Private Organizations in Global Politics
Private organizations play an increasingly important role in global politics, representing diverse interests and including a variety of actors from the business world to the humanitarian field. Recent years have witnessed a growing recognition of the significance of these actors on the global scene. Private Organizations in Global Politics is a ground-breaking study which brings together a broad range of case studies to examine the role and character of private organizations in the process of economic and political globalization. It ties empirical analyses with theoretical perspectives on organizations in areas such as economic policy-making, the financial sector, the chemical industry and the regulation of the Internet. It also focuses on areas such as human rights organizations, the international women’s movement, the combating of disease and the role of think tanks. The book’s expert contributors analyse the ways in which these groups organize their interest, how their activities vary across different policy fields and what their function is in relation to governance in the globalizing world, as they become key actors in global problem-solving. This much-needed study will be of great interest to students and scholars in Politics, International Relations and IPE, as well as to practitioners in private organizations and public agencies. Karsten Ronit is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Volker Schneider is Professor at the Department of Politics and Management, University of Constance, Germany.
Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science Formerly edited by Hans Keman, Vrije University, The Netherlands; now edited by Jan W.van Deth, University of Mannheim, Germany on behalf of the European Consortium for Political Research
The Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research—the leading organization concerned with the growth and development of political science in Europe. The series presents highquality edited volumes on topics at the leading edge of current interest in political science and related fields, with contributions from European scholars and others who have presented work at ECPR workshops or research groups. 1 Regionalist Parties in Western Europe Edited by Lieven de Winter and Huri Türsan 2 Comparing Party System Change Edited by Jan-Erik Lane and Paul Pennings 3 Political Theory and European Union Edited by Albert Weale and Michael Nentwich 4 Politics of Sexuality Edited by Terrell Carver and Véronique Mottier 5 Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations Edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek 6 Social Capital and European Democracy Edited by Jan van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Ken Newton and Paul Whiteley 7 Party Elites in Divided Societies Edited by Kurt Richard Luther and Kris Deschouwer 8 Citizenship and Welfare State Reform in Europe Edited by Jet Bussemaker 9 Democratic Governance and New Technology Technologically Mediated Innovations in Political Practice in Western Europe Edited by Ivan Horrocks, Jens Hoff and Pieter Tops 10 Democracy without Borders Transnationalisation and Conditionality in New Democracies Edited by Jean Grugel 11 Cultural Theory as Political Science Edited by Michael Thompson, Gunnar Grendstad and Per Selle 12 The Transformation of Governance in the European Union Edited by Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising 13 Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies Political Parties Behind Closed Doors Edited by Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole 14 Survival of the European Welfare State Edited by Stein Kuhnle 15 Private Organizations in Global Politics Edited by Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider 16 Federalism and Political Performance Edited by Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt 17 Democratic Innovation Deliberation, Representation and Association Edited by Michael Saward
18 Public Opinion and the International Use of Force Edited by Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia 19 Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe Edited by David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel Also available from Routledge in association with the ECPR: Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe, edited by Frances Gardiner; Democracy and Green Political Thought, edited by Brian Doherty and Marius de Geus; The New Politics of Unemployment, edited by Hugh Compston; Citizenship, Democracy and justice in the New Europe, edited by Percy B.Lehning and Albert Weale; Private Groups and Public Life, edited by Jan W.van Deth; The Political Context of Collective Action, edited by Ricca Edmondson; Theories of Secession, edited by Percy Lehning; Regionalism Across the North/South Divide, edited by Jean Grugel and Wil Hout.
Private Organizations in Global Politics
Edited by Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider
London and New York
First published 2000 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. © 2000 Edited by Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Private organizations in global politics/edited by Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Pressure groups. 2. Non-governmental organizations. 3. International agencies. I. Ronit, Karsten, 1957–. II. Schneider, Volker, 1952– JF529 .P75 2000 327’.06–dc21 00–042469 ISBN 0-203-45739-0 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-76563-X (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-20128-4 (Print Edition)
Contents
List of illustrations Notes on contributors Series editor’s preface Preface List of abbreviations 1
ix x xiii xvi xviii
Private organizations and their contribution to problem-solving in the global arena
1
KARSTEN RONIT AND VOLKER SCHNEIDER
2
Representation of private organizations in the global diplomacy of economic policy-making
34
PETER WILLETTS
3
Embedding global financial markets: securitization and the emerging web of governance
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PHILIP G.CERNY
4
The good, the bad or the ugly? Practices of global self-regulation among dyestuffs producers
83
KARSTEN RONIT
5
The Internet Society and its struggle for recognition and influence
102
RAYMUND WERLE AND VOLKER LEIB
6
Why do community-based AIDS organizations co-ordinate at the global level? 124 PATRICK KENIS
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Contents The global social capital of human rights movements: a case study on Amnesty International
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VOLKER SCHNEIDER
8
The international women’s movement as a private political actor between accommodation and change
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BOB REINALDA
9
The policy roles of private research institutes in global politics
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DIANE STONE
Index
208
Illustrations
Tables 2.1 Indicators of institutional integration in the UN system 7.1 The organizational growth of Amnesty
44 154
Figures 5.1 The Internet Society (ISOC) between two organizational fields 6.1 Institutional responses to the problem of HIV/AIDS
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104 127
Contributors
Philip G.Cerny is Professor of Government at the University of Manchester. He is the author of The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 1980) and The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency and the Future of the State (Sage, 1990), as well as the editor and a co-author of Finance and World Politics: Markets, Regimes and States in the Post-Hegemonic Era (Edward Elgar, 1993) and co-editor of Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations (Edward Elgar, 2000). He has published articles in such journals as International Organization, the European Journal of Political Research, the British Journal of Political Science, the Review of International Studies, Government and Opposition, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, International Journal and Civil Wars. Patrick Kenis is Professor at the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences at the Katholieke Universiteit Brabant. He is the author of The Social Construction of an Industry: A World of Chemical Fibres (Westview Press, 1992) and co-editor (with Bernd Marin) of Managing AIDS— Organizational Responses in Six European Countries (Ashgate, 1997) and (with Volker Schneider) of Netzwerk und Organization (Campus, 1996). He has published articles on organizations, networks and public policy in different policy areas. His major research interest is the role of organizations in public policy. Volker Leib is a Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany. His research is focused on Internet governance, the regulation of information networks and democracy in the information age. He is preparing a Ph.D. thesis on the co-ordination of the Internet. He has published in various journals and contributed to books. Bob Reinalda is Associate Professor in International Relations at the Nijmegen School of Public Affairs at the University of Nijmegen. Among his publications are: The International Transportworkers Federation x
Contributors
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1914–1945. The Edo Fimmen Era (International Institute of Social History, 1997), Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations (Routledge, 1998) (co-edited with Bertjan Verbeek) and “International organizations as sources of political change” in K.van Kersbergen, R.H.Lieshout and G.Lock (eds), Expansion and Fragmentation. Internationalization, Political Change and the Transformation of the Nation-State (Amsterdam University Press, 1999). Karsten Ronit is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. He has published on private organizations, in particular business interest associations, and their political activity at domestic and international levels, and edited Organized Interests and the European Community (Sage, 1992) (with Justin Greenwood and Jürgen R.Grote) and Evolution of Interest Representation and the Development of the Labour Market in Post-Socialist Countries (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1995) (with O.K. Pedersen and Jerzy Hausner). He has also published in a number of international journals. Volker Schneider is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Politics and Management of the University of Konstanz, Germany. He is the author of Politiknetzwerke der Chemikalienkontrolle (de Gruyter, 1988), Technikentwicklung zwischen Politik und Markt (Campus, 1989) and (with Patrick Kenis) of Netzwerk und Organization (Campus, 1996). His most recent monograph is Staat und Technische Kommunikation (Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999). He has published widely on the politics of technological development, policy networks and the evolution of governance structures. His research interests include state theory and the role of private actors in policy-making at the national, European and global levels. Diane Stone is Reader in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. She has written Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process (Frank Cass, 1996) and is now working on Ideas, Interests and Identity: Think Tanks in Transition. She has co-edited (with Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett) Think Tanks Across Nations. A Comparative Approach (Manchester University Press, 1998). Her interests also focus on higher education policy, globalization and policy studies and non-state actors. Raymund Werle is Principal Research Associate at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne. His research is focused on network development and standardization in telecommunications. It includes new telecom networks and new (multimedia) services and the evolution of international institutional regimes of co-ordination and control of this industry. His latest major publication is (with Susanne K.Schmidt) Coordinating Technology. Studies in the International Standardization of Telecommunications (MIT Press, 1998).
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Contributors
Peter Willetts has a personal chair at City University, London, as a Professor of Global Politics. He has published extensively on the role of NGOs in global politics, including editing two books of case studies. The first, Pressure Groups in the Global System (Pinter, 1982), focuses on the reasons for groups based in one country choosing to become transnational actors. The second, “The Conscience of the World” (Brookings Institution and Hurst, 1996), demonstrates how NGOs can make a substantial impact on policy-making in the United Nations.
Series editor’s preface
International politics and the study of organizations have been conventional areas of political science for decades and systematic research in these areas has made considerable progress. The inconspicuous observer might conclude from these long-established practices that the examination of the role and position of private organizations in international politics constitutes a recognized field of interest. Until recently this was not the case. Virtually each and every institute of political science still has distinct departments for public administration and comparative politics as well as for international relations. Scholars from these different areas used to concentrate on their own approaches and interests, exchanging findings and insights only incidentally. A state-oriented approach dominated the field of international relations, focusing on contacts between autonomous states as the major topic, whereas the study of organizations was left mainly to comparativists and policy analysts interested in differences and similarities within states. And although the rise of international organizations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was widely recognized as an important development, the Cold War underlined the relevance of national states for studying international relations and security, just as the reinvention of corporatist decision-making processes and the revival of communitarian ideas emphasized the need to analyse private organizations within specific national contexts. As usual, societal and political developments gradually made the conventional academic distinctions and divisions of labour inept. The bipolar system of independent states grouped in a very limited number of blocks dissolved with the crumble of the Soviet Union, and “globalization” became the fashionable term to characterize a world where communication, mobilization, trade and exchanges are no longer restrained by national borders and regulations. In this world, private organizations increasingly coordinated their activities with similar organizations abroad and—what is more important—they were increasingly converted into organizations acting on a global scale. National states and their traditional organizations, then, are confronted with a wide variety of non-governmental organizations
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Series editor’s preface
(NGOs), which represent an astonishing range of different interests and rapidly developed their own networks, resources and arenas. In the collection of essays presented in this volume the authors deal with the question of how and why private organizations can contribute to enhance the process of globalization (or to minimize its negative impacts) by improving governance in a number of emerging issue areas and established policy fields. Private organizations can play this role by offering either supplementary support whenever effective regulation is already achieved through states or markets, or by providing a mechanism for private cooperation in cases where states and markets fail to establish legitimate regulations. Depending on the particular circumstances, private organizations can even assume main responsibility for problem-solving and provide significant opportunities for new modes of self-regulation. This very diverse set of goals requires more or less unique organizational and administrative arrangements for various organizations in highly different issue areas and policy fields. It is for this reason—the apparently incredible diversity of issues, policies, opportunities and organizations—that the editors make an extensive effort in their introductory chapter to characterize private organizations in a global world from three perspectives, by focusing on their proliferation, representation and regulation, respectively. This broad overview cannot result in some simple typology of organizations and decision-making processes. What remains, however, is a very useful depiction of the divergent ways private organizations contribute to regulations in several global issue areas and policy fields. After the editors present their overview of the various approaches and conceptualizations of the role and functions of private organizations in global politics, eight thoroughly accomplished studies of decision-making processes are presented. The second and third chapters are addressed to different aspects of global economic policies: Peter Willetts analyses the involvement of private organizations in the field of economic policy-making (reporting no less than 1,517 NGOs approved by ECOSOC only!) and Philip G.Cerny concentrates on fundamental shifts in international banking and financial markets. The next two chapters illustrate the problems and prospects of private initiatives in rapidly changing branches such as the chemical industry (discussed by Karsten Ronit) and the attempts to coordinate the global Internet after the American government left this field to private initiatives (discussed by Raymund Werle and Volker Leib). The perspectives and positions of private organizations are emphasized in the remaining chapters in detailed analyses by Patrick Kenis of communitybased AIDS-organizations, in Volker Schneider’s examination of Amnesty International as a textbook example of a human rights movement, in Bob Reinalda’s research on the international women’s movement, and finally in Diane Stone’s investigation of the roles of private research institutes in global politics. A wide variety of existent global issue areas and policy fields, then, are considered here on the basis of expert knowledge and
Series editor’s preface
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experiences by focusing on the initiatives and opportunities of private organizations. Although different in scope, design and objective, the set of case studies and analyses of distinct issue areas and policy fields presented all confirm the understanding elaborated by the editors in their introductory chapter: “a treatment of global politics is incomplete without integration of all relevant actors, including those organized in a private framework”. It is this combination of analyses of the ongoing globalization of policy-making processes, on the one hand, and of new roles and functions of private organizations, on the other, which defines the unique character of the collection of essays presented here. Together with the volume Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations (edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek) already available in the Routledge/ECPR Series, this new collection of essays underlines the success of the highly needed attempts to integrate distinct academic endeavours in a world where conventional distinctions lost most of their relevance a long time ago. Jan W.van Deth Series Editor Mannheim April 2000
Preface
The initial steps of the project leading to this book were taken in the fall of 1995 when Ronit was a visiting fellow and Schneider a senior research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne. The background for organizing a workshop under the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) was formulated the following year and a preliminary theoretical framework was elaborated. Together with several of the contributions in this volume (chapters by Kenis, Reinalda, Stone and Werle and Leib), it was presented at the workshop “Private Organizations in Global Politics” held in Bern, Switzerland, in February and March 1997 during the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops. However, it proved necessary to go somewhat beyond the framework of this workshop to gather a number of additional papers for the present volume so as to include a variety of policy fields and organizations. Accordingly, a new conference was held in April 1998 at the Waldhaus Jacob/Schloss Seeheim near Lake Constance in southern Germany, where revised papers were reported and discussed, and to which new papers were commissioned and presented for the first time. This second conference was made possible through funding by Constance University and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. It was important in bringing together scholars from different areas of research who deal with economic and political aspects of private action in the international realm. We have several objectives for analysing global private action, which is a theoretically underdeveloped field and characterized by much fragmentation and a lack of dialogue between competing or parallel concepts and perspectives. We believe that inspiration must be sought from different traditions in political science and beyond. Indeed, building blocks cannot only be found within analyses on international affairs, but also in comparative politics where more established research traditions focus on the role of private actors in politics. Based upon this, our aim has been threefold. First, we wish to show that private organizations of very different origin and with very different goals are today present in the global political arena. Research on private organizations tends to specialize in specific categories, such as environmental movements, human rights organizations, the business
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world, etc. The contributors to this book, however, present a broad spectrum of actors and issue areas and demonstrate the centrality of private organizations to global politics. As pointed out by several other scholars, state-centric thinking is still dominant, and to bring the elementary message of the importance of private organizations into the discussion is no easy task. Efforts are therefore needed to present a integrated response. Second, we aim to emphasize that the participation of private organizations is an inherent element of the global policy process. Again, with strong variations across policy areas, private organizations are recognized participants and provide expertise and legitimacy to intergovernmental organizations. Indeed, without their multifaceted involvement, global politics is in many cases not imaginable. Although global politics is a highly complex aggregated phenomenon and the world of private organizations is extremely varied there are, nevertheless, well-elaborated rules regulating exchanges between these private organizations and the many intergovernmental organizations and their bureaucracies. In fact, these exchange patterns are often far more institutionalized than at the state level. Third, we attempt to show that contributions to global order are by no means just provided through the inputs of private organizations into public organizations. In many cases, private organizations have developed their own mechanisms of regulation which predate or replace regulation by public authorities. Such arrangements can be of a voluntary nature and are tacitly accepted by public authority, but in many cases tasks are also delegated and explicitly licensed by states and intergovernmental organizations. As is perhaps always the case, the organization of a book is more timeconsuming than planned. We have encountered numerous obstacles over and above those typically associated with such a project, including moving not only between institutions but also between countries. Despite this, we have completed the book and, although we cannot mention all of those who have helped us at various stages throughout the project, we should like especially to thank Hans Jörg Schmedes, who assisted us with the documentation work, and Michelle Fischer in Toronto, who improved our English. We are grateful also to Dirk Hyner and Tan Pflieger who prepared the disks for final publication and otherwise assisted us. Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider Copenhagen and Constance January 2000
Abbreviations
ACPS ACT-UP AfriCASO AI AIDS APCASO ARPANET ASEAN ASEAN-ISIS BCMA BoT BROC BSCD CEO CERN CONGO CORE CPS CSW DETO ECETOC ECOSOC ECPR EEC EPSOM EuroCASO EOC ETAD FIBV
Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power African Council of AIDS Service Organizations Amnesty International Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Asian Pacific Council of AIDS Service Organizations Advanced Research Projects Agency Network Association of South-East Asian Nations Association of South-East Asian Nations—Institutes for Strategic and International Studies British Colour Makers’ Association Board of Trustees Brazilian Operating Committee Business Council for Sustainable Development Chief Executive Officer Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations Council of Registrars Centre for Policy Studies Commission on the Status of Women Dyes Environmental and Toxicology Organization European Centre for Ecotoxicology and Toxicology of Chemicals Economic and Social Council European Consortium for Political Research European Economic Community Syndicat des Fabricants d’Emaux Pigments, Sels et Oxydes Metalliques European Council of AIDS Service Organizations European Operating Committee Ecological and Toxicological Association of Dyes and Organic Pigments Manufacturers International Federation of Stock Exchanges xviii
Abbreviations FNC GATT/WTO GB GPA HIV/AIDS IAB IAHC IANA IATA ICANN ICAO ICASO ICC ICCA ICW IEC IEC IEEE IESG IETF IFCS IFO IFRI ILGA ILO IMF INET INTA IOC IOC IOMC IOSCO IPCS IPMA IPPF IR ISEAS ISMA ISO ISOC ITU JOC
xix
US Federal Networking Council General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Great Britain Global Programme on AIDS Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Internet Architecture Board International Ad Hoc Committee Internet Assigned Numbers Authority International Air Transport Association Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers International Civil Aviation Organization International Council of AIDS Service Organizations International Chamber of Commerce International Council of Chemical Associations International Council of Women International Executive Committee International Electrotechnical Commission Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Internet Engineering Steering Group Internet Engineering Task Force Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Institut Français des Relations Internationales International Lesbian and Gay Association International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund ISOC’s annual conference International Trademark Association International Olympic Committee Indian Operating Committee Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals International Organization of Securities Commissions International Programme on Chemical Safety International Primary Market Association International Planned Parenthood Federation International Relations Institute of South East Asian Studies International Securities Markets Association International Organization for Standardization Internet Society International Telecommunications Union Japanese Operating Committee
xx
Abbreviations
JTC1 MNC MoU NACASO NATO NGO NII NIRA NSFNET NTIA OAS OCIMF OECD OPEC PCB POC PTT PWA RAC RAN RAND RFC SIPRI TCP/IP UAR UK UN UNAIDS UNCED UNCHR UNCTAD UN-DHA UNDP UN-ECE UNEP UNESCO UNFPA UNICEF USA USAID USOC
Joint Technical Committee of the ITU and the ISO Multi-National Corporation Memorandum of Understanding North American Council of AIDS Service Organizations North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization National Information Infrastructure National Institute for Research Advancement National Science Foundation Net National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization of American States Oil Companies International Marine Forum Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Programme Co-ordinating Board Policy Oversight Committtee Post, Telephone and Telegraph administration Person With AIDS Regulatory Affairs Committee Regional Action Network Rural Area Network Design Request for Comments Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol Union of American Republics United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS United Nations Conference on Environment and Development United Nations Centre for Human Rights United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Population Fund United Nations Children’s Fund United States of America United States Agency for International Development US Operating Committee
Abbreviations VdMI WBCSD WHO WICE WIPO WISE WIR WTO
Verband der Mineralfarbenindustrie World Business Council for Sustainable Development World Health Organization World Industry Council for the Environment World Intellectual Property Organization World Industry Council for the Environment World Resources Institute World Trade Organization
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1
Private organizations and their contribution to problem-solving in the global arena Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider
Introduction Many private organizations “make the world ‘go round”. Today, a diverse array of private organizations are, in one way or another, active in global politics. These include multi-national corporations, cartels, business associations, federations of trade unions, standardizing associations, learned societies, think tanks, the international media, religious orders, sporting organizations, environmental groups, etc. Private organizations sometimes seriously complicate governance, whereas at other times they make important contributions to problem-solving. Either way, they have changed the landscape of global politics without always being credited for this. The involvement of private organizations in the global arena may be traced far back in time. From the late middle ages onward, major transformation processes changed societies and paved the way for the creation of autonomous private organizations.1 Although a framework had been established in previous centuries, the proliferation of private organizations on a international scale increased significantly between the mid nineteenth century and World War I. This time period witnessed great enthusiasm for improved co-operation and peaceful dispute settlement. With the internationalization of economies and the expansion of communication facilities, private actors found new forms of international and global cooperation. A bundle of organizations, which today thrive in diverse policy fields, were founded (e.g. the International Red Cross as the flagship organization in the humanitarian field, the International Olympic Committee in sports, and, in business, the International Chamber of Commerce). Propelled by the systematic encouragement of the UN and its many specialized agencies, private organizations experienced new and even stronger growth after the Second World War. Over the last few decades, various private actors with differing agendas have enhanced the process of globalization, while globalization has given impetus to new forms of private co-operation as well as a search for new mechanisms of governance that go beyond market and state. 1
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Presently, the state is drawing back and has surrendered to the market dominance in numerous areas. This trend, seen not only in the Western world but also in countries previously under communist rule and in large parts of the third world, may not, however, be unilaterally characterized by a “retreat of the state”. In a number of emerging issue areas and established policy fields, new rules for control over market processes and communication, together with measures to minimize negative impacts of globalization, are frequently called for. In such cases it is often through private organizations that new forms of governance are established. Thus, where effective regulation is achieved through either the state or market, private organizations may also contribute. Where neither state nor market can effectively collaborate with private organizations to provide desirable and legitimate regulation, authority may be exercised by those private organizations demonstrating solid administrative capabilities. This chapter is divided into three sections: proliferation, representation and regulation. Discussion in the first part focuses on the different types of private organizations and concepts through which they are analyzed. Although different forms of political action are reviewed, the aim is not to identify the various kinds of private organization, but rather to highlight the fundamental framework upon which private interest groups are organized. Various categories of non-governmental organizations exist, each seeking, at the conceptual level, to identify private structures and activities, but few attempts have been made to synthesize these into a general framework. It is on these grounds that the concept of private organization is offered as a means to portray, and interpret, the many variations of organized international private action. The second part of this chapter examines the participation of private organizations in global policy processes. Private organizations are widely recognized and granted a kind of public status by intergovernmental organizations, thus becoming an integral part of the global political machinery. The operation of intergovernmental organizations and the complex role of private organizations cannot be properly understood without examining this. In this context it is necessary to ask which theories can assist in analyzing relations between private organizations and intergovernmental organizations at the global level. Having discussed the proliferation of organizations and the patterns of representation, we turn to the issue of regulation. Private organizations are not only influential through their participation in the policy process. In some cases they assume the primary responsibility for problem-solving, either on their own initiative or through encouragement by public authorities. In this way self-regulation through private organizations becomes an alternative to the more traditional and recognized forms of regulation through states and markets. In the concluding section we further develop this perspective and argue that a treatment of global politics is incomplete without full integration of all relevant actors, including those organized in a private framework. They deserve
Private organizations in the global arena
3
more than the scant attention which they usually receive in studies on international affairs. Despite various attempts to bring this view into discussions on global politics, private organizations are still marginal elements of the academic debate, despite having long ago entered the scene of global politics. Proliferation of private organizations in global politics The organization of private interests is characterized by an enormous proliferation of actors at the international and global level (see Judge 1995). Therefore it is not surprising that private organizations are given various labels within studies on international relations, international political economy and transnational relations. Indeed, one finds interesting contributions in other disciplines. For example, management studies and business history consider the organization of firms; sociology of religion looks at the organization of beliefs; industrial relations research discusses the role and relationship of workers and employers; and anthropology investigates the character and structure of ethnic groups. Traditionally, theories have focused on different structures of governance. International relations is based on states, international political economy on states and markets, and transnational relations on civil society and associations. These disciplines, which are not always easily separable, and which will be considered below, regard private organizations differently. International relations In the vast area of international relations, with its myriad of approaches and schools of thought, empirical studies and theoretical developments are orientated at public authority. A variety of academic and historical reasons account for this. When international relations emerged as a scientific discipline, the study of international authority was almost completely dominated by international public law, a field sharply separated from international private law, which includes business law. In international relations the power paradigm of structuring international affairs was stressed, but the new discipline remained preoccupied with the analysis of public authority and, in this respect, followed the established legalist approach. A number of events cemented this line of reasoning. The world wars, cold war, collapse of colonial empires and the emergence of new and independent states strengthened the belief that international and global politics is best understood from the perspective of independent and unitary states struggling for power and hegemony inside or outside the framework of intergovernmental organizations. In disputes between state-centric schools of thought in international relations, little room is left for other actors.2 The existence of private organizations is not denied, but they are, a priori, considered of minor importance and, accordingly, solid investigations are hardly worth the effort.
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However, even from a strong state-centric perspective, it makes sense to study private organizations to demonstrate how states influence the formation of private actors, or how they instrumentalize them in their rivalry with other states. This includes terrorist organizations, private armies, arms dealers, peace movements and other groups. Although voluntary private groups co-operating across states may disturb state-centric thinking, some aspects of private activity are discussed in writings primarily concerned with states and referenced in studies linking foreign policy with domestic policy processes (Evans et al. 1993; Skidmore and Hudson 1993; Keohane and Milner 1996). Nevertheless, in terms of global politics private organizations are rather a “backstage” phenomenon. The broad tradition of international organizations refers to both public and private actors and inter-organizational networks. Still, the focus is primarily on inter-state co-operation, and less on private activity. However, international organizations building upon public authority cannot be interpreted through the lenses of inter-state co-operation or through a principal-agent perspective where their activities are determined by member states alone, as they may also develop a certain degree of autonomy (Reinalda and Verbeek 1999). Again, it is not clear how this may affect, or is of relevance to, private organizations. International political economy In the field of international political economy, problem-solving is arranged around the state and market. Markets influence politics and vice versa without there being a balanced reciprocal influence. In some analyses, states are seen as having a controlling influence on economies. This strand of research somewhat reformulates the realist approaches. In some other studies the organization of markets is analyzed with states and intergovernmental organizations sharing responsibility for the operation of markets with firms, unions and trade associations. These have become increasingly institutionalized because deregulation is often followed by reregulation (Vogel 1996; Strange 1996) or voluntary standards and norms in the marketplace. Macro-economic problems, as well as the conditions of specific industries, are scrutinized and intergovernmental organizations, such as, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the World Trade Organization, are analyzed. Following the process of globalization, it is no surprise that some areas, such as the regulation of financial markets, and to a lesser extent the private organizations in the field, have received special attention over the last ten to fifteen years (Cerny 1993; Kapstein 1994; Stubbs and Underbill 1994; Underbill 1997; Porter 1993; Helleiner 1994; Filipovic 1997). When observing state-market relations, a greater role is attributed to private organizations although a rather limited spectrum of organizations is
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actually reviewed. Emphasis is first and foremost on transnational corporations that are sometimes more powerful than those nations which host them or where they operate. Nevertheless, a plethora of other private organizations involved in global politics exist in the marketplace, but these are rarely acknowledged. This applies, for instance, to: family dynasties, such as the Rockefellers, Morgans, Krupps or Rothschilds; various ethnic groups (Kotkin 1993); cartels in air transport, oil, diamonds and other commodities (see Sampson 1984; Yergin 1991; Kanfer 1993); conferences created in different areas of shipping (Marx 1953; Cafruny 1987); and business associations representing producer interests (Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Hollingsworth et al. 1994) and business roundtables, clubs or commissions fostering ideas and debates on general economic problems at “private summits” such as the Bilderberg meetings, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the World Economic Forum, the Trilateral Commission (Gill 1990) and so-called “international class coalitions” (Pijl 1984, 1998). By ignoring or giving relatively little attention to these fairly robust units of organized political action, the international political economy tradition cultivates, to some degree, the myth that business is individualistic and guided by narrow self-interests. This line of argument, consequently, goes on to state that business interests are generally unable to organize collectively on the global scene. Indeed, some of these private organizations in the business world are not necessarily created for political purposes, nor routinely involved in politics; however, some are established for this purpose or are politically active when the occasion warrants such behavior. Although many analyses of state and market provide only a partial idea as to how economic interests are collectively organized in global politics, some recent academic contributions highlight this (Cutler et al. 1999; Underbill 2000). This is somewhat ironical given the fact that globalization, perhaps more than anything else, propels the emergence of new private actors and has been an important consideration for the development of global politics during the last decades (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). It is problematic that the roles of many market actors in global politics are only vaguely dealt with by international political economy and a better guidance should be expected. However, it is also noteworthy that private, non-economic players generally fall outside the paradigms of international political economy. Hence, to understand the roles performed by this subset of private organizations, we must turn to a third approach for studying global politics. Transnational relations The third method reviewed here is the transnational or civil society approach. By analyzing structures of governance beyond market and state, this strand of research examines global processes in areas where civil society structures contribute to problem-solving through private organizations.3 Thus, a number of other policy fields, most typically those
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involving non-market actors and non-market relations, are addressed. This includes environmental protection, human rights and relief work, and efforts to safeguard underprivileged groups such as ethnic minorities, women and children. However, the transnational approaches are not only concerned with the involvement of private actors in policy fields that are commonly ranked as “low politics”, but they also point to the existence of secret private organizations such as arms dealers, mercenary groups, illegal uranium exporters and groups which influence “high politics” domains. While the alleged policy monopoly of states in areas of security policy is challenged, systematic publicly available knowledge about these groups is limited. Although international relations analyses are generally characterized by a state-centric view that devotes little space to private organizations, and whereas the international political economy only observes certain types of economic actors in politics, transnational relations is primarily occupied with understanding the role of organizations emerging out of civil society. This field does not employ a consistent vocabulary and a range of concepts are employed to describe different private organizations. Arguably, it would be more correct to speak of a collection of perspectives. The commonly used but contested concept developed within transnational relations studies is that of non-governmental organization. This is also supported by the branch of international organization research. Studies of non-governmental organizations encompass a very broad group of actors, and a huge glossary of acronyms has been created to account for the variety in the organization of private interests. Still, “non-governmental organizations” is a problematic category for characterizing private organizations.4 There are three major deficiencies. First, some basic features of private organizations are not elaborated on. “Non-governmental organizations” is a negative definition, which serves to distinguish such organizations from the more prominent—and presumably more important—intergovernmental organizations, which are fewer and easier to identify. The reason for adopting this concept is relatively straightforward. Scholarly work in international affairs has been heavily influenced by the efforts of the UN to identify and define relevant exchange partners in the years following its formation. For politicians and bureaucrats, “non-governmental organizations” has remained a satisfactory definition. Alternative concepts from interest group research in comparative politics could be a major source of inspiration, but studies on domestic and international private organizations have, strangely enough, been studied in isolation. A few exceptions, however, can be found. The concept of nongovernmental organization is, for instance, employed in development studies to categorize interest groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America, but it is almost never used to analyze private actors in the industrialized world, except, perhaps, in cases where national affiliates of international nongovernmental organizations are addressed. Although reference is sometimes
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also made to pressure groups in international affairs, in general little crossfertilization exists. Second, some types of private action fall outside traditional definitions. In the international political economy literature, multinational and transnational corporations are treated as global, profit-seeking organizations and therefore are usually excluded from the group of nongovernmental organizations mainly described as non-profit organizations. Such firms are also given less recognition as suitable exchange partners by intergovernmental organizations. The same applies to various international federations of political parties, which are associated with governments because they seek political office and, consequently, are not of a genuine private character. In a similar vein, national liberation movements aspiring to political power fall outside the concept of non-governmental organizations. Consequently, political and ideological movements, such as workers’ internationals or the Zionist movement that campaigned for a homeland for the Jewish people, cannot be treated properly within the existing framework of non-governmental organizations. Third, some private organizations are neglected. Research on nongovernmental organizations is strongly biased towards certain groups and policy fields. In particular, private actors emerging from the market and involved in co-ordination through industrial and financial networks or business associations are not well represented, although many business organizations are voluntary and non-profit driven and host a potential for governance that is not satisfactorily explored. Additionally, religious groups—whether from major world religions or minor sects—are generally not found in research on non-governmental organizations. The same applies to professional and scientific societies organized at the global level (Judge 1977; Schofer 1999). Today, our understanding of non-governmental organizations is strongly colored by principles embodied within research and draws on the experiences of a rather small selection of private organizations. These typically have few resources, engage in specific policy fields, and often struggle for recognition by public authority. In general, practitioners and scholars find it difficult to fully accept this whole and heterogeneous group of actors referred to above as positively private and not just nongovernmental. Consequently, the involvement of private actors, with or without a self-interest, in public policy may appear contradictory. Still, it is not raised as a problem, nor is it questioned why, when and how private organizations will and can assume public goals and functions. Mindful of these connotations and conceptual weaknesses, it is necessary to develop a new and all-encompassing theory which integrates all private actors active in global politics. Thus, it is appropriate to revive the inter-war conception of private organizations,5 Today, it is evident that single nation-states, the co-operation of states and, for that matter, unregulated market forces, do not have the necessary capacity to solve a
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range of domestic and global problems. Thus, despite some hesitation and resentment, private organizations are either silently accepted or explicitly welcomed. A sound evaluation of the role of private organizations in global politics, however, requires that their contributions are not prematurely disqualified because they emerge outside the realm of public authority. At the same time, however, the public side of their activity should not be exaggerated in an over-optimistic effort to highlight their role in the globalization process. In sum, their essentially private nature and their public potential must be reconciled in an integrated approach. The significant structural and territorial features of such an approach can be distinguished as follows: Private character Organizations referred to in this study are essentially private in character, hence the concept of “private organization”. “Private”, in this respect, means founded and controlled by individual persons or corporate actors—or aggregates thereof—in the pursuance of specific individual or organizational interests. Private organizations adopt their own rules and seek to finance their own activities; they determine their own goals and are accountable to their founders and members. All this, however, does not suggest that they are unrelated to or independent of their environment. When involved in politics, they cannot escape the influence of public authorities and public policy, as they may depend on the recognition of political institutions and, in some cases, also on public funding. This may have a huge impact on the way they organize and behave. It does not mean that private organizations are never “other regarding”, but the primary element of activity lies in the provision of “private goods” or “club goods” at the global level. Consequently, they seek to exclude free-riders from the consumption of goods reserved for members. Members of such private organizations have a basic incentive to participate in the production of goods, and it is this general feature that is also a classical problem in collective action theory (Olson 1965; Buchanan 1965; Sandler and Tschirhart 1997; Cornes and Sandler 1986). This, however, does not rule out the fact that private organizations can also behave altruistically. Members’ concerns for the welfare of other groups may cause them to make broader commitments, become involved in public policy, and produce public goods to benefit global society (Kaul et al. 1999). Indeed, this may, for a period of time and in certain issue areas, become the primary goal of a private organization, and not merely a side-effect of narrow organizational goals. Formal character Private interests are channeled mainly through formal organizations, as these usually provide the most appropriate and effective form of
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representation in the global arena. Private organizations can pool different types of resources as a basis for collective action. They run bureaucracies that can react promptly and do independent investigations, and they have a stable leadership able to formulate short-term tactics as well as long-term strategies. However, this is not to suggest that the organizational processes are de-coupled from ordinary members and their control over the organizations’ actions. Some room exists for independent initiatives to be channeled through the bureaucrats and elected leaders. Moreover, private interests are not exclusively represented on a collective basis. Individuals or single firms may develop advanced political strategies that independently seek to influence global policy-making. Global character As far as their territorial character is concerned, private organizations are active on the global level. Their constituencies attract members across the globe. They exchange ideas with political institutions like intergovernmental organizations, which are also organized in a global framework. Private organizations seek to influence decision-making, which is deemed valid for the global society. Independently, they also pioneer solutions to global problems. All this, however, does not suggest equal representation of each and every interest category. Additionally, certain countries and regions are better represented than others. Furthermore, only some organizations are primarily designed to influence global politics, while other groups participate only marginally in politics. The attempt to bring global private organizations “back in” has a number of precursors. Academic research began to take an interest in private organizations in the mid nineteenth century, after their numbers sharply increased, and a larger scale of transnationalism developed at the beginning of the twentieth century (Lyons 1963; Skjelsbaek 1971; Murphy 1994; Charnowitz 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999). International organizations emerged as a sub-discipline (Woolf 1916) and private international associations and bodies were identified as a distinct cluster of international organizations different from public organizations (Potter 1922). An important aspect in this development was the internationalization of commerce and communication. Powerful actors such as corporations, trusts, combines, cartels, conferences and business associations increasingly coordinated interests across nations and were distinguished in some of the classic literature on economic imperialism (Liefmann 1897; Hobson 1902; Hilferding 1910). However, most investigations into the behavior of the business world were not actor-centered and analyses were not always explicitly linked to the study of politics. Within the field of international organizations, monographic work was later devoted to the general category of private organizations, which included organizations representing economic and non-economic interests
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alike. An early explorative study is L.C.White’s work The Structure of Private International Organizations, where different types of organizations are treated as politically active groups (White 1933). At that time, a relatively varied landscape of private organizations at the international level had already matured, but this fact remained largely unrecognized within social sciences before the war. The creation of the United Nations and official principles to guide relationships with private actors caused the concept of “non-governmental organizations” to become the established definition. 6 This definition unquestionably included non-economic groups; however, profit-driven organizations and certain branches of international business were regarded with ambivalence in academic work. With this bias, non-governmental organizations gradually became accepted as a legitimate subject of research, although contributions were relatively few and isolated throughout the 1950s and 1960s (White 1951; Lador-Lederer 1962; Lyons 1963). In the early 1970s the transnational school was inaugurated and presented as a new “world politics paradigm”. In the next decades, it further developed this into interdependence theories and liberal approaches to international relations (Keohane and Nye 1971, 1977). Strongly associated with this school were also the new international political economy approaches. These approaches looked at the economic and political operations of transnational or multinational corporations, their impact on third world countries, and political power in the industrialized world (Vernon 1971; Barnet and Muller 1974; Fennema 1982; Stopford and Strange 1991; Sally 1995; Korten 1997). A preoccupation with the state and market approach meant, however, that the patterns of political activity in private organizations were not mapped out systematically. In the transnational approaches a fairly broad range of issue areas and private organizations were analyzed and recognized as important players in global politics.7 However, research on transnational organizations fragmented into different directions, leaving little room for dialogue and for finding a common platform. New general concepts, such as “pressure groups”, were only sporadically introduced in the study of international affairs (Willetts 1982). Some concepts have indeed experienced a successful carrier but these do not seek to encompass all global organizations, nor do they emphasize their basic “privateness”. Thus, following the upswing in the new social movements literature of the 1970s, various global private organizations are viewed as movements rather than formal organizations in non-economic issue areas. This is illustrated through references to private organizations as, for example, “transnational social movements” or “civil society organizations” (Smith et al. 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998). The prevailing concept of non-governmental organizations is not necessarily abandoned. Indeed, the majority of contributions dealing with non-economic actors in global politics, such as gender studies,
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environmental politics, humanitarian affairs, human rights and so on, still employ the established concept. Another major conceptual innovation refers to “non-state actors” (Mansbach et al. 1976; Risse-Kappen 1995). This category, while including non-governmental organizations, is designed to embrace an even larger category of actors such as multinational enterprises, cartels, and criminal, religious and ethnic networks. Some of these actors are never, or rarely, treated as non-governmental organizations.8 However, this concept is also problematic insofar as “non-state” overlaps with, but is not synonymous to, “private”. Thus, “non-state actors” also refers to organizations based on public authority below, as well as above, the level of states. These include municipalities, supranational institutions and intergovernmental organizations. Therefore, the concept offers an alternative interpretation of international relations by moving away from state centrism, but it fails to create a conceptual framework for the study of private organizations per se. As discussed, scientific inquiry into the role of private organizations in global politics is not of recent origin and a certain amount of continuity can be discerned over time. The extreme diversity of organizational goals, structures and territorial levels, together with the low priority attributed to private organizations in the study of international affairs, produces a high level of conceptual disorder. Moreover, it fails to recognize the private character and public functions of these organizations, and the problems arising from this specific position. In the following chapters, this intriguing duality will be scrutinized further through the representation of private interests in public policy-making and self-regulation by private organizations. Contributions to governance through the representation of private organizations To solve a range of societal problems, states and intergovernmental organizations are assisted through representation by private organizations. Although this institutionalization of contact goes far back in time, it was not really formalized in the early part of global politics (Charnowitz 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997). This was partly due to the administrative capacity of private organizations in many policy fields deemed generally superior to that of public bureaus, bodies and organizations. Therefore, problemsolving was undertaken by organizations outside public authority. Furthermore, inter-state co-operation was, at that time, limited and only embraced a few issue areas. With the development of an increasing number of intergovernmental organizations, consultation procedures developed accordingly. Although many private organizations have no representation, large segments have traditionally co-operated with intergovernmental organizations and it is to this group of private organizations and relationships that we shall now turn.
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Early on, empirical analyses of the international representation of private organizations moved beyond the paradigm of “pressure politics” and saw some organizations as “legislative non-governmental organizations” contributing to international and global governance (Lador-Lederer 1962:77). Their public function was often recognized through empirical observations, but at the theoretical level “pressure politics” was not challenged as the celebrated paradigm in general interest group research, which saw private organizations as not being fully integrated in the policy process. The theoretical debate has now changed and private organizations are increasingly recognized. There are a number of reasons for including private actors in public policy-making. Although many intergovernmental organizations operate a huge and often cumbersome bureaucracy, they face severe budgetary constraints and, compared with the challenges they meet, resources are scarce. To formulate coherent policies, draft conventions, adopt codes, implement programs and monitor the compliance of states, resources and inputs from private organizations are needed (Gordenker and Weiss 1997). Resources in the “private world” may be more widely distributed to smaller or larger groups of actors, and under these circumstances it would be a futile strategy to ignore the expertise outside the administration of intergovernmental organizations, as without this public policy is hardly imaginable. Nevertheless, there is always a risk that the expertise provided by private organizations is biased, and so a careful evaluation of this form of expertise is essential. In some cases it may be difficult to distinguish public from private resources. This is because knowledge is shared by both public and private actors involved in a given policy field, and forms agenda-based “policy communities” or knowledge-based “epistemic communities” grounded in beliefs, ideas, norms, values and interests (Haas 1992). As illustrated in the chapter by Stone on international think tanks, knowledge is produced by private organizations which are involved in independent problem-solving and they also co-operate with other private organizations, states or intergovernmental organizations in areas where they require additional resources. Resource dependency is not the only argument for inviting private actors. Through representation, private organizations not only provide information but also share responsibility for public policy (Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Boli and Thomas 1999). Although the legitimacy of actions taken by intergovernmental organizations is derived from their members, states cannot always provide a sufficient base of legitimacy. Therefore, private organizations must be invited and granted access to a variety of bodies through the creation of some relevant consultation procedures and practices. In this way the work of intergovernmental organizations rests upon a dual form of legitimacy provided by democratically elected governments, albeit not in all parts of the world, and the participation of private organizations representing the interests of
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citizens. The “numerical” and “corporate” channels that have long ago been identified and highlighted in comparative politics (Rokkan 1966) are also relevant to the level of global politics. States can filter private interests into intergovernmental organizations but in cases where these interests are not articulated or only articulated vaguely by states, private organizations find their own independent forms of representation. There are different reasons for the variation of inputs through states and private organizations. States must balance different private interests or must balance private interests with public goals and broader national interests, and there are even private interests which are in direct conflict with those of states. Even in cases where states actively support certain private organizations, they are not able to represent them over time in the same authentic form, or necessarily with the same vigor. In sum, the direct participation of private organizations lends a democratic quality to the management of intergovernmental organizations and is, therefore, an indispensable contribution to global politics. Private organizations are also more advantaged through formal representation. They have a unique opportunity to advise the administration of many intergovernmental organizations and, although they also operate under financial constraints, they have strong interests in providing assistance in areas where they have a monopoly on relevant information, or where their expertise is necessary to bring regulation in line with practical experiences. It should be borne in mind that many private organizations are organized within a global framework and uniquely positioned to collect information across the entire globe through their members and secretariats. In terms of territorial coverage, private organizations are in no way inferior to intergovernmental organizations, which draw upon information from states and conduct independent investigations. The involvement of private organizations in negotiation processes at the global level also provides a political and technical base for the translation of policies and instruments into regional and national legislation. In other words, members and local or regional groups in global private organizations can play an important role in the subsequent implementation of rules discussed and decided in the framework of intergovernmental organizations. Just as in domestic politics, private organizations at the global level increase the level of participation and broaden the spectrum of interest representation. However, the articulation of interests and unimpeded access to relevant forums is not always achieved, and private organizations face various dilemmas in their relations with intergovernmental organizations. Intergovernmental organizations may, for instance, thwart democratic interest representation, by instrumentalizing them to improve their capacity as autonomous policy-makers to support the interests of certain groups of states and in order to challenge the domains of other intergovernmental organizations (Reinalda and Verbeek 1999). The granting of a public status also has consequences for the internal
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democracy of private organizations. In exchange for being recognized, private organizations must in general be able to act in a coherent manner by mobilizing consensus in their membership and presenting a more or less uniform view. Indeed, this dilemma is dealt with in organization theory and in the neo-corporatist tradition of interest representation within comparative politics. However, it could be extended to understand global forms of representation. Thus, organizations have to strike a balance between the interests of the constituency (“logic of membership”) and representation of these interests in a form acceptable to their political environment (“logic of influence”) (Schmitter and Streeck 1981). Given the asymmetric distribution of resources, conflicts of interest and variation of values in the membership, this coherence can only be obtained at a certain price. In many cases the necessary amount of coherence can only be achieved if certain interests in the membership are neglected or squeezed out in the internal bargaining process. In the long run, however, this may prove unsatisfactory for “suffering groups” and so internal democracy becomes fragile. For private organizations, representation produces a number of dilemmas and requires an elaboration of complex representational strategies. These problematic situations have been referred to but not critically examined in research on the representation of private organizations at international and global levels. This is quite strange, given the enormous scope of representation and the systematic design of consultation mechanisms developed by intergovernmental organizations, especially since the mid 1940s (White 1951). Participation has since evolved as a multifaceted activity with a high complexity of exchange patterns. With regard to the major types of formal representation, we find interesting parallels across the different UN organizations, although each organization administers its own set of regulations, which are firmly rooted in history (Charnowitz 1997). In the context of the UN and its specialized agencies, rules are hammered out in the legal jargon of international law. Since they were first adopted and integrated into the organization’s charter, rules have undergone various revisions (White 1951; Pei-Heng 1981; Willetts 1996). Applicants must follow specific procedures and are critically assessed according to welldefined criteria. Different categories of consultative status (today “general”, “special” and “roster” in the context of the UN) can be granted to organizations. In practice, this means they have different degrees of access to documents, meetings and conferences, and to exchanges and negotiations with the UN (Spiro 1994; Willetts 1996; Feraru 1997). The whole legal machinery has been fine-tuned to meet these challenges, and through the last decades we have experienced a significant increase in both new issue areas and the number of organizations with consultation status. Briefly, three political and administrative explanations for the formalization of representation can be offered. First, the regulatory framework was drafted and further developed during the cold war years, a time of growing East-
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West conflict. Under these circumstances, states had a keen interest in maintaining strong gate-keeping functions regarding the participation of private actors in global politics. Second, the global level, more than any other territorial level, is inhabited by a very large population of private organizations seeking official recognition. Therefore, intergovernmental organizations must formulate a set of principles to reduce complexity in their environment and accept only a limited number of relevant organizations. Third, the application of these principles suggests that participation is restricted to non-governmental organizations. Groups or networks of private actors outside the official definition of non-governmental organization are, in other words, denied access. An analysis of representation through private organizations can, when based upon data provided by intergovernmental organizations, only cover officially recognized and recorded actor categories. Consequently, further investigations into the role of private organizations in global politics must compensate for this and examine representation with a somewhat broader perspective. The granting of various consultation rights to private organizations shows that intergovernmental organizations are not just passively taking the existing landscape of associations into account. To avoid fragmented interest representation, they deliberately encourage associations to formulate joint statements, do joint investigations, or merge existing associations so as to improve future co-operation. In this way, the universe of global private organizations and their more and more ramified networks is actively structured by public authority. Consequently, a hierarchy of private organizations emerges, either by cementing existing hierarchies or by challenging them. Intergovernmental organizations usually recognize only one organization for each interest category, and when managed successfully this strategy should avoid, or at least reduce, the number of inputs from competing organizations. This principle, however, does not exclude that a reasonably broad spectrum of groups are consulted, although preferably representing distinctly different interests. In other words, a certain mix of relevant—and sometimes even conflicting—interests to settle disputes within the forum of intergovernmental organizations is welcomed. This can strengthen the legitimacy behind public policy. In sum, intergovernmental organizations have strategies concerning representation that, on the one hand, welcome co-operation with private organizations and, on the other hand, are based on an advanced criterion for selection. If they did not need their assistance in the policy process, the elaboration of these specific mechanisms would be an unnecessary exercise and, likewise, the unbiased acceptance of all organizations would make the issue of regulation redundant. The idea of state-centric research on international relations without regard to private organizations is difficult to understand against the backdrop of the above legal framework of interest representation. Private organizations are not merely standing on the sidelines of politics
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offering ad hoc inputs to intergovernmental organizations. They are stable participants and often powerful forces contributing to the policy process. Information on representation is mainly provided by intergovernmental organizations adopting an open-door policy characterized by a high degree of transparency. Unfortunately, data from these sources has not been fully exploited in research. Thus, the evolution of representation and variation, across issue areas, and strategies of private organizations are just some topics receiving little attention in research, the analysis of which could give a broader and more differentiated understanding of the performance of private organizations. It is, for instance, clear that representation of private organizations is structured differently across sectors at the domestic level, and studies on global politics support this (Spiro 1994; Willetts 1996). In the chapter by Willetts, it is shown that even within economic policy-making sharp differences exist (see also Nelson 1995). Unlike analyses on domestic processes, the role of private organizations is generally considered to be small, and at best confined to areas and sectors of “low politics” in international relations literature. The distinction between “high politics” and “low politics” is highly disputable and the changing interpretations of “security” also blur these distinctions. Thus, instability in the financial sector may severely undermine national sovereignty, the spread of diseases, such as AIDS, may cripple a country’s economy, and environmental problems may threaten life on our planet and call for solutions in which private organizations are a part (Lipschutz and Mayer 1996; Young 1997). In sum, participation by private organizations in the global policy process is, indeed, of a general nature. The UN regulatory framework is often considerably more elaborate than that within individual countries, even in countries with a long and sustained tradition of integrating private interests into public policy-making. However, theoretical developments have been comparatively few and, given this, we may seek inspiration from the more lively debate on the role of interest groups at the domestic level. What could inform our deliberations is, for example, the discussion on pluralism versus neo-corporatism, which slowly began in the late 1960s and gained momentum from the mid 1970s onward. In this discussion, the paradigm of neo-corporatism became the dominant perspective in analyses of interest group participation across a variety of policy fields (Schmitter 1974). Arguably, it can, with certain modifications, be extended to global politics, although analyses inspired by these theories may not come out as sharply as in comparative politics. Unfortunately, however, the neocorporatist approach has remained almost unnoticed and, unlike the pluralist pressure group perspective, has not been applied to the global level. Also, a number of other academic contributions from the last decades, like the neo-institutional perspective (Olsen 1981), exchange theory (Marin 1989), network analysis (Kenis and Schneider 1991) or the advocacycoalition approach (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), have studied the
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complex role of private actors, but have only exceptionally, and then in a somewhat ad hoc fashion, crossed the boundary and entered the global scene (Nelson 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Smith et al. 1997). The lack of attention given to the above theories in the study of representation at the global level is rooted in the established division of labor between the branches of international relations and comparative politics. It is not specific idiosyncrasies towards certain theories on representation or a positive attitude towards other approaches, but rather a general lack of dialogue that is the problem. It may be argued, however, that analyses tend implicitly to draw upon pluralist assumptions, which stress the relatively open and free access to decision-making, the competitive relationship between actors in organizing and representing interests, and the multiple institutional channels of influence. Many policy fields are, indeed, characterized by such patterns, but this far from exhaustive perspective often fails to account for the reciprocal relationship between private organizations and intergovernmental organizations. The neo-corporatist tradition has stressed that private organizations may enjoy a monopoly in the representation of certain interests in society, that a status hierarchy exists between organizations, and that political institutions influence the behavior and structure of organizations. These features can also be found in the analysis of interest representation at the global level. It is an astounding fact, however, that this perspective has not been employed at this level, but has been confined to the study of domestic and, in some cases, European politics (Greenwood et al. 1992). Therefore, careful consideration must be given to how a theoretical framework, originally developed to analyze domestic and regional politics, can be employed within a global context. This suggestion reflects a guarded optimism, and in cases where strong connotations prevail it is advisable to look for other, more appropriate, theories and concepts. The purpose is not just to inject more theory into analysis on global interest representation. It is also necessary to integrate empirical studies on private organizations in both domestic and international contexts without referring to and accommodating concepts and theories employed to study either domestic and regional politics or global politics, and seemingly inapplicable beyond specific territorial boundaries. However, advances in the study on private organizations in global politics must be made in areas other than that of representation. In terms of governance, private organizations are not only contributing to problem-solving through different forms of representation, but they can play an even stronger role by being delegated or voluntarily assuming some public functions. This is the theme of the next section.
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Organizations and networks as global governance mechanisms Private organizations not only participate in global policy processes and become co-responsible for public policy, they also act as “private governments” by having tasks delegated to them from public authority or by voluntarily assuming responsibility for problem-solving through selfregulation.9 In this way, private organizations become alternatives to governance by the state or governance by the market—and influence the ways in which public authority is exercised and economic exchanges are performed in the marketplace. During the last decades, and following initiatives of the UN Commission on Global Governance, private organizations have become increasingly recognized as official partners in the fast-growing literature on global governance and in various programs regarding sustainable development, climate changes, trade negotiations and so forth. Thus, in the current debate on “global governance”, “global order”, “global commons”, “world polity”, “cosmopolitan democracy” and so on (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Archibugi and Held 1995; Wapner 1996), elements of self-regulation are also addressed. As with representation, self-regulation is not a recent contribution to global governance; rather, it follows from the proliferation of global organizations, although this historical development is complicated to track down. Furthermore, self-regulation today is not restricted to particular policy fields, and a few examples can illustrate the wide field of applications. In international commerce, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) began to develop various schemes of arbitration and justice in the 1920s in areas where public regulation was either weak or missing (Lyons 1963; Dezalay and Garth 1996; Ronit and Schneider 1999). Also, within the last decades, new measures have been taken by the ICC, and initiatives in international trade and business law have been welcomed and recognized by relevant intergovernmental organizations. In a variety of issue areas, especially in advertising (Boddewyn 1992), this organization, representing the world business community, has developed specific codes of conduct regulating the behavior of firms, thus contributing to the further development of international private law (Circus 1980). Without private regulation, smooth economic transactions across the globe would become jeopardized. Although the ICC has been one of the pioneers in international self-regulation, its position is not unchallenged as a number of law firms are also involved in setting international business law precedents (Dezalay and Sugarman 1995). In particular industries, similar arrangements exist (Cutler et al. 1999). In the chemical industry, for instance, codes are adopted to regulate competition between producers and improve relations with consumer groups. Some codes, however, are product specific and only seek to govern
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the behavior of a relatively small group of firms, as documented by the chapter on dyestuffs producers. Since the late 1960s, the chemical industry has struggled with a bad reputation and, consequently, holds an interest in demonstrating responsible behavior and avoiding public regulation. To this end, the industry has developed different measures of global self-regulation. Environmental organizations have been critical observers, although in some cases they are involved in joint efforts to regulate the behavior of producers. This development is also supported by single firms, which adopt their own codes of ethics for appropriate behavior. Many initiatives build upon the proactive policy of the industry, as demonstrated in some of the recent “responsible care programs”. These were embraced by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) as well as by a number of large firms to improve environmental performance. Other fields where a tradition of private regulation exists are transport and communication. In their early stages, these were characterized by internationalization and globalization. In aviation, private organizations do co-operate with intergovernmental organizations in the development of international regimes (Nayar 1995); however, their own and independent initiatives must also be recognized. Thus, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has for a long time been involved in self-regulatory measures (Chuang 1972). It has continually updated the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulation and established stricter standards than its intergovernmental parallel organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (IATA 1999). Although academic literature on the regulation of shipping has mainly studied the relationship between private and public organizations, and discussed the role of global regimes (Cafruny 1987), various self-regulatory arrangements exist here as well. Recently, for example, the shipping community has been involved in the adoption of the International Safety Management Code (ICS/IFS 1996). However, the idea and practice of self-regulation goes back even further and is expressed through the activities of many organizations. Examples are the classification societies, developing uniform standards, and special branches such as the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), which has issued more than fifty codes of practice and guidelines. Private regulation often takes the form of setting standards, and the role of the Internet Society in the area of telecommunications, dealt with in the chapter by Werle and Leib, is one such case. Once adopted, these standards can replace public regulation or make it redundant, something usually welcomed and recognized by public authorities. Self-regulatory measures are not only found in business or where economic goals are involved. Further examples can be found in professional societies. In some cases, the efforts of professions overlap with those of business. Some of these, for instance in the medical professions, are of an
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older day, whereas other areas are of more recent origin and much influenced by the process of globalization. One such example is the media. Ethical codes and other kinds of regulatory systems not only seek to regulate certain aspects of competition, as demonstrated by the role of the International Publishers Association in the protection of copyrights, but also, and sometimes more importantly, seek to influence public perceptions of the professions concerned. Nevertheless, value-based forms of regulation not only build trust around the professions themselves but function as an alternative to national legislation or international conventions. This is vividly illustrated through the efforts of private organizations in the area of sports. From the 1960s onwards, national Olympic committees, special federations and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have been concerned with the problem of doping in sports. Measures to establish ethical norms for fair competition have been implemented. The IOC Medical Code, with which all athletes must comply, was adopted in the late 1960s and has been revised to meet new challenges (IOC 1999). Administrative bodies to monitor violations of the code have been created, and special laboratories across the world have been accredited to do scientific tests. These initiatives are recognized as alternatives to public regulation, which has been minimal. However, the issue of doping has become ever more serious and the management of the Olympic movement, which is now trying to reform itself through the IOC Ethics Commission, has been heavily criticized. This shows that self-regulation is never complete and continuous efforts must be made to improve it. Although self-regulation through private organizations is not a brand new thing in global politics, scholarly interest is of relatively recent origin and various sources of inspiration are available. Research in economic history points to interesting examples of self-regulatory mechanisms in the middle ages (Black 1984; Kieser 1989; Milgrom et al. 1990; Greif et al. 1994). These historical examples are especially relevant in understanding micro-processes associated with self-regulation, including incentives to create, sustain and even violate arrangements. However, contemporary selfregulation is embedded in more complex economic and political contexts than in previous centuries, or even in previous decades. Thus, among some of the important qualitative changes, self-regulation is more readily extended to global levels and includes a significant number of national and regional organizations; self-regulatory arrangements are generally surrounded by a higher degree of transparency and the level of accountability must be raised accordingly; and the capacity of states and intergovernmental organizations to police self-regulation has increased, with considerably more elaborate techniques. Theoretical reflections can also be found in research dealing with modern forms of self-regulation. Since the 1940s, self-regulation has been studied under the somewhat all-encompassing concept “private government”, which includes the analysis of regulation through associations, networks, cartels,
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clans, firms and so forth. Major parts of the literature, however, are related to the role of associations in economic issue areas, in particular the labor market and industrial sectors, where advanced forms of “private interest governments” exist (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). This line of research addresses domestic self-regulation, or discusses governance issues in a more abstract sense and hence a more territorially neutral way; it can also inspire the analysis of global arrangements (Coleman 1997). From a theoretical viewpoint, many of the same questions can be asked and hypotheses can be built around the same assumptions, regardless of territorial level. Furthermore, to gain a better understanding of domestic arrangements, which are very often built into larger, global systems of self-regulation, we must examine how these more encompassing structures are orchestrated—and vice versa.10 Case studies on the capacities of global private organizations, and more systematic attempts to position self-regulation in the context of global governance, are still relatively few and they have not drawn upon analyses of domestic arrangements. It is evident, therefore, that a theoretical integration of the different approaches to domestic and international self-regulation is necessary to conceive of domestic as well as international policy processes. As with studies on representation, however, there has been a strict division of labor between, on the one hand, comparative politics focusing on the variation in national political institutions and policy styles and, on the other hand, international relations, international political economy and civil society approaches. Analyses on global self-regulation emphasize the demands for regulation following the current process of globalization. They are also marked by an interest in their historical roots (Haufler 1997). They are located within the international political economy perspective and the civil society approach, where producers institutionalize markets through a variety of private organizations, or where non-economic actors, such as professional societies, establish standards of behavior. However, environmental and consumer organizations may also contribute to governance, for example, through acting as countervailing powers monitoring the behavior of other private organizations (Princen and Finger 1994; Wapner 1996). Parts of this literature are framed within the regime-approach which, although primarily dealing with state-driven arrangements, notes the performance of private organizations (Krasner 1982; Finlayson and Zacher 1988; Young 1989). However, the role of private organizations is rarely central to this research and only elevated to a specific position in “private regimes”. This is because the category of private regimes has been coined as an alternative category drawing on insights from the general body of regime analysis (Haufler 1993). Horizontal co-ordination through networks or tacit agreements between certain groups of actors can possess a high quality of self-discipline. However, more advanced versions of self-regulation, manifested by codes of
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conduct and other formalized rule systems, are often managed by more solid forms of organizations. In general, they seem to have the necessary infrastructure to initiate, sustain and reform arrangements. Additionally, as they are more visible players in global politics, their actions are more easily observed by public authorities and thus associated with greater accountability. The universe of organizations involved in some kind of selfregulation with a view to solving societal problems is significant. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on which private actors or forms of action are to be included and, hence, qualify as producers of public goods. One reason for this is the different meanings attached to the definition and operationalization of public goods (Hardin 1982; Mansbridge 1998). The basic controversy is not so much whether private regulation becomes an alternative to public regulation, although this is of course doubted in statecentric approaches to international relations, but rather whether selfregulation assumes genuine public functions. A border-line case is, for instance, certain groups of private organizations and networks which we usually view as economic actors, such as cartels. However, it is not always clear whether they adopt wider goals and move beyond purely self-interested behavior (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Spar 1994; Porter 1999). This is a specific research question regarding the institutionalization of markets that should be addressed more explicitly in the future, for private rule-making may be quite efficient without necessarily producing any public good to benefit the world community. In some cases, public functions are linked to the self-interest of organizations and narrow, rent-seeking activities; but this can also be a firmly proclaimed goal. For private organizations, the integration of public goals is somewhat of a riddle, and in business it is an issue that calls for profound investigation since firms have an official strategy to maximize profits and survive in competitive environments. This strategy enhances the myth that economic actors are individualistic and unable to establish arrangements to the benefit of society. It is much easier to accept that other private organizations, such as environmental organizations or human rights groups, behave altruistically and contribute to the improvement of people’s welfare. When approaching the problem of global self-regulation, we should not limit ourselves to deliberations of this dilemma in collective action theory, but, more specifically, examine under what circumstances global selfregulatory arrangements are likely to emerge and be sustained. Without in any way presenting an exhaustive list of issues, it seems relevant to discuss the origin of private rules, the monitoring of compliance, and the mechanisms of sanctioning non-compliant behavior. When analyzing these issues we shall look at both the micro-structures—for example, those institutional rules and organizational properties that may be conducive to the development of successful self-regulation—and the macro-structures, or how private organizations and their regulation are embedded in a wider societal context.
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Origins of self-regulation There are different origins of self-regulation. Basically, we may distinguish between autonomous and voluntary regulation, where private organizations without outside interference establish and manage their own rules, and delegated self-regulation, where the arrangement is imposed on private organizations and where rules are generally defined by public authority, most typically by states or intergovernmental organizations. In the former case, rule-making tends to be unobserved by political institutions and, hence, unnoticeable by the general public. The process of private rule-making is not always characterized by a great deal of transparency and control, which, from a democratic point of view, serves to discredit private organizations. Consequently, some private rules do not live up to the average standard of public regulation. A number of cases can be found where relations in the marketplace are regulated through private organizations in order to reduce transaction costs and to enhance trust, as demonstrated in the chapter by Cerny. These arrangements are usually not portrayed as being of political relevance, but they often are. In the case of imposed arrangements, however, public authority is evident. Where issues cannot be optimally handled through traditional public regulation, private authority becomes relevant and appropriate private organization must be identified, encouraged and, occasionally, even licensed to assume formal responsibility—sometimes under the perceived threat of state intervention. Indeed, there are many cases where rule-making is embedded in a political process, and where private regulation is based on formal agreement between public and private organizations or on some kind of mutual understanding. Public authority is often present and selfregulation is, therefore, part of a complex process where both public and private actors have input. Monitoring systems A growing number of global private organizations formulate statements, issue ethical principles, draft guidelines, adopt codes and so forth, but these initiatives are sometimes of a rather symbolic nature, and strict compliance is not demanded. In cases, however, where members of private organizations are to abide by the rules and a high degree of compliance is needed to sustain the principle of self-regulation, effective monitoring mechanisms must be established. In self-regulation, responsibility for monitoring compliance is taken by private organizations and major financial and technical resources are invested to oversee arrangements. The development of competence to police private rules by pooling resources and centralizing control is one way of organizing systematic monitoring. Another way of overseeing compliance is through delegating responsibility to regional or domestic agencies and federalizing the monitoring capacity in large organizations where the
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behavior of the members is otherwise difficult to police (Ronit and Schneider 1999). Monitoring is also de-centralized when members are directly involved in overseeing codes of conduct. However, there is no single and celebrated model of monitoring and it is, therefore, appropriate to analyze under which circumstances and with what results specific models are applied. Private initiatives can stand completely alone, but even in cases where regulation is surrendered, states and intergovernmental organizations may still have a significant role in the monitoring of compliance, and thus assist private organizations. In this way, public authorities are involved in the “monitoring of monitoring”, and can provide an alternative framework of regulation, if need be. Sanctions Effective monitoring is not enough to sustain self-regulation, and sanctioning mechanisms must be added. In other words, private organizations and networks must develop not only legislative and executive capacity, but must also create a judicial capacity through alternative court systems, like a “transnational business justice” (Dezalay and Garth 1996). Although different systems of monitoring and sanctioning may enhance the overall capacity of self-regulation and contribute to the production of public goods, there are several problems associated with this type of regulation. From a formal point of view, only members of a given organization are to comply with private rules, but not all actors in a given interest category are necessarily members. Unlike associations, cartels usually seek to organize a sizeable proportion of the market, but do not strive to organize all producers. As a consequence, producers outside such agreements cannot be expected to follow its rules and tend to adopt lower standards than prescribed. When free-riding becomes a significant or perennial problem, self-regulation is eroded and the arrangement grows politically unacceptable; it cannot replace public regulation which defines universal rules. Free-rider activity is difficult to monitor and sanction in global contexts and non-compliance by members can trigger a variety of sanctioning mechanisms to correct such behavior. Members have special obligations and incentives to comply as they may enjoy the social and material benefits usually associated with membership. Hierarchical, top-down sanctioning by private organizations is one way of achieving compliance. Another model focuses on peer pressure from members, including group sanctions. Persuasion or more isolated efforts of single members, such as business firms, to develop corporate codes of conduct in the spirit of self-regulation may also encourage compliance. As with monitoring procedures, different principles of sanctioning can be combined and so become mutually reinforcing. It is of the utmost importance that private organizations establish effective procedures for the sanctioning of non-compliance and that
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these are fully acknowledged by members. However, where private sanctions are not working properly, states and intergovernmental organizations are likely to intervene and demonstrate their supreme sanctioning capacity. The development of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms for public authority and applied to the behavior of states has undergone a more indepth examination than the private forms of regulation sketched out above. While there are many interesting parallels between monitoring and sanctioning at the public and private level, more detailed studies only seem to recognize private organizations as assisting states and intergovernmental organizations (Chayes and Chayes 1995; Weiss and Jacobson 1998). To further develop the perspective of self-regulation at the global level we must analyze how private arrangements occasionally replace public forms of authority, and how public arrangements are integrated in order to improve problem-solving. This exercise should be unprejudiced and driven by the conviction that private models are not necessarily inferior to public regulation. Indeed, private models often emerge only where action by public authority is either weak or altogether absent. Research suggests that contributions to global governance are also provided by self-regulation and are, with varying degrees of success, similar to state and market forms of governance. Conclusions In most analyses of global politics, private organizations are ignored or attributed a minor role. This limited attention is, however, due not to their alleged peripheral role but rather to prevailing academic research traditions in the field. Interestingly enough, this lack of recognition is not unique. Comparative politics has traveled a somewhat similar way. This discipline was originally also strongly biased towards analyses of public authority structures and only gradually did private actors become recognized players in domestic affairs. In specialized areas of research on political parties, associations, movements and business firms, private actors were indeed analyzed. This research was integrated into general studies of domestic politics. For a long time, and with considerable consequences, private organizations were ignored in international affairs research because statecentric approaches were stubbornly defended within this field. Even though private organizations were readily accepted as intermediary actors in domestic politics and sometimes also the formulation of foreign policy, they were not regarded as genuine transnational players. Over time, they have gained greater recognition, but it appears there is still a long way to go before they receive the credit they actually deserve. Unequivocally, one contributing factor is the inability to present a coherent alternative to existing approaches to international affairs. Various attempts have been made to bring different categories of private organizations on to the global
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stage. However, research on private organizations is admittedly rather fragmented, with too little dialogue and few attempts to synthesize the different concepts. Private organizations constitute a highly complex category, making it difficult to provide empirical overviews and further complicating theory building. Only parts of the organizational landscape are scrutinized— especially those adopting the label of “non-governmental organizations” where research concentrates on non-economic groups. In this chapter we have tried to accommodate different actors, groups, networks, etc., under the concept of “private organizations”. We have pointed to certain features common across organizational typologies and policy fields, and have shown how they contribute to problem-solving. One basic and relatively uncontroversial activity is the representation of private organizations in the work of intergovernmental organizations, where various mechanisms of consultation are established to regulate interaction. In general, this regulation is characterized by a high degree of transparency, but attempts to systematically analyze formal participation, or for that matter other forms of exchange, are few. Nevertheless, representation is a major political activity of private organizations essential for the performance of intergovernmental organizations which cannot be understood exclusively as a forum for co-operation between states or as autonomous bureaucracies. Theories to understand representation in the global context are weakly developed. There is, however, a rich and almost unexploited theoretical potential for analytic work in interest group literature, which has advanced to the point of understanding representation at other territorial levels. Self-regulation through private organizations is much less recognized as a vehicle of governance, although these arrangements are not exceptional in global politics. Unlike representation, self-regulation is not officially registered and systematic data is not easily accessible. Self-regulation is also a more controversial topic, because it is a radical form of problem-solving in which private organizations not only assist states and intergovernmental organizations but also provide their own solutions to societal problems and become a valid alternative to public regulation. This may be much harder to accept in international relations theories where the role of states is emphasized. Private organizations, however, are not just wheeled in where state or market or dispersed civil society has failed, but can often be the most relevant and preferred mode of governance. Therefore, further analyses into global self-regulation should focus on both the motives of actors in developing such arrangements and the economic and political conditions under which they emerge. In recent years, where global governance has been discussed at many international conferences, private organizations have been seen with a new perspective. Still, their real potential in problem-solving is much bigger and encompasses a much larger group of organizations than is usually believed in
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these contexts. Therefore, a more systematic focus on private organizations should not only improve our understanding of global politics from an academic point of view, but should also improve existing arrangements and help design more effective and efficient institutions. This is not to suggest that private organizations can be used as the formula for governance. There is no need to exaggerate their role to compensate for a previous lack of attention. What is needed is a fresh and unprejudiced evaluation of the public functions of private organizations. Notes 1 The secularization of societies, demise of absolutism, emergence of a modern state system and development of capitalism disentangled the political, economic and religious spheres of power and led to a differentiation of state, market and civil society as specific sub-systems of societal governance. Also, before these processes gained momentum, there were important private organizations. The Fuggers and Medicis, for instance, can be understood as private organizations which combined different forms of commercial, religious and political resources. However, it is difficult to categorize these dynasties strictly as private organizations as their economic, religious and political positions were intertwined. 2 Well-organized states operate in juxtaposition to—an alleged—fragmented civil society and marketplace with limited private co-ordination. Likewise, economists have not taken a strong interest in the involvement of economic actors in global politics; therefore, political science and economics both confirmed the view that the international political arena was reserved for states. 3 Civil society is usually interpreted as community-based structures, such as families or tribes. However, civil society has undergone an organizational revolution and is represented through different formats today. In the transnational tradition, civil society has generally become synonymous with non-governmental organizations. As is argued later, this interpretation is too narrow. Still, we subscribe to the view that organizations may be understood as a new form of governance beyond market and state. 4 In the eagerness to create a taxonomy of organizations, categories have been developed for non-governmental organizations without ever coming into wider use. One example, BINGO (Business International Non-Governmental Organization) has been coined to categorize business organizations operating at the international level. However, in empirical studies and theoretical discussion very little reference is made to this term. 5 It was once customary to refer to “private international organizations”, and Geneva was the seat not only of the League of Nations but also of the Federation of Private International Organizations. 6 In the Charter of the United Nations, Article 71 empowers the Economic and Social Council of the UN to make consultations with non-governmental organizations. In contrast, the League of Nations’ relation to private organizations was limited to a relatively small number of organizations in a less codified form (see White 1951:248–58). 7 Interestingly, the labor movement became a fashionable subject of research and was embraced with great sympathy, but was mainly studied as a national phenomenon within comparative politics and rarely at an international organization level (Feld 1972; Windmuller 1980). As an established movement,
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it was not included in the new social movements research, and scholarly interest has been declining (but see Journal of World-System Research, 4 (1), Winter 1998). 8 In earlier times attitudes towards understanding various private organizations as non-governmental organizations were more open. White made reference to cartels and noted that they could also facilitate international problem-solving (White 1951). 9 The notions of “private government” and “private interest government” may appear to be oxymorons. “Private” is somehow anathema to “government”, but civil and economic life is also governed. Private actors may, as is argued here, fulfil some governmental functions to the benefit of society. 10 In the literature on domestic self-regulation there is an apparent lack of interest in how this may eventually be linked to, and integrated with, other territorial levels and organizations (see for instance Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Campbell et al. 1991).
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Krasner, S. (1982) International Regimes, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Lador-Lederer, J.J. (1962) International Non-Governmental Organizations and Economic Entities. A Study in Autonomous Organization and Ius Gentiu, Leyden: A.W.Sythoff. Liefmann, R. (1897) Die Unternehmerverbände. Konventionen, Kartelle. Ihr Wesen und ihre Bedeutung, Freiburg i.B.: J.C.B.Mohr. Lipschutz, R.D. and J.Mayer (1996) Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance: The Politics of Nature from Place to Planet, Albany: SUNY Press. Lyons, F.S.L. (1963) Internationalization in Europe 1815–1914, Leyden: A.W. Sythoff. Mansbach, R.W., Y.H.Ferguson and D.E.Lampert (1976) The Web of World Politics. Nonstate Actors in the Global System, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Mansbridge, J. (1998) “On the contested nature of the public good” in W.W. Powell and E.S.Clemens (eds), Private Action and the Public Good, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Marin, B. (ed.) (1989) Governance and Generalized Exchange. Self-Organizing Policy Networks in Action, Frankfurt and Boulder: Campus and Westview. Marx, D. (1953) International Shipping Cartels: A Study of Industrial SelfRegulation of Shipping Conferences, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Merriam, C.E. (1944) Public and Private Government, New Haven: Yale University Press. Milgrom, P.R., D.C.North and B.R.Weingast (1990) “The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges and the champagne fairs”, Economics and Politics 2:1–23. Murphy, C.N. (1994) International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850, Cambridge: Polity Press. Nayar, B.R. (1995) “Regimes, power and international aviation”, International Organization 49 (1):139–70. Nelson, P.S. (1995) The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations. The Limits of Apolitical Development, London: Macmillan. ——(1996) “Internationalizing economic and environmental policy: transnational NGO networks and the World Bank’s expanding influence” , Millennium. Journal of International Studies 25 (3):605–33. Olsen, J.P. (1981) “Organizational participation in government” in P.G.Nystrom and W.H.Starbuck (eds) Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Pei-Heng, C. (1981) NonGovernmental Organizations at the United Nations. Identity, Role and Function, New York: Praeger. Pijl, K.van der (1984) The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, London: Verso. ——(1998) Transnational Classes and International Relations, London and New York: Routledge. Porter, T. (1993) States, Markets and Regimes in Global Finance, New York: St Martin’s Press. ——(1999) “Hegemony and the private governance of international industries” in A.C.Cutler, V.Haufler and T.Porter (eds) Private Authority and International Affairs, Albany: SUNY Press.
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Potter, P.B. (1922) An Introduction to the Study of International Organization, New York: Century. Princen, T. and M.Finger (eds) (1994) Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global, London and New York: Routledge. Reinalda, B. and B.Verbeek (eds) (1999) Autonomous Policy-Making by International Organizations, London and New York: Routledge. Risse-Kappen, T. (ed.) (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rokkan, S. (1966) “Norway: numerical democracy and corporate pluralism” in R.A.Dahl (ed.) Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven: Yale University Press. Ronit, K. and V.Schneider (1999) “Global governance through private organizations”, Governance 12 (3):243–66. Rosenau, J.N. and E.Czempiel (eds) (1992) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sabatier, P. and H.C.Jenkins-Smith (eds) (1993) Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder: Westview. Sally, R. (1995) States and Firms: Multinational Enterprises in Institutional Competition, London and New York: Routledge. Sampson, A. (1984) Empires of the Sky: The Politics, Contests and Cartels of World Airlines, London: Hodder & Stoughton. Sandler, T. and J.Tschirhart (1997) “Club theory: thirty years later”, Public Choice 93:335–55. Schmitter, P.C. (1974) “Still the century of corporatism?”, Review of Politics 36 (1): 85–131. Schmitter, P.C. and W.Streeck (1981) The Organization of Business Interests: A Research Design to Study the Associative Action of Business in the Advanced Industrial Societies of Western Europe, IIM Discussion Paper no. HM/LMP 81– 13, Berlin: International Institute of Management. Schofer, E. (1999) “Science associations in the international sphere, 1875–1990: the rationalization of science and the scientization of society” in J.Boli and G.M.Thomas (eds) Constructing World Culture. International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Skidmore, D. and V.M.Hudson (eds) (1993) The Limits of State Autonomy. Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, Boulder: Westview. Skjelsbaek, K. (1971) “The growth of international nongovernmental organization in the twentieth century” in R.O.Keohane and J.S.Nye (eds) Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Smith, J., C.Chatfield and R.Pagnucco (eds) (1997) Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics. Solidarity Beyond the State, New York: Syracuse University Press. Spar, D.L. (1994) The Cooperative Edge. The Internal Politics of International Cartels, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Spiro, P.J. (1994) “New global communities: nongovernmental organizations in international decision-making institutions”, Washington Quarterly 18 (1):45–56. Stopford, J. and S.Strange (1991) Rival States and Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Strange, S. (1996) The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Streeck, W. and P.C.Schmitter (eds) (1985) Private Interest Government. Beyond Market and State, London: Sage. Stubbs, R. and G.R.D.Underbill (eds) (1994) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, London: Macmillan. Underbill, G.R.D. (ed.) (1997) The New World Order in International Finance, London: Macmillan. ——(2000) “From ships passing in the dark to a dialogue of the deaf: the contribution of international relations theory to understanding organized business” in J.Greenwood and H.P.Jacek (eds) Organized Business and the New Global Order, London: Macmillan. Vernon, R. (1971) Sovereignty at Bay. The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises, New York: Basic Books. Vogel, S.K. (1996) Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Wapner, P. (1996) Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, Albany: SUNY Press. Weiss, E.B. and H.K.Jacobson (eds) (1998) Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accord, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Weiss, T.G. and L.Gordenker (eds) (1996) NGOs, The UN and Global Governance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. White, L.C. (1933) The Structure of Private International Organizations, Philadelphia: Ferguson. ——(1951) International Non-Governmental Organizations, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Willetts, P. (ed.) (1982) Pressure Groups in the Global System. The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organizations, London: Pinter. ——(ed.) (1996) “The Conscience of the World”. The Influence of Non Governmental Organizations in the UN System, London: Hurst. Windmuller, J.P. (1980) The International Trade Union Movement, Deventer: Kluwer. Woolf, L.S. (1916) International Government, London: George Allen and Unwin. Yergin, D. (1991) The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, New York: Simon and Schuster. Yergin, D. and J.Stanislaw (1998) The Commanding Heights. The Battle between Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World, New York: Simon and Schuster. Young, O. (1989) International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ——(ed.) (1997) Global Governance. Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
2
Representation of private organizations in the global diplomacy of economic policy-making Peter Willetts
Introduction Study of politics within countries and of politics between countries still occurs as if they are two separate subjects. Universities have separate departments of “government” and “international relations”; the news media report on “home” and “foreign” affairs; and governments persist in having foreign ministries. Only with the increasing use of the term “globalization”—by academics, journalists and politicians—is there recognition of the connections between domestic and global politics. Sharp differences exist between orthodox analysts of domestic politics and of international relations, over the actors to be studied, the importance of various policy domains, the conceptualization of interests and the dynamics of politics. Unless the conventional assumptions of both disciplines are abandoned, it is impossible to ask what is the impact of private actors upon international economic policy. Instead of using the language of a united government and society pursuing the national interest in international trade, for example, we can analyse the influence of companies, trade unions and other groups over government policy on issues before the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is much more of a radical innovation when we move from the country level to analyse the WTO itself as a policy-making system. With a pluralist approach, transnational companies and international federations of trade unions do not have to be seen as agents of major governments, but can be considered as independent global actors. The system would also be open to issue-based pressure groups, such as those campaigning on the environment, human rights, gender equity or poverty. Alternatively, with a corporatist approach, global economic policy networks, operating through international organizations, can be seen as enabling governments, companies and unions to collaborate, excluding environmental concerns and the interests of marginal social groups. The integration of domestic and global politics requires some change of vocabulary. In domestic politics, the state is a part of a country, separate from society, whereas in international relations it is a collective entity, 34
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encompassing all branches of government and all sections of society. The ambiguity can be avoided by referring to government and society. It is necessary to disaggregate further. The term “transgovernmental relations” has been coined to indicate that different sections of a government may have their own independent external relations (Keohane and Nye 1974). Similarly, civil society is a diverse collection of political actors. When any of them enter global politics independently, they are referred to as transnational actors (Keohane and Nye 1971; Rosenau 1980; Willetts 1997). Thus in political analysis (but not in a legal context) we can replace interstate or international relations with multilateral policy networks of transgovernmental and transnational actors. The policy networks approach is well established in the study of domestic politics (Knoke 1990; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 1997). This chapter will ask whether there is a basis for it to be used in the study of global economic relations and whether policy-making occurs within pluralist or corporatist networks. Globalization is often referred to as a threatening process of economic change (Chossudovsky 1997; Hoogvelt 1997; Jones 1995), though in sociology it also encompasses cultural change (Waters 1995). Globalization is seen as threatening because it is presumed that the major transnational companies are able to promote their interests working with the governments of the leading industrial countries and the intergovernmental economic institutions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are usually portrayed as instruments of global capitalism. The same analysis may be applied to the two other less-known global economic policy-making institutions, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) and to the central United Nations organs. Only a small proportion of the attention given to the UN covers its role in the global economy, but it has been a major forum for the discussion of development issues, debt and globalization. It too is often characterized as being dominated by the United States (see, particularly, Bennis 1996). With a focus on globalization, it would be hypothesized that all six institutions are examples of global corporatism. Other writers emphasize the growth in communications, the rise of many new non-governmental actors and the concepts of transnational relations and interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1971, 1977; Rosenau 1980, 1990; Willetts 1982, 1998). The logic of their work can be extended to seeing the global institutions as relating to pluralist global policy networks. These six institutions have been chosen because they are the only global bodies with near universal membership and a broad mandate involving all aspects of the global economy. The central question to be addressed will be, “Who participates in policy-making?” If the answer is a limited number of economic interests and it is difficult for other actors to gain access to the network, we are at the corporatist end of the spectrum. Alternatively, if there is a wide range of actors, expressing diverse values, and new actors have
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open access to the network, we are at the pluralist end of the spectrum (Marsh and Rhodes 1992: chapters 1 and 11). Private organizations and the United Nations Private organizations have extensive rights of participation in virtually all the intergovernmental organs at the United Nations. These rights are based on Article 71 of the UN Charter, which provides for the Economic and Social Council to “make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations”. By extension, the rights can be claimed in all the subsidiary bodies that report to ECOSOC and at all UN global conferences. The procedures for NGO consultative status with ECOSOC evolved in the late 1940s and were reviewed and codified in a statute for NGOs in 1950.1 The main provisions have remained essentially the same for the last fifty years (Willetts 1996b; 1997). The NGOs were divided into three categories, with varying levels of access to the intergovernmental meetings. General Consultative Status is defined as being available to organizations which work on a wide range of issues, have a large membership and are representative of major segments of society in many countries. Special Consultative Status covers organizations with expertise and high status in a few fields of activity. There is also a list, known as the Roster, of other organizations which the Council, or the Secretary-General, consider can occasionally make useful contributions. All NGOs may attend meetings and receive the relevant documentation. All NGOs may submit written statements, but the word limits vary according to their status. All NGOs may make oral statements, but only General Status organizations are expected to have access to the full Council, while the others may speak to subsidiary bodies. Finally, there is an extraordinary right for those with General Status: they can propose items for ECOSOC’s agenda. The participation rights are generally only used in the full Council by a few of the General Status organizations and by CONGO (the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with ECOSOC) on behalf of all the recognized NGOs. However, they are used extensively in the subsidiary bodies. Four variables tend to determine the actual behaviour of governments towards the NGOs. The smaller the decision-making body, the less it has a public profile; the more technical the subject matter and the more experienced are the NGO representatives, the more likely it becomes that the NGOs will be treated as equals and exercise significant influence. It is important to acknowledge that the term “non-governmental organization” has become precise legal jargon in the United Nations. It is not synonymous with more general terms, such as “private organizations” and “transnational actors”. It is used to mean an organization that has been formally approved by ECOSOC. Currently, there is a list of 1,517 such NGOs, 103 with General Consultative Status, 745 with Special Consultative
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Status and 669 on the Roster.2 There are four essential requirements to gain recognition. An NGO cannot be established by governments. The group must not use or advocate violence. An NGO must respect the legal norm of “non-interference in the internal affairs of states”, which means a political party cannot be recognized and those concerned with human rights should not restrict their activities to a particular group, nationality or country. Lastly, an NGO cannot be a profit-making organization. Just one major change has been made to the original system. Since 1996, “national NGOs” have been encouraged to apply, in order to increase the presence of developing country NGOs. The above account gives the impression that most private economic interests from domestic politics would be prevented taking part in UN policy-making. However, the ban on commercial companies has not prevented industrial federations and other commercial lobbies from organizing on a global basis and gaining recognition. The voice of profitmaking bodies must be expressed through collective non-profit-making organizations. The International Chamber of Commerce, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers and the International Organization of Employers have all been in the highest category of consultative status since 1947. Many more are in Special Consultative Status or on the Roster. Not all industries are equally represented. It is not surprising that the airlines, shipping and other communications industries are prominent. The chemical and pharmaceutical industries are also well represented, but manufacturing, service industries and entertainment are less obvious. Some industries have given priority to particular policy domains. For example, the oil industry has a forum to work on oil pollution at sea and several lobbies for questions of climate change. Thus there is no effective distinction at the United Nations between the participation rights of nonprofit-making organizations and those of sectoral organizations representing commercial interests. Equally, the restrictions on national NGOs until 1996 and the ban on political parties have not prevented these bodies being represented at the UN through international federations. In the UN’s first year, the trade unions took the lead in pressing for, and winning, the wide range of participation rights. For a few months, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Co-operative Alliance and the American Federation of Labor were the only recognized NGOs. They were soon joined by the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions and then by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Some of the specialist trade union federations, such as those for transport workers, miners and teachers, are also recognized, but the majority are not. Women’s groups were particularly prominent from the beginning and they have continued to be the bestorganized and most effective lobbyists in the UN system. Even the environmentalists and the human rights activists cannot match the breadth and the depth of the influence achieved by the women’s groups. The
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remaining groups in the early years were mainly humanitarian organizations, religious bodies and professional associations. Now, it is safe to assume that any issues on the UN’s agenda will be covered by a wide range of interest groups and other types of pressure groups. There are a few hints of corporatism at the UN. The Secretariat is now making strenuous efforts to improve its relations with companies, especially in the USA, and particular activities have benefited from large donations by wealthy individuals. In 1995 for the first time, and then every year from 1997 onwards, the Secretary-General has addressed the annual meetings of the pre-eminent corporatist global network, the World Economic Forum, in Davos. Within the consultative arrangements, the economic interest groups are often well organized and have far greater resources in New York and Geneva than many of the individual issue-based NGOs. However, in any conflict over UN policy-making, the economic interests cannot outweigh the influence of the large coalitions of human rights, environmental, development or women’s groups. At best industry can delay and dilute programmes advocated by other NGOs. Overall, the UN must be characterized as a pluralist system. Emphasis has been given to the United Nations for a variety of reasons. First, the UN’s debates set the general framework for policy-making on development and are therefore important in their own right. Second, the ECOSOC arrangements have set a standard for the UN’s own subsidiary bodies and programmes and for most of the independent specialized agencies. Third, the codification of the arrangements in a statute for NGOs in 1950, (with minor amendments in 1968 and 1996), plus the routine application of the arrangements for fifty years mean that the right of NGOs to participate in multilateral diplomacy can be regarded as a norm of customary international law. Some points of terminology arising from the above discussion must be emphasized. In the UN and the wider UN system, NGOs are not just the issue-based citizen groups. Environmental, development, human rights and other activists may deplore the fact, but in international diplomacy the term “NGO” covers all types of private organizations except criminals, guerrillas and individual companies. Commercial interests in organized lobby groups and trade unions are also NGOs. Structures of global economic institutions: legal status, membership, political status, finance, voting, headquarters, ministerial representation and mandated functions The other five intergovernmental institutions cover the main aspects of global policy-making in the domains of macro-economic policy, investment, trade and employment. Although the procedures and practices of diplomacy give a superficial similarity to these institutions, they are very different from each other. Eight legal and political variables may be examined to describe
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the place of each of them in the global intergovernmental system and their degree of integration with the United Nations. The variables are their legal status, their membership, their political status, how they are financed, their voting system, the location of their headquarters, the type of ministerial representation at the institution and the nature of the functions within their mandate. The converse of integration with the UN is greater dependence on capitalist orthodoxy: these eight variables include measures of the extent to which the institution can be subject to control by major Western governments or are influenced by developing country governments, many of which are hostile to unregulated globalization. The structure and the practices of the United Nations have been identified as being pluralist. If corporatism is to be found at the global level, it must be expected it will exist in the economic institutions. The eight variables are important, because it can be hypothesized that the more an institution has independence from the UN the more it will be the focus for corporatist policy networks. The variables will provide indicators of integration in the UN system. The possible outcomes range from zero integration, when global corporatism would be expected to be at its strongest, to integration on all eight variables, when a version of the UN pluralist model would be expected. Legal status The WTO is the most distinct of the five institutions. It has no legal connection whatsoever to the UN, but there are some regular patterns of cooperation between its secretariat and other global institutions. The IMF, the Bank and the ILO are “UN specialized agencies”. Contrary to the normal meaning of the word “agency” they are autonomous, in legal terms. Their constitutions were also agreed before the United Nations Charter was finalized. They are referred to as UN agencies, because they have signed agreements to co-operate with the UN and to report annually to ECOSOC on their activities. In contrast to this, UNCTAD is officially part of the UN and a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. However, UNCTAD shares several of the features of an independent institution. Each has its own organs, a general plenary body of the whole membership and a smaller executive that meets more frequently. The crucial difference is that the WTO and the agencies are free to accept or reject UN decisions, whereas UNCTAD must obey the General Assembly. Membership Each of the five economic institutions has its own membership, which can and does differ from the UN’s membership. The UN, the ILO, the Fund and the WTO each gain members by governments ratifying their constitutional documents, as separate legal acts. Thus countries can be members of the UN
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without being in any of the agencies or the WTO. Equally they can join the agencies without being UN members. The Bank’s Articles of Agreement also have to be ratified separately, but this can only be done by governments which already are members of the Fund. The first UNCTAD occurred as an ad hoc global conference and, as is the normal practice, members of both the UN and of specialized agencies were invited. When UNCTAD was made a permanent institution, it was decided to continue with the same members. Governments do not choose to join UNCTAD. They are members by virtue of being a member of the UN or of one of the specialized agencies. Again, UNCTAD must be classified as the only one of the five institutions that is integrated with the UN. Political status When we move from the legal relationships to the patterns of political behaviour, we find there is a somewhat different dichotomy. The IMF and the World Bank for decades minimized their co-operation with the UN Economic and Social Council, to the extent that they could not be regarded as fully functioning specialized agencies. In political terms their relationship with the UN was comparable to the WTO’s. However, following the public relations failure of their fiftieth anniversary celebrations in 1994, due to the NGO campaign “Fifty Years is Enough”, there has been greater cooperation with ECOSOC. Despite the recent developments, they do not approach the level of co-operation the ILO has with the UN at all levels, including programme activities. The ILO’s Governing Body does not authorize new activities for the ILO before satisfying itself that there have been consultations with the UN on any aspects of joint concern. Furthermore, the Governing Body normally reviews its relations with the UN each year. UNCTAD is in a similar position. It has its own policy-making organs, a separate secretariat and distinct operational programmes, but they seek to minimize any bureaucratic or policy differences with the other UN organs. The ILO and UNCTAD may each be classified as having a much closer political relationship with the UN than the IMF, the Bank or the WTO. Finance For their “regular budgets”, which cover the administrative costs of running the secretariats and holding meetings, the three agencies and the WTO are separate from the UN. The Fund and the Bank face minimal financial constraint on their administrative processes, because their work is funded from the operational profits of the institutions. The WTO has no financial link to the UN, but it does not have the advantage of making operational profits and it has to ask its members for their assessed contributions each year, in the same manner as the UN does. While the ILO also requires distinct contributions
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from its members, it is much less independent, because less than half its finance comes from its own regular budget and most of its operational activities are funded by the UN Development Programme. UNCTAD is simply funded as one section of the UN’s overall regular budget. A focus on the financial relations with the UN reveals just part of the picture for these institutions. Even the Fund and the Bank face severe political constraints, from the continual need to increase their basic financial resources in line with the growth in the global economy, making them subject to the influence of the governments of the major industrialized countries, which must approve any increases in subscriptions. Legally, the WTO, UNCTAD, the ILO and the UN should not be constrained by a small number of rich countries. Their budgets are approved by majority votes of the whole membership, and payment of contributions is mandatory. In practice, the UN has been on the edge of bankruptcy for many years because of the refusal of the US Congress to authorize the necessary appropriations. Each agency has been constrained by the threat of the US withdrawing its membership and hence the loss of the largest contributor. Paradoxically UNCTAD is stronger, through not being an independent specialized agency, because the USA could not withdraw from UNCTAD without withdrawing from the UN as a whole. To summarize, UNCTAD has full financial integration with the UN, the ILO has partial integration and the other institutions have no integration. However, finance is the one structural variable by which the Western governments collectively, or even the United States by itself, can attempt to control all these institutions. Voting systems The five institutions have three types of fundamentally different voting systems. UNCTAD and the WTO each operate on the theoretical principle of the legal equality of sovereign states, and hence each government has one vote. The ILO has the same principle of equality, but each country has four votes: two for the government, one for a representative of the country’s employers and one for a representative of their trade unions. The governments, the employers and the unions can, and do, cast their votes separately. The Fund and the Bank have weighted voting systems, under which the number of votes for each country and their financial contributions to the agency are dependent on the extent of their role in the world economy. All of the institutions now try to minimize the use of their voting procedures, but even when there is decision-making by consensus the voting system affects the outcome. The political effect of this variable is to push UNCTAD, the ILO and the WTO towards consideration of the concerns of developing country governments, while the Fund and the Bank are pushed towards Western concerns.
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Headquarters location All five institutions have a separate headquarters, away from the UN headquarters in New York. Each has its own secretariat, headed by a prestigious independent chief administrative officer who personifies the institution. (The titles of the heads of the secretariats vary. The ILO and the WTO each have a Director-General; the Bank has a President; the Fund has a Managing Director; and UNCTAD has a Secretary-General.) The Fund and the Bank recruit staff on the basis of technical economic and financial expertise, which tends to mean people who have doctorates from US universities. They are also based in Washington and hence operate within the milieu of the US news media and Congressional politics. The ILO, UNCTAD and WTO recruit on a global basis and are based in Geneva, a city that offers more of a global perspective for diplomats. Overall, these sociological differences provide quite different political contexts for decision-making. Ministerial representation Different ministries are responsible for each institution. UNCTAD is seen by the various governments either as a UN body, which comes under the foreign ministry, or as a development-oriented institution, under the development ministry. On the other hand, the WTO is dominated by the ministries of trade and/or the ministries responsible for the main exporting industries. The Bank generally comes under combined delegations from finance and development ministries, with variation from country to country and from time to time as to which ministry heads the delegation. The Fund comes under finance ministries and central banks. However, even for countries where the difference is as great as the development ministry being responsible for the Bank and the central bank being responsible for the Fund, there are pressures to prevent policy divergences. At the level of the Boards of Governors, the legal separation between the Fund and the Bank is a fiction and policy in the Bank’s Board of Governors will always be under strong influence from the finance ministry. Last, the ILO is the responsibility of departments of employment or labour. The result of these transgovernmental differences is that different values are endorsed by the different delegations from the same countries. Trade and finance ministries are the most in favour of free-market ideologies, while development and employment ministries are the most in favour of government intervention to promote economic growth and to alleviate poverty. The ministers at UNCTAD and the ILO are more disposed towards integration with the practices and values of the UN than the ministers at the Fund, the Bank and the WTO. Mandated functions Finally, each institution is identified legally in its constitution and politically in the goals it has proclaimed with fulfilling certain functions. The Fund was
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originally designed primarily to control exchange rates and as a secondary goal to promote free markets. It has had to change to accepting floating exchange rates, with promotion of free markets becoming its primary goal. The Bank was intended to achieve economic growth through large-scale capital investment projects, but has changed its focus to growth that will achieve poverty reduction. WTO is predominantly identified with free trade, whereas UNCTAD is supposed to facilitate the participation of developing countries in world trade, particularly through increased trade in commodities. The ILO’s function is to promote full employment, improve labour relations and enhance standards of health, safety and welfare in employment. The Fund and the WTO are widely perceived to be in conflict with the sustainable development goals of the UN, while the Bank, the ILO and UNCTAD are compatible with the UN’s mandate. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the discussion of the eight variables that locate the institutions within the global intergovernmental system. The categories on each variable indicating relative closeness to the United Nations have been marked with asterisks. UNCTAD, with a score of 8, might be hypothesized to be fully integrated with the UN, to share its values and to make policy within a pluralist policy network. The ILO, with a score of 6, should be similar to the UN and UNCTAD. On the other hand, the WTO, the Bank and the Fund, with scores of 2, 1 and 0, should be distant from the UN, more in accord with capitalist values and more open to corporatist influences. Overall, one can place the five institutions along a spectrum from support for free markets through to advocacy of human development, but the ranks do not correlate well with the indicators. The WTO is currently under almost complete domination of free-market ideas and is resistant to employment, health and environmental concerns encroaching on world trade. The IMF also uses structural adjustment to promote deregulation, reduction in government expenditure and free trade, but has come to accept social safety nets. UNCTAD asserts the need to restructure markets, to enable developing countries to participate more in world trade and gain greater benefits from their output of commodities. The Bank speaks the language of free markets, but accepts the role of governments to counteract market failures and to alleviate poverty. The ILO propagates international labour standards to regulate markets and prevent exploitation of workers. To some extent, the place of the five institutions on the spectrum is predictable from the analysis of their different legal, financial, political and social structures. However, the indicators give no basis for explaining why the WTO is more committed to free markets than the Fund nor why the ILO is significantly more in favour of regulating markets than UNCTAD. The greatest surprise from a structural perspective is the way in which the Bank has shifted from an orthodox capitalist view of economic growth to a radical commitment to human development and poverty alleviation. Given the Bank’s high integration with the Fund and its lack of integration with
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Table 2.1 Indicators of institutional integration in the UN system
Note: * indicates relative closeness to the United Nations
the UN, there is no explanation of its policies being similar to those of the ILO. Private organizations and the global economic institutions Given the differences in the indicators of UN integration for the global intergovernmental economic institutions, we would expect that they will have very different relations with non-governmental organizations and commercial companies. Basically, UNCTAD, since it was established, and the ILO, since the Second World War, have had procedural arrangements similar to the ECOSOC consultative status. The WTO also has a comparable commitment in its constitution, but this has not been implemented with an agreed set of procedures. The Bank has formal relations with a limited number of NGOs and the Fund has no formal provisions. Thus, the legal
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situation would appear to match the predictions from the indicators. However, the actual political processes are more complex. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development The General Assembly resolution establishing UNCTAD provided that the Trade and Development Board may make arrangements for representatives of inter-governmental bodies…to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the subsidiary bodies and working groups established by it. Such participation may also be offered to non-governmental organizations concerned with matters of trade and of trade as related to development. (Resolution 1995, Section II, paragraph 11) Although the resolution refers only to the Board, NGOs have been given the same access to the quadrennial meetings of the Conference as well. The wording of the Assembly’s resolution offers a higher status to NGOs than they have with ECOSOC. Instead of “consultation”, which implies a subservient role, they are officially offered “participation”, which implies equality with governments in everything except voting. When UNCTAD came to approve its own amended version of the NGO statute, the Board explicitly decided to omit ECOSOC’s distinction between consultation and participation.3 There are two other significant political differences between UNCTAD’s provisions and the ECOSOC statute. UNCTAD does not allow any participation rights to national NGOs, though they may be entered on a Register to receive information. International NGOs are divided into a General Category, with “a basic interest in most of the activities of the Board”, and a Special Category, with “special competence in…specific matters”, covered by no more than two of the Board’s committees. Unlike ECOSOC, there is no third category for more peripheral NGOs. The overall approach is a closer relationship with a smaller number of NGOs. In 1965, during UNCTAD’s first year as a permanent institution, just eleven NGOs were recognized by the Trade and Development Board. These were mainly the very large commercial and trade union groupings that were already well established throughout the UN system. The only one that could not be seen as representing the economic interests of its members was the World Federation of United Nations Associations. The number of NGOs has grown slowly since then, producing a much greater diversity to the types of groups. By the end of 1998, they had reached 96 in the General Category, 82 in the Special Category and just 11 on the Register. The issue-based pressure groups are nearly all in the General Category, whereas the economic interest groups are more likely to be in the Special Category. More than three-quarters of the 178 international NGOs recognized by UNCTAD represent economic interests. The General Category includes 38
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sectoral groupings of commercial interests, 6 international trade union federations and 14 academic, technical or professional bodies concerned with trade. The Special Category contains 78 interest groups. They are dominated by commercial interests covering UNCTAD’s main areas of work, with 32 involved in shipping, 10 in insurance and 17 in basic commodities. Nearly a quarter of all the NGOs are issue-based groups. It is not surprising that the greatest number in the General Category, 17, are concerned with development. There are also 5 religious groups, 4 women’s groups and 10 concerned with international co-operation in general, but none covers human rights. In the Special Category, only four groups are issue-based. Environmental groups are greatly underrepresented, with just two in each category. Utilization of the formal participation rights at regular meetings of UNCTAD’s Board is at very low levels. Usually less than a dozen NGOs are present and they are mainly the large global organizations who can maintain a permanent office in Geneva. Many more NGOs attend the quadrennial conferences and engage in a wide range of activities both to lobby the delegates and to gain the attention of the news media. The formal rights to make speeches and circulate written statements are also taken up, mainly by the issue-based NGOs working as a broad coalition to promote their views on development. The Secretariat has made efforts to increase the involvement of NGOs with UNCTAD’s work, particularly in the last decade. Since 1988 it has convened annual consultations with an invited group of NGOs. These are mainly aimed at the issue-based NGOs rather than the economic interests. The invitations go beyond the lists of NGOs recognized by the Board, in order to bring in more participants from developing countries. Similarly, the Secretariat brings all types of NGOs into their programme activities, when they can contribute to publications, workshops, seminars, policy development, training and technical co-operation. The practice in relation to UNCTAD cannot be summarized unequivocally. On the one hand, it has the procedures of a pluralist system, with open access for all types of NGOs, more positive attitudes than in ECOSOC being expressed about their role and close collaboration with the Secretariat. On the other hand, economic interests are heavily represented among the recognized NGOs. With the legitimacy this affords and their resources to cover lobbying costs, they have easy access to delegates and the Secretariat in Geneva on an informal basis. In the major conferences, UNCTAD operates in a pluralist manner, whereas in work on policy for specific sectors, such as shipping and insurance, it is virtually corporatist. The International Labour Organization When the constitution for the International Labour Organization was written in 1919, no general provision was made for relations with international NGOs. However, it has already been mentioned that the ILO
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has a unique tripartite structure, quite unlike any other international institution. Trade unions and employers from each country are seated as of right and participate on an equal basis, with full authority, including the right to vote on all decisions. The tripartite structure applies in the General Conference of all member countries, in the elected Governing Body and in all subsidiary bodies. Nominally it is an inter-state institution, in that governments, unions and employers are held to be collective representatives of their state. In practice it is a hybrid between an intergovernmental institution and an international non-governmental organization. In the 1920s the ILO’s first Director General, Albert Thomas, maintained links with the International Federation of Trade Unions and the International Confederation of Industrial Employers. These organizations also provided administrative support for the Workers’ Group and the Employers’ Group at ILO meetings. Thomas developed an ILO programme to work with the International Co-operative Alliance, of which he had previously been a leading member. Gradually other organizations formed links, with the women’s NGOs being in the lead. After the Second World War, the ILO became a UN specialized agency and revised its Constitution in several ways. This included adding a formal provision for NGOs as Article 12 (3): “The International Labour Organization may make suitable arrangements for such consultation as it may think desirable with recognized non-governmental international organizations, including international organizations of employers, workers, agriculturalists and co-operators.” It is not surprising that the text makes no allowance for national NGOs, as the most relevant ones are already intrinsic to the institution. Given the tripartite structure applies in all policy-making organs, the international NGOs are given access to all of the organs. Thus, unlike the formal texts for the UN and UNCTAD, the ILO provides for NGOs to be consulted by its plenary body, the General Conference. ILO practice then distinguished between organizations with an interest in a wide range of its activities and those with a special interest in a particular sector. The former were regarded as having consultative status in line with the constitutional provision, but only six were recognized. They were three trade union federations, the employers, the co-operative movement and agricultural producers.4 These six NGOs could attend all meetings, but the other specialist NGOs had to be invited. It was not until 1956 that a formal Special List was created for the latter NGOs and three years later that they were given the right to attend all meetings. However, being on the Special List only makes an NGO a “passive observer”, with the ability to follow the proceedings. It is necessary to obtain the approval of the Governing Body to become an “active observer” and to have a representative at a meeting, (ILO 1969:22). Decades later there are still only eight NGOs with full consultative status, the original six plus trade unions and employers’ organizations from Africa. Another fourteen regional NGOs have been granted a similar status that was introduced in 1964 for regional meetings of the ILO. The great
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majority of NGOs are on the Special List, which has now expanded to a diverse range of 152 groups, covering some 40 educational and professional NGOs, 24 social welfare and health NGOs, 21 women’s NGOs and a few each from the human rights, youth, religious, disabled people, indigenous people, development and population NGOs. It is striking that there are no environmental NGOs at all, very few development NGOs and a relatively large number of women’s NGOs. Furthermore, unlike UNCTAD, there is minimal coverage of commercial interests. It is important to note that NGOs on the Special List have no general participation rights and no advantages over any other NGOs. Unless they have consultative status, all NGOs have to apply to the Governing Body for invitations to be represented at a meeting. This must be done one month in advance of its session preceding the meeting and they must specify at this point what agenda items are of concern to them. As the Governing Body normally meets in March and November, this means applications must be made up to eight months in advance. However, once they do receive invitations, no distinctions are made between the different categories of NGOs with respect to access to the conference hall to lobby delegates, the opportunities to make speeches or the circulation of written statements. Unlike UNCTAD, where only token NGO participation in plenary meetings has occurred, there are even frequent opportunities for NGO speeches in plenary. In addition, Article 18 of the Constitution says, “The Conference may add to any committees which it appoints technical experts without power to vote.” This has been used extensively to co-opt individuals from NGOs. Finally, technical meetings on specialist subjects are often convened jointly by the ILO and professional or technical NGOs. In principle, the ILO has open access, but in practice the bureaucratic impediments have limited the participation levels. The ILO has a much wider mandate, affecting more aspects of human rights, women’s issues, development and social welfare, than UNCTAD does, yet fewer international NGOs are involved in the ILO than in UNCTAD. Furthermore, the majority of the international NGOs taking part are specialist workers’ organizations. The elaborate tripartite system combined with the absence of a broad NGO constituency means workers and employers dominate among the private organizations. The annual meetings of the International Labour Conference do attract a small sample of the diversity in global civil society. Nevertheless, even when there has been an explosion of NGO interest in the question of child labour and the Global March against Child Labour ended at the ILO’s headquarters, the formal involvement of NGOs in the proceedings on this question was mainly limited to the normal tripartite processes. In the Governing Body and the specialist meetings on sectoral questions, the ILO becomes a pure corporatist body.
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The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund In contrast to the UN, UNCTAD and the ILO, the Bretton Woods institutions did not initially make any general provisions for formal relations with NGOs. The IMF Articles of Agreement make no mention of NGOs and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the predecessor of the WTO) never had any formal arrangements. The Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the first branch of the World Bank, did provide for a small Advisory Council that would meet annually to discuss general policy (Article V, Section 6). However, this Council never became a significant forum (Mason and Asher 1973:32) and it only met in 1948 and 1949. The great majority of NGOs showed no interest in establishing relations with the Fund, the Bank or GATT/WTO until the 1980s, and they remain totally unlike the other specialized agencies. The absence of institutional links does not mean the absence of informal relations with private organizations. The World Bank could not operate on a day-by-day basis without extensive contacts with commercial and other groups. Much of its finance is raised on the major capital markets and good relations with the banking community are essential. When the International Finance Corporation was established in 1956 as an affiliate of the Bank, it was necessary to develop working relations with a wider range of investors and industrialists. As the Fund moved from an international financial system controlled tightly by governments, to currency convertibility, and then floating exchange rates, it too has needed to communicate well with the banking community. With the debt crisis, the Fund became part of a system of trilateral negotiations, along with the debtor governments and commercial banks, to agree the terms for rescheduling debts. There may be no official role for commercial and investment banks at the annual meetings of the joint Boards of Governors, but they do attend in large numbers to be involved in the broad review of international financial policy. During the rest of the year, banking bodies such as the Institute of International Finance and the Group of Thirty have ready access to the staff, particularly of the Fund, and co-operate in research activity and seminars. As the staff of the Fund and the Bank are predominantly professional economists, they also have regular exchanges with economists in the academic community. The Fund and the Bank each have extensive contacts, of very different types, “in the field”. Bank staff assessing projects meet government officials from the ministries involved in the project, the UNDP Resident Representatives, field workers for the major transnational development NGOs and to some extent people in the local community. Fund staff have a much more limited perspective on developing countries. They mainly meet officials from finance ministries and the central bank, though country missions do also “meet with leading NGOs from time to time, with the support of the authorities, to discuss broad economic developments”.5
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GATT in the past and the WTO now have not had to engage in any form of regular activities in their member countries. The different mandates and the different experiences of the three institutions meant the Bank gradually became involved in operational collaboration with NGOs in a way that the Fund and GATT could not. From the 1970s the Bank began to give grants to NGOs, with the first one going to the prestigious global body, the International Planned Parenthood Federation. Then NGOs gradually began to be brought into project planning and the Bank started to organize workshops with specialist NGOs to review the overall policy approach in particular sectors, such as forestry, energy and water resources. In 1980, at one of these workshops, the idea emerged of a formal Bank-NGO Committee. This was established in 1981, with its mandate primarily aimed at improving collaboration on project-related work. It brought together Bank staff and representatives from twenty-five NGOs: five each from Africa, Asia and Latin America; four each from Europe and from North America and the Pacific; and two “international” NGOs. In all cases, the NGOs have been ones that define themselves as being concerned with development and poverty alleviation and the great majority run projects themselves There have been no other forms of specialist groups or sectoral interests, with the exception of the development organizations of religious groups. It is striking that the Committee has never included women’s, environmental or population NGOs. The Committee has had problems of legitimacy, with challenges over their selection, their communication with other NGOs and their cooptation by the Bank. As a result, the NGOs on the Committee do hold meetings, without the Bank staff, and these are serviced by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies. (This account is heavily reliant on Cleary 1996 and Nelson 1995.) Increasingly NGOs became critical of the failure of the Bank to address poverty alleviation and their poor record on environmental protection. With the debt crisis, the Bank moved from a heavy concentration on project lending into a significant volume of programme lending. As a result it promoted structural adjustment and became associated with all the negative criticisms of the IMF. The NGO community was split on how much to attack the Fund and the Bank. Development NGOs generally wanted financial flows to continue and so called for major reforms in structural adjustment programmes rather than their abolition. The environmental NGOs were generally much more radical, with many of them campaigning for the Bank to be closed down. Even the NGOs that continued to serve on the BankNGO Committee used the meetings to attack the social costs of Bank policies for the poor. From 1988, the joint annual meetings were faced with parallel conferences of NGOs, putting forward powerfully argued criticisms and gaining media attention. In 1994 the Madrid joint meetings, instead of being a celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Fund and the Bank, were a
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public relations disaster, being dominated by “Fifty Years is Enough”, an anti-Bretton Woods campaign by the NGOs. From the mid-1990s the Bank changed rapidly and substantially, with all projects being subject to environmental impact assessments, the availability of information being greatly increased, popular participation in project planning and implementation being encouraged and an Independent Inspection Panel being established to review complaints by those who have been adversely affected by projects. The Bank has now gone so far that its success is defined in terms of poverty reduction and it is one of the major forces for protection of the environment. NGOs have not been able to engage with the Fund in the same manner. It has been cocooned in a world of finance ministries, commercial and investment banks, and academic economists, in which nobody is directly engaged in debating its free-market ideology. There are no formal channels of communication with NGOs. Until the late 1990s, the activities of the staff and the deliberations of the Executive Board occurred at a level of secrecy that exceeded military organizations, such as NATO. From the mid1980s, the IMF’s approach to its structural adjustment programmes has been challenged by four external sources: resentment of nationalist politicians; rioting arising as a direct consequence of IMF programmes; criticism from other parts of the UN system, particularly UNICEF (Cornia et al. 1988); and spill-over from a different approach at the Bank. As a result, the Fund has moved towards protecting health and education when government expenditure is cut. It talks of the need for social safety-nets in its programmes. The most radical change is that discussion of cuts in military expenditure is no longer taboo. NGO influence upon the Fund became clear, even if it was indirect, via UNICEF and the Bank and via general public debate. Then the financial crises in South East Asia in 1997, followed by those in Russia and Brazil in 1998, widely discredited the Fund, including within its own constituency, the banking community. It was argued that the markets had failed because they had insufficient information. The Fund responded by a dramatic increase in its transparency. A range of documents on surveillance of financial systems and on the structural adjustment programmes is now being made public in an unprecedented manner. Until the 1980s, the Bank and the Fund were unambiguously corporatist, in that they were at the centre of informal policy networks, open to all groups having a direct interest in their work and sharing their assumptions, but closed to all others. The Bank then changed substantially. It has not followed the UN model and there are no procedures for any private organizations to be formal participants in any of its intergovernmental policy-making organs. However, during the 1990s, the work of the Bank NGO Committee, the depth of debate in official publications, the staff contact with the public and the NGO access to project planning and evaluation together constitute a different model of
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a pluralist system. The change in the Bank’s policy on the environment, popular participation, human development and poverty elimination has been substantial. It is possible that the Fund is undergoing a similar change and at the beginning of the twenty-first century has reached the point where it is starting to move from a tight corporatist system to a more open pluralist policy dialogue. The World Trade Organization GATT, the predecessor of the WTO, was regarded as a contract administered by a small secretariat, and it was not an intergovernmental institution. Therefore there was never any basis for any permanent official observer or consultative status for NGOs. Until the Uruguay Round started in 1986, GATT was primarily concerned with trade in manufactured goods, which meant few non-commercial NGOs were interested in its work. Industrial lobbies were often concerned about the debates affecting protectionism versus free trade, and they had ready access to the secretariat in Geneva, up to the level of the Director-General. Relations were particularly close with the International Chamber of Commerce, as it gave support to the goal of free trade. Specific industrial lobbies influenced GATT via pressure on government departments and legislatures in the capital cities. They also influenced the negotiating rounds, often by being included as advisers in the governmental delegations. The Uruguay Round opened up a much wider range of policy domains, by extending GATT’s responsibilities and by creating the WTO as a full intergovernmental institution. Because the impact would be so wide, a large range of development and environmental NGOs decided during the negotiations, for the first time, that GATT was salient to them. Most of these NGOs assessed the outcome as being damaging to development and facilitating increased exploitation by transnational corporations. Sir Leon Brittan, the EEC Commissioner for Foreign Trade, was sufficiently concerned to issue an open letter to all NGOs, seeking to reassure them when the Final Act was being signed. 6 During the period of the negotiations, environmental issues rose considerably higher up the global agenda and a variety of questions established links between environment and trade issues. Initially the environment was kept off the agenda of the Uruguay Round, but in the later stages, against the background of the Rio Earth Summit, there were discussions of a very general nature. On the very last day before the signing, a commitment was made that the first meeting of the WTO General Council would establish a Committee on Trade and Environment.7 The Uruguay Round Final Act was signed on 15 April 1994 and the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization came into effect on 1 January 1995. Article V (2) provided: “The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and co-operation with
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non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.” There was no doubt that this provision was understood to go beyond trading interests to include all types of NGOs. The final paragraph of the Decision on Trade and Environment made an implicit link to environmental NGOs, by saying that the Committee should help the WTO decide on “appropriate arrangements for relations with inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations referred to in Article V”. Criticism from the NGO community was addressed, by asserting the goals of economic growth, full employment and expansion of trade, in accordance with sustainable development, environmental protection and special measures for developing countries. With such general goals written into the Agreement, there could be no legal basis for avoiding relations with environmental and development NGOs. The Agreement is just a brief document, outlining no more than the skeleton of the WTO’s structure. The General Council did not give any priority to Article V and many trade ministries were unsympathetic to NGOs. The new secretariat tried to open the door, but were constrained by the traditions of secrecy surrounding GATT activity. After eighteen months, the Council adopted two decisions on its relations with NGOs.8 The only positive element was to encourage the Secretariat to have “a more active role in its direct contacts with NGOs”. Closer consultation could occur through “appropriate processes at the national level”. It was suggested that there would be “greater transparency…by making available documents”. However, it was specified that all working documents would remain restricted until a decision had been taken on them or six months had past. Similarly, the records of meetings would remain secret for six months. NGOs were outraged that documents would only be made public as a matter of historical record, thus preventing any effective political response to their content. Both UN norms and the obligations of Article V(2) had been rejected by the Council with a firm statement: “There is currently a broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.” In contrast to this, NGOs were given reasonable physical facilities at the first Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 1996. The International Coalition for Development Action co-ordinated with the Secretariat to provide meeting rooms, computers and video coverage of the proceedings. Some NGO representatives were able to initiate dialogue with government delegates. Much more progress was made in achieving communication and trust with a Symposium on Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development in May 1997 in Geneva that brought together NGOs, government representatives and international officials. The second symposium in March 1998 was very high powered, with the WTO Director-General and his Deputy, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme and the Assistant
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Administrator of the UN Development Programme all taking part. Leading academics and NGOs also made presentations, including the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the World Resources Institute, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF-US) and the radical Indian ecologist Vandana Shiva. At the final session a NGO representative, from the International Institute for Sustainable Development, summed up, by saying GATT/WTO had moved from being an opaque to a translucent organization.9 It remains to be seen how WTO’s relations with NGOs will evolve. Experience in the UN system shows that sustained effort by NGOs can build up trust and lead to routine acceptance of NGO activities. Once NGO representatives show expertise, by demonstrating understanding of complex issues both substantively and in terms of the diplomatic process, they gain respect and even come to be valued as useful participants in the debate. They also need to have some individuals who are willing to concentrate on questions of procedure. It is by no means impossible that some system of consultative arrangements will be formalized within the WTO’s first ten years. In the meantime, the WTO remains within an exceptionally small policy network. It cannot even be called corporatist, because companies have limited access as and when they can gain membership of a governmental delegation, while trade unions, professional and technical interests are mainly on the outside. Conclusions When the UN and the five global economic institutions are compared, it is plain there are substantial differences. No one model can be said to apply to them all and there is a spectrum from very open pluralist systems at the UN and the Bank to classical corporatism at the IMF. The situation in ECOSOC is one where an extraordinarily diverse range of pressure groups, with a minimal number of exclusions, are in principle part of the system. Some 1,500 NGOs can have full access to information about the official policymaking process and a limited amount of participation is allowed as of right. In as much as small Working Groups or caucuses do exclude NGOs, they are not any more disadvantaged than other governments that are excluded. It is difficult to imagine any real-world political system being any more open and pluralist than ECOSOC, its subsidiary bodies or the great majority of UN conferences. At the other extreme, the IMF is still a relatively closed system, in which an international bureaucracy, finance ministries and bankers are the core decision-makers. The only constraint on the financial elite is the general pressure of public opinion and the news media, combined with the limited authority legislatures have on the policy of individual governments. It is apparently a clear example of the corporatist model. However, there is some deviation. Threats to the prestige of the core policy-making group and the exposure of flaws in their intellectual framework are making the policy
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process more transparent and increasing the influence of outsiders on policy implementation. The other institutions occupy intermediate positions. UNCTAD is structurally pluralist, with all the arrangements being very similar to those in the main UN system, and some aspects being more positive towards all NGOs. However, UNCTAD only has one tenth of the number of NGOs and the majority represent the commercial interests that one might expect from the corporatist model. Environmental groups are notably absent, but solely because they have chosen to exclude themselves. Similarly, the first reaction to the ILO might be that the tripartite structure is an institutionalization of corporatism. However, it has none of the secrecy associated with corporatism and there is a version of consultative arrangements available in principle to all types of NGOs. In practice this is not a strong working system beyond the interest groups most directly affected by employment policies. UNCTAD and the ILO can each be characterized as having a pluralist structure that tends towards corporatist behaviour. In committees that have a sectoral mandate, they usually turn out to be pure examples of corporatism. The Bank was for many years as corporatist as the Fund. It has changed substantially. Despite its small size and its lack of visibility, the Bank NGO Committee was never a corporatist body, because it is dominated by the development constituency, which has been highly critical of Bank policies. The intellectual shift at the Bank has been substantial, with both reformist and radical rejectionist NGOs making a major contribution. However, there is a special structural feature of global politics that cannot be fitted into the standard models. The environmental NGOs in the United States gained indirect leverage over the Bank by using their influence in the US Congress when the Bank has needed new funding to be approved (Le Prestre 1989). This is pluralism in one limited but crucial part of the system. The debate in European countries has also been pluralist, but with a different balance to the outcome, as development NGOs have maintained support for Bank funding. At the global level, the Bank has a minimal structure for formal access, compared to the UN, UNCTAD or the ILO, but it behaves in as flexible and open a manner, with its staff at the centre of a pluralist system. The WTO is so new that the structure cannot yet be regarded as having been fully constructed. At the global level there is no functioning policy network, but within many countries the government takes a corporatist approach towards trade policy. At both levels, change is moving in a pluralist direction. Given the range of policy domains it now affects and the number of NGOs for whom trade has become salient, there is potential for the WTO to advance most of the way across the spectrum. Its secretariat is already relating to a wider range of NGOs than the staff of the Fund do. Lack of access to information keeps the WTO as a closed system. The conclusion from these comparisons is that the nature of a policy-
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making system depends upon much more than the structure of the relationships among the various actors. The degree of integration in the UN system was not a good predictor of the existence or absence of a pluralist network. First, the nature of the system does not depend solely on the legal position: much depends upon which actors choose to be politically active within the structure. UNCTAD and the ILO show that open systems can easily tend towards corporatist behaviour, when the full range of NGOs is not present. Conversely the Bank, the Fund and the WTO all show that closed systems can be made more open, when many NGOs focus on promoting change. Second, utilization of procedures does affect outcomes, irrespective of the structure. The ILO supports regulation of markets because trade unions are so deeply embedded in its activities, whereas UNCTAD is more in favour of free markets than would otherwise be expected because non-commercial NGOs have neglected UNCTAD’s Board and its committees. The Bank has evolved into a pluralist institution, with policies that are markedly different from the Fund and the WTO, because NGOs have engaged with the Bank with increasing institutional breadth and policy depth since the 1970s. Third, change in the substance of the policy debate can feed back into the structure. When a system loses legitimacy one response can be to engage more with its critics. Following the critical onslaught of the mid- and late 1990s, the IMF is changing rapidly from a corporatist to a pluralist system. It is possible that the WTO will do the same some years later. Finally, a working pluralist system is inherently stable, but a corporatist system will tend to move towards a pluralist system when it is subject to change. It may be possible to close doors and limit access to policymaking within individual countries, but this is much more difficult to maintain at the global level. Notes 1
2 3
4
The three successive versions of the UN’s statute for NGOs are given in ECOSOC Resolution 288B (X) of 27 February 1950, Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968 and Resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996. Initially NGOs were labelled as Category A, B or C. In 1950 this became Category A, Category B and the Register, while in 1968 it became Category I, Category II and the Roster. Since 1996 Category I has become General Status and Category II has become Special Status. “List of Non-Governmental Organisations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council as at 31 July 1998”, UN Document E/1998/INF/6 of 6 November 1998. “Arrangements for the participation of non-governmental organisations in the activities of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development”, Board Decision 43 (VII) of 20 September 1968. The text may be compared with the first sixteen paragraphs of ECOSOC Resolution 288 and Resolution 1296. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the World Federation of Labour (formerly the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions), the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Organization of
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Employers, the International Co-operative Alliance and the International Federation of Agricultural Producers. Letter to the author from the IMF External Relations Department, dated 30 September 1993. Sir L.Brittan, “GATT and Developing Countries: An Open Letter”, written in early April 1994, but circulated in Britain by the European Commission office in London with a covering letter dated 3 May 1994. Focus. GATT Newsletter 107 (May 1994):8–9. Decisions WT/L/160 and WT/L/162, adopted by the WTO General Council on 18 July 1996. Sustainable Developments 12 (1), 21 March 1998.
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Rosenau, J.N. (1980) The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalisation of World Affairs, London: Pinter. ——(1990) Turbulence in World Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Waters, M. (1995) Globalisation, London: Routledge. Willetts, P. (1982) Pressure Groups in the Global System. The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organisations, London: Pinter. ——(1996a) “Who cares about the environment?” in J.Vogler and M.Imber (eds) The Environment and International Relations, London: Routledge/Economic and Social Research Council Global Environmental Change Series. ——(1996b) “Consultative status for NGOs at the United Nations” in P.Willetts (ed.) “The Conscience of the World”. The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System, London: Christopher Hurst, and Washington: The Brookings Institution. ——(1997) “Transnational actors and international organisations in global politics” in J.B.Baylis and S.Smith (eds) The Globalisation of World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ——(1998) “Political globalisation and the impact of NGOs upon transnational companies” in J.V.Mitchell (ed.) Companies in a World of Conflict, London: Earthscan, and Washington: The Brookings Institution.
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Embedding global financial markets Securitization and the emerging web of governance Philip G.Cerny
Introduction The central focus of this book is on the way what have traditionally been considered “private” forms of organization are altering wider patterns of governance in world politics and political economy. Private forms of organization have throughout history been deeply embedded in political processes and state structures, whether in terms of kinship structures in village and patrimonial societies, or private forms of power and coercion in the “predatory” state (Levi 1981), or, more recently, the power and influence of modern capitalist firms in the national “corporate state” of the Second Industrial Revolution era from the middle of the nineteenth century until the mid to late twentieth. All these forms of private power, however, have in the last analysis been dependent for their real strength and influence upon the existence of coherent, centripetal and authoritative domestic political institutions. Since the seventeenth century this has meant the state, including its modern variation, the capitalist nation-state. This has been true not only for those individuals, groups, economic interests, etc., that have sought to achieve their private aims through shaping or controlling state power from above or within. It has also been true for those seeking to influence or oppose the power structure from below or outside, whether in the private economic sphere per se (e.g. through industrial action) or by more public engagement in mass political action, pressure group activity, and/or forms of bureaucratic co-optation such as corporatism. In the global era, however, the relationship between states and private structures and processes is being fundamentally reconstituted (Cerny 1990, 1997a). The rapid integration of international markets and other essentially private phenomena like multinational corporations, communications and information technology, etc., can no longer be organized either economically or politically on a scale which meshes so easily with the traditional power hierarchies of the nation-state and the traditional international states system (Cerny 1995). New webs of governance, inextricably intertwined with each other, are emerging and crystallizing, led by a revolution in financial markets sometimes called the Second Financial Revolution. Transnational and
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international financial markets cut across national boundaries in complex, multi-layered fashion and are no longer so easily governed by means of the kinds of domestic power structures and organizational resources possessed by nation-states, although states still play a vital and growing role in stabilizing, promoting and expanding the process of globalization itself. At the same time, international and transnational political institutions are not only still in relative infancy but also seriously constrained and even stunted by existing state-centric structures, both endogenously and exogenously (Lake 1999). Therefore, these newer forms of governance are less dependent upon the traditional power resources and structural capacities of states per se, involving an expanding core of intertwined private institutions, networks and complex transnational practices. At one level, they in effect exercise a kind of private authority (Strange 1996), alongside and outside as well as within and through the state. But, at another level, this is not merely private authority in the sense of new hierarchies replacing old; top-down authority itself is increasingly integrated into more extensive, labyrinthine and diffuse exchange relationships. The result is a complex web of governance, working through multiple, often unaccountable layers of market, hierarchy and network, mixing public and private in ways which increasingly privilege the latter at the expense of the former (Cerny 1999a, 1999b). At the core of this range of governance mechanisms lies the global financial marketplace, a complex of private and mixed public/private structures made up of many types of continuously interacting organizations. Financial markets are not only becoming global; they are also recasting the institutional framework of national and international politics by reorganizing the way resources, goods and values are produced and distributed. The organizations involved in this market-based governance complex include: firms such as banks, investment banks (and other “non-bank” financial institutions such as finance companies), brokerages, marketmakers, mutual funds and other investment vehicles for a wide range of old and new financial instruments, pension funds, accountancy firms, insurance companies and the like, often increasingly organized as conglomerates or “financial supermarkets”; institutionalized securities exchanges where stocks, bonds, and myriad financial instruments old and new are traded, increasingly linked both electronically and in terms of personal networks with other exchanges throughout the world, enabling complex “arbitrage” operations to be carried out across what had been distinct market or organizational sectors; “self-regulatory organizations”, including many securities exchanges themselves as well as financial industry associations, where internationally networked “practitioners” are granted legal or quasi-legal authority to run their own affairs in corporatist fashion; parapublic agencies and government regulatory authorities—often “captured” by industry interests or enmeshed in “iron
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triangles”—whose role is to promote the stability and expansion of market mechanisms and therefore, indirectly, the interests of private market organizations and market actors; large now-financial firms, especially multinational corporations, with the ability to engage in complex financial management activities on their own account and which increasingly need to arbitrage large amounts of financial resources across borders and sectors in order both to service their non-financial activities and to maximize returns (and minimize losses) from exchange rate fluctuations, interest rate variations and other exogenous financial conditions (international capital flows, cross-border price sensitivity) in a more open world; international industry associations and, in practice, much of what is done by international financial institutions (Filipovic 1997); and networks of relationships among market actors and state actors (networks among the latter are called “transgovernmental” networks, but they are merely part of wider “transnational” networks cutting across the private/public divide) which crystallize around crossborder market activities such as harmonizing domestic and intergovernmental regulatory regimes, managing international financial crises (Kahler 1998), attempting to control illicit activities such as money laundering (Friman and Andreas 1999), etc. The reasons these private and quasi-private organizations can exercise such wide-ranging influence and informal authority in the world today are twofold. In the first place, no public state-like authority structure at either the international or the domestic level is really capable of controlling either international capital flows or the way the price of money itself is set across borders. After all, the financial system is the “infrastructure of the infrastructure” (Cerny 1994a), the core of the price mechanism itself—not only for the price of money, but in turn, through the various functions that money fulfills in the wider economy, for all other transactions. As a consequence, the allocation of all other “goods” is subjected to the disciplines of the global financial marketplace, i.e. to what Marx called the “exchange value” they acquire. This process is constrained by the discipline not merely of “markets” in some abstract sense, but of market institutions and organizations too. Intergovernmental regimes and institutions are still floundering around, attempting to play catch-up with the phenomenal growth and increasing complexity of transnational and global markets, while states, even the economically strongest, must increasingly adjust their internal practices not only to day-to-day market conditions but also to the requirements of stabilizing, supporting and promoting the market system. Such internal practices include: their legal and administrative structures; their public and economic policies; the mindsets of politicians and bureaucrats; the way voters, interest groups and other “publics” perceive what they want; and the very concept of what might or might not be “in the public interest”, in particular the role of the state in redistributing goods and values among groups.
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In this process, of course, some states are more privileged than others because of their relative economic strength and, more importantly, because of a longer tradition of embedded pro-market practices as in the United States and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the reduction of international barriers has created a governance gap at the global level which is increasingly being filled by private market institutions and practices as such. The second reason for this transformation is the changing structure of the global financial system itself. At one level, this shift is quantitative. The vast mushrooming of trans-border capital flows since the 1960s and the rapidly growing stock of internationally held and traded financial instruments such as derivatives is usually seen as the major independent variable (Andrews 1994), with global foreign exchange transactions rapidly approaching two trillion US dollars per day. Other quantitative indicators include the convergence of world prices for capital as well as for other assets—real interest rates, stock market prices, etc., in the financial sector, as well as the prices of other goods and as they become more and more tradable through an increasingly integrated global financial marketplace (Cerny 1994b). However, at another level, by far the most significant structural shift in global finance is qualitative. This qualitative shift is rooted in the disintermediation and securitization of financial markets. In traditional forms of banking, the banker acts as an independent intermediary. Once funds are deposited or invested, the depositor or investor has no control over to whom they are loaned and for what purpose. The banker, by developing independent relationships with existing and potential borrowers, determines where capital is to go by approving its proposed use by the borrower. In turn, both depositor and borrower are locked into this intermediated relationship, which must be renegotiated with the banker if it goes sour. Intermediating institutions therefore tend to be hierarchical, much like the traditional notion of the state, and it is no surprise that the First Financial Revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries developed around national banking systems closely linked with the main emerging bureaucratic industrial nation-states of the era. In contrast, securitization broadly speaking is characteristic of more diffuse financial markets based on the trading of negotiable instruments, i.e. stocks, shares, bonds, etc., that are issued anonymously and sold to the highest bidder, who has the right to sell them on to whomsoever he or she chooses. In this case, institutions such as securities markets, brokerages, etc., focus on issuing such instruments on primary markets and trading them on secondary markets; control of the end uses of that capital is thereby determined in a relatively open and diffuse process of exchange rather than through hierarchical authority. Securitization also allows such exchanges to expand indefinitely, beyond the purview of any intermediary, and is therefore potentially global in scope. This chapter
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argues that securitization therefore not only alters the character of the financial marketplace, but changes the way states interact with and intervene in financial markets. The result places significant new public policy constraints on governments (Cerny 1996) as well as burdening them with new, much wider and more onerous tasks with regard to regulating this more and more internationalized and diffuse marketplace. The markets too are developing new forms of private governance i n order to cope with change. Taken together, these complex trends constitute not merely a change in degree within an evolving national-hierarchical Westphalian international system, but a change in kind from that system to an embryonic multi-layered, complex web of governance rooted in a more diffuse exchange-based structure. Markets as institutions The significance of the “market” poses particular theoretical problems for the social sciences. Classical and neoclassical economic theory see markets as the very antithesis of the kind of authoritative order which is at the heart of traditional political science or the forms of organized social solidarity and interaction which are the focus of sociology; economic history and business studies uneasily straddle the divide. Therefore when we look for modes of “governance” in the contemporary international system, we normally look for political or “public” processes and institutions which are somehow differentiated from the market. Markets, in contrast, are usually assumed to be at best a form of “enterprise association”, involving the interaction of private rather than public ends—and therefore by definition incapable of governing society in any broad systemic fashion (Oakeshott 1976; Auspitz 1976; cf. Gilpin 1987). States regulate and stabilize markets in the public interest, but are always in tension with the inherent anarchy of the market (on the level of structure) and the potentially pathological nature of the self-interested ends pursued by market actors. Nevertheless, markets are also governance structures, in three overlapping but analytically distinct senses. First, markets are, at their most abstract, forms of spontaneous order, as in classical economic thought— spontaneous and thus beyond the supposedly authoritative or power-driven world of politics, but order nonetheless (von Hayek 1989). Furthermore, they are part and parcel of the very constitution of both the modern capitalist nation-state and the modern world order, inextricably intertwined with our very understanding of how states have evolved historically and what state actors “do” today (Cerny 1990). And finally, markets are not merely spontaneous forms of human behavior, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”, but actual, real-time, real-world institutions—complex mixtures of different ideal-type organizational forms, historically path-dependent and deeply “embedded” or entrenched in wider social structures.
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Markets are, in this view, simply one form of organizational or institutional structure among others.1 In neoclassical economics, the “new institutionalist” strain associated with Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1985)—transaction cost economics—stresses a calculus of the relative efficiency of firms with different firm structures. These structural forms involve relatively perfect “markets” on the one hand versus relatively pure “hierarchies” on the other, depending on whether a firm is characterized respectively by so-called “non-specific assets” or “private goods” (i.e. easily tradable at readily reckoned market prices), in which case markets are the more appropriate form of what Williamson explicitly calls “governance,” or, alternatively, by “specific assets” or “public (collective) goods” (i.e. not easily tradable at a spontaneous market price), in which case hierarchical organizational forms are often more efficient. Furthermore, in the “new institutional history”, the “new institutional sociology” and “neoinstitutionalist” or “neo-structuralist” approaches to political science, the emphasis is on the evolution of linkages between economic structures and underlying social structures (Hall and Taylor 1996), i.e. whether firms and other forms of private economic governance mimic or mesh with noneconomic structures of social and political organization and vice versa. In this new institutionalist analysis, therefore, any fundamental distinction in kind between private and public organizations, while still crucial, is seen as theoretically problematic at several levels. Public and private institutional structures are inherently blurred, overlapping, cross-cutting and complex, exhibiting a wide range of mixtures of market, hierarchy and network (Thompson et al. 1991). For example, with regard to firms, Bradach and Eccles assert the significance of plural and other complex organizational forms and the importance of overarching macro-structure in evaluating the intricate “control mechanisms” of firms: [C]ombinations of control mechanisms…[can be] overlapping, embedded, intertwined, juxtaposed and nested…Typically, control mechanisms are grafted on to and leveraged off existing social structures…To understand the plural form, the analytic focus must be moved away from exclusive attention to individual transactions; instead, the dynamics of whole structures must be examined since the transactional context affects the control that can be brought to bear on individual transactions…in [even more complex] matrix structures the mechanisms intersect while in plural forms the mechanisms run in parallel. (Bradach and Eccles 1989:290) Of course, what is true of the dynamics of whole structures is even more true of societies and political systems. The state itself is not exclusively a hierarchical structure but can be seen as a complex plural or matrix structure characterized by overlapping clusters of differently structured games or
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transactions (Cerny 1990). In this context, globalization involves a range of intertwined processes which open up the organizational structure of the state and unbundle its traditional hierarchical form, challenging its very embeddedness and creating permissive conditions for both economic and political actors to engage in private institutional bricolage in order to bridge the resulting governance gap. Many critics of the concept of globalization argue that the state still possesses such a unique capacity to use its authoritative resources (especially if recaptured by political forces dedicated to social justice and stability) that it can slow or even reverse globalizing trends (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Boyer and Drache 1996). Indeed, they seem to condemn private organizations to remain mere enterprise associations. For such authors, states have defeated spontaneous market forces before, and provided that people are willing to pay the necessary short-term costs can do so again (Goodman and Pauly 1993; Helleiner 1994). They argue—as Polanyi (1944) did with regard to the haute finance of the turn of the last century—that the internationalized financial markets both of the Gold Standard era and of today’s global marketplace are profoundly disembedded and therefore extremely vulnerable to (1) volatility and instability or systemic risk (see Laurence 1996:337) and (2) political opposition based on social justice grounds. Thus the potential exists to re-embed financial markets within the nation-state through national capital controls and through intergovernmental co-ordination and co-operation regimes (e.g. Hirst and Thompson 1996: chapter 8). If this approach is correct, then the globalization of financial markets becomes merely another stage in the development of the Westphalian system. If not, then it becomes necessary to ask whether new authoritative control mechanisms might evolve to fill the growing governance gap. A crucial issue is whether markets as such are able to create the kind of trust that can permit the objectives of financial market actors to be reconciled in the name of common goals. In this world of “regulatory arbitrage”, can financial market actors in turn develop sufficiently coherent and strong private networks of trust, reinforced by transnational communications technology and cosmopolitan personal relationship structures, to blur, erode and overlay national psychological as well as economic boundaries? And from a sociological perspective, will transnational “clans” (Ouchi 1980, following Durkheim) or “global tribes” (Kotkin 1992) develop around the global financial community and penetrate into other economic sectors and bureaucratic structures (e.g. through transnational and transgovernmental policy networks) in such a way as to compete with and possibly outflank the nation-state as the dominant structuring mechanism of the international political economy? Finally, can the development of international financial markets themselves—in terms of purely economic transactions—create new conditions of embeddedness at a transnational level? At one level, this
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question has a quantitative dimension. As Bradach and Eccles (1989:282, citing Zucker 1986) point out, recurrent market transactions can themselves create trust, leading to the construction of institutions only when that “process-based trust” is not disrupted by instability and/or systemic risk. In other words, an increase in what Durkheim called “dynamic density” can lead to a restructuring of the division of labor along transnational lines, creating new forms of “organic solidarity” (Ruggie 1986). The growth of international capital mobility, cross-border price sensitivity and transnational network linkages, in the absence of an uncontrollable international financial crisis, thus could serve over time to embed global financial markets further in a social system of their own, at the crossroads of international, transnational and domestic politics and economics. At another level, however, the question also has a qualitative dimension—whether the development and growth of international financial markets can engender (1) a belief in accuracy and fidelity of information about what is going on and what different individuals and groups want—essentially the transparency of organizational arrangements—and (2) some level of normative consensus about the rules of the game, the nature of shared or collective interests among the parties, etc. (Ouchi 1980). Can such structures create what Almond and Verba (1963) called “system affect”, a kind of “rain-or-shine” loyalty to the system that is independent of how the system performs in particular circumstances? Such an outcome is not unprecedented. In earlier eras family and kinship structures, religious hierarchies and other kinds of private institutions have essentially played this public role. Indeed, according to Ouchi, private economic organizations have certain comparative advantages over states in terms of decision-making in complex social formations where groups have different normative goals but can agree on the rules of the game: [A]ny organizational form must reduce either the ambiguity of performance evaluation or the goal incongruence between parties. Put this way, market relations are efficient when there is little ambiguity over performance, so that the parties can tolerate relatively high levels of opportunism or goal incongruence. (Ouchi 1980:251) In effect, when markets are characterized by ambiguous information,2 price signals are likely to be highly inaccurate, and transactions will be highly vulnerable to opportunism, which then must be controlled by hierarchies or networks. Paradoxically, the more global financial markets can expand their activities and penetration within and across different economic sectors and geographical areas, the more information they provide to market actors. If such actors, over time, come to accept market signals and the information they contain as accurate, the more those markets will be seen as efficient and acceptable. Indeed, the very spread of
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markets can itself promote a kind of market-based embeddedness. This is true not only for financial institutions and major market players, but also for mass consumers. Whereas thirty years ago most people were reluctant to give up their cash to banks, they now have instant access both globally and locally to 24-hour-a-day cash dispensers and other forms of “electronic cash”. The face of money is less and less the national banknote and more and more the VISA card. Thus the embedding of financial markets involves not merely the extremely rapid development and expansion of the markets themselves in purely economic terms and the critical contribution of information and communications technology. It also involves the development of new transnational and transgovernmental social networks, the emergence of highly significant private institutions for market regulation, the restructuring of the state around supporting the internationalization of the market (deregulation, central bank independence, “reinventing government” and the New Public Management, new pro-market forms of re-regulation such as insider trading laws, disclosure requirements, etc.), and the rearticulation of domestic social coalitions around non-inflationary growth and the “embedded financial orthodoxy” of the competition state (Cerny 1997a). Because of a range of characteristics of finance as an economic phenomenon—especially its highly abstract, non-specific asset structure— the result is not the emergence of distinct, competing forms of governance structure, but actually a convergence of both domestic and international governance structures around a neoliberal model, especially in the financial issue area. Of course, in other, more asset-specific sectors, somewhat different patterns may result (Cerny 1995). The role of the state becomes extremely ambiguous within such a restructuring process. Recent scholarship on international finance has sought to resurrect the role of the state in the face of traditional market theories of financial globalization (see Andrews and Willett 1997). Traditionally, key features of the state permitted decisions to be made which were both medium-to-long range and redistributive, characteristics which are essential for the provision of public goods and the development of a common sense of the “public interest” to reconcile conflicting goals. Within this context, “voice” proved better as a conflict-resolution mechanism than “exit” (Hirschman 1970:83). However, as Laurence (1996) argues, international capital mobility not only makes the requirements of “voice” far more demanding where several states are involved but also makes the “exit” option far more viable. Thus the state’s role in regulating and controlling financial markets is paradoxical in two principal ways, reflecting the ongoing structure/agency problematic of social science. On the one hand, state actors are integral parts of a wider complex network of transnational problem-solving, linking transnational actors, domestic actors and state actors negotiating domestic and intergovernmental responses to transnational changes in the sort of
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matrix structures described above. On the other, state structures simultaneously constitute a key terrain of political and social conflict over issues which pit globalizing forces against domestic constituencies. As Andrews and Willett (1997) and Laurence (1996) argue (see also Cerny 1993: chapter 3), the structural impact of globalization in general, and of international financial integration in particular, is highly indirect, and must still be mediated through not only state policies but also domestic political processes. Having said that, however, the direction of change is the same everywhere. Financial markets are not only impacting on governance, but also increasingly acting as governance structures themselves and embedding their practices at domestic as well as transnational and international levels. The nature of that change is twofold. In the first place, financial markets are accruing to themselves a degree of authority which alters their relationship with the state. And in the second place, those markets are themselves changing the character of authority itself through the process of securitization and its structural ramifications. Globalization, the state and the private sector Finance is the most “globalized” of all economic sectors and therefore presents particular problems for understanding change in international governance structures. A combination of the symbolic and fungible character of money itself plus dramatic innovations in communications and information technology have compounded trade and other pressures towards financial market opening, facilitating the growth of transnational capital flows and complex patterns of two-way cross-border price sensitivity. These have so far dwarfed the monitoring and controlling capabilities as well as the public financial resources of states. Those national systems were originally constructed against the background of attempts to rebuild disrupted domestic and international economies in the 1930s and in the postWorld War II era, and generally embodied a range of uneasily coexisting functions: prudential regulation, i.e. maintaining the safety and soundness of the financial system itself as a collective good at both domestic and international levels; supporting public finances, especially the funding of public sector deficits (often the prime historical origin of national financial systems); and more widely supporting both macroeconomic and microeconomic policy goals, such as improving the allocative efficiency of national economies in both public and private sectors, reducing the cost of capital, providing liquidity for economic growth, pursuing national industrial policies, and financing the welfare state. While some of these functions have been reinforced and expanded by financial globalization, especially prudential regulation and the rapid growth of private investment, the scope for others, such as supporting autonomous macroeconomic policies, policies of social redistribution, and national industrial policies, has been significantly reduced.
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In pursuing these goals—especially the latter category, aimed at domestic socio-economic problems and constituencies—national financial systems and the regulatory systems within which they grew up were embedded in contrasting historical patterns of economic and social development; thus they were often structured quite distinctly from country to country. Capital-market systems, on the one hand, are those in which institutionalized relationships between banks and/or governments and industrial firms take a back seat in the provision of externally funded investment capital to stock and bond markets; Britain and the United States are the main cases. In credit-based systems, on the other hand, investment capital is predominantly provided through loans (especially long-term loans) allocated through more hierarchical institutions, whether state or combined public/private institutions (as in Japan and France) or through banks, especially “universal banks” (as in Germany). Thus each type was characterized by a particular relationship between the state and private capital. In capital-market systems, interaction is more indirect, what Zysman (1983) has called an “arm’s-length” relationship. Government provided a sometimes quite constraining financial regulatory environment, as well as certain wider public goods such as the welfare state and infrastructural spending, but did not overtly interfere with the outcomes of financial market processes. In credit-based systems, however, more hierarchical state manipulation of monetary, fiscal and industrial policies, along with a central coordinating role for banks and parapublic institutions (and often a prior tradition of collaboration between state and capital), drew private actors into institutionalized collaborative structures, whether through indicative planning, formal and informal corporatist bargaining processes, close bureaucratic collaboration with private as well as public industry, and the like, particularly with regard to the manipulation of the conditions and supply of credit for investment. Nevertheless, these models overlapped considerably insofar as all post-war governments attempted to promote economic growth, and private interests had considerable direct and indirect influence within states themselves through their general financial and economic power, interlocking elite networks, the “capture” of regulatory and other bureaucratic agencies, the provision of information, the granting or withholding of co-operation, etc., as well as pressure group activity, interest representation through electoral and parliamentary processes, political parties, and the like. Furthermore, the “post-war consensus” pulled even relatively conservative parties for a time into supporting more extensive state economic interventionism in the name of more or less social democratic principles within a “mixed economy”. Much of the debate on the impact of the internationalization of finance— generally seen to have come about mainly through the expansion of transnational markets (albeit often promoted and shaped by states and political processes and/or multinational corporations)—has concerned
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whether globalization necessarily involves a convergence of these regulatory systems, in particular the erosion of credit-based systems and their transmutation into capital-market systems. These academic debates are usually intertwined with political debates over the merits of the quasi socialdemocratic norms ostensibly underlying the politics of credit-based systems. On the one hand, such factors as capital mobility, price sensitivity, technological innovation, regulatory arbitrage and the decompartmentalization of different financial sectors have been seen by liberals (and pessimistic Marxists) as part of an inexorable process of marketization and liberalization leading to the convergence of prices (especially interest rates), corporate structures, conditions of exit and entry, and patterns of government intervention. Herring and Litan (1995, especially Table 2.2:29) set out five levels of international financial integration. I have argued that convergence does generally characterize the financial services sector and that this process derives from the particular character of asset specificity in that sector (Cerny 1993, 1994a, 1994b). Other writers, in contrast, focus on the differences among national trajectories of regulatory change (usually mislabeled “deregulation”, but actually a process of re-regulation). In an analysis which builds on an earlier distinction between “Type I Re-regulation” and “Type II Re-regulation” (Cerny 1991), Steven Vogel (1996) focuses on divergence among reregulatory patterns. He asserts that re-regulation takes two forms—“procompetitive re-regulation”, on the one hand (Type II) and “strategic reinforcement” (of pre-existing state/economy linkages), on the other (a variant of Type I)—and that these trajectories closely mirror earlier embedded patterns of financial system development, i.e. the former characterizing regulatory change in the United States and the United Kingdom, the latter Japan, France and Germany (although maintaining Zysman’s distinction between Japan and France as state-led credit-based systems and Germany as a bank-led credit-based system).3 Along with the debate over the fate of national regulatory systems, there are also debates about both international and transnational developments (see Herring and Litan 1995, for an excellent summary). I suggest that we are in the presence of three-level games. In other words, we do not merely have traditional “two-level games”, in which the state is the fundamental mediating structure between international pressures and “domestic” politics, policy-making and administration (see Keohane and Milner 1996). Rather, in addition to such two-level games, we are seeing the rapid development of “third-level” games—transnational interactions which flow around, under and over the state rather than going through it or even impacting directly upon it. The crystallization of third-level game structures can also be seen as constituting a web of relationships which impact the state both from above and from below, as well as from within. We must not lose sight of the first two levels, however (i.e. domestic regulatory change and international co-operation among states, mainly through international
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regimes); developments at all three levels are inextricably intertwined. Even here the underlying pressures for change—as Vogel argues—come primarily from a rapidly evolving and inherently transnational market environment. The main implication of these debates on changing patterns of governance in the financial sector,4 therefore, is that several trends are developing at the same time in interdependent fashion. The first and most elaborate debate concerns the national level, as discussed above, where the power of difficult-to-control transnational markets is seen to confront embedded national financial systems in “firstlevel games”. If governance structures do not merely derive from efficiency criteria but are part of a “path-dependent” process with many possible outcomes (“multiple equilibria”) and shaped by particular events, interpersonal networks and other contingent criteria which are then historically “locked in” (Granovetter 1985, 1992), then there is the possibility that national regulatory systems are still sufficiently “embedded” to weather the storm of market transnationalization, regulatory arbitrage, embedded financial orthodoxy and the like.5 Governments may be able to create enough “friction” in the market mechanism (Mayer 1992) to contain or reverse the liberalization process and bring other public interest criteria back in. However, even Vogel admits that his exemplar of “strategic reinforcement”, Japan, may merely be postponing the eventuality of full liberalization (Vogel 1996:195). This hypothesis was being put to the test in 1999–2000 as the Japanese “Big Bang” gathered momentum. Therefore regulation may be liberalizing, but it is not “deregulating” in the sense of removing rules; rather, it is the formulation and implementation of complex new rules intended to replace protected, self-regulated, cartel-like practices with liberalizing and market-promoting rules (see Laurence 1996; Loriaux 1991; Lütz 1996). At the other end of the governance spectrum from the fate of national regulatory systems stands the development of relatively formal international co-operation in regulating the sector—“second-level games”. Here the picture is more fragmented. Proposals for systematizing international monetary co-operation have been around for a long time, concerning such issues as targeted exchange rates (e.g. Williamson and Henning 1994), but the durability of the system of floating exchange rates, with international monetary relations increasingly embedded in hard-to-control international currency markets, makes effective co-operation episodic and often ad hoc; attempts to develop more systematic co-operation have often just set up a different kind of targets—targets for powerful market actors to aim at, as is well known in the case of the crisis of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992. Attempts to develop international regulatory standards for securities markets have quickly become bogged down in national differences of regulatory style (i.e. the more aggressive, legal-rational style of American regulation versus the more discretionary style of European regulatory systems, as well as differences over market
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structure between, for example, order-driven and quote-driven markets, restrictions on off-exchange trading, and the like) as well as differences over how to measure capital adequacy. However, recent activity at the Bank for International Settlements and the argument that the spread through policy transfer of the “home country regulation” actually embodies a genuinely international and intergovernmental approach to financial market regulation (Kapstein 1994) indicate that international co-operation will continue to be a major aspect of overall policy response to globalizing financial markets (Andrews and Willett 1997). In fact, however, the main process of regulatory change—“creeping liberalization”—has increasingly been accepted at the level of epistemic consensus, without requiring the presence of proactive intergovernmental co-operation to further it. Indeed, such co-operation is not necessary, although desirable. In contrast to the politics of trade, where international co-operation is required to open markets in the face of general domestic pressure from interest groups seeking closure, in financial markets most of the powerful market actors, whether financial firms, borrowers, or investors, look to their governments to “level the playing field” by unilaterally opening international markets. On the contrary, as the messy demise of the Bretton Woods System demonstrated, international co-operation is required for successful closure, whether the imposition of capital controls, ensuring the safety and soundness of banking systems, maintaining fixed or targeted exchange rates, etc., etc. In other words, the rational choice conundrum is turned on its head in the financial issue area compared to the trade issue-area (Cerny 1993: chapter 3; Helleiner 1994). Therefore a combination of regulatory capture and arbitrage means that state agencies compete with each other to open international markets on behalf of their respective clientèles, and “policy transfer” takes place by spontaneous neoliberal emulation rather than by formal co-operation. In such a context, even firstlevel (domestic) games, as they are increasingly dominated by the larger financial market players, can no longer be said to reinforce the role of the state in a more traditional two-level game structure. Domestic private actors—linked more and more closely with international financial markets—increasingly turn to “exit” rather than “voice”, leaving state actors to flounder as they fall over themselves to promote “competitiveness”. And as these domestic actors become more closely “locked in” to transnational financial markets, they do not focus mainly on trying to convince domestic politicians and bureaucrats to support their goals; instead they get on with their business. The changing structure of the financial sector: disintermediation and securitization Finance itself has never been a wholly homogeneous sector. Banking has always been characterized by much more highly institutionalized
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intermediaries than the securities sector, and the politics of the two sectors are often at odds. This is true in international finance too, although the twin processes of disintermediation and securitization have pulled the banking sector—traditionally the dominant partner—more into the world of the securities industry, both domestically and internationally. Thus to the extent that international co-operation has worked, it has predominantly involved the banking sector—which, though widely studied, is increasingly the exception to the rule.6 A combination of traditional government imbrication with banks and their more specific asset structures (“relationship banking”) has led to the banking system in each country itself being treated as a collective good, meaning that states have been far more concerned about the stability of banks and protective of their consumers than they have been with those of the securities markets, where much higher levels of risk have been accepted as standard. Even here, however, international co-operation has been patchy. Controversy still surrounds the relatively successful Basle Agreement on Capital Adequacy of 1988 (and its subsequent revisions) (cf. Kapstein 1992, 1994; Reinicke 1995; Cerny 1994a; Filipovic 1997; Herring and Litan 1995). There are at least three general goals of financial regulation, uneasily coexisting in different balances in different systems. The first is the stability and soundness of the financial system itself, i.e. prudential regulation (along with investor protection). The second involves making private money available for government purposes, i.e. financing budget deficits; this goal is, of course, alive and well, and has strongly influenced the deregulatory/reregulatory process in a wide range of countries, including the United States in the Reagan era, Japan in the late 1970s and early 1980s when domestic deficits ballooned, France in the early Mitterrand years (Cerny 1989), etc. However, such goals are perfectly consistent with market liberalization in a world of rapidly expanding private capital flows. The third set of goals in the list comprises wider public and economic policy goals, in particular redistributive welfare goals; these have often been important in the past in launching deregulatory/re-regulatory processes, as in the New Deal, but at the same time they are the main casualties of globalization and liberalization. In the past, while prudential regulation has always been a fundamental part of bank regulation, regulatory systems in the wider sense have often taken their fundamental character and drive from other goals, and have used different instruments. In order to lower the cost of capital or target investment on particular sectors, etc., governments have regulated a number of other aspects in ways which were far more important in terms of how each whole national system worked. The two main non-prudential approaches have involved (1) direct regulations on entry and exit to the financial system and (2) regulating prices (imposing fiat prices rather than marketdetermined prices). In some cases, furthermore, the organizational bases of so-called “self-regulation” have simply reflected the existence of cartellized
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arrangements for entry/exit control and price-fixing (such as the traditional system of fixed commissions), although usually backed up by the state. In a world of financial globalization and market liberalization, however, these tools are increasingly being seen as not only unworkable but also illegitimate. Only prudential regulation—the prevention of market failure through ex post enforcement and litigation (and consequently a concern with investor protection)—is nowadays seen as legitimate in a world dominated by an increasingly strong neoliberal consensus. As such, it constitutes the outer limit of both domestic re-regulation and international regulatory co-operation. Furthermore, as political scientists who have focused on this aspect of regulation have noted, “regulatory arbitrage” is not merely competition in laxity or a “race to the bottom”. In the matter of prudential regulation, it is often a “race to the top”, what David Vogel has called the “California effect”, in contrast to the “Delaware effect” (Vogel 1995; for an application of this notion to financial markets, see Lütz 1996; Laurence 1996). The role of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, given the powerful position of the United States in international financial markets, has been to defend strong prudential regulation while calling for deregulation and liberalization in ex ante structural regulation. This has added to the inability of the major states to come to international cooperative agreements on the regulation of securities markets (Underbill 1995). When added to the other constraints on international regulatory cooperation discussed above, the substantive content of second-level games, then, seems barren indeed from a wider public policy perspective. The development of such new but still embryonic transnational governance processes and structures represents a shift of the focus of transnational financial market regulation away from formal state institutions and state actors per se to a combination of privatized governance and loose, networked public/private interfaces—what Lake (1999) has recently called the privatization of governance itself. The main dynamic of this reconstitution of governance derives from the process of securitization discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Securitization first of all affects the nature of markets themselves. It shifts the center of gravity of markets from traditional hierarchical financial institutions to a much denser and more diffuse process of exchange. Its impact can be felt on several levels, private and public, intra-firm and interfirm, national and international. The first is that it becomes more difficult for institutions, whether private (banks and other firms) or public to control the content of the decisions of market actors themselves, including the market signals which they use in interacting with other actors. There is a purer exchange/risk calculus at work among a larger number and wider variety of participants. Negotiable financial instruments can simply be sold if they do not fit the utility
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preferences of owners. Therefore it becomes more difficult for governments to use capital markets for “top-down” ends. In the second place, as securitized markets expand, they develop a denser, more complex web of transactions. Although international capital flows were probably as high as a proportion of economic activity at the turn of the last century as they are today, the economies of the time were far less developed, and such flows involved a much smaller elite of rich investors than the growing securities markets of today, whether we look at individual investors or the rise of pension funds, mutual funds and the like. Therefore securities markets are much more a “bottom-up” phenomenon, affecting a wider range of people, including many who traditionally have not owned wealth-creating assets. This is particularly important with regard to the changing nature of financial crises in developing economies; as Kahler (1998) and his authors show, the dynamics of crisis in the context of extensive portfolio investment are quite distinct from those characteristic of earlier eras when investment predominantly took other forms. As a result, financial markets have a flatter organizational structure. Securities markets consist far more of their individual participants than banks do. This characteristic is multiplied by the impact of new information and communications technology, which not only allows more and more individuals to participate, especially in off-exchange trading through electronic communications networks and the like, forcing institutionalized exchanges to restructure and integrate their operations in order to compete. Indeed, as Germain (1997) argues, international financial markets up to the current era tended to be concentrated in terms of place in “principal financial centers” such as Amsterdam and London; today, although in some ways New York is the current PFC, place itself is less and less important as markets continue to diffuse outward and downward in geographical, technological and economic terms. What were once distinct markets, such as stocks, bonds, insurance, housing mortgages, derivatives, commodities, etc., are increasingly linked through decompartmentalization. Investors take it for granted that they can arbitrage their money across these different markets, just as they can do across borders. Banks are becoming less “bank-like”. In order to participate in securities markets, where the money is, banks are increasingly securitizing their own operations too, whether moving towards direct participation in securities markets, merging across old market boundaries (e.g. Citicorp and Travellers in the United States), or reorganizing their internal structures around such procedures as “mark-to-market” accounting in determining their capital adequacy and profitability. Government regulation of the financial sector has moved away from attempting to manipulate financial institutions and markets for public uses (e.g. industrial, macroeconomic or welfare policies) towards establishing and maintaining what are thought to be the right conditions for securities
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markets to be efficient. Examples include fostering the competitiveness of nationally based financial firms in the international marketplace, assuring the safety and soundness of the financial system (prudential regulation), promoting the technical efficiency and fairness of financial transactions through increased transparency and disclosure, and a heightened attack on fraud, such as insider trading and money laundering. Government macroeconomic policy now increasingly eschews using fiscal and monetary tools for democratic political goals. The promotion of market efficiency and the reduction of inflation have replaced redistribution and social justice as the overriding goals of financial and economic policy. Not only are particular policy tools, like interest rate-setting and budgetbalancing, increasingly attuned to the perceived dictates of global financial markets, but the institutions of the state itself are being re-equilibrated, with independent central banks in particular taking on more and more of a policeman role over the state itself as well as over the markets (for the developing world, see Maxfield 1997). International co-operation in financial matters remains quite limited, although the role of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements has grown in particular areas (Pauly 1997). There is still debate over whether there can be such a thing as an “international lender-of-last-resort” (Capie 1998), while converging regulatory practices spread more by regulatory arbitrage, competitive emulation and crisis management than by the development of any new international authority. Although co-operation is expanding in specific areas like money laundering (Helleiner 1999) that fit the new regulatory style, Bill Clinton’s and Gordon Brown’s calls in 1998 for a “new international financial architecture” remain essentially dormant. Nevertheless, new transnational industry associations and policy communities, often linked with transgovernmental networks of regulators, not only exercise indirect influence but also take on a degree of private authority. As Filipovic (1994, 1997) shows, such international nongovernmental organizations as the International Primary Market Association (IPMA), the International Securities Markets Association (ISMA) and the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) are gaining the effective power and legitimacy to act as self-regulatory bodies or even private regimes, developing common rules and practices and disciplining their own members. They and their domestic counterparts also interact closely with both national authorities and international organizations such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision in quasi-corporatist fashion to develop new rules and practices for the expanding global marketplace. Neither should the significance of private bond rating in playing this quasi-public role be underestimated (Sinclair 1994). These changes also have knock-on effects in other areas. Laurence
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(1996) suggests that the key change—although one which is still embryonic in some countries and proceeding very unevenly—is that in forms of corporate governance. The trend everywhere is to move decision-making power out of the hands of regulators and autonomous managerial elites and put it into the hands of shareholders—a key component of financial market-led systems like those of the US and the UK. A major area of potential change discussed by Herring and Litan is the gradual development of common international accounting standards, in which the running is being made not by governments but by the International Auditing Practices Committee of the International Federation of Accountants (Herring and Litan 1995:114–15; see also Strange 1996: chapter 10). These authors also point out that “a private organization, the Group of Thirty, has taken the lead in pressing for improvements in the clearing and settlement process in national securities markets” (Herring and Litan 1995:139). Such factors will inevitably come increasingly into conflict with the range of corporate governance practices associated with national models of industrial organization—pace Doremus et al. (1998), who argue that the “global corporation” is a myth; whether it will continue to be a myth in the twenty-first century is open to question. Conclusions Taken together, these trends represent a fundamental shift in the underlying organizational structure—the mix of market, hierarchy and network—that shapes financial markets and, through them, the international political economy in general, not merely from outside and inside, but cutting across once-distinct categories and linking them in complex ways. Strange (1988) has spoken of transnational structures as involving “webs of contracts”, and indeed it is the changing pattern of these underlying webs that is increasingly embedded in the broader web of governance characteristic of internationalized, transnational, globalizing financial markets today. This is not the interplay of pure market forces, but a profound reshuffling of organizational sources of power into complex three-level games. In such games, the power of the private does not reside merely in some alternative form of private hierarchical authority or even in new forms of corporatist bargaining, but in a more diffuse global financial marketplace, increasingly organized around the securitization of finance itself. In this context, the role of the state is being reduced to that of mere prudential supervisor—guardian of safety and soundness, but not a major determiner of the distributional or redistributional impact of market outcomes. To the extent that state power and traditional forms of market governance through public regulation remain important (and indeed are in some ways expanding in terms of the overall weight of state intervention), their focus increasingly will lie in (1) furthering liberalization, not hindering it, i.e. through Type II re-regulation, fraud prevention, etc.; (2)
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enforcing market outcomes on losers; and (3) finding a modus vivendi with the transnational market associations and expanding ongoing exchange relationships and networks which are rapidly consolidating. In this shift, of course, democracy, unified state power and the wider public interest are increasingly being eroded in the name of a new embedded financial orthodoxy and a widening and deepening of the private financial infrastructure of the international political economy. Acknowledgements I should like to thank numerous colleagues for their comments on several earlier versions of this paper, which were presented at the annual conference of the British International Studies Association, University of Sussex, 14–16 December 1998; a conference on Emerging Governance? Inter-state Cooperation in an Age of Global Challenges, University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart, Germany, 4–5 June 1998; a conference on Private Organizations in the International System, University of Konstanz, 17–19 April 1998; the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 28–31 August 1997; and a workshop on the Problem-Solving Capacity of Transnational Governance Systems, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Köln, 8–9 November 1996. I am particularly grateful to the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, and the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies for their support in the writing of this chapter. Notes 1
2
3
4 5
Ouchi, for example, defines organization as “any stable pattern of transactions between individuals or aggregations of individuals” (Ouchi 1980:254); this is a very broad definition, which would be hard to differentiate from well-known definitions of “institution” and/or “structure” (see Cerny 1990: chapter 1). Thompson et al. (1991:1), in comparing markets, hierarchies and networks, refer to “models of co-ordination” of “social life”, while Bradach and Eccles (1989:282) refer to “control mechanisms”. Ouchi is specifically referring here to the performance of individual employees in a firm, but the wider implication of his text indicates that “performance” could equally refer to the general ability of the price system to provide sufficient information in the form of market signals for mutually satisfactory transactions to occur without excessive potential for opportunism through going beyond the limits of bounded rationality. It should not be forgotten, however, that Britain, that exemplar of the “arm’slength” model, also had a strong social-democratic welfare state and a quasicorporatist bargaining system in the post-war period, while the United States has often been seen as a “corporate state” at national level and a “microcorporatist” system at local level. The definition of “governance” is contested (Rhodes 1996; Cerny 1997b; Prakash and Hart 1999), and will not be specifically dealt with in this paper. I have argued elsewhere that regulatory arbitrage and embedded financial
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orthodoxy are the main processes driving convergence (Cerny 1993: chapters 3 and 6). For the most part, comments on the banking sector in the international context refer to wholesale banking. Retail banking has so far remained relatively both culturally and legally embedded in national networks and regulatory relationships, although even here the expansion of consumer credit, the growth of asset-backed securities, the popularity of mutual funds, the market power of pension funds, and even the restructuring of welfare systems are bringing the Second Financial Revolution home to more and more middle- and workingclass people.
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4
The good, the bad or the ugly? Practices of global self-regulation among dyestuffs producers Karsten Ronit
Introduction Among the many actors populating the global scene of politics we find numerous private organizations. A large number of them enjoy consultative status with intergovernmental organizations and assist in collecting information, undertaking investigations, drafting international conventions and otherwise establishing norms and rules that can eventually be translated into national legislation. In some cases, however, private organizations move far beyond these tasks in their contribution to global governance. In areas where public organizations lack knowledge, resources and legitimacy, private organizations are officially delegated public functions, or they voluntarily design and create arrangements of private authority. To a greater or lesser extent, these forms of global arrangements may co-exist with, or fully replace, public regulation. Either way, private organizations contribute to problem-solving and challenge prevailing state-centric views of global order. This chapter is concerned with self-regulation in the dyestuffs industry, and the role of the Ecological and Toxicological Association of Dyes and Organic Pigments Manufacturers (ETAD), one of the numerous product specific organizations in the chemical industry. An examination of selfregulation within this industry will provide an illustration of how environmental management works at a sectoral level. After sketching out the increasing importance attributed to private organizations in environmental politics over the last decades, some of the studies addressing business selfregulation in comparative politics and in international affairs will be discussed. The subsequent sections will investigate various self-regulatory activities of ETAD as these are manifested through the issuing of Safety Data Sheets, Guidelines and codes of conduct. The organizational properties of the dyestuffs industry that make self-regulatory arrangements possible will also be analyzed. The conclusion will discuss and evaluate the achievements of ETAD in environmental management, and point to some of the shortcomings in the development of global arrangements.
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Private organizations as contributors to governance in the environmental field Through the last decades, environmental organizations not only sought to influence public policy at the discursive level or through spectacular actions to the benefit of the world community, but became increasingly recognized players in the global policy process in practically all stages, from agendasetting to evaluation. Environmental organizations are granted consultative rights and are involved in the creation of environmental regimes, thus assisting public authority in the formulation and implementation of policies. Actions are coordinated across borders to meet global challenges on the conviction that environmental problems are basically international in nature and should be approached accordingly by globally organized movements (Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992; Kamieniecki 1993; Princen and Finger 1994: Wapner 1996; Lipschutz and Mayer 1996; Young 1997). These transnational movements, which display a great deal of variation in terms of history, membership and strategy, are relatively easily accepted as defending the public interest, although some criticism is occasionally heard, for instance that regarding the appropriateness of radical activities or the bureaucratization of what was once an authentic grass-roots movement. A largely forgotten interest category in environmental politics which has become a thriving field of academic research is, strangely enough, business. This should be a decisive factor in the solution of environmental problems on a global scale. With the production and management of certain industries being highly globalized, single firms and producer associations have a distinctly different role to play in problem-solving, as they must ultimately provide practical solutions. At the same time, they are also held accountable for meeting regulatory requirements. It is, however, difficult to explain the relatively low-key interest in examining the political activities of global business without considering some general public perceptions of organized interests, which also circulate among and are sometimes nourished by social scientists. Some groups, such as environmental organizations, human rights groups, and relief organizations, belong to the “good” and tend to be seen as altruistic. A certain amount of sympathy with their work can be an important background for examining them. The business world, on the other hand, is seen as motivated by a totally different logic; societal goals of employment and welfare are not the primary goals of firms, instead they are driven by an underlying economic greed for profit. Accordingly, business is generally thought to belong to the category of “bad” actors in domestic as well as international affairs. However, there are even “ugly” groups in the area of global politics, such as religious sects, terrorists, arms dealers and money launderers. Special interests of the business world, such as the chemical industry, are also represented in this unofficial third category. For several decades, corporations in the chemical
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industry have had a very bad public image. They are seen as causing environmental hazards, and thus any contribution to problem-solving, especially a voluntary one, can hardly be expected. In other words, the chemical industry is considered part of the problem, if not the problem, rather than part of the solution. Attempts to solve environmental problems are rarely expected from industry; it is only when under external political pressures that problem resolution efforts are initiated. A change in this stereotype can, however, be observed. Environmental movements have departed from past ideology and are increasingly pragmatic. Today, governments and intergovernmental organizations see the chemical industry not only as an industry to be regulated and monitored, but also as a potential contributor to problem-solving in the environmental field. In other words, the combination of different governance systems—state, market and civil society institutions—is recognized as bringing some kind of order to global affairs. During the last decades, the contribution of private firms to the protection of man and the environment has become a key issue in global politics. The pollution of the seas and atmosphere has transboundary effects, and governments have become increasingly aware of the various hazards associated with industrial production. Activities are increasingly coordinated at the intergovernmental level, and, parallel to this, international environmental groups encourage governments and producers to adopt environmentally friendly policies. A search for new mechanisms of governance characterized the work of the United Nations Commission on Global Governance, and the conclusion was drawn that there is no single champion of governance, but that only the mutual efforts of governance systems can solve the variety of global problems (United Nations Commission on Global Governance 1995). Indeed, today this is the official policy of all UN special organizations, agencies and beyond, but the way this strategy is applied varies across issue areas. Thus, specific events, programs and initiatives, such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, prioritize governance systems differently and, thus, a new order for sustainable development is established. As far as issues of chemical safety are concerned, since the early 1970s various organizations, forums and units have been created to handle this emerging field of regulation. Today, a number of organizations pay attention to chemical safety issues, but the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), with its various subunits, is undoubtedly the key organization. Additionally, policies are coordinated between various UN organizations under the umbrella of the Inter-Organization Program for the Sound Management of Chemicals (IOMC), the International Program on Chemical Safety (IPCS) and the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS), which also cooperates with industry associations, labor, public interest groups and
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scientific organizations. These forums address the safety issues of interest to the chemical industry in general, while only a few regulations pertain to the producers of synthetic organic colorants in particular. Unfortunately, the role of business in international environmental governance remains vague in academic literature. Although the chemical industry is relatively well researched compared to many other globalized industries, with studies focusing on both large corporations and collective entities such as cartels and business associations, and economic as well as political dimensions of the industry, analyses on the chemical industry in the area of environment and development are relatively rare (Brickman et al. 1985; Pettigrew 1985; Schneider 1988; Martinelli 1991; Landau et al. 1998). In the context of governance systems, it is, therefore, relevant to consider whether the chemical industry and its many associations, clubs and groups can effectively design arrangements that contribute to problem-solving. Critical voices, however, remain skeptical as to the voluntary initiatives of the industry, and suggest that governments and intergovernmental organizations—and environmental movements—pressurize the industry to adopt policies that are friendly to the environment. In recent years, proactive measures have been taken by the business world and a leading role has been held by the chemical industry.1 Responsible Care programs are adopted by individual companies, while business associations across the chemical industry adopt codes of conduct for environmentally sound practices. More encompassing initiatives are taken by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBSCD), a merger between the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BSCD), and the World Industry Council for the Environment (WICE).2 Predating these initiatives are efforts made by chemical associations in some of the leading industrial nations where Responsible Care programs were adopted in the late 1980s. Also, at the global level, the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), founded in 1989, has become a key player in the promotion of voluntary Responsible Care programs in the spirit of Sustainable development (ICCA 1999) and is today a recognized organization in the field of environmental politics. This sequence of events shows that business, including the chemicals business, has given greater consideration to environmental issues through the 1990s. However, a pertinent question is whether these private forms of regulation predate or replace public authority and, therefore, some of the early efforts of the producers of dyestuffs and organic pigments will be traced to illustrate the environmental focus of this specific industry. It is particularly relevant to examine the types of self-regulation in the chemical industry, given its self-confidence and strong historical tradition of keeping the influence of government and intergovernmental organizations at bay. As a matter of fact, “there are significant government-industry interactions, but many significant issues are dealt with within the industry itself” (Grant et al.
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1988:67), a characteristic common to other areas of international affairs (Underhill 1995). Taking into consideration the various preconceptions surrounding the chemical industry, it has always been difficult to bring an argument forward suggesting that the “ugly” chemical industry produces public goods through self-regulatory arrangements. The distinction between various types of goods—and the dichotomy of private and public goods—is often of a rather abstract nature and not related to particular territorial levels. With globalization, attention has increasingly been focused on the contribution of different private and public actors to problem-solving, and hence a more elaborated taxonomy of different public goods has been created to account for the variation in the complexity of real-life production of goods in domestic and various international contexts (Keohane and Ostrom 1995; Kaul et al. 1999). Whereas governments are usually expected to provide public goods, the same may not be said for business, and few would see this industry as particularly altruistic or orientated towards the public interest at large. Although the primary goal of business is different from the public sector, and its behavior is judged by different standards, this does not rule out that certain activities can contribute to the public good. To turn the argument around, rigid behavior unilaterally guided by the narrow interests of chemical producers cannot be interpreted as based upon genuine self-interest. If associations behave truly self-interestedly, they will, for instance, seek to take the interests and beliefs of actors in their immediate surroundings into consideration, and to understand their behavior, “the conception of a differentiated self capable of changing the constitution through which it governs itself” is necessary (Coleman 1990:528). In other words, an industry may be hard pressed to invoke self-regulation, but through a historical learning process it may come to see a strategic advantage in proactively adapting to economic, political and cultural changes and voluntarily initiate self-regulatory arrangements by defining certain standards of behavior among producers and vis-à-vis other groups in society. Eventually, such measures not only regulate competition between producers but also improve the public image of the industry, and in this way industry and societal goals are mixed. Although many activities of the business association have both a private and a public dimension, it is the latter side of ETAD that is the focus of this chapter; thus we shall not seek to identify and characterize all the intermediary forms of public and private goods provided by ETAD. Business self-regulation in comparative politics and international affairs Where some interest groups have acquired a quasi-public status in different national and sectoral domains, comparative politics scrutinizes the
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performance of private regulation through business interest associations. These business associations have essentially taken the form of private interest governments as a mode of governance (Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Schmitter 1990; Lindberg et al. 1991; Hollingsworth et al. 1994; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). Building upon a long tradition in the study of interest groups and private authority (e.g. Merriam 1944; Macconnell 1966), these contributions stress that countries and industries with a solid record of associability have the necessary organizational infrastructure to provide a basis for private regulation. Whether business can achieve a role akin to private interest governments and make similar contributions at the global level is, however, a specific problem that is not analyzed within comparative politics literature. However, it poses a number of different questions, simply because the production and consumption of public goods at this level is embedded in very complex economic and political structures. For instance, business associations, which are delegated or voluntarily assume self-regulatory functions in national contexts, often operate in and enjoy a political atmosphere of mutual trust. Relevant state institutions and organized interests thrive in relatively small domestic policy-networks nourished by historical experiences of co-operation between state and organized interests. Self-regulatory arrangements can form part of a national style of regulation where the overall strategy is to enhance competitiveness and increase national welfare. With the internationalization of the economy, one should expect that business, more than any other interest category, is capable of designing global forms of self-regulation. Ironically, research analyses on the international dimension have been insufficient. International aspects were only highlighted when domestic arrangements across nations were examined; other territorial levels were usually excluded. Even in studies highlighting private regulation in the chemical industry, little or no reference to the existence of other territorial levels, and how domestic and international self-regulation are eventually linked, is found (Jacek 1991; Grant and Paterson 1994). Certain aspects of self-regulation have been studied in academic contributions that focus primarily on the role of individual multinational enterprises (e.g. Kline 1985). More recent studies on transnational relations have shown that business is also able to create private arrangements. These range from basic and informal industry norms and cartels to international private regimes and self-regulatory organizations (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Spar 1994; Underbill 1997; Eden and Hampson 1997; Coleman 1997; Haufler 1997; Cutler et al. 1999; Ronit and Schneider 1999). By stressing these alternative private forms of regulation on the international scene, these perspectives form part of a more general attempt to give private actors a more prominent position in global politics. However, relatively few examples of international associational governance have been recorded so far (UNCTAD 1996).
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Obviously, this strand of research addresses a large number of interesting problems relating to the governance of markets. This chapter will focus on only a few aspects concerning the institutional preconditions of such private arrangements that have not attracted major attention in this emerging theoretical debate. The aim is not just to demonstrate that business is actually capable of establishing various forms of self-regulation, although this is an interesting story to tell in itself, but to investigate whether this capacity replaces public authority and, more specifically, if it can be related to the character of a given industry and its associational properties. First, it may be hypothesized that voluntary private arrangements providing public goods are likely to emerge and be sustained in areas of business where the number of producers is limited and, accordingly, noticeability is high so that free-riding is less likely. If it does occur, however, it is easier to impose effective sanctions and discourage future non-compliance. Thus, global self-regulation must not only accommodate different national and sectoral traditions, but also develop an appropriate “technology” which grapples with the essential problem of rule enforcement and compliance in implementation. In business, single firms may assist their associations by overseeing and reporting on cases of noncompliance among competing firms. Unlike free-riding in intergovernmental regimes, where governments only have the jurisdiction to implement rules in their own country and have a limited capacity to oversee compliance in other countries, certain large corporations should be in a position to take part in the implementation of rules and also monitor compliance for the simple reason that they are globally present. From this it should, however, be evident that all global organizations face a number of problems in achieving compliance. This is because the monitoring of the behavior of a significant number of firms in producing and marketing a variety of commodities around the world is a very challenging enterprise. Second, it may be hypothesized that global governance cannot be implemented by global actors in isolation, but needs assistance from national or regional actors in the translation of global norms and rules. In an increasing number of policy fields, states have surrendered authority. This does not suggest, however, that the regulatory capacity at national levels is exhausted. Instead, it is likely that new private organizations located at this level will autonomously create or be delegated selfregulatory arrangements. Furthermore, the present process of regionalization, where states within different regions in the world formalize co-operation and build regulatory systems, makes it highly appropriate to analyze the potential of private organizations at this territorial level. Regulatory styles in the industrialized countries have traditionally shown a number of inconsistencies that are also apparent in the economic centers of Europe, USA and Japan, and new regions like
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South East Asia. In relation to global governance, however, we should not forget the cleavages between the industrialized world and the countries of the third world. In many of these countries there is a limited capacity for self-regulation, and the political-administrative system may have severe problems overseeing this. Under these circumstances, governance through private organizations is likely to work only in certain parts of the world, although global arrangements are intended. Practices of self-regulation: data sheets, guidelines and code of conduct Environmental politics have changed dramatically over the past decades. Today, environmental policies are formulated and translated into concrete action; environmental organizations are accepted as partners providing both legitimacy and expertise to public policy, and industries respond more effectively to new demands from states, environmentalists and consumers in domestic as well as international contexts. However, business presents no uniform view, and even in the chemical industry different strategies are adopted to meet these challenges worldwide. This variation is no surprise given the encompassing nature of this global industry. A general feature, however, is the ambition of the many and highly specialized branches to offer their own solutions to a range of technical, administrative and political problems. Evidence of this strategy can also be found in the historical development of the dyestuffs industry, a multiproduct industry with small volumes and a wide range of applications (Clarke 1996), represented by the Ecological and Toxicological Association of Dyes and Organic Pigments Manufacturers (ETAD).3 The formation of ETAD in 1974 was, from the beginning, related to the principle of self-discipline and self-regulation in the environmental field. Thus, it was “abundantly clear that it is also up to the manufacturers to make every possible effort to solve the difficult chemico-analytical and toxicological problems if these measures are to be successful” (Rhyner 1974:1). Indeed, the activities of the industry which developed within the new framework of ETAD were not entirely new, but rooted in tradition. Individual companies already had an established practice of scientific testing to provide reliable information on safety matters. Moreover, it was recognized that single-firm initiatives would no longer suffice, and under the umbrella of ETAD, new and co-ordinated efforts were made to provide reliable, standardized and tested information.4 This strategy stressed that what is “essential for the necessary environmental protection and the retention of a healthy industry, is a high degree of self-responsibility by industry, which legislation should support rather than cripple” (Anliker 1979:61). There are both commercial and political reasons behind this strategy. In
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the case of public regulation, producers of synthetic organic colorants would have to supply detailed information on their products and on chemical substances to public authorities. It was feared that under these conditions information could be disclosed to third parties and disseminated to competitors. Furthermore, the surrender of regulation to states and intergovernmental organizations would move the process of regulation away from the immediate control of industry, weaken potential industry initiatives, and base regulation on insufficient expertise. Indeed, many producer-related issues require ecological and toxicological knowledge which cannot be obtained fully outside firms or specialized scientific communities. The outcome, it was feared, would be excessively high and unjustified standards. The principle of self-regulation is not just formulated in general rules, but also manifested through concrete practices. From the early 1970s, ETAD adopted a common format including scientific and standardized test methods and a significant number of so-called Safety Data Sheets were generated and issued by individual members. These Safety Data Sheets, which are made available to member firms through a comprehensive database, committed members to provide essential information on different chemical substances in order to minimize dangers in handling colorants. By providing necessary documentation, producers paid attention to the diverse interests of processors, workers and consumers, and this form of self-regulation was, therefore, welcomed by public authorities, who saw the issuing of data sheets as an appropriate alternative to public regulation. Although ETAD became heavily involved in doing investigative studies and evaluating methods of general application, the responsibility for testing individual products remained with member firms. However, significant savings through testing colorants on a collective basis were made. The general methods were recognized and adopted by various intergovernmental organizations, such as the OECD and national standardization institutes, which sought to harmonize the classification of substances. The development of such uniform international standards was particularly valuable at a time when public regulation was not in place. However, Safety Data Sheets have, to a large extent, become irrelevant with the adoption of extensive chemical control regulation, in particular in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (Motschi and Clarke 1998). In other words, self-regulation was able to set an example and develop a new pattern of regulation, but it was followed, replaced and extended by public regulation, including product labeling. The early efforts of the industry to establish a correct classification of substances and provide information through the Safety Data Sheets has influenced the public regulation and organization of labeling. Still, ETAD assists in the formulation of public policy concerning international labeling practices through participation in various forms of committee work at the
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European level. Furthermore, the association also is involved in monitoring the functioning of these arrangements, for example through conducting an audit of product labeling by member companies (ETAD 1995:15). Although the Safety Data Sheets were originally developed in a European context, they have been applied elsewhere. In countries and regions where there is, as yet no public regulation in place, the Safety Data Sheets are of great importance, and ETAD closely monitors that member firms comply with private rules and standards in those parts of the world. A variety of further measures have been taken by ETAD; some of these have a political dimension aiming to evade, complement or even encourage public regulation. This is in part reflected through the adoption of a number of guidelines and recommendations which member firms are to follow and implement. These initiatives were particularly strong from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, and ETAD is still involved in this kind of activity. Some guidelines are regularly updated and in line with efforts to harmonize regulation guidelines. Thus, guidelines developed in one region of the world are sometimes taken over by another region in a modified form (ETAD 1998). On the basis of data on the toxicological and ecological properties of colorants, information on the production and correct handling of dyestuffs and pigments is disseminated, and members are advised how best to minimize occupational exposures and avoid environmental releases. Various issues are covered and expressed in publications such as Guidelines for the Safe Handling of Dyestuffs in Color Storerooms (ETAD 1983) and Guidelines for Safe Handling of Dyes (ETAD 1992). All these very specific measures of self-regulation, some of which have become redundant and replaced by public regulation, are today governed by the ETAD Code of Ethics. Adopted in 1989, it defines the basic principles of environmentally sound management. On two occasions, in 1993 and 1997, it was revised to include the principles of Responsible Care (ETAD 1993, 1997). The code was first agreed at a time when other areas of global business, including the chemical industry, were involved in defining standards through codes of conduct. However, the idea of self-discipline and selfregulation among colorants producers was already an official strategy and not just a timely response to new political pressures. Although “the credibility of the association demands that it monitors compliance and is responsive to any complaints” (ETAD 1996:12), as a relatively small organization, ETAD does not have the resources to fully police the code. Nevertheless, the code does have more than just a symbolic value. Indeed, non-compliant producers have been expelled, and some companies have been denied membership until their manufacture of colorants and information policy complied with the Code of Ethics. Some firms may also be discouraged to apply for membership, as ETAD accepts only companies with a high standard of environmental management. Consequently, ETAD
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membership identifies qualifying companies as being environmentally responsible. Organizational structures and dynamics in the development of private regulation The development of various self-regulatory mechanisms in the dyestuffs industry, including monitoring and sanctioning, is better understood if the organizational structure of ETAD is examined. The roles of member firms and the regionalization of activities are factors that seem to facilitate private regulation. The association has a direct membership format and today, with fortyone members from Europe, North and South America and Asia, it is one of the many groups of big multinational companies in chemicals. Smaller and specialized firms are also represented and, indeed, efforts are made to recruit and increase the proportion of smaller companies willing to raise standards and implement Responsible Care programs. To reach a high degree of compliance with various ETAD regulations, including of course the Code of Ethics, an effective monitoring capacity is required. The secretariat in Basle has a limited capacity and is assisted by individual members. It is an advantage that the sector is so concentrated, as companies with global operations are capable of monitoring the operation of competitors, reporting breaches and otherwise contributing to enforcement of the code. As emphasized in general collective action theory, small and concentrated groups facilitate compliance and thus make free-riding less likely (Olson 1965). As with many other industry associations, membership is strongly biased towards developed countries. However, the operations of many large firms are global, and as ETAD members they must ensure that their safety measures fully comply with the Code of Ethics, regardless of the country in which they operate. In other words, environmental management is exported to regions and countries where less stringent standards are applied. Basically, the various self-regulatory measures are first created and implemented in those parts of the world where advanced regulatory traditions exist, and where public regulation can be introduced as an alternative. After these experiences have taken root, regulatory styles are exported and replicated in other parts of the world. Under these conditions, member companies—domestic as well as foreign—cannot adopt lower standards and exploit the weak administrative and technical capacity of governments in third world countries. Therefore, the major problem in developing countries is domestic producers of synthetic organic colorants who free-ride; they do not comply with any code of conduct and are not monitored by any international or national industry association. This problem in the production of dyestuffs and organic pigments is moving eastward to India and South East Asia, where domestic regulation and administrative expertise is either weak or missing. ETAD and
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its members can still monitor the behavior of firms in these countries, but there is actually very little else that can be done apart from encouraging firms outside the association to adhere to high ethical standards. Under such circumstances, initiatives must be taken by governments and relevant intergovernmental organizations. Another feature of the organization is the regionalization.5 Between 1977 and 1982, the American dyes industry was organized within the framework of the Dyes Environmental and Toxicology Organization (DETO) but American producers decided to join ETAD and set up an office in 1982 by the US Operating Committee (USOC) to cover North America when Du Pont got out of the dyes business (ETAD 1982). Japanese multinationals were already very active in the association in the formative years, and a regional subcommittee was set up in 1976 to provide a platform for this group. However, the Japanese Operating Committee’s (JOC) office in Tokyo was not established until 1990. This was followed in 1992 by the formation of the European Operating Committee (EOC). Specifically, developments in the European Union have played a key role in the harmonization of regulatory systems, not only between member states but also world-wide. Linked to this committee is the expert Regulatory Affairs Committee (RAC) which covers areas not already monitored by other regional operating committees and offices, and which focuses on developed as well as developing countries. Regional centers have taken on responsibility for monitoring producers outside the traditional industrial centers of North America, Europe and Japan. Thus, the Brazilian Operating Committee (BROC), with offices in Sao Paolo, is responsible for all of South America. The most recent addition to the regional network of operating committees is the Indian Operating Committee (IOC) in Mumbai. It represents global firms, including some Indian companies, vis-à-vis the Indian government and co-ordinates interests with Indian business associations (ETAD 1998). ETAD has worked hard to reach the global harmonization of both public and private regulation, and in a number of ways its strategy has been successful. However, there are still national and regional variations in regulatory patterns. Thus, regional committees must closely follow and respond to national or regional regulation which has a negative impact on the international harmonization of legislation. Indeed, the process of regionalization has been guided by a new strategy where political activity is given higher priority, and less energy is devoted to technical and scientific work. A further key goal of regionalization is to provide an organizational basis for the monitoring of self-regulation where this is implemented. Monitoring of compliance using Safety Data Sheets, various guidelines and a Code of Ethics is not the only responsibility of each firm or ETAD as the global association. Some aspects of monitoring the behavior of member firms, as well as sanctioning measures, are now delegated to the operating committees and their regional offices. These have greater knowledge of
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regional and national regulation, and the advantage of being in close contact with regional and domestic authorities. Undoubtedly, this arrangement also facilitates the building of relationships of trust and provides a basis for the international harmonization of regulation. Conclusions The dyestuffs industry has played a pioneering but largely unobserved role in the field of environmental regulation. On a voluntary basis a number of rules, guidelines and codes have been adopted and implemented to avoid public intervention which, it was feared, could not be based on the same degree of expertise held by the association and the scientific information provided by member firms. This strategy was elaborated and translated into concrete action at a time when the chemical industry as a whole was under strong ideological pressure but, as yet, did not have a major public regulator in place to solve the many specific ecotoxicological problems of the dye industry. As a rule, industry has preferred to create its own mechanisms without relying on prior and formal consent from relevant agencies at national, regional and global levels. However, due to the good working relationship and frequent consultations with those agencies, it has in general been possible to evaluate whether such private arrangements were also politically welcome and could be sustained within a private framework. There is a strong element of continuity in the strategy of ETAD, and further initiatives building upon the idea of self-regulation have been taken during the last decade. However, public authority has also replaced private regulation in certain issue areas and regions of the world. As a matter of fact, it is even encouraged by industry in cases where private measures are inadequate or yield fewer results, such as with Safety Data Sheets. Early industry regulation has, in this case become redundant in Europe, but still has a significant role to play in other parts of the world, especially in developing countries. Where public regulation takes over, the technical capacity of private organizations, which actually developed prior to public regulation, is, however, still welcomed, and information provided by ETAD can greatly improve the quality of regulation. In fact, regulatory models already developed in a private framework which have, in many respects, been proved successful, can be installed and transformed into public regulation. For private organizations it is often an advantage to have some kind of established self-regulation to offer to public authorities when industry associations find that arrangements are exploited by an unacceptable level of free-riding. ETAD does not have the authority to introduce radical measures to correct the behavior of free-riders, and this is, of course, the Achilles’ heel of self-regulatory arrangements. Private organizations must also surrender
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when states and intergovernmental organizations prefer international conventions and national legislation to private arrangements. Where self-regulation is sustained, a stronger involvement of states and intergovernmental organizations in the environmental field, and a growing concern for chemical safety problems, can also assist ETAD in its monitoring and sanctioning activities and thus help achieve compliance among member firms. These developments show that the dyestuffs industry is not, and cannot be, regulated properly through either public regulation or industrydriven norms, but that co-operation and a mix of mutually reinforcing rulesystems can form a sound regulatory framework. Given this specific historical development of rule-systems, it is difficult to interpret the role of organized business from a kind of “in the shadow of the state” perspective where states and intergovernmental organizations are seen as having a directive influence on the emergence of associational selfregulation. Studies, especially those in the tradition of neo-corporatism, stress the omnipresent role of state authority in shaping organizational structures and interest representation by organized interests, but this perspective can be problematic when taken to understand all aspects and phases of global politics where public authority, as for instance in the environmental field, has been rather slow to emerge. If the role of public authority is exaggerated it becomes difficult to observe and recognize the independent and unprovoked actions of private actors, and thus perceive self-regulation as an essentially voluntary arrangement. The public dimension has often figured prominently in the creation of “private interest governments”, “self-regulatory organizations” and “private regimes”, but the emergence of private authority structures in global politics should not only be seen in the context of the political environment surrounding the industry and pressing for a higher ethical stance. Internal dynamics should also be taken into consideration when explaining the tradition of self-regulation. Thus, key objectives in the industry have been to establish rules to regulate competition among member firms, correct market failures and discourage members from unfair market practices. Of course, the violation of such rules may be noticed by relevant public authorities and be taken as an opportunity to intervene and set new public standards for environmental management. Mindful of this, attempts to institutionalize market processes by defining rules for relations between manufacturers, consumers, distributors and employees take into account the imminent risk of public intervention. Self-regulatory arrangements can only be created and sustained if some basic mechanisms of monitoring are established and cases of noncompliance are effectively and properly sanctioned. Here the specific structure of the industry appears to be an important variable. The chemical industry is characterized by many small and highly specialized branches, with large producers in small global associations, and this structure generally seems to facilitate co-ordination—from negotiating private arrangements to
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sanctioning cases of non-compliance. States and intergovernmental organizations have their own interests in providing solutions to chemical safety problems, but in business an essential part of monitoring is through competing firms. They have strong economic incentives to police and control rules so that competition is not distorted, and in the dye industry a few global companies are in a unique position to be able to supervise not only each other but also a number of smaller producers both inside and outside the association. Additionally, from the perspective of public authority, the industry structure is of importance. Surveillance of a few well-established producers is easier than policing a large number of smaller firms, and this can make eventual sanctioning by public authorities more targeted and expedient. The large multinationals in ETAD are, therefore, even more challenged to show a good example of responsible management, and as a whole the industry must demonstrate a high degree of self-discipline. The behavior of members in small associations is also more easily noticed by competitors outside the association, and although monitoring is intended to discourage members from non-compliance and in exceptional cases lead to sanctioning, it should also set a moral example beyond the membership. Apart from its size, the territorial structure of ETAD is also important in explaining self-regulation. It is clear, however, that the private arrangements do not have the same importance in all countries and regions, although member firms are obliged to observe the agreed standards around the globe. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that full global coverage has been achieved, but in this respect the arrangements in the dye industry are not much different from those in other industries, or, for that matter, many forms of public regulation, as the many non-ratified or unsatisfactorily implemented conventions in the state system demonstrate. Developed countries and regions have the best and most reliable system of monitoring and sanctioning, and this is underscored by the organizational structure of ETAD which, through its operating committees, focuses on North America, Europe and Japan. Other regions of the world are less closely monitored, illustrating that real global public goods are very difficult to produce, although regionalization has improved this. The public functions assumed by the association are evident, but this does not suggest that the processes leading to such arrangements are of a genuine public good character. Standards, codes and other forms of private rules are not brought to life in a democratic and transparent process. Rather, it is a closed process involving consultations between experts in firms and in specialized public agencies and there has been no attempt to include, for instance, different consumer groups or environmental movements in the monitoring and sanctioning process, or to establish mixed task forces to police rules effectively. Critics of self-regulatory industry arrangements also point to their democratic deficits, and it is correct that various mechanisms
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could be installed to improve transparency. The general lack of transparency associated with private rule-making does not, on the other hand, invalidate the contribution of industry associations to the solution of global problems, and should not be accepted as an argument against self-regulation. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that private regulation is more cost effective, and that both private and public resources can be saved. Costs are related to the complex negotiation processes between industry, governments and intergovernmental organizations, as well as the transfer of highly specialized information from industry to public agencies, and the management of a public bureaucracy with a permanent capacity to develop and sustain a regulatory framework. It is no easy task both to consider the aspect of the democratic deficit and cost containment issue, and to find an optimal solution to these economic and political problems of regulation. Although it is difficult to identify more systematic calculations made by private and public actors, private regulation is a recognized form of governance in the “ugly” chemical industry. A more thorough examination of this industry could demonstrate that such contributions are actually much more valuable than usually believed. Therefore, greater interest for various global self-regulatory arrangements in business is a welcome complement to the study of international affairs. Here the study of private organizations, if not entirely forgotten, has excessively focused on the “good” associations and networks. Notes 1
2
3
4
5
The issuing of industry guidelines to establish a uniform behavior in the business world goes back further and is related to the globalization of business as such. Significant forms of private regulation date back to around the First World War, but a new wave of regulation set in from the late 1960s onward, where the role of multinational corporations became politically salient and UN initiatives were taken to monitor their behavior (Kline 1985). A good part of the scholarly debate is, consequently, related to multinational corporations and specific issues of business ethics in large corporations. A large number of business interest associations are actually involved in environmental issues. A major player is also the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) which was instrumental in the creation of the World Industry Council for the Environment (WISE) and adopted the Business Charter for Sustainable Development: Principles for Environmental Management in 1991 (see also Schmidheiny 1992). Dyestuffs producers first formed the so-called “Lindau Circle” in 1970, but coordination was formalized in 1974 through the Ecological and Toxicological Association of the Dyestuffs Manufacturing Industry. From 1976 onwards, producers of organic pigments were also brought into the association. ETAD also co-operates with scientific organizations to provide tested and reliable information on chemical substances. A key partner is the scientific and noncommercial European Centre for Ecotoxicology and Toxicology of Chemicals (ECETOC), based in Brussels and founded in 1978. In some cases, the formation of national associations is relevant. In France, Syndicat des Fabricants d’Émaux Pigments, Sels et Oxydes Metalliques
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(EPSOM); in Germany, Verband der Mineralfarbenindustrie (VdMI); and in the UK, British Colour Makers’ Association (BCMA). They co-operate with ETAD, but ETAD has never encouraged the formation of national associations in the dye industry, and, in many cases, ETAD as a global association has direct contacts with national authorities. After all, it is a rather small and very specialized industry where international—regional as well as global—cooperation is easier than costly and ineffective national associations.
References Anliker, R. (1979) “Ecotoxicology of dyestuffs—a joint effort by industry”, Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety 3:59–74. Brickman, R., S.Jasanoff and T.Ilgen (1985) Controlling Chemicals. The Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Clarke, E.A. (1996) “Regulatory affairs (international perspective)” in A.Reife and H.S.Freeman (eds) Environmental Chemistry of Dyes and Pigments, London: John Wiley and Sons. Coleman, J.S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Coleman, W.D. (1997) “Associational governance in a globalizing era: weathering the storm” in J.Rogers Hollingsworth and R.Boyer (eds) Contemporary Capitalism. The Embeddedness of Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cutler, A.C., T.Porter and V.Haufler (eds) (1999) Private Authority and International Affairs, Albany: State University of New York Press. Eden, L. and F.Osler Hampson (1997) “Clubs are trump: the formation of international regimes in the absence of a hegemon” in J.Rogers Hollingsworth and R. Boyer (eds) Contemporary Capitalism. The Embeddedness of Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ETAD (1982) Annual Report 1981, Basle: ETAD. ——(1983) Guidelines for the Safe Handling of Dyestuffs in Color Storerooms, New York: DETO/US Operating Committee of ETAD. ——(1992) ETAD Guidelines for Safe Handling of Dyes, Basle: ETAD. ——(1993) Rules Governing the Enforcement of ETAD’s Code of Ethics, Basle: ETAD. ——(1995) Annual Report 1994, Basle: ETAD. ——(1996) Annual Report 1995, Basle: ETAD. ——(1997) ETAD Code of Ethics, Basle: ETAD. ——(1998) Annual Report 1997, Basle: ETAD. Gereffi, G. and M.Korzeniewicz (1994) Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, New York: Praeger. Grant, W. and W.Paterson (1994) “The chemical industry: a study in internationalization” in J.R.Hollingsworth, P.C.Schmitter and W.Streeck (eds) Governing Capitalist Economies. Performance and Control of Economic Sectors, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grant, W., W.Paterson and C.Whitston (eds) (1988) Government and the Chemical Industry. A Comparative Study of Britain and West Germany, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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Haufler, V. (1997) Dangerous Commerce. Insurance and the Management of International Risk, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Hollingsworth, J.R. and R.Boyer (1997) “Coordination of economic actors and social systems of production” in J.R.Hollingsworth and R.Boyer (eds) Contemporary Capitalism. The Embeddedness of Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hollingsworth, J.R., P.C.Schmitter and W.Streeck (eds) (1994) Governing Capitalist Economies. Performance and Control of Economic Sectors, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hurrell, A. and B.Kingsbury (eds) (1992) The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests and Institutions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. International Chamber of Commerce (1991) Business Charter for Sustainable Development: Principles for Environmental Management, Paris: ICC. International Council of Chemical Associations (1999) Statement on Contribution of Trade to Environmental Performance and Sustainable Development, no place: ICCA. Jacek, H.J. (1991) “The functions of associations as agents of public policy” in A.Martinell (ed.) International Markets and Global firms. A Comparative Study of Organized Business in the Chemical Industry, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage. Kamieniecki, S. (ed.) (1993) Environmental Politics in the International Arena: Movements, Parties, Organizations, and Policy, New York: State University of New York Press. Kaul, I., I.Grunberg and M.A.Stern (eds) (1999) Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keohane R.O. and E.Ostrom (eds) (1995) Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in two Domains, London: Sage. Kline, J.M. (1985) International Codes and Multinational Business. Setting Guidelines for International Business Operations, Westport and London: Quorum Books. Landau, R., A.Arora and N.Rosenberg (eds) (1998) Chemicals and Long Term Economic Growth: Insights from the Chemical Industry , London: John Wiley and Sons. Lindberg, L.N., J.L.Campbell and J.R.Hollingsworth (eds) (1991) “Economic governance and the analysis of structural change in the American economy” in J.L.Campbell, J.R.Hollingsworth and L.N.Lindberg (eds) Governance of the American Economy, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Lipschutz, R. and J.Mayer (1996) Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance: The Politics of Nature from Place to Planet, Albany: State University of New York Press. Macconnell, G. (1966) Private Power and American Democracy, New York: Alfred A.Knopf. Martinelli, A. (ed.) (1991) International Markets and Global Firms. A Comparative Study of Organized Business in the Chemical Industry, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage. Merriam, C. (1944) Public and Private Government, New Haven: Yale University Press. Motschi, H. and E.A.Clarke (1998) “Regulatory developments affecting European
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manufacturers and processors of dyes and pigments”, Review of Progress in Coloration 28:71–9. Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. Pettigrew, A. (1985) The Awakening Giant: Continuity and Change in ICI, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Princen, T. and M.Finger (eds) (1994) Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global, London and New York: Routledge. Rhyner, P. (1974) ETAD Inaugural Address, 21 July, ETAD. Ronit, K. and V.Schneider (1999) “Global governance through private organizations”, Governance 12 (3):243–66. Schmidheiny, S. (1992) Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on Development and the Environment, London: MIT Press. Schmitter, P.C. (1990) “Sectors in modern capitalism: modes of governance and variations in performance” in R.Brunetta and C.Dell’Aringa (eds), Labour Relations and Economic Performance, London: Macmillan. Schneider, V. (1988) Politiknetzwerke der Chemikalienkontrolle. Eine Analyse einer transnationalen Politikentwicklung, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter. Spar, D.L. (1994) The Cooperative Edge. The Internal Politics of International Cartels, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press. Streeck, W. and P.C.Schmitter (eds) (1985) “Community, market, state—and associations? The prospective contribution of interest governance to social order” in W.Streeck. and P.C.Schmitter (eds) Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State, Beverly Hills and London: Sage. UNCTAD (1996) Self-Regulation of Environmental Management. An Analysis of Guidelines set by World Industry Associations for their Member Firms, UNCTAD/DTCI/29, Environment Series no. 5, New York and Geneva: United Nations. Underbill, G.R.D. (1995) “Keeping governments out of politics: transnational securities markets, regulatory cooperation and political legitimacy”, Review of International Studies 21 (3):251–78. ——(1997) “Private markets and public responsibility in a global system: conflict and cooperation in transnational banking and securities regulation” in G.R.D. Underbill (ed.) The New World Order in International finance, London: Macmillan. United Nations Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighborhood, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wapner, P. (1996) Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, Albany: State University of New York Press. Young, O. (ed.) (1997) Global Governance. Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5
The Internet Society and its struggle for recognition and influence Raymund Werle and Volker Leib
Introduction With the formation of a private non-profit corporation providing mainly technical co-ordination and guidance for the global Internet, a new, as yet uncertain, era of the network’s governance began in November 1998. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) assumed the responsibility for functions which previously were guaranteed by the US government. Thus ICANN serves as an example of private governance with global significance, in an industry which can neither be completely left to the market nor be exclusively governed by national public authorities or international intergovernmental organizations. We will touch upon these points in this paper. However, our main focus is on a different question: given an increasing salience of private organizations in international governance, how must a private organization be equipped, or what determines the opportunities of such an organization to establish itself as an important actor in the new arrangement of private governance? As the answer to the question is based on a single case study, we cannot claim general validity for it. The study, however, does suggest a perspective that places single organizations in the context of a field of organizations and regards them as one player in a policy domain involving many public and private organizations. While these organizations differ with respect to their structure, resources, missions and legitimacy, they create an ecology which may be favourable or unfavourable to an organization with a given structure and a given aspiration to reach its goals. Our study does not record a success story because it is not focused on ICANN. Rather, the Internet Society (ISOC), which was formed in 1992 to take responsibility for the fast-growing Internet, is at the centre of our analysis. From its inception this private non-profit organization tried to establish itself as an international organization. However, the struggle for recognition both in the international realm and at the national level of the USA proved to be a tedious, if not altogether futile, task. This is amazing, given the need for an organization representing the Internet in the arena of international co-ordination at a time (the early 1990s) when no serious 102
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competitors to the ISOC existed. Although the composition of states, private organizations and market elements involved in co-ordinating the Internet’s technology and services has been contentious, this cannot be regarded as the main reason why the ISOC has experienced difficulties in establishing itself. One way of explaining these difficulties, we suggest, is by combining the corporate-actor approach to organizations with the new institutionalism in organization theory. The corporate-actor approach helps us to understand why the ISOC aspired to position itself at the international level. The institutional perspective on organizations and organizational fields directs our attention to both the changing landscape of organizations involved in regulating and co-ordinating telecommunications and the emerging Internet complex. The ISOC’s location at the interface of these two distinct organizational fields accounts for many of the tensions this corporate actor has been facing. At the time when the ISOC was set up, the international regime that governed global communication networks was in a state of transition. The core of this regime was the traditional telecommunications regime. In the 1980s it came under pressure as many industrialized countries began a process of deregulation and liberalization. National monopolies were dissolved and competition was introduced. This also affected the international telecommunications regime, which began to transform itself from a predominantly intergovernmental arrangement of self-sufficient technical co-ordination, interspersed with policies aimed at the protection of national monopolies, into a more open, less centralized cluster of private and public organizations blending many issues of technical co-ordination with strategic business interests. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), as the main public actor in the field of international telecommunications co-ordination, pursues a policy of multilateral coordination, which is characterized by its rather tedious processes and technical debates, which in turn always require a consensus being reached. The ITU has undergone substantial reforms since the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, its tradition as an intergovernmental organization determined by the habits of representatives of sovereign nation-states has left its mark on the telecommunications regime. The Internet has developed apart from telecommunications, as a separate organizational field. It is a global data network that initially sprang up in the United States, but was not bounded by national borders. The procedures, norms and membership rules that constitute the Internet complex of organizations differ fundamentally from those in telecommunications. This complex has not wanted to be absorbed by the organizations that traditionally operate, co-ordinate or regulate networks and services in telecommunications. Internet co-ordination is characterized by relatively informal procedures, open individual and organizational participation, and technically driven debates aimed at quick, easy-to-implement solutions. Parts of the Internet complex regard themselves as a “community” of
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individual and collective actors, and they have traditionally been in opposition to the telecommunications regime, including the area of international standardization. However, Internet governance has not yet reached a stable, mature state. The growing commercial viability and the global significance of the network have induced changes in the governance structure which were influenced by the ISOC. In 1992, when the ISOC was created, use of the Internet was no longer confined to its original domain of education and research, but had expanded into other sectors such as business and politics, not only in the USA but increasingly on a global scale. As a result, the Internet complex could not expect the US government to continue subsidizing and sheltering the community. Therefore, leading activists of the Internet community set up the ISOC in order to help consolidate the Internet by taking over some of the governmental functions and by co-ordinating the Internet complex with other organizational fields, chiefly telecommunications to begin with. Below we show why this has not worked out in the way some of the founding members of the ISOC hoped it would. We analyse the organization’s internal structure and relate it to the development of the two organizational fields or policy domains between which the ISOC was torn: the domain of international telecommunications co-ordination and the Internet domain (Figure 5.1). Both fields differ in many respects, but what they have in common is the fact that they are changing rapidly. Before we turn to these two fields we should like to briefly introduce the central theoretical concepts. Corporate actors and organizational fields The concept of the corporate actor is rooted in institutional economics, which has traditionally regarded corporatization as a specific means of
Figure 5.1 The Internet Society (ISOC) between two organizational fields
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concerting individual action (Commons 1961). In the corporate mode of concerting action, individual actors transfer rights and resources to act (i.e. power) to an organizational entity, which then acts for the members (Coleman 1974; 1990). A basic contract between the members as the sources of power (they are the sovereigns rather than the staff of an organization) and the corporate actor as the wielder of power is meant to ensure a maximum of conformity between the corporate actor’s actions and the members’ preferences. However, the rules cannot completely determine organizational action. They necessarily provide the corporate actor with some freedom to act. The results of organized action are usually group products, which cannot be received by individual members as separate returns, but are distributed among them according to special rules (Vanberg 1992). The rules are more relevant for business corporations than for labour unions, and they may be least relevant for those voluntary associations which produce public goods. On the other hand, as we know from the theory of collective action, these organizations often have difficulty attracting members unless they are able to provide selective incentives for membership (Olson 1971). The corporate-actor model approaches organizations from the procedural rules on which organized action is based. Its specific focus on the internal structure of an organization distinguishes this approach from other views of organizations. It has inspired a wealth of literature dealing with internal control as a principal-agent problem. But the consequence of this approach—attributing actor quality to organizations—has often been neglected. The corporate actor’s goals, interests and preferences are more than, or different to, the sum of the members’ respective features. Corporate actors have what can be called self-interest, i.e. they have goals such as autonomy, organizational survival, growth and domain expansion. Their strategic implications and the resulting internal and external conflicts depend on the institutional environment in which the organizations operate, and only to a minor degree on their internal structure (cf. Scharpf 1997:51– 68). We regard the ISOC as such a corporate actor. Since its creation, the ISOC has developed an interest not only in promoting the growth of the Internet, but also in establishing itself as a recognized and powerful actor in the arena of global co-ordination of the Internet. Research into the interaction of corporate actors in different policy domains has revealed that these actors prefer dealing with other clearly structured actors rather than being confronted with a diffuse conglomerate of fluid constellations of individuals, research projects, workshops, “movements”, etc. (cf. Flam 1990; Schneider et al. 1994). Thus, the incumbent corporate actors have an interest in the “corporatization” of new collective actors in their policy domain (Döhler and Manow-Borgwardt 1992; Döhler 1995). This provides new corporate actors, such as the ISOC in 1992, with a good opportunity—though no guarantee—for establishing themselves as recognized partners in a policy domain. To understand the
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development and behaviour of a corporate actor, therefore, requires including the actor’s environment in the analysis rather than concentrating solely on the internal structure and processes of a single corporate actor. In our particular case, the ISOC, this means that we should not simply look at its constitution, evolution and strategy from an internal perspective, but include the ISOC’s organizational and institutional environment and its specific dynamics as well. The ISOC is but one organization in a population of organizations which regard it as their business to promote and coordinate global information and communication networks. The organizations constitute what is called an organizational field in the new sociological institutionalism of organization theory. DiMaggio and Powell, who introduced this concept, use it to explain why, as they argue, organizations in a specific line of business grow increasingly similar to one another. The authors call this phenomenon institutional isomorphism. Borrowing from population ecology, they describe isomorphism as “a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b:66). Whereas population ecology in organization theory emphasizes competition as the selective force that eliminates non-optimal forms and produces organizational similarity in a given population (Hannan and Freeman 1977), the concept of institutional isomorphism includes other (institutional) forces that promote similarity. Unlike competition, these mechanisms trigger organizational change without necessarily making organizations more efficient. Organizations, for example, incorporate institutionalized elements of their environment because this increases their legitimacy, thereby strengthening support and securing their survival (Meyer and Rowan 1991). DiMaggio and Powell distinguish three mechanisms that trigger institutional isomorphic change. The first is external pressure, e.g. legal obligations, towards similarity (coercive isomorphism); the second is uncertainty, inducing imitation and copying of successful organizational models (mimetic isomorphism); the third is related to the cognitive and normative base of the professions which shape organizations (normative isomorphism). These three mechanisms do not provide a complete picture of how institutions affect organizational structure; other mechanisms need to be included (cf. Scott 1987). The distinction between institutions and organizations, however, allows DiMaggio and Powell (1991a:14) to draw our attention to rules and norms that structure organizations and the courses of actions of individual and corporate actors (see also Knight 1992:66). DiMaggio and Powell define an organizational field as a set of organizations involved in a common enterprise and mutually aware of each other. Patterns of coalitions and structures of domination between organizations characterize such a field, which includes “the totality of relevant actors” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b:64, 65). This understanding of an organizational field is similar to what has been called a policy domain
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in political sociology (see Pappi and Knoke 1991; Kenis and Schneider 1991). The concept of policy domains, however, puts greater emphasis on agency (actors) and interests than does the concept of organizational fields, which is restricted to institutions (cf. DiMaggio 1988). Two organizational fields provide the focus of our analysis: the relatively new Internet complex and the traditional area of telecommunications. A closer look at the structure of these fields helps us to understand why it has proved difficult for the ISOC to establish itself in both fields at the same time. Public and private co-ordination of global telecommunications The Internet is a comparatively new phenomenon. While predecessors can be traced back to the first half of the 1980s, the Internet only started to develop into a global network of networks in the early 1990s. At that time, the telecommunications sector was in a state of transition: from a system of highly regulated, nationally controlled networks, providing telephone and basic data transmission services, to a deregulated competitive system of a growing number of network operators and services providers, offering a wide range of voice and data services. While public administrations (PTTs) originally controlled almost every aspect of telecommunications, the public sphere was pared down to the minimum by the end of the 1990s, with the result that, today, private organizations can be found operating networks and providing services (Schneider 1999). Thus, the new national telecommunications regimes have many features of a market regime, and the governments’ capacities to control the sector directly have been reduced considerably. Regulatory agencies have been set up, whose central task involves safeguarding competition, providing open access to networks and ensuring universal provision of basic services. (For Germany, see Werle 1999.) The changes at the national level have also challenged the international telecommunications regime, which in the past resembled a closed shop in which national governments or their PTTs almost exclusively controlled the technical and commercial aspects of international telecommunications (Genschel and Werle 1993). Whenever international co-ordination was necessary, it was achieved in the context of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), one of the oldest intergovernmental organizations. The ITU provided technical and operational specifications (standards) as well as commercial regulations, such as accounting principles, rate sharing, prohibition of bypass practices and reciprocal monopoly protection (Aronson and Cowhey 1988). The ITU was the institutional basis for the transnational co-ordination of international telecommunications and, at the same time, an arena of national interest representation, which in effect reinforced the traditional regulatory
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structure to the benefit of the national monopolies (Cowhey 1990). In the wake of deregulation this system has lost much of its legitimacy. Accordingly, other international organizations such as the OECD or the WTO have achieved some leverage in telecommunications as liberalization has become global. Even technical standardization, a crucial basis of the ITU’s legitimacy, is no longer regarded as a “natural” part of its jurisdiction. This relates to the fact that in the past the ITU and, to a lesser degree, other standards organizations, such as the International Standardization Organization (ISO) or the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), managed to combine “pure” technical co-ordination with an element of legitimate political control of international standardization (Schmidt and Werle 1998). While in the era of public monopolies this arrangement appeared essential to the orderly development of the global telecommunications system, today many private network operators and service providers regard it as too rigid and even counterproductive to the promotion of open markets. As a result, some processes of standardization are simply left to the market, whereas others have been taken over by new private associations at the regional or international level. In these consortia and forums the principle of national representation is obsolete and political arguments are avoided. This does not mean, however, that technical standardization is “freed” from all nontechnical considerations. In private standardization business and profit motives play a significant role. Multimedia systems, national and global information initiatives and, of course, the Internet have increased the need for technical standards. Many new consortia and forums have been created, while others have extended their domains. It is estimated that their number exceeds two hundred in the computer and telecommunications industry. What these new units have in common is that they do not aspire in an “imperialistic” way to provide standards in most areas of telecommunications and information technology. Rather, they restrict themselves to more specific tasks, often in the context of a certain technology or technical solution. The consortia and forums mirror the tendency towards a more market-oriented way of developing and operating technical systems. On the other hand, the new organizations have also copied and only slightly modified the procedural rules, working methods and other features prevalent at the working level of the ITU and the other public or quasi-public standardization organizations. However, the appearance of the new units on the stage of international standardization has put pressure on the incumbents to improve their working procedures, modify their membership rules and rethink the overall organization of standard-setting and standard-distribution (David and Shurmer 1996). At present the consortia and forums co-exist with the ITU and other intergovernmental or quasi-intergovernmental standardization organizations, which are undergoing institutional reforms in order to cope
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with the new industry structure and the resulting co-ordination demands in telecommunications. Taken as a whole, the global landscape of technical co-ordination and standardization in telecommunications is a mixture of public and private organizations, which combine technical work with either political or commercial considerations. Where the organizations’ main focus is on telecommunications, the model of the telephone network, both as a technical system and as a social organization with specialized (and centralized) network operators, service providers and passive users, has left its mark on their structure, goals and strategies. Originally, the process of restructuring the international telecommunications domain was only marginally affected by the emergence of the Internet. Even though liberalization of telecommunications provided beneficial conditions for the Internet to take off, there was no need to deal with the network and its promoters in the context of international co-ordination of telecommunications. The Internet had its own address space and used its own set of technical protocols. For a long time it was viewed as an academic network controlled by the US government and the Department of Defense. Moreover, no private organization existed which might be addressed as an acceptable partner at the international level. Accordingly, no organization “representing” the Internet was among the stakeholders who played an active role in the process of transformation of the telecommunications regime. The changes in this regime, however, had to be considered by the ISOC and other organizations from the Internet domain if they wanted to be recognized by the incumbent organizations in the telecommunications domain. This recognition was regarded as necessary because the Internet depends on the telecommunications infrastructure. In particular, private households use the telephone line to connect up to the Internet. The big network operators and service providers who control the global telecommunications infrastructure have an interest in extending their control to the Internet (Werle 2000). The Internet complex and the Internet Society What we today call the Internet has different roots. Some go back to the late 1970s and early 1980s when in the USA the ARPANET fascinated its academic users and motivated those academics who had no access to this network to fight to get similar networks funded (Leib and Werle 1998). With the establishment of the NSFNET in the mid-1980s, an academic and research network funded by the National Science Foundation, a crucial step was taken towards setting up a nationwide network of networks. The NSFNET served as a national backbone to which other networks were connected. The connections were made possible using protocols on which the well-known Internet protocol suite TCP/IP came to be based, so that users can now access the Internet as if it were one single network. Already by
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the end of the 1980s the first commercial segments were linked to the Internet. This marked the beginning of a development that is characterized by commercialization, privatization and internationalization. Compared with the traditional telephone network, it is evident that the organizational foundation of the Internet is completely different. No central unit operates and controls the Internet. Although the functioning of the whole Internet depends on some parts of the network (the backbone) more than on others (the regional or local networks), its overall organizational structure is genuinely decentralized: the sub-networks, too, are loosely coupled. Thus, the Internet embodies a decentralized mode of provision of networks and services, where few “top-down” and many “bottom-up” elements interact. The Internet complex as an organizational field and the social and normative order of the Internet community evolved in the years when the US government funded the essential technical and organizational elements required to keep the system going. Stressing the decentralized nature of the Internet does not imply that it has developed in an unco-ordinated way. Especially in the area of technical co-ordination and standardization, a number of committees and groups have evolved that ensure operational stability and direct development. Some vital functions were originally executed by a single, top-level entity, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which had to make sure, among other things, that every host computer on the Internet had a unique address. Despite its functional importance the IANA was only a small unit in a distributed system relying heavily on delegation.1 The central unit of standardization is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The IETF is split into numerous working groups covering eight to ten functional areas. In the middle of 1999, 118 working groups were active in a total of eight areas. Working groups can be easily created, and most of them are wound up after they have fulfilled their brief. The groups are managed by area directors. In contrast to most of the standardization organizations in telecommunications, participation in the IETF and its working groups is open to virtually anyone. Formal membership is not required, and the latest IETF meetings were attended by more than two thousand people. As a rule, participants do not represent organizations and they are by no means regarded as delegates of their employer organization or their home country. Much of the work proceeds on-line via mailing lists, and many of the influential committee members are volunteers from public and private research organizations with a strong academic or professional interest. They follow the informal IETF credo, “We reject kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in rough consensus and running code”, coined by Dave Clark from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Laboratory for Computer Science. A steering body, the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), has been formed by the IETF Chair and the area directors. The IESG co-ordinates the
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activities of the working groups, assigns group chairs and approves the results of the groups’ work. Before standards are adopted, at least two independent implementations must have demonstrated that they really work. Moreover, when a standard is proposed, it is published electronically and at some stage of the standards track it is introduced as a “Request for Comments” (RFC) in the RFC document series. Thus, a broad and unrestricted discussion of the proposal is possible via electronic discussion groups and mailing lists. To be approved as a standard, the draft must be accepted by the IETF and the IESG on the basis of consensus. Every standard is provided free of charge and published as an RFC. Until 1992/93, when the standardization procedure was reorganized, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) had to give its approval, too. The IAB, an “independent committee of researchers and professionals with a technical interest in the health and evolution of the Internet system” as it defines itself, is the highest committee in the technical or techno-political “hierarchy” of the Internet. Since the 1992/93 reform, it only becomes involved in the standardization process if conflicts at the working level cannot be resolved at this level. Members of the IAB are appointed—by way of co-optation—for a two-year term by an IETF nominating committee. With the network’s global expansion, Internet standards have gained international significance similar to, and in some cases higher than, those issued by international organizations. If we compare Internet co-ordination and standardization with telecommunications, political considerations—and to a certain degree commercial considerations—appear to be less prevalent in the Internet community than in the telecommunications field. The Internet community is committed in the first place to scientific, educational and, above all, professional objectives.2 It is noticeable that these objectives are not restricted to national confines. Although the Internet activities originated in a national (partly even military) context, many of the relevant actors in the early Internet community had a global vision. Consequently, people from outside the USA participated in the Internet committees from the outset. In 1996, only seven out of twelve members of the IAB were based in the USA. The international shape of organizations which have been very closely linked to the development of the Internet is both a result of and a reinforcing factor in the growing global significance of the network.3 This development, however, has created challenges for these and other organizations involved in the co-ordination of the Internet, because the US government no longer sees a need to provide funds and organizational assistance to a network that has attracted thousands of firms and millions of users. The establishment of the Internet Society (ISOC) must be seen in this context. In 1992, the ISOC was formed “by a number of people with longterm involvement in the IETF” (Cerf 1995:1), who assumed responsibility for the network. This private non-profit organization (formally an incorporated not-for-profit corporation) was set up primarily “to facilitate and support
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the technical evolution of the Internet as a research and education infrastructure, and to stimulate the involvement of the scientific community, industry, government and others in the evolution of the Internet” (Articles of Incorporation of Internet Society: 3.A, also published as RFC 2134). The ISOC was supposed to take over certain functions of the US government concerning the provision of funds and organizational assistance in areas which still depended on these resources. From its inception the ISOC was not seen as being restricted to the USA (Malamud 1993), although one pressing reason for the creation of the ISOC was to mobilize resources in order to fund the IETF and other parts of the Internet’s administrative infrastructure, since the US government agencies had started to reduce financial support. The aim of the ISOC was to act as an internationally recognized body. This is mirrored in the board of directors (Board of Trustees, BoT) of the ISOC. Already on the initial board, three out of fourteen trustees were from Europe and one from Australia. Later, the number of non-US citizens in the board increased, reaching 50 per cent in the boards elected in 1997 and in 1999. The ISOC is open to individual and corporate membership. In 1999 the society had about 150 organizational members and more than 8,600 individual members from about 170 countries. The majority of individual members are now from outside the US, and despite this broad range of membership the ISOC has been guided by a circle of (elected) activists who were also involved in the IETF, the IAB or other groups functionally significant for the Internet. This network of actors with a high reputation in the Internet community still has considerable de facto control over those issues which are directly linked to the Internet, especially technical and organizational matters. The activists have in common the conviction that government action is not needed to provide the public good “Internet coordination” (cf. Eisner Gillett and Kapor 1997). This conviction is also shared by the US government, which since 1995 has repeatedly declared in official statements that it is committed to a hands-off policy. If collective rather than market co-ordination is needed, it should be provided by private organizations and not by American government agencies or intergovernmental organizations. Initial activities of the Internet Society aimed at establishing it in the organizational field of the Internet complex—a precondition for its future goal of also gaining recognition in the organizational field of telecommunications. The role of the ISOC vis-à-vis the IAB, the IETF, the IESG and the Internet standardization process had to be determined. This coincided with a perceived need by these organizations to reorganize standardization. With growing numbers of IETF working groups and participants involved in Internet standardization, organizational, procedural and legal issues arose which threatened to undermine the traditional patterns of standardization and technical co-ordination. Trie ISOC chartered the IAB and sponsored its work. As a consequence, the ISOC Board of Trustees
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(BoT) claimed the right to approve new members of the IAB. In addition, a recall mechanism was planned with the ISOC providing an ombudsman (see RFC 2282). Also, members of the ISOC BoT expressed their concern about legal issues, in particular with regard to the legal liability of the IESG. In the discussions which followed about the role of the ISOC it became evident that the other organizations did not want the ISOC to become involved in technical matters. In their view the ISOC was best suited to the role of a supervisor of formal procedures and a provider of a legal umbrella for the Internet Community. After some time a consensus was reached along these lines.4 This indicates that the IETF succeeded in preventing the ISOC from interfering with its business. It is important to notice that, during the discussions, the ISOC had to adopt the particular style of debate prevailing within the Internet community: “The ISOC will, like the IETF, use public discussion and consensus building processes when it wants to develop new policies or regulations that may influence the role of ISOC in the Internet or the Internet technical work” (RFC 2031). The somewhat intricate process used to define the relation of the ISOC and the IETF exemplifies the ISOC’s difficulties in getting established in the Internet complex. Originally, the ISOC was supposed to become a major funding organization for the Internet community, but due to the ISOC’s own financial problems this turned out to be unrealistic. Notwithstanding that the ISOC was expected to establish links to external organizations, it was not accepted as a representative speaker for the Internet community as a whole. However, in December 1997, the ISOC’s Board of Trustees could report a stable relationship between the IETF and the ISOC, even though this was reached on the IETF’s, rather than on the ISOC’s, terms. The ISOC’s incorporation into the Internet community is confirmed and declared by the fact that the ISOC’s articles of incorporation and by-laws have been published in the RFC-Series (see RFC 2134 and 2135 [April 97]). Compared with its original aspiration, the ISOC only partly succeeded in getting established in the organizational field of the Internet. This was a setback for the ISOC’s ambition to play a crucial role in the process of organizing global Internet governance as a distinct set of rules and organizations vis-àvis the organizational field of telecommunications. Before we examine the ISOC’s role at the interface of the two organizational fields, we need to look at the internal structure and resources the organization relies on. Internal problems of the Internet society as a global organization Corporate-actor theory emphasizes the significance of the actor’s constitution for its potential to respond to and act on the outside environment. The ISOC’s constitution apparently does not provide a consistent structure that legitimates and empowers organizational action
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effectively. When the ISOC was set up it was supposed to be an organization with individual membership. Only later could corporate entities also become members of the ISOC. However, the role of the individual vis-à-vis the corporate members and the rights of the membership in general were ill defined. The individual members have the right to elect the Board of Trustees (BoT), the central executive body of the society headed by a President, who is chief executive officer (CEO) at the same time. No other formal means of directly shaping the ISOC’s politics are provided in the by-laws. Organizational members may designate a representative to the ISOC Advisory Council, which provides advice and recommendations to the ISOC President and Board of Trustees, but the Council does not seem to play an active role. This may be one reason why the ISOC reports a high annual attrition rate. Moreover, although the ISOC maintains that it operates not only through its BoT but also through national and local chapters, the relation between the ISOC and these chapters is ambiguous. For individuals and organizations committed to the Internet and to the ISOC it is possible to set up chapters. All members of a chapter are at the same time members of the ISOC, but not vice versa. While the ISOC, on the one hand, appears as an umbrella organization with subordinate chapters, the chapters, on the other hand, define their own purpose, focus on local issues and maintain no formal linkages to the ISOC (apart from annual reports). To act as official chapters of the ISOC these units have to be recognized by the BoT. The ISOC has set up model by-laws—partly with obligatory phrasing—and guidelines for establishing a chapter. Chapters are funded by local membership (individual or organizational) and for that reason chapters can charge dues additional to the ones paid to the ISOC. The chapter’s scope may be local, regional or national, and redundancy should be avoided. For the time being, forty-five chapters have been recognized and some sixty are in formation. Some of them can be regarded as national chapters, for example the Norwegian, the German or the Japanese chapter. The national chapters, however, have committed themselves to different missions. Some see their central role in addressing national political agencies and influencing the national political process; others put more weight on providing services for the members. In Spain the ISOC chapters have emerged as regional organizations in Andalucia, Catalonia, etc. Four chapters have already been recognized and another two are in formation. Especially remarkable from the point of view of international coordination and regulation of the Internet are two local chapters of the ISOC. One is located in Washington DC and the other has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Setting up a chapter in Geneva was no accident. Many international organizations have their home here. Geneva also hosts European branches or headquarters of many multinational corporations. The Geneva ISOC Chapter created, a Special Interest Group on Development in order “to promote Internet connectivity and awareness in
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developing countries”. This group has a membership “drawn from International Organizations such as ITU, WHO, CERN, UNCTAD, ILO, IATA, UN-ECE, UN-DHA as well as from business and consulting backgrounds” (cf. ISOC Forum 2 (11), 26 November 1996). The ISOC chapter in Washington, as we read on its WWW home-page,5 was formed to meet unique needs of Washington, DC area Internet planners, builders, and users, and to help represent the Internet to the US government. The Internet Society itself (headquartered in nearby Reston, VA), as a global organization, has encouraged creation of DC-ISOC to allow the headquarters organization to maintain a global perspective, while the chapter meets the pressing need for Internet representation in the US government’s work to define the National Information Infrastructure (NII). The last two examples indicate that some kind of division of labour between the national and local chapters and the ISOC is emerging, although this is more haphazard than clearly and intentionally structured. The headquarter organization defines its role as an actor at the global level in the concert of international organizations. However, the headquarter organization is not the peak organization of an ISOC-federation, and the Geneva chapter’s Special Interest Group on Development, for example, works on its own right rather than on the basis of competencies delegated from headquarters. It does not formally report to headquarters either. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the ISOC decided to set up an extra office for the permanent presence of the ISOC staff in Geneva. The ISOC, we can summarize, is characterized by considerable internal ambiguity over its constitution, but particularly its relation to national and local chapters. Some chapters argue that a truly international ISOC would have to be governed by its constituent chapters, and therefore a national US chapter should be formed. At INET 1998 (the ISOC’s annual conference), representatives of the chapters got together with the ISOC’s headquarters management to discuss their relationship and also how chapters in regional areas should co-operate. The issue of regional co-operation came up after the European chapters had met in Brussels with the European Commission. It remained unresolved. While the ISOC enjoys a high degree of autonomy when it acts as a representative of its global membership, its ill-defined internal structure makes it a weak organization with little resources and therefore an unattractive ally for other organizations so far. The Internet Society between the telecommunications and the Internet domain In the eyes of many observers, the Internet complex has evolved as a decentralized heterogeneous system with a loosely defined national or
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territorial identity. Its social structure in a way mirrors the technical structure of the network of networks. The units are loosely integrated in the system. They retain as much autonomy as possible without this being detrimental to the links connecting the units. Organizations in this field interact on a peer-to-peer basis rather than in a hierarchical mode. Power, control and authority is distributed, and the system is open and responsive to bottomup initiatives. Co-ordination rather than regulation is the operating mechanism of this complex. This becomes apparent if we look at the organizations which laid the technical foundation of the network. Not only the IAB, the IETF and the IESG but others too were traditionally guided by professional and scientific, rather than political and economic, motives and values. The withdrawal of US government agencies from funding the coordination and administration of the network has reinforced privatization and commercialization of the Internet. Although commercial use of the Internet is regarded as legitimate and beneficial to the network, deliberations of technical and operational matters are not meant to be guided primarily by business concerns. Some features of the Internet complex stand in sharp contrast to the organizational field of telecommunications, which has inherited monopolistic or oligopolistic structures that are subject to regulatory and anti-trust intervention in order to maintain competition and prevent abuse based upon economic power (Kahin 1997). The users of telecommunications networks and services still play a passive role, whereas the Internet is more open to user participation. However, deregulation and liberalization of the telecommunications markets have triggered structural changes of this organizational field towards decentralization, greater competition and a globalization of network operators and service providers. This development has also left its mark on the global landscape of technical standardization, where many private consortia and forums have evolved which co-exist with the official intergovernmental standardization organizations enjoying global and regional significance. In addition, technical changes have accelerated the convergence of the Internet with the telephone network and the emergence of many new services. This has triggered a need for new standards and collaboration between the organizational field of the Internet and that of telecommunications. In this context it has become apparent that many organizations in telecommunications have traditionally ignored the Internet or regarded it as a transitory phenomenon. The majority of Internet standards have never been approved as international standards, although the specifications have gained an international significance and reputation on a scale parallel to the global expansion of the Internet. The international standardization organizations, the ITU in particular, have refused to give their approval because the Internet protocols provide a platform for a multitude of standards which are functionally equivalent to, but not directly compatible with, the standards developed by these organizations (Malamud
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1993). This policy indicates that powerful organizations in the telecommunications domain have tried to gain control over the Internet and absorb its components. The Internet community has been open and co-operative with regard to efforts aiming at improving technical and organizational co-ordination with telecommunications. However, it has not been clear who would represent the Internet at the international level. Early on, the ISOC had an interest in filling this gap and acting as the representative of the Internet community. This “mandate” would facilitate its acceptance as an important player in the area of international standardization and technical co-ordination. The start was promising. A first symbolic gesture indicated tentative international recognition. At its TELECOM 95 Forum in Geneva, for instance, the ITU organized a special
[email protected] conference with many companies representing the different facets of the Internet. At this occasion Vinton Cerf, a co-inventor of the generic Internet protocol and a member of the Board of Trustees of the ISOC, was awarded the ITU Medal by the ITU’s Secretary General, Pekka Tarjanne—an act of technopolitical diplomacy. A short time later a substantive step was made when a formal liaison was approved between the ISOC and JTC1 (the Joint Technical Committee of the ITU and the ISO) in the area of information technology standards—another notable stage of recognition from the ISOC’s point of view. However, other formal links were established between the IETF—not the ISOC—and several committees of regional and global standardization organizations. This was welcomed by the Internet community, although not so much by the ISOC. These developments mobilized the ISOC’s CEO, who announced a more active role for his organization in the future. In a press release of 1996 he declared that the ISOC aspired to be placed “squarely at the forefront of some very key issues developing with regard to Internet governance”. In fact, if the Internet complex wanted to prevent being absorbed by the telecommunications field it had to develop a stable governance structure which was recognized internationally. Thus, it was a logical consequence that the ISOC became involved in an international interorganizational committee charged with proposing a solution for restructuring the Internet Domain Name System—one of the basic building blocks of the organizational structure of the Internet. Initiated by the ISOC, an International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) was formed in order to define, investigate and resolve issues arising from an international debate over a proposal to establish global registries and additional generic top level domain names (such as “.com”, for example). The most important reason for this initiative was that the US government had signalled it would terminate its financial support of address and domain name administration. Contracts with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (I AN A) and other organizations involved in this area were not to be renewed, it argued, and the privatized and commercialized Internet should become self-supporting.
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While it is not our intention in the context of this paper to deal extensively with the technical background and the regulatory and legal implications of the Internet’s domain name system, suffice it to say that it is remarkable that the IAHC was composed not only of representatives of the Internet complex, including the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the ISOC and the IANA, but that it also included a representative of the US Federal Networking Council (FNC) and—more important with regard to the ISOC’s aspirations to become an international player—the ITU, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the International Trademark Association (INTA), i.e. three well-established international organizations. The IAHC was dissolved after the signing ceremony of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Geneva on 1 May 1997. According to the MoU, which has since been signed by more than two hundred organizations from around the globe, the Secretary General of the ITU was to act as the depository of the generic Top Level Domains. Seven new domains were created and domain registration was planned as a competitive field with different, commercially operating registrars. Representatives of the registrars formed the Council of Registrars (CORE), and before its dissolution the IAHC appointed the first members of an interim Policy Oversight Committee (POC), which was regarded as a central player in this new structure. All organizations that participated in the IAHC were empowered to appoint members of the POC and influence the administration of the domains through the POC. Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels (ACPs) were to be established to resolve disputes over domains names, and the WIPO was chosen to administer the procedures accompanying the disputes. The ISOC took a leading role in the construction of this predominantly private regime for governing the Internet. The idea behind the IAHC plan was to reinforce Internet self-governance and at the same time include UN Treaty organizations to provide the Internet with an international legal framework. However, the new system never took off. As the US government did not accept UN Treaty organizations getting involved in the governance of the Internet, in particular the ITU with its traditionally tight links to the former national PTT monopolies, it started to draft its own transition plan for the withdrawal of government agencies from the Internet domain name and address administration. As a first step the Department of Commerce issued a Green Paper (Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses), the drawing up of which was directed by its National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) agency.6 This paper meant a major setback to the Internet Society since the ISOC and the IAHC plan were not mentioned at all. The NTIA emphasized private non-governmental co-ordination as one principle of the new system. According to the Green Paper, the functions of the IANA would be transferred to a new not-for-profit corporation based in the US and
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competition would be introduced not only at the level of the registrars (which deal with the customers), but also at the level of registries (which run the domain name/IP number databases). The role of the US government would be confined to participation in policy oversight during the transition period and would be phased out by the end of September 2000. The successor to the IANA would be directed by an international Board of Directors, in which inter alia Internet users would be represented by a membership association, which according to the text had “to be created”. The NTIA received over four hundred comments on the Green Paper, among them one from the ISOC which stressed the principles of selfgovernance and the concept of “rough consensus” that spearheaded the evolution of the Internet. It pointed out that there was no need to reinvent the IANA, and expressed its discontent at not being recognized as the organization of Internet users that it is, i.e. representative, international and open. The US government’s response to the comments, however, gave no reason to expect that the ISOC’s position might be strengthened. In a second paper, known as the White Paper (June 1998), the NTIA considered the comments received on the Green Paper. The NTIA adhered to its plan to form a new corporation for the co-ordination of core Internet functions. It stated that the private sector should assume leadership and “that neither national governments acting as sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments should participate in management of Internet names and addresses”. While the IAHC concept followed the model of global co-ordination by intergovernmental arrangements, the NTIA favoured private arrangements akin to consortia and forums in international standardization. The White Paper set up the framework for the new corporation, but provided no definitive solutions. Although the ISOC participated in the discussions which followed, its influence on the foundation of the new Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was slight. In the middle of 1999, the ISOC reviewed its strategic plans and decided to concentrate on its role as an international and non-governmental professional organization. The ISOC will continue to struggle for recognition as both the membership association of Internet users and developers and a major player in the concert of international organizations. However, in keeping with the concept of organizational isomorphism, we surmise that the ISOC will have difficulties in the future in placing itself at the intersection of two different organizational fields. Conclusions Liberalization and technical innovations in telecommunications have changed the international regime of technical co-ordination and regulation including the landscape of international standardization organizations. The incumbent intergovernmental or quasi-intergovernmental organizations at
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the international and the regional level have been complemented by a growing number of vendor-driven consortia and forums, which at the same time represent a new model of standard-setting. The differences between the older intergovernmental and the new private organizations notwithstanding, we find substantial organizational similarity in the field of technical standardization in telecommunications and related areas of information technology (Schmidt and Werle 1998:58). Organizations rather than individuals predominate. Individuals are regarded as “delegates” of the organizations. Private units coexist and from time to time co-operate with (inter-)governmental organizations. In principle, participation is open, but de facto it is restricted to those organizations which are “substantially interested”. The work is committee-based, co-operative and consensusoriented. It follows formalized rules and procedures. Besides technical orientations, business interests guide the work. Historically, the developments in this field coincided with the evolution of new decentralized networks and services. Most spectacular was the evolution of the Internet, which developed into a backbone of the information society and a commercially viable global network. Standardization and technical co-ordination in the Internet context were motivated both by business and by scientific and professional objectives. The latter were re-inforced by the non-profit public-good tradition of the Internet. With regard to the co-ordination of the Internet, an organizational field evolved which comprised these elements, though it has not as yet reached a stable state. One of the organizations which form the Internet complex is the Internet Society (ISOC), which was set up at the time when US government agencies began to disengage from financially supporting the Internet. The ISOC’s goal was to support and fund the development and technical coordination of the Internet. The procedures of technical co-ordination and standardization in the Internet community add much to the view that the Internet represents a new paradigm of governance. As in telecommunications, participation is voluntary, though it is more open to interested actors because there are virtually no formal membership rules. Participants are seen as individuals and do not represent organizations or companies. The work aims at achieving quick technical solutions. Transparency of the working process is taken for granted. In contrast with telecommunications, all documents are available online and free. When technical co-ordination and support of the Internet assumed an international dimension, and increasingly overlapped and interfered with technical areas which were traditionally controlled by actors outside the Internet complex, this provided opportunities for the Internet Society as a corporate actor to establish itself as a player at the international level of coordination of telecommunications and data networks. However, the ISOC could not rely on strong organizational resources to take advantage of this situation, because its internal constitution as a corporate actor remained
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ambiguous. Neither the relation of the “headquarters” to the national and regional chapters nor the role of the individual and the corporate members of the ISOC are clearly defined. Individual membership and the predominance of the individual over the collective have been typical of the Internet community, whereas corporate membership and the priority of corporate before individual interests characterize the telecommunications domain. The ISOC has tried to integrate both elements under one roof and, in doing so, has manoeuvred itself into a somewhat marginal position with regard to both organizational fields. The ISOC’s difficulties in establishing itself as a powerful connecting link between the two organizational fields were aggravated by the general conflict over the role of private organizations vis-à-vis intergovernmental arrangements in the international co-ordination of technical networks. The transformation of Internet names and address management touches upon this general problem. Initially, the ISOC managed to bring together groups from the Internet complex and intergovernmental organizations to build a global regime of technical coordination of the Internet. However, when the US government intervened, the ISOC was not strong enough to channel the national and international debate into a direction favourable to the original governance model. Thus the process ended with the formation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which appears to be more in line with corporate interests than of benefit to the traditional Internet community. This is not to say that the new private system has already reached a stable state. Problems, such as the representation of the individual Internet user in the new governance structure or the enforcement of rules in the Internet that developed from a computer network for scientists to a universal infrastructure, remain to be solved. Some observers suggest that in the long run the inclusion of the International Telecommunication Union (or an equivalent body) in the governance of the Internet is inevitable. Yet few expect that the ISOC will be needed to cope with the problems. Torn between the two organizational fields and their different institutional structures, the ISOC could well end up being pushed into a marginal role in both fields. Notes 1 2
3
These functions have since been transferred to ICANN. Professional objectives always played a significant role in standardization, besides business interests and political interests. Many professional organizations are involved in standardization at the national as well as the international level. The most prominent professional association in this area is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). IEEE is a transnational society with about 300,000 individual members in over 130 countries. However, a change has been observed in recent years. Regarding the current composition of the IAB, most members are US residents working for the major information technology companies. This indicates that some functions of the IAB with regard to international co-ordination have been shifted to other
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Raymund Werle and Volker Leib organizations, particularly the ISOC. At the same time we find that many of the Internet pioneers have switched from the university and research area to business firms. This is documented in RFC 2028 (October 1996) entitled “The Organizations Involved in the IETF Standards Process”, which describes Internet standardization as “an organized activity of the ISOC, with the Board of Trustees being responsible for ratifying the procedures and rules of the Internet standards process”. In RFC 2031 (October 1996), which deals exclusively with the “IETF-ISOC relationship”, both organizations state clearly “that ISOC has no influence whatsoever on the Internet Standards process, the Internet Standards or their technical content” and that the ISOC should restrict its involvement to “provid[ing] a legal umbrella”. Thus, the ISOC should not directly deal with technical issues, but provide the legal shelter for Internet standardization. Accordingly, since October 1997, each Request for Comments (beginning with RFC 2220) contains a copyright statement, which acknowledges ISOC as copyright holder. Http://www.dcisoc.org/about.html The process is documented in some detail on the homepage of NTIA (http:// www.ntia.doc.gov).
References Aronson, J.D. and Peter F.Cowhey (1988) When Countries Talk. International Trade in Telecommunications Services, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. Cerf, V. (1995) IETF and ISOC, http://www.isoc.org/standards/ietfhis.html. Coleman, J.S. (1974) Power and the Structure of Society, New York: Norton. ——(1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA: Belknap. Commons, J.R. (1961) Institutional Economics, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Cowhey, P.P. (1990) “The international telecommunications regime: the political roots of regimes for high technology”, International Organization 44:169–99. David, P.A. and M.Shurmer (1996) “Formal standards-setting for global telecommunications and information services. Towards an institutional regime transformation?”, Telecommunications Policy 20 (10):789–815. DiMaggio, P.J. (1988) “Interest and agency in institutional theory” in L.G.Zucker (ed.) Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. DiMaggio, P.J. and W.W.Powell (1991a) “Introduction” in W.W.Powell and P.J. DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ——(1991b) “The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields” in W.W.Powell and P.J.DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Döhler, M. (1995) “The state as architect of political order: policy dynamics in German health care”, Governance 8 (3):380–404. Döhler, M. and P.Manow-Borgwardt (1992) “Korporatisierung als gesundheitspolitische Strategic”, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 1:64–106. Eisner Gillett, S. and M.Kapor (1997) “The self-governing Internet: coordination by design” in B.Kahin and J.H.Keller (eds) Coordinating the Internet, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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Flam, H. (1990) Corporate Actors: Definition, Genesis, and Interaction, MPIFG Discussion Paper 90/11, Köln: MPIfG. Genschel, P. and R.Werle (1993) “From national hierarchies to international standardization. Historical and modal changes in the governance of telecommunications”, Journal of Public Policy 13:203–25. Hannan, M.T. and J.Freeman (1977) “The population ecology of organizations”, American Journal of Sociology 82:929–64. Kahin, B. (1997) “The US national information infrastructure initiative: the market, the web, and the virtual project” in B.Kahin and E.J.Wilson (eds) National Information Infrastructure Initiatives, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kenis, P. and V.Schneider (1991) “Policy networks and policy analysis: scrutinizing a new analytical toolbox” in B.Marin and R.Mayntz (eds) Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Frankfurt/M.: Campus/Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Knight, J. (1992) Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Leib, V. and R.Werle (1998) “Computernetze als Infrastrukturen und Kommunikationsmedien der Wissenschaft”, Rundfunk und Fernsehen 46 (2– 3):254–73. Malamud, C. (1993) Exploring the Internet. A Technical Travelogue, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Meyer, J.W. and B.Rowan (1991) “Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony” in W.W.Powell and P.J.DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Olson, M. (1971) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pappi, F.U. and D.Knoke (1991) “Political exchange in the German and American labor policy domain” in B.Marin and R.Mayntz (eds) Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Frankfurt/M.: Campus/ Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Scharpf, F.W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Schmidt, S.K. and R.Werle (1998) Coordinating Technology. Studies in the International Standardization of Telecommunications, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schneider, V. (1999) Staat und technische Kommunikation. Die politische Entwicklung der Telekommunikation in den USA, Japan, Grossbritannien, Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Schneider, V., G.Dang-Nguyen and R.Werle (1994) “Corporate actor networks in European policy-making: harmonizing telecommunications policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (4):473–98. Scott, R.W. (1987) “The adolescence of institutional theory”, Administrative Science Quarterly 32:493–511. Vanberg, V.J. (1992) “Organizations as constitutional systems”, Constitutional Political Economy 3:223–53. Werle, R. (1999) “Liberalisation of telecommunications in Germany” in K.A. Eliassen and M.Sjøvaag (eds) European Telecommunications Liberalisation, London: Routledge. ——(2000) “The impact of information networks on the structure of political systems” in C.Engel and K.H.Keller (eds) Understanding the Impact of Global Networks on Local Social, Political and Cultural Values, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
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Why do community-based AIDS organizations co-ordinate at the global level? Patrick Kenis
Introduction Community-based organizations are now widely viewed as central components of an effective societal response to AIDS. These organizations are often very small, staffed and supported by a remarkable variety of activists ranging from gay men to drug users and dedicated social workers. These organizations are active in such different areas as providing care, popularizing safe-sex strategies, arguing for human rights promotion as an integral part of effective AIDS programs, providing treatment information in non-medical contexts, and strengthening the involvement of the people and communities affected by HIV/AIDS in designing policies as well as in all lines of decision-making and implementation. They are different from most nongovernmental organizations in that they are run for and by communities, such as gay men, drug users, ethnic minorities, etc. Not only do community-based organizations exist on the local and national level, but in the field of HIV/AIDS a number of community-based organizations have been established at the global level as well. They were successful in exercising considerable influence at that level. Consequently, the main question this chapter will address is why and to what extent community-based AIDS organizations played and still play an important role in global governance. Answering the above questions contributes to a realistic assessment and understanding of the role of community-based organizations in global governance. As such important lessons can be drawn on how the global level has dealt with such a challenging new problem as HIV/AIDS. Moreover, it can contribute to the ongoing debate in the literature of international relations on the role and influence of community-based organizations in global governance. Traditionally, international relation theories did not consider private, international organizations, and even less did they consider international community-based organizations to be relevant or significant realities worthy of being taken into consideration (Risse-Kappen 1995; Gordenker and Weiss 1995:32–4; Reinalda 1997). Rather, states or markets are emphasized as the 124
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most relevant independent variables for explaining international relations and governance. Consequently, “despite the rapidly rising curve of NGO numbers and activity in the context of the UN system, a firm consensus about their nature and functions remains elusive” (Gordenker and Weiss 1995:32); “a focus on transnational NGO activity is usually left distant and obscured” (Gordenker and Weiss 1995:34). Recently, however, a number of approaches can be distinguished that take a broader view and consequently provide room for the importance of private or community-based international organizations. First, they have been identified in their capacity to raise legitimacy (see Willetts 1982), resources (Halliday 1989) or assets (Princen 1994). Second, it has been argued and illustrated that they may gain access to official decision-making, in both the domestic and the international sphere, and that they may play a role in advocacy and implementation (Gordenker and Weiss 1995). Third, they have been identified as unfolding significant strategies (Risse-Kappen 1995), combining national and international strategies (Risse-Kappen 1995), and exerting influence beyond their formal status should they succeed in gaining a central position within networks (Gordenker and Weiss 1995). What all of the above approaches have in common is that they point towards the “pluralizing of global governance” (Gordenker and Weiss 1995:17). As will be clearly illustrated below, such a view is also much more consistent with the realities identified in the case of HIV/AIDS when compared to what any of the more traditional state-centered approaches would have us predict. A deficit of many of the newer approaches, however, is that they limit themselves primarily to identifying pluralized global governance structures and point to the dimensions, structures and contingencies of these structures in a rather unsystematic way. An example of this is the most interesting International Cooperation in Response to AIDS (Gordenker et al. 1995), which takes very seriously the social basis of politics and pluralized governance structures. On the basis of these, it describes the complexities of international co-operation in response to AIDS. It is, however, difficult to draw any general conclusions from this detailed empirical case study, apart from the fact that this is one more case demonstrating that the activities and strategies of the different actors should be taken into account when analyzing international co-operation. The present chapter would like to go a step further in attempting to systematically analyze and explain the structure of pluralized global governance structures. Later in this chapter, the general issue of the role of community-based organizations in AIDS governance will be addressed. Before turning to the more specific issue of the role community-based organizations play in global governance, it is important first to understand the role of organizations in the response to HIV/AIDS in general and the role of their response on the global level, in particular. In the third part of the chapter, it will be demonstrated that global governance of HIV/AIDS can indeed be best described in terms of a pluralized governance structure. It will
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become clear that the global governance of AIDS is an example of a case where community-based organizations and other private organizations have played a considerable role. The fourth section will address the question of how to explain the significance of community-based organizations in the field of HIV/AIDS at the global level. In order to answer this question, an inductive approach has been chosen, since—as mentioned before—the existing literature hardly gives any indications for concrete independent variables. Consequently, the main aim is not to test one approach or the other but rather to indicate, in a more or less systematic way, those factors that help to explain the phenomena in which we are interested. Finally, a number of more general conclusions will be formulated on the basis of the case studied. The role of community-based organizations in governance Before turning to the issue of the role of community-based organizations in global HIV/AIDS governance it is important to understand first what the governance of HIV/AIDS implies and what types of governance can be distinguished in this area. Second, it is important to present some general information on the organizational response at the global level. The governance of HIV/AIDS implies that responses are being developed to reduce both HIV transmissions and the personal and social impact of HIV/AIDS. It has been demonstrated that a number of such different responses have been developed (Kenis and Marin 1997), as can be seen in Figure 6.1. Apart from the “non-response” to or the “repression” of the HIV/AIDS problem, four other types of responses can be distinguished: the medical response, the behavioral response, the regulative or administrative response and the organizational response (including the response by community-based organizations). In the context of the present paper, it is important to notice that these medical, behavioral and regulative approaches have mobilized an unprecedented number of experts and policy-makers, as well as financial— thus constituting the core of responses developed to deal with the HIV/AIDS problem. It is interesting to see, however, that in such a context additional types of response developed. Parallel to all the above responses, but remarkably unnoticed by scientists and policy-makers in its potential as a response to HIV/AIDS, a whole spectrum of organizational responses developed quite early on. Many would agree with Perrow and Guillén’s statement that “it is inconceivable that a serious social problem such as an epidemic could have any other solution or mitigation than an organizational one” (Perrow and Guillén 1990:150). However, it took considerable time for researchers and policy-makers to explicitly recognize that the degree of HIVtransmissions, as well as the degree of personal and social impact of the disease, depends greatly on the development and responsiveness of private organizations in this particular field.
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Figure 6.1 Institutional responses to the problem of HIV/AIDS Notes: See Kenis and Vroom 1996 Whereas there is an enormous amount of research in the area of the medical and behavioral responses and a considerable amount of research on the regulatory response, the study of organizational response has been highly under-investigated. Only a handful of studies exist that look at the contribution of organizations to the problem of HIV/AIDS in a specific and symptomatic way. Exceptions are Perrow and Guillén (1990); Bennet and Ferlie (1994); Panem (1988); Fink and Chambré (1991); and Kenis and Marin (1997).
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, a number of organizational responses can be distinguished. Generally speaking, the top-down organizational approach can be equated with what is normally called the “modern welfare state”, where health policy is based on a complex, developed, medical-technological and task-differentiated professional health-care system. The top-down organizational response is located in the existing institutionalized welfarestate structure. It includes all those organizations that have a recognized, formalized task within the welfare state: both public organizations and professional welfare organizations. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has not only mobilized the existing organizational capacities of the different societies (“top down”), but it has also stimulated new organizational initiatives (“bottom up”). The bottom-
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up organizational response has its roots outside the formalized welfarestate structure; it includes organized risk-groups and organized communities, which make up the group of “community-based organizations”. Such organizations began to emerge, especially in the USA, first from the homosexual community and the smaller number of persons with HIV/AIDS who had contracted the disease from blood transfusions. These organizations developed from the ground up and, in their initial stages, could be described as limited to local horizons. At present, their aims are generally to call attention to HIV/AIDS, to develop wider understanding, to affect governmental policy, and to claim services or medicine for the injuries of their members, including the distribution of drugs to treat AIDS. What should have become clear by now is that the response of community-based organizations is far from self-evident and developed in a context of predominant, strong and socially legitimate (medicine, behavioral sovereignty, etc.) responses. However, as we will see, there is empirical evidence for the importance of community-based organizations in HIV/ AIDS, not only at the local level but also at the global level. The organizational response to HIV/AIDS and the global response to HIV/AIDS can be divided in three distinct phases. In a first phase, from the mid 1970s until 1981, the presence of a new pandemic was not suspected. HIV spread silently and unnoticed to all inhabited continents. Obviously, this period is characterized by non-response and the world can consider itself fortunate that this silent period of the HIV/AIDS pandemic was short. However, also in the second phase, which started with the identification of the first AIDS cases by Los Angeles clinicians in 1981 and which lasted until about 1985, non-response was predominant among most nations and international organizations (see e.g. Shilts 1987; Perrow and Guillén 1990). The third phase started in 1985–6. By 1991, the world’s first truly global strategy against the disease was developed. In this period, international collaboration in AIDS research usually consisted of highly intensified, international regulations formulated (especially regarding human rights) by international governmental organizations. The latter developed action programs, and community-based organizations intensified their international collaboration, especially by setting up international, private non-profit organizations. In the ten years following the identification of the first AIDS cases, the medical response to the AIDS pandemic was remarkable: a causative agent— the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)—was identified, its genes mapped and analyzed, drugs that act against it found and tried, and vaccines developed to a pre-clinical stage. All this happened in the context of international collaboration, financing and communication among AIDS researchers (9,000–16,000 of whom meet at the yearly World AIDS Conferences that have been taking place since 1985).
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In this third phase, a number of international resolutions, statements and declarations were also formulated by a number of international governmental organizations: e.g. WHO (on the type of measures to be taken, human rights, HIV screening, etc.), the Council of Europe (on protecting the blood supply and human rights issues), and the European Union. These international resolutions, statements and declarations have a limited scope and are difficult to enforce, besides being much fewer than those existing at the different national levels. However, it could be observed that they have had an influence on national legislation, particularly when it comes to human rights issues (see Mann et al. 1992:537–73). In this third phase, a “top-down” organizational response was also taking shape: national governments, intergovernmental organizations and established non-profit organizations started to develop strategies and programs to deal with the issue. Not until 1985 did strategic approaches begin to be formulated, articulated and endorsed by governments.1 This is illustrated by the development of the World Health Organization’s strategy. In 1986, the Executive Board of WHO initiated what eventually developed into the Global Program on AIDS (GPA).2 Thus, the world had a “topdown” strategy for dealing with this epidemic by 1987. The GPA was launched to provide bilateral assistance and enable member states to draw on resources provided by intergovernmental organizations. By that time, additional organizations—such as the UN Development Program, the World Bank, UNESCO, the UN Children’s Fund, the UN Population Fund, the ILO, UNICEF, the UN Center for Human Rights, USAID, the Red Cross, etc.—had all become active in funding and assisting HIV/AIDS programs and activities. As far as the “bottom-up” organizational response is concerned, there are obviously a number of reasons why one would not expect it to be very prominent at the global level. From the very type of its activities, it is bound to the local level; having already to cope with resource problems for developing activities at the local level, the question becomes how it could mobilize resources for participating in global activities and it is only one possible response to the problem of HIV/AIDS, as demonstrated above. Interesting now, however, is that at the global level an early and unprecedented community response to HIV/AIDS also developed. This will be illustrated in somewhat greater detail in the next section. Community-based organizations as global players By the middle of the 1980s, when governments began to move beyond ad hoc responses to planned interventions, there was already a truly volunteer response, with a substantial number of non-governmental care and prevention programs as well as policy and advocacy activities. Moreover, international collaboration and exchange of information among a great number of community-based organizations preceded international
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collaboration within well-established and well-funded international organizations. A number of these networks were constituted as formal organizations by the end of the 1980s: for example, the International Council of AIDS Service Organizations,3 the Global Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS, Migrants Against HIV/AIDS, the International Community of Women living with HIV and AIDS, the European AIDS Treatment Group, the International Lesbian and Gay Association, the European Interest Group of Drug Users, the Network of Sexwork-Related HIV/AIDS Projects, the Ethnic Minorities and AIDS Network, the International Steering Committee for People with HIV and AIDS, and ACTUP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power). Space does not allow for these different community-based organizations to be reviewed and described. Instead, in the following, instances will be presented in which the relevance and importance of a number of these organizations in national and global policy-making will be illustrated, i.e. activities by these community-based organizations will be described that go well beyond the self-help character often attributed exclusively to such organizations. Although these organizations are rather different according to a number of criteria (scope, size, budget, membership, activities, goals, etc.), they seem to have one principal objective in common: strengthening the involvement of the people and communities affected by HIV/AIDS in the design of policies and in all lines of decision-making and implementation. There is indeed clear evidence that community-based organizations have had unprecedented success in attaining this objective, although from their point of view the situation is still highly unsatisfactory. They have succeeded in influencing to a great extent the scope and content of the previously described international resolutions, statements and declarations. They have strongly influenced the organizational responses of established international organizations and have even had a significant impact on the medical response. As far as the medical response is concerned, global action by communitybased organizations has led to a series of unprecedented changes in the system of medical research and treatment. For example, the annual (since 1994 biannual) International Conference on AIDS, which was first organized in 1985 as a strictly medical conference, has seen radical changes in its format under the pressure of community-based organizations. In the context of the V International Conference on AIDS (Montreal 1989) the GPA (the WHO Global Program on AIDS) convened a pre-conference gathering of private organizations working on AIDS, in which more than a hundred organizations were represented. The VIII International Conference on AIDS—originally scheduled to be held in Boston in 1992—was held in Amsterdam as a protest by community-based organizations of American regulations restricting entry of people with AIDS and HIV into the country. Moreover, starting with this conference, ICASO (International Council of AIDS Service Organizations) became an official supporting organization of
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the conference. Representatives of community-based organizations, activists and persons with HIV/AIDS were represented on the program committee and representatives of community-based organizations, activists and persons with HIV/AIDS were invited to make formal presentations in all sessions, including the opening and closing plenary sessions.4 By the XII International Conference on AIDS in 1998 (Geneva), the involvement of international community-based organizations had developed to a point where they were (and continue to be) formally invited as co-sponsors and co-organizers of the conference (together with UNAIDS and the International AIDS Society). ICASO (International Council of AIDS Service Organizations), as the main representative of the community-based organizations, threatened “not to be a sponsor of the XII Conference, nor to be presented in the conference structure or committees”, because factually a “full and equal partnership with the [other] organizers…is not currently the case” (EuroCASO Newsletter 1/96). As a result, a few months later, UNAIDS announced that the conference program would be developed according to a new model: the Scientific Program Committee and the Community Program Committee would be the two bodies of equal standing to develop the final program of the conference. Other, maybe even more important instances where the medical establishment is challenged arise when it comes to influencing the prescribing of drugs or the organization of medical trials. Community-based organizations, in particular ACT-UP from its base in New York, rapidly spread around the USA and many other countries. For example, after a yearlong campaign led by ACT-UP, Burroughs-Wellcome lowered the price of AZT (Retrovir zidovudine) from $10,000 to $3,200 a year. ACT-UP also worked with Bristol-Meyers Squibb to develop a Parallel Track program for ddI (VIDEX didanosine) which provided the drug to 23,000 people with AIDS while ddI’s clinical trials were ongoing. The European AIDS Treatment Group is a European community-based organization which has as its main goals to ensure that the largest number of persons with HIV diseases in European countries have access, as soon as possible, to state-of-the-art treatment, including experimental treatments and monitoring; and to enable people with HIV and their advocates to give as much input as possible to the process of drug testing and approval, as well as to the mechanisms that rule the availability in each country. Regarding the content and number of the formulation of resolutions, statements and declarations, global action by community-based organizations has contributed to defending the right to privacy and has acted as a bulwark against discrimination. In this area, community-based organizations have been especially active in norm promotion and in monitoring national regulations, as well as in the international recommendations named above. Frame-setting declarations were made, such as the one by the UN Secretary General (addressing the General Assembly on 20 October 1987) stating that the fight against AIDS “is also a
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fight against fear, against prejudice and against irrational action born of ignorance”. He later added (on the occasion of World AIDS Day, 1 December 1988), that “the world should make war against AIDS, and not against people with AIDS”, obviously influenced by the activism of community-based organizations. This also led to a genuine precedent in the history of responding to a disease in that WHO incorporated human rights into its global AIDS strategy. In general, it can be said that the international resolutions, statements and declarations regarding HIV/AIDS (notification and contact tracing; mandatory, routine or voluntary testing; protection of blood and blood products from infection; nondiscrimination, etc.) generally do respect human rights criteria much more than does legislation produced at the national level. Whether this is partially the result of a more effective influence by community-based organizations at the global level than at the national level, is difficult to answer. What can be observed, however, is that in many cases these international standards have influenced national legislation. Community-based organizations that are very active in this area are especially the International Council of AIDS Service Organizations (ICASO) and its regional offices, the Global Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS, the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), and the different local branches of ACT-UP. Assessing and isolating the role or influence of community-based organizations in developing the response of established intergovernmental organizations, as well as in their decision-making processes with regard to HIV/AIDS, is a difficult task. Only very little information is available on the informal links and communication between community-based organizations and intergovernmental or established private organizations. Most of the work is done behind the scenes: lobbying governmental delegations, providing expertise in fact-finding and in drafting programs, strategies and resolutions. Generally speaking, however, it can be said that some intergovernmental organizations seem to be “immune” to any influence or involvement of people and communities affected by HIV/ AIDS, whereas other intergovernmental organizations have gradually taken up the point of view of community-based organizations in their strategies and programs. An example of the latter is the WHO General Program on AIDS involving a group of private non-profit organizations to survey their program. The promotion of formal links with these AIDS organizations represents a unique departure from an organizational milieu characterized by connections mainly between governmental officials and representatives of intergovernmental organizations. The WHO AIDS program began forming such links in 1987 and had a platform involving relationships with various non-profit organizations from the list of more than 150 having official relations with WHO. In the latter part of 1988, GPA officials began to meet with representatives from non-
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profit and community-based organizations to discuss the formation of an AIDS service-organization consortium. From this emerged a first general meeting, organized by GPA, of more than fifty community-based organizations in Vienna in February 1989. The statement that emerged voiced some concerns and, in addition, some of the organizational representatives clearly expressed during the discussion a desire to work alongside WHO personnel in making policy decisions on AIDS. Eventually, the Global Management Committee of GPA opened an entrance for nonprofit representation at its meetings. The formal structure of relationships was further elaborated with the adoption of a resolution by the World Health Assembly in 1989 that responded to some of the concerns voiced in Vienna. Another consequence was the formal establishment of the European Council of AIDS Service Organizations (EuroCASO) in Vienna in October 1990. EuroCASO brings together gay organizations, organizations for people with HIV and AIDS, sex workers’ organizations, drug users’ self-help groups, organizations for people belonging to ethnic minorities, and organizations like the Deutsche AIDS Hilfe or the Terrence Higgins Trust (at the moment, more than two hundred organizations from thirty-five European countries are members of EuroCASO). The Charter on which EuroCASO is based simply describes it as a tool for networking activities among organizations sharing a common interest. In the meantime, EuroCASO (as well as the other regional offices linked to ICASO) has managed in at least some way to influence the UN work. For example, in the 48th session of the commission for Human Rights at the United Nations, a representative from EuroCASO and AfriCASO had a consultative status at that meeting. As such, they were in a position to point out the link between AIDS and human rights to the representatives of the countries, as well as to the established private organizations on the Human Rights Commission. On 1 January 1996, the GPA was replaced by a new Joint United Nations Program on AIDS, UNAIDS. This program brings together six agencies, all of which have been active in responding to the HIV/AIDS epidemic—into a single co-sponsored program (UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, World Bank). UNAIDS’ main role is to serve as the advocate for the global response to AIDS; to serve as the primary source of policy, technical and strategic guidance for responding to AIDS; and to build national capability to respond to AIDS. What is most remarkable in this new program is that, for the first time in UN history, non-profit organizations and PWAs (persons with AIDS) are invited to have official seats on the Program Co-ordinating Board (PCB). The PCB of UNAIDS is the Board of Directors of the Program, made up of twenty-two UN Member States, representatives from the six UN co-sponsors, plus two PWAs and three non-profit organizations (of which at least one has so far been a community-based organization). At the moment, it is not possible to evaluate the decisions and strategies chosen by UNAIDS, since the program has only been in place for little over a year. But without
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doubt it can be said that community-based organizations and the communities affected will have a significant influence on the development of this program. Not only did community-based organizations intervene in global and national policy in the different ways described above, but they have also facilitated the development of their own structures, especially with regard to the development and operation of newly established community-based organizations on the local level. For example, the International Steering Committee for People with HIV and AIDS has helped to support the emergence of self-help groups in countries as diverse as Sierra Leone and India, and the International Council of AIDS Service Organizations (ICASO) has supported the formation of dynamic regional networks in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Another example is the European Council of AIDS Service Organizations (EuroCASO) facilitating the operation of local community-based organizations by challenging governments to overcome “structural impediments” to the efficacy of community-based organizations, such as laws that criminalize homosexuality or make sexually explicit education difficult. A further example is the International Steering Committee for People with HIV and AIDS, which in 1987 started organizing conferences exclusively open to people with HIV and AIDS and has now developed into a more consolidated and sustained network of organizations for people with HIV and AIDS—organizations that, due to the catalyzing impact of the previous conferences, have by now been established in most European countries. These are only a few examples of the numerous instances where community-based organizations have indeed made specific contributions to global politics and global governance. Conclusively, it can be said that community-based organizations not only fulfill important functions when it comes to the global response to HIV/ AIDS but, moreover, are generally considered the first case in medical history where the communities and groups at risk have formed influential international organizations. The remaining question is: why is this the case, and what are the conditions or constellations under which community-based organizations are not only willing to provide but are also capable of providing the above-described kinds of public functions? Why are there community-based organizations in the field of HIV/AIDS at the global level? As argued above, community-based organizations can be seen as global players, in that they are key alternative producers of governance functions at the global level. In what follows, hypotheses will be formulated why community-based organizations have developed in the field of HIV/AIDS. Answering this question is relevant from an academic point of view, since
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in the context of global politics, the part played by private actors as potential producers of global public goods through the various institutional arrangements as supporting and structuring devices therefore seems to be a challenging theoretical puzzle to be solved. (Ronit and Schneider 1997:8) Moreover, it is also highly relevant from a practical point of view, since in general the response to the HIV/AIDS crisis is seen as one producing a great number of innovations in problem-solving that, once better understood, can be very useful in dealing not only with future new problems but also with “old” problems (ranging from health in general to drug dependency and traffic problems: see Kenis and Nöstlinger 1997; Cattacin et al. 1996; deVroom et al. 1995). Based on empirical evidence from the organizational phenomena presented above, the following factors are suggested for such an explanation: the global level as an opportunity structure (including the deficiency of the national level in dealing with ill-structured problems and the presence of basic structures at the global level); the availability of special resources to global community-based organizations; and the predominance of informal communication processes. The fact that community-based organizations and their representatives move—initially through informal networks and later through formal organizations—to the global level is in any case an indication of the fact that the global level offers opportunities for actions and strategies. Collaboration is, as illustrated before, not limited to an exchange of information between local community-based organizations, but has been established at the global level as such. The question becomes, consequently, what makes the global level an opportunity structure for these organizations? There seem to be two appropriate answers to this question. First, the global level is a negatively defined opportunity structure, in that organizations turn to it because they have difficulties in pursuing their needs at another level (especially the national level). This is the “push argument”. Second, the global level is a positively defined opportunity structure, in that it contains a minimal set of structures and constituencies to which community-based organizations can connect their strategies (in contrast to outer space, for example). This is the “pull argument”. In the following, both issues will be discussed in somewhat more detail. There is ample evidence that, in the first five to ten years of the epidemic, traditional power at the national level—e.g. the political establishment, the medical establishment, medical-scientific societies, the public health-care and social-service system, the media and the church—to a great extent failed in responding to the needs of individuals confronted with the fatal realities of HIV/AIDS (see Panem 1988; Perrow and Guillén 1990 for the USA; and Kenis and Marin 1997 for Europe). The reason for this is at least twofold. On the one hand, there is the stigma related to HIV/AIDS; and on the other,
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there is a built-in deficiency of highly functionally differentiated systems to deal with ill-structured problems. Because governments and established private organizations were afraid of the stigma connected with AIDS victims, who tended to be gay or bisexual men and intravenous drug users, they failed to respond to the AIDS crisis. Government agencies failed to allocate money to education campaigns and even to spend funds that had been appropriated. Housing agencies, landlords, schools, corporations, businesses and many other organizations and persons would discriminate against persons with AIDS and HIV carriers, not only because of fear of contagion but also because of the association of AIDS with behaviors like homosexual sex or drug addiction (see Shilts 1987; Perrow and Guillén 1990). Even more important in explaining the deficiency of the national level in responding to HIV/AIDS may be the difficulty of modern, highly functionally differentiated governance systems to deal with “ill-structured problems”. Illstructured problems are problems upon which we have no structure to impose (Simon 1973). Functionally differentiated health and welfare institutions and bureaucracies are effective only when confronted with problems that are already well structured. Their strength is computing solutions to well-structured problems. One of the main characteristics of the HIV/AIDS problem is, indeed, that it has been an ill-structured problem: it is new, without familiar clues; it is complex, with many clues to be taken into account; and it is contradictory, with different elements suggesting different interpretations. In addition, functionally differentiated institutions are characterized by vested interests, which hinders the development of problem-solving capacities even more (Benz 1994; Kenis and Schneider 1991; de Vroom 1997). Consequently, such systems can first deal only unsatisfactorily with a problem as long as it is ill structured and, therefore, at that time do not produce an adequate response. Second, such systems leave little room for alternative approaches to develop. As a consequence of the above factors, it is conceivable that communitybased organizations are “pushed” towards the global level. There is indeed empirical evidence that the above argumentation is valid: in communitybased organizations, representatives from countries with highly functionally differentiated health and welfare systems in which community-based organizations do not traditionally play an important role, and/or representatives from countries with a catholic tradition, are especially over-represented (Mediterranean countries, Scandinavian countries, Austria, Belgium: see Kenis and Marin 1997). The significance of this argument is also illustrated by the fact that community-based organizations and their local representatives are often much more successful in influencing norm promotion on the global level than they are within their own country. Inversely, it can be said that the fact that community-based organizations had an option to find “residence” at the global level obviously had to do
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with the fact that authoritative structures and a system of functional differentiation at the global level are not as elaborate as at national levels. On the other hand, this level proved, at the same time, to be one with a degree of “selective affinity”. Based on the empirical illustrations previously presented, the relevant global level can be described as a level where a number of actors, problems, solutions and occasions for decision-making and strategies are floating around in a more or less unstructured way.5 Such a situation opens opportunities for bringing in or hanging on to certain issues, interests and needs. This is in fact what a number of community-based organizations have been successful at doing. For example, a number of community-based organizations have been “hanging around” at the initially strictly “scientific” international conferences on AIDS. In the meantime, they are one of the two main partners in making decisions on the program. Moreover, at these conferences they were successful in starting discussions, taking action and getting to know people at the exhibitor stands of the most important pharmaceutical firms world-wide. Another important existing structure on which they could hang is the highly elaborate human rights system of the UN, which traditionally works together with hundreds of non-profit organizations and is even to a large extent dependent on them. However, in this case community-based organizations dealing with AIDS have been confronted with a great number of problems and barriers when trying to participate in the human rights triangle. The most important structure on which community-based organizations have been able to rely has been WHO. Although WHO reacted very slowly to the new (and ill-structured) HIV/AIDS problem, as described above, it has been important (from about 1988 onwards) in legitimizing, giving credibility to, financing (although to a rather small extent) and in certain cases giving community-based organizations access to decision-making processes. There are a number of factors that can explain this relative “elective affinity” between WHO and the group of community-based organizations. First, WHO seemed to have developed a structure for the originally illstructured problem.6 The conditions that lead to the structuring of illstructured problems are still not well understood, which also applies to the present case. Further below, the hypothesis will be advanced that informal communication, in which community-based organizations have played an important role, is the most important single variable in such a process. It could indeed be observed that, once the structured problem was in place, the organizational field and the whole issue gradually became less turbulent. Second, although the supranational political authority of WHO is weak, and the enforcement of HIV/AIDS policy remains a matter of
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national policy, WHO was able to develop a strategy through which it has gained an important influence on national policies. Its strategy was not to develop a “global” approach, but rather to concentrate on the creation and support of national AIDS programs. This was a high priority of the GPA from its start in 1987, and it allocated more than half of its resources to this work. WHO set four criteria to define a national AIDS program. By 1990, every country in the world had established a program, although they did not always fully conform to the WHO definition (Mann et al. 1992:279–324). This strategy can be seen as a considerable success for WHO. It certainly restored most of the credibility lost in the beginning of the crisis and also had important implications for community-based organizations. First, community-based organizations could, given the specific resources they possessed, contribute to and influence norm-setting, norm promotion and monitoring of the national AIDS programs. Second, community-based organizations could act as “brokers” between the domestic and global level, such as by helping local community-based organizations to exert influence in the implementations of their national AIDS programs. As such, these programs were a “window of opportunity” for globally as well as locally acting community-based organizations to put governments under pressure. Third, persons at WHO (GPA) at that time were crucial in linking their organization with community-based organizations. The official at GPA/Euro (Copenhagen) responsible for contacts with non-profit organizations saw himself as part of the HIV/AIDS community and was also received as such by the people in it.7 Jonathan Mann, during his years as director of GPA, was an active network-builder: his background in public health made him well equipped to communicate to medical professionals. At the same time, he was highly respected by the HIV/AIDS community. In his travels around the world, he was in constant interaction with the task environment. As is often the case with boundary-role occupants, however, he also failed in the internal functions pertaining to his constituent organization, WHO, and consequently resigned in 1992. Conclusively, it can be said that within the global system a number of gaps and opportunities did exist for community-based organizations to hang in and hang on, because this level was much less functionally differentiated than the national level. An important precondition for this is not only that these opportunities are available, but also that they can be taken up. Hence, it is necessary that actors be available and hold the necessary resources. For community-based organizations to arise and develop strategies, they of course need resources. One of the main puzzles in explaining the importance of community-based organizations in the field of HIV/AIDS is the question of how they can manage, given the very limited resources they have available in terms of staff, finances and authoritative power.8 The answer to this question is that community-based organizations seem
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to be predominantly sustained not by “hard” but by “soft” resources. The argument is not, as we will see, that community-based organizations compensate the lack of hard resources by soft resources, but rather that the availability of these “soft” resources provides the hard or essential types of resources they need to accomplish a number of their objectives in the first place. The question then becomes: what are these soft resources and where do they come from? How are they brought into action and why were they especially relevant in the case of HIV/AIDS? What is striking is that all local as well as global community-based organizations were based on the existence within the affected community of people willing to donate their time and labor; of people willing to make contributions in money or in kind; and of leadership, administrative and managerial expertise. Such persons were at first especially mobilized in the homosexual community. The reasons for this were that, in these communities, community-based organizations already existed well before HIV/AIDS (see Kenis and de Vroom 1996). Homosexual persons were the first to be affected by the new crisis, and from within the homosexual community many professionals—such as lawyers, medical doctors, managers, university researchers, public relations professionals, etc.—were mobilized and in many cases volunteered to offer their expertise to their community. Overall, the founders of community-based organizations share a remarkable combination of being somewhat socially marginalized yet politically sophisticated and well connected to sources of support within their communities. Once the first community-based organizations were created as a result of the mobilization of the above particular mix of resources, it turned out that these organizations possessed soft resources or particular advantages that often made them very effective. They had the capacity to be more responsive, more flexible and more patient-oriented—which is what is required by a sudden and critical public health event like AIDS. Community-based organizations often possess the capacity to provide such sensitive services as targeted or culture-specific education and prevention campaigns. These can focus on safe-sex or injecting practices, psychological counseling and the like. Some of the reasons that they can do so are the following: their trustful relationship with the communities affected; their access to the specific and often sensitive information on which effective interventions are necessarily based; their legitimacy in being counselors for their own cases and their capacity to be intermediaries between the persons affected and public authorities. Some of these particular resources not only appear to be competitive advantages for local community-based organizations, as compared to other types of responses or organizations, but they also turned out to be valuable and instrumental at the global level. For example, community-based organizations are accepted as intermediaries between governmental organizations and local communities when it comes to influencing
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international norm promotion and monitoring. Or they control specialized resources and information to which international organizations generally have no access but which are crucial, however, in the development of effective strategies in coping with HIV/AIDS. Possessing these types of resources in a situation where, as described above, governmental and established non-profit organizations were confronted with an ill-structured problem, resulted in a situation where community-based organizations developed the capacity to control both the ownership of the problem and the structuring of the problem. Indeed, one of the main issues in the Working Group meetings of EuroCASO, for example, was to discuss which organizations can be seen as legitimate representatives of affected communities and how one can ensure that such organizations be primarily included in decision-making processes. By acquiring the “ownership of the problem”, community-based organizations have had an immeasurable soft resource at hand. In all of the relationships implied above (between community-based organizations and intergovernmental organizations, between communitybased organizations and the members of their own communities, among local community-based organizations, etc.) the predominant type of communication is not formal but informal. What becomes clear in the case studied is that informal communication on the global level between community-based organizations and their counterparts cannot simply be seen as a supplement to formally arranged forms of communication, but rather that it supplants them. As such, the capacity to engage in informal communication processes turns out to be a crucial resource in developing strategies and implementing policies. Reliance on informal channels seems, first, to facilitate communication in situations where sensible types of information are exchanged; and second, to be instrumental in dealing with ill-structured problems. HIV/AIDS is characterized by the fact that risk behavior is embedded within the private sphere and in particular cultures. In such a situation, not only do secrecy and the exchange of sensitive information play an important role, but there exists the need to use explicit language when discussing and designing effective strategies for action. Consequently, information materials on HIV/AIDS, for example, have often been developed in informal groups including representatives of the groups to be addressed. Second, informal communication is instrumental in dealing with illstructured problems. As argued above, the HIV/AIDS crisis was such a problem, especially in its first decade, since the pattern of interdependence among the components was not well understood. Such centralized, formal organizations as bureaucracies are effective in handling well-structured problems. However, they are deficient when it comes to dealing with illstructured problems. In these cases, informal mechanisms are much more effective for some of the following reasons (see Chisholm 1987):
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• Informal communication allows for co-ordination behavior in the absence of a formal structure. • Informal mechanisms require the participation only of those necessary to solve the problem, thus placing decision-making in the hands of the most qualified. • Informal arrangements are not prone to goal-displacement institutionalization but exist on an “as needed” basis. • Informal communication permits and facilitates co-ordination rather than interest representation and negotiation processes. • Informal communication allows for the adjustment to changes in the knowledge of problems and permits the exercise of expertise, judgement and intuition on the part of the decision-makers. • Informal channels permit the rapid adjustment of such organizational mechanisms as advances in knowledge, so that problems move from ill structured to well structured. There is some evidence that informal channels have played a significant role at the global level in dealing with HIV/AIDS. Community-based organizations seem to be capable of using informal channels in communicating their expertise, judgement, etc., and of building up mutual trust and respect at the global level. Conclusions The present chapter has attempted to do two things. First, it has offered empirical evidence on the importance of community-based organizations in global governance in the field of HIV/AIDS. Second, it has provided some theoretical clues as to why this is the case. As far as the importance of community-based organizations in global governance is concerned, it could be demonstrated that they were and indeed still are important in challenging medical practices, defending human rights and influencing global governance. This confirms the findings of empirical studies in other areas—such as human rights, environmental issues and violence against women—where the importance of community-based organizations and non-profit organizations in global governance has been equally demonstrated (see e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998). The HIV/AIDS case is nevertheless interesting as such, since it is a relatively new case without any particular historical roots and because of the fact that, in this case, the degree of influence has exceeded most of the other cases. For example, as mentioned by Willetts (1997:11), it was the first time that it happened in the UN system that non-profit organizations sit on the Board not as observers but as members. Consequently, this study not only presents empirical evidence on the HIV/AIDS case but can be seen as yet another challenge to the state- and market-centered view of global governance.
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Not only would classical international relations theory not have expected community-based organizations to be predominant in global governance. There are also a couple of additional theoretical reasons why this would be improbable. As spelled out in this chapter, governance through communitybased organizations is not the only—and certainly not the most legitimate— way to deal with the problem of HIV/AIDS. Community-based organizations are basically a local phenomenon in that they are very much connected to and dependent on local realities. In addition, community-based organizations have only very limited “hard” resources, such as money and staff; they have a lack of professionalism and authoritative power, and they also have to comply with highly democratic forms of decision-making. The analysis presented demonstrated that this theoretically improbable but empirically lively phenomenon could be explained only if other less common theoretical factors are taken into consideration for such an explanation: the type of the problem involved (“ill-structured problem”); the importance of informal communication; the ownership of the problem and the structure of the national systems compared to the structure of the global system. It is clear that these factors have been identified only on the basis of one case and therefore should be handled with some caution. Additional case studies would have to be undertaken to test the explanatory power of these factors. Apart from contributing empirical evidence on the role of communitybased organizations in global governance and contributing to a theoretical discussion on the explanation of this phenomenon, the study presented also results in a couple of additional queries for further research. Is globalization only an advantage for business or can it also be an advantage to marginalized groups? Would a more regulated and integrated system of global governance enhance or, indeed, be rather counterproductive to the influence of community-based organizations in global governance, as is suggested by the present case? Notes 1 2
The first global meeting on AIDS was held on 22 November 1983 at WHO Headquarters in Geneva. At that time, the disease had been reported in thirtythree countries on five continents. Resolution EB77.R12 was subsequently endorsed by the 39th World Health assembly (WHA39.29, May 1986), On 15 May 1987, the World Health Assembly adopted the Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of AIDS (WHA40.26), which endorsed the establishment of the Special Program on AIDS which was changed to the Global Program on AIDS (GPA) in January 1988. This culminated in the Global Strategy on AIDS being endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 October 1987 (Resolution 42/8 on Prevention and Control of AIDS), the adoption of the London Declaration on AIDS Prevention on 28 January 1988 as a result of the World Summit of Ministers of Health on Programs for AIDS Prevention, and the adoption of Resolution WHA41.24 by the World Health Assembly on 13 May 1988.
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ICASO is the central secretariat for EuroCASO (Geneva), NACASO (California), LacCaso (Mexico City), AFRICASO (Dakar) and APCASO (Manila). Some medical researchers regarded this as insupportable. For example, the wellknown German virologist who was head of the program committee of the IX International Conference on AIDS (Berlin), Professor Habermehl, originally intended to exclude non-scientists from participation in the conference. This provoked harsh protests and reactions not only by community-based organizations but also by GPA. He had to give in to the pressure and consequently made an interesting paradigmatic shift during the organization of the conference. In the closing plenary session of the conference, the “white-coat scientist” held hands with the “T-shirt activists” and declared that the conference could never have been such a success or even have come about without the input of the community-based organizations. I am referring here to the “garbage can theory” of Cohen et al. (1972). “How to prevent HIV transmissions, how to reduce both the personal and social impact of HIV/AIDS, and how to unify efforts against AIDS”, as often put at the time. He can be seen as a so-called “boundary-role” occupant (Roos and Starke 1981:302), somebody considered crucial in the effectiveness of interorganizational relations. The largest part of the international community-based organizations have no professional staff and yearly budgets under $100,000.
References Bennet, C. and E.Ferlie (1994) Managing Crisis and Change in Health Care—the Organizational Response to HIV/AIDS, Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press. Benz, A. (1994) Cooperative Verwaltung. Funktionen, Voraussetzungen und Folgen, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Cattacin, S., B.Lucas and S.Vetter (1996) Drogenpolitische Modelle—Ein vergleichende Analyse sechs europäischer Realitäten, Zürich: Seismo Verlag. Chisholm, D. (1987) “Ill-structured problems, informal mechanisms, and the design of public organizations” in J.E.Lane (ed.) Bureaucracy and Public Choice, London: Sage. Cohen, M.D., J.G.March and J.P.Olsen (1972) “A garbage can model of organizational choice”, Administrative Science Quarterly 17:1–25. Fink, J. and S.M.Chambré (eds) (1991) “The response of the voluntary sector to the AIDS pandemic”, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 20 (3), special issue. Fluss, S.S. (1992) “Global patterns of AIDS legislation”, paper presented at the Symposium on Transnational Networks in Response to AIDS, University of Lund, Sweden, January. Gordenker, L. and T.G.Weiss (1995) “Pluralising global governance: analytical approaches and dimensions”, Third World Quarterly 16 (3):357–87. Gordenker, L., C.Coate, C.Jonsson and P.Soderholm (1995) International Cooperation in Response to AIDS, London and New York: Pinter. Halliday, F. (1989) “State and society in international relations: a second agenda” in H.C.Dyer and L.Mangasarian (eds) The Study of International Relations. The State of the Art, Houndmills: Macmillan
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Keck, M.E. and K.Sikkink (1998) Activists Beyond Borders—Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Cornell University Press: Ithaca/London. Kenis, P. and B.Marin (eds) (1997) Managing HIV/AIDS—Organizational Responses in Six European Countries, Aldershot: Avebury. Kenis, P. and C.Nöstlinger (1997) “Organizational responses to HIV/AIDS in Austria” in P.Kenis and B.Marin (eds) Managing HIV/AIDS—Organizational Responses in Six European Countries, Aldershot: Avebury. Kenis, P. and V.Schneider (1991) “Policy networks and policy analysis: scrutinizing a new analytical toolbox” in B.Marin and R.Mayntz (eds) Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Campus/Westview: Frankfurt am Main/New York. Kenis, P. and B.de Vroom (1996) “Neue Organizationen und alte Sektoren—Eine Analyse der Organisationen im Bereich HIV/AIDS in einigen europäischen Ländern” in A.Evers and T.Olk (eds) Wohlfahrtspluralismus—Vom Wohlfahrtsstaat zur Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Kester, I., B.de Vroom and A.van Wolferen (1997) “HIV/AIDS Policy in the Netherlands” , in P.Kenis and B.Marin (eds) Managing HIV/AIDS— Organizational Responses in Six European Countries, Aldershot: Avebury. Kirp, D.L. and R.Bayer (1992) AIDS in the Industrialized Democracies, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Mann, J., D.J.Tarantola and T.W.Netter (1992) AIDS in the World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Misztal, B.A. and D.Moss (1990) Action on AIDS—National Policies in Comparative Perspective, New York: Greenwood Press. Panem, S. (1988) The AIDS Bureaucracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Perrow, C. and M.F.Guillén (1990) The AIDS Disaster. The Failure of Organizations in New York and the Nation, New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Princen, T. (1994) “NGOs: creating a niche in environmental diplomacy” in T.Princen and M.Finger (eds) Environmental NGOs in World Politics. Linking the Global and the Local, London: Routledge. Reinalda, B. (1997) “Private in form and public in purpose: NGOs as political actors in world politics”, paper presented at the ECPR 25th Joint Sessions of Workshops, Bern, Switzerland, February. Risse-Kappen, T. (ed.) (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations back in. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ronit, K. and V.Schneider (1997) “Private organizations in global governance”, paper presented at the workshop Private Organizations in Global Politics, at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Bern, February/March. Roos, L.L. and F.A.Starke (1981) “Organizational roles” in P.C.Nystrom and W.H.Starbuck (eds) Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 1, New York: Oxford University Press. Shilts, R. (1987) And the Band Played On, London: Penguin. Simon, H.A. (1973) “The structure of ill-structured problems”, Artificial Intelligence 4:181–201. Vroom, B.de (1997) “De besturssociologische benadering van onderhandelend bestuur” in N.J.H.Huls (ed.) Onderhandelend Bestuur, Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink. Vroom, B.de et al. (1995) Onderhandelend Bestuur—Een innovatieve strategic voor
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de ontwikkeling van automobiliteitsbeleid, Leidschendam: Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid. Willetts, P. (ed.) (1982) Pressure Groups in the Global System. The Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations, London: Pinter. ——(1997) “Social partnership or successful sidelining? The United Nations review of its relations with non-governmental organisations”, paper for the ECPR Workshops, Bern.
7
The global social capital of human rights movements A case study on Amnesty International Volker Schneider
Introduction One of the most visible areas in which private organizations play a major role of global problem-solving is the promotion and enforcement of human rights. Private and public actors closely co-operate in this sphere to enable the production of global public goods. The monitoring and enforcement of human rights standards at the global level, in particular, is very much dependent on the actions and the support of private organizations at the national and international level. Global and regional human rights regimes are based on transnational policy networks in which interrelated public and private action is combined to produce global public policy outputs. Policy networks are institutional mechanisms by which globally dispersed and complementary resources can be combined and integrated (Kenis and Schneider 1991). Global public policy networks in this sense are “alliances of government agencies, international organizations, corporations, and elements of civil society that join together to achieve what none can accomplish alone” (Benner and Reinicke 1999; Reinicke 1999). This chapter deals with the role, position and internal structure of undoubtedly the most prominent organization in this network, Amnesty International, along with its national sections and local groups. The subsequent analysis is focused on the internal networks and institutional arrangements by which the different resources of Amnesty are mobilized. The gamut of feeding these resources into the global policy network setting and the enforcement of human rights norms at the global level are also analysed. Human rights have a public dimension, since the successful enforcement of private norms internalizes potentially negative external effects of industrial or governmental action and generally benefits society at large (Buchanan 1976; Hanson 1978). In principle, nobody is excluded: everybody can refer or appeal to them. Monitoring devices and information diffusion networks are some of the important conditions that ensure that human rights violations will become known by the global public. They are therefore key ingredients for the successful promotion and setting of human rights norms. 146
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One of the theoretical questions to be dealt with in this chapter is the engagement of those private organizations which are mostly dependent on volunteers. Why are such organizations willing and able to produce specific global public goods from which everybody benefits, keeping in mind the fact that the activists themselves can expect to benefit least from these activities as they live in advanced and stable democracies? How do private organizations motivate their voluntary members to engage in the production of “public goods”—not just in an accidental manner but on a firm and longterm basis? In this analysis, it will be shown that there are basically two trajectories for explaining the above: on the one hand the assumption of generalized altruistic action orientations, and on the other hand the institutional and structural contexts transforming fundamentally individualistic and self-interested action orientations towards altruistic or quasi-altruistic action goals. The leitmotiv in this strategy is indicated by a variant of the “social capital” approach, which promises to solve the theoretical puzzle that the private production of public goods is highly problematic in a rational choice perspective, and achievable only under very specific conditions. The chapter will show the nature of the organizational structure of Amnesty International, which helps to induce a global civic engagement of constantly increasing numbers of volunteers at the grassroots level. Towards this purpose, the chapter will first outline some fundamental topics of the global human rights regime and the specific roles which private human rights organizations play in these policy networks, as well as the specific resources they introduce in these policy circuits. A case study of Amnesty International then addresses the problem of motivation and resource mobilization. In order to sketch these mechanisms, I will in the first place describe the relevant goals, resources, strategies, intra- and interorganizational networks and other aspects of this extremely prominent human rights organization. At the next stage, I will interpret this description in a social capital framework, in which the social capital of Amnesty is seen as a set of internal networks and institutional arrangements that are supportive of quasi-altruistic action. Protecting human rights in a global policy network Human rights are fundamental rights of individuals and secure the inviolability of personal integrity and dignity. While there are a number of definitions and also some confusion among political philosophers about their theoretical justification (Mendus 1995), one can safely assume that virtually nobody actually rejects the principle of human rights (Lukes 1993). Many, on the contrary, see it as the contemporary standard of civilization (Donnelly 1998). Human rights, then, may be divided into two main categories: on the one hand, rights protecting the integrity of the individual in relation to state
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power (e.g. unfair trials and arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, extra-judicial executions, disappearances, etc.), and on the other hand rights that protect individuals against violations carried out by other individuals or groups (Eide 1986). The scope of human rights is principally universal, since these rules aim to protect all members of the global society. In this sense the characteristic of this “good” clearly is global (universal in the territorial dimension) and public (non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness). On the other hand, in a world in which supranational political authority is still weak, and the enforcement of such rights largely remains a matter of national policy, human rights could also be seen as a profoundly national issue of public policy. In the same way human rights seem to be primarily related to governmental behaviour. Governments thus seem to be the primary targets of control. However, such a purely intergovernmental perspective seems to be too restricted in presentday society in which social differentiation has created a number of cleavages and conflicts. While it is certainly true that the protection of human rights targets the nation state as a major “agency” providing for or withholding such rights, human rights violators also may be cultural, religious or other status groups in contemporary society (e.g. racial, cultural and gender discrimination). The concept of human rights has a long history. While the first legal codes securing individual integrity may be traced back to ancient Babylon or the Hebrew Scriptures (Torah), its modern conception usually is related to “state of law principles” originating in the European middle ages. One of the earliest texts here is the Magna Carta (1215), which sets basic rules about how governments should treat their citizens. The Bill of Rights (1689), the Constitution of the United States of America (1787), the French “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” (1789), the USAmerican Seneca Falls Convention (1848), and the “Emancipation Proclamation” in 1862 are some of the other historical texts. The human rights issue gained an international dimension only in the 1860s with the Geneva Convention, and later the Covenant of the League of Nations adopted in December 1924. The current “rule systems” and the supporting institutional arrangements in the human rights area, repeatedly labelled as the “international human rights regime” (Donnelly 1986), originated after the Second World War when the “international political system” was reconstructed, giving the United Nations and its specialized bodies a focal role in this new institutional order. The major normative basis of the current human rights regime was provided through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Further, Covenants and Declarations were adopted by the UN in the 1960s and 1980s dealing with economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. A specificity in this area always has been the high involvement of private organizations in the process of “policy production”. Setting of
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norms as well as their implementation and monitoring is based on a complex division of labour in which global, regional and national private human rights organizations closely work together with governmental institutions. From a functional perspective, the human rights system is usually described as a combination of norm-setting procedures, and decision-making and monitoring devices (Donnelly 1986). Its main institutional elements are: 1 institutional mechanisms generating and promoting norms; 2 systems of intergovernmental informational exchanges where the governments report on the implementation of relevant norms in their territory; 3 routines and procedures facilitating individual complaints against states before international and regional human rights courts. A key problem in the UN system of human rights promotion and enforcement is that the UN is primarily a system of “rights of the states”, in which each government still retains its sovereignty to determine the adequacy of its legal achievements. Enforcement of human rights in most cases is mediated by national governments. The relevant bodies in the UN system can get into serious trouble if they start to make serious evaluations of or comment on the compliance or non-compliance of individual states. This enforcement problem is one of the main targets of criticism among scholars, who admit that though the international human rights regime may be relatively strong at the promotional level which involves the development of norms, it is at the same time rather weak at the level of monitoring and implementation (Donnelly 1986; Brett 1995). The conceptualization of the development of human rights in a purely intergovernmental perspective, however, has considerable shortcomings. If analysis is restricted only to governmental actors, and one presumes that almost every government tends to conceal or to deny human rights violations, it is difficult to understand why the diffusion and implementation of the human rights idea was so successful during the last decades. To understand this success we have also to take into account the human rights movement and its “transnational relations” or “issue networks”, by way of which human rights interest groups are linked to the human rights regime (Sikkink 1993; Risse et al. 1999). Private human rights organizations fulfil important complementary functions for the UN without which the whole system would simply stop functioning. Many of these organizations enjoy a formal consultative status with relevant UN bodies, but much of the work is done behind the scenes. Human rights groups seek to influence governmental delegations, provide expertise in fact-finding and in the drafting of resolutions, etc. The involvement of private organizations in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of human rights norms is so paramount that the analysis of contemporary human rights regimes without
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mentioning the important role of private organizations would simply miss the essence of the whole story. The first private human rights organization was the Anti-Slavery Society, which was founded in 1839 and is still active. The number of nongovernmental organizations active in the sphere of human rights has risen significantly since World War II. According to Sikkink (1993:418) there were 38 human rights NGOs in 1950, 72 in 1960, 103 in 1970, 138 in 1980, and 275 in 190. Although nothing is said about the precise definitional criteria of these organizations, it seems that Sikkink’s boundary specifications of this organizational field were rather restrictive. The number of organizations increases significantly if one takes into account all organizational actors with an interest in and participation in international meetings devoted to this policy topic. For instance, at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, June 1993, more than 1,500 organizations attended the NGO Forum: 426 were from Western Europe, 270 from Asia, 236 from Latin America, 202 from Africa (Gaer 1995:396). The most well-known and prominent organizations in this area are undoubtedly Amnesty International, the Anti-Slavery Society, the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Human Rights Watch, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Defence and Aid Fund, the International Federation of Human Rights, the International League for Human Rights, the Minority Rights Group, Survival International, the World Peace Council. Most of these organizations are expert-oriented, with a rather limited membership. In contrast, Amnesty International is more of a movement, in the sense that it is a grass-roots association supported by a large active membership. It has local groups in almost all countries in the world (Weissbrodt 1984:405–6). Complementary roles and resources of private human rights organizations Private organizations have important functions and are capable of mobilizing significant complementary resources in the international human rights regime. This is being increasingly acknowledged even by the UN. In 1993 the Vienna Statement of the International Human Rights Treaty Bodies recognized that the active co-operation of non-governmental organizations is essential to enable the treaty bodies to function in an informed and effective manner. They have important roles to play in scrutinising States party’s report at the national level; providing information to treaty-bodies; assisting in the dissemination of information; and contributing to the implementation of recommendations by the treaty bodies. (quoted in Brett 1995:102)
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One of the major limitations of an “intergovernmentalist” perspective is to conceive the implementation and enforcement of institutionalized rules only as vertical and hierarchical command relations in which governments or “states” are understood to be the sole agencies capable of enforcing international conventions in their territory. Effective pressure for the improvement of human rights situations is seen to come only “bottom up” in a state’s territory (i.e. by its own population). Global pressure groups may “influence governments directly or indirectly in this direction, but in the last resort they cannot themselves improve the human rights situation nor can they force governments to change” (Brett 1995:104). By focusing on the “top-down” enforcement, the more subtle mechanisms of informal and network-like rule enforcement are neglected. In the same way this perspective is blind to cross-linkages between the different levels of the international political system, in which transnational human rights organizations are important “brokers” and “intermediators” between the domestic, regional and global levels. In many cases these actors serve as vital communication nodes for victims and for organizations advocating human rights in repressive societies. This information resonates and diffuses in transnational networks (Sikkink 1993; Risse et al. 1999) that have similarities to “policy networks” or “issue networks” at the domestic level (Marin and Mayntz 1991). However, transnational networks in general seem to be significantly larger in scope and much more heterogeneous in composition. Domestic human rights groups are able to mobilize foreign and international “reference publics” through transnational inter-organizational relations. Transnational alliances are built through various communications channels. Once mobilized, the international level creates pressures on violating governments but also gives domestic social movements resources and protection. This “spiral effect” (Risse et al. 1999) and its underlying arrangement has been shown by Brysk (1993) in detail in the Argentine case. In this system, pressures from the top, cross-pressures and pressures from the bottom worked together closely in transforming the Argentine situation in the 1980s. A political division of labour has been formed in the human rights network in which intergovernmental agencies, social movements and national governments work closely together. Intergovernmental bodies develop and adopt norms and instruments (declarations, conventions) and establish the mechanisms and procedures for their implementation. Private organizations, however, are primarily concerned with the activation and the monitoring of those mechanisms and procedures. Violations of specific rights by governments are publicly denounced and individuals are supported in the pursuit of their rights. This in turn supports the instruments and the procedures used by human rights groups and at the same time delegitimizes such national governments by putting domestic and transnational pressure on them (Eide 1986).
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The strength of private human rights organizations lies in the control of specialized resources to which international public organizations generally have either no access, or at the same time are not equipped to create such resources in a satisfactory manner. A profound weakness of these human rights organizations, however, is their lack of authoritative capacities. The formerly mentioned resources are not only complementary in the creation of norms and the monitoring of compliance, but also in their authoritative enforcement and application by international courts. A good example is the so-called amicus curiae role of non-governmental organizations. This institution essentially developed in England, and was a result of the fact that common law procedures made third-party intervention extremely difficult. In the USA, legal representatives of the government and its agencies participate in cases before state and federal courts as amid curiae, as do associations and organizations serving professional or public interests. International non-governmental organizations are becoming increasingly involved in the area of human rights through fact-finding, legal analysis or witnessing in international litigation. Due to the fact that international courts face similar problems to many national courts (i.e. increasing caseload, overworked staff attorneys, etc.), some international courts (above all the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice) are increasingly relying on the resources of private organizations (Shelton 1994).1 The case of Amnesty International: contingencies and capacities in mobilizing social capital Amnesty International, the most important private organization in the field of human rights policy networks, “more representative and more influential than most of the other groups put together” (Brett 1995:106), is a prime example of the private mobilization of specialized resources. Amnesty is often seen as a model organization for its combination of components of grass-roots participation and professional management. Amnesty comes across as a kind of “good” MNC that is constantly able to increase its membership and financial resources and to obtain more and more influence in the human rights arena. Amnesty International was founded in 1961 by the British lawyer Peter Benenson, who dedicated himself to the release of “prisoners of conscience”. This rather limited mandate has gradually been extended during the last thirty years to cover all major aspects of the human rights issue (fair trials, abolition of death penalty, torture, etc.). While AI still is primarily concerned with political or religious prisoners, it has in recent years enlarged its activities to encompass issue areas such as killings in armed conflicts, certain aspects of women’s rights, discrimination, house demolitions, and AIDS/ HIV patients.
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The core of Amnesty’s activities, however, is still concentrated on its “limited mandate” (Baehr 1994) related to the “prisoners of conscience”. In more detailed terms, this means: 1 to free all prisoners of conscience detained anywhere for their beliefs or because of their ethnic origin, sex, colour or language, who have not used or advocated violence; 2 to ensure fair and prompt trials for political prisoners; 3 to abolish death penalty, torture and other forms of cruel treatment of prisoners; 4 to end arbitrary executions and political kidnappings. Amnesty is able to pursue its goals as a giant grass-roots organization with currently about 1.3 million members, subscribers and regular donors spanning about 160 countries. Its international headquarters in London (International Secretariat) is staffed with more than 320 permanent posts and 95 volunteers from more than 50 countries. It is divided into sections, affiliated groups and individual members. At present 56 countries have nationally organized sections. Its activists participate in the more than 5,300 local, youth, student and professional AI groups registered at the International Secretariat. In addition, there are a number of specialist groups and networks around the globe to monitor human rights abuses in every country of the world. For instance, there are 23 Regional Action Networks (RAN), involving around 1,800 groups, and a number of specialist networks—groups of medical professionals, lawyers and others—who use their expertise to campaign for victims of human rights violations. The Legal Network, for instance, is made up of 50 groups distributed among Amnesty International Sections around the world. The central decision-making body is a 9-member International Executive Committee (IEC). It comprises 8 volunteer members, elected every two years by an International Council comprising representatives of the global movement, and an elected member of the International Secretariat. The directive authority for the conduct of AI’s affairs is vested in the International Council. The International Executive Committee is responsible for the planning and implementation of the Council’s decisions which are taken in the council meetings. The operative affairs of AI are conducted by the International Secretariat headed by a Secretary General under the direction of the International Executive Committee. Since Amnesty International is based on the activities of its members, it is expected that members actively engage in the work of local groups beyond making mere financial contributions. A significant portion of Amnesty’s work is carried out by the local groups, which are in most cases small collections of members with a range of different activities and supporting prisoners of conscience. For instance, Amnesty volunteers
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Table 7. 1 The organizational growth of Amnesty
write letters to governments, staff tables at public events, convey information to the public, organize demonstrations and write press releases. With this solid base of volunteer groups, the organization is able to provide the comprehensive and detailed monitoring and is also able to collect information on human rights violations in any corner of the world. In order to decrease “response time” and to provide for rapid reaction, Amnesty has established an Urgent Action Network covering more than 60 countries and including more than 100,000 people (religious and political leaders, legal and health professionals, artists, students of all ages, educators, etc.). One of the key resources of AI is the credibility of its information. This again is based on an extremely good reputation. AI is generally acknowledged to be definitely the most objective and reliable source of information in the human rights area. An expression of this great esteem is reflected in the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Amnesty in 1977. A good reputation as a reliable producer and collector of credible information on human rights violations is no accident, but the result of a conscious and disciplined management strategy to preserve strict neutrality in its actions, and total independence from any government and from any political, religious or economic interests. Amnesty had the foresight to refuse any financial support from all governmental authorities. In addition, its impartiality has been upheld by the deliberate tactic of precluding local groups and national sections from investigation of their home countries.
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This is one of the strictest rules in Amnesty’s work (Ennals 1982). Amnesty reacted to increasing negative publicity in the late 1960s by limiting members to work on cases only outside their home countries. This was because of past experience that grass-roots activists were often not impartial about cases concerning their own countries. They either believed a case about human rights abuse without thoroughly scrutinizing it, or simply refused to believe it without verifying it. However, this “work-on-own-country” rule does not prevent all activities in home countries. As Christiansen and Dowding (1994) show in the British case, AI members may lobby domestic representatives in a number of regards (appeals to diplomatic action, legislative lobbying, governmental behaviour in asylum or immigration policy, etc.). These principles, together with the quality of its information on human rights violations, have enabled AI to build up a high level of credibility over time. This solid reputation is one of AI’s most critical resources and it would be a great mistake to underestimate it (Thakur 1994). AI exercises strict centralized control on information flows in order to preserve these strategic assets, and at the same time is also highly cautious in creating and maintaining political contacts. It is also very concerned about preserving its limited mandate and its specialization on “prisoners of conscience”. Responsibility for AI’s work on violations of human rights, including the collection, evaluation and diffusion of information, lies with the international governing bodies of the organization, and not with a section, local group or members in the country or territory concerned. Research departments at the International Secretariat assign substantial resources to scrutinize accurate information. However, centralization in information diffusion and strict organizational discipline is not unproblematic for a social movement and grass-roots mobilization. Baehr (1994), in quoting an Amnesty activist, points to the conflict between the logic of the Amnesty organization and the logic of the human rights movement. While the first is a specificity (i.e. concentration on political prisoners), the latter consists of the inseparability of all the human rights issues (i.e. fighting against all kinds of human rights abuses). The main output of AI is information on the violation of human rights— in its cognitive as well as in its affective sense. The final goal is to induce governments into releasing prisoners of conscience. This is attained in a direct manner by targeting information on specific governments violating human rights, as well as in an indirect way by contributing to the working of the whole human rights machinery anchored in the UN system. It is based on the simple precept that governments are inclined to respond in some way to public opinion. The only power that Amnesty can mobilize is publicity, or the threat of it. One of its traditional—but most effective—tactics in the realm of direct strategy is to influence the behaviour of target authorities either through
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“shaming” (i.e. appeal to internalized norms by virtually unopposable symbols) or by damaging their reputation in the eyes of other relevant institutions (e.g. the domestic public, politico-military allies, trading partners, international investors, the IMF or the World Bank) (Scoble and Wiseberg 1974:14). For a nation-state or government, this amounts to being put in the pillory, getting the image of a pariah state. In addition to such direct reputation effects, widespread international condemnation may also increase domestic pressures upon an oppressive government by providing greater leverage to domestic opposition groups. An extremely effective tactic in this context has been “tree-topping”, i.e. using other social or political elites controlling the relevant media to which governmental elites are attentive. In this respect, Amnesty recently also intensified co-operation with multinationals and welcomed the UN initiative to convince international companies to take up the human rights topic. Given the growing power and influence of these companies, AI tries to convince them that their reputation will be increasingly affected by their response to the human rights issue. Besides direct diplomatic activities and the use of media channels, AI is also involved in the institutional machinery of the UN system and provides the same with specialized expertise. Compared to the 330 Amnesty staff members in London, the UN Human Rights Centre in Geneva has only 70 employees. In addition, Amnesty marshals a global monitoring network down to the local level, something that the UN system lacks. Some years ago a German newspaper quoted an Amnesty staff member: “Without the AI the UN Human Rights Centre would break down, since 80 per cent of the UN information on human rights is coming from us” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 April 1996). However, it is obvious that AI cannot substitute for all the UN activities in this area. Its specialized assets are only complementary to those of intergovernmental organizations. While the UN system is the appropriate and legitimate forum for the creation and setting of norms binding all members of the world society, Amnesty International, as a private organization in particular, is able to investigate human rights abuses at the grass-roots level, thus supporting the intergovernmental rights regime with resources which it alone could not mobilize (Thakur 1994). As already shown, in many human rights contexts private actors such as Amnesty are better equipped and in possession of specialized resources allowing for more effective global monitoring than the international governmental machinery alone could perform. The puzzle of the private promotion of human rights: the social capital of Amnesty In this section I will try to explain the ability of Amnesty International to motivate its members and supporters for its special type of collective action, i.e. promotion of general human rights which serve the world community at
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large. A specificity here is that the people who benefit most from this work— in most cases—live far away from the activists, who in turn draw no direct benefits from this type of norm production. Human rights here clearly represent the category of “disjoint norms” (Coleman 1990:248), where the beneficiaries and the producers of social norms are completely distinctive groups. The capacity or resource by which a collectivity is able to motivate itself for engagement in activities producing collective goods for a community at large has recently been conceptualized as a kind of “social capital”. A prominent supporter of this concept, Putnam (1995:664), has defined social capital as “features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. Social capital in short, refers to social connections and the attendant norms and trust.” While there is some confusion about the sources of social capital and the benefits derived from it, it is important to note that it is not the voluntary collective action towards public goods itself that should be seen as social capital, but rather the ability to generate this action through specific networks, institutions and organizational strategies.2 In this perspective, social capital can also be understood as the ability to create and sustain voluntary associations (Hall 1999). Social capital thus has to be seen as a kind of hidden structural capacity which, under certain conditions, is able to generate the activities in question. Based on an “enlightened” rational choice perspective, the social capital perspective assumes that individual actors would largely act in a selfinterested manner, given the existence of institutional structures which are instrumental in transforming self-interest into more altruistic behaviour or other types of “interaction orientations” (Scharpf 1997:84–9). If we were to assume that volunteers were pure altruists (by nature or by culture), then we would not have any explanation problems. Altruists, by definition, are people who try to increase the utilities of others regardless of their own utility. The contribution of private human rights organizations to the voluntary production of public goods becomes something of a riddle only when we start with the assumption of some kind of autonomous and “basically” self-interested behaviour by (potential) members of voluntary organizations. However, in this special case of volunteerism we encounter the additional problem that it is not co-operation in mutual self-help, trust and reciprocity which has to be explained, but rather the commitment of persons living far away from the victims, who—even in a long-term perspective—will be unable to reciprocate. Although it could be imagined that relational exchange is effective according to the logic “when I do a favour for you at a time when you are in need, you should be ready to repay me with a favour in my time of need” (Coleman 1990:309), the incentives to act in this way seem to be extremely small. Most of the
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activists are living in liberal, pluralist and sufficiently stable democratic regimes, where it is unlikely that activists could be worried about getting into the same situation as the prisoners of conscience, and then looking for support from other activists in the world. The explanation of human rights activism on a rational action perspective thus raises interesting questions in social and political research. In theorizing benevolent behaviour, different proposals have been made to answer these problems. One is the explanation of “zealotry” by Coleman (1988, 1990); another focuses on ideology. Both explanations concentrate on social expectations of how people “should” behave towards others. As these explanations appear to be rather inappropriate for the case of Amnesty, I will propose a third approach, which combines basic characteristics of human behaviour with favourable organizational contexts and strategies. Zealotry According to this perspective, volunteers are not “real” altruists but obtain some important individual rewards or “selective goods” for their engagement in such activities. In these cases, however, the provision of public goods is not merely an unintentional side-effect (Olson 1965), but an official goal of collective action. This phenomenon has been recognized as “zealous activity” and is a form of “self-interested altruism” (Coleman 1990). This qualification does not make the concrete efforts less appreciative, but it helps to explain the motivation behind this apparently “irrational” form of collective action. The word “zealot” stems from a faction of fanatical Jewish nationalists at the time of the Roman occupation of Israel leading to the fatal insurrection against Rome (66–70 CE) shortly after the destruction of Jerusalem. Since then, this word has stood for “intense enthusiasm”, “ardent endeavour” or “devotion”. In his zealotry model, Coleman (1990:273–8) deals with the problem that free-riding is not involved in all situations where public goods are produced by voluntary collective actions. In contrast, he emphasizes that the.re is sometimes even an “excess of zeal”. Examples are military volunteers for front-line duty and other dangerous missions. In all of these cases, the costs incurred by the volunteers are extreme, including the risk of being killed. Interestingly, such “ardent devotion” was also observed in the human rights context. Extreme forms were the self-immolation of activists in the name of human rights (e.g. Kurds, Koreans, and Pastor Brusewitz of the former GDR). In all of these cases, volunteers face extreme costs in their efforts to bring about an outcome from which .they personally can hardly expect to benefit sufficiently to justify these costs. The logic of zealotry then consists in a superimposition of a first-order incentive—the public good—by a secondorder incentive through encouragement, positive sanctions by others or by the society at large. Coleman writes:
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If a number of persons’ interests are satisfied by the same outcome, then each has an incentive to reward the others for working toward that outcome. Each may in fact find it in his interest to establish a norm toward working for that outcome, with negative sanctions for shirking and positive sanctions for working toward the common goal. If the norm and sanctions do become established, then each person has two sources of satisfaction when he works for the outcome: the objective achievement of his interest through the contribution of his actions toward the outcome, and the rewards provided by the others for helping to achieve that outcome. (1990:274) The social capital enabling the motivation of members of a certain network consists in the collective norms and the effective sanctions which members receive for their activities oriented towards these norms. In this perspective, human rights activists do not need to be altruists but selfinterested persons, gaining some sort of “selective” incentives for their engagement in human rights activism. These incentives could be in the form of self-esteem and identity, but also personal contacts, friendly relations and community experiences. However, it is uncertain if these marginal incentives really outweigh the individual costs in the case of a voluntary organization, where the capacity for positive and negative sanctions is clearly limited. Ideology and religion Another explanation relates to ideology, or more specifically to certain cultural or religious structures. For decades, rational choice theorists have treated ideology as an important determinant in the shaping of preferences. In 1957, Downs was already emphasizing the importance of ideology in a rational explanation of election behaviour. About twenty years later North (1981:47) emphasized the need for an explicit theory of ideology to explain pro-social, non-free-riding behaviour and the “enormous investments that every society makes in legitimacy”. Up to now, however, the collective action theory has made little use of this concept in its efforts to explain altruistic behaviour and the solution of social dilemmas (but see Heckathorn 1998). An ideology is commonly conceived as a system of ideas or beliefs which are geared towards explaining the world, to morally justify existing conditions but also to appeal for changes. Some political ideologies also provide reasons and even programs for political action. Ideologies influence preferences and decisions, and ideologies operate through selective perceptions accepting some alternatives but filtering out others. From such a perspective it seems almost trivial to explain altruistic behaviour by ideologies as specific “cultural software packages” (Balkin 1998). However,
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sometimes less is more, as the proverb says, and a simple model may offer a better explanation. Empirical evidence for the important role of ideologies (in the form of religious structures) in collective action for the production of public goods has recently been provided by several authors. For instance, in examining the volunteerism phenomenon in the United States, Greeley (1997) was able to emphasize the role that religious structures are playing in the generation of social capital for voluntary community service. Hall (1988) found that religious sects and community types exhibit important structural features enabling them to solve commitment problems more effectively than other group structures. Jordan and Maloney (1996) interviewed 376 members of the British section of AI as part of an empirical study on Amnesty International activists. The goals of this study were to test the Olson model, to discuss other proposals for explanation and, finally, to come to a better understanding of the volunteers’ motivation. A major conclusion of this study was that explanations should also focus on non-material benefits, including generalized value orientations. Almost 48 per cent of those interviewed referred to “a general concern for human rights” in explaining their reasons for joining Amnesty. Only 13 to 22 per cent had more interest in specific organizational goals of Amnesty. While it seems plausible that many members of AI are strongly motivated by the ideals of justice and equity ethics, “harder” ideologies, such as religious confessions, or political ideologies, such as socialism or liberalism, seem to be only marginally effective in this case. As mentioned above, one of the basic policy orientations of Amnesty is a strict neutrality towards political and religious currents. Organizational structures and strategies The third explanation offered here relates the motivation of Amnesty volunteers less to a collective belief system and more to a general human predisposition or capacity for empathy. All humans possess this capacity to varying degrees, and it can be activated by specific institutional arrangements and other contextual structures, in our case by certain organizational structures and strategies. In social psychology, empathy has been used long since as a fruitful concept for explaining altruism and other types of pro-social behaviour (Clark 1991). The core of this concept is that human beings have an innate potential to react affectively towards others, and this emotional attachment is seen as a mechanism generating altruistic behaviour. A detailed multidimensional outline of this concept is beyond the scope of this paper (e.g. also discussing forms of “egoistic altruism”), but it suffices to say that a number of authors explain this “capacity” as some sort of human “social intelligence” that emerged through biological and cultural evolution (Davis 1996:29). In the case of civic engagement for human rights, empathy was
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highlighted for the first time by Dimitrijevic. He regarded empathy as a motivational source for local Amnesty groups: If we assume that the majority of people who are concerned about human rights situations outside their national society do not feel this way because they are afraid that their country will be attacked by the foreign oppressive government in question…then we must conclude that they are affected in some other way. It appears that empathy with other human beings is the same everywhere irrespective of borders, that distance possibly lowers its intensity, but does not change its nature. Transnational bonds and organization of persons of similar status, position and conviction sometimes create attachment to aliens that are stronger than those to co-nationals. (Dimitrijevic 1989:120) It seems quite plausible, and there is a fair amount of prima facie evidence that Amnesty has some specific emotional competencies which influence and attract members with strongly developed capacities for empathy. Clark and McCann (1991) emphasize that the motivation of the organization’s volunteers, through a handy management of symbols to foster the personal identification of volunteers with their adopted prisoners, is one of AI’s specialities. An illuminating example is a CD-ROM, Amnesty Interactive: A History and Atlas of Human Rights, which was produced by AI USA in 1995. The CD-ROM contains stories about former prisoners of conscience, short country reports on human rights violations in more than 80 countries, speeches of human rights activists, and a time-line of the evolution of the human rights idea. Textual information is supported by many pictures and sounds, producing an interesting mixture of emotional information. This example makes clear that Amnesty not only aggregates fixed preferences of its members, but also influences their interests and preferences in a two-way communication process. Additional motivational support is created by the logic of the small adoption groups. As mentioned above, the core of AI is the “local group”, supporting one or several prisoners by writing letters to governmental authorities and maintaining contacts to victims of human rights violation or/and their relatives. In this way, members of a local group not only become emotionally affected but also see a direct relationship between their commitment and its—in many cases—positive effect, resulting in the release of the prisoner. An interview question in the study of Jordan and Maloney (1996) was “What effect do you think your support of Amnesty International has on that organization’s ability to protect human rights?” Surprisingly, almost 70 per cent were convinced that their engagement had a significant or noticeable effect. Only 6.9 per cent of the activists opined that their participation has “no effect”. This indicates that Amnesty is quite successful in the solution of the size problem in collective action (Olson 1965), i.e. the larger the size of a collectivity, correspondingly smaller is the contribution of the individual member to the collective good. In
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this case, the key is the local group structure. Activists are organized in small and transparent groups. This fosters personal contact and sociability. At the same time the adoption and responsibility of an individual prisoner by a local group creates a direct linkage between effort and effect. When a prisoner is released, local members rightly perceive this as the result of their efforts, although this success clearly results from a combination of different activities undertaken by the whole organization. All in all, in this explanation, empathy, organizational structures and skilful management of emotional symbols combine to explain the success of Amnesty. This kind of social capital enables Amnesty to mobilize many volunteers for a global public good: the promotion and monitoring of human rights. Conclusions The setting and enforcement of human rights is an important domain where private organizations are heavily involved in the production of public goods. They contribute to norm promotion as well as to the monitoring and enforcement by incremental sanctions according to the slogans “A thousand feathers will sink a boat” or “Every voice makes a difference”. The case of Amnesty is an example of specialized assets or resources of private actors, which often are much better equipped and allow, for instance in this case, more effective global monitoring than intergovernmental machinery could perform. Sometimes private organizations are not merely useful alternatives in a given situation, but also the only feasible solution. The specific capacity of these organizations is based on specific structural and institutional conditions. In the case of Amnesty International, this is a complex multi-layered structure with competent local underpinnings that are able to motivate members much better than a conventional hierarchical organization would do. This chapter has also provided empirical evidence about the more abstract proposition that private organizations have the potential to support the provision of public goods. When important contributions to global governance through private actors are made in such problematic contexts as the human rights area, it would seem that there is a large undiscovered potential of private governance at the international level. This potential could give us a more realistic picture of the multiple roles private organizations perform in global politics. Acknowledgements I am grateful for research assistance and linguistic support provided by Dirk Hyner, Hans-jörg Schmedes and Malvinder Singh. Notes 1
See Weissbrodt 1984 for a more extensive description of the broad spectrum of activities of private human rights organisations.
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See Fortes and Landolt (1996) for this basic argument.
References Baehr, P.R. (1994) “Amnesty International and its self-imposed limited mandate”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 12:5–21. Balkin, J.M. (1998) Cultural Software. A Theory of Ideology, New Haven: Yale University. Benner, T. and W.H.Reinicke (1999) “Politik im globalen Netz. Globale Politiknetzwerke und die Herausforderung offener Systeme”, Internationale Politik 8, 25–32. Brett, R. (1995) “The role and limits of human rights. NGOs at the United Nations”, Political Studies 43:96–110. Brysk, A. (1993) “From above and below. Social movements, the international system, and human rights in Argentina”, Comparative Political Studies 26: 259–85. Buchanan, J. (1976) “Public goods and natural liberty” in T.Wilson and A.Skinner (eds) The Market and the State. Essays in Honour of Adam Smith, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Christiansen, L. and K.Dowding (1994) “Pluralism or state autonomy? The case of Amnesty International (British section): the insider/outsider group”, Political Studies 62:15–24. Clark, A.M. and J.A.McCann (1991) “Enforcing international standards of justice. Amnesty International’s constructive conflict expansion’, Peace and Change 16:379–99. Clark, M.S. (ed.) (1991) Prosocial Behaviour, Newbury Park: Sage. Coleman, J.S. (1988) “Free riders and zealots: the role of social networks’, Sociological Theory 6:52–7. ——(1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Davis, M.H. (1996) Empathy. A Social Psychological Approach, Boulder: Westview. Devries, U. (1989) Amnesty International gegen Folter. Eine kritische Bilanz, Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang. Dimitrijevic, V. (1989) “Human rights, interdependence and international normsetting” in J.N.Rosenau and H.Trompe (eds) Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, Aldershot: Avebury, 115–27. Donnelly, J. (1986) “International human rights: a regime analysis”, International Organization 40:599–642. ——(1998) “Human rights: a new standard of civilisation”, International Affairs 74:1–24. Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Row. Eide, A. (1986) “The Human Rights Movement and the Transformation of the International Order”, Alternatives 1:367–402. Ennals, M. (1982) “Amnesty International and human rights” in P.Willetts (ed.) Pressure Groups in the Global System, the Transnational Relations of IssueOrientated Non-Governmental Organizations, London: Pinter, 63–83. Gaer, F.D. (1995) “Reality check: human rights non-governmental organisations confront governments at the United Nations”, Third World Quarterly 16: 389– 404.
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Greeley, A.M. (1997) “Coleman revisited: religious structures as a source of social capital”, American Behavioral Scientist 40:587–94. Hall, J.R. (1988) “Social organization and pathways of commitment: types of communal groups, rational choice theory, and the Kanter thesis”, American Sociological Review 53:679–92. Hall, P.A. (1999) “Social capital in Britain”, British journal of Political Science 29: 417–61. Hanson, R.A. (1978) “Toward an understanding of politics through public goods theory” in W.Loehr and T.Sandler (eds) Public Goods and Public Policy, London: Sage, 67–95. Heckathorn, D.D. (1998) “Collective action, social dilemmas and ideology’, Rationality and Society 10:451–79. Jordan, G. and W.A.Maloney (1996) “How bumble-bees fly: accounting for public interest participation”, Political Studies 64:668–85. Kenis, P. and V.Schneider (1991) “Policy networks and policy analysis: scrutinizing a new analytical toolbox”, in B.Marin and R.Mayntz (eds) Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Frankfurt: Campus, 25–59. Lukes, S. (1993) “Five fables about human rights” in: S.Shute and S.Hurley (eds) On Human Rights. The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, New York: Basic Books. Marin, B. and R.Mayntz (eds) (1991) Policy Networks, Frankfurt/M.: Campus. Mendus, S. (1995) “Human rights in political theory”, Political Studies 63:10–24. North, D.C. (1981) Structure and Change in History, New York: Norton. Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Portes, A. and P.Landolt (1996) “The downside of social capital”, American Prospect 26:18–21. Putnam, R. (1995) “Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital”, Journal of Democracy 6:65–78. Reinicke, W.H. (1999) “The other World Wide Web: global public policy networks”, Foreign Affairs 76:127–38. Risse, T., S.C.Ropp and K.Sikkink (1999) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge University Press. Scharpf, F.W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism in Policy Research, Boulder: Westview. Scoble, H. and L.Wiseberg (1974) “Human rights and Amnesty International”, Annals of the American Academy 413:11–26. Shelton, D. (1994) “The participation of nongovernmental organizations in international judicial proceedings”, American Journal of International Law 88:611–42. Sikkink, K. (1993) “Human rights, principled issue-networks, and sovereignty in Latin America”, International Organization 47:411–41. Thakur, R. (1994) “Human rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations”, Journal of Peace Research 31:143–60. Thatcher, M. (1998) “The development of policy network analysis: from modest origins to overarching frameworks”, Journal of Theoretical Politics 10:389–416. Weissbrodt, D. (1984) “The contribution of international nongovernmental organizations to the protection of human rights” in T.Meron (ed.) Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 403–38.
8
The international women’s movement as a private political actor between accommodation and change Bob Reinalda
Introduction The women’s movement can be considered as a successful, private, political actor. It has brought about mass mobilization in many countries, and contributed to the conclusion of international conventions and the transformation of national legislation and practices. How can this success be explained? This chapter starts from the plausible thesis that the women’s movement as a private politico-social movement heading for its own emancipation has consciously, and from the beginning, used a transnational strategy. This has been achieved by building international federations and networks, and by engaging in intergovernmental arrangements, conferences and institutions and their international norm-setting mechanisms. Both international norms and their implementation procedures have been used to put leverage on national governments, which have felt a double pressure domestically and internationally. However, when agents of political change become active, we may expect them to evoke their counterparts (agents of conservatism). If institutions can no longer deny the agents of change and recognize them by allowing access to their mechanisms, their major response to opposition will be accommodation. This chapter will analyse the international women’s movement from this perspective of accommodation and change. Hence, it deals with the question of whether a private political actor’s success can be explained as the result of the interplay between private and intergovernmental pursuits of influence and, if so, in what way. In fact, four phases of accommodation and change can be discerned in the women’s movement’s development. The first phase is characterized by the processes of becoming recognized and gaining access to intergovernmental institutions (women as subjects of international relations within the League of Nations, International Labour Organization and Union of American Republics) and of developing non-discriminatory policies at the international level (women as objects of international relations). A process of renewed accommodation characterizes the second phase when, during the creation of the United Nations, the women’s movement had to re-gain access. Rejuvenation 165
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characterizes the third phase. The new women’s movement may not have been interested in what it referred to as “male” institutions, but the existence of “old” international women’s organizations active within intergovernmental institutions in combination with new political activities widely supported by new generations of women resulted in the conclusion of bold international norms in favour of non-discrimination of women. The fourth phase, with its mixture of national implementation and international evaluation, once more can be characterized as a period of accommodation. On a more abstract level, it can be said that women’s organizations have been recognized by official international political institutions. They have delivered resources to these institutions by bringing expertise into the decision-making and implementation processes, and have shared responsibilities for their public policies. As such they have influenced agenda setting and have added to the qualities and efficacy of official decisions and the legitimacy of the institutions. Simultaneously, these institutions have looked after and interfered with these private organizations through their official procedures in order to make them instrumental to their intergovernmental problem-solving. The next two sections of this chapter will discuss the transnational way in which private actors may strengthen their position in domestic politics, as well as the intervening tension between accommodation and change within intergovernmental institutions. Based on a critical examination of available research results, four phases in the history of the women’s movement will then be addressed. It will be shown that the accommodation and diversion forces inspired by global institutions did play a role, but did not keep women’s organizations from being successful as private political actors at the global level. Private organizations and the global exertion of influence Although international relations theory may still be dominated by a realist respect for state power, it has increasingly recognized the international system as one of both states and non-state actors such as private organizations and intergovernmental institutions. This section attempts to clarify the opportunities presented by the international system to private organizations such as transnational corporations, advocacy groups and professional organizations. Although, traditionally, realist IR theorists hardly recognized private actors, these actors’ actual roles could not be denied, as is demonstrated by the UN system. The nineteenth-century-based international public unions, which had produced some successful co-operation between governments and private actors, “informed the early organizational ideology that inspired the missions assigned to the UN’s specialized agencies and the growth of international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations generally” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1995:540; Murphy
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1994:112). Following the functional thesis that “non-political” or “technical” co-operation would contribute to social and political stability and hence improve the prospects for peace (Mitrany 1946), private organizations were permitted a small room in the impressive intergovernmental UN building to give expert opinions on a consultative basis. In 1955, 22 out of a total 269 international NGOs registered at the Economic and Social Council were women’s organizations (Yearbook of International Organizations 1956:240–43). A potentially wider understanding of intergovernmental and private actors was given by the launch of a transnational paradigm in the 1970s. This paradigm revealed the effects of transnational relations on interstate politics, among them the emergence of transnational organizations as quasi-autonomous actors “with private foreign policies that may deliberately oppose or impinge on state policies” (Nye and Keohane 1971:337). However, it was argued that the impact of non-state actors on world politics should not be exaggerated, since nation-states retain a near monopoly on the use of coercive force and retain an enormous capacity to shape global and state welfare. The nationstate “still molds the activities of nonstate actors more than its behavior is molded by them” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1995:196). A new inducement of attention for private organizations arose in the 1990s in what may be called the multilevel approach. Halliday noted that the state acts in two dimensions—the domestic and the international—and regarded the international dimension as important for all actors within a national society. Not only will those in state power (governments) recruit sections of domestic society for international activities or deploy international resources to contain domestic threats, those opposed to state power (society, e.g. social groups and their organizations) also seek international contacts in order to strengthen their position in domestic conflicts (Halliday 1989:49–51). As an answer to the question of why social movements go international, the rational choice analysis also suggests that groups facing constraints at the national level may enhance their national positions by international strategies (cf. Logue 1980 for trade unions). With regard to the roles played by intergovernmental organizations, the international regimes discussion clarified the increasing institutionalization of aspects of world politics and raised the question of autonomous policy-making by intergovernmental institutions (Keohane 1989; Reinalda and Verbeek 1998). Since these institutions have increasingly become a “major locus of public policy formulation at the international level”, both governments and private organizations seek to use them to achieve their purposes. As such intergovernmental organizations serve “both as targets for states and nonstate actors seeking to capture them and as forces trying to transform their own environment” (Keohane and Murphy 1992:874). In such a multilevel international system, private organizations, e.g. women’s organizations, have two ways to influence their national government (cf. Reinalda 1997:199–205). One is the national way, which
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allows for pressure according to the procedures and habits of the national political system. The other is the transnational way, which allows for pressure in an indirect manner as it is established via intergovernmental institutions. National private organizations may address themselves directly to intergovernmental organizations, or indirectly through the establishment of international federations of national private organizations. Either the private organization or the federation—as such, a compromise between various national member organizations—may try to influence intergovernmental decision-making through lobbying, through public opinion or by using its consultative status within the intergovernmental organization. Notwithstanding the fact that this influence is from outside or has merely the status of advice, the actual role of private organizations in intergovernmental agenda setting and decisionmaking processes has been more important than these official positions suggest. The explanation is that private organizations have their own power capabilities such as providing relevant information, attracting media attention, access to funds, and in general an ability to mobilize legitimacy (Princen 1994:34; Willetts 1982:23–4). The same goes for the implementation process of international decisions. Although implementation is supposed to be hindered by a lack of international authority to enforce these decisions, intergovernmental organizations have developed several ways to make their policies function. Various monitoring tools and subtle yet compelling mechanisms have been developed for discussing the progress in national implementation. This vision of exerting influence is based on the political process model applied to the interplay between national and international policy-making in which governments are forced to make compromises at two levels. One process takes place at the national level between various political, economic and social factions. Compromises reached there can be seen as “inputs” for the intergovernmental level. Debates within intergovernmental institutions lead to other, possibly different compromises for the same issue. The heart of the matter is international norm setting, i.e. the formulation of common norms and standards that should be incorporated in the respective national regulations and practices. Hence, international compromises—for example, on political rights of women or equal treatment—in their turn are “inputs” for national political systems. The next section will discuss what happens at the intergovernmental level, in particular with private organizations heading for political change such as non-discrimination and equality. Intergovernmental arrangements, political change and accommodation Gordenker and Weiss deal with private organizations in an advocacy role within the UN system, such as women’s organizations. Unlike operational
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and educational private organizations who aim at beneficiaries or the general public, advocacy organizations target “key decision-makers in parliaments as well as in governments and intergovernmental secretariats”. The domestic-transnational dimension discussed above is dealt with in terms of internal and external modes. Internal modes can be observed in capitals and domestic areas and include private organizations’ pressure on a government. External modes can be observed within the UN and include urging to add an issue to the agenda; gathering data to help frame or define a problem or a threat in ways that influence the work of official UN-sanctioned conferences; and contributing to the implementation of treaties by assisting countries without expertise to meet their obligations. (Gordenker and Weiss 1995:378–9) Williams identifies four major roles for private organizations in such external modes. These are advocacy of special interests of public importance; providing expert knowledge and advice in areas in which governments have an interest but in which their own resources of information are inadequate; acting as executing agents for a number of UN agencies operating in developing countries; and performing public relations functions on behalf of the UN and its agencies (Williams 1990:265). In general, private organizations act in favour of change. They have established a role for themselves “as sources of organized criticism of the imperfections of international society, as a stimulant to progress, as promoters of new ideas and programmes, as sources of additional voluntary funds for development, and as channels of publicity’ (Williams 1990:268–9). The power capabilities of private organizations heading for political change and their acquired roles within international institutions cannot be taken at face value, since the tension between political change and conservatism adds another dimension to what happens within international institutions. Research on women’s organizations inspired by the critical civil society approach has thrown more light on how intergovernmental institutions react to challenges posed to them. These reactions leave little room for change: accommodation of private organizations seems more likely than institutional change. With regard to challenging international institutions, Stienstra arrived at a modest conclusion. In general, women have been organized throughout the period 1840–1990, but “in spite of their many activities little change has occurred within international organizations” (Stienstra 1994:145). The discourse in these institutions changed from one of gender blindness to one of integrating women in development programmes. This change was followed by changes in organizational practices. Positive results at the international level have included an increased recognition of women as international actors (but with no concomitant change in the numbers of women participating in the
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decision-making elites), an increase in the number of statements relating to women’s equality (however, not followed by increases in funding, staff or authority), and some significant changes in women’s access to education and health around the world (notwithstanding the fact that most women’s situations have remained unchanged or have become worse in response to the economic crises of the 1980s) (Stienstra 1994:150). Three factors explain this meagre result. The first is women’s vulnerability: women’s situations are greatly affected by changes in the global political economy, including war and economic crises. The second factor is an inherent conservatism within international institutions, following from a resistance to changes in power relations and from the embeddedness of dominant gender relations. The third is the unwillingness of states and intergovernmental organizations to undertake a radical restructuring of their economies and societies; instead, they chose to accommodate some of the demands of women’s groups (Stienstra 1994:157). Whitworth gives an additional explanation, showing how the international system may limit or divert the activities of private organizations. Women’s under-representation and relegation in international relations are the effect of “very real and constantly created systems of domination and of power” (Whitworth 1994:30). Her account of the private organization IPPF (International Planned Parenthood Federation) shows that it has represented gender throughout its history, by and large by denying differences between women and men, despite an original inspiration to improve the lives of women. Its early emphasis on family planning displaced birth control from being a woman’s issue to one concerned strictly with family, social and global stability. The role of birth control in promoting family and social stability was also applied to an international scene “committed to the creation of international organizations and reeling from the supposed threats of international instability, population explosions and communism”. A contradictory international position resulted and did not change until the 1990s, when new activists both within and outside the IPPF managed to broaden its mandate to promote the empowerment of women and to reintroduce a language of sexuality to discussions of birth control and reproduction (Whitworth 1994:110–11). The conclusion is that the international system does offer opportunities to private organizations heading for political change through the transnational way. Simultaneously, however, a process of accommodation may divert the original strife for political change. The next four sections will analyse the women’s movement’s success at the global level from this perspective of opportunity and diversion. The first phase: gaining access to intergovernmental arrangements and standard setting The first women to become members of political organizations’ executive committees were Harriet Taylor (in 1867 elected into the General Council
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of Marx’s First International) and Marie Goegg (in 1868 elected as treasurer of the International League of Peace and Freedom). At that time, this combination of international workers’ and liberal peace organizations provided women with the opportunity to act publicly in the democratic political movement. Goegg used it to demand equal rights and to found the first international women’s organization in 1868. More international women’s organizations were established, sometimes moderate as they were dedicated to issues such as prostitution, temperance or social and hygienic reforms. However, the “political” weight of these organizations should not be under-estimated, given the often direct support for equal and other rights by their leaders. The International Council of Women (ICW), established in 1888, became broadly based by uniting the political and reform tendencies, even when in 1904 radical suffragists broke away. The idea that women have a special peace-encouraging task because of motherhood caused women to engage in the field of education and in international peace activities. They supported the peace conference in The Hague in 1899, and during the opening session presented nearly a million signatures. Women’s demonstrations were held in various capitals, and during the six weeks of the conference women were present to talk to the delegates at night when the official sessions were over. The second peace conference (The Hague 1907) was the first intergovernmental arrangement to invite private organizations to present their points of view. These were the ICW and the Salvation Army. In 1915 women proved to be less carried away by nationalistic feelings than men. They organized international women’s manifestations against the war, to be followed by a serious attempt at arbitration between belligerent and neutral states, undertaken by those who had broken away from the ICW. After its failure they decided to discuss the terms of peace after the war. In May 1919 they convened in neutrally Swiss Zurich. This congress was the first public meeting to discuss the drafted peace conditions. It also sent a delegation to Versailles to comment on the plans. That these women were officially received can be explained by their good connections in American government circles. When in January 1919 US President Wilson had proclaimed his programme for world peace, including a League of Nations, British women proclaimed that women should not remain outside this League. The ICW asked the commission working on the League’s covenant to be heard on the future status of women, and in April presented Wilson an elaborate memorandum with the purpose that the League’s covenant would forbid discrimination against women. Such a general statement was unacceptable, but Article 7.3 was inserted. It provided that all League positions were open equally to both sexes. Being only trivial, it nonetheless provided women with the official possibility to engage in the new institution and to continue the fight for equal rights within it (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989:51). Quite a few women’s organizations now removed their seats to Geneva.
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From 1925 on they collaborated in order to get more women appointed in the League’s commissions and in national delegations. An attempt in 1931– 2 to strengthen their official position in the League failed, neither were they successful with regard to equality. The League refused general pronouncements and the debate on nationality of women was lost because the League’s convention on nationality (1930) was not based on equality. It required tactical moves of the women’s organizations before the League’s discussion on equality could be restarted in 1935. Thanks to the creativity of some Latin-American states, the League decided to investigate the legal status of women in general. It took another three years, however, to establish a commission for that purpose, which saw its activities come to an end because of the Second World War. Within the League women were far more successful in the social field, on issues like prostitution, pornography, the well-being of children, health and education. In 1936 the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Women and Children (established in 1921) was transformed into the general Advisory Committee on Social Questions, which can be regarded as an achievement by women’s organizations. Compared to the rather conservative League, the Union of American Republics (UAR, now Organization of American States) was far more progressive. The Union had no problems in declaring that women should have equal civil and political rights as early as 1923, to be repeated in 1938 more extensively, in establishing an all-women and intergovernmental InterAmerican Commission of Women in 1928 and in adopting a convention on the nationality of women in 1933, based on equality. The fact that in 1923 women’s organizations gained access to the Union, and were successful within it with regard to equality policies, provided women’s organizations within the League with a stronger position because of Latin-American governmental support. Women’s organizations also gained access to the International Labour Organization (ILO). In 1919 the ICW presented a vision on women and labour to the commission in Versailles preparing the part of the peace treaty concerning the ILO. As a result of ICW and trade union pressures, the ILO constitution contained passages on female advisors for questions affecting women, female staff members and labour inspectors, as well as the principles of equal pay for work of equal value, and special protection. The ILO maintained special relations with the international women’s organizations, apart from the fact that within the ILO women trade unionists also manifested themselves. Special protection of women workers, adhered to by former intergovernmental conferences on labour in 1890, 1897, 1906 and 1913, was expressed in international labour legislation regarding women. As such it contrasted sharply with equality. In fact, in 1919 the ILO already embodied two factions, one in favour of special protection, among them most women trade unionists, and a smaller faction of women’s organizations in favour of equality. Although the last one in 1919 lost the debate, its position would be defended again in the 1930s and 1960s by organizations
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like Open Door International and Equal Rights International, which criticized the discriminatory character of special protection on principle. Thanks to this private opposition, the ILO in 1937 recognized that working women suffered from discrimination—the first time an intergovernmental organization had used this term—and declared that they should have full opportunity to work and payment without discrimination, in addition to full political and civil rights and full opportunity to education. The ILO also took a more progressive position than the League (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989:68–72, 118–20). How should this access to international institutions and mechanisms from the perspective of opportunity and diversion be assessed? Stienstra depicts the years 1915–19 as a period of social change challenging gendered assumptions of international relations because women began to participate outside their traditional spheres of home and family by sending their own peace envoys, by asking to work for the League and by including broader social issues such as the traffic in women. She also characterizes most women’s organizations’ activities in relation to international institutions as a politics of “mainstreaming”, based on the widely held belief that women’s participation at the international level was an extension of their roles as “good wives and mothers” which would also ameliorate international relations (Stienstra 1994:60). Mainstreaming means that they work for change within the context of existing institutions and propose adaptations that would allow for change without transformation, instead of providing critiques and alternatives to these institutions from a more distant position (Stienstra 1994:32).1 Connors also regards the League as the more influential actor, since it confined women’s activities to social and humanitarian issues, and confined their contribution to influencing public opinion in favour of the League and its policies and acting as assessors in advisory positions. She agrees to the suggestion that, to a large extent, women’s organizations themselves “unconsciously reinforced the narrow perception of their role” (Connors 1996:149). Keck and Sikkink mention another restriction of the working of international institutions in this period. They argue that the effects of international activities in the sense of bringing pressure on states from outside, referred to as a boomerang pattern, were absent in the crucial case of women’s suffrage. Nowhere did women find powerful foreign organizations or governments willing to use leverage or devote resources to promote women suffrage beyond their borders, nor were suffrage organizations able to use accountability politics, for no governments accepted international obligations to which they could later be held accountable. (Keck and Sikkink 1998:54) Even if it is true, however, that in relation to international institutions at that
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time opportunities for strengthening national positions were few and diversion was effective, two dynamic elements should also be considered. One is the creation of a transnational collective identity through international private organizations: “internationalism, in the form of organizational loyalties, took on greater salience, even rivaling national identities” (Rupp 1994:1598). It held the potential for wider appeal: If the extension of political rights to women in some parts of the world around the time of World War I divided rather than united women, and if appeals based on women’s social roles in the home struck no chords in societies in which women played central roles in agriculture or trade, women could nevertheless unite through their universal roles as mothers and the reality of world-wide violence against women. The perspectives of women from countries struggling for independence in the interwar period shed fresh light on the meaning of internationalism. (Rupp 1994:1599) The second dynamic element is the disagreement about equality among private actors within international institutions, as in the ILO between women’s organizations and trade unions, and among international institutions themselves (League, UAR and ILO). Accommodation of the wishes of private organizations may be one force active within intergovernmental arrangements; the continued strife by private organizations to reach their original goals, also by using windows of opportunity created by disagreement between international institutions, is another. This second dynamic element will be used to analyse the second phase of the movement, roughly covering the years 1940–70. The second phase: renewed accommodation and continued struggle for equality The previous section has already mentioned the accommodation of women’s organizations in the League during the inter-war period. However, taking the various international institutions together, some progress in the direction of equality as an international norm can be observed in various international positions. Its chronology reads: 1919 1923 1933 1937 1938
Article 7.3 (League) and equal pay principle (ILO) Resolution on equal rights (UAR) Convention on the nationality of women (UAR) Resolution on women workers and discrimination (ILO) The Lima Declaration in favour of women’s rights (UAR)
All these steps have been the results of private activities, including
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disagreement among organizations, bringing in new ideas and using windows of opportunity within intergovernmental arrangements. The debate on special protection as a form of discrimination in the 1930s is an example of raising new visions. The use of windows of opportunity can be illustrated by the supportive roles of some Latin-American states within the League, and by women’s activists and organizations working in San Francisco under the umbrella of the Inter-American Commission of Women in order to have their viewpoints included in the UN Charter (Connors 1996:150–1). After the League’s collapse, women had to gain access to a new intergovernmental institution, once again under war conditions. This was prepared by the still functioning liaison committee of international women’s organizations active within the League for equal rights and the World Woman’s Party, which united American and European women striving for non-discrimination. They presented their views to the conference in San Francisco, where in 1945 the UN was established and where the Brazilian delegation proposed to establish a Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). Although first seen as a subcommission on human rights, it became a commission of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In 1947 women managed to upgrade the commission’s scope of work somewhat, but its scope remained nonetheless rather limited: more focused on monitoring the status of women than on raising it (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989:127–31; Stienstra 1994:84–6). Compared to the League, relations between private organizations and the UN became formalized. Article 71 of the Charter authorized the ECOSOC to accord consultative status to recognized private organizations. This was a codification of practices established under the League. However, referring to the World Disarmament Conference in 1932, where many private organizations, in particular women’s organizations with this time over eight million signatures, had been allowed to address a plenary session of government delegates, professional diplomats in San Francisco successfully limited “what they saw as the damage” by confining private organizations to the economic and social side of the work (Williams 1990:260–1). Women’s organizations with a consultative status at global institutions performed their advocacy roles in favour of equal rights and opportunities by following the institutions’ procedures resulting in official declarations and agreements. In its Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), the ILO was the first intergovernmental institution to declare non-discrimination a fundamental international standard. It also adopted the policy principle of equal opportunities for men and women with regard to employment. With this new vision—to be elaborated in conventions on equal remuneration (1951) and against discrimination in employment and occupation (1958)— the ILO was far ahead of the UN, which was still struggling with the principle of equal rights. Although the UN Charter reaffirmed its “faith” in the equal rights of men and women, it was a matter of gradual change before it recognized equal rights as such in the 1966 covenants on human
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rights. This was accomplished through small incremental steps in the declaration of human rights (1948), the convention on political rights of women (1952) and the convention on the nationality of married women (1957). This slow development was a continuous struggle, urged on by international women’s organizations, the CSW and other international actors such as trade unions, some governments and the ILO. Recognition of non-discrimination and equal opportunities by the UN was once again a matter of time and perseverance by those favouring equality as an international standard. It was the early 1960s before the UN would elaborate on the principle of non-discrimination. The ILO conventions mentioned above had been followed by one against discrimination in education (UNESCO, 1960) and one on social policies (ILO 1962). In addition, in 1963 the UN itself decided to give its opinion on the elimination of discrimination against women. However, lack of political support prevented the drafting of an international convention. Instead, in 1967 a declaration was issued based on a moral judgement (discrimination is “fundamentally unjust”). Although a step forward, its significance was restricted because of a missing definition of discrimination (as in the 1966 covenants) and its legally weak format. UN implementation procedures— weaker anyway than those of the ILO—remained poor (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989:183–94). How should this general progress in vision from the perspective of opportunity and diversion be assessed? Although women’s organizations obviously managed to use opportunities provided by the UN and to gain results over a longer period of time, their attempt to define women’s concerns very broadly in this context was met by a challenge of that definition and an institutionalization with a narrow focus. This is true for the expulsion from the security field and the largely successful attempt during the establishment of the CSW to reduce the broad scope of gender relations to “a very narrow and harmless set of activities around women’s concerns” (Stienstra 1994:84). This narrowing of scope had long-term repercussions on the commission’s work. Besides, the commission’s very existence meant that most women’s organizations focused their attention on the commission and its activities. This contributed to a “neglect by both the traditional UN human rights framework and human rights NGOs of issues of concern to women”, and—the other side of the coin—to women’s organizations paying “little attention to the mainstream human rights framework and mechanisms within the United Nations” (Connors 1996:152, 154). The CSW’s absence in the debates on the wordings of the two human rights covenants, notwithstanding their recognition of women’s equal rights, illustrates this last aspect (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989:190). Human and women’s rights within the UN became even more separate in 1973, when the CSW secretariat was removed from the division of human rights to that of social development and humanitarian affairs, and in 1979, when it was moved from New York to Vienna (Connors 1996:152).
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Another institutional drawback on private organizations was the serious weakening of international women’s organizations as critical actors resulting from the long march through global institutions and the absence of organizational rejuvenation. Once mainstreaming equal rights feminists had reached their goal of institutionalizing an equal rights vision, “they faded away from the international scene”, and international women’s organizations in 1967 “played a lesser role in defining gender relations at the international level”. These organizations were increasingly left to lobby and provide information in the UN, while “women delegates, some of whom had strong relations with their own national women’s movements”, became the critical actors in the discussions (Stienstra 1994:89). Compared to the early League, this weakening of private organizations and the larger role of women in official government-related positions backed up by national movements constituted a more complex model of exerting private influence. Instead of organizations as sole private advocates of the women’s cause opposed to male government representatives, the new model contained both organizations and women delegates as advocates, since various governments as a result of national compromises had incorporated some of the women’s demands. This means that private domestic influence has also been mediated through nation-states. The next section will discuss this new model in the context of the changes of the 1960s and 1970s. The third phase: rejuvenation through Third World demands in the 1960s and 1970s Stienstra depicts the international women’s organizations discussed above as “primarily led and organized by and for First-World women”. Their activities were “weighted towards the interests of First-World women, especially urban women”. In general, she regards them as almost unable to address or even understand the concerns brought forward by women from the Third World. Even during the changes of the 1960s the women’s movements were unable to identify what these Third-World concerns were, and when the situation of women in the Third World was addressed it was primarily done so in terms of providing assistance or aid rather [than] bringing about their empowerment. (Stienstra 1994:90) Although some engagement by women’s organizations with Third World women can be mentioned, in particular by social democratic women from the 1950s on and by the ICW within the ILO in 1962, the remarkable change taking place in the CSW’s purpose during the 1960s had an external source. It all started in 1960 when ECOSOC, in response to demands from Third
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World states, generally agreed that further efforts were needed for the advancement and improvement of the status of women in economically underdeveloped countries. Through a Unified Long-Term Programme for the Advancement of Women (1962) and various ECOSOC and General Assembly resolutions against the background of the first Development Decade, a Programme of Concerted International Action for the Advancement of Women (1970) was established. It had the effect that in 1970 the CSW recast its programme of work by giving less attention to rights and more to roles of women in national development, followed in 1973 by another position in the UN organization, as mentioned above no longer in the human rights division. Boserup, the Danish economist and member of the UN committee of development planning, intensified the discussion on women and development with her book Women’s Role in Economic Development (1970), in which she demonstrated the different effects of development policies on men and women, at the expense of women. In 1972—twenty-five years after its first session—the CSW initiated a process to proclaim the year 1975 International Women’s Year as an opportunity to reflect on its positive effects. Support by Third World states striving for a new international economic order led to positive decisions by ECOSOC and the General Assembly on the project’s time period—the Netherlands preferred an International Week for the Status of Women—and on the widening of its central theme. ECOSOC and the General Assembly enhanced the element of development and added the commitment of women to peace because of its promotion of détente in the world. The final theme read: Equality, Development and Peace. Thanks to Third World states, it was decided to convene an international conference to examine to what extent UN policies had been implemented, to include the launching of an action programme, and to discuss the conference’s results in the General Assembly (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989:214–16). The women’s conference in Mexico (1975) and the following UN’s Women’s Decade (1976–85) were impressive mass mobilizing events with decisions bearing the general stamp of Third World influence. The ILO contributed to the result. Despite earlier discussions on the discriminatory character of special protection, the ILO’s practice of special protection had persisted, mostly because of national gender compromises on family and the sexual division of labour. The contradiction between equal opportunities as favoured by international policies and the actual double burden of working women with family responsibilities had been discussed at intergovernmental level (OAS, UN and ILO), but it was the late 1950s before ILO attitudes on women with family responsibilities began to change as a result of private influence. The conference on women in a changing world (1964) regarded part-time work as positive, opposed discrimination against women with family responsibilities, and believed that maternity protection should not be a reason for discrimination. It also declared that the problems
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of women workers should not, in principle, be distinguished from those of men. They should be solved within the same general policy framework. During this process of careful change, organizations like Open Door International and the International Federation of Business and Professional Women criticized special protection as generally wrong and favoured equal protection instead. Women in the international trade union movement had arrived at the same conclusion. However, by the end of the 1960s the ILO majority still held the position of driving back special protection and regarding some forms of protection as reasonable and non-discriminatory. A few years later, research carried out by the ILO, the CSW and private organizations convinced the ILO that this position was untenable because of continued discrimination. It had been recognized that many forms of distinction between the sexes may look “normal” but in fact are discriminating. In order to prevent a situation in which the UN was moving in the direction of equality and a conservative ILO would stick to conventions and declarations based on inequality, the ILO in 1975 issued a declaration on equality of opportunities and treatment for women workers. This contribution to the International Women’s Year can be regarded as a revision of its special protection stance. The ILO had taken the same position of equal protection as defended by a tiny faction of women in 1919 and was to start a process of renewing its conventions based on special protection. Within the UN, the ILO declaration removed a serious obstacle for drafting a convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Forced by the success of its conference in Mexico, the UN adopted such a convention in 1979, i.e. sixty years after women gained access to influence the League thanks to its Article 7.3 (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989). The so-called second wave of the women’s movement, originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s among younger generations of women, brought up different gender analyses: oppression by men plus women’s liberation instead of equal rights. Newly developed women’s studies would sharpen its insights. Unlike Third World states, the second wave was no actor in UN decisions on international women’s activities until 1975, apart from the fact that the second wave with its echo in many countries provided domestic support for new national and international gender policies. Engagement of the second wave was aroused by the non-governmental parallel sessions during UN world conferences on women in Mexico, Copenhagen (1980) and Nairobi (1985). The international women’s organizations and the CSW originating from the first wave created these parallel sessions and, in particular, the Copenhagen Forum would bring second-wave women to discuss the sense of interfering with intergovernmental arrangements. Being an “autonomous” movement, however, it still kept its distance from these arrangements. How should the changes taking place in the 1960s and 1970s from the perspective of opportunity and diversion be assessed? Unlike before, this is
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not a period of diversion but one of renewal or rejuvenation, influenced through the national rather than the transnational way. This is in line with the more complex model of influence previously discussed. The transnational way shows a further weakening of the mainstreaming private women’s organizations. They start to fail as critical actors in the UN and to lack an open eye for new developments, although some still fight and win a fundamental struggle in the ILO. The national way shows strong state pressures on the UN based on needs arising from domestic politics. In the Third World these are needs of incitements of development (aid; a new international economic order). These include policies regarding women, since modern development draws back on their social positions and since women, who have been active in international debates, also demand opportunities. In the First World, the needs are demands by younger generations of women who want to change women’s positions fundamentally and who still are developing their strategies towards existing institutions. Third World state pressures find sufficient support within ECOSOC and the General Assembly to imply a radical change of the scope of work of the CSW (from “rights” to “roles” in development), and, for the first time, a widening of the scope of women’s activities in 1975 (peace and security brought back in). These developments create various opportunities, among them the completion of the UN debate on equal rights and nondiscrimination in 1979, as well as a new, not fully consciously constructed mechanism, based on international standards, national implementation and international monitoring, as can be seen in the next phase. The fourth phase: new strategies and renewed accommodation During the Women’s Decade the second wave of women’s movements from the First and Third World began to develop its own international structure and strategy. Key elements were international tribunal-like conferences on new issues, such as violence against women, women and health, reproductive rights and strategies for empowerment, and international women’s networks with a less formal structure than the older women’s organizations. Networks that developed communications among and research about women have been most effective. They show commitments to providing thorough information in their areas of concern, to bringing attention to the issues of concern to women at the local or grass-roots level, to sharing that information around the world, and to increasing the participation and interaction of women at the international level. They have kept UN organizations and member states “abreast of the concerns of many women around the world and have filled the void of information available on the situation of women to which many governments have been unwilling to respond” (Stienstra 1994:142–3). This new feminism met with a relatively strong response in Latin America and Asia. What had changed was that
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feminists from the Third World were giving leadership in their own countries and to the international organizing efforts (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989:267–70; Stienstra 1994:116). Once again, Latin-American women acted as international pioneers. At the end of the 1970s, for instance, they convinced European women campaigning for abortion rights that their demands were too narrow and Western to build a truly international network. They helped by widening the network to one on reproductive rights, including visions on the double oppression of black and handicapped women. A conference in 1984, also an alternative to the UN conference on population, confirmed that the network should pursue an autonomous strategy, since international women’s organizations active at the UN conference received hardly any response to their far more moderate criticisms on official policies (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989:276–83). Despite this autonomous or disengaged tendency, there has also been an intermingling of old and new feminist efforts at the intergovernmental level. Some of the earlier women’s organizations, still holding official status at the UN, began to rejuvenate and to take new positions. International networks, for their parts, turned into professional expertise organizations with strong grass-roots support participating in national and international debates. The International Women’s Rights Action Watch, set up in 1986, has followed the Amnesty International model and presented critical counter-reports to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, which supervises the implementation of the 1979 convention through governmental reports. The intermingling of the two feminisms was enhanced by the fact that world conferences in 1980 and 1985 would evaluate the implementation of the world action programme adopted in 1975 (Reinalda and Verhaaren 1989:291–7). This monitoring process was even extended to a fourth women’s conference in Beijing in 1995. The non-governmental shadow conferences—in Mexico a women’s tribune, in later conferences a forum—provided women’s organizations and networks with the opportunity to express their visions and to exert influence at the official conferences. Referring to these conferences and to other UN conferences such as those in Rio on environment and development, in Vienna on human rights, and in Cairo on population and development, Chen describes the women’s movement as one entering the 1990s “with more political vision, know-how and strategies and with a wider political base than ever before”. It learned various lessons such as that women’s voices have little chance of being heard at UN world conferences without deliberate and concerted efforts; that the best time to influence a world conference is during the preparatory process; and that it needed to build consensus and coalitions to bridge ideological and material differences between women at the local, national and regional levels before being able to act internationally (Chen 1995:480–81). In pursuing key strategies such as mounting global campaigns, building coalitions and consensus among women, preparing policy documents, influencing official delegations, and bridging non-
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governmental organizations and official deliberations, the movement learned “to focus on key issues and on official documents, to work with all players and to become serious lobbyists”. With regard to shaping the policy agenda, there were four critical changes: there are new players on the global stage (among which significant networks of women from the South); these players have developed and strengthened their skills (substantive and technical; advocacy and political; research and policy analysis; and documentation and communication); alliances, networks and coalitions have been developed that cut across regional and North-South divides to build broad-based consensus on key issues; and increasing numbers of women from private organizations have been offered or taken places at policy-making tables (Chen 1995:488–9). Other analysts of the “long march to Beijing” regard women’s empowerment as a process that had gained in strength at various levels thanks to three different actors: the women’s movement, feminist politicians and feminist civil servants (so-called femocrats). In various European countries femocrats act as experts and gender consultants with regard to country reports or documents prepared for intergovernmental decision-making, and during international conferences as two-way intermediaries between official structures and civil society representatives. They are members of government delegations, but members with a mission. The triangle metaphor, with its interactions aimed to empower women through methods such as networking, mobilization and lobbying, produces a more finely tuned grip on power relations between political movements, official politics and professionals (Lycklama à Nijeholt et al. 1997:35–6). How should this process of renewed private activities within the UN be assessed from the perspective of opportunities and diversion? The change from the 1960s and 1970s resulted in another engagement of organized women with intergovernmental decision-making (“serious lobbyists”). Women’s networks raising new issues and demands became involved in and began to use international conferences as a medium to influence official policy-making and its implementation. The model of influence was strengthened thanks to femocrats as brokers or consensus builders. Apart from these opportunities, there is accommodation, too. Women have been much less successful in getting governments to deal with “all of the emerging issues that are considered important to the international women’s community”. For instance, no attention has been given to the issue of women and biological and genetic engineering. Violence against women was not seriously included in the Mexico or Copenhagen documents or a UN plan on women and development (Stienstra 1994:143). Others are more optimistic about the issue of violence. The campaign finally aimed at the UN conferences in Vienna and Beijing, where it all depended on the ability to draw attention to issues, set agendas and influence the discursive positions of both states and intergovernmental organizations, as opposed to other advocacy networks like the Vatican and anti-abortion activists. “By
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monitoring the status of bracketed issues and suggesting language to government delegations, representatives of non-governmental organizations and networks had real input into the final document” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:188). This conclusion is as optimistic as the one by Chen. Arts, however, demonstrated in the case of environmental private organizations that participation in the drafting process of formal texts does not automatically lead to political influence (Arts 1998:234). Besides, women’s rights, including the right to be free from violence, may have been placed squarely on the world agenda; what remains to be seen is whether the substantive gains manifested in the official conference documents will be realized. There remains the risk that women will fail to maintain the required momentum and slip back into the familiar concerns of women and development (Connors 1996:173). Conclusions What can be said about the women’s movement’s success as the result of an interplay between private and intergovernmental pursuits of influence, discussed in terms of the transnational way and accommodation within international institutions? Unquestionably, the transnational strategy, with its prospect of being a more powerful domestic actor, has been helpful in the women’s case to put new issues on the agenda (such as equal rights and violence against women), to elaborate internationally respectful norms and standards, and to make use of these in domestic politics. However, this is not a sufficient exposition. Private organizations raising issues at international institutions may get access to these institutions and mechanisms, but these will confine them with respect to the scope of their activities and their official positions. This has been the case with both the League of Nations and the UN showing accommodation in the first, second and fourth phases. Given their dependence on the power relations between nation-states, intergovernmental institutions are conservative with respect to changes in power relations and to a radical restructuring of economies and societies. This means that they will tend to remain as before and to set the rules of the game. This leaves less room for change than often has been thought, when the results of private organizations in world politics are discussed in terms of bold international standards. While governments have agreed to a certain level of private involvement at the international level, they still bar private participation in procedures or issues that in some way restrict state sovereignty, according to analysts of the limits of global civil society (Clark et al. 1998:29). Private organizations, however, can be relevant for international institutions because of their societal support for the institutions’ policies. This creates room for private manoeuvre, which can be enlarged if differences of opinion between international institutions provide windows of opportunity to achieve progress. These windows of opportunity
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were found during the first and second phases, and also in the third phase when the ILO had to give in to pressures at the UN level. Yet, if private organizations gain access to international institutions and are successful with regard to standard setting, there is no guarantee that they will continue their work. International women’s organizations within the UN after a while showed fatigue symptoms, and during the third phase were unable to recognize new developments outside their own fields. A revival of private organizations’ influence has also been possible, as the third phase shows. In the case of the UN in the 1960s and 1970s, however, this was not “a prime example of an NGO initiative taken up by the UN system” (Chen 1995:478), but a change caused by external factors, in particular the North-South divide, taken up by women’s organizations and networks with the support of Third World states striving for a stronger global position. As far as women played a role in this period of change, it was in domestic politics rather than international politics. This leads to the conclusion that the national way of exerting influence has become far more important for the understanding of international institutions and private actors within it than international relations theorists often suppose. The more domestic compromises in the field of issues also debated at the intergovernmental level, in this case women’s equality and opportunities, the more effects should be recognizable within the institutions, in particular through positions taken by national delegates, whether women or men, but in this case often through women identifying themselves with the issue. If it is true that there are two positions, either challenge or support of existing institutions, it can be noted that the second wave of the women’s movement during the fourth phase eventually moved to a more reformist or mainstreaming position. It has to be added that during this phase the UN system as such has changed, in the sense that they explicitly invite private organizations to participate in parallel forum conferences with regard to both programmatic and evaluative elements. Another change is that expert women from official state positions act as brokers between official and private actors. However, as expected, in this new situation accommodation and diversion forces can also be recognized, and it still remains to be seen what the real results of this new international engagement, as expressed in conference documents, will be in practice. The women’s movement’s success can be understood as the result of two variables, a private one and an intergovernmental one offering both opportunities and diversion. The women’s movement has been a successful private actor in gaining access to various international institutions and mechanisms, but also in holding off the accommodation and diversion forces within these institutions, including its critical moments of weakness. This success has been achieved through both the transnational and the national way; the transnational way as a long-term strategy, the national way as support for the international norm-setting mechanism and for general changes taking place in the international institutions. Both ways are part of
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the coherence in national and international efforts to manage political, economic and social affairs suggested by the term “governance”, which was not introduced into IR theory until recently. It refers to collective problemsolving in a continuously changing public realm, stressing processes and institutional procedures and practices rather than governmental authority. Governance goes beyond the common realist treatment of global politics in an interdependent world because it recognizes international institutions as facilitators of long-term change, and accepts private organizations and networks as critical participants influencing public policies, to a certain extent transforming the terms and nature of the policy-making process. Acknowledgements For their stimulating comments I would like to thank Bas Arts, Joke Swiebel and the editors, in particular Karsten Ronit. Note 1
This definition differs from the strategy of gender mainstreaming adopted by the UN world conference on women in Beijing in 1995, that governments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes, so that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, respectively.
References Arts, B. (1998) The Political Influence of Global NGOs. Case Studies on the Climate and Biodiversity Conventions, Utrecht: International Books. Boserup, E. (1970) Women’s Role in Economic Development, New York: St Martin’s Press. Chen, M.E. (1995) “Engendering world conferences: the international women’s movement and the United Nations”, Third World Quarterly, 16 (3):477–93. Clark, A.M., E.J.Friedman and K.Hochstetler (1998) “The sovereign limits of global civil society. A comparison of NGO participation in UN world conferences on the environment, human rights, and women”, World Politics, 51 (October): 1–35. Connors, J. (1996) “NGOs and the human rights at the United Nations” in P. Willetts (ed.) The Conscience of the World. The Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System, London: Hurst. Gordenker, L. and T.G.Weiss (1995) “Pluralising global governance: analytical approaches and dimensions”, Third World Quarterly, 16 (3):357–87. Halliday, F. (1989) “State and society in international relations: a second agenda” in H.C.Dyer and L.Mangasarian (eds) The Study of International Relations. The State of the Art, Houndmills: Macmillan. Keck, M.E. and K.Sikkink (1998) Activists beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kegley, C.W.Jr, and E.R.Wittkopf (1995) World Politics. Trends and Transformation, New York: St Martin’s Press.
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Keohane, R.O. (1989) International Institutions and State Power, Boulder: Westview. Keohane, R.O. and C.N.Murphy (1992) “International institutions” in L.M. Hawkesworth and M.Kogan (eds) Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, vol. 2, London: Routledge, 871–86. Logue, J. (1980) Toward a Theory of Trade Union Internationalism, Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, Department of History. Lycklama à Nijeholt, G., J.Swiebel and V.Vargas (1997) “The global institutional framework: the long march to Beijing” in G.Lycklama à Nijeholt et al. (eds) Women’s Movements and Public Policy in Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean, Hamden: Garland Publishing. Mitrany, D. (1946) A Working Peace System, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Murphy, C.N. (1994) International Organization and Industrial Change. Global Governance since 1850, Cambridge: Polity Press. Nye, J.S. and R.O.Keohane (eds) (1971) “Transnational relations and world politics”, International Organization, 25 (Summer): 329–49. Princen, T. (1994) “NGOs: creating a niche in environmental diplomacy” in T.Princen and M.Finger (eds) Environmental NGOs in World Politics. Linking the Global and the Local, London: Routledge. Reinalda, B. (1997) “‘Dea ex machina’ or the interplay between national and international policy making? A critical analysis of women in Western Europe” in F.Gardiner (ed.) Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe, London: Routledge. Reinalda, B. and B.Verbeek (eds) (1998) Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations, London: Routledge. Reinalda, B. and N.Verhaaren (1989) Vrouwenbeweging en Internationale Organisaties 1868–1986, De Knipe: Ariadne. Rupp, L.J. (1994) “Constructing internationalism: the case of transnational women’s organizations, 1888–1945”, American Historical Review: 1571–600. Stienstra, D. (1994) Women’s Movements and International Organizations, New York: St Martin’s Press. Whitworth, S. (1994) Feminism and International Relations. Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions, Houndmills: Macmillan. Willetts, P. (ed.) (1982) Pressure Groups in the Global System. The Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations, London: Pinter. Williams, D. (1990) The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations. The System in Crisis, London: Hurst. Yearbook of International Organizations (1956) Munich: K.G.Saur.
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The policy roles of private research institutes in global politics Diane Stone
Introduction There has been a world-wide boom of private policy research institutes, which are often better known as “think tanks”. Representatives from these private organizations can be found in national delegations to multilateral meetings or providing expert judgements for international agencies. Whilst they have mobilized expertise to contribute to policy thinking at the global level, think tanks are not usually credited with an involvement in global politics. Social scientists have neglected these organizations for a number of related reasons. First, these organizations are often regarded as scientific or research-oriented organizations with scholarly rather than political interests. Second, they are usually established as national or local organizations rather than as regional or global bodies. Third, as private organizations—usually established as charities or non-profit organizations—they lack authority and official status. Finally, compared to resources held by multinational companies, international organizations and the agencies of nation-states, think tanks are small organizations with little power. These factors, combined with the predominance of neo-realist state-centric perspectives in the international relations discipline, have meant that the policy role of think tanks in global politics has been under-rated alongside that of foundations, religious organizations and industry associations. Accordingly, the increasing numbers of think tanks addressing global issues and transborder policy problems warrants closer inspection. The paper is composed of four parts. In the first section, the conventional definition of “think tank” is outlined and the development of think tank growth is mapped into three chronological stages. Initially, think tanks are most noticeable in an Anglo-American context. This is possibly reflective of the (declining) hegemonic position of Great Britain up to World War II, and the emergence of the USA as the hegemon of the post World War II era. The usual definitions of “think tank” (inter alia McGann 1994 and Smith 1991) have been shaped by Anglo-American experience with private non-profit organizations. However, the character of think tank development elsewhere in the world clouds the distinction between 187
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private and public. The second section outlines the manner in which think tanks have become transnational actors. The third section investigates the supply and demand forces that propel these institutes beyond a national context. On the supply side, increased competition at a domestic level among think tanks and the global dimensions of many policy areas are two factors pushing think tanks to adopt a broader global remit. Demand for expert information comes from other private organizations, international organizations and states. Think tank policy relevance in global politics is the concern of the fourth section. The discussion draws primarily upon the epistemic community concept but also makes reference to transnational advocacy networks and policy communities as frameworks for understanding think tank agendasetting capacity and contributions to global governance. In particular, think tank policy entrepreneurship is noticeable, first, in the advocacy of a global network of free market institutes promoting the international spread of privatization policies; and second, the global politics of the environment whereby institutes such as the three European partners of the Institute for European Environment Policy participate in international fora to promote global responses to environmental problems. These two fields exemplify not only think tank efforts to establish the language of policy that shapes decision-making but also the manner in which think tanks sometimes participate in policy processes and acquire a monitoring role in programme implementation. The global spread of private policy research institutes Think tanks are relatively autonomous organizations engaged in the analysis of policy issues independently of government, political parties and pressure groups. They are different from university centres, consultancies and foundations, although they may share some features in common. Unlike a consultancy, think tanks make their product available to the public rather than keep it in confidence for the client. More often than not, think tanks are established as non-profit organizations. Their research and analysis services are argued to be for societal benefit, and their publications are usually available to the general public. Think tanks either supplement the policy research undersupplied by government agencies and international organizations, or meet differentiated demand from foundations, business groups or advocacy organizations for alternative perspectives and analysis. Policy institutes attempt to influence policy through intellectual argument and independent expert analysis rather than lobbying at the behest of interests. At a rhetorical level at least, they have public interest motivations in professing to educate the community, contributing to the social stock of knowledge, and in seeking to inform and improve policy by providing expert information and analysis. Think tanks are only “relatively autonomous” as they are often in
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resource-dependent relationships with other organizations and policy actors. The notion that a think tank requires financial independence from the state and private interests in order to be “free-thinking” is a peculiar AngloAmerican predilection that does not travel well into other cultures. There are significant differences between societally generated think tanks that are predominant in liberal democracies, and governmentally initiated or corporate think tanks that can often be found in Eastern Europe or Asia. Although they are usually non-profit organizations, think tank independence is often politically or legally constrained and limited by funding dependence. Intellectual freedom and professional commitment to epistemic values and knowledge creation can be compromised by the need to secure funding and be responsive to interests external to the organisation. Accordingly, financial independence could be liberally construed as developing an endowment or having numerous sponsors and a diverse funding base, so that the organization is not dependent on any one benefactor. Scholarly independence is reliant upon certain practices within an institute: for example, the processes of peer review and a commitment to open inquiry rather than directed research. While all display a high level of social scientific expertise or familiarity with governmental structures and processes, there is considerable diversity in style and output of think tanks. The “ink tank” can be poised against the “think-and-do tank”; that is, there are significant differences between think tanks that are scholarly in focus and geared towards publication of books and reports, and think tanks that are more activist and engage in grass-roots activity. Some think tanks are small and lean organizations that run a dispersed network of researchers. By contrast, the Institut für Wirtschaftsforchung (IFO) in Germany is a large, technical and professionalized establishment reliant on a salaried in-house research staff. Some are more accessible to the general public compared to relatively exclusive establishments, like the US Council on Foreign Relations. Needless to say, the ideological disposition of think tanks varies markedly. Private institutes were a relatively unusual phenomenon prior to World War II. Generally, they were exclusive associations catering to an elite and educated audience. Importantly, they helped create and concentrate a pool of expertise in an era when such expertise was often lacking in government (see, inter alia, Higgott and Stone 1994; Wallace 1994). The Foreign Policy Association in the USA was founded in 1918. Following the Versailles Peace Conference, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute for International Affairs (also known as Chatham House) emerged as private alternatives, challenging the tendency to secrecy and elite diplomacy in foreign policy-making with superior quality, independent expertise and analysis via discussion and publications. Other European institutes, such as the Centre de Politiques Etrangère in Paris, also emerged post-Versailles but soon became moribund. In the 1930s and 1940s, sister institutes of Chatham
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House were founded in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and at later dates in India, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago. These foreign policy institutes were also complemented by an increasing array of social policy and economic think tanks, such as the Brookings Institution in the USA. Think tank development after World War II was more extensive. Many can be described as Cold War tanks, given their interest in the new field of strategic and security studies. Think tanks were less like the older establishment entities and more likely to be composed of a new technocratic elite. The US foreign policy scene became populated with high-profile think tanks such as RAND, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Hudson Institute which mastered “rationalist” methodological and analytical approaches, often within a “realist” framework (Stone 1996). There were counterparts in Europe and Scandinavia, like the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Sometimes they were established with government backing or military support. The National Defence Research Establishment in Sweden was commissioned by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs to provide technical support and research for Sweden’s position in international negotiations relating to arms control and disarmament. Elsewhere, peace and foreign policy research institutes, like the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, grew in number. In Austria the International Institute for Peace was established in 1957 as a “nonprofit public interest organization which undertakes scientific research on problems of peace, disarmament, common security, development, international cooperation and other global problems” (Day 1993:22). Liberal “progressive” institutes emerged as dissatisfaction towards the USA’s global role mounted with the escalation of hostilities in Vietnam and the increased visibility of Third World issues. The Institute for Policy Studies in Washington DC is exemplary, and its work is complemented in Europe by the Amsterdam-based TransNational Institute. Development studies institutes burgeoned as Third World problems became acute and attracted funding from foundations and development agencies. From the 1970s, two broad trends are apparent: first, increasing competition and specialization within established think tank communities, and second, the proliferation of think tanks in developing and other countries. Countries where think tanks were already present, such as the USA, Britain, Sweden, Canada, Japan and Germany, experienced a proliferation of think tanks. In France, for example, the Institut Français des Relations Internationales has become a highly respected institute with wellestablished international links, while the Prométhée Institute has given itself the task of “spearheading an international effort to discuss the global networked society” that is being propelled by international telecommunications (Day 1993:113). Increased competition in the think tank industry has often encouraged policy advocacy and the politicization of research and analysis, most particularly in the USA (Fischer 1993). The
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Heritage Foundation is usually cited as the exemplar of this style. Similarly, increasing numbers of think tanks have promoted specialization and the search for policy niches. The European Community provided yet another forum for think tank activity. New institutes include the UK-based European Policy Forum; the Institut Européen de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité and the Centre for European Policy Studies, both in Belgium; and also the Research Institute for European Studies in Greece, a short-lived forum to generate interaction among younger scholars Europe-wide. Think tank development is quite extensive in some parts of Latin America, such as Argentina, where there is the relatively well-known Consejo Argentine para las Relaciones Internacionales, conducting research on the Antarctic, Latin-American integration and international trade and conflict resolution, as well as the Fondacíon Institute de Estudios Estratégicos Buenos Aires, investigating strategic issues. A handful of Chilean, Brazilian and Costa Rican institutes of international affairs or strategic studies were created in the early 1980s, but these organizations only emerged in El Salvador from 1990. Until recently, the political environment in many countries of this region has been unfavourable for the creation of independent policy research bodies. For instance, “an institute that seeks to specialize in strategic issues would normally have to convince a usually highly suspicious military of its good intentions” (Chipman 1987:52). Nevertheless, a number of institutes have been prominent in housing dissidents of authoritarian regimes and in introducing market liberal principles. Policy analysis was a monopoly of the state in the former communist bloc. Think tanks of the kind associated with North America and Western Europe were unknown. Nevertheless, there has been rapid growth of Western-style think tanks since 1989, often to import free market and Western liberal ideas into these societies. For example, the Liberal Institute in the Czech Republic was created as a “think tank for liberty” to advocate the principles and ideas of Milton Friedman and other like-minded theorists. The Market Economy Society in Estonia exists “to channel knowledge about the workings of a market economy and free enterprise from Scandinavia to Estonia” (Day 1993:91). Another development has been “the transformation of an existing institute, generally within a country’s academy of sciences, such as the Institute for World Economics in Budapest” or the Polish Institute of International Affairs. In many cases, “The foreign minister appoints the heads of these institutes, the majority of research personnel are ‘on loan’ from the ministries, and the great preponderance of budget support comes from government funds” (Quigley 1996:86). North East Asian think tanks tend to be large organizations, benefiting from government or corporate support. Leading Japanese institutes with corporate connections include the Nomura and Mitsubishi Research
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Institutes and the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA). NIRA produces a Think Tank Almanac and operates a web page on the Internet of think tanks world-wide. By contrast, the Korea Development Institute is a government-funded economic think tank. Taiwanese think tanks have established ties to academic institutions, but most, like the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, remain heavily reliant on government research contracts. Genuinely private think tanks, like the 21st Century Fund, are a new phenomenon in Taiwan, and numbers are still small. In South East Asian countries, think tanks are smaller in size and have fewer resources at their disposal compared to their more technocratic North East Asian counterparts. Frequently they are linked to their governments despite their autonomous legal status. Internationally prominent institutes include the Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore, the Institute for Strategic and Inter- national Studies in Malaysia, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia, and the Institute of Security and International Studies in Thailand (Yamamoto 1996). Compared to other continents, there are probably fewer think tanks in Africa and the Middle East. In the Arab world, however, there has been an increase in the number of institutes devoted to analysing Palestinian questions and the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as, for example, the Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Egypt. Many African institutes are concerned with questions of environment and development, such as the Mazingira Institute in Kenya and the Institutes for African Alternatives. Further think tank development in many African countries suffers in that there are relatively few people with the training or the entrepreneurial opportunity to muster the resources and institutional support to provide a research base on which think tanks can be founded. In summary, there are three discernible periods of think tank development. The first wave of development commenced at the turn of the century, lasting until World War II. Initial efforts by a few organizations to collaborate cross-nationally, or to be established as “imperial” entities (such as the now defunct Round Table) or on an international basis (such as was proposed at Versailles for the new institutes of international affairs) were foiled by the tyranny of distance and the difficulties presented by war and instability, the more rudimentary forms of communication and the persistence of elite and sometimes secretive policy-making processes. It was a considerable feat for these new think tanks to gain a secure organizational footing in a domestic political context let alone build international links. The second wave from 1945 was characterized by extensive think tank development, but these institutes remained state-centric. Often their emergence was a response to the need of national governments and local elites to better comprehend Cold War hostilities, developmental issues in the Third World or the domestic policy problems of industrialization and urbanization. The third wave of development is the phase in which think tanks can be
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clearly seen to be acting transnationally and in global fora. The OPEC oil crisis of 1974, the increasing salience of environmental issues and, more latterly, the breakdown of socialism have all seen the emergence of institutes responding to such events and focused on transborder policy problems. Think tanks are reactive to these “real world” phenomena, but they are also driven by proactive policy entrepreneurs who drive these institutes towards creating new global agendas and fashioning specific understandings and interpretations of events (see Badelt 1997). Think tank transnationalization While most policy research institutes have been established as state-based entities for national audiences, a small number claim to be “international”. Today, the Club of Rome advertises as a world-wide think tank, but at its genesis in 1967 it was a relatively formless collection of individuals. SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) has an international governing board and staff but is identified with Sweden as the Swedish parliament is its primary benefactor. The Trilateral Commission, established in 1973, provides the closest example of an international think tank. Although it operates with a small permanent staff, it draws together over three hundred leading individuals from politics, business, academe and bureaucracy in the European Union, Japan and North America. It does not have a strong organizational presence, unlike one regional think tank— ISEAS—which was established in 1968 in Singapore subsequent to the founding of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In general, however, the transnationalization of think tanks is a more recent phenomenon. There are six features of transnationalization. First, think tanks have moved off-shore and established branch offices. The Heritage Foundation opened an office in Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as has the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The European Policy Forum maintained offices in London and Brussels, as did the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Second, think tanks have been created as international or regional network institutes. The Institute for African Alternatives is a network of institutes in London, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Senegal and Zimbabwe conducting policy research on alternative development strategies and social transformation, and develops links with overseas development agencies and grass-roots organizations. The Institute for European Environmental Policy is a network of three sister institutes in London, Berlin and Madrid, dedicated to the advancement of European environmental policies. Third, the global think tank boom has stimulated cross-national collaborative research and exchange of personnel. For a few years in the early 1990s, the Tokyo Club Foundation drew together analysts from Brookings, Chatham House, IFO, and the Institut Français des Relations
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Internationales with the Nomura Research Institute in Japan (which provided most of the finance). Nomura sought to engage the “world’s leading research organizations” in an international think tank network. A fourth feature is the formation of industry-like associations and international gatherings. The Atlas Foundation (based in Virginia) is an umbrella organization for free market institutes world-wide that provides start-up funds and technical assistance for new institutes. Similarly, the Japan Center for International Exchange has convened a “Global ThinkNet” conference for the heads of the world’s most prestigious think tanks around the world to discuss ways of influencing policies. Indicative of growing appreciation of think tank role in knowledge development was the role of the Economic Development Institute, an operational unit of the World Bank, in sponsoring global and regional think tank conferences throughout 1997–99 to cultivate and strengthen interaction between these organizations, funding agencies and the World Bank. Fifth, the transnationalization of think tanks has also been propelled by processes of emulation and copying (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). As noted, a number of institutes were modelled after Chatham House. The Atlas Foundation actively encourages the transfer of free market institutes. Additionally, some individuals trained in Western educational systems have acquired a familiarity with the think tank form and a desire to replicate them in their home countries. In China, the Ford Foundation has provided start-up funds for the China Centre for Economic Research, staffed by Westerntrained scholars and patterned after American non-profit research institutes (Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 May 1995:75). An innovative enterprise is currently under way to export the US think tank model to Japan (Struyk et al. 1993). Finally, a number of think tanks with domestic policy interests have developed a global or regional focus. The Urban Institute is a good example. One of the pre-eminent American think tanks concerned with social policy, Urban has established an institute in Russia, and has provided advisers on social policy for a number of other countries. Importantly, think tanks do not become regional or global actors unless they find a firm fundament at a domestic level. Institutes that operate in global arenas tend to be elite, well-established and high-profile bodies in their national context. Furthermore, bodies like the Trilateral Commission, SIPRI, Brookings and ISEAS have prominence in global or regional affairs. Western think tanks are more prominent than institutes from the “South” or the developing world. These Western think tanks are sometimes viewed as disseminating ideas that bolster the prevailing liberal hegemonic order of free market economies and liberal democratic polities. They use their superior resources, whether it be funding, professional personnel or entrée to transnational policy networks, to promote normative policy positions. Such elite think tanks represent one organizational component of what
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some describe as a transnational grouping of global norm-setting elites (Gill 1990). The transnationalization of think tanks is creating new hierarchies, the emergence of global think tank establishment (epitomized by Global ThinkNet) and unequal power differentials between think tanks. The vast majority of think tanks are not known beyond their national borders and lack the size, stature, recognized experts and resources of these institutes. Most institutes do not have the funds or personnel to devote to networking at a global or regional level. Asian, Latin-American or African institutes may acquire regional stature but few gain the global reputation of relative “newcomers” like the World Resources Institute or the Institute for International Economics, both in Washington DC. Mature think tank communities in liberal democracies have created fertile conditions and a greater propensity for international exchange between like-minded think tanks in Europe and North America. In short, organizational consolidation at a domestic level is necessary to “push” some think tanks beyond national confines. Yet these “push” factors also enter into a dynamic with the forces that “pull” think tanks into global arenas. For instance, North American, Japanese and European foundations have been an important source of funding and impetus for cross-national collaboration between think tanks and other organizations. Accordingly, sources of demand pull think tanks into global politics, while “supply-side” factors push think tanks beyond a national context. Supply and demand dynamics Some think tanks are pushed into a global role by competition at the national level. For example, as the think tank industry has become saturated at the national level in the USA, and to a lesser extent in countries such as Canada, Germany and Britain, there is a need to expand organizational horizons. With intense competition at the domestic level, it becomes more difficult for individual think tanks to be noticed, consulted or contracted by national governments. Thus, globalizing organizational activity is an adaptation to secure relevance, organizational expansion and aggrandizement. It widens the political space in which they function. By contrast, in political systems that are more closed, moving on to a global or regional plane of interaction may be a way to circumvent authoritarian controls and exclusion from domestic policy networks. The global or regional domain allows greater scope for mobilization, as a think tank can find support from donor agencies or groups from other states. For example, many institutes in Asia or Latin America have become reliant upon links to certain German foundations which provide “political aid” to continue their activities (Bartsch 1997). Nevertheless, even those think tanks that have acquired a high international profile still speak to local
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and national audiences. Institutes engage in a multi-level effort to secure their policy relevance and organizational survival. Another push factor can be found in the internal dynamics of policy institutes. If the mission of an institute is to investigate international trade, democratization or environmental policy, then such organizational interest will push the institute to interact with transnational policy communities in these fields. The transnational character of many policy problems establishes a dynamic for research collaboration, sharing of information and cooperation on other activities that pull think tanks into intellectual networks and scientific associations. For instance, the IFO is a member of the European Economic Research and Advisory Consortium and belongs to the Association d’Institutes Européens de Conjoncture Economique. Through these private associations and regional research networks, states and international organizations can maximize their access to high-quality policy research and information at minimal cost (Raustiala 1997:727). Global networking also requires leadership skills and vision as well as expert personnel to carry the organization into these new fora. Think tank entrepreneurs “are needed to organize the changes in the supply structure”. That is, by making their organizations transnational, by developing new global research agendas and by plugging themselves into networks, the executives and scholars of these organizations adapt “to meet the changing demand” (Badelt 1997:171) from private and public actors at the global level. Individual think tank staff often have a vested interest in organizational expansion, for principled reasons as well as for self-interested reasons of seeking political visibility abroad and career enhancement. In short, they are “impure altruists” (Kingma 1997). Although think tanks are private organizations producing collective goods, private benefits also accrue to the individuals associated with these institutes. They acquire access to high-level networks, informal entrée to decision-making fora, policy experience and personal contacts that frequently position individuals to make beneficial career moves. On the demand side, there is a sufficiently large group of people in diplomatic and military circles, among other private actors, in the media, law firms and consultancy companies as well as in international organizations who require high-quality research and analysis. In the global system, such analysis tends to be under-supplied by governments and international organizations. The reasons for under-supply are multifaceted but three reasons are apparent. First, in many countries, knowledge activities that were traditionally supported by the public have suffered from fiscal restraint and state retrenchment. Second, knowledge development has the character of a public good which weakens investment in its production. Third, information asymmetries mean that consumers are often not able to judge the quality of private knowledge services and may defer from entering the market for such services. These “market failures” present opportunity for non-profit providers.
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Importantly, the non-profit form of most think tanks is advantageous. The non-profit label “is a signal of trust” (Kingma 1997:144). The analysis of non-profit organizations is often viewed as more credible and dispassionate, or more substantial, scientific and detailed, than that generated by consultancies, by activist-advocacy organizations or by some government research units. “Non-profit organizations, because of their stated goal of not seeking to maximize profit, are more trusted by consumers to provide these goods” (Kingma 1997:144). Think tank executives usually encourage such impressions, arguing that independent research and analysis is of greater academic integrity or more objective than that produced by groups representing vested interests, as well as more critical and challenging of policy than government analysis. However, this image of neutrality and scholarly impartiality is being eroded by a generation of more ideologically focused think tanks, the so-called New Right think tanks being a prime example. Non-profit organizations are often argued to be more responsive to the demands of donors or patrons—in this case, foundations, advocacy groups, and individuals—who wish to support and promote certain ideas, perspectives and norms in emerging modes of global governance (RoseAckerman 1997). Such norms may concern human rights, security cooperation or sustainable development. As alternative providers of knowledge, think tanks represent a concentration of information and expertise that can provide intellectual legitimation of norms. Activist organizations like Greenpeace can draw upon the analysis of respected institutes such as World Watch to reinforce its own research or advocacy on sustainable development. Those who desire policy analysis that supports the case for a free trading system are likely to find policy options and analyses of high but accessible standard produced by organizations such as the Institute of International Economics. The altruistic or ideological motives of scientists or activists find outlet through non-profit research institutes which are able to “reify” their beliefs and make them more credible. However, expertise is also used as ammunition in partisan or ideological causes rather than as a source of considered and objective information. In some cases, the activities of ideologically motivated think tanks have blurred the distinctions between analysis and advocacy, and their reputations as knowledge providers have become tarnished. Nevertheless, the degree of scholarly commitment and adherence to professional or scientific norms within many think tanks is often sufficient to ensure high-quality research provision that also attracts the patronage of governments and international organizations (RoseAckerman 1997:130). As “independent”, “expert” non-profit knowledge organizations, they have some intellectual authority. They can mobilize intellectual resources and are often viewed as prestigious organizations appropriate for hosting high-level delegations. For example, the Institut Français des Relations Internationales declares, “In view of its independence and its capacity to
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organize high-level encounters, the Institute has become a prominent meeting point for numerous foreign delegations—be they governmental, corporate, parliamentary or academic—and analysts from various think tanks” (IFRI 1994:57). Another governance function is that think tanks have the ability to monitor and review implementation of agreements in global and regional contexts by providing informed judgements. Thus, the International Institute for Environment and Development provided some evidence on which the International Whaling Commission placed a moratorium on commercial whaling (Day 1993:364). The World Resources Institute has taken a lead in developing guidelines for national biodiversity strategies, under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme, providing assistance to governments in the implementation of Article 6 of the International Convention on Biodiversity (Mathews 1996:68–9). Think tanks can supply the necessary skills and expertise to scrutinize the implementation or adherence to international agreements, conventions and treaties. The kinds of relationship between think tanks and official agencies are multifold, ranging from a low-key service role to co-option into policy deliberations. Think tanks are often more appropriate for undertaking certain tasks than governments or international organizations. For example, the European Centre for Work and Society investigated structural unemployment in Europe. The Centre also maintained the Mutual Information System on Employment Policies, which is a Europe-wide database for interested parties, as well as the Euro-TecNet network of vocational training demonstration projects (Day 1993:235). Both were funded by the European Commission. A specialized think tank like the Centre can run such projects more efficiently and closer to target groups than a large bureaucratic body. For similar reasons, foundations and donor agencies seeking to bolster civil society organizations in the “South” provide funding for local think tanks to aid development research, provide training or engage grass-roots organizations. “Informal diplomacy” represents a more active intervention and incorporation into decision-making processes and a governance role “behind-the-scenes” which is achieved by relatively few think tanks. This kind of diplomacy entails activities or discussions involving academics and intellectuals, journalists, business elites and others as well as officials “acting in their private capacity”. Consequently, the demarcation between official and unofficial involvement is unclear. When negotiations are undertaken in a bilateral or multilateral context between governments, the involvement of “independent” think tanks can help mediate tensions or communication lapses. They can act as intermediaries between interests because of their assumed neutrality, scientific objectivity and non-partisanship. Informal diplomacy is a useful mode of negotiation when new international or regional arrangements are being flagged, requiring coordination, information, analysis and discussion as well as discretion. Think
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tanks facilitate negotiations by providing a closed forum as well as a “middle ground” where new forms of co-operation or approaches to regional conflicts can be explored privately in an “off-the-record setting”. Such an activity is useful to governments if the think tank is a prominent organization, of which foreigners have heard, and, more importantly, if it can draw upon a network of distinguished statespeople, business leaders, diplomats, military officers and scholars. A good example of informal diplomacy conducted through think tanks is apparent in South East Asia. The ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) was an important research and policy network establishing political support for new ideas about security co-operation in the region and central in the initiation of a new multilateral forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum (Kerr 1994). Think tank involvement in global politics and regional affairs is becoming more extensive. However, it is in rare circumstances that these institutes acquire the power to influence policy agendas or sway decision-making. More often, they perform a service role of providing information and analysis or feedback on programme implementation. While it is the case that these private organizations produce public goods and services, the social status of think tanks as private organizations is debatable. These “private” organizations become quasi-public organizations when they are regularly invited to disseminate information for government agencies or international organizations, when they are incorporated into official deliberations to provide expert legitimation and testimony, or when they are requested or encouraged to monitor international agreements. The intermeshing of their activities with state agencies or regional organizations blurs the boundaries between public and private, and public perception of these organizations as independent institutes. Policy networks and think tanks Whether it be informal diplomacy in collaboration with international organizations or states, or disseminating ideas and information to other private actors, all but the most scholarly think tanks seek incorporation into policy networks. Two concepts currently fashionable in the international relations literature—epistemic communities and transnational advocacy networks—are useful frameworks for assessing the character of think tank contributions to global governance, and complement an older public policy literature on “policy communities” (Rhodes and Marsh 1992). The epistemic community approach focuses on scientists and other expert actors in policy-making who share norms, causal beliefs and political projects and who seek to translate their scientific beliefs and political values, through a common policy project in their domain of expertise, into public policies. They are defined by their “consensual knowledge” (Haas 1992). Transnational advocacy networks include relevant actors working
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internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink 1997). It is a looser concept than epistemic community, more focused on individual activists, a range of private organizations and social movements cohering around common values. Both these concepts emphasize the role of principled ideas in shaping policy. Their utility is in highlighting the strategic alliances that think tanks need to make with other global actors in order for private policy research and analysis to influence policy agendas and have impact in global politics. There is a mutually beneficial dynamic whereby think tanks engage in four different kinds of activity to help networks function. In brief, these are: 1 basic information provision; 2 a broad operational role that can include negotiations reporting, enhancing domestic signalling, building network infrastructure and developing linkages; 3 rule development and monitoring; 4 a value function. As non-profit knowledge organizations, think tanks confer some scholarly credibility on the policy aims of organizations or individuals they interact with in policy networks. In return, think tanks attract funding and other resources from individuals, foundations and corporations, and opportunities to spread their ideas beyond research communities. In the following discussion, think tank interactions within privatization and environmental networks are used to illustrate these four functions. Free market policy institutes (inter alia, the Lithuanian Free Market Institute, the Fraser Institute in Canada and the Walter Eucken Institute in Germany) have been important in spreading the ideas contributing to the international spread of privatization. In particular, the so-called New Right think tanks in Britain—such as the Centre for Policy Studies, the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute—pioneered research into privatization. During the 1970s and 1980s they helped establish intellectual legitimacy for the new policy approach and the blueprints for its implementation. Yet their research, analysis and advocacy of privatization had an international dimension. The Adam Smith Institute’s privatization consultancy work is a good example (Heffernan 1996:75). Since 1987 the Institute has held an annual international conference on privatization which attracts hundreds of foreign representatives based in government, international aid agencies, privatized companies, law firms, regulatory organizations and corporations. Privatization is also being marketed by other private actors such as banks, law firms and consultancies to which the free market think tanks also sought to provide advice and information. However, these companies are selling their regulatory and legal expertise for
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the implementation of privatization (or what is outlined as rule development above). Think tanks are more often involved in a prior process, getting such a policy accepted and on to policy agendas through information provision and norm promotion. The free market think tanks were part of an international intellectual network of individual academics, economists, journalists and others, that promoted privatization ideas prior to public or political understanding or acceptance of the approach. They developed the intellectual arguments to validate privatization, and once it was experimented with in Britain they sought to promote the policy transfer of privatization to other countries (see Butler 1992). The Centre for Policy Studies sent a “small team of British experts to brief President Reagan’s Privatization Commission” (CPS 1988). In the USA, the California-based Institute for Contemporary Studies has promoted privatization as an aid to development in developing countries, producing a handbook on techniques of privatization for this purpose (Hanke 1987). The Reason Foundation (a specialist think tank almost entirely devoted to privatization issues) has provided advice and assistance to Yugoslavian business leaders. The Urban Institute has provided technical advice on and funded a study of the privatization of housing in Hungary. For a number of years, the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York initiated an international privatization project to generate North American interest in privatization elsewhere in the world. These activities exemplify the first function of information provision. The market liberal think tanks acted not only as a clearing-house for information on privatization but also as advocates of neo-liberal values and principles. These organizations were informed by the ideas of F.A. Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and Milton Friedman that translated into an aversion to state intervention and a preference for the unfettered operation of market forces and individual choice. Rather than merely research privatization, these organizations sought, first, to educate the general public of the merits of privatization through media commentary, publications and public seminars, or provision of educational materials for schools and universities; second, to introduce privatization ideas into domestic policy communities by interacting with local government officials, politicians and business interests to build coalitions of support; and third, to spread privatization ideas through think tank networks to other countries and into international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. These activities are indicative of the principled ideas and normative project of an epistemic community, and of the “value” function outlined earlier. Common agendas among an international privatization epistemic community do not lead to similar outcomes. Country-specific institutional and political factors have moulded the forms of privatization chosen and implemented by states. Think tanks promoted the policy transfer of
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privatization principles at a broad ideational level. Consequently, the role of think tanks is less pronounced since privatization has moved from the policy agenda and become an accepted and relatively uncontroversial policy practice in most countries. The think tank role has diminished from advocacy of an innovative approach in the 1970s and 1980s to a broader operational role of providing technical assistance, monitoring world-wide privatization practices and acting as a resource bank (especially the Reason Foundation). A privatization epistemic community congregating around free market institutes persists, but it is less coherent and influential now that the impetus for privatization resides with governments, international organizations and other non-state actors. In retrospect, however, the governance role of these institutes was to mobilize information and expertise to set policy agendas in favour of privatization and shape policy developments world-wide. Environmental policy research institutes, or “green tanks”, have burgeoned over the last decade. While many of these institutes have strong connections to transnational advocacy networks, they remain similar to the free market institutes in that they are relatively elite and scholarly organizations interested in shaping agendas and in the transnational spread of ideas, norms and values. Many of these institutes are North American or European, such as the World Resources Institute, World Watch and Resources For the Future or, in Europe, the Institutes for European Environmental Policy, the Öko-Institut in Germany and the Green Left Research Bureau in the Netherlands. To an extent they are paralleled elsewhere in the world. For instance, the Thailand Environment Institute is a large, respected technocratic research institute similar to the World Resources Institute. Many “Southern” institutes combine environmental concerns with development issues: inter alia, the Mazingira Institute in Kenya and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Pakistan. These institutes usually house researchers from a range of disciplinary backgrounds, with expertise in such diverse fields as tropical deforestation, ozone depletion, whaling or resource accounting, who interact in various networks that extend outside the organization. Green tanks have carved out a role and reputation for information gathering and dissemination. They distribute information downwards to other private actors, grass-roots bodies and civil society associations as well as upwards to international organizations and states. The World Watch Institute’s annual State of the World, published in many languages, is regarded by many as a valuable reference concerning recent scientific thinking on environmental problems and policy developments. Other institutes distribute newsletters, organize seminars and maintain websites to disseminate information. Furthermore, their operational functions are diverse. For instance, in 1995 Resources for the Future arranged a series of briefings on policies for environmental protection in the US and other nations for a delegation to the US from China’s National Environmental
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Protection Agency, sponsored by the World Bank (Resources, 121 (1995): 11). Domestic signalling occurs when staff at the Thailand Environment Institute provide training programmes, lectures and technical advice concerning the ISO 14000 EMS standards through the Thailand Business Council for Sustainable Development (and for which the Institute acts as the Secretariat). In the early 1990s, one Institute for European Environmental Policy created an annotated directory of all private environmental organizations in Eastern Europe receiving European Union funds, in order to improve co-operation and communication. Green tanks reflect multiple value identities or normative positions. As noted above, the Institute of Economic Affairs has undertaken privatization research and advocacy, but the Institute’s “Environment Unit” is also an intellectual site for free market environmentalists. These two disparate policy fields are connected by a common neo-liberal paradigm which forms the core of their “consensual knowledge”. The Political Economy Research Center in the USA, the Institute of Economic Affairs in London and the Tasman Institute in Australia can be regarded as part of a free market environmental epistemic community that presents an alternative view from “mainstream environmentalism”. An organization with a quite different ideological character, the International Institute for Sustainable Development has been one think tank, in conjunction with the Earth Council and the Green Cross International, advocating the need for an “International Charter for the Earth” that would institute a set of “Earth ethics”. The long-range objective is ratification by members of the United Nations to entrench a global Sustainable development ethic in international law, an ambition indicative of the third function outlined earlier. While both groups of think tanks might subscribe to the value and broad policy project of “Sustainable development”, they are founded on different forms of consensual knowledge and, as such, belong to rival epistemic communities. These four functions carried out by think tanks help to promote the coherence and identity of networks, whether they be epistemic communities of experts, transnational advocacy networks in social movements or the more bureaucratically centred policy communities. Think tank activities in networks enhance the capacity of non-state actors to collectively influence policy agendas of states and international organizations. But different actors adopt different tactics. The style of think tanks is markedly different from the activism of many other private actors. The claims made by World Resources Institute (WRI) provide a good example of the different roles performed by environmental actors, and the agenda-setting objective of the Institute. In 1992 the global issues of environment and development had become so important that the heads of more than a hundred nations gathered at an “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to adopt an unprecedented agenda for achieving environmentally sustainable development in the twenty-first
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century. The significance of greenhouse warming and loss of biodiversity, which had been two primary areas of focus for WRI in its first ten years, was confirmed by the signing of international treaties to address these two issues. While WRI had been relatively alone in its examination of these problems in 1982, hundreds of organizations, inside and outside government, were actively trying to find solutions to them by 1992. WRI could pull back from aspects of these and related issues that primarily involved raising policymakers’ attention levels or generating political will to address well-defined options. WRI’s niche continued to be in generating and defining policy responses. Activist groups and membership organizations could better fulfil the other roles (Mathews 1996:64–5). Advocacy organizations such as Friends of the Earth also raise awareness and promote policies for the environment. However, they occupy a different niche from think tanks: they adopt pressure group tactics and are more often connected to transnational advocacy networks and social movements. Think tanks tend to have a low-key advisory role, are primarily driven by their research interests, professional norms and (social) scientific objectives, and are not accountable to grass-roots bodies or grounded in social movements. Like epistemic communities, think tanks are elite knowledge-based organizations, usually with attenuated roots in civil societies. It is tempting to portray think tanks as organizations that contain epistemic communities—in a sense, a tank or “brain-box” where epistemic communities may be germinated or housed. There is an evident complementarity between think tanks and epistemic communities. Both are deemed to be driven by the precepts of science and of influencing policy. For epistemic communities, think tanks are ideal organizations to broadcast and co-ordinate their policy aims. Indeed, in the immediate post World War II period an epistemic community of security specialists was influential in shaping US policy on nuclear deterrence and closely identified with the RAND Corporation (Stone 1996: chapter 12). However, characterizing research institutes as “intellectual containers” of epistemic communities is not the most appropriate use of the “tank” metaphor. Think tanks are not the sole locus of epistemic communities. Instead, it is more accurate to depict think tanks as vehicles which accommodate a range of passengers and which travel or traverse the network terrain of epistemic communities, transnational advocacy networks or policy communities as well as research or scientific networks. On occasion, an epistemic community may drive or direct a think tank, developing research agendas and producing policy analysis in tune with their consensual knowledge, but there will also be other passengers on board the think tank who may not defer to the “conventional wisdom” of the epistemic community. Furthermore, once members of an epistemic community have acquired official recognition and penetrated international organizations and state agencies, the private organizational vehicle may be abandoned in favour of
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other more stately vehicles, such as representation on scientific commissions or official appointments, that provide a more direct route to policy influence. Notwithstanding the incorporation into formal decision-making processes that epistemic communities may find, think tanks still provide informal communication structures between experts, activists, scientists and official actors and provide the infrastructure to connect epistemic communities with transnational advocacy networks and with policy communities of official actors. Conclusions Think tanks are small, private, non-profit research organizations that are able to survive in global policy arenas—indeed, proliferate—because of strong and varied sources of demand for think tank services. The policy entrepreneurs in the world’s leading think tanks build mutually beneficial relationships with other private actors, such as foundations, business associations, legal fraternities or advocacy groups, as well as with state agencies and international organizations. However, it is in conjunction with other like-minded actors in networks that think tank ideas and knowledge are broadcast and amplified, and these organizations encounter opportunities to establish new policy agendas or alter the terms of debate. Within policy networks, think tanks perform useful roles as information clearing-houses, initiating research and generating policy options, acting as a site for discussions for actors from disparate backgrounds, and developing network infrastructure—starting newsletters, building data-bases, organizing conferences and preparing submissions. In sum, think tanks can help networks function more efficiently and coherently. This represents an indirect contribution to global modes of governance in the sense of creating channels of communication between formal and informal policy actors. Additionally, the degree of professional commitment to scholarly norms and the quality of information and analysis produced by many think tanks attracts the patronage of governments and international organizations. Consequently, certain think tanks are contracted or co-opted into governance functions that include basic information provision for international organizations, negotiations reporting and domestic signalling to national political elites, as well as rule development and monitoring of international agreements. The network interactions of think tanks—their relationships with research associations and academic centres, or their involvement with epistemic communities—do not constitute the nascence of private regulatory regimes. Instead, these research institutes are one set of actors alongside an increasingly rich pageant of other private organizations incorporated by states and international organizations into global and regional policy processes.
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Acknowledgements Research for this chapter was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (reference number H52427008094). Some themes in this chapter were first outlined by the author in “Think tank transnationalization” in Global Society 14 (2) 2000 and in “Nongovernmental policy transfer”, Governance 13 (1) 2000. References Badelt, C. (1997) “Entrepreneurship theories of the non-profit sector”, Voluntas 8 (2):162–78. Bartsch, S. (1997) “The German political foundations’ foreign policy: of what is it an instance?”, paper prepared for the 38th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 18–22 March. Butler, E. (ed.) (1992) Privatization East and West, London: Adam Smith Institute. Centre for Policy Studies (1988) The Power of Ideas, London: Centre for Policy Studies. Chipman, J. (1987) Survey of International Relations Institutes in the Developing World, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Day, A.J. (1993) Think Tanks: An International Directory, Essex: Longman. Dolowitz, D. and D.Marsh (1996) “Who learns from whom: a review of the policy transfer literature”, Political Studies 44 (2):343–57. Fischer, F. (1993) “Policy discourse and the politics of Washington think tanks” in F.Fischer and J.Forester (eds) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, London: UCL Press. Gill, S. (1990) American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haas, P. (1992) “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’, International Organization 46 (1):1–35. Hanke, S.H. (1987) Privatization and Development, San Francisco: ICS Press. Heffernan, R. (1996) “‘Blueprint for a revolution?’ The politics of the Adam Smith Institute”, Contemporary British History 10 (Spring): 73–87. Higgott, R. and D.Stone (1994) “The limits of influence: foreign policy think tanks in Great Britain and the USA”, Review of International Studies 20 (1): 15–34. Institut Français des Relations Internationales (1994) Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris: IFRI. Keck, M. and K.Sikkink (1997) Transnational Issue Networks in International Politics, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. Kerr, P. (1994) “The security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific”, Pacific Review 7 (4): 397– 409. Kingma, B. (1997) “Public good theories of the non-profit sector: Weisbrod revisited”, Voluntas 8 (2):135–48. McGann, J. (1994) The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence in the Public Policy Research Industry, Lanham (Maryland): University Press of America. Mathews, J.T. (1996) “Creating an independent institute for policy research on global issues: the World Resources Institute” in J.Telgarsky and M.Ueno (eds)
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Think Tanks in a Democratic Society: An Alternative Voice, Washington DC: Urban Institute. NIRA (http://www.nira.go.jp/ice/tt-info/nwdtt96/index.html). Quigley, K. (1996) “Think tanks in newly democratic Eastern Europe” in J.Telgarsky and M.Ueno (eds) Think Tanks in a Democratic Society: An Alternative Voice, Washington DC: Urban Institute. Raustiala, K. (1997) “States, NGOs, and international environmental institutions”, International Studies Quarterly: 41:719–40. Rhodes, R.A.W. and D.Marsh (1992) “New directions in the study of policy networks”, European Journal of Political Research 21:181–205. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997) “Altruism, ideological entrepreneurs and the non-profit firm”, Voluntas 8 (2):120–34. Smith, J.A. (1991) The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite, New York: Free Press. Stone, D. (1996) Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process, London: Frank Cass. Struyk, R.J., M.Ueno and T.Suzuki (eds) (1993) A Japanese Think Tank: Exploring Alternative Models, Washington DC: Urban Institute. Wallace, W. (1994) “Between two worlds: think tanks and foreign policy” in C.Hill and P.Beshoff (eds) Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas, London: Routledge and London School of Economics. Yamamoto, T. (ed.) (1996) Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community, Singapore: Institute for South East Asian Studies and the Japan Center for International Exchange.
Index
Adam Smith Institute 200 Advisory Committee on Social Questions 172 African Council of AIDS Service Organizations (AfriCASO) 133 AIDS: community-based organizations 124–6; community-based organizations as global players 129–34; institutional responses to problem 127 (Figure 6.1); reason for community-based organizations at global level 134–41; role of community-based organizations in governance 126–9 AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) 130, 131 American Federation of Labor 37 Amnesty International: case study 146–7, 152–6; mobilizing social capital 152–6; organizational growth 154 (Table 7.1); social capital 156–62 Anti-Slavery Society 150 ARPANET 109 Association d’Institutes Européens de Conjoncture Economique 196 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 193, 199 Atlas Foundation 194 authority, private 60 aviation 19 Bank for International Settlements 72, 76 banking 72–3, 75–6 Basle Agreement on Capital Adequacy (1988) 73 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 76
Beijing women’s conference (1995) 181–2, 185n Benenson, Peter 152 Bilderberg meetings 5 Brazilian Operating Committee (BROC), ETAD 94 Bretton Woods System 72 Bristol-Meyers Squibb 131 Brittan, Sir Leon 52 Brookings 193, 194 Brown, Gordon 76 Burroughs-Wellcome 131 Business Council for Sustainable Development (BSCD) 86 Business International NonGovernmental Organization (BINGO) 27n California effect 74 capital-market systems 69 Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs 201 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 193 Center for Political and Strategic Studies 192 Center for Strategic and International Studies 190 Centre de Politiques Etrangère 189 Centre for Economic Policy Research 193 Centre for European Policy Studies 191 Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) 200, 201 Centre for Strategic and International Studies 192 Cerf, Vinton 117 CERN 114 Chatham House see Royal Institute for International Affairs
208
Index chemical industry 18–19, 85–7, 98 China Centre for Economic Research 194 Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research 192 civil society organizations 10 Clark, Dave 110 Clinton, Bill 76 Club of Rome 193 Code of Ethics, dyestuffs industry 92, 93, 94 Commission of the Churches on International Affairs 150 Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 175, 176, 178, 179, 180 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 181 community-based organizations 124–6; as global players 129–34; reasons for presence at global level 134–41; role in governance 126–9 Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGO) 36 Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales 191 consultation rights 15 Copenhagen Forum (1980) 179, 182 corporate actors 104–6 Council of Europe 129 Council on Foreign Relations 189 data sheets 91–2, 94, 95 Delaware effect 74 Deutsche AIDS Hilfe 133 disintermediation of financial markets 62, 72–7 Du Pont 94 Durkheim, Emile 65, 66 Dyes Environmental and Toxicology Organization (DETO) 94 dyestuffs industry 19, 83, 90–5 Earth Council 203 Ecological and Toxicological Association of Dyes and Organic Pigments Manufacturers (ETAD) 83, 87, 90–5, 97 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 36, 38, 44–6, 54, 175, 178, 180 Economic Development Institute 194 economic institutions, global 38–9; finance 40–1; headquarters
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location 42; indicators of integration in UN system 44 (Table 2.1); legal status 39; mandated functions 42–4; membership 39– 40; ministerial representation 42; political status 40; and private organizations 44–54; voting systems 41 environmental issues 84–7 Equal Rights International 173 Ethnic Minorities and AIDS Network 130 European AIDS Treatment Group 130, 131 European Centre for Work and Society 198 European Commission 198 European Council of AIDS Service Organizations (EuroCASO) 133, 134, 140 European Court of Justice 152 European Economic Research and Advisory Consortium 196 European Exchange Rate Mechanism 71 European Interest Group of Drug Users 130 European Operating Committee (EOC), ETAD 94 European Policy Forum 191, 193 European Union (EU) 94, 129, 203 Euro-TecNet 198 family dynasties 5, 27n Fondacíon Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos Buenos Aires 191 Ford Foundation 194 Foreign Policy Association 189 Fraser Institute 200 free-riders 24, 93–4, 95 Friedman, Milton 191, 201 Friends of the Earth 204 Fuggers 27n General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 49, 50, 52 Geneva Convention 148 global economic institutions see economic institutions Global March against Child Labour 48 Global Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS 130, 132 global policy: human rights 147–50;
210
Index
participation of private organizations 2 global politics, proliferation of private organizations 2, 3–11 Global Program on AIDS (GPA) 129, 130, 133, 138 Global ThinkNet 195 globalization: financial markets 65, 67–8; private regulation 19, 21; state and private sector 68–72; use of term 34, 35 Goegg, Marie 171 Gold Standard 65 governance: corporate 77; environmental field 84–7; financial markets 63, 68–72; global 83, 89–90; global mechanisms 18–25; privatization of 74; representation of private organizations 11–17; role of community-based organizations 126–9, 134; webs of 59–63 Green Cross International 203 Green Left Research Bureau 202 Greenpeace 197 Group of Thirty 49 guidelines, regulation 92, 94 Hayek, F.A. 201 Heritage Foundation 190–1, 193 HIV/AIDS see AIDS Hudson Institute 190 human rights: private organizations 150–2; private promotion 156–62; promotion and enforcement 146; protecting 147–50; UN system 137, 148–9 Human Rights Watch 150 implementation issues 149 Indian Operating Committee (IOC), ETAD 94 influence, global exertion 166–8 information diffusion networks 146 Institut Européen de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité 191 Institut François des Relations Internationales 190, 193–4, 197 Institut für Wirtschaftsforchung (IFO) 189, 193, 196 Institute for African Alternatives 192, 193 Institute for Contemporary Studies 201
Institute for European Environmental Policy 188, 193, 202, 203 Institute for International Economics 195 Institute for Policy Studies 190 Institute for Strategic and International Studies 192 Institute for World Economics 191 Institute of Economic Affairs 200, 203 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 121n Institute of International Affairs 191 Institute of International Economics 197 Institute of International Finance 49 Institute of Security and International Studies 192 Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS) 192, 193, 194 Inter-American Commission of Women 172, 175 Inter-American Court of Human Rights 152 intergovernmental arrangements 168–74 Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) 85 International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) 117–18, 119 International AIDS Society 131 International Air Transport Association (IATA) 19, 115 International Association of Democratic Lawyers 150 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 49 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 1, 18, 37, 52, 98n International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 19 International Coalition for Development Action 53 International Commission of Jurists 150 International Community of Women living with HIV and AIDS 130 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 37 International Confederation of Industrial Employers 47 International Conferences on AIDS 130–1 International Convention on Biodiversity 198
Index International Co-operative Alliance 37, 47 International Council of AIDS Service Organizations (ICASO) 130–1, 132, 134 International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) 19, 86 International Council of Voluntary Agencies 50 International Council of Women (ICW) 171, 177 International Defence and Aid Fund 150 International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 108 International Federation of Accountants 77 International Federation of Agricultural Producers 37 International Federation of Business and Professional Women 179 International Federation of Christian Trade Unions 37 International Federation of Human Rights 150 International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) 76 International Federation of Trade Unions 47 International Finance Corporation 49 International Human Rights Treaty Bodies 150 International Institute for Environment and Development 198 International Institute for Peace 190 International Institute for Strategic Studies 190 International Institute for Sustainable Development 54, 203 International Labour Organization (ILO) 46–8; AIDS response 129; finance 40–1; headquarters location 42; integration in UN system 44 (Table 2.1); Internet Society role 114; legal status 39; mandated functions 42–3; market regulation 56; membership 39–40; ministerial representation 42; pluralist structure 55; policy-making 35; political status 40; voting system 41; women’s movement 165, 172–3, 174, 175–6, 177–80 International League for Human Rights 150
211
International League of Peace and Freedom 171 International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) 130, 132 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 49–52; corporatism 54, 56; finance 40–1; headquarters location 42; human rights issues 156; integration in UN system 44 (Table 2.1); legal status 39; mandated functions 42–3; membership 39–40; ministerial representation 42; policy-making 35; political status 40; problem-solving 4; role 76; think tank influence 201; voting system 41 International Olympic Committee (IOC) 1 International Organization of Employers 37 International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 76 International Peace Research Institute 190 International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) 50, 170 international political economy 4–5 International Primary Market Association (IPMA) 76 International Program on Chemical Safety (IPCS) 85 International Red Cross 1, 129, 150 international relations: proliferation of private organizations 3–4; theory 166, 185 International Safety Management Code (ICS/IFS) 19 International Securities Markets Association (ISMA) 76 International Standardization Organization (ISO) 108 International Steering Committee for People with HIV and AIDS 130, 134 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 103, 107–8, 114, 116–18, 121 International Trademark Association (INTA) 118 International Whaling Commission 198 International Women’s Rights Action Watch 181 International Women’s Year 178, 179 internationalization 19 Internet Architecture Board (IAB) 111, 112, 116, 118
212
Index
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) 110, 117, 118–19 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 102, 119, 121 Internet Domain Name System 117 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) 110–11, 112, 116 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 110–11, 112, 113, 116 Internet Society (ISOC) 19, 102–7, 111–21 Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals (IOMC) 85 isomorphism, institutional 106 Japan Center for International Exchange 194 Japanese Operating Committee (JOC), ETAD 94
networks: as global governance mechanisms 18–25; policy 35 New Public Management 67 Nomura Research Institute 191–2, 194 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 7, 10, 36–8 non-state actors 11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 51 NSFNET 109 Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) 19 Öko-Institut 202 Open Door International 173, 179 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 108 Organization of American States (OAS) 172, 178 organizational fields 104 (Figure 5.1), 106–7
Korea Development Institute 192 League of Nations 148, 165, 171–2, 174–5, 183 Liberal Institute 191 Lithuanian Free Market Institute 200 Madrid meetings (1994) 50–1 Mann, Jonathan 138 Market Economy Society 191 markets: governance complex 60–1; as institutions 63–8; securitization of 62–3, 72–7 Marx, Karl 61, 171 Mazingira Institute 192, 202 Medicis 27n Migrants Against HIV/AIDS 130 Minority Rights Group 150 Mitsubishi Research Institute 191–2 monitoring systems 23–4, 93, 94, 146, 149 Mutual Information System on Employment Policies 198 National Defence Research Establishment 190 National Environmental Protection Agency 202–3 neo-corporatism 16, 17, 34, 38, 54–6 Network of Sexwork-Related HIV/ AIDS Projects 130
pluralism 16, 34, 54–6 policy networks 35 Political Economy Research Center 203 pressure groups 10, 34 private organizations: concept 8; contributions to governance 11–17; formal character 8–9; global character 9–11; global exertion of influence 166–8; international political economy 4–5; international relations 3–4; private character 8; proliferation 2, 3–11; transnational relations 5–8; UN role 168–9 problem-solving 1–3, 25–7; contributions to governance 11–17, 83; global governance mechanisms 18–25; human rights 146; international political economy 4–5; international relations 3–4; transnational relations 5–11 Prométhée Institute 190 RAND Corporation 190, 204 Reason Foundation 201, 202 regulation: business self-regulation in comparative politics and international affairs 87–90; development of private regulation 93–5; financial 73–7; framework 14–15; monitoring systems 23–4,
Index 93, 94; national systems 70–1; organizations and networks as global governance mechanisms 18–25; origins of self-regulation 23; practices of self-regulation 90–2; problem-solving 2, 18; re-regulation 70; sanctions 24–5, 93; self-regulation 2, 18–22, 26 Regulatory Affairs Committee (RAC), ETAD 94 religion 159–60 representation of private organizations 2, 11–17, 26 Research Institute for European Studies 191 research institutes, private see think tanks resource dependency 12 Resources for the Future 202 Rio Earth Summit see United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Round Table 192 Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) 189, 193, 194 rule systems 96, 148 Safety Data Sheets 91–2, 94, 95 Salvation Army 171 sanctions 24–5, 93 securitization of financial markets 62– 3, 72–7 Shiva, Vandana 54 Smith, Adam 63 sports 20 state: globalization and the private sector 68–72; regulatory role 67–8 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 193, 194 Survival International 150 Sustainable Development Policy Institute 202 Symposium on Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development (1997) 53 Tarjanne, Pekka 117 Tasman Institute 203 Taylor, Harriet 171 TELECOM 95 Forum 117 telecommunications: global 107–9; Internet Society 115–19 Terrence Higgins Trust 133 Thailand Environment Institute 202, 203
213
think tanks 187–8; global spread 188–93; policy networks and 199–205; supply and demand dynamics 195–9; transnationalization 193–5 Third World women 177–80 Thomas, Albert 47 Tokyo Club Foundation 193 trade unions 37 Transatlantic Business Dialogue 5 transgovernmental relations 35 transnational: actors 35, 36; relations 5–8; social movements 10 TransNational Institute 190 transport 19 Trilateral Commission 5, 193, 194 21st Century Fund 192 Union of American Republics (UAR) 165, 172, 174 United Nations (UN): AIDS strategy 141; Charter 175; creation 10; exchange partners 6; global economic institutions and 38–56; human rights system 137, 148–9; integration of global economic institutions in 44 (Table 2.1); organizations and agencies 14; private organizations and 36–8; regulatory framework 16; role in global economy 35; Women’s Decade 178, 180; women’s movement 37–8, 168, 175–85 United Nations Center for Human Rights 129 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 51, 129, 133 United Nations Commission on Global Governance 18, 85 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, Rio Earth Summit) 52, 85, 181, 203 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 35, 39–46, 48, 55, 56, 114 United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-DHA) 115 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 129, 133 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) 115 United Nations Educational, Scientific
214
Index
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 129, 133 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 85, 198 United Nations Human Rights Centre 156 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 129, 133 United Nations Programme on HIV/ AIDS (UNAIDS) 131, 133–4 United States: Federal Networking Council (FNC) 118; Internet role 103, 109, 111; National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 118–19 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 129 United States Operating Committee (USOC), ETAD 94 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 148 Urban Institute 194, 201 Urgent Action Network 154 Uruguay Round 52 volunteers 147, 157–62 von Mises, Ludwig 201 Walter Eucken Institute 200 Wilson, Woodrow 171 women’s movement: access to intergovernmental arrangements 168–74; continued struggle for equality 174–7; League of Nations role 171–5, 183; new strategies 180– 3; as political actor 165–6; private organizations and global exertion of influence 166–8; Third World demands 177–80; UN role 37–8, 168, 175–85 workers’ internationals 7 World AIDS Day (1988) 132 World Bank, 49–52; AIDS response 129, 133; environmental issues 203;
finance 40–1; headquarters location 42; human rights issues 156; integration in UN system 44 (Table 2.1); legal status 39; mandated functions 42–3; membership 39–40; ministerial representation 42; pluralist system 54, 55, 56; policymaking 35; political status 40; problem-solving 4; role 76; think tanks 194, 201; voting system 41 World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 19, 54, 86 World Conference on Human Rights (1993) 150 World Disarmament Conference (1932) 175 World Economic Forum 5, 38 World Federation of Trade Unions 37 World Federation of United Nations Associations 45 World Health Organization (WHO) 114, 129, 132–3, 137–8 World Industry Council for the Environment (WICE) 86, 98 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 118 World Peace Council 150 World Resources Institute (WRI) 54, 195, 198, 202, 203–4 World Trade Organization (WTO) 52– 4, 55–6; finance 40–1; headquarters location 42; integration in UN system 44 (Table 2.1); legal status 39; mandated functions 42–3; membership 39–40; ministerial representation 42; policy-making 34, 35; political status 40; problemsolving 4; telecommunications role 108; voting system 41 World Watch 197, 202 World Wildlife Fund 54 zealotry 158–9 Zionist movement 7
