PURE LOGIC AND
OTHEE MINOR WORKS BY
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STANLEY JEVONS M.A. (l.OND.), LL.D. (EDIN.), F.H.S.
EDITED BY ROBERT ADAMSON...
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PURE LOGIC AND
OTHEE MINOR WORKS BY
W.
STANLEY JEVONS M.A. (l.OND.), LL.D. (EDIN.), F.H.S.
EDITED BY ROBERT ADAMSON,
M.A., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AT OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER
AND
HARRIET
A.
JEVONS
WITH A PREFACE BY PROFESSOR ADAMSON
MAOMILLAN AND AND NEW YORK
1890
All
riylits reserved
CO.
PREFACE IN the present volume are contained some of the earliest and some of the latest contributions of the author to the
The several works and papers that have been included fall into two distinctly marked groups, corre science of logic.
sponding on the whole to the difference in time of their composition, and presenting at first sight no very clear indi cation of
common aim
The
or principle.
group consists of independently published works, the Pure Logic and the Substitution of Similars, with certain papers in which the general principles of the author their
most mature form in
Principles of Science carried out in
his
s
first
logical theory, stated in
main
logical
works,
and the Studies in Deductive
certain
special
directions.
the
Logic, are
In the second
group appear such portions of a general examination of J. S. Mill s philosophy as had been completed at the date of the author s death.
The essays
in the first group
seem
a permanent collection of the author
to
claim a place in
works, partly from the historic importance that must always attach to them, partly by reason of the relative fulness of discussion which they s
extend to certain fundamental and characteristic ideas in the general view of logic
contained in them.
They
are
they originally appeared, with only the correc tion of one or two obvious misprints. In the author s copy
reprinted as
PREFACE
vi
Pure Logic an alteration was introduced in his own For the expressions there given of De hand on 146. of the
Morgan s two types Everything
Some
of prepositional form, viz.
A or B neither A nor B
A=
is either
things are
There are substituted
1>
= I.
UA = & Ua =&U.
It has not
been thought desirable to introduce into the text
these alterations.
The arrangement of the four essays is chronological. Pure Logic or the Logic of Quality Apart from Quantity, with Remarks on Boole s System, and on the Relation of Logic The Substitution of Mathematics was published in 1864. True the Similars, Principle of Reasoning, Derived from a Modification of Aristotle s Dictum, was published in 1869. to
The memoir On
the
Mechanical
Performance
of Logical
was received by the Eoyal Society 16th October The paper On a and read 20th January 1870. 1869, General System of Numerically Definite Reasoning was com
Inference
municated in 1870 to the Literary and Philosophical Society of Manchester.
1
There have not been included in this collection one or
two contributions tents of
of less extent to logical science, the con
which have been reproduced
fashion in other works of the author.
in
A
more complete
communication
to
the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society on 3d
April
1866
deals with the Logical Abacus,
which
is
elabor
ately explained in the later work, Substitution of Similars.
A
paper
(Memoirs 1
On
the
Inverse,
of
the
Literary
As regards some points
edition, p. 172.
or
Inductive,
and
Logical
Philosophical
Problem
Society
of
in this paper, see Principles of Science, second
PREFACE Manchester, 1871-72),
vii
incorporated with no substantive
is
alteration in the Principles of Science,
A
short paper entitled
the Predicate ?
1877, pp. 137-143.
Who
Discovered the Quantification of in the appeared Contemporary Review, May
1873, pp. 821-824.
It
emphasises strongly the claims of
George Bentham to recognition as the first English writer on Logic who had stated and applied the principle .Mr.
The paper
of Quantification.
by Professor T.
in
S.
a
is
comment on an
Baynes formed part of a somewhat extended controversy, been judged needless to reprint it here.
The author himself attached critical
examination of
bestowed on
J. S.
article
the same journal, and as
Mill
so
much weight
s doctrines,
it
it
has
to
his
and the labour
played so large a part in the last ten or twelve years of his life, that the editors greatly regret their inability to
the author
it
add much
s
to the
four papers published during
lifetime in the Co nten iporcwy
large mass of MS. material
work, a general idea
for the
Re view.
From
the
further portions of the
be gathered as to the special lines of criticism that would have been followed but with one
may
;
or
two
state
as
exceptions no portion seemed to that the editors without hesitation
expressing the
author
s
views.
be
such
a
print
it
in
could
The four papers pub
lished
by the author himself appeared in the Contemporary jmcwJDec. 1877, Jan.JjSTS.J.pril 1878.. and Ko v. 1879, underjhe title John _Stucvrt_Mill s Philosophy Tested. The fragment from the author s MSS..on The Method of Difference deals with the point referred to him in the third of these
by
articles.
It
is
proposed here to
indicate the relation
which the criticism of Mill stands to the author s theory, and to give a brief connected account of the / was to have followed.
The distinguishing feature
of the doctrine first
in
logical lines it
expounded
PREFACE
viii
in the
Pure Logic
qualitative
is
aspect
the restriction of logical treatment to the It was in this that the of thoughts.
author found his difference from the system of Boole to con sist
;
and from
his logical
this follow the
method
main
features that characterise
There are certain conse
as a whole.
in it, moreover, which though not quences fairly involved are yet implied in his formally stated by the author himself,
and from which the precise ground of general theory of logic, clear. his emphatic dissent from Mill may be made tolerably Mill of views the between There is so much of
agreement and those expressed by the author in regard to the ultimate foundation of knowledge, both seeming to follow the lines of that the strenuous dissent of English empirical philosophy, the author from Mill s whole doctrine of logic at first pre
be followed out, r>
\ 1
J >
the conception of a logic of quality will be found to involve an opposition
But
sents a problem. it
if
between pure or formal logic and the theory of empirical or concrete reasoning, which for Mill constitutes logic, so
One or the other must yield. sharp as to be irreconcileable. first that has pre-eminence in Jevons s view, Briefly, it is the Only within the the second is the all-important with Mill. limits of the first is
characterised limits falls
there, according to Jevons, reasoning
by cogency and
no determination
universality, but within its of concrete existence
;
all its
contents are, in reference to concrete existence, hypothetical. to Mill there is no other field for reasoning than
According
that of concrete existence
;
a pure logic
is
but a subordinate
and relatively valueless abstraction from the actual processes of concrete reasoning.
To
restrict reasoning,
with
its
elements, the proposition
and term, to quality is a position which seems to connect between itself naturally with the familiar logical distinction initial his In the comprehension and extension of notions.
PREFACE
1,3, 4) the author refers to this dis
statements (Pure Logic, tinction,
ix
his expressions are not entirely in accord
and though
ance with the current logical doctrine, his position as resting effort to
upon
it,
and
it is
easy to understand system as an
to treat his
develop logical laws from the side of comprehension. may fairly be argued, both from the nature of the
But
it
case
and from many expressions
of the author himself, that
system is wholly independent of that distinction, and indeed proceeds from a point of view which renders the his
distinction meaningless
or inapplicable.
The
distinction as
ordinarily expressed makes reference more or less explicitly to classification, and whether the basis be nominalist or con-
the logician to contrast terms or notions which possess both comprehension and extension with those It would seem which are wanting in one or other aspect. ceptualist, leads
impossible to
work out
consistently from this point without
assigning to extension a certain measure of concrete exist
which,
ence,
when
found to involve
investigated, has
closely
Xow
difficulty.
it
is
always been
abundantly evident
that from all the implications of the view which finds expres sion in the distinction of comprehension from extension, the
author
s
fundamental positions are entirely
development
of logic
it
is
free.
wholly superfluous
to
In his recognise
the obscure and baffling differences that appear in the exposi tion of the various
kinds
of terms.
Whatever be
their
rest
whether grammatical or metaphysical, these differences on concrete details of matter, and not on anything in
the
pure form of thought.
origin,
The
familiar
distinctions
on
which the logician dwells, between Proper or Singular Terms and Common Terms, are of necessity rejected on the ground that
quantitative
difference
is
a
secondary and
derived
aspect, not affecting the fundamental laws of thought, and In a dependent in each case on the special data implied.
PREFACE
X similar fashion,
when
evident that what of
the
it
the proposition
has to convey
currently accepted
and that
particular,
in
interpreted
if
reached,
of
these be retained at
itself
the
becomes
it
altogether independent
distinctions
accordance with
thinking that concerns
is
is
universal
all,
and
they must be
fundamental laws
of
with the identity or non-identity
of the characterising qualities.
In adopting such a point of view, the logician is by no means prohibited from using forms of expression that seem to
to concrete existences, to classes or single
imply reference
objects
marked by the possession
of qualities
;
and
it
is
a
further question, on which the author has hardly touched,
whether
it is
axioms possible to formulate the fundamental
terms which do not imply such hypothetical What is fundamental in his view is that the
of thinking in objects.
are determined objects so referred to are hypothetical merely,
by the
qualities thought as characterising them,
and that
they are absolutely to be distinguished from real concrete On this account he emphasises so strenuously existences. the position he shares with other logicians
who have advanced
to the same conclusion from widely different points of view, 1 that in logic there is no question of existence, and insists
that logically non-existence is equivalent to contradictoriSuch existence as may be assigned in logic to an object ness.
Only on invariably possible existence. material data then, and with reference to a denned universe or class of objects
of objects, could
it
is
be concluded that the universe possessed
one quality or combination of qualities to the exclusion of
its
contradictory.
very difficult to retain the position thus taken at once be admitted, and it is evident that the author
That
may
it is
at various points of his exposition felt the difficulties. 1
Studies in Deductive Logic, pp. 141, 142.
The
PREFACE particular proposition
xi
an awkward adversary; there
is
some obscurity in the section of the Pure Logic where
De Morgan s
qualitative fashion
(
is
146),
types of propositions are expressed in ;
and a
little
is
hesitancy
observable in
stating and defending the general criterion of consistency which is a legitimate and inevitable consequence of the
But it view (Pure Logic, 159, note; Studies, p. 181). does not seem that he ever wavered in regard to the funda mental
position,
that
logically
all
judgments
are
non-
existential.
According
to
this
view, then, there
is
conceivable
a
pure logic, the complete statement of the ultimate con ditions to which apprehension of qualities, as the same or subject, and of the consequences that flow Within the realm of from such apprehension. necessarily The pure logic we have absolute security and certainty. is
different,
laws to which thought necessarily conforms in dealing with identical or non-identical contents presented to it are at once the primary and the ultimate tests of truth.
laws whatsoever absolute truth
is
attainable
From
must be
these
derived,
and absolute certainty can only be assigned to deductions Whenever we pass from the region of pure from them. thought to regions of more concrete matter, we find that such measure of absolute certainty as may there be attain able depends on the completeness of conformity between the most general laws of such matter and the laws of pure The elementary axioms of abstract arithmetic thought.
correspondence with the laws of pure thought, and are indeed derivatives from these laws. Number rests on logical discrimination or discrimination by pure thought, and its typical forms and laws are derivable from exhibit
a perfect
the conditions of pure thought
schema
of
difference.
when
applied to the abstract
The author has nowhere discussed b
PREFACE
xii
with such fulness as the nature of the question demands, the connection between geometrical axioms and the laws of
on which are to be rested the cer thought, and the grounds of geometrical reasoning. tainty and universality There follows from the view thus described an immediate as a logical doctrine, consequence which, when expressed the author s name. with has become familiarly associated is deductive in char All or, more exactly, all proof
reasoning,
and involves general propositions of absolute certainty. Proof is the more exact and appropriate term, for it re
acter,
mains within the limits of
logical science or
pure thought whereas the term reasoning is vaguely extended to cover the natural, psychological process of arriving from data at a a therefore, of natural fact, about which conclusion, ;
process,
the psychologist, not the logician, has to concern himself. The generality of the principle involved in any proof is not to
be construed after the concrete fashion, as an assertion
found
to hold
and possibly good about a number of concrete,
not exhausted, particulars.
It is either the
quasi-concrete
an established identity of qualities, or the a summary expression of exhaustive enumeration of strictly expression of
limited collection of instances.
a numerical identity. synthetical
In
It is either a qualitative or
strictness, indeed,
proposition which
is
no concrete or
more than a
collective
number of observed cases, can expression for a determinate Whenever we pass beyond the pure ever possess certainty. laws of thought, with their numerical derivatives, or beyond the statement of actually observed fact, we are in the region of assumption
achieved
is
to
The utmost that can be and probability. determine with what degree of probability the we make can be held. The rules for
general assumptions
numerical in character, and estimating such probability are of the laws of thought. possess all the certainty
PREFACE The range O
of assured
xin
knowledge O
is
thus of narrow extent
compared with the indefinite expanse of concrete exist But within that range it possesses absolute certainty. ence. as
There and there only consideration
of
is
So soon as the
proof possible. existence
concrete
enters
in,
we
are
dependent on the hazardous data of intuitive experience, as to which we can never feel assured that they contain all that
is
Within the region
required for complete insight.
concrete existence, reasoning, in the strict sense,
is
of
impossible.
All apparent reasoning in which data and conclusions are assertions about concrete fact is hypothetical in character, and the hypotheses made, however various in concrete ex pression, are essentially the
same
in all cases,
viz.
assump
tions that the concrete propositions correspond perfectly to
the conditions of pure abstract thought.
know
It
is
impossible
they do correspond but, knowing the types of valid inference, we can gauge by the us
for
to
accurately that
;
which they approximate
rules of probability the extent to
the desired correspondence. described,
is
not a special
to
Induction, then, as ordinarily
mode
of reasoning.
Psychologic
ally, we may no doubt pass in thought without further ojiery from isolated particulars to a generality but particulars can ;
no way substantiate what is not contained in them. There is only one method of reasoning the deductive, and it is used in concrete material as in abstract thought.
in
But
in
the
former case
w e have T
to
note that
our data
involve assumptions that cannot be completely justified, and that are only more or less probable in a partially determinable degree.
Xow
it is
between
the
the pointed opposition which the author
narrow but secure
thought and the wide sphere
of
region of
more
or
pure, less
makes
abstract
probable assumptions regarding concrete existence, an opposition in-
PREFACE
xiv
and springing from his conception of pure logic, that constitutes the real difference between his views and In the long run both agree in respect to the those of Mill.
volved
iii
character of existence.
vaguely called knowledge of concrete Neither accorded absolute certainty to the pro
what
is
positions composing
that
Though Mill un
knowledge.
doubtedly uses language in respect to so-called knowledge of nature that implies the possibility of attaining certainty
may fairly be urged that such expressions are to the qualifications necessitated by the general with taken be doctrine, that knowledge of nature can never amount to absol there, yet it
knowledge of nature constituted all our knowledge, and within the realm of con crete existence lay the province and process of reasoning.
ute certainty.
But, in Mill
s
view, this
Apparently abstract propositions, such as those of mathematics, were only abstracted from the concrete particulars, and had no other foundation for their certainty than the concrete experi
ence from which they were drawn, no superior generality than followed from the relatively greater ease with which
The laws they could be disentangled from concrete details. of pure thought, in which Jevons found the rules of absolutely certain
true
knowledge and reasoning, were by Mill regarded
but
rather valueless
language, and
having
divorced from concrete
no fact.
prescripts
function
A
pure
defining of
the
use
as
of
when
significance
logic, or logic of
con
language, he did, indeed, sistency in the employment admit to be possible, but in no way accorded to it special of
importance or viewed it as more than a result of abstraction The possibility of an inde from actual concrete reasoning. 1 for it he did not so much deny as ignore. foundation pendent
The
difference
is
as complete as could well be.
To the
1 The most explicit utterance of Mill on these points, which he rarely dis 461. cusses, are in the Examination of Hamilton (third edition), pp. 457,
XV
PREFACE
one thinker, the theory of reasoning was a well-rounded, independent whole, narrow it might he in extent, hut resting
on principles of absolute certainty, nut necessarily connected with any hypothesis as to the way in which knowledge of concrete fact is obtained or increased, and supplying the final standard by which evidence in concrete matters is to he tested. To the other, the theory of reasoning was part of the general doctrine of the ways in which an intelligence receiving its data as isolated empirical particulars gradually advanced to
knowledge, to the establishment of general propositions, and to criticism of the grounds on which these rested.
According
the
to
first
view, reasoning, in the strict sense of
the term, was confined to the region of analytical thinking, viz. stringent cogency of and what accompanies reasoning, was possible only of absolute conclusion, certainty proof,
According to the other view, reasoning no significance save in synthetical thinking, characteristics were such as could be obtained under
within that region.
had
and
little its
or
the conditions of synthetical thinking. It
was
inevitable, then, that
from the author
view in logical theory, the apparent attempt of Lofjic to is
show how general knowledge
fallacy,
the
outer
aspect
of
in Mill
point of s
System
in concrete material
gained and established, should present
doomed from the
s
itself as
a logical
outset to failure, and only securing
coherence by skilful
concealment of
For by knowledge the author underlying inconsistency. understood what is perfectly conformable to the pure laws of thought
and
is
warranted completely by them
attainable,
To admit, then as analytical thinking. do, the ultimate uncertainty of what is called
therefore, only in
Mill seemed to
knowledge of nature, and, while ignoring the pure laws of thought, to work out a theory of evidence on which know ledge might
rest,
was
to
occupy a wholly untenable
position.
PREFACE
xvi
of view adopted in the regards the general point examination of Mill s philosophy, the motives with
As
proposed
which
it
was undertaken, and the end aimed
at,
the author
of the series of articles
has given full explanation in the contributed to the Contemporary Review. first
Among
his
MSS.
are found portions of the sections intended to serve as the o-eneral introduction to the whole and as a summary con-
O
These contain in somewhat more detail the ex
elusion.
in the first article, and also planatory matter already given the to as some indication arrangement of topics to be followed It would appear that after the the completed work. o-eneral introduction the author purposed dealing in sueO cession with Mill s Essay on Religion, with his views on in
Free Will and Necessity, with his peculiar reformation of the Utilitarian Ethics, with his doctrine of Inseparable Associa tion,
and then with the main object of attack, the Logical The criticism of the logic was the central, the
Theory.
fundamental portion of the work given
;
the other discussions were
as illustrative confirmation of the
estimate
formed
mind was essentially illogical. by the author, that Mill s from the MSS., in what be however determined, It cannot these sections would have been arranged, nor is there
way
any indication given
as
to
the final
order in which the
various topics falling under logical theory would have been taken.
Taking logical,
we
first
into consideration the sections not specifically
find
the
among
MSS.
collected materials, with
occasional written out portions of statement, relating to Mill s on Religion, to his view on Free Will, and to his
Essay
As regards the Essay doctrine of Inseparable Association. the it is clear from on fragments, as also from a Religion, reference to the topic in the
Review, that the author
s
first article in
the Contemporary
intention was to dwell upon and
PREFACE enforce the apparent inconsistency between the two passages 1 from the essay in the said article.
quoted
The
section on Free Will
and
by a
Necessity begins
written out statement of Sir William Hamilton position, that
s
fairly
familial-
either conception, Liberty or Necessity, leads
an ultimate inconceivability, a position the which, on the whole, seems to have been accepted by in on the fragmentary The remaining MSS. subject, author.
when developed
to
remarks and references to passages in Mill
s
writings, enable
us to see the drift argument, that Mill, while pro makes admissions which are fessing the Determinist view, of
his
wholly irreconcilable with
it
and practically nullify
it.
out for closer scrutiny are specific admissions singled
The two
in
the number, closely connected, the one more psychological, view is the first The in character. other more
metaphysical
expressed most chap,
ii),
definitely in the System
of Loyic (Book
vi,
that while the actions of the individual can only be
as the outcome of his character, desire to modify regarded O that character must be recognised as a factor in its formation. The second is contained in the distinction drawn in the 2
between Nature
posthumous Essays of thin o
"s
is
with
all their attributes
human
apart from
as
the entire system
and Nature
intervention.
as that
which
The author s intention
seems to have been to press the arguments that, according to the principles 011
character
must
even
if
desire
to
modify
be treated like all other desires as a derivative
not as original and determining, and for one purpose man be severed from nature
and determined that,
which Mill proceeds,
fact,
The essence of religion is the strong Three Essays on Relirjion, p. 109. and earnest direction of the emotions and desires towards an ideal object, as of the highest excellence, and as rightfully paramount over all 1
recognised
from poetry, Ibid. p. 103 Religion, as distinguished these whether know to conceptions of the imaginative is the product craving have realities answering to them in some other world than ours.
selfish objects of desire.
-
P. 46.
PREFACE
xviil
and regarded as intervening in ciples, his
it,
activity of intervention
on Mill
s
general prin
can be contemplated in
no other light than as a fact subject to natural law.
If
any
other significance be assigned to the desire or intervening
the
activity,
Mill
only result
s ethical
theory
Utilitarian doctrine
is
is
is
utter inconsistency
criticised, so far as
of theory.
the statement of
concerned, in the fourth of the articles
The MS. fragments
published in the Contemporary Review.
entitled Morals indicate that the author purposed also dis
cussing Mill
view on the relation between Intention and
s
Motive, but do not of the points aimed
suffice to yield a fairly precise
statement
at.
Under the heading
MetapJujsics a criticism
is
projected of
The frag the explanation Mill offers of Necessary Truths. ments show the author s intention to have been to examine the doctrine of Inseparable Association with special reference to
the
fundamental axioms of number, with a .view to
exposing the inconsistency between the character allowed to these axioms by Mill and the theory of their empirical origin through inseparable association.
A Mill
very large portion of the MSS.
s
The
theory.
logical
several
doubt, the arrangement of topics to be treatment.
ment
We
have been unable
as to this arrangement,
is
concerned with
sections
made
indicate,
no
in the final
to find a definite
state
and the order in which they
are here referred to rests only on occasional expressions of
On
those
the whole they fall into two main groups, dealing with Mill s theory of the syllogism, those
which
criticise
the author.
methods.
System
of
Particulars
the doctrine of causation and the experimental
To the Logic, to
first
group belong the sections headed
Pctitio
Principii,
Propositions,
The fragments forming these various dates, and so far as any
Particulars.
sections are evidently of
General
xix
PREFACE fairly
written out portions
overlap one another.
are
concerned, they frequently
The following seems
the main line of criticism
to
have been
:
in Beginning with a pointed reference to the extreme of Mill s view consistency between the admitted novelty of
made in the Syllogism and the disclaimer of any novelty on the author dwells the Preface to the System of Logic, of Logic as expressed by general conception of the function Mill.
Logic
the Science of Proof or Evidence.
is
far as belief professes to
Logic
is
be founded on proof, the
In so office of
supply a test for ascertaining whether or not the
to
Logic neither observes, nor invents, 1 nor discovers; but judges. Agreeing on the whole with this conception of the function of logic, but indicating a belief
is
w ell founded. r
doubt as to whether even within the limits of the intro duction to the System of Logic, Mill does not use expressions irreconcilable with it, the author proceeds to say that he will
begin by showing that Mill upholds at one and the same 1 ) Logic is the science time the four following doctrines ( The of Proof or Evidence. Syllogism is the only mode (2) :
of reasoning
ness of an
by which we can assure ourselves of the correct (3) The Syllogism is nevertheless
inference.
"
of and imposed by the arbitrary fiat The Syllogism is at the same time necessarily "
entirely optional, (4)
logicians.
a fallacy of the
Turning
kind called Petitio Principii.
2
to the fourth of these doctrines the
author states
in opposition to it fully Mill s familiar position, and urges that the conclusion is not contained in the major premiss
At the same but only in the major and minor combined. time he recognises that such an answer by no means exhausts the question, and that the real foundation for Mill 1
System of Logic (seventh edition), vol. From the author s MS.
i,
pp.
8, 9.
s
view of
PREFACE
XX the syllogism
is
to be sought in his treatment of the general
From
proposition.
comment and
the passages selected for
on them,
from the fragments of criticism
evident that
is
it
the author intended to insist that Mill regards the general proposition in two aspects, distinct and wholly irreconcilable, and that his inconsistency in at once rejecting the syllogism
and allowing
it
to be the only
way
in
which we can assure
ourselves of the correctness of inference arises from the fact is brought to bear the other pre while in the formal discussion of syllogism, dominates in the treatment of Induction and of the Deduc
that one aspect of the general proposition
The general
Method.
tive
proposition, Mill insists, looking
from one point of view, is no more than the particulars it is based on and summarises particulars, and contains
at it it
;
into particulars
it
Viewed
resolvable.
is
general proposition as major premiss,
in this light, the
whether
of a conclusion contained in
reasoning in which
The form
established.
so used, the
is
it
it is
truth be
which the truth
or assumed, can not be the ground from
known
its
Syllogism,
is
of
clearly
But the general proposition has common in Mill s treatment. The
guilty of petitio principii.
another aspect, not less general
it
aspect
summary
has
its
greatest importance
of observed particulars.
and instructions unforeseen cases. case
is
It
for us, is
making Wherever an inference is
Data
to
sufficient to establish
are sufficient to establish a class of instances.
1
inferences
inferences
valid, the conclusion
this
more than a
embodies
innumerable
for
well founded,
general proposition.
If,
and in
proposition, as a rejmlt__pjLirjikcence,
in
a particular is
already a
one instance
1
then, reasoning or proof cannot legitimately advance
The author evidently projected a
special criticism on
Mill
s
view of a
the notion of which, as denned by Mill, seemed to him to involve the same ambiguity and inconsistency as the treatment of general propositions. The two questions are, indeed, one substantially. clans,
PREFACE from
a
may
be
to
proposition, but
general
established
established
?
how
to
s
it
Mill,
proposition
general
becomes
necessary
common form
the
is
of
the validity of a general conclusion
is
Consideration of the
criticism of Mill
a
if
reasoning,
ask what, according
reasoning, and
is
by
xxi
well-known
first
question
doctrine, that
is,
all
in brief,
reasoning
fundamentally inference from particulars to particulars
consideration of the second leads to a review of
;
salient
many
Induction. points in Mill s theory of
The discussion of the view that inference ticulars
to
is
particulars
incomplete.
is
from par
From what
remains,
seems that the author would have pressed the argument that though, in point of fact, we may and do pass mentally
it
from particulars to particulars, the process combination of plicated and precarious deduction,
indefinitely
far
factory proof or evidence, at
all,
induction
removed, therefore, from
and the rules of which,
must involve reference
a
is itself
if
to considerations that go
com and satis
possible
beyond
In other words, admitting that reasoning from particulars. be an actual, psychical process, particulars to particulars may the author maintained that the identification of the conditions of a natural process with the
conditions of proof was not
Mill s general only an error, but wholly inconsistent with the of not ways in which conception of logic as the science
we do reason but of the rules of Some portion of the criticism is
contained in
the
third
valid reasoning. of the theory of Induction
of the
articles
from the Con
in this temporary Review, and in the fragment, printed What remains was volume, on the Method of Difference. Baconian Methodj arranged by the author under the heads
and Causation.
In reference to the
first
point, the author
draws attention to the characjte^of_Mjirs objection to the use of Induction as described_._by_Bacon _and to his insisti
PREFACE
xxii
ence on the necessity for general reasoning. In this, and generally in all that Mill has described under the head of the Deductive Method, the author finds what at once corrects
and
destroys the erroneous conceptions of reasoning as inference from particulars to particulars, and of Induction as a process whereby we arrive at general results from 1
particular premisses.
The
section on causation
was evidently intended to take up in succession the definition of cause and of the causal relation offered
by
Mill, the assumption of the universality of
causation, and the grounds on
which its universality was rested. In examining the definition of cause, the author draws atten
tion to the ambiguity of Mill
s language, which allows a two be easily put upon the all-important An invariable terms, invariable antecedent and consequent.
fold interpretation to
sequence asserted might mean, he points out, either that
x invariably follows X, x invariably follows JT, x is invariably preceded by X.
or that while
The language employed, he resolved, and indeed tends interpretation.
It is
the ambiguity un favour the second mode of
insists, leaves
to
only when, at a later stage, plurality
of causes is formally introduced that
we
learn
how
abstract
our interpretation of invariable antecedent must be. The author s MSS. contain no further criticism of this point, but his
view on the subject can readily be gathered from
published works.
his
2
On
the second point, the universality of causation, the author contrasts at length passages in which the certainty of general knowledge is assumed, and is stated to depend on 1
2
See on this point Principles of Science (second edition), pp. 265, 508. See Principles of Science (second edition), pp. 222, 226, 737 sqq.
PREFACE
xxni
the law of causation, with the passage
:
in
which Mill
asserts
the uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise law of causation, must be received not as a law of
that
called the
the universe, but of that portion of the range of our
means
of sure
it
only which
is
within
observation, with a reason
able degree of extension to adjacent cases.
As
regards the third point, the treatment of the grounds
assumption of a universal law of causation coincides throughout with the criticism of Inductio per cnumcrationcm simplicem contained in the third of the articles on J. S. Mill s
for the
Philosophy.
To
and necessarily inadequate summary of the projected work, it must be added that only contact
this brief
author
s
with the MSS. can convey any
fair idea of
the painstaking
and conscientious manner in which the scrutiny of Mill s Whatever opinion may be writings had been carried out. formed of the value logical
of the general objections
taken to Mill
s
and philosophical doctrines, or of the appropriateness imposed by the author on his criticism, it must
of the limits
be acknowledged that he took every precaution against over sight or hasty judgment, and that his every utterance was
supported by the fullest evidence attainable.
The investiga
tion of the fundamental principles of reasoning is a problem
and complexity that exhaustive criticism of one distinguished logician by another must always be hailed of such sublety
with satisfaction.
It is not the least part of the severe loss
which science and philosophy incurred by the author s un timely death, that he was prevented from utilising, as he only could do, the materials he had collected. 1
System of Loyic, Book
iii,
chap, xxi,
sec. 4,
concluding paragraph.
CONTENTS PART
I
WRITINGS ON THE THEORY OF LOGIC TAGE I.
PURE LOGIC OR THE LOGIC OF QUALITY APART FROM QUANTITY.
II.
(1864)
THE SUBSTITUTION OF
.
SIMILARS.
(1869)
ON THE MECHANICAL PERFORMANCE
III.
ENCE.
(From
.
.
.
.
1
79
OF LOGICAL INFER
the Philosophical Transactions, 1870).
137
ON A GENERAL SYSTEM OF NUMERICALLY DEFINITE
IV.
REASONING.
(From the Memoirs
Literary and Philosophical
Society,
PART JOHN STUART MILL (Portions of
J /
I.
II.
\f III.
IV. ^-
V.
S
of the Manchester
1870)
II
PHILOSOPHY TESTED
an Examination
of J. S. Mill
ON GEOMETRICAL REASONING ON RESEMBLANCE
UTILITARIANISM
(I.
s
Philosophy)
.
.
s
.
.
.
OF DIFFERENCE
MSS.)
199
.222
IV. from the Contemporary Review the Author
.
.
.
THE EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
ON THE METHOD
.173
.
;
.
.
.
.
V. from
250 268 295
PART
I
WRITINGS OX THE THEORY OF LOGIC
PUEE LOGIC OR THE
LOGIC OF QUALITY APART FROM QUANTITY WITH REMARKS ON BOOLE
S
SYSTEM
AND ON THE RELATION OF LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS
INTRODUCTION IT
is
the purpose of this
work
to
show that Logic assumes a
new degree of simplicity, precision, generality and power J when comparison in quality is treated apart from .
-.
.
any
reference to quantity. 1.
It is familiarly
known
to
logicians that a term
must
be considered with respect both to the individual things denotes, and the qualities, circumstances, or attributes
it it
or implies as The belonging to those things. of individuals denoted forms the breadth or extent of the meaning of the term; the qualities or attributes connotes,
number
connoted form the depth, comprehension, or
meaning
of
the term.
however, are closely
intent,
of the
The extent and intent of meaning, related, and in a reciprocal manner.
The more numerous the qualities connoted by a term, the fewer in general the individuals which it can denote the one dimension, so to speak, of the meaning being given, the other follows, and cannot be given or taken at will. ;
Extent intent(
meanin
PURE LOGIC Logicians have generally thought that a proposition express the relations of extent and intent of the terms at one and the same time, and as regarded in the same 2.
Expression vsuaiiy
mus t
light.
The systems of
when compared with
logic
deduced from such a view,
the system which
may
otherwise be
had, seem to lack simplicity and generality. 3. It is here held that a proposition expresses the result of Separation necessary. a comparison and judgment of the sameness or difference of The meaning of terms, cither in intent or extent of meaning. in the one dimension of meaning, however, is not It is independent of the judgment in the other dimension.
judgment
only then judgment and reasoning in one dimension which Judgment and properly expressed in a simple system.
is
other dimension will he and must be be expressed in a numerical or quanti implied. may tative system corresponding to the qualitative system, but
reasoning in
the
It
its
expression in the same system destroys simplicity. I do not wish to express any opinion here as to the
nature of a system of logic in extent, nor as to its precise connection with the pure system of logic of quality. 4. Eeasoning in quality and quantity, in intent or extent of meaning, being considered apart, it seems obvious that the comparison of things in quality, with respect to all their points of sameness and difference, gives the primary and
Primary system.
It even seems likely most general system of reasoning. that such a system must comprehend all possible and conceivable kinds of reasoning, since it treats of any and All every way in which things may be same or different. on is founded the laws of and sameness probably reasoning difference which form the basis of the following system. 5. My present task, however, is to show that all and more than all the ordinary processes of logic may be combined in a system founded on comparison of quality only, without
Present task.
.
Relation Boole s
to
reference to logical quantity. 6. Before proceeding I
have to acknowledge that in a is founded on that of degree Boole, as stated in his admirable and highly
considerable
Logic.
Professor
this
system
INTRODUCTION
5 1
The forms of Mathematical Analysis of Logic, in reached be fact, by divesting his system my system may, of a mathematical dress, which, to say the least, is not original
The system being restored
to its proper that not be inferred, Logic is a part of simplicity, may in Professor Boole s is almost as Mathematics, implied are rather derivatives of Mathematics that the but writings,
essential
to
it.
it
All the interesting analogies or samenesses of logical and mathematical reasoning which may be pointed out, are
Logic.
surely reversed matics.
by making Logic the dependent
of
Mathe
By George Boole, LL.D. London, Investigation of the Laws of Thought. 1854. Frequent reference will be made to this work in the following pages. 1
CHAPTEE
I
OF TERMS
Of things and their names.
7.
Pure
logic
their sameness or
arises
from a comparison of
difference
things as
to
in any quality or circumstance
whatever.
In discourse we refer to things by the aid of marks, names, or terms, which are also, as it were, the handles by which the mind grasps and retains its thoughts about things.
Thus
correct thought about things
becomes in discourse the
Logic, while treating only of names, of sameness and difference of their relations the ascertaining meanings, treats indirectly, as alone it can, of the samenesses correct use of names.
Meaning of name.
and differences of things. 8. A term taken in intent has for its meaning the whole infinite series of qualities and circumstances which a thingOf these qualities or circumstances some may be possesses.
known and form ing
;
the description or definition of the the infinite remainder are unknown.
mean
Among the circumstances, indeed, of a thing, is the fact of its being denoted by a given name, but we may speak of a thing, of which only the name is known, as having a name unknown meaning. The meaning of every name, then, is either unknown or But we may speak of a term that is more or less known. more or less known as being simply Icnown.
of
Qualities infinite in
number.
the qualities and circumstances of a thing is to be counted everything that may be said of it, affirmatively 9.
Among
Any
or negatively.
that possible quality or circumstance
can be thought of either does or does not apply to any given
and therefore forms, either affirmatively or negatively, a quality or circumstance of the thing. Concerning any of statements number infinite be an there may thing, then, thing,
made, or qualities predicated. 10.
When we
assign a .
name .,
to a thing, with ,.,
knowledge
.
.
or circumstances, of, and regard to, certain of its qualities of name the that name is equally anything else of exactly For there is and circumstances. the same known qualities
Relation
f
meanings.
nothing in the name to determine it to the one thing rather than the other. Any name, then, must be the name in
anything and of all things agreeing in the qualities or circumstances which form its known meaning in intent, extent of
and in
this system.
well to point out that all our names or Present , ... , meaning. terms bear a universal quantity when regarded in extent, it must be understood, and constantly borne in mind, that 11.
Though
it is
-1
L
-I
-j.
further reference to the meaning of a term in extent or quantity of individuals, is excluded in these pages.
The primary and only present meaning of a name or term set of qualities, attributes, -properties, or circu ma stanccs, of thiny unknown or partly known. will be used to mean name, or any combination Term Term 12. and words describing the qualities and circumof names is
a certain
stances of 13.
a.
thing.
The terms
any combination
system may be made to express samenesses and differences in quality,
of this
of
Generality (
^
fe
circumstance, number, magnitude, degree, term or space. quantity, opposition, or distance in time in all may thus represent the qualities of a thing or person the complexity of real existence, so well and fully defined that
kind,
attribute,
A
we cannot suppose there are, or are likely to many circumstances. Such
the same in so
two things a term would
be,
non- Proper correspond to the singular, proper, non-attributive, or n( Such names are names of the old logic.
connotatire
accordingly by no means excluded from this system
;
and
PURE LOGIC here held that the old distinction of connotative and non-connotative names is wholly erroneous and unfounded.
it
is
If there is
any distinction to be drawn,
it is
that singular,
proper, or so-called non-connotative terms, are more full of connotation or meaning in intent or quality than others, instead of being devoid of such meaning. Condition of same ness of
meaning.
14.
As
logic only considers the relations of
meaning
of
terms, as expressed within a piece of reasoning, the special meaning of any term is of no account, provided that the
same term have
the
same meaning throughout any one
piece,
of
reasoning.
Thus, instead of the nouns and adjectives, to each of
which a
we
shall
special meaning is assigned in common discourse, use certain letters, A, B, C, D, U, .
.
.
.
V
.
.
.
each standing for a special term, or a definite meaning, and for any term or meaning, always under the above condition. Terms
known
15. or
unknown.
Our
common
like
terms, A, B, C,
discourse,
known
be either
may
the
or
terms of
unknown
in
It is the work of logic to show what relations of meaning. sameness and difference between unknown and known terms may make the unknown terms known.
Were
it
not to explain ignotum per iynotius, we might is the algebra of kind or quality, the calculus of
say that logic
known and unknown speaking
universal
essentially negative quantities)
unknown Symbols ofplain meaning.
16.
algebra (more strictly does not recognise the calculus of known and
which is
quantities.
Let
it
be borne in mind that the
duced, are in is
letters
A, B, C,
etc.,
marks -f 0, and = afterwards to be intro The term A, for no way mysterious symbols. a abbreviation for any convenient merely
as well as the
instance,
as
qualities,
arithmetic,
,
,
ordinary term of language, or set of terms, such as Red, or the Lords Commissioners for executing the office of the Lord
High Admiral of England. Again, + is merely a mark
substituted for the sake of
clearness, for the conjunctions and, cither, or, etc., of
common
TERMS The mark = some equivalent.
language. as,
or
is
9
merely the copula
The meaning
of
is,
0,
or
is
same
whatever
it
There is con exactly be, may also be expressed in words. in this nothing more symbolic or mysterious sequently system than in
common
language.
CHAPTER
II
OF PROPOSITIONS 17.
Pro2)osiS~
fined.
A proposition is a statement of the sameness or difference
f mean i ng f two
terms, that is, of the sameness or difference and circumstances connoted by each term. According as a proposition states sameness or differ-
of the qualities 18.
Affirma-
cnce >
^leqative its
^
19.
known Truth and Slty
ca^ ec^ affirmative or negative. is the purpose or use of a proposition to make the meaning of a term that is otlierwise unknovjn. *s
It
A
proposition is said to be true when the meanings terms are same or different, as stated otherwise it is called false or untrue. As logic deals with things only 20.
of
its
;
through terms, it cannot ascertain whether a proposition is true or false, but only whether two or more propositions are or are not true together, under the condition of meaning of terms ( 14). Notation of
21.
We
sameness
f
denote by the copula is, or by the mark =, the meaning of the terms on the two sides of a
proposition.
For the present we shall speak only of affirmative pro which are of superior importance and when not
positions,
otherwise specified, proposition
;
may
be taken to
mean
affirma
tive proposition. Conversion
qfpropositwns.
A proposition is simply convertible. The propositions and B = A are the statement; either of the terms A and B is the same in meaning as the other, un22.
A=B
distinguishable except in name.
PROPOSITIONS
1 1
This simple conversion comprehends both the simple con version, and convcrsio per accidens of the school logic.
One proposition and one known term may make known One term known unknown term. from one From A = B, so far as we know B, that is, know itsproposition. we know A, we can meaning, we can learn A so far as 23.
one
,,
,
4
;
learn B.
We
know samely of both sides of a proposition know of either. The same might be said of we whatever thus
uncertain or obscure knowledge.
which the Useless m proposition between any two terms of identical T TI* or same as known ditlerent, is propo meanings are otherwise For it cannot serve the purpose of a proposition sitions useless. , , excluded. ., Such is any proposition between a term and itselt, (
A
24.
_
...
,,
19).
A = A, B = B
These useless propositions are called Identical. They state the condition of all reasoning, but we know it without the statement. as
A is
(
14).
proposition repeated, or a converted proposition (S 22), mere convenience of memory,
also useless, except for the
or ready apprehension.
CHAPTEE
III
OF DIRECT INFERENCE
Law
of
thought and things, that things same which are same thing are the same as each other. More briefly SAME AS SAME ARE SAME. Hence the first law of logic that terms which are same in meaning as the same term, are the same in meaning as each other. It is in the nature of
25.
as the
obvious, is analogous to Euclid s first notion, that things which are equal to the same thing, are equal to each other. Things are called equal which are same in magnitude, but what is true of such
This law,
sameness,
is
is
Meaning of
is
common
may
things
laws of
it
axiom, or
also
true of sameness in any
be same or different.
Euclid
s
which geometrical law
way
in
but one case of the general law.
26. Logic proceeds by laws, and is bound by them. And YOT logic must treat names as thought treats things.
locjic.
.
.
the laws of logic state certain samenesses or uniformities in our ways of thinking, and are of self-evident truth.
showncind defined.
When
27.
Direct l
mem ^er f
two affirmative propositions are same in one each, the other members may be stated to be same.
From A = B, B = C, which are the same in the member For A and B, we may form the new proposition, A = C. C being each stated to be the same as B, may by the law of
sameness be stated to be the same as each other.
A
proposition got
got by
by the Law of Sameness is said and is called a direct inferent,
direct inference,
common
language, a
direct inference.
to be or,
in
DIRECT INFERENCE 28.
Propositions from which an inference anc^ are given or taken as
called 2}rcm/iscs
13
is
drawn
the
basis
are Pre of
>
not concerned with the truth or falsity reasoning. Logic of premises or inference, except as regards the truth or 20, 37). falsity of one with the other (j 29. An expression for a term consists of any other term is
which by premises we know
to
be the same in meaning
with that term. In inferring a new proposition from two premises Eiiminnare said to eliminate or remove the member wdiich is the
30.
we r
same
in the
From
two premises.
two jwewmcs we
infer one new proposition. meant that we always can. 31. Propositions
are
may By
said
eliminate only one term, and saying that we may, it is not to
be related to each other
which have a same or common member, or which are so and so on. related to other propositions so related In other words, any two propositions are related which form part of a series or chain of propositions, in which each ;
proposition
is
Terms
related to the adjoining ones or one. are said to be related which occur in
Related 2
^
3
2
defined.
one
Related
same, or in any J related propositions. 33. From two related premises and one known term we
defined.
32.
Use of 1f
sy terms, and not more. may From A = B and B = C, we learn any two of A, B. C, when the third is known. 34. From any scries of related premises, and one known Series of reimses term we may learn as many unknown terms as there are P = = = = = D E Thus from A B C F, we may learn premises. For each useful any five terms when the sixth is known.
learn two
unknown
1
-
-
may render one unknown term known 19). Between each two adjoining premises one term may be eliminated, becoming known in one premise, and rendering another term known in the other. There must at last remain a single proposition containing two terms, each of which occurs only in one premise. 35. The number of related premises must l/c one less than
proposition
(.^
PURE LOGIC Number of the number of different terms. and positions cannot be all related related terms
premises.
If
be
it
still
the pro
less,
be greater, some of the because be must useless, they must lie between premises terms otherwise known to be same by inference. It will be remarked that systems of mathematical pro ;
if it
positions or equations with known and unknown quantities are perfectly analogous in their properties to logical pro positions. Irrelevant
terms
and
premises.
When
a related premise contains a term or member not relevant to the purpose of the reasoning, this term is and for every such eliminated by neglecting the premise 36.
;
In regard both to premise neglected a term is eliminated. related and unrelated premises and their terms, the neglect of all irrelevant terms and premises may be considered a process of elimination which accompanies all thought. Science of Science.
37. Inference is judgment of judgments, and ascertains the sameness of samenesses. with B, and the same B with When in comparing
C,
we judge
that
A A = B and B = C,
we
obtain science, or
reasoned knowledge of things, as distinguished from the But when we judge mere knowledge of sense or feeling. = = and B the C to be the judgments same, as regards = Science. C, we obtain Science of C, with the judgment
A
A
A
Here
the true province of logic, long called Scientia Hence it is that logic is concerned not with Scientiarum. is
the truth of propositions per se ( 20), but only with the truth of one as depending on others. SCIENCE OP SCIENCE {A SCIENCE
= B = C} = A = {
A=B
THINGS Form and matter.
B=C
A
B
38. Here we find the clear meaning form and matter of thought.
( (
Things
of the distinction of
Form
Sameness of Samenesses
Sameness of things
C
REASONING JUDGMENT APPREHENSION
~ ,, Off thought.
Matter
,
Form Matter
II
,
CHAPTEE
IV
OF COMBINATION OF TEEMS
In discourse, when several names are placed together Addition by side, the meaning of the joint term is sometimes the f mean
39.
side
~
sum
of the
1 meanings of the separate terms. So in our system, when two or more terms are placed tot/ether, the joint term must have as its meaning the sum of
the mecminys of the separate terms. These must be thought of together and in one. 40. Any terms placed together will be said to form with ComUnan e respect to any of those separate terms a combination or comf
^
7
7
binccl
term.
-ITT--
fined.
i
With respect
other terms they may be called simply a term. For it must be remembered that any single term, A, 13, C, etc., is not more single in than to all
meaning
a combination. 1
I shall here consider only the cases of combination in which the com bined term means the added mcaninrjs of the separate terms. The same forms of reasoning apply, as I believe, mutatis mutandis, to any cases of combination under some such wider law as this
some
such extension can logic be made to embrace the Only by major part of all ordinary reasoning, which has never yet been embraced by it, save so far as this may have been done in some of Professor De s latest
Morgan But to show how such an extension may be grafted on to my system must be reserved for a future opportunity. In most relations it is obvious that the order of terms in relation is no longer indifferent (41). Concerning some inferences by combination, see Thomson s Outlines writings.
87, 88.
PURE LOGIC
!6
Order of
Uon
ind-if-
The meaning of a combination of terms
41.
is the
same in
whatever order the terms be combined.
Thus
ferent.
AB = BA ABCD = BACD = DCAB, ;
and
so on.
For the order of the terms can at most affect only the order in which we think of them, and in things themselves there is no such order of qualities and circumstances Law
of
simplicity.
(Boole, p. 30). combination of a term with itself is the 42.
A
meani ng with
tJie
AA = A, AAA = A,
Thus
same in
term alone.
and
so on.
Also, a combination of terms is not altered by combina = Thus tion with the whole or any part of itself.
ABCD
ABCD BCD = A BB CC = C, DD = D. .
.
The coalescence
of
.
CC
.
DD = ABCD,
since
BB = B,
same terms in combination must be
constantly before the reader s mind. This important and self-evident law of logic was first who brought into proper notice by Professor Boole (p. 32), To say good, good," in relation to any subject, remarks "
:
though a cumbrous and useless pleonasm, to say
is
the same as
"
good."
Professor
Boole gave to this
But
as
this
name, on
law the name Law of the one hand, is not
Duality. .... = the general fact, peculiarly adapted to express = A, and is peculiarly adapted to express the fact substitute and the transfer to I ventured have name, 99),
AAAAA A AB+A6
(
a Degree of quality.
new
one.
In the terms as used under the above law there is When required, each no re f erence to degree of quality. in a separate term, con degree of quality may be treated 43.
of the part of its meaning every less degree in Two or more degrees of a same quality logical quality. combination therefore produce the greatest of those degrees. 44. It is in the nature of thought and things that when
taining
Law
of
same parts
as
are
joined
Hence the law
of logic
qualities 1
and wholes.
- -
same.
to
same
qualities
the
wholes arc
COMBINATION Same
17
terms combined with same terms give same combined
terms.
A
= A and Thus, since This self-evident law second axiom. follows
:
B = B, is
a
therefore
AB = BA = AB.
more general case
of Euclid
may, perhaps, be most briefly stated Same parts make same wholes. It
s
as
Same terms being combined ivith both members of a premise, the combinations may be stated as same in a new 45.
ence
comct
*$
tion.
proposition which will be true with the premise. For what is true of terms obviously the same, as A, A, or B, B, must also be true of terms known to be the same = B we in meaning by a premise. infer Thus, from
A
may
AC BC
by combining C with each of A and B. As the number of possible terms which may be combined ==
with the terms of a premise is infinite, there may be drawn an infinite number of inferences by any premise combination.
from
46.
Inferences which
members
may be drawn by combining the two or more premises need not be considered
of
,
Combination
r .
jl
fi
positions.
here.
47.
A
true with for
proposition inferred by combination (45) will be uemmi premise, whatever be the term or terms used
its
combination.
When
^f-^
terms of specific meaning, indeed, ferences.
are selected at random, it will usually happen that the com binations of the inference are unheard-of, absurd, and useless. This does not affect the truth of the inferred proposition, which only asserts that the meaning of the one combination,
whatever
it be, is
the same as the meaning of the other.
In our daily use of specific terms, we constantly use each under the restriction of a number of premises so well 48.
,,
-,
Known
.
to all
persons that it is needless to express them. Terms joined not in accordance with these tacit relations make nonsense. For instance, the impassable difference of
matter and mind renders
it nonsense to join the name of material with that of any any mental attribute, except in a merely metaphorical sense. In that our
order,
inferences
should
always
be C
intelligible
then,
and
useful,
we
T
relati
excluded.
PURE LOGIC should require the expression of all tacit premises connected It is only the several with terms of specific meaning. branches of science, however, that can undertake the
Our inference remains necessary investigations in detail. true, however complicated be the relations of sameness and difference of the terms introduced.
premises which are ought Formation
stated,
But
it is
inference from
not from those which might
be or
to be stated.
When premises contain terms only partially the same, combination of each with the part that is different in the Such other will produce a term completely the same in each. 49.
the
premises may be considered as related ( 31). = C and B = CD, the terms C and Thus, in But the combination of the same. only partially
A
AD = CD, having one one member of B = CD. as
A=C
gives
same
AD = CD = B common
in the premises Again, to eliminate
E = BD, combine each
side
AD = CE, 50.
Useless
of in
D
the
which
:
thus,
B
B
C,
which was
AD = B. A = BC
from the premises
with each side second.
are
with
member completely the Hence we may infer
and eliminate the term
26),
(
CD
D
of the first,
Hence,
and and C with
AD = BCD = CE,
or
does not appear.
From premises which have no term
in
common,
this
process will only give us the inferences which might be had (46) by the direct combination of the respective terms of
Thus A = B BC = BD, whence AD = BC.
the premises.
and C = D give AD = BD, and And we might similarly get
AC = BD. Substitu tion de fined.
51. The following process may be called substitution, and will be seen to give the same inference as the two processes of forming a common term ( 49, 27), and then eliminat
ing
it.
For any
term, or part-term, in one premise, stituted its expression ( 29) in other terms.
In
Thus,
if
be
sub
two members of any premise may be used one in place of the other, wherever either occurs. A = BCD and BC = E, we may in the former
short, the
indifferently,
may
COMBINATION
19
EC its expression E, getting of inference consists in combining 1) with process both sides of BC = E, and eliminating the complete common
A=DE.
premise substitute for
The
full
term
BCD
52.
A=BCD = DE.
thus obtained, so that
We,
may
substitute
for any part of one member of a
Thus, in B, C, D,
the
A = BCD,
we may
i
tioi,
substitute
any one of the one member, for
BC, BD and CD, parts of BCD A, of the other member, inferring
whole,
the
new
propositions
A = ACD A = AD The
(
A = ABD A = AB
of this
validity
Simplicity
42),
and
A = ABC A = AC.
depends on the Laws of and Whole ( 44), as is seen
process
of .Part
by combining each member of the premise with itself. A = BCD we have A. A = BCD.BCD = BCD.D = AD coalescence of same terms, and substitution for BCD by
Thus, from of
its
expression A.
The new proposition thus sides pleonastic,
that
inferred will have one of its with some part of its meaning is, obvious that we cannot, as a general
But it is repeated. substitute for part of one side less than the whole of rule, the other, because we cannot from the premise alone know that the
meaning
of the part-term
in the part of the other
removed
member put
The above process may be
for
is
quite supplied
it.
called intrinsic elimination, to
from the former process of elimination between two premises, which may be called extrinsic elimination, and is seen to be that case of intrinsic elimination in which w e substitute for the whole of one side the whole of the other. distinguish
it
r
In a single premise, intrinsic elimination of a whole
would give only an Intrinsic
member
and useless result. elimination gives no new knowledge, but identical
is
of
constant use in striking out or abstracting terms concerning which we do not desire knowledge, and which are therefore
worse than useless in our
results.
insic
dimina-
proposition the whole of the other.
PURE LOGIC
20
Boole
Professor
s
of
system
believe, equivalent to the above,
may
53.
Failure of elimina-
not at
A
elimination
(p.
99),
is,
I
though the correspondence
sight be apparent.
first
be
term cannot
which
eliminated
intrinsically
The presence of of a proposition. be called a condition of the sameness of
members
occurs in both
such part-term may the remainder of the terms. Sameiy
54.
re-
Terms
are said to
be samely related in a premise
their interchange does not alter the premise. = BC, because Thus, B and C are samely related in
when
A
the premise change.
is
But
A
and
B
A = BCDE
.
(
B = AC. of B, C, two any
premise into
interchange alters the
In
A = CB
41), after their inter are not samely related, because their
the same,
.
.
D
.
.
.
.
are
and may be interchanged. Of 55. samely related terms, an expression for the one ^s t j ie same as the expression for another after the two terms in question have been interchanged. samely related
Inference concerning tioo such.
Concerning several.
,
i
-i
several terms are samely related, we obtain fae expressions concerning the rest from the expression for next one successively changing each term into the 56.
When by
any
the terms are kept in some fixed order. It is evident that we may always interchange the terms in any part of a problem, provided we do so throughout the And in those cases in which the premises problem ( 14).
when
remain unchanged thereby, we evidently get several infer This method of interchanges ences from the same premises. is
Mathe-
familiar to mathematicians.
be obvious that a mathematical term or in its laws quantity of several factors is strictly analogous 57.
It
to a logical
will
combined term, excluding
the
Law
of Simplicity.
CHAPTEE V OF SEPARATION OF TERMS 58.
It
in
is
from same
maimng
the nature of thought and things that when Law of same Qualities are taken, the re- mmeu hole of qualities *
sets
sets
are the same
or,
;
more
briefly
Same parts
from same wholes leave same parts. Hence the logical law When from same combinations of :
terms same terms are taken, the remaining terms are the same. This is the converse of the Law of Same Parts and
Wholes
But it ( 44), and is equally self-evident with it. not equally useful with it and in Pure Logic, in fact, is of no use at all. The removal of terms with their known is
;
meanings is not equally possible with their combination, and in useful logical premises, is not possible at all. For, in a useful
premise
(
19), a part at least of one member this part may or may not contain
must be unknown, and
the part we desire to remove. Even supposing then that a term occurs on either side of a premise, we cannot remove it from the known side, because we cannot know whether or not
we can remove
known
side.
Thus known.
it
from the unknown or partially
AB = AC, suppose A and C known, and B un We cannot infer B = C, because B may contain
in
part or the whole of the known meaning of A, in addition to the known meaning of C, by the Law of Simplicity from one (^ 42), and in leaving B, we do not remove
A
member
of the premise.
and parts.
PURE LOGIC
22
59.
Complete
The
logic of
15),
is
known and unknown
terms,
analogous to the calculus of
lo^aLf
sai d (
mathe-
known numbers. which
So, a logic in
has been
known would have
terms were
all
Arithmetic, a calculus in which
common
an analogue in
it
known and un-
all
Combination of terms the numbers employed are known. has an analogue in multiplication of numbers, and separation
As
in logic combination As in logic multiplication.
of terms in division of numbers. is
unrestricted, so in calculus
of
known terms
in a calculus of
is
is unrestricted, so only, separation of terms is unrestricted. division only,
known numbers
But, as in logic of known and unknown terms separation is numbers restricted, so in calculus of known and unknown division is restricted. It is well
60.
Restriction
of division.
known
that, in
manner, we cannot
like
O f an equation by an unknown factor, and fa v ife ^Q^ assert the resulting equation to be necessarily true, because s id es
may be=0. Thus, from xy = xz, we assert y = z, because if x happen to and cannot remove x, = be=0, the equation xy xz is true, whatever finite numbers be the meanings of y and z.
the
unknown
factor
The correspondence
is
thus shown
:
MATHEMATICAL EQUATIONS.
LOGICAL PROPOSITIONS. Terms known admit Combination
Numbers known admit Multiplication Division
Separation
(unless divisor
(unless either dividend contain divisor)
= 0)
Terms unknown admit Combination but do not admit
Numbers unknown admit
Separation
Division.
Multiplication but do not admit
The above analogies did not escape the notice of Pro Boole (pp. 36-37), and I am therefore at a loss to understand on what ground he asserts that there is a breach in the correspondence of the laws of logic and mathematics. fessor
61.
Parts not
the
fi^Tthe whole.
From
meaninff In
the
meaning of a whole term we cannot learn
f a P arL
A = BC,
if
we know
A
we
learn
BC
as a
whole
;
but
SEPARATION
23
we do
not thence learn the parts B, C, separately. For of the qualities in any part may be in B, and any part in C, including any part of those in B, by the Law of Simpli
A
It is only necessary that city (S 42). every quality in shall be either in B or in C. Even if we know one of
and
C,
we only
learn of the other that
it
A
A I>
must contain any
not in the first, quality of here meet the imperfection of an inverse process. 62. With reference to the relation between the number somber
We
*
(
3 3-o 5),
separate in premises, although they bination.
<>f
and the numbers of known and unknown terms ter nsaild premises. we must treat as separate terms any which occur
of premises,
Otherwise, tion as a single term.
we always
may
treat
also occur in
com
any whole combina
CHAPTER
VI
OF PLUKAL TERMS
A
plural term has one of several meanings, but
Terms of
63.
many
knoum which. Thus B or C
meanings.
for its
is is
meaning
is not
it
a plural term, or term of many meanings, either that of B or that of C, but it is not
known which.
A single
A Iternative d"fined.
;
term not in form such is A.
plural,
may
be distinguished as
The separate terms expressing the several possible meanings of a plural term are called alternatives, and are to be joined together by the sign + placed between each two 64.
adjoining terms. All that has been said of single terms applies to plural terms, mutatis mutandis. Order of
65.
The meaning of a plural term
same whatever
is the
be
alter-na tives.
the order
of the alternatives.
B or C is the same in meaning as either C or B, B+C = C + B. For the order in which we think of
Either that
is,
the possible qualities of a thing cannot alter those qualities, and the order must not convey any intimation that one
meaning Combina
66.
tion with
pi it raj
it
is
A
more probable than
term
with each of
For what is
Use of brackets.
C,
is
67.
is
another.
combined with a plural term by combining
its alternatives.
is
AC, and
A
and either
it is
B
or C,
therefore either
if it is
B,
AB
AC.
or
Let a plural term enclosed in brackets
(
is
AB
;
if it
),
LA IV OF UNITY
25
and placed beside another term, mean that it is combined with it, as one single term is with another Thus A(B+C) = AB+AC. 68. One plural term is combined with another by com- CmnUn :
tl n each alternative of the one separately with each of f J plum the other. Each combined alternative may then be com- terms.
birring
"{
I
bined with so
on
each
alternative of a
third
plural
term, and
:
Thus (D+E) (B+C) = B (D+E)
+C
(D + E)
= BD+BE+CD+CE. thought and things that same Law w same in meaning, as any one taken
It is in the nature of
69.
alternatives are
together
of
singly.
Thus, what
is
A
the same as
or
A
the same as A, a
is
self-evident truth.
A+A=A
A+A+A=A
A+A+B=A+B
This law is correlative to the Law of Simplicity ( 39), and is perhaps of equal importance and frequent use. It was not recognised by Professor Boole, when laying down the principles of his system. 70. In a plural term, any alternative of which a 1part forms another alternative.
Thus the term with
B
alone, or
(
99) that
B
not-C.
B
either
B
B+BC = B.
standing alone
A
For
let
BC is For
is
it
be removed, Super
-
terms.
the same in meaning is a self-evident truth
either the
same
as
BC, or
as
Thus
B + BC = B =B 71.
or
may
not-C
plural term obeys the
A = B+C;
+ BC + BC
io*-
Law
of Simplicity
then
= (B+C)(B+C). = BB+BC+BC + CC
A= B + BC + C A- B+C
(
42).
Plural
laws of
(
68).
(42). (
70).
PURE LOGIC
26
A
plural term obeys the
Law
of
Unity
(
69)
:
= B+C+B+C = For any alternative or part of an alternative may be ( 51) its expression in other terms Thus, if A = B + CD and D = E, substitute, getting
72.
Substitu-
substituted terms.
:
A = B+CE.
A
plural term may be substituted like a single term term, single or plural, of which it is the expression. any When in combination, the several alternatives must be 73.
for
separately combined
(
66, 68).
for a
plural Conversely, expression in a single term
term may be substituted
its
:
if A = BC and C = D+E, for C substitute D+E, A = B (D+E) = BD+BE. Or from the premises A = BD + BE = B(D + E) and C = D+E, we might by substitution get back to A = BC. 74. A plural term is known wlien each of its alternatives
Thus,
and
is
known.
A
is Thus, in A = B + C, each of B and C are known.
a single meaning of A,
and Number of premise".
(
the meanings ot But of course from knowing
we cannot
learn either or both of
B
C.
75. f
known when
With
33-35),
number known and unknown terms
reference to the relation between the
premises, and the
we must
numbers
of
treat as a separate
term each alternative
of a plural term.
A
proposition with a plural term thus corresponds to an equation with several unknown quantities. Plural and 76. As plural terms obey the laws of single terms, and S a term single in form may be plural in meaning, it will not ternis.
be necessary for the future to distinguish plural and single terms, any more than it has been to distinguish combined
and simple terms. it
terms.
some danger of misconception concerning plural Though a plural term has one of several meanings, cannot bear in this system more than one at the same There
is
PLURAL TERMS
27
Hence it still remains a unit, the name time, so to speak. of a single set of qualities, one of several sets, but it is not known which. The whole of this system in short is unitary, and involves the same remarkable analogies to a calculus of which have been brought forward so explicitly
unity and in
Professor Boole
s
system.
CHAPTER
VII
OF NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS
TERMS may also be known and being the same in meaning. Law
of
77.
difference.
It
is
ivhich differs that other.
in the nature of
thought and things that a thine/ from everything the same as
from another differs
More briefly stated Hence in logic
A
stated as differing, or not
term which differs
Same
as different are different.
from another term in meaning
differs
from every term which is the same as that other. If A is not the same as B, which is the same as C, then A is not the same as C. The inference arises in the sameness
B and
Hence C, allowing us to substitute one for the other. learn nothing of the sameness or difference of any two and E, each of which differs from a third, F for terms, of
we
D
D
and
;
E may
each have any of an indefinite variety of meanings, and each may yet differ from F ( 152). 78. Hence a chain of related premises between any of
Negative inference.
which inferences can be drawn, must not contain more than a single negative premise. Also any inference in which a negative premise
Conver
is
concerned must be a negative inference.
A
For negative proposition is simply convertible. not the same as B, is the same statement as is not the 79.
sion.
B
A
is
same
as A.
Law
80.
of
different
parts and wholes.
Wlien same terms are combined with different terms,
\
the wholes
may
be different.
NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS If
A
differs
from B, then
AC
however, that the difference of
any part of
It tions,
is
differs
and
B
from BC, provided, does not consist in
C.
81. When from different the remainders are different. M
This
A
29
u-Jwles
same parts are
taken, Law of wholes.
equally self-evident with the preceding converse. unnecessary further to consider negative proposi
is
because their inferences
affirmative propositions.
may
be obtained by use
of
CHAPTEE
VIII
OF CONTRARY TERMS
Negative
The known meaning of a negative term
82.
of the quality, or set of qualities, which forms the ing of a certain other, its positive term.
is
the
absence
known mean
Thus not-A is the negative term signifying the absence If the known meaning of the quality or set of qualities A. of be only a single quality, not-A means its absence but if mean several qualities, not-A means the absence of any
A A
;
one or more. Thus,
if
A=B.C
not-A Negative of
83.
= B not-C
+
not-B.C
+
not-B not-C.
The negative of a negative term
is the
corresponding
negative.
What simple con-
Notation.
not-not-A
is
A.
be called the simple contrary term of the other. 85. For convenience let not-A be written a. large and and not-a
Laws
is
Since the relation of a positive to a negative term is tne same as the relation of a negative to a positive, let each 84.
its is
Then any
small letter denote a pair of simple contraries A. Also, the contrary of BC ( 82) is
which expresses the absence of one or more of B and C. 86. All that has been said of a term applies samely one as to the other of a pair of contraries.
;
to
CONTRARY TERMS Thus, a obeys the several laws
aa = a 87.
Let
involve
a
a-\-a
:
C=I)
=a
.,
31
and so
_
on.
combined term or a proposition be said it contains either that term or
to
term when
a
/,,roiv defllicd -
.
its
contrary. 88. The contrary of a plural term a contrary of each alternative.
is
a term containing o^/w.y of plural
Ihus the contrary of A + B + C is abc. If any alterna tive has more than one contrary, for each there will be a contrary alternative.
Thus,
A+BC
t
"
rm
-
has the plural contrary
89. Any combined term which contains the simple contrary of another term may be called a contrary, or contranj combination of this, or of any combination this.
c<>/
coml>il> "-
containing
Thus, any combined term containing
A
is
a
contrary of
any term containing a, and it will seldom be necessary to distinguish by name simple contraries, such as A and a from contraries, or contrary combinations in general, which merely
A
contain
or
a.
is
in
(See, however,
^ 99, 100.) nature of thought and things that a Law of co,,tmthimj cannot loth have and not have the same quality.
90.
It
_.,
TT
-.
.
.
Hence a term which means a collection of qualities which the same quality both is and is not, cannot mean 91.
in
the
,..
,
.
,
the qualities of anything which is or ever will be known. Such a term then has no meanina, that is to say, no possible, useful, to
mean
or thinkable
Let
nothimj.
it
diction.
Contmdic ""
m
te
defined.
meaning but it may be said be called a self-contradictory, or, ;
sake of brevity, a contradictor term. 92. Let us denote by the term or mark 0, combined with any term, that this is contradictory, and thus excluded
for
>/
Then Aa = Aa.O, B6 = Bft.O, and so on. For Such propositions are brevity we may write Aa=Q, B&=0. from thought. tacit
premises of
Any two dictory term.
all
reasoning.
contrary terms in combination give a contra
o.
> <>f
PURE LOGIC
32
93. t/l
t ,
,
,
atf
i-
dietary.
being combined with a contradictory, the
Any term
whole is contradictory. For the whole then means a collection of qualities which does and does not contain some same quality, and is there fore
by
definition a contradictory. if
Thus,
Term
0.
94.
The term
A = B6
=B6.0
meaning excluded from
0,
thought, obeys
the laws of terms.
0.0 = otherwise expressed
What
excluded Condition
f non
- c<m -
tradictwn.
95.
Any
is
What
:
=
+ is
0,
excluded and excluded
excluded or excluded
term not known
to be
is
is
excluded.
contradictory must be taken
as not contradictory.
Any term known
to be contradictory is excluded from term concerning which we are desiring notice, any therefore be assumed not contradictory. must knowledge a term In 96. of which not all the alternatives are plural the contradictory alternative or alternatives must contradictory,
and
Contradic-
Imfivfs^
be excluded
from
notice.
If for instance if it
be
is
knowledge Eliminaturn of contradictory.
97.
No
i n*ference
A=0+B, we may
excluded
of, it
;
and
if
it
must be the other
contradictory
term
is
infer
A = B, because A
be such as we can desire alternative B.
to
be
eliminated in direct
,
we can require to know of a contradictory term is contradictory, and elimination of a contradictory term would prevent rather than give such knowledge. = Cc.O, B = Cc.O, all that we can require to Thus if For
that
it
all is
A
know of A arid B is known from these premises, and cannot be known from the inference A = B got by eliminating the contradictory Cc.O. So,
if
A = B = C = D = E = F = G#.0,
the only useful in
ferences are those showing each of A, B, C, contradictory. So, also, obviously, of intrinsic elimination.
1),
E, F, to be
CONTRARY TERMS It
be
may
said, in fact, that contradiction
other elimination by itself eliminating from further notice. 98.
An
alternative
is
eliminated
combined with a contrary of that the
Thus,
term
33
alternative
A/>
all
supersedes all contradictory terms
when
is Eiimii, ait ema
removed from the plural
is
AB+A& when combined with B. AB + A&) B = AB + AB& = AB + (
Then
plural term
its
alternative.
= AB
AC = AB -f A&
ABC = AB
BC = AB+B
AiC =A& r/BC
=B
abC = ab.
The term thus combined with each side cannot be elim ( 53), and remains a condition of the
inated intrinsically rejection
It is
of the other alternative.
by
this rejection of alternatives that the
width of the meaning
known meaning
is
of a
term
increased,
is
reduced, as
by combination
its (
extent or intent of 1).
For
known meaning, may be assumed to have an indefinite multitude of unknown In combination with a new term many of alternatives. every general term, in addition to
these will probably
its
become contradictory.
tii-es.
CHAPTEE
IX
OF CONTRARY ALTERNATIVES
Law
of Duality.
99.
^j
It
nf
thought and things that a the same as another thing. not e it]lcr the same or
is
js
the
in
nature
of
Otherwise
A
set
of qualities either does or does not contain a certain
quality.
must contain the meaning of one Thus any pair of simple contrary terms. A term is not altered in meaning by combination with any Hence, in
of
logic,
a term
:
simple contrary terms as alternatives.
For
if
A
has meanings containing only B, then
= AB. = contradictory, and A AB+0 If A has meanings containing only If
A
the law
This
exceptions.
then
has meanings of which some contain
B
AB =
is
and
and some
b,
is still true.
Law
of Duality
law of duality. Apparent
b,
AZ>
(See
is
not the same as Professor Boole
s
42.)
Some apparent exceptions may occur to this law. For instancej let A = virtue, B = black, and & = not -black. Then the statement 100.
Virtue to the b
is cither
black or not -black, seems true according
above law, and yet absurd.
not being simple contraries
;
for
This arises from
B may
B
and
be decomposed
LAW
say BC, and
into black-coloured
not
Hack and not
not coloured at 1C.
Be (
OF DUALITY
virtue
contradictory from the tacit premise black
is
is
really
is
we
Here, again,
Xow,
Abe, and, therefore, neither BC nor must observe that the combination
or
all,
b into not-black-colourcd, or
bC + bc.
coloured, or
35
is
a,
colour
48).
Other
inconsistencies
apparent
may
be
ex
similarly
plained.
Professor l)e
human
1 Morgan has excellently said, It is not for reason to say what are the simple attributes into
which an attribute may be decomposed. And for such a it is that I have as far as possible abstained from treating any term as known to be simple. 101. Let a term, combined with simple contraries as reason
alternatives, be called a development of the
term
as regards
Develop
m ent ,
defined.
the contraries.
Thus,
AB + A&
is
called a development of
A
as regards
B, or in terms of B, or involving B. 102. Any term is same in meaning after combination v:it/t Continued Pall the jwssiblc combinations of other terms, and their contraries
ment.
as alternatives.
Since
A = AB + and, A in AB + A&
of C.
again,
A?>,
substitute for
(
51)
A = AC-f Ac, its
we may
expression in terms
Thus,
A = ABC + ABc+ A5C+ Abe. Again, since
A = AD+Ad,
we may
substitute a second
time, getting
A = A13CD + ABCV+
+AZ>7,
and
so on.
Let any two alternatives, differing only by a single part-term and its contrary, be called a dual term. 103.
Thus,
AB + Ab
ABC+AJBc
as
a
is
C,
regards
dual term as regards B, and and we may speak of B + or
C-fc as the dual part. 104. A dual term, may always 1
?>
be
SijUrrlus, p. 60.
reduced
to
a single term
/;/
/,
PURE LOGIC
36 Reduction
by
removal
of
the
contrary
without
terms,
altering
the
Law of Duality, For the term thus obtained is, by the term dual former the as 99). ( the same in meaning
AB A&, we may always Thus, from such a term as the and B meaning of the term remove the dual part + &, = is a self-evident since AB+A& still be as before,
+
will
(99)
A
truth always in our knowledge.
A
CHAPTEE X OF CONTRARY TERMS IX PROPOSITIONS 105.
From
proposition
we may infer
ant/ affirmative premise Ijy
a,
negative its
From A = B we have A not = I and hence, by Law of Difference
;
= From
not
v
}
^
position.
contrary.
A
Aff.rmnti,-
n
changing any term on one side only into for evidently
77),
(
B
A=B
is
not
not =
= 6,
I,
or
Z>.
AB = AC,
similarly,
AB
not
= Ac.
106. The two terms of a negative proposition are con-
For the two terms of a negative proposition are different in meaning. Hence there must be some quality or qualities in the meaning of one, and not in that of the other thus,
Terms of
don.
;
the combination of
the two
terms would mean both the
absence and presence of a certain quality or qualities, and The two terms then are con would be a contradictory. trary
(
89).
107.
A
negative
proposition
may
be
changed
info
an
Negative
affirmative, of which one term is a term of the negative, and the other term this term combined with the contrary of the proposi-
1^^
othcr term of the negative.
= B. if A not=B, then A = or, again, B For developing A in terms of B ( 101), we have A = AB + A6, but A and B being contraries ( 10G), AB Thus,
is
AZ>;
0. Hence, A = 0+A& = A& ( we may show B = 0+r/B = B.
contradictory or Similarly,
96). So,
if
AB
PURE LOGIC
38
not = AC, then
ABC
is
inference
timpropositions.
For
AB = ABC+ ABc - ABc, since
And we
contradictory.
see that
ABc = AB (contrary of AC) = AB (Ac+C+e) = we may now convert any negative
Since
an
AB = ABc.
affirmative,
be further
not
will
it
proposition into necessary to use
negative propositions in the process of inference ( 81). 108. From any contradictory combination we may infer that any P art f ^ie combination not itself contradictory is
n ot
same in meaning as That the two parts differ the
remainder or any greater part. may be expressed in a negative
the
affirmative. proposition, or its corresponding
the other part be contradictory, it cannot be the And if same as the first part, which is not contradictory.
For
if
neither of the parts
same
is
contradictory in
in meaning, else their
itself,
they cannot be
combination would not produce
a contradiction. affirmative inferences corresponding ( 107) to the negative ones deduced under this rule may be otherwise
The
had, so that it seems unnecessary to consider the negative inferences further in this place. List of
109.
The following are the chief laws
or conditions of
logic:-
The meaning of a term must be Condition or postulate. so that A = A, same throughout any piece of reasoning B = B, and so on. ( 14.) ;
Law
of Sameness.
A = B = C; hence Law
of Simplicity.
AA = A, Law
of
Law
of Unity.
BBB = B, and
25.)
(
42.)
(
44.)
(
69.)
so on.
Same Parts and Wholes. A = B; hence AC = BC.
A+A = A,
(
A = C.
B+B+B = B, and
so on.
LAWS OF LOGIC Law
of Contradiction.
A.= 0, Lav:,
39
ABZ>
=
0,
and
($
<J9.)
(B + &) = AB+A&
(B+&) (C + c) = ABC+ABc+AZ/C+AZ>f, and
It
90.)
so on.
of Dmditij.
A- A A=A
(
so on.
seems likely that these are the primary and
sufficient
laws of thought, and others only corollaries of them.
Logic
treat only of l-nov;n samenesses of things; and differences of things need be noticed, only for the exclusion from
may
pure
all
that
In pure number
and
logical
thought of
is
self-contradictory.
its
science,
on the other hand,
differences of things only are noticed. The Laws of Simplicity, Unity,
Contradiction, and furnish the universal of The Duality premises reasoning. Law of Sameness is of altogether a higher order, involvingInference, or the
Judgment
of Judgments.
CHAPTER
XI
OF INDIRECT INFERENCE
Useofde-
110.
Taken by
the development of a term
( 101) But taken with the learn that some of the alternatives of the development are contradictory and to be The remaining alternatives then form a new and rejected.
itself,
new knowledge about a problem, we may of premises gi ves us no
Indirect inference.
it.
often useful expression for the term. 111. In thus using a development
we
are said to infer
indirectly, because we use the premise to show what a term is, not directly by the Law of Sameness, but indirectly by
showing what it is not. Indirect Inference is direct inference with the aid of
self-
evident premises derived from the Lawr s of Contradiction and But all Inference is still by the Law of Sameness. Duality. Example.
112. Let ferred from
(101):-
A=B
required expressions for A, B, a, I, in this premise. Develop these terms as follows :
A = AB+A6 a = B + ab
Examine which
B=AB+aB b
= Ab +ab
of the alternatives
contradictory according to the premise
A a b
combined with
A=B
gives
AB, Ab, aB,
A = B. A = AB AB=B Aa aE = Ab = Kb=Q
ab, are
INDIRECT 1XFEREXCE Hence we
may
learn
and Ab are contradictory, and
thut o\\
be rejected, and that
41
not contradictory according not found among any of
is
AI>
which
Of b, we can learn nothing from the premise, and it therefore cannot be known to be contradictory. Striking out a}\ and Ab in the developments of A, B, a, b. we have to the premise.
is
the above terms,
A = AT. + =AT. + b= We have liere the n
B= b
(tb
=--
=
AP>
Q
=
+
+ab =
AB ((
b
two inferences A = AB R = AB which might have been had from the premise by combina tion 45), and from which we may pass back by elimination 113.
Inferences.
(j$
of
AB to the premise. We also have a = ab,
had
direct
b//
these two
ini/ infer is
b
= cib, which
con/d not Imre been
And by
inference.
we have
indeed, that
and
the
eliminating ab between This result, inference a = b.
new
from the H me next of mco.mnij of fico wmcncxs of inenninij of their ximple
tlie
evidently true. 114. By a similar method
any number
we may draw
tcniix, -ve
contraries
inferences from
premises, namely, by developing any quired term in respect of other terms, and striking out the combinations which are shown to lie contradictory in any
premise.
Thus, from
and
0,
we
A=B
and
B = C,
to
infer expressions for
develop these terms as follows
A
:
A = ABC+ABc+A6C+A6c a = BC+ fBr. + abC-{-abc By combination we
then,
when
jiossible,
render one side
of each premise same with each of the alternative combina tions, and learn from the other side whether the combination
known
to
be
combinations
in
is
inf<
mic<<
"
re-
of
All the contradictory by the premise. the above developments will be found
contradictory, except A15C and abc, and we thus get the = ABC, and a=vbc, of which the former indeed inferences
A
might have been got
directly.
"
,"
,/"
s
y
PURE LOGIC Method of indirect inference.
The process
115.
of indirect inference
may
similarly be
inference or expression from applied to drawing any possible numerous and complicated. however of premises, any series abbreviated be full The according to the may
process following series of rules, which
METHOD OF INDIRECT INFERENCE 1.
Develop ment.
may
be said to form THE
:
premises being given, form a combination con 87). Change every term involved therein (
Any
taining
into its contrary, so successively each simple term of this of the simple terms combinations the as to form all possible
and Compari son.
Inchuled
their contraries.
Combine successively each such combination with When the combination forms both members of a premise. 2.
a contradiction with neither side of a premise, call it an when it forms a contradic included subject of the premise ;
subject.
Excluded.
an excluded subject of the with one side only, premise when it forms a contradiction call it a contradictory combination or subject, and strike it out. We may call either an included or excluded subject a tion
with
both
sides,
call
it
;
Contradic tion.
Possible.
Impossible.
Repeated compari son.
distinguished from a contradictory bination or impossible subject. 3. Perform the same process with each premise.
possible subject, as
com Then
an included subject of a series of premises, when it is an included subject of any one it is a contradictory subject when it is a contradictory of any one it is an excluded
a combination
is
;
;
when
Selection.
an excluded subject of every premise. subject 4. The expression for any term involved in the premises consists of all the included and excluded subjects containing it is
the term, treated as alternatives. 5.
Reduction.
Such expression may be simplified by reducing all 52) of 104), and by intrinsic elimination ( (
dual terms
terms not required in the expression. 6. When it is observed that the expression of a term contains a combination which would not occur in the
all
Elimina tion.
expression of any contrary of that term, we may eliminate the part of the combination common to the term and its expression.
(See below,
117.)
1XDIRECT INFERENCE
43
Unless each term of the premises and the contrary of Contmdic each appear in one or other of the possible subjects, 7.
^^mises
must be deemed inconsistent or contradictory. Hence there must always remain at least two possible
premises
subjects ($ 159). 116. Eecjuired
by the above process the inferences of the
Example.
A=BC.
premise
possible combinations of the terms A, B, C, and their DevdopEach of these being contraries, are as given in the margin.
The
"
combined with both following results
sides
of
premise,
we have
the Compari-
:
ABC
ABC =ABO = ABCVA//C = ABfrC = AB&Cc Abe = Ard3C = BC = ABtf = BCe = AalC = a lttC* = Aale =((ElCc ABc-
Q
the
(
=
=0
ABc AIG
=
Ale
= =
=0
included subject contradiction
ABC
contradiction
AIC
ABc
contradiction
BC
contradiction
B alC
excluded subject excluded subject
aic
ale
excluded subject
n bc
BC BG-
Tt appears, then, that the four combinations ABc to are to be struck out, and only the rest retained as possible
subjects.
Suppose we now require an expression for the term I as Selection. Select from the included inferred from the premise A=BC. contain as such and excluded subjects I, namely alC and ale. = occurs as C but l Then alC+alc, only with I, and not Eiiminatwn liule with B, its contrary, we may, by 6, eliminate I from -
rt&C
;
hence
I
The
117.
drawing between
= ad -\-alc. validity of
this
last
elimination
expression
for
aC,
which
the
all
(51)
expression C. other cases to which the rule applies.
by substituting
its
:
c)=al.
I
seen
by
similarly in
by
Kiimina71
.^: Then^ plained.
eliminate auL
And
AVe might also reduce the expression for follows
alC.
is
l = alC-\-alc, and alC = aC, we may
is
llule 5, as
PURE LOGIC
44
118.
Other in-
we have
To express
ference,
a = aBc+ab(J-{-abc, but observing that none of Be, 1C,
be,
occur with A, so that
= abc, we substitute these simpler terms, Bc, bC = abC, bc a = ~Bc-\-bC+bc, an evident truth whence eliminating a;
Bc =
113). 119. Similarly, i n ferences (
other inferences.
:
we may draw any
_
the
of
following
A=ABC=AB=AC = AB+a6C
Relation of
B and
c.
= ab
(no inference)
acdBc+abeac
(no inference).
B and C are samely related to anv inference concerning one of these terms from the similar inference concerning the other by inter changing B and C, b and c ( 56). 120.
Observe that since
^ we mav g
e
j.
Before proceeding to further examples of indirect infer we may make the following observations.
ence, Excluded objects.
121.
^ ^
^
n
When
any term appears on both sides an y combination containing
of a premise,
AB = AC,
its
contrary,
an excluded subject. Thus, in combining any term with both sides of a proposition, we render any contrary of a, is
the term an excluded subject. So, in mathematics we introduce a
equation when we multiply both Of
inferior
l* /toe
122.
An
sides
root
into an
by a factor.
excluded subject, though admitting of inference
and admitted into
As
inferences,
its
is
of inferior
name
it
expresses, importance. bination concerning which we do not
The sphere
new
of
an argument, or the
contains all the included subjects.
is
and often of no usually a
desire
knowledge.
Universe of
An
com
Thought,
excluded subject
is
INDIRECT INFERENCE such as are
lies
this
beyond
consider
to
obliged
45
But we sphere or universe. excluded subjects, because the
excluded
subject of one premise may be the included of other subject premises. 123. AVhen a premise is plural in one or botli sides, an piumi excluded subject is a contrary of all the alternatives on both i]rcmises
and a contradictory combination is a contrary of all side, and not of all on the other side. 124. Of an identical proposition the term itself appearing
-
sides,
on one
identical
osi on either side is the only included subject. All others ftre^f Its excluded, and there are no contradictory combinations.
useless nature
is
~
thus evident.
subject of a proposition remains an included, Common su J ect or excluded, contradictory subject as before, after combination with any unrelated terms. if the argument be Thus, 125.
Any
-
-
a sphere or common subject, defined by certain do not need expression in each premise, but terms, these may be retained as an exterior condition. Thus, by ABCD restricted to
(
...... we
might mean that
)
ABCD
is
to
be under
stood as combined with each term of any premises placed within the brackets. is then the common subject of the premises, which must contain no contrary of this.
ABCD
And any
contrary of
ABCD
is
an excluded subject of the
whole. 126.
premises
Any in
^_
set of terms which always occur in the Ofununbroken combination may be treated as a lrol n >
simple term.
Thus, if BC may write for 127.
Any
always thus in combination, we say D, and then d or not-~BG is
occur it,
set of alternatives
the premises as alternatives term. in
Thus,
may C is
for
if
which always occur together
may
B and C
B+C
occur always as alternatives, we write, say D, and then d or neither B nor
be.
128.
Any
proposition
may
Unbroken
be treated as a single fj^
be treated under the form of
PURE LOGIC
46 Simple proposi tion.
Technical terms.
A = B,
so long as
we do
not require to treat
its
part-terms
126, 127.) 129. Hence the convenience in every branch of know terms to stand for every large set ledge of using technical But such terms, of terms which usually occur together. or alternatives separately.
(By
of error if we do not carefully keep before us their definitions, those adopted premises in which we express the set of combined or alternative terms for which we substitute a technical term.
become the source
Meta physical tei-ms.
130. In that branch of knowledge, however, called First
and aims at resolving things, Philosophy, which is analytic, into their simplest components, about our them, or thoughts Such terms cannot fallacious. is terms technical of use the each arises from the synthesis of many All reasoning, then, its definition. simpler terms, forming First or in Metaphysics Philosophy, ought to be carried on vernacular elements of speech. most and in the simplest assist analysis, since
a mill which grinds down Analytic science should be like of the ordinary grains thought into their smallest and It is in the bakehouse we should
simplest
particles.
combine these particles again into loaves of a size and But most meta suitable for ordinary use.
consistency
physical reasoners, and the bakehouse. Inter
rupted process.
it
seems to me, have mistaken the mill
always necessary to carry out the process Each or any premise of inference exactly as in the rules. 131.
may
It is not
be treated as a separate one,
possible
subjects
if
afterwards combined
subjects of other premises. or try the effect of
We may
desirable,
with
the
and
its
possible
thus successively add
supposed ones. For instance, since AB and ab are the possible subjects of A = B, and BC and Ic of B = C, the possible combinations of these, namely ABC and abc, are the possible subjects of the two combined, observing that AB&c and a&BC premises,
premises
Unrelated premises.
are contradictory. If premises 132. will
include
all
be
possible
related,
direct
the
indirect
inferences.
inferences
From
unre-
INDIRECT INFERENCE lated
premises
we
si
mil
also
get
such
47
inferences
as
are
possible.
Thus, from the unrelated premises
we have
A = BCD + Bed <1
=
X>e
-}-
ale
,
and
so on.
133. It does not seem possible to give any general proof that the conclusions of the indirect method must a^ree with
!>-,<><->/
f
l/ld rect \
method.
those ot the direct method, which will make its truth any the more evident. Such proof could be little less than a
general recapitulation of the several Laws of Thought, 134. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the method Undid:* of indirect inference is equivalent to Euclid s indirect de^" monstration, or reductio ad alsurdum. Euclid assumes the Hon.
^
development of alternatives, usually that of equal or greater less, and showing that two of these lead to a contradiction,
or
establishes the truth of the third.
135.
common
Nor
process of reasoning at
is this
all
new
or un- commmi
any branch of knowledge save logic, which was to be the science of all reasoning. Simple instances supposed occur perhaps as frequently as instances of direct inference, and complicated instances are only rendered scarce by the limited powers of human memory and attention. Among in
?f in
U8
-
method.
instances of indirect argument we may place all those dis courses in which a writer or speaker states several possible alternatives or cases of his subject, and, after showing some them to be impossible, concludes the rest to be necessary,
of
or else proceeds further to develop regard to other premises ( 131). in
is
found
s
alscissio infiniti
has a close relation to indirect inference.
Even brute indirect method
136.
the
instance
Argument on the Divine Benevolence (Moral Book II, chap. v). The old logical process called
Paley
Phil.,
and consider these with
A good
animals,
it
would seem, may reason by
:
This creature, saith Chrysippus (of the dog),
is
not void
Quotation
PURE LOGIC
48
beast he eometh to of Logick for, when in following any the to one, and then to the three several ways, he smelleth :
second
;
not fled
he find that the beast which he pursueth be one of these two ways, he presently, without smell
and
if
to ing any further
it,
same Philosopher,
is
which, saith the the Beast must thus as if he reasoned other the or this, or way; but neither taketh the third
be gone either this, this nor this ; Ergo, the third
way
;
:
:
so
away he runneth. SIR
W. RALEIGH.
CHATTER
XI [
OF liELATIOX TO COMMON LOGIC
BEFORE giving examples ence as
now
set forth,
it
of the processes of logical infer will be well to consider the relation
of our system to the logic of common thought. 137. In ordinary reasoning it will be found that there
is Oniinrmj
economy of thought. Not only are large collections P roposi tioH imperfect. -ITattributes and things grouped together under the fewest
great P
of
.,
possible terms, but only those particular attributes of the things under consideration on which the reasoning turns are brought forward. certain natural disinclination to
A
exertion causes us to simplify our modes of thought as much as possible, and to leave in the background everything that is not essential. Thus when we say t/n/n /* mortal, we mean. that the attributes of mortality are among the attributes of man. But we leave out those infinitely numerous attributes
of
man which
are not comprised under mortality, because
we do not happen tion, then, in this
with them. The proposi not that equation of qualities, that
to be occupied
form
is
statement of perfect sameness or equivalence of meaning, which we have taken as a proposition. 138.
It
position
as
may we
be objected that we ought to take the profind
it
in
common
thought.
Aristotle so
_
E^uatimi or sam e ,
ness the
Some of the trw.form system has had a long reign. reason of his system even denied that there could be a / expounders proposition of two universal and equivalent terms. They took
it,
and
his
could not have committed a greater error or more completely E
PURE LOGIC
5o
Not only, course of reasoning. misrepresented the ordinary of multitudes establish sciences several the do as a fact, of which the two terms are equivalent and
propositions of this kind, universal, but all definitions are propositions the in meanings of and the definitions requisite connecting
complex terms, must always form a large part If we further consider that even of our data in reasoning. Aristotle s negative propositions have a universal predicate,
more and
less
men show
that
the proposition of fallacy,
a constant tendency to treat the predicate of as universal, whence several common kinds
A
and that reasoning from same
be detected as the
to
fundamental principle of
same things
may we
all the sciences,
need have no hesitation in treating the equation as the true Aristotle s form as an imperfect proposition. proposition, and It is thus the Law of Sameness, not the dictum of Aris totle, which governs reasoning. Quantifiedtion ofpre-
only of very late years that the imperfection out, proposition has been properly pointed the discovery of the so-called quantification of the which has reduced the proposition to the form of a
139. Q
tke
It
is
It
is
or( ji nar y
predicate convertible equation, field of
140.
Boole s
Analysis
-
and opened out
improvement. Professor Boole
s
to logic
first
system,
an indefinite
published
in
his
1847, involves this Analysis of Logic, of the According discovered predicate. quantification newly to Boole, the some, which is the adjective of particular logical Men arc some mortals class symbol. quality, is an indefinite = -vy, where x instructs is expressed by him in the equation, x us to select from the universe all things that are men, and Mathematical
y to
in
select all things that are mortal.
The proposition then
informs us that the things which are men consist of an in definite selection from among the things which are mortal, v further steprequi-
selected. being the symbol of this indefinite quantity or class It is to me to seems more One 141. necessary. step
and quantitative mean word some. In the the logical terms, including or man is some mortal form of the proposition
se p ara t e completely the qualitative
ings of all qualitative
i
5
more correctly speaking, man
is
interpret some or some, kind as
unknown
perhaps
collection of
some kind of -mortal
we
meaning an indefinite and qualities, which being added
the qualities mortal, give the known qualities of man. In the quantitative form men arc some mortals, we have the to
equivalent statement that the collection of individuals in the some mortal* is the collection of individuals in the class
class
men. 142. is strange that the purely qualitative form of proposition man is some kind of mortal, which is the most distmct lorni ot statement, and is perhaps the most prevalent, It
,
.
.
Qualitative i":
*
**-
tion dis-
regarded.
both in science and ordinary thought, was totally disregarded by logicians, at least as the foundation of a system of logic. 1 The Logicians, until our day, says Professor De Morgan,
have considered the extent of a term as the only object of under the name of the logical whole the intent was
logic,
:
called
from
by them the metaphysical
logic.
be seen that this word some or some kind, much difficulty and error, must in our ^ treated as a term of indefinite and unknown
It will
143.
the
whole, and was excluded
d
source of so
system be
*
me
icina.
It is an unknown term, not only at the begin of a In no two premises ning problem, but throughout it. then can the term some or some- kind be taken to mean the
meaning.
same
set of qualities. Thus we cannot argue through or eliminate a term with some, while at least it retains this unknown term that is to say, we can never use it as a :
common term B,
and some
A
is
some still
($
B
is
27) in direct inference. Thus, if some C, we cannot eliminate some
A
is
*ome
B
getting meaning, the
some C, because some being of unknown B is not necessarily the same in both cases.
more plain
kind of kind of
B
in the
form
A
This is some kind of B, and some for it is obvious that the one is
some kind of C, not necessarily the same as the other. 144. Since the term some or some kind is not only unknown but remains unknown throughout we
B
is
is
any argument,
1
Syllabus, p. 61.
x//////w//s
PURE LOGIC
52
to it some symbol such as might conveniently appropriate Thus no term I conditions. its special U, to remind us of term other U, or U = U is with any is to be taken as same But in the propositions A and E it not known to be true. is best to eliminate U by writing is always open to us, and for it the other
A = UB, B
proposi-
E I
Mm-
a
The four propositions
Every
.
No
.
Some Some
.
A A A A
is
is
not
is
thus
may
:
A = AB A = Ab
UA = UB B UA = U&
or or
are 146 Two new propositions of De Morgan s system expressed :is
Some things arc Thomson,
old logic
of the
A = UBor A = L b or
B B B
is
Everything
proposi-
A = AB,
those of B.
d expression in our system
fi
A
SSST
better written as
A
145.
tions.
De
much
Thus, of the proposition ( 52). three involves of kind some is B,
involving only the that qualities of and B, and yet perfectly expressing all of those are among those of A, but not necessarily
among Aristotle s
A
meaning that It is
terms.
A
member
either
neither
A A
or
nor
B B
147. All these propositions, and as
A=& a =1.
many more
as
may
be prosed, can be brought and partially treated ( 128) = B, which I believe to be the simple form under the form The existence of doubly -universal pro of all reasoning.
A
far from being unknown to many out of deference to the Aristo but of the School Logicians, The present telian system, such propositions were neglected.
kind positions of this
Archbishop of York system of lines,
was
first
logic, giving
passim}.
it
embodied the
this
name U.
proposition
(Thomson
s
in
a
Out
CHAPTEE EXAMPLES OF
XIII
METHOD
TIIK
IN this chapter I shall place some miscellaneous examples inference according to the system of the foregoing its method, or its chapters, suited to show the power of of
relation to the old logic. 148. Let us take a syllogism in
FELAPTON. Felup-
i/i
A
Xo
Every
A
Some C
From
A=
AC = A&C, and or AC =
We
C
is is
C not
B
($
14H).
we might by combination ( 45) infer whence AC = A&C = from A = AC, A& = which is a more, precise statement 0/UC = U&,
AZ>
A/>,
\1>,
or some
A = U6=A6 A = UC = AC
is P,
AZ>C
Direct
;
B, the Aristotelian conclusion. may, however, obtain this conclusion, as well as is not
all
indirect inference.
other possible ones, by Of the possible combinations of A, B, C,
ABC and a, Ale and ABr are contradicted by (as well premise, second the AlC, ^/BC, as AIV ) is contradicted by premise. alC, ale, are the remaining combinations in which we the
1>,
<&<\
no relation between B and C per sc, since B But occurs with C and c, and C occurs with B and b. find there
AC = A&C, the
is
and Ab = AlC, whence, by elimination,
same conclusion as before. The following conclusions may
also be
drawn
A&C
<-,
first
:
AC =
A/>,
f
f
c
w
PURE LOGIC
54
= rt(B+&) (C + c) = a(no inference)
+abC +abc =
+BC+&C = &c =ac = +abc = ab(C + c) = ab(no inference) C = BC -f- 6C = aC (B + &) = (no inference) fa = abc.
ab
Example
:
AB = CD
((l>C
premise AB CD is of some contradicts the combinations ABOZ, ABcD,
ABCD
are
AbCd
CD
=
The
149.
interest.
It
AB7, which
AB
and not CD, and AbCD, BCD, abCl), which are Prom the remainder we easily draw the and not AB.
AbcT>
Abed
inferences.
aECd BcD aBcd abCd abcD abed
= BCr/
a
+ BcD + \cd + cilVd+abcD+abccl. that A and B enter samely into the premise,
Observing
we may
1
deduce the expressions for B and and B, a and b in the above thus (
easily
changing
A
b
;
B = ACD + dBCd+aBcD +
by inter 54-56)
B
And since A, B enter samely with C, D, we might deduce the corresponding expressions for C, D, and c, a, by interchanging at once A with C, and B with D, or A with D, and
B
Prom
with C. the expression for a
we
thus get
d = CBa + C&A+C&rt +rfcB+rfe&A+rfc&. Observe, that that
for
a,
if
nothing
result, verifying
the expression for
A
be combined with
but contradictory terms will be the
Aa = 0.
And,
if
we combine
the expres
any terms not contrary, as B and d, we get the same result as we might have drawn by the separate appli cation of the process. sions for
Thus, ~Bd = AbCI>+aBCd+aBcd=0+aBd.
EXAMPLES
55
In expressions thus derived there will often appear, as in the above instance, a superfluous and contradictory term the (A&CD, a contrary of IV), but being only an alternative, proposition
us take
is
not untrue.
As an example
150
of a premise with a plural term, let K.mpi?,
A = B+C.
In comparing- the eight combinations of A, B, C, a, b, c, with the premise, any one is contradictory which contains without containing either B or C or, again, which conThus, ABC, tains either 15 or C without containing A.
A
;
are the included subjects, AIV and rest are contradictory. and the subject, We may draw the inferences 1
,
A?>0,
ale
is
AB( AIV ,
^
an excluded
A = BC + = ABC+Ae = AB
B and C
enter samely, so that their expres derived sions may be mutually by interchange. = Bc+Z>C differs from the last in the Kw,n 151. The premise ~ cannot at once be B and C. very important point that AIV It has the included subjects ABc and A6C, and the
Observe that
A
A
The following expressions and nbc. excluded subjects ^] are seen to be simple and symmetrical, and it is instructive >C
to
"
^
form their combinations.
infer no Arisnegative premises we can It is well to show that this totelian conclusion (& 77, 78).
152.
From two
:
A=B+C
-V
PURE LOGIC remains true when the negative propositions are converted into their corresponding affirmatives ( 107). Let us take the premises
These
may
A
is
not the same as B,
C
is
not the same as B.
be expressed by the affirmative propositions
A = Ab, AbC Abc aEc
If
C = &C. we go through
attempt obtain
to express
A
the process of indirect inference, and
and C in terms of each
other,
we
shall
:
abc
A
7i(
^
A
i
JLi~U\j ~j~
A\.U 7i
7i/
i.(/O
^
1
1
I
V>
/A is
i
~~\
A
7i \.U
C = A&C +abC = bC (A+.) = bC. These are the premises over again, and there can be no
new Solutions
of form
inference, except
153.
B=
Bc.
A=B
The proposition
statement, its full solution of the similar propositions
interchanging
A
and
a,
Premise
B
is
A
and
a = ~B
a=
b
B
ab
ab
Ab
AB
Contradiction
Ab
AB
AB
aB
Contradiction
B
ab
Ab.
154.
Let us take
mises.
A BCD
A=b Ab &B
Included subject
We
b.
A=B AB
Excluded subject
E;cample of two pre
being the simplest form of given below, and the solutions = b, a = B, a = b, are inferred by
have,
Hence
by
ab
A = ABC, B+C=BD+CD.
direct inference
from the second premise,
BC = BCD = ABC = ABCD
(45) (26).
rcBCD
BcD 6CD rt&cD
abed
The indirect process gives four included and two ex cluded subjects, as in the margin. Hence not only the above inference, but the following,
among
other possible ones
:
EXAMPLES
57
+abd
=BD + C = ABD
((Y)cD -\-(dcD
c
155.
&
+ rtBCD+&CD = ABD+CD =acl)
-{-abed
-\-a~bd
The ordinary Sorites is easily and Taking four premises such as
clearly solved in
Sorites
this system.
A = AB B = BO C=
CL>
D = DE, many inferences
will be evident
from the
following series of the subjects, or possible combinations.
ABODE \ BCDE f 7 PDF
>
/
&cDE abcdE ,
,
.
^
nc ^ u ^ e ^ subjects.
j \ >
Excluded
The Dilemma of the old
156.
subjects.
logic is easily included in Diiem
our system, when we supply a term which understood in its usual statement. The follows If is
is
suppressed or
dilemma
is
as
:
A
B, or
is
B,
C
is
E
and
if
C
D, therefore
E
is
is
E,
is
D,
E
is
E
:
but, either
A
Adopting Wallis s re duction to the categorical form, and supplying some term G, to express the present circumstances, or the case in which either A is B, or C is D, we have the premises F.
AB = ABEE CD = CDEE G = ABCI+CDG. By the direct process alone we get the required con clusion that, under the condition G, E is E thus ;
GE = AB + CD) GE = ABEEG + CDEFG = GEE or, GE = GEE. (
PURE LOGIC Condi tional
Syllogism.
The following
157.
Destructive
tional Syllogism. If B, C
A
is
is"
known
is
1)
;
but C
is
as
a Destructive Condi
not
I)
;
therefore,
A
is
not B. the Supplying the suppressed term, say E, expressing is not B, the following is the circumstances in which statement of this syllogism in our system
A
:
AB=ABCD By
direct inference
ABE = ABD.CE - ABD.CV/E = 0.
Forms of old loyic.
Hence
ABE
AE
not
is known ABE, or in
to be contradictory
therefore ($ 108), is not B. the circumstances E, 158. The forms of the old logic being comprehended in this system along with an indefinite multitude of other is
;
A
forms, logicians can only properly accept this generalisation, due to Boole, throwing off as dead encumbrances the
by
useless distinctions
of
history of the Science
The past the Aristotelian system. not, as hitherto, bar its progress.
must
when Logic will be developed almost like Mathematics, the Study between discriminate Mathematicians like Logicians
And of
Thought and the Study of Antiquarian Lore. I will now give a few complex problems, more suited
show the power 159.
Complex
to
of the method.
Let the premises be
problem.
A = B+C
AD = BCD. And let it be required to infer the description of any term, say By the indirect process, we shall find that the only combination uncontradicted by one or other premise .
is
ABCd. Thus,
we
find
there cannot
be any a at
all,
without
EXAMPLES contradiction, whatever
may
means, doubtless, that
It
59 1
be the meaning of this result. the premises are contradictory
115.7).
(S
We
also easily infer
A = BCV B = A(.V C = A1W
any of the following
AB = Cd AC = 1V
ABC A1W
BC=A(/
:
= ABCY7 etc.
160. The following premises are such as occur in physical science
might easily
p.-obiem.
:
C= 1
Tlic following la\v, being of a less evident character than the been placed apart. Every logical term must have if* contrary.
That
is
to say
:
JVItatever qualify
u-e treat
an present
v:e
may
rest,
has Lav: />/
also treat as
absent.
Xo term can be pro- Universe of logic. whole sphere for the contrary of any term logic unLet U be the universe then u "Oiinaea. inust add a sphere of indefinite magnitude. is not included in U. Nor will special terms limit the universe. There
is
thus no boundary to the universe of
posed wide enough to cover
its
;
;
TltiiKj
c.i
isfi/ig
has
its
contrary in thing not existing.
Tinny thi nl-able has its contrary in thiny not thinkable. Even thiinj, the widest noun in the language, has a contrary in is
not
a
that which
thiiuj.
is only true speaking in the strictest logical sense, and terms in the most perfect generality. If the above be granted as true, every proposition of the form A = B + & Contradicmust lie regarded as contradictory of a law of thought. For the contrary of t}1J P A from the above is Bi, a contradiction, or A is used as having no contrary, sl
Of course the above
using
all
1
"!"
and forming the universe. Also every system of premises must lie rejected which altogether contradicts Contradic^ on JJ ~ any term or terms. Thus in the indirect process we must always have at least two combinations remaining possible, one of which must contain the contrary of each simple term in the other. In this view the peculiar premises >re
"
(
159) contain subtle contradictions.
and being
For a according to the
must by the second premise be iirst premise also, A, or both A and a, 15 and b. But this subject needs more consideration. must be
be,
c,
it
I!,
first
premise
and hence by
-
PURE LOGIC
6o
ABcDE v!cDe rtBcDE aBcde
combinations in the margin gives most useful information, but the the b y inspection perhaps inferences. formal following are a few
The
series of possible
A = ABcDE + ABcde + AbCDe
i
rt&cDE
p -[-,_ p -DCJJ
abd = abcd cd = ABcde + aBcde + abcd(E + e)
= There Com-
P
$teL
T-v-p
JjCJjjl<
abcDe cdE
161.
6CI>.
no relation between abc and D and E. conclude with the solution of a still more com-
is
I
Pleated system of premises.
A+C+ E = B
The possible combinations are
ABc^EF ABcdEf
:
aBcdEf abCdEF
AbCdEF.
Whence
may
the
be drawn
following,
among many
other
inferences,
:
A = BcDe/+ ABcd Bc= D=
dE = ABcd+ 6CF + Bc = BctZ + 6CF
EXAMPLES
61
Whence which
it
the remarkable and unexpected relation would not be easy to detect in the premises.
C = b,
Inferences may be verified by combining- the expressious of two or more terms, and comparing the result with the expression of the combined term as drawn from For instance, in the the series of possible combinations. 162.
problem last given for A with that for A.rfE =
=
w e may combine T
(
1G1),
/E, as follows
the expression
:
(BcD/+ABedE+
+
AB
+ + A&CWEF,
the contradictory combinations being struck out.
thus
expressions simplest terms.
it is,
may
obtained
The reduction
163. it
be remarked,
is
may
not
always
be
But the in
their
of inferences to their simplest terms, n in no way essential to their truth ;
It only renders them more pregnant with information. in which there is of the the only part process perhaps,
any
Vcri tion
s
^
iec
difficulty.
In working these logical problems, it has been Working of 2no found very convenient to have a series of combinations of terms beginning with those of A, B, and proceeding up to 164.
those of A, B, C, D, E, F, or more, engraved upon a common In any given problem, the series is chosen writing slate.
which just furnishes sufficient letters for the distinct terms. The contradictory combinations may then be rapidly struck out, and the remaining combinations lie ready before the eye.
CHAPTEE XIV COMPARISON WITH BOOLE
S
SYSTEM
To show the power and
facility of this method, as of Professor with that Boole, it will be sufficient, compared those as regards already acquainted with Professor Boole s to present the solution of one of his complex ex system,
165.
Thus, let us follow Professor Boole s investigation amples. 1 that wealth is of Senior s definition of wealth, namely either and in limited u^lftt productive supply, transfcraUc, of pleasure or preventive of pain (Boole,
p.
106).
Let A = Wealth
B
--=
Transferable
C = Limited in supply D = Productive of pleasure E = Preventive of pain. The
definition in question is expressed
by the proposition
A=BC(DE+De+dE) which includes
the combinations of D, E, d, c, except Striking out the dual term (E-f e) from BCD (E+f), may state the definition in the more concise form all
dc.
we
A=BCD+BCdE.
We may pass over Professor Boole s expression for 1
Here, as usually elsewhere,
I
A, after
take words in intent of meaning, and trans
form most statements accordingly.
BOOLE S EXAMPLE intrinsic elimination of
63
E (A = BC1)4-ABCW),
/*
\
as beincr O suffi-
ciently obvious. 166. Required
C in terms of A, B, 1) (Boole, p. 107). Ky session the combinations of A, B, C, I), EJ-^ABCDE Eorming possible and their contraries, and comparing them with the premise, ABG Dc ABt we shall find all the combinations from ABCWe to /BCV/E all
inclusive contradicted.
The remaining subjects
are
as
in
BGVe
.
,
the margin.
f,
Selecting the terms containing C,
BtD?
we have
C = ABCDE+ ABCI )c+ AIJCVE+rtBCWtf
"aEcde
Striking out the dual terms (E+f), and intrinsically eliminating remaining E s or c s by substitution of C, we have
abCde "
f
C = ABCD+ABCd+aBCd+&CD+&Cd
ABCD
C from
B , DE
^
abcde
117), because ABI)=ABCI), and striking out the dual terms (A-\-a) and (U + c/), we have either of the expressions
Eliminating
From
the latter
we
read,
($
What
is
limited in supply
either productive of
wealth, transferable (and ABC), or else some kind of iiot
what
is
is either
^>lcasure
or not,
not wealth, but is cither
transferable (abC], or, if transferable, is not productive of
pleasure (BCW). This conclusion Boole, on
p.
is
exactly equivalent to that of Professor
108.
His so-called secondary propositions, namely, 1. is iutransferable and L productive of 1pleasure, does not exist and 2. Wealth that is intransferable and not 167.
Wealth that ;
productive of pleasure does not exist, are negative conclu sions implied in the striking out of the contradictory com binations A//CDE, AbCDe, AM)E, AMfr, and AbCde, AlcdYu, Abcde, wliich are easily reducible to
AID
(C+r) (E+c)=
AM) =
Aid
=
AM. =
(C + r) (E + c)
0.
AlC (IE,
Xeyatii co nclu ~ ,
stons.
PURE LOGIC
64
does not exist
is open to exception. an 168. Again, required expression for productive of wealth of in terms (A), and preventive of pain pleasure (D),
The expression
Expression
(E) (Boole, p. 111). The complete collection of combinations containing 1)
We may
ABODE
rt&CDE
ABCDc
alCVe
BcDE
rt&cDE
BcDc
abcDe.
then write
D
as follows
But we may observe
is
:
also that
ADE = ABCDE and Ac = ABCDt-. Hence we may terms
substitute
of the expression for
D.
ADE and Ae for the two first We may also strike out the
dual term (E+c) in the third term, and eliminate the plural
term (Bc+&C + &c) intrinsically
Thus we
(
52) by substitution of D.
get the expression in the required terms
:
D = ADE+Af+aD, What is pro which may be translated into these words ductive of happiness is either some kind of wealth preventive :
of pain, or any kind of wealth not preventive of pain, or some kind of ivhat is not wealth (Boole, p. 1 1 1 ad fin.} 169. For the expression of
Expression
for
d we
easily select
d.
d = AdE + adc + adE = AdE+ad
What is not productive of pleasure which the meaning is some kind of wealth preventive of pain, or some kind of what is not wealth (Boole, p. 112). 170. These are the chief inferences furnished by Mr.
of
is either
Other in-
Boole.
From
the
list
of possible combinations
we
could
in fact as many easily add a great many more inferences, of the five terms be drawn as more, concerning any may and their contraries. A, B, C, D, E,
COMPARISON WITH BOOLE S SYSTEM Thus
for
CE
expressed in the remaining terms,
65
we have
CE = ABCI.) K+ ABCWE+ &CI)E+&CWE = (ABCE -\-abCE) Striking
eliminating
out
C
dual term
the
in
ABCE,
since
and
(D-\-d)
we
observe
extrinsically = that
ABE
ABCE, we have which may be translated
What
is
limited in supply,
and preventive of pain,
is either
wealth, transferable and preventive of pain, or some kind of icliat is not wealth and not transferable.
But we may often to express.
we
Thus,
in
find
that there
trying to express
is
no special relation in terms of E
abCD
find
abCD = rtftCD E+f = &CD. 171. Besides affording these formal deductions, the series a possible combinations will often give us at a O glance a OJ clear and valuable notion of the manner in which the uni of
,
*-
CO
verse of our subject is made up. In this instance we see that for wealth three combinations
not-wealth
for
B,
C,
and
c
(a)
BCDE,
BCI>,
we have
all
we have the and BCYE, and that thus possible
combinations of
With r?B we have Cde I), E, except and with ab, we have all possible (DE-fD^+rfE-fc/c), those
three.
combinations of C, D, and E. Thus the definition gives no relation between what is not wealth and not transferable,
and what
is
limited in supply, productive of pleasure, or
preventive of pain. 172. It is the character of this logical system, in common with that of Professor Boole, that it is perfectly general. The
same
which govern the inferences from one or two premises, involving two or three terms, are applicable with rules
out the slightest modification to any number of premises, Of course the working of involving any number of terms. the inferences becomes rapidly more laborious as the comF
<-
<-i;en
r
system
PURE LOGIC
66
and a considerable liability plexity of the problem increases, in the nature of things, and is But this to mistake arises. the process of inference, consisting in the mere comparison of terms as to their sameness or difference, seems to me the CampariJloole
simplest process that can be conceived. 173. Compared with Professor Boole s system, in its mathematical dress, this system shows the following ad-
.>
system.
vantages
:
Every process is of self-evident nature and force, and Euclid s governed by laws as simple and primary as those of 1.
axioms. 2.
or
The process
is infallible,
anomalous results. 3. The inferences
may
and gives no uninterpretable
be drawn with far less labour
system, which generally requires a separate computation and development for each inference.
than in Professor Boole
s
CHAPTER XV REMARKS ON BOOLE S SYSTEM, AND OX THE RELATION OK LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS 174. So long as Professor Boole s system of mathematical logic was capable of giving results beyond the power of any other system, it had in this fact an impregnable stronghold. Those who were not prepared to draw the same inferences in some other Boole.
manner could not quarrel with the manner I
Jut
if
it
be
true
of Professor
that the
system of the foregoing chapters is of equal power with Professor Boole s system, the case is altered. There are now two systt-ms of notation, giving the same formal results, one of which gives them with selfevident force and meaning, the other by dark and symbolic The burden of proof is shifted, and it must be for processes. the author or supporters of the dark system to sho\v that it is in some way superior to the evident system. 175. It is not to be denied that Boole s system is consistent and perfect within itself. It is, perhaps, one of the most marvellous and admirable pieces of reasoning ever put together. Indeed, if Professor Ferrier, in his Institutes of Metaphysics, is right in holding that the chief excellence of a system is in being reasoned and consistent within itself, then Professor Boole s is nearly or quite tho most perfect system ever struck out by a single writer.
176. But a system perfect within itself may not be a perfect representation of the natural system of human The thought. laws and conditions of thought as laid down in the system may not correspond to the laws and conditions of in
thought
reality.
the system will not be one of Pure and Natural Logic. Such is, I believe, the case. Professor Iloole s system is Pure Logic fettered with a condition which converts it from a purely If
so,
PURE LOGIC
68
His inferences are not logical to be interpreted, or translated inferences; hence they require without back into logical inferences, which might have been had ever quitting the self-evident processes of pure logic. to Boole s Among various objections which I might urge chief ones to four are in as purpose, purely logical system, regarded whicli I shall here confine my attention.
a numerical system. logical into
First Objection
177. Boole symbols of
s
symbols are essentially different
common
discourse
his
logic
is
from
the
names
not the logic of
or
common
thought.
on Professor Boole uses the symbol + to join terms together, cannot which are that contraries, the understanding logical they
without be predicated of the same thing or combined together words the In strictness, He says (p. 32) contradiction. of two or terms the between descriptive interposed "or,"
"and,"
imply that those classes are quite distinct, is found in another. so that no member In the ordinary use of these 178. This I altogether dispute.
more
classes of objects,
of one
we do not necessarily join logical contraries only so joined do prove to be logically contrary, terms and when in the meaning it is by virtue of a tacit premise, something teaches us which of them, of the names and our knowledge of the meanings our when And are knowledge contrary. they is defective, it will often be impossible of the words ;
conjunctions,
joined
to decide
whether terms joined by conjunctions are contrary
or not.
A
peer is either a 179. Take, for instance, the proposition If or a viscount, or a baron. an or a earl, or marquis, duke, s symbols, it would be implied that Boole Professor in expressed and a peer cannot be at once a duke and marquis, or marquis Yet many peers do possess two or more titles, and the earl. Prince of Wales is Duke of Cornwall, Earl of Chester, Baron If it were enacted by parliament that no peer Renfrew, etc. should have more than one title, this would be the tacit premise
which Professor Boole assumes to exist. Academic graduates are either bachelors, masters, Again, of or doctors, does not imply that a graduate can be only one lower. the annul not does the these higher degree ;
Shakespeare
s lines
REMAKA S av BOOLE S SYSTEM
69
Beauty, truth, and rarity, Grace in all simplicity,
Here inclosed
To
in cinders
lie.
this urn let those repair
That are either true or
fair,
certainly do not imply that beauty, truth, rarity, grace, and the true and fair are incompatible notions, so that no instance of one
an instance
of another. In the sentence Repentance is not a single act, but a habit or virtue, it cannot be implied that a virtue is not a habit by
is
;
Aristotle
s
definition
it is.
Unstain d Milton has the expression in one of his sonnets if fee is is obvious that the not or where it fee. always by gold -
gold, the gold
is
a fee or bribe.
Most Tennyson has the expression wreath or anadem. readers would be quite uncertain whether a wreath may be an anadem, or an anadem a wreath, or whether they are quite distinct or quite the same.
When
From Darwin
we see s Origin, I take the expression, or organ developed in a remarkable degree or manner. For if In this, or is used twice, and neither time disjunctively. part and organ are not synonymous, at any rate an organ is a any part
part.
And
it
same time both
is
obvious that a part
may
in an extraordinary degree
may be comparatively rare. From a careful examination of
be developed at the
and manner, although
such cases 180.
ordinary writings,
it
will
or vary found that the meanings of terms joined by and There is no from absolute identity up to absolute contrariety. logical condition of contrariety at all, and when we do choose The contrary expressions, it is because our subject demands it. matter, not the form of an expression, points out whether terms And if there is one point on which logicians are are exclusive. agreed, it is that logic is formal, and pays no regard to anything
l)e
not formally expressed. 48.) (See 181. And if a further proof were wanted that Professor Boole s symbols do not correspond to those of language, we have Me actually translates one same only to turn to his own work. sentence into different sets of symbols, according to the view he takes of the matter in hand. For instance (p. 59) he interprets Either productive of pleasure or preventive of pain so as not
and preventive of from the nature of the subject,
to exclude things both productive of pleasure pain.
It is plain,
he remarks,
rURE LOGIC
7o
either productive of pleasure or preventive that the expression of pain," in the above definition, is meant to be equivalent to either productive of pleasure or, if not productive of pleasure, "
"
;
preventive of
pain."
in remarking upon other possible interpretations, he before attempting to translate our data into the That says, it is above all things necessary to rigorous language of symbols, ascertain the intended import of the words we are using (p. 60). This simply amounts to consulting the matter, and Professor
And
Boole
s
symbols thus constantly imply restrictions not expressed but existing, if at all, as tacit or under
in the forms of language,
stood premises. + B not to 182. In my system, on the contrary, I take may not be B, but if this be the case, it must imply at all that = Ab or = b. be owing to an expressed premise
A
A
A
183. bols
is
How
A
essential Professor Boole s restriction
on
his
to the stability of his system, one instance will show.
his proposition
on
p.
sym Take
35
and give the following meanings
to x, y, z
:
- Csesar y = Conqueror of the Gauls z = First emperor of Rome. x
Now, there is nothing logically absurd in saying Ceesar is the conqueror of the Gauls or the first emperor of Rome. It is quite conceivable that a person should remember just enough of history to make this statement and nothing more. And there is nothing in the logical character of the terms to decide whether the conqueror could or could not be the same person as the first emperor. But now take Professor Boole s inference from the proposition x = y + z, namely x - z = y got by subtracting z from either side Then we have the strange inference of x = y + z. :
Ccesar, provided he queror of the Gauls.
This leads
me
to
is
not the first emperoi of
my
Rome,
is
the
con
second objection to Professor Boole
s
system.
Second Objection
184. There are no such operations as addition and subtraction in
pure
logic.
REMARKS ON BOOLE s SYSTEM
71
The operations of logic arc the combination and separation of terms, or their meanings, corresponding to multiplication and division in mathematics. I cannot support this statement with out going at once to the gist of the whole matter. 185. Number, then, and the science of number, arise out of It has logic, and the conditions of number are defined by logic. been thought that units are units inasmuch as they are perfectly instance, three apples are three units, inasmuch as each has exactly the same qualities as the other in being an
For
similar.
apple.
The truth
is
exactly opposite to
Unit* are units
this.
inasmuch as they are logically contrary. In so far as three apples are exactly like each other, one could not be distinguished from the other. perfectly
Were similar
there three apples, or any three things, so every way that we could not tell the
in
difference, they would he but one unity before stated, A + A + A = member that among the logical position in space with relation to
by the law of But then we must re
thing, just as,
A.
characters
of a thing is its other things, not to speak of we speak of three apples, we
Now, when position in time. three things, which, however perfectly in all other qualities, occupy different places,
its
mean
same they may be and are therefore
distinct things. In so far as they are, same they arc one ; in that they are different they are time. 186. The meaning of an abstract unit is something only known as logically distinct of a concrete unit
from is the
or contrary to other things. The abstract unit uith certain qualities
meaning known or
defined.
A
For instance, in of the units 1 1 ,
1",
(! is
",
+
1"
+
-
1 ")
that each
is
A
+
A"
+
A
"
the
meaning
something logically distinct
from the other, and when we predicate of each of these that + A A, say an apple, we get three distinct A s, A + So in multiplication, tic ice two is four A"
(1
+
1) (1
+
1)
=
1
+
1
+
1
+
it is
".
1.
The logical significance of the process is that if we have two logically distinct notions, and we divide each into two logically distinct notions, we get four logically distinct notions. In = + Aft + B + ab, where logical formulae (A + a) (B + b) and a, and b, express logical contraries.
AB
A
B
187. Now addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, are alike true as modes of reasoning in numbers, where we have the logical condition of a unit as a constant restriction. But addition and subtraction do not exist, and do not give true
PURE LOGIC
72
in a system of pure logic, free from the condition of number. For instance, take the logical proposition results,
A+B+C=A+D+E Meaning
wliat is either
A
or
B
C
or
is
dther
A
or
D
or E,
and
vice versd.
There being no exterior restrictions of meaning whatever, except that the same term must always have the same meaning 14), we do not know which of A, D, E, is B, nor which is C ( nor, conversely, do we know which of A, B, C, is D, nor which The proposition alone gives us no such information. is E. ;
In these circumstances, the action of subtraction does not It is not necessarily true that, if from same (equal) apph take same (equal) things the remainders are same we things It is not allowable for us to subtract the same thing (equal). (A) from both sides of the above proposition, and thence infer 7
.
B+C=D+
E.
is not true if, for instance, each of B and C is the same and D is the same as A, which has been taken away. Yet the equivalent inference by combination will be valid. We may combine a with both sides of the proposition, and we have aA + aB + aC - aA + aD + aE
This
as E,
or,
striking out the contradictory terms aA,
aB + aC = aD +
we have
aE.
188. But subtraction is valid under the logical restriction that the several alternatives of a term shall be mutually exclusive or contrary. (
in
1
)
which
DMw
Let
AMN + BM?t + CwN - AMN + DMn + EiN obviously impossible that AMN can
it
is
be either
or ETON, contraries of AMN, or any one of the alternatives any other. Then we may freely subtract from both sides, getting the necessary inference
BMrc + CroN =
(2)
+ mN)
;
DMw + EmN.
merely equivalent to the com proposition (1) of the term for the combination being performed, and contra-
This subtraction, however, bination with both (M?i
three
AMN
sides
is
of the
REMARKS ON HOOLE^S SYSTEM dictory terms struck out,
it
will be
73
found that the proposition
(2) results.
189. In short, when alternatives are contraries of each other, subtraction of one is exactly equivalent to combination with the The axiom (Boole, p. 36), that if equal things are taken rest.
from equal things, the remainders are equal, is nothing but a case of the Law of Combination ( 44), that if same (equal) terms be combined with same (equal) terms, the wholes arc same (equal). Take the self-evident proposition
AB
B+
+ A& +
ab
= A 13 + Ab + aB +
ab.
+ ab, may be subtracted from both sides by Any terms, say combining the other terms AB + Al with each side of the pro <7B
Then
position.
(AB +
Aft)
(AB + Ab + aB + al) = (AB + Al) (AB + Ab + B + + 0. + = AB + Ab + + + Ab +
AB
And what
.
is
.
.
true of this self-evident case
the premise is not self-evident. 190. Having thus established terms, provided all alternatives
ab)
.
must be true when
our liberty to subtract same are contraries, we have the
corresponding liberty to add by the inverse process. 191. The processes of addition and subtraction thus arise out The axioms of addition of the logical process of combination.
and subtraction are only valid under a logical condition, which or language generally. is certainly not applicable to thought And this condition is that which logic imposes upon number, It is that each two units shall be contrary logical alternatives. = A, A A + Law of a the to reduces which unit, by Unity, logic any two alternatives known to be the same, so that the science of
number
treating of units, treats of alternatives
But
different or contrary.
known
to be
logic itself is the superior science,
mail treat of alternatives of which
it is
not
known whether
the)/
and are
same
or different. 192. It is the self-evident logical
Law of Unity, then, which number. This law merely amounts to from saying that a thing cannot and must not be distinguished lays the foundations of
We commit an error against this law, when in counting over coins, for instance, to ascertain their numbers, that is, how many logically distinct coins there are, we count the self-same coin two or more times, making the coins for instance
itself.
C +
C"
+
C"
+
C
"
+
C""
+
PURE LOGIC
74
C +
instead of
C"
+ C =
+ Unity that one coin in number. C"
ences of time
C"
"
+
C""
In this
but in
It is by the Law of same coin counted twice is but case no attention is paid to differ
+
or the
C",
cases, things otherwise perfectly the same, like the beats of a pendulum, are distinguished and made into different units by one being before or after the other in time. ;
many
Third Objection
it
is
My
third objection to Professor Boole s system is, that inconsistent with the self-evident law of thought, the Law of Unity
193.
(A +
A=
A). Professor Boole having assumed as a condition of his system that each two terms must be logically distinct, is unable to recognise
the
Law
of Unity. It is contradictory of the basis of his system. x, in his system, means all things with the quality x, de noting the things in extent, while connoting the quality in intent.
The term
If by 1 we denote all things of every quality, and then subtract, as in numbers, all those things which have the quality x, the re mainder must consist of all things of the quality not-x. Thus + (1 - x) means in his system all x s with all not-x s, which, taken
together,
must make up
by multiplication
all
things, or
1.
Avith x, to select all x s
But from
let
us
now attempt
this expression for
all things.
x(x
+
1
-
x)
=x+x-
x.
Professor Boole would here cross out one + x against one - x, It is surely leaving one + ,r, the required expression for all x s.
however, that x + x is equivalent to x alone, whether in extent of meaning, as all the x s added to all the x s, which is simply all the x s, or in intent of meaning, as either x or x, which is surely x. Thus, x + x - x is really 0, and not x, the self-evident,
we regard
it
required result, and it is apparent that the process of subtraction in logic is inconsistent with the self-evident Law of Unity. 194. It is probable, indeed, that Professor Boole would alto-
gether refuse to recognise such an expression as x + x - x, on the it does not obey the condition of his symbols that each t\vo alternatives shall be distinct and contrary, x + x not
ground that being
so.
arrived at
It
may
be answered, that the expression has been
by operations enounced
as universally valid, which And if it be simply said that ought to give true results. x + x - x is not interpretable in Professor Boole s system, it may be again answered, that when translated into its equivalent in words, the expression x + x - x has a very plain meaning. It is
REMARK S ON BOOLE S SYS7*EM either
not it
.r,
x or x, prodded it be not although it ought to be
was
75
x,
and
must
hold,
is
x,
according to the
mode
in
this, I
simply
which
got.
195. In founding his system, Boole assumed that there cannot be two terms A + B, the same in meaning or names of the same the laws of thought require nothing of the kind, and thing ;
cannot require it, because among known and unknown terms, any two such as A + B may prove to be names of the same thing AB. Thought merely reduces the meaning of two same terms AB + AB, by the Law of Unity, to be the same as that of one term AB. And when it is once known that all terms in question are contraries of each other, or naturally exclusive and distinct, then Boole s system and the whole science of numbers apply. 196. It is on this account that my objections have no bearing against Professor Boole s system as applied to the Calculus of For it is Probabilities, so far as I can understand the subject. a high advantage to that calculus to have to treat only events mutually exclusive, probabilities being then capable of simple addition and substraction. 1 It seems likely, indeed, that this distinction of exclusive and unexclusive alternatives is the (Jordian knot in which all the abstract logical sciences meet and are e titan uied.
197. The last objection that Professor Boole s system is, that
I shall
at
present urge against
symbols }, y, ^-, establish for themselres no lo///cal meaning, and oidij bear a meaning derived front The some method of reasoning not contained in the symbolic system. the-
-,
meanings, in short, are those reached in the self-evident indirect method of the present work. 198. Professor Boole expressly allows, as regards one of these symbols at least, {}, that it is not his method which gives any It is the peculiarity of his system, that to the symbol. The he bestows a meaning on his symbols by interpretation. is explained on pp. 89, 90, and he says, interpretation of Although the above determination of the significance of the is founded upon the examination of a particular case, symbol the yet principle involved in the demonstration is general, and there are no circumstances under which the symbol can present
meaning
-
-}}
itself
to
which
the
same mode
of
analysis
is
inapplicable.
Again (p. 91), Its actual interpretation, however, as an inde finite class symbol, cannot, I conceive, except upon the ground 1
SOP
Do Morgan
s
Syllabus,
2!f>.
PURE LOGIC
76
of analogy, be deduced from its arithmetical properties, but must be established experimentally. 199. If I understand this aright, it simply means, that where-
ever a term appears in a conclusion with the symbol $ affixed, we may, by a mode of analysis, by some process of pure reason ing apart from the symbolic process from which $ emerged, ascertain that the meaning of % is some, an indefinite class term.
The symbol # is unknown until we give it a meaning. Before, therefore, we can know what meaning to give, and be sure that this meaning is right, it seems to me we must have another dis tinct
and
intuitive system
by which
to get that meaning.
Pro
fessor Boole s system, then, as regards the symbol is not the system bestowing certain knowledge ; it is, at most, a system ,
pointing out truths which, by another intuitive system of reason ing,
we may know
200. It
to be certainly true. to show this with
sufficient
regard to a single because the incapacity of a system, even in a single instance, proves the necessity for another system to support it. I believe that the other are open to exactly the symbols, j, same remarks, but from the way in which Mr. Boole treats them, involving the whole conditions of his system, it would be a lengthy matter to explain.
symbol
is
$,
,
,
201. The obscure symbols |, #, have the following --, i ap correspondence with the forms of the present system, pearing as the coefficient of a term means that the term is an included subject of the premise, so that, if combined with both members of the premise, it produces a self-contradictory term with neither side ( 115). ,
Similarly, $ means that the term is an excluded subject of the premise, producing a self-contradictory with both sides of the premise. And either i or means that the term is a self-contradictory or impossible term, producing a self-contradictory term with one side only of the premise.
202. The correspondence of these obscure forms with the of the present system is so close and obvious, as to suggest irresistibly that Professor Boole s opera tions with his abstract calculus of 1 and 0, are a mere counter
self-evident inferences
part of self-evident operations with the intelligible symbols of Professor Boole starts from logical notions, and pure logic. self-evident laws
of thought he suddenly transmutes his for mulae into obscure mathematical counterparts, and after various intricate manoeuvres, arrives at certain forms, corresponding to ;
REMARKS ON BOOLE S SYSTEM
77
forms arrived at directly and intuitively by ordinary or Pure Logic by that analysis, from which the interpretation of his And by this interpretation symbols was reached and proved. he transfers the meaning and force of pure logical conclusions to obscure forms, which, if they have meaning, have certainly no Boole s system is like the demonstrative force of themselves.
shadow, the ghost, the reflected image of logic, seen derivatives of logic.
among
the
203. Supposing it prove true that Professor Boole s Calculus 1 and has no real logical force and meaning, it cannot be denied that there is still something highly remarkable, something highly mysterious in the fact, that logical forms can be turned into
of
numeral forms, and while treated as numbers,
still possess formal proves that there is a certain identity of logical and numerical reasoning. Logic and mathematics are certainly And the clue to their connection seems to not independent. consist in distinct logical terms forming the units of mathematics. 204. Things as they appear to us in the reality of nature,
logical truth.
It
it were in a frame time and space. By our mental powers we abstract first time, then space, and then attribute after attribute, until we can finally think of things as abstract units deprived of all attri
are clothed in inexhaustible attributes, set as of
and only retaining the original logical condition of things, In logic w e argue upon things is distinct from others. same and one, in number we reason upon them as distinct and
butes,
r
that each as
many. be ultimately allowed that Professor Boole s not really logic at all that his system is founded upon one condition, that of exclusive terms, which does not belong to thought in general, but only numerical thought and that it ignored one law of logic, the Law of Unity, which these really distinguishes a logical from a numerical system 205. Supposing
calculus of
1
and
it
is
;
;
errors scarcely detract from the beauty and originality of the views he laid open. Logic, after his work, is to logic before his
work, as mathematics with equations of any degree are to mathe-matics with equations of one or two degrees. He generalised that it became possible to obtain any true inference from premises of any degree of complexity, and the work I have attempted has been little more than to translate his forms into processes of self-evident meaning and force. logic so
1
II
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS, TH E
TEUE PEIXCIPLE OF SEASONING
THE LOGICAL ABACUS.
10
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS ARISTOTLE
is,
perhaps, the greatest of human authors, but to him the words of Bacon, Let great
we may apply
authors have their due, as Time, the author of authors, be not deprived of his due, which is farther and farther to discover truth. Aristotle has had his due in the obedience of
more than twenty
deprived of his due.
centuries,
and Time must not be
Men, whose
birthright is the increas ing result of reason, are not to be bound for ever by the dictum of a thinker who lived but a little after the dawn of scientific thought. are not to be
We
persuaded any
longer to look upon the highest of the sciences as a dead science. Logic is the science of the laws of thought itself,
and there is no sphere of observation and reflection which is more peculiarly open to any inquirer, than the inquirer s own mind as engaged in the process of reasoning. It is from reflection on the operations of his own mind that Aristotle must have drawn the materials of his memorable But Benthain s mind, as he himself remarked, Analytics. was equally open to Bentham, and it would be slavery 1
indeed all his 2.
if any dictum of the first of logicians were to deprive successors of the liberty of inquiry. It may be said, perhaps, that the weaker cannot 1
Essay on
Lo<jic,
Bentham G
s
works, vol.
viii,
21S. {>.
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
82
possibly
the
push beyond
allowed that
stronger,
and
among us moderns can few
it
or
is
willingly
none be found
to equal in individual strength of intellect the great men But Time is on our side. of old. Though we reverence
them
as the ancients, they really lived in the childhood of race, and these times are, as Bacon would have
human
the
We enjoy not only the best in Greeks and Romans, but also the wonderful additions to the physical and mathematical sciences made since the revival of letters. In our time we possess
said, the
ancient times.
1
tellectual riches of the
an almost complete comprehension of many parts of physical science which seemed to Socrates, the wisest of men, beyond We have before us an the powers of the human mind. abundance of examples of the modes in which solid and undoubted truths may be attained, and it is absurd to suppose that among such successful exertions of the human intellect we can find no materials for a newer analytic of the mental operations.
The mathematics especially present the example of a of abstract science, evolved almost wholly from branch great the mind itself, in which the Greeks indeed excelled, but in which modern knowledge passes almost infinitely beyond Intellects so lofty and acute as those their highest efforts. of Euclid or Diophautus or Archimedes reached but the few 3.
on the way to the widening generalisations of modern mathematicians and what reason is there to sup pose that Aristotle, however great, should at a single bound first
steps
;
1 De antiquitate autem, opinio quam homines de ipsa fovent, negligens omnino est, et vix verbo ipsi congrua. Mundi enim senium et grandaevitas pro antiquitate vere habenda sunt quce temporibus nostris tribui debent, non junior! petati mundi, qualis apud antiques fuit. Ilia enim setas respectu Atque nostri, antiqua et major respectu mundi ipsius, nova et minor fuit. revera quemadmodum majorem rerum humanarum notitiam, et maturius judicium, ab homine sene expectamus, quamajuvene, propter experientiam, eodem et rerum quas vidit et audivit, et cogitavit, varietatem et copiam ;
;
;
modo
et a nostra aetate (si vires suas nosset, et experiri et intendere vellet) majora multo quam a priscis temporibus expectari par est ; utpote aetate
mundi lata.
cuniugrandiore, et infinitis experimentis, et observationibus aucta et Novum Oryanuui, Lib. i Aphor. 84.
THE TRUE PKIXC1PI.E OF XEASOA EYC
83
have reached the highest generalisations of a closely kindred science of human thought 4. Kant indeed was no intellectual slave, and it might well seem discouraging to that he con logical >.
sidered
logic
Aristotle,
unimproved
in
his
and indeed declared that
except in perspicuity.
speculators day since it
could not
]Jut his opinions
the
time
of
lie
improved have not prevented
the improvement of logical doctrine, and are now effectually succession of eminent men, -.Jeremy Bentham, George Bentham, Sir William Hamilton, Professor J)e Morgan,
disproved.
A
Archbishop Thomson, and the late Dr. Boole, have shown that in the operations and the laws of thought there is a wide and fertile area of Bentham did more investigation. than assert our freedom of in his uncouth
inquiry logical writings are to be found most original hints, and in editing his papers his nephew George Bentham pointed out the all;
important key to a thorough logical reform, the ^uuntijiffition Sir William Hamilton, of the praUi-ntc? Archbishop Thom
and Professor De Morgan, rediscovered and developed new idea. Dr. Boole, lastly, employing this funda mental idea as his starting-point, worked out a mathematical system of logical inference of extraordinary originality. 5. Of the logical system of Mr. lioole Professor De son,
the same
Morgan has
said in his
"Budget
legitimately have entered
it
of
Paradoxes":
-
I
might
among my pamduscs,
or things a paradox which, like
counter to general opinion but it is that of Copernicus, excited admiration from its first appear ance. That the symbolic processes of algebra, invented as tools of numerical to ex calculation, should be :
competent
press every act of thought, and to furnish the grammar and dictionary of an all-containing system of logic, would not have been believed until it was When Hobbes, in proved. the time of the Commonwealth, published his Computation or Lotjiqii.c, he had a remote glimpse of some of the points
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
84
The light of day by Mr. Boole. in all the applications of of forms the of thought unity reason, however remotely separated, will one day be which are placed in the
matter
name
of
will
and common wonder; and Boole s remembered in connection with one of
notoriety
be
the most important steps towards the attainment of this
knowledge. 6. I need hardly name Mr. Mill, because he has ex pressly disputed the utility and even the truthfulness of
am considering, and has evolved most of his own in a wholly different direction divergent opinions from the eminent men just mentioned.
the reforms which I
7. In the lifetime of a generation still living the dull and ancient rule of authority has thus been shaken, and the immediate result is a perfect chaos of diverse and original
Each logician has invented a logic of speculations. marked so own, by peculiarities of his individual mind,
his
and
his customary studies, that no reader would at first suppose Yet they treat of the same subject to be treated by all.
the same science, and, with the exception of Mr. Mill, they start from almost the same discovery in that science. Modern logic has thus become mystified by the diversity
and by the complication and profuseness of the The formulae invented by the different authors named. quasi-mathematical methods of Dr. Boole especially are so mystical and abstruse, that they appear to pass beyond the comprehension and criticism of most other writers, and are
of views,
No inconsiderable part of a lifetime is calmly ignored. indeed needed to master thoroughly the genius and tendency of all the recent English writings on Logic, and we can scarcely wonder that the plain and scanty outline of Aldrich, or the sensible but unoriginal elements of "Whately, continue to be the guides of a logical student, while the works of
De Morgan 8.
or of Boole are sealed books.
The nature
of the
great
discovery alluded
to,
the
quantification of the predicate, cannot be explained without proposiintroducing the technical terms of the science.
A
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING tion, or
judgment expressed in words, by a wpala. to a
or attribute united
85
consists of a predicate xn.lyed.
In this pro
position,
AU
mt talx
a.i
c cle iiH iits,
the predicate dement is asserted of die subject metal, and the force of the assertion consists, as usually considered, in
making the class of metals a part of the class of elements. The verb, or copula, arc, denotes inclusion, of the metals among the elements. But the subject only is quantised
:
for
it
is
stated that all metids are
elements, but
it
is
not
what proportion of the elements may be metals. the quantification of the predicate consists in giving some indication of the quantity or portion of the predicate stated
Xow
really involved in the judgment.
AU is
the
change
nietals are
same proposition thus seems
trifling,
the
The proposition no longer in
some elements quantified, and,
consequences
are
though the momentous.
asserts the inclusion of one
the other, but the identity of group with group.
class
The
proposition becomes an equation of subject and predicate, and the significance of this change will be fully apparent
who see that logical science thus acquires of contact with mathematical science. Xor is it point in a that the two abstract sciences only single point great only to those
a
Boole
remarkable investigations prove that, the proposition as an equation, all the deductions of the ancient doctrine of logic, and many more, meet.
Dr.
s
when once we view
be arrived at by the processes of algebra. Logic is found to resemble a calculus in which there are only two and 1, and the analogy of the calculus of quality numbers, or fact and the calculus of quantity proves to be perfect.
may
Here, in all probability, we shall meet a the truth observed by Baden Powell, that
new all
instance of
the greatest
advances in science have arisen from combining branches
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
86
of science hitherto distinct, principles pervading them. 9.
And
modern
and
showing the unity of
in
1
yet any one acquainted with the systems of the must feel that something is still wanting.
logicians
So much diversity and obscurity are no usual marks of and it is almost incredible that the true general system of inference should be beyond the comprehension of
truth,
nearly every one, and therefore incapable of affecting ordinary I am thus led to believe that the true clue to thinkers. the analogy of mathematics and logic has not hitherto been seized, and I write this tract to submit to the reader s judg
ment whether
or not I
During the
10.
last
have been able to detect this clue. two or three years the thought has
itself upon my mind, that the modern have altered the form of Aristotle s proposition
constantly forced logicians
without making any corresponding alteration in the dictum or self-evident principle which formed the fundamental
They have thus got the right postulate of his system. form of the proposition, but not the right way of using it. Aristotle regarded the proposition as stating the inclusion term or class within another; and his axiom was
of one
perfectly adapted to this view. The so-called Dictum dc
omni
is,
in
Latin phrase, as
follows
Quicquid dc omni
valet,
valet
ctiam dc gruibusdam
et
singulis.
And
the corresponding Dictum dc iiullo is similarly Quicquid de nullo valet, ncc dc quilmsdam ncc dc singulis
valet.
In English these dicta are usually stated somewhat as follows
Wliatcver
whole class.
class
is
may
Or, as Sir
negatively of a predicated of anything contained in that
predicated affirmatively lie
W. Hamilton more
or
briefly expresses
them,
IVliat pertains to the higher class pertains also to the lower. 2 1
Baden Powell, Unity -
of the Sciences, p. 41. Lectures on Loyic, vol. i, p. 303.
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF XEASOiVING These to
the
dicta, then,
subject,
know
or
and
87
enable us to pass from the predicate affirm of the subject whatever we
to
can affirm of
the
But we
predicate.
are
not
authorised to pass in the other direction, from the subject to the predicate, because the proposition states the inclusion of the subject in the predicate, and not of the predicate in the subject.
The
proposition,
All
nieta.h arc elements,
taken in connection with the dictum dc ornni authorises us to
apply to
all
knowledge we may have of
nictah whatever
the nature of elements, because metals are but a subordinate class included among the elements and, therefore, possess But we commit an ing all the properties of elements. ;
we argue in the opposite direction, and what we know only of metals. This is neither authorised by Aristotle s dictum, nor would it be in obvious fallacy
if
infer of elements
accordance with
fact.
Aristotle
s
postulate
is
thus perfectly
view of the nature of a proposition, and adapted his system of the syllogism was admirably worked out in accordance with the same idea. 11. But recent reformers of logic have profoundly altered our view of the proposition. They teach us to regard it as an equation of two terms, formerly called the subject and to
his
predicate, but which, in becoming equal to each other, cease to be distinguishable as such, and become convertible.
Should not logicians have
altered, at the
same time and
in
a corresponding manner, the postulate according to which the proposition is to be employed ? Ought we not now to
known
term of the proposition ? Does not the is known and may now that the two dictum, in short, apply in both directions, terms are indifferently subject and predicate ? 12. To illustrate this we may first quantify the predicate
say that whatever
is
of either
be asserted of the other
of our
own former example,
getting the proposition,
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
88
All metals are some dements,
where the copula are means no longer are contained among, but are identical with ; or availing ourselves of the sign = a meaning closely analogous to that which it bears in mathematics, we may express the proposition more clearly as, in
All metals It
is
now
= some
elements.
we know of a certain we know of all metals, and metals we know of a certain in
evident that whatever
indefinite part of the elements
whatever we know of
all
definite part of the elements.
We
seem
to
have gained no
and if we are asked to define advantage by the change what of the elements we are speaking of, more exactly part ;
we can only answer, Those which All metals is
=
are metals.
The formula
all metallic elements
a more clear statement of the same proposition with the
predicate quantified ; for while plies the inclusion of metals
it
asserts
among
an identity
elements.
But
it
im
it
is
an accidental peculiarity of this form that the dictum only applies usefully in one direction, since if we already know
what metals are we must know them to be metallic elements, the adjective metallic including in its meaning all that can be known of metals ; and from knowing that metals are
we gain no clue as to what part of the But it is hardly properties of metals belong to elements. too much to say that Aristotle committed the greatest and most lamentable of all mistakes in the history of science
metallic elements
when he took
kind of proposition as the true type of It was and founded thereon his system. propositions, a mere misled but the of accident that he was by fallacy so rooted once a master-mind became committed fallacy by in the minds of all succeeding logicians, by the influence of authority, that twenty centuries have thereby been rendered a blank in the history of logic. this
all
;
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING
89
Aristotle ignored the existence of an infinite number of definitions and other propositions which do not share the 13.
If we define peculiarity of the example we have taken. elements as substances which cannot be decomposed} this defi
nition
is
of the form
JJlciiicnts
=
u/iideeomposal>le
substances
and since the term clement does not occur
;
in
the second
member, we may apply the diet am usefully in both direc Whatever we know of the term dement we may tions. assert of the distinct term /indecomposable substance; and, I ice versa, whatever we know of the term undecomposable substance
we may
assert of element.
The example, Iroii is the most useful of the metals
hardly needs quantification of the predicate, for of the form
Iron
;
it is
evidently
the -most i/seftd of the metals,
the terms being both singular terms, and convertible with
each other.
We may
we know
either.
of
evidently infer of both terms what we join to the above the similar
If
proposition, I, -oil
=
ike cltcapest
of the metals,
we are easily enabled to infer that the cheapest of the metals = thc most useful of the metals, since by the dictum we know of iron that it is the cheapest of the metals; and this we are These enabled to assert of the most useful, and vice versa. and are almost self-evident forms of reasoning, yet they were neither the foundation of Aristotle s system, nor were
His they included in the superstructure of that system. syllogism was therefore an edifice in which the corner-stone 1
In strictness we should add, by our present
mcaii.s.
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
90
was omitted, and the true system is supplying this omission, and re-erecting the
itself
to be created edifice
by
from the
very foundation. 14. I am thus led to take the equation as the funda mental form of reasoning, and to modify Aristotle s dictum in accordance therewith. It may then be formulated some
what
as follows
Whatever
is
known of a term may
be stated
of
its
equal or
equivalent.
Or
in other words,
Whatever I
is trite
of a thing
is true
of
its like.
must beg
of the reader not to prejudge the value of It is derived from Aristotle s very evident axiom. dictum by omitting the distinction of the subject and pre dicate and it may seem to have become thereby even a more transparent truism than the original, which has been this
;
condemned
as such
by Mr. J. S. Mill and some must be judged by its
the value of the formula
I do not hesitate to assert that
others.
results
;
But and
not only brings into harmony all the branches of logical doctrine, but that it unites them in close analogy to the corresponding parts of mathematical method. All acts of mathematical reasoning may, I believe, be considered but as applications of a corresponding axiom of quantity and the force of the axiom may best be illus trated in the first place by at it in its mathematical looking it
;
aspect, 15. The axiom indeed with which Euclid begins to build presents at first sight little or no resemblance to the modified dictum. The axiom asserts that
Things equal
to the
same thing arc equal
to
each other.
In symbols, a
= I= = c.
c
gives a
Here two equations are apparently necessary in order that an inference may be evolved and there is something ;
THE TRUE PRIXCIPLE OF XEASOXL\\;
91
character of the peculiar about the threefold symmetrical formula which attracts the attention, and prevents the true nature of the process of mind from being discovered.
We
that an inference get hold of the true secret by considering a of the use is equally possible by single equation, but that
when Thus
there if
we
is
no equation no inference
^
use the sign
to
at all
can
lie
denote the existence
drawn. <>f
an
inequality or difference, then one equality and one inequality, as in
enable us to infer an inequality a
Two
inequalities,
not
enable us
relation of
may
both
i
.
on the other hand, as in ft
do
j~.
a and from ;
differ
v/~>
make any
to <
&
%/>
for if these I,
and
e,
inference concerning the quantities are equal, they
so they
if they are unequal. be supplemented by
may
The axiom of Euclid two other axioms, which can only be expressed in somewhat thus requires to
awkward
language, as follows
And aain
16.
Reflection
upon the
force of these
axioms and their
relations to each other will show, I think, that the deductive
power always
resides
in
an equality, and that difference as
My
meaning incapable of affording any inference. will be more plainly exhibited by placing the symbols in the following form such
is
:
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
92
a=b
a hence
II
||
c
c.
Here the inference
is seen to be obtained by substituting v O virtue of their equality as expressed in the first by equation a = l, the second equation l = c being that in which
a
b
for
substitution
other
is
is
passive,
One equation
effected.
and
it
is
active
and the
a pure accident of this form of
is
inference that either equation may be indifferently chosen as the active one. Precisely the same result happens in this
case to
which
b
=c
is
be obtained by a similar act of reasoning in
shown below
^the active equation, as
=c
b
My warrant
c
hence
II
||
view of the matter
for this
is
to be
found in
the fact that the negative form of the axiom is now easily brought into complete harmony with the affirmative form, except that, since it has only one equation to work by, there
can be only one active equation and one form in which the inference can be exhibited as below
a=b
a hence
S
Inference
manner
is
seen
as before
S
to take place in exactly the same the substitution of a for b, and the
by
^
c is the part in which negative equation or difference b substitution takes place, but which has itself *no substitutive
power.
Accordingly
into the
same form,
we
shall in vain
throw two differences
as in (i
on
b
S c
b
or
S a,
<~r>
c
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING we have no copula allowing
because
us
to
93
make any
substitution. 17.
am
I
confirmed
in
this
view by observing
while the instrument of substitution
is
the forms of relation in which a substitution
by no
are
difference.
related
is
<
equation,
may
be made
means restricted to relations of equality or If a = b, then in whatever way a third quantity to one of them, in the same way it must be
related to the other.
conceivable
that,
tin
always
kind
If
we
^ to denote any between one quantity and
take the sign
relation
of
another, then the widest possible expression of a process of is shown in the form
mathematical inference
a.
=I
a hence
S
as denoting that e is If in one case we take the sign if it is a multiple of b, it follows that it is a multiple of a the /i i\\ multiple of one, it is the nili multiple of the other "
;
;
the nili submultiple, or the nili power, or the nili root of one, it similarly follows that it stands in the same
if
it
is
relation to the other or less than /t.
In this
c
or
;
if,
lastly,
c-
be greater than
b
will also be greater or less than by //, all-powerful form we actually seem to it
by n by ,
have
together the whole of the processes by which equations are solved, viz. equal addition or subtraction,
brought
multiplication or division, involution or evolution, performed That upon both sides of the equation at the same time.
most familiar process
in
mathematical reasoning, of substitut
ing one member of an equation for the other, appears to be the type of all reasoning, and we may fitly name this all-important process the substitution of canals.
An
apparent exception to the statement that all mathematical reasoning proceeds by equations may perhaps occur to the reader, in the fact that reasoning can be con 18.
ducted
by
inequalities
A
chapter on the subject of be found in most elementary works
inequalities.
may even
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
94
on algebra, and it is self-evident that a greater of a greater is a greater, and what is less than a less is less. Thus we certainly seem to have in the two formula?, >!
c
hence
c
hence a
a>c,
and <
c,
two valid modes of reasoning otherwise than by equations. But it is apparent, in the first place, that the use of these and demands some precautions which do not signs <
>
attach to the copula
=
the formula?,
;
do not establish any relation between a and the reader will not find
easy to explain
it
c
;
why
and
I
think
these do not
and the former do, without implying the use of an equation or identity. The truth is, that the formulas, a>b>
c,
a
c
involve not only two differences, but also one identity in the direction of those differences, whereas the formulae,
a
I
>
<
c,
ac,
appear to
fail
in giving
any inference because they involve and quantity. this view of the matter by observ
only differences both of direction
Strength is added to ing that all reasoning by inequalities can be represented with equal or superior clearness and precision in the form of equalities, while the contrary is by no means always true.
Thus the inequality
is
represented by the equality (1)
a
=
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONIXC which
in
is j>
any positive quantity greater than zero
95
;
and
the inequality I
is
c
>
similarly represented by the equality
S-c+fc
(2)
which q
is again a positive quantity greater than zero. substituting for I in (1) its value as given in (2), we obtain the equation
in
]>y
a = c+p+q, which, owing to the like signs of p and q, is a representation in a more exact and clear manner of the conclusion <
>
(
hi
c.
the other hand, the formula a
would evidently lead
>
1)
<
c
to the equation
a = e+p-r, in
which p
is
Xow
the excess of
over
1>,
and r the excess of
c-
equation, taken in connection with the former one, seems to give much clearer information as to
over
It.
this
the conditions under which inference
is
possible than do the
formula of inequalities, and I entertain no doubt at all that, even when an inference seems to be obtained without the use of an equation, a disguised substitution is really per formed by the mind, exactly such as represented in the But I can only assert my belief of this from equations. the examination of the process in my own mind, and I must submit to the reader s judgment whether there are exceptions or
not to
the rule, that
we always reason by means
of
identities or equalities. 19. Turning now to apply these considerations to the forms of logical inference, my proposed simplification of the
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
96
rules of logic is founded upon an obvious extension of the one great process of substitution to all kinds of identity. The Latin word ccqiialis, which is the original of our equal,
was not
restricted in signification to similarity of quantities,
but was often applied to anything which was unvaried or similar when compared with another. have but to "VVe
interpret the word equal in the older and wider sense of like or equivalent, in order to effect the long-desired union of logical and mathematical reasoning. to show that all forms of
employment of the of equals, sim ilars.
or,
if
For
it is
not difficult
reasoning consist in repeated universal process of the substitution
the
be preferred, substitution of
phrase
To prevent a confusion
of mathematical and logical will be desirable to use large capital letters to denote the things compared in a logical 20.
applications of the formula,
it
sense, but the copula or sign of before. Thus the symbols.
identity
may remain
as
A=B denote
the
identity
indefinite terms or
in one case to
of
names
mean
Iron,
the
A
things
and B.
represented
Thus
A may
when B might mean
by
the
be taken
the cheapest
In another of the metals, or the most useful of the metals. would mean clement, and B example which we have used
A
that which cannot be decomposed, and so on. The fundamental principle of reasoning authorises us to substitute the term
on one side of an identity
for the other term, ichcrcver this
whatever relation B stands to a third thing C, in the same relation must stand to C. to denote any possible or conceivable Or, using the sign
may
be encountered, so that in
A
-^>
kind of relation, the formula
A=B
A hence
C represents a self-evident inference.
C Thus,
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING
and
If C Ij C // C
fo a
If
it-
CJ
be tin
/dthc
I-
of L,
C
is
compound of B, C
ic /Ac absence
of
\\,
identical with B,
97
father of A; w a compound of A;
C w C
/Ac absence of
identical with
-is
A; A;
so on.
We
may at once proceed to develop from this process of substitution all the forms of inference recognised by Aris 21.
hi the first place, there cannot be a totle, and many more, simpler act of reasoning than the substitution of a definition for a term defined and though this operation found no place in the old system of the syllogism, it ought to hold the first place in a true If we take the definition system. ;
of
element as
Element = andccornposable substance,
we
are authorised to
[tosable substance
either of
in
employ the terms dement and undccomlieu of each other
them may be found.
of element,
may
it
If
we
whatever relation
in
describe iron as a kind
also be described as a kind of undecompos-
able substance. 22.
Sometimes we may have two definitions of the same
term, and
according (1)
(2)
we may then equate to
these to each other.
Thus,
Mr. Senior,
Wealth = whatever has exchangeable Wealth = whatever is useful,
-value.
transferable,
and limited
in stqrpbj.
We
can employ either of these to the other, obtaining the equation,
make
a substitution in
Whatever has exchangeable value = (dude ccr ferable,
and limited
is
useful, trans
in supply.
^ here we have one affirmative proposition or equation, and one negative proposition, we still find the former suflicieut for the process of inference. Thus Iron = the most useful metal. (2) Iron y the metal most early used by primitive nation*. (1)
ii
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
9S
By
substituting in (2)
The most useful metal
by means of
^
the
(1)
we have
metal most early used by
primitive nations. 23. result.
But two negative propositions Thus the two propositions,
Snowdon Snowdon
will of course give no
mountain in Great Britain, highest mountain in the world,
^n the highest on
the
do not allow of any substitution, and therefore do not give any means of inferring whether or not the highest mountain in Great Britain
is
the highest mountain in the world.
Postponing to a later part of this tract (36) the consideration of negative forms of inference, I will now 24.
notice
some inferences which involve combinations
However many nouns, substantive joined together, we may substitute Thus, if we have the propositions, Square = equilateral Equilateral
or
adjective,
of terms.
may
be
for each its equivalent.
rectangle,
= equal-sided,
= right-angled quadrilateral, = Quadrilateral four-sided figure,
Rectangle
we may by evident
substitutions obtain
Square = equal-sided, right-angled, four-sided figure. 25.
It is desirable at this point to
fact that the order in a is
matter
of
identically the
same
it
to the
which nouns adjective are stated
indifference.
and even when
draw attention
as
A an
is
four-sided, equal-sided figure equal-sided, four-sided figure ; difficult to
sometimes seems inelegant or
the order of names describing a thing, it is gram matical usage, not logical necessity, which stands in the way. and B represent any two names or terms, their Hence, if
alter
A
AB
will be taken to indicate anything which junction as in and B, and then it follows unites the qualities of both
A
that
AB = BA.
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING
99
This principle of logical symbols has been fully explained by Dr. Boole in his Lues of Thought (pp. 29, 30), and also in my Pare Loijie (p. 15); and its truth will be assumed here without further proof. It must be observed, however, that this property of logical symbols is true only of adjec tives, or their equivalents, united to nouns, and not of words
connected together by prepositions, or in other Thus ways. table of wood is not equivalent to wood I able but if we ; of treat the words of wood as equivalent to the adjective wooden, it is
true that a table of wood
26.
We may now
proceed
is
the
same
as a wooden table.
to consider the ordinary pro
position of the form
A = AB, A
which asserts the identity of the class with a particular part of the class 13, namely the part which has the proper ties of A. It may seem when stated in this way to be a truism, but it is not, because it really states in the form of an identity the inclusion of A in a wider class B. Aristotle happened to treat it in the latter aspect only, and the ex treme incompleteness of his syllogistic system is due to this
circumstance. identity that
is only by treating the proposition as an relation to the other forms of reasoning be
It its
comes apparent. 27. One of the simplest and by far the most common form of argument in which the proposition of the above form occurs is the mood of the syllogism known by the
name Barbara. As an example, we may take (1)
Iron
(2)
A
(3)
Iron
is
an
is
an
element, therefore
element.
The propositions thus expressed become,
in a strictly logical (
1
)
(2)
:
a metal,
metal is
the following
in the ordinary
form
Iron = metallic iron, Metal elementary metal.
manner
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
ioo
Now for
metal or metallic in (l)we alent in (2) and we obtain
may substitute
its
equiv
= elementary, metal, iron ; (3) Iron which in the elliptical expression of ordinary conversation becomes Iron is an element, or Iron is some kind of element, the words an or some Itind being indefinite substitutes for a more exact description The form of this mode of inference must be stated in If we take symbols on account of its great importance.
A = iron, B = metal, C = clement, the premises are obviously,
and substituting for the conclusion
B
(1)
A = AB,
(2)
B = BC,
in (1) its description in (2)
we have
A = ABC, which
is
28.
the symbolic expression of (3).
The mood Darii, which
is
distinguished from
Bar
bara in the doctrine of the syllogism by its particular minor premise and conclusion, cannot be considered an essentially
A
in the previous
remaining as before, we should
then have the
For if, instead of taking example = iron, we had taken it
different form.
A = some B and
native minerals;
conclusion
A -ABC, denoting
some native minerals are elements
;
an instance of the syllogism Darii exhibited in form as Barbara. the same exactly
which
affords
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING 29.
The
sorites
101
chain of syllogisms consists but in a
or
of premises of the same kind, allowing of repeated substitution. Let the premises be series
(1)
The, honest
man
it
truly wise,
(2) The truly wise man is happy, (3) The happy man is contented, (4)
The contented
man
is to be
envied,
the conclusion being (5)
The honest
man
is to be envied.
Taking the letters A, B, 0, D, and ively honest man, truly wise, happy,
E
to indicate respect
and
contented,
to
lr
envied, the premises are represented thus
A = AB,
(1)
(3)
B = BC, C = CD,
(4)
D=I)E,
(2)
and successive substitutions by and by (2) in (1), give us
in
(4)
(3),
by
(3)
in
(2).
C = CDE, B = BCDE,
A -ABODE. Or we may get exactly the in a different order, thus
same conclusion by substitution
A = AB = ABC = ABCJ = ABODE. )
The ordinary statement indefinite expression
of the conclusion in
of the
(5)
full description of
A
is
only an
given in
A = ABODE. All the affirmative moods of the syllogism may be As represented with almost equal clearness and facility. 30.
an example of Darapti
in the third figure
Oxygen
is
an
(2)
Oxygen
is
a
(3)
Some
(1)
we may take
clement,
gas,
gas, therefore, is
an
element.
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
102
A=gas,
Making
B = oxygen, C = element, the premises become
B = BC, B = BA.
(1) (2)
Hence, by obvious substitution, either by (1) in (2) or by (2) in (1),
we
get
BA = BC.
(3)
Precisely interpreted this means that gas which is oxygen element which is oxygen ; but when this full interpretation
is
is
unnecessary, we may substitute the indefinite adjective some for the more particular description, getting,
Some gas or, in
the
still
more vague form
Some gas 31.
some element,
is
is
of
an
common
language,
element.
The mood Datisi may thus be
illustrated
(1) Some metals are inflammable, (2) All metals are elements, (3) Some elements are inflammable.
Taking
A = elements,
C = inflammable, D = some,
B = metals, we may
represent the premises in the forms
DB = DBC
(1)
(2)
B = BA.
Substitution, in the second side of (1), of the description of given in (2) produces the conclusion
B
(3)
DB = DBCA,
or, in words,
Some metal = some metal element inflammable.
r
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF KEASOXIA G lu this and sentation
many
my method
other instances
found to give a
is
far
103
more
and
full
of
repre con
strict
but ellipsis or a substitution clusion than the old syllogism of indefinite particles or adjectives easily enables us to pass from the strict form to the vague results of the syllogism ;
:
would be in vain that we should attempt more strict conclusion by the syllogism alone. it
beg of the reader not to judge the validity of
reach the
to
"But
my
I
must
forms by
any single instance only, but rather by the wide embracing Even common thought powers of the principle involved. must lie condemned as loose and imperfect if it should lie found in certain cases tion
be inconsistent with a generalisa
to
which holds true throughout the exact sciences
as well
as the greater part of the ordinary acts of reasoning. 32. Certain forms of so-called immediate inference, chiefly brought into notice in recent times by Dr. Thomson, are
readily derived from our principle. added determinant^ Inrnicdidte inference
consists
in
b>/
joining a determining or (pialifving adjective, or some equiv alent phrase, to each member of a proposition, a new pro Dr. Thomson s own example position being thus inferred. is
as follows
A whence we
A
negro
/s
a fellow-creature
infer immediately,
negro in suffering
?x
a fellow-creature in suffering,
To explain accurately the mode seems
to be
;
made according to our A = ncijro, >=
in
which
this inference
principle, let us take
fellow-creature,
C = suffering. The premise may be represented A = AB.
Xow
it
is
self-evident that 1
AC
is
as
identical with
Outline of thr Lairs of Thought,
87.
AC,
this
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
104
being a fact which some
down
necessarily laid
in
may the
think to be somewhat un of the
first
41). thought (see In the symbolic expression of this
we can
substitute for
A
primary laws of
fact,
member
in the second
its
equivalent
AB, getting
AC = ABC. This
be interpreted in ordinary words
may
A which
suffering negro is
as,
a suffering negro fellow-creature,
only from the conclusion as. stated by Dr. the qualification negro in the second
differs
Thomson by containing member.
33. Immediate inference by complex conception closely resembles the preceding, and is of exceedingly frequent occurrence in common thought and language, it although o O O O has never had a properly recognised place in logical doctrine *
until lately. 1
nature
Its
following
is
best learnt from such an
Oxygen
an
is
pound weight of oxygen pound weight of an element.
is
a very plain case of substitution
;
= oxygen,
P= pound
weight,
Q = element, we may
represent the premise as
= OQ.
Now
as the
element,
Therefore a
This
example
:
it is
self-evident that
P ]
of
Thomson
- P of s Outline,
0, 88.
is
for if
a
we make
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING and substituting we have
second
in the
P an
In
34.
common form
member
105
the description of
(J
= P of OQ.
of
exactly similar manner we may solve a of reasoning which the authors of the Port
Royal Logic described as the Complex Si/Hot/ism, remarking how little attention logicians had in their day given to
many common
forms of reasoning. 1
example, which
is
as follows
The sun
is
an
(1)
1
will
employ
their
insensible thing,
The Persians worship the sun, The Persians, therefore, worship an insensible thiny.
(2) (?)}
Making
A = sun, = insensible tiling, = C Persians, I) = worshippers, I)
we may
represent the above by the symbols (1)
A = AB
(2)
C = CDo/A.
Hence, by substitution for (3)
35.
from
in (2)
C = CD
by means of
(I),
o/AP..
I
regard hypothetical propositions as only differing categorical propositions in the accidental form of well
It
handbooks of
logic, that
represented
phraseology
;
is
in
known
readers of the ordinary hypothetical propositions can always the categorical form by altering the
expression.
l)e
A
and the
fact
to
that the alteration required
is
often of the slightest possible character seems to show that there is no essential difference. Thus the proposition,
If iron contain phosphorus, 1
it is brittle,
Port Royal Logic, translated by Mr. Spencer Riynes,
p.
207.
1
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
06
is
hypothetical, but
to
exactly equivalent
the
categorical
proposition, Iron, containing phosphorus, is brittle
which
is
;
of the symbolic form,
AB-ABC. But propositions such If
as,
the barometer falls,
a storm
is
coming,
cannot be reduced but by some such mode of expression as the following
:
The circumstances of a falling barometer are circumstances of a storm coming. Nevertheless,
expression
being
sufficient
granted,
freedom they
in
readily
the
the
alteration
of
come under our
formulae. 36.
I
have as yet introduced few examples of negative may be treated in their
propositions, because, though they
purely negative form, it is usually more convenient to convert them into affirmative propositions. This conversion is effected by the use of negative terms, a practice not un
known as
it
to the old
logic,
should have been.
A is not B A ^ B,
or is
but not nearly so much employed Thus the negative proposition,
much more
conveniently represented by the affirmative
proposition or equation,
which we denote by b the quality or fact of differing The term b is in fact the name of the whole class of tilings, or any of them, which differ from B, so that it is a matter of indifference whether we that A differs say from B and is excluded from the class B, or that it agrees in
from B.
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING
107
There are advantages, I. 1 form. the affirmative however, employing 37. The syllogism Celarent is now very readily brought Take the example under our single mode of inference. with
I
and
is
included in the class
in
All metals arc dements, transmvted, (2) No element can (3) No metal, therefore, can Ic transmuted. (1)
l>e
To represent
this symbolically, let
A = metal, ~B
= element,
C = transmutaUc, c
Then the premises
= untransmutable.
are (1)
A = AB
(2)
Substituting in (1) by
means
metals 38.
1
It
=
P>r.
of (2)
we
get
A = A1V;
(3) or,
]>,=
metals, elementary, untransmutable.
Before proceeding to other examples of the syllogism,
may
sccin to the reader contradictory to
condemn the negative pro
and incapable of affording inferences, and shortly afterwards an affirmative proposition of fertile or inferential power. But on trial it will be found that the propositions thus obtained yield no Thus the negative premises, conclusions inconsistent with my theory. position as sterile to convert it into
A
is not
B
is
I
,
not C,
or equations, yield the affirmative propositions
And when logical
these premises are tested, whether on the logical slate, abacus, or to in a later page, they are found to give no con The description of A is given in the relation of A and C.
machine referred
clusion concerning
the equation.
from which
it
A = AbC-\-Ab<; appears that
A may
indifferently occur with or without C.
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
loS
it will be well to point out that every affirmative proposition or equation gives rise to a corresponding equation between the negatives of the terms of the The general original. proposition of the form
A = B, treated by the fundamental principle of reasoning, informs us that in whatever relation anything stands to A, in the same relation it stands to B, and similarly vice versd.
Hence, from B, and whatever differs Now the term b denotes what differs from B, and a denotes what differs from A so that from the single original proposition we may draw the two pro whatever differs from A from B differs from A.
differs
;
positions
adb b = ab.
But
as these propositions
we can make a
have an identical second member,
substitution,
*
This form of inference, though the traditional logic,
importance.
It
little if
may
at all noticed in
of frequent occurrence be illustrated by such
and of great examples as
is
= contented, = unhappy not-contented ; Jiappy
hence or again,
triangle
= three-sided
rectilinear figure,
hence
what
is not
a triangle = wliat
is
not a three-sided
rectilinear figure.
The new proposition thus obtained may be called the contra/positive of the one from which it was derived, this being a name long applied to a similar inference from the old form of proposition. 39. Though the details of this new view of logic
may
not yet have been perfectly worked out, much evidence of the truth of the system is to be found in the simplicity,
THE TRUE PKL\CirLE OF REASONING and universality
variety,
of the
109
forms of reasoning which
can be evolved out of a single law of thought,
the similar
treat inciit of siniilars.
The old system of the syllogism, indeed, was nominally founded on a single, or rather double, axiom or law, the dicta to
mode
of Aristotle, but the
conclusions
logical
student
was
so
in
which these dida
led
from
far
could not be
being evident, that the A trusted with their use.
more rules of the syllogism order that the validity of an argument might thereby be tested ; but, as even then the task was no easy or self-evident one, logicians formed a cumbrous system of was therefore made
six, eight, or
out,
in
number of forms obeying these and composed a curious set of mnemonic lines by which they might be committed to memory. These lines, the venerable JJarlam, Cclarcn.t, etc., were no doubt of the limited
complete
list
artificial
rules,
creditable to the ingenuity of men who lived in the darkest ages of science, but they are altogether an anachronism in the present age. What should we think now of a writer of mathematical textbooks,
who should
select
about a score
commonest forms of mathematical equations, and invent a mnemonic by which both the forms of the equa tions and the steps of their solution might be carried in the of
the
Instead of such an absurdity, we now find, even elementary books, that the general principles and processes are impressed upon the pupil s mind, and he is taught by practice to apply these principles to indefinitely
memory
?
in purely
numerous and varied examples.
So
it
should be in logic
;
the logical student need only acquire a thorough compre hension of the principle of substitution and the very primary laws of thought, in order to be able to analyse any argument
Xo and develop any form of reasoning which is possible. would be subsidiary rules are needful, and no mnemonics otherwise than a hindrance.
have yet a striking proof to oiler of the truth of the views I am putting forward; for when once we lay 40.
down
L
the primary laws of thought, and employ
them by
i
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
io
means
the principle
of
of
unlimited system of forms
substitution, of indirect
we
find
that
an
reasoning develops itself spontaneously. Of this indirect system there is hardly a vestige in the old logic, nor does any writer previous to Dr. Boole appear to have conceived its it existence,
though
must no doubt have been often unconsciously employed in particular cases. This indirect or negative method is closely analogous to the indirect proof, or reductio ad absurdum, so frequently used by Euclid and other mathematicians, and a similar method is employed by the old logicians in the treatment of the syllogisms called Baroko and Bokardo, by the reductio ad impossible. But the incidental examples of the indirect logical method which can be found in any book previous to the Mathematical Analysis of Logic of Dr. Boole give no idea whatever of its all-commanding power for it is not only capable of proving all the results obtained already by a direct method of inference, but it gives an unlimited number of other inferences which could not be arrived at in any other than a negative or indirect manner. In a pre vious little work 1 I have a but somewhat given complete, tedious, demonstration of the nature and results of this ;
method, freed from the
difficulties
which Dr. Boole
involved.
outline of 41.
left
it
and occasional I will
now
errors in
give a brief
its
The
principles. indirect method
is founded upon the law of the substitution of similars as with the aid of the funda applied mental laws of thought. These laws are not to be found in
most textbooks of logic, but yet they are necessarily the basis of all since enounce the very nature of reasoning, they similarity or identity. Their existence is assumed or implied, therefore, in the complicated rules of the syllogism, whereas
my system is founded upon an immediate application of the laws themselves. The first of these laws, which I have already referred to in an earlier part of this tract 1
Pure Logic, or
Boole
s
System,
Jevons, M.A.
(p.
103),
is
the Logic of Quality apart from Quantity: with Remarks on and on the Relation of Logic and Mathematics. By W. Stanley London: Edward Stanford, 1864.
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING LAW OF
the tical
with
IDENTITY, that whatever
itself
;
is,
is,
HI
or a tiling
is
iden
or, in symbols,
A = A. The second law, THE LAW OF XOX-COXTKADKTIOX, is that thing uniwt both, be and not be, or that nothing can com I
bine contradictory attributes
;
or, in
symbols,
Aa=0, that is to say, what is both A and not and cannot be conceived. The third law, that of excluded middle, call
it,
the
LAW OF
A
does not exist,
or, as I
prefer to
DUALITY, asserts the self-evident truth
that a tiling cither exists or does not
const,
or that everything
either possesses a given attribute or does not possess Symbolically the law of duality is shown by
it.
A = AB-I-A&, indicates alternation, and is equivalent which the sign the true meaning of the disjunctive conjunction or. Hence the symbols may be interpreted as, A is cither B or in
-I-
to
not B.
These laws may seem truisms, and they were ridiculed as such by Locke but, since they describe the very nature three of identity in its aspects, they must be assumed as ;
consciously or unconsciously, and if we can build a system of inference upon them, their self-evidence is surely in our favour.
true,
The nature of the system examples, and I will first apply it 42.
old
syllogism. trated (1) (2)
(3)
Now
it is
a sun,
by
Camcstres
A A A
sun
is
planet
may
will to
be best learnt from several
thus be
moods
proved and
of the illus
self-luminous, is not self-luminous,
pletnd, therefore,
is
not a sun.
apparent that a planet is either a sun or But if it be a sun, the law of duality.
it it
is
not
is self-
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
U2 luminous by
(I), whereas by (2) it is not self-luminous; it a sun, combine contradictory attributes. By the law of non-contradiction it could not exist, therefore, as a
would,
if
and it consequently is not a To represent this reasoning in
sun,
sun.
symbols take
A = sun. B ^planet. C = self-luminous. Then the premises
are (1)
A = AC
(2)
B=Bc.
the law of duality
By
we have
B-BA-l-Ba, and substituting
But
for
A
this value in the second side of (2)
in the above
we may
substitute
its
we have
expression
in (1), getting
B = BcAC and striking out one dictory
we
of these
-I-
Bra;
alternatives
which
is
contra
finally obtain
The meaning of
this
formula
is that a planet is a planet which only differs from the being more full and precise. 43. The syllogism Camenes may be illustrated by the following example
not self-luminous, and not a sun, Aristotelian conclusion in
:
(1)
All monarchs are
(2)
JVb
(3)
No
This is
is
either a
human
beings,
human
beings are infallible, infallible beings, therefore, are monarchs.
proved by considering that every infallible being monarch or not a monarch but if a ;
monarch,
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING then by (1) he
is
human
a
which is impossible a monarch. Or in symbols, taking
fallible, is
being, ;
and by
therefore, no
(2)
115 is
not in
infallible
being
A = monarch, B = 1tH ll CLlllJ, C = inj dUililc ill (I
I
lcin<j,
the premises are
Xow
(1)
A = AB
(2)
B = Be.
by the law of duality
C = aC-l- AC. Substituting for premises,
A
value as derived from
its
both the
we have
C = a(M-ABCc; and, striking out the contradictory term,
44.
By the
method we can obtain and prove
indirect
the truth of the contra-positive of the ordinary proposition is B, or
A
A = AB.
(1)
What we b
;
A
require
is
the description of the term not-B or this is, in the first place, either
and by the law of duality or not-
A
:
(2)
b
Substituting for obtain
A
But the term
breaks
ABZ>
(p. Ill), so that
whatever
is
we have
not-B
is
value as given in (1)
in (2) its
the
left
l
or
= Al !&.
law of
only
= al),
also not-A. I
we
non- contradiction
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
114
Thus,
A = metal, B = clement,
if
from the premise All metals arc elements
we conclude
that all substances ivhich are not-elemcnts are not
which
proved at once by the consideration, sym bolically expressed above, that if they were metals they would be elements, or at once elements and not-clemcnts, which
metals
is
;
is
impossible. It is
45.
the peculiar character of this
direct inference that
in the
it is
method
of in
capable of solving and explaining,
most complete manner, arguments of any degree of
complexity. the problem
It
furnishes, in
fact,
a complete solution of
propounded and obscurely solved by Dr.
first
Boole Giren any number of propositions involving any number of distinct terms, required the description of any of those terms or any combination of those terms as expressed in the other terms,
under condition of
the premises remaining true. This method always commences by developing all the possible combinations of the terms involved according to the
law
of duality.
Thus, if there are three terms, represented then the possible combinations in which can present itself will not exceed four, as follows
by A, B,
A
C,
(1) If
A = ABC.|-ABc-|-A&C-|.AJf.
we have any premises
of A, B,
and
C, that
present themselves,
or statements concerning the nature
the combinations in which they can proceed to inquire how many of the
is,
we
above combinations are consistent with the premises. Thus, if A is never found with B, but B is always found with C, the two first of the combinations become contradictory, and we have
or,
A
is
with C.
never found with B, but
may
or
may
not be found
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING This conclusion
may
115
be proved symbolically by express
ing the premises thus
A = XI, B = BC, and then substituting the values occur on the second side of (1). 46.
As
of
A
and
wherever they
\\
a simple
example of the process, let us take the and following premises, investigate the consequences which flow from them. 1
From
D
A
follows B.
and from C follows
1); but
B
and
are inconsistent with each other.
The possible combinations
in which A, B, C, and themselves are sixteen in number, as follows present
I)
may
Each of these combinations is to be compared with the premises in order to ascertain whether it is possible under the condition of those premises. This comparison will really consist in substituting for each letter its description as given in the premises, which thus be may symbolically ex pressed
A = AB,
(1)
The combination ing for
A
its
(2)
C=
(3)
B = Btf.
CI),
A & C D is contradicted by (1) A B C d by (2), aEcD
value; 1
See
Do Morgan
s
Formal
Logic, p. 123.
in substitut
by
(3),
and
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
ii6
so
There will be found to remain only four possible
on.
combinations
A Be
Now,
we
if
we wish
d,
a I
CD,
a a
c
I)
D,
b c d.
term A,
to ascertain the nature of the
learn at once that
it
can only exist in the presence of
B
and the absence of both C and D.
We of both
with
I).
ascertain also that I) can only appear in the absence and B, but that C may or may not be present
A
Where
D
is
absent,
C must
also
be absent, and
so on. 47.
Objections might be raised
against this process of
and tedious one and so Tedium indeed is no argument it is, when thus performed. and if, as I confidently assert, this method against truth of solving means us the o-ives O an infinite number of O an infinite number of conclusions, at and arriving problems, in no demonstrable often which are simpler way, and in fact no such in no other way whatever, objections would be of that almost all the fact The however is, any weight. to mistake tediousness and liability may be removed from of mechanical aids, which are of the process by the use While practising myself in the several kinds and degrees. use of the process, I was at once led to the use of the logical slate, which consists of a common writing slate, with indirect inference, that
it is
a long
;
;
several series of the combinations of letters engraved it,
thus
upon
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF KEASO.VIXG
When of 4,
8,
117
series consist respectively fully written out, these and that series is 04 and combinations, 10, 32,
chosen for any problem which just affords enough distinct Each combination is then examined in connection terms. with each of the premises, and the contradictory ones are struck through with the pencil. 48. It soon became apparent, however, that if these combinations, instead of being written in fixed order on a
were printed upon light movable slips of wood, it would become easy by suitable mechanical arrangements to in convenient classes, so as im pick out the combinations with the mensely to abbreviate the labour of comparison in the out This idea was carried logical abacus, premises. which I constructed several years ago, and have found slate,
useful
and successful
in the lecture-room for exhibiting the
complete solution of logical arguments. 49. This lofjical alarum has been exhibited before the
members of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical of it is extracted from Society, and the following description the Proceedings of the Society for 3d April, 18GG,
The abacus 1.
3
i t.
An
p.
161.
consists of
inclined black board, furnished with four ledges,
long, placed 9 in. apart. Series of flat slips of wood, the smallest set four in
2.
number, and other sets, 8, 1C, and 32 in number, marked with combinations of letters, as follows FIRST SET
SECOND SET
The
third
and fourth
sets
exhibit
the
corresponding
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
uS
combinations A, B, C, D, E,
The
the
of
a, b,
c,
letters d,
A, B, C, D,
furnished with
slips are
a,
I,
c,
d,
and
c.
little
pins, so that,
when
placed upon the ledges of the board, those marked by any given letter may be readily picked out by means of a straight-edged ruler, and removed to another ledge. 50. The use of the abacus will be best shown
Take the syllogism
example.
Man
is
by an
Barbara
in
mortal,
Socrates is
man,
Therefore Socrates
is
mortal.
Let
A = Socrates, B = man, C = mortal. The corresponding small
italic letters
then indicate the
negatives,
a = not-Socrates, b c
= not-man, = not-mortal,
and the premises may be stated as
A
is
B,
B
is
C.
Now
take the second set of slips containing all the combinations of A, B, C, a, b, c, and ascertain possible which of the combinations are possible under the conditions of the premises. Select all the slips marked and as all these ought to be B s, select again those which are not-B or b, and re
A
ject
them.
reject those
only four
;
Unite the remainder, and, selecting the B s, which are not-C or c. There will now remain
slips or
combinations
A i;
C
a
a
R C
C
b c
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING
119
ratcs, or A, we take If we require the description of the only combination containing A, and observe that it is hence the Aristotelian conclusion, Socrates is joined with C AVe tuortcd. may also get any other possible conclusion. class of things not-wan or b is seen from the For instance, R<
:
the two last combinations to be always a or not-Socratcs, but either mortal or not-mortal as the case may be.
same obvious system of analysis is As an ex arguments however complicated.
Precisely the
51.
applicable to in Boole ample, take the premises treated p.
s
Laic* of Thought,
125. Similar figures
"(!)
arc
(nigles
crjv.cd,
of all whose corresponding corresponding sides are propor-
consist
and whose
tional."
are equal have Triangles whose corresponding angles versa." and vice their corresponding sides proportional, -Let "
(2.)
= similar, = triangle,
A. ~B
C = ha ring
= having
~[)
The
premises
corresponding angles equal, corresponding sides proportional.
may
then be expressed
in Qualitative
Logic, as follows
Take the which are not not
A;
CD
out of the
out of the
BD s
remain only six
From
1 G
set of
these
;
slips
:
out of the
CD
As
reject those those which are
s reject are not Bl) and reject those which There will those which are not BC.
BC s
reject
out of the
slips, as
we may
;
follows
at once read off all the conclusions
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
120
We
laboriously deduced by Boole in his obscure processes. at once see, for instance, that the class a, or "dissimilar figures, consist of all triangles
responding angles equal
(c)
and
all figures not being triangles (b)
equal (C)
and
(B) which have iwt
tJieir cor
sides proportional (d),
and of
which have either their angles
sides not proportional (d), or their corresponding
sides proportional (D)
and
angles not equal, or neither their
corresponding angles equal nor corresponding sides proportional" (Boole, p. 126). The selections 52.
as
made upon the abacus
are
of
course subject to mistake, but only one easy step is required to a logical machine, in which the selections shall be made
mechanically and faultlessly by the mere reading
down
of
the premises upon a set of keys, or handles, representing the several positive and negative terms, the copula, conjunc
and stops of a proposition. 53. In the last paragraph I alluded to a further mechani contrivance, in which the combination-slips of the abacus
tions,
cal
should not require to be moved by hand, but could be placed in proper order by the successive pressure of a series of keys or handles.
made a successful working model which may be considered a machine cap
I have since
of this contrivance,
able of reasoning, or of replacing almost entirely the action of the mind in drawing inferences. I have an oppor
When
tunity of describing the details of
its
construction, I think
will be found to afford a physical proof, apparent to the eyes, of the extreme incompleteness of the Aristotelian logic.
it
Not only
and other old forms of argument worked upon the machine, but an indefinite number of other forms of reasoning can be represented by the simple regular action of levers and spindles. 54. The most unfortunate feature of the long history of are the syllogisms
capable of being
our present traditional logic has been the divorce existing
between the logic of the schools and the logic of common life. There has been no apparent connection whatever be tween the formal strictness of the syllogistic art and the more loose but useful suggestions of analogy from particu-
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONIXG lars
to
particulars.
It
is
owing
to
this
121
separation, as 1
apprehend, that a succession of English writers from Locke down to Mr. (. S. Mill have Iteen led to under-estimate the
In Mr. Mill
value of the syllogism.
s
system of logic the
that of an syllogism occupies a very anomalous position extraneous form of proof which may be employed when we
wish to ensure correctness of inference, but which for the discovery of truth.
I believe that the
is
useless
new view
of
the syllogism which I am now proposing will remedy this lamentable disconnection of the parts of what should be one most harmonious and consistent whole. There is no sub ject
in
system
which we might expect more perfect unity and and more wide-ruling generalisations to be
to exist,
discoverable, than in the science of the laws of thought and I conceive that a prime object of any logical reform
;
should be to reconcile the
strict
doctrine with the looser
forms of ordinary thought. This reconciliation will really be effected, I believe, by adopting as the fundamental prin
axiom
which I have called some future time to of similars. hope results which to follow from the seem explain fully the principle and the harmony which it creates between the several branches of logical method, and I will only attempt in this tract a few slight illustrations. 55. The most frequent mode of inference in common life is that known as reasoning from analogy or resemblance, by which we argue from any thing or event we have known to ciple the modified
the
of Aristotle I
xii.lmtitntion
at
This a like tiling or event encountered on another occasion. seems to be Mr. Mill s view of the ordinary process of reason
and value of the syllo we have observed, we feel warranted in concluding that what we found true in those instances holds in all similar ones, past, present, and And again he future, however numerous they may be. 2 in I believe more that, point of fact, explains fully: ing, for in discussing the functions
gism, he says
1
l
:
From
instances which
System cf Logic, -
vol. i, p. 210, fifth edition. Ibid. p. 212.
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
122
when drawing inferences from our personal experience, and maxims handed down to us by books or tradition, we much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars not from
directly,
than through the intermediate agency of any general We are constantly reasoning from ourselves or from one person to another, without
proposition. to other people,
giving ourselves the trouble to erect our observations into When we general maxims of human or external nature.
conclude that some person or act so
and
so,
sideration of the
will,
on some given occasion,
feel
we sometimes judge from an enlarged con manner in which human beings in general,
or persons of some particular character, are accustomed to feel and act ; but much oftener from merely recollecting the
and conduct of the same person in some previous instance, or from considering how we should feel or act feelings
not only the village matron who, when upon the case of a neighbour s child, on the evil and its remedy simply on the recol pronounces lection and authority of what she accounts the similar case of her Lucy. ourselves.
It
is
called to a consultation
Mr. Mill expresses as clearly as it is well possible argue in common life, as he thinks, not by the syllogism, but directly from instance to instance by the But this argu similarity observed between the instances. ment from similars to similars is the identical process which I have called the substitution of similars, and which I have 56.
that
we
shown
to
much
more.
be capable of explaining the syllogism itself, and In fact, we find Mr. Mill enunciating this
principle himself in another chapter, where he is treating of argument from analogy or resemblance. After noticing the stricter meaning of analogy as a resemblance of relations,
he continues l It is on the whole more usual, however, to extend the name of analogical evidence to arguments from any sort of resemblance, provided they do not amount to a complete induction without peculiarly distinguishing resemblance of :
1
System of Logic,
vol.
ii,
p. 86.
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING relations.
Analogical reasoning, in this sense,
123
may
be re
duced to the following formula Two things resemble each other in one or more respects a certain proposition is true of the one therefore it is true of the other. But we have :
;
;
nothing here by which to discriminate analogy from induc type will serve for all reasoning from experi ence. In the most rigid induction, equally with the faintest
tion, since this
analogy,
we
conclude, because
A
resembles
B
in one or
more
properties, that it does so in a certain other property. 57. If this be, as Mr. Mill so clearly states, the type of all reasoning from experience, it follows that the principle
of inductive reasoning is actually identical with that which I have shown to be sufficient to explain the forms of deduc tive reasoning.
deductive
The only
reasoning
difference I apprehend is, that in or assume a similarity or
we know
identity to be certainly known, and the conclusion from is therefore equally certain; but in inductive
it
arguments from one instance to another we never can be sure that the similarity of the instance is so deep and perfect as to war rant our substitution of one for the other. Hence the con
never certain, and possesses only a degree of probability, greater or less according to the circumstances of the case and the theory of probabilities is our only clusion
is
;
resource for ascertaining this degree of probability, tainable at all.
if
ascer-
58. It is instructive to contrast mathematical induction with the induction as employed in the experimental sciences.
The process by which we arrive at a general proof of a problem in Euclid s Elements of Geometry is really a pro cess
of generalisation presenting a striking illustration of To prove that the square on the hypothenuse
our principle.
of a right-angled triangle is equal to the
sum
of the squares
on the sides containing the right angle, Euclid takes only a single example of such a triangle, and proves this to be true. He then trusts to the reader perceiving of his own accord that all other right-angled triangles resemble the one acci dentally adopted in the points material to the proof, so that
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
I2 4
any one right-angled triangle may be indifferently substituted Here the process from one case to another for any other. is certain, because we know that one case exactly resembles In physical science it is not so, and the distinc another. tion has been expressed, as it seems to me, with admirable insight by Professor Bovveu in his well-known Treatise on 1 He says of mathe Logic, or the Laws of Pure Thought. matical figures The same measure of certainty which :
the
student
of
nature obtains
by
intuition
respecting a
single real object, the mathematician acquires respecting a whole class of imaginary objects, because the latter has the
which the former can never attain, that the single which he is contemplating in thought is a perfect object of its whole class he has this assurance, representative because the whole class exists only in thought, and are there assurance,
:
actually before him, or present to consciousness. this bit of iron, I find by direct observation, melts at a certain temperature but it may well happen fore
all
For example
:
;
that another piece of iron, quite similar to it in external appearance, may be fusible only at a much higher tempera ture,
owing
to the unsuspected presence with
it
of a little
more
or a little less carbon in composition. But if the angles at the base of this triangle are equal to each other,
I
know
that a corresponding equality
must
exist in the case
of every other figure which conforms to the definition of an isosceles triangle ; for that definition excludes every disturb The conclusion in this latter case, then, is ing element.
universal, while in
the former
it
can be only singular or
particular.
This passage perfectly supports my view that all reason ing consists in taking one thing as a representative, that is to say, as a substitute, for another, and the only difficulty is
to estimate rightly the degree
of
of certainty, or
mere
The probability, with which we make the substitution. forms and methods of induction and the calculus of pro babilities are necessary to guide us rightly in this but to ;
1
Cambridge, United States, 1866,
p.
354.
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONIXG principle of substitution
show that the
is
125
really present
and
under
active throughout inductive logic is more than I can take to show in this tract, although 1 believe it to be so. out how consistent are many I have 59.
Though
pointed
Mr. Mill s expressions with the view of logic here put he describes the forward, and how clearly in one place of substitution itself, I cannot but feel that his of
principle
and breaches of consistency. system is full of anomalies the from I profound error into which These arise, believe, the of logical discovery of the he has fallen, undervaluing Of Sir W. Hamilton s views of the predicate.
quantification he says 1 If I do not consider the doctrine of the quan to the art of tification of the predicate a valuable accession the consider I because ordinary rules of the it is i
only an adequate test, and perfectly sufficient to syllogism to be exclude all inferences which do not follow from the pre science mises. Considered, however, as a contribution to the
logic,
analysis of the mental processes new doctrine appears to me, I the concerned in reasoning, but erroneous; since the confess, not merely superfluous, form in which it clothes the propositions does not, like the what is in the mind of the speaker ordinary form, express I cannot think Sir when he enunciates the
of logic,
that
to
is,
the
proposition.
William Hamilton right in maintaining that the quantity of "
the predicate
is
always understood in
thought."
It is
im
who is not present in the mind of the person plied, but De Mr. of Morgan s asserts the proposition. Again, he says writer discoveries, to which every logical ingenious logical isso deeply indebted:
undeniable that in Mr. De Morgan, can ferences, in the cases examined by and that the ordinary theory takes legitimately be drawn, worth no account of them, I will not say that it was not to reduced while to show in detail how these also could be IX: Mr. What formula as rigorous as those of Aristotle. once (perhaps more than worth was done has doing Morgan but I question if its results are as a school exercise Since
it
is
;
once*),
1
System of
cd. vol. Lorjic, fifth
i,
note. p. 196,
THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS
126
worth studying and mastering for any practical purpose. In these and many other places Mr. Mill shows a lamentable
want of power of appreciating the principles involved in the As regards the most original quantification of the predicate. discoveries of Dr. Boole, there is not, so far as I have been able to discover, a single
word
Mr. Mill
in
s
edition of his
Logic published in 1862, to indicate that he was conscious of the publication of Mr. Boole s Mathematical Analysis in of his great work, The Laws of Thought, in 1854. a disciple and potent supporter of the accounted Although doctrines of Jeremy Bentham, he appears unaware that the
1847, and
doctrine of the quantification of the predicate is traceable to his great master, or at all events to the work of a nephew7
founded upon the manuscripts of Bentham. 60. I ought not to omit to notice that Dr. Thomson substantially adopts the principle of substitution in treating of what he calls the syllogism of analogy. He states the canon in the following manner 1 The same attributes i
may be assigned to distinct but similar things, provided they can be shown to accompany the points of resemblance in the things and not the points of difference. This means that one thing may be substituted for another like to it, provided that their likeness really extends to the point in question,
which can often only be ascertained with more or
He adds, that the probability by inductive inquiry. expression of the agreement must consist of a qualified judg
less
ment
of identity, or a proposition of the form U, by which symbol he indicates a proposition denoted in this tract by the expression A = B. This exactly agrees with my view of the matter. 61. The principle of substitution of similars seems to throw a clear light upon the infinite importance of classifi cation. For classification consists in arranging things, either
in the mind or in cabinets of specimens, according to their resemblances, and the best classification is that which exhibits the most numerous and extensive resemblances. The pur1
Laivs of Thought,
fifth ed. p. 251.
THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING
127
that we pose and effect of such arrangement evidently is, of know we whatever apply to all members of a class
may
All the members of any member, so far as it is a iiicmlcr. a class are mutual substitutes for each other as regards their common characteristics, and a natural classification is that
which gives the greatest probability that characters as yet unexamined will exhibit agreements corresponding to those Classification is thus the infinitely which are examined. useful mode of multiplying knowledge, by rendering know as
ledge of particulars the greatest possible
general as possible, or of indicating of substitutions which may
number
inference. give rise to acts of 62. I need hardly point out that not only in our reason but in our acts in common life, we observe the principle ings,
Any new kind of action or work is performed with doubt and difficulty, because we have no knowledge But no sooner has derived from a similar case to guide us. the work been performed once or twice with success than much of the difficulty vanishes, because we have acquired
of similarity.
knowledge which will guide us in similar cases. Mankind, too, have an instinctive respect for precedents, we act in one particular case, we ought feeling that, however
all
the
act similarly in all similar cases, until strong reason or The whole a new precedent. necessity obliges us to make consists in all if not in others, law English courts, practice of established the rule to causes new all in deciding according
to
in the
most nearly similar former
be found
sufficiently similar.
No
causes, provided ruler, too,
any can
but an absolute
act but under the responsi tyrant can perform any public to perform a similar act, or make bility of being called upon a similar concession, in similar circumstances.
the present day, for instance, the Government is called upon to take charge of the telegraphs and railways, because great benefit has resulted from their management It is implied in this demand that the of the 63.
At
post-office.
or are even identical with
telegraphs and railways resemble the