POST–COLD WAR
Recent Titles in The Greenwood Press “Daily Life through History” Series Civilians in Wartime Asia: From...
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POST–COLD WAR
Recent Titles in The Greenwood Press “Daily Life through History” Series Civilians in Wartime Asia: From the Taiping Rebellion to the Vietnam War Stewart Lone, editor The French Revolution James M. Anderson Daily Life in Stuart England Jeffrey Forgeng The Revolutionary War Charles P. Neimeyer The American Army in Transition, 1865–1898 Michael L. Tate Civilians in Wartime Europe, 1618–1900 Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey, editors The Vietnam War James E. Westheider World War II G. Kurt Piehler Immigrant America, 1870–1920 June Granatir Alexander Along the Mississippi George S. Pabis Immigrant America, 1820–1870 James M. Bergquist Pre-Columbian Native America Clarissa W. Confer
POST–COLD WAR Stephen A. Bourque
The Greenwood Press “Daily Life through History” Series American Soldiers’ Lives David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Series Editors
GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bourque, Stephen A. (Stephen Alan), 1950– Post–Cold War / Stephen A. Bourque. p. cm. — (The Greenwood Press “Daily life through history” series, ISSN 1080–4749. American soldiers’ lives) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–313–33290–6 (alk. paper) 1. United States—History, Military—20th century. 2. United States—History, Military— 21st century. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1989– 4. United States. Army—Military life—History—20th century. 5. United States. Army—Military life— History—21st century. 6. Soldiers—United States—History—20th century. 7. Soldiers— United States—History—21st century. I. Title. E840.4.B68 2008 355.00973—dc22 2007048839 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2008 by Stephen A. Bourque All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007048839 ISBN: 978–0–313–33290–6 ISSN: 1080–4749 First published in 2008 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America
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Dedicated to my students at the United States Army Command and General Staff College
CONTENTS
Series Foreword
ix
Preface
xi
Acknowledgments
xv
Timeline 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
The Cold War Army: An Overview The Years 1989–1991: Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm The Years 1992–2006: Interventions and Insurgencies Organizing the Army from 1989 to the Present Recruiting Training The Soldiers The Soldier at Home in the Military The Soldier and Technology Going to War The Post–Cold War Veteran
xvii 1 9 29 49 67 85 105 117 135 147 163
Bibliography
177
Index
187
SERIES FOREWORD
More than once during the military campaigns undertaken by American armies, leaders in both civilian and martial roles have been prompted to ask in admiration, “Where do such people come from?” The question, of course, was both rhetorical and in earnest: the one because they knew that such people hailed from the coasts and the heartland, from small hamlets and sprawling cities, from expansive prairies and breezy lakeshores. They were as varied as the land they represented, as complex as the diversity of their faiths and ethnic identities, all nonetheless defined by the overarching identity of “American,” made more emphatic by their transformation into “American soldiers.” They knew and we know where they came from. On the other hand, the question for anyone who knows the tedium, indignity, discomfort, and peril of military service in wartime is more aptly framed, “Why did they come at all?” In the volumes of this series, accomplished scholars of the American military answer that question, and more. By depicting the daily routines of soldiers at war, they reveal the gritty heroism of those who conquered the drudgery of routine and courageously faced the terrors of combat. With impeccable research and a deep understanding of the people who move through these grandly conceived stories—for war, as Tolstoy has shown us, is the most grandly conceived and complex story of all—these books take us to the heart of great armies engaged in enormous undertakings. Bad food, disease, haphazardly treated wounds, and chronic longing for loved ones form part of these stories, for those are the universal afflictions of soldiers. Punctuating long stretches of loneliness and monotony were interludes of horrific violence that scarred every soldier, even those who escaped physical injury. And insidious wounds could fester because of ugly customs and ingrained prejudices: for too long a span, soldiers who happened to be minorities suffered galling injustices at the hands of those they served, often giving for cause and comrades what Lincoln called “the last full measure of devotion,”
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despite unfair indignities and undeserved ignominy. And sadly, it is true that protracted or unpopular wars could send veterans returning to a country indifferent about their sacrifices, sometimes hostile to the cause for which they fought, and begrudging even marginal compensation to their spouses and orphans. But quiet courage, wry humor, tangible camaraderie, and implacable pride are parts of these stories as well, ably conveyed by these gifted writers who have managed to turn the pages that follow into vivid snapshots of accomplishment, sacrifice, and triumph. Until recently the American soldier has usually been a citizen called to duty in times of extraordinary crisis. The volunteer army of this latest generation, though, has created a remarkable hybrid in the current American soldier, a professional who nevertheless upholds the traditions of American citizens who happen to be in uniform to do a tough job. It is a noble tradition that ennobles all who have honored it. And more often than not, they who have served have managed small miracles of fortitude and resolve. Walter Lord’s Incredible Victory recounts the story of Mike Brazier, the rear-seat man on a torpedo plane from the carrier Yorktown in the battle of Midway. He and pilot Wilhelm Esders were among that stoic cadre of fliers who attacked Japanese carriers, knowing that their fuel was insufficient for the distance to and from their targets. Having made their run under heavy enemy fire, Esders finally had to ditch the spent and damaged plane miles short of the Yorktown in the rolling Pacific. He then discovered that Brazier had been shot to pieces. Despite his grave wounds, Brazier had managed to change the coils in the radio to help guide the plane back toward the Yorktown. In the life raft as he died, Mike Brazier never complained. He talked of his family and how hard it had been to leave them, but he did not complain. Instead he apologized that he could not be of more help. In the great, roiling cauldron of the Second World War, here was the archetype of the American soldier: uncomplaining while dying far from home in the middle of nowhere, worried at the last that he had not done his part. Where do such people come from? We invite you to read on, and find out. David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler Series Editors
PREFACE
On September 11, 1990, President George H. W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress, describing what he accomplished during his recent talks in Helsinki with Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Against a backdrop of a disintegrating Communist system in Europe and a defiant Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, the talks between the two leaders went well. The president was exuberant when he told the listening legislators and the nation, “Out of these troubled times . . . a new world order . . . can emerge: a new era, free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace.”1 We know today that this was not to be a period of peace, and the post–cold war era was to be one of the most tumultuous in American history. This book examines soldiers’ lives at the end of the cold war era, beginning with President George H. W. Bush’s administration, which, after eight years of military and diplomatic confrontation during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was not, however, to be a time of peace. The president sent the army into Panama in 1989 to protect American lives and secure the canal. The following year, he ordered the American military to defend Saudi Arabia and, six months later, evict the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. American troops continued to be stationed in Germany and Korea, while the navy operated fleets in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans. Later historians may come to see this period as the apogee of American power as it demonstrated its ability to effectively employ its armed might anywhere in the world. Certainly, at the time, Operation Desert Storm was hailed as an amazing achievement of American arms and a validation that the United States was the world’s only superpower. American soldiers not only remained in southwest Asia, but before he left office in January 1993, President Bush sent American troops to Somalia.
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Certainly no one expected the incoming president, William Jefferson Clinton, who had campaigned on the slogan “It’s the economy, stupid,” to embark on any more foreign adventures. Yet, during his term, in a style reminiscent of the Indian Wars of the 1860s and 1870s, American soldiers confronted a wide array of opponents in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Simultaneously, the United States’ military forces continued to confront Saddam Hussein’s rump regime in northern Iraq through inspections and no-fly zones. After eight years of the tumultuous Clinton presidency, the experienced foreign policy team of President George W. Bush promised a respite from the interventionist policy of his predecessor. Then came al-Qaeda’s destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001. President Bush unleashed America’s military might against the Taliban–al-Qaeda regime in Afghanistan and, in April 2003, against Saddam Hussein’s government. On May 1, President George W. Bush dramatically landed on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and, with a banner proclaiming “mission accomplished” hanging from the carrier’s superstructure, announced the end of combat operations in Iraq. Events were to prove that combat operations were not over, and American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines continued to fight and die in both Iraq and Afghanistan for the remainder of Bush’s two terms in office. What this premature announcement had signified was an end to the period after the cold war when the military power of the United States seemed omnipotent around the world. Certainly the idea that American forces were trained and equipped to fight primarily large-scale conventional wars was slipping from most doctrinal field manuals. In 2007, the current trends were on counterinsurgency and military operations other than war. After more than 50 years on European and Korean soil, anticipating large-scale conventional combat, American forces began closing down their installations and returning to the United States.2 This book begins with a timeline of events during the period covered by this book so as to place events into a more easily scanned context. The first chapter is a look at the cold war U.S. Army that prepared for a war that never came. Emanating from the ruins of the draftee force that fought in Vietnam, it continued to improve, until it considered itself superior to the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. That belief was never tested as the Soviet Union broke apart without a shot being fired. However, dictators in Panama and Iraq offered the army a chance to show what it could do. Chapter 2 discusses Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm, all campaigns that validated the army’s expenditure in weapons, equipment, and quality soldiers. The new American soldier overwhelmed the Panamanians and soundly thrashed the Iraqis in two campaigns that remain as hallmarks of military proficiency. However, it had little chance to recover, as intervention upon intervention followed in rapid succession: Kurdistan (1991), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1993), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999). Following al-Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the army embarked on a perpetual state of war and began combat operations in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Each event was different and, cumulatively, altered the nature of the army, so that by 2003 and the transition into the insurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan, it was no longer the same force it had been at the beginning. Chapter
PREFACE
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3 is a brief summary of these combat operations, which saw fewer soldiers fighting and more conducting so-called peace operations. The next chapters look in more detail at soldiers’ lives. Chapter 4 describes the army these soldiers joined and looks at its organization, types of units, kinds of equipment, and the different roles these things played. Recruiting and joining the force is the focus of chapter 5, which describes the nature of the all-volunteer army and the journey of the soldier from entrance station, through basic combat and advanced training, to the unit. Training, the most important peacetime role of the army, is the subject of chapter 6. The army spends an incredible amount of energy and resources on making sure that soldiers have the skills for modern war. The nature of the soldier is the focus of chapter 7: Who were these soldiers? What was their rank structure? What was the role of women in this new army? How were minorities treated? Was there a place for homosexuality in the service? How soldiers lived is described in chapter 8, which covers the various military installations and the details of army posts. What was life like for the soldier and his or her family during this period? No discussion of the post–cold war soldier would be complete without a discussion of microchip technology, found in chapter 9. Certainly this was one element that separated these soldiers from those in previous eras, and one that was constantly changing. The final two chapters look at the results and consequences of going to war in the post–cold war era. What was it like to deploy from home to go to war not once, but many times over a long career? How did families adjust? What were the differences between the deployment for soldiers of Desert Storm and those at the end of the period? The concluding chapter presents a discussion of post–cold war veterans and the world they returned to. What was it like to be a veteran of this period? The book concludes with an extensive bibliography of topically arranged books and articles, both in print and online. Unlike for other books in this series, the ending of this period was less than precise. President George W. Bush’s declaration of “mission accomplished” proved a significant error, and the fighting for the post–cold war soldier is not over. Military units and individual soldiers have continued to rotate in and out of Afghanistan ever since they arrived in October 2001. In the fall of 2007, many American soldiers, especially if they were careerists, were on their third or fourth rotation to Iraq and engaged in something between an insurgency and a full-scale civil war. Readers should also realize that there is no more rapid time for change in a military service than during war, and this army had been at war for almost 18 continuous years as of this book’s writing. Equipment, doctrine, organizations, and procedures that were in place in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down no longer existed with the fall of Baghdad in 2003. New weapons, new vehicles, new radios, and different uniforms all marked the intense changes that took place during this period. The personal computer was brand new when this period began, and e-mail was still an inefficient and clumsy way to communicate. In 2007, every soldier had an e-mail account, and the army ran one of the most sophisticated information networks in the world. How things have changed.
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PREFACE
The same is true for the men and women who earned the name “soldier.” Those who entered the service at the beginning of the period were approaching normal military retirement in 2007. Many of them had seen more combat than any other generation of American soldier. The vaunted “Band of Brothers” of World War II fame saw less than six months of intense combat. This group of baby boomers and Generation Xers, with battles on Medina Ridge, in Mogadishu, Najaf, Fallujah, and Tora Bora, will match experiences with the greatest generation anytime. Those who liberated German concentration camps in 1945 will relate to those post–cold war soldiers who comforted the survivors of Srebrenica 50 years later. Soldiers who jumped into Panama as young men and women fought in Somalia and helped take down the Taliban in Afghanistan. This is a tired generation of soldiers, to whom America owes a debt it will never be able to repay. Military history is usually about history’s great captains or campaigns. Bookshelves groan with the weight of books about the Pattons and Lees, or about battles such as Gettysburg or Normandy. What is often lost in the great stories of battles and generals is the daily life of the soldiers and junior officers who occupied, in the words common at the end of the cold war, “the tip of the spear.” What was war like from their perspective? What did they think of their military service? What was their training like? How did they and their families live? How good was their equipment? What kinds of education and training did they receive? How did technology affect the soldier and his or her family? These and many more questions, often overlooked, are essential to understanding the experience of war. This book looks at this period and asks the simple question, What was the soldier’s experience at the end of the cold war? NOTES 1. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 370. 2. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President of the American Legion at the 86th Annual National Convention (Washington, DC: White House, 2004).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I have been fortunate to have had the help of a wide variety of historians and friends in preparing this manuscript. At the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History, the chief of military history, Dr. Jeffery Clark, has been one of my staunchest supporters for over 10 years. His staff, especially his library staff, run by Frank Shirer and Patricia Ames, provided me with work space and the time to peruse their extensive collection of materials. David Keogh, at the U.S. Army Military Institute, helped find the many reference files on this piece of recent history. Britt McCarley, Ben King, Ann Chapman, and Claire Samuelson, at the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, provided me all the information I needed on the dynamic changes in training programs in the army over the last 20 years. Dan Mortensen, from the U.S. Air Force’s Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama, listened to innumerable presentations and comments on military operations during the 1991 Gulf War and was a great advocate of my writing. At the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Dr. James Willbanks, the director of the Department of Military History, encouraged and supported my writing efforts. Other members of the department, especially Sean Kalic and Jon House, read and commented on various portions of this manuscript. I also thank the staff of the Combined Arms Research Library, who provided a superb environment for research and writing. My office mate, Susan Rosell, helped with correcting my prose and giving me guidance on writing mechanics. At the Combined Arms Research Library, Mike Brown and the rest of the staff provided assistance in locating a variety of references. At Greenwood Press, Anne Thompson was my most devoted supporter and continued to provide the encouragement and guidance that brought me back on track as I wandered through my manuscript. David and Jeanne Heidler, the series editors, gave me all the intellectual and textual support I needed to complete this manuscript.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks to my good friend and coauthor on a previous endeavor, John Burdan, for his tireless interviews with soldiers from the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and his permission to use some of the material he gathered for the squadron history. Also, these interviews would never have been transcribed without the support of John Votaw and the 1st Infantry Division Museum at Wheaton, Illinois, and Kelly Winkelblack of California State University, Northridge, who transcribed them. I must also thank my wife, Debra, who has tolerated my love of research and writing and has read and listened to countless renditions of my developing prose. Our nation is blessed to have an incredibly talented and dedicated officer corps. As this manuscript is in preparation, the young majors in this corps have been either engaged in or supporting combat operations for most of their careers. Some have never had a normal stateside assignment in their 12 years of military service. Most have little understanding of what a peacetime army is or how normal families live. All have been extremely supportive of my efforts to tell their stories. To these brave men and women, I humbly dedicate this work.
TIMELINE
Dec. 27, 1972 April 30, 1975 May 15, 1975
July 1, 1976 July 7, 1976 April 18, 1978 April 28, 1978 July 16, 1979 July 19, 1979
Nov. 1, 1979 Nov. 4, 1979 Nov. 5, 1979
Last soldier drafted into the army six months earlier than legislative authority for the end of the draft, which expired in June 1973. Last American troops leave Saigon. Mayaguez incident. SS Mayaguez captured by Cambodian (Khmer Rouge) forces with 39 crewman on board. U.S. Marines attempt to rescue crew, resulting in 18 killed and 50 marines wounded. This is generally considered the last incident of the Vietnam War. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Active Defense). Considered the beginning of the revitalized United States Army. The first 119 women enter the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Panama Canal Treaty. Ratified by the U.S. Senate, it gave full control of the Panama Canal to Panama by 2000. Disestablishment of Women’s Army Corps and beginning of integration of women into regular army. Saddam Hussein takes control in Iraq. Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, a left-wing popular movement to overthrow what was considered a corrupt government headed by General Somoza. Maxell Thurman takes command of Recruiting Command. Beginning of serious recruitment efforts in the all-volunteer army. Iranian militants seize American embassy in Tehran. Beginning of the hostage crisis. The Carter administration begins planning and initial training of a hostage rescue mission under the command of Colonel Charles Beckwith.
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TIMELINE
Dec. 25, 1979 March 4, 1980 March 24, 1980
Sept. 22, 1980 Jan. 20, 1981 Jan. 5, 1982 Aug. 20, 1982 Sept. 1, 1983 Oct. 23, 1983
Oct. 25, 1983
Dec. 15, 1983 April 15, 1986
Nov. 1, 1986
Feb. 10, 1988
May 26, 1988 Aug. 20, 1988 Jan. 20, 1989 Feb. 15, 1989 May 10, 1989
Oct. 1, 1989 Oct. 7, 1989
Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Presentation of the “Hollow army” speech by General Shy Meyer before the House Budget Committee. Iran rescue mission (Eagle Claw). The operation is launched, forces land at a predetermined desert airstrip in Iran, and forces suffer several mechanical and unfortunate mishaps that result in the loss of vital equipment and men for the operation. The mission is aborted. Iraq invades Iran. Beginning of Iran-Iraq war, which lasts until 1988. President Ronald Reagan inaugurated in the United States. First army rotation at the National Training Center. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Air Land Battle). Forms basis for success in Operation Just Cause and Desert Storm. Political situation in Grenada deteriorates. Bomb attack on U.S. Marine barracks and French headquarters in Beriut, Lebanon. Suicide bombers kill 241 U.S. Marines, along with 58 French soldiers. Operation Urgent Fury. 6,000 U.S. forces invade Grenada. Island is secured after 60 hours of combat. Eighteen soldiers and marines killed and 83 wounded. Problems in cooperation between services set the stage for passage of Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Last of the U.S. forces leave Grenada. Operation El Dorado Canyon. Bombing of Tripoli, Libya, by U.S. Navy and Air Force aircraft in retaliation for Libyan-sponsored terror bombing of West Berlin nightclub frequented by American servicemen. Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Makes Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff a principle advisor to the president and requires better inter-service cooperation. Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega turns to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya for military support after his indictment by a U.S. grand jury for drug smuggling. Beginning of Somali Civil War. Iran and Iraq accept cease-fire, effectively ending their eight-year long war. President George H. W. Bush, who was President Reagan’s vice president, assumes office. Last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan. Exercise Nimrod Dancer. Nineteen hundred combat troops from 7th Infantry Division, 5th Infantry, and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force are deployed to Panama as a show of force. General Colin L. Powell assumes chairmanship of Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the first chairman under new Goldwater-Nichols Act. End of Soviet military support to Warsaw Pact. Beginning of the end of communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
TIMELINE
Nov. 9, 1989 Dec. 15, 1989 Dec. 16, 1989 Dec. 20, 1989
Jan. 3, 1990 Aug. 6, 1990
Nov. 19, 1990
Jan. 7, 1991 Jan. 17, 1991
Feb. 24, 1991 Feb. 26, 1991 Feb. 27, 1991 March 2, 1991 March 3, 1991 March 4, 1991 March 5, 1991 March 20, 1991 March 30, 1991 April 5, 1991 April 7, 1991 June 25, 1991
xix
Collapse of the Berlin Wall. Noriega declares “state of war” with the United States. Assaults on Americans in Panama. Operation Just Cause. Over 22,500 U.S. forces invade Panama and overthrow Manuel Noreiga’s dictatorship. U.S. casualties were 23 killed and 220 wounded. Manuel Noriega surrenders to U.S. forces. Signals the end of combat operations in Panama. Operation Desert Shield. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait several days earlier, the United Nations (UN) authorized forces to defend Saudi Arabia and deter further Iraqi aggression. By November, over 220,000 U. S. forces, and thousands from other participating nations, are deployed in Saudi Arabia. Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Beginning of the long process of removing U.S. troops from Europe where they had been stationed since 1945. Operation Proven Force. Military operations in support of Operation Desert Storm conducted from Turkey. Operation Desert Storm. UN-authorized operation to evict Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. Over 380,000 U.S. forces and another 110,000 allied forces confront Iraq’s 550,000 man force. It begins with an air operation that lasts until February 23. Beginning of ground offensive on Operation Desert Storm (the 100 hours). Destruction of the Iraqi Tawakalna Mechanized Division by the U.S. VII Corps. Battle of Medina Ridge. Destruction of the Iraqi Medina Armored Division by the U.S. VII Corps. Battle of Rumaylah. Twenty-fourth Division against the Hammurabi Armored Division. Cease-fire negotiations between General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Iraqi military representatives at Safwan Airfield, Iraq. Shia uprising in southern Iraq against regime of Saddam Hussein. It is brutally repressed by Iraqi forces still loyal to Hussein. Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq. Iraqi troops begin suppression of Kurdish revolt. Mass Kurdish exodus to border mountain ranges. Creates worldwide expression of outrage and sympathy. UN Security Resolution 688 condemns Iraqi repression of Kurds and authorizes the use of force to protect them. Operation Provide Comfort. Over 12,000 U.S. and 10,000 allied forces provide protection and nourishment for Kurdish civilians. Slovenia and Croatia independence. Beginning of break-up of Yugoslavian Republic. Yugoslavian Army attacks to restore national unity.
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TIMELINE
Dec. 1, 1991 Feb. 21, 1992
April 1, 1992 April 5, 1992 April 24, 1992 April 27, 1992 May 1, 1992 July 1, 1992 Aug. 15, 1992 Aug. 27, 1992 Sept. 14, 1992 Dec. 3, 1992
Dec. 9, 1992 Jan. 20, 1993 Feb. 1, 1993 May 4, 1993
June 5, 1993
Aug. 22, 1993 Oct. 3, 1993
Dec. 15, 1993 Jan. 6, 1994 March 25, 1994
Operation Homeward Bound. Beginning of withdrawal from Europe. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR I). Authorized by the United Nations to enforce cease fire between Croatian and Yugoslavian forces. End of Somali Civil War. Bosnia declares its independence. Bosnian Serbs begin campaign to detach territory to form a greater Serbia. UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I). UN Security Council Resolution 751 delivers relief supplies to Somalia. Joint Task Force LA provides army support during Rodney King riots in Los Angeles. Provide Promise supplies food and medicine to Bosnian refugees in the Balkans. Operation Provide Relief provides American relief to Somalia. Operation Southern Watch secures Iraqi airspace and protects Shiites in southern Iraq. United Nations Protection Force II (UNPROFOR II). Extension of UN-authorized Balkan mission to provide stability in Bosnia. Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Organized in Somalia under the direction of the United States to coordinate military and non-governmental organization support to Somalian refugees. American marines land at Mogadishu, Somalia. President William J. Clinton takes office. Joint Task Force Provide Promise. Controlled U.S. military operations in former Yugoslavia. UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II; Continued Hope). U.S. forces turn over control of Somalian operations to United Nations command. Attack on Pakistani soldiers in Somalia. Two separate attacks by forces loyal to Somalian warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed kill 23 and would 56 Pakistani soldiers in a direct challenge to UN operations. U.S. Special Operations (SOF) Task Force Ranger dispatched to Somalia to apprehend Aideed. Task Force Ranger raid into Mogadishu fails as Aideed’s forces ambush U.S. soldiers. Result was 18 dead and 69 wounded Americans and supporting Malaysian and Pakistani forces have 2 killed and 7 wounded. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin resigns as a result of failed operations in Somalia. Task Force Able Sentry provides security for former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. Last Americans leave Somalia.
TIMELINE
Oct. 10, 1994 July 6, 1995 Aug. 29, 1995
Oct. 1, 1995 Nov. 21, 1995 Dec. 2, 1995 Dec. 31, 1995
Dec. 20, 1996
June 20, 1998
Aug. 7, 1998 Aug. 20, 1998 Dec. 16, 1998
March 24, 1999
April 3, 1999 June 3, 1999
June 11, 1999
Oct. 12, 2000 Jan. 20, 2001
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Operation Uphold Democracy. UN-authorized operation to restore democracy in Haiti. Bosnian Serb massacre of over 8,000 Muslim Bosnians at Srebrenica. The incident creates international outrage and a demand for action. Operation Deliberate Force. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation designed to force Bosnian Serbs to cease their aggression against the Muslim population. Training begins for Task Force Eagle. This force would provide U.S. support to operations in Bosnia. Dayton Peace Accords to end the war in the Balkans. U.S. forces prepare to deploy Task Force Eagle. Operation Joint Endeavor and United Nations Implementation Force (IFOR), including Task Force Eagle, ordered to Bosnia. 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, and 1st Armored Division (main element of Task Force Eagle) cross the Sava River as part of Operation Joint Endeavor. Ultimately the United States deployed over 18,500 soldiers to this part of the former Yugoslavia. Operation Joint Guard. Implementation force in Bosnia changed to the United Nations Stabilization Force. U.S. forces in Bosnia reduced to approximately 10,500. Operation Joint Forge. Beginning of open-ended NATO commitment to maintain the peace in Bosnia. U.S. forces reduced to approximately 1,000 soldiers. Bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by alQaeda. Operation Infinite Reach. President William J. Clinton orders cruise missile attacks on al-Qaeda sites in Afghanistan. The United States launches Operation Desert Fox, primarily an air and missile attack against Iraq in response to Iraqi refusal to cooperate with UN inspectors. Operation Allied Force. NATO air bombing operation to compel Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic to end the persecution of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Task Force Hawk. Deployment of U.S. ground and helicopter forces in preparation for army combat against Yugoslavian forces. Yugoslavia agrees to Allied terms, including presence of an international security force, KFOR for Kosovo Force. Deployment of this NATO force was called Operation Joint Guardian. Advanced party for Task Force Falcon, U.S. contribution to Operation Joint Guardian, arrives in Kosovo. This United States-led task force would have combat elements from the United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, Russia, Greece, and Poland in addition to U.S. soldiers. Attack on USS Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen, by suicide team from al-Qaeda, kills 17 sailors and wounds 39 others. President George W. Bush takes office.
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TIMELINE
Sept. 11, 2001
Oct. 7, 2001 Oct. 19, 2001 Oct. 22, 2001 Nov. 10, 2001 Nov. 14, 2001 March 2, 2002 Dec. 11, 2002 March 20, 2003 March 23, 2003 March 24, 2003 March 28, 2003 April 2, 2003 April 7, 2003 April 9, 2003 May 1, 2003 May 23, 2003 July 1, 2003 Dec. 14, 2003 April 4, 2004
April 28, 2004 Oct. 9, 2004 Nov. 7, 2004 Dec. 30, 2006 Jan. 10, 2007
The World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., are attacked by three commercial airliners hijacked by al-Qaeda terrorists , causing the deaths of nearly 3,000 Americans. A fourth hijacked airplane is crashed by resisting passengers, with no survivors. Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. operations to topple Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Special Forces detachments arrive in Afghanistan. Northern Alliance offensive against Taliban. Mazar-e Sharif falls to Northern Alliance. Liberation of Kabul. Operation Anaconda. U.S. operation to destroy al-Qaeda forces along Pakistani border and capture Osama bin Laden. Hamid Karzai takes power in Afghanistan. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). American and British campaign to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. Ambush of 507th Maintenance Company. Worst single American combat incident during OIF. Iraqi defeat of U.S. 11th Aviation Brigade attack. Brings into question doctrinal concept of the “deep attack.” 173rd Airborne Brigade parachutes into northern Iraq to support Kurdish militia. Initial U.S. attacks on Baghdad. Attack into center of Baghdad. Regime essentially defeated. U.S. Marines topple statue of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. President George W. Bush lands on USS Abraham Lincoln in San Diego and announces “mission accomplished” in Iraq. Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority director Lewis Paul Bremer III issues Order Number 2, disbanding the entire Iraqi Army. Beginning of Iraqi insurgency. Saddam Hussein captured by U.S. forces. First Battle of Fallujah, Iraq. U.S. soldiers and marines attack to capture city and avenge killing of American contractors. Ended on May 1, when the U.S. Government decided to pull back forces in the face of Iraqi government protests. Abu Ghraib prison cases of torture and prisoner abuse by U.S. forces exposed. Hamid Karzai elected as first president of Afghanistan. Second Battle of Fallujah, Iraq. U.S. forces capture city and eliminate insurgents. Saddam Hussein executed by hanging after Iraqi trial. President Bush announces troop surge and new strategy to contain Iraqi insurgency.
1
THE COLD WAR ARMY: AN OVERVIEW
It was obvious to all present in 1990 on the day that President George H. W. Bush declared the “New World Order” that the cold war, the struggle that the United States and Soviet Russia had waged for over 45 years, had ended. One reason for the apparent American victory was the American soldier, with his superb equipment, organization, doctrine, leadership, and training. The Soviet Union, according to some observers, simply could not keep pace with the resurgent cold war army. This military excellence had not always been the case and was a direct development of a protracted series of improvements and modifications in all aspects of the American military. POST-VIETNAM PARALYSIS Following the army’s military victory over Iraq in 1991, which we will discuss in the next chapter, many army leaders reflected over the causes of their dramatic success. Most senior officers credited it with the determined and comprehensive restructuring of the army in the years following Vietnam. The context of this victory can be found in the reaction to the latter years of the Vietnam conflict, the renewed focus of army doctrine, and the structure of the U.S. Army at end of the cold war. Any discussion of the army of the late cold war era, therefore, must begin in the jungles of Vietnam. For the entire decade of the 1960s, the United States expended its military and diplomatic capital in a vain effort to stop the North Vietnamese from attaining their dream of a unified Communist state. As early as 1969, President Richard M. Nixon realized that the American military had to change and began to lay the foundations of what would become the modern professional army.1 By the early 1970s, a war-weary government realized that the American people would not sustain the war any longer and ordered the military to disengage. In the spring of 1975, the last Americans escaped from Saigon, leaving thousands of South Vietnamese supporters to the mercy of the Communists. While the reasons for this outcome
2
POST–COLD WAR
Soldiers on patrol in Vietnam, 1971. (Courtesy of Soldiers)
would be a continual subject for debate, the fact remained that in spite of overwhelming American military technology, economic power, and physical size, the North Vietnamese had forced the armed forces of the United States out of Southeast Asia. The U.S. Army’s combat performance, in its latter years, was suspect and tainted by incidents of battlefield atrocities, indiscipline, drug abuse, and racial strife. No matter what the enemy did, the American public expected its soldiers to reflect the nation’s values and ideals. Reports of officer “fraggings,” failure to obey orders, and events such as the My Lai Massacre tarnished that image. Newspaper photographs of soldiers with peace signs on their helmets and smoking marijuana only confirmed this impression in the minds of much of America.2 Leaders who remained with the army when it returned in 1973, while not completely agreeing with its negative image, realized that it was no longer an effective element of national power. Thanks to a decision by President Richard Nixon, the American military was now an all-volunteer force and had to depend on enlistments, rather than selective service, better known as the draft. We will discuss the nature of the all-volunteer army in a later chapter.3 With the controversial war only recently concluded, the army found it difficult to enlist quality soldiers, and units were rife with racial and ethnic tensions. Many units found themselves understrengthed and forced to promote less than qualified soldiers into noncommissioned officer positions. The army was short of quality leaders as many, disillusioned with multiple tours of senseless combat, had left the service for the civilian economy. Combat equipment was worn out and becoming outclassed by the large amounts of quality tanks, fighting vehicles, artillery, and aircraft that was streaming out of the Soviet Union’s factories. In addition, it was obvious to most thoughtful leaders that the American public no longer supported its army and considered military service an unsavory profession.4 In Europe, which most military experts believed to be the most dangerous theater of war, the majority of the army’s heavy forces were committed. Two U.S. Army corps with over four combat divisions and two armored cavalry regiments, along with an equal
THE COLD WAR ARMY
3
Soldiers in the Vietnam War. (Photofest)
number of troops from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, defended West German territory. Across a massive fence line, named the “iron curtain” by Winston Churchill, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact deployed the largest combat force in the world, led by the five armies of Group of Soviet Forces Germany, with over 7,000 first-class battle tanks, and supported by the national armies of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Supporting this massive force were the large reserve forces of the other Communist states and the Red Army’s massive reserves. The U.S. Army, Europe, depleted by years of acting as a staging and support area for operations in Vietnam, had little prospect of stopping a Soviet assault without resorting to theater-level or strategic nuclear weapons. The Warsaw Pact forces simply had more forces and were better equipped, with a more relevant doctrine, or way to fight.5 By 1975, the United States had been waging an ideological war against the Soviet Union and Red China for 25 years, with mixed results. On the positive side of the equation, there had been no massive nuclear war between the adversaries, as many had predicted. American troops still guarded the iron curtain in Europe and defended a line carved out during a bloody conflict on the Korean Peninsula. However, the long-term prospects did not look good, as Soviet troops smashed attempts at liberalization in Eastern Europe, most notably in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Communists were pouring military and economic support into the Middle East in an effort to bring that region under its political and economic sway. Army officers watched as Soviet power increased, as new
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POST–COLD WAR
missiles, aircraft, and tanks were rolling off the assembly lines in impressive numbers, and—bothering Western observers—these were of excellent quality. The Soviet Union now had a powerful navy, equipped with many submarines that routinely challenged American vessels. In December 1979, the Soviets confirmed their aggressive intentions by engineering a coup in Afghanistan and backing it with force. There was little, initially, that the United States could do. The same was the case as the Castro-backed Sandinistas took control of Nicaragua that same year.6 Meanwhile, an Iranian resistance movement overthrew its American-backed ruler and instituted a new Islamic Republic. In November 1979, a radical crowd stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held 100 of its employees hostage. There were few options for the administration of President Jimmy Carter. In an emotional meeting attended by the military’s senior leaders, Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer told Carter that only 40 percent of the army was deployable and that these troops could not be sustained in a combat zone. He ended his briefing by the chilling words, “Mr. President, basically what we have is a hollow Army.”7 Events were to prove Meyer’s words prophetic in April 1980. Responding to public pressure, including from Ronald Regan, who had begun campaigning for the presidency, the Carter administration directed that a task force train and organize to rescue the hostages in Tehran. The task force was an ad hoc, multiservice organization that was poorly trained for the job. Part of the plan called for the raiding party to land in central Iran at a remote location called “Desert One.” Here the four C-130 aircraft and eight large RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters were to refuel prior to the final effort to grab the hostages. The raid was a disaster. By the time the rescue force arrived at the designated location, only five of the eight helicopters were on the ground and serviceable. The landing zone was on an Iranian highway, and civilian traffic disrupted operations and compromised security. Most unfortunately, a helicopter crashed into a fuel-laden C-130. The result was a tragic explosion that destroyed both aircraft and killed a number of servicemen. The commander decided to evacuate on the remaining cargo aircraft. They left behind in the Iranian desert eight dead, the remaining helicopters, all of the classified electronic gear, and American military prestige.8
THE RENEWED FOCUS FOR THE ARMY IN THE 1970S Even before the debacle at Desert One, senior officers had begun to revitalize the army’s doctrine and organization as the last troops left Vietnam. With the U.S. military now made up of volunteers, it had no choice but to discard its World War II–era persona and make military service more attractive to America’s youth. Many of the reforms were cosmetic, such as improved barracks and mess halls—renamed “dining facilities”—and the elimination of KP, or “kitchen police.” More important were the intellectual reforms that would guide the service for the next 20 years. What caught the attention of the army’s senior generals was the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In just three weeks of fighting, both sides had lost more tanks, crew, and equipment than existed in the entire U.S. Army, Europe.9
THE COLD WAR ARMY
5
Rather than reevaluate the conduct of the war in Vietnam and attempt to learn from these problems, the American defense establishment rejected the concept of lowintensity conflict and refocused on the more serious, but least likely, probability of war in Europe. Senior officers were convinced that if faced with such an onslaught in Europe against better-equipped Soviet forces, American troops would be hard-pressed to hold the line and be forced to “go nuclear” early in the conflict.10 Led by Vietnam-era veterans, such as generals Donn Starry and William E. DePuy, the army began developing a military doctrine to fight the Soviet Union in Western Europe called “Active Defense.” The authors of this doctrine argued that the United States should discard the illusion that its forces could slowly mobilize and deploy to Europe in time to stop the Red Army. The experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War indicated that America’s fight could be over after the first engagement, an engagement that might determine the outcome and dictate the political settlement. Therefore the army had to “win the first battle of the next war.”11 Now the U.S. Army had a single-minded focus on one enemy—the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact—and on one problem—stopping them in Europe. Almost as soon as the field manual (FM 100-5 Operations, 1976) arrived, it sparked a debate throughout the American defense establishment. Some critics were concerned that it was too defense-oriented. Others argued that it placed too much emphasis on the first battle, which the United States could initially win, but then later lose as the Soviet follow-on forces took advantage of their numbers to wear out or maneuver to the rear of American forces. These and other criticisms of what most observers agreed was an unprecedented evaluation of the army’s way of making war sparked furious debates in military journals and service schools.12 Emanating from this debate was a further doctrinal revision, eventually called “AirLand Battle.” Announced in 1982 and refined in 1986, it gave the army an aggressive method of fighting wars that combined its overwhelming firepower with forces possessing great maneuverability. It was a unifying concept that focused all military schools, weapons procurers, leaders, and soldiers on the single task of defeating Soviet-style forces anywhere in the world, but especially in Europe. What made this field manual unique in American history is that its writing not only showed the influence of recent military operations, but looked back at the writings of military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini. Their ideas, which originally found expression in the 1820s and 1830s and included the culminating point, centers of gravity, and lines of operation, now found expression in the centerpiece of the army’s way of war. For the first time in American military history, the army introduced the concept of operational art, or that level of war between strategy and tactics that is concerned with the maneuver and employment of large units. It was also a doctrine that emphasized joint operations, or the conduct of war in conjunction with the other services.13 Another major element of change was the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This 1987 law fundamentally changed the structure of the American defense establishment. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the first time, provided independent advice to the president and the secretary of defense. The doctrine also, for the first time, ensured
6
POST–COLD WAR
that the military forces of the United States would fight as a joint force with a unified focus.14 The new army was not simply a creature of doctrine. Later chapters will describe the various aspects of the army that made it so proficient. These included its new weapons systems, especially the M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, Apache attack helicopter, and other modern systems that gave it the edge against a Soviet-equipped force. In addition to equipment, training and education for all ranks underwent a major overhaul. To support the new force, a new concern with quality housing and the health and welfare of soldiers and their families became important. Finally, the quality of the soldier himself or herself continued to improve as soldiers decided that a tour in the military was part of their long-term plans.
THE END OF THE COLD WAR By the summer of 1989, the U.S. Army had recovered from its preoccupation with Vietnam. Its military units were as good as any in the world, and its leaders believed it would give a good accounting for itself if war were to come across the Atlantic. Just as it seemed that the army had regained its poise and direction, international conditions again began to change. After more than 40 contentious years of political and military domination by the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe began to break away. The internal problems faced by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989 would have stressed even the most resilient of governments. His implementation of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) permitted the public to comment on topics that Russian citizens never had discussed before. Certainly the explosion at the nuclear facility at Chernobyl in 1986, and the ineptitude in the government’s reaction, had caused many to question the quality of the government. The costly decadelong war in Afghanistan, with the Red Army’s draftees returning maimed and embittered, contributed to the government’s domestic problems. Gorbachev removed the last Soviet troops in February 1989, after an enormous cost in lives and treasure to the fragile state.15 He also signaled to the Communist leaders of the East European states that they could no longer count on Soviet units to support their regimes, a point he made on October 7 with East German party secretary Erich Honecker. Almost immediately, the citizens of the once-feared Warsaw Pact began to overthrow dictatorial regimes as Soviet divisions garrisoned within their territories stood idly by. Poland led the way, followed by Hungary, which opened its frontier with East Germany on September 10. East Germany followed with major riots in Liepzig on October 16. Without the Red Army’s backing, there was no support for using force to quell the growing rebellion. Surrendering to the popular demands, the German Communists opened the Berlin Wall on November 9. Over 4,000,000 East Berliners swarmed through the gates and inaugurated one of the greatest spontaneous celebrations of the century. Within days, the Berlin Wall began to tumble down, as did Communist control over the remainder of Eastern Europe.16 Although no one could predict the outcome, it was obvious that the military situation in Europe was changing. Already, President George H. W. Bush, who took over
THE COLD WAR ARMY
7
Checkpoint Charlie, the gateway between East and West Berlin. (Ceren Tutal)
from Ronald Reagan in January 1989, had begun talks to reduce the American military commitment in Central Europe. Anticipating the end of military confrontation, the U.S. Army had already begun to prepare for a reduction of its commitment to Europe, a process that it would formalize with the Soviets in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, signed by the president in Paris on November 19, 1990. Although the outlines of the New World Order were somewhat hazy, it was apparent to most leaders and the public that things were going to change.17 This was the context, therefore, of the army that America fielded at the end of the decade. Reorganized in response to an embarrassing defeat in Asia, trained and equipped to fight a major land war in Europe, and finding itself as the best its country ever fielded, the army was the best it had ever been. Now, as the Soviet empire began to collapse, it found itself without a comparable threat. Already, in 1989, Congress began asking when it was coming home. NOTES 1. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1995), 25–26. 2. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, a History, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1997). George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950–1975, 2nd ed. (New York:
8
POST–COLD WAR
Newberry Awards Records, 1986). Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978). 3. Robert K. Griffith Jr., The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968–1974, ed. Jeffery J. Clarke, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1997), 40–44. Bernard Rostker, I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006). 4. Tom Clancy Jr. and Frederick M. Franks, Into the Storm: A Study in Command (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1997), 83–91. James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 121–31. Vincent H. Demma, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1989, ed. Susan Carroll (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 3–5. Richard Lock-Pullan, “ ‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 1973–1976,” Journal of Military History 67 (2003): 483–511. 5. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “Ruck It Up!”: The Post-Cold War Transformation of V Corps, 1990–2001 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 4–14. Stephen A. Bourque, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2002), 7–11. Stewart Menaul, Russian Military Power (New York: Bonanza Books, 1982), 237– 40. Schubert and Kraus, Whirlwind War, 25–26. 6. Kitfield , Prodigal Soldiers, 201. 7. Ibid., 198–99. 8. Ibid., 215–28. Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn’t Win (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 85–103. Mark Bowden, “The Desert One Debacle,” Atlantic Monthly, May, 2006. 9. Griffith, U.S. Army’s Transition, 102–14. Lock-Pullan, “Inward Looking Time,” 490–93. 10. Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 42– 47. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1976). William E. DePuy, “Letter from General DePuy to General Abrams Which Analyzes the Arab-Israeli War,” in Selected Papers of General William DePuy, ed. Richard M. Swain (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1974), 71–74. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 3–4. Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Papers (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988). 12. Romjue, From Active Defense, 13–21. Lock-Pullan, “An Inward Looking Time,” 505–9. 13. U.S. Department of Army, FM 100-5. Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1862). Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, indexed ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). 14. Colin Powell and Joseph E. Perisco, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 398–99. James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” Joint Forces Quarterly 13 (1996): 10–17. 15. Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife Since 1945 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1998), 124 –34. 16. Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century, 4th ed. (New York: Harcourt, 2002), 650–56. William Joe Webb, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1990– 1991, ed. W. Scott James (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1997), 3–4. James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 153–76. 17. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 370.
2
THE YEARS 1989–1991: OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, AND DESERT STORM
The basic outlines of the U.S. Army did not change very much during the latter years of the cold war. A soldier could essentially count on a series of predictable tours in Germany or Korea, balanced by extended assignments with units stationed at posts in the United States or protracted attendance and assignment at the branch schools scattered around the country. This predictable lifestyle changed with end of the cold war, as soldiers found themselves on repeated combat tours while the United States tried to cope with the turmoil following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first years of this era found the United States engaged in two operations that tested the cold war army. OPERATION JUST CAUSE, 1989–1990: THE FIRST TEST FOR THE NEW ARMY American troops literally jumped into the post–cold war era only six weeks after German citizens tore down the Berlin Wall. Serious problems between Panama and the United States began on February 5, 1989, when grand juries in Miami and Tampa indicted Panama dictator Manuel Noriega as a drug trafficker and issued warrants for his arrest. For over nine months, tension between the two countries continued to intensify, until December 15, when Noriega’s rump legislature proclaimed that a state of war existed with the United States and that “bodies of our enemies” would end up in the Panama Canal. The next day, a Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) check point stopped four American officers and ordered them out of their car. When they refused and drove away, the Panamanians opened fire, killing a marine lieutenant. The PDF also arrested a navy officer and his wife, who witnessed the event, and brought them to a local police station, where he was beaten and she sexually assaulted. President George H. W. Bush decided it was time to act and, with plans and troops already in position, ordered the
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immediate apprehension of Manuel Noriega and the execution of Operation Just Cause to begin on December 20, 1989.1 On December 19, almost 13,000 soldiers from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Fort Lewis, Washington, Fort Ord, California, and Forts Stewart and Benning in Georgia began assembling to join the 13,000 American servicemen and women stationed in Panama. The first unit in the air was a battalion from the 75th Ranger Regiment from Fort Lewis, Washington, on C-130 cargo aircraft shortly after 1:00 A.M. Soon, over 200 transport aircraft, loaded with paratroopers and equipment, were on the way for the initial assault. The size of the approaching air armada was difficult to hide, and Noriega received information that the American troops were on the way, but he dismissed the reports and failed to take any serious defensive measures. Convinced that the Americans would never invade, he spent the evening in the arms of a prostitute, rather than at his command and control bunker.2 To capture the Panamanian dictator and disarm his forces rapidly, Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, organized his assault forces into five separate task forces, four conventional and one, the Joint Special Operations Task Force, consisting of special operations troops from all services.3 These ad hoc organizations were essentially groups of small units designed to accomplish specific missions and would, almost simultaneously, assault Panama’s military structure, contribute to the capture of Noriega, and set the conditions for the restoration of an American-friendly government. Operation Just Cause would be this organization’s first combat test, and it began at a military base called Rio Hato, 45 miles west of Panama City. Following an attack from F-117A Stealth fighters, two battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment parachuted onto the enemy compound a little after 1:00 A.M. After five hours of battle, 250 enemy soldiers surrendered, while another 200 escaped into the countryside. In the fight, the 75th Rangers lost 4 killed and 18 wounded, while the jump injured another 26.4 Simultaneously, Navy SEALs attacked Balboa Harbor and Paitilla airfield in the Panama City area. After several hours, the Americans killed or captured all of the defenders, blocked the runway, and disabled Noriega’s jet. The price was high, however, as the American attackers lost four dead and eight wounded in the brief attack, a high cost for such a small unit.5 Two airfields, Omar Torrijos International and the adjacent Tocumen Military, were critical targets for the invasion force. As with all actions that morning across Panama, the attack began just before 1:00 A.M. Two AH-6 Little Bird attack helicopters, part of the army’s 160th Aviation Regiment, and one AC-130H Spectre gunship raked various targets on both airfields. Just as the aircraft fires lifted, four companies from the 75th Ranger Regiment parachuted from 500 feet, a very low altitude, onto the runways. Within a short time, they secured most of the objectives and almost captured Noriega, who had left his love nest and almost ran into an American roadblock. Fighting was limited as the Rangers captured their objectives, securing the PDF barracks and killing or capturing any enemy soldiers who were still in the area.6 Once the rangers were on the ground, the plan called for the 82nd Airborne Division ready brigade to drop as one assault at 1:45 A.M. However, winter weather in the United States delayed and interrupted the deployment. The first parachute assault arrived 15 minutes late, and then the remainder spread over five separate drops, ending at 5:00 A.M.7
THE YEARS 1989–1991
11
With the arrival of the brigade headquarters, the army paratroopers and rangers combined into Task Force Pacific and began clearing objectives to the west of Panama City.8 Task Force Pacific secured several other key objectives that morning. The most difficult was at Tinajitas, home of the PDF’s 1st Infantry Company, almost 200 strong. Approaching by helicopter, the Americans began taking accurate fire before they arrived at the landing zone, wounding the UH–60 Black Hawk helicopter company commander. The defending Panamanians killed two Americans, one by a sniper and the other by mortar fire, as soon as the helicopters were on the ground. Almost all of the helicopters were hit by enemy fire, and at least three were out of service. While the paratroopers secured the area, fighting on the fringes would continue for several days.9 Another assault, at Fort Cimarron, east of Tocumen-Torrijos, was much smoother, and the facility was captured by a battalion of the 325th Infantry with little opposition.10 The three-battalion Task Force Bayonet, consisting of 5–87th Infantry, 1–508th Infantry, and 4–6th Infantry, supported by a platoon of M551 Sheridan light tanks, a special operations AC-130 gunship, and Apache and Little Bird helicopters, had the task of seizing the Comandancia, the PDF command post. In the heart of urban Panama City, the Comandancia was the most strongly fortified installation in the country, defended by three PDF rifle companies and a variety of other units and well supplied with weapons of all types.11 Shortly before 1:00 A.M., the three battalions left Fort Clayton and other staging areas and began heading for their objectives. Meanwhile, the AC-130 gunships and AH-6 Apache helicopters pounded the Comandancia. The AC-130 carries a 105-mm howitzer, and the Apache fired the new Hellfire missile, all of which created quite a show for the approaching troops. Unfortunately, while dramatic, the effect of the fire was marginal and did little other than destroy targets on the roof and top floor. The defenders shot down one of the Apaches that ventured too close, and it crashed inside the compound, but the two crew members escaped with their lives. As the ground troops approached, coordination between them and the supporting aviation broke down. Thinking it was engaging Panamanian vehicles, an AC-130 opened up on an American platoon and raked three M113 armored personnel carriers with machine gun fire, wounding 21 out of 26 soldiers. The problem of fratricide between air and ground forces would be a major problem throughout the post–cold war era. By 6:00 P.M., the Americans controlled the Comandancia and the supporting installations after some of the fiercest fighting of the day. With its capture, the PDF lost their centralized command and control and their ability to influence the action.12 The final combat on the Pacific coast was Task Force Semper Fi. This small force, consisting of a marine rifle company and a light armored vehicle company, had the mission of securing terrain around Howard Air Force Base and Bridge of the Americas, the major avenue of escape and reinforcement on the coast through Panama City. On the way to the bridge, they engaged a Department of Traffic and Transportation station, defended by an aggressive PDF unit, losing a marine in the fight. The marines secured their objectives by dawn.13 Across the Isthmus, Task Force Atlantic, made up of two light infantry battalions, began attacking a wide assortment of targets, designed to secure the entrance of the canal and break the back of the local resistance. In addition, it had to protect the large
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POST–COLD WAR
number of American civilians located in the area. Colonel Keith Kellogg, commander of the task force, was determined to hit all of his objectives as rapidly as possible to preclude any effective enemy resistance. The 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry drew the mission of securing the various objectives in the Colon area. Its biggest target was the Panamanian naval infantry base on Coco Solo. When its C Company arrived on the waterfront, some of the enemy had already jumped into their assault boats and began firing. In response, 1st Platoon, C Company, 4–17th Infantry opened up with a Vulcan antiaircraft gun and M60 machine guns. Soon the fight was joined by platoons attacking the facility from different directions. By dawn, the naval base was secure, as were other facilities in and around the port city.14 The 504th Infantry drew the mission of securing key facilities along the Canal Zone, to include Madden Dam, Renacer Prison, and the American housing area at Gamboa. At the prison, they freed 64 prisoners, including two American citizens. By 10:29 A.M., the task force reported all of its missions accomplished.15 At the end of the day, the consensus was that the PDF fought much harder than expected. In spite of overwhelming American combat power, they resisted for hours before surrendering or escaping into the countryside. The invaders killed 53, wounded 55, and captured over 1,200 members of the PDF. In some cases, the PDF defended their positions for three or four hours, killing 19 and wounding another 99 American soldiers. On December 20, more troops from the 7th Infantry Division and the 16th Military Police Brigade began arriving in Panama to provide general security and begin rebuilding the state. Noriega, the master of deception, continued to elude American forces, until he sought refuge in the papal Nunciatura in Panama City on December 24. For several days, there was a dramatic standoff, to include a psychological operations unit blaring hard rock music at the facility. Finally, on January 3, 1990, Noriega emerged from the papal sanctuary and was whisked away to trial in the United States.16 Operation Just Cause, the first American intervention since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1987, demonstrated that the various elements of the Department of Defense were beginning to work together in an effective manner. The new, highly trained U.S. Army fought well against a much smaller enemy. This was a popular war and helped to reverse the poor relationship between American citizens and their army. Most of the fighting only lasted a day. Yet generally hidden from most observers was a flaw in American military operations and planning that would come back to haunt the army in the next decade. The intention of operations in Panama was to get in, accomplish the obvious military mission, and then depart. The reality was that leaving the theater of operations was simply not that easy, and the Department of Defense was forced by the postwar situation to provide support to rebuild the area and restore order. These so-called nation-building operations were usually unwanted, unplanned for, and improvised. This self-imposed dichotomy between fighting and rebuilding would haunt the army, and its soldiers, for the next decade.17
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OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, 1990: A DEMONSTRATION OF POWER AGAINST IRAQ On August 2, 1990, the Medina and Hammurabi Armored and the Tawakalna Mechanized Divisions, the best units in the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command, crossed the border and invaded Kuwait. Simultaneously, Iraqi commando units attacked government installations in Kuwait City by helicopter. After limited governmental resistance in the city, the Iraqis swept across the desert landscape and moved forward to the Saudi Arabian border. Incorporating Kuwait as its “Nineteenth Province,” the Iraqi Baathist regime began a systematic program of absorbing the small kingdom’s wealth and population. It also controlled or threatened a major portion of the world’s supply of oil. The scale of the Iraqi military deployment indicated that Saddam Hussein had the option of continuing the attack south to Saudi Arabia. The most likely objectives of an Iraqi attack would be the Saudi ports of al-Jubayl and Dhahran on the coast of the Persian Gulf. A successful attack would end the kingdom’s export of oil from the eastern provinces and directly threaten other oil producers on the Arabian Peninsula. Such a strategic situation was unacceptable to the American government.18 Shown satellite imagery of Iraqi divisions arrayed along his kingdom’s border, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia agreed to receive American forces. His decision set in motion Operation Desert Shield, which had four major objectives: (1) develop a defensive capability to deter Saddam Hussein from
Soldiers from 101st Airmobile Division celebrate after a successful operation. (Courtesy of Soldiers)
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attacking Saudi Arabia; (2) defend Saudi Arabia if deterrence failed; (3) build a military coalition to participate in regional defense; and (4) enforce economic sanctions against Iraq, as prescribed by the United Nations Security Council.19 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the American commander, determined that his first requirement was to deter Saddam from continuing his offensive south. Ground forces, led by the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, began arriving in Saudi Arabia on August 9. This division had only a limited antitank capability, and soldiers joked that they were “speed bumps” in the path of a determined Iraqi assault. Certainly there was not enough serious combat power on the ground those first few weeks to effectively defend the eastern portion of the kingdom. The first heavy ground forces arrived in late August, when a brigade of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force was ready for operations in the vicinity of al-Jubayl. On August 20, the lead units of the 101st Airborne (Airmobile) Division and the 24th Infantry (Mechanized) Division, all under the command of Lieutenant General Gary Luck’s XVIII Airborne Corps, began arriving near Dhahran. The arrival of these two army units, with their Apache attack helicopters, M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, and M1A1 Abrams tanks, along with the large quantity of fighter and bomber aircraft in theater, ensured that an Iraqi attack wound not succeed.20 Not since the original move to Vietnam in August 1964 had so many American forces left the continental United States at one time. Not only was the scope of the troop commitment large, but also the scale of the area of operations was beyond the experience of almost anyone in the U.S. Army. The size of the deployment was also unprecedented in the last quarter of the century, with the coalition committing an equivalent of 15 combat divisions. In addition, most of these were heavy divisions, with a robust accompaniment of fuel, ammunition, and supply trucks and thousands of other support vehicles. The cumulative result of terrain and concentration meant that almost every soldier in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could actually see the magnitude of the deployment and actually watch armored divisions maneuver in the desert. Almost every American soldier traveled on the Tapline Road, the most important supply route from the port, to his or her assembly area. Like the beaches at Normandy or the Pusan Perimeter in Korea, watching the influx of soldiers heading to the front made a profound impression on almost every soldier.21 By the end of October, General Schwarzkopf had sufficient forces, including Allied forces from a large international coalition, on hand to decisively defeat and destroy any potential Iraqi invasion. As impressive as this combat power was, it did not appear sufficient to force Saddam out of Kuwait. At the beginning of November, the Iraqi Army had over 500,000 soldiers, 4,000 tanks, 3,000 artillery pieces, and 2,800 armored personnel carriers in the Kuwait area of operations, organized into approximately 40 combat divisions. The Iraqi Army arrayed these forces in a series of defensive sectors along the border and extending in depth back to the Euphrates River. In the center of the sector, the Republican Guard Forces Command deployed three heavy and several light divisions, poised to counterattack any Allied thrust into Kuwait.22 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and Schwarzkopf, therefore, let Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney know that they would require
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significant reinforcement if the president wished to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait. On November 8, President Bush notified the world that the United States had decided to send additional forces in the Gulf region to wage an offensive campaign. The centerpiece of this reinforcement would be Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks Jr.’s US VII Corps from Stuttgart, Germany. The 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, the 2nd Armored Division (Forward), and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment from Germany would join the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) from the United States in making up the corps’ combat power. The British also contributed their reinforced 1st Armoured Division to this large combat force. The French 6th Light Armored Division joined the XVII (Airborne) Corps, while the 1st Cavalry Division, less its 2nd (Tiger) Brigade, which supported the marines, reverted as Schwarzkopf ’s reserve.23 Operation Desert Shield, therefore, was not about fighting, and there were no battle casualties. Less than one month after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, General Schwarzkopf assembled a coalition of land, air, and maritime forces in southwest Asia robust enough to defeat an invasion by the world’s fourth largest army. With the deployment of the VII Corps, the American government, in an amazingly short time, moved a second army corps into assembly areas and set the conditions for rapid military success on Operation Desert Storm. It was a dramatic demonstration of the political and military capabilities of the United States at the end of the cold war. OPERATION DESERT STORM IN IRAQ, 1991: THE LAST COLD WAR CAMPAIGN As the middle of January 1991 approached, the Allied coalition amassed a considerable arsenal of combat power. Over 2,000 combat aircraft and a large naval force, equipped with cruise missiles and carrier-based aircraft, prepared to gain control of Iraqi airspace and destroy the equipment and facilities Saddam Hussein needed to wage war. More than 70 percent of the 472,000 ground forces came from the United States, outnumbering the 336,000 Iraqi defenders. On paper, the Iraqi and coalition forces were evenly matched in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, with approximately 6,000 on each side. Hussein’s forces outgunned his opponent’s in artillery tubes, 2,475 to 1,186. However, superior Western target acquisition and fire control methods made such a comparison invalid.24 The reality was that the fighting ability of the Allied soldier was far superior, and the U.S. Army fought the cold war battle it had prepared for against a well-armed but poorly trained Iraqi army. Army attack helicopters led the first strike into Iraq early on January 17, 1991, destroying a critical early-warning radar site. Within minutes, Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117 stealth fighters crossed the border and destroyed other elements of the Iraqi air defense system. Soon, every part of the Allied air armada was involved, attacking a wide range of strategic targets. Within 10 days, coalition aircraft had air supremacy and could fly where they wanted, with little fear of interception by Iraqi aircraft. Although the front-line troops took a serious pounding by Allied aircraft, the regime’s main operational force, the Republican Guard Forces Command, remained at a relatively high level of combat readiness, in spite of having to hide from the coalition’s air forces.25
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M1A1 tank crews prepare for operations. (Courtesy of Soldiers)
Articles and books published soon after the war portrayed the ground offensive as one rapid sweep across southern Iraq and Kuwait. In fact, the ground offensive was actually a complex, phased scenario that took over a full month to execute. The initial step in this operation was the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division north, to the sector just west of the Wadi al Batin. From there, it conducted a deception operation to attract the attention of Iraq’s degraded intelligence collection assets and cause their commanders to focus on that sector. Next, the 1st Infantry Division sent combat units west of the 1st Cavalry to secure a new logistics facility in the VII Corps attack sector. Then, each of these two divisions conducted a series of limited actions in front of their existing positions to confuse further the Iraqi commanders as to the intended direction of the American attack. With the border area secure, the remainder of the VII Corps and the entire XVIII Corps moved several hundred kilometers from their Desert Shield locations in the east to their Desert Storm sectors west of the Wadi al Batin. Meanwhile, the two Arab corps and the U.S. Marine Corps moved into position between the wadi and the coast, south of the Kuwait border. Only then, in late February, was Schwarzkopf prepared to throw the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait.26 Opening Battles While the details of this campaign are beyond the scope of this manuscript, readers should visualize the ground offensive in two connected but separate phases. First came
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a series of dramatic battles with the large, but generally ineffective, Iraqi regular army along the border on February 24, 1991, followed by the penetration of these defenses and a movement past the initial defenses on February 25. These battles generated the many prisoners that provided the footage for television broadcasts in the United States, indicating that the Iraqi Army was in tatters. The second phase was the destruction of two of Iraq’s three Republican Guard heavy divisions on February 26 and 27, the elimination of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and a pursuit to the Euphrates River on February 27 and 28, and a short fight between the 24th Infantry Division and the Hammurabi Division after the cease-fire on March 2. These battles were generally beyond the vision of the American public and senior officers in distant command posts. They were also much more intense and bloody. Across the front, the coalition struck at dawn on February 24 toward objectives deep in Iraq. The French, reinforced by the truck-borne 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, crossed the border unopposed. By noon, they had captured Objective Rochambeau, 90 miles beyond the border on the road to As Salman.27 That same morning, the 101st Airmobile attacked deep to seize an objective that became the division’s forward operating base (FOB Cobra), 165 kilometers into Iraq and halfway to the Euphrates River. From this location, the division used its air mobility to transport troops to a critical blocking position (AO Eagle), where the main road between Baghdad and Basra (Highway 8) and the Euphrates River meet.28 Like the 101st Division, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) had the mission of racing to Highway 8 to block the movement and escape of Iraqi forces on that critical highway. At 3:00 P.M., the division moved forward with three brigades on line. The weather was terrible, and blowing sand reduced visibility to only a few hundred yards. Yet, by 11:00 P.M., the division was on Phase Line Lion, about halfway to the Euphrates, encountering few enemy soldiers.29 Along the Kuwait border, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1st and 2nd Divisions), supported by the 1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division attacked with its ultimate goal of capturing the al-Mult’a Pass and the roads leading out of Kuwait City. Well across the border, it fought swirling battles among burning oil wells as older American M60A1 tanks and wheeled reconnaissance vehicles destroyed a large number of Soviet-made T-62 and T-55 tanks.30 About the same time, Joint Forces Command–East also attacked and began driving Iraqi defenders back along the coastal highway. Joint Forces Command–North, especially the Egyptian 3rd Mechanized and 4th Armored Divisions, attacked into western Kuwait and generally maintained their alignment with the marines in the center.31 To the west, along the Wadi al Batin, the 1st Cavalry Division continued to play its part in General Schwarzkopf’s deception plan and kept the Iraqi forces focused on the area south of Kuwait and the Wadi al Batin.32 In the center of the coalition’s line, Lieutenant General Franks organized the VII Corps into two separate attacks. The 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) cleared the western end of the Iraqi defensive belt and opened up a supply route into Iraq. The British Desert Rats passed through the Big Red One and attacked due east to clear the zone along the border and destroy the defenders that were confronting the 1st Cavalry Division. While the breach operation was in progress, the 2nd Armored Cavalry led the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions through an unprotected
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portion of the front farther west. Once they were through the border area, the two armored divisions pulled on line and advanced in a northeast direction in search of the Republican Guard.33 February 25 was a day of movement in the west as the American forces strived to find the three Republican Guard heavy divisions. The XVIII Airborne Corps on the west flank continued its rapid turning movement at a breakneck pace. The 24th Infantry and 3rd Cavalry Divisions conducted an almost unopposed movement toward the Euphrates River.34 The VII Corps led off with the 2nd Cavalry, reinforced by the 210th Field Artillery Brigade. One incident that morning was indicative of the entire confrontation between American and Iraqi soldiers during Operation Desert Storm. As they moved forward, one of the 2nd Cavalry’s troops literally ran into a company of enemy infantry and its MT-LB armored personnel carriers. Although they had just been under air and artillery attack, the Iraqis apparently were not expecting ground combat so soon. They had posted no security, they had no heavy weapons manned, and the officers were not providing any apparent supervision. It was obvious to the attacking cavalry troopers that the enemy company had no idea they were approaching when, without challenge, the Americans drove their Bradley fighting vehicles into the area where the Iraqis were digging. The enemy infantrymen simply looked up, took no action, and continued digging, possibly believing the American vehicles were Soviet made infantry fighting vehicles or some other system in their own army. Certainly no officer or sergeant took any action to start defensive operations, and the Iraqi infantry, oblivious to the arriving Americans, acted as if nothing had happened. Obviously, the cavalry troopers identified the infantry as enemy and opened fire, essentially knocking this Iraqi company out of operation.35 February 26 and 27 was the major confrontation as the army fought two of its three large battles. These engagements between heavily armored opponents reflected the way American planners had long imagined the next war would be: heavy forces slugging it out with heavy armor, self-propelled artillery, and airpower. It was exactly the kind of battle for which American forces had been trained and equipped. Little did most soldiers realize that this was to be the end of the old way of fighting wars. In conflicts over the next 20 years, no other power would be foolhardy enough to match its armed forces directly against the military might and technology arrayed by the United States.
Tawakalna The Tawakalna Mechanized Division blocked the VII Corps’ advance on the evening of February 26. In spite of weeks of aerial bombardment, the most powerful division in the Iraqi Army prepared to defend the western approach into Kuwait. The fight began when Colonel Leonard (Don) Holder’s 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and Lieutenant General Thomas G. Rhame’s 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) attacked the southern sector of the Tawakalna’s battle line, called “Objective Norfolk.” The cavalry made the initial contact with the Iraqis and overran several unsuspecting battalions in what has been called the battle of 73 Easting. As the regiment maintained contact, the 1st Infantry Division passed through, and by 10:30 P.M., its five heavy battalions and the divisional
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cavalry squadron were fighting through two Iraqi brigades. The 1st Brigade commander, following just behind his lead battalions, thought he was “watching a vintage black and white movie. Everything seemed to move in slow motion.” Such was the thunder of battle that “there was no noticeable sound that anyone could recall.”36 As they slowly advanced, M1A1 tank commanders acquired the thermal images of the Iraqi tanks or infantry fighting vehicles long before they were themselves spotted. Platoon leaders, team commanders, and even battalion commanders issued unit-wide fire commands. Before the defending Iraqis had any idea what was happening, their whole line of vehicles exploded. By dawn, the combined attack of the 2nd Armored Cavalry and the Big Red One had destroyed almost four Iraqi armored or mechanized brigades. In addition, they captured what remained of the massive logistics installation at the confluence of the IPSA Pipeline, al Busayyah and Saudi border roads. The Republican Guard’s left flank was gone, and the way was now open for exploitation.37 At the same time that the 2nd Armored Cavalry was making contact with the Tawakalna, Major General Paul Funk’s 3rd Armored Division was in contact in the adjacent sector. By 4:30 P.M. on February 26, Funk’s lead battalions had found the center of the Iraqi division’s defenses, consisting of approximately 8 Iraqi heavy battalions, facing the attacking 3rd Armored Division’s 10 battalions. In a space of only 270 square kilometers, enemy defenders had massed over 122 tanks, 78 BMPs, and hundreds of other combat vehicle and fighting systems. Several different weapon systems covered almost every meter of ground. Thousands of infantrymen had dismounted from their combat carriers and, once on the ground, constructed dug-in company strong points and prepared to use their Sagger antitank missiles and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to engage the attacking Americans. Finally, there were approximately a dozen field artillery batteries arrayed along the rear of the Tawakalna’s operations zone in this sector. The Iraqi defenses were thus thick, and General Funk had no soft or exposed Iraqi flanks to exploit.38 Funk, of course, did not intend to fight the battalions on equal terms. His main effort was in the northern portion of his sector, where Colonel Robert W. Higgins’s 2nd Brigade moved across the line of departure at 4:45 P.M. Higgins’s three battalions and supporting artillery gave the Iraqis a demonstration of a classic coordinated combined arms attack during the next four hours, as disciplined tank and Bradley crews moved through the enemy’s defenses. Tank companies bounded forward by platoons, using their thermal sights and stand-off range to engage Iraqi vehicles on their own terms. Out-ranged and fighting blind, the Republican Guard soldiers returned fire without any noticeable effect. Attack helicopters and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers destroyed Iraqi artillery almost as soon as it fired. As the brigade line moved forward, Iraqi infantry emerged from their hiding places and tried to engage American armor from close range but had little chance of success, with the line of Bradley fighting vehicles, moving just behind the tanks, killing them with machine gun fire.39 Nevertheless, the Iraqi 29th Brigade commander continued to resist the American advance, directing several counterattacks by armored and mechanized platoons and companies. Many of those were effectively targeted against the 2nd Brigade’s flank, but concentrated tank, Bradley, and artillery fire stopped these attacks before they could
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interfere with the 2nd Brigade’s progress. Beyond the range of the advancing tank and Bradley crews, attack helicopters and artillery continued to suppress or destroy any Iraqi units that moved or appeared to threaten the advance. Given the depth of the American attack, the Iraqi brigade had no way of countering its effects and no choice but to stand and fight or surrender. Most enemy soldiers continued to fight, but to no avail.40 At the same time as the 2nd Cavalry and 3rd Armored Division attacked the Tawakalna’s forward defenses, the Iraqis’ northern-most battalion lay in the path of the 1st Armored Division. Although Major General Ronald Griffith’s primary objective was the Medina Division about 30 kilometers father west, his easterly movement brought his division through the area held by the right (northern) flank battalion of the Tawakalna Division. The one battalion of the 29th Mechanized Brigade that occupied positions in this intermediate sector, however, was too good a target to pass by, and it lay in the path of Colonel Dan Zanini’s 3rd Brigade. While Zanini maneuvered his battalions into position, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued to move east toward the Medina.41 While most of the brigade provided suppressing fire, 45 Abrams tanks from 1st Battalion, 37th Armor attacked on line, moving at less than 10 kilometers per hour. Behind that wall of steel came the task force’s infantry company mounted on its Bradleys, following about 1000 meters behind the tanks to help destroy any threat to the tanks from their rear. The three tank companies rushed forward in the dark and began engaging hot spots 2,000–3,000 meters, almost two miles, away. Only after the gunners came much closer, less than 1,500 meters from the thermal images, could they positively identify the targets as T-72 tanks and BMP fighting vehicles. By 9:30 P.M., the battalion reached the Iraqi vehicles located behind a low ridge and protected by an antitank minefield. The M1s lost their range advantage and were now in a close fight.42 As was the case with the entire Tawakalna Division, the Iraqi soldiers fought to the best of their capabilities. Many tanks had kept their engines off to defeat the American thermal sights. American tankers, however, were often able to locate those vehicles because of the strange white spot, the tank commander’s head, seemingly suspended in thin air.43 However, when not found first, the Iraqis were able to turn their turrets by hand and engage the M1s close in their flanks and rear. Iraqi infantry moved in three- to five-second rushes in the hope of moving close to the attacking American armor. Burning vehicles and explosions washed out the thermal sights, making target acquisition difficult. In the confusion of the fight, 3rd Armored Division Apache helicopters, working in the sector just to the south, unleashed a barrage of Hellfire missiles, damaging four M1A1 tanks. The quality of the American armor was obvious as all four tank crews walked away with only minor injuries.44 That Iraqi battalion, however, never had a chance. It was receiving direct fire from at least three American battalion task forces.45 Several field artillery and attack helicopter battalions had engaged it throughout the depth of its position. Moreover, it was assaulted by a tank battalion with arguably the best gunnery skills in the entire U.S. Army.46 When the American battalion emerged on the far side of the objective, the Iraqi unit was in shambles. By 11:00 P.M., the objective was clear, prisoners were rounded up, and the 1st Brigade prepared to continue its mission east. The 1st Battalion, 37th Armor lost four tanks and six soldiers wounded. Because of good luck, good training, and the
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effectiveness of the Abrams’ enhanced armor, there were no American fatalities. In the sector swept by the 1st Brigade, two Iraqi tank companies and one mechanized infantry company were burning hulks: approximately 24 T-72 tanks and 14 BMPs. Part of one BMP company escaped and fled due east, away from the brigade.47 Therefore, soon after the 1st Armored Division’s attack started at 8:00 P.M. on February 26, the 3rd Armored Division launched its attack just to the south. One hour later, the 1st Infantry Division passed through the 2nd Cavalry and captured all of Objective Norfolk. The Tawakalna Division’s commander, who probably perished in this battle, had been decisively engaged by a force four times the size of his command from the beginning of the battle until his unit was annihilated during the early morning hours of February 27. He never had an opportunity to maneuver, use reserves, or even use his artillery to any effect. His spirited defense, however, confirmed Franks’s concern that the Republican Guard did not enter the battle already defeated. They did not run away and fought with extreme bravery. The Tawakalna also had good equipment, although its soldiers proved no match for the American troops in tank gunnery and other combat skills. In Lieutenant General Franks’s most significant tactical success of the war, he massed six heavy brigades and a cavalry regiment directly against it, while flanking it to the north and south with two more brigades. Franks used a little luck and good tactics to effect a double envelopment on this once proud Iraqi unit. By attacking it in depth, with attack helicopters and long-range artillery systems, the VII Corps provided a textbook example of land combat at the end of the twentieth century. By dawn, the devastating effects of synchronized combat power stretched along 40 kilometers of the 73 Easting.
Battle of Medina Ridge The second major battle took place late in the afternoon of February 27, 1991. The Medina Armored Division, one of Saddam’s three heavy Republican Guard divisions, anchored a defensive line just west of the Rumaylah oil fields. Extending south for almost 50 kilometers, just west of the Kuwait border, the battle line continued with surviving units from the 10th, 12th, and 17th Armored Divisions and other Iraqi units. Despite the destruction of the Tawakalna, the Iraqi High Command still hoped to stop the Americans long enough to evacuate most of its troops from Kuwait.48 Around 11:30 A.M., soldiers of the Medina’s 2nd Armored Brigade began preparing lunch. Although previously under attack from the air, they obviously believed that precautions were now unnecessary. It was so rainy and overcast that the American A-10 aircraft were unable to find and attack them, and feeling secure, they failed to deploy units forward of their main defensive line to warn of an attack. The brigade arrayed its combat vehicles to take advantage of a low ridge—a rear slope defense. Such a defensive arrangement seeks to draw an attacker’s lead vehicles over a hill and into a prearranged kill zone, while the following vehicles, still on the back of the hill, are unable to observe the engagement. Defenders can improve the effectiveness of these kill zones by using mines and other engineered obstacles as well as prearranged artillery fire to destroy and disrupt the following units. However, as was the case with most Republican Guard units, the 2nd Armored Brigade prepared
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its positions poorly. Its own vehicles were dug in only superficially and used very few obstacles. Iraqi unit commanders had not verified their weapons’ ranges to the top of the hill and were unaware that their battle line was too far back from the ridge to hit the attacking American armor when it crested the top. While these may have been some of Iraq’s best troops, their tactical ability, especially in the defense, was not up to the standard expected of an elite force.49 Colonel Montgomery Meigs’s 2nd Brigade was nearing the ridge at almost the same time as the Medina’s 2nd Armored Brigade began its lunch. Meigs had no idea that this large Iraqi formation was less than 7,000 meters away since visibility was poor, and vehicle commanders could see no more than 1,500 meters without the aid of thermal sights. At 12:17 P.M., the 4th Battalion, 70th Armor moved over a small rise with three tank companies abreast. As the battalion reached the top of the ridge, its thermal sights went wild with images of hundreds of Iraqi vehicles 3,000 meters away. Even with binoculars, the tank commanders would have missed the hidden target array. But now, thanks to thermal imagery, an entire reinforced armored brigade lay arrayed as if stationary targets on a tank range at Grafenwöhr or the National Training Center.50 The American tankers opened fire, interrupting the Iraqis’ lunch. With an effective gun range of less than 2,000 meters, the Iraqi crews in their T-72 tanks were unable to hit the American vehicles on the ridge. Although they returned fire toward the flashes of the M1A1s’ cannons, most of their rounds landed harmlessly in the dirt in front of the American line. Meanwhile, the American tankers showed discipline, control, and deliberate gunnery. There was no special haste, as they picked off their targets with impunity, beyond the Iraqis’ range.51 To the south, the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor moved to the top of the same hill and also began to acquire targets in the valley. The battalion’s D Company, the first on the hill, destroyed two BMPs about 2,700 meters away. Suddenly, the valley came alive as Iraqi crews fired back. As each company came on line, they replied to the ineffective Iraqi shooting with platoon and company volleys of tanks and anti-tank missies. Bradley crews registered missile hits out to 3,300 meters, over two miles away. For almost 40 minutes, the battalion fired away at the hapless Iraqi defenders.52 Meanwhile, a third American task force, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, pulled on line in the southern portion of the brigade sector. At ranges of 2,600–2,800 meters, these crews engaged an Iraqi mechanized battalion in the valley.53 The Iraqis called for artillery fire, and the guns, all preregistered, overshot their targets, causing no initial damage. The 2nd Battalion (155 SP), 1st Field Artillery joined the counterartillery fire battle by shooting at any Iraqi battery their target acquisition radars could identify. As in previous engagements, the Iraqis adjusted none of the artillery missions, so identification was rather easy. Within a few minutes, the Old Ironsides counterbattery fire destroyed the Medina firing batteries, allowing the Americans to shift the artillery fire to help Meigs’s committed battalions.54 Colonel Meigs positioned himself behind his center battalion, where he could observe as much of the battle as possible. Although he was unable to see it all, he had probably the best view of a battle of any brigade commander in the war. While his tank crews and artillery pounded the 2nd Armored Brigade, he struggled to direct Apache helicopters and air force ground attack aircraft into the battle. However, they did not
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show up until after 1:00 P.M., after Meigs’s “Iron Brigade” eliminated the Iraqi 2nd Armored Brigade.55 Meanwhile, Colonel James Riley’s 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division encountered the Iraqi defensive line just south of Meigs’s unit. In this sector, many of the vehicles were still facing south, as though the attack was coming up the Wadi al Batin. Using the stand-off capability of the M1A1 and Bradley, the brigade shot first at almost maximum range, killing several T-72s and T-55s before they were able to rotate their turrets and return fire. A handful of T-72s were out in the open, apparently receiving supplies, and were quickly destroyed by U.S. armor. The remaining Iraqis fought back but were incapable of hitting the Americans so far away.56 In the southern part of the 1st Armored Division sector, Colonel Daniel Zanini’s 3rd Brigade struck the left of the Medina’s line around 1:00 P.M. Here, as in the 1st Brigade sector, the foe constituted a mixture of units caught generally out of position, and the earlier scenario repeated itself as tankers continued to methodically engage and destroy Iraqi tanks and fighting vehicles. Now Apache helicopters joined the firing line, sending Hellfire missiles over the heads of the American tankers. Air force close support aircraft arrived and began attacking Iraqi forces beyond the range of the U.S. ground troops. After only a few hours of intense combat, the Medina Armored Division and several smaller units essentially ceased to exist, as the valley was littered with hundreds of burning tanks and armored personnel carriers.57 Already, by 1:00 P.M. on February 27, the rest of the corps was well into its exploitation phase. At one level, it had been a series of small tactical successes. Better gunnery, better drill, better training, and better equipment had all contributed to the overwhelming success of the VII Corps’ armor and infantry crews. At another level, the success reflected the sophistication of the corps and division commanders and their staffs. Each tactical engagement was part of an operational concept that simultaneously massed overwhelming combat power against the enemy’s front and struck them with artillery and air throughout the depth of the battle position. Franks and his commanders fought the battle exactly as the U.S. Army doctrine, developed in the years after Vietnam, said they should fight it.
Battle of Rumaylah By February 28, the Allied coalition had defeated the Iraqi Army. Across the entire battle front, Iraqi units were in headlong flight toward the Euphrates Valley, with most concentrated around the city of Basra. Kuwait was free of organized Iraqi units. The U.S. VII Corps occupied all of northern Kuwait, and the XVIII Corps’ 24th Infantry Division, reinforced by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, blocked the escape routes south of the Euphrates River. At 8:00 that morning, the war ended, as President George Bush declared a unilateral suspension of hostilities and offered the Iraqi government a chance to negotiate a permanent cease-fire. Two of the Republican Guard’s three heavy divisions were in shambles. The third division, the Hammurabi, was caught in the “Basra Pocket.” The 24th Infantry (Victory) Division (Mechanized), commanded by Major General Barry McCaffery, had provided the bulk of XVIII Corps’ ground combat punch. From
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the beginning of the ground war until the cease-fire, it had moved almost 250 miles into Iraq, to the banks of the Euphrates River. After capturing the major air fields at Jalibah and Tallil, it continued to move southeast toward Basra along Highway 8.58 Although the cease-fire went into effect on February 28, Iraqi units continued to shoot at the Americans in the hours that followed. In the early morning hours of March 2, a brigade or more from the Hammurabi Division tried to force its way out of the Rumaylah oil fields, through the Victory Division’s positions on Highway 8. Apparently, they were trying to cross over a repaired portion of the Hammar Causeway to assist in suppressing the growing Shia rebellion in southern Iraq.59 It ran right into the 24th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel John Le Moyne. American attack helicopters, artillery, and long-range tank and TOW fires wreaked havoc among the Iraqi soldiers. For several hours, this unit’s T-72 tanks, BMPs, and support vehicles tried to move through the American unit without success. Finally, at 10:45 A.M., Le Moyne unleashed his 4 – 64th Armor Battalion. Maneuvering from the south of the Iraqi forces, the battalion delivered the coup de grâce in a scorching flank attack that cut right through the disorganized Iraqis and swept up to the edge of the causeway. Sweeping through the fire and devastation, the American tankers destroyed every item of equipment not burning, as thousands of panic-stricken Iraqi soldiers ran toward Basra. At the end of this fight, over 185 armored vehicles, 400 trucks, and three dozen artillery pieces lay scattered on the desert floor.60 The battle of Rumaylah signified the end of combat operations during Operation Desert Storm. The next day, Iraqi military officer sat down with General Schwarzkopf in a tent at Safwan airfield. While the war appeared to be a military success, the political benefits were not so apparent. The failure to force an admission of defeat by the Hussein regime ensured that the United States would remain militarily involved with Iraq for the next dozen years. NOTES 1. Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988–January 1990 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 9–27. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 121–74. R. Cody Phillips, Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2004), 8–9. 2. William Joe Webb, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1990–1991, ed. W. Scott James (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1997), 16–17. Cole, Operation Just Cause, 30–35. Phillips, Operation Just Cause, 17–19. 3. Lawrence A. Yates, “Operation Just Cause in Panama City, December 1989,” in Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations, ed. William G. Robertson (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2002), 333. 4. Cole, Operation Just Cause, 38–39. Phillips, Operation Just Cause, 34. 5. Yates, “Operation Just Cause,” 338–41. 6. Phillips, Operation Just Cause, 20–22. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, February 1988–January 1990 (New York: Lexington Books, 1995), 193–213. 7. Donnelly et al., Operation Just Cause, 193–213. Yates, “Operation Just Cause,” 340–41. 8. Donnelly et al., Operation Just Cause, 217–20, 226–27. 9. Ibid., 220–26, 229–32. Cole, Operation Just Cause, 41.
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10. Donnelly et al., Operation Just Cause, 227–29. 11. Cole, Operation Just Cause, 40. 12. Yates, “Operation Just Cause,” 344 – 45. Phillips, Operation Just Cause, 23–27. 13. Donnelly et al., Operation Just Cause, 183–87. 14. Ibid., 243–54. 15. Cole, Operation Just Cause, 40. 16. Ibid., 57–63. 17. Peter Huchthausen, America’s Splendid Little Wars (New York: Viking, 2003), 125–26. Richard H. Shultz Jr., In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and NationBuilding in Panama Following Just Cause (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL Air University Press, 1993), 63–73. 18. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 303–15. 19. U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), 19–20. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992). 20. Charles Lane Toomey, XVIII Airborne Corps: From Planning to Victory (Central Point, OR: Hellgate Press, 2004). 21. Peter S. Kindsvatter, “Notes and Operations: Operation Desert Storm” (VII Corps, 1991). Author’s own primary document. 22. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 70–73. John C. Davidson, The 100 Hour Ground War: The Failed Iraqi Plan, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. 23. Peter S. Kindsvatter, “VII Corps in the Gulf War: Deployment and Preparation for Desert Storm,” Military Review 72 (1992): 2–16. 24. U.S. Army Central Command, ARCENT Morning Brief (February 24, 1991), VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 7. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 4, The Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 117. 25. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1–26. Cordesman and Wagner, Gulf War, 619–20. 26. Stephen A. Bourque, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2002), 189–91. 27. Toomey, XVIII Airborne Corps, 309–14. 28. Ibid. Major General J. H. Binford Peay III, Commander, “A Narrative/Significant Activities Summary, Sequence Number: 202,” U.S. Department of the Army 101st Airborne Division AWC. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Swain Papers. Major General J. H. Binford Peay III, June 5, 1991. 29. Lieutenant General Gary E. Luck, Daily Situation Report 262200z, February 1991, U.S. Department of the Army XVIII Corps Main Command Post-G3, Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Military History Institute, Swain Papers. Toomey, XVIII Airborne Corps, 340–43. Jason K. Kamiya, A History of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team during Operation Desert Storm (Fort Stewart, GA: 24th Infantry Division, 1991), 47–48. 30. Toomey, XVIII Airborne Corps, 510–11. Charles H. Cureton, With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm: U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), 64–88. 31. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 265–67. 32. Davidson, 100 Hour Ground War. John C. Wirick, “1st Cavalry Division in the Battle of Ruqi Pocket,” U.S. Department of the Army HQ, First Cavalry Division, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Military history Institute, Swain Papers. First Cavalry Division, Chronology of the 1st Cavalry Division, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. 33. Bourque, Jayhawk!, 189–99. 34. Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, 527. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 406–7. It was an inappropriate comparison since Franks commanded a corps and McCaffrey a division.
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35. Davidson, 100 Hour Ground War, 111. Steve Vogel, “A Swift Kick: The 2d ACR’s Taming of the Guard,” Army Times 5 (1991): 28. Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks Jr., Commander’s SITRREP 39 (242100z–252100z, February 1991), VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Colonel Leonard D. Holder, Operation Desert Storm, 2nd ACR Operations Summary, 23 Feb–1 Mar 91, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Peter S. Kindsvatter, “VII Corps in the Gulf War: Ground Offensive,” Military Review 72 (1992): 25. 36. Lon E. Maggart, “A Leap of Faith,” Armor 101 (1992): 28 37. Lon E. Maggart, “A Leap of Faith,” Armor 101 (1992): 28. John Sloan Brown, Desert Reckoning: Historical Continuities and the Battle for Norfolk, 1991 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1992). VII Corps, Frago 144-91 VII Corps Continues Attack North and East to Destroy Enemy Forces in Zone. VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), 291. Gregory Fontenot, “Fright Night: Task Force 2/34 Armor,” Military Review 73 (1993): 47. 38. Stephen A. Bourque, “Correcting Myths about the Persian Gulf War: The Last Stand of the Tawakalna,” Middle East Journal 51, no. 4 (1997): 566–83. 39. Major General Paul E. Funk, April 4, 1991. Major General Paul Funk, Chronology of 3ad Operation Desert Spear, 24–28 Feb 91, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Third Armored Division HQVII Corps, Colonel Robert Higgins, 2d Bde 3ad History, Operation Desert Shield December 1990–27 February 1991, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Scales, Certain Victory, 280. 40. Funk, Chronology. Higgins, 2d Bde 3ad History. Davidson, 100 Hour Ground War, 120–21. 41. Major General Ronald H. Griffith, Daily Staff Journal, Main Command Post, G3, 1st Armored Division HQ, 1st Armored Division, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Captain Carlos A. Abinader and Sergeant First Class Steve D. Kennedy, “Official Journal of Our Dragon Battalion (1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment),” First Armored Division Third Brigade S3, 1–34 Armor/Third Brigade, First Armored Division AWC, Swain Papers. Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks Jr., Commander’s Sitrep #4 (202100z–212100z Jan 91), VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Richard M. Bohannon, “Dragon’s Roar: 1–37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting,” Armor 101 (1992): 11. Davidson, 100 Hour Ground War, 120. Guy C. Swan III, 1st Armored Division Battle Summary for Combat Operations Conducted in Support of Operation Desert Storm 23–28 February 1991, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. 42. Bohannon, “Dragon’s Roar,” 12–13. Scales, Certain Victory, 268. Abinader and Kennedy, “Official Journal.” Tom Carhart, Iron Soldiers: How America’s 1st Armored Division Crushed Iraq’s Elite Republican Guard (New York: Pocket Books, 1994), 246 – 47. 43. Thermal imagery requires some amount of heat. With their engines off, armored vehicles generally have the same temperature as the surrounding countryside and therefore do not show up on the sights. 44. Bohannon, “Dragon’s Roar,” 13–16. Swan, “1st Armored Division.” 45. Task Force 4th Battalion, 18th Infantry from the 3rd Armored Division in the south and 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 37th Armor from the 1st Armored Division. 46. D Company, 1st Battalion, 37th Armor was the army’s selection for the upcoming Canadian Army Trophy Competition. This was a demanding, NATO-wide tank gunnery competition. 47. Bohannon, “Dragon’s Roar,” 17. Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie, Daily Staff Journal, 27 February, VII Corps Tactical Command Post, VII Corps After Action Report. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991. Entry 19. 48. Lieutenant General John Yeosock, “Briefing: Desert Storm Intelligence Summary,” U.S. Army Central Command, U.S. Department of the Army. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Swain Collection. Davidson, 100 Hour Ground War, 133–34. 49. Davidson, 100 Hour Ground War, 132. Scales, Certain Victory, 293. 50. 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division interview. Roy S. Whitcomb, Operation Desert Viper, June 5, 1991, After Action Report. VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Scales, Certain Victory, 292–93.
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51. 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division interview. Whitcomb, Operation Desert Viper. 52. 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division interview. Volley fire is nothing more than all of the weapons in a unit firing at the same time. It creates a great psychological impression on the attacker and, if effective, a negative one on the defender, who starts to fear the effects of the next volley. 53. 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division interview. 54. Carhart, Iron Soldiers, 279–302. 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division interview. Scales, Certain Victory, 293. 55. 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division interview. Carhart, Iron Soldiers, 279–302. 56. Steve Vogel, “Killer Brigade: 3d Infantry Division ‘Phantoms’ hunt the enemy,” Army Times, November 11, 1991, 16. 57. 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, interview by Norm Johnson, March 26, 1991, Washington: Center for Military History. 58. Kamiya, A History, 40. 59. Cordesman and Wagner, Gulf War, 648– 49. 60. James Blackwell, “Georgia Punch: 24th Mech Puts the Squeeze on Iraq,” Army Times 20 (1991): 312–14.
3
THE YEARS 1992–2006: INTERVENTIONS AND INSURGENCIES
Operation Desert Storm proved to be the only war fought as the authors of AirLand Battle Doctrine intended. It was the only one with large formations, major encounters between mechanized units, identifiable front lines, and large targets that the artillery and air force could engage with all of the weapons they had available. The new post–cold war era found the army engaged in a series of small, messy conflicts that were difficult to define, fought with various international partners with competing aims against enemies that had their own method of resisting American forces. Usually, these conflicts devolved into humanitarian and peacekeeping operations—tasks that the warrior-soldier was little prepared to perform. In addition, although soldiers had a wide array of sophisticated weapons and equipment, they struggled against an enemy who refused to play by the rules of conventional combat. In addition, the army embarked on a radical reduction in force that would see its strength decrease from 770,000 in 1989 to only 499,000 in 2003. While American soldiers would depart Iraq in May 1991, little did they realize they were now entering a new post–cold war era of constant deployments for peacekeeping and nation building that would last for the next 15 years. The most obvious reason for these continued deployments is that the government of the United States entered the post–cold war era without a clear strategic vision. Without a guidepost, such as the Truman and subsequent administrations had following the development of the strategy of containment in the 1950s, both President George H. W. Bush and President William Jefferson Clinton seemed to bounce aimlessly from one crisis to the next.1 Following the cease-fire negotiations after Desert Storm, most American soldiers looked forward to returning to their normal duty assignments. Almost immediately, they began the task of packing up equipment, destroying abandoned and captured Iraqi equipment, and preparing to move out of Iraq and to the ports in Saudi Arabia. While international diplomats worked out the formal arrangements at the United Nations (UN),
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the XVIII and VII Corps patrolled a military demarcation line, or MDL, throughout March and April.2 Little did most suspect that the concept of a routine between home station and deployments was about to change. The cease-fire terminating hostilities during Desert Storm took place at the March 3, 1991, meeting between coalition commanders General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and General Kalhid bin Sultan and the Iraqi delegation consisting of Lieutenant General Sultan Hashim Ahmad, an Iraqi army deputy chief of staff, and Lieutenant Colonel Salah Abbud Mahmud, commander of III Corps, on the Safwan airfield. During this discussion, Schwarzkopf presented the Iraqi representatives with a map showing a temporary boundary line that would separate coalition and Iraqi military forces. Until both sides agreed on a permanent cease-fire, opposing units would stay 1,000 meters away from a military demarcation line. Schwarzkopf wanted to prevent unintended engagements such as had taken place the day before in the 24th Infantry Division’s sector.3 With great hesitation, the Iraqi commission agreed to the temporary boundary, and American soldiers patrolled this MDL throughout March and April. Almost as an afterthought, the Iraqis asked if they could fly their helicopters. Schwarzkopf, without consulting his experts or even his co-commander, agreed. This snap decision would have severe consequences.4 Until the meeting at Safwan, the coalition’s units remained where they were at the end of hostilities. Once the Iraqi delegation agreed to terms, everyone started to move. Lieutenant General Gary Luck’s XVIII Corps, which had been the first units on the ground in August, were the first to depart. Therefore, on March 7, Lieutenant General Frederick Franks’s VII Corps assumed control of the entire MDL.5 The 2nd Cavalry patrolled the Euphrates River from As Samawah, east to An Nasiriyah, backed up by the 1st Infantry Division’s 3rd Brigade. The 1st Armored Division secured the sector from Highway 8 to Ar Rumaylah, while the 3rd Armored Division, which had replaced the 1st Infantry Division in the Safwan area, occupied the corps’ right flank. Located in the center of the sector, at Assembly Area Allen was patrolled by the remainder of the 1st Infantry Division.6
THE SHIITE UPRISING AND REFUGEE SUPPORT, 1991 The army’s first challenge was the Shiite uprising, or intifada, as it was sometimes called. The importance of this relatively unknown event became obvious to the outside world after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its subsequent involvement in a dramatic insurgency and power struggle between the majority Shiite and minority, but powerful, Sunni religious groups.7 This outburst took place along the Euphrates River in March 1991, and the Iraqi Army that remained loyal to the regime after its defeat in the Persian Gulf War ruthlessly repressed it.8 Although many of the details remain obscure, it began at the end of February, as a protest of regular army soldiers southwest of Basra. Apparently, they believed Saddam Hussein and his Republican Guards had abandoned them during the scramble out of Kuwait. This protest sparked a spontaneous, leaderless demonstration of Shiite frustration with the regime.9 Soon, cities such as al-Zubayr, An
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Nasiriyah, As Samawah, An Najaf, and Karbella were all involved in heavy fighting.10 For a variety of reasons, President Bush decided not to support the rebels, and the insurgency began to fall apart. The presence of Iraqi government attack helicopters, permitted by the Safwan agreement, gave Saddam’s loyal troops the mobility and firepower they needed to control the uprising.11 While the revolt caught Hussein’s government off guard, the regime soon recovered. It reconstituted the army, especially the survivors of Republican Guard units, and began a brutal program to destroy all involved. Often, these forces conducted operations in full view of coalition troops, just across the MDL. American soldiers watched as Iraqi tank and helicopter units attacked Shiite strongholds using, in some cases, the chemical weapons they never employed against the coalition forces. For almost a month, Saddam Hussein unleashed all the power at his disposal against his fellow countrymen.12 Emotionally, American soldiers would have relished the chance to inflict punishment on Hussein’s vindictive troops. However, almost any overt action could find the U.S. Army engaged in a civil war, the length, cost, and outcome of which was uncertain. It would have gone into Iraq alone since most of the coalition would not have followed. Certainly events following Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 bore out the wisdom of the time.13 It was a road down which the U.S. government, in 1991, did not wish to travel. The revolt’s suppression caused thousands of Shiites to flee Iraq for safety in Saudi Arabia and Iran and it fueled a rebellion of the Kurdish people in the north. American soldiers did, however, indirectly participate in the Shiite uprising by performing refugee triage and providing medical support to those who tried to escape the fighting. The refugee problem began almost as soon as the Shiite rebellion began. In the XVIII Corps’ sector, the 82nd Airborne Division began receiving refugees fleeing An Nasiriyah and the repression by the Iraqi Army on March 4. These Iraqi civilians came in search of food, water, medical treatment, and protection from Iraqi Army reprisals. The 82nd Division settled them in an abandoned construction camp near Suq as-Shuykll, about 35 kilometers southeast of An Nasiriyah and just south of the MDL. Soldiers named the settlement Camp Mercy, and depending on the intensity of the fighting north of the MDL, its population ranged from as few as 200 to as many as 6,000. From February 28 until March 24, when the VII Corps relieved the 82nd Division, doctors and medics treated more than 1,100 refugees for maladies ranging from minor illnesses to gunshot wounds. They also provided these unfortunate civilians with thousands of meals and clean drinking water.14 Refugees began crossing into the VII Corps sector on March 3. Basra, 25 kilometers to the north, was the scene of some of the earliest heavy fighting between the Republican Guard and the Shiite insurgents. As the fighting became more intense, waves of refugees streamed across the MDL. For example, on the night of March 24, the outposts from the 2nd Cavalry watched an intense battle in the town of As Samawah across the demarcation line between attacking Iraqi soldiers and Shiite defenders. The next day, over 1,000 refugees began moving south out of the town toward American lines. By late afternoon, the 2nd Dragoons had almost 2,500 refugees and 350 Iraqi soldiers requesting prisoner of war status.15 Ultimately, over 33,000 Shiites sought refuge within the American lines.16
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The swell of Iraqi civilians placed the two corps commanders in a difficult position. On one hand, they expected the Iraqi government and the coalition powers to sign a formal cease-fire agreement within days, which would require all U.S. forces to leave Iraq.17 On the other hand, the law of war requires that an occupying power, which the United States was, care for the civilians who are displaced by the conflict.18 The administration of this problem was further complicated by the impending departure of the XVIII Corps, which gave responsibility of the entire demarcation sector to Franks and his VII Corps. Lieutenant General Franks, acutely aware of all of these responsibilities right from the start, grew increasingly uncomfortable as the refugees continued to arrive with no indication of when the recent belligerents would sign a formal cease-fire agreement. Realizing he was the senior U.S. military commander in Iraq, Franks took steps to establish refugee camps and a temporary civil-military government in occupied Iraq. He formed a task force at the corps tactical command post that consisted of the Corps G5 (Civil Affairs), a member of the Staff Judge Advocate staff, and logistics personnel to coordinate the corps’ civil-military responsibilities.19 Ultimately, the corps established two refugee centers, at Safwan in the east and Rafha in the west. The first of these refugee centers was near the town of Safwan. Only a day’s walk from Basra, refugees from the fighting in that city began to appear on March 3. The 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division established a temporary refugee center in the narrow sector between the Kuwait border and the demarcation line.20 As the refugee problem grew, division, corps, and army assets began arriving to assist the 2nd Brigade. Ultimately, the area contained three mobile army surgical hospital (MASH) units, which provided basic medical care. Truckloads of food and water arrived, providing the refugees with some of the best nourishment they had had in months. VII Corps soldiers distributed not only army-issued rations, but also baby food, local foods, lentils, and rice.21 On March 19, Colonel William Nash’s 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division replaced the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in the Safwan area and assumed the mission of humanitarian relief. The number of refugees at Safwan, which ultimately approached 20,000, soon overwhelmed Safwan’s original refugee sites. In March, the 3rd Brigade established another site at an abandoned Indian construction camp about a kilometer north of the Kuwait-Iraq border.22 By now, the corps had coordinated the kind of support operation that was needed to provide adequate assistance for as long as it was required. Civil affairs teams from the 352nd Civil Affairs Brigade provided the expert advice needed to administer the camps. These units also sent medical and civic action teams out into the countryside to distribute food, water, and medical care. The 332nd Medical Brigade’s MASH and other medical support worked to improve the health of the local civilians. Finally, 3rd Armored Division engineers and civil affairs teams cleaned up Safwan’s water supply and reopened the town’s school.23 The Safwan humanitarian mission is another often overlooked aspect of the VII Corps’ role in southwest Asia. By the time the Safwan camp formally closed on May 7, the soldiers of the 1st Infantry and 3rd Armored Division had registered more than 24,000 Iraqi civilians and had distributed almost 1,000,000 individual meals, 173,000 cases of bottled water, and 1,136,000 gallons of potable water. The mobile hospitals and
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medics treated more than 23,400 Iraqi civilians with everything from diarrhea to lifethreatening wounds.24 However, Safwan was not the only camp in operation. To the west, the VII Corps also operated a refugee site north of the border, near Rafha. On March 23, VII Corps assumed the occupation mission for all of southern Iraq. The 11th Aviation Brigade, augmented by the French 1st Combat Helicopter Regiment, relieved the French 6th Light Armored Division on the MDL’s western flank. The 11th Brigade’s civil affairs team took charge of an ongoing humanitarian operation at the small town of As Salman. Just as Safwan provided the focus for refugees in the east, As Salman provided a conduit in the western area of the occupation zone. As in the case of Safwan, civil affairs teams serviced the refugee centers and spread out in the countryside, organized to deliver food, water, and medical treatment along 200 kilometers of the north–south highway between the Saudi border and the MDL at the Euphrates River in the north.25 By the end of March, the Saudis had established a large, semipermanent refugee holding facility, known as Rafha I, just inside the Iraqi border. This camp was in the 11th Aviation Brigade’s sector, and they took over the direction of providing humanitarian support. The situation was the same as in Safwan as VII Corps soldiers continued to provide food, water, shelter, and, most of all, security to more than 17,000 Iraqi civilians.26 The permanent cease-fire agreement with Iraq called for coalition forces to depart Iraqi territory by the end of April and for the UN to assume responsibility for occupied Iraq. The United Nations (UN), much to Franks’s consternation, was not prepared to take care of the refugees. Franks believed he had a moral and legal right under the laws of war to continue to protect these civilians from certain death or abuse by the Iraqi government.27 Understandably, the Saudis were also hesitant to create a refugee zone in their, relatively, underpopulated country. The refugee problems in Jordan, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip were, essentially, a warning to the Saudi government. In addition, the scale of the refugee problem had caught the Saudi Arabian authorities, like the United States, by surprise. By late April, however, the Saudi government had agreed to house those Iraqi refugees who did not wish to return to Iraq.28 The VII Corps’ task was now to move the refugees from Safwan, As Salman, and Rafha I to Saudi territory just north of Rafha. First, the corps had to construct a temporary camp until the Saudis could construct their permanent facility. The 2nd Armored Division (Forward), now detached from the 1st Infantry Division, built a temporary camp, Rafha II, just inside Saudi Arabia, adjacent to the proposed site of the Saudi camp. This center was a large facility, about one by one and a half kilometers, surrounded by a concertina barbed wire fence and capable of accommodating 30,000 refugees. Engineers placed 13 rubberized, 3,000-gallon fabric tanks known as SMFTs (semitrailer-mounted fabric tanks) on top of sand berms around the perimeter of the camp. Gravity-fed water flowed from the SMFTs to faucets and shower facilities inside. A perimeter road ringed the camp, and another bisected it. On each side of the bisecting road, refugees were grouped by family and organized into subcamps known as counties. Each county had its own water, showers, and latrines.29 Refugees began arriving at Rafha II almost immediately upon its completion. Some drove cars, but most traveled by military and civilian trucks and buses. American military
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police registered the refugees and gave each an identification card and a Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) with a bottle of water on arrival.30 Commanded by Brigadier General Gene Blackwell, the 2nd Armored Division soldiers processed a total of 20,000 civilians into Rafha II, with over 4,000 a day arriving at the peak of the operation. When the flood of refugees threatened to overwhelm Rafha II, Blackwell built a smaller camp, Rafha III, to provide a short-term holding area.31 Finally, on April 28, the Saudi government was ready to assume control of the refugee operation. Supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and the UN High Commission on Refugees, the Saudi facility was ready on April 28. The 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division supervised the move from Safwan to the new camp. Safwan refugees who chose to go to Saudi Arabia were making a lifelong decision never to return to Iraq. Those who wished to return to their homes in Iraq were offered gasoline and all the food and water they could carry. The rest were flown from the Safwan airfield by air force C-130s over about a 10-day period. Over 8,400 Iraqi civilians flew to the new camp in Saudi Arabia.32 On May 10, General Blackwell handed over responsibility for all the camps and their refugees to the Saudi government.33 As of 2007, many of these refugees remained as guests of the Saudi government in much more permanent camps around Rafha.34
KURDISTAN, 1991 While the American government watched the slaughter in the south, the pressure from the international community forced the United States to act in the north. One aspect of Desert Storm was a supporting operation, called Operation Proven Force (1991), that maintained air superiority over northern Iraq and targeted Iraqi missiles and chemical and biological weapons, and interfered with air defense and Iraqi troop movements. Seeing the American presence, and aware of the Shiite uprising in the south, the Iraqi Kurds also sought to remove Hussein’s troops. Beginning around March 5, the Kurdish revolt continued to grow as Kurds deserted from their military units. By March 20, the revolt was in full form. Kurdish rebels seized a number of major cities in the north. The battered Iraqi units withdrew, waiting for reinforcements after the completion of the Shiite suppression in the south. As in the south, the Kurdish revolt was poorly coordinated and received no support from external coalition forces.35 It was on March 20 that the Iraqi forces returned to restore order in Kurdistan. Following the suppression of the revolt in the south, Iraqi forces, including surviving units of the Republican Guards, began to regain the terrain captured by the Kurds. In addition to tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles, the Iraqi forces used helicopters to carry troops and attack helicopters to engage Kurdish units on the ground. In addition, the Iraqi helicopters attacked groups of Kurdish refugees, keeping them moving north and east. As the Iraqi Army continued to attack, the Pesmerga (Kurdish fighters) urged the Kurdish citizens to evacuate the area, and by the end of the month, almost 1,000,000 refugees were seeking protection in the mountains. While Iran, working with the UN, took care of refugees arriving in that country, Turkey limited the influx of refugees. While the
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Turkish and international relief agencies had planned on a refugee influx, no one expected the half million destitute Kurds that found themselves stranded in the mountains without food, water, or shelter. Following on the heels of the repression in the south, the fate of the Kurdish refugees was attracting the attention of the rest of the world. The UN Security Council condemned the Iraqi behavior on April 5.36 Two days later, there were almost 2,000,000 Kurdish refugees trying to escape northern Iraq. Responding to international pressure, President George H. W. Bush ordered the implementation of Operation Provide Comfort. Ultimately, over 21,000 military personnel from 13 countries participated in the event, including 12,000 Americans. Although the American administration did not wish to get mired in the region, the growing international outcry became intense. When Secretary of State James Baker toured the site, he was appalled by the devastation. At one point, he recoiled as Kurdish women tried to throw their infants on board Baker’s helicopter for safety. Baker, and the administration, now decided to act.37 The operation began without a plan of any kind. The president said that it was “an interim measure designed to meet an immediate, penetrating humanitarian need.” American aircraft began dropping relief supplies on April 7, with British, Canadian, Italian, and French aircraft joining during the next two days. Soon, the amount of humanitarian support flowing into Turkey was beyond the capability of the Allied aircraft to distribute. On April 9, the U.S. European Command defined objectives for Operation Provide Comfort that included stopping the dying and suffering in the mountains, resettling the refugees in temporary camps within northern Iraq, and returning the refugees to their original homes. Those on the ground also found an implied task of developing and securing a safe haven for these refugees in northern Iraq. Taking charge of the American effort was the command’s deputy commander, Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, who assumed command on April 18. His staff was directed by the V Corps deputy commander, Major General Jay Garner. From the beginning, Shalikashvili and Garner saw the key to their success in getting the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in the process. Operating from a forward base in Silopi, Turkey, supplies began to flow into Kurdistan. Over three dozen humanitarian organizations were on the ground providing relief by the time the two American commanders arrived in the region.38 By mid-April, the biggest problem faced by the coalition’s forces and the NGOs was the resistance by the Iraqi military to the returning Kurdish refugees and problems of coordination among the various international agencies. Now organized into two subordinate organizations with different missions, Joint Task Force Alpha focused on dispensing humanitarian assistance and helping the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) work with the refugees. The other force, called Joint Task Force Bravo, kept the Iraqis away from the Kurds. At a meeting in the village of Zakho between Shalikashvili and Iraqi officers on April 19, the coalition made it clear that the Kurds were returning and that Saddam’s military had to stay at least 30 kilometers away. By May 6, the coalition had carved out a 70- by 160-kilometer safe area for the Kurdish refugees. A month later, the UN assumed responsibility for all refugee support. By the middle of July, most American forces were on their way home. However, many soldiers and airmen remained in the
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area to monitor refugee support and keep watch on the Iraqi military. These extensive commitments continued until December 1996.39
SOMALIA, 1991–1994 No sooner had American troops returned to the United States than the new world order began to fall apart in Africa in 1991. The former Italian colony of Somalia was a state in name only, being in reality a large group of tribes and clans. Strongman Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and, depending on his own clan for support, implemented his own form of socialism. In 1977, he invaded neighboring Ethiopia, hoping to acquire the Somali-dominated Ogaden region. The Ethiopians, backed by Soviet arms, Cuban soldiers, and East German advisors, forced Barre’s forces back across the border in a humiliating defeat.40 Formed during the war, the Somali National Movement looked to rid the country of the Barre regime. On May 26, 1988, this organization attacked a government garrison in northern Somalia, setting off civil war. The corrupt regime progressively disintegrated as the rebels continued to make progress. By the end of 1990, while most American citizens were caught in the drama of Desert Shield, U.S. Marines evacuated almost 400 noncombatants from the embassy in Mogadishu in an operation called Eastern Exit. Siad Barre abandoned the fight in April 1992 and went into exile in Nigeria. Essentially, Somalia had no functioning government since 1990.41 By the spring of 1992, the situation inside Somalia was nothing short of catastrophic, as starvation was rampant. News reports showed the effects of starvation with pictures that rivaled those of the liberation of German concentration camps in 1945. Responding to public pressure, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 751 on April 27, granting authority for armed intervention to deliver relief supplies. The first few months were generally a failure, as the few troops on the ground were incapable of providing the security to enable the supplies to get through. Experienced with this kind of operation in Kuwait only recently, the U.S. Department of Defense believed it could deliver supplies, provide security, and turn the operation over to the UN in short order. Americans began to airlift supplies in August in an operation called Provide Relief. This was only marginally successful, as supplies still could not reach the people who needed it. The last straw for the UN was when the warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed shelled the port of Mogadishu and closed the port to shipping on November 15.42 By the end of the year, over 300,000 Somalis had perished, and the United States was under great pressure from the international community to intervene. The nation, under President George H. W. Bush, had a record of successful interventions in Panama and Kurdistan, and it seemed like the right thing to do. The president agreed to send forces but wanted American troops to enter Somalia as soon as possible and then be replaced by UN peacekeepers in the shortest feasible time. This operation was named Restore Hope and focused on the delivery of food and other aid to the ravished region. The president announced this coalition to the world on December 4, and the first ground troops, U.S. Marines, landed at Mogadishu five days later. The primary army unit was
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initially the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York. The commanding general, Major General Steven L. Arnold, and a large part of the division, over 10,000 men and women, arrived in mid-December.43 President William J. Clinton replaced President Bush on January 20, 1993. His administration was committed to multilateral activities and working through the UN. The administration believed, for the long term, that it was essential to wean the organization from depending exclusively on the United States for these kinds of missions. While in some ways, the situation was improving, as international aid was reaching those in need, on another level, American and coalition pressure was constraining the flexibility of the various Somalia warlords. Riots in February and March indicated that tension was actually increasing, especially in the capital. Nevertheless, on May 4, the United States transferred responsibility for operations in Somalia to the UN in what was called “United Nations Operation Somalia II” (UNOSOM II). While it had helped many Somalis survive and put an end to the mass starvation, the situation on the ground was far from stable. Over 21,000 American servicemen out of 37,000 from all of the 20 nations supporting the operation had served in Somalia.44 Although the UN was technically running the operation, American troops were still in the country, as the situation deteriorated. On June 5, Aideed’s forces ambushed a Pakistani unit, killing 23 of their soldiers and wounding 44 others. The following day, the UN Security Council, pushed by the United States, approved Resolution 837, adopting a more aggressive military stance toward the Somali strongman.45 While the politics and strategy for this move are beyond the parameters of this manuscript, this resolution created an adversarial situation between the UN and Aideed as the UN added a mission to their humanitarian efforts of hunting him down. American aircraft attacked Aideed’s headquarters in June. The warlord retaliated in a series of attacks in July and August, and the UN commander issued a warrant for his arrest. In August, Secretary of Defense Les Aspen directed deployment of a special operations task force to Somalia in response to Aideed’s attacks. Named Task Force (TF) Ranger, it had the mission of capturing Aideed and his key lieutenants. The major problem was that TF Ranger did not fall under the command of the UNOSOM II commander. A few weeks later, the commander of the 10th Mountain Division requested a Bradley tank team for force protection. The light infantrymen in Mogadishu had no armor protection to provide support against the increasingly heavily armed Somali gunmen. The secretary of defense disapproved this request.46 Other than the pictures of starving Somali families that blanketed the television news shows in 1992 and 1993, the most dominant images concerned the events of TF Ranger’s raid into Mogadishu. These events, captured by Mark Bowden’s book Black Hawk Down and the movie by the same name, portrayed the violence of urban combat. The raid was an attempt to capture two of Aideed’s important subordinates in the center of Mogadishu. It began at 3:30 P.M., October 3, when helicopters carrying rangers took off from the airport. Shortly thereafter, a ground convoy, consisting primarily of unarmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWVs), also headed for the center of the city. Rangers arrived at the targeted building and captured several Somalis.
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A few moments later, the force came under intense fire, and a militiaman’s rocket-propelled grenade knocked down one of the Black Hawk helicopters. It was to be a harrowing night, as a handful of American soldiers and helicopter pilots fought thousands of Somalis and their supporters. It required the American commander to ask for support from the only mechanized forces in the area, four Pakistani M48 tanks and 28 Malaysian armored personnel carriers, to rescue the exhausted American troops. When it was over, two helicopters were destroyed and a number were badly hit, 18 U.S. Army soldiers were killed, and another 84 were wounded. Somali losses are hard to determine, but conservative estimates are 500 killed and over 700 wounded. The Somalis also showed that they were prepared to fight and die against the American force.47 The next day, the Department of Defense ordered the deployment of a M2 Bradley mechanized company augmented with a M1 tank platoon to Somalia. President Clinton addressed the nation on October 7 and announced that he was ending the mission by March 31, 1994. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, who was widely blamed for not approving the armored support, resigned on December 15. On March 3, the last American troops departed.48 The Somali adventure was, at the time, seen as an anomaly, and many blamed bad leadership by President Clinton and his administration. Yet, from a distance, there is a more serious problem—a lack of vision. Certainly Clinton had as an advisor one of the most experienced military advisors available in General Colin Powell, so not all blame can go to his administration. The American military eschewed reliance on proven technology and sufficiently trained soldiers for special operations units and their flashy equipment. There was a trend to fight conflicts like these on the cheap, with as little force as possible. In addition, there was a confusing relationship between American goals and the politics of the world community, as represented by the UN. The U.S. government showed a propensity to use military force, rather than continue the diplomatic negotiations between the UN and Mohamed Aideed that had been in progress before May 4. Finally, and most important, neither the Bush nor Clinton administration had been able to formulate a comprehensive vision of the post–cold war world and the use of American military force. This problem would continue for the next decade.
HAITI, 1994–1995 The troops had only recently returned from Somalia when they were again alerted for military operations in 1994. This time, it was to restore the legitimate Haitian government to power. Regime change, a task that the United States had not performed since World War II, was the focus of Operation Restore Democracy. Elected in Haiti’s first free elections in December 1990, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was able to spend only nine months in office before being overthrown in a coups led by his military chief, Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, the following September. The UN then spent the next three and a half years alternating between negotiating and threatening the Cedras government to convince them to stand down and restore Aristide, to no avail. The UN Security Council issued Resolution 940 on July 31, 1994, asking its members to “use
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all necessary means” to evict the military regime from Haiti. A secondary reason for the American intervention was to halt the increasing flow of poor Haitians jumping into makeshift boats and trying to make their way to the United States. By January 1992, the navy and coast guard had picked up over 14,000 at sea, and the George H. W. Bush administration began repatriating these “boat people” back to Haiti. In July 1994, following a deadly sinking, with the loss of 150 Haitians at sea, Clinton’s government changed this policy and began sending these refugees to a holding center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and other locations across the Caribbean.49 Many of the soldiers the Department of Defense chose to send to the Caribbean were the same that had been in Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York, and special operations forces from various bases in the United States. The plan called for either forced or permissive entry, and the commanders did not know until hours before landing that the Cedras regime accepted that its days were numbered and agreed to an American departure timetable. The army soldiers flew into the capital of Port-au-Prince in Black Hawk helicopters launched from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower on September 14, 1994.50 The 10th Mountain’s soldiers had difficulty in making the transition from combat in Somalia to peace operations in Haiti. It was confusing for the population, and the Americans and the former enemy were now walking the streets trying to maintain order. There were numerous confrontations between the Americans and the population, and between the U.S. soldiers and the Haitian police, called the Fad’H (Armed Forces of Haiti). The rules of engagement (ROE, an acronym that was much used during the post–cold war era) were often confusing. In one, much publicized instance, American soldiers stood by on September 20, while Fad’H attacked a peaceful crowd celebrating the change of government. The result was many injured civilians, one man dead, and a population confused about America’s role. The confusion continued as Major General David C. Meade, still smarting from operations in Somalia, placed protecting his force as his most important priority, rather than working with the Haitian population.51 The 10th Mountain Division was not the only American presence in Haiti, as special operations forces and U.S. Marines worked with the population and the new government to speed Cedras’s departure. A multinational coalition from a host of countries joined the American effort, bringing the total outside troops to over 21,000 in October, with 20,000 being American. In November, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, replaced the 10th Mountain. By January 1995, most American forces, other than special operations, had been withdrawn, and responsibility was turned over to the multinational force in March.52
BALKANS, 1991–2004 It is somewhat ironic that the last general European conflict of the twentieth century would take place in the same region in which the first one took place. The breakup of the Yugoslavian Republic after 1980 unleashed all of the ethnic tensions that the former Communist regime had suppressed. Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in
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June 1991, inducing the Yugoslav Army to respond. The Slovenes won their independence first in a short fight. The war between Croatia, which had a large Serbian minority, and the federation was longer and bloodier, but by December 1992, all players accepted the independence of both of these states. However, the situation was not resolved so quickly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which experienced some of the most violent armed conflict and atrocities committed against civilians that Europe had witnessed since World War II.53 America’s intentions had been to let the Europeans take the lead in regards to this conflict. But this was not to happen, as the Bosnian Serbs and Croats drove the Bosnian Muslims from many of their farms and villages, instigating a reign of ethnic cleansing that left the rest of the world generally appalled. The UN protective force (UNPROFOR), in place since September 1992 was generally impotent and was, in fact, prohibited from using force to stop the violence. The nadir of the struggle took place in the town of Srebrenica in July 1995, when Bosnian Serbs massacred almost 7,500 men and boys in the greatest mass murder in Europe in over 50 years.54 Along with other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States began an air offensive to force the Bosnian Serbs to stop besieging Sarajevo and bring them back to the peace table. After three weeks of aerial punishment, coupled with an extremely successful offensive by a retrained Croatian Army, the Serbians had had enough. They, along with all belligerents, agreed to meet at Wright Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. From the American soldier’s perspective, the outcome, officially known as the Dayton Peace Accord, signed in December 1995, signaled the approval of a NATO implementation force (IFOR), which included American troops.55 The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 1st Armored Division crossed the Sava River on December 31, 1995, leading the reinforced American division into Bosnia-Herzegovina. Attached to the division was a mixed unit called the Nordic Brigade, a regiment from Turkey, and a Russian parachute brigade. This was a potentially dangerous mission, and the division lost its first soldier from a land mine even before the main body crossed the river. It was also a huge undertaking, with the initial deployment of 24,000 soldiers and equipment requiring over 400 trains, 7,300 railcars, 500 buses, 1,700 tractor trailers, and over 1,300 aircraft flights. The division’s initial task was to separate the warring factions into their own sectors. This was a peace enforcement mission, and the American soldiers found themselves, in rather primitive winter conditions, manning checkpoints and conducting armed patrols. It was an extremely dangerous mission, as the former belligerents were used to getting their way by force. For example, in one instance, a truckload of Bosnian Serbs tried to bypass a checkpoint. The sergeant in charge ordered the 22 armed men out of the truck. One of the Serbs told the American sergeant in perfect English, “I’ll kill you.” Supported by the four other members of the checkpoint, the 1st Armored Division soldier said, “I don’t think so,” and repeated the order to get out of the truck. They soon collected two dozen firearms and ammunition. The entire deployment required all the skill, patience, and professionalism soldiers anywhere have ever had to exhibit.56 Although the Clinton administration expected the American commitment to be over in a year, the situation on the ground required that the soldiers remain. Ethnic hostility, large caches of weapons, and over 750,000 land mines kept the troops extremely busy.
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The 1st Infantry Division replaced the 1st Armored Division in December 1996, as the mission took on a new perspective, called the Stabilization Force, or SFOR. Now the force began more nation-building and civic action projects and continued to work with the local population on minefield awareness and discovery. It also continued to confront ethnic hostility, such at the town of Brcko, which was the focus of a number of riots and injuries to American troops. In June 1998, the mission changed again to Operation Joint Forge, which essentially became an open-ended commitment to support NATO in its peace-enforcement mission. American troops began to withdraw, as NATO took more control and the United States became embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan. By late 2004, less than 1,000 U.S. Army soldiers remained in Bosnia. During operations in Bosnia, American junior leaders, lieutenants, captains, and sergeants, took on rolls with operational and strategic ramifications. Routinely, they operated without clear guidance, based on only mission orders from their commanders. This trend, common to peace enforcement, would take on more significance in the post–cold war era.57 In 1999 American soldiers deployed to another part of the former Yugoslavia: Kosovo. Strife between governing Serbs and Albanian residents led to another round of ethnic cleansing and a NATO air campaign to force the Belgrade government to back off. American soldiers, first as part of an Apache attack helicopter unit called Task Force Hawk, and later as a peace enforcement contingent, called Task Force Falcon, worked to divide the warring sides. Called Operation Joint Guardian, American forces continued to participate in this NATO-led mission through 2007.58
AFGHANISTAN, 2001 President George W. Bush and his advisors assumed control of the U.S. government in 2001 in the spirit of no more interventions in places like Bosnia and Somalia. With veteran leaders such as Richard Cheney as vice president and Colin Powell as secretary of state, most observers believed the new Republican administration would focus on improving the military’s ability to respond to worldwide incidents, a process called “transformation.” Al-Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001, completely changed the nation’s focus. While the nation grieved, adjusted, and reorganized, the military’s first target in the so-called global war on terror would be the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. From the beginning, the U.S. government looked to hunt down those responsible for the attack. It soon became obvious that al-Qaeda, an Islamic organization determined to erase Western influence in the Middle East, was responsible for the attacks on September 11. They had attacked the United States before: its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the destroyer USS Cole in the port of Aden in 2000. The Bush administration decided to destroy this organization and the government that protected them, the Islamic Taliban of Afghanistan. Remembering the difficult history of foreign forces in that region—the British in the nineteenth century and the Soviets in the twentieth—the Department of Defense sought ways to minimize the involvement of American ground forces but still accomplish the mission.59
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American air and missile attacks began operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda on October 7, 2001, kicking off Operation Enduring Freedom. These attacks, like those launched by the Clinton administration in 1998, were not very effective. The most sophisticated weapons systems have limited value in a third world state with terrain as rugged as Afghanistan. But this time, the United States was going to put boots on the ground. Operating from staging areas in friendly Uzbekistan, several special forces A teams, each consisting of 12 experienced soldiers, deployed to Afghanistan. They made contact with tribal warlords who had opposed the Afghan government for years. Almost immediately, the special forces soldiers showed their value by directing all the air power available in the American air force and navy inventory on the frontline Taliban soldiers. Unlike the previous bombing efforts, these were precision strikes directed by army soldiers with Global Positioning Systems (GPS) devices and laser designators. The massive amount of precise air attacks, including strikes from B-1 and B-2 bombers and an array of fighter bombers, broke the back of the Taliban’s will to resist. The world’s media was soon being entertained with photos of bearded special forces soldiers riding horses alongside Afghan insurgents in old-style mounted cavalry charges. By November 10, the important city of Mazar-e Sharif fell to the so-called Northern Alliance and its supporting American soldiers.60 Meanwhile, another special forces team infiltrated into Afghanistan and joined up with another warlord north of Kabul. Using the old Soviet air base at Bagram as a base, they targeted Taliban fighters defending the capital at Kabul. By November 13, these Islamic defenders had been totally demoralized by the intense American air strikes, and they fled south, as the Afghan insurgents liberated the city the next day. In early December, the new Afghan government, led by Hamid Karzai, was in control. Many of the Taliban fled to the region bordering Pakistan to reorganize and regroup. Meanwhile, American and British special forces teams, along with indigenous Afghan forces, hunted down those Taliban units remaining in the country’s heartland. In many ways, the defeat of al-Qaeda and its Islamic defenders was the kind of victory the United States wanted to attain. Only a few hundred American and Allied Western troops, supported by massive amounts of air power and the ground efforts of local fighters, destroyed a hostile government in only 76 days of fighting.61 The war was not over, however. Now freed from the problems of government, the enemy assumed the role of insurgent and continued to rebuild their strength in the rugged mountains near Tora Bora, supported by friendly Pakistani tribesmen across the border. By November 2001, the United States had over 50,000 service members from all branches in Afghanistan. Yet most of these troops were combat support, and the army had only elements of two brigades available for combat. Perhaps the speed of the Taliban’s initial demise emboldened American planners, who decided to use this limited force to destroy the enemy in its sanctuary. Operation Anaconda began on March 2 and was an attempt to destroy about 200 enemy fighters. The elements, arrogance, and inexperience in this kind of fighting proved more challenging than anyone expected. It also demonstrated the limits of the intelligence system as the actual Taliban–al-Qaeda strength turned out to be over 1,000 determined, veteran soldiers. Allied Afghan warlords—there
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was no Afghan army yet—proved incapable or unwilling to close with the enemy, and there were simply not enough American ground soldiers. Al-Qaeda did not run, but put up an extremely determined resistance, with supporting accurate sniper and mortar fire. Most of the enemy were able to get away across the Pakistani border. By 2007, despite more than five years of combat operations, American, and NATO, forces continue to battle al-Qaeda groups in the Afghan border areas.62 IRAQ, 2003 Before the war was over in Afghanistan, President George W. Bush shifted operations back to Iraq. The purpose of this war, and its conduct, remains quite controversial as of 2007. Exactly why the United States invaded Iraq—fear of weapons of mass destruction, frustration with Saddam’s defiance of the international community, determination to finish the war of 1991, support of al-Qaeda in its attack on the United States—were all reasons presented by the government.63 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 Whatever the reason for the war, the initial operation was executed as well as any in American history. On March 20, believing that Saddam Hussein and his sons were located at one location, General Tommy Franks, commander of United State Central Command, ordered his forces to attack. Thirty-six Tomahawk land attack missiles opened the assault, thus beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom. The next day, the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and 1st (U.K.) Armoured Division crossed the border into Iraq in what would become known as a “rolling start,” essentially ahead of the main air operation. Other units, such as the 101st Airmobile Division and 82nd Airborne Division, would follow and come under command of Lieutenant General William S. Wallace’s V Corps. The Iraqi forces fought hard and, supported by bad weather, slowed the American advance and achieved some tactical success on their own.64 The ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company, on March 23, was the worst single American combat incident of the attack, with 11 soldiers dead, 7 captured, and 9 wounded in one short battle. Special operating forces rescued one of the soldiers, Private First Class Jessica Lynch, on April 1, in what would become a controversial event long after combat had ended. The public affairs officers in the Pentagon elaborated on the incident in an attempt to use it as propaganda. They exaggerated Lynch’s battlefield conduct in order to turn her into a national hero. They also released camera footage of the rescue, indicating that it was much more dangerous and complex than it actual was. More accurate details of both her ordeal and rescue would later come to light and contribute to America’s increasing lack of support for this conflict. She would testify before a congressional subcommittee in April, 2007, as part of an investigation into the Pentagon’s mismanagement of public relations.65 On March 24, Iraqi air defenses, essentially small arms machine gun fire, defeated an attack by the 11th Aviation Brigade. Most of the attacking Apache helicopters were seriously damaged and did not reach the objective. This defeat called into question the
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entire army doctrine of “deep attack,” which had been a cardinal principle since 1982.66 Meanwhile, the American forces continued to roll north, while the British troops secured the area around Basra. On March 28, the 173rd Airborne Brigade parachuted into northern Iraq and opened a northern front in the conflict to protect and reassure the Kurdish population.67 In spite of fierce fighting by Iraqi irregular forces, who fought better than the regular army, the last days of the Iraqi regime began on April 2. While the 3rd Infantry Division began its attack on Baghdad Airport, the 1st U.K. Armored Division isolated Basra, and the 101st Airmobile and 82nd Airborne Divisions secured the American lines of communication. Two days later, the 3rd Infantry and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force isolated the city. On April 5 and 7, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division ran two “thunder runs,” essentially free-fire attacks into the city. After the second attack, the brigade remained in the center of Baghdad. The world witnessed the dramatic destruction of Saddam’s statue, pulled down by a marine tank retriever, on April 9. By the end of the next day, the fighting in the city was essentially over.68 For a short time, things continued to improve in Baghdad and the remainder of Iraq. Recognizing these changes, the president provided one of the greatest photo opportunities by landing on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1 and, under a large sign proclaiming “mission accomplished,” declared that combat operations in Iraq were over. Unfortunately, that was not the case. Although American forces captured Saddam in December, peace did not follow. American politicians had determined that the army was not going to be part of nation building, and there were not enough forces available to prevent looting and the rise of an insurgency.69 By 2004, the United States had been unable to prevent Iraq from falling into its own civil war. American soldiers would remain in Iraq, and individual soldiers would rotate in and out for several years. By 2007, some soldiers had served four or more combat tours, ranging from 6 to 18 months in length. American casualties would continue to rise, with almost 3,700 dead and another 35,000 wounded by mid-year. While the civil war/insurgency continued in Iraq, the Taliban appeared to be reorganizing in Afghanistan, where American troops, now backed by NATO troops, continued to be engaged on the ground. Ever since, the United States has been involved in a different kind of war, more akin to the wars on the Indian frontier or in the Philippines following the Spanish-American War. The post–cold war era ended with the president’s announcement in 2003. The period, therefore, from 1989 to 2003 was a period of unprecedented engagement for those soldiers who volunteered to serve their country. Soldiers with only five years’ service would have more campaign ribbons than most 20-year veterans of the cold war army. What was it like to be a solider during this period? How did they train? Where did they work? How did they live? These are all good questions for the following chapters. NOTES 1. The most terse and least informative chapter in President Bush and Brent Scowcroft’s memoirs is the one on the postwar period, “After the Storm.” It says next to nothing about the decisions not to intervene during the Shiite uprising or the development of Operation Provide
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Comfort. See George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 488–92. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007), 332. 2. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 564–65. Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks Jr., VII Corps, interview by Peter Kindsvatter, KKMC Saudi Arabia, April 30, 1991. Historical Office, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command: Transcript. Fragmentary Orders, Frago 156–91 VII Corps Continues Its Enemy Equipment and Munitions Destruction, March 4, 1991. VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. 3. XVIII Corps, Daily Situation Report-022200z Mar 91, XVIII Corps Main Command PostG3 Army Daily Situation Report. On March 2, the day before General Schwarzkopf and the Iraqi generals were to sit at Safwan to discuss terms, the U.S. 24th Infantry Division fought a short battle with the Iraqi Hammurabi Division. For postwar controversy on this battle, see Seymour M. Hersh, “Overwhelming Force: What Happened in the Final Days of the Gulf War?,” New Yorker, May 22, 2000. 4. Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, 564–65. Khaled bin Sultan, Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander, trans. Patrick Seale (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 422–424. 5. VII Corps, Fragplan 8: Assumption of XVIII Airborne Corps Sector, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. VII Corps, Frago 160-91, VII Corps Relieves XVIII Airborn Corps in Sector Beginning 9 March, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. 6. VII Corps, Frago 167-91, VII Corps Forces Continue Their Zone Clearance Operations, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Peter S. Kindsvatter, “VII Corps in the Gulf War: Post-Cease-Fire Operations,” Military Review 72 (1992): 4. 7. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 362. The Shia are the major dissident sect in Islam and trace their origin to Ali, the last of the original Caliphs, cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad. They are the major religious group of neighboring Iran. See Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1991), 22–25. Other English spellings include “Shi’is” and “Shi’a.” 8. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 4, The Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 961–62. Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 103. 9. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 241–48. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), “Defense Department Briefing: March 5, 1991.” Ben Fenton, “The Gulf; Saddam’s Tanks Move to Quash Basra Rebels,” Daily Telegraph, March 6, 1991. Tom Masland, “Danger for Saddam,” Newsweek, March 18, 1991, 25. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Iraq, a Country Study, Area Handbook Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 95–97. Fuller and Francke, Arab Shi’a, 103–4. 10. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 246–47. Cordesman and Wagner, Gulf War. 11. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 419–20. Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 451–52. VII Corps, Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps Tactical Command Post, VII Corps Tactical Command Post, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. 12. Cordesman, After the Storm, 445; Colin Powell and Joseph E. Perisco, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996). 13. Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994). 14. VII Corps, Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps Tactical Command Post (24 March 1991), VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. John C. Davidson, The 100 Hour Ground War: The Failed Iraqi Plan, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. 15. Fuller and Francke, Arab Shi’a. 16. Franks interview, April 30, 1991.
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17. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949. Details are contained in U.S. Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual 27-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1956), 146. 18. Franks interview, April 30, 1991. 19. Scales, Certain Victory, 328. 20. Franks interview, April 30, 1991. VII Corps SITREP 74, March 31, 1991. 21. Scales, Certain Victory, 328–29. Kindsvatter, “VII Corps in the Gulf War,” 7. 22. Kindsvatter, “VII Corps in the Gulf War,” 7. Franks interview, April 30, 1991. 23. Scales, Certain Victory, 332. 24. Ibid., 330. 25. Kindsvatter, “VII Corps in the Gulf War,” 9. Scales, Certain Victory, 330. 26. bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, 444. Franks interview, April 30, 1991. 27. Ibid,, 444–47. Scales, Certain Victory, 330–31. 28. Scales, Certain Victory, 330. 29. Ibid., 330–32. 30. Ibid., 332. 31. VII Corps, Frago 226-91 Relocation of Refugees from Border to New Camp, VII Corps After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991. Kindsvatter, “VII Corps in the Gulf War,” 12–13. Franks interview, April 30, 1991. 32. Scales, Certain Victory, 332. 33. bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, 444. 34. Gordon W. Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2004), 24, 29–31. 35. Ibid., 30–36. Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991). 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., 42–51. Donna Miles, “Helping the Kurds,” Soldiers 46, no. 7 (1991): 13–20. Gordon Rudd, e-mail message to author, March 7, 2007. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “Ruck It Up!”: The PostCold War Transformation of V Corps, 1990–2001 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 170. Scales, Certain Victory, 341. 38. Scales, Certain Victory, 341–50. Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention. Kirkpatrick, “Ruck It Up!,” 170–71. 39. Robert F. Baumann, Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington, “My Clan against the World”: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992–1994 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2004), 9–16. Walter S. Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), 5–6. 40. Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife Since 1945 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1998), 97–103. Peter Huchthausen, America’s Splendid Little Wars (New York: Viking, 2003), 165. 41. Huchthausen, America’s Splendid Little Wars, 165–69. 42. Brogan, World Conflicts, 97–103. Poole, Effort to Save Somalia, 21–23. Baumann et al., “My Clan against the World,” 38–43. Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2002), 10. 43. Brogan, World Conflicts, 97–103. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia, 14. 44. Brogan, World Conflicts, 97–103. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia, 16. 45. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia, 16. Stephen L. Arnold, US Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) After Action Report, Summary (Fort Drum, NY: U.S. Department of the Army, 1993), 155. 46. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999). Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia, 19–23. Arnold, US Army Forces, 1138–39. 47. Arnold, US Army Forces, 39, 156. Brogan, World Conflicts, 97–103. 48. UN Security Council, Resolution 940 (Authorization to Use Force in Haiti). Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 210–12. 49. Kretchik et al., Invasion, 93–160. 50. Ibid., 98–107. 51. Ibid., 215–23. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1998), 109.
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52. Huchthausen, America’s Splendid Little Wars, 186–211. R. Cody Phillips, BosniaHerzegovina: The U.S. Army’s Role in Peace Enforcement Operations, 1995–2004 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005), 5–16. 53. Huchthausen, America’s Splendid Little Wars, 185–193. Robert Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2004), 48–54. 54. James P. Herson, “Road Warriors in the Balkans: The Army Transportation Corps in Bosnia (1995–1996),” Unpublished manuscript, 2007): 52–53. Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 5–16. 55. Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1, 19–22. 56. Ibid., 36– 42. 57. Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History, vol. 2, The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917 to 2003, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005), 464. Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan: October 2001–March 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2004), 7–8. 58. R. Cody Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian, The U.S. Army in Kosovo (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2007), 1–57. 59. Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan, 10–13. Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, Kalev I. Sepp, Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2003), 125–27. Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond (New York: Vintage, 2005). 60. Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan, 14–25. Stewart, American Military History, 464–70. 61. Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan, 29–44. Stewart, American Military History, 473–76. Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Caliber Books, 2005). 62. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 4–74. 63. Stewart, American Military History, 465. 64. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2004), 154–60. Stewart, Global Era, 482–83. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, Significant Issues Series (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2003), 77. 65. Nancy Gibbs, “The Private Jessica Lynch.” Time Magazine, online edition. November 17, 2003, 162 (20). Available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,10006147,00. html. CBS News “Jessica Lynch Sets the Record Straight” at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 2007/04/25/earlyshow/main2725423.shtml, accessed 2 December, 2007. 66. Cordesman, Iraq War, 80–82. 67. Ibid., 90–112. Fontenot et al., On Point, 336–47. 68. Stewart, Global Era, 492–93. 69. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 149–202.
4
ORGANIZING THE ARMY FROM 1989 TO THE PRESENT
What young men and women discovered when they emerged from their entry-level training, a topic we will discuss in a later chapter, was an organization that was the combination of sophisticated analysis, budgetary concerns, and military tradition. Historically, armies expend a great deal of effort developing the right organization. On the basis of doctrine, or a vision of the kinds of battles the ground forces expected, it determined the right amount of tanks, infantry, artillery, and other branches of the service. It determined how many soldiers each unit would get, of what type and what rank. Arriving at the wrong organization could put an army at a severe disadvantage against an opponent on the battlefield that no amount of soldier bravery could overcome.1 The previous army organization, called the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD), emerged during the presidency of John F. Kennedy and had grown out of the World War II, Korean, and early cold war experience. This structure served the army well throughout the Vietnam era but was no longer seen as capable of providing the rapid response and flexibility required in the post-1973 war environment. For 10 years, officers in the Pentagon and at the various service schools argued about the best way to match the increasingly sophisticated equipment with the new all-volunteer force. The result was a new organization, called the “Army of Excellence,” that took effect in 1983 and would be the unit framework at the end of the cold war and the basis for changes into the next decade.2 The first decision a soldier had to make upon joining the army concerned his or her branch of service. The U.S. Army of the late 1980s had over 330 specific skill fields called “military occupational specialties,” or, in army jargon, MOS. The army grouped them into various career fields such as personnel, communications, and so on.3 The chosen MOS determined much about the soldier’s destiny, including initial training, assignments, quality of life, and promotion prospects. Although the army was trying to
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downplay the differences of these fields and make all of them more warrior-like, these specialties generally aligned along traditional groupings of combat, combat support, and combat service support.4 Let us briefly look at what kind of fields soldiers could serve in the post–cold war army. COMBAT ARMS Infantry The traditional combat arms of armor and infantry formed the core of maneuver units. When soldiers joined the infantry, their first assignment would be to Fort Benning, Georgia, for training at the Infantry School. While there, they trained in one of two special tracks: light or mechanized infantry. Each of these fields had evolved in such a way that each possessed unique skills, weapons, and tactics. All but the mechanized forces, which accompanied tanks on the battlefield, were considered as light infantry. By 1989, the standard infantry battalion had essentially disappeared from the U.S. Army, and the half dozen that remained were split between the Berlin Brigade in Germany and the Sixth Infantry Division in Alaska. Within two years, these battalions would disappear, as the troops in Berlin were no longer needed and the Alaskan battalions converted to a modified organization to support the new light infantry division organization. The cause of their demise was their large size, approximately 874 soldiers, and their excessive support requirements.5 The failure of American forces on Desert One, observations of Soviet activities in Afghanistan, and the potential for military operations in other parts of the world indicated that the nation needed an infantry force that it could deploy rapidly in response to a regional crisis. After years of discussion and debate, the infantry structure, which emerged in 1983, consisted of three major components: light, airmobile, and airborne. The light infantry battalion was the heir to the ground forces that had slogged their way through World War II and the jungles of Vietnam. At the squad level, the differences between the new and old organizations were in the number of soldiers and the quality of the firepower. The new doctrine reduced the squad from 12 to 9 soldiers. The advantage of this smaller organization was an ability to maneuver with two teams: one moving, while the other provided overwatching fire. The squad leader controlled his organization by communicating by voice command or hand signals to his two team leaders. Revised squad tactics, which the army had learned and forgotten in the years since World War II, became the cornerstone of instruction at all training centers after the elevation of General William E. DePuy to commander of the new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1974. Terms such as traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch became fundamental skills for all soldiers, and by 1989, these new tactics were the foundation of small unit maneuver.6 Although smaller than earlier organizations, the modern squad possessed excellent firepower, with seven M16A2 rifles, two equipped with M203 grenade launchers, and two M249 squad automatic weapons. The individual infantryman would also carry an array of grenades, mines, and M72 light antitank weapons, or LAWS.7 A
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second lieutenant, assisted by his platoon sergeant, commanded the light infantry platoon. Together, they controlled three rifle squads and a small headquarters consisting of a forward observer team, a medic, two M60 machine gun teams, and a radio-telephone operator. If the unit was airborne or on air assault, the machine gun teams moved to a weapons squad and added two M47 DRAGON medium antitank missiles. The DRAGON was a wire-guided missile that replaced the Vietnam-era 90-mm recoilless rifle. Weighing a little more than 25 pounds, it was a bulky system and difficult to fire. However, its 140-mm high-explosive antitank warhead and 1,000-meter range made it an extremely valuable weapon for the light infantryman. The infantry were never happy with the DRAGON, and by 1998, the army replaced it with the much more effective Javelin anti-tank guided missile.8 A captain commanded the light infantry company from his small headquarters. In addition to his three platoons, he controlled additional firepower with a mortar section of two M224 60-mm mortars. The lightweight M224 could lob high explosive rounds out to 3,500 meters and gave the infantry leader his own responsive artillery. To the soldier, the most important person in the 130-soldier company was the first sergeant, who watched over every aspect of his professional life. Along with his platoon sergeant, these senior noncommissioned officers were constantly inspecting his equipment and living space if he lived in the barracks. It was, however, much leaner and unlike the infantry company of the Vietnam era, with all administration and supply now consolidated at battalion. The old company clerk was a relic of the past.9 Three infantry companies and a headquarters company formed the light infantry battalion. The headquarters had a small staff, a scout platoon, and a mortar platoon with four 81-mm mortars. The army had 19 of these 567-man battalions in 1989. Without question, these were lean units, designed primarily to get soldiers on the ground quickly.10 One variation of the light infantry was the air assault battalion, which many soldiers wanted to join because of their esprit and opportunity for more exciting use. The army had 21 of these battalions, primarily in the 101st Air Assault Division and the 25th Infantry Division. These units were heirs of the air mobility concept introduced in the army during the early years of the Vietnam War and made famous by Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway’s book We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young and the 2002 movie of the same name, starring Mel Gibson. In Vietnam, these units used the UH-1 “Huey” helicopters to fly deep into selected locations and fight the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese People’s Army. Once on the ground, these light forces used Cobra attack helicopters, artillery, and air force attack aircraft to generate enough firepower to fight the, often, larger enemy forces.11 By 1989, infantry soldiers could elect to go to air assault training and join one of these battalions, which were configured generally the same as the light infantry battalions. Its major difference was in how it got to the battlefield. Using the new UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter and the old, but remodeled, CH-47 Chinook medium helicopter, airmobile commanders could move more troops and equipment farther and faster than their Vietnam-era predecessors. The Black Hawk was over 20 knots faster than the old UH-1 Huey and could carry a full 11-man infantry squad over 110 nautical miles in less
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than an hour and return for another load. The CH-47 Chinook had been in the army’s inventory since the 1960s but was now receiving its fourth upgrade to the “D” model. Its value was its ability to carry, or sling load under the aircraft, light vehicles, towed artillery, or ammunition and food pallets to support the assault infantry. Once the troops were on the ground and the helicopters gone, the airmobile infantry battalion fought like regular infantry and required extensive combat support, especially from the air, to generate combat power against a determined foe.12 The last kind of light infantry unit soldiers could volunteer for was the airborne. These units attracted some of most aggressive and motivated soldiers. Airborne soldiers came in three varieties: the regular airborne, the more specialized rangers, and the special forces. Nine out of 10 of the airborne battalions operated under control of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Just like their World War II predecessors, who jumped into Normandy and Holland, the army had the capability to drop these soldiers on the ground, anywhere in the world, without regard to airfields or ports. The soldiers underwent rigorous training at Fort Benning, Georgia, that included three weeks of airborne training and five jumps from air force cargo aircraft. At the end of the training, they were certified as parachutists and received their jump wings and were generally sent to an airborne company. Organized as light infantry, they routinely practiced parachuting into enemy territory, gathering and organizing their equipment, and then moving to combat. One battalion of these troopers was kept at constant readiness so as to be on the way to anywhere in the world in 18 hours as the nation’s strategic reaction force.13
Special Operations Forces One other infantry category that formed part of the army’s airborne structure in 1989, and saw extensive use in Panama, Kurdistan, Somalia, and Afghanistan, was its Special Operations Forces (SOF). The infantry component of this force consisted of two very different kinds of troops, rangers and the special forces. Rangers were the army’s shock troops. These soldiers, all volunteers, were considered by all as the toughest fighters. Certainly they had the most extensive physical fitness and small-unit training of any unit in the army. Their baptism of fire as a new organization was Operation Just Cause, where they secured Rio Hato and Torrijos Airport. As light troops, however, they had little staying power on the ground, as operations in Mogadishu later demonstrated. Soldiers who join the 75th Ranger Regiment do one thing when not in combat: train. They exercise daily, practice fire their weapons, and practice skills. They rehearse different kinds of missions such as hostage rescue, intelligence collection, and limited attacks to capture or destroy special targets. With each of the three battalions ready to deploy on only 18 hours notice, Rangers find themselves sent on practice missions from the artic to the jungles. Usually the training unit parachutes from Air Force aircraft into the training area, executes the practice mission, then have an after-action review, and fly home. Soldiers in Ranger units have very high morale and consider themselves the army’s elite troops. 14 With a completely different mission were the Special Forces, the famous Green Berets. Organized into four special forces groups, they were primarily not fighters, but
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advisors and trainers. They received extensive experience during the Vietnam War and remained the mainstay of international training activities and covert military operations throughout the cold war. During Operation Desert Storm, these soldiers worked with Saudi Arabian, Syrian, Egyptian, and other non–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) units to improve coordination among the entire coalition. Throughout this period, the Green Berets found themselves on the front line in the war against militant Islam and drug warlords. Their focus was on winning the allegiance of the local population and having them combat terrorists with as little American intervention as possible. During the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, small special forces elements advised indigenous Afghan forces in their successful ouster of the Taliban government.15 Taken together, the special operations forces became increasingly important, as the focus of American policy changed from its focus on heavy combat to fighting insurgencies. But the bedrock of the American army remained the conventional force, and many infantrymen joined the heavy maneuver forces that rode into battle in tracked vehicles. By 1989, the venerable Vietnam-era M113 armored personnel carrier was still in use but on its way out as the primary infantry carrier. This aluminum-hulled, lightly armored vehicle was designed to transport infantry soldiers to the battle area, behind battle tanks. At the appropriate time, the infantry would dismount and, using the tanks’ armor for cover, help secure the objective or defend it from counterattack.16 This vehicle was no longer satisfactory, and most mechanized infantry soldiers used the Bradley fighting vehicle, or BFV, named for the World War II leader general of the army Omar Bradley, who had passed away only several years earlier, in 1981. The standard version was the M2, designed for the infantry. This was a large vehicle, over nine feet high, and carried a nine-man infantry squad, including the gunner, driver, and vehicle commander. Although not as heavily armored as a tank, it was a powerful fighting machine. The commander and gunner operated from a turret that controlled a 25-mm Bushmaster automatic cannon, a 7.62-mm machine gun, and a TOW17 antitank missile. In addition, the onboard infantry squad could participate in the fight using six firing ports on the sides and rear of the vehicle. Most important, it was fast and possessed almost the same speed and mobility as the new M1 tank. By 1990, over 44 battalions had turned in the M113 for the new M2. The M3 cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV) carried more ammunition, a three-man crew, and two additional scouts.18 Four Bradleys and 36 soldiers made a platoon, commanded by a lieutenant. One vehicle served as the platoon headquarters, and there was one for each of the three squads. The platoon almost always fought as a unit and was seldom broken up. The biggest command decision a platoon leader usually had to make was to stay mounted or stop the carrier and let the infantry move on the ground. Once the squad dismounted, the fighting vehicles provided covering, then called “overwatching,” fire, while the dismounted elements maneuvered to the objective. The dismounted platoon had only 23 soldiers and was limited in the amount of combat it could sustain without Bradley supporting fire. Keeping this limitation in mind, the BFV was an incredibly powerful machine, and its TOW missile system, of which it carried two ready to fire, could destroy most of the
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world’s armored vehicles. Its 25-mm Bushmaster cannon could be fired on the move and carried 300 armored piercing and high-explosive rounds ready to fire. The Bushmaster was extremely effective against enemy fortifications. It gave the infantry platoon the capability to, as pointed out by one captain, “reach out and touch” fortifications out of range of most enemy weapons. On Desert Storm, fire from this potent system caused enemy bunkers to collapse.19 Three platoons and a small company headquarters made up the mechanized company. Unlike the organization of the 1970s, the company no longer had a weapons platoon or a maintenance section. It was purely a fighting organization and could fight either as a pure mechanized infantry company or, by exchanging platoons with tank companies, as a mechanized company team. The company commander could also expect other elements to ride along with him into battle. These could be, depending on the unit’s mission, an engineer squad, a Stinger team or Vulcan section for air defense, a field artillery fire support team (FIST), and a maintenance and medical team.20
Armor While most maneuver soldiers were in the infantry, the glamour arm of the army at the end of the cold war was armor. Armor warfare received great emphasis following the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam and the dramatic armor encounters during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. When the reformers during this period looked at their probable Warsaw Pact enemy, they realized that they based their entire way of war on tank and mechanized forces.21 The Active Defense doctrine specified that the tank was the “primary offensive weapon in mounted warfare” and “all other elements of the combined arms team must be employed to support and assist the forward movement of tanks.”22 In 1989, a tank battalion had 58 of these 67-ton monsters. A tank crew had four members and, unlike infantry squads or most other units, required exactly four to operate effectively. All members were connected by an intercommunication system that they operated through their combat vehicle crew, or CVC, helmet. The driver operated the automotive portion of the vehicle and responded to the direction of the tank commander. He was also responsible for alerting the crew to obstacles and hidden enemy just forward of the tank. The junior member of the tank, the loader, maintained and loaded the ammunition into the main gun and a 7.62-mm machine gun that fired from the loader’s hatch. The loader responded to the commander’s direction as to what kind of ammunition to have loaded in the main gun. The gunner, usually a sergeant grade E5, used his laser range finder and thermal imagery sight to identify targets, day or night, and destroy them with the main gun. For personnel or thin-skinned vehicles, he could also use his 7.62-mm machine gun. The senior member of the crew was the tank commander, either a senior sergeant or lieutenant, who could also view targets through the thermal sights. In commanding the tank, he made all the decision as to how to move, what targets to engage, and what kind of ammunition to use. In addition, he maintained contact with his platoon leader by hand signals or FM radio.23
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The tank platoon in 1989 consisted of four tanks, a decrease of one from the Vietnamera army. The platoon leader, a lieutenant, commanded one of the tanks, while a platoon sergeant in the grade of E7 commanded another. The two other tanks, often called wingmen, since they operated on the wings of the platoon leader or platoon sergeant, were controlled by staff sergeants (E6). As with the crew, the platoon needed exactly 16 soldiers to operate, no more, no less. It had no place to carry extra soldiers to replace losses in case one of the regular crew was sick or injured. Such temporary replacements had to come from the company or battalion. The captain commanding the company had four platoons under his control, with a total of 5 officers and 57 enlisted soldiers. He and his executive officer each had their own M1A1 tank. The E8 first sergeant also controlled two HMMWVs, an M113 armored personnel carrier, and a 5-ton truck, which carried the supply sergeant and armorer. The modern tank company was a bare-boned organization with none of the extras that characterized the 91-soldier Vietnam-era company.24 Like the mechanized infantry battalion, the tank battalion had four maneuver companies and a headquarters company, all commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Embedded within the headquarters company was a scout platoon and a heavy mortar platoon with six M107-mm self-propelled mortars. The headquarters company also coordinated the battalion command post, a maintenance section, a supply section, and any other units that senior headquarters would attach for a specific mission.25 The armor soldier could also be assigned to a cavalry platoon. In 1989, these came in two varieties: armored and divisional. Divisional cavalry troops, primarily equipped with the M3 Bradley CFV, was the division’s primary ground reconnaissance unit. In spite of warnings from World War II and Vietnam-era cavalrymen, the army pulled all the tanks from divisional cavalry squadrons to use in other combat organizations. This new divisional cavalry organization was no longer assigned directly to the division commander, but to a new organization: the Aviation (sometimes referred to as the 4th) Brigade. Nevertheless, this squadron, organized into two ground troops and two air troops, was the division commander’s primary organization for conducting reconnaissance and security operations. However, without tanks, its ability to conduct heavy combat in a high-intensity environment was limited. As mentioned previously, in addition to the divisional squadron, each tank and mechanized infantry battalion also had a scout platoon with six M3 CFVs. The CFV was similar to the infantry fighting vehicle, except it had less room for soldiers and more for ammunition.26 The other kind of cavalry unit was the armored cavalry regiment. In 1989, three of these heavy units were still in the army’s active organization: the 2nd, the 3rd, and the 11th. Each armored cavalry regiment, or ACR, had the same roles as the divisional unit: reconnaissance and security. However, because of its heavy combined arms organization, the regiment could also conduct the same heavy combat operations as a mechanized division, with the exception of those missions that were infantry-specific. The typical armored cavalry squadron had 41 tanks, 38 CFVs, and a field artillery battery of eight M109, 155-mm self-propelled howitzers. Each regiment had three of these ground squadrons and an engineer squadron. It was a powerful and flexible organization.27
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Artillery Throughout history, field artillery has been a branch that attracted the most technically and mathematically inclined soldiers. It was also the most lethal since a small artillery battery had the capability of killing many soldiers and destroying a large amount of equipment with each and every round. The advent of precision weapons and multiple munitions warheads only increased its effect. Each maneuver brigade had a direct support artillery battalion. Along with the 24 M109A2 155-mm self-propelled artillery systems, this battalion contained over 250 other vehicles, including fire support vehicles (FIST-V), command tracks (M577), ammunition trucks, fuel trucks, and tracked ammunition carriers. The actual tactical direction of this large organization was usually in the hands of the unit executive officer because the commander’s second role was even more important. He was the brigade commander’s key to the division’s fire support system. Not only could he call for his own battalion’s fire, but he could quickly channel fire from all of the other division and corps artillery units, if available. Since World War II, the field artillery has been at the core of the U.S. Army’s way of war. Better than any other military in the world, American artillerymen have been able to mass indirect fire, from a variety of sources, on a single target. During the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, the artillery branch continued to improve its ability to deliver accurate fire in support of infantrymen on the ground. During the 1980s, this ability continued to evolve as the artillerymen worked to better coordinate their activities with both aviation and ground units as well as with counterfire against enemy artillery. The apogee of this artillery performance was during Operation Desert Storm, with the VII Corps using eight brigades of artillery, including one British divisional artillery brigade, to destroy and disrupt Iraqi units throughout the depth of the battlefield. During Desert Storm, the primary weapon systems were the M109, 155-mm self-propelled howitzer, the new multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), and, used primarily by National Guard units, the M110 203-mm self-propelled howitzer. These systems could attack targets at ranges between 8 and 20 miles away. Also used for the first time was the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which could reach enemy units over 50 miles beyond the American front line.28 The artillery battalion was a complex organization that included far more than its artillery weapons. Each battery had a fire direction center that controlled the fire of its six guns. It also had an ammunition section, with trucks and trailers capable of moving the heavy artillery shells and propellant to the vehicles. Soldiers working in the ammunition section would be performing tasks of carrying and loading shells, at the firing battery, a task that had changed little since World War II. The field artillery (FA) battalion looked simple on paper but was actually quite complex. A FA battalion was normally placed in direct support of a maneuver brigade. It was that commander’s responsibility, through his command post, to coordinate all the indirect fire that the brigade required, including mortars, attack helicopters, and air force aircraft. To provide observed fire, the FA battalion sent fire support teams to forward units in modified M113 armored personnel carriers to act as forward observers with units on the line. In addition, each battalion
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had access to the findings of the firefinder radars, assigned to the target acquisition battery, which located enemy artillery fire. The battalion also had the standard complement of maintenance, communications, medical, and administrative soldiers.29 Air Defense Artillery Air defense artillery soldiers, trained at Fort Bliss, Texas, were responsible for clearing the skies of enemy aircraft that could interfere with the conduct of operations on the ground. By 1991, air defense artillery rested on two basic systems. At the tactical level, Stinger teams worked with individual companies and troops. This fire and forget rocket was small enough to be carried by individual soldiers and relatively easy to use. The reality of American air dominance is such that these missiles, along with the M163 Vulcan gun system, were almost never used during the post–cold war era. The only aircraft that flew were those that the United States wanted to fly.30 The second kind of system, and far more important during this period, was the Patriot air defense system. The Patriot was a dramatic element in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, intercepting a number of Iraqi-launched Scud missiles targeted against both Saudi Arabia and Israel.31 Aviation Soldiers found aviation to be a very attractive branch. Only officers and warrant officers piloted army aircraft, while enlisted soldiers served as crew chiefs on Blackhawk and Chinook helicopters and observers on OH-58 reconnaissance helicopters. The most important helicopter system in the army was the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. Equipped with sophisticated night vision systems and armed with Hellfire missiles, rockets, and a 30-mm chain gun, the Apache was designed to be a tank killer and was an extremely deadly aircraft. Aviation soldiers took their advanced training at Fort Rucker, Alabama. COMBAT SUPPORT Combat arms soldiers had fighting as their primary responsibility. Other soldiers had to fight, but their primary role was to perform other tasks that allowed the infantry, armor, artillery, and attack helicopters to do their jobs efficiently. These soldiers were considered by the military as performing the role of combat support. These branches allowed women to participate at all levels, and they could be found in the heat of battle and confronting enemy soldiers and hostile civilians. Engineers One of the most important groups were the engineers, who received their training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. These soldiers were responsible for three specific tasks in the army: first, they ensured that the military forces could move where they wanted to, a mission called “mobility.” Using M9 armored combat earthmovers, combat
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engineer vehicles, explosives, mine-clearing equipment, and a host of other standard or experimental equipment, engineers breached enemy obstacles and allowed the combat units to move into enemy-controlled territory. It was the combat engineer units that directed the breaching of the border berm along the Iraqi border in 1991.32 Once the battle passed, the engineers used standard construction equipment to build and improve roads and bridge rivers. For example, the 1st Armored Division engineers constructed the longest pontoon bridge since World War II to cross the Sava River in 1995 and allowed the Americans to occupy their sector in Bosnia. Once in their sector, the engineers used their mine detectors and mine-clearing devices to open the roads to an adjacent areas for the movement of the troops on patrol.33 The engineers’ second mission was counter mobility. This is the opposite of mobility, and it involved the use of mines, explosives, and heavy machinery. In this role, the same construction troops took on the role of destroyer: blowing up bridges, constructing barriers to movement, and emplacing minefields. The third mission was survivability and involved the construction of combat fighting positions, command posts, and other facilities that allowed a force to perform its role in the field.34
Signal Soldiers Signal soldiers, trained at Fort Gordon, Georgia, were responsible for establishing and maintaining communications between units of all sizes. Communications in the modern era has become incredibly complex and ranges from simple land-line telephones that World War I–era soldiers would understand, to simple radios of the Vietnam era, to an whole array of digital, cellular, and computer-based systems. Means of sending information have changed from simple wire and radio waves to optical fiber, microwave, and satellite methods. This information all has to be secure from enemy interference or interception and capable of rapid processing in computer-based information systems. In addition, most of these systems need to be flexible, based on military movements.35
Military Police Soldiers in military police (MP) units had a difficult time during the post–cold war era, and there were never enough to go around. While not formally combat soldiers, they were in the front lines from the beginning of the period and always in danger. Trained at Fort McClellan, Alabama, they were responsible for police duties that were specifically military in nature, such as route reconnaissance, watching the various roadways after they were open, maintaining the traffic flow on the main supply routes, and controlling stragglers. In this era, working with the large numbers of refugees displaced by fighting was a major task. They had major security responsibilities, especially within areas claimed to be secure by major combat forces. They were the first responders in the event of a terrorist attack and also led many convoys on dangerous routes. MPs ran the prisoner of war and internee collection points, manned the military jails and prisons, and supervised the evacuation of these personnel to other locations. Finally, they were
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the military’s basic law and order organization, which included traffic control, criminal investigation, and the confinement of military prisoners. All of these tasks brought them into dangerous situations.36 Military Intelligence Specialists Not always in the line of fire, but extremely important to the modern American army, were the military intelligence specialists. These young men and women, and there were many women in this branch, turned information gathered from various sources into intelligence that commanders could use to understand the environment they operated in. In most traditional conflicts, the “G2,” or intelligence staff, focused on three main elements: the enemy, the weather, and the terrain. This information was normally obtained by human means such as contact with enemy forces, prisoner interrogations, aerial reconnaissance reports, and some radio interception. In the post–cold war era, the intelligence tasks were more difficult. Now the G2 had to manage a variety of collection devices, including ground surveillance radars, electronic emissions intercepts, electronic jamming devices, ground and airborne direction finding and attack systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, satellite imagery, and a variety of human intelligence. In addition, with the army deployed in a variety of peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, tactical commanders also depended on the intelligence soldier for information about the local area and its inhabitants. Cultural awareness was a term used often in the post–cold war era.37 Chemical Corps Soldiers Many of the United States’ potential opponents had the capability to use nuclear, biological, or chemical agents. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the realization of the Soviet’s chemical warfare capability, the U.S. Army has placed increasing emphasis on protecting its soldiers from this kind of attack. In the post–September 11 era, with the rise of international terrorism and the potential for hostile groups to gain and use these so-called weapons of mass destruction, these responsibilities for protection became increasingly important. The Chemical Corps soldiers, trained at Fort McClellan, Alabama, had the responsibility of protecting American soldiers from these threats. Assigned at almost every level of command, Chemical Corps soldiers helped to maintain protective equipment and clothing, prepared for the daunting task of decontaminating military equipment, and coordinated the training of soldiers required to operate in a contaminated environment.38 Civil Affairs Units One other group that became more important in the post–cold war era were soldiers assigned to civil affairs units. Soldiers assigned to these units, usually from the National Guard or Army Reserve, had the responsibility of working with local friendly inhabitants. Their duties could range from assisting with establishing effective health
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services to supervising the erection of a public school. After Operation Desert Storm, these soldiers worked with the thousands of refugees driven out of Iraq by the Shiite revolt in the south and the Kurdish revolt, as part of Operation Provide Comfort, in the north. These soldiers became essential during relief operations in Somalia, peacekeeping in Bosnia, and in the effort to rebuild the Iraqi and Afghan governments at the end of military operations.39 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Modern armies do not place most of their soldiers in front-line combat units, or even in the combat support organizations. A very large proportion of these soldiers are those who, in modern jargon, sustain the force. In fact, it is normal for most soldiers in a deployed theater of operations to be those who are providing the infrastructure for the army to operate in the field. The list of these functions is long, but it gives an idea of where most soldiers are actually working.40 Equipment Specialists and Mechanics In post–cold war years, every unit had soldiers from the Ordnance Corps and trained at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, assigned to maintain their complex equipment. At the basic level, most units had a small-arms repair specialist, often as an additional duty, to fix the unit’s personal and crew weapons. Each battalion had its own maintenance section that took care of repairing and servicing the unit’s tracked and wheeled vehicles, aircraft, and other heavy equipment. Combat and combat support battalions had mechanics trained to service the vehicle turrets and heavy weapons. Most units had someone to repair radios and communications equipment. Each division had several battalions devoted to providing what the army calls direct support maintenance. Maintenance soldiers at this level provided more sophisticated and complex repairs, such as repairing tank engines or restoring vehicle radios. All of this work can be done by the unit in a deployed, combat environment. Finally, there was a whole array of general support and depot-level maintenance that could essentially rebuild vehicles and major items of equipment. Soldiers working in these organizations were generally given titles like mechanic, repairman, or technician.41 Explosive Device Specialists and Ammunition Supervision and Maintenance Ordnance Corps soldiers performed two other major service support functions. They were the ones that destroyed explosive devices such as old mines and ammunition. Called explosive ordnance disposal, or EOD, these specialists became more important in the post–cold war era. On one level, they trained to respond to random terrorist bombings. On another, they worked during peacekeeping operations to locate and destroy some of the tens of thousands of mines that litter old battlefields. A second responsibility of Ordnance soldiers was ammunition supervision and maintenance. They were the ones that ensured it was shipped properly, stored properly, and handled by all units
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safely. They maintained ammunition supply points and kept track of the wide range of munitions used by the army. In addition, they inspected this ammunition to ensure that it was usable by the soldiers in the field. When it was no longer useable, they coordinated with EOD specialists for its destruction.42
Supply Specialists Supply specialists, generally quartermaster-branch soldiers trained at Fort Lee, Virginia, managed the incredible array of products and materials that kept the army operating. Traditionally, these products were organized into various classes of supply. Food was the first class of supply and included food service specialists, who organized its procurement and distribution, through ration supply points, to unit cooks and dining facilities. The second class of supply was very general and ranged from mechanics toolboxes to clothing, chemical defense equipment, and unclassified maps. The soldiers who managed these items were generally referred to as supply clerks, and they used a wide array of computer programs to monitor, process, and order these supplies. The next category of supply, called Class III, comprised fuel and other petroleum products such as oil and grease. Soldiers in this field, petroleum supply specialists, worked in a variety of capacities, including driving the large HEMTT fuel trucks, for use in the combat zone, and large fuel tankers. They supervised fuel supply points and aviation fuel supply points and controlled and coordinated the distribution of supplies. They were also responsible for maintaining the purity of this fuel since, if contaminated, it could destroy tank and aircraft engines. The next category of supply (Class IV) comprised building materials used by engineer soldiers. Class V supply items were the ammunition managed and distributed by the Ordinance soldiers. Items procured for purchase by soldiers, called Class VI, were also shipped into each theater of operations. Major equipment, such as tanks, aircraft, and trucks, were considered as the seventh category of supply. Supply specialists also managed the procurement and distribution of water.43
Quartermaster Soldiers and Field Services Quartermaster soldiers in the post–cold war army performed a wide range of tasks, called field services, that allowed the combat and combat support soldiers to accomplish their missions. These began with the essential tasks of cooking and distributing food and purifying and locating water supplies. These functions were generally done at all levels of the organization. These were the soldiers, not those in the personnel field, that took care of those soldiers who died in the service. Mortuary activities included taking care of the soldier’s body and his or her personnel effects. These all needed to be treated with respect and precision to avoid serious morale problems among the soldiers and their families. During combat, this process included locating, identifying, and registering the graves of deceased soldiers. These soldiers were the ones who, long after combat was over, continued to investigate old battlefields to find those missing in action. Fort Lee– trained soldiers planned and supervised the aerial delivery of all kinds of supplies by
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air landing, helicopter, or parachute. They operated field laundries and shower points. Finally, they established field tailor shops to repair military clothing and exchange facilities to replace those no longer repairable. Supply soldiers performed a large array of tasks that were essential to the operations of the army.44 Transportation Services Fort Eustis, Virginia, trained those soldiers who chose transportation as their career field. These soldiers managed a complex system that tied in to the Defense Transportation System, the central clearing house for all military movements. On one level, these soldiers operated control headquarters to ensure that unit moves happened in a smooth and logical manner. For example, movement control centers identified main and secondary supply routes and granted units and convoys permission to use them for specific periods. This practice reduced congestion and ensured that they arrived with minimal disruption. These soldier also operated terminals, essentially facilities at ports and airfields, that received military equipment and units. The casual reader may be surprised at the size of the army’s “navy” of harbor vessels used to unload ships and conduct port operations. One of the transportation branch’s key tasks was to manage what they called “nodes.” Essentially, these were the locations where different kinds of transportation means, such as air, rail, truck, and ship, all came together. To most army soldiers, the most visible aspect of this branch was the many truck companies that supported the modern force. Army units employed thousands of trucks of all sizes, most operated by transportation branch soldiers. Less obvious was that these soldiers also had the capability to manage and repair railroads in the theater of operations.45 Health Services Health services were essential to the army’s operations. This was a complex system, with most soldiers trained at the Army Medical Department Center and School, located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Soldiers in this field performed a wide range of tasks, including treating wounded soldiers from the battlefield and evacuating them back to hospitals in the field and in the United States. They operated these hospitals and worked at all levels. They supplied all medical units and facilities with medicine and supplies. They operated dental clinics and veterinary clinics in the field and at remote sites. They supervised preventive medical measures to maintain the soldiers’ health in the field, the same kinds of functions that any public health department would perform in the United States. Finally, they also operated mental health facilities for those soldiers involved in combat operations.46 Human Resources Like any large organization, the post–cold war army had a large human resources organization. These soldiers received their training at the Adjutant General School at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Assigned at battalion and above, they ensured that soldiers
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were properly assigned according to the complex authorization tables that dictated each unit’s organization. They managed unit replacements and operated replacement detachments. They maintained unit strengths and attempted to maintain accounting of soldiers in transit, on leave, sick in the hospital, or who became causalities. Although the quartermaster soldiers took care of the deceased soldier’s personnel remains and effects, it was the adjutant general soldier who managed the casualty system, to include the notification of next of kin and arranging for casualty assistance officers. In addition, these soldiers took care of all personnel services, which included awards, promotions, reassignments, and identification documents as well as special investigations. They also ran the army postal system, controlled the unit band, and monitored the soldiers’ morale and helped to provide appropriate recreation such as gyms and movie theaters.47 Finance and JAG Services The post–cold war army needed a variety of other services to operate. It had a finance branch that supervised dispersal of funds to soldiers, contractors, and even civilians in the field during peacekeeping operations. Of increasing importance during this period were the legal services provided by Judge Advocate General Corps (JAG) lawyers and soldiers. Especially during peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operations, military lawyers guided the commanders and assisted the troops in a variety of ways. They assisted with wills, powers of attorney, civil disputes, contracts, and any other traditional form of legal assistance. Of course, they also represented those soldiers charged with crimes. When deployed overseas, JAG soldiers worked with host countries and their citizens to navigate the complex world of local laws and customs. Army chaplains provided religious support and counseling to soldiers and their families and acted as advisors to unit commanders on the command’s health and welfare. Of course, the army had a number of military bands designed to contribute to the morale of the individual soldier.48 What the reader should gather from this short summary is that the army of the post–cold war era was an incredibly complex organization. Combat units, using tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, attack helicopters, and field artillery cannons and rockets, attacked the enemy force. Combat support units, such as intelligence, engineers, and MPs, helped the combat arms soldiers accomplish their tasks. Finally, the service support soldiers provided the infrastructure to make all of this happen. What changed in the 1990s and into the next millennium was that all of these young men and women were in the line of fire. There were no rear areas, as any place where soldiers worked and lived was a target for an insurgent or a long-range missile. NOTES 1. Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, ed. Theodore A. Wilson, Modern War Studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001). 2. Glen R. Hawkins and James Jay Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI: U.S. Army Division Design Initiatives and Experiments, 1917–1995 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1997), 19–26. Vincent H. Demma, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1989, ed.
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Susan Carroll (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 63–64. John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1997). 3. Demma, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 116. 4. Ibid., 63–85. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1986), 27. 5. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 390–91. Dwight D. Oland Jr. and David W. Hogan, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1992 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2002), 33–39. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Student Text 101-1: Organizational and Tactical Reference Data for the Army in the Field (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), 4–22. 6. William E. DuPuy, “Briefing at Fort Polk, Louisiana, 7 June, 1973,” in Selected Papers of General William E. DuPuy, ed. Richard M. Swain, Donald L. Gilmore, and Carolyn D. Conway (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 62–63. The author participated in these “new” tactics during his Reserve Officers’ Training Corps summer camp in the summer of 1974. 7. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-8, the Infantry Platoon and Squad, with change 1 ed., Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1992), chap. 2, Appendix B. Donald S. Pihl and George E. Dausman, eds., United States Army: Weapon Systems 1990 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 39–41. 8. George C. Wilson, Mud Soldiers: Life inside the New American Army (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1989), 154–56. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-8, chap. 2, Appendixes A and B. U.S. Army Material Command, “Army Weapons and Equipment,” Army 52 (2002): 286. U.S. Army Material Command, “Army Weaponry and Equipment,” Army 40 (1990): 322. 9. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-10, the Infantry Rifle Company, Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1990), 1–9 to 1–11. U.S. Army Material Command, “Army Weaponry and Equipment,” 263. 10. Demma, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 63–82. DTOE 07015C000 Infantry Battalion, Infantry Division, Light, October 2005. 11. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992). John M. Carland, Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide: May 1965–October 1966, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000), 113–50. 12. Pihl and Dausman, United States Army, 94–97. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-10, 1–10. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 71-100-3, Air Assault Division Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996), chap. 1. 82nd Airborne Division, Annual Historical Summary, ed. William T. Steele (Fort Bragg, NC: 82nd Airborne Division, 2002), chap. 1. 13. XVIII Airborne Corps Annual Historical Review 1997 (Fort Bragg, NC: HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps, 1998), 69–116. 14. R. Cody Phillips, Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2004), 21, 32. Http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75th_home.html, accessed 3 December, 2007. 15. Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, Kalev I. Sepp, Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2003), 93–202. An excellent overview of the Green Berets in the period after September 11, 2001, is found in Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond (New York: Vintage, 2005). 16. U.S. Army Material Command, “Army Weaponry and Equipment,” 339. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 71–1, the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1977), 4–12. By 1989, over 80,000 of these vehicles had been built and were in service around the world. 17. TOW is short for “tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command–link guided.” 18. Pihl and Dausman, United States Army, 17. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-7j, the Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley), Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1993), Appendix B.
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19. Captain John E. Bushyhead, Interview by Robert Cook, Transcript, Washington, DC: U. S. Army Center of Military History, March 29, 1991. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-7j, chap. 1, 1–5. Tom Clancy, Armored Cav: A Guided Tour of an Armored Cavalry Regiment (New York: Berkley Books, 1994), 74–78. 20. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 71-1, the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1998), chap. 1. 21. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1976), chap. 2. 22. Ibid., 4–7. 23. U.S. Department of the Army, ARTEP 17-237-11-Mtp Tank Crew Training Plan, Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2003). U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-20.12 Tank Gunnery (Abrams), Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2005). 24. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-20.15 Tank Platoon, Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2001), chap. 1. 25. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 71-2, the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1988), chap. 2. Center for Army Tactics, Student Text 100-3: Battle Book (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), chap. 3. 26. Peter S Kindsvatter, The Army of Excellence Divisional Cavalry Squadron—A Doctrinal Step Backward? (Fort Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985). U.S. Department of the Army, FM 71-100, Division Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1990), 2–5. 27. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Corps Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1989), 3–5 to 3–6. 28. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 4, The Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 712. Stephen A. Bourque, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2002), 192–93. 29. U.S. Department of the Army, DTOE 06302C00 HHB, Infantry Division Artillery, Heavy Division (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996). U.S. Department of the Army, Field Artillery Battalion, Toe 06365a100, Etc. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996). U.S. Department of the Army, Field Artillery Battery, Field Artillery Battalion, 155mm, SelfPropelled, Toe 06367a100/06367a200 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996). Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1995), 260–63. 30. Stephen K. Conver, “Army Weaponry and Equipment,” Army 41 (1991): 286–88. 31. Schubert and Kraus, Whirlwind War, 264. 32. Bourque, Jayhawk! 33. Robert Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2004), 96 34. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 71-100, Division Operations, 1–19 to 1–20. 35. Ibid., 2–11. 36. Ibid., 1–16 to 1–17. 37. Ibid., 1–14 to 1–15. 38. Ibid., 1–16. 39. Ibid., 1–18. 40. General information for the following paragraphs comes from a variety of military texts, including U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2001), U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1988), and Raymond K. Bluhm Jr. and James B. Motely, The Soldier’s Guidebook (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995). 41. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 4-0, Combat Service Support, Field Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2003), 8–1 to 8–10. 42. Ibid., 8–10 to 8–16. 43. Ibid., 6–1 to 6–9.
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44. 45. 46. 47. 48.
Ibid., 6–10 to 6–14. Ibid., 7–1 to 7–8. Ibid., 9–1 to 9–11. Ibid., 10–1 to 10–7. Ibid., 11–1 to 14–3.
5
RECRUITING
Most Western nations have required their young men to serve in the armed forces during time of war, ever since the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. In the United States, Congress passed conscription acts to raise troops during both the Civil War and the First World War. In both cases, these laws expired at the end of the conflict, and the army returned to voluntary recruitment as its primary method of raising soldiers in peacetime. At the beginning of the Second World War, the threat of war with Germany and Japan persuaded Congress to expand the size of the military establishment, and it enacted the Selective Service Act of 1940. This law continued, with a two-year break, from 1946 to 1948, in effect as the primary means of raising troops through the Second World War and Korea with little opposition from the American public. By the Vietnam era, the government was “drafting” about 300,000 men a year into the armed forces. The war in Vietnam, coinciding with the baby boomers’ coming of age, made the draft exceedingly unpopular. Rising casualty rates, real and perceived deferment inequalities, and the civil rights movement all created an atmosphere of resentment by those chosen to serve or under the threat of national service. Certainly the quality of the soldiers entering service was uneven as high school dropouts were twice as likely to join the service as college graduates. Soon after Richard Nixon assumed the presidency, he began to study ways of eliminating what had become a political problem.1 The government drafted the last soldier into the army on December 27, 1972, six months earlier than the expiration of the federal law. From then on, a period that coincided with the military’s withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the U.S. Army selected only volunteers.2 By 1989, the army had almost 770,000 soldiers on active service, only 50 percent of its combat strength at the height of the Vietnam War a decade earlier. While smaller, however, its soldiers were qualitatively superior to any other army in the nation’s history. It was a more complex force, with soldiers enlisting for a variety of reasons and coming from not only all regions of the nation, but also all races and both sexes. It consisted only of volunteers, with a greater percentage of the enlisted soldiers
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possessing a high school education than in previous eras, and almost all of its officers had a college degree.3 WHO JOINED THE ARMY, AND WHY? In 1989, three-quarters of the officers and slightly less than half of the enlisted soldiers were married, with slightly more than 990,000 wives and children, now called “family members,” rather than the more pejorative term “dependent.” Over 32,000 of these soldiers were single parents, a phenomenon almost unheard of in earlier years, and another 28,000 were married to other service members. While it was still a white man’s army, blacks made up 31 percent of the force, and all other minorities 8 percent. Racial and ethnic tensions were less of a problem than ever before. White male dominance of the service continued to erode with women increasing to almost 11 percent of the force. Yet, in spite of the absence of a draft, the army continued to attract enough men and women to join the force and was attractive enough to induce them to stay beyond their initial obligation.4 This chapter, therefore, investigates three main questions: Who, why, and how did young men and women join the army? The first years of the new all-volunteer force did not go well. Recruiting for the general force was down, there were growing shortages of soldiers with critical skills, and the Carter administration was generally ambivalent to the military’s dilemma. Efforts were being made to lower recruiting standards and eliminate incentives to remain with the military as a career such as the 20-year retirement option. Senator Sam Nunn from Georgia, generally opposed to the direction the army was heading, indicated he believed the new army was doomed by starting hearings in 1978, stating, “There now appears to be a growing consensus that the All-Volunteer Force, as currently constituted, may fail to provide an adequate foundation for the future national security needs of our Nation.”5 Certainly, as it was currently configured, some members of Congress believed it was just too expensive.6 Two things reversed the confusion that staffing the army was inducing. First was the international standoff with Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the winter of 1979, which forced the Carter administration to reconsider the use of force in international affairs. Army Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer’s warning to both the president and Congress of a “hollow army” had helped to change its defense orientation. The army’s budget grew from $23 billion in 1976 to $32 billion in fiscal year 1980, partially as a response to the inability of the force to face challenges in the world. It was a condition only highlighted by the fiasco of the hostage rescue mission in the spring of that year.7 Recognizing that the army also had internal problems, Meyer, who should be considered as one of the era’s most effective leaders, determined to overhaul the Army Recruiting Command. In 1979, he sent Major General Maxwell R. Thurman to take command of the troubled agency. An incredibly talented and driven officer, Thurman was, according to Bernard Rostker, who helped design the 1980s organization, “the most important person in the history of the All Volunteer Force.”8 In a brilliant move, Thurman hired a Madison Avenue advertising firm to help entice soldiers to enter. During production, however, Thurman did not let the advertisers
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run the program alone. For example, in the middle of viewing one agency-produced recruiting movie, Mad Max, as Thurman was known throughout the army, demanded that the “soldier,” who was really only a skinny actor, be pulled and that only beefy, real warriors appear in the army’s recruiting films. This program, as everything else in the recruiting program, bore the mark of this intense officer. Americans who came of age in the 1980s will remember the army’s advertisements. First shown on television at the end of the 1980–1981 college football season, these television spots highlighted young soldiers jumping out of airplanes, scaling off mountains cliffs, and splashing across streams in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. It targeted not only men, but also young women working on radarscopes, directing traffic, or helping in a hospital. Magazines and radio stations also carried the ubiquitous advertisements that hit at the heart of that generation’s dilemma: how to challenge yourself, get the education you need, and start on the road to success. It did not hurt that these ads were also exciting and thoughtprovoking and had a great sound track. At the end of each action-packed video clip or radio spot came a catchy jingle that challenged America’s youngsters to “be all you can be, in the army.” Stressing adventure, challenge, and the educational rewards of joining the army, the effort was one of the most successful advertising campaigns in American history.9 Key to the success of the program was the army recruiter. Immediately upon taking control, the new commander visited every one of his 57 recruiting battalion commanders and made the officers personally responsible for acquiring new soldiers. Under Thurman, the recruiting sergeants now became an intensively trained, motivated, and managed group. For an officer, failure to perform in a supervisory position would essentially terminate his or her career. In one of his first acts, he ordered that every officer in the command enlist one soldier in the service in the next 30 days or leave the organization—and probably end his career. By 1980, Recruiting Command was filling the army with highquality soldiers, and Thurman could claim responsibility for creating, for the first time in many years, a quality perception of the U.S. Army by the American people.10 However, Thurman’s Recruiting Command, with slick slogans and well-trained recruiters, would have no effect if their product, military service, did not have some appeal. What induced young men and women to join the service? Generally, we find that the promise of a better future, educational benefits, and financial bonuses were the most common reasons for this generation of Americans. Enlisting in the Service Washington Post journalist George C. Wilson lived for a year with a company of soldiers in 1987 during their training experience. Beginning at Fort Benning, Georgia, he watched them go through basic and advanced training. Since it was a “cohort” unit, designed to stay together through basic training to their first assignment, he then traveled with them to Fort Riley, Kansas, as the company became part of the First Infantry Division. He wanted to know how new members of the all-volunteer army compared with those of the draftee army a generation earlier. In addition to spending time talking to soldiers,
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Wilson asked each of his young companions to fill out a questionnaire explaining the reasons why he joined the army. What Wilson discovered was that his subjects reflected the hopes and dreams of many recruits throughout America’s history. Some wished to get away from problems at home and start a new life. Others were tired of dead-end jobs in both the country’s small towns and urban areas. Some found themselves strapped to support young families on the minimal wages they were qualified to earn with their high school diplomas. Others came from poor or lower-middle-class families and wanted to take advantage of the military’s educational benefits. Some simply knew they lacked the discipline to succeed in a competitive economic world. Finally, there were those that simply wanted to experience danger—to test themselves, as young men had done since the beginning of time. At their core, all of these young men sought opportunity and, unlike most of their peers, were willing to take the chance to leave home and seek it. As Wilson noted, “They had no automatic up-escalator to step onto that would whisk them painlessly to colleges, to high-paying jobs, to homes in the suburbs with cars in the driveway. They had to risk their lives to get a chance at sharing the American dream.”11 Wilson’s informal study reflects the official data that soldiers enlisted because of solid advertising that appealed to their need to earn respect and a sense of adventure. These two generations, the last children of the World War II baby boom and the boomers’ children, believed that education was the ticket to success. The World War II,
Soldiers in training, 1989. (Courtesy of Soldiers)
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Korean War, and Vietnam War soldier benefited from one of the great social programs of all time, the GI Bill. The educational benefits prompted the postwar veterans to return to college en masse, creating an educational boom in the United States. Universities and junior colleges sprouted in communities across the country to take care of the rising demand. The program continued into the Vietnam era as veterans in the thousands returned to school. That law then came to an end on December 31, 1978, with over 17,000,000 veterans of three wars receiving educational assistance. The new program, established by the Veterans’ Educational and Assistance Act of 1976, did not provided soldiers leaving the army with benefits as robust as those available to their fathers and older brothers.12 The Department of Defense, under the severe funding constraints during the Carter years, experimented with a variety of educational programs for service members. None of them was very successful, until Representative G. V. “Sonny” Montgomery of Mississippi pushed through a revised program of educational benefits that was attractive to the new recruit of the all-volunteer army.13 For those needing money for college, the Montgomery GI Bill was extremely popular. For the first year, soldiers were required to contribute $100 a month to the fund. After completing a three-year enlistment, the Veterans Administration matched the soldier’s $1,200 contribution with $9,600. The army also had an additional program, called the Army College Fund, which worked in conjunction with the Montgomery GI Bill and tied additional educational benefits to enlistments in certain shortage career fields. In 1989, this program could add another $14,000 into the soldier’s pocket after he or she left the service, bringing education at a state college or university well within reach of the average veteran. These programs were extremely popular, and between 90 and 95 percent of all new enlistees participated in one or both. The Montgomery GI Bill benefits continued to increase during the period, from $250 per month for full-time attendance at a college or university in 1990 to $650 per month in 2000 and $1,075, or a total of $38,700, in 2006. While the Army College Fund benefits varied depending on specialty and the recruiting situation, the combined programs alone could net a recruit in 2006 almost $73,000 for college. It was quite an incentive to enlist, given the rising cost of education. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard would also kick in an additional $50.00 per month for those who stayed in for the duration of their contract. Those with a college degree already could enlist in a critical field and have the army repay their existing student loans at a rate of 33 1/3 percent per year for three years. Total benefit by 2006 was $67,000.14 As one officer who started her career as an enlisted soldier pointed out, “I used the enlisted [track] as a stepping stone that served me well. I have taken advantage of the education as the [Army] paid me for my AA, BA, and MA.”15 An additional motivator to enlist was the bonus program. From the earliest days of organized national armies, recruiters used cash payments, beyond the soldier’s pay and allowances, to entice them to join the military. With the advent of the all-volunteer army, these bonuses were just as effective. Like the Army College Fund, the army tied enlistment bonuses to specific shortage career fields. In 1989, these cash payments ranged from $1,500 to $8,000 for initial-entry recruits. Several of George Wilson’s
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questionnaire respondents remarked that one reason they joined was that they “wanted the $5,000 bonus for joining the infantry.” By 2006, the clever soldier could combine various bonus options and receive over $40,000 in his or her pocket for a four-year enlistment.16 Finally, one theme common among many soldiers, and those seeking commissions, was simple patriotism. One young major remarked, “I wanted to serve my country. . . . I am the first on both sides of my family to be born in the US. I know that my cousins and other relatives do not have the opportunities that this great country has provided me.”17 Another soldier who enlisted in 1988 said she “joined to serve.”18 Women in the Service One group that George Wilson did not talk to was women soldiers. Until April 28, 1978, females were second-class service members, belonging to the Women’s Army Corps, with a host of limitations on where and in what fields they could serve. With the army’s abolishment of that segregated branch, women now had the opportunity to serve alongside their brothers in the all-volunteer army.19 Certainly most women joined the service for some of the same reasons as the men. In many instances, it was the opportunity to compete in the same world as men and get a good job, while others joined because of a variety of employment and educational opportunities. However, there were also other, gender-specific reasons for joining. Women who matured to young adulthood in the 1970s were reaping the benefits of the feminist movement. Betty Friedan’s influential The Feminine Mystique (1963) incited publicity over the Equal Rights Amendment, and rapidly opening opportunities inspired many young women to reject, or at least delay, the standard early marriage–motherhood–stay at home pattern of their predecessors.20 As one officer reported, she was determined to get away from “farming and factory work.”21 It was an exciting time for this female generation, and the all-volunteer army offered them many paths to achieve fulfillment and equality with their male counterparts, and serve their country. By 1989, women were an accepted part of military life, and the army had opened up most assignments, except for battalion close-combat units such as infantry and armor. Over 10 percent of all soldiers were female, and that number continued to increase to over 13 percent by 1996. While some officers resisted the integration into the army’s field army, it was a process made more important by requirements of the all-volunteer army. Both the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) and the U.S. Military Academy were now options for women who wished to serve their country as officers.22 The army allowed women to train as parachutists, and the first two earned their jump wings at Fort Benning in 1973. The army sent most of the early female airborne soldiers to serve as parachute riggers for the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg. By the early 1980s, more and more women soldiers were taking the challenge and attending jump school.23 The army had opened up over half of all duty positions to female soldiers by 1989. Initially, personnel managers used a “risk rule” to determine if these soldiers could
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be assigned to a certain military skill and a specific military unit. This rule weighed the probability of a woman’s “risk of direct combat and the exposure to hostile file or capture,” in the words of one army spokesman at the time.24 Before 1988, any unit that had the words infantry, armor, cannon artillery, or combat engineers in its title was automatically barred from accepting female soldiers. A more in-depth review conducted by Training and Doctrine Command earlier that year argued that most organizations had units where women could serve without undue exposure.25 These rules would later be revised, and by the end of the 1991 Gulf War, several women would be wounded, captured, and killed in action. Black Americans gave the all-volunteer army their overwhelming support. With only 12 percent of the American population, they constituted 26 percent of the force. In addition to the reasons shared with white soldiers, they had powerful reasons for joining the service. By 1989, no sector of American society was more racially integrated than the army. The fact that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was a black army officer gave substance to the rhetoric of equality. Studies indicated that not only were they looking for equal pay for equal work, a desire they shared with their female counterparts, but they were also looking for education. Black high school graduates were attracted to military service by the promise of educational benefits. In another study, African Americans chose, when they could, noncombat assignments, such as clerks and medical specialties, that they could translate into advancement in the civilian world when they left the service.26 Officers Officers of all branches received their commissions from one of four possible sources: the ROTC program, conducted at most major universities; the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York; Officers Candidate School (OCS); and finally, in cases where there was a professional need, such as with nurses or doctors, they could be offered a direct commission. Each year, about 14,000 high school students applied for the 1,300 openings at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. The young cadets, among the best and brightest of America’s youth, were welcomed to their new environment in a hail of orders, changes of clothing, and haircuts. At the end of the first day, they were already in uniform and ready for the ritual of “beast barracks” that began their transition from civilian to officer.27 As one would expect from a military school, it was an extremely structured program, with each class expected to adopt certain norms of behavior. Every behavioral and academic act for four full years was controlled by the student chain of command. In 1975, President Gerald Ford directed that the armed forces admit women to their academies, and the first 119 female cadets, or approximately 10 percent of the class, arrived at West Point in the fall of 1976. Four years later, 62 new female second lieutenants joined the service.28 By far, ROTC was the most common source of commissioning. Variations of university-level commissioning programs had been in existence since Norwich University
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included military science courses in its academic program in 1819. Civilian college-based commissioning programs continued to grow in an uneven manner through the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln signed the Morrill Act in 1862, directing the “land grant” colleges, those that had received parcels of land from the federal government, to include military studies in their courses. The official ROTC is a product of World War I legislation, to provide the nation with a large, standardized cadre of officers who could augment the regular army in time of war. This program continued to grow haphazardly through World War II and into the cold war. The program became controversial during the Vietnam War and emerged from that conflict somewhat disorganized.29 As with the rest of the army, the ROTC program underwent a major reorganization and reju