Vol. 20, 2004 World System Analysis: Contemporary Research and Directions P P P P
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© 2004 Gerhard Preyer Frankfurt am Main http://www.protosociology.de
[email protected] Erste Auflage / first published 2004 ISSN – 1611-1281 Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http:// dnb.ddb.de abrufbar. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung der Zeitschirft und seines Herausgebers unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeisung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http:// dnb.ddb.de. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of ProtoSociology.
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Proto Sociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Volume 20, 2004 World-System Analysis: Contemporary Research and Directions Edited by Richard E. Lee and Gerhard Preyer Contents Introduction: Contemporary Directions and Research in WorldSystems Analysis ............................................................................ Richard E. Lee and Gerhard Preyer
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New Directions in World-Systems Analysis Global Democracy: A World-Systems Perspective ......................................................... Christopher Chase-Dunn and Terry Boswell
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Material Spatialities of Cities and States ........................................ Peter J. Taylor
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Culture as a World System ............................................................ Göran Therborn
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Contemporary Research in World-Systems Analysis A Note on Method with an Example – The “War on Terror” ....... Richard E. Lee
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Path-Dependency, Stocks, Switching-Points, Flows: Reflections on Long-term Global Change and Local Opportunities .................... 85 Denis O’Hearn
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Atlantic History and World Economy: Concepts and Constructions. ............................................................................... 102 Dale Tomich
Culture in the World-System Multi-Dimensionality, Mutual Constitution and the Nature of Systemness: The Importance of the Cultural Turn in the Study of Global Systems .............................................................................. 125 Barrie Axford Ethnicity and Religion: Structural and Cultural Aspects of Global Phenomena.................................................................................... 143 Mathias Bös Multiple Modernities and Globalization ....................................... 165 Gerard Delanty Diaspora History Construction and Slave Culture Formation on Small U.S. Plantations ................................................................... 186 Wilma A. Dunaway The Dialogue between Cultures or between Cultural Interpretations of Modernity – Multiple Modernities on the Contemporary Scene ..................................................................... 201 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt Culture and its Politics in the Global System ................................ 217 Jonathan Friedman National Identity and Globalization: Policy Paths and the Process of Reimagining Community ......................................................... 239 Frank J. Lechner
On Contemporary Philosophy Simulation Theory on Conceptual Grounds ................................. 261 Brie Gertler Unconventional Utterances? Davidson’s Rejection of Conventions in Language Use ............................................................................ 285 Mason Cash
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Moral Realism, Supervenience, Externalism and the Limits of Conceptual Metaphor ................................................................... 320 Ron Wilburn Eine neue Theorie der Kooperation............................................... 374 Gerhard Preyer Development – Paradox, Paralysis and Praxis ................................ 390 Robert Kowalski Contributors.................................................................................. Imprint .......................................................................................... On ProtoSociology ........................................................................ Published Volumes ........................................................................ Bookpublications of the project .................................................... ProtoSociology: Digital volumes available ..................................... Cooperations / Announcements ....................................................
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Introduction: Contemporary Directions and Research in World-Systems Analysis Richard E. Lee and Gerhard Preyer
The emergence of world-systems analysis in the mid-1970s was, and continues to be, an instructive example of the politics of the structures of knowledge and illustrates how the processes reproducing the modern world in the economic and political arenas cannot be wholly understood without reference to the socio/cultural realm. Certainly, world-systems analysis was an intellectual project that repudiated the mutual exclusivity of the nomothetic and idiographic modes of constructing accounts of the human world inherited from the nineteenth century. At the same time however, it was also a political intervention that, along with the movements of 1968, challenged the structures of the modern world and its institutionalized inequalities. This two-pronged assault found scholarly focus in the critique of the modernization perspective and its ideological baggage. As the papers in this collection plainly show, world-systems analysis has not lost its polemical edge; as Immanuel Wallerstein has written, if it did, the concept of world-system “would be vitiated and would scarcely add any insights of value” (1993: 721). Drawing on experiences of the Second World War and the preoccupations of the Cold War, “modernization” theory expressed the realization by Western, especially U.S., social scientists of the increasing geopolitical importance of the non-West and the non-rich, but sought to understand these critical areas and peoples by simply extending, or universalizing, the historical trajectory and analytic frameworks of the West.1 The ideological aspect of the modernization project resulted from a preoccupation with political change and the social forces determining its direction. There was a real consideration for inequality on a world scale on the part of many social scientists; however, this was accompanied by the concern of Cold War policy planners for propagating an ethos and system of values that would offer an attractive alternative to communism. A second 1
See Lee (2001) for a detailed analysis of the link between the modernization perspective and the early development of world-systems analysis.
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consideration of post-1945 social scientists was the attainment of professional respectability through developments in theory and measurement applied to the quantitative study of cross-sectional relations. The comparative method in the social sciences, allied with a structural-functionalism involving some form of Talcott Parsons’s translation of Weberian “rationality” into sets of pattern variables, represented the analogue of the experimental method in the natural sciences, and the “systems” model of interdependent, interacting structures maintaining system equilibrium became increasingly common in social research and fundamental to the modernization perspective. Overwhelmingly however, whatever “system” these analysts studied, they were primarily concerned with outcomes at the level of the state. But empirical observations soon began to give the lie to the predictions on which modernization studies were predicated, and criticism of the descriptive suppositions of the modernization perspective accompanied demonstrations of its short-comings as theory. In this context, from the early 1970s, Immanuel Wallerstein began to argue for a single, singular and overarching unit of analysis for the study of long-term, large-scale social change in the modern world. Wallerstein directly linked his term “world-system” to Fernand Braudel’s concept “économie-monde”; Wallerstein’s “world-economy” referred first, “not to the world, but to a world” and second, not to the “economic relations among constituted political units inside that world, but to the economic processes within that world in its entirety” (Wallerstein 1993: 720). There followed a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive typologies of historical social systems: small “autonomous subsistence economies” or minisystems, and two varieties of large “worlds,” “defined by the fact that their self-containment as an economic-material entity is based on extensive division of labor and that they contain within them a multiplicity of cultures.” These two varieties of world-systems are “world-empires,” “in which there is a single political system over most of the area” and “world-economies,” “in which such a political system does not exist over all, or virtually all of the space” (Wallerstein 1974: 348). Over the past three decades, this conceptualization has let to significant progress in developing modes of integrating the analytically distinct arenas of production and distribution, the economic, and decision-making and coercion, the political, in terms of long-term processes and medium-term fluctuations. The fecundity of the approach is apparent in the
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fact that this analytic framework has given rise to such a wide range of intellectual projects, indeed some of which are still occasions for debate (for instance in terms of temporalities, as in Frank and Gills 1993). Christopher Chase-Dunn and Terry Boswell work within the comparative world-systems perspective to engage in the debates among counter-hegemonic critics of capitalist globalization and advance the argument for global democracy. The comparative world-systems perspective posits world-systems, when properly conceptualized and bounded, as the fundamental unit of analysis of social change. This makes possible comparisons, which can result in the study of both variant forms and transformations as well as likenesses and continuities with the eventual aim of tackling the real problems and possibilities of the contemporary world. Questioning the thesis that parliamentary democracy in individual states, even if that included most states, adds up to global democracy, Chase-Dunn and Boswell argue for the agency of the semiperiphery and a World Party. In a large-scale reconceptualization of the spatiality of the world-system, Peter J. Taylor contrasts the spatialities of cities, spaces of flows, to those of states, spaces of places. This revisionist world-systems analysis argues that spaces of places, in the form of states, represent the unexamined conception of spatiality embedded in the social sciences. This shift in thinking supplies an analytic base for the suggestion that a world-system of cities could provide an opening for the creation of a non-hierarchical, egalitarian world. One of the hallmarks of the depth and range of the influence of a particular analytic strategy is, of course, the degree to which it becomes established in the field but, as Göran Therborn insists, there is another relevant indicator and that is how it is taken as an inspiring challenge. This, in fact, is what has stimulated Therborn. He argues that culture is an underdeveloped arena in world-systems analysis and would address that state of affairs by positing a set of at least five major human world systems that, although interconnected and interacting, are not reducible to one another. The present work, then, focuses on the “world system of culture”, and especially the world-scale relationships between symbolic forms and institutional structures and traces the dynamics of their interaction noting that these may be attributed to either parametric change of contextual conditions (constituting or molding processes) or intra-contextual change (global flows, such as trade, capital, and people).
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The rhetorical construction of the contemporary events of the socalled “war on terror”, provide the analytic material for Richard E. Lee’s contribution. On the one hand, the argument is about method; Lee argues for a long-term, large-scale relational perspective that relies on analogies among instances of processes rather than the case-based approach represented in the literature. On the other hand, there are very real consequences of method in terms of differing prognostications of the future, dependent on the methodology employed; Lee suggests that the present period is analogous to the period of the Hundred Years’ War and thus that, if this is so, a systemic transformation is in the offing. Denis O’Hearn takes a careful look at Ireland’s recent economic development from the particular perspective of world-system processes of accumulation. Although the model has been highly promoted, O’Hearn argues that the striking disparity between GDP and GNP – evidencing the repatriation of profits – shows that even very high stocks of foreign investment, although resulting in “growth”, do not overcome the negative impacts of these stocks. Thus, the Irish model is partly an illusion, may not be sustainable, and cannot be replicated. Finally, he argues, it is not even desirable, having resulted in the degradation of Irish people and Irish life. Thus, the example makes clear the problems of conceptualizing development only in terms of growth. The specifically relational character of objects of analysis that is the hallmark of the world-systems approach as originally conceived grounds Dale Tomich’s work on the Atlantic as a historical region of the capitalist world-economy. His approach is part of an on-going struggle with the methodological dilemmas entailed in such work – that is, how does one go about constructing defensible historical accounts without relying on a set of independent, autonomous, and thus comparable, cases or simply connecting up a chronological succession of events. Here, with the focus shifted from agencies to the relationships that enable and constrain such agencies, the diverse units may be analyzed as the outcomes of world-historical processes at different spatial and temporal junctures. Indeed, it is the relating entity itself that is treated as the object of analysis. World-systems analysis not only identified a unique and unitary “world”, exhibiting both long-term regularities and constant change, the “world” that constitutes its unit of analysis, but recognized the phenomenological wholeness of human reality as well. Early on it was understood that an account of the social world was incomplete if this aspect were not
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included. The problem was, and continues to be, that the categories we use in the analysis of the modern world-system are products of its development so consequently must “all … be analyzed as processes, rather than as categories” Wallerstein 1979: 357).2 Nonetheless, much progress has also been made in the study of the social or cultural sphere – the “third” arena as one of us has called it (see Lee 2003a). Barrie Axford seeks to operate a very therapeutic shift from an under-theorized cultural globalization to consider global systems as “enacted” in part through cultural processes. Axford would press the world-systems community to fully embrace “relationality” among the imbricated arenas of economics, politics, and culture and recognize and overcome the tendency to treat cultural variables as dependent in order to fully consider the meaningfulness of meaning to agents in their making and remaking of the world. Mathias Bös confronts the thorny and under-researched problem of the relationship between religion and ethnicity as concepts that emerged in their modern meanings part and parcel with the development of the Europe-centered world-system. He individuates two senses in which these concepts are generally used: as a structure of meanings shared among individuals or as functional to group definition and cohesion. Marshalling quantitative data on a global scale, Bös shows how if, on the one hand, most religions include many ethnic groups, on the other hand, most ethnic groups have primarily one religion, and this often leads to a local perception identifying an ethnic group with a single religion. Noting how ethnicity and religion have both particularizing and universalizing effects, this chapter underlines the importance of their study as enabling modes of “acting together” on the same scale as politics and the economy. In his wide-ranging contribution, Gerard Delanty treats modernity as a global phenomenon that while having emerged in western Europe, is now an expression of a world culture increasingly framing the local. His understanding of the term “multiple” modernities is not of a plurality of societal forms; nonetheless, he argues that modernity is not converging or coalescing into any homogenous form. He sees it rather as a mode of processing, or translating, culture. In her work on Appalachia, Wilma Dunaway shows how peripheral social formations develop within the 2 For an example of one author’s answer to this specific problem – that is, the conceptualization of developments in the cultural realm in secular terms of systemdefining structures and processes of reproduction and change – see Lee (2003b).
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capitalist world-economy as products of local conditions and global processes. She investigates how mountain slave communities, despite their low population densities, engaged in collective activities and operated as subcultures of resistance through noncooperation, sabotage, and the construction of counter-hegemonic culture and religion. These come across in hidden transcripts that express social condition, shared suffering, and domination understood as a power relation rejecting the myth of inferiority, thus creating a political connection to a global community defined by a shared diasporic memory. The notion of “multiple modernities” has been well argued previously by S. N. Eisenstadt in a series of publications. In his piece for the present collection, he gives us an overview of these arguments with particular emphasis on the changes and transformations in the discourse of modernity conceived as different interpretations or programs of modernity. Jonathan Friedman addresses directly the difficult problem of culture in global analysis. Beginning with a sketch of the evolution of the concept in American anthropology, he notes how the development of the concept has paralleled the history cultural politics in the real world and concludes that cultural interpretations in the contemporary world are indeed all forms of cultural politics. Finally, in a focused empirical study, Frank J. Lechner takes the development of policy initiatives (social, minority, media) shaping national identity in the Netherlands as an illustration of how local paradigms respond to challenges that are global in nature – the culture of the world-system – and lead to a reimagining of national community. He thus demonstrates how close analysis of single cases can show how the “enmeshment” of national cultures in a globalized world generates heterogeneity.
Works Cited Frank, A. G. and B. K. Gills, eds. 1993. The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? London: Routledge. Lee, Richard E. 2001. “After History? The Last Frontier of Historical Capitalism.” Protosoziologie 15, 87-104. —. 2003a. “The ‚Third‘ Arena: Trends and Logistics in the Geoculture of the Modern World-System.” In Emerging Issues in the 21st Century World-System. Edited by Wilma A. Dunaway. Westport: Greenwood, 120-27. —. 2003b. Life and Times of Cultural Studies: The Politics and Transformation of
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the Structures of Knowledge. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press. —. 1979. “Theoretical Implications: A Roundtable Discussion Between Giovanni Arrighi, John Higginson, Bernard Magubane, John Saul, and Immanuel Wallerstein.” Review III, 2, 355-360. —. 1993. “World-System.” In The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought. Edited by William Outhwaite and Tom Bottomore. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 720-21.
Global Democracy: A World-Systems Perspective
New Directions in World-Systems Analysis
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Christopher Chase-Dunn and Terry Boswell
Global Democracy: A World-Systems Perspective
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Global Democracy: A World-Systems Perspective Christopher Chase-Dunn and Terry Boswell
Abstract This essay is on the concept of global democracy. We discuss the historical development of the concept of democracy and the material bases for the possible emergence of a democratic and collectively rational global commonwealth in the future. We confront the problem of contested meanings of democracy, the roots of the modern concept in the European Enlightenment, the problem of Eurocentrism in the formulation of a global philosophy of democracy, the relationship between capitalist globalization and antisystemic movements and the need for globalization from below.
A useful conceptualization of global democracy requires both an astute political philosophy and a deep understanding of the historical and structural processes of institutional development. This paper addresses emerging debates among counter-hegemonic critics of capitalist globalization and presents an approach that is intended to be helpful to those who wish to construct a more democratic and egalitarian world society. The approach we develop employs the comparative world-systems perspective.1 For many modern citizens global democracy simply means the addition of more and more national democracies – parliamentary governments in which fair elections decide the political leadership of the state. This is the subject of most of the democratization literature. But we will argue that global democracy needs to mean much more than this if real progress is to be made. We contend that the peoples of the world live in a single social system, and that decisions about what will happen in that system are the relevant foci for understanding the meaning of global democracy. Democracy means that the majority of the people have a say over the decisions that affect their lives. When the problems are global, 1
For an introduction see Shannon (1996) and Hall (2000). This essay draws heavily from Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000).
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the democracy should be global, meaning that the majority of the people of the Earth should have a say. Our approach questions the idea that parliamentary democracy in single states, even when most of the states in the world-system have this kind of political system, adds up to global democracy. Some states are much more powerful than others, and their policies affect people all over the Earth. We call this the problem of global vs. single-state democracy. The second focus of our essay is on the issue of the contested nature of the idea of democracy. Here we will note that the definitions of democracy have themselves been issues of political struggle both within the discourse of the European Enlightenment and in the discourse about Eurocentrism. Our goal is to move toward the formulation of a global consensus about the meaning of the idea of popular democracy. This requires drawing on knowledge of this history of political struggles all over the Earth, and an understanding of the historical development of human societies over the last twelve thousand years. The democratization literature has mainly studied how and why some societies have been able to institutionalize parliamentary systems for the peaceful transition of power by means of popular elections. This is a very important literature and much has been learned about the conditions that are favorable for stable parliamentary regimes. The world-systems perspective points out that it has been successful core capitalism that has been the main support for institutionalizing parliamentary systems. The core countries of Europe, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and India are the most successful cases. The rest of the world has had a difficult time institutionalizing parliamentary democracy, though there have been recurrent waves of democratization in the parliamentary sense (Markoff 1996). The main reason for this is that the hierarchical division of labor between the core and the periphery concentrates greater resources in the core, making alliances between potentially competing elites and cross class alliances more stable because there is a bigger pie to share. In peripheral countries the struggle to control the state apparatus is more often violent because it is the only game in town. To be sure there are exceptions, and trends. Many semiperipheral and peripheral national societies have been able to achieve at least the trappings of parliamentary democracy, especially in the latest wave. We do not wish to minimize the important differences between formally democratic regimes that operate according to the law versus lawless
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and arbitrary authoritarian regimes. Achieving formal parliamentary democracy and the rule of law are huge gains for people who have not had them in the past. But we do wish to point out that formal parliamentary democracy, even in those societies in which is it most heavily institutionalized, is not necessarily the best of all possible worlds. Within the European Enlightenment discourse there has long been a contest between representative formal democracy and popular social democracy. Bill Robinson (1996) characterizes “polyarchy” as a contest managed by contending elites to legitimize regimes based on huge inequalities. The now-dominant definition of democracy in the West is a definition that separates political rights from economic rights and that legitimizes and sustains private property in the major means of production. More populist and direct versions of the idea of democracy challenge the radical separation between political and economic rights, and the exclusion of economic democracy from the realm of legitimate contentions. Thus the kind of democracy that has become hegemonic in the modern world-system is the kind that is most congruent with capitalism. It protects private owners of the major means of production from claims on their property and profits by narrowly defining the proper terrain of rights. Polyarchy undercuts social democracy and defines certain claims as outside the bounds of rational discourse based on a narrow political philosophy that has evolved from the conservative branch of the European Enlightenment discourse. The leftist versions – anarchism, socialism, and communism – have been vanquished and proclaimed dead in the celebration of the “end of history” and the victory of capitalistic democracy. The critique of Eurocentrism has also challenged the hegemony of the polyarchic definition of democracy. Many of the peoples of the colonial empires had indigenous forms of small-scale political regulation that allowed people in local communities to have input in decisions that were made in matters that affected their lives. In the contemporary popular resistance to globalizing corporate capitalism many voices are reasserting the authenticity and value of these traditional political institutions (e.g., Shiva 2002). However “backward” and inegalitarian these traditional political institutions may seem to the Western democracies, that they are resisting global corporate capitalism is making them newly popular with their dispossessed constituencies.
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During the nineteenth century, movements that mobilized people around ideas of community self-reliance were often responses to the calamities of the integration of rural regions into the global market. In combination with droughts and famines, market integration produced huge and disastrous “late Victorian holocausts” during the great wave of capitalist globalization of the late nineteenth century (Davis 2001). These indigenous movements often employed millenarian ideologies in which the “good king” was to return or the powers of the universe were expected to intervene to destroy the invading railroads and the white devils that were held to be throwing the natural balances of the universe awry. Self-reliance movements in the Brazilian Northeast, the Philippines and the American West rediscovered local autarky as a protective mechanism from disruptive global market forces and threatening technologies far beyond their control. Much of the post-colonial critique of Eurocentrism has assumed that it was the ideology of the European Enlightenment that was a main tool in the colonial subjugation of the Third World by European states. And so the assertions of rights, the separation of church and state, and other elements of European thought have sometimes been rejected as so many relics of domination. But it was not liberal ideology that caused so much exploitation and domination. The Europeans were able to dominate and exploit because they had better gunships and other technologies of power that capitalism had enabled them to develop. The values of liberty and equality were fine values, but they were conveniently put aside as European imperialism expanded. Indeed, these very values have often proven to be useful tools for legitimating resistance in the hands of the subjects of European colonialism and neocolonialism. The first point to make is that democracy is not a European invention and neither has it been a European monopoly. The European civilizational claim that democracy was an invention of the classical Greek citystates is full of contradictions. The economies of most of the Greek citystates were based on slavery (Bollen and Paxton 1997), while the polities of nomadic foragers, which are everywhere on Earth the ancestors of all peoples, were egalitarian systems in which all adults participated in making the important collective decisions. Greek ideas and institutions are only part of the story of the struggle for autonomy and popular control.
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Capitalist Globalization We understand the historical development of the modern world-system in terms of the evolution of institutions. These key institutions: commodity production, technology and techniques of power, have been shaped by tremendous struggles. These include conflict among contending powers and between the core and the periphery over the past six centuries as Europe rose to hegemony and capitalist globalization expanded in waves of commodification and integration. The story of how global orders have been restructured in order to facilitate capitalist accumulation must be told in deep temporal perspective in order for us to understand how the most recent wave of corporate globalization is similar or different from earlier waves of globalization. Of particular interest here is the phenomenon of world revolutions and increasingly transnational antisystemic movements. In order to comprehend the possibilities for the emergence of global democracy we need to understand the history of popular movements that have tried to democratize the world-system in the past. Of particular relevance here is the story of the nineteenth century and its tsunami of capitalist globalization under the auspices of British hegemony. Transnational antisystemic movements, especially the trade union movement and the feminist movement, emerged to contend with global capitalism. Workers and women consciously took the role of world citizens, organizing international movements to contend with the increasingly global organization of an emergent global capitalist class. Political and economic elites, especially finance capitalists, had already been consciously operating on a global stage for centuries, but the degree of international integration of these reached a very high level in the late nineteenth century.2 The British created the Concert of Europe after defeating Napoleon, an alliance of conservative dynasties and politicians who were dedicated to the prevention of any future French revolutions. The Royal Navy suppressed the slave trade and encouraged decolonization of the Spanish colonies. The English Anti-Corn Law League’s advocacy of international 2 The Institute for Research on World-Systems (IROWS) at the University of California, Riverside is carrying out a research project to compare the degree and contours of international integration of nineteenth-century and twentieth-century global elites (Chase-Dunn, Giem, Jorgenson, Lio, and Reifer 2002).
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free trade (carried abroad by British diplomats and businessmen) was adopted by most European and American states in the middle of the century. The gold standard was an important support of a huge increase in international trade and investment (Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). The expanding Atlantic economy, already firmly attached to the Indian Ocean, was accompanied by an expanding Pacific economy as Japan and China were more completely and directly brought into the trade and investment networks of Europe and North America. American Ginseng was harvested in the Middle Atlantic states as an important commodity that could be traded for Chinese manufactures rather than having to resort to payment in silver. The nineteenth-century wave of capitalist globalization was massively contested in a great globalization backlash. The decolonization of Latin America extended the formal aspects of state sovereignty to a large chunk of the periphery. Slave revolts, abolitionism and the further incorporation of Africa into the capitalist world-system eventually led to the abolition of slavery almost everywhere. Within Europe, socialist and democratic demands for political and economic rights of the non-propertied classes strongly emerged in the world revolution of 1848. An important aspect of our model of world-systems evolution is the idea of semiperipheral development (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: Chapter 5). We note that institutional development in premodern world-systems occurred because innovations and implementations of new techniques and organizational forms have tended to occur in societies that have semiperipheral positions within larger core/periphery hierarchies. Semiperipheral marcher chiefdoms conquered adjacent core polities to create larger paramount chiefdoms. And semiperipheral marcher states conquered adjacent core states to create larger and larger core-wide empires (e.g., Chin, Akkad, Assyrian, Achaeminid Persians, Alexander, Rome, Abbasid Caliphate, etc.) And semiperipheral capitalist city-states (Dilmun, Phoenician Tyre, Sidon, and Carthage; Venice, Genoa, Malacca, etc.) expanded commercialized trade networks and encouraged commodity production within and between the tributary empires and peripheral regions, linking larger and larger regions together to eventually become the single global economy of today. The modern hegemons (the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century, the United Kingdom of Great Britain in the nineteenth century, and the United States of America in the twentieth century) were all formerly
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semiperipheral nation-states that rose to the position of hegemony by transforming the institutional bases of economic and political/military power in response to challenges from contenders for hegemony and challenges from popular movements contesting the injustices of capitalism and modern colonial imperialism. The modern world-system has experienced system-wide waves of democracy rather than separate and disconnected sequences of democratization within individual countries (Markoff 1996). These waves have tended to start in semiperipheral countries and the institutional inventions that have diffused from country to country have disproportionately been invented and implemented in semiperipheral countries first (Markoff 1999). Both the Russian and Chinese Communist challenges to capitalism emerged from the semiperiphery. The worker’s movement became increasingly organized on an international basis during the nineteenth century. Mass production made working conditions increasingly similar for industrial workers around the world. Labor organizers were able to make good use of cheap and rapid transportation as well as new modes of communication (the telegraph) in order to link struggles in distant locations. And the huge migration of workers from Europe to the New World spread the ideas and the strategies of the labor movement. Socialists, anarchists and communists challenged the rule of capital while they competed with each other for leadership of an increasingly global antisystemic movement that sought to democratize the world-system. The decline of British hegemony and the failure of efforts after World War I to erect an effective structure of global governance led to the collapse of capitalist globalization during the depression of the 1930’s, culminating in World War II. In our perspective, capitalist globalization is a cycle as well as a trend. The great wave of the nineteenth century was followed by a collapse in the early twentieth century and then a reemergence in the period after World War II. The global institutions of the post World War II order, now under the sponsorship of the hegemonic United States, were intended to resolve the problems that were perceived to have caused the military conflagrations and economic disasters of the early twentieth century. The United Nations was a stronger version of a global proto-state than the League of Nations had been, though still a long way from the “monopoly of legitimate violence” that is the effective center of a real state.
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The Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – were originally intended to promote Keynesian national development rather than a globalized market of investment flows. Free trade was encouraged, but important efforts were made to track international investments and to encourage the efforts of national states to use fiscal policy as a tool of national development. The architects of the Bretton Woods institutions were chary about the effects of volatile waves of international capital flows on economic development and political stability because of what they perceived to have been the lessons of the 1920s. The restarting of the world economy after World War II under the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions and U.S. support for relatively autonomous capitalism in Europe and Japan succeeded tremendously. But the growing power of unions within the core, and the perceived constraints on U.S. fiscal and financial interests imposed by the Bretton Woods currency regime, along with the oil crisis of the early 1970s, led the U.S. to abandon Bretton Woods in favor of a free world market of capital mobility. The “Washington Consensus” was basically ReaganismThatcherism on a global scale – deregulation, privatization, and reneging on the “social contract” with core labor unions and the welfare state. The IMF was turned into a tool for imposing these policies on countries all over the world. This U.S./British-led neo-liberal regime of global capitalism (Reaganism-Thatcherism) was a reaction to the successes of the Third World and the core labor movements, not in achieving true global democracy, but in getting a somewhat larger share of the profits of global capitalism. The attack on the institutions of Keynesian national development (labor unions and the welfare state), was also a delayed response to the world revolution of 1968 in which students, women, environmentalists, Third Worldists, indigenous peoples, democracy movements, and radical parts of the labor movement had critiqued and resisted the inadequacies of the welfare capitalism and business unionism from the Left. The New Right appropriated some of the ideology and many of the tactics of the 68ers – such as demonstrations, civil disobedience, guerilla armies, drug financing, and mobilization of subnations. These tactics have come back to haunt the powers that be. In the recent wave of “blowback,” organizations and ideologies formerly supported by the U.S. CIA as instruments against the Soviet Union (e.g., Al Qaeda) have turned against their former sponsors, employing dirty tricks to besmirch symbols of global po-
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wer and to murder innocent bystanders in the heart of the core. We contend that the current historical moment is similar to the end of the nineteenth century. Like British hegemony, U.S. hegemony is declining. Contenders for global economic power have been emerging in German-led Europe and in Japan-led Asia. Popular movements and institutions have been under attack, especially since the rise to ideological hegemony of the neo-liberal “globalization project.” Anti-systemic movements are struggling to find new paths for dealing with capitalist globalization. New communications technologies such as the Internet provide possibilities for creating coordinated and integrated movements in favor of global democracy. The liberating potential of decentered and democratized communications is great. But cheap interactive and mass communications also facilitate increasing differentiation and specialization of political mobilization, which can undercut efforts to promote inter-movement coordination. We hold that the Internet will be, on balance, a liberating force, but the big gains in movement integration will probably come as a response to the economic, political, and ecological disasters that globalized capitalism is likely to produce in the not too distant future (Chase-Dunn 2001). We expect that the current resistance to global capitalism will in large part take the form of local self-reliance, the revitalization of diverse cultural forms and the rejection of the cultural and technological totems of corporate capitalism. Thus the characterization of the recently emergent protest movements (Seattle, Genoa, etc.) as “anti-globalization” movements is partially correct, but it is misleading. Self-reliance may take forms that are progressive or forms that promote divisions among the people based on ethnicity, nation, or race. We want to point out that selfreliance by itself is not an adequate strategy for transforming capitalism into a more humane and sustainable social system. Rather the building of self-reliant communities needs also to organize with a coordinated movement of “globalization from below” that will seek to reform, or create de novo, world institutions that will promote social justice and environmental sustainability.
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Imagining Global Democracy This means imagining global democracy. What might global democracy look like? And how could we get from here to there? A consideration of global democracy must confront two main issues: huge and growing inequalities within and between countries; and the grave problems of environmental sustainability that capitalist (and Communist) industrialization has produced. Rather than drawing the blueprint of a global utopia and then arguing the fine points it makes more sense to learn from the heritages of earlier efforts to do what we are here proposing. Utopias may be useful for those who are unable to imagine any possible improvement over existing institutions. But they also function to delegitimize efforts to make social change because they usually appear to be unattainable. A more useful approach is to imagine an historically apt next step, one that the relevant constituencies can agree is a significant improvement and that is plausibly attainable. Global democracy means real economic, political and cultural rights and influence for the majority of the world’s people over the local and global institutions that affect their lives. Local and national democracy is part of the problem, but not the whole problem. Global democracy requires that local institutions and national states be democratic and democratic institutions of global governance. We basically support the proposals for radically reforming the United Nations and for establishing an institutional framework for global finance proposed by Camilleri, Malhotra and Tehranian (2000).3 Their principles and thoughtful step-by-step proposals for democratizing global governance address most of the issues quite well. We agree with the principle of subsidiarity, which decentralizes control to the local level over all issues that can be effectively resolved at that level (2000: 46). This principle is similarly applied to the national and international regional levels, so that global-level institutions deal with problems that can only find effective solutions at the global level. Camilleri, Malhotra and Tehranian also abjure the term “global government” and prefer terms such as “interlocking institutions” and “in3
Patomaki, Teivainen, and Ronkko (2002) provide a valuable review of proposals for globalizing global governance that includes the U.N., the Bretton Woods institutions, and the system of international courts.
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ternational regimes” for describing global governance (2000: 25). We see the political sensitivities involved in this choice of terms, and we agree that it is important to use language wisely. There is a lot of resistance to the idea of an emerging world state because people understandably fear that such an institution might become an instrument of repression or exploitation. But we are concerned that careful rhetoric might obscure or paper over issues that need to be confronted explicitly. It is arguably true that the main reason that the United Nations has been largely ineffective at stopping interstate warfare is that it is not a state in the Weberian sense – a monopoly of legitimate violence. International law is not truly law according to Weber because it is not backed up by institutionalized sanctions. Our position is that the human species needs to establish a global government that is legitimate, effective and democratic. This does not require the centralization of everything. As stated above, we agree with the principle of subsidiarity in which everything that can effectively be left to local, national, and regional bodies should be. But inequality, environmental problems, population pressure, and peace are all global problems that can only be effectively solved by a democratic global government with the power to enforce the law. Thus, reforming the United Nations must move in the direction of the establishment of a democratic global government. This is in the interest of all the people of the Earth, but especially the dispossessed. The Westphalian interstate system has allowed powerful capitalists to repeatedly escape the institutional controls that have emerged from antisystemic movements that have sought to protect workers and communities from exploitation. Only a democratic world state can produce institutions that can guarantee social justice. We also support the establishment of new institutions to provide a framework for global financial relations that can support local and national development, and increased oversight of these by the United Nations (Patomaki, Teivainen, and Ronkko 2002). And we see a need to go beyond polyarchy at both the national and the global levels. As pointed out above, we are not satisfied with polyarchy (parliamentary democracy) at the national level. We contend that real democracy must address the issue of wealth and property, rather than defining these as beyond the bounds of political discourse. This said, we can also learn much from those failed experiments with collective property that were
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carried out in the socialist and Communist states in the twentieth century. State ownership works well for infrastructure, such as health and education, but for the production of goods and services, even when the state is itself truly democratic, this creates grave economic problems because of the problem of “soft budget constraints.” This is because firms are usually bailed out by the state for their budget mistakes, and they respond to state rather than consumer demands. In order to achieve a modicum of efficiency large firms need to compete with one another in markets, but even more importantly they should compete for financing by showing that they can make a profit. We support John Roemer’s (1994) advocacy of a kind of market socialism in which ownership shares of large firms are distributed to all adult citizens, who then invest their shares in a stock market that is the main source of capital for large firms. All citizens receive a set number of shares at the age of majority and when they die their shares revert to the public weal. So there is no inheritance of corporate property, though personal property can be inherited. Firms, large and small, produce for markets and labor is rewarded in competitive labor markets. Small firms can be privately owned. This kind of market socialism equalizes income, though some inequalities due to skill differences will exist. The economy will still be a market economy, but the democratic state will provide security, due process, and oversee the redistribution of corporate shares across generations. This model of public market socialism incentivizes technological change and efficiency without producing increasing inequalities. It would probably work well, especially in the core countries for which Roemer has intended it. But when we think about the global economy there are certain problems that are not addressed in Roemer’s model. One of the main problems in the global economy is the huge difference in productivity between core and peripheral labor. This is why labor standards in international economic agreements are anathema to workers and unions in peripheral countries. A single worldwide minimum wage standard sounds good, but it would tend to function as a protectionist agreement for core workers, and undercut the ability of peripheral firms and workers to sell their products in core markets. Wage and other standards have to take into account local conditions, but their enforcement is the key to preventing the race to the bottom pursued by many transnational corporations. The real solution to this is to raise the level of productivity of peripheral labor. So global democracy needs to structure
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institutions that can do this. Banning child labor worldwide while supporting the children’s families to speed the demographic transition would be a giant first step in this direction. This is why we need effective institutions of global governance. Antiglobalization cannot simply dismantle such institutions as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. They must either be reformed (democratized and empowered) or they must be replaced. Market socialism in the core will not be enough. A movement for economic democracy in the core needs also to mobilize for economic democracy at the global level. Support for both more democratic national regimes and global socialist institutions is likely to come from the semiperiphery. We expect that some of the most potent efforts to democratize global capitalism will come out of movements and democratic socialist regimes that emerge in semiperipheral countries. As in earlier epochs, semiperipheral countries have the “advantages of backwardness” – they are not already heavily invested in the existing organizational and political institutions and technologies – and so they have the maneuverability and the resources to invest in new institutions. Peripheral countries could also do this, but they are more completely dependent on the core and they are not able to mobilize sufficient resources to overcome this dependency. The semiperiphery, especially the large semiperipheral countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, India, Indonesia, and China, has opportunities that neither core nor peripheral countries have. If a democratic socialist regime is able to come to state power by legal means, and if this regime has the political will to mobilize the popular sectors in favor of democratic socialism, an experiment in one or another version of market socialism could be carried out. We expect that regimes of this type will in fact emerge in the near future as the options of kowtowing to the megacorps or demagoging the popular sectors (Chavez in Venezuela) become more obviously bankrupt. The smaller semiperipheral countries (South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, Israel) may also opt for democratic socialism, but we expect that these will only be able to do so after earlier efforts have been made in the large semiperipheral countries. Much also depends on what happens in the contest for hegemony. Continued U.S. primacy will likely strengthen the resistance to democratizing global governance, while the rise of the European Union, which has stronger social democratic traditions, will
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likely provide greater core support for democratizing global institutions and for emerging democratic socialist movements in the semiperiphery. The semiperipheral democratic socialist regimes will be the strongest organizational entities that can forge the links among the global antisystemic movements and produce a network for bringing forth the institutions of global socialism. Globalization from below and the formation of global socialist institutions will need to be facilitated by an organized network of world citizens. We have adopted the name given to such a confederation by Warren Wagar (1996) – the World Party. But this is not a party in the old sense of the Third International – a vanguard party of the world proletariat. Rather the World Party we propose would be a network of individuals and representatives of popular organizations from all over the world who agree to help create a democratic and collectively rational global commonwealth. The World Party4 will actively recruit people of all nations and religions and will seek to create the institutional bases for a culturally pluralistic and socially just and ecologically sustainable world society. This is what we mean by global democracy.
Works Cited Bollen, Kenneth A. and Pamela M. Paxton. 1997. “Democracy before Athens.” In Inequality, Democracy and Economic Development. Edited by Manus Midlarsky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 13-44. Boswell, Terry and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 2000. The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism: Toward Global Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Camilleri, Joseph A., Kamal Malhotra and Majid Tehranian. 2000. Reimagining the Future: Towards Democratic Global Governance. Bundoora, Australia: Department of Politics, LaTrobe University. Chase-Dunn, Christopher 2001 “Through the Sticky Wicket(s) and on to Global Socialism.” Paper presented at the Conference on the 25th Anniversary of the Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University, November 2-3, 2001. Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Rebecca Giem, John Gulick, Andrew Jorgenson, Shoon Lio and Thomas Reifer. 2002. “United States Hegemony in Comparative and Historical Perspective: Transnational Elite Integration in the 19th 4 http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/archive/praxis/wp/index.htm
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and 20th Centuries.” Paper presented at the World Congress of Sociology, Brisbane, Australia, July 7-13, 2002. Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Thomas D. Hall. 1997. Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems. Boulder, CO.: Westview. Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Yukio Kawano and Benjamin Brewer. 2000. “Trade Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World-System.” American Sociological Review, 65, 1, February: 77-95. Davis, Mike. 2001. Late Victorian Holocausts. New York: Verso Hall, Thomas D., ed. 2000. A World-Systems Reader: New Perspectives on Gender, Urbanism, Cultures, Indigenous Peoples and Ecology. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Markoff, John. 1996. Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Pine Forge Press. —. 1999. “From Center to Periphery and Back Again: Reflections on the Geography of Democratic Innovation.” In Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States. Edited by Michale Hanagan and Charles Tilly. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 229-46. O’Rourke, Keven H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1999. Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Patomaki, Heikki, Teivo Teivainen, with Mike Ronkko. 2002. Global Democracy Initiatives: The Art of the Possible. Hakapaino, Finland: Network Institute for Global Democratization. Robinson, William I. 1996. Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roemer, John E. 1994. A Future for Socialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Shannon, Richard Thomas. 1996. An Introduction to the World-Systems Perspective. Boulder, CO: Westview. Shiva, Vandana. 2002. Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Wagar, W. Warren. 1996. “Toward a Praxis of World Integration,” Journal of World- Systems Research 2:1. Http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html
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Material Spatialities of Cities and States Peter J. Taylor
Abstract The concept of spatiality is introduced as an analytical tool for studying the modern world-system. The spatialities of cities and states are contrasted as spaces of flows and spaces of places respectively. It is argued that the latter is embedded in the social sciences as an unexamined spatiality. Dis-embedding is achieved through constructing a revisionist world-systems analysis that focuses on cities. This world-systems analysis is then used to describe two world-spatialities, for the current situation and for a generation hence. The conclusion identifies a systemic bifurcation as an anarchist moment.
Social science was conceived and created within modernity and has continued, by and large, to be constituted of discourses that attempt to explain, interpret or understand the modern experience. It is a modern knowledge par excellence: its origin-myth is that the methods of the natural sciences can be used to understand and improve society. And two key trajectories of this modern society, not found in other societies, have been the extraordinary increasing powers of states, and the ever-increasing rise in urbanization that has recently made city dwellers a global demographic majority. Quite simply, modern states and modern cities are unprecedented in their political capacity and economic production respectively. In this paper I explore how cities and states relate to each other as social collectivities. It might be thought that this question would be a wellworn one within social science but surprisingly this is not the case. There are, of course, very large literatures on each collectivity but their relationship is under-researched. It seems that, post-founding fathers, social-science specialization into disciplines left cities and states located in separate intellectual camps: cities came under the purview of sociologists and geographer-planners, while states were the special subject of political scientists and economists. It has taken the current exigencies of globalization to bring my question to the fore again: today it is seriously asked
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whether cities, viz global city-regions, are replacing states as the prime organizational nexus of social change (Scott 2001). I do not think that cities are replacing states but I do believe that the evidence for fundamentalwith changes in the relationships between the two has become overwhelming. This paper will attempt to justify this claim. To achieve this aim I take a particular perspective on both of my subjects by focusing on their spatialities. The concept of spatiality derives from the rejection of two traditional views on the role of “space” in social change: first, that it is merely an inert platform upon which social events take place, and second, that it is a simple context for events, an “active” locale that “influences” social action but is still divided from it. Spatiality is the concept of the alternative idea that the spatial and the social cannot be treated separately: we make our own geographies as well as our own histories. Thus spatiality, like historicity, is inherent in all social activities; all social institutions have their spaces and times, and therefore cannot be “abstracted” as if space and time are simply the metrics we use to keep track of the where and when of life. Spatiality can be defined as the materially-constructed, socio-spatial orders of life that are routinely produced and reproduced by people carrying out their everyday pursuits. It is because cities and states exhibit quite distinctive, indeed contrasting, spatialities that this perspective is chosen as a lever to understand their changing relationship. The paper is divided into two related arguments: development of a spatiality perspective on cities and states through identifying types of material spaces, and application of this perspective to evaluate contemporary and near-future world-spatialities. The arguments are separated by an interlude; the latter acts as an intellectual bridge by summarizing my revisionist world-systems position that has been presented more fully elsewhere.
Types of Material Space and Social Science Socio-spatial formations are constituted as two types of space. These are spaces of places and spaces of flows (Castells 1996). Thus social space is comprised both of processes operating in a specific place to make it distinctive and, perhaps, provide it with an identity, and by processes that operate across places to create a coherent social formation of connections.
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These two sets of processes are not exclusive to each other; they operate simultaneously to produce their spatial outcomes in complex social packages. Nevertheless it is analytically useful to distinguish between them. Spaces are created by social practices. Thus they are not universal, they are always historically specific. Spaces become socially important when they are constituted by myriad social practices. In this form they define a material spatiality of life. All spatialities are products of social agents: activities by people operating as the makers of spaces. There are makers of spaces of places who create worlds of “local” identities, and there are makers of spaces of flows who create worlds of connections. Through these social practices a spatiality is formed in which spaces of places and spaces of flows mutually co-exist but where one may be dominant. Thus we can contrast the dominance of flows over places in the current Kondratieff B-phase (neo-liberal globalization) with the dominance of places over flows in the previous B-phase (1930s nationalist protectionalism). These represent two distinctive world-spatialities half a cycle apart. Making a place is to give a particular segment of space a social meaning. Here I focus on places that provide an encompassing identity to their inhabitants. I use the concept of home to describe the result of combining place with identity. Home implies a place where a person feels comfortable, literally feels “at home”: disruption of home is therefore socially catastrophic. I treat home as a construction that exists at different geographical scales: with no suffix it refers to the locale of modern households, otherwise it can be “home neighborhood”, “home village”, “hometown”, “home province” (home state in the U.S., e.g., Californian or Texan), homeland (referring to the territory of one’s state or country), and culminating with contemporary environmentalists who try and persuade us of Earth as the (only) home of humanity, our “home planet” (Taylor 1999). In this discussion I will focus on one key scale – the makers of spaces that are the places we call homelands because they are the ultimate reproducers of nation-states. In early modern Europe states were largely dynastic in character and therefore were identified with a “royal house” that supplied its rulers. This was a territorial solution to the gross political instability consequent upon the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Codified in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), state subjects were required to adhere to the
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religion of their sovereign. This created a mosaic of politico-religious spaces, sovereign territories enclosing jurisdictional places. These were states created by “high politics” (through dynastic marriages and succession wars) that were, once military security was established, only of marginal relevance to the everyday lives of ordinary people. But these remote dynastic states, the first state form of the modern world-system, did not survive the exigencies of ever-changing modernities. As socio-territorial containers, modern states developed functions beyond the initial politico-security imperative to encompass, first, economic functions (mercantilism), second, cultural identities (nationalism), and third, social needs (welfare state) (Taylor 1995). These state developments cumulatively produced what Jessop (2002) has termed the “Keynsian Welfare National State” of the twentieth century. In other words the original “high politics” had to cede ground to a new “low politics” that addressed the lives of ordinary people. This is the basis of the common conflation of nation (which is a cultural grouping) with state (which is a political apparatus): the harnessing of the concepts together as nation-state confirms their indelible combination in the contemporary modern state. It is with the nation-state that the world-spatiality of modernity becomes dominated by spaces of places. The high politics of states produced the containers in which places were nationally constructed as homelands. Through a variety of state institutions from nineteenth-century “national education” through to twentieth-century “national media”, there is a powerful socialization process that nationalizes people into the state. Thereafter their behaviors – working (providing income taxes for states), shopping (providing sales taxes for states), TV watching (receiving news about states), driving (licensed and regulated by states), voting (providing leaders for states), and the like – create a “national world” in which person and state are entwined. This is consolidated by cultural celebrations that “bring the nation together”. The state-as-nation becomes the dominant lens through which the social world is viewed and constructed: it is a world mosaic, as depicted by that most familiar cartographic product, the world political map. Nation is imbued so deeply that this map has come to be seen as “natural”: how else would humanity be divided? The fact that this mosaic is a relatively recent modern artefact is lost in the nationalist myths of multiple special, sometimes “chosen”, peoples. Thus, Anderson’s (1983) famous dictum, that, in later modernity, “nation” has replaced early
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modern religion as the prime identity for people locating their place in the Cosmos. The result is a mosaic world-spatiality. The making of spaces of flows involves the intersection of two wellknown stories: an economic one about the spread of markets, and a technological one about the “shrinking” of distance. Thus the cultural and political focus of the last story is replaced by the doings of economic and financial agents and the consumption of their goods within a changing context of transport and communication. It is the business of merchants to create spaces of flows. They make their profit by buying cheap and selling dear and this requires “movement” of commodities in either time or space. The former involves holding stock to “play” the market, the latter involves transporting stock to create commodity chains. Commodity chains typically define a myriad space of flows organised through cities. Cities are critical to economic spaces of flows in a second, more opaque, way. According to Jacobs’s (1984) classic theory of dynamic cities, it is cities that are the crucibles of economic innovations that generate economic growth. Such innovation feeds directly into trade through import replacement. For instance, an entrepôt is a mere distribution center that does not of itself create economic growth. However, it becomes a dynamic city when it begins to manufacture goods it previously imported. It can then begin to consume and export its own products. This need not be a problem for the city it previously imported from; as a dynamic economic entity the latter can switch to new commodities of higher value such as the machine tools that the former entrepôt now requires. This process emphasizes the interdependencies of cities in a virtual spiral of economic growth. The unit of economic change is thus city networks in which cities are more than trading nodes, they are the basic locales of economic growth (Jacobs 1984). It is just such a space of flows – a world city network – that is undermining the modern mosaic spatiality of nation-states (Taylor 2004a). The space of places that is the world of nation-states exults homogeneity; it is what nationalism, in its many guises, is ultimately about. Such politics defines who is and who is not a citizen (or potential citizen when the state-making process is still ongoing). In contrast, spaces of flows organized through cities are about heterogeneity; trading only makes sense across spatial differences in production. Thus cities are traditionally full of merchants from different places: the more successful a city, the
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wider and denser its inward flow of “foreigners”. It follows that cities are inherently cosmopolitan, thriving on their heterogeneity in spaces of flows. Technological innovations that have made transport and communications faster and cheaper over the last two centuries have profoundly affected potentials for the scope and scale of economic activities. While trading has been a world-wide activity since the “long sixteenth century” (c.1450-1650), it remained largely coastal and riverine until the nineteenth century. Communication was subsumed into these trading patterns. However, railways and improved road transport, and the telegraph/telephone and new media such as the radio, altered fundamentally the space of flows. The initial effect was that the new spatial possibilities were harnessed to “nation-building” by states through development of national railway and highway networks, and national telephone and national media as communication separated out from transport. In other words localisms were eroded as states promoted the new technologies to homogenize their territories. This stimulus for a mosaic state world spatiality lasted about a century, from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. However, in the last half-century technologies have made possible increases in the scale of spaces of flows, containerization of land and sea transport, and air transport have created new global commodity spaces of flows, while telecommunications have enabled global organization to become a reality. In particular the combination of communication and computing technologies have provided the means of worldwide command and control for “global corporations” since the 1970s. Subsequently media has become less national and more global. Collectively these technological advances have provided the infrastructure of the space of flows that is globalization. For Jacobs (1984) there is no such thing as a “national economy”; it is a myth to imply state territories are coherent economic units. She calls them “grab-bags” (32) of different economies – aggregations of city economies – that create wholly artificial economic units. She asks why there is an assumption that economic processes should conform to political units, states, created by military and political processes. Jacobs traces the problem back to mercantilism and its state-centric growth theory and development policy: economic success was measured by hoarding bullion within a state. Thus economic study came to be about the state and this easily elided into the assumption that states define economies.
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This “mercantilist tautology” (31) continues in contemporary macroeconomics of all political hues. I accept Jacobs’s argument, which I call an unexamined spatiality in economics knowledge. I take the argument a stage further by finding the same unexamined spatiality at the heart of mainstream social science knowledge. The mercantilist tautology has been consolidated in economic knowledge in the last century through reform of state “treasuries” to encompass fiscal/economic regulation, management and planning roles for the state. This reform of economic practice in the state has proved to be important for place-making due to its insistence on the importance of state boundaries as containers. Simultaneously, the broad intellectual tradition of “political economy” was converted into a specialist discipline of “economics” to provide the relevant knowledge for the new expanded state. Thus, following Jacobs, the result was an embedded statism within the new discipline. Other social knowledge was similarly afflicted. The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was the era both of reforms and discipline-making that went beyond state economics. The discipline of “sociology” was a product of state social reforms that emerged from a more general, positivist “social science”. And political reforms led to more specific knowledge than traditional “political philosophy” that came to be called the discipline of “political science”. It is this specialist trilogy of disciplines that came to be recognized as the “social sciences” in the mid-twentieth century when this form of knowledge became widely legitimized through its institutionalization as chairs/departments in universities (Taylor 1996). Among the many effects of this embedded statism, one stands out as particularly relevant here: the strange assumption of spatial congruence in people’s collective behavior. The study of economic processes, social processes, and political processes are all circumscribed by state boundaries in such a way that economy, society, and politics are nationalized. Whether theoretical or empirical, macro studies use identical spatial units (state territories) to delimit the scope of their arguments. In the case of empirical research this is further enforced by the fact that macro-level data is produced by states for states so that statistics (state-istics) are statedelimited. But theoretical treatments are equally susceptible to this unexamined spatiality. Wallerstein (1984) doubts the validity of the concept of society since it always implies a national entity; he suggests abandoning the term. Recent concerns for replacing “government” by “gover-
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nance” are based on a similar revelation that not all relevant politics are national. In other words, for most of their short history the social science trinity has been a vehicle for reproducing a world space of places; they are best termed mosaic social sciences. Such a knowledge form has had a deep effect on our understanding of cities (Taylor 2004a). As we have seen, cities are organizational centers of spaces of flows. They are inter-locked by economic (and other) activities that create networks in which the cities act as nodes. However for states, their cities are administrative sub-units, mini-territories that require “local government”. This bureaucratic perspective creates an administrative urban hierarchy with the capital city (national government) at the top and other cities largely ordered by size in different layers of hierarchy. Of course, major cities continued to engage in important “cross-border trade” but this has been treated as largely irrelevant to what was viewed as the national urban hierarchy. And this position was bolstered by social scientists who produced a large literature on “national urban systems” wherein were found urban hierarchies (Taylor 2004a). Purporting to be a tool for state economic management, this “systems-thinking” intellectually legitimized the imposition of the state’s self-image as a hierarchy on to knowledge of cities. The irony of this unexamined spatiality is that the most networked of social collectives, cities, were territorialized; a mosaic urban studies was created wherein a strange world of multiple and separate national urban hierarchies was conceived. This has been disastrous for understanding cities within spaces of flows (Taylor 2004a). The lesson is that mosaic social science is particularly unsuitable as a vehicle for understanding globalization with its transnational processes. We need a “network social science”, social knowledge not mesmerised by state and nation. World-systems analysis is such knowledge, depicting as it does a world of connections within and without the nation-state. But this alternative spatiality embedded in world-systems analysis has never been fully exploited as a radical departure from conventional social science. Such a revisionist world-systems analysis is offered here.
Interlude: Revisionist World-Systems Analysis My revision is a geohistorical one. As well as using the spatiality perspective previously developed, I focus upon a particular time period: the
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“long sixteenth century” that culminates in the establishment of a modern world-system (Wallerstein 1974). This timeframe is chosen because it shows the operation of a nascent modern world-system before both the consolidation of the inter-state system and the rise of nationalism. The expectation is that a glimpse of a less state-centric early modernity can help us transcend embedded statism for understanding late modernity, viz globalization. The result is a city-centric variation on Wallerstein’s (1979) world-systems analysis. Most of the ideas have been presented in more detail elsewhere (Taylor 2004a, 2004b, 2004c); here I provide a summary listing of the argument. (a) Following Wallerstein (1974), I identify the long sixteenth century as the transition from a feudal Europe to a European modern world-system. The key phases of any social transition are the initial developments when alternative social matrices come to the fore and the final period when one alternative is consolidated into the dominant social matrix. (b) Following Braudel (1984), I focus on the “city-studded spine” of late medieval/early modern Europe, with its two clusters of cities: a “southern pole” in north Italy and a “northern pole” in the Low Countries. Although the development of a Europe-wide city network centered on these two poles pre-dates the long sixteenth century (Spufford 2003), this separation of city-centered Europe was to prove crucial to the outcome of the transition. (c) In the 1490s north Italy was invaded first by France and then by Habsburg Spain: this showed the military vulnerability of citystates to rising “medium-sized” territorial states. Southern pole cities were not destroyed but they lost their political autonomy. At the same time new trading routes (around Africa, to the “New World”) were beginning to re-orientate European external links from the Mediterranean cities to Atlantic cities. (d) This was the opportunity of the northern pole to become more important economically than the traditionally much richer southern pole. In effect the Iberian states used maritime expertise from Mediterranean cities to develop new trans-continental trading networks that ultimately benefited the northern pole cities, centered on Antwerp. (e) The autonomy of northern pole cities was based on their political location in a decentralized Holy Roman Empire. When the
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(g)
(h)
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Habsburgs tried to centralize their power and eradicate a Protestant rebellion the outcome was very different from the earlier fate of southern pole cities. In this case the Habsburgs failed to obtain a military victory resulting in the emergence of a new city-rich polity, the United Provinces, centered on Amsterdam. This was made possible because the cities in the northern Low Countries allied together to produce a fortified territorial shell surrounding their urban wealth-producing centers. The combined wealth of their cities enabled the United Provinces to produce a formidable defensive military capability that repelled the invaders. The result was an oasis of peace within the massive material destruction of the Thirty Years’ War; it became a platform for economic elites to project their power across the nascent modern world-system. Once the shackles of centralizing (territorial) power demands were removed, extraordinary economic growth through autonomous cities took off to create the Dutch “golden age”. There are three interpretations of this new polity: as a new territorial state, as Amsterdam’s city-state, or as a “half-way house” between city and state (Braudel 1984). Since the independence of the United Provinces is the crucial element in the consolidation phase of the transition to the modern world-system (Wallerstein 1980), it follows that how this new polity is interpreted is vital to how we interpret the modern world-system itself. For nineteenth-century Dutch historians the United Provinces were the result of a nationalist revolt that produced the Dutch nation-state. As Schama (1987) has pointed out, this interpretation tells us more about nineteenth-century historians than seventeenth-century history. For twentieth-century historians and social scientists the United Provinces constitutes a new modern state that they call the Dutch Republic (’tHart 1993; Israel 1995). This is the position Wallerstein accepts. However, I think we can make a Schama-type criticism: this interpretation tells us more about the embedded statism of twentieth-century social scientists than the nature of this first Dutch polity. We do not need to equate the United Provinces with what went before (relatively autonomous cities, city-states) or what came after (sovereign states, nation-states) or take Braudel’s middle
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stance that assumes a progression from cities to states. I treat the United Provinces as a historically singular polity. It was a highly networked multi-nodal city region with a defensive territorial shield that was able to place itself at the center of system-wide trading networks. This enabled this cluster of cities to capture a disproportionate amount of the wealth being created in the early modern world-system. (j) The unique feature of this state is that it was controlled by economic elites; foreign contemporaries dismissed the polity as a mere “merchant’s state”. But that is the point, merchants in charge of a multi-city polity with no territorial ambitions showed how they could employ a “light” political touch – funding only what was necessary – and create a dynamic economic growth region. However, the reaction to Dutch success was not more “merchant states” but rather mercantilist states that combined old political territorial imperatives with the new economic practices. The result was a political economy of modern states in which there is some sharing of power between political and economic elites. Although the balance between these elites varies greatly over time and space, modern states are distinguished by this historically unusual intrusion of economic concerns into the traditional political realm of kingdoms and empires. (k) Thus the Dutch polity pioneered a capitalist organization of society by economic elites but their mercantilist legacy was only a pale reflection of this. Indeed we might consider that the modern world-system is not actually a capitalist world-economy as Wallerstein (1974) argues, but is better termed a world politicaleconomy to acknowledge the continuing importance of political elites. The latter have, of course, been hugely important in the unfolding of the modern world-system. The French invasion of 1672 is usually taken as the marker for the end of Dutch hegemony. Although (unlike the invasions of northern Italy in the 1490s) this attempted political take-over failed, the United Provinces were irretrievably weakened. In this revised world-systems analysis this year also marks the confirmation of the modern world-system as a world political-economy. The post-hegemonic Dutch polity begins to behave just like any other mercantilist state. Its specificity as a multi-nodal urban
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polity rapidly wanes in an interstate system that leaves no room for autonomous city polities. It is not until the rise of contemporary globalization that cities are again considered seriously as major players in the modern world-system (Taylor 1995).
Material Spaces of the Twenty-first Century The revisionist interpretation of the modern world-system as a world political-economy has profound implications for interpreting contemporary globalization. Following Wallerstein’s argument for the decline of U.S. hegemony, the recent worldwide promotion of neo-liberal economic agendas represents a major global shift of power from political elites to economic elites. Thus, accepting that we are in the demise phase of the modern world-system, interpreting the latter as a world politicaleconomy means that we are finally on a possible transition to capitalism, to a capitalist world-economy. This is to argue for a world-system that is about to continue where the Dutch left off in the seventeenth century. Here I present two world-spatialities, one that interprets the present and one that extrapolates to a generation hence. I focus upon concrete outcomes in which national spaces of places are interwoven with global spaces of flows. Despite the rise of world cities, the most impressive feature of the contemporary world is the unprecedented political power of one state, the United States. From a standard world-systems position this is interpreted as a post-hegemonic effect: a political-military attempt to compensate for relative economic decline. The classic case is the expansion of the British Empire after British hegemony in the late nineteenth century. But the American situation today is different. The British may have built the largest empire in history but their power within the interstate system was far inferior to the current projection of U.S. power across the world. This reflects the one simple fact that hegemons have gotten larger over time: hegemonic United Provinces were a small polity, hegemonic Britain was a medium-sized state, hegemonic United States was a continental state. Political compensation in the latter case has produced a unique superpower. Instead of viewing hegemony at the state-territorial level, the revisionist position is that it is in cities that the wealth-generation to create hege-
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mony occurs. And the cities are not evenly spread across the territories identified as hegemonic: the key Dutch cities were in or near Holland (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Leyden, Utrecht, Haarlem, Delft); key British cities were in the north (Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool, Leeds, Newcastle); and key U.S. cities were in the “manufacturing belt” (New York, Chicago, Boston, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cleveland). Notice that the capital cities are not featured; The Hague, London, and Washington, D.C. were not central to hegemony-making. Also noteworthy is the fact that beyond these cities there were lands that looked anything but hegemonic: the Dutch outer provinces, Ireland in the U.K., and the American “Deep South”. In other words, it is practices in clusters of dynamic cities that initially created each hegemonic interval. This is particularly pertinent to understanding U.S. hegemonic decline. The peak of U.S. hegemony in the 1960s coincided with the final domestic confrontation with the racist ex-Confederate South. The resulting rise of the “New South” coincides with the hegemonic decline. If you divide the United States into a continental wide north-south division we get the two world faces of the country: producers and traders in the north (San Francisco-Silicon Valley, Seattle, Chicago, New York, Boston), and circuses and soldiers in the south (Los Angeles-Orange County, San Diego, Las Vegas, Texas, Florida). And in our consumer society it is the latter that have dominated politically (Kennedy in 1960 is the last time a candidate from the north won a Presidential election). Northern U.S. cities created hegemony; the southern U.S. is using it up. This is the source of the U.S. post-hegemonic political-military compensation, but in the unique circumstances of creating a superstate there is an additional interpretation. In past hegemonic declines there has been rivalry between two states, one dominated by economic elites, the other by political elites: after Dutch hegemony England/Britain versus France, after British hegemony the United States versus Germany. Today, although there is no hegemonic (economic) successor to the United States, it does seem to be the case that the political-military challenge has been internalized. In this argument the southern-dominated United States is the successor of Bourbon/Napoleonic France and Imperial/Nazi Germany. The current balance between national spaces of places and global spaces of flows is that a neo-conservative United States – the “last sovereign state” (Martin and Schumann 1997: 216) – is operating alongside a
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neo-liberal world city network (Taylor 2004a). This contrast in contemporary spaces is made particularly intriguing because U.S. cities are relatively underrepresented within the world city network; only 7 of the top fifty world cities, as measured by commercial connectivity, are located in the United States (Taylor and Lang 2004a). Looking ahead is speculation; we cannot know the future but we can make informed guesses. From a spatiality perspective I conjecture that the current spatiality will evolve as a reversal of the early modern worldsystem. That is to say, the earlier erosion of city power by states will turn full circle so that in the late modern world-system we will find erosion of state power by cities. Unlike Petrella’s (1995) famous scenario that depicts a city dystopia in which states have been eliminated, in my scenario states and cities continue to operate through their two distinctive spaces. State authorities are eroded by cities, which become the main sources of connections across the world. In the erstwhile periphery and semi-periphery zones of the world political-economy, major world cities develop (Sao Paulo, Mexico City, Johannesburg, Moscow, Mumbai, Bangkok), and where there are failing states, cities substitute (e.g., Kinshasa for the Congo). In the European Union (EU) the territorial-sovereign conflict between the nationstates and the EU-center is elided as the trans-border connections of Europe’s cities makes this “old” politics less and less salient. In 2025 most of the world is clearly being run as network relations between cities with states as places of secondary importance. But not all the world is city-dominated. The declining importance of states is hardly operating in two political poles where strong states continue to be powerful. In the western pole, the power of the United States of today remains remarkably resilient, cemented domestically by a strong civic nationalism. In the eastern pole, the rise of the Chinese state creates a political balance with the U.S., its ethnic nationalism connecting it to a wider Chinese diaspora. Both poles will have important cities linked to the world city network (for the U.S.: New York, Washington, Atlanta, Houston, Miami, Los Angeles; for China: Hong Kong, Beijing, Shanghai, Singapore, Taipei, Guangzhou), but they will continue to operate through a neo-conservative territorialist logic, that is, to accumulate wealth within a place in the manner of traditional mercantilism. Economically and demographically these two states provide a severe challenge to the maturing world city network. Too large to dislodge, the
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modern world-system has come to an impasse between political elites in their two continental territories and economic elites in their global networks.
Conclusion: Systemic Bifurcation I have attempted to demonstrate in this paper that spatiality is a valuable analytic concept for studying world-systems. My revisionist world-systems analysis has ended with an impasse and I will conclude this demonstration by showing how this relates to Wallerstein’s (2003) argument that the demise of the modern world-system will create a systemic bifurcation. The prediction is that the transition to a capitalist world-economy through the world city network will be hampered by the two champions of political economy, the United States and China. This is a contest between the alternative ruling elites – political and economic – now increasingly divided as the modern world-system declines. The hiatus will finally be broken when the cities in the United States and China begin to feel the economic costs of neo-conservative use of boundaries to divert flows. It is only with the re-emergence of an incipient capitalist worldeconomy that the critical bifurcation appears. The world city network can operate in two ways. One builds upon existing power differentials to create strong hierarchical tendencies within the network, with new monopolies to enable enhanced capital accumulation. This route consolidates a capitalist world-economy. The second route involves a mobilization of citizens to attack existing power differentials and ensure the world city network lives up to its potential for social mutuality. We might call this the anarchist moment. Their previous political flowering coincided with national consolidation of states (a maximal inhospitable social environment for anarchists), but with states gone or tamed the systemic bifurcation provides a practical opening for creating a non-hierarchical, egalitarian world-system of cities (Taylor 2004b).
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Works Cited Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Braudel, F. 1984. The Perspective of the World. London: Collins. Castells, M.1996. The Rise of Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. ’tHart, M. 1993. The Making of a Bourgeois State: War, Politics, and Finance during the Dutch Revolt. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Israel. J. I. 1995: The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Jacobs, J. 1984. Cities and the Wealth of Nations. New York: Random House. Jessop, B. 2002. The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity. Martin, H-P., and H. Schumann. 1997. The Global Trap. London: Zed. Petrella, R. 1995. “A Global Agora vs. Gated City-Regions.” New Perspectives Winter: 21-22. Schama, S. 1987. The Embarrassment of Riches. London: Collins. Scott, A. J. 2001. Global City-Regions. New York: Oxford University Press. Spufford, P. 2003. Power and Profit. London: Thames and Hudson. Taylor, P. J. 1995. “World Cities and Territorial States: The Rise and Fall of their Mutuality.” In World Cities in a World-System. Edited by P. L. Knox and P. J. Taylor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 48-62. —. 1996. “Embedded Statism and the Social Sciences.” Environment and Planning A 28: 1910-16. —. 1999. “Places, Spaces and Macy’s.” Progress in Human Geography 23: 7-26. —. 2004a. World City Network. London: Routledge. —. 2004b. “Homo Geographicus: A Geohistorical Manifesto for Cities.” Review 27, 1: 35-58. —. 2004c. “Dutch Hegemony and Contemporary Globalization. In Hegemonic Declines: Present and Past. Edited by J. Friedman and C. Chase-Dunn. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press. Taylor, P. J., and R. L. Lang. 2004. Us Cities in the World City Network. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Wallerstein, I. 1974. The Modern World-System. New York: Academic. —. 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. —. 1980. The Modern World-System II. New York: Academic. —. 1984. The Politics of the World-Economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. —. 2003. The Decline of American Power. New York: The New Press.
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Culture as a World System Göran Therborn
Abstract This article attempts to come to grips with the lack of a systematically argued “systemness” in world-systems analysis and with a reductionism regarding the multidimensionality of world-system relations. In addressing these issues, systemness is taken as a contingent variable and a case made for distinguishing at least five major interconnected and interacting human world systems, that, however, are not reducible to one another. From this perspective, the world system of culture is singled out and illustrative examples of the relationships between religious identities, family structures, cognitive and symbolic forms, and high and popular culture on a global scale are examined to highlight the contradictions of hegemony and resistance in the contemporary world.
Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974-) still on-going work, The Modern WorldSystem, was a trail-blazer of global social analysis, something which needs to be emphasized now that a younger generation is being snowed under by an avalanche of books on “globalization”. Its daring analytical edge and its enormous erudition stand out. However, in the scholarly world, a shining example may legitimately be taken as an inspiring challenge as well as a model to follow. For a number of reasons I have tended to relate to Wallerstein’s work in the former way. I see two major problems. One regards the system-ness of the Wallersteinian world-system, which is asserted to be tight, strong, even singular, without ever being systematically laid out and cogently argued. The other is the dimensionality of the world-system, and the tendency of Wallerstein to subsume political and cultural dimensions under an assumed, rather than demonstrated, economic primacy. Another approach of some promise may be to take the notion of system as an heuristic tool in the analysis of interdependent complexity and change and to treat systemness as a variable. Systems may then be constituted by the interdependence and the interactions of exogenous actors (be they tribes, cities, states, individuals, or whatever) and, at the other end, systems may operate through actors formed by the system itself
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(such as corporations formed on global markets and cultural groups formed by global cultures) according to an inherent systemic dynamic. Systemness of endogenous or exogenous elements/actors is probably better seen as a continuum than as a dichotomy. If world systemness is taken as a contingent variable, then global processes become central foci of investigation as the constituent parts of variable systemness. Focusing on processes, we can more clearly specify an explanatory framework for world patterns. This entails two elementary distinctions. First, between the global and the sub-global: for modern periods we may short hand the sub-global the national, although it also includes local and regional processes. National processes, the autonomy of which have to be assessed empirically, include national politics, national culture, national economic growth, national demography, and national distributions of resources. Second, among three different kinds of pertinent global processes: global history in the sense of enduring legacies or path dependencies from previous crucially formative moments of trans-national processes; current global flows, such as trade, capital, people, information (including ideas of all sorts), and environmental and/or medical matter; interactions or entanglements of largescale actors, such as states, international organizations, and trans-national movements. In this vein, the basic analytical framework proposed here looks like this.
Figure 1. Global Processes and Global Outcomes
The relative weight of the causal arrows is empirically assessable, and will indicate the world systemness of the world. In the Wallersteinian world
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the most powerful arrows by far fly from global history and global flows, whereas the outgoing national arrows are negligible. In the “modernization” worldview, against which world-system analysis rose in rebellion, all the powerful arrows fly from the nations and the others are ignored or considered insignificant. Now, with hindsight, the world appears more complicated. Analyzing three kinds of world inequality, this writer (Therborn 2003) found global history and national processes most important in explaining current economic inequality, and global flows and entanglements bearing significantly on vital and existential inequality in the contemporary world. With regard to the second problem of existing world-system analysis, that of multi-dimensionality or reductionism, it may be worth while starting out from an agnostic conception of primacy by indicating some key dimensions of world systemness. The inter-relations of these dimensions would then be taken as an object of subsequent empirical analysis. In order to get at the complex multidimensionality of the world, it seems useful to start from a perspective of several world systems – in the minimalist sense of structured totalities – certainly not independent of each other, but with uncertain, largely contingent relations of interaction and influence not to be determined by a priori fiat. In this sense, I think we may heuristically distinguish five major human world systems, interconnected and interacting, probably asymmetrically, but without one being reducible to another: 1. The socio-economic system, currently, world capitalism, with its global markets, division of labor, and social structuration. This is, of course, the focus of Wallerstein’s analysis. 2. The world system of power, of violence as well as of “governance” and influence. This is first of all an inter-state system, the dynamics of which is a perennial topic of controversy among analysts of international politics. 3. The world system of culture, to which a new attention has been given after the end of the Cold War, which was usually framed in some version of inter-state power relations. So far, however, the predominant approach to global cultural analysis has been mutations of Cold War politics (Huntington 1996; Barber 1995). 4. Humanity as a global population system, governed by family and bio-medical processes, as well as by socio-political interventions
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into them. Here is a confluence of demography, family analysis, and bio-medicine. 5. Finally, the planetary ecology of the socio-natural environment, the world as a human habitat. Each of these systems is certainly dependent upon, affected by, and affects the others. Nevertheless, there seem to be two good reasons for singling them out, even though at the end of the day they all may have to be re-assembled. Distinguishing them will make it easier to spell out their specific aspects and dynamics. By the same token, usually not everything can be done at the same time. Heuristically separating different world systems – not assuming an exhaustive list of five only – will facilitate treatment of the many dimensions of the human world. Within this framework of global processes, variable systemness, and of world systems of different dimensions, the rest of this paper will deal with culture. The point is not to assert any kind of cultural primacy, but in some way to remedy the underdevelopment so far of world cultural analysis.1
The World as a Cultural System “Culture” will here be taken in a sociological sense, broader than in literary and most so-called cultural studies, more delimited than in cultural anthropology. A world cultural system will refer to a worldwide configuration of patterns and processes of identity, values, cognition, and symbolic forms. A global cultural system provides meanings of the world, meanings of oneself in the world, as well as the meaning of others in it. Such a configuration is obviously imbricated with world economics and world power politics (but these relations must be left to another venue). A cultural system in this sense has at least four core elements: 1. An architecture of identities. This is the means by which people perceive the world, the members of it, and their own place in it. A world culture implies some awareness of the social environ1
Recent contributions to these questions included Barber (1995), Huntington (1996), Meyer et al. (1997), Jameson and Myoshi ( 1998), and Berger and Huntington (2002); however, few have made attempts at any comprehensive systematicity.
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ment as a world society, as a global totality, of cultural practices as, in some way, related or comparable to a world of such practices. 2. A geocultural pattern of values and norms. “Geoculture” is a term coined by Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) in analogy with geopolitics, for the “underside”, the “cultural framework” of the worldsystem. But once in the public domain, the notion may also be used for other purposes. In my work on family and sexuality in the world of the twentieth century (Therborn 2004), I found it very useful to treat family systems as geocultures, indicating a historically produced geographic cultural anchorage of norms and institutions. To illustrate, in South Asia the major axis of variation of patriarchy and misogyny is not religion or nation, but region – that is, North versus South. 3. A structure of cognition. There is knowledge of the world and there is ignorance, with their specific modes of production and their channels of distribution. The cognitive is a fundamental dimension of world culture, of any culture. Today, the structuration of cognition means above all, the production of science, the establishment of social perspectives, and the reproduction of literacy. But there is also a developing consensus that the very meaning of knowledge differs widely, even from non-religious perspectives, in terms of different modes of thought and in different ways of manifesting or formulating knowledge, as well as in different historical contexts. 4. Interconnected configurations of symbolic forms. “Symbolic forms” are here used to denote the “high culture” of the arts and of etiquette as well as the “popular” or “mass” culture of entertainment, sports, styles, and brands – languages of all kinds. In all these areas, irreducible to one another, presentation and appearance are crucial, a creative mastering of rules (rather than their following), an imaginative use of knowledge (rather than producing it or having it). There are also two constitutive processes which together produce and maintain a cultural world system. 1. Historical moulding. That is, historical processes of imposition and of diffusion that connect the myriads of cultures of the world
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with each other in certain particular ways. In principle this may be done by any means, including random mixing, but in actual practice it has always occurred within a power matrix, defining center and periphery, superior and inferior. 2. Current flows and entanglements. What sustains a cultural system is basically a flow of information (in the most general sense) from the conveying of complexes of ideas to iconological signs. But following the methodological rule of approaching global social systems as always potentially systems of systems, that is, link-ups of national and/or other sub-global systems, global cultural flows have to be searched for and identified – rather than assumed – and then their relative significance must be evaluated. And from the assumption of the possibly non-global follows that a global process may not necessarily be a planetary flow. It may also, or instead, involve encounters, interactions (i.e., entanglements of global and non-global actors and institutions), and hybridizations of forms. Finally, as a system the world cultural system has at least two descriptive configurational variables, two ways in which its shape may be characterized, both of which sustained by an infrastructure of means of communication. 1. A horizontal dimension, laying-out the socio-spatial divisions of world culture. In the field of literary studies, this is now being undertaken as a systematic research endeavor (e.g., Moretti 1998). 2. A vertical dimension, of hegemony, dependence, resistance, and alternatives, a dimension which also may be conveyed by the more ambiguous distinction of center and periphery (e.g., Casanova 1999). The systemic dynamic of global culture can no longer be assumed by a rationalist conviction, like that characteristic of the generations of Karl Marx and Max Weber, and still maintained by their disciples of the third quarter of the twentieth century. A persistent drive towards secularization, rationalization or disenchantment is no longer to be taken for granted. The post-modern moment of the late twentieth century has in that sense made an epochal rupture. We are left with a directionless –
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unpredictable – dynamic of human imagination and creativity. Globality means that a freeze of creativity, into repetitions and imitations of the past, well known historically, is becoming more unlikely because of the difficulties of necessary isolation. The dynamics of human creativity render socio-spatial divisions porous and mutable, and hegemonies are likely to be contested. However, the dynamic of creativity may manifest itself as well in imaginative and creative adaptations by the centers and the hegemons. All the same, the actual dynamics of the cultural system cannot be captured by an inherent human creativity only. Cultural efflorescence is dependent on economic resources, from patrons or from commercial auto-commodification. Its radius of influence is dependent on muscles of power. In neither case is there a one-to-one correlation to be expected, but yes, a positive association between wealth or power, on one hand, and cultural influence, on the other. In this way, I think, culture may be systematically analyzed as a world system of its own as well as in its coupling with other kinds of world systemness. In what follows I will try to put some flesh on the bones of this assertion.
The Architecture of Identities Individuals as well as collectives have multiple identities, of a salience shifting from one situation to another, and these identities or self-conceptions are overlapping and crisscrossing in complicated ways. They are all social constructions. But how important is a sense of human or world commonality in the current configuration of identities? How do the major divisions of collective identities run? Most clear-cut are pan-human and planetary identifications. They became significant only in the second half of the twentieth century, and especially in the last third of it. Human rights were introduced into mainstream global discourse with the constitution if the United Nations against the background of the racist barbarism of the Second World War. The rights of all humans qua humans became fully recognized only a couple of decades later, with the fall of racist institutions in the southern United States, the international de-legitimation of South African apartheid, and the thaw in the Cold War that made the USSR recognize human rights in Eastern Europe (in the Helsinki Accords) as the United
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States did in Latin America with the Carter Presidency. The United Nations Women’s Conferences, from Mexico in 1975 to Beijing in 1995, were also extremely important in articulating a human identity. The oil crisis of the 1970s and eruptive issues of planetary exhaustion and pollution raised a considerable large-scale ecological awareness in the last quarter of the past century, again with crucial inputs of the United Nations machinery, beginning with the Stockholm Conference in 1972. Another perspective on global identities concerns worldwide communities. The great universalistic religions, Christianity and Islam in particular, have always had something of global community to them. Both these religions have recently spawned vigorous movements of revivalism not only in the lands of their roots but beyond as well. In the second half of the twentieth century an important secular globalism developed, dividing the planet into two ideological halves, “the Free World” and “the Socialist Camp” (with the non-aligned leaning in one or the other direction), which served as rallying-points for hundreds of millions of people. Global communities may also take the form of classes or movements. There is a noteworthy convergence of establishment and of leftwing antiestablishment opinion in a recent emergence of a global business community, of what Samuel Huntington (1996: 57) calls “Davos culture” or what Leslie Sklair (2001) sees as a “transnational capitalist class”. This is clearly a novel phenomenon. On the other hand, while there is now an important worldwide International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, freed from the shackles of the Cold War, there is probably less of a world labor identity than among the militants of the early twentiethcentury labor movement. But there is now a counterpart to the “Davos culture”, which by analogy may be named the Porto Alegre culture, the wide spectrum of trans-national movements meeting at the World Social Forum, originally in Porto Alegre (Brazil), most recently in Mumbai (India). This is not one community, but a heterogeneous ensemble of movements, labor, peasant, indigenous, environmentalist, feminist, and the like. What they share is a conviction of the global injustice of today’s world and of its current dominant tendencies. There are also two, more individual, aspects of global identities. One is the establishment and the recognition of a global ranking of merit to which relevant actors relate – as in sports, entertainment, the arts, and science. There is now a world market of perceived talent and a world constellation of stars. The social sciences, philosophy, and cultural stud-
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ies have some world stars too, but economics apart they and the humanities in general have retained a predominance of national or regional processes of identification. This division of the global market of merit versus national/regional delimitation appears to be much more important than what Peter Berger has termed “the globalization of the Western intelligentsia” (2002: 4). A global individual positioning of identity may also follow, in a non-hierarchical form, from the possibility of easily communicating across all borders. Internet chatting may then be seen as involving globalized individuals relating to one another. Finally, there is the globalization of icons with which people identify. Such icons may be cultural stars, in relation to their fans; they may be brands of consumer goods; or they may be packages of objects and practices seen as “styles”. Although there were some embryonic developments in the wake of late nineteenth-century European imperialism, the identification with worldwide icons was hardly possible before the advent of the cheap cassette, satellite television, and trans-national franchising. It is mainly a phenomenon dating from the last decades of the twentieth century. This identification with world icons has tended to transform the traditional relationship between elite and popular cultures, with the latter usually being much more local. While there may be a global business class, the middle and upper middle classes may now tend to be more national or regional in their cultural identifications than sectors of the popular strata. In sum, these global identities (with the possible exception of the trans-national capitalist class), although representing an epochal cultural change, should be seen as additions to, rather than as replacements of other identities such as national, regional, local, religious, political, occupational, or of age, gender, and family position. Moreover, cleavages of us and them remain.2 Indeed, we may ask directly, do global religious cleavages play a major role in the contemporary world? Probably the best answer would be, not generally. But the Islamic 2 In the mid-nineties, Samuel Huntington presented a bold thesis about a new pattern of world identities: “Peoples and countries with similar cultures are coming together. Peoples with different cultures are coming apart” (1996: 125). “Cultures” or “civilizations” were rather arbitrarily defined, which undermined the reach of the argument from the beginning. And since Huntington explicitly admitted that political alignments will “of course not” always coincide with those of culture and civilization (1996: 128), his thesis is difficult to put to any meaningful test.
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versus non-Islamic one clearly does. The reasons are complex, but a major one is undoubtedly geopolitical, the fact that the payment for the European genocide of European Jewry was thrust upon the Islamic world with the establishment of Israel in Palestine, instead of, say, in Bavaria. A second important reason, which also has little to do with deep civilizational structures, concerns the outcome of the Cold War during which the victors invested heavily in Islamic militancy, above all in Afghanistan – which on a larger scale became to the Muslim generation of the 1980s what Spain was to the European one of the 1930s – but also inside the Arab world. Do regions and regional identities count? Increasingly so. Geography still matters. There is a general tendency for contiguous, trans-national regions to become foci of internal interaction and identification. Africans have a post-colonial continental identity, which does not seem to be seriously cut by the Islamic versus non-Islamic divide, but which rather fades with the Arab and Berber culture on the northern rim. After its series of horrible civil wars, Europe became a significant referent of identity in the final quarter of the twentieth century. With the unification of Europe and the end of the Cold War, “Europe” has clearly gained at the expense of “the West”. Latin Americanism has been a cultural current for a long time. But in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century there was also an important elite identification with Europe (sometimes also with or including the United States), against the “barbaric” natives at home. Although there are still Latin Americans more at ease in Miami than in, say Caracas or La Paz, this is now a private class affinity rather than a direction of cultural and socio-political aspirations. Asia is huge, and the cradle of several ancient great civilizations. But ASEAN, originally a local Cold War appendix, is growing into a center of East Asian interaction, creating a sense of commonality, and connecting with its big and resourceful Northeast (China, Japan, Korea) and reaching out to its Northwest (India). That leaves us with the very important question for the future of what is happening to global class and ideological cleavages. Yes, a global capitalist class is emerging, but how far will global anti-capitalist forces develop with a common identity, and not just as a the coexistence of a series of specific interests? Hitherto, sufficient hard evidence is lacking to sustain a meaningful hypothesis.
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Geocultures: The Experience of Family and Sexuality When I started my work in this field, there were two major alternatives available for understanding the enormous variety of family forms in the world. One, deriving from kinship anthropology, focused on basic structural characteristics of the family (for instance, the nuclear family, the stem family, the joint family) highlighting certain features of generational and of conjugal relations. The problem with this structural perspective is that it starts from a descriptive typology and, when stripped of no longer tenable evolutionist assumptions of the nuclear family as the destination of humankind, it does not include any framework for explanation or prediction. The other alternative was culturalist, some variety of a civilizational approach, with a focus on religions and quasi-religious moral philosophies (e.g., Confucianism). Since the moral canons of civilizations defined in this way were intensely preoccupied with norms of family and sexuality, with the sole exception of Buddhism, such an approach would have added arrows of explanation to the descriptive structures of kinship. However, the empirical record shows that basic cultural values have been crucially affected by time and space, by history and geography. A “Christian” family was very different in slave-holding and in settler America, among Catholics in Western and Eastern Europe, in Europe and in Africa. A “Muslim” family turned out to vary enormously, between location in West Africa, in West Asia, or in Southeast Asia. Hindu families of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar or Rajastan in northern India, were more similar to Muslim families of Pakistan and Bangladesh than to Hindu families of the south Indian states of Tamil Nadu or Karnataka. From these considerations, I found it useful to treat family systems as a set of historically evolved territorial geocultures, transcending modern political boundaries. They are the (Sub-Saharan) African, the European (including the New World settlements), the East Asian, the South Asian, the West Asian/North African, and the interstitial family systems of the Southeast Asian and the Creole American. Behind the divisions are findings that territorial geocultures have a tendency to prevail, in their bearing upon family features under study, over religious divisions without obliterating the latter. In terms of contemporary polygyny, for instance, African Christians or Muslims are similar to fellow Africans of other religions, and very different from Christians of Europe, or West Asian Muslims, respectively.
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Geocultures have no fixed, no clear, boundaries and there is no reason to assume a priori that the geocultures of patriarchy, marriage, and informal sexuality, which my study identified, are the same for other kinds of human behavior. That can only be established by empirical investigation. But what the notion of geocultures contributes to cultural analysis is a sense of space and a sense of history. Through different historical experiences the same cultural system, for instance a religion, becomes anchored in very different terrains. Geocultures are pertinent to global studies to the extent of their trans-national, or better, their trans-polity character. Transposed onto the current arena of global politics, it seems that it would make much more sense to analyze it culturally in terms of geocultures than in those of civilizations. The World Value Surveys offer a case in point.
Hegemonies of Cognition and of Symbolic Forms Part of cultural hegemony is a domination of cognitive perspectives. Flows of information as cognitive raw materials usually run from political and cultural peripheries toward powerful centers of knowledge production and elaboration. It tends to be at the centers of wealth and power that overviews and comparisons are produced with the peripheries limited to local knowledge. This constitutes a cognitive power relation. More serious, however, is the production of hegemonic universalisms, social and cultural knowledge pretending to be universally valid and true, while in fact often being little more than elaborations of the provincialism of the powerful. A good deal of IMF economics seems to be of this kind. However, knowledge is formulated differently in diverse parts of the world, which complicates cultural diffusion and translation. Just within the modern North Atlantic context, a German sociologist has distinguished some characteristic national forms of “formulating knowledge”: the British “enquiry”, the American “paper”, the German “work”, and the French “essay” (Münch 1986). But we do have good evidence from experimental psychology that the very process of cognition itself is culturally different in the contemporary world, deriving from ancient civilizational roots. Most of this evidence, assembled by the American psychologist Richard Nisbet (2003), is based on experiments with stu-
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dents of different regional background. East Asians tend to perceive the world more in contextual, relational, contradictory, and spatial terms than Euro-Americans, who focus more on actors’ dispositions, on objects and their categorization, on abstract rules, and on an excluding logic of either/or. In spite of these and related studies, an unraveling and a mapping of global knowledge patterns are just beginning. While there is much more to “knowledge” than (natural) science, science is the main component of a world system of cognition. The configuration of the production of scientific knowledge is a very important part of the contemporary cultural system at a time when a “knowledge-based economy” has become a major slogan of political economy, officially endorsed by the EU, for instance. From a forthcoming study by Peter Weingart (figure 11) we may borrow some indicative data on shares of international science citations 1996-2000: the United States and the European Union (fifteen states) then each accounted for 39 percent, East Asia for 8 percent, and Latin America and South Asia for about 1 percent each. The current EU15 fares surprisingly well by this measure in comparison with the United States. The tie with the United States tells us something about the broad scientific base of Western Europe, while East Asia – led by Japan with a 6 percent share – comes out as a poor third. Nevertheless, the overwhelming picture is of the high geographic concentration of the world science system. At the top level, the dominance of the United States is striking. Out of 371 Nobel Laureates in science and in economics for 1946-2000, 218 or 59 percent were based at institutions in the United States and 139 or 37 percent at Western European institutions. Four percent are then left to the rest of world, according to the Nobel e-Museum. A 2003 Chinese ranking of world universities – from the Institute for Higher Education at Jia Tong University in Shanghai, but soon withdrawn from the public domain – put four U.S. universities at the top, with Cambridge (England) in fifth place. Finally, news is still produced and diffused mainly by national and local media, but there is also an increasingly important component of trans-national production and distribution. The major global players are all Anglo-Saxon, the American CNN, the BBC, and Rupert Murdoch’s Star in Asia, Sky in Europe, and Fox in the United States. Regional networks of importance include the European Euronews and the two independent-minded Arab broadcasters – a thorn in the side of both the United States government, which repeatedly has tried to silence them,
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and Arab autocracies – Al-Jazeera in Qatar and the very recent AlArabiyya in Dubai.
Symbolic Forms: High and Popular Culture In their manifestations in art, architecture, and etiquette, symbolic forms have roots in the pre-modern cultures of civilizations as well as in modern national and local cultures. But since the advent of modernism in the heyday of European imperialism in the decades around 1900, there has existed a world system of art and all kinds of aesthetic symbolic forms, with its centers, models, and hierarchies. This now includes the recent symbolic manifestations of mass culture: film and television programs, popular music, sports, and style consumption. High culture, in the form of spectacular architecture and top-quality institutions for the performing arts, has become a major instrument of global urban competition for prestige and tourist money. High culture is largely multipolar and is probably less centralized than during the first three quarters of the twentieth century. Paris has lost much of its previous centrality, although remaining an art center of the world; in literature, London is a more important center of publishing (Casanova 1999). New York, which in the 1940s succeeded Paris as the center of painting, seems no longer to be that outstanding, although clearly still a major pole of the art world. The mid-century Euro-American “International Style” of architecture has been followed by a more varied elite taste and Asian architects have reached a very high profile; indeed, the International Style always had an important competitor in Latin American Modernism. Film is a good illustrator of the multipolarity of high culture and the heavy concentration of mass culture. Art film of world acclaim has always been produced in a number of countries, from Sweden and Denmark to Japan, from India to Brazil. For more than a decade, the world elite has been applauding the rise of Chinese cinema, of Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige, and others. On the other hand, the world has only three net exporters of film, the United States, India, and China, and while Indian and Chinese export markets are concentrated in parts of Asia and Africa, films from the United States dominate globally. The world music industry is concentrated in a handful of corporations, but with different geographical origins, Western European EMI, Universal, and BMG, Japa-
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nese Sony Music, and American Time-Warner. Their cartel power is being corroded, though, by internet buccaneering or unlicensed downloading. However, alongside global mass culture, there are also significant regional variants, with regional centers, like Britain in Europe, Egypt in West Asia, India, and Japan in East Asia – although Korea and Taiwan both tried to prohibit the entry of Japanese culture until recently – always accompanied by other trans-national stars of the region, for instance Korean into Vietnam or Taiwanese into Mainland China (Aoki 2002; Hsiao 2002; Thomas 2002). More generally, among the world’s one hundred most valued brands, sixty-two are American, including the first five – Coca Cola, Microsoft, IBM, GE, and Intel – and eight of the top ten. Regionally speaking, sixty-three brands are North American (including ex-Cuban Bacardi in Bermuda, but no Canadian), twenty-nine are Western European, and eight are Northeast Asian. No other region of the world has managed to launch any world brand of comparable value.
Hegemony and Multipolarity The power structure of the world cultural system may be summed up in two words: hegemony and multi-polarity. Economic development or growth, market economies and mass consumption, seems to be the predominant human aspiration. That is an old modernist striving, which at least on a global scale does not seem to have been weakened by “postmaterialism” or “post-modernism”. On the contrary, it now stands out more clearly, as it is for the time being little bothered by rival projects. The success of this strategy in East Asia, the final failure of Communist economics – in Asia as well as in Europe – and the exhaustion of inwardoriented capitalism in South Asia and Latin America settled the issue, for the time being. True, there is a counter-hegemonic view of development floating around in the “Porto Alegre/Mumbai culture”. At the World Social Forum in Mumbai in January 2004, there was a slogan at the center-stage, “People do not want ‘development’. They just want to live”. This draws upon real experience, upon resistance – particularly but not exclusively in India over the past two decades – of local communities and national support movements against big development projects, like dam construction, threatening to uproot community life. The resistance has
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sometimes been powerful and at least in part successful. But successful economic development is without doubt an ideological ace. Economic wealth and consumption style then naturally become central elements of the cultural hegemony of the United States. The hegemonic language of the world cultural system is English; after the Second World War and the surge of American power, it definitively superseded French as the main language of international diplomacy and information. However, it is important to take notice of the limitations of this hegemony. The cultural dominance of the United States is in no way comparable to its military might. There are two significant counter-hegemonic forces, neither of which is a rival hegemon in any foreseeable future, but rather constitute limiting factors. Militant Islamism is one, concerned with shari’a and the community of believers, instead of with economic development. Secular humanism is the other, espoused by protagonists of sustainable development over accumulation and consumerism, and by militants of peace and human rights. Both are important worldwide forces, although with heavy regional accents. However, neither has a really concrete project of political and economic institutions. As their appeal is to very different social milieux, they are hardly competitors. Moreover, their lack of institutionalization precludes tactical anti-hegemonic alliances. More constraints on and limitations of the hegemony of the United States come from what we may call “regional reservations”. These do not contest the hegemon frontally. Global dominance is accepted with varying combinations of respect and resignation. But a regional culture affirms itself in its own region. This holds for cultures of political economy as well as for mass cultures of entertainment. Within the European Union, for instance, it is a mainstream – if by no means unanimous – opinion that the European “social market economy” or welfare state capitalism is preferable to the American variant of capitalism. Similar views, with respect to Asian socio-economic arrangements, are very widespread and respectable in Asia, not the least in the most successful Northeast and Southeast Asian countries. The American, big publicity-money-driven form of democracy probably has more critics than admirers in the world. On the one hand, as we have seen, high culture is not completely under American dominance (even Stockholm has a special niche of importance as the home of the Nobel Prizes) and mass culture and entertainment and
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alternative journalism have strong regional centers. In sport, practitioner as well as spectator, there is hardly any U.S. hegemony at all. What are the most popular sports varies widely among countries and regions. The United States dominates some, and are at best secondary in others. Football, or soccer, for example, has its centers in Europe and in Latin America, with a quite modest interest and participation in the United States; baseball, on the other hand, is a big American sport, which arouses limited interest outside the country. On the other hand, science is centered in the United States, although the last few decades have seen a remarkable rebounding of European social science and social thought. Something similar may very well happen rather soon in other regions, first perhaps in East and South Asia. Thus, the world cultural system differs from the economic and politico-military systems of the world. Like culture in comparison with wealth or might, the cultural system is more complex and multi-faceted. Easily more fascinating intellectually, culture should not be taken as a veil, hiding the stark features of the contemporary world, the power and privilege, the violence and the exploitation. Culture adds a third dimension to the flat field of political economy.
Cultural Dynamics A cultural system cannot be assumed to have an inherent tendential direction. Rather, its dynamic should be seen as contingent in direction and amenable to systematic empirical analysis. In this vein, it seems reasonable to distinguish, first of all, between constituting and constituted processes. The distinction is relative and is dependent on the topic of analysis, but it does refer to a fundamental discontinuity in processes of change, between parametric change of contextual conditions and intracontextual change. Constituting or moulding processes refer to the former; they are normally more infrequent than the latter and are part of “global history”, which is constitutive of contemporary world culture. To get a handle on “world history” in the model, we have to transform it into a small set of variables. “Civilization” has been defined in several different ways and has been used for many different purposes. In spite of its controversial context, it nevertheless seems to be the most convenient way for high-
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lighting an important dimension of pre-modern history (cf. Arnason 2003). A “civilization” is here being used to denote a large, trans-ethnic pre-modern culture area with some enduring impact on contemporary culture. Because of the unique longevity of religions, civilizations tend to have a strong religious loading, but they also include canons of “classicism”, of classical art, literature, philosophy, and, at a more popular level, oral treasures of tradition and aspects of ancient habitus, often deriving from the ecological context of the culture. “Modernity” is another useful as well as often misused concept. Here, and elsewhere, I have found it most fruitful to stay very closely to the literal temporal meaning of the word. Modernity is then considered as a culture, an epoch, a society, a social sphere having a particular time orientation. That is, a time conception looking forward to a this-worldly future, open, novel, reachable or constructible, a conception seeing the present as a possible preparation for a future, and the past either as something to leave behind or pieces from which to build a future. Modernity in this sense does not designate per se a particular chronological period or any particular institutional forms, although here the concept is applied to world history of the last 500 years. What then emerges is another crucial distinction, that is, between different historical routes to and through modernity. The most economical as well as the most systematic way of identifying these roads, is to define them by the conflicts surrounding the rise of modernity. Everywhere, modernism and modernity meant a rupture with what had been and this rupture was naturally conflictual. But the forces for and against a modernist break differed fundamentally from one part of the world to another.
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Pre/Anti-Modernity Internal Internal External & “Native”
Europe New Worlds of Settlement
Pro-Modernity External Imported &Learnt Reactive Modernisation
Forced Colonial Zone
Note: Countries of Reactive, or externally induced, Modernisation, e.g., Japan, China, Ottoman Empire/Turkey, Iran, Siam/Thailand.
Figure 2. Roads to/through Modernity by the Location of Forces and Cultures For and Against
The new future orientation first emerged in Europe, not as a natural emanation of European civilization, but out of conflicts internal to Europe, to North-western Europe primarily. In other words, the European route was one of civil war, which pitted the forces of reason, enlightenment, nation/people, innovation, and change against those of the eternal truths of the Church, of the sublime wisdom and beauty of ancient philosophy and art, of the divine rights of kings, of the ancient privileges of aristocracy, and of the customs of fathers and grandfathers. How much the final outcome of the struggles between the forces for and against modernity depended upon European colonial conquests and plunder overseas is still an undecided issue for scholars. But clearly, the rise of modernity in Europe did take place in a global context of colonial expansion and of wars of colonial rivalry. The vanguards of European modernity, the Netherlands and Britain, were rising as major colonial powers, and the French Revolution took place within the crucial context of the crisis of French state finances resulting from colonial wars with Britain. In the New Worlds of European settlement, anti-modernity was, in the rise of modern currents, perceived as mainly external: in the conservative metropolis, in Britain to North America, in Spain and Portugal to Latin America, and, increasingly, in the local Others of the settler societies, the natives, the slaves and ex-slaves. Independence took care of the external metropolis, but what to do with the local Others was to haunt the moderns of the New Worlds for a very long time. It still does. To the Colonial Zone, from north-western Africa to southeast Asia, modernity arrived literally out of the barrel of guns with conquest subduing the internal forces of tradition. Modernity was not carried further by
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settlers, but by new generations of natives, of “évolués”, who turned what they had learnt from their conquerors against the latter. After independence the ex-Colonial Zone has carried a complex legacy of nationalism, a colonial elite culture – of language, habitus, and, for instance, exotic sports interests (like cricket in South Asia and the Anglo-Caribbean) – and colonial-turned-ex-colonial state-society bifurcation. The countries of Reactive Modernisation were challenged and threatened by colonial domination, and in the face of these threats a part of the internal elite started to import innovation from the outside. Meiji Japan is the most successful and straightforward example, but several pre-modern empires embarked upon it: late Qing and Republican China, rather unsuccessfully; Siam very cautiously; Iran and the Ottoman empire/Turkey hesitantly and belatedly, but finally with a strong push from above. Different modernities have had different Others and the great modern tasks – of emancipation, progress, or survival – did not look the same along the different roads to and through modernity. They were, nonetheless, all inter-connected. Investigating current world culture, it seems useful to add a third aspect of general historical moulding, after civilizations and routes to/ through modernity. That is the experience of twentieth-century history, which may, of course, be seen as a temporal subset of the roads through modernity. Here we have the two World Wars and their outcomes, the global Cold War, the wave of de-colonization, and the crucial periods of the world economy, the Depression, the post-1945 boom, the late-century crisis. Now I shall turn to the second element, intra-contextual change, affecting the cultural system; it is that of global flows, including those of trade, capital, and people. Of particular interest is the flow of information; however, the flow of information has is own modality and has become increasingly decoupled from the other flows with the availability of electronic means of communication. A technical revolution at the end of the twentieth century produced a quantum leap in global flows of information. The internet, cellular telephones, satellite broadcasting and telephony have brought about an enormous growth and extension of what are in essence cultural flows. All flows have a direction. While not doing away with the traditional cultural flow from centers to peripheries, the electronic revolution has made a considerable flow from the peripheries to the centers possible.
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Immigrant populations in Western Europe and North America now have access to television from their countries of origin. Turkish and Arabic newspapers are widely available in Europe, some of them printed in Europe. The internet is a two-way means of communication. Although the electronic media provide for direct flows, they are subject to remote control, like the ownership of broadcasting stations, or by limited access to computers. Thus, cultural flows are to a great extent not direct but gated communication, controlled by agents of selection and translation, and by agents of reception. Here national cultures and national powers are very much at work, constituting inter-national rather than trans-national flows. Cultural institutional entanglements of global and sub-global have become much more important than ever before. As in the case of flows, political and economic entanglements, for instance of states and the IMF or the World Bank, have cultural significance. But we may also single out specific cultural entanglements. Four major forms of recent prominence may be discerned, although it should be remembered that global flows and entanglements are not assumed to have supplanted national (or local) cultural institutions and processes, but to coexist with the latter. One form might be summed up as trans-national networking and imbrication of influential national and trans-national ideological actors. Three current examples of entangled cultural politics are global feminism, enormously stimulated by the United Nations Conferences and the ensuing international support; Neoliberalism as organized by worldwide alumni of U.S. departments of economics and by current and former employees of the IMF and the World Bank; and indigenism as a world movement of local cultural leaders interconnected by global support structures and electronic media. Second, the recent migratory flows of people – still smaller than they were a century ago – have brought about a new ethnic cultural complexity by juxtaposing and inter-relating communities, and not only individuals and families of different backgrounds. In previously nationally standardized Western Europe, this is something new. But a culturally much wider range of migrants than before is also adding a high-profile diversity to the modern countries of immigration, North America and Australia. Third, diaspora-home nation relations are acquiring more importance due to easier, cheaper, and more direct communications.
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Fourth, global cultural entanglements are manifested in a hybridization of symbolic forms, most audible in music. A hundred years ago, to the extent that it occurred at all, hybridization was a prerogative of the avant-garde of high art, such as Picasso’s use of African masks. These illustrations of the analytical framework proposed may provide indications enough for discussions and evaluations of its promise. It can be summed up in a figure of variables and their inter-relations.
Figure 3. Global Cultural Processes
The point, then, is that through analyses of its processes, culture in a broad, multi-dimensional sense may be conceived as a world system and the extent of systemness of the world’s culture may be investigated and assessed.
Works Cited Aoki, T. 2002. “Aspects of Globalization in Contemporary Japan.” In Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. Edited by P. Berger and S. Huntington. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 68-88.
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Arnason, J. 2003. Civilizations in Dispute. Leiden: Brill. Barber, B. 1995. Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Times Books. Berger, P. and S. Huntington, eds.. 2002. Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Berger, P. 2002. “Introduction.” In Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. Edited by P. Berger and S. Huntington. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-16. Casanova, P. 1999. La République mondiale de lettres. Paris: Seuil. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael. 2002. “Cultural Globalization and Localization in Contemporary Taiwan.” In Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. Edited by P. Berger and S. Huntington. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 48-67. Huntington, S. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations. New York: Basic Books. Jameson, F. and M. Miyoshi, eds. The Cultures of Globalization. Durham N.C.: Duke University Press. Meyer, J., J. Boli, G. M. Thomas, and F. Ramirez . 1997. “World Society and the Nation-State.” American Journal of Sociology 103, 1: 144-81. Moretti, F. 1998. Atlas of the European Novel 1800-1900. London: Verso. Münch, Richard 1986. Die Kultur der Moderne 2 vols. Franbkfurt: Suhrkamp Nisbett, Richard E. 2003. The Geography of Thought. London: Nicholas Brealey Sklair, L. 2001. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Oxford: Blackwell. Therborn, G. 1992. “The Right to Vote and the Four World Routes to/through Modernity.” In State Theory and State History. Edited by R. Torstendahl. London: Sage, 62-92. —. 2003. “Dimensions and Processes of Global Inequalities.” In The Moral Fabric in Contemporary Societies. Edited by G. Skapska and A.M. Bukowska. Leiden: Brill, 119-42. —. 2004. Between Sex and Power: Family in the World 1900-2000. London: Routledge. Thomas, M. 2002. “Re-Orientations: East Asian Popular Cultures in Contemporary Vietnam.” Asian Studies Review 26, 2: 233-260. Wallerstein, I. 1975-. The Modern World-System, 3 vols. New York: Academic Press. —. 1991. Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weingart, P. forthcoming. “Knowledge and Inequality.” In Inequalities of the World. Edited by G. Therborn. London: Verso.
A Note on Method with an Example –The “War on Terror”
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A Note on Method with an Example – The “War on Terror” Richard E. Lee
Abstract Much has been made of the centrality of comparison to sociological research. The world-systems perspective, however, posits a single unit of analysis that challenges the possibility of designating the independent cases demanded by the formal logic of comparative analysis. The present work suggests an alternative to comparisons of multiple cases in the form of analogies among instances of processes. The consequences of such a methodological shift are explored through the example of the contemporary “War on Terror”.
One still often hears the claim that all sociology is comparative; indeed, just as Durkheim asserted: “comparative sociology is not a special branch of sociology; it is sociology itself ” (1982[1895]: 157). We might also observe that it is now well-accepted that meaning itself is constructed through difference. Furthermore, with the increasing importance given to the study of larger and larger units over the past half century (associated with establishing generalizability and thus the predictability of interventions), more and more social research has consciously and purposefully identified itself as “comparative”. Whether one works with a large number of cases in a quantitative setting in order to establish explanations, laws or quasi-laws of cause and effect serving as a basis on which to envisage the probable consequences of some projected action, or few cases and “ideal types” qualitatively to account for historical divergences, the aim is a “balance between competing claims of complexity and generality” (Ragin and Zaret 1983: 731). The common, everyday reality, however, is still an on-going tension between the nomothetic stance of the present-oriented disciplines of sociology, political science, and economics and the idiographic propensity of history, anthropology, and oriental studies (this last largely superceded by area studies). Indeed, the more recent criticisms of large-scale work in the nomothetic social sciences have revolved around the absence
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of the historical dimension. In many respects, this represents the recognition, or the return of a recognition, of agency and complexity as coconstitutive of human reality along with the structures that constrain certain possibilities for action and promote others. The mirror image is the criticism of the idiographic social sciences as providing only nongeneralizable, particularist descriptions that offer no guide to social action. The rise of “comparative-historical sociology” is one manifestation of these critiques. Over the two decades after 1945, an ensemble of new approaches to scientific inquiry (that had actually begun to emerge in the 1930s) was elaborated in opposition, especially, to the reigning positivism and reductionism. In one way or another these new approaches were conceived as appropriate to the study of systems that Warren Weaver (1948) noted exhibited organized complexity, the middle ground between simplicity (the problems of classical physics with few variables, the realm of necessity) and disorganized complexity (problems with many variables amenable to statistical description). These systems had proven particularly resistant to the application of the analytic method, that is, to the development of mathematical models or equations expressing general laws in which all contributing causal factors appeared as variables. The issues involved were addressed by, among others, the elaboration of General System Theory (GST). The domain of GST1 may be specified as those general aspects, correspondences and isomorphisms or rigorous analogies that are common to systems in general. GST cut across disciplinary, cultural, and ideological lines. It tended to negate the nomothetic-idiographic or quantitativequalitative divide and, as Ludwig von Bertalanffy wrote, was “apt to bridge the opposition of C.P. Snow’s ‚Two Cultures‘” (1968: xxiii). In the living world, and the more so in the human world, there were no apparent analogues of the laws of motion. And since positivist and reductionist approaches were as pervasive in the social sciences as in the natural sciences,2 GST seemed to offer new possibilities for describing and un1
In 1954, Ludwig von Bertalanffy formed the Society for General Systems Research with Kenneth Boulding (an economist), Ralph Gerard (a physiologist), and Anatol Rapoport (a mathematical biologist). See Bertalanffy (1968) and George Klir’s fine overview of the field (1991a) and his broad collection of the representative literature (1991b). 2 Although the opposition to reductionism, the idea that “properties of the whole are
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derstanding the irreducible experience of the phenomenal world of social relations. This scientific reorientation called for inquiry into questions of organization and configurational wholes, those “wholes” that had been eschewed as metaphysical by the logical positivists, over the analytic, mechanistic and summative causality of classical science and its primary units of discrete elements or events. At the macro level, von Bertalanffy wrote that history “is borne by entities or great systems, called high cultures or civilizations … each presenting a sort of life cycle” (1968: 200). This of course would included the world of contemporary social relations. He also noted the level of technological development and the planetary extent of “our civilization … which explode the cyclic scheme of history and seem to place our civilization at a different level from previous ones” (1968: 204). One could conclude, then, that “our civilization” would not be amenable to explanation via comparative analysis, but rather would have to be treated as a single and unique system or unit of analysis. The consequences of this perspective in terms of structural form and mode of reproduction prefigure in many ways the world-systems perspective. [O]rganization of biological wholes [and on analogy in the best tradition of GST, social wholes, REL] is built up by differentiation of an original whole which segregates into parts. … Such transition towards higher order presupposes a supply of energy, and energy is delivered continuously into the system only if the latter is an open system. … [P]arts become fixed with regard to a certain action. Therefore, progressive segregation also means progressive mechanization. … Progressive segregation is often connected with progressive centralization, the expression of which is the time-dependent evolution of a leading part (1968: 69-72).
At the macro level of production and distribution and decision-making and coercion, however, the specification of the appropriate unit(s) reexplicable in terms of properties of the constituent elements”, was “one of the main roots from which systems movement sprang” [sic] … now the two doctrines are viewed, by and large, as complementary” and “current systems thinking goes far beyond thinking molded from either reductionism or holism” (Klir 1991a: 24, 30-31). The political context and ramifications of the opposition to the reductionism of (Western) quantitative social science and that inherent in the Marxist base-superstructure model from the 1950s is examined in Lee (2003).
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mained problematic. In the English-speaking world during the quarter century following 1945, a particular style of inquiry, theorized as structural-functionalism and operationalized through quantitative techniques and survey data, defined the parameters of authoritative social research, especially in the nomothetic social sciences, sociology, political science, and economics. From the beginning the focus was on “systems analysis“, but the methodology was inherently comparative, and most often reductively quantitative. This always implied multiple units of analysis and it was nowhere more apparent than in the macro arena, where attempts were being made to explain differential development on a world scale based on modernization theory. Modernization theory joined policy planners (with their eyes on the East-West struggle) with social scientists (absorbed with explaining inequality). With explicit reference to GST, social structures and institutions were conceptualized as performing functions in systems where a “society” was a self-sufficient social system. Nonetheless, “societies” were ultimately associated with the state; time was transmuted into a function of autonomous society/state units simultaneously positioned at different points on a single reputed temporal hierarchy of development (horizontal history); and intentional action modifying social structures was postulated as a primary mechanism of change and “progress.” There was a clear bias against, nay explicit rejection of, the move so suggestive in von Bertalanffy. World-systems analysis brought together an intellectual critique of modernization theory, and the way it concealed rather than revealed the working of the world, with the real-world politics of the antisystemic activities of the movements of the 1960s. Modernization theory failed, empirically, on its own terms: fulfilling the political imperative of institutionalizing liberalism and representative democracy, the cultural imperative of implanting meritocracy and entrepreneurialism, and the economic imperative of scratching together enough capital for economic “take-off“, simply did not produce the results anticipated. The seeds of failure were in the methods of analysis; the units were not autonomous and comparable, but all formed historically and relationally in the drive for endless accumulation of capital within a single system. As von Bertalanffy had suggested, for the world-systems perspective the relevant unit of analysis of long-term, large-scale social change is the
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“historical system“. However, it was argued that historical systems were not amorphous, ill-defined “civilizations“, but constituted a typology of large-scale, long-lasting structures with clear bounding criteria that included world-empires, world-economies, and mini-systems. The modern world-system or capitalist world-economy is such a historical system. Systemic; it possesses continuities in its relational patterns – in other words, its structures remained qualitatively recognizable over the long term. Historical; it has exhibited irreversible change over the long term – in other words, it came into existence at a specific time and place, underwent a spatio-temporal development that rendered it at all times and places different, and ostensibly will eventually cease to exist. Alone among historical social systems, it expanded to cover the entire globe and incorporated all other previously autonomous systems. It was, then, an “open system“. Its expansion to incorporate new pools of low cost labor represented an intake of “energy” in the form of labor-power. The system could thus overcome the entropy of its accumulation processes, capital corresponding to congealed labor. The salient characteristic of this formalization was that the elements of the modern world-system, including the categories through which social scientists, and activists, sought to understand it, were not pre-existing, timeless entities, but historically constituted by the evolution of the system’s relational structure. Over the past quarter century, this conceptualization has provided fruitful ground for a great deal of work developing theoretical strategies and methodological practices that avoid reification and reductionism. When we consider the practical issues of actual research, promulgating and putting into practice methodological practices appropriate to the world-systems framework, it becomes clear that not only our view of the world must undergo a gestalt shift, the ways in which we arrive at our understanding of that world must as well experience a fundamental transformation. It is from this particular perspective that I want to discuss the violent and disconcerting reality of the contemporary world as an example of how the choice of methodological approach constrains our understanding of real-world phenomena. On the morning of Tuesday, 11 September 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City and United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the south tower; American Airlines Flight 77 smashed into the west side of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.; and United Airlines Flight 93 came down in
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Somerset County, Pennsylvania as passengers thwarted hijackers in anther presumed attack. For the first time in history, the Federal Aviation Agency halted all commercial aviation traffic in the United States. The White House was evacuated. New York City bridges and tunnels were closed and trading on the New York City Stock Exchange was suspended. The two World Trade Center Towers and Building 7, along with parts of the Pentagon, collapsed and fires at the World Trade Center continued to burn for a hundred days; the eventual death toll approached three thousand. On the evening of what will come to be known as 9/11, President George W. Bush promised that no distinction would be made between the perpetrators and the governments that harbored them. The next day, he declared the attacks an “act of war“. By the end of the week he had received congressional authorization to use military force and the Senate had granted forty billion dollars in emergency spending. As Bush authorized calling up thirty-five thousand reservists, Continental Airlines laid off twelve thousand employees; U.S. Airways announced eleven thousand lay-offs; and Boeing prepared to lay off thirty thousand. On Friday, 14 September, Secretary of State Colin Powell identified Usama bin Laden as the prime suspect in the attacks. First of all, let us listen to George W. Bush. In his major address before a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September, Bush made clear the official interpretation of the events: “we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom“; “enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country“; “in a single day … night fell on a different world – a world where freedom itself is under attack” (Bush 2001: 2, 5). This was “civilization’s fight … the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom“; “the whole civilized world is rallying to America’s side” (16). He placed the blame squarely on “a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda … [whose] goal is remaking the world” and its leader, Usama bin Laden, along with the Taliban regime of Afghanistan that “by aiding and abetting murder … is committing murder” (5, 6, 8). But now what of this bin Laden? Usama bin Laden, born in 1957 the seventeenth of fifty-one children, grew up as a strict Muslim in Saudi Arabia; was trained as an engineer; and fought, provided recruits, and supplied infrastructure for the mujahedeen in their resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan. The “al-Qaidea” network grew out of a desire to
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document the people who had passed through his “guesthouse” and camps in Afghanistan. In 1996, in a major policy statement, he made clear the motivations and the intentions of the “blessed awakening which is sweeping the world in general and the Islamic world in particular“: “the people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies.” He decried the massacre of Muslims around the world as the world watch and hear, and not only didn’t respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear conspiracy between the USA and its allies and under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves. … The latest and greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet … is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places … by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies (bin Laden in Alexander and Swenam 2001: Appendix 1A: 1-2).
On the one hand, bin Laden indicts the “corrupt” regime of Saudi Arabia for the “deterioration of the economy, inflation, ever increasing debt and jails full of prisoners,” and collusion with the United States (Appendix 1A: 3). On the other hand, the “crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims” (Appendix 1B: 2). Although he declares economic boycotts an effective weapon (to be used particularly by women!), “due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted i.e. using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other word to initiate a guerrilla warfare, were the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it” [sic] (Appendix 1A: 12, 11). Indeed, bin Laden, in addressing the U.S. Secretary of Defense directly, stated that the “sons of the land of the two Holy Places had come out to fight against the Russian in Afghanistan, the Serb in Bosnia Herzegovina and today they are fighting in Chechnya and by the Permission of Allah they have been made victorious over your partner, the Russians” (Appendix 1A: 1314). Here are two competing, mutually exclusive visions of the world. They do, however, seem to agree significantly on two things: the nature of the struggle and the final outcome. For Bush, “the war on terror begins with
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al Qaeda, but it does not end there” and “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen” (Bush 2001: 10, 13). He ended his address on the twentieth of September by stating that the “course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain” (23). In a final prayer, bin Laden exhorts “Our Lord, make the youths of Islam steadfast and descend patience on them and guide their shots” (in Alexander and Swenan 2001: Appendix 1A: 22). Both see this as a long war and as an episodic war. Furthermore, they both predict ultimate victory for their respective forces. Victory means different things, however. For Bush, victory comes in terms of the reproduction of the world substantially unaltered; for bin Laden, victory is clearly couched in terms of the transformation of the world as we know it into an Islamic utopia. But how do we, whose profession it is to make sense of the world, much less we as citizens of the world, go about arriving at some understanding of what, on the face of it, seems an impossibly complex situation already cast in terms of diametrically opposed, mutually exclusive world views? The most common response is to look for parallels, to find “cases” that can be assimilated to a general classification and treated comparatively. This is, indeed, what we find in the post-9/11 literature. For many, the events of 9/11 were most obviously reminiscent of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 – the “day that will live in infamy“. A complete surprise, it was considered an unprovoked, “sneak“, attack on US soil (although tensions between the United States and Japan had been mounting for some time) and determined the entry of the United States on the side of the Allied powers in the Second World War. A second parallel has been suggested in the War of 1812. This was the American front in the wars of Napoleon I. Although what actually caused the outbreak of war were clashes with the British on the western frontier, impressments of sailors and the seizure of U.S. shipping were already causes for strong resentment. A third parallel that has been suggested are the Tripolitan and Algerene Wars. In 1800 the Pasha of Tripoli raised the tribute on Christian Nations and thus on U.S. shipping in the Mediterranean and went so far as to declare war. President Jefferson sent a squadron of warships to North Africa and after a long blockade a peace treaty was signed abolishing the annual tribute for the United States. The United States ended all tribute
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to North African states in 1815 and broke the back of Barbary piracy in in that year. Now as cases for comparison with the present situation, each of these prior phenomena presents similarities, and the consequences of designating such parallels are readily apparent. More precisely, the conclusion that can be drawn from each comparison offers a clear prognostic for the future, both in terms of actions and outcomes. In the case of Pearl Harbor, the United States came out of the war the major victor and in a position of such power that no other coalition of states could challenge her militarily, commercially, or financially. The message is clear: staying the course and bringing overwhelming force to bear, without regard for the cost, will lead to a (new) golden age of Pax Americana and national affluence. Ideologically, this return of the United States to its position of hegemony in the world-system in the immediate post-1945 world not only remains attractive to the political right in the United States, but is, in fact, the stated goal of the Bush administration. Simply asserting the parallel gives the objective a veneer of legitimacy and the actual comparison underwrites the action to be taken and the projected outcome. In the case of the War of 1812, what was at stake was the existence of the United States as a sovereign state and this has been one of the themes of the war on terror. Indeed, the ultimate victory of the United States in the War of 1812 determined a period of nationalistic fervor mixed with isolationism, something that we are already seeing today, where isolationism does not mean pulling back behind national borders, but rather the “go it alone” strategy seeking the maximum of control, including coercive control, over foreign relations. In the case of the wars against the Barbary pirates, it should be remembered that besides the religious or civilizational element, there is a specific mention of such actions in the Constitution and although the United States at this moment does not assert that there exists a state of war, “the legal state of affairs most closely resembles one we experienced at the founding of the Republic“. At the time, pirates and privateers were deemed such a menace that the Constitution gave Congress the “the much narrower power [than declaring war] to ‚define and punish Piracies, Felonies committed on the High Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations‘” (Koh 2001: 158-59). Here the question was whether the United States could project force in a way that would secure the safety of
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American commerce and its citizens. This is a primary concern of many today, from intellectuals and policy analysts to the protagonists of social movements at the global level. The result of meeting the challenge two hundred years ago suggests the rightness of that decision, and thus of the decision to “meet the challenge” in our own time. As simple comparisons, each of these parallels is defensible and presents a certain face validity; however, comparative sociology demands multiple and autonomous cases, which nonetheless belong to a single category of phenomena that may be characterized by the same set of variables. But how do we proceed when our unit of analysis is singular – a single case? Comparisons may not be the most appropriate mode of inquiry for answering questions about the modern world-system.3 Systems analysis suggests that analogies, or rather the kind of rigorous analogies that systems scientists call homologies (for our purposes, the investigation of the articulation of diverse instances to the same processes reproducing the long-term structures of the system) may offer the answer. I would, then, like to see how the outcome of our inquiry might be altered by the shift from comparing these cases to treating them as analogies. In doing this, we recognize at the level of method a conception of the processes reproducing the modern world as playing out through social time: the uniqueness and singularity of the structures, the fluctuations that account for the long-term dynamic equilibrium of those structures, the trends that manifest the changes in the continuously recognizable system, and finally, the events, Fernand Braudel’s “poussière“. From this perspective, Pearl Harbor may be seen as a single event, which took place, however, in the context of a hegemonic war. Thus, the analogy must be with the Thirty-Years War of the seventeenth century that ended with the Hegemony of the Dutch and with the Napoleonic Wars that ended with the hegemony of the British. The thirty-years long war of the twentieth century, of course, ended with the hegemony of the United States. That period of hegemony is over. Thus, this analogy is one that suggests that the struggle is for world leadership, a world leadership that the Americans, unlike the Dutch, are unwilling to give up. There is much to suggest that no matter what the expenditure of treasure and lives, it will be to no avail and that the harder the United States fights for a return to the state of the world in the quarter century following the end of the war in 1945, the worse will be the future, both for the United States in the long term and for the world, at least in the short and
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medium term (see Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996; Wallerstein 2003). The question, of course, is who or what is the challenger for world leadership. This question is the key to understanding the analogy with the War of 1812. By prevailing in this conflict, the United States established its sovereignty within the Interstate System. That organization of mutually recognized (but always partial and fluctuating) territorial autonomy, which structurally, only demands that there be at minimum two state-like entities to avoid the imposition of a world-empire. It assures the reproduction of the world division of labor based on the law of value resulting in exploitation and the polarization of inequalities by regulating flows of capital, goods, and labor across borders and restricting resistance activities to the state rather than the system level. Today that sovereignty is being challenged anew, but not by another state or states as it was two centuries ago, but rather by non-state entities that express a completely different conception of the organization of the legitimate use of force on a world scale; this is a challenge to that very system. The Barbary pirates episode in American history, illustrates what Frederic Lane called “protection rents” (1979: 13) and the way that political and economic processes interact. The two wars were fought for “free trade” and certainly are analogous to the struggles today over the appropriation and accumulation of surplus that the present thirty-year economic contraction has made apparent. All the same, the free trade of two hundred years ago is not the neo-liberalism of today. So far my examples have been one-sided; each of the cases that I have cited is based on comparisons among short-term events with outcomes manifested in the medium-term. This generally includes those who see the present period as paralleling anti-colonial or anti-imperial struggles, with the world experiencing the impact of the “weapons of the weak”. However, in world-systemic terms these are but resistances to the deepening of the structures of domination and exploitation that the expansion of the world-system had extended to the entire globe by the end of the nineteenth century. Those who would sustain that the present period is in some way special in this respect should consider that the expansion of the world-system (and resistance to it) has been one of the processes that not only has defined it but assured its reproduction over the long term by resolving its medium-term crises. Nonetheless, the conditions of neo-imperialism and globalization suggest another long-term element.
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Usama bin Laden (like his adversaries) might well remember that toward the end of the nineteenth century this expansion began to reach its asymptotic limit with no part of the globe left un-incorporated in the axial division of labor. Indeed, for bin Laden whose inspiration is to be found in Wahhabism – “a return to the way of ‚virtuous ancestors,‘ a highly regressive, monolithic interpretation of Islam known as Salafiyya, a doctrinal propensity that for centuries encouraged strict adherence to puritanical principles” (Amanat 2001: 36) – the ideal parallel is a return to the Caliphate and the golden age of Islam on the world stage, prior to the full incorporation of the Islamic world. But what if we were to ask the same questions that Bush and bin Laden are asking about the present situation, but answer them with an analogy that belongs explicitly to the long-term, structural time of the modern world-system? There are good reasons to believe that, with no room for expansion, the internal contradictions of the processes of the modern world-system may no longer allow for the reproduction of the system as a whole (see Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996). The analogy, then, that I would propose for the present would be the long and episodic Hundred Years’ War, the conflict out of which were born the structures of decision making and coercion, production and distribution, and cognition and intentionality that heretofore have been constitutive of our historical system. When Edward III of England made claims on lands on the mainland of Europe and assumed the title of “King of France” in the second quarter of the fourteenth century he did so asserting his feudal rights. At the time England and France were not what we would call “states” today, but realms or royaumes. A century later, the English had achieved little (the government was bankrupt, the Lancastrian dynasty discredited, and civil war was on the horizon). For France, the outcome was very different. They were the big winners, but the system for which they fought, feudalism based on parcelized sovereignty and reciprocal rights and obligations, was moribund. The cost of winning was the death of the object. The emergence of a new geo-political form laid the groundwork for the Interstate System organized as a relational system (with England and France as its founding parts) that would be formalized by Jean Bodin and institutionalized in the Treaty of Westphalia. So George W. Bush may be right in the sense that he will “win“, but winning viewed from a long-term perspective could lead to the transfor-
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mation of the system that he believes he is trying to protect – much the way France “won” the Hundred Years’ War. So, he is probably dead wrong, however, in thinking that he can reestablish U.S. hegemony in the world-system. Usama bin Laden may also be right, but in the sense that even though his struggle certainly will not succeed – indeed, as Gilles Kepel (2003) has argued, militant, fundamentalist Islamism is actually in decline – it may very well lead to, or at least be part of, the transformation of the world as we know it, although probably not in the direction he would desire. The events of 9/11, then, are like the Khobar Towers bombing of 1996, the Kenya and Tanzania embassies bombings in 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and the aftermath links it to the events such as the bombings, hijackings, and hostage crises of the 1970s and 1980s and reprisals such as the attack on Muammar el-Qaddafi’s compound in 1986. Indeed, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq – and 9/11 – are specs of Braudelian dust, but they are analogous to the Battle of Crecy and the Jacquerie. Together, they are suggestive of the way analogies among instances of processes may tell a very different story from comparisons of cases.
Works Cited Amanat, Abbas. 2001. “Empowered through Violence: The Reinventing of Islamic Extremism.” In The Age of Terror: America and the World after September 11. Edited by Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda. New York: Basic Books, 23-52. Alexander, Yonah and Michael S. Swenam. 2001. Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network. Ardsley NY: Transnational Publishers. Bertalanffy, Ludwig von. 1968. General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications. Revised Edition. New York: George Braziller. Bush, George W. 2001. Our Mission and Our Moment: President George W. Bush’s Address to the Nation Before a Joint Session of Congress September 20, 2001. New York: Newmarket Press. Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Thomas D. Hall. 1997. Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems. Boulder, CO: Westview. Durkheim, Emile. 1982[1895]. The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method. New York: Free Press. Hopkins, Terence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein, cords. 1996. The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World-System, 1945-2025. London: Zed. Kepel, Gilles. 2003. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge: Belknap.
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Klir, George J. 1991a. “Systems Science: A Guided Tour.” In Facets of Systems Science. Edited by George J. Klir. New York: Plenum Press, 1-205. – , ed. 1991b. Facets of Systems Science. New York: Plenum Press. Koh, Harold Hongju. 2001. “Preserving American Values: The Challenge at Home and Abroad.” In The Age of Terror: America and the World after September 11. Edited by Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda. New York: Basic Books, 143-69. Lane, Frederic C. 1979. Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises. Albany: State University of New York Press. Lee, Richard E. 2003. Life and Times of Cultural Studies: The Politics and Transformation of the Structures of Knowledge. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. McMichael, Philip. 1990. “Incorporating Comparison within a World-Historical Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method.” American Sociological Review 55, 3: 385-97. Ragin, Charles and David Zaret. 1983. “Theory and Method in Comparative Research: Two Strategies.” Social Forces 61, 3: 731-54. Tomich, Dale. 1994. “Small Islands and Huge Comparisons: Caribbean Plantations, Historical Unevenness, and Capitalist Modernity.” Social Science History 18, 3: 339-58. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2003. The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World. New York: New Press.
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Path-Dependency, Stocks, Switching-Points, Flows: Reflections on Long-term Global Change and Local Opportunities Denis O’Hearn
Abstract This paper examines the possibilities for peripheral localities to achieve upward mobility in the world-system by “hooking on” to larger processes of world-system accumulation. In particular, is it possible for economies that are dependent on foreign investment to receive a flow of investments that is high enough to overcome the negative impacts of a high stock of foreign investment, thus enabling them to cross a threshold and achieve upward mobility in the world-system? An analysis of the recent experience of the southern Irish “Celtic Tiger” economy during 1990-2000 indicates that such an upward movement is possible on the basis of massive foreign investment inflows. On closer examination, however, the Irish-type model appears to be highly deficient, because a high proportion of growth is illusionary and also on grounds of social desirability and lack of generalizability.
In this paper I combine two important debates in the development literature to explore the relationship between systemic and local economic change. Specifically, I examine the possibilities for peripheral localities to achieve upward mobility in the world-system. One debate concerns the nature of long-term historical change and, particularly, the impact of hegemonic-centered accumulation cycles on local developmental possibilities. The other is about the impact of foreign investments, flows and stocks, on local development. The two are obviously related. Direct investments are a key mechanism by which hegemons and hegemonic contenders attempt to transform local economies to support their global strategies. But are there conditions whereby localities can exploit investment flows to achieve developmental goals or, more specifically, to attain upward mobility within the world system. And, if it is possible for a small region/country to “hook on” to larger processes of accumulation in this way, are the results desirable or generalizable?
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I will analyze these questions using the recent example of southern Ireland. This is an important topic for development theory but also in practice. Orthodox experts have used the recent Irish example to convince countries like Poland that accession to the EU will inevitably lead to economic convergence with the European core. Beyond Europe, they have used the Irish example to revive the modernizationist promise of development by invitation.
Systemic Processes and Local Possibilities The broad world-systems approach has done pretty well at generating models to explain long-term patterns of development and peripheralization. In particular, there are compelling accounts of the logic of recurrent cycles of accumulation with respect to trade in commodities (Wallerstein 1984), strategies for controlling the extraction and movement of raw materials (Bunker and Ciccantell forthcoming), and high finance and the application of key technologies (Arrighi 1994; Frank 1998). Not only does the establishment of advantages in these areas by hegemonic contenders shape the developmental processes within the cycle. In addition, the way in which advantages are established – what raw materials are used and from where, which technologies are employed, and which regions are incorporated and reincorporated into specific roles within global commodity chains – can determine the (under)developmental trajectories of peripheral and semi-peripheral regions. Long-term historical analysis indicates that this relationship between development and underdevelopment happens in patterned although not fully determinate ways. Big external forces limit and imperfectly determine courses of change in localities. The structuration and reproduction of a global hierarchy involves alliance, co-optation and compromise with, and the exercise of power over local states, classes and other groups. It involves imperfect plans and actions, including failures, which explain observed variance from the central tendencies of global hierarchy and exploitation of peripheries by core institutions. Each local social or economic structure has its own peculiar characteristics. This is not a world of perfect imperialist control but one where some imperialists are effective enough to dominate regions, exploit people, and compete with other
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imperialists. Local forces resist and collaborate, creating many of the contingencies that plague attempts to elaborate general theories of economic change. Histories create path dependencies, place barriers, provide favorable conjunctures and opportunities, and sow seeds of destruction in powerful industrial regions and poor agrarian regions. Remarkable people in remarkable institutions strive to transcend the limitations of history. Sometimes they exploit what history provides in remarkable ways; other times (perhaps most times) they fail. Thus, local specificity and historical contingency matter and strikingly different processes occur in different regions and at different times despite the designs of core industrial powers or the hypothesized regularities of the global system. This contingency has been the subject of some debate within the literature. McMichael (1990) approaches the matter of contingency in his critique of encompassing comparisons of historical development. He criticizes world-systems approaches that utilize functionalist analyses of processes such as incorporation, that is, they happen because core regions need to establish control over regions in order to accumulate and expand the world-system. This is an inferior method of historical comparison, argues McMichael, because it predetermines economic outcomes in specific regions by the nature of the whole system and, especially, its need to establish a world-wide division of labor. A superior method is the incorporating comparison, which progressively constructs the whole system through comparative analysis of its spatial or temporal “parts” that form and reform across time and space. This method does not deny system, structure, or recognizable patterns of change but it insists that causal regularities cannot be assumed but must be uncovered by comparing varying or convergent outcomes. Some incorporating comparisons are made at a specific historical juncture, such as the historical dialectic whereby different social relations, such as wage labor and slave relations, are combined and redefined to form something new and possibly even unpredictable. Others compare instances of an evolving process across time. Inter-temporal comparisons may reveal systemic processes and regularities, and even directions of change. Arrighi’s (1994) analysis of systemic cycles of accumulation, begins with broad world-systemic assumptions about the nature of economic and hegemonic cycles but, with the aid of secondary historical analysis, re-examines each cycle in detail to uncover what is particular about each successive hegemonic regime and what is regular across cycles. Likewise, Bunker and Ciccantell (forthcom-
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ing) compares cycles of accumulation with respect to their characteristic relations of material extraction and transport. A similar debate about the nature of long-term patterned change is found in the literature on path dependency. Economic historians have shown how historical economic change is shaped and limited through path dependent mechanisms that, once introduced, “lock in” given trajectories of economic change. Often, these mechanisms are set in train by the introduction of something – a technology, policy, or social relation – that is one of several contingencies at a critical historical juncture, or turning point. The initial change may have been imposed, chosen because of short-term considerations, or even introduced through chance, yet it can have significant long-term consequences that are often inefficient or disadvantageous. What is important is that a change, once made, has cumulative causality: changes in one period affect and limit what happens in subsequent periods. Mainstream economists who discuss path dependency usually focus on a limited set of circumstances where a discrete technological “choice” at one period affects subsequent technologies. Under certain conditions, such as increasing returns to scale, an inefficient technology or producer can dominate a market, an early entrant can remain dominant or a suboptimal pattern of industrial location can be locked in by decisions taken in early history of settlement (Arthur 1988). Exit from a sub-optimal path is not possible by individual actions but requires a “big push” by a central authority or state, which co-ordinates actions by many individuals until they achieve exit into a new, more productive equilibrium path (Rosenstein-Rodin 1943). Self-reinforcing processes are also common to critical theories of economic change. Dependency and world-system approaches, for example, concentrate on how core powers impose structural relationships that “lock in” vast regions to peripheral locations within global divisions of labor. Although their specific forms of production and associated technologies may change over time, these regions remain identifiably peripheral or semi-peripheral. Whether or under what conditions peripheral states may exit to a more advantageous position through policy choice is a key debate within the study of economic change. In a similar vein to McMichael’s critique of historical comparison, Haydu introduces contingency and local agency to the more sterile concepts of path dependency, by moving beyond simple path dependency to
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reiterative problem solving. “Continuities across temporal cases”, he claims, “can be traced in part to enduring problems, while more or less contingent solutions to these problems are seen as reflecting and regenerating the historical individuality of each period” (1998: 354). Rather than focusing on how an initial change determines a cumulative subsequent trajectory, this brings choice and variability back to each critical juncture. One must explain why one solution is chosen instead of another and how this solution sets a new historical direction and limits future choices. Outcomes at a given “switch point” are thus products of the past rather than historical “accidents”, the preferred term of path dependency. Solutions embody contradictions, create further crises, and also give tools with which to confront future crises. Solutions at one time may close off future options, but they also shape future switch points and can even create new possible solutions in future periods. How does this relate to the debate about investment penetration? The possibility of “switching points” raises the further problem of what kinds of strategies may enable a peripheralized locality to achieve certain developmental results at an opportune time. Certain strategies may be historically identified for localities that have already achieved core status. But orthodox theories like modernisation theories and more recent theories of post-imperialism specifically propose that transnational investments, or development by invitation, is an effective strategy for upward mobility, regardless of the historical trajectories of past entrants to the core. The debate about the effects of foreign investment penetration has concentrated on the distinctions between stocks and flows. Put simply, incoming flows of investments (most recently we are speaking about direct investments by transnational corporations, or TNCs, although there are historical precedents) have an undeniable positive effect on local growth. By definition, they must induce new economic activities, first through the building of plant and then through the subsequent production process. TNC investment flows have both direct growth effects (the output of the project itself ) and indirect (multiplier) effects (the linkages and indirect supporting output it induces). There is little debate about this. The capital dependency approach, however, asserts that flows contribute to a stock of foreign investment penetration that retards economic growth, sometimes through direct plunder but more often through other mechanisms like profit repatriations or squeezing out domestic industry.
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As a flow of investments turns into a stock over time, TNCs implement strategies in localities that weaken the abilities of local agents to induce growth and indigenous development. Many empirical studies have found a negative association between foreign investment-penetration and economic growth (see Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978; Dixon and Boswell 1996). Firebaugh (1992) challenged these empirical findings, arguing that observed negative relationships between foreign penetration and economic growth were artefacts of incorrect measurement of foreign investment flows and capital stocks.1 He agreed, however, that domestic investments tend to induce much more economic growth than foreign investments, possibly because they induced more linkages, spin-offs, and local reinvestments. Dixon and Boswell (1996) respecified Firebaugh’s measure of capital penetration and, like earlier dependency studies, found that foreign penetration depresses economic growth. They explain their findings in terms of externalities. While stocks of foreign investments are not harmful of themselves, TNCs induce structural changes in domestic economies that harm economic growth. For example, TNCs prefer freer trade where 1
More specifically, the effects of flows and stocks of foreign investments have generally been estimated by applying multiple regression analysis to a cross-section of countries for a given time period, where foreign investment flows are defined as investments over a given period (say, five years) while stocks are defined as the accumulated capital held in foreign hands at the beginning of the period. Defined thus, foreign investment flows and capital stocks are simply the numerator and denominator, respectively, of the foreign investment rate, which is positively associated with economic growth. When the effect (coefficient) of capital stock on economic growth is estimated by multiple regression, the effect of investment flows (the other regressor) is held constant. Thus, with the numerator of the investment rate held constant, a falling foreign capital stock by definition implies a rising investment rate, which is in turn associated positively with economic growth. The negative relationship between foreign capital stock and economic growth, therefore, is a denominator effect produced by the fact that such a stock is the denominator of a ratio that has a strong positive effect on growth. Firebaugh’s argument that the negative relationship between capital stocks and economic growth is simply a denominator effect is demonstrated most powerfully by introducing domestic investment rates and stocks into the multiple regression. As with the foreign capital stocks, he finds a negative relationship between domestic capital stocks and economic growth. Unless we recognise the problem of misspecification, we are left with the absurd conclusion that both foreign and domestic capital stocks hinder economic growth.
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they invest, causing import penetration that threatens the viability of local firms. Dixon and Boswell cite O’Hearn (1989), who shows that the economic growth generated by TNC investments in Ireland between 1955 and 1987 was accompanied by greater free-trade-induced losses in the domestic economy. Foreign penetrations also increase the disarticulation of economies and depress levels of domestic investment. Despite remaining disputes, then, the debate about stocks and flows of TNC investment has shown almost decisively that over time TNCs restrain growth in host countries below their optimal levels if other indigenous paths were followed. But are indigenous paths available to peripheralized regions? Clearly, world-system power relations reduce their availability. If indigenous strategies are unavailable, or if they will be strongly resisted and punished by the core, localities may find development by invitation more attractive (and certain class fractions within localities will certainly find them more attractive). But if our assumptions about stocks of TNC investments are correct, this is likely to be a limited strategy, and the distortions and negative externalities created by TNCs will become a major blockage to local development. In other words, TNC penetration (stocks) are a major path-dependent mechanism whereby localities are “locked in” to a given position within the world-system. On the other hand, what I want to examine here is whether a sufficient flow of foreign direct investment can act as a “switching point” to move a local economy onto a new economic trajectory and enable it to achieve upward mobility within the world-system. Let us for the moment leave aside the debate about TNC investment stocks. They have negative consequences on local growth (Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978; Dixon and Boswell 1996) or they are inferior to indigenous means of achieving economic growth (Firebaugh 1992). Either way, they may be connected to path-dependent processes that limit local economic change. Instead, let us ask whether there are historical junctures where the flows of TNC investments can be great enough to move a local economy onto a new economic growth path. Can a sufficiently high investment flow, in Schumpeter’s terms, enable the local economy to shift outward its productions possibilities frontier so that it achieves upward mobility, say, from semi-peripheral to core status within the world-system. In such a case, can the new outward-shifted production frontier be “locked in” so that the local economy is more or
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less insulated from the inevitable stock effects of the new, higher level of TNC penetration of its economy. If so, we can speak of some kind of threshold effect of TNC investment flows, beyond which a temporary flow permanently transforms an economy? To explore this possibility I want to briefly review historical cases of upward mobility from the literature and then to introduce the case of the Celtic tiger, the southern Irish economy, which experienced a quite stunning economic boom in the short period from about 1994 to 2000. This boom, I argue, is precisely caused by a rapid and sustained flow of inward TNC investments, which dominated any negative effects caused by the stock of previous and incoming TNC investments.
Historical Core Entrants and the Irish Example From a critical perspective, there are two seemingly regular “laws” of movement within the world-system hierarchy. First, upward mobility between the three main zones of the system – core, semiperiphery and periphery – is rare (Arrighi and Drangel 1986), although movement into the semiperiphery may be more common than into the core (Wallerstein 1979). Second, in those cases where core status has been attained, it has generally been achieved when a region has been able to avoid or overcome the negative effects of world-system peripheralization, usually with the aid of an effective developmental state.2 According to Innis’s staple growth theory, Canada (and New Zealand and Australia) achieved core status by exploiting a sequential series of resource-export regimes, for which there was significant demand and undersupply in the world market (Innis 1956). Upward mobility by the United States has been explained by various internal factors, including its pattern of resource availability in space and by its ability to capture economies of scale and space in their extraction and transport (Bunker forthcoming). Perhaps more to the point of this paper, small states in Western Europe achieved upward mobility in the late 1800s despite the fact that pathdependent mechanisms meant that divisions of labor established at the 2 I will not discuss movements from periphery to semiperiphery in this paper, although Wallerstein’s (1979, 1980) distinction between “seizing the chance” and “promotion by invitation” raises the question of limited upward mobility into the semiperiphery through mechanisms such as TNC investments.
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end of the Middle Ages continued to determine their development paths. According to Senghaas (1985), they went through critical turning points where policy choices determined whether they would achieve “autocentric” industrial development or revert into peripheralization. Small European countries, having been compelled to turn toward the world market, realized the gap that had opened up between them and the industrialized European core after the industrial revolution. Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Romania responded by continuing to adapt to an externally-imposed division of labor. They remained peripheral. But the Scandinavian countries broke out of underdevelopment by inducing a broad-based agricultural revolution and spreading the gains from agricultural productivity to raise the average incomes of all sectors. By expanding and protecting the domestic market, they created demand for new domestic industrial products, especially the specialized processing of local agricultural produce. From such beginnings, they built up an industrial base and moved into export markets and eventually to free trade only after they had gone a substantial way toward equalizing their development levels with the already industrialized countries. The development of linkages between economic sectors was key to the process. In countries like Ireland and Spain productivity gains were sectorally limited and dualistic structures impeded the opening up of the domestic market. Growth remained exogenously determined and dependent. But the Scandinavian countries switched from exports of staples to processing and exporting finished and semi-finished manufactures. As a result, they developed linked indigenous economies and then graduated to export-orientation, which enabled such small countries to transcend the limits of their local markets. None of them achieved upward mobility in the context of an open economy and high dependence on foreign investment penetration. Ireland appears to have been different. It missed out on the upward movement to the core achieved by the small northern European states, primarily because of the economic restrictions imposed by Britain. The 1801 Act of Union insured deindustrialization and reperipheralization of its economy, including a transformation from cotton manufactures to pasture-based extensive agriculture that was helped along considerably by famine (O’Hearn 2001a; Crotty 2001). In the twentieth century, its attempt to achieve indigenous protected industrialization after 1931 – a strategy that, arguably, enabled its upward mobility into the semiperi-
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phery – was cut short both by an underdeveloped and incompetent state and, then, by its reperipheralization under U.S. control after the Second World War. Under intense pressure from the U.S. State Department after 1946 and in severe recession in the 1950s, the Irish economy transformed overnight from extreme protection to extreme openness. It rapidly became dependent on TNC investments, primarily from electronics and chemical firms in the United States. Its dependency on these investments became particularly acute after Ireland’s accession to the European Union in 1973, when it became a main point of entry for the products of U.S. TNCs that sought access to the emerging EU market. Despite its membership of the EU, a core regional association, Ireland until the 1990s appeared to be stuck in a semi-peripheral position that provided little prospect of upward mobility and almost certain stagnation and economic degradation. In gross economic terms, it was stuck at per capita income levels that cycled between 50 and 60 percent of the EU average. In good years, TNCs provided sufficient investments to enable the country to maintain a moderate economic growth rate and to maintain unemployment rates at 5-10 percent, as long as enough people emigrated so that even this low growth rate was not put under pressure. In bad times, as in the mid-1980s, the economy experienced negative real growth rates and the unemployment rate rose to 20 percent, despite rising emigration (O’Hearn 1998: 50, 67). Against all expectation, this seeming historical stagnation changed practically overnight. During six short years between 1994 and 2000 Irish economic growth rates (real GDP) rose to 5.8 percent and remained at least as high until the end of the decade, sometimes exceeding ten percent. Per capita national income, which had been barely 60 percent of the EU average in 1988, reached the EU average in 1997. Today, less than a decade after the term “Celtic tiger” was coined, Irish per capita GDP (in purchasing power standards) is more than 20 percent above the EU average and the country is considered to be the richest in the EU except Luxembourg (Eurostat 2003). This amazing story of rapid enrichment is almost entirely the result of an unprecedented level of TNC investment flows. During the decade of the 1990s, TNC investment flows nearly tripled. The first wave of investments came after 1991 as most of the major computer-related companies in the United States followed Intel into Ireland to access the European market, made even more attractive by unification in 1992. A further wave
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was from U.S. pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer, whose introduction of one Irish-produced product, Viagra, led in 1996/97 to a 70 percent rise in “Irish” output of organic chemicals without adding a single new worker. As critical theorists might predict, these foreign investment flows squeezed out local investments, which fell by about a third. This process was reinforced as TNCs dominated their share of corporate profits in Ireland and indigenous profits actually fell during the 1990s. Thus, we have the seeming paradox that Ireland’s economic growth was historically rapid, not just by national but by world standards, while its indigenous sector was actually contracting. In 1990, the indigenous share of fixed investments in manufacturing was more than 40 percent. By the end of the decade, it was below 15 percent – 85 percent of investment flows in Irish manufacturing were by TNCs and 85 percent of those were U.S. TNCs (data supplied to the author by the Irish Central Statistics Office). The only viable conclusion is that the new flow of foreign investments was so rapid that it actually moved the “Irish” production function and per capita incomes significantly upward. The inflow of TNC investments was rapid and sustained enough to counteract any negative externalities that they had on indigenous sectors (the exact connection between the investment inflow and falling indigenous investment is not examined here). While the stock of foreign investment as a proportion of GDP was about 10 percent in 1990, roughly equivalent to the EU and world averages, it rose to about 50 percent in 2000, four to five times the world average. As a result of this massive flow of foreign investments, along with other indicators of openness, sources like Foreign Policy magazine have for some years found Ireland to be the world’s most globalized economy, far ahead even of Singapore and Switzerland (Foreign Policy 2003). TNCs directly accounted for most of the economic growth that Ireland experienced, and indirectly caused much more in construction and services. Between 1995 and 1999 TNCs directly accounted for 85 percent of economic growth in terms of value added. Their rising profits alone accounted for 53 percent of economic growth! The effect of TNCs on economic growth was concentrated in exports of three manufacturing sectors that are dominated by US firms: chemicals, computers, and electrical engineering. These three sectors alone (not including software-related services and teleservices) accounted for 40 per cent of Irish GDP
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growth during the 1990s and more than half in recent years. They were the only economic sectors that exceeded the average GDP growth rate of 6.3 percent during the 1990s, together growing annually by about 15 percent. The recent southern Irish experience, while possibly unique in recent world history, appears to indicate that it is indeed possible to reach a threshold where the flow of TNC investments is so great that they swamp the negative stock effects of such investment, enabling the country to achieve rapid upward mobility into the core of the world-system.
Limitations of the Irish Example Having set out the case that there is a threshold beyond which TNC investment flows can create long-term upward mobility for a locality, I will now argue why we should not take this conclusion too seriously and why this experience should not be considered an appropriate model for other localities. This is because: the Irish experience is partly an illusion, it is not sustainable, it is due to highly specific circumstances that are impossible to replicate, and it is socially undesirable. It is partly an illusion. Ireland’s economic convergence with and exceeding of EU income levels is based on Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), which can overstate income levels in countries whose economic growth is dominated by certain kinds of exports. An even bigger illusion is caused directly by TNC-domination of the economy. Ireland is unique in the EU and rare in the world in the degree to which gross national product (GNP) diverges from gross domestic product (GDP), which is the preferred measure of comparative income levels and comparative economic growth. The difference between the two measures is dominated by repatriated TNC profits, which are included in GDP but not in GNP. GNP is thus a more accurate measure of the well-being of a country, as it measures what is produced in and remains in a country. In Ireland’s case, the difference is huge. TNC profits rose as a proportion of total corporate profits in Ireland from 48 percent in 1990 to 89 percent in 2001. They are so great that in 2002 Irish GDP was 24 percent higher than GNP. Thus, even before inequality is taken into account, Irish per capita incomes are overstated because of TNCs by a quarter. On this account alone, the true Irish income level, rather than being above the EU average is actually below it. To drive the point home, in 2002
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Ireland was the fastest-growing economy in the EU: its GDP grew by 6.1 percent. In the same year, Ireland was also the slowest growing economy in the EU: GNP grew by only 0.1 percent. Despite the recent history of Irish economic growth, its average living standards, wage rates, levels of technology and even its physical infrastructure are all still well below the EU average. It remains dependent on TNC investments as a source of economic growth and, as such, is structurally still a semiperipheral region even if its current level of national income is quite high even by European core standards. It may not be sustainable. The world-system is replete with historical and contemporary examples of boom economies. There are always social scientists who jump at a case at a specific historical moment and argue that its boom disproves certain supposed hypotheses of critical development approaches. In time, most of these booms end, local economies are again degraded, and the supposed exception returns to the fold of the experiences of historical underdevelopment. Resource-based boom economies of the late twentieth century led some analysts, for example, to theorize “post-imperialism”. In his study of Peru, Becker even argued that “bonanza development … is a viable model” precisely because of the interdependence of interests of TNCs and localities (Becker et al. 1987: 64). The subsequent experience of those resource-dependent countries and regions showed in a very short time, once again, that imperialism is alive and well, hardly “post-” and probably healthier than ever. Likewise, the Irish boom may turn round and the Irish economy may experience severe degradation. Extreme dependence on U.S. investments raises new concerns about the sustainability of economic growth. A repeat of US disinvestments as happened in the 1980s could create another, possibly even deeper, period of recession and decline. Largescale cutbacks in TNCs in Ireland already began in 2001 and the computer sector experienced negative growth. A sustained downturn in such growth sectors could cause severe income contraction. Of course, this may not happen. Most economists are optimistic that the southern Irish economy is in for a “soft landing” on the basis that local service sectors will replace TNCs as the engine of growth (Bergin et al. 2003: 82; also Barry and Bradley 1997 and Krugman 1997). Yet it is difficult to understand where these services will originate when, to date, growth has been so overwhelmingly dependent on a flow of foreign investment.
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It cannot be replicated. Even if the Irish experience is real and sustainable, it is due to unique conditions. Countries on the EU periphery and further afield look to Ireland as a model of successful development. Yet southern Ireland “succeeded” because it attracted 40 percent of U.S. high tech sector investments into the EU, with just 1 percent of the EU population. Next door, Britain attracted 40 percent of total foreign investments into the EU but with twenty times as many people. It hardly became a “tiger” for doing it. The same limitations of the TNC-led model hold for all but the smallest countries or regions. It is not even desirable. Many people have begun to question whether the TNC-led form of economic growth in Ireland is socially desirable. It has caused an extreme rise of inequality, as the profit share of nonagricultural incomes rose from its usual level of 30 percent (up to the mid-1990s) to more than 50 percent today. Even apart from the TNCs, which have pocketed the vast proportion of wealth generated under the Celtic tiger (after all, that is its raison d’etre), the other main recipient of the wealth created by economic growth, to a much greater extent than elsewhere in the core, has been professionals. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the Celtic tiger is the complete lack of connection between economic growth and the state’s ability to service the population. Here, Dixon and Boswell’s (1996) hypothesis that TNC investments create external diseconomies is most apt. In order to attract TNC investments, the Irish state had to not only institute the most neoliberal tax retime in Europe, where corporations are practically exempt from taxation, it also has followed a strictly neoliberal strategy down the line of social policies. Thus, the fiscal resources that were created by growth were not invested in better services for the people but instead were used to finance tax reductions that heavily favored the rich. Between 1998 and 2001 the top 50 percent of income earners received about 8 percent more income because of budgetary changes while the bottom 30 percent gained less than 2 percent and the lowest decile actually lost income. I could go on and on about other indicators of degradation of Irish people and Irish life under the recent growth regime, but this clarifies the picture. As a result of growth and the policies that have been associated with growth, the south of Ireland is now the second most unequal country in the OECD, with the second highest poverty rate. At the end of the millennium it had the lowest per capita expenditure in Europe on pri-
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mary education, one of the highest rates of adult illiteracy in the OECD, a severely ailing health programme and the worst physical infrastructure in the EU (O’Hearn 2001b).
Toward a more Meaningful Development Concept This paper has admittedly used a strange logic. After introducing the possibility of contingency as an opportunity for localities within the world-system I used the recent Irish example to show that one of the tenets of modernization theories is at least possible. An adequately large flow of foreign investments into a country can create wealth to such an extent that the country achieves rapid upward mobility in the worldsystem. There may be “switching points” whereby a locality can use a strategy of development by invitation to break out of its historically-defined and path-dependent position in the world-system hierarchy and division of labor. Yet in the Irish case the results of such a strategy were highly questionable on grounds of sustainability and desirability, and completely absurd on the question of generalizability. The recent Irish experience is no appropriate model for any locality that is seeking to develop within the context of the world-system. At a general level, this example shows the weaknesses of conceptualizing development strictly in growth terms. Even critical approaches, while eschewing capitalist models of development, often slip into growthbased analyses and evaluations of local developmental experiences. Obviously, “development” entails other outcomes than growth, regarding not just distribution and quality of life for the masses of a population but also cultural issues such as the escape from the humiliation of colonial histories and, in the process, the reinforcement of human dignity. While such alternative visions of development are beyond the subject of this paper, one implication of the limitations of income-based strategies is, once again, that we need to be looking in places other than simple economic growth for our models of social and economic change.
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Works Cited Arrighi, G. 1994. The Long Twentieth Century. London: Verso. Arrighi, G. and J. Drangel. 1986. “Stratification of the World-Economy: An Explanation of the Semiperipheral Zone.” Review 10, 1: 9-74. Arthur, W.B. 1988. “Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics.” In The Economy as a Complex Evolving System. Edited by P. Anderson, K. Arrow, and D. Pines. Santa Fe: Santa Fe Institute. Barry, F. and J. Bradley. 1997. “FDI and Trade: The Irish Host-Country Experience.” Economic Journal 107, 445: 1798-1811. Becker, D., J. Frieden, S. Schartz, and R. Sklar. 1987. Postimperialism: International Capitalism and Development in the Late Twentieth Century. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner. Bergin, A., D. Duffy, J. Fitzgerald, and J. Cullen. 2003. Medium Term Review 2003-2010. Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute. Bornschier, V., C. Chase-Dunn, and R. Rubinson. 1978. “Cross-National Evidence of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Survey of Findings and a Reanalysis.” American Journal of Sociology 84, 3: 651-83. Bunker, S. and P. Ciccantell. Forthcoming. From Amsterdam to Amazonia: A Sociological Inquiry into how Matter, Space and Technology Shape Globalization. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. Crotty, R. 2001. When Histories Collide: The Development and Impact of Individualistic Capitalism. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira. Dixon, W. J. and T. Boswell. 1996. “Dependency, Disarticulation, and Denominator Effects: Another Look at Foreign Capital Penetration.” American Journal of Sociology 102, 2: 543-62. Eurostat. 2003. “Eurozone and EU15 GDP up by 0.1%.” http://www.wuropa. eu.int/comm/eurostat/Public/datashop/print-product/EN?catalogue= Eurostat&product=2-10072003-EN-AP-EN8mode. Firebaugh, G. 1992. “Growth Effects of Foreign and Domestic Investment.” American Journal of Sociology 98, 1: 105-30. Foreign Policy. 2003. “Measuring Globalization: Who’s Up, Who’s Down?” Foreign Policy January-February: 60-72. Frank, A. 1998. ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University of California Press. Haydu, J. 1998. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving.” American Journal of Sociology 104, 2: 33971. Innis, Harold A. 1956. Problems in Canadian Economic History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Krugman, P. 1997. “Good News from Ireland: A Geographical Perspective.” In International Perspectives on the Irish Economy. Edited by Alan Gray. Dublin: Indecon.
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McMichael, P. 1990. “Incorporating Comparisons within a World-Historical Perspective.” American Sociological Review 55: 385-397. O’Hearn, D. 1989. “The Irish Case of Dependency: An Exception to the Exceptions?” American Sociological Review 54, 4: 578-96. —. 1998. Inside the Celtic Tiger: The Irish Economy and the Asian Model. London: Pluto. —. 2001a. The Atlantic Economy: Britain, the U.S. and Ireland. Manchester: Manchester University Press. —. 2001b. “Economic Growth and Social Cohesion in Ireland.” In Economic Growth and Social Cohesion in Europe Edited by Michael Dauderstadt. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Rosenstein-Rodin, P. N. 1943. “Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.” Economic Journal 55: 202-11. Senghaas, D. 1985. The European Experience. Leamington Spa: Berg. Wallerstein, I. 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. —. 1980. Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750. New York: Academic Press. —. 1984. The Politics of the Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Atlantic History and World Economy: Concepts and Constructions Dale Tomich
Abstract This article presents a unified, multidimensional, and relational approach to Atlantic history by treating the Atlantic as a historical region of the capitalist world economy. In contrast to more conventional comparative approaches, the approach presented here grounds Atlantic history in the longue durée geographical historical structure of the maritime Atlantic and construes particular political, economic, social, or cultural units as parts of the more encompassing Atlantic and world economies. Within this framework, particular units or relations are viewed as complex historical outcomes of relations and processes operating across diverse spatial and temporal scales. Thus each unit is related to the others, and each occupies a distinctive location in the maritime Atlantic division of labor. Through an example of plantation slavery, the article examines the ways in which specific units are formed within the larger historical field and examines the variation among them. By calling attention to the relations among units over time and in space within a unified historical field, it identifies specific conjunctures and contingencies shaping Atlantic history.
In the last several decades the Atlantic has emerged as the focal point of innovative work in transnational history. For many scholars, an Atlantic perspective or Atlantic history offers a promising and productive horizon of research. Yet, for all the promise of Atlantic history, great uncertainty remains about what the Atlantic is and how to study it. Scholars of the Atlantic have paid too little attention to the problems of theory and method attendant upon the Atlantic as a perspective for historical inquiry. Too often, Atlantic history is written as if the objects of its inquiry were already given political, social or cultural units. Thus, the boundaries of empire are taken to constitute distinctive British, French, Spanish, or Portuguese Atlantics. These empires are themselves regarded as comprised of metropolises and colonies. Whether the concern is with relations between empires or within them, such units are treated as closed,
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coherent, and internally unified entities and other such units are regarded as external to them. Exploration, diplomacy, war, trade, migration, colonization, and state policy are regarded as the forms of interaction through which such ostensibly autonomous entities are brought into relation with one another (Hopkins 1982b: 146-52). Thus, the Atlantic is seen as a composite of autonomous units, whether empires, colonial territories, or nations rather than as an integral historical space. The theoretical and methodological premise of internality and externality guides strategies of interpretation, analysis, and comparison. Such frameworks treat the Atlantic by extending conventional approaches that were formulated to study national histories. Conventional conceptions of state formation are extended to include empire, of class to include migration, and so forth. Such studies emphasize the agency (of individuals, groups, or states) that constitutes an Atlantic space – for instance, voyages, routes, colonization, migration. They focus on the movement from stable Old World centers (Europe and Africa) to fluid New World peripheries (the Americas), and on the comparison of conditions in Old and New within the already constituted analytical units or between units. (Of course, such approaches may also be applied to social and cultural units rather than to political units, hence a Yoruba or Bantu Atlantic may be constructed through quite similar procedures.) The result of such conceptions is the production of a bounded and internally integrated English Atlantic, Yoruba Atlantic, Spanish Atlantic, or Portuguese Atlantic. Each of these is presented with the latent expectation that such partial studies somehow can and will be combined to realize the promise of a rich and diverse Atlantic history. I wish to argue that the methodological approaches pursued in such studies and the theoretical assumptions that underlie them vitiate the possibility of arriving at an Atlantic history through such a procedure. Their focus on agencies too often ignores the relationships that enable and constrain such agencies. By extending the framework of national histories to embrace empires, such approaches fragment the spatial relations specific to the Atlantic. The fragmentation of space is matched by the fragmentation of time. Instead of disclosing the temporal rhythms specific to the Atlantic world, historical analysis and interpretation is trapped in the chronology of European national histories (e.g., early modern history, colonial history). Such approaches break up the Atlantic into a composite of discrete and self-contained sub-units (English, Por-
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tuguese, etc.) each with its own history. Ironically, they effectively eliminate from consideration the Atlantic as a constitutive relation of Atlantic history only to try to bring it back into the account as the product of imperial or national histories. In any case, summing up such partial histories cannot reveal the spatial-temporal relations specific to Atlantic history. However, the Atlantic is more than the sum of its truncated parts. We need methodological and theoretical approaches that allow us to grasp the Atlantic in the fullness of its spatial and temporal complexity. My point is not that inquiry into partial domains of Atlantic history is invalid or unfruitful. (Still less am I claiming that empire, colonies, or states do not have boundaries or that such boundaries are inconsequential.) Rather, my contention is that scholars of the Atlantic have paid insufficient attention to the methodological and theoretical issues entailed in constituting such units as objects of historical inquiry within the framework of Atlantic history. We need to reconsider the theoretical premises and methodological assumptions upon which we construct such studies and the historical-geographical parameters within which we conduct them in order to realize the rich potential of an Atlantic perspective. This article addresses these questions by treating the Atlantic as a specific historical region of the capitalist world economy. There are substantive grounds for this choice. On the one hand, the incorporation of the Atlantic is the historical condition for the creation of a specifically European world economy (i.e., it is formative of the larger totality of relations comprising what Immanuel Wallerstein refers to as the modern world system [Wallerstein 1974]). On the other hand, such world economic processes construct the specificity of the Atlantic space as a distinctive historical region. At the same time as the Atlantic is viewed here as a historically and geographically singular space, it is not isolated from the larger complex of relations. This perspective regards the formation and reformation of the Atlantic as part of more encompassing spatial-temporal processes forming a capitalist world economy.
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World Economy and Historical Social Science: Braudel and Wallerstein The perspective of world economy opens a distinctive methodological approach to Atlantic history. The innovation of scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein and Fernand Braudel is not that they emphasize a longer time frame or a larger geographical unit as the object of study. Nor is it simply that they posit a new supranational object – world economy – that coexists alongside other social-historical units. Rather, their challenge is the proposal for the development of a new historical social science that is implied in and required by their understanding of world economy. By positing world economy as the governing unit of analysis, Braudel and Wallerstein introduce a radical theoretical and methodological approach to inquiry that implies a rethinking of the necessary relation between history and theory. They take as their point of departure the world economy as a singular unit of analysis. They conceive of the world economy as a distinctive and comprehensive theoretical-historical construct that is unified in time and space. Put simply, if, in this approach, the concept of world economy is taken to represent a specific historically encompassing and unified world, then no phenomenon belonging to such a world may be treated independently of it. States, relations of production and exchange, classes, and ethnicities are not treated here as independent of the larger complex of relations or of one another. Rather, they are regarded as constituent relations of the world economy as a whole. Further, each particular relation, that is, each possible sub-unit is formed through its relation with others, and each occupies a distinctive spatial-temporal position within the evolving ensemble of relations comprising the world economy. Finally, in this perspective, time and space are substantive properties of social relations, and the ensemble of relations of the world economy produces its own temporal rhythms and spatial extensions. (This is not to say that these relations may not have histories that are antecedent to the formation of the world economy or that their histories simply reflect the historical development of the larger governing whole. Rather, it is to say that, once formed, the world economy provides the ground from which such relations derive their distinctive roles, rankings, and meanings.) This distinctive set of premises and assumptions alters the role of theory in historical explanation. Here, it is not a question of looking for
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universal laws or formulating theoretical statements about patterns of shared variables within formally independent and comparable units. Instead, causal and interpretive statements are specific to the myriad of diverse, discrete and autonomous object units comprising the world economy. Here, the distinctive logic of interpretation and explanation seeks to disclose spatially and temporally linked processes forming particular social historical configurations within a differentiated and heterogeneous but nonetheless unified world economic whole (Wallerstein 1991: 135-48). The focus of concern is not with the formulation of immutable laws or, on the other hand, with the interpretation of random contingencies. Rather, this approach seeks to comprehend the formation and re-formation in space and time of relations and processes comprising the world economy, hence the distinctive temporal rhythms and spatial organization of world economic change. Such an approach allows us to reconstruct the spatio-temporal specificity of both parts and whole within the totality of relations comprising historically distinct and singular world economies. In this perspective, we may distinguish between world economy as unit of analysis and particular units of observation (including, of course, the world economy itself )) (Hopkins 1982a: 29-37). As a theoretical-historical construct world economy provides a notional conception of the whole. It is the ground for analysis and interpretation of particular phenomena and enables us to reconstruct the complex interaction of relations and processes historically forming the world economy. Thus, within the framework of the world economy as unit of analysis, we may focus our research on particular units of observation. These could be social, economic, political or cultural, or geographical relations of varying spatial and temporal extension. Such particular sites of observation are construed as parts of the larger whole and interpreted through reference to encompassing processes of the world economy. Our concern here is not with the aggregate of discrete empires, national, or colonial societies. Rather, it is with the formulation of a spatially and temporally comprehensive framework that allows us to understand the conditions and processes of differentiation of particular social, political, economic, or cultural formations throughout the hemisphere within broader fields of world historical process. Such an approach allows us to specify particular configurations of relations over diverse temporal and spatial scales through their relation to one another and to the larger whole. It thereby
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discloses the complex interactions and interdependencies forming and reforming relations of the capitalist world economy. From this perspective, the Atlantic (or the British, Spanish, French, Dutch, Portuguese, Yoruba, or Bantu Atlantics) constitutes a unit of observation, while the world economy forms the unit of analysis. The Atlantic is conceived as a particular sub-region of the European world economy and is treated through its relation to the larger spatial-temporal whole. In this approach, the Atlantic is not presumed as a given empirical unit. Rather, it is seen as the product of theoretical and historical reconstruction. Its unity, coherence, and integrity as a part of the historical formation of the capitalist world economy must be established. Inquiry focuses on processes forming the Atlantic world and creating its boundaries within the larger world economic whole. Within this framework, the specific characteristics of particular formations are not taken as points of departure for comparative inquiry. Rather, they too represent the results of theoretical and historical reflection. The question is how, over long historical time, the physical and human space of the Atlantic is shaped through its complex historical interaction with the processes and relations forming the world economy. This approach enables us to specify and differentiate particular relations (or complexes of relations) in order to establish the diverse temporalities, conjunctures and spatial formations of the Atlantic as part of the historical processes of the European world economy. It thereby discloses the long-term relations that at once enable and constrain agency. The outcome of this inquiry is understood as a compound of diverse spatial-temporal relations and processes, or as Braudel puts it, a “set of sets” (Braudel 1981b: 458-599).
Geographical Space: Human Space Atlantic historians are trapped in a paradox. At the same time that they want to write “Atlantic history,” they remain deeply suspicious of what they regard as geographical determinism (see, for example, the chapters by Braddick and Elliot in Armitage and Braddick 2002: 11-27, 233-49). It is never quite clear what is meant by geographical determinism. Nonetheless, in their eagerness to avoid it, they treat the Atlantic as if it were an absolute geographical space rather than a social historical space. Their Atlantic is the physical Atlantic – that is, the Atlantic as a given, already
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constituted physical space. It becomes the passive setting for their accounts rather than constitutive of historical processes. Consequently, they are unable to engage the complex geo-historical realities of the Atlantic as the organizing framework for their inquiries. Their histories remain partial accounts that are inscribed over the geographical space of the Atlantic rather than constructed through it. By treating the Atlantic as a given external space, this conceptual approach transforms its historical units into abstractions that exist independently of their geographical setting. In such a perspective, the validity and value of “Atlantic” as a unit of historical analysis itself comes into question. There is little besides the geographical setting or the particularity of contingent events to distinguish the British Atlantic from British Asia. Our interest, however, is not with absolute geographical space, but with what Braudel refers to as human space (1995, I: 276). That is to say, we are not concerned with an inert geography but with the interaction between natural and human actors over diverse spatial extensions and temporal rhythms. This concept of human space is especially important for scholars writing from the perspective of world economy. Their conception of historical capitalism is necessarily grounded in a historically singular world and entails the political and economic reorganization of distinct geographical spaces – that is, the relation of human space and geographical space – over long historical time. The historical geography of world capitalism is fundamental to this conception of capitalism. The question for world systems theorists is how does the geographical Atlantic intersect with historical processes of the capitalist world economy? Or, more precisely, how is the Atlantic continually made and remade as a distinctive world region, and, conversely, how does the distinctive historical geography of the Atlantic region shape the development of historical capitalism as a world system? Braudel remarks: Europeans therefore neither discovered America and Africa [sic] … Europe’s own achievement was to discover the Atlantic and to master its difficult stretches, currents and winds. This late success opened up the doors and routes of the seven seas. From now on the maritime organization of the world was at the service of white men (1981a: 62-3).
On the one hand, this comment draws our attention to the accomplishment and condition of European expansion, and, on the other hand, it brings into focus the human space of the Atlantic. From this perspective,
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the question is not the movement from Old World to New World, the fate of individual spaces within the Atlantic basin, or the chain of events that lead from discovery to colonization. Rather, Braudel’s focus on the sea throws into relief the structural relation between four continents (Europe, Africa, North and South America) over long historical time. The ocean is the medium that creates this relation – the human space of the Atlantic, the Atlantic as a spatial zone of the capitalist world economy. Its discovery and conquest bring together the hitherto disparate spaces of the Atlantic and calls the historical geography of the Atlantic into existence as a formative moment of the European world economy. At the same time, the ocean shapes the distinctive temporality of Atlantic history, that is, its duration and the historical rhythms of its development.
Geographical History: The Atlantic and the Longue Durée Braudel’s emphasis on the sea provides the analytical framework for conceptualizing the Atlantic as an object of analysis. It calls attention to the relation of spaces established through the sea, hence to the interface of geography and history that shapes Atlantic history over the longue durée and provides the analytical framework for conceptualizing the Atlantic as an object of analysis. The geographical heterogeneity of territories conjoined by the Atlantic shaped its incorporation into the European world economy. The maritime Atlantic represents a distinctive social-geographic space of diverse ocean currents and winds, soils, climates, topographies, hydrologies, ecologies, landforms, coastal features, and socialeconomic and cultural zones. Only human agents who had mastered the sea could have unified its disparate regions. Nonetheless, these agencies were at once enabled and constrained by the region’s specific geographies. Diverse geographical, material, and social historical conditions governed the potential material and social interdependence forming the Atlantic as a zone of the world economy. They provided the natural and human endowments to be transformed into economic resources in accordance with the historically changing needs and capacities of the capitalist world economy. The formation of the Atlantic as a zone of the world economy is not a question of geographical determinism. Indeed, even to think of the adaptation of the social and economic arrangements of the world economy to
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the physical and cultural environments of the Atlantic risks obscuring the complex historical processes through which specific aspects of those environments and not others were selected and developed. Which natural and human resources were developed and the scale, intensity, and direction of their development depended upon the historically developed needs, technical and social capacities, and forms of social and political organization of the world economy. Even a cursory glance at the early colonization of the Atlantic, let us think of the Captaincies of Brazil for example, is sufficient to indicate that the successful exploitation of the Atlantic environments was by no means guaranteed. The establishment of material and social interdependence between geographically distinct zones created the maritime Atlantic as a stable and coherent historical region of the world economy. They established a material and spatial division of labor that shaped the patterns of settlement and economic activity in the new Atlantic space and determined the flows of commodities and (forced and unforced) migrations. The diverse environments of the maritime Atlantic were integrated into a hierarchical order that served accumulation in its European centers (and redefined Europe’s relation to Asia, creating a European world economy). Atlantic Europe was divided between the Iberian maritime empires that pioneered Atlantic expansion and the ascendant commercial and manufacturing centers in northwestern Europe (Holland, Britain, and France). The winds and currents of the north Atlantic gave Europe access to the entire seaboard of North America as well as the Caribbean. The south Atlantic currents carried European shipping towards the coast of South America and then toward the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa (Braudel 1981a: 420). The temperate regions of the Americas were zones of European migration and settlement. In North America, the fur trade, forest products, fisheries, and European style farming and husbandry combined with commerce and manufacturing as the predominant economic activities. In the temperate zones of South America, the Rio de la Plata flourished as a commercial outlet for highland mining zones while the rich Pampas provided oxen, cattle, and mules to the region’s mining and plantation economies. The sub-tropical and tropical region stretching from the Chesapeake Bay to São Paulo in Brazil developed as a zone of export agriculture based on African slave labor and the production of plantation staples. In Africa, both natural and human obstacles impeded European penetration of the interior. The European
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presence on the continent’s Atlantic coast was limited, for the most part, to trading. The sea routes gave these coastal trading stations access to the plantation zones of both North and South America, and, for over four centuries, these entrepôts responded to the Atlantic economy’s changing demand for slave labor. The ocean was the focal point of the maritime Atlantic. Across its surface flowed the tropical staples, foodstuffs, raw materials, manufactured goods, and labor that integrated and animated the region’s development. Throughout the circum-Atlantic world economic activities and patterns of social life were reoriented toward the sea. The boundaries of the Atlantic were, of course, fluid. At certain points in time one could, for example, construe Peru or Mozambique as part of the Atlantic. Nonetheless, the heart of this system was the network of ports and sea routes linking the coastal enclaves, river systems, and islands of the circum-Atlantic littoral. Not only ecological considerations, but also proximity to water transport privileged the coastal zones as centers of economic activity. The American plantations, the slave trading entrepôts of Africa, and the commercial and manufacturing centers of temperate Europe and North America were concentrated between coast and fall line. The movement of goods and people, social and technical innovation, and intense cultural interaction and the creation of new identities characterized this dynamic and cosmopolitan maritime zone (Berlin 1998: 15-92). Beyond the coast there were hinterlands indirectly linked to the Atlantic: the farming frontiers of North and South America, the pastoral region of the Brazilian northeast and of the Pampas, and the slave trading kingdoms behind the African coast. Finally, we may include even movements into the interior frontiers, including North American fur traders and pioneers, the Brazilian bandeirantes, and African slavetrading expeditions that extend the influence of the Atlantic far inland. This approach calls attention to the interrelation, interaction, and mutual dependence of the geographical zones of the maritime Atlantic. Each such zone is formed through its relation to the others. Each particular site of observation is a point of concentration of diverse relations, a partial outcome of complex processes of varied spatial and temporal extension. None can be conceived in isolation from the more comprehensive Atlantic and world complexes of which it forms an integral part. (For a recent work that embraces such a relational conception of Atlantic his-
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tory, see Alencastro 2000.) Indeed, these more comprehensive fields of relations provide the ground through which the historical development of particular regions or relations is interpreted. The stability of the relation between the various zones of the maritime Atlantic determined the temporal continuity of Atlantic history over the longue durée.1 This relational matrix is the most basic level of Atlantic history. Despite the continual transformation of physical and social environments, changing material conditions of production, and development of the forms of economic and social organization of the world economy, this slowly changing spatial-temporal relation provides the framework of Atlantic history and defines its continuity. As long as the ocean articulates interdependence and a division of labor between zones, there is a distinctive Atlantic region and ground for Atlantic history.
Historical Geography: Reformations of the Atlantic Within the long-term geo-historical structure of the maritime Atlantic, empires, colonies, particular complexes of production and exchange, social groups, and movements of people and goods are made and remade. Through their development, they continually transform physical and social environments, alter material conditions of production, and change forms of political and economic organization. These agencies or acting units are formed through their relation to the long-term socialmaterial conditions of the Atlantic world and to one another. Each such agency is a site of concentration of diverse relations and processes and occupies a distinctive spatial-temporal position within the Atlantic division of labor. Each is a partial product of complex causes and a partial cause of complex outcomes (Hopkins 1982b). As parts of a broader field 1
I use Braudel’s famous concept of longue durée here to invoke his discussion of plural temporalities (Braudel 1972). However, I should note my reservations about its use in this context: the long-term temporal continuity of the Atlantic refers to a specific historical geographical configuration whose coherence is itself contingent upon first, the specific maritime link articulating a regional division of labor, and, second, its relation with the wider world economy. Further, the duration of the Atlantic longue durée, although longer than the temporality of the conjuncture, is shorter that what Braudel seems to have in mind when he uses the term long durée. The Atlantic is an historical artifact of the European world economy.
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of relations they necessarily operate in more limited spatial and temporal domains. They must adapt to the conditions presented by the maritime Atlantic even as they are agents of its development. Within this framework the continually changing relations among these constituent elements creates distinctive spatial transformations and temporal rhythms of lesser extension and duration (conjunctures). We may trace such systemic transformations of the maritime Atlantic by examining the historical trajectory of plantation slavery in the Americas. The establishment of plantation slavery beginning in the sixteenth century was a fundamental aspect of the formation of the Atlantic division of labor and world economy. Let us take as our unit of observation what anthropologist Charles Wagley conceptualized as “plantation America” (Wagley 1957: 3-13). In his seminal essay, Wagley calls attention to the unity of “plantation America” as at once a distinct New World cultural sphere and spatial region. This sphere extends from the tropical coastal lowlands midway up the coast of Brazil to the Guianas, along the Caribbean coast, throughout the Caribbean itself, and into the United States (where it is no longer tropical). During the nineteenth century, it penetrated into the mainland interior, but only in Brazil and the United States (Wagley 1957: 5). Europeans discovered at the beginning of colonization that, even though these tropical lowlands possessed neither dense aboriginal populations nor mineral wealth, their rich clay soils were suitable for the cultivation of sugar cane that, in turn, required a large labor force. “Thus,” writes Wagley, “the sugar plantation with African slave labor became the fundamental formative features of the PlantationAmerica culture sphere – other crops such as cacao, coffee, and later cotton were grown by a similar system.” There are important differences within this cultural sphere, “but where the plantation system and slavery were fundamental institutions, a way of life took form which has resulted in many common problems and many similar contemporary culture traits throughout the region” (Wagley 1957: 5). Wagley’s purpose is to develop a typology of common cultural characteristics that is valid across space and time. These common features distinguish this region and define what he regards as the distinctive type of New World plantation society. He argues that such an approach avoids studying process and problems of plantation societies in too local terms. Wagley urges that studies of particular new World plantation societies in Brazil, the Caribbean, and the United States should take this broader
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culture sphere, which shares certain basic institutions and cultural patterns, as their frame of reference (Wagley 1957: 11). Wagley’s concern is with the functional adaptation of labor, culture, and society to a particular geographical environment. Nonetheless, his formulation enables us to conceptualize the pervasive presence of African slavery and plantation production in the Americas as a unified spatiotemporal zone that is necessarily linked to the maritime Atlantic division of labor and European world economy. Such a conception at once holds open the spatial and temporal boundaries of social historical process and delineates the parameters of plantation slavery’s longue durée structures from the beginning of the sixteenth century to slave emancipation in Brazil in 1888. It allows us to treat particular slave formations not as internally integrated and self-enclosed entities, but as constituent parts of the larger world economy. This approach enables us to specify differences between slave plantation complexes not by establishing the presence or absence of particular universal factors across cases, but by specifying the processes forming and reforming particular slave plantation regimes through their relation to the maritime Atlantic division of labor. In each instance, these relations are constituted differently within emerging patterns of the world economy. By identifying the distinctive temporal rhythms and spatial configurations that shape their development within more comprehensive processes of polity and economy, we may differentiate particular slave plantation formations from one another and determine the variation of relations that constitute the slave zone of the Americas. The diverse plantation commodities produced by slave labor provide a means to conceptualize individual slave formations as integral parts of the European world economy and, further, to examine the variation among them. The distinctive plantation crops of the various slave regimes, sugar, coffee, cotton, tobacco, indigo, wove each into the broader fabric of the Atlantic world. By focusing on plantation crops we may at once call attention to the ways that distinctive material processes associated with each crop shape relations of production and social relations more generally. Further, we may disclose the ways that variation and succession of different crops express the extension, deepening, and differentiation of the world division of labor. The formation of different crop regimes, their distribution over space, and their succession through time, provide an axis that allows us to specify particular complexes of slave
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relations within the processes of the divisioning of labor, state formation, and material expansion of the European world economy. Around these axes, we may reconstruct the movement of peoples, institutions, and cultures forming distinctive slave plantation societies. (Within the methodological framework proposed here, such systemic transformations of slave plantation regimes are themselves indicators of fundamental changes is the world economy as a whole.) This focus on material production calls attention to the geographical and ecological diversity and the possible distribution of slave labor in the hemisphere. It incorporates the particularities of place into the spatial and temporal dynamics of the European world economy and shapes specific historical trajectories. Particular crops only grow in certain regions or under certain environmental conditions. (Mineral exploitation is, of course, completely place specific.) Location and the physical characteristics of crops are fundamental factors in determining the possibility of slave labor and the relation of individual zones to the world market. At the most elemental level, the relation of the value of the labor input to the value of the product determined the suitability of slave labor in a given territory. At the same time, as Sidney Mintz (1985) has argued, the first slave crops were “drug crops.” Their material characteristics created new needs and drew consuming populations into new market relations. Specific combinations of material processes and social relations of slave production create distinctive complexes of export agriculture in particular environmental zones. To this day, the identification of place, crop, and slavery remains strong: sugar in Brazil and the West Indies, tobacco in the Chesapeake, rice in the Carolina Low Country, and Sea Island Cotton. The question of how, when, and under what conditions such environmental niches are exploited is key to the historical differentiation of slave relations in the Americas. Different crops were produced at different times and in different places with different consequences. The fate of any particular slave zone is historically contingent upon the material and social conditions of production, exchange, and consumption obtaining in the world economy as a whole. The succession of crops and sites of production further draws our attention to the dynamic character of slave production in the Americas. Gavin Wright (1987) highlights an important difference between slavery and other forms of coerced or dependent labor, the consequences of which have not received the attention they
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deserve. Unlike serfs, debt peons, or other forms of dependent or unwaged labor, slaves are highly mobile. They can move not only from Africa to the Americas, but also from one zone of production to another within the Americas. Geographically mobile slave labor animates not simply isolated zones of production, but moving commodity frontiers (Moore 2000). Migratory plantation agriculture and itinerant slave labor combine and recombine across the territory of the Americas to exploit new spaces and create new configurations of land, slave labor, and capital. World demand for specific crops, the changing needs and capacities of the various colonizing powers, the sources and availability of slave labor, and conditions on the slave commodity frontier shaped distinct rhythms and patterns of development across the American plantation zone. At the same time, different crops require different material conditions of production. Cotton, sugar, rice, tobacco, coffee impose different conditions on slave labor. All differ, among other things, in environmental requirements; the procedures necessary to process them; and the relations between weight, bulk, and value that they embody. Such distinctions have important consequences for the location of production sites, transportation requirements, land-labor ratios, the number of production units and the scale of production, the division of labor and technological conditions of production on the estates, and the character and rhythm of expansion. Such factors, in turn, are directly related to the size and composition of the slave labor force and the distribution of tasks and skill requirements within it; the organizational structures and practices of management and social control; and the organization of labor time over the day, the season, or the year. Task labor, for example, was particularly suitable for rice and tobacco cultivation. In contrast, large-scale gang labor and the management strategies associated with it were important in propelling the nineteenth-century cotton boom in the U.S. South. Sugar production, on the other hand, combines gang labor for agricultural operations with skilled labor in manufacturing. Attention to such differences discloses systemic variation of slave labor regimes along the spatial-temporal continuum of the world division of labor. The movement and succession of zones of production call attention to the world economic character of slave labor and the interdependence of material and political economic factors in shaping it throughout the hemisphere. Sugar is paradigmatic of one kind of itinerant crop.
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While in any site it may appear almost immobile, over the long historical time of the maritime Atlantic the center of world sugar production migrated across the Atlantic world. From São Tomé, paradoxically perhaps the first American sugar colony, where, from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, sugar making was the exclusive work of slaves and slaves were exclusively African, the core of sugar production moved to Brazil from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries. Then it moved to the French and British Caribbean from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries, and finally to Cuba in the nineteenth century. Each geographical shift in sugar production was part of a cyclical restructuring of the Atlantic economy. Each such shift was characterized by superior ecological conditions, an increase in the scale of production, technological innovation, the recruitment of slave labor from new sources and on a new scale, and, importantly, the dominance of a new imperial power. Particularly noteworthy is the role of Holland in transferring the center of sugar production from Brazil to the Caribbean and reorganizing the Atlantic economy around the superiority of Dutch productive, commercial, and financial capital. As I will discuss below, Britain played a similar role in restructuring the Atlantic division of labor during the nineteenth century. Brazilian economic historian Antônio Castro (1971 II: 49-83) argues that geographical expansion of export staple production is best understood in terms of the formation of three distinct zones: a pioneer zone, a zone at the peak of its productive capacity and a zone in decline. We may also note that in each cycle of systemic expansion, increased scale of production and changing location meant changing relations of bulk, value, and transport costs (Bunker 1994: 112-42). Thus, we may discern such a process of differentiation both within particular territories and between territories as sugar migrated across the maritime Atlantic boundaries. The changing character of production zones altered the relation of labor and output over time and transformed the character of slave relations in the different zones. Gilberto Freyre’s well-known portrait of the patriarchal character of Brazilian slavery (1981) draws substantially on evidence from the period of decline of the sugar industry in the Brazilian Northeast. In contrast, Franklin Knight (1970) has demonstrated that protective legislation of Church and State that intended to guard the moral personality of the Cuban slave was a dead letter once the sugar boom began there.
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At the same time, the scale and technological complexity of sugar production was continually transformed over the course of its development in the New World. But this was in no way a linear movement. During the nineteenth century, for example, under the material and social conditions prevailing in Martinique, expanding demand for sugar in combination with local forms of slave resistance provoked a crisis of gang labor and the emergence of task labor as the prevailing form of labor discipline (Tomich 1990). Concomitant with this development, Cuba was able to respond to the increased demand for sugar by establishing larger plantations and incorporating new technologies. These innovations lead to the extension and intensification of gang labor in the fields (Tomich 1994; Fraginals 1976). Before the nineteenth century, the slave zones of the Americas were closely integrated into the Atlantic maritime complex. Not only ecological considerations, but also proximity to water transport limited the extension of Brazilian and Caribbean sugar as well as American tobacco to coastal enclaves and insular environments. In contrast, the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a massive reconfiguration of slavery across the hemisphere in response to industrialization, urbanization and market integration in the core regions of the world economy. The international slave trade was abolished. In the new interregional configuration of slave labor, cotton, an industrial raw material not a drug crop, emerged as the key commodity in world trade. The steamship and railroad broke the transportation barrier. Extensive new areas of the U.S. South were opened to cultivation and an internal commodity frontier was created. At the same time, planters in Cuba and Brazil used slave labor to produce sugar and coffee on an unprecedented scale. They also developed internal commodity frontiers, often incorporating new production and transportation technologies. These new production zones sustained patterns of trade and economic activity outside of old colonial frameworks. As Southern planters exported raw cotton to British and Northern industrial centers, the United States became a major consumer of Cuban sugar and Brazilian coffee. At the same time, new regions of tropical staple production developed outside of the Americas. These changes were part of the expansion of the world economy and restructuring of the world division of labor under the hegemony of British capital. This new scale of production and reconfiguration of the world division of labor superseded the maritime
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Atlantic and marks the limit of Atlantic as a relevant concept for historical analysis.
Conclusi