Political Handbook of the Americas 2008

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAS 2008

REGIONAL POLITICAL HANDBOOKS OF THE WORLD

Political Handbook of the Americas 2008 Political Handbook of the Middle East 2008 Political Handbook of Africa 2007 Political Handbook of Asia 2007 Political Handbook of Europe 2007

Political Handbook of the Americas 2008 Editors: Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, William R. Overstreet Associate Editors: Judith Isacoff, Thomas Lansford Assistant Editor: Tony Davies Production Assistants: Thomas Scalese, Erin Stanley, Kathleen Stanley CQ Press Sponsoring Editor: Anna S. Baker Development Editor: Anastazia Skolnitsky Chief, Editorial Acquisitions, Reference Publishing: Andrea Pedolsky Managing Editor, Reference: Joan A. Gossett Production Editors: Belinda Josey, Emily Bakely Copy Editors: Elaine Dunn, Shannon Kelly, Jon Preimesberger Manager, Electronic Production: Paul P. Pressau Manager, Print and Art Production: Margot W. Ziperman Senior Vice President and Publisher: John A. Jenkins Director, Reference Publishing: Alix B. Vance President and Publisher, Congressional Quarterly Inc.: Robert W. Merry

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAS 2008

A DIVISION OF CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC. WASHINGTON, D.C.

CQ Press 2300 N Street, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202-729-1900; toll-free, 1-866-4CQ-PRESS (1-866-427-7737) Web: www.cqpress.com Copyright  C 2008 by CQ Press, a division of Congressional Quarterly Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover design: TGD Communications Composition: Production staff at Aptara Corp. Inc., New Delhi Maps by International Mapping Associates ∞ The paper used in this publication exceeds the requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences– 

Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992. Printed and bound in the United States of America 12

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ISBN 978-0-87289-903-2

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CONTENTS

Intergovernmental Organization Abbreviations

I INTRODUCTION

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Introduction to the Americas II GOVERNMENTS

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St. Vincent and the Grenadines 425 Suriname 431 Trinidad and Tobago 444 United Kingdom Territories 455 United States and Related Territories 467 Uruguay 501 Venezuela 514

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Antigua and Barbuda 33 Argentina 40 Aruba 61 Bahamas 65 Barbados 71 Belize 78 Bolivia 85 Brazil 103 Canada 118 Chile 137 Colombia 148 Costa Rica 167 Cuba 177 Dominica 187 Dominican Republic 194 Ecuador 204 El Salvador 225 French Territories 239 Grenada 247 Guatemala 256 Guyana 273 Haiti 284 Honduras 302 Jamaica 314 Mexico 322 Netherlands Antilles 342 Nicaragua 349 Panama 366 Paraguay 381 Peru 393 St. Kitts and Nevis 413 St. Lucia 419

III INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 533 Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) 535 Andean Community of Nations (CAN) 539 Association of Caribbean States (ACS) 544 Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) 548 Central American Common Market (CACM/MCCA) 554 Central American Integration System (SICA) 558 The Commonwealth (CWTH) 562 Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (LAES/SELA) 568 Latin American Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI) 571 Organization of American States (OAS/OEA) 574 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 582 Regional and Subregional Development Banks 586 Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) 586 Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) 587 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 589 Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR/ MERCOSUL) 594 United Nations 599 Security Council: Peacekeeping Forces and Missions 602

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United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 602 Economic and Social Council: Regional Commissions 602 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 603

IV APPENDIXES 605 Appendix A: Chronology of Major Events in the Americas, 2007 607 Appendix B: Serials List 615 Index

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I N T E R G OV E R N M E N TA L O R G A N I Z AT I O N A B B R E V I AT I O N S

Memberships in non-UN intergovernmental organizations are listed at the end of each country’s section under Intergovernmental Representation. An asterisk indicates a nonofficial abbreviation. In the individual country sections, associate memberships are indicated by italics.

ACS ALADI BCIE CACM CAN Caricom *CWTH *IADB

Association of Caribbean States Latin American Integration Association Central American Bank for Economic Integration Central American Common Market Andean Community of Nations Caribbean Community and Common Market The Commonwealth Inter-American Development Bank

LAES Mercosur OAS OECS OPANAL

SELA SICA

Latin American and Caribbean Economic System Southern Cone Common Market Organization of American States Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean Latin American Economic System Central American Integration System

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAS

Natural and Historical Setting The Americas present two faces to the humans who have been settling there for millennia. Most of the region, which stretches out over two continents and a sea full of islands, boasts conditions inviting to human settlement. In the area on which this volume focuses, running south from the United States’ land border, and from the tip of the Florida peninsula on the Atlantic seaboard, temperature zones range from temperate to subtropical to tropical. Some of the highest mountain regions, or the deserts, or swamplands, challenge endurance, but they compensate with beauty what they lack in comfort. Counterbalancing these advantages, much of the region lies atop seismically active ground. An earthquake zone runs from Mexico down to Chile, and into the Caribbean. Tens of thousands of people have died in earthquakes in the 20th century alone. By way of compensation, the same unsteady soil holds, in several areas, silver, gold, and petroleum. The riches don’t end there. Among the other bounties: the 2.3 million-squaremile Amazon, the world’s biggest rain forest; the vast plains of Argentina and Brazil that provide some of the world’s richest farmland; and an extraordinary agricultural heritage. Maize, tomatoes, potatoes, chili peppers, chocolate, tobacco, and coca (the raw material of cocaine)—all these are native to the Western Hemisphere. They are known and savored everywhere else as a result of the arrival of the European powers—the historical event that joined the Americas to the rest of the world. The Spanish, Portuguese, French, and British all moved into the region with one major goal: to exploit the New World’s mineral and agricultural riches to the utmost. For the Iberians, transforming the Americas into a bastion of Christianity counted as nearly as an important a mission. Clearly, those two objectives collided, as one prelate saw when the Spanish conquest had barely begun. In 1511, Antonio de Montesinos, a Dominican friar from Hispaniola (an English corruption of la isla Espa˜nola, an island now shared by the Dominican Republic and Haiti), condemned as sinners those who enslaved Indians. His sermon resonated as far as the mother country, shocking even the conscience of King Ferdinand. Montesinos’s sermon certainly didn’t transform the conquest into a purely spiritual undertaking. But his insistence

that even so-called savages were full-fledged humans marks the beginning of the human rights movement in the Americas. On a practical level, Montesinos made a convert of Bartolom´e de las Casas, who joined the Dominicans and campaigned for equal rights for Indians for the rest of his life. When Montesinos unleashed his wrath on his fellow colonists, the European presence consisted of settlements on Hispaniola and Cuba. The conquest of the mainland wouldn’t begin in earnest until 1519 (although Portuguese had landed on Brazil’s coast, without realizing the magnitude of the continent beyond). Within a few decades of those early entries, Spain and Portugal had established full-fledged colonies on both continents of the New World. The independence wars that expelled the colonial powers didn’t flare up until the early 19th century—first in Haiti, against France. Hence, as of the early 21st century, all of the Americas save the United States and Canada had spent more time as colonies than as independent nations. In the Caribbean, where the conquest began, European powers still have at least formal ties to some nations. And Cuba, one of the earliest colonies, didn’t free itself of Spanish rule until the very end of the 19th century. Europe’s legacy to the New World begins with language. Spanish, Portuguese, and French—the languages of the vast majority of the 533 million people of Latin America and the Caribbean—all come from Europe (as does English, for that matter). And all of the region’s legal and political institutions owe an enormous debt to European models, whose political doctrines and parliamentary systems traveled to the former colonies. But the copies were not exact. Mexico, for example, made a point of adopting a version of the U.S. constitutional model, with a strong president elected independently of congress. Even so, the stability and prosperity that Europe achieved in the second half of the 20th century still elude the former colonies of Latin America and the Caribbean. The foundation of those achievements, the establishment of at least a minimum standard of socioeconomic equality, remains only a vision almost everywhere in the region. Costa Rica, in Central America, is the exception. The World Bank in 2003 ranked the region among the world’s most unequal, with the richest 10 percent of individuals receiving 40 to 47 percent of total income, and the poorest 20 percent receiving 2 to 4 percent (in the United

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INTRODUCTION

States, the wealthiest 10 percent earn 31 percent of total income).1 Governments, international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as the United States, have deployed numerous strategies designed to spur economic growth and lessen inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean. And citizens of the region have developed their own strategy to better their conditions: migration to the United States, Canada, and Europe. Mexicans living along the border have been working in the United States for the better part of a century. In the 1940s and 1950s migration took a more organized form, when citizens of the British West Indies flocked to Britain and then to the United States. The poverty and inequality that fostered migration developed under a long series of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes that characterized the entire region, with brief exceptions, for most of its postindependence life. Political systems began opening up toward the end of the 20th century (except in Cuba). Citizens of the Americas have come to see free and fair elections as a fundamental right. With that standard in place, the regional political class has lost its exclusive hold on the political process. To be sure, mass political involvement long existed in the Americas, but in appearance only. In some countries, political parties could put hundreds of thousands of members in the streets. However, these parties were machines to deliver enormous blocs of votes, thereby providing the illusion of democratic process. Mexico provided the classic model. Its Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Instituctional—PRI) enjoyed one of the longest-running political monopolies in the world thanks largely to its efficient stage-managing of national and local elections. As the new century began, essentially fictitious elections gave way to the real thing. In 2000 Mexican voters ended the PRI’s extraordinary 71-year-run as a state-owned party. Twelve years before that, Chileans had voted to end a military regime. One year after Chile’s electorally generated transformation, Nicaraguan voters in 1989 turned out of office a government that had seized power with most of the country’s support and then had its power ratified by voters. And in 1998, Venezuelan voters elected a charismatic ex-army officer who had tried and failed to stage a coup aimed at destroying a two-party system that had fallen into corruption and sloth. Elections channeled political turbulence but didn’t end it. No mechanism exists to calm the geological instability that underlies much of the region. During the 20th century alone, the Americas suffered 176 earthquakes at a cost of 190,000 lives. In recent decades, tens of thousands of people died in earthquakes in Peru (1970 and 2007), Nicaragua (1972), Guatemala (1976), 1 See David de Ferranti et al., “Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking with History?” The World Bank, 2003, 2, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/ECADocByUnid/ 4112F1114F594B4B85256DB3005DB262?Opendocument (accessed December 2, 2007).

Colombia (1979), Mexico (1985), and El Salvador (2001).2 Like disasters everywhere, those in the Americas have revealed enormous shortcomings by governments that left citizens defenseless in the face of predictable events. Some governments have paid the price. In Nicaragua, chaos and corruption followed a major earthquake in 1972. Simmering discontent expanded into all-out opposition to a long-reigning dictatorial dynasty that was toppled seven years later. In Mexico, government helplessness in the wake of a 1986 earthquake that leveled parts of the capital altered the country’s political dynamic. The PRI lost much of its credibility, setting the stage for the later loss of its political monopoly. Another form of disaster grows out of poverty. Rainstorms that lead to disastrous mudslides plague Central America and the Caribbean region, where torrential rains are an annual event. There and throughout the region, landless poor people build communities on unstable terrain, sometimes in ravines or on hillsides. Haiti, most of Central America, and Venezuela have experienced thousands of deaths due to major rains. Some of the rainstorms are brought by hurricanes, an annual danger in the Caribbean Basin and along the Eastern Seaboard of the United States. The word itself originated in the Caribbean: The Spaniards appropriated huracan from the Carib people, who also gave their name to the area where they flourished. As the hurricane zone crosses continental boundaries, so does the region itself. North America ends at the MexicoGuatemala border, where Central America begins. That narrow strip of countries, which bridge North and South America, leads across the Darien jungle to Colombia. East of the continents, the Caribbean Basin is dotted with 13 nation-states. Two countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, share the island of Hispaniola. And Trinidad and Tobago and St. Kitts and Nevis have formed two-island states. In South America, the equator cuts through the continent and lends its name to the Republic of Ecuador. That nation and nearly all of its South American counterparts are also divided internally by the Andes mountain range, the world’s longest. Only Brazil, Uruguay, Guyana, and Suriname are untouched by the Andes, which run north-south for nearly the entire length of the continent. As a result, divisions between highlanders and lowlanders pervade most of the region’s continental countries. Rural indigenous cultures, from Canada’s far north to the southern Andes, are persisting against a massive and irreversible trend of urbanization. To some extent, these distinctions reflect historical and cultural identities. Most Latin Americans who identify themselves as members of indigenous peoples are clustered in the Andes. Amazon tribes and the Guaran´ı people of Paraguay are among the exceptions. 2 See Matt Pritchard, “Natural Hazards: Keeping Them from Becoming Natural Disasters in Latin America,” ReVista (Winter 2007): 30–33, http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu/revista/files/ 4613c6a1bb9b7/revista winter07 web.pdf.

INTRODUCTION

Latin American societies became predominantly urban during the second half of the 20th century, with 75 percent of the region’s 500 million people living in cities by the year 2000, according to a United Nations study. Three Latin American urban centers—Mexico City, population approximately 19 million; S˜ao Paulo, 18 million; and Buenos Aires, 13 million—are among the world’s 20 “mega-cities.”3 Rapidly expanding cities, inadequate job creation, and frayed social safety nets have created a huge urban underclass throughout the region. Often residents of sprawling shantytowns, these so-called marginal citizens account for most crime victims and for the robbers, kidnappers, and drug dealers who have created a permanent crime wave in most of the region’s big cities. Journalists who have reported on organized crime in countries including Mexico and Colombia have paid with their lives. In the age of dictatorships, critical journalists were hunted by government agents, not gangsters, and crime waves were unknown. The price for freedom from nonpolitical crime was paid in massacres and death squad killings of alleged political opponents. Not surprisingly, the crime upsurge has led some to call for the old mano dura—the strong hand.

Twilight of the Caudillos The strongman, or caudillo, is a recurring figure throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Spanish political culture’s emphasis on personal leadership and disdain for democratic mechanics helped set the stage. Indeed, Spain itself didn’t grow out of the caudillo era until the death of dictator Francisco Franco in 1975. In the Americas, a constant pattern of political and social disorder that seemed to call for a strongman in charge kept the region for most of its independent life in a cycle of turbulence followed by the emergence of yet another caudillo. As that history implies, some caudillos are fondly remembered. Sim´on Bol´ıvar (1783–1830), who led the war for independence of northern South America (Jos´e de San Mart´ın and Bernardo O’Higgins commanded independence forces in the southern part of the continent), had an upper-class distrust for direct democracy. “Institutions which are wholly representative are not suited to our character, customs, and present knowledge,” he wrote in his long “Reply of a South American to a Gentleman of This Island [Jamaica]” in 1815. “As long as our countrymen do not acquire the abilities and political virtues that distinguish our brothers of the north, wholly popular systems, far from working to our advantage, will, I greatly fear, bring about our downfall.”4 Still, Bol´ıvar was not writing that Latin 3 “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision—Fact Sheet 7,” United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2006, http://www.un.org/esa/ population/publications/WUP2005/2005WUP FS7. pdf. 4 “Reply of a South American to a Gentleman of This Island [Jamaica],” September, 6, 1815, in Selected Writings of Bolivar, trans. Lewis Bertrand (New York: Colonial Press, 1951), http://

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Americans would never be ready for democracy. He might have been unhappy to learn that the reasoning he used served as a rationale for any number of 20th-century rulers who insisted that their countries weren’t prepared for truly representative government. More recently, Mexico’s L´azaro C´ardenas (1895–1970), in many respects a reformer who played something of the same role in his country’s political culture as Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States, nevertheless helped consolidate the PRI, with its deeply undemocratic system of presidents choosing their successors. Most caudillos have shown few of the benign instincts that C´ardenas displayed. Among the many 20th-century strongmen known more for repression and corruption are Augusto Pinochet (1915–2006), who headed Chile’s military junta from 1973 to 1988; Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua (1925–1980), who inherited his father’s dictatorship; and Rafael Trujillo (1891–1961) of the Dominican Republic. The latter’s rule ended with his assassination; Somoza was assassinated in exile following his overthrow; and Pinochet spent his last years fighting indictments for corruption and human rights abuse. The fates of these once all-powerful rulers make clear why the life of a strongman doesn’t beckon as brightly today as it did only a few decades ago. President Hugo Ch´avez of Venezuela began his career as leader of the failed Venezuelan coup of 1992, and then moved into electoral politics. A declared disciple of both Sim´on Bol´ıvar and Fidel Castro, Ch´avez has broken with Castro’s precedent by insisting on adherence to democratic procedures. He paid the price in December 2007, when voters rejected his proposal to amend the Venezuelan constitution to allow unlimited presidential terms. Other chief executives also have used democratic mechanisms to allow them to stay in office longer. As recently as the 1990s, the originally elected President Alberto Fujimori of Peru won voter approval of a constitutional term-succession provision, and then maneuvered parliamentary approval of a third successive term. This was before his corrupt regime collapsed; he is now on trial for human rights abuses, having fled to and been extradited from Chile. ´ But in Colombia, the enormously popular President Alvaro Uribe won parliamentary approval for a constitutional change that enabled him to run for a second successive term, which he did. Uribe’s supporters are considering allowing him a third successive term, which he may try. Uribe’s temperament verges on autocratic; he recently accused of corruption a Supreme Court justice who had ordered an investigation of Uribe’s cousin. But whatever authoritarian tendencies he may possess have been curbed by a still-powerful system of checks and balances. Further south, the forms of electoral democracy coexist with a tradition of spousally enabled continuity in office. The politically popular Argentine President N´estor Kirchner and faculty.smu.edu/bakewell/BAKEWELL/texts/jamaica-letter.html (accessed December 9, 2007).

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INTRODUCTION

his wife, Cristina, a former senator, traded places when she won election in 2007. The expectation is that N´estor Kirchner will run for office again after Cristina Kirchner’s four-year term ends. Members of a party founded by populist caudillo Juan Per´on, the Kirchners were using a method he employed under different circumstances. In 1974, when Per´on took ill, his third wife, Isabel, was sworn in as interim president, a post she kept until 1976. In Bolivia, the election of a charismatic one-time leader of coca-growing farmers—the first member of an Indian community to be elected as head of state in Bolivia’s history—has intensified the country’s bitter ethnic-tinged socioeconomic conflict. Street violence that erupted during a political battle over a new constitution led President Evo Morales to call in early December 2007 for a national vote on whether he and nine regional governors should remain in office. Six of the nine oppose him. “If the people say ‘Evo’s going,’ I’ve got no problem— I’m democratic,” Morales said in a televised speech. In earlier decades, the events might well have served to justify a military coup. Morales’s declaration made clear that that old method is no longer considered acceptable, at least for the moment. Equally noteworthy, in Guatemala’s November 2007 presidential elections, voters rejected an ex-military man—a classic would-be caudillo—who had vowed to call in the army to fight criminals who have made the country one of the most danger´ ous in the region. Instead, Guatemalans elected Alvaro Colom, a center-left president who explicitly rejected a military crackdown as a strategy out of the country’s past. A spirit of self-critical reflection has taken hold in the region casting the old traditions of strongman rule in a poor light. “We in Latin America are not trying to look for a leader,” President Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) da Silva of Brazil, a former union activist from a poor family, told the New York Times in September 2007. “We don’t need a leader. What we need to do is build political harmony because South America and Latin America need to learn the lesson of the 20th century. We had the opportunity to grow, we had the opportunity to develop ourselves, and we lost that opportunity. So we still continue to be poor countries.”5

Languages To outsiders, major divergences in political culture from country to country tend to be masked by the prevalence of one language, Spanish. In the continental region that runs southward from Mexico’s border with the United States, Spanish enjoys a near-monopoly. That linguistic presence would be a real monopoly but for the presence of another language in the region’s biggest and richest country, Brazil. Its version of Portuguese bears roughly the same relationship to Spanish as French does to Italian. Portuguese owes its presence in the Americas to the stroke of a pen. As the age of European exploration was beginning 5 Quoted in Alexei Barrionuevo, “A Resilient Leader Trumpets Brazil’s Potential in Agriculture and Biofuels,” New York Times, September 23, 3007, A12.

in the late 15th century, Pope Alexander VI decreed that Spain and its Iberian Peninsula neighbor, Portugal, had to divide the unexplored globe between them. A territorial division that the two powers agreed to in the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 effectively gave Portugal dominion over the then-unknown region that became Brazil. Portuguese and Spanish aren’t entirely alone on the South American continent. Tens of thousands of people throughout Latin America speak indigenous languages, such as Guaran´ı in Paraguay and Quechua in Bolivia, and may speak Spanish as well. The Linguistic Society of America lists more than 158 Indian languages in Brazil alone.6 English is spoken in Belize, a tiny former British possession. Further south, Guyana, formerly known as British Guiana, is also Anglophone. Purely local languages persist in some corners of the Americas that remain isolated despite the overall expansion of urban territories. The New York Times has reported the case of a tongue, Palenquero, created centuries ago by rebel ex-slaves along Colombia’s Caribbean coast. Some of their descendants in a small, hard-to-reach inland village still speak the language. One of Palenquero’s contributing strains is the Kikongo language of Congo and Angola; another is Portuguese, a reflection of the predominant nationality of 17th-century slave traders.7 Portuguese forms a strand of another language born of African slavery. Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao, self-governing Caribbean islands still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, are home to Papiamentu. That tongue grew out of Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and West African and native Indian languages. English is the mother tongue in Jamaica and the other 14 nation-states that make up the “British West Indies,” as they are still called; 5 of them remain British possessions. In their day-to-day business most Jamaicans, and residents of some of the other Anglophone islands, speak a creole English often impossible for English speakers from elsewhere to understand. English is also an official language in Belize (formerly British Honduras) and Guyana (formerly British Guiana). In Haiti and Martinique (the latter still part of France), a similar language regime prevails. French is an official language, though in Haiti the dominant tongue is Creole (Krey`ol ), which is rooted in French and African tongues. Fluency in French is an unmistakable sign of education. Across the border from Haiti, Spanish reigns in the Dominican Republic. Cuba is also Spanish-speaking (as is Puerto Rico, a U.S. possession). Throughout the southern zone of the hemisphere, English is widely spoken among top businesspeople and, increasingly, among politicians. Maintaining business connections with the United States, earning a degree from one of its universities, and 6 See The Linguist List, Linguistic Society of America, 2008, http://www.linguistlist.org/forms/langs/find-a-language-orfamily.html. 7 See Simon Romero, “A Language, Not Quite Spanish, with African Echoes,” New York Times, October 18, 2007, A4.

INTRODUCTION

having the ability to send one’s children to its schools all mark privileged status elsewhere in the Americas. Brazil again stands out as an exception. The relative unimportance of English for Brazilians reflects their country’s sense of self-sufficiency.

Religion All Europeans arrived in the New World with at least some notion of converting indigenous peoples to Christianity. Of the colonizers, the Spanish took that mission most seriously, because the church-state link formed a crucial element of their political culture. When the Spanish explorations began, the Christian monarchs of Spain had just won a religious war, reestablishing themselves throughout Spain at the end of the 15th century, after vanquishing the last of the Muslim rulers who had governed a good part of the Iberian Peninsula for 700 years. Those circumstances lent the Spanish conquests from the start a more religious character than those of the other European powers, especially the British, whose ranks were filled with religious dissenters. For the Spanish, observed one of Mexico’s great 20th-century writers, Octavio Paz, “The conversion legitimized the conquest. This politico-religious philosophy was diametrically opposed to that of English colonizing; the idea of evangelization occupied a secondary place in England’s colonial expansion.”8 Although Spain and the other Old World empires eventually were forced out of the Americas, the religion they brought with them remained. Roman Catholicism sank deep roots in the culture of Spanish America. Above all, this development reflected the willingness of both missionaries and indigenous peoples to adapt and blend their beliefs. “Certain Indian ideas— gods sacrificing themselves for men, the need to do penance, the stoic acceptance of suffering, the evanescence and futility of earthly pleasures—resembled those of the new faith,” historian Enrique Krauze wrote about the Mexican experience, which other nations shared.9 Mexican Indians’ collective acceptance of Catholicism was consecrated by an event in 1531. The Virgin of Guadalupe, a Spanish incarnation of the Virgin Mary, was recorded as having appeared to Juan Diego, an Indian peasant, at the very place where a pre-Columbian mother-goddess, Tonantzin, had been worshipped. Over time, the Virgin became the supreme icon of Mexican popular culture, both the mother figure of Christian belief and a completely Mexican saint. That is, she represented the dual heritage at the core of Mexican identity, even though the church as an institution arrayed itself as the major opponent to construction of a secular state. That long conflict reached the point of open warfare, the only such event in the history of the Americas (a late 19th8 Octavio Paz, “Mexico and the United States,” The New Yorker, September 17, 1979, in The Labyrinth of Solitude (New York: Grove Press, 1985), 361. 9 See Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997), 70.

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century conflict in Brazil’s desperately poor northeast led by a messianic prophet was more of a peasant uprising than a church-state war). In the 1920s, Mexican Catholic guerrillas, the cristeros, waged an insurgency against the central government. With the victory of the state, the Mexican Church definitively lost the political power that it had enjoyed in colonial times and the early postcolonial period. Elsewhere in the region, the Church and indigenous peoples made accommodations of belief and practice along the same lines as in Mexico. In Brazil, Cuba, and the French colony, Saint Domingue, that became Haiti, the religions of Africa that slaves brought with them also melded with Catholicism, but not completely. Slaves’ descendants kept more of the mother continent’s beliefs and practices. As a result, throughout the Afro-Americas, the African religions and Catholicism exist side-by-side, often drawing on the same pool of worshipers rather than having achieved a complete synthesis. In the 1960s, one wing of the Church emerged as a major political force. As challenges to governments and ruling classes gathered strength throughout the region, some priests and bishops aligned themselves explicitly with those demanding radical change. Colombia’s Cuban-inspired National Liberation Army (Ej´ercito de Liberaci´on Nacional—ELN) included two priests in its ranks in the 1960s, one of whom rose to command the organization until his death in 1998. Both guerrilla priests drew their initial sympathy for armed conflict from the “Liberation Theology” movement. But most adherents of this influential school of Catholicism rejected violence and Marxism-Leninism. At its simplest, Liberation Theology holds that the Church must side with the impoverished masses to the point of fighting for social justice. This means discarding charity alone as a way to help poor people. Charity, the liberationists hold, effectively maintains injustice because it seeks to alleviate immediate problems without attacking deeper conditions. Liberation theologians distilled and summarized their conclusions at a bishops’ conference in Medell´ın, Colombia, in 1968. The “institutionalized violence” of the class hierarchy, they declared, grew out of a contemporary colonial system that, “seeking unbounded profits, foment[s] an economic dictatorship and the international imperialism of money.”10 Post–World War II France had seen a similar movement. There, “worker priests” doffed their clerical garb, took jobs in factories, and joined unions, all in an effort to show workers that the Church was on their side. The Vatican shut the movement down in 1954, though it was later allowed to start again. Liberation Theology too soon found itself in trouble with the hierarchy, especially in the Vatican. Before ascending to the papacy, Pope John Paul II had shown some sympathy for the “worker priests.” But with the Latin American political environment of the 1980s polarized between left and right, there was no question which side of the divide the Liberationists 10 Quoted in Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America—the Catholic Church in Conflict with U.S. Policy (New York: Penguin, 1991), 38.

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INTRODUCTION

occupied. The Polish pope, a survivor of a totalitarian system that cloaked oppression with some of the same vocabulary the Liberationists employed, disciplined some of its leading exponents, forcing at least one of them from the Church. Sympathies for Cuba by some Liberation Theology priests was also a red line for the pope, given Castro’s alliance with the Soviet Union, oppressor of the Pope’s native Poland and the rest of Eastern and Central Europe. (Fr. Alberto Libˆanio Christo, “Frei Betto,” conducted long, sympathetic interviews with Castro that became a book in which the Cuban comandante expressed sympathy for Liberation Theology.) Some Latin American churchmen with sympathies for the movement came into conflict with their fellows over allegiance to the Cuban-inspired revolutionary model. During the Sandinista period in Nicaragua, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, archbishop of Managua, made a transition from supporter of the Sandinista insurrection to prominent opponent of the revolutionary government, a government that included four Liberation Theology–identified priests in senior positions, three of them cabinet ministers. Elsewhere in Central America, priests and nuns played major roles as human rights defenders against military counterinsurgency campaigns. In fact, much of the peasant organizing in El Salvador that large landowners and the military viewed as a gestating communist revolution began in “base communities,” prayer and study groups led by Liberation Theology priests or lay workers with liberationist training. Archbishop Oscar Romero (1917–1980) of San Salvador was assassinated as a result of his human rights advocacy; other priests in El Salvador and Guatemala met the same fate. Yet in the most dramatic illustration possible that the Church was not of one mind on sociopolitical issues, an Argentine ex-priest was convicted in 2007 of participation in seven murders, 42 kidnappings, and 31 cases of torture while serving as police chaplain during the military dictatorship of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Haiti, a Liberation Theology priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, reached his nation’s highest office. But he resigned from the priesthood in 1994, under what he called pressure from the church hierarchy. Liberation Theology may have divided the Church against itself. But in the years since the insurgencies and counterinsurgencies of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s wound down (except in Colombia), another challenge has come to face the Church as a whole. Protestantism, specifically Pentecostalism, has made a place for itself in the Latin American religious landscape. The challenge to Catholicism arose rapidly. Despite that dramatic entrance, after more than four centuries of Catholic dominance, the chances of converting an entire country verge on nil. Since the Reformation era in Europe, times have changed sufficiently that, in the only country in which a head of government openly espoused Pentecostalism (Guatemala), his religious affiliation did not force a national religious conversion. Even so, Pentecostals now account for 75 million people in the region, about 13 percent of the total population. In a region that was close to 100 percent Roman Catholic as recently as

50 years ago, the Protestant Pentecostal surge draws on a powerful social current. Along with Guatemala, the countries where the trend has registered with greatest force are Brazil, Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. All are nations that have suffered grievously from civil conflict and class divisions. Yet other countries about which the same could be said—Bolivia, for example, or Honduras—have seen Pentecostalism gain far less ground. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life notes that Pentecostalism is also growing in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. In most of these countries, members of Indian communities have made up major portions of the Protestant churches’ flocks.11 Questions over national receptivity aside, there is little question of Pentecostalism’s appeal on a personal level. Much credit goes to its insistence on personal discipline, a message that resounds among many poor and lower-middle-class households. Giving up drinking and smoking, remaining faithful to one’s partner—these are among the basic requirements of Pentecostal churches. Catholicism, perhaps because of its history of adapting itself to local custom, is seen as demanding less of its believers in their daily lives. But how many nominal Roman Catholics can be counted as believers? Notwithstanding the Church’s historical position and Catholicism’s cultural roots, millions of Latin Americans have little connection to the institutional Church. Edward L. Cleary, O.P., a political scientist and a Dominican priest with missionary experience in Latin America, writes that “the major sector of Catholicism affected by this shift has been that of nominal, indifferent Catholics, who have supplied most of the converts to Pentecostalism.”12 Cleary may not be an entirely disinterested observer. Nevertheless, the erosion of the institutional Catholic Church is plain to see in Latin America. To the extent that millions of people feel the need for an organized spiritual presence in their lives, the Pentecostals have been knocking on an open door.

Politics, Intellectuals, and the Media Spanish has no word for “accountability.” That facet of the major language of the Americas has become a truism of Latin American politics. But long before anyone commented on the monarchist strain still running through Spanish political vocabulary, Latin Americans knew that the inner workings of their governments, in nearly all countries, were closed to them. Throughout the region, newspaper reporting was a lowprestige, low-paid occupation. Reporters, often corrupt by 11 Figures cited from Overview Pentacostalism in Latin America, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, October 2006, http://pewforum.org/surveys/pentecostal/latinamerica (accessed December 1, 2007). 12 See Edward L. Cleary O.P., “Shopping Around: Questions about Latin American Conversion,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research, University of Texas, Religion in Latin America, http://www.providence.edu/las/Brookings.html (accessed December 1, 2007).

INTRODUCTION

sheer necessity, covered daily events, while intellectuals—who often had more freedom of maneuver—wrote analyses and commentaries. Traditionally, members of the educated classes tried to fill the vacuum with political journalism, essays, novels, and other works of art. One example among many: Mario Vargas Llosa’s Conversation in the Cathedral (1969) reveals more about the operation of Peru’s authoritarian military regime of the 1950s than newspapers of the time could publish, or than politicians could say publicly. Colombian Nobel Prize winner Gabriel Garc´ıa M´arquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude (1967) has become a common point of reference throughout the Americas for surrealism in all dimensions of life, including politics. Arguably, the book tells more about the interplay of personal honor, family ties, and the remoteness of central government than Garc´ıa M´arquez’s own political journalism, the field in which he began in the late 1940s as an editorial writer and reporter in Colombia’s Caribbean coastal region. Today’s journalists operate largely free of the state control, spoken or unspoken, that stunted the careers of so many of their professional ancestors. The legacy of journalism as instrument of big political and economic interests runs strong. Still, readers in nearly all the big cities of the region can find newspapers and magazines that have managed to carve out a space for independent and critical journalism. (Brazil, an exceptional case, has a stronger tradition of powerful but hard-hitting newspapers and magazines.) Disturbingly, censorship by government has been replaced in many countries by censorship by gangsters, especially in small towns and cities. In Colombia, traditionally one of the most perilous countries for journalists, the New York–based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that most journalists in the provinces had abandoned reporting on topics such as drug trafficking, paramilitary activities, and corruption. The dangers of pursuing such themes had become clear: The CPJ recorded 54 journalists killed in the period from 1986 to 2006, making it one of the four most dangerous countries in the world for reporters since the mid-1980s (the others are Iraq, Algeria, and the Balkans).13 In 2007, one Colombian journalist was killed, though the CPJ called the circumstances unclear. The government credited the virtual absence of assassinations to an official policy of providing armored cars, bulletproof vests, and bodyguards to threatened journalists. The CPJ countered that journalists’ self-censorship is another reason for the somewhat improved security climate.14 In any event, death threats against Colombian journalists continue. In 2007, three reporters were forced to flee Colombia because of death threats. In one case, the threats followed a 13 See “Special Report 2006” and “A New Front in Mexico,” November 7, 2007, Committee to Protect Journalists, http://cpj. org (accessed December 5, 2007). See also “Attacks on the Press in 2007—Americas,” 2008, http://cpj.org/attacks07/americas07/ col07.html (accessed March 8, 2008). 14 See “Attacks on the Press.”

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claim by President Uribe that one of the journalists had helped the ex-mistress of a slain druglord write a book that accused the president of ties to the late gangster. The journalist denied the allegation. Elsewhere, reporters have paid for their work with their lives. In 2007 alone, the committee records reporters (or, in one case, news employees) gunned down in Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay—a total of eight murders, in addition to the shooting and wounding of a Brazilian journalist and two nonfatal grenade attacks against a newspaper in the border state of Sonora, a drug syndicate center. Four of those killed were radio reporters, the backbone of journalism in smaller towns throughout Latin America. Independent journalists in Cuba face a different set of problems. Nongovernmental media don’t exist on the island, so independent journalists by definition file their reports abroad. With that practice, they have opened themselves to charges by the government that they are betraying their country. As of mid-2007, 24 Cuban journalists were imprisoned; 22 have been behind bars since a March 2003 crackdown. They were convicted of charges including acting against “the independence or territorial integrity of the state” and “the security of the state.”15 Though the written word hasn’t lost its power to provoke, the advent of private television stations throughout the region in the 1990s has shaken up the media industry. Tabloid-style news shows have proved especially popular. And secretly recorded videotape has emerged as a political weapon. The final collapse of the regime of Peruvian strongman Alberto Fujimori in 2000 began after a television station broadcasted tapes taken by his intelligence chief, showing him bribing politicians and two TV station owners on the regime’s behalf. In Mexico, two close associates of the populist Mexico City mayor were shown, respectively, gambling big money in Las Vegas and taking a bribe from a businessman. Another indicator of the decline of writing is that artists who want to shine a light on their societies are turning to film and video rather than the novel. Mexican filmmaker Daniel Sarinana takes up that very theme in a popular 1999 movie, Todo el Poder (All the Power), that shows a moviemaker turning his camera on crime bosses, at a time when rampant lawlessness had Mexicans terrified. More recently, a Brazilian filmmaker lit a firestorm of controversy in 2007 with a film, Elite Squad, on the activities of an antigang police unit that runs rampant through slum areas, torturing and killing. The film has opened a debate on the morality and efficacy of these tactics. Though the film, strictly speaking, is fictional, the unit exists; the co-screenwriter is a former member of the squad. A pioneer of the new wave of film and video social realism, Venezuelan novelist and newspaper columnist Ibsen Mart´ınez used a classic Latin American melodramatic vehicle, 15 See “Cuban Journalist Released after 15 Months in Prison,” August 21, 2007; “Cuba’s Draconian Laws,” Committee to Protect Journalists, http://cpj.org (accessed December 5, 2007).

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INTRODUCTION

the telenovela (soap opera), to attack the corruption and dishonesty of the political and economic system in the 1990s, which came to a head under President Carlos Andr´es P´erez. Por estas calles (On These Streets) became a big hit and helped rouse the civic consciousness that gave the former golpista Hugo Ch´avez his first electoral victory in 1998. “In that telenovela all the politicians were cynical, all the businessmen were for the ‘small state’ and for that reason kept corrupt officials on the payroll, and all violations of law by the down-and-out poor were justified,” Mart´ınez wrote in a recent semiconfessional essay that also shows how small the world is for Latin American intellectuals. “During the week, as scriptwriter for Por estas calles I played the part of street agitator. On Sundays, in my Sunday column in El Nacional, I quoted Alain Touraine or Pierre Bourdieu* while obnoxiously attacking the performance of P´erez’ economic cabinet members, many of them friends of mine. Being a ‘public intellectual’ in Venezuela was never as easy as it was in the ’90s.”16 Martinez, who more recently has become an ardent critic of Ch´avez, has never traded pen for government position. And in turning a critical eye on himself and his brethren, he is breaking with the custom of political intellectuals worldwide. (“The belief in the independence of intellectuals, as so much of the twentieth century proves, is nothing but a fairy tale,” writes Charles Simic, poet laureate of the United States.17 ) Latin American intellectuals, more than their counterparts elsewhere, enjoy a long tradition of serving in senior government positions. Francisco Santos, former editor of El Tiempo, Colombia’s major daily, and an ex-journalist for the leading Spanish newspaper, El Paıs, is vice president of Colombia. Jorge G. Casta˜neda, who was Mexico’s foreign minister in 2000–2003, has been otherwise engaged, more or less simultaneously, as a university professor, political activist, journalist, and author. Mario Vargas Llosa, one of a handful of Latin American novelists who has reached global literary stardom, ran for president of Peru in 1990 but lost. Teodoro Petkoff, a Venezuelan economics student-turned-guerrilla in the 1960s, then planning minister in the mid-1990s, edits Tal Cual, a newspaper that is a major voice of opposition to Ch´avez. History offers even more examples. Octavio Paz (1914– 1988), a poet and essayist who was one of the region’s Nobel laureates, was a career Mexican diplomat (he resigned in protest of a massacre of students in 1968). Mexican novelist Carlos Fuentes, an ambassador’s son, entered the diplomatic corps for a time in the 1970s. Pablo Neruda (1904–1973), another Nobel Prize–winning poet, was a member of the Chilean foreign service in the 1930s and 1940s. As a Communist Party ∗ French

sociologists and social activists. Mart´ınez, “Una Conversaci´on con Mois´es Na´ım,” Letras Libres (November 2007), http://www.letraslibres. com/index. php?art = 12459. 17 Charles Simic, “The Renegade,” New York Review of Books, December 20, 2007, 70. 16 Ibsen

member, Neruda also provided diplomatic protection for the painter David Alfaro Siqueiros following his participation in the first, failed, assassination attempt against dissident Soviet exile Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), an operation mounted by the Soviet NKVD, predecessor to the KGB.18 In the Caribbean islands, whose smaller populations make multiple careers even more common, the leading figure of Trinidad and Tobago’s independence movement and its leading postindependence leader was Eric Williams (1911–1981), an Oxford-educated historian whose books include From Columbus to Castro The History of the Caribbean. In the Americas today, a professional historian such as Williams likely would not rise to the very top of a political system. Lower-ranking members of government may have backgrounds as intellectuals, but only full-time politicians become presidents. And full-time politicians don’t have the time, apparently, for scholarship.

Relations with the United States Part I Since the 19th century, no single nation has loomed larger for Western Hemisphere countries than the United States. Like neighbors of all large countries, the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have developed complicated relationships with the presence they can’t ignore. A sometimes brutal history, the long reach of U.S. economic power, and the magnetic quality of U.S. popular culture form contributing elements. Another influence has taken hold in recent years, as millions of people from the region have moved to or visited the United States. In the past, most Latin Americans depended on what they heard about the United States. Today, residents or visitors forming their own impressions of the United States come from every class, with ordinary working folk the majority, outnumbering the privileged who have long traveled back and forth between home and the United States. But even without the benefit of travel or modern mass media, politically aware Latin Americans realized by the time the 20th century dawned that the United States was the power with which they had to reckon. In 1900, Jos´e Enrique Rod´o, a Uruguayan writer, authored an impassioned essay that served for decades as a manifesto of Latin American values to be defended from the encroaching giant to the north. Rod´o warned Latin American youth against a United States he defined as boorish, purely utilitarian, and profit-driven. Latin American civilization, by contrast, embodied a respect for art and culture inherited from Greece and Rome. “The North American has managed to acquire . . . the satisfaction and vanity of sumptuary magnificence, but has not succeeded in acquiring the chosen mark of good taste,” Rod´o 18 John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 277.

INTRODUCTION

wrote in Ariel (1900). “The ideal of beauty doesn’t strike passion in the heart of the descendant of the austere puritans. Nor does the ideal of truth.” The essay struck a chord throughout the entire Spanish-speaking world. But beginning in the 1930s, and in far greater numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, Latin Americans preoccupied with U.S. power turned from esthetics to class struggle. Marxism, with its hardheaded focus on material conditions and social justice, came closer, paradoxically, to the “North American” spirit that Rod´o found so crass. U.S. activities in a nearby area of the hemisphere during the first three decades of the 20th century did their part to inspire a tough-minded view of regional geopolitics. Panama, site of the United States-built-and-owned Atlantic-Pacific canal, became a de facto U.S. possession. Military occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic followed, as well as repeated military interventions in Nicaragua. The latter saw U.S. creation of a military force which, in 1934, murdered a popular left-wing nationalist guerrilla, Augusto Sandino. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) opened a new chapter in hemispheric relations in 1934 with his “good neighbor” policy. Its accomplishments included a refusal to retaliate against Mexico for a 1938 nationalization of the oil industry that shut down operations of U.S. oil companies. For all of the benign aura with which Roosevelt surrounded his moves, he was a highly practical politician who was building goodwill among U.S. neighbors in anticipation of a war against distant powers. His strategic vision is summed up in a remark he is said to have made about the U.S.-sponsored dictator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza: “He’s a sonofabitch, but he’s our sonofabitch.” The line, a version of which was first reported in 1939, most likely is apocryphal. However, some historians view it as an accurate summation of the American foreign policy establishment’s unsentimental view of foreign relations in general and Latin American affairs in particular.19 Whoever coined the remark, it anticipated Cold War attitudes. An event that occurred during the same period helped set the stage for the long United States–Soviet Union standoff: the assassination in Mexico of Trotsky, the exiled revolutionary who had become Stalin’s major enemy on the left. Trotsky had been welcomed to Mexico by President C´ardenas, but Mexican sanctuary couldn’t protect Trotsky from Stalin’s campaign to exterminate his left-wing opponents. Those who did survive were among the leading opponents of Stalin’s eventual takeover of Eastern and Central Europe, so Stalin’s strategy reflected a long-range strategy that anticipated the Cold War. Cuba became a major front in that conflict. The Cuban writer Guillermo Cabrera Infante (1929–2005), who defected from the Cuban foreign service in 1965, told this writer in 1994 that the earliest visible sign of the Soviet hand in the Cuban government was the sudden disappearance of books by and about Trotsky from Cuban bookstores. Another Cuban tie to the Trotsky assassination led to the assassin himself. Ram´on 19 William Safire traced the first reporting of the alleged remark to Time Magazine. See William Safire, “On Language: Realism,” New York Times, Sunday Magazine, December 24, 2006, 20.

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Mercader, a Spaniard partly of Cuban descent, spent his final years on the island as an honored retiree.20

Part II After World War II, with the United States and the Soviet Union locked in confrontation, Roosevelt’s successors mixed his kid-glove approach with a strong dose of raw power. Throughout the Cold War, with some exceptions, U.S. administrations of both parties supported military or militarybacked strongmen. They were virtually the only brand of politician whom Washington trusted to maintain a consistently pro-American and anti-Soviet stance. That strategy was first deployed in Guatemala. There, in 1954, the CIA overthrew an elected government on the grounds that its left-wing orientation posed a political threat to the region and an economic threat to U.S. business interests. Most important among the latter was the United Fruit Co., whose board had included CIA chief Allen Dulles. The former law firm of his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, also had represented the company in Guatemala. In place of the elected government, the CIA installed a military regime. Guatemala wouldn’t see another freely elected government until 1986. The Guatemala coup inflated U.S. confidence to the point that officials believed in their ability to shape events in Latin America at will. But the coup was followed only five years later by the Cuban revolution. The triumph of Fidel Castro and his guerrilla army in 1959 set off a chain of events that tested American officials’ belief in their omnipotence. The series of defeats that the Cuban revolutionary regime and its Soviet ally inflicted on the United States proved decisive for American policy in the region until the Cold War ended. The outcome of the Cuban revolution fulfilled American leaders’ worst expectations for political movements that promised social and economic equality. As Cuban dictator Fidel Castro consolidated his rule, he took on the role of worldclass challenger to the United States. He supplied training and other aid to Marxist guerrilla armies in the region, while denouncing the United States as the imperialist power behind oligarchic regimes. Castro’s defiance of the United States accounted for much of his appeal. Only 33 years old at his moment of victory, and surrounded by even younger comrades, he and his fellow revolucionarios—above all the Argentine Ernesto “Che” Guevara—captured the hearts and minds of young people across the region. All of that would have been dangerous enough, from the U.S. point of view. But Castro also brought to life the nightmare vision of the U.S. foreign policy establishment: Soviet expansion on America’s doorstep. Initially, the Cuban revolution prompted the John F. Kennedy administration to reexamine the U.S. role in a region characterized by social and economic injustice. In 1961 Kennedy launched the “Alliance for Progress” with the aim of 20 Mercader’s story is told in great detail in Asaltar los Cielos, a 1996 Spanish documentary. See IMDb, Internet Movie Database, www.imdb. com/title/tt0115575.

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INTRODUCTION

promoting non-Communist reform governments. The initiative could claim modest success in its early years, but old ways soon returned. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, sent U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent restoration of an illegally deposed left-of-center president. By the end of the 1960s, a wave of military governments had seized power in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, with U.S. backing or implicit approval. Seemingly paradoxically, in 1961 the CIA had plotted the assassination of the brutish right-wing dictator, Rafael Trujillo, who then ruled the Dominican Republic (and who was, in fact, assassinated). During the same period, writes New York Times correspondent Tim Weiner in a history of the CIA, the spy agency and the White House discussed sponsoring the overthrow and killing of the equally malign dictator Fran¸cois (“Papa Doc”) Duvalier of Haiti.21 For the most part, though, the United States during the Cold War used its clout on behalf of right-wing political forces. Most notoriously, the Nixon administration put the CIA to work to block the election of socialist Salvador Allende as president of Chile. After he won, the CIA promoted the idea of a military overthrow. Ironically, U.S. intelligence and Allende’s many enemies in the military and business establishment got unintended help from the Castro-allied Chilean left, who urged Allende to intensify the class struggle and to arm the masses to fight off any attempted seizure of power. But the right-wing military brass deposed Allende in a bloody coup on September 11, 1973. Whether the United States directly participated, those who mounted the coup knew that the United States would welcome their move, which proved to be the case. Gen. Augusto Pinochet, who headed the military junta, ruled Chile until 1988. In that year, he lost a plebiscite that he had called. The 1977–1981 Jimmy Carter administration, with its new insistence on human rights observance, made a modest difference in U.S. policy toward a brutal military regime in Argentina, then in the midst of a “dirty war” against the left. Carter had a stronger effect in Guatemala, working with Congress to declare an arms embargo against a government whose counterinsurgency war against leftist guerrillas was turning its country into a slaughterhouse. President Ronald Reagan, upon taking office in 1981, reversed Carter’s course in Guatemala, among other countries. Nonetheless, Carter’s administration left a lasting impression in Latin America, persuading many that American power could be redirected from automatic support for military rulers. Reagan poured American aid into El Salvador, where an elected civilian government fought a well-organized Marxist guerrilla army. The guerrillas enjoyed close coordination between their military and political wings. But on the government side, civilians had little control over the U.S.-backed military, which was closely linked to death squads that murdered thousands of alleged guerrilla sympathizers. During 1980s, the Reagan administration also funneled weapons and other assis21 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 190.

tance to Nicaraguan guerrillas, known as the contras, who were trying to topple the Sandinista government. Both the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan wars grew out of longstanding internal conflicts and tensions. At the same time, the conflicts were proxy confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Reagan and his CIA chief, William Casey, saw it as their mission to help America’s friends fight America’s enemies. Indeed, while the United States was sending arms and advisers to Central America, the CIA was aiding Afghan rebels fight Soviet invaders in Afghanistan. The Afghan aid campaign enjoyed widespread political support in the United States. Not so for the U.S. role in Central America, especially the Contra war. Aid to the Nicaraguan rebels defied an explicit congressional prohibition. Top administration officials’ contempt for that law led to the “Iran-Contra” scandal, which involved selling arms to Iran—also prohibited—and using the profit to buy supplies for the Nicaraguan rebels. After the scheme came to light, the spectacle of senior administration officials being hauled before judges and congressional committees electrified spectators in Latin America. Critics of the United States had viewed its government as monolithic. The Reagan administration’s invasion of Grenada, and the invasion of Panama by Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush, demonstrated, however, that the era of U.S. military intervention in the region had not ended. Yet, the 1989 Panama intervention, aimed at toppling strongman Manuel Noriega and arresting him for drug trafficking, came as the Soviet empire was in the process of disintegrating. With its dissolution, the Cold War came to an end.

Part III Once the USSR collapsed, the classic justification for supporting autocrats in the Americas disappeared. Indeed, at roughly the same time as the Soviet Union was fading away, military rule in Chile ended as the result of a national plebiscite. Brazilian military rulers had anticipated the Chileans by relinquishing power in 1985. And voters in Nicaragua stunned the Sandinista government—and its leftist supporters worldwide— by voting in 1989 for a U.S.-supported politician as president. Peace accords in El Salvador and Guatemala followed. Echoing these political developments, governments almost everywhere in the region made a break from the statist economic policies that had marked virtually their entire histories, both in colonial and postcolonial times. Several trends converged to swing the biggest countries in the region toward U.S.style capitalism, the system that outlasted the Soviet Union. The Latin American dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, whether of rightist (Argentina, for example) or of rhetorically leftist (Mexico) stripe, looked increasingly incapable of managing national economies. That reality was clear to ordinary citizens of the Americas who had to cope, for instance, with state-owned telephone companies that took months to install phone lines.

INTRODUCTION

Under presidents such as Carlos Sa´ul Menem of Argentina and Gonzalo (“Goni”) S´anchez de Lozada of Bolivia, Latin America in the 1990s became the world leader in privatization, accounting for 55 percent of developing countries’ revenues from sales of government-owned businesses worldwide during that decade.22 Meanwhile, protectionism, another longstanding feature of Latin American statism, was colliding with growing consumer demand for higher-quality products made abroad—demand that couldn’t be satisfied by the region’s smugglers, ranging from airline crews bringing in items for friends or acquaintances to gangs of professional contrabandistas. Mexico, which had begun privatizing hundreds of notoriously inefficient state enterprises in the 1980s, took the most dramatic step toward opening its economy by approving the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a treaty between the three countries of North America. NAFTA took effect in 1994 following U.S. ratification. The trade deal threw open Mexico’s long-closed economy to a wave of U.S. imports. The Mexican “party-state,” the PRI, had thrown its weight behind NAFTA. But the sudden influx of U.S. companies, accompanied by a wave of privatizations of Mexican companies, eroded the party’s control of Mexico’s economy. Those economic developments hastened the collapse in 2000 of the political monopoly the PRI had enjoyed since 1929 as a result of its uninterrupted control of the presidency. The entire chain of events illustrated a paradoxical quality of relations with the United States. The PRI’s critics on the left tended to oppose NAFTA as a vehicle for putting Mexico at the service of American corporations, yet the trade agreement also helped topple the PRI. The U.S. foreign policy establishment, which had enjoyed a long relationship with the PRI, greeted its dethroning in 2000 as part of the worldwide spread of democracy and free-market capitalism. But, elsewhere in the Americas, the sudden shock of major economic policy shifts proved to be more politically volatile than supporters of the privatization and free-trade wave had anticipated. Evidence that newly privatized firms proved more efficient and profitable than they’d been in government hands did little to comfort thousands of workers who lost jobs in the process. The median privatized firm in the region fired 24 percent of its employees.23 In addition, the privatization process in some countries showed little sign of the “transparency” that officials of the United States and international organizations were preaching as a democratic free-market virtue. In Mexico, under the PRI (whose U.S.-trained technocratic wing began the privatization process in the 1980s) the sale in the early 1990s of 18 22 Alberto Chong and Florencio L´ opez de Silanes, “The Truth about Privatization in Latin America,” Inter-American Development Bank, October 2003, 8, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/ getdocument.aspx?docnum=771361 (accessed February 24, 2008). 23 Chong and L´ opez de Silanes, 15.

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banks for $12 billion to businesspeople who included cronies of high-level politicians helped fuel a financial crisis in 1994. In its wake, the government renationalized 12 banks—part of a bailout that came with a price tag of $62 billion. “Mexicans, does it seem right to you that the profits go, once again, to the few,” Andr´es Manuel L´opez Obrador, then president of the leftwing Partido de la Revolucion Democratica, said in 1998, “while the losses go, once again to the majority?”24 L´opez Obrador was part of a wave of Latin American politicians and activists who condemned the onset of “neoliberalism”— “liberal” in the European sense of open markets. In the Americas and Europe, critics of the process tended to use that term, while advocates of privatization and related measures typically favored the term “free markets.” Beneath these terminology differences lay a reality in which countries characterized by deeply rooted socioeconomic inequality arguably proved a poor environment for economic shock treatment. “Neoliberal reform takes no prisoners,” Jerry Haar, director of the Inter-American Business and Labor program at the University of Miami, told the New York Times in 1999, “and a lot of these governments have failed to provide a safety net or focus on the tax and regulatory policies necessary to make free market development work and target allocations to those in need.”25 By then, the political ripple effects were already evident with the election of Ch´avez in Venezuela. In 2002, the Latinobarometro annual survey of 17 Latin American countries reported that 68 percent of respondents found that privatization hadn’t benefited their countries.26 Over the next few years, as left-populist leaders such as Ch´avez, or social democrats in the Lula da Silva mode, rose to the presidencies of their countries, privatizations ground to a halt. Ch´avez, in fact, reversed the trend, nationalizing the country’s major electric utility as well as two oil-exploration projects owned by ExxonMobil. The United States hadn’t created the neo-capitalist trend, but U.S. officials lost no opportunities to promote and praise it. President Bill Clinton, who pushed hard for U.S. ratification of NAFTA, had described it as a template for a hemispheric trade deal, the “Free Trade Area of the Americas.” He chaired a 1994 summit meeting in Miami of political and business leaders from the Americas intended to launch a campaign for the proposed pact. “Future generations will look back on the

24 Quoted in Julia Preston and Samuel Dillon, Opening Mexico The Making of a Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 366–367. 25 Quoted in Larry Rohter, “After a Hard Year, Latin America Looks for Better Times,” New York Times, December 20, 1999, C26. 26 Cited in Jorge Carrera et al., “Privatization Discontent and Its Determinants: Evidence from Latin America,” University of La Plata (Argentina) and University of Milan (Italy), March 2005, 38, www.iadb.org/res/includes/pub hits.cfm?pub id=S500&pub file name=pubS-500.pdf (accessed February 24, 2008).

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INTRODUCTION

Miami summit as a moment when the course of history in the Americas changed for the better,” Clinton said.27 More than a decade later, prospects for the hemispheric pact are dim. And the disenchantment with, at least, the most extreme or corrupt versions of the free-market package revived skepticism and animosity toward the United States. Yet attempts to establish a radical alternative to the neoliberal model have been foundering. In Venezuela, milk and other basic foods have become unavailable while whiskey and other luxury goods abound. These results of price controls on staples help explain the defeat of Ch´avez’s proposed constitutional changes in 2007. “Official statistics show no signs of a substantial improvement in the well-being of ordinary Venezuelans, and in many cases there have been worrying deteriorations,” Francisco Rodr´ıguez, chief economist of the Venezuelan National Assembly (the country’s congress) in 2000–2004, wrote in an article published in early 2008. “The percentage of underweight babies, for example, increased from 8.4 percent to 9.1 percent between 1999 and 2006. During the same period, the percentage of households without access to running water rose from 7.2 percent to 9.4 percent, and the percentage of families living in dwellings with earthen floors multiplied almost threefold, from 2.5 percent to 6.8 percent.”28 Politically, Ch´avez’s anti-Americanism remains undimmed. But its use as a mobilizing doctrine, given the failing results of the president’s economic moves, may have its limits. Never invaded by the United States, Venezuela has never been a hotbed of opposition to the nearby superpower. Colombia provides another example of the variances in U.S. relations in the region. Most people in the region view American military might through the prism of colonial histories that inspire distrust for imperial armies. Yet a majority of Colom´ bians support a president, Alvaro Uribe, who makes his military relationship with the United States a cornerstone of his administration, as did Uribe’s predecessor. The United States is helping Colombia wage a counterinsurgency war against guerrilla armies who have been trying to topple the Colombian state since the 1960s. The guerrillas’ deep involvement in the drug trade, and their reliance on kidnapping as a fund-raising and terrorism tool, have earned them the revulsion of most Colombians. (So much so that Uribe has even been able to make a disarmament deal with antiguerrilla paramilitaries on favorable terms to them, without paying a high political cost. U.S. law enforcement and military aid to Colombia predates Uribe by decades. The assistance grows out of the “war on drugs” (a phrase first used by President Richard M. Nixon in 1971). Other countries that have received aid, sometimes in the

form of Drug Enforcement Administration agents and military trainers, include Peru, Bolivia, Haiti, and Mexico. Many commentators have likened the antidrug offensive to the Cold War. But differences outnumber similarities. Communism was seen as a threat largely because it could win the hearts and minds of people on America’s doorstep. To be sure, drug consumption has grown steadily in Latin America as well, one reason that Colombians aren’t alone in supporting some form of antidrug aid. Mexico, which is seeing horrific violence by narcotraficantes in its northern border region, has been more concerned to avoid the presence of armed Americans on Mexico soil. Some Mexicans also fear that a built-up anti–drug force could ride roughshod over human rights. Human rights activists have concluded, however, that their concerns aren’t shared by President Felipe Calder´on’s administration.

Immigration has drawn the Americas closer together socially and economically more than any policy, trend, or event ever did. The United States is home to more than 19 million people born in Latin America and the Caribbean (according to 2005 data, the most recent available).29 People born in Mexico make up the single biggest group of immigrants to the United States from the Americas, and of the entire U.S. foreign-born population. Natives of Latin America and the Caribbean region working in the United States sent a total of $45 billion to their families back home in 2006, the Inter-American Development Bank estimates (counting the contributions of those working elsewhere, remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean reached an estimated $62 billion).30 This spontaneous familyassistance program exceeds what the region receives in foreign direct investment and foreign aid combined. Naturally, Mexico is by far the biggest beneficiary ($23 billion in 2006), but every single country in Latin America and the Caribbean receives remittances that are counted in the millions of dollars. The enormity of the migration flow to the United States and, increasingly, to Canada marks a widely shared failure to provide jobs and possibilities for social advancement for those born in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. In Mexico, that failure, and the role that NAFTA may have played in encouraging Mexican workers to migrate, became major issues in the 2005 presidential campaign. As the candidates fought for power, 14 percent of the Mexican workforce was employed in the United States, according to calculations by the

27 Quoted in Tracy Wilkinson and William R. Long, “Americas Summit Ends; Clinton Hails ‘Watershed,’” Los Angeles Times, December 12, 1994, A1. 28 Francisco Rodr´ıguez, “An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Ch´avez,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2008), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87205-p0/ francisco-rodriguez/an-empty-revolution.html (accessed March 9, 2008).

29 “Foreign Born by Region of Birth: 2000 and 2005,” Pew Hispanic Center, http://pewhispanic.org/files/other/foreignborn/ Table-2.pdf (accessed December 3, 2007). 30 See “The Largest Remittances Market,” Inter-American Development Bank, March 28, 2007, http://www.iadb.org/research/ homepageDetails.cfm?language=English&conid=61&page=1& frame=1 (accessed December 6, 2007).

Migration

INTRODUCTION

nonpartisan Migration Policy Institute, a Washington thinktank.31 American candidates in the primary elections for the 2008 U.S. presidential race have followed the example of their Mexican counterparts by making immigration a major issue. Notably, politicians campaigning for the Republican presidential nomination decried the presence of millions of Latin Americans with no authorization to be in the country. The sound and fury marked a change in treatment of immigration, specifically Latin American immigration, by national politicians, including the patron saint of modern Republicanism, Ronald W. Reagan. In 1986, Reagan signed an immigration law overhaul that granted an opportunity for legal status to millions of immigrants who were in the country illegally. When that law was found to have made no provision for people from El Salvador who had fled civil war to settle in the United States, Reagan issued an order that these migrants not be deported. He acted on a plea by President Jos´e Napole´on Duarte (1926–1990) of El Salvador to grant temporary legal status to his countrymen. Duarte pointed out that El Salvador couldn’t accommodate an influx of citizens newly deported from the United States. Reagan formally rejected Duarte’s petition, but the U.S. president added, “There will be no large-scale deportations.”32 Some of today’s Republican politicians might call that presidential vow an amnesty. Duarte had told Reagan that 400,000 to 600,000 refugees, about 10 percent of El Salvador’s population, sent family members back home as much as $600 million a year. By 2005, the number of Salvadoran nationals in the United States had grown to nearly 1 million. Thanks in part to Reagan’s refusal to deport Salvadorans, total remittances to El Salvador from immigrants abroad reached $3.3 billion in 2006. Meanwhile, two decades of booming migration to the United States have forced a consensus throughout the region that no country would be capable of taking back all those who have left. A related observation that became commonplace throughout the region is that migration serves as a safety valve for social and political discontent, as well as a relief mechanism for economic stress.

Race and Class The interplay between race and class that marks U.S. society has counterparts throughout the hemisphere. Broadly speaking, “whiter” or “European” features tend to be more favored over those that show “Indian” or “African” descent. The rise of populist movements in much of the region represents a rebellion against social barriers usually expressed in racial or ethnic terms. 31 See “What Kind of Work Do Immigrants Do?” Migration Policy Institute, January 2004, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ pubs/five industry occupation foreign born.pdf. 32 Quoted in Robert Pear, “Reagan Rejects Salvadoran Plea on Illegal Aliens,” New York Times, May 15, 1987, A1.

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Class distinctions that take racial form appear even in countries that might seem, to outsiders, not to present an opportunity for color prejudice to arise. In Haiti, where the Creole word blan, which literally means “white,” signifies “foreigner,” because virtually the entire nation is black, gradations of skin tone have played a key role. The so-called mulatto elite dominated the country for much of its post-1804 independent existence (a division explicitly reinforced in the early 20th century by U.S. military occupiers). Language also works to some extent as a class signifier: All Haitians speak Krey`ol but the poorest speak nothing else. People with at least some education also speak French. The culture of the neighboring Dominican Republic, whose majority population would qualify as black by U.S. standards, also shows a preference for lighter skin and a disdain for Haitians. Dictator Rafael Trujillo actively promoted hatred of Haitians. Even worse, he ordered a 1937 massacre of an estimated 20,000 Haitians in the Dominican border region. His proteg´e and eventual successor, Joaqu´ın Balaguer, dealt with one rival’s ambitions to unseat him by spreading the word that the candidate, who was dark black, was really Haitian. Mistreatment of Haitian migrant workers and refugees is a constant feature of Dominican political life. In one Caribbean country, Cuba, the reigning ideology is explicitly egalitarian. Nearly a half-century of Communist rule hasn’t sufficed, however, to dissolve a social system of racial preferences growing out of the colonial plantation economy. Even diehard loyalists concede that the shortage of AfroCubans at the upper levels of the system is not coincidental. The imbalance has become more striking as Cuba’s black and mixed-race share of the population has grown, because those who leave Cuba legally or illegally are disproportionately white. Another twist on the race/class dynamic comes in the eastern Caribbean region. There, the major social, political, and economic divide lies between African-descended and East Indian–descended populations. The twin-island country of Trinidad and Tobago and the nearby mainland nations of Guyana have all experienced political conflicts that reflect the ethnic split in populations. Racial expression of class differences is less pronounced elsewhere in the Caribbean, where the population tends to be homogeneously of African descent. In the continental Americas, the black-white dynamic so familiar in the United States plays out most notably in Brazil, whose large black and mixed-race population—estimates vary from 40 percent to half the population—enjoys little representation at the upper levels of politics, business, and the professions but are disproportionately found among Brazil’s poorest. Easygoing personal relations between Brazilians of all colors long camouflaged a connection between class and race, one that in recent years has become an open topic. In Colombia, Afro-Colombians concentrated in communities along the Pacific coast have long complained of discrimination, but at about 4 percent of the population lack the numbers to make their grievances a national political issue.

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INTRODUCTION

In the rest of the continental Americas, the major race/class gulf lies between Indian- and European-descended populations. The nuances of these divides can be confusing. Given centuries of mixed relations—mestizaje—millions of citizens who identify with their larger societies are physically indistinguishable from members of indigenous communities, making cultural self-identification the criterion. This mixed-heritage legacy serves to increase the social premium for “European” appearance. That is even more the case in Paraguay, the landlocked country bordering Brazil, Bolivia, and Argentina. There, in a country where an estimated 90 percent of the population speaks the indigenous language, Guaranı, the vast majority of the population is of mixed ancestry. Some 75 to 80 percent of Guaran´ı-speaking Paraguayans also speak Spanish. Despite the homogeneity, communities that identified completely with the indigenous culture suffered brutal repression during the 1970s, when right-wing ideology permeated the ruling classes of the entire region, especially southern South America. Argentina paid the heaviest price for the rightist orientation of its rulers during the military dictatorship of the 1970s and early 1980s. Perversely fitting for a country so self-consciously “European” in its culture, Argentina is the only nation to suffer from Europe’s most noxious export, anti-Semitism. Hatred of Jews played a role in the “dirty war” of the 1970s and early 1980s, reflecting the Argentine security establishment’s embrace of the Old World notion that Communism and Judaism amounted to the same thing. In three Andean countries, the late 20th and early 21st centuries have been marked by assertions of political power by Indian majorities. In two of those countries, Peru and Bolivia, presidents who claimed their Indian roots as a point of pride were inaugurated in 2001 and 2006, respectively, for the first time since independence. And in Ecuador, the newly mobilized Indian population has become the key actor in the country’s political life. Social discrimination continues in those countries, however. That is the case in Guatemala as well, where the wounds of a civil war marked by guerrillas’ attempted mobilization of indigenous communities, who were then massacred by the military, still run deep. Mexico’s upper-level political and business class tends toward more European features than the country at large. Yet Mexico’s race-class dynamic varies from that of other countries where large Indian populations survived the conquest. Mexico’s independence war against the Spanish was fought largely by Indians under the banner of the Virgin of Guadalupe. And while Peru and Bolivia didn’t elect Indian-identified presidents until the early 21st century, one of Mexico’s most revered presidents, Benito Ju´arez, a Zapotec Indian from the state of Oaxaca, first took office in 1858. Mexico’s 1910 revolution led to a new social code in which the nation’s mestizo heritage became part of official political culture. In recent years, still-unresolved political tensions in the heavily Indian states of Chiapas and Oaxaca evidence the Mexican system’s failure to fully carry out the revolution’s promises.

Indeed throughout the region, the persistence of links between race or ethnicity and class serves to illustrate the gulf between dreams of just social orders and the day-to-day realities that the vast majority of the region’s citizens face.

Introduction to South America Historical Background National revolutions throughout the South American continent had by 1830 created all of the countries that exist today. Not all of them were full-fledged countries, however, and some borders have changed considerably. Over the course of the 19th century, South America entered the world economy. But it did so as an exporter of commodities—Argentina’s wheat, for example, and Bolivia’s tin. As a result, the continent became dependent on up-anddown market cycles. Above all, South America was late to develop industries that matched those of Europe, depending instead on the Old World for imports of manufactured goods. Indeed, during the 19th and early 20th centuries, South America maintained closer economic and cultural links to Europe than to the United States. Edwin Williamson of the University of Edinburgh questions whether the continent’s countries could have taken any other path of development, given their relative lack of capital and the state of their educational systems. In any event, South America imported more than products. By the end of the 19th century, the old Catholic Church–dominated ideas were fading. “The educated classes were absorbing a truly secular, materialist culture,” Williamson writes in The Penguin History of Latin America (1992). Some of these imported ideas were welcomed because they validated the high opinion of themselves that the upper levels of society already possessed. “White” peoples were superior to all others, according to the Social Darwinist doctrine, which was running strong in Europe (as well as the United States). And, Williamson says, “Strong government, even dictatorship, was necessary to contain the forces of regression while material conditions could be transformed to pave the way for genuine liberal democracy.”33 The notion that naturally disordered societies need the firm hand of the State resonated on both the left and the right throughout the 20th century, playing naturally into the cultural affinity for caudillos. Right-wing parties and politicians were more frank in their allegiance to the doctrine of authoritarian leadership. Gen. Augusto Pinochet (1915–2006), one-time military dictator of Chile, was the last—at least for now—of the South American rightist advocates of the doctrine. As export-oriented development expanded from the late 19th century and into the early 20th, this economic activity took a form that did little to encourage indigenous capitalism. To a great extent, the resources being exported were in the 33 Edwin Williamson, The Penguin History of Latin America (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 283.

INTRODUCTION

hands of foreign companies. Argentina provided a dramatic example. British companies owned essentially the entire modern sector of the Argentine economy, including the railways and the meat-packing plants that supplied the export market. There and elsewhere, a near-absence of Argentine-owned industry gave potential businesses little in the way of economic environment in which they could pursue their goals. The native upper classes, meanwhile, saw no reason to do anything with their wealth but use it for pleasure rather than for investment at home. The resentment that this frivolousness created evolved into a steadily building social pressure for social justice. Doctrines that laid the intellectual foundations for alternative social orders began to develop, partly with the help of ideologies from Europe. As early as the 1920s, efforts began to adapt left-wing ideologies to the far different conditions of South America. Peruvian political activist and writer V´ıctor Ra´ul Haya de la Torre founded the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), which melded European socialdemocratic doctrine about state ownership of the economy with Latin American ideas about the need to end the oppression of the Indian masses. APRA, which explicitly refused to subordinate itself to Soviet Communism, made deep inroads in Peruvian politics. The party remains a force; President Al´an Garc´ıa is an aprista. At the same time as Haya de la Torre was formulating his ideas, another left-wing writer and activist, Jos´e Carlos Mari´ategui, was developing a harder-line version, which drew a direct link between socialism and Indian liberation. The latter goal would be accomplished largely by restoring Indian communal ownership of their ancestral lands. “Socialism preaches solidarity with and the redemption of the working classes,” he wrote in an essay cited by Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith in Modern Latin America (1989). “Four-fifths of Peru’s working classes consist of Andean Indians. Therefore, socialism means the redemption of these Indians.”34 Mari´ategui’s linkage can be seen, in debased form, in the doctrines of Sendero Luminoso, the guerrilla army behind an insurgency in Peru in the 1980s and early 1990s, which made a practice of assassinating opponents on the left and terrorizing Indian communities into cooperation. European fascism also appeared in early 20th-century South America. The ideology’s appeal was largely confined to two countries, but they were two of the most influential countries on the continent. In Brazil, the Estado Nˆovo regime of Get´ulio Vargas, which lasted from 1930 to 1945, embodied many of the doctrines put into practice by Benito Mussolini, including state control of the economy and a virtual absence of civil liberties. These features were moderated, at least in principle, by benefits for workers. A similar model was adopted in Argentina under Juan Domingo Per´on (1895–1974), an Army colonel whose regime ran from 1943 to 1955 and again in 1973–1974. Per´on’s personal magnetism—not to mention that of his second wife and political partner, Eva—and his atten34 Quoted in Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 202.

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tion to workers’ conditions gave him lasting influence. (Eva, despite her enormous charisma, was never president, though she and her husband were contemplating running for president and vice president, respectively, when she died in 1952 at the age of 33). But, like Vargas, his regime wasn’t as successful as Mussolini’s, or that of Spain’s Francisco Franco, in establishing full control over all institutions, notably, in Per´on’s case, the Roman Catholic Church. Per´on did, however, sympathize openly with the Axis powers during World War II. Resisting U.S. pressure to side with the Allies, Argentina stayed officially neutral during the war. Brazil’s Vargas proved much more flexible, going so far as to declare war on Germany and dispatching troops to fight on the Italian front in 1944.

From Coups to Courtrooms Golpes de estado—Spanish for coups d’etat—found a welcoming climate in South America. The continent didn’t invent them, but coups proved to be an efficient way of resolving power disputes in countries with poorly developed systems of political representation, when these existed at all. For a region that welcomed caudillos, coups replaced elections as a means of political succession. One of the world’s most coup-prone countries, in fact, lies in South America. Bolivia has suffered nearly 200 coups and countercoups, by the CIA’s count, since it gained independence in 1982. That number stands out, but the penchant for coups has plagued every single country on the continent, in most cases well into the final decades of the 20th century. In the 21st century’s first decade, the collective body politic may finally have built up resistance to coups. The strongest evidence is national courts’ willingness to hold ex-dictators accountable for their crimes. Gen. Pinochet, the Chilean dictator who had taken power in a 1973 coup, spent his last years fighting off prosecution (his surviving relatives were indicted in 2007 for looting state assets). Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, who had carried out a constitutional coup to remain in office, went on trial in Lima in late 2007 on charges of human rights abuse. Argentina has been trying officers—and a priest—accused of participating in the “dirty war” against alleged leftists. Nevertheless, the absence of coups doesn’t guarantee stability. Bolivia, again, stands as the clearest example. Specifically, the country traded coups for popular uprisings—at best a form of direct, if rough, democracy; at worst, mob rule. In 2003, mass demonstrations and street violence forced President Gonzalo (“Goni”) S´anchez de Lozada to flee the country. His vice president and successor, Carlos Mesa, resigned under popular pressure. Neighboring Ecuador has seen a similar succession of sudden presidential departures. The three presidents who preceded the present chief executive, Fernando Correa, who began his term in 2007, were forced from office. As for old-fashioned golpes, the most recent one attempted as of this writing came in 2002, when oppositionists allied with a military unit toppled President Ch´avez of Venezuela. The coup collapsed in less than two days, as those who had

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INTRODUCTION

mounted it fought among themselves. A loyalist army faction freed Ch´avez to return to the presidential palace. The golpistas had accused the president of harboring dictatorial ambitions, so they did their own cause little good by adopting the standard tactic of military strongmen. To be sure, Ch´avez himself had led a failed coup attempt in 1992 before embracing electoral democracy. Countries with little experience of coups would seem to be favored by fortune. But seizures of power don’t represent the only danger. Colombia has suffered only three golpes in its history, the most recent one as far back as 1953, yet it leads the region in the frequency, durability, and savagery of its civil conflicts. From independence in 1819 until the end of the 19th century, Colombia underwent no fewer than 55 internal wars, some of them regional in scope, though no less violent. Unfortunately, the tendency to armed conflict only grew stronger in the 20th century. Equally unfortunately for those who see political parties as a countervailing force to war, virtually all of these wars were fought under the banners of the Conservative (large landowners) and Liberal (workers and small-business people) parties, though some of the conflicts were intraparty affairs. A stunningly brutal period that dates from 1948 roughly to 1958 left marks on Colombia that endure to this day. The period known simply as La Violencia lay the groundwork for an insurgency by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). That nominally Marxist guerrilla organization, founded in the mid-1960s, controls parts of several rural regions. The FARC enjoys a big enough revenue from the cocaine industry and kidnapping for ransom to endure widespread hatred in the society at large—a response that would doom any ordinary civilian. (The smaller, Cuban-influenced Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional has been more open than the FARC to disarmament talks with the government.) President Uribe’s strategic decision to eliminate the FARC once and for all as a military threat is showing results. In early March 2008, the Colombian military killed the guerrillas’ number-two commander. Less than one week later, the Colombian government announced that another senior FARC commander had been killed by one of his own men, who then surrendered to authorities. Links to the drug trade characterize not only the FARC but their opposite number, the “self-defense” (paramilitary) forces, originally formed at the behest of big landowners. The paramilitaries, now partly disarmed, worked for years in cooperation with some elements of the army. A political scandal, still under way, has produced evidence that paramilitaries exerted influence in Colombia’s congress, by way of close relations with some lawmakers. The “parapolitical” affair demonstrates the extent to which Colombian politics have been subverted by what Colombians call “armed actors.” In effect, the paramilitaries tried covertly to penetrate government institutions rather than openly take them over. At the same time, the scandal demonstrates the vigor of Colombia’s press and judiciary, which have maintained pressure on the government and political class. That effort parallels

other countries’ prosecutions of past leaders and followers of regimes born in coups. Born in barracks, golpes are being put to rest in courtrooms.

Introduction to Central America Historical Background The leaders of newly independent Central America saw the isthmus as an ideal environment for a federation of all its countries. That vision was realized relatively briefly in the years following independence from Spain. Since that interlude, however, each country has followed separate paths. The political cultures that grew out of Central American countries’ histories share some elements, but otherwise diverge sharply. Early plans for a united Central America sprang from a colonial heritage they all shared. The countries had all belonged to the Kingdom of Guatemala, itself part of New Spain, whose capital was Mexico City. Nevertheless, during the period of Spanish colonialism, today’s Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala had already established individual identities. However, today’s Mexican state of Chiapas was then part of Guatemala, as was today’s nation of Belize, and Panama was part of Colombia. After independence in 1821, some leaders of the former kingdom accepted a postcolonial version of their former arrangement, as a part of newly independent Mexico. But the latter, hearing rumbles of discontent from nationalist Central Americans, declared the isthmus countries free to establish an autonomous existence. Yet the “Federal Republic of Central America” disintegrated amid civil war in 1838. Later attempts throughout the 19th century to reunite the old kingdom also provoked armed conflicts and also failed. Central America’s early history of union and division helps explain the paradox of small, neighboring countries whose political traditions show marked differences. Resemblances do exist. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua suffered horrific armed conflict in the 1980s and into the 1990s and are experiencing alarming levels of criminal violence today. Political violence hasn’t entirely disappeared either. Honduras, which avoided most of the warfare that gripped its neighbors, has not escaped the criminal violence plague. One Central American country, however, evaded both civil war and its sequel. In this and in most other respects, Costa Rica stands as an exception in its region, and in the entire hemisphere. Costa Rica’s good fortune began in its early colonial life. Geographically more oriented toward the Pacific than the Atlantic, Costa Rica was for that reason out of Spain’s eye, and distant from the early postindependence conflicts. The caudillos who ran Costa Rica during its first century also differed from their counterparts. They favored practical measures such as establishing sound school systems and diversifying agriculture from coffee into bananas. “They turned out to be ‘progressive’ in the nineteenth-century sense, which meant that they were more than ready to use the authority of the state to

INTRODUCTION

promote economic development,” writes a longtime historian of the Americas, Lester D. Langley, then of the University of Georgia.35 By mid-20th century, Costa Rica, peaceful and democratic, had abolished its military, making it a worldwide model. In the 1980s, then-President Oscar Arias used his nation’s peaceful, democratic tradition as political capital in his efforts to encourage peace negotiations in El Salvador and Nicaragua, efforts that won him the Nobel Prize in 1987. His peace brokering was credited with playing an important role in persuading warring sides to quit fighting. The contrast with Costa Rica’s neighbors could hardly have been starker. Guatemala’s Spanish conqueror, Pedro de Alvarado, made himself notorious even in the 15th century for the violence he unleashed on the country’s original inhabitants. Hugh Thomas, a leading historian of Spain and Spanish America, writes that Alvarado’s career was characterized by “brutal . . . unconcern for human life.”36 Whether Alvarado can be blamed for Guatemala’s subsequent horrors, the least that can be said is that he got the postconquest history off to a bad start. Indeed, relations between the country’s Indian majority and its mixed-race (known in Guatemala as ladino) and Europeandescended rulers have been defined, for a longer period of time than anywhere else in the hemisphere, by the rulers’ emphasis on repression. In modern times, Guatemala’s civil conflict lasted longer than that of any other Central American country, and as long as that of any in the entire hemisphere, Colombia excepted. The toll was enormous. An estimated 200,000 people, mostly highlands Indians, died during the counterinsurgency campaigns of 1960–1996, the country’s Commission for Historical Clarification concluded in 1999. A peace agreement negotiated with the help of the United Nations created the commission. Despite the formal end of hostilities, political and criminal violence still wracks the country. And Guatemala’s tormented history bears another distinction: The 1954 CIA-managed coup that overthrew an elected left-leaning government marked a key moment in early Cold War history. Like Guatemala, El Salvador spent its formative first century under the dominion of large landowners. Until civil conflict burst into civil war in 1979, the signature event that marked the country’s political landscape was an aborted Communistled military revolt and peasant uprising in 1932, followed by a massacre of suspected communists and their sympathizers. The Salvadoran army, which had taken power in a coup, killed at least 10,000 people; the country’s total population was then 1.5 million. Salvadorans dubbed the event La Matanza (the Massacre). The massacre both prepared the ground for and foretold the savagery of the war that tore apart the country in the 1980s. At least 70,000 people, civilians, soldiers, and guerrillas, died in 35 Lester Langley, Central America The Real Stakes (New York: Crown, 1985), 112. 36 Hugh Thomas, Conquest Montezuma, Cortes, and the Fall of Old Mexico (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 595.

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that late 20th-century conflict. Paradoxically, the titular head of government for much of that time was a centrist Christian Democrat politician who represented a strain of reformism in Salvadoran politics that developed in the wake of the 1932 massacre, but couldn’t overcome the repressive impulse of the military and the business elite. Leading the insurgency was a coalition of Marxist parties who fought as allies in the Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Mart´ı para la Liberaci´on Nacional—FMLN). The FMLN took its name from a young Communist militant who helped spark the failed insurgency of 1932 and was captured and executed. The FMLN did assassinate some enemies, including unarmed American State Department officials and U.S. military personnel on two occasions, showing greater ruthlessness and logistical capability than the hapless young leftists of 1932 had displayed. In the 1980s, however, assassinations were primarily a tactic of the political right. Killings of alleged leftists often were carried out by technically anonymous “death squads,” which had close ties to elements of the military. Though that connection was known to all concerned, the military wasn’t in a position to conduct formal executions. That step was presumed unacceptable to the U.S. public, hence impossible, given the indispensable military aid that the United States provided to government forces. The Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista—ARENA) a hard-right party (which has since moved toward the center) led by a former army major, Roberto d’Aubuisson, was at the center of death-squad activities. A “Commission on the Truth” established as part of the peace accord concluded that d’Aubuisson formed the death squad that committed one of the most notorious of the war’s killings of individuals, the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero. The churchman had denounced the military and its repression of leftists and liberals. Shortly after Romero’s killing, a sometimes violent political conflict devolved into full-fledged warfare. The war ground on through the entire decade of the 1980s, with guerrillas eventually controlling a swath of territory in the eastern zone of the Massachusetts-sized country. But a 1989 offensive in San Salvador that the FMLN hoped would topple the government failed to do so. The defeat pressured the guerrillas to agree to peace negotiations. United Nations–sponsored peace talks led to the signing of a peace accord in 1992. The FMLN now competes for votes as a legal political party, an outcome that seemed inconceivable during the civil war. The party’s candidates have won elections for mayor of the capital, San Salvador, and other cities, and for congress, but never the presidency. At street level, the war prompted developments that underlay the creation of a multinational street gang culture. Hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans who fled the war for the United States settled in the Los Angeles area. There, many refugees or their children found their way into a subculture of MexicanAmerican gangs that had developed over decades. When some

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INTRODUCTION

of the Salvadorans were deported to their homeland, or went back on their own, they took with them the mindset and rituals of gang life. Many of the country’s slum-dwellers, hardened by a war that had also disrupted families, proved easy recruits for gangs, which have since spread through the region, especially in Honduras and Guatemala. As war was brewing in El Salvador during the 1970s, the same process was under way in nearby Nicaragua. There, Anastasio Somoza, who had essentially inherited power from his dictator father, proved unable to meet the challenge. After years of underground organizing, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberaci´on Nacional—FSLN) adopted a new strategy of allying with members of the upper class who were alienated from the corruption of the Somoza regime. Pedro Joaqu´ın Chamorro, editor of a major newspaper, La Prensa, was a classic example. But his role as socially respectable oppositionist was apparently too much for the dictatorship: He was assassinated in 1978. All fingers pointed to the regime. Protest riots escalated into an insurrection which, by 1979, toppled the Somoza dynasty. By then, the United States, the Somoza family’s original patron, had abandoned Somoza. The Carter administration cut off all military aid following the Chamorro assassination. At a time when right-wing dictators still ruled major countries in the hemisphere, the Sandinistas found their victory against an archetypal Latin American tyranny hailed worldwide among left-wingers and liberals. Adding to their luster, they pledged to hold elections—a sign that they would not slavishly imitate the Castro government, their longtime patron. The Sandinistas’ adherence to the new worldwide minimum standard of political respectability seemed to reflect the same impulse that led them to embrace business-class opponents of Somoza. Daniel Ortega, the leading advocate of that strategy, was the Sandinista candidate for president in a 1984 election, which he won. But the Sandinistas, with their political mandate confirmed, relied on Cuban security expertise and on Soviet military aid. Those relationships, in turn, convinced an already hostile Reagan administration that the Sandinistas represented a genuine threat. Unrelenting American political and (via the Contra guerrillas) military pressure added to internal discontent. Nicaragua’s business owners, large and small, saw their country as another Cuba in the making. Many ordinary Nicaraguans came to hate the military conscription that accompanied the Contra war. And the Sandinistas legalized the expropriations of property, including luxurious villas, that followed their victory, an act that many Nicaraguans found typical of all previous rulers. Amid this political turmoil, the country held presidential elections in 1990. To the shock of the Sandinistas and their foreign supporters, they lost to Violeta Chamorro, widow of the assassinated newspaper editor whose killing had helped propel the Sandinistas into power. Strikingly, Chamorro won her victory only two months after the fall of the Berlin Wall. With that, the Soviet empire entered the period of its final collapse. The Cold War, which had proved so critical an element

in Central American politics for four decades, had ground to a halt. But with the lessening of chances for global military confrontation, the end of the Cold War also prompted a sharp drop-off in American interest in Central America. Following Chamorro’s five-year term, politics in Nicaragua reverted for a time to the unashamedly corrupt style that had marked the Somoza regime. The most blatant abuser was President Arnoldo Alem´an, who stole millions of dollars during his 1997–2002 term, including for luxury travel on government credit cards. Alem´an was sentenced to 20 years in prison but was allowed to serve it at his mansion. From there, he forged a working alliance with his one-time ideological foe, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega, who was reelected president in 2006, bringing Nicaragua’s political course full circle.

Introduction to North America Each of North America’s three countries occupy such vast territories that the continent they occupy is rarely seen as a whole. The continent presents the sharpest contrasts in the hemisphere. In the middle lies the country frequently labeled the world’s sole remaining superpower. To its south sits Mexico, one of the giants of Latin America. Mexico now boasts the world’s richest man (telecommunications and retail magnate Carlos Slim Hel´u). But for millions of ordinary Mexicans, jobs and possibilities for social advancement are scarce enough to have sent millions of its most ambitious citizens over the border to the United States. Canada, north of the U.S. border, has virtually nothing of Mexico’s conflictive history with the United States. But surface similarities in language and culture belie a deep difference in American and Canadian political cultures. Simply put, Canada represents the European alternative to the American version of modern capitalism. Canada’s version includes universal, publicly financed health care and free higher education. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 represented a first step toward trying to link the continent’s economies. How successful the attempt has been is a question still debated in the three NAFTA countries. Mexico is at the center of the debate. As the least advanced of the three partners, it was supposed to gain the most from the agreement. For some Mexicans, imbued with the sense of tragedy evoked by an old saying attributed to a 19th-century president, Porfirio D´ıaz, the NAFTA result was no surprise. “Poor Mexico,” the saying goes, “So far from God, so close to the United States.” Thus NAFTA awakened a fear of foreign domination whose roots run deep in the history of a country that has tried, as none other in the region, to meld the cultures of the conquered and the conquerors.

Mexico: Divide and Conquer Of all the conquest histories of the hemisphere, none is as rich in characters, events, and intrigue as the expedition that marked the beginning of Spanish rule on the continent. The first

INTRODUCTION

major Spanish incursion on the mainland in 1519 culminated in the takeover of Mexico by way of the conquest of the Aztec court in Mexico City. Worthy of Shakespeare, the saga still echoes through Mexican culture. One of the major concepts to emerge from the conquest is malinchismo. The term for betrayal of one’s country is taken from the name of Malinali (or Malintz´ın or Malinche). A young woman of N´ahuatl origin—that is, the Aztec Empire’s ruling people—who had been sold as a child to Mayan Indians, she became the translator and mistress of Hern´an Cort´es, the Spaniard who conquered the vast Aztec empire with a force of only 300 men. Malinali played an indispensable role in helping forge alliances with Aztec subject peoples whose help was essential to Cort´es’s victory. Malinali’s intimate relationship with Cort´es lends a female dimension to a preference for foreigners. Hence the history of the Spanish takeover has taken the question of Mexico’s national identity to the depths of human emotion, where dramas of woman’s betrayal and man’s conquests play out in all their endless variations. On a less profound level, the conquest produced the Mexican political tenet that the country’s regions and peoples must stay united. History also teaches that the center may pay a high price for failing to attend to the needs of the provinces. The fact that Mexico was conquered as much by guile and intrigue as by force of arms showed Mexicans that diplomatic encounters may be life-and-death matters, even if they take place in palaces instead of on battlefields. Cort´es may have done as much as anyone to shape the Mexican nation. But Alan Riding, a former New York Times correspondent in Mexico, notes in a classic work of reportage that Cort´es is saluted by only one statue in all of Mexico. Mexico’s honors go to the emperor whom Cort´es dethroned, Moctezuma, but above all to his son, Cuauht´emoc, who resisted the Spaniards more bravely than his father. 37

The Long Revolution. After Mexico fought for its independence from Spain, under the initial leadership of a priest, Fr. Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico entered decades of turmoil. A picturesque general and political leader, Jos´e L´opez de Santa Anna, would embody the period. President 11 times, in most cases for less than a year, his career serves as a textbook of Mexico’s political ills. The threat of corruption, the struggle between centralism and regional autonomy, and the temptation to betray the country to stronger foreign powers form the major themes of Santa Anna’s career. He fought in the liberation war against Spain, formally ceded Texas’ independence, led troops against the United States in 1846, was toppled from power, and had his wealth confiscated on the grounds that he acquired it illegally. The definitive revolt against Santa Anna was led by one of Mexico’s everlasting heroes, Benito Ju´arez, a man of hemispheric stature. A contemporary of Abraham Lincoln, Ju´arez 37 Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors A Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 22–24.

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played roughly the role in Mexico’s political heritage that Lincoln did in the U.S. tradition. But Ju´arez, who didn’t begin learning Spanish until the age of 12, arguably rose against higher odds. As a political leader, Ju´arez not only kept Mexico united but also led it in war against the French occupation of 1864–1867. Ju´arez spearheaded the writing of a republican constitution aimed at reducing the political and economic power of the Catholic Church and at imposing civilian rule on the military. Ju´arez also laid down a principle of Mexican foreign policy that later presidents invoked in setting out a national doctrine of nonintervention: “Among nations, as among individuals, peace comes from respect for the rights of others.” The dictum has become a staple of Latin American political culture. The next major president following Ju´arez was a military hero of the war against the French. Porfirio D´ıaz, he of the saying about Mexico’s distance from God, went on to rule Mexico until 1910. A dictator who professed allegiance to democratic forms, D´ıaz surrounded himself with a group of advisers, the cientıficos (scientists), an early version of technocrats. They oversaw a modernization program that included construction of railroads, but saw no great value in democracy. Social and political pressures building up beneath the surface of the tranquil social order on which D´ıaz and his advisers prided themselves burst forth in 1910. Those pressures were intense enough that the revolution launched by liberal landowners and intellectuals in that year set off a period of civil conflict, rule by regional warlords, and militarized central government that lasted until 1929. Still, the struggles for sheer power that motivated many of the main players existed alongside a vein of genuine idealism. For many Mexicans, the peasant guerrilla Emiliano Zapata embodies this dimension of the revolution. At the head of armed farmers from his state of Morelos, south of Mexico City, Zapata demanded land reform but turned down a chance to acquire personal power, refusing a role in the provisional government. Zapata and his fellow revolutionaries made another important contribution to political culture, not merely in Mexico but around the world. With their broad-brimmed hats, moustaches, and ammunition bandoliers crossed on their chests, Mexico’s irregular fighters helped create the iconic figure of what would later be called the Third World revolutionary. Their contributions in this regard would have been impossible without the work of a small group of pioneer war photographers, who themselves helped found a signature 20th-century art form. For Zapata and other radicals, Mexico’s constitution of 1917, regarded as the revolution’s embodiment, fell short of their hopes. But the constitution did mark a clear break with the past. The right to a free, secular education was guaranteed, with religious schools—meaning Catholic schools— prohibited. Priests were barred from participating in politics, including by casting ballots. The revolution’s anticlericalism sparked a three-year regional civil war in the deeply religious central zone of Mexico. Its national reverberations included the assassination of a mili´ tary strongman, ex-president Alvaro Obreg´on, in 1927, before

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INTRODUCTION

he was sworn into a second term. The killer was a Catholic activist. Mexico didn’t encounter a genuinely unifying postrevolutionary figure until the late 1930s. L´azaro C´ardenas, renowned as the president who expelled the foreign oil companies, turned the ruling party—the Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana, later renamed as the PRI—into an instrument of social peace in which the competing interests of labor and capital would be reconciled under the supervision of the party leader-president. C´ardenas, like his successors until 2000, was effectively chosen to be president by his predecessor, who named him as the ruling party candidate. In reality that dedazo, the laying-on of the finger, meant appointing him as president. Even so, C´ardenas rose to the challenges of social and economic turbulence without succumbing to demagoguery.

“The Perfect Dictatorship.” Following C´ardenas, Mexico entered into nearly six decades marked by the steady expansion of the PRI. For the first two postwar decades, the middle class grew as well, as Mexico’s closed economy and policy of import substitution, producing Mexican versions of goods that otherwise would have to be imported, delivered on its promise. Through the 1960s, the real buying power of wages increased by 6.4 percent a year.38 Economic success and political tranquility came at a price. Independent labor unions were crushed and their leaders, some of them Communist Party militants, were imprisoned. Political opposition parties were tolerated, even subsidized, as long as they made no attempt to break out of the role of permanent minority. One exception was the center-right Partido Accion Nacional, which had a strong though technically illegal connection with the Catholic Church and a solid base in the north and north-central region. The ranchers and farmers of the agricultural belt running through the states of Michoac´an, Jalisco, Le´on, Colima and Guanajuato, Chihuahua and Sonora, and the big-business community clustered in the industrial capital, Monterrey, cultivated a hostility to the centralist, statist, and rhetorically revolutionary political culture of the capital. The northerners’ hostility often came mixed with a sense of ethnic superiority. The panistas were unrelenting. For years, they kept entering candidates in elections. They were allowed to win a few mayoralties, some seats in state legislatures, and a handful of positions in the lower house of the national congress. But the senate and governorships were out of the question. As for the presidency—completely unthinkable. In 1968, the PRI-gobierno demonstrated the penalties for pushing past the system’s limits. In that year of student uprisings around the world, a student movement began calling for genuine democracy. In Mexico City, where the movement was strongest, it began attracting older members of the middle class. The movement came to an abrupt end on October 2, 1968, when plainclothes army snipers shot into a protest meeting in a large 38 See

Krauze, 681.

plaza near the city center. An estimated 300 people were killed; to this day, the exact number is unknown. A “dirty war” followed, marked by deadly repression focused on small underground guerrilla organizations. The Mexican guerrilla movement was marked by a sharp difference from its counterparts elsewhere—an absence of assistance from Cuba. Castro was repaying Mexico’s refusal to break relations with the island, as other Latin American nations did at the United States’ behest. By the late 1970s, the violence, more limited than in South America, had tapered off. The Mexican government began a period of courting the international left and buying off peaceful left-wing leaders and intellectuals. The biggest sign of change was the legalization of the Communist Party in 1978. The political system held firm through financial emergencies in the 1980s generated largely by massive borrowing in the 1970s, when oil revenues peaked. But the aftermath of the deadly Mexico City earthquake of 1985 revealed the weakness and incompetence underlying the party-government system. Still, Mexican presidents retained their power to appoint their successors. Even an increasingly discontented and vocal public found the system still impregnable. In the oft-repeated words of Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa, Mexico’s rulers had invented the “perfect dictatorship.” But by the time Vargas Llosa coined the phrase in 1990, the PRI monopoly had entered its final decade. The period of decline actually began in 1988. The chosen presidential candidate, Harvard-trained economist Carlos Salinas de Gortari, faced a nightmare opponent. Cuauht´emoc C´ardenas, son of the revered president of the 1938 oil nationalization, had abandoned the PRI and helped form a new left-wing party. The combination of C´ardenas’s ancestry, his appeal to ordinary Mexicans hardpressed by the crises of the 1980s, and the erosion of the PRI’s authority and credibility made the race the first genuine contest for president in memory. Once the ballots were in, the interior ministry announced that its vote-tallying computers had broken down. Once the allegedly broken machines were supposedly repaired, Salinas was declared the winner. Whether he really won likely never will be known. The real result can be surmised from the fact that, once Salinas became president, he ordered the paper records of the election burned. Salinas’s departure was marked by mystery as well. The man he originally picked to succeed him, Lu´ıs Donald Colosio, was assassinated in mid-campaign in 1994. A confessed gunman was convicted, but the reason for the killing is unknown. So are the identities of whoever else may have been involved. The man who replaced Colosio as the official candidate represented one of the few successes of Salinas’s administration, which was mired in scandal and murder. (Colosio’s wasn’t the only one; Salinas’s brother was involved in a bizarre drama involving the murder of a prominent politician.) The new candidate was Ernesto Zedillo. With his doctorate in economics from Yale, Zedillo seemed the archetypal cientıfico for a new age. But unlike the classic model, he took democracy seriously.

INTRODUCTION

Zedillo refused to manipulate the 2000 presidential election to ensure the PRI candidate’s victory. The result was the first victory of a non-PRI candidate since the long-ruling party’s formation as the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1929. Vicente Fox, the election winner, came from the National Action Party (Partido Accion Nacional—PAN), and seemed to embody all its hallmarks. A devout Catholic from the state Guanajuato, a hotbed of the Catholic guerrilla movement of the 1920s civil war, Fox came from a farming background and spent most of his career as a sales executive for Coca-Cola. Fox left office without a cloud of scandal, but also without any major political victories. Among other things, he had promised to forge a migratory work agreement with the United States. However, the Al-Qaida attacks of September 11, 2001, ended U.S. attention to any such plan.

Introduction to the Caribbean The Caribbean as a cultural region includes parts of the mainlands of Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, as well as Guyana (and New Orleans and Key West in the United States). But if the Caribbean is, in writer Mark Kurlansky’s term, a “continent of islands,” the islands make up the Caribbean heartland.39 That region consists of 16 independent countries; one U.S. commonwealth (Puerto Rico); one U.S. territory (U.S. Virgin Islands); two French departments, the equivalent of states (Guadeloupe, made up of six islands, and Martinique, one island of the same name); five British territories (British Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands, comprising a total of 13 islands in all); and, until December 31, 2008, a self-governing possession of the Netherlands (the Netherlands Antilles, made up of five islands; those islands will be independent nations as of January 1, 2009). Strikingly, the Caribbean islands, Europe’s gateway to the Americas, hold the region’s longest-lasting political ties to the old colonial powers. Because of the islands’ role as entry point to the New World, mistreatment of the indigenous inhabitants sparked Europeans’ first criticisms of human rights violations in the New World. By a perverse twist of events, that criticism contributed to one of history’s great tragedies. Bartolom´e de las Casas, the Spanish Dominican friar who converted to the Indians’ cause in 1511, endorsed early requests for royal permission to bring slaves from Africa to work the land. “Like all enlightened men of his time, he believed that an African enslaved by Christians was more fortunate than an African in domestic circumstances,” writes historian Hugh Thomas (Las Casas repented years later, but to no effect).40 39 Mark Kurlansky, A Continent of Islands (New York: Addison Wesley, 1992). 40 Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440–1870 (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 98.

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The enormous trade in humans grew out of the colonizer’s unending need for vast armies of laborers. The slave trade would guide the course of Caribbean history as well as that of all the Americas, directly or indirectly. The descendants of African slaves make up the overwhelming majority of the islands’ population. Hence, it is fitting that the Caribbean became the site of the world’s first slave revolution since Spartacus led an uprising against the Roman Empire. In the 1790s, Haiti’s slaves rose up and began their independence war. In 1804, after the French had been vanquished, Haitians founded the world’s first black republic. A wave of fear immediately rolled through white society in the Caribbean, and all the way to the North American mainland. But the revolution failed to spark any sequels elsewhere. Later in the century, the Cuban rebels who fought the Caribbean’s longest and most brutal war of colonial independence in 1868–1878 finally won in 1898, in large part due to black fighters and one brilliant commander, Antonio Maceo (known honorifically as the “Bronze Titan”). Though relatively late to independence, people of the Caribbean pioneered the immigration trend that has spread throughout the region. (Mexican migration to the United States began earlier but with a different character—largely as a backand-forth movement between home and work north of the border.) Mass emigration began in the Caribbean in the 1940s, expanding in the 1950s and 1960s. Jamaica and other British Commonwealth islands saw tens of thousands of citizens depart for Britain as early as the 1940s. Between 1948 and 1965 at least 300,000 citizens of the British Caribbean islands took advantage of their status as British subjects to move to England. Xenophobic reaction by white Britons eventually forced the government to cancel automatic immigration rights for “West Indians.” In the French-speaking Caribbean, doctors and other professionals, fleeing the Duvalier dictatorship in the 1950s, began settling in New York and in French-speaking Canada. During the same time, Puerto Ricans, whose American citizenship made travel as easy as stepping on an airplane, began creating a virtual second island in New York City. As on the other islands, the combination of fewer job opportunities after World War II and the postwar boom in the United States and Europe proved irresistible. Approximately 500,000 Puerto Ricans moved to the United States in the 1940s and 1950s. Puerto Ricans often still call their New York community Nuyorico. The Puerto Ricans blazed a trail for other islanders. By the mid-1960s, the United States replaced Britain as the destination of choice for Caribbean migrants. The British immigration restriction virtually coincided with enactment of a 1965 U.S. law that scrapped immigration limits imposed during the mid1950s. In the 1960s, 470,000 Caribbean immigrants entered the United States, including the tens of thousands of Cubans who fled the revolution and the Castro government.41 41 See “Caribbean Migration,” in In Motion The AfricanAmerican Experience, undated, Schomburg Center for Research in

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INTRODUCTION

Meanwhile, Canada, whose vast expanse and relatively small population made the country welcoming to immigrants, took in tens of thousands of foreign nationals. Canada shared a British cultural background with immigrants from the Englishspeaking islands, and a French heritage with immigrants from the Francophone Caribbean. By 2001, 5 percent of 5.4 million Canadian immigrants came from the Caribbean (and nearby Bermuda).42 To many who were touched by the phenomenon, the enormous dimensions of Caribbean migration seemed to mark another chapter in an epic, one that began with the forcible removal of millions of Africans from their home continent. In recent decades, members of the Caribbean community in the islands and elsewhere have been describing the migration as a diaspora, a biblical term originally applied to the far-flung Jews. The term comes up frequently in the context of plans to use immigrants’ resources to benefit home islands. In a typical example, in 2006 the Inter-American Development Bank made a $10 million loan to Haiti to recruit “diaspora professionals” to the country’s nascent civil service. On all the islands, the emigration has existed for long enough that an entire business sector catering to migrants’ needs and those of their families at home has sunk deep roots (as it has now for continental migrants). It includes remittancetransfer houses, phone cards, cable TV news from back home, as well as newspapers and radio outlets. The absence of jobs in sufficient number for the islands’ educated and ambitious was the engine of emigration. An abundance of seductively picturesque settings couldn’t compensate for insufficiently developed economies.

Overview of the English-Speaking Caribbean—the “West Indies” British heritage is the dominant political trait in the Caribbean. The British West Indies form the eastern edge of the Caribbean sea except for Jamaica, the biggest island, which lies south of Cuba and west of Hispaniola. Jamaica, whose population of 2.7 million dwarfs that of any of its Anglophone neighbors (Trinidad and Tobago has slightly more than half as many people), is the West Indies’ cultural and political powerhouse. Its problems are correspondingly big as well. Trinidad and Tobago, lying east of the Venezuelan coast, occupies a far smaller space in world consciousness but plays a greater economic role. The twin-island nation’s offshore territory enjoys the Caribbean’s biggest petroleum deposits. These are low by world standards, but high enough for Trinidad and Black Culture, New York Public Library, www.inmotionaame.org/ migrations/landing.cfm?migration=10 (accessed November 15, 2007). 42 “Immigrant Population by Place of Birth and Period of Immigration (2001 Census),” Statistics Canada, undated, http://www40.statcan. ca/l01/cst01/demo24a.htm?sdi=immigrant (accessed November 17, 2007).

Tobago to base its economy on petroleum exports. That stable, industrial foundation exists nowhere else in the Caribbean. Trinidad and Tobago does share a demographic characteristic with the nearby mainland nation of Guyana. The populations of both countries are divided roughly evenly between people of African and people of East Indian descent. And Trinidad and Tobago shares a feature of its political heritage with most of the Americas—a long period of supremacy by a charismatic figure. Eric Williams, the historian and politician who spearheaded Trinidad and Tobago’s independence, served as the country’s only prime minister for the first 18 years of its postcolonial life. He died in office in 1981. Williams founded one of the country’s major political parties, the People’s National Movement. AfroTrinidadians make up its major constituency. Williams and other proindependence activists enjoyed a political climate that differed greatly from the environment that surrounded their counterparts in Africa and Asia. There, independence came only after decades of struggle, in some cases warfare. In the Caribbean, the move toward independence was a gradual process in which the British government and island leaders cooperated. As a result, Williams and his counterparts on other islands were willing to enlist in a British project to create a federation out of the former Crown colonies. Once formed, however, the federation couldn’t bridge political differences between its members—mainly Trinidad and Tobago, on the one hand, and Jamaica, on the other. Williams and his colleagues favored, in effect, a U.S.-influenced model, with a strong central government. Jamaican leaders preferred what amounted to a European Common Market approach. Williams himself, writing in general terms, blamed, “the desire of the units to continue pursuing competitive rather than complementary strategies of economic development.”43 For Trinidad and Tobago, the economic backdrop of the dispute was its natural resource wealth and an unwillingness to subsidize poorer islands. That economic solidity has given Trinidad and Tobago the strength to weather its biggest challenge in recent years, an attempted uprising by a Muslim sect of black Trinidadians. In 1990 the group took over the parliament building and held members and the prime minister hostage. One parliamentarian was killed, but the would-be insurrectionists eventually negotiated a peaceful surrender. The brief law-and-order vacuum that followed the takeover sparked riots and looting by black Trinidadians in the island’s main city, Port of Spain. Police quickly restored order, but the episode did open a period of increased criminal violence that continues to this day. In Jamaica a steady stream of criminal violence, sometimes with political links, began earlier and has left deep wounds in the island’s society. A countervailing trend of idealism and yearning for social justice hasn’t been strong enough to prevail.

43 See Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro The History of the Caribbean (New York: Vintage, 1984), 508.

INTRODUCTION

A politician who tried to embody that strain of Jamaican culture was more successful in his international endeavors. Michael Manley (1924–1997), a charismatic speaker who had graduated from the London School of Economics, became prime minister in 1972 when his People’s National Party (PNP) won the parliamentary majority; he served until 1980, then held the office again in 1989–1992. In a career that took off at the same time as singersongwriter Bob Marley was becoming a world figure, Manley embraced the Caribbean version of Afro-consciousness, Rastafarianism, that Marley and other Jamaican artists were preaching. In his 1972 campaign, Manley made a show of carrying the “Rod of Joshua,” a staff of ebony and ivory that he said had been given to him by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, whom Rastafarians (Ras Tafari Mekonnen was the emperor’s given name) considered a holy figure. Manley’s first term in office also coincided with the height of influence of the “Non-Aligned Movement,” in theory made up of developing countries that hadn’t formally enlisted with either side in the Cold War. Among its members was Soviet ally Cuba, with whom Manley established friendly relations. Without espousing the Soviet-style system that Castro implanted, Manley made an informal alliance with the Cuban leader, whom Manley depicted as a champion of the developing world. Much of Manley’s admiration grew out of Castro’s military backing of newly liberated Angola against a 1975 invasion by South Africa, at the time ruled antidemocratically by white-minority leaders. Toward the end of his life, Manley recalled in an interview that he had rebuffed then–U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who asked for Jamaica to vote against Cuba’s presence in Angola.44 Manley may have made Jamaica a player in global affairs, but the country’s own political culture was descending into gang warfare. When the relatively conservative Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) tried to displace Manley’s PNP in elections in 1976 and 1980, gun battles erupted. (Bob Marley was nearly killed in an attack seemingly intended to prevent him playing at a government-organized concert seen by some as a PNP event.) In 1980, the preelection death toll reached 800. The JLP finally displaced the PNP in that election. As a result, JLP leader Edward Seaga served as prime minister until 1989. He tilted Jamaica’s international stance in a more proU.S. direction. Manley returned to office in 1989. For all of their ideological and stylistic differences, neither Manley nor Seaga made much of a dent in the socioeconomic inequities that pervade Jamaican society. Violence continues to plague the political scene, though its frequency has lessened. Indeed, criminal gangs often boast a connection to one of the two major parties. Only recently have Jamaican political veterans begun to admit responsibility for the country’s condition. “We are part of a failed state and as such we failed the country,” a former 44 See Manning Marable, “Michael Manley (interview),” The Progressive, July 1, 1993, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/ 1G1-13972336.html (accessed November 18, 2007).

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tourism and information minister in Seaga’s government, Anthony Abrahams, said on a talk-show program in 1999 hosted by Beverly Anderson Manley, Michael Manley’s widow. She spoke frankly as well: “How did we get into such a stage of anarchy? I knew the nature of our politics. I was married to a party leader. I couldn’t say I didn’t know.”45 Jamaica has succeeded, however, in shielding its profitable tourist industry from the effects of the country’s class divide and its sometimes-murderous politics. Elsewhere in the West Indies, political violence and a friendship with Cuba that went beyond Manley’s rhetorical declarations of solidarity led to the first, and so far the only, open combat between U.S. and Cuban troops. On the island of Grenada, a 1979 coup against a longtime strongman led to the establishment of a left-wing government that established close ties with Cuba. As the relationship deepened, Cuba dispatched hundreds of construction and other technical experts, many of them also military men. Then, the Grenadian leaders fell out among themselves in 1983. Fighting broke out, and the head of government, Maurice Bishop (1944–1983), was executed by his former comrades. Those events led President Reagan to order the Grenada invasion. The immediate rationale was the rescue of a group of young Americans who were attending medical school on the island. But Reagan had warned since taking office in 1981 that Cuba and the Soviet Union were making Grenada a beachhead for subversion in the region. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the notion of Cuba as a security threat to its Caribbean neighbors essentially disappeared as well.

Overview of the Spanish-Speaking Caribbean The Spanish Caribbean comprises the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico as well as the Dominican Republic, which occupies half the island of Hispaniola (Puerto Rico, because it is not a country, will be treated only tangentially in these pages). Though the English-speaking islands far outnumber them, one Spanish-speaking country alone far outweighs them politically. Cuba, the biggest country in the entire region, is the only Caribbean nation to have established a lasting presence on the world stage. Fidel Castro’s outsized personality partly explains Cuba’s international status. His seemingly limitless ambition found an outlet thanks to the Cold War. By transforming Cuba into a Soviet ally, one that sat practically on America’s doorstep, Castro made himself and his country major players. The political culture that Castro inherited when he appeared on the scene as a law student and apprentice politician was still emerging from Spain’s lengthy colonial domination, which ended only in 1898. Slavery had ended only in 1873, leaving 45 Both quoted in David Gonzalez, “A Killing Shocks Jamaicans into Soul-Searching,” New York Times, October 18, 1999, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 9B01E4DE1739F93BA25753C1A96F958260 (accessed November 18, 2007).

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INTRODUCTION

a linkage between race and poverty. Economically, the country depended on the volatile world markets in sugar and tobacco. “Political independence brought interludes of hectic prosperity,” writes Hugh Thomas, “never freedom from unrest.”46 Castro from the beginning of his career exploited the longstanding tie between freedom and disorder in Cuba. Since 1959, when Castro’s guerrilla forces toppled dictator Fulgencio Batista, Cuba has not held a genuine election. Except for the Catholic Church, Cuba has no independent political institutions of any kind. And Castro’s 2006 transfer of power to his slightly younger brother and lifelong comrade, Defense Minister Ra´ul Castro, as a result of his own failing health shows a dynastic strain running through the Cuban version of Soviet socialism. The elder Castro made his retirement permanent in February 2008, at the age of 81. Cuba’s National Assembly then formalized the handing over of power to 76-year-old Ra´ul, who became president. Cuba’s quasi-monarchical system has shown considerable resilience. Despite widespread expectations, it survived the Soviet Union’s demise. Before Venezuela’s President Ch´avez extended substantial economic aid to Cuba, Castro weathered the disappearance of Soviet subsidies in part by opening the economy to European and Canadian tourism operators and hotel builders—a strategy that collided with early revolutionary rhetoric decrying Cuba’s past as a playground for foreign visitors. The hard-edged realism reflected in that strategy coexists, confusingly, with a rhetoric that glorifies last stands against all odds. As the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada was getting under way, for instance, Castro ordered his 700 troops there to resist the 1,900-strong American force to the death. But the Cuban colonel in command surrendered with most of his men; all were later repatriated to Cuba. According to Brian Latell, a retired career Cuba specialist for the CIA, a furious Castro demoted all officers including the colonel, who was sent off to fight in Angola, where he was killed.47 And when the invasion loomed, Castro sent no reinforcements to the men he’d ordered not to surrender. “It is not the new Grenadan government we must think of now, but of Cuba,” he said in a comment cited by Cuba specialist Edward Gonzalez of the University of California, Los Angeles.48 Most Caribbean states supported the invasion of Grenada. But since the Soviet Union’s collapse, even staunch U.S. allies have established warm relations with Cuba. “We have to be able to strike strategic relationships with those who are willing to help us in charting a course of serious development as we confront the 21st century,” Keith Mitchell, then the prime 46 Hugh

Thomas, Cuba The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 1111. 47 See Brian Latell, After Fidel The Inside Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 176. 48 Edward Gonzalez, “Challenge in the Caribbean Basin,” in Cuban Communism, 7th ed., ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Transaction, 1989), 656.

minister of Grenada—a post he may not have held if the invasion hadn’t occurred—said in a 1997 interview with the New York Times. “When we look back at our relationship with Cuba, I think most Grenadians of all ages and groups agree that, over all, the Cuban role and presence here was positive.”49 Cuba itself, meanwhile, has been enjoying a new lease on economic life in the 21st century. As Venezuelan president Ch´avez has solidified his position at the helm of the region’s major oil power, he has been shipping petroleum to Cuba at subsidized prices, in return for the services of more than 20,000 Cuban doctors in Venezuela. For many observers, the Venezuelan support has ensured that Cuban communism will outlast Castro. However, the December 2007 defeat of Ch´avez’s proposed constitutional changes has introduced a note of doubt into that assessment. So did renewal of a current of critical comment from within Cuba—a trend that has appeared periodically since the revolution, only to be snuffed out. Vivid evidence of youthful dissatisfaction came in a video leaked to foreign media, which showed Cuban university students confronting veteran Cuban diplomat Ricardo Alarc´on with tough questions about why they couldn’t travel outside Cuba without authorization, or enjoy free access to the Internet, among other restrictions. Alarc´on’s responses included the comment that most Bolivians couldn’t travel either—and the world aviation system wouldn’t be able to function if everyone in the world who wanted to travel were able to do.50 Lest critics of the Cuban regime take too much encouragement from the confrontation, Cuba’s official information system released a second video in which one of the most tenacious of Alarc´on’s questioners, Eli´ecer Avila, later appeared in a state-sponsored interview, saying his questions and those of his fellow students had no rebellious purpose. “It is to build a better socialism, not to destroy it,” Avila said, prompted by an editor of a Cuban government Web site.51 Even though Cuba’s security apparatus seems to have lost none of its efficiency, the only full-fledged Soviet-style system in the region has been no better able than other Latin American countries to retain many of its inhabitants. Over the course of nearly a half-century, approximately 10 percent of the Cuban population, now about 11 million, have departed the island. That volume is not extraordinary in the Caribbean context. Nor is the sense among Cubans that emigration serves as a sociopolitical safety valve for a society unable to contain the dissatisfactions of people who find no outlet for their talents or energies at home. Whatever price Cuba has paid for the 49 Quoted in Larry Rohter, “Caribbean Nations, Ignoring U.S., Warm to Cuba,” New York Times, December 21, 1997. 50 “Alarcon y Estudiantes de la UCI, Video Completo,” February 14, 2008, http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid= 862625216710039760 (accessed March 9, 2008). 51 “Transcripci´ on de Palabras de Estudiantes Cubanos de la UCI,” February 18, 2008, http://www.cubainformacion.tv/ index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=3863&Itemid= 65 (accessed March 9, 2008).

INTRODUCTION

loss, first, of educated professionals and the business class, and, later, of numbers of independent-minded and daring citizens, the government evidently has calculated that it gains more in stability. Substantial Cuban e´ migr´e communities exist in Spain and Mexico, but the real second Cuba lies in the United States, especially Florida’s Miami-Dade County. “Miami Cubans,” in political shorthand, have made themselves a national political presence, as their electoral dominance in their population center has made up for their relatively small numbers (1.6 million, versus 28.3 million U.S. residents of Mexican origin). As a result, they play a major role in influencing U.S. policy toward Cuba. However, they aren’t all-powerful in that regard, political folk wisdom to the contrary. A U.S. policy of turning back Cuban refugees at sea is only one example of Cuban-Americans not getting their way. Yet, administrations of both parties have felt obliged to demonstrate that they take the conservative wing of the Cuban-American political establishment into account. One result is that the 1966 “Cuban Adjustment Act” remains on the books. Under the law, Cubans who reach the soil of the United States are granted virtually automatic permanent residence. The law now is benefiting Cubans who flee to Mexico and are allowed into the United States at ports of entry along the U.S. southern border. Politics, in an odd way, has kept ties strong between Cubans and Cuban-Americans. As legal residents of the United States, nearly all Cubans are eligible to make U.S.-allowed family visits back to the island (though the Bush administration has reduced their frequency from once a year to once every three years). Migrants from elsewhere don’t enjoy this advantage. Politics hasn’t played a role, since the fall of the Trujillo dictatorship, in the migration of tens of thousands of Dominicans to the United States. Their mainland presence is centered in New York, where they account for at least 400,000 residents. In the age of air travel and instant communications, the island and mainland Dominican communities are close enough that a New York–raised Dominican felt secure enough in homeland politics to run for president. Leonel Fernandez, whose image as a Dominican rooted in the island and in New York accounted for much of his initial appeal, developed a track record of stability during his first administration (1996–2000). That record was strong enough that voters brought him back for a second term in 2004, set to expire in mid-2008.

Overview of the French-Speaking Caribbean The Francophone Caribbean consists of only one fully independent country. Haiti, the first country in Latin America and the Caribbean to expel its colonial masters, has been a free nation since 1804. That brave beginning may have marked Haiti’s best moment. Since then, oppression, corruption, and steadily increasing poverty have blighted the country. Making the picture even bleaker, the French colonial islands that failed

27

to mount a revolution today enjoy a relatively prosperous and peaceful existence. However, the realities of French rule discourage any easy conclusion that Haiti would have done better to have remained a colony. Even by the standards of the time, that regime was notable for the systemic sadism with which the French administered the territory, whose sugar and cotton production were mainstays of France’s economy. Colonial rule had so deformed Haitian society that life as an independent country began with what amounted to a reimposition of slavery under the rule of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, a tyrant who had been one of revolution’s generals. The overall commander, Toussaint Louverture, had showed himself to be a more humane leader. But he fell victim to French trickery, the first of the countless tragedies that have scarred Haiti’s postrevolutionary history. French authorities invited Louverture to negotiate the terms of France’s definitive exit from the island. He was taken prisoner and spent the rest of his life in solitary confinement in a French mountain fortress. Louverture’s fate has served as a cautionary example to every Haitian in public life. The lessons are stamped indelibly on the country’s political culture: No promise of negotiations should be believed; foreign powers mean Haiti no good; a leader who trusts adversaries’ good intentions will die. In modern times, supporters of Haiti’s most charismatic and polarizing figure, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, have cast him as a modern Louverture. Aristide, the former priest who emerged as the first champion of Haiti’s impoverished majority, is seen by supporters as a victim of betrayal by the United States, aided by its friends among Haiti’s well-off. The ex-president’s detractors scoff at the notion of Aristide as a liberator, viewing him as a would-be dictator every bit as corrupt as the bourgeoisie he scorns. Each side points to a considerable body of evidence. When he emerged as a revolutionary priest, during the 1986 uprising that drove Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier from the country, Aristide helped rally Haitians to the “uprooting” (dechoukaj) of Duvalierists, including members of the feared and hated secret police force known as Tontons Macoute. In the uprooting, their homes were destroyed. Some of the Duvalierists were beaten to death. “Our consciences should be clear,” Aristide told Mark Danner of The New Yorker at the time. “These Macoutes were Satan, Satan incarnate. . . . The people must continue to show how strong they are, how strong they can be!”52 But the Duvalierists remained powerful. Haiti’s first attempt at a postdictatorship election in 1987 was stopped short by exMacoutes who rampaged through Port-au-Prince, killing people gathered at polling places—an estimated 34 in all. In 1990, when the pressure for an election proved unstoppable, Aristide was swept into office by a tidal wave of electoral 52 Quoted in Mark Danner, “Beyond the Mountains (Part I),” New Yorker, November 27, 1989, http://www.markdanner.com/ articles/show/beyond the mountains part i (accessed November 26, 2007).

28

INTRODUCTION

support. But months into his term, it was clear that his goal of a revolutionary transformation of Haiti collided with the interests of the small business class and the military men they subsidized. With rumors of a coup already flying around the capital, Port-au-Prince, Aristide gave a speech at the National Palace in which he used his gift for allusion and his grasp of popular imagery to call for what was universally understood to be the “necklacing” (placing a gasoline-soaked tire around the head) of Duvalierists who were plotting a counterrevolution: “What a beautiful tool! What a beautiful instrument! What a beautiful piece of equipment! It’s beautiful, yes it’s beautiful, it’s cute, it’s pretty, it has a good smell, wherever you go you want to inhale it.”53 For Aristide’s enemies, the speech showed conclusively that he was a tyrant in the making. His supporters called the speech a desperate attempt to rally the masses. But it failed; Aristide was overthrown. In 1994, after three years as an exile in Washington, Aristide was restored to office by a U.S. government that he still deeply distrusted. His suspicion was proved valid by the 2004 revolt that toppled him a second time. The Aristide camp views the revolt as a Bush administration production. U.S. officials have denied the accusation, though they clearly welcomed Aristide’s ouster. In any case, Haiti’s political scene had grown more complicated. The former Aristide camp had fractured, with many onetime supporters transformed into bitter opponents. And with Aristide’s departure, the United Nations established a “stabilization” mission, including about 7,000 troops. The mission’s military force commander is a Brazilian major-general, and countries that have contributed troops and police include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Grenada, Peru, and Uruguay. Their participation represents a break with a past in which Haiti’s neighbors wanted nothing to do with a country that was seen as having nothing in common with the rest of the Americas. The presence of the UN troops reflected another change in Haiti’s sociopolitical picture. The poorest of the poor were no longer a humble, unarmed population. Cite Soleil (in Krey`ol, Site Soley), a vast slum on the Port-au-Prince waterfront, came to harbor well-armed gangs who financed themselves from kidnap ransom and the drug trade. Drug smugglers have made Haiti a busy transshipment point for South American cocaine and heroin headed for the U.S. market. Stabilization force troops have had some success in lessening gang control in Cite Soleil, though for how long remains uncertain. Haiti’s future is equally unclear. Despite some improvements in infant mortality (from 150 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 117 per 1,000 live births in 2004), the country remains the poorest in the Western Hemisphere. Life expectancy there is 52 years.

53 See “Aristide’s ‘Pe Lebrun’ speech”—President Aristide’s speech of Friday, September 27, 1991, trans. by Haiti Observateur, http://www.hartford-hwp. com/archives/43a/009.html (accessed November 26, 2007).

Conclusion As the end of the new century’s first decade approaches, most citizens of Latin America and the Caribbean face the same social and economic inequalities that propelled alternating cycles of revolution and repression for much of the past century. One difference stands out: free and fair elections have come to be seen almost everywhere as the only acceptable means of political change. In Argentina, Guatemala, and Venezuela, voters made fundamental choices in late 2007 about the directions they want their societies to take. Whether electoral politics can contain Bolivia’s interconnected regional, ethnic, and class conflicts seem less certain; at the start of 2008, four of the country’s eastern provinces were vowing to pursue their effort to secede almost entirely from the rest of the country. Ecuador is caught up in the drafting of a new constitution to replace one written in 1998. President Correa, who won a 2007 referendum on his proposal to call a constituent assembly, wants to reduce the power of Congress, a center of opposition to his administration. Venezuela’s referendum on the Ch´avez-proposed constitutional changes has sparked a debate over the president’s brand of socialism. Opposition has gone far beyond the privileged sectors whom Ch´avez depicts as his main opponents. A newly emerged student movement took to the streets to protest Ch´avez’s political plan. Gen. Ra´ul Baduel, who had been a longtime comrade of Ch´avez among left-wing officers, played a key role in rallying opposition to the Ch´avez-proposed amendments. The general may also have been among those who forced Ch´avez to accept defeat. Heinz Dieterich, a Mexico City–based political scientist and ideological mentor to many chavistas, argues in a critique on a pro-Ch´avez website that corruption, ineptitude, and intolerance were eroding Ch´avez’s administration from within. These ills, and Ch´avez’s emphasis on one-man rule, could spell doom not only for Venezuela’s incipient socialist system but also for those of Bolivia and even of Cuba, Dieterich warns. “Not only is it true that ‘the Revolution devours its children,’ but also that when revolutionary leaders transform themselves into unilateral directors, ‘they devour the Revolution.’”54 Fidel Castro made himself “unilateral director” of Cuba in the early days of the country’s revolutionary transformation. As his life enters what seems to be its final act, the path his successor would take looms as an unknown, the subject of a long-running guessing game among Cubans on the island and abroad. New president Ra´ul Castro, who took office on February 24, 2008, has been described by many as an economic pragmatist who might loosen a few of the restrictions that prohibit nearly all private business ventures outside of tiny operations such as selling produce. But Cubans on the island and in exile say they expect little else—above all no loosening of the 54 Heinz Dieterich, “Derrota Estrat´ egica en Venezuela; Peligro Mortal para Bolivia y Cuba,” December 3, 2007, www.aporrea.org/tiburon/a46125.html (accessed December 10, 2007).

INTRODUCTION

political reins. As if to demonstrate the regime’s resistance to change, the official named as first vice president is 76-year-old Jos´e Ram´on Machado Ventura, another of the shrinking circle of historicos—members of the Castro brothers’ guerrilla army. Machado Ventura’s appointment—by election of the National Assembly, technically speaking—seems designed to squelch widespread foreign speculation that Fidel Castro’s successors might undertake deeper economic and perhaps even political reform. Some analysts had said that appointment of one of the regime’s 40- and 50-year-old officials could signal such intentions. Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner began her new administration in an atmosphere of tension. U.S. arrests of men allegedly part of a scheme to deliver $800,000 in campaign cash to her from the Venezuelan government occurred only three days after she was sworn in. Kirchner characterized the charges as a move against her government. Neither she nor anyone in her administration was a target of U.S. judicial proceedings, so the effects of the criminal case, whatever they may be, will be political rather than legal. Guatemalan voters clearly rejected the old military class when they chose Alvaro Colom, a left-of-center president. But the challenge he faces from a criminal culture deeply embedded in the country’s security apparatus can’t be overstated. In Colombia, investigations into connections between lawmakers and rightist paramilitaries raise the question of whether the paras’s demobilization as a fighting force simply marks a change in the way they exert their influence. The FARC, the left-wing guerrilla force, shows no serious interest in demobilization. Like its paramilitary enemies, the FARC devotes as much or more of its energies to the drug trade as to political organization. For years, that diversification into the high-profit field of drug trafficking seemed to ensure the FARC’s longterm survival, even if its objective of seizing national power had become a mirage. However, early in 2008, the FARC’s prospects took a turn for the worse. The Colombian military, pursuing President Uribe’s strategy of crushing the FARC, zeroed in on number-two commander Ra´ul Reyes (a nom de guerre) and killed him in an air attack on an encampment on the Ecuadoran side of the border with Colombia. That violation of Ecuadoran sovereignty precipitated a brief flurry of tension between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Venezuela’s president, Ch´avez, had lately been in contact with FARC commanders to arrange the release of some of the guerrilla’s armies longtime captives. After Reyes died, Ch´avez praised him and even declared a moment of silence in his honor. President Bush, meanwhile, declared U.S. support for Colombian force’s pursuit of enemies across its border. As tensions kept rising, the Colombian government announced that Iv´an R´ıos, a senior FARC commander, had been killed by one of his own men, who then surrendered to the government. On the diplomatic front, Uribe and his Ecuadoran and Venezuelan counterparts declared their hostilities over, a move that followed Uribe’s apology for the violation of sovereignty. But, even aside from the combative personalities of the three

29

presidents, tensions could easily reemerge. Documents that the Colombian government said came from dead FARC commander Reyes’s computer showed the guerrillas in contact with Ch´avez on a plan to establish diplomatic recognition of the FARC as a legitimate combatant, instead of a terrorist force, as the organization is now classified by the United States and the European Union. However long the FARC survives, its decades of existence provide a sobering example of how drug trafficking can grow from a criminal problem into a national security threat. Mexico, where drug-trafficking gangs are expanding their power in several states, seems to be in the grip of the “Colombianization” that had long been held out as a major peril. President Calder´on’s plan to use U.S. aid to crush the regional syndicates whose power rivals the government’s has not yet begun. Of all the countries in the region, Mexico is also the nation most affected by the hardening of U.S. attitudes toward immigrants who enter or remain in the United States illegally. New U.S. laws and border-control measures may succeed in reducing the flow of migrants. An economic slowdown could yield the same result. Even so, there is little question that a substantial Latin American and Caribbean population has become a permanent part of U.S. society. Latin American leaders since Bol´ıvar have been dreaming about peoples of the Americas unifying. They are doing so in ways that weren’t predicted, and in the most unexpected of locations. Marriages between first- or second-generation immigrants from different countries of the Americas, for instance, have become commonplace in states with high immigrant populations. “If you ask an Anglo, where is your family from, they’ll say something like, my mother is Irish, my father is German and my grandfather was Norwegian,” Nestor Rodriguez, a University of Houston sociologist, told the Arizona Republic. “The same thing is happening to Latinos. One parent may be Mexican, the other Guatemalan, or Salvadoran or Honduran.”55 The migration phenomenon has also introduced a new wrinkle in U.S. policy toward the Americas. Presidents from George H. W. Bush on have been promoting the free movement of capital and goods and services between the United States and the rest of the Americas as a major strategy to promote economic growth and prosperity. Ordinary people from Latin America and the Caribbean have, by way of their unauthorized migration, effectively added free movement of labor to the list of free trade attributes. After centuries of colonialism, and postcolonial authoritarianism and instability, ordinary people from all over Latin America and the Caribbean have become agents of social and economic change. As voters and as economic migrants, they have taken their futures into their own hands. Peter Katel is a staff writer for the CQ Researcher who previously reported on Haiti and Latin America for Time and Newsweek and covered the Southwest newspapers in New Mexico. 55 Quoted in Daniel Gonzalez, “Mixed Latino Families Are New Trend,” Arizona Republic, December 24, 2007.

PART TWO

G OV E R N M E N T S

A N T I G UA A N D B A R B U D A

The Country Located in the northern part of the Caribbean’s Lesser Antilles (see map, p. 342), the islands of Antigua and Barbuda are populated largely by blacks whose ancestors were transported as slaves from western Africa in the 17th and 18th centuries. Minorities include descendants of British colonial settlers, Portuguese laborers, and Lebanese and Syrian traders. Anglican Protestantism and Roman Catholicism claim the largest number of adherents, although a wide variety of other denominations exist, and complete religious freedom prevails. Agriculture dominated the economy until the 1960s, when a pronounced decline in sugar prices led to the abandonment of most cane fields and increased reliance on tourism, which currently accounts for about 60 percent of GDP. The harbor at St. John’s, long used as a dockyard for the British Navy, is a port of call for 11 major shipping lines, while a modern air facility, featuring a Canadian-financed terminal complex, is served by 6 international carriers. Although real GDP rose by an average of 4.3 percent during 2000–2006, while inflation averaged less than 2.0 percent through the same period (the lowest in the region), the country has long faced a variety of economic problems, including high external debt and damage from a series of severe hurricanes. As a result, Antigua and Barbuda have undertaken efforts to promote agriculture, particularly livestock raising and produce cultivation; expand the fishing industry; and, most recently, develop an Internet gambling industry (see Foreign relations, below).

Government and Politics Political Background Colonized by Great Britain in the early 17th century after unsuccessful efforts by Spain and France, Antigua became a founding member of the Federation of the West Indies in 1958, following the introduction of ministerial government two years earlier. Together with its northern dependency, Barbuda, it joined the West Indies Associated States in 1969 as an internally self-governing territory with a right of unilateral termination, which it exercised

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Barbuda Codrington

VENEZUELA

Caribbean Sea

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Saint John's Bolans

Redonda

Parham

Antigua

0 0

Freetown

10 Mi 10 Km

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A N T I G UA A N D BA R BU DA

on November 1, 1981. At independence, Premier Vere C. BIRD Sr., whose Antigua Labour Party (ALP) had returned to power in 1976 and was victorious in the election of April 1980, became prime minister. In the election on April 17, 1984, the ALP swept all the Antiguan seats in the House of Representatives, with Bird forming a new government two days later. In 1987 Prime Minister Bird resisted demands that his son, Vere C. BIRD Jr., be dismissed as public works minister in the wake of an official inquiry that had charged him with conduct “unbecoming a minister of government” in connection with the funding of an airport rehabilitation project. The issue led to a split within the Bird family. The prime minister’s second son, Deputy Prime Minister Lester Bryant BIRD, joined a “dissident majority” of eight officials, including Education Minister Reuben HARRIS, who announced a campaign to rid the country of “family government.” For its part, the opposition seemed unable to capitalize on the intra-ALP cleavage. Efforts to form an antigovernment alliance before the 1989 election proved unavailing, as a result of which the ALP retained power in the March 9 vote by winning 15 of 17 legislative seats. In February 1990 Education Minister Harris continued his attack on his government colleagues by suggesting that “corrupt practices” might be involved in a scheme to lease 400 acres of land in his district to a group of Hong Kong investors for the construction of a tourist facility. Far more embarrassing was the revelation in early May that a shipment of arms that Israeli authorities said had been approved for sale to the Antiguan government had turned up at the ranch of a notorious Colombian drug trafficker. After it became known that his name was on the purchase order held by Israel, Vere Bird Jr. was obliged to leave the cabinet. In August, Lester Bird announced that the cabinet’s “deep sense of shame and outrage” had yielded agreement on a government “cleanup” and on November 13 the prime minister announced his reluctant acceptance of all major recommendations of a committee of inquiry, including the banning from public office of his eldest son, whom the re-

port had castigated as a “thoroughly unprincipled man.” In the course of a cabinet reshuffle on March 15, 1991, Prime Minister Bird assumed the finance portfolio and in a subsequent parliamentary presentation gave a summary rather than a detailed account of his budget proposals. In response, four government ministers, including Deputy Prime Minister Lester Bird, resigned after branding the action “unconstitutional,” both of the younger Birds, for quite different reasons, thus having left the government. A new scandal erupted in January 1992, when the opposition weekly Outlook accused Prime Minister Bird of having pocketed a government check for $25,000 that was to have covered unspecified “medical expenses” incurred by the cousin of a longtime live-in companion. The charges provoked a general strike as well as widespread civil unrest that included arson attacks on a number of public and private buildings. The prime minister responded with an announcement that he would not seek reelection in 1994, although Lester Bird, who had returned to the cabinet as external affairs minister, was unable to muster sufficient support at a party convention in May to stand forth as a certain successor to his father. He was, however, successful in a second leadership bid in September after gaining the support of Vere Bird Jr., who had previously endorsed his opponent. The ALP won its fifth consecutive general election in legislative balloting on March 8, 1994, albeit with a reduced majority of 11 of 17 seats. Two days later, Lester Bird announced the formation of a new government that included John ST. LUCE, his most recent challenger for the party leadership, while generating some surprise by excluding his brother Vere Bird Jr. The ALP majority in the House of Representatives increased to 12 seats in the election of March 9, 1999. Vere Bird Sr. died on June 28, 1999. In the wake of long-standing charges of corruption involving senior ministers, the ALP was decisively defeated in the election of March 23, 2004, with Lester Bird among those losing their House seats. On March 24, Winston Baldwin SPENCER,

A N T I G UA A N D BA R BU DA

Political Status: Former British dependency; joined West Indies Associated States in 1967; independent member of the Commonwealth since November 1, 1981. Area: 171.5 sq. mi. (444 sq. km.), encompassing the main island of Antigua (108 sq. mi.) and the dependent islands of Barbuda (62 sq. mi.) and Redonda (0.5 sq. mi.). Population: 77,426 (2001C); 81,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): ST. JOHN’S (22,700). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: East Caribbean Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.70 EC dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir James B. CARLISLE; sworn in to succeed Sir Wilfred Ebenezer JACOBS, who retired June 10, 1993. Prime Minister: Winston Baldwin SPENCER (United Progressive Party); sworn in March 24, 2004, following election of March 23, succeeding Lester Bryant BIRD (Antigua Labour Party).

leader of the United Progressive Party (UPP) was sworn in as the new prime minister.

Constitution and Government Although the opposition Progressive Labour Movement (PLM) had campaigned for a unicameral legislature elected by proportional representation, the independence constitution retained the existing bicameral legislature composed of an appointed Senate and a House of Representatives elected from single-member constituencies (16 on Antigua and 1 on Barbuda) for a five-year term, subject to dissolution. Of the 17 senators, 11 are selected in consultation with the prime minister, 4 in consultation with the leader of the opposition, 1 on the advice of the smaller island’s Barbuda Council, and 1 at the governor general’s discretion. Executive power is exercised by a Council of Ministers headed by a prime minister and responsible to Parliament. The constitutional independence of

35

the judiciary is reinforced by the fact that Antigua and five neighboring states (Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) participate equally in a Supreme Court, which encompasses a Court of Appeal with a High Court, one of whose judges is resident in Antigua and presides over a Court of Summary Jurisdiction. District courts deal with minor offenses and civil actions involving not more than EC $500. While Antigua and Barbuda constitute a nominally unitary state, secessionist sentiment has long been pronounced on the smaller island. Premier Bird initiated, before independence, a limited devolution of powers to the Barbuda Council, which contains nine directly elected members in addition to a government nominee and the Barbuda parliamentary representative. However, in early 2000 Barbudans complained of the government’s handling their affairs through a single ministry (Home Affairs), and in March the Commonwealth appointed two members to review relations between the council and the government. Among other things, the council had called for establishment of a federal system under which Barbuda would have a legislative assembly with full authority over its internal affairs. In late 2000 the Commonwealth review commission rejected that proposal, although officials from Barbuda pledged to pursue the issue. Meanwhile, St. John’s endorsed the creation of a new joint consultative committee of representatives from both islands to oversee a proposed fiveyear development plan for Barbuda, and in 2004 the Spencer administration established a separate Barbuda ministry (Barbuda Affairs).

Foreign Relations In 1965 (then) chief minister Bird, a strong believer in regional cooperation, played a leading role in organizing the Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta), predecessor of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom). Upon independence, Antigua became a member of the Commonwealth and, shortly thereafter, the 157th member of the United Nations. Subsequently, St. John’s accepted observer status within

36

A N T I G UA A N D BA R BU DA

the Nonaligned Movement, viewing the latter as a “viable alternative [to] . . . confrontation between the superpowers.” However, in January 1982 the prime minister called on the United States to “protect” the Caribbean against foreign “subversive elements.” Antigua is also an active member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which provided troops in support of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983. The swing to the right continued in 1985, with St. John’s agreeing to the establishment of a U.S.-backed regional military training base on the main island and the use of existing U.S. bases for regional security exercises. In April 1999 the government announced an overhaul of its banking supervision board after foreign banks had been warned of dealing with local institutions because of money-laundering charges. In November the government said it had uncovered one such scheme and in April 2000 agreed to adopt a number of UN-sponsored measures to prevent abuses of its offshore facilities. In mid-2003 the Bird administration filed an appeal with the World Trade Organization (WTO) against restrictions on Internet gambling by U.S. consumers. Nine months later, in a landmark decision, the WTO ruled in favor of Antigua, stating that the restrictions were inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and in April 2005 the WTO ordered the United States to either lift its ban or remove a “discriminatory exemption” for horse-race betting.

Current Issues As of mid-2007 the WTO gambling controversy remained unresolved. The United States refused to comply with the WTO’s order on the ground that to do so would violate a number of state laws, and in September 2006 the U.S. Congress passed an “Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act” that specifically banned Internet horse-race betting and gambling within the United States. Washington’s truculence in the matter has been attributed largely to the fact that Antigua’s capacity to retaliate is

limited to sanctions on trade, the level of which is miniscule. Domestically, controversy has recently turned on a High Court claim by the government against nine opposition figures, including former Prime Minister Lester Bird, for allegedly misappropriating funds from government accounts in the Swiss American National Bank.

Political Parties Government Party United Progressive Party (UPP). The UPP was launched in March 1992 by merger of the Progressive Labour Movement (PLM), the United National Democratic Party (UNDP), and the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM). The action came in the wake of involvement by the three groups in antigovernment demonstrations triggered by the January corruption scandal. In power from 1971 to 1976 under its (then) leader George Walter, the PLM was organized in 1970 as the political affiliate of the Antigua Workers’ Union (AWU), which had emerged in the wake of a 1967 split in the Antigua Trades and Labour Union (AT&LU). The PLM delegation to the December 1980 independence talks in London refused to sign the conference report following rejection of proposals that included guarantees related to human rights and the right to strike, the adoption of proportional representation and a unicameral legislature, and assurances of greater local autonomy for Barbuda. In 1984 the party lost the three parliamentary seats it had won four years earlier, but with no parties other than the ruling ALP represented in the lower house, the PLM insisted that it remain the “official opposition.” The UNDP was formed in early 1986 by merger of the United People’s Movement (UPM) and the National Democratic Party (NDP). The UPM had been organized in 1982 by former PLM leader Walter, who had been forced to withdraw from active politics in February 1979 on conviction of mishandling state finances while premier from 1971 to 1976. The decision was reversed several days

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after the 1980 election, Walter subsequently accusing the new PLM leadership of efforts to exclude him. With considerable support from AWU members, who had been omitted from the PLM delegation to the independence talks, Walter announced that the UPM would be devoted to social democracy and to returning the country “to the hands of Antiguans”—a reference to extensive foreign participation in the economy. Ironically, in late 1982 a government official accused Walter of accepting financial support from Venezuela in return for a pledge of greater cooperation with Caracas should the UPM win power. The UPM secured no parliamentary representation in 1984 and Walter assumed no public role in forming the UNDP, reportedly because of the negative impact it might have in launching the new formation. The NDP was organized by a group of business leaders in early 1985. Initially perceived as a conservative alternative to both the ALP and the ACLM (below), it subsequently attempted to forge links with the leftist opposition in an effort to soften its image as a “middle-class party.” However, elements within the NDP, as well as within the ACLM, were reportedly opposed to the latter’s inclusion in the UNDP, which secured one parliamentary seat in 1989. Originally known as the Afro-Caribbean Liberation Movement, the ACLM was a “new left” organization that contested the 1980 election, winning less than 1 percent of the vote and obtaining no parliamentary seats. In 1982 ACLM accusations of government corruption in regard to the sale of passports and the alleged “disappearance” of loan funds resulted in a police raid on the offices of the party’s newspaper, The Outlet, where classified documents were discovered, in violation of the Official Secrets Act. Subsequently, party leader Tim Hector and a number of others were arrested and fined for violations of the Newspaper Registration Act and the Public Order Act. In 1985 Hector was sentenced to six months imprisonment on charges of “undermining confidence in a public official,” after publishing criticism of several government ministries; he remained free on bail while his appeal was heard, and in May 1986 his conviction

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was overturned by the High Court, which ruled the relevant section of the Public Order Act to be unconstitutional. The ACLM presented no candidates for the 1984 balloting; in 1989 it gained only 2 percent of the vote and won no seats. Hector died in November 2002. The UPP won only 4 lower house seats in 1999 but held a commanding majority of 13 seats after the 2004 balloting, with former opposition leader Baldwin Spencer being named prime minister. Leaders: Winston Baldwin SPENCER (Prime Minister), Wilmoth DANIEL (Deputy Prime Minister), Charlesworth SAMUEL (Agriculture Minister), Leon SYMISTER (Chair).

Opposition Party Antigua Labour Party (ALP). In power from 1967 to 1971 and a decisive victor in subsequent balloting in 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1989, the ALP has long been affiliated with the AT&LU. By the early 1980s, however, questions had arisen as to the viability of its grassroots linkages. In accepting redesignation as party chair in June 1984, the incumbent prime minister’s son, Lester Bird, adopted a posture of appealing over the heads of the older leadership to women’s, youth, and other groups for “modern approaches” and “a proper philosophical base” for party activity. In doing so, he appeared to be solidifying his claim to political succession, a claim strengthened in late 1989 with an agreement between rival ALP factions to rally behind the person ultimately selected by intraparty ballot to inherit the elder Bird’s mantle. In response to the corruption controversy that engulfed his administration in January 1992, the 82-year-old prime minister announced on March 30 that he would not seek reelection in 1994 but would continue in office for the balance of his existing term. Subsequently, balloting in a special ALP convention on May 24 to elect a new party leader ended inconclusively with an even split between Lester Bird and (then) information minister John St. Luce. In a second poll at the party’s annual convention on September 5–6, Bird defeated St. Luce, and he became prime minister in March 1994. He

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Cabinet As of April 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Winston Baldwin Spencer Wilmoth Daniel

Ministers Agriculture, Food Production, and Marine Resources Barbuda Affairs Ecclesiastical Affairs Education, Sports, and Youth Affairs Finance and Economy, Social Security, Cooperatives, Insurance and Credit Unions Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Health and 2007 Cricket World Cup Housing and Social Transformation Information, Broadcasting, and Telecommunications Justice and Public Safety, Police and Fire Division Legal Affairs and Attorney General National Security Public Utilities and Energy Public Works, and Transportation Tourism and Civil Aviation; Environment and Culture Without Portfolio

remained in office after the March 1999 poll but led his party to defeat in March 2004. Leaders: Steadroy (“Cutie”) BENJAMIN (Leader of the Opposition), Lester B. BIRD (Former Prime Minster and Former Leader of the Opposition), Vere C. BIRD Jr. (Party Chair), Adolphus Eleazer FREELAND (Former Party Chair), John E. ST. LUCE.

Other Parties National Movement for Change (NMC). The NMC was organized as an anti-Bird opposition party in March 2002. Leader: Alistair THOMAS. First Christian Democratic Movement (FCDM). The FCDM was launched in 2003. Leader: Egbert JOSEPH.

Charlesworth Samuel Winston Baldwin Spencer Winston Baldwin Spencer Bertrand Joseph Leon Errol Cort Winston Baldwin Spencer John Herbert Maginley Hilson Baptiste Edmond Mansoor Colin Derrick Justin Simon Winston Baldwin Spencer Winston Baldwin Spencer Wilmoth Daniel Harold Lovell Aziz Hadeed

Barbuda People’s Movement (BPM). The BPM is a separatist party that presently controls the local Barbuda Council. Having rejected the independence agreement, party leader Hilbourne Frank asserted in early 1982 that parliament’s passage of a bill altering land-tenure practices and permitting individual ownership “erodes the traditional, customary and constitutional authority handed down to the Council and the people of Barbuda.” Frank was elected Barbuda’s parliamentary deputy on March 9, 1989, while the BPM swept all four local Council contests at balloting on March 23 to win full control of the nine elective seats. In March 1997 the BPM won all five seats up for reelection, thereby retaining full control of the body. Leaders: Thomas Hilbourne FRANK, Fabian JONES (Chair).

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Barbuda People’s Movement for Change (BPMC). Launched in 2004 as the successor to the former Organization for National Reconstruction (ONR), the BPMC favors self-government for Barbuda. Leader: Arthur SHABAZZ-NIBBS.

The Worker’s Voice (6,000), twice-weekly organ of the ALP and AT&LU; The Outlet (5,500), ACLM weekly; The Nation (1,500), government weekly; Antigua Sun, daily; Rappore, UPP weekly.

A number of additional parties emerged prior to the 2004 election, including the Antigua Freedom Party (AFP), the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), the National Labour Party (NLP), and the Organization for National Development (OND).

There is no domestic facility. Most media rely on the regional Caribbean News Agency (CANA) for international coverage.

Legislature

Radio ZDK is a private station broadcasting from St. John’s. The government-operated Antigua and Barbuda Broadcasting Service (ABBS) transmits over one radio station and one TV facility, the latter providing the most sophisticated full-color service in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Other radio facilities include Voice of America, BBC Caribbean, and Deutsche Welle relays, plus a religious station, Caribbean Radio Lighthouse; additional television service is provided by privately owned CTV Entertainment Systems. As of 2005 there were 356 Internet users and 1,056 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

The Parliament is a bicameral body consisting of an appointed Senate and a directly elected House of Representatives. Senate. The upper house has 17 members named by the governor general: 11 (including at least 1 from Barbuda) appointed on advice of the prime minister, 4 named after consultation with the leader of the opposition, 1 recommended by the Barbuda Council, and 1 chosen at the governor general’s discretion. President: Hazelyn Mason FRANCIS. House of Representatives. The lower house has 17 members chosen every five years (subject to dissolution) from single-member constituencies, plus the attorney general, ex officio. At the most recent election of March 23, 2004, the UPP won 12 seats; the ALP, 4; and the BPM, 1 (obtained subsequently in a tie-breaker with the BPMC). Speaker: Giselle ISAAC-ARRINDELL.

News Agency

Broadcasting and Computing

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Deborah Mae LOVELL U.S. Ambassador to Antigua and Barbuda: Mary Martin QURISMAN (resident in Barbados)

Communications

Permanent Representative to the UN: John William ASHE

Freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed. The following are published in St. John’s:

IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OECS, OPANAL, WTO

Press

A R G E N T I NA ARGENTINE REPUBLIC Rep u´ blica Argentina

The Country Second in size among the countries of South America, the Argentine Republic includes the national territory of Tierra del Fuego and claims certain South Atlantic islands (including the Falklands), as well as portions of Antarctica. The country extends 2,300 miles from north to south and exhibits a varied climate and topography, including the renowned pampas, the fertile central plains. The population is largely Caucasian but of diverse national origin. Spaniards and Italians predominate, but there are also large groups from other Western and Eastern European countries, as well as Middle Easterners of both Arab and Jewish descent. Although Spanish is the official language, English, Italian, German, and French are also spoken. More than 90 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. According to 2001 Census, literacy was over 97%. Women pursue professional careers in great numbers. With the exception of both wives of former president Per´on, women have historically been minimally represented in government, although a women’s group called Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo was at the forefront of opposition to the former military regime. In the 2007 presi´ dential election, a woman, Cristina FERNANDEZ de Kirchner, was elected president. In the Higher Chamber, 27 out of 77 members are women, and in the Lower Chamber, 99 out of 277 members are women. Argentinians have traditionally enjoyed one of the highest per capita incomes in South America but for a number of years were subject to rampant inflation that escalated to more than 1000 percent

in early 1985, necessitating a drastic currency revision by midyear as part of a series of “war economy” measures. Inflation fell to an annualized rate of 50 percent the following year but escalated to an unprecedented rate of nearly 5000 percent in 1989, despite several attempted stabilization programs. However, a currency convertibility plan introduced in March 1991 (under which the peso was pegged to the U. S. dollar) subsequently eliminated hyperinflation (which declined steadily to a remarkable low of 0.1 percent in 1996) and prompted a surge of investment. The currency change also required

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Political Status: Independent republic proclaimed 1816; under military regimes 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; current constitution adopted August 22, 1994. Area: 1,068,013 sq. mi. (2,766,889 sq. km.), excluding territory claimed in Antarctica and the South Atlantic. Population: 36,260,130 (2001C); 39,596,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): BUENOS AIRES (12,704,000), C´ordoba (1,315,000), Rosario (908,000), La Plata (581,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (official rate November 2, 2007: 3.13 pesos = $1US). The peso had been at par with the dollar from 1991 to 2001, but in the wake of a severe economic crisis it was devalued for financial and international trade purposes to a rate of 1.40 pesos = $1US on January 7, 2002; concurrently, it was allowed to float for other transactions. A unified floating (albeit heavily managed) exchange rate system was introduced on February 11, 2002. ´ President: Cristina FERNANDEZ de Kirchner (Justicialist Party–Victory Front); elected on October 28, 2007 and inaugurated for a four-year term on December 10, 2007 to succeed N´estor Carlos KIRCHNER (Justicialist Party–Victory Front). Vice President: Julio C´esar Cleto COBOS (Radical Civic Union for Kirchner–Victory Front); elected on October 28, 2007, and inaugurated for a term concurrent with that of the president on December 10, 2007, succeeding Daniel Osvaldo SCIOLI (Justicialist Party).

the imposition of conservative banking measures, including higher interest rates. GDP, which had fallen by an average of 0.4 percent annually in 1980–1990, rose by an average of 5.3 percent annually during 1990–1998. However, international financial crises in 1997–1999 tested the convertibility law, and, in part due to the refusal of the government to devalue the peso, the economy subsequently suffered more than three years

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of recession, with unemployment rates ranging between 14 and 19 percent. In a move that generated substantial global attention, the government in late 2001 announced a moratorium on repayments of $155 billion of public debt. (Formal default on the debt front was averted in mid-2002 with a $550 million repayment to the Inter-American Development Bank [IADB], although no progress was registered in talks with private bondholders, to whom an overwhelming proportion of the loans was owed.) Meanwhile, the peso was devalued in January 2002 and allowed to float in February in an effort to spur growth. The economy experienced a severe decline of 11.0 percent in 2002, but it rebounded to growth of 8.8 percent in 2003 and 9.0 percent in 2004, with the government holding firm to an offer to settle on a 70 percent write-down of the privately held bonds’ nominal value. In early March 2005 agreement was reached with three-quarters of the private creditors on a write-down of approximately $100 billion, and in late December the country paid off its outstanding debt of $9.8 billion to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the Kirchner administration concurrently declaring that it was severing relations with the fund. Significantly, growth averaged 8 percent per year in 2003–2006, and unemployment, which had been mired in double digits for nearly a decade, fell to 8.7 percent at the end of that period. However, the administration’s fiscal policies also led to rising inflation, which reached 9.8 percent in 2006, more than three times that of Brazil, Argentina’s major trading partner. When the government reported an unusually low 1.1 percent monthly rate of inflation in January 2007 (1.8 percent had been forecast), many analysts questioned the accuracy of the figures. Among those concerned over the poor quality of the official economic statistics were investors, who had also been upset the previous December by the government’s decision to extend the “economic emergency” law of 2002, which gave the government the right to freeze tariffs on utilities and to renegotiate privatization agreements. Labor leaders also charged the government with failing to bargain with them in good faith by relying on the allegedly faulty data

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in determining inflation-adjusted raises. That issue was a major factor in a three-day teachers’ strike in April.

Government and Politics Political Background Following the struggle for independence from Spain in 1810–1816, Argentina experienced a period of conflict over its form of government. The provinces advocated a federal system to guarantee their autonomy, while Buenos Aires favored a unitary state in which it would play a dominant role. A federal constitution was drafted in 1853, but Buenos Aires refused to ratify the document until its 1859 defeat in a brief war. Following a second military reversal in 1880, the territory was politically neutralized by being designated a federal district. The early years of the 20th century were dominated by the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador—PC). However, the reformist Radical Civic Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Radical—UCR) in 1912 successfully pressed for enactment of a liberal electoral law that resulted in the election of UCR leader Hip´olito IRIGOYEN as president in 1916. Faced with mounting economic problems, the Irigoyen government was overthrown and replaced by the nation’s first military regime in 1930. With the election of August´ın P. JUSTO to the presidency in 1932, a second period of Conservative rule was launched that lasted until 1943, when the military again intervened. Juan Domingo ´ Sosa was elected chief executive in 1946, PERON inaugurating a populist dictatorship that was eventually overthrown in 1955. His second wife, Mar´ıa ´ (better known as Eva Per´on Eva Duarte de PERON or Evita) was an active participant. She established the Eva Per´on Foundation with donations and funds coerced from the private sector, which helped to improve the lives of the poor. Per´on’s influence over the political arena can hardly be exaggerated, as it was during his government and through his leadership that unions were recognized as legitimate political actors and that the “masses” (known as

the descamisados or “shirtless ones”) were incorporated into political strategies. Women’s suffrage was introduced in 1951 after a strong campaign by Evita. Per´on relied more on cooptation and coercion than on democratic representation, and he struggled when economic growth slowed and the politicized masses had minimal institutional channels to accommodate them. During his term in office, a divorce law was promulgated with Per´on’s approval, an act which put him at odds with the Catholic Church, which actively campaigned for his removal. The loss of control was noted by elites, who supported the military coup that removed Per´on. Subsequent military and democratic governments attempted to “ban” peronism, but it remained the country’s most powerful ideological influence. In the March 1973 general election, the pero´ nista Dr. H´ector J. CAMPORA emerged victorious. Four months later C´ampora resigned to force a new election in which Per´on would be eligible as a candidate. The new round of balloting, held in September, returned the former president to power with an overwhelming majority after 18 years of exile. Following his inauguration, Per´on was plagued by factionalism within his movement and by increasingly widespread opposition from guerrilla groups. After his death on July 1, 1974, he was succeeded by his wife, Isabel (born Mar´ıa Estela) Mart´ınez ´ who had been elected vice president de PERON, the preceding September. Isabel Per´on’s turbulent presidency was terminated on March 24, 1976, by a three-man military junta, which on March 26 designated Lt. Gen. Jorge Rafael VIDELA as her replacement. In December 1976 General Videla stated that his government was “very close to final victory” over left-wing terrorists, most prominently the so-called Montonero guerrillas and the People’s Revolutionary Army. Earlier, in an apparent consolidation of power by Videla, a number of rightist officers were retired and replaced by moderates. On May 2, 1978, however, it was announced that while Videla had been redesignated as president for a three-year term retroactive to March 29, he would cease to serve as a member of the junta following his military retirement on August 1. The pattern was repeated

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with the retirement of Lt. Gen. Roberto Eduardo VIOLA as army commander and junta member as of December 31, 1979, and his designation to succeed Videla in March 1981. Buffeted by health problems and an inability to deal with a rapidly deteriorating economy, Viola stepped down as chief executive on December 11, and he was succeeded eleven days later by the army commander, Lt. Gen. Leopoldo Fortunato GALTIERI, who continued as a member of the junta, along with Adm. Jorge Isaac ANAYA and Lt. Gen. Basilio Arturo LAMI DOZO, commanders of the navy and air force, respectively. The region and the world were shaken by a brief but intense conflict with Great Britain that erupted in 1982 as the result of a 149-year dispute over ownership of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), located in the South Atlantic about 400 miles northeast of Tierra del Fuego. Argentina invaded the islands on April 2, prompting the dispatch of a British armada that succeeded in regaining control with the surrender of about 15,000 Argentine troops in the capital, Stanley, on July 15 (see Contested Territory, below). Branded as having “sold out” the country by his conduct of the war, Galtieri resigned on June 17 and was succeeded immediately as army commander by Maj. Gen. Cristino NICOLAIDES and on July 1 as president by Gen. Reynaldo Benito Antonio BIGNONE. In the face of an economic crisis and mounting pressure from the nation’s political parties, Bignone announced in February 1983 that elections for a civilian government would be advanced to the following October. In balloting for national, provincial, and municipal authorities on October 30, 1983, the UCR, under the leadership of Ra´ul ALFONS´IN Foulkes, scored a decisive victory, winning not only the presidency but a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Following pro forma designation by the electoral college, Alfons´ın and his vice-presidential running mate, V´ıctor MARTINEZ, were sworn in for sixyear terms on December 10. On November 3, 1985, at the first renewal of the lower house in twenty years, the UCR marginally increased its majority, largely at the expense of the

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oficialista wing of the Peronist party (see Justicialist Party [Partido Justicialista—PJ], under Political Parties, below). On September 6, 1987, on the other hand, the Radicals were reduced to plurality status, with most of the Peronist gains again being registered by the movement’s renovadores faction, whose principal leaders, Antonio CAFIERO (governor of Buenos Aires) and Carlos Sa´ul MENEM (governor of La Rioja), emerged as the leading peronista contenders for presidential nomination. In the primary balloting in July 1988, Menem and the UCR’s Eduardo C´esar ANGELOZ were formally selected as their parties’ standard-bearers for the presidential poll, which yielded a peronista victory on May 14, 1989. Although not scheduled to be inaugurated until December 10, Menem and his running mate, Eduardo Alberto DUHALDE, were sworn in on July 8, following congressional acceptance of the resignations of their predecessors. The unprecedented early transfer resulted from suddenly escalating commodity prices in late May that necessitated the declaration of a state of siege to contain widespread food riots. However, Menem’s standing in the opinion polls, which had reached a peak of 74 percent in September, plunged to a low of 31 percent by the end of the year because of his inability to halt the downward economic spiral. In early December 1990 the army responded to the country’s economic problems, as well as to the imprisonment of officers associated with the “dirty war” of 1976–1983, with its fourth revolt in three years. The government moved quickly, however, to counter the dissidents, who had seized the army headquarters in central Buenos Aires immediately prior to a state visit by U. S. President George H. W. Bush. The uprising was reported to have been staged by a nationalist military faction headed by (former) Colonel Mohamed Al´ı SEINELDIN, who was under arrest at the time. Thereafter, despite widespread popular opposition, Menem issued pardons for a number of former presidents and military leaders convicted of criminal acts during the period of military rule, as well as for former Montonero guerrilla leader Mario FIRMENICH and several others.

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Largely because of continued implementation of stringent economic reforms, including the introduction of full currency convertibility in March, inflation plunged in 1991, yielding an unexpectedly strong peronista showing in a series of provincial and federal legislative elections between August and October. One of the victors was Vice President Duhalde, who resigned his federal post on December 5 to assume the governorship of Buenos Aires province. In mid-1993 President Menem indicated that, subsequent to forthcoming congressional balloting, he might call a national referendum on constitutional reform, the most important component of which would permit him to seek reelection. However, the peronistas secured an unprecedented victory in the poll of October 3, and on November 14 Menem and opposition leader Alfons´ın concluded a “Democratic Pact” (see Constitution and Government, below) that made the referendum unnecessary. In Constituent Assembly balloting on April 10, 1994, both of the leading formations experienced setbacks. The peronistas were held to a plurality of 136 seats on a 37.7 percent share of the vote, while the UCR won 75 seats on a 19.9 percent vote share. The most striking gain was registered by the left-of-center Broad Front (Frente Grande—FG) coalition, which captured 31 seats as contrasted with only 3 Chamber seats in 1993. In the general election of May 14, 1995, Menem surpassed poll projections by easily winning direct election to a new four-year mandate on a 49.8 percent vote share—20.6 percent more than that of his nearest competitor, Jos´e Octavio BORDON, who headed a recently formed leftist coalition (the Front for a Country in Solidarity [Frente del Pa´ıs Solidario—Frepaso]), that included the FG. By contrast, the UCR candidate, Horatio MASSACCESI, came in third with 17.1 percent of the vote. The Justicialist Party (PJ), as the peronistas were formally known, also won control of a majority of lower house seats and 9 of 14 contested provincial governorships. Further rounds of regional balloting later in the year gave the PJ control of 14 of the country’s 23 provinces; 5 of the

remainder were won by the UCR and 4 by provincial parties. However, in a dramatic reversal in Buenos Aires’ first-ever mayoral election on June 30, 1996, the UCR candidate, Fernando DE LA ´ swept to victory with a 39.8 percent vote RUA share, while the incumbent, Jorge DOMINGUEZ, placed third in the four-candidate field with 18.8 percent. In nationwide balloting on October 26, 1997, the peronistas lost control of the Chamber of Deputies by winning only 51 of 127 contested seats; the opposition UCR and Frepaso secured 46 seats in a coalition and an additional 17 seats on separate lists. On October 24, 1999, opposition presidential candidate de la R´ua defeated the PJ’s Duhalde with a 48.5 percent vote share. In simultaneous balloting for 130 of 257 Chamber of Deputies’ seats, representation of the president-elect’s Alliance for Work, Justice and Education (Alianza por Trabajo, Justicia y Educaci´on—ATJE) rose to 127, which, with the support of third-party allies, gave it a working majority. In addition to continuing economic malaise, the de la R´ua administration was shaken by a bribery scandal in September 2000 that prompted a cabinet reshuffle on October 5. Protesting the retention of two ministers who had been implicated in the affair, Vice President Carlos Alberto ALVAREZ resigned the following day, his Senate presidency being assumed by the president pro tempore, Mario An´ıbal LOSADA. In the congressional balloting on October 14, 2001, the peronistas regained control of both houses, the ATJE winning only 88 of 257 Chamber and 25 of 72 Senate seats. Two months later, on December 20, President de la R´ua resigned in the face of widespread public protests over continued economic decline, and Senate President Ram´on PUERTA became his successor on an acting basis. On December 23 a special joint session of legislators and provincial governors elected the Peronist governor of San Luis, Adolfo RODR´IGUEZ Sa´a, as interim chief executive. Rodr´ıguez Sa´a was popularly applauded when he immediately declared a moratorium on the payment of Argentina’s

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international debt, but many established politicians did not back him on the measure. Rodr´ıguez Sa´a resigned on December 30, his office devolving briefly on the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Ed˜ before passing by another joint uardo CAMANO, election to former vice president Eduardo Duhalde on January 1, 2002. Duhalde quickly ended the convertibility regime and allowed the peso to float. He chose N´estor Carlos KIRCHNER, a governor from the remote province of Santa Cruz, as his preferred successor, rejecting Menem. In first-round presidential balloting on April 27, 2003, former president Menem narrowly outpolled Kirchner, a fellow peronista, with a plurality of 24.3 percent. On May 14, however, Menem withdrew from a runoff after it became apparent that Kirchner would be supported by the other minor candidates. Kirchner and his running mate, Daniel SCIOLI, were subsequently inaugurated on May 25. Before the legislative poll of October 23, 2005, Kirchner waged a bitter struggle with his immediate predecessor, Duhalde, over control of the Justicialist Party, while launching on August 24 a Victory Front grouping to contest constituencies where his supporters did not possess majorities. The strategy yielded a substantial victory for the kirchneristas, who won 69 of 127 contested seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 17 of 24 in the Senate. Although President Kirchner’s approval rating stood at 60 percent in July 2007, he declined to stand in the upcoming election, announcing on July 1 that his wife, first lady and senator Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner, would be a candidate to succeed him, fueling speculation that the presidential couple aimed to circumvent constitutional convention by holding rotating presidencies for the maximum number of terms, effectively holding collective leadership during both their tenures in the office. Other presidential candidates included former finance minister Roberto LAVAGNA, who enjoyed the backing of some Justicialist Party dissidents, including the Duhalde family, and some UCR members. Meanwhile, powerful anti-Kirchner peronistas, including former presidents Menem and

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Puerta, decided to support their own candidate, Alberto Rodr´ıguez Sa´a. In the presidential election of October 28, 2007, Senator Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner secured 44.92 percent of votes, precluding a recount by exceeding the forty percent threshold requirement to become Argentina’s first elected woman president. ´ Her nearest rival, Elisa Mar´ıa Avelina CARRIO, of the Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic (Afirmaci´on para Una Rep´ublica Igualitaria— ARI), represented the Coalici´on C´ıvica with a 22.95 percent vote share, followed by Roberto Lavagna, of the Concertation Alliance (Alianza Concertaci´on UNA—AC), with 16.88 percent. Minor candidates included Alberto Jos´e Rodr´ıguez Sa´a, representing the Union and Liberty Party (Alianza Frente Justicia Union y Libertad—JUL), with 7.71 percent of votes, and N´estor PITROLA, representing the Worker’s Party (Partido Obrero— PO) with 6.19 percent. Legislative elections also held on October 28, 2007, returned pluralities for the Victory Front (Frente para la Victoria—FPV) (see Legislature, below).

Constitution and Government After Argentina returned to civilian rule in 1983, most of the constitutional structure of 1853 was reintroduced. The president and vice president were again designated for nonrenewable six-year terms by an electoral college chosen on the basis of proportional representation, with each electoral district having twice as many electors as the combined number of senators and deputies. The National Congress consisted of a 46-member Senate, one-third being replenished every three years, and a 254-member Chamber of Deputies, one-half being elected every two years. The judicial system encompassed a Supreme Court, federal appeals courts, and provincial structures including supreme and subsidiary judicial bodies. In 1993 President Carlos Menem negotiated an agreement (in what became known as the Olivos Pact) on constitutional change that would allow reelection of the president in exchange for reducing

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the presidential mandate from six to four years. The pact also reduced some of the powers of the president over other branches. The constitution of August 1994 provided for direct election of the president and vice president for four-year terms, with the possibility of one consecutive renewal. (First-round election requires a 45 percent majority [40 percent in the event of a gap greater than 10 percent between the two leading contenders].) Newly created was the post of cabinet chief (jefe de gabinete), a coordinating position filled by presidential appointment, subject to recall by an absolute majority of each of the legislative chambers. The number of senators from each province was increased from two to three under the 1994 basic law revisions, the added member to represent the leading opposition party or group. The senatorial mandate, on the other hand, was shortened from nine years to six, with replenishment of one-third by direct election every two years commencing in the year 2001. The Chamber of Deputies continued to be renewed by halves every two years. The 1994 basic law provided for an auditor general nominated by the largest opposition party and for a people’s defender (ombudsman) appointed for a once-renewable five-year term by a two-thirds vote of each legislative chamber. It also affirmed Argentina’s sovereignty over the Falklands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich islands. There are now 23 provinces (Tierra del Fuego having been upgraded from the status of a National Territory in 1991), plus the Federal District of Buenos Aires. The provinces elect their own governors and legislatures and retain those powers not specifically delegated to the federal government; in practice, however, there has been a history of substantial federal intervention in provincial affairs. Included in the current constitution is a provision that the mayor of Buenos Aires (formerly a presidential appointee) also be directly elected. In August 2006 the congress voted to give expanded powers to President N´estor Kirchner, including the ability to make alterations in the government budget without congressional approval and to issue executive decrees. Concurrently,

Kirchner agreed to make Supreme Court Judicial nominations more transparent and to reduce the size of the court from nine to five (reversing the Menem expansion in 1990). He also reduced the size of the Magistrates’ Council from 20 to 13 members, 5 of whom he appoints. Province and Capital Buenos Aires (La Plata) Catamarca (Catamarca) Chaco (Resistencia) Chubut (Rawson) C´ordoba (C´ordoba) Corrientes (Corrientes) Entre R´ıos (Paran´a) Formosa (Formosa) Jujuy (San Salvador de Jujuy) La Pampa (Santa Rosa) La Rioja (La Rioja) Mendoza (Mendoza) Misiones (Posadas) Neuqu´en (Neuqu´en) R´ıo Negro (Viedma) Salta (Salta) San Juan (San Juan) San Luis (San Luis) Santa Cruz (R´ıo Gallegos) Santa F´e (Santa F´e) Santiago del Estero (Santiago del Estero) Tierra del Fuego (Ushuaia) Tucum´an (San Miguel de Tucum´an)

Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2006E)

118,843 38,540 38,468 86,751 65,161 34,054 29,427 27,825 20,548 55,382 35,649 58,239 11,506 36,324 78,383 59,759 33,257 29,632 94,186 51,354 52,222

14,634,000 378,000 1,065,000 443,000 3,328,000 1,007,000 1,233,000 538,000 657,000 322,000 333,000 1,671,000 1,067,000 523,000 578,000 1,205,000 670,000 417,000 220,000 3,109,000 878,000

8,074 8,697

121,000 1,449,000

77

2,686,000

Federal District Distrito Federal (Buenos Aires)

Foreign Relations Argentina has traditionally maintained an independent foreign policy and has been reluctant to follow U. S. leadership in hemispheric and world affairs. Argentina claims territory in the Antarctic and, despite the outcome of the 1982 war with Britain, continues to assert its long-standing claim to sovereignty over the Falklands (Islas Malvinas). The latter has won support at the UN General

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Assembly, which, since the cessation of hostilities, has repeatedly called on the claimants to initiate negotiations on a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Relations with Chile became tense following the announcement in May 1977 that a panel of international arbitrators had awarded Chile the ownership of three disputed islands in the Beagle Channel, just north of Cape Horn. As in the case of the Falklands, there is evidence of petroleum in the area. The award also permitted Chile to extend its nominal jurisdiction into the Atlantic, thereby strengthening its Antarctic claims, which overlap those of Argentina. Having expected a “political” rather than a purely legal judgment, with at least one island being awarded to each country, Argentina formally repudiated the decision in January 1978. A subsequent 19-month mediation effort by Pope John Paul II resulted in a proposal that endorsed the awarding of the three islands to Chile, while limiting the assignment of offshore rights on the Atlantic side of the Cape Horn meridian. The proposal was rejected by the Argentine junta but accepted by Ra´ul Alfons´ın before his election as president of Argentina, and a treaty ending the century-old dispute was narrowly ratified by the Argentine Senate in March 1985. Additional border issues were ostensibly resolved by an agreement between presidents Menem of Argentina and Frei of Chile in 1991, but its terms drew opposition in both countries because of an “additional protocol” concluded by the two chief executives in late 1996. It was not until June 1999 that ratifications were completed on the Continental Glaciers Treaty that resolved the last remaining border dispute between the two countries. For nearly a decade Argentina was embroiled in a dispute with Brazil over water rights on the Paran´a River. In October 1979, however, both countries joined Paraguay in signing an agreement that not only resolved differences over Brazil’s Itaip´u Dam, the world’s largest, but also freed the way for cooperative exploitation of the Uruguay River. Economic linkage between the continent’s two largest states was further enhanced on December 10, 1986, with the signing by presidents Alfons´ın and Sarney of 20 accords launching an ambitious economic in-

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tegration effort. Under the plan, a customs union was established for most capital goods as of January 1, 1987, with cooperation in the exchange of food products, the promotion of bilateral industrial ventures, the establishment of a $200 million joint investment fund, and joint energy development (including a new $2 billion hydroelectric facility) to follow. President Sanguinetti of Uruguay, who was at the meeting, pledged his “determined support” for the move and agreed to a series of ministeriallevel talks designed to pave the way for his country’s participation in the integration process. The result was the signing in Asunci´on, Paraguay, on March 26, 1991, of a four-nation treaty (including the host country) providing for the formation of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Com´un del Cono Sur—Mercosur). In 1988 Argentina and Brazil agreed to cooperate in the nuclear power industry. While neither was a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (see article on the International Atomic Energy Agency), the two countries formally rejected the development of nuclear weaponry in a July 1991 accord that also banned the introduction of such arms from external sources. In addition, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, after a lengthy delay, voted in November 1993 to ratify the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (see article on the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), which bans nuclear weapons from the continent. Although insisting during the 1989 presidential campaign that Argentina would recover the Falklands “even if blood has to be spilled,” Menem subsequently indicated that he was prepared to engage in a “civilized dialogue” with Britain, particularly if the latter were to abandon its economic zone around the islands. In mid-October the first direct talks between the two countries in five years were held in Madrid, Spain. At the conclusion of a second round of talks in Madrid on February 15, 1990, an agreement was reached to restore full diplomatic relations. By contrast, fresh tension erupted in August 1993 as the result of a suggestion that the Falkland Islanders be given cash awards by Buenos Aires to

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reduce their opposition to Argentine sovereignty claims, coupled with the introduction by Britain of a new fishing license regime for the waters around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. No sooner was an agreement reached in settlement of the latter controversy than a British geological survey suggested that the undersea oil potential in the Falklands area appeared to be substantially greater than in Britain’s North Sea fields. The result was a major agreement signed in New York in September 1995 for joint oil and gas exploration in a 7,000-square-mile area southwest of the disputed islands (see Contested Territory, below). In October 1998 President Menem traveled to Britain for the first such visit by an Argentine chief executive in four decades. Although he insisted during his stay that the question of sovereignty over the Falklands remained nonnegotiable, tension between the former combatants manifestly eased, and in mid-December the administration of Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that the British arms embargo would be relaxed, save for materiel that would put the disputed territory at renewed risk. In mid-1999 an agreement was reached on the restoration of air traffic with the mainland and a resumption of visits to the territory by Argentinians. However, the dispute over sovereignty remained unresolved and the issue was not discussed during a visit by Blair (the first by a British prime minister) in August 2001. The Argentinian hard line continued under President Kirchner, who, in April 2005, emphasized his government’s commitment to “full recovery” of the islands, albeit “through dialogue and peace.” Relations with Brazil were at their warmest with a state visit by Brazilian President Lula da Silva in October 2003 but declined thereafter. With growth in Argentine exports to Brazil in 2003–2004 scarcely more than 10 percent of Brazil’s to Argentina, Buenos Aires complained of Mercosur’s “economic asymmetries”; Argentina also objected to Brazil’s posture as regional leader in its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. BrazilianArgentine relations subsequently continued to decline as Argentina turned much of its trade attention toward Venezuela, with whom Kirchner, as a

“progressive Peronist,” desired closer ties. Argentina and Venezuela became involved in the proposed development of a South American development bank that would be an alternative to the U. S.-dominated IADB; the two countries also urged the creation of an organization of petroleum- and gas-producing countries in South America. Concurrently, Venezuela agreed to supply lower-priced oil to Argentina, and the Venezuelan government bought $3.1 billion of Argentine bonds. The ties between the two administrations negatively affected U. S.-Argentine relations, especially after the Argentine government hosted Venezuelan President Ch´avez in Buenos Aires for a “counter rally” to the simultaneous visit of U. S. President George W. Bush to Uruguay. Despite hopes that relations could improve under the new president, U. S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pointedly skipped Argentina in a regional tour during March 2008. Relations have also worsened quite significantly with Uruguay recently as a result of Argentine opposition to the decision of a Finnish company (Botnia) to invest in a pulp mill along the Uruguay River. (The project was supported by a $100 billion loan from the World Bank.) Argentine protestors insisted that the mill would bring pollution and that Argentina should have been consulted on the project. Protests included the blockade of bridges between the two countries. The Spanish company Ence subsequently decided to move a related project to a less controversial section of Uruguay, but Botnia and Uruguayan president Tabar´e Vazquez did not appear willing to back down. President N´estor Kirchner, his wife, president-elect Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner, Tabar´e Vazquez, and the King of Spain met in Santiago, Chile, the first week of November 2007 to discuss the pulp mill on the banks of the River Uruguay. The following week, the president of Uruguay closed the border with Argentina. While they were negotiating in Chile, Vazquez gave the green light for the inauguration of the mill. Upon learning of the decision, the Argentine government left the negotiating table. Relations between Venezuela and Argentina took a slight, but brief, turn for the worse on

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November 18, 2006, when an Argentine judge issued warrants for Akbar Rafsanjani (Iranian president in 1989–1997) and eight other former Iranian officials for an alleged background role in an attack on a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994, that killed 85 people. The judge argued that the Lebanese group Hezbollah had been implicated in the bombing and that the Iranian officials were potentially liable because of their financial support of Hezbollah. Ch´avez’s unwavering support for the Iranian republic led Kirchner’s housing secretary, Luis D’EL´IA, considered pro-Ch´avez, to critique the warrant as “an American-Israeli military aggression against the Islamic republic.” D’El´ıa was subsequently sacked.

Current Issues In addition to fostering economic recovery, President N´estor Kirchner was widely credited with challenging the “impunity” granted by the Menem administration to those involved in the authoritarian excesses during the 1976–1983 junta rule. The president called for the prosecution of numerous officials who had been covered by the previous amnesty agreement, while in 2005 the Supreme Court annulled several amnesty laws that had protected low-ranking officers who had argued they had acted in “due obedience” during the “dirty war.” That decision led to many trials, including ´ a former police sergeant, who that of Julio SIMON, was sentenced to 25 years in prison for kidnapping and torture. Problems arose in the case of Miguel ETCHECOLATZ, police commissioner in Buenos Aires province during the period in question. He was sent to prison for life on the evidence provided by more than 130 people. However, on the day before his testimony, a witness for the prosecution went missing and was presumed dead, leading many to question the accountability of the current police force. Kirchner was subsequently perceived as being less successful in dealing with impunity in regard to current malfeasance than in regard to earlier actions. The challenge to impunity most prominently led to the overturning of pardons of Jorge VIDELA,

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the first leader of the military junta, and Albano HARGUINDEGUY and Jos´e Mart´ınez de HOZ, former interior and economic ministers, respectively. About 200 other people had been arrested and were scheduled to be tried for crimes related to the military period, and Kirchner had clearly decided that the legacy of justice would be central to his administration. However, critics of Kirchner pointed to the “lopsided” direction of prosecutions, noting that Montoneros and other leftist revolutionaries remained protected from arrest. (Kirchner was close to several ex-Montoneros, as were other members of his administration.) Meanwhile, in a more surprising move, Argentine officials asked Spanish authorities to detain former president Mar´ıa Estela de Per´on for human rights investigations. She has been largely perceived to have had no control over the government when she was president from 1974 to 1976, and she has denied any knowledge of the activities under investigation. By mid December 2007, the former commander of the Army, Cristino Nicolaides, received 25 years in prison. Another seven members of the same battalion received between 20 and 25 years in prison for kidnapping and torture during the “dirty war.” On August 4, 2007, Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson, a businessman holding joint U.S.Venezuelan citizenship, arrived in Buenos Aires with $800,000 in his suitcase. He traveled on a private jet chartered by Enarsa, an oil company owned by the Argentine government, and was accompanied by the company president and representatives of the Venezuelan state oil company, PDVSA (Petr´oleos de Venezuela, S.A.). By the time this trip was made public, Wilson had already returned to Miami. Investigators suspected that the money was destined for use as bribe payments or to fund groups sympathetic to Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez. On December 12, four Venezuelans and a Uruguayan were charged in Miami with acting illegally as agents of the Venezuelan government by allegedly attempting to pressure Antonini to cover up the source and destination of the money. According to FBI records, the money was earmarked for Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner’s campaign, a charge denied by the Argentine government.

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In an effort to promote investment in Argentina, Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner traveled to Germany and Austria in the run-up to the presidential election, and visited the U. S. after winning the presidency. She also met with the presidents of Brazil, Venezuela and Bolivia during the campaign, burnishing her credentials as the candidate best placed to conduct foreign policy. Following his wife’s election, former president N´estor Kirchner announced his candidacy for president of the Justicialist Party in late January 2008. In an unrelated development, mainstream Argentine press sources published articles early in the year which questioned his increase in assets while in office, focusing particularly on his acquisitions in real estate following earlier discussions which had been intensified following the Kirchners’ submission of their annual report on personal finances. The opposition Civic Coalition (Coalici´on C´ıvica—CC) said that it was considering setting up a commission to further investigate the Kirchners’ holdings. In another confirmation that the new president’s honeymoon would be brief, the government faced a challenge in early 2008 when Bolivian President Evo Morales confirmed that Bolivia would not be able to provide the gas supplies mandated in contracts between Argentina and Brazil. While Morales said Bolivia would try to find an “equilibrium” in the dispatch of gas to avoid further shortages, his hydrocarbons minister asserted that domestic demand would take priority, with prospects for increased exports bleaker due to slackened production and investment. In January, President Fern´andez de Kirchner met with Morales to discuss an agreement to invest $1.8 billion to build a Pipeline of Argentine North East (Gasoducto del Noreste Argentino [GNEA]) that would transport 20 million cubic meters of Bolivian gas to Argentina daily.

Political Parties A ban on political activity, imposed by the military on its return to power in March 1976, was formally lifted by President Bignone at his inau-

guration on July 1, 1982, and more than 300 national and regional groups participated in the general election of October 30, 1983. However, two formations, the Radical Civic Union and the Justicialist Liberation Front (Peronist) shared 92 percent of the vote. In the legislative balloting of November 3, 1985, the combined vote share of the UCR and peronistas dropped to 77 percent, with “orthodox” and “renewing” factions of the latter (alone or in alliance with smaller parties) presenting separate lists in most districts. In the midterm lower house poll of September 6, 1987, the two major groups drew more than 79 percent of the vote, although the UCR slipped from majority to plurality status by retaining only 117 of 254 seats. The combined vote of the two parties in the presidential balloting of May 14, 1989, was a little more than 84 percent, with the peronistas outpolling the UCR in 23 of 24 electoral districts. (The UCR has been affiliated with the Socialist International since 1996.) On August 3, 1997, the two main opposition parties (the UCR and Frepaso, below) announced an Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education (Alianza por Trabajo, Justicia y Educaci´on—ATJE) for the October legislative poll and the 1999 presidential balloting. Although the ATJE was received with varying degrees of enthusiasm by provincial leaders, it outpolled the peronistas by nearly 10 percent in the 1997 election, depriving the latter of their legislative majority. In addition to winning the presidency in 1999, the ATJE secured a near majority of lower house seats with the absence of upper house balloting, leaving Justicialista control of the Senate undisturbed. Since then, however, the peronistas have been dominant, particularly the Victory Front (FPV), the “kirchenismo” wing founded in 2003 to sustain the presidential candidacy of N´estor Kirchner, which also attracted the support of the “K Radicals”—those UCR members who supported Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner in the 2007 presidential elections. The former governor of Mendoza, Julio C´esar Cleto COBOS, one of five UCR-affiliated governors who declared their support for Kirchner, ran in the ticket with Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner under UC for K–Victory Front, becoming vice president after the election.

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Cobos, together with four other governors, was subsequently expelled from the UCR. Cobos was slated to lead the talks between the dissident governors and the UCR, which maintained that the proKirchner expellees would have to resign from any government posts before being admitted back into the party (see UCR, below).

Federal Parties with Legislative Seats as of January 2008 Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista— PJ). What was formerly the Justicialist Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Justicialista—MNJ) grew out of the extreme nationalist peronista (also known as laborista) movement led by General Per´on from 1946 to 1955. Formally dissolved after its leader went into exile, the peronistas regrouped, in alliance with a number of smaller parties, as the Justicialist Liberation Front (Frente Justicialista de Liberaci´on—Frejuli) before the 1973 election. Frejuli’s victorious candidate, H´ector C´ampora, subsequently resigned to permit the reelection of Per´on, who had returned in 1972. The movement’s nominal leader, Isabel Per´on, who was ousted as her husband’s successor in 1976 and confined to prison and house arrest for five years thereafter, was permitted to go into exile in July 1981. The peronistas (as they are still popularly known) have experienced a number of internal cleavages, including one occasioned by the corrientes renovadoras (“current of renewal”), which was initially launched by a group of moderate trade unionists and students calling for a more democratic party structure. Although both factions asserted their allegiance to Isabel Per´on at separate congresses in February 1985, she withdrew as MNJ leader: subsequently, dissent within the renovadores faction led to their defeat at a unified party congress in July, which ignored her resignation and reelected her as titular president. For the 1985 legislative balloting, the two factions presented separate lists in alliance with smaller parties in most districts. The oficialistas revived Frejuli in coalition with a number of mi-

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nor formations. In critical Buenos Aires province they were, however, substantially outpolled by the Front of Renewal, Justice, Democracy, and Participation (Frente Renovador, Justicia, Democracia y Participaci´on—Frejudepa), an alliance of renovadores and Christian Democrats; in the federal capital, they won no seats, as contrasted with four captured by a renovador formation that had campaigned as the Justicialist Party. Senator Vicente Saadi, an oficialista, resigned as MNJ first vice president following the 1985 election, reportedly because of the movement’s poor showing. On December 10, 1985, Herminio Iglesias, also an oficialista, stepped down as secretary general, while the renovadores, 11 days later, appointed a leadership of their own, headed by Antonio Cafiero, Carlos Grosso, and Carlos Sa´ul Menem. In November 1986 the renovadores boycotted the movement’s national congress, at which Isabel Per´on and Senator Saadi were elected honorary and “effective” presidents, respectively. However, a cleavage subsequently developed within the dissident troika, Cafiero boycotting a renovador congress in Tucum´an, while Grosso withdrew from the meeting because of a dispute over the timing of internal party elections in C´ordoba and Buenos Aires provinces. Following a relatively poor showing by oficialistas at the 1987 election, Senator Saadi resigned as Justicialista president, paving the way for a “unity slate” that awarded the group’s presidency and vice presidency to Cafiero and Menem, respectively. Menem defeated Cafiero as the party’s 1989 standard-bearer in an MNJ presidential primary on July 9, 1988, and led the party, campaigning with minor party allies as the Justicialist Front of Popular Unity (Frente Justicialista de Unidad Popular—Frejupo), to a conclusive victory in the nationwide balloting of May 14, 1989. On August 6, 1990, Cafiero resigned as party president, being succeeded four days later by Menem. Concurrently, the president’s brother, Eduardo Menem, was named party vice president, while the subsequent designation of Munir Menem as secretary general made the leadership essentially a “family affair.”

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The party contested the partial legislative elections of 1991, 1993, and 1995 under the Partido Justicialista rubric, although the total number of “Justicialista” seats resulting from each poll included seats held by affiliated peronista groups. In 1995 President Menem secured reelection to a foreshortened term of four years on a 49.8 percent vote share while the PJ won its first absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1997 the party’s lower house representation was reduced to 118 of 257 seats. With Menem ineligible to run for a third term, the party lost the presidency in 1999 and was reduced to second place in the Chamber of Deputies with 110 seats. It recovered its majority in both houses on October 14, 2001, despite its leader’s arrest, four months earlier, on charges of UN arms embargo violations. Menem secured a plurality in the 2003 presidential poll, but he withdrew from a runoff when it became apparent that he could not defeat N´estor Kirchner in a two-man race. Late in the year, after taking up residence in Chile, Menem was charged with tax fraud; however, the case was dismissed in May 2004. Menem returned to Argentina in December 2004, secured election to the Senate on a “best loser” basis in October 2005, and vowed to contest the 2007 presidential election. Before the 2005 congressional balloting, the PJ split into two principal factions, a Victory Front (Frente para la Victoria—FPV), launched by President Kirchner, and a Federal Peronist (Peronismo Federal—PF) grouping headed by former president Duhalde. In addition, former presidents Menem and Rodr´ıguez Sa´a campaigned as leaders of a distinctly minor Justicialist Loyalty and Dignity (Lealtad y Dignidad Justicialista—LDJ). After the next electoral cycle in 2007, Menem took office as the only senator under the Federalism and Liberation (Federalismo y Liberaci´on—FL) designation within the PJ, while Rodr´ıguez Sa´a was sworn in as part of the Justicialist Front (Frente Justicialista—FJ) grouping, an offshoot party that claimed 3 seats in the senate as of January 2008. Several members of the UCR formed a coalition with the FPV for the 2007 elections. The PJ–FPV ballot secured 42 Senate and 129 Cham-

ber seats after the election. The president-elect, Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner, received 44.92 percent of the votes. The party has smaller regional chapters, including the Santa Cruz Victory Front (Frente para la Victoria Santacrucena). Leaders: Cristina Fern´andez de KIRCHNER (President of the Republic, PJ–FPV), N´estor Carlos KIRCHNER (Former President of the Republic, PJ–FPV), Eduardo Alberto DUHALDE (Former President of the Republic, PF), Carlos Sa´ul MENEM and Adolfo RODR´IGUEZ Sa´a (Former Presidents of the Republic, LDJ). Civic Coalition (Coalici´on C´ıvica—CC). The CC, a coalition of political parties, non-government organizations, and public personalities, was created ´ The coalion April 11, 2007, by Elisa CARRIO. tion includes the ARI, Union for Everybody (Uni´on por Todos—UPT), some members of the Socialist Party, and the UCR. The Coalition secured two seats in the upper house and eighteen in the lower house. ´ (2000, 2003 and 2007 Leaders: Elisa CARRIO presidential candidate) and Patricia BULLRICH (President) Radical Civic Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Radical—UCR). The UCR, whose history dates from the late 19th century, represents the moderate left in Argentine politics. In the period following the deposition of Juan Per´on, the party split into two factions, the People’s Radical Party (Uni´on C´ıvica Radical del Pueblo—UCRP) and the Intransigent Radical Party (Uni´on C´ıvica Radical Intransigente—UCRI), led by former presidents Arturo Ill´ıa and Arturo Frondizi, respectively. The UCR reemerged following the legalization of parties in 1971 and remained relatively unified during the 1973 presidential candidacy of Dr. Ricardo Balb´ın but suffered a number of internal cleavages thereafter. Balb´ın was instrumental in organizing the 1981 fiveparty alignment to press for a return to civilian rule but died on September 9, leaving the party without a unified leadership. Largely because of the personal popularity of its presidential candidate, Ra´ul Alfons´ın, the party led the

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1983 balloting with 51.8 percent of the vote, winning, in addition to the presidency, a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Subsequently, internal dissention diminished, the balbinista faction concluding a late 1984 alliance with leftleaning elements, while the long-standing policy of incompatibility between government and party roles was abandoned with the designation of President Alfons´ın as ex officio party leader. In early 1986, as the issue of presidential succession loomed, a new rivalry emerged between former labor minister Juan Manuel Casella, the apparent alfonsinista front-runner, and the influential governor of C´ordoba province, Eduardo Angeloz, with the latter being designated the UCR candidate in internal party balloting in July 1988, but losing to the MNJ’s Carlos Menem in May 1989. In October 1991, following the poor showing of candidates he had endorsed for recent provincial elections, Alfons´ın submitted his resignation as party president, while announcing the formation of an internal faction, the Movement for Social Democracy (Movimiento por la Democracia Social—MDS), devoted to defending traditional UCR “social-democratic” principles. He was reelected party leader by an overwhelming margin in November 1993. In the 1995 presidential poll, UCR nominee Horatio Massacessi placed a distant third, with a 17.1 percent vote share; in the legislative balloting the party retained second rank, though its representation fell from 83 to 69 seats. Alfons´ın again resigned on September 27, 1995, and was replaced on November 17 by Rodolfo Terrango. For the legislative election of October 26, 1997, an alliance with a left-of-center electoral coalition styled the Front for a Country in Solidarity (Frente del Pa´ıs Solidario—Frepaso) yielded 46 of 127 contested seats, while the UCR secured 12 seats running separately. The alliance candidate, Fernando De La R´ua, won the presidency in 1999, but he resigned in December 2001 because of the economic crisis. The UCR’s share of the presidential vote plummeted to 2.3 percent in 2003. It remained the second-ranked

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congressional party after the 2005 balloting, albeit with only 39 of 257 lower house seats. The centralization of power in the hands of president Kirchner, his increased ability to control governors, and his progressive politics made him very popular among so-called “K Radicals” in the UCR. Others in the party preferred either supporting Roberto Lavagna (apparently still formally a member of the PJ) in the 2007 presidential balloting or presenting a candidate from the UCR ranks. After considerable negotiation, it was determined that Lavagna would run as a candidate of the UCR in an alliance with Just Society Peronists (Duhalde). Within the UCR, Lavagna had strong support from former president Alfons´ın, though five of six Radical governors supported Kirchner. The UCR decided not to run its own candidate for president and ultimately coalesced behind Roberto Lavagna, who received 16.88 percent of the votes. The party lost 5 seats in the Senate and 16 in the Chamber of Deputies, leaving it with 8 senators and 24 deputies in the lower house. The UCR expelled Julio Cobos and the four other governors who supported Kirchner in the elections. On March 15, 2008, under the banner of Radicals K, Cobos urged like-minded politicians to join an Official National Concertation (Concertaci´on Nacional Oficial) and persuade the UCR leadership not to expel them, but to instead support formation of a new Radicals for Concertation grouping. Cobos was expected to take the lead in talks aimed at convincing the UCR leadership to accept him and his fellow pro-Kirchner governors (see Political Parties, above). Leaders: Angel ROZAS, Dr. Ra´ul ALFONS´IN Foulkes (Former President of the Republic and of the Party), Mario LOSADA (Former President of the Party), Leopoldo Ra´ul Guido MOREAU (2003 presidential candidate). Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic (Afirmaci´on para Una Rep´ublica Igualitaria— ARI). The ARI was organized in mid-2000 by the left-wing UCR defector, Elisa Carri´o.

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Affiliating with the new formation, which secured 1 Senate and 31 Chamber seats in October 2001, was the Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democr´atico—PSD), Carri´o ran fourth in the 2003 presidential election, with a 14.2 percent vote share, and second in the 2007 presidential election, with a 23 percent vote share. The ARI was decimated in the 2003 congressional poll but recovered marginally to win eight lower house seats in 2005. In 2007 the ARI formed a coalition with the PS (below). Some members ran under ARI, securing 2 Senate and 9 Chamber seats. ´ (2000, 2003 and Leader: Elisa CARRIO 2007 presidential candidate). Union for Everybody (Uni´on por Todos— UPT) was founded in 2002 by Patricia Bullrich, a former minister who held the social security portfolio in 2000 and the labor portfolio in 2001.The party joined the Civic Coalition for the 2007 election. Leader: Patricia Bullrich (President) Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS). The PS was launched in 2003 by a merger of the PSD (under ARI, above) and the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular— PSP), which had been reorganized as the Argentine affiliate of Socialist International. Rub´en H´ector GIUSTINIANI ran on the ticket with Elisa Carri´o in 2007, while the PS presented a separate, independent ballot for the legislative polls that year, securing 10 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Leaders: Rub´en H´ector GIUSTINIANI (PSP), Hermes Juan BINNER. Republican Proposal (Propuesta Republicana—PRO). A center-right group based in Buenos Aires, PRO was launched before the 2005 election by businessman Mauricio Macri. It was able to capitalize on a center-left cleavage between the FPV and ARI to win 34 percent of the vote in the federal capital. In the 2007 balloting, Macri was elected Mayor of Buenos Aires.

The PRO and RECREAR (below) signed a political alliance ahead of the 2007 elections, adopting the Republican Proposal designation. Ricardo L´opez Murphy, the party’s candidate for president in the 2007 election, received less than a 2 percent vote share, while the party lost 2 of its 11 Chamber seats in that year’s legislative balloting. Leader: Mauricio MACRI. Recreate for Growth Party (Partido para Recrear el Crecimiento—RECREAR). RECREAR is a conservative formation that contested the 2003 election in an alliance with a number of provincial parties styled the Movimiento Federal para Recrear el Crecimiento—MFRC (Federal Movement to Recreate Growth) that continued into the 2005 poll. The movement’s leader, Ricardo L´opez Murphy, formerly a right-wing member of the UCR, placed third in the 2003 presidential balloting. RECREAR entered a political alliance with PRO ahead of the 2007 polls. Leaders: Ricardo L´opez MURPHY (President), Ricardo URQUIZA (Secretary). Action for the Republic–New Direction (Acci´on por la Rep´ublica–Nueva Direcci´on— AR–ND). The AR–ND was formed in 1997 as an electoral alliance of the AR, which had been launched by former economic minister Domingo Cavallo in support of his bid for a congressional seat, and the ND, a Buenos Aires–based party founded in 1996. The grouping won 9 lower house seats in 1997 and 12 in 1999, only one of which it retained in 2005. Leaders: Armando Caro FIGUEROA (AR), ´ Gustavo BELIZ (ND), Domingo CAVALLO (1999 presidential candidate). Republican Force (Fuerza Republicana— FR). The FR was organized before the 1989 national balloting by a retired army general, Antonio Domingo Bussi, who hoped to convert the formation into “a great national party” before the expiration of Carlos Menem’s term in 1995. The party won three lower house seats from the northwestern province of Tucum´an in October 1993 and added a fourth in May 1995. In July 1995 Bussi won the

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Tucum´an governorship, but he was suspended in April 1998 when confronted with impeachment proceedings because of an undeclared foreign bank account. The vote against removal subsequently fell short, and Bussi was reinstated. The party’s lower house representation was reduced to two in 1997, with the same number (elected in 2003) remaining in 2005. Leader: Gen. (Ret.) Antonio Domingo BUSSI (Former Governor of Tucum´an).

Regional Parties with Legislative Seats as of January 2008 Regional groups winning congressional representation in 2007 included the Concertation Alliance (Alianza Concertaci´on UNA—AC), 10 seats; the Civic Front for Santiago (Frente C´ıvico por Santiago—FCS), 8 seats; the Justice, Union and Liberty Front (Frente Justicia, Uni´on y Libertad—FJUL), 6 seats; the Popular Social Encounter (Encuentro Popular y Social), 4 seats; the New Front (Frente Nuevo—FN), including the C´ordoba-based New Party against Corruption, for Honesty and Transparency (Partido Nuevo contra la Corrupci´on, por la Honestidad y la Transparencia—PNCHT) and others, 4 seats; the Buenos Aires-based Blue and White Union (Uni´on Celeste y Blanca—UCB), 4 seats; the Neuqu´en Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Neuquino—MPN), 4 seats; the Justicialist affiliate Salta Renewal (Renovador de Salta— RS), 3 seats; the Corrientes–based Front for Everybody (Frente de Todos—FT), 2 seats; the San Luis–based Production and Labor Front (Frente Producci´on y Trabajo—FPT), 2 seats; the Buenos Aires-based Recreate for Growth (Recrear Para el Crecimiento—RPC), 2 seats; Democratic Mendoza (Dem´ocrata Mendoza—DM), 1 seat; Buenos Aires for Everybody in Southern Project (Buenos Aires Para Todos en Proyecto Sur—BATPS), 1 seat; the Catamarca-based Civic and Social Front (Frente C´ıvico y Social—FCS), 4 seats; the Viable Santiago Movement, 1 seat; the Buenos Aires city–based Dialogue for Buenos Aires (Di´alogo por Buenos Aires—DPBA), 1 seat;

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the Entre R´ıos–based Entrerian Concertation (Concertaci´on Entrerriana—CE), 1 seat; the Buenos Aires province–based Federalist Unity (Unidad Federalista—UF), 1 seat; the Catamarcabased For the Truth (Por la Verdad—PLV), 1 seat; the Buenos Aires-based Independent Movement (Movimiento Independiente—MI), 1 seat; Liberal Party of Corrientes (Partido Liberal de Corrientes—PLC), 1 seat; the C´ordoba-based Memory and Democracy (Memoria y Democracia—MD), 1 seat; the Buenos Aires-based National Justicialist (Justicialista Nacional—JN), 1 seat; the Buenos Aires-based National Union (Nacional Sindical—NS), 1 seat; the Misiones-based Peronist Dignity (Dignidad Peronista—DP), 1 seat; and the Buenos Aires-based Peronist Guard (Guardia Peronista—GP), 1 seat.

Other Parties A number of additional parties have been active in recent years, but the current status of most is unclear. See earlier editions of the Handbook for listings.

Legislature Argentina’s bicameral National Congress (Congreso Nacional) was dissolved in March 1976 and reconstituted after the election of October 30, 1983. Senate (Senado). Before adoption of the 1994 constitution, the upper house consisted of 2 senators elected for nine-year terms by each of the 23 provincial legislatures, plus 2 from the federal district named by an electoral college, the body being replenished by thirds every three years. The 1994 basic law increased the membership to 72 (3 from each of the 23 provinces and 3 from the federal district of Buenos Aires). Since 2001, one-third of the seats have been renewed every two years for six-year terms. After the elections of October 28, 2007, the Justicialist Party–Victory Front and its affiliates had 42 seats (Justicialist Party–Victory Front, 37; Concordia Renewal, 2; Salta Renewal, 1; and the

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Cabinet As of July 22, 2007 President Vice President Chief of Cabinet

Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner [f] Julio C´esar Cleto Cobos Alberto Angel Fern´andez

Ministers Defense Economy and Production Education, Science, and Technology Federal Planning and Public Investment Foreign Relations, International Trade, and Worship Interior Justice, Security, and Human Rights Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Public Health Social Development and Environment Science and Technology

Nilda Garr´e [f] Mart´ın Lousteau Juan Carlos Tedesco Julio Miguel de Vido Jorge Enrique Taiana An´ıbal Florencio Randazzo An´ıbal Domingo Fern´andez Carlos Alfonso Tomada Graciela Oca˜na [f] Alicia Kirchner [f] Lino Bara˜nao

Secretaries Secretary General of the Presidency Secretary of State Intelligence Legal and Technical Secretary Military House (Casa Militar) Secretary of Culture Secretary of Tourism Secretary of Prevention of Drug Addiction and Battle against Drug-Trafficking Secretary of Communication Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development

Oscar Parrilli Hector Icazuriaga Carlos Alberto Zannini Col. Alejandro Guillermo Graham Jos´e Nun Carlos Enrique Meyer Jos´e Ram´on Granero Enrique Ra´ul Albistur Romina Picolotti [f]

[f] = female

pro-Menem Federalism and Liberation, 1); the Radical Civic Union, 9; the Justicialist Front, 3; the Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic, 2; the Civic Coalition, 2; the Civic Front for Santiago, 2; the New Front, 2; the Civic and Social Front, 2; the Republican Force, 2; Concertation for Development, 1; Federalist Unity, 1; the Neuqu´en Popular Movement, 1; Production and Labor Front, 1; the Socialist Party, 1; and the Viable Santiago Movement, 1. President: Julio C´esar Cleto COBOS.

Chamber of Deputies (C´amara de Diputados). The lower house currently consists of 257 deputies, directly elected for four years, with approximately one-half reelected every two years. After the 2007 elections, the Justicialist PartyVictory Front and its allies had 129 seats; the Radical Civic Union, 24; the Civic Coalition,18; Socialist Party, 10; the Concertation Alliance, 10; Republican Proposal–Recreate for Growth Party, 11(Republican Proposal, 9; Recreate for Growth, 2); the Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic

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(autonomous), 9; the Civic Front for Santiago, 6; the Justice, Union and Liberty Front, 6; Popular Social Encounter, 4; the Blue and White Union, 4; the Neuqu´en Popular Movement, 3; the New Front, 2; Salta Renewal, 2; Civic and Social Front, 2; Front for Everybody, 2; National Justicialist, 1; Democratic Mendoza, 1; Entrerian Concertation, 1; Memory and Democracy, 1; Production and Labor Front, 1; Dialogue for Buenos Aires, 1; Peronist Dignity, 1; Peronist Guard, 1; National Union, 1; Independent Movement, 1; Federalist Unity, 1; For the Truth, 1; Buenos Aires for Everybody in the Southern Project, 1; the Liberal Party of Corrientes, 1; and independents, 1. Realignments have made assessments of party strength difficult. President: Eduardo FELLNER.

Communications The impact of Argentina’s traditionally influential news media has been substantially reduced in recent years. There were numerous newspaper closings during the Peronist revival, while official censorship and personal attacks on journalists further inhibited the media before the restoration of civilian rule in 1983. Before the October 1993 legislative election, attacks on journalists had become increasingly prevalent, while economic difficulties had drastically curtailed the circulation of virtually all leading papers, except for Clar´ın, which, having diversified into radio and television, had emerged as the country’s foremost media power.

Press Unless otherwise noted, the following are Spanish-language dailies published in Buenos Aires: Clar´ın (700,000 daily, 1,000,000 Sunday), reportedly the world’s largest-selling Spanishlanguage paper; La Naci´on (630,000 daily, 835,000 Sunday), founded 1870; Cr´onica (330,000 daily, 450,000 Sunday); P´agina 12 (280,000), highly regarded investigative paper launched in 1987; Diario Popular (140,000); El Cronista Comercial (63,000); La Raz´on (60,000); La Prensa (50,000),

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founded 1869; Buenos Aires Herald (22,500), in English.

News Agencies The domestic agencies include Diarios y Noticias (DyN), Noticias Argentinas (NA), and the official Agencia TELAM. There are also a number of foreign agencies with bureaus in Buenos Aires.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is supervised by the Secretar´ıa de Communicaciones and the Comit´e Federal de Radiodifusi´on (Comfer). Nearly two-thirds of the more than 120 radio stations and 29 of the 44 television stations are privately owned. Radio Nacional is an official government service providing local, national, and international programming. Government-owned commercial radio and television stations are grouped under the Direcci´on General de Radio y Televisi´on, while most privately owned stations belong to the Asociaci´on Radiodifusoras Privadas Argentinas (ARPA) and the Asociaci´on de Teleradiodifusoras Argentinas (ATA). As of 2005 there were approximately 83.7 personal computers and 178 Internet users per 1,000 people. As of the same year there were about 574 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: H´ector TIMERMAN U.S. Ambassador to Argentina: Earl Anthony WAYNE Permanent Representative to the UN: Jorge ¨ ARGUELLO IGO Memberships (Non-UN): AfDB, ALADI, BCIE, BIS, CAN, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

Contested Territory Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). First sighted by an English vessel in the late 11th century and

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named after the incumbent treasurer of the Royal Navy, the Falkland Islands were later styled Les Malouines (from which the Spanish Las Malvinas is derived) by a group of French settlers who transferred their rights to Spain in 1766. A British settlement, recognized by Spain in 1771, was withdrawn in 1774, the islands being uninhabited at the time of Argentine independence in 1816. The new government in Buenos Aires claimed the territory by right of colonial succession in 1820, although a group of its nationals were forcibly expelled in 1832, before a reaffirmation of British sovereignty in 1833. Argentine claims to the smaller South Georgia and South Sandwich islands, several hundred miles to the southeast, were not formally advanced until 1927 and 1948, respectively. The question of the legal status of the territories, collectively encompassing about 6,000 square miles (16,058 sq. km.), became the subject of extensive negotiations initiated under UN auspices in 1966 and extending to early 1982. The British claim is based on continuous occupation since 1833 and the manifest sentiment of the 2,900 inhabitants (primarily

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ATLAN TI C O CEAN

Falkland Islands (U.K.)

Port Howard Goose Green

West Falkland

Stanley

East Falkland

Falkland Islands (U.K.)

0 0

50 Mi 50 Km

ATLAN TI C O C E A N

sheepherders domiciled on East and West Falkland) to remain British subjects. The immediate precipitant of the 1982 conflict was the arrival in South Georgia on March 19 of a group of workers to dismantle an old whaling station, in the course of which the Argentine flag was raised. Following a British protest to the UN Security Council, Argentinian troops landed on the Falklands on April 2 and quickly overcame resistance by a token force of Royal Marines. South Georgia and South Sandwich were seized on April 3. Two days later the lead ships of a British armada sailed from Portsmouth, England, participating in the recovery of South Georgia on April 25 and 26. On May 21 about 5,000 British troops began landing at San Carlos Bay on the northwestern coast of East Falkland, initiating an operation that culminated in the surrender of the main Argentine force in Stanley on June 14. Overall, the campaign cost 254 British and 750 Argentinian lives and heavy material losses, including that of Argentina’s only heavy cruiser, the General Belgrano, and, on the British side, of two destroyers and two frigates. Subsequently, Argentina and 19 other Latin American countries submitted the Falkland issue to the UN General Assembly, although no de jure resolution of the sovereignty issue has yet been forthcoming. During 1985 President Alfons´ın repeatedly expressed alarm at the construction of an airport (approximately the size of that at Point Salines in Grenada) on Mount Pleasant and named as his government’s priority “the demilitarization of the South Atlantic.” A more serious problem arose in 1986 with a British announcement in late October that it would establish a 200-mile “exclusive economic zone,” measured from the shore of the islands, as of February 1, 1987, thereby overlapping a 200-mile zone previously claimed by Argentina off its continental mainland. However, the effect of the action was subsequently diluted by a British foreign ministry declaration that it would police the new zone (impinging largely on fishing) only up to the limit of the previously established 150-mile Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Management Zone (FICZ), measured from the center

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of the islands. As part of the agreement concluded in Madrid in February 1990, Britain also yielded (save for fishing) on the 150-mile zone, allowing Argentine ships and planes to approach within 50 and 75 miles, respectively, of the islands without prior permission. (For additional details, see United Kingdom: Related Territories.) In April 1990 the Argentine Congress, in what was termed a “purely symbolic act,” approved the inclusion of the Falklands in the (then) national territory of Tierra del Fuego. Subsequently, a series of “technical” discussions were held between Argentine and British representatives to prevent overfishing in the waters surrounding the islands. The Falklanders protested their exclusion from the talks, which yielded an agreement in December on a third-party fishing ban in the portion of the 200-mile economic zone that did not overlap the corresponding Argentine limit. Argentina and Britain in September 1991 reached new accords that liberalized military restrictions imposed by Britain in the aftermath of the 1982 conflict; Argentine authorities insisted, however, that the action should not be construed as implying relinquishment of their country’s claim to the islands. Thus in early January 1992 President Menem proposed that the jurisdictional conflict be settled through international arbitration, in much the same manner as the earlier border dispute with Chile. However, despite an assertion in May 1993 that recovery of the islands remained a “strategic” part of Argentinian foreign policy, he appeared unwilling to press the matter, lest it reverse the recent improvement in relations with London. Following the Argentine reaffirmation of sovereignty over the Falklands in its 1994 constitution, Britain began patrolling the nonoverlap portion of the “gap” between the 150- and 200-mile zones. British authorities responded to Argentine complaints that the new policy was an act of “reprisal” for the constitutional claim by insisting that they were simply attempting to deny unlicensed fishing vessels a staging area for intrusion into British- and Argentine-controlled areas.

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During 1995 the question of oil rights supplanted that of fishing. On September 27, following a meeting between Argentine and British representatives in Madrid, the two countries signed an agreement in New York on the extraction of oil in waters surrounding the archipelago. Under the accord, Britain would earn two-thirds and Argentina one-third of the royalties from drilling east of the islands, while the two would share equally in the yield from extraction off the Argentine coast in the west. UCR legislators immediately charged that the Menem government had “ceded a measure of sovereignty” by agreeing to the lower share in the east, while the government insisted that its participation implied recognition of the Argentinian claim. In May 1996 Foreign Minister Guido DI TELLA announced that Argentina would “never consent” to the Falklands becoming an independent state. The declaration came after Britain and the Falkland Island Council had urged the UN Special Committee on Decolonization to adopt a resolution on selfdetermination for the territory (an action that the UN body has been unwilling to pursue). In mid1997 the committee cited its long-standing opposition to the “colonial situation” in the islands by reissuing an appeal to the two governments to resolve the dispute by peaceful negotiations. In July 1999 Britain agreed to lift restrictions on travel by Argentine citizens to the islands and to reestablish Chilean flights to the mainland, which had been suspended by Santiago following the March detention in London of its former president Augusto Pinochet. In a further sign of improved relations, the British and Argentine navies conducted in November their first joint naval exercise since the 1982 war. On July 19, 2000, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, dismissed as too late a lawsuit by Argentinians seeking compensation from Britain for the deaths of relatives killed when British forces sank the cruiser General Belgrano. Lawyers for the plaintiffs stated that they would pursue the matter at the World Court in The Hague, Netherlands. As part of the suit, the plaintiffs had sought the extradition of former British

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prime minister Margaret Thatcher to stand trial for “aggravated homicide and war crimes.” Subsequently, in a mark of improved relations, Argentina and Britain signed an agreement in early 2001 that permitted Argentinian planes to fly to the islands for the first time in nearly two decades. In April 2004 Argentinian President Kirchner reaffirmed his government’s commitment to regaining sovereignty over the islands through “dialogue and peace.” The administration in 2005 also criticized the inclusion of the islands in the proposed new European Union (EU) constitution, arguing that the sovereignty question remained unsettled. During events in 2007 commemorating the 25th anniversary of the 1982 war, Argentinian officials again accused the UK of “illegitimate occupation”

of the islands. Perhaps in view of upcoming elections, President Kirchner appeared to adopt a hard line, unilaterally canceling some previous oil exploration agreements with the UK and revoking charter flights from the islands to the mainland. Meanwhile, although the issue of sovereignty remained nonnegotiable, the UK administration called for “constructive ties” in the hope of resolving “lingering hostility.” Popular opinion in Argentina remained highly supportive of Kirchner’s position, although the inhabitants of the islands reportedly continued to evince no opposition to their UK status. (One recent report estimated that the islanders enjoyed an annual GDP per capita of approximately $50,000 [one of the highest in the world], based to a large extent on the sale of licenses for fishing and oil exploration.)

ARUBA

The Country Aruba is a Caribbean island situated approximately 16 miles off the northeast coast of Venezuela and 50 miles west of Cura¸cao. Like other former Dutch dependencies in the area, its population is largely of mixed African ancestry, with minorities of Carib Indian and European extraction. Roman Catholicism is the dominant religion. Tourism is presently of primary economic importance. The island’s only oil refinery, owned by a subsidiary of the U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobil, was closed down in March 1985. However, it was rehabilitated by a subsidiary of the U.S. Coastal Corporation later in the decade and remains a significant source of income, as does transshipment of petroleum. Economic growth averaged greater than 4 percent annually in 1996–1999, with annual inflation averaging about 0.7 percent. A downturn began in 2000, with growth for the year declining to 2.5 percent. In 2001 the tourism sector was adversely affected by the September terrorist assaults on the United States, which contributed to a 4 percent decline in GDP for the year. A further decline in tourism resulted from publicity surrounding the disappearance of American Natalee Holloway in May 2005 (see Current issues, below).

However, a majority of the islanders disliked what was perceived as both political and economic domination by Cura¸cao and entered into lengthy discussions with Dutch authorities that resulted in the achievement of formal parity with the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles, under the Dutch crown, on January 1, 1986. Upon the assumption of domestic autonomy, the assets and liabilities of Aruba and the five remaining members of the federation were divided in the ratio 30–70, Aruba agreeing to retain economic and political links to the Netherlands Antilles at the ministerial level for a ten-year period. (Full independence was initially projected for 1996 but tentative agreement was reached in July 1990 for the island to maintain its

Caribbean Sea

Noord

Oranjestad

Aruba

(NETHERLANDS)

Santa Cruz

Government and Politics Political Background Like Cura¸cao and Bonaire, Aruba became a Dutch possession in 1634 and remained so, save for a brief period of British control during the Napoleonic wars, until participating in constitutional equality with the Netherlands as part of the Netherlands Antilles in 1954.

Caribbean Sea 0 0

4 Mi 400 Km

Sint Nicolaas

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ARUBA

current status indefinitely rather than move on to independence. References to the 1996 independence date were removed from the related constitutional documents completely in April 1995.) Pre-autonomy balloting on November 22, 1985, yielded victory for a four-party coalition headed by J. H. A. (Henny) EMAN of the center-right Aruba People’s Party (AVP) over the People’s Electoral Movement (MEP), then led by “the architect of Aruba’s transition to . . . eventual independence,” Gilberto (Betico) CROES. Following the election of January 7, 1989, a three-party government was formed, led by the MEP’s Nelson ODUBER. The coalition continued in office after the election of January 8, 1993, although the AVP outpolled the MEP. Oduber resigned on April 17, 1994, after disagreements with his coalition partners, and Eman returned as head of a new government coalition that included the small Aruban Liberal Organization (OLA) following a general election on July 29. The legislature was dissolved on September 15, 1997, in the wake of a dispute between the AVP and its coalition partner, with the OLA offering to form a caretaker coalition with the MEP. However, the governor general refused the request. A general election on December 12 failed to resolve the impasse, the parliamentary distribution remaining unchanged. Subsequent negotiations continued until April 16, 1998, when the former coalition partners reached agreement on a new government. The AVP/OLA government again collapsed in June 2001 when the two OLA members resigned after voicing objections to the AVP’s plan to convert the tourism ministry into a semiprivate agency. Early elections were therefore held on September 28, with the MEP winning a majority of 12 seats, setting the stage for the return of MEP leader Oduber to the prime minister’s post on October 30. Oduber remained in office following the election of September 23, 2005, at which the MEP moved, by 1 seat, to a plurality of 11.

Domestic affairs are the responsibility of the prime minister and other members of the Council of Ministers, appointed with the advice and approval of a unicameral Staten (legislature) of 21 deputies. Control of foreign affairs and defense is vested in the Council of Ministers at The Hague, with an Aruban minister plenipotentiary sitting as a voting member in matters affecting the island. Judicial authority is exercised by a local court of first instance, with appeal to a joint Court of Appeal of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, and ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands at The Hague.

Constitution and Government

Leading Parties

The Dutch sovereign is titular head of state and is represented in Aruba by an appointed governor.

People’s Electoral Movement (Movimento Electoral di Pueblo—MEP). Founded in 1971 and a

Current Issues Aruba’s tourist industry, already depressed by U.S. travelers’ concern over terrorism, was further weakened by the disappearance in May 2005 of 18-year-old Holloway, who was with a group from Alabama celebrating their high school graduation. Three men seen leaving a bar with her were arrested on June 23 but were subsequently released. Publicity over the matter was unabated, in part because of a number of trips to the island by the missing girl’s mother, who accused local authorities of inept handling of the case. Unable to bring the matter to a successful conclusion, the Oduber administration in early 2007 asked the Netherlands to assume responsibility for further inquiry, with Dutch officers given full investigative powers. Earlier Aruba had joined the Netherlands Antilles in opposing a proposal by the Dutch immigration minister that would sanction the return of lawbreakers to the islands, arguing that it would run counter to the European Human Rights Treaty. Aruba also joined with its neighbor in complaining of Venezuela’s arms buildup at a time of growing tension between Venezuela and the United States.

Political Parties

ARUBA

Political Status: Formerly part of the Netherlands Antilles; became autonomous in internal affairs on January 1, 1986. Area: 74.5 sq. mi. (193 sq. km.). Population: 90,508 (2000C); 102,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): ORANJESTAD (30,000). Official Language: Dutch. English, Spanish, and Papiamento (an Antillean hybrid of mainly Portuguese and Spanish that is common to the Leeward Islands) are also spoken. Monetary Unit: Aruban Guilder (official rate November 2, 2007: 1.79 guilders = $1US). The guilder (also called the florin) is at par with the Netherlands Antilles guilder, both currencies being pegged to the U.S. dollar. Sovereign: Queen BEATRIX Wilhelmina Armgard. Governor: Fredis P. (Freddy) REFUNJOL; invested on May 7, 2004, succeeding Olindo KOOLMAN. Prime Minister: Nelson Orlando ODUBER (People’s Electoral Movement); sworn in on October 30, 2001, following the election of September 28, succeeding Jan Hendrik Albert (Henny) EMAN (Aruban People’s Party); reappointed following election of September 23, 2005.

member of the Socialist International, the MEP was in the forefront of the struggle for self-government. It won a plurality of 10 Staten seats in 1989. Two were lost in 1993, but the MEP was able to form a governing coalition with the NDA and APP prior to the withdrawal of both in April 1994. In the 2001 election the MEP won 12 seats, 1 of which was lost in 2005. Leaders: Nelson Orlando ODUBER (Prime Minister and Leader of the Party), Hyacintho R. (Rudy) CROES. Aruban People’s Party (Arubaanse Volkspartij—AVP/Partido di Pueplo Arubano— PPA). Like the MEP, the AVP advocated separation

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of Aruba from the Netherlands Antilles. A member of the Christian Democrat International, it formed a coalition government that included the APP and NDA after the 1985 balloting but was forced into opposition in 1989. It increased its vote share by 23 percent in 1993, exceeding that of the MEP, but could do no better than to tie its opponent’s nine seats. It formed a new government in coalition with the OLA after the 1994 election, which was revived in May 1998 but fell in June 2001. In the September election it won six Staten seats, adding two more in 2005. Leaders: Jan Hendrik Albert (Henny) EMAN (Former Prime Minister), Michiel Godfried EMAN. Aruban Patriotic Party (Arubaanse Patriottische Partij—APP/Partido Patri´otico Arubano— PPA). Organized in 1949, the APP has opposed full independence for the island. It won two parliamentary seats in 2001, both of which were lost in 2005. Leader: Benedict (Benny) Jocelyn Montgomery NISBETT. Aruban Liberal Organization (Organisatie Liberaal Arubaanse/Organisacion Liberal Arubano/Organisashion pa Liberashou di Aruba— OLA). The OLA won two Staten seats in 1994, thereupon joining the government as the AVP’s junior partner in a coalition that was formally terminated in September 1997 but revived in April 1998. In the 2001 election the OLA won one seat, which it lost in 2005. Leader: Glenbert Fran¸cois CROES (Former Deputy Prime Minister). Also winning seats in the 2005 election were the Network of Eternal Democracy (Red Eternal Democratico—RED) and the Aruban Patriotic Movement (Movimento Patriotico Arubana— MPA), led by Monica Kock ARENDS, who was described as Aruba’s first female party leader. The Real Democratic Party (Partido Democracia Real—PDR) failed to secure representation in 2005, although it came within 20 votes of success in one district.

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ARUBA

Cabinet As of June 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Nelson Orlando Oduber Marisol Tromp-Lopez [f]

Ministers Administrative Affairs Education Finance and Economic Affairs General Affairs and Utilities Justice Public Health and the Environment Social Affairs and Infrastructure Sports, Culture, and Labor Tourism and Transportation Minister Plenipotentiary to the Hague

Candelario A. S. D. (Booshi) Wever Marisol Tromp-Lopez [f] Nilo J. J. Swaen Nelson Orlando Oduber Hyacintho Rudy Croes Candelario A. S. D. (Booshi) Wever Marisol Tromp-Lopez [f] Tai Foo Ramon Lee Edison (Eddy) Briesen Francisco (Fredo) W. Croes

[f] = female

Legislature The unicameral States (Staten) consists of 21 members elected for four-year terms, subject to dissolution. At the most recent balloting, held on September 23, 2005, the People’s Electoral Movement won 11 seats; the Aruban People’s Party, 8; the Aruban Patriotic Movement and Network of Eternal Democracy, 1 each. President: Mervin Glorinda RAS.

Communications Press The following are dailies published in Oranjestad: El Diario (17,000), in Papiamento; Amigoe di Aruba (12,000, including Netherlands Antilles), in Dutch; The News (10,000), in English; Aruba Today/Bon Dia Aruba (10,000), in English and Papiamento.

News Agencies The Netherlands News Agency (Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau—ANP) and the Associated Press (AP) maintain offices in Oranjestad.

Broadcasting There are nine privately owned radio stations (one devoted to evangelical and cultural broadcasting), with television provided by the commercial Tele-Aruba. As of 2005 there were approximately 80 personal computers and 1,351 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Foreign relations are conducted through the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, although there is a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Netherlands Embassy in Washington. IGO Membership (Non-UN): ACS, Interpol

BAHAMAS COMMONWEALTH

OF THE

BAHAMAS

The Country The Commonwealth of the Bahamas encompasses a group of about 700 flat, coral islands stretching from the western Atlantic near Florida to the Caribbean Sea. Geomorphically an extension of the Little and Great Bahama banks, the archipelago features as its principal components New Providence and Grand Bahama. The islands have a temperate climate with modest rainfall but lack sufficient fresh water, much of which must be imported. Most Bahamians (85 percent) are descendants of former slaves. The most important religious denominations are Anglican, Baptist, Methodist, and Roman Catholic. Banking and tourism have long been mainstays of the Bahamian economy. One of the first—and the largest—of the offshore “tax havens,” the country has more than 300 financial institutions, including more than 100 Eurocurrency branches of foreign banks; there are currently no corporate, capital gains, or personal income taxes. Extensive resort facilities typically attract in excess of 2.5 million tourists annually, while oil refining and transshipment has emerged as an important industry. During 1990–1993, on the other hand, tourist bookings and sugar production declined sharply, with the economy contracting by 2 percent in 1992 and 1993; further declines in 1994 and early 1995 were attributed primarily to fewer calls by cruise ships, although arrivals by air set a new record in 1995. Real GDP grew by 5.9 percent in 1999, before dropping to 1.9 percent growth in 2000 and collapsing to –0.8 percent in 2001, with modest recovery thereafter to an estimated 3.5 percent in 2005, despite a severe blow to the economy in September 2004 when

Hurricane Frances caused more than $200 million in damage.

Government and Politics Political Background A landfall of Columbus in 1492 and subsequently inhabited by a variety of private settlers, the Bahamas suffered harassment by the Spanish and by pirates until becoming a British Crown Colony in 1717. During the U.S. Civil War the islands enjoyed a degree of prosperity as a base for

0

Grand Bahama Florida (U.S.)

Freeport

Eleuthera

New Providence Andros Island

S ea

Cat Island

THE BAHAMAS Great Exuma

CUBA

100 Km

AT LANT IC O CEAN

Abaco

Nassau

C aribbean

100 Mi

0

Long Island

Great Inagua Matthew Town

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blockade runners. Similar periods of prosperity occurred during the U.S. prohibition era and following World War II. After more than two centuries of colonial rule, constitutional changes were negotiated in 1964 that called for the establishment of internal self-government with a bicameral legislature and a prime minister. These changes were implemented following an election in 1967 that resulted in a victory for the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) under the leadership of Lynden O. PINDLING. Local government authority was broadened in 1969, and independence, which was not supported by the opposition Free National Movement (FNM), was formally granted on July 10, 1973. In the parliamentary elections of 1982 and 1987, the PLP retained control of the House of Assembly, although falling short of the three-fourths majority it had previously enjoyed. The quarter-century Pindling era came to an end in the balloting of August 19, 1992, with the FNM, led by Hubert A. INGRAHAM, winning 33 of 49 lower house seats. The FNM retained control by a substantially wider margin on March 14, 1997, winning 34 seats in a reduced House of 40 members, with an additional seat added at a byelection in September. However, the FNM suffered a decisive reversal in the May 2, 2002, balloting, winning only 7 seats compared to 29 for the PLP, led by Perry G. CHRISTIE. The FNM returned to power after the election of May 2, 2007, at which, for the first time, a governing party was ousted after only one five-year term.

Constitution and Government Under the 1973 constitution, executive authority is vested in the queen (represented by a governor general with largely ceremonial powers) and the prime minister, who serves at the pleasure of the elective House of Assembly, in which legislative authority is concentrated; the appointive upper house (Senate) of the bicameral Parliament has limited functions. Internal administration is based on the natural division into island groupings. Islands other than

New Providence and Grand Bahama are administered by centrally appointed commissioners, although a program was launched in early 2000 to transfer authority in the smaller entities to elected local officials. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and a Court of Appeal, although certain cases may be appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London; there also are local magistrates’ courts. On the outer islands the local commissioners have magisterial powers. In March 2006 British law lords invalidated Bahamian capital punishment as inhuman and degrading. But with polls showing overwhelming public support for executing convicted murderers, the action was seen as likely to trigger debate over retention of the Privy Council as the country’s court of final appeal.

Foreign Relations Bahamian foreign relations have been determined in large part by the islands’ proximity to Cuba, Haiti, and the United States. A long-standing dispute with Cuba over territorial fishing rights led in May 1980 to a Cuban MiG aircraft sinking a Bahamian patrol vessel that had apprehended two Cuban fishing boats for poaching. Havana subsequently agreed to pay compensation of $5.4 million and apologized for the “involuntary violation” of Bahamian sovereignty. In regard to Haiti, the Pindling government periodically attempted to deport illegal aliens, who were estimated to constitute more than 10 percent of the resident population; progress was reported to have been made with Port-au-Prince on the issue before the fall of the Duvalier regime, although criticism of treatment accorded the aliens continued thereafter. In May 1994 a group of 239 Haitians were returned to Haiti after being declared “economic refugees,” while 17 listed as “political refugees” were refused entry for “national security” reasons. Terming illegal immigration as “the single greatest threat to our system of orderly development,” the government declared an amnesty for the illegal residents in

BAHAMAS

Political Status: Independent member of the Commonwealth since July 10, 1973. Area: 5,380 sq. mi. (13,935 sq. km.). Population: 303,611 (2000C); 328,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): NASSAU (227,000). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: Bahamian Dollar (principal rate November 2, 2007: 1.00 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Arthur Dion HANNA; inaugurated on February 1, 2006, succeeding Dame Ivy DUMONT. Prime Minister: Hubert Alexander INGRAHAM (Free National Movement); served as prime minister 1992–1997; returned to office on May 4, 2007, in succession to Perry G. CHRISTIE (Progressive Liberal Party), following election of May 2.

October and November, during which about 2,000 registered for government-assisted repatriation. An agreement with the Haitian government in January 1995 provided for the return of several thousand additional aliens of whom about 1,200 had departed (most involuntarily) by mid-February. The influx of illegal residents nonetheless continued, with more than 1,000 being deported in 1997. In March 1998 more than 150 Cuban detainees went on a hunger strike to protest alleged favorable treatment accorded four expatriate baseball players and their coach. In June, on the other hand, the government concluded an agreement with Cuba on the repatriation of unauthorized immigrants. In May 1997, citing the “overwhelming size, economic strength, and expanding political influence” of mainland China, diplomatic relations were transferred from Taipei to Beijing, although an embassy in the Chinese capital was not opened until January 2006. Relations with the United States have been generally cordial although periodically strained by U.S. accusations of high-level Bahamian participation in drug trafficking.

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The Bahamas is a member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the Organization of American States. It participates in the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) as a member of the Community but not the Common Market. Thus, it elected not to join the more integrated Caricom Single Market (CSM) at the latter’s launching on January 30, 2006.

Current Issues In early 2004 the U.S. government approved one of three proposals for a liquified natural gas (LNG) pipeline from Freeport, Grand Bahama, to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The action came despite long-standing concern by environmentalists that construction would pose a threat to fragile coral reefs. In protests that continued into early 2007, environmentalists also expressed concern about locating an LNG facility within the Bahamas. In a move coincident with, but not directly linked to the Privy Council’s abolition of the death penalty (see Constitution and government, above), a Constitutional Commission recommended in March 2006 that the British monarch be replaced as head of state by a Bahamian selected by the two legislative chambers. In the run-up to the 2007 election, both the FNM and PLP pledged to curb illegal immigration and fight crime; however, a major issue for Ingraham was his contention that the Christie government had been selling too much land to foreign investors. Also damaging to the Christie campaign was the resignation of Immigration and Labour Minister Shane GIBSON, who had been accused of rushing through a residency permit for the subsequently deceased Anna Nichol Smith in return for sex and gifts.

Political Parties Government Party Free National Movement (FNM). The FNM was founded in 1972 by amalgamation of the

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Hubert A. Ingraham Brent Symonette

Ministers Agriculture and Marine Resources Education, Youth, Sports, and Culture Finance Foreign Affairs Health and Social Development Housing and National Insurance Lands and Local Government Legal Affairs Maritime Affairs and Labor National Security and Immigration Tourism and Aviation Works and Transport Attorney General

Lawrence Cartwright Carl Bethel Hubert A. Ingraham Brent Symonette Hubert A. Minnis Kenneth Russell Sidney S. Collie Claire L. Hepburn [f] Dion Foulkes Orville A. T. (Tommy) Turnquest Neko Grant Earl Deveaux Claire Hepburn [f]

Ministers of State Culture Finance Immigration Legal Affairs Public Utilities Social Development Tourism and Aviation Youth and Sports

Charles Maynard Zhivargo Laing Elma Campbell [f] Desmond Bannister Phenton Neymour Loretta R. Butler-Turner [f] Branville McCartney Byran Woodside

[f] = female

United Bahamian Party (UBP) and a number of anti-independence dissidents from the PLP. In 1979 it was reconstituted as the Free National Democratic Movement (FNDM) by merger with the Bahamian Democratic Party (BDP), which had been organized in late 1976 when five FNM parliamentary deputies withdrew from the parent group. Before the 1982 election, which it contested under its original name, it was joined by the two remaining representatives of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which had been founded by BDP dissidents

in late 1979 and had been recognized thereafter as the official opposition. Following the 1987 balloting, Kendal G. L. ISAACS resigned as parliamentary leader, the party’s chair (and founder), Sir Cecil Wallace-Whitfield, being designated his successor; Sir Cecil, who died in May 1990, was in turn succeeded by Hubert A. INGRAHAM, a former independent MP who had joined the party only a month before. Isaacs died in May 1996. Sir Orville A. T. (Tommy) Turnquest was elected “leader-designate” of the FNM in August 2001,

BAHAMAS

Ingraham having previously announced his plans to retire from politics following the general election in 2002, at which time the party lost its majority and went into opposition. Ingraham returned to politics in mid-2005 and was designated opposition leader in the House of Assembly before returning as prime minister in May 2007. Leaders: Hubert A. INGRAHAM (Prime Minister and Party Leader), Brent T. SYMONETTE (Deputy Party Leader).

Opposition Party Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). A predominantly black-supported party, the PLP was formed in 1953 in opposition to the policies of business interests who then controlled the government. It was a leading supporter of the independence movement and endorses policies promoting tourism and foreign investment while at the same time preventing land speculation and providing more opportunity for indigenous Bahamians. Although subject to some internal dissent, the party secured commanding parliamentary majorities in 1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987 but lost by a better than two-to-one margin in 1992. Following the further loss of all but six seats on March 14, 1997, Lynden PINDLING resigned as party leader and on July 7 announced his retirement from parliamentary politics (he died in August 2000). The party returned to power under Perry G. Christie in the election of May 3, 2002, before losing to the FNM in 2007. Leaders: Perry G. CHRISTIE (Former Prime Minister and Leader of the Party), Raynard S. RIGBY (Chair).

Other Groups Coalition Plus Labour (CPL). The CPL was formed before the 2002 election as an alliance of three recently organized small groups: the Bahamas Freedom Alliance (BFA), led by D. Halston MOULTRIE; the Coalition for Democratic Reform (CDR), led by Bernard NOTTAGE; and the People’s Labour Movement (PLM). It failed to secure legislative representation.

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Legislature The Parliament consists of an appointed Senate with limited powers and a directly elected House of Assembly. Senate. The upper house consists of 16 members, 9 of whom are appointed on the advice of the prime minister, 4 on the advice of the leader of the opposition, and 3 on the advice of the prime minister and others whom the governor general may wish to consult. President: Lynn HOLOWESKO. House of Assembly. The lower house presently consists of 41 members directly elected on the basis of universal suffrage for five-year terms (subject to dissolution). In the most recent election of May 2, 2007, the Free National Movement won 23 seats and the Progressive Liberal Party, 18. Speaker: Alvin SMITH.

Communications Press The following are published daily in Nassau, unless otherwise noted: Nassau Guardian (14,100); Nassau Daily Tribune (12,000); Freeport News (Freeport, 4,000); Bahama Journal; Official Gazette, a weekly government publication. In August 1998 the Tribune concluded a partnership agreement with the Miami Herald to produce a combined edition of the two papers.

Broadcasting and Computing The government-owned Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas operates two commercial radio stations in Nassau and one in Freeport. Bahamas Television began broadcasting from Nassau in 1977, while the Canadian-owned Cable Bahamas commenced cable TV transmission in March 1995; the nation also receives U.S. television direct from Florida. As of 2005, there were approximately 319 Internet users per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 584 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

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Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas: (Vacant)

Permanent Representative to the UN: Paulette BETHEL IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, SELA, WCO

BARBADOS BARBADOS

Note: Prime Minister Owen Arthur of the Barbados Labour Party was ousted after 13 years in a snap legislative election on January 15, 2008, with the BLP retaining just 10 of 30 seats. The new prime minister-elect, David Thompson, was sworn in on January 16, and led his Democratic Labour Party back into government, securing the remaining 20 legislative seats.

The Country Geographically part of the Lesser Antilles, Barbados also is the most easterly of the Caribbean nations (see map). The island enjoys an equable climate and fertile soil, approximately 85 percent of the land being arable. Population density is among the world’s highest, although the birth rate has declined in recent years. Approximately 80 percent of the population is of African origin, and another 15 percent is of mixed blood, with Europeans representing only 5 percent of the total; nonetheless, there is a strong and pervasive sense of British tradition and culture. The Anglican Church enjoys official status, but other Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish groups are active. The island historically has been dependent on sugar, which still is a major contributor to the economy. Tourism is the leading source of foreign exchange, while manufacturing, especially that geared toward fellow members of the Caribbean Community, also is an important source of income. After modest advances in 1988 and 1989 the economy was buffeted by the onset in 1990 of a series of reversals that led to a 4 percent decline in real GDP during 1992. In 1993 unemployment soared to 25.5 percent (the highest in 15 years), although GDP registered a healthy advance of more than 3.0 percent. In 1998 GDP growth increased further to 4.2 percent, before falling to 3.2 percent in 1999 and a record low of –3.4 percent in 2001 before recovering to

an average of 2.8 percent for 2002–2006, with 4.0 to 4.5 percent projected for 2007. In a 2003 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, Barbados retained its status as the highest-ranked developing country in the world, with a Human Development Index (HDI) score close to that of several developed nations.

BARBADOS VENEZUELA

Speightstown Bathsheba

AT LA N T IC OCEA N

Holetown

BARBADOS

Carlisle Bay

The Crane

Bridgetown

Car i bbean S ea 0 0

5 Mi 5 Km

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Government and Politics Political Background Historically a planter-dominated island, and often called the “Little England” of the Caribbean, Barbados has been molded by a British tradition extending back to 1639. In 1937 economic problems caused by the fluctuating price of sugar led to demonstrations in Bridgetown, which resulted in the establishment of a British Royal Commission to the West Indies. The commission proved instrumental in bringing about social and political reform, including the introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1951. The island was granted full internal sovereignty ten years later. Barbados played a leading role in the shortlived West Indies Federation (1958–1962) and supplied its only prime minister, Sir Grantley ADAMS. The collapse of the federation and the inability of Barbadian leaders to secure the establishment of an Eastern Caribbean Federation as a substitute left independence within the Commonwealth, which was achieved on November 30, 1966, as the only viable alternative. An election held November 3, 1966, confirmed the dominant position of the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), whose leader, Errol Walton BARROW, had been named premier in 1961 and was reappointed prime minister in 1971. In an election held September 2, 1976, the opposition Barbados Labour Party (BLP) upset the DLP, and Barrow’s 15-year rule ended the following day with the designation of Sir Grantley’s son, J. M. G. M. (“Tom”) ADAMS, as prime minister. In voting that was extremely close in many constituencies, the BLP retained its majority on June 18, 1981. Adams died in March 1985 and was succeeded by his deputy, H. Bernard ST. JOHN, who was unable to contain deepening fissures within the party. As a result, the DLP won a decisive legislative majority of 24–3 in balloting on May 28, 1986, with a new Barrow administration being installed the following day. Barrow died suddenly on June 1, 1987, and was succeeded on the following day by Lloyd Erskine SANDIFORD, who led the party to victory

on January 22, 1991, with a reduced margin of ten seats in the lower House of Assembly. After losing a legislative confidence vote on June 7, 1994, over his appointment of a new chief executive of the Barbados Tourism Authority (BTA), Sandiford dissolved the House of Assembly and called for a premature general election on September 6. The result was an overwhelming defeat for the DLP, with the newly installed BLP leader, Owen S. ARTHUR, being named to head a government that was sworn in on September 12. The BLP inflicted a shattering 26–2 defeat on its opponent in the election of January 20, 1999, with analysts crediting the victory to a buoyant economy. Riding a wave of favorable public opinion, Arthur was elected to a third term at an early vote on May 21, 2003.

Constitution and Government The Barbados governmental structure is modeled after the British parliamentary system. The queen remains titular head of state and is represented by a governor general with quite limited functions. (The establishment of a republican form of government, in which the queen would be replaced as head of state by a president, is currently under consideration [see Current issues, below].) Executive authority is vested in the prime minister and his cabinet, who are collectively responsible to a bicameral legislature. The upper house of the legislature, the Senate, is appointed by the governor general after consultation with the government, the opposition, and other relevant social and political interests. The lower house, the House of Assembly, sits for a maximum term of five years. The franchise is held by all persons over the age of 18, and voting is by secret ballot. The judicial system embraces lower magistrates, who are appointed by the governor general with the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission, and a Supreme Court, encompassing a High Court and a Court of Appeal. The chief justice is appointed by the governor general on the recommendation of the prime minister after consultation with the leader of the opposition.

BARBADOS

Political Status: Independent member of the Commonwealth since November 30, 1966. Area: 166 sq. mi. (431 sq. km.). Population: 250,010 (2000C); 273,000 (2006E). The 2000 figure does not include an adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Center (2005E): BRIDGETOWN (urban area, 142,000). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: Barbados Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.00 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir Clifford HUSBANDS; named to succeed Dame Ruth Nita BARROW, who died December 19, 1995. Prime Minister: (See headnote.) Owen Seymour ARTHUR (Barbados Labour Party); appointed September 7, 1994, to head cabinet, sworn in September 12, in succession to Dr. Lloyd Erskine SANDIFORD (Democratic Labour Party), following election of September 6; formed new government on January 25, 1999, following election of January 20, and on May 26, 2003, following election of May 21.

Previously elected local government bodies were abolished in 1969 in favor of a division into 11 parishes, all of which (in addition to the municipality of Bridgetown) are now administered by the central government.

Foreign Relations Barbados has pursued an active, but nonaligned, posture in United Nations, Commonwealth, and hemispheric affairs. After participating for some years in the Organization of American States (OAS) ostracism of Cuba, Barbados reestablished relations with Havana in 1973, although still enjoying cordial relations with the United States. In December 1979, in a move characterized by Prime Minister Adams as an act of “East Caribbean defence cooperation,” Barbados dispatched troops to St. Vincent to help maintain order while St. Vincent police were deployed in containing an uprising on the Grenadines’ Union Island. Relations with

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neighboring Grenada, on the other hand, deteriorated following installation of the leftist regime of Maurice Bishop in St. George’s in March 1979, and the Adams government participated in the U.S.-led invasion precipitated by the coup of October 1983. This action, while strengthening Bridgetown’s relations with Washington, strained its links with United Kingdom and, perhaps more seriously, with Trinidad, which claimed that the operation was undertaken without properly consulting all members of the Caribbean community. Despite his government’s difficulties, Prime Minister Adams was widely perceived as a regional leader, his death being described as “leaving a power vacuum in the Caribbean.” Subsequently, Barbados moved even closer to the United States. Despite outspoken dissatisfaction with the level of aid provided by the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative, the island was designated in early 1985 as the center of the U.S.-funded Regional Security System (RSS), which conducted military maneuvers in the eastern Caribbean the following September. Even before Adams’s death, however, the idea of providing the RSS with a 1,000man rapid deployment force had quietly been dropped. Following the DLP’s 1986 victory, Prime Minister Barrow joined James Mitchell of St. Vincent in opposing the conclusion of a formal RSS treaty, stating in a letter to six regional chief executives that his government would rely instead on a 1982 memorandum of understanding that provided for cooperation in a number of nonmilitary activities such as drug control, prevention of smuggling, and maritime conservation and training. In August 1998 the government announced that henceforth it would place more emphasis on its relations with Asia and the Pacific. Concurrently, indicating that the “basic focus” of its foreign policy would be economic, Barbados established a consular office in Geneva to coordinate relations with the World Trade Organization. Indicative of a shift from Washington to Havana, Prime Minister Arthur signed a number of economic accords with Cuba in mid-1999, while accepting Cuba’s highest decoration, the Jos´e Mart´ı

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award, for opposing the continued U.S. blockade of the Castro regime. In mid-2005 Barbados had a falling out with St. Vincent over inter-island drug traffic, Prime Minister Arthur suggesting that the Kingstown administration was doing little to curb the illegal trade. He appeared to draw support from BBC Caribbean Radio, which commented that the Vincentian police regarded traffickers as “responding to economic circumstances rather than having a purely criminal intent.”

Current Issues In May 1995 Prime Minister Arthur appointed a ten-member Constitutional Review Commission to propose reforms aimed at building a “new, just and humane society,” and in July 1996 the commission began a review of issues that included maintenance of the link to the British Crown. Underlying the inquiry was rising concern over the role of Britain’s Privy Council, which had recently tightened procedures for executions in capital cases, with both parties adopting an essentially republican posture during the 1994 electoral campaign. Assembly debate began in mid-2000 on the commission’s report, which recommended a move to republic status, under which an indirectly elected president would serve as head of state while most governmental authority would remain with the prime minister. In early 2005 Arthur pledged that a referendum (endorsed by his party’s 2003 election manifesto) would be held on the matter. The pledge was reiterated in December, although a promised referendum on the issue had not been scheduled by mid-2007. In 2004 the Arthur administration reiterated its long-standing objection to a maritime treaty between Trinidad and Venezuela that purportedly assigned to the signatories “an enormous part of Barbados’ and Guyana’s maritime territory” and declared that it would follow Guyana in taking the dispute to the United Nations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The action came after the arrest of two Barbadian fishermen in what were alleged to be Trinidadian waters

and appeared linked to the allocation of regional offshore oil and gas exploration blocks. The dispute was ultimately resolved in early 2007, following a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, which established a maritime boundary roughly halfway between the two countries.

Political Parties For most of the period since independence, the Barbados Labour Party and the Democratic Labour Party exhibited similar labor-oriented philosophies with political contests turning mainly on considerations of personality. Recently, however, the DLP has adopted a somewhat right-of-center posture that appears to have influenced the launching of the National Democratic Party (below) as a third force in island politics.

Government Party Barbados Labour Party (BLP). Founded in 1938, the BLP is the oldest of the leading parties. After dominating Barbadian politics in the 1950s under the leadership of Sir Grantley Adams, it went into opposition, winning nine seats in 1966, three of which were lost in 1971. It returned to power in 1976 under Sir Grantley’s son, J. M. G. M. (“Tom”) Adams, and retained its majority in the election of June 18, 1981. The party split into a number of factions after the death of the younger Adams in 1985, thereby contributing to the defeat of the St. John government a year later. Former foreign minister Henry FORDE, named to succeed St. John as parliamentary leader in October 1986, declared that the party would have to be rebuilt as a “highly decentralized” organization featuring “mass democracy in the formation of policy.” Forde was succeeded in July 1993 by Owen Arthur, who led the party to victory 14 months later. The BLP retained power in an electoral landslide on January 20, 1999, winning 26 of 28 lower house seats, 3 of which were lost in 2003. Leaders: Owen Seymour ARTHUR (Prime Minister and Party Chair), Mia MOTTLEY (Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of Government

BARBADOS

Business in the House), William DUGUID (General Secretary).

Opposition Parties Democratic Labour Party (DLP). A moderate party founded in 1955 by dissident members of the BLP, the DLP has, for most of its existence, been closely allied with the country’s principal labor group, the Barbados Workers’ Union. In the 1971 election the party obtained 18 of 24 legislative seats, but it retained only 7 in 1976; its representation rose to 10 in 1981. Former prime minister Errol W. Barrow resigned as DLP leader following the 1976 reversal but returned to the party presidency in mid-1980. After the 1981 defeat, he again stepped down as president while remaining in Parliament as leader of the opposition. In 1985, in the wake of Tom Adams’s death, continued recession, and the likelihood of an early election, Barrow advanced an essentially conservative program including privatization of state enterprises, cutbacks in public works, sale of the government’s share in a number of corporate sectors, and the introduction of business incentives. However, the new platform also deplored Bridgetown’s involvement in U.S. strategic interests and called for dissolution of the RSS. Barrow returned as prime minister in 1986, but he died the following year; his deputy, Erskine Sandiford, assumed leadership of the government and the party. Former finance minister David Thompson was named to succeed Sandiford after the party’s electoral loss in September 1994. The party’s legislative representation plummeted to two seats in January 1999. Thompson resigned as party president in September 2001; he was succeeded by Clyde MASCOLL, an economist, who was not a member of the Assembly. The party continued in opposition after the 2003 poll, with a net gain of five House seats and Mascoll assuming the opposition leadership in the lower house. In August 2005 Thompson returned to the party presidency, defeating the incumbent, Sen. Freundel Stuart, by an Annual Conference vote of 345–164. He was reconfirmed be a party poll in November,

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after some members had indicated a preference for Mascoll. Mascoll reacted to his defeat by resigning from the party in January 2006, and he was promptly named to a BLP cabinet post, Thompson succeeding to his role as opposition leader. Leaders: David THOMPSON (President of the Party and Leader of the Opposition), Sen. Freundel STUART (Former President of the Party). National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP was launched on February 1, 1989, following the withdrawal of former finance minister Richie Haynes and three other MPs from the DLP. Haynes, who had earlier criticized the Sandiford administration for raising taxes in violation of a 1987 campaign pledge, declared that the new party would strive for a “just and caring society” with “efficiency and integrity in public affairs.” The NDP lost all four of its seats in January 1991; one that was regained in September 1994 was lost in January 1999. In mid-1997 several NDP figures rejoined the DLP, although most of its founding members indicated that they would remain with the dissident formation. Leaders: Dr. Richard (Richie) HAYNES (Former Leader of the Opposition), Edgar BOURNE, Richard BYER. Minor parties include the People’s Progressive Movement (PPM), founded in 1979 and led by Eric SEALY; the left-wing Workers’ Party of Barbados (WPB), founded in 1985 by Dr. George BELLE; and the leftist People’s Empowerment Party (PEP), launched in 2006 by Robert (Bobby) CLARKE, former leader of the Movement for National Liberation (Monali).

Legislature The bicameral Parliament consists of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Assembly. Senate. The Senate consists of 21 members appointed by the governor general; 12 are appointed on advice of the prime minister, 2 on advice of the

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Cabinet As of May 1, 2007 see headnote Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Owen S. Arthur Mia Mottley [f]

Ministers Agriculture and Rural Development Commerce, Consumer Affairs, and Business Development Defense and Security Economic Affairs and Development Education, Youth Affairs, and Sports Energy and Environment Finance and Social Security Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Health Home Affairs and Attorney General Housing and Lands Immigration Information and Broadcasting Labour and Civil Service Public Works Social Transformation Tourism and International Transport Town and Country Planning

Erskine Griffith Lynette Eastmond [f] Owen S. Arthur Mia Mottley [f] Anthony Wood Elizabeth Thompson McDonald [f] Owen S. Arthur Billie Miller [f] Jerome Walcott Dale Mashall Reginald Farely Owen S. Arthur Owen S. Arthur Rawle Eastmond Gline Clarke Trevor Prescod Noel Anderson Lynch Owen S. Arthur

Ministers of State Prime Minister’s Office Education, Youth Affairs, and Sports Finance Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade

Joseph Atherley Cynthia Forde [f] Clyde Mascoll Kerrie Symmonds

[f] = female

leader of the opposition, and 7 to represent social, religious, and economic interests. President: Sir Fred W. GOLLOP. House of Assembly. The House currently consists of 30 members elected for five-year terms by direct popular vote. In the most recent election of May 21, 2003, the Barbados Labour Party won 23 seats, and the Democratic Labour Party, 7. Speaker: Ishmael A. ROETT.

Communications All news media are free of censorship and government control.

Press The following are privately owned and published in Bridgetown: Daily Nation (32,000 daily; 52,000 Sunday, published as Sunday Sun); The Beacon (15,000), weekly BLP organ; Barbados

BARBADOS

Advocate (15,000 daily; 21,000 Sunday), independent; Action, weekly. In addition, an Official Gazette is issued on Monday and Thursday.

News Agencies The regional Caribbean News Agency (Cana) is headquartered in St. Michael; Spain’s Agencia EFE also is represented in Barbados.

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multidenominational religious system has sought licensing. The CBC operates the only television service, apart from two cable channels. As of 2005, there were approximately 595 Internet users and 149 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 767 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation

Broadcasting and Computing

Ambassador to the U.S.: Michael Ian KING

Barbados Rediffusion Service, Ltd., has operated a wired radio system since the 1930s, and the government-owned Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) has offered a wireless system since 1963. The Voice of Barbados, privately owned, began broadcasting in 1981, while Barbados Broadcasting Service (BBS), also private, began transmission in late 1982. In addition, a

U.S. Ambassador to Barbados: Mary Martin OURISMAN Permanent Representative to the UN: Christopher Fitzherbert HACKETT IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, SELA, WCO, WTO

BELIZE BELIZE

Note: In the snap legislative polls on February 7, 2008, the United Democratic Party (UDP) won 25 of 31 legislative seats, led by the newly elected prime minister, Dean Barrow. The People’s United Party of former Prime Minister Said Musa secured the remaining 6 seats. The new government was sworn in on February 8.

The Country Located on the Caribbean coast of Central America, bordered by Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula on the north and by Guatemala on the west and south, Belize is slightly larger than El Salvador but with less than 3 percent of the latter’s population. Most of the inhabitants are of mixed ancestry. Mestizos of Spanish and Mayan Indian derivation comprise the largest part of the population (43.6 percent), while Creole descendants of African slaves and English settlers form the second largest group (29.8 percent). Other smaller ethnic groups include Amerindians (mainly Mayans), Carib Blacks (Garifunas), Asians, German Mennonites, and others of European descent. Roman Catholics constitute the largest religious group (60 percent), with roughly equal numbers (14 percent each) of Anglicans and Methodists. Approximately three-quarters of the country are forested, but the quality of its timber has been depleted by more than two centuries of exploitation by British firms, and in 1992 the government banned the export of ziricote and rosewood in lumber form. Less than a fifth of the country’s arable land, located primarily in the south, is under cultivation. The principal export commodities are sugar, molasses, fruit, and fish, with the economy subject to chronic trade deficits. Although living conditions in Belize City, which contains nearly one-quarter of the population, are poor, school attendance is high and adult literacy is more than 90 percent.

Average income is little more than $1,000 a year, in part because of widespread unemployment that has induced tens of thousands of Belizeans to emigrate, principally to the United States. Economic growth, as reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), averaged 2.9 percent during 1993– 1998, before rising to 6.5 percent in 1999 and 10.4 percent in 2000. After several years of deflation

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Gu l f o f Ho n du r as HONDURAS

BELIZE

Political Status: Former British dependency; became independent member of the Commonwealth on September 21, 1981. Area: 8,867 sq. mi. (22,965 sq. km.). Population: 240,204 (2000C); 302,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): BELMOPAN (13,600), Belize City (62,300). Official Language: English. Spanish is the country’s second language, and a form of English Creole is widely spoken. Monetary Unit: Belize Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 1.95 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir Colville YOUNG; sworn in November 17, 1993, following the resignation of Dame Minita Elvira GORDON. Prime Minister: (See headnote.) Said MUSA (People’s United Party); sworn in on August 28, 1998, in succession to Manuel A. ESQUIVEL (United Democratic Party), following legislative election of August 27; formed new government on September 1, 1998; reinvested on March 7, 2003, following election of March 5.

(averaging 0.8 percent in 1997–1998), inflation of 1.0 percent was recorded in 2000. The economy was severely battered by a hurricane in October 2001. GDP growth in 2005 receded to 3.0 percent despite the discovery of an oil field in Spanish Lookout in western Belize but rebounded to 5.3 percent in 2006. The IMF credited the improvement to a reduction in the trade imbalance, an increase in tourism, and the outset of crude oil exports. However, the IMF called the outlook for 2007 “worrisome” because of high scheduled debt obligations and predicted GDP growth of only 2.6 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Initially colonized in the early 17th century by English woodcutters and shipwrecked sailors, the

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territory long known as British Honduras became a Crown dependency governed from Jamaica in 1862 and a separate colony in 1884. The country’s western boundary was delineated in an 1859 convention that was repudiated by Guatemala in 1940 (see Foreign relations, below). Internal selfgovernment was granted under a constitution effective January 1, 1964, and the official name was changed to Belize in June 1973. Although the dispute with Guatemala remained unresolved, independence was granted on September 21, 1981, with Great Britain agreeing to provide for the country’s defense “for an appropriate period.” At independence, George Cadle PRICE, who had served continuously in an executive capacity since his designation as first minister in 1961, was named prime minister. At the country’s first postindependence election on December 14, 1984, the electorate expressed its apparent weariness of more than three decades of rule by Price’s People’s United Party (PUP), turning by a substantial margin to the more conservative United Democratic Party (UDP) led by Manuel A. ESQUIVEL. However, at balloting on September 4, 1989, PUP returned to power, winning 15 of 28 legislative seats in a narrow electoral victory (50.3 to 48.4 percent) over the incumbent UDP. The UDP’s loss was linked, in part, to popular disenchantment with its economic policies, which Price had castigated as “savage economic liberalism.” Buoyed by sweeping victories in a 1993 parliamentary by-election in January and local government balloting in April, Prime Minister Price called a snap Assembly election for June 30. This proved a mistake, as the opposition UDP captured 16 of 29 seats, returning Esquivel to government leadership. However, PUP swept municipal balloting on March 11, 1997, winning all seven town boards, and went on to a conclusive victory at the Assembly poll of August 27, 1998, winning 26 of 29 seats. Shortly thereafter Said MUSA was named to succeed Esquivel as prime minister, and he remained in office following the election on March 5, 2003, at which time PUP representation declined marginally to 22 seats.

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Constitution and Government With modifications appropriate to Britain’s yielding of responsibility in the areas of defense, foreign affairs, and the judiciary, Belize’s 1981 constitution is structured after its 1964 predecessor. The Crown is represented by a governor general of Belizean citizenship who must act, in most matters, on the advice of a cabinet headed by a prime minister. The National Assembly, with a normal term of five years, is a bicameral body currently encompassing a 29-member House of Representatives elected by universal adult suffrage, plus the speaker, if not an elected member, and an appointed Senate of 13 members. Cabinet members may be drawn from either house, except that the finance minister must sit in the House of Representatives, where all money bills originate. The governor general is empowered to appoint a 5-member Elections and Boundaries Commission and, on the advice of the prime minister, 8 members of a 13-member Public Services Commission (the remaining members serving ex officio). The judicial system includes a Supreme Court as superior court of record, whose chief justice is appointed on the advice of the prime minister after consultation with the leader of the opposition; and a Court of Appeal, from which final appeal may, in certain cases, be made to the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council. (In early 2004 the government indicated that it would seek to amend the Constitution to make the Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] the country’s final court of appeal.) There also are courts of summary jurisdiction and civil courts in each of the six districts into which the country is divided for administrative purposes.

Foreign Relations Belize became a full member of the Commonwealth upon independence and was admitted to the United Nations in September 1981, despite a Guatemalan protest that the “unilateral creation” of an independent state in disputed territory constituted “an invitation to third powers to become protectors of Belize” and thus make Central America “an area for ambitions and confrontation.” Although it formally requested membership in the

Organization of American States (OAS) in October, the Price government indicated its willingness to have action on the matter deferred in view of an OAS rule prohibiting the admission of a state involved in territorial disputes with existing members. Guatemala had long contended that its dispute was with Britain, not with Belize. Guatemalan leaders claimed that their country’s repudiation in 1940 of the Belizean boundary set forth in the 1859 convention was justified because of Britain’s failure to fulfill certain treaty obligations, including a commitment to construct a road from Belize City to the border to provide northern Guatemala with access to the Caribbean. Thus, under its 1945 constitution, Guatemala claimed British Honduras, as Belize was first known, as part of its national territory. Progress toward resolution of the problem was attempted in a tripartite “Heads of Agreement” document drafted in London on March 11, 1981, with Guatemala yielding on the territorial issue and Belize abandoning certain maritime claims as a means of granting Guatemala “permanent and unimpeded access” to its relatively isolated port of Puerto Barrios on the Gulf of Honduras. However, the agreement angered elements within both Belize and Guatemala, as well as serving to revive a long-standing Honduran claim to the Sapodilla Cay group. Further talks held in New York in late May 1981 were reported to have “succeeded in turning a large bulk of the . . . agreement into treaty language,” but Guatemalan intransigence thereafter led to a British announcement that it would proceed with independence on September 21 despite the lack of formal settlement. The immediate postindependence period yielded further negotiations between the three countries and an increase in external support for Belize. In 1982 Guatemala called for renewed discussions with Britain, and tripartite talks were reopened in January 1983 but broke down immediately because of Belize’s continued refusal to cede any territory. More inconclusive discussions were held in Miami, Florida, in April 1987. In May 1988 a Joint Permanent Commission was established, with Guatemala appearing to yield in

BELIZE

its demand for a land corridor across Belize in return for the right of free transit and guaranteed access to Belizean waters. Collaterally, British aid for road improvements on the Guatemalan side of the border was seen as a means of securing token compliance with the 1859 treaty, which lay at the heart of the dispute. The commission subsequently held a number of “positive and cordial” meetings, including a session in Miami on February 1–3, 1989, which concluded with a call for talks “at a higher level” to settle on the details of a draft treaty. In May 1990 tension again flared in the form of a clash between residents of Belize’s Toledo district and Guatemalan agricultural workers who had unknowingly planted crops on the Belizean side of the border. The incident prompted a meeting between Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo Ar´evalo and Prime Minister Price on the Honduran island of Roat´an on July 9, at the conclusion of which “significant progress” was reported in reaching a solution to the lengthy impasse. In January 1991 Belize was admitted to the OAS after the Guatemalan president-elect, Jorge Serrano El´ıas, indicated that his administration would continue talks aimed at settling the controversy. One month after his inauguration, Serrano asserted that “Belize has the recognition of the international community” and again committed himself to resolution of the “sterile dispute.” Shortly thereafter, however, his foreign minister, Alvaro Arz´u, insisted that Guatemala did not recognize Belize’s independence and continued to lay claim to the territory. Less than six months later Serrano overruled Arz´u by announcing that his administration recognized “the right of the Belizean people to self-determination” and on September 5 extended diplomatic recognition to Belmopan. Termination of the lengthy dispute was reinforced in November 1992 by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court, which upheld Serrano’s action in a 4–3 vote, and on April 16, 1993, the two countries reached agreement on a nonaggression pact during a meeting in Miami. On May 13 the United Kingdom announced that its army garrison and jet aircraft would be withdrawn by August 1994. The rapprochement with Guatemala came after Belize had agreed to reduce its southern territorial

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limit to three miles and to grant its neighbor access to the sea from the northern department of Pet´en. Belize also ceded the use of port facilities at Stann Creek and the right to participate in offshore ventures, such as oil exploration, in Belize’s 12-mile economic zone. Criticism of the accord ensued in both countries: Guatemalan foreign minister Arz´u resigned after insisting that Serrano’s action was unconstitutional, while a faction of the Belizean UDP (see NABR, below) distanced itself from the parent group on the grounds that the maritime provisions would have adverse consequences, particularly for fishermen. During another round of territorial negotiations in Miami on November 20, 1998, the Belizean delegation rejected a Guatemalan proposal that the underlying dispute be resolved by an international court, but the two governments did agree to establish a mixed commission to deal with a variety of issues concerning the rights of their respective citizens. Following a number of border incidents, agreement was reached in September 2002 to deploy OAS observers to the disputed area pending the holding of a referendum on the issue in both countries. However, the accord was repudiated by Guatemala in August 2003, and in May 2004 new discussions were launched at OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C., to find an “equitable and permanent solution” to the controversy. After lengthy negotiations, an Agreement on a Framework of Negotiations and Confidence Building Measures between Belize and Guatemala was signed on September 8, 2005. The document provided for a bilateral commission to undertake cooperation projects and develop a solution to the territorial dispute. On November 23, at the conclusion of its first meeting, the commission announced that it had discussed “issues of fact and law” on which subsequent negotiations would be based. Evidence of the thaw in relations was provided in October 2005 by the conclusion of the first bilateral trade accord between the two countries and again in July 2006 when they endorsed a preliminary trade agreement that would allow 150 products to be traded duty-free. Despite these positive steps, in January 2007 Prime Minister Musa called for an independent international tribunal to resolve

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the territorial dispute, agreement having reportedly been reached on both sides that the current negotiations under OAS auspices did not appear headed toward resolution.

Current Issues As of early 2006 no consensus had been reached on a long-standing proposal that Belize should become a republic, although some progress had been made in normalizing the country’s relations with Guatemala (see Foreign relations, above). Meanwhile, with Prime Minister Musa’s popularity plummeting to a low of 16 percent, opposition leader Dean BARROW announced that he would step down if the UDP lost in local elections on March 1. The party responded by handing PUP its first defeat in a decade by winning a landslide 64 of 67 contests and 60 percent of the votes. Also in March, government officials announced that the oil field discovered in the Spanish Lookout district contained an estimated 6–10 million barrels. In an apparent effort to capitalize on the nation’s first significant oil find, the government announced plans to raise the oil income tax from 25 percent to 40 percent. In response, the Belize National Energy (BNE) company, the primarily private group that had conducted the exploration, threatened to leave the country if its profits were threatened too heavily by government policies. Meanwhile, the people of Belize reportedly harbored considerable doubt that they would benefit from the oil discovery. In October 2006 the United States removed Belize from the list of countries failing to meet minimum standards of fighting trafficking in persons. Attention in early 2007 focused on the government’s apparently successful efforts to reschedule payments on more than half of its external debt.

Political Parties Government Party People’s United Party (PUP). Founded in 1950 as a Christian Democratic group, PUP has

been dominant for most of the period since the achievement of internal self-government in 1964. After 34 years in office (largely under colonial administration), PUP was decisively defeated at the December 1984 election, and former president and party leader George C. Price was among those losing their legislative seats. Following the election, (then) PUP chair and right-wing faction leader Louis SYLVESTRE resigned from the party. At a January 1986 “Unity Congress,” the leader of the left-wing faction, Said Musa, was elected party chair, while the leader of the rump right-wing faction, Florencio MARIN, was elected deputy chair. Utilizing promises of a liberalized media policy and an expanded state role in the economy, PUP regained legislative control at the September 1989 election, before again losing it at the early vote of June 1993. In May 1996 deputy chair Mar´ın resigned, prompting speculation that he was positioning himself for a power struggle with Musa for the party leadership post held by the aging Price. In midOctober Price resigned, and at balloting at the party’s national convention on November 10 Musa outpolled Mar´ın, 358 to 214, to capture the top PUP slot. Musa became prime minister following the party’s landslide victory on August 27, 1998. Leaders: Said MUSA (Prime Minister and Party ˜ (Deputy Prime Minister Leader), John BRICENO and Deputy Party Leader).

Opposition Parties United Democratic Party (UDP). The UDP was formed in 1974 by merger of the People’s Democratic Movement, the Liberal Party, and the National Independence Party. A largely Creole grouping, the party boycotted the preindependence constitutional discussions and the independence ceremonies on the grounds that assurances of continued support by Britain were “vague and uncertain.” The UDP includes an extremist youth wing, the Belize Action Movement, whose adherents engaged in numerous clashes with

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Cabinet As of March 1, 2007 see headnote Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Said Musa (PUP) John Brice˜no (PUP)

Ministers Agriculture and Fisheries Culture Defense Education and Labor Finance Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Health Home Affairs and Public Utilities Housing Human Development Local Government National Development and Investment Natural Resources and Environment Public Service Tourism, Information, and National Emergency Management Transport and Communication Youth and Sports Attorney General

Vildo Marin Mark Espat Cordel Hyde Francis Fonseca Said Musa Eamon Courtenay Jos´e Coye Ralph Fonseca Cordel Hyde Sylvia Flores [f] Jos´e Coye Mark Espat John Brice˜no Said Musa Godfrey Smith Jos´e Coye Cordel Hyde Francis Fonseca

[f] = female

police during the pre-independence period. In January 1983 Manuel Esquivel was named party leader in succession to Theodore Aranda, who withdrew from the UDP while retaining his parliamentary seat. Aranda later formed the center-right Christian Democratic Party before joining PUP in mid-1987. After securing an unexpectedly lopsided victory at the balloting of December 14, 1984, Esquivel became head of the first non-PUP government since independence. In December 1986 the UDP triumphed again, winning all nine seats on the Belize City Council. Hampered by opposition criticism of its economic policies, it lost its legislative majority at the September 1989 balloting and failed to retain a single council seat the following December.

Most of the UDP leadership, including Esquivel, supported the 1991 settlement with Guatemala, although a minority led by Philip GOLDSON (who resigned from his position as deputy secretary general in mid-November) did not, and, after leaving the party, helped launch the NABR (below). The UDP won only 3 of 29 seats at the election of August 27, 1998, and on March 1, 2000, lost all 7 seats in Belmopan’s first municipal poll, while retaining control in only one of seven other municipalities. Although losing to PUP by a wide margin in March 2003, it secured an overwhelming victory in the municipal poll of March 2006 when it won 64 of 67 seats. Leaders: Dean BARROW (Party Leader), Douglas SINGH (Chair).

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National Alliance for Belizean Rights (NABR). The NABR was organized in February 1992 by a group of UDP dissidents who strongly believed maritime concessions to Guatemala were an abridgement of Belizean sovereignty. In November the Supreme Court issued a bankruptcy order against (then) NABR chair Derek AIKMAN, thus setting the stage, under Belizean law, for his expulsion from the House of Representatives. Despite the circumstances of its launching, the NABR campaigned with the UDP in 1993 and subsequently joined the Esquivel government. Leader: Philip S. W. GOLDSON (National Coordinator).

Legislature The Belize National Assembly is a bicameral body consisting of an appointed Senate and a directly elected House of Representatives, both serving five-year terms, subject to dissolution. Senate. The upper house currently has 12 members, plus the Senate president. Six of the members are appointed by the governor general on the advice of the prime minister, 3 on the advice of the leader of the opposition, and 3 on the advice of various sectors of society. President: Philip ZUNIGA. House of Representatives. The lower house currently has 30 members, 29 elected by universal adult suffrage, plus the speaker. At the election of March 5, 2003, the People’s United Party won 22 seats, while the United Democratic Party won 7. Speaker: Elizabeth ZABANEH.

Communications Press Freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed. The following are weeklies published in Belize City: Amandala (40,000), independent; The Reporter (7,000), pro-UDP; The Belize Times (6,000), PUP organ; People’s Pulse (5,000), UDP organ; Government Gazette.

Broadcasting and Computing The Belize Broadcasting Network (BBN) provides daily programming on a semicommercial basis in English and Spanish; formerly governmentoperated, the BBN was privatized in November 1998. In mid-1986 the government issued licenses to eight operators for 14 privately owned television channels retransmitting U.S. satellite programs, all of which technically had been operating illegally previously. Two additional licenses for the operation of nationwide television services were issued in late 1994. As of 2005, there were approximately 141 Internet users and 443 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to Belize: Robert Johann DIETER Permanent Representative to the UN: (Vacant) IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WTO

BOLIVIA REPUBLIC

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Potosi

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CHILE

ay

Tarija

Paragu

A country of tropical lowlands and pampas flanked by high mountains in the west, landlocked Bolivia is noted for a high proportion of Indians (predominantly Aymar´a and Quechua), who constitute more than 60 percent of the population, although their integration into the country’s political and economic life progressed slowly until recently. Women constitute approximately 39 percent of the labor force, with roughly equal numbers in agricultural, manufacturing, clerical, and service activities. Spanish, the sole official language until 1977, is the mother tongue of less than 40 percent of the people, while Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion. Although providing only one-sixth of Bolivia’s gross national product, agriculture employs about half the population, mostly on a subsistence level. The main crops are soybeans, cotton, coffee, sugar, wheat, barley, and corn. According to recent estimates, only 10 percent of the nation’s farming families own 90 percent of arable land, a situation the current administration plans to alter through a controversial land distribution plan (see Current issues, below). Tin mining has been a traditional mainstay of the economy, although the state-owned mines have long been wracked by labor difficulties. Other significant metal exports include silver, zinc, and tungsten. Bolivia also reportedly controls one of the world’s largest unexploited reserves of iron ore, while the nation’s first gold mine was scheduled to begin operation in 2007. Natural gas surpassed tin as the leading export commodity in 1982. Gas reserves (estimated as

the second largest in Latin America) are located primarily in the eastern lowlands, exacerbating a long-standing divide between the poorer western highlands (populated mainly by Indians) and the richer east (populated mainly by people of European descent and mestizos). Based on the rapidly growing gas and agricultural sectors, the department of Santa Cruz and other lowland departments have served as the country’s “economic engine” for several decades. Petroleum production peaked in 1974.

PA CI F I C OCEAN

The Country

ARGENTINA

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A leading contributor to the underground economy has long been coca leaf production, with the overwhelming proportion of annual output entering the cocaine trade. In the late 1980s, about 400,000 persons in the Chapare region alone were engaged in coca cultivation, with total income from drug trafficking estimated at more than $2.5 billion. U.S.-backed efforts at coca eradication, chiefly by means of crop substitution, fluctuated thereafter. Inflation reached a world record of 24,000 percent in 1985 before falling steadily to 6.5 percent in 1998 under the influence of a sustained austerity program. The economy consistently expanded for most of the 1990s, although unemployment, exacerbated by austerity measures, remained exceedingly high at 25 percent and a majority of the population continued to live in poverty. Growth rates decreased in 1999–2003 under the influence of political turmoil and growing social tensions. GDP growth recovered to more than 4 percent in 2005, 2006, and 2007 due to sharp increases in revenue from hydrocarbon and other mineral exports. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while citing Bolivia’s “macroeconomic stability,” noted in 2006 and 2007 that economic advancement had only marginally assisted the poor. The new leftist government announced a massive poverty-reduction program designed, among other things, to create jobs and provide better public services. (Government spending was expected to grow by nearly 30 percent in 2007.) The administration rebuffed an IMF recommendation to increase privatization and instead embarked on a controversial program of partial nationalization of the gas and mining sectors (see Current Issues, below).

Government and Politics Political Background Bolivia’s history since its liberation from Spanish rule in 1825 has been marked by recurrent domestic instability and frequent conflicts with neighboring states, especially Chile, Peru, and Paraguay. Increased unrest in the mid-20th century

prompted a seizure of power in April 1952 by the reform-minded Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario— MNR), which proceeded to carry out a thoroughgoing social and political revolution under the leadership of presidents V´ıctor PAZ Estenssoro and Hern´an SILES Zuazo, who alternately dominated the political scene in four-year terms from 1952 to 1964. MNR rule was cut short in November 1964, when the vice president, Gen. Ren´e BARRIENTOS Ortun˜no, acting in the midst of widespread disorder, assumed power by a military coup. After serving with Gen. Alfredo OVANDO Cand´ıa as copresident under a military junta, Barrientos resigned to run for the presidency and was elected in July 1966. Supported by the armed forces and a strong coalition in Congress, his regime encountered intense opposition from the tin miners, who charged repression of workers’ unions. A southeastern jungle uprising led by Castro-ite revolutionary Ernesto “Ch´e” GUEVARA in 1967 resulted in Guevara’s death at the hands of government troops and the capture of guerrilla ideologist R´egis DEBRAY. President Barrientos was killed in a helicopter crash in April 1969, and Vice President Luis Adolfo SILES Salinas succeeded to the presidency. Siles was deposed the following September by the military, which installed Barrientos’s former copresident, Ovando Cand´ıa, as chief executive. Backto-back coups occurred in October 1970, the first led by Gen. Rogelio MIRANDA and the second by Gen. Juan Jos´e TORRES. The Torres regime came to power with the support of students, workers, and leftist political parties. It was accompanied by continuing instability, the nationalization of properties (both foreign and domestic), and the creation in 1971 of an extraconstitutional “Popular Assembly” of trade-union leaders, Marxist politicians, and radical students led by Juan LECHIN Oquendo of the tin-miners’ union. In August 1971 the armed forces, in alliance with the MNR and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana— FSB), deposed Torres and appointed a govern´ ment under (then) Col. Hugo BANZER Su´arez. Two years later the MNR withdrew from the

BOLIVIA

Political Status: Independent republic proclaimed 1825; civilian government reestablished in October 1982 after virtually constant military rule since September 1969. Area: 424,162 sq. mi. (1,098,581 sq. km.). Population: 8,280,184 (2001C); 9,915,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): LA PAZ (administrative capital, 826,000), Sucre (judicial capital, 231,000), Santa Cruz (1,337,000), Cochabamba (583,000), Oruro (209,000). Official Languages: Spanish, Aymar´a, Quechua (Aymar´a and Quechua were adopted as official languages in 1977). Monetary Unit: Boliviano (market rate November 2, 2007: 7.64 bolivianos = $1US); the peso was replaced by the boliviano in February 1987 at a ratio of 1,000,000:1. President: Evo MORALES (Movement to Socialism); elected December 18, 2005, and inaugurated January 22, 2006, for a five-year term, succeeding Interim President Eduardo RODR´IGUEZ Velts´e (Nonparty). ´ Vice President: Alvaro GARC´IA Linera (Movement to Socialism); elected December 18, 2005, and inaugurated January 22, 2006, for a term concurrent with that of the president. (The office had been vacant since assumption of the presidency by Carlos Diego MESA Gisbert on October 17, 2003.)

coalition, and, after an abortive revolt the following November, B´anzer rescinded an earlier pledge to return the nation to civilian rule in 1975. In November 1977 President B´anzer again reversed himself, announcing that a national election would be held on July 9, 1978. After balloting marked by evidence of massive fraud, the military candidate, Gen. Juan PEREDA Asb´un, was declared the winner over his closest competitor, former president Siles Zuazo. However, faced with a suddenly unified opposition, Pereda was forced to call for an annulment. President B´anzer then declared that he would not remain in office be-

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yond August 6, and on July 21 Pereda was installed as Bolivia’s 188th head of state. Pereda was himself ousted on November 24 by Brig. Gen. David PADILLA Arancibia, who promised to withdraw following an election on July 1, 1979. In the 1979 election, Siles Zuazo, the nominee of a center-left coalition, obtained a bare plurality (36.0 percent to 35.9 percent) over former president Paz Estenssoro, who headed a new MNR coalition that included a number of leftist groups. Called on to decide the outcome because of the lack of a majority, the Congress was unable to choose between the front-runners and on August 6 designated Senate President Walter GUEVARA Arce to serve as interim executive pending a new presidential election in May 1980. Guevara was ousted on November 1, 1979, in a military coup led by Col. Alberto NATUSCH Busch, who was himself forced to resign 15 days later in the face of widespread civil disorder, including a paralyzing general strike in La Paz. On November 16 the Congress unanimously elected the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Lidia GUEILER Tejada, to serve as the country’s first female executive for an interim term expiring August 6, 1980. In the national election on June 29, 1980, Siles Zuazo again secured the largest number of votes while failing to win an absolute majority. As a result, before the new Congress could meet to settle on a winner from among the three leading candidates, the military, on July 17, once more intervened, forcing the resignation of Gueiler the following day in favor of a “junta of national reconstruction” that included Maj. Gen. Luis GARCIA MEZA Tejada (sworn in as president on July 18), Maj. Gen. Waldo BERNAL Pereira, and Vice Adm. Ramiro TERRAZAS Rodr´ıguez. During the following year the regime was divided because of differences within the military and internationally isolated because of charges that certain of its members were actively engaged in the drug trade. In early 1981 revolts broke out at the military academy in La Paz and in Cochabamba, southeast of the capital, while former presidents Natusch and B´anzer were both exiled in mid-May

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for plotting against the government. On May 26 Garc´ıa Meza resigned as army commander and as junta member, naming Gen. Humberto CAYOJA Riart as his successor in both posts; three days later Admiral Terrazas resigned as navy commander and junta member in favor of (then) Capt. Oscar PAMMO Rodr´ıguez. On June 27 General Cayoja was arrested for involvement in a plot to remove Garc´ıa Meza from the presidency, Brig. Gen. Celso TORRELIO Villa being designated his successor. On August 4, following a rebellion in Santa Cruz, the president resigned in favor of General Bernal, who, in turn, yielded the office of chief executive to General Torrelio on September 4. Amid growing economic difficulty, labor unrest, pressure from the parties, and lack of unity within the military, President Torrelio announced that a constituent assembly election would be held in 1984. The increasingly beleaguered government issued a political amnesty in late May 1982 and authorized the parties and trade unions to resume normal activity. On July 19 General Torrelio was ousted in favor of Gen. Guido VILDOSO Calder´on, who announced, following a meeting of armed forces commanders on September 17, that the Congress elected in 1980 would be reconvened to name a civilian president. The lengthy period of military rule formally ended on October 10 with the return to office of Siles Zuazo and the concurrent installation of Jaime PAZ Zamora as vice president. During the ensuing two years, numerous government changes proved incapable of reversing steadily worsening economic conditions, and in November 1984 Siles Zuazo announced that he would retire from the presidency following a general election in mid-1985. In the balloting on July 14, 1985, former president B´anzer of the right-wing Nationalist Democratic Action (Acci´on Democr´atica Nacionalista—ADN) obtained a narrow plurality (28.6 percent) of the votes cast, while the MNR of runner-up Paz Estenssoro won a plurality of congressional seats. In a second-round poll in Congress on August 5, Paz Estenssoro secured a clear majority over his ADN competitor. He was inaugurated for his fourth presidential term on

August 6 in the country’s first peaceful transfer of power since his succession of Siles Zuazo exactly 25 years earlier. While successful in virtually eliminating one of history’s highest rates of inflation, the new administration proved unable to resolve a wide range of other economic difficulties that included massive unemployment (generated, in part, by a crippling decline in world tin prices) and an illegal cocaine trade that provided half the country’s export income. The public responded on December 6, 1987, by rejecting most government candidates in municipal balloting that yielded impressive gains for both the rightist ADN and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR). As in 1985 the results of the nationwide balloting of May 7, 1989, were inconclusive. MNR candi´ date Gonzalo (“Goni”) SANCHEZ DE LOZADA Bustamente obtained a slim plurality (23.1 percent) in the presidential poll over the ADN’s B´anzer (22.7 percent) and the MIR’s Paz Zamora (19.6 percent). A period of intense negotiation ensued that yielded a somewhat improbable pact of “national unity” between the right-wing ADN and the leftof-center MIR on August 2 and the congressional selection four days later of Paz Zamora to head an administration in which 10 of 18 cabinet posts were awarded to the ADN. The unusual accord (which excluded the MNR) was seen, in part, as a continuation of long-standing personal animosity between former president B´anzer and MNR leader S´anchez de Lozada. B´anzer claimed as his reward the chair of an interparty Political Council of Convergence and National Unity (Consejo Superior de Unidad y Convergencia), which some interpreted as the effective locus of power within the MIR–ADN coalition. In the nationwide poll of June 6, 1993, S´anchez de Lozada again defeated B´anzer, this time by a sufficiently impressive margin to ensure designation by Congress under a new procedure that confined its options to the two front-runners. In the legislative balloting, the MNR obtained an equally improved plurality (69 of 157 seats overall) that yielded a preinaugural governing pact between the

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MNR, the rightist Civic Solidarity Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Solidaridad—UCS), and the leftist Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre— MBL). The UCS withdrew from the coalition in September 1994, apparently because of government concessions to labor in furtherance of its antidrug campaign; however, the party rejoined the coalition in June 1995. The 1997 candidacy of the ADN’s B´anzer was aided by the withdrawal of the highly respected Ren´e BLATTMANN Bauer, in favor of the relatively colorless Juan Carlos DURAN. Despite his advanced age of 71 and former role as a military dictator, B´anzer led the June 1 poll with 22.3 percent of the vote and ensured his congressional designation by entering into a postelection coalition with the MIR, the UCS, and the fourth-ranked Conscience of the Fatherland (Conciencia de Patria— Condepa). Overall, the group controlled 96 of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 24 of 27 in the Senate. Following a leadership dispute within Condepa in mid-1998, its two cabinet members resigned, and B´anzer dropped the party from the ruling coalition. An ailing B´anzer resigned on August 7, 2001, and was succeeded by Vice President Jorge Fern´ando QUIROGA Ram´ırez to serve for the balance of the presidential term to August 2002. In the election of June 30, 2002, the MNR, in alliance with the MBL, won pluralities of 11 Senate and 36 Chamber seats, while S´anchez de Lozada outpolled Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS) leader Evo MORALES by a bare 1.5 percent margin in presidential balloting and was reappointed by Congress on August 4. The ensuing year was marked by turmoil on a number of fronts, including opposition to the U.S.-backed coca eradication program, anger at the plight of the landless, objections to the export of natural gas to Chile, and discontent with tax increases and a number of recent privatizations. On October 13, 2003, Vice President Carlos MESA Gisbert withdrew his support for the president, and on October 17, amid widespread clashes between security forces and demonstrators, S´anchez de Lozada was forced to resign and flee the country. Mesa assumed

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the presidency, naming a new and formally nonpartisan cabinet. President Mesa resigned on June 6, 2005, in the wake of widespread unrest over the nation’s hydrocarbon policies and related autonomy pressure in several regions, most notably Santa Cruz. After the president of Congress and the president of the Chamber of Deputies had removed themselves from the official line of succession to permit a compromise with the MAS (the party most directly involved in the protests), Supreme Court Justice Eduardo RODR´IGUEZ Velts´e was named interim president by the Congress. Rodr´ıguez promptly announced an interim cabinet and launched negotiations for a new election schedule that would fill the presidential and vice-presidential vacancies and select a new Congress. However, a dispute erupted over a constitutionally mandated redistribution of seats to reflect demographic changes recorded by the 2001 census. A congressional effort to sidestep the redistricting issue by decreeing that elections called for December 4 would be based on the 1992 census was voided by the Constitutional Court on September 22, 2005. On November 1, Rodr´ıguez issued a constitutionally questionable decree redistricting the legislative seats, and on December 18 MAS leader Morales won the presidency, defeating his closest competitor, former president Quiroga, by securing an unanticipated 53.7 percent of the vote. (Morales was the first presidential contender since the end of military rule in 1982 to gain a majority in the national poll and thereby secure victory without congressional action.) In the congressional races, the MAS won control of the lower house with a 72-seat majority, while running a close second to Quiroga’s Social Democratic Power (Poder Democr´atico Social—Podemos) in the Senate. However, the MAS won the prefectures (governorships) in only three of the nine departments in concurrent balloting. As requested by the Morales administration, Congress in March 2006 authorized the election of a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution. In balloting on July 2, the MAS secured 137 of 255 seats in the assembly, while in

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concurrent balloting on a referendum regarding proposed greater regional autonomy, the five western departments (La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, Chuquisaca, and Cochabamba) voted no and the four eastern departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando) voted yes. Autonomy was thereby not granted to any of the departments, the National Elections Court (Corte Nacional Electoral—CNE) having previously ruled (much to the consternation of the easterners) that a majority of voters nationwide needed to approve the measure for it to be adopted in any department. (The national “no” vote totaled 57 percent.) President Morales appointed a new cabinet with a “distinct leftist tilt” on January 24, 2007, in the midst of a severe east/west schism regarding constitutional revision and other issues (see Current Issues, below). The Senate was dissolved following the Constituent Assembly’s approval of a new charter in December 2007, and the president reshuffled the cabinet on January 24, 2008.

Constitution and Government The constitution of February 1967 was Bolivia’s sixteenth since independence. It vested executive power in a popularly elected president and legislative authority in a bicameral Congress. Suspended in 1969, it was reinstated in 1979, the country having been ruled during the intervening decade by presidential decree; the constitution remained technically in effect following the 1980 coup, subject to military contravention of its terms, and was restored to full force upon the return to civilian rule in October 1982. Under the 1967 basic law the president was directly elected for a four-year term if the recipient won an absolute majority of votes; otherwise, Congress made the selection from among the three leading candidates. However, given the selection in 1989 of the third-ranked contender, congressional leaders in mid-1990 agreed on a revision that limited Congress to choosing between the plurality candidate and the runner-up. In 1997 the term of office was extended to five years, with a limit of only one term.

The bicameral legislature consists of a 27member Senate and a 130-member Chamber of Deputies, both directly elected for five-year terms. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court whose 12 members divide into four chambers: two for civil cases, one for criminal cases, and one for administrative cases. There is a District Court in each territorial department, as well as provincial and local courts to try minor offenses. There are nine territorial departments, each administered by a prefect (governor), who was appointed by the central government until first-ever direct elections were held for the posts in December 2005. Although the 1967 constitution called for the biennial election of municipal councils (empowered to supplant the president in the designation of mayors), implementing legislation was deferred until 1986, with local balloting being conducted in December 1987 for the first time in 39 years. In July 1996 the government secured approval from the Chamber of Deputies for a constitutional amendment on redistribution of seats in the Chamber, giving added representation to the more populous and powerful departments of La Paz and Santa Cruz at the expense of the peripheral departments of Chuquisaca, Pando, and Potosi. Agreement also was reached on the first-ever introduction of singlemember constituencies. Congress, under pressure from the Morales administration, passed a resolution in March 2006 calling for a 255-member elected constituent assembly to rewrite the Bolivian constitution beginning August 6, 2006, following direct elections on July 2, 2006, for the assembly delegates. The assembly was given a one-year mandate, after which its proposals were to be presented for a national referendum. Little progress was reported within the assembly throughout most of 2007, as government and opposition members argued over procedures. The Morales administration was pursuing, among other things, revisions to basic law that would permit presidents to serve more than one term, as well as codification of the government’s plans to redistribute land to the benefit of the Indian population and to give indigenous populations the power to conduct political and economic affairs according

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to their traditions. Meanwhile, opposition parties (dominant in the resource-rich eastern lowlands) called for greater regional autonomy, the establishment of elected regional legislatures, and other decentralization measures that would weaken the power of the president. On December 9, 2007, the Constituent Assembly approved a new charter that would be subject to national referendum in 2008.

Foreign Relations Throughout most of the modern era, Bolivia’s relations with its immediate neighbors have been significantly influenced by a desire to regain at least a portion of the maritime littoral that was lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879–1884). In February 1975 relations with Chile were resumed after a 12-year lapse, Chile announcing that an “agreement in principle” had been negotiated between the two countries whereby Bolivia would be granted an outlet to the sea (salida al mar) along the Chilean-Peruvian border in exchange for territory elsewhere. However, definitive resolution of the issue was complicated in late 1976 by a Peruvian proposal that the corridor from Bolivia be linked to an area north of the city of Arica (obtained by Chile as a consequence of the war) that would be under the three nations’ joint sovereignty. The proposal was based on a 1929 treaty that provided that any cession of former Peruvian territory must be approved by Peru. (For developments from 1976 to 1994, see the 2007 Handbook.) In 2006, Evo Morales became the first president-elect in more than half a century to invite Chile’s president to attend his inauguration, while insisting that restoration of full diplomatic relations would be contingent on Chile’s acceding to Bolivia’s demand for a sovereign corridor to the sea. During July of that year, Morales and Chilean President Bachelet reached agreement on an “agenda” for resolving the territorial issue, and by early 2007 it was reported that the “cold war” between the two countries had clearly been replaced by a period of confidence building. Under the B´anzer dictatorship, Bolivia pursued an anti-Communist and pro-U.S. line in inter-

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American affairs, although links with the United States were tenuous during most of the period of military rule because of the alleged involvement of senior officials in the cocaine trade. Relations with Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela were severed after the 1980 coup. In July 1992 Bolivia applied for membership in the recently launched Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), while indicating that it wished to retain the membership in the Andean Pact. Subsequently, the S´anchez de Lozada administration endorsed a proposal to construct a 1,360-mile natural gas pipeline from Santa Cruz to S˜ao Paulo, Brazil, as well as a joint venture with Paraguay to develop a waterway for oceangoing ships from Bolivia to the Atlantic. While flow through the gas line following its inauguration in mid-1999 was far less than anticipated, talk of a second line arose in the wake of additional gas discoveries in Bolivia and a substantial increase in projected Brazilian demand. Meanwhile, the route of a pipeline to the coast to permit gas exports to Mexico and the United States became a major factor in domestic politics. In an elaborate demonstration of reconciliation that included an exchange of trophies between opponents in the bloody Chaco War of 1932–1935, President Wasmosy of Paraguay visited La Paz in August 1994. Subsequently, at the conclusion of a Rio Group meeting on September 10, S´anchez de Lozada signed a free-trade agreement with Mexican President Salinas de Gortari. In 1996 Bolivia and the United States issued seemingly divergent assessments of the coca eradication campaign, the former insisting that a targeted reduction of 5,000–8,000 hectares for the year would be reached, and the latter claiming that the area under cultivation had remained constant during an eight-year period. (The statements were not incompatible, as land taken out of production could have been offset by new plantings elsewhere.) A revised U.S. estimate in mid-1997 contended that the total area under cultivation had increased by 27 percent during the preceding decade, and under a new cooperation agreement signed in late August the United States cut its farmer compensation funding by half. In September 2001 Bolivia conceded

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that claims by former president B´anzer that most illegal plantations had been eradicated were in error and that about 6,000 hectares (rather than 600) remained under cultivation. In late 2002, amid reports that new plantings were far outstripping eradication, U.S. satellite imagery placed the figure at 24,400 hectares. President Morales, while urging decriminalization of coca cultivation and its removal from the UN list of banned substances, indicated in 2006 that he opposed both processing the leaf into cocaine and trafficking in the drug. Before his inauguration, Morales embarked on a whirlwind international tour that took him to ten countries, including Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, China, and Spain. Warmly greeted in Cuba and Venezuela for his stand against “American imperialism,” he was coolly received in Spain, whose officials were uneasy about his plans for greater control of the energy industry. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in early 2006 described the election of Morales, whose campaign had showcased anti–United States rhetoric, as “clearly worrisome,” and the United States quickly announced plans to reduce military aid to Bolivia. However, any potential gap from that decision was apparently resolved by Bolivia’s conclusion of a military agreement with Venezuela, which was reportedly greeted with concern in neighboring Peru and Paraguay. Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez, of whom Morales was considered a close ally, also pledged massive aid to Bolivia for the construction of hospitals and other social needs. In addition, Morales and Ch´avez negotiated a “people’s trade area” with Cuba. On the other hand, Morales, revealing a pragmatic approach that his critics had not anticipated, declined to follow Ch´avez’s decision to withdraw from the Andean Community of Nations. He also toned down his criticism of the United States.

Current Issues Few countries have matched Bolivia’s unhappy record of political instability, which yielded nearly

200 chief executives in its first century and a half of independence. There were 13 presidents from 1969 to 1982 alone, the most durable incumbency being that of General B´anzer (1971–1978), while eight more followed in 1983–2006. Given the magnitude of his victory, there was hope that the pattern might be broken with the 2006 election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous chief executive. President Mesa won approval of a somewhat ambiguous five-part hydrocarbons referendum in July 2004 that called for “using gas as a strategic resource to recover sovereign and viable access to the sea” (a reference to the dispute with Chile; see Foreign relations, above). Also approved were recovery “over all hydrocarbons at the wellhead” and the levying of taxes up to 50 percent on oil and gas production. The referendum, as presented, had been opposed by the western, oil-producing department of Santa Cruz. The cruce˜nos, who included most of the country’s European descendants, contrasted their region of “productive Bolivia” with the Incadominated “conflictive Bolivia” of the western highlands; by mid-2004 they were calling for regional autonomy, if not secession. In January 2005 Santa Cruz announced the formation of an autonomous regional government. President Mesa responded by terming the unconstitutional action as presenting “one of the gravest and most difficult situations that Bolivia has ever had to face.” In 2006 President Morales attempted to defuse the divisive hydrocarbon issue (the oil-producing department of Santa Cruz had announced formation of an autonomous regional government in 2005 to lay claim to its resources following a 2004 referendum that approved the use of gas as “strategic resource” for the entire country, among other things). Morales endorsed nationalization while insisting that it did not mean “confiscation or exportation,” only that “control of the resources at the wellhead” would no longer be retained by private companies. In May 2006, Morales sent soldiers to occupy 32 privately owned oil and gas fields. Arguing that foreign corporations had been plundering what

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rightfully belonged to the Bolivian people, Morales gave the companies six months to renegotiate their contracts or face eviction. Instead of the 50 percent return that he had campaigned on in 2005, Morales now wanted foreign corporations to return 82 percent of their oil and gas revenue to Bolivia. Morales’s bid to nationalize Bolivia’s energy industry stirred anguish among the country’s private developers, especially those in neighboring Brazil, whose state company Petrobras was the largest foreign investor in Bolivia. However, within weeks Brazilian President Luiz da Silva and Morales agreed to resolve the issue “rationally.” (In 2007 Petrobras agreed to sell its two refineries in Bolivia to the Bolivian government for $112 million.) During this same period in 2006, Morales announced a plan for wide-scale land reform and redistribution to the country’s indigenous rural workers, an issue even more divisive within the eastern regions of the country than the nationalization of natural gas and oil. Under the plan, 12 million state-owned acres would be redistributed initially, followed by the seizure and redistribution of privately owned land deemed “unproductive” because it was not used for farm production. The government contended that the legal ownership of much of the eastern lowlands under consideration was dubious because it had been acquired illegally by wealthy landowners under the B´anzer dictatorship. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera attempted to assuage fears among Santa Cruz landowners by giving them the opportunity to legalize their deeds and retain property that was under cultivation. Ultimately, the government’s plan called for about 48 million acres to be redistributed by 2011, with limits to be placed on the size of private holdings. Despite their initial outcries over the new hydrocarbon proposals and threats to withdraw from Bolivia, the foreign energy companies in October 2006 negotiated agreements whereby they would continue their activities while ceding a much larger share of the profits to the government. Although Bolivia’s state-owned energy company was given

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formal control of hydrocarbon operations, it was widely agreed that it lacked the resources to develop the gas sector on its own. In addition, soaring global gas prices made it much easier for both sides to reach agreement on the allocation of revenues. President Morales was credited with having adopted a more pragmatic approach toward this issue than originally anticipated in many quarters, a development that prompted criticism from the far left. Meanwhile, Morales pledged that nationalization of a sort would proceed in the mining, telecommunications, and other sectors, although deadlines were not imposed as the government sought additional foreign investment. The president’s other proposed major policy thrust—land redistribution—was one of the main topics of discussion in the Constituent Assembly that was elected in mid-2006 with a mandate to draft a new constitution (see Constitution and Government, above). The assembly did not begin work in earnest until spring 2007 because of the insistence of MAS, Morales’s party, that individual components of the draft constitution be approved by majority vote in the assembly rather than the two-thirds vote demanded by the opposition. (Morales lost that battle.) The assembly also grappled with the complicated issue of greater regional autonomy, which agribusiness leaders in the eastern lowlands had demanded. Much of the population in the eastern departments appeared to support increased autonomy, particularly because it would mean greater local control of resource revenues. (Large-scale anti-Morales demonstrations had broken out in several cities earlier in the year.) Due to the contentiousness of the issues, the assembly was unable to meet its August deadline and its mandate was extended until December. (Tensions resulting from the polarization of the country were heightened throughout the latter part of the year as the homes of politicians aligned with Morales, trade unions, and other public offices were the targets of bomb attacks.) On December 9, 2007, despite a boycott by the opposition Podemos, the Constituent Assembly approved a new charter. However, one key article

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failed to garner the required two-thirds vote—a provision defining the “unproductive land holdings” that were key to the president’s controversial redistribution plan. That article was to be the subject of a referendum in 2008 and, if approved, the entire proposed constitution would then have to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly and another referendum held on the entire charter, also in 2008. Articles approved in the charter included those allowing two consecutive presidential terms of five years each; increased power for the indigenous people; abolition of the Senate; and greater state control over natural resources. Days later, thousands of supporters of Morales demonstrated in favor of the new charter, while thousands in opposition—including those allied with the country’s four wealthiest provinces, which had declared their autonomy—protested in the streets. The regions declaring autonomy, in addition to the eastern province of Santa Cruz, included three other provinces rich in natural resources, also in the eastern lowlands. In January 2008 Morales met with the opposition governors in an effort to overcome the impasse, though the four provinces were scheduled to hold local balloting on the autonomy measures sometime in 2008. No election dates had been set by early 2008 as Morales continued to seek reconciliation. However, chances for rapprochement between the government and its opposition were undermined February 28, as referendum supporters blocked opposition legislators from entering Congress to vote on the referendum date, which was subsequently slated for May 4.

Political Parties Of approximately 60 political parties in Bolivia, the leading contenders in 1985 were the MNR and the ADN, with the MIR emerging as a threat to both in 1989. The MIR joined with the ADN in a Patriotic Accord (Acuerdo Patri´otico—AP) electoral coalition in 1993. In 1997 the MIR, UCS, and Condepa formed an alliance with the ADN that yielded the designation of Hugo B´anzer Su´arez as president. The 2002 poll was narrowly won by an

alliance of the MNR and five minor parties. In 2005 most of the traditional parties were eclipsed by the triumph of Morales’s MAS.

Government and Government-Supportive Parties Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS). Traditionally a minor leftist grouping, the MAS contested the 1997 election as a component of the United Left (below). In 2002 it emerged as the leading opposition group with 8 Senate and 27 Chamber seats. Militant cocagrower leader Evo Morales, an Aymara Indian, was “adopted” by the MAS for the 2002 presidential campaign, placing second to the MNR’s S´anchez de Lozado. The party led all others in the 2004 municipal elections, winning 13 departmental capitals. Morales won the presidency with 53.7 percent of the vote in 2005, and the MAS secured a comfortable majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The party also won the prefectures of the departments of Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Potosi. The MAS won a majority in the July 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly established to propose constitutional revision and subsequently established ties with the MBL (below) and other small parties to extend its influence in that assembly. Leaders: Evo MORALES (President of the Re´ public), Alvaro GARC´IA Linera (Vice President of the Republic), Silvia LAZARTE (President of the Constituent Assembly), Gerardo GARC´IA, Roman LOAYZA. Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre—MBL). A breakaway faction of the MIR, sometimes styled the Leftist Revolutionary Movement–Free Bolivia (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria–Bolivia Libre—MIRBL), the MBL was formed in January 1985. It was a member of the IU before the municipal elections of December 1989. The party secured four lower house seats in 1997. In 2002 it entered into an electoral alliance with the MNR.

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The MBL, centered in the department of Cochabamba, cooperated with the MAS in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly, securing eight seats. Leaders: Frank BARRIOS, Orlando CEVALLOS.

Opposition Parties Social and Democratic Power (Poder Democr´atico Social—Podemos). The right-wing Podemos was launched in 2005 under the leadership of former president and former ADN leader Jorge Quiroga before the December 2005 balloting, at which it won a plurality of Senate seats and placed second to the MAS in the Chamber of Deputies. Quiroga, who enjoyed strong support within the business community, also finished second in the concurrent presidential race with 28.6 percent of the vote, while Podemos won the prefectures of the departments of La Paz, Beni, and Pando. Podemos, in many respects considered an “extension” of the ADN, won 60 seats in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly, calling for constitutional change that would strengthen the legislature at the expense of the president and provide for the direct election of more officials. In 2007 Quiroga accused the Morales administration of “undemocratic behavior.” Leaders: Jorge Fern´ando QUIROGA Ram´ırez (Former President of the Republic), Fernando MESSMER, Rub´en DAR´IO Cu´ellar, Carlos Alberto GOITIA. National Unity Front (Frente Unidad Nacional—UN). The UN was launched in late 2003 by cement magnate Samuel Doria Medina, a defector from the MIR (below), who called for equal representation of men and women in the new group and economic policies favoring “those entrepreneurs who generate employment and are absent from national decision-making.” Doria Medina ran third in the 2005 presidential poll with 7.8 percent of the vote. The UN won eight seats in the 2005 balloting for the Chamber of Deputies and the

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same number in the 2006 poll for the Constituent Assembly. Leaders: Samuel DORIA Medina, Jos´e VILLAVICENCIO (Former President of the Senate), Ricardo POL. Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR). Founded in 1941 by V´ıctor Paz Estenssoro, the original MNR ruled from 1952 until 1964 but was outlawed for a time after the 1964 coup. It joined with the FSB (see ADN, below) and others in a National Popular Front in support of the B´anzer coup in 1971 but withdrew two years later. The MNR spawned a number of other parties as a result of leadership disputes and contested the 1978 election as the leading component of an electoral coalition styled the Historic Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Hist´orico—MNRH), after failing to negotiate an accord with the moderately leftist Democratic and Popular Union (UDP, under MNRI, below). The MNRH in turn contested the 1979 and 1980 elections as the core party of the Alliance of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Alianza de Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—A–MNR). Although tendered left-wing congressional support in defeating General B´anzer for the presidency in August 1985, Paz Estenssoro subsequently concluded a political accord with the ADN (below) to facilitate implementation of a hard-line economic stabilization program. The MNR was decisively defeated in most of the municipal contests of December 6, 1987, and was unable to retain the presidency despite recovery to marginal front-runner status in the general election of May 7, 1989. Three months later Paz Estenssoro, who had been living in the United States since the inauguration of his nephew as president of the republic, announced that he was resigning the party leadership. The decision was formalized at a party congress in mid-1990 by the election of Gonzalo S´anchez de Lozada as his successor. During the congress the 84-year-old MNR founder attempted to heal a breach between

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a group of “renewalists” headed by S´anchez de Lozada and a “traditionalist” faction led by former vice president Julio GARRET. (Paz Estenssoro died on June 7, 2001.) On October 27, 1992, S´anchez de Lozada resigned as MNR president and withdrew from the 1993 presidential election campaign after reportedly receiving a death threat from an MNR congressional deputy. However, he resumed both activities on November 20 and subsequently served as chief executive from 1993 to 1997. Reelected in 2002, he was forced to resign in October 2003. The party was virtually annihilated in the 2004 municipal balloting. In the December 2005 poll it secured one Senate and seven Chamber seats, while its presidential candidate secured 6.5 percent of the vote. The MNR, currently described as a “traditionalist” and right-wing grouping, won eight seats on its own in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly and apparently shared ten other seats in alliance with other parties. Leaders: Michiaki NAGATANI Morishita ´ (2005 presidential candidate), Eduardo YANEZ, Mirtha QUEVADO Acalinovic.

Other Parties that Contested Recent Elections New Republican Force (Nueva Fuerza Republicana—NFR). The NFR is a group led by Manfred Reyes Villa, who supported B´anzer in 1997. It elected 2 senators and 25 deputies in 2002 but fared poorly in the 2004 municipal balloting and elected none of its congressional candidates in 2005, its presidential candidate in the latter year securing only 0.7 percent of the vote. Reyes Villa was elected prefect of the department of Cochabamba in 2005 under the banner of the National Union Alliance (Alianza de Unidad Nacional—AUN), which also won eight seats in the 2006 Constituent Assembly balloting. Leaders: Manfred REYES Villa (2002 presidential candidate), Adm. (Ret.) Gildo ANGULA Cabrera (2005 presidential candidate). Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (Movimiento Ind´ıgena Pachakuti—MIP). The MIP was

formed before the 2002 poll by Felipe Quispe (“Mallku”), executive secretary of the United Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (Confederaci´on Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia—CUTCB) and a former member of the EGTK (below). Quispe won 2.2 percent of the vote in the 2005 presidential balloting. Leader: Felipe QUISPE Huanca (“Mallku”). Civic Solidarity Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Solidaridad—UCS). The UCS is an outgrowth of the National Civic Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Nacional— UCN), founded in 1988 to promote the presidential aspirations of right-wing industrialist Max ´ FERNANDEZ Rojas. The group was first registered under its present name for the December 1989 municipal balloting, at which it ran a surprising third, winning 22.8 percent of the vote. The party also ran third in the June 1993 national poll with 13.1 percent. In May 1994 continuance of the UCS as an MNR government partner appeared threatened by an unheralded pact concluded by the president with Julio MANTILLA and Ivo KULJIS, the leaders, respectively, of two UCS splinters, the Popular Patriotic Movement (Movimiento Popular Patri´otico— MPP) and the Unity and Progress Movement (Movimiento de Unidad y Progreso—MUP). Four months later, in what was interpreted as a reaction to the administration’s pact with the Bolivian Workers’ Confederation, Fern´andez announced that the UCS was withdrawing from the government coalition. However, a group of dissidents led by Edgar Talavera refused to join in the walkout, and in June 1995 the party rejoined the coalition. Fern´andez died in a plane crash the following November. The party backed Kuljis for president in 1997 because Johnny Fern´andez, one of the party’s founders, was too young to stand as a candidate. Immediately before the 2002 election, the Constitutional Tribunal overturned an Electoral Court ban on Fern´andez’s presidential candidacy because of tax arrears. The party’s future is currently in doubt because of its inability to win any municipal council seats in 2004, to secure legislative representation in 2005,

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or to gain seats in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. ´ Leader: Johnny FERNANDEZ Saucedo (2002 presidential candidate). Nationalist Democratic Action (Acci´on Democr´atica Nacionalista—ADN). The ADN was formed in early 1979 by Hugo B´anzer Su´arez under the slogan “peace, order, and work.” B´anzer ran third in presidential balloting in both 1979 and 1980. He secured a plurality of the popular vote in 1985 but was defeated by Paz Estenssoro in a congressional runoff. Following the election, the ADN concluded a somewhat fragile legislative alliance, the Democratic Pact (Pacto pour la Democracia) with the MNR, which was reaffirmed after both parties had experienced losses in municipal balloting in December 1987. The alliance was broken by the ADN in early February 1989 to permit the party to campaign separately in the run-up to the May balloting, in which B´anzer ran a close second in the presidential race. In August the party concluded a “national unity” pact with the MIR (below), being awarded 10 of 18 cabinet posts in the Paz Zamora administration. Subsequently, the ADN, the MIR, and the PDC (below) jointly contested the December 1991 municipal elections under a Patriotic Agreement (Acuerdo Patri´otico— AP) rubric, after having announced their support of B´anzer as their 1993 presidential candidate. The FRI (below) joined the AP for the June 1993 balloting, in which the former chief executive again placed second. The AP was dissolved in August 1993, while in November B´anzer resigned as ADN leader and announced his retirement from public life. However, in February 1995, shortly after Paz Zamora of the MIR had ended his withdrawal from politics, B´anzer followed suit. He won a plurality in the balloting of June 1997 and was returned to the presidency with the support of the MIR, the UCS, and Condepa. In mid-1999 Otto RITTER, leader of the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana—FSB), a minor ADN ally, stated that B´anzer was unfit to rule and called for his res-

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ignation. As a result, the FSB’s sole congressional deputy (elected on the ADN list) was expelled from the alliance. B´anzer resigned the presidency on August 7, 2001, and died on May 5, 2002. Before the 2005 election, former president Jorge Fern´ando Quiroga, an ADN leader, withdrew from the party to form Podemos (above), taking many of the ADN members with him. (Quiroga had reportedly concluded that the ADN rubric was too closely associated in the public consciousness with B´anzer.) The rump ADN failed to secure representation in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. Leaders: Ronald MACLEAN (2002 presidential candidate), Mauro BERTERO. Patriotic Democratic Transformation (Transformac´ıon Democr´atica Patri´otica—Tradepa). Tradepa was launched in August 2005 to represent retired military officers. It failed to secure representation in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. Leader: Luis GEMIO. Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR). Affiliated with the Socialist International, the MIR is a non-Communist Marxist party that organized as a splinter of the PDC and has a history of cooperation with the MNRI. It joined the UDP coalition before the 1978 election, its leader, Jaime Paz Zamora, running for the vice presidency in 1979 and 1980, and assuming the office in 1982. The MIR withdrew from the government in January 1983 but returned in April 1984. In mid-December Paz Zamora resigned as vice president to qualify as a presidential candidate in 1985. In addition, several members left the MIR in 1985 to form the MBL (above), Paz Zamora’s supporters subsequently referencing themselves as the MIR–New Majority (MIR–Nueva Mayor´ıa—MIR–NM). The MIR was surprisingly successful in the December 1987 municipal balloting and, although running third in the national poll of May 1989, was awarded the presidency as the result of its “national unity” pact with the ADN. The party supported the ADN’s B´anzer

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as a member of the AP in 1993. Paz Zamora entered into “permanent retirement” in March 1994 but returned to public life less than a year later, following the December 1994 arrest on drugtrafficking charges of the MIR’s (then) secretary general, Oscar Eid Franco. The MIR–NM won one seat in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. Leader: Jaime PAZ Zamora (Former President of the Republic and 1997 and 2002 presidential candidate). Left Revolutionary Front (Frente Revolucionario de Izquierda—FRI). The FRI is led by Oscar Zamora Med´ınaceli, who once headed the Marxist-Leninist Bolivian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Boliviano Marxista-Leninista— PCB–ML), a pro-Communist China offshoot of the PCB, and was subsequently a founder of the MIR. For the 1985 elections Zamora Med´ınaceli formed an alliance with the MNR and was rewarded with the Senate presidency. In 1989 he backed the MIRADN coalition and was named labor minister in the government of his nephew, Paz Zamora. He resigned the labor portfolio in November 1992, ostensibly to campaign for president in 1993, but instead he accepted the vice-presidential slot on the ticket headed by the ADN’s B´anzer. Subsequently, he became mayor of Tarija. An MNR–FRI alliance won eight seats in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. Leaders: Oscar ZAMORA Medinacelli, Dr. Manuel MORALES D´avila. Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). The PDC is a somewhat left-of-center Catholic party, a right-wing faction of which supported the B´anzer regime. It joined the A–MNR before the 1979 election. In early 1982 (then) PDC leader Benjam´ın Miguel Harb, in an apparent reference to right-wing elements within the MNR, indicated that the party would henceforth refuse to cooperate with other parties that “lack a democratic vocation.” In November the party joined the UDP coalition, one of its members accepting the housing portfolio in the Siles Zuazo government. However, the PDC withdrew from the coalition in October 1984.

Although the party won no legislative seats as an ally of the ADN in May 1989, its 1985 presidential candidate, Dr. Luis Ossio Sanjin´es, was elected vice president of the republic as a result of its adherence to the ADN–MIR pact in August. The party campaigned as a member of the AP in 1993. It was reported in 2005 that the PDC was one of the founding components of Podemos, although details were limited. Leader: Jorge SUAREZ Vargas. Other parties and groups active in recent elections include the 21st Century Alliance ˜ (Alianza Siglo XXI), led by Pablo Mauricio IPINA Nagel; the Agrarian Patriotic Front of Bolivia (Frente Patri´otico Agropecuario de Bolivia— FrePAB), whose presidential candidate, Eliceo RODR´IGUEZ Pari, won 0.3 percent of the vote in 2005; Autonomy for Bolivia (Autonom´ıa para Bolivia—APB), which won the prefecture of the department of Santa Cruz in December 2005 and three seats in the 2006 Constituent Assembly elections; the AYRA Movement (Movimiento AYRA), which secured two seats in the Constituent Assembly in 2006; the Citizens Action Movement (Movimiento de Acci´on Ciudadana—MAC), which ran unsuccessfully in the Constituent Assembly balloting; Citizens Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica Ciudadana— CDC), which ran unsuccessfully in the 2006 elections for the Constituent Assembly; Local Autonomy (Autonom´ıa Vecinal—AVE), a Beni-based grouping led by Erwin Rivero ZIEGLER; the Movement for Bolivian Integration (Movimiento de Integraci´on Boliviana—MIBOL); the Movement of Patriotic Social Union (Movimiento de Unidad Social Patri´otica—MUSPA), led by Juan Gabriel BAUTISTA; the National Concertation (Concertaci´on Nacional—CN), a Christian evangelical grouping founded in 2005 under the leadership of Antonio FANOLA Aliaga that secured five seats in the 2006 Constituent Assembly elections; the Original Popular Movement (Movimiento Originario Popular—MOP), which won three seats in the Constituent Assembly from the department of Podosi; the Path to Change (Camino al Cambria—CC), which won the

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prefecture of the department of Tarija in 2005; the Progress Plan (Plan Progresso—PP), which had initially been reported as a component of Podemos but was subsequently ruled by the election commission not to have participated officially in that grouping; the Regional Autonomy Movement (Movimiento Aut´onomo Regional—MAR), which failed to gain representation in the 2006 Constituent Assembly elections; the Social Alliance (Alianza Social—AS), a Potosi-based grouping that won six seats in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly; the Social Union of the Workers of Bolivia (Uni´on Social de Trabajadores de Bolivia—USTB), whose presidential candidate, Nestor GARC´IA Rojas, won 0.3 percent of the vote in 2005; and the Without Fear Movement (Movimiento Sin Miedo—MSM), a “progressive” grouping led by Juan DEL GRANADO Cos´ıo.

Other Parties Leftist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda—MNRI). An offshoot of the MNR, the MNRI was the principal element in the organization of the center-left Democratic and Popular Union (Uni´on Democr´atica y Popular—UDP) before the 1978 balloting. Its presidential candidate, Hern´an Siles Zuazo, obtained electoral pluralities in 1979 and 1980 and returned as the country’s chief executive in October 1982. Faced with insurmountable economic problems, the president announced in November 1984 that he would cut short his term by one year. The party, which had suffered the defection of its secretary general three months earlier, split into a number of factions, including the center-right Nationalist Revolutionary Movement–April 9 Revolutionary Vanguard (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario– Vanguardia Revolucionaria 9 de Abril—MNRV) and the Leftist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement–One (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Izquierdo–Uno—MNRI–1), each of which campaigned separately thereafter. Leaders: Dr. Hern´an SILES Zuazo (Former President of the Republic), Federico ALVAREZ Plata (Secretary General).

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Conscience of the Fatherland (Conciencia de Patria—Condepa). Condepa was formed in 1988 by popular singer and La Paz broadcast personality Carlos PALENQUE Avil´es, who attracted widespread notoriety in November of that year by airing a “friendly” interview with the “king of co´ caine,” Roberto SUAREZ. The party’s ten-member congressional delegation supported Paz Zamora’s selection as president in August 1989. Condepa won a plurality of votes in the 1989 municipal balloting in La Paz but was denied the mayoralty when the MNR cast two swing council votes for the ADN–MIR candidate. It ran fourth in the 1991 municipal poll, winning overall 12.5 percent of the vote but scored a victory in La Paz, with 26.4 percent. It placed fourth in the 1993 legislative balloting, winning an overall total of 14 seats, which increased to 17 in 1997. Palenque Avil´es died on March 8, 1997; his successor as party leader, Remedios Loza, was the first Indian woman to run for president. Condepa participated in the B´anzer coalition government until August 6, 1998, when, in the wake of the withdrawal of its two ministers, it was expelled because of what the president termed internal strife that detracted from “the image a serious administration must have.” Leaders: Remedios LOZA (1997 presidential candidate), Nicolas Felipe VALDIVA Almanza. United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU). The IU advanced Ramiro Velasco of PS–1 as its presidential candidate in the 1993 balloting, at which it lost all ten of its existing legislative seats; it regained four in 1997. The IU long had a substantial following in the extra-legislative Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (Asamblea por la Soberan´ıa del Pueblo—ASP), led by Evo MORALES, who was presented as a 2002 presidential candidate by the MAS (above). Leaders: Alejo VELEZ (1997 presidential candidate), Germ´an GUTTIEREZ, Marcos DOMIC (1997 vice-presidential candidate and IU coordinator). Patriotic Alliance (Alianza Patri´otica— AP). The AP (not to be confused with the Acuerdo Patri´otico, above, under ADN) is an

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outgrowth of the former Workers and Masses Front (Frente Obrero y de Masas—FOM), a dissident MIR group also referenced as MIR–Masas and long linked to the Bolivian Workers’ Central. It was launched as an electoral coalition in the late 1980s by a number of leftist groups, including the Patriotic Axis of Convergence (Eje de Convergencia Patri´otica—ECP), which remained active in 1998. Leader: Walter DELGADILLO Terceros. Socialist Party–One (Partido Socialista– Uno—PS–1). The PS–1 was organized in 1971 by a group seeking a return to the policies of former president Ovando Cand´ıa. A relatively small party, it nonetheless obtained about 7 percent of the vote in 1979 and 8 percent in 1980. Its presidential candidate on both occasions, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, was murdered during the 1980 coup. It won five congressional seats in 1985, although being credited with only 2.2 percent of the vote. There also is a dissident Partido Socialista–Uno–Marcelo Quiroga, led by Jos´e Mar´ıa PALACIOS. Leaders: Ramiro VELASCO (1985 and 1993 presidential candidate), Roger CORTEZ, Walter VAZQUEZ. Bolivian Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Bolivia—PCB). A group with ties to the former Soviet Union formally organized in 1952, the PCB lost much of its influence because of a failure to support the guevarista insurgents in the mid-1960s. Subsequently, it joined the UDP coalition, losing further support within the labor movement because of its participation in the Siles Zuazo government. At a contentious party congress in February 1985, Sim´on Reyes Rivera was named to succeed Jorge Kolle Cueto as PCB secretary general. Shortly thereafter a minority faction, also styling itself the Partido Comunista de Bolivia, split from the parent group under Carlos Soria Galvarro. Leaders: Sim´on REYES Rivera (Former Secretary General), Marcos DOMICH (Secretary General), Carlos SORIA Galvarro (minority faction leader).

Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS). A PCB splinter, the PS was launched in 1989 as the Socialist Vanguard of Bolivia (Vanguardia Socialista de Bolivia—VSB), which obtained 1.4 percent of the presidential vote in 1997. It secured one lower house seat in 2002. Leader: Jeres JUSTINIANO (1997 presidential candidate). Tupaj ´ Katari Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario T´upaj Katari— MRTK). Formerly a member of the A–MNR, the MRTK is one of several small campesino formations, including the splinter MRTK–L and the guerrilla EGTK (below). Leaders: Juan CONDORI Uruchi (President), Genaro FLORES Santos (1985 presidential candidate). Tupaj ´ Katari Revolutionary Movement– Liberation (Movimiento Revolucionario T´upaj Katari–Liberaci´on—MRTK–L). The MRTK–L outpolled its parent party in 1985, winning two congressional seats, both of which were lost in 1989. In late 1992 the MNR sought to “balance” its 1993 presidential ticket by selecting the MRTKL’s V´ıctor Hugo C´ardenas as Gonzalo S´anchez de Lozada’s running mate. ´ Leaders: V´ıctor Hugo CARDENAS Conde (Former Vice President of the Republic), Norberto ´ PEREZ Hidalgo (Secretary General). Revolutionary Vanguard of 9 April (Vanguardia Revolucionaria 9 de Abril—VR–9). The VR–9 is a small grouping formed following the fractionalization of the MNRI (above). The party was highly critical of the ADN–MIR policies (particularly the coalition’s effort to seek a postponement of the 1989 municipal balloting). Leaders: Dr. Carlos SERRATE Reich, Roberto CROFF Centeno (Secretary General).

Other Groups Tupaj ´ Katari Guerrilla Army (Ej´ercito Guerrillero T´upaj Katari—EGTK). Not to be confused with either the MRTK or MRTK–L, the EGTK was a terrorist group believed to be

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Cabinet As of February 1, 2008 President Vice President

Evo Morales ´ Alvaro Garc´ıa Linera

Ministers Defense Education and Culture Finance Foreign Affairs Health and Sport Hydrocarbons Interior Justice Labor Mining and Metallurgy Planning and Sustainable Development Presidency Production and Micro-enterprise Public Services and Public Works Rural Development and Agriculture Water

Walter Rodr´ıguez San Miguel Magdalena Cajias de la Vega [f] Luis Alberto Arce Catacora David Choquehuanca Cespedes Walter Selum Carlos Villegas Quiroga Alfredo Octavio Rada V´elez Celima Torrico Rojas [f] Walter J´uvenal Delgadillo Albert Echazu Graciela Toro [f] Juan Ram´on Quintana Taborga Angel Gonzalo Hurtado Oscar Coca Antezana Susana Rivero Guzm´an [f] Walter Valda

[f] = female

responsible for more than 30 bombings, as well as the assassination of an ADN member of Congress in November 1992. Three months earlier its leader, Felipe Quispe Huanca, had been apprehended by police. In November 1995 a “manifesto” purportedly issued jointly by the EGTK and the Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (Comisi´on N´estor Paz Zamora—CNPZ), which had been identified with the celebrated kidnapping of businessman Jorge LONSDALE in 1990, claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of former planning minister Samuel ´ DORIA Medina. However, Raquel GUTIERREZ, an imprisoned EGTK leader, insisted that her group had abandoned armed activity in 1992 and had no links to the CNPZ. The government last reported alleged EGTK activity in 1997, and

the group has been considered defunct since at least then. Alvaro Garc´ıa Linera, elected vice president of the republic in 2005, was once an EGTK member, having served five years in prison in the 1990s for guerrilla activity. Several former EGTK members were reportedly involved in radical leftist political action in the department of Cochabamba in early 2007. Camba Nation (Naci´on Camba). Formed in the early 2000s in support of autonomy (if not independence) for Santa Cruz and other eastern departments, Camba Nation (“camba” is a nickname for residents of Santa Cruz or, more broadly, “lowlanders”) currently claims a membership of about 40,000. The government alleges that the group has

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armed itself for possible military confrontation, but Camba leaders insist they are committed to pursuit of their goals through peaceful means only. Leader: Sergio ANTELO.

past military governments, Bolivia currently rates among the highest for countries in Latin America in various press freedom indexes.

Press

Legislature The bicameral Bolivian Congress (Congreso) currently sits for five years. The most recent election was held on December 18, 2005. Senate (Senado). The upper house consists of 27 members, 3 from each department, elected for terms concurrent with those of the Chamber of Deputies. In each department delegation, 2 seats are held by the majority party or group, while 1 is reserved for the minority. After the 2005 election, Social and Democratic Power held 13 seats; the Movement to Socialism, 12; the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, 1; and the National Unity Front, 1. ´ President: Alvaro GARC´IA Linera. Chamber of Deputies (Camara de Diputados). The lower house currently consists of 130 members elected in a mixed majoritarian/proportional system by universal and direct suffrage for five-year terms from 70 single-member constituencies and 9 multimember constituencies. Following the 2005 election, the Movement to Socialism held 72 seats (45 majoritarian, 27 proportional); Social and Democratic Power, 43 (22, 21); the National Unity Front, 8 (1, 7); and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, 7 (2, 5). President: Edmundo NOVILLO Aguilar.

Communications All news media are privately owned. Although strict censorship was often enforced under

The following papers are published daily in La Paz, unless otherwise noted: El Diario (55,000); La Raz´on (35,000); Los Tiempos (Cochabamba, 19,000), independent; El Mundo (Santa Cruz, 15,000), business oriented; Jornada (12,000), independent; El Deber (Santa Cruz); La Prensa; El Nacional.

News Agencies The domestic facility is the Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF); a number of foreign agencies, including AFP, ANSA, and AP, maintain bureaus in La Paz.

Broadcasting and Computing Bolivia has numerous radio and television outlets. As of 2005, there were approximately 52 Internet users and 23 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 264 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Gustavo GUZMAN Saldana U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia: Philip S. GOLDBERG Permanent Representative to the UN: Hugo SILES ALVARADO IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ALADI, CAN, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

BRAZIL FE D E R A T I VE R E P U BL I C

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The population of South America’s largest country, which occupies nearly half the continent, is approximately 55 percent Caucasian, with at least 35 percent of mixed blood and less than 0.5 percent pure Indian. The Caucasians are mainly of Portuguese descent but include substantial numbers of Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian, and Spanish immigrants. There are also small Arab, Japanese, and Chinese minorities. Roman Catholicism is by far the predominant religion (73 percent), but other faiths are permitted, and evangelical Protestantism is making substantial gains. Women make up 35 percent of the paid labor force, a majority in domestic service, with one-quarter estimated to be unpaid agricultural workers. Although women have been minimally represented in political life, a few from powerful families have managed to occupy highlevel government and party positions. The Brazilian economy was traditionally based on one-crop agriculture under the control of a landed aristocracy. In recent years, however, substantial diversification has occurred, with coffee, which once accounted for 50 percent of the nation’s exports, falling to a low of 2.7 percent in 1992 before recovering to 6.3 percent in 1995. Soybeans, cotton, sugar, and cocoa are other important commodities. In industry, textiles remain important, while iron, steel, petroleum, and paper production have grown significantly; in addition, Brazil’s arms industry is now an important source of export income. Numerous minerals are mined commercially, including quartz, chromium, manganese, gold, and silver.

In the 1980s, due to depressed commodity prices, government stabilization programs were unable to reduce high levels of inflation and external debt (in excess of $100 billion). By January 1987 inflation had spiraled to an annualized rate of 500 percent, and in late February the government suspended foreign debt payments. The moratorium ended with a highly favorable refinancing agreement in November 1988, but by March 1990 prices had risen by more than 3,900 percent during the preceding 12 months, prompting incoming President Fernando COLLOR de Mello to advance a

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radical fiscal package designed to bring inflation under control. The short-term result was dramatic: a single-digit monthly rate by May. However, by July double-digit figures had returned, continuing into 1991, and yielding an increase for the year of more than 480 percent, followed by further escalation to 1,128 percent in 1992 and 2,600 percent in 1993. Following the adoption of an economic stabilization program and introduction of another new currency (the real) in mid-1994, inflation for the year fell to about 24 percent with economic growth registering 5.7 percent, the highest since 1986. The architect of the “Real Plan”—Finance Minister Fernando Henrique CARDOSO—was elected president in 1994 and reelected in 1998, largely as a result of his success in stabilizing the economy, based primarily on linking the real’s value to the dollar. Turbulence in international financial markets forced a costly devaluation in 1999, but Brazil’s economy recovered relatively quickly. Growth during the first da Silva administration (2003–2007) averaged approximately 2.5 percent annually, lower than the Latin American average. However, price stability and the direct transfer of government resources to the poor were widely considered to have reduced the maldistribution of wealth.

Government and Politics Political Background Ruled as a Portuguese colony from 1500–1815, Brazil retained its monarchical institutions as an independent state from 1822 until the declaration of a republic in 1889. The constitution was suspended in 1930 as the result of a military coup d’´etat led by Get´ulio VARGAS, whose dictatorship lasted until 1945. Enrico DUTRA, Vargas, Juscelino KUBITSCHEK, and Jˆanio QUADROS subsequently served as elected presidents. In 1961 Quadros resigned and was succeeded by Vice President Jo˜ao GOULART. Goulart’s leftist administration, after being widely criticized for inflationary policies, governmental corruption, and prolabor and alleged pro-Communist tendencies, was

overturned by the military in March 1964. Marshal Humberto de Alencar CASTELLO BRANCO, who served as president from 1964 to 1967, vigorously repressed subversive and leftist tendencies, instituted a strongly anti-inflationary economic policy, and reestablished governmental authority on a strictly centralized basis. Brazil’s 13 political parties were dissolved in 1965, and political freedom was drastically curtailed by an “institutional act” whose main provisions were later incorporated into a constitution adopted under presidential pressure in 1967. Direct presidential elections were abolished, the president was given sweeping powers to regulate the press, and formal political activity was limited to two newly authorized parties—the progovernment National Renewal Alliance (Alian¸ca Renovadora Nacional— Arena) and the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democr´atico Brasileiro— MDB). The policies of Castello Branco were continued under Artur da COSTA E SILVA (1967–1969) and Em´ılio Garrastaz´u MEDICI (1969–1974), rising political dissatisfaction with authoritarian rule being countered in December 1968 by the president’s assumption of virtually unlimited powers that were retained for nearly a decade thereafter. Despite periodic disturbances, the ease with which power was passed to President Ernesto GEISEL in early 1974 suggested that the military and its allies were still firmly in control. However, at a legislative election in November the opposition MDB obtained approximately one-third of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 16 of 20 seats that were up for election in the Senate. Four years later the MDB won a clear majority of votes cast but failed to capture either house because of electoral arrangements favoring the government party. On March 15, 1979, Jo˜ao Baptista FIGUEIREDO was sworn in for a six-year term as Geisel’s hand-picked successor, after electoral college designation five months earlier by a vote of 355–226 over the MDB candidate, Gen. Euler Bentes MONTEIRO. In November Arena and the MDB were dissolved under a policy of political

BRAZIL

Political Status: Independent monarchy proclaimed 1822; republic established 1889; current constitution promulgated October 5, 1988. Area: 3,286,470 sq. mi. (8,511,965 sq. km.). Population: 169,799,170 (2000C); 186,819,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): BRASILIA (federal district, 2,231,000), S˜ao Paulo (10,278,000), Rio de Janeiro (6,094,000), Salvador (2,673,000), Belo Horizonte (2,375,000), Recife (1,501,000), Bel´em (1,397,000), Pˆorto Alegre (1,387,000). Official Language: Portuguese. Monetary Unit: Real (market rate November 2, 2007: 1.76 reals = $1US). President: Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) DA SILVA (Workers’ Party); elected in runoff of October 27, 2002, and inaugurated on January 1, 2003, for a four-year term, succeeding Fernando Henrique CARDOSO (Brazilian Social Democratic Party); reelected in runoff of October 29, 2006, and inaugurated for another four-year term on January 1, 2007. Vice President: Jos´e ALENCAR (initially elected as a member of the Liberal Party; currently a member of the Brazilian Republican Party); elected in runoff of October 27, 2002, and inaugurated on January 1, 2003, for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Marco Antˆonio de Oliveira MACIEL (Liberal Front Party); reelected in runoff of October 29, 2006, and inaugurated for another term concurrent with that of the president on January 1, 2007.

relaxation (abertura) that permitted the emergence of a more broad-ranged party spectrum. Despite electoral procedures that favored its newly established Social Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico Social—PDS), the government failed to gain a majority of lower house seats at the legislative poll of November 15, 1982. Subsequently, Tancredo NEVES of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Partido do Movimento Democr´atico Social—PMDB) de-

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feated PDS nominee Paulo MALUF in the electoral college balloting of January 15, 1985, but was unable to assume office because of illness. His vice-presidential running mate, Jos´e SARNEY Costa of the Liberal Front Party (Partido dˆa Frente Liberal—PFL), became acting president on March 15 and succeeded to the presidency at Neves’s death on April 21. Sarney negotiated a somewhat fragile coalition between the PMDB and the PFL, the former securing a 53 percent majority and the coalition 77 percent of lower house seats in the legislative election of November 15, 1986. During the ensuing three years, despite promulgation of a new, substantially liberalized constitution in October 1988, Sarney’s popularity eroded sharply, with leftist parties registering significant gains in municipal elections in November. In early 1989 Fernando COLLOR de Mello, the young and relatively obscure governor of Alagoas, the country’s second-smallest state, presented himself as presidential candidate of the newly launched National Reconstruction Party. Running on a free enterprise platform, Collor won a plurality in a field of 24 contenders in first-round balloting on November 15 and obtained a 53 percent vote share to defeat Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) da SILVA, leader of the socialist Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores— PT), at a runoff on December 17. In April 1992 President Collor reshuffled his cabinet, dismissing a number of ministers accused of corrupt practices. A month later the president came under fire as the result of charges by his younger brother, Pedro de MELLO, that his former campaign manager, Paulo C´esar Cavalcante FARIAS, had operated a vast extortion network, part of the proceeds of which were intended to finance a reelection bid. On August 26 a lengthy congressional probe concluded that the president knew of the $330 million “PC scheme” (“esquema PC ”) but had done nothing to deter it. As a result, the Chamber of Deputies on September 29 voted 441–38 to impeach Collor, with Vice President Itamar Augusto Cautiero FRANCO being sworn in as his acting successor on November 2. Ten days later Collor was indicted on criminal charges, and on December 29 he resigned in favor of Franco, who

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was immediately invested for the remaining two years of the presidential term. During 1994 the poll ratings of presidential candidate Fernando Henrique CARDOSO proved inversely proportional to a decline in inflation, for which he, as former finance minister, was given credit. Thus, Cardoso, who had trailed his principal opponent, Luiz da Silva, by 22 percentage points in early July, gradually overtook the PT leader to win the presidential vote on October 3 with an absolute majority of 54.3 percent. Concurrently, Cardoso’s Brazilian Social Democratic Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasiliera— PSDB) and its coalition partners (PFL, the Brazilian Labor Party [Partido Trabalhista Brasiliero— PTB], and the Liberal Party [Partido Liberal—PL]) won congressional pluralities of sufficient magnitude to give the new president broad support for a constitutional reform program. In mid-December 1994 the Supreme Court acquitted Collor of personal involvement in the illegal financial scheme that had forced him to resign in 1992. In the wake of the ruling, Brazil’s attorney general announced that he would bring unrelated charges of embezzlement against the former president. For his part Collor indicated that he viewed the court’s action as total vindication and vowed to reenter politics at the conclusion of an eight-year ban from public office. (Collor was acquitted of the new charges in January 1998. He was elected to the senate in 2006.) Following his inauguration on January 1, 1995, President Cardoso appointed members of four parties (the PSDB, PFL, PTB, and PMDB) to his cabinet, and he pledged to move forward on a number of policy fronts that included the breakup of the state’s oil and telecommunications monopolies, civil service and land reform, and a series of fiscal measures that included deindexation of wages and revision of the tax system. Despite substantial opposition from a variety of affected interests, Cardoso, on June 4, 1997, was able to secure final legislative approval of a constitutional amendment permitting him to seek reelection in 1998. On October 4, 1998, Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to win a second term. In addi-

tion, his five-party coalition (which now included the Brazilian Progressive Party [Partido Progressista Brasiliero—PPB]) won 377 of 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, thereby gaining the minimum three-fifths majority needed for constitutional revision, while losing only 1 of 69 seats previously held in the Senate. Cardoso named a new cabinet on January 1, 1999, which included the five parties in the previous government and the addition of the small Popular Socialist Party (Partido Popular Socialista—PPS). However, the PTB resigned from the government in March when its sole representative was replaced as budget minister amid severe economic turmoil. During 2000 the country was threatened by a wave of political scandals. Adding to President Cardoso’s woes was an energy crisis in early 2001 that necessitated power rationing; by midyear his successor, Jos´e SERRA, the PSDB’s candidate, claimed a poll rating of only 4.2 percent, as opposed to 31.3 percent for the PT’s Luiz da Silva. In first-round presidential balloting on October 6, 2002, da Silva won 46.4 percent of the vote, and he went on to defeat Serra in an October 27 runoff with 61.4 percent. During the ensuing two years, the president countered most regional critics by retaining broad public support, while the PT increased the number of cities under its control from 187 to 411 in municipal elections in October 2004. President da Silva was reelected in secondround balloting on October 29, 2006, securing 60.8 percent of the vote versus 39.2 percent for Geraldo ALCKMIN of the PSDB. Alckmin, a former governor of S˜ao Paulo, had campaigned on an anticorruption platform. Meanwhile, the PMDB overtook the PT in the October 1 elections to the Chamber of Deputies, and da Silva again had to rely on a broad coalition of parties (including the PMDB) for legislative support. Some two-thirds of the governors elected on October 1 were reportedly supportive of the da Silva administration. In what was hailed as a landmark decision in October 2007, the supreme court ruled that lawmakers could change party affiliation only under specific, limited circumstances

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(i.e., if a party changed its ideology), which was seen as an effective curb to lawmakers’ propensity to change affiliation with some frequency.

Constitution and Government On September 2, 1988, after 19 months of sharp disputes and major shifts in party alliances, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, approved a new basic law encompassing 246 articles covering a wide range of social and economic issues, including a 40-hour work week, minimum wage, health and pension benefits, access to education, maternity and paternity leave, labor autonomy and the right to strike, Indian rights, and protection of the environment. The 1988 document provided for a president to be directly elected for a nonrenewable five-year term (reduced to four years in May 1994), with Brazilians in an April 1993 plebiscite decisively rejecting a return to either a parliamentary or monarchical form of government. In addition, provisions for referenda and “popular vetoes” on proposed and enacted legislation, respectively, were introduced, as well as provisions for “popular initiatives” of draft bills for congressional consideration. An amendment ratified on June 5, 1997, authorized reelection of the president, as well as of state governors and mayors. The existing bicameral National Congress, consisting of a Senate and Chamber of Deputies, was retained, with the Congress gaining added power in regard to budget preparation, foreign debt agreements, and the drafting of legislation. The judicial system, headed by a Supreme Court whose members must be approved by the Senate, gained substantial administrative and financial autonomy. There are also federal courts in the state capitals, a Federal Court of Appeals, and special courts for dealing with military, labor, and electoral issues. Brazil is divided into 26 states and the Federal District of Bras´ılia. The states, which have their own constitutions, legislatures, and judicial systems, may divide or join with others to form new states. Thus the former state of Guanabara merged with Rio de Janeiro in 1975, the new state of Mato

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Grosso do Sul was formed out of the southern part of Mato Grosso in 1979, and the former territory of Fernando de Noronha was included in Pernambuco under the 1988 constitution. Province and Capital Acre (Rio Branco) Alagoas (Macei´o) Amapa (Macap´a) Amazonas (Manaus) Bahia (Salvador) Cear´a (Fortaleza) Esp´ırito Santo (Vit´oria) Goi´as (Goiˆania) Maranh˜ao (S˜ao Lu´ıs) Mato Grosso (Cuiab´a) Mato Grosso do Sul (Campo Grande) Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte) Par´a (Bel´em) Para´ıba (Jo˜ao Pessˆoa) Paran´a (Curitiba) Pernambuco (Recife) Piau´ı (Teresina) Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro) Rio Grande do Norte (Natal) Rio Grande do Sul (Pˆorto Alegre) Rondˆonia (Pˆorto Velho) Roraima (Boa Vista) Santa Catarina (Florian´opolis) S˜ao Paulo (S˜ao Paulo) Sergipe (Aracaj´u) Tocantins (Miracema do Tocantins)

Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2006E)

59,343 11,238 54,965 605,390 218,912 56,253 17,658 131,339 127,242 348,040 138,021

695,000 3,056,000 622,000 3,323,000 13,969,000 8,237,000 3,474,000 5,745,000 6,198,000 2,867,000 2,303,000

226,496 481,404 20,833 76,959 39,005 97,017 16,855 20,528 108,369 92,039 86,880 36,802 95,852 8,441 107,075

19,518,000 7,138,000 3,627,000 10,408,000 8,517,000 3,041,000 15,589,000 3,050,000 10,981,000 1,568,000 406,000 5,975,000 41,162,000 2,007,000 1,338,000

2,237

2,394,000

Federal District Distrito Federal (Bras´ılia)

Foreign Relations Long a leader in the inter-American community, Brazil has traditionally been aligned in international affairs with the United States, which is its major trading partner. However, the conclusion of a 1975 nuclear-plant agreement with West Germany in the wake of the Geisel government’s refusal to sign the 1968 UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), coupled with

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problems arising from increased coffee prices and the stand on human rights by the administration of President Jimmy Carter, led to a degree of estrangement between the two countries. In March 1977, largely in reaction to the human rights criticism, Brazil canceled a 25-year-old military assistance treaty with the United States. As a result, Brazil’s arms industry became one of the fastest-growing sectors of the economy, with customers including Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. While improved Washington-Bras´ılia relations during the administration of President Ronald Reagan led to the signing of a military cooperation agreement in February 1984, controversy continued over an “understanding” that Washington would be allowed to monitor the sale of Brazilian arms using U.S. technology. Subsequently, differences arose over Brazilian import restrictions on U.S. computer software, which Washington charged as encouraging piracy of the programs, while in mid-1988 Reagan announced a projected $200 million in trade sanctions because of Brazil’s refusal to accord patent protection to U.S. pharmaceutical and chemical products. On July 3, 1978, a Treaty of Amazon Cooperation (Amazon Pact) was signed with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela. The pact was criticized as lacking in detail on substantive development of the Amazon basin. In turn, Brazil has strongly objected to “foreign meddling” in the region. Relations with Argentina, which had been strained because of a series of disputes over the development of the hydroelectric potential of the Paran´a River, improved in late 1979 with the conclusion of a tripartite accord involving the two countries and Paraguay. More conclusive evidence of realignment within the Southern Cone was provided by a visit of President Figueiredo to Buenos Aires in May 1980 (the first by a Brazilian head of state in 30 years), during which a total of ten intergovernmental agreements were signed, embracing such traditionally sensitive areas as arms manufacture, nuclear technology, and exploitation of the hydroelectric resources of the R´ıo Uruguay. During the 1982 Falkland Islands war Brazil joined with its regional neighbors in supporting Argentina, while

the Brazilian embassy in London represented Argentine interests in the British capital. However, its posture throughout was distinctly muted, partly because of traditional rivalry between the continent’s two largest countries and partly because of an unwillingness to offend British financial interests, which were viewed as critical to resolution of Brazil’s foreign debt problems. The 1983 election of Raul Alfons´ın to the Argentine presidency served to dampen rapprochement with Buenos Aires because of the new chief executive’s well-publicized links to Brazilian opposition leaders; however, by mid-1984 the situation had improved and a number of trade and cooperation agreements were concluded after Brazil’s return to civilian rule in early 1985. Economic ties were further enhanced on December 10, 1986, with the signing by presidents Sarney and Alfons´ın of 20 accords launching an ambitious integration effort intended to eventuate in a Latin American common market. Under the plan, a customs union was established for most capital goods as of January 1, 1987, with cooperation in the exchange of food products, the promotion of bilateral industrial ventures, the establishment of a $200 million joint investment fund, and joint energy development (including a new $2 billion hydroelectric facility) to follow. In 1988 Brazil and Argentina agreed to cooperate in the nuclear power industry, although (without endorsing the NPT) formally rejecting the development of nuclear weaponry in a July 1991 accord that also banned the introduction of such arms from external sources. In mid-1990 they responded positively to U.S. President George H. W. Bush’s call for a regional free trade zone and announced that an Argentine-Brazilian common market would be launched by December 1994. The latter initiative was broadened to include Paraguay and Uruguay in a treaty concluded in March 1991 to create, by the original target date, a Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Com´un do Cono Sur—Mercosur). Diplomatic relations were restored with Cuba in June 1986, after a 22-year rupture, and in July 1988, during a five-day official visit to China by President Sarney, a number of bilateral agreements were

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announced, including a $150 million joint venture to launch two low-orbit sensoring satellites by 1994. In January 1992 gold miners along the sparsely populated border of Brazil and Venezuela sparked a flare-up between the two countries. Several months earlier a government drive to clear the area for a planned Yanomami Indian homeland caused many of the miners to cross into Venezuela, where a number of jungle airstrips were created that were subsequently attacked by Venezuelan aircraft. On June 3–14, 1992, Brazil drew international attention by hosting the largest gathering of world leaders in history for the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme, a special body of the UN General Assembly). In May 1994 Brazil extended its 1991 nuclear accord with Argentina by signing an amended version of the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty proscribing the use of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (see IGO entry under OPANAL). During 1997 a number of trade problems emerged with fellow Mercosur member Argentina, including the imposition by the Argentine Senate in early September of a 20 percent import tax on Brazilian sugar. Nonetheless, U.S. President Bill Clinton hailed Mercosur as a stepping-stone to a Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) during a visit to Brazil in mid-October. In what was billed as a “mini-Maastricht” pact, Brazil and Argentina agreed in mid-1999 to adopt mutually compatible mechanisms of fiscal restraint, with a view to moving toward a common currency within Mercosur. In March 2000 Brazil went further by calling for early negotiation of a South American Free Trade Agreement during an economic summit in Bras´ılia in late August. However, the meeting became preoccupied with concerns over U.S. military policy toward Colombia. Given the oil wealth of Venezuela and President Hugo Ch´avez’s criticism of ethanol, President da Silva has often been at loggerheads with the Venezuelan president. Brazilian relations with Bolivia have also suffered due to Ch´avez’s support for

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Bolivian president Evo Morales. In 2006, Morales’s bid to nationalize Bolivia’s energy industry stirred anguish among the country’s private developers, especially those based in Brazil, whose state company, Petrobras, was the largest foreign investor in Bolivia. However, within weeks da Silva and Morales had met and agreed to resolve the issue “rationally.” Various international agencies increased pressure on Brazil in 2007 to halt the deforestation of rainforests in the Amazon. Meetings between U.S. President George W. Bush and da Silva in March 2007 concentrated on promoting ethanol and reducing tariffs in the United States. At a South American energy summit on April 15, Ch´avez backed away from criticism of ethanol, but Brazil was stung by a Venezuelan-Bolivian-Argentine proposal for an Organization of Gas Producing and Exporting Countries of South America.

Current Issues At his inauguration in 2003, President da Silva pledged that ending hunger, poverty, and corruption would be his top priorities. However, his administration was embarrassed by a series of fiscal scandals, and was racked in 2005 by a corruption scandal when the PTB’s Roberto JEFFERSON led his party out of da Silva’s coalition government after accusing senior PT officials of accepting bribes in exchange for political support. On June 16 cabinet chief Jos´e DIRCEU resigned to defend himself and his colleagues against those and subsequent charges. Additional cabinet changes followed, along with the resignation of the president of the Liberal Party, Valdemar da Costa NETO, who confessed to a role in the affair in 2005. The president of the Chamber of Deputies, Severino CAVALCANTI of the PPB, also resigned after being charged with accepting a bribe. Considering the corruption problems and the outbreak of gang violence in S˜ao Paolo in midMay 2006 (see the 2007 Handbook for details), some observers predicted that da Silva would face difficulties in his 2006 reelection bid. However, his administration was successful, having been

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credited with reducing inflation, maintaining economic stability, and fostering the direct transfer of government resources to some 11 million of Brazil’s poorest families. Corruption charges continued to plague the government, however, and prompted thousands to demonstrate against da Silva in early August 2007. That same month, the Supreme Court indicted a dozen politicians, including Dirceu, and Jos´e GENOINO, former PT president, and in September the Senate narrowly rejected a call by a congressional ethics committee to expel Senate president Renan CALHEIROS. Calheiros, a close ally of da Silva, said in October that he would take a leave of absence in the wake of the widening corruption scandal, though he denied all charges. He subsequently resigned the post on December 4 but retained his Senate seat. In November, the PT was cited by investigators for having used public funds for election campaigns of political supporters, and other fraudulent schemes brought down Finance Minister Antonio PALOCCI and Ricardo BERZIONI, among others who were close to da Silva. On a more positive note, the government in 2007 announced a stimulus package that included new tax cuts and the promotion of ethanol as a substitute for petroleum-based fuel to help reduce dependence on Bolivian gas. In December, however, observers said da Silva was dealt a political blow when lawmakers, after months of debate, narrowly refused to approve an extension to the financial transaction tax that the government had been using to pay for antipoverty programs.

Political Parties All of Brazil’s parties were dissolved by decree in 1965, clearing the way for establishment of a single government party, the National Renewal Alliance (Alian¸ca Renovadora Nacional— Arena), and a single opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democr´atico Brasileiro—MDB), which began organizing in 1969. In the November 1978 election Arena retained control of both houses of Congress but

was substantially outpolled in the popular vote by the MDB. Both groups were formally dissolved on November 22, 1979, after enactment of legislation sanctioning a more liberal party system. Under the new arrangement, parties were required to swear allegiance to the “democratic system,” give six months’ prior notice of a national congress, and win 5 percent of the total vote to retain legal status. For the indirect presidential balloting in 1985, a Democratic Alliance (Alian¸ca Democr´atica) was formed, composed of the PFL and PMDB (below), in support of the candidacy of Tancredo Neves. However, neither Alliance partner was firmly committed to the leadership of Neves’s successor, while President Sarney called for a “National Pact” centered on the non-Malufista wing of his preelection Social Democratic Party (PDS). On May 9, 1985, Congress enacted a bill that restored direct presidential elections and legalized all political parties, a move presumed to be directed mainly at the theretofore proscribed Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasiliero—PCB), which had been publicly running candidates under the PMDB banner. On the other hand, a law passed before the 1990 balloting required that a party have at least 300,000 members to qualify for formal registration.

Government Parties Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT). Long endorsing “a pure form of socialism” that rejected orthodox Marxism, the PT made important gains in the 1985 municipal balloting, electing Maria Luisa FONTONELLE as one of the country’s first two women mayors in Cear´a’s capital, Fortaleza, and winning 20 percent of the vote in S˜ao Paulo. It increased its lower house representation from 14 to 19 in 1986, while retaining its single Senate seat. During the 1987–1988 controversy over the duration of President Sarney’s mandate and the possible introduction of a parliamentary system of government, the PT came out strongly in favor of immediate presidential elections with the avowed intention of running PT

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president Luiz da Silva as its candidate. The party registered significant gains in the November 1988 municipal balloting, securing, most notably, the election of Luiza Erundina as S˜ao Paulo’s first woman mayor. In late 1991, at the party’s first congress since its founding a decade earlier, the da Silva-led majority voted to abandon its former advocacy of “democratic socialism” and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in favor of coexistence (not excluding cooperation) with other groups, both socialist and nonsocialist. Luiz da Silva was runner-up to Collor de Mello in the 1989 presidential poll and placed second behind Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994. Failing again in 1998, he was victorious in 2002, although the PT was held to a 91-seat plurality in the Chamber of Deputies. The PT encountered a crisis in 2005 because of a corruption scandal, with a number of individuals replaced in leadership roles. Nevertheless, da Silva was reelected in 2006, and PT deputies under investigation were reelected in concurrent legislative elections. The PT trailed the PMDB in number of legislative seats held following the elections. Leaders: Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) DA SILVA (President of the Republic), Ricardo BERZOINI (President of the Party), Marco Aur´elio GARCIA (Vice President of the Party). Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Partido do Movimento Democr´atico Brasiliero— PMDB). Rejecting government strictures against the adoption of names implying continuity with earlier party groups, the PMDB was launched in 1979 by about 100 federal deputies and 20 senators representing the more moderate elements of the former MDB. In late 1981 it was enlarged by merger with the Popular Party (Partido Popular— PP), a center-right grouping, most of whom had also been affiliated with the MDB. As the party reorganized to prepare for the 1986 congressional balloting, a conservative faction, Grupo Unidade, insisted that PP elements (which opposed recent PMDB initiatives for land reform and tax revision) were underrepresented in the party and issued an ˜ unsuccessful challenge to Ulysses GUIMARAES

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for the party presidency. The PMDB won a majority in both houses of congress and 22 of 23 state governorships in the November 1986 election. The party became increasingly divided in 1987, with leftists, organized as the Progressive Unity Movement (Movimento da Unidade Progressiva— MUP), proposing a “grand leftist front” that would include “nonradicalized” factions of the PT and the PDT (below) to campaign for truncation of Sarney’s term and an immediate presidential election. By early 1988 the hist´oricos (constituting a majority within the party, but not within the Constituent Assembly) were also pressing for a break with the Sarney government; in June most of the dissidents withdrew to form the PSDB (below). Following the October 1990 balloting the PMDB held plurality status in both the senate and chamber with 26 and 109 seats, respectively. In March 1991 the 20-year party leadership of Ulysses Guimar˜aes came to an ´ end with the election of Orestes QUERCIA to succeed him as president. Guimar˜aes was killed in a helicopter crash on October 12, 1992. Qu´ercia resigned on April 26, 1993, in response to allegations of corruption during his recent term as governor of the state of S˜ao Paulo, although subsequently he presented himself as a candidate for the federal presidency in 1994. The largest single contributor to the Franco coalition, the PMDB in 1994 won 9 of 26 gubernatorial contests and secured a plurality of seats in both houses of Congress. Retaining its preeminence in the senate, it fell to third place in the chamber in 2002. It participated in the da Silva government until its withdrawal in late 2004, although its cabinet representatives chose to remain in office. The party held a plurality in the chamber following the 2006 election, and was brought back into government in 2007, having been given several ministries. Considerable opposition was reported within the PMDB to this arrangement, but overall the party’s “amorphous” ideology and preference for being in office allowed continued support for the da Silva government. Leaders: Michel TEMER (President), Itamar FRANCO (Former President of the Republic), de ´Iris ARAUJO ´ (First Vice President of the Party),

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Anthony GAROTINHO, Garibaldi ALVES Filho (President of the Senate), Mauro LOPES (Secretary General). Progressive Party (Partido Progressista— PP). The PP designation was adopted in 2003 by the former PPB, which had been launched on September 14, 1995, as a merger of the Progressive Renewal Party (Partido Progressista Reformador—PPR), led by Paulo Salim Maluf, then mayor of S˜ao Paulo; the Progressive Party (Partido Progressista—PP), led by Alvaro DIAS; and the Progressive Republican Party (Partido Republicano Progressista—PRP). The party, which favors economic reform, secured a seat in the Senate following the 2006 election, while its representation in the chamber fell from 49 to 42 seats. Party president Pedro Corr´ea, accused in a votebuying scandal, was expelled from his chamber seat in March 2006. Four members of the PP were among 12 people indicted on corruption charges by the Supreme Court in August 2007. ´ (President), Paulo Leaders: Pedro CORREA Salim MALUF, Leodegar TISCOSKI (Secretary General). Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro—PSB). The PSB, which has been described by observers as more pragmatic than other socialist parties in the country, withdrew from the Franco government coalition in August 1993. It won two state governorships in 1994 and that same year was part of a broad coalition that supported da Silva’s presidential bid. Former party president Miguel ARRAES died in 2005. Leaders: Eduardo CAMPOS (President of the Party), Roberto AMARAL (Vice President), Ciro GOMES, Renato CASAGRANDE (Secretary General). Brazilian Republican Party (Partido Republicano Brasileiro—PRB). The PRB was formed in 2005 as a successor to the Municipal Renewal Party (Partido Municipalista Renovador—PMR), which was established following the 2005 cor-

ruption scandals by Brazil’s leading evangelical group, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus—IURD). The IURD is a well-known Pentecostal group, with branches in 172 countries, headed by an entrepreneurial “bishop,” Edir Macedo. The PRB, however, has been described as being more driven by pragmatism than by ideology, though a party that defends the interests of the church. The PRB has supported the da Silva presidency on the basis of its concern for social democracy and eliminating inequality. Leaders: Jos´e ALENCAR (Vice President of the Republic), Edir MACEDO (IURD leader), Jorge PINHEIRO (Coordinator). Green Party (Partido Verde—PV). Organized largely by a group of PMDB deputies, the PV was legalized in 1988. Its former president, Fernando Gabeira, a former guerrilla who campaigned for mayor of Rio de Janeiro in 1986 under the PT banner, left the group in 2002 to join the PT, but returned to the PV in 2006. The party, which primarily promotes sustainable development, more than doubled its chamber representation in 2006 over 2002, when it had held five seats. Leaders: Alfredo SIRKIS (President of the Party), Fernando GABEIRA, F´abio FELDMAN. Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil—PCdoB). An offshoot of the PCB, the PCdoB was formed in 1961 as a Maoist group in support of rural guerrilla operations against the military. In August 1978 it publicly expressed its support for the Albanian Communist Party in its break with the post-Maoist Chinese leadership. In the mid-1980s, the party was instrumental in promoting huge demonstrations against the military regime. In 1994 the PCdoB endorsed da Silva in his initial bid for the presidency, and has continued to support him since. The party, whose platform calls for a socialist Brazil that is “truly democratic and sovereign,” gained a chamber seat in 2006, following the 12 seat allocation it secured in 2002. Leader: Renato REBELO (President).

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Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democr´atico Trabalhista—PDT). The PDT is a left-wing party organized by Leonel da Moira BRIZOLA, who served as governor of Rio Grande do Sul and leader of the pre-1965 Brazilian Labor Party, following his return on September 5, 1979, after 15 years in exile. In the 1982 balloting Brizola, a man of known presidential aspirations, won the state governorship of Rio de Janeiro; before Neves’s election, he attempted unsuccessfully to form a new socialist party and after the president-elect’s death led the campaign for direct presidential balloting in 1988. In the November 1985 municipal balloting, the PDT won mayoralties in Pˆorto Alegre and, more importantly, Rio de Janeiro, while Brizola regained the state governorship in 1990. Brizola waged losing battles for president in 1989 and 1994, and was da Silva’s running mate in the 1998 contest. He died on June 21, 2004. The PDT has opposed President da Silva’s perceived lack of accountability in federal transfers. The PDT’s 2006 presidential candidate, Cristovam Buarque, received 2.6 percent of the vote in the first round of balloting. Leaders: Carlos LUPI (President), Cristovam BUARQUE (2006 presidential candidate), Manoel DIAS (Secretary General). Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro—PTB). The PTB was organized in 1980 by a niece of former president Get´ulio Vargas. It attained a degree of visibility in 1985 by supporting Quadros in his successful mayoral bid. The PTB was a member of the Cardoso coalition government installed in 1994 but withdrew from the cabinet in March 1999. It withdrew from the da Silva administration in June 2005 when its leader, Roberto Jefferson Monteiro Francisco, initiated the charges of high-level corruption. Jefferson was later forced to step down as party president in the wake of his expulsion from congress for attacking colleagues “without proof.” He faced charges in 2007 in connection with the alleged vote-buying scandal two years earlier. Meanwhile, Walfrido dos Mares GUIA, a key minister who was the president’s liaison with congress, resigned in

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November 2007 in the wake of a money-laundering investigation. ´ Leaders: Jos´e MUCIO Monteiro, Luis Antˆonio FLEURY Filho, Fernando COLLOR de Mello, Antˆonio Carlos De Campos MACHADO (Secretary General).

Opposition Parties Brazilian Social Democratic Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira—PSDB). The PSDB was launched in June 1988 by a number of center-left congressional deputies from the PMDB’s hist´orico faction, plus others from the PDS the PFL, and the PTB and PSB (below). The new alignment issued a manifesto calling for social justice, economic development, land reform, and environmental protection. In addition, it pledged to call for a plebiscite on establishment of a parliamentary system within the next four years. In 1994 and 1998 it joined with the PMDB, the PFL, and the PTB and PL (below), in supporting the successful presidential bids of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The PSDB has suffered since the Cardoso administration in terms of finding a presidential candidate who could unify the party. Lackluster party support for Jos´e Serra in 2002 and Geraldo Alckmin (a former governor of S˜ao Paulo) in 2006 was a major problem. Among other divisive factors, party president Tasso Jereissati, former party president Eduardo AZEREDO, and party official A´ecio Neves have criticized the party as being too centered on S˜ao Paulo. The internal divisions and da Silva’s shift toward pro-S˜ao policies have made it difficult for the PSDB to mount an effective opposition effort. In 2007 Azeredo was implicated in a fraudulent campaign finance scheme. Leaders: Tasso JEREISSATI (President), Fernando Henrique CARDOSO (Honorary President and Former President of the Republic), Jos´e SERRA (Governor of S˜ao Paulo), A´ecio NEVES (Governor of Minas Gerais), Geraldo ALCK˜ MIN (2006 presidential candidate), Eduardo PAES (Secretary General).

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Democrats (Democratas). The Democrats is the name adopted in 2007 by the Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal—PFL), which contested the 2006 elections under the PFL rubric. The PFL was formed in 1984 as a faction within the PDS that was opposed to the presidential candidacy of Paulo Maluf (later, of the PP). The PFL organized as a separate entity before the 1985 electoral college balloting, at which it supported Tancredo Neves as a member of the Alian¸ca Democr´atica. In the 1986 balloting it became the second-largest party in Congress. In September 1987 the PFL announced its withdrawal from the alliance, thus formally terminating its link with the PMDB, although it decided the following month to continue its support of party cofounder, then-President of the Republic, Jos´e Sarney, until after approval of the new constitution. As of early 1992 it was the largest progovernment formation in the Chamber of Deputies and subsequently became the largest component of the Cardoso coalition. The PFL withdrew from the coalition government in March 2002 to protest an official investigation into the business dealings of Roseana SARNEY, the PFL’s 2002 presidential candidate. Sarney withdrew from the race in April, and the PFL subsequently threw its support behind Ciro GOMES, then of the PPS (below). The PFL supported the PSDB’s Geraldo Alckmin in the 2006 presidential balloting. In 2007 the PFL, now the Democrats, revised its leadership structure to address a “new Brazil.” The Democrats have favored a more “balanced” and moderate form of government versus the da Silva administration’s move toward populism. Leaders: Rodrigo MAIA (President), Antonio ˜ Carlos MAGALHAES Neto, Marco MACIEL, Jorge BORNHAUSEN, Jayme CAMPOS (Secretary General). Socialist Peoples Party (Partido Popular Socialista—PPS). The PPS was launched in January 1992 as successor to the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro—PCB), which had been formed in 1922, but enjoyed only nine years of legal existence thereafter. In

June 1991 the PCB elected a “renewalist” leadership and argued that it was “no longer necessary [for] a Marxist to be a Communist.” In furtherance of this posture, the party voted to confine Marxism-Leninism to the status of “historic relevance” and authorized the pursuit of socialism by democratic means. In 2004 the party withdrew from the governing coalition and subsequently expelled party leader Ciro Gomes, who had decided to remain in his cabinet post. Gomes then joined the PSB. Leaders: Roberto FREIRE (President), Rubens BUENO (General Secretary). Christian Social Party (Partido Social Crist˜ao—PSC). The PSC was launched in 1970 as the Democratic Republican Party (Partido Democr´atico Republicano—PDR); it adopted the PSC rubric in 1985. Leader: V´ıtor Jorge Abdala NOSSIES (President). Socialist and Liberty Party (Partido do Socialismo e da Libertade—PSOL). A far-left formation, the PSOL was launched in June 2004 by Helo´ısa Helena, who had been expelled from the PT in late 2003 for voting against the government. She was subsequently joined by a number of other PT defectors. The PSOL follows an ideology similar to that of the PCdoB and the PSTU. It has benefited from the public perception that its members have been considered “honest politicians.” Helena secured 6.8 percent of the vote in the first round of the 2006 presidential balloting. Leader: Helo´ısa HELENA (2006 presidential candidate). Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL). The PL was a tradesmen’s party committed to free enterprise and a “more just” wages policy. In 2005 party president Valdemar da Costa Neto resigned from congress after he acknowledged his role in a corruption scandal, though he denied accepting bribes. In 2007, however, several members of the PL were accused of taking bribes in exchange for political support in congress. Leader: Luciano CASTRO.

BRAZIL

Party for the Rebuilding of the National Order (Partido de Reedifica¸ca˜ o da Ordem Nacional—PRONA). PRONA is a far-right grouping founded in 1989 by a S˜ao Paulo cardiologist, En´eas Ferreira Carneiro, who was the party’s candidate in the country’s first presidential election that year. He ran for various offices over the years and in 2006 was elected as a deputy, securing one of his party’s two seats. He died in May 2007. The party reportedly disbanded in 2007 and joined members of the Liberal Party to form the Party of the Republic (Partido da Rep´ublica—PR), led by Sergio TAMER. Other parties represented in the legislature are the National Mobilization Party (Partido da Mobiliza¸ca˜ o Nacional—PMN), led by Oscar Noronha FILHO; the Humanist Party of Solidarity (Partido Humanista da Solidariedade—PHS), led by Paulo Roberto MATOS; the Party of the Nation’s Retirees (Partido dos Aposentados da Na¸ca˜ o—PAN), led by Dreyfus Bueno RABELLO; the Christian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Crist˜ao—PTC); the Labor Party of Brazil (Partido Trabalhista do Brasil– PtdoB), led by Luis Henrique de Oliveira RESENDE; and the Renewed Brazilian Workers Party (Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro—PRTB), led by Jos´e Levy Fidelix DA CRUZ.

Other Parties Other parties that contested the 2006 elections include the Socialist Party of Unified Workers (Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado— PSTU), led by Jos´e Maria DE ALMEIDA; the Christian Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata Crist˜ao—PSDC), led by Jos´e Maria EYMAEL (2006 presidential candidate); the Social Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal PSL), led by Luciano Caldas BIVAR (2006 presidential candidate); the Progressive Republican Party (Partido Republicano Progressista— PRP), led by Ovasco Roma ALTIMARI and Ana Maria RANGEL (2006 presidential candidate); the National Workers Party (Partido Trabalhista Nacional—PTN), led by Jos´e Masci DE ABREU; and the Workers’ Cause Party (Partido da Causa

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Oper´aia—PCO), led by Rui Costa PIMENTA (2006 presidential candidate).

Legislature The bicameral National Congress (Congresso Nacional) consists of a Federal Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, both of which are directly elected by universal suffrage. The two houses, sitting together, form a Constituent Assembly for purposes of constitutional revision. Federal Senate (Senado Federal). The upper house currently consists of 81 members (3 for each state, plus 3 for the Federal District) elected for eight-year terms, with one-third and two-thirds, respectively, elected every four years. Senators are elected in single-round plurality voting. Voters vote for one candidate when one-third of the membership is renewed, two candidates when two-thirds of the membership is renewed. Following the balloting of October 1, 2006, for one-third of the seats, the distribution of seats in the full senate was the Liberal Front Party, 18 (6 won in 2006); the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, 15 (4); the Brazilian Social Democratic Party, 15 (5); the Workers’ Party, 11 (2); the Democratic Labor Party, 5 (1); the Brazilian Labor Party, 4 (3); the Brazilian Socialist Party, 3 (1); the Liberal Party, 3 (1); the Communist Party of Brazil, 2 (1); the Progressive Party, 1 (1); the Socialist Peoples Party 1(1); and the Renewed Brazilian Workers Party, 1 (1). President: Garibaldi ALVES Filho. Chamber of Deputies (Cˆamara dos Deputados). Seats in the lower house are allocated on a population basis, their 513 current occupants serving four-year terms. Members are directly elected via party-list proportional balloting from 27 multimember constituencies (1 for each state and 1 for the Federal District). In the most recent balloting on October 1, 2006, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement won 89 seats; the Workers’ Party, 83; the Brazilian Social Democratic Party, 65; the Liberal Front Party, 65; the Progressive Party, 42; the Brazilian Socialist Party, 27; the Democratic Labor Party, 24;

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BRAZIL

Cabinet As of February 1, 2008 President Vice President Chief of Civilian Cabinet Secretary General of the Presidency

Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) da Silva (PT) Jos´e Alencar (PRB) Dilma Rousseff (PT) Luiz Dulci (PT)

Ministers Agrarian Development Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply Cities Communications Culture Defense Development, Industry, and Commerce Education Environment Finance Foreign Affairs Health Justice Labor and Employment Mines and Energy National Integration Planning, Budget, and Management Science and Technology Social Development and the Fight against Hunger Social Security Sport Tourism Transport

Guilherme Cassel (PT) Reinhold Stephanes (PMDB) M´arcio Fortes (PP) H´elio Costa (PMDB) Gilberto Gil (PV) Nelson Jobim (PMDB) Miguel Jorge (ind.) Fernando Haddad (PT) Marina Silva (PT) [f] Guido Mantega (PT) Celso Amorim (ind.) Jos´e Gomes Tempor˜ao (PMDB) Tarso Genro (PT) Carlos Lupi (PDT) Edison Lob˜ao (PMDB) Geddel Vieira Lima (PMDB) Paulo Bernardo (PT) S´ergio Rezende (PSB) Patrus Anan´ıas (PT) Luiz Marinho (PT) Orlando Silva J´unior (PCdoB) Marta Suplicy (PT) [f] Alfredo Nascimento (PRB)

Secretaries with Ministerial Status Agriculture and Fisheries Human Rights Institutional Relations Institutional Security in the Office of the President Policies to Promote Racial Equality Social Communication Strategic Affairs in the Office of the President Women’s Rights [f] = female

Altemir Gregolin (PT) Paulo de Tarso Vannuchi Jos´e M´ucio Monteiro (PTB) Gen. Jorge Armando Felix (ind.) Martvs das Chagas (PT) [f] Franklin Martins (ind.) Roberto Mangabeira Unger Nilc´ea Freire (PT) [f]

BRAZIL

the Liberal Party, 23; the Brazilian Labor Party, 22; the Socialist Peoples Party, 21; the Green Party, 13; the Communist Party of Brazil, 13; the Christian Social Party, 9; the Christian Labor Party, 4; the Socialist and Liberty Party, 3; the National Mobilization Party, 3; the Humanist Party of Solidarity, 2; the Party for the Rebuilding of the National Order, 2; the Labor Party of Brazil, 1; the Brazilian Republican Party, 1; and the Party of the Nation’s Retirees, 1. (Changes in memberships have traditionally been known to occur with some frequency. ´ President: Arlindo Chignalia JUNIOR.

Communications Brazil has a vigorous and extensive news media network, which was subject to censorship, though somewhat relaxed after 1978, during the period of military rule. The Sarney government announced the end of political constraints in March 1985 and virtually all forms of media control have been banned under the 1988 constitution. However, in 2007, violence against journalists seemed to be surging, with the fatal beating of a journalist who reported on allegations of financial irregularities, and the attempted murder of a radio broadcaster. The watchdog group, Reporters Without Borders, reported, however, that President Lula da Silva continued to back laws promoting freedom of the press.

Press No Brazilian newspaper enjoys truly national distribution. The following are Portugueselanguage dailies, unless otherwise noted: O Estado de S˜ao Paulo (S˜ao Paulo, 491,000 daily, 460,000 Sunday), independent; O Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 350,000 daily, 600,000 Sunday), conservative; Fˆolha de S˜ao Paulo (S˜ao Paulo, 320,000 daily, 500,000 Sunday); O Dia (Rio de Janeiro, 250,000 daily, 500,000 Sunday), popular labor; Not´ıcias Populares (S˜ao Paulo, 150,000); Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 107,000 daily, 145,000 Sunday), Catholic conservative; Ultima Hora (Rio de

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Janeiro, 57,000); Di´ario de Pernambuco (Recife, 31,000), oldest paper in Latin America (founded 1825), independent.

News Agencies There are a number of domestic agencies, including Agˆencia Globo and Agˆencia Jornal do Brasil, both headquartered in Rio de Janeiro; Agˆencia ANDA, headquartered in Bras´ılia; and Agˆencia o Estado de S˜ao Paulo and Agˆencia Fˆolha de S˜ao Paulo. Numerous foreign agencies also maintain bureaus in Bras´ılia, Rio de Janeiro, and S˜ao Paulo.

Broadcasting and Computing The government’s National Telecommunications Department (Departamento Nacional de Telecomunica¸co˜ es—Dentel) oversees television and radio broadcasting. Most of the country’s nearly 3,000 radio stations are commercial, but several are owned by the government or the Catholic Church. Most of the more than 260 television stations are organized into a national association, Associa¸ca˜ o Brasileira de Emissoras de R´adio e Televis˜ao (ABERT), and a number of regional groups. Among the television networks, TV Globo dominates with an audience share of about 70 percent. As of 2005, there were approximately 172 Internet users and 161 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 463 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Antonio de Aguiar PATRIOTA U.S. Ambassador to Brazil: Clifford M. SOBEL Permanent Representative to the UN: Maria Luiza Ribiero VIOTTI IGO Memberships (Non-UN): AfDB, ALADI, BIS, CAN, CPLP, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

C A NA DA

The Country Canada, the largest country in the Western Hemisphere and the second largest in the world (after Russia), extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Arctic to a southern limit near Detroit, Michigan. Because of its northerly location, severe climate, and unfavorable geographic conditions, only one-third of its total area has been developed, and more than two-thirds of its people inhabit a 100-mile-wide strip of territory along the U.S. border. Colonized by both English and French settlers, it retained throughout a long period of British rule a cultural and linguistic duality that continues as one of its most serious internal problems. Of the more than 6.7 million Canadians who claim French as their mother tongue, approximately 86 percent are concentrated in the province of Quebec, where demands for political and economic equality (or even separation from the rest of Canada) persist. A major step toward linguistic equality was taken in 1969 with the enactment of an official-languages bill that provided for bilingual districts throughout the country. Nevertheless, Quebec enacted legislation establishing French as its sole official language in 1977, although a series of court rulings from 1984 to 1988 voided some provisions of the act. In early 1987 the Inuit, an Eskimo people accounting for about 17,000 of the sparse overall population of 51,000, won tentative agreement to the formation of their own territory (Nunavut) in the larger, eastern portion of the vast Northwest Territories; the smaller western region is home to a more varied population that includes Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Eskimos, Yukon Indians, Athapaskanspeaking D´en´e Indians, and M´etis (mixed Indian and European), but with a narrow white majority. The creation of Nunavut was eventually ap-

proved in 1992 (see Constitution and government, below), and the new territory was formally founded on April 1, 1999. Women constitute approximately 47 percent of the Canadian labor force, concentrated largely in service (particularly health care and social assistance), sales, and teaching. Women currently occupy 6 of 27 cabinet positions, 34 of 93 occupied Senate seats, and 21 percent of the seats in the House of Commons. Women also have long taken an active role in political party affairs, and several hold portfolios in the current federal cabinet. As of mid-2007, 5 of 13 provincial lieutenant governors and territorial commissioners, but no provincial or territorial premiers, were women.

ARCTIC OCEAN RUSSIA ICELAND

Greenland (DENMARK)

Alaska (U.S.)

Beaufort Sea

Whitehorse

Baffin Bay

CANADA

Iqaluit

Hudson Bay

Edmonton Vancouver

Calgary

Winnipeg Quebec Ottawa Toronto

UNITED STATES 0 0

800 Mi 800 Km

Montreal

Hamilton ATLANTIC OCEAN

CANADA

Political Status: Granted Dominion status under British North America Act of 1867; recognized as autonomous state within the Commonwealth in 1931; constitution “patriated” as of April 17, 1982. Area: 3,855,081 sq. mi. (9,984,670 sq. km.), including inland water. Population: 31,612,897 (2006C); 32,777,304 (2007E). The 2006 figure is unadjusted for underenumeration. (The unadjusted number in 2001 rose by 3.1% after adjustment.) The 2007 estimated figure is the government’s official population count, including adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (urban areas, 2006C): OTTAWA (1,130,761), Toronto (5,113,149), Montreal (3,635,571), Vancouver (2,116,581), Calgary (1,079,310), Edmonton (1,034,945), Quebec (715,515), Winnipeg (694,668), Hamilton (692,911). Official Languages: English, French. Monetary Unit: Canadian Dollar (market rate November 2, 2007: 1 dollars = $1.07US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Micha¨elle JEAN; appointed by Queen Elizabeth II on the advice of the prime minister and installed for a five-year term on September 27, 2005, succeeding Adrienne CLARKSON. Prime Minister: Stephen HARPER (Conservative Party of Canada); asked by the governor general on January 24, 2006, to form a new government following the general elections of January 23 and inaugurated with new government on February 6 in succession to Paul MARTIN (Liberal Party of Canada).

For many decades the economy relied on foreign investment capital, primarily from the United States, to finance development, and industry still has a high proportion of foreign ownership. However, the country’s resultant prominence among the world’s manufacturing and trading nations has more recently permitted Canada, in turn, to become a major investor abroad, with investment outflow exceeding inflow. The economy’s health contin-

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ues to depend highly on trade, especially with the United States, which absorbed 83 percent of Canadian exports in 2003. Having concluded a free trade agreement in 1988, Canada and the United States subsequently joined Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force in 1994. (Notably, imports from the United States slid from 77 percent of total imports in 1998 to 70 percent in 2003.) The once-dominant agricultural sector (including fishing and forestry) now employs only 3 percent of the workforce while contributing about 2.2 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, Canada’s farms and ranches continue to produce vast quantities of wheat and beef, substantial portions of which are available for export. In addition, Canada ranks first among world exporters of wood pulp, paper, and fish. Industry as a whole, including mining, constitutes about 30 percent of GDP and employs about 22 percent of the labor force. In addition to processed foods, paper, and wood products, leading manufactures include automobiles and auto parts (roughly one-fourth of the country’s exports), fabricated metals, and electrical and electronic products. Mineral wealth also plays an important role. Possessing significant petroleum reserves, Canada is additionally a major source of cobalt, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, molybdenum, nickel, platinum, silver, uranium, and zinc. Mineral products make up about 15 percent of exports. Following a slow recovery from the international recession of the early 1990s, Canada saw its GDP rise at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent from 1994 to 1997, easily outpacing the average for the Group of Seven (G-7) leading industrial states. Despite adverse world commodity prices and the negative effect of an Asian financial crisis, GDP rose 3.1 percent in 1998. At the same time, unemployment continued its decline from more than 11 percent in 1993 to 8.3 percent, while core consumer price inflation stood at 1.2 percent. Aided by the buoyant U.S. economy, GDP growth reached more than 5 percent in 2000, marking the country’s longest uninterrupted expansion in more than three decades. However, growth dropped to 1.8 percent in 2001 and 2003 before recovering to nearly

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CANADA

3 percent in 2004 and 2005. Unemployment fell to 6.8 percent in 2005, while inflation stood at 2.2 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background United under British rule in 1763 following France’s defeat in the Seven Years War, Canada began its movement toward independence in 1867 when the British North America Act established a federal union of the four provinces of Quebec, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The provinces reached their present total of ten with the addition of Newfoundland in 1949. Under the 1867 act, executive authority was vested in the British Crown but was exercised by an appointed governor general; legislative power was entrusted to a bicameral Parliament consisting of a Senate and a House of Commons. Canada’s growing capacity to manage its affairs won formal recognition in the British Statute of Westminster of 1931, which conferred autonomous status within the Commonwealth. With a political system and institutional structure closely modeled on British precedents, the country was for all practical purposes governed for more than a century by alignments equivalent to today’s Liberal and Conservative parties. Liberal governments, headed successively by W. L. MacKenzie KING and Louis ST. LAURENT, were in office from 1935 to 1957, when the Conservatives (named Progressive Conservatives of Canada [PCP] in the 1940s and the Conservative Party of Canada [CPC] in 2003 following the PCP’s merger with the Canadian Alliance) returned to power under John DIEFENBAKER, prime minister from 1957 to 1963. Lester B. PEARSON, leader of the Liberal Party, headed minority governments from 1963 until his retirement in 1968, when he was succeeded by Pierre Elliott TRUDEAU. The new prime minister secured a majority for the Liberals in the election of June 1968 and was returned to power with a reduced majority in October 1972. Contrary to preelection forecasts, the Trudeau gov-

ernment won decisive control of the House of Commons in July 1974. In May 1979 the 16-year Liberal reign ended when the PCP won 136 of 282 seats in the newly expanded House. Although his party remained 6 seats shy of an absolute majority, the PCP’s Charles Joseph CLARK was sworn in as prime minister in June, Trudeau becoming leader of the opposition. In December, however, the Clark government experienced a stunning parliamentary defeat in an effort to enact a series of stringent budgetary measures, necessitating a dissolution of the House and the calling of a new election for February 1980. Given an evident resurgence of Liberal popularity, Trudeau agreed to withdraw his November 1979 resignation as party leader and returned to office in March as head of a new Liberal government that commanded a majority of 6 seats in the Commons. As a French Canadian, Trudeau deployed his political weight against the pro-independence Quebec Party (Parti Qu´eb´ecois—PQ), which had come to power in the province in 1976, thereby helping to defeat the PQ government’s “sovereigntyassociation” plan in a Quebec referendum in May 1980. However, continued economic difficulties combined with accusations of political patronage began to erode the Trudeau administration’s popularity. In February 1984 Trudeau again resigned the leadership of his party; he was replaced at a party convention in June by John Napier TURNER, who had served as finance minister from 1972 to 1975. Heartened by polls indicating that the transfer of power had aided his party’s popularity, newly installed Prime Minister Turner called a general election for September, but the balloting produced a decisive reversal: the PCP won 211 of 284 House seats, and PCP leader Brian MULRONEY took office as prime minister. During the ensuing four years the Mulroney administration encountered widespread resistance to its fiscal and defense policies, was embarrassed by a series of scandals involving cabinet officials, and encountered strong opposition to the Meech Lake constitutional reform proposals (see Constitution and government, below). Nonetheless, in an early general election in November 1988, the PCP

CANADA

retained control of the Commons by capturing 170 of 295 seats. The future of the country’s de facto two-party system was challenged by a devastating Liberal loss to the New Democratic Party (NDP) in Ontario provincial elections on September 6, 1990, followed by a third-place Liberal finish behind the NDP in Manitoba five days later. The NDP further asserted itself in October 1991 by toppling a Social Credit (Socred) administration in Saskatchewan and a Conservative government in British Columbia. His party’s standing in the opinion polls having plummeted to an unprecedented low, Mulroney resigned as prime minister and PCP leader on June 23, 1993, in favor of Kim CAMPBELL, who proved unable to reverse the antiConservative tide. On October 25 the PCP suffered the most punishing blow to any ruling party in Canadian history, with its parliamentary representation plunging from 153 to 2. Installed as prime minister on November 4, Liberal leader Jean ´ CHRETIEN faced major challenges from both the separatist Quebec Bloc (Bloc Qu´eb´ecois—BQ), led by Lucien BOUCHARD, and the western populist Reform Party, the former becoming the official opposition. A renewed threat to the Canadian federation resulted from provincial elections in Quebec on September 12, 1994, when the PQ, after nine years in opposition, defeated the incumbent Liberals by a decisive seat margin of 77 to 47. A PQ government committed to taking Quebec to independence was installed on September 27 under the premiership of Jacques PARIZEAU. In December 1994 Parizeau introduced detailed independence proposals and launched a “consultation” process aimed at securing referendum endorsement of Quebec’s “sovereignty” by the end of 1995. The Chr´etien federal government, initially relaxed about the referendum initiative, became more concerned when the small pro-autonomy Democratic Action of Quebec (Action D´emocratique du Qu´ebec—ADQ), potentially commanding the swing vote in Quebec, endorsed the proposal. When the highly able Bouchard took over the leadership of the PQ’s cam-

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paign from Parizeau, the Chr´etien administration launched a major drive against separation. The effort succeeded by the barest of margins: in a turnout of 93 percent on October 30, 1995, 2,308,028 votes (49.4 percent) were cast in favor of the proposition and 2,361,526 (50.6 percent) against. In January 1996 Parizeau was succeeded as provincial premier and PQ leader by Bouchard, who recommitted the PQ to the goal of independence for Quebec but declared that his more immediate aim was the province’s economic revival. In a daring move, Prime Minister Chr´etien announced on April 27, 1997, that new elections would be held in June (17 months earlier than required), following the shortest campaign in Canadian history. Chr´etien’s decision was apparently influenced by the Liberals’ large lead in public opinion polls and a desire to solidify the government’s toughened position against unilateral separation by Quebec. The June 2 balloting kept the Liberal Party in power, albeit with Canada’s smallest-ever majority, 155 seats out of 301 total. Having won 60 seats, the Reform Party replaced the BQ (38 seats) as the official opposition. In general, Canada’s electorate fragmented along regional lines, and only the small NDP (21 seats) could claim a national representation (a seat in three different regions). In the Quebec provincial election of November 1998, Premier Bouchard was reelected, although the PQ’s support softened as the Liberals edged the secessionists by 1 percent in the popular vote. During his campaign Bouchard said he would not seek another referendum on independence until “winning conditions” were clearly in place. Three months earlier, on August 20, the Supreme Court had ruled that Quebec could secede, but only with the agreement of the federal government and the other provinces on such questions as settlement of national debt and continued use of a common currency. Despite strong objections from the BQ, in March 2000 the House of Commons passed a controversial “clarity” provision that outlined procedures for secession. Passed into law by the Senate in July, the bill authorized the House to determine whether the wording of future independence referendums is sufficiently clear.

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CANADA

On October 22, 2000, five days after a cabinet reshuffle, Prime Minister Chr´etien called a federal election for November 27, 19 months before the expiration of his mandate. Buoyed by Canada’s healthy economy, the Liberals won 172 seats in the House of Commons, while the new Canadian Alliance—in large part a right-wing successor to the Reform Party—won 66 seats. The BQ, the NDP, and the PCP all saw their federal representation decline in the election that again confirmed the country’s regional divide. In June 2002 Chr´etien sacked Paul MARTIN (Chr´etien’s chief Liberal rival) after nine years as finance minister, apparently because Chr´etien believed Martin had begun his campaign to be the next prime minister too early. However, Martin was subsequently elected as the new Liberal leader (see Political Parties, below, for details), and on December 12, 2003, he succeeded Chr´etien as prime minister, appointing a new cabinet on the same day. Faced with a rapidly developing financial scandal, Martin called early elections for June 28, 2004, at which the Liberals were able to secure only a plurality of 135 of the 308 seats in the House of Commons. Martin formed a new minority government on July 20. However, the ongoing scandal and the Liberals’ weak parliamentary position continued to plague the Martin government (see Current issues, below). On November 24, 2005, Conservative Party leader Stephen HARPER introduced a no-confidence motion, which passed 171–133 on November 28. The following day Martin asked Governor General Micha¨elle JEAN to dissolve Parliament and call new elections. In the election on January 23, 2006, the Conservatives secured a plurality of 124 seats compared to 103 seats for the Liberals. Consequently, Harper was sworn in as the head of the minority Conservative government on February 6. The cabinet was reshuffled in January and August 2007.

Constitution and Government From 1867 until 1982 the British North America Act served as Canada’s basic law. A lengthy effort by Prime Minister Trudeau to “patriate” a purely

Canadian constitution generated considerable controversy in the provinces and met with mixed judicial construction, which led to a September 1981 determination by the Supreme Court that the government’s effort was legal but that it offended “the federal principle” by proceeding without overall provincial consent. Trudeau responded by convening a meeting with the provincial premiers in early November, at the conclusion of which all but Que´ bec’s Ren´e LEVESQUE agreed to a compromise that included an amending formula and permission for the provinces to nullify bill-of-rights provisions within their boundaries, should they so wish. On this basis, the Canada Bill (the Constitution Act 1982) was approved by the British Parliament in March 1982 and formally signed by Queen Elizabeth II in a ceremony in Ottawa on April 17. The document did not, however, secure final Canadian parliamentary approval until June 22, 1988, after the Mulroney administration (in the Meech Lake Accord of April–June 1987) had agreed to recognize Quebec as a “distinct society.” The concession, which required the approval of all ten provinces, was bitterly opposed by a number of prominent Canadians, including former prime minister Trudeau, who had long been committed to a bilingual country of politically equal provinces and who argued that the distinct-society clause would open the door to Quebec’s eventual departure from the federation. The latter prospect was by no means precluded when the deadline for approval of the accord expired on June 22, 1990, after cancellation by Newfoundland of a scheduled ratification vote. In June 1991 a Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future that had been established by Ottawa in late 1990 submitted a report urging recognition of Quebec as a unique entity within the federal system, the introduction of self-government for aboriginal peoples, and restructuring or abolition of the Canadian Senate. Mulroney responded to the proposals in late September by placing before the House of Commons a document titled “Shaping Canada’s Future Together” that again would recognize Quebec as a “distinct society,” while transferring a number of federal functions, particularly in the area of

CANADA

culture, to provincial administrations. The document also called for granting indigenous inhabitants self-government within ten years, removing a number of restrictions on trade between the provinces and territories, and establishing an elective Senate. Following a series of national “consultations” on the Mulroney proposals, political agreement on a new reform plan was achieved at a conference of federal, provincial, territorial, and native leaders in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, held August 18–23, 1992. However, on October 26 voters decisively rejected the accord in a nationwide referendum (only the third in Canada’s history), opposition being strongest in Quebec, where radical separatists regarded its provisions as insufficient, and in the western provinces, where the concessions to Quebec were seen as overly generous (see Current issues, below, for subsequent developments). Meanwhile, on December 16, 1991, the government had announced formal agreement with Inuit representatives on formation of the Nunavut (“Our Land” in Inuktitut, the Inuit language) territory, subject to approval by voters in the existing Northwest Territories (NWT), from which the new entity would be detached. Under the accord, the Inuit would be granted self-government (not independence, as some had demanded) and a share in mining and oil proceeds from lands that would remain largely under federal ownership. In addition, a wildlife management board would be established to regulate hunting and trapping, while a fund of approximately US $653 million would be set up to assist in implementation of the homeland by 1999. The agreement was ratified on May 4, 1992, by a NWT majority of 54 percent (90 percent in the east) and on November 3–5 by 69 percent of about 8,000 participants in an Inuit referendum. The autonomous territory of Nunavut was founded on April 1, 1999. Under the present constitution, the British monarch, as sovereign, is represented by a governor general, now a Canadian citizen appointed on the advice of the prime minister. The locus of power is the elected House of Commons, where the leader of the majority party is automatically designated by

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the governor general to form a cabinet and thus become prime minister. The House may be dissolved and a new election called in the event of a legislative defeat or no-confidence vote. The Senate, appointed by the governor general (on the advice of the prime minister) along both geographic and party lines, also must approve all legislation but tends largely to limit itself to the exercise of a secondary, restraining influence. It is prohibited from introducing financial legislation. Provincial governments operate along comparable lines. Each of the provinces has its own constitution; a lieutenant governor appointed by the governor general; a Legislative Assembly whose principal leader is the provincial premier; and its own judicial system, with a right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Municipalities are governed by elected officials and are subject to provincial rather than federal, authority. The Yukon is governed by a premier and a popularly elected Council. The Northwest Territories are governed by a premier and a popularly elected Legislative Assembly. Nunavut is governed by a premier and a 19-member popularly elected legislature. (The legislative bodies elect the premiers in the territories.) Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2006C)

255,540 364,762 250,114 28,150 156,452

3,290,350 4,113,487 1,148,401 729,997 505,469

21,345 415,596 2,185

913,462 12,160,282 135,851

595,388 251,365

7,546,131 968,157

Northwest Territories 519,732 (Yellowknife) Yukon Territory (Whitehorse) 186,271 Nunavut (Iqaluit) 808,181

41,464

Province and Capital Alberta (Edmonton) British Columbia (Victoria) Manitoba (Winnipeg) New Brunswick (Fredericton) Newfoundland and Labrador (St. John’s) Nova Scotia (Halifax) Ontario (Toronto) Prince Edward Island (Charlottetown) Quebec (Quebec) Saskatchewan (Regina) Territory and Capital

30,372 29,474

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Foreign Relations Canadian foreign policy in recent decades has reflected the varied influence of historic ties to Great Britain, geographical proximity to the United States, and a growing national strength and selfawareness that made the country one of the most active and influential “middle powers” of the post– World War II period. Staunch affiliation with the Western democratic bloc and an active role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other Western organizations have been accompanied by support for international conciliation and extensive participation in UN peacekeeping ventures and other constructive international activities. While maintaining important joint defense arrangements with the United States, Canada has shown independence of U.S. views on a variety of international issues. In addition, anti-U.S. sentiment has been voiced in connection with extensive U.S. ownership and control of Canadian economic enterprises and pervasive U.S. influence on Canadian intellectual and cultural life. Thus, a general review of Canada’s international commitments begun in the late 1960s resulted in diversification of the nation’s international relationships. In line with this trend, Canada reduced the number of troops committed to NATO, and Prime Minister Trudeau made state visits to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. In the face of a substantially reduced threat from Eastern Europe, the NATO commitment was further curtailed in September 1991, while the Mulroney government’s pledge in February 1992 that for budgetary reasons all Canadian combat troops would be withdrawn from Europe by late 1994 was in fact accomplished by late 1993. While disputes with the United States over fishing rights and delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Maine were largely resolved following a decision of the International Court of Justice in October 1984, the effects of U.S.-produced “acid rain” on Canadian forests remained an area of contention between the two countries. However, immediately before the third annual U.S.-Canadian summit in April 1987, President Ronald Reagan

announced that his government would spend $2.5 billion over five years on demonstration projects aimed at cleaner coal burning, while President George H. W. Bush in early 1989 promised that he would seek prompt approval of additional “clean air” legislation. In another area of contention with Washington, the Canadians hailed the conclusion in early 1988 of an agreement on Arctic cooperation, although the pact did not include U.S. recognition that waters adjacent to the Arctic archipelago are subject to Canadian sovereignty. In September 1996 Ottawa hosted the inauguration of the eightnation Arctic Council, established on Canada’s initiative to promote cooperation between states with Arctic territories (see article on Arctic Council). While France has been careful not to become overtly involved in the Quebec separatist issue since a controversial visit to the province by President Charles de Gaulle in 1967, a maritime controversy erupted between Ottawa and Paris following Canada’s declaration of a 200-mile economic zone in 1977. France responded by claiming a similar zone around the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which are located only a few miles off the coast of Newfoundland. Eventually, the two parties agreed to submit the dispute to binding arbitration, the outcome of which in June 1992 limited France to a 12-mile zone around the two islands, save for a 10.5-mile-wide corridor running south for 200 miles to international waters. In December 1994 the two sides concluded a ten-year agreement on allowable catch quotas in the area. On January 1, 1990, Canada became the 33rd member of the Organization of American States (OAS). It had held observer status with the hemispheric body since 1972 but had been reluctant to become a full member of a grouping perceived as being dominated by the United States. Despite its historic sensitivity over trade with the United States, Canada participated in extension of the 1988 U.S.-Canadian free trade agreement to include Mexico. Initialed on August 12, 1992, and subsequently ratified by all three parties, NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. It was the first such accord to link two industrialized powers with a developing state.

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Relations in general with the United States remained strong even when Canada’s trade and cultural ties with Cuba became a source of friction after the U.S. Congress in March 1996 passed the Helms-Burton Act, which strengthened the U.S. embargo of the island. More recently, Canada’s relations with Cuba have cooled over Havana’s human rights record. Canada’s long-standing sensitivity to cultural domination by imports of American songs, films, magazines, and other products resurfaced in 1998 as members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reached an impasse in April on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which is intended to encourage direct, cross-border investments. Canada, differing with the United States, wanted cultural industries excluded. Ottawa and Washington also were divided over whether NAFTA provisions exempt culture and therefore permit the Canadians to restrict U.S. media. From April 20 to April 22, 2001, Quebec City hosted the third “Summit of the Americas,” which was attended by the heads of state and government from 34 hemispheric countries. Approximately 30,000 protesters, most of them opposing globalization, threatened to disrupt the meeting, leading to tight security and several hundred arrests. Following the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, Ottawa concluded a number of agreements with Washington providing for increased cooperation in the areas of intelligence and security, designed, among other things, to monitor border crossings more effectively. Canada also adopted stronger domestic antiterrorism legislation. (In October 2006 the courts struck down four provisions of the law, including its definition of terrorism. In February 2007 Parliament allowed the controversial provisions for holding suspects without charges and compelling testimony to expire.) Despite these new accords, relations between Canada and the United States subsequently grew colder, if not more contentious. Facing declining public support for going to war in Iraq and considerable opposition within his Lib-

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eral Party, Prime Minister Jean Chr´etien declared in March 2003 that, in the absence of UN authorization, Canada would not participate in the invasion of Iraq. Members of the U.S. and Canadian administrations subsequently traded criticisms, including the comment by one of Chr´etien’s cabinet members referring to President George W. Bush as a “moron.” Expectations of improved relations were raised when Paul Martin became prime minister in December 2003, but tensions continued over defense and trade issues. During a visit by President Bush in November 2004, Martin’s administration continued to press for the end of the ongoing U.S. ban on Canadian beef imports because of mad cow concerns raised in 2003 and the 27 percent tariff that the Bush administration imposed on Canadian softwood lumber imports in 2001. In February 2005 Martin declared that Canada would not participate in the development of the U.S.-led missile defense program. By the end of 2004 Canada’s economic relations with China had deepened as Chinese energy companies discussed ambitious deals for petroleum development in the province of Alberta. China’s rapidly growing energy needs had already driven world petroleum prices higher and were beginning to cause increased competition over Canadian supplies, one of the largest sources of petroleum imports for the United States. In the period following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, Canada evolved a “human security” program as a central component of its foreign policy, covering five areas: protecting civilians, peace support operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety. Specific projects have ranged from a concerted effort to promote acceptance of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), to peacekeeping duties in Afghanistan, to reform and reconstruction efforts in Haiti after the departure of Jean Bertrand Aristide in February 2004. Following the installation of the Harper administration in February 2006, expectations rose for a closer Canadian relationship with the United States. Among other things, Harper, widely

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perceived as a strong supporter of U.S. President Bush, promised a legislative vote on whether Canada would become involved in the proposed NATO missile defense plan. Concurrently, Harper announced that an agreement had been reached on softwood lumber trade, and in May the House of Commons voted to extend Canada’s mission in Afghanistan until 2009. Harper also aligned himself with U.S. foreign policy by defending Israel during its conflict in the summer with Hezbollah in Lebanon. On the other hand, Harper subsequently announced that Canada would not participate in the U.S. missile defense program.

Current Issues One perplexing and difficult current issue for Canada remains national unity, in particular the will of a provincial population versus the constitutional integrity of Canada. Few countries in the world allow unfettered departure of a part of national territory, and none without the approval of some central authority. The continuing question of Quebec sovereignty, which never disappears from the headlines, took an unexpected turn in January 2001 with a surprise resignation announcement by Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard, who acknowledged his failure to make progress on the issue. According to reports, Bouchard had also grown weary of fending off party militants, who insisted, for example, on instituting stiffer French-language laws and scheduling another independence referendum. His successor, Bernard LANDRY, although a somewhat more ardent champion of separation, could hardly ignore a May 2000 opinion poll that registered only 43 percent support for independence among Quebec’s residents. (In November 2006 Prime Minister Harper, facing a proposed motion from the BQ that would have declared Quebec as a “nation,” offered his own motion recognizing Quebec as a “nation within a united Canada.” Harper’s motion, which had prompted the resignation of Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs Michael Chong [who opposed Harper’s language and described Canada as “undivided” and “one nation”], was approved by

the House of Commons on November 27 by a 266– 16 vote.) In recent years Canada has taken historic steps to grant self-government to native peoples. April 1, 1999, marked the division of the Northwest Territory and the founding of Nunavut, a territory considerably bigger than Alaska (or western Europe) that is now governed to a large extent by the Inuit. Earlier, in November 1998, after 20 years of negotiations, the Nisga’a Indians ratified a treaty giving them 745 square miles of British Columbia, the first comprehensive land settlement made by the province in the 20th century. With dozens of other Indian bands also pressing their case in the province, in April 1999 the Nisga’a agreement received the approval of the provincial assembly. In December the House of Commons passed the agreement despite opposition from the Reform Party, which argued that the precedent would endanger Canada’s constitutional integrity. Passage through the Senate followed in April 2000, with the treaty then receiving royal assent from the governor general and entering into force on May 11. It remained subject to a number of lawsuits, however, including some brought by other native bands. On March 10, 2001, the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, representing about 7,000 Indians in 12 bands, also signed a treaty agreement with federal and provincial officials. The agreement, which awaits approval by the individual bands and the federal and provincial legislatures, includes provisions on self-rule and shared control of old-growth forests and other natural resources contained in about 260 square miles of Vancouver and Meares islands. In 2000 Jean Chr´etien, 66, became the first prime minister to win three consecutive parliamentary majorities since Mackenzie King in 1945. He undoubtedly benefited from Canada’s strong economy, which enabled him to cut income and other taxes in 2000 while keeping the federal budget in surplus, thereby exploiting what had traditionally been Conservative issues. He also benefited from the Alliance’s inability to attract more Progressive Conservatives into the new party, which left the right wing split, and from divisions in Quebec over how and when to pursue greater regional autonomy.

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Chr´etien’s success was made more remarkable by the fact that, earlier in the year, he had overcome calls from within his party for him to step down in favor of a younger leader. After assuming the premiership in December 2003, Paul Martin had only a brief “honeymoon” before a financial scandal roiled the government. (A February 2004 audit accused the federal government of “blatant misuse” of about $190 million in various promotional activities.) The Liberals clearly suffered from a loss of popular support as a result of the scandal in the June 2004 balloting for the House of Commons. At the same time, most observers described the performance of the new Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) as worse than had been expected. Stephen Harper, the leader of the CPC, had pledged to increase military spending and reduce taxes, earning him criticism as a “right-winger” from the Liberals and the NDP. A December 2004 Supreme Court ruling that the government could expand marriage rights to gays and lesbians caused splits within both major parties. Meanwhile, Canada had continued toward decriminalization of marijuana use, a trend that had contributed to tension with the United States. The flow of an estimated $7 billion worth of marijuana into the United States had, among other things, prompted the governors of U.S. states adjoining Canada to call for greater U.S. federal border enforcement, also an issue in regard to illegal immigration and the potential entrance of terrorists into the United States. Prime Minister Martin announced in April 2005 that he would ask for dissolution of Parliament within a year, a timetable that was initially accepted by the NDP, on whom the Liberals were relying for support. However, the minority Liberal government remained fragile, even though the opposition parties offered no coherent policies on which they might form a majority administration. Underscoring the administration’s tenuous status, its budget legislation passed in May only because of a tiebreaking vote by the speaker. The Gormery Commission (changed with investigating the “sponsorship” scandal uncovered in 2004) issued its first report in early Novem-

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ber 2005. The commission exonerated Martin but found fault with the administration of former prime minister Chr´etien for ignoring procedural safeguards that might have prevented the abuses. Although Martin avoided being directly criticized, the report reportedly raised concerns within the NDP about the Liberals and provided Harper with a context for the no-confidence motion that brought down the government in late November. (The motion, which was supported by all members of the opposition parties, was the first successful noconfidence motion conducted outside the area of a substantive policy issue.) In their successful campaign for the January 2006 elections, the Conservatives proposed five major initiatives: a reduction in the goods and service tax, tougher criminal penalties, stricter accountability for politicians and civil servants, a child care subsidy, and a maximum waiting time for surgery. Initial aspects of the tax reduction, child care, and accountability legislation were approved by the House of Commons in June, and pilot projects regarding waiting time for surgery were subsequently launched, some in association with provincial governments. Meanwhile, various proposals for stricter criminal laws remained under consideration. However, Harper’s proposal to ban same-sex marriage was defeated in December by a vote of 175–123, and Harper announced he would not revisit the issue. Controversy continued in the second half of 2006 regarding environmental issues, as the Harper administration declared the goals and timetables in the global Kyoto Protocol to be unrealistic. The government prepared an alternative plan, which was broadly derided at the Group of Eight (G8) meeting in Germany in 2007. Meanwhile, in April 2007 Environmental Minister John BAIRD announced that Canada would not be able to meet its Kyoto goals until at least 13 years after the proposed target date.

Political Parties Canada’s traditional two-party system diversified in the 1930s, and the process gathered pace in

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the 1980s. The Liberals were the only party to win more than 20 percent of the national vote in 1993 (when the Quebec Bloc [QB] first appeared and the political right split between the Reform Party and Progressive Conservatives) and again in 1997 (when the split on the right was maintained and the QB retained influence). However, in the 2000 election the right began to coalesce once again, and the 2004 and 2006 elections featured the return of a two-party dominant national political scene, centered on the Liberals and Conservatives. In the 2006 balloting for the House of Commons, the Conservatives won a nationwide plurality of votes and seats (124), winning all 28 seats in Alberta, 12 of 14 in Saskatchewan, and majorities in the other two western provinces—British Columbia and Manitoba. The Liberals won seat majorities in five of six eastern provinces, the exception being Quebec, where the QB won 51 of 75 seats. Overall, the second-place Liberals won 103 seats in 2006, similar to the 99 seats won by the second-place Conservatives in 2004. The second-place totals in 2004 and 2006 were considerably higher than the second place totals of 1993 (54, by the QB, which therefore formed the Official Opposition), 1997 (60, by the Reform Party), and 2000 (66, by the Alliance). Provincial elections since 2001 have witnessed considerable turnover of the governing parties. The Liberals won British Columbia from the NDP in 2001 and held their majority there in 2005. Moreover, the Liberals won the critical province of Ontario from the PCP in 2003 and also took control of New Brunswick in 2006 and Prince Edward Island in 2007. On the other hand, the PCP won Newfoundland and Labrador from the Liberals in 2003. In Quebec the Liberal Party of Quebec took over from the Parti Qu´eb´ecois in 2003. (In 2007 the Liberals retained control of Quebec, but only through a minority government, as the ADQ surged into status as official opposition in the province.) The PCP fell from majority to minority control in Nova Scotia in 2003, a position the PCP maintained in 2006. However, the PCP continued its majority control in Alberta in 2004. The NDP won slim majority control in Saskatchewan in 2003, ending the existing

NDP–Liberal coalition formed in 1999. In 2007 the NDP maintained its sizable majority in Manitoba. The resurgent Yukon Party pushed the Liberals out of power in the Yukon Territory in 2002 and retained its majority status in 2006. Meanwhile, the Assembly of the Northwest Territories consists entirely of independent members (candidates do not contest elections under party labels), and there are no political parties in Nunavut.

Governing Party Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). The CPC is the result of the 2003 merger of Canada’s two leading conservative parties—the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance (Canadian Alliance) and the Progressive Conservative Party (PCP). The Canadian Alliance traced its origins to a September 1998 convention called to discuss formation of a “national, broad-based, democratic conservative movement.” The effort was spearheaded by Preston Manning and other leaders of the Reform Party of Canada, who hoped to convince other conservatives, particularly those in the PCP, to participate. Following up on the initial meeting, a United Alternative Convention convened in February 1999, with a number of United Alternative Action Committees then being established in the fall to draft a platform and a constitution for the new organization. A second convention was held in January 2000, at which time the organization’s name and founding documents were approved. Party tenets include lowering and simplifying taxes; paying down the national debt; making balanced federal budgets mandatory; increasing defense spending; downsizing government; furthering free and open trade; eliminating public funding of multiculturalism; and reemphasizing the role of the provinces in setting social policy with regard to health, education, housing, and related areas. On March 27, 2000, the Canadian Alliance became the official opposition party in the House of Commons, about 92 percent of the Reform Party’s membership having voted in favor of merging into the new formation.

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A right-wing populist group, the Reform Party had been launched in Alberta in 1988 but subsequently attracted broad western support. The party strongly opposed the Charlottetown agreement in the October 1992 referendum and also opposed new federal proposals for constitutional accommodation with Quebec after the October 1995 independence referendum. It finished third in federal representation following the 1993 vote and in March 1996 sought, without notable success, to extend its power base by presenting candidates in a series of federal by-elections in the eastern provinces. In the federal election of June 1997 the party won 60 seats and thereby became the official opposition party. After formation of the Canadian Alliance, Manning was soon challenged for the leadership by Stockwell DAY, a conservative populist and Alberta’s treasurer. Day, an opponent of abortion and gay rights, secured the leadership position in second-round balloting in July 2000. In the November 2000 House of Commons election the Canadian Alliance won 25.5 percent of the national vote and 66 seats, all but 6 of them in Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan, and thereby retained its status as the official opposition. In May 2001 dissatisfaction with Day’s leadership reportedly led a number of members to leave the party. Day resigned in December in preparation for another leadership election in 2002, John REYNOLDS succeeding him on an interim basis. In balloting on March 20, 2002, economist Stephen Harper defeated Day and two minor candidates for the alliance’s leadership post. Harper won a by-election for a House of Commons seat from Calgary on May 13 (neither the Liberal Party or the PCP offered an opponent), thereby gaining access to the position of leader of the opposition. The PCP was more nationalistic in outlook and traditionally less willing to compromise with the Quebec separatists than the Liberals. It also placed greater emphasis on Canada’s British and Commonwealth attachments while actively promoting programs of social welfare and assistance to farmers. Following the replacement of Charles Joseph Clark by Brian MULRONEY as party leader in

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June 1983, the PCP climbed steadily in the polls before winning decisive control at the federal level in September 1984. Although losing 41 seats in November 1988, the PCP became the first party to win a second consecutive term since 1953 and claimed that securing representation in nine of the ten provinces was a sign of “national unity.” However, by the end of 1990 Prime Minister Mulroney’s rating in the public opinion polls had fallen to a low of 12 percent. The voters’ rejection of the Charlottetown constitutional reform agreement in October 1992 caused further problems for Mulroney, who announced on February 24, 1993, that he would not lead the PCP in the forthcoming general election. His successor, Kim CAMPBELL, served as prime minister for only 134 days before the party’s crushing defeat on October 25, only 2 seats being retained. On December 13 Campbell stepped down as party leader in favor of Jean J. CHAREST. The PCP launched a comeback by scoring a stunning victory on June 8, 1995, in provincial balloting in Ontario, Canada’s most populous province, where the party had been in opposition since 1985 (most recently to the NDP). Standing on a populist, antiwelfare ticket, new provincial PCP leader Mike HARRIS, a former golf professional and ski instructor, led the party to an overall majority of 82 seats out of 130 on a 45 percent popular vote share. Charest quit as party leader in March 1998 and was succeeded by Joe Clark, former federal prime minister, who rejected efforts by the Reform Party to bring the PCP into what became the Canadian Alliance. Meanwhile, the party continued to fare well at the provincial level. In Ontario the PCP and Harris were returned to office in June 1999 despite Liberal gains. The PCP also assumed control of the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia governments in 1999 but lost Manitoba to the NDP. Having suffered several parliamentary defections to the Liberals and the Alliance in 1999 and 2000, the PCP saw its representation in the House decline to 12 in November 2000, down from the 20 seats won in 1997. Clark announced in August 2002 that he would resign as PCP leader by mid2003, thereby setting the stage for renewed efforts

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to merge the PCP with the Canadian Alliance. In the run-up to new elections for the PCP leadership, and amid speculation of a merger with the alliance, leadership hopeful David Orchard agreed to support rival Peter Mackay on the condition that he would not pursue merger talks. Nonetheless, after winning, Mackay agreed to merge with the Canadian Alliance in October 2003 and became deputy leader of the CPC. The CPC represented an attempt to “unite the Right” around a Conservative platform that advocated strong national defense, personal tax reduction, retirement savings accounts, support for ranchers in western provinces, and opposition to gun registration and gay marriage. Other less traditionally Conservative policy positions included support for a massive infusion of funds in the national health care system and a pledge not to legislate on abortion. Stephen Harper resigned his Canadian Alliance post as Leader of the Opposition on January 12, 2004, to run for leader of the CPC. On March 20, 2004, he easily defeated two other leadership candidates on the first ballot. In the June 2004 election, the CPC gained 27 seats for a total of 99 seats, but its 29.6 percent of the vote was 8.1 percentage points below the combined totals received by the Canadian Alliance and the PCP in November 2000. Nevertheless, the CPC’s second-place finish gave it the position of official opposition in the House of Commons. In the January 2006 balloting the CPC won 36.3 percent of the vote and 124 of 308 seats. The CPC subsequently formed a minority government under the premiership of Harper, who was sworn in on February 6. The CPC’s success was attributed to Harper’s ability to quell doubts about his earlier strongly conservative positions on social matters, a moderated perception of the party in general, and the late December 2005 official announcement of alleged financial misdeeds by the Liberals’ finance ministry. Leaders: Stephen HARPER (Prime Minister), Peter VAN LOAN (Leader of the Government in the House), Marjorie LEBRETON (Leader of the Government in the Senate), Michael D. DONISON (Executive Director).

Opposition Parties Liberal Party of Canada. Historically dedicated to free trade and gradual social reform, the Liberal Party is sometimes regarded as the “natural party of Canada” because it has formed the government for most of the past century. Recently, it has promoted federal-provincial cooperation and an international outlook favoring an effective United Nations, cooperation with the United States and Western Europe, and a substantial foreign economic aid program. The Liberal Party was in power in all but two years from 1963 to 1984, mostly under the premiership of Pierre TRUDEAU. Shortly after Trudeau retired in June 1984, the new Liberal leader and prime minister, John TURNER, called a September election that produced the Liberals’ worst defeat in history, as they won just 28 percent of the vote and 40 seats. Subsequent battling over his ability to return the party to power forced Turner to fend off three ouster attempts. Despite the turmoil, Turner was credited with leading an effective albeit losing campaign in November 1988 that yielded a doubling of Liberal parliamentary representation. In February 1990 Turner resigned as opposition leader, with Jean Chr´etien, a former Trudeau aide, being elected his successor on June 23 and steering the party to victory in October 1993. The Liberals won again, with a smaller majority of 155 seats (22 less than in 1993), in June 1997. In the November 2000 election the party won 40.9 percent of the vote and 172 seats, making Chr´etien the first prime minister since 1945 to win parliamentary majorities in three consecutive elections. Nevertheless the party entered a period of turmoil when increasing competition for party leadership from Finance Minister Paul Martin caused Chr´etien to sack him from the cabinet in June 2002. Martin’s dismissal apparently involved his perceived unofficial campaign to succeed Chr´etien, the prime minister having directed that no campaigning or fund-raising be conducted until a party convention scheduled for February 2003. In August 2002 Chr´etien announced that he would not seek another term as prime minister, and a party convention in November 2003

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overwhelmingly elected Martin as the new party leader. Chr´etien then moved his retirement (scheduled for February 2004) up to December 12, 2003, on which date he was succeeded by Martin as prime minister. Martin led the party in the June 28, 2004, election when it lost its majority status but won a plurality of votes and seats. It subsequently formed a minority government. In May 2005 the Liberals barely survived a budget battle that could have turned into a vote of no confidence only to lose a similar vote six months later. The January 2006 election saw the Liberals’ vote fall by 6.5 points, to 30.2 percent, and its seats reduced to 103. Following the defeat, Martin resigned as leader on February 1. Bill Graham replaced him as interim leader of the party and leader of the opposition. Michael Ignatieff, a well-known academic who had lived in either the United Kingdom or the United States for several decades until 2005, was considered the early favorite among eight candidates in December 2006 balloting for the party leader’s post. Although he led the first two ballots, Ignatieff lost the fourth and final ballot to St´ephane Dion, who had received the support of Gerard KENNEDY (the third-place finisher in the second ballot). Leaders: St´ephane DION (Leader of the Opposition), Michael IGNATIEFF (Deputy Leader), Ralph GOODALE (House Leader), Lucienne ROBILLARD (Deputy House Leader), Karen REDMAN (Whip), Marcel PROULX (Deputy Whip), C´eline HERVIEUX-PAYETTE (Leader of the Opposition in the Senate), Jamie CARROLL (National Director). Quebec Bloc (Bloc Qu´eb´ecois—BQ). The BQ is a francophone grouping organized by former Liberal environment minister Lucien BOUCHARD and six defectors from other parties after the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord in mid-1990. Although presenting candidates only in Quebec Province, it became the secondranked federal party in October 1993, Bouchard thereby becoming leader of the opposition. Operating as the Ottawa representative of Quebec separatism, the BQ backed the provincial Quebec Party

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(PQ, below) in its declared aim of independence for Quebec following the September 1994 balloting, subject to the creation of a two-state institutional framework covering political and economic relations. Bouchard’s popular standing increased by late 1994 as he led the separatist movement in the national capital. A year later, after the failure of the sovereignty referendum in 1995 and the subsequent resignation of Quebec’s Premier Jacques Parizeau, Bouchard left federal politics to become premier of Quebec and leader of the PQ. The BQ was the third-ranked party, with 44 seats, after the 1997 federal election and retained that position in November 2000 despite dropping to 38 seats in the House of Commons, based on a provincial vote share of 39.9 percent. In the 2004 elections the BQ retained its third-place ranking, but it increased its seat total to 54 in the House of Commons. In 2006 its seat total fell slightly, to 51, again making it the third-largest parliamentary party. Leaders: Gilles DUCEPPE (Leader), Michel GUIMOND (Leader in the House), Monique GUAY (Deputy Leader in the House), Michel GUIMOND (Whip), Pauline PICARD (Deputy Whip), Louis PLAMONDON (Caucus Leader). New Democratic Party (NDP). A democratic socialist grouping founded in 1961 by merger of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and the Canadian Labour Congress, the NDP favors domestic control of resources, a planned economy, broadened social benefits, and an internationalist foreign policy. Traditionally strong in the midwest prairie provinces, the NDP long played the role of third party in relation to the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives, its lower house representation rising to 43 in the election of November 1988. Its highly respected leader, John Edward BROADBENT, retired in 1989 and was succeeded by Audrey McLAUGHLIN (the first woman to lead a significant North American party). In September 1990 the party won a spectacular victory by defeating the incumbent Liberal administration of Ontario. It scored equally impressive victories in October 1991 by ousting a Social Credit administration in British Columbia

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and the Conservative government in Saskatchewan (an NDP stronghold), although in October 1992 it lost control of Yukon Territory. Its momentum was more decisively reversed a year later when its representation in the Commons plunged from 43 members to 9. In September 1995 McLaughlin was succeeded as NDP federal leader by Alexa McDonough. In the 1997 federal election the NDP recovered somewhat, winning 21 seats, but its total fell again, to 13, in November 2000, when it captured only 8.5 percent of the national vote. McDonough announced in June 2002 that she would retire from her NDP leadership post at the convention scheduled for late in the year. In the June 2004 federal election, the NDP recovered somewhat by securing 19 seats in the House of Commons under the leadership of Jack Layton. In January 2006 the party rebounded further, having its best results since 1988, winning 17.5 percent of the vote and 29 seats. Leaders: Jack LAYTON (Federal Leader), Bill BLAIKIE (Deputy Leader), Libby DAVIES (House Leader), Yvon GODIN (Whip), Judy ´ WASYLYCIA-LEIS (Caucus Chair), Eric ´ HEBERT-DALY (Federal Secretary).

Other Parties Other parties participating unsuccessfully in the January 2006 election included the Animal Alliance Environment Voters Party (AAEV), which, led by Liz WHITE, presented one candidate in a Toronto constituency (72 total votes) and elsewhere often promoted NDP candidates; the Canadian Action Party, which, led by Constance FOGAL, took 0.04 percent of the 2006 vote; the Christian Heritage Party of Canada, led by Ronald O. Gray (0.19 percent); the Communist Party of Canada, which dates from 1921 and is led by Miguel FIGUEROA (0.02 percent); the First Peoples National Party (FPNP), which, under interim leader Barbara WARDLAW, advocates aboriginal rights (0.01 percent); the Green Party of Canada, led by Elizabeth MAY (4.49 percent); the Libertarian Party of Canada, led by Jean-Serge BRISSON (0.02 percent); the Marijuana Party,

led by Blair T. LONGLEY (0.06 percent); the Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada, led by Sandra SMITH (0.06 percent); the Progressive Canadian Party (PC), led by Tracy PARSONS (0.10 percent); and the Western Block Party (WBP), led by Douglas H. CHRISTIE, who also heads the separatist organization Western Canada Concept Party (0.01 percent). An eligible party not participating in the 2006 election was the People’s Political Power Party of Canada, led by Roger Poisson. The Natural Law Party, led by Ashley Deans, voluntarily deregistered as a federal party in 2004. Perhaps of greatest historical significance is the Social Credit Party (Socred), which controlled Alberta from its founding in 1935 until 1971 and which governed British Columbia from 1975 until 1991. It has not been represented at the federal level since 1980.

Regional Parties Quebec Party (Parti Qu´eb´ecois—PQ). The PQ was founded in 1968 by the journalist Ren´e LEVESQUE. Running on a platform of French separatism, it won control of the provincial assembly from the Liberals in the election of November 1976, L´evesque becoming premier. In a referendum held in May 1980, however, it failed to obtain a mandate to enter into “sovereignty-association” talks with the federal government. In April 1981 it increased its majority in the 122-member assembly to 80. In 1985 the party was weakened by the defection of a militant group to form the Democratic Rally for Independence (Rassemblement D´emocratique pour l’Ind´ependance—RDI). In October 1985 Pierre-Marc JOHNSON was sworn in as provincial premier in succession to L´evesque, who was in poor health and whose influence had waned because of divisiveness over the sovereignty issue. However, neither Johnson’s conciliatory posture on federalism nor an emerging conservatism on economic issues averted a crushing defeat in provincial balloting in December, when the PQ obtained only 23 seats to the Liberals’ 99.

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L´evesque died in November 1987. Ten days later, amid a resurgence of pro-independence sentiment, Johnson stepped down as party president. His successor, Jacques PARIZEAU, promised a return to the PQ’s separatist origins, and in provincial elections on September 12, 1994, the PQ won a commanding majority of 77 of the 125 legislative seats. On being inducted as premier, Parizeau pledged that a referendum on the independence question would be held in 1995. The vote on October 30 yielded a margin of less than 1 percent against separation and the resignation of Parizeau as PQ leader and Quebec premier. He was succeeded in January 1996 by Lucien Bouchard, theretofore leader of the federal BQ. The PQ won 75 seats in the provincial election of November 30, 1998, although observers attributed the victory more to the moderate Bouchard’s successes in the economic sphere than to his gradualist approach toward the sovereignty issue. At a party convention in May 2000, 91 percent of the delegates endorsed his leadership. In January 2001, however, a series of developments, including continuing pressure from adamant separatists (many of whom want more stringent French-language laws and less attention to minority rights), led Bouchard to announce his surprise resignation from party and government offices, effective upon designation of a successor. In February Quebec Finance Minister Bernard Landry assumed the party leadership, promising to reinvigorate the separatist cause upon becoming premier in early March. Despite Landry’s pledge, the PQ lost control of the provincial government to the rival Liberal Party of Quebec (Parti Lib´eral du Quebec—PLQ) in the 2003 balloting, securing only 45 of 125 seats. Landry announced in late summer 2004 that he would stay on as leader. However, after a vote on his leadership in June 2005 fell short of the endorsement he was seeking, he was replaced on an interim basis by Louise HAREL and then, in the November leadership election, by Andre BOISCLAIR. Harel stayed on as leader of the opposition in Quebec, because Boisclair did not hold an assembly seat. The PQ’s electoral fortunes declined further in the March 2007 provincial balloting, at which it

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finished third with only 36 seats on a vote share of 28.3 percent and lost its position as official opposition in the province to the ADQ (see below). (The PLQ led all parties with 48 seats to retain control of the provincial government.) Boisclair announced his resignation in May, and he was succeeded in late June by Pauline Marcis, the only announced candidate for the post. Leaders: Pauline MARCIS (Leader), Monique RICHARD (Party President), Fran¸cois REBELLO (First Vice President), Philippe-Edwin ´ BELANGER (Second Vice President), Farouk KARIM (Third Vice President).

Democratic Action of Quebec (Action D´emocratique du Qu´ebec—ADQ). The ADQ’s founding congress took place in March 1994. The party was launched by former Liberals who wanted Quebec to remain within a Canadian confederation but with substantially greater autonomy. It won 6.5 percent of the vote and one seat (taken by its leader) in the September 1994 provincial election, thereafter increasing its opinion poll support to around 15 percent. Its endorsement of the June 1995 PQ–BQ pact on postindependence economic and political links with Canada was accordingly seen as boosting the prospects of a “yes” vote in the planned referendum. By negotiating both sovereignty and “association” (with Canada) as part of the tripartite agreement among the ADQ, the PQ, and the BQ, leader Mario Dumont led the partners to accept a role for Canada in the social and economic development of an independent Quebec. In the provincial election of November 1998, the ADQ almost doubled its share of the popular vote, gaining 11.8 percent, although it still won only one seat. In the 2003 provincial elections the ADQ secured four seats on an 18.2 percent vote share, and it continued to gain strength in the 2007 provincial balloting, at which it finished second with 41 seats on a 30.8 percent vote share and became the official opposition to the PLQ’s minority provincial government. Leaders: Mario DUMONT (Leader), Gilles TAILLON (President).

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Saskatchewan Party (SP). The SP was established in August 1997 and held a leadership election in April 1998 that was won by a former Reform Party MP, Elwin Hermanson. Contesting the provincial election of September 1999 on a platform that called for lower taxes, better health care, and improved highways, the SP finished a surprising second, capturing 26 of the 58 seats in the Legislative Assembly. In the November 2003 provincial balloting the SP improved to 28 seats on a 39 percent vote share. Leaders: Brad WALL (Leader of the Official Opposition and Party Leader), Michelle HUNTER (President). Yukon Party (YP). A newly formed group, the YP won a plurality in Yukon territorial elections on October 19, 1992, thus ousting the NDP from the territorial government. Holding 7 of the 17 seats, it subsequently formed a minority administration under John OSTASHEK. In the 1996 election the party retreated to 3 seats as the NDP surged, while in April 2000 the YP captured only 1 seat in the territorial legislature as the Liberal Party won control. When early elections were called in 2002, voters reportedly angry at having to vote after only two years gave the YP an overwhelming victory with 12 of the 18 legislative seats. Resignations reduced the YP majority to 10 seats as of May 2006. The YP retained its 10-seat majority in the October 2006 territorial elections, followed by the Yukon Liberal Party (5 seats) and the Yukon New Democratic Party (3 seats). Leaders: Denis FENTIE (Premier and Party Leader), Dan MACDONALD (President). Dozens of additional provincial parties exist— more than 30 are officially registered in British Columbia, for example, counting regional branches of national parties—but none currently holds seats in any provincial or territorial legislature.

Legislature Influenced by British precedent (although without its own peerage), Canada’s bicameral

Parliament consists of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Commons. Senate. The upper house consists of individuals appointed to serve until 75 years of age by the governor general and selected, on the advice of the prime minister, along party and geographic lines. Its current and normal size is 105 senators, although under a controversial constitutional provision successfully invoked for the first time by Prime Minister Mulroney in 1990, it can, with the queen’s assent, be increased to no more than 112. Senate reforms remain under consideration. Among other things, Prime Minister Harper has promised to recommend the appointment of senators who have been chosen by unofficial popular referendums in the provinces. In the first action in that regard, Harper in 2007 successfully recommended the appointment of an Albertan who had won a plurality of votes in an election in Alberta in 2004 and had since then been known as a “senator in waiting.” In a September 2007 speech Harper argued that the Senate must be reformed or “vanish.” As of July 1, 2007, the distribution of seats was as follows: the Liberal Party of Canada, 61; the Conservative Party of Canada, 24; the Progressive Conservative Party, 3; the “Independent New Democratic Party,” 1 (although this member claims affiliation with the New Democratic Party [NDP], the NDP does not recognize appointments to the Senate); independents, 4; vacant, 12. Speaker: No¨el KINSELLA. House of Commons. The lower house currently consists of 308 members elected for five-year terms (subject to dissolution) by universal suffrage on the basis of direct representation. In the election on January 23, 2006, the Conservative Party of Canada won 124 seats; the Liberal Party of Canada, 103; the Quebec Bloc, 51; the New Democratic Party, 29; and independents, 1. Speaker: Peter Andrew Stewart MILLIKEN. All of the above are members of the Conservative Party of Canada.

CANADA

Cabinet As of September 1, 2007 Prime Minister

Stephen Harper

Ministers Agriculture and Agri-Food Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency Canadian Heritage and Status of Women Canadian Wheat Board Citizenship and Immigration Democratic Reform Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec Environment Federal Economic Development Initiative for Northern Ontario Finance Fisheries and Oceans Foreign Affairs Health Human Resources and Social Development Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for M´etis and Non-Status Indians Industry Intergovernmental Affairs International Cooperation International Trade Justice and Attorney General La Francophonie and Official Languages Labor National Defense National Revenue Natural Resources Pacific Gateway and the Vancouver-Whistler Olympics Public Safety Public Works and Government Services Transport, Infrastructure, and Communities Veterans Affairs Western Economic Diversification Government Leader in the House Government Leader in the Senate President, Queen’s Privy Council for Canada President, Treasury Board [f] = female Note: All of the above are members of the Conservative Party of Canada.

Gary Ritz Peter Gordon MacKay Jos´ee Verner [f] Gary Ritz Diane Finley [f] Peter Van Loan Jean-Pierre Blackburn John Baird Tony Clement James Michael Flaherty Loyola Hearn Maxime Bernier Tony Clement Monte Solberg Charles Strahl Jim Prentice Rona Ambrose Beverley Oda [f] David Emerson Robert Douglas Nicholson Jos´ee Verner [f] Jean-Pierre Blackburn Peter Gordon McKay Gordon O’Connor Gary Lunn David Emerson Stockwell Day Michael Fortier Lawrence Cannon Gregory Francis Thompson Rona Ambrose [f] Peter Van Loan Marjory LeBreton [f] Rona Ambrose [f] Vic Toews

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Communications News media are free from censorship or other direct government control.

Press Until the start of The National Post in October 1998, there were no national press organs; of the roughly 1,200 newspapers, about 100 are dailies, most of them owned by ten publishing chains. The following are English-language dailies, unless otherwise noted: Toronto Star (Toronto, 441,000 daily, 661,000 Saturday); Globe and Mail (Toronto, 314,000 morning, 395,000 Saturday); Le Journal de Montr´eal (Montreal, 267,000 morning, 325,000 Sunday), in French; National Post (Toronto, 247,000 morning, 270,000 Saturday); Toronto Sun (Toronto, 208,000 morning, 369,000 Sunday); La Presse (Montreal, 190,000 morning, 278,000 Saturday), in French; Vancouver Sun (Vancouver, 180,000 morning, 238,000 Saturday); The Province (Vancouver, 160,000 morning, 196,000 Sunday); The Gazette (Montreal, 144,000 morning, 168,000 Saturday), the oldest Canadian newspaper, founded 1788; Ottawa Citizen (Ottawa, 137,000 morning, 172,000 Saturday); Edmonton Journal (Edmonton, 132,000 morning and Sunday); Winnipeg Free Press (Winnipeg, 119,000 evening, 169,000 Saturday); Calgary Herald (Calgary, 114,000 morning, 126,000 Sunday); The Spectator (Hamilton, 106,000 morning, 123,000 Saturday); London Free Press (London, 92,000 morning, 113,000 Saturday); Financial Post (Toronto, 90,000 morning); Le Soleil (Quebec, 83,000 morning, 117,000 Sunday), in French; Windsor Star (Windsor, 75,000 morning, 85,000 Saturday), Edmonton Sun (Edmonton, 71,000 morning, 99,000 Sunday).

News Agencies In January 1985 the Canadian Press, a cooperative of more than 100 daily newspapers, became Canada’s only wire service after buying out its only competitor, United Press Canada. Numerous foreign agencies maintain offices in the leading cities.

Broadcasting and Computing Radio and television broadcasting is supervised by the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), which was formed by the 1968 Broadcasting Act. The publicly owned Canadian Broadcasting Corporation/Soci´et´e Radio Canada (CBC/SRC) provides domestic radio and television service in English, French, D´en´e, and Inuktitut. Most major television stations not associated with the CBC are affiliated with the CTV Television Network, Ltd., although there are several other smaller services, some emphasizing Frenchlanguage and/or educational programming. As of 2005 there were approximately 679 Internet users and 698 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 525 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Michael WILSON U.S. Ambassador to Canada: David Horton WILKINS Permanent Representative to the UN: John McNEE IGO Memberships (Non-UN): AC, ADB, AfDB, APEC, BIS, CDB, CWTH, EBRD, G-10, G-7/G-8, IADB, IEA, Interpol, IOM, NATO, OAS, OECD, OIF, OSCE, PCA, WCO, WTO

CHILE REPUBLIC

OF

CHILE

Rep u´ blica de Chile

The Country

PERU

BOLIVIA BRAZIL

PA RA

Antofagasta

Y UA G

Occupying a narrow strip along about 2,700 miles of South America’s west coast, the Chilean national territory also includes Easter Island, the Juan Fern´andez Islands, and other smaller Pacific territories. The population is predominantly mestizo (mixed Spanish and Indian) but also includes German, Italian, and other foreign groups. Roman Catholicism, which was disestablished in 1925, is the religion of 85 percent of the people. Women constitute about 33 percent of the paid labor force, a majority in domestic service with the rest concentrated in agriculture, education, and health care. Save during the Allende regime of 1970–1973, when women were prominent both in government and the opposition, female political representation was minimal until 1999, when women were awarded nearly one-third of ministerial appointments. Chile is the world’s leading copper producer, the commodity accounting for more than two-fifths of export earnings, although reserves are expected to be exhausted within 20 years. Other commercially mined minerals and products include gold, silver, coal, and iron. In addition, there are extensive nitrate deposits in the north and some oil reserves in the south. Since World War II, the country has suffered from lagging agricultural production, with a reliance on food imports contributing to record balance-of-payment deficits in the early 1980s. From 1985 to 1997 the economy grew at an average rate of 6.4 percent a year, with deceleration thereafter to –1.1 percent in 1999 before a gradual rise to 6 percent in 2004 and 2005. Inflation, which had

crested at 505 percent in 1974, declined to 2.3 percent in 1999, and then nearly doubled to 4.5 percent in 2000 before falling again to an average of 2.3 percent from 2001 to 2005. According to government sources, inflation rose again to 7.8 percent in 2007, prompting a sharp increase in produce prices. Annual GDP growth of 4.2 percent was recorded in 2006, with growth of about 5.5 percent projected for 2007. As unemployment reached nearly 8 percent, the government in 2007 announced tax cuts and other stimulus measures designed to promote small- and medium-sized businesses.

CHILE PA C IF IC OCEAN

Viña del Mar Valparaíso

Santiago Puente Alto

URUGUAY

Concepción

AT L A N T IC OCEAN

Falkland Is.

(UNITED KINGDOM)

0 0

300 Mi 300 Km

Punta Arenas

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CHILE

Government and Politics Political Background After winning its independence from Spain from 1810 to 1818 under the leadership of Bernardo O’HIGGINS, Chile experienced a period of alternating centralized and federal constitutions. The political struggles between conservative and liberal elements culminated in the civil war of 1829–1830, the conservatives emerging victorious. Conflicts with Peru and Bolivia from 1836 to 1839 and 1879 to 1884 (the War of the Pacific) resulted in territorial expansion at the expense of both. Liberal elements prevailed in the presidential balloting following World War I. The election of Arturo ALESSANDRI Palma in 1920 was a victory for the middle classes, but the reforms he advocated were never implemented because of parliamentary intransigence. Left-right antagonism after World War II occasioned widespread fears for the future of the democratic regime, but the election in 1964 of Eduardo FREI Montalva initially appeared to open the way to fundamental economic and social reforms. The failure of the Frei regime to accomplish these goals led to the election of Salvador ALLENDE Gossens in 1970, Chile thus becoming the first republic in North or South America to choose an avowedly Marxist president by constitutional means. Allende immediately began to implement his openly revolutionary “Popular Unity” program, which included the nationalization of Chile’s principal foreign-owned enterprises, a far-reaching redistribution of social benefits, and the pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. Despite the very real benefits that began to accrue to the lower classes as a result of these and other policies, Allende gradually alienated the middle class, a sizable portion of the legislature, the judiciary, and finally the military. He died (subsequent evidence indicating suicide) during a right-wing coup on September 11, 1973, which resulted initially in rule by a four-man junta. On June 26, 1974, Maj. Gen. Augusto PINOCHET Ugarte was designated head of state, the other junta members assuming subordinate roles.

Proclaimed president on December 17, 1974, Pinochet governed on the basis of unwavering army support, despite widespread domestic and foreign criticism centering on human rights abuses, including the “disappearance,” arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and exiling of opponents. Citing the need for harsh measures to combat communism, the Pinochet regime typically operated under either a state of siege or a somewhat less restrictive state of emergency. In a national referendum on January 4, 1978, Chileans were reported, by a 3-to-1 majority, to have endorsed the policies of the Pinochet government. However, the significance of the poll was lessened by the inability of opposition groups to mount an effective antireferendum campaign. On September 11, 1980, the electorate, by a 2to-1 margin, approved a new constitution designed over a nine-year period that commenced March 11, 1981, to serve as the framework for “slow and gradual evolution” toward a democratic order. In a plebiscite of October 5, 1988, 54.7 percent of the participants rejected a further eight-year term for General Pinochet. As a result, he continued in office only until March 11, 1990, when Patricio AYLWIN Az´ocar, a Christian Democrat who had led a Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertati´on de los Partidos por la Democracia—CPD) to a 53.8 percent vote share in presidential balloting on December 14, 1989, was sworn in as his successor. In the general election of December 11, 1993, Eduardo FREI Ruiz-Tagle (Frei Montalva’s son) secured a remarkable 58 percent majority in a field of seven presidential contenders. The CPD was equally successful, retaining its majorities of elected senate and chamber members. However, the coalition failed to gain control of the upper house because of unelected senators named to eight-year terms by the Pinochet administration in 1989. The legislative balance was essentially unchanged after the election of December 11, 1997, with rightist forces continuing to control the senate and the chamber limited to passage of a nonbinding motion “rejecting and repudiating” Pinochet’s scheduled congressional seating, which, preferring to remain as army commander, he subsequently

CHILE

Political Status: Independent republic since 1818; present constitution approved September 11, 1980 (with effect from March 11, 1981), partially superseding military regime instituted in 1973; fully effective as of March 11, 1990. Area: 292,256 sq. mi. (756,945 sq. km.). Population: 15,116,435 (2002C); 16,318,000 (2006E). The 2002 figure lacks an adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): SANTIAGO (4,771,000), Puente Alto (602,000), Antofagasta (306,000), Vi˜na del Mar (288,000), Valpara´ıso (260,000), Concepci´on (215,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (market rate November 2, 2007: 497.95 pesos = $1US). President: Michelle BACHELET (Socialist Party of Chile); elected in runoff balloting on January 15, 2006, and inaugurated on March 11 for a four-year term, succeeding Ricardo LAGOS Escobar (Party for Democracy).

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vation (Renovaci´on Nacional—RN) as the dominant component of the opposition alliance. Except for the elimination of nonelective senators, the legislative distribution was relatively unchanged after the election of December 11, 2005. The CPD displayed marginal improvement in the Chamber of Deputies, winning 65 of 120 seats, while retention of its existing 20 seats yielded a majority in the now wholly elective Senate. In the presidential race on December 11, 2005, and runoff balloting on January 15, 2006, Michelle BACHELET of the CPD’s Socialist component outpolled her competitors but failed to win an absolute majority. In runoff balloting on January 15, however, she de˜ feated Sebasti´an PINERA Echenique of the rightwing Alliance for Chile 53.5 percent to 46.5 percent to become the country’s first elected woman president. The cabinet was reshuffled on March 27, 2007, and again on January 8, 2008.

Constitution and Government

deferred until March 1998. In a related action the Communist Party of Chile filed an unsuccessful suit in the Santiago Court of Appeals attempting to block Pinochet’s move to the Senate for having engaged in “genocide, kidnapping, and illegal burying of bodies” during his tenure as president. In the first round of presidential balloting on December 12, 1999, CPD candidate Ricardo LAGOS bested his right-wing opponent, Joaqu´ın LAV´IN Infante, by less than 1 percentage point, necessitating the first runoff in Chilean history. Despite a marginally improved victory in the second round on January 16, Lagos, a former Socialist, faced formidable opposition from a congress whose designated senators contributed to a rightist majority in the upper house. In the legislative election of December 16, 2001, the CPD retained its lower house majority by a greatly reduced margin, while the right-wing Independent Democratic Union (Union Dem´ocrata Independiente—UDI) supplanted National Reno-

The basic law drafted by the former Council of State and adopted by popular vote in September 1980 provided for a directly elected president serving a nonrenewable eight-year term, in the course of which he or she would be permitted one legislative dissolution. It also called for a bicameral National Congress encompassing a Senate of 26 elected and 9 designated members (exclusive of former presidents) and a 120-member Chamber of Deputies sitting eight and four years, respectively, subject to dissolution. In an unusual electoral requirement, political lists or coalitions must double their rivals’ votes to secure both parliamentary seats in any district. In a plebiscite on July 30, 1989, the term of the next president (but not those of his successors) was reduced to four years, and the number of directly elected senators was increased to 38; in addition, the congressional majority needed for constitutional amendment was reduced from threequarters to two-thirds, and the ban on Marxist parties was replaced by a clause calling for “true and responsible political pluralism.” By constitutional

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amendment in January 1994 Congress approved a new presidential term of six years. In November 2004 the presidential term was again reduced, to four years, with simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. The 2004 changes also eliminated life-time seats (thus ensuring that all future senators would be popularly elected) and restored the president’s authority to remove military commanders. The double-your-rival provision was retained, but failing approval in the Senate was a provision calling for the Congress to elect a presidential successor should the incumbent die or become incompetent. In 1975 the country’s 25 historic provinces were grouped into 12 regions plus the metropolitan region of Santiago, each headed by a governor (governador), and were further subdivided into 40 new provinces and more than 300 municipalities, headed by intendents (intendentes) and mayors (alcaldes), respectively.

Foreign Relations Chile has traditionally adhered to a pro-Western foreign policy, save for the Allende era, when contacts with Communist states were strengthened, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba. Concomitantly, Chilean relations with the United States cooled, primarily as a result of the nationalization of U.S. business interests. Following the 1973 coup, relations with the U.S. improved, diplomatic ties with Cuba were severed, and links with other Communist-bloc nations were curtailed. However, the assassination in Washington, D.C., on September 21, 1976, of Orlando LETELIER del Solar, a prominent government official under the Allende regime, became a festering bilateral issue. In May 1979 the Chilean Supreme Court refused a U.S. Justice Department request for the extradition of three army officers who had been charged in the case, including the former chief of the Chilean secret police, and Washington moved to curtail diplomatic, economic, and military relations with Santiago after the Court-ordered closure of investigations into possible criminal charges against the three in Chile. A Chilean court reopened the case in mid-1991, only weeks before expiration of a

statute of limitations, and indictments were subsequently handed down for two of the three men (the third having confessed his involvement after voluntarily surrendering to U.S. authorities in 1987). In January 1992 an international tribunal awarded noncontestable damages of $1.2 million to the Letelier family, plus damages of $815,000 to the family of an aide who had also been killed, while the two officers indicted in Santiago—generals Manuel CONTRERAS Sep´ulveda and Pedro ESPINOZA Bravo—were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms of seven and six years, respectively, in November 1993. In June 1994 Chile’s Supreme Court ruled that a 1978 amnesty law did not apply to the convicted Letelier killers, and on May 30, 1995, the court upheld the convictions. In March 1978 Bolivia severed diplomatic relations with Chile because of its alleged inflexibility in negotiations in regard to Bolivia’s long-sought outlet to the Pacific (see Bolivia: Foreign relations). Further inflaming tensions were two Bolivian military incursions into Chile in May 2004 and Peru’s claim in October 2005 to about 70,000 square miles of ocean controlled by Chile under treaties concluded in 1952 and 1954, which Lima insisted referenced only fishing rights. (In 2008 Peru sued Chile in the International Court of Justice over the unresolved water rights.) In 1992 Lima concluded a treaty with La Paz whereby Bolivia was accorded unrestricted access to two free zones in the Peruvian port of Ilo. A lengthy dispute with Argentina over the ownership of three islands in the Beagle Channel north of Cape Horn was technically resolved in May 1977, when a panel of international arbitrators awarded all three islands to Chile. However, the award was repudiated by Argentina, as it permitted Chile to extend its territorial limits into the Atlantic, thereby strengthening its claims to contested territory in the Antarctic. Mediation initiated by Pope John Paul II in 1981 yielded an agreement in 1984 under which Chile still received the islands but claimed only Pacific Ocean territory, conceding all Atlantic rights to Argentina. In August 1991, presidents Aylwin of Chile and Carlos Menem of Argentina reached accord on all but one of 23 other boundary disputes that had

CHILE

long plagued relations between their countries, but it was not until June 1999 that ratifications were completed on a Continental Glacier Treaty that resolved the last remaining border controversy. At the conclusion of the 1991 state visit to Argentina (the first by a Chilean president in 38 years), Aylwin and Menem also signed a number of accords dealing with investment and transportation, including access to Pacific port facilities for Argentine exporters. During the Summit of the Americas in Miami in December 1994, Chile was invited to become the fourth nation to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The action came six months after Santiago had announced that Chile intended to join Mercosur as an associate member, an agreement that was signed on June 25, 1996. Five months later, Chile responded to the effective U.S. obstruction of Chilean membership in NAFTA— the Clinton administration had failed to persuade the U.S. Congress to pursue “fast track” approval— by concluding a bilateral free-trade agreement with NAFTA member Canada, complementing an earlier commercial accord with Mexico. It was not until late 2002 that the pact with the United States was finalized. Tension with Britain arose in October 1998 over the arrest of General Pinochet at a London medical clinic on a Spanish warrant alleging “crimes of genocide and terrorism” against Spanish nationals during his presidency. On October 28 the British High Court quashed the warrant on the ground that Pinochet was entitled to sovereign immunity while serving as head of state. The decision was reversed by the House of Lords on November 25, and on December 9 Chile recalled its ambassador to London. In March 1999 a panel of law lords upheld the legality of Pinochet’s detention, although it ruled that 27 of the 30 charges filed by the Spanish prosecutor were invalid because they involved events before 1988, the year the International Convention Against Torture was implemented in the United Kingdom. After 16 months of house arrest, Pinochet was released on grounds of mental and physical infirmity, and on March 3, 2000, he returned to Santiago to face a variety of domestic charges (see Current Issues, below).

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A recent destabilizing regional factor has been the foreign policy of Venezuela’s President Hugo Ch´avez and its polarizing effect within the CPD government. In 2006, when Venezuela and Guatemala competed for a seat on the UN Security Council, Bachelet initially indicated solidarity with Ch´avez. However, her foreign minister, Christian Democrat Alejandro FOXLEY Rioseco, was very much against the Venezuelan leader. Over time, the Chilean government became less sympathetic to Ch´avez’s “Bolivarianism” and more firm in its defense of market-based, social-democratic policies, as evidenced by Bachelet’s meeting with Mexican president Felipe Calder´on in 2007. While there was sympathy within the more left-leaning parties in the CPD for Ch´avez’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, if not his policies, Chile, along with Brazil, remained uncomfortable with subordinating its foreign policy agenda to Ch´avez’s or turning Mercosur into a larger platform for Ch´avez.

Current Issues At the time of Pinochet’s return to Chile in 2000, more than 100 actions had been filed against him, most on behalf of the more than 3,000 people who had died or disappeared during his tenure. However, his health issue aside, a major hurdle to legal action was Pinochet’s senatorial immunity as an ex-president. Thus, the prosecutor investigating charges against the former dictator applied to have the privilege removed, and in May 2000, contrary to most expectations, the Chilean Court of Appeals complied. Then, in a complicated scenario, the Appeals Court suspended proceedings against Pinochet in July 2001 on the ground that he was suffering from “moderate dementia.” The decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on July 1, 2002, which appeared to void further prosecution by ruling that the dementia was irreversible, and on July 4 Pinochet resigned as senator-for-life. However, in May 2004 the Appeals Court removed Pinochet’s immunity from prosecution, and on December 13 the former dictator was indicted on charges of kidnapping and murder, an action that was upheld by the Supreme Court on January 4, 2005. Further legal proceedings culminated in a Supreme Court

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ruling on December 26 that Pinochet was mentally fit to stand trial. Michelle Bachelet’s presidential victory in January 2006 was attributed to the continued popularity of her CPD predecessor, her success in retaining the support of most of the PDC’s conservative faction, and a rightist split between runner-up Pi˜nera and former contender Joaqu´ın Lav´ın. Earlier, Lav´ın’s UDI had split with Pi˜nera’s RN by refusing to accept constitutional rights for Chile’s indigenous communities. Having campaigned on a pledge that she would govern differently than previous politicians, President Bachelet chose a cabinet equally divided between men and women, raised pensions, increased the number of state-run nurseries, and adopted other progressive policies. However, a public relations disaster erupted in April 2006 when students went on strike over an increase in bus fare. Some 600 students were arrested, and in May an estimated 500,000 protesters demonstrated in Santiago. Bachelet subsequently added $200 million to the education budget. The administration was also heavily criticized for myriad problems in its initiative to modernize the Santiago public transportation system. General Pinochet died on December 10, 2006, and his legacy became the dominant topic of discussion. Though he had always been a polarizing figure, his support among many sectors had waned since inquiries regarding torture and foreign bank accounts appeared in the past six years. Particularly galling for many was evidence that he held some $27 million in foreign accounts under different names. Throughout December, some 65 demonstrations (some in mourning, some in celebration) were held in 25 cities across the country. Nevertheless, scores of protesters, many of them students, clashed with police in the capital in April 2007, during demonstrations against an extensive overhaul of the public transportation system, criticized as inequitable and inefficient. Growing unrest over perceived social inequality resulted in more widespread and violent demonstrations by labor groups in August, despite the president’s apology in May for failing to fix the transportation problem and her pledge to rectify the situation. The

president also promised to reduce the budget surplus by spending more money on education, and in November she signed into law a consensus bill on education reform. Meanwhile, rifts in the CPD began to undermine the governing coalition’s control, as the coalition lost its majority in the lower Chamber of Deputies in 2008 for the first time since Chile’s return to democracy. After a PDC member was expelled in late 2007 for voting against the government on the transportation issue, five PDC members resigned in protest in January 2008, leaving the governing coalition with only 57 of 120 seats. President Bachelet subsequently reshuffled the cabinet on January 8, maintaining a balance among the four parties in the coalition. Observers said the cabinet reorganization was not expected to “herald major changes in government policy.” In early 2008, violence erupted in the Araucania region, where indigenous Mapuche residents had set fire several times to equipment owned by logging and agribusiness firms. The Mapuche claimed that the land being used for commercial purposes belonged to them. Clashes with police followed, killing at least one Mapuche activist. Meanwhile, a non-indigenous woman prisoner staged a 111day hunger strike on behalf of the Mapuche cause, bringing international attention to the claims of disenfranchisement by the Mapuche. The upheaval prompted President Bachelet to create a special commission for indigenous affairs. She also offered prison benefits as a concession to the activist, who then ended her hunger strike for a brief period, reportedly resuming it in early March.

Political Parties and Groups Chile’s traditional multiparty system ran the gamut from extreme right to extreme left, and parties have historically played an important role in the nation’s political life. In the wake of the 1973 coup, however, the military government, declaring party politics to be inappropriate, outlawed those groups that had supported the Allende government and forced the remainder into “indefinite recess.” In 1977, following the alleged discovery of a “subversive plot” by the Christian Democrats, Chile

CHILE

formally dissolved all of the existing parties and confiscated their assets. In the early 1980s, as opposition to the Pinochet regime crystallized, the traditional formations resurfaced, most of them, although still illegal, being tolerated by the government within unstated but generally understood limits. A number of somewhat fluctuating coalitions followed, and in March 1987 legislation was approved that permitted the reregistration of most groups, save those of the far left. A large number of parties contested the postPinochet balloting of December 11, 1989, the principal contenders on the right being the PRN and UDI (below), both of which supported the presi¨ dential candidacy of Hern´an BUCHI Buc against the centrist Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD), then a 17-member grouping that endorsed Patricio Aylwin Az´ocar (for more detailed coverage of pre-1990 alignments, see the 1992 Handbook, pp. 147–149). By 1993 the CPD had become the somewhat less inclusive formation referenced below, while the PRN and UDI had joined with the smaller UCCP in the right-wing Union for Progress of Chile (UPC), subsequently the Alliance for Chile (AC). As of 2007 the party system appeared to be moving back to its pre-Pinochet structure with a wide range of ideologies supported by political groups.

Governing Coalition Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertaci´on de los Partidos por la Democracia— CPD). The CPD had its origins in the anti-Pinochet Multipartidaria, which was formed in early 1983 and months later became the Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democr´atica—AD). In 1987 the Christian Democratic core of the AD endorsed “singleparty” opposition to the regime that would include right-centrist and moderate-leftist formations, while excluding groups advocating the use of violence. The result was the formation of the CPD, which successfully supported Aylwin Az´ocar’s bid for the presidency in 1989 and was equally successful in backing the 1993 candidacy of Frei RuizTagle.

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The Democratic Left Participation (Participaci´on Democr´atica de Izquierda— PDI), a coalition member formed in 1991 by a group of former Communist Party of Chile human rights activists, was dissolved in November 1994, after having failed to gain the required minimum vote share of 5 percent in the 1993 election. PDI leader Fanny POLLAROLLO joined the Socialist Party of Chile, while PDI secretary general Antonio LEAL joined the Party for Democracy. The CPD won 70 Chamber seats in 1993 and a similar number in 1997, fell to 62 in 2001, and recovered marginally in 2005. Leaders: Michelle BACHELET (President of the Republic), Ricardo LAGOS Escobar and Eduardo FREI Ruiz-Tagle (Former Presidents of the Republic). Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). Founded in 1957, the PDC is currently Chile’s third-strongest party, although long divided into right-, center-, and left-wing factions. It obtained 39 lower house seats in 1997, 24 in 2001, and 20 in 2005. The PDC reportedly considered leaving the CPD in late 2006 to protest apparent corruption in government ministries. In 2007 party rifts developed, and in January 2008, five PDC deputies resigned their chamber posts in protest over the party’s dismissal in December 2007 of Senator Adolfo ZALDIVAR, who had refused to support financing for the administration’s transportation initiative. Zaldivar also had clashed with other party leaders, most notably Soledad ALVEAR, who replaced him as party president. With chamber representation reduced to 57 seats following the resignations, coupled with resignations from the PPD (below), the CPD was seen as losing significant political influence. Leaders: Soledad ALVEAR (President of the Party), Sergio MICCO (First Vice President), Eduardo FREI Ruiz-Tagle (Former President of the Republic and President of the Senate), Patricio AYLWIN Az´ocar (Former President of the Republic), Andr´es ZALDIVAR Larra´ın (Former President of the Senate), Jaime MULET Mart´ınez.

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Socialist Party of Chile (Partido Socialista de Chile—PS or PSCh). Founded in 1933, the PSCh was long split into a number of factions that reunited in late 1989 under the presidency of Clodomiro ALMEYDA Medina, with Jorge Arrate MacNiven as general secretary. Subsequently, Arrate succeeded Almeyda as president, and yielded the position in November 1991 to Ricardo Nu˜nez. Almeyda died on September 25, 1997. In the run-up to the 2001 congressional poll, the PS split with the PDC in asserting that it would support Communist candidates in two constituencies; however, it subsequently reversed itself and agreed to support CPD nominees. In recent years, the party has been described as becoming more centrist. Leaders: Michelle BACHELET (President of the Republic), Camilo ESCALONA (President of the Party), Ricardo Solari SAAVEDRA (Vice President), Marcelo SCHILLING Rodriguez (Secretary General). Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia—PPD). The PPD was organized in 1987 by a group of Socialist Party dissidents under Ricardo Lagos Escobar, who was succeeded as president by Eric Schnake in mid-1990. The PPD and the PSCh formed a subpact for the June 1992 municipal poll, and both endorsed Lagos Escobar for the presidency in 1993. The PPD was rattled in 2006 by a corruption scandal involving allegations dating back to the Lagos administration. Several prominent leaders subsequently left the party, including former PPD president Jorge SCHAULSOHN, who said there was an “ideology of corruption” within the CPD. The dissidents launched a splinter centrist group, Chile First (Chile Primero), in advance of the 2009 presidential election to promote education and combat poverty (see below). Leaders: Sergio BITAR (President of the Party), Ricardo LAGOS Escobar (Former Pres´ Morales ident of the Republic), Carolina TOHA (Vice President), Pepe Auth STEWART (Secretary General).

Social Democratic Radical Party (Partido Radical Social Dem´ocrata—PRSD). The oldest of Chile’s extant parties, the Radical Party (Partido Radical—PR) was founded in 1863, but appeared, according to the Latin American Weekly Report, to be “headed for extinction” as the result of its extremely poor showing in the 1993 balloting. In an effort to revamp its image, the party adopted its present name in 1994. It increased its chamber representation from two seats to four in 1997, to six in 2001, and to seven in 2005. PRSD president Anselmo SULE Candia died on June 7, 2002. ´ Leaders: Jos´e Antonio GOMEZ (President), Luis ESCOBAR Cerda, Ernesto VELASCO Rodriguez (Secretary General).

Opposition Groups Alliance for Chile (Alianza por Chile—AC). A coalition of Chile’s leading rightist groups, the Alliance was launched before the 1997 election as the Union for Chile (Uni´on por Chile) in emulation of its 1993 predecessor, the Union for the Progress of Chile (Uni´on por el Progreso de Chile—UPC). It adopted its present name in 1999. Leader: Joaqu´ın LAV´IN Infante. National Renovation (Renovaci´on Nacional—RN). The RN, then most commonly referenced as the National Renovation Party (PRN or Parena), was formed in 1987 by merger of the Movement for National Union (Movimiento de Uni´on Nacional—MUN), led by Andr´es Allamand Zavala; the National Labor Front (Frente Nacional del Trabajo—FNT), led by Sergio Onofre Jarpa Reyes; and the UDI (see below), with whom it split over the 1988 plebiscite. Jarpa withdrew as a presidential candidate in August 1989, and the coalition subsequently joined the UDI in supporting the candidacy of Hern´an B¨uchi. The RN’s long-standing support of the military eroded in late 1992 when two of its leaders, Evelyn MATTHEI and Sebasti´an Pi˜nera, were forced to withdraw as presidential hopefuls in the wake of a wiretapping incident involving the army’s telecommunications battalion. Pi˜nera

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subsequently ran in 1993 as an independent, and in 1999 as the candidate of the alliance. Recently the RN has been perceived as separating itself from the legacy of General Pinochet and adopting a more centrist position. In 2005, Pi˜nera, one of the wealthiest men in Chile, lost his presidential bid by a narrow margin in a runoff election with Michelle Bachelet. Leaders: Carlos LARRAIN (President), ˜ Sebasti´an PINERA Echenique (1999 and 2005 presidential candidate), Andr´e ALLAMAND, ´ Cristian MONCKEBERG Brunett, Lily PEREZ (Secretary General).

ident, criticizing the approach of the leading parties as populist, ineffective, and overly encumbered by Chile’s history. Its manifesto emphasized the need to pragmatically address income inequality, access to technology, and Chile’s global competitiveness. Leader: Fernando FLORES.

Independent Democratic Union (Uni´on Dem´ocrata Independiente—UDI). The UDI joined in the formation of Parena but withdrew following the expulsion in April 1988 of its founder, Jaime GUZMAN Err´azuriz, from the coalition leadership. Previously a legal adviser to General Pinochet, Guzman organized a “UDI pour el S´ı ” campaign on Pinochet’s behalf in October 1988. He was assassinated, with the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) claiming responsibility, on April 1, 1991. The UDI won pluralities of 33 chamber and 9 senate seats in the 2005 election, making it the single party holding the most legislative seats. The conspicuous absence of the UDI’s Jaoqu´ın Lav´ın from Pinochet’s funeral in 2006, and his earlier offer to assist president Bachelet with the student strike appeared to reveal an effort by L´avin to move from the right toward the center, possibly with the goal of appealing to Christian Democrats, according to observers. Leaders: Hern´an LARRAIN (President), Andr´es CHADWICK (Vice President), Jovino NOVOA Vasquez, Joaqu´ın LAV´IN Infante (1999 and 2005 presidential candidate), Dario PAYA (Secretary General).

Communist Party of Chile (Partido Comunista de Chile—PCC or PCCh). Founded in 1922 and a participant in the Allende government of 1970–1973, the PCCh was proscribed during the Pinochet era. In January 1990 the party renounced its policy of “armed popular rebellion” and secured legal recognition the following October. Ten months later its (then) president, Volodia Teitelboim, declared that Marxism-Leninism was a “narrow formula” and that the dictatorship of the proletariat was “reductionist.” In 1991 the PCCH was the core party in formation of the Movement of the Allendist Democratic Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Democr´atica Allendista—MIDA). MIDA leader Andr´es Pascal Allende, a nephew of the former president, had led the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR), a quasi-guerrilla organization formed by PCCh elements in the 1960s, before returning secretly from exile in August 1986. MIDA secured a vote share of 6.6 percent in the June 1992 municipal balloting, with its presidential candidate securing only 4.7 percent in 1993. The PCCh ran on its own in 1997, winning four Senate seats. The party secured no congressional representation thereafter. Its former president and 1999 candidate for president of the republic, Gladys MARIN Millie, died in March 2005. Leader: Guillermo TEILLIER (President).

Other Parties Chile First (Chile Primero). Chile Primero is a splinter centrist group launched in 2007 by PPD dissidents, including Senator Fernando FLORES, in advance of the 2009 presidential election. The party planned to present its own candidate for pres-

Wallmapuwen. Wallmapuwen was launched in February 2006 to represent the indigenous Mapuche people located largely in the Araucan´ıa region of southern Chile. Leaders: Pedro Gustavo QUILAQUEO, Pedro ´ Claudio CURIHUENTRO. MARIMAN,

Groupings affiliated with the PCCh following the demise of the MIDA included the Chilean Christian Left Party (Partido Izquierda Cristiana

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CHILE

Cabinet As of February 1, 2008 President

Michelle Bachelet (PS) [f]

Ministers Agriculture Culture Defense Economy Education Energy Environment Finance Foreign Relations Health Housing and Urban Development Interior Justice Labor and Social Welfare Mining National Assets National Service for Women Planning and Cooperation Presidency Public Works Transport and Communications Secretary General of Government

Marigen Hornkohl (PDC) [f] Paulina Urrutia (ind.) [f] Jos´e Go˜ni Carrasco (PPD) Hugo Lavados (PDC) Yasna Provoste Campillay (PDC) [f] Marcelo Tokman (PPD) Ana Lya Uriate (PS) [f] Andr´es Velasco Bra˜nes (ind.) Alejandro Foxley Rioseco (PDC) Maria Soledad Barr´ıa (PS) [f] Patricia Poblete Bennett(PDC) [f] Edmundo Perez Yoma (PDC) Carlos Maldonado Curti (PRSD) Osvaldo Andrade Lara (PS) Santiago Gonzalez (PRSD) Romy Schmidt Crnosija (PPD) [f] Laura Albornoz Pollmann (PDC) [f] Paula Quintana (PS) [f] Jos´e Antonio Viera-Gallo (PS) Sergio Bitar (PPD) Ren´e Cort´azar Sanz (PDC) Francisco Vidal (PPD)

[f] = female

de Chile); the Socialist Alternative Party (Partido Alternativa Socialista); and the New Popular Alliance Party (Partido Nueva Alianza Popular). Humanist Party (Partido Humanista—PH). Formerly a member of the CPD, the PH joined with the Greens (below) in a Humanist-Green Alliance (Alianz Humanista–Verde—AHV) for the 1993 presidential campaign in support of Cr´ısti´an REITZE. It campaigned as an ally of the PCCh in 2005 but secured no congressional representation. Leaders: Efren OSORIO (President), Marilen CABRERA Olmos (Secretary General). The Greens (Los Verdes). The Greens joined their former PH partner in the AHV for the 1993

campaign. They have no current representation. The party reportedly renewed itself as the Ecology Party (Partido Ecologista) in January 2008, with environmentalist Sara Larrain as party president. The party’s stated goal was to be a “distinct alternative.” Leaders: Sara LARRAIN (President of the Party and 1999 presidential candidate), Manuel BAQUEDANO, Isabel LINCOLAO.

Legislature The bicameral National Congress (Congreso Nacional) established under the 1980 constitution encompasses a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies,

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elected for terms of eight and four years, respectively, subject to a one-time presidential right of dissolution. Senate (Senado). The upper house currently consists of 38 directly elected members, with half of the members renewed every four years. The alliance/party distribution of seats following the December 11, 2005, election was as follows: Coalition of Parties for Democracy, 20 (Socialist Party of Chile, 8; Christian Democratic Party, 7; Party for Democracy, 3; Social Democratic Radical Party, 2); Alliance for Chile, 17 (Independent Democratic Union, 9; National Renovation Party, 8); independent, 1. President: Eduardo FREI Ruiz-Tagle. Chamber of Deputies (C´amara de Diputados). The lower house consists of 120 directly elected members. In the most recent election on December 11, 2005, the Coalition of Parties for Democracy won 65 seats (Party for Democracy, 21; Christian Democratic Party, 20; Socialist Party of Chile, 15; Social Democratic Radical Party, 7; allied independents, 2); the Alliance for Chile, 54 (Independent Democratic Union, 33; National Renovation Party, 19; allied independents, 2); independent, 1. President: Patricio WALKER Pietro.

Communications Until 1973 the Chilean news media enjoyed freedom of expression and were among the most active on the South American continent. Subsequently, policies adopted by the military junta severely depleted the ranks of both press and broadcasting facilities while sharply curtailing the freedom of those that remained. Most press restrictions were lifted before the December 1989 balloting, but press offenses have not been decriminalized. According to the watchdog group Reporters Without Borders, five journalists were stoned and beaten by police and three others were arrested during a demonstration in May 2007.

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Press The following are published in Santiago: La Tercera (200,000); Las Ultimas Noticias (150,000 daily, 130,000 Sunday); El Mercurio (120,000 daily, 280,000 Sunday), world’s oldest Spanishlanguage paper (founded 1827), conservative; La Naci´on (45,000), financial; La Segunda (40,000); Qu´e Pasa? (30,000), weekly; Diario Oficial (10,000). El Siglo, a Communist Party fortnightly, claimed a clandestine circulation of 25,000 until September 4, 1989, when it resumed legal publication.

News Agencies The domestic facility is Orbe Servicios Informativos; a number of foreign bureaus, including ANSA, AP, Reuters, TASS, and UPI, maintain offices in Santiago.

Broadcasting and Computing Radio Nacional de Chile is a governmentoperated network; the owners of more than 300 private stations are members of the Asociaci´on de Radiodifusores de Chile (ARCHI). Televisi´on Nacionale de Chile has more than 150 outlets; there also are a number of private facilities. Four of the country’s universities offer noncommercial TV programming. As of 2005 there were approximately 289 Internet users and 148 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 678 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation ´ Ambassador to the U.S.: Mariano FERNANDEZ Amunategui U.S. Ambassador to Chile: Paul SIMONS Permanent Representative to the UN: Heraldo ˜ MUNOZ IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ALADI, APEC, BIS, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

COLOMBIA REPUBLIC

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COLOMBIA

Rep u´ blica de Colombia

Note: Colombian security agents entered Ecuador in pursuit of FARC rebels on March 2, 2008, killing Raul Reyes, a key FARC leader, sparking a regional crisis which threatened to turn violent as Ecuador and Venezuela curtailed diplomatic relations and mobilized troops on Colombia’s borders. While Colombia apologized for the border raid, it maintained its right to pursue individuals whom it believed undermined national security, citing the failure of neighboring governments to control rebels within their borders. The crisis abated following dialogue between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela at the Rio Grupo conference in El Salvador on March 7, during which Venezuela agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Colombia.

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Situated at the base of the Isthmus of Panama, with frontage on both the Caribbean and the Pacific, Colombia is divided geographically into three main regions defined by ranges of the Andes Mountains: a flat coastal area, a highland area, and an area of sparsely settled eastern plains drained by tributaries of the Orinoco and Amazon rivers. In terms of population, Colombia is more diverse than most other Latin American countries. About 75 percent of Colombians are of mixed blood, including both mestizos and mulattoes; ethnically pure (Spanish, Indian, Negro) groups are quite small. Spanish is the language of most people, except for isolated Indian tribes. Women constitute approximately 40 percent of the official labor force, with a substantial additional proportion engaged in unpaid agricultural labor; in the urban sector, women are concentrated in domestic service and informal trading. Overall, female participation in government is minor, although three women held cabinet posts as of mid-2007. Colombia’s economy is diverse and includes large manufacturing, agriculture, and mineral sectors, as well as sizable public and private-service

sectors. Petroleum products, chiefly fuel oil, rank second among official exports, while efforts to develop agricultural alternatives—cotton and sugar,

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COLOMBIA

Political Status: Independent Gran Colombia proclaimed 1819; separate state of New Granada established 1831; republican constitution adopted 1886; bipartisan National Front regime instituted in 1958 but substantially terminated in 1974; current constitution promulgated July 5, 1991. Area: 439,734 sq. mi. (1,138,914 sq. km.). Population: 37,664,711 (1993C); 46,844,000 (2006E). The 1993 figure includes an adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (urban areas, 2005E): ´ (formerly Bogot´a, SANTAFE´ DE BOGOTA 8,350,000), Medell´ın (3,450,000), Cali (2,700,000), Barranquilla (1,925,000), Cartagena (1,075,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (principal rate November 2, 2007: 2,017.90 pesos = $1US). ´ President: Alvaro URIBE V´elez (Independent); elected May 26, 2002, and inaugurated August 7 for a four-year term, succeeding Andr´es PASTRANA Arango (Conservative Party); reelected May 28, 2006, and inaugurated August 7, 2006, for a second four-year term. Vice President: Francisco SANTOS Calder´on (Independent); elected May 26, 2002, and inaugurated August 7 for a term concurrent with that of the president; reelected May 28, 2006, and inaugurated August 7, 2006, for a term concurrent with that of the president.

in particular—have been partially successful. Coffee, cut flowers, and bananas are the most important agricultural exports. While the 1990s ended with a contraction of the economy, the first decade of the 2000s has seen recovery and growth. GDP has grown steadily since 2001, topping 5.1 percent in 2005, and estimates range from 6.3 to 6.8 percent for 2006; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects a growth rate of 5.5 percent for 2007. Inflation, which was in the double digits at the start of the decade, slowed to 5.0 percent in 2005 and 4.5 percent in 2006 and was projected to be 4.2 percent in 2007. Unemployment, which was at 20 percent in

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2000, fell to 12 percent in 2005 but was up to 12.8 percent in 2006. Also important, but difficult to quantify in terms of the official economy, is the production and trafficking of drugs including cocaine, heroin, and (to a lesser degree) marijuana.

Government and Politics Political Background Colombia gained its independence from Spain in 1819 as part of the Republic of Gran Colombia, which also included what is now Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. In 1830 Ecuador and Venezuela separated, the remaining territory, New Granada, being designated the Granadan Confederation in 1858, the United States of Colombia under a federal constitution promulgated in 1863, and the Republic of Colombia under a unitary constitution adopted in 1886. Panamanian independence, proclaimed in 1903, was not recognized by Bogot´a until 1909. The critical 19th-century issues of centralism versus federalism and the role of the Catholic Church gave rise to the Liberal (Partido Liberal Colombiano—PL) and Conservative (Partido Conservador Colombiano—PC) parties, which remain critical, if no longer exclusive, determinants of Colombian politics. Relative calm extended from 1903 to the early 1940s, when domestic instability emerged, culminating in a decade (1948–1958) of internal violence (la Violencia) that may have taken as many as 300,000 lives. This period included a coup d’´etat in 1953 that yielded a four-year dictatorship under Gen. Gustavo ROJAS Pinilla. To avert a resumption of full-scale interparty warfare after the fall of Rojas, the two major parties agreed in the so-called Pact of Sitges, concluded in July 1957, to establish a National Front (Frente Nacional) under which they would participate equally in government until 1970. However, the front’s existence was extended to 1974 by a constitutional reform of December 1968 that provided for its gradual dismantling, beginning at the local and subsequently extending to the national level, with the partial exception of the executive

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branch (see Constitution and government, below). Thus Misael PASTRANA Borrero in 1970 was the last president to have won under the National Front rules. The 1970 elections were also noteworthy for the allegations of electoral fraud from supporters of former dictator Rojas, who ran as a dissident Conservative candidate. (The subsequent guerrilla movement known as M-19 [see Political parties, below] took its name from the date of the election— April 19.) Electoral competition for the presidency re´ sumed, in 1974, with Alfonso LOPEZ Michelsen ´ representing the Liberals and lvaro GOMEZ Hurtado representing the Conservatives. L´opez captured 56 percent of the vote, Liberals and Conservatives together securing 90 percent of the legislative seats. The presidential election of June 4, 1978, was much closer, with the Liberal candidate, Dr. Julio C´esar TURBAY Ayala, defeating his Conservative opponent, Dr. Belisario BETANCUR Cuartas, by a paper-thin margin. In view of the outcome, Turbay, adhering to a continuing vestige of the Frente Nacional, awarded 5 of 12 cabinet posts to the Conservatives, with whom a formal leadership pact (opposed by dissident factions within both parties) was concluded in May 1979. In a March 1982 legislative election the Liberals captured a majority of lower house seats; however, an intraparty dispute between orthodox and New Liberalism (Nuevo Liberalismo—NL) factions resulted in the nomination of ex-president L´opez by the former and of Dr. Luis Carlos GALN Sarmiento by the latter for the presidential balloting on May 30. As a result of the Liberal split, Betancur, who had been renominated by the Conservatives, emerged as the victor with 46.8 percent of the valid votes and was inaugurated as the new chief executive on August 7. The Liberal cleavage proved less costly in the legislative balloting of March 7, 1986, the mainstream group securing a majority in both houses. As a result, Gal´an, who had been renominated by the NL, withdrew from the presidential election of May 25, at which Virgilio BARCO Vargas decisively defeated the Conservatives’ 1974 nominee, G´omez.

Gal´an, an unswerving critic of the Medell´ın and Cali drug cartels, resurfaced in 1989 as the Liberals’ leading presidential candidate but was assassinated on August 18. His equally outspoken successor, C´esar GAVIRIA Trujillo, easily defeated G´omez (now running as a candidate of his party, the National Salvation Movement [MSN]) in the May 1990 presidential election, with the official Conservative, Rodrigo LLOREDA Caicedo running fourth behind Antonio NAVARRO Wolff, who had become the candidate of the recently legalized April 19 Movement (M-19, see below) following the assassination of Carlos PIZARRO Le´onG´omez on April 26. While M-19 secured only one seat in the legislative poll of March 11, 1990, it captured second place (only five seats behind the Liberals) at Constituent Assembly balloting on December 9, suggesting that the traditional bipartisan era might have run its course. Subsequently, after six months of debate a new constitution (see below) was adopted and the existing Congress dissolved, with quasi-legislative functions assigned to a presidential advisory commission of 18 members drawn proportionally from the parties represented in the Constituent Assembly. Meanwhile, the drug problem, increasingly involving the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombian (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla groups (see below), drained government resources. The Liberals retained control at legislative and gubernatorial balloting on October 27, 1991, winning majorities in both houses of Congress and capturing 15 of 27 governorships, while leftist parties suffered a major defeat in the legislative poll of March 13, 1994, the voters, in effect, endorsing a return to the historic dominance of Liberals and Conservatives. Subsequently, the narrow victory of the Liberal candidate, Ernesto SAMPER Pizano, in the second-round presidential balloting on June 19, accompanied by a remarkably low voter turnout of only 35 percent, was attributed to the basic similarity of the leading party programs. On December 2, 1993, the head of the Medell´ın drug cartel, Pablo ESCOBAR, who had escaped from confinement in mid-1992 after having

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surrendered to authorities a year earlier, was killed by security forces. President Gaviria immediately proclaimed the “dismemberment” of the Medell´ın group, while indicating that the drug problem would remain, pending destruction of the more sophisticated cartel in the southwestern city of Cali. The latter effort yielded significant results during the first half of 1995. In April Eli´eur RODR´IGUEZ Orejuela, the younger brother of Cali kingpins Gilberto and Miguel RODR´IGUEZ, was arrested; in June Gilberto and Henry LOAIZA Ceballos, the cocaine cartel’s “minister of war,” were apprehended, as was Miguel Rodr´ıguez in early August. However, four months earlier the ruling Liberal Party had been plunged into crisis over alleged links of nine of its legislators to the cartel. On July 27 Santiago MEDINA, the president’s 1994 campaign treasurer, was arrested on charges of having accepted contributions from the Cali drug lords. Accused by Medina of involvement in the affair was Defense Minister Fernando BOTERO Zea, who resigned on August 8 and was arrested a week later amid allegations that Samper himself was aware of the funding source. On August 16, in what some branded as an effort to divert attention from the scandal, Samper declared a “state of internal commotion,” or state of emergency, which was ruled invalid, however, by the Constitutional Court on October 18. In early 1996 public opinion, which had initially supported the president against his accusers, appeared to have turned decisively against him; nonetheless, Samper, benefiting in part from an upsurge in anti-U.S. sentiment over the drug issue, succeeded in rallying a majority of the lower house to his side in late May, thus averting a threat of impeachment. In mid-January 1997 President Samper declared a state of economic emergency, which failed judicial scrutiny a month later. Earlier, it had been reported that guerrilla strength, unlike the trend elsewhere in the region, had risen, by army estimates, to control two-fifths of the country’s municipalities. In the 1998 presidential election the Liberals were badly split between pro- and anti-Samper fac-

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tions, many of the latter supporting the PC nominee, Andr´es PASTRANA Arango, who defeated his Liberal opponent, Horacio SERPA Uribe, by half a million votes in the second-round balloting on June 21. The Liberals, however, retained decisive legislative majorities (56 percent of seats in the Senate and 60 percent in the Chamber of Representatives). Despite the introduction of an ambitious “Plan Colombia,” designed to defeat the drug traffickers with the massive infusion of $1.3 billion in U.S. aid, President Pastrana’s popularity plummeted to a low of 20 percent by September 2000. On October 29, in municipal balloting that was termed a “punishment vote” against the administration, Conservatives won only 2 of 30 gubernatorial races and an equal number of mayoralties in departmental capitals. In the presidential election of May 26, 2002, ´ independent Alvaro URIBE V´elez, with Conservative support, easily defeated the Liberals’ official candidate, Serpa Uribe. A hard-liner, Uribe V´elez benefited from his predecessor’s failed efforts at negotiating an end to the country’s 30 years of internal conflict. Earlier, on March 10, both of the traditional parties were outpolled in legislative balloting by an unprecedented aggregate of minor candidates, although most legislators declared their support for the new chief executive. Uribe’s efforts to end both rightist and leftist insurgencies (including the passage of a “justice and peace” law in 2005 establishing the conditions for demobilizing the country’s insurgents), yielded unusually high approval ratings during the ensuing three years, paving the way for a reelection bid in May 2006. In 2006 the two leading left-of-center parties announced that they would merge to form an Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democr´atico Alternativo—PDA, see under Political parties, below) to contest the legislative and presidential elections. The legislative elections on March 12, 2006, gave the Liberal Party, in opposition to President Uribe along with the PDA, a small plurality, but ultimately a majority of seats once more was won by an aggregate of parties and candidates allied with the president. In first-round presidential balloting

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on May 28, Uribe won reelection by winning 62 percent of vote (with 45 percent voter turnout), well above the 50 percent necessary to avoid a second-round runoff. Sen. Carlos Gaviria of the PDA placed second with 22 percent of the vote. Liberal candidate Horatio Serpa Uribe placed third with 11.8 percent. None of the other four candidates won more than 1 percent.

Constitution and Government The 1886 constitution, one of the world’s oldest, had been extensively revised before its replacement in 1991. The most notable amendment had been that of 1957, which instituted the Frente Nacional, under which the presidency alternated between Liberals and Conservatives, with equal numbers of offices held by members of the two parties. The parity rule also applied to the legislative and judicial branches until 1974, when a new president and all legislative bodies were elected on a nonrestrictive basis. The rule continued for local, departmental, and national executive offices until 1978, after which the president was mandated to name members of the leading nonpresidential party to administrative positions on an “equitable basis.” Most notable among the 1991 reforms were changes affecting Congress and the judiciary. The Senate was reduced from 114 seats to 102 (including 2 for indigenous communities), with senators elected nationally rather than by department. The Chamber of Representatives was reduced from 199 members to 161, each department or territory electing at least 2 representatives, with additional seats allotted on a population basis. In addition, up to 5 special seats could be assigned to minority groups or citizens living abroad. The earlier Napoleonic judicial system was supplanted by an essentially accusatory U.S. system. An office of general prosecutor (fiscal´ıa general) was established to investigate and charge offenders; in addition, a people’s defender (defensor del pueblo) must oversee the fiscal´ıa and ensure the protection of human rights, while a judicial council (consejo de judicatura) reviews the professional qualifications of the judiciary. Finally, a corte con-

stitucional interprets the constitution, leaving to the Supreme Court the sole responsibility of serving as the highest court of appeal. In October 2003 a referendum on a number of constitutional reforms sought by President Uribe (including a further reduction in the number of legislative seats) failed because the electoral turnout fell short of a mandated 25 percent. In December 2004, however, Congress gave formal approval to an amendment permitting presidential reelection, which was affirmed by the Constitutional Court in late 2005 (procedural issues had been raised). Another significant reform that came into effect in 2006 required political parties to offer only one list of candidates per office. Before 2006 parties could offer as many lists as they wanted, which created a structural advantage to the larger parties, especially the Liberal Party (see below). The new rules benefited newer parties in the 2006 legislative elections. Colombia is divided into 32 departments plus the Federal District of Santaf´e de Bogot´a. Before 1991 there were 23 departments and 9 national territories, but the 1991 constitutional reforms converted the territories into departments. Since 1991 the governors of the departments have been popularly elected. (The president had appointed the governors under the 1886 constitution.) Reform in 1988 allowed for the popular election of mayors (akin to county administrators in all but large urban areas).

Foreign Relations Apart from cooperation with the United States in attempts to limit the drug trade, Colombia’s activity on the international scene has recently centered on regional affairs. An active member of the Andean Pact, Colombia in 1976 became the first Latin American country to forgo all U.S. economic assistance. Relations with Nicaragua, already strained because of deportations of Colombian migrant workers, were further exacerbated in late 1979 by Managua’s decision to revive a series of long-standing claims to the Caribbean islands of San Andr´es and Providencia, both acquired by

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Colombia under a 1928 treaty, and the uninhabited cays of Quita Sue˜no, Roncador, Serrana, and Serranilla, which were assigned to Colombia under a 1972 agreement with the United States. In February 1980 Nicaragua formally denounced the 1928 accord as having been concluded under U.S. military occupation, while arguing that the cays were located on its continental shelf and thus constituted part of its national territory. (Honduras, which had also been a party to the dispute, recognized Colombia’s claim to the islands in an accord concluded in August 1986 but not ratified by the Colombian Congress until December 1999.) Since 1979 relations with Venezuela, the country’s northeastern neighbor, have also been strained because of a dispute involving the maritime boundary through the Gulf of Venezuela; little progress was registered in resolving the latter until February 1989, when the two parties agreed to the appointment of a Conciliation Commission chaired by former Spanish prime minister Adolfo Su´arez. Two years earlier talks had been initiated on issues involving contraband trade and the containment of guerrilla activity along their common border. The problem intensified in February 1995 as the result of a cross-border raid by guerrillas of the ELN that resulted in the death of eight Venezuelan marines. President Samper then proposed that a joint force be created to patrol the area while rejecting Venezuela’s claim to a right of “hot pursuit” of intruders. In November, following an incursion of Venezuelan troops into Colombia, the two countries announced the appointment of a bilateral commission to delineate the border more accurately as a means of preventing the recurrence of such incidents. In a subsequent flare-up, Venezuela closed the border to heavy goods shipments in May 1999 because of alleged unfair competition from Colombian truckers. More recently, Bogot´a lodged a diplomatic protest in mid-2002 over a Venezuelan plan to auction offshore oil leases in waters claimed by Colombia, while border issues continued to disrupt relations into 2005. A serious row with Venezuela erupted in late 2004 with the kidnapping in Caracas of FARC “foreign minister” Rodrigo GRANDA (a.k.a.

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Ricardo GONZALEZ), who was transported to the border and handed over to Colombian agents. In mid-January 2005, after Venezuela had threatened to break relations, Colombia admitted that it had paid bounty hunters for the abduction. Relations with Venezuela remain strained, including the withdrawal of Venezuela from the Andean Community (CAN—see separate entry) over, among other things, a free trade pact negotiated between Colombia and the United States. Relations improved in 2007 when Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez visited President Uribe in Bogot´a on August 31, 2007, with an offer to mediate negotiations with the FARC for a release of hostages (see Current issues, below). Relations with the United States have long been shaped by the drug issue. On balance, Colombian administrations have been cooperative with Washington on this subject, with the Uribe administration being perhaps the most cooperative ever. If Uribe is the high point of U.S.-Colombian relations, then the Samper administration (1994–1998) was the low point. In mid-1996 Washington announced the cancellation of Samper’s U.S. visa as the result of accusation of linkages between Samper and the Cali Cartel; four months earlier the administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton had “decertified” Colombia for insufficient antidrug efforts, an action that was repeated in February 1997, despite ongoing cooperation between the two countries’ military establishments. The United States continued to be displeased by the Colombian Congress’s final vote in November 1997 on revocation of its ban on extradition; while the change was approved, it was made nonretroactive, thus precluding the extradition of Cali cartel kingpins for trial in U.S. courts. Extraditions (the first in nearly a decade) were resumed in late 1999 as the U.S. Congress moved to approve a $1.36 billion antidrug package. Under the Uribe administration extradition of drug traffickers has resumed. On August 30, 2000, Clinton strongly endorsed President Pastrana’s commitment to coca eradication in a one-day visit to Cartagena. On November 22, 2004, President George W. Bush also visited Colombia, where he praised Uribe’s anti-insurgent efforts and indicated that he

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would ask the U.S. Congress to augment the more than $3.3 billion spent from 2000 to 2004 with additional funding to eradicate coca production. Bush returned in 2007 becoming the first U.S. president to visit Bogot´a since Ronald Reagan did so in 1982. The Bush administration signed a bilateral free trade pact with Colombia in November 2006 (the United States is Colombia’s largest trading partner), along with similar agreements with Colombia’s Andean neighbors, Peru and Panama. President Uribe in turn visited Washington, D.C., in May 2007 to lobby the U.S. Senate for ratification of the United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement and for the release of $55 million in frozen U.S. aid to Colombia. The Colombian government sought additional funding for a phase II of Plan Colombia that would focus more on economic development. Both actions were tabled by congressional leaders pending action from the Uribe government to quell internal violence and to advance investigations into the murder of Colombian trade union leaders by right-wing paramilitary forces. Colombia is currently the fifth-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid.

Current Issues Recent years have witnessed a three-cornered struggle among government, far-right paramilitary groups, and left-wing armed forces, the last two having largely abandoned ideology in a contest over control of the drug trade. Following his inauguration on August 7, 2002, President Uribe moved energetically to counter the insurgencies that had plagued his predecessors (see Political Handbook of the World 2007), albeit with somewhat greater success in right-wing, rather than left-wing, demobilization. In December 2002 the main components of the rightist paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—AUC, see Rebel and Clandestine Groups, below) agreed to demobilize within a year, although they did not begin to do so until November 2004. The process commenced after three paramilitary leaders had

been granted safe-conduct passes for a remarkable appearance before Congress to plead their “irreversible mission of peace.” However, progress in implementing complete AUC demilitarization remained elusive until 2006–2007. In his campaign against the left-wing guerrilla group FARC, Uribe launched a number of strategies, including a “humanitarian” exchange of prisoners, the pardoning of noncriminal imprisoned guerrillas, and the withholding of extradition to the United States of drug traffickers who agreed to participate in a “social reinsertion” program. Meanwhile, with abductions and murders significantly reduced, drug seizures multiplying, and the economy improving, Uribe continued to be accorded a remarkable approval rating of between 70 and 80 percent—the highest of any Latin American leader—on the strength of his justice and peace law and internal “democratic security” policies. Increasingly, however, there were concerns about the personal safely of a chief executive who had theretofore survived at least 13 assassination attempts. By early 2006 President Uribe had been cleared for a reelection bid, and exploratory disarmament talks had been launched with ELN representatives in Havana, Cuba, while France, Spain, and Switzerland had offered to broker similar talks with the FARC. However, FARC leaders were unresponsive, and the extent of AUC demobilization was unclear. Nonetheless, the March 2006 legislative elections gave the pro-Uribe parties a majority of seats in the Congress, a strong signal that Uribe would win reelection. In peaceful first-round balloting on May 28, 2006, Uribe won convincingly—the first time an incumbent Colombian president had been reelected in more than a century. Some observers attributed the win to the surging economy and Uribe’s partial success in curbing the violence and crime that has long plagued the nation. The most significant challenge at the beginning of Uribe’s second term was the political fallout from the “parapol´ıtca” situation that focused public attention on the connection of the right-wing paramilitaries to mainstream politicians. While there had been accusations in the past of collusion

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between mainstream politicians and paramilitaries, the recent public revelations from a laptop computer owned by former paramilitary leader Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (a.k.a. “Jorge 40”, leader of the Northern Bloc paramilitary group) and the public confessions of Salvatore MANCUSO G´omez (former leader of the AUC) led to dramatic evidence of electoral manipulation and intimidation in Colombian departments where the right-wing paramilitaries, with their drug trafficking and death squad activities apparent to all Colombians, have long operated freely. Mancuso’s revealing testimony, given under arrangements for leniency under the justice and peace law, brought to light the existence of a political agreement signed by AUC leaders and nearly 30 legislators in Santa Fe de Ralito in July 2001 (the “Ralito pact”). In that pact AUC leaders and politicians pledged to cooperate closely in “constructing a new Colombia” by “refounding our country and signing a new social contract” and working to “restore order.” The existence of the agreement, signed by some members of the new Congress, shed more light on the paramilitary groups’ project to extend their control into the Congress during the 2002 legislative elections, in part to make it easier to pass legislation to ban extradition of drug kingpins, thus giving them more insulation from international efforts to dismantle the Colombian nacrosyndicates. Both sources also confirmed long-held suspicions that military leaders and police were cooperating with the right-wing paramilitaries against the left-wing armed groups and leftist political enemies. By late September 2007 the scandal resulted in the supreme court launching an investigation of 113 national and departmental politicians and the arrest of more than 50 politicians, including 15 sitting members of the Congress. The most ´ high-profile arrest was that of Senator Alvaro ´ ARAUJO Castro and his father (an ex-senator) ´ ´ Alvaro ARAUJO Noguera—the brother and father respectively of the Foreign Minister Maria Con´ suelo ARAUJO, who resigned her post in March of 2007 in the wake of the scandal. Also arrested was Jorge NOGUERA, the former head of the Colombian secret police and internal security apparatus,

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who after signing the Ralito pact, was alleged to have supplied the AUC with the names of leftwing activists, including trade union leaders and human rights activists, who were later murdered by paramilitaries. A leaked U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report also implicated Gen. Mario Montoya, the commander of the Colombian army, alleging extensive collaboration between Montoya and AUC leaders in operations against FARC. In a move that international observers and domestic critics and supporters alike found puzzling, President Uribe on May 25, 2007, unilaterally offered to release hundreds of FARC prisoners (setting June 7 as the release date); his expressed goal was to facilitate the release of hostages held by FARC, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and a dozen deputies from the Valle departmental legislature. This sudden move represented a dramatic shift from Uribe’s previous strategy of pursuing a military solution to the left-wing insurgency. Some observers viewed the move as a cynical ploy to distract attention away from the parapolitical scandal, while others viewed it as intended to bolster Colombia’s human rights record in the eyes of the U.S. Congress to help secure ratification of the free trade pact. Uribe may also have been seeking either to force the FARC to engage in humanitarian exchanges, or, by refusing a reciprocal hostage release, to put FARC on the defensive, thus rendering renewed government military operations more legitimate. Uribe’s gesture also appeared to be motivated by a desire to appease the newly elected French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who stepped into the conflict to seek the release of Betancourt, a dual citizen of Colombia and France, via an exchange rather than by military force. At Sarkozy’s suggestion, Uribe included in the first release of prisoners the FARC “foreign minister” Rodrigo Granda, who had been seized by bounty hunters in Venezuela and delivered to Colombian authorities in 2004 (see Foreign relations, above). The unilateral release of several dozen FARC insurgents did not inspire reciprocity, however, as FARC spokesperson Raul Reyes tied a release of the 50– 45 “exchangeable” hostages to its long-standing

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condition for peace: the creation of a demilitarized zone (despeje) in the southwestern region of Valle department centered on the towns of Pradera and Florida. The situation became grim when 11 of the 12 Valle deputies held hostage by FARC were reported killed after an armed attack on a FARC position by an unidentified group or force on June 18. The FARC claimed the 11 were victims of crossfire during the attack; the government claimed the FARC shot the captives to prevent their escape. Public reaction to the killings was massive: nearly 1 million Colombians demonstrated across the country against the killings on July 5. In August 2007 President Uribe met with the father of a hostage held by FARC in a public event in the main square of Bogot´a, following the man’s 46-day and 500-mile walk seeking his son’s release. After the encounter, which was broadcast across Colombia, Uribe repeated his refusal to grant FARC’s demands for a demilitarized zone or the return and release of FARC leaders extradited to the United States, but he offered to create a 90-day encounter zone for a hostage release as a compromise gesture, which the FARC subsequently rejected. Meanwhile, the government moved to purge some military and top police officials in July and August 2007 after revelations that the highest military echelons had been compromised by both drug traffickers with links to right-wing paramilitaries as well as by FARC, and that the police had been illegally wiretapping suspects, prisoners, politicians, and journalists for more than two years. Soon after the military purges the government was able to seize Diego Montoya, a high-profile fugitive who headed Norte del Valle, one of the country’s largest drug syndicates, in a highly publicized military operation in September. In another surprising development in the FARC prisoner exchange situation, President Uribe accepted Venezuelan President Ch´avez’s offer in midAugust to mediate talks between the government and FARC, and Uribe even extended the invitation to include the stalled negotiations with the ELN in Cuba over a ceasefire. Ch´avez’s participation brought a new dynamic to the peace process: He was respected by the FARC and the ELN leader-

ship, and his high profile in the region put pressure on FARC to show some flexibility over the conditions for a prisoner exchange. The August 31 summit between Ch´avez and Uribe in Bogot´a ranged beyond the FARC mediation to include the possibility of Venezuela rejoining CAN. Subsequent to the summit, Uribe gave permission for a senior FARC leader to travel to Caracas to meet with Ch´avez, but Uribe declined Ch´avez’s offer in September to travel to the Colombian jungle to meet with FARC leaders in their own backyard. (See headnote.) Regional elections were scheduled for October 28, 2007; 16 political parties and more than 240 citizens’ movements had registered to field candidates for governor, deputy, and mayor across the 32 departments.

Political Parties The Liberal and Conservative parties have traditionally dominated Colombian politics and from 1958 to 1974 shared power under the National Front system, with the leading minority group remaining entitled to representation in the executive branch until adoption of the 1991 constitution. The Conservatives have been waning since the early 1990s and the Liberals, once thought to be a permanent majority party, have seen their electoral fortunes diminish in recent cycles and now are part of the opposition countering the various parties and factions that make up the “uribistas” in support of the Uribe government. The party system is currently in a state of evolution.

Government–Supportive Parties Social Party of National Unity (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional—PSUN) or, as more commonly referenced, the Party of the U (Partido de la U). PSUN is a new pro-Uribe party formed of former members of the PL and miscellaneous small parties. The party’s 2006 legislative results changed the balance of power in Congress as the PSUN candidates won 30 seats in the Chamber on a national vote share of 16.7 percent (making them the second largest voting bloc in the lower house and the

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largest bloc of votes supporting the Uribe government) and won the plurality of seats in the Senate in 2006 (20 seats and 17.5 percent of the vote), thus disrupting the usual balance of power amongst the traditional rivals, the PL and the PC. Leaders: Carlos GARC´IA Orjuela (President), Luis GUILLERMO Giraldo (Secretary General). Colombian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano—PC). A traditional party formerly based in the agrarian aristocracy, the Partido Conservador was long divided between National Front conservatives and an independent faction composed of followers of the late president Laureano G´omez. The essentials of the split continued until November 1981, when the ospina-pastranistas, led by Dr. Misael Pastrana Borrero (president, 1970–1974), concluded an ´ agreement with the alvaristas, led by Dr. Alvaro G´omez Hurtado (unsuccessful 1974 candidate) that set the stage for the 1982 upset victory of Dr. Belisario Betancur Cuartas, a party moderate who had failed in a challenge to National Front candidate Pastrana in 1970. In 1986 Dr. G´omez Hurtado was presented as the Conservative nominee but was decisively beaten by the PL’s Barco, in part because of close association with his dictatorial father, Laureano, during the period of la Violencia. For the 1990 campaign the party was again split, the official candidate, Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, being outpaced by G´omez Hurtado, who, as candidate of a dissident National Salvation Movement (Movimiento de Salvaci´on Nacional—MSN), was decisively defeated by the PL’s Gaviria Trujillo in the May balloting. (From 1987 to 1992 the party operated under the name Social Conservative Party [Partido Social Conservador—PSC], although it then reverted back to the PC rubric.) In 1994 Andr´es Pastrana Arango (running as an independent with PC endorsement) lost to the PL’s Samper Pizano by a mere 0.8 percent of the second-round vote. Before accepting the PC nomination, Pastrana Arango, a former mayor of Bogot´a, headed a dissident conservative group, the New Democratic Force (Nueva Fuerza Democr´atica—NFD), which secured eight Senate seats in 1991 (only one less than the mainline PC) but only one upper house

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seat in 1998. Pastrana defeated the PL’s Horatio Serpa Uribe in second-round presidential balloting on June 21, 1998. For the 2002 campaign a largely disoriented PC endorsed the former Lib´ eral, Alvaro Uribe, for president (after their candidate withdrew from the contest). Carlos HOLGUIN Sardi resigned as PC president following his party’s poor showing in the March legislative poll. Following the March 2006 legislative elections the PC secured 29 seats in the Chamber of Representatives with a 15.8 percent national vote share and had 18 seats in the Senate with 16 percent of the vote. Leaders: Efra´ın Jos´e CEPEDA Sarabia (President), Myriam Alicia PAREDES Aguir and Ciro RAM´IREZ Pinz´on (Vice Presidents), Benjam´ın HIGUITA Rivera (Secretary General). Radical Change (Partido Cambio Radical— CR). Founded in 1997 by a group primarily made up of dissident Liberals, the party supported Uribe in the 2002 election and in 2006 became one of several medium-sized parties to form a pro-Uribe legislative bloc. The CR’s platform emphasizes commitments to democracy, security, and economic fairness and progress for Colombians while promoting social policies that seek enhanced income and health security, land reform, transportation improvements, and support for education. The party also puts government transparency, decentralization, and greater independence for the judiciary as top priorities for public-sector reform. Its electoral strength is concentrated around Bogot´a and the departments of Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Valle, Boyac´a, and Tolima. The CR secured 20 Chamber seats and a 10.7 percent vote share in the 2006 legislative elections, which combined with its 15 seats in the Senate (13.4 percent of the vote) made the CR the fourthlargest bloc in both the upper and lower houses. Leaders: Germ´an VARGAS Lleras (President), ´ Antonio ALVAREZ Lleras (General Secretary), Federico ECHAVARR´IA Olarte (Supervisor). Citizens’ Convergence Party (Partido Convergencia Ciudadana—CC). Formed in 1997 by Luis Alberto Gil Castillo (former teacher’s union

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leader and M-19 member) and Jairo C´espedes Camacho, this leftist party’s strength lies in the Santander department, where it was founded. In the 2006 legislative elections the CC secured a 4.6 percent share of the national vote and eight seats in the lower house; the party won seven seats in the Senate with 6.3 percent of the vote. Leaders: Luis Alberto GIL Castillo (President), Miguel Jes´us ARENAS Prada (Vice President), ´ Jairo CESPEDES Camacho (Secretary General), ´ Edgar ESP´INDOLA Ni˜no. Wings–Team Colombia Movement (Movimiento Alas–Equipo Colombia—MAEC). The party formed in anticipation of the 2006 elections from the merger of Partido ALAS and the Movimiento Equipo Colombia, the later of which first contested national elections in 2002. The party’s ideological orientation follows the outlines of Christian social democracy parties elsewhere, emphasizing divinity, human rights, social unity and the sanctity of the family unit, and a mixedmarket economy with concern over fair and sustainable socioeconomic development. In the 2006 legislative elections MAEC received 4.3 percent of the national vote, securing eight seats in the Chamber of Representatives and five seats in the Senate (4.7 vote percentage), both blocs ranking MAEC seventh in the respective chambers. Leaders: Jaime ARIAS Ram´ırez (President), Luis Alfredo RAMOS Botero (Director), Javier PINILLA Palacio (Secretary General).

Opposition Parties Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano—PL). A traditional party that tends to reflect the interests of the more commercialized and industrialized sector of the electorate, the PL (not abbreviated as PLC) has endorsed moderately paced economic and social reform (and has observer status in the Socialist International). In May 1979, following the conclusion of a sevenpoint agreement between the majority (Grupo de los 90) faction headed by President Turbay Ayala and the Conservative Party leadership, a formal opposition movement, the Uni´on Liberal Popular

(ULP), was launched within the party, with the dissident Democratizaci´on Liberal faction of former president Lleras Restrepo at its center. At a party convention in September 1981, former chief executive L´opez Michelsen was designated Liberal candidate for the presidency in 1982, as a result of which his archrival, Lleras Restrepo, and another former president, Alfonso Lleras Camargo, threw their weight to an independent center´ left campaign launched by Dr. Luis Carlos GALAN Sarmiento of the then newly organized New Liberalism (Nuevo Liberalismo—NL). Running on a platform that called for abandonment of the de facto two-party system and of the constitutional provision permitting ex-presidents to seek reelection after only four years out of office, Gal´an drew enough Liberal votes from L´opez Michelsen to throw the May presidential election to the Conservative candidate, Belisario Betancur. For the 1986 campaign the mainstream leadership, including the still-influential Lleras Camargo, joined in supporting the former mayor of Bogot´a, Virgilio Barco Vargas, a political centrist, whose capture of the presidency on May 25 was preceded by a PL victory in the legislative poll of March 9. Having fared poorly in the 1986 legislative balloting, the NL reentered the parent party in mid-1988 to bolster support for President Virgilio Barco. Gal´an Sarmiento, who had emerged as the leading Liberal candidate for the presidency in 1990, was assassinated on August 18, 1989. Subsequently, at an unprecedented primary poll conducted in conjunction with legislative and municipal balloting on March 11, 1990, C´esar Gaviria Trujillo was formally selected as the new PL nominee and went on to defeat his closest competitor, Conservative dissident G´omez Hurtado, by a near two-to-one margin. In the legislative and gubernatorial elections of October 27, 1991, the Liberals retained their majorities in both houses of Congress. In April 1992 L´opez Michelsen resigned as party leader, ushering in a period of factional infighting that yielded four leadership changes in as many months. The PL’s presidential candidate in 1994, Ernesto Samper Pizano, was from the Nuevo Liberalismo,

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while his running mate was drawn from the party’s right wing. Although outpolling the Conservatives by a more than two-to-one margin in firstround balloting on March 8, 1998, the PL’s Horatio Serpa Uribe lost the presidency to the independent (and PC-endorsed) candidate Andr´es Pastrana in second-round balloting on June 21. Returning as his party’s nominee in 2002, Serpa Uribe ran ´ second to Alvaro Uribe V´elez, a former PL conservative. In 2006 Serpa was again the PL presidential nominee and came in third behind President Uribe and the PDA candidate, Carlos Gaviria D´ıaz. Serpa polled less than 12 percent in the election—easily the worst showing by a Liberal candidate in the modern era. The PL won a plurality in the legislative elections, however, with 35 seats in the Chamber of Representatives and a national vote share of 19 percent. It tied with the longtime rival PC for second-largest bloc of Senate seats at 18 seats with 15.5 percent of the votes. In the parapolitical scandals that surfaced after the elections, Juan Manuel L´opez, a Liberal senator from C´ordoba, was identified as one of the politicians who signed the pact of Railto with the AUC. After meeting with Liberal leader C´esar Gaviria, L´opez distanced himself from the party in 2007. C´esar Gaviria was reelected party director with 80 percent of the party delegate votes at a May 2007 party conference. Leaders: C´esar GAVIRIA Trujillo (Director and Former President of the Republic), Jose Noe RIOS Mu˜noz (Secretary General), Horacio SERPA Uribe (1998, 2002, and 2006 presidential candidate), ´ Ernesto SAMPER Pizano, Dr. Alfonso LOPEZ Michelsen, (Former President of the Republic), Hernando DURAN Luss´an, Miguel PINEDO. Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democr´atico Alternativo—PDA). The left-of-center PDA was launched in late 2005 by merger of the Independent Democratic Pole (Polo Democr´atico Independiente—PDI) and the Democratic Alternative (Alternativa Democr´atica—AD) and contains elements of a number of far-left parties like the Communist Party of Colombia

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(Partido Comunista de Colombia—PCC) and the Independent and Revolutionary Labor Movement (Movimiento Obrero Independente y Revolucionario—MOIR). Consisting largely of M-19 dissidents, the PDI had been formed in July 2003 by Luis Eduardo (“Lucho”) GARZON, who argued that President Uribe’s policy of “democratic security” had accorded the emphasis to the second component of the slogan to the detriment of the first and in 2004 was elected as the first leftist mayor of Bogot´a. The AD had been organized in November 2003 by a group of minor left-wing parties equally opposed to the president’s policies. The PDA won 10 Senate with 9.7 percent of the vote and eight Chamber seats in 2006 on the strength of 8.2 percent of the national vote. The PDA presidential nominee Carlos Gaviria D´ıaz placed second in the national presidential balloting. Its electoral strength primarily comes from Bogot´a and the more populous coastal and northern departments. As the parapolitics scandal reached its zenith in March and April of 2007, PDA senator (and former M-19 member, see below) Gustavo Petro launched a rheotical attack on President Uribe, attempting to tie Uribe to the paramilitaries in his activities as governor and later as president. Petro also drew attention when he criticized the PDA leadership in July for not being more openly critical of the FARC, especially in the wake of the deaths of the 11 provential deputies held hostage by FARC. Petro’s remarks drew the ire of the party’s leadership, who met to consider sanctioning him, and abstained from any public defense of his remarks. Leaders: Samuel MORENO Rojas (President), Antonio NAVARRO Wolff (General Secretary), Carlos GAVIRIA D´ıaz (2006 presidential candidate).

Other Legislative Parties Smaller parties receiving less than 3 percent of the vote for either house but nonetheless gaining legislative representation in 2006 included

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the Afro-Colombian Social Alliance (Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana—ASA), led by Josefina VILLARREAL Sanchez; the “Afrounincca” Political Movcement (Movimiento Pol´ıtico “Afrounincca”); the Democratic Colombia Party (Partido Colombia Dem´ocrata—PCD), led by Mario URIBE Escobar (a cousin of President Uribe); For the Country of Our Dreams (Por el Pais que So˜namos—PePqS), led by Enrique ˜ PENALOSA Londo˜no; the Green Party Center Option (Partido Verde Opci´on Centro—OC), led by H´ector El´ıas PINEDA Salazar; the Huila New and Liberalism (Huila Nueva y Liberalism— HNL), a regional party from Huila department; the Indigenous Authorities of Columbia Movement (Movimiento Autoridades Ind´ıgenas ˜ de Colombia—AICO), led by Yesid BRINEZ Poloche, with one seat in the Senate; the Indigenous Social Aliance (Movimiento Alianza Social Ind´ıgena—MASI), led by Marco AVIRAMA, with one seat in the Senate; the Liberal Opening (Movimiento Apertura Liberal— MAL), formed in 1993, currently led by Miguel ´ ´ Angel FLOREZ Rivera; the Mira Movement (Movimiento MIRA—MM), an evangelical Christian party led by Alexandra MORENO Piraquive; the National Movement (Movimiento Nacional— MN), led by Gustavo RODR´IGUEZ Vargas; the National Salvation Movement (Movimiento de Salvaci´on Nacional—MSN), led by Eduardo JARAMILLO Hoyos; the People’s Participation Movement (Movimiento de Participaci´on Popular—MPP), led by Gustavo CASTELLANOS Pulido; the Progressive National Movement (Movimiento Nacional Progresista—MNP), led by Guillermo RODR´IGUEZ Daza; the Regional Integration Movement (Movimiento Integraci´on Regional—MIR), led by Dorky JAY Julio; the Renovation Movement Labor Action (Movimiento Renovaci´on Acci´on Laboral—MORAL), led by Mercedes CAMPO de Pinedo; the Social Action Party (Partido Acci´on Social—PAS), led by Alfonso ANGARITA Baracaldo; the United People’s Movement (Movimiento Popular Unido—MPU), led by Alberto MACHADO Ceballos; and the Viva Colombia Movement (Movimiento Colom-

bia Viva—MCV), a Christian democracy party led by Jairo Enrique MERLANO Fern´andez.

Other Parties and Non-Rebel Groups Democratic Alliance/April 19 Movement (Alianza Democr´atica/ Movimiento 19 de Abril— AD/M-19). Initially a self-proclaimed armed branch of the National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular—Anapo) that shocked the military establishment by a daring raid on an army arsenal north of the capital in January 1979, M-19 was subsequently responsible for the two-month occupation of the Dominican Embassy in Bogot´a in early 1980 and the 27-hour seizure of the Palace of Justice at the capital in November 1985, during which more than 100 people were killed. In 1981 it appeared to have split into two factions: a moderate group led by Jaime BATEMAN Cay´on, who announced in January that he favored a legal role for the organization, and a hard-line faction styling itself the Coordinadora Nacional de Bases (CNB), which advocated continued armed resistance and was reported to have established operational links with FARC (see below). Before his death in a plane crash in April 1983, Bateman repudiated a truce agreement concluded six months earlier; a new dialogue with the government, undertaken by his successors in 1984, was repudiated in mid-1985. Carlos PIZARRO Le´on-G´omez, commander of the Batall´on Am´erica (see under Rebel and Clandestine Groups, below), became head of the M-19 in March 1986, following the killing by government forces of its two principal leaders, Iv´an Marino Os´ pina and Alvaro Fayad; in August 1986 the group’s new second-in-command, Gustavo Londo˜no Arias, was also killed. In early 1990 M-19 agreed to lay down its arms and joined with several small groups in forming a Nationalist Action for Peace (Acci´on Nacionalista por la Paz—ANP) that succeeded in outpolling the UP (see below) in the legislative and municipal balloting of March 11. Pizarro was assassinated on April 26 and was succeeded as M-19 leader by Antonio Navarro Wolff, who ran a surprising third in the presidential election of May 27 as the candidate of a 13-member leftist coalition

COLOMBIA

styled the Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica—CD). Following the May election the Navarro Wolff grouping operated as AD-M19, which more than doubled its vote share to nearly 27 percent at the December Constituent Assembly election before slipping to 10 percent in October 1991. It declined further to a meager 3.8 percent in the first-round presidential balloting of May 30, 1994, with Navarro Wolff subsequently joining the PDI (see under PDA, above). A dissident faction headed by Carlos Alonso Lucio, a former guerrilla commander, has blamed the M-19’s declining strength on an abandonment of “revolutionary principles.” As an electoral group, the AD/M-19 is moribund, with its more significant members (e.g., Navarro and Senator Gustavo Petro) now affiliated with the PDA (see above). ˜ Cuellar, Carlos Leaders: Diego MONTANA Alonso LUCIO (dissident faction). Patriotic Union (Uni´on Patri´otica—UP). The UP was formed in May 1985 as the reputed political arm of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, see below), which had itself been viewed as the paramilitary wing of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC, see Political Handbook of the World 2007). Advancing a program that included political and trade union freedom, agrarian reform, and opposition to U.S. interference in Latin America, the UP won one Senate and ten Chamber seats in March 1986. It mounted a major effort on behalf of its initial presidential nominee, FARC leader Jacobo ARENAS, although Arenas withdrew his candidacy in January following the alleged discovery of a plot to assassinate him. A number of UP leaders were subsequently murdered (reportedly by paramilitary police units), including the organization’s president, Jaime PARDO Leal, on October 11, 1987. The UP performed poorly in the March 1990 balloting, partly because of competition from the recently launched ANP and partly because of a lengthy “dirty war” against it that cost the lives of more than 1,000 of its members in 1989 alone. Before the 1990 presidential poll, its candidate, Bernardo JARAMILLO Ossa, was assassi-

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nated, reportedly by order of the Medell´ın cartel. In 1994, after deaths of its members had risen to more than 2,300, the party declined to advance a presidential candidate, its principal leader (recently returned from exile in Switzerland) declaring simply that “he would be killed.” Another leader, Manuel CEPEDA Vargas, who represented both the UP and the Communists in the Senate, was assassinated in August 1994. The group participated in the 1998 balloting but secured no representation. UP president Aida Abella was reportedly in exile in 1998 after receiving death threats. Leaders: Ern´an PASTRANA (President), Ovidio SALINAS (Executive Secretary).

Rebel and Clandestine Groups In 1985 the two groups immediately following (ELN and FARC) joined with M-19, Hope, Peace and Liberty (Esperanza, Paz y Libertad—EPL), the Quint´ın Lame Commando (Comando Quint´ın Lame) and Free Homeland (Patria Libre) formations operating in Cauca and Sucre departments, respectively, and the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores— PRT) in forming a National Guerrilla Coordination (Coordinadora Guerrillera Nacional—CGN). The name was changed to National Guerrilla Coordination Sim´on Bol´ıvar (Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera Sim´on Bol´ıvar—CNGSB) in the wake of a 1986 agreement with guerrillas in Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela to launch a Batall´on Am´erica as the projected core of a Bolivarian army (ej´ercito bolivariano) composed of rebels from the countries freed by Sim´on Bol´ıvar in the early 19th century. Quint´ın Lame and the PRT laid down their weapons in 1991, with the CNGSB becoming defunct after a breakdown in talks on demobilization of the remaining rebel units. The EPL was dealt a near fatal blow when the faction lead by Oscar William Calvo that operated in Antioquia, Caldas, and Risaralda departments surrendered to government forces in July 2006. By 2007 the FARC and ELN no longer coordinated their efforts but were instead rivals. (For recent demobilization developments, see Current issues, above.)

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National Liberation Army (Ej´ercito de Liberaci´on Nacional—ELN). Once the largest and most militant of the insurgent organizations, the Cuban-line ELN was responsible for the November 1983 kidnapping of the (then) president’s brother, Dr. Jaime Betancur Cuartas, but released him after Cuban President Fidel Castro characterized the act as “unrevolutionary.” Alleged to have links with guerrilla forces in El Salvador, Peru, and Venezuela, the group’s leadership has consistently termed offers of amnesty a “sham,” although some of its rank and file are reported to have accepted the government’s terms. In a type of guerrilla activity termed petroterrorismo, the ELN has mounted more than 100 attacks on the country’s oil pipelines, causing losses estimated at more than $1 billion. In mid-1993 the government reported that 193 ELN fighters had been killed during the previous six months. Subsequently, it appeared that the organization split into three factions, a hard-line Frente Domingo La´ın tendency of about 1,000 rebels operating along the Venezuelan frontier; a 2,000-strong “centrist” group loyal to the Spanish-born former priest Manuel P´erez; and a “moderate” breakaway group, the Socialist Renovation Current (Corriente de Renovaci´on Socialista—CRS), which had appeared on the verge of demobilizing its forces before the murder of two of its negotiators in September and eventually agreed to sign a final peace agreement in April 1994. ELN guerrillas used terror to disrupt local elections in October 1997, and in a widely publicized propaganda victory used the November 1 release of two captured members of an Organization of American States (OAS) team to reiterate their demand for a constituent assembly as a condition for laying down their arms. Longtime ELN leader Gregorio Manuel PEREZ Mart´ınez died on February 14, 1998. Peace talks with ELN representatives and the Pastrana government were opened at an undisclosed northern location in late December 1999 but proved unproductive. The talks were re-

sumed in August 2001 after a four-month hiatus, but were suspended within a week, following reports of a split within the ELN leadership. ELN leader and spokesperson Gerardo Bermudez, known as Francisco Gal´an, was released conditionally from prison in January 2007 after serving 15 years of a 30-year sentence. Gal´an’s release was intended to further progress in peace talks between the government and the ELN in Havana, Cuba (see Current issues, above), but Gal´an refused to renounce membership in the ELN in exchange for an unconditional release. The ELN’s top command structure (Coce) has been weakened by the government’s military campaigns, and ELN forces have been on the short end of armed confrontations with the FARC in Arauca and Nari˜no departments over oil profits and drug smuggling routes in late 2006 and early 2007. So far the ELN has refused to demobilize under the terms of the justice and peace law, however, and has reiterated the demand for a constituent assembly for formulating social and economic reforms as a precondition. In the sixth round of negotiation in Havana, the ELN also stipulated that a ceasefire would require ending the free trade pact with the United States, a freeze on privatization of state-owned companies, and a minority stake in the state oil company. One small splinter group of the ELN known as the Ej´ercito Revolucionario del Pueblo— ERP, operating in Bol´ıvar department, demobilized in April 2007. Leaders: Gerardo BERMUDEZ (a.k.a. Francisco Gal´an), Jos´e Nicol´as RODRIGUEZ Bautista (a.k.a. Gabino, Political Commander), Antonio GARCIA (Military Commander), Fabio VASQUEZ Casta˜no, Pablo BELTRAN, Juan Carlos CUELLAR. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC). FARC was long a Moscowline guerrilla group affiliated with the now moribund Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista de Colombia—PCC). In late 1983

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it indicated a willingness to conclude a ceasefire agreement, which was formalized in March 1984. The agreement was renewed on March 2, 1986, in return for which the Betancur government guaranteed (without conspicuous fulfillment) the safety of electoral candidates advanced by FARC’s alleged political wing, the Patriotic Union (see above). A dissident FARC group, the Ricardo Franco Front (Frente Ricardo Franco), led by Javier DELGADO and Jos´e FEDOR Rey, refused to participate in the accord, and by late 1987 FARC itself was reported to have returned to a posture of “total insurrection.” Inconclusive peace talks with the government were resumed in late 1989, with the group formally joining the CNGSB a year later, shortly after the death of its cofounder, Luis Alberto Morantes (a.k.a. Jacobo Arenas). In January 1995 about two dozen FARC guerrillas wearing army uniforms raided a prison in southern Colombia, freeing 93 inmates, and in August FARC was accused of killing 16 members of the EPL (see above). FARC’s urban wing is known as the Bolivarian Militias (Milicias Bolivarianas), two of whose commanders were reported to have been apprehended in Bogot´a in November 1995. On February 9, 1996, 5 army soldiers were killed and 11 injured in two clashes with FARC guerrillas in the department of Antioquia. Sporadic attacks in succeeding months proved to be a prelude to the most deadly FARC action for decades at the end of August, when approximately 60 soldiers and policemen were killed, at least 27 of them when 500 guerrillas overran Las Delicias army base in the southwestern Putumayo region. In mid-1997 FARC was credited with launching the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia (Movimiento Bolivariano por una Nueva Colombia—MBNC), which won a lower house seat in October 1998. In July 1998 President-elect Pastrana held an unprecedented jungle meeting with FARC commander Manuel MARULANDA V´elez, after which Pastrana declared that he would com-

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ply with the rebels’ demands for withdrawal of government forces from five southern municipalities as a precondition for peace talks that would commence subsequent to his August inauguration. On November 7, despite an upsurge in FARC attacks, it was announced that the military withdrawal had been completed, and on January 7, 1999, Pastrana participated in a ceremonial launching of the talks in San Vincente del Cagu´an. Although Marulanda failed to appear because of alleged threats against his life, Pastrana insisted that his absence would not derail the peace process. However, the FARC withdrew from the peace negotiations temporarily later in the month in the wake of increased activity by the AUC. The FARC demanded government action against the AUC “death squads” and other right-wing paramilitary groups as a precondition for its return to the negotiating table. Although the government announced the formation of a special unit for that purpose, intensive military campaigns were also reported in February and March against both the FARC and the ELN (see above). The talks with the FARC were resumed in the rebel-held town of La Uribe in October 1999 but were unproductive; the FARC dialogue being suspended in May 2000 in the wake of a “necklace bomb” murder incident that generated widespread notoriety. In early 2000 it was reported that there had been 2,663 kidnappings in 1999, exceeding the 2,216 reported in 1998. The violence continued throughout 2000, with 20 mayoral candidates being killed and 24 withdrawing from contention because of intimidation before the municipal balloting in late October. In early 2001 agreement was reached for renewed talks with the FARC, but little was accomplished before the group’s withdrawal in October because of the government’s rejection of a number of demands, including autonomy for a rebel-held “demilitarized zone” until the end of Pastrana’s term in 2002. The FARC was deeply opposed to the U.S.-backed “Plan Colombia,” and charged collusion between government

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forces and right-wing paramilitaries (see Current issues, above). Luis Eduardo Diaz, the FARC intelligence chief, was reported killed on May 29, 2006, by security forces in the southern department of Putumayo. Leaders: Pedro Antonio MARIN (“Torofijo,” a.k.a. Manuel MARULANDA V´elez), Guillermo Le´on SAENZ Vargas (a.k.a. Alfonso CANO), Luis Eduardo DEVIA (a.k.a. Mono JOJOY), Ra´ul REYES (Peace Negotiator), Iv´an M´arquez. The most prominent right-wing paramilitary grouping has long been the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—AUC), which was organized in 1996 to coordinate the activity of about 20 smaller organizations. Until recently, the leader of the AUC had ˜ who had earlier formed been Carlos CASTANO, the Cordoba and Uraba Self-Defense Union (Autodefensas Unidas de C´ordoba y Urab´a—AUCU) following the death of his father, a wealthy landowner, at the hands (reportedly) of leftist guerrillas. The AUC engaged in several clashes with the FARC in late 1998 and early 1999, in part, according to some observers, in an effort to gain representation in the current peace negotiations. In mid-2001 the AUC claimed that 5,000 new recruits had joined its ranks, bringing their total to 13,000. Shortly thereafter Casta˜no resigned his AUC post to lead a political affiliate, the National Democratic Movement (Movimiento Nacional Democr´atico—MND). In April 2004 he was reported to have disappeared, leading to speculation that he may have been murdered. In early 2005 Casta˜no’s successor, Salvatore MANCUSO G´omez, accepted demobilization and was replaced by Ram´on ISAZA; Mancuso continued, however, as the group’s lead negotiator with the government, and in 2006 and 2007 as a key witness in investigations of ties between public officials and the AUC, thus avoiding deportation to the United States, where he was sought on drug charges (see Current issues, above).

The Organization of American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (OASMAPP) released a report in July 2007 that raised red flags about the success of the demobilization of the AUC and other right-wing paramilitary groups under the justice and peace process. The report warned that elements of the junior leadership had so far refused to participate in the demobilization process and were still heavily involved in drug trafficking. Moreover, demobilized members who soured on the peace process were joining the holdouts and resuming paramilitary activities.

Legislature The Colombian Congress (Congreso) is a bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Representatives, each elected for a four-year term. From 1958 to 1974 both houses were theoretically divided equally between Liberals and Conservatives, although members of other groups could run as nominal candidates of one of the two major parties and thus gain representation. At each of the seven regular elections before 2002, the Liberals obtained majorities in both houses. The election of March 10, 2002, was highly fractionalized, although support for President Uribe was subsequently credited as overwhelming in both Senate and Chamber. Senate (Senado de la Rep´ublica). The upper house is presently composed of 102 members, including 2 elected to represent indigenous communities. Following the election of March 12, 2006, the Social Party of National Unity held 20 seats; the Colombian Conservative Party, 18; the Colombian Liberal Party, 18; the Radical Change, 15; the Alternative Democratic Pole, 10; the Citizens’ Convergence, 7; the Wings-Team Colombia Movement, 5; the Democratic Colombia Party, 3; the Mira Movement, 2; the Viva Colombia Movement, 2; the Indigenous Authorities Movement, 1; and the Indigenous Social Alliance, 1. ´ President: Nancy Patricia GUTIERREZ.

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2007 President Vice President

´ Alvaro Uribe V´elez Francisco Santos Calder´on

Ministers Agriculture and Rural Development Communications Culture Education Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development Finance and Public Credit Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade, Industry, and Tourism Interior and Justice Mines and Energy National Defense Social Protection Transport

Andr´es Felipe Arias Leyva Mar´ıa del Rosario Guerra de la Espriella [f] Paula Marcela Moreno [f] Cecilia Mar´ıa V´elez White [f] Juan Francisco Lozano Ram´ırez (CR) ´ Oscar Iv´an Zuluaga (PSUN) Fernando Ara´ujo Perdomo (PC) Luis Guillermo Plata P´aez Carlos Holgu´ın Sardi (PC) Hern´an Mart´ıinez Torres Juan Manuel Santos (PSUN) Diego Palacio Betancourt Andr´es Uriel Gallego Henao

[f] = female

Chamber of Representatives (C´amara de Representates). The lower house currently has 166 members with each department being entitled to at least 2 representatives and 5 seats being set aside for special representation (2 for blacks, 1 for indigenous persons, 1 for Colombians living abroad, and 1 for political minorities). In the election of March 12, 2006, the Colombian Liberal Party secured 35 seats; the Social Party of National Unity, 30; the Colombian Conservative Party, 29; the Radical Change, 20; the Alternative Democratic Pole, 8; the Civic Convergence, 8; the Wings-Team Colombia Movement, 8; the Liberal Opening, 5; the Regional Integration Movement, 4; the Democratic Colombia Party, 2; the Huila New and Liberalism, 2; the National Movement, 2; the United People’s Movement; 2; For the Country of Our Dreams, 2; the Mira Movement, the National Salvation Movement, the People’s Participation Movement, the Progressive National Movement, the Renovation Movement Labor Action, the Social Action Party,

the Center Option Party, the Afro-Colombian Social Aliance, and Afrounincca, 1 each. President: Oscar Alberto ARBOLEDA Palacio.

Communications Press The press in Colombia is privately owned and enjoys complete freedom. Most newspapers function as the organs of political parties or factions. The following are dailies published in Bogot´a, unless otherwise noted: El Tiempo (270,000 daily, 550,000 Sunday), llerista Liberal; El Espacio (160,000), turbayista Liberal; El Colombiano (Medell´ın, 90,000), Conservative; El Heraldo (Barranquilla, 70,000), turbayista Liberal; El Nuevo Siglo (68,000), alvarista Conservative; El Pa´ıs (Cali, 60,000 daily, 110,000 Sunday), ospinapastranista Conservative; La Rep´ublica (55,000),

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ospina-pastranista Conservative; La Patria (Manizales, 22,000), Conservative; Occidente (Cali, 25,000), ospina-pastranista Conservative. Colombia’s oldest daily, the financially ailing El Espectador, which was launched in 1887, was converted into a Sunday weekly in August 2001.

News Agencies The domestic facility is the National News Agency “Colprensa” (Agencia Nacional de Noticias “Colprensa”); in addition, a number of foreign agencies maintain offices in Bogot´a.

Broadcasting and Computing The 11 major radio networks, of which only Radiodifusora Nacional is publicly owned, service more than 500 stations. The country’s three national television channels are controlled by the Instituto Nacional de Radio y Televisi´on, although broadcasting time is distributed among private

production companies. There are also six regional channels; cable service for Bogot´a was introduced in 1985. As of 2005, there were approximately 104 Internet users and 42 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 479 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Carolina BARC O Isakson U.S. Ambassador to Colombia: William R. BROWNFIELD Permanent Representative to the UN: Claudia BLUM de Barberi IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, ALADI, BCIE, CAN, CDB, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

C O S TA R I C A REPUBLIC

OF

COSTA RICA

Rep u´ blica de Costa Rica

One of the smallest of the Central American countries, Costa Rica lies directly north of Panama and combines tropical lowland, high tableland, and rugged mountainous terrain. Its people, known as Costarricenses, are overwhelmingly of European (predominantly Spanish) descent. This unusual homogeneity is broken only by mestizo and Negro minorities, which are concentrated in the provinces of Guanacaste and Lim´on, respectively. More than 90 percent of the population adheres to Roman Catholicism, the state religion, but other faiths are permitted. The country’s 93 percent literacy rate is the highest in Central America. Women constituted 34 percent of the paid workforce in 2006. They are employed mainly in administrative positions, human resources, and customer services and reportedly earn 50 percent less than their male counterparts. In the current legislature 22 of 57 members are female, and there are 5 women in the cabinet. In 1948 Costa Rica embarked on the establishment of what became one of the world’s most progressive welfare states, providing a universal program of health care and education for its citizens that contrasted with regressive systems elsewhere in Latin America. Substantial economic growth, yielding one of the region’s highest standards of living, continued through most of the 1970s before giving way to depressed prices for coffee, beef, bananas, and sugar exports, accompanied by increased oil import costs. By the early 1980s the country was experiencing deep recession, marked by high inflation, unemployment, budget deficits,

and trade imbalances. Bankruptcy was averted by means of aid from the United States, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), although several IMF agreements were compromised by Costa Rica’s inability to meet fund conditions. By 1994 more than half of the country’s economic activity had become service-based, with tourism its most important component. Concurrently, the proportion of families living in poverty had risen to an estimated 30 to 38 percent, with nearly one-quarter of workers engaged in the “informal sector.” By 1996 GDP growth had receded

NICARAGUA Lake Nicaragua

Caribbe an Se a

Liberia Nicoya

C O S TA R I C A

Puntarenas

Alajuela San Francisco San José

Limón

San Isidro

PACIFIC O CE A N

0 0

60 Mi 60 Km

Golfito

PANAMA

The Country

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steadily to less than 1.0 percent, but by 1999 it was the highest in Latin America, at 8.3 percent. A rapid reversal in 2000, when GDP expanded by only 1.4 percent, was largely attributed to higher prices for imported petroleum and lower earnings from exports. Improvement thereafter culminated in GDP growth of 5.6 percent in 2003, 4.0 percent in 2004, and 5.9 percent in 2005. The IMF predicted GDP growth of 6.5 percent for 2006 and inflation of 11 to 12 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Costa Rica declared its independence from Spain in 1821 but accepted inclusion in the Mexican Empire of 1822–1823. It was a member of the United Provinces of Central America from 1824 to 1839, when its autonomy was reestablished. A republic was formally declared in 1848 during a period characterized by alternating political conflict and rule by the leading families, who monopolized the indirect electoral system. In 1897 Costa Rica joined El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua in the Greater Republic of Central America, but the federation was dissolved in 1898. A year later, President Bernardo SOTO sponsored what is considered to be the Costa Rica’s first free election, inaugurating a democratic process that has survived with only two major interruptions, one in 1917 and the other in 1948. Since the uprising led by Jos´e FIGUERES Ferrer, following annulment of the 1948 election by President Teodoro PICADO, transfer of power has been accomplished by constitutional means, further securing Costa Rica’s reputation as what has been called “perhaps the most passionately democratic country in Latin America.” In the election of February 6, 1994, Figueres Ferrer’s son, Jos´e Mar´ıa FIGUERES Olsen of the National Liberation Party (Partido de Liberaci´on Nacional—PLN), with 49.6 percent of the vote defeated Miguel Angel RODR´IGUEZ of the Social Christian Unity Party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana—PUSC), who took 47.5 percent. However, Rodr´ıguez was elected president at balloting

on February 1, 1998, with 46.9 percent versus 44.4 percent for the PLN’s Jos´e Miguel CORRALES. In concurrent legislative balloting the PUSC reversed the tables on the PLN (the leading party in the previous assembly) by securing 27 of the 57 seats. The PUSC lost 8 of its seats in the legislative balloting on February 3, 2002, although it retained a 2-seat plurality over the PLN. Meanwhile, the PUSC’s presidential candidate—Abel PACHECO—led a field of 13 in the concurrent first round of presidential balloting, with Rolando ARAYA Monge finishing second with 31 percent. Pacheco won the second round over Araya by 58 to 42 percent. Prior to the 2006 election, the PLN’s Oscar ARIAS S´anchez appeared to have a decisive lead in public opinion polls over his main opponent in a field of 14 candidates—Ott´on SOL´IS Fallas of the Citizen’s Action Party (Paratido Acci´on Ciudadana—PAC). However, on February 5 Arias garnered only a thin margin of 40.9 percent of the votes to 39.8 percent for Sol´ıs. In the concurrent legislative poll the PLN was confined to a plurality of 36.4 percent of the vote and 25 of 57 seats. However, Arias subsequently achieved sufficient legislative support for his new government (installed on May 8) by reaching accommodation with the centrist Libertarian Movement Party (Partido Movimiento Libertario—PML), which held 6 legislative seats. In the December local elections, the PNL won control of nearly three-fourths of the municipalities, including the mayorship of San Jos´e.

Constitution and Government The 1949 constitution provides for three independent branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative branch enjoys genuinely coequal power, including the ability to override presidential vetoes. The president serves as chief executive and is assisted by two elected vice presidents in addition to a cabinet selected by the president. By Latin American standards the president’s powers are limited, and a 1969 constitutional amendment prohibited the reelection of all previous incumbents. However, in an unexpected and controversial ruling in April 2003, the Supreme

C O S TA R I C A

Political Status: Part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala that declared independence from Spain in September 1821; member of the United Provinces of Central America that was launched in 1824; autonomy reestablished in 1839; republic declared in 1848; democratic constitutional system instituted in 1899. Area: 19,575 sq. mi. (50,700 sq. km.). Population: 3,810,179 (2000C); 4,276,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): SAN JOSE´ (344,000), Lim´on (62,000), Alajuela (49,000), San Francisco (46,000). Principal Language: Spanish (there is no “official” language). Monetary Unit: Col´on (market rate November 2, 2007: 518.97 col´ones = $1US). President: Oscar ARIAS S´anchez (National Liberation Party); elected on February 5, 2006, and inaugurated for a four-year term on May 8, succeeding Abel PACHECO de la Espriella (Social Christian Unity Party). First Vice President: Laura CHINCHILLA (National Liberation Party); elected on February 5, 2006, and inaugurated on May 8 for a term concurrent with that of the president, ´ succeeding Lineth SABORIO Chaverri (Social Christian Unity Party). Second Vice President: Kevin CASAS Zamora (National Liberation Party); elected on February 5, 2006, and inaugurated on May 8 for a term concurrent with that of the president, the office having been vacant following the resignation of Luis FISHMAN (Social Christian Unity Party) on January 27, 2005.

Court declared the amendment invalid (see Current issues, below). A proposed amendment that would extend the presidential and legislative terms to five years had been under consideration since 1994 but was not adopted before the 2006 vote. The judicial branch is independent of the president, its members being elected for eight-year terms by the legislature. The judicial structure encompasses the Supreme Court of Justice, which may rule on the constitutionality of legislation; four

169

courts of appeal; and numerous local courts distributed among the judicial districts. One unique feature of the Costa Rican governmental system is the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), an independent body of three magistrates and three alternate magistrates elected by the Supreme Court of Justice for staggered six-year terms. The Tribunal oversees the entire electoral process, including the interpretation of electoral statutes, the certification of parties, and the adjudication of alleged electoral irregularities. For administrative purposes the country is divided into 7 provinces and 81 municipios, the former administered by governors appointed by the president. The latter are governed by councils that have both voting and nonvoting members and by executive officials appointed by the president. The executive officers may veto council acts, but all such vetoes are subject to judicial review. Costa Rica is one of only a handful of countries that constitutionally prohibit the raising of a national army, except under strictly limited circumstances of public necessity. The proscription has, however, yielded a proliferation of legally sanctioned armed groups, including private “auxiliary police” units and separate police forces for virtually every government ministry, most of which are beyond the control of the ministry of public security.

Foreign Relations A founding member of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States (OAS), Costa Rica has typically been aligned with the liberal, democratic wing in Latin American politics and has opposed dictatorships of both the right and the left. In May 1981 it broke relations with Cuba after a protest regarding the treatment of Cuban political prisoners had elicited an “insulting” response by Cuba’s representative to the United Nations. The principal external concern for the remainder of the decade was the Nicaraguan sandinista-contra conflict and the associated U.S. involvement in regional affairs. Although formally neutral on the issue, Costa Rica strongly criticized Nicaragua’s post-Somoza Marxist orientation, while accepting

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more than $730 million in economic aid from the United States. In early 1987 President Arias introduced a peace plan that served as the basis of intensive effort to negotiate an end to fighting in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. The initiative earned him the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize, while his reputation was further enhanced by brokering the sandinista-contra cease-fire in March 1988. In early 1991 President Rafael Angel ´ CALDERON Fournier concluded a free trade agreement with Venezuelan President Carlos P´erez and subsequently became the first Central American chief executive to negotiate a similar agreement with Mexico, which he hoped would pave the way to membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, when the latter accord came into effect on January 1, 1995, there was concern that Costa Rica would be adversely affected by the recent devaluation of the Mexican peso. Meanwhile, Costa Rica had failed to ratify the Central American Parliament treaty, arguing that the institution would be a threat to its sovereignty and insisting that its neighbors had made insufficient progress in the implementation of domestic democratic processes. In June 1995, on the other hand, Costa Rica formally ratified the December 1991 Tegucigalpa Protocol establishing the Central American Integration System as a means of promoting regional economic integration. In March 2004 it also signed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States (see Current issues, below, for subsequent developments). In a move that some viewed as an attempt to reduce unemployment among Costa Ricans, the government in late 1993 launched a campaign to deport an estimated 2,000 undocumented Nicaraguans. The action, which came in the wake of two highly publicized kidnappings by Nicaraguans, exacerbated a long-standing dispute over navigation rights and demarcation of the border along the San Juan River. While an 1858 treaty had granted Nicaragua sovereignty over the river, it guaranteed both parties “free navigation” for commercial purposes, which Nicaragua interpreted to exclude tourism. A further problem stemmed from Costa

Rica’s issuance in 1979 of land deeds to campesino settlers on a tract of land south of the river that later proved to be Nicaraguan territory. On June 26, 1995, despite a long-standing Costa Rican offer of relocation to its side of the border, the settlers proclaimed the independence of the “Republic of Airrec´u” (a word meaning “friendship” in the local Maleku language), thereby provoking the dispatch of Nicaraguan troops to evict them. In July 1998 the two countries concluded an agreement to make the treaties governing navigation on the San Juan “more functional,” including a provision that army vessels could accompany Nicaraguan police patrols along the river. The agreement was, however, rescinded by Nicaragua less than a month later. During the 1980s thousands of Nicaraguans fled domestic insurrection to the relative safety of Costa Rica. Subsequent underemployment in Nicaragua served to maintain the flow, with 300,000 to 500,000 estimated to have crossed the border by 1996. In October 1999 about 160,000 of the migrants were reported to have availed themselves of an amnesty declared by Costa Rica after Hurricane Mitch had devastated their homeland, although Nicaragua continued to insist that they were being mistreated. Tension over the river dispute was partially abated by an agreement in mid-2000 that restored Costa Rica’s right to armed patrols as long as Nicaragua received prior notification of their movements. The river controversy appeared to be further abated in September 2002 by an agreement on bilateral talks over a three-year period. However, soon thereafter Nicaraguan President Enrique Bola˜nos ordered the interdiction of Costa Rican police boats “under any circumstances,” and in September 2005, after Costa Rica had submitted the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), he announced that henceforth all vessels navigating the river would be obliged to fly the Nicaraguan flag.

Current Issues Once considered the democratic jewel of Central America, Costa Rica has recently been beset with political infighting and allegations of

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corruption that have embroiled three former presidents and tainted current President Arias, despite his status as a Nobel laureate. The 2003 Supreme Court validation of presidential reelection (see Constitution and government, above) overturned a 2000 ruling that the court lacked constitutional authority in the matter. The action generated intense debate, with the opposition PAC insisting that the ban did not violate the country’s basic law and arguing that an issue of such importance should be decided by elected, rather than by nonelected, officials. By seeking a second term, Arias not only appeared to flaunt the constitution but also, as a neoliberal, generated controversy within the PLN, a traditionally left-of-center group that held Costa Rica’s membership in the Socialist International. A number of displeased high-ranking members left the party, including its secretary general, Luis Guillermo SOL´IS, and former president Luis Alberto MONGE. For his part, Arias, following his narrow victory in the February 2006 elections, pledged to maintain the PLN’s social-democratic thrust, despite opening up state monopolies. He also remained committed to CAFTA membership (a prominent element of his campaign platform), which drew criticism from unionists and students. Arias initially anticipated that CAFTA ratification would be achieved by a vote in the assembly. However, in April 2007 the Supreme Electoral Tribunal ruled that the opposition had the right to seek a national referendum on the matter. Arias subsequently announced he would welcome such a vote, and a national referendum on October 7 resulted in a 51.6 percent “yes” vote, sufficient for ratification. Costa Rica’s entry into CAFTA was expected to be formalized in March 2008.

Political Parties Government and Government-Supportive Parties National Liberation Party (Partido de Liberaci´on Nacional—PLN). Founded by former president Jos´e Figueres Ferrer in the aftermath of

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the 1948 revolution, the PLN has traditionally been the largest and best organized of the Costa Rican parties and is a classic example of the democratic left in Latin America. Affiliated with the Socialist International, it has consistently favored progressive programs. In July 1976 President Figueres precipitated a crisis within the party leadership by calling for revocation of the constitutional requirement that a president may not serve more than one term, thereby contributing to the defeat of Luis Alberto Monge as PLN presidential candidate in 1978. Subsequently, the cultivation of a network of predominantly regional and local support, coupled with a “return to the land” (volver a la tierre) campaign slogan, enabled Monge to secure a decisive victory in 1982. Although Oscar Arias S´anchez won a primary election over the more conservative Carlos Manuel CASTILLO in early 1985 (subsequently serving as president from 1986 to 1990), disagreement between their supporters, largely abated during the 1986 campaign, continued in the assembly. Castillo was the party’s nominee to succeed Arias in 1990 but fell short by obtaining only 48 percent of the vote. Longtime party leader Figueres Ferrer died on June 8, 1990. The PLN’s Jos´e Mar´ıa Figueres captured the presidency in 1994, but the party failed to retain either that office or a legislative plurality in 1998 or 2002. The membership of the party’s 2002 presidential candidate, Rolando ARAYA Monge, was suspended for six months in March 2003 for dubious electoral financing. Arias S´anchez’s return to candidacy in 2005 generated intraparty conflict (see Current issues, above), although the second-term effort succeeded by a narrow margin. Leaders: Oscar ARIAS S´anchez (President of the Republic); Francisco Antonio PACHECO Fern´andez (President of the Party); Jos´e Mar´ıa FIGUERES Olsen and Daniel ODUBER Quir´os (Former Presidents of the Republic); Oscar ˜ NUNEZ Calva (Secretary General). Libertarian Movement Party (Partido Movimiento Libertario—PML). Launched in early

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1995, the PML is a centrist group that opposes state interventionism and policies that constrain individual liberties. The PML sharply improved its legislative representation from one seat to seven seats in February 2002, winning 9.3 percent of the vote, although its candidate took only 1.7 percent in the first round of presidential balloting. The party fell to six legislative seats in 2006, its leader placing third in the presidential poll. The PML subsequently agreed to support the PLN government in the legislature in return for the PLN’s pledge to pursue reforms designed to promote business “competitiveness” and to make it easier for people in border regions and “marginal” urban areas to gain property rights. Leaders: Otto GUEVARA Guth (President and 2002 and 2006 presidential candidate), Ronaldo ALFARO Garc´ıa (Secretary General).

Opposition Parties Citizens’ Action Party (Partido Acci´on Ciudadana—PAC). Launched in early 2001 by, among others, PLN defector Ott´on Sol´ıs Fallas, the PAC ran in the 2002 election on a populist platform promising to combat corruption and to help farmers and traditional industries that had been weakened by recent market reforms. Sol´ıs finished a surprisingly strong third in the first round of presidential balloting in February 2002 with 26 percent of the vote, while the PAC garnered 13 seats in concurrent legislative balloting. A year later, six PAC members withdrew to form a Patriotic Bloc (Bloque Patriotico—BP). In his 2006 campaign for the presidency, Sol´ıs lost to the PLN’s Arias S´anchez by about 1 percent of the vote. The PAC garnered 17 seats in the concurrent legislative election. Leaders: Ott´on SOL´IS Fallas (2002 and 2006 presidential candidate), Epsy Campbell BARR (President), Sadie BRAVO P´erez, Teresita AGUILAR Mirambell (Secretary General). Social Christian Unity Party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana—PUSC). A loose alliance of the essentially conservative parties, listed imme-

diately below, plus the former Democratic Renovation Party (see National Union Party, below), the PUSC campaigned before the 1978 election as the Partido Unidad Opositora (PUO) and as the Coalici´on Unidad in 1978, adopting its present name in December 1983. Partly because of conflict within the PLN leadership, the party won the presidency in 1978 but was defeated in both 1982 and 1986. The PUSC returned to power with a 52 percent presidential mandate in 1990 before losing a close race in May 1994. It regained the presidency in 1998, retained it in 2002, but wound up in fourth place in the 2006 presidential balloting, amid allegations of corruption against the administration of retiring president Abel Pacheco. Leaders: Abel PACHECO de la Espriella, Miguel Angel RODR´IGUEZ, Rafael Angel CAL´ Fournier, and Rodrigo CARAZO Odio DERON (Former Presidents of the Republic), Luis Fishman ZONZINSKI (President of the Party), Ricardo Jaime TOLEDO Carranza (2006 presidential candidate), Lorena VASQUEZ Badilla, Xinia CARVAJAL Salazar (Secretary General). Calderonist Republican Party (Partido Republicano Calderonista—PRC). Named after former president Rafael Angel Calder´on Fournier, the PRC was formed in 1976. ´ FourLeaders: Rafael Angel CALDERON nier (former President of the Republic), Alvaro CUBILLO Aguilar (President of the Party), Gerardo BOLANOS Alpizar (Secretary). Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). The PDC is a traditional Christian Democratic group formed in 1962. Leaders: Rafael Alberto GRILLO Rivera (President), Claudio GUEVARA Barahona (Secretary). Popular Union Party (Partido Uni´on Popular—PUP). The PUP is a coalition of rightwing interests. Leaders: Cristi´an TATTENBACH Yglesias (President), Juan Rafael RODRIGUEZ Calvo (Secretary).

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National Union Party (Partido Uni´on Nacional—PUN). The PUN was formed in April 1985 by the leader of the previously PUSC-affiliated Democratic Renovation Party (Partido Renovaci´on Democr´atica—PRD), Oscar AGUILAR Bulgarelli, who opposed Rafael Calder´on’s “absolute and antidemocratic control” of the parent coalition, including an alleged effort to change its posture from social democratic to liberal. The PUN won one legislative seat in the 2006 election. Leaders: Jos´e Manuel ECHANDI Meza (2006 presidential candidate), Arturo ACOSTA Mora (President of the Party), Hern´an Ricardo ZAMORA Rojas (Secretary General). Accessibility Without Exclusion Party (Partido Accesibilidad Sin Exclusi´on—PACE). This San Jos´e–based party was formed in 2005 as a voice against the free-trade agreement and against discrimination toward the disabled, senior citizens, and their families. The new party won one seat in the 2006 assembly poll. ´ Leaders: Oscar Andr´es LOPEZ Arias (President), Victor Emilio GRANADOS Calvo (Secretary). Broad Front (Frente Amplio). This group, which promotes “more participative and direct forms of democracy,” won one seat in the 2006 assembly elections. Leaders: Jos´e MERINO del R´ıo (President), ´ Enid GONZALEZ Rojas (Secretary). National Restoration Party (Partido Restauraci´on Nacional). A San Jos´e–based provincial party, this grouping won one seat in the 2006 assembly poll with 2 percent of the vote. ˜ Calvo (PresLeaders: Carlos luis AVENDANO ˜ ident), C´esar Alexander ZUNIGA Ram´ırez (Secretary General).

Other Parties that Contested the 2006 Legislative and/or Presidential Elections Costa Rican Renewal Party (Partido Renovaci´on Costarricense—PRC). A small conserva-

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tive party, the PRC won a single seat in the February 2002 legislative poll, while its candidate secured 1.1 percent of the vote in the first round of presidential balloting. Leaders: Bolivar SERRANO Hidalgo (2006 presidential candidate), Gerardo Justo OROZCO Alvarez (President of the Party and 2002 presidential candidate), Jimmy SOTO Solano (Secretary). Homeland First Party (Partido Patria Primero—PPP). The PPP was launched before the 2006 elections, in which its presidential candidate captured 1.1 percent of the vote and the party 1.6 percent of the legislative vote. Leaders: Juan Jos´e VARGAS Fella (President and 2006 presidential candidate), Wilberth ´ HERNANDEZ Vargas (Secretary). National Integration Party (Partido Integraci´on Nacional—PIN). The PIN was launched in 1996 but won no representation in 2002 or 2006. ˜ Leaders: Dr. Walter MUNOZ C´espedes (President of the Party and 2006 presidential candidate), ˜ Valverde (Secretary General). Marlyn BENDANA National Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democr´atica Nacionalista—ADN). The AND’s presidential candidate in 2006 captured 0.2 percent of the vote. Leaders: Jose Miguel VILLALOBOS Uma˜na (President of the Party and 2006 presidential candidate), Emilia Maria RODR´IGUEZ Arias (Secretary General). Democratic Force Party (Partido Fuerza Democr´atica—PFD). The PFD was launched before the 1994 election as the Fuerza Democr´atica (FD), a leftist coalition that included the two parties below as well as the Ecological Humanist Movement (Movimiento Humanista Ecologista—MHE), the Progress Party (Partido del Progreso—PP), and the subsequently dissolved Costa Rican Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Costarricense—PSC).

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The PFD candidate for president in 2006 secured less than 0.2 percent of the vote. Leaders: C´elimo GUIDO (Party Leader), Manuel Vladimir DE LA CRUZ de Lemos (Secretary General and 1994 and 2006 presidential ˜ candidate), Marco NUNEZ Gonz´alez (President).

placed 12th in the 2006 presidential balloting with less than 0.2 percent of the vote. Leaders: Fabio Enrique DELGADO Hern´andez (President), Alvaro Eduardo MONTERO Mejia ´ (2006 presidential candidate), Alejandro LOPEZ Mart´ınez (Secretary General).

Workers’ Party (Partido de los Trabajadores—PT). The PT has long been the political wing of the Revolutionary People’s Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo— MRP), a Maoist extremist group that endorsed revolutionary activity in 1978–1980, although its leadership appeared to moderate its position in mid-1981, declaring that “popular struggles can . . . be waged [in Costa Rica] without the unjust violence of terrorist actions.” It was a member of the PVP-led PU in 1978 and 1982. Leaders: Jos´e Francisco ARAYA Monge (President), Ilse ACOSTA Polonio (Secretary).

Coalition of the United Left (Coalici´on Izquierda Unida—IU). An alliance of the PVP and the Revolutionary Party of Workers (Partido Revolutionario de los Trabajadores), the IU won 0.4 percent of the legislative vote in 2006. Leader: Humberto Elias VARGAS Carbonel (2006 presidential candidate). Popular Vanguard Party (Partido Vanguardia Popular—PVP). Founded in 1931 as the Costa Rican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Costarricense—PCC), the PVP adopted its present name in 1943 and regained legal status in 1975, following the lifting of a longstanding proscription of nondemocratic political organizations. During the 1978 and 1982 campaigns, it participated in a People United (Pueblo Unido—PU) coalition that included the PSC and PT (see above). In 1983 a struggle erupted between the essentially moderate “old guard” leadership and a younger hardline group. In 1985 the PPC and its allies were permitted to register under the PU label. As a result, the PVP formed a coalition for the 1986 campaign styled the Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular—AP), with the former ´ PU standard bearer, Dr. Rodrigo GUTIERREZ S´aenz, as its presidential candidate, securing one legislative seat. In 1995 the PVP, while retaining its separate identity, joined with a group of independents to form the People’s United Party (Partido Pueblo Unido—PPU). Manuel MORA Valverde, the founder of the PPC and a leader of the 1948 civil war, died in 1994. Leaders: Trino BARRANTES Araya (President), Humberto El´ıas VARGAS Carbonell (Secretary General).

National Rescue Party (Partido Rescate Nacional—PRN). Organized in 1996, the PRN

Union for Change (Uni´on Para el Cambio— UPC). The UPC is a small formation launched

Costa Rican People’s Party (Partido del Pueblo Costarricense—PPC). The PPC originated as a Havana-oriented Popular Vanguard splinter led by Manuel Mora Valverde; the group initially presented itself as the “real” PVP but was rebuffed in February 1984 when the Civil Registry recognized the mainstream (Vargas-Ferreto) faction as being in legitimate possession of the traditional party name. In 1984 the party joined a number of other groups as the Patriotic Alliance (Alianza Patri´otica) before being accorded official registration under the Pueblo Unido rubric. In 1986 the PU and the PVP-led Alianza Popular captured one legislative seat each. Of four leftist parties running separately in 1990, only the PPC won representation. Leaders: Daniel CAMACHO (1990 presidential candidate), Manuel Enrique DELGADO Cascante, Len´ın CHACON Vargas (Secretary General), Eduardo MORA Valverde (Undersecretary General).

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Cabinet As of May 1, 2007 President First Vice President Second Vice President

Oscar Arias S´anchez Laura Chinchilla [f] Kevin Casas Zamora

Ministers Culture Education Environment and Energy Finance Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade Health Housing and Fight Against Poverty Justice Labor Planning and Economic Policy Presidency Production Public Works and Transport Science and Technology Security Tourism Without Portfolio

Mar´ıa Elena Carbello [f] Leonardo Garnier Roberto Dobles Guillermo Zu˜niga Bruno Stagno Marco Vinicio Ruiz Dr. Mar´ıa Luisa Avila [f] Fernando Zumbado Laura Chinchilla [f] Francisco Morales Kevin Casas Rodrigo Arias S´anchez Alfredo Volio Karla Gonz´alez [f] Eugenia Flores [f] Fernando Berrocal Carlos Ricardo Benavides Mario Vargas

[f] = female

before the 2006 election. It presidential candidate secured 2.4 percent of the vote in 2006. ´ Leaders: Antonio ALVAREZ Desanti (President and 2006 presidential candidate), Roberto Javier GALLARDO Nu˜nez (Secretary). Patriotic Union Party (Partido Uni´on Patrio´ tica—PUP). The PUP candidate for president in 2006 received 0.1 percent of the vote, while the party secured 0.5 percent of the legislative vote. Leaders: Jos´e Miguel CORRALES Bola˜nos (President), Jos´e Humberto ARCE Salas (Vice President and 2006 presidential candidate), Rafael Angel VARELA Granados (Secretary General).

Provincial parties that contested the 2006 elections unsuccessfully included the Agricultural Force Party of the Cartagonians (Partido Fuerza Agraria de los Cartagineses—PFAC), led by Alicia SOLANO Bravo; the Agricultural Labor Action Party (Partido Acci´on Laborista Agr´ıcola—PALA) of Alajuela, led by Eli´ecer RODR´IGUEZ; the Alajuelan Democratic Action (Acci´on Democr´atica Alajuelense—ADA), led by Esli Antonio VEGA Alvarado; the Authentic Heredian Party (Partido Autentica Herediano) of Heredia, led by Jos´e Francisco SALAS Ramos; the Cartagen Agricultural Union Party (Partido Uni´on Agr´ıcola Cartaginesa—PUAC), led by Juan Guillermo BRENES Castillo; the Green

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Ecologist Party (Partido Verde Ecologista) of Cartago, led by Rodrigo Jos´e ARIAS Gutti´errez; the Independent Guanacaste Party (Partido Guanacaste Independiente—PGI), led by Jos´e Angel JARA Chavarria; the Movement of Workers and Peasants (Movimiento de Trabajadores y Campesinos—MTC) of Lim´on, led by Orlando BARRANTES Cart´ın; the New Feminist League (Nueva Liga Feminista) of San Jos´e, led by Ana Felicia TORRES Redondo; and the Provincial Integration Party “Three” (Partido Integraci´on Provincial “Tres”—PIP3), led by Isabel Cristina ARIA Calder´on.

Legislature The Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) is a unicameral body whose 57 members, representing the provinces in proportion to population, are elected under a proportional representation system for four-year terms by direct popular vote and may not be immediately reelected. In the most recent election of February 5, 2006, the National Liberation Party won 25 seats; the Citizens’ Action Party, 17; the Libertarian Movement Party, 6; the Social Christian Unity Party, 5; and Accessibility Without Exclusion Party, the Broad Front, the National Restoration Party, and the National Union Party, 1 each. President: Francisco Antonio PACHECO Fern´andez.

Communications All news media are free of censorship, subject to limitations such as the abuse of public officials. In recent years journalists have complained about threats, intimidation, and inadequate press protections.

Press The following are Spanish dailies published in San Jos´e: La Naci´on (125,000), conservative;

Diario Extra (120,000), independent; La Rep´ublica (60,000), independent; La Prensa Libre (50,000), independent; The Tico Times (15,000), independent English weekly.

News Agencies The regional Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias (ACAN) serves in lieu of a domestic facility. Agence France-Presse, Deutsche PresseAgentur, Prensa Latina, and Tass maintain offices in San Jos´e.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is supervised by the government’s Departamento Control Nacional de RadioTelevisi´on. Television and radio stations are commercial, except for several offering religious or cultural programming. The Sistema de Radio y TV Cultural (SINART) network was organized by the government in 1978 to transmit news and cultural programs, while U.S.-based Cable Network News (CNN) is available by subscription. As of 2005 there were approximately 213 Internet users and 231 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 255 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation ˜ Ambassador to the U.S.: Tomas DUENAS U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica: Mark LANGDALE Permanent Representative to the UN: Jorge URBINA IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, BCIE, CACM, IADB, Interpol, IOM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WCO, WTO

CUBA REPUBLIC

OF

CUBA

Rep u´ blica de Cuba

Note: After almost five decades, President Fidel Castro resigned on February 19, 2008. His brother, acting president Raul ´ Castro, was officially installed during a National Assembly meeting February 24, in which other regime veterans assumed major posts, dispelling speculations that immediate changes were forthcoming.

The Country The largest of the Caribbean island nations, Cuba lies at the western end of the Greater Antilles, directly south of Florida. Its varied terrain, with abundant fertile land and a semitropical climate, led to early specialization in the production of sugar as well as tobacco, coffee, and other crops. Its ethnic composition is a mixture of Caucasian and Negro. The vast majority of the population is Roman Catholic, although the Church’s mainstream is increasingly being challenged by santer´ıa, which features a substantial component of African animism. In addition there are more than 50 registered Protestant denominations, nearly half of which are joined in a largely regime-supportive Ecumenical Council of Cuba (Consejo Ecum´enico de Cuba). Women constitute nearly 40 percent of the labor force and provide close to half of the country’s administrators. The Cuban economy faced great difficulty following the 1959 revolution. Production lagged, dependence on foreign assistance (mainly from the Soviet Union) increased, and real per capita income declined. Despite sporadic attempts at industrialization, the Castro regime emphasized agricultural development, and sugar remained the principal export. The nearly three decades of economic adversity was followed by a degree of recovery in 1988– 1989, generating expectations that renegotiation of

the country’s $6.4 billion external debt might be imminent; however, political developments within the “socialist camp” in 1989–1990 resulted in the effective loss of Cuba’s leading trade partners and a need to place the domestic economy on a near-wartime footing, including an expansion of rationing to include virtually all consumer goods. In May 1991, following a five-month suspension AT L A N T IC OCEAN

UNITED STATES

Gu l f o f Mexico

THE BAHAMAS

Havana

Matanzas Santa Clara

Pinar del Río

CUBA Camagüey

Holguín Guantánamo

Caribbean

Cayman Islands (U.K.)

Sea

Santiago de Cuba JAMAICA

0 0

100 Mi 100 Km

HAITI

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in food shipments from the Soviet Union, it was agreed that such shipments would thenceforth be made only on a barter basis; concurrently, it was announced that as of 1992 hard currency valuation would be required for Soviet oil. As a result, the government mounted a drive to achieve selfsufficiency in food production, coupled with an effort to augment foreign reserves by enhancing tourism and the export of pharmaceuticals. The opening of farmers’ markets on October 1, 1994, led to a substantial decline in domestic prices and in the black market rate for U.S. dollars. By December 1 the government had opened markets for consumer goods at deregulated prices. After suffering contraction of 40 percent from 1989–1994, the GDP grew, according to government figures, by an average of 4.7 percent annually during the next five years and expanded by 5.6 percent in 2000, before declining to 2.6 percent growth in 2003. Meanwhile, unemployment, although showing signs of recent improvement, was officially reported to be 32 percent in late 2003. Much of the difficulty stems from a long-standing U.S. trade embargo, which has left Cuban citizens facing what one New York Times reporter described as an “unending scramble to make ends meet.” Arguing that wages alone did not indicate “true purchasing power,” Cuba in 2005 adopted a new measure of economic growth that included free services to its citizens. The result was a surge in reported GDP, which precluded meaningful comparison with other developing economies.

Government and Politics Political Background Liberated from Spanish rule as a result of the Spanish-American War of 1898, Cuba was established as an independent republic on May 20, 1902, but remained subject to U.S. tutelage until abrogation of the so-called Platt Amendment in 1934. Subsequent political development was severely limited by the antidemocratic influence of Fulgencio BATISTA, who ruled the country directly or indirectly from 1933 to 1944 and maintained a repressive dictatorship from 1952 to 1959.

On January 1, 1959, a revolutionary movement under Fidel CASTRO Ruz, who had commenced guerrilla operations in 1956, overthrew Batista’s regime, which had been weakened by army and middle-class disaffection. After a brief period of moderation, the Castro government embarked on increasingly radical internal policies, which gradually developed into a full-scale social revolution purportedly based on the adaptation of Marxist-Leninist ideas to Latin American conditions. Relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the result of Castro’s strident anti-Americanism, yielding in October 1960 the expropriation of all U.S. business interests. The United States responded by severing diplomatic relations, imposing a trade embargo, and supporting an ill-fated invasion by anti-Castro Cuban exiles (at the Bay of Pigs) in April 1961. Coincident with the decline in U.S.-Cuban relations, Castro cultivated increasingly close ties with the Communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, whose emplacement of offensive missiles in Cuba precipitated the U.S.-Soviet “missile crisis” of October 1962. Thereafter, the Castro government consolidated its internal authority, aided in part by the departure of thousands of disaffected Cubans, most of whom settled in the United States. In the fifth general election on April 30 and May 7, 1989, 14,246 delegates were elected to local municipal bodies, with subsequent indirect election to provincial and national assemblies. Thereafter, at a party Central Committee meeting in January 1990, it was decided that the responsibilities of the municipal and provincial assemblies would be strengthened and that the National Assembly would be converted from a largely ceremonial body into a genuine parliament. Thus, on February 24, 1993, the National Assembly was for the first time directly elected, although the sole antiregime option (exercised by 11.6 percent of the participants) was to vote against the nominees, all of whom were elected. Heightened isolation and economic distress prompted a series of major policy changes in 1993. On July 26 the government announced that Cuban citizens would thenceforth be allowed to possess

CUBA

Political Status: Independent republic founded in 1902; under Marxist-inspired regime established January 1, 1959; designated a Communist system in December 1961; present constitution adopted February 16, 1976. Area: 42,803 sq. mi. (110,860 sq. km.). Population: 9,723,605 (1981C); 11,249,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): HAVANA (2,244,000), Santiago de Cuba (434,000), Camag¨uey (311,000), Holgu´ın (285,000), Santa Clara (216,000), Guant´anamo (215,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (official rate November 2, 2007: approximately 1 pesos = $1.22US). There are two pesos used in Cuba. One, the “regular” peso, is used for state salaries and government goods and services. The “convertible peso” is used by visiting foreigners and by Cubans for most goods and services. It had been pegged at 1.00 convertible peso = $1US for many years until the government announced two revaluations in the first half of 2005 (2006 exchange rate quoted above). The regular peso as of November 2, 2007, was trading at approximately 25 regular pesos = 1 convertible peso. Meanwhile, the dollar, which had been permitted to circulate since 1993, had ceased being accepted as legal tender as of November 8, 2004, by order of President Castro.

and spend U.S. dollars and other convertible currencies. Two days later, restrictions on exile visitations were ended, and on September 9 selfemployment in 117 occupations, encompassing individuals such as computer programmers, hairdressers, taxi drivers, and sellers of farm products, was legalized. In late October the new self-employed sector was declared “subject to progressive taxation, based on income” as part of a new revenue system designed to “re-establish order” in the state’s finances. One indicator of such a need was a sharp decline in the sugar harvest (an estimated 4.2 million tons, as contrasted with 7.0 million tons in 1992), which had forced suspension of sugar exports for a six-week period at midyear.

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President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers, and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba: (See headnote.) Fidel CASTRO Ruz; assumed office of Prime Minister in 1959; became First Secretary of the Communist Party on October 2, 1965; named President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers by the National Assembly on December 2, 1976; reappointed in 1981, 1986, 1993, 1998, and on March 16, 2003. Acting President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers: (See headnote.) Gen. Ra´ul CASTRO Ruz; designated First Vice President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers by the National Assembly on December 2, 1976; reappointed in 1981, 1986, 1993, 1998, and on March 16, 2003; named Acting President on July 31, 2006, following incapacitation of the president. Vice Presidents of the Council of State: Juan ALMEIDA Bosque, Corps Gen. Abelardo COLOME Ibarra, Carlos LAGE D´avila, Juan Esteban LAZO Hern´andez, Jos´e Ram´on MACHADO Ventura. Almeida has served since 1976; Machado was designated in December 1986; Colom´e, Lage, and Lazo were appointed on March 15, 1993, to replace Osmany CIENFUEGOS Gorriar´an, Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ Rodr´ıguez, and Pedro MIRET Prieto. All five incumbent vice presidents were reappointed on February 24, 1998, and on March 16, 2003.

The first major antigovernment riot in 35 years erupted on August 5, 1994, after police in Havana had intervened to prevent would-be emigrants from seizing a ferry and sailing it to Florida. (For a summary of the 1994 emigration crisis, see Foreign relations, below.) However, by mid-1995, in the wake of modest economic recovery, domestic opposition to the regime appeared to have waned. The second election to the National Assembly was held on January 11, 1998, with the 601 candidates approved by the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) again facing a “yes or no” decision from the voters. All of the candidates received the required 50 percent endorsement in what was officially reported as a 98 percent turnout. (President Castro hailed the election as a “vote of unity” by his

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country.) On February 24 the new assembly reappointed Castro to another five-year term as President of the Council of State. All six incumbent vice presidents were also reappointed (including Castro’s brother, First Vice President Ra´ul CASTRO Ruz, who had reportedly been exercising growing governmental influence), although some new members were included in the rest of the Council. The third direct election of assembly deputies was held on January 19, 2003. The results were identical to those of 1998, except that the number of members had been increased to 609. Following the poll, President Castro and all six incumbent vice presidents were again reappointed. On July 31, 2006, President Castro was hospitalized for an undisclosed but obviously serious internal illness, and he ceded power, on a provisional basis, to his brother Raul.

Constitution and Government A revised basic law, which had been under preparation for nearly a decade, was approved at the first PCC congress in December 1975, adopted by popular referendum on February 16, 1976, and declared in effect eight days later, on the anniversary of the commencement of the 1898 war of Cuban independence. It provided for an indirectly elected National Assembly, which, under a 1991 amendment, was changed to a directly elected body. The Assembly designates a Council of State from among its membership. The Council of State appoints a Council of Ministers in consultation with its president, who serves as head of state and, in his role of president of the Council of Ministers, as chief of government. The judiciary consists of a People’s Supreme Court in addition to intermediate and local courts. Members of the judiciary (as well as of the state council and cabinet) are subject to legislative recall. Under the 1976 constitution, Cuba’s 6 traditional provinces were abandoned in favor of a 14-province structure, with provincial assemblies designed to encourage greater popular involvement in government. Members of the provincial assemblies are drawn from 169 popularly elected municipal as-

semblies, an earlier provision for intraprovincial regional assemblies having been dropped following a “popular power” experiment in Matanzas Province in June 1975. Members of the municipal and provincial assemblies serve for terms of twoand-one-half years, while the National Assembly sits for five years. In mid-1991 the existing terms of both the national and subnational assemblies were extended, with municipal elections being held on December 20, 1992, and provincial and national assembly balloting taking place on February 24, 1993. The 1991 adoption of direct and secret balloting did not authorize opposition formations, and “the final objective of building a Communist society” was reaffirmed. However, in calling for socialist ownership of the means of production, the wording was revised to “basic means of production,” while (then) National Assembly president Juan ESCALONA Reguera subsequently declared that retention of the one-party system was necessary because of the U.S. economic blockade. In other changes, all references to the Soviet Union were deleted, the state’s religious orientation was characterized as laical rather than atheistic, and the sanctioning of “mixed enterprises” opened the door to joint ventures with foreign investors. In September 1995 investment rules were further relaxed to permit 100 percent foreign ownership, equality of opportunity for e´ migr´e investors, and free remittance abroad of profits and capital.

Foreign Relations Partly because of its attempt to promote Castrotype revolutions throughout Latin America, Cuba was for a number of years ostracized by most other Latin American governments. It was excluded from participation in the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962, and the OAS imposed diplomatic and commercial sanctions in 1964. However, following the 1967 death in Bolivia of the Argentine-born revolutionary Ernesto (“Ch´e”) GUEVARA, the Castro regime scaled down its support of external guerrilla activity, and by 1974 a number of OAS states had moved to

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reestablish relations. In July 1975 the OAS itself, while not formally lifting the sanctions, adopted a resolution stating that its members would thenceforth be “free to normalize” relations with Havana. Although Cuba no longer stands out as a selfproclaimed nemesis of other Latin American governments, its foreign relations were long shaped by an ingrained hostility toward the United States and other established governments in the Americas, and by a corresponding affinity for revolutionary movements around the world. In March 1969 it became the first country to accord formal recognition to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and during 1975 initiated a major program of military assistance to the Soviet-backed regime in Angola. As host of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State of the Nonaligned Movement in September 1979, it sought, with some success, to identify the “socialist camp” as the “natural ally” of the third world movement. Subsequently, Havana served as a conduit for the flow of military and other assistance to the sandinista government of Nicaragua. During 1981 Havana’s international posture was dominated by a massive emigration of Cuban citizens after President Castro had indicated that Cuban exiles in the United States would be permitted to pick up anyone who wished to leave from the port of Mariel. Subsequently, more than 114,000 Cubans departed by boat for Florida. In the wake of the Grenada crisis in October 1983, Cuban relations with the United States and the region at large fell to their lowest ebb in years, Cuba being placed in a “state of national alert.” Although there were indications of a thaw in 1984, with formal talks on the status of the Mariel refugees leading to a December 1984 immigration agreement, the accord was suspended by Havana in May 1985 after Radio Mart´ı, an “alternative” radio station directed at Cuba, had commenced transmissions from Florida. Five years later, following the U.S. launching of a companion TV Mart´ı, the government initiated 24-hour jamming of the broadcasts. A major foreign policy development in 1988 stemmed from a series of U.S.-mediated discussions among Cuban, Angolan, and South African

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representatives that commenced in London in May and concluded at UN headquarters in New York on December 22 with the signing of an accord for the withdrawal of an estimated 40,000–50,000 Cuban troops from Angola, coupled with South African acceptance of a 1978 Security Council resolution demanding UN-supervised elections for an independent Namibia. Under the agreement, which followed the departure of South African forces from Angola in September, Cuba pledged to withdraw its troops during a 30-month period. A similar pullout from Ethiopia (where nearly 15,000 Cubans had been deployed at the height of the Ogaden war) was completed in September 1989. In September 1991 Havana, reeling from the withdrawal of Soviet economic support (the Soviet Union would dissolve officially on December 31, 1991), reacted angrily to Moscow’s unilateral declaration that it would soon remove all of its military personnel from the island. It termed the announcement, made without reference to the presence of U.S. troops at Guant´anamo Bay, an “unconditional concession” that provided the United States with a “green light to go ahead with its aggressive plans against Cuba.” Nonetheless, the two governments agreed in September 1992 that the former Soviet military brigade that had been on the island since the 1962 missile crisis would be withdrawn by mid-1993. Earlier, in mid-August, a foreign office spokesperson indicated that Cuba was prepared to accede to the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty (see OPANAL, under Intergovernmental Organizations), a pledge that was fulfilled in March 1995. In October 1992 U.S. President George H. W. Bush signed the Cuban Democracy Act (popularly known as the “Torricelli Law”), which tightened the U.S. economic embargo by making it illegal for overseas subsidiaries of U.S. firms to trade with Cuba. In an unusually strong response, the UN General Assembly voted 59 to 3, with 92 abstentions, to support repeal of the measure, reflecting a steady erosion of the U.S. position. A similar vote in November 1995 yielded a drastically enhanced majority of 117–3–38, while the 14th such poll in 2005 was 182–4–1, with the Marshall Islands and Palau joining the United States and Israel in

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opposition. In actions reflecting Washington’s lack of political consensus, President Bill Clinton in October 1995 eased a number of constraints, including certain impediments to travel and communication, despite the approval, only days before, of a congressional bill to tighten the embargo. Earlier, a crisis had arisen over Cuban “boat people.” Castro, in evident frustration with U.S. intransigence over the embargo, announced in August 1994 that Cubans would no longer be prevented from leaving. More than 13,000 promptly did so (more than the total for the preceding decade). President Clinton reacted by declaring that Cubans arriving in Florida would be accorded the same treatment as Haitians in being denied automatic refugee status. The crisis eased late in the month when Clinton endorsed bilateral talks on “legal, orderly, and safe migration,” and on September 9 an agreement was concluded whereby Havana would reintroduce restrictions on “unsafe departures,” while the United States would move toward compliance with a 1984 agreement to issue up to 20,000 entry visas a year. The status of about 22,000 Cubans being held at Guant´anamo was eventually resolved in early May 1995, with Washington agreeing to admit them to the United States, while Havana agreed to accept the return of any further migrants attempting to reach the United States by sea. During 1998 the Castro regime participated in a number of initiatives designed to end its diplomatic isolation. In March Havana announced that it would launch negotiations to become the 16th member of Caricom and expressed an interest in becoming a member of the EU-affiliated African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. In early April Spain restored relations that had been severed 16 months earlier over the issue of Cuban dissidents at its embassy, and later in the month Jean Chr´etien made the first visit to Cuba by a Canadian prime minister. In mid-June a repatriation agreement was concluded with the Bahamas, while President Castro embarked on state visits to Jamaica, Barbados, Grenada, and the Dominican Republic during July and August. Thereafter, in what was viewed as a harbinger of “return” to the regional community,

Cuba on November 6 was admitted to full membership in the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI). Relations with the United States in late 1999 and the first half of 2000 were dominated by a custody battle over Eli´an GONZALEZ, whose mother and stepfather were among 11 Cuban nationals who drowned in an attempt to reach Florida on November 25, 1999. Despite demands by his natural father, Juan Miguel GONZALEZ, that Eli´an be returned to Cuba, family relatives in Miami obtained a temporary custody order. In March 2000 a federal court effectively upheld a decision by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to send the boy back to Cuba, and on April 6 Juan Miguel arrived to claim his son. The two were reunited after INS agents had forcibly seized Eli´an in the early morning of April 22 and remained secluded thereafter in Washington, D.C., until June 28, when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to preclude their embarking for Havana. On April 12, 2000, President Castro called for abolition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in an attack on the global capitalistic system during a Group of 77 summit in Havana. Fifteen days later, Cuba withdrew its ACP application after the European Union had voted with the United States in favor of a UN resolution that criticized Cuba’s record on human rights. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Havana in December 2000, the first such visit by a Russian leader since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The trip was described as an effort to “mend the ravaged relations” between the two countries, and several cooperation agreements were signed. Diplomatically, little reference was made to the estimated $20 billion Soviet-era debt still owed by Cuba, although several partially completed projects envisioned by the earlier lending were reportedly scrapped. At the United States’ insistence, Cuba was excluded from the Summit of the Americas held in Quebec, Canada, in April 2001, which endorsed establishment of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), in which Cuba was also not permitted to participate. When former U.S. President

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Jimmy Carter traveled to Cuba in May 2002, the U.S. administration of President George W. Bush criticized Carter for his suggestion that Washington consider ending the embargo. Among other things, Carter met with Cuban dissident Oswaldo PAYA, who had attracted international attention by submitting a petition to the National Assembly calling for a national referendum on the extension of political freedom. Relations with the United States deteriorated in 2003, even though U.S. food sales to Cuba surged and, despite retention of the embargo for most commodities, the United States by early 2004 had become Cuba’s seventh-largest trading partner. In June 2004 the Bush administration announced a series of measures drastically increasing restrictions on travel to the island. Under the new rules, CubanAmericans could visit only once every three years, instead of once a year, and more stringent limits were imposed on the amount of cash and baggage that could be carried. By contrast, a number of U.S. congressional delegations have traveled to Cuba, the largest a tenmember bipartisan group headed by U.S. Representative Jeff FLAKE that visited Havana on December 15–17, 2006. Upon his return, Flake asserted that Castro’s illness was an opportunity for the two countries to become reengaged, while warning that in the event of the Cuban leader’s death, “the chaos that many [have] predicted isn’t going to happen.” In a slap at the United States, Cuba in early 2006 won a seat on the recently launched UN Human Rights Council, formed as successor to the discredited UN Commission on Human Rights, which in April 2004, by a margin of one vote, had approved a motion censuring Cuba for human rights abuses.

Current Issues By early 2007 the dominant issue in Cuban affairs was Fidel Castro’s condition. Before entering the hospital, the Cuban leader said that relinquishing authority to his brother was “provisional” and requested that celebrations planned for his 80th birthday be deferred until the 50th Anniversary of the Revolutionary Armed Forces on December 2.

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However, he remained a hospital patient, with medical reports largely unavailable, except for assurances that, while afflicted with internal bleeding, he did not have cancer. Meanwhile, Ra´ul Castro displayed what appeared to be a new, if somewhat enigmatic, leadership style. While sharing Fidel’s deep-rooted antiAmericanism and opposition to political democracy, he was seen by some as favoring the Chinese example of opening up the economy, including lifting restrictions on foreign investment. Fueling such speculation was the fact that he had made a number of trips to China, whose trade with Cuba more than doubled to US$1.8 billion in 2006. On the other hand, National Assembly President Ricardo ALARCON de Quesada insisted in January 2007 that Cuba was not China and Ra´ul was not “Cuba’s Deng Xiaoping.” He went on to report that Fidel remained “very involved, very connected, very active in all manner of important decisions,” although not in “the same way he did before, because he has to dedicate a good part of his time to recuperating physically.” Gradual improvement in the stricken leader’s condition was subsequently reported, and in mid-April Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez, a close friend and ally, insisted that, although remaining hospitalized, Castro had “almost totally recovered” and had “reassumed a good part of his duties.”

Political Parties Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista Cubano—PCC). The country’s only authorized political party, the PCC is a direct descendant of the Rebel Army and the 26th of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio), which constituted Fidel Castro’s personal political following during the anti-Batista period. The organizational revolution began in 1961 with the formation of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas—ORI), which included the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP), the 26th of July Movement, and the Revolutionary Directorate (Directorio Revolucionario—DR). The ORI was

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transformed into the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revoluci´on Socialista Cubana—PURSC) in 1963, the latter being redesignated as the Communist Party of Cuba in 1965. The first PCC congress was held December 17–22, 1975, and the second December 17–20, 1980. The third congress, which held its first session February 4–7, 1986, reconvened November 30–December 2, primarily to discuss a campaign aimed at the “rectification of mistakes and negative tendencies” that had been launched by President Castro in July. The rectification campaign received added emphasis at an extraordinary plenum on February 16, 1990, during which the Central Committee reiterated its commitment to one-party MarxismLeninism, which should, however, be “adapted to Cuban mentality, history and traditions.” During its fourth congress, held in Santiago de Cuba October 10–14, 1991, the PCC endorsed direct election to the National Assembly, dropped a requirement that only atheists could become party members, abolished the party Secretariat and the appointment of alternates to other party organs, and approved a substantially restructured Politburo from which five existing members were excluded. In July 1994 numerous changes in provincial leaders were announced as part of a revamping of political cadres. The party’s fifth congress was held in Havana October 8–10, 1997. At a Plenary Party Meeting on July 1, 2006, a new 12-member Executive Committee was launched, seemingly as a resuscitation of the former Secretariat. In addition, seven additions to the Central Committee were announced, including Fran´ Vald´es, president of the National cisco SOBERON Bank, and six provincial first secretaries. First Secretary: Dr. Fidel CASTRO Ruz (President, State Council and Council of Ministers). Acting First Secretary: Gen. Ra´ul CASTRO Ruz (Acting President, State Council and Council of Ministers). Other Members of Politburo: Ricardo ALARCON de Quesada (President of National Assembly), Juan ALMEIDA Bosque (Vice President, State Council), Jos´e Ram´on BALAGUER

Cabrera (International Relations Chief, Central Committee), Concepci´on CAMPA Huergo (Director of Finlay Institute), Miguel Diaz CANEL Berm´udez (First Secretary, Villa Clara Provincial Committee), Lt. Gen. Julio CASAS Regueiro (First Deputy Minister, Revolutionary Armed Forces), Gen. Leopoldo CINTRA Fr´ıas (Chief, Western Army), Gen. Abelardo COLOME Ibarra (Vice President, State Council, and Interior Minister), Misael ENAMORADO Dager (First Secretary, Las Tunas Provincial Committee), Gen. Ramon ESPINOSA Mart´ın (Chief, Eastern Army), Alfredo ´ Morales (former Agriculture Minister), JORDAN Carlos LAGE D´avila (Vice President, State Council and Secretary, Council of Ministers), Esteb´an LAZO Hern´andez (Vice President, State Council), Jos´e Ram´on MACHADO Ventura (Vice President, State Council), Abel Enrique PRIETO Jim´enez (Culture Minister), Juan Carlos ROBINSON Agramonte (First Secretary Santiago de Cuba Provincial Committee), Lt. Gen. Ulises ROSALES del Toro (Sugar Minister), Pedro ROSS Leal (Secretary General, Confederation of Cuban Workers), Pedro SAEZ Montejo (First Secretary, Havana City Provincial Committee), Jorge Luis SIERRA Cruz (First Secretary, Holgu´ın Provincial Committee).

Dissident Groups There are numberous dissident groups that tend to fluctuate, in part as their leaders are jailed or released. Many have appealed, without success, for official recognition. As of early 2007 about 365 such groups had joined an Assembly to Promote the Civil Society in Cuba (Asamblea para Primover la Sociedad Civil en Cuba), led by Martha Beatriz ROQUE Cabello.

Legislature A unicameral National Assembly of People’s Power (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular) was convened, with a five-year term, on December 2, 1976, following elections (the first since 1958) to municipal assemblies, which in turn had elected delegates to both provincial and national legislative

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Cabinet As of May 1, 2007 see headnote President, Council of Ministers

Fidel Castro Ruz

Ministers Acting President, Council of Ministers Vice President, Council of Ministers Executive Committee Vice Presidents, Council of Ministers

Gen. Ra´ul Castro Ruz Jos´e Ramon Fern´andez Alvarez Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriar´an Carlos Lage D´avila Gen. Pedro Miret Prieto Jos´e Luis Rodr´ıguez Garci´a

Ministers Agriculture Auditing and Control Basic Industry Computer Science and Communications Construction Culture Domestic Trade Economy and Planning Education Finance and Prices Fishing Industry Food Industry Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation Foreign Relations Foreign Trade Higher Education Interior Iron, Steel, and Engineering Industry Justice Labor and Social Security Light Industry Public Health Revolutionary Armed Forces Science, Technology, and Environment Sugar Industry Tourism Transportation Without Portfolio President, National Bank of Cuba Secretary, Council of Ministers Executive Committee [f] = female

Maria del Carmen P´erez Hern´andez (Acting) [f] Gladys Maria Bejarano Portera [f] Yadir´a Garc´ıa Vera [f] Ramiro Valdes Mendez Fidel Fernando Figueroa de la Paz Abel Enrique Prieto Jim´enez Marino Murillo Jorge Jos´e Luis Rodr´ıguez Garc´ıa Luis Ignacio G´omez Guti´errez Georgina Barreiro Fajardo [f] Alfredo L´opez Vald´es Alejandro Roca Iglesias Marta Lomas Morales [f] Felipe Ram´on P´erez Roque Ra´ul de la Nuez Ram´ırez Juan Vela Valdes Gen. Abelardo Colom´e Ibarra Fernando Acosta Santana Roberto D´ıaz Sotolongo Alfredo Morales Cartaya Estela Martha Dom´ınguez Ariosa [f] Jos´e Ram´on Balaguer Cabrera Gen. Ra´ul Castro Ruz Fernando Mario Gonz´alez Berm´udez (Acting) Gen. Ulises Rosales del Toro Col. Manuel Marrero Cruz Jorge Luis Sierra Ricardo Cabrisas Ru´ız Wilfredo L´opez Rodr´ıguez Francisco Sober´on Vald´es Carlos Lage D´avila

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bodies. A similar procedure was used to elect assemblies that convened in December 1981 and December 1986. In July 1991 the assembly voted to extend its existing mandate by one year to consider reform proposals within the one-party context. The second direct election to the nationwide body was held on January 11, 1998, coincident with replenishment of the provincial assemblies. All 601 candidates approved by the Communist Party of Cuba received the 50 percent favorable vote required for election. (The assembly had been enlarged from 589 to 601 members for the balloting; however, when the new body convened, its membership was reported to be 595.) The most recent poll, for 609 members, was held on January 19, 2003. President: Ricardo ALARCON de Quesada.

Communications The press is censored and all channels of communication are under state control.

Press The following newspapers are published in Havana, unless otherwise noted: Granma, official PCC organ, morning and weekly editions; Juventud Rebelde, organ of the Communist Youth; Los Trabajadores, labor oriented; Tribuna de la Habana; Adelante (Camag¨uey); Sierra Maestra (Santiago de Cuba); Vanguardia (Santa Clara). Circulation figures are currently unknown because of the introduction of restrictions in the availability of newsprint to all papers (including party organs) in late 1990. In addition, it was announced in February 1991 that Granma would thenceforth be issued only from Tuesday to Saturday, while Juventud Rebelde and Los Trabajadores would appear only on Sunday and Monday, respectively.

News Agencies The domestic facilities are the governmentcontrolled Prensa Latina and Agencia de Informa-

ci´on Nacional (AIN). A large number of foreign agencies maintain offices in Havana.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is controlled by the Ministry of Communications and the Instituto Cubano de Radio y Televisi´on. There are five national radio networks (classical music, instrumental music, general entertainment, music and sports, 24-hour news) in addition to short-wave service provided by Radio Habana, Cuba; about 50 TV stations operate throughout the country. As of 2005 there were approximately 17 Internet users and 34 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 255 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people. In March 1994 an independent panel established by the U.S. Congress recommended changes in television broadcasts to Cuba, including conversion of TV Mart´ı transmissions from VHF (confined to predawn hours because of a requirement under international law not to interfere with local programming) to UHF (thus affording prime-time programming because Cuba did not use the latter channels).

Intergovernmental Representation There are, at present, no diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States. On September 1, 1977, however, a U.S. interest section was established in the Swiss Embassy in Havana; concurrently, a Cuban interest section was established in the Czech Embassy in Washington, which moved to the Swiss Embassy after the post-Communist Czech government announced in early 1990 that it no longer wished to serve as Havana’s “protecting power” in the United States. Permanent Representative to the UN: Rodrigo MALMIERCA D´IAZ IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, ALADI, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

DOMINICA COMMONWEALTH

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DOMINICA

The Country The largest of the West Indies Associated States as constituted in 1967, Dominica is located between Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Windward Islands of the eastern Caribbean. Claimed by both France and Great Britain until coming under the latter’s exclusive control in 1805, the island continues to reflect pronounced French influence. Most of its inhabitants are descended from West African slaves who were imported as plantation laborers in the 17th and 18th centuries, although a few hundred members of the Carib Indian tribe, which once controlled the entire Caribbean and gave the area its name, remain. Roman Catholicism is the dominant religion, but there are also long-established Anglican and Methodist communities. One of the poorest and least developed of third world countries, Dominica was devastated by hurricanes in 1979 and 1980, which virtually destroyed the economy. Particularly hard hit was banana production, which typically accounts for about 70 percent of the country’s exports. An increase in tourist arrivals, some inflow of foreign capital in support of labor-intensive export industry, and improved banana output subsequently yielded a measure of economic recovery, although sustained development has been hindered by poor infrastructure, including an inadequate road system, and the ravages of further major hurricanes (notably Hugo in September 1989 and Luis in September 1995). Real GDP growth in 1994 was reported to be 2.1 percent, as contrasted with 6.6 percent in 1990, while unemployment was approximately 23 percent. The growth rate fluctuated thereafter, despite good showing by tourism and nonbanana agriculture, because of hurricane-induced banana losses,

registering an estimated 3.5 percent in 1998 but dropping to 0.3 percent in 1999. It declined further to –5.2 percent in 2002 but revived thereafter, reaching 3.1 percent in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background An object of contention between Britain and France in the 18th century, Dominica was administered after 1833 as part of the British Leeward Islands. In 1940 it was incorporated into the Windward Islands, which also included Grenada,

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St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. It participated in the Federation of the West Indies from 1958 to 1962 and became one of the six internally self-governing West Indies Associated States in March 1967. The West Indies Act of 1966 stipulated that the islands’ external dependency on Britain was completely voluntary and could be terminated by either party at any time. Thus, having failed to agree on a plan for regional unity, the Associated States declared in December 1975 that each would separately seek full independence. The details of an independence constitution for Dominica were discussed at a London conference in May 1977, and in July 1978 both houses of Parliament approved an Order in Council terminating the association as of November 3. Pending a new election, the existing premier, Patrick Roland JOHN, was designated prime minister, while the incumbent governor, Sir Louis COOLS-LARTIQUE, continued as interim chief of state. Following government rejection of an opposition nominee for president, the speaker of the House, Fred E. DEGAZON, was elected to the largely ceremonial post by the legislature and was sworn in December 22, 1978. Subsequently, in the wake of an extended general strike and a series of opposition demonstrations in Roseau, President Degazon retired to Britain, his successor, Sir Cools-Lartique, also being forced to resign only 24 hours after his return to office on June 15, 1979. On June 21 Prime Minister John was obliged to step down after a number of his legislative supporters had moved into opposition, the interim president, Jenner ARMOUR, designating former agriculture minister Oliver James SERAPHINE as his successor. In the legislative balloting on July 21, 1980, both Seraphine and John were denied reelection, and Mary Eugenia CHARLES of the victorious Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) was asked by President Aurelius MARIE (who had succeeded Armour in late February) to form a new government. There were two attempts by supporters of former prime minister John to overthrow the government in 1981, the second of which included an effort to free him from a jail term that had been imposed

under a state of emergency. Following his acquittal and release from prison in June 1982, John moved to reunify the opposition Democratic Labour Party (DLP), from which Seraphine had withdrawn in 1979. The effort succeeded in mid-1983, Seraphine being designated DLP leader and John his deputy. In early 1985 opposition forces further closed ranks as the DLP absorbed the United Democratic Labour Party (UDLP) and the Dominica Liberation Movement Alliance (DLMA), although the enlarged group failed to oust the DFP in the parliamentary election of July 1. Subsequently, John was convicted on retrial of the 1981 conspiracy charge, being sentenced in October to 12 years in prison; he was released on May 29, 1990, after having served only four and one-half years of his sentence and in late 1991 was appointed general secretary of the National Workers’ Union. Prime Minister Charles remained in office following the May 1990 election, at which the DFP retained a bare one-seat majority of Assembly seats. While continuing as prime minister, Charles stepped down as party leader on August 14, 1993, in favor of Brian ALLEYNE. However, Alleyne proved unable to prevent a one-seat victory on June 12, 1995, by the United Workers’ Party (UWP), whose leader, Edison JAMES, was named to form a new government. Since the DFP and DLP had each won five seats, Alleyne accepted appointment as leader of the opposition with the understanding that he would withdraw after one year in favor of the DLP’s Roosevelt (Rosie) DOUGLAS; however, the change was mandated only a month after the election when a DFP victor was declared ineligible for parliamentary service (although subsequently reinstated). In August 1996 Alleyne resigned his parliamentary seat to accept a judicial appointment in Grenada, the DFP again being reduced to thirdparty status by losing the ensuing by-election. The DLP won 10 of 21 elective Assembly seats in the election of January 31, 2000, Douglas being named prime minister as head of a coalition with the DFP on February 3. Following Douglas’s death on October 1, the deputy DLP leader, Pierre CHARLES, was sworn in as his successor.

DOMINICA

Political Status: Former British dependency; joined West Indies Associated States in 1967; independent member of the Commonwealth since November 3, 1978. Area: 290.5 sq. mi. (752.4 sq. km.). Population: 71,727 (2001C); 69,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): ROSEAU (14,000). Official Language: English (a French patois is widely spoken). Monetary Unit: East Caribbean Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.70 EC dollars = $1US). President: Nicholas LIVERPOOL; elected by the House of Assembly on October 2, 2003, and inaugurated for a five-year term on October 6, succeeding Vernon SHAW. Prime Minister: Roosevelt SKERRIT (Dominica Labour Party); sworn in January 8, 2004, to succeed Pierre CHARLES (Dominica Labour Party), who died on January 6; remained in office following election of May 5, 2005.

No major government changes were made at that time, although a downsized and reshuffled cabinet was announced in June 2001. Charles died on January 6, 2004, and was succeeded two days later by Roosevelt SKERRIT, who, at age 31, became the world’s youngest head of government and remained in office following the election of May 5, 2005. Subsequently, September 6 marked the death of the “Iron Lady of the Caribbean” and the region’s first female prime minister, Dame Mary Eugenia Charles.

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agreement between the two. The president may not hold office for more than two terms. Parliament consists of the president and a House of Assembly, which includes one representative from each electoral constituency (as defined by an Electoral Boundaries Commission) and nine senators who, according to the wishes of the legislature, may be either elected or appointed (five on the advice of the prime minister and four on the advice of the leader of the opposition). The term of the House is five years, subject to dissolution. The president appoints as prime minister the elected member who commands a majority in the House; in addition, he may remove the prime minister from office if, following a no-confidence vote, the latter does not resign or request a dissolution. Provision is made for a Public Service Commission to make appointments to and exercise disciplinary control over the public service, as well as for a Police Service Commission and a Public Service Board of Appeal. The court system embraces the Supreme Court of the West Indies Associated States (redesignated, in respect of Dominica, as the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court), courts of summary jurisdiction, and district courts (the latter dealing with minor criminal offenses and civil cases involving sums of not more than $EC500). In late 2004 Parliament approved legislation for Dominica’s participation in the Trinidad-based Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), replacing the London-based Privy Council as the country’s final court of appeal. Partially elected local government bodies function in the principal towns and villages, with Roseau and Portsmouth controlled by town councils consisting of both elected and nominated members.

Constitution and Government Under the constitution that became effective at independence, the Commonwealth of Dominica is a “sovereign democratic republic” based on a respect for the principles of social justice. The head of state is a president who is elected for a fiveyear term by the legislature after joint nomination by the prime minister and the leader of the opposition, or by secret ballot in the event of dis-

Foreign Relations Although Dominica was admitted to the Commonwealth at independence and to the United Nations shortly thereafter, its diplomatic ties are extremely limited. It maintains only token representation in Washington, most official contacts with the United States being maintained through the U.S. ambassador to Barbados, who is also accredited

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to Roseau. Regional memberships include the Organization of American States (OAS) and various Caribbean groupings, including the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Closely allied with the United States, upon which it relies heavily for foreign aid, Dominica joined the multinational force that participated in the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (see article on Grenada), and endorsed the U.S. bombing of Libya in April 1986. However, formal diplomatic ties were established between Dominica and Libya in early 2001, prompting Tripoli to promise significant development aid. Dominica also signed several social and economic cooperation agreements with Cuba in 2001. More importantly, it switched relations with Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China in early 2004, after China had offered a $12 million aid package. Prime Minister Charles supported an effort by St. Vincent’s James Mitchell to persuade the seven OECS members to form a unitary government. Given no discernable progress in the matter, Dominica joined with its Windward Island neighbors to launch a four-member grouping. During the third meeting of a Regional Constituent Assembly in Roseau, Dominica, in September 1991, agreement was reached on a federal system with a common legislature and executive. However, no further action on the less inclusive structure has yet taken place. A long-standing dispute has centered on the status of tiny Bird Island (Isla de Aves), 70 miles west of Dominica but controlled by Venezuela, some 350 miles to the south. In 2001 Dominica asked its Caribbean neighbors for support in pursuing its claim to the island, which falls within competing maritime economic zones. The action was sharply rebuffed by Venezuela, which in 2005 established a naval base on the island. In June 2006 Prime Minister Skerritt conceded that the international community recognized Venezuelan sovereignty over the island and announced that a bipartisan commission would be established to delineate the maritime boundary. Concurrently, it was announced that the two countries had concluded a joint energy agreement to supply oil byproducts to Dominica.

Current Issues Dominca’s small size has made it extremely vulnerable to external pressures, including, most importantly, those from Venezuela, which manifestly used “oil diplomacy” in gaining its way on the Bird Island dispute. In September 2006, two months after Skeritt’s reversal on the issue, Venezuela agreed to provide Dominica with up to 1,000 barrels of fuel oil per day under low-interest financing and to join a feasibility study on the construction of a smallscale refinery to supply oil to other Caribbean countries. Earlier, President Liverpool had broached a number of constitutional reforms, including direct election of the president to serve for a five-year term as both head of state and head of government.

Political Parties The Dominican party system has been in a state of considerable flux since independence. In early 1979 a number of parliamentary members of the original Dominica Labour Party (DLP) withdrew under the leadership of Oliver Seraphine to form the Democratic Labour Party (subsequently the Dominica Democratic Labour Party—DDLP), while the cabinet named by Seraphine on June 21 drew on a recently organized Committee of National Salvation (CNS)—an alliance of former opposition groups that included the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP), headed by Eugenia Charles. The CNS was, however, divided between a leftwing faction, representing trade-union interests, and the traditionally conservative DFP. Another component of the CNS, the National Alliance Party (NAP), had recently been formed by Michael A. DOUGLAS, who subsequently became finance minister in the Seraphine government. The 1980 election was contested by a rump of the DLP, led by Patrick John; the DDLP; the DFP; and a recently organized Dominica Liberation Movement Alliance (DLMA). The principal contenders in 1985 were the DFP and the Labour Party of Dominica (LPD), with the recently formed United Workers’ Party (UWP) becoming a serious

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contender in 1990 and securing a legislative majority in 1995. In 2000 the DLP won a plurality and formed a coalition government with the DFP as its junior partner.

Government Parties Dominica Labour Party (DLP). The present DLP was formed in early 1985 by merger of the preexisting Dominica Labour Party (DLP), the United Dominica Labour Party (UDLP), and the Dominica Liberation Movement Alliance (DLMA). The dominant party after the 1975 election, the DLP was weakened by the defection of Oliver Seraphine and others in 1979 as well as by a variety of charges against party leader Patrick John, including an allegation that, as prime minister, he had attempted to secure South African backing for a number of developmental projects. The DLP won no seats in the 1980 election, and John was subsequently charged with attempting to overthrow the government. After leaving the DLP, Seraphine launched the Democratic Labour Party, restyled the Dominica Democratic Labour Party (DDLP) before the 1980 election, at which it secured two Assembly seats without, however, returning its leader. In late 1981 the opposition parliamentarian, Michael Douglas, who claimed to have been designated DDLP leader at a meeting in September, was expelled from the party and organized the UDLP, while Seraphine brought the DDLP back into the DLP in mid-1983. A self-proclaimed “new left” grouping, the DLMA was organized by Atherton MARTIN following his dismissal from the Seraphine government in October 1979, allegedly for advocating closer links to Cuba. In January 1984 an investigation was launched into the activities of the group’s general secretary, William REVIERE, following the discovery, during the Grenada invasion, of letters from him requesting aid from Eastern-bloc countries. In a contest for the DLP leadership, Douglas defeated Seraphine at a merger conference by a vote of 12–3, Seraphine and Henry Dyer, former minister of communications and works in the Charles

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government, being elected deputy leaders. Concurrently, John was named DLP general secretary, a post that he was obliged to vacate, along with his Assembly seat, when he was reimprisoned in October. (John resigned from the party in September 1987 in a move that was interpreted as aimed at securing his freedom.) Despite a dispute as to who would stand in a by-election to replace John, Douglas was reelected party leader at an August 1986 DLP convention; in March 1992 he was reported to be terminally ill with inoperable cancer and on November 29 the annual party convention elected his brother, Rosie Douglas, as his successor. In June 1995 the DLP won five House seats on a third-place vote share of 29.6 percent. Its leader succeeded Brian Alleyne as leader of the opposition when a DFP seat was vacated in July 1995. He became prime minister following the election of January 31, 2000. Douglas died on October 1, 2000, and was succeeded by his (then) deputy party leader, Pierre Charles. Charles died on January 6, 2004, and was succeeded by Roosevelt Skerrit. Leaders: Roosevelt SKERRIT (Prime Minister and Party Leader), Ambrose GEORGE (Deputy Leader), Peter ST. JEAN (Party President). Dominica Freedom Party (DFP). A right-ofcenter grouping long associated with propertied interests in Roseau, the DFP won 17 of 21 elective House of Assembly seats in 1980, 15 in 1985, and a bare majority of 11 in 1990. In August 1993 the party elected Foreign Affairs Minister Brian ALLEYNE to succeed Dame Eugenia Charles as DFP leader after the prime minister’s retirement before the next election. The DFP won a plurality of 35.8 percent of the votes in the balloting of June 12, 1995, but captured only 5 of 21 house seats, one of which was briefly vacated in July 1995 by the High Court, which ruled that the incumbent was a public service employee. In April 1996 Charles Savarin, Dominica’s former ambassador to the European Union, was elected party leader, in succession to Alleyne, who had resigned for “personal and professional reasons.”

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Cabinet As of April 1, 2007 Prime Minister

Roosevelt Skerrit (DLP)

Ministers Agriculture, Fisheries, and Environment Caribbean Affairs and Overseas Nationals Community Development and Gender Affairs Economic Development and Planning Education, Sports and Youth Affairs, and Human Resource Development Energy and Ports Finance and Economic Planning Foreign Affairs and Trade Health and Social Security Housing and Lands Immigration Information and Culture Labor and Public Service Legal Affairs and Attorney General National Security Prime Minister’s Office Telecommunications Tourism, Industry, and Private Sector Relations

Collin McIntyre (DLP) Roosevelt Skerrit (DLP) Matthew Walter (DLP) Julius Timothy Vince Henderson (DLP) Reginald Austrie (DLP) Roosevelt Skerrit (DLP) Charles Savarin (DFP) John Fabien (DFP) Reginald Austrie (DLP) Ian Douglas (DLP) Matthew Walter (DLP) Charles Savarin (DFP) Ian Douglas (DLP) Roosevelt Skerrit (DLP) Rayburn Blackmore (DLP) Reginal Austrie (DLP) Yvor Nassief (DFP)

Junior Ministers Caribbean Affairs Public Works and Public Utilities Tourism and Industry

The DFP won two legislative seats in January 2000, thereafter joining the DLP in a government coalition. Leaders: Charles SAVARIN (Foreign Affairs Minister and Party Leader), Vanoulst Jno CHARLES (President of the Party).

Opposition Party United Workers’ Party (UWP). The UWP was launched in July 1988 by the former general manager of the Dominica Banana Marketing Corporation to “promote sound and orderly development” in the face of an “erosion of basic democratic rights” and a “state of fear in the nation.” The party

Kelly Graneau (DLP) Ambrose George (DLP) Loreen Bannis-Roberts

won six House seats in the 1990 election, supplanting the DLP as the principal opposition grouping. In 1995 it secured a narrow majority of 11 seats on a second-place vote share of 34.4 percent; its margin was strengthened by the acquisition of an additional seat in a by-election in August 1996. It returned to opposition after winning only nine Assembly seats in January 2000, one of which was lost in 2005. Leaders: Earl WILLIAMS (Leader of the Opposition), Ron GREEN (President). Also active are the Dominica Progressive Party (DPP), led by Leonard (Pappy) BAPTISTE; A Righteous Kingdom Party (ARKP), launched

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in early 2005 by Hermina VALENTINE as Dominica’s first Christian party; and the People’s Democratic Movement, formed by William Pava RIVIERE in mid-2006.

Legislature Parliament consists of the president, ex officio, and a House of Assembly that sits for a five-year term and encompasses 21 elected representatives and 9 senators who, at the discretion of the House, may be either appointed or elected, in addition to the speaker and the attorney general. Following the election of May 5, 2005, the Dominica Labour Party held 13 representative seats; and the United Workers’ Party, 8. Speaker: Alix BOYD-KNIGHT.

Communications Press The following are published in Roseau: New Chronicle (3,000), independent weekly; The Trop-

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ical Star (3,000), weekly; Official Gazette (550), weekly.

Broadcasting and Computing The government-operated Dominica Broadcasting Corporation (DBC) provides radio service in English and French patois; two independent subscription services, Marpin Television and Video One, offer cable programs from the United States. As of 2005 there were approximately 182 personal computers and 12 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to Dominica: Mary Martin OURISMAN (resident in Barbados) Permanent Representative to the UN: Crispin S. GREGOIRE IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OECS, OIF, OPANAL, WTO

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC R E P U´ B L I C A D O M I N I C A N A

The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern two-thirds of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, which it shares with Haiti. The terrain is varied, including mountains, fertile plains, and some desert. About 70 percent of the population is of mixed ancestry, both mestizo and mulatto, with small minorities (about 15 percent each) of pure Caucasian (Spanish) and Negro origin. The cultural tradition is distinctly Spanish, with 98 percent of the people professing allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church. In 2000, not counting unpaid agricultural family workers, 31 percent of the adult female population was in the official labor force. Female representation in government has long been virtually nonexistent, although President Fern´andez named two women to cabinet posts during his first term and three in his second. The Dominican Republic’s economy is primarily agricultural, the leading cash crops being sugar, coffee, cocoa, and tobacco. The agricultural sector employs nearly 50 percent of the labor force and accounts for nearly half of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. Manufacturing is largely oriented toward agricultural processing, but deposits of gold, silver, ferronickel, and bauxite contribute significantly to export earnings. In the 1980s spiraling foreign indebtedness and plummeting commodity prices severely crippled the economy, with austerity measures further inhibiting the capacity of most individuals to meet basic food and shelter needs. During the period unemployment was consistently in excess of 20 percent, with inflation soaring to more than 60 percent in 1989. Partially offsetting a decline in world commodity prices was a surge in tourism, which gave rise to an increas-

ingly active service sector. As a result, economic growth rose to 8.3 percent in 1999 (one of the world’s highest such increases), with inflation dropping to less than 6.0 percent. By 2003, however, the country again faced economic crisis, with mounting public debt, surging inflation, and economic contraction of –1.0 percent. Thereafter, a series of comprehensive macroeconomic policies by President Fern´andez generated another resurgence, with 2005 showing a 7.0 percent increase in GDP, a decline in inflation to 7.4 percent, and a reduction in unemployment to 17 percent. Further growth of 10.7 percent in 2006, with inflation at 5.0 percent,

AT L A N T IC O C E A N Monte Cristi

Puerto Plata Santiago de los Caballeros

HAITI

The Country

San Francisco de Macorís

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Santo Domingo

San Pedro de Macorís

Barahona Pedernales Caribbean

0 0

80 Mi 80 Km

Sea

Higüey

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was termed “extraordinary” by a U.S. investment analyst.

Government and Politics Political Background Since winning its independence from Spain in 1821 and from Haiti in 1844, the Dominican Republic has been plagued by recurrent domestic conflict and foreign intervention. Administered by a U.S. military governor from 1916 to 1924, the country entered into a 30-year period of control by Gen. Rafael Leonidas TRUJILLO Molina in 1930. Trujillo ruled personally from 1930 to 1947 and indirectly thereafter until his assassination in 1961, his death giving rise to renewed political turmoil. An election in December 1962 led to the inauguration of Juan BOSCH Gavi˜no, a left-ofcenter democrat, as president in February 1963. Bosch was overthrown in September 1963 by a military coup led by (then) Col. El´ıas WESSIN y Wessin. Subsequently, the military installed a civilian triumvirate that ruled until April 1965, when civil war erupted. U.S. military forces—later incorporated into an Inter-American Peace Force sponsored by the Organization of American States (OAS)—intervened on April 28, 1965, and imposed a truce while arrangements were made to establish a provisional government and prepare for new elections. Dr. Joaqu´ın BALAGUER Ricardo, a moderate who had been president at the time of Trujillo’s assassination, defeated Bosch at an election held in June 1966. Emphasizing material development and political restraint, Balaguer was reelected in 1970 and successfully dealt with an attempted coup in 1971. In 1974 he was virtually unopposed for election to a fourth term, all of his principal opponents having withdrawn in anticipation of election irregularities. After the election Silvestre Antonio GUZMAN Fern´andez, speaking on behalf of the opposition coalition, demanded annulment of the results; however, he agreed not to press the demand after securing Balaguer’s assurance that he would not seek further reelection in 1978. Despite his pledge, Balaguer contested the 1978 election

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but lost to Guzm´an Fern´andez by a three-to-two majority. The inauguration of the new president on August 16 was the first occasion in Dominican history that an elected incumbent had yielded power to an elected successor. In late 1981 four-time former chief executive Balaguer surprised many observers by announcing that he would seek to regain the presidency in 1982, despite his age at 74 and failing eyesight. The announcement came in the wake of mounting economic problems and a significant weakening of President Guzm´an’s influence within the ruling Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). At midyear, Guzm´an declared that he would not seek reelection and formally endorsed Vice President Jacobo MAJLUTA Azar as his successor. However, at a PRD convention in November Majluta was decisively rejected in favor of Guzm´an’s arch rival, Salvador JORGE Blanco, who had been defeated for the 1978 nomination and whom Guzm´an had succeeded in ousting from the party presidency in late 1979. In the May 1982 election, Jorge Blanco defeated Balaguer by a 10 percent margin, while the PRD retained its majority in both houses of Congress. On July 4 President Guzm´an died of an apparently self-inflicted gunshot wound, being succeeded on an acting basis by Majluta Azar until Jorge Blanco’s inauguration on August 16. In the vote on May 16, 1986, Balaguer was elected to a fifth term, narrowly defeating Majluta after the PRD had succumbed to severe internal friction attributed primarily to a left-wing faction ˜ G´omez. led by Jos´e Francisco PENA Announcement of the 1990 presidential outcome was delayed for nearly a month, with Balaguer being credited in mid-June with a 14,000vote victory over former president Juan Bosch. The paper-thin victory was equaled in the Senate, with Balaguer’s Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) retaining control by a margin of only one seat; by contrast, the opposition secured an overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Balaguer was initially declared the winner of the May 1994 presidential race by fewer than 30,000 votes. However, only three weeks before the

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Political Status: Independent republic established in 1844; under constitutional regime reestablished July 1, 1966. Area: 18,816 sq. mi. (48,734 sq. km.). Population: 8,562,541 (2002C); 9,196,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): SANTO DOMINGO (1,922,000), Santiago de los Caballeros (526,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (market rate November 2, 2007: 33.70 pesos = $1US). ´ President: Leonel Antonio FERNANDEZ Reyna (Dominican Liberation Party); served as President 1996–2000; reelected on May 16, 2004, and inaugurated on August 16 for a four-year term, succeeding Rafael Hip´olito MEJ´IA Domingues (Dominican Revolutionary Party). Vice President: Rafael ALBURQUERQUE (Dominican Liberation Party); elected on May 16, 2004, and inaugurated on August 16, for a term concurrent with that of the President, succeeding Milagros ORTIZ Bosch (Dominican Revolutionary Party).

August 16 constitutional deadline for swearing in a new president the Santo Domingo electoral board responded to numerous complaints by voiding the results (40 percent of the total) at the capital. On August 2 the Junta Electoral Central (JCE) ignored a report by its electoral committee in overruling the Santo Domingo body. However, the action drew intense opposition, including a threat of military intervention, and on August 10 Balaguer concluded a “Pact for Democracy” (“Pacto por la Democracia”) with Jos´e Pe˜na G´omez, who had succeeded Majluta as PRD leader, to foreshorten the presidential term to 18 months, with new balloting on November 16, 1995. While Bosch’s Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) also supported the accord, it subsequently reversed itself and joined with the PRSC in endorsing a two-year term. On August 14 a constitutional amendment to such effect was hurriedly approved by Congress, along with

amendments banning future presidents from serving consecutive terms, reforming the JCE, creating a National Judiciary Council to ensure the independence of the judiciary, and establishing dual citizenship for Dominicans living outside the country. The PRD responded to revision of the August 10 agreement by withdrawing from the congressional session and boycotting Balaguer’s inauguration of his seventh term. At first-round presidential balloting on May 16, 1996, the PRD’s Pe˜na G´omez was accorded a 45.9 percent plurality, substantially outdistancing the ´ PLD’s Leonel FERNANDEZ Reyna (38.9 percent) and Vice President Jacinto PEYNADO Garrigoza of the PRSC (15.0 percent). Before the second round on June 30, President Balaguer joined with the leaders of a number of small right-wing groups in endorsing Fern´andez, who won a narrow (51.3 to 48.8 percent) victory over Pe˜na G´omez and was installed as Balaguer’s successor on August 16. Despite the death of Pe˜na G´omez on May 10, 1998, the PRD won a sweeping legislative victory (83 seats in an enlarged 149-seat body) on May 16, while gaining control of about 90 percent of the island’s 115 municipalities. By contrast, President Fern´andez’ PLD won only 49 seats. In the May 2000 presidential election, the PRD’s Hip´olito MEJ´IA received a near majority of 49.86 percent and was declared the winner when his opponents withdrew from runoff contention. In congressional balloting on May 16, 2002, the PRD lost its lower house majority, although it retained a plurality and increased its Senate representation. Seeking reelection in 2004, President Mej´ıa faced opposition within his party. In addition, his administration was buffeted by numerous problems, including rampant inflation, a breakdown in electrical-generating capacity, and the collapse of the nation’s second largest bank. The result was a landslide victory for the PLD’s Leonel Fern´andez, who avoided a runoff by securing 57.1 percent of the first-round vote. For the first two years of his restored mandate, Fern´andez faced a legislature dominated by the PRD. However, on May 16, 2006, Mej´ıa’s party suffered a massive defeat, with the PLD securing

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overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress (see Legislature, below).

Constitution and Government The constitution of November 28, 1966, unchanged in its structural components by a 1991 successor, established a unitary republic consisting of 26 (later 32) provinces and a National District. Executive power is exercised by the president, who is elected (together with the vice president) by direct vote for a four-year term, save for the truncated two-year mandate imposed in 1994. Members of the bicameral Congress of the Republic, consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, are likewise elected for four-year terms. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court of Justice, which consists of at least nine judges elected by the Senate. The Supreme Court appoints judges of lower courts operating at the provincial and local levels. All three branches of government participate in the legislative process. Bills for consideration by the legislature may be introduced by members of either house, by the president, and by judges of the Supreme Court. In July 2002 a Special Constituent Assembly reversed a requirement that the president be limited to a single term. For administrative purposes the provinces are divided into 95 municipalities and 31 municipal districts. Provincial governors are appointed by the president, while the municipalities are governed by elected mayors and municipal councils.

Foreign Relations A member of the United Nations and most of its Specialized Agencies, the Dominican Republic also participates in the OAS. Traditionally it maintained diplomatic relations with most Western but not communist countries, although in response to a 1986 cut in the U.S. sugar import quota, President Balaguer announced in mid-1987 that his government intended to restore trade links with Cuba after a 26-year hiatus. Relations with the United States were long strained by the latter’s history of intervention, but they substantially improved with the reestablishment of constitutional government

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in 1966. Recurring tensions and frontier disputes with Haiti have also influenced Dominican external affairs, periodically resulting in closure of the 193mile common border. In June 1991 the Dominican government launched a systematic expulsion of illegal Haitian residents, most of whom had been working on sugarcane plantations (some for several decades). The deportations were seen, in part, as a response to foreign allegations that child laborers were being inhumanely treated on state-owned plantations. The expulsions escalated in early 1997, about 15,000 Haitians being deported in late January and the first half of February. Shortly thereafter, at a summit of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) on February 20– 21, President Fern´andez reached an agreement with Haitian President Pr´eval to halt large-scale repatriations while securing acknowledgment of his country’s right to expel illegal immigrants. However, a new wave of expulsions in November 1999 further exacerbated relations between the two countries. Tensions again eased in February 2002 during a visit by Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide that yielded an agreement to provide jobs for Haitians at the countries’ common border. The cyclical pattern resumed in mid-2005 with the recall of the Haitian ambassador after the lynching of three Haitians in Santo Domingo. The Fern´andez administration responded by deporting 1,000 illegal residents on August 15 and shortly thereafter 1,000 more of the estimated 1 million Haitians said to be living in the country. In November 2006 the government reiterated a long-standing contention that it did not mistreat Haitians but indicated that it would continue to deport illegal immigrants and, in a position that had drawn international criticism, would refuse to grant citizenship to Haitian offspring born within its borders. Although not a member of Caricom, the Dominican Republic concluded a free trade agreement with the organization. A similar pact with the United States was proposed in mid-2002 by President Mej´ıa, and in early 2004 his administration conducted negotiations for accession to the trade pact between the United States and the recently

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launched Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The CAFTA-DR accord provided for immediate elimination of 80 percent of intragroup tariffs, with the remaining tariffs to be phased out over a ten-year period. However, for a number of technical reasons, the agreement, signed on August 5, 2006, did not come into effect until March 1, 2007.

Current Issues Upon returning to office in 2004, President Fern´andez promised to mount a “democratic revolution” that would involve both political and economic reforms. Backed by widespread popular support and a substantial congressional majority, he sought to revise the electoral cycle to align presidential and legislative balloting. Meanwhile, continued economic growth provided an opportunity for the Fern´andez administration to comply with the mandate of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce the nation’s debt: The government in 2007 raised taxes for the third consecutive year. Not surprisingly, the opposition insisted that the government should first attempt to curtail its “wasteful spending,” but the president insisted that CAFTA-DR, while a boon to the business sector, would bring in less customs income, necessitating the new levies.

Political Parties The shifting political groupings that have appeared in the Dominican Republic since the fall of Trujillo reflect diverse ideological viewpoints as well as the influence of specific personalities. Party divisions and splinter groups are common with a total of 23 parties and coalitions registered for the May 2002 legislative election.

Presidential Party Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberaci´on Dominicana—PLD). A breakaway faction of the PRD (see below), the PLD was organized as a separate party under PRD founder Juan BOSCH Gavi˜no during the 1974 campaign. Bosch

ran unsuccessfully as PLD presidential candidate in both 1978 and 1982, securing 9.8 percent of the vote on the latter occasion. Subsequently, he was highly critical of the Blanco regime’s economic policies as well as its often harsh antiprotest tactics. Although popular opinion polls showed Bosch running second to Balaguer in late 1985, the PLD nominee placed third, with 18.4 percent of the vote, in the 1986 presidential balloting; in an extremely close contest, he ran second to Balaguer in 1990. In March 1991 Bosch stepped down as PLD leader and withdrew from party membership to protest deep-rooted animosity between right- and left-wing factions; he reversed himself two weeks later in response to appeals from his colleagues. In April 1992 the PLD experienced a severe crisis when 47 of its left-wing members, including one senator and ten members of the Chamber of Deputies, resigned in protest at the expulsion of a popular trade unionist, who had criticized the party’s position on a proposed new labor code. The intraparty split had first emerged at a PLD congress in February 1991, when a right-wing group under Chamber president Jorge Botello had won control of the governing Political Committee. In May a number of additional persons were expelled from the party, including its former vice-presidential candidate, Jos´e Francisco Hern´andez Castillo, the mayor of San Pedro de Macor´ıs, Manuel Rodr´ıguez Robl´es, and three deputies, all of whom, characterized by Juan Bosch as “rotten mangos,” subsequently participated in organization of the APD (below). Bosch, with the support of the right-wing Progressive National Force (Fuerza Nacional Progresista—FNP), headed by Marino Vinicio (Vincho) CASTILLO, ran a distant third in the presidential balloting of May 16, 1994, and on June 19 announced his resignation as PLD president. He died on November 1, 2001, at the age of 92. Although the PLD held only 12 of 120 lower house seats, its candidate, Leonel Fern´andez Reyna, secured a narrow victory in second-round presidential balloting on June 30, 1996, with the support of former president Balaguer. It ran

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second to the PRD in the 1998 legislative and 2000 presidential polls. It continued as runner-up to the PRD in the 2002 Chamber elections, while losing three of its four Senate seats. Fern´andez Reyna was elected to a second presidential term in 2004, and the PLD won majorities in both legislative houses in 2006. ´ Leaders: Leonel FERNANDEZ Reyna (President of the Republic and President of the Party), Rafael ALBURQUERQUE (Vice President of the Republic), Reinaldo PARED P´erez (Secretary General).

Other Legislative Parties Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano—PRD). Founded as a left-democratic grouping by former president Juan Bosch Gavi˜no in 1939, the PRD has rejected both communism and Castroism but has been critical of U.S. “imperialism” and “neo-colonialism.” A member of the Socialist International since 1966, the party boycotted both the 1970 and 1974 elections but won the presidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies under the relatively conservative leadership of Antonio Guzm´an Fern´andez in 1978, repeating the performance under Salvador Jorge Blanco in 1982. A three-way split within the PRD in the run-up to the 1986 election raised two distinct possibilities: that former vice president Majluta Azar might compete as the nominee of his right-wing La Estructura faction, and that Blanco supporters, unhappy with the president’s endorsement of left-leaning Jos´e Pe˜na G´omez, would rally for reelection of the incumbent. In July 1985 Majluta registered La Estructura as a separate party, but in January 1986 was named the PRD candidate with Pe˜na G´omez succeeding him as party president. Majluta attributed his defeat in the May balloting to Pe˜na G´omez, many of whose followers were reported to have supported Juan Bosch of the PLD. Lacking a congressional majority after the election, President Balaguer named a number of PRD/La Estructura members to the cabinet formed in late August. In 1990 Majluta and his associates ran separately (see PRI, below).

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In July 1993 the PRD nominated Pe˜na G´omez as its 1994 presidential candidate; supporters of President Balaguer then launched an intense personal attack against Pe˜na G´omez who was Black and of Haitian extraction. For the 1994 campaign, the PRD concluded pacts with a number of minor parties, including the Democratic Assembly (Concertaci´on Democr´atica—CD); the Democratic Unity (Unidad Democr´atica—UD), and the PTD (under PRSC, see below). However, the UD, which was awarded three upper and seven lower house seats, refused to support the PRD’s postelectoral boycott, thus substantially reducing the effectiveness of the action. In August 1995 the PRD concluded a 1996 electoral pact with three parties that had formerly supported the PRSC: the PQD (see below), the Institutional Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico Institucional—PDI), and the National Party of Civil Veterans (Partido Nacional de Veteranos Civiles—PNVC). PRD candidate Pe˜na G´omez led the first-round presidential poll on May 16, 1996, with 45.8 percent of the vote but was defeated in the June 30 runoff after the PRSC’s Balaguer had endorsed the PLD’s Fern´andez. Gravely ill, Pe˜na G´omez announced his retirement from politics in April 1997 and died on May 10, 1998. Having won control of both houses of Congress in May 1998, the PRD completed its sweep with the election of Hip´olito Mej´ıa as president two years later. However, in 2002 it lost its majority in the Chamber, securing instead a plurality of 73. In 2004 the party was divided as to whether President Mej´ıa should run for reelection; he was, however, nominated and overwhelmingly defeated by former president Fern´andez Reyna in the balloting of May 16. In the 2006 legislative poll, the PRD ran a poor second to the resurgent PLD, falling from 29 seats to 6 in the Senate and from 73 to 60 in an enlarged chamber of Deputies. Leaders: Hip´olito MEJ´IA Domingues and Salvador JORGE Blanco (Former Presidents ´ of the Republic); Vincent SANCHEZ Baret (Chair); Miguel VARGAS (2008 presidential candidate); Rafael SUBERVI Bonilla (2004

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vice-presidential candidate and Secretary General of the Party). Social Christian Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano—PRSC). Created in 1963 by Joaqu´ın BALAGUER, the PRSC stresses a policy of economic austerity, national reconstruction, and political consensus. Drawing heavily on peasant and middle-class support, it won the elections of 1966, 1970, and 1974, but lost in 1978 after its leader had withdrawn a pledge not to become a candidate for another term. It lost again in 1982, Balaguer being defeated in the presidential election by a 37 to 47 percent margin; however, public recollection of a strong economy under Balaguer gave the ex-president a narrow victory over his PRD opponent in May 1986; his margin of victory was even narrower (0.7 percent) in winning a sixth term in May 1990, while the PRSC lost its former plurality in the Chamber of Deputies. In the 1990 election the PRSC was allied with two minor parties, the Dominican Workers’ Party (Partido de los Trabajadores Dominicanos—PTD), led by Jos´e GONZALEZ Espinosa, and the Socialist Block (Bloque Socialista—BS). Balaguer resigned as PRSC party president in February 1991, citing the time-consuming nature of government leadership; he won a seventh presidential term in 1994, which was shortened to two years. In 1996 he offered only lukewarm first-round support to his party’s presidential nominee and backed the PLD’s Leonel Fern´andez in the second round. He ran for an unprecedented eighth term in the balloting of January 2000, gaining third place on a 24.6 percent vote share. The 95-year-old former president died on July 14, 2002. Leaders: Eduardo ESTRELLA (2004 presidential candidate), Rafael BELLO Andino (President of the Party).

Other Parties Independent Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Independiente—PRI). The PRI was launched before the 1990 election by Jacobo MAJLUTA Azar, the leader of the PRD’s La Estructura faction, after he had been defeated for con-

trol of the party by Jos´e Pe˜na G´omez. Before his death on March 2, 1996, Majluta committed the PRI, which had no congressional representation but voting strength of about 100,000, to the support of the PRD’s Pe˜na G´omez in the 1996 presidential race. In December 2001 President Mejia accepted the honorary presidency of the PRI, and the party secured congressional representation in May 2002 by running candidates under the PRD banner. Leaders: Trajano SANTANA (2004 presidential candidate), Jos´e Rafael MOLINA Ure˜na (President of the Party), Stormi REYNOSO (Secretary General). Liberal Party Structure (Partido Liberal la Estructura—PLE). An autonomous component of the PRI, the PLE joined the Liberal International in 1986. It endorsed former president Joaqu´ın Balaguer as its candidate for the 2000 race. Leader: Andr´es VAN DER HORST. Quisqueyan Democratic Party (Partido Quisqueyano Dem´ocrata—PQD). A right-wing group, the PQD was formed by Gen. El´ıas Wessin y Wessin following his departure into exile in the United States after the civil disturbances of 1965; two years earlier, the general had led the military coup that overthrew President Juan Bosch. The PQD supported Wessin y Wessin in the 1970 presidential campaign and participated in the coalition which boycotted the 1974 election. In September 1977 General Wessin announced his candidacy for the 1978 presidential election but subsequently withdrew in favor of MID candidate Francisco Augusto Lora. Wessin ran a distant fourth in the 1982 presidential balloting. In November 1986 he was named interior minister in the Balaguer administration, to which the armed services portfolio was added in June 1988; he continued as armed services minister after a cabinet reshuffle in August 1989, with the PQD being credited with Balaguer’s margin of victory in May 1990. Leaders: Pedro BERGES (President), Dr. El´ıas WESSIN Ch´avez (Secretary General).

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Alliance for Democracy (Alianza por la Democracia—APD). Launched in mid-1992 by a group of left-wing PLD dissidents, the APD indicated a willingness to join in a broad front in 1994 to prevent the reelection of President Balaguer. However, in April 1993 it split into two factions led, on the one hand, by Sen. Max Puig and former PLD vice-presidential candidate Jos´e Francisco Hern´andez, and, on the other, by economist Vicente Bengoa and union leader Nelsida Marmolejos. The latter group, which sought to forge an alliance with the PRD, was suspended for six months by an “emergency secretariat” organized by the Puig/Hern´andez faction. Leaders: Jos´e Francisco HERNANDEZ Castillo (former PLD vice-presidential candidate), Sen. Max PUIG, Manuel RODRIGUEZ Robl´es, Nelsida MARMOLEJOS (dissident faction), Vicente BENGOA (Secretary General). Democratic Integration Movement (Movimiento de Integraci´on Democr´atica—MID). Organized as the Movimiento de Integraci´on Nacional in support of the 1970 presidential candidacy of Francisco Augusto Lora, the rightwing MID was joined by several other parties in promoting Lora’s candidacy in 1978. Leader: Dr. Francisco Augusto LORA. Movement of National Conciliation (Movimiento de Conciliaci´on Nacional—MCN). Formed in late 1968 to sponsor the presidential candidacy of H´ector GARCIA Godoy, former Dominican ambassador to the United States and provisional president of the Republic after the 1965 revolution, the MCN also boycotted the 1974 election and joined the coalition supporting Francisco Augusto Lora in 1978. Leaders: Dr. Jaime M. FERNANDEZ (President), V´ıctor MENA (Secretary). Revolutionary Social Christian Party (Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano—PRSC). A party of the democratic left that rejects both capitalism and communism, the PRSC is patterned after other Christian Democratic parties of Latin America and draws most of its supporters from young

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professionals as well as from youth and labor. Its youth wing is considerably more radical in its approach than is the party mainstream. Leaders: Dr. Claudio Isidoro ACOSTA (President), Alfonso Moreno MARTINEZ, Dr. Alfonso LOCKWARD (Secretary General). Revolutionary Force (Fuerza de la Revoluci´on—FR). The FR was launched in 2000 by merger of the former Dominican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Dominicano—PCD) with a number of other leftist groups. Leaders: Rafael FLORES Estrella (2004 presidential candidate), Secundino PALACIO (2004 vice-presidential candidate). Dominican Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Dominicano—MPD). Organized in 1965 as a pro-Peking extremist group, the MPD subsequently assumed a measure of respectability as part of the coalition that attempted to prevent President Balaguer from winning a third term in 1974. ˜ Vald´es. Leader: Julio de PENA Joining the PRSC, PLD, PQD, and PCD in presenting presidential candidates in recent elections have been the Christian Popular Party (Partido Popular Cristiano—PPC), backed by representatives of the Unification Church; the rightwing National Progressive Force (Fuerza Nacional Progresivo—FNP), led by Dr. Marino VINICIO Castillo; the New Power Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Poder—MNP), led by Antonio REYNOSO; and the Dominican Social Alliance (Alianza Social Dominicana—ASD), whose presidential candidate, Carlos RAMON Bencosme, also ran in 2004. Other minor parties and their candidates in 2004 included the National Solidarity Movement (Movimiento Solidaridad—MSN), led by Ramon Emilio CONCEPCION; the New Alternative Party (Partido Nueva Alternativa— PNA), led by Ramon Mar´ıa ALMANZAR; and the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Popular—PDP), led by Ramon Nelson DIDIEZ.

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Cabinet As of April 1, 2007 President Vice President

Leonel Fern´andez Reyna Rafael Alburquerque

Secretaries of State Agriculture Armed Forces Culture Education Environment Finance Foreign Relations Higher Education Interior and Police Labor Presidency Public Health Public Works Sports Tourism Trade and Industry Without Portfolio Women’s Affairs Youth Attorney General Administrative Secretary of the Presidency Technical Secretary of the Presidency

Salvador Jim´enez Gen. Ram´on Aquino Garc´ıa Jos´e Rafael Lantigua Alejandrina German [f] Maximiliano Puig Vicente Bengoa Carlos Morales Troncoso Ligia Amada de Melo [f] Franklin Almeyda Jos´e Ramon Fadul Danilo Medina Bautista Rojas G´omez Manuel de Jes´us P´erez Felipe Jay Payano F´elix Jim´enez Francisco Javier Garc´ıa Miguel Mej´ıa Eduardo Selman Flavia Garc´ıa [f] Manuel Crespo Radhames Jim´enez Luis Manuel Bonetti Veras Juan Temistocles Montas Dom´ıguez

[f] = female

Legislature The Congress of the Republic (Congreso de la Republica) consists of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, both directly elected for four-year terms. Senate (Senado). The Senate currently consists of 32 members, 1 from each province and the National District. Following the election of May 16, 2006, the Dominican Liberation Party held 22 seats; the Dominican Revolutionary Party, 6; and the Social Christian Reformist Party, 4.

President: Reinaldo PARED P´erez. Chamber of Deputies (C´amara de Diputados). The Chamber presently consists of 178 members elected on the basis of 1 deputy for every 50,000 inhabitants, with at least 2 from each province. As a result of the election of May 16, 2006, the Dominican Liberation Party held 96 seats; the Dominican Revolutionary Party, 60; and the Social Christian Reformist Party, 22. President: Julio C´esar VALENT´IN.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Communications Press The following privately owned newspapers are published in Santo Domingo, unless otherwise noted: List´ın Diario (85,000), moderate independent; Ultima Hora (50,000); El Nacional (45,000), leftist nationalist; Hoy, (40,000); El Caribe (30,000), moderate nationalist; La Noticia (18,000); La Informaci´on (Santiago de los Caballeros) (15,000); and El Siglo.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility; several foreign agencies maintain bureaus at Santo Domingo.

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cial television networks, two of which also offer educational programming. As of 2005 there were approximately 168 Internet users and 23 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 407 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Flavio DARIO Espinal U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic: (Vacant)

Broadcasting and Computers

Permanent (Vacant)

Representative

to

the

UN:

Broadcasting is supervised by the Direcci´on General de Telecomunicaciones. There are more than 140 radio stations as well as seven commer-

IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WCO, WTO

E C UA D O R REPUBLIC

OF

ECUADOR

Rep u´ blica de Ecuador

Note: After an attack on March 2, 2008 (see note in Colombia entry), by Colombian security forces on a Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) camp based in Ecuador, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa protested that Colombia had undermined Ecuador’s sovereignty. Colombia apologized, but asserted its need to pursue the rebels. Ecuador and its ally Venezuela suspended diplomatic links with Colombia and massed troops on its borders, but a conference between the three states on March 7 eased tensions, calming the region’s worst rift in recent years.

The Country

COLOMBIA Esmeraldas Pu

South America’s fourth-smallest republic has four main geographic regions: the Pacific coastal plain (Costa), the Andes highlands (Sierra), the sparsely populated eastern jungle (Oriente), and the Gal´apagos Islands (Archip´elago de Col´on) in the Pacific. The population is roughly 40 percent Indian, 40 percent mestizo, 10 percent white, and 10 percent black. Although Spanish is the official language, numerous Indian languages are spoken, the most important of which is Quechua. Approximately 90 percent of the population professes Roman Catholicism, but other religions are practiced, including tribal religion among the Indians. According to the World Bank, 27 percent of the labor force is female, primarily in domestic service, market trade, and transient agricultural labor; female participation in government had been quite limited, but in 2007 there were seven women members in the cabinet. Adverse climate, jungle terrain, volcanic activity, and earthquakes limit the country’s habitable area and have slowed its economic development. The economy is primarily agricultural, with approximately one-half of the population engaged in farming, mainly on a subsistence level. The most important crops are bananas (of which Ecuador is

the world’s largest exporter), coffee, and cocoa. Following the lowering of tariff barriers for exports to the United States, cut flowers, broccoli, and mangoes emerged as important cash crops. Hardwoods and balsa are harvested from the forests,

tu

PACIFIC OCEAN Manta

yo

Nueva Loja

Quito

R.

ECUADOR Portoviejo

La Libertad

ma

Riobamba

Ambato Puyo

Guayaquil Cuenca Machala

PERU

Loja 0 0

80 Mi 80 Km

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Political Status: Gained independence from Spain (as part of Gran Colombia) in 1822; independent republic established in 1830; present constitution approved by a constituent assembly elected November 30, 1997, and in effect from August 10, 1998. Area: 109,482 sq. mi. (283,561 sq. km.), excluding the region previously in dispute with Peru, but including the Gal´apagos Islands. Population: 12,922,474 (2001C); 13,765,000 (2006E). Both figures include adjustments for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): QUITO (1,526,000), Guayaquil (2,194,000), Cuenca (315,000), Ambato (166,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: United States Dollar. The dollar was phased in from January 2000 to March 2001 to replace the sucre as Ecuador’s legal tender. President: Rafael CORREA Delgado (Country Alliance); elected in second-round balloting on November 26, 2006, and inaugurated January 15, 2007, for a four-year term, succeeding Alfredo PALACIO Gonz´ales (independent). Vice President: Lenin MORENO Garc´es (Country Alliance); elected in second-round balloting on November 26, 2006, and inaugurated January 15, 2007, for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Alejandro SERRANO Aguilar.

while Ecuadorian Pacific waters are a prime tunafishing area. Gold, silver, and copper continue to be mined, and production from Amazonian oil fields has placed Ecuador fifth among South American countries in petroleum output (Ecuador has the second largest oil reserves in South America) and second among the continent’s suppliers of crude oil to the United States. Other energy resources include natural gas deposits in the Gulf of Guayaquil and considerable hydroelectric potential. The economy experienced severe recession during the mid-1980s. Some recovery was registered in 1988, although inflation of nearly 75 percent

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was recorded by late 1989. The Gulf crisis in August 1990 yielded a surge in oil revenue, with the government disappointing creditors by electing to use the windfall for social programs rather than debt. Overall, annual GDP rose by an average of 2.9 percent during 1991–1998 before declining significantly in 1999 due to the collapse of Ecuador’s currency. Further, in mid-1999 a proposed round of austerity measures as preconditions for a $400 million International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan generated strikes and protests that led to the retraction of a government-promised price freeze. As a result, Ecuador became the first country to default formally on a series of so-called U.S. “Brady” bonds by failing to pay $44 million in interest. A month later it announced that it would also default on $500 million in outstanding Eurobonds. Following the adoption of the dollar as the medium of exchange in 2000, inflation declined and stable growth resumed due, in large part, to the strength of high worldwide oil prices. GDP growth of 4.7 percent was recorded in 2005, and 4.1 percent in 2006. Growth slowed to just under 2 percent in 2007, due to disruptions in oil production, but it was projected to increase to about 4 percent in 2008. Remittances to family members from some two million Ecuadorians who have emigrated to the United States and Europe (primarily Spain) in recent years have amounted to a significant revenue stream of about $2.5 billion a year.

Government and Politics Political Background Charismatic individuals rather than political platforms have dominated Ecuador’s political life through most of the period since the country’s liberation from Spanish rule in 1822 and its establishment as an independent republic in 1830. A historic division between conservatives and liberals (now of little practical significance) emerged in the 19th century, the conservatives being based in the highlands and the liberals on the coast. More recently, Ecuador has experienced tremendous

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political instability, with eight chief executives within 11 years, politicized high courts, and little popular support for the legislature. The country is on the verge of adopting its 19th significant constitutional revision since it became an independent republic. A bright spot in Ecuadorian political life occurred in 1948 with the election of Galo PLAZA Lasso as president. The first chief executive since 1924 to complete his full term, Plaza created a climate of stability and economic progress, while his successor, Jos´e Mar´ıa VELASCO Ibarra, stood out in a lengthy catalog of interrupted presidencies and military juntas. Before his election in 1952 (his only full term), Velasco had served twice as president, in 1934–1935 and in 1944–1947. He was subsequently elected in 1960 and in 1968, but coups ended both terms prematurely. His 1961 successor, Carlos Julio AROSEMENA Monroy, also was ousted by a military junta in July 1963. During his last term in office, Velasco in mid-1970 dissolved the National Congress and assumed dictatorial powers to cope with a financial emergency. He was deposed for a fourth time in February 1972, the stimulus to military intervention being the approach of a presidential election in which Assad BUCARAM Elmhalim, a populist politician, appeared the likely winner. The military leadership, under Gen. Guillermo RODRIGUEZ Lara, canceled the election, nominally restored the Liberal constitution of 1945, and advanced a “nationalist, military, and revolutionary” program emphasizing the objectives of social justice and popular welfare. In December 1975 President Rodr´ıguez announced his intention to make way for a return to civilian rule, but his actual departure in January 1976 was precipitated by a government crisis during which the entire cabinet resigned. A three-man junta headed by Vice Adm. Alfredo POVEDA Burbano succeeded Rodr´ıguez, declaring that the 1972 program of the armed forces would be honored and that the nation would be returned to civilian leadership within two years; however, it was not until July 16, 1978, that a presidential election, in which no candidate obtained a majority of votes, was

held. At a runoff on April 29, 1979, the center-left ´ Aguilera, defeated his candidate, Jaime ROLDOS ´ ´ conservative opponent, Sixto DURAN-BALL EN C´ordovez, by a more than two-to-one majority and was inaugurated, without incident, on August 10. Rold´os, his minister of defense, and a number of others were killed in a plane crash on May 24, 1981, and the Christian Democratic vice president, Osvaldo HURTADO Larrea, was immediately sworn in to complete the remainder of Rold´os’s five-year term. On June 2 the late president’s brother, Le´on ´ Aguilera, by a legislative margin of one ROLDOS vote, was elected to the vice presidency. A dispute between the president and vice president in early 1982, ostensibly over rapprochement with neighboring Peru (see Foreign relations, below), led to the resignation of two Roldosista ministers and, amid mounting economic problems, a period of uncertain legislative support for Hurtado, who was constitutionally precluded from reelection in 1984. In the balloting on January 29, with 17 parties competing, the opposition Democratic Left (Izquierda Democr´atica—ID) won 24 of 71 legislative seats, while its presidential candidate, Rodrigo BORJA Cevallos, obtained a slim plurality. However, at a second-round poll on May 6, Borja was narrowly defeated by the nominee of the conservative National Reconstruction Front (Frente de Reconstrucci´on Nacional—FRN), Le´on FEBRES Cordero. Subsequently, a major constitutional struggle erupted between the executive and legislative branches over control of the judiciary, with the president refusing to recognize a new Chamber-appointed Supreme Court. The issue was eventually resolved in December, when the Chamber agreed to the resignation of both judicial panels and the appointment of a new court composed of progovernment and opposition members. In June 1985 two ID deputies joined five members of the independent Radical Alfarista Front (Frente Radical Alfarista—FRA) in shifting their allegiance to the president, thereby, with the support of the Concentration of Popular Forces (Concentraci´on de Fuerzas Populares—CFP), providing the government with its first legislative majority since the 1984 election. However, the

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fragility of the president’s legislative support led him to issue a call in February 1986 for a June constitutional plebiscite on whether independent candidates should be permitted to stand for elective office. The government was shaken in midMarch 1986 as the result of a brief revolt led by Lt. Gen. Frank VARGAS Pazzos, who had been dismissed as armed forces chief of staff after demanding the discharge and imprisonment of Defense ˜ Minister Luis PINEIROS Rivera and army commander Gen. Manuel ALBUJA for alleged misuse of public funds. Although both submitted their resignations, forces loyal to Vargas subsequently occupied the Quito air base, claiming that the government had broken an agreement to place the two under arrest. In midterm legislative balloting in June 1986 (postponed from January to allow for voter recertification), the progovernment parties again lost control of the Chamber by a decisive margin of 27–43, while the referendum on independent candidacies was defeated by an even more impressive 25.2 to 58.8 percent vote. The result was a renewal of friction between the two branches, with the president rejecting a congressional amnesty granted to General Vargas in September. On January 16, 1987, Febres was kidnapped by dissident paratroopers at Taura air base and held for 11 hours, until agreeing to the release of Vargas. The legislature then approved a nonbinding resolution calling on the president to resign. The chief executive responded by declaring that he intended to remain in office until the expiration of his term in August 1988. In the general election of January 31, 1988, Social Christian (Partido Social Cristiano—PSC) ´ ´ presidential candidate Sixto DURAN-BALL EN ran a poor third to the ID’s Borja Cevallos and Abdal´a BUCARAM Ortiz of the Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano— PRE). Buttressed by a comfortable legislative majority, Borja defeated Bucaram in runoff balloting on May 8 and formed a largely ID administration following his inauguration on August 10. The president’s legislative supporters were reduced to a minority in the biennial election of

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January 31, 1990, with Averroes BUCARAM Saxida (a cousin of Abdal´a) being elected Chamber president. In late October, however, with the creation of a “Political Ethics Bloc” (Bloque de Etica Pol´ıtica), the body tilted briefly in favor of Borja, who was thereby able to secure Bucaram’s ouster as presiding officer. Subsequently, legislative control again passed to the opposition, which displayed its hostility toward the president by impeaching no less than six of his ministers by mid-1991. At second-round presidential balloting on July 5, 1992, Dur´an-Ball´en, who had been denied renomination by the PSC, defeated his former party’s candidate, Jaime NEBOT Saadi, by sweeping 19 of the country’s 21 provinces. The PSC had, however, secured a legislative plurality, with Dur´an-Ball´en’s recently organized Republican Unity Party (Partido Unidad Republicano— PUR) in third place after the PRE. The most conspicuous loss in the presidential election was the formerly dominant ID, whose candidate attracted a vote share of only 8.2 percent. In the midterm legislative election of May 1, 1994, the PSC won 22 of the 65 contested seats, while Dur´an-Ball´en’s PUR plummeted from 12 seats to 3. The result was an intensification of the long-standing legislative-executive rift, with the Chamber forcing changes in most leading ministries either by impeachment or the threat of impeachment. In August 1995 Vice President Alberto DAHIK became the center of a corruption scandal. In the wake of imperfectly validated suggestions by the vice president that the government had made payments to members of the legislature and judiciary to ensure favorable treatment of economic reform measures, Dahik himself was accused of illegal use of “discretionary funds” kept in the personal accounts of two of his secretaries. Among the alleged uses of the funds was a down payment on the purchase of a radio station by former foreign minister Diego PAREDES Delgado, who, along with Dahik’s secretaries, went into hiding. In late September President Dur´an-Ball´en urged Dahik to resign. He refused and in early October escaped dismissal by the failure of a legislative vote of

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impeachment. However, also facing charges by the Supreme Court, he resigned on October 11 and fled to Costa Rica, where he appealed for political asylum. A week later the president secured approval for the naming of former education minister ˜ Trivi˜no as Dahik’s successor. The Eduardo PENA Dur´an-Ball´en administration suffered a further embarrassment when all 11 of its latest constitutional reform proposals were rejected in a plebiscite on November 26 (see Constitution and Government, below). In the first-round presidential poll of May 19, 1996, the PSC’s Jaime Nebot and the PRE’s Abdal´a Bucaram qualified for runoff balloting with vote shares of 27.4 and 25.5 percent, respectively. In the second round on July 7, the populist Bucaram confounded earlier opinion polls by easily defeating his opponent (54.3 to 45.7 percent) and was sworn in on August 10. However, the PRE held only 19 of 82 legislative seats, leaving Bucaram, like his predecessor, with the difficult task of seeking support from a deeply divided Chamber of Representatives. Following his inauguration, President Bucaram abandoned most of his populist campaign promises and advanced an economic reform program that included privatization of state-owned enterprises, elimination of guaranteed job security, and devaluation of the Ecuadorian sucre from approximately 3,500 to 4 per U.S. dollar. The result was a wave of domestic unrest amid plummeting presidential popularity. On February 6, 1997, the National Chamber of Representatives ousted Bucaram because of “mental incapacity” and designated its ´ Rivera, as his presiding officer, Fabi´an ALARCON successor. Two days later it yielded to the constitutional claim of Vice President Rosal´ıa ARTEAGA Serrano, electing her interim president. On February 11 Arteaga submitted her resignation, and Alarc´on was reinstated as chief executive for an 18-month term, with new elections scheduled for May 1998. Alarc´on’s incumbency was endorsed by 65 percent of those participating in a May 25 referendum, the voters also approving a call for a constituent assembly that was elected on November 30 with a party distribution not significantly different

from that of the National Chamber. The assembly’s principal output was a new set of electoral rules that included an increase in the number of legislative seats from 82 to 121 and the abolition of midterm replenishment. In a nationwide election on May 31, 1998, the Popular Democracy (Democracia Popular—DP), a restyled Christian Democratic grouping, won a plurality of Chamber seats, while its presidential nominee, Jamil MAHUAD Witt, bested five opponents with a 35 percent vote share. In a second-round contest on June 12, Mahuad secured 51.3 percent of the vote, defeating the Roldosista runner-up, Alvaro Fernando NOBOA Pont´on. President Mahuad assumed office in August 1998 amid severe economic problems, including the effects of El Ni˜no–induced flooding the previous winter that had caused more than $2.5 billion in damage to coastal regions. Falling oil prices in 1998 exacerbated the situation. The new government proposed austerity measures in January 1999 designed to reduce the budget deficit, but it was forced to abandon planned increases in taxes and fuel prices at the insistence of the PSC, on which the DP was relying for a legislative majority. By August 1999 President Mahuad’s popularity had declined from 68 percent to 12 percent, and by January 1, 2000, had plummeted further to an unprecedented 2 percent in the wake of a debt-restructuring effort that generated a new wave of protests. The president responded by declaring a state of emergency and adopting the dollar as the Ecuadorian currency. On the streets, the native Confederati´on de Nacionalidades Ind´ıgenas del Ecuador (Conaie) launched a campaign to oust not only Mahuad but also members of Congress and the Supreme Court in favor of a “patriotic government of national unity.” On January 21 Mahuad was overthrown in a coup led by a group of colonels who had joined forces with Conaie leaders. However, Gen. Carlos MENDOZA, who had been installed with Conaie president Antonio VARGAS and former Supreme Court president Carlos SOLORZANO as a ruling triumvirate, promptly mounted a countercoup that endorsed the

E C UA D O R

“constitutional” elevation of Vice President Gustavo NOBOA Benjarano to the post that Mahuad had ostensibly “abandoned.” Conaie responded by charging the military with “betrayal” and called for a plebiscite to remove legislative and judicial incumbents, reverse the dollarization policy, end the U.S. military presence in Ecuador, and secure amnesty for those participating in the January 21 uprising. ´ On November 24, 2002, Lucio GUTIERREZ Borb´ua, a retired colonel who had participated in the ouster of Mahuad (an event commemorated in the full title of his small group, the Patriotic Society Party of January 21 [Partido Sociedad Patri´otica 21 de Enero—PSP]), defeated Alvaro Noboa Pont´on, now running as leader of the Institutional Renewal Party of National Action (Partido Renovador Institucional de Acci´on Nacional—PRIAN), in second-round presidential balloting. Nine months later, in the wake of an apparent shift to the right after Guti´errez had attempted to introduce a number of IMF-mandated economic reforms, his administration was severely weakened by the withdrawal of the Conaie-based New Country–Pachakutik Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Pais–Pachakutik—MNPP). The president then entered briefly into an implausible alignment with the two leading legislative parties, the centerright PSC and the center-left ID. The effort soon failed, with both of the erstwhile allies joining an opposition drive for his impeachment. By mid2004 poll results showed 68 percent of the public felt Guti´errez should resign. However, he persevered by courting the Roldosistas. Although having earlier opposed the return of Abdal´a Bucaram, he met with the former president on September 1. Less than three months later, he deflected impeachment by negotiating a “new majority” that included the far-left Democratic Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Democr´atico—MPD), the right-wing PRIAN, and the PSP, the PRE, and the CFP. Emboldened by an opposition suddenly in disarray, Guti´errez recalled Congress in early December and pushed through a constitutionally questionable measure that removed all 31 Supreme Court justices. This allowed new appointees who

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would clear the way for former president Bucaram’s return by dismissing the charges against him. On March 31, 2005, the charges were annulled and Bucaram returned on April 2. These maneuvers aroused the public, and a wave of demonstrations in Quito, including an incursion of rioting students into the congressional building, yielded a 60–2 legislative vote on April 20 to remove Guti´errez in the wake of a spurious finding that he had “abandoned” his post. Also purged were all 31 members of the Supreme Court. Vice President Alfredo PALACIO Gonz´ales, assuming the presidency after election by Congress on the same day in 2005 that Guti´errez was removed, encountered an equally intractable legislature. In June 2005 he called for a referendum to establish “more democratic representation” by breaking with party-controlled electoral lists in favor of constituency-specific candidates (singlemember districts) but was rebuffed by Congress. On October 4, 2005, Guti´errez returned from exile and was arrested on charges of attempting to destabilize the government by not recognizing the legitimacy of Palacio as his successor. Members of the country’s third Supreme Court in less than a year were installed on November 30. Guti´errez was released by judicial order in March 2006 after a high court ruling that Guti´errez’s conspiracy accusations against Palacio were not a violation of law and his actions did not threaten national security. Palacio’s government was plagued by civil unrest in the first half of 2006 (see Current Issues below) and a constant stream of cabinet reshuffling during his tenure in office; at least 55 ministers served from April 2005 until the swearing in of his successor in January 2007. First-round balloting for president on October 15, 2006, resulted in a runoff from an original list of 13 candidates between Alvaro Noboa Pont´on of the PRIAN, a right-of-center populist millionaire, and Rafael CORREA Delgado, leader of a new leftwing bloc, the Country Alliance (Alianza Pa´ıs— PA´IS), an economist and former finance minister. Correa was elected in the second round on November 26, having prevailed in a particularly bitter

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campaign in which Noboa won the first-round. Noboa challenged the final results, which gave Correa 57.07 percent of the vote to Noboa’s 42.96 percent, and refused to concede, despite validation by the electoral commission and international organizations. Correa was inaugurated on January 15, 2007, and formed a new government, drawn mostly from PA´IS members, the same day. Legislative elections concurrent with the 2006 presidential election gave the PRIAN a plurality in Congress, with nine other parties also holding seats. The cabinet was reshuffled in June 2007, when three ministers stepped down to register as candidates for the constituent assembly. In a second reshuffling in July, finance minister Ricardo ˜ was reassigned in the wake of a scandal PATINO involving alleged manipulation of the bond markets for Ecuadorian debt.

Constitution and Government In a referendum held January 15, 1978, Ecuadorians approved a new constitution that came into force with the retirement of the military junta and the inauguration of Jaime Rold´os Aguilera in August 1979. The new basic law provided for a unicameral legislature and a single four-year presidential term, extension of the vote to illiterate citizens (presumed to be about 30 percent of the population), and establishment of a framework of social rights for citizens. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court, which is responsible for supervising superior courts. The superior courts in turn supervise lower (provincial and cantonal) courts. On March 1, 1994, President Dur´an-Ball´en launched a program of constitutional reform by announcing an eight-part plebiscite coincident with the May 1 congressional poll that included provisions for presidential reelection, compulsory voting, creation of an upper legislative chamber, and four-year terms for all representatives. However, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral or TSE) immediately struck down the proposal as “illegal and impractical.” The TSE also

rejected a call on June 10 for a July 31 plebiscite on formation of a constituent assembly to consider the changes, with the president insisting that the TSE’s action was itself illegal since he had the right to “consult the people” on any matter that he wished. Subsequently, a scaled-down plebiscite was held on August 28, following the August 10 commencement of a new congressional session. An unusually low turnout of voters by a 2–1 majority approved most of the package, including a limitation on congressional power to determine public spending, authorization for nonparty candidates to stand for elective posts, and reelection of elected officials, including the president. A second set of reform measures was rejected by approximately 56 percent of the participants in a plebiscite on November 26, 1995. Among the proposals were election of all legislators from single-member constituencies for four-year terms, presidential authority to dissolve the legislature, a ban on public service strikes, administrative decentralization to the provinces and municipalities, and partial privatization of the social security system. The constituent assembly elected in 1997 redrafted the constitution; the changes, which went into force on August 10, 1998, provided for a National Congress of a size (currently 100) determined by a somewhat complex population-based formula, with members sitting for four-year terms; it also lowered the first-round cutoff for presidential balloting to 45 percent, with the victor serving a four-year term. In 2007 President Correa launched yet another initiative for constitutional reform; after his inauguration he issued a decree providing for a national referendum to call a constituent assembly with the power to draft a new constitution. Eighty percent of voters approved the ballot measure on April 15, 2007, to form a constituent assembly. Elections for delegates to the constituent assembly were held on September 30, 2007. Administratively, the country is divided into 22 provinces (the 22nd province, Santa Elena, previously a part of Guayas, was added in 2007), including the Gal´apagos Islands. The provinces are subdivided into municipalities.

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Foreign Relations The most enduring foreign-affairs issue for many years was a boundary dispute with Peru that dates to the 16th century and involves a 125,000square-mile tract of land between the Putumayo and Mara˜no´ n rivers, both tributaries of the upper Amazon. The dispute resulted in periodic conflict and a number of agreements, including the Rio Protocol of January 1942, which awarded the greater part of the area to Peru and was formally repudiated by Velasco Ibarra in 1960 on the ground that Ecuador had been pressured into acceptance of its terms by the guarantor states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States). The frontier established by the Rio Protocol was itself never fully delineated, a 50-mile stretch in the vicinity of the Condor Mountains remaining to be charted along the presumed watershed of the Zamora and Santiago rivers, in an area where a new tributary of the Mara˜no´ n was subsequently discovered. In January 1981 Ecuador and Peru engaged in five days of fighting in the Condor region, while representatives of the guarantor states convened in Bras´ılia, Brazil, for negotiations on a cease-fire that was accepted by the combatants on February 2. However, it was not until March 17 that the two sides began to withdraw their forces from the disputed area. The dispute flared up again in August 1991, when Peruvian border units reportedly discovered Ecuadorian troops clearing woods for cattle raising inside Peruvian territory. Subsequently, Ecuador reiterated its rejection of the Rio Protocol, while the Peruvian popular press headlined the incident as a full-scale invasion by its neighbor. In October 1993 a suggestion by Foreign Minister Paredes Delgado at the United Nations that Ecuador would seek an accord with Peru not to resort to force over the territorial issue prompted a “clarification” by Quito that it was not proposing a nonaggression pact with its neighbor. Two months earlier President Dur´an-Ball´en had announced that he would “repay the compliment” of three visits to Ecuador by Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori in 1992 by embarking on the first state visit by an

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Ecuadorian president to Lima, Peru. However, in the wake of widespread criticism within Ecuador, the trip had not materialized by late January 1994, when troops, tanks, and fighter planes massed on both sides of the border. While Peruvians outside the contested area were reported to be largely indifferent to the latest confrontation, Ecuador charged its neighbor with “launching a massive offensive” and vowed a “fight for the fatherland.” Despite the announcement of a cease-fire on February 1, 1995, renewed fighting erupted the following day, with peace talks in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, being broken off on February 5. Thereafter, in another about-face, the two sides signed a peace agreement in Bras´ılia on February 17. Under the socalled Itamaraty Declaration, the guarantor states would dispatch a team of observers on a renewable 90-day mission to oversee a “gradual and mutual demobilization” of the area and initiate talks aimed at resolving the long-standing dispute. It was not until July 25 that the two sides accepted full demilitarization in a further agreement that did not, however, settle the central issue of border demarcation. In a remarkable display of warmth accompanying the July accord, Dur´an-Ball´en congratulated his Peruvian counterpart on his reelection, while Fujimori indicated that he would attend a Rio Group summit in Quito in early September. Although the two did not formally meet on the latter occasion, Fujimori stated that their countries were undergoing a “recovery of mutual trust” and extended an invitation to Dur´an-Ball´en to reinstate his earlier intention to visit Lima. Tension again flared in late 1995, when Peru learned that Ecuador was about to take delivery of four military aircraft from Israel in a deal approved by the United States, despite its status as a guarantor of the Rio Protocol. A number of border incidents ensued, with Israel declaring on January 1 that it would not proceed with delivery of the planes until peace negotiations had been concluded. An easing of relations, if not a resolution of the dispute, was evidenced by a symbolic embrace between the chairs of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian joint chiefs of staff in the frontier region on February 11. The two generals subsequently held meetings in Quito

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on March 1 and in Lima on March 4, while a further series of meetings occurred in Bras´ılia in 1997. Finally, on January 19, 1998, agreement was reached in Rio de Janeiro on a timetable leading to a peace treaty. Under the accord, four commissions dealing with major aspects of the controversy would be established, including one dealing with the thorniest issue: border demarcation. The lengthy dispute was formally settled with a “global and definitive” accord signed by presidents Mahuad and Fujimori in Bras´ılia on October 26, 1998. While the disputed territory was awarded to Peru, control (but not sovereignty) of the principal town of Tiwintza, in addition to a corridor from the border, was assigned to Ecuador, which was also granted free navigation rights along the Amazon and the right to establish two port facilities within Peruvian territory. Provision was also made for linkup between the two countries’ electrical grids and oil pipelines. Resolution of the lengthy controversy appeared to be confirmed by the presence of the two countries’ chief executives at a frontier marker ceremony on May 13, 1999. During a ministerial meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on September 16, 1992, Ecuador announced its withdrawal from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in protest over the high annual membership fee of US $2 million and an inability to gain approval for increasing its production quota. However, it maintained linkage with the group as a nonvoting associate member. (Ecuador rejoined OPEC as a full member in October 2007 for “strategic reasons.”) Regionally, Ecuador and Chile signed a free trade agreement in December 1994 designed to liberalize 90 percent of their bilateral trade by 1997. However, recent relations with Colombia have been mixed. In September 2005 Ecuador and Chile became involved in controversy over whether the Colombian guerrilla group, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), should be considered a “terrorist” organization, as claimed by Colombia, or an “irregular armed group,” as defined by Ecuador. The Palacio administration agreed in January 2006 to let the border area serve as an “anvil”

against which the Colombian military could “hammer” the guerrillas, but did not fundamentally alter Ecuador’s long-standing policy of nonintervention in Colombia’s domestic conflict. Less than two weeks later, however, relations again soured in the wake of an incursion by Colombia in pursuit of rebel forces. Nonetheless, Ecuadorian army units were deployed in February to disrupt FARC activities in the eastern Amazonian provinces, where they found and destroyed several FARC bases and captured several guerrillas. Similar activity by Ecuadorian troops in May demonstrated that despite the noninterference rhetoric, FARC activities were receiving greater attention. Ecuador’s relations with Europe have largely revolved around trade issues (particularly banana exports to the European Union [EU]) and of late on the growing number of Ecuadorian e´ migr´es in the region. In November 2006 Ecuador renewed its complaints against the EU’s import restrictions on its banana exports. Ecuador’s suit before the World Trade Organization claimed that the EU banana import tariff introduced in January 2006 was discriminatory and had the effect of reducing its market share vis-`a-vis the shares of African and Caribbean former colonies, contrary to a 2001 agreement guaranteeing Ecuador’s share of the EU banana trade. By 2006 Ecuador’s relations with Peru had improved, with the two countries finalizing a deal for electricity from Peru to help Ecuador supplement its hydroelectric power generation deficit. Also, Ecuador’s military redeployed troops that had been on the border with Peru to the Colombian border, closing down the bases left behind. Like its Andean neighbors Colombia and Peru, Ecuador pursued negotiations with the United States over a bilateral free trade agreement in 2006. The agreement was meant to codify and extend trade preferences granted to Ecuador under the U.S. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), but the negotiations broke down in April and May following the passage of a windfall profit tax on oil revenues earned by foreign energy firms and the seizure of one U.S.-based energy firm’s Ecuadorian assets (see Current Issues,

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below). The government then announced it would seek to enhance commercial links with Chile and Mexico and to work out trade agreements with Central American neighbors who have bilateral free trade agreements with the United States. The United States, for its part, claimed that Ecuador acted in violation of the bilateral investment treaty between the two nations and warned that it might end Ecuador’s preferential treatment under ATPDEA. The Correa administration declined to renew the military base access agreement with the United States that allowed U.S. forces access to the Pacific coast base at the port of Manta, primarily for counternarcotics operations. The agreement is now set to expire in 2009. Ecuador turned to Venezuela for energy cooperation and assistance after the cancelation of the Occidental Petroleum contract, signing an agreement to cooperate broadly across energy production and petrochemical sectors and for the initiation of joint enterprises between the state petroleum companies in May 2006. Ecuador also considered an arrangement to have Venezuela refine a portion of its oil output for domestic use, an arrangement with favorable terms that was expected to save Ecuador hundreds of millions of dollars. Given the tense relations between the United States and Venezuela, however, the Palacio government announced less extensive strategic alliances with Brazilian and Argentine state-owned oil companies, thus avoiding the appearance of being too friendly with Venezuela’s president Hugo Ch´avez. While Correa has what observers describe as an “amiable” relationship with Ch´avez, he is not characterized as following an identical political model, though he did mandate nationalization of Ecuador’s resources. In early 2008, Ecuador and Venezuela announced plans to build a huge oil refinery in the coastal province of Manabi, Ecuador.

Current Issues During his brief tenure in office, President Alfredo Palacio’s government was beset by a series of public protests, led by oil workers, university students, labor unions, and indigenous groups, over

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the status of a foreign oil company operating in Ecuador and the government’s negotiations over a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States. The unrest began with a violent protest in Napo province in February 2006 that disrupted the flow of oil to pipelines, spurring Palacio to declare a state of emergency and arrest several public officials sympathetic to the protesters (who sought action on promises by the government to fund the construction of local transportation infrastructure projects). Additional protests erupted in March, followed by a general strike organized by the largest labor syndicate in opposition to the free trade negotiations. Soon, larger-scale unrest, coordinated by the indigenous group Conaie, spread more broadly in protest of the trade negotiations and the government’s reluctance to cancel an oil production contract with Occidental Petroleum. Tens of thousands of protesters disrupted much of the nation’s transportation and commerce as Conaie organized highway barricades in half of the nation’s provinces. Palacio appealed for calm, declared a broader, more sweeping state of emergency, and dispatched his ministers to demobilize some of the protests with promises of government investment in local projects, but he nevertheless vowed to continue negotiations over the trade agreement. In March, the Congress passed legislation that imposed a higher tax on foreign oil companies, increasing the windfall profit tax rate from 30 percent to 60 percent. Palacio then moderated his position on the free trade issue in April, announcing that the agreement would be adopted only if it was in the country’s best interest. Palacio subsequently vetoed the oil windfall profit tax provision that set the tax rate, substituting instead a 50 percent rate, which Congress ratified on April 19. In reaction to the windfall profit tax, the United States halted negotiations on the trade agreement. In May public pressure ratcheted up, as Conaie and other groups urged the government again to cancel the Occidental Petroleum contract (though the company had offered to pay a $20 million penalty and to pay windfall profit taxes). On May 15 the energy minister ruled that the contract was canceled. In response, the United States formally

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suspended negotiations over the free trade agreement. Subsequently, Occidental filed suit with the World Bank Group’s investment dispute settlement agency (which ruled in Ecuador’s favor on preliminary issues in August 2007). By late July 2006 most of the political activity in Ecuador was directed toward the October presidential and legislative elections, as 13 candidates registered to run for the presidency. Le´on Rold´os Aguilera, a former vice president of the republic, and a center-left leader of a new party, Ethics and ´ Democracy Network (Red Etica y Democracia— RED), emerged as the front-runner in opinion polls during the early months of the campaign. However, by September, Rold´os’s stiff campaigning style and his close ties to the ID/RED alliance’s congressional candidates (at a time when public regard for the Congress was low) eroded his support. By early October the new front-runners were two populists: Alvaro Noboa Pont´on, of the recentlyformed PRIAN, and Rafael Correa Delgado, leader of the new far left-wing alliance PA´IS. Noboa won the first-round balloting with 26.8 percent of the vote over Correa’s 22.8 percent. Gilmar Guti´errez, the PSP candidate and brother of former president Lucio Guti´errez, ran a strong third with 17.4 percent. Rold´os placed fourth with 14.8 percent. Each of the remaining candidates received less than 10 percent of the vote. Prior to the second round of presidential balloting in November, Noboa portrayed his runoff opponent, Correa, as a radical, a communist, and a lackey of Venezuelan president Hugo Ch´avez. Correa, for his part, accused Noboa, a banana magnate, of seeking to run the country for his own personal gain. Noboa advocated a diplomatic distance from Venezuela’s President Ch´avez and Cuba, offering instead to embrace closer ties with the United States and a resurrection of the free trade agreement. Correa’s election platform drew on themes from the anti-U.S. Andean leftist populism (typified by Venezuela’s Ch´avez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales). Correa called for an increase in social spending, the suspension or restructuring of repayment on foreign debt, a renegotiation of investment contracts with foreign oil companies, and nonrenewal of the agreement for the U.S. military

base. He opposed the U.S. free trade agreement, suggesting that it would hurt the small agricultural producers. Correa’s victory in the 2006 presidential election set up yet another showdown between the executive and legislature. Having shunned putting forward legislative candidates, Correa’s PA´IS had no dedicated support in Congress other than from the small number of seats won by the radical, left-wing MPD, and from the MNPP. The largest parties in Congress, the PRIAN, PSP, and PSC, were positioned to take advantage of any alliance they might form to leverage control. Correa issued a decree immediately after his inauguration in 2007 calling for a national referendum on a constituent assembly with power to rewrite the constitution. Following a ruling by the TSE that the decree was subject to approval by Congress, Correa reached an accord with the opposition PSP and the PRE to support the referendum. Congress passed the measure on February 13, two weeks after proreferendum protesters forced the evacuation of the legislative chamber. The TSE then set the referendum for April, but later crafted the ballot question in such a way as to grant a constituent assembly plenipotentiary powers, including the power to dissolve the Congress. This move provoked opposition deputies in Congress to accuse the TSE of acting unconstitutionally (claiming only the Congress could authorize such powers). Five deputies filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the referendum; another 52 deputies voted with the original 5 for the removal of the TSE’s president. The TSE ordered the removal of these 57 legislators for one year, on grounds of obstruction. Congress was unable to reconvene with the necessary quorum until March 20, when 21 alternates arrived under armed guard. In the interim some of the dismissed legislators had tried to reenter Congress to retake their seats; in the violence and chaos that ensued, 2 legislators were shot and injured. The 21 alternate deputies formed a bloc, the Dignidad Nacional, of 9 PRIAN, 9 PSP, and 3 PSC alternates who supported conferring plenipotentiary powers on a constituent assembly.

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In the referendum of April 15, 2007, the measure passed overwhelmingly, with 80 percent of voters in favor of calling a 130-member constituent assembly. A week later the TSE ruled for the reinstatement of 50 of the dismissed legislators; the next day the Congress, without the expunged legislators, voted to dismiss the TSE judges. On April 24 an arrest warrant was issued for two dozen of the dismissed legislators, accusing them of sedition. More than a dozen of them briefly fled to Colombia, requesting asylum and seeking international intervention. Ultimately, the crisis abated as the Congress continued to operate without the suspended legislators. Though President Correa had threatened to suspend Ecuador’s payments on its foreign debt, the finance ministry paid off all outstanding debt to the IMF in early 2007 and vowed to end dealings with it. In February, however, Correa and his finance minister, Ricardo Pati˜no, began threatening not to make a scheduled interest payment to Ecuador’s foreign creditors and bond markets, in order to shift priorities to spending on education and antipoverty programs. The government paid the interest on February 14, but warned that it reserved the right to default on future payments and would be looking to restructure its payment terms. In May a videotape emerged showing Pati˜no discussing manipulation of bond markets with representatives of two U.S. securities brokerage firms just two days before the interest payment. Ecuadorian legislators alleged that Pati˜no had deliberately manipulated prices for Ecuadorian government bonds for personal gain and called for his dismissal. Correa resisted until late July, when Pati˜no was reassigned to a new department overseeing the coastal provinces. In mid-2007 attention turned to political maneuvering in anticipation of the constituent assembly election on September 30. Correa’s PA´IS won decisively with 69.5 percent of the vote and 80 of the 130 seats. The closest competitor was the PSP, with just under 7.3 percent of the vote and 18 seats. Following the assembly’s first meeting on November 29, delegates overwhelmingly voted to declare the opposition-controlled Congress in re-

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cess without pay until approval of a new constitution in a referendum to be held in 2008. The assembly then assumed the powers of Congress. Critics blasted the assembly’s action, claiming that it was giving too much power to the executive branch, particularly after the attorney general, the banking chief and other top officials were suspended. In a symbolic gesture, Correa declined to step down. The assembly was expected to meet for at least six months. On the economic front, the president decreed an increase in the state’s share of windfall oil profits from 50 percent to 99 percent in October 2007. The increase affected foreign companies operating in Ecuador that had previously seen extraordinary profits as a result of high international oil prices.

Political Parties Historically dominated by the conservative and liberal parties and long complicated by pronounced personalist tendencies, the Ecuadorian party system has recently been in a state of considerable flux. Many of the traditional parties have been built around particular candidates or families, consistent with the elite character of the country’s political culture for many generations. Party organizations have therefore been weak. Party alliances and coalitions have tended to form to win particular election contests or deal with immediate crises, then dissolve after the elections or crises have receded. The principal coalitions formed for the 1984 elections were a right-of-center National Reconstruction Front (Frente de Reconstrucci´on Nacional—FRN), which supported the presidential candidacy of Febres Cordero, and a left-ofcenter Progressive Front (Frente Progresista—FP). Both groups subsequently underwent a degree of restructuring, ultimately constituting a minority presidential bloc and a majority opposition bloc after the midterm congressional balloting of June 1986. In the second-round presidential balloting of May 1988, Rodrigo Borja was supported by the ID, DP, CFP, FRA, FADI, and MPD, which had collectively obtained a majority of legislative seats

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in January. By contrast, Borja’s ID lost more than half of its seats in the June 1990 legislative election, giving an opposition grouping led by the PSC and PRE a slim majority that the president was able to reverse in late October by concluding a fragile alliance of deputies ranging from communists to conservatives. By early 1991 the unlikely accord had dissipated, with legislative-executive conflict persisting for the remainder of Borja’s term. Shifts in the balance of legislative power have by no means been confined to electoral outcomes. During Dur´an-Ball´en’s first year in office (1992– 1993), no fewer than 22 of the Chamber’s then 77 representatives were officially reported to have changed their party affiliations. The fluidity was responsible, in part, for the downfall of presidents Bucaram in 1997, Mahuad in 2000, and Guti´errez in 2005.

Presidential Party ´ The Country Alliance (Alianza Pa´ıs—PAIS). ´ is a loose collection of socialist organizations PAIS and left-of-center personalities organized in 2006 largely by Rafael Correa, its presidential candidate. Correa chose not to participate in the presidential primaries sponsored by Conaie (below), instead forming alliances with the PS-FA, PSP, and the MNPP, among others, for support in the second round of balloting. During his 2006 campaign, Correa had targeted for radical reform what he labeled the “partidocracia” of traditional parties that had long controlled the National Congress and that brought down or crippled successive presidential administrations. Subsequently, the PA´IS refused to field candidates in the 2006 legislative elections, amid corruption allegations among various parties. After winning the election, President Correa successfully steered the PA´IS toward its goal of winning the constituent assembly election on September 30, 2007. He rejected an attempt by some close advisers to launch a party whose acronym would match his initials, deriding this as another example of the destructive pattern of personalization of politics in Ecuador.

The party was fined close to $1 million by the TSE in August 2007 for concealing campaign spending from the November 2006 presidential runoff, but the TSE backed away from that decision amid allegations by Correa that the investigation unit had not treated PA´IS and the opposition PRIAN equally with regard to overspending. Leaders: Rafael CORREA Delgado (Leader of the Alliance and President of the Republic), Lenin MORENO Garc´es (Vice President of the Republic).

Government-Supportive Parties Socialist Party–Broad Front (Partido Socialista–Frente Amplio—PS–FA). A long-established leftist formation (its founder, Ricardo PAREDES, having broken away to found the Ecuadorian Communist Party in 1931), the PS formed a coalition with the FA that secured three Chamber seats in 2002. For the 2002 presidential campaign, the coalition joined with the DP and the CFP in supporting former vice president Le´on Rold´os Aguilera, who finished third on a 15.5 percent vote share. The FA is a six-party formation whose core group has long been the Ecuadorian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Ecuatoriano—PCE). The other parties are the Committee for the People (Comit´e del Pueblo—CDP), a splinter group of the Maoist Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (Partido Comunista Marxista-Leninista—PCML); the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario—PSR), a pro-Cuban group that withdrew from the Socialist Party in 1962; the Revolutionary Movement of the Christian Left (Movimiento Revolucionario de Izquierda Cristiana—MRIC), supported by a number of leftwing Catholics; the Movement for Leftist Unity (Movimiento por la Unidad de la Izquierda— MUI); and the Second Independence Movement (Movimiento Segunda Independencia—MSI). In 1988 the FA supported General Vargas in the first presidential round and Borja Cevallos in the runoff; it supported Gustavo ITURRALDE in 1992.

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The PS–FA allied itself with Rafael Correa and the Alianza Pa´ıs for the 2006 elections. Like Correa’s party, the PS–FA boycotted the legislative elections, offering no candidates on its list, and it endorsed Correa for president. PS–FA party leader Guadalupe Larriva was selected by Correa to be his first defense minister, becoming the first woman named to the post. She was killed in a helicopter crash on January 24, 2007. The PS–FA formed an alliance with the MNPP to contest the constituent assembly election in September 2007, but the alliance secured less than 1 percent of the vote. Leaders: Gustavo AYALA Cruz (President), Gonzalo AGUILAR (Vice President), Tito ´ GOROZABEL, Fausto DUTAN (Executive Secretary). New Country–Pachakutik Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Pais–Pachakutik—MNPP). The New Country Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Pais—MNP) was launched as an antiestablishment grouping that backed TV journalist Freddy Ehlers, who had entered the 1996 presidential race in February as an independent candidate on an anticorruption, environmentalist platform. After declaring his candidacy, Ehlers moved quickly to second place in the opinion polls, ahead of the ultimate victor, Abdal´a Bucaram. While proving attractive as a political “outsider,” Ehlers was hindered by having served as a member of the Andean Pact secretariat in Lima, Peru, where he married a Peruvian national. Even more damaging was his selection of a running mate, Rossana VINUEZA, who, although a prominent environmentalist, was linked to the Conservative Party through the rightwing Catholic organization, Opus Dei. As a result, Ehlers finished with a third-place 21 percent vote share in the first-round presidential balloting. Subsequently, he insisted that the Nuevo Pa´ıs was the “real winner” because it had led in the 11 highland provinces and predicted that the group would prevail over the “old country” parties in the year 2000. In 1998 the MNP joined with Pachakutik, the political wing of the 2.5 million strong Conaie, in

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a coalition styled the MNPP that supported Lucio Guti´errez for president but went into opposition in August 2003. Most of the MNPP’s electoral strength is based in the Andean highlands and Amazonian provinces, where the 11 indigenous and ethnic groups it represents are concentrated. In 2006 the party’s presidential candidate, Luis Macas, finished a distant sixth in the first-round balloting, with 2.2 percent of the vote. The party secured 3 percent of the vote in the legislative balloting on the same day. Its alliance with the PS–FA to contest the constituent assembly elections netted less than 1 percent of the overall vote. Leaders: Victor GRANDA (President), Guilberto TALAHUA, Belisario DAHUA, Freddy EHLERS Zurita (1996 and 1998 presidential candidate). Democratic Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Democr´atico—MPD). Although initially banned from participation in the 1978 election, the TSE subsequently acknowledged the party’s legitimacy. Drawing much of its support from trade union members and teachers, the MPD, described as a far-left party, has since been represented in the Congress. In 1996 it lost 9 seats, leaving it with a total of 2, which the MPD retained in 1998. It secured an additional seat in 2002. In 2004 the MPD was part of President Lucio Guti´errez’s “new majority” that helped him deflect impeachment and push through a measure that removed all 31 Supreme Court justices. In 2006 the MPD’s presidential candidate, Luis Villacis, won only 1.3 percent of the vote in firstround balloting. Subsequently, the MPD supported Correa. In the September 30, 2007, constituent assembly elections the MPD won just over 1.7 percent of the vote. Leaders: Luis VILLACIS (National Party Director and 2006 presidential candidate), Eduardo MEDINA (Second Assistant Director), Maria Eugenia LIMA (1998 presidential candidate), Juan Jos´e CASTELLO (1996 presidential candidate).

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Other Parties That Contested the 2006 Elections Democratic Left (Izquierda Democr´atica— ID). The ID, a moderate social democratic party, named Rodrigo Borja Cevallos as its presidential candidate in 1978, endorsed Rold´os Aguilera in the 1979 runoff, and offered partial support to the Hurtado Larrea government after Rold´os’s death. It narrowly lost the presidency in the May 1984 runoff after having captured a substantial legislative plurality in January. Borja Cevallos was the front-runner in the first-round presidential balloting in January 1988 and defeated Abdal´a Bucaram of the PRE in a runoff on May 8. By contrast, its 1992 candidate, Ra´ul Baca Carbo, ran a distant fourth in the first-round vote. In 1996 the party’s legislative representation plummeted from 8 to 4, but it recovered to 17 in 1998, losing an additional seat for a total of 16 in 2002. The ID joined forces with Leon Rold´os’s RED party to contest the 2006 presidential elections, endorsing Rold´os as the presidential candidate. For the September 2007 constituent assembly elections the ID formed an alliance with other small left-wing parties, but the coalition won only 0.5 percent of the vote. ´ Leaders: Andr´es PAES (President), Agustin Ortiz (Vice President), Rodrigo BORJA Cevallos (Former President of the Republic, 1998 and 2002 presidential candidate), Luis PARODI Valverde (Former Vice President of the Republic), Ra´ul BACA Carbo (1992 presidential candidate). ´ Ethics and Democracy Network (Red Etica y Democracia—RED). Formed in January 2005 by its leader and former vice president of the republic Le´on Rold´os Aguilera, the social democratic party focused on reform of the constitution to create a bicameral legislature with elements of party-list proportional representation and geographic constituencies, greater autonomy for local and regional authorities, eradication of political corruption, and reform of the education system. RED formed an alliance for the presidential election with the ID, with Rold´os standing as the coalition’s presidential candidate. In the early

stages of the election, Rold´os led opinion polls, but his early strength dwindled as a large number of voters remained undecided. As the campaign heated up in late summer 2006, Rold´os fell behind PRIAN’s Alvaro Noboa and PA´IS coalition candidate Rafael Correa, with the latter emerging as the candidate with the most support from centerleft voters. Rold´os seemed to bolster the attacks on Correa by Noboa and other candidates from the right, claiming that Correa’s high-profile campaign advertising was financed by Venezuelan president Hugo Ch´avez. To shore up support on the left, Rold´os promised not to accept assistance from the IMF if elected. RED occupied 6 of the 10 seats won by the ID/RED alliance in the 2006 legislative elections. In the September 30, 2007, constituent assembly elections, RED, no longer in alliance with the ID, won just over 2 percent of the vote. ´ Aguilera (President Leaders: Le´on ROLDOS of the Party, Former Vice President of the Republic, and 2006 presidential candidate), Dolores PADILLA (Vice President), Ney BARRIONUEVO (Second Vice President), Carlos AGUINAGA (Secretary General). Institutional Renewal Party of National Action (Partido Renovador Institucional de Acci´on Nacional—PRIAN). The PRIAN is a center-right party, launched by former Roldosista Alvaro Noboa Pont´on, reportedly Ecuador’s wealthiest man, to support his presidential bid in 2002 after the former Roldosista member was defeated in 1998. In July 2006 the PRIAN and PSP forged an alliance to contest the presidential election, with Noboa as the presidential candidate, despite his earlier statements that he would not run. The PRIAN won 24.5 percent of the national vote in legislative elections of 2006, displacing the PSC (below) as the largest bloc in the chamber. Despite its opposition to Correa’s proposed constituent assembly, the PRIAN fielded candidates for the assembly election in 2007, winning 6.6 percent of the vote, with Alvaro Noboa elected as a delegate. Jorge Cevallos Mac´ıas, president of the

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National Congress, was expelled from the party in June, reportedly because he “broke from the party line” and rejected the dismissal of 57 lawmakers as the TSE had mandated. ´ Leaders: Wilson SANCHEZ (President), Vicente TAIANO (National Director and 2006 vice presidential candidate), Alvaro NOBOA Pont´on (2002 and 2006 presidential candidate), Sylka ´ SANCHEZ, Gloria GALLARDO. Patriotic Society Party of January 21 (Partido Sociedad Patri´otica 21 de Enero—PSP). Launched before the 2002 election, the PSP was joined by the MNPP in supporting the successful candidacy of Lucio Guti´errez, the PSP’s charismatic founder and leader, whose platform emphasized anticorruption measures and support for the poor. After Guti´errez was removed from the presidency by the Congress in April 2005, he fled the country. He returned in October but was arrested on sedition charges and jailed. The courts ordered his release and dismissal of the case in March 2006. Two months prior to his release, Guti´errez was nominated by the PSP as their presidential candidate for the October 2006 election. Guti´errez’s major election plank was the promise to call a constituent assembly to reform the dysfunctional political system. His candidacy was disallowed, however, by a TSE ruling in May 2006 that barred Guti´errez from standing for election for two years because of a campaign finance violation. Guti´errez continued to campaign in defiance of the TSE ruling. In late July 2006 the PSP announced that it would join forces with PRIAN for the presidential election, with PRIAN’s Noboa running for president and Gilmar Guti´errez (the brother of Lucio) as the vice presidential candidate. By September, however, the parties had gone their separate ways, with Gilmar Guti´errez registering as a candidate for president under the PSP banner. Guti´errez came in third in the first round of balloting with 17.4 percent of the vote. The PSP list won 17.5 percent of the vote in the legislative election, giving it the second largest bloc of seats in the Congress. The PSP renewed its loose alliance with the PRIAN for

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the November 26 presidential runoff, supporting Noboa in exchange for promises that a Noboa government would prosecute perpetrators of the 2005 “coup” against Lucio Guti´errez. After its defeat in the presidential elections, the PSP eventually agreed to support a constituent assembly referendum. Soon thereafter some PSP legislators joined other opposition members in voting to dismiss the TSE chief after a dispute over the power that would be vested in the assembly, and the lawmakers were subsequently dismissed. In the 2007 constituent assembly elections, the PSP won 7.3 percent of the vote, with Gilmar Guti´errez elected a delegate. ´ Leaders: Col. (Ret.) Lucio Edwin GUTIERREZ Borb´ua (Former President of the Republic), Gilmar ´ GUTIERREZ Borb´ua (National Director and 2006 ´ (Secretary presidential candidate), Carlos TERAN ´ General), Fidel ARAUJO. Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano—PSC). Moderately right-of-center, the PSC was launched in 1951 by former president Camilo PONCE Enr´ıquez. Subsequently, it served in coalition with the PCE and the Ecuadorian Nationalist Revolutionary Action (Acci´on Revolucionaria Nacionalista Ecuatoriana—ARNE), a rightist group that was denied electoral registration in 1978 and thereafter dissolved. Sixto Dur´an-Ball´en, the PSC’s 1988 presidential candidate who failed to secure sufficient votes in first-round balloting, eventually embarked on an ultimately successful race for the presidency as the PUR nominee. The PSC’s legislative representation increased from 9 seats in 1988 to a plurality of 16 in 1990; it retained its plurality in 1992 by capturing 21 seats. In 1996 the PSC held 27 seats. In 2006, PSC presidential candidate Cynthia Viteri won 9.6 percent of the vote in the first round. In the legislative election held on the same day the PSC list won 13.5 percent of the vote. The PSC won just under 4 percent of the vote in the constituent assembly election in 2007. Leaders: Pascual DEL CIOPPO Aragundi (President), Pedro Carlos FALQUEZ Batallas (Vice President), Cynthia VITERI (2006 presidential

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candidate), Antonio Xavier NEIRA Menendez (2002 presidential candidate), Jaime NEBOT Saadi (1996 presidential candidate), Le´on FEBRES Cordero Rivadeneira (Former President of the Re´ Carrera (Secpublic), Xavier Eduardo BUITRON retary General). Christian Democratic Union (Uni´on Dem´ocrata Cristiana—UDC). In late 1977 the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano— PDC) joined with the Progressive Conservatives in organizing the Popular Democratic Coalition (Coalici´on Popular Democr´atica), which, having been denied separate registration by the TSE, joined with the CFP in supporting the 1978/1979 presidential candidacy of Jaime Rold´os Aguilera. In August 1981 the Popular Democratic legislative group (subsequently identified as the Democr´acia Popular—DP) joined with a number of other members in a government-supportive alliance styled the Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica). During the 1984 presidential race, the group (also identified as Democracia Popular– Uni´on Dem´ocrata Cristiana) campaigned under the Popular Democracy label in support of former PCP leader Julio C´esar TRUJILLO. It supported Borja Cevallos in second-round balloting in May 1988. At a meeting of the party’s national junta on July 3, 1989, which was boycotted by aliancista members, a pro-Hurtado rupturista faction secured approval of a motion to withdraw from the executive (but not the legislative) partnership with the ID. In early August, however, the decision was reversed, with the ID agreeing to support the reelection of Christian Democrat Wilfredo Lucero as president of the Congress. The party fared poorly in both the presidential and legislative elections in 1992 and held only 4 Chamber seats after the 1994 balloting. In 1996 the party tripled its Chamber seats to 12. In 2002 former president Hurtado participated in the formation of a youth-oriented United Fatherland (Patria Solidaria—PS), becoming that party’s presidential candidate. By 2006, the DP name had disappeared from national election campaigns; the UDC, however,

won 8.1 percent of the legislative vote, securing 5 seats in Congress. In the constituent assembly elections in September 2007, the UDC won 0.4 percent of the vote. Leaders: Carlos LARREATEGUI (President), Ord´on˜ ez DIEGO Guerrero, Jamil MAHUAD Witt and Osvaldo HURTADO Larrea (Former Presidents of the Republic), Wilfredo LUCERO Bola˜nos, Dario FLORES Rubio (Secretary General). Concentration of Popular Forces (Concentraci´on de Fuerzas Populares—CFP). Formed in 1946 by Carlos Guevara Moreno, the CFP is committed to broad-based socioeconomic change. Its longtime leader, Assad Bucaram, was the frontrunner in the abortive 1972 presidential campaign and was considered the leading contender in 1978 until being declared ineligible on the basis of foreign parentage. Bucaram’s prot´eg´e and nephewin-law, Jaime Rold´os Aguilera, the candidate of a coalition of the CFP and Popular Democrats, obtained a plurality of ballots cast on July 16 and defeated Dur´an-Ball´en in a runoff on April 29, 1979. Following the CFP victory, a pronounced breach emerged between Rold´os and his former mentor, most party leaders remaining loyal to Bucaram. In 1980 Rold´os formally broke with the CFP, organizing a group called People, Change and Democracy (Pueblo, Cambio y Democracia—PCD). Further defections occurred, and on November 6, 1981, Bucaram died, leaving the rump CFP with no firm leadership. The party’s Chamber representation fell from 6 seats in 1988 to 3 in 1990; it plunged further to a single national constituency seat in 1992, which was lost in 1994, regained in 1996, and again lost in 1998. In 2002 it joined with the PS–FA in endorsing the presidential candidacy of Le´on Rold´os Aguilera while continuing to lack Chamber representation. The CFP’s 2006 presidential candidate, Jaime Damervil Martinez, secured less than 0.5 percent of the vote in first-round balloting. Leaders: Averroes BUCARAM Saxida (1992 presidential candidate), Jaime DAMERVIL Mart´ınez (2006 presidential candidate), Galo VAYAS (Director).

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Other parties that participated in the 2006 elections were the Revolutionary Movement of Popular Participation (Movimiento Revolucionario de Participaci´on Popular—MRPP), led by Lenin TORRES; the Alfarista National Integration (INA), led by Carlos Francisco Sagnay de la BASTIDA; the Movement for Democratic Renovation (Movimiento de la Renovaci´on Democr´atica—MRD), led by Marco Proa˜no MAYA; and the Alliance of the Third Republic (Alianza Tercera Republica—ATR), led by Marcelo LARREA Cabrera.

Other Parties Alfarist Radical Front (Frente Radical Alfarista—FRA). The FRA was founded by Abd´on ´ Mu˜noz, a maverick Guayaquil busiCALDERON nessman who was assassinated on November 29, 1978. The party’s legal recognition was withdrawn in early 1979, after which its supporters were reported to have joined the Democratic left to participate in the congressional election of April 29. Its legal status restored, the FRA made an unexpectedly strong showing in local and provincial elections in December 1980, winning more than 20 percent of the national vote, but by 1998 was reduced to only 3 Chamber seats, all of which were lost in 2002. FRA leader Fabi´an Alarc´on Rivera, president of the republic from February 1997 to August 1998, was arrested on corruption charges in March 1999, his supporters describing the action as motivated by politics. There has been little party activity reported since 2002. Leaders: Fabi´an ALARCON Rivera (President of the Party and Former President of the Republic), C´esar VERDUGA V´elez, Iv´an CASTRO Pati˜no. Ecuadorian Popular Revolutionary Action (Acci´on Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana— APRE). Formerly styled the Ecuadorian Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana), APRE resulted from a rivalry within the Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP, above) in the 1950s between a majority faction led by Assad BUCARAM and a leftist minority led by Jos´e HANNA Musse. In 1958 Hanna Musse formally broke with the CFP, his new organization

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being known until 1978 as the National Guevarista Party (Partido Nacional Guevarista). APRE supported General Vargas for president in 1988 and 1992, winning one legislative seat on the latter occasion and adding another in 1994, by which time Vargas had become its acknowledged leader. Leader: Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Frank VARGAS Pazzos (1988, 1992, and 1996 presidential candidate). Independent Movement for an Authentic Republic (Movimiento Independiente para una Rep´ublica Aut´entica—MIRA). MIRA was launched in 1996 by Vice President Rosal´ıa Arteaga. Leader: Rosal´ıa ARTEAGA Serrano (Former Vice President of the Republic and 1998 presidential candidate). Radical Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Radical Ecuatoriano—PLRE). The PLRE is the principal heir to the traditional Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL), which was dominant in Ecuadorian politics for a half-century after 1895 but subsequently split into a number of factions. It lost its only legislative seat in May 1996. Leaders: Ivonne Leyla JUEZ Abuchakra (2002 presidential candidate), Blasco Manuel ˜ PENAHERRERA Padilla (Former Vice President of the Republic), Julio PONCE Arteta (Director), Alejandro LASSO de la Torre (Secretary General). Ecuadorian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Ecuatoriano—PCE). Formed in 1855, the PCE is Ecuador’s oldest political party. It is based on a traditional alliance between church and state and has historical roots in the Andean highlands. In early 1976 the party split into rightand left-wing factions, the latter subsequently organizing as the Progressive Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Progresista—PCP), which joined with a number of other parties, including the Christian Democrats (see Christian Democratic Union, above), in a 1978 alliance styled the Popular Democratic Coalition that supported the presidential candidacy of Jaime Rold´os Aguilera. By 1986 its Chamber representation had been reduced to a single seat, which it retained in 1988 before recovering to three in 1990 and six in 1992, all of

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which were retained in 1994. The party fell back to two legislative seats in 1996 (both retained in 1998), even though it had absorbed (then) President Dur´an-Ball´en’s Republican Unity Party (Partido Unidad Republicano—PUR) in 1995. (A PSC splinter, the PUR was registered in October 1991 as a 1992 campaign vehicle for Sixto Dur´an-Ball´en, who had run as a PSC candidate in 1978 and 1988. Following Dur´an-Ball´en’s inauguration, the PUR experienced internal rancor, culminating in mid-1993 with the withdrawal of former president Carlos Julio AROSEMENA, who insisted that the group lacked leadership and direction.) The party still has some support in the provinces of Carchi and Imbabura, where it cooperates with the PSC. ´ ´ Leaders: Sixto DURAN-BALL EN (Former President of the Republic), Alberto DAHIK Garzoni (Former Vice President, currently in exile). Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata—PD). The PD was organized in 1981, initially as the Radical Democratic Party (Partido Radical Dem´ocrata—PRD), by a number of dissident Liberals, including Francisco Huerta Montalvo, who had been the PLR presidential candidate before his disqualification in 1978 because of alleged financial irregularities. The PD was joined by deserters from other parties, including Le´on Rold´os Aguilera. Before the 1984 election Rold´os joined the People, Change and Democracy (under CFP, above). The PD won five Chamber seats in 1984, one in 1986, and none thereafter. Leaders: Dr. Francisco HUERTA Montalvo (1984 presidential candidate), Luis PIANA. In anticipation of the September 2007 constituent assembly election, several new parties emerged, including the National Honesty Movement (Movimiento Honradez Nacional—MHN), ´ led by Ximena BOHORQUEZ, which won 0.7 percent of the vote, and A New Option (Una Nueva Opcion—UNO), which won 1.1 percent.

Indigenous Organizations Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities (Confederaci´on de Nacionalidades

Ind´ıgenas del Ecuador—Conaie). The confederation serves as an umbrella organization for nearly a dozen indigenous groups. It has advanced claims to most of the Andean province of Pastaza. To reinforce their demands, which included administrative autonomy and control of natural resources, including oil, the Indians mounted a brief insurrection in June 1990 and staged a protest march in Quito in April 1992. They were instrumental in forcing the ouster of President Mahuad in January 2000. With nearly 2.5 million members, the organization has proved a powerful political force. Antonio VARGAS, the former president of Conaie, hoped to be the 2002 presidential candidate of Conaie and its political arm, the Pachakutik Movement (see under MNPP, above), but he resigned as president of the confederation because of a scandal involving signatures on a referendum petition. In 2006 Conaie played a major role in organizing and staging the March protests against the free trade agreement negotiations with the United States and against any accommodation for Occidental Petroleum with regard to the breach of its oil production contract with Ecuador. Conaie also appealed to the UN and human rights groups to monitor the situation in Ecuador to safeguard against excessive use of force to stop the protests. Conaie proposed a single primary in late July for all of the left-of-center parties to select a candidate for the October 2006 elections. Its leader, Luis Macas, secured the nomination under the MNPP banner and won 2.19 percent of the votes. Leaders: Luis MACAS (President of the Party and 2006 presidential candidate), Santiago DE LA CRUZ (Vice President). Federation of Indigenous People, Peasants and Negroes of Ecuador (Federaci´on de Pueblos Ind´ıgenas, Campesinas y Negros del Ecuador— Fedepicne). Fedepicne was launched in 1996 by a group of Conaie dissidents. In 2005, former party president Marco MORILLO was identified as a member of the ID. Leaders: Luis PACHALA (President), Ricardo GUMABO, Pedro GUAMBO.

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Cabinet As of February 1, 2008 President Vice President

Rafael Correa Delgado Lenin Moreno Garc´es

Ministers Agriculture and Fisheries Coastal Affairs Coordinating Minister of the Economy Coordinating Minister of Internal and External Security Coordinating Minister of Politics Coordinating Minister of Production Coordinating Minister of Social Development Coordinating Minister of Strategic Sectors Cultural and Natural Heritage Coordination Culture Economic and Social Inclusion Economy and Finance Education Electricity and Renewable Energy Environment Foreign Relations, Commerce, and Integration Government and Police Industry and Competitiveness Justice and Human Rights Labor and Employment Petroleum National Defense Public Health Sport Tourism Transportation and Public Works Urban Development and Housing

Walter Poveda Ricaurte Carolina Portalupi [f] P´edro P´aez Gustavo Larrea Ricardo Pati˜no Susana Cabeza de Vaca [f] Nathalie Cely [f] Derlis Palacios Guerrero Doris Solis Carri´on [f] Antonio Preciado Bedoya Jeannette S´anchez Zurita [f] Fausto Ortiz de la Cadena Ra´ul Vallejo Coral Alecksey Mosquera Marcela Agui˜naga [f] Mar´ıa Isabel Salvador Crespo[f] Fernando Bustamante Ra´ul Sagasti Lupera Gustavo Jalkh Antonio Gagliardo Valarezo Galo Chiriboga Zambrano Wellington Sandoval C´ordova Caroline Chang [f] Ra´ul Carri´on Fiallos Ver´onica Si´on [f] Jorge Mar´un ´ Mar´ıa de los Angeles Duarte [f]

[f] = female

Legislature The current legislature is a unicameral National Congress (Congreso Nacional) of 100 members, popularly elected (via proportional representation in 22 constituencies [1 for each province]), serving four-year terms. In the most recent election on October 15, 2006, the Institutional Renewal Party of National Action won 27 seats; the Patriotic Society

Party, 23; the Social Christian Party, 12; the Democratic Left/Ethics and Democracy Network, 10; the Ecuadorian Roldosist Party, 6; the New Country– Pachakutik Movement, 6; the Democratic Popular Movement, 3; the Christian Democratic Union, 2; others, 11. (As has been commonplace in Ecuador, the number of seats held by parties subsequently

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changed as a result of defections on the part of individual legislators.) President: Jorge Jos´e CEVALLOS Mac´ıas.

Communications Ecuador’s Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, and journalists have normally been able to do their work unhindered. However, in recent years, the watchdog group Reporters Without Borders noted that press freedom had deteriorated under the administrations of President Lucio Guti´errez Borb´ua and President Rafael Correa. In 2007, Correa reportedly stopped holding news conferences in response to perceived hostility from journalists. Also in 2007, a journalist received a 60-day prison sentence for criticizing a politician.

Press The following are daily newspapers published in Guayaquil, unless otherwise noted: El Universo (143,000), independent conservative; El Comercio (Quito, 100,000), independent conservative; Ultimas Noticias (Quito, 60,000), evening counterpart of El Comercio; Hoy (Quito, 72,000), center-left; El Tel´egrafo (60,000 daily, 55,000 Sunday), liberal; El Expreso (60,000), center-right; El Tiempo (Quito, 35,000), independent conservative; La Raz´on (28,000), liberal; and La Hora.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility. A number of foreign agencies maintain bureaus in either Quito or Guayaquil.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is supervised by the nongovernmental Asociaci´on Ecuatoriana de Radiodifusi´on (AER) and the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones (Ietel). Of the more than 300 radio stations (the most numerous, on a per capita basis, in Latin America), about two dozen are facilities of the religious La Voz de los Andes. There are 14 television stations, most of which are commercial. There were approximately 65.5 personal computers and 73 Internet users per 1,000 people in 2005. As of that same year there were about 472 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Lu´ıs Benigno GALLEGOS Chiriboga U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador: Linda JEWELL Permanent Representative to the UN: Diego CORDOVEZ IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ALADI, CAN, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPEC, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

E L S A LVA D O R REPUBLIC

OF

EL SALVADOR

Rep u´ blica de El Salvador

The Country The smallest of the Central American countries and the only one whose territory does not touch the Caribbean Sea, El Salvador is oriented geographically and, to some extent, psychologically toward the Pacific and the other isthmus countries. Its population density is the highest in the Americas, while its per capita income is among the lowest. Although there is a small Indian minority, the people are largely of mixed Spanish and Indian descent, with 90 percent classified as mestizo. The Catholic Church is predominant, but Protestant and Jewish faiths are represented. Women constitute approximately 35 percent of the paid labor force, concentrated largely in domestic and human service sectors and in manufacturing; female participation in government is minimal. Traditionally dependent on agriculture, with coffee as the primary cash crop, El Salvador— before the domestic instability generated by the coup of October 1979—had become the region’s leading exporter of manufactured goods. The industrial sector as a whole now accounts for about 30 percent of GDP, while agriculture contributes 10 percent (down from nearly 40 percent in 1980). Most external sales are made to the United States and neighboring Central American nations. During 1979–1989 all major economic indicators steadily declined, counterinsurgency being described by one analyst as the country’s “only growth sector.” Most severely affected was agriculture, with production of coffee, cotton, and sugar each falling by approximately 50 percent from 1979– 1982 and capital flight reported at more than $1

billion through the period. More than half the population remained below the national poverty line, and much of the workforce was under- or unemployed; in addition, despite land-redistribution efforts in the early 1980s, no more than 15 percent of the rural population currently holds land title. In mid-1989 the Cristiani administration announced a “National Rescue Plan” that called for government spending cuts, the lifting of price controls, and the privatization of state-run industries (including coffee plantations) in order to reduce budget deficits and external debt arrears. The effort yielded

GUATEMALA

HONDURAS

Santa Ana

E L S A LVA D O R Mejicanos Acajutla

San Salvador

Soyapango

San Miguel La Unión Golfo de Fonseca

PAC IF IC 0 0

30 Mi 30 Km

OC EAN

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measurable results by 1992 with real GDP growth of 4.6 percent and a halving of inflation to 11.2 percent. Annual growth for the 1990s as a whole averaged 4.7 percent, but by 2001 expansion had slowed to 1.7 percent. In 2001 El Salvador adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency in an effort to stabilize exchange rates and attract foreign investment. However, growth showed little improvement until 2005, when it increased marginally to 2.8 percent, with inflation of 4.4 percent. In 2006 GDP grew by 3.5 percent, with inflation of 4.1 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background After the colonies comprising the Captaincy General of Guatemala declared their independence from Spain in 1821, a period of conflict ensued with Mexico over perceived Mexican domination efforts. El Salvador subsequently joined Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in forming the United Provinces of Central America in 1823. In the wake of the collapse of that star-crossed federation into civil war in 1838, El Salvador formally declared its status as an independent entity in a constitution adopted in 1841. Many constitutional revisions were subsequently enacted during ongoing political turbulence throughout the rest of the 1800s, which also included several abortive attempts to reform a Central American Federation. However, El Salvador enjoyed periods of relative calm during the first three decades of the 20th century and again from 1950 to 1960. Lt. Col. Oscar OSIRIO ruled from 1950 to 1956 and was succeeded by an elected president, Lt. Col. Jos´e Mar´ıa LEMUS, but a coup d’´etat in 1960 overthrew Lemus and inaugurated a period of renewed instability. A new constitution was promulgated in January 1962 and an election was held the following April, although the opposition did not participate. Col. Julio Adalberto RIVERA, candidate of the recently organized National Conciliation Party (Partido de Conciliaci´on Nacional—PCN), was certified as president and served a five-year

term. Subsequent PCN victories brought Gen. Fidel ´ SANCHEZ Hern´andez and Col. Arturo Armando MOLINA Barraza to power in 1967 and 1972, respectively, but announcement of the 1972 results provoked an unsuccessful coup by leftist forces, in the wake of which their candidate, Jos´e Napole´on DUARTE Fuentes, was exiled. Following the election of February 20, 1977, the PCN candidate, Gen. Carlos Humberto ROMERO Mena, was declared president-elect with a majority of 67 percent of the votes cast, although the opposition, as in 1972, charged the government with massive electoral irregularities. The PCN won 50 of 54 seats in the legislative election of March 18, 1978, which was boycotted by most of the opposition because of inadequate assurances that the tabulation of results would be impartial. In the wake of rapidly escalating conflict between right- and left-wing groups, General Romero was ousted on October 15, 1979, in a coup led by ´ Col. Jaime Abdul GUTIERREZ and Col. Adolfo Arnoldo MAJANO Ramos, who were joined by three civilians on October 17 in a five-man ruling junta. While appealing to extremist forces to respect “the will of the majority” and aid in the installation of a “true democracy,” the junta was actively opposed by leftist elements protesting military rule, and a state of siege, lifted on October 23, was reimposed three days later. Two of the three civilian members of the junta, as well as all civilian cabinet members, resigned on January 3, 1980, in protest at a “swing to the right” for which the remaining civilian junta member, Mario Antonio ANDINO, was allegedly responsible. Andino himself resigned the following day, three prominent members of the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC) joining the junta on January 9 after obtaining assurances that rightist influence would be contained and a dialogue initiated with leftist organizations. One of the three, H´ector DADA Hirezi, withdrew on March 3 and was replaced by former PDC presidential candidate Jos´e Napole´on Duarte, who had returned from exile after the October coup. The most widely publicized terrorist act of the year was the assassination of the liberal Msgr. Oscar

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Political Status: Part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala that declared independence from Spain in September 1821; member of the United Provinces of Central America that was launched in 1823; status as independent political entity formalized in constitution of 1841; Republic of El Salvador formally established in constitution of 1859; constitution of 1962 suspended following military coup of October 15, 1979; provisional government superseded following promulgation of new constitution on December 20, 1983; peace treaty with FMLN guerrillas (effective February 1) signed January 16, 1992. Area: 8,124 sq. mi. (21,041 sq. km.). Population: 5,118,599 (1992C); 6,996,000 (2006E). The 1992 figure is unadjusted for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): SAN SALVADOR (508,000), Soyapango (295,000), Mejicanos (189,000), San Miguel (183,000), Santa Ana (179,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Effective January 1, 2001, El Salvador adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency. President: El´ıas Antonio (“Tony”) SACA Gonz´alez (Nationalist Republican Alliance); elected on March 21, 2004, and inaugurated for a five-year term on June 1, succeeding Francisco Guillermo FLORES P´erez (Nationalist Republican Alliance). Vice President: Ana Vilma ALBANEZ de Escobar (Nationalist Republican Alliance); elected on March 21, 2004, and inaugurated on June 1 for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Carlos QUINTANILLA Schmidt (Nationalist Republican Alliance).

Arnulfo ROMERO y Galdames, archbishop of San Salvador, on March 24. While the junta initially blamed leftist forces for the act, the actual perpetrators were widely assumed to be rightist elements. Earlier, three major mass organizations, in concert with the Salvadoran Communist Party, had announced the formation of a Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (Coodinadora Revolucionario

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de Masas—CRM) to oppose the PDC-military coalition. In April 1980 the CRM was superseded by the Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Revolucionario—FDR), a coalition of 18 leftist and far-leftist groups, including a dissident faction of the PDC. Subsequently, the major guerrilla organizations formed the Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Mart´ı para la Liberaci´on National—FMLN) to serve as the FDR’s military affiliate. In the wake of these and other developments, including the apparent complicity of government security forces in the murder of three American nuns and a lay worker on December 2, the junta was reorganized on December 3, with Duarte and the increasingly hard-line Guti´errez being sworn in as its president and vice president, respectively, on December 22. Although FMLN activity was widespread by early 1981, President Duarte on March 5 named a three-member commission to update electoral registers for Constituent Assembly balloting in March 1982. By midyear the PDC and four rightist parties had been registered, subsequently being joined by the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista—Arena) of former army major Roberto D’AUBUISSON Arrieta, who was reported to have been implicated in the murder of Archbishop Romero. The FDR, on the other hand, refused to participate, continuing efforts initiated in January to secure external support for its revolutionary program. In the election of March 28, 1982, the Christian Democrats secured the largest number of seats (24) in the 60-member Assembly. However, four rightwing parties collectively constituted a majority and refused to permit Duarte to continue as president. The ensuing interparty negotiations resulted in a deadlock, with the Christian Democrats insisting on representation in the new government proportional to their share of the vote. On April 22 the Assembly convened for its first session and elected Major d’Aubuisson as its president by a vote of 35– 22. After further negotiations that were reportedly influenced by pressure from the United States, the armed forces presented the Assembly with a list of

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individuals whom it considered acceptable as candidates for provisional chief executive, pending a direct presidential election. One of those listed, the ˜ Borja, was acindependent Dr. Alvaro MAGANA cepted by the Assembly on April 29 and sworn in on May 2 together with three vice presidents representing the PDC, the PCN, and Arena. Two days later a tripartite administration was formed. The move toward democracy generated no reprieve from insurgent activity. Nonetheless, the five parties represented in the Constituent Assembly agreed in August 1983 to establish a multiparty commission to prepare a timetable for new elections. Following promulgation of a revised constitution on December 20, the Assembly approved presidential balloting for March 1984 and legislative and municipal elections for March 1985. The 1984 election was contested by eight candidates, the acknowledged front-runners being d’Aubuisson and Duarte, neither of whom secured a majority. At a runoff on May 6, Duarte emerged the clear winner, with 53.6 percent of the vote, and was inaugurated on June 1. The FDR-FMLN, refusing to participate in the presidential campaign, stepped up its military activity, although agreeing to peace talks with Duarte in late 1984. The talks, held in the guerrilla-held town of La Palma on October 15, were hailed as “historic,” but FMLN insistence on “purification” of the armed forces through the integration of guerrilla elements proved a stumbling block for future talks, which were suspended altogether in January 1985. In something of a surprise victory, the Christian Democrats swept the March 1985 election, winning 33 seats in the National Assembly and control of 200 of the country’s 262 municipalities. The defeat of Arena, which had inhibited land reform measures and blocked Duarte’s efforts in the areas of human rights and peace negotiation, was taken as evidence that traditional rightists in the business sector and the military had shifted to the PDC, the former heartened by negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the latter welcoming U.S. military aid funds and training that had

measurably enhanced the armed forces’ firepower and counterinsurgency capability. Duarte, viewing the election results as a “mandate for peace,” pledged to reopen negotiations with the insurgents while rebuilding the collapsed Salvadoran economy. Within a year of the election, however, efforts at negotiation had largely been abandoned; economic measures had managed to alienate both the business community and Duarte’s traditional grassroots and trade union support; and the military stalemate which had prevailed since 1981 (in the words of a U.S. observer, “due to the high quality and dedication of both sides”) continued to sap the country’s economy and infrastructure. The rebels’ capacity to act with relative impunity was dramatized by the kidnapping of the president’s daughter, In´es Guadalupe DUARTE Dur´an, by FMLN-affiliated forces in September 1985. The bombardment of insurgent areas was suspended while the bishop of San Salvador negotiated the release of Duarte’s daughter and a group of abducted bureaucrats in exchange for 34 political prisoners, including a number of guerrilla commanders, with 98 wounded insurgents given safe passage to Mexico City. The agreement provoked resentment on the part of the armed forces, as well as a widespread perception that only In´es Duarte’s abduction had prevented the indefinite detention of the kidnapped officials. Public discontent was further fueled by the government’s 1986 economic austerity plan, which included a 100 percent currency devaluation, limited wage concessions, tax increases, and a doubling of gasoline prices. Business leaders charged Duarte with “bowing to the dictates of the IMF,” while labor unrest intensified. On February 21 thousands marched in San Salvador to protest sharp increases in the cost of living, which had risen by more than 125 percent since 1980. Through the mediation of Peruvian President Alan Garc´ıa, the first meeting in more than a year between government and rebel representatives was held in Lima in May 1986. However, Duarte’s close advisor, Minister of Culture Julio REY Prendes, insisted that the administration had been “deceived” into believing that the opposition leaders would be

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speaking for their individual parties rather than on behalf of the FMLN, and the talks were quickly suspended. On the basis of a peace plan advanced by the five Central American presidents in August 1987, discussions with FDR-FMLN representatives resumed in San Salvador in early October. However, the government insisted that the rebels lay down their arms as a precondition for inclusion in the “democratic” process and the talks again foundered. Subsequently, at legislative balloting in March 1988, Arena won a near majority of 30 seats, with the PDC and PCN winning 23 and 7, respectively. Two months later Arena secured an absolute majority as the result of a PCN crossover. Earlier, in November 1987, Dr. Guillermo UNGO and Rub´en ZAMORA Rivas, leaders, respectively, of the National Revolutionary Movement and the Popular Social Christian Movement had announced the formation of a leftist Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica— CD), with the declared aim of seeking a resolution to the conflict through electoral participation. Since the two also served as president and vice president of the FDR, the action provided a linkage between the legal political process and the insurgency. Following the 1988 legislative elections (for which the CD did not present candidates), it was announced that the new grouping would participate in the 1989 presidential campaign. In early 1989 the FMLN leadership advanced a plan whereby the rebels would lay down their arms if the government would agree to a number of stipulations, including a six-month delay in the balloting scheduled for March 19. While rejecting the plan as unconstitutional, the government (responding in part to intense U.S. pressure) agreed to participate in formal talks with the insurgents that commenced February 22 in Qaxtepec, Mexico. Four days later President Duarte offered to postpone the first-round voting until April 30, leaving sufficient time for a second round, if necessary, before the June 1 expiration of his five-year term. However, the proposal was rejected by both the rebels and Arena, with Arena candidate Alfredo CRISTIANI Burkard securing the presidency on the basis of a 53.8 to 36.6

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percent single-round victory over the PDC nomi´ nee, Fidel CHAVEZ Mena. Protracted negotiations over the next two years, punctuated by a series of rebel offensives, culminated in a meeting in Mexico City (the first to be attended by FMLN field commanders) held April 4–27, 1991, that yielded agreement on a tentative package of constitutional amendments. During further talks in Caracas, Venezuela, in late May the two sides endorsed the formation of a human rights monitoring team, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, whose initial contingent was deployed on July 26. Two months later, during a New York meeting on September 25, Cristiani and FMLN representatives reached general agreement on a permanent ceasefire to end the bloody 12-year-old conflict. On January 16, 1992, a treaty (incorporating a formal cessation of hostilities on February 1) was signed in Mexico City. The document provided for UN supervision of the cease-fire while rebel forces disbanded over a nine-month period; purchase by the government of land for distribution to peasants in rebel-held areas; a blanket pardon for all combatants; “purification” of the government’s officer corps; absorption of the infamous national guard and treasury police by the regular army; dissolution of the military’s intelligence, civil defense, and counterinsurgency units; and the creation of a new civil police force. Despite setbacks that delayed completion of the peace process by two months, demobilization of both rebel units and the government’s notorious Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalions was completed on December 15, 1992, at which time the war was declared at an end and the FMLN legally certified as a political party. Heading a leftist coalition, Rub´en Zamora was defeated in second-round presidential balloting on ´ April 24, 1994, by Arena’s Armando CALDERON Sol. Subsequently, splits within both Arena and the FMLN led to withdrawals and the formation of new parties by the dissidents (see Political Parties, below). At the legislative balloting of March 16, 1997, Arena barely outpaced the FMLN, while in

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local contests leftists captured most of the country’s major cities, including the capital, San Salvador. However, the leftist surge subsequently lost momentum, and Arena’s Francisco FLORES easily outpolled six challengers to win the presidential poll of March 7, 1999, his nearly 52 percent of the vote precluding the need for runoff balloting. In the legislative election of March 2000, the FMLN captured a slim plurality of seats, but not enough to take control from the allied conservative forces of Arena, the Christian Democrats, and the PCN. The result was the same in March 2003, while Arena retained the presidency with the election of Antonio (“Tony”) SACA on March 21, 2004. The legislative distribution was not radically altered in the triennial balloting of March 12, 2006, although Arena replaced the FMLN as the plurality grouping by a gain of six seats (see Legislature, below).

Constitution and Government The constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly on December 6, 1983, provides for a president and vice president, both elected by direct popular vote for five-year terms, and for a unicameral National Assembly elected for a three-year term. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court, whose 13 members are elected by the Assembly. The country’s 14 departments are headed by governors appointed by the chief executive.

Foreign Relations El Salvador belongs to the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and their subsidiary bodies. It is an active member of the Organization of Central American States, whose secretariat is located in San Salvador, and of other regional institutions. In the early 1980s, following allegations of aid to the FMLN by the sandinista regime in Nicaragua, cooperation between El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras increased. In October 1983, at the urging of the United States, a revival of the Central American Defense Council (Condeca), originally a four-member group that included Nicaragua, was

announced in support of a joint approach to “extracontinental aggression of a Marxist-Leninist character.” Although no formal action was undertaken by the truncated Council, San Salvador and Tegucigalpa cooperated during U.S. military maneuvers in the region in 1983–1984, as well as in attempts to interdict Nicaraguan arms shipments to Salvadoran rebel forces. On November 26, 1989, Cristiani severed diplomatic relations with Managua after a Nicaraguan-registered plane, loaded with Soviet SAM-7 missiles allegedly consigned to the FMLN, crashed in El Salvador. Eleven months later a number of SAM-7 and SAM-14 missiles, reportedly supplied by dissident sandinistas, were handed over by the FMLN to Nicaraguan authorities. The action came in the wake of an unprecedented joint appeal by Moscow and Washington for political settlement of the Salvadoran conflict. During 1987–1988 El Salvador came under increasing criticism for the alleged misuse of U.S. aid funds, the economic and military components of which totaled more than $400 million in 1987 alone. Relations were further complicated by a U.S. district court ruling in April 1988 that a longstanding exodus of Salvadorans to the United States consisted largely of economic (hence illegal) entrants, rather than of political refugees. In October 1990 the U.S. Senate voted to withhold half of an $85 million military aid appropriation for El Salvador until the Cristiani government “demonstrated good faith” in talks with the FMLN, curbed military assassinations and abductions, and mounted a meaningful inquiry into a number of murders, including those of six Jesuit priests a year earlier. The funds were finally released by President George H. W. Bush following the killing of two U.S. airmen by rebels in January 1991. In September 2 of 11 military personnel (a colonel and a lieutenant) were convicted of the Jesuit massacre. While most foreign observers were disappointed at the number of those exonerated (some of whom had confessed to complicity in the affair), others felt that even two convictions represented “an historic achievement.” In September 1992 a long-standing territorial dispute that had provoked a brief war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 was resolved

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by a World Court judgment. In addition to ruling on control of a number of coastal land “pockets” (bolsones), two-thirds of which were awarded to Honduras, the Court decided that the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca were not international, but a closed condominium of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which benefited Honduras by providing it with access to the Pacific Ocean. In September 1995 a Bi-National Commission set up to implement the judgment agreed that residents of the territory could choose either Salvadoran or Honduran nationality. In February 1998 Honduran and Salvadoran representatives signed two treaties on demarcation of their borders, about 70 percent of which remained in dispute. However, approval of the treaties by Honduras was not immediately forthcoming because of opposition objections to their terms. Claiming that the Goascoran River, used to define the border, had changed its course over the past 200 years, El Salvador in late 2002 appealed the 1992 ruling, but the bid was unsuccessful. In June 1997 President Calder´on met with U.S. legislators in Washington to seek relief from tough new immigration laws under which more than 300,000 undocumented Salvadorans could be subject to deportation. In addition to hardship for the expatriates, El Salvador could have lost up to $1 billion a year in remittances (60 percent of export earnings and 15 percent of the country’s GDP). A year later Washington expressed its displeasure over the release of three of five Salvadoran national guardsmen who had received 30-year prison sentences in 1984 for the 1980 rape and murder of three American nuns and a lay worker. In March 1999 U.S. President Bill Clinton visited El Salvador as part of a tour designed to highlight Washington’s financial support to assist Central American recovery from the devastating effects of Hurricane Mitch in late 1998. Clinton also took the opportunity to comment on U.S. support for the government in the 1980s in its campaign against leftist insurgents. He noted that U.S. policy had caused “deep divisions” in U.S. society and pledged that the “mistakes” of the past would not be repeated.

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In 1996 El Salvador and Guatemala, with a combined 60 percent of Central America’s GDP, agreed to combine their customs agencies. In early 2000 the accord was amplified by the signing of an Investment and Service Trade Treaty, with a free flow in goods and services expected by 2002. In March 2000 the Flores government came under attack for agreeing to let the United States set up a logistics base for its war on drugs at a military sector of the international airport in Comalapa, 20 miles from the capital. The Legislative Assembly approved the pact on July 7 by a 49–35 vote, despite objections by the FMLN, which insisted that a three-quarters majority was necessary because the issue impinged on the nation’s sovereignty. In December 2004 El Salvador became the first Central American country to ratify the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States. Salvadoran agricultural exports to the United States fell 3.7 percent in 2006, while imports from the United States grew by 17 percent. In April 2006 the presidents of Honduras and El Salvador signed documents marking the end of 26 years of border demarcation dispute and announced they would reactivate the plan to build the joint El Tigre hydroelectric power plant on the Honduras side of the river. In November 2006 the United States approved the Millenium Challenge Account for El Salvador, which would provide $460 million for improvements in transportation, expansion of running water and electricity, formal and informal education, and assistance to agricultural producers. In a possibly related vein, El Salvador has been the only Latin American country to send troops in support of the U.S.-led initiative in Iraq.

Current Issues During 2005 President Saca’s principal problem was a soaring crime rate, prompting, in late May, an order—unprecedented since the end of the rebellion in 1992—authorizing house searches by security forces. In early September 2005 El Salvador joined the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras in a joint operation against so-called

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Mara Salvarucha gangs, arresting nearly 700 individuals, and in late November the government ordered military deployment against the 10,000 Maras estimated to be active in the country. In December 2006 Saca reinstated the ministry of public security and justice (previously under the interior ministry) in an effort to improve the security situation. In early 2007 U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales met with Saca at a regional conference in San Salvador on the Mara gangs. The United States subsequently announced it would assist the Salvadoran police in combating the Maras, with the intention of using “aggressive” tactics rather than a “rehabilitation” approach.

Political Parties The principal contenders in the 1989 presidential and 1991 legislative elections were the rightwing Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena) and the basically centrist Christian Democrats, with the conservative National Conciliation Party (PCN) running a distant third and the pro-insurgent Democratic Convergence (CD) consigned to fourth place on both occasions, although the vote share for the CD in 1991 exceeded that of the PCN by more than one-third. In 1994 the recently legalized Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front (FMLN) emerged as runner-up to Arena and fell only one seat short of a tie with the latter in 1997. In the March 1999 presidential election Arena’s Francisco Flores defeated the FMLN candidate, resulting in a movement toward a more traditional hard-line posture on the part of the government. In legislative polls of March 12, 2000, and March 16, 2003, the FMLN won a plurality of seats; Arena, however, retained control by means of rightwing coalitions with the PCN and the Christian Democrats (PDC). After retaining the presidency in 2004, Arena in 2006 wrested a legislative plurality legislative from the FMLN by two seats.

Presidential Party Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista—Arena). Arena was

launched in 1981 as an outgrowth of the Broad National Front (Frente Amplio Nacional—FAN), an extreme right-wing grouping organized a year earlier by ex-army major Roberto d’Aubuisson. D’Aubuisson was arrested briefly in May 1980 as the instigator of an attempted coup against the junta, which he had accused of “leading the country toward communism.” Runner-up in the 1982 election with 19 Assembly seats, the Alliance formed a conservative bloc with the PCN, which succeeded in scuttling most of the postcoup land-reform program and secured the appointment of a right-wing judiciary. Although remaining second-ranked in the March 1985 balloting, Arena’s legislative representation dropped to 13 seats on the basis of a 29 percent vote share. Amid mounting evidence that his leadership and reputation had become a liability to the group, d’Aubuisson formally resigned as secretary general in September, holding thereafter the title of honorary president until his death in February 1991. Arena secured a 53.8 percent popular vote victory at presidential balloting in March 1989 but slipped to a plurality of 44.3 percent in 1991 that gave it only 39 of 84 legislative seats; the party’s legislative representation was unchanged in 1994, although Armando Calder´on Sol defeated the FMLN’s Rub´en Zamora Rivas by a better than two-to-one margin in the second round of the presidential race. In 1997 a number of prominent Arena members defected to the PCN (below), with the party benefiting, in turn, by desertions from the PDC (below). The net result in the March balloting was a 1-seat Arena plurality over the FMLN. As its 1999 presidential candidate, Arena chose Francisco Flores, a 39-year-old economist who had held several ministerial posts and most recently had served as president of the Legislative Assembly, where he had earned a reputation as a skillful negotiator based on what Central America Report described as a “calm and balanced approach to politics” (in contrast to some previous Arena leaders). Flores easily outdistanced six other candidates to win the March 1999 presidential poll with nearly 52 percent of the vote. His successor,

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Antonio (“Tony”) Saca, also won easily in March 2004, with a 57.7 percent vote share. Theretofore second-ranked, Arena gained plurality status in the 2006 legislative poll with 34 seats. It also won a plurality of municipalities in the 2006 local balloting. In February 2007 three Arena members (including a son of the late Roberto d’Aubuisson) were murdered in Guatemala. The motive for the murders was unclear. Leaders: El´ıas Antonio (“Tony”) SACA (President of the Republic); Francisco Guillermo FLO´ Sol, Alfredo RES P´erez, Armando CALDERON F´elix CRISTIANI Burkard (Former Presidents of the Republic).

Other Parliamentary Parties Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Mart´ı para la Liberaci´on Nacional—FMLN). The FMLN was organized in October 1980 as the paramilitary affiliate of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Revolucionario—FDR), an umbrella formation of dissident political groups. Headed by a National Revolutionary Directorate (Direcci´on Revolucionaria Nacional—DRN) composed of representatives of participating armed units, the FMLN was in active rebellion until the late 1991 agreement that led to a formal cessation of hostilities on February 1, 1992. During ensuing months the Front engaged in a process of phased disarmament and on December 15 was recognized by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) as a legal political party. Demobilization rendered the DRN participants superfluous, while the FDR became redundant upon transformation of the FMLN. At its first National Convention on September 6, 1993, the FMLN endorsed Rub´en Zamora of the Democratic Convergence (below) as its 1994 presidential candidate. Following the election an internal split emerged between the People’s Renewal Expression (ERP) and the National Resistance (RN; see both under PD, below), on the one hand, and the Salvadoran Communist Party (Partido Comunista Salvadore˜no—PCS), the Popular Libera-

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tion Forces (Fuerzas Populares de Liberaci´on— FPL), and the Central American Workers Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos—PRTC), on the other. While surfacing as a dispute over the selection of legislative officers, a major factor of the split appeared to be resistance by the tripartite group to the ERP leader’s advocacy of a departure from Marxism-Leninism, and in December 1994 both the ERP and RN left the Front, save for a rump RN faction headed by Eugenio CHICA ´ and Marco JIMENEZ. In early 1995 the remaining FMLN components agreed to changes designed to yield a unitary organization and by midyear had begun to dissolve their respective party structures to become “currents” or “tendencies” within the revamped larger grouping. The PCS was formerly a pro-Moscow group that was repudiated by most mass and guerrilla organizations for its “revisionist” outlook. In early 1980 it adopted a more militant posture, becoming under its secretary general, Schafik Jorge Handal, a de facto component of the FMLN. Following his party’s break with the UDN (under CD, below), Handal became official coordinator and subsequently coordinator general of the legitimized FMLN. The FPL was previously the FMLN’s largest military component. In May 1993 a scandal erupted as the result of an explosion at a clandestine FPL arsenal in Managua, Nicaragua, of arms that were supposed to have been turned over to ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador) for destruction. A number of other such caches were subsequently discovered, tarnishing the credentials of the FMLN as a legal party. The PRTC was a small FMLN component. One of its leaders, Francisco VELIS, was assassinated in October 1993. Having gained as much public support as the governing Arena Party in the 1997 legislative poll, the FMLN held high hopes of achieving government control in the March 1999 presidential balloting. However, friction between orthodox Marxists and the modernist wing (“renovators”) caused sustained difficulty in choosing a candidate. The

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ultimate selection, Facundo GUARDADO, a former guerrilla leader supported by the “renovators,” generated little enthusiasm among the non-FMLN voters and won only 28.9 percent of the vote. Having failed even to force a runoff ballot, Guardado resigned as the FMLN’s general coordinator on March 15, with his successor, Fabio Castillo, heading a new leadership in which traditional Marxists held a slim majority. The FMLN rebounded to win a legislative plurality in March 2000 but was unable to gain control in the face of an Arena-led conservative coalition. It did, however, capture 8 of the 14 provincial capitals, including San Salvador, whose mayor, H´ector SILVA Arguello, was reelected. Thereafter, the sharp division between the orthodox and reform wings persisted, and in October 2001 it was reported that Guardado had been “expelled,” although he announced he would continue to participate in FMLN activity. Hard-liner Salvador S´anchez Cer´en was elected as the new general coordinator in November. Subsequently, in early 2002, it was reported that a group of reformist FMLN legislators had left the party’s parliamentary bloc, including H´ector Silva, who stood for president in 2004 as the candidate of a PDC/CDU coalition (see under PDC, below). Although retaining its legislative plurality of 31 in March 2003, the FMLN, led by Schafik Jorge Handal, was again rebuffed in its bid for the presidency in March 2004. In March 2005 the party was weakened by the withdrawal of seven of its legislative deputies who joined with other FMLN dissidents to form a new Democratic Revolutionary Front (see FDR, under CD, below). Subsequently, the death of Handal on January 24, 2006, appeared to provide an opening for reconciliation between his supporters and the FDR; however, his hard-line deputy, S´anchez Cer´en, was named to head the FMLN legislative bloc, and in the March 12 election the party, while gaining one slot, lost its plurality to Arena. The FMLN performed well in San Salvador in the 2006 municipal balloting. ´ Leaders: Salvador SANCHEZ Cer´en (Leader of Legislative Bloc), Jos´e Luis MERINO

(PCS), Jos´e MANUEL Melgar (PRTC), Fabio CASTILLO (Former General Coordinator), ´ Medardo GONZALEZ (General Coordinator). National Conciliation Party (Partido de Conciliaci´on Nacional—PCN). At the time of its founding in 1961 the PCN enjoyed a fairly broad range of political support and displayed some receptivity to social and economic reform. Over the years, however, it became increasingly conservative, serving the interests of the leading families and the military establishment. Following the declared willingness of its leadership to support peace talks with the rebels in mid-1982, 9 of its 14 Assembly members withdrew to form Paisa. The PCN’s Francisco GUERRERO, running as a candidate of moderation, placed third in the March 1984 presidential balloting, and his refusal to back d’Aubuisson in the runoff was considered crucial to Duarte’s victory. The party won 12 legislative seats in March 1985, 5 of which were lost in the 1988 poll. Its 1989 presidential candidate, Rafael MORAN Caste˜neda, ran third in the March 19 balloting, winning only 4.2 percent of the vote. Its legislative representation rose from 4 to 11 seats in 1997, when it also performed well in mayoralty races. However, PCN Co-Secretary General Rafael Hern´an Contreras finished fifth in the March 1999 presidential poll, his 3.8 percent of the vote just barely surpassing the required 3 percent for continued party registration. The party won 16 legislative seats in 2003 but placed fourth, with 2.7 percent of the vote, in the 2004 presidential race. It won 10 Assembly seats in 2006. Leaders: Jos´e Rafael MACHUCA Zelaya (2004 presidential candidate), Ciro Cruz ZEPEDA (Secretary General). Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). An essentially centrist grouping, the PDC was the core component of the National Opposition Union (Uni´on Nacional Opositora—UNO), which won 8 legislative seats in 1972 and 14 in 1974 but boycotted the 1976 and 1978 balloting. Its best-known figure, Jos´e Napole´on Duarte, returned from exile following

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the October 1979 coup, joined the junta on March 3, 1980, and became junta president on December 22. He was succeeded by Provisional President Alvaro Maga˜na in May 1982 after the PDC had failed to secure a majority at the March Constituent Assembly election. Although Duarte continued as president under the new constitution in May 1984, the PDC did not win legislative control until March 1985; it returned to minority status as a result of the 1988 legislative balloting (an outcome attributed, in part, to intraparty bickering) and lost the presidency in 1989. For the 1991 election the party appealed to the left by forming an alliance with two labor-based groups, the National Union of Peasant Labor (Uni´on Nacional Obrera Campesina—UNDC) and the Salvadoran Workers’ Central (Central de Trabajadores Salvadore˜nos—CTS). Duarte died on February 23, 1990. Two leading factions, led by Fidel Ch´avez Mena and Abraham RODR´IGUEZ, competed for the party’s presidential nomination in 1994, Ch´avez Mena (the 1989 nominee) receiving the designation and finishing third in the March first-round balloting. Subsequently fidelista legislators were charged with having sold out to Arena, while the abrahamistas were accused of aligning with the FMLN. At a national party convention in late November the party elected a fidelista directorate and on December 11 dissident abrahamistas withdrew to form the PRSC. The election of Ronald Uma˜na, representing a relatively young “new guard” or “new political class,” as secretary general at the 1995 convention yielded a dispute with long-time “old guard” leader Julio Samayoa, who succeeded in forcing his opponent’s expulsion from the party. In March 1996 the TSE confirmed the dismissal of Uma˜na and six associates, who promptly challenged the ruling’s legality, and in December the TSE reinstated Uma˜na. For some constituencies in the March 1997 balloting, the PDC formed a “Great Center Coalition” with the Democratic Party (PD, below), which elected three deputies as compared with seven elected by the PDC outright.

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Indicative of recent internal problems within the PDC was its replacement in January 1998 of Secretary General Ronald Uma˜na by Horacio TRUJILLO only to have Uma˜na reinstated in March by the TSE. Rodolfo Parker, former legal adviser to the military during the civil war, was the PDC standardbearer in the March 1999 presidential campaign, during which the PDC attacked what it perceived as widespread corruption in the Arena governments of the 1990s. Parker secured 5.8 percent of the vote, thereby dropping the PDC to fourth place behind the newly formed CDU (below) in party rankings. For the 2004 presidential race the PDC joined with the CDU in sponsoring former FMLN leader H´ector Silva Arguello; however, Silva’s vote share of 3.9 percent was less than the joint minimum required to maintain the parties’ registrations. In 2005 three PDC legislators left the party to help form the new Popular Social Christian Party (Partido Popular Social Cristiano—PPSC) under the leadership of former PDC secretary general Ren´e AUILEZ. Those legislators subsequently joined with members of the newly formed FDR and the UDC to create a bloc of 14 legislators known as the G-14. However, G-14 influence declined substantially following the 2006 assembly poll, when most of its members ran under the CD banner. Meanwhile, the PDC won six assembly seats in 2006, one more than in 2003. Leaders: Rodolfo Antonio PARKER Soto (1999 presidential candidate and Secretary General of the Party), Dr. Fidel CHAVEZ Mena (1994 presidential candidate and Former Secretary General of the ˜ (Former Secretary GenParty), Ronald UMANA eral). Democratic Change (Cambio Democr´atico—CD). The CD was launched before the 2006 election as an alliance of the CDU, FDR, and other members of the G-14 (see PDC, above). Contrary to expectations, the coalition won only two legislative seats as contrasted with the five obtained by the CDU alone in 2003. Leaders: Carlos RIVAS Zamora (FDR), Vinicio ˜ PENATE (CDU). H´ector DADA Hirezi (Secretary General)

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United Democratic Center (Centro Democr´atico Unido—CDU). The CDU was launched in October 1998 as an electoral coalition of the two parties below, plus a number of smaller groups including the Popular Labor Party (Partido Popular Laborista—PPL) and a PDC faction styled the Christian Democratic Unification Movement (Movimiento Unificado Democr´atico Cristiano— MUDC). CDU leader Rub´en Zamora Rivas, who had run as the presidential candidate of the FMLN in 1994 but had subsequently distanced himself from that grouping, contested the March 1999 poll on a “center-left” platform. He secured 7.6 percent of the vote. Leaders: Dr. Rub´en Ignacio ZAMORA Rivas (Secretary General and 1999 presidential candidate), Ana Guadalupe MART´INEZ. Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica—CD). The CD (not to be confused with Cambio Democr´atico) was organized in November 1987 as an alliance of the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Dem´ocrata—PSD), a left-wing grouping formed in 1987 by Mario Reni Rold´an; the Popular Social Christian Movement (Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano—MPSC), a founding component of the FDR (see under FMLN, above); and the MNR (see under PD, below). The new coalition, characterized as part of an effort by the theretofore clandestine formations to resume open political activity within El Salvador, was ranked third (behind Arena and the PDC) in a public opinion poll conducted before the 1988 balloting, at which it did not attempt to present candidates. In 1989 the CD supported the presidential candidacy of Guillermo Manuel Ungo, who ran fourth with a 3.2 percent vote share. Following the election Ungo and Dr. Rub´en Zamora Rivas served as guerrilla spokespersons, and as the result of an increase in death squad activity in late November were forced to go underground. Ungo died in Mexico City in February 1991, with Zamora effectively succeeding him as leader of the newly legalized left. In early 1992 V´ıctor Manuel VALLE of the MNR announced his organization’s withdrawal from the CD on the ground that the rationale for it “no longer

exists.” However, Valle’s action appeared to have been prompted by Zamora’s attempt to secure sole leadership of the coalition and obtain for it membership (also sought by the MNR) in the Socialist International. In September 1993 the CD, which had been augmented by the addition of the Democratic Nationalist Union (Uni´on Dem´ocrata Nacionalista— UDN), a group that had served from 1979 to 1992 as a legal front for the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS, under FMLN, above), declared that it was ceasing to exist as a coalition and was reforming as a unified party. Concurrently, it designated MPSC leader Rub´en Zamora Rivas as its 1994 presidential candidate. Leaders: Mario RENI Rold´an (PSD), Dr. Rub´en Ignacio ZAMORA Rivas (MPSC), Vinicio ˜ PENATE (Secretary General).

Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico— PD). The PD was launched on March 28, 1995, by former guerrilla leader Joach´ın VILLALOBOS following the departure of the People’s Renewal Expression (Expresi´on Renovadora del Pueblo— ERP), led by Villalobos, and the National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional—RN), led by Eduardo SANCHO (a.k.a. Ferm´an CIENFUEGOS), from the FMLN in December 1994. Also joining the new grouping, in addition to the centrist National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario—MNR), were a number of PDC dissidents. Then styled the People’s Revolutionary Army (Ej´ercito Revolucionario del Pueblo), the ERP was the second-largest military component of the FMLN. Under its subsequent name (chosen to retain the ERP initials) it announced on September 28, 1993, that it had abandoned Marxism-Leninism in favor of a social democratic posture and on December 6, 1994, formally withdrew from the FMLN. A month earlier ERP leader Joaqu´ın Villalobos had been arrested on a defamation charge for having suggested that a noted businessman had been linked to right-wing death squads, a charge that subsequently appeared to be substantiated by

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2007 President Vice President

El´ıas Antonio (“Tony”) Saca Gonz´alez Ana Vilma Albanez de Escobar [f]

Ministers Agriculture and Livestock Defense Economy Education Environment and Natural Resources Foreign Affairs Housing Interior Labor Public Health and Social Security Public Security and Justice Public Works Tourism

Mario Salaverria Nolasco Gen. Otto Romero Orellana Yolanda Mayora de Gavidia [f] Darlyn Meza [f] Carlos Jos´e Guerrero Francisco La´ınez Rivas William Jacobo H´andal Juan Miguel Bola˜nos Jos´e Roberto Espinal Escobar Dr. Jos´e Guillermo Maza Brizuela Ren´e Mario Figueroa Jorge Isidro Nieto Men´endez R´uben Rochi Parker

[f] = female

press reports based on declassified U.S. government documents. The RN was formerly styled the Armed Forces of National Resistance (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional—FARN). Its leader was FMLN representative at the La Palma talks in October 1984. On December 14, 1994, it joined the ERP in withdrawing from the FMLN. The MNR was a sociodemocratic formation that participated in the Uni´on Nacional Opositor from 1972 to 1978. It was a founding member of the FDR following the resignation of Guillermo Ungo from the junta in January 1980 and in 1987 helped launch the CD, from which it withdrew in early 1992. The PD retained its legal standing after the 1997 balloting because of votes garnered in seven departments in coalition with the PDC. Subsequently, Villalobos resigned from the party, leaving a truncated leadership under Ana Guadalupe Mart´ınez. Leader: Ana Guadalupe MART´INEZ.

Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Revolucionario—FDR). Named after its revolutionary predecessor, the current FDR was launched by a group of reform-oriented FMLN dissidents, including some seven legislators, in June 2005. Although allied with the UDC as a component of the CD in the 2005 legislative elections, the FDR failed to draw significant electoral support from FMLN voters. Leaders: Carlos RIVAS Zamora (Former Mayor of San Salvador), Ilena ROGEL, Jorge ESCOBAR, ´ Nicol´a GARC´IA, Julio HERNANDEZ (Secretary General). (For information on a number of other parties and groups that were active in the 1990s, see the 2007 Handbook.)

Legislature Formerly a 60-member body, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) currently

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consists of 84 legislators, 64 elected from multimember constituencies and 20 by proportional representation, serving three-year terms. In the most recent election of March 12, 2006, the Nationalist Republican Alliance won 34 seats; the Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front, 32; the National Conciliation Party, 10; the Christian Democratic Party, 6; and the Democratic Change, 2. President: Rub´en ORELLANA.

Communications News media, with the exception of one official journal and certain broadcasting facilities, are nominally free of censorship and government control. Most commercial media are, however, owned by right-wing interests.

Press The following newspapers are published daily in San Salvador: El Diario de Hoy (100,000 daily, 96,000 Sunday), ultraconservative; La Prensa Gr´afica (98,000 daily, 116,000 Sunday), conservative; El Mundo (58,000 daily, 63,000 Sunday); La Noticia (30,000); Diario Latino (20,000); Diario Oficial (2,100), government-owned.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility, the media relying primarily on the government’s National

Information Center (Centro de Informaci´on Nacional—CIN) and the regional Central American News Agency (Agencia Centroamericana de Not´ıcias—ACAN).

Broadcasting and Computing The former Administraci´on Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Antel) was divested in 1998. Virtually all of the licensed radio stations are now commercial, one exception being the cultural Radio Nacional de El Salvador. Of San Salvador’s 11 television channels, 2 feature educational programming and are government operated. As of 2005 there were approximately 93 Internet users and 51 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 351 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Ren´e Antonio Rodr´ıguez LEON U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador: Charles L. GLAZER Permanent Representative to the UN: Carmen Mar´ıa GALLARDO Hern´andez IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, BCIE, CACM, IADB, Interpol, IOM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WTO

FRANCE FRENCH REPUBLIC R´e publique Fran¸c aise

Related Territories The former French overseas empire entered a state of constitutional and political transformation after World War II, as a majority of its component territories achieved independence and most of the others modified their links to the home country. The initial step in the process was the establishment in 1946 of the French Union (Union Fran¸caise) as a single political entity designed to encompass all French-ruled territories. As defined by the constitution of the Fourth Republic, the French Union consisted of two elements: (1) the “French Republic,” comprising metropolitan France and the overseas departments and territories, and (2) all those “associated territories and states” that chose to join. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia became associated states under this provision; Tunisia and Morocco declined to do so. The arrangement proved ineffective, however, in stemming the tide of nationalism, which led within a decade to the independence of the Indochinese states, Tunisia, and Morocco; the onset of the war of independence in Algeria; and growing pressure for independence in other French African territories. In a further attempt to accommodate these pressures, the constitution of the Fifth Republic as adopted in 1958 established the more flexible framework of the French Community (Communaut´e Fran¸caise), the primary purpose of which was to satisfy the demand for self-government in the African colonies while stopping short of full independence. Still composed of the “French Republic” on the one hand and a group of “Member States” on the other, the community was headed by

the president of the French Republic and endowed with its own Executive Council, Senate, and Court of Arbitration. Initially, 12 French African territories accepted the status of self-governing member states, with only Guinea opting for complete independence. In response to the political evolution of other member states, the French constitution was amended in 1960 to permit continued membership in the community even after independence, but no previously dependent territory elected to participate. The community’s Senate was abolished in 1961, at which time the organization became essentially moribund. As a consequence of constitutional changes instituted in March 2003 and legislation passed in February 2007, the present French Republic encompasses, in addition to mainland France and Corsica, four overseas departments, six overseas collectivities, and two overseas collectivities sui generis, each of whose history and present status is discussed below.

Overseas Departments The overseas departments (d´epartements d’outre-mer—DOM) all have similar political institutions. Like the metropolitan departments, their chief administrative officers are commissioners of the republic or prefects, appointed by the French Ministry of the Interior. Unlike the metropolitan departments, which are grouped into regions, each overseas department is geographically coterminous with an overseas region (r´egion d’outremer—ROM). Each overseas department elects a General Council (Conseil G´en´eral) to which

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many of the earlier day-to-day prefectural powers, particularly in financial affairs, were transferred in 1982. General councilors are elected to represent individual districts (cantons). Voters also elect, from party lists, a Regional Council (Conseil R´egional) to which enhanced policy and planning powers in economic, social, and cultural affairs were accorded in 1983. In addition, there are directly elected mayors and municipal councils for the various townships (communes). French Guiana (Guyane). Situated on the east coast of South America between northern Brazil and Suriname, French Guiana became a French possession in 1816, after two centuries of strife involving, at various times, most of the Western European sea powers. It was ruled as a colony until 1946, when it became a department. From 1852 to 1947 it was utilized as a penal colony, includˆ du Diaing, most notoriously, Devil’s Island (Ile ble, one of the Salut group), where political prisoners were incarcerated. In 1968 a major rocketlaunch facility was established in Kourou, from which the European Space Agency has launched

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SaintGeorge R.

Maripasoula Saül

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satellites and space probes since 1983. The economy is heavily dependent on French subsidies and on the European Space Center, which contributes about one-quarter of the department’s GDP. Fishing and tourism also contribute to the economy. Among the largely undeveloped natural resources are significant gold deposits. The department covers an area of 35,135 square miles (91,000 sq. km.). Of its population (2006E) of 200,000, some 90 percent inhabit the coastal region and are mainly Creoles, interspersed with Chinese, Lebanese, Brazilians, Haitians, Surinamese, and others, while the 10 percent living in the interior are largely Indian and Noir Marrons (descendants of fugitive slaves). The capital, Cayenne, had an estimated population of 57,100 in 2005. The department elects two deputies to the French National Assembly and, from September 2008, two senators instead of one to the Senate. Local government is based on 2 districts, comprising 19 cantons and 22 communes. The two main parties are the local branch of the Gaullist Union for a Popular Movement (UPM) and the Guianese Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Guyanais—PSG), an affiliate of the French Socialist Party whose longtime advocacy of internal self-rule was recently augmented by a demand for autonomy as a “necessary and preparatory stage” for full independence. Three candidates of the proindependence Movement for Decolonization and Social Emancipation (Mouvement pour ´ la D´ecolonisation et l’Emancipation Sociale— MDES) were elected to the Regional Council in March 1998, although the PSG maintained a plurality and retained the presidency of the council. The PSG secured only 5 of 19 seats in the subsequent election for the General Council, with left-winger Andr´e LECANTE of the Guianese Democratic Action (Action D´emocratique Guyanaise—ADG) being elected as that council’s president. He was succeeded in March 2001 by Joseph HO-TENYOU, who had been elected as a Divers Gauche (Diverse Left) candidate. Pressure from government and political leaders within the department for increased autonomy led to a meeting in Paris in December 2000

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between recently installed Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories Christian Paul and leaders of the PSG, the RPR (the predecessor of the UMP), the Guiana Democratic Forces (Forces D´emocratiques Guyanaises—FDG) of Sen. Georges OTHILY, and the leftist Walwari movement (but not the MDES, which had refused an invitation). In November 2001 the French government endorsed a series of locally drafted autonomy proposals, which included greater legislative and administrative control. In an unprecedented development, longtime Guianese politician Christiane TAUBIRA, founder of Walwari, ran for the French presidency in 2002 as the nominee of the PRG. She won 2.3 percent of the national vote in the first round. At the June National Assembly election French Guiana’s two seats were filled by Taubira, who was running for reelection with the endorsement of the Socialist Party as well as the PRG and Walwari, and another incumbent, L´eon BERTRAND, now of the UPM. Bertrand was subsequently named head of tourism in the Raffarin administration and was succeeded in the assembly by Juliana RIMANE (UMP). In the Regional Council election on March 21 and 28, 2004, the PSG, headed by Council President Antoine Karam, won 17 seats, with the UMP and an FDG-Walwari joint list splitting the other 14 seats. The outcome of balloting for the General Council was less conclusive, leaving the body with no clear majority. After the election Divers Gauche members held 9 seats, compared to 3 each for the UMP and the Divers Droite group, with the PSG claiming 2; the MDES, 1; and an independent, 1. Following the election, Pierre D´esert (Divers Gauche) was named president of the General Council. In October 2006 the French government suspended authorization for development of an open-cast gold mine near Cayenne. Opponents of the facility had convinced Paris that pollution from the mine would cause significant harm to an adjacent nature preserve. Exploitation of the department’s gold reserves remains a contentious issue, however, especially in the south, where “informal

gold mining” is largely conducted by miners who have illegally crossed the border. Illegal immigration from Suriname and Guyana remains a significant issue, as does smuggling. In February 2007 France established by decree the French Guiana Amazonian Park. Encompassing some 3.4 million hectares in the south, the new national park includes 2 million hectares of primary rainforest. The June 2007 National Assembly election concluded with Taubira having won reelection but with L´eon Bertrand losing to the PSG’s Chantel BERTHELOT. ` Prefect: Jean-Pierre LAFLAGUIERE. President of the General Council: Pierre ´ DESERT (Diverse Left). President of the Regional Council: Antoine KARAM (PSG). Guadeloupe. Situated in the Lesser Antilles southeast of Puerto Rico, Guadeloupe encompasses the main islands of Basse-Terre and adjacent Grande-Terre as well as a number of the smaller

Guadeloupe Passage

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GrandeTerre

La Désirade

GrandAnse

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Marigot

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(FRANCE) Basse-Terre

GrandBourg

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islands, including Marie-Galante, La D´esirade, Les Saintes (Terre-de-Haut and Terre-de-Bas), and the uninhabited ˆIles de la Petite Terre. (The island of Saint Barthelemy and the northern half of Saint Martin were separated from Guadeloupe in 2007—see separate write-ups, below.) Guadeloupe was first occupied by the French in 1635, was annexed as a colonial possession in 1815, and became a French department in 1946. It has an area of 630 square miles (1,632 sq. km.) and a population (2006E) of 473,000, of whom approximately 12,000 are residents of the capital, Basse-Terre. The largest town is Les Abymes (63,000E).Guadeloupians are predominantly black and mulatto, with a few native-born Caucasians and many metropolitan French. The department’s economy is based principally on tourism and the export of bananas, sugar, and rum. High unemployment remains a perpetual problem. The department elects four deputies to the French National Assembly and three senators to the Senate. Local administration is based on 2 districts, divided into 40 cantons and 32 communes. Long-simmering aspirations on the part of leftist organizations erupted in a series of bombings in the 1980s but gave way, by the 1990s, to calls for greater autonomy. At present, the leading parties are branches of PS and the UPM, plus the Guadeloupian Democratic and Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste D´emocratique Guadeloup´een—PPDG), which was formed in the early 1990s by dissidents from the Communist Party of Guadeloupe (Parti Communiste Guadeloup´een— PCG). At local elections in 1992 the PS retained control of the General Council, but the Guadeloupe Objective (Objectif Guadeloupe—OG), an electoral alliance led by Lucette MICHAUX-CHEVRY of the RPR (the predecessor of the UMP), gained 15 of 41 Regional Council seats. With the support of 6 dissident Socialists, Michaux-Chevry won the Regional Council presidency. The 1992 results were subsequently invalidated on the ground of irregularity, but the OG gained an absolute majority of 22 seats at a reelection in January 1993. The Socialists

retained local control in the General Council poll of 1994. Center-right parties secured a majority in the Regional Council election in March 1998, Michaux-Chevry being reelected as council president despite reportedly being the target of a corruption investigation that she described as “politically motivated.” The left continued to control the General Council. In January 1999 the department’s treasurer resigned, describing Guadeloupe as riddled with corruption and stuck in an economic and political “coma.” In March 2001 Jacques Gillot of the United Guadeloupe, Socialism and Reality (Guadeloupe Unie, Socialisme et R´ealit´e—GUSR), a PS offshoot, defeated the incumbent, Marcellin LUBETH of the PPDG, for the presidency of the General Council. In the 2002 National Assembly election the new Union for the Presidential Majority (precursor of the current UMP) won 2 seats; the PS, 1; and Divers Droite, 1. In the second round of Regional Council balloting on March 28, 2004, the UMP-led rightist list headed by Guadeloupe’s “Iron Lady,” MichauxChevry, was handily defeated by a La Guadeloupe pour Tour list that brought together the PS, PPDG, GUSR, and other leftists. Led by Victorin Lurel of the PS, the left won 29 of 41 seats, ousting Michaux-Chevry after 12 years in power. At the same time, the left easily retained control of the General Council. The March 2004 election was viewed as confirmation of a December 7, 2003, referendum in which opponents of decentralization, led by the left, defeated a UMP-backed proposal to replace the Regional and General Councils with one assembly. The 73 percent “no” vote, which came despite support from both existing councils, appeared to reflect fear that greater autonomy would ultimately lead to reduced funding from Paris. In December 2005 Minister of State Nicolas Sarkozy postponed a scheduled trip to Guadeloupe and Martinique in response to protests over a recent French law requiring public schools to teach the “positive” aspects of French colonial rule. The

FRANCE

visit was to have focused on illegal immigration and drug-trafficking. In the June 2007 election for the National Assembly two seats were won by Divers Gauche candidates (Eric JALTON and Jeany MARC), one by the UMP’s Gabrielle LOUIS-CARABIN, and one by the PS’s Victorin Lurel. Lurel was elected from the fourth district, which at the time still included St. Barth and St. Martin. Accordingly, he will continue to represent both new overseas collectivities until the next National Assembly election. The department’s senators are Lucette MichauxChevry (UMP), Jacques Gillot (GUSR), and Daniel MARSIN of the Socialist Renewal (Renouveau Socialiste/Divers Gauche). Prefect: Jean-Jacques BROT. President of the General Council: Jacques GILLOT (GUSR). President of the Regional Council: Victorin LUREL (PS). Martinique. Occupied by the French in 1635, the Lesser Antilles island of Martinique was an-

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nexed as a colonial possession in 1790 and became a department in 1946. It has an area of 425 square miles (1,100 sq. km.). Its population of 403,000 (2006E) is predominantly black, with a small number of native-born Caucasians and many metropolitan French. The capital, Fort-de-France, had an estimated population of 92,000 in 2005. The economy, based largely on sugarcane, bananas, and rum, is, like that of the other overseas departments, heavily dependent on direct and indirect subsidies from the French government. Martinique is represented in the French Parliament by four deputies and two senators. Local administration encompasses 4 districts, divided into 45 cantons and 34 communes. The leading parties include the PS-affiliated Socialist Federation of Martinique (F´ed´eration Socialiste de la Martinique—FSM); the Martinique Forces of Progress (Forces Martiniquaises de Progr`es—FMP), which in 1998 replaced the departmental UDF affiliate; and UPM, successor to the RPR. There also is a Martinique Communist Party (Parti Communiste Martiniquais— PCM). In local politics, however, the most successful parties have recently been the separatist Martinique Independence Movement (Mouvement Ind´ependantiste Martiniquais—MIM) and the leftist Martinique Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Martiniquais—PPM). The RPR retained 2 seats in the 1997 French National Assembly vote, while the PPM incumbent also was reelected. The fourth seat was won by Alfred Marie-Jeanne, a leader of the MIM and mayor of Rivi`ere-Pilote. Marie-Jeanne also was elected president of the Regional Council following the March 1998 election, in which the MIM led all parties by winning 13 of the 41 seats. He was subsequently described as the first proindependence leader of a French regional body. In the March 2001 local elections, the PPM kept its control of most municipalities, and the PPM’s Claude Lise was reelected to lead the General Council. In the 2002 National Assembly election the FSM/PS gained a representative, LouisJoseph MANSCOUR, while Alfred ALMONT

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of the new Union for the Presidential Majority (predecessor of the current UMP) held his RPR district. The other two seats were won by the MIM’s Marie-Jeanne and Pierre-Jean SAMOT (Divers Gauche) of the new, leftist Build Martinique (Bˆatir le Pays Martinique—BPM). In March 2003, however, the Constitutional Council ruled that Samot had improperly received campaign funds from his unregistered party, forcing a by-election that was won by the BPM’s Philippe EDMONDMARIETTE. A December 7, 2003, referendum on replacing the Regional Council and General Council with a single body was narrowly defeated. The election of March 21 and 28, 2004, saw the proindependence Martinique Patriots (Patriotes Martiniquais) list, led by the MIM and the National Council of Popular Committees (Conseil National des Comit´es Populaires—CNCP), win 28 of the Regional Council’s 41 seats. The leftist Martinique Convergences (Convergences Martiniquaises), a list headed by the PPM, won 9 seats, while the FMP claimed 4 seats. Balloting for 23 of the General Council’s 45 seats saw the left increase its majority by 2. The June 2007 National Assembly election saw three incumbents returned, but Edmond-Mariette lost in the second round to the PPM’s Serge LETCHIMY. The department is currently represented in the Senate by Claude Lise (PPM) and Serge LARCHER (Divers Gauche). Prefect: Yves DASSONVILLE. President of the General Council: Claude LISE (PPM). President of the Regional Council: Alfred MARIE-JEANNE (MIM). Saint Barthelemy (Saint-Barth´elemy). Lying east of the Virgin Islands in the Leeward Islands of the Lesser Antilles, with St. Martin to the northwest and St. Kitts and Nevis to the South, St. Barth (also St. Bart, St. Barts, St. Barths) came under French control in 1648, was sold to Sweden in 1784, and was sold back to France in 1878, at which time it was administratively linked to Guadeloupe. On February 21, 2007, President Chirac signed into

law legislation converting the island from a commune of the Department of Guadeloupe to a separate overseas collectivity. The relevant laws entered into effect upon publication in the official register on February 22, but Saint Barthelemy was not fully established as a collectivity until its first Territorial Council convened on July 15. The process of amicable separation from Guadeloupe had been put in motion by passage of a referendum on December 7, 2003, in which 96 percent of those voting approved becoming a collectivity. St. Barth is France’s smallest overseas collectivity, with an area of 9 square miles (24 sq. km.) and a population of 6,850 (2006E). The seat of government and largest town is Gustavia (named after a Swedish king). The vast majority of the population is Caucasian, and although French is the official language, English is also widely spoken. With no natural resources to exploit and virtually no arable land, the economy depends heavily on high-end tourism. The government of St. Barth combines aspects of a commune, a department, and a region.

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The representative of the French government is a deputy prefect. The Territorial Council comprises 19 members serving five-year terms. The council elects from its membership a president and a 6-member Executive Council. In the new collectivity’s first election, held July 1, 2007, the St. Barth First (St.-Barth d’Abord) list, headed by Bruno MAGRAS (UMP), the communal mayor, won an easy victory, taking 72 percent of the vote and 16 council seats. The other 3 seats were split among the other three competing lists: Together for Saint Barthelemy (Ensemble pour Saint-Barth´elemy), headed by Benoˆıt CHAUVIN (MoDem and Cap 21); All United for Saint Barthelemy (Tous Unis pour Saint-Barth´elemy), led by Karine MIOT; and Action-BalanceTransparency (Action-Equilibre-Transparence), led by Maxime DESOUCHES. Magras was elected president by the council when it convened on July 15. Pending election of its own National Assembly deputy at the next French general election (no later than 2012), St. Barth will continue to be represented by Guadeloupe’s Victorin Lurel (PS), whose district included St. Barth at the time of the June 2007 election. The island’s senator is to be elected in September 2008. Deputy Prefect: Dominique LACROIX. President of the Territorial Council: Bruno MAGRAS (UMP). Saint Martin (Saint-Martin). Lying east of the Virgin Islands in the Leeward Islands of the Lesser Antilles, with Anguilla to the north and Saint Barthelemy to the southeast, the island of St. Martin is divided roughly in half, with the French overseas collectivity of Saint-Martin in the north and the Dutch dependency Sint Maarten in the south. First claimed by Spain following the early voyages of Christopher Columbus (who, despite legend, neither named nor made explicit reference to the island), Saint Martin was partitioned by the Dutch and French in 1648, although up until 1815, as a consequence of various European wars, the French sector repeatedly fell under Dutch or English control. During this period the island’s

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economy was based on the extraction of salt from salt ponds and the cultivation of cotton, tobacco, and, from the late 1700s, sugarcane, which led to the importation of African slaves far in excess of the Caucasian population. Emancipation came in 1848, after which sugar declined in importance. From 1946 the French half of the island comprised two communes in the Department of Guadeloupe. Seventy-six percent of St. Martin’s voters approved establishment of a separate overseas collectivity in a referendum held on December 7, 2003. On February 21, 2007, President Chirac signed the necessary legislation, which accorded the same collectivity status to nearby Saint Barthelemy, effective February 22. However, St. Martin was not fully established as a collectivity until its first Territorial Council convened on July 15, 2007. The overseas collectivity of St. Martin encompasses about 20 square miles (53 sq. km.) and has a population of 35,000 (2006E). The administrative center and largest community is Marigot. The population is primarily of African, British, Dutch, French, and Creole ancestry. French is the official language, but English is spoken universally. Today, the economy largely depends on tourism, followed by trade and offshore financial services. Representing the French government is a deputy prefect. Local legislative responsibility is held by the Territorial Council, which comprises 23 members serving five-year terms. The council elects from its membership a president and an Executive Council. Five lists competed in the collectivity’s first election, held July 1 and 8, 2007: the Union for Progress (Union pour le Progr`es—UPP), led by Louis Constant-Fleming (UMP), which won 40 percent of the first-round vote; Togetherness, Responsibility, Success (Rassemblement, Responsabilit´e, R´eussite—RRR), led by Alain RICHARDSON (32 percent); Succeed Saint-Martin (R´eussir Saint-Martin—RSM), led by Jean-Luc HAMLET (11 percent); Alliance for the Overseas Collectivity of Saint Martin (Alliance pour le COM de Saint-Martin), headed by Dominique RIBOUD (9 percent); and the Democratic Alliance for Saint Martin (Alliance D´emocratique pour le Saint-

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Martin), led by Wendel COCKS (8 percent). The first three proceeded to the second round, at which the UPP won 16 seats, to 6 for the RRR, and 1 for the RSM. Constant-Fleming was elected president when the Territorial Council convened on July 15. Until the next French general election (no later than 2012), St. Martin will be represented in the

National Assembly by Guadeloupe’s Victorin Lurel (PS), whose district included St. Martin at the time of the June 2007 election. St. Martin is scheduled to elect its first senator in September 2008. Deputy Prefect: Dominique LACROIX. President of the Territorial Council: Louis CONSTANT-FLEMING (UMP).

G R E NA DA STATE

OF

GRENADA

The Country Grenada, located close to St. Kitts-Nevis, encompasses the southernmost of the Caribbean’s Windward Islands, about 90 miles north of Trinidad (see map, p. 511). The country includes the main island of Grenada, the smaller islands of Carriacou and Petit Martinique, and a number of small islets. The population is approximately 75 percent black, the balance being largely mulatto, with a small white minority. English is the official language, while a French patois is in limited use. Roman Catholics predominate, with Anglicans constituting a substantial minority. Grenada’s economy is based on agriculture; bananas, cocoa, nutmeg, and mace are its most important products. Tourism, an important source of foreign exchange, declined substantially in the mid1970s but subsequently revived. Unemployment has long been a major problem, encompassing upwards of 40 percent of the adult population in 1994 before dropping to a reported 21 percent in November 2003. Structural reform goals in the early 1990s included liberalization of trade regulations, civil service streamlining, and privatization of state-run enterprises. GDP grew steadily from 3.5 percent in 1996 to 6.0 percent in 1998. Meanwhile, inflation remained low (1.4 percent in 1998), although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that Grenada’s “public finances” had deteriorated under the effect of tax cuts, which had contributed to, among other things, a growing budget deficit that threatened to serve as a brake on future economic development. The 1999 and 2000 growth figures were 7.5 and 6.5 respectively; however, the economy was buffeted by a decline in tourism following

the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and real GDP registered –3.3 for the year, with marginal improvement in 2002 despite extensive damage from a tropical storm in September. Far more devastating was Hurricane Ivan, which on September 7, 2004, destroyed 90 percent of the country’s buildings, with damages estimated in excess of US $2 billion and economic contraction of at least 3.5 percent. A marginally less severe hurricane in July 2005 yielded additional destruction estimated at $200 million.

GRENADA

Petit Martinique

Hillsborough

Carriacou I.

VENEZUELA

Frigate I.

Large I.

Caribbean Sea Diamond I.

Ronde I.

Les Tantes Caille I.

GRENADA Sauteurs

AT L A N T IC

Tivoli

OCEAN

Grand Roy St. George's

Marquis Saint David's

Calivigny 0 0

10 Mi 10 Km

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GRENADA

Government and Politics Political Background Discovered by Columbus on his third voyage in 1498, Grenada was alternately ruled by the French and British until 1783, when British control was recognized by the Treaty of Versailles. It remained a British colony until 1958, when it joined the abortive Federation of the West Indies. In 1967 Grenada became a member of the West Indies Associated States, Britain retaining responsibility for external relations. Eric M. GAIRY, who had been removed from office by the British in 1962 for malfeasance, was redesignated prime minister upon the assumption of internal autonomy. On February 7, 1974, Grenada became an autonomous member of the Commonwealth, two years after an election that the British interpreted as a mandate for independence. Many Grenadians, however, were opposed to self-rule under Gairy, whom they compared to Haiti’s “Papa Doc” Duvalier. United primarily by their dislike of Gairy, the nation’s three opposition parties—the Grenada National Party (GNP), the New Jewel Movement (NJM), and the United People’s Party (UPP)— contested the election of December 7, 1976, as a People’s Alliance. Although failing to defeat the incumbent prime minister, the Alliance succeeded in reducing the lower house strength of Gairy’s Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) to 9 of 15 members. In the early morning of March 13, 1979, while the prime minister was out of the country, insurgents destroyed the headquarters of the Grenada Defense Force, and a People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) was proclaimed by opposition leader Maurice BISHOP. Joining Bishop in the new government were 11 other members or supporters of the NJM plus two members of the GNP. In September 1983 disagreement arose between Bishop (who reportedly favored rapprochement with the United States) and Deputy Prime Minister Bernard COARD (who sought a clear-cut alignment with the Soviet bloc), Bishop being forced to accept an NJM Central Committee decision call-

ing for joint leadership. On October 13 Bishop was removed from office and placed under house arrest by Gen. Hudson AUSTIN, commander of the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA). Six days later, after having momentarily been freed by rioting supporters, Bishop was recaptured and executed, with General Austin being installed as head of a 16member Revolutionary Military Council (RMC). On October 25, after the governor general, Sir Paul SCOON, had requested the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to intervene and restore order, U.S. military forces, with OECS endorsement and limited personnel support, invaded the island, seizing Austin and others involved in the coup. Subsequently, a provisional administration under Nicholas A. BRATHWAITE was established, which held office until the installation of Herbert A. BLAIZE as prime minister of a new parliamentary regime on December 4, 1984. In an unusual development, the allegedly “authoritarian” Blaize lost the leadership of the New National Party (NNP) to Dr. Keith MITCHELL at a party convention held January 21–22, 1989. Six months later Blaize dismissed Mitchell from the cabinet and announced the formation of a new grouping, the National Party (NP). Faced with the certainty of an adverse confidence vote, the prime minister prorogued the legislature on August 23. After a long illness, Blaize died on December 19 and was immediately succeeded by his deputy, Ben JONES, who dissolved Parliament in anticipation of an election that was constitutionally mandated by March 1990. The election of March 13, 1990, yielded a plurality of seven legislative seats for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), whose leader, Brathwaite, formed an administration that moved from minority to majority status with the May 7 defection to the NDC of a GULP representative. Prime Minister Brathwaite, whose government had encountered criticism over its structural adjustment policies, resigned as NDC leader in July 1994 and was succeeded in the latter capacity by Agriculture Minister George BRIZAN on September 4. Brathwaite, who had reportedly become disenchanted with party politics, continued as prime

GRENADA

Political Status: Independent member of the Commonwealth since February 7, 1974; constitution suspended following coup of March 13, 1979; restored November 9, 1984. Area: 133 sq. mi. (344 sq. km.). Population: 100,895 (2001C); 106,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): ST. GEORGE’S (3,600). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: East Caribbean Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.70 EC dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir Daniel WILLIAMS; assumed office on August 8, 1996, upon the retirement of Sir Reginald Oswald PALMER. Prime Minister: Dr. Keith C. MITCHELL (New National Party); sworn in on June 22, 1995, to succeed George BRIZAN (National Democratic Congress), following legislative election of June 20; reappointed following elections of January 18, 1999, and November 27, 2003.

minister until February 1, 1995, when Brizan also became head of government. However, despite a nearly five-month run-up, Brizan was unable to lead the NDC to a legislative victory on June 20, being obliged to step down in favor of Mitchell, whose NNP had captured 8 of 15 lower house seats. The NNP won all 15 seats in the election of January 1999 but was reduced to a narrow 1-seat margin in November 2003.

Constitution and Government Grenada’s constitution, originally adopted in February 1967 and modified only slightly on independence, was suspended following the March 1979 coup, but restored in November 1984, the legitimacy of laws enacted in the interim being confirmed by Parliament in February 1985. The British monarch is the nominal sovereign and is represented by a governor general. Executive authority is exercised on the monarch’s behalf by the prime minister, who represents the majority party

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in the House of Representatives, the lower house of the bicameral legislature. The House is popularly elected for a five-year term, while the upper chamber, the Senate, consists of 13 members appointed by the governor general: 10 on the advice of the prime minister (3 to represent interest groups) and 3 on the advice of the leader of the opposition. The judicial system includes a Supreme Court composed of a High Court of Justice and a two-tiered Court of Appeal, the upper panel of which hears final appeals from the High Court. There are also eight magistrates’ courts of summary jurisdiction. Grenada is administratively divided into six parishes encompassing 52 village councils on the main island, with the minor islands organized as separate administrative entities.

Foreign Relations The United Kingdom and the United States recognized the Bishop government in March 1979, but relations subsequently deteriorated, with Washington condemning St. George’s midsummer signing of a two-year technical-assistance pact with Cuba, and London deploring “the unattractive record of the Grenada government over civil liberties and democratic rights.” Relations with Washington worsened further in the wake of U.S. and North American Treaty Organization (NATO) naval maneuvers off Puerto Rico in July 1981, Grenada branding the exercises as a rehearsal for invasion of its territory. Nine months later, after Grenada had become the only English-speaking Caribbean state to declare its support for Argentina in the Falkland Islands war, U.S. President Ronald Reagan opened a four-day visit to nearby Barbados by charging that St. George’s had joined with Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union in an effort to “spread the virus of Marxism” in the area. Regional reaction to the Bishop regime was initially somewhat mixed, but by mid-1982 all of the other six members of the OECS (Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) were generally hostile, although the most vocal regional criticism of the PRG came from Prime Minister Adams of Barbados. Bishop’s

250

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murder provoked even more widespread condemnation, including that of the Cuban government, which announced on October 20, 1983, that “no position claimed as revolutionary . . . can justify savage methods such as the elimination of Maurice Bishop and the outstanding group of honest and moral leaders who died.” The ensuing military intervention by U.S. and Caribbean forces, coupled with Reagan’s assertion that Grenada had become “a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied for use as a major military bastion to export terror,” left little opportunity for an improvement in relations between St. George’s and Havana under either the interim administration of Nicholas Brathwaite or the restored parliamentary government of Herbert Blaize. Thus, the last Cuban diplomat remaining in Grenada (a charg´e d’affaires) departed in March 1984, with relations between the two countries being further strained during the ensuing year by Havana’s attempt to recover $6 million for equipment used to construct an airport at Port Salines that the United States had earlier characterized as a military threat to the region. Subsequently, Grenada participated in the U.S.-backed regional security plan designed to avert future leftist takeovers, Prime Minister Blaize remaining one of the strongest supporters of U.S. Caribbean policy until his death in December 1989. President Reagan was warmly received during a visit on February 20, 1986, which included a “minisummit” with other English-speaking Caribbean leaders. Earlier, on October 31, 1985, Queen Elizabeth II was reported to have been given a “subdued welcome” because of Britain’s failure to assist in the 1983 intervention and the relatively modest dimensions of its subsequent aid program. Following an inconclusive response to an appeal by Vincentian prime minister James Mitchell to convert the seven-member OECS into an integrated regime, Grenada joined in 1991 with its Windward Island neighbors to launch a less inclusive four-member grouping. During the third meeting of a regional Constituent Assembly at Roseau, Dominica, in September, agreement was reached on a federal system with a common legislature and executive; however, opposition was voiced to the

proposal, which is yet to be submitted to preliminary referenda in the four constituencies. Earlier, Prime Minister Brathwaite had met with Cuba’s deputy foreign affairs minister at a July Caricom summit in St. Kitts to work out the “modalities” for resuming diplomatic relations. The way to rapprochement had been paved by Havana’s withdrawal of the Port Salines compensation claim. In May 1997 Prime Minister Mitchell made a visit to Cuba, the first by a Grenadan government head since 1983. During the visit an economic cooperation agreement was signed; concurrently, the Cuban state airline became the first foreign air carrier to schedule service to the Port Salines airport. On August 1, 1998, nearly 15 years after the U.S. intervention, Cuba’s Fidel Castro arrived for a state visit. While many did not approve of the trip, Prime Minister Mitchell insisted that it would aid in the achievement of national reconciliation, and diplomatic relations were formally reestablished on December 1, 1999. A number of additional cooperation agreements were signed in 2000 and in May 2004 the National Democratic Party (NDP, under NNP below) joined with the NDC and the People’s Labour Movement (PLM, below) in protesting the “inhumane and immoral blockade” of Cuba by the United States. In late May 1996 the government signed two treaties with the United States involving mutual legal assistance and extradition. The latter, replacing a 1931 treaty between Washington and London, was advanced as part of a campaign to curb drug trafficking in the region. A year later, the presence of a detachment of U.S. Marines to aid in the construction of a Grenadan coast guard facility on the northern island of Petit Martinique generated strong opposition from the island’s 800 inhabitants, who viewed the installation as a threat to trading in forms of contraband not considered illegal and which had long been a mainstay of the local economy. In December 2004 Prime Minister Mitchell visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seeking aid for damage caused by Hurricane Ivan, and shortly thereafter his administration shifted diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the PRC.

GRENADA

Current Issues The main issue in 2006 and early 2007 concerned the continued incarceration of individuals given lengthy sentences for involvement in the 1983 killing of Maurice Bishop. On July 6 the UK Privy Council rejected an appeal that the manslaughter convictions of three of the “Grenada 17” be set aside on procedural grounds. The ruling notwithstanding, the three were released on December 3, after having served 23 years of 30-year sentences, with the Privy Council ordering that the others be resentenced. Defense lawyers were then expected to seek release of the remaining prisoners, although no official decision in the matter was immediately forthcoming. In March 2007 Prime Minister Mitchell defended economic aid from Venezuela as reflective of an “honorable” relationship between the two countries, although Sir James Mitchell, the former Vincentian leader, advised the Grenadan administration to “beware of Greeks bringing gifts.”

Political Parties Before the 1979 coup, Eric Gairy’s Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) had consistently dominated the country’s politics, although its majority in the House of Representatives was substantially reduced in the election of December 1976, which the leftist New Jewel Movement (NJM), the centrist United People’s Party (UPP), and the conservative Grenada National Party (GNP) contested as a People’s Alliance. For the 1984 balloting, only the GULP campaigned under its original name. The recently formed New National Party (NNP) secured an overwhelming majority in 1984, a much slimmer margin in 1995 after a period of ascendancy by the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and total control in 1999.

Government Party New National Party (NNP). The NNP was launched in August 1984 as an amalgamation of the Grenada National Party (GNP), led by Herbert Blaize; the National Democratic Party (NDP), led

251

by George Brizan and Robert Grant; the Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM), led by Dr. Francis Alexis; and the Christian Democratic Labour Party (CDLP), led by Winston WHYTE. The center-right GNP, founded by Blaize in 1956, had been essentially moribund during its leader’s retirement from politics after the 1979 coup. The NDP, organized in early 1984, became the most liberal component of the NNP. The GDM was formed in 1983 by a group of right-wing exiles resident in Barbados and elsewhere, who reportedly benefited from substantial U.S. support. The CDLP (see under NDC, below) withdrew from the coalition in September 1984, after a series of policy disputes with the other groups. In its 1984 campaign manifesto, the NNP formally endorsed the 1983 military intervention and urged that foreign military and police units not be withdrawn. It dominated the elections of December 3, winning 14 of 15 lower house seats. However, by mid-1985 the coalition was in substantial disarray, GNP elements holding most of the government portfolios. Infighting continued throughout 1986, Brizan and Alexis reportedly mounting an unsuccessful challenge to Blaize’s leadership before a December convention at which the GNP faction gained virtually complete control, with Ben Jones, seemingly the prime minister’s heir apparent, defeating Brizan for the post of deputy leader. In April 1987 Brizan and Alexis left the government and moved into opposition, leaving the NNP little more than a “reborn GNP,” with a diminished legislative majority of nine members. A far more critical cleavage was revealed in January 1989 when (theretofore) General Secretary Keith Mitchell, who had previously criticized Blaize for contributing to a “lack of camaraderie” among senior members, defeated the prime minister for the party leadership. Despite the action, Mitchell asserted that because of his “tremendous respect and admiration” for Blaize he would not seek the latter’s removal from government office before the next election. Dismissed from the cabinet on July 21, Mitchell joined with Brizan in filing a motion of nonconfidence that failed to be voted upon because of the legislative prorogation of August 23. Mitchell was named prime minister following the

252

GRENADA

NNP victory of June 20, 1995. The NNP swept all of the 15 parliamentary seats on January 18, 1999, 7 of which were lost on November 27, 2003. Leaders: Dr. Keith MITCHELL (Prime Minister and Party Leader), Sen. Gregory BOWEN (Deputy Leader), Lawrence JOSEPH (Chair).

Other Parties National Democratic Congress (NDC). The NDC was launched in April 1987 by George BRIZAN and Francis Alexis, who had defected from the NNP and were subsequently joined by a variety of anti-Blaize figures, including leaders of the Grenada Democratic Labour Party (GDLP) and the Democratic Labour Congress (DLC). Launched in March 1985 by (then) opposition leader Marcel PETERS, the GDLP had expressed concern about unemployment, a lack of “Christian values,” and Grenada’s security in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. The DLC had been formed in August 1986 by Kenny LALSINGH, a legislative representative who had left the NNP earlier in the year, in a realignment that included the former Christian Democratic Labour Party (CDLP), a centrist formation of ex-UPP members that competed unsuccessfully in the 1984 election. The NDC held its inaugural conference on December 18, 1987. In January 1989 Brizan stepped down as opposition leader in favor of Nicholas Brathwaite, who had served as head of the 1983–1984 provisional administration, and who became prime minister following the election of March 13, 1990. In March 1991 party chair Kenny Lalsingh resigned as minister of works and communications after being accused of improperly importing transmitting equipment for use by the operator of an unlicensed radio station. In July 1994 Prime Minister Brathwaite resigned as party leader; at the NDC’s annual convention on September 4 Brizan was elected his successor, although not replacing Brathwaite as prime minister until February 1, 1995. Four months later the NDC retained only 4 of 15 legislative seats, thereby becoming the opposition party. Brizan was given a one-month suspension from the House of Representatives on August 27, 1997, for criticizing

the appointment of Daniel Williams as governor general. Before the January 1999 legislative vote, Brizan announced that, because of his declining health, Deputy Chair Joan Purcell would serve as the NDC standard-bearer. The party reportedly attempted to negotiate a formal electoral alliance with the GULP, DLP (see under PLM, below), and NP; however, agreement could not be reached on seat allocation or leadership. The NDC consequently presented its candidates (including Brizan and Purcell), although informal agreement was reported between the NDC and the GULP/United Labour not to challenge each other’s strongest candidates. The party lost all of its seats (on a vote share of 25 percent), and Brizan subsequently announced his retirement from active politics. Tillman Thomas, a former minister of tourism, was elected party leader in October 2000. Leaders: Tillman THOMAS (Party Leader), George PRIME (Deputy Leader), Joan PURCELL, Peter DAVID (General Secretary). Grenada United Labour Party (GULP). The GULP was founded in 1950 as the personal vehicle of Eric M. Gairy, who headed governments from 1951 to 1957, 1961 to 1962, and 1967 to 1979. Having acquired a reputation for both corruption and repression while in office, Gairy did not present himself for election in 1984, when the GULP secured 36 percent of the popular vote compared to the NNP’s 59 percent. The party’s only successful candidate, Marcel Peters, after being formally designated leader of the opposition, announced his withdrawal in protest at alleged electoral irregularities, but he later reversed himself and secured the appointment of three associates as opposition senators. In early 1985 Peters formed the GDLP (see under NDC, above) after being expelled from the GULP, which was thus left with no parliamentary representation. Although Sir Eric had announced in December 1987 that he was retiring from politics, he faced no opposition in reelection as GULP president at the party’s annual convention in December 1988. The party was runner-up to the NDC in the balloting of

GRENADA

March 1990, winning four legislative seats, Gairy being among those defeated. Following the election, one of GULP’s representatives defected to the NDC, while a second defected in the interest of “national unity” after an April 27 fire that destroyed a government complex at St. George’s. A third resigned from the party in May 1991, after having been characterized by Gairy as a “recalcitrant schoolboy.” The last of the four elected in 1990, Leader of the Opposition Winifred STRACHMAN, was expelled by the party’s Executive Council in March 1992 on grounds that included “blatant disloyalty” and a “substandard, negligible and disappointing” performance as an MP. The GULP won two legislative seats in June 1995, with Gairy again among the losers. Sir Eric died after a lengthy illness on August 23, 1997. After failing to negotiate a more inclusive electoral alliance (see NDC, above), the GULP contested the January 1999 legislative poll jointly with the DLP, the ticket being known as GULP/United Labour. However, discord was reported within the GULP over the reemergence of Raphael Fletcher as the party’s standard-bearer. Fletcher had been suspended from the GULP in 1988 because of his links to Libya and had subsequently defected to the NNP and served in the Mitchell administration. Fletcher returned to the GULP in late 1998 after his departure from the government and the NNP had triggered early elections. The GULP/United Labour secured only 12 percent of the vote (and no seats), despite the support of Marcelle GAIRY (the daughter of Eric Gairy), who resigned as Grenada’s high commissioner to London to participate in the campaign. Leaders: Wilfred HAYES (President), Gloria PAYNE-BANFIELD (Party Leader). People’s Labour Movement (PLM). The PLM was initially launched as the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in December 1995 by four NDC dissidents led by former attorney general Francis Alexis, who had resigned in July from the parent party claiming it was “finished and done with.” It competed in the January 1999 legislative poll in alliance with the GULP (above).

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Leaders: Dr. Francis ALEXIS (Leader), Wayne FRANCIS (Deputy Leader), Dr. Terrance MARRYSHOW (President). National Party (NP). The NP was organized in July 1989 by Prime Minister Blaize, who had been deposed in January as leader of the NNP. Since the NP did not command a majority of lower house seats, Blaize prorogued the body on August 23, pending an election that was expected to be held late in the year. Immediately following Blaize’s death on December 19, the governor general appointed Deputy Prime Minister Ben Jones as his acting successor, despite the party’s continued minority status. The NP’s legislative representation dropped from five to two in March 1990. In December the party offered its support to the Brathwaite administration, with Jones returning to his former post as external affairs minister; however, on January 5, 1991, Jones resigned after his party had returned to opposition in a dispute over the 1991 budget. The NP won no legislative seats in 1995 and did not present candidates in 1999 or 2003. Leaders: Ben JONES (Former Prime Minister), George McGUIRE (Chair), Paul LANDER (Secretary). United Republican Party (URP). The URP was formed in 1993 by a group of New York–based Grenadians. It contested the 1995 election without success. Leader: Antonio LANGDON. Grenada Progressive Party (GPP). The GPP was organized by a former teacher in June 1997 with the avowed aim of appealing to women and young people. Leader: Prescott WILLIAMS. Good Ole Democracy (GOD). The GOD offered three candidates in the 1999 election, capturing a minuscule 0.2 percent of the total vote that was, nevertheless, an improvement over its 1995 vote share. It contested only two constituencies, without success, in 2003. Grenada Renaissance Party (GRP). The GRP is a small formation that failed to elect its sole candidate in 2003.

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Cabinet As of May 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Gregory Bowen

Ministers Agriculture, Forestry, Lands, and Fisheries Agriculture, Forestry, Lands, and Fisheries (Second Minister) Business and Private Sector Development Carriacou and Petit Martinique Affairs Communications, Works, and Transport Education and Labour Finance, Trade, Industry, and Planning Foreign Affairs and International Trade Gender and Family Affairs, Housing, and Social Services Health, Social Security, Environment, and Ecclesiastical Relations Human Resource Development Information and Communication Technology Legal Affairs and Attorney General Marketing and National Importing Board National Security Public Utilities and Energy Sports, Community Development, and Cooperatives Tourism, Civil Aviation, Culture, and Performing Arts Youth Development

Gregory Bowen Roland Bhola Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Elvin Nimrod Clarice Modeste-Curwen [f] Claris Charles [f] Anthony Boatswain Elvin Nimrod Yolande Bain Joseph [f] Ann David Antoine [f] Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Elvin Nimrod Gregory Bowen Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Gregory Bowen Adrian Mitchell Brenda Hood [f] Dr. Keith C. Mitchell

Ministers of State Prime Minister’s Office with Responsibility for National Security, Business, and Private Sector Development Prime Minister’s Office with Responsibility for Youth Development

Einstein Louison Emmalin Pierre [f]

[f] = female

Legislature The bicameral Parliament, embracing an appointed Senate of 13 members and a popularly elected 15-member House of Representatives, was dissolved by the People’s Revolutionary Government following the March 1979 coup. It reconvened on December 28, 1984, following a general election on December 3.

Senate. Of the 13 members of the upper house, 10 are nominated by the government and 3 by the leader of the opposition. President: Kenny LALSINGH. House of Representatives. In the most recent election of November 27, 2003, the New National Party won 8 seats and the opposition National Democratic Congress, 7. Speaker: Lawrence JOSEPH.

GRENADA

Communications Press There are no daily newspapers. The Grenada Informer (6,000) is a general-interest weekly; other weeklies include the Grenadian Voice (3,000), independent right-wing; the Grenada Guardian, a GULP publication; and Grenada Today. The West Indian is a government-owned biweekly. An opposition Grenadian Tribune was launched in June 1987. Strain has been reported in recent years between the media and the Mitchell government, which, among other things, has proposed a code of ethics for journalists.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility; for international news the media rely primarily on the regional Caribbean News Agency (CANA).

Broadcasting and Computing In October 1990 legislation was approved to end direct government control of the Grenada

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Broadcasting Corporation (GBC). Under the new arrangement broadcasting was to be supervised by a statutory board containing private sector representatives, with TV facilities to be readied for privatization. Full divestiture was achieved in 1997. As of 2005 there were approximately 186 Internet users and 157 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 424 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Denis G. ANTOINE U.S. Ambassador to Grenada: Mary Martin OURISMAN (resident in Barbados) Permanent Representative to the UN: Angus FRIDAY IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OECS, OPANAL, WTO

G UAT E M A L A REPUBLIC

OF

GUATEMALA

Rep u´ blica de Guatemala

´ Note: In balloting on November 4, 2007 (at which turnout was less than 50 percent), Alvaro Colom Caballeros of the National Union for Hope (UNE) was elected president with 52.8 percent of the vote over Otto P´erez Molina of the Patriotic Party. Colom and the new vice president, Dr. Rafael Espada (also of the UNE), were scheduled to be inaugurated on January 14, 2008, after which a new cabinet was to be installed.

The Country

Paxbán

MEXICO

Us

um

a

in

c

BELIZE

Flores ta

La Libertad Ri

er

v

The northernmost of the Spanish-speaking Central American countries, Guatemala is also the most populous, with an annual population growth rate close to 3 percent. The population, which is noted for its high proportion (65 percent) of Indians, is concentrated in the southern half of the country. The other major population group, the ladinos, is composed of mestizos and assimilated Indians. Although Spanish is the official language, about two dozen Indian languages are spoken, of which the most important are Cakchiquel, Caribe, Chol, Kekchi, Mam, Maya, Pocoman, and Quich´e. The dominant religion is Roman Catholicism, although recent inroads by Pentecostal Protestantism have prompted Guatemalan bishops to take a new look at “the discovery of America” and issue calls for a “new evangelism” capable of incorporating indigenous rites and rituals. Women constitute approximately 27 percent of the official labor force, not including subsistence farming and unreported domestic service; employed women are concentrated in sales, clerical, and the service sector, and make up 40 percent of professionals. Female participation in government has traditionally been virtually nonexistent, although three women held ministerial portfolios in the de Le´on Carpio administration and four in the Berger cabinet; in addition,

a woman served as president of Congress during the Arzu tenure. At the 2003 election, 15 of 158 seats (19.4 percent) were won by women. The Guatemalan economy is still largely agricultural and coffee remains by far the single most important source of foreign revenue; cotton,

Gulf of Honduras

Huehuetenango

Cobán

Lago de Izabal

Puerto Barrios

G U AT E M A L A

Quetzaltenango Mazatenango

Motagua River

Zacapa

Mixco Guatemala City Champerico Villa Nueva Escuintla San José PA C I F I C O C E A N

0 0

50 Mi 50 Km

HONDURAS

EL SALVADOR

G UAT E M A L A

Political Status: Independent Captaincy General of Guatemala proclaimed 1821; member of United Provinces of Central America, 1824–1838; separate state established 1839; most recent constitution (adopted May 31, 1985, with effect from January 14, 1986) amended by referendum of January 30, 1994. Area: 42,042 sq. mi. (108,889 sq. km.). Population: 11,237,196 (2002C); 12,911,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): GUATEMALA CITY (991,000), Mixco (307,000), Villa Nueva (237,901), Quezaltenango (114,000), Escuintla (72,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Quetzal (market rate November 2, 2007: 7.68 quetzales = $1US). Since May 1, 2001, foreign currencies have been permitted to circulate and may be used in business transactions. President: (See headnote.) Oscar Jos´e BERGER Perdomo (Grand National Alliance); elected in second-round balloting on December 28, 2003, and sworn in for a four-year term on January 14, 2004, succeeding Alfonso Antonio PORTILLO Cabrera (Guatemalan Republican Front). Vice President: (See headnote.) Eduardo STEIN Barillas (Grand National Alliance); elected on December 28, 2003, and sworn in for a term concurrent with that of the President on January 14, 2004, succeeding Juan Francisco REYES L´opez (Guatemalan Republican Front).

bananas, and sugar are also exported. Significant progress is currently being registered in manufacturing, which, like commercial farming, is predominantly in the hands of ladinos and foreign interests. The latter, including investors from the United States, Europe, and the “Four Tigers” (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), are deeply involved in the maquiladora, virtual sweatshop industries that turn imported materials into finished products (such as textiles) for export.

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Severe budgetary difficulties have persisted since the early 1980s, and both poverty and income inequality remain fundamental problems, with up to 60 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Real GDP growth averaged about 4.0 percent from 1992 to 1997, peaked at 5.0 percent in 1998, then declined steadily to 1.5 percent in 2004 before rising to an estimated 3.2 percent in 2005, albeit with inflation at 6.0 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Guatemala, which obtained its liberation from Spanish rule in 1821 and its independence as a nation from the breakup of the United Provinces of Central America in 1839, has existed through much of its national history under a series of prolonged dictatorships, including that of Gen. Jorge UBICO from 1931 to 1944. The deposition of Ubico in 1944 by an alliance of students, liberals, and dissident members of the military known as the “October Revolutionaries” inaugurated a period of reform. ´ Led initially by President Juan Jos´e AREVALO and then by Jacobo ARBENZ Guzm´an, the progressive movement was aborted in 1954 by rightist elements under Col. Carlos CASTILLO Armas. The stated reason for the coup was the elimination of Communist influence, Castillo Armas formally dedicating his government to this end until his assassination in 1957. Still another coup in 1963 overthrew the government of Gen. Miguel YDIGORAS Fuentes. A new constitution drawn up under Yd´ıgoras’s successor, Col. Enrique PERALTA Azurdia, paved the way for the election in 1966 of a ´ civilian president, Julio C´esar MENDEZ Montenegro, and the restoration of full constitutional rule with his inauguration on July 1. M´endez was succeeded as president by (then) Col. Carlos ARANA Osorio in an election held March 1, 1970, amid widespread terrorist activity that included the kidnapping of the nation’s foreign minister. The 1974 presidential and legislative balloting presented a confusing spectacle of charges and countercharges. Initially, it appeared that

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Gen. Efra´ın R´IOS Montt, the candidate of the National Opposition Front (a coalition of the Christian Democrats and two minor parties) had placed first in the presidential race by a wide margin. Subsequently, however, the government declared that Gen. Kjell Eugenio LAUGERUD Garc´ıa, the candidate of the ruling right-wing coalition, had obtained a plurality of the votes cast. Since neither candidate was officially credited with a majority, the Congress, controlled by the conservatives, was called on to designate the winner and named General Laugerud. Similar confusion prevailed at the election of March 5, 1978, evoking numerous allegations of fraud and threats of violence during a five-day period of indecision by the National Electoral Council, which eventually ruled that the center-right candidate, Maj. Gen. Fernando Romeo LUCAS Garc´ıa, had narrowly outpolled his right-wing opponent, Colonel Peralta Azurdia. In the election of March 7, 1982, Gen. Angel An´ıbal GUEVARA, the candidate of a new centerright grouping styled the Popular Democratic Front, was declared the victor over three opponents representing far-right, centrist, and center-left interests, respectively, with no far-left organizations participating. Two days later the defeated candidates joined in a public demonstration protesting the conduct of the election and calling for annulment of the results. The appeal was rejected by outgoing President Lucas Garc´ıa and on March 23 a group of military dissidents seized power in a bloodless coup aimed at the restoration of “authentic democracy.” On March 24 formal authority was assumed by a three-member junta consisting of General R´ıos Montt, Brig. Gen. Horacio Egberto MALDONADO Schaad, and Col. Francisco Luis GORDILLO Mart´ınez. Subsequently, on June 9, R´ıos Montt dissolved the junta and assumed sole authority as president and military commander. Although taking office with strong military and business support, R´ıos Montt became increasingly estranged from both by a series of anticorruption and economic reform proposals, while incurring mounting opposition from the Catholic Church because of overt proselytizing by a U.S. Protestant sect to which he belonged. Following a number of

apparent coup attempts, he was ousted on August 8, 1983, by a group of senior army officers under Brig. Gen. Oscar MEJ´IA V´ıctores, who promised that an election would be held in 1984 to pave the way for “a return to civilian life.” The balloting of August 1, 1984, in which 17 parties participated, was for a National Constituent Assembly, which drafted a new basic law (adopted on May 31, 1985) modeled largely on its 1965 predecessor. In the subsequent general election of November 3, 1985, the Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (PDCG) obtained a slim majority of legislative seats and in a runoff presidential poll on December 8, its candidate, Marco Vinicio CEREZO Ar´evalo, defeated the National Center Union (UCN) candidate, Jorge CARPIO Nicolle, with a 68–32 percent margin. Assuming office on January 14, 1986, Cerezo Ar´evalo became the first civilian president of Guatemala since the incumbency of M´endez Montenegro from 1966 to 1970. From the early 1960s Guatemala was beset by guerrilla terrorism. Initially, two groups, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the 13th of November Movement (M-13), operated in the country’s rural northeast. After 1966 counterinsurgency actions drove the guerrillas into the cities, generating urban violence that claimed the lives of many Guatemalans as well as some members of the foreign diplomatic community. In 1976 a new leftwing group, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), claimed credit for a wave of increased terrorism following a devastating earthquake in February. Both left- and right-wing extremism intensified after the 1978 balloting, with the principal leftwing groups forming in January 1981 a unified military command called the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (see URNG under Political Parties and Groups, below). In August 1982 R´ıos Montt established the most extensive Civil SelfDefense Patrol (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil— PAC) network in the world, encompassing virtually every adult male in the countryside and eventually constituting a counter-guerrilla force of nearly 1 million men. The rebels responded by attempting to establish a “liberated corridor” from Guatemala City to the Mexican border, populated by Indians

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fleeing army resettlement into “protected” villages. Despite such efforts, vigorous offensive action by the government was reported by late 1983 to have substantially weakened guerrilla operations. In October 1986 President Cerezo signaled his willingness to enter into peace talks with the country’s rebel organizations, including the URNG. However, no formal contacts were made with the insurgents before a series of “exploratory talks” in Madrid under Spanish government auspices in October 1987. In January 1988 the country’s six leading labor organizations joined peasant and student groups in forming a Popular Labor Action Unity (Unidad de Acci´on Sindical y Popular—UASP) with which, following protest rallies in the capital, President Cerezo concluded a “social pact” that called for cutbacks in recent price increases and salary adjustments for state workers. However, in June the president, faced with a severe foreignexchange shortfall, breached the agreement by unifying the country’s exchange rates and freeing fuel and food prices, which triggered an inflationary surge. In August, following renewed UASP agitation, Cerezo Ar´evalo was forced to issue a series of “corrections” to the June package. Meanwhile, although the ruling Christian Democrats had won a majority of municipal elections in late April, military unrest was evidenced by a failed coup in mid-May and the administration was forced to cancel a meeting in Costa Rica between the National Reconciliation Commission (Comisi´on de Reconciliaci´on Nacional—CRN) and representatives of the URNG guerrillas. By fall, with the ranks of the insurgents reportedly reduced to little more than 10 percent of their earlier strength, the president faced mounting opposition from both rightwing extremists buoyed by the recent electoral success of anti-Duarte forces in El Salvador and the human rights Mutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo—GAM), which had long campaigned for the appointment of an independent body to inquire into the fate of the country’s missing persons. The leading presidential contenders in the runup to nationwide balloting in November 1990 appeared to be former president R´ıos Montt, heading

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a “No Sell-Out” (No-Venta) coalition of right-wing parties, and Carpio Nicolle of the UCN. In late October, however, the Court of Constitutionality vacated R´ıos Montt’s final appeal against disqualification because of his involvement in the 1982 coup. Thereafter, Carpio’s failure to secure a majority on November 11 forced a runoff on January 6, 1991, which Jorge SERRANO El´ıas of the recently organized Solidarity Action Movement (Movimiento de Acci´on Solidaria—MAS), with substantial backing from No-Venta supporters, won by a better than two-to-one margin. Following his inauguration President Serrano faced four major problems: the fragile state of the nation’s economy, an unenviable panorama of human rights abuses by the military, a surge in drug trafficking, and the inconclusive status of negotiations with the URNG on the guerrilla insurgency. In early February the three leading union federations indicated that they would not join in a new “social pact” before the reversal of a number of government economic policies that included the recent abandonment of price controls and largescale layoffs of public-sector employees. Concurrently, an official commission reported that there had been 304 killings by “death squads” and 233 “disappearances” in 1990, with Guatemala ranked third, worldwide, in the latter regard. For its part, the United States announced a suspension of military aid in December because of the government’s failure to “criticize or exhaustively investigate” those chargeable with human rights abuses. Earlier, Guatemalan Treasury police revealed that a total of 4,770 kilos of cocaine had been seized in 1990, most of it originating in Colombia, with Guatemala serving not only as a bridge for shipments to the United States, but also as a major money-laundering center. In March and October 1990 the third and fourth rounds of negotiation with URNG representatives were held in Oslo, Norway, and Metepec, Mexico, respectively. The talks proved unproductive because of the Guatemalan military’s insistence that it would join in a “dialogue with the subversive delinquents” only after they had laid down their arms. However, the army reversed itself in early 1991, agreeing, for the first time, to

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participate in a new round of talks launched in Mexico City in late April. The 1991 talks continued in Cuernavaca, Mexico, in June, and in Queretaro, Mexico, in July, where agreement was reached on the need for “a negotiation process [having] as its final objective the search for peace through political means.” A further meeting in Mexico City in September yielded a series of rebel demands, including abolition of the PAC units and an end to military conscription; however, no substantive results were reported apart from a number of “approximations” (incremental advances) in regard to human rights issues. A round of talks that concluded in late February 1992 also failed to yield a breakthrough, despite pressure on both sides stemming from formal settlement in mid-February of the conflict in neighboring El Salvador. In August a compromise was reached on the Civil Self-Defense Patrols, the URNG dropping its demand for their immediate dissolution and the government agreeing not to expand them. In October an agreement (subsequently formalized in a tripartite accord involving the UN High Commissioner for Refugees—UNHCR) was concluded on the return of approximately 43,000 Guatemalan refugees, many of whom had spent upwards of a decade in camps on the Mexican side of the border. By early 1993, however, the parties had become deadlocked over a timetable for implementation of human rights guarantees and the establishment of a “truth commission” to investigate human rights violations during the lengthy armed conflict. On May 25, 1993, scarcely more than two weeks after the ruling MAS had registered a sweeping victory in municipal balloting, President Serrano attempted to assume near-dictatorial powers that included dissolution of the Congress and dismissal of the Supreme Court. Initially, the action appeared to be supported by the military, but on June 1 the defense minister, Gen. Jos´e Domingo GARC´IA Samayoa, responded to widespread popular protests by announcing that both Serrano and Vice President Gustavo ESPINA Salguero had resigned and that Congress would reconvene to select a successor to the ousted head of state. However,

the president of the Supreme Court concurred with Espina’s contention that he had remained in office and the military indicated that on constitutional grounds they would accept him as the new chief executive. A National Consensus Petition (Instancia Nacional de Consenso) was then advanced by an unlikely grouping of business, labor, and other leaders, contending that Esp´ına was barred from office because he had supported Serrano’s autogolpe. The Constitutional Court agreed, and on June 5 the Congress, in a surprising move, selected the coun´ try’s human rights ombudsman, Ramiro DE LEON Carpio, to serve the balance of Serrano’s presidential term. The new chief executive proceeded to exercise his reformist credentials by insisting that Congress purge itself of unsavory elements, particularly 16 deputies whose votes were alleged to be for sale on a regular basis. Securing no response, de Le´on called in late August for the resignation of all 116 deputies, as well as of the 9 Supreme Court justices. Although 76 deputies agreed to step down, none of the 16 targeted members did so, and on September 27 the president called for a national referendum to settle the matter. Meanwhile, he had offered the URNG rebels a “two track” peace plan that called for the establishment of a representative forum within Guatemala to discuss resolution of the issues that had provoked the conflict, in addition to revival of the talks with rebel leaders in Mexico City. However, the insurgents rejected the overture, as well as a substantially modified plan tendered in early October. In mid-October 1993 the Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction against the referendum but immediately excused itself from further action, since it was a party to the case. The way was thus cleared for a Constitutional Court ruling in the government’s favor on October 21; however, on November 11 it reversed itself by upholding a claim that the vote would cause “irreparable damage to the institutional order.” Six days later the president moved to defuse the crisis by concluding a “Contract for the Restructuring of the State” with Congress, whereby the referendum would be revised to encompass a series of constitutional

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reforms, including the shortening of congressional and judicial mandates; an increase in the size of the Court to 13 members; the review of parliamentary immunity cases by the Court, rather than by Congress; increased autonomy for the attorney general and comptroller general; and limitations on the discretionary appointive powers of both president and Congress. The proposals were approved by a 67.9 percent popular majority on January 30, 1994. However, the turnout was only 16.1 percent, meaning that passage involved only 10.9 percent of the electorate. Despite such dubious authorization, the reforms became law on April 8, paving the way for election of a new Congress on August 14. An agreement with URNG representatives on January 10, 1994, to reopen peace talks led two months later to a Global Human Rights Accord and a timetable for continued negotiations. Subsequently, during a UN-mediated meeting in Oslo the two sides agreed to set up a three-member commission to look into Guatemala’s unhappy record of human rights violations and acts of violence. In the August 1994 balloting for a truncated congressional term (to January 1996), a turnout of scarcely more than 20 percent of the registered voters gave an unexpected plurality to former president R´ıos Montt’s Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG). Initially outmaneuvered by a coalition of other rightist groups that included the second-ranked National Advancement Party (PAN) in being excluded from the new congressional directorate, the FRG eventually succeeded in forging an alliance with the PDCG and UCN that yielded the designation of R´ıos Montt as legislative president on December 2. During the first half of 1995 the FRG waged a strenuous campaign to overcome R´ıos Montt’s disqualification as a presidential candidate on November 12. In mid-February the Constitutional Court, on technical grounds, rejected a series of r´ıosmontista electoral reforms, with the FRG, despite retention of a slim legislative majority, subsequently losing ground on the issue. On August 9, in the wake of a final ruling by electoral authorities, the general’s wife, Teresa Sosa DE R´IOS, requested

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inscription as the FRG candidate for the November poll, but she was also rejected on constitutional grounds a week later. On August 22 the URNG announced a temporary cease-fire to facilitate electoral participation, while declining to endorse any of the contestants. After failing to win a majority in presidential balloting on November 12, 1995, the PAN’s ´ Irigoyen narrowly deAlvaro Enrique ARZU feated the FRG’s Alfonso PORTILLO Cabrera in a second-round vote on January 7, 1996. Earlier, the PAN had secured outright control of the National Congress by winning 43 of its 80 seats. Skirmishes with the URNG resumed only two days after Arz´u’s inauguration on January 14, 1996. Talks with rebel leaders did, however, resume in Oslo on February 6 and in Rome on February 12. Two weeks later the president, in a bold move, traveled to Mexico for a secret meeting with URNG representatives. The action led to a cease-fire on March 20 and formal negotiations that yielded an agreement on socioeconomic and agrarian affairs on May 6. Earlier, the Guatemalan defense minister, Gen. Julio BALCONI Turcios, had declared that the conflict was over, while the president of the government’s peace commission, Presidency Secretary Gustavo PORRAS, expressed his confidence that a definitive peace agreement would be signed by mid-September. However, such a target became increasingly problematic because of heightened hard-line activity within the military by a group styling itself Reclaiming the Guatemalan Army (PREGULA), which on August 12 issued a document charging 16 civilians and 57 military officers with treason for their support of the peace negotiations. On the other hand, tangible progress in negotiations with the rebels culminated in the signing in Mexico City on September 19 of a UN-mediated agreement, under which the Guatemalan military undertook to reduce its 46,000-strong complement by onethird in 1997 and to concentrate on defending the country’s borders rather than on internal security. Another cease-fire on December 4 was followed by a formal peace accord on December 29 that laid

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out procedures for reincorporating the guerrillas into civilian life and legalizing the URNG, while providing amnesty for a wide range of civil rights violations on both sides of the conflict. In a May 16, 1999, referendum, an extremely low turnout of voters (18 percent) rejected about 50 constitutional reforms mandated, in large part, by the 1996 accord. As a result, completion of the peace process was substantially imperiled. Earlier, on February 26, an independent Historical Clarification Commission that had been established with UN backing submitted an unexpectedly severe assessment of the 36-year civil war. In addition to concluding that the military had committed “acts of genocide” against the Mayans, it confirmed earlier reports that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had provided both money and training in support of the government effort. At first-round presidential balloting on November 7, 1999, Alfonso Portillo Cabrera secured 47.8 percent of the vote and went on to defeat the PAN’s Oscar BERGER Perdomo by a two-to-one majority in a December 26 runoff. The FRG also won a majority of legislative seats and 147 of 330 municipal contests. At the subsequent balloting of November 9, 2003, Oscar Berger’s recently organized Grand National Alliance (Gana) won a plurality of 49 legislative seats, while Berger himself led in the presiden´ tial race and went on to defeat Alvaro COLOM Caballeros of the center-left National Unity for Hope (UNE) in a runoff on December 28. Guatemalan presidential politics were complex before and after Oscar Berger’s inauguration in January 2004. In mid-2003 the Constitutional Court ruled that R´ıos Montt could contest the November poll, observing that a ban on persons who had participated in a coup could not be applied retroactively. However, a third-place finish in the first round precluded his involvement in the December runoff. Subsequently, in March 2004 the former president was charged with criminal behavior during disturbances leading up to the Court’s decision, and he was placed under house arrest to prevent his leaving the country. His legal problems notwithstanding, the FRG leader remained

politically influential, and in May one of Gana’s constituent parties withdrew from the governing Alliance because President Berger had sought R´ıos Montt’s support for his fiscal reform program. Meanwhile, Berger’s predecessor, Alfonso Portillo, fled the country in the face of charges that he had participated in embezzlement and money laundering. Gana fell to second place in the September 9, 2007, legislative poll behind the UNE. Concurrently, the UNE’s Colon finished first among some 14 candidates in the first round of presidential balloting. (See headnote.)

Constitution and Government The 1985 constitution, as amended, mandates the direct election for four-year, nonrenewable terms of a president and a vice president, with provision for a runoff between the two leading slates in the absence of a majority. The president is responsible for national defense, security, and naming a cabinet. Legislative power is vested in a unicameral Congress of 158 members serving four-year terms. The 13 members of the Supreme Court are selected by the Congress, with the president of the Court supervising the judiciary throughout the country; the Supreme Court head also presides over a separate Constitutional Court. Local administration includes 21 departments and the municipality of Guatemala City, each headed by a governor appointed by the president. In December 1986 Congress approved legislation organizing the departments into eight regions.

Foreign Relations The principal focus of Guatemalan foreign affairs has long been its claim to Belize (formerly British Honduras), which became independent in 1981. Guatemalan intransigence in the matter not only delayed Belizean independence but adversely affected relations with the United Kingdom, which dispatched military reinforcements to the area in 1975 after receiving reports that Guatemala was massing troops at the border. Despite talks in 1975 and 1976 and a joint commitment in 1977 to a

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“quick, just, and honorable solution” to the controversy, no agreement was reached. Thus, when the United Kingdom granted independence to Belize in September 1981 the Lucas Garc´ıa government severed all diplomatic ties with London and appealed unsuccessfully to the UN Security Council to intervene. In August 1984 representatives of the three leading groups offering presidential candidates for the forthcoming election met in Washington, D.C., with U.S. officials to formulate a policy that would permit formal recognition of Belize and withdrawal of the British “trip wire” force. While no immediate results were forthcoming, the conciliatory posture was continued by the Cerezo Ar´evalo administration, and direct discussions were held with Belizean representatives in Miami, Florida, in 1987. Meanwhile, consular relations with the United Kingdom were resumed in August 1986, with full diplomatic ties restored the following January. In May 1990 tension with Belize again flared after it was revealed that Guatemalan agricultural workers had unknowingly planted crops across the border in Belize’s Toledo district. The incident prompted a meeting between President Cerezo and Belizean Prime Minister George Cadle PRICE on the Honduran island of Roat´an on July 9, although settlement of the lengthy impasse did not occur until the installation of President Serrano in January 1991. In mid-February Serrano asserted that “Belize has the recognition of the international community” and seven months later overruled his foreign minister (who resigned over the issue) by extending diplomatic recognition to the country. Amid continued domestic controversy the Guatemalan Constitutional Court ruled by a narrow margin in November 1992 that the recognition of Belize was valid, subject to approval by a popular referendum. Belize was not a major issue during the de ´ Le´on Carpio administration. However, Alvaro Arz´u revived Guatemala’s claim to Belizean territory, while insisting that he was committed to reaching a peaceful settlement. Concurrently, his newly installed foreign minister, Eduardo STEIN, indicated that he was weighing the rela-

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tive benefits of further negotiations or international arbitration. In June 1999 a Guatemalan peasant who had apparently strayed across the border was killed by a Belizean military patrol. In October, Belizean authorities arrested four Guatemalans on murder and weapons charges and in February 2000, after another Guatemalan farmer had been killed, Guatemala arrested three Belizean soldiers and a police officer. Insisting that the seizure had occurred on its side of the border, Belize branded the action as a “kidnapping” and withdrew from further talks with its neighbor until the four had been released. A July meeting between Foreign Minister Gabriel ORELLANA Rojas and Belizean Prime Minister Said MUSA led to an agreement on a mechanism for resolving further border and territorial disputes, but incidents involving Guatemalan peasant squatters continued into mid2001. Agreement was reached in September 2002 on the deployment of Organization of American States (OAS) observers to the disputed area pending the holding of referenda on the issue in the two countries. However, the accord was repudiated by Guatemala in August 2003, and in May 2004 new discussions were launched at OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C., on finding an “equitable and permanent solution” to the longstanding controversy. The talks yielded an agreement in early 2006 to invite a “recognized expert on the Law of the Sea” to help settle maritime aspects of the dispute. Generally cordial relations with the United States yielded crucial military and other aid that supported relatively successful counterinsurgency efforts during the late 1960s. Subsequently, however, the United States evidenced concern over the diminishing effectiveness of such assistance in a context of increased polarization between right and left. In March 1977 Guatemala repudiated U.S. military support after the Carter administration had announced that human rights considerations would be used in setting allocation levels. Although military and economic assistance was resumed under the Reagan administration, all aid (except for cash sales) was suspended by Congress in November 1983 following publication of the Kissinger

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Commission report on Central America, which attributed thousands of recent civilian deaths to “the brutal behavior of the security forces.” The program was again reinstituted in mid-1984, although Guatemalan officials complained that “the most important country in Central America” was receiving a fraction of the aid given to Honduras and El Salvador because of its posture of neutrality in intraregional conflicts. In December 1990 the U.S. Congress imposed a new ban on military assistance and in June 1991 extended it to most categories of economic aid, pending evidence of “progress [in] eliminating human rights violations and in investigating and bringing to trial those responsible for major human rights cases.” In May 1993 the United States joined other foreign governments in condemning Serrano’s bid for full power and helped set in motion OAS procedures that may have influenced the military’s about-face in the matter. In August 1994, a week before leaving office, Panamanian President Guillermo Endara rejected a request for the extradition of Serrano El´ıas, on the ground that the accusations against the former Guatemalan chief executive were political in nature. Endara’s decision was upheld by his successor, Ernesto P´erez Balladares, whose September 1 inauguration was boycotted by his Guatemalan counterpart. A third extradition request was rejected by Panama in February 1998. On September 19, 1994, the UN General Assembly announced the establishment of a Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). The Mission began its work on November 21 with a staff of 200 foreign human rights observers, 60 police officers, and 10 military officers to monitor compliance with the human rights agreement signed by the government and the URNG on March 29. However, the level of violence continued, prompting MINUGUA to warn in late 2002 of a breakdown of law and order in several regions of the country. Meanwhile, drug trafficking continued unabated, and in early 2003 the United States “decertified” Guatemala for having “failed demonstrably” to meet its obligations under international counter-narcotics agreements.

Despite widespread opposition, Congress approved the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States on March 10, 2005, by a vote of 126–12. Entering into force on July 1, 2006, CAFTA eliminated customs tariffs on a number of goods and created clear enforceable regulations for all aspects of cross-border trade, including investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, electronic commerce, and the use of sanitation to protect public health. In late 2005 the government was obliged to cooperate with U.S. authorities in arranging for Adan CASTILLO, the head of its Anti-Narcotics Analysis and Investigation Service (SAIA), to attend an antidrug training course in Virginia, where he was arrested for complicity in cocaine trafficking. The Berger administration pledged to cooperate with representatives of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in overhauling the SAIA. Calls to regulate the movement of drugs in the Americas increased in 2007, as did demands for improved regulation of Guatemala’s private adoption agents, due to the high number of Guatemalan babies being adopted by U.S. couples. While the government attempted to increase the transparency of the process, critics, and some parents, charged that children were being unlawfully taken from their parents to meet U.S. demand. Meanwhile, the extradition process of former president Alfonso Portillo, who had been in exile in Mexico for over three years, was suspended in mid-2007 when Mexican courts declared that Guatemala’s extradition request was “irregular.”

Current Issues In the wake of his 2003 election, President Berger reportedly had an exceptionally high approval rating of 89 percent. However, by early 2006 it had plummeted to a mere 25 percent, in large part because of a soaring crime rate by socalled mara street gangs that had become powerful enough to challenge the drug cartels for control of the retail drug trade. The impact of gang violence was illustrated by Guatemala’s murder rate,

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which at 47 per 100,000 was second only to Colombia in 2006. Women made up an increasing proportion of the victims, often suffering torture and sexual abuse by gang members before their deaths. Guatemalans partly attributed the large proportion of unpunished criminals to an overwhelmed police force, which was often subject to corruption. Politicians, as well as members of the public, were subject to increased violence in the run-up to the September 2007 elections. In February three Salvadoran members of the Central American Parliament (based in Guatemala) and their driver were murdered. Four police officers were arrested as suspects and shot in their cells a few days later, forcing the resignation of the interior minister. Subsequently, two party coordinators for the center-left UNE were murdered by hired killers after leaving a political gathering near the border with El Salvador in April. Vice President Stein and the Catholic Church warned in early 2007 that organized crime could potentially impact the upcoming elections. Two additional political murders were perpetrated by the end of May: a mayoral candidate backed by the Encounter for Guatemala party and an activist for the FRG were killed in two separate attacks. Public frustration was evidenced by growing support for a revived death penalty, promoted by UNE presi´ dential candidate Alvaro Colom, as well as PP pres´ idential candidate Otto PEREZ Molina. P´erez’s slogan, “A strong hand now!” (mano dura) highlighted crime control as the centerpiece of his platform. Likewise, Colom promised to strengthen the attorney general’s office and the National Civil Police (Polic´ıa Nacional Civil) to curtail the violence that prompted public disenchantment with traditional parties. Guatemala has not returned a ruling party to power since 1986, and electoral returns on September 9, 2007, followed that pattern. Its support undercut by the public’s apparent perception that the ruling alliance was unable to curb corruption, violence, and poverty, Gana lost its top position in the legislature, coming second to UNE, while its presidential candidate, Alejandro GIAMMATTEI, failed to advance beyond the first round. The two

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remaining candidates, Colom and P´erez, had electoral strengths in rural areas and Guatemala City, respectively. Colom’s emphasis on social justice resonated in regions plagued with unemployment, while P´erez’s tough stance on crime appealed to residents hounded by violence in a city where the murder rate is even higher than in the country overall. (See headnote.)

Political Parties and Groups Political power in Guatemala has traditionally been personal rather than institutional, with parties developing in response to the needs or ambitions of particular leaders. In a late 2005 survey, a remarkable 84.3 percent of respondents said they sympathized with none of them. Under current law, parties must maintain a minimum vote share to retain legal status; however, unrecognized groups may, upon petition by a sufficient number of signatories, secure recognition before any given election. In 1995, 14 of 23 participating groups failed to qualify for continued registration. Of the 9 that survived, only incoming President Arz´u’s PAN, R´ıos Montt’s FRG, and the left-of-center FDNG were viewed as fully viable formations. The leading parties in 1999 were the FRG and PAN, with the recently formed New Nation Alliance (ANN) a distant third. In 2003 Oscar Berger’s Grand National Alliance (Gana) led a field that included Alvaro Colom’s National Union for Hope (UNE), the FRG, PAN, and the ANN.

Legislative Groups (Following the September 2007 Elections) National Union for Hope (Uni´on Nacional de Esperanza—UNE). The center-left UNE, also known as the National Unity for Hope (Unidad Nacional de Esperanza), was launched in 2001 ´ by PAN secessionist Alvaro Colom Caballeros. It won 30 congressional seats in 2003, with Colom, runner-up in the first-round presidential balloting, losing to Berger in the second round on December 28. Colom, who promised an improved justice system and increased social expenditures if elected,

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finished first in the first round of presidential balloting in September 2007 with 28.3 percent of the vote. The UNE also led all parties in the concurrent legislative poll by winning 48 seats. ´ Leaders: Alvaro COLOM Caballeros (2003 and 2007 presidential candidate), Dr. Rafael ESPADA (2007 vice-presidential candidate). Grand National Alliance (Gran Alianza Nacional—Gana). Launched in early 2003, Gana is a center-right grouping that presidential aspirant Oscar Berger joined at midyear following his defection from PAN (below). Its founding parties included the Guatemalan Reform Party (Partido Reformador Guatemalteco—PRG), also known as the Reform Movement (Movimiento Reformador—MR), and the Party of National Solidarity (Partido Solidaridad Nacional—PSN), as well as the PP (below). Gana secured a plurality of 49 seats in the November 2003 legislative elections, and Berger won the December presidential runoff to secure political dominance for the group. However, Gana lost 7 of its legislative seats when the PP withdrew in May 2004 to protest an apparent rapprochement between President Berger and former president R´ıos Montt. Following a campaign season marked by violence, Gana lost its legislative plurality in the September 2007 balloting, finishing second to the UNE with 37 seats. In addition, Gana’s candidate, Alejandro Giammattei, finished third in the concurrent first round of presidential elections with 17.1 percent of the vote. Several Gana mayors re´ portedly backed UNE candidate Alvaro Colom for the upcoming presidential runoff, although the party refrained from formally endorsing either candidate. Leaders: Oscar Jos´e BERGER Perdomo (President of the Republic), Eduardo STEIN Barillas (Vice President of the Republic), Alejandro GIAMMATTEI (2007 presidential candidate). Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota—PP). Founded in 2002 and initially part of Gana, the PP withdrew from the presidential alliance in May 2004. One of its most prominent members, Rodolfo CASTELLANOS, was murdered in March 2006. The party continued to advance,

however, with its 2007 presidential candidate, Otto P´erez Molina, responding to public discontent over violence by promising to expand the police force and revive the death penalty if elected. The PP won 30 seats in the September 2007 legislative election, and P´erez Molina finished second in the concurrent first round of presidential balloting with 23.6 percent of the vote. Aura Marina SALAZAR Cutzal (secretary of the PP’s congressional delegation and an assistant to P´erez Molina) and her bodyguard were shot in early October 2007. P´erez Molina blamed organized crime for the killings. ´ Leader: Otto PEREZ Molina (Secretary General and presidential candidate). Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco—FRG). A right-wing formation launched in 1988, the FRG participated in R´ıos Montt’s No-Venta coalition for the 1990 campaign. Deregistered thereafter, its legislative members joined the government grouping as an independent bloc that was awarded the leadership of four congressional commissions. In late 1993 the party failed to secure legislative approval for revocation of the constitutional provision banning heads of state who had participated in coups from running for the presidency. It registered a dramatic victory in the 1994 legislative contest, winning 32 seats, with R´ıos Montt subsequently being named congressional president. In 1999 the party won the presidency and a majority of congressional seats. However, by mid2001 factional differences erupted, with supporters of President Portillo aligned against those loyal to R´ıos Montt and Vice President Reyes L´opez. During 2003, allegations of corruption were made against Portillo, and in early 2004 he left the country. The party received 15 legislative seats in the September 2007 elections and its presidential ´ finished fifth in the candidate, Luis RABBE, concurrent first round of presidential balloting with 7.3 percent of the vote. Leaders: Gen. (Ret) Jos´e Efra´ın R´IOS Montt (Former President of the Republic, Former President of Congress, and 2003 presidential candidate),

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Juan Francisco REYES L´opez (Former Vice President of the Republic), Luis RABBE´ (2007 presidential candidate). Unionist Party (Partido Unionista—PU). The PU was organized by former president Alvaro Arz´u in the wake of inconsistent support for his policies within the PAN. Subsequently eclipsed within the new party by leftist-oriented Gustavo PORRAS, Arz´u eventually regained control and succeeded in having Guatemala City’s center-right mayor, Fritz GARC´IA-Gallout, named the PU secretary general and standard-bearer for the 2003 presidential campaign. Garc´ıa-Gallout placed fifth in the November poll, with a 3.0 percent vote share. In 2007 Garc´ıaGallout again finished out of the running in the first round of presidential balloting with 2.9 percent of the vote. ´ Irigoyen (ForLeaders: Alvaro Enrique ARZU mer President of the Republic), Fritz GARC´IAGallout (Former Mayor of Guatemala City and presidential candidate in 2003 and 2007). Center of Social Action (Centro de Acci´on Social—CASA). The CASA was launched in 2003 to represent the interests of indigenous peoples. The CASA won five legislative seats during the September 2007 parliamentary poll, and its presidential candidate, Eduardo Suger, finished fourth in the concurrent first round of presidential balloting with 7.4 percent of the vote. Leaders: Rigoberto QUEME´ Chay, Eduardo SUGER (2007 presidential candidate). Union of Nationalist Change (Union del Cambio Nacionalista—UCN). The UCN advocates a constitutional, democratic, and republican regime focused on uniting the country. The party, whose slogan was “better times” (tiempos mejores), campaigned for the September 2007 elections on a platform that pledged to advance women’s and workers’ rights and to limit corruption and social and economic polarization. The UCN presidential candidate, Mario Estrada, finished sixth in the first round of the 2007 presidential balloting with 3.2 percent of the vote. Leaders: Sydney Shaw ARRIVILLAGA (Secretary General), Mario Amilcar ESTRADA Orellana (2007 presidential candidate).

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National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional—PAN). PAN was organized before the 1990 election by the former mayor of Guatemala City, Alvaro Arz´u Irigoyen, who placed fourth in the presidential poll and entered the Serrano El´ıas cabinet as foreign minister. Arz´u resigned from his ministerial post in September 1991 after disagreeing with the president over recognition of Belize, thereby shattering the existing governmental coalition. The party was runner-up to the FRG in 1994, winning 24 congressional seats; it secured a legislative majority in 1995, with Arz´u winning the presidency in second-round balloting on January 7, 1996. By late 1997 three factions were reported to have emerged within the party: one led by congressional president Arabello Castro and backing Interior Minister Rodolfo MENDOZA for president in 1999, one united behind Guatemala City mayor Oscar Berger, and one loyal to President Arz´u. Berger won the party’s presidential nomination in early 1999 but was severely beaten by the FRG’s Portillo Cabrera in the November runoff. Dissension within the party led 15 PAN deputies to announce in June 2000 that they intended to sit as independents. At the time, the party was severely split by a leadership struggle between two factions—one loyal to former president Arz´u and Rodolfo Mendoza, and the other headed by Oscar Berger and Leonel L´opez, the recently elected secretary general. A principal dispute concerned L´opez’s support for an FRG bill that permitted the reelection of R´ıos Montt as legislative president. Berger defeated L´opez for Pan’s 2003 presidential nomination; the two then had a falling out, with Berger and nine other legislators leaving the party to join Gana. L´opez thereupon became the PAN standard-bearer, placing fourth in November’s first-round balloting. The original 2007 presidential candidate was Francisco ARREDONDO. However, Arrendondo refused to accept the PAN nominee for vice president, Oscar Rodolfo Casta˜neda, as his running mate. The party executive ultimately removed Arredondo from the ballot, nominating Casta˜neda for president. Casta˜neda finished ninth in the first

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round of the presidential poll with 2.6 percent of the vote. ´ Leaders: Leonel Eliseo LOPEZ Rodas (2003 presidential candidate), Rub´en Dar´ıo MORALES ˜ (Secretary General), Oscar Rodolfo CASTANEDA (2007 presidential candidate). Encounter for Guatemala (Encuentro por Guatemala—EG). The left-wing EG was organized in 2006 by Nineth Varenca Montenegro Cottom (a member of Congress) and C´esar Montes, who had recently resigned from the ANN along with several other legislators. In February 2007 the EG reached an agreement with the indigenous grouping Winaq (below) that guaranteed Winaq a 50 percent share of the EG’s legislative and mayoral candidates for the September election. Winaq leader Rigoberta Mench´u finished seventh as the EG’s candidate in the first round of the 2007 presidential balloting with 3.1 percent of the vote. Leaders: Nineth Varenca MONTENEGRO Cottom (General Secretary), C´esar MONTES, ´ (2007 presidential candiRigoberta MENCHU date). Winaq. An indigenous grouping founded in 2005 by Rigoberta Mench´u, the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Winaq gets its name from a Mayan word that means “the wholeness of the human being.” Since Winaq is not recognized as a party, Mench´u represents the EG. ´ Leader: Rigoberta MENCHU. Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca—URNG). The URNG was formed in January 1981 as a largely exile-based umbrella organization designed to provide various guerrilla groups with a unified military command, which was never fully implemented. Its political wing, led by Ra´ul MOLINA Mej´ıa, was styled the United Representation of the Guatemalan Opposition (Representaci´on Unitaria de la Oposici´on Guatemalteca—RUOG). In October 1987 inconclusive “low-level” talks aimed at seeking “peace and democracy” were held with government representatives in Madrid, Spain.

A significant increase in URNG activity was reported during late 1989 and early 1990, while another inconclusive round of talks with government representatives was held in Oslo, Norway, during March and April 1990. Seemingly more fruitful discussions were held in Madrid in June, with the URNG and political party representatives agreeing on the need for elections to a constituent assembly in 1991 in which the guerrillas could participate. After having urged Guatemalans since its formation not to participate in elections, the URNG appealed in May 1995 for a voter turnout in favor of “alternative candidates.” The organization did not, however, indicate who the candidates in question might be. A definitive cease-fire was signed by government and URNG representatives in Oslo on December 4, 1996, paving the way for conclusion of a formal peace accord on December 29 (see Political background, above). The URNG’s longtime leader and former secretary general, Ricardo Arnoldo RAM´IREZ de Le´on ´ (a.k.a. Rolando MORAN), died on September 4, 1998. On October 19 the URNG formally filed for registration as a legal party. The URNG participated in the 1999 and 2003 balloting as a member of the ANN (below), but that alliance appeared to have splintered by 2007 when the URNG won two seats in the September legislative poll, while Miguel Angel Sandoval won 2.1 percent of the vote as the URNG candidate in the concurrent first round of presidential balloting. Leaders: Alba Estela MALDONADO Guevara (Secretary General), Miguel Angel SANDOVAL (2007 presidential candidate), Rodrigo ASTURIAS Amado (2003 presidential candidate). Democratic Union (Uni´on Democr´atica— UD). Launched before the 1994 election, the UD campaigned vigorously as a party “without a past.” However, despite a nationwide campaign that relied heavily on television ads, it secured only one congressional seat in both 1995 and 1999, in coalition, in the latter occasion, with the Greens (LOV), below. The party won two seats in 2003, while supporting Gana’s Berger for the presidency.

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The UD secured one legislative seat in the September 2007 elections, while its presidential candidate, Manuel Conde Orellana, received 0.8 percent in the first round of presidential balloting. Leaders: Gen. Rodolfo Ernesto (Fito) PAIZ Andrade (Secretary General), Manuel CONDE Orellana (2007 presidential candidate).

Other Parties New Nation Alliance (Alianza Nueva Nacio´ n—ANN). The ANN was formed in February 1999 as a left-of-center electoral alliance of the URNG, DIA, and a number of smaller groups. Its 2003 presidential candidate, Rigoberto QUEME, withdrew in September after an internal dispute over candidacies, prompting its principal components, the URNG and DIA, to compete separately from the party in the presidential race. The Alliance won seven legislative seats in 2003, two less than in 1999. The ANN presidential candidate, Pablo MONSANTO, received 0.6 percent of votes in the initial round of the 2007 presidential contest, as the URNG and DIA each presented its own candidate. Leaders: Alfonso BAUER Paiz (Secretary General), Pablo MONSANTO (2007 presidential candidate). Authentic Integral Development (Desarollo Integral Aut´entico—DIA). The DIA was formerly known as the Authentic Comprehensive Development (Desarollo Inclusivo Aut´entico). The party’s 2007 presidential candidate, H´ector Rosales,was shot at while campaigning In August in a rural area close to the town of Cunen. Rosales won 0.6 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential poll. Leaders: Jorge Luis ORTEGA Torres (Secretary General), H´ector ROSALES (2007 presidential candidate). Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca— PDCG). Founded in 1955 as a centrist party of liberal and reformist views, the PDCG secured a majority of 51 congressional seats in 1985, with its longtime leader, Vinicio Cerezo Ar´evalo, defeating the UCN’s Carpio Nicolle in a runoff for

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the presidency. Its 1990 standard-bearer, Alfonso Cabrera Hidalgo, withdrew from candidacy in late October, ostensibly because of failing health, but was nonetheless credited with a third-place finish. Its congressional representation fell from 28 to 13 seats in 1994. In April 1995 the PDCG formed an electoral coalition styled the National Alliance (Alianza Nacional—AN) with the UCN and PSD, below. With the formation of the AN, nine PDCG members of Congress resigned their party memberships and set themselves up as an independent bloc to protest an Alliance decision to support the presidential candidacy of Andrade D´ıaz Dur´an. The party’s representation dwindled to three congressional seats in 1995 and in 1999 fell to two, both of which were retained in 2003. After the September 2007 legislative election, the party lost its registration due to its failure to meet the vote threshold. Meanwhile, its presidential candidate, Vinicio Cerezo Bland´on, won 0.8 percent of votes in the first round of balloting. Leaders: Marco Vinicio CEREZO Ar´evalo (Former President of the Republic), Ana Catalina Reyes SOBERANIS (Former President of the National Congress), Dr. Francisco VILLAGRAN Kramer (Former Vice President of the Republic and ´ Leader of the right-wing faction), Ren´e DE LEON Schlotter (Leader of the left-wing faction), Vinicio CEREZO Bland´on (2007 presidential candidate), Jacobo ARBENZ (2003 presidential candidate). National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberaci´on Nacional—MLN). The origins of the MLN date back to the “Liberation Movement” headed by Carlos Castillo Armas, which ousted the Arbenz government in 1954. Reflecting its early anti-Communist orientation, it favors close ties with the Roman Catholic Church but disclaims a reactionary philosophy, despite links to El Salvador’s Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena). MLN leader Mario Augusto SANDOVAL Alarc´on was officially declared the runner-up in the 1982 presidential balloting; in 1984 the party formed an alliance with the CAN (below), which obtained a plurality in the Constituent Assembly. In 1990

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it campaigned with the National Advancement Front (Frente de Avance Nacional—FAN) in an alliance that obtained four congressional seats. The party secured two seats in its own right in 1994, none thereafter. Mario Sandoval Alarc´on died in April 2003. Leader: Ulysses Charles DENT Weissenberg (Secretary General). Nationalist Authentic Central (Central Aut´entica Nacionalista—CAN). Formerly known as the Organized Aranista Central (Central Aranista Organizada—CAO), the CAN is a right-wing group that emerged as a significant political force by electing 35 mayors—more than any other party—in the municipal balloting in April 1980, although running a distant fourth in the 1982 presidential race. It contested the 1984 Assembly election in coalition with the MLN; a single congressional seat won in 1985 was lost in 1995. Leaders: Lionel SISNIEGA (1995 presidential candidate), H´ector MAYORA Dawe, Jorge Roberto ARANA Espa˜na (Secretary General). Social Democrat Party (Partido Social Dem´ocrata—PSD). Formerly known as the Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democr´atico), the PSD is a center-left grouping affiliated with the Socialist International, which had gone underground in 1979 after the murder of many of its leaders. The PSD did not participate in the 1984 Assembly election. It won two congressional seats in 1985 and one in coalition with the Popular Five Alliance (Alianza Popular Cinco—AP5) in 1990. In a largely futile effort to appease the unions, PSD Secretary General Mario ´ SOLORZANO Mart´ınez was named labor minister by Serrano El´ıas. Hurt by its 1991–1993 alliance with the Serrano El´ıas government, the PSD failed to secure legislative representation in 1994 or thereafter. Leader: Sergio Alejandro PEREZ Cruz (Secretary General). New Guatemala Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Nueva Guatemala—FDNG). The

FDNG was launched in July 1995 as a progressive formation designed to unite a broad range of political movements, parties, and individuals around a common program. However, a number of its founding groups, including the PSC and URS, along with a number of PDCG and PSD dissidents, soon withdrew, virtually annihilating its electoral prospects. One of the Front’s leaders, Luis YAT Zapeta, was assassinated in May 1998 and another, Roberto GONZALEZ, met the same fate in May 1999. The FDNG was a founding member of the New Nation Alliance (ANN) in February 1999 but withdrew in July because of a dispute over congressional candidacies. ´ Leaders: Jorge Luis GONZALEZ del Valle (1995 presidential candidate), Juan Le´on ALVARADO (1995 vice-presidential candidate), Rafael ARRIAGA Mart´ınez (Secretary General). The Green Organization (La Organizaci´on Verde—LOV). LOV is a coalition of several small groups, including the Democratic Union (Uni´on Democr´atica—UD) and the Social Democratic Unity (Unidad Social Dem´ocrata—USD). Leaders: Rodolfo ROSALES Garc´ıa Salas (2003 presidential candidate), Marcos Emilio RECINOS Alvarez (Secretary General).

Clandestine Right-Wing Groups Anti-Communist Secret Army (Ej´ercito Secreto Anticomunista—ESA). A right-wing group presumed to be an outgrowth of the former White Hand (La Mano Blanca), the ESA is reportedly linked to the more extreme faction of the MLN. It is known to maintain a “death list” of numerous left-wing activists and has been prominently involved in the escalation of political assassinations that began in late 1978. In early 1980 it threatened to kill 20 leftists for each assassination of a rightist and in mid-1988 issued a communiqu´e stating it would ensure that “Communist” journalists “either leave the country or die inside of it.”

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2007 see headnote President Vice President

Oscar Berger Perdomo Eduardo Stein Barillas

Ministers Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Communications and Public Works Culture Defense Economy Education Energy and Mines Environment and Natural Resources Foreign Affairs Interior Labor and Social Security Public Finance Public Health and Social Welfare Chair, Human Rights Committee Head, Peace Secretariat

Bernardo de Jes´us L´opez Figueroa Francisco Unda Toriello Manuel de Jes´us Salazar Tetzahuic Ronaldo Cecilio Leiva Rodriguez ´ Luis Oscar Estrada Burgos Maria del Carmen Ace˜na Villacorta de Fuentes [f] Carmen Urizar [f] Juan Mario Dary Fuentes Gert Rosenthal Koenigsberger Adela Camacho de Torrebiarte [f] Rodolfo Colmenares Arandi Hugo Beteta Alfredo Antonio Privado Medrano Frank La Rue Norma Quixt´an Argueta [f]

[f] = female

Other extreme right-wing formations include the Squadron of Death (Escuadr´on de la Muerte—EM) and the Officers of the Mountain (Oficiales de la Monta˜na—OdeM).

Legislature Guatemala’s legislative body is a unicameral Congress of the Republic (Congreso de la Rep´ublica) that currently consists of 158 members elected for four-year terms. According to initial results, in the most recent election of September 9, 2007, the National Union for Hope won 48 seats; the Grand National Alliance, 37; the Patriotic Party, 30; the Guatemalan Republican Front, 15; the Unionist Party, 8; the Center of Social Action, 5; the Union of Nationalist Change, 4; the Encounter for Guatemala, 4; the National Advancement Party,

4; the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, 2; and the Democratic Union, 1. ´ President: Jorge MENDEZ Herbruger.

Communications In mid-1991 the Central America Report cited an international team of observers to the effect that in Guatemala “freedom of expression is severely restricted by direct violence targeted at journalists and by an ever-present climate of fear and repression.” The study indicated that from 1978 to 1985, 47 Guatemala journalists had been killed and that by 1983 at least 100 had been forced into exile. In August 1991 the Mexican news agency Notimex closed its Guatemala City bureau after its offices had been ransacked, while the Britishbased Reuters announced the temporary closure

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of its facility because of a lack of security. Two months earlier La Epoca, a left-wing weekly whose premises had been fire-bombed as it commenced publication in early 1988, had been shut down in the wake of another such attack.

Press The following newspapers, all published in Guatemala City, are privately owned Spanish dailies, unless otherwise noted: Prensa Libre (110,000); Siglo Veintiuno (56,000); La Hora (18,000); Diario de Centroam´erica (15,000), official government publication; Central America Report, English-language weekly.

News Agencies The only domestic facility is the indepe ndent Inforpress Centroamericana; a number of foreign agencies maintain bureaus in Guatemala City.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is supervised by the government’s Direcci´on General de Radiodifusi´on y Televisi´on

Nacional. Of the approximately 140 radio stations, 5 are government-operated and 6 offer educational programming. There are 6 commercial television stations, in addition to a government educational outlet, a religious station, and a station devoted largely to music and entertainment. In 2005 for every 1,000 Guatemalan residents there were 18 personal computers and 79 internet users. In that same year there were 358 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Jos´e Guillermo CASTILLO Villacorta U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala: James M. DERHAM Permanent Representative to the UN: Jorge ´ SKINNER-KLEE IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, BCIE, CACM, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WCO, WTO

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a reversal of the trend began. Since 1975 Guyana has experienced severe economic difficulty, with falling export prices generating large balance-ofpayments deficits and shortages of basic commodities creating a vast underground economy supported by widespread smuggling. In 1986 Prime Minister Hoyte attempted to alleviate the situation by launching a “reconstructive” liberalization program that departed significantly from his predecessor’s socialist policies. Despite a 70 percent currency devaluation in April 1989 and the removal of most trade restrictions and price controls, lengthy talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) failed to yield agreement on standby and structural

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Noted for its dense forests and many rivers, Guyana, whose name is an Amerindian word meaning “land of many waters,” is situated on the northern Atlantic coast of South America, with Venezuela and Suriname on the west and east, respectively, and Brazil on the south and southwest. Its inhabitants are concentrated along a narrow coastal belt, the only area suitable for intensive agriculture. Most of their ancestors arrived during the centuries of British colonial rule: African slaves before 1800 and East Indian plantation workers during the nineteenth century. At present about 50 percent of the population is of East Indian origin, mainly engaged in agriculture; 35 percent is African, encompassing most civil servants; 7 percent is of mixed blood; 7 percent is indigenous Indian; and the remainder is European or Chinese. The principal religions are Christianity (50 percent), Hinduism (30 percent), and Islam (15 percent). In 1997, 33 percent of adult women were in the paid labor force, mainly concentrated in agriculture and cottage industry; female participation in national government was close to 20 percent, with substantially less representation at the local level. The Guyanese economy is based primarily on agriculture, with sugar and rice being the principal crops, although exploitation of mineral resources, including bauxite, alumina, gold, diamonds, and manganese, has become increasingly important. Bauxite mining and the sugar industry were nationalized in the mid-1970s and about 80 percent of the country’s productive capacity was within the public sector (with cooperatives accounting for another 10 percent) by 1982, when

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adjustment facilities until mid-1990, in the wake of another devaluation of 26.7 percent. For 1990 as a whole, the GDP declined by 3.9 percent, as contrasted with a targeted increase of 3.1 percent, and in early 1991 a further devaluation of 55.8 percent was announced. A year later it was reported that unemployment stood at 13.5 percent and inflation at 75 percent, although a 6.1 percent increase in real GDP during 1991 represented the indicator’s first gain since 1984. GDP continued to grow at an average of 6 percent through 1997, followed by a 1.8 percent decline triggered by bad weather and export contraction in 1998. GDP rose by 3.0 percent in 1999 but displayed little or negative growth thereafter until 2004, when a marginal increase was recorded. It declined again by 2.8 percent in 2005 before rising (by government report) to 4.7 percent in 2006.

Government and Politics Political Background Guyana’s political history during its first decade of independence was largely determined by an unusual ethnic structure resulting from the importation of African slaves and, subsequently, of East Indian laborers to work on the sugar plantations during the centuries of British colonial rule. The resultant cleavage between urbanized Africans and rural East Indians was reflected politically in an intense rivalry between the Communist-led, East Indian–supported People’s Progressive Party (PPP) of Dr. Cheddi B. JAGAN and the African-backed People’s National Congress (PNC), led by Linden Forbes BURNHAM, a former PPP leader who broke with Jagan in 1955. Jagan’s party, with a numerically larger constituency, came to power in British Guiana under a colonial constitution introduced in 1953 but was removed from office later that year because of British concern over a veer toward communism. Jagan’s party again emerged victorious in general elections held in 1957 and 1961 but was defeated in 1964, when the introduction of a new system of proportional representation made possible the formation of a coalition gov-

ernment embracing Burnham’s PNC and the small United Force (TUF). In spite of earlier internal disorders, Burnham’s administration successfully negotiated with the British for independence and remained in office following the achievement of full Commonwealth status in 1966 and the adoption of a republican form of government in 1970. However, the PNC’s continued dominance in 1968 and 1973 generated widespread controversy. Contributing to opposition charges of fraud and withdrawal of the TUF from the governing coalition was a revision of the electoral law to allow Guyanese residing overseas to vote. The 1970 redesignation of Guyana as a “cooperative republic” attested to the ruling party’s increased commitment to socialism. In his “Declaration of Sophia,” published on the tenth anniversary of his premiership, Burnham referred to the PNC as a “socialist party” committed to government land control, the nationalization of foreign business interests, and a domestic economy of three sectors, “public, cooperative, and private,” with the cooperative sector predominant. He also called for revision of the nation’s constitution to expunge the “beliefs and ideology of our former imperialist masters.” Subsequently, in a referendum held July 10, 1978, more than 97 percent of those voting were said to have approved extension of the legislature’s term beyond its July 23 expiration date so that the PNC-dominated National Assembly could serve, additionally, as a constituent body to consider a series of drastic changes in the nation’s basic law. World attention focused on Guyana in late 1978 with the bizarre suicide-murder of more than 900 members of the People’s Temple commune in Jonestown following an investigation by U.S. Representative Leo J. Ryan, whose party was ambushed by cult members as it prepared to enplane at a northwestern airstrip on November 18. Subsequent reports indicated that the Burnham government had been unusually hospitable to a variety of dissident religious sects, including the House of Israel, a 7,000-member group of Black converts to Judaism headed by David HILL (known locally as “Rabbi Washington”).

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Political Status: Formerly the colony of British Guiana; independent member of the Commonwealth since May 26, 1966; under republican regime instituted February 23, 1970; present constitution approved February 11, 1980, with effect from October 6. Area: 83,000 sq. mi. (214,969 sq. km.). Population: 701,704 (1991C); 753,000 (2006E). The 1991 figure (reflecting possible underenumeration) was substantially lower than that of 1980 (758,619). Major Urban Center (metropolitan area, 2003E): GEORGETOWN (231,000). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: Guyana Dollar (market rate November 2, 2007: 204.20 dollars = $1US). President: Bharrat JAGDEO (People’s Progressive Party); sworn in August 11, 1999, to succeed Samuel A. (Sam) HINDS (Civic), who had been elevated from Prime Minister to Provisional President upon the resignation of Janet JAGAN (People’s Progressive Party) for health reasons on August 1; sworn in for a second term on March 31, 2001, following legislative election of March 19; sworn in for a third term on September 2, 2006, following legislative election of August 28. Prime Minister: Samuel Archibald Anthony (Sam) HINDS (Civic); sworn in December 19, 1997, succeeding Janet JAGAN (People’s Progressive Party); reappointed by President Jagdeo on August 11, 1999, April 4, 2001, and on September 4, 2006.

Guyana’s new constitution was declared in effect on October 6, 1980, with Burnham assuming the office of executive president and designating Ptolemy A. REID as prime minister. On December 15, in an election branded by an international team of observers as “fraudulent in every possible respect,” the PNC was credited with an overwhelming popular mandate, and on January 1, 1981, the government was substantially expanded to include five vice presidents and additional ministers. In the wake of worsening fiscal conditions, the regime faced mounting internal and external polit-

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ical challenges, culminating in the arrest by Canadian authorities in December 1983 of six persons, including a member of the Toronto-based rightwing Conservative Party of Guyana, who were charged with plotting to assassinate Burnham and other key officials. A number of subsequent leadership changes included the appointment in August 1984 of Vice President Hugh Desmond HOYTE to succeed the reportedly ailing Reid as first vice president and prime minister. President Burnham died on August 6, 1985, while undergoing surgery in Georgetown, and was succeeded by Hoyte, who was accorded a regular five-year mandate on December 9 in balloting that, as in 1980, yielded allegations of widespread fraud. Elections that should have been held in late 1990 were postponed to permit the compilation of new electoral rolls, with the life of the National Assembly (due to expire on February 2, 1991) being accorded a series of two-month extensions before formal dissolution on September 28. On November 10 President Hoyte announced that the longdelayed balloting would take place on December 16; on November 22, however, he responded to continued domestic and international criticism of the voter registration procedure by again postponing the poll. The action was validated by the Assembly in December after its having been reconvened under a state of emergency decree, with the parliamentary session prolonged to September 30, 1992. The balloting on October 5, 1992, in contrast to its two predecessors, was characterized by a team of 100 foreign observers as largely fair and impartial; the PPP, in alliance with Civic (C), a small social and political group of business owners and professionals, won a majority of the popular vote. Dr. Jagan was installed as president four days later and his party, after lengthy negotiations with TUF and another small formation, the Working People’s Alliance (WPA), secured control of the National Assembly and approval for a government headed by Civic leader Samuel A. (Sam) HINDS. The PPP and its allies won 48 of 65 Neighborhood Democratic Councils (NDCs) and three of six municipalities in local government elections on August 8, 1994. The principal loss was in the

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capital, where 12 of 30 seats were captured by Good and Green Georgetown, a new formation led by former prime minister Hamilton Green, who served a one-year term as the city’s mayor, before being defeated in August 1995, then reelected in 1996. President Jagan suffered a fatal heart attack on March 6, 1997, and was immediately succeeded, for the balance of his term, by Prime Minister Hinds, who also held the post of vice president. On March 17 Hinds appointed his predecessor’s wife, Janet JAGAN, as first vice president and prime minister, additionally naming Agriculture Minister Reepu Daman PERSAUD as second vice president. Mrs. Jagan was named to succeed her husband in the general election of December 15, 1997 (which yielded a largely unchanged distribution of legislative seats), thereafter naming Hinds as first vice president and prime minister, and Bharrat JAGDEO as second vice president. The election generated intense controversy, however, and the PNC did not agree to take up its Assembly seats until mid-1998. Mrs. Jagan resigned for medical reasons on August 1, 1999, and a somewhat complicated scenario ensued. As constitutionally prescribed, Prime Minister Hinds again assumed the presidency on a provisional basis. He then named Jagdeo as first vice president and prime minister and resigned in the latter’s favor. Following his installation as president, Jagdeo reappointed Hinds as prime minister, who proceeded to name a cabinet virtually identical with its predecessor. In January 2001 a Guyanese Supreme Court judge declared the 1997 election null and void because of the introduction of voter identification cards. However, in a March 1 “clarification” the judge ruled that the Jagdeo government was not illegitimate, even though installed under unconstitutional legislation. Shortly thereafter, the issue became moot with the March 19 victory of the PPP/C (characterized by international observers as “basically fair”) and the incumbent’s reinstallation. Jagdeo continued in office following the election of August 28, 2006, at which the PPP/C increased its parliamentary majority by two seats.

Constitution and Government The 1966 constitution established Guyana as a parliamentary member of the Commonwealth under the sovereignty of the British queen. The monarchical structure was abandoned in 1970 in favor of a titular president elected by the National Assembly. The 1980 constitution provided for a president who is selected each time voting occurs (normally every five years) for a new National Assembly. (The successful presidential candidate is the nominee of the party that receives the most votes in the legislative balloting.) The president’s extensive powers include the authority to appoint and dismiss an unspecified number of vice presidents and a prime minister, to dissolve the legislature, and to veto all legislative enactments. The National Assembly includes 53 popularly elected members plus 12 members designated indirectly to represent regional and local interests; its normal term is five years. In an unusual procedure, voters cast their ballots for party slates, with selection of those to enter the assembly being a postelectoral internal party matter. The judicial system consists of ten magistrates’ courts, one for each judicial district, and a Supreme Court, encompassing a High Court and a Court of Appeal; however the National Assembly in November 2004 approved a bill transferring jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as of launching of the Trinidad-based regional body in March 2005. There are elected councils in the country’s ten regions, in addition to municipal administrations in Georgetown and four towns, although the balloting of August 1994 was their first replenishment since 1970. Local councilors elect from their membership a National Congress of Local Democratic Organs, which, together with the National Assembly, constitutes a deliberative body known as the Supreme Congress of the People of Guyana. Constitutional amendments must be approved by the Assembly and, if not endorsed by a twothirds majority, submitted to a popular vote (the

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legislative extensions of 1991 being technically in the form of constitutional amendments carried by the PNC’s [then] overwhelming Assembly majority).

Foreign Relations Guyana’s major foreign policy problems stem from boundary disputes with both its eastern and western neighbors. The disagreement with Suriname centers on the delineation of a riparian boundary between the two countries: Guyana claims that the boundary follows the Corentyne, while Suriname claims it follows the New River. The dispute with Venezuela is the most serious: Venezuela has long claimed all territory west of the Essequibo River, which amounts to more than half of Guyana’s total area (see map). In 1966 the two countries agreed to settle the issue by diplomatic means, while in 1970, after talks had failed, Venezuela agreed to a 12-year moratorium on its claim. The 1970 protocol provided that if the dispute was not resolved by September 18, 1982, it would be referred to an “appropriate international organ” or, failing agreement on such an organ, to the secretary general of the United Nations. In the wake of a series of border incidents that accompanied expiration of the moratorium, Venezuela rejected a Guyanese request to seek a ruling from the International Court of Justice and formally requested the mediation of UN Secretary General Javier P´erez de Cu´ellar. In March 1983 Venezuela announced that Guyana had acquiesced in the action, but no further progress was reported until February 1985, when the Venezuelan foreign minister indicated that his government was prepared to adopt a conciliatory attitude in furtherance of a “new spirit of friendship and cooperation” between the two countries. Following a November 1989 meeting in Caracas with Venezuelan President Carlos Andr´es P´erez, President Hoyte announced that the two governments had agreed to seek the “good offices” of the vice chancellor of the University of the West Indies, Alister McIntyre, in formulating a resolution of the long-standing dispute. Evidence of

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the changed climate was provided by Guyana’s admission to the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1991, after Venezuela had withdrawn an objection stemming from the boundary issue. The Essequibo dispute was rekindled in October 1999 after Guyana had awarded offshore oil concessions in waters claimed by Venezuela to three foreign firms. The Guyanese foreign minister pointed out that the contested territory had been awarded to Guyana under an 1899 arbitration award and was “internationally accepted” thereafter. A constituent assembly, then considering changes in the Venezuelan constitution, responded by insisting that it would reject any modifications to the original Captaincy-General of Venezuela that had been “vitiated by nullity.” A subsequent agreement to accept a Barbadian diplomat as mediator proved unproductive. Tension increased even further in mid-2000 when a Texas firm, Beal Aerospace, announced plans to erect a $100 million rocket facility in the region claimed by Venezuela, which Caracas argued could serve as a cover for a U.S. military installation. For its part, Georgetown promoted the initiative as the country’s biggest development effort to date and extolled its potential in attracting tourists. However, in October Beal announced it was withdrawing from the project on the ground that U.S. federal support for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had made it impossible for the firm to compete effectively in the rocket-launching business. Meanwhile, the dispute with Suriname had continued to simmer. In June 2000 Surinamese gunboats evicted a Canadian-owned oil rig from an offshore concession granted by Guyana in 1998; four months later, it was reported that Surinamese forces had crossed the Corentyne and fired on a Guyanese vessel. With no resolution forthcoming, Guyana referred the matter to arbitration under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in February 2004. Suriname filed a counterclaim in March, and in June the case was assigned to a UN tribunal in Hamburg, Germany, which was expected to issue a decision in 2007 or 2008.

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Earlier, another threat to Guyana’s national identity loomed from Brazil, which had begun paving a 60-mile highway between its northern state capital of Boa Vista and the Guyanese town of Lethem (see map). The new road was expected to open up Guyanese gold mines to Brazilians, who already accounted for nearly 10 percent of the smaller country’s population.

Current Issues A new election had been anticipated in March 2006. However, the Guyana Election Commission announced that because of difficulties in assembling a valid electoral list the balloting would be delayed beyond the constitutional deadline of August 4. Nine days later, on April 22, a shockwave was generated by the assassination of Agriculture Minister Satyadeow SAWH by a group of masked gunmen, who also murdered Sawh’s brother and sister, in addition to a security guard. While the police report indicated that the motive was robbery, President Jagdeo suggested that the perpetrators were attempting to disrupt the election, which was ultimately held on August 28. Because of the delay, the new National Assembly did not convene until September 28, more than three weeks after the constitutionally mandated date of September 2 (four months after the May 2 dissolution). The opposition immediately argued that the deferral would require a constitutional amendment, but a writ to such effect was dismissed by the chief justice; the PNC/R thereupon indicated that it would appeal the decision to the Caribbean Court of Justice. Earlier in 2006, in an address May 25 at Guyana’s 40th anniversary of independence, President Jagdeo asserted that the greatest threat to the country came “from the enemy within,” comprised of drug lords and armed gangs that had been held responsible for the theft in February of high-powered weapons from the Guyana Defence Force and the assassination of Agriculture Minister Sawh. Concurrently, guerrilla activity loomed by a group styling itself the Guyanese Armed Resistance (AGAR).

The issue of internal turmoil was highlighted by the arrest and conviction in New York of Roger KHAN, an alleged Guyanese drug trafficker, who opposition leaders insisted had been given a “shield of protection” by the Hinds administration. Khan had been apprehended on June 26, 2006, and expelled to Trinidad and Tobago, where, on June 29, he was handed over to U.S. law enforcement officials. Criticism of the transaction came from within the PPP, former president Janet Jagan joining with others in accusing the Suriname government of playing “stooge to the USA” by allowing Khan’s seizure and deportation.

Political Parties Government Party People’s Progressive Party (PPP). Launched in 1950 by Dr. Cheddi B. Jagan and his wife, Janet Jagan, the PPP began as an anticolonial party speaking for the lower social classes but subsequently came to represent almost exclusively the large East Indian racial group. It long adhered to a pro-Soviet line, and at a June 1969 Moscow meeting Dr. Jagan formally declared the PPP to be a communist party. While the PPP and other opposition groups charged that the PNC fraudulently manipulated the overseas vote in the 1973 election, Dr. Jagan offered his “critical support” to the PNC in August 1975. The PPP Central Committee narrowly approved participation in the December 1980 legislative balloting, at which the party was officially credited with winning ten seats. It was awarded eight seats in 1985. In June 1991 Jagan retreated from his earlier insistence on state ownership by saying that the PPP would “critically examine” enterprises in the public sector and consult with both business and labor “as to the best means of insuring their viability.” Dr. Jagan died on March 6, 1997. Under the leadership of his wife, the PPP won a majority of directly elected legislative seats in the balloting of December 15, 1997. Janet Jagan resigned the presidency for medical reasons on August 1, 1999.

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In Georgetown, the PPP is allied with a Civic movement of local business owners and professionals headed by former interim president and current prime minister Samuel HINDS. Leaders: Bharrat JAGDEO (President of the Republic), Janet JAGAN (Former President of the Republic), Donald RAMOTAR (General Secretary).

Principal Opposition Group People’s National Congress (PNC). The PNC was created by Linden Forbes Burnham in 1957 after he had broken with PPP leader Cheddi Jagan. Primarily an urban-based party, it represents the African racial bloc of about one-third of the population, including most of the nation’s intellectuals. Initially, it advocated a policy of moderate socialism, anticommunism, and hospitality to private investment, but a swing to the left, culminating in Prime Minister Burnham’s 1974 “Declaration of Sophia” (see Political background, above), brought the PNC close to the opposition People’s Progressive Party on most domestic issues. In 1987 President Hoyte rejected allegations of a shift to the right, insisting that the PNC remained committed to socialism, while arguing that the latter, given local conditions, must follow an “innovative course.” The PNC drew heavily on the overseas vote in securing a two-thirds legislative majority in 1973 and was accused of massive fraud in obtaining better than three-quarter majorities in 1980 and 1985. It was runner-up to the PPP in 1992, winning 27 Assembly seats with 43.6 percent of the vote. Severe intraparty differences that had broken out before the 1992 election continued thereafter, with former Prime Minister Green, Viola BURNHAM (widow of the former president), and 13 other ex-ministers being dropped from the PNC’s new parliamentary delegation. In February 1993 Green was expelled from the party following a disciplinary inquiry into misconduct charges that had been filed against him. He then filed a High Court writ against Hoyte and other PNC leaders, claiming violation of constitutional rights, and in May announced that he would stand for election as

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mayor of Georgetown later in the year. Although subsequently identified with a group styled the Forum on Democracy, Green stated that his objective was not to form a new party, but “to capture the PNC and bring it back to the people.” He captured the Georgetown mayoralty in September 1994 as leader of the Good and Green Georgetown (GGG, below). Despite Hoyte’s 1987 position, the PNC at its biennial congress in May 1994 adopted a new constitution that omitted reference to it as a “socialist” party, the former prime minister describing the word as a “chameleon term” endorsed by a variety of groups that had “only a ritual jargon in common.” For the 2001 legislative balloting the PNC was aligned with Reform, a movement comprising a number of prominent business owners and professionals, one of whom, Stanley MING, was slated to be named prime minister if the PNC/R had prevailed in the election. The coalition continued for the 2006 poll, at which (running under the rubric People’s National Congress/One Guyana—PNCR/1G) it failed to oust the PNC. Former president Hoyte died on December 22, 2002; Viola Burnham died on October 10, 2003. Leaders: Robert H. O. CORBIN (Leader of the Opposition and Party Leader), Vincent ALEXANDER (Chair), Oscar E. CLARKE (General Secretary).

Other Parties Alliance for Change (AFC). The AFC was launched in October 2005 by Khemraj Ramjattan (a legislator who had been expelled from the PPP in 2004 for having made allegations of corruption within the PPP leadership) and Raphael Trotman (a PNC legislator). Former members of the WPA (below) and GAP (below) also reportedly joined the new formation, which argued that the Guyana people were eager to support a “racially integrated party” after so many years of conflict between the nation’s racially divided major parties. The AFC pledged to pursue higher living standards in Guyana based on free-market

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policies, which led some observers to suggest that it enjoyed background support from the United States. Leaders: Khemraj RAMJATTAN, Raphael TROTMAN. Guyana Action Party (GAP). The GAP was launched in January 1989 as the Guyanese Action for Reform and Democracy (Guard). A self-described civic movement that did not seek power as a political party, Guard organized a series of public rallies on behalf of political (particularly electoral) reform in mid-1990. A charge by President Hoyte that the formation was “a political party masquerading as a nonpolitical, apolitical faction” appeared to be substantiated by the issuance of a statement in November that it might take part in a “third slate” involving the URP (below). The situation was further clouded in December, when businessman Sam Hines resigned as Guard chair to accept designation as PPP shadow prime minister. While continuing to emphasize the need for reform, Guard announced in August 1991 that it would contest the forthcoming election with Nanda K. Gopaul, a former trade union official, as its presidential candidate. However, in early 1992 Gopaul emerged as the founder of the Guyana Labor Party (GLP). Under the GAP rubric, the formation won two legislative seats in 2001 as a partner of the WPA and retained one in 2006 in alliance with Roar (below). Leader: Paul HARDY. Rise, Organize, and Rebuild (Roar). A small grouping launched in 1999 to promote the rights of the indigenous Indian population, Roar won one legislative seat in 2001 and retained it in 2006 in coalition with the GAP. Leader: Ravi DEV. The United Force (TUF). A small party that represents conservative business and other interests, TUF favors racial integration and has found support from white, Amerindian, and other minority groups. Its programs have favored economic orthodoxy, closer ties to Western nations, and en-

couragement for private investment and foreign loans. TUF withdrew from the governing coalition in 1968 to protest the enfranchisement of the overseas voters. A single legislative seat won in 1992 was retained in 1997 and 2001. Its leader became an “opposition” participant in the Hinds government in 2001 and continued in that capacity after the 2006 election. Leader: Manzoor NADIR (2001 presidential candidate). Working People’s Alliance (WPA). The WPA was organized in late 1976, following the tender of PPP support to the (then) ruling PNC, as a coalition of left-wing groups that included the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA), founded by Eusi Kwayana during his affiliation with the PNC. Three of its principal leaders, Dr. Omawale, Dr. Rupert Roopnaraine, and Dr. Walter Rodney, were indicted on arson charges in July 1979, the last being killed by a bomb explosion in June 1980. The party has been described as having “the appearance of a genuine bridge across the racial barrier in Guyana” in that its membership is drawn from both the African and Indian ethnic communities. It refused to participate in the December 1980 election on the ground of anticipated irregularities. It won one seat in 1985 and two in 1992. In January 1994, following a week-long public fast by Walter Rodney’s son Shaka, the government announced that a special committee would be appointed to review the files on the 1980 bombing, for which, despite a 1988 ruling of death by “accident or misadventure,” the PNC was widely believed to have been responsible. The inquiry led in June 1996 to the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of a former Guyana Defense Force sergeant, Gregory SMITH, who had been living in French Guiana since the 1980 assassination. A consultative member of the Socialist International, the party contested the 1997 election as the Alliance for Guyana (AG), reverting to its original name for the 2001 campaign, at which it won only two legislative seats in conjunction with the Guyana Action Party (GAP, above).

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The party has recently been in decline (in part because of the defection of one of its legislators to the AFC in 2005), and it secured no assembly representation in 2006. Leaders: Dr. Rupert ROOPNARAINE (Chair), Dr. Clive THOMAS (1992 presidential candidate), Nigel WESTMAAS (Secretary), Bonita HARRIS, Eusi KWAYANA, Wazir MOHAMED. Justice for All Party (JFAP). Led by C. N. Sharma, a local television station owner, the JFAP claimed that electoral irregularities cost it a seat in the 2001 legislative balloting; it was also unsuccessful in 2006. Leader: Chandranarine SHARMA. Guyana Democratic Party (GDP). The GDP was launched in July 1996 by Dr. Asgar Ally, who had resigned as finance minister in May 1995. Leaders: Dr. Asgar ALLY (1997 and 2001 presidential candidate), Nanda K. GOPAUL (prime ministerial candidate). United Party (UP). The UP was launched in early 2005 by Cheddi Jagan Jr., after a dispute with the leadership of his parents’ PPP. Leader: Cheddi JAGAN Jr. Good and Green for Guyana (GGG). The GGG was formed as the Good and Green for Georgetown before the 1994 Georgetown municipal campaign by former prime minister Hamilton Green, who had been expelled from the PNC in February 1993. The new party won a plurality of 12 of 30 seats in the September 1994 election, with its leader, now Georgetown mayor, signaling a return to national politics under the more inclusive rubric in mid-December. In August 1995 a coalition of PNC and PPP/C councilors succeeded in denying Green election to an additional one year as mayor; however, he was reelected to the post in August 1996. Leaders: Hamilton GREEN (Former Mayor of Georgetown), Ramesh KISSOON (Former Deputy Mayor of Georgetown). Democratic Labour Movement (DLM). Affiliated with the Christian Democrat International, the DLM was founded in 1982 as a largely

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centrist affiliate of the small National Workers’ Union. Leaders: Paul Nehru TENNASSEE (1992 presidential candidate), Jainarayan SINGH (General Secretary). People’s Democratic Movement (PDM). The PDM is a small centrist group founded in 1973. Leader: Llewellen JOHN. United Republican Party (URP). A rightwing group, the URP was launched in 1985 by Robert GANGADEEN, a U.S.-based former member of the UF, who returned to Guyana in 1989 to urge the adoption of free enterprise economics as the only remedy for the country’s problems. Gangadeen was ousted at the party’s second biennial conference in April 1990 and promptly announced the formation of a new group, the National Republican Party (NRP). Leader: Dr. Leslie RAMSAMMY (President of the Party and 1992 presidential candidate). Three other parties—the Guyana National Congress; the long-standing National Democratic Front, led by Joseph BACCHUS; and the People’s Republic Party, led by Harry DAS—have contested only regionally.

Legislature National Assembly. The unicameral legislature, which sits for five years barring dissolution by the president, currently consists of 65 elected members. Before 2001, 53 members were directly elected on a proportional basis, 10 were selected by the regional councils (1 by each of the 10 councils), and 2 were designated by the National Congress of Local Democratic Organs, to which each regional council had elected two members. Constitutional amendments in early 2001 provided for direct election of all 65 members, 40 on a proportional basis from national lists and 25 on a “geographic” basis that assigned from 1 to 7 seats to each of the ten regions. Following the election of August 28, 2006, the People’s Progressive Party/Civic held 36 seats; the People’s National Congress/Reform, 22;

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2007 Prime Minister

Samuel A. Hinds

Ministers Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, Crops, and Livestock Amerindian Affairs Culture, Youth, and Sports Education Finance Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade and International Cooperation Health Home Affairs Housing and Water Human Services and Social Security Labour Legal Affairs and Attorney General Local Government and Regional Development President’s Office (Parliamentary Affairs) Public Service Tourism, Industry, and Commerce Transport and Hydraulics Head, Presidential Secretariat

Robert Montgomery Persaud Carolyn Rodrigues [f] Frank Anthony Shaik K. Z. Baksh Desrey Fox (second minister) [f] Ashni Kumar Singh Jennifer Webster (second minister) [f] Samuel Rudolph (Rudy) Insanally Henry Jeffrey Dr. Leslie Ramsammy Bheri Ramsarram (second minister) Clement Rohee Harrinarine Nawbatt Priya Manichand [f] Manzour Nadir Doodnauth Singh Kellewan Lall Reepu Daman Persaud Dr. Jennifer Westford [f] Manniram Prashad Robeson Benn Roger Luncheon

[f] = female

the Alliance for Change, 5; The United Force, 1; and a coalition of the Guyana Action Party and Rise, Organize, and Rebuild, 1. Speaker: Hari Narayen (Ralph) RAMKARRAN.

Communications Press Newspapers are indirectly censured through government control of newsprint, which was relaxed somewhat in 1986. The following are published in Georgetown: New Nation (26,000), PNC

weekly; Mirror (25,000), twice-weekly PPP organ; Guyana Chronicle (23,000 daily, 45,000 Sunday), state-owned; Stabroek News (22,000 midweek, 28,000 weekend), independent; The Catholic Standard (10,000), weekly; Dayclean, WPA weekly.

News Agencies The state-owned Guyana News Agency (GNA) was established in 1981, following termination of an agreement with the Barbados-based Caribbean News Agency. A number of foreign agencies maintain bureaus at Georgetown.

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Broadcasting and Computing Until recently, radio broadcasting was controlled by the Guyana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC), which was formed from the Guyana Broadcasting Service and Radio Demerara (a local affiliate of Rediffusion, Ltd. London) when the government took over the latter’s assets in 1979. In March 2004 the GBC and the Guyana Television and Broadcasting Company (GTV) merged to form a National Communications Network (NCN). More than a dozen television outlets have been operating under government license since 2001; in addition, two private stations relay TV programming from the United States. As of 2005 there were approximately 213 Internet users and 39 personal

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computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 375 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Bayney Ram KARRAN U.S. Ambassador to Guyana: David M. ROBINSON Permanent Representative to the UN: Samuel Rudolph INSANALLY IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OIC, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

HAITI REPUBLIC

OF

HAITI

R´e publique d’Ha¨ıti

The poorest country, on a per capita basis, in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti occupies the western third of the mountainous Caribbean island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Approximately 95 percent of the largely illiterate population is of pure African descent, with a small percentage of mulattoes and whites. Roman Catholicism, which coexists with a folk cult based on various voodoo practices, is the official religion, but other faiths are permitted. Women constitute close to 50 percent of the agricultural labor force and 60 percent of the urban workforce, concentrated in domestic service and manufacturing; female representation under the Duvalier regime was minimal, save for the reputed influence of Jean-Claude DUVALIER’s wife, Mich`ele; by contrast, the short-lived Pr´eval government of 1991 included four women of ministerial rank. A female prime minister, Claudette WERLEIGH, served from October 1995 to February 1996. The economy has long been handicapped by an underdeveloped social infrastructure and a paucity of mineral resources, the extraction of limited amounts of bauxite having ceased in 1983. While the manufacturing sector has grown, with an emphasis on plants for assembly and reexport of imported components, agriculture remains the country’s economic mainstay, although contributing only about 30 percent to GDP. Important crops include sugarcane, cacao, sisal, and especially coffee, the principal commodity, which accounts for about 30 percent of export earnings. Before the

1991 coup, unemployment exceeded 50 percent, while declining coffee revenues had strained finances in a country in which much of the annual budget was normally derived from foreign aid; subsequently, the economy came to a virtual standstill because of trade and financial embargoes during the exile of President Aristide in 1991–1994. The growth in real GDP was estimated at 2.9 percent in 1996 after having averaged –5.2 percent in 1985–1995. Growth of 2.2 percent was achieved in 1998, 2.7 percent in 1999, and 0.9 percent in 2000. However, because of a sustained period of

AT L ANT I C CUBA

OCEAN

Île de la Tortue Windward Passage

Cap-Haïtien

Port-de-Paix

Gonaïves Golfe de le Gonâve

Grande Cayemite

Saint-Marc

HAITI

Île de la Gonâve

Jérémie Les Cayes

Port-au-Prince Carrefour Miragoâne Île à Vache

Caribbean Sea 0 0

60 Mi 60 Km

Hinche

Jacmel

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Country

HAITI

Political Status: Independent state proclaimed in 1804; republic since 1859; military-backed regime installed following coup of September 30, 1991; constitutional government reinstated on November 8, 1994. Area: 10,714 sq. mi. (27,750 sq. km.). Population: 7,929,048 (2003C); 8,589,000 (2006E). The 2003 figure does not include an adjustment for undernumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): PORT-AU-PRINCE (1,249,000), Carrefour (446,000), Cap-Ha¨ıtien (112,000). Official Languages: French, Creole. Monetary Unit: Gourde (market rate November 2, 2007: 35.90 gourdes = $1US). ´ President: Ren´e PREVAL (Front for Hope); elected on February 7, 2006, and sworn in on May 14, succeeding acting President Boniface ALEXANDRE (Independent). ´ Prime Minister: Jacques-Edouard ALEXIS (Front for Hope); nominated by the president on May 22, 2006, and sworn in on June 9, succeeding G´erard LATORTUE (Independent).

severe political turmoil (see Political background and Current issues, below), GDP began to contract, dropping from –1.1 percent in 2001 to –3.8 percent in 2004, with inflation reaching nearly 20 percent. Observers estimated current unemployment ranging from 60 to 80 percent, with less than half of school-age children attending primary school, the maternal mortality rate the highest in the Western Hemisphere, and more than three-quarters of the population living under conditions that have been termed “worse than Darfur.” At the opposite pole, 1 percent of the population controls most of the country’s wealth.

Government and Politics Political Background Since a slaves’ revolt that established Haiti in 1804 as the first independent republic in Latin America, the nation’s history has been marked by

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violence, instability, and mutual hostility between blacks and mulattoes. After a period of U.S. military occupation (1915–1934), mulatto presidents held office until 1946, when power passed to a ´ His moderblack president, Dumarsais ESTIME. ate administration was terminated in 1950 by an army coup that prepared the way for the regime of another black, Gen. Paul MAGLOIRE, who was also overthrown, in December 1956. Five interim regimes followed before Fran¸cois DUVALIER won the presidency in the election of September 1957. Contrary to expectations, the Duvalier administration quickly degenerated into a dictatorship, with Duvalier forcing an unconstitutional reelection in 1961 and being designated president for life in May 1964. Throughout his incumbency Duvalier maintained a tight grip over the country. With most opponents in exile, the regime maintained a balance of terror using a blend of persuasion, voodoo symbolism, and a personal army of thugs and enforcers, the so-called Tontons Macoutes (Creole for bogeymen). In early 1971 Duvalier had the constitution amended to allow him to designate a successor; his son, Jean-Claude DUVALIER, was promptly named to the position and assumed the presidency following his father’s death on April 21. Beginning in mid-1977 the younger Duvalier appeared to yield somewhat under continuing U.S. pressure to ameliorate the more corrupt and repressive aspects of his family’s two decades of rule. Thus in November 1978, in return for substantially increased U.S. aid, he ordered a series of budgetary and ministerial reforms. In the election of February 11, 1979, an independent candidate running on a human rights platform (despite offering “critical support” for the regime) won an overwhelming victory against a government-endorsed opponent, while in an unprecedented act of public defiance, about 200 intellectuals issued a manifesto in June protesting censorship of plays and films. Most startling of all was the appearance at midyear of three new political parties (see Political Parties, below) after publication of a book by ` Gr´egoire EUGENE, a law professor, which pointed

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out that such organizations were technically permissible under the Haitian constitution. By the end of the year, however, the period of liberalization appeared to have ended with the passage of a repressive press law and increased attacks on dissidents by former members of the Tontons Macoutes. The first municipal elections in 26 years were held in mid-1983. No opposition candidates presented themselves, several potential nominees having disappeared before the balloting. In August the national legislature dissolved itself after accepting a new, presidentially drafted constitution. While balloting for a new chamber on February 12, 1984, resulted in the defeat of numerous Duvalierists, foreign observers were convinced that the government, wishing to create the appearance of change, had asked incumbents not to campaign vigorously. Six months later, a regime-supportive Progressive National Party (PNP) was launched under legislation permitting partisan activity by groups agreeing to accept the life presidency. Earlier, extensive rioting had erupted in response to government misuse of food aid and manifest police brutality, yielding a press crackdown and the detention of several opposition politicians. In November the government announced the discovery of a “communist” plot against the regime, in what was widely perceived as a bid for support from anticommunist donor nations, particularly the United States. In early 1985, under visible pressure from both the United States and France (another substantial aid donor), the government released a number of political prisoners, and in April President Duvalier announced a series of “democratic” reforms. These included the legalization of political parties, increased power for the National Assembly, and provision for a new post of prime minister, to be filled by presidential appointment from the parliamentary majority. However, restrictions on party registration ensured the exclusion of known regime opponents, while the life presidency remained intact. Renewed rioting broke out in November 1985 in response to the killing of several teenagers during an antigovernment demonstration in Gona¨ıves,

and in December a government reshuffle was announced that suggested a shift in the balance of power to an inner circle of Duvalierist hardliners. On January 8, 1986, all schools and universities were closed in response to a widespread student boycott, while the first major protest demonstration at the capital was dispersed by police ten days later. However, the disturbances intensified, and on February 7 Duvalier, with an entourage of family and close associates, departed on a U.S. plane to France. The army chief of staff, Gen. Henri NAMPHY, immediately assumed power as head of a five-member National Council of Government (Conseil National du Gouvernement—CNG) that included two other officers and two civilians. On February 10 a 19-member provisional government was announced that, however, contained a number of leading Duvalierists. On March 20 the one prominent anti-Duvalierist in the new administration, Haitian human rights leader G´erard GOURGUE, resigned from both the CNG and the justice ministry, alleging “resistance” to liberalization. General Namphy responded by excluding the Duvalierists from a reconstituted Council that included himself, (then) Col. Williams REGALA (the interior and defense minister), and Jacques FRANC¸OIS (succeeded as foreign minister in a cabinet reshuffle on March 24 by retired general Jean-Baptiste HILAIRE). In the face of continued unrest that, in the words of General Namphy, left the country “on the verge of anarchy . . . and civil war,” it was announced in June 1986 that municipal elections would be held in July 1987 and that a new government would be installed in February 1988, following presidential and legislative balloting the preceding November. In September an election was held for 41 of 61 members of a Constituent Assembly charged with drafting Haiti’s 23rd constitution since independence. The new basic law, incorporating a number of safeguards to prevent the return of a Duvaliertype dictatorship, was overwhelmingly approved by a referendum on March 29, 1987. By mid-1987 the Namphy regime had proven to be unwilling or unable to curb a mounting campaign of terror by disbanded Tontons Macoutes and

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the promised local elections were postponed. Presidential and legislative balloting commenced on the morning of November 29 but within hours was also called off because of widespread violence and voter intimidation. The four principal opposition leaders thereupon withdrew as presidential candidates, and Leslie MANIGAT, a self-proclaimed “democratic centralist” who was widely believed to have the backing of the CNG, emerged from the rescheduled poll of January 17, 1988, with a declared majority of 50.3 percent. On June 17, 1988, President Manigat attempted to remove General Namphy as army commander but was himself overthrown by a military coup two days later. On June 20 Namphy announced the formal deposition of the Manigat administration, declaring that he would thenceforth rule by decree as the country’s chief executive. Less than three months thereafter, a revolt by noncommissioned officers of the Presidential Guard, led by Sgt. Joseph HEBREUX, resulted in Namphy’s ouster, with power passing to Lt. Gen. Prosper AVRIL on September 18. Subsequently, Avril successfully resisted countercoup efforts by army units on April 2 and 5, 1989, and on September 24 announced that a series of local, national legislative, and presidential elections would be held in 1990. Following the assassination of a Presidential Guard colonel on January 19, 1990, General Avril declared a nationwide state of siege and a roundup of opposition leaders, some of whom were deported after being brutalized by police. While the emergency decree was rescinded on January 30, popular unrest continued, forcing the general’s resignation on March 10. His acting successor, Army Chief Staff Herard ABRAHAM, promised to remain in office for no more than 72 hours and on March 13 Supreme Court justice Ertha PASCALTROUILLOT was sworn in (also on an acting basis) as the country’s first female president and its fifth chief executive since the Duvalier ouster. Presidential and legislative elections, initially scheduled for September 1990, were postponed until November 4 because of problems in voter registration and deferred again until December 16, when Fr. Jean-Bertrand ARISTIDE, a radical Catholic

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priest who had been expelled from his order two years earlier, won a landslide victory with 67 percent of the vote. However, Aristide’s somewhat hastily organized National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD) was able to nominate only 50 candidates for 110 seats in the two legislative houses and, following his inauguration on February 7, 1991, the new head of state was obliged to settle for his second choice, the politically inexperienced ´ Ren´e PREVAL, as prime minister on February 13. On September 30, 1991, scarcely more than seven months after his installation as Haiti’s first democratically elected chief executive, Aristide was ousted and sent into exile in a bloody coup headed (although reportedly not instigated) by the armed forces commander, Brig. Gen. Raoul ´ CEDRAS. On October 8 a rump group of senators was induced to declare the presidency vacant and approve the installation of Supreme Court president Joseph NERETTE as interim head of state. Nerette, in turn, named Jean-Jacques HONORAT, a former diplomat and government official who had been exiled by the younger Duvalier in 1981, to head a government formed on October 16. On October 29, 1991, the United States imposed strict economic sanctions, which induced the military-backed regime to enter into negotiations with a mission from the Organization of American States (OAS) aimed at restoring Aristide to office. By late November the talks were at an impasse, with the Haitians demanding an end to the embargo but refusing to reinstate the ousted president. Honorat then challenged the OAS by announcing that new elections would be held in early January, although most of December was spent in an effort to find a prime ministerial candidate that would be acceptable to Aristide, C´edras, and Haitian political and business leaders. In January 1992 a compromise reached in Caracas, Venezuela, that called for the appointment of Ren´e THEODORE, secretary general of the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH), as prime minister was repudiated by the military leadership. In a similar understanding reached in Washington, D.C., on February 23 among Aristide, Theodore, and a Haitian parliamentary

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delegation, Aristide dropped a demand for C´edras’s removal and offered immunity from prosecution for all those involved in the coup. Subsequently, however, he withdrew the pledge, while the military-dominated National Assembly refused to endorse the plan after Nerette had characterized it as “unconstitutional.” On May 9, 1992, military, government, and legislative leaders in Port-au-Prince proposed the appointment of a new government and Nerette’s resignation “at a suitable moment,” with no mention of a successor. Pro-Aristide deputies succeeded in blocking passage of the unilateral scheme, but a more specific version was approved on May 20 that provided for Nerette’s departure on the installation of a new administration, with no presidential replacement until an overall political solution had been reached. Accordingly, Nerette on June 2 named conservative businessperson and former World Bank official Marc Louis BAZIN to head a government that was installed on June 19. In early July 1992 Aristide demanded a UN presence in Haiti and declared that he would meet with Bazin only after the latter had relinquished office. On the other hand, the head of Aristide’s “presidential commission,” Rev. Antoine ADRIEN, and Bazin’s foreign minister, Fran¸cois BENOIT, met in Washington, D.C., on September 1, with the Haitian regime agreeing on September 12 to the deployment of 18 human rights observers (3 per department, as contrasted with 18 per department sought by Aristide). However, in mid-December, after being permitted only one brief probe beyond Port-au-Prince, the UN team was charged by the Bazin government as having “no legal basis” to continue its activities. Subsequently, under strong pressure from both the United States and the UN, the government reversed itself, and in mid-March the first of several hundred civil rights observers arrived under the leadership of UN mediator Dante CAPUTO. In mid-April 1993 Caputo left Port-au-Prince after failing to obtain General C´edras’s assent to a UN/U.S. plan to step down in return for an amnesty for his involvement in Aristide’s ouster.

The regime’s intransigence was further reflected by its refusal on May 24 to accept a multilateral military force to supervise the former incumbent’s return to office. On June 15 the Haitian legislature agreed to Aristide’s reinstatement as president but set no date for his return and attached conditions (including a general amnesty for his military opponents) that he had long declared unacceptable. Shortly thereafter the army agreed to “proximity talks” between General C´edras and Aristide, which began on June 27 in New York. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Bazin was obliged to submit his resignation after four of his ministers refused to step down in what appeared to be a failed autogolpe (self-coup). The New York meeting yielded an agreement that provided for Aristide’s return to Haiti on October 30, assuming the following sequence of events: (1) a “dialogue” under UN and OAS auspices of Haiti’s parties, leading to the annulment of a partial senatorial election that had been conducted, despite an opposition boycott, in January; (2) the naming by Aristide of a prime minister; (3) acceptance of the nominee by the “normalized” Haitian parliament; (4) the lifting of UN and OAS sanctions against Haiti; (5) the modernizing of Haiti’s armed forces with the assistance of a 2,000-member international force (half from the United States); (6) an amnesty for those involved in the 1991 coup; (7) the creation of a new police force under an Aristideappointed commander; and (8) General C´edras’s “early retirement.” On August 3, 1993, it was announced that Robert MALVAL, a wealthy Port-au-Prince businessman, had been asked by President Aristide to become the next prime minister. Malval, characterized as a “profoundly reluctant public figure,” was reported to have accepted the job on condition that he play a purely transitional role and be replaced by a permanent successor no later than December 15. On August 25 the Haitian parliament, after extensive wrangling between pro- and anti-Aristide blocs, approved the appointment of Malval, who was sworn in by the exiled president five days later at the Haitian embassy in Washington. However, the military, headed by General C´edras but

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apparently under the effective control of police chief Michel FRANC¸OIS, mounted a concerted effort to block Aristide’s return. Perhaps most importantly, it refused to counter a wave of domestic violence by thousands of armed military “attach´es” modeled after the Tontons Macoutes militia. On October 15, 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton dispatched a flotilla of six warships to Haitian waters to enforce an oil and arms embargo ordered by the UN Security Council after a contingent of American and Canadian advisors for a UN peacekeeping force had been prevented from disembarking in Port-au-Prince. The military responded by pressing for completion of the first major highway linking Haiti to the neighboring Dominican Republic. Prime Minister Malval’s formal resignation on December 15, 1993, coincided with the conclusion of a two-week foreign trip, during which he failed in an attempt to mount a national conference to break the country’s political stalemate. Although initially supporting the initiative during a meeting with Malval and President Clinton at the White House, Aristide subsequently reversed himself, thereby drawing from Malval the criticism that he possessed “a serious ego problem.” Malval went on to characterize the impasse between C´edras and Aristide as involving “a man who refuses to resign and a man who has made a choice to remain abroad as a sort of flag bearer, a mystic symbol.” On January 11, 1994, anti-Aristide upper house members attempted to dismiss the Senate president by lowering the number required for a quorum from 11 to 9. Two days later the Chamber of Deputies employed less questionable procedure in dismissing its pro-Aristide speaker, Antoine JOSEPH, in favor of Frantz Robert MONDE, a former Tontons Macoutes leader. On February 15, 1994, Aristide rejected a new U.S.-backed peace plan that called for the appointment of a broad-based government without setting dates for the exiled president’s return or a military stepdown. Another U.S. plan in late March that called for C´edras’s removal, but not that of Fran¸cois, was also rejected by Aristide. Washington then called for a global trade embargo of Haiti,

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which, along with a freeze on the foreign assets of about 600 army officers, was approved by the UN Security Council, effective May 22. Meanwhile, anti-Aristide legislators had on May 11 declared the presidency vacant, thus permitting the 80-year-old president of the Supreme Court, Emile JONASSAINT, to assume the office on a “provisional” basis. On June 24 direct flights to and from the United States were terminated, with all international commercial flights ending on July 30. Finally, on July 30 the Security Council authorized a U.S.-led invasion if Haiti’s military attempted to continue in office. On September 17, 1994, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, U.S. Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Colin Powell, and Sen. Sam Nunn flew to Port-au-Prince for a “last best effort” meeting with C´edras and Jonassaint. The talks yielded an agreement signed by Carter and Jonassaint the following day that provided for the “honorable retirement” of “certain military officers of the Haitian armed forces,” the approval of a general amnesty by the Haitian parliament, the lifting of economic sanctions “in accordance with United Nations resolutions” (which required President Aristide’s return), coordination by U.S. and Haitian military units, and formal approval of the accord by the U.S. and Haitian governments. On September 19, 1994, an initial contingent of 2,000 U.S. troops landed without incident on Haitian soil. On October 10 General C´edras resigned his command and flew to exile in Panama three days later. On October 15 President Aristide received an exuberant welcome on his return to Haiti and on October 18 appointed wealthy U.S.-educated businessman Smark MICHEL as prime minister. A new government was named by Michel on November 6 and sworn in November 8 amid pledges to revitalize the economy, in part by privatizing most large industries. Other objectives included “relaunching” the agricultural sector, improving tax collection, creating an autonomous university, and establishing a “truth commission” to investigate human rights abuses during the period of military-backed rule. For his part, President Aristide, bowing to pressure from the Catholic

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hierarchy, agreed on November 16 to leave the priesthood. In two-stage balloting for partial Senate replenishment and a new Chamber of Deputies (originally scheduled for June 4 and 25, 1995, but not completed until September 17), President Aristide’s Lavalas Political Organization gained control of both houses by wide margins. By mid-1995 Prime Minister Michel was warning of “drastic consequences” if the economic program backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should fail and reportedly had complained of President Aristide’s lack of support for one of its crucial components: the privatization of nine state enterprises. Michel resigned on October 16, 1995, and was succeeded by the (then) foreign minister, Claudette Werleigh, who was believed to share the president’s doubts about divestiture, particularly in view of the anticipated loss of 6,000 jobs. Despite considerable uncertainty as to his intentions, President Aristide on November 30, 1995, reiterated an earlier pledge that he would not attempt to extend his term to discount his years in exile, and on December 17 the Lavalas candidate, Ren´e Pr´eval, secured an overwhelming mandate, albeit on a turnout of substantially less than half of the electorate, as Haiti’s next head of state. Although Pr´eval reportedly favored the installation of former Lavalas leader G´erard PIERRECHARLES as prime minister, the selection was vetoed by the outgoing president, who preferred retention of the incumbent. It was not until March 6 that Rosny SMARTH, having secured legislative approval, was sworn in as the new head of government. Subsequently, a rift emerged between the essentially populist Aristide and Prime Minister Smarth, who sought to implement an IMF-approved structural adjustment program that included substantial privatization. In November 1996 the former president broke with the existing Lavalas organization by forming a competing Lavalas Family movement that applied for registration as a party in early 1997. While Smarth survived a “no confidence” vote on March 27, he felt obliged to submit

his resignation on June 9, amid a mounting wave of strikes and demonstrations against his policies. On June 25 President Pr´eval named an economist, Eric PIERRE, as Smarth’s successor. Pierre failed, however, to secure legislative approval, and on August 20 Smarth announced that he would no longer continue in a “caretaker” capacity. On November 3 Pr´eval nominated another economist, Herv´e DENIS, as the next prime minister, but Denis was also rejected by the legislature on December 23. A third nominee, Jacques Edouard ALEXIS, was declared eligible by the two houses of Parliament in December 1998, but he fell two votes short of approval by the Chamber of Deputies in early January 1999. On January 12, 1999, President Pr´eval ruled that the term of office of nearly all members of the National Assembly (as well as those of mayors and many other municipal officers) had expired the previous day under the law governing the 1995 election. He therefore declared the Assembly dissolved and announced he would rule by decree, with Alexis serving as prime minister pending negotiations with various political groups regarding new elections. Discussions with opposition parties yielded an agreement in early March on a transition government, which was sworn in on March 26 under the leadership of Alexis, and establishment of a nine-member Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to oversee balloting that the government hoped to conduct before the end of the year. In June 1999 the CEP set aside the 1997 legislative election results and called for a new poll the following November. The date was subsequently changed to March 21, 2000, then to April 9, and finally to May 21, at which time first-round balloting was conducted for municipal councils, the full Chamber of Deputies, and 19 Senate seats. Opposition parties, many having coalesced under the banner of the Democratic Convergence (Convergence D´emocratique—CD), charged the government with fraud in counting the votes from the May 21 balloting and called for a boycott of secondround balloting on July 9, arguing that only complete new elections would expunge the irregularities. Meanwhile, on June 17 the CEP president,

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Leon MANUS, fled the country because of alleged threats over his refusal to certify the May 21 results. On August 16, 2000, the CEP announced that the Lavalas Family had won 72 of the lower house seats, 18 of the contested Senate seats, and about 80 percent of the municipal seats. The CD-led opposition also boycotted the presidential balloting of November 26, at which Aristide was credited with 92 percent of the vote over six other candidates. Following his inauguration on February 7, 2001, Aristide appointed Jean-Marie CHERESTAL, a former finance minister and trade negotiator, to form a new government, which was installed on March 2. However, in light of the continued debilitating impasse with the opposition and rapid economic decline, Ch´erestal in January 2002 announced his intention to resign as prime minister. He was succeeded on March 14 by Yvon NEPTUNE, theretofore president of the Senate. During the ensuing two years, the Aristide regime encountered a mounting wave of strikes and mass protests, culminating in an armed uprising that yielded the fall of Haiti’s fourth largest city, Gonca¨ıves, to insurgents on February 5, 2004. On February 22, Haiti’s second city, Cap-Ha¨ıtien, also fell. With rebel forces led by Guy PHILIPPE and Louis-Jodel CHAMBLAIN approaching the capital, President Aristide resigned on February 29 and was flown into exile (under duress, he subsequently maintained) on a U.S. aircraft. Concurrently, U.S. President George W. Bush ordered the dispatch of 500 marines to Port-au-Prince, with France announcing that 200 of its troops would be similarly deployed and the UN Security Council authorizing the formation of a multinational interim peacekeeping force. In the wake of Aristide’s departure, his constitutionally designated successor, Supreme Court President Boniface ALEXANDRE, was sworn in as acting head of state on March 8, 2004. On March 9 a U.S.-backed Council of Elders announced that it had appointed as interim prime minister G´erard LATORTUE, who proceeded to name a largely nonpartisan cabinet. On December 9 Latortue stated that he would not contest the pres-

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idential balloting originally scheduled for November 2005. After four postponements, presidential and legislative elections were held on February 7, 2006, with former president Ren´e Pr´eval narrowly avoiding a runoff with an announcement on February 16 that he had secured 51.2 percent of the vote. However, his installation was delayed until May 14 because of inconclusive legislative results that necessitated a runoff poll on April 21 in which a mere 15–20 percent of eligible voters were reported to have participated.

Constitution and Government The 1987 constitution, repudiated by General Namphy in July 1988, was restored by President Pascal-Trouillot in 1990 and remained nominally intact after the 1991 coup. It provides for a directly elected president, who may serve no more than two nonsequential five-year terms, and a prime minister, who is responsible to a legislature composed of a Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The president negotiates and signs all treaties and presides over the Council of Ministers; the prime minister must come from the legislative majority or, if there is none, be appointed after consultation with the chamber presidents, subject to parliamentary endorsement. Constitutional amendments, which must be supported by a two-thirds majority in each house and approved by a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast in a joint legislative sitting, can come into effect only after the installation of the next elected president. The judiciary encompasses a Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), whose president serves as acting head of state in the event of a vacancy; courts of appeal; courts of first instance; courts of peace; and special courts as prescribed by law. The 1987 basic law divided the traditionally monolithic armed forces into distinct military and police components; accorded the universally spoken Creole language official status in addition to French; banned Duvalierists from public office for ten years; authorized an independent commission to supervise elections; asserted the

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previously nonexistent rights of free education, decent housing, and a fair wage; and eliminated sanctions (theretofore largely ignored) against the practice of voodoo. Haiti is presently divided into nine departments, each headed by a presidentially appointed prefect and subdivided into arrondisements and communes.

Foreign Relations Despite its membership in the United Nations and a number of other international bodies, Haiti has avoided close ties with neighboring countries and before joining the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) had distanced itself from most moves toward Caribbean economic and political integration. Its historically most sensitive foreign affairs issue, the border relationship with the Dominican Republic, has been periodically aggravated by activities of political exiles from both countries. Relations with the United States, which were briefly suspended in 1963, have fluctuated, the Duvalier government frequently using its votes in international bodies to bargain for increased foreign assistance from Washington. In early 1983 long-standing litigation regarding the rights of Haitian refugee “boat people” being detained in Florida was resolved by a U.S. landmark decision, which allowed about 1,700 detainees to apply for political asylum while establishing constitutional protection for those remaining incarcerated. In September 1985 Haiti concluded an agreement with the Bahamas that would require all illegal immigrants to register with Bahamian authorities, with only those resident in the islands before December 30, 1980, married to Bahamians, or owning real estate being permitted to remain. In the wake of President Aristide’s initial ouster a new wave of Haitians attempted to flee by boat to the United States. By early 1992 several thousand had been picked up at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard and accorded temporary refuge at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. By midyear the exodus had largely ended in the wake of an order by President

George H. W. Bush on May 24 that all Haitians intercepted at sea be returned immediately to their homeland without determination of whether they qualified for political asylum. The order was overturned on July 26 by a New York appeals court but upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on August 1. In early 1993 it was estimated that of more than 40,000 Haitians attempting to reach the United States since the 1991 coup, nearly three-quarters had been returned by the U.S. Coast Guard. By mid1994 the Clinton administration had demonstrated considerable ambivalence in the matter, initially adhering to the Bush policy of repatriation, then supporting ship-based processing of refugees for possible transfer to third countries. However, a lessthan-enthusiastic response to the latter, particularly from Panama, led, in early July, to an announcement that the processing facilities at Guantanamo would be reactivated. Thus, despite the ease with which Cubans had thenceforth been able to claim eligibility for asylum in the United States, the number of Haitians that could look forward to such status was held to approximately 5 percent. The United States, which had manifestly favored the conservative Bazin in the 1991 presidential poll, joined the OAS embargo against the militarybacked government and was a prime mover in the June 1993 talks that established the original timetable for Aristide’s return to office. By the end of September 1994 the U.S. military intervention involved 20,000 troops, with their eventual replacement, a 6,900-member UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) being assembled in Puerto Rico. By late December the U.S. contingent had been reduced to approximately 9,000 personnel, of whom only 5,000 remained upon transfer of responsibility for Haitian security to the UNMIH on March 31, 1995. The balance of the U.S. force, apart from about 200 noncombatant personnel, withdrew on January 18, 2000. The UNMIH mandate was extended for six months from March 1, 1996, albeit only after China (which objected to Haitian relations with Taiwan) had insisted on a reduction to 1,200 troops; however, Canada announced that it would provide an additional 700 personnel at its own expense to bring

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the total up to the Security Council’s target of 1,900. The peacekeeping mission was renewed for an additional five months on July 1 (and renamed the UN Support Mission in Haiti, or UNSMIH), after China had dictated a new cut to 600 (exclusive of 700 from Canada, Pakistan, and Bangladesh funded jointly by Canada and the United States). In early December the Security Council voted to extend UNSMIH until May 31, 1997, subject to renewal at that time for two additional months. Although it had been agreed that the Mission would not continue past July 31, the mandate was further extended to November 30, with the last UN troops departing during the ensuing month save for a 300member police monitoring unit (the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti/Mission de Police Civile des Nations Unies en Ha¨ıti—MIPONUH) that was to remain for another year. In March 1996 President Pr´eval met with his counterpart from the Dominican Republic in the first visit by a Haitian president to the neighboring state in more than six decades. Despite the rapprochement, more than 15,000 Haitians were expelled from the Dominican Republic in late January and early February 1997. In an effort to avert a crisis, the two presidents agreed during a summit of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) on February 20–21 to an immediate halt to large-scale repatriation, while acknowledging the right of the Dominican Republic to deport illegal immigrants. Despite the accord, Haitian officials claimed in November that as many as 40,000 Haitians (of an estimated 500,000 without legal status) had been forced to leave the Dominican Republic during the year. Reciprocating Pr´eval’s 1996 visit to the Dominican Republic, Leonel Fern´andez on June 18–20, 1998, became the first Dominican head of state to visit Haiti since Rafael Trujillo in 1936. A meeting of the two presidents was preceded by a session of a joint Dominican-Haitian commission, which reached agreement in a number of areas without resolving such major issues as migration and trade. Despite the rapprochement, further border incidents occurred, followed by discussions on December 1–2, 1999, that yielded a protocol limiting the

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hours of deportation from the Dominican Republic and providing for Haitian migration inspection at border crossing points. The U.S. military presence in the wake of Aristide’s second departure from office in 2004 quickly grew to a 3,600-member force, which on June 1 formally transferred its peacekeeping mandate to a UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which had 7,413 troops and civilian police deployed as of April 2005. The mandate was renewed in February and August 2006, and again in March 2007. Tension with the Dominican Republic reescalated in mid-2005 with the withdrawal of the Haitian ambassador after the lynching of three Haitians in Santo Domingo. The Dominicans responded by deporting 1,000 illegals on August 15 and, shortly thereafter, 1,000 more of an estimated 1 million Haitians said to be living in the country. In March 2007 Venezuela and Cuba announced the creation of a $1 billion fund to aid Haiti, while Venezuelan President Ch´avez, during a visit to Port-au-Prince, promised additional assistance, including an increase in oil shipments from 3,000 to 14,000 barrels per day.

Current Issues Ren´e Pr´eval was accorded a narrow first-round victory in the 2006 presidential race only after the CEP, on somewhat dubious legal ground, had eliminated about 85,000 blank ballots from the tabulation. The move drew intense opposition criticism, even though the second-place contender, former president Leslie Manigat, secured only 12.4 percent of the vote. Not surprisingly, the CEP head, Jacques BERNARD, emulated his 1999 predecessor by fleeing the country in the wake of the action. While Pr´eval’s Lespwa formation won only 22 of 99 lower house seats, the new president was able to secure support from other parties for the designation of a prime minister and legislative officers. Pr´eval’s return to office left Aristide’s status uncertain. The Fanmi Lavalas had been divided over support for the former president’s one-time prot´eg´e, while Pr´eval himself hedged on Aristide’s

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return, stating only that the constitution did not allow for the banishment of any Haitian. In late 2006 the Berlin-based Transparency International cited Haiti as “the most corrupt country in the world.” Prime Minister Alexis responded by challenging the group’s methodology, noting that “the figures used for [the] report were from 2004 and 2005 and didn’t result from the government over which I preside.”

Political Parties All parties were outlawed during the first six years of the Fran¸cois Duvalier dictatorship. In 1963 a regime-supportive National Unity Party (Parti de l’Unit´e Nationale—PUN) was organized with an exclusive mandate to engage in electoral activity. Its Jean-Claudiste successor, the National Progressive Party ( Parti Nationale Progressiste—PNP), was launched in September 1985. Six years earlier, three unofficial groups had surfaced: the PSCH and PDCH (below), plus a Haitian National Christian Party (Parti Chr´etien National d’Ha¨ıti—PCNH) organized by Rev. Ren´e des RAMEAUX; all three were subjected to intermittent repression for the remainder of the Duvalier era. In March 1987 it was reported that more than 60 new parties had been formed. Two months earlier, a National Congress of Democratic Movements (Congr`es National des Mouvements D´emocratiques—CNMD/Konakom) had been organized in opposition to the Namphy regime by delegates from nearly 300 political groups, trade unions, peasants’ and students’ organizations, and human rights associations. Subsequently, the CNMD became the core of a loosely organized “Group of 57” that organized a variety of antigovernment protests (including a general strike in Portau-Prince on June 29) before being amalgamated into a National Front for Concerted Action (Front National de Concertation—FNC) in September. The FNC joined the PDCH in boycotting the election of January 1988. Although a large number of groups participated in the December 1990 balloting, the FNCD (under Alyans, below), Panpra (under PFSDH, below),

and the MIDH (below) emerged as the principal formations. By 1995 the PPL (under OPL, below) had become the dominant group, most opposition groups boycotting the legislative balloting of June– August and the December presidential poll; in late 1997, however, the PPL’s dominance was challenged by The Lavalas Family (La Fanmi Lavalas), a new formation launched by former president Aristide. Following the disputed first-round elections of May 21, 2000, about 15 opposition parties formed the Democratic Convergence (Convergence D´emocratique—CD), which became the primary anti-Aristide coalition. United primarily (if not solely) by their “common hatred” of Aristide, the CD parties boycotted the second round of balloting on July 3 as well as the presidential and Senate polls on November 26. Calling the Aristide government “illegitimate,” the CD in February 2001 announced that it had named G´erard GOURGUE of the FNC (below) as “alternative president.” The CD declined an offer to join the government of Prime Minister Neptune in March 2002, demanding instead the installation of a “consensus” administration to oversee new presidential and legislative elections. About 70 political groups existed before the 2006 elections, of which 10–50 were active in the run-up to the first-round poll on February 7, with numerous changes occurring before the secondround legislative balloting on April 21.

Legislative Parties Front for Hope (Fwon Lespwa/Front de l’Espoir—Lespwa). Lespwa was launched by Ren´e Pr´eval (theretofore a member of Lavalas) in his successful bid for a second presidential term in 2006. Upon completion of the legislative balloting in December, it held a plurality of 22 seats. ´ Leader: Ren´e PREVAL (President of the Republic). Haitian Social-Democratic Fusion Party (Parti Fusion des Sociaux-D´emocrates Ha¨ıtienne—PFSDH or Fusion). Fusion was launched before the 2006 elections by Serge

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Giles, who had previously led the Nationalist Revolutionary Progressive Party (Parti National Progressiste R´evolucionnaire—Panpra) that in 1989 became the first Haitian Party to be admitted to the Socialist International. In 2004 Giles organized the Haitian Socialist Grand Party (Grand Parti Socialiste Haitien—GPSH), which became a component of Fusion. Fusion was runner-up to Lespwa in the 2006 Chamber of Deputies balloting. Leader: Serge GILES (2006 presidential candidate). Democratic Alliance Party (Alliance D´emocratique—AD/Alyans). Alyans was organized before the 2006 election by Evans Paul, former leader of the National Front for Change and Democracy (Front National pour le Changement et la Democratie—FNCD), which had been formed in late 1990 as an alliance of more than a dozen left-of-center groups supporting Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In 1999 Paul launched the Harmonious Space for Preservation of Democracy (Espace de Concertation pour la Sauvegarde de la D´emocratic— EC, also referenced as Espace) as an alliance of the FNCD and other groups to contest the legislative balloting that was eventually conducted on May 21, 2000. Alyans placed third in the 2006 lower house poll. Leader: Evans PAUL (Former Mayor of Portau-Prince). Organization of the Struggling People (Organisation du Peuple en Lutte—OPL). The current OPL is an offshoot of the center-left Lavalas Political Organization (Organisation Politique Lavalas—OPL), which emerged after its founding in 1991 as the principal pro-Aristide formation. In 1995 the latter group launched the Lavalas Political Platform (Plateforme Politique Lavalas— PPL) as an alliance that also included the PLB (below) and the Movement for the Organization of the Country (Mouvement d’Organisation du Pays— MOP), a center-right formation whose leader, Jean MOLIERE, had been the third-ranked presidential candidate in 1988.

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In 1996 the original OPL split into two groups— the pro-Aristide FL (below) and the Organization of the Struggling People, which retained the OPL abbreviation and subsequently became a “bitter opponent” of Aristide and a leading rival of the FL. The OPL initially participated as part of the Democratic Consultation Group in negotiations with President Pr´eval in February 1999. However, it withdrew from the Group following the assassination of OPL Senator Jean-Yvon TOUSSAINT in early March, demanding that the crime be solved as prerequisite to the party’s return to discussions with the government. Consequently, the OPL was not represented in the new cabinet installed in late March. The OPL was one of the leading parties in the election originally scheduled for late 1999 but postponed to May 21, 2000. Leader: Paul DENIS. The Lavalas Family (La Fanmi Lavalas— FL). The Lavalas Family was launched by former president Aristide in November 1996. While Aristide denied that the new group was intended as an “instrument of division,” it reflected his growing disenchantment with President Pr´eval’s economic policies and served as a vehicle for his return to the presidency in November 2000. Yvon Neptune, a former senator and talk show host, was named prime minister by Aristide in March 2002, but he was subsequently imprisoned by the Latortue administration for allegedly inciting a massacre during the 2004 uprising. With no formal charges being lodged against him, Neptune termed his incarceration a “political witch hunt” and went on a prolonged hunger strike. G´erard Jean-Juste, the FL’s initial 2006 presidential candidate, was disqualified by the CEP for not personally submitting his registration by the deadline (an impossibility because he was imprisoned at the time). The party formally boycotted the election, although a portion of its membership endorsed Pr´eval. Leaders: Jean-Bertrand ARISTIDE (Former President of the Republic, in exile), G´erard JEAN´ JUSTE, Luis GERARD-GILES (2006 presidential candidate).

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National Christian Union for the Reconstruction of Haiti (Union National Chr´etienne pour la Reconstruction d’Ha¨ıti—UNCRH). The UNCRH candidate, Jean Chevannes Jeune, placed fourth in the 2006 presidential balloting with a vote share of 5.6 percent. Leader: Jean Chevannes JEUNE (2006 presidential candidate). Mobilization for Haiti’s Development (Mobilization pour le Developpement d’Haiti— MPDH). The MPDH won four lower house seats in 2006. Leader: Samir Georges MOURRA. Rally of Progressive National Democrats (Rassemblement des D´emocrates Nationaux Progressistes—RDNP). The RDNP was organized by Leslie Manigat while an exile in Venezuela during the 1970s. Strongly anti-Communist, Manigat called in mid-1986 for a “solidarity pact” between centrist parties. The lack of an effective response was attributed, in part, to Manigat’s reputation as a noiriste, hence a threat to the country’s powerful mulatto elite. He was credited with securing a bare majority of the presidential vote in the highly controversial balloting of January 17, 1988, but was ousted in a coup on June 19. He returned from exile in 1990 but was barred from another presidential bid. In 2002, Manigat was reported to have organized a four-party opposition coalition styled the Patriotic Union (Union Patriotique—UP) that was followed in 2004 by a National Democratic Progressive Coalition (Coalition des D´emocrates Nationaux Progressistes—CDNP). Manigat placed second in the 2006 presidential race, with 12.4 percent of the vote. Leader: Leslie Fran¸cois MANIGAT (Secretary General). Standard-Bearer in Action (Latibonit an Aksyon/l’Arbonite en Action—LAAA). The LAAA was formed prior to the 2006 poll, at which it won two senate and four chamber seats. Leader: Youri LATORTUE. Christian Movement for a New Haiti (Mouvement Chr´etien pour une Nouvelle Ha¨ıti—

Mochrena). A center-right party formed in 1991 by evangelical Protestant churches (reportedly with financial support from their U.S. counterparts), Mochrena won three seats in the 2000 balloting for the Chamber of Deputies, all of which were retained in 2006. Its 2006 presidential candidate placed fifth on a 3.4 percent vote share. ´ Leaders: Luc MESADIEU (2006 presidential candidate), Gilbert N. LEGER. Cooperative Action to Build Haiti: (Konbit pou Bati Ayiti —Konba). Konba, which means “fight” or “combat” in Creole, won three lower house seats in 2006. Leader: Chavannes JEAN-BAPTISTE. National Reconstruction Front (Front de la Reconstruction Nationale—FRN). The FRN was launched in late February 2004 by a group of former rebels led by Guy Philippe, who has insisted that all white forces must leave the country. Leaders: Buteur METAYER (President), Guy PHILIPPE (Secretary General). Bridge (Pont). The Bridge party won two Northwest Senate in 2006. Leader: Evalli`ere BEAUPLAN. Movement for National Reconstruction (Mouvement pour la Reconstruction Nationale— MRN). Launched in 1991 by Ren´e Th´eodore, the leader theretofore of the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (Parti Unifi´e des Communistes Ha´ıtiens—PUCH), the MRN was prohibited from participating in the 1995 elections, ostensibly because of a dispute as to whether Th´eodore or Jacques Rony MODESTIN (also of the MRN) controlled the party name. Subsequently, Th´eodore, once an Aristide ally, called for annulment of the election results. The party secured one lower house seat in 2006. Leaders: Ren´e THEODORE, Jean-Enol BUTEAU. Heads Together (T`et Ansanm). T`et Ansanm won a lower house seat in 2006, although the Electoral Council rejected the candidacy of its leader on the ground that he was a U.S. citizen. ´ Leader: Dumarsais SIMEUS.

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Other groups winning one lower house seat each in 2006 were the Haitian Democratic and Reform Movement (Mouvement D´emocratique et Renovateur d’Ha¨ıti—Modereh), led by Dany TOUSSANT and Prince Pierre SONSON, the Independent Movement for National Reconciliation (Mouvement Ind´ependent pour la R´econciliation Nationale—MIRN), led by Luc FLEURINORD; the Justice for Peace and National Development (Justice pour la Paix et le D´eveloppement National—JPDN), led by Rigaud DUPLAN; the Liberal Party of Haiti (Parti Liberal Ha¨ıtien—PLH), led by Gehy MICHELL; and the Union of National and Progressive Haitians (UNITE), led by Edouard FRANCIQUE.

Other Parties Respect (Resp`e/Respect). Respect is a small group launched before the 2006 presidential poll, at which its leader won third place with 8.2 percent of the vote. Leader: Charles Henri BAKER (2006 presidential candidate). Open the Gate Party (Pati Louvri Barye— PLB). Originally launched as a pro-Aristide party in mid-1992, the PLB won two seats in the 2000 balloting for the Chamber of Deputies. It was subsequently perceived as adopting a middle ground in the nation’s political impasse, calling for negotiations between the FL and CD. Leaders: Renaud BERNARDIN, Fran¸cois PIERRE-LOUIS (Secretary General). Movement for the Installation of Democracy in Haiti (Mouvement pour l’Instauration de la D´emocratie en Ha¨ıti—MIDH). The MIDH was founded in 1986 by the conservative Marc Bazin, a former World Bank official, who participated in the 1988 boycott. As the 1990 presidential candidate of the National Alliance for Democracy and Progress (Alliance Nationale pour la D´emocratie et la Progr`es—ANDP) that also included Panpra, Bazin was runner-up to Aristide with a 15 percent vote share, while the ANDP ran second to the FNCD in the legislative poll. Bazin subsequently endorsed the September 1991 coup that resulted

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in Aristide’s ouster and was named prime minister by Interim President Nerette on June 2, 1992. He resigned from the position on June 8, 1993. The MIDH boycotted the 1995 legislative poll but participated (unsuccessfully) in the 2000 balloting. Leader: Marc Louis BAZIN (Former Prime Minister). Patriotic Movement for National Salvage (Mouvement Patriotique pour le Sauvetage National—MPSN). The MPSN was formed in 1999 as a coalition of right-wing groups led by the Duvalierist head of the MDN. The MPSN participated unsuccessfully in the 2000 legislative balloting, subsequently decrying the government’s inappropriate “control” of the electoral process. Leader: Hubert de RONCERAY. Mobilization for National Development (Mobilisation pour le D´eveloppement National—MDN). The runner-up to Manigat in the 1988 presidential balloting and subsequently one of the most outspoken critics of General Avril, MDN leader Hubert de Ronceray was among those expelled from the country in January 1990. He supported Aristide’s ouster in 1991, and the MDN became prominent in the opposition following his return in 1994. In August 1996 two leading MDN members were shot dead in Port-au-Prince by unknown assailants. De Ronceray again went into temporary exile in October 1997 following the assassination of MDN deputy leader Pastor Antoine LEROY in late August. Leaders: Hubert de RONCERAY (President), Max CARRE (Secretary General). Haitian Social Christian Party (Parti Social Chr´etien d’Ha¨ıti—PSCH). The PSCH was launched on July 5, 1979, as one of two parties styling themselves the Haitian Christian Democratic Party (see PDCH, below). Subsequently it added the issue date of its manifesto, becoming known as the PDCH-27 Juin, before being more commonly identified by the Social Chris` tian label. Its leader, Gr´egoire EUGENE, was deported to the United States in December 1980 and

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prohibited from returning until after the February 1984 election, when he resumed his position as professor of Constitutional and International Law at Haiti University. For the remainder of the Duvalier era, he and his daughter, Marie, were sporadically subjected to either detention or house arrest. Eug`ene was credited with running fourth in the 1988 presidential poll. The party is now led by Eug`ene’s son. ` Leader: Gr´egoire EUGENE Jr. Haitian Civic and Political Front (Front Civique et Politique d’Ha¨ıti—Frontciph). Frontciph was launched in September 1999 as an electoral alliance of the PDCH and PAIN, below, and about 30 other parties and civic organizations, including the National Cooperative Movement (Mouvement Koumbite National—MKN), led by Volvick R´emy JOSEPH and the National Party of Labor (Parti National du Travail—PNT), led by Thomas ´ DESULME. Haitian Christian Democratic Party (Parti D´emocratique Chr´etien d’Ha¨ıti— PDCH). The PDCH was formed on July 5, 1979, by Silvio CLAUDE, who had been arrested and deported to Colombia after standing unsuccessfully for election to the legislature in February. Rearrested on his return to Haiti, he was sentenced in August 1981 to a 15-year prison term for attempting to create “a climate of disorder.” Although the sentence was annulled in February 1982, periods of arrest and/or detention continued for the remainder of the Duvalier era. The PDCH refused to participate in the election of January 1988, while its leader placed fourth in the 1990 presidential balloting. A forceful critic of Aristide, Claude was killed in an act of apparent retribution by followers of the ousted president during the 1991 coup. Leaders: Osner FEVRY, Joachim PIERRE. National Agricultural and Industrial Party (Parti Agricole et Industriel National— PAIN). PAIN was formed by Louis D´ejoie, the son of a prominent Duvalier opponent, who participated in the 1988 boycott. In late 1989

it was reported to have joined with the MDN and PSCH in a conservative coalition, no name for the alliance being announced. D´ejoie ran third in the 1990 presidential race with a 5 percent vote share. Although PAIN endorsed the overthrow of the Aristide government in 1991, ´ its leader, Louis DEJOIE II (D´ejoie’s son) was named Malval’s minister of commerce and industry in September 1993. The elder D´ejoie died in early 1998. Leader: Toussaint DESROSIERS (Spokesperson). National Front for Concerted Action (Front National de Concertation—FNC). The FNC was organized in September 1987 by merger of the “Group of 57” with a number of other moderate left-wing formations. Led by G´erard Gourgue, a prominent human rights lawyer who had resigned as minister of justice in the Namphy administration in March 1986, the party joined the PDCH in boycotting the January 1988 balloting. It was subsequently affiliated loosely with Konakom. Leader: G´erard GOURGUE. Other parties and groups include the Alliance for the Liberation and Advancement of Haiti (Alliance pour la Lib´eration et l’Advancement d’Ha¨ıti—ALAH), led by Reynold GEORGES; the Alternative for Change ( L’Alternative pour le Changement—AC), led by G´erard BLOT; the Alternative for the Development of Haiti Party (L’Alternative pour le D´eveloppement d’Ha¨ıti— ADH), led by attorney Gerard DALVIUS; Credo, a right-wing party led by Prosper AVRIL; Democratic Action to Build Haiti (L’Action D´emocratique de Bˆatir Ha¨ıti—Adebha), led by Ren´e JULIEN; the Democratic Revolutionary Party of Haiti (Parti R´evolutionnaire D´emocratique d’Ha¨ıti—PRDH), led by Fran¸cois LATORTUE; Effort of Solidarity to Build a National and Popular Alternative (Effort de Solidarit´e pour la Construction d’une Alternative Nationale et Populaire—ESCANP), a party based in the western region of Grand-Anse that cooperates with the influential grassroots group called the Resistance Committee of Grand-Anse (Komite Reziztans Grand-Anse—KOREGA); the Grand Rally

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for the Evolution of Haiti (Grand Rassemblement ´ pour l’Evolution d’Ha¨ıti—GREH), led by Himmler REBU; the anti-LF Haitian Democrats’ Party (Parti des D´emocrates Ha¨ıtiens—PADEMH), led by Jean-Jacques Clark PARENT; the far-left Haitian National Popular Party (Parti Populaire National Ha¨ıtien—PPNH), a pro-Aristide group formerly led by Bernard SANSARICQ (who narrowly escaped death in a shooting incident with government troops in August 1987) and now led by Ben DUPUY, the editor of the weekly Haiti Progress; the Konbit National Movement ( Mouvman Konbit Nasyonal—MKN), led by Volvick Remy JOSEPH; the Movement for the Advancement, Development, and Innovation of Democracy in Haiti (Mouvement pour l’Avancement, le D´eveloppement, et l’Innovation de la D´emocratie en Ha¨ıti—MADIDH), led by Marc Antoine DESTIN; the National and Patriotic Movement of November 28 (Mouvement Nationale et Patriotique du 28 Novembre—MNP-28), led by former ´ Senate president D´ejean BELIZAIRE; the antiFL National Progressive Democratic Party of Haiti (Parti National D´emocratique Progressiste d’Ha¨ıti—PNDPH), led by Turneb DELPE; the National Unity Movement (Mouvement d’Unit´e National—MUN), led by Georges SAATI; the Organization for the Advancement of Haiti and of Haitians (Organisation pour l’Avancement d’Ha¨ıti et des Ha¨ıtiens—OLAHH), led by Joel BORGELLA; the extreme-right Organization for Democracy in Haiti (Organisation pour la D´emocratie en Ha¨ıti—OPDH), whose leader, Carl DENIS, was arrested in August 1995 for allegedly plotting against the government; the Papaye Peasants Movement (Mouvement Paysan de Papaye— MPP), described as the nation’s largest peasant organization and a member, under the leadership