–6, 91, 95, 155 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All ER 717; rev’d [1994] 2 All ER 685 .....................................................................................95, 117 Eldan Services Ltd v Chandag Motors Ltd [1990] 3 All ER 459....................115 Ellenborough Park, Re [1956] Ch 131 ...........................................................88 Endacott, Re [1960] Ch 232 ...........................................................28–9, 46, 72 English & American Insurance Co Ltd, Re [1994] 1 BCLC 649....................147 Errington v Errington & Woods [1952] 1 KB 290..........................................31 EVTR, Re [1987] BCLC 646 .................17, 27, 42, 48, 65, 69, 147, 149, 151, 153 ffrench’s Estate, Re (1887) 21 LR Ir 283 ......................................................141 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 ..........................................................................................115 Foord, In re [1922] 2 Ch 519 .......................................................................100 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102...............................23, 37, 95, 121, 132–3 Garrud, ex p Newitt, Re (1880) 16 Ch D 522...............................................155 General Communications Ltd v Development Finance Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 406 ..............................69, 92, 98, 100, 109, 153 Gestetner Settlement, Re [1953] Ch 672 ........................................................57
xvi Table of Cases Gibert v Gonard (1884) 54 LJ Ch 439 ................................................25, 30, 91 Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund, Re [1958] Ch 300; aff’d [1959] Ch 62 ..............................................................................36, 137, 139 Goldcorp Exchange Ltd, Re [1995] 1 AC 74...............................18–19, 55, 115, 131–2, 134, 138, 140, 147–8, 150 Grey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 1....................................106 Guardian Ocean Cargoes Ltd v Banco do Brasil SA (Nos 1 and 2) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 152, 160..............................................77, 103, 114, 147 Guinness Mahon & Co Ltd v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London BC [1999] QB 215 ..................................................................................133 Gulbenkian’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1970] AC 508..................................57, 59 Gulbenkian’s Settlements (No 2), Re [1970] Ch 408 ......................................74 Halifax Plc v Omar [2002] 2 P & CR 26......................................................141 Hallett’s Estate, Re (1879) 13 Ch D 696 ........................................................95 Harries v Church Commissioners for England [1992] 1 WLR 1241................90 Harrison, ex p Jay, Re (1880) 14 Ch D 19 ...................................................154 Hassall v Smithers (1806) 12 Ves 119.......................................................95, 98 Hay’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1982] 1 WLR 202.............................................70 Hayim v Citibank NA [1987] AC 730 ...........................................................70 Hazel v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1...............................131 Henry v Hammond [1913] 2 KB 515 .............................................................17 Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121 ................................................................94 Hodgson v Marks [1971] Ch 892 ..................................................................83 Holiday Promotions (Europe) Ltd, Re [1996] 2 BCLC 618....................147, 150 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191........................................................99 Hooley, Re [1915] HBR 181....................................................25, 153, 155, 160 Hopkins’ Will Trusts, Re [1965] Ch 669 .....................................................106 Hoystead v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1920) 27 CLR 400 ...............99 Hughes v Footner [1921] 2 Ch 208................................................................73 Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v CG Maloney Pty Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 420 .......95 Ilich v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 110 .........................................................97 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1WLR 896........................................................................146 James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 13 ACLC 1604 ...............160 Johnston, Re [1939] 2 All ER 458 .................................................................13 Jones (FC) & Sons v Jones [1997] Ch 159 .....................................................95 Jopp v Johnston’s Trustee (1904) 6 F 1028 ..................................................175 Kayford Ltd, Re [1975] 1 WLR 279 .....................................................153, 158 Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205 ......................................................................74 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54.................................................................21
Table of Cases xvii Keppell v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517 ..........................................................94 Kern Corp Ltd v Walter Reid Trading Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 164 .............100 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Sandwell BC [1994] 4 All ER 890 ...........................134 Klug v Klug [1918] 2 Ch 67...........................................................................70 Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 .......................................................................................20 Lady Hood of Avalon v Mackinnon [1909] 1 Ch 476 ....................................95 Lambe v Eames (1871) 6 Ch App 597............................................................64 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265............118 Leahy v A-G for New South Wales [1959] AC 457 ........................................46 Ledgerwood v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1997) 41 NSWLR 532..................108 Lewis’s of Leicester Ltd, Re [1995] BCC 514 ...............................................158 Lipinski, Re [1976] Ch 235 ...........................................................................14 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 .......................95, 97, 141, 162 Lohia v Lohia [2001] EWCA Civ 1691 ..........................................................83 London County Council v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642 ..........................................25 Lonrho Plc v Fayed [1992] 1 WLR 1............................................................136 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499 ............................................20, 23–4, 99 Macadam v Martin’s Trustee (1872) 11 M 33..............................................175 MacJordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd [1992] BCLC 350 .........................................................................................32, 163 Mackay, Ex p (1873) 8 Ch App 643.............................................................154 McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 .....................................................57, 59, 70 Mallott v Wilson [1903] 2 Ch 494 ...............................................................102 Malory Enterprises Ltd v Cheshire Homes (UK) Ltd [2002] Ch 216 .............117 Manchester Trust v Furness [1895] 2 QB 539 ..........................................18, 55 Marwalt, Re [1992] BCC 32 ................................................................147, 156 Melbourne Banking Corp v Brougham (1882) 7 App Cas 307 ......................117 Mercedes-Benz Finance Ltd v Clydesdale Bank plc 1997 SLT 905 .........169, 184 Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587 .........................71–2 Mid-Kent Fruit Factory, Re [1896] 1 Ch 567 ...............................................157 Middlemas v Gibson 1910 SC 577...............................................................172 Miles, ex p National Australia Bank Ltd v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy, Re (1988) 85 ALR 216......................................................16, 27 Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264 .........................................................22 Ministry of Health v Simpson [1951] AC 251 ..............................................117 Moffit v Moffit [1954] 2 DLR 841 ...............................................................100 Mond v Hammond [2000] Ch 40 ................................................................156 Moore v Bathrop (1822) 1 B & C 5...............................................................25 Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves 522 .............................................35 Morley v Morley (1678) 2 Ch Cas 2..............................................................16 Morley-Clarke v Jones (Inspector of Taxes) [1986] Ch 311..........................146
xviii Table of Cases Mortgage Corporation v Mitchells Robertson 1997 SLT 1305 ..........174, 184–5 Moseley v Cressey’s Co (1865) LR 1 Eq 405 ................................................115 Mycroft, Petitioner 1983 SLR 342 ...............................................................172 Nanwa Goldmines Ltd, Re [1955] 1 WLR 1080...........................................115 Napier v Public Trustee (Western Australia) (1980) 32 ALR 153..................101 National Bank of Scotland v MacQueen (1881) 18 SLR 683 .................170, 181 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175...........................31 National Westminster Bank v Halesowen [1972] AC 785 ............................157 National Westminster Bank plc v Somer International (UK) Ltd [2002] QB 1286...................................................................................................97 Neste Oy v Lloyds Bank plc [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658 ..........................................................17, 21, 116, 135–7, 156, 158–9 Neville Estates v Madden [1962] Ch 832 .....................................................129 Niagra Mechanical Services International Ltd (Canary Wharf Contractors (DS6) Ltd v Niagra Mechanical Services International Ltd), Re [2000] 2 BCLC 425 .................................................................................147 Noreberg v Wynrib (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449 .................................................19 Northern Bank Ltd v Ross [1990] BCC 883 .................................................165 Northern Developments (Holdings) Ltd, In re, 6 October 1978 ...............................................................29, 47, 98, 109, 153 Osoba, Re [1979] 1 WLR 247 ................................................................14, 122 Park, Re [1932] 1 Ch 580..............................................................................73 Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431...............................................................22 Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527........................................................62, 79 Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075.......................................................22 Perowne, Re [1951] Ch 785.........................................................................128 Peter v Beblow [1993] 1 SCR 980, 101 DLR (4th) 621 ...................................116 Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 SCR 834, 117 DLR (3rd) 257 ................................116 Pollitt, Re [1893] 1 QB 455 .........................................................................157 Polly Peck International plc (in administration) (No 2), Re [1998] 3 All ER 812 ...........................................................................................159 Practice Direction (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 3 All ER 77 ...........................151 R v Clowes (No 2) [1994] 2 All ER 316..................................................17, 147 R v Common Professional Examination Board, ex p Mealing-McCleod The Times, 19 April 2000..................................................53, 64–5, 147, 150 Recher’s Will Trusts, Re [1972] Ch 526.......................................................129 Rogers, ex p Holland & Hammond, In re (1891) 8 Morr 243...........................................................25–6, 77, 95, 153, 155, 160 Rolls Razor Ltd v Bloom, 30 July 1969 ...........................................................7 Rolls Razor Ltd v Cox [1967] 1 QB 552..........................................................6
Table of Cases xix Rose, Re [1952] Ch 499 ................................................................................22 Rose v Rose (1986) 7 NSWLR 679 ..............................................................102 Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2002) 76 ALJR 203 ...................................................................................123, 135 Royal Products Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 ..............147 Ryall v Ryall (1739) 1 Atk 59 ......................................................................116 Sanderson’s WT, Re (1857) 3 K & J 497 .......................................................14 Satnam Investment Ltd v Dunlop Heywood & Co Ltd [1999] 3 All ER 652.............................................................................................20 Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115; aff’d (1841) Cr & Ph 240....27–9, 85, 126 Schebsman, Re [1944] Ch 83 ...............................................................104, 124 Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd (Isle of Man) [2003] 3 All ER 76 .............73, 75 Schulman v Hewson [2002] EWHC 855 .....................................................147 Seldon v Davidson [1968] 2 All ER 755 .........................................................84 Sharp v Thomson 1995 SC 455; rev’d 1997 SC 66 ....................................178–9 Sharp’s ST, Re [1973] Ch 331 .......................................................................73 Sharpe, Re [1980] 1 WLR 219.......................................................................13 Shaw, Re [1957] 1 WLR 729.......................................................36, 57, 72, 128 Shaw v Foster (1872) LR 5 HL 321 ...............................................................99 Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 ..........................................121, 132–4, 141 Smith v Hurst (1852) 10 Hare 30 ....................................................98, 105, 109 Smith v Liquidator of James Birrell Ltd 1968 SLT 174.................................183 Smith, Re (1971) 16 DLR (3rd) 130................................................................80 Sorochan v Sorochan [1986] 2 SCR 35, 29 DLR (4th) 1 ................................116 Souper v Smith 1756 Mor 744..............................................................171, 181 Space Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co (Bahamas) [1986] 1 WLR 1072..................................................................68 Standing v Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282......................................................102 Stanlake Holdings Ltd v Hammoud Financial Times, 25 June 1991 .............147 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latreefers Inc (No 2) [2001] 2 BCLC 116.................147 Stump v Gaby (1852) 2 De GM & G 623.....................................................117 Style Financial Services Ltd v Bank of Scotland 1996 SLT 421; 1998 SLT 851 ..................................................................................175, 184 Sutman International Inc v Herbage 2 August 1991 ..........................175, 183–4 Taitapu Gold Estates Ltd v Prouse [1916] NZLR 825..................................117 Tay Valley Joinery Ltd v CF Financial Services Ltd 1987 SLT 207 ...............175 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562.......................................................26, 37 Taylor v Wheeler (1706) 2 Ver 564 ...............................................................95 Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340.............................................................165 Toovey v Milne (1819) 2 B & A 683...................................................25–7, 155 Tribe v Tribe [1996] Ch 107 .......................................................................165 Triffit Nurseries Ltd v Salads Etcetera Ltd [2000] 2 All ER Comm 737 .....135–6
xx Table of Cases Trusts of the Abbott Fund, Re [1900] 2 Ch 326 .............................................14 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774 ..............................................................25, 96 Turner v Turner [1984] Ch 100 ...............................................................70, 72 Tutt v Doyle (1997) 42 NSWLR 10 .............................................................117 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164........i, 6, 11, 16–17, 19, 24, 27, 41–3, 46–7, 49–56, 58–61, 63, 65–7, 69, 75, 77–8, 82, 84, 88–9, 92–3, 96, 103, 105, 111, 116, 121, 124–9, 132, 136, 139, 141–2, 146–9, 153, 165, 184 US v Jones (1915) 236 US 106 .....................................................................117 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291 ........12, 22, 35–8, 51–2, 61, 83, 110, 116, 137 Vandervell’s Trust (No 2), Re [1974] Ch 269 .........................................51, 107 Vatcher v Paull [1915] AC 372......................................................................70 Venture, The [1908] P 218 ............................................................................12 Verrall v Great Yarmouth BC [1981] QB 202................................................86 Vinogradoff, Re [1936] WN 68.....................................................................12 Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch D 9 ..............................................................23 Watson, Re (1912) 107 LT 96; aff’d (1912) 107 LT 783..........................................................25, 30, 78, 91, 95, 153, 155, 160 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669........................................12, 35, 61, 121, 132–7, 140, 142, 158 Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland [1981] AC 487 ...................................12 Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Millennium Productions Ltd [1948] AC 173.....................................................................................31, 48 Wood v Leadbitter (1845) 13 M & W 838.....................................................48 Wood v R [1977] 6 WWR 273, 9 AR 427 ......................................................81
Table of Legislation Australia Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 122.......................................................................................................161 Companies Code s 451.......................................................................................................161
Canada Matrimonial Property Act 2000 (Alberta) s 36 ..........................................................................................................83 Perpetuities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 16 ..........................................................................................................81 Residential Tenancies Act 2000 (Alberta) s 46(2) ....................................................................................................119
New Zealand Property Law Act 1952 s 49A(3)..................................................................................................109
United Kingdom Bankruptcy Act 1869 ..................................................................................162 Bankruptcy Act 1883 s 4(1)(g) ..................................................................................................155 s 43 ........................................................................................................155 s 49 ........................................................................................................156 Bankruptcy Act 1914 s 1(1)(g) ..................................................................................................155 s 31 ........................................................................................................156 s 37 ........................................................................................................155
xxii Table of Legislation s 44 ........................................................................................................161 (1).....................................................................................................161 s 45 ........................................................................................................156 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act s 33(1)(b) ................................................................................................171 Charities Act 1993........................................................................................81 Companies Act 1948 s 165(1)(b)..................................................................................................6 s 212.......................................................................................................161 s 302.......................................................................................................158 s 320.......................................................................................................158 s 495.......................................................................................................163 Companies Act 1985 s 395.......................................................................................................163 s 458.......................................................................................................164 Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999..................................................24 Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 s 27 ........................................................................................................173 Enterprise Act 2002 ....................................................................................166 s 250.......................................................................................................167 Estate Agents Act 1979 ...............................................................................174 s 13(1) ....................................................................................................175 (2) ....................................................................................................175 Insolvency Act 1986 .....................................................................2, 153, 161–2 s 72A......................................................................................................167 s 74(2)(f).................................................................................................161 s 107.......................................................................................................154 s 127.......................................................................................................155 s 213.......................................................................................................164 s 214.......................................................................................................165 s 239(4) ..................................................................................................158 (5) ..................................................................................................158 s 240(1)(a) ..............................................................................................158 s 283(3)(b) ..............................................................................................153 s 284.......................................................................................................155 s 328(3) ..................................................................................................154 s 436 ........................................................................................................59 Insolvency Rules 1986 r 4.90......................................................................................................156 r 4.181 ....................................................................................................154
Table of Legislation xxiii Law of Property Act 1925 s 53 ..........................................................................................................83 (1)(c)....................................................................................35, 106, 109 s 60(3) ......................................................................................................83 Solicitor’s Accounts Rules 1986 rr 3–7 .......................................................................................................63 Trustee Act 1925 s 31(2)(i)(b) ..............................................................................................73 Trusts (Scotland) Act 1961 s 2 ..........................................................................................................180 Variation of Trusts Act 1958 ........................................................................73 Wills Act 1837 ...............................................................................80, 104, 108
1
Rolls Razor Ltd ROBERT STEVENS
was incorporated in 1921 to manufacture razors. The razor had an everlasting blade, unlike modern expendable safety razors, and a sharpening mechanism based upon a roller, from which the company took its name. It continued to manufacture them at its Cricklewood factory until the 1950s, but then fell upon hard times, partly due to the arrival on the market of electric razors. In 1958, the company attempted to diversify into washing machines, marketing a model called the Foamatic. It was not a success. Between 1954 and 1959, the company lost around £300,000. Without the intervention of John Bloom, it would probably have been put into liquidation. John Bloom was born in the East End of London in 1931. His schooling was at Hackney Downs Grammar, which closed in 1995, having been labelled by some sections in the press as the worst school in Britain. Bloom did his national service in the RAF. After demobilisation, he tried several different business schemes. A haulage business and the selling of paraffin door to door proved unsuccessful. He then hit upon the idea of the direct selling of twin tub washing machines. Unlike modern automatic machines, twin tubs had two separate tubs set on the top of the machine, one for washing, the other for spinning. Bloom found a supplier in the Netherlands who was prepared to sell him the machines, called Electromatics, for around £23 each. He sold two versions, one for 49 guineas, and a deluxe model for 59 guineas. In order to trade, he formed the Electromatic Washing Machine Company Ltd. His success came very quickly and was founded on two factors. First, the price of his machines was very low, around half what was being charged by Hoover and Hotpoint, the market leaders. This, coupled with selling on hire purchase terms, meant that the washing machine was no longer a luxury item but affordable by the average housewife. Second, the machines were sold direct by advertising in the daily press, thereby avoiding the costs of selling through retailers. The machines were light enough to be moved and demonstrated by a single salesman. Once in the door, the salesman usually persuaded the housewife that she really needed to buy the more expensive deluxe version with heater rather than the heavily promoted ordinary model (the so called ‘switch selling’ technique). By May 1958, Bloom had a team of sixty salesmen. An advertisement on the back page of the Daily Mirror in September 1958 led to over 8,000 enquiries. By
R
OLLS RAZOR LTD
2 Robert Stevens the following September, he was selling 400 machines per week, as many as his Dutch manufacturers could supply. Bloom needed more machines. Rolls Razor could be used to assist in the manufacturing of the machines and, more importantly, the financing of getting more. Rolls Razor Ltd was a public limited company quoted on the Stock Exchange and therefore ideal for both purposes. Association with the entirely unconnected company of Rolls Royce was also seen as beneficial. In November 1960, a company called Equity and Share Company (London) Ltd acquired the entire issue of 3 million one shilling shares for £150,000. Subsequently, the assets of Electromatic were sold to Rolls Razor in return for those 3 million shares. The Stock Exchange suspended dealings in Rolls Razor shares at the beginning of 1960, but in May 1962, Rolls was allowed to offer 500,000 one shilling shares at a minimum price of 20 shillings per share through Kleinwort Benson. The fraud involved in the acquisition of Rolls Razor and its quotation on the Stock Exchange is outlined by the liquidator of Rolls Razor, Sir Kenneth Cork:1 When Bloom sold Electromatic to Rolls Razor it was no longer the practice to value a company by its assets. What a company was worth, when it came to selling it, was a matter of multiplication of profits. So if Bloom could augment Electromatic’s profits he could demand more Rolls Razor shares for it than, to put it mildly, was reasonable. John Bloom invented a new kind of fraud. He had to get, and keep his quote on the Stock Exchange, and he needed financial capital both for himself and his company. . . . John Bloom’s profits in these opening stages were reasonably small. What did he do? He formed a new company . . . with practically no share capital, which he owned personally. Then he charged the greatest expenses to that company. For instance purchase tax, advertising, and items like that . . . The result was that when profits were disclosed in the manufacturing company they were magnified enormously; in fact the market price increased by ten times the amount that he had paid himself. Then when the operation was over, he sold sufficient of his shares at the advanced price to put the money into his own little company to pay for the expenses which had been paid on behalf of the manufacturing company!2
Bloom was made managing director of Rolls Razor in March 1960 and given complete control over production at the Cricklewood factory. Unfortunately, the Dutch suppliers of the Electromatic and a group of Bloom’s staff broke away to form their own company selling Duomatic washing machines, a brand name which survives to this day. Bloom was forced to move the bulk of his production to Cricklewood. Unfortunately, the Rolls Electromatic machines were 1 Sir Kenneth Cork, Cork on Cork (London, 1988). Kenneth Cork was the foremost insolvency practitioner of his generation. His firm, Cork Gully, now part of Price Waterhouse Coopers, carried out the most important liquidations of the 1970s. He chaired the Insolvency Law Review Committee, the recommendations of which led to the Insolvency Act 1986: Insolvency Law and Practice, Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558, 1982). He was subsequently Lord Mayor of London. 2 This form of creative accountancy resembles the more complex fraud involving Enron’s use of Special Purpose Entities: Report of Investigation by the Securities Investigative Committee of Enron Corp (The Powers Report) 1 February 2002.
Rolls Razor Ltd 3 unreliable, with a tendency to flood. The next model adopted a new name, the Starmatic, but these were prone to explode and were returned at almost the rate they were sold. Subsequent models, however, the Rolls 66, Rolls Rapide Deluxe and the Rolls Concorde, saw improvement. Sales steadily grew. Bloom reckoned that sales of 29,000 units in 1960 had more than doubled to 68,000 the following year, and by the end of 1962, had reached 101,000. At one point, Rolls Razor overtook Hotpoint to become the second largest supplier of washing machines in the United Kingdom. Richard Reader Harris, Conservative Member of Parliament for Heston and Isleworth, became Chairman in March 1961, his appointment acting as a counterbalance to the perception of Bloom as an arriviste. In 1962, Sir Isaac Wolfson’s General Guarantee Corporation agreed to provide Rolls Razor with hire purchase facilities of up to £10 million on a revolving credit basis. Bloom was given a seven-year contract at a salary of £15,000 per annum, the use of a Rolls Royce car, and a Park Lane apartment. His wealth led to fame. In his autobiography, It’s No Sin to Make a Profit,3 he claims to have mixed with a large number of celebrities of the 1960s: Peter Ustinov, Terence Stamp, Lionel Bart, Joe Loss, Tommy Steel, Bernard Bresslaw, Billy Wright, Sean Connery, Shirley Bassey, Adam Faith, Charlie Drake, three of the Beatles, and Robert Maxwell. Bloom courted publicity. He married Anne Cass in February 1961, the wedding stage managed for maximum effect, with the cake consisting of a giant replica of the Rolls washing machine. Pictures of the bride and groom cutting the cake appeared on the front page of the Daily Mirror. Like other tycoons, he became interested in football, becoming a director of Queens Park Rangers and making a highly publicised attempt to take over the club. Bloom’s profile was further raised by his tangential involvement in the Blue Gardenia Club murder trial. In September 1962, Harvey Holford, owner of the club, killed his wife, Christine. He was eventually convicted of manslaughter. Before the trial, he issued a writ against Bloom, alleging that he had enticed away his wife. The story was front page news in the tabloid press and cannot have enhanced Bloom’s image in the City, where he was already perceived as an upstart. To cope with demand, the bulk of production of the washing machines was moved in March 1963 to the Swansea works of Pressed Steel Ltd. Bloom also acquired Bylock Electrical Ltd, a manufacturer of the motors in many of his products. However, orders could only be met by sacrificing quality, leaving Rolls Razor with a poor image of reliability. Automatic washing machines had started to come on to the market in the early 1960s. Bloom ordered his production engineers to develop a Rolls Razor automatic, though none had appeared by the summer of 1964. Further, Bloom’s condition that the machine be capable of being transported and demonstrated by a single salesman was to prove impractical. Bloom’s competitive edge was also fast disappearing. The major 3
J Bloom, It’s No Sin to Make a Profit (London, 1971).
4 Robert Stevens manufacturers, Hoover and Hotpoint, realised that they could not go on attempting to sell at the high prices they had charged in the past and started to sell much cheaper machines. Retailers, aware that direct selling could put them out of business, also responded with lower prices. Other players also copied Bloom’s techniques. By 1964, another direct-selling competitor was offering a fully automatic machine for 10 guineas less than Rolls Razor’s deluxe model. 1964 saw a sharp falling off of sales: 18,600 in March, 13,800 in April, and only 8,800 in June. By this stage, production was geared to over 5,000 units per week. With the enormous advertising costs involved, each machine was now being sold at a substantial loss. In an attempt to replicate his earlier success, Bloom diversified into other ventures. Rolls Rentals Ltd was formed to promote the rental of television sets. Rolls Photographic Ltd sold home movie kits and still cameras. Most infamous of all was Rolls Tours Ltd, formed to sell package holidays to Bulgaria. The beaches of Bulgaria are indeed beautiful, but 2,000 mile trips by coach across the Iron Curtain did not prove entirely successful. A Private Eye front cover featured The Wreck of the Medusa, with the speech bubble: ‘That is the last time I book a John Bloom holiday!’4 Bloom even bought his own trading stamp company, the Golden Eagle, from Sir Isaac Wolfson, putting his own face, with trademark goatee beard, on the stamps. In the April 1964 edition of the consumer magazine Which?, the twin tub machine of a competitor was severely criticised. These machines were then dumped on the market at reduced prices (39 guineas), further hitting sales of Rolls Razor’s 59 guinea machines. Rolls Razor’s machines were subsequently criticised in an edition of the BBC consumer watchdog programme, Choice. This seems to have been the catalyst for the loss of confidence in the company.5 By ‘the Spring of 1964 Rolls Razor was in Queer Street.’6 The situation was chaotic: ‘most of the paperwork was never properly executed and minutes rarely acted on in the way intended.’7 Unfortunately, Bloom and the other directors were in a state of denial. On May 14, 1964, the directors approved the accounts for the year ending December 31, 1963 and resolved to recommend a final dividend of 120 per cent, making a total dividend of 200 per cent for that year. On the same day, Patrick Hutber was appointed ‘financial co-ordinator’, a role with no defined duties. Hutber forecast a trading profit of £125,000 to the end of March 1964, and a total profit of £500,000 for the year. In fact, the accounts showed a loss for the first three months of £179,000, a figure that the liquidator subsequently said should have been put much higher.8 By June 4, 1964, Rolls Razor’s overdraft with its bank amounted to £484,000, against a limit of £250,000. Its subsidiary, Bylock Electric Ltd, was close to collapse. The 4 5 6 7 8
Private Eye, No 65, 2 June 1964. Benson, Accounting for Life (London, 1989), 142. Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose [1968] 1 Ch 540, 548 (Harman LJ). Above n 1 p 63. Above n 1 p 63.
Rolls Razor Ltd 5 bank wrote to Rolls Razor threatening to refuse to allow the continuation of the business unless the overdraft position improved by the end of the month. At a general meeting of July 2, 1964, the recommended dividend was approved, to be paid on July 24. At a board meeting the next day, Bloom told his fellow directors that Rolls Razor needed an immediate cash injection of £1.5 million and that he had so far failed to secure underwriting facilities for an issue of that size. One director, Jack Jacobs, said that unless permanent finance was forthcoming the board must recommend liquidation. John Bloom was at the time in discussions with the financier Sir Isaac Wolfson, the mysterious Mr ‘X’ of Harman LJ’s judgment,9 for a loan of £1 million from his firm, General Guarantee Corporation.10 As Wolfson was making large profits through the hire purchase contracts entered into by the purchasers of Rolls Razor machines, he had an obvious interest in keeping the ailing golden goose alive for as long as possible. By a memorandum of July 9, 1964, one of the suggested conditions of the financing was that the dividend would be paid. Quistclose Investments Ltd was a shell company through which John Bloom lent Rolls Razor the money to pay the dividend.11 The source of the funds was John Bloom. Exactly where Bloom obtained the money from is uncertain, though Cork states that it was lent to Bloom by Barclays Bank.12 This might be a mistake on his part. On 15 July, 1964, Quistclose drew a cheque for £209,719 8s 6d in favour Rolls Razor Ltd. Following a meeting between a Mr Goldbart, a director of Rolls Razor, and a representative of Barclays Bank, the cheque was presented to the bank with a covering letter stating that the money was to be paid into a No 4 ordinary dividend share account and was only to be used for the payment of the dividend. On July 16, 1964, Quistclose Ltd’s account was debited and the next day Rolls Razor’s No 4 account was credited. Perhaps surprisingly, Bloom showed such confidence that all would be well that he took a plane to Bulgaria on 11 July, where he stayed aboard his £300,000 yacht, The Arianne, in order to make holiday arrangements for Rolls Tours. At a board meeting of Rolls Razor on 17 July, Claude Miller, a ‘financial adviser’ employed by Rolls Razor for a fee of £25,000 for five years (payable in advance), informed the board that Rolls Razor was hopelessly insolvent and that the company should be wound up voluntarily immediately. The board, without the guidance of their managing director, felt obliged to accept this advice and issued a statement to the press and to the Stock Exchange. Upon his return on 20 July, Bloom was left with no choice but to accept what had been done. That same day, Barclays informed Rolls Razor that it was exercising its right to combine all its accounts, saving for the moment the No 4 ordinary share dividend account. 9 10 11 12
Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Ltd [1968] 1 Ch 540, 549. Cork, above n 1 p 64; Bloom, above n 3 p 8. Bloom, above n 3 p 207, 234, 250; Cork, above n 1 p 64. Cork, above n 1 p 66.
6 Robert Stevens On 25 July, Edward Heath, the then President of the Board of Trade, ordered the appointment of inspectors under section 165(1)(b) of the Companies Act 1948 to enquire into the affairs of Rolls Razor. Morris Finer QC (later Finer J) and Henry Benson (later Lord Benson) were appointed by the Companies Inspection Branch. They reported, after taking a great deal of evidence, on 30 November 1965. The Report was not published because of fears that it might prejudice any subsequent criminal proceedings.13 The Companies Investigation Branch is now part of the Department of Trade and Industry. Enquiries have led to the Report being searched for unsuccessfully. Unlike a large number of other documents concerning Rolls Razor, the Report is not held at the Public Records Office. The accountants Cork Gully were approached to produce a Statement of Affairs for submission to a creditors’ meeting. They reported a total deficit of more than £4 million. Barclays Bank were reasonably protected for, whilst owed £455,000, they had taken a fixed charge over the Cricklewood factory, then valued at £427,000.14 The position of Rolls Razor’s team of salesmen was considerably less happy.15 Many were owed a substantial proportion of the commission they had earned as Rolls Razor had ‘retained’ these sums as security against default by the salesmen. They were not entitled to preferential treatment in the winding up as they were independent contractors. As the bank was largely secured, the major losers from the litigation in Barclays Bank v Quistclose Investments Ltd were the unsecured creditors, who were as a result to receive nothing from the sale of the Cricklewood premises. Before the House of Lords, the interests of the unsecured creditors were unrepresented, although counsel for the liquidator had appeared at first instance and before the Court of Appeal. At the shareholders meeting in the Kingsway Hall on 27 August, Bloom was far from friendless. Whilst the salesmen outside jeered him, a slight majority of shareholders in a floor vote were against liquidation: 74 to 72. However, a proxy vote disclosed an overwhelming majority in favour of liquidation. Bloom himself was the largest single shareholder, with 500,000 shares.16 He had previously held a much larger shareholding. The winding up was finally completed in 1980, with creditors paid a dividend of just under 12 (new) pence in the pound. The criminal charges against John Bloom were brought to trial in 1969. He was charged with seven counts of fraud. The difficulties of bringing a complex fraud case to trial five years after the event, and the additional problem of finding reliable oral witnesses, are obvious. In an early example of plea bargaining, Bloom pleaded guilty to two counts and was fined £30,000. Fining someone such as Bloom seems particularly pointless. If declared bankrupt, the fine would 13
H Benson, Accounting for Life (London, 1989), 143. Cork, above n 1 p 66. The bank does not appear to have taken a floating charge over the entire undertaking: cf Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] AC 164, 191, per Lord Millett, though this does not undermine the force of Lord Millett’s point. 15 See Rolls Razor Ltd v Cox [1967] 1 QB 552. 16 Cork, above n 1 p 68. 14
Rolls Razor Ltd 7 remain payable and enforceable, its burden consequently falling on his unsecured creditors. Only one civil action was successfully brought against Bloom. An action for breach of warranty in relation to the sale of Electromatic to Rolls Razor resulted in a judgment for £51,195 5s 5d.17 Another action, brought by the liquidator on behalf of the company against Bloom for misfeasance, was commenced but not pursued to trial. The liquidator commenced several actions against the company’s professional advisers, including Kleinwort Benson and Price Waterhouse, for negligence. These actions were also not pursued to trial. The major losses were, however, caused by the directors’ share dealings. These losses were suffered not by the company but by the other shareholders, who were left with nothing. John Bloom’s subsequent career was also colourful, if less legally interesting. He ran a number of clubs, including the Crazy Horse Saloon in the West End of London, where he had a notorious affair with a waitress, the implausibly named Miss Lovebody. He appears to have been forced out by a gangster, Jo Wilkins. In 1972, he opened a chain of Merrie England restaurants around Los Angeles. His house was raided by the FBI, and in March 1979 he was given a suspended sentence for making pirated video copies of the film Star Wars.18 He then left for Majorca, where he opened a bar/restaurant. Here the trail goes cold. It would be a mistake to consider Bloom to be a villain in the same class as Robert Maxwell. The verdict of Sir Kenneth Cork was that John Bloom was not ‘a particularly attractive character, but with all the bad advice he had to suffer and his inability to see it as such I could not but have a certain sympathy for him.’19 Bloom succeeded in breaking into a market and radically lowering prices. Like Sir Freddie Laker twenty years later, he was not the one to take the benefit from the market he transformed. The major beneficiary was the consumer.
17 18 19
Rolls Razor Ltd v Bloom (30 July 1969) (Fisher J). Cork, above n 1 p 68. Cork, above n 1 p 60.
2
Orthodoxy WILLIAM SWADLING
great difficulties with the decision of the House of Lords in Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Ltd1 is squaring it with orthodox principles of trusts law. This chapter takes the view that it cannot be done. It mounts a sustained assault on the decision and the case-law it relies on. By examining the precise grounds on which the trust was found in that case, it concludes that the House of Lords fell into error and that the priority thereby given to the lender was undeserved. A number of distinguished commentators, most notably Lord Millett and Professsor Chambers, have attempted to rescue Quistclose by explaining the result on different grounds. This chapter takes the view that those explanations are also flawed.
O
NE OF THE
I : THE QUISTCLOSE TRUST ( S )
Rolls Razor Ltd, a company in the empire of the notorious John Bloom, was in desperate financial straits. It had declared a generous dividend for its shareholders of £209,719 8s 6d, though it did not have the wherewithal to pay it. Worse still, its overdraft limit of £250,000 had been exceeded by a factor of almost two, and its bankers, Barclays, were refusing to lend any more. Fortunately, a mysterious and unnamed person2 agreed to lend Rolls Razor a huge sum of money (around £1,000,000), provided only that it first found the funds to pay the dividend. Bloom arranged for another company in his group, Quistclose Ltd, to lend Rolls Razor the money, and a note that the loan was made to Rolls Razor ‘for the purpose of that company paying the final dividend due on July 24 next’ was recorded in the board minutes of Quistclose. Payment to Rolls Razor was made by cheque, which Rolls Razor passed to Barclay’s, telling them of the purpose of the loan, instructing them that it was to be used only for that purpose, and requesting that a separate account be opened, and the money paid into it. Not long afterwards, and before the dividend had been paid, 1
[1970] AC 567. This turns out to have been Sir Isaac Wolfson. Wolfson had an interest in keeping Rolls Razor Ltd afloat as it was his firm which supplied the credit for Rolls Razor’s customers. Details in ch 1 of this volume: p 5. 2
10 William Swadling Rolls Razor went into voluntary liquidation. Barclay’s, relying on its right of set-off,3 thereupon sought to offset the positive balance in the new account with the negative balance in Rolls Razor’s other accounts. Quistclose argued that the chose in action represented by the positive balance in the new account was, in the events which had happened, now held for them by Rolls Razor on trust. And given that Barclay’s had notice of that trust, they could not claim the benefit of the chose in action for themselves. The House of Lords agreed. Lord Wilberforce, with whom Lords Reid, Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Guest, and Pearce agreed, concluded: . . . arrangements of this character for the payment of a person’s creditors by a third person,4 give rise to a relationship of a fiduciary character or trust, in favour, as a primary trust, of the creditors, and, secondarily, if the primary trust fails, of the third person. . . .5
We will consider the two trusts Lord Wilberforce describes, the ‘primary’ trust and the ‘secondary’ trust, in turn.
II : THE PRIMARY TRUST
There is no doubt but that the right held by Rolls Razor, the benefit of the chose in action against Barclay’s, was capable of forming the subject-matter of a trust.6 The difficult question is why it was held on trust rather than outright.7
1. The causative event Rights do not arise spontaneously but respond to events which happen in the world. If I carelessly run you down and cause you physical injury, you are given a right against me in damages. In the same way, the placing of rights behind a trust is not a spontaneous occurrence. It too is a response to events. The most common event by which a trust arises is a conveyance of rights to another with an expression of intent by the transferor that the transferee hold them, not for himself, but for another.8 Alternatively, a right-holder might declare himself a
3
Presumably conferred on Barclays by virtue of its contract with Rolls Razor. This was not the facts of Quistclose, for the payment, if made, would not have been of Rolls Razor’s creditors by Quistclose but by Rolls Razor itself. 5 [1970] AC 567, 580. 6 Lawyers often talk about the subject-matter of a trust as the ‘trust property’. However, there is no requirement that the subject-matter be property rights. Many personal rights, such as the benefit of a loan, can also be held on trust. 7 Although Lord Wilberforce talks of ‘fiduciary relationship’ and ‘trust’ as alternatives, only the latter could give Quistclose the priority it sought. 8 It is assumed for the moment that a trust must have a person as its object. The question of trusts for purposes is addressed below: text to nn 114–24. 4
Orthodoxy 11 trustee. In both cases, the law responds to a manifestation (declaration) of consent on the part of a right-holder to create a trust. Though that declaration needs normally to be proved to have taken place, in a few limited instances courts will presume a declaration to have been made.9 But a presumed declaration is just as much a manifestation of consent as a proven declaration. For ease of exposition, we will therefore call all declared trusts, proven or presumed, ‘consent’ trusts. But events other than manifestations of consent can cause rights to be placed behind a trust. A clear example is the trust which arose in A-G for Hong Kong v Reid.10 There, a high-ranking government official who took bribes to suppress criminal prosecution was turned by the court into a trustee of the bribe moneys for his employer. This trust undoubtedly arose in response to an event which was not a manifestation of consent to create a trust. Those who transferred the rights to Reid, criminal gangs in Hong Kong, intended Reid to hold them for himself, not the Hong Kong Government. And Mr Reid at no point declared himself a trustee of his rights for the Hong Kong Government. Nor did the facts bring it within one of the situations in which courts presume that a declaration of trust was made.11 The trust in Reid can only have arisen because of an event which had nothing to do with a manifestation of intent to create a trust. It is therefore an unequivocal example of what we will call a ‘not-consent’ trust.12 One of the most difficult questions which can be asked about the primary trust in Quistclose is whether it was a consent trust or a not-consent trust. The answer has not been spelt out in any case, and it is interesting to note that counsel for the lender in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley, at least in the Court of Appeal,13 described the trust argued for as an express/implied/constructive/bare trust. He was, in other words, arguing for a consent/not-consent trust. We have to do better than that. And we do so by first asking whether the trust can be seen as one arising because of a manifestation of consent. If this is not possible, we ask whether the trust in Quistclose is consistent with any of the situations in which not-consent trusts presently arise. i. Identifying the primary trust We need to first know exactly what it was that was held on trust and by whom. We also need to know the identity of the settlor. We will leave to one side the 9
Below, text to nn 16–22. [1994] 1 AC 324. 11 Enumerated below at text to nn 16–22. 12 It might be asked why such trusts are not called ‘constructive’ trusts. The reason is the inherent ambiguity in the word ‘constructive’ (LD Smith, ‘Constructive Trusts and Constructive Trustees’ [1999] CLJ 294) and its consequent loose usage by the courts, as witness the so-called ‘common intention constructive trust’. 13 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 438, 449. The arguments of counsel in the House of Lords are, unfortunately, not separately reported: [2002] 2 AC 164, 166. 10
12 William Swadling objects of the trust for the moment. The subject-matter of the trust was the chose in action Rolls Razor held against Barclays, which arose when Rolls Razor lent to Barclays the money they had in turn borrowed from Quistclose. And the trustee could only be Rolls Razor, for it alone held the benefit of the chose in action. It could not be Barclays, for the burden of an obligation cannot form the subject-matter of a trust; though I might declare myself a trustee of money owed to me, I cannot declare myself a trustee of money I owe to others.14 And assuming for the moment that this was a consensual trust,15 the settlor, the person creating the trust, must have been Quistclose, the transferor of the right. If Rolls Razor was to be considered as having declared itself trustee for the dividend creditors, it would have been a fraudulent preference. ii. Is the primary trust a consent trust? Presumed Consent At the outset, we can say that this was not one of those situations in which a declaration of trust is presumed. Those situations are threefold: where there is a gratuitous transfer of rights to a person not the wife or child of a male transferee;16 where a purchase of rights is made in the name of another;17 and where part of the purchase price is provided but title is taken in the name of another.18 Like all presumptions of fact, the presumption that a trust was declared will not arise where evidence before the court proves that a declaration was not in fact made.19 There are at least two reasons why the facts of Quistclose do not fall within one of these three facts situations. First, the presumption only arises where the full facts are not before the court.20 The presumption arises to fill a gap in the evidence, and here there was no lacunae to fill.21 Second, the transfer of rights was made for consideration: there was an obligation to repay the amount borrowed. Courts do not presume that a declaration of trust was made in situations in which money has been advanced by way of loan, for if the purchaser was to 14 Lord Wilberforce seemed to treat Barclays as a trustee, for he says that it is important to ask whether it had notice of the terms on which the loan was made: [1970] AC 567, 579, 582. This is strange. If a right is held by a person as trustee, it is simply not available to pay that person’s creditors. It is of course different if it has been so applied, and the question then is whether the creditor can claim to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. But prior to such application, questions of notice can have no relevance. 15 There is no possibility of finding a settlor where the trust is a not-consent trust. 16 As, eg, in Re Vinogradoff [1936] WN 68. 17 Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox 92. 18 As, eg, in Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland [1981] AC 487. 19 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, 708 (Lord BrowneWilkinson). 20 As was clearly the case in The Venture [1908] P 218, where it was unclear whether money used to buy a yacht was transferred by way of gift, loan, or purchase. 21 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291, 329 (Lord Wilberforce). This case is discussed in more detail below: text to nn 149–70.
Orthodoxy 13 have an interest in the fund as well as a right to be repaid, he would ‘get his money twice: once on repayment of the loan and once on taking his share of the . . . property.’22 The reason why advancement by way of loan does not give rise to a presumption that a trust of the transferred funds was declared by the lender in his own favour is that proof of an agreed debtor/creditor relationship itself resolves any ambiguity over the capacity in which the transferee received the funds. Receipt on loan is proof that he took absolutely and not as trustee. Proven Consent If it was a consent trust, then we need to find on the proven facts an intent by Quistclose to vest the rights in Rolls Razor as trustee rather than absolutely. The clearest way for a right-holder to demonstrate that he intends to make another a trustee is to use the word ‘trustee’ to describe that other. No such words were used in Quistclose. This is not necessarily fatal to the finding of an intention to create a trust. Where we do not have the use of the word ‘trust’, what is needed are words indicating that the transferor is obliged to hold the rights received on behalf of another, not himself. An expression of desire to benefit another will not be enough.23 At the very least, the words must be imperative.24 The problem here, of course, is that no words whatever were used by Quistclose to indicate that the rights vested in Rolls Razor were to be held for anyone other than Rolls Razor itself. All we have is a note in the lender’s board minutes that the loan was made for the purpose of enabling Rolls Razor to pay the dividend; it was never a condition of the loan that it would be so used. Of course, the terms on which Rolls Razor lent the money to Barclay’s did state that the chose in action could only be applied to the discharge of this particular debt. And by a remarkable process of interpretation, Lord Wilberforce seized on this to ascribe to Quistclose the same intention: It is not difficult to establish precisely upon what terms the money was advanced by [Quistclose] to Rolls Razor Ltd. There is no doubt that the loan was made specifically in order to enable Rolls Razor Ltd to pay the dividend. There is equally, in my opinion, no doubt that the loan was made only so as to enable Rolls Razor Ltd to pay the dividend and for no other purpose. This follows quite clearly from the letter of Rolls Razor Ltd to the bank of July 15, which letter, before transmission to the bank, was sent to [Quistclose] under open cover in order that the cheque might be (as it was) enclosed in it. The mutual intention of [Quistclose] and of Rolls Razor Ltd, and the essence of the bargain, was that the sum advanced should not become part of the assets of Rolls Razor Ltd, but should be used exclusively for payment of a particular class of its creditors, namely, those entitled to the dividend.25 22
Re Sharpe [1980] 1 WLR 219, 223 (Browne-Wilkinson J). Thus, the words ‘in full confidence that [my widow] will do what is right as to the disposal thereof between my children, either in her lifetime or by will after her decease’, in that they did not impose an obligation on the transferee to hold for another, were held not to create a trust: Re Adams & Kensington Vestry (1884) 27 ChD 394. 24 Re Johnston [1939] 2 All ER 458, 460 (Crossman J). 25 [1970] AC 567, 579–80. 23
14 William Swadling But even if Lord Wilberforce was right to ascribe the intentions of Rolls Razor to Quistclose, the question is whether those intentions comprised an intention to constitute Rolls Razor a trustee of the right transferred. The words may have been imperative, but that fact alone is not enough. If I order a new computer and make it a term of the contact that it must arrive by next Monday, I do not thereby create a trust, for I say nothing about rights being held by one person on behalf of another. And neither does an intention that the money be used for no other purpose than the payment of a dividend indicate an intention to create a trust, for, whatever else those words might mean,26 they do not say that the rights transferred are not to be held outright by the transferee. They speak only to the ends to which the rights should be applied, which is a completely different thing. An example will illustrate. Suppose my teenaged son proposes to buy himself a motorbike. Worried for this safety, I promise to buy him a safety helmet if he will agree to never to ride the bike over the applicable speed limit. Can it realistically be said that by so agreeing he has declared himself a trustee of the bike? And the position can no different where, instead, I buy the bike and transfer it to him on exactly the same condition. Are we really saying that by agreeing to a restriction on its use my son thereupon ceases to hold his rights in the motorbike for himself? That he now holds them on trust? Not surprisingly, there are a number of cases, none of which were cited to the House in Quistclose, where a condition of use attached to a transfer has been held not to evidence an intention to create a trust.27 They lay down the following rule: where the whole of a sum is given for a particular purpose, the transfer is seen as absolute.28 Where, however, only part of a larger sum is to be used for that purpose, the transfer of that part is absolute and the remainder returns to the transferor.29 Thus, the purpose, where it is operative, is seen merely as defining the subject-matter of the gift; it in no way creates a purpose trust. The purpose is seen as either the motive for the gift or as defining the subject-matter of that gift. As Buckley LJ explained in re Osoba:
26
The actual meaning of the words is discussed below, text to n 52. Prominent examples are: Re Bowes [1896] 1 Ch 507; Re Andrew’s Trust [1905] 2 Ch 48; Re Lipinski [1976] Ch 235; Re Osoba [1979] 1 WLR 247. 28 The leading case is Re Sanderson’s WT (1857) 3 K & J 497 where Page-Wood V-C, at p 503, gave the rule of construction for transfers for purposes: If a gross sum be given . . . and a special purpose assigned for that gift, this Court always regards the gift as absolute. . .; while, on the other hand, if a portion only of the fund is given for maintenance, then they are entitled to draw out so much only as may be necessary for the purpose specified . . . Thus, where there is the gift of a sum to apprentice a child, or to buy a commission for a son, the Court gives effect to the entire gift; and whether the sum can or cannot be applied for the purpose of buying the commission or apprenticing the child, the Court holds that the child is entitled to the whole of it. On the facts of re Sanderson itself, the second construction was adopted. 29 As in re Trusts of the Abbott Fund [1900] 2 Ch 326. 27
Orthodoxy 15 If a testator has given the whole of a fund . . ., whether directly or through the medium of a trustee, he is regarded, in the absence of any contra indication, as having manifested an intention to benefit that person to the full extent of the subject matter, notwithstanding that he may have expressly stated that the gift is made for a particular purpose, which may prove to be impossible of performance or which may not exhaust the subject-matter. . . . This is because the testator has given the whole fund; he has not given so much of the fund as will suffice or be required to achieve the purpose, nor so much of the fund as a trustee or anyone else should determine, but the whole fund. This must be reconciled with the testator’s having specified the purpose for which the gift is made. This reconciliation is achieved by treating the reference to the purpose as merely a statement of the testator’s motive in making the gift.30
It might be argued that Quistclose is different, for here the dedication of the fund to the particular purpose was an enforceable term of a contract of loan. We have already seen that, on the actual facts of Quistclose, this was not actually true. But, even if it was, this contractual enforceability cannot show an intention to create a trust, for if a non-contractual expression of a purpose is not an expression of an intention to create a trust, the same intention now incorporated as a term of a contract is not an intention to create a trust either. As was said above, the mere fact that an obligation has been laid upon a person does not mean that a trust has thereby been created. Only if that obligation is to hold rights on behalf of another will there be a trust, and in such a case it will not matter whether that obligation was or was not contained in a contract, for the obligation to hold rights on trust can be independent of any contractual obligation.31 Contra-indications But not only were no positive words of trust used in Quistclose, there were facts which would usually be taken as indicating that no trust was intended. i. Rights transferred pursuant to contract of loan The first contra-indication of a consent trust is that the rights which formed the subject-matter of the trust were transferred to Rolls Razor pursuant to a contract of loan. This meant that Rolls Razor was contractually obliged to repay the amount it received to Quistclose from the moment of receipt. A number of commentators, including Professors Birks and Chambers in this volume,32 take the view that the debt only arises at the moment of application of the money to the purpose for which it was lent, or on the failure of the purpose. There is also a clear implication in Lord Wilberforce’s speech to the same effect, when he says that Rolls Razor’s liability to repay the amount borrowed to Quistclose arose on the application of the loan monies to the intended purpose.33 But this simply does not square with the facts, as the contract of loan provided nothing of the sort. Thus, in the 30
[1979] 1 WLR 247, 257. As, for example, where a right-holder gratuitously declares himself trustee for another. 32 Pp 78 (Chambers) and 125 (Birks). 33 ‘. . . when the purpose is carried out (ie, the debt paid) the lender has his remedy against the borrower in debt’: [1970] AC 567, 581. 31
16 William Swadling unlikely event of the insolvency of Barclays Bank, Rolls Razor would have been liable to Quistclose to repay the amount borrowed, whether or not the money had been paid to the dividend creditors. An even clearer case is the only other decision of the House of Lords on the topic, Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley,34 for here the borrower incurred a liability to pay interest (at 24%) the moment the money was advanced. If, at this point, the money was not owed, how could it be that the borrower could be charged interest? A liability to repay the value received does not arise where rights are transferred on trust. The relationship between trustee and beneficiary is not one of debtor and creditor. If a trustee puts trust money in a bank and the bank fails, the trustee, assuming he has acted intra vires and with due care, will not be personally liable to make good the loss to the trust fund. In Morley v Morley 35 the defendant was trustee for the plaintiff, an infant, one of the trust assets being £40 in gold. An employee of the defendant stole £200 of his employer’s own money, as well as the £40 in gold. It was held that the defendant was not liable to pay his beneficiary the value of the stolen gold. Quistclose is therefore distinctly odd, because the consequence of the finding of a trust, which trust was to co-exist alongside an obligation to repay, meant that the lender neither bore the risk of destruction of the subject-matter of the trust (as would a normal trust beneficiary), nor the risk of the borrower’s insolvency (as would a normal lender).36 It is no accident, as we have already seen,37 that courts refuse to presume a declaration of trust in the case of money transferred by way of loan. None of this would the case were we talking about a loan for use rather than for consumption. If I lend you my bike and, without fault on your part, the bike is stolen or destroyed, I have no claim against you for payment to me of the value of the bike. The rights remained in me, and with those rights went the risk of loss or destruction of their subject-matter. But Quistclose involved a loan for 34
[2002] 2 AC 164. (1678) 2 Ch Cas 2. 36 The point is well put by Meagher and Gummow, who say that the decision in Quistclose gave the lender the ‘best of all possible worlds. As beneficiary it could stand outside the liquidation and recover the loan in full, yet if the company had remained solvent but, without fault on its part, the fund had disappeared, the lender presumably could have recovered the money at law as a debt’: R Meagher and W Gummow, Jacob’s Law of Trusts in Australia, 5th edn (Sydney, 1986) para 215. The sixth edition of this work, published in1997, omits any criticism of the case. One judge has questioned the priority in insolvency that Quistclose gives. In re Miles, ex p National Australia Bank Ltd v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy (1988) 85 ALR 216, 221, Pincus J said: Experience suggests that bankruptcy or the liquidation of an insolvent company often awkwardly interrupts the progress of an intended transaction or set of transactions. If goods are delivered under a contract of sale and the property has passed, but bankruptcy supervenes just before an intended payment is made for them, the vendor cannot get them back. He must submit to their being sold to satisfy the general body of creditors–or perhaps even more galling, to satisfy a secured creditor or one having statutory priority. The common sense claim of such an unpaid vendor to recover ‘his’ goods rather than prove for the price may be no less appealing than Quistclose’s claim to repayment of the money it advanced and the same may be said of any number of types of transaction interrupted by bankruptcy. 37 Text to nn 21–2. 35
Orthodoxy 17 consumption. If I lend you a bag of sugar and that sugar is, without fault on your part, stolen or destroyed, your obligation to give me a bag of sugar is not dissolved. Loans for consumption are different from loans for use, and the loan in Quistclose was a loan for consumption. This difference was not, however, noticed by Lord Wilberforce. ii. No duty of segregation A second contra-indication of a consent trust is that the lender imposed no obligation on the borrower to keep the funds separate from its own assets.38 Although the presence of such a requirement is not determinative of the question whether or not there was an intention to create a trust, its absence is a good indicator that the funds were to be held absolutely by their recipient. As Channell J said in Henry v Hammond:39 It is clear that if the terms upon which the person receives the money are that he is bound to keep it separate, either in a bank or elsewhere, and to hand the money so kept as a separate fund to the person entitled to it, then he is a trustee of that money and must hand it over to the person who is his cestui que trust. If on the other hand he is not bound to keep the money separate, but is entitled to mix it with his own money and deal with it as he pleases, and when called upon to hand over an equivalent sum of money, then, in my opinion, he is not a trustee of the money, but merely a debtor.40
There, a shipping agent had sold coals on behalf of his principal. The sums received in exchange were paid by the agent into his own bank account, there being no obligation on him to keep them separate. For the purposes of limitation, it was necessary to decide whether the agent had received the proceeds of sale as a trustee for his principal or on his own behalf. Channell J held that he took them for himself, with merely a duty to account to his principal.41 The same result obtained in Neste Oy v Lloyds Bank plc,42 where payments were made to an agent to enable him to pay expenses incurred in respect of the principal’s ships. Bingham J held that since there was no obligation on the agent to keep the payments separate, he was not a trustee of them, with the consequence that the principal had no priority on the insolvency of the agent.43 iii. Inappropriateness of fiduciary relationship A trustee is a fiduciary. This means that he must avoid situations in which his own interests might conflict with those of his beneficiary. At the very least, he has a duty to be loyal to his 38 This feature is also lacking in a number of other cases on this topic, eg, re EVTR [1987] BCLC 646, and Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164. 39 [1913] 2 KB 515. 40 Ibid p 521. See also R v Clowes (No 2) [1994] 2 All ER 316, where, at p 325, Watkins, LJ said: ‘As to segregation of funds, the effect of the authorities seems to be that a requirement to keep moneys separate is normally an indicator that they are impressed with a trust, and that the absence of such requirement, if there are no other indicators of a trust, normally negatives it’ (emphasis in original). 41 [1913] 2 KB 515, 522. 42 [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658. 43 Ibid p 664.
18 William Swadling beneficiary.44 Can it really be said that a person who borrows money from a bank and promises to use it only to buy a new car is in a fiduciary position viz a viz that bank, with all the consequence that such a relationship brings, so that, for example, that he must be loyal to that bank during the currency of the loan and not take his banking business elsewhere? The courts have, on a number of occasions, warned against the wholesale infiltration of equitable doctrines into commercial law.45 This is not to say that equitable doctrines have no place in commercial law. Far from it. But what it does mean in this context is that equitable doctrines should not be used to rewrite consensual bargains so as to turn an arms-length bargaining relationship into one of trust and confidence.46 It is instructive to compare the facts of Quistclose with those of the well-known decision of the Privy Council in re Goldcorp Ltd.47 Goldcorp Ltd contracted to sell gold bars to a number of customers. The gold was not to be delivered immediately but stored by Goldcorp until needed by the customers. The company did promise, however, to have enough stocks of gold to always maintain their obligations to customers. There never was any gold, or at least not as much as promised. On Goldcorp’s insolvency, the assets of the company being swallowed up by a floating charge in favour of a bank, the customers tried, inter alia, to make claims to some sort of proprietary right in the money (or its traceable proceeds) they had paid over under the contracts of purchase. The New Zealand Court of Appeal48 held that Goldcorp stood in a fiduciary relationship to its customers and from the moment of receipt of the purchase price held those monies on trust, which trust, through a process of tracing, gave the customers a charge over the company’s assets ranking in priority to the bank’s charge. The Privy Council disagreed. There was no fiduciary relationship between the customers and Goldcorp. Lord Mustill said: No doubt the fact that one person is placed in a particular position vis-à-vis another through the medium of a contract does not necessarily mean that he does not also owe fiduciary duties to that other by virtue of being in that position. But the essence of a fiduciary relationship is that it creates obligations of a different character from those deriving from the contract itself. Their Lordships have not heard in argument any submissions which went beyond suggesting that by virtue of being a fiduciary the company was obliged honestly and conscientiously to do what it had by contract promised 44 ‘The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary’: Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18 (Millett LJ). It has been argued that the duties go further, that the fiduciary owes positive duties of altruism to his beneficiary: P Birks, ‘The Content of Fiduciary Obligation’ (2002) 16 TLI 34. 45 The most famous example is that of Lindley LJ in Manchester Trust v Furness [1895] 2 QB 539, 545, who warned about the dangers of introducing ideas of constructive notice into the area of bills of lading. 46 The Court of Appeal in A-G v Blake [1998] Ch 439, 453 spoke of the inappropriateness of branding a contract-breaker a fiduciary in order simply to force him to disgorge profits consequential on breach. Labeling the borrower a fiduciary would seem even less defensible in the case of a simple loan transaction. 47 [1995] 1 AC 74. 48 [1993] 1 NZLR 257.
Orthodoxy 19 to do. . . . It is possible without misuse of language to say that the customers put faith in the company, and that their trust has not been repaid. But the vocabulary is misleading; high expectations do not necessarily lead to equitable remedies.49
If it was right to say that there was no fiduciary relationship in re Goldcorp, it is difficult see how it could be right to say that there was such a relationship in Quistclose. The warning of Sopinka J in Noreberg v Wynrib 50 that ‘Fiduciary duties should not be superimposed on . . . common law duties simply to improve the nature or extent of the remedy’51 would seem particularly apposite here. What did the parties intend? If it was not meant to create a trust, what was the condition meant to achieve? This is difficult to say, for, as we have seen, Lord Wilberforce ascribed an intention to Quistclose it never actually had. But even if we accept that Quistclose did place such a limitation on the use of the moneys, what was it intended to achieve? Since this was never spelt out, we can only speculate. The most likely explanation is that Quistclose wanted Rolls Razor to be able to secure the loan of £1,000,000 from Mr X. In other words, the purpose of the restriction was to ensure the solvency of Rolls Razor, not to provide security for Quistclose. And, so far as that purpose was concerned, the creation of a trust of which Rolls Razor was trustee could do absolutely nothing to further that aim.52 iii. Is the primary trust a not-consent trust? If it is not possible to say that the primary trust in Quistclose arose as a response to some manifestation of intent on the part of Quistclose, proven or presumed, that Rolls Razor was to hold the rights vested in it on trust, might it be that the trust was in fact a not-consent trust? We have already seen an example of a notconsent trust in A-G for Hong Kong v Reid.53 Might the Quistclose trust also be of the same kind? Although Lord Wilberforce seemed to think that he was dealing with a consensual trust,54 their Lordships in Twinsectra v Yardley were more equivocal.55 Lord Hoffmann said only that the terms on which the money was
49
[1995] 1 AC 74, 98. (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449. 51 Ibid p 481. 52 Though this was not the case in Quistclose, the aim may sometimes be to give the lender security in the event of the borrower’s insolvency. That may well have been the lender’s purpose in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 in enjoining the borrower only to spend the money on ‘property’. But, as Lord Hoffmann, at p 169, pointed out, this would be a fairly ineffective form of security because there would be nothing to stop the borrower then mortgaging that ‘property’ to the hilt. And even if this did not happen, it would often be the case that ‘property’ once purchased would be subject to a pre-existing floating charge in favour of the borrower’s bank. 53 Text to nn 10–12. 54 There is, however, an indication in his speech to the effect that the right arises by operation of law. This is discussed below: text to n 86. 55 The matter is dealt with in greater detail in the chapter by Penner in this volume. 50
20 William Swadling lent meant that it was received on trust.56 But whether this was because those terms57 evinced an intention to create a trust or because they created a not-consent trust58 is nowhere made clear. Lord Hutton also talks of the undertakings creating a trust without saying whether that trust was a consent or a notconsent trust.59 And, as we will see below,60 there are a number of passages in Lord Millett’s speech which indicate that the trust in that case was a not-consent trust.61 This is not the place to go into the rights and wrongs of not-consent trusts. For the moment, we can only note the situations in which they conventionally arise and ask whether the Quistclose trust falls within one of those categories. English law makes no effort to categorise its not-consent trusts according to the events which bring them into existence, preferring instead to lump them all under the heading of ‘unconscionability’. However, if we are to subscribe to the rule of law, we must be able to do better. Events other than consent which have the effect of creating rights can be conveniently classified under the headings of Wrongs, Unjust Enrichment, and Miscellaneous Others.62 And looking at the matter empirically, it seems that those same events sometimes have the effect of placing rights behind a trust. Wrongs There is no doubt that trusts sometimes, though rarely, arise as a response to wrongdoing. A-G for Hong Kong v Reid63 is a clear example, the wrong there being a breach of fiduciary duty. It is a difficult question whether any other wrongs have this effect,64 and even whether the wrong of breach of fiduciary duty should do so.65 But accepting for the moment that wrongs can have the 56 ‘The terms of the trust upon which Sims held the money must be found in the undertaking given to Twinsectra as a condition of payment. Clauses 1 and 2 of that undertaking made it clear that the money was not to be at the free disposal of Mr Yardley. Sims were not to part with the money to Mr Yardley or anyone else except for the purpose of enabling him to acquire property. . . . In my opinion the effect of the undertaking was to provide that the money in the Sims client account should remain Twinsectra’s money until such time as it was applied for the acquisition of property in accordance with the undertaking’: [2002] 2 AC 164, 168. 57 Clause 1 provided that: ‘The loan moneys will be retained by us until such time as they are applied in the acquisition of property on behalf of our client’. Clause 2 provided that ‘The loan moneys will be utilized solely for the acquisition of property on behalf of our client and for no other purpose’. 58 As cases like Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499 (specifically enforceable contract of sale) show, contractual terms can also create not-consent trusts: text to nn 83–4. 59 [2002] 2 AC 164, 171. 60 Text to nn 87–8. 61 [2002] 2 AC 164, 185. 62 This is the scheme proposed by P Birks, ‘Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13’ in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (Oxford, 1997), 1. 63 [1994] 1 AC 324. 64 In common law Canada, it seems breach of confidence might have this effect, though since the reasoning is phrased in terms of ‘unconscionability’, it is impossible to be sure: Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR 14. Breach of confidence has been held not to have the effect of creating a trust by the English Court of Appeal in Satnam Investment Ltd v Dunlop Heywood & Co Ltd [1999] 3 All ER 652, though the point is only obiter. 65 For a convincing criticism of the reasoning in Reid, see D Crilley, ‘A Case of Proprietary Overkill?’ [1994] RLR 57.
Orthodoxy 21 effect of placing rights behind a trust, it is clear that this cannot be the explanation for the primary trust in Quistclose, for there was no wrongdoing on the part of Rolls Razor at the moment of receipt, the point at which the primary trust arose. So an explanation based on wrongdoing cannot work. Unjust Enrichment There are cases in which a trust has arisen as a response to an unjust enrichment. Examples are Chase Manhattan v Israel-British Bank,66 where Goulding J held that the recipient of a mistaken payment was a trustee of it for the payor, and Neste-Oy v Lloyds Bank,67 where Bingham J held that a payment received for a consideration which at the time was known to have failed was similarly held on trust. Both cases are unequivocal examples of not-consent trusts responding to the not-consent event of unjust enrichment. The problem in explaining the primary Quistclose trust as an unjust enrichment trust, however, is that there was no unjust enrichment of Rolls Razor at the moment of receipt. Not only was there no unjust factor (mistake, duress, failure of consideration, etc), there was a valid contract subsisting between Rolls Razor and Quistclose at the date of payment, and claims in unjust enrichment for restitution of benefits transferred under a valid contract cannot succeed unless and until that contract is first set aside.68 No such avoidance having been made in Quistclose, the primary trust cannot be said to be responding to the unjust enrichment of Rolls Razor. But there is another, logically prior, reason why the primary trust in Quistclose could not be a trust responding to the unjust enrichment of Rolls Razor. This is because the receipt of the loan monies was not an enriching event, for Rolls Razor was already contractually liable from that point on to repay the amount received. If I receive £10 and am immediately liable to repay £10, there is no enrichment needing reversal. If we were to add in an unjust enrichment generated obligation to repay the same amount, then I would be liable to pay £20, not £10. It is different with the classic unjust enrichment scenario, the mistaken payment. In Kelly v Solari,69 a widow was mistakenly paid money under a lapsed insurance policy. She had never contractually promised to repay that sum. If the unjust enrichment obligation to repay the amount received had not arisen, the payment would have been enriching, as she would have had no obligation whatever to repay. Miscellaneous Others This category, as its name makes clear, is a miscellany. There are demonstrably cases in which not-consent trusts have arisen which cannot be explained as responding to the events of wrongdoing or unjust enrichment. And though we may be able to state the rules generating these trusts, they are impossible to 66 67 68 69
[1981] Ch 105. [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658. Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161. (1841) 9 M & W 54.
22 William Swadling rationalise. For this reason, such cases languish in an innominate category. The main situations in which not-consent trusts arise outside wrongs and unjust enrichment,70 in no particular order, are as follows: i. The rule in re Rose71 A non-intentional trust will arise where I purport to make a gift to you but that gift does not take effect immediately because a third party has yet to take action to transfer to you the right which is the subjectmatter of the gift. Until that action is taken, I will, for reasons which have never been made clear,72 hold that right for you on trust, a trust which I clearly did not intend to create. This is the rule in re Rose. It forms an exception to the rule that the courts of equity will not perfect imperfect gifts.73 And this explains why the rule can have no possible application to the facts of Quistclose, for the transfer of rights in that case was not imperfect in any way. ii. Imperfect gift and detrimental reliance Where a donor purports to make a gift of rights to a donee but fails to comply with the formalities necessary to pass those rights to the donee, and the donee, thinking that the gift is perfect, acts to his detriment, the donor will be a trustee of those rights for the donee.74 Like re Rose, it provides an exception to the imperfect gift rule. And for that reason, it too can have no application to the facts of Quistclose. iii. Mutual Wills This is a complicated doctrine, and it unnecessary to go into it in detail.75 It relies, however, on two persons making wills in each other’s favour, agreeing that the survivor should enjoy all their rights and then leave them to nominated beneficiaries. Provided certain conditions are met, this will lead to the creation of a not-consent trust. But given that no wills were involved in Quistclose, the doctrine can have no application on the facts of the case. iv. Transfer on Trust Failing to Exhaust the Beneficial Interest 76 The typical case is where I convey rights to you with a declaration of trust for uncertain objects. In such a case, you will hold those rights on trust for me rather than the uncertain objects. That such a trust is not responding to a manifestation of consent, either presumed or proved, was made clear by the House of Lords in Vandervell v IRC,77 where evidence that the transferor did not wish a trust to be 70 Though this list tries to detail the main instances of not-consent trusts outside Wrongs and Unjust Enrichments, it makes no claim to being exhaustive. It does, however, hope not to have omitted any not-consent trust bearing any relation to that in Quistclose. 71 [1952] Ch 499. 72 The Court of Appeal in the leading case of re Rose [1952] Ch 499, 506, said that the trust arose as a matter of ‘common sense’. The more recent case of Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075 is no better, the judges there being content to talk only of ‘unconscionability’. 73 Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264, 274–75. 74 As, for example, in Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431. 75 Discussion in T Youdan, ‘The Mutual Wills Doctrine’ (1979) 29 University of Toronto Law Journal 390. 76 Some, most notably Birks and Chambers, would argue that this head of not-consent trust should be included under the heading of ‘unjust enrichment’. 77 [1967] 2 AC 291.
Orthodoxy 23 created in his favour was held to be irrelevant to the question whether he was a beneficiary of that trust. But the simple reason why the primary trust in Quistclose cannot be seen as an example of this sort of trust is that the initial transfer in that case was, as we have already seen,78 not a transfer on trust. v. Unauthorised substitution 79 If I take your money without consent and buy myself a car, I will hold that car for you on trust.80 Just like the trust in A-G for Hong Kong v Reid,81 the trust is one arising from an event other than a manifestation of intent on either of our parts to constitute me a trustee. But that kind of trust cannot be relevant here, for, though there was a substitution in Quistclose,82 it was not unauthorized. vi. Specifically enforceable promise to transfer rights This is the last category. The most common example of this type of not-consent trust is that which arises when the holder of a fee simple estate in land enters into a contractual promise to convey his right to the promisee. Provided specific performance is available, the vendor immediately becomes a trustee of his right for the promisee. As Sir George Jessel MR said in Lysaght v Edwards:83 The moment you have a valid contract for sale the vendor becomes in equity a trustee for the purchaser of the estate sold, and the beneficial ownership passes to the purchaser, the vendor having a right to the purchase-money, a charge or lien on the estate for the security of that purchase-money, and a right to retain possession of the estate until the purchase-money is paid . . .84
Exactly why a trust should arise in such a situation has never been satisfactorily explained, the courts being content to rely on the fiction that ‘equity looks upon as done that which ought to be done’, which, of course, is no explanation at all. But the one thing we can be sure of is that the trust here arising does not do so because of any intention by the vendor to constitute himself a trustee for his purchaser. Might it be argued that the primary Quistclose trust belongs here? The answer is no, for two reasons. First, as we have seen, the doctrine rests on the maxim that ‘equity looks upon that as done which ought to be done’. It anticipates the fact that the promisee will undoubtedly, because performance will be compelled if not voluntarily made, become holder at law of the rights he has contracted to buy. The promise in Quistclose, however, was purely negative, 78
Text to nn 16–51. Like the previous head, this too is argued by some to fall under the general heading of ‘Unjust Enrichment’: P Birks, ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment, and Tracing’ (2001) 54 CLP 231, 245–47. There is also a case for saying that it falls under the heading of ‘Wrongs’. 80 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102. 81 [1994] 1 AC 324. 82 The benefit of the chose in action Quistclose enjoyed against its bankers was exchanged for the benefit of a chose in action against Rolls Razor. 83 (1876) 2 Ch D 499. The other commonly cited case in this area is Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch D 9, in which the leading judgment is also given by Sir George Jessel. 84 (1876) 2 Ch D 499, 506. 79
24 William Swadling that the money would not be applied for any purpose other than the payment of the dividend. There was no guarantee that it would ever be applied to anyone. And second, even if it was positive, the dividend creditors were strangers to the contract of loan and consequently had no ability to compel its performance.85 This is important, for the Lysaght v Edwards trust only arises in favour of a person both able to compel performance and in whom the rights will eventually vest.85a In Quistclose, by contrast, the lender could, assuming a positive rather than a negative stipulation, compel a performance which would not vest in him the rights concerned, but the creditors, who would eventually obtain the rights concerned, could not compel performance. vii. Right of restraint? It is clear, therefore, that the facts of Quistclose fit no pre-existing category of not-consent trust. Might it be argued that the existence of a power enforceable by injunction to restrain the application of the rights in a particular way gives the holder of the right of restraint an interest under a trust? Such thinking can be found in the speeches of both Lord Wilberforce in Quistclose and Lord Millett in Twinsectra. In Quistclose, Lord Wilberforce said that ‘when the money is advanced, the lender acquires an equitable right to see that it is applied for the primary designated purpose’.86 Lord Millett’s speech in Twinsectra is even clearer in pointing to a not-consent trust arising in this way: Money advanced by way of loan normally becomes the property of the borrower. He is free to apply the money as he chooses, and save to the extent to which he may have taken security for repayment the lender takes the risk of the borrower’s insolvency. But it is well established that a loan to a borrower for a specific purpose where the borrower is not free to apply the money for any other purpose gives rise to fiduciary obligations on the part of the borrower which a court of equity will enforce. . . . When the money is advanced, the lender acquires a right, enforceable in equity, to see that it is applied for the stated purpose, or more accurately to prevent its application for any other purpose. This prevents the borrower from obtaining any beneficial interest in the money, at least while the designated purpose is still capable of being carried out.87
That the obligation precedes and is the cause of the trust is made even clearer two pages later: It is unconscionable for a man to obtain money on terms as to its application and then disregard the terms on which he received it. Such conduct goes beyond a mere breach of contract. . . . The duty [of application] is fiduciary in character because a person who makes money available on terms that it is to be used for a particular purpose only and not for any other purpose thereby places his trust and confidence in the recipient to ensure that it is properly applied. This is a classic situation in which 85 At least at the time Quistclose was decided, ie, before the enactment of the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 85a Re Anstis (1885) 31 Ch D 596, 605 (Lindley LJ). 86 [1970] AC 567, 581. 87 [2002] 2 AC 164, 184 (emphasis supplied).
Orthodoxy 25 a fiduciary relationship arises, and since it arises in respect of a specific fund it gives rise to a trust.88
But is it correct to say that a right to restrain the use to which rights are put makes the person against whom the restraint can be exercised a not-consenttrustee of the rights he holds? It is difficult to see how it can. There are certainly cases in which negative restrictions enforceable in equity have been held to create rights in their holder which are capable of binding third parties. An example is a restrictive covenant over the use of land, as exemplified by Tulk v Moxhay.89 There are, however, at least two problems with the application of that doctrine to the facts of Quistclose. First, it requires that there be land which is benefited as well as land which is burdened.90 For this reason, the doctrine was held by Scrutton LJ in Barker v Strickney to have no possible application to things other than land.91 But more fatal is the objection that even if we were able to apply the Tulk v Moxhay doctrine we would not end up with a trust. The right which the dominant landowner obtained in Tulk v Moxhay was a right which he held outright, not one held for him on trust by his neighbour. The only right the servient owner held was his fee simple, and he held that for himself. By contrast, the right we are concerned with is one held by one person on behalf of another. For the short reason that Tulk v Moxhay does not produce trusts, it can have no application here. viii. Pre-Quistclose case-law It will be recalled that Lord Wilberforce claimed over 150 years of authority for his principle. Does that authority shed any light on the reason for the trust? Unfortunately, it does not. Lord Wilberforce cited five cases in support of his proposition, Toovey v Milne,92 Edwards v Glyn,93 in re Rogers, ex p Holland & Hammond,94 in re Drucker (No 1),95 and in re Hooley, ex p Trustee.96 Lord Millett97 has identified three further cases, Moore v Bathrop,98 Gibert v Gonard,99 and re Watson.100 The genesis of the principle is to be found in Toovey v Milne. A bankrupt was lent £120 by his brother-in-law to settle with his pressing creditors. He was unable to do so and repaid £95 of the money. His assignee in 88 Ibid p 186 (emphasis supplied). A similar point is made at p 188, where his lordship says that ‘the equitable right [Lord Wilberforce in Quistclose] had in mind was not a mandatory order to compel performance but, a negative injunction to restrain improper application of the money. . . .’. 89 (1848) 2 Ph 774. 90 London County Council v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642. 91 [1919] 1 KB 121. The case is discussed in more detail below: text to nn 137–9. 92 (1819) 2 B & A 683. 93 (1859) 2 El & El 29. 94 (1891) 8 Morr 243. 95 [1902] 2 KB 237. 96 [1915] HBR 181. 97 PJ Millett QC, ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?’ (1985) 101 LQR 269, 270–74. 98 (1822) 1 B & C 5. 99 (1884) 54 LJ Ch 439. 100 (1913) 107 LT 783.
26 William Swadling bankruptcy brought money had and received against the brother-in-law to recover the £95 on the ground that the repayment could not be ‘protected’. Abbott CJ refused to allow the claim. The money had been received on trust and so never formed part of the bankrupt’s estate: . . . the fair inference is from the facts proved was that this money was advanced for a special purpose, and that being so clothed with a specific trust, no property in it passed to the assignee of the bankrupt. Then the purpose having failed, there is an implied stipulation, that the money shall be repaid. That has been done in the present case; and I am of the opinion that the repayment was lawful . . .
Surprisingly, this dogmatic statement of a common law judge101 has been simply followed unquestioned in all the later cases. Only two cases come near to explaining why a trust should arise in such circumstances. In Edwards v Glyn, money borrowed to meet a run on a bank was repaid when it became apparent that the run could not be met and pressure was brought by one of the guarantors of the loan. A claim by the assignee in bankruptcy to return the money on the ground of a fraudulent preference was rejected, the reason being that a payment under pressure could not be said to be voluntary.102 A minority of the court, Erle and Crompton JJ, also found in favour of the repaid lender on the ground of Toovey v Milne. The explanation for the trust there put forward by Crompton J was that ‘the bankrupts, though they might have a legal, had not an equitable right to use the money for any other purpose; and equity would, I think, have interfered to prevent them from doing so.’103 The same explanation was put forward in re Rogers, where money lent to pay off pressing creditors and so used was reclaimed by the trustee in bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal refused the claim on the ground that the money was impressed with a trust. Lindley LJ said: I entertain no doubt that [the lender] could have obtained an injunction to restrain the bankrupt from using that money for any purpose except that of paying his pressing creditors. If this be so, the money never was the bankrupt’s in any proper sense so as to vest in his trustee [in bankruptcy] as part of his general assets.104
But the problem with these explanations is, as we have already seen,105 that a right of restraint in equity does not give rise to a trust, nor (outside the case of 101 In this respect, we might heed the warning given by Harman J in re E Dibbens & Sons Ltd [1990] BCLC 577, 579: ‘As so often when common law judges talk about trustees, who were the trustees, for what purpose they were the trustees and on what terms they held the trust fund or what the trust fund was are entirely unclear’. In that case, an insurance policy held by a furniture storage company which protected ‘Goods in Trust’ was held to refer to goods ‘entrusted’ to the company as bailees, not trustees. A similar confusion between trust and bailment can be detected in the judgment of Lord Ellenbrough in Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562. 102 Applying the rule in Brown v Kempton (1850) 19 LJ NS CP 169. 103 (1859) 2 El & El 29, 51. The case was actually decided on the ground that the repayment of the lender was not a fraudulent preference. The Toovey v Milne principle was applied only by two out of the four judges, and then as an alternative ground. 104 (1891) 8 Morr 243, 248. 105 Above, text to nn 86–91.
Orthodoxy 27 land) does it even create an equitable proprietary interest. The upshot is that there is simply no plausible explanation of the trust which arose in Toovey v Milne, the case from which the Quistclose trust is derived.
2. If there is a trust, who or what are the objects? But even if we could say that Rolls Razor was a trustee, we would need to go on to identify the objects of that primary trust. This issue was not addressed by Lord Wilberforce. There are three possibilities: i. The dividend creditors Grave difficulties stand in the way of saying that the creditors were the objects of the trust, for not all Quistclose–type trusts involve loans for the payment of specific creditors.106 Some, such as those in re EVTR107and Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley,108 were for the purchase of particular assets. And even those which do involve loans for the payment of creditors cause difficulties. First, many involve ordinary trade creditors. As has already been pointed out, it is simply a nonsense to say that the debtor owes the fiduciary obligations which attach to trusteeship to such persons.109 Second, if the creditors were the beneficiaries of these trusts, they could compel payment of the loan moneys to them, leaving the lender and borrower with no opportunity to vary the terms of the contract between them. And third, the creditors would be able to claim twice over. Assume I owe you £10. Someone then gives me £10 to hold for you on trust. If, following an application by you under the rule in Saunders v Vautier,110 I give you the £10 trust money, the debt obligation is left intact. In exactly the same way, if the creditors are given the rights held for them under the trust, the debt they are owed is not discharged. The result is that they can recover twice over.111 ii. The lender This is the solution adopted by Lord Millett in Twinsectra. In his view, the only explanation consistent with orthodox trust law is to say that the lender is the beneficiary, with a power in the borrower/trustee to appoint to the purpose for 106 In the decision of the Federal Court of Australia in re Miles (1989) 85 ALR 216, Pincus J, who was obviously unhappy with Quistclose (n 1 above) refused to extend it beyond the payment of money for the discharge of debts. 107 [1987] BCLC 646 (purchase of ‘equipment’). 108 [2002] 2 AC 164 (purchase of ‘property’). 109 Text to nn 44–51. 110 (1841) 4 Beav 115. 111 This last problem would of course disappear if there was no debt until the money was spent or the purpose failed, but this is not how the loans are structured. See discussion above, text to nn 32–7.
28 William Swadling which the loan was made.112 There are a number of difficulties here, similar to those considered immediately above. There is the problem that the lender could recover twice, first as beneficiary of the trust, and second as obligee under the contract of loan. There is the inappropriateness of the fiduciary label in a purely commercial, arms-length context. And finally, there is the problem of Saunders v Vautier,113 which gives the beneficiary of a trust the right to demand that the subject-matter of the trust be transferred to him at any time, despite terms of the trust to the contrary. Such rights are clearly inconsistent with the rights given by the contract of loan. iii. The purpose Might it be that the objects of the trust were not the lender or the creditors but the purpose for which the money was lent? One difficulty is in identifying the exact purpose for which the loan was made. Was it to benefit the dividend creditors? Or was it to ensure the solvency of Rolls Razor?114 This uncertainty alone should cause any purpose trust to fail. But even were the purpose to be considered certain, the difficulty immediately encountered would be the rule laid down by the Court of Appeal in re Endacott.115 In that case, a testator left his residuary estate ‘to the North Tawton Parish Council for the purpose of providing some useful memorial to myself’. Provided these words were sufficient to indicate that a trust was intended, the Court of Appeal held that any such trust would be void. It was a fundamental principle of the law of trusts that trusts for purposes are void unless those purposes are charitable: No principle perhaps has greater sanction or authority behind it than the general proposition that a trust by English law, not being a charitable trust, in order to be effective, must have ascertained or ascertainable beneficiaries.116
This is the ‘beneficiary principle’. Its application to the facts of Quistclose would mean that the primary trust, which was certainly not a charitable trust, was void for want of beneficiaries. Unfortunately, none of the authorities on this question were cited to the House of Lords. Might it be argued that the primary trust in Quistclose fell within the exception created by Goff J in re Denley’s Trust Deed?117 Denley conveyed a plot land land to trustees to be ‘maintained and used as and for the purpose of a recreation or sports ground primarily for the benefit of the employees of [a particular] company and secondarily for the benefit of such other person or persons (if any) as the trustees may allow . . .’. Despite the fact that this was clearly not a charit112 113 114 115 116 117
[2002] 2 AC 164, 187. (1841) 4 Beav 115. As Stevens in this volume shows, it was almost certainly the latter: pp 5–6. [1960] Ch 232. Ibid p 246 (Lord Evershed MR). [1969] 1 Ch 373.
Orthodoxy 29 able trust, Goff J refused to allow it to be struck down. It was not caught by the beneficiary principle because its purpose directly or indirectly benefited individuals. This indeed was the solution adopted by Sir Robert Megarry V-C in re Northern Development118 and by Peter Gibson J in Carreras Rothman Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd,119 two cases which utilize the Quistclose trust. There are, however, a number of problems with re Denley. First, it is clearly inconsistent with the actual decision of the Court of Appeal in re Endacott, where the provision of a useful memorial to the testator would have benefited the residents of North Tawton just as much as the provision of a sports ground benefited the employees and their guests in re Denley. Second, even if it could be distinguished from re Endacott, the decision is internally flawed. Goff J said that the beneficiary principle laid down in Endacott only applied to trusts involving abstract purposes.120 But, having said this, he went on to apply that same beneficiary principle to the case before him, which he assumed not to involve abstract purposes. He said that the trust did have beneficiaries, viz, the employees of the company. But this is to confuse factual with legal benefit.121 There is no doubt that the employees would receive a benefit in a very general sense if the trust were upheld, for they would now have somewhere to play football on a Sunday morning; if the trust were struck down, they would have to find somewhere else. So there were people who benefited. But this is not the same thing as saying that the rights to the land held by the trustees were held on trust for the employees, for, if they were, the employees could exercise their rights under Saunders v Vautier122 and compel the transfer of those rights to themselves. The trust which the settlor created was not one in which the employees were intended to have what we might be loosely called ‘ownership’ rights, only ‘use’ rights, which is not the same thing at all. Thus, despite Goff J’s protestations to the contrary, the beneficiary principle was not satisfied on the facts of re Denley, and the trust should accordingly have been held void. As it is, we are left with the situation in Denley of not being able to point to any person for whom the rights were held. This problem was in fact recognized by Peter Gibson J in Carreras Rothmans, when he said that the beneficial interest in a Quistclose trust is in suspense until the purpose is either carried out or fails,123 though for reasons which are left unexplained, he did not seem to find this problematic.124 However, if there is to be a primary trust in Quistclose, this would seem to be the only solution to the problem of who or what the objects of such a trust might be. 118
6 October 1978. [1985] Ch 207. 120 [1969] 1 Ch 373, 383. An example would be re Astor’s Settlement Trust [1952] Ch 534, where the objects included ‘the maintenance of good relations amongst nations’ and ‘the preservation of the independence of the newspapers’. 121 JM Evans, (1969) 32 MLR 96, 98. 122 (1841) 4 Beav 115. 123 [1985] Ch 207, 223. 124 This may be due to the very curious fact that no cases on the beneficiary principle were cited to the court. 119
30 William Swadling 3. Perhaps there was no trust at all The difficulties which lie in the way of saying there is a primary trust in Quistclose, consensual or otherwise, would appear to be insuperable. Might it therefore be that there was in fact no trust at all? i. Quasi-trusts It is not without significance that not all the cases talk of a trust.125 So, for example, in Gibert v Gonard126 North J described money lent for a purpose as being traceable ‘in the same way as if it had been trust money’.127 In re Drucker (No 1)128 Wright J said at first instance that the fund was ‘impressed with a trust—not in the strict sense of the word—but in substance with a quasi-trust that it should be applied . . . for the discharge pro tanto of the claim of the bank’.129 Phillimore J used the same expression in the later case of re Watson.130 And though neither Wright J or Phillimore J explain what a ‘quasi-trust’ might be, the one thing we can be sure of is that it is not a trust. A quasi-cat may be a dog, but it is certainly not a cat.131 A quasi-contractual obligation is not a contractual obligation, but one arising for not-contract reasons, usually, though not always, the unjust enrichment of the defendant. Exactly what a quasi-trust might be is never made clear. It does, however, show that some judges at least thought the doctrine they were applying was not orthodox. ii. The Chambers explanation Chambers, who defends the result in Quistclose, also takes the view that there was no primary trust in that case. He argues that this does not matter, for the equitable right of restraint recognized in Quistclose was sufficient to make the arrangement binding on third parties, such as the defendant bank in that case. He says: The trustee in bankruptcy takes the property of the bankrupt ‘subject to equities’, ie, has no greater rights to the property than did the bankrupt. The property is not available for distribution if the bankrupt could have been restrained from using the property for that purpose. The bankrupt need not be a trustee with only bare legal title.132 125 Even Lord Wilberforce talked of a ‘relationship of a fiduciary character or trust’: [1970] AC 567, 580. 126 (1884) 54 LJ Ch 439. 127 Ibid p 440. 128 [1902] 2 KB 55. 129 Ibid p 57. 130 (1912) 107 LT 96, 98. Aff’d (1912) 107 LT 783. 131 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford, 1989) 22. 132 R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford, 1997) 72.
Orthodoxy 31 Unfortunately, this passage suffers from a failure to identify whether this right to restrain a misapplication of the funds (which presumably is born of contract) is a personal right or a property right. Only property rights are capable of binding strangers to their creation. It does not follow that simply because a right is enforceable in equity that it is a property right.133 So, for example, a trustee’s liability to his beneficiaries for losses made through his negligent investment, even though enforced in equity, binds the trustee alone. It is a personal right. If the right of restraint is a personal right, then it cannot be enforced against third parties, even third parties who know of its existence. Contractual licensors of land, for example, can be restrained by injunction from preventing their licensees using the land as agreed, but that fact alone does not elevate the contractual licence into a property right.134 If it did, then the line between personal rights and property rights would be all but destroyed. Lord Wilberforce himself said the same thing in respect of the so-called ‘deserted wife’s equity’ in National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth:135 Early in the development of the doctrine it was perceived that the deserted wife’s right could not be classified as an equitable interest in land. . . . This appears to me to have been inevitable and correct, and it should have led to the conclusion that the wife’s right was not binding on third parties. But, instead, it was sought to describe it as an ‘equity’ which as such could be binding on assignees of the husband. In the authorities, the word is used in several senses and for several purposes. Sometimes it is used as referring merely to the existence of an equitable remedy, such as a remedy by injunction: the thought seems to have been that since the courts will interfere by injunction to prevent interference with or departure from a right, that gives the proprietor of the right something which is capable of binding not only the other party but his assignees, or successors, provided of course that they have notice of the right. In this form the argument is clearly fallacious. The fact that a contractual right can be specifically performed, or its breach prevented by injunction, does not mean that the right is any the less of a personal character or that a purchaser with notice is bound by it: what is relevant is the nature of the right, not the remedy which exists for its enforcement.136
The exercise which has to be undertaken here is a search through decided cases and statutes to discover whether a right to restrain the misapplication of a fund is a property right. No case says it is. More importantly, Barker v Strickney,137 already encountered above,138 says that it is not. There, a purchaser of copyright was held not to be bound by contractual stipulations entered into by its creator 133 This is the mistake made by Denning LJ in Errington v Errington & Woods [1952] 1 KB 290, 298–99, where he held that the making available by the House of Lords in Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Millennium Productions Ltd [1948] AC 173 of equitable relief in the form of an injunction meant that a contractual licensee of land now had an equitable property right. 134 Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold [1989] 1 Ch 1. 135 [1965] AC 1175. 136 Ibid pp 1252–53. 137 [1919] 1 KB 121. 138 Text to n 91.
32 William Swadling and the purchaser’s predecessor in title, despite the fact that the purchaser had actual notice of the terms. Scrutton LJ said: A purchaser of chattels is not to be bound by mere notice of stipulations made by his vendor unless he was himself a party to the contract in which the stipulations were made.139
It might be objected that Chambers is not talking about a right binding third parties, merely one binding the trustee in bankruptcy. But, unless the right he describes is one which can bind a third party, it cannot explain the result in Quistclose itself, where the third-party bank was (at least according to Chambers’ theory) held bound by Quistclose’s right to restrain Rolls Razor from applying the funds other than to the payment of the dividend. Furthermore, his argument assumes that an injunction would indeed issue against a trustee in bankruptcy. That assumption is wrong. If I have a contractual licence to use your computer but you become insolvent, I will not be allowed to claim an injunction to prevent your trustee in bankruptcy taking the computer back, for that would allow me to evade the pari passu distribution rule. Instead, I will be left to my claim in damages. This important point was noticed in MacJordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd.140 A company had promised but failed to set up a retention fund out of which the plaintiffs were to be paid. The Court of Appeal held that the failure to set aside such a fund was fatal to any claim that an interest in such a fund existed. Furthermore, Scott LJ said that a mandatory order to set up the fund, even if available against the company itself, would not issue against the liquidator: In a case where the employer is insolvent when the application for a mandatory order is made, the mandatory order would, assuming it were complied with, give preference to the contractor as against other unsecured creditors. I do not see any reason why the court should do such a thing. If the directors of an insolvent company were . . . to set aside a retention fund for the benefit of a building contractor, questions of preference might well arise. . . . So I question whether in a case where the employer is insolvent the court would necessarily make a mandatory order for the setting up of the retention fund. If, in the present case, there had been funds available for unsecured creditors of Brookmount, I do not follow why the plaintiff should, in respect of the indebtedness due to it for retentions, be in any better position than other unsecured creditors.141
The upshot is, therefore, that the argument of Chambers cannot save the result in Quistclose either, for the right of restraint was not one capable of binding anyone other than the borrower in that case.142
139
[1919] 1 KB 132. [1992] BCLC 350. 141 Ibid p 359. 142 The different question whether a right of restraint enforceable by injunction creates a trust was dealt with above, text to nn 86–91. 140
Orthodoxy 33
III : THE SECONDARY TRUST
The argument so far has been that there cannot have been a primary trust in Quistclose, and that Lord Wilberforce was wrong to find one. If that is right, then there is obviously no room for a secondary trust arising on the subsequent failure of the primary trust because there is no primary trust to fail. It was further argued, contrary to the view of Chambers, that the right to restrain a misapplication of the fund is a personal and not a proprietary right and therefore not one capable of binding third parties, even third parties with notice, so that on the insolvency of the borrower there could again be no right over the funds capable of binding the trustee in bankruptcy. But not all those who support the outcome in Quistclose argue that there need be a secondary trust arising on failure. Most prominent of these is Lord Millett, who says that there is simply one trust throughout, a trust in favour of the lender with a power in the borrower to appoint to the creditors.143 We have, however, already seen how any notion of a primary trust is untenable. But in order to examine the secondary trust of Lord Wilberforce, we must assume, contrary to what has been argued above, that there was a valid primary trust, that the object of that primary trust, contrary to the beneficiary principle, was the payment of the dividend creditors, that the primary trust failed on the insolvency of Rolls Razor Ltd,144 and that the secondary trust arose at the point when the primary trust failed. The question which must then be asked is exactly why that secondary trust arose.
1. Objects Before embarking on our search for the causative event, we should immediately note that, differently from the primary trust, there is no problem in identifying the object of the secondary trust. It is the lender. This does not, however, mean that the difficulties we identified with the primary trust which would arise if the lender were its beneficiary145 now disappear. The same objections, for example, as to double recovery, are still present.
143
[2002] 2 AC 164, 187. It has been questioned whether the insolvency of Rolls Razor really did cause the purpose of the loan to fail. Why, it is asked, was it not still possible to pay the dividend creditors?: W Goodhart and G Jones, ‘The Infiltration of Equitable Doctrine Into English Commercial Law’ (1980) 43 MLR 489, 494, n 28. 145 Text to nn 32–51. 144
34 William Swadling 2. Causative Event As with the primary trust, we will first ask whether the secondary trust was created because of a manifestation of consent, and, if not, whether it comes within one of the recognized categories of not-consent. i. Consent We have seen how consent needs normally to be proved, though in limited circumstances it may be presumed. Proven Consent Lord Wilberforce was clearly of the opinion that the secondary trust in Quistclose arose as a response to proof of intent to create a secondary trust. He said: ‘the intention to create a secondary trust for the benefit of the lender, to arise if the primary trust to pay the dividend, could not be carried out, is clear . . .’146 But, with respect, it was not clear at all that any such trust was intended. As we have seen, there was no proof of an intent to create even a primary trust, let alone a secondary trust, and, as the following passage makes clear, particularly by his use of the words ‘necessary consequence’, Lord Wilberforce’s finding of an intent to create a secondary trust is dependent on there being a primary trust in place: The mutual intention of the respondents and of Rolls Razor Ltd, and the essence of the bargain, was that the sum advanced should not become part of the assets of Rolls Razor Ltd, but should be used exclusively for payment of a particular class of its creditors, namely, those entitled to the dividend. A necessary consequence from this, by process simply of interpretation, must be that if, for any reason, the dividend could not be paid, the money was to be returned to the respondents: the words ‘only’ or ‘exclusively’ can have no other meaning or effect.147
For the same reasons that made it impossible to find any intent to create a primary trust, there could be no proven intent secondary trust either. Presumed Consent Will presumed consent supply the causative event? In one of the situations in which the court presumes that a declaration of trust was made, the trust there arises in favour of the transferor. The secondary trust in Quistclose arose in favour of a transferor. Might it therefore be that the secondary trust arising in Quistclose did so because this was a case in which the courts presumed a declaration of trust to have been made? The answer is no. For the same reasons that the primary trust could not be said to have arisen because of a presumption of intent on the part of Quistclose, ie, because the transfer was for consideration 146 147
[1970] AC 567, 582. Ibid p 580.
Orthodoxy 35 and there were no missing facts,148 it is equally clear that the secondary trust cannot be one based on a presumption that a declaration of trust was made by the transferor in his or her own favour. ii. Not Consent If it is not consent, then we might describe the event giving rise to the secondary trust as the failure of the primary trust. There is no doubt that trusts arise in favour of transferors for reasons other than consent on the failure of trusts. The clearest example is the trust which arises where a trust fails for uncertainty of objects.149 That they arise for a reason which is not consent was established by the House of Lords in Vandervell v IRC,150 where a settlor failed to declare the intended objects of a trust of an option to purchase. The House of Lords held that the option to purchase was held for the settlor on trust. It rejected an argument that the trust was based on a presumption of intent on the part of the settlor that he wanted such a trust, and that evidence that he did not intend to create a trust for himself could therefore rebut the presumption. The House held that the trust arose by operation of law, not because of a presumption of consent. It could not be a presumption of consent, said Lord Wilberforce, for the simple reason that all the facts were known: The transaction has been investigated on the evidence of the settlor and his agent and all the facts have been found. There is no need, or room, as I see it, to invoke a presumption. The conclusion, on the facts as found, is simply that the option was vested in the trustee company as a trustee on trusts, not defined at the time, possibly to be defined later.151
Despite the fact that this reasoning, being the ground on which Mr Vandervell lost his case,152 forms the ratio of the decision, Lord Browne-Wilkinson has since rejected the notion that a trust in favour of the settlor arising on the failure of an express trust for uncertainty of objects arises for a reason other than the consent of the settlor. In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC,153 he said that such trusts were based on the presumed intentions of the settlor.154 In should straightaway be noticed that his lordship’s opinion was obiter and, as a matter of precedent, therefore carries little weight.155 But,
148
Above, text to nn 16–22. As, for example, in Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves 522. 150 [1967] 2 AC 291. 151 Ibid p 329 (emphasis supplied). 152 He won a different point on the application of the Law of Property Act 1925, s 53(1)(c). 153 [1996] AC 669. 154 Ibid p 708. 155 It therefore comes as a surprise to find some textbooks citing Westdeutsche as good law on this point. So, for example, Oakley, in AJ Oakley, Parker & Mellows: Modern Law of Trusts, 7th edn (London, 1998) 273 says that Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view ‘unquestionably represents English law at present.’ J Martin, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity, 16th edn (London, 2001) 238 is only marginally better. 149
36 William Swadling as a matter of principle, it is clearly wrong. Lord Browne-Wilkinson would presumably argue that most settlors who discovered their trusts to be void for uncertainty of objects would want the rights they had transferred to the intended trustees returned. That may well be true, though, as Vandervell v IRC shows, it is not a universal truth. But this would not be a presumption of intent at all. Bowen LJ reminded us in Edgington v Fitzmaurice that:156 . . . the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else.157
Lord Browne-Wilkinson would not be talking about the presumption of a fact, an event which happened in the world. He would instead be talking about presuming an intent which the settlor never had, but which we suppose he might have had had he been asked what his intentions were if the trust was to fail. We know that he did not actually have such an intention because he did not address his mind to the question of failure: if he had, he would have have catered for such an eventuality along with the invalid declaration of trust.158 In truth, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s ‘presumed’ intent is no intent at all, as Harman J acknowledged in re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund:159 The general principle must be that where money is held upon trust and the trusts declared do not exhaust the fund it will revert to the donor or settlor. . . . This doctrine does not . . . rest on any evidence of the state of mind of the settlor, for in the vast majority of cases no doubt he does not expect to see his money back: he has created a trust which so far as he can see will absorb the whole of it. The . . . trust arises where that expectation is for some unforeseen reason cheated of fruition, and is an inference of law based on after-knowledge of the event.160
In other words, the trust here arising in favour of the transferor does so by operation of law, which is simply another way of saying that it arises for a reason other than the consent of the transferor. Might it be that the secondary trust in Quistclose is a not-consent trust of the Vandervell type? The immediate objection is that the consent trust in Vandervell failed from the start, whereas in Quistclose the primary trust failed subsequent to the receipt of the funds, on the insolvency of Rolls Razor. Subsequent failure is difficult. Trusts for persons cannot fail subsequently: there are either beneficiaries at the outset or there are not. Subsequent failure is only a possibility in the case of trusts for purposes. We have already seen how trusts for charitable 156
(1885) 29 Ch D 459. Ibid p 483. 158 As, eg, did George Bernard Shaw in re Shaw [1957] 1 WLR 729, where the author by his will tried to set up a trust for the invention of a new alphabet and, obviously being warned by his legal advisers that such a trust would be struck as not charitable and therefore a void purpose trust, further provided what was to happen to his estate should the trusts ‘fail through judicial decision’. 159 [1958] Ch 300. 160 Ibid p 310. 157
Orthodoxy 37 (public) purposes are the only purpose trusts which are tolerated. In such cases, there is an elaborate machinery to deal with subsequent failure, the cy pres doctrine, whereby the court has power to declare new trusts for other charitable purposes as near as possible to those originally intended. Such trusts are clear examples of trusts arising by operation of law. There is no similar machinery for failed private purpose trusts, for, ex hypothesi, no such machinery is needed. We are assuming, however, that the primary trust in Quistclose was valid, and, as such, was a trust for purposes rather than persons, and that those purposes were private, not public. If the law were to allow private purpose trusts to exist, then it would need to invent some machinery to cope with subsequent failure. In the absence of some private cy pres doctrine,161 it would arguably utilize the sort of trust which arose in Vandervell, using the (slightly dubious) argument that funds not spent before the purpose failed were simply funds over which no valid trust had been declared.162 If such a trust were to arise, the question we would have to ask is why it did so. Recall for the moment that are still in the realm of not-consent trust. This is an extremely difficult issue. On the assumption that we are dealing with a Vandervell-type trust here, the natural place to begin is with Vandervell itself. Unfortunately, the case itself gives little guidance. Both Lords Upjohn and Wilberforce explain the incidence of the trust on the ground that, the consent trust being void ab initio, the settlor’s option to purchase had not been given away and so remained in him.163 But this is wrong, for in cases such as these, the transferor does manage to get rid of the interest he was holding. If he had not done so, there would be no question of that right now being held for him on trust by another. The interest he holds as beneficiary of the trust is different to the outright interest he held before the transfer.164 There can therefore be no retention. Instead, there is a new right. And it is the creation of that new right which needs explanation.165 161 Gardner has argued for just such a thing: S Gardner, ‘New Angles on Unincorporated Associations’ [1992] Conv 41, 52. 162 The difficulty is that it would not be clear at the outset which funds were subject to the primary trust and which to the secondary trust. 163 ‘If A intends to give away all his beneficial interest in a piece of property and thinks he has done so but, by some mistake or accident or failure to comply with the requirements of the law, he has failed to do so, either wholly or partially, there will, by operation of law, be a . . . trust for him of the beneficial interest of which he had failed effectually to dispose. If the beneficial interest was in A and he fails to give it away effectively to another or others or on charitable trusts, it must remain in him.’ (Lord Upjohn, [1967] 2 AC 291, 313). ‘. . . [T]he equitable, or beneficial, interest cannot remain in the air: the consequence in law is that it must remain in the settlor. . . . [Mr Vandervell] had, as a direct result of the option and of the failure to place the beneficial interest in it securely away from him, not divested himself absolutely of the shares which it controlled’ (Lord Wilberforce, [1967] 2 AC 291, 329). 164 I myself have fallen into error on this point in the past: WJ Swadling, ‘Property’ in P Birks and F Rose, Lessons of the Swaps Litigation (London, 2000) 242, 265–67. 165 A similar failure to recognize a new right is evident in the cases on unauthorized substitutions, such as Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562 and Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102. For criticism of Foskett on these lines, see P Birks, above n 79, 242–5.
38 William Swadling The only explanation so far put forward is that of Professor Birks,166 who says that such trusts are unjust enrichment trusts, arising ‘because the evidence shows that the transfer was not intended to enure to the benefit of the transferee.’167 That thesis is taken up and expanded by Professor Chambers, who says that the raising by the court of a trust is ‘an active response to the fact that the settlor did not intend to benefit the trustee.’168 Birks and Chambers argue that the prevention of unjust enrichment explains the incidence of all trusts, other than proven consent trusts, which arise in favour of transferors and a refutation would require a full-scale assault on their work. There is no room to do that here. For the moment, we have to see it as the best explanation so far of the trust which arose in Vandervell v IRC.169 It is, however, difficult to extend it to the facts of Quistclose for similar reasons to those which prevented us saying that the primary trust was responding to the unjust enrichment of Rolls Razor. Not only is the initial receipt of the loan monies, because of the contractual obligation to repay, a non-enriching event, their retention is not an enriching event either, for the obligation to repay still subsists. Only if the contract is first put to one side, which it never was in Quistclose, is there the beginning of an argument that the second trust in that case was responding to the unjust enrichment of Rolls Razor. We must not forget, however, that we are still playing Lord Wilberforce’s game and assuming that there was a valid primary trust. If, as has been argued, there was not, then there is no need to find an explanation for the secondary trust, for the secondary trust simply never in fact arises. Finally, it should be recalled that Professor Chambers’ own explanation of the trust in favour of the lender arising at the moment of failure cannot be sustained because, as has been argued above,170 the equitable right of restraint is not a right capable of binding third parties and therefore not one which could give priority on the insolvency of the borrower. And the Quistclose trust in favour of the lender would certainly appear to do just that.
IV : CONCLUSION
What seems to have worried Lord Wilberforce in Quistclose was the thought that Barclays could exercise its right of set-off and thereby evade a pari passu distribution of the loan monies.171 This would certainly not have been possible 166 P Birks, ‘Restitution and Resulting Trusts’ in S Goldstein (ed), Equity and Contemporary Legal Developments (Jerusalem, 1992) 335, reprinted in P Birks and F Rose, Restitution and Equity (London, 2000) 265. 167 Ibid p 362. 168 R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford, 1997) 41. 169 [1967] 2 AC 291. 170 Text to nn 132–42. 171 He describes it at the end of his speech as a ‘complete windfall’: [1970] AC 567, 582.
Orthodoxy 39 had Rolls Razor opened a special account with a different banker, and the real question, which will not be pursued here, is whether it is correct to say that set-off rights operate in an insolvency in the same way as when all parties are solvent. But in seeking to avoid the application of set-off by the finding of a trust, Lord Wilberforce departed from orthodox principles of trust law. It is impossible to say that the transfer was a transfer on trust because the restriction only referred to how the rights were to be applied, not for whom they were held. And even were we able to say that a trust was intended, grave difficulties arise in identifying the objects of that trust. It could not be the creditors for a number of reasons, the most prominent of which is that it would allow them to be paid twice over. For almost identical reasons, it could not be the lender. Nor could it be the purpose, for the purpose was a private purpose and English law does not countenance trusts for private purposes. And the argument of Chambers, that there need be no primary trust, does not succeed either, because it fails to explain how a personal right to see that the fund is not misapplied can bind a stranger, including the borrower’s trustee in bankruptcy, to the contract which creates that right. And given that Lord Wilberforce’s secondary trust depends on the validity of the primary trust, the argument that there was a consensual trust of the loan monies in favour of the lender on the failure of the purpose cannot be sustained. For the same reasons, a secondary trust arising by notconsent on the subsequent failure of the primary trust is not arguable either. In short, the House of Lords was wrong in Quistclose to find a trust and thereby give priority to the lender. The funds should have been held to be part of Rolls Razor’s general assets and treated accordingly.
3
Lord Millett’s Analysis JAMES PENNER 1
I : INTRODUCTION R I T I N G I N 1985 ,2
Lord Millett (then Peter Millett QC) showed how the trust found in the case of Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd 3 could be explained as a perfectly orthodox trust, fully in line with traditional principles. He has more recently applied this analysis in his speech in Twinsectra v Yardley.4 The argument of this paper is that Lord Millett’s explanation of the Quistclose trust is, for the most part, successful. However it will also be argued that in recent cases, judges, Lord Millett included, have, in the course of determining whether a Quistclose trust has arisen, shown a willingness to depart from traditional principles of trust law in a way that is out of keeping with the general spirit of Lord Millett’s original explanation. The fact pattern of Quistclose trusts is generally quite simple. A transfers money to B, which money B receives under an obligation to use it for some specified purpose, typically to pay off particular creditors of B. Upon spending the money according to the obligation, it is clear that B becomes a debtor to A for the equivalent sum (and interest, usually). It is also clear that, should B become insolvent prior to his expenditure of the money according to the obligation, the money does not stand as one of B’s assets available to his trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of his general creditors. So much is agreed. Where competing analyses differ is in the legal structure they claim operates during the period when B is in receipt of the money but his expenditure of the money according to his obligation under the arrangement with A is still in the offing. One analysis, convincingly demolished by William Swadling in this volume,5 is that B holds the money under a hitherto unrecognised private purpose trust. A second,
W
1 Thanks to Peter Birks, Andrew Burrows, Robert Chambers, George Gretton, Ewan McKendrick, Charles Mitchell, Lionel Smith, Robert Stevens and William Swadling for comments. I also was much enlightened by Eoin O’Dell’s extensive, but as yet unpublished paper, ‘Understanding Quistclose’, which he let me see in draft, and Jamie Glister’s ‘Twinsectra v Yardley: Trusts, Powers, and Contractual Obligations’ (2002) 16 Trust Law International 223. 2 ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?’ (1985) 101 LQR 269. 3 [1970] AC 567. 4 [2002] 2 AC 164. 5 At pp 9–39.
42 James Penner originating in the work of Robert Chambers, is discussed by him in this volume.6 A third, which will be the focus of this chapter, is the analysis first developed to any degree of clarity and rigour by Lord Millett. We should begin by pointing out that in commercial transactions our initial analytic impulse should be toward the contractual, at least in so far as the use of the trust device is not expressly intended. Traditionally, and usually, if A lends money to B, the money immediately becomes B’s legal property and A becomes an ordinary creditor of B, having the right to be paid an equivalent sum and, almost always, interest. This is so even if A pays the money to B with certain stipulations, for example, that the money has been lent for and must only be expended on certain business projects. If B spends the money otherwise, he commits a breach of contract, one consequence of such a breach of contract possibly being that the loan is immediately repayable. Loans of money, then, typically sound entirely within the law of contract. As Lord Millet put it: [A lender] may be said to lend the money for a purpose in question, but this is not enough to create a trust; once lent the money is intended to be at the free disposal of the borrower. Similarly payments in advance for goods or services are paid for a particular purpose, but such payments do not ordinarily create a trust. The money is intended to be at the free disposal of the supplier and may be used as part of his cashflow. Commercial life would be impossible if this were not the case.7
However, it is clear that in Quistclose itself and the line of cases leading up to it more than mere contractual obligations were involved, for the court in these cases found an arrangement whereby the money received by B was not at B’s free disposal subject only to a contractual obligation to spend it in a particular way, but was someway bound in equity, with the result that, for example, unexpended money did not fall into B’s estate in bankruptcy. Lord Millett’s analysis proceeds as follows: A, the provider of the funds, never relinquishes the beneficial ownership of the trust property until the recipient, B, applies the money in line with the instructions A gives, eg to pay a dividend (as in Quistclose) or to purchase new equipment (as in Re EVTR8), and, until such time, B holds it on trust for A. The disposal of the money is properly accomplished when B exercises his power as legal owner of the property and carries out A’s direction to spend the money as A instructs; that terminates the trust, for the subject matter of the trust has been fully disposed of in compliance with A’s 6 At pp 77–120. It will not be my purpose here to compare and in consequence favour either Chambers’ or Lord Millett’s analysis. It will be argued that Lord Millett’s view in its original version (see Section III, below) both explains the case law (in the sense of justifying those decisions which appear right and giving grounds for explaining the errors in cases which appear wrong) and does so according to traditional principles of trust law. As Chambers himself puts it in his chapter, the central question concerning his analysis is whether the arrangement he describes stands as a legal device which subjects of the law ought to be able to employ in the organisation of their affairs, having advantages which are not available under the Quistclose trust as characterised by Lord Millett. 7 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 185. 8 [1987] BCLC 646.
Lord Millett’s Analysis 43 instructions, ie properly disposed of not in breach of trust. When B has done this, B may become A’s debtor for an equivalent sum plus interest if there is also a contract between them so specifying, though, as Lord Millett has rightly insisted, there is no necessity that a transfer of property from A to B on trust for A subject to a power in B to distribute the trust property according to instructions given by A only arise in the context of commercial loan arrangements.9 B must follow (or at least must not violate10) A’s instructions, and by using the money for a purpose not instructed or allowed by A, B would commit a breach of trust as well as a breach of contract where there is one. This analysis is clearly attractive. It is simple and straightforward, and the trust as characterised operates on conventional principles of trust law; it also assimilates the Quistclose trust to the extremely common trust upon which purchasers and mortgagees transfer funds to solicitors so that the latter may complete a purchase of land, a variant of which arose in Twinsectra itself. In such cases, the money is held on trust for the mortgagee or purchaser, but the solicitor may under the mandate given to him transfer the money to the vendor of the property so as to complete the purchase of the land and acquire a legal mortgage in favour of the mortgagee. Until this is done, the money is beneficially the mortgagee’s or purchaser’s; if the solicitor spends the money otherwise than in pursuance of the mandate, he commits a breach of trust; if the instruction cannot be carried out, the money is simply held by the solicitor to the order of the mortgagee or purchaser; if the transaction goes ahead, and the money is properly spent on completion, the trust terminates as the trust fund is properly disposed of according to the beneficial owner’s instruction. Finally, Lord Millett’s analysis appears to avoid a difficulty faced by Chambers’ analysis: since the trust for A exists from the outset of the arrangement, rather than arising upon B’s insolvency, the trust for A is straightforwardly unavailable to B’s creditors on traditional insolvency principles.11 There are, however, two features of Lord Millett’s analysis which cause difficulty. The first has to do with certain of his characterisations of A’s instructions to B. The second concerns his characterisation of the Quistclose trust as a ‘resulting’ trust.
II : THE CHARACTER OF B ’ S POWERS AND DUTIES
There are two possible ways to characterise the nature of the obligations of the trustee under the Quistclose trust consistent with Lord Millett’s analysis. Under the first, A is essentially the beneficiary of a bare trust. There are no trust terms 9
10 11
‘Any analysis of the Quistclose trust must be able to accommodate gifts and loans for an abstract purpose’: Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 189. See section II. Discussed in detail by Stevens in Chapter 8 of this volume.
44 James Penner other than that B should hold the trust property to A’s order. A’s instructions constitute mandates, which A may give, vary and revoke from time to time— they may either impose duties on B positively to do something, or confer powers upon B to deal with the property in certain ways if he so chooses. These mandates impose personal obligations upon B. If B distributes the trust property in violation of one of these mandates, he thereby commits a breach of trust, though not because the mandate is a term of the trust; he commits a breach of the only trust term there is, viz the overarching duty to hold the property to A’s order or mandate. By distributing the trust property in violation or outside the scope of A’s orders, he fails to hold the property to A’s order and for that reason commits a breach of trust. By contrast, in general B commits no breach of trust if his failure to comply with a mandate is a matter of non-feasance. In the case of non-feasance, B still holds the property to A’s order; he simply fails to carry out a particular mandate of A’s. If I transfer £10,000 on bare trust to my broker or agent to make investments on my behalf, and over the course of this relationship the broker fails to carry out an order to invest £5000 in shares of XYZ plc, in consequence of which I must buy them later at a higher price, we would not normally say that the broker or agent committed a breach of trust. We would say instead that he failed to carry out a contractual mandate concerning the disposition of my equitable property. We would not say that he violated my property rights in equity—rather, he simply failed in a personal contractual obligation to me, for which he should be liable for damages. The situation is analogous to a contractual bailment, where the bailee must hold the property to the bailor’s order—to sell it on specified terms with the bailor’s authority if the bailor so instructs, and so on. If the bailee sells the property without authority, it is clear that he has interfered with the bailor’s property rights and is thereupon liable for conversion. But if he merely failed to carry out an instruction, he would not have interfered with the bailor’s property rights—he would merely be liable for breach of contract. Furthermore, A’s mandate to B does not bind A in any way as a matter of property law, since A is the beneficial owner of the trust property; A may, however, contract with B not to revoke his instruction; if A then revokes, it would seem12 that B will commit a breach of trust if he goes ahead and spends the trust money to carry out A’s original instruction; no longer being able to carry out the instruction without committing a breach of trust, B may, however, sue A for breach of contract for any damages which A’s revocation causes him. It is the essence of this explanation of the Quistclose trust that the trust aspect of the relationship is minimal. The trust secures A’s beneficial interest in the property in question, keeping it safe from B’s insolvency and from B’s wrongful expenditure of it. But the rest of the arrangement between A and B sounds not in the law of property rights, but in the law of obligations, usually the law of contract.
12
See text accompanying nn 22–26.
Lord Millett’s Analysis 45 However, in keeping with the general framework of Lord Millett’s analysis, the Quistclose trust can be analysed otherwise. One can analyse the trust as a special, as opposed to a bare, trust. A’s instructions under the contract of loan could be regarded as specific terms of the trust that B undertakes, imposing true trust duties or conferring true trust powers on B. To the extent that A had the power to add to, vary, or revoke any of those instructions, this would be conceived as the power to vary the terms of the trust. On this view, any instructions imposed by A upon B that were obligatory would count as trust duties, or more shortly, trusts, and any rights conferred upon B that he might choose to exercise or not at his discretion, powers over trust property, powers to appoint. Under such a trust, A, by making the trust irrevocable, could not revoke any of the duties imposed or powers conferred upon B. Where A genuinely imposed trust duties upon B to expend the property in various ways so as not to benefit A, during such time as those duties were in place (not revoked), A’s beneficial interest in the trust funds would be to that extent displaced, so that in such cases it would no longer be true that the beneficial interest in the trust funds would remain in A throughout the life of the trust, and such cases would depart from the thrust of Lord Millett’s analysis. Thus, in order to keep within Lord Millett’s analysis, one would have to stipulate that where the arrangement imposed a duty on B with respect to the funds, such a duty would need to be seen as personal (typically, contractual), though where B merely received powers under the arrangement, these could be true powers of appointment forming part of the trust terms, for the mere conferral of powers does not displace the beneficial interest in the property of those who would take in default of exercise of the power,13 here A. Notice that these two analyses are not entirely incompatible. True, they are incompatible to the extent there is any positive obligation upon B to expend the trust moneys in any particular way. Under the first analysis, these obligations are purely contractual, while under the second, they are trust duties, which actually displace A’s beneficial interest. But as regards mere powers over the trust property vested in B, it is difficult to distinguish the cases. Whether a mere personal obligation under the contract or mandate under the former or as a power ‘under the trust’, an actual term of the trust, the effect is essentially the same (leaving to one side the issue of revocation).14 In both cases, any misfeasance will be restrained by equity in protection of A’s beneficial interests in the trust property and will result in liability for breach of trust if carried out. The asymmetry between the case of the power and the duty arises because of the nature of A’s rights in the property. In the case of powers, both the improper exercise of a power under the trust and a power or authority conferred under a contract have the same result—an unauthorised dealing with A’s equitable property rights, which equity will restrain. It is not the source of any powers to 13 14
Re Brook’s Settlement Trusts [1939] Ch 993. The nature of the power is discussed by Smith in Chapter 4 of this volume.
46 James Penner deal with the property that B has which is in issue in such cases—not being authorised by any means to deal with A’s property in this way, B is a simple interferer with A’s property; we are back to the default position of A’s property rights being invaded by someone without a right to do so. When B acts beyond his powers or authority to deal with A’s property, he is in no better position than any third party who interferes with A’s property rights; when B acts outside of his rightful authority he is not in a better or different position than such a third party because he is authorised by A to deal with A’s property in some other way. In the case of duties, the situation is starkly different. A’s contractual mandate to B does not bind the trust property. It confers upon B an authority to deal with the property in compliance with the duty (a duty to do something comprises the right to do it) but it does not impress the property with that duty as under a trust—it does not displace A’s beneficial interest in favour of the beneficiary of the duty, or create a purpose trust in which no one has any beneficial interest in the trust property. It merely creates a personal obligation in B to use his authority to deal with the property in a particular way. But in the latter case, the duty binds the property itself. As a trust will not fail for want of a trustee, should B get hit by a bus, the court will see that another trustee carries out the duty. In view of this, it appears that we can frame certain parameters for the shape of the Quistclose trust such that there may indeed be slight variations in the character of the duties and powers involved. In the first place, it seems wrong to state that B’s positive obligations to expend the trust monies in any particular ways should be treated as trust duties. They should always be regarded as personal. This is essential for two reasons. The first, the cornerstone of Lord Millett’s analysis, is that under a Quistclose trust the beneficial interest remains at all times in A until the money is properly expended, and the imposition of any trust duties on B would necessarily displace A’s interest. Secondly, given the scope of Quistclose trusts, only by treating any duties upon B as personal does Lord Millett’s analysis keep the Quistclose trust within the traditional principles of trust law. It is common ground that under Quistclose arrangements A can impose a duty upon B to expend the trust monies so as to carry out an abstract purpose which, were it to be seen as a duty imposed under a trust, would be invalid on orthodox trust principles, both in violation of the certainty of objects requirement15 and of the beneficiary principle.16 As Lord Millett states, ‘There is no reason to make an arbitrary distinction between money paid for an abstract purpose and money paid for a purpose which can be said to benefit an ascertained class of beneficiaries, and the cases rightly draw no such distinction.’17 But of course, if B has trust duties to carry out abstract purposes, the trust clearly violates these principles. 15
Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534. Leahy v A-G for New South Wales [1959] AC 457; Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232; Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534. 17 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 189. 16
Lord Millett’s Analysis 47 At points in his speech in Twinsectra, Lord Millett appears to suggest that B is under trust obligations to expend the trust money according to the stated purpose, the performance of which equity will compel, although this is usually qualified. So, for example, he says: ‘When the money is advanced, the lender acquires a right, enforceable in equity, to see that it is applied for the stated purpose, or more accurately to prevent its application for any other purpose’.18 Similarly, criticising Chambers’ view that the beneficial interest lies with B during the time that the purpose can be carried out, Lord Millett refers to ‘the fact, well established by the authorities, that the primary trust is enforceable by the lender’,19 though ‘enforceable’ here could mean either compelling performance or restraining misuse. Perhaps the statement which best expresses the view that B’s positive obligations are trust duties is the following: The duty [on B] is not contractual but fiduciary. . . . The duty is fiduciary in character because a person who makes money available on terms that it is to be used for a particular purpose only and not for any other purpose thereby places his trust and confidence in the recipient to ensure that it is properly applied. This is a classic situation in which a fiduciary relationship arises, and since it arises in respect of a specific fund it gives rise to a trust.20
Elsewhere, however, Lord Millett seems to depart from this view. Criticising Megarry V-C’s analysis in In Re Northern Developments,21 in which the ViceChancellor held that the primary trust was a valid purpose trust, Lord Millett states: ‘Lord Wilberforce [in Quistclose] makes it plain that the equitable right he had in mind was not a mandatory order to compel performance, but a negative injunction to restrain the improper application of the money’.22 However, towards the end of his exposition of the nature of the Quistclose trust, Lord Millett quite firmly adopts the view that B is not under any trust duties, saying: ‘The borrower is authorised (or directed) to apply the money for a stated purpose, but this is a mere power and does not constitute a purpose trust’.23 If, under the trust, B has only a mere power, even when directed, ie obliged, to apply the money for a stated purpose, then any positive obligations which B has must be personal, typically contractual. If the preceding analysis is right, equity will not compel the performance of a trust against B; at most, it could require specific performance on B’s part, and to the extent the trust purpose is abstract, the application of the principle of equity looking upon that as done which ought to be done to give rise to a constructive trust could not operate, for there is no person or persons who could be the beneficiaries of such constructive trust.
18 19 20 21 22 23
Ibid p 184 (emphasis supplied). Ibid p 191. Ibid p 186. 6 October 1978. Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 188. Ibid p 193 (emphasis supplied).
48 James Penner There are a few final loose ends to tidy up. First, in most cases it will not in practice matter whether the power given to B to expend the funds in a particular way is treated as a personal authority under a bare trust or a mere power under a special trust. In either case, equity will be able to restrain any expenditure by B lying outside the scope of the purpose. It will, however, matter in the case where A makes the grant of the power or authority irrevocable. To the extent that the authority lies in contract, A would be in breach of contract were he to revoke B’s power to distribute the trust property according to the purpose. But at common law, the general rule, as shown in Wood v Leadbitter,24 is that one’s powers over one’s property remain effective despite one’s contractual obligations. Accordingly, A would be entitled to revoke B’s power to distribute the trust assets, even though he would be acting in breach of contract, and, in consequence, if B went ahead in the face of the revocation and distributed the property anyway, he would be liable for breach of trust. True, recent judicial developments concerning contractual licenses of land do not leave ejected licencees simply to their remedy in damages—equity may specifically enforce their contracts, effectively nullifying the licensor’s power to revoke a licence in breach of a contract allowing occupation of land.25 But it is not clear that this equitable specific performance right will or should apply equally to the case of Quistclose trusts. Consider, for example, a case such as Re EVTR,26 where the plaintiff provided money under a Quistclose trust to his former employer to buy equipment. Normally, grants of powers or rights under contracts are irrevocable by the other side unless clearly specified—to revoke would be to depart from the terms of the contract agreed, and the provision of general powers of revocation under contracts would be atypical. Nevertheless, if the plaintiff in this case, having second thoughts about the arrangement, had revoked his former employer’s authority to deal with the trust funds, there seems to be no compelling reason to give the employer the protection of an injunction, or refrain from treating him as a trustee in breach should he anyway go ahead with the purchase of the equipment, relying for protection on the fact that no power of revocation was specified in the contract. After all, the plaintiff was in essence doing his former employer a great favour, and it is difficult to see why the employer should not be left to claim in damages for a loss the revocation caused him, if any. In general, the tenor of a Quistclose trust is that A empowers B to deal with his, ie A’s property, to benefit B in a course of action with which A agrees. In these circumstances, it should be a rare case in which A’s beneficial interest in the property and the powers that go with it should not trump any personal rights to deal with the property that B has.27
24
(1845) 13 M & W 838. Winter Garden Theatre (London) v Millenium Productions Ltd [1948] AC 173; Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold [1989] Ch 1. 26 [1987] BCLC 646. 27 See further, Glister, above, n 1 p 227–29. 25
Lord Millett’s Analysis 49 The situation is, of course quite different where the entire transaction takes place within the law of trusts. While we have seen that it would violate basic trust principles to allow any duties on B to be part of the trust structure, the same does not apply to powers. It is perfectly conceivable that A could grant B a mere power to deal with the trust property otherwise held entirely for A. Unless A specifically grants himself a power to revoke such a power, it is irrevocable. For it is part of the trust now, and A’s beneficial interest in the trust property is now subject to it. A no longer has an indefeasible full beneficial interest in the trust property, as he did under the bare trust. (The interest under the bare trust is not diminished from full beneficial ownership by the fact that A may from time to time direct by issuing revocable mandates to his trustee how the property should be dealt with, for in such cases B is applying the property to A’s order, not complying with trust terms over which A no longer has any control.) A has a defeasible interest, which may be defeated if B ever exercises the power he has, over which A has no controlling rights whatsoever. It seems unlikely that this sort of framework would represent the intentions of many As, and in many cases, Quistclose included, it could not have been the framework. No one suggests that Rolls Razor Ltd had an indefeasible power to pay the loan moneys out as a dividend to its shareholders come what may, or that its liquidator acceded to such a power on Rolls Razor’s insolvency. Such an irrevocable power would be an asset available to the liquidator, with which the liquidator might have bargained with the shareholders for its exercise. (There is no suggestion that the power was other than personal; that is, that neither Rolls Razor (nor thus, the liquidator) could be regarded as fiduciary power holders, holding it for the best interests of the shareholders.) The point, of course, is that no one thinks that the power granted to B is ever meant to last beyond B’s bankruptcy. Nor does the general intent seem to be that the power be irrevocable by A, but lapses automatically (is a determinable interest from the outset or is alternatively defeasible via a condition subsequent) when B becomes bankrupt. As Lord Millett states: [I]f the borrower is treated as holding the money on a resulting trust for the lender but with power (or in some cases a duty) to carry out the lender’s revocable mandate, and the lender’s object in giving the mandate is frustrated, he is entitled to revoke the mandate and demand the return of the money which never ceased to be his beneficially.’28
The clear implication of this is that the frustration of the purpose or the bankruptcy of B are not events which determine rights or powers under the arrangement automatically, as under a detailed, drafted, special trust, but that A, with all the rights and powers that would attend the beneficiary of a bare trust in his favour, is entitled to react to such events and revoke all the powers of B, as until
28
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 192 (emphasis supplied).
50 James Penner the trust property is paid away according to his order, it remains his absolutely in equity. One must remember that both of the preceding arrangements are possible, and, as O’Dell and Chambers29 both warn, it would be a mistake to assume that every sort of Quistclose arrangement is organised wholly in equity rather than incorporating contractual elements. The claim here is that, generally, it makes most sense of the intentions of the parties, purposes of the arrangements, and results when things go wrong to begin with what might be called the ‘minimum’ input of equity that secures the central features revealed by the cases, and this is best accomplished by the bare trust elaboration of Lord Millett’s analysis, rather than the special trust elaboration wherein all powers are equitable. As has been pointed out above, since it is patently impossible to claim that B has any trust duties while at the same time maintaining that A’s beneficial interest remains in him throughout, it would make sense to treat all the ‘special’ features of the Quistclose arrangement as personal, typically contractual, which sit on the bare trust structure, rather than shoehorning as much as one can permissibly manage into the realm of trusts, ie making the powers special features of the trust structure, while out of necessity ‘leaving’ any duties as merely personal.
III : EXPRESS OR RESULTING TRUST ? 30
We have so far proceeded on the basis that, even if informally expressed, Quistclose trusts are intentional trusts, that is, trusts that arise on the basis of the genuine intentions of the parties involved. But in Twinsectra, Lord Millett stated quite unequivocally that Quistclose trusts are resulting trusts arising by operation of law. This departure from the view he expressed in 1985, where the Quistclose trust was clearly characterised as one based on the parties’ actual
29
O’Dell, above, n 1; Chambers, pp 77–120 of this volume. In first preparing this section of the chapter, I took my task to be one of clearing up a possible confusion that might arise from Lord Millett’s use of the term ‘resulting trust’ in Twinsectra. To my mind, Lord Millett merely extended the use of the term beyond the two conventional cases of presumed intention resulting trusts and automatic resulting trusts to encompass any trust, express or not, under which the provider of value to the trust received a beneficial interest. Thus a bare express trust, where A transfers property to B to hold to his order, would count as a ‘resulting trust’ on this broad use of the term. My initial view was that, despite his use of ‘resulting trust’, Lord Millett would fully agree with the proposition that Quistclose trusts were express or intentional trusts (however informally expressed) (see my statement to this effect in (2002) 16 Trust Law International 165, 171), and I thought it best to dispel any idea that Lord Millett’s use of ‘resulting trust’ indicated otherwise. However, on closer comparison of Lord Millett’s views expressed in 1985 and those in Twinsectra itself, I now think that his view of the nature of the trust has genuinely shifted to one in which he does not, as a matter of principle, regard the central case of the Quistclose trust as being express, but as arising by operation of law, though as we shall see in this part and the next, many traces of what I now think as his former view (that Quistclose trusts are express) also appear in Twinsectra. 30
Lord Millett’s Analysis 51 intentions,31 is a source of considerable worry. It is important to note that on Lord Millett’s analysis, the impossibility of B carrying out A’s instruction does not give rise to what Megarry V-C dubbed an ‘automatic resulting trust’ in Re Vandervell’s Trust (No 2),32 which would properly describe the ‘secondary trust’ that would arise upon the failure of a purpose trust. According to Lord Millett’s analysis, which is approved of here, the beneficial interest remains with A throughout. Nor could the trust properly be called a ‘presumed’ or ‘presumed intention’ resulting trust under the second category identified by Megarry V-C in Vandervell, for in no case has A ever been identified as having the beneficial interest on the basis of the evidentiary longstop33 to which the ‘presumption’ of resulting trust is applied. Therefore, according to the orthodox classification of resulting trusts, there is no ‘resulting’ trust at all in Quistclose cases. A’s beneficial ownership is intended from the first—he takes that interest as the intended beneficiary under the bare trust or nomineeship. His continuing interest until the money is properly applied or returned to him is never his as the result of the operation of a resulting trust, automatic or presumed. Lord Millett, however, holds the Quistclose trust to be ‘an entirely orthodox example of the kind of default trust known as a resulting trust. The lender pays the money to the borrower by way of loan, but he does not part with the entire beneficial interest in the money, and in so far as he does not it is held on resulting trust for the lender from the outset.’34 31 In his 1985 article (n 2), Lord Millett (by my count) only uses the term ‘resulting’ trust three times, on pp 270, 280, and 287, to describe the ‘secondary’ trust that would arise on a failure of a purpose under the ‘two trusts’ analysis of Quistclose of which he disapproves: thus at p 287 he says: ‘A’s right is not the right of the beneficiary under the resulting trust, for if the primary trust is fulfilled there is no resulting trust.’ The only statement in the article which comes close to treating the trust as one arising by operation of law is at p 284: ‘In the case of an ordinary express trust the answers depend on the construction of the trust instrument. The Quistclose trust, however, arises only partly from the language used. In most cases it arises largely, and in some cases wholly, by implication of law. It is a presumed or implied trust. . .’ (emphasis supplied). But the author then carries on as follows: ‘. . . and the answers to questions such as those raised above have to be inferred from the language and conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case’ (emphasis supplied), indicating that the court is not implying a trust by operation of law but inferring the parties’ intentions from all the available evidence. Throughout the rest of the article, the trust is analysed as an intentional one, though one which might be informally expressed and where A’s intentions must be determined on the basis of all the evidence in context. So, for example, he says (at p 289): ‘This construction of the deed [ie where B is to hold the property on trust to A’s order], however, depends on the intention which the court attributes to A. Thus where the court is able to draw the inference that it was A’s intention to benefit his creditors, or where the obvious intention of the transaction would be frustrated if he were to retain a power of revocation, the deed will be held to create an irrevocable trust in favour of the creditors’. An almost identical statement is made at p 285, and similar remarks about inferring A’s intentions are made at pp 288 and 289. Finally, and most unambiguously, in his summary and conclusions at p 290, he writes: ‘The answer to the question raised at the beginning of this article depends upon A’s intention, to be collected from the language used, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the case. The following, it is suggested, may be regarded as suitable guidelines by which A’s intention may be ascertained . . .’ All of the suggestions made concern the ascertainment of A’s genuine intentions. 32 [1974] Ch 269, 294. 33 Vandervell v IRC (1967) 2 AC 291, 313, (per Lord Upjohn). 34 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 192–93.
52 James Penner This characterisation of the Quistclose trust seems to follow from Lord Millett’s approval of Chambers’ general theory of the resulting trust, which he endorses in Twinsectra as follows: The central thesis of Dr Chambers’s book is that a resulting trust arises whenever there is a transfer of property in circumstances in which the transferor (or more accurately the person at whose expense the property was provided) did not intend to benefit the recipient. It responds to the absence of an intention on the part of the transferor to pass the entire beneficial interest, not to a positive intention to retain it. Insofar as the transfer does not exhaust the entire beneficial interest, the resulting trust is a default trust which fills the gap and leaves no room for any part to be in suspense. An analysis of the Quistclose trust as a resulting trust for the transferor with a mandate to the transferee to apply the money for the stated purpose sits comfortably with Dr Chambers’s thesis, and it might be thought surprising that he does not adopt it.35
In Air Jamaica v Charlton, Lord Millett characterised the resulting trust as follows: Like a constructive trust, a resulting trust arises by operation of law, though unlike a constructive trust it gives effect to intention. But it arises whether or not the transferor intended to retain a beneficial interest—he almost always does not—since it responds to the absence of any intention on his part to pass a beneficial interest to the recipient. It may arise even where the transferor positively wished to part with the beneficial interest, as in Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners. . . .36
It would be unfortunate were the analytic clarification of the nature of Quistclose trusts to depend upon the adoption of Chambers’ thesis as to the nature of resulting trusts, as elaborated by Lord Millett, irrespective of how compelling some commentators find it. The thesis is a controversial one, and it is questionable whether a novel thesis, whose first extensive elaboration occurred with the publication of Chambers’ book in 1997, and which extends the ambit of the category of resulting trust well beyond the traditionally recognised categories, can form part of an analysis the central claim of which is that it accords with orthodox principles of trust law. Furthermore, the Chambers’ resulting trust analysis cannot cover express Quistclose trusts, ie cases where the documents specifically declare that B holds the property on trust for A until properly applied for the specified purpose, for in such cases there is no question that there is merely an absence of intention on A’s part that B should take the property beneficially—there is a positive intention that the property is to be held on trust for A. One could of course maintain that true Quistclose trusts are only those trusts that arise by operation of law in circumstances where it would be unjust for B to treat the money at his free disposal, and in which A had only an absence of intention to benefit B, but no
35 36
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, p 190. [1999] 1 WLR 1399, 1412.
Lord Millett’s Analysis 53 genuine intention that the money should be held beneficially for himself,37 whereas cases where A positively intends to retain the beneficial interest in the money until properly applied38 should be called something else, perhaps ‘loans with retention of beneficial title’. However, there is no advantage in this. Whether the Quistclose trust is express or arises by operation of law, the structure of the trust and its operation are the same. Lord Millett himself said: I do not think subtle distinctions should be made between ‘true’ Quistclose trusts and trusts which are merely analogous to them. It depends on how narrowly or widely you choose to define the Quistclose trust. There is clearly a range of situations in which the parties enter into a commercial arrangement which permits one party to have a limited use of the other’s money for a stated purpose, is not free to apply it for any other purpose, and must return it if for any reason the purpose cannot be carried out. The arrangement between the purchaser’s solicitor and the purchaser’s mortgagee is an example of just such an arrangement. All such arrangements should if possible be susceptible to the same analysis.39
It is not clear how the arrangement between the solicitor and his purchaser’s mortgagee is plausibly to be regarded as arising by operation of law rather than on the basis of the parties’ expressed intentions, so the ‘resulting trust arising by operation of law’ analysis now apparently favoured by Lord Millett would appear to make the common analysis he favours unlikely. It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to try to determine whether Chambers’ general theory of resulting trusts is correct, or to determine to what extent, according to it, trusts formerly regarded as intentional (where that intent is presumed rather than proven) ought now to be regarded as arising by operation of law. However, we cannot put off the resolution of this issue for long, for it largely determines how the court should properly take into account evidence of the parties’ intentions in determining whether a Quistclose trust has been created or has arisen. If the trust arises by operation of law on the court finding that A did not intend B to take the transferred property beneficially, then a Quistclose trust will arise in any case of a loan where A insists that B use the money only for a stated purpose in terms which seem to indicate that the money is ‘not at the free disposal of’ B. If a resulting trust arises by operation of law in response to the absence of intention, it is not clear how any of the traditional requirements for express trusts (the ‘three certainties’ of intention, subject-matter, and objects), 37 This distinction is almost scholastic in its unreality. What, in a two party case where A transfers property to B, genuinely distinguishes A’s intention that he retain the beneficial interest from A’s intention only that B should not have it? If B is not to have it, then who else can A mean to have it except himself? We are not concerned here with the possibility that A might want to vest the interest in a third party, C, but only as to whether A or B is to have it, and with respect it seems clear that the exclusion of an interest for one party necessarily dictates that it rests with the other. 38 A clear example is the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v CPE Board, ex p MealingMcCleod The Times, 19 April, 2000, where the loan documents specified the trust on which the borrower held the money for the lender. 39 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 192.
54 James Penner which might otherwise constrain a finding of trust, are presumed to be relevant, for these concern the intentional creation of trusts, and not trusts arising by operation of law. Therefore, A need have no intention that the money is to be held for him beneficially (ie no intention to create a trust), no intention that the funds are to be held separate from B’s own, and no genuine application of the test of certainty of objects. Rather, in circumstances where the court finds a resulting trust arising by operation of law on the basis only that A did not intend B to take a beneficial interest—in the sense that A did not want the funds to be at B’s free disposal—the court itself must devise a workable trust which reflects as best it can its determination to preserve in A a beneficial interest in some property, whether the property received by B or some traceable substitute. The need to locate a traceable substitute is likely to arise again and again, for having no intention to positively retain any beneficial interest A is unlikely to have instructed B to keep the property separate, and so B would naturally mix it with his own. This approach is a recipe for a largely unfettered discretion in the court to find trusts in commercial circumstances on flimsy evidence about what might have been absent to A’s mind, as opposed to determining the true intentions of the parties. And once we escape any requirement that the court find a genuine intention on the part of A that the beneficial interest in the property is to remain his until properly applied by B, it seems difficult not to conclude, despite Lord Millett’s claim that loans granted with a purpose for the money should typically be seen as sounding only in contract,40 that any loan which is expressed to be used only for a stated purpose should give rise to a Quistclose trust, for expressing that sort of restriction is tantamount to saying the money is not to be at B’s free disposal. In short, shorn of any genuine requirement that the parties intend A to have the beneficial in the property, and in that sense it is understood that the money is not to be at B’s ‘free disposal’, ie, it is not his money to spend (however informally or imperfectly this genuine intention is expressed), ‘the free disposal’ criterion must inevitably amount to an invitation to the courts to impose a trust wherever a purpose is stated. Seen from the perspective of the Chambers theory of resulting trusts, as adopted by Lord Millett, how can the following statement of his Lordship suggest anything else? It is unconscionable for a man to obtain money on terms as to its application and then disregard the terms on which he received it. Such conduct goes beyond a mere breach of contract. . . . The duty is not contractual but fiduciary. It may exist despite the absence of any contract at all between the parties . . .; and it binds third parties. . . . The duty is fiduciary in character because a person who makes money available on terms that it is to be used for a particular purpose only and not for any other purpose thereby places his trust and confidence in the recipient to ensure that it is properly applied. This is a classic situation in which a fiduciary relationship arises, and since it arises in respect of a specific fund it gives rise to a trust.41 40 41
Text accompanying n 6. Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 186.
Lord Millett’s Analysis 55 Note that the reference to a specific fund does not require any finding of intention as to the beneficial interest in that specific fund. Since all loans are loans of specific funds, this ‘requirement’ on the finding of a Quistclose trust serves no gate-keeping function whatsoever. This invitation seems to have been taken up without hesitation by Lord Millett in Twinsectra, as appears from the concise statement of his reasoning to a result: In the present case paragraphs 1 and 2 of the undertaking are crystal clear. Mr Sims undertook that the money would be used solely for the acquisition of property and for no other purpose; and was to be retained by his firm until so applied. It would not be held by Mr Sims simply to Mr Yardley’s order; and it would not be at Mr Yardley’s free disposition. Any payment by Mr Sims of the money, whether to Mr Yardley or anyone else, otherwise than for the acquisition of property would constitute a breach of trust.42
If the situation is as I have described it, then Lord Millett’s adoption of the Chambers thesis produces just the likelihood of uncertainty and injustice from the intervention of equity into commercial transactions of which judges have long warned.43 Having said that, however, Lord Millet’s approach to the relevance of the parties’ intentions elsewhere in Twinsectra seems to indicate that more was necessary to give rise to a Quistclose trust than the mere acceptance of money to be used for a purpose: On this analysis [ie, Lord Millett’s own], the Quistclose trust is a simple commercial arrangement akin . . . to a retention of title clause (though with a different object) which enables the borrower to have recourse to the lender’s money for a particular purpose without entrenching on the lender’s property rights more than necessary to enable the purpose to be achieved. The property remains the property of the lender unless and until it is applied in accordance with his directions, and insofar as it is not so applied it must be returned to him. I am disposed, perhaps pre-disposed, to think that this is the only analysis which is consistent both with orthodox trust law and with commercial reality.44
In this passage, the Quistclose trust is characterised as a simple commercial arrangement akin to a reservation of title clause. In the vast majority of cases, one would presume that reservation of title arrangements are intentionally entered into by the parties, not that they arise by operation of law. Certainly, in the case of a clause reserving legal title, there is no room for a resulting trust analysis, for the operation takes place wholly at law. The arrangements in a 42
Ibid p 186 (emphasis in original). See, eg Manchester Trust v Furness [1895] QB 539, 545, (per Lindley LJ); Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74, 98, (per Lord Mustill). In the Court of Appeal in Twinsectra, Potter LJ adverted to this consideration: [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 438, 454, though it did not prevent him finding a trust on the facts. 44 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 187 (emphasis supplied). 43
56 James Penner Quistclose trust are intentionally conceived, as appears from the passage, as ones in which the lender’s money is made available to the borrower, ie that there is a shared understanding or intention that the money remains the lender’s property and does not become the borrower’s. What clearer intention could there be that the money is held on trust for the lender? I have pursued this issue in some detail so as to make the following conclusion plausible. It seems that Lord Millett’s analysis has altered from that stated in his 1985 article to his elaboration of it in Twinsectra. In respect of its orthodoxy and its respect for commercial reality and its kinship with similar commercial arrangements, the analysis is essentially unchanged. The Quistclose trust is an intentional (if informally expressed) trust, created by the parties, and the determination whether an arrangement is a Quistclose trust must be determined by drawing such inferences as the court can as to the parties’ true intentions from their statements, their actions, and all the surrounding circumstances. But overlaid upon this original analysis has been an attempt to combine it with or modify it to cohere with Chambers’ general analysis of resulting trusts. It is submitted that this hybrid is unstable, leading to any number of inconsistencies in approach to the facts of a case. It is further submitted that the move in the direction of Chambers’ general thesis in this particular area of law is not to be recommended. It invites a broad discretion in the court to find trusts irrespective of, or giving little weight to, the parties’ true intentions, introducing uncertainty in the law and, as with all broad discretions, giving rise to the possibility of significant injustice. It also seems wholly unnecessary. There does not seem to be a single instance in which the original 1985 elaboration of Lord Millett’s analysis cannot provide for a solution. Finally, it is simply the case that, as in reservation of title cases, the background assumption must be that commercial actors, advised as they often are by lawyers (as they were in Twinsectra), will regard themselves appropriately bound only to what they agreed, ie to arrangements that reflect their intentions. Taking an approach to commercial arrangements which focuses not upon the true intentions of the parties but on what was not on their mind can only sew confusion in the judgments, and with respect, this seems to be what happened in Twinsectra, which will provide the focus of the discussion of the requirements of certainty of objects and certainty of intention in the next section.
IV : CERTAINTY OF OBJECT , PURPOSE AND INTENTION
A brief recapitulation of the facts in Twinsectra is necessary. The borrower, B, was seeking short term finance of £1m for the purchase of land, fearing that his regular lender would not approve a loan in time. Through an intermediary, the lender, L, was approached. As it turned out, B’s regular banker did provide a loan of £1m, which was used in the intended purchase of land. However, B continued, via a solicitor, S1, to negotiate for the loan with L. At this stage, it was
Lord Millett’s Analysis 57 clear that the nature of B’s interest in the loan from L had changed. S1 owed B upwards of £1m under a series of dubious transactions involving bribes to Nigerian officials paid to realize certain amounts to be paid by a Nigerian Ministry under an engineering contract. S1 gave his personal undertaking to repay the loan, and B appeared to think that, in consequence, he would receive the loan funds and that S1 would be solely, or primarily, liable to repay them. B no longer had any intention to use the loan moneys from L for the purpose of a specific property transaction, and following receipt of the money by S1, it was transferred to S2, another solicitor of B’s, who placed it in his client account and expended the money to the order of B. About two-thirds of the money was expended on several different purchases of land, while the rest was used for various business purposes of B. The loan was negotiated on behalf of L by several intermediaries, but was concluded by his solicitor, S3. The main difficulty in determining whether the loan arrangement gave rise to a Quistclose trust was that the attention of all the parties active in negotiating and concluding the agreement was directed to obtaining S1’s undertaking to repay the loan money, the form of that undertaking, and the interest rate. Little or no attention was paid to the loan purpose. The following two terms appeared in the written form of the undertaking signed by S1: 1. The loan moneys will be retained by us until such time as they are applied in the acquisition of property on behalf of our client; 2. The loan moneys will be utilized solely for the acquisition of property on behalf of our client and for no other purpose.
Certainty of object or purpose Whether contractual or an actual term of the trust, any power to spend the trust funds must be sufficiently certain to determine whether the property is applied or misapplied, for only on that basis will the parties and the court be able to determine whether a breach of trust has taken place. Traditionally, of course, the test has been framed in terms of certainty of objects, objects here being conceived of as human beneficiaries. A court must be able to determine with certainty whether any given postulant ‘is or is not’ within the class entitled to benefit.45 However, courts clearly seem to accept the possibility that mere powers may be for abstract purposes,46 so long as they are not capricious,47 and, of course, to the extent that Lord Millett’s analysis of the Quistclose trust is in all basic terms correct, as I have argued it is, the validity of Quistclose trusts is itself proof that powers for abstract purposes are valid in English law. It follows that 45 Re Gestetner Settlement [1953] Ch 672; Re Gulbenkian’s Settlement Trusts [1970] AC 508; McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424; Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) [1973] Ch 9. 46 Re Douglas (1887) 35 Ch D 472; Re Shaw [1957] 1 WLR 729. 47 Brown v Burdett (1882) 21 Ch D 667; but see Bird v Luckie (1850) 8 Hare 301.
58 James Penner the same test, the ‘is or is not’ test, should apply to determine whether any purpose is certain enough, suitably modified to cover purposes rather than people: a power should be valid if it can be determined whether any application of the funds falls within the class of expenditures the purpose comprises. It is worthwhile noting that, though we traditionally distinguish ‘certainty of objects’ from ‘certainty of intention’, using the latter to state the requirement that the settlor must intend to create a trust, the test of certainty of objects can only be applied to what the settlor, or the parties in a commercial relationship such as the Quistclose trust, intended. It only operates when there is some intended purpose, and to that purpose the test of certainty is applied. So, in respect of certainty of purpose, we are clearly in the realm of dealing with the parties’ intentions as inferred from all the evidence. At trial, Carnwath J found that L could not claim that the purposes for the loan money were critical to its agreement to the loan: [The principal of Twinsectra (the lender)] understood that the borrower did not want detailed investigation of the underlying transaction. He accepted that position, since, as he emphasized in evidence, the security on which he was relying was the solicitor’s undertaking.48
As to S3, L’s solicitor, Carnwath J found that he had in the form of the undertaking ‘deliberately excluded any reference to a transaction, or even a specific client.’49 He also found that S3 regarded the entire transaction as a dubious one, that he had ‘deliberately refrained from asking the relevant questions and encouraged the ambiguity of the undertaking’:50 In my view, neither the content of the undertaking . . . nor the evidence of the parties, justifies the implication of such a trust in this case. It is possible that the original draft, which [S3] used as a base, was prepared with Quistclose in mind. However there is no evidence that [S3] or his clients were alive to that aspect when concluding the present transaction. Nor does the document itself have the certainty necessary to create a trust. A basic requirement for a Quistclose form of trust is that there is clearly identified the purpose, failure of which is to trigger the resulting trust in favour of the lender. I have already commented on the lack of clarity of the undertaking as to what was thought to be the intended use of the loan, and the deliberate omission of any specific references. This ambiguity is reflected in the different ways in which the alleged trust is defined in the pleadings. . . . If equity were to impose a trust, it would not be giving effect to the intention of the parties.51
Potter LJ52 in the Court of Appeal and Lords Hoffmann and Millett in the House of Lords disagreed. They all found the purpose as stated in the document describing the undertaking, ‘the acquisition of property’, sufficiently certain. 48 49 50 51 52
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley, 20 December, 1996, Lexis transcript, p 21. Above, n 48, p 20. Above, n 48, p 26. Above, n 48, p 30. With whom Sir Iain Glidewell and Sir David Hirst agreed.
Lord Millett’s Analysis 59 Unfortunately, in reaching this conclusion, neither Lord Millett nor Lord Hoffmann correctly stated the test for certainty of powers established in Re Gulbenkian.53 In that case, the House of Lords explicitly disapproved the view of Lord Denning MR in the Court of Appeal that a power was valid so long as one or a certain number of dispositions under the power could be said to be certain.54 In Twinsectra, Lord Hoffmann said, citing McPhail v Doulton,55 that ‘a power is sufficiently certain if the court can say that a given application of the money does or does not fall within it terms’.56 But the test is whether any application of the money could be said to fall within the power’s terms. Lord Millett put it this way: ‘Provided the power is stated with sufficient clarity for the court to be able to determine whether it is still capable of being carried out or whether the money has been misapplied, it is sufficiently certain to be enforced.’57 This formulation too seems to focus upon there being some cases where the expenditure would fall within the scope of the purpose (‘is still capable of being carried out’) or specific cases before the courts (‘whether the money has been misapplied’) rather than the ‘any possible case’ stringency of the Gulbenkian test. We should not make too much of this. In a context where both their Lordships thought the stated purpose, ‘the acquisition of property’, was certain enough, perhaps abundantly certain in their view, precise statements might not be necessary. But it is more than arguable that ‘acquisition of property’ would not survive scrutiny as a purpose defining the scope of a power to expend trust property under the ‘is or is not’ test of Re Gulbenkian. One might suppose that, in one sense, ‘property’, treated as a legal term of art, could not be regarded by the courts as uncertain on pain of bringing the law into disrepute, though it is fair to point out that ‘property’ is variously defined by statutes for their own purposes.58 The problem in Twinsectra was that it is obvious that the acquisition of anything that would count as a property interest in law would not have fallen within the power intended by the parties. Closer would be the ‘acquisition of real property’. Closer still might be the ‘acquisition of fee simple interests in real property’, but here we run into real problems, for it is doubtful on the facts that even if the parties had addressed their minds more resolutely to the purpose of the loan than they clearly did, they would have been able to state with sufficient certainty what all might have contemplated to be the purpose. Long-term leasehold interests? A residence for Mr Yardley as opposed to business premises? With respect, it would appear that the ‘acquisition of property’ does not have the robustly certain scope which their Lordships seemed so easily 53
[1970] AC 508. [1968] Ch 126, 133, 134. 55 [1971] AC 424. 56 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 169 (emphasis supplied). 57 Ibid p 193. 58 For example, the Insolvency Act 1986, s 436, provides that: ‘ “Property” includes money, goods, things in action, land and every description of property wherever situated and also obligations and every description of interest, wherever present or future or vested or contingent, arising out of, or incidental to, property’. 54
60 James Penner to find.59 What seems to have led their Lordships to this conclusion is the analogy of money being provided to solicitors for the purchase of a specific parcel of land. That is indeed what the transaction was originally intended to be. The ‘acquisition of Blackacre’ is undoubtedly certain. The irreproachable certainty of ‘the acquisition of Blackacre’ seems to have, in the context of this case, made the ‘acquisition of property’ equally robust, which on closer examination it is not. Given the trial judge’s views on this point, it is at first sight surprising that their Lordships did not discuss this issue in greater detail, as their findings do not appear to meet the essence of Carnwath J’s argument that the purpose was uncertain. Carnwath J did not claim that a general purpose such as ‘the acquisition of property’ was inherently uncertain, but rather that, on the facts of this case, no general purpose of this kind represented the true intentions of the parties. His view was that if there was a Quistclose trust intended here at all, it must have concerned a specific property transaction, not the general purpose of ‘acquiring property’. Carnwath J found that L never settled on any purpose for the loan, specific or general. At the outset, it wished to make the loan on the basis of a specific underlying transaction, but refused to concern itself in any way with specifying what that was; following the debtor’s default it chose to claim, relying on terms 1 and 2 of the form of the undertaking, that a general, unspecified purpose of ‘acquiring’ property was its intention for the loan, but Carnwath J found that this was simply not the case. This is a perfectly plausible reading of the facts, and if correct, would mean that there was no certainty of purpose. It is no objection to this finding that a general purpose of ‘acquiring property’ is certain enough if that reflects the true intentions of the parties; the point is that Carnwath J found that in the circumstances of this case no such general purpose of that kind was intended by the parties. What clearly distinguished the approach of the trial judge on this issue and that of Potter LJ in the Court of Appeal and Lords Hoffmann and Millett in the House of Lords is that they concerned themselves only with the purpose as expressed in the document of undertaking, whereas Carnwath J looked to the parties’ intentions as gleaned from all the surrounding circumstances.60 This difference of approach was also reflected in their approach to the certainty of intention to create a trust, to which we now turn.
Certainty of intention to create a trust As we have seen, Carnwath J looked to the true intention of the parties as the foundation for any trust. Though he framed the trust as resulting, he did so 59
I am grateful to Charles Mitchell for drawing many of the points in this paragraph to my atten-
tion. 60 As was accepted he was entitled to do: Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 438, 459 (Potter LJ).
Lord Millett’s Analysis 61 following Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s characterisation of a presumed resulting trusts61 as one which ‘gives effect to [the lender’s] presumed intention’.62 To say, however, that his finding was one of a ‘presumed resulting trust’ is to erroneously apply the label. Presumed resulting trusts only arise where the presumption is necessary to dispose of a case. It is a longstop, to be used only where the evidence is not sufficient to determine a case and all reasonable inferences have first been drawn from the surrounding circumstances.63 In Twinsectra, all the relevant parties were alive and testified and there was a wealth of evidence upon which to infer their intentions—there was simply no room for the presumption to operate.64 On the issue whether the parties’ intentions were sufficiently certain for the creation of an express trust, Potter LJ said that the question turned on the true construction of the undertaking in light of the surrounding circumstances,65 and found that the surrounding circumstances ‘lean[t]’ in favour of an intention to create a trust [in the terms of the undertaking]’.66 In the House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann held that L’s intention depended not on what L understood, but on the true construction of the undertaking, in particular, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the loan document.67 Lord Millett’s reasons were more extensive, but along the same lines. He said: A settlor must, of course, possess the necessary intention to create a trust, but his subjective intentions are irrelevant. If he enters into arrangements which have the effect of creating a trust, it is not necessary that he should appreciate that they do so; it is sufficient that he intends to enter into them. Whether paragraphs 1 and 2 of the undertaking created a Quistclose trust turns on the true construction of those paragraphs. . . . The question in every case is whether the parties intended the money to be at the free disposal of the recipient . . .. His freedom to dispose of the money is necessarily excluded by an arrangement that the money shall be used exclusively for the stated purpose, for as Lord Wilberforce observed in the Quistclose case . . .: A necessary consequence from this, by a process simply of interpretation, must be that if, for any reason, [the purpose could not be carried out,] the money was to be returned to [the lender]: the word ‘only’ or ‘exclusively’ can have no other meaning or effect.68
From the perspective of Quistclose trusts being intentional trusts, this approach seems radically insufficient. The terms of the undertaking did not use the word ‘trust’, nor did they require the borrower to hold the assets separately, for 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
Above, n 48, p 30. Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, 708. Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291, 313 (Lord Upjohn). Ibid p 329 (Lord Wilberforce). Twinsectra Ltd v Yardly [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 438, 460. Ibid. Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 169. Ibid p 185.
62 James Penner example, in a special bank account. Paragraphs 1 and 2 speak only of the retention of the loan money until applied for the stated purpose, albeit in fairly stringent terms. Now it is trite law that the presence or absence of the word ‘trust’ is not determinative of whether a settlor’s expression gives rise to a trust,69 but the absence of the word ‘trust’ in a document prepared by lawyers which was the focus of extensive negotiations cannot be taken as leaning in favour of a trust, and must indeed be a counter-indication, though perhaps a weak one. The issue was complicated by the fact that the loan money was to be transmitted to B’s solicitor, who would of course hold the funds in a separate account, ie in his client account. An intention that moneys were to be transmitted by L in this way should serve perfectly well in some circumstances as sufficient evidence of an intention that the funds be segregated so as to draw the inference that a Quistclose trust was intended, but by the same token, it would not necessarily do so in every case. In this case, Carnwath J found that both B and S2 believed that S2 held the funds to B’s order, and while the learned trial judge may have got that wrong, there is nothing inconceivable about such an arrangement. The mere fact of a lender transmitting funds to a borrower’s solicitor cannot in all cases necessarily give rise to a Quistclose trust in favour of the lender, for it is perfectly plausible that the funds were transmitted to the solicitor in this way to help give effect to a loan purpose or for the borrower’s convenience, as, for example, in this case, where the money was expended by S2 in transactions involving various companies of B, in short, for reasons of commercial convenience. The facts of this case are clearly unusual; this was not a usual transmission of funds to a solicitor by a lender/mortgagee for the completion of a purchase of land; nor was there any apparent concern over the possibility of B’s insolvency, such that L might seek the Quistclose device to protect himself. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Lord Millett did not advert to the discussion in his 1985 article as to when a Quistclose trust ought typically to be inferred.70 As regards the line of cases more or less directly leading to Quistclose, he there considered that where the intentions of the parties must be gathered from the circumstances as opposed to being expressed explicitly in the contract of loan, a Quistclose trust will properly be inferred if the arrangement can be interpreted as one in which B is, in essence, spending L’s money to achieve a purpose which L cannot by spending his own money directly. In Quistclose itself, Quistclose was hoping to stave off Rolls Razor’s bankruptcy by ensuring that Rolls Razor was able to pay its declared dividend. If, however, Quistclose had tried to pay the dividend itself, it would have revealed to the world Rolls Razor’s desperate circumstances. So it could only do so by putting the money in Rolls Razor’s hands.71 Nothing of this sort of motivation coloured L’s intention in this case. 69
See, eg, Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527. PJ Millett QC, ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?’ (1985) 101 LQR 269, 284 et seq. 71 Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch 207 is an even better example of a case where L intended to spend the money for its, ie L’s, own purposes, but could not do so just by spending the money itself. 70
Lord Millett’s Analysis 63 Apparently, Lord Millett did not think it appropriate to undertake an investigation of the parties’ actual intentions, even though the meagre documentation of the transaction would appear to have invited it. Rather, he was able to find that B’s obligations to retain the money until applied only for the stated purpose, as expressed in the undertaking, were a sufficient basis for the court’s finding an absence of intention on L’s part to part with the beneficial interest in the money advanced. This is reflected in the passages quoted in the preceding section, where Lord Millett characterises his approach to equity’s intervention in such cases and his short summary of his reasoning,72 and in the passage quoted directly above, where he focuses exclusively on B’s duty to apply the money only for the stated purpose, making no reference to any duty to hold the funds separately for L or otherwise treat them as belonging to A beneficially. By contrast, Potter LJ in the Court of Appeal appeared to regard the intention to segregate the fund as a highly relevant indication of an intention to create the trust: [I]n a commercial setting, there must be some element or circumstance present additional to a simple declaration of purpose to give rise to a fiduciary obligation on the recipient of a loan, such element or circumstance usually being found to exist in the form of a requirement by the lender that the loan monies be held in a special account separate from the recipient’s general funds.73
It seems clear that Lord Millett’s decision in Twinsectra, in the way that it addressed both the issues of certainty of purpose and certainty of intention to create a trust, is best explained as a departure from an analysis of the Quistclose trust as an intentional trust. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this is his apparent unconcern whether the parties evinced any intention that the recipient hold the funds separately as the beneficial property of someone else, not as his own. This is an absolutely essential aspect of any true intention to create a trust. Where the parties intend to create a Quistclose trust, their intention, as in all other cases of trusts, is the intention to enter into a specific sort of property transaction, under which the property the recipient receives is not to be regarded as beneficially his, and not beneficially his in a strong sense, ie that he must hold the property separate from his own and for the benefit of the intended beneficiary, be that the transferor or a third party. Having this intention does not require using the word ‘trust’, or even knowing what a trust is in law. But it does require the understanding that to deal inappropriately with the received funds would be equivalent to theft or conversion, ie, the taking of or interference with someone 72
Text to nn 38–39. Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 438, 456. Potter LJ stated (at p 458) that deposit in a solicitor’s client account could serve as sufficient segregation of Quistclose trust funds: 73
[S]egregation from [S1’s] own assets was inherent in the requirements of the Solicitor’s Accounts Rules 1986, rules 3–7, relating to the keeping of a client account. While the money in the client account would not be segregated from the monies of other clients . . ., the strict obligations imposed by the Rules as to the payments proper to be made into and out of the account would ensure the preservation of the fund once paid in.
64 James Penner else’s property, and not merely the breach of a personal obligation as regards what one does with one’s own. Furthermore, it is not fanciful to suggest that having this intention may be undermined by the facts even in the face of a loan contract specifying that the borrower will hold the funds on trust. Consider, for example, the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Common Professional Examination Board, ex p Mealing-McCleod,74 in which the written contract of loan included the following provision: ‘You must use the cash loan for any purpose specified overleaf. . . . You will hold that loan, or any part of it, on trust for us until you have used it for that purpose’. That seems straightforward enough. But one should still look at how the money was advanced. What if the bank, according to its regular practice, simply paid the loan money into its borrower/client’s current account? That would raise the suspicion that the contractual provision was mere boilerplate, especially if this was in the bank’s standard form, inserted on solicitor’s advice at head office to take advantage of the decision in Quistclose, with the local loan officer or bank manager probably having no idea of its real significance. One can easily imagine, upon the lender/client asking what it imported, the manager saying something like, ‘it means you must spend the loan money on the purpose you told us about in applying for the loan’, which of course indicates no intention to create a trust as opposed to a mere contractual obligation. And if neither A nor B see anything wrong in paying the loan money into B’s current account, ie immediately mixing the funds with B’s own, this should give rise to a strong presumption that whatever the words of the loan contract, including ‘trust’, there was no intention to create a Quistclose trust at all. It seems that Lord Millett’s analysis, when combined with the Chambers theory of resulting trust, leads not to a complete disregard of the parties’ intentions, but rather to an unwillingness to explore them and draw the appropriate inferences. As has already been pointed out, this difference is clearly reflected in the different approaches of Carnwath J, on the one hand, and the appellate courts on the other. Though it was not mentioned by any judge in the case, it is trite law that vagueness in or uncertainty of objects has a ‘reflex’ action, calling into doubt the question whether the settlor had an intention to create a trust at all.75 For this reason, the validation of ‘the acquisition of property’ as a certain purpose by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, without addressing Carnwath J’s finding that no such settled general purpose reflected the parties’ intentions, further weakens any suggestion that the appellate courts concerned themselves seriously with the question whether the parties actually intended a trust relationship. Indeed, on this point, Lord Millett said, ‘If [the power to apply the money] is uncertain, however, then the borrower has no authority to make any use of the money at all and must return it to the lender under the 74 75
The Times, 19 April, 2000. Lambe v Eames (1871) 6 Ch App 597.
Lord Millett’s Analysis 65 resulting trust. Uncertainty works in favour of the lender, not the borrower.’76 In short, the preceding principle of orthodox trust law, that uncertainty of object or subject-matter calls into doubt the intention to create a trust, has no room for operation in Quistclose cases, because the establishment of the trust does not turn on the actual intentions of the parties. Similarly, while the majority of the House quite properly expressed the view that only in rare circumstances should an appellate court overturn a trial judge’s finding of fact with regard to the dishonesty of a defendant, none of their Lordships showed the same hesitation in overturning Carnwath J’s finding that the parties to the loan agreement in question did not intend a Quistclose trust.77 This is remarkable, for it is clear that the intention to create a trust, in particular whether parties to a transaction have with any certainty determined that a recipient of property is to hold it on trust, is a matter of fact, which, just as much as dishonesty, will turn on the veracity and creditable memory of those testifying in the witness box. Though remarkable, it is the result one would expect if the parties’ true intentions were not the basis upon which the Quistclose trust was established.
V : CONCLUSION
For the reasons given at the end of section III, and which are illustrated in section IV, it is submitted that the original analysis of Lord Millett, under which Quistclose trusts are to be seen as intentional trusts, is to be preferred to the more recent hybrid of his lordship’s original analysis and Chambers’ theory of resulting trusts, which appears to discourage an investigation of the parties’ true intentions. Consider again, for example, the fact situation in R v CPE Board, ex p Mealing-McLeod,78 described above.79 What would have been the result if it turned out that the practice of the bank was indeed to write loans on standard forms incorporating boilerplate provisions declaring the funds were to be held on trust until applied for the purposes stated (‘overleaf’, no doubt), but that also as a matter of course the loan money was paid into the borrower’s current account, immediately mixing the funds with the borrower’s own? On the hybrid analysis as applied in Twinsectra, the bank’s true intentions, as reflected in its practice, which show no understanding of or intention to create the expressed trust, would be irrelevant. This cannot be regarded as a correct result on orthodox trust principles, and neither would it seem an advance in justice to pursue the result the hybrid would appear to dictate. 76
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 193. It is rather disturbing to find that the Quistclose trust appears to be something of an appellate court phenomenon. Besides the Court of Appeal’s and the House’s finding a trust where Carnwath J did not in Twinsectra, trial judges found no such trust to reflect the true intentions of the parties in Re EVTR [1986] BCLC 523, 531 or in Barclay’s Bank v Quistclose [1967] Ch 910, 929–31 itself. 78 Above, n 74. 79 Ibid. 77
66 James Penner In any case, as things presently stand, it seems that the conflicting statements of Lord Millett in Twinsectra, some of which appear to make sense only on the original version, others promoting the hybrid, can only lead to disarray as lower courts try to follow the decision, particularly if the hybrid version is understood to reflect orthodox principles of trust law.
4
Understanding the Power LIONEL SMITH 1
I would reject all the alternative analyses, which I find unconvincing for the reasons I have endeavoured to explain, and hold the Quistclose trust to be an entirely orthodox example of the kind of default trust known as a resulting trust. The lender pays the money to the borrower by way of loan, but he does not part with the entire beneficial interest in the money, and insofar as he does not it is held on a resulting trust for the lender from the outset. Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeal, it is the borrower who has a very limited use of the money, being obliged to apply it for the stated purpose or return it. He has no beneficial interest in the money, which remains throughout in the lender subject only to the borrower’s power or duty to apply the money in accordance with the lender’s instructions. When the purpose fails, the money is returnable to the lender, not under some new trust in his favour which only comes into being on the failure of the purpose, but because the resulting trust in his favour is no longer subject to any power on the part of the borrower to make use of the money. Whether the borrower is obliged to apply the money for the stated purpose or merely at liberty to do so, and whether the lender can countermand the borrower’s mandate while it is still capable of being carried out, must depend on the circumstances of the particular case.2 H I S C H A P T E R F O C U S E S on one aspect of Lord Millett’s analysis: the power or duty of the borrower to dispose of the money lent. How can it be understood within the general law of trusts, and what implications are there for the parties’ ability to unwind the arrangement voluntarily? To begin, we have to understand a number of different features or characteristics of powers.
T
I : POWER OR DUTY ?
In the extract above, and elsewhere in his speech, Lord Millett refers to the possibility that the borrower is not holding a power to dispose of the money in a particular way, but in fact is under a duty to do so.3 In such a case, there would 1 I acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 2 Twinsectra Limited v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, para 100 (Lord Millett). 3 See especially paras 76 and 98. Para 76, read literally, suggests that whenever specific property is transferred subject to a promise, that promise takes effect as a trust with effects on third parties. This
68 Lionel Smith not simply be a power to dispose, but rather disposal would be required by the terms of the trust. If there is a duty to dispose to a person or persons, then they will be beneficiaries of the trust. There would not be any power as that term is normally used.4 There would not be what we would call a Quistclose trust. If there is an attempt to impose a duty to dispose in favour of an impersonal purpose, then in general, according to orthodox doctrine, the attempt fails.5
II : ADMINISTRATIVE OR DISPOSITIVE ?
Leaving aside the possibility that there is a duty on the lender to dispose of the money, we can consider the case where there is a power of disposal without any duty to dispose, which is usually what is implied when we say there is a power of disposal. Common practice distinguishes the ‘dispositive’ powers of trustees from their ‘administrative’ powers. The latter exist for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. Examples are powers to insure and powers to invest. Here again, the power is actually coupled with a duty. It is not a duty to dispose as such. But administrative powers are held for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. They are therefore constrained by the duty of loyalty owed to those beneficiaries: the trustee must exercise the power (or not) in what he perceives to be the best interests of the beneficiaries. To put it differently, an administrative power does not have ‘objects’ of the power who can benefit from it; it only exists for the benefit of those who are already beneficiaries. Again, there is no Quistclose trust in this case. Consider Space Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co (Bahamas).6 Here, the trustee, a bank, had an unusual investment power, one that allowed it, as trustee, to lend the money to itself, as bank. It did this and later became insolvent. The trust beneficiaries failed in their argument that they deserved a special priority. They were unsecured creditors of their own trustee. It is similar to Lord Millett’s analysis of a Quistclose trust in that the trustee, by a lawful act, applied the trust property in such a way that the beneficiaries lost their trust interest and instead became mere creditors. But the power in this case was one to invest the trust property. So again, as in the case of a duty to dispose, this is not what we usually mean by the terms ‘power of disposition’ or more briefly, ‘power.’7 Those ‘dispositive’ seems too wide. On its terms it is confined to money, but there is no principle of equity that applies only to money and not to other property. The proper reading is probably that this occurs when the true construction of the promise is such that it does not allow the transferee to enjoy the property beneficially. 4 If a trustee has a duty to transfer property to X, inevitably he also has a power to make the transfer. But when ‘power’ is opposed to ‘trust’ or ‘duty,’ the connotation of ‘power’ is ‘power but not duty.’ 5 Of course there is a lively debate about this, outlined later in this chapter: text to n 23. 6 [1986] 1 WLR 1072. 7 Among dispositive powers, it is normal to distinguish powers of appointment, powers of maintenance and powers of advancement; the distinctions concern the function that the disposition is to serve.
Understanding the Power 69 powers always have objects, whose interests can potentially be opposed to the interests of the beneficiaries.8
III : PERSON OR PURPOSE ?
As is the case with trusts, so with powers of disposition, we can ask whether the object is a person (or persons), or is an impersonal purpose. In some of the Quistclose cases, the lender advanced money to the borrower to be used for a particular purpose, such as buying equipment.9 Lord Millett was at pains to point out that such an arrangement should be just as valid as a case where the purpose was to pay a person.10 The validity of powers for purposes will be discussed below. Of course, there is another possibility, that the power is one to dispose of the property to, or for the benefit of, a particular person or persons. In Quistclose Investments Ltd v Rolls Razor Ltd11 itself, Quistclose lent money to Rolls Razor for the purpose of the latter discharging its debts to shareholders arising from the declaration of a dividend. On Lord Millett’s analysis, Rolls Razor held the money on trust for Quistclose, with a power to use it to pay the dividend. We might say that the objects of the power were the shareholders, an ascertained or ascertainable class. If the power was exercised, they would benefit by getting money, albeit in discharge of a debt owing to them. Alternatively, we could say that the object of the power was Rolls Razor itself, since it would benefit by discharging its debt to shareholders, albeit with the acquisition of a different debt, to Quistclose. In Twinsectra, Lord Millett considered and rejected the possibility that either the borrower or the potential recipient of the money were trust beneficiaries.12 But his arguments are not inconsistent with the possibility that these parties are objects of the power he proposes.
8 Of course, it is often the case that the objects of the power are the same as the beneficiaries of the trust, in which case the opposition is less clear. Even here, though, their interests as objects of the power are distinct from (and possibly opposed to) their interests as trust beneficiaries. For example, X may be entitled to the trust property on reaching the age of 18, but the trustee may have a power to appoint property to her before then. The exercise of the power inevitably reduces the amount of property available upon reaching 18. In Re Brooks’ ST [1939] Ch 993, a beneficiary’s settlement of his beneficial interest did not include (even though it was apparently intended to) what he later received as object of a power of appointment. 9 Re EVTR [1987] BCLC 646; General Communications Ltd v Development Finance Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 406. 10 [2002] 2 AC 164, para 89: ‘Any analysis of the Quistclose trust must be able to accommodate gifts and loans for an abstract purpose.’ 11 [1970] AC 567. 12 [2002] 2 AC 164, paras 82–97.
70 Lionel Smith
IV : HOW IS THE POWER HELD ?
It is conventional wisdom that a power may be held in one of two ways. It may be held in a fiduciary capacity, or not. To take a typical example: a trustee, T, holds an investment portfolio for A for life, remainder to B, which means that A is entitled to the income for her life, and on A’s death, the capital goes to B. The trustee may well have a power to encroach on the capital during A’s life, in favour of A, or B, or both.13 This power is held in a fiduciary capacity. We could imagine that, in addition, A herself has a power to appoint the trust capital to B during A’s own life. This is a power held in a non-fiduciary capacity. The exercise of dispositive powers is subject to two distinct kinds of control. One is the obvious requirement that a power can only be exercised according to its terms.14 If there is a power to dispose of property among a person’s children, a purported disposition to his nephew is void. This is so whether the power is held in a fiduciary capacity or not. Where the power is held in a fiduciary capacity, there is another control that arises out of the fiduciary obligation.15 In general, the fiduciary obligation of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act with a particular motive: she must act (or not act) in what she perceives to be the best interests of the person to whom the duty is owed. This applies directly in the case of administrative powers, which are held for the benefit of some beneficiary, and which are constrained by the same fiduciary duty that is owed to that beneficiary. But where the fiduciary holds a dispositive power, the position is different.16 The trustee has express authority to favour the interests of one or of some over the interests of others, and it would therefore not make sense to control the power through the duty of loyalty, not even with the help of the ‘even hand’ rule that assists when the duty of loyalty is owed to more than one person. The dispositive power authorizes uneven treatment. Moreover, the objects of the power may not even be trust beneficiaries; in this case, the power authorizes the trustee to advance the interests of a nonbeneficiary over those of a beneficiary. In exercising a dispositive power, therefore, the fiduciary’s motive need not be what he perceives to be the best interests of one or more beneficiaries; instead, he should be motivated by fulfilling the purposes for which the power was granted.17
13 And, conversely, may have a power to withhold income from A and add it to capital, or give it to B, or both. 14 A violation of this requirement is called ‘the excessive execution of a power’ in the terminology of G Thomas, Powers (London, 1998) ch 8. 15 A violation of this requirement is called ‘fraud on a power’ in the terminology of G Thomas, Powers (London, 1998) ch 9. 16 DWM Waters, The Law of Trusts in Canada, 2nd edn (Toronto, 1984) 788. 17 Vatcher v Paull [1915] AC 372, 378; Klug v Klug [1918] 2 Ch 67; McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424, 449, 457; Re Hay’s Settlement Trusts [1982] 1 WLR 202, 209; Turner v Turner [1984] Ch 100; Re Beatty [1990] 1 WLR 1503, 1506; Hayim v Citibank NA [1987] AC 730, 746.
Understanding the Power 71 The case in which the object of a fiduciary power is not a trust beneficiary is quite likely to arise under Lord Millett’s analysis of the Quistclose trust, and so deserves further consideration. Assume that T holds property on trust, with a power to appoint any or all of it during a ten-year period to L or M in whatever proportions T sees fit. The trust instrument further provides that if any property remains unappointed after ten years, it shall be transferred absolutely to N, thereby bringing the trust to an end. It may well be the case that N has no realistic expectation of getting any of the property. On the other hand, it is clear that L and M are not trust beneficiaries; they are only objects of a power. The property is held in trust nonetheless, and it follows that the only trust beneficiary is the ‘taker in default (of exercise of the power)’, ie, N. But N’s beneficial interest is defeasible by the exercise of the power in favour of L or M.18 T owes a duty of loyalty to N, but also holds the power of appointment which allows him to act otherwise than in what he perceives to be the best interests of N. A duty of loyalty is not owed to L or M; T does not need to act in what he perceives to be their best interests. His duty in respect of the power, to act in what he perceives to be the best fulfilment of the purpose for which the power was granted, is owed to L and M, and probably to N as well. So, for example, if it is the case that T simply fails to address the question whether the power should be exercised, L and M have standing to implead him and demand that he do so, or that he be replaced.19 A trustee is often said to be presumed to hold any dispositive power in a fiduciary capacity.20 It is possible to rebut this presumption, however, and show that although the trustee owes fiduciary duties to the trust beneficiaries, the particular power is held in a non-fiduciary capacity.21 There are two important consequences of the difference between holding a power in a fiduciary capacity and holding it in a non-fiduciary capacity. One relates to release. A non-fiduciary can release the power; that is, abandon its future exercise and so terminate it. A fiduciary cannot, because this would be inconsistent with the duty to exercise it in what he perceives to be the fulfilment of the purpose for which it was granted.22 That duty implies a positive obligation to turn his mind from time to time to the exercise of the power. Another consequence relates to powers for impersonal purposes. The primary objection of principle to trusts for purposes is that they purport to impose 18 Duke of Northumberland v IRC [1911] 2 KB 343, rev’d on another point [1911] 2 KB 1011; Re Brooks’ ST [1939] Ch 993. 19 G Thomas, Powers (London, 1998) 291–93, 378. Where the class of objects is very wide, our understanding of the duty owed by the donee to the objects may need to change. One could argue that in such a case the donee’s duties owed to the objects are impliedly modified (ibid pp 274–82, esp p 281). 20 For example, J Mowbray, et al, Lewin on Trusts, 17th edn (London, 2000) 734. 21 Ibid; G Thomas, Powers (London, 1998) 25–33, 605. Just as it is possible that someone who is not a trustee holds a power in a fiduciary capacity: Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587. 22 See, eg, DJ Hayton, Underhill and Hayton: Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 16th edn (London, 2003) 29.
72 Lionel Smith duties without designating any legal person as the holder of the correlative right.23 This objection does not arise in the case of a power for purposes, held in a non-fiduciary capacity. There are no duties. We may say that the holder has a duty to exercise it only within its scope, but this is not really a duty; it is a disability. If the power is to appoint to the children of X, the donee of the power is disabled from appointing to X’s nephew. But no one has any rights, strictly speaking, against the donee relating to the exercise of the power. X cannot be impleaded for doing nothing. Hence, a power for a purpose seems unobjectionable. On the other hand, if the power is held in a fiduciary capacity, there are real duties on the donee. The donee is not only disabled from appointing to X’s nephew, he must positively address his mind to whether he should appoint to X’s children, and if so to which, and in what amounts.24 And those children hold the correlative rights.25 But if a power for an impersonal purpose was granted in a fiduciary capacity, there would be obligations without any right-holders. The only possible ‘enforcer’ is the taker in default. It is not clear that this provides any solution, since the interest of the taker in default is in the non-exercise of the power.26 Although there is no direct authority on the point, it seems to follow that a power for an impersonal purpose cannot be valid if held in a fiduciary capacity.27
V : APPLICATION
We can leave out the case of administrative powers, since the power in Lord Millett’s understanding of the Quistclose trust does not seem to be such a power. This allows a two-dimensional portrayal of the possibilities.
23 DJ Hayton, ‘Developing the Obligation Characteristic of the Trust’ (2001) 117 LQR 96 argues that the presence of an ‘enforcer’ can solve this problem. In response, P Matthews, ‘From Obligation to Property, and Back Again?’, in DJ Hayton (ed), Extending the Boundaries of Trusts and Similar Ring-Fenced Funds (London, 2002) 203, argues that this cannot solve the problem, because the proprietary nature of the trust means that only a person with a beneficial interest (and who therefore can suffer from a breach of trust) can meaningfully enforce the trust. 24 Turner v Turner [1984] Ch 100. 25 See Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587, 1617, addressing possible ways in which a court could ensure that those rights were respected. 26 If an ‘enforcer’ can validate a trust for an impersonal purpose, by providing a person with standing to enforce the trust even though having no personal interest in its due performance, then presumably there is no problem with the taker in default fulfilling the role of enforcer for the power. See n 23 above. 27 Bearing in mind that an executer holds his powers in a fiduciary capacity, one relevant authority is Chichester Diocesan Fund v Simpson [1944] AC 341. Moreover, has been held more than once that it is not possible to construe a void purpose trust as a power: IRC v Broadway Cottages Trust [1955] Ch 20, 36; Re Shaw [1957] 1 WLR 729, 746; Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232, 246. Some authors (eg, J Penner, The Law of Trusts, 3rd edn (London, 2002) 84) have questioned why a benevolent construction could not have been used to validate the trust as a power, but if the argument in the text is correct, the power would have been just as void as the trust.
Understanding the Power 73 The object of the power is: The capacity in which the power is held is:
A purpose
One or more persons
Fiduciary
Case A
Case C
Non-fiduciary
Case B
Case D
Case A It appears that the power in Case A will be void, as an attempt to create duties without rights.28 Lord Millett’s view is that a Quistclose trust in which the power is for a purpose should be valid. This will be possible only if (a) a power for a purpose held in a fiduciary capacity is valid, contrary to the argument above, or (b) the appropriate construction is that the power is held in a nonfiduciary capacity (Case B below). If the power itself was valid in Case A, we could consider the possibilities for the collapse of the arrangement. A trust can be terminated extrajudicially when all of those holding or potentially holding beneficial interests, being fully capacitated, agree on the disposition of the trust property.29 If there is only one beneficiary, he can terminate the trust if he is fully capacitated and his interest is indefeasible. Lord Millett’s interpretation is that once the purpose for which the power was granted fails, the power determines, leaving the lender holding an indefeasible beneficial interest. Clearly, the lender can then demand the trust property and terminate the trust. More interesting is the question whether the trust can be terminated before the purpose of the power has failed. In that situation, the lender’s beneficial interest is defeasible, because there is an outstanding power. The effect is that the lender cannot simply demand the termination of the trust.30 There are two solutions for extrajudicial termination. One 28
See text to nn 23–27. See, eg, J Mowbray, et al, Lewin on Trusts, 17th edn (London, 2000) ch 24. This chapter does not address the possibility of an application to the court under the Variation of Trusts Act 1958; that legislation generally only permits the court to consent on behalf of incapacitated or unascertained parties. 30 Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd (Isle of Man) [2003] UKPC 26 para 41, [2003] 3 All ER 76. It is perfectly clear that the interest of a beneficiary is defeasible if it is subject to a power (see n 18 above), and it is also clear that one who holds only a defeasible interest cannot, alone, demand the termination of the trust. In Re Park [1932] 1 Ch 580 there was a power of appointment over a trust fund, the taker in default being a charity. The litigation was about the validity of the power and the trust. The charity was a party, and actively argued that the power was invalid, while the trust was valid, with the result that the charity was entitled absolutely. The power and the trust were held to be valid. Much of the proceeding would have been pointless if a taker in default could demand the trust property where his interest is subject to a dispositive power; the charity would have been entitled whether or not the power was valid; and indeed, would have been entitled to the trust property, having lost the case. Similar is Hughes v Footner [1921] 2 Ch 208. See also Re Sharp’s ST [1973] Ch 331: the beneficiaries of a trust were held not to be entitled ‘absolutely’, within the meaning of Trustee Act 1925, s 31(2)(i)(b), where their interests were defeasible by a power of appointment. My thanks to Paul Matthews for citations to Re Sharp’s ST and to Schmidt. 29
74 Lionel Smith is release: if the power is released, the problem disappears. However, a power held in a fiduciary capacity cannot be released. The other is unanimous consent: if the object or objects of the power also consent, then all possible beneficial interests are accounted for and the trust can be terminated.31 If the power is for a purpose, it is not clear how the objects can consent to termination. It seems that the only way to find that such a power is valid, when it is held in a fiduciary capacity, is by saying that the taker in default operates as a kind of enforcer.32 It may be that if this is the basis on which such a power is valid, then this person’s consent is enough to allow the trust to be terminated. This solution, however, underlines the unsatisfactory nature of the idea that the taker in default is the enforcer; it is in his interests that the power not be exercised, or that the trust be collapsed, and so he hardly looks like a useful enforcer. Although Case A raises problems of principle, we can say that if powers for purposes held in a fiduciary capacity are valid, and if a Quistclose trust was interpreted as creating such a power, then the arrangement could probably be collapsed on the instructions of the lender at any time, regardless of the wishes of the borrower/trustee.
Case B This case seems unobjectionable as far as the validity of the power is concerned, because, although it is for a purpose, it is held in a non-fiduciary capacity. This also means that it can be released. It would seem to follow that the trust could be collapsed by the agreement of the lender (as sole beneficiary) and the borrower, because the borrower can release the power, leaving the lender with an indefeasible beneficial interest. There remains the question whether a Quistclose trust could reasonably be interpreted as falling into Case B. Normally, when a trustee holds a power, he is presumed to hold it in a fiduciary capacity unless there is some express stipulation to the contrary.33 There are two ways around this. One is to observe what must be true, that this presumption is really only a matter of construction, and what really matters is the intention of the settlor in setting up the trust.34 We might well say that in a commercial arrangement, it is reasonable to understand the lender as impliedly stipulating (qua settlor) that the power to apply the money for an abstract purpose is held by the borrower/trustee in a non-fiduciary capacity.35 The other way is to ask whether the borrower/trustee is really a 31 Even though a power held in a fiduciary capacity cannot be released, the object of the power can disclaim any future possibility of benefit under it: Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements (No 2) [1970] Ch 408. 32 See n 23 above. 33 See n 20 above. 34 See n 21 above. 35 In Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205, for example, a modification to the normal incidents of a fiduciary relationship was based on an implied term of a contract.
Understanding the Power 75 fiduciary at all. Lord Millett seemed clearly to accept that the Quistclose trust is a normal resulting trust, qualified by the power. In at least some resulting trusts, there seem to be good reasons to doubt whether the trustee owes the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. That duty is normally imposed by the consent of the fiduciary, not by operation of law.36 However, in Twinsectra, much of Lord Millett’s reasoning was based on the fiduciary nature of the borrower’s undertaking,37 so this line of reasoning may not be relevant.
Case C This is a classic arrangement, raising no questions as to validity of the power. Applied to a Quistclose trust, however, it raises some issues. Because of the outstanding power, the beneficial interest of the lender (qua beneficiary) is defeasible.38 The power being held in a fiduciary capacity, it may not be released by the borrower/trustee. The collapse of the arrangement, therefore, would require the consent of the object of the power.39 In Twinsectra, Lord Millett considered and rejected different possibilities for the location of the beneficial interest during the currency of the arrangement: that it was in the borrower, or in the intended recipients of the money, or in suspense. Under Case C, a similar exercise is essential in order to determine who is the object of the power.40 That person or persons will have certain rights against the borrower/trustee in relation to the fiduciary exercise of the power. And, for exactly the same reason, it will not be possible to collapse the arrangement without the consent of that person. No broad rule can be laid down. It would be a question of interpretation in each case. The lender cannot be the object of the power, because that would amount to saying that the lender’s beneficial interest is indefeasible and unqualified. It would be a bare trust, a trust that simply requires the trustee to hold the property to the order of the beneficiary. If, however, it was thought that the borrower was the object, the arrangement could be collapsed by the agreement of the borrower and the lender. If the object of the power was the person to whom the money might be paid (such as the shareholders in Quistclose), then the arrangement could not be collapsed without the agreement of that person or persons.
36 R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford, 1997) 194–200; L Smith, ‘Constructive Fiduciaries?’ in P Birks (ed), Privacy and Loyalty (Oxford, 1997) 249, 263–67. 37 [2002] 2 AC 164, paras 68, 76, 95, 97. Lord Hoffmann also expressly said that the power was held in a fiduciary capacity (para 13). 38 See n 18 above. 39 Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd (Isle of Man) [2003] UKPC 26 para 41, [2003] 3 All ER 76. 40 One of the possibilities considered by Lord Millett, that the trust was for a purpose, is not relevant here because that would correspond to cases A and B.
76 Lionel Smith Case D Again, here there is no difficulty of principle as to the validity of the power. One issue would be whether the arrangement could reasonably be interpreted as creating a power to be exercised in a non-fiduciary capacity; that issue was addressed above, in Case B. Another issue, as in Case C, is that it would be essential to inquire into which person or persons are the objects of the power. Differently from Case C, however, collapse of the arrangement is simpler. Just as in Case C, it could be accomplished by the consent of the lender, as beneficiary holding a defeasible interest, and the objects of the power. Alternatively, as in Case B, the borrower is free to release the power, making the lender’s interest indefeasible; effectively, therefore, even if the object of the power is neither the lender nor the borrower, those two can, together, terminate the arrangement prematurely.
VI : CONCLUSION
As a matter of commercial efficacy, the most pertinent constructions are probably Case B (if the power is for an impersonal purpose) and Case D (if for a person). The only difficulty is whether the borrower/trustee can properly be understood to hold the power in a non-fiduciary capacity. If he can, the result will be that Quistclose trusts, including the power, are valid, and can be terminated prematurely by the agreement of lender and borrower. If the borrower/trustee is thought to owe a duty of loyalty, and if the presumption that such a person holds any dispositive powers in a fiduciary capacity is too deeprooted to be shifted by implication, then the relevant constructions are Cases A and C. Case A raises a serious question of validity of the power. Case C, and possibly Case A as well, describe an arrangement of which the borrower and lender may not have effective control.
5
Restrictions on the Use of Money ROBERT CHAMBERS
a relationship that can be created when one person, A, pays money to another, B, subject to a condition that the money will be used for a specific purpose. It takes its name from Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd,1 in which A loaned money to B, to be used only to pay a dividend due to B’s shareholders. This is the typical situation in which a Quistclose trust arises: the payment from A to B is a loan and a condition attached to that loan is that the money can be used only to pay B’s creditors, C. However, the payment to B need not be a loan, but can be a gift2 or payment of a debt,3 and the condition need not be payment to B’s creditors, but can be payment to specific persons or to achieve a particular purpose, such as ‘the acquisition of property’.4 The essential feature of every Quistclose trust is that money is paid by one person to another with a condition attached to its use.5 The money may be cash or any form of equivalent value, such as a cheque or bank account. A condition restricting the use of other assets, such as land, goods, or intellectual property, will not produce a Quistclose trust; nor will a condition that does not restrict B’s use of the money received, but merely requires B to pay an equivalent sum of money to someone or for some purpose.6 Once the money is used for the specified purpose, the Quistclose trust comes to an end. The parties may have some other relationship, but it would not be a Quistclose trust. For example, if A loaned the money to B, A would be B’s creditor for the amount due under the loan agreement. They could both have interests in assets purchased with the money, for example, if B complied with a condition to use it to buy land and mortgage that land to A. However, they would have no interest in the money once it was spent and the Quistclose trust was performed. If A’s payment to B was a conditional gift, they might have no legal relationship at all once the money was spent.
A
QUISTCLOSE TRUST IS
1 2 3 4 5 6
[1970] AC 567. Conservative & Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1982] 1 WLR 522. Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] 1 Ch 207. Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 168. Re Rogers (1891) 8 Morr 243. Guardian Ocean Cargoes Ltd v Banco do Brasil SA [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 152.
78 Robert Chambers If the condition attached to the use of the money cannot be fulfilled, the Quistclose trust does not end, but the relationship changes. The purpose of the payment has failed, B is required to repay the money to A, and B is a trustee of that money (or its traceable proceeds) for A. There is no doubt that a trust exists at this stage of their relationship, but there is some debate about when and why that trust arises. This is not surprising, since there is some uncertainty over the nature of the first stage of their relationship, which begins when A pays money to B and continues so long as the condition is unfulfilled, but capable of fulfilment. Before Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd was decided, that relationship was sometimes called a ‘quasi-trust’,7 in Quistclose it was described somewhat vaguely as ‘a relationship of a fiduciary character or trust’,8 and it now goes by the unhelpful name of ‘Quistclose trust’. Unless that relationship is clearly identified and understood, the consequences of a failure to fulfil the condition cannot be properly explained. In the first stage of a typical Quistclose trust, while B has the money and is willing and able to pay it to C, A has an equitable right to restrain B from misusing it for any other purpose. Lord Millett said that this is because B holds the money in trust for A pending payment to C,9 while I said that a trust for A was not necessary during the first stage of the relationship, so long as A could obtain an injunction restraining B’s misuse of the money.10 Some discussions of the Quistclose trust portray the issue as a choice between two irreconcilable views. However, there is no doubt that the parties can create a trust for A. The real question is whether that is the only possible relationship. It is not. There are a variety of different relationships that can be created by a payment of money with a condition attached to its use. The first step towards better understanding the Quistclose trust is to identify all the possible relationships that can be created when A pays money to B subject to the condition that it will be used only to pay C or for some other specific purpose. The second step is to determine which of those relationships is created in any given situation. Only then will it be clear why B holds the money in trust for A if the condition attached to its use cannot be fulfilled and when that trust arises. These are the issues discussed in this chapter.
I : POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS
When A pays money to B to be used only to pay it to C, B acquires legal ownership of it. However, beneficial ownership could belong to A, B, or C. In other 7 Re Drucker (No 1) [1902] 2 KB 55, 57; aff’d [1902] 2 KB 237; Re Watson (1912) 107 LT 96, 98; aff’d (1912) 107 LT 783. 8 [1970] AC 567, 580. 9 PJ Millett QC, ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?’ (1985) 101 LQR 269; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 186–93. 10 R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford, 1997) 73–77.
Restrictions on the Use of Money 79 words, B might be holding the money in trust for A or C or might receive beneficial legal ownership of the money. These three possibilities are explored in the next three sections. There is also a fourth possibility, in which beneficial ownership is shared by two or all three parties. This is discussed in the fourth section below. Admittedly, some of the relationships described below are a long way from the usual conceptions of a Quistclose trust. However, each one is a possibility that may need to be considered when trying to determine which relationship was created when A paid money to B subject to a condition that it be used only to pay C (or for some other specific purpose). Therefore, it is useful to survey the full range of relationships that could be created by that transaction before asking which relationships are most likely to be created.
1. Trust for C It is elementary that a person can create a trust without using the word ‘trust’, so long as that person intends to create the relationship which is recognised in a court of equity as a trust.11 The intention to create a trust is not an intention to benefit another, but an intention that one person should have title to or control over an asset, while another person has the right to use and enjoy the benefit of that asset.12 It is quite possible that A intends to create a trust for C when A pays money to B subject to a condition that the money can only be used to pay C. That seems to be how Lord Wilberforce understood the relationship initially created in Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd, which he described as a primary trust in favour of the creditors: That arrangements of this character for the payment of a person’s creditors by a third person, give rise to a relationship of a fiduciary character or trust, in favour, as a primary trust, of the creditors, and secondarily, if the primary trust fails, of the third person, has been recognised in a series of cases over some 150 years.13
It is also possible that B could receive the money in trust for A (as discussed below) and that A’s beneficial ownership of the money could later be assigned to C.14 (a) Express Trust or Constructive Trust? Since a settlor can create an inter vivos trust of money without observing any formalities, if it is certain that the arrangement was intended for the immediate benefit of C, then there is no reason why it would not create an express trust for 11 12 13 14
Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527. FW Maitland, Equity (Cambridge, 1936) 71–72. [1970] AC 567, 580. PJ Millett QC, ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?’ (1985) 101 LQR 269, 289.
80 Robert Chambers C. However, if the arrangement is part of a testamentary disposition, then it could not take effect as an express trust unless it was made in writing, signed, and witnessed as required by the Wills Act 1837 or similar legislation in other jurisdictions. If those formalities are not observed, the condition to use money only to pay C could produce a constructive trust for C, provided the rules for creating secret trusts are met. For example, suppose that A made a will containing a legacy for B, A asked B to use that legacy only to pay it to C, B agreed to do so, A died, the will was probated, and B received the legacy. Although the intention to benefit C did not produce an express trust for C because it was not expressed in the required form, B would hold the money on constructive trust for C because of A’s detrimental reliance on the expectation that B would pay the money as agreed.15 (b) Identity of the Settlor If a loan from A to B creates an express trust for C, the settlor of that trust may be A or B. It is possible that A and B have a contract in which A agreed to create the trust for C in exchange for B’s promise to pay A over time for the cost of creating that trust. It is more likely that B borrowed the money from A so that B could create a trust for C. The fact that A imposes the condition on the use of the money does not mean that A must be the settlor. For example, suppose that B wants to create a trust for B’s child, C, to meet a requirement that C has enough money to cover tuition and living expenses to attend university in a foreign country. B may need to borrow that money from a bank, A, and A may attach a condition to the loan that it only be used to pay C. Although A imposed the condition on the use of the money, B is the settlor of the trust for C. Once a trust for C is created, the identity of the settlor is usually irrelevant, since the settlor becomes a stranger to the trust and has no right to interfere with the trust relationship between trustee B and beneficiary C.16 The settlor’s identity may be relevant for some purposes, such as income or capital gains taxation. Importantly in the present context, the settlor’s identity is important if the trust for C fails. If A is the settlor, then normally B would hold the remaining money on resulting trust for A. If B is the settlor, then the express trust for C ends and B’s legal ownership of the remaining money becomes beneficial ownership.17
15 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts Second (St Paul, 1959) [55]; G Elias, Explaining Constructive Trusts (Oxford, 1990) 57–58; R Chambers, ‘Constructive Trusts in Canada’ (1999) 37 Alberta Law Review 173, 189–93; reprinted in (2001) 15 Trust Law International 214, 226–29. 16 Re Smith (1971) 16 DLR (3d) 130. 17 AW Scott and WF Fratcher, The Law of Trusts, 4th edn (Boston, MA, 1989) para 433, (referred to below as ‘Scott on Trusts’).
Restrictions on the Use of Money 81 (c) Purpose Trusts If the condition attached to the use of the money is not payment to C, but payment for some purpose that does not benefit identifiable persons, then a trust for C is not possible. In that case, the beneficial ownership of the money will belong to A, B, or both of them, unless the arrangement creates a valid purpose trust. If the purpose is charitable, the trust for that purpose will be enforced on behalf of the Crown.18 If the purpose is one of the few acceptable non-charitable trust purposes, such as care of a grave, monument, or animal, the trust will be enforced by those entitled to the remaining money when the purpose is fulfilled or fails.19 Although they may have no interest in compelling performance of the trust, they can complain if the money is misused for any other purpose. Scott believed that those cases were merely instances of a wider principle and that B should be permitted to use the money for the specified non-charitable purpose so long as that purpose was not ‘capricious’.20 In several Canadian provinces, a ‘trust for a specific non-charitable purpose that creates no enforceable equitable interest in a specific person’ is converted by statute into a power of appointment valid for 21 years.21 This is similar in effect to a valid non-charitable purpose trust, since the power of appointment is enforced negatively by the persons entitled to the money remaining in default of appointment. If the money is subject to a charitable purpose trust, no one is the beneficial owner of the money. B’s duties as trustee correspond to the Crown’s rights to enforce those duties, but the Crown does not hold those rights for its own benefit. If the money is subject to a valid non-charitable purpose trust, it is not clear who has beneficial ownership while it remains in B’s hands. If A is entitled to the money on default of appointment, A might be regarded as its beneficial owner, subject to divestment by B’s exercise of the power. However, A would not be entitled to collapse the trust while B was willing and able to perform it, which indicates that A is not the beneficial owner of the money at that stage (or at least not its only beneficial owner). Scott left this matter in doubt. Regarding a testamentary bequest for the care of a monument, grave, or animal, he said: Even though the legatee cannot be compelled to apply the property to the designated purpose, the courts have very generally held that he can properly do so, and that no resulting trust arises so long as he is ready and willing to carry it out. The legatee will not, however, be permitted to retain the property for his own benefit; and if he refuses or neglects to carry out the purpose, a resulting trust will arise in favor of the testator’s legatee or next of kin.22 18 Charitable trusts may be enforced by the Attorney-General, Charity Commissioners, or Public Trustee, depending on the jurisdiction in which the trust is located: A-G v Alford (1855) 4 De GM & G 843; Charities Act 1993. 19 See Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534. 20 Scott on Trusts, para 124. 21 Perpetuities Act 1990 (Ontario), s 16; Wood v R [1977] 6 WWR 273, 9 AR 427. 22 Scott on Trusts, para 124.
82 Robert Chambers Although it is clear that B is not permitted to use the money for B’s own benefit, Scott said that a resulting trust for A does not arise unless and until B fails to use the money for the permitted purpose. This suggests that, as with a trust for a charitable purpose, the beneficial ownership does not exist so long as the purpose is or will be performed.
2. Trust for A A’s payment to B, subject to a condition that the money will be used only to pay C, can create a trust for A, with B having a power or duty to pay C. This is the relationship that Lord Millett described, first in the Law Quarterly Review,23 and later in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley.24 (a) Express Trust or Resulting Trust? The trust for A can arise in two different ways. First, it could be an express trust created directly by A’s intention to retain beneficial ownership of the money paid to B. As Lord Millett explained, this is sometimes called an illusory trust because, although it looks like a trust for C (usually A’s creditor), the arrangement is entirely for A’s benefit and under A’s control.25 Secondly, the trust for A could be a resulting trust arising, not because A intended to retain beneficial ownership of the money, but because A did not intend to benefit B. If the condition restricts B’s use of the money to the extent that B is not its beneficial owner and A did not intend to give the beneficial ownership to C (or anyone else), then a resulting trust arises at the outset to carry beneficial ownership back to A. As Potter LJ said in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley: Express trusts are fundamentally dependent upon the intention of the parties, whereas the role of intention in resulting trusts is a negative one, the essential question being whether or not the provider intended to benefit the recipient and not whether he or she intended to create a trust. The latter question is relevant to whether the provider succeeded in creating an express trust, but its relevance to the resulting trust is only as an indication of lack of intention to benefit the recipient . . .26
Since no formalities are required to create an inter vivos express trust of money, if A does intend to keep the beneficial ownership of the money after payment to B, then the trust for A is express. Even if A did not use the word ‘trust’, A clearly intended to create a trust relationship, in which formal ownership and control belongs to B, while beneficial use and enjoyment belongs to A. There is no room for a resulting trust in this situation, since A’s intention was directly effective to 23 24 25 26
PJ Millett QC, ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?’ (1985) 101 LQR 269. [2002] 2 AC 164, 186–93. (1985) 101 LQR 269, 288–89. [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 438, para 81.
Restrictions on the Use of Money 83 create a trust of the money. This is different from cases like Hodgson v Marks,27 where an intention to retain beneficial ownership of land could not create an express trust because that intention was not expressed in the form required by section 53 of the Law of Property Act 1925. In that case, the transferor’s intention to retain beneficial ownership was relevant because it showed ‘that the transfer was not intended to operate as a gift’.28 The resulting trust arose by operation of law in response to that lack of intention to benefit the transferee.29 If A did not intend to retain beneficial ownership of the money paid to B or it is not clear whether A had this intention, then a resulting trust can arise so long as it is proven or presumed that A did not intend to benefit B. The resulting trust will arise in that situation even if A clearly did not want to retain any interest in the money and had intended to dispose of it completely.30 If A does not want B to have beneficial ownership of the money, but does not give it to anyone else, it will return to A via a resulting trust. (b) Presumptions of Resulting Trust and Advancement The presumptions of resulting trust and advancement might be used to resolve uncertainty over A’s intentions, but they would not apply to most of the situations discussed in this chapter and would probably not help even when they did apply. The presumptions arise when there is an apparent gift of assets from A to B and it is not clear whether A actually intended to make a gift. The presumption of advancement is an assumption that A did intend to give and it applies if A is B’s parent or husband.31 The presumption of resulting trust is an assumption that A did not intend to give and it applies if A and B are in any other relationship. In the United States, the presumption of resulting trust does not apply to apparent gifts made by a direct transfer of assets from A to B, but applies only when A buys an asset for B as an apparent gift. In that country, a gratuitous transfer of assets from A to B is assumed to be a gift.32 27
[1971] Ch 892. [1971] Ch 892, 933 (Russell LJ). 29 P Birks, ‘Restitution and Resulting Trusts’ in S Goldstein (ed), Equity and Contemporary Legal Developments (Jerusalem, 1992) 335, 363–64; R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford, 1997) 34; cf W Swadling, ‘A New Role for Resulting Trusts?’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 110; W Swadling, ‘A Hard Look at Hodgson v Marks’ in P Birks and F Rose (eds), Restitution and Equity (London, 2000) 61. 30 Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 2 AC 291. 31 It is not clear whether the presumption of advancement applies in England and Wales to apparent gifts from mothers, but it does in Australia, Canada, and the USA: see R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford, 1997) 28–30. Statutes dividing assets at the end of a marriage may change the application of the presumptions of advancement and resulting trust to apparent gifts between the spouses: eg Matrimonial Property Act 2000 (Alberta), s 36. 32 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts Second (St Paul, 1959) [405]. In England and Wales, the presumption of resulting trust might not apply to gratuitous transfers of land because of s 60(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925. There are similar statutes in British Columbia, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, and Western Australia. See Lohia v Lohia [2001] EWCA Civ 1691; R Chambers, ‘Lohia v Lohia’ (2001) 15 Trust Law International 26. Those statutes do not affect the presumptions relating to gratuitous payments of money. 28
84 Robert Chambers Since the presumptions apply only to apparent gifts, they would not apply if B gave consideration for A’s payment. If the transaction was a loan to B or payment of A’s debt to B, it is assumed that A intended B to have beneficial ownership of the money, except insofar as the restriction on B’s use of the money prevents B from using the money for B’s own benefit. If it is not clear whether the payment was a loan or a gift, the presumptions could be used to resolve that issue