Poles and Saxons of the Napoleonic Wars

> *

--

The Poles and Saxons During the Napoleonic Wars by George Nafziger Mariusz T. Wesolowski Tom Devoe

THE EMPEROR'S PRESS Chicago, Illinois "Simply the Finest!"

Dedication This book is dedicated to the most significant Poles in my life: Kazimir Jozwiak 1st Infantry Regiment & Artillery Det. 1st Division (Pilsudski's Legion) Polish National Army and the 8th US Army (1939 —1945) To his wife Lucyna Jozwiak and Lawrence J. Karnowski Lt. Colonel USAF Vietnam (1970 —1971)

© George Nafziger All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the author. Original Edition; Published in 1991 Printed and Bound in the United States of America ISBN 0-9626655-2-5 Published by:

The Emperor's Press 5744 West Irving Park Road Chicago, IL 60634 U.S.A. Toll Free, if calling in U.S.A: 1-800-59-EAGLE Calling from outside U.S.A: 312-777-8664 "Simply the Finest/"

Books by George Nafziger

Napoleons Invasion of Russia, Presidio Press, 1988 The British Military, 1803 - 1815, with S.J. Park, RAFM Company, 1983 Russian Army, RAFM Company, 1983

Privately Published

Napoleon's German Enemies: The Armies of Hanover, Brunswick, HesseCassel, and the Hanseatic Cities, 1990 The Armies of Westphalia and Cleves-Berg, 1991 The Wurttemburg Army, 1991 The Armies of the Kingdom of Bavaria and the Grand Duchy of Wurzburg, 1991 The Armies of Germany and the Confederation of the Rhine, Volume 1,1991

For information on George Nafziger's books and other titles of related interest, please write: The Emperor's Press 5744 West Irving Park Road Chicago, IL 60634 U.S.A. Toll Free, if calling in U.S. A: 1-800-59-EAGLE Calling from outside U.SA: 312-777-8664

TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I —

The Army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 1807 — 1814 and Internal Organization of the Polish Army

Chapter II — Polish Forces in French Service Chapter HI — The Poles in Battle Chapter IV —

Feuds and Personalities of the Polish Army and Government

Introduction to the Saxon Army Chapter V — The Saxon Infantry Chapter VI — The Saxon Cavalry Chapter VTI — The Saxon Artillery Chapter VIC — The Saxons in Battle

Appendices Appendix I: Staffing of the Polish Army Appendix II: Orders of Battle

Footnotes

Bibliography

Introduction The armies of Saxony and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw may seem like an unusual pa: to place in a single volume, but there is, in fact, a considerable historical tie between th two states. The principal of this connection is Frederick Augustus II, Elector of Saxon; who assumed the throne in 1734. Once again, as Napoleon restored Poland in the vestigial form of the Grand Duchy, : was placed under the rule of the King of Saxony. Because of this, it seemed logical t combine the study of these two armies into a single volume. It is also difficult to speak of the Polish forces in the Duchy and not touch on the Polis forces that served as part of the French army from 1795 through 1815. As a result, th: work has been modified from its original concept of purely a review of Saxony and th Grand Duchy of Warsaw to include the various Polish demi-brigades, legions, an regiments that served as part of the French army.

Special Note of Thanks The final appearance and quality of the work on the Grand Duchy of Warsaw is muc the result of the kind and selfless assistance of Mariusz T. Wesolowski, a Polish nation who left his homeland to settle in Canada. His justifiable national pride in tl accomplishments of the Polish soldiers of Napoleon's era have caused him to study the actions and to freely and most generously not only share those researches, but to edit ar. improve the manuscript as well. Similarly, Tom DeVoe is owed considerable thanks for his almost fanatical gathering ( data on the Saxons. He has shared those researches in order to bring to the printed pag the history of his favorite Napoleonic army. I am most indebted to the assistance of both these men.

Note on Translation Where possible in the Saxon study, the original German terms have been maintaine because of the flavor they provide, and because of several subtleties of meaning that a: lost in translation to English. Terms that have no additional meanings have bet translated. Unfortunately, in order to avoid certain Polish grammatical problems, very litt original Polish terminology is used. However, because French terminology was ofte used officially, when source documents used the French, it was treated in the sair manner as the German text.

:

•

The Army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 1807 — 1814 Old Poland In order to understand the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, it is necessary to review the history of Poland prior to the Napoleonic wars. On the death of August II in 1733, Stanislaw Leszczyski, father-in-law to Louis XV of France attempted to regain his throne with the aide of a small French force under Louis de Br£han. Because the king of Poland was elected, he solicited and received the assistance of the Czartoryski family. He was reelected king a short time later. Subsequently, Poland split into factions and the Lithuanians (the Czartoryskis) who favored Frederick August II of Saxony, son of the late king, invited the Russians to intervene. A Russian army appeared before Warsaw, forced a phantom sejm (the body that elected the king), and had August m declared king. Stanislaw retired to become Duke of Lorraine and Bar, keeping the title of King of Poland, but leaving August III as the actual king. August HI left the burden of running the country to his minister, Heinnch von Briihl, who in turn turned the government of Poland over to the Czartoryskis. Unfortunately, the great families of Poland were obstinately opposed to any reform or violation of their constitution. The Francophile Potockis in particular, whose possessions in southern Poland and the Ukraine covered thousands of square miles, hated the Russophile Czartoryskis and successfully obstructed all of their efforts. In the Saxon period, every sejm was dissolved by the hirelings of some great lord or of some foreign potentate. After a period of cooperation with the Saxon court, the Czartorskis broke with the Saxon court and turned to Russia. Their intermediary was their nephew Stanislaw August Poniatowski*. They sent Stanislaw as a Saxon minister to the Russian court in the suite of the English minister Sir Charles Hanbury Williams in 1755. The handsome and insinuating Poniatowski quickly won the heart of the Grand Duchess Catherine, but gained nothing else for Poland, and returned discredited in 1759. Poland's decline continued under the Saxon court. A general agricultural crisis from the 17th to the mid-18th Century ruined towns and peasants, as well as the small gentry. Only the large and prominent families improved their situations in this period. With the death of Augustus III, the Czartoryskis began their manipulations again. Stanislaw August Poniatowski was elected king with the aide of recommendations and troops from Catherine II of Russia on 7 September 1764. The actual interregnum lasted from 5 October 1763 to 7 May 1764, when the Convocation Diet was assembled. In late 1763, Prince Nikolai V. Repnin arrived in Warsaw and brought up the question of Polish dissidents. This was done officially again on 4 November 1766. The population of Poland was about 11,420,000,1,000,000 of whom were dissidents or dissenters. Half of these were Protestants living in the towns of Polish Prussia and Great Poland. The other half was the Orthodox population of Lithuania. The dissidents had no political rights and their religious liberties were unjustly restricted. For these persons, mainly agricultural laborers, artisans, and petty tradesmen, Repnin, in the name of Catherine II, demanded absolute equality, political and religious, with the Catholic population of Poland. He was well aware that an aristocratic and Catholic assembly like the sejm would never concede so unacceptable a demand. In 1767, conservative magnates supported by Repnin formed a conference at Radom whose first act was to send a deputation to St. Petersburg petitioning Catherine to guarantee the liberties of the republic. With a carte blanche in his pocket, Repnin proceeded to treat the sejm as if it were totally subservient to Russia. Despite threats, bribes, and the presence of Russian troops outside the doors (as well as inside the Chamber of Deputies), the patriots steadfastly refused Repnin's demands. Only the arrest of the leaders of the resistance by Russian grenadiers stopped further opposition.

In addition to removing all restrictions against the dissidents, Russia effectively toe control of the government of Poland. This led to a Catholic patriotic uprising known as the Confederation of Bar, started in 1768 in the city of Bar in the Ukraine. Though supported by the Frenc revolt lingered slowly for four years before it died. It also brought to the attention of and Vienna that Russia was about to absorb all of Poland, so they began to move to e their own territories at Poland's expense. On 17 February 1772, the first treaty of partition was signed between Prussia, A and Russia. Russia obtained the palatinates of Vitebsk, Polotsk, Mscislaw, and 1,3 new inhabitants. Austria got Little Poland without Krakow, but it did get Lvov, Tar and Halicz, which it formed into a new province called Galicia. This territory had 2,6 inhabitants. Prussia received the Palatinate of Pomorze, less Danzig; the Palatir Chelmno, minus Torun (Thorn); the northern half of Great Poland, and the Palatin. Malbork (Marienburg) and Warmia, calling the new acquisition West Prussia territory had 580,000 inhabitants. Poland lost 4.5 million of its 11.4 million inhat (39%) and 81,584 of its 283,204 square miles (29%) of territory. The partitioning powers presented the remains of Poland with a new constit which retained the two worst elements of the old constitution: the elective monarcl the liberum veto (which allowed one dissenting vote to veto any action). The shock of the partition curbed much of the petty bickering of the Polish nobilit "four years sejm" was convened in 1788. The Permanent Council was abolished, the prerogative was enlarged, an army of 65,000 men was raised, and the constitutic reformed. To further ensure its security, Poland sought an alliance with Prussia. Fret Wilhelm II initially stipulated that Poland must surrender to him Danzig and ' (Thorn). The Poles refused, and Austrian political intervention prevented the cessic 19 March 1791 Prussia and Poland signed a treaty to guarantee each other's possei and to render mutual assistance if the other was attacked. With a series of unusual and decisive political maneuvers, on 3 May 1791 the constitution was instituted. This constitution established a limited, hereditary constitu monarchy and eliminated the liberum veto and the other obstructive machinery of tl system. Not to be out done, Stanislaw Feliks Potocki, Seweryn Rzewuski, and Ksawery Bra. the three chief opponents of the new constitution, went to Russia. Here they arrangec Catherine II to undertake a restoration of the old system by force of arms. On 14 May some Polish troops accompanied the three conspirators into the town of Targowica\ Ukraine and declared an end to the new constitution. Four days later the Russian mir in Warsaw presented a formal declaration of war to the Polish government. Pr abandoned the Poles, leaving King Prince Jozef Antoni Poniatowski, nephew of Stanislaw II, and Tadeusz Kosciuszko to lead their 46,000 man army to the east.. winning three pitched battles against the Russians, they were obliged to withdra Warsaw by Russia's overwhelming numbers. In a moment of weakness, the king gave in to the Russian demands and hostilities suspended. The Polish army disintegrated in disgust and the new constitution abandoned. The old system was restored and the Russians occupied all of eastern Po. The Prussians, alarmed at this turn of events, took action of their own. After every possible means of coercion was applied to the Poles, the second trea partition was signed on 23 September 1793. Russia got all of Poland's eastern prov: between Livonia and Moldavia. Prussia got Dobrzyn, Kujavia, Great Poland, Torun, Danzig. Poland now had only 83,012 square miles of territory and a population of a 4,000,000 inhabitants. Austria did not take part in the second partition. In an effort to stop the destruction of Poland, if not restore her lost territories, Koscius Kollataj, and Ignacy Potocki, among others, renewed their work for Poland. Kosciu

went to revolutionary France to propose a league of republics to oppose the league of sovereigns. Jacobin France, operating for its own benefit, gave him an evasive reply. When he returned empty handed, he found that Polish officers had started a revolt against the imposed limit on the army of 15,000 men. His hand forced, Kosciuszko declared a dictatorship on 23 March 1794 in Krakow. He reinstated much of the 1791 constitution and called the peasants to arms. At first, Kosciuszko's army was successful and the Russians were repeatedly defeated. Not only was much of the lost territory recovered from Russia, but Warsaw and Wilno were liberated by popular uprisings. However, the overwhelming masses of Prussian and Russian troops were to prove too powerful for Kosciuszko's Poland, and his army was destroyed on the battlefield at Maciejowice. Kosciuszko was wounded and taken prisoner. Warsaw was stormed and captured by Suvarov. A massacre occurred in the Praga suburb. Afterward, the remains of Poland were divided by the three powers. Austria received Lublin, Siedlce, Radom, Cracow, and Kielce, and Prussia tookSuwalki, Bialystok, Lomza, and Warsaw. Russia annexed all the rest. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw The Treaty of Tilsit, signed 7 and 9 July 1807, created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. This treaty took back from F^ussia the former Polish territories taken in the second and third partitions of Poland to form the "Grand Duchy of Warsaw." There were three exceptions: Danzig became a free city, the district of Bialystok was given to Russia, and the Notec district, annexed by Prussia in the first partition, was given to the Duchy. The Duchy's constitution was dictated by Napoleon and presented to the Poles on 22 July 1807. The constitution was based on the French model, and included several very advanced reforms. Equality before the law, absolute religious tolerance, and a highly developed bureaucracy were its principal features. Instead of a free, independent Poland under a Polish sovereign, it was placed under the guardianship of the King of Saxony, who was made its Duke by Napoleon. Its formal overnment was placed in Warsaw with Stanislaw Malachowski as the President of its tate Council, and Prince Poniatowski as its Minister of War; but its administration was controlled by the French. In spite of being subjected to the most burdensome financial and military exigencies for the purpose of supporting Napoleon's continuous warfare, the economy of the duchy is reputed by some sources to have prospered, while other sources indicate it was constantly on the brink of financial ruin. On 21 September 1807 Frederick August, King of Saxony and the new Grand Duke of Warsaw, arrived in Warsaw to personally supervise the organization of the state. This was a very wise selection by Napoleon, as the King of Saxony spoke Polish, but a questionably popular decision with the Polish people. There were period jokes about the Duchy having "a Saxon King, French laws, Polish army, and Prussian currency." It was under Frederick August's direction that the Grand Duchy was organized along the French model, with departments established as the second level of government throughout the country. In addition, it had a state treasury which was heavily financed by France. This was not, of course, without compensation to France. With Napoleon's defeat in Russia, Poland once again saw herself invaded by a Russian army. The vestiges of the Duchy's army withdrew to the west, eventually joining the main French armies, and began reforming for the 1813 campaign. Despite the successes in the spring campaign, the Duchy remained occupied by the allies. The disastrous Fall campaign of 1813 sealed the Duchy's fate, and though its soldiers continued to fight in the French army through 1815, the independent Polish nation vanished until it was restored by Pilsudski after World War L

f

The Polish Army Reborn After western Poland was liberated from Prussia in 1806, General Dombrowski was

recalled from Italian service and directed to establish the new Polish army. He be; 16 November 1806. On 29 November, Napoleon directed him to form eight regim infantry, each with two battalions. Four were to be raised in Posen and four in 1 Napoleon directed on 10 December that a draft of one man from every ten househc made in the Warsaw region and that the resulting men be used to organize twc regiments. By December, General Dombrowski had a force of 11,000 men, in Post an honor guard of 100 light cavalry, which was presented to Napoleon. The Posen honor guard was organized on 7 November 1806 by General Dombr and commanded by Colonel J.N. Uminski. It ceased to exist after 15 December 1806. on that day, while leaving Posen for Warsaw, that Napoleon ordered Dombrowski t the officers of this guard commissions in the newly forming Polish regiments. Even t : a large number of these men ended up in the Polish General Staff and Uminsk < Wk command of a newly formed uhlan regiment. The Warsaw Honor Guard was formed by Dombrowski from members of the it of the Friends of the Fatherland" sometime in early December 1806. It was comma vvcL.< by W. Krasinski and became the nucleus of the Polish Lancer Regiment of Imperial Go**A Between 23 October and 3 November 1806, Napoleon held a series of audiencet v*/iAV\ General Dombrowski in Berlin and Dessau. In these audiences, Dombrowski prowl ^ Napoleon that he would raise a force of40,000 Poles in the newly liberated Polish-PnMv ^ districts. On 6 November, Dombrowski arrived in Posen. He organized the Polish authorifc Posen and Kalisz, territories which were already free of Prussian forces. On 16 Novi mU^ he issued a decree ordering the Polish population of the Posen, Kalisz, and, later, W Departments to provide one infantry recruit from every ten households, one cz j recruit from every 45 households, and one light infantryman (chasseur) from every e These latter men were usually gamekeepers. The forces to be raised were: Department Posen Department Kalisz Department Warsaw Department

Infantry 8,684 6,844 5,300

Cavalry 1,800 1,800 1,800

Chasseurs 100 100 200

The quotas for the departments still under Prussian control were as follows: Department Bromberg & Marienwerder Plock Bialystok

Infantry 800 5,300 8,200

Cavalry 1,800 1,800 2,000

Chasseurs 100 100 150

However, these quotas were quite unrealistic. The quota for Bromberg and Marienwt was too small and Bialystok's too large. As for Warsaw, the city was liberated three * after Posen, and the local government was preoccupied with urgent administrative t As a result, the conscription was not announced until 15 December. By mid-Januar Warsaw Department had raised less than 3,000 men, while Posen and Kalisz had prov i A* b a total of about 18,000 men. The total strength of the Polish units in January 1807 was 26 regular soldiers and another 2,500 to 3,500 volunteers. At first, Dombrowski planned to organize the infantry into three battalion regime vii S with nine companies per battalion. A company was to consist of: 1 1 1 1

Capitain Lieutenant Sous-lieutenant Sergeant major

V 4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 106 Privates 125 Total The battalion staff contained one lieutenant colonel and one adjutant. However, on 1 December 1806, Dombrowski decided that two battalion regiments were more practical in wartime and organized accordingly. This would have set the organization of a regiment at 63 officers and 2,210 men. However, according to Colonel J. Weyssenhoff, at the beginning of1807 the infantry of Dombrowski's division went into Pommerania organized in six company battalions. Each company had a strength of 150 men. As for the regular cavalry, before the reorganization of 26 January 1807, a regiment theoretically numbered 40 officers and 772 men organized in four squadrons. The artillery is not, however, well documented, and details are quite scarce. It is known that three companies were formed by the time of Friedland and two of those batteries, under Capitains Gugenmus and Kobylanski, took part in the battle. The order of 2 January 1807 directed that the first battalions of the 1st through 8th Regiments should be organized in Bromberg, raised to a strength of 800 men each, and organized into a division to serve under General Dombrowski. The second battalions were to join them as soon as they were raised to a strength of 800 men each. On 26 January 1807, the Governing Committee ratified the official structure with three legions. Each legion was to have a staff, four infantry regiments, one light cavalry regiment with six squadrons, and a battalion of artillery and engineers. The number of companies in an infantry battalion remained at nine, but the number of soldiers per company was fixed at 140. In addition, on 26 January 1807 it was directed that the legions be renumbered. Before 26 January became 1st Legion 1st Infantry 2nd Infantry 3rd Infantry 4th Infantry 1st Chasseurs 2nd Uhlans 1st Artillery Battalion 3rd Legion 9th Infantry 10th Infantry 11th Infantry 12th Infantry 5th Chasseurs 6th Uhlans 3rd Artillery Battalion

After 26 January 3rd Legion 9th Infantry 10th Infantry 11th Infantry 12th Infantry 5th Chasseurs 6th Uhlans 3rd Artillery Battalion 1st Legion 1st Infantry 2nd Infantry 3rd Infantry 4th Infantry 1st Chasseurs 2nd Uhlans 1st Artillery Battalion

The actual reorganization occurred on 1 March 1807 and the Polish army was organized into the three legions. The 1st Legion (Division) under Poniatowski and the 3rd Legin (Division) under Dombrowski were as described above, while the 2nd Legion (Division) under Zayonczek contained the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Infantry Regiments, the 3rd Uhlan Regiment, the 4th Chasseur b. Cheval Regiment, and the 2nd Artillery Battalion.

The Posen (Dombrowski) Legion The legion staff was organized on 20 November 1806 and consisted of: Legion Commander: Chief of staff: Chefs de brigade: G£n6ral de brigade:

G£n£ral de division J.H.Dombrowski Colonel M. Hauke G£n£ral de brigade A. Kosinski W. Axamitowski

Adjutants-General:

Lt. Colonel P. Tremo Lt. Colonel C. Pakosz Lt. Colonel J. Weyssenhoff Lt. Colonel J. Hurtig Lt. Colonel C. Godebski Lt. Colonel A. Cedrowski Sous-lieutenant J. Hauke.

Adjuncts:

(

Three days later, General Kosinski was sent to Bromberg to supervise the organization of the army there. His brigade was taken over by General de brigade Stanislaw Fiszer. Fiszer, in his turn, was sent to Kalisz with a similar task on 29 December 1806. The legion absorbed conscripts from the Posen and Bromberg Departments. They were to be organized into twelve provisional battalions (eight form Posen, four from Bromberg) and later converted into eight regular battalions. The surplus was equally divided into four regimental depots. In practice, the recruits came almost exclusively from the Posen Department. Bromberg was under threat by Prussian forces, so it kept its recruits at home and organized them into units there. The majority of the latter were grouped into the 11th Infantry Regiment in Swiec and commanded by Colonel Szerer. This regiment, numbering only six companies (600 men), accompanied Dombrowski into Pommerania, and in March 1807 was converted into the divisional depot of the Posen Legion. The 1st Infantry Regiment was organized in Gniezno (Gnesen), the 2nd Regiment was organized in Rogozno, the 3rd in Posen and the 4th in Koscian. The auxiliary regimental depots were established in Leszno, Zduny, Pawlowice, and Rawicz. The cavalry units were formed in Koscian, Wschowa, and Bromberg. The commanders of the infantry regiments were not professional soldiers, but wealthy landowners who made great financial contributions to the organization of their units. The actual field command was, therefore, in the hands of the regimental majors, with the exception of the 2nd Regiment, whose acting colonel was a veteran. The majors were veterans of the Polish Legions in Italy. Regiment 1st 2nd 3rd 4th

Colonel ' A. Sulkowski T. Lecki (honorary) A. Downarowicz (acting) S. Mielzynski S. Poninski

Major S. Jakubowski P.Tremo J.Sierawski A.Darewski

The organization of the infantry regiments in the Posen Department went very smoothly due to the presence of a large number of Polish conscripts in the local Prussian units, which the Prussians had not been able to mobilize in time for the 1806 campaign. These men, along with the numerous deserters from the other Prussian regiments, reputedly over 3,000 men by 20 December 1806, formed the first battalions of the four infantry regiments. They began their training in the second half of December. The second battalions were generally fleshed out from new conscripts. Apart from these units, Dombrowski was organizing a company of light infantry under Capitain Golaszewski, which was designated

as a reconnaissance force. In contrast, the organization of the cavalry went quite slowly due to the lack of horses. Most of the horses had already been taken by the mass levy. By the end of December 1806, a two company squadron, 180 riders, under Colonel J.N. Uminski, was ready at Koscian. Another group of 150 men under Colonel F. Garczynski was organized in Wschowa. In Bromberg, Major D. Dziewanowski gathered 80 troopers from the dispersed Prussian "Towarczy" uhlan regiment. The unit grew slowly and by the end of December it had 125 men. On 3 January 1807 Dziewanowski was nominated colonel and commander of a light cavalry regiment, which became the 2nd (later the 6th) Uhlan Regiment. In a show of defiance, Dziewanowski's uhlans decided to retain their Prussian uniforms, which were patterned after the customary Polish cavalry dress, despite the fact that if they were captured they faced certain execution. They did, however, add horsehair plumes to their czapkas and changed the black Prussian eagles to white Polish eagles. The first company of foot artillery was completed in Posen on 29 December 1806. However, it seems that it was not ready to go to the field because when Dombrowski moved into Pommerariia, he was accompanied by a company of French artillery and a battery of six Polish guns, sent to his division from Warsaw, which were manned by improvised crews. The Kalisz (Zayonczek) Legion Prior to mid-December, the organization of this legion was supervised by the Posen Legion staff through its local representative General P. Skorzewski. Afterward, G£n£ral de division J. Zayonczek, recently transferred from the command of the Legion du Nord, became its commanding officer. General H. Wolodkowicz acted as his chief of staff. Apart from these two men, the provisional and incomplete staff of the Kalisz Legion included G£n6raux de brigade S. Fiszer, serving as infantry commander, and G£n£raux de brigade J. Niemojewski and I. Krasinski, who jointly supervised the cavalry. The legion's infantry units, after 6 March 1807, were located as follows: Regiment 5th 6th 7th 8th

Commander Colonel I.Zielinski Colonel M.Sobolewski Colonel M.Skorzewski Colonel C.Godebski

Garrison Kalisz Kolo Radomsk Lutomierz

The chasseur company, commanded by General J. Stokowski, was located in Kalisz. By the end of December 1806, the Kalisz Legion had already organized 3,200 men in the first battalions of its four assigned infantry regiments. Its cavalry consisted of noble levy units scattered all over the department, had very inconsistent structures. On 6 April 1807 elite companies, grenadiers and voltigeurs, were established in the Kalisz Legion infantry regiments. The 3rd Uhlan Regiment went into the field in January 1807, fighting in East Prussia with Zayonczek's observation corps until July 1807. The 4th Chasseur Regiment, organized from the Krakow irregular cavalry units, joined the 3rd Uhlans in June 1807. The 3rd Uhlans were commanded by Colonel J. Laczynski and the 4th Chasseurs were commanded by Colonel W. Mecinski. The artillery of the Kalisz Legion was organized in December 1806 in the captured fortress of Czestochowa. At first it had only 40 men, but by January 1807 it had risen to a strength of 160. After the issuance 6f the 26 January 1807 organizational decree, which assigned a three company artillery battalion to each legion, Lt. Colonel A. Gorski received 460 men from the 2/8th Infantry Regiment. From these men he formed three artillery companies, a sapper company, and a train company. The artillery battalion received a

further 50 men from the 6th Infantry Regiment in the Fall of 1807. The Warsaw (Poniatowski) Legion This legion was initially organized by Generals Onufry Dombrowski and I. Gielgud, but they were replaced on 26 January 1807 by Prince J. Poniatowski. Its incomplete staff consisted of G£n£raux de brigade L. Kamieniecki and S. Woyczynski, and Colonels J. Rautenstrauch and F. Paszkowski. The legion was recruited from the Warsaw and Plock Departments. Its infantry consisted of: Regiment 9th 10th 11th 12th

Commander Garrison Colonel M.Grabowski Warsaw Colonel S.Potocki Warsaw Colonel E.Zoltowski Lenczyca Colonel F.Potocki Plock

The legion also had a light infantry company. The organization of the 10th and 12th Regiments went very quickly, as opposed to the 9th, which did not take shape until midJanuary 1807. The 11th Regiment was even slower and was not truly a regiment until the end of March 1807. It was finally brought to regimental strength by the incorporation of the light infantry companies from Posen, Kalisz, and Warsaw. These companies were formed into a weak, 400 man battalion that was finally absorbed into the 11th Regiment on 31 March 1807. The first battalions of the Warsaw infantry regiments, 3,200 men, were more or less ready for combat by the end of January 1807. Napoleon's order of 28 January 1807 directed that six battalions be united into a legion under Poniatowski's command. One battalion each was raised in Lenczyca and Lowicz, and four were raised in Warsaw. This legion was to serve as the garrison of Warsaw and Praga. Starting in 2 February 1807, these battalions began leaving for the front, leaving their regimental depots and administration in Warsaw. The 9th and 11th Regiments fought in Zayonczek's observation corps after mid-March 1807. The 12th Regiment participated in the blockade of Graudenz from May to July 1807, which the 10th Regiment fought with the Lemarrois division and later joined the siege of Graudenz. The 1st Chasseur is discussed in the following section on the Noble Levy. The 2nd Uhlans were organized in Plock in 1806 as the 2nd Light Cavalry Regiment under the command of W. Kwasniewski. In May 1807 the regiment joined the Lemarrois division and fought against the cossacks on 9 May 1807 at Zatory. The legion's artillery started forming in January 1807 with seven guns supplied by the French. By June 1807, Poniatowski had two artillery companies. The 1st Company was under Captain I. Bielicki and the 2nd was under Capitain I. Hauschild. The Mass/Noble Levy of November 1806 — January 1807 The first movement in this direction occurred on 11 and 13 November 1806 when the reactivated palatinate councils of Lenczyca and Sieradz called for one fully equipped rider from each estate and every 40 town households. A total of 3,000 men were anticipated to be organized in this conscription. On 2 December 1806, the palatine (voivode) of Gnesen, J. Radziminski, issued a manifesto calling the nobility from the left bank of the Vistula to gather in Lowicz by 25 December for the purpose of forming a Noble Levy. In his organizational decree, which accompanied the manifesto, General Dombrowski nominated the "rotmistrz" (cavalry leaders - a term incorporated into Polish from the German "rittmeister") for the nine palatinates, giving them the rank of major generals and specifying the structure of the palatinate cavalry units. These units were called "choragiew" (literally "banner" or

u standard7').

A choragiew consisted of: 1 Porucznik ("Lieutenant," but in fact a capitain) 1 Podporucznik ("Sous-lieutenant," in fact a lieutenant) 2 Chorazy ("standard bearers," actually sous-lieutenants) 5 Namiestnik (Brigadiers) 1 Namiestnik pisarz (Fourrier or company clerk) 50 Rycerz and 50 Pocztowy ("knights & squires")

A choragiew was supposed to have its own military band or, at least, one or two trumpeters. Each rider was to be armed with a saber and a pistol or carbine. If firearms were not available they were to have three meter long lances. On 1 January 1807, over 6,000 riders appeared at Lowicz. Four hundred were chosen to form the 1st National Cavalry Regiment under the command of Colonel J.M. Dombrowski, the general's son. It had three squadrons, each of 120 men. After Colonel Dombrowski was severely wounded at Dirschau (Tczew) the command passed to Colonel K. Przebendowski. The regiment was later renamed the 1st Chasseur a Cheval Regiment. Immediately after the New Year Review, about half of the Noble Levy simply went home. The 2,840 cavalry remaining included: 143

137 314 858 206 560 182 206 234

from the palatinate of

Lenczyca Gnesen Rawa Sieradz Wielun Kalisz Kujawy Inowroclaw Mazovia

These units went, for the most part, with General Dombrowski into Pommerania, while the others joined the Grande Arm£e to protect their winter quarters. Among the latter, 500 men were present with Lasalle's division during the battle of Eylau. The Posen levy joined Dombrowski's division during its operations in Pommerania. The Noble Levy was dissolved by the Governing Committee on 20 January 1807, but the majority of its men decided to stay with the army, gradually joining its cavalry regiments. The Dombrowski Division — 2 January — 27 May 1807 On 2 January 1807, Napoleon ordered the formation of a Polish division under the command of General Dombrowski. Its first brigade, under General W. Axamitowski, was formed from the first battalions of the Posen Legion and concentrated around Gnesen. The second brigade, under General S. Fiszer, contained the first battalions of the Kalisz Legion and was concentrated around Konin. The division had a decreed strength of 6,400 infantry, but its actual strength never exceeded 5,000 foot soldiers at any time. The 3,000 cavalry assigned to the division consisted of the 1st Chasseurs, under Colonel Garczynski (150 men), one squadron of the 2nd Uhlans under Colonel Uminski (150 men), one squadron of Dziewanowski's uhlans (125 men), the 1st National Cavalry Regiment (400 men in 3 squadrons), and most of the Noble Levy units from Lowicz. They were commanded by General Axamitowski. The division was accompanied by a French artillery company under Capitain Charelot. It had four cannons and two howitzers. The division departed for Bromberg on 7 January and arrived by 21 January. On 23 January, MarSchal Berthier ordered the division broken into two parts. The Kalisz battalions went to Graudenz to join its blockade force under Bemadotte. All the cavalry

and the Posen battalions were sent toward Danzig. General Kosinski took over command of the irregular cavalry. The regular forces went under General Axamitowski. The infantry was organized into two provisional regiments. The 1/lst and l/2nd Regiments were under Colonel J. Sierawski and the l/3rd and l/4th Regiments were under Colonel J. Wasilewski. In addition, the division passed into the X Corps of Marshal Lefebvre. On 27 January, the Poles encountered the retreating Prussians. Though initially successful, their vanguard was surprised by about 400 Prussians at Dirschau and suffered substantial losses. Colonel Uminski was taken prisoner in this action. Colonel Dziewanowski assumed command of the 2nd Uhlans and incorporated his Towarczy into it. Capitain Golaszewski was killed and his light infantry were absorbed into Sierawski's regiment. A pause occurred in the offensive between 29 January and 12 February. During that time, the second battalions of the Posen Legion joined their regiments and the second battalions of the Kalisz Legion were temporarily assigned to Dombrowski's command to hold the line of the Vistula between Thorn and Neustadt. In addition, there were over 3,000 cavalry and six guns with 66 gunners (plus the French artillery company of Capitain Charelot). On 7 February General Kosinski took command of the vanguard and General M. Sokolnicki assumed command of the irregular cavalry. On 14 February, the Poles took Mewe (Gniew) and contacted Menard's Division, which included the Legion du Nord. This division passed under Dombrowski's general command. On 20 February, Sokolnicki and his irregular cavalry, plus two infantry companies, stormed and took Stolpen (Slupsk), cutting off the Prussian lines of communication between Danzig and Kolberg. On 23 February, the main body of Dombrowski's division, assisted by a force of Baden infantry and the Legion du Nord, stormed and took Dirschau (Tczew). This assault was the baptism of fire for the Posen troops. General Dombrowski was wounded, and command passed to General Kosinski. Thirteen Poles and Capitain Charelot, of the French artillery battery accompanying the division, were awarded crosses of the Legion d'Honneur for their parts in this battle. By the end of the month, Sokolnicki reorganized the irregular cavalry, abandoning the loose "choragiew" structure and forming three regiments. Each regiment had two squadrons, formed with two companies of 80 men. On 3 March the entire cavalry of the division was sent to the right bank of the Vistula under the command of General Zayonczek. However, only the 1st National Cavalry Regiment and a few loose units of Noble Levy, attached to various infantry groups operating outside the main body of the division, joined Zayonczek as a cavalry group under General Niemojewski. The Sokolnicki group, the 1st Chasseurs and the 2nd Uhlans, remained with the Polish division. The second battalions of the Kalisz Legion, temporarily attached to the Dombrowski Division, now joined their first battalions under Zayonczek. With them went the irregular cavalry units from the Kalisz Department, i.e. from the Kalisz, Sieradz and Wielun palatinates. It is possible that these are the "loose units" of Noble Levy refered to earlier. During the firs t week of March, in preparation for the siege of Danzig, Lefebvre allocated various Polish units to the different divisions of his corps. The l/2nd, l/,2/3rd and l/,2/ 4th Infantry joined the 1st Division under General Kosinski. The 2/2nd Regiment went to the 4th Division. The 1st Regiment was detached and sent to the blockade of Kolberg. The Legion du Nord remained with Menard's 1st Division. The remaining cavalry joined the French cavalry division under the Saxon General von Polenz. This temporarily disbanded Dombrowski's division, but these assignments kept changing during the course of the siege. The siege of Danzig lasted from 10 March to 27 May. A total of 9,000 Poles participated, of which 1,600 were killed and 400 were wounded. The Legion du Nord was, in early March 1807, at the siege of Danzig. Napoleon was also at this time merging the 1st and 2nd Legions and reorganizing them into two regiments. On 6 March, Zayonczek proposed Colonels M. Radziwill (who commanded the Legion in

his absence) and M. Sobolewski as commanders of these two regiments. Poniatowski and i; Davout approved the recommendations. These units were titled the 5th Chasseurs and 6th Fusiliers respectively. Officially, between February 1807 and February 1808, the fate of the now combined % legions was still undecided. Napoleon wished to transfer it to Polish service, which f 'L' resulted in Zayonczek7s inclusion of it in his corps, but the Duchy government was unable % to pay for it, so Davout delayed the transfer as long as possible. After the capitulation of Danzig, the Legion garrisoned the Weichselmiinde fortress. Its strength was down to £ about 2,000 men. In September 1807 the Legion marched to Posen and went under the % command of Dombrowski. Finally, on 13 February 1808, at Gnesen, the Legion took an I oath of fidelity to Frederick August. On 7 March, it moved to Warsaw, where it was disbanded and its soldiers distributed between the 5th and 6th Infantry Regiments. All but one of the French officers in the Legion, nearly two thirds of all the Legion's officers, elected to return to French service. As for the original 5th Infantry Regiment, on 9 March 1808, it had only 51 officers and 1,315 men. The actual incorporation of the Legion du Nord did not occur until 1 April 1808. Poles in the Lemarois Division On 28 January 1807, Napoleon sent two battalions of the Warsaw Legion to join Lemarois' division. In addition, the Warsaw Legion uhlans, once formed and operational, also joined Lemarois. The division operated southeast of Zayonczek's division in much the same role. r!

The End of the 1807 Campaign When Danzig fell on 27 May, the Dombrowski division was reassigned to the newly organized corps under Marshal Mortier. Its 1st Infantry Regiment had been detached and was blockading Kolberg. Though Zayonczek's forces were unable to join the Grande Arm6e for Friedland, Dombrowski's did. Dombrowski's infantry and artillery stood on the right flank of Mortier's Corps while the 5th (previously the 1st) Polish Chasseurs and the 6th (previously the 2nd) Polish Uhlans stood with the French cavalry on the corps' front. Though suffering from artillery fire, the infantry did not eneage in the battle. The cavalry attacked the Russian Guard several times, earning Napoleon's praise and several decorations. After Friedland, Napoleon concentrated the Polish forces at hand into a single corps under Dombrowski and dispatched it to Grodno. They were to remain there during the talks at Tilsit. After the 1807 Campaign On 22 July 1807 Napoleon gave the Grand Duchy of Warsaw its constitution in a ceremony in Dresden. The Governing Committee was replaced by a State Council and the Council of Minister. Prince Poniatowski was made Minister of War and the constitution established the Duchy's army at 30,000 men. In fact, by mid-July, the strength of the army rose to about 31,800 men, of whom 9,000 were in hospital. This force contained a large percentage of officers without position within the structure of the newly forming army. In order to employ them, a corps of veterans was formed under the command of Poniatowski. In addition, there were problems with the discrepancy between the army structure (39,321 men) set forth in the organizational decree of 26 January 1807, and the constitutional limit of 30,000 men. The Legion du Nord had been officially incorporated into the army in February 1808, and the demands of the new campaign had brought more men into the army. In order to resolve this problem the army was kept in permanently understrength. That is, many cadres were formed and kept at full strength, but the numbers of soldiers was kept at about half the ratio of soldiers to cadre normally found. As a result, on 1

October 1808, the 5th Infantry lacked 886 men, the 6th 773 men, and the 8th 731 men. After July, the cavalry was reorganized and brought into conformance with the January organizational decree. The 1st National Cavalry Regiment, 1st Chasseur Regiment and the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Cavalry were brought up to full strength by absorbing irregular units. The 5th and 6th Regiments (formerly the 1st and 2nd) also absorbed some irregulars. From 22 July 1807 to the beginning of the 1809 campaign, the nominal strength of the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was set at 30,000 men. By the end of the 1809 campaign, it reached a strength of 59,500 men and continued to grow. The army consisted of the three divisions. Each division consisted of four, two battalion infantry regiments, two light cavalry regiments, and three artillery batteries organized into a single battalion. Their organization, strength and commanders on 27 November 1807 were: Division or Legion 1 2 3 1

1 2 3

Regiment 1st Artillery 2nd Artillery 3rd Artillery 1st Infantry 2nd Infantry 3rd Infantry 4th Infantry 5th Infantry 6th Infantry 7th Infantry 8th Infantry 9th Infantry 10th Infantry 11th Infantry 12th Infantry Legion du Nord 1st Cavalry 2nd Cavalry 3rd Cavalry 4th Cavalry 5th Cavalry 6 th Cavalry Veteran Corps

Regimental Commander Colonel Dobrski Lt. Colonel A. Gorski Lt. Colonel J. Hurtig Colonel M. Grabowski Colonel S. Potocki Colonel E.Zoltowski Colonel F. Potocki Colonel L Zielinski Colonel M. Sobolewski Colonel P. Skorzewski Colonel C. Godebski Colonel A. Sulkowski Colonel A. Downarowicz Colonel S. Mielzynski Colonel S. Poninski Prince M. Radziwill Colonel J.M. Dombrowski Colonel W.Kwasniewski Colonel B.J. Laczynski Colonel W. Mecinski Colonel K. Turno Colonel D. Dziewanowski Lt. Colonel Wiener

Strength 354 597 389 1518 1746

696 1466 1088 1087 1558

1552 1339

1606 14 77

1316 1361 653 571 857 823 943 996 116

The King of Saxony signed a convention on 10 May 1808 which directed that a force of 8,000 men be drawn from the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw for service in the French army. The 4th, 7th, and 9th Regiments were chosen and organized with two battalions each. Each battalion was to have nine companies, including one of grenadiers and one of voltigeurs. In addition, the infantry was supplemented by the addition of a 140 man artillery company and a 200 man sapper company. Napoleon took this force into French service on much the same basis as the Hessians served the British in the American Revolution. They were prompdy sent to Spain where they engaged in considerable combat. The actual strengths of these regiments were as follows:

Date Unit August 7 4th Infantry July 19 7th Infantry August 2 9th Infantry August 1 Artillery Company July 2 Sapper Company

Officers 65 65 64 4 4

Soldiers 2,494 2,465 2,351 145 186

Total 2,559 2,530 2,415 149 190

The organization of the army of the Grand Duchy became more formal in its structure after a period of peace, and its overall structure settled down into the following form: 1st Division: Commander: Division Major: Chief of Staff: Brigade Commanders: Adjutant of the Divisional Commander: A la suite: 1st Regiment 2nd Regiment 3rd Regiment 4th Regiment 1st Chasseurs 2nd Uhlans Artillery & Sappers 2nd Division: Commander: Division Major: Chief of Staff: Brigade Commanders: Adjutant of the Divisional Commander: 5th Infantry 6th Infantry 7th Infantry 8th Infantry 3rd Uhlans 4th Chasseurs Artillery & Sappers 3rd Division: Commander: Division Major: Chief of Staff: Brigade Commanders: Adjutant of the Divisional Commander: 9th Infantry 10th Infantry

General J. Poniatowski General L. Bieganski Colonel F. Paszkowski General W. Axamitowski General S. Woyczynski Colonel J. Rautenstrauch General L. Kamieniecki Colonel K. Malachowski Colonel S. Potocki Colonel E. Zoltowski Colonel F. Potocki Colonel J.M. Dombrowski2 Colonel T. Tyszkiewicz Lt. Colonel J. Redel

Warsaw Modlin Warsaw Plock Piaseczno Warsaw Warsaw

General J. Zayonczek General P. Skorzewski Colonel K. Kossecki General J. Niemojewski General I. Krasinski Colonel A. Radziminski Colonel M. Radziwill Colonel J. Sierawski Colonel M. Sobolewski Colonel C. Godebski Colonel B.J. Laczynski Colonel W. Mecinski Lt. Colonel A.Gorski

Czestochowa Czestochowa and Kalisz Kalisz Konin Sieradz Warta Kalisz

General J.H.Dombrowski Colonel M. Hauke Colonel C.Pakosz General M. Sokolnicki General M. Grabowski Lt. Colonel A. Cedrowski Colonel A. Sulkowski Colonel A. Downarowicz

Leszno Lenczyca

Colonel S. Mielzynski Colonel J. Weyssenhoff Colonel K. Turno Colonel D. Dziewanowski Lt. Colonel J. Hurtig

11th Infantry 12th Infantry 5th Chasseurs 6th Uhlans Artillery & Sappers

Danzig Rawicz Rawa Radziejow Posen

The staff of the army consisted of: 3 Generaux de division 13 G£n£ral de brigade 35 Adjutants 1 Adjutant-commandant 3 Inspecteurs aux revues 6 Sous-inspecteurs 3 Commissaires de guerre 3 Paymasters It was in August 1808 that the 4th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Regiments, one regiment from each division, plus an artillery and sapper company were sent to Spain. At the same time, the 10th Regiment joined the 11th in Danzig. The 4th Chasseurs £ Cheval went to Stettin on 21 February 1809 where they formed part of the garrison. Twelve companies of the 5th Regiment were also detached to the garrison of Glogau. This so stripped the organization of the 3rd Division, now lacking three infantry regiments, that it was placed on a reduced standing and General Dombrowski went on leave until April 1809. From mid-July 1807 to August 1808, the actual general command of the Poles was in the hands of Marshal Davout. He did not initially trust Poniatowski, but after a very candid interview in late August he changed his opinion and, when he left Warsaw in early September 1808, he turned command over to Poniatowski. On 21 March 1809, Poniato wsla was nominated Commander-in-Chief by the King of Saxony, who was also the Grand Duke of Warsaw. Despite that, Poniatowski still was theoretically subordinated to Marshal Bemadotte. During this period the only major development in the army was the organization of static artillery companies organized in the fortresses of Serock, Thorn, Praga, and Modlin. In addition, a horse artillery company with four officers, 58 gunners, four 6pdrs, and two howitzers was organized by Capitain W. Potocki. A second horse battery was formed in January 1809, bring the total strength of the horse artillery to 7 officers and 112 men serving 8 guns. On 1 January 1809, the army of the Grand Duchy was as follows: Regiment

Location

Strength

Colonel

Regiment

Location

1»C Regiment

Praga

1.707

K. Malachowski

1st Chasseurs

Gora/Czersk

745

ICPrzebendowski

2nd Regiment

WATMW

1,707

& Potocki

2nd Uhlans

Warsaw

880

T. Tyszkiewicz

3rd Regiment

Wtmw

1,707

E. Zoltowski

3rd Uhlans

Pia5ec7.no

719

J. L&czynski

4th Regiment

Spain

1,308

F. Potocki

4th Chasseurs

Stettin

5th Regiment

Kustrin/Clogau

1,933

M. Radziwill

5th Chasseurs

On Niemen R.

596

K. T u m o

6th Regiment

Serock/Pul tusk

1,635

J. Sierawski

6th Uhlans

Blonie

691

D. Dziewanowski

7th Regiment

Spain

t817

M. Sobolewski

8th Regiment

Modlin

1,539

C. Codebski

Artillery

9th Regiment

Spain

1,945

A. Sulkowski

1st Foot Bn

Warsaw

409

J. Redei

10th Regiment

Danzig

A. Downarow»cz

2nd Foot Bn

Serock/Czestochowa

137

A. Gorski

11th Regiment

Danzig

S. Mielzynski

3rd Foot Bn

Praga/Modlin/Thom

266

J. Hurtig

12th Regiment

Thorn

J. Weyssenhoff

1st Horse Bn

Warsaw

119

1,178

Strength Colonel

W. Mednski

W. Potocki

I

:

yi 12th Regiment

Thorn

1,178

J.Weyssenhoff

1st H o c * Bn

Warsaw

1st Sapper Co.

Warsaw

79

J. Lubiewski

Train Battalion

402

2nd Sapper Co.

Praga/Modlin

103

J. Sternberg

Pontooncrr/ Artisan Co.

3rd Sapper Co.

Czestochowa/Serock

91

i

W . Dombrowski •

119

W. Potocki

67 Thom

The 2/5th Infantry (585 men) served as the garrison of the Czestochowa fortress. Because of the wide distribution of Polish forces, from Spain to the Grand Duchy, the divisional organization had become obsolete. Poniatowski, in an effort to organize functional tactical formations, proposed changes to the divisional structure. As a temporary measure, the infantry of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments was brigaded under G£n£ral de brigade L. Kamieniecki, and the 1st Chasseurs, 2nd Uhlans, and 5th Chasseurs were brigaded under G£n£ral de brigade A. Rozniecki. In addition to implementing this temporary restructuring, Poniatowski made proposals to Napoleon who decided to reorganize the Polish forces into three new divisions. Each division was to consist of four line infantry regiments, two cavalry regiments, and two light infantry battalions. Napoleon determined that the infantry regiments should be increased to a three battalion strength. Each company was raised from 95 to 140 men each3. In addition, the cavalry regiments were to be increased to 1,047 men, growing from three to four squadrons each. The battalions were reorganized and the nine company structure reduced to six, as set forth in Napoleon's famous Decree of 18 February 1808, which addressed the organization of the French infantry. A draft in the spring of 1809 was to bring the company strengths up from 95 to 140 men each. The results of this effort are not clear. Indications are that before the eruption of the 1809 campaign, this reorganization to six companies was completed for the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments. The third battalions of these regiments were sent to Thorn to replace the 12th Regiment, which was sent to Warsaw. However, in a letter dated 8 April Poniatowski informed Marshal Davout that the increase in company strength to 140 men had been completed. However, before the outbreak of the 1809 campaign only the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Regiments had had their companies raised to the new strength, which is why their two battalions show a strength of 1,707 men each. It should be noted that the 4th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Regiments, then in Spain, had already raised their company strengths to 140 men, but were to retain the two battalion organization. Indeed, they retained the 9 (later 8) company organization up to May 1812. As with the infantry, the cavalry had not had time to implement these reorganizations, and no fourth squadrons existed by the commencement of the 1809 campaign. Immediately before the 1809 campaign, the army of the Grand Duchy, less various detachments, stood at 18,634 men. Line regiments, garrison troops, and their assigned artillery numbered 74 staff officers, 486 regimental officers, 14,857 rank and file, an d 246 guns. In addition, there was a 2,000 man Saxon corps. On 19 April, at Raszyn, about 14,000 Poles and Saxons, with 39 guns, faced the Austrian VII Corps, which had 33,000 men and 90 guns. After a pitched battle, the Poles were forced to withdraw and temporarily abandon Warsaw. In May, the Poles began an offensive campaign taking the war into Austrian territories and seizing the fortresses of Sandomierz, Zamosc, and Krakow. One unusual unit raised during that period was the Guides of Poniatowski. This was a personal bodyguard force raised by the order of 8 May 1809. All of the non-commissioned officers and troopers were volunteer noblemen serving without pay. The company was very short lived and was disbanded on 27 November 1809. Most of its troopers were then commissioned as souslieutenants in the various line regiments. In the course of the 1809 campaign; Poniatowski liberated western Galicia, taken by the Austrians in 1795, and advanced as far as Lvov and Tarnopol. After the peace treaty of Schonbrunn (14 October 1809), western Galicia and the Zamosc district of eastern Galicia were incorporated into the Grand Duchy.

In order to improve his situation, Poniatowski began to recruit more men. By the end of the 1809 campaign he had raised a total of six new infantry regiments (13th through 18th) and ten new cavalry regiments (7th through 16th). These new regiments were organized both in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and in the newly liberated regions of Galicia. The latter were financed by local landowners who often became their colonels. These Galician regiments formed the "Galician-French Army" and had a separate numbering until October 1809. The infantry was numbered 1 - 4 and the cavalry 1-7. The regiments formed in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw received temporary numbers that were later changed. The new Grand Duchy regiments were the 14th and 15th Infantry Regiments, the 7th and 9th Uhlans, and the 10th Hussars. The Galician-French regiments became the 13th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Infantry Regiments, the 8th, 11th, 12th, 15th, and 16th Uhlans, the 13th Hussars, and the 14th Cuirassiers in October. The new regiments were to be organized on the French model, with four line battalions of six companies each and a fifth depot battalion with four companies. In fact, only a few of these regiments actually reached this organizational strength. On 30 March 1810, the number of battalions was reduced to three. By the end of1809 there were a total of eighteen infantry regiments, sixteen cavalry regiments, three battalions of foot artillery, a horse artillery battalion with two companies, and a company of engineers. The strength of the Polish army on 14 November 1809 was: Regiment Commanding Officer 1st Regiment Colonel K. Malachowski 2nd Regiment Colonel S. Potocki 3rd Regiment Colonel E. Zoltowski 4th Regiment Colonel M. Wierzbinski 5th Regiment Colonel M. Radziwill 6th Regiment Colonel J. Sierawski 7th Regiment Colonel S. Jakubowski 8th Regiment Colonel K. Stuart 9th Regiment Colonel A. Sulkowski 10th Regiment Colonel B. Wierbzicki 11th Regiment Colonel S. Mielzynski 12th Regiment Colonel J. Weyssenhoff 13th Regiment Colonel A. Szneyder 14th Regiment Colonel E. Siemianowski 15th Regiment Colonel K. Miaskowski

Effectives 2,690 3,030 2,647 2,241 2,104 2,673 1,905 2,302 2,050 1,996 2,145 2,614 3,435 2,852 3,422

Location Praga Warsaw Modlin Spain Kustrin Serock Spain Warsaw Spain Danzig Danzig Krakow Zamosc Plock Krakow

Regiment 16th Regiment 17th Regiment 18th Regiment 1st Chasseurs 2nd Uhlans 3rd Uhlans 4th Chasseurs 5th Chasseurs 6th Uhlans 7th Uhlans 8th Uhlans 9th Uhlans 10th Hussars 11th Uhlans

Effectives 2,338 2,561 1,985 937 1,163 1,015 687 1,097 1,009 840 954 v 936 803 899

Location

Commanding Officer Colonel J. Keszycki Colonel K. Czartoryski Colonel J. Homowski Colonel K.Przebendowski Colonel T.Tyszkiewicz Colonel J. Laczynski Colonel W. Kwasniowski Colonel K.Turno Colonel D.Dziewanowski Colonel A. Zawadzki Colonel K. Rozwadowski Colonel F. Przyszychowski Colonel J. Uminski Colonel A. Potocki

-

Warsaw/Rawa Plock Warsaw Warsaw Krakow Westphalia Rawa Posen Kalisz Krakow Konin Pultusk Zolkiew

12th Uhlans 13th Hussars 14th Cuirassiers 15th Uhlans 16th Uhlans

Colonel G. Rzyszczewski Colonel J. Tolinski Colonel S. Malachowski Colonel A. Trzecieski Colonel M. Tarnowski

943 1,048 610 916 661

Biala Siedlce Konskie Ostrolenka Lublin

On 7 December 1809, King Frederick August changed the official state of the army to 60,000 men, which was, in fact, a reduction in the actual strength as it stood at that time. Two further decrees were issued that furthered this process, the first being on 10 March 1810 and the second on 30 March 1810. The new organization of the army was: General Staff 8 G£n£raux de division, including 1 Commander-in-Chief 4 Military District Commanders 3 Inspectors General 15 G£n£raux de brigade 2 Command Adjutants (with the Grand Duke) 1 Command Adjutant, Sous-Chef of the General Staff 4 Command Adjutants, Chiefs of the Divisional Staffs 9 Chefs d'escadron, Adjutant Generals 24 Capitains, Adjutant Generals 4 Lieutenant-Colonels - assistants 8 Capitains - assistants 12 Lieutenants - assistants 17 Infantry Regiments, 3 battalions each 15 Cavalry Regiments, 4 squadrons each 1 Cuirassier Regiment, 2 squadrons The Decree of 20 March 1810 reorganized the Grand Duchy of Warsaw into four military districts. They were as follows: District I Warsaw II Posen HI Lublin IV Radom

Commander G£n£ral de division J. Zayonczek G£n£ral de division J.H. Dombrowski G£n£ral de division L. Kamieniecki G£n£ral de division M. Sokolnicki

In September 1810, the Polish army raised a third battalion for the 13th through 17th Regiments. On 1 October 1810 the strength of the army was: Regiment 1st Regiment 2nd Regiment 3rd Regiment 4th Regiment 5th Regiment 6th Regiment 7th Regiment 8th Regiment 9th Regiment 10th Regiment

Commanding Officer Colonel K. Malachowski Colonel J. Krukowiecki Colonel E. Zoltowski Colonel T. Wolinski Colonel M. Radziwill Colonel J. Sierawski Major W. Borowski Colonel K. Stuart Colonel M. Cichocki Colonel M. Wierzbicki

Effectives 2,388 2,322 2,267 2,211 2,496 2,275 1,832 2,357 1,990 2,403

11th Regiment Colonel A. Chlebowski 12th Regiment Colonel J. Weyssenhoff 13th Regiment Colonel J. Keszycki 14th Regiment Colonel E. Siemianowski 15th Regiment Colonel K. Miaskowski 16th Regiment Colonel K. Czartoryski 17th Regiment Colonel J. Hornowski

2,410 2,379 2,228 2,163 2,398 2,361 2,076

1st Chasseurs 2nd Uhlans 3rd Uhlans 4th Chasseurs 5th Chasseurs 6th Uhlans 7th Uhlans 8th Uhlans 9th Uhlans 10th Hussars 11th Uhlans 12th Uhlans 13th Hussars 14th Cuirassiers 15th Uhlans 16th Uhlans

799 813 786 800 791 795 770 818 769 691 878 782 814 315 777 655

Colonel K. Przebendowski Colonel T. Tyszkiewicz Colonel J. Laczynski Colonel S. Dulfus Colonel Z. Kurnatowski Colonel M. Pagowski Colonel A. Zawadzki Colonel K. Rozwadowski Colonel F. Przyszychowski Colonel J. Uminski Colonel A. Potocki Colonel G. Rzyszczewski Colonel J. Tolinski Colonel S. Malachowski Colonel A. Trzecieski Colonel M. Tarnowski

On 6 April 1811, Poniatowski proposed to Napoleon organizing two gun regimental batteries . This was approved on 17 May. The actual organization took place after the issuance of the Royal Decree of 25 May 1811. On 17 May 1811, Napoleon ordered the alteration of the regimental strength from 18 to 19 companies. The 19th Company was to be 200 men strong and serve as a depot and reserve. These depots were grouped together in the fortresses of Thorn and Modlin, where they served as a garrison as well as depots. In case of war, the strength of these companies were to be raised to 300 to 400 men. In June 1811, the army of the Grand Duchy consisted of 17 infantry regiments, three of which had been serving since 1808 in Spain. From among the remaining 14 regiments, another three were stationed in Danzig. Each of these 14 regiments was composed of three battalions (18 companies of 136 men each) and a staff of 39 men, giving the army a theoretical strength of 34,818 infantry. The actual strength was probably around 32,000. The three regiments in Spain, who had a theoretical strength of 7,590 men in 54 companies and their staffs, had been reduced by combat and other causes to a strength of about 5,000 men. There were also 16 cavalry regiments, all of whom, except for the cuirassiers, had four squadrons. This gave the Poles a total strength of 12,764 men organized in 62 squadrons and regimental staffs. However, several of the regiments, most notably the 10th Hussars, had only three squadrons, and their total strengths were probably 500 short of the prescribed strength. In addition, there was a two squadron regiment of horse artillery with a theoretical total of 691 men, a foot regiment with a staff, 12 field companies and four static companies (theoretically 2,685 men), a sapper/miner battalion (756 men), and an artisan company (123 men). The infantry regiments in Spain had with them an artillery company of about 140 men and a sapper company, also of about 140 men. This gave the Duchy a total strength of 60,000 men (52,000 in the Duchy and Danzig and 8,000 in Spain), but efforts were already underway that would raise this to 75,000 within the Duchy alone.

In 1811, each infantry regiment raised a depot battalion of four companies, and the cavalry raised depot squadrons consisting of two companies. All of the artillery's depot needs were attended to by a single depot battalion, which had six companies The 1st, 4th, and 5th Cavalry Regiments were chasseurs & cheval, the 10th and 13th were hussars and the 14th was a cuirassier regiment. The other regiments, numbering up to the 16th Regiment, were uhlan or lancer regiments. The regimental commanders of the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in June 1811 were: Regiment 1st Chasseurs 2nd Uhlans 3rd Uhlans 4th Chasseurs 5th Chasseurs 6th Uhlans 7th Uhlans 8th Uhlans 9th Uhlans 10th Hussars 11th Unlans 12th Uhlans 13th Hussars 14th Cuirassiers

Regiment 1st Regiment 2nd Regiment 3rd Regiment 4th Regiment 5th Regiment 6th Regiment 7th Regiment 8th Regiment 9th Regiment 10th Regiment 11th Regiment 12th Regiment 13th Regiment 14th Regiment

Commander Col. K.Malachowski Col. J.Krukowiecki Col. E.Zoltowski Col. T.Wolinski Col. M.Radziwill Col. J.Sierawski Col. P.Tremo Col. K.Stuart Col. M.Cichocki Col. B.Wierzbicki Col. A.Chlebowski Col. J.Weyssenhoff Col. F.Zymirski Col. E.Siemianowski

Regiment 15th Regiment 16th Regiment 17th Regiment

Commander Col. K.Miaskowski Col. K.Czartoryski Col. J.Hornowski

Foot Artillery Horse Artillery Sapper Battalion

Col. A.Gorski Col. W.Potocki Commandant M.Kubicki

Regiment 15th Uhlans 16th Uhlans

Commander Col. K.Przebendowski Col. T.Tyszkiewicz Col. B.Laczynski Col. S.Dulfus Col. Z.Kurnatowski Col. M.Pagowski Col. Z.Zawadzki Col. D.Radziwill Col. F.Przyszychowski Col. J.N.Uminski Col. A.Potocki Col. G.Rzyszczewski Col. J.Tolinski Col. S.Malachowski Commander Col. A.Trzecieski Col. M.Tarnowski

The internal situation in the Grand Duchy was not good. A letter from Davout to Napoleon, dated 26 November 1811, said that the state of commerce was bad and property holders were not able to make the required contributions. He stated that the pay of the army was eight to nine months in arrears and the military finances were destitute. There were no funds to pay for the repairs and improvements of the fortifications at Modlin, Thorn, and Zamosc and, "if it were not for the love of their country and the general enthusiasm for the Emperor and his cause, the entire machine would have seized up long ago." On 1 January 1812, Napoleon took into French pay the 5th, 10th, and 11th Infantry Regiments, the 9th Uhlans, and the artillery company stationed in Danzig and Kustrin. These three infantry regiments were brought up to full strength for the existing three battalions, and fourth battalions raised. In the fall of 1811, the 5th lacked 200 men, the 10th lacked 389 men, and the 11th lacked 233 men from their theoretical full strength. On 25 February 1812, a convention was signed by France and the Grand Duchy that stated the three infantry regiments in Danzig were to bring their companies up to 140 men each and that a 25th or depot company raised. This was intended to bring the regimental strengths to over 3,500 men. This convention also directed that the eleven infantry regiments in the Duchy were to bring the strength of their companies up to 160 men, bringing their strength to 2,919 men

per regiment. Similarly, the 15 cavalry regiments were to bring the company strengths up to 120 troopers, giving them a new field strength of 983 men per regiment. The 14th (formerly Cuirassiers) Regiment was to have 499 men. By 1812 the army of the Grand Duchy consisted of 75,000 men and 165 cannon. It provided the forces that formed the V Corps of the Grande Arm£e during the 1812 campaign. This force was joined by all the Poles serving in the French army at that time, including the Vistula Legion and the 4th, 7th, and 9th Polish Regiments, though they served in other corps. During the invasion of Russia Napoleon liberated portions of ancient Lithuania which had been part of Poland in the not too distant past. There was sufficient pro-Polish sentiment there to cause Napoleon to form a provincial government on 1 July 1812 and make it part of the Grand Duchy. The Decree of 1 July raised the Vilna National Guard (2 battalions), which was slowly fleshed out with men drawn from the recently captured territories. To police the countryside, Napoleon raised a gendarmerie in the Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, and Bialystok districts. This force consisted of a single company of 107 men posted in each county. There were four districts with a total of 33 counties (Powiaty), so the strength eventually reached six squadrons. In addition, Lithuania was the organizing grounds for the 18th to 22nd Infantry Regiments and the 17th to 21st Uhlan Regiments. On 13 July Napoleon named the colonels for these regiments: *

Regiment 18th Infantry 19th Infantry 20th Infantry

Commanding Officer Colonel A. Chodkiewicz Colonel K. Tyzenhauz Colonel A. Biszping

Regiment 21st Infantry 22nd Infantry 17th Uhlans 18th Uhlans 19th Uhlans 20th Uhlans 21st Uhlans

Commanding Officer Colonel K. Przezdziecki4 Colonel S. Czapski Colonel M. Tyszkiewicz Colonel J. Wawrzecki Colonel K. Rajecki Colonel X. Obuchowicz Colonel J. Lubanski

In August, Colonel K. Przezdziecki was named colonel of the 18th Uhlan Regiment, leaving the 21st Infantry Regiment. In addition, a Lithuanian Hussar Regiment was being organized under Colonel Abramowicz, as was a Franco-Polish Regiment under Prince A. Sapieha. However, neither regiment appears to have materialized. A Lithuanian Tartar squadron was being organized by Mustapha Murza Achmatowicz. The 21st Uhlans were organized by the end of 1812 by merging Colonel I. Moniuszko's Chasseur & Cheval Regiment with the uhlans being formed by Colonel J. Lubanski. The Army of Lithuania, as it was called, was placed under the direct command of Napoleon and not made part of the Grand Duchy's field forces. Initially, it did not receive its orders from the Polish general staff. Because the territory had been ravaged by the retreating Russians, it was impossible for the Lithuanian army to be raised without active French financial support. Napoleon provided finances, but not sufficient to do the job completely. In order to fully provide the finances for the fledgling army, the regimental commanders were selected from the most eminent and wealthy families of the country. They were expected to provide a great deal of the funds necessary for the organization of their regiments. Money was not the only problem. There were insufficient weapons, uniforms were hard to acquire, and horses

were quite scarce. Approximately40,000 muskets were provided by the French, but the lack of organization and the shortness of time prevented a complete distribution of these arms. In addition, the recruitment and organization went very slowly. By the end of July the only standing unit was the l/18th Infantry Regiment in Vilria. It was formed with volunteers and 354 Polish prisoners of war. A conscription was finally declared on 5 August for the infantry and on 15 August for the cavalry. Up to then, the actual number of volunteers was only about 2,400 men. For unknown reasons, many of the Lithuanian recruits were sent to the French 129th Line Regiment and the Illyrian Regiment instead of joining their national units. In addition, volunteers joined the Imperial Guard 1st Chevaul£ger-lancer (Polish) Regiment and the 3rd (Lithuanian) Guard Chevaulegers. On 24 August, Napoleon named General Hogendorp as president of the Commission of the Lithuanian Government and charged him with completing the organization of the Lithuanian army. Hogendorp promised Napoleon that he would have the army completed by the beginning of January, but the outcome of the campaign prevented this from happening. On 30 September the strengths of the Lithuanian infantry regiments were as follows: 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd

— —

1,650 men 929 1,014 1,197 1,133

In the beginning of August it was decided that an additional six battalions, all of light infantry, would be raised. The commanding officers and their cadres were quickly selected. Unit 1st Light Battalion 2nd Light Battalion 3rd Light Battalion 4th Light Battalion 5th Light Battalion 6th Light Battalion

Commanding Officer J. Kossakowski Rokicki K. Plater Kurczewski Obuchowicz Lochowski

These battalions were formed from foresters and other outdoorsmen who had weapons experience. They were to act as scouts, control the incursions of cossacks, apprehend vagabonds, and act as a police force. They were organized from volunteers, and the expense of their outfitting was to be absorbed by the proprietors of the forests in which they had worked prior to their volunteering. In September, it was decided to incorporate these six battalions into the regular army. In November, the government of Lithuania resolved to form these troops into two regiments of light infantry, each with three battalions. However, recruitment was very slow. Only one regiment was actually formed and it had only two battalions. It was commanded by Colonel Kossakowski. On 4 November, it had a total of 624 men. The first two battalions were raised in the Minsk district. Eventually, a third battalion was raised near Vilna, but it did not join the regiment. It remained as an independent body for the rest of its existence. There is some indication that a fourth light battalion was raised, but very little documentation is available to provide details of its service. A total of 15,000 Lithuanians were brought into active service by the French administration. These men and their regiments were distributed throughout the province, and with the retreat of the French army from Moscow, they quickly found themselves in

combat. Some units participated in the battles during the passage of the Berezina and, along with approximately 6,000 others, withdrew with the French into Germany. Others simply vanished. The 18th, 20th, and 21st Infantry Regiments, and the 18th and 20th Uhlan Regiments arrived in Warsaw relatively intact, as did the cadre of the 22nd Infantry. In addition, the embryo of the Tyzenhauz's Lithuanian horse artillery regiment, the debris of the Tartar squadron, a squadron of the Moniuszko Chasseurs & Cheval, the 4th Light Infantry Battalion, detachments of the horse gendarmes, detachments from the national guard, and the debris of the 3e Regiment de Chevau-16gers de la Garde also arrived in Warsaw. The 17th and 19th Uhlan Regiments retired to Konigsberg with part of the 19th Infantry Regiment. The total Lithuanian force that escaped totaled 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. In order to defend the Grand Duchy after Napoleon's defeat in Russia, the government announced on 20 December 1812 a mass/noble levy under Poniatowski, who would act as its "regimentarz," or commander-in-chief. This effort was a dismal failure that produced only a few hundred horsemen that were incorporated into the existing regiments. The next effort was the execution of the conscription of 25,000 men decreed by the Duchy's government in November 1812. In addition, an extraordinary draft of one horsemen per 50 rural households and one light infantryman for every 20 rural households was declared. The results fell below the goal, but were better than the previous attempt to raise troops. A further attempt occurred on 25 January 1813 when Frederick Augustus decreed a draft for the National Guard of one soldier for every 20 rural and urban households and ten riders from every county (subdivisions of the districts). However, the steady encroachment of the Russian armies into Poland reduced this draft to well below the anticipated 13,000 men. There were further problems with increasing desertion among the conscripts. Poniatowski began forming third battalions of the infantry regiments from the National Guard and incorporated the mounted guardsmen into the cavalry regiments, despite the semi-legality of these moves. By mid-January, the Duchy's army reached 12,000 men, 1,105 veterans in hospital, and 4,000 conscripts on their way to the depots. The 1813 Campaign The Decree of 18 January 1813, issued by the King of Saxony, directed the reorganization of the Polish army. A total of 1,145,557 florins were initially issued for its reorganization. Eventually, a total of 6,499,919 florins were spent. The 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Infantry Regiments and the 9th Uhlan Regiment were still in French service as a form of French military subsidy As the 1813 spring campaign developed, control in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was largely in the hands of Schwarzenberg's Austrian Corps, and he was, though nominally still an ally, very steadily defecting from the French ranks. Poniatowski began withdrawing southwards across Poland as Schwarzenberg's perfidious maneuvers exposed him to the approaching Russians. His 8,000° man army was joined by about 6,000 light cavalry from the four southwestern departments, but due to the lack of proper supervision, this force suffered a very high desertion rate. Those that remained were incorporated into the infantry or used to form the 1st Krakus Regiment under Major K. Rzuchowski. While Poniatowski's forces in Krakow were growing back to 15,000 men, a second group under Zoltowski moved out of Great Poland into Saxony with Reynier's VII Corps. Zoltowski commanded the 2nd, 14th, and 1/ 15th Infantry Regiments, the 2nd Uhlans and 4th Chasseurs, a company of gendarmes, a veteran company, and the depots of the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 14th, and 15th cavalry regiments. This force was reorganized by the Imperial Decree of 18 April into a Polish corps under the command of Genercd Dombrowski. The third force of Poles reforming at this time were the old 5th, 10th, and 11th Infantry Regiments (233 officers and 3,438 men), the 6th and 16th Foot Batteries and a horse artillerycompany (10 officers and 301 men), a sapper company (3 officers and 68 men), and the 9th

Uhlan Regiment (30 officers and 413 men). This force was in Danzig forming part of the city's garrison. The survivors of the 28th (Polish) Division of IX Corps (the 4th, 7th and 9th Infantry Regiments) had gathered in Posen. Between 16 January and 12 February they were joined by the remains of the Vistula Legion and about 200 cavalry, mostly of the 2nd Uhlan Regiment. They were organized into a division under Generals Girard and Bronikowski. The 4th Infantry Regiment was eventually sent to Wittenberg to form part of the garrison. The 7th and 9th were initially assigned to the garrison of Spandau. When the fortress capitulated to the Prussians, they were sent to Erfurt. The Imperial Decree of 18 June merged the 4th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Regiments into a new 4th Polish Infantry Regiment with two battalions of about 450 men each. The Vistula Legion's survivors returned from Russia, and the Legion had about 200 men in Posen in early 1813. The 4th Vistula Legion Regiment arrived shortly later with 22 officers and about 800 men. In February, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Vistula Legion Regiments moved to Spandau, and on 25 May they totaled 78 officers and 365 men. The 4th Regiment moved to Wittenberg, where it was besieged. There was a slow, but steady trickle of men into the Legion, and the end of May the four regiments had grown to 133 officers and 1,190 men. The 18th, 20th, and 21st (Lithuanian) Infantry Regiments withdrew from Russia, and in January 1813 they were in Modlin. Here they took part in the year long siege. The 19th (Lithuanian) Infantry was annihilated near Vilna; its survivors withdrew into the Grand Duchy and Modlin. In June, they were merged into the 21st (Lithuanian) Regiment. The 22nd (Lithuanian) Infantry Regiment was badly beaten at Koidanovo on 15 November, and its survivors withdrew to Modlin. The Chasseur & pied Regiment was also mauled at Koidanovoand it took further beatings at Berezina and Vilna. Eventually, it joined the 17th Uhlan Regiment and retreated into Germany with them. In Poniatowski's corps, the artillery was reformed and consisted of a six gun horse battery, six foot companies, and a train battalion. In addition, a company of sappers, a company of military equipage, and a company of gendarmes were reorganized. In Dombrowski's corps, a second horse battery was raised by the Decree of 18 April 1813. Beyond the forces already mentioned, the Imperial Decree of 18 April also reorganized Dombrowski's corps. This force had the 2nd and 14th Infantry Regiments) and the 2nd and 4th Uhlan Regiments. The infantry regiments had two six company battalions each and the cavalry, reformed in the French pattern had four squadrons per regiment. In Poniatowski's corps, six cavalry regiments (1st, 3rd, 6th, 8th, 13th, and 16th Regiments) were organized into two cavalry divisions. The cuirassiers and the Krakus formed an advanced guard cavalry brigade. On 29 June, the 1st and 5th Chasseurs were used to reform the 1st Chasseur & Cheval Regiment. The 3rd Uhlans were reformed from the 3rd and 11th Uhlans, the 6th was reformed from the 6th Uhlans and the 18th Lithuanian Uhlans, the 8th was reformed with the 8th and 12th Uhlans, the 13th Hussars was reformed with the 10th and 13th Hussars and their depot. The 16th Uhlans were reformed from the 16th Uhlans and the 20th and 21st Lithuanian Uhlans. The 14th Cuirassiers were reformed with only two squadrons totaling 180 men. During this process, the cuirassiers absorbed their depot. The 17th (Lithuanian) Uhlans absorbed the 19th Uhlans on 20 April 1813 and joined the XIII (Davout) Corps in Hamburg. All of the other regiments were reorganized with the old four squadron strength and their internal structure was identical to that of the French chasseurs & cheval. On 12 March 1813, the forces Poniatowski organized in Krakow were designated by Napoleon as the VIII Corps of the Grande Arm£e. They departed Krakow during the second week of May 1813, marching through Bohemia to Saxony, where they arrived in mid-June. The horse gendarmerie, at its height, had six squadrons. A squadron of the Minsk gendarmes had fought under General Doumerc at Stachov. The Lithuanian gendarmes

had fought at Vilna on 9 December. About 60 gendarmes were incorporated into the 1st Guard Chevaul£ger-lancier (Polish) Regiment and the rest went to the French 7th and 8th Lancer Regiments. On 23 May 1813, the reorganized army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw stood as follows: 22 May 1813

22 May

1813 Regiment

Regimental Commander Off Men

Regiment

Regimental Commander Off Men

1st Infantry

Col. Piotrowski

59 774

12th Infantry

Col. Wierzbinski

61847

2nd Infantry

Maj. Szymanowski

830

13th Infantry

Maj. Obertynski

28 525

3rd Infantry

Maj. Hoffman

46 918

14th Infantry

Maj. Winnicki

848

4th Infantry

15th Infantry

Col. Straszewski

37 619

5th Infantry

16th Infantry

Maj. Nosarzewski

59 784

17th Infantry

Col. Koszarski

18th Infantry

Col. Chodkiewicz

19th Infantry 20th Infantry

Maj. Pawlowski Col. Biszping

10th Infantry

21st Infantry

Col. Gielgud

11th Infantry

22nd Infantry

Col. Czapski

6th Infantry

Maj. Kossecki

44 766

7th Infantry 8th Infantry 9th Infantry

Col. Stuart Col. Cichocki

55 636

22 May 1813 1813 Regiment

Regimental Commander Off Men 22 317 1st "Advance Guard"* Maj. Suchecki 20352 2nd "Advance Guard" Maj. Nosarzewski 3rd "Advance Guard" Maj. Korytowski

22 May Regiment

Regimental Commander Off Men

12th Uhlans

Chef d'e. Zabielski

13th Hussars

29305

19 431 28 312

16th Uhlans

Col. Tamowski

35 535

Col. Przezdziecki

24162 19 431

Maj. Dwemicki

1st Chasseurs

Chef d'e. Hryniewicz

2nd Uhlans

Col. Rzodkiewicz

3rd Uhlans

Maj. Rzuchowski

4th Chasseurs

Col. Kumatowski

5th Chasseurs

Col. Kumatowski

15 233

20th Uhlans

Col. Obuchowicz

6th Uhlans

Col. Suchorzewski

22405

Foot Art. Rgt.

Col. Redel

7th Uhlans

Col. Zawadzki

8th Uhlans

22 474 Pontooneer CpyCapt. Bujalski Col. Potocki Supplementary Art Bn Chef de Bn Weysflog Sapper Bat. 28369 Chef de Bn Rakowiecki Col. Oborski

11th Uhlans

24 310

Maj. Gutakowski 14th Cuirassiers Maj. Skarzynski

15th Uhlans

9th Uhlans

•

9 200

17th Uhlans 25357

18th Uhlans 19th Uhlans

Horse Art. Rgt. CoL Hurtig

Train Battalion

Chef de Bn Hryniewicz * Also known as the Krakus Regiment

In June 1813, in Zittau, the forces of the Grand Duchy were reorganized into two infantry divisions containing a total of five infantry regiments (1st, 8th, 12th, 15th, and 16th). The depots of the 3rd, 6th, and 13th Infantry were absorbed into the other regiments in an effort to bring them up to full strength. Dombrowski's forces had joined the Grande Armee in February. The Imperial Decree of 18 April set the strength of this force at two cavalry regiments (3,000 men), two infantry regiments, each with two battalions, and a horse battery. On 25 April this force consisted of 211 officers, 2,813 men and 1,492 horses. The corps' cavalry consisted of the 2nd Uhlans and the 4th Uhlans, which had been converted from the earlier chasseur regiment. The rest f

of the corps consisted of the 2nd and 14th Infantry Regiments and a horse battery with six guns under Chef d'escadron J. Szweryn. The Imperial Decree of 7 June directed that Dombrowski's forces, and the 4th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Regiments, and the Vistula Legion, were to be merged into the VIII Corps, but this decree was soon countermanded because of fears of mass desertions that might result from Austrian actions. On 18 June, the four Vistula Legion Regiments were merged into one regiment, known as the Vistula Regiment. On 27 June 1813, Napoleon issued a decree organizing the Polish VIII Corps. This decree stated that Poniatowski was to be rendered the same honors as the French marshals. Earlier, on 24 June, Napoleon sent to Poniatowski the proposed reorganization of the VTII Corps. Poniatowski opposed the complete disbanding of the 7th and 9th Infantry Regiments and the organization of separate depots for his and Dombrowski's corps. He also pointed out the impossibility of fitting the cuirassiers and the Krakus into the proposed cavalry scheme. When Napoleon issued the Decree of 27 June, Napoleon had chosen only to accept Poniatowski's comments on the cavalry. The 27 June Decree established the Krakus or "regiments d'avant-garde" with four squadrons of 220 men each. Initially, the 1st Krakus consisted of the departmental riders who marched with Poniatowski from Warsaw to Krakow. The 2nd and 3rd Krakus were formed from those recruited during the army's stay in Krakow. This was the source of the regiments' name and their dress. Shortly later, the three regiments were combined into a single Krakus Regiment, which was organized with a theoretical strength four squadrons, each squadron having 220 men. It was brigaded with the 14th Polish Cuirassier Regiment. The provisions of this decree relating to the incorporation of Dombrowski's forces into the Vni Corps were never executed. Dombrowski's forces were renamed an Observation Corps and posted near Wittenberg under the general command of Marshal Oudinot. They were quite short of horses and unable to mount all of their troopers. The 2nd Uhlans had 1,125 men and 880 horses, while the 4th Uhlans had 1,032 men and only 713 horses on 14 July. Portions of Dombrowski's forces were later engaged at Hagelsberg, where Girard was defeated and driven back to Wittenberg. At that time, the 4th Polish Infantry Regiment was incorporated into Dombrowski's Corps. As a result of the change in Dombrowski's corps, only the Vistula Regiment joined the V n i Corps. On 6 July 1813, the VTII Corps stood as follows: VIII Corps: G£n£ral Poniatowski 26th Division: G£n£ral de division Kamieniecki 1st Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Sierawski 1/lst Polish Infantry Regiment (30/528)6 2/lst Polish Infantry Regiment (24/512) l/16th Polish Infantry Regiment (31/538) 2/16th Polish Infantry Regiment (24/528) 1/,2/Vistula Regiment (detached to Wittenberg) 2nd Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Malachowski l/8th Polish Infantry Regiment (29/549) 2/8th Polish Infantry Regiment (24/530) l/15th Polish Infantry Regiment (31/542) 2/15th Polish Infantry Regiment (24/523) Artillery: Orzinski 5th Polish Foot Artillery (7/132) 7th Polish Foot Artillery (6/129) 18th Polish Foot Artillery (6/133) 27th Division: 2nd Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Grabowski

l/,2/4th Polish Infantry Regiment (detached to Wittenberg) l/12th Polish Infantry Regiment (32/560) 2/12th Polish Infantry Regiment (24/549) Artillery: Chef de bataillon Weisflog 10th Polish Foot Artillery (6/136) Det. 14th Polish Foot Artillery (3/61) 27th Light Cavalry Brigade: G£n6ral de brigade Uminski l/14th Cuirassier Regiment (8/147) 2/14th Cuirassier Regiment (1/83) 1/Krakus Regiment (17/208) 2/Krakus Regiment (8/195) 3/Krakus Regiment (9/199) . 4/Krakus Regiment (4/114) Artillery Park: Colonel Bontemps 11th Polish Foot Artillery (6/129) Det. 14th Polish Foot Artillery (3/62) 1st Polish Sapper Company (5/135) Polish Military Equipage (9/98) Polish Gendarmes (4/90) At the same time, Napoleon organized the IV Cavalry Corps from the large force of Polish cavalry. The strength and organization of the IV corps, as of 6 July 1813, was: IV Cgrpg:7 7th Light Cavalry Division: G£n£ral de division Sokolnicki Brigade: G£n6ral de brigade Krykowiecki (Detached to I Corps) 2nd Polish Uhlan Regiment 4th Polish Chasseur k Cheval Regiment Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Tolinski l/3rd Polish Uhlan Regiment (19/208/276)8 2/3rd Polish Uhlan Regiment (8/195/232) 3/3rd Polish Uhlan Regiment (9/199/237) 4/3rd Polish Uhlan Regiment (4/144/112) l/13th Polish Hussar Regiment (19/164/221) 2/13th Polish Hussar Regiment (7/102/109) 3/13th Polish Hussar Regiment (8/105/120) 4/13th Polish Hussar Regiment (8/127/138) 8th Light Cavalry Division:GenSral de division Sulkowski Brigade: General de brigade Uminski 1/lst Polish Chasseur k Cheval Regiment (20/181/262)

2/lst Polish Chasseur & Cheval Regiment (7/119/140) 3/lst Polish Chasseur k Cheval Regiment (8/141/163) 4/1st Polish Chasseur & Cheval Regiment (11/98/106) l/6th Polish Uhlan Regiment (20/182/272) 2/6th Polish Uhlan Regiment (8/141/166) 3/6th Polish Uhlan Regiment (9/148/168) 4/6th Polish Uhlan Regiment (11/126/87)

Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Weissenhoff l/8th Polish Uhlan Regiment (20/231/298) 2/8th Polish Uhlan Regiment (11/167/202) 3/8th Polish Uhlan Regiment (11/170/203) 4/8th Polish Uhlan Regiment (15/164/161) l/16th Polish Uhlan Regiment (19/193/262) 2/16th Polish Uhlan Regiment (11/130/159) 3/16th Polish Uhlan Regiment (11/118/143) 4/16th Polish Uhlan Regiment (12/129/162) Artery: 1st Polish Horse Battery (8/161) On 29 August Napoleon directed that Austrian prisoners of war known to be Polish were to be sent to the four Polish depot companies in Dresden. Each company was to be brought to a total strength of 500 men each, and commanded by a Polish major. One more company was formed for the 4th Polish Infantry Regiment, one for the Vistula Legion, and two for the regiments of General Dombrowski, whose depots were stationed in Dusseldorf. A total of 4,000 men were organized into these eight companies. The last four were commanded by Major J. Regulski. The Poles were severely handled at Leipzig. Most of the Polish survivors of the battle at Leipzig were captured when a bridge over the Elster was destroyed prematurely. In an attempt to swim the river Prince Poniatowski drowned. He had received his marshal's baton only three days before. Shortly before the battle of Leipzig, on 2 October 1813, Napoleon ordered the raising of a Polish Battalion of the Imperial Guard. The unit was raised before 2 October and it can be found on official orders of battle, but its actual strength is in question. Admission to the battalion required participation in one campaign and a decoration. The commanding officer of the battalion was Lt. Colonel S. Kurqusz, who had served in the 1809 and 1812 campaigns. The battalion was organized and equipped in Dresden, and barracked with the Saxon Grenadier Garde. The soldiers selected for this battalion were all at least 23 years old with two years of service in the other Polish regiments. They were hand picked. The battalion was attached to the Old Guard Division. The battalion appears to have disintegrated, and by 18 December 1813 only 15 officers and 80 soldiers remained. The officers of the regiment, with three exceptions, and all the men went to Paris and served in the 3e Eclaireurs de la Garde. After Leipzig With the death of Prince Poniatowski, the army of the Grand Duchy began to fall apart and individual soldiers wandered back to Poland or followed the retreating French westwards. The VIII Corps ceased to exist, only about 500 men escaping Leipzig. The four cavalry regiments of the IV Corps and Krukowiecki's Brigade, though weakened, retreated westward with little trouble. The Krakus were in an acceptable condition, but the 14th Cuirassiers were reduced to a few score men. When Dresden capitulated and the allies reneged on their agreement, the 7th Chevaul£gers9,13th Hussars, and 16th Polish Uhlans passed into captivity. Dombrowski's tiny corps withdrew to the west without much difficulty. However, the Polish general officers began a bout of serious infighting and politicking, most notably General Krukowiecki. In addition, the simple Polish soldiers began to desert because they were moving further and further from their homeland. Napoleon intervened personally and restored order, but General Sulkowski, though innocent, found himself compromised and obliged to retire to Poland. All the remaining Poles were placed in a single, united force under the command of Dombrowski.

On 20 November 1813, the remains of the Polish cavalry were drawn together in Sedan. They totaled about 221 officers, 1,761 men, and 1,851 horses, not including the Gardes d'honneur. Napoleon entertained thoughts of completely disbanding the infantry and organizing four uhlan regiments and two regiments of Polish Cossacks. However, the Imperial Decree dated 18 December 1813, reorganized them into a Polish Army Corps. This corps consisted of two regiments of lancers, each with four 125 man companies, one regiment of Krakus with six squadrons of 250 men, a single infantry regiment known as the Vistula Regiment (organized with two battalions, each battalion having six 140 man companies), a horse artillery battery, four foot artillery batteries, and a sapper company. All excess officers were organized into four companies of Gardes d'honneur. The French encouraged those officers to remain with the French army, which was terribly short of trained officers. To promote the incentive, they were offered a promotion of one rank. However, very few accepted the offer. On 1 January 1814, the Polish Corps in Sedan had: Unit Officers 1st Uhlans 25 2nd Uhlans 25 Eclaireurs (Krakus) 78 Horse Artillery 5 Vistula Regiment 47 4 Foot Batteries 20 Sapper Company 4

Soldiers 505 505 997 120 807 500 64

Total 530 530 . 1,075 125 854 520 68

Horses 399 336 360 47 13 —

The eclaireurs were short 576 men and the Vistula Regiment 854 men. The corps was short a total of 1,471 horses. In the uhlan regiments, 196 horses were unfit for service. In the beginning of February, the remnants of the Polish Guard Battalion were incorporated into a 3rd Eclaireur Regiment of the Guard. With the abdication, all of the Poles still in French service found themselves released and returned to Poland. Unit Officers 2nd Uhlan Regiment 45 3rd Uhlan Regiment 32 4th Uhlan Regiment 26 8th Uhlan Regiment 48 16th Uhlan Regiment 4 1st Chasseur Regiment 28 Krakus Regiment 21 13th Hussar Regiment 17 1st Gardes d'honneur 93 2nd Gardes d'honneur 60 Total 374

Men 384 221 203 369 27 191 257 113 —

——

1,765

Horses 392 230 229 402 10 188 288 112 139 97 2,087

Internal Organization of The Polish Army in 1807 The legions or divisions formed in 1807 consisted of a divisional staff, four infantry regiments, two cavalry regiments (uhlans and chasseurs), and a battalion of artillery and sappers. The term "legion" remained in use until the end of 1807 and was later replaced by the term "division." The legion or divisional staff consisted of: 1 G£n£ral de division 1 Major of the Legion (G£n6ral de brigade or Colonel) 2 Brigade commanders (G6n£raux de brigade) 1 Chief of staff (G£n£ral de brigade or Colonel)

3 Adjutants to the Legion Commander (one Chef d'escadron, one Captain, one Lieutenant) 2 Adjutants to the Major of the Legion (one Captain, one Lieutenant) 4 Adjutants to the Brigade Commanders (two Captains, two Lieutenants) 2 Engineering Officers 1 Commissaire de guerre 1 Adjunct to the Commissaire de guerre 1 Inspector of Reviews 3 Under Inspectors of Reviews 1 Paymaster 1 Surgeon Major 2 Surgeon Aides 2 Surgeons 2nd Class The staff of the infantry regiments consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Major (ranking as a Lt. Colonel) 2 Chefs de bataillon (also Lt. Colonels) 1 Adjutant-major (Capitain) 1 Quartermaster (Capitain) 11st Class Surgeon 1 2nd Class, Sous-Surgeon 1 Chaplain 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Cobbler 1 Master Armorer 1 Drum Major 1 Music Master 8 Musicians Each battalion had a staff formed with: 1 Chef de bataillon (shown in regimental staff) 1 Adjutant-major (Lieutenant) 1 Surgeon 2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Battalion Drummer The battalion was organized with nine companies. The first battalion had the odd numbered companies, i.e. the 1st Grenadier, 1th Voltigeur, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 13th, and 15th Fusilier Companies. The even numbered companies were in the 2nd Battalion. The companies were organized very close to the organization established by the French Imperial Decree of 18 February 1808. Each company had: 1 1 1 1 1

Capitain Fourrier Lieutenant Sous-lieutenant Sergeant-major

4 Sergeants 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 120 Soldiers 1 Sapper or Clerk 140 Total

Each company was organized into three platoons, commanded by the lieutenant, souslieutenant and sergeant major. One of the four sergeants was designated as the chef de compagnie, and the other three were assigned as second in command to each of the platoons. Each platoon was organized with three sections, each a corporal, and totaling 13 privates. There was also a sapper and one clerk assigned for every two companies. Initially, the War Directory Decree of 18 January 1807 assigned the legion a single cavalry regiment with six squadrons. This regiment was to consist of: 1 Colonel 6 Chefs d'escadron 1 Adjutant Major, Capitain 2 Adjutant NCO's 12 Capitains 12 Lieutenants 12 Sous-lieutenants

12 Sergeant majors 48 Sergeants 12 Brigadiers Chefs (Lance Corporals) 96 Brigadiers (Corporals) 24 Trumpeters 12 Blacksmiths1,800 Troopers 2,050 Total

However, the organization of the cavalry had progressed so far that many regiments stood with three full squadrons, and convenience intervened. There were several advantages to having two smaller regiments in view of the two brigade structure of the legion, one of which was that smaller formations were also more flexible. Thus, in March 1807 each legion was organized with two, three squadron regiments with separate staffs. Their structure was as follows: 1 Colonel 1 Major 3 Chefs d'escadron 1 Adjutant Major (Capitain) 2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Staff Surgeon 1st Class 1 Surgeon 2nd Class 1 Quartermaster (Captain) 1 Paymaster (Capitain) 1 Staff Fourrier 1 Trumpet Major 1 Veterinarian 1 Master Saddlemaker 1 Master Armorer 1 Master Cobbler 1 Master Tailor 19 Total Each of the three squadrons were formed with two companies. Each company was divided into three platoons and contained: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Brigadiers 2 Trumpeters 1 Blacksmith

1 Blacksmith 150 Troopers 170 Total This gave the squadron a total of 340 men. The entire regiment, after the addition of one standard bearer per squadren in February 1808, numbered 1,042 men. Three battalions of artillery, three companies of sappers, and three train companies were formed. These were divided between the legions such that each legion's artillery and sapper battalion was formed with three foot artillery companies, a sapper company, and a train company. Each company had three platoons and each platoon had three sections. The first two sections of each artillery platoon were gunners and the remaining third were drivers. A company had six guns. These units were organized with: Artillery Battalion 3 Artillery Companies with: 1 Chef de Battalion (Battalion Commander) 3 Capitains 3 Lieutenants 3 Sous-lieutenants 3 Sergeant majors 12 Sergeants 3 Fourriers 24 Corporals 6 Drummers 3 Artisans 360 Gunners 421 Total Train Company 1 Lieutenant 1 Sergeant major 4 Sergeants 1 Brigadier fourrier 8 Brigadiers 180 Train Soldiers 195 Total

Sapper Company 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant major 4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 1 Artisan 120 Sappers 138 Total

Zych provides a variation in the organization of the sapper company. Though he states it was formed like the artillery companies, his breakdown (3 officers, 15 NCOs and 120 sappers) suggests that there were no artisans or drummers as were found in the artillery companies. This force was the cadre from which the artillery and engineering forces of the Polish army were eventually organized. The artillery was combined into a three battalion artillery regiment, while the train and sapper companies were combined into battalions. In all three instances this change appears to have been more administrative than an actual shifting of men and material. The Legion du Nord staff was formed with: 1 General de division 1 Major of the Legion

4 Assistant Surgeons 1 Drum Corporals

1 Quartermaster-Paymaster 1 Surgeon Major 4 Sous-Surgeons

2 Drummers 8 Musicians 2 Artisans 26 Total

Each battalion consisted of: 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Adjutant-major 1 Adjutant non-commissioned officer 7 Chasseur Companies (139 men each) 1 Voltigeur Company (139 men) 1 Carabinier Company (139 men) 1,254 Total Each company had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 4 Sergeants '

1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 12Q Chasseurs, Voltigeurs, or Carabiniers 139 Total

The legion had no cavalry and consisted solely of four battalions and a staff with a total strength of 5,042 men. Infantry of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 1809-1814 During March 1809, a new staff organization appeared. The regiments sent two battalions into the field and their staff consisted of: 1 Colonel 2 Chefs de bataillon 2 Adjutant-majors 1 Eagle Bearer 4 Surgeons 2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Drum major 1 Drum corporal 8 Musicians £ Wagon drivers 28 Total The single battalion remaining behind in the depot had a staff that consisted of: 1 Major 1 Chef de battalion 1 Adjutant NCO

2 Surgeons 3 Artisans

In 1810, there was a reorganization of the internal structure of the Polish infantry. Each battalion now was reorganized with six companies. Of these companies, one'was a grenadier company, one a voltigeur company, and four were fusilier companies. Each regiment was organized with three line battalions, though before 1812 some regiments raised a 4th Battalion. The regimental staff now consisted of:

I

W

1 Colonel 1 Major 3 Chefs de bataillon 1 Quartermaster treasurer 3 Adjutant-majors 1 Port-aigle (Eagle bearer) 11st Class physician 2 2nd Class physicians 3 3rd Class physicians 1 Chaplain 6 Adjutant non-commissioned officers 2 2nd & 3rd Port-aigle (Eagle bearer), non-commissioned officers 1 Regimental Drum Major 1 Drum Corporal 8 Musicians 1 Master armorer 2 Tailors 1 Master Cobbler Between all the companies of the regiment there were: 6 1st Class Capitains 6 2nd Class Capitains 6 3rd Class Capitains

91st Class Lieutenants 9 2nd Class Lieutenants 18 Sous Lieutenants

Each company consisted of: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 2 Drummers (buglers in voltigeur co.) 117 Fusiliers 136 Total 2 Enfants de troupe This set the regiment with a staff of39:54 officers, 252 non-commissioned officers, 2,106 soldiers and 36 drummers and buglers. The regimental total was 2,487 men and 36 enfants de troupe. This formation did not remain the standard organization for the Polish infantry throughout the remainder of the existence of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but the changes were very minor. The convention between France and the Grand Duke of Warsaw, signed on 25 February 1812, added 20 soldiers to each line company. The increase was paid by the French treasury. On 21 March 1812, Frederick August added another four soldiers, bringing the company strength up to a final strength of 160 men, from the 136 men per company existing before the February convention. In 1811, depot battalions were organized for the first 14 line regiments. Each depot battalion was commanded by a 1st Class Capitain and had four fusilier companies

organized with: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant major 4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 121 Fusiliers 140 Total The Supplementary Decree of 13 June 1812 specified the number of caissons per infantry regiment as follows: 3 Ammunition caissons 3 Cartridge caissons 3 Bread caissons 1 Ambulance caisson 1 Document caisson In addition, there was one field forge for every three regiments. Uniforms of the Polish Line Infantry From mid-November 1806 through January 1807, the uniforms for the period were dark blue with collars, facings, cuffs, and side stripes in the departmental color: Posen — white, Kalisz — crimson, Warsaw — yellow. However, before March 1807, any uniformity of dress is in question, though there was a tendency toward a restoration of the old national uniform and colors. On 16 November, General Dombrowski specified that a draftee should wear a dark blue kurtka, white sleeved vest, dark blue or gray pants, and a dark blue or gray czapka. Because of the lack of haversacks and bullet pouches, they carried their belongings in canvas bags and their cartridges in their pockets. Antoni Bialkowski states in his memoirs that the 4th (Posen) Infantry Regiment was equipped with dark blue czapkas with gold trimming, a tricolor cockade, and six inch tall pompons (gold for the fusiliers, poppy red for grenadiers, green for voltigeurs), dark blue kurtkas with yellow facings and cuffs, dark blue pants with yellow side stripes, white sleeved vests with dark blue collars and shoulder straps, short black gaiters with eight buttons, and gray overcoats with yellow collars and shoulder straps. The regimental colors of the Posen Legion were as follows: 1st Regiment 2nd Regiment 3rd Regiment 4th Regiment

— white — green — fight blue — yellow

Because of supply problems, many units wore modified Prussian uniforms or anything that was available, including modified civilian cloths. It was not uncommon for regimental commanders to use artistic license and modify their regiment's uniforms. On 2 March 1807, the uniform was modified and a divisional uniform was adopted. They were as follows:

Unit 1st Division 2nd Division 3rd Division

Kurtka Dark Blue Dark Blue Dark Blue

Cuff & Lapels Yellow Crimson White

Collar Poppy Red Crimson White

Buttons Yellow White Yellow

The soldiers wore a white cockade on their hat. Their pants were dark blue with stripes of the divisional color. The piping on the uniform was the color of the lapels. The grenadiers had a poppy red epaulets, the voltigeurs wore light green epaulets. Both officers and soldiers were supposed to wear black felt shakos, but the czapka was commonly used. Pompons and plumes varied. Officers wore white ones, the grenadiers wore poppy red, the voltigeurs wore light green, and the fusiliers wore black. Though the grenadiers wore bearskin bonnets, there are sources that indicate that in some of the regiments they wore czapkas with brass plates bearing a grenade. When the 4th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Regiments went to Spain in August 1808, their uniforms were so ragged that they were issued some French uniform articles. French shakos were issued to many who lacked head gear. Despite the issuance of uniforms cut in the French style, they continued to wear the basic Polish colors. This changed with the issuances of the Imperial decrees of 19 January and 17 February 1812, which issued them the new French "habit court/' shakos with the tricolor cockade, and eliminated the last vestiges of their Polish uniforms. However, the 4th Regiment wore its 1807 divisional dress until 1813. The grenadiers wore a wide poppy-red band around the top of their shakos, and it is probable that the voltigeurs wore the wide yellow band of the French voltigeurs. The drummers and buglers were issued Imperial livery, light green jackets with dark green and yellow bands, decorated with imperial eagles and ciphers. In 1809, a large number of Polish troops went into the field wearing a white sleeved vest and linen pants. The newly formed Galician-French regiments were clad as best as could be managed. The 13th Regiment wore uniforms taken from Austrian magazines. They wore shakos and white kurtkas with light blue collars, cuffs, and facings. The Decree of 3 September 1810 directed that all of the infantry uniforms be changed such that they all had the same facings. Despite the decree, the 4th Regiment retained its yellow facings and these regulations did not apply to the other regiments in French service. The Duchy infantry now wore a dark blue kurtka (coat) with white lapels. The collar was crimson, though a dark blue collar with crimson piping was often worn by grenadiers. The cuffs were crimson though yellow cuffs with white piping were worn by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments and the voltigeurs of the 5th Regiment. The cuff flaps were usually white with crimson piping, though for the 4th, 5th, and 9th Regiments they were dark blue with white piping. The breeches and gaiters were white in the summer. In the winter they wore dark blue breeches. The grenadiers wore a peaked bearskin bonnet with brass plaque bearing a white metal eagle and the regimental number between two grenades. On the top of the bearskin was a red patch with a white cross. The bonnet was hung with poppy red cords and had a poppy red plume. All the grenadiers wone poppy red epaulets, long mustaches, and large sideburns. However, only the bonnets of the 2nd, 4th, and 16th Regiments seem to have conformed with regulations. The grenadiers of the 13th Regiment continued to wear the shakos issued in 1809. This shako had a poppy red pompon, cords and tassels and its brass plate bore the regimental number surmounted by a brass grenade. The black visor was trimmed with brass. The variations in the grenadier uniform of other regiments were as follows: Regiment

Peaked

Plaque

Cords

Tassels

Plume

1st

Yes

Yes*

No

Poppy Red on Right

No

2nd

Yes

Regimental Number

White White, right and top center only

No

3rd 4th 5th

No

No

White

As the 2nd

No

Yes

Yes-

6th

No Brass Grenade with Regimental Number White No No

As the 2nd

No

7th

No

8th 9th 10th

No No

No

White

As the 2nd

No

No

White

No

No

No

White

None As the 2nd

No

11th

No

No

White

As the 2nd

No

12th

No

White

As the 2nd

No

13th

No See text

14th

No

No

White

As the 2nd

Poppy Red

15th

No

No

White

As the 2nd

No

16th

Yes

Yes

As the 2nd

Yes

17th

No

No

White White

As the 2nd

Poppy Red

• Plaque was according to regulation requirements.

In 1812, most of the grenadier companies wore a plume. The voltigeurs wore a czapka with white cords and a yellow over green plume. The voltigeurs wore green epaulets, yellow collars, and short mustaches. The fusiliers wore a black czapka with a white eagle over a copper plaque, which bore the regimental number. The edges of the square top of the czapka were trimmed with brass. They wore a black pompon and white cords with white and crimson tassels for the non-commissioned officers. The fusiliers wore dark blue shoulder straps and were clean shaven. The 13th Regiment continued to be an exception with its white and light blue uniforms and black shakos with pompons. Both the grenadiers and voltigeurs had light blue collars. The grenadiers were distinguished by a poppy red pompon, cords and epaulets. There was also a brass grenade on the shako. The uniforms of the voltigeurs had dark green pompons and cords on their shakos, and dark green epaulets. The shako also bore a brass bugle and brass plaque with the regimental number. They did not wear the Polish eagle on their shakos. The sappers wore the same bearskin as the grenadiers with a crimson plume and white cords and tassels. They had the red cloth crossed axes and a grenade symbol on their sleeve. Their apron was of white leather and they wore gauntlets. The sapper's axe was carried in a black leather pouch. All sappers carried a saber and a dragoon carbine. Some sources also show the sappers carrying studded maces. They wore the traditional full beards. The rank distinctions for all grades were the same as those worn by the French. Polish Guard Infantry Battalion On 2 October 1813, Napoleon decreed that a battalion of Polish Guard be raised for his Imperial Guard. This battalion was raised and did serve at the battle of Leipzig and Hanau. The battalion consisted of a staff and four companies. The staff consisted of: 1 Battalion Commander 1 Adjutant major 1 Sous-adjudant 1 Paymaster 1 2nd Class Surgeon 1 Wagon master

1 Drum corporal 1 Master armorer 2 Mule drivers 11 Total Each company contained: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 2 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 4 Sergeant 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 3 Drummers 183 Grenadiers 204 Total The staff and battalion contained 21 officers and 803 non-commissioned officers and men. Though not part of the decree, there were three servants assigned to the battalion commander and a further three mule drivers, bringing the total of the battalion to 830. There had originally been an allowance for an eagle bearer and two assistant eagle bearers, but Napoleon deleted them from the organization. In addition, there were to be eight sappers in the batallion with the rank and pay of corporals, two assigned to each company. Theoretically, the grenadiers wore black Saxon shakos with a scarlet pompon and tuft over the Polish cockade. There was no plaque as the Saxon one was removed, and the chinscales were gilt. Their kurtka was royal blue and in the Polish style; its collar was royal blue and the kurtka had white demi-lapels. The cuffs were scarlet with white cuff flaps. The turnbacks and piping along the bottom of the jacket was also scarlet, and the fringed epaulets were white. The breeches were royal blue with white gaiters. The boots were black and the belts, white. However, the regiment did not have time to be uniformed in this manner and the soldiers wore the uniforms from their original regiments with bearskin bonnets. The National Guard of 1807-1809 The first units of the national guard were organized spontaneously in the Posen Department. As early as February 1807, the Posen National Guard had 18 companies, while small towns, such as Wschowa, formed up to seven companies each. In Warsaw, the nucleus of the National Guard was the local militia, organized in November 1806, just a few days before the departure of the Prussian garrison. This group served as a police force and was commanded for a shortl time by Poniatowski, then by J. Moszynski and Raszka. In April 1807, the Governing Committee discussed a project of reorganizing the Warsaw militia into a National Guard. Though the project was approved on 24 April, its implementation was initially limited to Warsaw. The Warsaw National Guard Regiment was organized like a regular infantry regiment, with two battalions of nine companies. Zych states that it had three battalions, but this seems unlikely as he provides a total strength in 1807 of 2,479. All property owners in Warsaw, as well as merchants, artisans, and their apprentices (the latter only if sons of property owners), were drafted into the regiment. Priests that were not attached to a parish or a hospital were also incorporated into the guard and had to pay a contribution towards its upkeeping. Jews and public school students were exempt. The guardsmen had to buy their own uniforms and weapons. The guardsmen

too poor to afford that expenditure were provided money from the National Guard treasury. Those funds were, in fact, obtained from citizens who were able to escape service. The guard was unpaid unless they had to do service more than two miles from their garrison. The only salaried guardsmen were the officer-instructors from the regular army i.e., the regimental major, two adjutant-majors10 (one per demi-battalion) and the junior adjutants" (one per demi-battalion and company). The drummers also were paid. These men were paid according to army scales. On 22 June 1807, the Governing Committee ordered the formation of National Guard units in all municipalities of the Duchy. They were provided the following guidance by the committee: Number of Potential Guardsmen 2,400+

Rank of Commander Colonel

Assigned Regular Army Instructors As in Warsaw

1,200

Unit to be Formed Regiment with at least 2 battalions Battalion

Lt. Colonel

600

Demi-Battalion

Capitain

120 50+ Less Than 50

Company

Lieutenant Lieutenant

1 Capitain/Battalion 1 Lt/ company 1 Lt. & 1 SousLt. per company 1 Sous-lieutenant Salaried NCOs

None, regions which could not raise 50 men were exempted.

The National Guard did not have a centralized high command, although it was in practice subordinated to the military authorities. In peacetime, it was at the disposal of the administration and the police, but their orders had to be acknowledged and accepted by the proper military officials. In war they were subordinated to the district commanders or garrison commanders. On 30 March 1809, the total strength of the National Guard reached 24,557 men and was still growing during the Austro-Polish portion of the war. The break down of these men was as follows: 1,973 in the city of Warsaw 12,306 in the Posen Department 7,332 in the Kalisz Department 2,880 in the Lomza Department 66 in Chelmno (Bromberg Department) Indications are that it reached about 30,000 men. In March 1809, the State Council created the Sedentary National Guard as a police force. It contained all men between 16 and 60 years of age. They were organized in units of ten, 100 and 1,000. In 1811, the National Guard was organized in the newly acquired territories of Galicia. The National Guard of 1811-1813 Despite Poniatowski's well-founded arguments that the National Guard was an unnecessary burden on the fragile Polish economy, Napoleon pressed the State Council into reorganizing and expanding it. The Decree of 10 April 1811 drafted all men from 20 to 50 years of age (except clergy, teachers, and the handicapped) into the National Guard.

Jews were included on this occasion, but in practice they were often allowed, on a local basis, to avoid service. The entire force was divided into the Sedentary Guard, the Mobile Guard, and the permanent Paid Guard. The Sedentary Guard were property holders, public officials, merchants, artists, licensed artisans, and wealthier farmers. They formed a policing force in the villages and towns, and defended them in case of a direct enemy threat. In large cities, a part of the Sedentary Guard, uniformed at its own expense and divided into regular companies, was kept on a permanent basis, parading on various holidays under the supervision of regular army officers and NCO's assigned according to the need. The Mobile Guard consisted of apprentices, petty farmers, and everybody else. In peacetime, it was divided into "legions" (legie), "banners" (choragwie), and "sections" (roty), while during wartime it was to be organized into battalions and companies with army officers. The Mobile Guard could be used anywhere in the Duchy; if it were sent away from their home departments, the guardsmen were to receive pay on a par with regular army units. The funds for its upkeep came from the civilian administration. The Paid Guard consisted of volunteers, preferably from among veteran soldiers, commanded by officers on half pay, and veterans. They were formed into permanent police units. The idea was to relieve the regular army from having to perform such duties as well as to reduce or eliminate the costs resulting from the employment of other guardsmen in this capacity. The Paid Guard was maintained and paid from a 15 % increase in the personal tax. Both Poniatowski and Bignon (Napoleon's resident in Warsaw) were very skeptical about the actual implementation of this decree. Their judgment proved correct. The civilian administration, with its notorious slowness and lack of motivation, turned the proposed general restructuring of the guard into a complete mess. Poniatowski demanded a suspension of the April decree, and, on 7 May 1811, ordered the call-up of part of the existingguard, which, according to the April decree, fell under the category of the mobile guard. Tnis half-measure was necessitated by the scarcity of regular army forces in the Duchy. At the same time, National Guard units were established in the Galician departments. The Sedentary Guard and Paid Guard remained unformed and did not progress beyond a paper organization. The May decree prescribed the company establishment as follows: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant major 1 Fourrier 17 Sergeants 1 Drummer 177 Guardsmen 200 Total The battalion staff consisted of a battalion commander and an adjutant-lieutenant. A battalion contained six companies, including one of grenadiers and another of voltigeurs. The actual organization ordered into existence was as follows: Organizei/Commander Number of Men Territory 1,200 Lubienski City of Warsaw 1,200 Biernacki Kalisz Department 1,000 Krasinski Radom Department 1,000 Krasinski Krakow Department 1,000 Stogetin Lomza Department

3,000 1,500 300

Posen Department Bromberg Department Plock Department

Garczynski Lachocki Poletyllo

The Decree of 22 May organized 400 guardsmen in the Lublin Department and a further 200 in the Siedlce Department under the command of Wieniawski, bringing the total projected strength to 10,800 men organized in 54 companies. The effects of this partial reorganization, based on the 22 June 1807 decree and the 10 April 1811 decree, were mixed. Warsaw, having an established force, functioned satisfactorily. The Radom guard was roughly organized in May 1811, but deteriorated. The Bromberg guard was established by the end of June, the Krakow guard was formed in August, and the Kalisz guard in September. The organization of the Lomza guard went smoothly, and its men were posted on permanent border guard duty. In the other departments the situation was much worse. The military organizers encountered numerous obstacles thrown in their way by local civil authorities, and the practice of sending unsatisfactory substitutes to the guard was wide spread. In some districts, the administrators treated the guard units as penal institutions and filled their ranks with vagrants and beggars. The project failed. Poniatowski proposed to Frederick August on 25 September 1811 that a large portion of the existing guard units be incorporated into the army where they could be used to greater advantage. This was approved by the Grand Duke on 18 December 1811, with the exception of the guard units in the large cities and the Lomza Department. The remainder of the guard was drafted into the army, and their numbers subtracted from the conscription quotas of their departments. Only a few small units were retained by the prefects for police duty and they were absolved from any military duties. As the year 1812 arrived, the National Guard was in a state of considerable chaos. Faced with the approach of war, on 17 March 1812, the Ministry of internal affairs decided to reactivate the April 1811 decree and reordered the organization of the Sedentary Guard. They also ordered a census of the Mobile Guard. Both were to be finished by 1 April 1812. The organization of the Paid Guard remained suspended. On 15 April, when it became apparent that executing the decision was impossible, an order was issued to preserve the existing active guard units as in 1811 as Mobile Guard. The Mobile Guard units were employed along the Russian border. Shortly after most of the national guard units from southern and southeastern parts of the Duchy were assigned to the Kosinski Division. Of these units, only the Krakow battalion constituted a reliable fighting force. The other units either lacked uniforms and arms or were in a deplorable condition. Kosinski was especially shocked by the sight of the Radom guard, which was formed of vagrants and beggars. He wrote that, "even a cossack would be ashamed to fight against such rabble," who were, "so haggard that they couldn't be used even to dig ditches..." As a result, Kosinski left the majority of his guard units in the Zamosc fortress, taking into the field only 7 officers and 156 men of the Krakow guard. The total number of guardsmen from the Mobile Guard that were activated during the 1812 campaign reached about 3,900. Between February and May 1813 these units were either incorporated into the regular army regiments or simply disintegrated. Those that remained under arms were used by the Allied occupation authorities for police duty, until the Polish National Guard was finally disbanded by the resolutions of the Congress of Vienna. Only in Krakow, which became an independent republic, did any vestige of the National Guard remain. Many of the former guardsmen surfaced again in the ranks of the local militia between 1815 and 1836. National Guard of Warsaw A Council of Ministers decree dated 15 June 1812 stopped the reorganization of the National Guard directed by the April 1811 decree, causing the organization established

in May 1811 to be retained. It also increased the number of men being raised. In order to lighten the burden of military duties, additional categories of citizens were drafted. The decree also contained a guarantee that, "the National Guard would be used only within the city limits, and solely for the purpose of keeping law and order there." The ranks wore dark blue kurtkas and the officers wore dark blue tailcoats. They had light blue collars (yellow for the voltigeurs) and pointed cuffs, both of which were piped with white. The white facings were piped with light blue. The turnbacks were white for the officers and dark blue with light blue piping for the soldiers. The epaulets of the officers were gold, those of the grenadiers were poppy red, the voltigeurs were light green, and the fusiliers did not wear them. The officers wore tight white breeches, while the troops wore white pantaloons. The officers wore black hussar boots with black or golden tassels. The enlisted men wore black shoes and white gaiters. The officers wore bicorns with silver corner tassels, white cockades, and agraffes. The rank and file wore black shakos with a yellow band around the top of the grenadier shako; the fusiliers had a orange band. Light blue pompons surmounted with poppy red plume was worn by the grenadiers. The plumes were light yellow for the voltigeurs, and small orange pompons were worn by the fusiliers. The cords were poppy red for the grenadiers, light yellow for the voltigeurs, and orange for the fusiliers. The shako had a rhomboid brass plaque. The officers wore golden buttons, while the soldiers wore yellow. All of their leather work was white. The National Guard of Krakow The National Guard of Krakow was organized in mid-1811 by J. Krasinski, formerly a major in the Warsaw National Guard. The Regiment consisted of two battalions, each with six companies. Each battalion had one grenadier, one voltigeur and four fusilier companies. The regiment was formed and operational by 15 August 1811. As Krakow did not have a formal garrison the national guard was assigned those duties. The only other forces in the city were the depots of 12th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Uhlan Regiment. In 1812, one battalion was sent to Zamosc and took part in the operations of Kosinski's Division, losing almost half of its strength. The regiment was, as a result, one of the most heavily engaged of the national guard units. It was disarmed in May 1813 by the Russian troops that occupied Krakow and disbanded shortly there after. Their uniform consisted of a dark blue kurtka or tailcoat with light blue collars, pointed poppy red cuffs (yellow for the voltigeurs) with white piping, and white facings piped with poppy red. The bottom edge of the uniform and the turnbacks were also piped with white. They wore the same epaulets, legwear and foot wear as the Warsaw National Guard, except the officers' boots had no tassels and the soldiers did not wear gaiters. The officers bicorns had white cockades, golden tassels and agraffes, and silver pompons with a short, brush-like plume (white for the fusiliers, light green for the voltigeurs). The grenadier officers wore bearskins with poppy red pompons and long plumes, white cords and tassels. The other ranks wore czapkas with light green pompons topped with plumes as on the officers' hats. The cords were light green for the voltigeurs, white for the fusiliers. The grenadiers' were like those of their officers, except the top of the plume was white. On the czapkas they had a yellow brass plaque with the Krakow coat of arms. The sappers wore the grenadier uniform with poppy red crossed axes on the left sleeve and long white aprons. All of the leather work was white. National Guard of Lublin This force was one of the units raised in 1811. Its only notable aspect was its uniform. The grenadier officer's uniform consisted of a black bicom hat with gold tassels in the comers. The coats were navy blue with light blue cuffs and collar. The epaulets, grenades, and buttons were blue. The pants and officers' sashes were white and the officers' sashes had gold fringes.

I The National Guard of Vilna The National Guard of Vilna was formed by the Order of the Day of 1 July 1812, issued in the Imperial camp at Vilna. This order directed that two, six company battalions be organized, establishing them with a complement of 714 men each. It had a staff consisting of: 1 Commandant 2 Chefs de bataillon 2 Adjutants-major 1 Quartermaster 2 Adjutant NCOs

1 Drum major 3 Master Artisans 1 Surgeon Major 1 Assistant Surgeon Major 2 Musicians 22 Total

Each company had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 4 Sergeants

1 Quartermaster Corporal 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 100 Soldiers 119 Total

This gave the Vilna National Guard a total strength of 1,450 men. The national guardsmen wore the same uniform as the Polish infantry. The same decree also directed the raising of a gendarmerie commanded by a colonel in the governments of Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, and Bialystok. In Vilna and Minsk there were to be two chefs d'escadron (squadron commanders), and in Grodno and Bialystok one chef d'escadron. Each county had a single company consisting of: 11st Class CapitainCommanding 1 2nd Qass Capitain 11st Class Lieutenant 2 2nd Qass Lieutenants

1 Sergeant major 4 Sergeants 22 Total 16 Brigadiers 80 Gendarmes 1 Trumpeter 107 Total

This force was also uniformed like its Warsaw counterpart. Corps of Veterans and Invalids The organization of the Corps of Veterans and Invalids is unknown. Research reveals only its existence and the details of its uniforms. Though the various veteran and invalid corps throughout Europe at this time did have a "typical" infantry company cadre assigned, they generally took in every veteran or invalid who met their requirements. As a result, their structures were quite variable and generally not mandated beyond indicating what made up the cadre. The uniforms of this corps were identical to those of the line infantry units, with the following exceptions. They were of light blue cloth, as was the lining. The collars and cuffs were, depending on the source, either light blue or crimson. The lapels were light blue with crimson piping. The buttons were white metal and bore the motto "Weterany," meaning veteran. The czapka was black with a light blue turban piped in crimson; it had a crimson pompon and white plaque with the "Weterany" motto. The czapka plaque was occasionally surmounted by the Polish eagle. The officers wore a bicorn with round crimson pompons, silver tassels and agraffes. Their breeches were either light blue or white, and they had hussar style boots. The epaulets, gorgets, sword knots, czapka cords,

and galons were in silver or white metal. Rank distinctions were the same as the line infantry.

6

i

6

'1 hi

6

6

5 or 7

1. 2. 3. 4.

i|

1 J6

6|

• 0

H

H

0 0 0 00 5. 6. 7. 8.

Captain Oberstleutnant Sous-lieutenant Sergeant-Major

Sergeant Corporal Fourrier Sapper

Grand Duchy Fusilier Company 1808 - 1814

6

6

<1 M

S

6

6

[ 6

|

|

00 1. 2. 3. 4.

»

£6

|

000

Captain Lieutenant Sous-lieutenant Sergeant-Major

MM o 5 or 7

5. Sergeant 6. Corporal 7. Fourrier

Grand Duchy Grenadier Company 1808 -

1814

•

5 or 7

1. 2. 3. 4.

0 0 00 0 0

Captain Lieutenant Sous-lieutenant Sergeant-Major

a

5. Sergeant 6. Corporal 7. Fourrier

Grand Duchy Voltigeur Company 1808 -

1814

Tactical Organization The Polish infantry was organized along the lines of the French reorganization of 1808. The positions of the company officers and non-commissioned officers varied slightly from those set by the R£glement de 1791. The capitain and his sergeant were posted on the right wing of the company, the sergeant seconding the capitain in the third rank. The lieutenant, sous-lieutenant, and sergeant-major were posted in the file closers rank where they kept the men in the ranks. Two sergeants were posted in the file closers rank between the sergeant-major and the sous-lieutenant, and on the right behind the first file on the wing. When a sapper was designated, he was posted behind the capitain in the file closers rank. The standard guard of each battalion was organized with the eight fourriers of the fusilier companies. This is the reason why their position is marked with a "5 or 7," indicating that both the sergeant or fourrier could be in that position in the formed company. This detached force of fourriers was posted to the left of the fourth peloton and maneuvered with it. The first rank consisted of a sergeant-major, who carried the flag, and two fourriers who marched on either side of the flag. The two other ranks were formed with three fourriers each. These fourriers as well as the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) posted behind the various officers in the peloton ranks, carried their muskets on their right arm. The sergeant-major who carried the flag was chosen by the regimental colonel. This position was extremely important as the sergeant who carried the flag was the guide for the entire regiment and set the marching pace of the rest of the unit. The positions of the staff officers in the Polish army was identical to that set for the French by the R£glement de 1791. When maneuvering, the companies were designated as pelotons, each peloton consisting of two sections. When the six companies were present, they were arranged from right to left as follows: grenadiers, 3rd, 1st, 4th, 2nd, and voltigeurs. The battalion always maneuvered by division (a division contained two pelotons.)

0

s

• 0 0

0 0 0

0 1. 2. 3. 4.

Colonel Lieutenant Colonel Drum Major Drum Corporal

5. Drummers 6. Musicians 7. Sappers

Grand Duchy Infantry Regiment in Line 1808 - 1 8 1 4 The Cavalru of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw In 1810, the Polish cavalry was reorganized into four squadron regiments. The only exception was the cuirassier regiment, which had only two squadrons and was never raised to a four squadron strength. In contrast to oilier nations where each type of cavalry was numbered by its type, the Polish uhlans, hussars, cuirassiers, and chasseurs were numbered sequentially without regard to the type of regiment involved. The staff of the cavalry regiments was altered in March 1809 and the two squadrons, which went into the field from every regiment, had a staff of: 1 Colonel 2 Chefs d'Escadron 2 Adjutant majors 2 Standard bearers 4 Surgeons 2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Trumpet major 6 Baggage soldiers The single squadron that remained behind had: 1 Major 1 Chef d'escadron 2 Surgeons 1 Adjutant NCO 3 Artisans The history of the cuirassiers is sufficiently unusual as to require an indepth review. The

14th Cuirassier Regiment was originally formed as the 1st Cuirassier Regiment of the Galician-French Cavalry. It was organized by S. Malachowski on his estate of Konskie near Kielce on 11 July 1809. Malachowski became the regiment's colonel on 2 September 1809. During the next three months, the regimental depot in Konskie received recruits and horses. By 14 November 1809, it had risen to a strength of 610 men. The regiment continued to grow, and from July 1809 to July 1810 737 soldiers of all grades passed through its ranks. This would indicate that it was initially intended to form a four squadron regiment, but for some undocumented reason many officers and noncommissioned officers were transferred to other regiments. It was quite possibly the lack of suitable horses that caused this; however, Napoleon felt that the cuirassiers were too expensive, and stated a strong preference for either chasseurs or uhlans, rather than cuirassiers. On 28 December 1809, the Galician-French units were incorporated into the Duchy's army. On 30 March 1809 there was a reorganization that formally established the regiment at a strength of 419 men and 8 enfants de troupe. The regiment was fixed with a strength of two squadrons. In response to a letter from Napoleon dated 6 October 1810, the King of Saxony issued a decree on 21 November 1810 that directed the reorganization of the cuirassiers as a chasseur k cheval regiment. Poniatowski tried to persuade the King of Saxony into converting the unit into a dragoon regiment, thus at least preserving its uniforms, on 20 December 1810 Frederick August repeated his previous statement, adding that, "its transformation into a dragoon regiment would not fulfill the purpose of this change." On 29 December 1810, Poniatowski wrote to the King again, confirming the transformation of the cuirassiers into the chasseurs & cheval. He added, however, that the actual conversion was going to take a long time due to numerous practical obstacles. One week later, Poniatowski issued a farewell address to the regiment, which in the meantime had deposited its protective armor in the Warsaw armory. For the next sixteen months, the 14th Regiment was in an organizational limbo, causing confusion among the Russian spies who alternatively identified it as either a chasseur or a dragoon regiment. Finally, on 30 April 1812, Napoleon himself restored its former status and assigned the Polish cuirassiers to Lorge's heavy divison in the IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. The internal organization in 1810 of the cavalry was quite consistent. The chasseurs, hussars, and uhlans were all organized with a staff and four squadrons, each squadron having two companies. The staff of all but the cuirassiers consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Major 2 Chefs d'escadron 1 Paymaster 2 Adjutant-majors 11st Class Physician 2 2nd Class Physicians 2 3rd Class Physicians 1 Chaplain 1 Standard Bearer 2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Trumpet Major 1 Veterinarian 1 Master Armorer 1 Master Saddle maker 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Breeches maker 1 Master Cobbler

Each of the eight companies in a regiment had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 2 Sous-lieutenants 1 Sergeant major 4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 1 Blacksmith 8 Corporals 2 Trumpeters Z2 Troopers 100 Total 2 Enfants de troupe Within the regiment there were: 3 Capitains 1st Class 5 Capitains 2nd Class 4 Lieutenants 1st Class 4 Lieutenants 2nd Class 16 Sous-lieutenants The regiments, as a result, had a staff of 23,32 company officers, 112 non-commissioned officers, 8 blacksmiths, 16 trumpeters, and 632 men. The total stood at 823 men and 16 enfants de troupe. The staff of the cuirassier regiment, which had only two squadrons, consisted of:

\

1 Colonel 1 Major 1 Chef d'escadron 1 Paymaster 1 Adjutant-major 1 Adjutant NCO 11st Class Physician 1 2nd Class Physicians 2 3rd Class Physicians

1 Chaplain 1 Standard Bearer 1 Trumpet Major 1 Veterinarian 1 Master Armorer 1 Master Saddlemaker 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Breechesmaker 1 Master Cobbler 19 Total

Within the squadron there were: 2 Capitains 1st Class 2 Capitains 2nd Class 2 Lieutenants 1st Qass 2 Lieutenants 2nd Qass 8 Sous-lieutenants • The total theoretical strength of the cuirassier regiment stood at 19 staff, 16 officers, 56 non-commissioned officers, 4 blacksmiths, 8 trumpeters, and 316 men. This gave the regiment 419 men and 8 enfants de troupe. The equipment of the Polish regiments was quite varied. At first, the Poles were issued captured Prussian and Austrian carbines. The legion cavalry in Italy had Austrian 1770-

1774 carbines and French Model 1763 and Model 1777 pistols. After 1801 they appear to have been issued the French Model 1786 carbines. The Krakus did not, however, ever carry carbines. Normally, the Poles might be expected to have been equipped with French swords, but these weapons proved quite scarce. As a result they were armed between 1807 and 1809 with Prussian 1721 model hussar sabers or straight dragoon "Pallasch" of the 1735 and 1797 models. There is some possibility that a few were armed with Russian sabers. After 1809, they were equipped with Austrian hussar sabers of the 1769 and 1803 models and some French sabers of the Model IX, XI, and XIIL In addition, after 1810, many were also armed with sabers of Polish manufacture. In 1810 alone, New Galicia produced 10,000 sabers, which probably supplanted many foreign sabers in the Duchy's army. The cuirassiers carried the French swords, Model IX, XI, and XIII. The various cavalry officers carried every type of saber imaginable. Their swords were not covered by regulation and if they were, the regulations would have been ignored. As a result, everything from antiques to captured swords to oriental swords were worn. Between 1813 and 1814, the Polish cavalry was armed with French weapons. The 1st and 2nd Uhlans carried the Model XI sabers, the Model XI or XIII pistols, and the Model IX carbine. Their lance was the Model 1812,2.87 meters long. The uhlans carried a lance and were noted throughout Europe for their prowess with it. In the 1809 and 1813 campaigns the chasseur k cheval regiments also carried a lance. The lance ran 265 to 277 cm long (104-109 inches). It was made of ashwood impregnated with a mixture of linseed oil and tar, making it quite light, so much so that one could hold it between the looped forefinger and the middle finger of the right hand raised high above the head, delivering in this manner a very powerful thrust called "par le moulinet." The only metal elements were the spearhead and the heel on the other end. In the hands of an experienced uhlan it was an effective and terrible weapon. On 18 December 1813, when the Polish cavalry was reformed, the organization changed. The staff of the two uhlan regiments consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Colonel en second 2 Chefs d'escadron 2 Adjudant-majors 1 Quartermaster 1 Chirurgien major 1 Chirurgien aide-major 2 Adjudant NCOs 1 Trumpet Major 1 Master Armorer 1 Veterinarian (NCO) 14 Total The four companies each had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 2 Sous-lieutenants 1 Sergeant-major 4 Sergeants 1 Quartermaster 8 Brigadiers 2 Trumpeters 109 Troopers 129 Total

This gave the line regiments a strength of 25 officers and 505 rank and file. On 5 January 1814, Napoleon ordered the addition of one lieutenant and one sous-lieutenant per company, which raised the number of officers in each regiment to 33. Uniforms of the Grand Duchy Legions Cavalry The Uniform Regulations of 2 March 1807 prescribed a single uniform for all of the Polish Cavalry, uhlans, or chasseurs. There were absolutely no differences in the uniforming and equipping of these two formations, except that the uhlans carried lances. They were uniformed according to the division to which they were assigned. 1st Division: A dark blue kurtka with poppy red collars and cuffs, yellow facings piped with white, a white vest, dark blue breeches with double yellow stripes, and yellow buttons. The collars and cuffs were also piped with white. They wore a black shako, though the uhlans often wore a czapka, with black plumes and white cords. In undress, the breeches were gray with a double yellow side stripe. The elite companies had their shakos/czapkas sewn around with black lambskin or wore bearskin colpacks. In either instance, the elite companies headdress had a poppy red plume, bag, and cords. The senior officers wore white plumes and silver cords. 2nd Division: The collar, cuffs, and facings were crimson with white piping. The side stripes were also crimson, but were not piped. The buttons were white, and all other details of the uniform were the same as the 1st Division. 3rd Division: The collar, cuffs, and facings were white with white piping. The side stripes were also white, but were not piped. The buttons were yellow, and all other details of the uniform were the same as the 1st Division. Uniform of the Cuirassiers The first reference to uniforms for the cuirassier regiments dates from 1809 when it was the Cuirassier Regiment of the Galician-French Army. The steel helmet was of the French pattern. It had a black leather visor and a bearskin turban. The crest, chinscales, and metal band around the outer edge of the visor were brass. The houpette (tuft) was of white horsehair and the flowing crest was of black horsehair. A red plume mounted in a yellow metal socket was worn on the left side of the helmet. The coat was a single breasted habit vest or Kinski of white with a poppy red collar and cuffs. The coat tails were turned back to show the poppy red lining. The cuffs and collars were piped with white, but the turnbacks were not. The buttons were yellow metal with the regimental number "1" within a laurel wreath. The cuirass was bare steel without lining. There was a multi-pointed yellow metal star its center. The breeches were white, worn with black boots reaching above the knees. Steel spurs were worn on the boots. This uniform was worn until December 1809. On 19 December 1809, the uniform worn by the regiment upon their entry into Warsaw consisted of a dark blue habit-veste lined with red. The collar was poppy red and closed with three hooks. The poppy red cuffs were square cut and piped with dark blue. The vest, though not visible, was white. Their breeches were white leather. They wore long black boots extending to the knees with long mobile steel spurs. They had gold/yellow buttons, and gold epaulets for the officers, which distinguished them from the French cuirassiers. The NCO's had red with yellow epaulets, and the troopers had red epaulets. Their cuirass was steel and covered the chest and back. It was trimmed with copper, and the straps joining the two plates at the shoulder were scaled copper. The arm holes and waist were trimmed with red cloth in the same style as the French cuirass. Their helmet

was of the French model and had a red plume on the left side, black flowing crest, and a yellow houpette or tuft at the peak. In practice, the houpette, being the knotted end of the horse hair crest, was black. The cuirassiers did not, apparently, have cuirasses for the 1813 campaign. They were said not to have them upon their arrival at Zittau nor did they have them after the battle of Leipzig. Uniform of the Chasseurs d. Cheval Prior to 1808, the chasseurs wore a dark blue kurtka, but after that it was dark green. There is one exception and that is the 5th Chasseur & cheval Regiment, which continued to wear its blue uniform until 1810. Its cuffs, collars, piping, and turnbacks were in the regimental colors (1st Regiment — Poppy Red, 4th Regiment — Crimson, 5th Regiment — Orange). The buttons were yellow, and their green breeches were worn over short black leather shoes. The soldiers and officers of the elite companies wore colpacks of black bearskin with a bag of the regimental color and a gold button in its middle. Its cords and plume were red. The soldiers and officers of the center companies wore a black shako with white cords and a plume of the regimental color tipped with green. It had a metal plaque that bore the regimental number The regimental staff officers wore white plumes. If the officer or trooper wore a colpack, it sometimes had a carrot shaped pompon instead of the plume. This would be golden for officers and poppy red if it was worn by a trooper. The officers' cords, if present, were always silver. After 1810, the bags on the colpacks apparently disappeared. In 1813, the 1st Chasseurs was equipped with lances and the 4th Chasseurs were converted into an uhlan regiment; only the number remained unchanged. It is interesting to note that, during the 1809 campaign, the chasseurs also carried lances, probably to make up for the lack of carbines. From 1810 to 1812 they did not carry lances. Uniform of the Hussars The hussars wore dark blue pelisses trimmed with black fur for the 10th or white fur for the 13th. On the front it had 18 to 20 rows of buttons according to the size of the wearer. Each row had five buttons, and between these buttons was strung yellow (gold for officers) lace for the 10th Regiment and white lace (silver for officers) for the 13th Regiment. The dolman was also dark blue and had a crimson collar. It also had arranged the same arrangement of buttons and lace as the pelisse. In their dress uniform, the breeches were dark blue with yellow (gold) or white (silver) single side stripes and thigh knots. For the undress uniform, gray Hungarian breeches with crimson side stripes were worn and the inside of the legs lined with leather. Hungarian style boots were included. Initially the shakos were black, but later the shako of the 13th because light blue with white cords. They had white chinscales and a black plume. The officers and men of the elite companies wore a black or dark brown colpack with light blue tops, poppy red cords, and plumes. The officers wore either gold or silver cords, to match the lace, and white plumes. The common illustrations of "Polish hussars" in light blue shakos, crimson pelisse and dolman, and light blue breeches are, in fact, not hussars, but adjutants of the Commanderin-Chief, Poniatowski, and some of the adjutant-generals. Uniform of the Uhlans The uhlans wore a dark blue kurtka cut in the Polish style. It was decorated with cuffs, collars, turnbacks, and piping of the regimental color. The piping was found around the cuffs, collar, and pockets, as well as the outer seams of the sleeves and the back. The regimental colors were:

Regiment 2nd 3rd 6th 7th 8th 9th 11th 12th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st

Collar Piping Turnbacks Piping Poppy Red Dark Blue Yellow White Crimson White Dark Blue White White Crimson Dark Blue Crimson Yellow Poppy Red Dark Blue Poppy Red Poppy Red Dark Blue Dark Blue Poppy Red Poppy Red Dark Blue Dark Blue White Crimson Dark Blue Crimson White Dark Blue Crimson White White Crimson White Crimson White Dark Blue Crimson Crimson White Dark Blue Dark Blue Crimson Crimson Dark Blue Crimson Crimson White Yellow Yellow Dark Blue Dark Blue Dark Blue Yellow Dark Blue Crimson The regimental distinctive color was orange.

Cuffs Poppy Red Crimson Dark Blue Yellow Poppy Red Dark Blue Dark Blue Dark Blue Crimson Crimson Crimson Crimson Yellow Yellow

Piping White White Crimson Poppy Red Dark Blue Poppy Red Crimson White White White Dark Blue Dark Blue Dark Blue Dark Blue

The kurtka had yellow buttons with the regimental number on them. A white vest was worn under the kurtka. Their breeches were dark blue and worn over the short boots with spurs screwed into the heels. The breeches had a double band of yellow for the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 19th, and 20th Regiments, poppy red for the 8th and 9th Regiments, and crimson for the other regiments. These stripes were piped with white, except for the 7th and 8th Regiments, which were piped with poppy red. A black czapka was worn. The edges of the square top were reinforced with yellow metal and cords hung from corner to corner. The cords were golden for officers, white for troopers, poppy red for elite companies. A yellow plaque, known as an "Amazon's Shield," bore the regimental number. Over the plaque was a white metal eagle. There were regimental variations, and some regiments preferred a sunburst plaque with the eagle superimposed; the 17th Uhlans (a Lithuanian regiment) and probably several other Lithuanian regiments wore the sunburst plaque with a mounted knight superimposed on it. This was the ancient emblem of Lithuania. Officers wore a two inch wide golden band on their czapka just above the turban. The troopers had a white band. A plume was worn on the front peak of the czapka. The plumes were white for staff officers, black for troopers, and poppy red for the elite companies. The elite companies, however, wore a black lambskin czapka or colpack with poppy red bags, plumes, and cords. The lance pennants of the 2nd, 3rd, 15th, and 16th Regiments were red over white. Those of the 7th through 12th were tricolored with a dark blue triangle at the shaft of the lance; the upper portion was red and the lower portion white. In the 17th through 21st Regiments, those regiments raised in Lithuania, the pennant was blue over white. Unfortunately, this listing is only an approximation, for there were many more color combinations, often within the same regiment. Only the Lithuanian regiments appear to have been fairly consistent on this respect. Despite this, the 6th Uhlan Regiment continued to wear its old legion/ division dark blue uniform with white facings well into 1810, though the collar was changed from white to poppy red. The 11th Uhlans had non-regulation white facings, and side stripes and crimson piping on the facings. In addition, several regiments took to wearing nonregulation plumes cut la russe," or uncut long horse hair cascading down from the top. The 4th Uhlan, converted from the 4th Chasseurs in May 1813, wore dark blue kurtkas with crimson collars, facings and cuffs, crimson breeches with double dark blue side stripes, yellow epaulets and aguilettes on the right shoulder. The collar appears to have been piped with yellow. The czapkas were crimson with yellow piping and trimmings, black turbans topped with yellow bands, yellow cords and white plumes, as well as

black turbans topped with yellow bands, yellow cords and white plumes, as well as sunburst plaques. The center of this plaque was white and the sunburst rays were yellow. Uniform of the Lithuanian Mounted Gendarmes The gendarmes wore a dark blue "surtout" with poppy red collars, cuffs, piping and turnbacks. Their buttons were white, as were the epaulets, aguilettes on the left shoulder, and grenades on the collars. They wore short white breeches and black cuirassier boots. Their headgear consisted of black bicorns with white trim, cockades, and agraffes, as well as poppy red carrot shaped pompons. All leather work was white. The lance pennant was poppy red over white. They also carried a lance, carbine, saber, and a pair of pistols. Uniform of the Krakus When formed in 1813, they wore the folk costume of the Krakow region. This consisted of soft, square topped red czapkas with black or white lambskin turbans and without visors. These were known as either "krakuskas" or "konfederatkas." They wore white or brown russet coats with embroidery and appliques, wide pantaloons or tight breeches, long boots, and various overcoats. Later, as the 1813 campaign progressed, they wore cossack style colpacks and litewkas. The officers usually wore "military style" visored czapkas. The basic uniform colors were dark blue, crimson, and white, though there was truly no uniformness to it. In 1813, they were equipped with a lance, thought it did not always have a pennant. They carried sabers and pistols. Because of the lack of time for proper training, commands were given by waving a handkerchief. In 1814, this function was performed by using a "bunczuk," or horsetail, on a pike in the manner of the Tartars. The Krakus were mounted on small peasant horses, which resulted in Napoleon calling them his " pygmy cavalry." Despite that, he was very happy with their performance. Many of the Krakus spoke German or Russian, and they provided a tremendous asset in skirmishing and reconnaissance duties. In 1814, the Krakus adopted an unusual melon-like beret. It had a white spread tassel on top and white lace stripes running from the button to the black sheepskin band. The body of the beret was crimson. A white cockade and plume were worn on the left side of the beret. They wore a single breasted, full skirted coat, like the litewka worn by the Prussians. It had a crimson collar and cuffs with white piping on all edges. A crimson sash was worn at the waist. Their breeches were also blue with crimson side stripes and black leather inserts. They carried pistols, sabers, and lances without pennants. Tactical Organization of the Cavalry The squadron was commanded by the senior capitain, who had no designated position. Generally, he positioned himself at the head of the squadron, at its center in front of the two brigadiers that formed the junction between the first and second division. The junior capitain was in the file closers rank three paces behind the center of the squadron. The lieutenant of the first division stood before the center of the first peloton, the tail of his horse one pace in front of the first rank. The sous-lieutenant of the division stood before the center of the second peloton with his horse one pace in front of the first rank. The lieutenant of the second division stood before the center of the fourth peloton and the souslieutenant of the division stood before the third peloton. The second sous-lieutenants were posted at the center of their companies, in the file closers rank. The senior sergeant-major was in the file closers rank, in the center of the outer pelotons. The sergeants were posted in the front rank of their companies with one on each flank of the peloton. They had a brigadier posted so that one was adjacent to them, inside each peloton, and one was behind them in the second rank. The fourrier of each company was posted behind the center of the second peloton.

•

0

h

a

4. Sergeant Major 5. Sergeant 6. Fourier

1. Captain 2. Lieutenant 3. Sous-lieutenant

Grand Duchy Cavalry Regiment 1808 - 1814

00 0

0 1. Z 3. 4.

Colonel Major Chef d'escadron Standard Bearer

0 0

0 5. Adjutant NCO 6. Trumpet Major 7. Trumpeters

Grand Duchy Cavalry Squadron 1808 - 1814

Artillery and Engineers The Polish field army on 18 March 1809 had the following equipment assigned to it: Guns Advance Train ' 12pdrs 6pdrs Howitzers

Number Horses 6 48 18 108 6 36

Spare Carriages 12pdrs in Advance Train 6pdrs Howitzers

1 4 2

4 16 8

12pdr Caissons in Advance Train 6pdr Howitzers Infantry Park Field Forges Covered Wagons Prolonges

22 40 30 70 2 6 14 8

132 240 180 420 12 36 84 48

The personnel assigned to the Polish artillery corps consisted of: Staff General Staff

Colonel Pelletier, Commander of artillery & engineers Colonel Gorski, Chief of staff Capitain Jodko, Assistant

Engineering Staff

Capitain, Mallet, Commander of engineers Capitain Gotkowski, Assistant Potier, Engineering guard

Artillery Direction

Capitain Bontemps, Park director 2 Assistants

Vanguard Officers & Troops

Chef de bataillon Gugemus, commander of the artillery & engineers 1 Assistant 1 Horse Artillery Company 1 Sapper/Pontooneer Company 6 Artisans

Army Corps Officers & TroopsChef de bataillon Hauschild, commander of the artillery & engineers 1 Assistant 3 Foot Artillery Companies 1 Sapper/Pontooneer Company 8 Artisans Reserve Officers & Troops

Potocki, commander of artillery 1 Assistant 1 Horse Artillery Company 1 Foot Artillery Company

6 Artisans Park Troops

2 Foot Artillery Companies 1/2 company of artisans

The royal decree of 30 March 1810 organized the artillery and engineers. The artillery corps consisted of a Foot Artillery Regiment, a Horse Artillery Regiment, a company of artisans, and a battalion of engineers. The general staff of the artillery consisted of: 1 Inspector general, in the General Staff 1 Adjutant, Capitain to the General Staff 1 Colonel, Director of Powder & Saltpeter, Arms Factories and Gun Foundries 2 Assistant Capitains 2 Assistant Lieutenants 1 Colonel, Director of the Engineers 2 Assistant Capitains 2 Assistant Lieutenants 1 Colonel Director of Arsenals 1 Assistant Capitain 1 Assistant Lieutenant 1 Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of the Topographical Service 1 Assistant Capitain 1 Assistant Lieutenant 3 Lieutenant-Colonel, Assistant Directors 7 Capitains, Assistant Directors 4 Capitains 12 Lieutenants 12 Sous-lieutenants, Students 10 Guards 10 Assistant Guards 1 Chief Artificer 1 Artificer 76 Total In addition, a sapper-miner battalion was raised, with 756 men and 180 horses. The Foot Artillery Regiment consisted of 12 field companies and 4 static companies. The staff of the artillery regiment consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Major 3 Chefs de bataillon 1 Paymaster 2 Adjutant-majors 11st Class Physician 1 2nd Class Physicians 2 3rd Class Physicians

2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Regimental Drum Major 1 Battalion Drum Major 1 Veterinarian 1 Master Armorer 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Saddlemaker 1 Master Cobbler 21 Total12

Within the field companies of the regiment there were: 12 Capitains 24 Lieutenants 1st Class

12 Lieutenants 2nd Class Each field company had: 1 Capitain 1st class (1) Capitain 2nd Class13 21st Class Lieutenants 1 2nd Qass Lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 8 Sergeants 1 Fourrier

8 Corporals 4 Artificers 2 Blacksmiths 2 Harnessmakers 2 Drummers 401st Class Gunners14 1QQ 2nd Qass Gunners 172 Total15

The companies also had the two enfants de troupe assigned to their strength. The four static companies consisted of: 1 Capitain 1st Class (1) Capitain 2nd Class16 21st Class Lieutenants 1 2nd Qass Lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 4 Artificers 1 Blacksmith 1 Harnessmaker 2 Drummers 241st Qass Gunners 76 2nd Qass Gunners 126 Total17 1 Enfant de troupe The field company manned a battery of two 6" howitzers and four 6pdr cannons. There appears to have been only one 12pdr battery in the army of the Grand Duchy and it appears to have had 6 12pdrs and no howitzers. Most of the equipment was either captured Prussian or Austrian equipment. The Foot Artillery Regiment had a total of 2,685 men and 1,803 horses. The Horse Artillery Regiment had four horse artillery companies, each with four 6pdr cannons and two 6 inch howitzers. The decree of 30 March 1810 set staff of the horse artillery regiment at: 1 Colonel 1 Major 2 Chefs d'escadron 1 Paymaster 2 Adjutant-majors 11st Qass Physician 2 2nd Class Physicians 2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Regimental Trumpet Major 1 Battalion Trumpet Major 1 Veterinarian (Artiste Veterinaire)

1 Veterinarian (Marshal expert) 1 Master Saddlemaker 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Cobbler 19 Total This was an enlarged version of the staff of the previoulsy existing horse artillery battalion, which contained: 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Adjutant-majors 1 Paymaster 11st Class Physician 1 2nd Class Physicians

1 Adjutant NCOs 1 Battalion Trumpet Major 1 Master Armorer 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Saddlemaker I Master Cobbler I I Total

As with the foot companies, the horse companies had always consisted of: 1 Capitain 1st Class (1) Capitain 2nd Qass 18 21st Class Lieutenants 1 2nd Class Lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 8 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Brigadiers (Corporals) 4 Artificers 2 Blacksmiths 1 Saddlemaker 1 Harness maker 2 Trumpeters 48 1st Class Gunners 88 2nd Qass Gunners19 168 Total20 2 Enfants de troupe The horse regiment had a total of 691 men and 902 horses. After instructions sent by the King of Saxony and Duke of Warsaw, each infantry regiment additionally had two 3pdr regimental guns. The men and equipment were: 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 3 Sergeants 3 Corporals 20 Cannoneers 2 Artisans 40 Train Soldiers 70 Total

2 3pdr cannons 3 Caissons 1 Field Forge (for 3 regiments) 1 Ambulance Caisson 1 Document Caisson 2 Caissons per battalion for cartridges and bread 95 Horses

The supplementary artillery battalion, established by the Decree of 26 June 1811, had a staff and eight companies. The staff had:

1 Chef de bataillon 1 Quartermaster 2 Adjutant majors 3 Health Officers 2 Adjutant NCOs 9 Trumpeters, artisans, etc. Each of the eight companies had: 1 Lieutenant 1st Class 2 Lieutenants 2nd Class 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 4 Corporals 1 Blacksmiths 1 Harness maker 1 Trumpeteer 341st Class Gunners ZQ 2nd Class Gunners21 120 Total22 Poniatowski indicates the single artillery artisan company had: 1 Commanding Capitain 1 Capitain 2nd Class 2 Lieutenants 1st Qass 1 Lieutenant 2nd Class 1 Sergeant major 8 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 1 Drummer 241st Class Artisans Z£ 2nd Class Artisans23 123 Total 2 Enfants de troupe24 Other sources indicate it had: 1 Commanding Capitain 2 Lieutenants 1st Class 1 Lieutenant 2nd Class 1 Sergeant major 8 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 1 Drummer 24 1st Class Artisans 7£ 2nd Qass Artisans 124 Total 2 Enfants de troupe

The sapper-miner battalion had a staff and six companies. Of the six assigned companies, one was actually a pontooneer company. The staff consisted of: 1 Major 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Quartermaster 2 Adjutant-majors 11st Qass Health Officer 1 2nd Class Health Officer 2 Adjutant NCOs 3 Master Artisans The companies consisted of: 1 Commanding Capitain 1 Capitain 2nd Class25 2 Lieutenants 1st Class 1 Lieutenant 2nd Class 1 Sergeant major 8 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 4 Miners 2 Drummers 241st Class Sappers Z£ 2nd Qass Sappers26 129 Total27 2 Enfants de troupe The sapper-miner battalion had a total of 756 men and 180 horses. Uniforms of the Foot Artillery, Corps of Engineers and Sappers Between 1807 and 1810 the foot artillery wore dark green infantry kurtkas with black collars, facings, cuffs, cuff flaps, and turnbacks. All were piped with red. Their buttons were yellow, their epaulets were poppy red, though the officers wore gold epaulets. Their trousers were black with dark green side stripes; the officers had a double stripe. The trousers covered the short boots of the officers, but the enlisted wore black gaiters and infantry shoes. The shakos were black with poppy red pompons and cords. Again, the officers wore golden pompons and silver cords. Between 1807 and 1810 the engineering and sapper officers wore black shakos with a golden band around the top, and silver cords and short tassels. In front they had a golden convex rosette. Their epaulets were golden, their breeches were dark gray with double dark green side stripes and were worn over their short boots. They were, otherwise, dressed like the foot artillery, except they wore no cuff flaps. This uniform was retained until 1811, when they adopted the 1810 foot artillery uniform. After-1810, the uniform of the all three services consisted of a dark green jacket with cuffs, cuff flaps, collar, and lapels of black velvet piped with red. The vest and summer breeches were white cloth; dark green breeches were also worn. If the white breeches were worn, white gaiters were worn with them. If the green was worn, black gaiters completed the uniform. The buttons were yellow metal, and the shako was black with poppy red pompon, plume, and cords. It had a brass plaque with the same crest worn on the buttons. A white metal eagle was over the plaque.

After 25 May 1811, the 2nd Class Gunners were distinguished by breeches covered on the inside of the legs with black leather and by black shoulder straps piped in poppy red. They also appear to have worn pompons rather than plumes. The only significant difference between the uniforms was that the artillery buttons had crossed cannons and a bomb on them. Those of the engineers and sappers had crossed cannons surmounted by a cuirass in the middle of a trophy of flags and a helmet. Uniforms of the Horse Artillery Between 1808 and 1810, the uniform of the horse artillery consisted of a dark green kurtka cut like those worn by the uhlans. Its collar was black velvet with poppy red piping, and there were two golden grenades embroidered on the collar. The facings and cuffs were also black velvet with poppy red piping. The kurtka had poppy red piping as well and its buttons were gold. Their breeches were dark green with black side stripes, and they wore a czapka like that of the uhlans. In 1810, the czapka was discarded for a colpack with a dark green bag. It had poppy red (gold for officers) cords, pompon, and tassels. In undress, the officers wore a bicorn. The breeches were now dark green cloth with double black side stripes. The gray breeches were used in undress only. The grenades and buttons were yellow for the soldiers and golden for the officers. The officers' boots were in the Hungarian style with gold trim and tassels. Otherwise, they wore uhlan style boots. In undress, the officers wore hussar style breeches, heavily laced vests, and, sometimes, pelisses and dolmans. Uniforms of the Train Drivers The uniform of the drivers of equipment train and ammunition wagons before 1811 consisted of a blue-gray uniform with yellow buttons. The officers wore dark blue uniforms with golden buttons. The czapka was dark blue with a black lambskin turban and rhomboidal brass plaques. The officers czapkas had a golden band around the top and the plaque and eagle were also golden. After 1811, the blue-gray uniform had light yellow collars and cuffs, black shakos with small light yellow pompons and white eagles. The buttons were white. The gun team drivers were the 2nd Class Gunners of the artillery companies and their uniforms are discussed above.

(

Polish Forces in French

Service

The Lombard/Cisalpine Legion and the 1st Polish Legion The third partition occurred in 1795 and the last bit of Poland totally disappeared from the map of Europe, many of the Polish officers and soldiers fled to Revolutionary France where they felt an ideological affinity. One of these Polish officers, General Dombrowski, had hopes of forming a force of Polish troops with those refugees. His proposals were rejected by the French government, which had enacted legislation forbidding the use of foreign troops by France. It is reputed by Belhomme that the prohibition by the Revolutionary government against foreign troops serving in the French army was first ignored on 1 April 1795 when a Polish battalion was raised in the 21e Demi-brigade by General Kellerman. This battalion consisted of the standard nine companies, one grenadier and eight fusilier companies. It was reportedly recruited from Polish prisoners as well as Austrian and Hungarian deserters. Belhomme states that it was commanded by von Tauffen, a former Austrian major, and its officers were Polish, Piedmontese, and Italian. The battalion's staff consisted of: 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Adjutant NCO 1 Master tailor 1 Master cobbler Each of the nine companies had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major

4 Sergeants 1 Caporal-fourrier 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 70 Fusiliers or Grenadiers 89 Total

Dombrowski went to Italy where the Lombard Republic was being formed. In conjunction with Napoleon, he approached the Lombard Council and proposed forming a Polish Legion. The proposal was accepted. On 9 January 1797, an agreement was signed which gave any Pole serving in the Lombard Legion the same pay and privileges as the national troops. Shortly after that agreement was signed, Dombrowski issued a proclamation calling all free Poles to join his legion. Within a month, approximately 1,200 men were enrolled. Many were exiles, while others were prisoners of war and deserters from the Austrian Galician regiments formed in what used to be Poland. Belhomme suggests that the Polish battalion of the 21e Demi-brigade was used as the cadre around which the Legion was formed. However, the nucleus of the Polish legions were actually two Polish companies in the Lombard (native) Legion and a Polish battalion attached to this legion established by Bonaparte's order of 5 December 1796. The Polish Legions, proper were created by the convention between Dombrowski and the Lombard Republic, with Napoleon's approval, on 9 January 1797. The first specific organizational decrees are found in Napoleon's order of 17 May 1797. At first, they consisted of three battalions and bore the name of the "Polish Auxiliary Legions in Lombardy." On their way from Milan to Mantua they fought at Salo (30 March 1797) and afterwards put down local uprisings in Brescia, Rimini, and Verona. On 2 June 1797, the Polish Legions stood in Bologna and contained about 6,648 men. In July 1797, the Lombard Republic was enlarged and renamed the Cisalpine Republic.

The new government delayed the signing of a new convention with the Poles until 17 November 1797, and this convention was never formally ratified. The Poles were now renamed the "Polish Auxiliary Legions of the Cisalpine Republic." In November 1798, its name was changed to the "Polish Auxiliary Corps of the Cisalpine Republic." The legion consisted of two "demi-l£gions," each of three battalions, and one artillery company. Its staff was to consist of: 1 Chef de Legion — Brigadier General 1 Adjudant g£n£ral — Chef de brigade 1 Aide de camp to the chef de legion 2 Adjoints for the adjudant general 1 Chef de bataillon — artillery commander 1 Capitaine d'artillerie — charged with organization & material 2 Magazine guards 2 Teamsters The demi-legion staffs were to consist of: 1 Chef de brigade 1 Major 2 Adjoints 1 Chef de bataillon — to command the grenadiers of the demi-legion The battalion staffs consisted of: 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Adjutant major 2 Adjutant NCOs Napoleon's directive did not specify the number of companies per battalion or any other organizational details of the companies, but he did state that all companies, except the grenadiers, were to have ten men trained to act as "Eclaireurs," or scouts. These men were to be detached and converged into a separate company that would be directed by a capitain, a lieutenant, and a sous-lieutenant who were also part of the battalion staff. The directive went on to state that the artillery companies were to be organized with four 6pdrs and two howitzers each. Each battalion was also had an infantry munition caisson. On 9 February, a total of 1,128 men were organized and divided into two five company battalions. One of these battalions was a grenadier battalion and the other a chasseur battalion. These battalions consisted of: 1 Chef de bataillon I Capitain I I Lieutenants 1 Battalion Surgeon 10 Sous-lieutenants 65 Corporals 5 Drummers 513 Grenadiers 521 Sharpshooters or Chasseurs 1,128 Total The legion was expanded by a steady stream of Polish volunteers, and the legion began to take the form directed by Napoleon. The 1st Fusilier Battalion was raised that April in

Mantua, the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Battalions and two artillery companies were raised in Milan. By May 1797, there were six full battalions. Each battalion staff consisted of: 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Major 1 Adjutant 2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Quartermaster Each battalion was organized with ten companies. The first company was the grenadier company, the second was the "strzelecka," or chasseur company, and the last eight were "fizylierskie," or fusilier companies. Each company was organized with: 1 Capitain 8 Corporals 2 Lieutenants 3 Drummers 1 Sergeant 1 Surgeon 1 Ensign 3 Sappers 1 Quartermaster 15Z Soldiers Corporal 178 Total Each demi-legion was formed with three battalions and had an attached artillery company. In addition, there was an administrative staff assigned to the legion that consisted of: 1 Chef de brigade 3 Chefs de bataillon 2 Capitains 2 Lieutenants 2 Soldiers In his decree of 17 May 1797, Napoleon attached the Polish artillery, three batteries strong, to the Lombard artillery regiment as one of its four brigades. The Convention of 17 November 1797, however, treated it as part of the Polish force. On the other hand, W. Axamitowski, the battalion commander, states that his unit was in an organizational limbo until December 1798, when it was finally attached to the Polish corps. In the meantime, they wore Lombard/Cisalpine uniforms with French cockades and Polish officer distinctives. A 7th Battalion was raised on 26 February 1797 in Milan. In addition, the French Directory formed a provisional Polish battalion in Lille with 1,000 Polish prisoners of war taken from the Austrians. This battalion was dispatched to Milan where it arrived on 30 May 1797. It was then attached to the 2nd Fusilier Battalion of the 1st Polish Legion, of the Lombard Legion, and used to form the 2nd Polish Legion. The 1st Legion was commanded by General K. Kniaziewicz and the 2nd Legion was commanded by General J. Wielhorski. The artillery was commanded by Chef de bataillon W. Axamitowski. General Dombrowski was the commander-in-chief of the entire Kniaziewicz took command of the 1st Legion in September 1797. Prior to that, the 1st Legion was commanded by J. Wielhorski and the 2nd Legion was commanded by F. Rymkiewicz. In July 1798 Wielhorski took over command of the Cisalpine group of the Legions. The 2nd Legion was commanded by Rymkiewicz until his death from wounds received in 5 April 1799 at the battle of Magnano; Wielhorski then led the remains of the 2nd Legion to Mantua. The 1st Legion did not participate because it had gone to the Roman Republic. Both the 1st and 2nd Polish Legions, as the Lombard Legion became known, were formed with three battalions of ten companies. The companies were organized with 100

men. Each battalion also is reputed to have had a 120 man artillery company attached to it as well, though they probably were still administratively assigned to a separate artillery battalion. The organization of the Lombard Legion changed in June 1797. Its demi-legion staffs reorganized and consisted of: 1 Chef du legion 1 Assistant chef, Chef de brigade 1 Major, Battalion Commander 2 Adjutant majors, Capitains 3 Adjutant Sous-lieutenants (assigned to battalions) 1 Chief Surgeon 1 Drum Major 1 Music Director 13 Musicians 1 Tailor 1 Cobbler 3 Gunsmiths 5 Drivers 13 Sappers The battalion staffs now consisted of: 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Major (paid as a capitain) 1 Adjutant Major, Lieutenant 1 Quartermaster, Lieutenant 1 Standard Bearer, Sous-lieutenant 1 Senior Surgeon 1 Drum Corporal 7 Total The battalion still consisted of ten companies, but each company now had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Quartermaster Corporal 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 124 Soldiers 123 Total The Lombard Legion was made part of the Cisalpine Republic's army on 4 August 1797. The Cisalpine army consisted of four legions. The 1st Legion was formed with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Cohorts of the Lombard Legion in Palmanova. The 2nd Legion was formed with the 4th, 5th and 6th Cohorts of the Lombard Legion in Venice. The 3rd Legion was formed from the Modene Legion's three cohorts and the 4th Legion was formed from the 7th Cohort of the Lombard Legion, the cohort of Bergamo, and three companies from Crinsac. Each legion consisted of three battalions, an artillery company, and a squadron of chasseurs.

The Lombard Legion was engaged in the battle of Reggio in July 1797 and at Civita Castellana. A cavalry regiment was raised in 1799. It consisted of two squadrons and was furnished with Austrian equipment captured at Gaeta. A third reorganization of the Lombard Legion occurred on 14 September-October 1798, when they were reformed into the Polish Auxiliary corps of the Cisalpine Republic. The battalion staff now consisted of: 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Major 1 Adjutant 1 Quartermaster 1 Battalion Surgeon

1 Staff Fourrier 1 Ensign 1 Battalion Drummer 1 Gunsmith 1 Senior Wagoneer 2 Wagoneers

There were still ten companies per battalion, including one grenadier company, one a chasseur company, and eight fusilier companies. The total strength of the battalion was 1,230 men, plus 10 supernumerary officers. The artillery battalion had 313 men, 7 in the staff plus three companies of 101 men each and 3 supernumerary officers. The general staff of the Polish Corps contained 8 officers, including one g£n£ral de division and one g£n6ral de brigade. The staff of a single legion contained 69 men, thus the entire Polish corps, two legions with six battalions and one artillery battalion, contained 7,899 men. By the end of December 1798, the 1st legion had captured so many horses that it was possible to begin the organization of a cavalry units in Gaeta under the supervision of Chef d'escadron Eliasz Tremo. By the beginning of January 1799, two companies of about 100 men had been organized. Their uniforms and weapons were modeled after the national cavalry regiments in pre-1795 Poland, while the organization followed that of the French light cavalry regiments thought it preserved the Polish nomenclature. A company, therefore, consisted of: 1 Rotmistrz (Capitain) 1 Porucznik (Lieutenant) 2 Podporucznik (Sous-lieutenants) 1 Namiestnik (Sergeant major) 4 Wachmistrz (Sergeants) 1 Furier (fourrier) 8 Brygadier (Brigadiers) 2 Trumpeters 2£ Uhlans 116 Total On 9 January 1799, Tremo, with 30 — 40 uhlans, went to Traetta to prevent a local uprising. The Poles were trapped and about half were killed by gunfire. Tremo and 8 uhlans were captured, mutilated, and roasted alive. One officer and a few troopers escaped into an old tower, where they defended themselves for three days by throwing stones. They finally managed to slip out into the night and returned to their base. Despite this setback, the uhlans' ranks were filling so fast that by 12 February 1799 they were formed into two squadrons, each with two companies. The Polish nomenclature, impossible for the French, was abandoned. The command of the regiment was taken by General A. Karwowski and later passed to Colonel A. Rozniecki. On 25 November 1799, the regiment had a staff and two squadrons. The staff consisted of:

1 Chef de brigade 1 Chef d'escadron 1 Adjutant Major 1 Quartermaster 1 Adjutant Sous-lieutenant 1 Surgeon 1 Adjutant NCO In December, the regiment was transferred to the Danube legion, where it eventually grew to a strength of four squadrons. In May 1799, the 1st Polish Legion formed two elite battalions from a portion of its 2,800 men. The first elite battalion was formed with three 150 man companies of grenadiers, and the second was formed with three companies of 150 chasseurs. The 3rd Battalion of the 1st Polish Legion was captured at the battle of Trebbia on 17 to 19 June 1799 and its soldiers reincorporated into various Austrian regiments. Two of the legion's fusilier battalions succeeded in following the withdrawing French. Later, the 1st Legion, in Nice, was reorganized and reinforced. It rose to a strength of about 2,500 men. On 26 March 1799, the 2nd Legion lost 750 men from the 1st Battalion at Legnano. On 5 April 1799, another 1,000 were lost. The remaining 1,200 infantry and 300 artillery went to Mantua where they became trapped in a siege that lasted two-and-a-half months. When the city capitulated, the Poles were handed over to the Austrians. The Austrians incorporated them into the Austro-Galician regiments. The officers were jailed and remained there until the French victory at Marengo. The non-Polish troops taken in Mantua were set free. Appromimately 240 of the 800 Poles succeeded in avoiding incorporation into Austrian regiments by shedding their uniforms and blending with the rest of the departing garrison. They were reformed in May and sent to Marseilles in late 1799. On 18 July 1799, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Legion, then in Genoa, absorbed the 600 man depot of the 2nd Legion. The 1st Legion, after its reorganization in Nice, fought at the battle of Novi on 15 August 1799, losing 1,000 men. During the next several weeks, the remaining 1,500 legionnaires fought in the Ligurian mountains and in a second battle of Novi, fought on 6 November. The 1st Legion was then sent to Marseilles, where Dombrowski was organizing eight battalions of the Polish Legion (also known as the 1st Polish Legion as opposed to the 2nd or Danube Legion). In December 1799, all Polish forces were directed to Marseilles and incorporated into the French army. They received the full pay and allowances accorded to French units. The cavalry regiment was detached and sent to the Armee du Rhin, where it became part of the Legion of the Danube, commanded by General Kniaziewicz. When the Polish infantry arrived in Marseilles, they were rearmed and issued new uniforms. The new uniform had the same cut of jacket, but the cuffs and plastron were crimson, the Polish national color. The artillery uniform was not altered. The infantry and artillery were divided into several detachments that were used to fight pirates and the English, who were threatening the French coast with landings in 1800. The 7th Battalion was re-raised in early 1800, and the 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions were brought back up to nearly full strength by combing the prisoner of war camps for Polish volunteers. The Polish Demi-brigades, Legion du Danube and Vistula Legion Legion duDanube The Law oF8 September 1799 raised the LEgion du Danube. The actual formation of the legion (initially called the LEgion du Rhin because it was assigned to the Arm£e du Rhin) began on 8 November 1799 in Phalsbourg. According to the September law, it consisted of a staff, four infantry battalions (10 companies of 123 men each), four cavalry squadrons

(2 companies each, 232 men per squadron), and a horse artillery company. It had a theoretical strength of 4,947 infantry, 943 cavalry, and 76 artillery. The actual organization in August 1800 was as follows: General Staff 1 G£n£ral de brigade, chef de la lEgion 1 Adjutant General, Chief of Staff and Vice-Chef 1 Capitain Quartermaster General 1 Sous-lieutenant adjutant to the Legion Commander 1 Capitain Adjutant to the Legion Commander 1 Sous-lieutenant Adjutant to the Legion Chief of Staff 1 Surgeon Major 2nd Qass 24 Musicians The infantry staff consisted of: 1 Chef de brigade 4 Chefs de bataillon 4 Adjutant-major Lieutenants 1 Quartermaster Adjunct Lieutenant 4 Adjutant NCOs 1 Surgeon Major 2nd Class 4 Assistant Surgeon 3rd Qass 4 Standard Bearer Sergeants 1 Drum Major 4 Senior Drummers 1 Master Armorer 4 Tailors 1 Cobbler Sappers 50 Total Each battalion had ten companies: one grenadier, one chasseur, and eight fusilier companies. The companies had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Caporal-fourrier 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 104 Fusiliers 123 Total The cavalry staff consisted of: 1 Chef de brigade 2 Chefs d'escadron 1 Adjutant Major Lieutenant 1 Quarter-master Adjunct Lieutenant 1 Surgeon Major 2nd Class for both cavalry & artillery

2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Assistant Surgeon 3rd Class 4 Standard Bearers (Sergeant majors) 1 Regimental Trumpeter 1 Armorer-spurmaker 1 Master of Uniform Material 1 Cobbler 1 Saddlemaker 1 Veterinarian 1 Blacksmith 20 Total The cavalry regiment had four squadrons of two companies each. Each company consisted of: 1 Capitain 1 lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Brigadier-Fourrier 8 Brigadiers 2 Trumpeters 2£ Lancers 115 Total The horse artillery company had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 2 Sous-lieutenants 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Brigadier Fourrier 4 Brigadiers 30 Gunners 1st Class 30 Gunners 2nd Class 2 Trumpeters 76 Total The horse artillery compnay was equipped with two 8-pdrs, two 4-pdrs, two 6-inch howitzers, eight caissons, one wagon, and a field forge. A train company, not included in the original September 1799 organization, was organized at the beginning of August 1800 with a theoretical strength of 72 men (1 souslieutenant, 1 trumpeter, and 70 artisans and drivers) who wore uniforms of the French train service. Such companies were not introduced into the French army until 3 January 1800.

The cadres of the LEgion du Danube came from the Italian Polish Legions. General K. Kniaziewicz was the Chef de legion and was seconded by General Gawronski. M. Sokolnicki commanded the infantry brigade and W. Turski commanded the cavalry. Capitain Redel commanded the artillery, and the depot, organized in mid-September, was commanded by Capitain Pagowski. By mid-February 1800, the legion stood with an actual strength of 2,700 men.

?i By the second half of February, the depot and all the assigned men were moved to Metz. Since the soldiers did not have uniforms, shirts, or even shoes, they marched from Phalsbourg dressed in sleeved linen vests and pants: a third of them were barefoot! By the end of April 1800, the first three battalions, a total of 2,819 men, were organized under the commands of Chefs de bataillon Fiszer, Drzewiecki and Zeydlitz. They marched to Strasbourg where the depot had also been moved. However, the line units were later sent to the Kehl fortress. Though they still did not have proper uniforms, the LEgion du Danube found itself engaging the Austro-Galician uhlans at Altenburg and Offenberg. The actual strengths of the units of the Danube Legion in August 1800, when its organization was relatively complete, were: 1st Battalion 2nd Battalion 3rd Battalion 4th Battalion 1st Squadron 2nd Squadron 3rd Squadron 4th Squadron Artillery Artillery Train Total

Men 986 920 1,000 492 210 212 230 185 75 80 4,390

Horses

163 160 154 148 75 150 885™

In August, they also received uniform supplies and horses for its cavalry and artillery. Two squadrons of "chasseurs" were organized within the legion prior to 20 February 1800. The cadres of the other two, under chef d'escadron A. Rozniecki, arrived from Dombrowski's Polish Corps, then in Italy, on 17 May 1800. Two-and-a-half months later, the 1st and 4th platoons of each company of this new regiment were issued lances, making it an uhlan regiment. The 2nd and 3rd platoons of each company were armed with carbines. This, however, didn't prevent the French commanders from referring to them as "dragoons," "mounted rifles," or even "hussars." In November, the Legion served with Decaen's division in Bavaria and fought at the battle of Hohenlinden. The depot was moved to Ulm on 29 December. After the Treaty of Luneville (9 February 1801), the Danube Legion was sent to Geneva and from there to Italy. Because of the political ramifications of a "Poland," the legion was transferred to the newly formed Kingdom of Etruria, under the rule of a Bourbon prince. In May 1801, the legion was sent to Florence, the capital of this new kingdom. This was not a popular move; the soldiers deserted, and the officers committed suicide or resigned their commissions. When Kniasiewicz resigned, command passed to Jablonowski, but problems continued and the French didn't know what to do with the unit. There was even talk of disbanding it. On 22 December 1801 the Legion was transformed into the 3e Demibrigade Polonaise. It had a strength of 2,918 men, and its cavalry and artillery were amalgamated. The 1st Polish Legion is Reformed In early 1800, the debris of the 1st Polish Legion was gathered in Genoa29 and Nice, while the surviving members of the 2nd Polish Legion were gathered in Marseilles30. The Arr£t£ of 10 February 1800 organized the new 1st Polish Legion. It consisted of four battalions of infantry and a horse battery. The Danube Legion was renumbered as the 2nd Polish Legion. The staff of the 1st Polish Legion consisted of:

1 GEnEral de brigade, commanding 1 Adjutant General 1 Quartermaster General (capitain) 1 Chief Surgeon The infantry staff consisted of: 1 Chef de brigade 4 Chefs de bataillon 4 Adjutant majors 4 Adjutant NCOs 1 Quartermaster Adjunct (lieutenant or sous-lieutenant) 1 Chief Surgeon of Infantry 4 Assistant Surgeons 1 Drum major 4 Senior drummers 1 Master Armorer 4 Tailors 1 Cobbler Each of the four battalions was organized identically to those in the Danube Legion and had a theoretical total strength of 1,230 men per battalion. The cavalry staff consisted of: 1 Chef de brigade 2 Chefs d'escadron 1 Adjutant major 1 Adjutant NCO 1 Quartermaster adjutant (lieutenant or sous-lieutenant) 1 Surgeon Major 1 Assistant Surgeon 4 Standard Bearers 1 Staff Trumpeter 1 Master Armorer/Spurmaker 1 Tailor 1 Cobbler 1 Saddlemaker 1 Blacksmith 1 Veterinarian 16 Total The horse artillery company consisted of: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant, 1st Class 2 Lieutenants, 2nd Class 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Corporal Fourrier 4 Brigadier 301st Class Gunners 30 2nd Class Gunners 2 Trumpeters 76 Total

This structure, which strictly mirrored the original organization of the LEgion du Danube, was submitted to Dombrowski, who proposed to exchange the cavalry regiment and the horse artillery company for three more infantry battalions and a foot artillery battery. In effect, the Arr£t£ of 13 March 1800 reorganized the 1st Polish Legion with seven battalions, each with ten companies of 123 men (one grenadier, one chasseur, and eight fusilier companies). The battalion staff had six officers. In addition, there was an artillery battalion with five companies. Each artillery company had four officers and 83 men. The legion had a total theoretical strength of 9,093 men. The 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions were organized at the end of April in Marseilles with the remnants of the old 2nd Polish Legion. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions were organized in Nice in June from the 1st Legion. The 7th Battalion and the depot were organized in Marseilles. The cavalry regiment was transferred to the Danube Legion. In July 1800, another legion depot/recruiting office was organized in Milan. This Milanese recruiting office also processed the officers of the 2nd Legion then returning from Austrian captivity. On 23 September 1800, it was decided that the 1st Polish Legion was returned to the pay of the newly reorganized Cisalpine Republic. This was not announced until 1 November 1800. In the second half of October 1800, the Legion was divided into two brigades. The 1st Brigade was commanded by Chef de brigade Strzalkowski and consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions, and all seven grenadier companies. The 2nd Brigade was commanded by General Karwowski and consisted of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions, less their grenadier companies. These last three battalions were filled out with released prisoners of war from the former 2nd legion. The 7th Battalion was still in the process of being formed. On 1 Germinal IX (11 March 1801), the 1st Polish Legion consisted of a general staff formed with: 1 G£n£ral de division/Chef de lEgion 3 Chefs de bataillons aide de camp g£n£ral 1 Capitaine aide de camp g£n6ra1 1 GEnEral de brigade 2 Aides de camp g6n£ral de brigade 1 Adjutant commandant 3 Aides de camp d'etat major 2 Lieutenants assigned to the Quartiermaitre general 1 Chief physician The legion staff consisted of: 4 Chefs de brigade 1 Chef de brigade d'artillerie 2 Chirurgiens 2e classe 2 Baggagemasters 2 Drum majors

1 Master armorer 1 Master cobbler 1 Master tailor 40 Musicians

Each battalion of infantry had a staff of: 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Capitaine adjudant-major 1 Surgeon, 3rd Class 1 Standard Bearer (sous-lieutenant) 1-2 Supernumerary officers

Each of the ten companies in the battalions were organized with: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Caporal-fourrier 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 102 Soldiers 121 Total The artillery battalion consisted of: 1 Chef de bataillon 1 Adjutant Major (Capitain) 1 Surgeon, 3rd Class 10 Capitains 15 Lieutenants 1 Lieutenant Standard Bearer 550 NCCX s and gunners In addition, there was a depot consisting of200 men, and a train company for the artillery that consisted of 70 men. The legion had an actual, not organizational, strength of 10,686 men on 11 March 1801. Polish Demi-Brigades The Arr£t£s of 11/21 December 1801 united the Polish legions, the 1st Polish Legion in Italy and Danube Legion, and formed them into three demi-brigades31. Each demibrigade had three battalions. The Ire Demi-brigade was formed with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Legion, the 2e Demi-brigade was formed with the 4th, 5th, and 7th Battalions of the 1st Legion and the 3e Demi-brigade was formed with the four battalions of the 2nd Polish Legion (formerly the Danube Legion). The 6th Battalion and the artillery were absorbed into the first two demi-brigades. The 1st Demi-brigade was organized in Modena and the 2nd was organized in Reggio. Dombrowski was made Inspector General of the Polish Demi-brigades, and all former Polish legions were disbanded as of 20 January 1802. The general staff consisted of: 1 G£n6ral de division 1 GEnEral de brigade 1 Adjutant-Commandant 2 Chefs de brigade 12 Chefs de bataillon The staff of these demi-brigades consisted of: 1 Chef de brigade 4 Chefs de bataillon32 1 Quartermaster Treasurer 3 Adjutant-majors

3 Health Officers 1 Baggagemaster 3 Adjutant NCCYs 1 Drum Major 1 Drum Corporal 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Cobbler 1 Master Gaitermaker 1 Armorer 2 Musicians including one music master) 30 Total Each battalion had nine companies, one of grenadiers and eight of fusiliers. The companies were organized with: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Caporal-fourrier 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 64 Grenadiers or 104 Fusiliers 84 Total in a grenadier company 123 Total in a fusilier company When the horse battery of the Danube Legion was disbanded, its troops, numbering 21 1st class gunners and 26 2nd class gunners, were amalgamated into the uhlan regiment. The staff of the uhlan regiment consisted of: 1 Chef de brigade 3 Chefs d'escadron 1 Adjutant Major 1 Quartermaster Capitain 1 Surgeon 1st Class 1 Surgeon 2nd Class 2 Adjutant NCO's 1 Staff Trumpeter 1 Master Cobbler 1 Master Saddlemaker 13 Total Each of the four squadrons had two companies, each of which had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 2 Sous-lieutenants 1 Sergeant Major 4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Brigadiers

96 Uhlans 2 Trumpeters 116 Total The actual regimental strength on 22 December was 707 officers and men, with only 66 uhlans per company. However, by 29 April 1802 it had grown to 946 men and 1,000 horses. The first two demi-brigades were transferred into the service of the Italian Republic, formerly known as the Cisalpine Republic on 21 January 180233. The cavalry of the former Danube Legion was transferred on 31 December 1801. According to Pachonski the Italian army was reorganized on 29 April 1802 and those changes affected the. Polish demi-brigades. Their battalions were reduced to eight companies each, one grenadier one chasseur and six fusilier companies. However, the total strength rose to 3,710 men. The strength of the cavalry regiment was raised to 946 men and 1,000 horses. The total of the two demi-brigades and the cavalry in Italian service rose to 8,366 men. Shortly later the demi-brigades were supplemented by the addition of an invalid and veteran company. In early 1801 2e Demi-brigade became branded as a subversive unit because of its Masonic activity, which had republican overtones. It was taken back into French service on 10 December 1802 and redesignated as the 114th Demi-brigade. The 3e Demi-brigade Polonaise departed for Santo Domingo on 17 May 1802 and was redesignated as the French 113rd Demi-brigade. It was later joined by the 2e Demi-brigade (or 114th), which left Italy between 30 January and 4 February 1803. Both units consisted of 3 full battalions. It is suggested that these two units went because of their republican attitudes and the expense of maintaining foreign units. Yellow fever and other diseases ravaged their ranks and the savagery of the war in Santo-Domingo left few survivors. Both units disappeared from the French army. About 500 men returned to France. Many of the men were captured by the British or sold by the Haitians to the British where they were absorbed into the 5/ 60th Royal American Regiment of Foot. They were, apparently strongly resistant to the initial pressures, but a deliberately harsh imprisonment and the deliberate violation of all the terms of their surrender by the British soon forced many to enlist in the British army. As the wars continued and the 5/60th was transferred to Spain for service against Napoleon many of these legionnaires deserted the British army to join their fellow Poles in French service. Some of the returning survivors were incorporated into various units. About 100 of them 4 were assigned to a "foreign battalion" stationed on Elba. Between February and June 1804 they were transferred back to the ler Demi-brigade Polonaise. The ler Demi-brigade Polonaise remained in Italy and became part of the newly formed army of the Kingdom of Northern Italy. Its morale was not high either and by August 1802 desertion had reduced it to 2,400 men. The first two battalions had to be reinforced by drawing soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, seriously reducing its strength. In May 1803 the demi-brigade stood with two battalions assigned to General Lecchi's Italian-Polish Division. The 3rd Battalion had remained in various northern Italian garrisons. The ler Demi-brigade Polonaise was renamed the "Polish Infantry Regiment" in 1804. In February 1806 the Polish Infantry Regiment participated in the French invasion of Naples. A total of 770 Austro-Polish prisoners, or 26% of the regiment's strength, were incorporated into the regiment, seriously undermining its morale and patriotic spirit. Despite that the regiment continued in the campaign and by April the staff had 15 men, the 1st Battalion -1,046, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions -1,011 men each. In addition, each battalion had a single 3pdr gun assigned to it. On 4 July 1806, twelve companies from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions (937 men strong) participated in the battle of Maida with a British expeditionary force, losing between 350 and 500 soldiers. In the following encounters the losses mounted and the regiment's

7th Regiment Chevau-Leger Landers strength was reduced to about 400 men per battalion. On 4 August 1806 the Polish infantry and cavalry regiments serving in Italy were transferred to the service of Joseph Napoleon's new kingdom, Naples. The regiment, whose 1st and 2nd Battalions totaled about 850 men, went back into Calabria with MassEna's punitive expedition, suffering further losses. The survivors of the regiment were drawn together in February 1807 and reestablished. It contained 78 officers and 1,463 men. On 2 February 1807 they were returned to French service. The losses suffered in the Calabrian campaign amounted to 33% of its officers and 56% of its rank and file. By March 1807 the regiment grew to 98 officers and 2,610 men. On 22 January 1807 the Polish Cavalry Regiment was struck from the Neapolitan army rolls and its 586 men and 490 horses were transferred to Silesia. There are indications that part of these troops were, at the last minute, incorporated into King Joseph's Neapolitan guard cavalry. Joseph Napoleon also kept 1,192 soldiers from the Polish Infantry Regiment, so that only 57 officers, 338 NCO's and about 900 soldiers followed the cavalry into Silesia. These soldiers were to form the nucleus of the LEgion Polacco-Italienne. 1st (Kalinowski's) Polish Hussar Regiment During the last months of 1806 Prince Jan Sulkowski34 organized a Polish Hussar Regiment in Siewierz. It was initially called a "light cavalry regiment" and was, by Napoleon's Decree of 12 March 1807, taken into French pay. The decree renamed the unit the 1st Polish Hussar Regiment and gave it a decreed strength of 1,043 men. In April 1807 Sulkowski was caught gathering illegal contributions and was arrested. He escaped abroad and the regiment was passed to Colonel M. Pruszak. Its organization was now based on the Decree of 8 May 1807. Its organization progressed very slowly and on 1 July 1807 it consisted of 42 officers and 348 men. On 28 July the command passed to Colonel J. Kalinowski and the regiment, now known as the Kalinowski Hussars, reached the strength of 529 men.

Unfortunately, the material support promised by Napoleon never materialized and only the 112 man elite company had uniforms and horses, both paid for by Kalinowski. The remainder were in civilian cloths and without mounts. Even the elite company lacked boots and, because of their lack of footwear, they became known as the "poodles." The reason being that, though dressed in furs, they went around barefoot. On 10 October MarEchal Davout reviewed the regiment, finding it's men barefoot and equipped with only 85 officers horses and 132 mounts for the rank and file. Ten days later Davout asked Berthier to send the hussars 400 great infantry coats and 400 pairs of shoes. On 27 October 1807 Kalinowski's Polish Hussar Regiment was disbanded and the men were transferred to Westphalia where 300 were incorporated into the Polish Cavalry Regiment that had served in Italy. One hundred were also assigned to King Jerome's Westphalian Royal Guard. The hundred sent to Kassel eventually rejoined their comrades when they were incorporated into the Vistula Legion cavalry. Colonel Kalinowski rose to the rank of general-adjutant in Westphalian service and eventually returned to Polish service. Ligion du Nord During the course of Napoleon's lightning campaign against Prussia the French found themselves in possession of a large number of Polish-Prussian deserters and prisoners of war. In order to use them to the best political advantage, on 20 September 1806, Napoleon issued a decree to organize "une lEgion polonaise," which was to be organized under the command of G£n£ral de division J. Zayonczek. The decree specified that at least two thirds of the officers were to be Poles, while the rest were to be those who had not served in the French ranks, but were willing to fight for their country. Napoleon also forbade the enlistment of any Polish officers currently serving in the French army. However, as events would prove, both of these instructions were ignored. Two thirds of the officers turned out to be Frenchmen, including former Emigres, and Germans. Napoleon personally dispatched five Polish officers to the new LEgion from the ArmEe d'ltalie. Two days later, on 22 September, in a second letter to General Dejean, Napoleon spoke of the 1st LEgion du Nord being organized in Juliers (Jiilich) and ordered the organization of a second in Niimberg under the command of Colonel Henry35. Both legions were to have four battalions each. Napoleon also stated that the colonels issuing proclamations to form these units were not to use the word "Poland" in their decrees. The 1st legion had its depot in Jiilich, with barracks in Landau, Hagenau and later in Mainz. In the beginning of October 1806 the 1st Battalion, 1st Legion,was ready in Landau, but the other three were still being formed in Mainz. They were later brought up to full strength by the incorporation of Polish prisoners of war from the Prussian garrison of Magdeburg, which capitulated on 8 November. In the first half of December, the 1st Legion, with 6,425 men, moved to Leipzig and then on to Magdeburg. It was still there on 8 January when an irate Napoleon blasted Berthier as to why it was not yet in Stettin. By February the 1st Legion had joined MEnard's Division in Pommerania with a strength of about 5,000 men. The evolution of the 2nd Legion was not as satisfactory. General Wolodkowicz began organizing it on 9 October 1806 in Niirnberg. By 10 November he had only 77 men. By the end of November it grew to 148 men and by 4 December stood at 164 men.'On 9 December the 2nd Legion was moved to Spandau and its organization dragged on. The 2nd Legion had very few Polish officers and could not compete for rank and file because the volunteers preferred (and were openly enticed by Dombrowski) to join Polish regiments on native soil. Realizing this, on 29 November Napoleon ordered it to march to Posen to be incorporated into the 1st Legion. This decision was formalized bv the Decree of 1 March 1807. The next major changes occurred to the legion with the formation of Dombrowski's Division and Zayonczek's Observation Corps, which are discussed in the organization of the Polish Army in 1807.

Legion Polacco-Italienne The Decree of 5 April 1807 redesignated the Polish regiments form Italy as the Polish legion. It was to consist of a lancer regiment (4 squadrons of 300 men each) and an infantry legion (3 regiments with two battalions each, 9 companies per battalion, 150 men per company having a total of 8,100 soldiers and about 100 men in the legionary staff). As the actual organization of this force began after the Treaty of Tilsit, political considerations obliged Napoleon to call it the LEgion Polacco-Italienne, although this change was never introduced by any official means. The 1st Regiment of the legion was formed on 7 June 1807. the remaining two began organizing shortly later. By 10 August 1807 the infantry numbered 91 officers and 4,246 men and the lancer regiment had 37 officers and 1,097 men. The Vistula Legion The Decree of 11 November 1807 transferred the LEgion Polacco-Italienne into the service of Westphalia, but this was reversed by the Decree of 20 March 1808, which brought them back into French service. In a letter to Davout dated 31 March 1808 Napoleon renamed the legion the "Vistula Legion" and directed a reduction in the number of soldiers in its infantry companies to 140 men each. He also stated that the infantry regiments were to be treated on a par with French line regiments and cavalry with the French chasseur k cheval regiments. The legion was still en route to Paris, so the actual reorganization had not yet begun. The LEgion and its Lancer Regiment went to Metz and Bayonne, where they, and detachments from all other Poles in French service, began organizing the Vistula Legion by the end of May 1808. Later, the Vistula Legion organized its depot in Sedan and established a depot battalion of three companies under a major. On 11 April 1808 Napoleon issued the organizational decree for the Vistula Legion. It was to contain three infantry regiments, each with two battalions. The number of companies was reduced to six per battalion. This brought the Polish battalions into a close approximation of the organization established by the Decree of 18 February 1808 which put the French in a six company organization. The Decree of 24 June 1808 established the final organization. The field battalions were now organized with one grenadier, one voltigeur and four fusilier companies of 140 men each. The depot battalion was organized like the field battalions, but had neither a grenadier company nor a voltigeur company. The Legion staff consisted of: 1 Colonel 13 Majors36 6 Chefs de bataillon 7 Adjutant-majors37 1 Quartier-maitre trEsorier 3 Officiers payeurs (paymasters) 3 Porte-aigle (eagle bearers) 1 Chaplain

1 Chirurgien-major 6 Chirurgiens 6 Chirurgiens aides 14 Adjutant NCOs 1 Drum major 2 Drum corporals 6 Master artisans 15 Musicians 79 Total

Each of the six companies had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 4 Sergeants 1 Caporal-fourrier

#

8 Corporals 121 Soldiers ^.Drummers 140 Total In addition, the legion had two administrative committees, one for the infantry and one for the lancer regiment. The lancer regiment was organized like a French chasseur & cheval regiment. The Decree of 24 June 1808 did not address the lancers, so they retained their earlier organization of 43 officers and 1,000 rank and file organized into four squadrons. Each squadron had two companies. Kirkor gives their organization at this time as the following: Staff 1 Colonel 1 Major 2 Chefs d'escadron 2 Adjutant-majors 1 Quartier-maitre 1 Chirurgien-major 1 Chirurgien aide-major 2 Chirurgien sous-aide 2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Brigadier Trumpeter 1 Veterinarian 1 Master Cobbler 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Armorer/Spurmaker 1 Master Harnessmaker 19 Total Each company was to have: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 2 Sous-lieutenants 1 MarEchal des logis chef 4 Marechaux des logis 8 Brigadiers 108 Lancers 1 Farrier (blacksmith) 2 Trumpeters 128 Total The depot was formed in Sedan with three infantry companies and a cavalry company. It had a total of 545 men. In addition, the reorganization left the legion with a very large number of surplus officers serving a la suite, that is, without an assignment or duties. These first organizational decrees had the effect of reducing the decreed strength of the Vistula Legion from 9,460 men to a more realistic 6,600 men. The Decree of 24 June brought it to a strength of 5,959 men. It should also be noted that French nationals were not permitted to serve in the legion, except as the company clerks (fourriers), battalion adjutant non-commissioned officers and as paymasters. The Poles, apparently, had little concern for administrative duties and, driven to desperation, Napoleon relented on these

administrative positions. At this time the legions regimental commanders were: Commander in Chief: 1st Infantry Regiment: 2nd Infantry Regiment: 3rd Infantry Regiment: Lancer Regiment:

GEnEral de brigade J. Grabinski Colonel J. Chlopicki Colonel S. Bialowieyski Colonel P. Swiderski Colonel J. Konopka

Between 27 May and 20 June elements of the Vistula Legion arrived in Bayonne preparing for participation in the Spanish campaign. The lancers arrived first and were permitted to retain their lances. The officers, non-commissioned officers and flankers were also issued carbines. On 8 June Napoleon assigned the 2nd and 3rd Vistula Regiments to General Grandjean's Division, effectively destroying the legion concept. General Grabinski no longer had a legion to command and, after a private conversation with Napoleon retired on an unpaid leave, never to return to French service. The Decree of 24 June gave the Vistula Legion a unique command structure: the colonel of the 1st Regiment was at the same time the commander of the entire Legion, while the two remaining infnatry regiments were commanded by majors. The lancer regiment was independent. At this time Colonel Bialowieyski died and command passed to Major M. Kasinowski. Colonel Swiderski retired and the 3rd Regiment passed to Major J. Szott. After the battle of Wagram, Napoleon found that he was once again in possession of a large number of ethnic Poles amongst his Austrian prisoners of war. The Decree of 8 July 1809 directed that these men were to form the 2nd Vistula Legion under the c ommand of Mikolaj Bronikowski. This legion was to have two regiments with four battalions. Each battalion was to be organized with six companies of 160 men. Its organization began in Saint-Poelten and ethnic Germans and Austrians were also accepted into its ranks. There were, however, insufficient men to fully form the second legion and in September its scope was reduced to two battalions. Both battalions were formed and sent to Sedan in October. The Decree of 23 July 1809 ordered the raising of every infantry company to a strength of 200 men. This strength was not reached until the end of 1810. The 2nd Vistula Legion did not seem able to complete itself, so it was disbanded by the Decrees of 12/15 February 1810. Its men were incorporated into the 1st Vistula Legion as a 4th Regiment. In 1810 Bronikowski became a g£n£ral de brigade and command of the 4th Regiment passed to K. Tanski, a former major in the 2nd Legion. The regiment, composed of former Austrian soldiers, had not enjoyed a very good reputation and was considered by the rest of the legion as a place of banishment. Tanski resigned his post on 26 June 1810 and on 12 July Colonel S. Estko was designated as his replacement. Estko, however, delayed his arrival until February 1812. The cavalry regiment consisted of four squadrons, each with two companies. A ninth company acted as a depot. It consisted of 1,171 men, of whom 47 were officers. It had 1,184 horses of which 64 were officers mounts. There were three further units that were transferred to French service during this period. The King of Saxony, also the ruler of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, complained to Napoleon that his treasury could not support the expanding Polish national army. On 16 March 1808 Napoleon decided that the Vistula Legion could, if the need arose, be sent to the aid of the King of Saxony without arousing particular attention. In addition, he authorized the transfer of the 4th, 7th and 9th Polish Regiments from Polish service to French service. They established their depots in Sedan and were organized with two, nine company battalions, and a depot company38. Each company had 140 men.

The regimental staff of these three regiments consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Major 2 Chefs de bataillon 2 Adjutants-major 1 Quartier-maitre trEsorier 1 Officier payeur 1 Chirurgien-major 2 Chirurgiens aide-major 2 Chirurgiens sous-aide 2 Adjutant NCOs

1 Vaguemestre (baggagemaster) 1 Drum Major 1 Drum Corporal 1 Chef de musique 7 Musicians 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Cobbler 1 Master Armorer 1 Master Gaitermaker

' Each company had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 4 Sergeants 1 Caporal-fourrier 8 Corporals 121 Fusiliers, Grenadiers or Voltigeurs 2 Drummers 140 Total These units left Poland in May 1808 and arrived in Metz in August. They were sent directly to Spain where they fought until 1811. On 13 December 1808 a royal decree organized four depot companies for these regiments in Lenczyca. Each company consisted of 3 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, one drummer and 122 soldiers. On 29 October 1808 Napoleon directed that a main depot be formed in Bordeaux. Each regiment was to send one company to Bordeaux for this purpose, thus reducing their field strengths to eight companies. This depot processed new recruits being sent from Lenczyca. A separate artillery company accompanied the Poles. This company consisted of six 4pdrs, four 8pdrs and two howitzers. In addition, regimental batteries were raised as well. In 1812 the 4th, 7th and 9th Regiments were withdrawn and incorporated into the Grande Arm£e for the invasion of Russia where they were destroyed. Each regiment also began forming a third battalion in Posen. The third battalions followed the regiments into Russia and joined them in Smolensk on 10 October. Shortly after their arrival in France and prior to their departure for Spain they altered their organization to the standard organization of the Polish infantry, which was similar to that established by the Decree of 18 February 1808. Their staff now consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Major 3 Chefs de bataillon 3 Adjutants-major 1 Officier payeur 1 Chirurgien-major 2 Chirurgiens aide-major 3 Chirurgiens sous-aide 6 Adjutant NCOs 2 Porte aigle sous-officiers

(NCO eagle bearers) 1 Chaplain 1 Drum Major 1 Drum Corporal 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Cobbler 1 Master Armorer 1 Master Gaitermaker Each company had the same strength as it had been assigned in 1810 and stood at: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major 4 Sergeants 1 Caporal-fourrier 8 Corporals 117 Fusiliers, Grenadiers or Voltigeurs 2 Drummers 136 Total The Vistula Legion also adopted this organization during its reorganization in France39 and it too was sent to Spain where it fought in the sieges of Saragossa and Segunto. In fact, the Vistula Legion seemed particularly destined to participate in sieges and fought in all of the major sieges in eastern Spain during the early years of the Peninsular War. The next organizational change was the raising of the 2nd Lancer Regiment on 7 February 1811. Its organization was identical to the 1st Lancer Regiment. The one difference being that it had no separate depot company. On 18 June 1811 the two lancer regiments were stripped from the Vistula Legion and redesignated as the 7e and 8e Regiments de ChevaulEger-lanciers, part of the regular French army. A third "Polish" regiment was raised on 23 February 1811 when the 30e Chasseurs & Cheval were raised in Hamburg. For a short while they were known as the "chasseurslanciers" because they carried lances and dressed as chasseurs, but on 18 June 1811 they were converted into the 9e ChevaulEgers, also part of the French army. Though officially known as the "9eme REgiment de landers Polonaise de la Ligne," they were predominately ethnic Germans. In preparation for the invasion of Russia the Vistula Legion was withdrawn from Spain in early 1812. The Decree of 3 March 1812 ordered the transformation of the legion into a division. This was to be done by supplementing its four regiment with the organization of a 3rd Battalion for each regiment and the assignment of artillery companies. Command of the division was given to General Claparede and Chlopicki served as a brigade commander. On 14 March the Vistula Legion was renamed "La LEgion du Grand Duche de Varsovie." However by 5 May it reverted to the "Vistula Legion." On 13 March 1812 Napoleon issued the organizational decrees for the artillery and the third battalions. The decree for the third battalions did not, however, survive. A regimental artillery company was to consist of two guns, an appropriate number of ammunition wagons, an ambulance and a field forge. It was to have: 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 3 Sergeants

3 Corporals 20 Gunners 2 Artisans 4Q Train Soldiers 70 Total These reorganizations brought the theoretical regimental strength from 1,705 men to 2,622 men and the entire division to a strength of 10,488 men, plus divisional staff. The actual decreed strength was never to be reached. On 2 April 1812 Napoleon decided to include the Poles in the Young Guard corps under MarEchal Mortier a la suite rather than designating them as Guard. The third battalions were formed, but on 31 May, after reviewing them in Posen, Napoleon directed that they were not to form elite companies. Napoleon felt their soldiers were too young. However, they would follow the main army as far as Smolensk and Gjatsk, joining the main body only during the retreat in the beginning of November. On 15 June the Vistula Legion, sans 3rd Battalions, had a total of 112 officers and 4,910 men, a far cry from the theoretical strength of 150 officers and 5,175 rank and file. The 4th Regiment was also still serving in Spain. In July 1812 the Vistula Legion accompanied the Grande ArmEe into Russia and was attached to the Imperial Guard. Of the almost 7,000 Vistula Legionnaires that entered Russia in the Legion less than 1,500 marched out between December 1812 and February 1813. These man had fought bravely at Smolensk, Borodino, Tarutino, Krasnoe and the Berezina. On 18 June 1813 the Vistula Regiment was organized from the remnants of the Vistula Legion. It consisted of only two battalions. It was reformed at its depot in Sedan in early 1814 with all of the Poles remaining in French service in an effort to bring it up to strength. The new regiment was commanded by Colonel M. Kosinski and its staff consisted of: 1 Colonel 2 Chefs de bataillon 2 Adjutants-major 1 Paymaster 1 Eagle Bearer 1 Chirurgien Major 1 Chirurgien Sous-major 2 Chirurgien Sous-aides 4 Adjutant NCOs 2 Porte-Etandard sous-officiers 1 Drum Major 1 Drum Corporal 1 Master Armorer 1 Music Master 7 Musicians Each company had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant Major

4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 121 Soldiers 2 Drummers 140 Total

The regiment had two battalions. Each battalion had six companies, one grenadier, one voltigeur and four fusilier companies. It fought at Leipzig, Hanau, and at Soissons, where it fought valiantly against the blockading Russian forces. After earning 23 LEgions d'honneur (two officer and 21 cavalier) in Soissons, the legion moved to the CompiEgne. They fought at Rheims and Arcis-sur- Aube where Napoleon sought shelter in one of its battalions as it formed square. The legion then went on to fight at the battle at St. Dizier. When the war ended the survivors returned to Poland. The 7e and 8th Chevauldger-lanciers in Trench Service On 18 July 1811 the two cavalry regiments in the Vistula Legion were drawn into the French line cavalry organization and redesignated as the 7th and 8th ChevaulEger-lancier Regiments. The Decree of 15 July 1811 established their internal organization as follows: Staff 1 Colonel 1 Major 2 Chefs d'escadron 2 Adjutant-majors 1 Quartier-maitre 1 Chirurgien-major 1 Chirurgien Aide-major 2 Chirurgien Sous-aide 2 Adjutant NCOs 1 Brigadier Trumpeter 2 Veterinarians 1 Master Cobbler 1 Master Tailor 1 Master Armorer/Spurmaker 1 Master Harnessmaker 20 Total Each company had: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 2 Sous-lieutenants 1 Marechal des logis chef 4 Marechaux des logis 1 Brigadier Fourrier 8 Brigadiers 108 Lancers 2 Trumpeters 128 Total On 13 December 1813 Napoleon order the merging of the 7e and 8e Regiments into a new 8e REgiment. However, the officers of the 7e REgiment sent him a memorandum of protest against this decision and the decree was changed on 18 January 1814. This,* in effect, preserved the 7e REgiment. A rebuilt 7e REgiment with three squadrons was formed, but there is considerable question as to the fate of the 8e REgiment. Though it was to have been absorbed by the 7e REgiment, it appears on several orders of battle through the early 1814 campaign and may well not have been disbanded. The Royal Ordinance of 12 May 1814 disbanded the 7e and 8e ChevaulEger Regiments.

3e Regiment stranger (Polonaise) and 7e Chevauliger-lancier in 1815 With Napoleon's return to France during the One Hundred Days, he began to restore his army to its full strength. The first foreign unit he began reorganizing was the Poles. On 23 March he directed that a Polish battalion begin forming in Rjheims. The Polish depot at Rheims was established shortly after 28 May 1814 to accommodate the Poles still left in France. It was commanded by Chef de bataillon Golaszewski. The "Poles" in this depot also included a number of native Russians who had served in various Polish regiments. On 11 March 1815 the battalion had 29 officers and 560 non-commissioned officers and men. A further 12 were in hospital and there were 8 women and 5 children carried on the rolls. The Polish battalion was to have one voltigeur, one grenadier and four fusilier companies. Each company had 3 officers, 14 NCOs, 56 privates and two drummers. The battalion staff consisted of 9 officers, non-commissioned officers and craftsmen. This gave the entire battalion a theoretical strength of 22 officers and 459 men. The battalion was sent to Sedan, the depot of the now disbanded Vistula Legion. On 23 April it was raised to a regiment by the addition of a second battalion that was to be raised. This battalion was to be formed from prisoners Napoleon expected to take. The Decree of 11 April directed the formation of cadres for five foreign regiments. Each was to have two battalions. One regiment was to form in Soissons with the Poles. Disorders broke out in the ler and 2e Regiments Etranger royale and they were disbanded by the Decree of 2 May. Only a few of these disbanded troops remained to be used in the raising of these new regiments. The 3e REgiment d'Etranger royale, or the Irish Regiment, was the only regiment retained and it was renumbered as the 7e REgiment d'Etranger. These decree's were followed, in short order, by intensive propaganda campaigns along the various borders in an effort to raise troops for these regiments. However, they succeeded in recruiting only deserters from the foreign armies and a few veterans who had served in the French armies before 1814. The cadres of these six foreign regiments were very carefully selected from amongst the foreign officers who had remained in France after the First Restoration. The 3e REgiment was, in fact, raised on 23 April 1815 in Laon. However, it and its depot were quickly sent to Soissons. On 15 June 1815 the Polish regiment had 29 officers and 476 enlisted. The Poles seem to have eventually raised a total of 22 officers and 637 men under the command of chef de bataillon Golaszewski. It is known that the 3e REgiment Etranger was organized with a staff consisting of: 1 Chef de Bataillon 1 Adjutant-major 1 Quartermaitre 1 Health Officer

1 Adjutant NCO 1 Drum Corporal 1 Master tailor 1 Master cobbler 1 Master armorer 9 Total

Each of the companies was organized with: 1 Capitain 1 Lieutenant 1 Sous-lieutenant 1 Sergeant-major

4 Sergeants 1 Fourrier 8 Corporals 2 Drummers 56 Soldiers 75 Total

Napoleon also desired to raise some foreign cavalry regiments. These too consisted of many deserters from the various foreign armies advanced posts, but never amounted to any significant force. Napoleon's first move was to raise, in Soissons, a cadre of Polish cavalry with the issuance of the Decrees of 28 April and 12 May 1815 in an effort to organize a Polish light cavalry regiment. Shortly later, the 7e ChevaulEger-lancier Polonais was organized in Soissons with 23 officers, 327 enlisted and 13 horses. They fought on foot in the defense of the bridges in SEvres, just outside Paris on 2 July 1815, earning Davout's praise. In October the foreign regiments were disbanded, but the 3e REgiment and the 7e Landers were not to be disbanded. Those that were still willing to serve were absorbed into the army of the Kingdom of Poland, which served the Czar of Russia. Apparently the 7e Landers refused this and were disbanded in France. Uniforms of the Polish Formations In French Service 1795-1814 Infantry of the Lombard/Cisalpine Legion Shortly after the Lombard Legion was raised, between January and May 1797, its uniform was as close as possible to the traditional Polish uniform. The first battalion of grenadiers and chasseurs wore the "konfederatka," which was a visorless cap with a fur turban and a square top so well known from the czapka, a later military cap. The turban was of black lamb's wool and the square top was of blue cloth piped with the battalion colors: amaranth for the grenadiers and green for the chasseurs. A Polish national cockade was worn and over the cockade was a yellow plume with a horizontal red band. The uniform consisted of a dark blue kurtka, or jacket, piped with the battalion color. The chasseurs had green lapels, cuffs and turnbacks, while those of the grenadiers were dark blue. Both the grenadiers and chasseurs wore a tricolored belt (top to bottom - red, white and blue). The chasseurs wore blue epaulets with green piping, while those of the grenadiers were red. The breeches of both battalions were dark blue. They were skin tight and had no side stripes. The bullet pouch was suspended from a white belt worn over the left shoulder. Their haversack was of the standard French issue as was all their other equipment. In some instances, however, captured Austrian and Italian equipment was used. When the fusilier battalion was raised it adopted the same uniform as the existing troops, except their cuffs, collar, lapels and turnbacks were yellow. The artillery wore green uniforms and a konfederatka with a black turban, green top and black piping. The uniform was piped black and the epaulets were dark red. When the legion was organized into two separate legions, the uniforms were altered. The artillery adopted a green czapka with a red plume, and abandoned the black piping for blue facings on their coats. Each of the two legions now had three battalions which were marked with the legion color. It is probable that this new uniform was an attempt by the Cisalpine government to bring the Poles into conformance with their national uniforms. However, the Poles were very sensitive to this and resisted such attempts with great vigor. Turnback Collar Cuffs Plume

over over

1st Legion Green Red White Blue Red White

2nd Legion Red White Green White Blue Red

Infantry of the Vistula Legion The fusiliers also wore a pompon on their czapka, yellow with a red horizontal stripe. It is important to note that there are conflicting descriptions of the uniforms worn in this period. Kukiel states that the grenadier battalion work dark blue uniforms with crimson distinctives and the chasseur battalion wore dark green with black distinctives. He states that initially they wore bicorns, but shortly later adopted the "Konfederatkas." There are other aspects of the preceding description that are inconsistent with the general history of Polish and French uniforms and throw them into question. With the June 1797 reorganization the legion it adopted a new color pattern. The colors of the old legion, amaranth yellow and green, were to be kept by the 1st Legion. The first battalion was to have cuffs, collar, turnbacks and lapels that were amaranth and a plume40 that was, top to bottom, blue, red and white. The second battalion was to wear green distinctives and a plume that was red, white and blue. The third battalion wore yellow distinctives and a plume that was white, blue and red. The 2nd Battalion was to have yellow buttons, while those of the other battalions were to be white. The 2nd Legion was assigned the following battalion colors: 1st - black, 2nd - blue, 3rd - pink. The plume sequence was to be the same as in the 1st Legion. The buttons of all the battalions in the 2nd Legion were to be white. The basic color of the uniforms was still, however, dark blue. The grenadiers of both legions were to wear red plumes and the chasseurs wore a green plume. Only the fusiliers were to wear the multi-colored plume. The grenadiers were to be issued French bicorns and the chasseurs brimmed hats. However, Polish documentation indicates the plume sequence described was introduced, but not until 26 March 1799. Between October 1798 and March 1799 the plume was, top to bottom, red, white and blue. The battalion distinctions were derived from the dress of the pre-1795 Polish regimental uniforms. This was because these new Polish battalions

were considered by their members as the cadres for an eventually restored army of the Polish Kingdom. Thus, for example, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Legion wore the colors of the National Cavalry and the 2nd Battalion wore those of the Wegierski Chasseurs. On 31 October 1798 the new uniform regulations almost completely removed the battalion distinctions and introduced legion distinctions. The 1st Legion wore amaranth distinctives and the 2nd Legion wore poppy red distinctives. The artillery uniforms were dark green with black distinctives. The czapka, now worn by all the infantry, was dark green for the rank and file and dark blue for officers. It had poppy red and white pipping and a cloth turban in the former color battalions, i.e. crimson for the 1/lst Legion, yellow for the 2/1st legion, etc. The czapka lost the black lambskin turban. The grenadiers had poppy red plumes and the chasseurs had green plumes. The fusiliers wore the tri-colored plume that were amaranth, dark blue and white, as described above. Both officers and the rank and file wore long hair that reached to the middle of their collars. It was in the style known as"kla Kosciuszko." The grenadiers were required to wear moustaches. All officers wore an epaulet on their left shoulder with the traditional Polish rank distinctives. On their right shoulder was a counter-epaulet with a strap in the Cisalpine colors (red, white and green). The white band of this strap bore embroidered on it the words "Gli uomini liberi sono fratelli" (All free men are brothers). In February 1800 the remnants of the Polish Auxiliary Corps of the Cisalpine Republic were transformed into the (First) Polish Legion in French service. The uniform was simplified. Now the infantry wore dark blue kurtkas with crimson distinctives. Their breeches were also dark blue. Their czapkas were dark blue with black lambskin turbans and black leather visors. The fusiliers had white cords and black, 6 inch tall woolen pompons. The grenadiers had poppy red cords and plumes and brass grenade front plates. The artillery uniform remained unchanged, except that they had poppy red cords and plumes. The legion also had 40 sappers wearing bearskins. The cockade was the traditional Polish cockade. Decrees issued by the President of the Italian Republic on 26 June and 26 September 1802 changed the crimson parts of the uniforms to yellow. Some iconographic sources also indicate that a sunburst plaque was adopted on the czapka, but this seems implausible. The cockade was changed to the Italian colors, green replacing the dark blue. When the 2nd Demi-brigade, renamed the 114th Demi-Brigade, went to Santo-Domingo, its soldiers were issued white linen jackets and pantaloons. In practice the soldiers wore portions of both the new and old uniforms, keeping the dark blue and yellow kurtkas and wearing the white pantaloons. Many discarded the czapka in favor of wide brimmed straw hats. The 1st Demi-brigade retained its 1802 uniforms until 1807. Cavalry of the Lombard Legion When the first Polish cavalry regiment was raised, it was out fitted with Austrian equipment captured at Gaeta. Its uniform was dark blue and very similar in cut to that worn by the infantry. Their czapka was crimson with a black turban and dark blue piping. The czapka also had a removable visor. The plumes of the first squadron were, top to bottom, blue, white and red in the first company and red,white and blue in the second company. The first company of the second squadron had a white, blue and red plume, while the second company was red, blue and white. Their kurtka had crimson cuffs, collar, lapels and turnbacks. The uniforms piping was crimson. The breeches were dark blue and worn inside short black boots. The outside seam of each leg had a crimson stripe. In addition to company distinctions with the plumes, the lance pennants also indicated company assignments. The pennants were what is known as a swallowtailed pennant:

The squadrons and company colors were distributed as follows: 1st Squadron 1st Company 2nd Company

a Blue B Red R

b Red Blue

c White White

2nd Squadron 1st Company 2nd Company

a b c White Red Blue V Red White Blue R

The horse cloths were white lamb's wool with crimson wolves teeth edging. Infantry of the Danube Legion The uniform regulations of October 1799 gave the infantry dark blue kurtkas with crimson lapels and square cut cuffs, both piped white. The breeches were dark blue and had a narrow crimson stripe down each leg. The plain metal buttons were yellow. The leather work was all black. They wore short black light infantry gaiters with white edging on the tops and white tassels. The grenadiers wore poppy red epaulets, the chasseurs wore dark green and the fusiliers wore crimson. The cockade and rank insignia were French. All troops wore a dark blue czapka with a black lambskin turban and black leather visor. It was surmounted by eight inch tall feather plume that was red for the grenadiers, green for the chasseurs and yellow for the fusiliers. The fusilier officers wore a tricolor plume. The tassel cords were probably of the same color. However, on 7 January 1800, the plumes were ordered to be made of horsehair, with the top six inches colored poppy red for the grenadiers, green for the chasseurs and crimson for the fusiliers. The bottom two inches were given the following battalion distinctive colors: 1st Battalion 2nd Battalion 3rd Battalion 4th Battalion

— White — Blue — Poppy Red — Yellow

Thus the grenadier company of the 3rd Battalion had entirely poppy red plumes. The linen cords were now yellow for everybody and the tassels were of die battalion colors. Due to a lack of funds and problems with contractors, it was a long time before the more than part of the officer staff had the regulation dress described above. The men still wore their old, mostly Austrian, uniforms or whatever rags they could lay their hands on. The more industrious ones "deserted" to the enemy, where they were issued decent uniforms and shoes, then happily came back. This situation lasted until May 1800 when Kniaziewicz pointed out to his French superiors that his soldiers, soon to face the Austriaris, were exposed to unnecessary danger from both the Imperial as well as the French side, and asked for an issuance of French light infantry uniforms. By the end of the month, the Poles received bicorns, long "habits," striped pantaloons or tight breeches, etc. In June the 1st and 2nd Battalions were almost totally dressed in Polish regulation fashion, but the rest continued to wear the French or (the newcomers) Austrian uniforms. Though by 19 August the battle ready units were uniformly clad in the prescribed manner, the problems with uniform supplies continued to plague the Legion until the end of its existence. It is worth mentioning that a contemporary print shows the Legion infantry wearing kurtkas with crimson collars and dark blue lapels. The cloth belts were dark'blue with crimson edging and square buckles, colored left to right, crimson, white and blue. When the Danube Legion became the 3rd Polish Demi-brigade, its officers were ordered on 31 March 1802 to wear bicorns with black plumes, the bottom of which had the battalion colors: 1st Battalion - poppy red, 2nd Battalion - blue, 3rd Battalion - white. It is, however,

unknown how this regulation affected the uniforms of the other ranks. In Santo-Domingo, the 113th Demi-brigade wore their old uniforms, combined with white linen like the 114th Demi-brigade. Chasseurs/Uhlans of the Danube Legion As in the case of the infantry, the Legion cavalry received around May 1800 the French light or horse artillery, with minor modifications. These uniforms consisted of dark blue hussar style dolmans, vests and tight breeches. They had no fur trimming on the dolmans. The dolman had poppy red piping and braid. The breeches had poppy red side stripes. Their visored czapkas were black with black leather turbans, yellow cords, poppy red plumes and French cockades. After receiving lances, before the end of July 1800, the former chasseurs were uniformed in the fashion prescribed by the October 1799 regulations.. They wore dark blue czapkas with yellow cords (gold for officers), black leather turbans and visors. The French cockade was worn on the left side. The twelve inch tall horsehair plumes were, in accordance with the 7 January regulations, crimson with a two inch bottom in the squadron colors: 1st Squadron 2nd Squadron 3rd Squadron 4th Squadron

— — — —

White Blue Poppy Red Yellow

The yellow cords also had tassels in the squadron colors. A dark blue kurtka with amaranth cuffs, collar, lapels and turnbacks that were piped white was adopted. The belts were black with gold zig-zag stripes for the officers and white for the troopers. The breeches were dark blue with an amaranth stripe on the outside seams. The lance pennants appear to have been horizontally sectioned, top to bottom, blue, white and red. In 1802 the uniforms changed again. The uhlans changed their crimson for yellow. The czapka received a white,probably lambskin, turban and white cords. The lance pennant was, top to bottom, red and green with a white triangle. The cockade was Italian. Otherwise the uniform remained unchanged. Subsequent to this there were a number of minor changes that moved the uniform slowly to a more French style of uniform. In the transitory period between November 1807 and March 1808, when the uhlans passed into Westphalian service, the elite company had black bearskins with poppy red plumes and yellow bags decorated with white piping and tassel. The bearskins were discarded when the cavalry passed into the Vistula Legion. Artillery of the Danube Legion At first, the artillerists were given the uniforms of French sappers, but soon replaced them with French horse artillery uniforms. This consisted of a visored mirliton of black felt that had a black wing piped with poppy red. The cockade was worn half way down the side of the mirliton and was attached to the poppy red plume with a poppy red stripe. The cords, tassels and flounders were poppy red. The gunners wore their hair in long tresses were worn over each temple and were not tied at the end, but secured by a split pistol ball. They wore a dark blue dolman, vest and breeches. There were thirteen rows of brandenburg braid on the dolman with five buttons on each row. The breeches were cut in the Hungarian hussar style. They were skin tight with had Hungarian knots on the thighs and poppy red stripes down the outer seams. Hussar style boots were worn that had poppy red trim and tassels. In August 1800, they finally received their Polish uniforms. The 1799 regulations prescribed them as identical to the cavalry uniforms, with the exception of the lapels, which were dark blue with crimson piping. The dark blue czapkas had dark blue-white-

crimson cords, and twelve inch tall poppy red feather plumes, as specified by the 7 January regulations. On the other hand, Gembarzewski, after an unidentified source, depicts the artillery uniform as consisting of kurtkas with black collars, lapels and cuffs. Both the kurtka and breeches were piped with poppy red. The side stripes were also poppy red. The czapka was black with a black leather visor, tricolor cords, a French cockade and a poppy red plume. They wore short black boots over their breeches and their sash was poppy red. The Kalinowski Hussars Very little is known about the uniform of the Kalinowski Hussars. The only original source, a painting of Lieutenant Dawid Torosiewicz, shows him dressed in a dark blue dolman with crimson piping around the collar and down the middle, silver lace in double strands strung on five spherical buttons and ending in silver tassels. The dolman also has silver epaulets. The cartridge pouch's bandoleer was silver. His breeches are not shown, but they were probably gray. Legion du Nord The legion wore a dark blue kurtka with crimson cuffs, cuff flaps, lapels and piping around the collar and turnbacks. Their buttons were white. The czapka was of black felt with a black leather turban. It had a yellow metal sunburst plaque. The plume, pompon, cords and trim were crimson for the carabiniers, yellow for the voltigeurs and light blue for the fusiliers. Their epaulets were of the same color. The cockade was French. The legionnaires wore white or dark blue breeches and white or black gaiters with black leather buttons. Their overcoats were brown. The uniform also included a white, sleeved vest and a black handkerchief of a "fleecy fabric" around the neck. The uniforms were manufactured in the Prussian military factories captured in 1806. After the capitulation of Danzig, the cloth supplies captured there were used to uniform the legion as well. The 2e LEgion du Nord was uniformed as the first, but with pink distinctives. r

Infantry of the Vistula Legion The Vistula Legion infantry wore French shakos with a brass "sunburst" plaque being marked with either the regimental number or the imperial cipher, "N." The cords were white. A carrot shaped pompon was worn that was red for the grenadiers, green or green and yellow for the voltigeurs, and white for the fusiliers. The grenadiers' and voltigeurs' shakos had "V" side stripes and bands around the crown of the shako. They were red for the grenadiers and yellow for the voltigeurs. However, prior to 1812 the grenadiers wore bearskins with poppy red cords, plumes and patches. The sappers wore bearskins with yellow sunburst plaques, white cords, and a yellow bag with white wolves teeth edging and a white tasseL The sunburst plaques had the Imperial eagle in the center with the regimental number on its breast. On occasion, the plaque had only the regimental number and no eagle. On the bottom edge of some of the plaques there was the inscription "Legia Nadwislanska," but this was not common. From 1808 to 1811, the regiments wore the Polish style uniform of dark blue cloth. The collar, lapels and turnbacks were faced with the regimental color. These were: Regiment Collar Collar Piping Cuff Cuff Piping Turnbacks 1st Dark Blue Yellow Yellow — Yellow 2nd Yellow Yellow — — Yellow 3rd Yellow Dark Blue Yellow Yellow Yellow 4th Dark Blue Dark Blue Yellow Yellow Yellow The fusiliers wore dark blue shoulder straps piped with yellow. The epaulets of the

grenadiers were white and those of the voltigeurs were green and yellow. They wore white breeches and knee high gaiters of black cloth. Their equipment was identical to that worn by the French line infantry. In 1812, a project of new uniform regulations was prepared by Colonel Bardin and the Vistula Legion regimental distinctives were established as follows: Cuff Cuff Piping Regiment Collar Collar Piping Yellow 1st Yellow White Dark Blue Yellow 2nd Yellow — Yellow 3rd Dark Blue Yellow Dark Blue Yellow 4th Dark Blue Yellow It is, however, uncertain if these color changes were implemented. In 1813 the Vistula Regiment wore a French "habit veste" with the same colors as before. They wore long gaiters reaching above the knee instead of the previous light infantry gaiters. The grenadiers wore dark blue Polish czapkas with white cords, white carrotshaped pompons and yellow sunburst plaques. These plaques bore the Polish eagle and the inscription "Polk Nawislanski." Vistula Lancers and the 7e and 8e Regiments des Landers Polonais de la Ligne The Vistula Lancers wore a dark blue kurtka with yellow cuffs, collars, lapels and turnbacks. The piping on the uniform was also yellow. The elite companies wore white epaulets on their right shoulders and white aiguilettes on their left. The other companies wore pointed shoulder straps that were blue piped with yellow. They wore a white cummerbund around their waists that had two blue lines. In full dress they wore blue breeches with two yellow stripes separated by blue piping down the outside seams. The "pantaloons & cheval" were also blue and had black leather inserts on the insides and a single yellow stripe down the outer seam. Both regiments wore a dark blue czapka with a black turban. The dark blue top was piped with white and had the French cockade surmounted by the Maltese cross. In full dress a white plume was worn. The chin strap was brass and there was no plaque on the czapka. In 1811 the czapka received the sunburst plaque above the visor and the plume was replaced by a carrot shaped pompon. Those pompons were in squadron colors: 1st - red, 2nd - sky blue, 3rd - aurora and 4th - violet. The elite companies wore a red plume with white cords. The uniforms of the 7e and 8e Regiments were only slightly different from those worn while part of the Vistula Legion. They wore a dark blue Polish kurtka. The 7e wore blue piping on yellow shoulder straps, cuffs, collar and lapels. The 8e wore yellow piping on blue shoulder straps, cuffs, collar and lapels. Their headgear consisted of the traditional square topped czapka. It had a black leather turban surmounted by a black cloth square peak. It had a sunburst brass plaque on its front and had a French cockade surmounted by the Maltese cross. The elite company wore a red plume, white cords and flounders. The other companies wore white plumes, cords and flounders. The center companies had a pompon in the squadron color. These squadron colors were 1st Squadron - red , 2nd - sky blue, 3rd aurora and 4th - violet. The elite companies wore white shoulder straps on the right with a white aiguilette on the left. The other companies wore epaulets piped with the facing color. Colonel Bardin's regulations of 1812 give the Polish lancers dark blue uniforms with white buttons and dark blue-and-white striped belts. Both regiments wore dark blue shoulder straps with yellow piping. The distinctive regimental colors were:

Regiment Collar Collar Piping 7th Yellow Dark Blue 8th Dark Blue Yellow

Lapels Cuffs Cuff Piping Turnbacks Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Dark Blue Yellow Yellow

Both regiments wore white leather sword belts and cross belts. Their carbine belt was slightly wider than their bullet pouch belt and the carbine was hung from a swivel hook. The lancers carried the light cavalry saber, but it had two styles of hilt, that of the An IX and the An XI. One hilt was a simple single bar and the second had three bars which provided more protection. Their carbine was the same as that used by the chasseurs and hussars, the An IX Musketoon. Their lance was 2.65 meters long and made of hardened wood. It was generally painted black and had a white leather strap at the balance point to allow better control of the lance. It had a swallow tailed pennant attacked to it with three iron studs. The pennant was 73 cm long, 38 cm wide and 37 cm from the shaft to the notch of the swallowtail. 9e Regiment de Landers Polonaise de la Ligne While designated the 30th Chasseur-lanciers the regiment wore dark blue jackets and breeches with crimson cuffs, sidestripes and piping. There are some unsubstantiated stories about them acquiring the nickname "landers rouges" or "red lancers" because of a shortage of appropriate cloth and the use of red cloth for various uniform parts. However, Polish sources do not confirm this. The regiment wore black shakos with white cords and pompons for the center companies. The elite company wore a brown fur colpack with the white cords and pompon. The colpack had a crimson bag with white tassel and piping. The elite companies wore plain crimson epaulets and the other companies wore white ones. They wore hussar style boots with white trim and tassels. After being designated as the 9e Landers on 15 July 1811 they were issued Polish style uniforms. The czapka consisted of the black leather turban with a dark blue top piped white. There is some question if the sunburst plaque was worn. The black leather peak was bound with white metal and the chinstrap was of black leather. A black plume with a green tip was worn for full dress, the cords were white and hung from the left to right across the corners of the square top. The kurtka was dark blue. The cuffs, collar, lapels and turnbacks were "chamois" or a light yellow. The troopers wore dark blue shoulder straps that were piped chamois. Both dark blue and the notorious red cloth were used for breeches. These breeches were often in the baggy Mamelouk style. This was preferred by the officers. Those of the troopers were generally the "pantalons k cheval" with black stripes on the outside seams. The schabraque was red with a black lace stripe on the edge. There was red piping on the extreme edge of the schabraque. A green portemanteau was carried on the back of the saddle. It was round and its flat ends were trimmed with a stripe similar to that of the schabraque. The lance pennant was either chamoise or white over red, varying between source documents. Uhlan Uniforms in 1814 The uniforms of the two uhlan regiments organized in 1814 were based on the 1811 /12 regulations for the Polish lancer regiments in the French army. The kurtkas were dark blue with poppy red collars, cuffs, lapels, turnbacks and piping on the back seams for the first 1st Regiment and crimson for the 2nd Regiment. The buttons were white for the troopers and silver for the officers. The elite companies probably wore white fringed epaulets, while the center companies wore dark blue shoulder straps piped in the regimental colors. The troopers wore dark blue overalls, reinforced with leather, and decorated with single side stripes of the regimental color down the outer seam. The officers' trousers were either

poppy red or crimson, depending on the regiment, with a single wide silver sidestripe. The czapkas were dark blue with black leather turbans, brass sunburst plaques with white regimental numbers ins the center, and French cockades. The troopers had round, white pompons, possibly in a carrot like shape for the elite companies, while the officers wore white feather plumes. Their belts were made of cloth, with four white (silver for officers) and three poppy red or crimson stripes. All leatherwork was white, except for the black bullet pouches. Weapons of the Polish Infantry The Polish Legions in Italy between 1797 and 1799 carried Austrian muskets of the 1754, 1774 and 1784 models. Some of the chasseur companies, however, were issued rifled carbines. By 1800 they were receiving the French Charleville 1777 as well as weapons made in Verona. The LEgion du Nord carried old, reworked Prussian muskets of the 1720 and 1782 patterns. The army of the Grand Duchy between 1807 and 1809 carried 1801 pattern Prussian muskets and a few miscellaneous Russian weapons. Between 1809 and 1811 they still carried principally Prussian muskets, plus a substantial number of Austrian 1807 pattern muskets with rifled barrels. From 1811 through 1814 they were almost completely reequipped with French muskets of the 1793 and 1800/1801 patterns. With the end of the 1812 campaign and the sudden need to replace lost equipment and outfit numerous new recruits, Russian 1808 pattern muskets were pressed into service. In addition, large numbers of reserve and garrison units had Prussian 1805 and 1809 pattern weapons made under French supervision at Potsdam.

Poles During the Revolutionary

Wars

Civita Castellana - 4 December 1798 On 23 November 1798, the Neapolitan army, 60,000 men under Austrian Feldmarschallieutenant Karl Mack, invaded the newly created Roman Republic. The fledgling republic was defended by the ArmEe de Rome, under the command of GEnEral de division J.E.Vachier, also called Championnet. His force consisted of 26,794 French soldiers and 7,109 allies, including 2,957 Poles organized in the three battalions of the 1st Polish Legion. At the moment of the invasion, Championnet could only muster about 20,000 of his men. Faced by a numerically superior enemy, Macdonald, commander of the Rome garrison and one of Championnet's divisional commanders, abandoned Rome. Macdonald took up a position to the north of Rome, by the fortified town of Civita Castellana. The position was protected from the south by two deep and narrow ravines. At the bottom of each ravine was a stream, each spanned by single bridge. On the other side, the town was surrounded by a wide plain that allowed unobstructed troop deployment. The possession of Civita Castellana also gave the French command of the bridge at Barghetto, which was vital for preserving communications with the left bank of the Tiber. The Poles were under Chef de brigade Karol Kniaziewicz. They were brigaded with the 2/30th Demi-brigade, two squadrons of the 16th Dragoon Regiment, a company of the 19th Chasseur k Cheval Regiment, three guns and the 200 men of the Roman legion who had not deserted. The 3rd Polish Battalion occupied Corchiano and the rest of the brigade camped to the northwest of Civita Castellana, forming the center and reserve of the 1st Division. The Austrian general, Mack, advanced without knowing Macdonald's dispositions. On the morning of 4 December the main Neapolitan column attacked Rignano. Shortly afterward, the Neapolitans, under Chevalier de Saxe, grandson of the Polish king Stanislaw Leszczyski, advanced against Macdonald's rear by moving through Falari. To the southwest, at Nepi, the Neapolitan advance was fought to a standstill until around noon, when the 2nd Polish Battalion, under Chef de battaillon Maciej Forestier and Major Jozef Chlopicki arrived. The Polish counterattack routed the Neapolitans. They abandoned 800 dead and wounded, and a further 2,000 prisoners, 15 guns, 30 caissons, 4 standards, 3,000 muskets, 900 horses and mules, their military chest and all their baggage fell to the 19th Chasseurs, who pursued them from the field. While this occurred, Chevalier de Saxe's advance through Ronciglione remained undetected. About 1:00 p.m., his lead elements broke through the woods near Fabrica, cutting off three companies of the 1st Polish Battalion stationed there. The Poles were obliged to withdraw to Corchiano. Kniaziewicz reacted quickly and directed three companies of the 1st Polish Battalion (290 men) and a company of the 19th Chasseur k Cheval Regiment (60 men), under Chef de battaillon Bialowiejski, to move against the Austrian flank. They were to join the 3rd Polish Battalion (900 men) and the three aforementioned companies of the 1st Battalion (280 men) at Corchiano. This combined force was to attack Chevalier de Saxe from the north, while Kniaziewicz marched with the rest of the brigade toward Falari. About 3:00 p.m., halfway between Falari and Fabrica, Kniaziewicz met the Neapolitans coming out of the woods on a narrow road. The narrowness of the road prevented the Neapolitans from deploying more than their three leading battalions and the Poles attacked them immediately. The speed of the Polish attack crumpled the Neapolitan line, blocking the deployment of the Neapolitan units still trying to come out of the woods. Chevalier de Saxe mounted a counterattack that won him only a brief respite, but did permit him to move more of his troops out of the narrow defile. A stalemate developed. At 7:00 p.m., Chevalier de Saxe was wounded by fire from Polish skirmishers. When he fell from his horse the Neapolitans' spirit broke. Kniaziewicz attacked quickly, sending his cavalry forward, breaking the Neapolitan line. The Neapolitans began the second rout of

the day, abandoning their guns and fleeing to the rear. The victory would have been overwhelming if Bialowiejski's group had struck the Austrian left wing at that time, but it had gotten bogged down in muddy roads and didn't join the battle. The 3rd Polish Battalion was also unable to intervene, so many of the Neapolitans escaped that might otherwise have been captured. Trebbia 17-19 June 1799 In early June 1799, General E. Macdonald and his Arm£e de Naples descended from the Appenines onto the Lombardy plain in an offensive directed against the Russo-Austrian forces in northern Italy. Macdonald commanded 31,756 men organized into a vanguard (Salme), six divisions (Olivier, Rusca, Montrichard, Watrin, Dombrowski, and Gaultier) and an artillery reserve (Salva). General Moreau, the commander of the Arm£e d'ltalie, then in Liguria, promised full cooperation with Macdonald's enterprise and sent Victor's division (7,000 men) to operate with him. The Austro-Russian forces were operating in two groups. The Austrians, under Feldmarschal-lieutenant Melas, stood in eastern Lombardy and numbered 25,000 men. The second group totaled 35,000. Its main body, under Generalissimo Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov, stood between Turin and Alessandria in western Lombardy. The remainder of the second force was scattered between Fossano, Fenestrella, Mondovi and Tortona. Macdonald selected Melas as his first target, choosing to deal with Suvorov later. His plan needed Moreau's cooperation, which did not materialize because Moreau chose, unknown to Macdonald, to remain in Liguria. When Suvorov learned of Macdonald's march toward the Trebbia River, he marched to Melas' aid. He detached Kaim in Turin and Bellegarde in Alessandria. Kray was ordered to lift the siege of Mantua, but he refused to do so on the basis of his instructions from the Hofkriegsrath in Vienna. As a result, Suvorov marched to Melas' assistance with the Bagration's advanced guard, and the divisions of Forster, Sheveikovski, and Frohlich. In mid-June, Macdonald came into contact with Feldmarschal-lieutenant Ott's vanguard (5,000 men), which made a fighting retreat westwards toward Trebbia. The French crossed the river near Borgo San Antonio on 17 June with the divisions of Victor, Rusca, and Dombrowski. At this time Dombrowski's division, a total of 2,875 men, contained of the 1st Polish Legion (2,200 men in three fusilier battalions and two elite battalions, three companies strong, of chasseurs and grenadiers), the 2/8th Demi-brigade (400 men), a French horse artillery company (50 men), 45 French cavalrymen, and two squadrons of Polish uhlans (180 men). On 17 June they contacted the Austrians. The Austrian skirmish lines were drawn up on the left (western) bank of the Tidone. Charpentier crossed the shallow river bed and attacked them, but soon ran out of ammunition and found himself threatened in the left flank by enemy columns. Charpentier requested help from Rusca's division, which then entered the battle to the left (south) of Charpentier's forces. When Rusca also found himself threatened by encirclement it became clear that the French were facing more than just Ott's vanguard. Rusca, in turn, sent for Dombrowski's division to extend the French front to the left. Dombrowski directed the Polish Chasseur Battalion (under 300 men) of Chef de battaillon I. Jasinski, to move toward Castel San Giovanni supporting the attack of the 16th and 19th Dragoons (Rusca's division). He moved the rest of his division to the southwest. His left flank was covered by J. Brune's brigade (1st Polish Battalion and the cavalry), while the 2/8th Demi-brigade marched in reserve. The French forces dispersed the Austrians and almost took Castel San Giovanni, when they were struck from the west by six regiments of Austro-Russian cavalry lead by Suvorov himself. Suvorov, who was resting with his group at Stradella, had been alarmed by Ott's courier, and immediately dispatched one of Melas' brigades toward Castel San

Giovanni. This was the flanking force that had prompted the moving forward of Dombrowski's division. Suvorov then followed with his main body one hour later. Upon receiving another desperate message from Ott, he rushed forward with six cavalry regiments. After reaching Castel San Giovanni, Suvorov sent two cossack regiments to the left and Bagration to the right with the Grekov and Pozdieyev Cossack Regiments, followed by the Austrian Karaczay and Levehner Dragoon Regiments. Bagration's group struck the French 16th and 19th Dragoon Regiments, which were scattered across the field pursuing the broken Austrian infantry. The French panicked and in their flight ran into the Polish chasseur battalion. The Poles formed square and tried to retreat. They soon ran out of ammunition and were slaughtered by the cossack lances that outreached their bayonets. Many, including Chef de battaillon Jasinski and Major Pokrzywnicki, were taken prisoner. Under the cover of Bagration's cavalry, two Austrian grenadier battalions reinforced Ott's left wing. The Austrian center was strengthened by Forster's division and the right wing was formed from Shveikovski's Russian division with two grenadier battalions from Grand Duke Constantine's forces deployed before them. Dombrowski met the approaching Russians "en echelon" order, with the 1st Polish Battalion (700-800 men) on the extreme left, farthest from the Russians. The Austrian Erzherzog Joseph Hussar Regiment charged and cut the battalion off from the rest of the division. The battalion, formed in square, managed to withdraw into the nearby mountains, followed by the 2/8th Demi-brigade. On the left wing, Generalmajor Prince Gorchakov, with two Russian infantry regiments and two grenadier battalions, attacked Salme's vanguard. Gorchakov was followed by six of Frohlich's battalions, and the French were steadily pushed back. Finally, at 9:00 p.m., the entire French front line was pushed behind the Tidone and the fighting ended at about 1 0 : 0 0

p.m.

The allies lost about 1,200 men while the French lost 600 men dead, 600 wounded, and 400 prisoners. Suvorov did not attempt to cross the river to pursue the French, but on the other hand Macdonald decided to withdraw his forces to the eastern bank of the Trebbia so that the field between the two rivers was left unoccupied. During the night of 17/18 June the allies camped on the western bank of the Tidone. Ott stood to the north of Ponte Tidone, Forster stood in the center, and Shveikovski and Bagration stood to the south in Borgo Novo. Suvorov's headquarters and Frohlich were to the west in Castel San Giovanni. At 9:00 a.m., on 18 June, Suvorov gave the command of the Austrians on the left wing to Melas; Frohlich's division formed Melas' reserve. The center remained under Forster and the right wing was under Rosenberg. The center and right wing were formed almost entirely of Russian troops. Suvorov's plan was simple, cross the Trebbia and go as far as the Nura River, capturing Macdonald's army in the process. Victor, who had been acting as the French commander since Macdonald was wounded on 6 July, deployed his troops on the eastern bank of the Trebbia as follows: Salme's vanguard formed a weak right wing near Borgo San Antonio, awaiting the arrival of Olivier and Montrichard. Watrin's Division stood in reserve. The center consisted of Victor's (Charpentier's) division with Rusca's division to the south. On the left, near Gossolengo, stood Dombrowski, who had yet to learn of the fate of 1st Polish Battalion and the 2/ 8 th Demi-brigade. Shortly after 9:00 a.m., Dombrowski sent the 2nd Polish Battalion (J. Chlopicki) and 30 cavalry across the Trebbia to Casaliggio. Around 11:00 a.m., the 1st Polish Battalion and the 2/8th Demi-brigade returned to the division. At noon, Dombrowski organized his forces into two columns. One was formed from the Polish grenadier battalion under Chef de battaillon K. Malachowski, the debris of the chasseur battalion, the 3rd Polish Battalion under Chef de la lEgion Forestier, and Dombrowski himself with the Polish-French

cavalry. This force was to march to Tuna, while the other column under Brune, was to occupy Bolzone (2/8th Demi-brigade) and Gazzola (1st Polish Battalion under Chef J. Au). Both columns crossed the Trebbia in battalion squares. About 10:00 A.m., Bagration crossed the Tidone at the head of a vanguard formed of four cossack regiments, the Karaczay Dragoon Regiment, two Russian jager battalions, and two Russian grenadier battalions. Bagration split his forces into two groups, moving toward Casaliggio and Tuna. The Shveikovski division advanced behind Bagration. Their movements were covered by the heavy undergrowth and uneven terrain, so they remained undetected by the French. Dombrowski was shocked to find himself attacked simultaneously from three directions when he arrived before Tuna. When he saw the predicament of Brune's forces, he formed his column into a reversed "L" in order to help Brune to rejoin him. The Russian pressure was too strong and Dombrowski finally decided to withdraw to the Trebbia, marching along its bank toward Casaliggio. During this march, he was struck by Bagration's Austro-Russian cavalry. The 3rd Polish Battalion was shattered and its standard captured. Chef de la lEgion Forestier, Chefs de battalion Zawadzki (3rd) and Malachowski (the grenadiers), and 12 other officers were taken prisoner. Dombrowski was lightly wounded, but managed to fight his way through the allies with his staff at the head of some cavalry and a handful of infantry. In the meantime, Chlopicki and the 2nd Polish Battalion were attacked at Casaliggio by Shveikovski's division. He formed square and retreated in perfect order to the other bank of the Trebbia, fighting constantly with the allied cavalry. Only one of his officers was captured. After crossing the river, Chlopicki took up positions on the left of Rusca's division, acting as a left wing for the entire French army; Dombrowski found him there. In this action Dombrowski's division lost about 400 killed and 300 prisoners. Shveikovski's division advanced to attack Rusca's division. The fighting was heavy and Rusca was himself wounded. Eventually Charpentier's division was obliged to send reinforcements to support him. The French lost 600 killed and 60 prisoners. Suvorov, encouraged by Shveikovski's success, ordered a general attack along the Trebbia at 2:00 P.M. The Russians crossed the river in front of Grignano. Though initially successful, Ott and Frohlich were stopped by Charpentier, who had been reinforced by the arrivals of Olivier and Montrichard's divisions at 2:30 P.M. At 6:00 P.M., two allied infantry columns and a swarm of cavalry attempted to turn the French left wing from the direction of Tuna. Victor moved his divisions to the left. He organized six columns with company frontages, interspersed them with cavalry, and launched a counterattack. The column on the extreme left was formed of Poles, mostly Chlopicki's 2nd Battalion. The French did not, however, realize that Brune's group was even further to the left (south) and were still marching across the mountains, restricting the freedom of Bagration and Shveikovski's movements. The six French columns marched across the Trebbia and engaged the Russians in a murderous bayonet fight. The enraged Poles and French routed the first allied line. Chlopicki's battalion captured two Russian guns, turning them on their fleeing owners. Unfortunately, the French cavalry was unable to support its infantry. The second Russian line counterattacked and after another struggle, pushed the French back into the river, recapturing the lost guns. At 11:00 P.M., the fighting died down. The allies remained on the western bank on of the Trebbia and the French on the eastern bank. Although Macdonald's forces had repulsed three enemy attempts to cross the river, his losses were substantial (at least 1,000 killed and an equal number of wounded.) The allies losses were higher, including 2,000 taken prisoner. Brune was to finally rejoin Dombrowski on the morning of 19 June after a march of 14 miles along mountain paths. On 19 June, Macdonald had barely 20,000 men and 28 guns. His ammunition and food

9 7

were running short. On the other side of the Trebbia stood 42,000 allies, 62 guns, and plenty of material reserves. Macdonald, still counting on Moreau's arrival, resolved to continue the fight. He reorganized his army into two corps: Olivier's (Salme's vanguard, now commanded by Lacroix, the divisions of Olivier and Montrichard) and Victor's (the divisions of Victor/ Charpentier, Rusca, and Dombrowski). Watrin's division formed the army's reserve. The divisions were organized into battalion columns, with cavalry on the flanks, and two reserve units. The general attack was scheduled for 9:00 A.M. Only the reserves were to stay behind the Trebbia as a cover for any retreat to the Nura River. Between 9:00 and 10:00 A.M., Rusca crossed the Trebbia and attacked Shveikovski in front of Tuna. After an initial success Rusca was pushed back toward the river, but his second line destroyed the pursuing Russian column. The French morale was so electrified by this success that they counterattacked and chased the Russians back to their initial position. Victor's forces were doing equally well, and victory was in sight. Unfortunately, Dombrowski had to wait for Calvin's brigade, which did not arrive until 10:00 A.M. Once it arrived, he crossed theriver,leaving his cavalry and artillery behind, and drove Bagration out of Rivalta, leaving Brune's group as a garrison. The rest of the division formed itself into four columns "en echelon" with a reserve, moved north along the river, turned to the west and captured Tuna. Shveikovski would have found himself caught between Rusca and Dombrowski, but Shveikovski moved before the trap closed and slipped free. Charpentier's division, fighting to the north, now found itself struck on both sides by Frohlich's division and part of Shveikovski's division. He had to withdraw losing 400 dead and 126 prisoners. This uncovered Rusca's right, forcing him to retreat. Rusca, twice wounded, was taken prisoner. Dombrowski, in his turn, was forced to fall back to Rivalta, where he took up positions by the old castle. The attack by the French right had begun at 12:15 P.M., because Montrichard's division arrived late. Olivier took San Nicola from Ott, but the appearance of some small groups of Allied cavalry in Montrichard's rear caused a panic and demoralized the entire division, causing it to fall back in disorder to Piacenza. The resulting gap opened Olivier and Charpentier's flanks to the allies. Both divisions were obliged to retreat, but not without a murderous fight in the river bed and two counterattacks. Watrin, who operated on the extreme right flank, was the last to leave the battlefield. The battle ended about 9:00 P.M. Some time earlier, when Dombrowski learned of the collapse of the French offensive from Victor, he moved his division out of Rivalta and marched behind the Trebbia. On 19 June, Victor's corps lost 1,000 killed and 300 to 500 prisoners. Olivier7 s losses were 900 killed and 500 prisoners. The Polish losses that day were small. In the fight on the French left wing, the allies lost one standard, 1,000 killed, and 600 prisoners. During the course of the three day battle, the French lost4,000 killed, 2,300 prisoners, and 4,000 wounded. Most of the wounded were captured by the allies in the Piacenza hospitals. They also lost 8 guns, 10 standards, and a portion of their train. The allies lost 3,815 killed, 4,178 wounded, and 1,200 to 2,000 prisoners. During the month the Poles losses were:

Infantry Cavalry

Initial Strength 2,669 180

Strength 30 June Killed 990 376 140 20

Wounded 329 12

Prisoners 1,005 28

On 20 June, Dombrowski's division was designated as the rearguard for the entire army and stood in San Giorgio on the eastern bank of the Nura River. Despite many sharp engagements, in two of which Dombrowski was nearly captured, his division (now reduced to the 2nd Polish Battalion, the 2/8th Demi-brigade, and the 1st Polish Battalion

escorting the army artillery park) had fulfilled its duty and arrived in Castel Arquato with its standards and arms. Hohenlinden 3 December 1800 On 1 December 1800, the Danube Legion served as the 3rd Brigade of the 3rd Division of the ArmEe du Rhin. The other two brigades of this division, under General Decaen, were formed by the 4th and 100th Demi-brigades, the 17th Dragoons, the 6th and 10th Chasseur £ Cheval Regiments, the 3/5th Foot Artillery, the 2/3rd Horse Artillery, the l/4th Sapper Battalion, and the artillery train. The division stood at about 10,000 men. The 3rd Brigade, or Danube Legion, had 2,672 infantry (2,334 under arms), 509 uhlans with 431 horses (401 under arms), 68 horse artillerists with 69 horses, for a total of 3,249 men (2,799 under arms). The entire brigade, except for the 3rd Battalion and one uhlan company which were left at Monheim, was to participate in the battle. On 3 December 1800, the ArmEe du Rhin, commanded by Moreau, stood near the town of Hohenlinden, waiting for the approaching Austrian army under Erzherzog Johann. Three divisions of Grenier's left wing group (Legrand, Bastoule and Ney) stood to the north of Hohenlinden, while Grouchy7 s division, from the center group, covered the town from the east. D'Hautpoul's cavalry division stood behind Ney'srightwing. Richepance's division stood to the south of Hohenlinden, near Ebersberg. Decaen, with Kniaziewicz, was to the west of Richepance, near Zarnolding. Lecourbe's division, forming the French right wing, was far to the south at Aibling, and did not participate in the battle. The ArmEe du Rhin had an effective strength of 74,500 infantry, 17,000 cavalry, and 4,000 artillery manning 153 guns. Another 10,000 had been detached with 45 guns to serve in various garrisons. The Austrian forces were divided into the "operative army" and the "defensive army." The operative army consisted of Meczery's vanguard corps, Reisch's left wing (Merveldt and Gyulai's divisions), Baillef s center (Hesse-Homburg and Hohenlohe's divisions), Kienmayer's right wing (Schwarzenberg and Erzherzog Ferdinand's divisions), and the reserve corps under Kollowrath and Liechtenstein. It had a total of 49,000 infantry, 16,000 cavalry, 100 field guns, and a number regimental guns. The "defensive army" contained 55,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry. It was formed into a number of corps, some of which were to take part in the battle of Hohenlinden. The Austrians marched in several columns in a generally southwest direction. They engaged the French early on the morning of 3 December. The weather was dark and snowy. At 7:30 A.M., Lopper attacked Grouchy at Hohenlinden, but he was pushed back by 9:00 A.M. Reinforced by Kollowrath and the Bavarian corps under General Zweibriicken, Lopper renewed the engagement until about noon. At 10:00 A.M., Baillet reached Schnaubing. Though he sent five battalions to support Lopper, he still commanded three battalions and six squadrons. They assumed a position on the Mitabach Heights and remained inactive. The two divisions of Keinmayer's corps attacked separately. Erzherzog Ferdinand attacked Legrand at Buch, pushing him toward Reithofen, while Schwarzenberg contested the possession of Forsten with Bastoule's division. During these opening phases of the battle both the French and Austrians were stalling for time while they awaited the arrival of further forces. In the meantime, Richepance's division marched toward Mattenbett to strike Kollowrath's left flank and the Austrian rear. Shortly after 8:00 A.M., its rear brigade (Drouet) and the divisional reserve (Sahuc) were engaged at St. Christoph by two of Kollowrath's battalions that had been dispatched to make contact with Reisch's Corps. Around 10:30 A.M., Drouet's brigade was attacked from the opposite direction by Riesch's corps. The situation was critical and Drouet began to retreat, suffering substantial losses. While this occurred, Richepance, with the 8th and 48th Demi-brigades, the 1st Chasseurs, and six guns, rushed into Mattenbett, surprising Prince Liechtenstein's cuirassier brigade

and eight guns. After considerable initial success, the French were thrown back by the unexpected attack of a Bavarian cavalry regiment. Adhering to his assigned objective of striking Kollowrath's rear, Richepance left the main part of his forces to engage the Austro-Bavarian cavalry and moved forward with the 48th Demi-brigade. Kollowrath, learning of the French in his rear, assumed them to be part of the French division already dispersed by Reisch and sent only two or three battalions of Hungarian grenadiers and four horse guns. When the Hungarians encountered the French they formed three squares. Richepance asked his men, "What do you think about these men?" They responded, "G6n6ral, ils sont morts" (they are dead). After utterly crushing the Hungarian battalions and taking their guns, Richepance encountered two Bavarian battalions and engaged them. Meanwhile, Decaen's division departed Zarnolding at 5:00 A.M. The Danube Legion marched immediately behind the vanguard. En route, de Billy's brigade was detached in Ebersberg at 7:00 A.M., to wait for Lecourbe. The division reached St. Christoph at 10:30 a.m., where Drouet continued his uneven fight against Reisch and Kollowrath. At 11:00 A.M., the Danube Legion joined the battle, but was unable to stop the Austrian advance, until the 3rd Battalion, under Chef de battaillon Jan Junge, launched a frontal bayonet charge and began pushing the Austrians back. The rest of the legion's infantry and its cavalry and artillery moved around to encircle Reisch's right flank. The first to attack was the 2nd Battalion, under Chef de battaillon Jozef Drzewiecki, which struck the enemy at Schiitzen. The bayonet charge was successful, but it encountered heavy resistance. Of all the Polish units, Drzewiecki's was to suffer the heaviest losses that day. During the fight a Polish grenadier corporal and two grenadiers took one Austrian officer and 21 soldiers prisoner. Jozef Rodziewicz, a 13 year old drummer of the 8th Company, became separated from his unit. Not losing his head, he started running through the woods, beating the "pas de charge" signal on his drum and scaring away an entire Austrian battalion. For that, drummer Rodziewicz was promoted to the rank of corporal. Soon afterwards, and about a quarter mile further to the north, the 1st Legion Battalion, under Julian Sierawski, attacked Reisch's flank. Some Austrian units broke and fled the field, while the rest moved to new positions between Albaching and Freimerich. The Polish uhlans and horse artillery supported the infantry in these actions. During this action one of the Polish 6pdr guns was dismounted by Austrian counter-battery fire. Due to the difficult terrain, wooded and marshy, the battle broke down into a series of skirmishes between small groups of soldiers. Jan Pawlikowski, a 23 year old brigadier27in the 3/3rd Squadron, noticed Austrian infantry in a copse. Accompanied by a French chasseur named Gdtebeuf, he charged the Austrians, shouting commands to imaginary squadrons. After killing two officers with his lance, he took prisoner one officer and 57 men. Decaen, who met him leading the prisoners, offered him a promotion to lieutenant, but Pawlikowski answered in broken French, "No know read, no know write, no be officer." He also refused a monetary reward, but he was later given a carbine d'honneur inlaid with silver. The remnants of Drouet's brigade and Sahuc's reserve were now reformed in the French rear. About 12:30 they were dispatched toward Mattenbett. The Polish uhlans and horse artillery preceded them. Around 1:00 P.M., they attacked Kollowrath's baggage and artillery trains, causing a panic. Lieutenant T. Kostanecki and 8 uhlans took six loaded guns and their crews, plus a 60 man escort. The Polish cavalry also attacked the two Bavarian battalions engaging Richepance and destroyed them, allowing Richepance to move deeper into Kollowrath's rear. Kniaziewicz and his infantry stayed behind Wall and Albaching to continue engaging Reisch frontally. Around 3:30 P.M., Reisch was reinforced by four battalions and three guns; he began a counterattack. Kniaziewicz responded with a bayonet charge by the 1st and 2nd Legion Battalions, and, despite the Austrians' superior numbers, captured one

gun and many prisoners. The lead elements of Reisch's column were finally destroyed, but the falling darkness saved the rest of his force, which had withdrawn toward Albaching and further east. In the meantime, Richepance dispersed Kollowrath, and Moreau, moving steadily forward since noon, completed the rout from the west. By 5:00 P.M., the Austrians were in full rout. In the battle of Hohenlinden, the Austrians lost 20,000 men, including 2 generalmajors, 4 colonels, 179 other officers, and around 11,000 rank and file prisoners. Between 80 and 100 guns and much of the Austrian baggage train were also captured. The French lost 1,200 killed and wounded and about 600 prisoners. The Poles lost 3 wounded officers, of whom one later died, 30 wounded, and 50 dead rank and file. The Poles During the Napoleonic

Wars

Dirschau 23 February 1807 Dirschau (Tczew) stands on the western bank of the Vistula river, about 20 miles south of Danzig. In 1807, it was the last important stronghold of Prussian resistance in the 18067 campaign. The city garrison was formed by 650 men of the 52nd Infantry Regiment, 31 hussars, 2-6 guns, and about 800 "burgergarde," under Major Both. In late February 1807, a Polish force under Dombrowski, consisting of 7 battalions (5,000 men), four companies of light infantry (about 100 men), 6 French and 6 Polish guns, moved against the city. Two further battalions of the LEgion du Nord, some Baden cavalry and some artillery, marched through Pilau (Pilawa). Another battalion of the LEgion du Nord advanced from Stettin (Szczecin) with the 1st Baden Infantry Regiment and two guns. They joined Dombrowski's main body on 22 February, bringing his total forces to about 12,550 men. Early on 23 February 1807, Dombrowski deployed before Dirschau. His vanguard brigade, under Colonel J.M. Dombrowski (the general's son), consisted of the 1st National Cavalry Regiment, four light infantry companies, and two guns. It was posted on the northern edge of the village of Narkowy. Behind the vanguard, in Narkowy, stood Niemojewski with the 1/,2/lst Infantry Regiment (Colonel Prince A. Sulkowski) and the l/3rd Infantry Regiment (Lt. Colonel K. Fiszer). Dombrowski's headquarters and the rest of his artillery were in the village of Gremblin. Kosinski's brigade, the l/,2/2nd Infantry (Colonel A. Downarowicz), two squadrons of Dziewanowski's cavalry regiment, the l/,2/4th Infantry Regiment (Colonel Prince Poninski), and a squadron of the 1st Chasseur a Cheval Regiment, stood in Gogolewo. At 4:00 A.M., the Poles began their advance on Dirschau, with Dziewanowski's uhlans acting as a liaison unit between the advancing columns. As the French and Baden troops took up positions before the Danzig Gate, Dombrowski moved his column forward. The l/3rd Infantry moved along the western bank of the Vistula to protect the right flank of the Polish column and to eventually assault the Vistula Gate. The weather was warm and melted the snow, making the Polish movements difficult. The Poles had only 9 musket cartridges per soldier. The voltigeur company of 1st Infantry Regiment marched with half was of them in skirmish order marching through the orchards on both sides of the road, and the other half in column moving down the road. A company of voltigeurs from the 1st Infantry Regiment seized Gross-Zeisgendorf, but were soon greeted with a volley of musketry that drove them back in disorder. Dombrowski sent forward more infantry and a gun, which set the village on fire. The voltigeurs renewed their assault, supported by their grenadiers, and pushed the Prussians out, taking 30 prisoners. The surrounding Prussian outposts were then forced back into the town. In the meantime, the 1/lst Infantry Regiment ran through the burning village streets

toward the Vistula Gate. The divisional sappers attempted to break down the gate with their axes, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Even when joined by the l/3rd Infantry, the Poles were unable to take the gate, so they pulled back and awaited the arrival of their artillery. As this occurred, Dombrowski and Niemojewski's brigade fought its way to the west and joined the French before the Danzig Gate. Dombrowski sent an emissary to Major Both, demanding his surrender. The Prussians refused and responded with a volley that wounded both Dombrowskis. The son was severely wounded and his left arm had to be amputated. The Poles responded with at least three assaults, during which General Dombrowski had three horses killed underneath him. The Poles were forced to fall back. Between 11:00 A.M., and 12:00 P.M., Dombrowski sent the 1st National Cavalry Regiment and a battalion of Baden infantry to blockade the Mill Gate. He then moved the 1/LEgion du Nord, the rest of the Baden infantry, and two guns to the Schoneck-Danzig crossroads. Around noon, three Polish guns, served by improvised crews, arrived. One was placed before the Vistula Gate and the other two before the Danzig Gate. They opened fire at point blank range, while a French battery began to bombard the town. Soon both gates were broken and between 1:00 and 2:00 P.M., the Poles stormed into the town. The 1/lst Infantry was the first to rush through the Vistula Gate, followed by the l/3rd Infantry Regiment. The 2/lst Infantry, supported by a Baden battalion, broke through the Danzig Gate. The Prussians fell back to their last strong points in the city cemetery and church, but were forced to surrender by 4:00 P.M. Many of the Prussians attempted to escape across the thin ice of the frozen Vistula, but the Polish artillery broke the ice and they drowned. In the city the "biirgergarde" kept firing at the Poles, who plundered the town with a vengeance. Small groups of enemy soldiers hid in the cellars from which they were flushed the next day. The Prussians had learned of the assault, and a relief column, under Major Wostrowski, was sent forward from Muhlbanz. At noon two battalions of the LEgion du Nord intercepted them near Domerau (Dabrowa) and drove them back. After being reinforced by some Baden infantry and Dziewanowski's cavalry, the Poles stormed Muhlbanz. These two engagements cost the Prussians about 200 dead, 200 wounded, and between 600 and 800 prisoners. Dombrowski also captured five guns and several hundred muskets. The Polish losses consisted of one officer and 30 soldiers dead, and 20 officers and 200 men wounded. Raszyn 19 April 1809 As part of the Austrian attempt to revenge themselves against Napoleon in 1809, they sent a force against the new Grand Duchy of Warsaw. On 15 April 1809, at 5 A.M. the Austrian VII Corps, under Erzherzog Ferdinand d'Este, crossed the Pilica River and invaded the Grand Duchy with 33,000 men. Prinz Jozef Poniatowski, the Polish commander-in-chief, had at his disposal only 10,058 infantry and 3,631 cavalry. His artillery had 4 foot batteries with six guns each, and two horse batteries, each with four guns, giving him a force of 15,363 Poles.20 In addition, his army was augmented by a small Saxon division under General Dyherrn, 2,155 men in two and a half weak battalions, two hussar squadrons, and 12 guns. Bernadotte had attempted to order these Saxons back to Saxony on 15 April, but Poniatowski countermanded the order for the duration of the first battle. Though he was terribly outnumbered, Poniatowski could not politically afford abandoning Warsaw without a fight. He selected his battlefield near the village of Raszyn, about 71/2 miles south of Warsaw. It was a good defensive position behind a river that was bordered with heavy marshes crossed by only a few bridges and causeways. On 11 April, the 1st Chasseurs and 3rd Uhlans under General Rozniecki, were deployed in a cavalry screen south of Raszyn, between Gora and Mszczonow. Behind them, General L. Bieganski moved the 3rd Infantry, 6th Uhlans, and four guns into Raszyn. On 15 April,

Rozniecki, reinforced with the 2nd Uhlans, moved in the direction of Nowy Dwor, toward the advancing Austrians with Bieganski's brigade in support. That afternoon the rest of the Polish forces, 8 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 19 guns, departed Warsaw for Raszyn. The Saxons left a small detachment in Warsaw and moved south on 16 April. The bulk of the Saxons went to Raszyn, while 100 hussars, under Major Gablentz, moved to Grodzisk to cover the Polish left wing. Rozniecki's cavalry skirmished with the Austrian advanced guard between 16 and 18 April, withdrawing slowly northwards toward Raszyn. On 18 April, the 2/6th Infantry moved into Wola and the 5th Chasseurs went to Praga in order to protect Warsaw from a flank attack. On the morning of 19 April 1809, Rozniecki's cavalry and four horse guns covered the front of the main position. The 3rd and 6th Uhlans, about 1,400 men, stood to the northeast of Sekocin and Slonim. Two squadrons of the 2nd Uhlans (580 men) were at the crossroads south of Falenty, by the "Wygoda" Inn. Another squadron of the 2nd Uhlans stood behind the Mrowa River by Dobrowka. Rozniecki's forces totaled about 2,340 men. General Sokolnicki's vanguard consisted of the 1/lst Infantry (850 men) by Falenty Male, a battery of four guns (later six guns) by the entrance to the Raszyn causeway, and the l/8th Infantry (760 men) stood in front of Falenty Duze. He had a total of about 1,700 men. The l/6th Infantry (810 men and two guns) stood northeast of Janki to protect the vanguard from any Austrian move from the Nadarzyn-Raszyn road. Later, the two guns were to detached and joined Sokolnicki's battery. One company of the 5th Infantry and a squadron of the Saxon Hussars north of Sokolow (about 190 men) stood on the right wing of the vanguard. The main Polish position was behind the Mrowa River. The right wing was under General Bieganski and consisted of the l/,2/3rd Infantry Regiment, supported by two guns and two howitzers stationed on a low hill southwest of Michalowice. It had a total of 1,740 men. The center, about 3,700 men, was commanded by Poniatowski. The l/,2/2nd Infantry and two guns were placed to the west of Raszyn. The 12 Saxon guns stood on both sides of the village. The Saxon infantry and one hussar squadron, under General Polentz, stood to the east. The left wing was under General L. Kamieniecki and consisted of the 2/lst Infantry, the 2/8 th Infantry, and six guns, about 1,700 men, deployed around the village of Jaworowa. TTiere was also a small reserve, formed by the 1st Chasseurs and five horse guns, about a mile behind the center of the Polish lines. The total Polish force consisted of about 13,000 men in 12 battalions, 14 cavalry squadrons, and the crews of 39 guns. The Austrians advanced against the Poles with their forces organized in three columns, a cavalry division under Schauroth with 3,200 men and six guns, a vanguard under Mohr, with 5,520 men and 12 guns, and the main column under Mondet. The main column had three infantry brigades and was supported by a sizable cavalry force. The main column had a total strength of over 17,700 men. Branovacsky's brigade was not present, as it had been detached to the Czestochowa fortress on 14 April. The total Austrian force was 28,500 men in 23 battalions, 36 squadrons, and 86 guns. By noon, Mohr and Schauroth's cavalry attacked Rozniecki's uhlan screen. Though the Polish cavalry fought bravely, they were soon threatened with being cut off when the Austrian vanguard reached Janczewice. The Poles withdrew through Janki to Michalowice. From there they moved behind Raszyn to join the Polish reserve, though some detachments were made to both wings of the Polish line. At 2:00 P.M., the battle began along the entire front of the Polish line. Mohr moved five battalions, supported by 12 guns, against Sokolnicki in Falenty, but the Polish artillery fire stopped their advance. Mohr soon received six battalions and twelve more guns as reinforcements. Sokolnicki's reinforcements consisted of only 2 guns. Despite the over-

#

whelming superiority of the Austrian army, the Polish artillery kept them at bay for almost an hour, inflicting heavy losses on them. While Sokolnicki faced Mohr, four squadrons of the Palatinal Hussar Regiment attacked Kamieniecki near Jaworowa. Again the Polish artillery stopped the attack. The hussars fell back into a marsh where they became stuck and took more heavy losses from the Polish artillery fire. A cuirassier regiment then attempted to encircle Kamieniecki from the east, became stuck in the marshes and suffered the same punishment as the hussars. The broken Austrian cavalry withdrew toward the Tarczyn road when the Austrians launched an infantry regiment in a frontal assault against Jaworowo, while two Wallachian grenz battalions from Mohr's vanguard moved into Dawidy and attacked Kamieniecki on his left flank. The Polish artillery and infantry broke those attacks. Only the Austrian artillery fire saved their infantry from total annihilation. At 3:00 P.M., the Vukassovich Infantry Regiment attacked an alder grove on the western edge of Falenty Duze occupied by the 1/8th Infantry Regiment. A murderous battle swept through the copse for the next hour until the decimated Poles were pushed back toward the Raszyn causeway. Poniatowski arrived and stopped their withdrawal. He reinforced them with the 1/lst Infantry Regiment and personally led their counterattack, fighting as a common soldier. Pounded by the Polish artillery and assailed by their infantry, the Vukassovich Infantry Regiment was finally dislodged and the Poles regained their position. The Austrians sent forward two more battalions, and for the next two hours they unsuccessfully counterattacked the Falenty grove. At 6:00 P.M., further Austrian battalions joined the attack. Two of them pushed into a gap between the l/8th Infantry in the grove and the 1 / 6th Infantry north of Janki, forcing Sokolnicki to withdraw his forces to Raszyn. As they withdrew down the causeway, the Poles suffered heavy casualties from the Austrian artillery and were forced to abandon two guns. At the same time, the l/6th Infantry Regiment was pushed out of Janki toward Raszyn by Schauroth's division. The Austrians pursued the Poles across the causeway and pushed some units to the southeast of Raszyn, where they now attacked the Polish center frontally and from the left flank. Raszyn was defended by the Saxon 1/Oelschoelwitz Regiment, the Saxon Einsiedel Grenadier Battalion, and the 2/2nd (Polish) Infantry. The l/2nd Infantry Regiment stood in the second line with the guns. The Polish right wing was threatened by Schauroth's division and was unable to send forces to support the center. Around 8:00 P.M., the Austrians held the causeway and part of Raszyn. Poniatowski concentrated the fire of 12 Saxon and 4 Polish guns on the RaszynWarsaw Road, decimating the attacking Austrians. The marshy ground prevented the Austrians from bringing forward their artillery, allowing the Polish infantry to successfully counterattack and drive the Austrians back between 9:00 and 10:00 P.M. Despite being repulsed the Austrians were still able to retain their hold on the causeway. With that, the battle ended. The Poles had lost 450 killed, 800 to 900 wounded, and 43 prisoners. The Austrian losses amounted to about 2,500 killed and wounded. Defense ofFuengirola 15 October 1810 In the fall of 1810, General Colin Campbell, the military governor of Gibraltar, and Admiral Penrose prepared a plan to capture the port of Malaga in southern Andalusia. The choice of Malaga was dictated as much by the wish of making the French siege of Cadiz more difficult by establishing a supply base and refuge for guerrillas operating against the French supply lines as by the fact that Malaga served as a base for the French privateers and military gunboats that threatened Allied merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. The plan called for a landing at the Fuengirola Castle, about 23 miles southwest of Malaga, in order to lure the Malaga garrison out of the city. Once that was accomplished, the British expeditionary force would re-embark and sail straight for the now, hopefully

Vistula Legion in Spain

defenseless city. They also reasonably anticipated assistance from the Spanish population of Malaga in the capture of the city. Major General Andrew Thomas Lord Blayney, a distinguished veteran of the Dutch, Italian, Egyptian, and Indian campaigns, was appointed to command the expedition. His force contained the 2/89th Regiment of Foot (10 officers and 343 men), an infantry battalion composed of mostly deserters (17 officers and 492 men), an artillery unit (3 officers and 66 men) and 60 British soldiers serving as crews for the gun boats28. The Spanish provided the REgimiento Imperial de Toledo (20 officers and 630 men) to support the assault. In addition, there were various staffs, the naval crews of the frigates, gunboats, barges, and others. Blayney's artillery consisted of five mixed field guns and the guns of his ships. Viewed in the contest of the British involvement in the Peninsular War at this time, his command was a sizable force. Blayney's preparations were careful and his plan had a good chance of success, especially when the Spanish coast in this sector was only defended by minuscule units of Poles, upon whom, in His Lordship's own words, "little dependence could be placed." The irony of his words would be bitter seasoning to his fate. On 9 October 1810, Blayney ordered a British emissary in Andalusia to secure the assistance of the local guerrilla groups in cutting Fuengirola off from the mainland. The next day he dispatched a cargo of arms to the guerrillas aboard the frigate Sparrowhawk. After delivering the arms, the frigate was to rejoin the expedition. Finally, on 11 October, his force sailed from Gibraltar. The convoy, formed by the frigate Topaze, several brigs, and a number transport barges, headed for Ceuta. In Ceuta it embarked the REgimiento Imperial de Toledo, which, when inspected by Blayney, lacked 148 muskets and had no ammunition. These shortages were immediately remedied. On 12 October, a convoy of

five gunboats from Gibraltar joined him on the next leg of his journey. During the early morning of 14 October, the frigate Sparrowhawk rejoined him as well. At 9:00 A.M., the entire flotilla dropped anchor in the Cala Moral Bay, about 2 miles southwest of the Fuengirola Castle. The Fuengirola Castle was in a very poor state of repair. Its garrison consisted of a single company, 3 officers and 150 men, of the 4th Infantry Regiment of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw', under the command of Capitain Franciszek Mlokosiewicz. They had at their disposal two old iron 16pdr cannons and two 2pdr field guns, served by three equally old Spanish cannoneers. The original guns of the castle had been spiked and pushed into the moat by the Spanish garrison when the French overran Andalusia. Food supplies were scant, supplemented by a herd of 40 cattle grazing outside the castle. Gunpowder and ammunition were stored in one of the interior castle rooms with unprotected window and door openings. The ammunition was covered with damp hides for safety. The closest Polish or French outpost was at Mijas, where Lieutenant E.Chelmicki, two other officers, and 60 men of the 4th Regiment were posted. In Alhaurin el Grande, further inland, there were 5 officers and 200 men from the 4th Regiment, and 2 officers and 80 troopers from the French 21st Dragoons, under Chef de Bataillon I. Bronisz. Chelmicki observed the arrival of the British convoy from his vantage point at Mijas and promptly sent word to General SEbastiani in Malaga and Bronisz in Alhaurin. Then he put his men on alert and waited. Blayney's force completed its landing around noon. Because of the poor paths along the shore, Blayney left his guns aboard the ships. He was pleasantly surprised by the lack of any resistance, but quite disappointed by the meager number of Spanish partisans waiting for him on the beach. After practicing a trumpet signal system with his multilingual units, Blayney led them northeast along the shore, while the ships sailed parallel to the beach toward the castle. Around 1:30 P.M., a large group of Spanish guerrillas swooped out of the mountains and attacked, capturing the herd of cattle, killing one Polish sentry and wounding another. Mlokosiewicz sent 40 men under Lieutenant Ubysz in pursuit. Just minutes after their departure, the British ships and infantry arrived before the castle. Mlokosiewicz sounded the alarm and Ubysz returned. At 2:00 P.M., the ships anchored before the castle, and the British and Spanish infantry took up positions on the hills above the walls. Blayney sent an emissary to Mlokosiewicz demanding his surrender. His response, "Venez le prendre/" (Come and take it!) The British ships opened fire. Since the Spanish gunners had quietly disappeared before the shooting began, there was no one to serve the castie's guns' The bombardment continued for an hour, by which time Mlokosiewicz found two of his soldiers who had served in the Russian artillery and Sergeant Zakrzewski, who had an obvious knack for artillery. Zakrzewski had beginner's luck, for one of the first shots fired by a 16pdr struck and sank a gunboat. The continuing Polish fire caused so many casualties that the remaining four gunboats withdrew out of range. Under the cover of gunfire from the two frigates, Blayney began his land assault. Some of his skirmishers fired on the castle from the adjacent hills, and the rest marched straight for the walls. The Poles responded with musketry and cannister from their two 2pdr guns. On the other side of the castle, one volunteer "gunner" was killed. As the Polish fire slacked off, the ships moved closer to the shore. However, the land defense by the Poles was far more than Blayney had expected. The final blow came when Major Grant, commander of the 2/89th, was killed. With the other losses already suffered, Blayney decided he had suffered enough and withdrew for the day. The naval bombardment, however, continued for several more hours, until a thunderstorm and the approach of night ended it. The battle so far had cost the Poles three dead and 13 wounded, including Mlokosiewicz. The British had lost 10 to 15 men on the ships and about 35 infantry.

The Poles kept watch on the walls during the night and searched for the relief column. In the meantime, Lt. Chelmicki, observing the fight from Mijas, sent another messenger to Bronisz in Alhaurin, asking him to help the garrison, but received no reply. He decided to go to Fuengirola himself. His handful of soldiers barricaded the barracks' gate, and at night Chelmicki and his 60 men slipped out through the windows so as to not alert any Spanish that might be watching. Chelmicki's luck held and their movements were hidden by the night and a thunderstorm as they successfully slipped through the British lines and into the castle. Blayney was not idle, either. Quite irritated by the stubborn Polish defense, his losses, and the resulting delay, he resolved to take Fuengirola at all costs. During the night, all offduty soldiers and sailors worked to prepare two gun emplacements. One stood on the spacious top of a very steep hill about 1,040 feet southwest of the castle. The other was close to the shore on the south of the castle. Despite the tremendous thunderstorm that night, both emplacements were finished by dawn. In the first the British installed three 12pdr cannon and one heavy mortar. In the second one there was a 32pdr carronade which had been too heavy to be moved further inland. The locations were chosen in front of the weakest stretches of wall, which were already badly shaken by the previous day's bombardment. Blayney also remembered the Polish-French garrison in Alhaurin and the detachment in Mijas. After midnight, he sent four Spanish companies and 100 Germans (450 men total), under the command of Capitain Mullins, to a defile where the paths from those two villages met. However, Chelmicki had already passed and was inside the castle when this happened. The Spanish colonel didn't like the idea of sending his soldiers to fight on Sunday without a priest, but Blayney eventually managed to convince him to permit the movement despite such objections. That evening, Bronisz marched out of Alhaurin toward Mijas with his entire command. He arrived at 5:00 A.M., and was puzzled when he found the empty barracks. He waited for dawn, which was fortunate, for at 6:00 A.M., his scouts warned of the advancing force of Spanish and British soldiers. They were moving to Mijas to escape from the storm. Bronisz let them come up the hill and opened a devastating fire on them. Though the Spanish fought well and part of Mullins' German company actually broke into the village, a Polish bayonet charge broke them. The terrain prevented Bronisz from using his cavalry, so a large part of the Spanish and Germans escaped, fleeing as fast as they could run back to Blayney. They left behind 20 dead and wounded, and 40 prisoners. After a brief pursuit, Bronisz returned to Mijas and ordered a necessary rest. At daybreak on 15 October, the British renewed their bombardment of Fuengirola from the sea and the new land batteries. The castle's defenders kept up their fire, but the walls were being steadily broken down. A bastion collapsed, killing nine men instantly. Despite that, the Polish fire was so strong that the Allied infantry could not approach the castle. Blayney sent yet another emissary, but Mlokosiewicz didn't let him in, fearing for his men's morale. This demand was also rejected. Upon hearing of the approach of a large relief force just leaving Malaga, the British redoubled their efforts. The castle, raked by fire on three sides, barely responded. Nearly everyone in the garrison was wounded. In the meantime, Bronisz, in Mijas, agonized over what course of action to take. He did not wish to destroy his small unit in a fight in broad daylight in an open field with a force at least six times stronger than his own, nor did he wish to abandon Mlokosiewicz. Finally, around 1:00 P.M., he called a war council. All the Polish and French officers voted to fight. At 2:00 P.M., Bronisz and his infantry marched toward Blayney's left wing, while the company of French dragoons, under Capitain AutiE, moved along the road to the village of Fuengirola (about 1 mile from the castle). At the same moment, HMS Rodney, a 74 gun ship of the line, and a similar Spanish ship of the line dropped anchor in front of the castle. The Rodney carried the l/82nd Regiment

of Foot (22 officers and 910 men), which had been sent as reinforcements from Gibraltar. Blayney sent boats for the regiment, and, now certain of his imminent victory, ordered the 2/ 89th to leave its position near the hill battery and move to the beach to draw rations. The battery on the hill was now guarded only by the Spanish and the foreign battalion40. Mlokosiewicz and Chelmicki had been debating the virtues of a sally, preferring it to being crushed to death by falling masonry. Now they noticed a large force of infantry moving away from the hills, and a small cavalry force coming out of Fuengirola village. The latter was Bronisz's French dragoons, one sergeant, and ten men. Chelmicki and 90 volunteers ran straight for the hill battery. Mlokosiewicz and another 40 men followed him as support. The seriously wounded Poles were left in the castle along with the rest of the able bodied soldiers, who gave supporting fire. The French dragoons galloped after Chelmicki's group. In a desperate fight, the Poles and French pushed back the British gunners and the two supporting battalions (one hundred Poles against 1,000!), killed several and took 40 prisoners, Blayney's adjutant among them. Chelmicki, chasing the scattered enemy, was wounded and temporarily taken prisoner, but his soldiers soon freed him. The Spanish retreated along the hill tops behind the battery. The foreign battalion moved to the beach to join the 2/89th. The Poles joyfully bombarded the British with their own guns. Seeing all this chaos, Blayney collected and reformed the 2/89th and the foreign battalion on the beach, and counting on the support of the l/82nd, which was approaching the beach in their boats, led his force forward in column against the hill battery. All of this took about a half hour, during which time the Poles raked them with continual musketry and cannon fire. The British recaptured the battery, but not before the Poles detonated a large portion of the battery7s ammunition, wounding three of their own in the effort. As Mlokosiewicz and Chelmicki withdrew toward the castle, Blayney stopped his two battalions by the batteiy and began to dress their lines. While they prepared to renew their advance, Bronisz's infantry swept out of a nearby ravine and struck the 2/89th on Blayney's left wing. After firing a few volleys, the Poles rushed to the summit and engaged the British with bayonets. Despite the uneven odds, 200 against 300 British supported by a further 1,000 Spanish and Germans, Bronisz broke the British in a pitched hand-to-hand battle. Soon only Blayney and nine British soldiers stood facing Bronisz's forces. The rest had either fled or died. Blayney defended himself valiantly, wounding several Poles before his saber was taken from him and he was knocked to the ground. He was saved from the enraged Poles by Lieutenant Fryderyk Petit (a Pole) and taken into the castle. As Bronisz had attacked, Mlokosiewicz gathered his remaining soldiers together and led them forward against the British right wing, that is, the foreign battalion. The Spanish regiment stood further to the rear. This attack was also successful. As both attacks were delivered very quickly, the British gunners didn't have time to fire a single shot from the hill battery. The Spanish REgimiento Imperial de Toledo, which stood on a hilltop behind the battery, fired a few volleys and retreated toward the shore. There a crowd of British soldiers desperately fought to get into the boats. The Poles once again turned the captured guns against the British, while their comrades and the French dragoon company attacked the British flank. The few companies of the l/82nd that had disembarked, now stood in line, but they soon broke and followed their fellows in the run for the boats. Further to the south, the Spanish infantry loaded completely unmolested and rowed out to the waiting ships. The British were saved from total destruction by Capitain Hall and his four remaining gunboats, which came as close as possible to the shore and covered the mad embarkation with gunfire. Nevertheless, many British soldiers were captured and collected in the castle courtyard. The unceasing naval bombardment of the castle stopped when Blayney signaled the ships from the castle walls. The entire flotilla, by then reinforced by the frigate

Circe, sailed away a short time later. When S£bastiani and his relief column arrived on the morning of 16 October he had already read Mlokosiewicz's report. He showered the Poles with praise. His own report to Marshal Soult took no credit for the victory, giving it all to the Poles, refuting the desperate attempts by the British apologists to claim that the crushing British defeat was only due to the arrival of his overwhelming force. As for the British, the official report of General Campbell lists one officer and 12 men killed, 1 officer and 23 wounded, and 7 officers and 167 "missing" (captured), plus one killed and 3 wounded aboard the gunboats. These figures stand in stark contrast to Blayney's memoirs. The casualty returns of the 2/89th Regiment of Foot (preserved in the War Office, signature W.0.25/2105) have had the three sheets with the casualty listings for Fuengirola torn out. There are good reasons to assume that the British losses were 40 killed, 70 wounded, and 180 taken prisoner. The Poles also captured 5 guns, 300 muskets, 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and a great number of tools. For the defense of Fuengirola, Mlokosiewicz, Chelmicki and Bronisz received the Cross of the Legion d'Honneur on 18 December 1810. It is worth noting that, despite Mlokosiewicz's direct involvement in the 1830/31 Polish Revolution as a Major General, in 1844 Czar Nicholas I presented him with an especially designed coat of arms named "Fuengirola." Lord Blayney's saber is currently preserved in the Czartoryski Collections in Krakow, Poland. Albuera 16 May 1811 In early May 1811, the British-Portuguese Corps of Marshal William Carr Viscount Beresford laid siege to the fortress of Badajoz in Estramadura. Marshal Nicholas Soult, with 24,260 men, marched from Sevilla to relieve the besieged French garrison of Badajoz. Learning this, on 12 May Beresford lifted the siege and moved his force to a point near the village of Albuera in order to intercept Soult's corps. During the night of 15/16 May, Beresford was joined by the Spanish Corps of General Joachim Blake, thus increasing his strength to 35,280 men. Albuera, situated about 13 miles southeast of Badajoz, stood on the western bank of the Albuera Brook, which forked south of the village into the Chicapierna and Nogales streams. Between the streams, to the south of the village, there was a long narrow ridge, which partially obstructed the view of the western bank. A long line of hills, varying from 65 to 165 feet high, stretched along the western bank of the Chicapierna/Albuera, where Beresford deployed his forces. The bank itself was quite low, only developing near the Albuera Bridge 10 to 13 feet tall banks. The eastern bank of the Nogales/ Albuera was flat, rising gently toward distant hills covered with olive groves. The village of Albuera was formed of massive stone buildings, ideal for defense. On the morning of 16 May, the British deployed as follows: the right wing was formed by the Spanish corps of General Blake, 17 infantry regiments in three divisions, and the Spanish brigade of General d'Espana (3 infantry regiments), deployed in two lines along the hilltops. The Spanish cavalry of General toy, four weak regiments, stood on the extreme right wing of Blake's corps. The 13th (British) Light Dragoons were posted in front of Blake's right flank, near the bank of the Chicapierna, while two Spanish battalions stood in front of Blake's center, also close to the stream. The total strength of the right wing was about 15,000 men. The center was formed to the west of Albuera. The 2nd British Division of General W. Stewart, formed with the three brigades of Colborne, Houghton and Abercrombie (about 5,400 infantry) formed the main body of the center. The two British dragoon regiments under General Long, and two Spanish squadrons under General Villemur, stood on Stewart's extreme right wing. The British-Portuguese division of General Cole, 8 battalions in two brigades, stood at some distance to the rear of Stewart's left wing. The

independent infantry brigade of the KGL, two battalions under General Alten, was in the village of Albuera. The center had a total of 13,000 men. Stewart's division was formed in one, two rank deep line below the skyline, completely hidden from French view. The British left wing stood to the north of Albuera. The Portuguese division of General Hamilton, 4 infantry regiments, formed the first line, while the Portuguese brigade of Collins, two infantry regiments, formed the second line. The Portuguese cavalry brigade of General Otway, four weak regiments, stood to the left of Hamilton's left wing. The wing had a total strength of about 7,000 men. Beresford had about 35,000 men with at least 38 guns. He deployed his troops along a front of about 3 miles. Soult's plan was based on the assumption that Blake's corps hadn't joined Beresford. He decided to make a false frontal attack against Albuera, while the main force moved around the Britishrightwing and attacked from the flank. It was an elegant and very "Napoleonic" scheme that had a good chance of success, even if Blake had joined Beresford, since the ridge between the streams effectively hid the French troop movement to the south. During the morning of 16 May, Soult deployed his forces along the eastern bank of the Nogales/Albuera stream, south to north as follows: Girard's division (4 regiments with 9 battalions, 4,250 men), Gazan's division (4 regiments with 10 battalions, 4,200 men), Latour-Maubourg's cavalry Corps (9 French regiments in 3 brigades, plus the 27th Chasseurs and the Spanish 4th Chasseurs, about 3,400 men), two combined grenadier battalions (11 companies, 1,030 men) under Colonel Varr£, including two companies from the 4th Infantry Regiment of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Werl£'s infantry brigade (3 regiments with 9 battalions, 5,600 men), the Vistula Lancer Regiment (591 men in 4 squadrons), and on the northern most flank stood Godinot's infantry brigade (2 regiments with 6 battalions, 3,900 men). Girard stood roughly in front of Lo/s cavalry, while Godinot was at the bridge leading to Albuera. The total strength of Soult's army was about 24,300 men with at least 40 guns. The morning of 16 May was dark and cloudy, with a cold northern wind and frequent cloud bursts. Around 8:00 A.M., Soult began his diversionary frontal assault against Albuera with Godinot's infantry and Briche's light cavalry brigades. The Polish lancers, under Colonel Jan Konopka, were ordered to join in the assault. The two flanker (skirmish) platoons of Sous-Lieutenants P. Rogoyski and K. Wojciechowski, a total of 50 men, crossed the Albuera below the bridge (the southern side), followed by two more flanker platoons under Captain Leszczynski. The KGL infantry, drawn up in front of the village, let them pass without firing a'single shot. The first two platoons spread out into a skirmish screen and moved uphill against Beresford's center. Leszczynski's platoons remained as a support near the bank of the stream. The rest of the regiment stood on the opposite bank, beside Werl£'s infantry brigade, Varr£'s grenadiers, and the two dragoon brigades of Bron and Bouvier des Eclats. The rest of the French forces were, at that time, marching south in their flanking movement against the allied right wing. Wojciechowski and Rogoyski were close to the enemy lines when the 370 men of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, led by General Long in person, moved down hill against them. The Polish lancers dispersed the leading British squadron (120 men) and pushed it back into the following squadrons. Attacked by the two other squadrons, the Poles withdrew toward Leszczynski's platoons, turned around and counterattacked, breaking the dragoon's for a second time. The fight developed into a melee. With the support of French batteries from the far bank, the two Polish platoons pushed the British away from the stream. Long reformed his dragoons and attacked again in full force. In the meantime, Leszczynski's support platoons were recalled to the regiment, which moved with other French units upstream. For some reason, the order didn't reach Wojciechowski's and Rogoyski's platoons. Left alone and threatened by both the dragoons in the front and the infantry on their flank, they withdrew, crossing the stream's steep banks under a raking fire.

Wojciechowski's platoon lost 14 men, most of them during the crossing, while Rogoyski, who left the field first to cover his colleague's retreat, had 2 or 3 men wounded. Another serious loss was the death of Capitain Leszczynski, who was mortally wounded at the beginning of the fight. The 3rd Dragoon Guards report losing 10 killed, 9 wounded, and 1 missing, but that would appear to be an understatement as the action took place over the period of an hour. The ratio of killed to wounded also demonstrates the deadly skills of the Polish lancers. During this action, Godinot's 16th L£g£re Regiment crossed the bridge and stormed Albuera. Between 9:00 and 10:00 A.M., Soult's encircling movement of Blake's Spaniards was completed by Girard's and Gazan's divisions, the 2nd Hussars, the 27th Chasseurs, the 4th Spanish Chasseurs, and a horse battery. The French cavalry dispersed Loy's horse and took up positions in the rear of the Spanish infantry, facing north. The French infantry did the same, trying to attack in a northerly direction along the ridge. Fortunately for the Spanish, four of Zayas' battalions were already positioned across the ridge. When Girard and Gazan approached them in heavy battalion columns, the French center units moved one by one to the south, behind the initial outflanking group. Latour-Maubourg, with his two dragoon brigades, moved to the left of the French light cavalry brigade and Werl£'s infantry brigade to the south east of Gazan. This is the movement that left Wojciechowski's and Rogoyski's platoons stranded near Albuera. The Vistula Lancers stood on Latour-Maubourg's right wing, closest to the attacking French infantry. The returning flanker platoons rejoined the lancer regiment in this position. The eastern bank of the Nogales was now occupied only by a few cavalry platoons and Varr£'s grenadier battalions. Beresford hastily redeployed his forces as follows: the bulk of the British and Spanish cavalry, under General Lumley, faced Latour-Maubourg's regiments from the northwest, supported by Cole's infantry division to the north. Stewart's infantry division moved to reinforce Blake's right wing, and Hamilton was sent to take Stewart's place west of Albuera. The 13th Light Dragoons covered Blake's left flank, facing south. Finally, the Spanish battalions of Ballasteros and Lardizabal's divisions were dispatched to reinforce Zayas' line. All these movements took time, but they were more or less complete by 11:00 A.M.

Girard's infantry furiously attacked Zayas' position. Heavily outnumbered and decimated by murderous fire, the Spaniards were nearly overwhelmed when Stewart arrived with his leading brigade, under Colborne. Colborne struck the French left flank, arranged in echelon. The 3rd "Buffs" Regiment of Foot (755 men) in front and to the right, 2/48th (452 men) in the middle and the 2/66th (441 men) in the rear and to the left. The remaining 2/31st (418 men) was still some distance to the rear. The combined effect of the Spanish and British musket fire broke Girard's advance. Suddenly, the British saw a body of enemy cavalry forming to charge their right flank. The Buffs turned to the right and faced the enemy. The other two battalions did the same, but none of them had time to form square. Instead they were formed in lines that were at least six ranks deep29. The cavalry forcing this maneuver was the Vistula Lancer Regiment (now 576 men), and behind them was the 2nd (French) Hussar Regiment (305 men). Both regiments had left their positions near Gazan's left flank, crossed a dry stream bed, and formed in squadrons to charge in full view of the British, who stood on the hill above. The Poles trotted uphill, negotiating the slope and spurred their horses into a gallop. The British openedfire at close range, but the lancers broke the ranks of the Buffs, then those of the 48th and 66th. Scattered groups of infantry tried to offer resistance, but the Poles overthrew everything in front of them, at first taking no prisoners. Capitain Wincenty Konopka (brother to the colonel), although seriously wounded, took the first standard. Four other standards were taken immediately afterwards. Only the

King's Colour of the Buffs was rescued by Lieutenant Matthew Latham, almost at the cost of his life. This overthrow of British infantry was absolutely unique in the course of the Peninsular War. The lancers, followed by the hussars, pursued the fleeing British to the Cleve's KGL battery. One gun managed' to escape, but the remaining five and their crews were captured by the Poles. 'Although the charge really ended there, several scores of lancers galloped into the middle of the British army. A small group of them attacked the 31st Regiment of Foot, already formed in square. After being repulsed by musket volleys, they moved into the rear of the Spanish lines, creating havoc. They chased Zayas' staff from the open field into the safety of a Spanish battalion. General d'Espafia was wounded. One lancer charged Beresford himself. The gigantic British marshal threw the man off his horse, but the Pole kept lunging at him until killed by a pistol shot from an orderly. Another lancer rushed the entire Portuguese staff, overthrowing two officers and wounding several others before being killed. About the same time, the British 4th Dragoons (387 men in two squadrons), and Penne Villemur's Spanish cavalry (721 men) were sent by Lumley to Colborne's aid. The main bodies of the Vistula Lancers and the 2nd Hussars reformed and moved against them. At the sight of the advancing Poles and French, the Spanish cavalry broke and fled. The dragoons clashed with them, but after losing 27 men as casualties and both squadron capitains captured, they also broke and, according to the official British report, "went back faster than they arrived." The battle stopped momentarily and the French lost their momentum. For some inexplicable reason, Latour-Maubourg did not send forward the rest of his cavalry into the gap in the British lines, even though it would have decided the battle. The triumphant lancers and hussars were now busily herding their prisoners and dragging away the captured howitzer. The other four guns had to be abandoned on the field because the French camp followers had stolen the horses. The charge of the Vistula Lancers had cost the Buffs 216 men killed, 248 wounded, and 179 prisoners (85 % of its strength), the 2/48th lost 48 killed, 96 wounded, and 199 prisoners (76%), and the 2/66th lost 55 killed, 116 wounded, and 101 prisoners (61.5 %). It is true that an insignificant number of these casualties were caused by their engagement with Girard's infantry, but the bulk of them were the handiwork of the Poles. The original number of prisoners was 800, but many o r them escaped during the battle and more were to escape en route to Seville. The 2nd Hussars lost 73 killed wounded and captured, while the Poles lost between 130 and 180 men during the entire battle. Though the moment of the Poles' greatest glory was over, the battle was not. The Vistula Lancers next charged Harvey's four Portuguese battalions. The Portuguese had time to form square and inflicted heavy losses on the Poles. However, by forming square, the Portuguese were separated from the rest of Cole's division and effectively isolated from the final, decisive infantry battle. Latour-Maubourg finally attacked Cole, but was repulsed. Soult sent the lancers forward again in one further attack against Cole. They broke the right wing companies of Myer's fusiliers and temporarily disorganized the rest, but they ran into Harvey's Portuguese again, who repulsed them for a second time. When the infantry battle was decided and Soult began his retreat, Varr6's grenadiers and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry served as the rearguard. The grenadiers, though not engaged during the main part of the battle, now lost 13 officers and nearly 400 men. By 3:00 P.M., the battle was over. The French losses were between 7,000 and 8,000 men. The British and Spanish lost nearly 6,000. In addition, Soult was forced to abandon a field hospital with several hundred of his most seriously wounded, among them a dozen or so lancers. One month later, when

the French reoccupied the region of Albuera, these Poles were found in terrible condition because the British had refused to treat their wounds in a petty act of revenge for several "purported" cases of Vistula lancers spearing surrendering British officers and men. Although such incidents may have occurred, and neither side was innocent of such actions in the heat of battle, they were far from common and motivated more by the fury of the battle than cruelty. That the Poles had no deliberate policy of such actions is clearly demonstrated by the 2/ 66th Regiment of Foot, which was the last struck and suffered the fewest numbers of dead and wounded. In addition, many British officers, Colborne included, speak in their memoirs about the decent treatment they received from the Poles. The 1812 Russian Campaign The invasion of Russia began on 23 June 1812. At 10:00 P.M., General Morand passed three companies of the 13th L£g£re across the Niemen in small boats, and General Elbe's engineers began to raise the first pontoon bridge. At the sight of this crossing, a group of Polish uhlans, probably belonging to the 6th Uhlans, spurred their mounts forward into the river, hoping to seize the honor of being the first to be on Russian soil. Unfortunately, the current proved too swift and they were quickly swept downstream, engulfed by the river. As the men slipped beneath its waters they were clearly heard to cry, "Vive l'Empereur!" Skirmish at Mir On the 8th July, the French occupied the village of Korelitchi. Platov's forces (Hlowaiski #5, #10, #11, #12, Syssoief #3, Karpov #2, Grekov #8, and Kharitonov Don Cossack Regiments, as well as two Don horse batteries) were deployed, for the most part, in the Iablonovchtchina woods, south of Mir. Platov posted the Syssoief #3 Cossack Regiment on the southern edge of Mir with one sotnia on the road to Piasotchna, one to the left of the road, and one on the right of the road. On the 9th, the 2nd brigade of the 4th Light Cavalry Division (the 3rd, 15th and 16th Polish Uhlans) advanced from Korelitchi on Mir with the 3rd Uhlans leading the way. The 3rd advanced in a column of three squadrons. When the 3rd Uhlans reached Piasotchna, they threw back Platov's advanced post and traversed the village at a gallop until they encountered the Syssoief #3 Cossack Regiment on the far side of the village. The 3rd Uhlans reformed, but were quickly engaged by the bulk of Platov's cossacks and nearly annihilated. The few survivors escaped only with the greatest difficulty as the two flanking squadrons of the Syssoief #3 Cossacks had struck their flanks and rear. General Turno brought up the remainder of the 2nd Brigade, but was only able to hold Platov temporarily. He was thrown back with 356 dead and wounded. Turno was then reinforced by the arrival of Dziewanowski's 28th Light Cavalry Brigade (2nd, 7th, and 11th Uhlans). At the same time, Platov was reinforced by the arrival of Generalmajor Vasiltchikov with the Akhtyrsk Hussars, the Kiev and' New Russia Dragoons, the Lithuania Uhlans, and the 5th Jager Regiment. However, night fell as they arrived and the battle broke off. On the 10th, Platov drew up his rearguard (Akhtyrsk Hussars, Kiev and New Russia Dragoons, Hlowaiski #5, #10, #11 and #12, and two horse batteries) along the road to Mir, and placed the rest of the cossacks in an attempt to ambush the Polish cavalry as it resumed the advance. Kouneinikov's brigade (five sotnias of the Ataman Don Cossack Regiment, Grekov #18, Simpheropol Tartar Regiment, and Kharitonov Don Cossack Regiment) had almost reached Slobtzi when it was recalled to Simakovo. While the 7th Uhlans followed the retiring Russian rearguard, the 3rd, 15th, and 16th Uhlans remained on the edge of Simakovo. The 2nd and 11 th Uhlans stood on the northern edge of the village. Platov ordered his rearguard to turn on the 7th Uhlans, throwing them back on Simakovo and continuing to attack the 3rd, 15th, and 16th Uhlans. The 7th Uhlans

were in echelon by the right, supported by one squadron of the 3rd Uhlans to their west and one squadron of the 16th to the east. Two squadrons of the 3rd stood in reserve. Behind these elements, came the 4th Division, Kaminski's division of the V Corps. When this cavalry battle began, Kaminski was near Tyrskiewicz, a half mile from Mir. The 4th Division received orders to hold there, and the cavalry battle raged for a total of six hours. About 2,100 men of Kouneinikov's cossack brigade arrived and charged into the melee, throwing back the French left wing. At the same moment, Platov charged Turno's brigade again, disordered it, and threw it back. Platov's forces then advanced into Mir, where they encountered Tyskiewicz's brigade (the 4th Polish Chasseur k Cheval Regiment) and the divisional horse artillery. Platov decided to withdraw, leaving 600 dead and wounded Poles in his wake. The Russians losses were considerably less. General Advance On the morning of 15 July, the 1st Polish Chasseur k Cheval Regiment, the lead element of Latour-Maubourg's corps, encountered Platov's advanced guard. The cossacks withdrew, pulling the Poles into an ambush. The remaining cossacks attacked in their famous "lava" formation, where the sotnias were widely separated and the individual cossacks had a great deal of independence to maneuver. The 2/1st Chasseurs broke into a skirmish formation, as the remaining three squadrons formed in echelons by the left behind them. Latour-Maubourg ordered the Poles to attack, and their commander sent the 3rd and 4th squadrons forward. Hlowaiski and Kouneinikov led their forces in a flank attack as the Karpov cossacks struck the Poles frontaUy. The Poles lost 279 of the 700 engaged, and the battle ended with the arrival of the rest of the French corps. Platov recrossed the Vousva River, burning the bridge behind him. The batde was then taken up by the cossack horse batteries on the far bank. This became an artillery action as Platov resumed his withdrawal. Operations on the Northern Flank On the northern flank of the Grande Arm£e, Marshal Macdonald advanced against Riga, while Marshal Oudinot operated between him and the main army. The Russians had detached Wittgenstein's 1st Corps to operate against Oudinot and maintain communications with General Essen, the garrison commander of Riga. On 18 July, the principal battle formation of the Russian 1st Corps was in Balin with 22 battalions, 8 squadrons, and 72 guns, a total of 13,065 men. The second line of battle, under General Sazonov, had 8 battalions and totaled 4,559 men. He was posted near Pridouisk to cover the reconnaissance forces of Prince Repnin and General Kulnieff. Prince Repnin had a detachment of two battalions, eight squadrons and a position battery. This force had 1,607 men. General Kulnieff, who commanded another reconnaissance force of four battalions, eight squadrons, and two guns totaling 3,731 men, moved out at the break of dawn and sent his cossacks across the Dvina, forcing back the French pickets. His cossacks continued on to Onikschti, where they encountered eight squadrons of the 11th Chasseur k Cheval Regiment and the 10th Polish Hussar Regiment, detached from the 2nd Light Cavalry Division. The French cavalry advanced against the cossacks, attempting to push them back. However, the Russian advanced guard crossed the bridge at Drouia and began to deploy before the viUage. The cossacks continued to hold the French cavalry until four squadrons of the Grodno Hussars arrived. The Russian hussars immediately attacked the French and pushed them back to a ravine by Litichki. Here the French reformed their cavalry into four columns. Ridiger, seeing the remaining four squadrons of his regiment closing in, moved on the French flanks and threw them in great disorder to the village of Jaga. The French reformed their cavalry there. While the French reformed, part of the chasseurs dismounted and formed a skirmish line. The Russian hussars charged again while the cossacks attacked the French in the flank. The French fell back with the Russians in pursuit until they reached Tschernevo.

The remainder of Kulnieff's forces remained in place to cover the movement of his cavalry against a potential advance of the French main body, which was camped near Drissa. Kulnieff learned that a considerable French force was advancing along the right bank of the Drouia and that more French infantry was between Trouia and Tschernevo. Having completed the reconnaissance and locating the French forces, Kulnieff determined that they intended no offensive moves in this area. He recalled his cavalry, and recrossed the Dvina, leaving only the cossacks on the far bank. This small clash cost the Russians 12 men with 63 more wounded, while the French losses were considerably higher. The main battle line of the Russian 1st Corps and the corps reserve moved to Pokahevzi to replace Baggovout's corps. The Battle ofOstrovno Murat proceeded toward Ostrovno with his cavalry on 25 July. About 6:00 A.M., the French 8th Hussar Regiment encountered two squadrons of the Russian Guard Hussar Regiment and eight 6pdr guns of Horse Battery #7 about three miles from Ostrovno. This was Ostermann's advanced guard. The Russian cavalry, supported by the artillery, drove the 8th Hussar Regiment back on the rest of Pirn's 4th Light Cavalry Brigade. The 8th Hussars joined the 16th Chasseur k Cheval Regiment. They counterattacked, capturing the eight guns and taking 150 prisoners. Ostermann fell back to await the arrival of the Russian infantry that was following him, and directed the Soum Hussar Regiment to attack Pir£. They quickly found themselves facing Murat's advanced guard, the I Reserve Cavalry Corps under General Nansouty. General St.Germain and two battalions of infantry advanced against the Russians, while all of the Corps horse artillery was formed into a single battery to play on the Russians. When they arrived, Ostermann deployed Tchoglokov^s 11th Division on both sides of the main road, and Bakhmetieff's 23rd Division formed itself in battalion columns as a second line behind him. Murat estimated the total force to be seven or eight battalions. Murat advanced St. Germain's division, which was formed by brigades and supported by Bruy£re's division. A heavy cannonade developed, and the Ingremannland Dragoon Regiment moved to take the French in the right flank. The French countered this by moving the 15th Light Brigade to face them. This brigade consisted of two Polish Uhlan Regiments and the combined Prussian Hussar Regiment. The brigade charged and drove the Russians back, taking 200 prisoners. At the same time, Omano's 12th and 13th Light Brigades charged along the main road, only to be thrown back by the Russian infantry's defensive fire. Murat sent two battalions of the 8th L6g£re Regiment into the woods on his left to support the 1st Cuirassier Brigade. The Russians responded by sending three battalions to attack them. The Russian advance was stopped by the 9th Polish Uhlans and the Prussian Combined Hussar Regiment. Ostermann attempted to force the French to retreat by threatening their right, but the battalion he sent was struck by the 9th Polish Uhlan Regiment supported by two squadrons of the Prussian Hussars and a brigade of cuirassiers. A further 200 prisoners were captured and the Russians withdrew. At the same time, two other Russian battalions moved against the French right and were attacked by the 6th and 8th Polish Uhlans of the 15th Light Brigade, leaving 200 Russian dead and 150 wounded behind them. Murat's continued attacks forced Ostermann's infantry back into the woods. Murat soon realized that it was useless to attempt to attack and backed off his cavalry. He had possession of the ground where the initial attack on the 8th Hussar Regiment had occurred. He positioned Bruy&re's 1st Light Division and St. Germain's 1st Cuirassier Division where they could hold that position and watch the Russians. As the French rallied and prepared their next attack, they were reinforced by the arrival of Delzon's 13th Infantry Division, from Eugene's IV Corps. This division took position

on the heights in time to stop an advance by the Russians. Two battalions of the 8th Leg£re Regiment stopped repeated attacks by the Russians. Faced with this overpowering force, Ostermann had no alternative, but to withdraw. He withdrew in good order to favorable positions before Ostrovno, ending the engagement. As a serious battle seemed to be developing, the divisions of Morand, Friant, and Gudin, of I Corps, the III Corps, Sebastiani's division (then posted on the right bank of the Dvina), the 2nd and 4th Cuirassier Divisions from the II Reserve Cavalry Corps, as well as General Montbrun with the three regiments of Bavarian cavalry, received orders from Napoleon to congregate on the scene. Ostermann's new position was well chosen and commanded the ground in front of it, overlooking all the roads that approached Ostrovno. The city stood astride the main road and was flanked by the Dvina River on the right, a ravine on its front, and thick woods on the left. Ostermann was positioned so that he had communication with the magazines that supplied him, as well as with Vitebsk, the regional capital. Ostermann intended to defend this city. That evening Murat was joined by the remainder of Eug&ne's IV Corps. Ostermann was also reinforced by the 3rd Russian Cavalry Corps and by Konovnitzin's 3rd Division. At 10:00 A.M., Murat sent Delzon's division forward against Konovnitzin's division, which was in a strong position behind the ravine. Konovnitzin's left wing was fixed in a forest that bordered the left of the battlefield. Murat sent a strong reconnaissance against them, consisting of the French advanced guard and two battalions of the 8th L£g£re Regiment. The Russian infantry fire drove back the French cavalry, but the Russian advance was stopped by the French infantry supporting the cavalry. Delzon sent the 84th Line Regiment, in column by divisions under General Huard, against the Russian right while the 92nd Line and the 1st Provisional Croatian Infantry Regiment were directed to enter the heavy woods on the Russian left. The French artillery of Anthouard formed on their center, while the 106th Line Infantry Regiment and Nansouty's cavalry and artillery remained as a general reserve behind the ravine. The difficulties in pushing the Russians out of the woods slowed Huard's advance. He attempted to push Konovnitzin's division back twice, but the Russian reserve deployed to counter his thrust. The Russians struck back, and the 8th L£gere and 84th Line Regiments vainly tried to hold them back. The French line gradually diminished, littering the ground in front of the position with their dead and the plain behind them with their retiring wounded. The stream of wounded was joined by others who abandoned the ranks. This trickle of deserters grew into a stream, and eventually developed into a rout. The French artillery, perceiving itself abandoned, also began to retire, resulting in a general rout. Reportedly, Murat saw this and darted forward, placing himself in front of the 8th Polish Uhlan Regiment. He excited them with his words and actions, though they were already enraged by the sight of the advancing Russians. Murat then ordered them forward. He had apparently only wished to stimulate them and send them against the Russians. He had no intention of throwing himself with them into the midst of a melee, from which he could neither see nor command; but the Poles were already crouched in the saddle. The charging cavalry covered the width of the field completely and pushed Murat before them. He could neither separate from them or stop. He had no choice but to charge in front of the regiment, where he had stationed himself to harangue them. He submitted himself with some grace to what was, at best, an uncomfortable position. The battle obliged the Russians to withdraw. The battle had been exhausting and the movement through the woods had badly disordered the French. As night fell, they stopped to reorganize and prepare for the night. Opposite the French lines, the skies were lit with the multitude of bivouac fires that marked the Russian positions. They had lost 2,500 men hors de combat during the battle, while the French lost 3,000 and about 300 prisoners.

Battle of Smolensk On 17 August, Poniatowski's Poles attacked the Nicolskoi suburb on the East, the French right. His goal was the suburb and the Malakov gate. The 20th Light Cavalry Brigade, supported by a battery of light artillery, chased the cossacks out of the suburb. The Polish artillery, supported by the French, engaged in a heavy artillery duel in an effort to silence the Russian batteries firing on the advancing 16th and 18th (Polish) Divisions. A Polish battery, posted between the two advancing divisions, tired to drive back the Russian skirmishers that formed a line along the edge of the suburb. Three companies of voltigeurs were detached and sent into a ravine in which the Russians were concealed. They were supported by two further companies. This action was supported by heavy artillery fire. Prince Poniatowski directed two battalions of converged voltigeurs and a battalion of the 8th Polish Line Regiment against the suburb of Malakov. The 12th and two battalions of the 13th Polish Line Regiments moved on the Malakov Gate, the 15th Polish Line Regiment moved on the Saint Nicolas Gate, and the 2nd Polish Line Regiment moved on the suburb on the banks of the Dnieper. As the Poles passed over the ravine and advanced into the suburbs, they were taken in the flank by Russian artillery on the far bank. Their progress into the suburb was not good. In an effort to disrupt the Russian communications, Poniatowski raised a battery of sixteen guns and directed its fire on the bridges. However, this battery was too exposed and suffered heavily from Russian artillery fire. Despite Russian reports that the Polish artillery was silenced, it was not. The Poles divided their artillery into three groups. The first was assigned to fire counterbattery on the right bank of the river. Four 3pdrs were placed so that they could engage a Russian battery. The second group was placed on the left, where it supported the attack on St. Nicholas. The rest of the Polish artillery fired on the bridges over the Dnieper. At 5:00 P.M., the Poles heavily attacked the Malakov Gate. At the same time, they struck the Ralschenka suburb. The Polish attacks steadily drove the Russians back and moved on the bridge. Barclay directed the fire of a powerful battery against the Ratchevka suburb, but the news that Docturov sent to him about his difficulty in holding his position forced him to do more. In response, Barclay sent General Prince Wurttemberg to assist him. Wurttemberg led four regiments to the Malakhov gate, and General Rossi took the Tobolsk and Volhynie Infantry Regiments forward to relieve the Guard Jager Regiment. Puchnizki's brigade was sent to support Lichatcheff's division and the 4th Jager Regiment advanced to the Malakov Gate. These orders were followed with great zeal, and the Russians threw the Polish brigade of General Grabowski back, Grabowski being killed in the assault. The Russian assault recaptured Ratchevka, but it was soon ordered to evacuate the suburb. Significant actions by the Poles ceased at this point in the battle. The Poles lost 18 officers and 500 men killed, and 47 officers and 765 men wounded. The Battle of Borodino The battle of Borodino occurred over two days. On the first day the fights were around a series of fleches. The French army moved quickly to take control of them so they could move against the main body of the Russian army. On the second day, the main battle began; the Poles played a major role in this battle. The Polish involvement at Borodino was two fold. Poniatowski's Corps stood on the extreme French right and was to engage in a major battle of its own. The Polish cavalry was to play a role in the cavalry assault on the Russian center. To the south of the battlefield, Poniatowski's Poles had advanced to their positions early in the morning. About the same moment that the 57th Line Regiment was making its first advance against the fleches, Poniatowski's forces became heavily involved around Utitza. The first shots began about 8:00 A.M., when Poniatowski encountered Generallieutenant Strogonoff's 1st Grenadier Division, about one mile south of the fleches. Two Russian

n;

grenadier regiments were positioned to the right of the mound. Behind them stood another grenadier regiment; on the mound itself were four 12pdr cannons. To the left of the mound were two further grenadier regiments and a twelve gun battery. The Tauride Grenadier Regiment was detached to the right, where it reinforced the six jager regiments. The jagers were in the brush and formed the link between the Russians around the fleches and the Utitza Mound. Behind Tuchkov and on either side of the mound, were 4,000 Moscow Opolochenie armed with pikes and thirty-six cannon. At 10:30 A.M., Poniatowski renewed his advance. He moved twenty-two guns (another source says forty) forward and directed their fire on the Russians around the Utitza Mound. Tilings were rapidly becoming dangerous for the Russians. The 17th Division, and later the 4th Division, were sent south to assist Tuchkov. The entire 2nd Infantry Corps was eventually shifted south, and only the six jager regiments remained in their original positions.

Polish Cuirassiers attacking the Redoubt at Borodino. Position Battery #17 was directed to the Utitza Mound, where it established itself the moment Poniatowski's twenty-two gun battery opened fire. A combination of an uneven artillery duel and the rapid advance of the Poles forced Position Battery #17 to limber up and withdraw. The Polish advance was met by the Bieloserk Infantry Regiment, which held a position on the mound. A bloody fight began. At noon two Russian Corps moved forward, advancing as far as the village of Utitza. Poniatowski's artillery engaged in a three hour duel with the Russians, in an effort to prepare the way for the pending infantry assault. He planned a two column attack against the mound. Once the attack was launched, two Polish columns advanced around the northern flank of the mound until they encountered the 2nd Infantry Corps. The Polish left column was a diversion, and it succeeded in that function very well. Poniatowski's main force advanced to the southern foot of the mound. Baggovout counter-attacked with Karpov's cossacks, the 1st Grenadier Division and the 17th Infantry Division. This force only barely succeeded in stopping the Polish advance.

This stabilized the battle for the Russians momentarily. However, the situation to the north left Baggovout's position very exposed. He was obliged to fall back along the Old Smolensk Road, abandoning his positions to Poniatowski. Poniatowski sent his divisions forward against the mound. The 13th Polish Hussar Regiment, supported by three other cavalry regiments of the V Corps, moved forward to strike Baggovout's left flank. Karpov's cossacks counter-attacked and brought this attack to a halt. The Krementchug Infantry Regiment had barely 300 men and was soon joined by the Minsk Infantry Regiment, which only had 200 men. Supported by the four guns and eventually by the Brest and Riazan Infantry Regiments who came up behind them, this tiny force of 500 Russian infantry advanced against the Poles. The Minsk Infantry Regiment was smothered with musketry and attacked by the 12th Polish Uhlan Regiment. The Russian regiments fell back, their numbers reduced to less than 350. The battle at Borodino for the Poles was to end with this action. The Berezina The first bridge over the Berezina River was completed in the afternoon of 26 November. Oudinot and Dombrowski, with 11,000 men, crossed immediately. The second, and larger, bridge was complete about 3:00 p.m., and the remainder of Oudinot's artillery and the Imperial Guard crossed. While Ney, reinforced by Claparede (Vistula Legion), crossed the Berezina, Junot and Victor took up positions around Borisov. Davout assumed a position near Loshnitsa. It was on the plateau of Studianka that Victor placed his troops. Hochberg's Baden brigade, a battalion of the French 55th Line Regiment under Chef de Bataillon Joyeaux, and four French 12pdrs, formed the allied right. Its flank was secured on the Berezina and its left on Studianka. The center was held by the Berg brigade and the allied left was held by Girard's 28th Division. The Poles (4th, 7th, and 9th Regiments) stood forward, supported by Kleingel's Saxon brigade (von Low and von Rechten Infantry Regiments), which were held in reserve. Girard's left flank was unable to secure itself against the woods to the east of the plain and hung in the open as a result. The gap between the flank and the woods was filled by what little cavalry remained to the corps. This was the 350 cavalry of the Baden Hussar Regiment and the Hessian Chevauleger Regiment under General Fournier. In the beginning of the battle, the Russians quickly engaged the allied right. While this was occurring, the Russians continued their heavy cannonade on the allied left. The Russian line extended itself toward the allied right and began redeploying their artillery to threaten the most exposed portion of the allied line. In response to this threat, Victor ordered General Damas to attack the Russian artillery on the heights with the Berg brigade. The withdrawal of the Berg brigade, on their flank, forced the Poles to fill in the gap. They did not recognize the Baden infantry, and almost fired on it. As the fire of the Russian Horse Battery #23 intensified, the 34th Jager Regiment as well as the Nisov and Vorohenz Infantry Regiments advanced. They engaged the 7th and 9th Polish Infantry Regiments in a lively fusillade. The Hessian Chevaulegers and Baden Hussars moved forward to attack; they totaled 350 men. Fournier, their commander, was quickly wounded and the command passed to Colonel de LaRoche These brave men threw themselves against the flank of the advancing Russian column and broke it after a short fight. Two squadrons of the cuirassiers and a grenadier depot battalion advanced to counterattack them. The Hessian and Baden cavalry charged again, forcing the two German cavalry regiments back. Once reformed and rallied, there remained only 50 men. Though a costly attack, it had reestablished the center of the French lines. The Russian General Fock brought up his reserves and moved against the French left. The Saxons and 4th Polish Infantry Regiment fought off this last Russian attack.

The battle died down after this and the Russians contented themselves with renewing their artillery and skirmish fire on the French lines. When the battle was over, the Poles had a total of 250 men left in their ranks. 1813 Fall Campaign In early August, Napoleon dispatched Poniatowski's VIII Corps to Gabel. He also sent Uminski's 27th (Polish) Light Cavalry Brigade to Reichenberg and Friedland to cover the defile on the left flank and assure an unbroken line of communications with Gorlitz and Lowenberg. Napoleon did not move Poniatowski's Vm Corps from Gabel, Reichenberg and Friedland, for much of August. Instead, it was to remain in the defiles of the Lusace Mountains for most of the early portion of the 1813 Fall campaign. Poniatowski's orders were to watch the mountain defiles to Bohemia. Limited probing actions were executed in order to keep track of the Austrian activities, but no major offensive action was undertaken. The first major occurrence was the evacuation of Reichenberg during the morning of 23 August, when General Bruneau was obliged to withdraw because of the defection of four squadrons from the 1st and 2nd Westphalian Hussar Regiments. His withdrawal was harried by Austrian forces, and covered by a detachment under General Uminski, consisting of the Krakus Regiment and the cuirassiers. Poniatowski's war consisted of small unit actions against the Austrian general Neipperg. Forays of a few companies and some cavalry squadrons represented the bulk of the maneuvers for some time. When Poniatowski learned of Macdonald's defeat at Katzbach, he held his ground, even when he heard that three Russian divisions had appeared near Rumburg. Poniatowski understood that he had been ordered to guard the Gabel and Georgenthal mountains, and that the French success at Dresden allowed him to act according to circumstances without fear of other consequences. As a result, Poniatowski not only decided to hold his ground, but move his forces into Lieckendorf and establish the IV Cavalry Corps in Zittau, Lieckendorf, and Hirschfeld. The troops under his command began moving to Rumburg on 1 September, with the goal of reaching it that evening. The IV Cavalry Corps was moving to the Neisse heights to observe the allied movements on Gabel Mountain. The allies did not act aggressively against Poniatowski on 1 September. There were no serious actions, but Poniatowski was beginning to suspect that he was the object of some major maneuvers. On 3 September, he decided to move the VIII Corps to Neustadt and to hold the IV Cavalry Corps in Schluckenau. Poniatowski felt that if Macdonald continued withdrawing, he would also be obliged to withdraw. During the evening of 4 September, Poniatowski received a letter from Berthier ordering him to concentrate his forces in the vicinity of Bautzen and that a battle was expected. He ordered Poniatowski to hold himself ready to act against the Allied left and to arrive in Bautzen at day break. In response to Berthier's orders to move, Poniatowski organized a column of two infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment, and four guns, under General Malachowski, and dispatched them to Neusaltza. The VIII Corps and the IV Cavalry Corps were to march united, but would be unable to leave until the morning. The two corps would march with strong forces of cavalry and infantry on their flanks under General Uminski. Dombrowski's Division On 15 August, Dombrowski's Division, a total of5,000 to 6,000 men, stood in Wittenberg. As Oudinot moved to his rendezvous with destiny at Gross-Beeren, his march was supported by Dombrowski's tiny division of six battalions and eight squadrons. On 21 August, Girard's Division departed Magdeburg and moved toward Belzig where it

sought to join Oudinot. The Poles soon found themselves in contact with Winzingerode, who sought to push them back and to strike Girard's flank. Generalmajor Czernichev, supporting Winzingerode, passed the village of Treuenbrietzen and attacked all of Dombrowski's advanced posts. Czernichev's main force, five regiments and four guns under his immediate control, attacked Weddin, which was occupied by a squadron of the 4th Polish Uhlan Regiment, three companies of the 14th Polish Infantry Regiment, and two guns, under the command of Colonel Kostanecki. The ensuing battle lasted eleven hours. Kostanecki sustained ten attacks, and 500 cossacks dismounted to combat as skirmishers, but to no avail. Dombrowski dispatched two squadrons and a battalion to reinforce his troops, and this force tipped the scales in the Poles favor. The cossacks withdrew, and the Poles followed at a distance of about a mile. On 3 September, Dombrowski's 27th (Polish) Division had united itself on the left wing of Oudinot's army. It consisted of the 2nd, 4th, and 14th Polish Infantry Regiments, each with two battalions, the 2nd Uhlan and 4th Chasseur a Cheval Regiments, and six guns. Oudinot was defeated at Gross-Beeren falling back to Magdeburg and Wittenberg. The Poles also withdrew, back to their initial positions, but not suffering significantly as a result of Oudinot's defeat at Gross-Beeren or Girard's defeat at Hagelberg. Battle ofDennewitz Oudinot was replaced by Ney, and the French advance resumed in early September. On 6 September the French and allies again met near Dennewitz and another battle was joined. As the battle of Dennewitz began, the Polish 18th Light Cavalry Brigade, under Krukowiecki, moved toward Dennewitz29. The Prussians were struck in the right wing by the Polish 2nd Uhlan Regiment. The Prussian 3/3rd Reserve Regiment formed itself into column but was caught off guard by the Polish cavalry. Part of the cavalry drove the Prussian skirmishers off, killing several, while the other part attacked the battalion proper. A third group of Poles remained in reserve. The Prussians were savagely handled and fell back with heavy casualties. Ney sent four battalions of Wiirttembergers forward, down the road from Dennewitz and over the Nuthe. The Prussian cavalry, now reduced to 30 files, was sent forward again to face the Polish uhlans some time between 12:15 and 1:15 p.m. The Prussian cavalry struck at the Wiirttembergers again, falling back with little success though the Wiirttembergers line was disordered. As they withdrew, the two regiments of Polish cavalry threw themselves through the skirmish line and attacked the formed infantry behind them. The Prussian 4th Reserve Regiment and the 2/,3/,4/3rd East Prussian Landwehr Regiment formed square. The Poles avoided the squares and were engaged by Tauentzien's cavalry. The 1st Leib Hussar Regiment also joined the counterattack. The Poles lost nine officers, 93 men, and 50 horses. Unfortunately for the Poles and the French, Dennewitz proved to be another defeat. They withdrew back to their starting positions in Magdeburg and Wittenberg again. Leipzig On 15 October, the great cavalry battle occurred at Liebertwolkwitz, but the Poles took no part in the main fighting. However, in the four days that followed, the Poles engaged in the largest battle fought in the history of warfare up until that date — the Battle of Leipzig. Here, both Poniatowski's VIII Corps and Dombrowski's divisions fought. Dombrowski served to the north of Leipzig near Mockem and Poniatowski served near Wachau. Part of Poniatowski's VIII Corps stood near Mark-Kleeberg, on the extreme western edge of the Wachau battlefield. On the heights to the south and southwest of Dosen stood

the rest of Poniatowski's VIII Corps and Sokolnicki's IV Cavalry Corps. When the initial Austrian attacks began, Poniatowski's VTII Corps and a brigade of the 52nd Division advanced toward Mark-Kleeberg, driving out an Austrian detachment. As the battle expanded, Poniatowski's VIII Corps secured its right flank along the Pliesse, repelling all allied attacks. The IV (Polish) Cavalry Corps had moved from its positions by the Pleisse. It made up its lack of numbers with its equestrian skill and aggressive nature. They were joined by part of the Empress Dragoons of the French Imperial Guard. This combined force then moved to the west of Wachau from where they attacked the Austrians in support of Poniatowski's advance between Wachau, the Auenhain Farm, and Mark-Kleeberg. The attack went well. In the center, around noon, Kleist's column became involved in a series of cavalry battles. Sokolnicki's IV Cavalry Corps struck Helfreich's Russian 14th Division, the Prussian battalions assigned to Helfreich, and the Loubno Hussar Regiment, driving them back. The Polish cavalry then fought and defeated Generalmajor Levaschoff and his two cuirassier regiments. Schvichov's thrust at Wachau alarmed Victor and Oudinot. More strong French columns moved west of Wachau to strike the southern side of the village, where Wurttemberg's Russian Corps stood. From there the Victor moved against Grobern; Poniatowski attacked the same time. He placed a brigade from Augereau's DC Corps in his first line and marched against Mark-Kleeberg. Sokolnicki's cavalry, reinforced by the Guard Dragoons, followed Oudinot's Young Guard columns. The Prussian battalions standing in Mark-IGeeberg bravely faced the attack of the Poles and French. To support them, Helfreich's decimated 14th Division and Schvichov's detachment31 were drawn back from Crostewitz. At the same time, an Austrian cuirassier brigade under Kuttalck crossed the Pleisse River and counterattacked the Polish cavalry. The Austrians threw themselves repeatedly against the Poles, while more Austrian cuirassiers moved into the battle. The attack of Austrian cuirassiers was successful and forced Polish cavalry to abandon the pursuit of Levaschoff s beaten cuirassier brigade. The Polish cavalry rallied and advanced at the trot against the Austrian cuirassiers again. A ferocious battle began as they threw themselves into the low eround between YVachau and Mark-Kleeberg. The Austrians threw more cuirassiers into the battle and the French Guard and Poles found themselves obliged to fall back toward Wachau. Most of Bordesoulle's 1st Heavy Cavalry Division, including the Saxon cuirassier brigade, had been posted so as to cover the French artillery. As the Austrian cuirassiers punished the French cavalry, the Saxon cuirassier brigade, under Berkheim, moved to the right and joined two squadrons of the Polish 8th Chevaul£ger-lancier Regiment. The Saxons and Poles struck and pushed the Austrian cuirassiers back. Merveldt's artillery responded to the initial Austrian setback by redoubling its fire, and his infantry vainly sought to find a crossing on the Pleiss. Bianchi and Kleist moved to support this passage, but Lefol's Independent Division, the 52nd Division, and Poniatowski's VIII Corps stopped their efforts. Napoleon directed one more effort against the allied center and sent Murat forward with his cavalry against Stormthal. Drouot was to advance his artillery in support. Macdonald, Mortier, Lauriston, Victor, Oudinot, and Poniatowski were to advance and take the last allied position. As the French attacked various points, Poniatowski moved against Crostewitz. The Old Guard moved forward to support Poniatowski's attack. The artillery on the French right redoubled its efforts, but the heads of Poniatowski's columns stopped and began to fall back. Between 4:00 P .M. and 5:00 P.M., the shakos of the Hungarian infantry appeared on the heights between Mark-Kleeberg and Dosen. Napoleon ordered Curial, to throw back the offending Hungarians with the 2nd Old Guard Division7. Poniatowski's VIII Corps

and the 52nd Division appear to have also participated in this attack. Poniatowski now found himself reinforced by the Brayer7s 8th Division, III Corps, but night was coming fast. The Poles pushed forward in an effort to recapture the chateau by Ddlitz, which was now defended by a company of Austrian infantry. Their efforts failed and the Austrians held their position. When the day's battle ended, Poniatowski's VIII Corps and Kellermann's (Sokolnicki's) IV Cavalry Corps stood between Dolitz and Dosen. As Poniatowski fought his battles around Wachau, Dombrowski found himself engaged in the Battle of Mockern on the north of Leipzig. As the battle began to develop, the French and Allies found themselves lacking specific knowledge of the positions of the other side. Ney's best chance to determine the allied moves were lost bv not ordering Krukowiecki's Polish cavalry brigade to probe the allied lines; this type of reconnaissance was something that the Poles performed very well. He remained in the dark as to the allies' movements. Ney believed that Marmont's VI Corps had been relieved, as ordered, but this was an error. The first elements of Marmont's relief, the 8th and 11th Divisions, did not arrive until noon. The 9th Division was far behind. Dombrowski did not reach Wiederitzsch until 3:00 P.M. The only reserve immediately available to Marmont's VI Corps was Dombrowski's Polish Division, though Delmas' 9th Division was marching toward the battlefield. Dombrowski's tiny division consisted of six battalions formed with 1,380 men supported by six guns. The Army of Silesia advanced Langeron's corps through Breitenfeld toward Wiederitzsch in two columns. On the right marched Kapzevich's 10th Corps and behind him came Olsulov's 9th Corps. To their left was Emanuel's cavalry brigade, reinforced by the Dorpat and Lithuanian Infantry Regiments. On the left wing Korff's reserve cavalry followed in echelons. The only French troops in Wiederitzsch were cavalry detachments from Fournier's 6th Light Cavalry Division, but at 3:00 P.M., four or five of Dombrowski's battalions moved into the village and established themselves in preparation for a defense of the village. The Poles consisted of about 3,800 men from Zoltowski's infantry brigade, Krukowiecki's cavalry brigade and an artillery battery. Dombrowski also commanded Fournier's 6th Light Cavalry Division32 and Defrance's 4th Heavy Cavalry Division. The total strength of these two cavalry divisions was about 2,000 men and six guns. The withdrawing screen of French and Poles soon reorganized themselves, behind the main body of Dombrowski's 27th (Polish) Division, which moved up. Dombrowski deployed his forces so that his infantry occupied both Klein- and Gross-Wiedderitzsch. Fourteen Polish and French cavalry squadrons were deployed on the hillocks near Plossen and Mockau facing Gross-Wiedderitzsch. Krukowiecki's cavalry stood behind them as a reserve, and the French 13th Cuirassiers stood near Seehausen. Langeron's response was timid and covered with gross exaggerations of the threat posed by the advancing Poles. In order to cloak the weakness of his leadership, he relates in his memoirs, that he had believed Napoleon himself was leading the advancing French columns. The management of the battle by Langeron was completely defective. He was quite disoriented as to the flow of the battle and it would appear that his own batteries fired on 6pdr Foot Battery #3 of the Prussian 7th Brigade for a while. It was 3:00 P.M. when on the right wing of Yorck's Corps was ordered to attack Mockern and the battle began. After the battle around Mockern had developed for a while, Yorck noticed that the French had not only reinforced their left wing, but also the troops holding Mockern. He perceived the Marmont intended to push forward against his right wing and drive down the Leipzig Road moved against Lindenthal and Radefeld in order to hold Mockern. Yorck recognized the importance of snatching Mockern away from French in

order thwart Marmont's battle plan. An advance by his own left wing was impossible as Langeron's Corps had not won enough room to secure his flank. Yorck perceived a failure to take Mockern would bring the French forward and the battle would be lost. Yorck ordered Mecklenburg's brigade to make a renewed attack by fresh forces in an effort to take Mockern. As the battle hung indecisively, the 7th and 8th Brigades moved forward against the left wing. At this point, the French were ready and responded with heavy musketry. The French then renewed their attack into Mockern and the position of the Prussians was becoming critical. The tables were turned by a timely Prussian cavalry attack that allowed Mockern to fall into their hands. Immediately, the French brought forward more troops to prevent a further erosion of their position' The terribly weakened Prussian battalions holding the village were now subjected to a hail of cannister and suffered further losses from a French battery on their left that contained 50 guns. Count Langeron, finally stirred into action, advanced to the stream that ran before the village of Klein-Wiedderitzsch. The Russian 10th Corps stood on the right flank. The eight battalions of the advanced guard under Rudsevich stood on the left. The cavalry of the advanced guard was reinforced by the Dorpat and Lithuanian Chasseur & Cheval Regiments, raising its strength up to three dragoon regiments, four cossack regiments, and the two weak chasseur k cheval regiments. The Russian 9th Corps, which now consisted of only the 9th Division, as the 15th Division was assigned to the advanced guard, stood as a reserve behind the right wing as the battle began. General Lieutenant von Korff, with the Reserve Cavalry, stood behind the left wing. The villages of Klein- and Gross-Wiedderitzsch were occupied by four battalions, 800 cavalry from Fournier's 6th Light Cavalry Division33 and two artillery batteries of Dombrowski's 27th (Polish) Division. Langeron's cavalry vanguard moved against Seehausen first, engaged the 13th Cuirassier Regiment and drove them back toward Eutritzsch. Dombrowski responded by ordering Zoltowski to form his infantry into three columns to repulse a possible cavalry attack. He then ordered Krukowiecki's cavalry brigade, the 2nd and 4th Uhlan Regiments, to move to the right wing. Langeron struck Klein-Wiedderitzsch. The outnumbered Poles fought back, contesting bitterly every foot that the Russians advanced. Emanuel advanced with the Russian cavalry of the advanced guard and attacked the French cavalry capturing seven guns, several caissons, and 500 prisoners. The Kiev and New Russia Dragoons, the Lithuanian Chasseurs, and the 1st and 3rd Ukrainian Cossacks then pushed further forward. The French cavalry, under Defrance, and the Poles, under Krukowiecki, counterattacked and pushed the Russians back across the Reitzschke stream. The Polish infantry followed the attack and reoccupied the village. The 9th Division first appeared on the battle field around 3:00 p.m. It had 4,235 men, and detached several flank battalions to strike the and rear of the Russian position. Langeron responded by ordering General Lieutenant Olsoviev to move to the left flank in haste, and he ordered all of Kortf's reserve cavalry there as well. As a result, Langeron had no more reserves to feed into the battle around Wiederitzsch. This was a problem, for not only were Dombrowski's Poles better led, but they had bravely fought against the vastly larger Russian force. Despite the terrible odds against them, the Poles succeeded through great effort in holding the village. Olsoviev permitted the French 9th Division (Delmas) to occupy the Birkenholz (birch woods), while the Russian 15th Division marched forward from the reserve. Light Battery #29, also from the reserve artillery, opened fire against Delmas' 9th Division. Korff's cavalry reserve positioned itself between the Birkenholz and Podelwitz. Delmas deployed his division and allowed Dombrowski to reorganize his forces behind its protection. Reorganized, the Poles once again drove forward, supported by Delmas,

and pushed Langeron's forces out of both villages. The Russians reeled back to their original positions by the stream. The French then occupied both villages and advanced to the stream. The French artillery pounded Langeron's forces, inflicting heavy casualties. Udom, with the 10th and 38th Jager Regiments and covered by the skirmishers of the Nacheburg, Apcheron, and Iakout Regiments, occupied a position in the Birkenholz. He was assaulted soon after by the advancing French. An artillery duel began between Light Battery #29 and the French artillery; the French renewed their assault. General Lieutenant Olsoviev moved Colonel Medinzov forward with the Riajsk and Kolyvan Infantry Regiments to support Udom. The French attack from Birkenholz was repelled and the French 145th Infantry Regiment suffered heavy losses, including its eaGeneral Lieutenante. The Russians prevailed and the woods remained in their hands, but the Russians could not fight long at both Birkenholz and Wiederitzsch; the allies needed reinforcements if they were to win the battle. Fortunately for them, Bliicher still had St.-Priest's 8th Corps by Lindenthal and Sacken's 11th Corps to the rear by Radefeld. Between the crisis around Mockern and the news from Korff's cavalry of the situation on the left flank of the Army of Silesia Bliicher decided that it was time to order his reserve forward. GD Delmas withdrew his 9th Division. Korff followed him with his cavalry, capturing a few vehicles. Four regiments of Don cossacks, which had been under von Sacken when the battle began, were sent against Diiben. Here they captured six guns, which they then abandoned because of the lack of horses to draw then. With the French withdrawing, Langeron once again renewed his assaults against KleinWiedderitzsch. He personally led the Schusselburg Regiment, while Rudsevich stood at the head of his mounted chasseurs. Kapzevich supported the attack with his 10th Corps. A French column stood to the side of Klein-Wiedderitzsch and struck the right wing of the Russian attack. General Lieutenant Kapzevich sent forward 12pdr Battery #34, supported by the Viatka and ArchanGeneral Lieutenante Regiments, to engage them. St. Priest advanced and took up a position by Lindenthal and awaited orders while supporting GENERAL MAJOR Bistram with his jagers. The Russian attack proved too powerful and the French and Poles withdrew, abandoning Klein-Wiedderitzsch. Two Russian batteries moved forward into the interval between the Prussian and Russian corps, supported by the 3/,4/Brandenburg Hussar Regiment. St.-Priest's Russian 11th Infantry Division stood by Lindenthal while he swung the 17th Division swung against Marmont's right wing that was locked in combat with the Prussian 7th Brigade. The flanking fire of two allied batteries supported this attack. However, his maneuver caused a gap to appear between the 17th Division and the Russian 10th Corps, which the efforts to take Gross-Wiederitzsch widened. Dombrowski grasped this opportune moment and thrust forward with some of his battalions, which he had gathered behind the village. The Poles burst forward into the gap. It was only by the rapid commitment of the allied reserve that the Polish attack was repelled. Olsoviev's Russian corps also went over to the offensive and pushed back Delmas' 9th Division from Seehausen toward Neutzsch and Plosen. A part of the French park and train column was captured by cossacks, who took six guns, 100 wagons and about 500 prisoners. The French right wing, near Birkenholz and Wiederitzsch was pressed back, deciding the fate of the lines by Mockern in Bliicher's favor. He credited his success to Yorck's determination and the bravery of his soldiers. On the north wing of the French VI Corps, indescribable confusion reigned. The greatest part of the French VI Corps pulled behind the Parthe and reorganized itself during the night. Dombrowski's 27th (Polish) Division, now reduced to a few hundred men, drew itself together behind Pfaffendorf, while the 9th Division (Delmas) moved between Eutritzsch and Gohlis to cover Leipzig. On 17 October, the Army of Silesia renewed its assaults. As the advancing Russians

began to skirmish by Gohlis, Ney assigned Dombrowski's sadly diminished Polish Division to the defense of Gohlis and the adjacent Rietschke passage over the river. Sacken's attack was supported by a battery on the heights by Gohlis. The Poles defended themselves vigorously, but they were slowly pushed back; the Poles withdrew in good order to the suburbs of the city. The attacks against Gohlis cost the Russians 192 cavalry hors de combat, the cossacks 132, and the infantry about 100 men hors de combat. Dombrowski's 27th Division was withdrawn toward Liebertwolkwitz to serve as a reserve. Poniatowski regarded his situation with little confidence since he had lost a third of his men and as many of his officers, and had barely enough munitions for an hour's fighting. Prisoners he had taken said that the allies awaited the arrival of Bennigsen and the Army of the North on 17 October. All this news from every side of the battlefield steadily depressed the mood in the headquarters. The truth of the situation finally broke at about 3:00 A.M. as the reports from the battle around Mockern and Lindenthal arrived. The movement of Dombrowski's 27th (Polish) Division, ordered earlier, was canceled. Murat was with Napoleon on this critical Sunday morning, and by referring to the great losses the allied forces had suffered, sought to console the great leader. In case Napoleon should actually have the intent, through a renewed attack against the Army of Bohemia in order to gain breathing space, preparations had to be made, otherwise catastrophe loomed. Toward noon, on 18 October, the King of Prussia came to inspect the allied lines. The Austrians were able to maintain their positions, but all of their efforts to push forward were stymied by the efforts of the brave Poles of the VIII Corps and the Imperial Guard facing them. Prince Poniatowski and Marshal Oudinot had stopped the repeated Austrian assaults. Weissenwolf later wrote that when the Austrian grenadiers moved into the burning village of Dolitz, the village was found to be filled with dead and wounded Poles, a large quantity of discarded weapons, and uncountable corpses covered both sides of the field. The day was one of unrelenting assault and counterattack. Napoleon had watched each episode of the battle around Probstheida from his position at the Quandt Tobacco Mill and was initially quite concerned when the Prussians appeared to the north of the village. He ordered Curial's 2nd Old Guard Division forward. Rousseau's Brigade moved immediately north of Probstheida, while Rothembourg was sent to support Oudinot with the Saxon, Polish, and Westphalian Guard. They did not, however, join the battle. That morning, on the northern flank, Franquemont's Mixed (Wurttemberg) Division moved to Weissenfels, leaving the Halle suburb defended by Dombrowski's tiny division. Dombrowski's forces totaled about 1,600 infantry and six guns34. Behind him, in Leipzig, stood the Italian battalion of the Milan Guard and the Baden Hochberg Brigade. There was only a sinGeneral Lieutenante company to watch the Halle Gate, as the two divisions of Young Guard under Mortier marched to the west toward Lindenau. Dombrowski's forces stood in the small village of Pfaffendorf that was a short distance from the Halle suburb. At 9:00 A.M., as Bliicher ordered Langeron across the Partha he also ordered Sacken to move against Pfaffendorf and the Halle Gate. The Prussian 1st Corps was in position after 10:00 A.M. as a reserve in the second line on the heights between Eutritzsch and Gohlis. Horn's Brigade formed the right wing and that of Hiinerbein formed the left wing. At 10:00 A.M., Neverovsky's 27th Division (about 3,000 men), supported by its artillery, moved to the attack. Dombrowski knew that his tiny force could not hope to hold against over twice its numbers, and withdrew them behind'the Partha River, taking up positions to defend the bridge and the suburb's gate. He was supported by the Baden company that already manned the gate. Everything depended on the endurance of the weak Polish Division defending the Halle suburb. The loss of this suburb meant disaster to Napoleon because the RanstadtGate was

the bottleneck through which his entire army had to pass as it withdrew from Leipzig. Gourgaud, one of Napoleon's aides-de-camp, recognized the danger, and reassured by Dombrowski that he would die before abandoning his position, hurried to advise Napoleon of the threat. Pacthod's 1st Young Guard Division (12 battalions — 6,000 men and 3 batteries) was sent from Thonberg at the double to support Dombrowski. Pacthod moved his division forward and deployed his artillery in the Rosenthal on the west bank of the Pleisse. At 11:00 A.M. the 1st Brigade, 8th Division, moved into Pfaffendorf and reinforced Dombrowski's Division, which was under attack on the right. The 2nd Brigade, with all the artillery of the 8th Division, took up a position on the plain to the right of the village to prevent the allies from turning the suburb and Pfaffendorf. Despite the odds against them Dombrowski's valiant Poles held their positions until night fall, marking the end of the battle. On 19 October the village of Grimma was occupied by the VIII Corps (Poniatowski) and the XI Corps (Macdonald). They were ordered to hold it to the last extremity, in order to allow the army, its artillery, and its equipment sufficient time to effect a retreat. When the bridge was destroyed, the remaining French sought another route out of the city. A second bridge had been raised in the Richter Garden, but it broke under the weight of the traffic over it. Many attempted to swim the Elster and Poniatowski was shot and drowned in his effort to escape across the river. Trapped in the city, some of the remainder fought, while others threw away their arms and attempted to escape in any way they could. The rest waited for the allies to take them into custody. The few Poles that succeeded in crossing the Elster marched westward with the Grande Armee. Those that were captured in Leipzig were marched off to prisoner-of-war camps, where they were held until the war was over. There was one other major force of Poles in the campaign. They were assigned as part of the garrison of the city of Danzig and they played a tremendous part in the defense of that city. On 29 August the allies attacked the city. They formed two columns, which attacked Langfuhr. One column advance through the village toward Stries, while the other moved against the Heiligenbrun heights. The small French posts withdrew into two blockhouses, where they took up positions. The Russians assaulted both houses, but the defensive fire of the grenadiers of the 11th Polish Infantry Regiment held them at bay. After heavy losses, the Russians began to withdraw as Capitaine Kmita, of the 11th Polish Regiment, pushed them with a bayonet attack. The Russians withdrew and brought forward two guns. The Russian artillery began to fire down the road and stopped the Polish counterattack. Prince Radziwill advanced his reserves to Aller-Engel and Kabum, along with four guns, to face this new allied threat. However, the allied position was too strong, and he was forced to withdraw back to his original positions. At 7:00 A.M., the Russians once again advanced and occupied Grand Belveder where the French only maintained a post during the day. Rapp arrived and directed Chef de bataillon Szembek's battalion of the 11th Polish Regiment to take the position. The attack was successful and the Russians fell back before the superior Polish forces. The Russians then gathered their forces to make a more serious attempt on Langfuhr. They organized a large force of infantry and cavalry supported by 15 guns, and sent it forward between Pitzkendorf and Brentau. The Russians had serious intentions of taking Langfuhr, and Rapp, determined to anticipate them, prepared to march out and meet their attacks with his main force. Colonel Kamienski, 10th Polish Regiment, moved forward with part of his regiment to support the 11th Polish Regiment, which was engaging the Russians behind Langfuhr, in the gorge of the Jeschkenthal valley and before the Petit Belveder.

At the same time, the Russians sent forward two columns by Stries, supporting them with a battery behind the village. A lively firefight began all along the line until about 11:00 A.M., when it began to slacken. The Russians began to indicate, through their movements, that they were making a serious attempt to take Langfuhr. Rapp decided not to surrender this piece of ground, and ordered the Poles not to begin their attack on the Grand Belveder and Johannisberg until specifically ordered to do so. In an effort to embarrass the Russian attack, Rapp decided to personally attack from the side of Pitzkendorf. He hoped to strike the center of the allied forces on the Pitzkendorf plateau and those in the Konigsthal Valley. He deployed his forces as follows. Colonel Kamienski, with two battalions of the 10th Polish Regiment and two of the 11th Polish, was to remain before Langfuhr. The rest of the 7th Division, under General Grandjean, were placed in the ravines by Zigankenberg, with the cavalry supported on its left by the 34th Division. The 33rd Division covered the right and observed Langfuhr. Finally, the 30th Division occupied Schidlitz and Stolzenberg and served as a reserve. Twenty-four guns were placed in the middle and between the two wings. Two six gun batteries took positions on the Zigankenberg plateau and began firing on the allied redoubts, on the Pitzkendorf camp and on their massed infantry. The Russian artillery responded with little success. The fire served to cover the advance of the French infantry into their assigned positions. A battalion of the 11th Polish Regiment, under Chef de bataillon Szembek, moved rapidly against Diwelkau and chased the Russians out of the village, but not before it was put to the torch. Two other battalions of the 10th Polish Regiment, led by Major Krasyn, supported by the 13th Bavarian Regiment and the 1st Westphalian Regiment, moved forward from the left of the French artillery. The cavalry in the first line, under General Farine, consisted of 250 hussars, chasseurs, and lancers. It moved in parallel with the infantry to support their attack on the Russian Redoubts Nos. 9,10,11, and 12, which stood before Pitzkendorf and were now manned solely with infantry, the artillery having been withdrawn. The fall of Diwelkau had forced the Russians to withdraw hastily from a small earthwork covering that position. The Poles and the light cavalry, seeing the Russian hesitation, moved quickly against the four redoubts. As they burst over the front of the redoubts, they caught the Russian and Prussian garrisons in the act of withdrawing through the back of the redoubts and plunged into the mass of milling soldiers. The allies lost many dead and prisoners to the attack. The commander of the redoubts was taken prisoner. The Russian cossacks attempted a counterattack to restore the situation, but General Cavignac led the reserve cavalry forward and threw the cossacks back into the large ravine which lies by Pitzkendorf. The French and Poles remained the masters of the Russian position. The artillery battle continued, and the allies remained in Johannisberg and the Konigsthal valley. In response, Rapp directed that four guns be detached from the principal French battery, and that they be moved to the crest of the hill that forms the back of the Konigsthal valley and extends to Langsfuhr. The position was quite favorable to the French, and the first rounds put the allies into a rapid withdrawal. The allies fell back to the crest of a hill occupied by a large force of cavalry and a battery of five guns. Rapp ordered a battalion of the 11th Polish Regiment and two platoons of dragoons to attack this position. Between Langfuhr and Pitzkendorf, the engagement lasted from the early morning until 6:00 P.M. The allied losses were heavy because of the superiority of the French artillery placed near Zigankenberg, which took their columns in the flank. The engagement around of the four redoubts before Pitzkendorf, and the annihilation of a battalion of 300

- 400 men in the Jeschkenthai valley by the 11th Polish Regiment cost the allies heavily. On 10 October, four hundred Poles supported the French attack on the Frioul Batteiy. Their objective was to prevent the forces of Major Dauger from being turned, and to assure their retreat if it became necessary. The French and Polish attacks were successful. Despite the many small successes, the siege was not destined to be successful. Danzig fell through less than honorable actions by the allies who signed a capitulation allowing the garrison to receive the honors of war, and, once the garrison was committed, refused to honor it. A second capitulation was signed on 29 December. On 30 December, the Poles of the garrison left Danzig to become prisoners of war. Soissons and Arcis-sur-Aube 1 — 20 March 1814 On 28 February 1814, after defeating the Austrians ten days earlier at Montereau, Napoleon renewed his pursuit of Bliicher's Army of Silesia. Pressed hard toward the Aisne River, the Prussians faced certain destruction unless they could manage to capture the bridge at Soissons. Soissons' defenses were quite weak, consisting of brick reinforced ramparts surrounded by a ditch and with several guns positioned at long intervals. The bridgehead was protected by a powerful battery. The town was garrisoned by the Vistula Regiment, commanded by Colonel Michal Kosinski (41 officers and 751 men in two battalions), 80 eclaireurs de la Garde, 140 gunners with 20 guns, and 300 municipal guardsmen. The overall command was in the hands of G£n£ral de brigade Moreau, whom Napoleon had ordered to hold the town at all costs, and if necessary, blow up the bridge rather than allow it to fall into the hands of the allies. On 1 March, Bulow's Prussian corps and Winzingerode's Russian corps, which were marching to Bliicher's aid, arrived before the gates of Soissons. The following day they bombarded the town, and their infantry made several attempts to storm the ramparts. When the Russians got too close to the southern side of the defenses, Colonel Kosinski sallied forth with 300 Poles and attacked them with such impetus that they were pushed out of the suburb, far into the surrounding fields. The Vistula Regiment had 6 killed and about 20, including Kosinski, were wounded. At the end of the day, a Prussian emissary arrived with a call to surrender. Moreau assembled a war council, during which Kosinski and French Colonel Saint-Hillier voted categorically against capitulation. The council decided to continue the defense, and SaintHillier left the room. Shortly later, a Russian emissary arrived with a much more stronGeneral Lieutenanty worded ultimatum, threatening to put the garrison to the sword and to sack the town. Since Saint-Hillier didn't know about the renewed negotiations, Kosinski was left without support and Moreau weakly agreed to sign the act of capitulation, which guaranteed the garrison free passage to Compi£gne. A few moments later, at 9:00 A.M., on 3 March they heard the sound of Napoleon's guns. According to the terms of the capitulation, the Poles were to open the gates at 9:00 A.M. and pull back to the town center. The garrison was to leave at 4:00 P.M., when the Russians were to enter Soissons through the main southern gate and the Prussians through the northern gate. When informed of this, the Vistula Regiment nearly mutinied. Its soldiers were seen biting their muskets with impotent fury, but they obeyed the hated orders. The Allies were in such a hurry that, at 3:00 P.M., two Russian battalions, led by Winzingerode in person, entered the town and found themselves facing the Poles. Kosinski told the Russian general to leave for another hour or he would start shooting. Winzingerode agreed, turned around, and left. At 4:00 P.M., the garrison departed Soissons with its arms and guns, receiving military honors. When the last soldier passed, Winzingerode asked Moreau why he didn't order his division to march after the vanguard. Moreau replied that this was his entire force. Napoleon ordered all the commanding officers of the Soissons garrison placed under arrest. Moreau was later courtmartialled, and Kosinski found himself in Abbaye prison.

He was released once his actions were revealed, but was unable to return to his regiment. The Vistula Regiment was awarded two officers of the Legion d'Honneur (Chefs de bataillon Pawel Muchowski and JanSkrzynecki) and 21 Chevaliers de la Legion d'Honneur for its actions in Soissons. Kosinski was omitted from the awards. The Vistula Regiment, now commanded by Muchowski, became part of Lefol's division in Ney's VI Corps. On 11 March, it returned from Compi£gne to the recently recaptured Soissons. From there, it marched toward Rheims where it engaged the allies on 13 March. During the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, on 20 March 1814, the Vistula Regiment (48 officers and 912 men) stood near Torcy-le-Grand. At 2:00 P.M., a mass of allied cavalry attacked S£bastiani's Guard cavalry, pushing it in wild disorder into Napoleon's entourage. The Emperor, protected by a platoon of the Polish 1st Chevaul£ger-lanciers de la Garde, took shelter in the battalion square of the Vistula Regiment commanded by Jan Skrzynecki. The battalion repulsed several cossack charges, and was continuously under heavy gunfire. After some time, Napoleon, seeing four squadrons of fleeing Guard cavalry, ran out of the

The Death of Prince Poniatowski, October 19, 1813 Engraving by C Rahl after a sketch by J. A. Klein square and turned the rout back into a victorious charge. Contrary to the popular version, the sword he wielded at that occasion was not his, but that of his adjutant. His own was stuck in its scabbard. At nightfall, the Vistula Regiment was ordered to retake Torcy-le-Grand, which it did, supported by two battalions of Guard infantry. During this fight, Skrzynecki was seriously wounded. The regiment had 11 men killed, and 11 officers and 76 men wounded. Besides the Vistula Regiment, two Polish Uhlan regiments and the 3rd Eclaireurs de la Garde, whose officers were mostly Poles, took part in the battle. The eclaireurs had 12 officers wounded.

Feuds in the Polish Army and

Government

After the collapse of the Kosciuszko insurrection of 1794, many Polish political activists went to Paris. The former members of the Polish Jacobin Club — who rejected the 1791 constitution as not radical enough — formed the so-called Polish Deputation. The more moderate, liberal and pro-constitutional elements were grouped in the Agency. The Agency was run by F. Barss, a representative of Kosciuszko. The Deputation, whose ideological leader was H. Kollontaj, then in an Austrian prison, was headed by D. Mniewski, G. Taszycki, F. Dmochowski, and J. Szaniawski. Connected with it were J. Sulkowski, Bonaparte's ADC, and J. Zayonczek. The Deputation's goal was to organize a victorious uprising in Poland. To this effect, its activists created a conspiracy, and supported an organization of a Polish military force in Wallahnia (the Ottoman Empire), just across the border from the Austrian Galicia. The Agency, on the other hand, put the main stress on creating a Polish army in alliance with a foreign power (Prussia, then France). Needless to say, each group's policy was anathema to the other. Dombrowski cooperated with the Agency. When he was given the command over the Polish Legions in Italy, the Deputation launched against him a furious campaign of denunciations addressed to the French government officials and military commanders. Zayonczek, true to his nature, even challenged him to a duel. These attacks were based upon some facts from Dombrowski's past which were open to not-favorable interpretations (his participation in the Targowica military commission, favors showed to him by the Russian general Suvorov, his Prussian connections, etc.). They ceased only after Bonaparte's return from Egypt, for the Deputation no longer had access to the First Consul (Sulkowski had been killed in Cairo). After 1806, the former members of the Deputation turned against Poniatowski. The latter was the nephew of the last Polish King, connected with the Czartorysis compromised by his access to the Targowica Confederation and subsequent compliance with the Russian demands. He was also a former Austrian general and a recipient of Prussian decorations, amongst other things. The Jacobins, however, lost their power after 1807, and couldn't do much damage to the commander-in-chief. Zayonczek kept fighting with both Dombrowski and Poniatowski till 1809. His temper later cooled down, although he remained Poniatowski's enemy even after the man's death. As for the enmity between Poniatowski and Dombrowski, it had manifold psychological and practical reasons, one of them being Dombrowski's frustrated ambitions to become commander in chief of the Polish army. The only two instances when something took place were the renumbering of the legions in January 1807 and Dombrowski's rather imposed leave in the second half of 1808. A much more serious opposition against Poniatowski arose in 1810 when the members of the "Galician factions" — wealthy landowners from the newly liberated southeastern departments -gained several portfolios in the Duchy government. For them, the Duchy constitution was far too radical, so they wanted to supersede it with the semi-liberal system introduced by Tsar Alexander in the western districts of Russia. The leader of this faction, Tadeusz Matuszewicz, who became Minister of Finances, developed a plan of reconstructing Poland under the rule of Alexander. For this plan to succeed, it was necessary to seperate the Duchy from France; since Poniatowski was the pillar of the Polish-French alliance, the Galicians tried to undermine his position by cutting down the funds for the army, his principal source of support. Apart from lowering the military

budget, they were also spreading pacifistic and pro-Russian propaganda.

Jan Henryk Dombrowski (1755 —1818)

October 24,1796 The Directory assigned him to Jourdan's Arm£e de Sambre-et-Meuse as general staff officer 1 la suite, but he never actually served.

Born at Pierzchowiec near Cracow; raised and educated in Saxony. A marching song October 30,1796 Nominated g£n£ral de division. mentioning his name along with that of Bonaparte — the "Dombrowski's Mazurka" of 1797 — intimebecame the Polish national December 1796 anthem. Went to Milan to discuss with Bonaparte the organization of a Polish auxiliary force. 1769—1792 Served in the Saxon army, reaching the January 9, 1797 rank of Rottmeister in a guard cavalry Signed a convention with the Lombard regiment. Republic creating the Polish Legions in Italy; appointed their commander-in-chief. July 1792 Given the rank of vicebrigadier general in February 20, 1800 the 1st Great Poland National Cavalry Nominated commander of the (1st) Polish Brigade. Legion. January 1793 Defended Gnesen against the invading Prussians. Forced to retreat into central Poland, he was planning a concentration of the entire Polish army and a break-through into France. Later agreed to join the Targowica military re-organization commission in Grodno in order to save the cadres of the Polish forces. May 1794 Joined the Kosciuszko insurrection; nominated major general in June. Took significant part in the defense of Warsaw in August. Afterwards, he led his small corps into Great Poland to hinder for six weeks the advance of 30,000 Prussians. For this success, he was nominated lieutenant general in October. On November 18, he signed with Kosciuszko and several other leaders an act of surrender to Suvorov, but refused offers to serve in the Russian or Prussian army. February 1796 Left Poland for Berlin, where he tried to persuade Frederick Wilhelm II to reconstruct Poland under the rule of the Hohenzollern dynasty. September 1796 Arrived in Paris and began talks with the Directorv.

December 1801 Nominated Inspector General of the Polish Corps (demi-brigades) in the French service. May 1802 Appointed Inspector General of the Cavalry of the Italian Republic. November 1806 Recalled from the Italian service to organize the new Polish army. November 20,1806 to Fall 1808 Commanded the 1st (later 3rd) Legion/ Division of the Polish/Grand Duchy army, fighting with it in Pomerania and Friedland. In the fall of 1808, sent on leave by Poniatowski. April 1809 Recalled to active service, fought in the Austro-Polish war. March 1810 Appointed commander of the II (Posen) military district of the Grand Duchy.

1811

Headed military intelligence operations in Prussia.

1812

Commanded the 17th Division of the V Corps. During the retreat, defended unsuccessfully the Beresina crossing at Borisov. Wounded on November 28 at the Beresina while in command of the entire V Corps. 1813 Commanded a Polish division/ observation corps formed at Wetzlar. Fought in the Leipzig campaign. In October, given the general command of the Polish forces. December 1813 — May 1814 Commander-in-chief of the Polish forces in France. May 1814 Returned to Poland; put in charge of the organization of the Kingdom of Poland army. November 1815 Nominated general of cavalry (a rank specific to the Kingdom of Poland army with counterparts in infantry and artillery, next to commander-in-chief).

Professional Characteristics: An excellent organizer, a well-educated and very capable officer, a brave soldier and a caring leader of men. Military historians sometimes blame him for abandoning the bridge at Borisov, not remembering that he put up a stubborn resistance, losing 1,800 of his 2,400 Poles.

Karol Kniaziewicz (1762 —1842)

Although not on Prendel's list, he was one of the most important military figures in the Polish army. Born at Assiten in Kurland; educated in the Military Academy (Szkola Rycerska) in Warsaw (1744 —1776), then in the School of Artillery (1776 —1779, trained combined with actual service). 1780 Served in infantry, reaching the rank of lieutenant of fusiliers in 1787. 1792 During the Polish-Russian war, promoted to major of chasseurs, but this promotion wasn't later confirmed.

June 6,1818 Died in Winnogora in Great Poland. His name is inscribed on the Arc de Triomphe.

1794 In the Kosciuszko insurrection, appointed chief-of-staff to General Zayonczek. promoted to major in May, to colonel in July, to major general in August. After the battle of Maciejowice, in which he commanded the Polish left wing, was taken prisoner by the Russians (October 10,1794).

Wounded: Trebbia (June 18, 1799), Dirschau (February 23, 1807), Friedland (June 14, 1807), the Beresina (November 28,1812).

September 1797 Arrived in Italy and joined Dombrowski's Legions. In October, nominated chef de brigade and commander of the 1st Legion.

Personal Characteristics: A bear of a man, good-natured and rather phlegmatic. A great patriot, even though he never spoke correct Polish. Contemporaries sometimes criticized him for his too-lenient attitude toward captured German officers, who often were his acquaintances from the past. Somehow naive and impressionable, he frequently got engaged into personal cabals, more often than not directed against Poniatowski.

1798 Fought in the Franco-Neapolitan war at Magnano, Civita Castellana, and Calvi; captured the fortress of Gaete.

December 1815 Left active service; appointed a senator.

1799 In January, promoted to g£n£ral de brigade. In March, presented captured Neapolitan standards to the Directory in Paris. On November 28, appointed commander of the Danube Legion.

1800

Fought with the Danube Legion in the Arm£e de Rhin in Germany (notably at Hohenlinden). February 1801 Dissatisfied with Bonaparte's Polish policy, resigned his command and settled in Wolhynia. 1807 Rejected Tsar Alexander's offer to organize Polish troops in the Russian service.

1812

In May, returned to service, was promoted to g£n£ral de division and assigned to King Jerome's staff. In July, took over from General Kamieniecki the command of the 18th Division of the V Corps. Wounded at the Beresina while in command of the entire V Corps (November 28). 1813 At Kracow, in March, requested and received dismissal from active service on ground of poor health (a nervous breakdown caused by his wife's death, but there might have been political reasons as well). 1814 Took part in organizing the Kingdom of Poland army, but after several clashes with the Grand Duke Constantine resigned his post in December. 1817 Left Poland and settled in Dresden. 1830 —1831 During the November uprising, acted as representative of the Polish National government to the government of France. After the uprising's collapse, remained in France. May 9,1842 Died in Paris. His name appears on the Arc de Triomphe. Wounded: The Beresina (November 28,1812)

Personal Characteristics: In Kukiel's words, "More a knight than a commanding general." A giant endowed with proportionate strength (he could easily break a horseshoe in two); a man of absolute integrity and courage, critical toward Napoleon. An uncompromising patriot. Kept away from personal feuds. Professional Characteristics: An excellent soldier, officer, and commander, but motivated more by his sense of honor than by any political calculations.

Josef Zay onczek (1752 — 1 8 2 6 )

The Polish spelling: Zajaczek; alternate Gallicized spellings: Zayonschek, Zayonchek, etc. Born at Kamieniec in Podolia, he was undoubtedly the most colorful figure among the Polish generals of the Napoleonic period, and probably the most tragic as well. 1786 Began his military career as ensign in a Polish cavalry regiment, with which he joined the Confederation of Bar, fighting against the Russians until 1772. 1774 Promoted to capitain in the Bulawa Wielka Koronna dragoon regiment. 1775 Received commission in the 1st Hussar Regiment of the Royal French Army as supernumerary lieutenant. 1777 With the Russian army during the RussoTurkish war; present at the siege of Ochakov. 1784 Became lieutenant colonel in his old Polish regiment. 1792 During the Polish-Russian war, promoted to colonel in the same regiment, then in quick succession to major general and lieutenant general.

m 1812 —1813 Commanded the 16th Division of the V Corps. Wounded at Smolensk (August 18), returned to his division, his wounds not quite healed, just in time for the battle of November 1796 Attached to the general staff of the Arm£e Tarutino (October 18). From the beginning d'ltalie in rank of g£n£ral de brigade of November, succeeded Poniatowski in (formally confirmed only on May 11,1801). the command of the V Corps. On November 28 at the Beresina, lost his leg (which was amputated by Larrey on Napoleon's own 1798 — 1801 Helped preparing the Egyptian bed; Zayonczek's command was then taken expedition, and joined the Arm£e d'Orient by Dombrowski and Kniaziewicz, both as a cavalry commander. In Egypt, fought wounded one after the other). A few days in all major encounters; his fondness for later in Vilna, Zayonczek was taken prisoner watermelons earned him the nickname of and kept in Kiev. The captivity completely "le g£n£ral Pasteque." Promoted to general broke his spirit. de division on May 7, 1801; on May 12, appointed general commander of cavalry 1814 Took part in organizing the Kingdom of in the Arm£e d'Egypte. Remained in Egypt Poland army; nominated general of infantry till the end. (see Dombrowski, November 1815). 1801 —1805 December 1815 Served again in the Armee d'ltalie. Appointed viceroy of the Kingdom of Poland, and subsequently given the title of September 1805 Transferred to the Grand Arm£e for the prince; removed from active military service. Austerlitz campaign, fell sick in Vienna, The public opinion ridiculed and despised and in March 1806 was allowed to go to him for his totally pro-Russian attitudes. He also went completely deaf. Paris. 1794 In the Kosciuszko insurrection, was the actual commander of the defense of Warsaw.

|

September 1806 Appointed organizer and commander of the (1st) Legion du Nord. December 1806 Transferred to Poland to organize Polish units in the Kalisz department; subsequently, commander of the Kalisz Legion February — July 1807 Commanded a division/observation corps on the Narew river. After the treaty of Tilsit, was unwillingly transferred to the Polish service, remaining in command of the 2nd Division (i.e. the former Kalisz Legion). 1809 Took part in the Austro-Polish war. March 1810 Appointed commander of the I (Warsaw) military district of the Grand Duchy.

July 28,1828 Died in Warsaw. His funeral was attended by a handful of people. His name is inscribed on the Arc de Triomphe. Personal Characteristics: A man of innumerable contradictions, a firebrand and born plotter, but not much of a typical opportunist. Politically, he moved across the entire spectrum in more than one aspect: at first, a Bar confederate (therefore a sworn "defender of the Catholic faith" and conservatist), then a Polish Jacobin who eventually replaced his fervent patriotism with a blind dedication to Napoleon. Finally, an obedient pawn of the Tsar (but just that, not a vicious persecutor of Polish patriots on his own initiative like Rozniecki). His choleric temperament and sharp tongue didn't gain him many friends. Self-rightous and individualistic to the extreme, he quarreled both with Poniatowski and Dombrowski. In order to get at his

"enemies/' he was able to stoop to reallylow tricks (his brother Ignacv, the chief of the postal service in the Duchy, ran for him a "black chamber," intercepting letters of important figures, especially those of Poniatowski and his circle). Professional Characteristics: A good leader and organizer with great personal courage. An exacting and demanding commander, he was quite unpopular in the officer corps. In contacts with his Polish colleagues and superiors, he was often rude and outright insubordinate.

1797 Arrived in Paris, where he presented to the Directory a project of organizing Polish legion in the Arm£e de Rhin. 1799 Appointed chef de brigade; commanded the infantry of the Danube Legion. 1800 Fought in the Danube Legion; nominated chef en second of the Legion. 1801 After Kniaziewicz's resignation, led the remnants of the Legion into Italy.

For example, he wrote to Poniatowski in April 1807: "Je suis fatigue de votre correspondence. Le ton de vos lettres ne me 1802 Commanded the 3rd Polish Demi-Brigade convenient pas. Cesson de nous £crire, c'est le plus sage. Rappelez-vous que je suis un until superseded by General Jablonowski. officier de g£n£ral fran^ais, je commande Shortly afterward, he left active service. les Polonais parceque S.M. L'Empereur l'a voulu." In fact, Poniatowski wasn't yet the 1806 —1807 commander-in-chief, but, as Director of War, Helped organize the cavalry of he was Zayonczek's administrative Dombrowski's Posen Legion, and fought supervisor). On the other hand, he always with it in Pomerania. Nominated g£n£ral showed exemplary obedience to his French de brigade of the Duchy army, commanded superiors. As a veteran of the Egyptian a brigade in the 1st Division. campaign, Zayonczek enjoyed Napoleon's protection. 1809 Fought bravely at Raszyn (April 19); was one of the most enterprising commanders Michal Sokolnicki (1760 —1816) Bornat Wierzeja in Great Poland; educated in the Austro-Polish war. at the Military Academy (Szkola Rycerska) in Warsaw, later studied military 1810 engineering in Saxony. Held a teaching post In March, promoted to g£n£ral de division at the Szkola Rycerska, where he was a and nominated commander of the IV mentor and friend of Jozef Sulkowski, the (Radom) military district. In September, future Bonaparte's ADC in Italy and Egypt. took a three month leave of absence and went to Paris. 1787 Nominated capitain of engineers in the 1811 Polish army. Was on prolonged leave till April; stayed on in Paris without permission, plotting 1792 against Poniatowski, and was finally struck Appointed quartermaster general in the off the Polish army list on December 10. (Polish) Army of Lithuania. Went subsequently into the French service. 1794 Promoted to colonel and major general, fought in the Kosciuszko insurrection; taken prisoner by the Russians.

1812

In Napoleon's entourage, headed the field military intelligence of the Grand Armee.

1790 1813 Transferred to line cavalry; promoted to In May, he was sent to Poniatowski in Kracow with Napoleon's orders for the capitain and adjutant-general in the Little Polish corps to return to the Duchy, but the Poland Cavalry Brigade. actual situation made them obsolete. In June, appointed commander of the 7th Light 1792 Cavalry Division in the IV Reserve Cavalry Fought in the Polish-Russian war. Corps. After Leipzig, he was for a short time Afterwards engaged in patriotic commander-in-chief of the VIII Corps; conspiracies. thanks to Krukowiecki's intrigue, was replaced by A. Sulkowski. 1794 Took part in the Kosciuszko insurrection, advancing to the rank of vicebrigadier 1814 Commanded the Polish Gardes general. d'Honneur. By the end of May, left with his honor column for Poland, taking on his way March 1798 Poniatowski's body from Leipzig. Later Joined the Polish Legions in Italy with the attached to the Kingdom of Poland army as rank of colonel. g£n£ral a la suite. 1799—1801 Commanded the Polish cavalry regiment September 23,1816 Hit by a runaway horse during a military in the Danube Legion. review in Warsaw, died on the next day. 1802 —1806 With his regiment in the Italian and Personal Characteristics: The Saxon minister Senfft called him Neapolitan (King Joseph's) services. "homme vain, sans principes et cerveau brul§." Not without panache and personal March 1807 Promoted to g£n£ral de brigade and charm, he was rather an opportunist, more interested in his career than in the Polish appointed inspector general of Polish cavalrv. cause. j Professional Characteristics: A daring field commander and experienced cavalry leader. Quite liked by soldiers, his talents were employed most brilliantly in the 1809 campaign. Suffering from self-importance, he was forever writing memoranda on the "Polish question" for Napoleon ("turgid in style, devoid of any useful information," according to Kukiel), or preparing projects of military (re)organizadons, usually not being asked to do so. In opposition to Poniatowski.

Aleksander Rozniecki (1768 —1849)

Born in Warsaw; alternate dates of birth: 1772 or 1774. Educated in the Military Academy (Szkola Rycerska) in Warsaw. Alternate date of his death: 1839. 1788 — 1789 Served in the Polish Royal Horse Guard, reaching the rank of sous-lieutnant.

1809 Fought bravely in the Austro-Polish war, leading daring cavalry raids into eastern (Old) Galicia. March 1810 Promoted to g£n£ral de division; worked under Fiszer in military intelligence. 1812

Commanded the 4th Light Cavalry Division in the IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. Blundered at Mir and Romanov, but rehabilitated himself at Borodino. 1813 Appointed chief-of-staff of the VIII Corps; wounded and taken prisoner at Leipzig (some contemporaries state that he could have escaped captivity, but preferred it over following Napoleon into France).

1815 Appointed the general commander of two cavalry divisions (another strange and unique rank in the Kingdom of Poland army).

1816

Also appointed the commander of the gendarmerie corps and head of the secret police. 1826

Promoted to the rank of general of cavalry. 1830 On November 29, when the patriotic uprising began, Rozniecki escaped in disguise from Warsaw and joined the Grand Duke Constantine. In December, followed Constantine into Russia, afterwards cooperating with the Tsarist government against the Poles. 1832 Went into the Russian service. Died in 1849 (1839?). Personal Characteristics: Not without personal courage, he was very opportunistic, rude to his subordinates (notorious for his vicious remarks like, "Mister, you hang this horse like a dog on a fence"), and officious and servile toward his superiors. Always of rather low moral standards, after 1815 he hit the bottom becoming a drunkard, debauchee, and gambler. To support this lifestyle, he demanded bribes for promotions and extorted them through blackmail. Commonly loathed as the chief of the secret police. Zayonczek called him, "the greatest possible coward, a vile and abject intrigant"; other contemporaries described him as being, "dirty in soul and body, unkempt in dress," "brutal, following his lust like a wild beast." Altogether, a quite unsavory character. Professional Characteristics: A gifted cavalry organizer commander.

and

Stanislaw Fiszer (1769 —1812) Educated in the Military Academy (Szkola Rycerska) in Warsaw. Served as an infantry officer until 1790, when Kosciuszko chose him for his ADC with the rank of major. In this capacity, he took part in the wars of 1792 and 1794. Wounded and taken prisoner at Maciejowice, he spent two years imprisoned in Nizhnoy Novgorod. After his release in 1796, Fiszer went to France, where in 1799 he was appointed chef de battalion in the Danube Legion. Taken prisoner by the Austrians in May 1800, he was imprisoned in Bohemia until February 1801. After the treaty of Luneville, he followed Kniaziewicz and left the service. In 1806, Fiszer joined Dombrowski in Poland, becoming a brigade commander in the Posen Legion. Eventually transferred to the Kalisz Legion, he ended up as inspector general of infantry. In March 1810, he was promoted to g£n£ral de division and confirmed in his function of the chief of the general staff. He also supervised the "shallow" military intelligence operations (conducted within ten miles from the Duchy borders). Fiszer was killed while delivering Poniatowski's orders on October 18,1812 at Tarutino. Personal Characteristics: Upright, loyal, and very talented, his only weakness was a tendency to imitate Poniatowski even in the manner of dress. Contemporaries remark on how funny he looked in a tall uhlan czapka (Fiszer was quite short). Although much loved by common soldiers, he could be brusque and snappish with officers, but never without reasons. Attributing "deceit" to him, as Prendel does, is rather too much. Professional Characteristics: An excellent organizer, justly credited with creating all that was the best in the Polish infantry. He was a strict disciplinarian, but always took the side of the common soldiers. His inspections were famous for their thoroughness. Brave and decisive in the face of the enemy, he was totally devoted to Poniatowski.

Grand Duchy of Warsaw Fusilier, 4th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division - 1807 Fusilier, 13th Infantry Regiment - 1809 Fusilier, 9th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Division - 1807

Saxon Army (1810-1813) Trooper, von Polenz Chevauleger Regiment Officer, Zastrow Cuirassier Regiment Trooper, Leib Cuirassier Regiment

Ludwik

Kamieniecki

(1758 —1816)

1792 Adjutant general to Poniatowski with the rank of colonel. 1794 Promoted to major general; in November, Poniatowski handed over to him the command of his division in Warsaw. Rumored to have entered into a secret agreement with the Prussians, thus surrendering the capital. 1795 —1806 Administered Poniatowski's estates. February 1807 Nominated chief-of-staff in Poniatowski's (Warsaw) Legion with the rank of g£n£ral de brigade. He was eventually superseded by Fiszer, but remained a brigade commander in the 1st Division. 1808

Appointed commander of the infantry group (the 2nd, and 3rd Regiments). 1809 Took part in the Austro-Polish war. March 1810 Promoted to g£n£ral de division and nominated commander of the III (Lublin) military district.

1812

Commander of the 18th Division of the V Corps. From July, military governor of Grodno. 1813 With Poniatowski in Kracow and Saxony. Commanded the 26th Division of the VIII Corps. Stayed in Leipzig and let himself be taken prisoner. 1813 In the Kingdom of Poland army, commandant of the Warsaw military district. Died in 1816.

Personal Characteristics: A Poniatowski factotum, nothing ofl'f interest. Professional Characteristics: Great ambitions, no abilities. Wincenty Axamitowski (1760 — 1828) f Polish artillery 1774, campaigns of 1792 £ and 1794 (major), the Polish Legions in Italy/ 1797 — 1799 (chef de battalion, organizer-; and commander of artillerv), the (1st) Polish/1 Legion 1800 — 1801 (chef de brigade), the£ 2nd Polish Demi-Brigade 1802 (commander; fl said to have arranged for the sending of his p unit to Santo Domingo, while himself^ staying behind in Italy), in the French services? 1803 — 1806, summoned to the organizing^ Polish army 1806 (g£n£ral de brigade,,'/ organized the corps of artillery andi* engineers), in France 1808 —1811, returned** to the Polish service 1811, governor of Posenr1 and deputy chief-of-staff in Jerome's staff/ 1812, inline duty 1813 —1814, commander* of the Siedlce department 1815, left the army/ in 1816. Good soldier but an ultraloyalist„> quick to denounce any anti-French activities^ among his comrades. An enemy oflf Poniatowski. Izydor Krasinski (1774 —1870) Sous-lieutenant in the 5th Infantry 1789J/ major of his own fusilier battalion 1793*/ colonel and major general 1794, in Russiarr1 captivity 1794, g£n£ral de brigade in thes? Kalisz Legion 1806, brigade commander irr1 the 2nd Division 1807, took part in the 1807? and 1809 campaigns, commanded the 16th4 Division in the V Corps between August 15^ and October 16,1812, and the remnants off the V Corps in the first half of December*" 1812, g£n£ral de division January 1813, taken4 prisoner at Leipzig, commander of the 2nc# Infantry January 1815, General of Infantry/ September 1826, recalled from his post anal placed 1 la suite May 1829, Minister of Watf in the Polish national Government* December 1830 — March 1831, after 1831 deported to Vologda. A good-natured but* phlegmatic man, without significant* organizational abilities. In opposition to the? Grand Duke Constantine.

Maurycy Hauke (1775 — 1830) Miner in 1790, sous-lieutenant 1794, in the Polish Legions in Italy from April 1798, lieutenant May 1798, capitain and Dombrowski's ADC July 1800, chef d'escadron March 1805, colonel on the staff of Dombrowski's Posen Legion December 1806, ggngral de brigade December 1807, commandant of the Zamosc fortress May 1809 — November 1813, g<§n£ral de division February 1813 (nominated during the siege), quartermaster general January 1815, deputy minister of war April 1816, general of artillery September 1826. Killed on November 29,1830 while trying to stop the army mutiny in Warsaw. An ascetic technocrat and the most talented of the Polish engineering officers, morally without blemish, but out of touch with the army. Did not engage in politics.

army mutiny in Warsaw, and was mortally wounded by a shot fired from the ranks of the 3rd Infantry. Died on the next day, despairing about being killed, "by a Polish hand." During the Duchy period, Potocki was extremely popular among the soldiers and the Warsaw public. In the Kingdom of Poland army, he became to some extent influenced by Russian rigidity, but still remained a good-natured and amiable man. Quite indecisive, he did not possess any military talents.

Dominik Dziewanowski (1759 —1827) Began his military service in the Prussian army, from ca. 1790 in the Polish service, took part in the 1794 uprising, retired to his estate 1795 — 1806, organized a cavalry regiment November 1806, colonel of the 1st (later 6th) Uhlans January 1807, took part in the 1807 and 1809 campaigns, general de brigade March 1810, commanded the 28th Lukasz Bieganski (1755 —1839) Entered the Polish army 1774, ensign1782, Light Cavalry Brigade in the IV Reserve lieutenant 1783, major 1794, colonel Cavalry Corps 1812, wounded at the February 1807, g£n£ral de brigade December Beresina and taken prisoner November 1807, took part in the 1809 campaign, had a 1812, left military service in the spring of domestic assignment in 1812, organized the 1814. One of the best cavalry commanders Polish corps and interned by the Austrians in the Duchy army. Did not serve in the in Kracow May 1813, from December 1814 Kingdom of Poland army. to July 1831 director of the uniform commissariat, g£n6ral de division Prince Josef Antoni Poniatowski September 1826, pensioned July 1831. Prince Josef Antoni Poniatowski was born Modest, hard-working, very amiable and on 7 May 1763, to Andre Poniatowski. At stayed away from politics. Always loyal to age ten, when his father died, his uncle, Poniatowsld. Served only in Poland. King Stanislaus August, became his guardian. His education was thorough, but he was not formally instructed in Polish, a Stanislaw Potocki (1776 —1830) Gunner 1789, artificer major and sous- language he learned from his household. In lieutenant 1790, lieutenant 1792, 1780, he was commissioned in the 2nd Poniatowski's ADC 1794, capitain May 1794, Carabiniers. In 1781, he became a squadron colonel of the 10th Infantry December 1806 commander and in 1786 a Lt. Colonel in (later renumbered the 2nd), adjutant to the Joseph n's Light Horse. He was a gifted Grand Duke and King of Saxony March cavalry officer with a special eye for terrain 1809, took part in the 1809campaign, g£n£ral and an abiding interest in training. In 1784, de brigade and commandant of Warsaw he served in an Austrian uhlan regiment. In March 1810, commanded an infantry 1788, during the Russian siege of the Turkish brigade in the 18th Division of the V Corps city of Sabatch, he was wounded. In 1812, taken prisoner of war in Warsaw 1813, November 1788, he was promoted to commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade Colonel by the Austrian Emperor. In 1789, January 1815, divisional infantry he was given command of the Modena commander October 1815, g£n£ral de Regiment, but was recalled to Poland before division October 1819, adjutant to the Tsar he could lead it to war. Serving in Warsaw April 1826, General of Infantry May 1829. until 1790 when he assumed command of On November 29,1830, he tried to stop the the 4th Division by Braclaw. In 1792, he won

the battle of Zielence when his army ambushed Russian General Markov. After the "betrayal" of the Confederation of Targowica, he joined in the conspiracy to kidnap his uncle, King Stanislaus August, but this was transitory. In July, he resigned his commission and left Poland. Poniatowski took no part in the planning of the Kosciuszko Insurrection, but returned to Poland after it erupted and joined the effort. Though starting his participation as a common soldier, he eventually was given command of a division. During the defense of Warsaw, he was surprised and defeated by a Prussian night assault, and his command was temporarily given to Dombrowski. After the failure of the insurrection, he once again returned to exile until 1798, when he returned to Prussian occupied Warsaw. In 1807, he met Murat in Warsaw and began overtures to the French for the restoration of a free Poland. In 1807, he began organization of the Polish army under Davout and Napoleon's supervision. In 1809, he led the Polish national army in its war against the Austrians. In 1812, he led the V Corps of the Grand Arm£e into Russia, fighting at Smolensk, Borodino, Tarutino, and Krasnoe. In 1813, he oversaw the rebuilding of the Polish forces that were to become the VIII Corps, but participated in no major actions in the Spring campaign. In the Fall campaign, his first and only major action was to be Leipzig. On 17 October 1813, Napoleon made him Marechal. At Leipzig, Poniatowski's VIII Corps held the critical French right wing between Connewitz and Wachau. On 19 October 1813, as the French began to withdraw, the Lindenau Bridge was destroyed prematurely. While evacuating Leipzig, he drove his horse into the Pleisse River. After crossing, his received his second wound of the day. While approaching the east bank of the Elster, he was surrounded by enemy infantry. He spurred his horse into the river, only to be shot in the chest, disappearing under the water. His body was found by fishermen five days later. 1763 Born in Vienna.

1773 Became ward of his uncle, the King of Poland. 1780 Entered the Austrian Army. 1786 Lieutenant Colonel in Joseph II Light Horse. 1787 Served as representative to the Russian court. 1788 Wounded at siege of Sabatch, fighting the Turks. 1789 Became Major General of the Polish Army. 1792 Won battle of Zielence. Resigned after the armistice and banished from Poland. 1794 Joined Kosciuszko Insurrection only to return to exile. 1798 Visited Russian court at invitation of Czar Paul. 1807 Became minister of war in the Polish Directory. 1809 Faced Austrians at the battle of Raszyn, invaded and overran Galicia, seized Krakow.

1812

Lead V Corps of the Grande Arm£e. Fought at Smolensk, Borodino, Tarutino, and Krasnoe. 1813 Led Polish army into Saxony. Commander of VIII Corps, promoted to Marechal d'Empire and fought at the battle of Leipzig. October 19,1813 Drowned in the Elster River.

Prince Poniatowski, Marshal of France After an engraving by J.G. Mansfeld

The History of Saxony

Frederick Augustus II succeeded Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony, and mounted the throne of Poland in 1734. The last years of his reign were unfortunate, as his Saxon territories were ravaged by the Seven Years War. He was compelled to abandon his capital. Frederick II of Prussia entered Dresden and levied heavy contributions from its inhabitants. The Saxon army was trapped in the camp of Pirna and taken prisoner. Many of the soldiers were incorporated into the Prussian army. Frederick August II attempted to negotiate a peace with Frederick II of Prussia with no success. Eventually he was permitted to depart for Poland. Saxony remained in Prussian hands until the Peace of Hubertusberg on 15 February 1763. The invasion of Saxony had cost it 250,000,000 pounds in contributions and destroyed property. These losses affected the country for many years. Frederick August II died on 4 November 1763 and was succeeded by his son Frederick Christian Leopold, or Frederick August III. His wife, Maria Josephina, was daughter of the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph, which tied the family to Austria. One of the daughters of Frederick August II married into the Spanish royal household and another became the Dauphine of France and mother to Louis XVI. The King of Saxony was the senior branch of the Saxon families founded by the Elector Albert before 1500. The electoral house possessed several provinces in upper Saxony. They were the electorate of Saxony, composed of several united principalities; the county of Mansfeld, in great part, the principality of Querfurt, the circle of Franconia, the county of Henneberg, and the Margravate of upper and lower Lusace. Saxony contained 1,470 square leagues, Lusace had about 500, and Henneberg had 24, giving a total area of the electorate of 1,994 square leagues. The census of 1755 gave it a population of 1,680,908 people, but after the Seven Years War it had 1,633,000. The famine following the war killed 65,844, but by 1785 the population had grown to 1,941,806 souls. By 1808, it had approximately 2,300,000 inhabitants. The states of Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Eisenach, Saxe-Gotha, Saxe-Altenburg, and SaxeCoburg were independent states ruled by other branches of the family founded by Albert. They were not tied politically to the Electorate and later Kingdom of Saxony. In 1806 Saxony found the Prussians once again invading its territory. There is some question as to whether or not the Saxon army was dragooned into participating with the Prussians or if it voluntarily joined them in their campaign against France. Many of the Saxon officers resented the French, but many had memories of the Prussian devastation of their country. Certainly, feelings were mixed. The result of the brief campaign was a rapid reconsideration of the Saxon attitude towards France. Seeing the wisdom in joining France, the Elector of Saxony joined the Confederation of the Rhine, albeit not as one of the founding members. When it joined the Confederation of the Rhine, the Elector was elevated to the title of King. After the 1806 campaign the Saxons quickly put together a small contingent that joined the French in the 1807 campaign. This force consisted of the von Siissmilch and von Cerrini Grenadier Battalions, the Prinz Anton, von Sanger, Prinz Maximilian, and von Belivaqua Infantry Regiments, the Konig Cuirassier Regiment, detachments from the Prinz Johann and von Polenz Chevauxlegers, and two artillery batteries. The Saxons served in L£f£bvre's Corps and fought bravely in the siege of Danzig, in the battle of Heilsberg, and at Friedland. When Napoleon founded the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, he reinstated the Saxon house as the rulers of his newly formed Polish state. The King of Saxony was the ruler of the Grand Duchy from 1807 to 1813. The Saxon adherence to the Confederation of the Rhine grew, and in 1809 their entire army marched with the French against Austria. They participated in Aspern-Essling and in the Battle of Wagram where they suffered their famous rout under the command of Bernadotte. The Saxon army again marched to war with the French in 1812 when it was used to form

the VII Corps under General Reynier. The cavalry and some regiments were distributed to other corps. One force of Saxons was defeated by the Russian General Tormassov early in the war on the southern flank when the city of Kobrin was seized. Only the Prinz Clemens Uhlans escaped. The remainder of the 2,400 Saxons were killed or captured. Though they continued operating on the south, there were very few other notable events. The next major accomplishment by the Saxons was in the Battle of Borodino when their heavy cavalry seized the Great Redoubt. This is one of the two instances during the Revolution and Napoleonic wars where cavalry captured earthworks. Saxon infantry and cavalry also fought valiantly during the Berezina crossings. When the Grande Arm£e returned to Germany, little remained intact of the Saxon army. Reynier did withdraw much of his command successfully because it had not penetrated very far into Russia, but it was necessary to reorganize and re-raise all of the units in the Saxon army. The war in Germany was principally a war in Saxony. The two major battles were Dresden and Leipzig. However, the Saxon army, under Oudinot, suffered a nasty defeat in the Battle of Gross-Beeren just before the Battle of Dresden. In September the Saxon army began to grow disaffected and units began defecting. The major defection occurred in the battle of Leipzig when nearly the entire Saxon army passed over to the Allies. On 19 October 1813, Generalmajor von Ryssel assumed command of the Saxon division and was sent to operate with the Prussian General Tauenzien's corps blockading Torgau. Torgau fell, and on 14 November the remaining Saxon forces were taken to Merseburg where they were reorganized. The Saxon army participated in a few minor operations in Germany until Napoleon's abdication in 1814. With the Congress of Vienna, Saxony found many of its soldiers drafted into the Prussian army and many of its northern provinces were seized by Prussia as an indemnity for losses Prussia had suffered. Saxony lost half of its territory and inhabitants to Prussia as a result of the Congress. When Napoleon returned from Elbe, the Saxons were mobilized and assigned to the Austrian army of the Upper Rhine. They engaged in a few blockades and sieges, returning to Saxony on 20 November 1815.

Friedrich August I, King of Saxony 1750 —1827

The Saxon Army The Infantry The organization of the Saxon infantry at the outbreak of the Revolutionary Wars had been set on 3 July 1763, when the Saxon army reorganized itself. There were twelve regiments of line infantry, each formed with three battalions. Each regiment was formed with staff, two grenadier and twelve musketeer companies. The 1st and 2nd Battalions had four musketeer companies and a grenadier company, while the 3rd Battalion had only four musketeer companies. The staff consisted of: 1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 3 Majors 3 Adjutanten 1 Regimentsquartiermeister 1 Auditeur 1 Regimentsfeldscheer 3 Fahnenjunker 1 Provost Each company had: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnant 114 Unteroffizier and Soldiers 118 Total The twelve regiments in the army were: Kurfiirst or Garde zu fuss Borcke Prinz Xaver Kurfiirstin Prinz Clemens Prinz Anton Prinz Maximilian von Block Prinz Karl Prinz Gotha Graf Solms von Thiele Because of increasing political tensions that eventually resulted in the War of the Bavarian Succession, the Elector of Saxony felt it appropriate to review the condition of his army in preparation for the pending conflict. After a decade and a half of peacetime, he justly felt that his army was not fully prepared for war. On 12 March 1778, the infantry was reorganized. The four company 3rd Battalion was disbanded, leaving each regiment with two battalions of five companies. In addition, the companies were increased to a strength of 124 men each by the incorporation of men from the disbanded 3rd battalion. Each battalion had a grenadier and four musketeer companies and was to receive two field pieces. The two sous-leutnants in each company were replaced by ensigns. In

addition, all old and unserviceable muskets were replaced with new model muskets. As political tensions rose and war became a very real possibility, Saxony allied itself with Prussia and organized a mobile division under the command of General Count Solms. This division contained ten line regiments: Prinz Xaver, Kurfiirstin, Prinz Anton, Prinz Maximilian, Le Coq, Graf Solms, Prinz Gotha, Karlsburg, Prinz Karl, and von Thiele. This division was assigned to the Prussian Corps of Prinz Heinrich of Prussia and served there during the entire war. A second, defensive immobile division was formed under General von Riedesel and consisted of the Leibgrenadiergarde, Kurfiirst, and Prinz Clemens Regiments. An order dated 20 October 1780, that was effective on 1 May 1791, directed the addition of ten privates to each grenadier and fusilier company. On 5 October 1782, each company had an additional twelve men added to it, raising it to a strength of 120 men. On 1 May 1785, the strength of a company was raised to 130 men. This continued with the addition of ten more men per company by the order of 15 July 1788. The regiments and regimental commanders at the outbreak of the wars of the French Revolution were: Regiment Kurfiirst or Garde zu fuss Nostitz Prinz Xaver Prinz Clemens Prinz Anton Prinz Maximilian von Zanthier von Lindt Prinz Gotha von den Heyde Niesemeuschel aus dem Winkel

Regimental Commander Oberst von Romer Oberst von Sanger Oberst aus dem Winkel Oberst von Wiedemann Oberst von Ryssel Oberstleutnant von Hauszler Oberst Bevilaqua Oberst von Nostitz Oberst von Brunst Oberst von Gerstenberg Oberst von Pogrell Unknown

In 1793, the Saxons took to the field against the French and the Saxon infantry consisted of the Leib-Grenadier-Garde Regiment, twelve field regiments, one Garrison-Company, and three half-companies of "invalides" or veterans. All of the field regiments had existed for some time prior to this period, but several ceased to exist between 1789 and 1815. The chronology of the principal infantry formations was as follows: Regiment Leib-Grenadier-Garde 1. Regiment Kurfiirst

2. Regiment Prinz Anton

Later Raised 1729 1670

1702

Names

Dates

None Konig 1806 Provisional Guard Regiment 1813 Garde Regiment 1815 1st Provisional Line Regiment Prinz Anton

1813 1815

3. Regiment Maximilian

1701

4. Regiment Friedrich August

1711

5. Regiment Xavier

1723

6. Regiment Clemens

1704

7. Regiment von Lindt

1730

8. Regiment von Niesemeuschel 1673 9. Regiment aus dem Winkel

1741

10. Regiment von Low

1682

11. Regiment von Nostitz

1742

12. Regiment von der Heyde

1748

2nd Provisional Line Regiment 1813 Prinz Maximilian 1815 3rd Provisional Line Regiment Prinz Friedrich August

1813 1815

von Oebschelwitz 1806 Disbanded 1810 von Steindel Disbanded

1812

von Rechten Disbanded

1801 1813

Vacant

1810-1813

von Sanger von Cerrini Disbanded

1798 1808

1810

Disbanded

1813

von Thummel von Burgsdorff Disbanded

1802 1808 1810

von Braune von Ryssel von Bunau von Bevilaqua von Dyherrn Disbanded

1800 1800 1805 1806 1808 1810

1813

In 1797, the regiments were slightly reorganized. Each regiment was reduced to a strength of ten companies, including the two grenadier companies. In the Leibgrenadiergarde Regiment, two of these companies were designated as "flugelkompagnien" or "wing companies." For a variety of reasons the organization of the Saxon infantry was very similar to that of the Prussian infantry. In 1797, the Saxons underwent a major organizational change.

The staff of a field infantry regiment now consisted of: 1 Chef (Chief) 1 Oberst (Colonel) 1 Oberstleutnant (Leutnant Colonel) 2 Majors 1 Regimentsquartiermeister (Regimental Quartermaster) 2 Adjutanten (Adjutants) 1 Auditeur (Regimental judge) 1 Regiments-Feldscheer (Regimental Field Surgeon) 2 F&hnjunker (Cadets) 1 Stabs-Feldscheer (Staff Field Surgeon) 1 Provost & servant 14 Total The ten companies (musketeers and grenadiers) had: 7 Capitains 3 Stabcapitains (Staff captains) 10 Premierleutnants (1st Leutnants) 12 Sousleutnants(Under Leutnants) 8 Fahnrichs (Cadets) 30 Sergeants 10 Fouriers (Quartermasters) 10 Feldscheers (Field Surgeon) 80 Corporals 30 Drummers 20 Fifers 20 Sappers 300 Grenadiers 1,200 Musketeers 1,740 Total Each company having: 1 Kapitan or Stabcapitain (Staff Kapitan) 1 Premierleutnant (1st Leutnant) 1 Sousleutnant (Under Leutnant) 1 Fahnrich (Cadet)(not in grenadier company) 3 Sergeants 1 Fourier (Quartermaster) 1 Feldscheer (Field Surgeon) 8 Corporals 3 Drummers 2 Fifers 2 Sappers 150 Grenadiers or Musketeers 174 Total In 1802, the regimental inhabers and commanders of the various Saxon regiments were as follows:

Leibgrenadier Garde Kurfurst Prinz Anton Prinz Maximilian Prinz Friedrich Prinz Xaver Prinz Clemens von Rechten von Nostitz Niesemeuschel Sanger von Low von Ryssel

Colonel vacant von Gerstenberg von Schonberg von Bebschelwitz Freiherr Bevilaqua von Thiimmel von Biinau von Galssey von Schonberg von Barnedeckow von Cerrini von Burgsdorff von Ryssel II

Inhaber General von Lindt The Elector of Saxony Prinz Anton of Saxonv Prinz Maximilian of Saxony Prinz Friedrich August Prinz Xaver of Saxony Prinz Clemens of Saxony von Rechten von Nostitz von Niesemeuschel Sanger von Low von Ryssel I

In 1806, the Saxon army was obliged to join the Prussian army in its war against France. It was fully integrated into the Prussian army and was placed under the command of Fiirst zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen. This can be seen in the following order of battle of the combined Prusso-Saxon Army of 1806. Advanced Guard Division: Generalleutnant Prinz Ludwig von Preussen Brigade: Generalmajor von Schimmelpfennig Horse Battery Bruse (Prussian) Schimmelpfennig Hussars (8 sqn) (Prussian) Brigade: Generalmajor von Pelet Fusilier Battalion Pelet (Prussian) Fusilier Battalion Ruhle (Prussian) Fusilier Battalion Rabenau (Prussian) Brigade: Generalmajor Bevilaqua (Saxons) 6pdr Foot Battery Reimann (Prussian) Muffling Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Prussian) Prinz Clemens Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon) Kurfiirst Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon) Heavy 4pdr Battery von Hover (Saxon) Brigade: GeneraJmajor von Trutzschler Saxon Hussars (8 sqn) Corps de Bataille: 1st Division: Generalleutnant von Grawert Brieade: Generalmajor von Muffling 12pdr Foot Battery Glasenapp (Prussian) Grenadier Battalion Hahn (Prussian) Hohenlohe Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Prussian) Sanitz Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Prussian) Brigade: Oberst von Schimonsky Zastrow Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Prussian) Grawert Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Prussian) Grenadier Battalion Sack (Prussian) 12pdr Foot Battery Wolframsdorf (Prussian) 2nd Division: General der Kavalerie von Zechwitz Brigade: Generalmajor von Burgsdorf Heavy 8pdr Battery Hausmann (Saxon) Xaver Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon)

von Thummel Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon) Friederich August Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon) Heavy 8pdr Foot Battery Ernst Brigade: Generalmajor von Dyherrn Bevilaqua Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon) von Low Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon) Niesemeuschel Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon) 12pdr Foot Battery Bonniot (Prussian) Cavalry: Generalleutnant von Holtzendorff Brigade: Generalmajor Graf Henkel Holtzendorff Cuirassiers (5 sqn) (Prussian) Horse Battery Steinmehr (Prussian) Henkel von Donnersmark Cuirassiers (5 sqn) (Prussian) Brigade: Oberst Heister Kraft Dragoons (5 sqn) (Prussian) Cavalrv: Generalleutnant von Zezschwitz Karabiniers (4 sqn) (Saxon) Horse Battery Grossman (Saxon) Prinz Albrecht Chevaulegers (4 sqn) (Saxon) Kochtitzky Cuirassiers (Saxon) Light Troops: Oberst von Erichson Gettkandt Hussars (10 sqn) (Prussian) 1/2 Horse Battery Studtnitz (Prussian) Fusilier Battalion Erichson (Prussian) Light Troops: Generalleutnant von Polenz (Saxon) Fusilier Battalion Boguslawsky (Prussian) 1/2 Horse Battery Studtnitz (Prussian) Polenz Chevauleger (4 sqn) (Saxon) Reserve Division: Generalleutnant von Prittwitz Brigade:Generalmaior von Krafft Prinz Clemens Chevauleger (4 sqn) (Saxon) Horse Battery Hahn (Prussian) Prittwitz Dragoon Regiment (5 sqn) (Prussian) Brigade: Generalmajor von Sanitz 12pdr Battery Schulenburg (Prussian) Grenadier Battalion Losthin (Prussian) Grenadier Battalion Bork (Prussian) 1/2 Mortar Battery Collin (Prussian) Brigade: Generalmajor von Cerrini (Saxon) Grenadier Battalion Thiollaz Grenadier Battalion Lecoq (Saxon) Grenadier Battalion Lichtenhayn Grenadier Battalion Metzsch Grenadier Battalion Hundt (Saxon) Mortar Battery Thullmann Corps: Generalmajor Tauenzien Brigade: Generalmajor von Zweissel 1/2 Mortar Battery Herwarth Zweiffel Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Prussian) Brigade: Generalmajor von Schonberg (Saxon) von Rechten Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon) Prinz Maximilian Infantry Regiment (2 bn) (Saxon) Grenadier Battalion an dem Winkel (Saxon)

Mortar Battery von Kotsch Light Tropp?: Brigade: Generalmajor von Viela Viela Hussar (5 sqn) (Prussian) Fusilier Battalion Rosen (Prussian) Brigade: Generalmajor von Senfft von Pilsach Prinz Johann Chevauxlegers (4 sqn) (Saxon) Once defeated by the French, the Saxon grenadiers provided the rearguard that kept the immediate battle losses to a minimum. When the campaign was completed Saxony passed into a French alliance. One of the principal changes was that Napoleon made the Kurfiirst of Saxony a king. With the crowning of the Kurfiirst of Saxony as King, the Kurfiirst Infantry Regiment was redesignated as the Konig Infantry Regiment. At the outbreak of the 1809 campaign, there were some serious changes in the staff of the Saxon army. The staff consisted of six Generals, eight Generalleutnants, and 18 Generalmajors, most of which served as regimental inhabers or patrons. Twelve generals, considering themselves unfit for field service, retired to depot commands. The remaining generals had little or no training in the command of higher tactical formations and had little opportunity to obtain it. In addition, the average age of the regimental officers was quite high. Colonels averaged 65 years, staff officers 60, and captains 55. This was a serious handicap to the Saxons, but there were some improvements in other areas that offset this problem to a modest degree. In early 1809, the old, badly made, and inadequate muskets were beginning to be replaced with the new model "Neuschuler" musket. It also had a significantly longer bayonet. New pistols were also introduced. The non-commissioned officers abandoned their spontoons and were issued muskets and pistols. By the outbreak of the 1809 campaign, however, only two regiments, Konig and Niesemeuschel, had been issued the new weapon. Each infantryman carried 60 rounds of ammunition with him and a further 44 rounds per man were carried in munition wagons in the ammunition park. With movement towards war, the depots of the infantry regiments were dispatched to Dresden on 7 March where two depot battalions were formed. The first consisted of six officers and 677 men, the 2nd consisted of eight officers and 646 men. In addition, a staff battalion was formed from excess officers. It did not last long and was disbanded shortly before the end of the 1809 campaign. It is interesting to note that this battalion did not have a distinct uniform and the officers forming it retained their varied regimental uniforms. In addition, five provisional infantry battalions were raised in Saxony to serve as a home defense. They were placed under the command of the Royal Adjutant Colonel Thielmann. When the campaign began, only the Garrison company remained in the Konigstein fortress with 193 men. In mid-March, it was reinforced by the addition of twelve officers and437 men detached from various infantry regiments. In addition, the three Halbinvaliden compagnien remained for penal administration. The events of the campaigns of 1806,1807, and 1809 taught the Saxons a great deal. They learned that their organization was inadequate and required serious revision. Generalmajor von Gersdorf began a review in early 1810, and on 7 March 1810, his recommendations were accepted. This resulted in the establishment of a permanent general headquarters, a general staff as well as permanent divisions, brigades, and newly reorganized regiments. Among other changes the drill and tactics were revised and modeled along the lines of the French system, a conscription was instituted, and a program for the selection of younger men as non-commissioned officers was instituted. During the course of this the Oebschelwitz, von Cerrini, von Burgsdorf and von Dy herrn Infantry Regiments were disbanded, their troops being distributed amongst the other infantry regiments.

Two infantry divisions were organized. Each division had two brigades formed with two regiments. This meant a total of four battalions per brigade, or eight per division. The grenadier companies of each brigade were converged into one battalion that remained with that brigade permanently. These formations were: 1st Division: Generalleutnant von Zeschau 1st Brigade: Generalmajor von Dyherrn von Brause Grenadier Battalion Konig Infantry Regiment von Niesemeuschel Infantry Regiment 2nd Brigade: Generalmajor von Anger von Anger Grenadier Battalion Prinz Anton Infantry Regiment von Low Infantry Regiment 2nd Division: Generalleutnant von Lecoq 1st Brigade: Generalmajor von Klengel von Stutterheim Grenadier Battalion Prinz Maximilian Infantry Regiment von Rechten Infantry Regiment 2nd Brigade: Generalmajor von Steindel von Liebenau Grenadier Battalion Prinz Friederich August Infantry Regiment Prinz Clemens Infantry Regiment 3rd Brigade: Generalmajor von Sahr 1st Light Infantry Regiment 2nd Light Infantry Regiment Jager Corps Special Corps: Generalmajor von Gersdorff Engineer Corps Foot Artillery Regiment with Handwerkerkompagnie Horse Artillery Brigade Artillery Train Battalion 1st Halb-Invalidenkompagnie in Waldheim 2nd Halb-Invalidenkompagnie in Liebenwerda 3rd Halb-Invalidenkompagnie in Colditz In addition, the regimental artillery was disbanded with the guns being concentrated into the artillery regiment with sixteen companies. These changes resulted in a reorganization of the Guard Grenadiers whose staff now consisted of: 1 Colonel • 1 Leutnant Colonel 2 Majors 2 Adjutants-majors 1 Regimental Quartermaster 1 Regimental Surgeon 1 Auditeur (Regimental judge) 2 Fahnenjunker (Cadet)

1 Staff Quartermaster 1 Surgeon Major 2 Drum Corporals 81st Qass Musicians 12 2nd Qass Musicians 1 Armorer 1 Gunsmith 1 Provost 1 Provost's assistant 38 Total

The eight grenadier companies contained: 41st Qass Captains 4 2nd Qass Captains 8 Leutnants 16 Sousleutnants 8 Feldwebel (Sergeant Major) 16 Sergeants 8 Quartermasters 4 Surgeons 80 Corporals 24 Drummers 16 Sappers 1,440 Grenadiers 1,628 Total The infantry regiment still consisted of two battalions, each with four companies, and two grenadier companies. The regiment staff consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Leutnant Colonel 2 Majors 2 Adjutants-majors 1 Regimental Quartermaster 1 Auditeur (Regimental Judge) 1 Regimental Surgeon 2 Fahnenjunker (Cadets) 1 Stabfourrier (Staff Quartermaster) 1 Assistant Surgeon 1 Drum Corporal 81st Class Musicians 12 2nd Qass Musicians 2 Armorers 1 Provost 38 Total The ten companies of the regiment each had: 6 1st Qass Captains 4 2nd Qass Captains 10 Leutnants 20 Unterleutnants 8 Fahnrich (Ensigns) 10 Feldwebel 20 Sergeants 10 Fouriers 5 Surgeons 100 Corporals 6 Drummers (grenadier companies) 24 Drummers (musketeer companies) 4 Sappers (grenadier companies) 16 Sappers (musketeer companies) 360 Grenadiers 1,440 Musketeers 2,043 Total

The commanding officers of the various regiments in 1812 were: Regiment Grenadier-Garde von Low von Rechten Prirtz Maximilian Prinz Frederich August Prinz Clemens Prinz Anton Konig von Niesemeuschel

Commanding Officer Oberst von Warnsdorff Oberst von Jeschky Oberst von Bose Oberst von Ebrenstein Oberst von Brochewski Oberst von Mellentin Oberst von Gablenz Oberst Gophardt Oberst Vogel

In the 1812 campaign, nearly the entire Saxon army marched to war. Though not as heavily engaged as the principal French armies, it was heavily engaged and did suffer severe losses. It fought under the command of Reynier with the Austrian Hilfkorps of Schwarzenberg. With the rebuilding of the Saxon army after the retreat, most of the infantry regiments had but a single battalion. As the campaign progressed, efforts were made to increase these units back to full strength, but they were not very successful. Not only was the number of new recruits low, but there were losses as the campaign progressed. In the spring campaign an entire battalion of the Prinz Maximilian Regiment was captured at Liineburg. The fate of battalion was unusual, in that it continued to fight as the 6th Russo-German Legion Battalion in the 1813 Fall campaign. On 11 May 1813 a new Saxon division was raised and was organized as follows: Commanding General: Generalmajor von Sahr Chief of Staff: Major Major von Cerrini Commander of Artillery: Oberstleutnant Raabe 1st Brigade: Generalmajor von Mellentin Leib-Grenadier-Garde (1 bn) Prinz Friederich August (1 bn) von Steindel (1 bn) 1st "von Lecoq" Light Infantry (1 bn) 6pdr Light Battery von Kuhnel 2nd Brigade: Oberst von Bose Converged Grenadier Battalion (1 bn) Prinz Anton (1 bn) von Low (1 bn) 2nd "von Sahr" Light Infantry (1 bn) 6pdr Light Battery Rouvroy II Cavalrv Brigade: Oberstlieutent von Lehmann Hussars (1 sqn) Prinz Clemens Uhlans (1 sqn) Chevaulegers (1 sqn) Attached: Reserve Artillery Park 1 Sapper Unit 1 Bridging Train

Gradually, the forces were rebuilt and two divisions containing approximately 18,000 men were reorganized and set into the field. There appears to have been only one organizational change, the elimination of the eight fahnreich or ensigns from the regiment. 24th Division: Generalleutnant von Lecoq 1st Brigade: Oberst von Brause Leib-Grenadier-Garde Regiment (1 bn) 1st "von Lecoq" Light Infantry Regiment (2 bn) Prinz Maximilian Regiment (1 bn) von Rechten Regiment (1 bn) Feldjagers (1 company) 2nd Brigade: Generalmajor von Mellentin Converged Grenadier Battalion (1 bn) (from Prinz Max, von Rechten, Prinz Friederich and von Steindel) Prinz Prinz Friederich Regiment (2 bn) von Steindel Regiment (1 bn) Artillery Brigade: Major von Roth 6pdr Foot Battery Kiihnel 6pdr Foot Battery Rouvroy II Sapper Company 25th Division: Generalleutnant von Sahr 1st Brigade: Oberst von Bose Converged Grenadier Battalion (1 bn) (Konig, Niesemeuschel, Prinz Anton & Low) 2nd "von Sahr" Light Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Konig Regiment (1 bn) Niesemeuschel Regiment (1 bn) 2nd Brigade: Oberst von Ryssel Prinz Anton Regiment (2 bn) von Low Regiment (2 bn) Artillery Brigade: Major Gau 6pdr Foot Battery Dietrich 6pdr Foot Battery Zandt Light Cavalrv Brigade: generalmajor von Gablenz Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) Prinz Clemens Uhlan Regiment (5 sqns) 1st 6pdr Horse Battery 2nd 6pdr Horse Battery Artillery Reserve: 12pdr Foot Battery Rouvroy I Artillery Park The Saxon army suffered heavy losses at Grossbeeren and Dennewitz in the first portions of the 1813 campaign. On 7 September, the Saxon army was reorganized due to those losses. Its field forces now consisted of:

1st Division: Generalleutnant Lecoq 1st Brigade: Oberst von Brause Leib-Grenadier-Garde Regiment (1 bn) 1st "Lecoq" Light Infantry Regiment (1 bn) von Rechten (1 bn) Jagerkompagnie (1 co) Brigade: Generalmajor von Mellentin von Spiegel Grenadier Battalion (1 bn) Prinz Friederich August Regiment (1 bn) von Steindel Regiment (1 bn) Artillery: 6pdr Foot Battery Dietrich Sapper Company Division: Generalleutnant von Zeschau Brigade: Oberst von Ryssel Anger Grenadier Battalion (1 bn) Prinz Anton Regiment (1 bn) von Low Regiment (1 bn) Brigade: Oberst von Bose Konig Regiment (1 bn) von Niesemeuschel Regiment (1 bn) 2nd "von Sahr" Light Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Artillerv: 6pdr Foot Battery Zandt Cavalry Brigade: Oberst von Lindenau Hussar Regiment (8 sqns) Prinz Clemens Uhlan Regiment (5 sqns) Horse Battery Probsthahn (4 guns) Reserve Artillerv: Horse Battery Brinbaum (4 guns) 12pdr Foot Battery Rouvroy I Main Artillery Park Grossman On 23 September 1813, the Konig battalion in Oberst von Bose's brigade defected to the Swedes. In the battle of Leipzig, the Saxon cavalry and the Saxon infantry division defected to the allies. The Saxon forces at Leipzig consisted of 171 officers, 4,049 soldiers, 1,261 horses and 22 guns. The defection of the Saxons began with the defection of the Hussars and the Prinz Clemens Uhlans. They were followed by the Schutzen Battalion, and between 4 P.M. and 5 P.M. the rest of the Saxon army defected; only the Garde Grenadiers remained loyal. They formed in front of the Royal Palace to guard the King of Saxony as the French withdrew and were taken into captivity with the King of Saxony. After the defection, the Saxon army remained at Leipzig where it reorganized. The von Niesemeuschel, von Rechten, von Low, and von Steindel Regiments were disbanded. The other regiments were reorganized into provisional regiments. Each regiment was to have three battalions but the light regiments kept two battalions. In actuality, the strength of these regiments was little more than a battalion. These regiments were organized as follows:

New Regiment Old Regiments Provisional Garde Regiment Leib-Grenadier-Garde Konig All grenadiers

New Bn No. 1st 2nd 3rd

1st Provisional Infantry

Prinz Anton Prinz Anton

1st 2nd

2nd Provisional Infantry

Prinz Maximilian von Rechten von Steindel

(2)

3rd Provisional Infantry

Prinz Friederich August (2) •

These provisional regiments were quickly pressed into action and were used by the allies in the siege of Torgau where they engaged their former allies, the French, in a number of sharp skirmishes. Though the records are not overflowing with details, the indications are that the Saxons were not overly aggressive in these actions and tended to be thrashed by the French when they met. In early 1813 a Landmiliz battalion was raised with three companies. The standard organization of the Landmiliz battalion established by the Saxon government was: 1 Major 1 Hauptman 1 Adjutant 3 Feldwebel 3 Sergeanten 3 Fahnj unker 1 Fourier 15 Corporals 6 Fourierschiitzen 3 Fifers 6 Drummers 200 Men 345 Total Eventually, seven landwehr regiments were organized. Each landwehr regiment had three battalions and a half battalion for a depot. In addition, a "Banner" of light infantry consisting of two battalions of infantry was formed. Each of those battalions had four 100 man companies. The companies were commanded by a kapitan and two or three leutnants. The structure below that appears to have been very inconsistent. This force operated with the allies, but more on the basis of a prisoner than as a full ally. On 12 April, after Napoleon's abdication, the Saxon landwehr went back to Saxony and most of it was disbanded. One group of Volunteer Saxons was transferred to the Russian Imperial Guard. It never saw combat, and in one instance an entire company of foot jagers died when a boat capsized on the Main River. Major General von Carlowitz commanded the remaining Saxon landwehr forces which consisted of six companies of infantry, six squadrons of cavalry, a foot battery and a company of sappers. A National-Burger-Garde was also organized in 1813. It consisted of a staff, a squadron of mounted gensdarmes, and eight companies of guards. The staff had: 1 Chef 1 Commandant

1 Stabsfourier 1 Fahnjunker

1 Adjutant 1 Auditeur 1 Oberchirurgus

1 Zeugwarter 1 Tambour Major 10 Hautboisten 1. classe 2 Hautboisten 2. classe 27 Total

The Gens d'armes squadron had: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 1 Sousleutnant & adjutant 2 Sousleutnant 1 Wachtmeister (Sergeant) 2 Seconde Wachtmeister (2nd Sergeant)

1 Estandartjunker (Cadet) 1 Quartermaster 1 Surgeon 10 Corporals 4 Trumpeters 100 Gendarmes 125 Total

The eight companies of city foot guard consisted of: 8 Capitans 8 Premierleutnants 16 Sousleutnants 8 Feldwebel 16 Sergeanten 8 Fourier (Company Quarter Masters) 8 Surgeons 56 Corporals 16 Drummers 720 Guards 864 Total In 1815, after Napoleon's return from Elba, Saxony suffered dismemberment at the hands of the Prussians. Northern Saxony and 6,807 men from the Saxon army were seized by the Prussians. On 7 July 1815 the Saxon army reorganized itself with three line regiments, each organized with one landwehr and two musketeer battalions. In addition, there was a single light infantry regiment with two battalions. The staff of these reorganized regiments was as follows: 1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 2 Majors 2 Adjutants 1 Regimental quartermaster 1 Regimental surgeon

1 Battalion Surgeon 1 Staff Secretary 2 Officer Cadets 1 Regimental Drum Major 8 1st Class Musicians 12 2nd Qass Musicians 2 Armorers 36 Total

The two battalions, with a total of eight companies, had: 4 Capitans 1. classe 4 Capitans 2. classe 8 Premierleutnants

8 Surgeons 80 Corporals 32 Gefreite (Lance Corporals)

16 Sousleutnants 8 Feldwebels

24 Drummers 16 Sappers 1.240 Soldiers 1,464 Total

The landwehr battalion attached to the infantry regiment had a staff that consisted of: 1 Commandant 1 Battalion drummer 1 Adjutant 1 Armorer 1 Battalion surgeon 1 Officer cadet 6 Total This battalion had four companies and a total of: 2 Capitans 1. classe 2 Capitans 2. classe 4 Premierleutnants 8 Sousleutnant 4 Feldwebels 8 Sergeants 4 Fouriers 4 Surgeons 40 Corporals 16 Lance Corporals 12 Drummers 8 Sappers §20Soldiers 732 Total The Landwehr-Reserve Regiment was formed from men taken from the disbanded Russo-German legion, the Banner of Saxon Volunteers, and the landwehr regiments. It participated in the blockade of some fortresses during the latter part of the 1815 campaign and returned to Saxony on 20 November 1815. The staff had: 1 Commandant 3 Battalion Commanders 3 Adjutants 1 Regimental Quartermaster 1 Regimental Surgeon 1 Battalion Surgeon 1 Staff Fourier 3 Officer Cadets 3 Battalion Drum Majors 3 Armorers 20 Total The three battalions were organized with four companies each. The regiment had a total of:

6 Capitans 1. classe 6 Capitans 2. classe 12 Premierleutnants 24 Sousleutnant 12 Feldwebels 24 Sergeants

16 Fouriers 16 Surgeons 120 Corporals 48 Lance corporals 26 Drummers 24 Sappers 1.860 Soldiers 2,196 Total

Grenadier Battalions As mentioned earlier, it was the Saxon practice to draw the grenadier companies from the line regiments and converge them into independent grenadier battalions. With the mobilization for war in 1778, the grenadier battalions were organized as follows: Battalion Number 1 2 3 4 5 6

Parent Regiments Kurfiirst Karlsburg Kurfiirstin Xaver Prinz Karl Gotha Prinz Anton Prinz Clemens Prinz Maximilian Le Coq Solms Thiele

Commander Major A.D.Winkel Major von Hauszler Major von Rittrich Major von Stammer Major von Reitschiitz Major von Pistoris

This organization remained until 1800. During the 1806 campaign, the grenadier battalions were formed and named as follows: Grenadier Battalion 1st von Winkel

Parent Regiments of Grenadier Companies Prinz Maximilian von Rechten

2nd von Thiollaz

Prinz Xavier Prinz Clemens

3rd von Hundt

Prinz Anton von Niesemeuschel

4th von Metsch

Prinz Frederich August von Thummel

5th von Lecoq

von Sanger von Low

6th von Leichtenstein

Kurfiirst Bevilaqua*

*In 1805 this was the Bunau Infantry Regiment.

This force was organized into the von Cerrini Brigade and served as part of the Prussian Reserve under the command of Generalleutnant von Prittwitz. There was one remaining grenadier battalion, the von Winkel Grenadier Battalion, which was formed from the Prinz Maximilian and von Rechten Infantry Regiments. It was assigned to von Tauentzien's Corps, von Schonberg's Brigade. During the 1807 campaign very little of the Saxon army mobilized, most of it being involved with reorganizing after the 1806 campaign. As a result, only two battalions were formed: the von Sussmilch Grenadier Battalion (formed from Prinz Clemens and von Oebschelwitz Infantry Regiments) and the von Cerrini Grenadier Battalion (formed from the von Sanger and von Low Infantry Regiments). In 1809, as part of the French army, the Saxons fielded four grenadier battalions. They were: Grenadier Battalion Grenadier Battalion von Bose

Parent Regiments of Grenadier Companies Prinz Friederich August von Burgsdorf*

Grenadier Battalion von Hake

Prinz Clemens von Obeschelwitz

Grenadier Battalion von Radeloff

Prinz Anton von Niesemeuschel

Grenadier Battalion von Winklemann von Cerrini** von Low * In 1808 the old von Thummel Regiment assumed this name. ** In 1808 the old von Sanger Regiment assumed this name. During the 10 June 1809 reorganization of the Saxon army all of the grenadier battalions were formed into a single brigade which also included the Garde Grenadiers. This was the 1st Brigade, 1st Division. At the same time the von Bose Grenadier Battalion was renamed the Rex Grenadier Battalion. During the 1809 campaign, a fifth battalion was raised. The von Einsiedel Grenadier Battalion was organized from the von Dyherr and Konig Infantry Regiments. It operated in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but was soon recalled to Saxony. The grenadier companies of the Prinz Maximilian Infantry Regiment were formed into part of the garrison at Glogau, but were not designated as a grenadier battalion. In early June, two grenadier companies drawn from the von Rechten Infantry Regiment were joined with two depot companies in Saxony to form what was known as the Wolan Battalion. This battalion served under Royal Adjutant Colonel Thielmann as part of the mobile home defense force. In mid August, the two grenadier companies from the Prinz Maximilian Regiment were ordered to return to Saxony from their garrison in Glogau. They were then organized with the grenadier companies from the von Rechten Infantry Regiment to form the von Stutterheim Grenadier Battalion. In 1810 the Oebschelwitz, von Cerrini, von Burgsdorf and von Dyherrn Infantry Regiments were disbanded. The men from their grenadier companies were sent to the other regiments and the number of converged line grenadier battalions fell to four. These four battalions were organized as follows:

Grenadier Battalion Grenadier Battalion von Brause Grenadier Battalion von Anger

Parent Regiments of Grenadier Companies Konig von Niesemeuschel Prinz Anton von Low

Grenadier Battalion von Stutterheim Prinz Maximilian von Rechten Grenadier Battalion von Liebenau

von Friederich August von Clemens

In 1812, the von Brause Grenadier Battalion was officially renamed the Eychelburg Grenadier Battalion, but as Oberst von Brause still commanded the battalion it was also known by that name. In the same sense, the von Stutterheim Battalion was renamed the von Spiegel Battalion. With the beginning of the 1813 campaign, it became necessary to reorganize the Saxon infantry. With the severe losses, there were two single grenadier battalions formed. The first was the von Spiegel battalion and consisted of companies from Prinz Maximilian, von Rechten, Prinz Frederich August, and the Prinz Clemens Regiment, now know as the von Steindel Regiment. The second battalion, the von Sperl Grenadier Battalion, consisted of companies drawn from the Konig, von Niesemeuschel, Prinz Anton, and von Low Regiments. On 21 September 1813, this battalion was renamed the von Anger Grenadier Battalion. After the Battle of Leipzig where the Saxons deserted Napoleon, the grenadier companies were converged to form the 3rd Battalion of the Provisional Garde-Regiment. When the Saxon army was reorganized in 1815, a total of three new converged grenadier battalions were formed. Headquarters Guard Battalion In order to provide security for the Saxon headquarters, a headquarters guard company was raised in June 1809 during a long layover in St. Poelten. It was organized with drafts drawn from the line infantry regiments and assigned security duties, and was later enlarged to the size of a battalion. It served as the security battalion in 1809 at Pressburg, but during the reorganization of the Saxon army in 1810 it was disbanded. Uniforms of the Saxon Infantry On 19 September 1765, the Saxon infantry adopted a white uniform in place of the dark blue it had worn before that time (the exception was the Thiele Regiment which wore a red jacket). These uniforms were decorated with regimental colors on the cuffs, collars, and waistcoats. These colors were crabapple red, light blue, dark blue, grass green, yellow, and "purple red." The regimental uniforms were issued these colors in pairs, with the colors of the buttons, white and yellow, being used to distinguish between the regiments. The regimental colors were: Regiment Kurfiirst Borcke Prinz Xaver Kurfurstin Prinz Clemens

Regimental Color Crabapple Red Crabapple Red Light Blue Light Blue Dark Blue

Buttons Yellow White Yellow White Yellow

Prinz Anton Prinz Maximilian von Block Prinz Karl Prinz Gotha Graf Solms von Thiele

Dark Blue Yellow Yellow Grass Green Grass Green Purple Red Purple Red

White Yellow White Yellow White Yellow White

The Leib-Grenadier-Garde wore a red jacket with yellow distinctives. On 1 January 1771, white breeches were adopted. These uniforms remained until 1806. In 1806, the musketeer privates wore small bicorns with a white pompon. The center of the pompon was the regimental facing color. The bicorn also had a white paper cockade. The coat was white with the regimental facing color on the cuffs, lapels, and collar. Their breeches were also white. The buttons were either white or yellow, depending on the regiment. The bandoleers were of white leather, as was the waist belt, which had in addition a large brass buckle with the Saxon coat of arms. They wore their hair in a queue, powdered white and tied with a black ribbon, until 1808. Their other equipment consisted of a calfskin pack, a black leather cartridge case, bayonet, straight sword, and musket. It should be noted that many period illustrations indicate that the musket sling was red. This is a translational error of a technical term. The leather was "reddened" by rubbing the tanned leather with oil. It was not dyed red. The grenadiers were almost identical, except they wore the Austrian style grenadier bearskin. It had a brass plate in front and its bac&ng was white, decorated with the regimental facing color. They were equipped with short muskets, bayonets, and sabers. All grenadiers wore a mustache. The regimental schiitzen differed from the musketeers only in that they had a green plume on their bicorn and they carried rifles. The regimental colors of the Saxon regiments was as follows: Facing Buttons Yellow Red Konig 1806 Provisional Guard Regiment 1813 Garde Regiment 1815 Red White von Sanger von Cerrini 1808 Disbanded 1810 Dark Blue White Prinz Anton 1st Provisional Line Regiment 1813 Prinz Anton 1815 Dark Blue Yellow Prinz Clemens von Steindel 1812 Disbanded 1813 Yellow Yellow Prinz Maximilian 2nd Provisional Line Regiment 1813 Prinz Maximilian 1815 Yellow White von Nostitz von Thummel 1802 von Burgsdorff 1808 Disbanded 1810 Yellow Prinz Friederich August Light Green* 3rd Provisional Line Regiment 1813 Prinz Friederich August 1815 Regiment Kurfiirst

von Low Prinz Xaver von der Hevde

von Niesemeuschel von Lindt 1786 Garrison and Invalides

Light Green Disbanded 1813 Light Blue von Oebschelwitz 1806 Disbanded 1810 Light Blue von Braune 1800 von Ryssel 1800 von Bunau 1805 von Bevilaqua 1806 von Dvherrn 1808 Disbanded 1810 Purple Red Vacant 1810-1813 Purple Red von Rechten 1801 Disbanded 1813 Black

White Yellow White

White Yellow White

Became light blue right after Leipzig. In 1809, the spontoons and halberds used by the non-commissioned officers were abandoned. In 1810, the Saxon uniforms underwent a major change. The infantry adopted a French style shako with a brass frontplate. This plate was surmounted by a crown and bore the royal cipher "FA". It had brass chinscales, white cords, cockade and a white plume surmounted with the regimental facing color. They also adopted short black gaiters. The other details of the uniform remained fundamentally unchanged except that the NCO's now wore their rank insignia only on their left arms. The grenadiers adopted the shako as well. It had red plumes and cords. They also adopted red epaulets and sword knots. This uniform continued through 1815, though with the economic disaster of the 1813 campaign it was little maintained. When the Saxons transferred to the Allies, their cockade became white-round-yellow-round-green. On 7 June 1815, the cockade changed again and became white with green edging. When the landwehr was raised, it wore a black shako with yellow cords and a carmin red plume. Some sources, however, indicate a green plume was worn. Its cockade was (from the inside out) green, black, yellow, and red. The jacket was dark blue with dark blue lapels, carmin red cuffs, turnback, and collar. Their shoulder straps and buttons were yellow. At least one other source indicates that the shoulderstraps were red. Their breeches were gray and all leatherwork was black. They wore a calf skin pack with their great coat rolled up and hung on the pack in the Prussian or Russian stvle. The Leib-Grenadier-Garde wore a red coat with yellow cuffs, lapels and collars. The uniform buttons were white metal. They wore white breeches, black or white gaiters with yellow buttons, and white leather work. Their headdress consisted of a black bearskin bonnet without a plume. It had a yellow patch on the top with a white cross; the cords were white. In addition, a large brass plaque with the electoral cipher "FA" was worn on the front. As with other nations, all the grenadiers wore mustaches. The Infantry Detachment "Zu Schleusingen" wore a black shako with a white plume and cords, and also had brass chinscales. Their jacket was dark blue and had red cuffs, collar, lapels, and piping on the turnbacks and shoulderstraps. The buttons were yellow. They wore gray breeches and black gaiters. Their uniform was cut in the Prussian style.

When organized in 1814, the Provisional Guard Regiment wore a uniform that was also very Prussian in style. It consisted of a light blue tunic with red cuffs, collar, and turnback linings. The trousers were light blue and had a red stripe down the outer seam. Their shako was light blue and had brass chinscales. The Saxon Light Infantry, J tigers and Schiitzen In contrast to many of the other armies of Europe before 1792, the Saxon army had an almost total lack of light infantry. In 1793, an internal schiitzen organization was formed where the regiment designated two officers and two drummers to lead the regiments sharfschiitzen (or sharpshooters.) Each company then provided one corporal and eight men. When a skirmish force was required, these men were called out with the order "Ausschwarmen." The drummers were used to control the schiitzen, but eventually buglers replaced them. In 1802, the schiitzen were drawn from the various line regiments and organized into two battalions, though they were not employed as such in 1806. On 18 May 1808, the schiitzen were organized into two schiitzen or light infantry battalions. Each battalion had four companies organized with: 1 Company Commander 2 Subaltern Officers 1 Company Quartermaster 1 Surgeon 12 Non-Commissioned Officers 3 Buglers 1 Drummer 3 Sappers 150 Schiitzen 174 Total In 1809, these company schiitzen were reorganized with the Garde-Grenadier-Regiment drawn together so that every company had a section of four rotten (files) and every two sections had one peloton of schiitzen. The first stood as the Grenadier-Schiitzen and the entire division of 40 rotten (files) stood in two ranks in five pelotons. The organization of the internal company schiitzen in 1809 changed slightly from the earlier organization. Now it consisted of one officer and ten men, including a drummer or fifer, per company. On 31 August 1809, a Jager or Schiitzen Corps was organized. It consisted of a single company and had: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnant 1 Feldwebel (Sergeant Major) 1 Sergeant 1 Surgeon 11 Oberjagers (Senior Jagers) 3 Signalisten (Signalers) 2 Waldhornists (Forest Hornists, Buglers) 1 Serpentist (a musician plaving a "serpent") 100 Jagers 2_Train Soldiers 126 Total 4 Horses

This unit was raised as a result of the influence of First Court Master Huntsman von Preuss for a voluntary force of huntsmen. Each jager was expected to provide his own rifle, sword, and knapsack. After their discharge from the corps, they were assured a post in the Royal Forestry and Hunting Service. The commander of this unit was originally Kapitan von Carlowitz, who quickly rose to major. During the 1809 campaign, two light infantry battalions, von Metzsch and von Egidy, were deployed. A third light unit, not of battalion strength, was organized from elements of the line and depot units still in Saxony, and the newly raised provisional infantry battalions. This unit had no official title and was merely referred to as the "Rifles of the Saxon Infantry/' This force did not act as a single formation, but was divided into small detachments that were used as part of the Mobile Home Corps. On 20 August 1809, it was drawn together and used to form the 9th Provisional Battalion, reverting to a line formation. The two light battalions, von Metzsch and von Egidy, operated with two separate divisions. On 10 June 1809, the von Metzsch battalion was sent to join the French division of General Dupas. However, both were engaged at the Battle of Wagram, but von Egidy was badly shot up on the 5th and little remained for the battle. With the reorganization of the Saxon army, the two light infantry battalions were expanded into full regiments on 1 May 1810. The 1st Light Infantry Regiment was known as the Le Coq Light Infantry and the 2nd Light infantry was known as the von Sahr Light Infantry. Each regiment had a total strength of 1,652 men. The regimental staff consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Lieutenant Colonel 2 Majors 2 Adjutants-Majors 1 Regimental Quartermaster 1 Regimental Surgeon 1 Auditeur (Regimental Judge) 1 Staff Quartermaster 1 Battalion Surgeon 2 Staff Buglers 2 Gunsmith 1 Provost IProvost's assistant (eliminated in 1813) 17 Total The eight companies had: 4 Kapitans 1. klasse 4 Kapitans 2. klasse 8 Premierleutnants 16 Sousleutnants 8 Feldwebel 16 Sergeants 8 Fouriers 4 Surgeons 80 Corporals 24 Buglers 8 Drummers 16 Sappers 1,440 Light Infantrymen 1,636 Total

The commanding officers of the two light regiments in 1810 were: 1st Light Infantry LeCoq 2nd Light Infantry von Sahr

Oberstleutnant von Egidy Oberst von Tettenborn

In 1812, jagers were broken up into independent detachments, and in 1813 operated in an independent company assigned to the army. After the defection of the Saxons, their light infantry was reorganized. The 1st Provisional Light Infantry was formed from the von Lecoq or 1st Light Infantry and its 1st Battalion was formed from convalescents and 2nd from former POW's. The 2nd Provisional Light Infantry's was formed principally from the von Sahr Light Infantry. Its 1st Battalion was formed from former POW's and the 2nd reformed from the remains of the von Sahr Light Infantry. Both regiments had only two battalions each. The jagers were reformed as a battalion and continued to exist through 1815. In 1815, there was a single light infantry regiment organized with two battalions. Its internal structure was identical to the line infantry regiments except it had no landwehr battalion. It also had a depot company that serviced it and the jager battalion. That depot company consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnants 1 Feldwebel - for jagers 1 Sergeant 1 Fourier 1 Surgeon 8 Corporals 2 Oberjager (Senior Jagers) 4 Gefreite 3 Hornists (1 for jagers) 2 Sappers 8 Feldjagers (Jagers) 30 Scharfschiitzen (Sharpshooters) 124 Light infantrvmen 188 Total Uniforms of the Jagers, Schiitzen, and Light Infantry In 1809, all three light infantry formations wore the regular Saxon musketeer uniform with the facings, etc., of their parent units. The only special modification to their uniforms was the addition of a 12 -14" tall green plume, denoting them as light infantry. All other uniform details and equipment, including the use of the Saxon musket, were the same as the line infantry. These troops did not carry rifles, despite their being called "rifles." A new uniform was adopted in 1810. It was the same pattern as the line infantry, including the shako with a brass plaque and chinscales. It bore the white national cockade and a dark green plume, cords, and flounders. The non-commissioned officers had a plain brass band around the top, while the officers had gilt fittings, gold lace, silver cords, and flounders. The top shako band had a clover-leaf motif. The visor was of polished leather, which was edged with gold for the officers. When on campaign, the expensive fittings were replaced. A ball-shaped pompon of dark green replaced the plume. This was replaced later by a flat, black, lentile-disc pompon like that worn by the French. In foul weather, a black oilskin cloth covered the shako. After 1813, this oilskin had the regimental number and bugle on it. The tunic was cut like that of the infantry, but was dark green, with rounded cuffs and

pointed shoulder-straps. The cuffs, collar, and lapels were black, edged with scarlet. The shoulderstraps were piped with scarlet as well. The turnbacks were green and piped with scarlet and the buttons were brass. The officers tunic was long-tailed and double breasted. It had gold lace piping along the edges and green turnbacks piped with gold. Their collar and cuffs were piped with gold and they wore gold epaulets. The greatcoat worn by all personnel was gray with brass buttons. The collar was black and piped scarlet. Their waistcoats were green and had a single row of brass buttons. The enlisted wore gray trousers with a scarlet stripe down the outside seam on campaign. Their dress breeches were dark gray and had a scarlet stripe. The officers had green trousers with black stripes and gray trousers with a gold stripe on campaign. For dress they wore tight green breeches with gold Hungarian knots on the upper thigh. Junior officers had a black stripe piped with scarlet. Senior officers had gold piping. The light infantry officers did not wear a gorget. The officers wore Hungarian style boots with gold lace and tassels. The other ranks wore shoes. The pack was of calfskin with black leather strips. Their gray blanket was often worn slung over their shoulder. The musket had a black leather sling with brass fittings and the bayonet scabbard was brown leather. The remainder of their equipment was like that carried by the grenadiers. The musicians wore the same uniform as the light infantry. The only distinction was dark green fringed epaulets. Their drums were grass with the rims painted in alternating diagonal stripes of white and dark green. The drum carriage was black leather. In 1813, a variety of uniforms was worn. The 1810 uniform and other issue was used because of a breakdown of the Saxon system and a frantic effort to reorganize and re-equip the Saxon army as quickly as possible. After the initial trauma and rush, a greater uniformity in uniforms began to appear. The jagers uniform was initially that of the line infantry, but without the regimental color facings. In all probability it was identical to that worn by the line infantry. With the 1810 reorganization, the jagers received their own uniform. It was identical to that worn by the light infantry, except that the jager's shako had a brass bugle on it. In full dress it also had a green plume, cords, and flounders. On campaign, the shako was covered by a black oilskin. Their jacket was dark green with scarlet piping on the lapels. It had black pointed cuffs and squared shoulder straps with scarlet piping. The collar was black in front and green in the back with scarlet piping as well. The turnbacks were light green and had brass bugle horns on it. On campaign, their trousers were gray and sources indicate that it had a black stripe down the outer seam. Their dress uniform had gray breeches, which were worn with half calf black gaiters. Their great coats were pepper-gray and the collar was the same as that worn by the light infantry. Their knapsack was made of calfskin with black leather shoulder straps, the left one supported their bullet pouch and the right one supported their sword bayonet. The enlisted wore shoes and the officers wore black leather boots. The jagers were equipped with their own personal rifles, so there was no uniformity of equipment. Tactical Organization The placement of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Saxon infantry company and battalion, as established by the 1809 exercise regulation, is most unusual. It diverges considerably from the placement of the cadre in all the armies of Napoleonic Europe. Prior to the issuance of this regulation indications are that the Saxons adhered closely to the Prussian system, but the earlier regulation was not located during the preparation of this study. As a result, no firm conclusions or comparisons can be made

with the earlier system. The first difference between the Saxon 1809 system and that of the rest of Europe was that the Saxons had two company line formations: parade and firing line. In the rest of Europe, the same formation served both needs, but this was not the case in the Saxon army. In the Saxon army, the parade formation placed the officers in front of the company where, if the company were to fire, they would be cut down. It was a universal European practice that the company kapitan stood on the right flank of the company where he could both see and control the company. In contrast, the Saxon kapitan was not placed on the right flank of the company. In the parade formation, he stood in front of the middle of the company. In the firing line, his position appears to have been unregulated. The position on the right flank was, as a result, relegated to the senior leutnant, the Premierleutnant. No doubt many of the duties normally assigned to the captains of other European armies were delegated to him. The kapitan appears to have been free to wander to such a position as might suit him, but the drummers were posted behind the company. As they were the principal method of communicating with the company when firing, it is reasonable to expect he spent much of his time running from where he stood to watch events back to the drummers so he could control the company. The next unique factor was that the other junior officers, in this case the Secondleutnant and the Fahnrich, were in the front rank. It was normal practice for them to be placed in the file closers rank in most European armies. That duty seems to have been entirely delegated to non-commissioned officers and the schiitzen. The final significant difference was the schiitzen. Instead of being positioned behind the rear rank in a single formation they were broken into two smaller groups (four in the middle and six on the right flank). They were also integrated with other, non-schiitzen, individuals. It appears as if they were both an integral, detachable light infantry force as well as an " elite" non-cadre augmentation to the file closers rank. This flaws of this system do not appear significant, as the theoretical requirements for file closers, etc., are met, but apparently they were not satisfactorily met. During the battle of Wagram in late 1809, the file closing system appears to have failed en masse with the rout of the Saxon division. The parade formation is shown in the following figure. It was, however, not a purely parade formation. The parade formation was definitely used for maneuvers, though it is not clearly indicated if the Saxons maneuvered in the firing line formation or not. Preferably/ in the bayonet charge, the officers would not have been standing between their company and the enemy, but there are subtle suggestions that they maneuvered in the parade formation and changed to the firing line formation only when required to fire or charge. This would have tended to slow down their response to any combat situation because they would have to clear their front before engaging the enemy. Saxon Company in Firing Line The firing line was not significantly different from the parade, except that the officers withdrew from the front of the company and placed themselves in the front rank. The file closers rank also closed up and the schiitzen were totally integrated into the file closers rank. The following figure illustrates the firing line formation. The Saxon company had 50 "rotten" or files. When the schiitzen were withdrawn from the main body of the company, it was reduced to 47 files. A section was formed with four to six rotten. The company consisted of two divisions. The 1st division had twenty four rotten in two sections, and the 2nd division had twenty three rotten, also formed into two sections. Each division was also divided into two pelotons. The 1st, 2nd (1st division) and 3rd pelotons (2nd Division) had twelve rotten and the 4th peloton had only eleven. This is consistent with the Saxon practice of always eliminating any unfilled positions from the left flank of the company.

0 00

0 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

191 ' I71

0 0

6. Unteroffiziere 7. Schiitzen Unteroffiziere 8. Schiitzen 9. Sappers (2) 10. Drummers (3) 11. Fifers (2)

Captain Premierlieutenant Souslieutenant Fahnrich Feldwebel

Saxon company in parade formation

2

5

• 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

3

10

Premierlieutenant Souslieutenant Fahnrichtenant Feldwebel Unteroffiziere

11

5

1

0 6. Schiitzen Unteroffiziere 7. Sappers (2) 8. Schiitzen (6) 9. Schiitzen (4) 10. Drummers (3) 11. Fifers (2)

Saxon company in firing line

Theoretically, the company had a frontage of 37.5 paces. An interval of 3 / 4 pace was allocated for each man in the company. In order to maintain this frontage, the Saxon regulation directed that a section was to form in three ranks if it had nine or more men. If its strength fell to between four and eight men it was to form in two ranks. If it had three or fewer men it was to form a single rank. This would allow, under certain seriously depleted conditions, for a Saxon infantry company forming only two ranks. In contrast to the better known British reasons for this, in this case it was to permit consistent maneuvering. The battalion, as mentioned earlier, had four administrative companies. However, for tactical purposes, it was divided into four divisions, or eight half divisions or sixteen platoons. The use of the term "division" is very consistent with common European practice of the period. The Saxon process of redesignating a company as a division for maneuvering purposes is consistent with the Russian and Prussian practices. The French, because of a different battalion structure, redesignated two companies as a division. Despite this, the "division" was the principal maneuvering element used in battalion formations by all four of these nations. 4

7

4

7

4

7

4

7

4

I |

I I

1 1

1 1

I |

I |

1 1

11

11 1 1 1 I I

4747

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 I

1 1

1 1

I f "

11

1 l

1 !

1 I

1

I 1

| I

"

7 •

7

4

7

4

7

4

7

4

II

II

11

1 1

II

II

II

II 7

7777

7 | |

1 1

7 j 7

7 I T ' '"

4

9 6 • 3 D

7

£<

10 6

7

9 6

C D

•

C D D

7

L M [ M )

II

1 1

116

7

7

C D

•

•

II 9 6

7

u n a

3

3

f

•

•

•

I I

1 1

10 L U

5 0

A 7 0 C8D 4 n8

6

II

7 •

II 9

6

7

c n u

Major Adjutant Captain Company Officer Schiitzen Officer Feldwebel Unteroffiziere Over Complement Fahnjunker Fifers

1 1 6 C D

3

3

D

0

•

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. s. f.

7 II

II

9. 2 Drummers 4 Schiitzen 1 Schiitzen Unteroffiziere 10. 2 Sappers 6 Schiitzen 1 Feldwebel 11. 3 Drummers 4 Schiitzen 1 Schiitzen Unteroffiziere

Saxon infantry battalion, firing line, 1809 The numbering of the sixteen pelotons and two divisions was as follows:

4 th Company Obgrstleutnant Company 16| 8 | l 2 | 4

1 4 j

6|10| 2

2nd Division

Oberst Company

Leib Company

15j 7|ll| 3

13| 5 | 9 | 1

1st Division

Numbering system of Saxon pelotons The battalion could form in either a parade or a firing line formation. The parade formation placed the battalion commander in front of the middle of the battalion. The positions of the other officers and NCO's does not appear to have changed significantly. The standard platoon was placed between the 2nd and 3rd companies, in the middle of the formation. When the battalion formed a firing line, very few changes were made to the formation. The major and staff formed behind the middle of the battalion and the standard platoon formed in the middle of the battalion. The major difference was that the any men in excess of the normal complement, the over complement, were converged into a large block posted to the right rear of the major. The positioning of the schiitzen was slightly modified, but was not significant. The following illustration shows the positions of the officers and non-commissioned officers when the Saxon battalion formed a firing line. Garrison and Invalid Companies In addition to the regular infantry, there were three half //Invaliden-Compagnies,/, each of which had a staff consisting of: 1 Commandant, Staff Officer 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnants 4 Sergeants 9 Total The companies were flushed out with any number of pensioned veterans and were not of a standard organization. The first was organized in 1748 as an old soldiers school and was posted in Waldheim. It had: 1 Fourier 1 Feldscheer (Field Surgeon) 10 Corporals 4 Drummers 150 Men 1 Knecht 176 Total

In 1810, one of the sergeants was replaced by a feldwebel (sergeant major) and the "feldscheer" was replaced by a "Compagnie-Chirurgus" (company surgeon). The second company, founded in 1764, was posted in Barby and consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnant 3 Sergeanten 1 Fourier 1 Feldscheer 6 Corporals 3 Drummers 2 Sappers 100 Men 1 Steckenknecht (Horse tender) 121 Total In 1810, it made the same changes as the Waldheim company, but moved to Liebenwera, in the Wittenberg Fortress. The third company was founded in 1769. It was posted in Eisleben and had: 1 Commandant and Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnant 3 Sergeanten 1 Fourier 1 Feldscheer 8 Corporal 2 Drummers 2 Sappers 96 Men 1 Steckenknecht (Horse tender) 118 Total It also underwent the 1810 conversion and moved to Colditz. The garrison company was posted in Konigstein. It performed much the same functions as the "halbinvalidencompagnien" already discussed. Its staff consisted of: 1 Commandant (Generalmajor) 1 Untercommandant (Oberstleutnant) 1 Schliesscapitan (Kapitan of the Guard) 1 Garrisonmedicus (Garrison Physician) 1 Garrisonprediger (Garrison Priest) 1 Proviantverwalter und Bauschreiber 1 Garrison Auditeur (Garrison Judge) 1 Garrisonchirurgus (Garrison Surgeon) 1 Festungwachtmeister(Fortress Sergeant Major) 1 Feuermauerkehrer (Chimney Sweep) 1 Brunnenstreiger (Well Tender) 1 Garrisoncantor (Garrison Cantor) 12 Total

The company had: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierlieutnant 2 Sousleutnants 1 Fahnrich (Cadet) 4 Sergeants 1 Fourier (Quartermaster) 1 Feldscheer (Field Surgeon) 10 Corporals 4 Drummers 10 Sappers 156 Soldiers 1 Provost 1 Provosfs servant 193 Total This organization had been in effect prior to 1802, but in 1813 this underwent some changes. The staff remained unchanged, but the garrison now had: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierlieutnant 2 Sousleutnants 1 Feldwebel 3 Sergeants 1 Fourier (Quartermaster) 1 Compagnie Chirurgus (Company Surgeon) 10 Corporals 4 Drummers 10 Sappers 156 Soldiers 1 Provost 1 Provost's servant 193 Total In 1815, indications are that only the Colditz and Waldheim companies remained. The Liebenwern company seems to have been disbanded. The Waldheim halbinvaliden compagnie consisted of: 1 Commandant 1 Kapitan 1 Premierlieutnant 2 Sousleutnants 1 Fahnrich 1 Feldwebel 3 Sergeants (4 in 1802) 1 Fourier 1 Feldscheer 10 Corporals 4 Drummers 10 Sappers (none in 1802) 150 Soldiers 186 Total (176 in 1802)

The Colditz company had: 1 Kapitan and commander 1 Premierlieutnant 2 Sousleutnants 1 Fahnrich 1 Feldwebel 2 Sergeants 1 Fourier 1 Feldscheer 3 Corporals 2 Drummers 100 Soldiers 119 Total In 1802, there was a garrison company in Neustadt assigned to the Government of Dresden. It was the remains of the city garrison formed in 1520. It consisted of: 1 Gouverneur (Governor) and Oberkommandant (Senior Commander) of Dresden and Neustadt 1 Kommandant (Commander) of Neustadt 1 Gouvernementsadjutant (Government Adjutant) 1 Platzmajor (Place Major) 1 Stadtmajor (City Major) 1 Platzadjutant (Adjutant) 3 Militia Instruction Officers 1 Regimentsschultheis (Judge) 1 Gouvernementssekretar (Secretary) 1 Garrisonprediger (Priest) 1 Regimentsactuarius 2 Governmentscopisten 1 Gerichtswaibel (Lawyer) 16 Total Its function was administer over the line regiments serving as the garrison of Dresden. Uniforms of the Garrison and Halbinvalidencompagnien Prior to 1809, they wore the same uniform as the line infantry, faced with black. The officers wore light blue interim uniforms (tunics) and white breeches with tall black boots or gaiters. The hat worn for normal service had silver lace, but the interim had no lace. The uniform of the halbinvalidencompagnien appear to have been a double breasted white tunic with a black collar and cuffs. The lapels were not of the facing color. The members of the Government of Dresden wore a dark blue coat with dark blue cuffs and collars. Their vest and breeches were red and the buttons were white. The adjutant wore silver braid and the platzmajor and platzadjutanten wore silver epaulets. The National Guard In 1809, a "National Guard" was raised in Dresden. It consisted of four companies, one of mounted gensdarmes, one of sharpshooters, one of archers (an honorary title, as they were most certainly not armed with bows and arrows!) and one of armed merchants. A force similar to the Dresden National Guard was raised in Wittenberg and known as the Wittenberg Municipal Rifle Company.

The Royal Decree of 6 December 1809 ordered the raising of a new standing "National Civil Guard" in recognition of the service provided during the recent campaign by the Dresden National Guard. Its organization was set at one mounted company and five infantry companies of 100 men per company. The infantry was organized into one carabinier and four musketeer companies. It had a small musical staff and was placed under the command of the Governor of Dresden. In 1815, the number of companies of the Dresden National Guard was raised to eight. Its staff consisted of: 1 Commandant 1 Adjutant 1 Auditeur 1 Oberchirurgus (Senior Surgeon) 1 Stabfourier 1 Tool keeper 10 Hautboisten 1. klasse (1st Qass Musicians) S Hautboisten 2. klasse (2nd Class Musicians) 26 Total The mounted gensdarmes company consisted of: 1 Rittmeister (Cavalry Kapitan) 1 Premierleutnant (1st Leutnant) 2 Sousleutnants (Under Leutnants) 1 Oberwachtmeister (Sergeant Major) 2 Wachtmeister (Sergeants) 1 Fahnentrager (Standard Bearer) 1 Fourier 1 Chirurgus (Surgeon) 10 Corporals 4 Trumpeters 100 Gendarmes 125 Total Each of the eight infantry companies consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnants 1 Feldwebel (Sergeant Major) 1 Fourier (Quarter Master) 7 Corporals 2 Drummers 90 Gensdarmes 105 Total The uniforms of the National Guard did not vary between 1809 and 1815. The gensdarmes were a dark blue jacket with blue cuffs and turnbacks; the collars, however, were blue velvet. The buttons were made of yellow metal and yellow aiguilettes were worn on the right shoulder. Blue contre epaulets piped with gold were also worn as well as gray or white breeches and black Hungarian boots. The hat was a black tricorn with a white national cockade and gold clasp. All leatherwork was black. The infantry wore a dark blue tunic with no distinctive color on the cuffs, collars, or

turnbacks. Only the collar was piped with red. Their buttons were of yellow metal and either gray or white breeches were worn. A black tricorn with the national cockade and gold clasp was worn by the musketeers, but the carabiniers had a white plume and cords. In 1815, the gensdarmes adopted a bicorn with white tassels and the new Saxon national cockade. This bicorn was surmounted by a large bushy green over white plume. A double breasted jacket with no distinctive facings was adopted. All other details remained fundamentally the same. The infantry also adopted the double breasted jacket. It had no distinctive facing color, but the cuffs and collars were piped with red. They also imitated the bicorn of the gensdarmes. The only difference between the musketeers and the carabiniers was a tall white plume on the carabiniers' bicorn.

Saxon Landwehr in 1814 Kadettenkompagnie In addition to the various combat units, there was an officer's school designed to train future Saxon officers. This was known as the "kadettenkompagnie" or "cadet company." In 1746, the Cadet Company consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Kapitanleutnant 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnant 2 Fahnrich 1 Feldwebel 1 Gefreiterkorporal

1 Fourier 1 Musterschreiber 1 Kapitan-d'armes 1 Feldscheer 10 Korporal 8 Hautboisten 1 Querpfeifer 3 Tambours 120 Cadets 1 Knecht 156 Total To support the cadets there was an instructional staff of: 1 Ingenieurkapitan 2 Ingenieurs (Engineers) 1 Fechtmeister (Fencing Master) 2 Sprachmeisters (Speech Masters) 1 Tanzmeister (Dance Master) 1 Informator in der Geographie (Geographer) 1 Informator in der Gotteskurcht (Religious Instructor) 1 Unterfechter (Assistant Fencing Instructor) 1 Vortanzer (Assistant Dance Master) 1 Rechenmeister (Mathematician) The kadetten kompagnie was stationed in Dresden and, though under the direct orders of the King, served under the nominal command of a major general. The cadet training program changed and in 1763 there were only 44 cadets, but in 1766 it changed again. The staff altered slightly and the feldwebel was replaced by a sergeant and the knecht became a provost. The number of cadets was raised to 120 again. The instructor staff remained unaltered. Between 1792 and 1810, the cadets' uniforms consisted of a black bicorn that had a white edging. They wore a red coat with white facings, cuffs, and buttons. The collar was white, piped with red. Their stockings and breaches were white; in the winter they wore black gaiters and in the summer they wore white. Their belts were white; the shoes and bullet pouch were black. The officers wore the same uniform with silver epaulets, bicorn cockade, sword, and spurs. Their sword scabbard was black. After 1810, the only change was that the white edging on the bicorn was eliminated. The Swiss Guard To provide a personal body guard for himself, the King of Saxony, like many European monarchs, had a Swiss guard. This was primarily a ceremonial force that never engaged in any combat. In 1776 it consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Kapitanleutnant 1 Premierleutnant 1 Sousleutnant 1 Wachtmeisterleutnant 1 Feldscheer 6 Rottmeister 3 Fifers

3 Drummers 8 Musicians i Sappers 96 Men In July 1797, it was reorganized and consisted of: 1 Schweizer hauptman (General) 1 Kapitanleutnant (Stabsoffizier) 1 Premierlieutnant 1 Sousleutnant 1 Auditeur 1 Oberfeldscheer 1 Wachtmeisterleutnant 3 Rottmeister 3 Korporals 3 Tambours 3 Pfeiffer 1 Fourierschiitze 100 Swiss 120 Total The uniform of the Swiss Guard consisted of a black bicorn edged with white. They wore a yellow coat with light blue facings, breeches, and stockings; the buttons were white. The uniform was edged with blue and white stripped lace. Henneburg Militia Henneburg was one of the counties belonging to Saxony. It consisted of the offices of Schleusingen, Schul, and Kiindorff. In January 1809, this territory was garrisoned by a "landmiliz bataillon" and an infantry detachment that belonged to the Franconia Kreiscontingent. The landmiliz battalion consisted of: 1 Commander, Major von Falkenstein 1 Hauptman 1 Adjutant 3 Feldwebel 3 Sergeants 3 Fahnjunkers 3 Fouriers 15 Corporals 6 Fourierschiitzen 3 Fifers 3 Drummers 30Q Soldiers 345 Total The commander and hauptman commanded companies posted in Schul and Kiihndorf. The uniforms worn by these men were white with blue turnbacks. The Franconian Kreisregiment detachment was posted in Schluesingen and consisted of:

1 Commander, Major von Falkenstein 1 Feldwebel 2 Corporals 2 Vice Corporals 1 Drummer Musketeers 23 Total The Franconian Kreisregiment detachment wore a dark blue coat with short tails piped red. Their cuffs, lapels, and collar piping were red. Their buttons were yellow, the gilets were white. They wore long gray breeches with calf length black gaiters. They wore a shako with white cords and plume. The leatherwork was black.

Infantry in full gear and campaign uniforms

Saxon

Cavalry

In 1763, the Saxon cavalry consisted of eight cuirassier regiments and a dragoon regiment. They were: Garde du Korps Regiment Gardekarabiniers Regiment Koniglicher Prinz Cuirassier Regiment von Arnim Cuirassier Regiment Fiirst Anhalt Cuirassier Regiment von Plotz Cuirassier Regiment von Bitzthum Cuirassier Regiment von Sacken Dragoon Regiment Tracking the evolution of these units is quite involved. The evolution of these Regiments through the period between 1763 and 1815 was: Heavy Cavalry

Date Raised

Garde du korps

before 30 Years War 1812

Destroyed Karabiniergarde

Date Renamed

1713*

Karabinicr 1810

Disbanded Anhalt Cuirassiers

Light Cavalry

Date Raised

Date Renamed

Kurland Chevauxiegcr

1733

1770

Dehn- Rothfelser Chcvauxleger Prinz Clemens

1799

Prinz Clemens Uhlans

1811

Prinz AJbrocht ChevauxJeger 1745 Disbanded

1696-

Von Sachen Dragoons

1742

Kochtitzky Cuirassiers

Von Gersdorff Chevauxieger

1790

1809

Disbanded

1813

Kurfurst Cuirassiers

1680

Prinz lohann Renard Dragoons

1804 1733

Gotdacker Chevauxieger

1799

Konig Cuirassiers

1806

von Polenz

1801

Lei b- Kurassier-Car de

1807

Vacant

1810

Kurassier• Regi ment

1813

von Polenz

18U~

Leib-Kurassier-Garde

1815

Disbanded

1813

Hussar Regiment

1791

von Arnim Cuirassier incorporated into Kurfurst Cuirassier*

1778*

1813

Zochwitz Cuirassiers

Zastrow Cuirassiers

1796

1778

von Plotz Cuirassier von SAC ken Dragoon Regiment Brenkenhot Cuirassiers

1764

incorporated into Sacken Dragoons

1778

von Bitzthum Cuirassier Benbkendort f Cuirassiers incorporated into Renard Dragoons

1778

Koniglich Prinz Cuirassiers Ronnow Cuirassiers

1764

incorporated into Karabiniere

1778

• Taken from the service of Bayrcuth. T a k e n from the service of WolfcnbutteL Destroyed in Russia.

When the infantry was reorganized, the cavalry was as well. The Garde de Korps consisted of four squadrons. The staff consisted of:

1 Generakommandant 1 Oberst 2 Oberstleutnants 2 Majors 1 Oberquartiermeister (Senior Quartermaster) 2 Adjutant 1 Oberauditeur (Senior Regimental Judge) 1 Oberfeldscheer (Senior Field Surgeon) 1 Stabsquartiermeister (Staff Quartermaster) 1 Drummer 1 Feldscheergeselle (Field Surgeon Journeyman) 1 Provost 15 Total Each squadron had: 1 Rittmeister 1 Seconderrittmeister 2 Premierleutnants 2 Sekondleutnants 2 Wachtmeisters 1 Standartenjunker 1 Quartiermeister 6 Korporals 1 Feldscheer 3 Trumpeters 1 Smith 72 Trabanten (Life-Guardsmen) 93 Total The Gardekarabinier Regiment also had four squadrons. Its staff consisted of: 1 Chef or Inhaber 1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 1 Major 1 Regimentsquartiermeister 1 Auditeur 1 Regimentsfeldscheer 5 lower staff 12 Total Each squadron had: 2 Rittmeister 2 Premierleutnants 2 Sousleutnants 144 Non-commissioned officers and men 150 The cuirassier regiments had four squadrons. Their staff was organized identically to that of the karabiniers. Their squadrons were similar, except there were only 84 in'the squadron, not 150.

The dragoon regiment was redesignated as a chevauxleger regiment. It had begun its existence in 1760 when the Austrian Major Otto raised a force of 300 infantry and 200 cavalry. This force consisted of a squadron of mounted jagers, a squadron of che vauxlegers and a squadron of hussars. By 1763, only 89 men and horses (7 hussars, 39 mounted jagers and 53 chevauxlegers) remained. This became the Schill'schen (Schill's) Leibjagerkompagnie and eventually the von Sacken Dragoon Regiment. The chevauxleger regiment had the same staff as the cuirassiers, except in addition it had eight hautboisten (musicians) and a wagonmaster. It was formed with eight companies. Each company consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Leutnant 1 Fiihrer 2 Wachtmeister 1 Fahnenj unker 1 fourier 1 Feldscheer 5 Korporals 1 Saddlemaker 1 Smith 2 Drummers 75 Chevauxlegers 1 Servent 93 Total On 24 June 1764, the Karabiniergarde Regiment became the Karabinier-Regiment and the Leibkurassiers became the Kurfursten Cuirassiers. Both units lost their guard designation as well. The cavalrv now consisted of: Garde du Korps Karabinier Regiment Kurfurst Cuirassier Regiment Arnim Cuirassier Regiment Fiirst Anhalt Cuirassier Regiment Graf Bitzthum Cuirassier Regiment Graf Ronnow Cuirassier Regiment (formerly Prinz Brenkenhof and von Plotz) Priz Albrecht Chevauleger Regiment Prinz Karl von Kurland Chevauleger Regiment (formerly von Sacken Dragoon Regiment) On 20 September 1770, the Saxon cavalry was reorganized into eleven regiments, the Karabinier Regiment, six Cuirassier Regiments, and four Chevauxleger regiments. Each consisted of four squadrons, each squadron having 2 companies. The staff of the regiments were raised to eleven men. Each of the eight companies had 66 men and 60 horses. The Garde du Korps had 539 men and 480 horses, and the other line regiments had 535 men and 411 horses. In 1778, the cavalry was again reorganized. It was reduced to a total of seven regiments, the Karabinier Regiment, two cuirassier regiments (Kurfurst and Fiirst Anhalt), and four chevauxleger regiments. Of these four "chevauxleger" regiments, two (Kurland and Albrecht) were actually known as chevauxlegers. The other two bore the name "dragoons". The four junior cuirassier regiments were disbanded and their troops distributed between the other regiments to bring them up to full strength.

The Ronnow Cuirassiers were incorporated in to the Karabiniers, the greatest portion of the Arnim Cuirassiers went to the Kurfurst Regiment. The Brenkenhoff Cuirassiers went entirely into the Sacken Dragoon Regiment as did the Benkendorff Cuirassiers went entirely into the Renard Dragoon Regiment. In May 1799, the Saxon cavalry consisted of: Karabiniers Kurfurst Cuirassier Regiment Fiirst Anhalt Cuirassier Regiment Herzog von Kurland Chevauxleger Regiment Prinz Albrecht Chevauxleger Regiment Goldacker Dragoon Regiment (formerly the Renard Dragoon Regiment) von Sacken Dragoon Regiment On 10 July 1791, the order was issued for the raising of the Hussar Regiment. Initially, it was to consist of 557 men and 500 horses and drew its cadre from each of the seven line regiments. Its staff consisted of: 1 Chef 1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 2 Majors 1 Regimentsquartiermeister 2 Adjutants 1 Auditeur 1 Feldscheer 1 Veterinarian 1 Staff Trumpeter 1 Saddlemaker 1 Gunsmith 14 Total The eight squadrons had a total of: 3 Rittmeister 5 Stabrittmeister 8 Premierleutnant 8 Sousleutnant 8 Coronets 8 Wachtmeister 8 Sekondwachtmeister 8 Standartjunker 8 Fourier 8 Feldscheer 72 Corporals 8 Trumpeters 8 Smiths 880 Hussars 1,040 Total The regiment had a total of 1,048 men and 1,000 horses. After the wars of the French Revolution (1792 to 1799), the Saxon army underwent a

major reorganization. The internal structure of the regiments was altered. The Garde du Corps staff now consisted of: 1 Chef 1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 2 Major 1 Oberquartiermeister 1 Adjutant 1 Auditeur 1 Oberfeldscheer 1 Stabsquartiermeister 1 Pauker (Drummer) 1 Stabsfeldscheer 1 Provost & Servant 13 Total The eight companies had: 8 Rittmeister 8 Premierleutnant 8 Sousleutnant 8 Wachtmeister 4 Standartjunker (only 1 per squadron) 8 Quartiermeister 8 Feldscheer 28 Corporals 8 Trumpeters 8 Smiths 320 Troopers 416 Total This gave the regiment a total of 429 men and 369 horses, excluding officers' horses. The other cavalry regiments were slightly different and their staff consisted of: 1 Chef 1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 2 Major 1 Regiments-Quartiermeister 1 Adjutant 1 Auditeur 1 Regiments-Feldscheer 1 Stabsfourier 1 Pauker (Drummer) or Staff Trumpeter 1 Stabsfeldscheer (Staff Physician) 1 Rossartz (Veterinarian) l.Provost & Servant 14 Total

The eight companies had: 8 Rittmeister 8 Premierleutnant 16 Sousleutnant 8 Wachtmeister 8 Standartjunker or Fahnenjunker 8 Fourier 8 Feldscheer 40 Corporals 8 Trumpeters 8 Smith 600 Troopers 720 Total The cavalry regiments had a total of 734 men with 666 horses, excluding officers horses. The Hussar Regiment's staff was altered slightly and now had: 1 Chef 1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 2 Major 1 Regiments-Quartiermeister 2 Adjutant 1 Auditeur 1 Regiments-Feldscheer 1 Stabsfeldscheer 1 Stabsfourier 1 Stabstrompeter (Staff Trumpeter) 1 Sattler (Saddlemaker) 1 Buchsenmacher (Gunsmith) 1 Provost 1 Rossartz (Veterinarian) l_Provost & Servant 17 Total The sixteen companies were altered by the addition of eight vice corporals and now had: 8 Rittmeister 8 Premierleutnant 8 Sousleutnant 8 Coronets 8 Wachtmeister 8 Seconde-Wachtmeister 8 Standartjunker 8 Fourier 8 Feldscheer 72 Corporals 8 Vice-Corporals 8 Trumpeters 8 Smiths 880 Troopers 1,048 Total

The Hussar Regiment had a total of 1,065 men and 1,002 horses, excluding officers' horses. The entire Saxon cavalry force was as follows: Squadrons Garde-du-Corps 4 3 Heavy Cavalry Regiments 12 4 Chevauxleger Regiments 16 1 Hussar Regiment 8 Total 9 Regiments 40

Men 420 2,202 2,936 1,065 6,631

Horses 369 1,998 2,664 1,002 6,033

The heavy cavalry rode Holstein horses, those of the Garde-du-Corps being black. The chevauxleger and hussars rode Polish horses. The cost of a horse for the Garde-du-Corps was 75 Thalers, while the cost for a remount for the rest of the cavalry was 60 Thalers. The Saxon cavalry was formed in three ranks, except for the hussars which formed in two ranks. The flankers were placed in the third rank. The squadron was tactically organized into two "halb-eskadrons" (half squadrons), four "ziigen", eight "halbzugen", and threes. The basic maneuvering unit was the halb-eskadron. At the end of the 1806 campaign, those regiments which had gone to war were stripped of their horses. Those horses were then turned over to the French cavalry regiments as remounts. In October 1806, when the regiments returned to their garrisons, each squadron had only ten to twelve horses and they remained in the depots. Only the Konig Cuirassier Regiment, which had not participated in the 1806 campaign, retained its horses. On 24 June 1807, the Konig Cuirassier regiment changed its name to Leib Cuirassiers, because of its distinguished performance at Heilsburg and Friedland in 1807. The lack of horses resulting from the stripping of horses from the regiments by the French in 1806 meant that only 20 squadrons could be mobilized at the beginning of the 1809 campaign. Despite the lack of horses, the Saxon cavalry was excellent in its training and skills in the field. Much of the professionalism of the Seven Years War remained. On 22 February 1809, the Saxon army was mobilized and the missing horses were replaced. However, there remained in Saxony, due to a lack of horses, three squadrons of the Hussars, two Carabinier squadrons, three squadrons of the Herzog Albert Chevauxlegers and four squadrons of the von Polenz Chevauxlegers. In 1810, the Karabinier Regiment was disbanded and the remaining regiments were reorganized. Other than the Hussar Regiment, the line regiments still consisted of four squadrons, each with two companies. The regimental staff now consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Leutnant Colonel 2 Major 1 Adjutant-major 1 Regimental Quartermaster 1 Auditeur 1 Regimental Surgeon

1 Staff Quartermaster 1 Trumpet major or Tympanists (pauker) Major 1 Veterinarian 1 Stabsfeldscheer 1 Provost 1 Armorer 4 Saddlemakers 18 Total

The eight companies now consisted of: 4 1st Class Captains 4 2nd Class Captains 8 Premierleutnant 16 Unterleutnant 8 Wachtmeister

8 Fourier 4 Feldscheer 40 Corporals 8 Trumpeters 8 Blacksmiths

8 Standart-junker

£52 Troopers 768 Total

The Hussar Regiment staff consisted of: 1 Colonel 1 Leutnant Colonel 2 Majors 2 Adjutant-major 1 Regimentsquartiermeister 1 Auditeur 1 Regimentsfeldscheer 1 Stabsfourier 1 Trompeter (Trumpet Major) 1 Rossartz (Veterinarian) 1 Biichsenmacher (Armorer) 4 Sattler (Saddlemakers) 1 Provost 19 Total The sixteen companies consisted of: 4 Capitains 1. classe 4 Capitains 2. classe 8 Premierleutnants 8 Unterleutnants 8 Coronets 8 Wachtmeister 1. classe 8 Wachtmeister 2. classe 8 Standart-junker 8 Quartermeister 8 Feldscheer 80 Corporals 16 Trumpeters 8 Blacksmiths 880 Troopers 1,056 Total After the withdrawal from Russia, the Saxon cavalry was in very bad shape. Very little of it remained and what did was reorganized into three regiments. The Prinz Clemens Uhlans had escaped relatively intact, having escaped the disaster at Kobrin. They were filled out to a full four squadrons, and some sources indicate that a 5th squadron was raised. The Hussar Regiment was reformed and raised to a strength of four squadrons. A cuirassier regiment was being reformed from the survivors of Russia, the Leib Cuirassier Regiment and the depot for the Garde du Corps. The Garde du Corps adopted a new organization and its staff now consisted of: 1 1 2 1 1 1

Oberst Oberstleutnant Majors Oberquartiermeister Adjutant Oberregimentsquartiermeister

1 1 1 1 1 1

Oberregimentschirurgus Stabsquartiermeister Pauker p r u m m e r ) Rossartz (Veterinarian) Hospitalchirurgus Gunsmith

1 Oberauditeur

4 Saddlemakers 1 Provost & Servant 18 Total

The eight companies had: 4 Rittmeister 1. Classe 4 Rittmeister 2. Classe 8 Premierleutnant 16 Sousleutnant 8 Wachtmeister 8 Standartjunker (only 1 per squadron) 8 Quartiermeister 4 Chirurgen 40 Corporals 8 Trumpeters 8 Smiths 652 Troopers 768 Total When the Saxons defected to the allies, they were reformed into a hussar, an uhlan, and a cuirassier regiment, each with three squadrons. In addition five squadrons of landwehr hussars were raised. The landwehr was returned to Saxony at the end of the 1814 campaign with the other landwehr. After the dismembering of Saxony by the Prussians, the Saxon cavalry consisted of the Leib-Kurassier-Garde, the Uhlan Regiment and the Hussar Regiment. The internal organization of these regiments was changed. The Leib-Cuirassier-Regiment had four squadrons and a staff. The staff consisted of: 1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 2 Majors 1 Adjutant 1 Regimental quartermaster

1 Regimental surgeon 1 Staff Secretary (Clerk) 1 Staff trumpeter 1 Veterinarian 1 Armorer 4 Saddlemakers 15 Total

The regiment had four squadrons, each with two companies. These companies had a total force of: 4 Rittmeister 1. classe 4 Rittmeister 2. classe 8 Premierleutnant 16 Sousleutnant 8 Wachtmeister 8 Standartjunker (officer cadets)

8 Fourier 8 Surgeons 40 Corporals 8 Vice Corporals 8 Trumpeters 8 Smiths 592 Cuirassiers 720 Total

The hussar and uhlan regiments had a staff and six squadrons each. These squadrons also had two companies. The staff consisted of:

1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 4 Majors 1 Adjutant 1 Regimental quartermaster 1 Regimental surgeon 1 Battalion surgeon 1 Staff secretary (clerk) 1 Staff trumpeter 2 Veterinarians 1 Armorer ^.Saddlemakers 22 Total The six squadrons had: 6 Rittmeister 1. classe 6 Rittmeister 2. classe 12 Premierleutnant 24 Sousleutnant 12 Wachtmeister 12 Standartjunker (Officer Cadets) 12 Fourier 12 Surgeons 72 Corporals 8 Vice Corporals 24 Trumpeters 12 Smiths 792 Troopers 1,104 Total Uniforms of the Saxon Cavalry The uniforms of the heavy cavalry before 1810 consisted of a large bicorn with a white feather plume and cockade. This bicorn also had the same loop, button, and corner tassels as those of the infantry bicorn. Their tunics were single breasted and colored buff. The regimental facings were: Regiment Garde du Corps Karabiniers Kurfurst Kochtitzky

Facing Dark Blue Red Red Konig Leib Yellow Zastrow

Lace Yellow with two red stripes Yellow with red and black stripes Yellow with red edges Yellow with black and white edges

These facing colors were worn on the cuffs, turnbacks, and collar. The regimental lace was worn as edging on the collar, shoulder straps, cuffs, turnbacks, and down the front of the tunic. Their waist coat was in the facing color edged with the regimental lace. They wore buff breeches, heavy cavalry boots, buckle-on steel spurs, and white leatherwork. Though these units were designated as cuirassiers, they had a surprising habit of leaving their cuirasses in the depot when it came time to go to war. Only the Karabiniers seem to have worn their cuirasses in 1809 and none of the units entering Russia wore them. Indeed,

it is noted that they rolled their great coats and wrapped them around their chests like an bandolier to provide some protection. A bicorn was worn before 1810. It had a white or yellow edge, white cockade and plume, with the regimental button. In 1810, the bicorn was replaced with a brass helmet with a brass comb, white crest and plume, brown fur turban, and brass chinscales. Their schabraque was in the regimental color and trimmed with the regimental lace. The electoral and later the royal cipher "FA" decorated the corner of the schabraque. A white or black sheepskin saddle cover was worn. The leather work was black. The troopers of the Garde du Corps rode black horses, while the officers rode golden bays. The uniforms of the light cavalry were very similar to those of the heavy cavalry. However, their tunics were red with two rows of buttons. They wore their tunic with the top two buttons open and the top of the lapels open to show the facings. The facing colors were worn on the collar, square cuffs, lapels and turnbacks; their waistcoats were of the facing color. They wore buff breeches, buckle-on steel spurs, and schabraques of the facing color decorated with the electoral/royal cipher "FA". A bicorn was worn before 1810. It had a white or yellow edge, white cockade and plume, and the regimental button. In 1810, a shako was adopted. It had white cords and plumes with a brass plaque with the royal cipher "FA" and brass chinscales. Regiment Prinz Clemens Prinz Albrecht Prinz Johann* von Polenz

Facing Light Green Dark Green Black Light Blue

Buttons Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow

* The turnbacks and shoulder strap piping were light buff. In 1813, the tunic of the Prinz Clemens Uhlans was changed to light blue with black facings piped with red. They changed to a red tunic with light blue facings in 1815. The lance pennant was white over green. In 1812, there was reported to have been lance pennants of red and white as well as pennants of green and red. The hussars were raised in 1791. They adopted the traditional Hungarian style uniform topped with black mirliton shako. The wing was light blue with white edging. Their dolman was white with a light blue collar and cuffs, and its lace was white. Their pelisse was light blue edged with black fur, and had white lace. They wore a crimson and white sash, white breeches, and a white belt. They wore the traditional hussar boots. Their schabraque was light blue with white edging. In about 1806, their dolman became light blue and in 1810 they adopted a black shako with white cords and plumes. When the freiwilliger jagers of the Banner were raised their uniform consisted of a dark green cap with a yellow cross. Their coat and breeches were also dark green. Their collar, cuffs, and piping were red. Their buttons were yellow. They wore black boots with white tassels. Their leatherwork was black. The hussars of the Banner wore a light blue shako with a dark green plume, white cords, and light green band on the top. It also bore a yellow cross and copper chinscales. Their dolman was dark green with yellow buttons, a red collar with orange lace, and red cuffs. Their breeches were light green with yellow side stripes and orange Hungarian lace. Dragoon Staff Company On 13 December 1813, a small company of dragoons was organized to provide a security guard for the army's staff when in the field. Its commander was Major von Cerrini. Its original strength was 62. This strength was reduced on 15 June 1815, and it consisted of:

1 Commandant (Kapitan) 1 Stabmeister (Staff master) 3 Corporals 1 Trumpeter 45 Dragoons 51 Total It is unclear, but indications are that it was either disbanded at the end of 1815, or it remained in service until 1817 when it was disbanded. They wore a uniform that consisted of a red jacket with black collars and lapels. It had a buff lining and turnbacks; the buttons were yellow. They wore yellow shakos with white feather plums with green tips. Cavalry Formation and Tactics In 1810, the cavalry squadrons were organized in two ranks separated by a distance of one and a half paces, like most other European cavalry. In addition, each squadron was divided into four ziigen (sections). The largest and best horses were placed in the first rank, the largest being placed in order from the right wing to the left wing. Those horses of the same color or nearly so were placed in the front rank. The light colored horses, the whites, greys, piebalds, were placed in the second rank. The standard bearer was placed in the first rank of the right wing of the 2nd half squadron. The squadron commander was posted six paces in front of the middle of the squadron. The captains and the two premier-leutnants were posted two paces before their companies. The captains were in front of the 3rd Rotte (file). The premier-leutnants were posted before the middle of the 2nd and 3rd zuge (sections). The junior sous-leutnant was posted behind the squadron commander and the remaining officers were posted in the file closers rank. The Wachtmeisters were placed in the file closers rank and were able to take the place of any of the junior officers who might be lost. The Unteroffizier (non-commissioned officers) were posted such that each zuge in the first rank had one on each wing. The remaining four Unteroffizier and the two fouriers were posted on the wings of the second rank of the half squadrons. There were eight basic types of trumpet commands for the Saxon cavalry: Advance or March, Trot, Gallop, Attack, Halt, Retire, Right, and Left. With these commands the cavalry would execute the various maneuvers necessary for combat. There were three forms of attack. The first was the "Frontmarsch im Carriere" or forward advance at the gallop in line. In this attack, there was always a reserve held behind to engage the enemy after a melee occurred. The second form of attack was the "k la debandade" attack. This form of attack was used only against unformed infantry. It was executed in a loose organization, not closed up as in an attack against cavalry. The cuirassiers never used this form of attack, but the light cavalry often used it to great advantage. When executed every squadron two middle ziigen remained in closed order in order to have a formed reserve should it be necessary. The outer two ziigen then advanced in an extremely loose order against the enemy. The third form of attack was the "Schwarm-attaque" or Swarm Attack. In this attack, a line of skirmishers was formed from the regimental carabiniers and placed 50 to 80 paces before the formed body of the cavalry. The function of the skirmishers was to tease the enemy infantry into firing. Once they had discharged their fire the formed cavalry would swing out and strike the square while the infantrymen were attempting to reload. Usually one of the regiment's squadrons was detached as a reserve. If a single squadron was making the attack it would also hold back a reserve. If the squadron had 48 or more Rotten the reserve would consist of an Unteroffizier and nine Rotten.

0

0

0

00

0 1. 2. 3. 4.

0

0

Squadron Commander Captain Premierlieutenant Sous-lieutenant

5. 6. 7. 8.

00 Standartjunker Wachtmeister Unteroffiziere Fourier

Saxon cavalry squadron, 1810

0 0

0 0 0

0 1. Oberst 2. Oberstleutnant 3. Major

4. Adjudant-Major 5. Trumpet Major

Saxon cavalry regiment, 1810

0

Banner of the Saxon volunteers, 1814 Hussar, Schiitzen, and Schiitzen officer From Krtotoi

Saxon

Artillery

In 1767, the Saxon army reorganized its artillery along with the rest of the army. Its new state consisted of a staff, a Feuerwerkskompagnie, eight Kanonierkompagnie, a Fusilierkorps, a Pontonierkorps, a Mineurkorps, an Artillery Park, and an Artillery Reserve. The staff consisted of: 1 Oberst 1 Oberstleutnant 1 Major 1 Quartiermeister 1 Adjutant 1 Auditeur 1 Oberfeldscheer 1 Stabsfourier 1 Provost The Feurwerkscompagnie (Pyrotechnician Company) which manned howitzers consisted of: 1 Oberfeuerwerker und Batteriemeister (Senior Pyrotechnician and Battery Master) 1 Mathematikus und Zahlmeister (Mathematician and Paymaster) 8 Unteroffiziere (Non-Commissioned Officers) 50 Feuerwerker (Pyrotechnicians) 50 Bombardiers (Bombardiers) The eight foot companies were divided into regimental batteries. They manned 40 7pdr howitzers and 80 4pdr guns (Geschwindschusskanonen or rapid fire guns). Each company was formed with: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnants 1 Stuckjunker (Piece Cadet) 10 Unteroffizier 2 Zimmerleute (Sappers) 1 Feldscheer 2 Drummers 48 Kanonier (Gunners) 96 Unterkanonier (Assistant Gunners) 164 Total The Fusilierkorps (Fusilier Corps) consisted of a staff and four companies. It was tasked with protecting the guns of the artillerists. The staff consisted of a major and an adjutant. Each of the companies consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnants 1 Feldscheer 8 Unteroffizier

2 Drummers 120 Fusiliers 135 Total The Pontonierkorps (Pontoon Train) consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 1 Sousleutnant 5 Unteroffizier 25 Pontoneers 33 Total The Mineurkorps (Miner Corps) consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 1 Sousleutnant 3 Unteroffizier £ Miners 12 Total The artillery park and artillery reserve contained twelve 12pdr guns, six 8pdr guns, six light 12pdr guns, ten light 8pdr guns, six 16pdr howitzers, ten 7pdr howitzers, three 32pdr block mortars, three 24pdr block mortars, eight 4pdr quick firing cannon, and twelve 2pdr quick firing cannon. On 1 July 1766, an artillery school was raised. The director of this school was an artillery corps staff officer and he had four artillery captains or subalterns as teachers in his school. In addition, there were four or five Non-Commissioned Officers to assist the teaching staff. On 1 February 1771, the miner company was disbanded and its officers were absorbed into the artillery. During 1777, the number of guns assigned to each regiment was reduced to two. On 5 May 1778, the guns mobilized and assigned to the army consisted of sixty 4pdr guns assigned as regimental artillery, twelve 12pdrs (six heavy and six light), eighteen 8pdrs (six heavy and six light) and eighteen 8pdr howitzers. The reserve park contained eight 4pdr regimental guns, two heavy 12pdr guns, two light 8pdr guns and two 8pdr howitzers. The pontoon train consisted of fifty pontoons and four pontoon carts with twelve tool and requisition wagons. By 1779, the artillery had been raised to a total of twelve companies. In 1797, the Saxon artillery consisted of the Hauptzeughause, the Artillery School, a Haus-Artillerie-Compagnie, regimental artillery batteries assigned to the infantry regiments, and a Feld-Artillerie-Corps consisting of a Feld Artillerie Regiment with twelve foot companies, and one horse artillery battery. The artillery train was assigned to the Horse Office and consisted of boys and horses not organized until mobilization. The boys were supervised by stable masters who were taken from the cavalry and gunners. The field batteries themselves were formed only when war was declared from elements of the artillerists companies and the Horse Office. In 1797, the Feld-Artillerie-Regiment had two battalions. Its staff consisted of: 1 Chef 1 Oberst 2 Oberstleutnant

2 Majors 1 Artilleriequartiermeister 2 Adjutanten 1 Auditeur 1 Oberfeldscheer 1 Stabsfourier 1 Stabsfeldscheer 1 Provost 1 Knecht (Servant) 15 Total The foot batteries had: 1 Capitains (7 Capitains & 5 Stabcapitairis) 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnant 1 Stuckjunker (Cadet) 1 Fourier (Quartermaster) 1 Feldscheer (Surgeon) 1 Feuerwerker-Corporal (Pyrotechnician Corporal) 1 Kanonier-Sergeanten (Sergeant gunner) 4 Feuerwerker (Pyrotechnicians) 12 Kanonier-Corporals (Corporal Gunners) 2 Drummers 3 Sappers 1 Miner 19 Ober-Kanoniers (Senior Gunners) 86 Unter-Kanoniers (Junior Gunners) 132 Total The horse batterv had: J *

1 Commandeur 2 Sousleutnants 1 Stuckjunker (Cadet) 1 Kanonier-Sergeant 2 Feuerwerker 1 Fourier 1 Feldscheer 6 Corporals 2 Trumpeters 20 Ober-Kanoniers Unter-Kanoniers 97 Total 91 Horses

There was a train detachment serving the artillery that consisted of 27 men and 52 horses (4 in reserve) and 4 artisans. In 1797, the foot companies were augmented by the addition of a Feuerwerker (Pyrotechnician), a corporal, four Ober-kanoniere (Senior Gunners), and eighteen Unterkanonier (Under Gunners). In 1802, there was a reorganization and a foot battery now consisted of:

1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 1 Sousleutnant 1 Sergeant 1 Oberfeuerwerker 1 Fourier (Quartermaster) 1 Feldscheer (Surgeon) 10 Feuerwerker-Corporals (Pyrotechnician Corporals) 2 Drummers 2 Sappers 3 Artisans 100 Kanoniers 124 Total The horse battery now consisted of: 1 Premierleutnant 2 Sousleutnant 1 Stuckjunker (Cadet) 1 Kanoniersergeant 2 Feuerwerker 1 Fourier (Quartermaster) 1 Feldscheer (Surgeon) 6 Feuerwerker-Corporals (Pyrotechnician Corporals) 2 Trumpeters 20 Oberkanoniers Unterkanoniers 107 Total The train consisted of: 1 Wagenbauer 26 Knecht 4 Artisans 52 Draft horses The Saxon artillery manned light 4pdrs as regimental guns, heavy 4pdrs, 8pdrs, 12pdrs, 4pdr mortars, and 8pdr howitzers in the field batteries. In the 1806 campaign, the Saxons had 106 guns of which only six were 12pdrs. The Feld-Fuss-Batterie (former Haus-Artillerie-Compagnie) consisted of: 1 1 1 1 1 1

Hauptmann (Kapitan) Premierleutnant Sousleutnant Stuckjunker (Cadet) Fourier Feldscheer (Field Surgeon)

1 Kanonier-Sergeant 1 Feuerwerker 7 Corporals 1 Drummer 2 Sappers 11 Ober-Kanoniers 69 Unter-Kanoniers 98 Total

In addition, a train establishment existed and consisted of:

1 Wagenmeister (Wagon master) 2 Schirrmeister (Supply Sergeant) 2 Wagenbauer (Wagon Builders) 1 Schmiedegeselle (Journeyman) ZQ Knecht 76 Total Each gun was accompanied by a munition caisson, except the 8pdr howitzers which had two. In addition to the field artillery, each infantry regiment had a regimental battery that consisted of four 4pdr guns. The four gun battery was provided with four munitions caisson/requisition wagons, and an infantry cartridge caisson. A total of 180 round shot and 120 cannister were provided for each gun. Each gun was manned by: Serving the Guns 1 Subaltern officer 4 Non-Commissioned Officers 40 Gunners Serving the Horses 1 Supply sergeant 17 Knecht (Servants) 35 Horses In addition, the grenadier battalions had two light 4pdrs each. These guns were manned with: Serving the Gun 1 Subaltern officer 2 Non-Commissioned Officers 20 Gunners Serving the Horses 1 Supply sergeant 9 Knecht (Servants) 19 Horses They had two munitions/requisition caissons equipped with 240 round shot and 60 cannister rounds. In July 1806, a horse artillery battery was raised but it served as a foot battery. It consisted of four light 8pdr guns, with a premierleutnant, 92 NCO's and men, 94 horses for the gunners, 57 train and 112 horses assigned to the train. It was disbanded after the campaign. In 1809, the Saxon artillery still consisted of two battalions, each with six companies. It totaled 69 officers and 1816 men. Despite the elapse of time and the 1806 campaign, the Saxon artillery was in the same state as in the Seven Years War. The companies were dispersed in small garrisons and used for sentry duty with only minimal training. Exercises with limbered guns were not performed until mobilization. The companies were concentrated at Dresden only once a year for a very short period of training where they were permitted to fire the field and fortress guns. With the outbreak of the 1809 campaign, four batteries were hurriedly mobilized. A further three batteries remained in Saxony while they were being formed. Four foot batteries and one horse battery accompanied the main Saxon army during the campaign. The remaining two batteries were assigned to the Polish theater.

In 1810, with the reorganization of the Saxon army, the regimental artillery was disbanded with the guns being concentrated into the artillery regiment giving it sixteen companies. The Feld-Fuss-Batterie (former Haus-Artillerie-Compagnie) was disbanded, its troops being absorbed by the others. The horse artillery now consisted of two batteries formed in a brigade. They consisted of: 1 Major 1 Adjutant-major 11st Class Kapitan 1 2nd Class Kapitan 2 Premierleutnants 4 Sousleutnants 2 Sergeants 4 Feuerwerkers 2 Quartermasters 16 Corporals 2 Surgeons 4 Trumpeters 2 Blacksmiths 40 1st Qass Gunners 160 2nd Qass Gunners 242 Total 226 Horses The foot artillery staff consisted of: 1 Colonel 2 Leutnant Colonels 3 Majors 7 Adjutants-majors 1 Regimental Quartermaster 1 Regimental Judge 1 Regimental Surgeon 1 Staff Secretary 6 Assistant Surgeons 1 Provost 24 Total The sixteen companies each had: Per Company 1 or 1 2 4 2 4 12 2 6 2 16 SQ 114

Total 81st Class Captains 8 2nd Class Captains 16 Leutnants 32 Unterleutnants 16 Sergeants 32 Master Artificiers 48 Artificiers 16 Quartermasters 96 Corporals 32 Drummers 2561st Class Gunners 1,230 2nd Qass Gunners 1,824 Total

The artillery train battalion consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Leutnant 16 Sergeants 1 Quartermaster 24 Corporals 2 Trumpeters 1 Blacksmith 28§_Soldiers 330 Total 134 Horses Documents indicate that in March 1811, some of the available Saxon artillery equipment was as follows: In the Dresden Arsenal: 12 - 24pdr cannons 28 -12pdr cannons 40 - 8pdr cannons 57 - 4pdr cannons 2 - 6pdr cannons (Austrian) 8 - 3pdr cannons (Austrian) 1 - 6pdr cannons (Prussian) 6 - 24pdr howitzers on carriages 6 - 16pdr howitzers on carriages 19 - 8pdr howitzers on carriages 1 - 8pdr howitzer on immobile base 7 - 4pdr howitzer on immobile base 4 - 48pdr mortar on carriages 4 - 32pdr mortar on carriages 6 - 24pdr mortar on carriages 6 - 16pdr mortar on carriages 1 - 12pdr experimental cannon 1 - 6pdr experimental cannon 1 - 8pdr experimental howitzer In the old arsenal of the Dresden fortress: 38 -18pdr cannons 38 -12pdr cannons I - Spdr cannons 46- 6pdr cannons I I - 4pdr cannons 3 - 3pdr cannons 5 - 2pdr cannons 2 - lpdr cannons In the Konigstein fortress:

18 - 24pdr cannons without carriages 6 - 18pdr cannons without carriages 2 - 12pdr cannons without carriages 2 - 8pdr cannons without carriages 5 - 6pdr cannons without carriages 6 - 6pdr cannons on carriages 12- 8pdr howitzers 8 - 48pdr mortars 12 - 32pdr mortars At Wittenberg: 38 - 18pdr iron cannons 38 - 12pdr iron cannons 20 - 6pdr iron cannons In addition, the regular army appears to have had the following artillery material assigned to it: 1st Division (4 batteries) 8 - 8pdr cannons 4 - 8pdr howitzers 2 - Heavy 12pdr cannons 6 - Light 12pdr cannons 4 - 8pdr howitzers 8 - 8pdr shot caissons 8 - 8pdr howitzer shell caissons 16 - 12pdr shot caissons 8 - 8pdr howitzer shell caissons 2nd Division (4 Batteries) 12 - 8pdr cannons 6 - 8pdr howitzers 4 - Light 12pdr cannons 2 - 8pdr howitzers 12 - 8pdr shot caissons 12 - 8pdr howitzer shell caissons 8 - 12pdr shot caissons 4 - 8pdr howitzer shell caissons 3rd Division (4 Batteries) 12 - 8pdr cannons 6 - 8pdr howitzers 4 - Light 12pdr cannons 2 - 8pdr howitzers 12 - 8pdr shot caissons 12 - 8pdr howitzer shell caissons 8- 12pdr shot caissons 4 - 8pdr howitzer shell caissons 1st Division Park 1 - 8pdr cannon 1 - Heavy 12pdr cannon 1 -8pdr1lowitzer

10 - 8pdr shot caissons 12 - 12pdr shot caissons 24 - 8pdr howitzer shell caissons 37 - Infantry munition caissons 3 - Cavalry munition caissons 2nd Pivfopn P?rk 1 - 8pdr cannon 1 - 12pdr cannon 1 - 8pdr howitzer 14 - 8pdr shot caissons 7 - 12pdr shot caissons 24 - 8pdr howitzer shell caissons 37 - Infantry munition caissons 3 - Cavalrv munition caissons J

?rd PivjgiQn Paris 1 - 8pdr cannon 1 -12pdr cannon 1 - 8pdr howitzer 14 - 8pdr shot caissons 7 - 12pdr shot caissons 24 - 8pdr howitzer shell caissons 37 - Infantry munition caissons 3 - Cavalry munition caissons Two Horse Batteries 12 - 6pdr/8pdr cannons 4 - 4pdr howitzers 12 - 6pdr/8pdr shot caissons 4 - 4pdr howitzer shell caissons Hprsff Battery Parfr 18 - 8pdr caissons 8 - 4pdr howitzer shell caissons In this period there were three new guns under study for use in the Saxon army. These guns were eventually adopted for general use, but the old guns were not totally abandoned. They were a new 12pdr, a 6pdr, and a 8pdr howitzer. The new 12pdr varied from its predecessor principally in that it was significantly lighter. The old guns weighed 2,100 kg and the new gun weighed only 1,400 ke. These were 18 caliber guns, that is that the barrel's length was 18 times the diameter of the bore. The principal shortcoming of the gun was the direct result of its lightness. Its weight was insufficient to minimize its recoil. In sandy soil, it would recoil ten paces, with some of the recoil being minimized by the newly designed carriage. The 6pdr was new to the Saxon army. No doubt it was adopted to minimize supply considerations when it operated in support of the French who began abandoning the 8pdr in 1803 with the adoption of the system of the Year XI. The new 6pdr was also an 18 caliber weapon. It weighed 700 kg. The gun performed very satisfactorily and was adopted by the horse artillery, replacing the 4pdrs they had used in the past. The 6pdr had an over open sights range of 425 paces and a maximum range of 1,625 paces. When firing cannister its maximum range was about 600 paces. The new 8pdr howitzer was a 7 caliber weapon. The weapon weighed 1,400 kg. The maximum range of the howitzer was 1,625 paces and its minimum range was about 150

paces. When firing cannister it had a maximum range of about 600 paces. For the 1812 campaign, the Saxons mobilized 1,198 Non-Commissioned Officers and men manning 59 guns. This force was organized into four foot, five regimental and two horse batteries assigned to the VII Corps, a third horse battery assigned to the IV Cavalry Reserve Corps and a regimental battery assigned to the Prinz Maximilian Regiment, 34th Division, XI Corps. The foot and horse batteries and their commanders for the 1812 campaign were: Battery 1st Horse Battery 2nd Horse Battery 1st Foot Battery 2nd Foot Battery 3rd Foot Battery 4th Foot Battery

Commander Kapitan von Roth Kapitan von Hiller Kapitan von Brause Kapitan Sontag Kapitan Bonniot Kapitan Rouvroy

After the return from Russia the Saxon artillery was reorganized and consisted of two eight gun foot batteries, a 12pdr reserve battery and two four gun horse batteries. These were: 1st Foot Battery (Kapitan Dietrich) 2nd Foot Battery (Kapitan Zandt) 1st Horse Battery (Kapitan Probsthayn) 2nd Horse Battery (Kapitan Birnbaum) 12pdr Reserve Battery (Kapitan Rouvroy) With the reorganization the internal structure of the artillery was altered and now consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 1 Sousleutnant 1 Sergeant 1 Oberfeuerwerker 1 Fourier 1 Surgeon 10 Feuerwerker-Corporals 2 Drummers 2 Sappers 3 Artisans 100 Kanoniers 124 Total The train now consisted of: 1 Sousleutnant 1 Sergeant 4 Corporals 12 Train soldiers 4 Train soldiers 12 Train soldiers 8 Train soldiers 3 Train soldiers

1 Horse 4 Horses 24 Horses 8 Horses 24 Horses 16 Horses 6 Horses

6-6 pdr guns 2-8pdr howitzers 6-6pdr shot caissons 4 8 pdr grenade caissons 1 Requisition wagon

2 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 10 Train soldiers 61 Total

4 Horses 1 Rack wagon 4 Horses 1 Company wagon 4 Horses 1 Field Forge 12 Horses Reserve 105 Total

The single 12pdr battery had the same organization as the other batteries. However, its train unit had: 1 Sousleutnant 1 Sergeant 5 Corporals 18 Train soldiers 4 Train soldiers 12 Train soldiers 8 Train soldiers 3 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 12 Train soldiers 80 Total

1 Horse 5 Horses 36 Horses 8 Horses 48 Horses 16 Horses 6 Horses 4 Horses 4 Horses 4 Horses 12 Horses 142 Total

6-12pdr guns 2-8pdr howitzers 12-12pdr shot caissons 4-8pdr grenade caissons 1 Requisition wagon 1 Rack wagon 1 Company wagon 1 Field Forge Reserve

The single 6pdr horse battery had: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 1 Sousleutnant 1 Sergeant 1 Oberfeuerwerker 1 Fourier 1 Surgeon 7 Feuerwerker-Corporals 2 Trumpeters 1 Smith 3 Artisans 20 Kanoniers 99 Total The train was now consisted of: 1 Sousleutnant 1 Sergeant 4 Corporals 12 Train soldiers 4 Train soldiers 12 Train soldiers 12 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 10 Train soldiers 64 Total

1 Horse 4 Horses 24 Horses 8 Horses 24 Horses 24 Horses 4 Horses 4 Horses 4 Horses 10 Horses 111 Total

4-6pdr guns 2-8pdr howitzers 6-6pdr shot caissons 4-8pdr grenade caissons 1 Administration wagon 1 6pdr spare carriage 1 Field Forge Reserve

This organization appears not to have continued been under the allies. On 14 March 1814, "mobile" batteries were organized and they consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 1 Sousleutnant 1 Sergeant 2 Feuerwerker 1 Fourier 1 Surgeon 6 Corporals 2 Trumpeters 1 Smith 1 Saddlemaker 20 Oberkanoniers SQ Unterkanoniers 98 Total The train consisted of: 1 Leutnant 1 Sergeant 6 Corporals 1 Trumpeter 12 Train soldiers 6 Train soldiers 12 Train soldiers 6 Train soldiers 4 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 10 Train soldiers 16 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 3 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 2 Train soldiers 10 Train soldiers 98 Total

1 Horse 6 Horses 1 Horse 24 Horses 12 Horses 24 Horses 24 Horses 8 Horses 4 Horses 20 Horses 32 Horses 4 Horses 6 Horses 4 Horses 4 Horses 4 Horses 10 Horses 177 Total

4-6pdr guns 2-8pdr howitzers 6-6pdr shot wurst caissons 4-8pdr grenade wurst caissons 2 6pdr reserve wurst wagons l-8pdr reserve wurst wagons 5-6pdr shot caissons 8-8pdr grenade caissons l-6pdr spare carriage 1 Requisition wagon 1 Company wagon 1 Rack wagon 1 Field Forge Reserve

In early 1815 it was increased to four foot batteries and two horse batteries. Later, this regiment was increased to twelve companies formed into three brigades. One of these brigades was of horse artillery. The staff of the regiment consisted of: 1 Oberst & Commander 1 Oberstleutnant 3 Majors 5 Adjutants 1 Regimental quartermaster 1 Auditeur 1 Senior Regimental Surgeon 1 Staff secretary 12 Assistant surgeons 1 Regimental Drum Major or Staff Trumpeter 27 Total

The twelve companies consisted of: 6 Capitans 1. Classe 6 Capitans 2. Classe 12 Premierleutnants 24 Sousleutnants 12 Senior pyrotechnicians 36 Pyrotechnicians 12 Fouriers 72 Corporals 2 Trumpeters with the leading batteries 22 Drummers and hornists 36 Sappers 192 Senior gunners 972 Gunners 1,416 Total In addition to the artillery brigades, there was also a handwerker company and a battalion of train. Uniforms of the Saxon Artillery and Train The uniform worn by the regimental artillerists was the same as that worn by the regiment to which they were attached. However, the uniforms of the regular artillery formations were significantly different. The Saxon artillerists traditionally wore a dark green jacket with red cuffs, turnbacks, lapels, and collar; the buttons were yellow. Their leatherwork, waistcoat, and breeches were buff. Knee high black gaiters were worn by the enlisted. Before 1809, an edged bicorn was worn which had gold edging. The officers wore a white cockade with no plume, while the Non-Commissioned Officers wore a white plume with a black tip over that cockade. By the 1809 campaign, a black shako was adopted with gold band on its top, decorated with a red plume over the national cockade, red cords, and flounders. It had brass chin scales and a brass shield plaque on the front. The horse artillerists wore approximately the same uniform, but its cut was like that of the chevauxleger regiments. They also wore white breeches instead of buff ones. The train wore a uniform very similar to that of the artillery, The "Stuckknecht" wore an artillery green jacket. They wore black bicorns with black over green plumes. Their waistcoat was the same color as the jacket and had yellow buttons. The rest of the facings, etc., were like that of the artillerists. After 1810 they wore shakos with white plumes and cords. Their cockades were was yellow and blue. Their coat was light blue with black facings piped with red. In 1814 the facings were changed light blue. The collar was of a slightly darker blue than that of the jacket. Their buttons were white and their leatherwork was black. Their trousers were gray with white buttons and a red stripe up the outer seams. Uniforms of Supply Train Personnel The Saxon supply train personnel were provided with a regulated uniform, but they do not appear to have been organized into a military formation. They were known as "Proviant-Fuhrknecht/' Their uniform was a medium-dark blue jacket with red cuffs and collar. The breeches were buff and they wore high black riding boots that reached over their knees. They wore a black bicom that had a black over blue plume, and white cockade. Engineer Corps The Engineering Corps was formed in 1631 and was part of the general staff. In 1701 it became part of the field artillery establishment, but in 1702 it returned to the general staff. In 1712 it became an independent corps. In 1806 the Saxon engineering corps consisted of

two brigades, the "Landbrigade" and the "Feldbrigade." Each of these brigades consisted of: 1 Oberstleutnant 1 Major 3 Capitains 3 Premierleutnants 5 Sousleutnants £ Non-Commissioned Officers 19 Total A staff supervised their operations and consisted of: 1 1 1 1

Chef Oberst Ingenieur-quartiermeister Adjutant

In 1763, the Saxon miner corps was organized and consisted of: 1 1 1 1 2 6

Kapitan Premierlieutnant Sousleutnant Sergeant Corporals Miners

The pioneer corps consisted of: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutnant 1 sousleutnant 1 Briickenschreiber 2 Sergeants 2 Corporals 24 Pontooneers The pontooneer company in 1799 had: 1 Kapitan 1 Premierleutenant 1 Sousleutnant 1 Briickenschreiber (Master Bridger) 2 Sergeants 1 Surgeon 2 Corporals 42 Pontooneers 57 Total The pontooneer company manned 82 covered and 10 hollow pontoons in wartime. However, train existed to transport 52 covered and 10 hollow pontoons. In addition there were 3 reserve pontoon wagons, one tool wagon, one field forge, and one coal wagon. This provided a total of 73 wagons with enough bridging equipment to traverse a 1,000 foot river.

In 1810, there was a reorganization and the Ingenieur-Korps staff consisted of: lOberst 2 Majors 3 Kapitans 3 Premierleutnants 6 Sousleutnants 1 Adjudant sous-leutnant 12 Tranchee Sergeanten (Trenching Sergeants) 26 Total The pontooneer company remained unchanged, and a sapper company was raised and consisted of: 1 Kapitan 3 Premierleutnants 3 Sousleutnants 1 Sappeur-Sergeant 1 Miniermeister 1 Fourier 3 Drummers 18 Obersappeurs 26 Untersappeurs 127 Total This force sent a detachment into Russia, and afterwards there was a reorganization to make good the combat losses. However, there was no reorganization of the internal structure of either the pontooneers or the sappers until 1815. On 12 August 1815, the engineering corps was reorganized and consisted of: 1 Oberst 1 Major 3 Kapitans 4 Premierleutnants £ Sousleutnants 13 Total The combined sapper and pontooneer company consisted of: 1 Mineurmeister 1 Sappeursergeant 1 Pontoniersergeant 1 Briickenschreiber 1 Fourier 1 Surgeon 3 Drummers 10 Obersappeurs 3 Pontonierkorporals 72 Untersappeurs 4J Pontoneers 137 Total When the landwehr was organized in 1814 there was a "freiwilliger Banner" militia troops. This force contained a single sapper company formed with four officers and 126

men. By 18 February 1814, this force consisted of six officers and 153 men. When the landwehr was disbanded after the 1814 campaign, this force was absorbed into the existing line engineering forces. In 1815, the organized engineering detachments began operating with the mobile forces. They consisted of: 2 Premierleutnants 1 Sousleutnant 1 Minirmeister (Master Miner) 1 Sappeur Sergeant 1 Pontonier Sergeant 1 Fourier .1 Surgeon 7 Ober Sappeurs (Senior Sappers) 1 Pontonier Corporal (Pontooneer Corporal) 48 Unter Sappeurs (Junior Sappers) 21 Pontoniers (Pontooneers) 88 Total The uniforms of the engineer corps were identical to those worn by the artillery except their buttons were silver. No other distinctions between their uniforms existed. Saxon Flags and Standards Each infantry regiment had two colors, one for each battalion. The 1st Battalion carried the Leibstandart or Life Color. They were always white. The 2nd Battalion carried the ordinary color, whose base color was the regimental facing color. Post 1810 Regiment Leib Grenadier Garde Prince Maximilian KonigPoppy Red Prinz Anton Prinz Clemens Prinz Frederich August von LowGreen von Rechten von Niesenmeuschel

Color Yellow Yellow Dark Blue Dark Blue Green Crimson Crimson

Both the Leib and Ordinary standards carried the same emblems and crests. One side carried the Saxon royal arms surmounted by the royal crown and draped with the ribbons of the Polish Order of the White Eagle and the Saxon St. Heinreich Military Order. There were crosses of both orders hanging below the arms. In each corner there was a small shield bearing the cipher "RS" for Rex Saxoniae - King of Saxony. On the other side of the standard was a white crowned shield encircled by a green laurel and palm branches that bore the royal cipher "FA" for Frederich August, the King of Saxony. This shield also bore the ribbons of the Order of the White Eagle and the St. Heinreich Military Order. It is not clear if the light infantry had standards, but indications are that they did not. It is known that the Hussars had no standard. The other cavalry regiments did carry standards and the colors were unique to each regiment. One standard was carried for each squadron and these squadron standards were not always identical, as shown below.

Regiment Garde du Corps Leibgarde Karabinier Rochitzski Prinz Clemens EV

Polenz Prinz Johann Prinz Albrecht

Kc

Base N u m b e r

4 4

Border Color white white

4 4 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3

white white white red white red white red white red

Fringes & Color gold crimson

Tassels blue/gold white/crimson

poppy/green yellow green/violet

white/crimson yellow/crimson light green/violet

lt.blue/ gold

lt.blue/gold

black/green

white/crimson

green/brown

w h i t e / crimson

All standards bore the Saxon arms as described for the infantry earlier, but in the case of the cuirassiers, the standards were surmounted by a mantling and the royal crown. On the other side were the royal ciphers "FAR" encircled by two green laurel branches. The borders were a complicated design of arabesques, oak leaves, and other motifs. To distinguish between the four squadrons, each regiment also affixed a bow and ribbons. The ribbons were white, red, blue, or yellow.

I

Saxon general officers, 1810 General of Infantry, Lieutenant-General and Royal Adjutant, General of Cavalry, Major-General, and Officer of the Royal General Staff This artist has made a mistake. The breeches should be red.

\

.

Saxon Artillerymen, 1810 Artillery Officer, Train Officer, and Horse Artillery Sergeant From Knotel

r*

/

Saxon

Muskets

The Alt-Suhler Musket, Model 1778 The Artillery Commission of 1774 was presided over by the Minister of Weir. It was to investigate the virtues of a new model musket and did so between 1774 and 1776. This new model combined the merits of the Saxon, Danish, and Dutch weapons of the period. It was unusual in that it had a 17.2mm bore, which was smaller than the weapons used by the other armies of the period. It was accepted and became the Saxon standard in 1778. The inspiration for the smaller caliber and the cylindrical ramrod came from the Danish weapon of the period. The commission took the "waterpan," which had a groove and drain for rainwater, from the Dutch model. The swan neck of the lock and the unusual bayonet fixture, which had two knobs on the shaft, as well as the sleeve shaft with three interruptions, came from the Saxon weapon. The barrel of the musket was 106.2 cm long. The rings on the stock were steel, but the rest of the fittings were brass. The bayonet adopted with this musket was triangular and 35.4 cm long. This weapon became known as the 1778 Model, or later the Alt-Suhler Musket. In 1778, the Spangenberg firm of Suhl received a contract for 15,000 of these muskets to be delivered within two years. A second order was placed with the Klaffen factory in Obernhau for 1,000 muskets. In 1789, the Schul works in Anschutz and Spangenberg received orders for 1,200 further weapons. A total of 17,200 Model 1778 muskets were on order, sufficient to arm the entire Saxon infantry establishment. This was unusual because there was always breakage and other reasons for muskets to be lost, and this number of weapons on order allowed for no replacement. It is inconceivable why the Saxon ministry chose to do this, as Saxony had one of the most developed arms industries in Germany. This failure to continue to produce a military weapon resulted in the financial collapse of the smaller Olbernhau work at Klaffenberg. This additionally resulted in the Saxon arms industry being as inadequate as those of the other European nations of its day, but it also saddled the Saxons with a musket of so unusual a caliber that logistical problems were bound to occur. This musket remained the standard issue for many years, never being completely replaced. Neu-Suhler Musket - Model 1809 The proclivity for unusual calibers persisted, and in 1809 a 16.5 mm weapon was adopted. The light infantry required a new weapon, and this weapon was developed for the four light infantry battalions organized in 1810. The Neu-Suhler Musket was unusual for more than its light caliber. It had a notched sight at the end of the barrel and a fixed rear sight welded to the upper barrel. In contrast to the other weapons of its day, these two sights were firmly set in the line of sight. The barrel was fastened to the stock with two slides and a screw on the upper strapping instead of the usual rings. In addition, the Neu-Suhler musket had a hooked trail screw which held the Baskul disk in place. If the slide and screw on the upper shaft were loosened, the barrel could be released from the stock at the muzzle and hooked at the Baskul disk by the end. This arrangement had previously only been seen in sport and hunting weapons and made dissassembly safer and easier. The weapon was extremely light, weighing only 3.75 kg. The barrel length was 106.9 cm and its overall length of 146.5 cm was essentially identical to the Alt-Suhler weapon. It had a triangular bayonet whose blade was 63.7 cm long which was an unusually long bayonet for the day. Despite the smaller bore, the Neu-Suhler weapon had an unusually heavy kick, which the light infantry repeatedly complained about. Much of this is due to the lightness of the weapon and the heavy powder charge of 10.9 gm. A second complaint was that the conical touch holes were often not sufficiently clear after the first shot to permit proper use of the

weapon. This problem persisted until 1819, when reworked French weapons were issued to replace this weapon. The Vienna Musket - Model 1811 In 1811, the Vienese musket manufacturer Philipp Calnot delivered a new model musket to Dresden. There are no documents available, however, to show the impact and influence this weapon had on the 1812 campaign nor how many were issued. This weapon was delivered during the course of a major influx of Austrian and French weapons (muskets, carbines, and pistols) that was occurring during this period. This weapon was also a 16.5 mm weapon with a retractable sight which was probably intended for use by the light infantry. Its construction was more durable than that of the Neu-Suhler Model and it incorporated many innovations from Austrian weapons. The barrel was 106 cm long and its overall length was 144 cm, so it did not vary much from the Saxon norm, but other features were taken from the Austrian Model 1798. It had the regulation Saxon cylindrical ramrod and conical touch hole. Its bayonet socket was of Austrian design but the flat triangular blade of the bayonet was Saxon. The bayonet's blade was only 47.2 cm long, shorter than that of the Neu-Suhler bayonet. The gun weighed 4.5 kg and had a smaller kick than the Neu-Suhler weapon as well.

Infantry and Invalids, 1802 Fourier, Musketeer, Invalid Officers in parade and interim uniforms, and Invalid

The Saxons in the Wars of the French

Revolution

Saxony remained neutral from the eruption of the French revolution until 1792, when it provided a contingent to the Coalition army. It was on 19 October 1792 that Saxony decided it would provide the a contingent to serve in the Imperial war with France. This force was to consist of two cavalry regiments, two hussar squadrons, four musketeer battalions and one grenadier battalion. The five infantry battalions were to be organized in two provisional infantry regiments. Each battalion was to be supported by two regimental guns, and a reserve artillery force of four 8pdrs or howitzers and the necessary men and munitions was to be provided. The force was organized by 12 December 1792 and consisted of: General Staff Commissary, Hospital, Paymaster, Magazine, Bakery, etc. Karabinier Regiment (8 cos) Kurland Chevauleger Regiment (8 cos) Hussars (2 sqns) 1/Kurfurst Regiment 1/Prinz Clemens Regiment 2/Prinz Anton Regiment 2/Prinz Gotha Regiment Christiani Grenadier Battalion1 Artillery, Train & Horse Park

Men 3

Horses 17

475 695 696 325 687 687 676 676 672 365

687 698 698 321 45 45 40 40 40 279

The artillery consisted of ten regimental guns, two per battalion and a howitzer battery under Hauptman Birnbaum. On 10 February this force departed its garrison and marched to the Rhine. In March three Saxon columns moved through Frankfurt and soon joined the siege of Mainz. Between 23 March and 22 June 1793 the Saxon contingent served with the Prussians in their attempt to reduce the fortress of Mainz. There were skirmishes, but no major pitched battles. On 22 June the fortress capitulated. On 30 July the entire Saxon corps moved to the left bank of the Rhine and advanced into the Saar. On 14 September, at 6:00 A.M., the German advanced posts by Rohrbach and Spiesen, not far from the cane farms, encountered a French detachment of about 15,000 men and 8 guns. The French attacked and threw the Saxons back. In order to hinder the French, who won more and more terrain, two squadrons of the Saxon Karabiniers, under Oberst von Ferber, and one squadron of Hussars, under Rittmeister von Gutschmidt, advanced against the French, supported by a battalion of the Prussian Crousaz Infantry Regiment. The Saxon cavalry advanced at the trot and luckily cleared a major defile without incident. They then attacked the French cavarly, which awaited their attack with drawn sabers. The French were struck with such force that they were thrown back. The advance of the Crousaz Infantry Regiment and the defeat of their cavalry caused the French infantry to withdraw. The French lost one gun and 32 prisoners. At the same time the French were struck frontally near Neunkirchen. Two Prussian battalions supported by five guns, and the Saxon battalions of the Prinz Anton and Prinz Clemens Regiments, supported by a further seven guns and by two squadrons of the Karabiniers and Kurland Chevaufegers drove the French back. On 23 September Fiirst von Hohenlohe lead forward his forces in a reconnaissance of the French forces standing by Blieskastel. The allies advanced in four columns formed of Prussian and Saxon infantry and Saxon cavalry. The fire of the allied regimental guns drove the French artillery from the heights and a skirmish force, supported by the Saxon

two squadrons of the Karabinier Regiment and a detachment of hussars, drove back a French battalion. The Saxon cavarly suddenly found itself attacked by French cavalry from a nearby woods and fired upon by a French battery unmasked by the movement of the infantry. The Karabiniers struck the French cavalry and drove them back, capturing the position. The engagement ended with that action. The war was to continue in a series of small actions until 29 and 30 November when a major battle was joined at Kaiserslautern. The Saxon battalions Kurfiirst and Prinz Anton stood in the first line on the Moorlautern heights and were attacked by two columns of French infantry. The French were counter attacked by the Kurland Chevaulegers, which found itself attacked in the rear. The Karabinier Regiment rode to their assistance, striking the French in the flank and driving them back. However, in the center of the allied lines, the French attacked with bayonets, inflicting heavy casualties and suffering even more. Unfortunately, night fell before the battle was resolved. On the morning of 30 November the battle renewed. The Kurfiirst and Anton battalions struck at the French and drove them back to the Erlenbach woods. Their attack was supported by the Clemens and Gotha battalions. The latter two battalions were subsequently withdrawn to a position by Kaiserslautern. The French rallied their forces and then sent forward an attack with 15 battalions and 30 squadrons, but the assault was defeated. The allies Saxons lost 1 officer and 28 men dead, 11 officers and 139 men wounded. The total allied losses were around 1,200 men. The French lost about 6,000 men. In the following pursuit the Saxon Hussars captured 60 French provision wagons and captured 100,000 livres in their war treasury. On 4 January 1794 the Saxon corps standing on the Rhine was disbanded and returned to Saxony. In its place a new force was organized and dispatched to the front. This force consisted of: Hussar Regiment (2 sqns)(313 men) Kurfiirst Cuirassier Regiment (4 sqns)(633 men) Albrecht Chevauleger Regiment (4 sqns)(633 men) 1/von Lindt Regiment (652 men) 2/von Langenau Regiment (652 men) 1/Prinz Maximilian Regiment (652 men) 2/Prinz Xaver Regiment (652 men) von Thiimmel Grenadier Battalion (652 men)2 The only forces from the original contingent that did not stand down were the artillery battery and the medical personnel. They joined the new contingent and the force stood on the Rhine ready for action on 4 March 1794. The first battle they were to partake in occurred on 13 July 1794 at Kaiserslautern. However, the Saxons were not engaged in any significant combat. In October they withdrew to Mainz and in the end of 1794 the Saxon contingent once again stood down. And at the same time it was reorganized and now consisted of three cavalry regiments (696 men each), 4 hussar squadrons (701 men), three infantry regiments (1,320 men each), three grenadier battalions (657 men) and in addition to the two regimental guns per battalion, there was an 8pdr battery and a howitzer battery, each with six guns and 307 artillerists. In preparation for the 1795 campaign the Saxons were organized as follows: 1st Brigade: Generalmajor von Zezschwitz Gersdorff (later Sacken) Chevauleger Regiment (4 sqns) Zezschwitz Cuirassier Regiment (4 sqns) 2nd Brigade: Generalmajor von Rechten Schonberg Grenadier Battalion3

Barnekow Grenadier Battalion4 8pdr Battery 3rd Brigade: Generalmajor von Wiedermann von Nostitz Infantry Regiment (2 bns) von Zanthier Infantry Regiment (2 bns) von Wiedermann Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Howitzer Battery 4th Brigade: Generalmajor von Rosier Rosier Chevauleger Regiment (4 sqns) Hussar Regiment (4 sqns) The force had a total of 9,706 men and 4,813 horses, with 28 guns. Despite this force, during 1795 they did not engage in any significant battles. In 1796 the Saxon contingent consisted of: 1st Brigade: Generalmajor von Zezschwitz Hussar Regiment (4 sqns) (712 men) Kurland Chevauleger Regiment (4 sqns)(726 men) Karabiniers (4 sqns) (732 men) 2nd Brigade: Generalmajor von Nostitz Brandenstein Grenadier Battalion (675)5 2/Kurfiirst Infantry Regiment (677 men) 1/Prinz Anton Infantry Regiment (688 men) Weimar Jager Battalion (550) 8pdr Battery (4 guns) 3rd Brigade: Generalmajor Sanger von den Heyde Infantry Regiment (1,363 men) 1/Gotha Infantry Regiment (688) 2/Prinz Clemens Infantry Regiment (676 men) Glassey Grenadier Battalion (675)6 4th Brigade: Generalmajor von Dehn-Rothselser Gotha Dragoon Regiment (3 sqns)(507 men) Albrecht Chevauleger Regiment (4 sqns) (726 men) On 2 June 1796 this force found itself engaged in a battle by Kirn. Sanger's artillery engaged in some counter battery with some French artillery and the Saxon Hussars served with the Austrian light forces. The total Saxon losses were two dead and three wounded. It was not a major action. On 15 June 1796 it was engaged once again at Wetzlar. The Saxons stood on the allied right wing. They drove the French out of the village of Altenberg and their cavalry was engaged by and defeated a force of French cavalry. However, they found themselves too far forward and were showered with musketry and artillery shot. The battle was one of many inconclusive engagements. By'the fall the Saxons had withdrawn back to their lagers and shortly later they were withdrawn from the war. They were to remain neutral until 1806 when the entire army was mobilized. The 1806 Campaign and the Battles ofSaalfeld and Jena Suggestions that the Saxons were "dragooned" into joining the Prussians are gross exaggerations and a hangover from the Seven Years War when Frederick the Great did, indeed, take their army captive and force them into joining his army. The Saxon army was totally mobilized and completely integrated into the Prussian army. Their first action was at Schelitz on 8/9 October. This engagement was more of a

clash of light troops and cavalry than a serious fight. The Saxons and Prussians fell back from the fight. On 10 October the Saxons found themselves in a major action at Saalfeld. The Xaver Regiment and Kurfiirst Infantry Regiments attacked the French on a ridge by the road from Saalfeld. The Xaver Regiment advanced against the village of Beulwitz where it soon found itself under murderous musketry and was attacked in the flank. It collapsed and withdrew under the protection of the Kurfiirst Regiment. The Kurfiirst Regiment was later sent in a bayonet attack against the village of Krosten. This attack was not successful. Later Bevilaqua's brigade was attacked by the French 9th and 10th Hussar Regiments. The Saxon Hussars counter attacked, but broke under the French attack. It was during this attack that Prinz Ludwig von Preussen was killed. With his death the Saxon and Prussian will to fight collapsed. The Prusso-Saxon forces withdrew from the field. They marched from the battlefield at Saalfeld and arrived at Jena on 14 October in time for their fateful encounter with Napoleon. On the morning of 14 October Napoleon issued orders for the main body of his army to advance against the Prusso-Saxon positions around Jena. Graf Tauentzien had deployed his light troops and the Saxon 1/Friedrich August Infantry Regiment along the Closwitz-Liitzeroda line and placed his line troops and cavalry behind them. At 6:00 A.M., the Pelet Fusilier Battalion stood in and before Closwitz, the Schiitzen stood on the ground by Rauthales,. Valentini's Jager Company stood to their left in the Zwatzen Woods with a weak detachment from the Herwarth Grenadier Half Battalion. The 1/ Friederich August Infantry Regiment and the Wernder Jager Company stood between Closwitz and Liitzeroda. the Rosen Fusilier Battalion stood in the Isserstadt Forest to defend the Lieskauer Valley. The other half of the Herwarth Grenadier Battalion stood in Dornberg with the Zweiffel Infantry Regiment, the Saxon 1/Rechten Infantry Regiment, and the Studnitz (half) horse battery'. On the Dornberg heights stood the Thiollaz, Lichtenhayn and Lecoq Grenadier Battalions with the Tiillmann Howitzer Battery. Behind them stood eight squadrons of the Gettkandt Hussar Regiment. The Saxon von Hundt and von Metzsch Grenadier Battalions stood in the Pfarrholz Woods. Tauentzien's light troops passed through the line of the Saxon 1/Friederich August Infantry Regiment and advanced about 200 yards, no longer standing behind the 1/ Zweiffel Regiment. The Pelet Fusilier Battalion advanced and aligned itself with the first line on the left wing. The von Hundt and von Metzsch Grenadier Battalions advanced out of the Pfarrholz Woods to cover the left wing to the left of Closwitz, with the von Metzsch Battalion on the right and the von Hundt Battalion on the left. Three squadrons of the Gettkandt Hussars posted themselves in the Zwatzenholz Woods between and in front of the grenadiers and Closwitz. In the middle of the line stood the Prussian Zweiffel, the Saxon 1/Rechten, Saxon 1/ Friederich August and the Bose Battery. They were withdrawn behind Klein-Romstadt. The Maximilian Regiment, 2/Rechten and Winkel Grenadier Battalion, under General von Schonberg, stood by Vierzehnheiligen. They had originally been assigned to Tauentzien's Corps, but had, by oversight, been left without orders. The Saxon Generalmajor von Cerrini had, as Tauentzien's advance began, received the order to march forward in line. His brigade was deployed in column to the left and swung to the right into line, beginning their advance. An adjutant of General Tauentzien remarked to Cerrini that his division had moved too far to the right. This was corrected by a partial swinging to the right by half divisions that brought the right wing forward so that the village of Liitzeroda remained on the right of the village. On the right wing of the brigade stood the Thiollaz Grenadier Battalion, to their left stood the Lecoq Grenadier Battalion and on the left wing stood the Lichtenhayn Grenadier Battalion. To the right of

Liitzeroda stood three squadrons of the Gettkandt Hussars and a battery formed from the regimental guns of the Prussian Zweiffel Regiment and the Saxon 1/Rechten Infantry Regiment under the Saxon Leutnant of artillery von Bose. Marechal Lannes had placed his batteries in the intervals of the first line of Suchet's division. The three battalions of the 17th L£g£re (Clapar&de's Brigade) and two horse guns moved towards Closwitz while the 34th and 40th Line Regiments advanced to support their attack. The four battalions of Wedell's brigade remained in reserve. Gazan's Division deployed to the left with the 100th and 103th Line Regiments in the first line and the 21st Leg£re in the reserve. The French skirmishers were not able to move forward aggressively and were unable to see Closwitz. They moved widely to the left. They could, however, see the lead elements of the allied line and engaged it with a lively skirmish fire. The fog greatly complicated the development of the battle. Being unable to see specific targets the allied infantry fired into the fog until many units had fired their last cartridges. The von Hundt and von Metzsch Grenadier Battalions were taken under an uncertain cannon fire from a French battery that appears to have been placed to the right of Rauthal. Cerrini's grenadiers were also taken under cannon fire and a caisson of the Lichtenhayn Battalion was destroyed. The battalion guns returned the French fire, but only with the assistance of the Studnitz (half) Horse Battery were they able to begin to control the French artillery fire. The brigade pulled its right back to the Liitzeroda village while detachments of the Prussian Erichsen Fusiliers and Werner Jagers pulled back behind the right wing. They were out of ammunition. Tiillmann's Howitzer Battery, about 4-500 paces behind the main position, engaged two French batteries. To the right of Liitzeroda, von Bosen's battery fired in support of the Erischen Fusilier's skirmish line, but was under constant skirmish fire and its gunners wished to withdraw from the fight because of the casualties they were suffering. Around 8:00 A.M., General Tauentzien was wounded as the first line pulled back through the line of the 1/Friederich August Infantry Regiment. The Saxons then aligned themselves with the 1/Rechten Infantry Regiment and assumed the front line of the allied formation. The weakness of the allied line became apparent as the fog began to burn off and the Saxons soon found themselves severely attacked by the French skirmishers. The von Erischen Fusiliers, to the right of Liitzeroda, were driven back. Von Bose's battery and its supporting hussars were soon completely isolated. The battery fired cannister on the French skirmishers in an effort to drive them back, but was soon forced to withdraw. The Thiollaz Grenadier battalion was ordered by Tauentzien to strike the head of the French column moving out of the Lieskauer Valley. However, being unable to see the French it marched in the general direction not knowing what it would meet. At a range of 60 paces the Saxons engaged the head of the French column. The French recoiled, but soon recovered and began a second push forward only to be driven back again. The battalion guns, under Leutnant Silber, supported the Saxon infantry with cannister fire. The Rechten and Friederich August infantry battalions, under Oberst Winter (commander of the von Rechten Regiment), soon found themselves overwhelmed by the advancing French and were driven back on the Zweiffel Regiment. During their withdrawal a French artillery shot destroyed one of the caissons of the Friederich August Regiment. The French pursued the Saxons aggressively. General Tauentzien rode forward to Tiillman's battery and ordered it to move forward and fire through the interval of the withdrawing allied troops. At the same time an adjutant was sent to the infantry to order them to open up sufficient room for the cannister fire. General von Cerrini lead the withdrawal from the right wing of the Thiollaz Battalion, bringing order back to its shattered ranks. The Lecoq and Lichtenhayn Battalions

withdrew in good order on the left flank. The Thiollaz Grenadiers remained somewhat forward. Once it was reorganized it again withdrew and fell back to take the position of the retiring Lichtenhayn battalion. All the while it was under heavy French fire. The Tiillmann battery had begun to fire cannister at this point. Though its cavalry support had withdrawn, it began a lively rearguard action to cover the withdrawal of the Saxon grenadiers. However, the strength of the French advance soon threatened it. Despite that, Tauentzien ordered the battery to continue firing to delay the French still further. Kapitan Tullmann told Tauentzien that his losses were heavy and that his battery would soon captured if he did not withdraw. Tauentzien responded by placing his pistol to the captain's head and ordering that he continue the action. However, its supporting cavarly was gone and its munitions were soon expended. It was no longer covered by the Gettkandt Hussar Regiment and became trapped in a deep ditch as it withdrew. It was taken by French chasseurs k cheval. It was 9:30 A.M., as Tauentzien's troops withdrew to the Dornberg heights and took up positions there. They were under almost constant fire from the French and their casualties, at this time, became significant. Nearly half of the Prussians and Saxons had been killed or wounded and their ammunition was almost totally expended. Tauentzien then ordered his front line to withdraw and form a second line by Klein-Romstadt. The Saxon infantry, 1/Friederich August and 1/Rechten, with the Prussian Zweiffel Regiment and the Herwarth Half Grenadier Battalion formed themselves here, constantly under French artillery fire, and moved in the direction of Vierzehnheiligen. The von Bose battery moved to the right wing of the Friederich August battalion and covered the withdrawal with its fire. The Cerrini Grenadier Brigade had already begun its move to Dornberg in order to open space in the line for the TiillmannHowitzer Battery to fire on the French. It moved to the left and joined the recently rallied Thiollaz Grenadier Battalion. The fog, however, soon confused the withdrawal and instead of moving towards the Isserstadt Forest, it encountered more and more of Tauentzien's main body. This force was under heavy pressure and had been badly shot up by the French 34th Line and 17th L£gdre Regiments. The French struck at the Prussian left flank, supporting their attack with three battalions from Gazan's division, where they encountered the Saxon grenadiers. The Lecoq Grenadier battalion had fired most of its ammunition and was hard pressed by the rapidly advancing French. Though it inflicted heavy casualties, it was pushed back. The Lichtenhayn and Thiollaz Battalions were driven back towards the Isserstadt Forest and dispersed. In the woods stood the two companies of the Erichsen Fusiliers, the Rosen Fusilier Battalion and the Werner Jager Company. They had been thrown into the woods after their defeat by the Lieskauer valley. The Lecoq Grenadier battalion sought to join these troops, but upon learning that the French were already moving around the woods they withdrew along the forest edge towards the rear. It soon found itself isolated and surrounded by French skirmishers. Its fire was ineffective and it withdrew towards Vierzehnheiligen, where it jointed the 1/Friederich August Infantry Regiment. Again they were attacked by French skirmishers and moved into a copse on the left and withdrew in disorder towards the rear. Oberstleutnant Lecoq could only draw together a force of 170 men from the now shattered battalion. In contrast, the Prussian forces, Rosen Fusilier Battalion, and the jagers succeeded in withdrawing through the forest and moved behind the Isserstadt. The two grenadier battalions, von Metzsch and von Hundt, had, since 9:30 A.M., been under fire by the French. The Pelet Fusilier Battalion had only moved up to Closwitz and occupied the village while the Valentini Jagers had occupied the Zwantzen Forest. The French skirmishers closed opened fire on the Prussians. They responded in kind. French columns moved forward out of the woods and the Prussians were obliged to withdraw under the protection of three squadrons of the Gettkandt Hussars.

In the Pfaarholz Woods stood the two left wing companies of the Pelet Fusilier Battalion as the cover for the left wing of Tauentzien's forces. The retreating Prussians soon joined them. However, as they moved into the woods, the units became entangled and the French pushed forward rapidly cutting towards the Alten-Gonna defile. The Prussian grenadiers then moved to Hermstadt, later towards Apolda and then towards Weimar where they joined with the debris of the Saxon grenadier brigade. The two fusilier companies moved towards Kapellendorf to join the rest of their battalion. The troops under the personal command of General Tauentzien withdrew in good order past Krippendorf and towards the Vierzehnheiligen heights. Once on the heights, General Tauentzien attempted to reform his troops in line again so as to stave off the French advance. The Zweiffel Regiment took position on the left wing, supporting itself on the village of Vierzehnheiligen. The Saxon 1/Friederich August Regiment stood on the right wing with the von Bose Battery at its side and the Gettkandt Hussars further to the right. The French proceeded to take the position under fire with 8pdr guns and howitzers. The Prussian hussars were soon forced back. The von Bose battery had lost so many men that three files from the 1/Friederich August Battalion were detached to assist in working the guns. The Prussians and Saxons remained in this position until Grawert's cavalry division rode forward to attack the French and permit the the opportunity to resume their withdrawal Around 10:00 A.M., the Guyot's Brigade (8th Hussars and 11th Chasseurs) attacked the Prinz Clemen Chevauleger Regiment. The Saxon regiment was shattered and dispersed as it fled to the rear. Tauentzien's forces facing the formed only half of the Prussian army. The Prussians had a major portion of their forces away from Tauentzien, under Grawert, that were not involved in the early stages of the battle. The Saxons were not to be very active or involved in the early engagements by Grawert's wing. The Polenz Chevaulegers and the Karabiniers served as the link between the Prussians and the Saxons under Niesemeuschel. At 3:00 A.M., a report arrived in the Saxon Headquarters, in Holstadt, that the advanced posts by Mtihlthale could hear the sounds of the French advancing from Jena. They also knew that a strong French column stood on the heights by Cospoda, and that the French were organizing a battery by Fackelscheine. Major von Funck was sent forward with a reconnaissance detachment. Major von Egidy was sent from Hohlstadt between 4:00 and 5:00 A.M., to carry word to Fiirst Hohenlohe. General von Zezschwitz arrived in the lager at 5:00 A.M., to observe the situation. Hohenlohe, armed with this news, reviewed his situation. The position between Camburg and Dornburg was guarded by a force of Prussian grenadiers. The Saxon grenadiers, the Polenz and Albrecht Chevaulegers and the Saxon Hussars were still in their lager. Hohenlohe decided to leave them in their lager so as to keep them as fresh as possible, though they were eventually brought forward. Niesemeuschel's Saxon Division (Burgsdorf and Nehrhoff's Brigades) was ordered, at 5:20 A.M., to advance to the Schnecke and to form facing Remderode along the road so that their left wing stood on the Schnecke by Flohberg and their flank stood on the Isserstadt plain. Their right wing stood on the Schwabhauser plain and consisted of Oberst Boguslawsky's detachment. The Saxon schiitzen stood in closed detachments, supported by the Saxon artillery. Despite the heavy fog, the 2/Niesemeuschel Regiment was pushed about 100 paces forward of the schiitzen, but it was later drawn back into the line. This division was to remain here, unengaged, until much later in the battle. The Saxon staff was uncertain of the direction of march of the main French army. Soon the grenadiers were called forward from the lager and leaving only the von Polenz and Albrecht Chevaulegers in the lager. The Saxons had been hearing musketry from the Cospoda heights since about 6:00 A.M. The Maximilian Infantry Regiment, the 2/Rechten Infantry Regiment, and the Winkel

Grenadier Battalion moved from their bivouac, through Illerstadt towards Vierzehnheiligen, to support Tauentzien's forces in that village. The Saxon cavalry and Dyherrn's brigade stood in the lager with General Grawert and his division. Around 7:00 A.M., General Grawert, hearing the cannon fire in the direction of Apolda, marched his division forward to find the enemy. He directed the cavalry to move to KleinRomstadt on his left wing. The cavalry, 250 horses of the Holtzendorf Cuirassiers, the Henckel Cuirassier Regiment, the Prittwitz and Krafft Dragoon Regiment and Steinwehr's horse battery, moved to the position and the infantry advanced to align itself with the cavalry. General Dyherm moved his forces forward. The right wing reserve, Cerrini's brigade and Sanitz's brigade, moved out of the lager. This force, consisting of the one battalion of the Kurfurst Regiment, two of the Xavier, one of the Prince Clemens and one of the Muffling Infantry Regiments. It formed a line by the lager and acted as a reserve. At this time Dyherrn moved his brigade out of the lager. At 7:00 A.M., Hohenlohe's headquarters mounted up and moved towards Closwitz. The fog was so dense that one could not see more than 10 paces in front of one's self. The Prusso-Saxon army continued to grope through the fog until 10:00 A.M. At that time Grawert's cavalry division advanced and the infantry was ordered to follow it. The ten Prussian battalions of the right wing (Sack Grenadier Battalion, 12pdr Battery "Glasenapp", Hahn Grenadier Battalion, the Hohenlohe, Sanitz, Zastrow 1/Grawert Infantry Regiments, 12pdr Battery "Wolframsdorf" and the 2/Grawert Infantry Regiment) marched forward at the "%eschwindschritt", military bands playing, in the best order possible and advanced to occupy the heights that dominated their position. The 1/ Muffling Infantry Regiment stood in the second line behind the Zastrow Infantry Regiment. Dyherrn's brigade and the Kotzsch Howitzer battery advanced behind Grawert's right wing in the direction of Isserstadt.Grawert's cavalry covered the advance. On the left wing stood the Krafft Dragoons and two squadrons of the Katte Dragoons, supported by half of the Studnitz horse battery. They passed around Verzehnheiligen. On the right wing were the Prittwitz Dragoons, Henckel Cuirassiers and the Steinwehr Horse Battery covered by two squadrons of the Holtzendorff Cuirassiers. They passed by the small woods and towards Isserstadt. Oberst von Massenbach was then ordered to turn about and brought his cavalry back to a position behind the heights near Vierzehnheiligen and Isserstadt. It was at that moment that General Tauentzien and his troops arrived at the Vierzehnheiligen heights and the main portion of the Cerrini Reserve brigade was destroyed. The Saxon cavalry was ordered then by Generalleutnant von Zezschwitz forward from their lager towards Isserstadt. The l/,2/,3/von Polenz Chevauleger Regiment were sent forward against Isserstadt. The 1/von Polenz was detached to cover a battery by the Schnecke. General von Zezchwitz's force consisted of the Kochtitzky Cuirassiers, the Karabiniers and the 2/Albrecht Chevauleger Regiment. At the same time Oberstleutnant von Ende and the three squadrons of Saxon Hussars moved out of the bivouac and advanced towards Isserstadt to join Dyherrn's brigade on the right wing of the Prussian position. Along the Prussian front the sound of musketry and cannon fire grew. Fiirst Hohenlohe sent Leutnant Dietrich to General von Holtzendorf with the order to strike the French right flank. Grawert's infantry division contained four Saxon battalions (Prinz Max Regiment, 2/ Rechten Regiment and Winkel Grenadier Battalion). They stood in the second line and were commanded by Generalmajor von Cerrini. They were drawn to the right wing. Also the Dyherrn's Saxon cavalry brigade, consisting of the Hussars, Kochtitzsky Cuirassiers, Albrecht Chevualegers and Kotsch Battery were drawn to Grawert's Division. The Grossman Horse battery fired with great effect on the French around Isserstadt from its

position the by Vierzehnheiligen. The Polenz Chevauleger Regiment engaged the French 21st Chasseur & Cheval Regiment in a sharp action and drove the French back. Despite these successes, the Prussian army was losing the battle and began to fall back. As the Prussian regiments collapsed and withdrew to the rear the Winkel Grenadier Battalion formed square and withdrew from the field in good order. Fiirst Hohenlohe stood in their square as they marched off the field. As the battle ended the Kochtitzky Cuirassiers, Polenz Chevaulegers and Saxon Hussars engaged in a few sharp rearguard actions. The Niesmeuschel Division had, during the course of the battle, stood on another part of the battlefield, near the Schnecke. They were deployed as follows: On the slope near the road entrance stood two battalions of the von Low and Niesemeuschel Regiment, behind them in support stood a battalion of the Bevilaqua Regiment. Their battalion guns covered the road from the Isserstadt while the batteries of Hausmann and Bonniot faced Schwabhausen. Ernst's battery was right of the Karabiniers facing Isserstadt. The remaining five battalions formed a hook half facing Schwabenhausen and half facing Flohberg. Around 11:00 P.M., the left flank facing the Isserstadt Forest appeared threatened, and General von Zezschwitz advanced Burgsdorf's Brigade (1/,2/Thiimmel, 2/Friederich August & 1/Bevilaqua Regiments) supported by Hausmann's and Bonniot's batteries towards Isserstadt. Nehrhoff's brigade remained stationary on the Schnecke, while Generalmajor von Dyherrn, commanding the forces falling back from the advanced guard, stopped and reorganized his forces. The first action occurred when three French columns attacked the Saxon forces on the Schnecke. Marchand's division passed through the Isserstadt Forest and moved against the Saxon left flank. The other two columns (Heudelet's Division) moved frontally against the Saxons. The Saxon batteries fired heavily against the advancing French. When the French artillery and cavalry moved against the rear of the Saxons, the situation finally became critical. General von Zezschwitz had no choice but to order the withdrawal, despite the arrival of Generalquartermaster Major von Egidy with news of the pending arrival of Riichel's Corps. Seeing that the support of the Prussian troops was not be in time, General Zezschwitz acted promptly. The Nehrhoff Brigade formed a giant square and began to withdraw in good order to the music of its military bands. Meanwhile the French cavalry and infantry swarmed around and began to strike them viciously. They were taken in by the Burgsdorf Brigade. Oberst von Boguslawsky pushed forward, but the hussars were quickly forced to withdraw by the French cavaliy. They fled in the direction of Weimar. Both infantry brigades now feared that the French artillery would be directed against them and broke into single battalions, resuming their reatreat. The French cavalry and skirmishers swarmed around them, slowly chewing them up and capturing many prisoners. The entire force was obliged to surrender. Though there were still some cavalry actions and some of the infantry did escape from the battlefield, this action effectively ended the Saxon participation in the 1806 campaign. The Saxons were soon to pass into an alliance with France. The 1809 Campaign and the Battle ofWagram 5/6 July 1809 In 1809, when Austria invaded Bavaria, the Saxons once again marched to war. Having rebuilt their army, they marched with the French and their first action was on 17 May 1809 at Dornach. The Saxon cavalry operated with the Wiirttemberg cavalry and they encountered an Austrian advanced guard. The Austrians were defeated and their supporting artillery was captured. They were not to take part in any other actions early in the campaign and did not participate in the battle at Aspern-Essling. However, they were to play a historical and tragic role in the battle of Wagram on 5/6 July. The von Winkelmann and von Hake Grenadier Battalions were assigned as guards for the islands in the Danube. The remainder of the Saxon infantry formed itself by

battalion in half division columns and advanced across the Danube at 2:00 P.M., on 5 July. They advanced into a central position between the Corps of Oudinot and Massena. In a first engagement, the Prinz Anton Regiment drove the Austrians from the village of Raasdorf and occupied the village. On the left the Austrian cavalry formed in force. The Saxon cavalry marched towards them and a battle was engaged. The Prinz Clemens Regiment, only 250 horse total, attacked an Austrian Cuirassier Brigade and were repulsed. They fell back behind the Saxon Lieb Cuirassier Guard. The Saxon cavalry brigade Feilitzsch consisted of the Leib-Cuirassier-Garde, Karabiners and a weak few squadrons of the Albrecht Chevauleger Regiment, the Prinz Johann Chevauleger Regiment (which was held to the rear on the Danube) successfully attacked the Austrian Cuirassier brigade. At the same time the Saxon Hussar squadron von Lindenau broke a square of an Austrian infantry battalion and siezed its flag. Then von Feilitzsch's brigade closed on that of Generalmajor von Gutschmidt, which stood with the Hussars and Prinz Clemens Chevaulegers on the heights behind Raasdorf. After 6:00 P.M., when Oudihnot and Prince Eugene attacked, Bernadotte moved his Saxon infantry forward behind them. In the dark they became tangled in some combat with the Austrian reserve division, but that soon died down and the battle ended for the night. As the morning of 6 July broke over Wagram, the Austrians quickly moved against the Saxons. The Saxons abandoned the village of Aderklaa had moved closer to Eugene and Massena in an effort to shorten the line, abandoning a critical sector to Bellegarde's Austrians. Napoleon quickly ordered Bernadotte and Massena to retake the position without regards to the losses they might incur. The Saxons marched on the right of Carra St.-Cyr's division. Aderklaa was retaken, but Archduke Charles sent forwards the Austrian grenadiers and reserve cavalry. The Saxons collapsed, taking Massena's corps with them. Fortunately for the French Napoleon rode onto the field at that time, and after cashiering Bernadotte, stabilized the situation by 9:00 A.M. This initial crisis resolved, Napoleon sent forward Lasalle's cavalry to stall the Austrian penetration of the line. Bessi£re's cavalry and the cavalry reserve were called forward. Together they launched repeated attacks against the Austrian forces forming at Aderklaa and Siissenbriinn, enabling the Saxons and Massena to disengage themselves from the Austrians. The Saxons and the Army of Italy filled the gap this formed in the French line and supported by 112 guns formed in a grand battery, the situation was stabilized. Though the battle was not over, for the Saxons there were 'to be no further significant changes. In addition to the Saxons operating with the French in the main theater of the war, a small contingent under Generalmajor von Dyherrn operated with the Poles in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It fought in the battle of Raszyn on 19 April 1809. The Saxon contingent formed the center of the Saxon-Polish line and consisted of 14 guns, 1 / Oebschwelwitz Regiment, the Einsiedel Grendier Battalion, and some companies from the von Rechten Infantry Regiment. They fought bravely, but the battle was lost and the Saxons suffered 450 dead, 900 wounded, and 300 missing as they withdrew to Warsaw. After the battle of Raszyn they withdrew back into Saxony. The Battle ofKobrin In mid-July, Tormassov received orders to advance. He moved on the French rear along a line that extended from Pinsk to Brest-Li to vsk, but his main forces moved on Kobrin. Kobrin was a small country village at the Junction of the Dvina-Pruszany and Brest-Pinsk roads, standing on the banks of the Murawiec River. There were only a few houses on the right bank of the river, connected to the village by a wooden bridge over which the road to Pruszany ran. Tne only stone building had been converted by the Saxons into a strong point. It was a small cloistered church on the left bank. Below the church, on the other side of the street, was a tumbled down redoubt left over from the days of Charles XII of

Sweden's invasion of Russia. It was completely surrounded by wooden buildings. The terrain around the village was open, but beyond the village streets stretched a swampy lowland crossed only by the two main roads and narrow paths. The Murawiec River was only six to eight paces wide as it passed through the village and was quite shallow. Klengel deployed his troops as follows: On each of the three main roads entering the city he positioned two or three companies of infantry with a pair of guns. In the market, in front of the church, he posted a battalion of the Konig Infantry Regiment as a reserve. On the right bank of the Murawiec there were two companies, two guns, and a squadron of the Prinz Clemens Uhlan Regiment under the command of Matthai. The approach to the city was barricaded, a single house being occupied. Major von Becka's squadron of the Prinz Clemens Uhlans stood a half-hour from the city on the road to Brest and that of Major Piesport stood on the road to Polska. Klengel had 2,433 men under his command: the Konig and Niesemeuschel Infantry Regiment with 1,019 infantry, and the regimental artillery with 2 officers and 123. There was sufficient ammunition on hand, but insufficient rations. Fifty of the brigade's train wagons loaded with rations had not reached the main body, even after a night march. Delayed by a broken bridge, the ox-drawn wagons had been forced to seek another route to Kobrin. The train was captured by cossacks. On the morning of 27 July, thanks to a reconnaissance report from Major von Becka, Klengel learned that the road to Brest was swarming with "kkmucks and bashkirs." Von Piesport's squadron was also attacked and both squadrons were driven back to Kobrin. The third squadron, posted on the right bank of the of the Murawiec, commanded by Matthai, pulled back to Kobrin as more Russian squadrons crossed the river to face them. The main body of Tormassov's forces approached along the road from Antopol. The attacking Russians came from Zalesie. Major Bevillaqua, with two companies of the Konig Infantry Regiment and two 4pdr guns faced them alone. Opposing him were twelve Russian squadrons and a battery of twelve guns. Bevillaqua had no choice but to withdraw into Kobrin. The village was completely surrounded by Russian cavalry. The Russian artillery battered the city and around 10:00 A.M. their dragoons attempted to break into it. Though the Saxon positions were still holding, Klengel ordered Colonel Zechwitz to break out in the direction of Pruszany with the Prinz Clemens Uhlans. They broke out and eventually rejoined Reynier's main force. Around 11:00 A.M. the Russian assault columns approached the city along all three main roads. Colonel Gophardt, with a portion of the Konig Regiment, moved down the road towards Brest in an attempt to stop the Russians. Major Bevillaqua held the Antopol road with his two companies of the Konig Regiment. Major von Schlieben, with six companies of the Niesemeuschel Regiment, held the southern portion of the city and a furious house to house battle began. An hour later, Major von Schlieben fell back to the market place. The Konig Regiment took up positions in the church, on the bridge, and the redoubt. An hour later the Niesemeuschel Regiment also moved into the redoubt. The Saxon infantry was running out of ammunition and the guns were down to fifty rounds when the columns began their assault on the redoubt. They struck "like a whirlwind" and General Klengel capitulated. Generals Markoff and Oldekopf accepted his surrender. In this action the Russians captured 62 officers, 1,992 men, 4 guns and 4 flags. There were 13 officers and 260 Saxon officers hors de combat, while the Russians lost about 600 men. Reynier had been marching to Klengel's aid, but he encountered the Russian advanced guard near Antopol and was forced to retire. Schwarzenberg, knowing of Tormassov's strength, had not moved to join the main army as Napoleon directed, but had remained at Slonim. With the fall of Kobrin he moved to Reynier's assistance, obtaining Napoleon's

approval for his actions after the fact. The Battle of Gorodetschna or Prujany As the Austro-Saxon forces resumed their advance, Tormassov took up a position half way between Prujany and Kobrin in an effort to stop Reynier. Schwarzenberg and Reynier were anxious to avenge Kobrin and advanced on him rapidly. There were 13,000 Saxons and 25,000 Austrians facing Tormassov's 18,000 Russians. After his withdrawal, Tormassov had taken up a strong position and was awaiting his 13,000 man reserve. He was positioned such that his front and right flank were covered by a swamp that extended about three miles along the river whose waters formed it. There was a thick wood, nearly one and a half miles long that continued to bend around to within two miles of the Kobrin road. This road was important to the Russians, as it formed their only line of retreat. However, it was dangerous to them because it passed through a bottleneck formed by the woods. The Russian position resembled a half moon and was approachable by three dry passes: the road from Kobrin to Prujany, the road from Poddoubny which was not passable by artillery, and the road from Kobrin to Cherechev. Tormassov believed that the road from Kobrin to Prujany was the only likely line of assault and positioned his forces accordingly. He had positioned his forces such that his first line consisted of the Vladimir and Tambov Infantry Regiments. Behind them, forming a second line, stood the Dnieper and Kostroma Infantry Regiments. The 28th Jagers covered their wings and the Starodoub and Taganrog Dragoon Regiments were posted on their left to observe the plain. Two twelve gun batteries were placed to cover the river crossing and the swamp to the left. Realizing the strength of this position, Reynier and Schwarzenberg maneuvered to avoid what they knew could only be a bloody frontal assault. General Reynier suggested that they should maneuver to strike the Russian left flank and rear. Schwarzenberg agreed that it was the only reasonable approach to their problem and detached von Zechmeister's brigade to support the Saxon attack. Schwarzenberg later decided this wasn't enough and detached von Lilienberg's brigade as well, bringing the total to two chevauleger and two hussar regiments sent to support the Austrians. The Saxons advanced, lead by the a battalion of the 1st Saxon Light Infantry, the Prinz Anton Infantry Regiment, two light batteries, the Saxon Polenz Chevauleger, the Prinz Clemens Uhlans and the Saxon Hussars. Behind them came the von Zechmeister's brigade of the Hohenzollern and O'Reilly Chevaulegers, General Le Coq's Saxon division, and Sahr's brigade. Siegenthal's Austrian division moved on the road to Poddoubny. The 2/2nd Saxon Light Infantry seized the crossing on the road to Tevele by a coup de main. Kamenski attacked and drove the light infantry back while he established a battery of twenty-four guns to hold the Austrians in check on the road to Poddoubny. Reynier personally directed the successful main attack along a dry passage. His advanced guard was primarily the Saxon light cavalry under the command of Baglez. The advanced guard passed over the marsh and stream. It entered and deployed from the woods onto the plain behind the Russian left. They were followed by the rest'of the Saxons and Austrians under Reynier. They remained concealed in the forest until 11:00 A.M., when Zechmeister moved his brigade out and formed it into two lines. His move was supported by the Saxon artillery along the edge of the heights on which the forest stood. Zechmeister positioned his brigade such that there was sufficient space for the infantry to exit from the woods and safely deploy. The 2/1st Saxon Light Infantry occupied the forest along the edge of the swamp. The 1/lst Saxon Light Infantry moved along the edge of the forest and the Prinz Anton Regiment posted itself on the heights so as to cover the passage of the rest of the infantry. A zug of the 1st company, Saxon 1st Light Infantry and the skirmishers of the Prinz Anton Regiment moved to the left where they joined the 2/1st Light Infantry.

The second Saxon Division remained in reserve in the forest while Lilienberg's brigade moved to the left of the 1st Saxon Division. The Saxons gradually spread along the ridge . Sahr's brigade, all that remained of the second Division, assumed the critical position anchoring the Saxon left on the swamp where they had crossed. The Austrian general Bianchi assumed command of Lilienberg's brigade after Lilienberg was wounded and moved it to a position on Sahr's right. The center was held by Le Coq's 21st Saxon Division and Zechmeister, who commanded Gablenz's Saxon light cavalry as well as his own brigade, held the extreme right of the Saxon army. Zechmeister was directed to move to the east and cut the single line of escape of the Russians: the road from Kobrin to Gorodetschna. Frimont positioned his forces across the river facing Tormassov's position. He was in command of Trautenberg's division, Liechtenstein's brigade, two divisions of the Reisch Dragoons, two divisions of the Kienmayer Hussars, two Austrian wurst batteries, a 6pdr position battery and a 12pdr position battery. Liechtenstein's brigade was formed in two lines. A division of the Reisch Dragoon Regiment was placed on the slope of the hill to the right of Liechtenstein. On their left were two battalions of the Duka Infantry Regiment and a twenty gun battery on the heights. The Saxon maneuver surprised Tormassov, who had not suspected that the ground in the swamp would support such a move. His line facing the Austrians across the river consisted of the Vladimir and Tambov Infantry Regiments in the front line and the Dnieper and Kostroma Infantry Regiments in the second rank. A battalion of the 28th Jagers was posted on either flank, the Starodoub and Taganrog Dragoon Regiments were posted at right angles to the infantry with the Position Batteries #9 and #18 deployed before them. When Tormassov saw and reacted to the Saxon move to his flank and rear. He stripped his right, leaving only the Riajsk Infantry Regiment, six guns of Position Battery #15 and the Tver Dragoon Regiment to watch the road to Gorodetschna. He positioned the Vladimir Infantry Regiment to watch the crossing at Poddoubny and moved the rest of his army to face the Saxons. Dnieper, Kostroma, and Tambov Infantry Regiments formed a line with the 28th Jagers on their left wing linking them to the Vladimir Infantry Regiment. On their right were the 24 6pdr guns of Light Batteries #12 and #34. The Starodoub and Taganrog Dragoon Regiments formed behind them in echelon to the left. Tormassov ordered Generalleutnant Markoff's corps - Nacheburg, Koslov and Vitebsk Infantry Regiments, 10th Jagers, 4 squadrons of the Tartar Uhlan Regiment, six 12pdr guns of Position Battery #15 - to turn about and face the Saxons. Markoff moved his forces to the ridge of hills facing the Saxons that ran between the village of Poddoubny and the village of Zavnice under heavy Saxon artillery fire. To his right Kamenski extended his forces - Dnieper, Kostroma, Tambov Infantry Regiments and 22nd Jagers - to the river. To the south of Markoff, General Lambert deployed his forces - the Kourin Infantry Regiment, 14th Jagers, Alexandria Hussar Regiment, and six guns. Markoff formed his forces into two lines with the Tartar Uhlan Regiment forming the link with Lambert. The cossacks and kalmucks were posted further to Lambert's left as was the Pavlovgrad Hussar Regiment. While the Russians and Saxons raced to extend their flanks towards Zavnice, a heavy battle began at the critical junction of Sahr's brigade and the Austrians on the far side of the river. For an hour the Austrians and Saxons were subjected to heavy Russian artillery fire. The Alvinzi Infantry Regiment lost 90 men to this fire. Sahr's forces were repeatedly charged by the Russian dragoons, but the support of the Austrian artillery on the far bank forced them back. The 2nd Saxon Light Infantry formed a line with the von Speigel and von Anger Grenadier battalions in square on either flank. Part of the 2nd Light Infantry was formed in skirmish order before them. The 6th company of the 2nd Light Infantry was charged by the dragoons and formed

klumpen (small knots of men sometimes known as "hasty squares") and bravely fought off the Russian dragoons with the support of the 2nd company. The 2nd Light Infantry lost 7 officers and 260 men during these attacks. The Russian cavalry near Zavnice continually charged the Saxons, especially the Le Coq's 21st Division, on whose right was all the Saxon cavalry. The first major Russian cavalry attack consisted principally of 10 squadrons of cossacks and two dragoon regiments. They struck Zechmeiste/s brigade. Zechmeister faced them frontally with the Polenz Chevauleger Regiment and a few squadrons of the hussars, while he sent the Hohenzollern Chevauleger Regiment into their flank taking 150 prisoners. Reynier ordered the Austrian chevaulegers and Polenz Chevaulegers to move against the Cherechev-Kobrin road and gain the Russian left flank. This maneuver was countered by the Pavlograd and Alexandria Hussar Regiments, who drove them back. During the evening, as the battle slackened, Sahr/s brigade renewed its attack on the Russian right supported by the Alvinzi Infantry Regiment, the skirmishers of Le Coq's 21st Division, and 1/Collerado Mansfield Regiment. This Austrian battalion was positioned on the far side of the river. It crossed through the swamp and pushed forward against the Russian flank with bayonets, driving back the Russian infantry. It's advance was stopped by the threat of attack by the Russian cavalry. It was forced back to the edge of the swamp where it was supported by 2/ Collerado Mansfield Regiment which had also crossed the river. The Hiller Infantry Regiment moved up too, but did not cross the swamp. It had support from the Austrian artillery on the far bank. Because of the threatening cavalry the Alvinzi Infantry Regiment, also advancing to support the 1/Collerado Mansfield Regiment, formed battalionsmasse and continued to advance. General Frelich moved to support them with the Blankenstein and Kaiser Hussar Regiments. Further support came from the half battery of Leutnant Aust which fired on the Russian left flank. Despite the ardor of the Russian attack it was driven back after failing to dislodge the Austrians. Night began to fall and the battle died out. Before Gorodetschna, at about 5:00 P.M. General Frimont, who commanded the force watching the original Russian positions across the river from Gorodetschna, resolved to attack the Russians before him. To do this he established a 6pdr battery which directed its fire on them. He had noticed the slow drawing off of forces facing him across the river. When they did not respond to his artillery fire he advanced a Grenz infantry battalion, a battalion of the Beaulieu Infantry and three divisions of cavalry into Gorodetschna to support the 6pdr battery. This alarmed the Russians, who responded by placing four battalions and eight guns by the Gorodetschna post office, three divisions of cavalry and eight more guns on the right and near the swamp a further three divisions of cavalry. Behind them Frimont saw masses of infantry on the sandy hills and decided that the position was too strong to attack. About the time he withdrew night was falling and the battle died down. Tormassov was reinforced by the 13,000 men he had been expecting, but he had not engaged more than 18 battalions and 48 squadrons of his total force of 39 battalions and 66 squadrons. He decided that his position was too dangerous to continue to hold. Once night fell he began to withdraw. He had lost about 4,000 men hors de combat and 500 prisoners. The Austrians had lost 2,000 men hors de combat and the Saxons lost 3 officers and 166 men dead, 16 officers and 644 men wounded, and 1 officer and 5 men missing. In addition the Saxons lost five guns, three of them the horse battery von Roth, which were destroyed in the artillery duels during the day. On the 13th Reynier advanced to renew his effort on the Russian left only to find their rearguard under General Count Lambert. The Russians fell back behind Mouk Navelsa and the allies occupied Kobrin without resistance. On 15 August the Austro-Saxons attacked the Russian rearguard without serious effect near Novo Selki and again the next day at Divin. By the 17th the Russians reached Samary

without opposition. Tormassov reached Ratno on the 17th with detachments of Prince Khowartshoi's and Generalmajor Tschlapitz forces. On the same day he learned of Admiral Tchichagov's approach after the conclusion of peace with Turkey. He determined to retrace his steps and moved back to establish his army on the Styr River. Schwarzenberg also heard of Admiral Tchichagov's approach and stopped his pursuit at the Styr. The effect of this action, though technically a Russian failure, was to draw Schwarzenberg away from the main army and its ordered junction with Davout. It also prevented many of the Polish troops in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw from being sent to the rear areas of the main French army to support its operations. Instead they were tied to garrison duties in the Grand Duchv of Warsaw. The Battle of Borodino 7 September 1812 The only Saxon forces at the battle of Borodino were assigned to the IV Cavalry Corps. This corps was the catch all corps of allied heavy cavarly and was formed of the Saxon, Westphlian and Polish cuirassiers. They were assigned to the left wing of the French army. Their destiny placed them before the Great Redoubt and their actions would inscribe their names on the pages of history. The center of the Russian position was commanded by General of Infantry Docturov. The first detachment from the center was under Colonel Voutich I and consisted of the 19th and 40th Jager Regiments. They were posted in the ravine to the right of the Raevsky Redoubt. The second detachment was under Generalmajor Alexapol. He commanded the 1st Jager Regiment which was spread between the Raevsky Redoubt and Borodino. In the woods bordering the Kolocha the 6th and 20th Jager Regiments were posted in a skirmish screen that reached to the Kamenka stream. Docturov had deployed his 6th Infantry Corps with the 7th Division on his right. Generalmajor Kreutz and his 3rd Cavalry Corps were posted in the center as well. At 10:00 A.M., French attacked the Russian center. Friant advanced his division flanked by the heavy cavalry of the I and IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. This force advanced directly on the rubble that had been Semenovskaya. The assault was heralded by a tremendous artillery barrage that furthered the destruction of the already ravaged village. The Russian artillery replied and directed much of its fire on the French cavalry. About 10:00 A.M. the French assault began and the cavalry quickly began their advance. LatourMaubourg's forces advancing in half squadrons, his forces divided into two columns. As he crossed the Semenovskaya stream his right hand column was the 7th Cuirassier Division, commanded by Lorge. The right column contained the Saxon cuirassier regiments - Garde du Corps and Zastrow (8 squadrons); the Polish 14th Cuirassier Regiment (2 squadrons); and 1st and 2nd Westphalian Cuirassier Regiments (8 squadrons). The left column was formed by the 4th Light Cavalry Division. As the leading two and a half squadrons of the Saxon Garde du Corps crossed the stream, they encountered a Russian battery supported by the 2nd Grenadier Division formed in square. General Thieleman formed the remaining squadrons in echelon to the left and charged the Russians. One square was broken and the others forced back. In their pursuit of the withdrawing Russian infantry they encountered the dragoons of General Siever's 4th Cavalry Corps. The dragoons were supported by the fire of the 2nd Guard Light Artillery Battery. This was insufficient to halt the Saxons and they pressed beyond the village and found themselves facing the Ismailov and Lithuanian Guard Infantry Regiments formed in six battalion squares. The Saxon cavalry assault was furious, but the Ismailov Guard withstood them. In one of few historically recorded instances the Ismailov Guard actually executed a bayonet charge against the attacking cavalry.

Saxon Cuirassiers At the same General Borosdin II, with his 1st Cuirassier Division (Emperor, Empress and Astrakhan Cuirassier Regiments) struck the Saxons frontally and the Akhtvrka Hussar Regiment struck them in the flank. The Saxons suffered heavy casualties from the ensuing cavalry battle because they had left their cuirasses in Saxony. They were driven back behind a crest to the right of Semenovskaya. The Polish uhlans of the 28th Light Brigade, who had advanced to the left of the Saxons, had become involved in battles around the Raevsky Redoubt and captured eight guns. The toll was heavy and the 11th Uhlan Regiment lost nearly all of its officers and most of their men hors de combat. A lull developed as the cavalry withdrew and Friant brought the 15th L6g£re and 48th Line Regiments into the ruins of Semenovskaya. The cavalry engagement renewed itself as the blown Russian cavalry was struck by the Westphalian cuirassiers. The Russian cavalry was pushed off the battlefield. As the two cavalry battles raged on the sides of Semenovskaya, the 2nd Converged Grenadier Division reformed and established a weak line in front of the village. General Docturov slowly fed the Moscow and Astrakhan Grenadier Regiments into the village to provide support for the converged grenadiers.

The Russian resistance in Semenovskaya was impressive. Friant's forces were discouraged by the Russian resistance. However, a renewed French attack crushed what resistance remained in the grenadiers and the 15th Legere ana 48th Line Regiments swept over the ruins of Semenovskaya. The breech in the Russian lines had finally been formed and it lay directly in the path of the French reserve. This was the classical time for the Napoleonic coup de grade, but it did not occur. Murat and Ney had been conducting the battle uninterrupted by Napoleon's direction. They sent a courier to Napoleon requesting the release of the reserves, specifically the Young Guard. Napoleon slowly considered the situation and initially consented. He quickly recanted, however. General Lobau and the Young Guard, disappointed by this, slowly edged forward on the pretext of correcting the alignment of their ranks. Napoleon saw this and immediately brought it to a halt. From this gap the Lithuanian and Finland Guard withdrew in perfect order, while the rest of the 2nd Army of the West, which had defended the fleches withdrew in great disorder into the woods behind Semenovskaya. With his line pierced, Barclay turned the 4th Infantry Corps south in order to seal the threat to his army from that flank. At the same time Platov began his maneuver to the north of Eugene on the French bank of the Kolocha. General Beillard arrived at noon with a second request for the release of the Young Guard. It was denied by Napoleon.The result of Napoleon's failure to release the Young Guard had given Docturov and Konovnitzin time to reform what remained of the 2nd Army of the West. At the same time Barclay maneuvered the 4th Infantry Corps. These movements obliged Napoleon to release General Sorbier and the sixty pieces of Guard artillery, which he had held in reserve. General Sorbier quickly deployed them in support of General Friant. The Guard artillery, eager to join the battle, galloped forward. The stopping of the infantry assaults on the Raevsky Redoubt and the successful advance against Semenovskaya had opened a gap in the French lines. The only force available to fill this gap was the IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. As a result, for the best part of three hours, these magnificent and expensive horsemen were used to fill the gap. They were then subjected to the undivided attention of the Russian artillery in and around the redoubt. The 1st Brigade of the 7th Cuirassier Division, under General Thieleman, was badly mauled and lost about half its strength. The Westphalians of the 2nd Brigade, under General Lepel, were singled out for special attention and suffered even more cruelly as the they stood in the open. At 2:00 P.M. Napoleon ordered Eugene to resume his attacks. The divisions of Broussiere, Gerard and Morand advanced, supported on the left by part of Chastel's 3rd Light Cavalry Division. This force was to strike the right and front of the redoubt, while Wathier's 2nd Cuirassier Division and Lorge's 7th Cuirassier Division attacked the left of the redoubt. Barclay had positioned the 4th Infantry Corps to the left of the Raevsky Redoubt, his left wing refused. He placed the 7th Infantry Corps and the Preobragenski and Semenovski Guard Infantry Regiments behind the 4th Corps as a second line. He then began forming a third line with the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps. They were reinforced by the Chevalier Guard and Horse Guard Regiments. The 2nd Cavalry Corps had not arrived by the time the French assault began. In addition, a large portion of the 3rd Cavalry Corps had been detached to the left wing. The desire of the French, Saxon, Polish and Westphalian horsemen to come to grips with the gunners who had had them under fire for so long caused them to move quickly. Once they were ordered forward, they quickly outstripped their supporting infantry. The flashes of fire from the redoubt's guns tore more holes in their ranks, but they pressed on. General Wathier's 2nd Cuirassier Division arrived at the redoubt first and as they were about to enter its rear they were greeted by a heavy volley from the infantry stationed there. General Caulaincourt, at the head of the 5th Cuirassier Regiment, was struck and killed. Wathier's division was repulsed and the IV Reserve Cavalry Corps moved in to fill the gap. Lorge's 7th Cuirassier Division, composed of the Saxons, Poles and Westphalians,

Rozniecki's light cavalry formed in two lines to their left, and the corps horse artillery advanced. They were met by the fire of the 33rd Jager Regiment, as well as that of the Perm and Kixholm Infantry Regiments at 60 paces. This fire brought them to a halt, but General Thielemann continued to push forward with the Saxon Garde du Corps. The Garde du Corps drew out to the left and advanced directly on the redoubt's breastwork, unmasking the Zastrow Cuirassier Regiment. The Garde du Corps and the nearest squadrons of the Zastrow Cuirassier Regiment poured up and over the breastwork, while the other squadrons forced their way through the rear and embrasures of the breastwork. As the Saxons passed over the top of the breastwork they were greeted by the uplifted bayonets of a compact mass of troops that occupied the redoubt. They were supported by the fire from the Russian infantry posted around the redoubt. The dead tumbled into the redoubt, but they were quickly followed by their enraged fellows. A bloody melee ensued in which all sense of military discipline and organization disappeared. The French infantry had advanced close on the heels of the cavalry, occupying the redoubt with the 9th Line Regiment and consolidating their gains. Despite the fury of the battle around the redoubt, the Russians succeeded in withdrawing six of the guns from the redoubt. Two others were abandoned in the northern entrance and the third was thrown into the ditch. A further ten were found dismounted in the redoubt. The capture of this redoubt by heavy cavalry was an act unparalleled in military history. Once the redoubt was secured, Eugene began to mass all available cavalry behind it, including the II and IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. Grouchy's III Reserve Cavalry Corps was released when the Russian threat to the northern flank had passed. At that time Grouchy's cavalry joined the others behind the redoubt. Once these three cavalry corps had completely reorganized, they advanced beyond the redoubt to face the Russians again. Barclay took personal command of the forces in the Gorki ravine and directed the 24th Division to retake the redoubt. However, before the counter attack could begin, the 14th Polish Cuirassiers descended into the ravine in a column of threes, stopped the counterattack, and drove the Russians back. The French cavalry fell back all along their front after the attacks against the Russian 4th and 6th Infantry Corps proved unsuccessful. The Russian infantry successfully resisted their repeated attacks. Latour-Maubourg, supported by Defrance's 4th Cuirassier Division, charged one of the batteries and some of the infantry of the 6th Infantry Corps. The gunners stood encouraged by the artillery commander of the 6th Infantry Corps, while Generalmajor Korff arrived with the 2nd Cavalry Corps and Generalmajor Kreutz arrived with the 3rd Cavalry Corps. Generals Defrance, Chastel, Houssaye and part of the French V Corps charged the Russian 7th Division. The Chevalier Guard and the Horse Guard were posted on a ridge before the village of Kniazkovo, behind the 7th Division. When the French carabiniers broke through the 7th Division, crushing the 19th Jager Regiment's squares and sabering the gunners of the 2nd Guard Horse Artillery Battery these two Guard cavalry regiments charged. They recaptured the battery and turned to engage the IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. The Chevalier Guard was formed by squadrons, in two lines with gaps between the two squadrons in the first line sufficient to permit the squadrons of the second line to pass through. The Horse Guard was posted in line to their left. Facing them were the Saxon Garde du Corps, followed by the Zastrow Cuirassier Regiment and the Polish 14th Cuirassier Regiment. The Horse Guard moved against the flank of the advancing Saxons and were countered by the 14th Cuirassiers. The Poles, having already been heavily engaged and suffered many losses, were insufficient to hold them back. The Saxons and Poles were forced back. The battle was to continue for some hours with the Russians eventually quitting the field. For the remainder of the battle the Saxon cavarly continued to served but its major action for the day was finished. The Saxon cuirassiers had covered themselves with honor and siezed for themselves a place unparalleled in the pages of history.

Saxon Pioneers crossing the Bug, 1 October, 1812 From a work of von Trache

The Battle ofKalisch 14 February 1813 On 13 February 1813 Reynier arrived in Kalisch. The Saxon division under Reynier was reduced to about 6,000 men, but Reynier's Corps was soon reinforced by Durutte's French 32nd Division. After five or six days of harassing attacks by cossacks and light cavalry on his right column, Reynier should have taken precautions against surprise. However, he neglected to do so and on 13 February bivouacked his forces too widely. Reynier's forces were posted as follows: Generalmajor von Gablenz formed the rear guard and was in Zelaskow and Zborow, three hours from Kalisch. Gablenz commanded 174 men of the Polenz Chevauxleger Regiment, 134 men of the Hussar Regiment 400 men of the 1st Light Infantry Regiment and a horse battery with 83 men. Attached to him was the a battalion of the French 2e Regiment de la Mediterran£e (133rd Line), which was posted in Nakwarizyn. Generalmajor Nostitz and six companies of the Saxon Prinz Anton Infantry Regiment and two regimental guns was in Borkow, 11/2 hours march from Kalisch. This force consisted of 19 officers and 300 men. Jarry's brigade of Durutte's division occupied the right bank of the river, as well as the suburbs of Kalisch. Maury's brigade of Durutte's division was positioned slightly to the north on the road to Skarzew, and was designed to serve as a rallying point and reserve for Gablenz. Generalleutenant Lecoq with two companies of Prinz Anton, the von Lebenau Grenadier Battalion and the two regimental guns of the Prinz Anton Regiment was in Kokanin, one hour from Kalisch. General Lecoq posted his forces in Kokunin, so that the two companies of the Prinz Anton Regiment blocked the road to Stawisczyn, a grenadier company blocked the road to Kirchhof, and the remaining three grenadier companies formed a reserve and were posted on the road to Kalisch. Part of the von Polenz

Chevauxleger Regiment was also posted in the village. General von Steindel commanded the Prinz Clemens Infantry Regiment, with four regimental guns and the von Brause 6pdr Foot Battery. This force was posted between Kokanin and Kalisch in Pawloweck and Pruszkowo. It served the troops in Kokunin as a reserve. General von Sahr's brigade was around Winiary, next to Kalisch. Von Sahr's brigade consisted of the von Anger, von Spiegel and von Eichelberg Grenadier Battalions as well as the 2nd Light Infantry Regiment and Bonniot's 6pdr Foot Battery. At 3:00 A.M., Winzingerode's 6,000 cavalry appeared suddenly and pierced the Saxon lines. They quickly seized Russow, which was garrisoned with an insignificant force. Lanskoi was followed quickly by Winzingerode's infantry, commanded by Prince Eugene of Wurttemberg, which assaulted the Saxons. After a three hour fire fight in the dark, the Russians forced the Prinz Clemens Regiment and the von Brause's battery to withdraw to Prosna. A portion of the Polenz Chevauxleger Regiment attempted to retake Russow without success. This is hardly surprising, in as much as the Russian cavalry numbered several thousand men. At the same time, a large Russian cavalry force struck Borkow, which was garrisoned by the 200 man strong Polenz Chevauxlegers. The two companies of the Prinz Anton Infantry Regiment and three companies of the von Liebenau Grenadier Battalion in Kokanin were dispatched to assist the Polenz Regiment, but did not succeed in reaching the beleaguered regiment. In their own turn, the infantry was surrounded by cavalry and forced to withdraw into the town. There they took up positions in the buildings. The Russian attack was such that one of the companies of the Prinz Anton Regiment was eventually forced to surrender. Two Saxon guns opened fire on the Russian cavalry, standing on the road to Stawisczyn. Two grenadier companies, placed behind Stawisczyn, advanced as skirmishers under the support of the von Polenz Chevauxlegers. Unfortunately, the distances were too great and the grenadiers were forced to fall back on the chevauxlegers. The Saxon cavalry advanced bravely to defend the grenadiers, but their cause was hopeless. They left their colonel and 166 men as prisoners in the hands of the Russians. The cavalry that drove back the von Polenz Chevauxlegers was followed quickly by more Russian cavalry under General Knorring. They struck the three companies of the Saxon Liebenau Grenadier Battalion, that were isolated in the plain. Some of the Saxons were dispersed as skirmishers into a small woods, each man fighting for himself. This force held the cossacks at bay, while the remainder formed themselves into two unequal squares. This force then began to march across the plain, fighting the Russian cavalry as they marched. Despite the heavy and repeated cavalry attacks, the fire of Russian artillery and 57 casualties left lying on the field, the brave little battalion marched towards safety. After an hour and a half of marching and combat they arrived on the heights to the north of Kalisch, where they were sheltered by Jarry's brigade. At the same time, Winzingerode directed Lanskoi to send three regiments (White Russian Hussars, Lithuania Chasseurs and a cossack regiment) to turn Kokanin by the west, in an effort to cut a force of Saxons off from retreat to Kalish. At the same time, two jager battalions were sent forward in an assault on the Saxon positions. They were held at bay by the three companies of Saxons that held the north of Kokanin, as well as the Saxon regimental artillery. In the battle before Borkow Generalmajor von Nostitz directed six companies of the Prinz Anton Regiment. This force totaled 19 officers, 300 men and had two 4pdr regimental guns. They bravely defended their position, but were eventually pounded into submission and surrendered to the Russians. General Gablenz learned of the battle and took his brigade towards Kalisch, in an effort to relieve the situation. His brigade was joined by the von Gablenz Cavalry Regiment. The Saxons were struck in the flank by six Russian squadrons, but quickly drove them back.

By the time he could see Kalisch, it had been taken by the Russians and he could not advance against it. He moved to Tolkinia, where he joined Maury's brigade. Eventually he joined Zawadsky's Polish rearguard. This force, cutoff from the rest of Reynier's forces, moved around the Russians, executing a 14 hour march, rejoining Reynier only after the battle was complete. While Winzingerode's forces pushed between Kokanin and Borkow, Russian cavarly moved down the main road to Kalish and Prosna in a wide front. They moved directly on Pawloweck and Pruszkowo. Oberst von Mellentin was the commanding officer of the Prinz Clemens Infantry Regiment, which was in Pawloweck. He ordered his infantry into square and defended his position during attack after attack by this force Russian cavalry, greeting each charge with cannister from the von Brause foot battery. To counter this, the Russians brought up a battery of licornes, and three hours of counter battery fire began. Eventually the two Saxon 4pdrs and four munition wagons were destroyed. Finally the Saxons were driven out and obliged to cross over the Prosna stream. They moved quickly under the cover of darkness and the cover of skirmishers. They found the ice on die river sufficient to bear their weight and successfully executed their withdrawal, falling back on Durutte's division. Devaux's French brigade was established on the right bank of the Prosna River after its night march. Jarry's French brigade had arrived in Kalisch at about 2:00 A.M. and had taken up positions before the village, occupying the heights on the right bank (their right) with the 133rd Regiment and placing the 132nd Regiment on the left near Chocz. The Russians did not delay long their assault on this force. They moved several columns of cavalry, supported by ten guns which began to fire cannister on the French infantry. The French responded by sending forward a force of skirmishers to engage the artillery. This effort ceased when the Russians began to deploy their own infantry for an assault. At the same time the Russians began to advance along another line of attack, directly against Kalisch. Prince Eugene von Wurttemberg had been ordered to seize the city. He formed his corps into two lines, the first being Schakowski's and Sorhend's divisions and the second being the division under Bachmetiev. The Russian infantry was formed in attack columns and preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, drawn from all the regiments and placed under the command of Colonel Rebnitz. This attack was supported by two strong batteries placed in the first line. The Russian attack threatened the French center along the route to Stawisczvn. General Jarry directed a heavy cannonade against the Russian columns advancing in that direction and' advanced three companies of the 132nd Regiment into the suburb, where they manned the rim of a ravine. Two companies of the 35th L£g£re moved up to support them. A battalion was then established as a reserve by Devaux's brigade. Jarry also took pains to parade his forces back and forth before the enemy, so as to give them a distorted idea of his forces. The Russians continued their advance in column, preceded by heavy screen of skirmishers. On the right Colonel Menu was forced back and the Russians penetrated into the suburb of Tyniec, where they occupied a few houses. General Jarry reported the gravity of his situation to Durutte, whose only response was to hold to the last man. Jarry's response was to order a bayonet attack which, as a result of the efforts of the companies of the 133rd Regiment, drove the Russians back out of the suburb and along the route to Dobre. The Russian elan began to fail. On their right, two jager regiments which had advanced hard against the French, found themselves stopped by a ditch filled with water, but whose ice was too thin to support their weight. Their advance stopped and they found themselves smothered with fire from the French skirmishers on the far side of the ditch. Jarry's action stalling the Russian left and holding to the last was critical. The order to hold to the last man was not a cynical move of desperation, but a calculated military necessity. Jarry had to hold as long as possible, so as to permit Sahr's Brigade, Maury's

brigade and Gablenz's detachment to reach Kalisch. With the arrival of Sahr's brigade, Jarrv found he was sufficiently strong to assume the offensive against the Russians. Generalmajor von Sahr's brigade had moved to Winiary in the afternoon. When the battle began, the von Anger Grenadier Battalion moved up the road towards Kalisch, in an effort to re-establish contact with the VII Corps. It quickly found that the Russians had occupied the Tyniec suburb with a combined force cavalry, a horse battery and some infantry. The Saxon grenadiers continued their advance, supported by the von Spiegel Grenadier Battalion and Kapitan Bonniot's 6pdr Foot Battery. This force established itself near the windmills and deployed its battery, while it waited for the arrival of the rest of the brigade. The Saxon artillery found the milling Russian cavalry an ideal target and inflicted many casualties upon it. When the brigade arrived, the von Anger grenadiers moved forward and two companies occupied several of the houses, while the other two seized the bridge over the Prosna. At the same time, the von Sahr Infantry Regiment and the von Eichelberg Grenadier Battalion advanced to attack the suburb. It was then that Jarry's brigade struck the other side of Kalisch, trapping the Russians in between. The Russian brigade in the suburb was engaged in a skirmish firefight that lasted eight hours. Eventually the entire Saxon brigade was sent by General Reynier into Kalisch. The Russians were forced to withdraw and, as Reynier lacked fresh troops to pursue the Russians, the battle ended at about 9:00 P.M. The Saxon losses were General Nostitz, 3 colonels, 36 officers, 1,500 killed and wounded, 2,000 prisoners, 2 flags, and 8 cannon. The Russian infantry withdrew at dusk after having sustained 400 or 500 casualties. Landskoi's cavalry lost a similar number. General Zapolsky was wounded and died later. At midnight, Reynier evacuated Kalisch and forced marched his troops, leaving baggage and the enfeebled in his wake. He reached Glogau on 18 February without further contact with Winzingerode. The Battle of Gross-Beeren 23 August 1813 G£n£ral de division Reynier started the VII Corps advancing about noon, on 23 August. His advanced guard, formed from Saxon light infantry, encountered the Prussian skirmish line about a mile before Gross-Beeren. The Prussians, however, did not attempt to prevent his advance. As the road exits the woods before Gross-Beeren, there is a large, rising plain that extends to the village. To the southwest, the terrain is a long hill that runs parallel to the edge of the woods at a distance of a mile. The Saxon advanced guard, as it advanced onto the plain, observed columns of Prussian cavalry and a battery on this hill. Reynier decided quickly to attack the village of Gross-Beeren. His Saxon horse artillery and a foot battery set up and began a counterbattery designed to eliminate the Prussian half battery. The gunfire set the village afire. Generalleutnant von Sahr's 25th (Saxon) Division moved forward a line of skirmishers and organized itself behind them. The Bosch's 1st (Saxon) Brigade deployed to the right of the road and the Rvssel's 2nd (Saxon) Brigade to the left. They were organized in four lines, in columns by battalions. Reynier ordered them forward to seize Gross-Beeren. The Saxon Sperl Grenadier Battalion pushed to the right of the dirt road, where it broke from the northern point of the woods and moved to the southern part of the woods. The battalion was supported by 2/Konig Infantry Regiment, which straddled the road. The division's battery assumed a position on the heights to support the attack and to fire on the village. A slight rain was falling, that would impede the ability of muskets to operate, but Sperl led his grenadier battalion forward. A half company took up positions in the village, while the rest established itself in the woods between Gross-Beeren and KleinBeeren. The infantry entered the village from the side where the road from Holzecke enters the village. The Prussian infantry detachment reformed itself to the north of Heinersdorf. The 1st

Leib Hussars returned to their brigade. The Prussian advanced guard consisted of the one line, one reserve and one landwehr battalion, the 1st Leib Hussars, and 4 6pdr foot guns. At 4:00 P.M., these forces, standing in Gross-Beeren, were attacked by Saxon troops of the VII Coaps moving from Wittstock. The Saxons deployed 16 to 20 guns and covered them with a iarge swarm of skirmishers. The half of Prussian 6pdr Foot Battery #19 attempted to stem the tide of advancing Saxons and French, but was out gunned, lost a gun and several horses, and was forced to withdraw. The Prussians pulled back and the Saxons moved through the village. Once they moved out of the village, they saw the Prussian skirmishers on the plain. Reynier thought that the day's action was finished and did not bother to send his light cavalry after the retiring Prussians. He indicated the positions where the VII Corps was to bivouac. The 25th (Saxon) Division moved to the right of Gross-Beeren and to the left of the wind mill. The 32nd Division (General de division Durutte) was to its left and rear. The 24th (Saxon) Division was to end the line these divisions formed. G£n£ral de division Reynier established his headquarters in a manor house. G£n£ral de division Defrance's 4th Heavy Cavalry Division had not yet arrived and Reynier may well have felt that he could not risk the Saxon cavalry brigade against the obviously superior allied cavalry. Before Reynier lay the entire Army of the North, except for Tauentzien's corps. To the east of Ruhlsdorf stood Biilow's 3rd Prussian Corps. To the west of Ruhlsdorf, stood Stedingk's Swedish corps and on his right stood the Russians of Winzingerode and Voronzov, extending towards Gutergotz. Bernadotte, observing the French dispositions, decided he had the opportunity to destroy the French central column, Reynier's VII Corps, before the other two corps could effectively intervene. However, instead of seizing the opportunity, he hesitated, ceding to the Prussian desire that they led advance. Biilow's 3rd Corps attacked without the support of the rest of the army, at 6:00 P.M. Biilow massed his corps into a sinGeneral Leutnante column and advanced quickly against Reynier's isolated corps. Biilow had the 3rd Brigade on his right, the 6th Brigade on the left, and the 4th Brigade behind the 6th Brigade. The 5th Brigade stood behind the 4th Brigade. Treskow's cavalry brigade, of the cavalry reserve, stood behind the Prussian right. Sydow's cavalry brigade stood behind the left wing. The Fus/4th East Prussians and a squadron of the 1st Pommeranian Landwehr Cavalry stood in Klein Beeren. Reynier stood with General Leutnant von Sahr's 25th (Saxon) Division in the first line. Bosch's 1st Brigade formed his first line with the von Sahr 2nd Light Regiment on the left and 2/Konig Regiment on his right next to Gross-Beeren. Rissel's brigade formed the second line with the two battalions of the von Low Regiment to the left and the two battalions of the Prinz Anton Regiment to the right, next to Gross-Beeren. The Sperl Grenadier Battalion7 stood on the far side of Gross-Beeren, across the stream with its back to Gross-Beeren. Deployed in front of von Sahr's brigade were, left to right, the 1st Horse Battery, the 3rd 6pdr Foot Battery and the 4th 6pdr Foot Battery, which stood nearest Gross-Beeren. Durutte's 32nd Division would shortly stand to the left rear of von Sahr. Once there, he would deploy in three lines with the four battalions of his first line deployed in line, the four battalions of his second line held in column and the two battalions of his third line deployed in line3. He held his artillery behind the infantry. General Leutnant Lecoq's 24th (Saxon) Division would appear later on the road to NeuBeeren and assume a position behind the left flank of the first line. Brause's Brigade would be on the right and Mellen tin's would be on the left. The cavalry stood in columns of squadrons between the two lines of infantry and on the road from Gross-Beeren to NeuBeeren. The Saxon Hussars stood on the left and the Prinz Clemens Uhlan Regiment stood on the right. The 1/Prinz Maximilian Infantry Regiment (Generalmajor Brause's brigade, 24th Division) stood in Luckau and the 1/Niesmenchel Infantry Regiment (Generalmajor Bosch's Brigade, 25th Division) stood in Wittstock.

Biilow, seeing an opportunity to strike the isolated Saxons, chose to advance against the them. The Prussian example was quickly followed by Stedingk, who moved his Swedish corps on Neu-Beeren, in order to be able to strike Marechal Oudinot's corps in the flank. The Prussian 3rd Corps advanced in two lines. The first was formed by the 3rd and 6th Brigades of Generalmajor Hessen-Homburg and Generalmajor Krafft. The second line was formed by Generalmajor Thiimen's 4th Brigade, which was to serve as a reserve. The forces that had engaged the French earlier during the fall of the village of GrossBeeren, remained as a reserve by Heinersdorf. Bulow's first line was formed with intervals between the battalions sufficient for them to deploy. The second line was formed in columns on the center, each brigade being equally disposed on two lines. Observing that the terrain was very level and that the French had already established a strong battery on the Windmiihlberg Biilow brought forward the greatest part of his batteries and formed a battery to face them. This battery consisted of the 6pdr Foot Battery #6 (Ludwig), Russian 12pdr Battery #7 (Dietrich), 12pdr Foot Battery #4 (Meyer), 6pdr Foot Battery #16 (Spreuth), and part of 6pdr Foot Battery #19 (Liebermann). Russian 12pdr Battery #21 (Schlueter), and Horse Batteries #5 and #6 remained in the reserve behind the infantry. Between 5:00 P.M., and 6:00 P.M., the 12pdr batteries began to fire on the Saxons. The Prussian infantry stood behind the guns. After about a half hour, the Prussian 6pdr batteries advanced closer and began to fire on the Saxon first line. After suppressing the Saxon artillery, Holtzendorf moved forward the other part of a 6pdr battery and a Russian 12pdr battery. A Prussian horse battery, escorted by a cavalry squadron, moved to the right where it fired on the left flank of the Saxon artillery. At the same time another horse battery moved against the Saxon left. Later, Colonel von Cardel led forward a small Swedish force consisting of a battery and two squadrons to join the grand battery. This battery took up a position to the right the main allied battery and began firing cannister. It drew the attention of the Saxon artillery and suffered a number of casualties as a result. The weather was very advantageous for the use of artillery. Rain fell heavily and made observations easier, as the clouds of smoke from the guns was immediately knocked down, where normally smoke obscured the battlefield completely after a few minutes. On the other hand, the sodden ground prevented the ricochet effect of the round shot from having its usual effectiveness. The battle was, like those at Dresden and on the Katzbach, to be one of saber, bavonet and cannon. The Saxon batteries of the VII Corps fired back on the Prussians with some success. They were disposed, right to left, as follows: The two batteries of the 25th (Saxon) Division were to the north of a small woods to the northwest of Gross-Beeren. Two Saxon horse batteries and the two batteries of G£n£ral de division Durutte's 32nd Division stood across the front of Durutte's line. The Saxon infantry supported the artillery, which stood in front of the infantry. Sperl's Converged Grenadier Battalion, too weak to occupy the entire edge of Gross-Beeren, stood in the cemetery. The l/,2/2nd (von Sahr) Saxon Light Infantry Regiment stood in the small woods to the west, having on its left the battalions of the 1/,2/Anton and 2/ Konig Infantry Regiments and all the rest of von Sahr's 25th Division. During the battle, the artillery of the VII Corps dismounted nine Prussian guns. General Leutnantasenapp's 6pdr Foot Battery #5 was, as a result of this punishment, obliged to withdraw from the battle. In view of the poor reputation of the Saxon artillery, their success in this artillery duel is quite surprising. After about a half hour, one and a half Prussian batteries advanced to within 900 paces of the village. The entire Prussian artillery line soon followed their example. Two Prussian batteries advanced and took the village under fire. The Prussian infantry marched to a range of 300 paces behind its artillery. When they

did, the batteries of the VII Corps turned their fire on them, forcing them to deploy from battalion column to line, so as to minimize their casualties from the artillery fire.' Generalmajor Borstell had received the general instruction to follow Thiimen's 4th Brigade, and to act according to circumstances, to cover the left flank of the army. Borstell began to believe that the movement of the 3rd Corps to the right threatened to cut communications with Tauentzien's 4th Corps and decided to move towards KleinBeeren, by a conversion to the right and to occupy the village. Reynier was unaware of Borstell's movement and made no effort to anticipate it. Borstell, ignorant of the Prussian garrison of Klein-Beeren, two reserve battalions, two hussar squadrons and four horse guns to take the village. The two battalions advanced in a column covered by skirmishers. Their artillery stood in the center. At the same time the rest of the brigade moved against the heights. The first line consisted of a grenadier battalion, one line battalion and and three reserve battalions. Behind them came the two line battalions and two landwehr battalions in the second rank. An uhlan regiment stood on their right flank and the remaining two hussar squadrons stood on the left. A foot battery and a half horse battery took positions before the wooded entrance into Gross-Beeren, where they could fire into the Saxon lines. On hearing the cannonade towards Gross-Beeren, the Prussians decided to attack, in order to facilitate the march of Krafft's 6th Brigade. The artillery and cavalry advanced in front of the infantry and took up a position on the heights to the east of Gross-Beeren, facing it across the stream. The artillery bombarded the village until the moment when the infantry joined it. The Prussian skirmishers moved forward, while those of the reserve regiment advanced only to the road running from Klein to Gross-Beeren. The Prussians, having observed that the Saxon cavalry supported the Saxon artillery, moved some artillery to the right of the Klein-Beeren-Gross-Beeren road where it bombarded them with some success. The Saxon cavalry, to escape the fire, withdrew into Gross-Beeren. Prusswian skirmishers moved into Gross-Beeren, supported by the a reserve battalion. Another reserve battalion advanced to the left in column,* to cover the Prussian artillerv. j Soon 82 Prussian guns were firing on the Saxons in Gross-Beeren. Reynier was finally aware of the danger to his right. Lecoq's 24th Division stood in the woods while the cannonade went on. Reynier had given Lecoq the mission of covering the left and the division was deployed in column, while forming a large square that was open in the rear. The 1/Grenadier Guard Regiment, von Sperl's Grenadiers, and the regiments of 1/,2/Prinz Friederich and 1/,2/Steindal formed the square. The 1st Brigade placed a chain of skirmishers on the north edge of the Genshagener-Heide. The remainder moved into Neu-Beeren and on towards the forest to the north west to observe the Prussians. The Saxon's skirmish fire, probably from the 2/Prinz Friedrich Regiment struck the flank of the Swedish battery and obliged it to withdraw into a small forest occupied by five Swedish battalions. A Saxon battery stood before the square and the other remained in reserve, in front of the skirmishers from Brause's brigade. Reynier, hearing action to his right, found all of von Sahr's 25th Division engaged, with no reserve left. Reynier sent von Sahr the order to arrange his forces so they could charge the first troops that advanced against him. Von Sahr responded by withdrawing from his line two battalions, the 2/Anton and 2/Konig Regiments, as well as half of Zandt's battery to reform a reserve. The Saxon artillery inflicted enough casualties on Hessen-Homberg's infantry that he was forced to form them into line, to diminish the effectiveness of the Saxon artillery fire. The process of deploying them into line disordered them and they returned to column formations. They stood in echelon in two lines. The left flank, also the closest to GrossBeeren, being forward. The rain had fallen heavily and the soaked uniforms of the soldiers emitted clouds of

water vapor, as the rain evaporated out of them. The Prussian columns resembled great clouds of steam. The Prussian corps advanced in an oblique order. The left was forward. Krafft's 6th Brigade was obliged, as it closed on Gross-Beeren, to pull several battalions out of the first line and put them behind it, because of a stream that ran parallel to the Heinersdorf-GrossBeeren road. The battalions formed a third echelon. Thiimen's brigade detached two battalions of the 5th Reserve Regiment to search the woods that stood to the north of the village, to the east and parallel to the Heindersdorf road. They found the woods unoccupied and returned to Krafft's brigade where they became a reserve. The Prussian attack advanced against Gross-Beeren at the same time as the l/,2/2nd Reserve Regiment, supported by two squadrons of the Pommeranian Hussar Regiment and four guns, struck from the east. Sperl's Grenadier Battalion defended the village. The 131st Line and 36th L£g£re Regiments sent two battalions to support the Sperl Grenadiers. The l/2nd Reserve Regiment struck the Sperl Grenadier Battalion and one of the French battalions, throwing them out of the village. As they withdrew, they suffered under the fire of the four guns of Horse Battery #11. The 1/Colberg Regiment, covered'on the left by the 2/Colberg and the right by the 2/ 5th Reserve Regiment, attacked Gross-Beeren frontally. The 1/Colberg was deployed in line, while the other two battalions advanced in columns of companies. The Saxons'of the Prinz Anton Regiment and the Sperl Grenadier Battalion attempted a volley, but only five or six guns fired. The rest misfired. The Prussians charged forward with a bayonet assault, capturing and bayoneting many. The remainder of the Saxons withdrew hastily. Five Saxon cannons were captured. The road down which the Saxons withdrew crossed a wooden bridge, which was blocked, and many of the Saxons were captured. Two Prussian battalions advanced into the woods to the west of Gross-Beeren, while Oberst Krafft moved his second echelon to close the gap that had formed between him and Generalmajor Hessen-Homburg's division. As the Fus/Colberg and l/2nd Reserve Regiments advanced out of Gross-Beeren, they saw the Saxon battalions of the 3/Konig and 1/,2/Prinz Anton Regiments standing in column. General Leutnant von Sahr had placed Anton's battalion on the right wing of the ravine and the 2/Konig to the left. Zandt's battery was between them, but its support was short lived, as the fire from the Prussian Horse Battery #11 quickly silenced it. In order to disengage his right, Reynier ordered Lecoq's 24th Division to advance against the Windmuhlberg and to stop the advance of Hessen-Homburg's division there. From there it was to cover the road to Wittstock. G6n£ral de division Durutte's 32nd Division was to support von Sahr's attack towards Gross-Beeren. This attack failed to begin because of discipline problems9. Reynier then ordered von Sahr to attempt a counterattack. This counterattack was executed with great energy. The von Low Regiment advanced its two battalions in battalion columns. The 1/von Low Regiment threw back the 2/lst Neumark Landwehr Regiment, but it was promptly counterattacked frontally by the 2/5th Reserve Regiment, while the 3/5th Reserve Regiment attacked its flank. The result was that the 1/von Low was annihilated, losing 330 prisoners. The 2/von Low was attacked by the 3/4th Reserve Regiment, led by Prince von Hessen-Homburg personally. During the attack the Prussians captured the 2/von Low's standard and their skirmishers captured a howitzer. When the 3/4th Reserve Regiment was within 70 paces of the Saxons, the 2/von Low made a half turn and sought to withdrew behind a small copse. The 3/4th Reserve had its skirmishers deployed before it and they followed the fleeing 2/von Low. The 3/4th Reserve then advanced with an aggressive bayonet attack while Major von Sioholm led the l/3rd East Prussian Regiment against its flank. The combined attack drove the 2/von Low back 500 paces beyond the woods. The Prussians stopped an attack on some French when they saw three squadrons of the Prinz Clemens Uhlan Regiment and half of Probsthayn's foot battery facing them. One Prussian reserve battalion withdrew back behind the hill with the rest of the brigade. The

rest stopped their advance and assumed defensive formations. A landwehr infantry regiment advanced to support them. The 1st Pommeranian Landwehr Cavalry Regiment counterattacked the Prinz Clemens Uhlans, capturing the Saxon regimental commander and pushing them back. The Saxon Hussar Regiment advanced, engaged the Pommeranians and pushed them back, covering the uhlan's withdrawal. On the right flank of this battle, Prince von Hessen-Homburg sent his forces forward to engage von Sahr's left, standing to the west of Gross-Beeren. The rest of Hessen-Homburg's 3rd Brigade formed into line. A number of Prussian batteries moved to position before them. Treskow's cavalry brigade assumed a position on the left flank. Darkness was beginning to fall. A Prussian infantry assault formed and advanced with a force of cavalry in support. It was countered by the Saxons and driven back. Sandrart, commanding the 1st Leib Hussars then led forward his entire regiment and the West Prussian Uhlan Regiment. They struck at the right flank of the first Saxon line. The two left squadrons of the 1st Leib Hussars struck the second Saxon line forcing them into square. Fournier's 6th Light Cavalry Division was at this time moving up the main road, north from Ahrensdorf to wards Sputendorf, withGuilleminot's 14th Division behind it. Fournier heard the sound of artillery at Gross-Beeren and turned east in Sputendorf to close on Gross-Beeren. At this phase of the battle, General Leutnant von Biilow brought his cavalry across the Gross-Beeren stream and ordered them to charge the debris of the French and Saxon divisions, that remained on the battlefield. They were stopped and thrown back by the Prinz Clemens Uhlan Regiment. A landwehr regiment, seeing the advancing Saxon cavalry, withdrew and did not rally until it was behind Gross-Beeren. Once there it formed itself in to battalion squares. The Saxon cavalry, meeting the prepared infantry and having no support, stopped and withdrew back to its original positions. At the end of this action Generalmajor Krafft's 6th Brigade was in position, to the left and 200 paces in front of Gross-Beeren. The battalion of his extreme right was on the Windmuhlberg. General Leutnant von Biilow now stopped all forward movement. To the Saxon left, General Leutnant Lecoq's 24th Division had been unable to execute its orders. Mellentin's brigade forward movement had started against Hessen-Homburg. The Saxon attack was serious. Part of the Saxons moved towards the small woods to the west of Neu-Beeren, to turn the Prussian right with their artillery. Major Sioholm observed this movement and sent a line battalion from the second line to the right and extended his line towards two Swedish battalions that were approaching from the Ruhlsdorf forest. After the check of the 32nd Division, Reynier decided it would be an error to engage his last reserve, Brause's brigade. He ordered Lecoq to withdraw down the road from NeuBeeren, while Jarry's Brigade and the 2nd (von Sahr) Saxon Light Regiment were to defend the road from Gross-Beeren to Wittstock. During this action, the Saxon Hussar Regiment was sent to Wittstock, to cover the bridges. The Saxon withdrawal was covered by Oberst von Brausche using the 1st (Lecoq) Saxon Light Infantry Regiment, 2/Rechten, the Prinz Friedrich Regiment, the Jagers and Rovray's 12pdr Battery. The progress of the Prussians was stopped by the Saxon 2nd 6pdr Foot Battery and Rovray's 12pdr Battery. A small Prussian force of infantry and cavalry pursued the 24th Division. The infantry skirmishers pushed through and captured a small woods to the south of Neu-Beeren, capturing the Saxon 12pdr battery. Only the appearance of a strong force of French cavalry kept them from holding the battery. The Prussian skirmishers, now totally disorganized, withdrew back to their brigade, rather than face annihilation by the French cavalry. The Saxons remanned their battery and withdrew it. The XII Corps had reached Arensdorf during the day, but stopped there for the evening. Around 6:00 P.M., it heard the sounds of Biilow's artillery and G£n£ral de division Guilleminot's 14th Division, led by Oudinot, moved towards Spitendorf. After the destruction of the von Low Regiment, Oberst von Bose, commander of the 1st

Brigade, 25th Division, found his right and rear covered with Prussian skirmishers. He was in danger of being cut off, even though the effectiveness of the skirmishers was greatly diminished by the rain. He withdrew decided to withdraw on Lowenbriick, and while moving there, he was joined by the grenadier battalions and 2/Konig Infantry Regiment. Among his ranks as he bivouacked that night, were three eaGeneral Leutnante bearers from French regiments, who had become separated from their regiments. Shortly afterwards the rest of the 25th Division joined him, and the 24th Division, which was covering the retreat, arrived at 10:00 P.M., that evening. The Battle ofDennewitz 6 September 1813 The battle of Dennewitz occurred on 6 September 1813. Ney lead his army towards Berlin in an effort to knock the Prussians out of the war. He encountered the Army of the North near Dennewitz in a meeting action. Ini tially, the French 5th Light Cavalry Division, the 12th and 15th Division, and the Polish 18th Light Cavalry Brigade encountered the lead elements of Tauentzien's corps and the battle began. The Saxon corps formed of Ney's army, but it was in the middle of his advancing column. As a result, the battle was well developed by the time it arrived on the field. It was thrown into the battle in an effort to secure the left rear of Ney's lead elements as the French line formed in two perpendicular lines resembling the Greek letter gamma. The Saxon VII Corps (Reynier) had begun moving down the Ohna-Rohrbeck road about 1:00 P.M., accompanied by Defrance's 4th Heavy Cavalry Division. Reynier's Corps, at this time, contained 16,278 men and 59 guns. They were distributed as follows: 24th Division — Lecoq 25th Division — von Sahr 32nd Division — Durutte 26th Light Cavalry Brigade — Lindenau

5,136 men 3,981 4,600 1,361

16 guns 20 10 9

As they closed on the battlefield, one of Ney's adjutant's arrived with word that Reynier was to detach a force to support Morand's left wing. Durutte's 32nd Division was pulled from the middle of the march column and sent north. It arrived about 2:00 — 2:30 P.M. Jarry's brigade passed over the stream by the mill and relieved the Wiirttembergers, and Devaux's Brigade positioned itself to support the guns on the heights southwest of Gohlsdorf, near the stream. Reynier then saw the Prussians to the west, and swung his two Saxon divisions to meet them. The Saxon cavalry and horse artillery moved to Rohrbeck, where it encountered Tauentzien's cossacks. The 1/Niesemuschel Regiment was detached to cover the road and left in Ohna. As Durutte's 32nd Division moved to its assigned position, it became entanGeneral Leutnanted with Lecoq's 24th Division, delaying its march. The 25th Division (von Sahr) found itself set upon by Voronzov's and Czernichev's cossacks, which had come from Zahna into the rear of the French army. Lecoq's 24th Division received its orders. Mellentin's 2nd Brigade was ordered to seize Gohlsdorf and von Brause's 1st Brigade was ordered to move to his right and cover a 12pdr battery, that was to be raised on the Windmiihlberg (Wind Mill Hill). The 25th Division was to move behind Mellentin and support its attack. Defrance's 4th Heavy Cavalry Division was also closing up and passed between Dennewitz and Gohlsdorf to take a position on the low hills behind the guns facing Wolmsdorf. About 3:00 P.M., Jarrv and Devaux led their brigades forward against Nieder-Gorsdorf, where Clausewitz stood with three Prussian battalions. Jarry's assault pushed the Prussians into the burning village. They rallied with another Prussian battalion, but soon found themselves assaulted from the south be Defrance's

cavalry. The Prussian withdrew and joined Thiimen's 4th Brigade. As Reynier s forces deployed, Lecoq's 24th Division swung to the west facing Gohlsdorf and began to advance towards the Prussians. Brause's brigade assumed a position on the north flank of the village, while Mellentin's brigade moved into and occupied the eastern half of the village. To face this movement the Fus/3rd East Prussian Regiment moved through the western gardens of the village and occupied the village before Mellentin's brigade arrived. On the Windmuhlberg stood Spreuth's Prussian 6pdr foot battery. The pressure of the Saxon attack was such that Spreuth was obliged to withdraw back behind Wolmsdorf. However, the fusiliers remained to fight for the possession of the village. The Saxon schiitzen, supported by the Saxon Grenadier Battalion Spiegel, advanced into the village and pushed the Prussian fusiliers out. The Prussian's quicldy regrouped, returned to the village with a bayonet assault, and threw the Saxons back/ The Saxons renewed the effort by sending in a battalion of the Steindel Infantry Regiment and one other. The Prussians pulled back into the cemetery and assumed a position behind an earthen wall, about 100 paces from the village. The Prussian fusiliers were shortly joined by the schiitzen of the 9th Reserve Regiment under Kapitan von Petzhold and supported by the remainder of the battalion of the 9th Reserve Regiment. Biilow, seeing the developing battle for Gohlsdorf, ordered HesseHomburg's 3rd Brigade forward to contest the village with the Saxons. Brause had placed his Saxon brigade on the north of Gohlsdorf, along the road running from Gohlsdorf to Dennewitz. The 2nd 6pdr battery stood before his infantry, a 12pdr battery stood on right and a French horse battery was slightly further to his right. Von Sahr7s 25th Division closed behind Brause's brigade and sent its artillery forward to the right of Brause's supporting artillery. His other battery moved to the south of Gohlsdorf, where it could bombard Oppen's reserve cavalry, which stood on the plains to the south of Gohlsdorf. The Prussians moved two foot and a half horse battery forward to face the Saxon 12pdr batteries. One battery was quickly driven back by skirmishers coming from the north end of the village and the other lost four guns. The Saxon artillery drove Oppen's reserve cavalry back behind Wolmsdorf. The Saxon pressure was heavy and Krafft was ordered to withdraw. Once he was disengaged from the Saxons, he was reinforced by the arrival of three battalions. A second attack was prepared, with the battalions of the first line being deployed, in order to minimize their losses to the French artillery. The second line of battalions advanced in columns 300 to 400 paces behind the first. A Prussian assault by four battalions was covered on the flank by the four Prussian guns and half of a russian 12pdr position battery. On the right side of the village, by the reserve cavalry, stood a horse battery and a 6pdr foot battery. The Prussian artillery began a furious barrage to support the Prussian advance. A special effort was made to suppress the flanking fire from the French and Saxon batteries to the north of Gohlsdorf. A Prussian battalion pushed into the village supported by the fire of two Prussian batteries. As these Prussians drove forward, the first Swedish forces appeared on the field. A Swedish horse battery supported by the Morner Hussar Regiment arrived and joined Borstell, assuming a position on the left flank. The first Prussian assault was pushed back. A second assault started, when two fresh battalions ordered forward to assist the first wave and attack Gdhlsberg. Three Prussian landwehr battalions pushed main street of the village. The 1/Colberg Regiment moved into the northern edge of the village. The 2nd East Prussian Grenadier Battalion and the 1 /3rd East Prussian Infantry Regiment moved into the southern part of the village. The reserve, following the assault, consisted two landwehr battalions. The Prussian foot battery and the half Russian battery advanced and continued their fire on the northern side of the village, while on the south the batteries of Neindorff and General Leutnantasenapp continued their fire. Two Prussian battalions then moved against the

Windmuhlberg. The battle in the village ceased to be a formal battle of volley fire and became a house to house bayonet fight. On the northern end of the village, the Saxon Prinz Friederich Infantry Regiment had positioned itself in the church and defended itself with the greatest tenacity. They were facing the l/3rd East Prussian Regiment. In an effort to push the Prussians out, the Saxons charged forward in column. Major von Biilow swung his right wing and fired on the Saxons at a range of 60 - 80 paces. Despite the Saxon defense, the Prussians were to prevail, taking 300- 400 Saxon prisoners. With his forces pushed out, Oudinot turned his artillery loose on Gohlsdorf, determined to pound the offending Prussians into submission. The Prussians were obliged to withdraw, surrendering the village once again to the Saxons. Borstell brought his 5th Brigade forward to renew the attack. He advanced with his eight battalions in two lines on Gohlsdorf and supported them with artillery and cavalry. The other battalions advanced to the heights below the village. The Saxons fought desperately to hold their positions. The Prussian 2/2nd Reserve Infantry Regiment moved against a battery by the village, only to be driven back by its fire and that of its supporting infantry. It suffered massive losses. The Saxons responded by counterattacking with six battalions. This was more than the Prussians could stand and they were pushed back in their turn. As Borstell advanced, Oppen's reserve cavalry moved to the south of the field and several Prussian batteries formed a strong battery on the Windmuhlberg heights. The 1/lst Pommeranian Infantry Regiment advanced against the Windmuhlberg, attacking the Saxon 12pdr battery supported by a battalion of the Anton Infantry Regiment. The battery defended itself at 60 paces with cannnister, followed by a volley fire from the Anton Infantry Regiment, which killed or wounded 90 men. Under such punishment the Pommeranians fell back. Elsewhere, however, the battle went better for the attacking Prussians and the Leibfahn (principal standard) of the Saxon 2/Konig Regiment was captured. The French army was unable to sustain the battle, and despite their exertions, neither could the Saxons.'The battle was soon broken off and Ney directed his forces toward Dahme. The Saxons had fought a hard battle at Dennewitz against superior Prussian forces. They had held the flank and allowed the French to successfully disengage their right wing. Their contribution was significant, and without it the French losses at Dennewitz would have been devastating. The Battle of Leipzig, 18 October 1813 The battle of Leipzig began on 16 October 1813. There were limited Saxon forces present as the battle began and they did not engage in any action of note until the third day of the battle, 18 October. The Saxon VIII Corps, under General de division Reynier stood to the north of Leipzig and didn't arrive on the field until late on 17 October.'Facing them was the Army of the North under Crown Prince Bernadotte. They were supported by several French infantry and cavalry corps. Marechal Marmont had overall command of the northern flank of the battle. As the battle developed on 18 October Reynier had a small garrison in Taucha. At 9:00 A.M. he sent his cavalry brigade with the Sahr Battalion and a horse battery to the left against the Partha and sent Zeschau's 24th (Saxon) Division behind Paunsdorf, where it stretched its left wing towards Schonefeld, occupied by Durutte's 32nd Division. The VIII Corps (Reynier) was formed around Paunsdorf in two lines. Detachments of cavalry and artillery, the weak brigades of the VI and VIII Corps, stood by Blick, Cleuden and Taucha. The von Sahr Infantry Battalion and Normann's Wurttemberg cavalry brigade stood between Paunsdorf and Taucha. As the Russian cavalry approached them Normann's cavalry and the von Sahr Battalion defected to them.

r Marmont looked across the fields and saw a large force of light cavalry heading in his direction. He called his corps to arms and assumed that Normann's brigade had been attacked and was withdrawing in disorder. It turned out to be cossacks. Normann and his brigade had defected to the allies. It was at about 10:00 A.M. that Major von Fabrice, with the Saxon cavalry, found themselves faced with Emanuel's Russian cavalry (part of Korff's force). The engagement was very one sided and the Saxon cavalry may or may not have attempted any action. According to Marmont it simply defected, passing into the allied lines. Adding insult to injury, the Saxon battery with them promptly unlimbered and began firing on the French. At the same time Platov moved his forces forward from Zweenfurth and moved to the south, by Baalsdorf. Platov's artillery began to fire on the Saxons around Paunsdorf and Reynier responded by detaching his reserve artillery to engage them, a 12pdr battery and Horse Battery Probsthayn. The French began reorganizing their forces and at 10:00 A.M. Marmont advanced his corps to the Schonefeld-Paunsdorf line. Lagrange's 21st Division stood adjacent to Schonefeld, with Friederich's 22nd Division to the east and Compans' 20th Division stood on Friederich's left. Durutte's 32nd Division, of Reynier's VII Corps, held the gap between Compans and Paunsdorf. Behind to Durutte was Zeschau's 24th Division which stood between Paunsdorf and Stiinz. Paunsdorf, itself, was occupied by two companies of the Lecoq Light Infantry Regiment. The III Cavalry Corps was divided and stood behind both flanks. Fournier (6th Light Cavarly Division) and Lorge (5th Light Cavarly Division) stood behind Schonefeld and Defrance stood bv ^ Stiinz. The III Corps stood behind Marmont, by Volksmarsdorf. The 9th Division stood in reserve behind Schonefeld, forming a number of small posts that moved from the left of Partha to Leipzig. The 11th Division was by Reidriitz, the 8th Division stood by Kohlgarten, between Reidniz and Paunsdorf, contacting the VII Corps, which was behind Paunsdorf. The 8th and 11th Divisions had begun moving at 9:00 A.M. to occupy their new positions, followed by the III Corps park, reserves and light cavarly. The 8th Division formed the head of the column. It was ordered to pass to the right of Kohlgarten and to move towards Pfaffendorf. The allies slowly advanced across the plain between the Partha and Taucha, driving out the French and Saxon advanced posts. The small village of Taucha continued to be occupied by the Saxons who defended their position with great courage. General Pahlen turned the village, seconded by Colonel Arnoldi, who, in supporting this attack with his artillery, lost an arm. As the village fell, about 11:00 A.M., the Saxon Prince Friederich August Regiment, who occupied the village, was forced to lower its arms and surrender. Bennigsen's fourth column, formed with Bubna's Austrian 2nd Light Division, advanced despite the heavy French resistance from Zwengfurth on the main road from Wurzen to Leipzig, taking the village of Molkau. Bubna's 2nd Light Division had, around 10:00 A.M., reached the Wurzen road. It stood in the great open zone on both sizes of the Wurzen Road where Bennigsen had sent it to await the arrival of the Army of the North. It soon engaged the Saxons and French around Paunsdorf, and despite its small size, did not permit the French to shake it off until the Army of the North decisive armed forces arrived from Walplatz. Upon his arrival before Paunsdorf, Bubna was joined by the Platov's cossacks, who had engaged the French XI Corps around Sommerfeld as it fought its way in great chaos towards Leipzig. Bubna's appearance moving towards a union with Langeron forces, as they passed over the Parthe, forced Marmont to swing his right flank around the pivot of Schonefeld, back towards Paunsdorf. Lagrange's 21st Division occupied Schonefeld. On his right stood the divisions of Friederichs and Compans. Durutte's 32nd Division stood northwest of Paunsdorf and the Saxons stood between Paunsdorf and Stiinz on the farthest right wing. Detachments of both divisions occupied Paunsdorf. The Saxons had half of the Lecoq Light Battalion in the village. Arrighi's III Reserve Cavarly Corps

supported them. On the left wing, behind Paunsdorf, stood Defrance's 4th Heavy Cavalry Division, less Quinette's Brigade. Fournier's 6th Light Cavalry Division stood behind Schonefeld and Lorge's 5th Light Cavalry Division stood by Dombrowski. Initially, there stood a battery of six Saxon 6pdrs facing the Austrians. Birmbaum sent three of his horse guns to reinforce them and the Saxon battery eventually rose to 21 guns before Paunsdorf. They directed their fire down the road against Bubna's advancing division. Bubna responded by detaching his two horse batteries, a total of 12 guns. He held back his battery of six 3pdrs/which he did not want to face the greater force of the French and Saxon 8pdr and 6pdr batteries. The Austrian artillerists served their guns better than the French and Saxons, despite their fewer numbers and lighter guns. After a half hour of uninterrupted fire the Austrians succeeded in suppressing the French batteries. Seven French guns were dismounted, whereupon the remaining guns withdrew behind the village. However, half of the Austrian guns were also destroyed, 30 horses from their teams were killed, and they had fired off all of their ammunition. The Austrian horse artillery was also obliged to pull back and remain behind Zuschauer. The artillery duel was decided by noon. With the departure of the Saxon artillery, the wav was cleared for the Austrian infantry assault. Bubna ordered Zechmeister to attack the French and Saxon forces occupying Paunsdorf. Zechmeister's Brigade lead the assault with Neipperg's Brigade to his right while Platov's cossacks held the attention of Durutte's division. The Jager Battalion #6 advanced into the edge of the village. The 1/ Peterwardeiner Grenz Regiment, part of the same brigade as the jagers, pushed in to support the jagers. The Austrians eventually broke into Paunsdorf, but with heavy casualties on both sides. As the Austrian jagers passed over each village wall the French directed a heavy cannister fire against them and threw fresh infantry forward to throw them back. In the meantime the Saxon artillery began to fire on the village with its howitzers and the village began to burn. The dense smoke and the heat of the flames, coupled with the fire of the Saxon and French infantry, were more than the Austrians could bear. The jagers pulled back, out of the village. Zechmeister had positioned six squadrons of the Liechtenstein Hussars, supported by the 1/ Peterwardeiner Grenz, so that they could strike the French as they pursued the Jager Battalion #6 out of Paunsdorf. As they drove the French back, the hussars and grenzers pushed into Paunsdorf, renewing the battle. As the battle in the village raged, Bubna learned from Platov that the French were forming to strike Paunsdorf from the north. He swung Neipperg's Brigade to the right. By and by came the entire light division was drawn into the battle, except for two battalions, which were held back as the division's as the last reserve. The battle had already lasted two hours. It was around 1:00 P.M., that cannon fire was heard in the direction of Schonefeld. Langeron's attack on the left wing of Ney's army group had begun. At the same time the first advance of the columns of the Army of the North appeared moving from Taucha towards Leipzig. Ney hurried to his right wing and found the Saxon 24th Division, under Zeschau, behind Sellerhausen, which was occupied by a part of Durutte's 32nd Division. He ordered the Saxons to counterattack. Because of their unreliability, however Reynier had held the Saxons back as reserve. Reynier launched into an immediate and vehement exchange of words with Ney, but Ney again ordered the Saxons to attack Paunsdorf so that he could once again gain possession of it. Ney also ordered the Saxons to hold the village as long as possible, despite the overwhelming force facing them. The Austrian foothold became stronger, but the battle lasted two hours. Reynier threw in Ryssel's Saxon Brigade, 24th Division, supporting it with Brause's Saxon Brigade which stood by Sellerhausen. The Saxon jagers advanced into Paunsdorf and supported the left of the Saxon artillery line to the south of the village. The battle over Paunsdorf remained undecided, so Ney directed Durutte to sent one of

his battalions into the village. It advanced into the village, with the support of its entire division, and quickly became embroiled in the street fighting. At the same time Neipperg's Brigade moved to the north and began to engage Durutte's 32nd Division. This assault succeeded in throwing the Austrians out of Paunsdorf, doing so shortly before the arrival of Biilow's Corps. When Durutte had engaged part of his 14 battalions in his attack against Paunsdorf, Zechmeister found himself in a difficult situation. A partial envelopment of the village by the French actually placed two companies in the greatest danger of being cut off were and the 6th Jagers suffered heavy losses. The jagers lost 20 dead, 5 officers and 62 men wounded and 49 prisoners during Durutte's attack. Shortly later Bliicher noted that the French were sending reinforcements from Leipzig to Schonefeld and directed Sacken's Corps towards the Halle Gate of Leipzig to face them. At the same time he attacked the entrenchments on the right bank of the Partha. The effect of these two moves was to stop the advance of the French reinforcements. The allied advance had obliged the French to redeploy their forces. Pacthod's 1st Young Guard Division had been pushed back from Gohlis and stood between it and the Hall suburb of Leipzig. Behind him stood Dombrowski's infantry. The planes to the east of the Eutritzsch-Leipzig road were empty with the first French forces to the east being Lagrange's 21st Division which occupied Schonefeld. Marmont's Corps stood to Lagrange's right of Schonefeld, with Friederich's 22nd Division being adjacent to Schonefeld and Compan's 20th Division to its left. Across their front was a large battery of artillery. Reynier's VII Corps occupied Paunsdorf with Durutte's 32nd Division Behind Durutte stood Zeschau's 24th (Saxon) Division and a large battery of Saxon artillery faced due east, south of Paunsdorf. Behind Friederichs stood Fournier's 6th and Lorge's 5th Light Cavalry Divisions in two lines. Behind them, extending from the Schonefeld-Leipzig road stood the divisions of Ricard, Brayer, and Delmas (11th, 8th and 9th). Beurmann's cavalry brigade (III Corps) stood on Delmas's right. Nansouty's Guard Cavalry Corps stood to the south, between Stiinz and Stotteritz. Defrance's 4th Heavy Cavalry Division stood just north of Stiinz, behind Zeschau's 24th Division. Major assaults began on the French center left against the village of Schonfeld that dominated the battle. Massive artillery batteries were organized by both sides. In the middle of the field, before Langeron's main body, was an clear and open plain. Facing Langeron across that plain were the massed forces of Marmont's VI Corps. Langeronorganized a battery of 100 guns from his corps, adding to that 60 guns from Winzingerode's corps and 20 Swedish guns under Cardell before his line. To the east a second battery was formed with 36 of Biilow's guns, though this figure later rose to 40 guns. Marmont responded with his own artillery, which may not have exceeded 49 guns, though he had 82 at his disposal. To his left Reynier faced 27 guns north. Reynier already had 21 of his guns deployed to defend Paunsdorf from the east and could not move them to counter this threat. Eventually this rose by another 61 guns which were sent forward from the III Corps, which stood in reserve. A total of 137 French guns faced 220 allied guns. The artillery roared and the field between the two lines of guns was swept clean of the living. The battle for Paunsdorf was to last from 2:00 to 4:00 P.M. Bubna's 2nd Light Division faced it from the left on the Wurzener Road. Biilow and Hessen-Homburg advanced south against this important corner of the French line. When Biilow received a report that Paundorf was occupied by the French, he directed his artillery to take the village under fire and at the same time Hessen-Homburg's Prussian 3rd Brigade moved off the road deployed. Four Prussian and Russian batteries and Kapitan Bogue's British rocket battery fired on the village and the French artillery by the village. These guns, however, directed their fire against Marmont's right, while the British rocket battery began firing into Paunsdorf from a position between Bubna's Division and

Hessen-Homburg's Division. With the beginning of this bombardment, Biilow ordered his forces to attack Paunsdorf. Three battalions from his left wing advanced. As the attack developed these three battalions sent their schiitzen forward. To the left of the Prussian attack advanced the Austrian Jager Battalion #6 of Bubna's Division, the advancing schiitzen took heavy fire from Durutte's battalion facing them, littering the field with their dead and wounded. The defenders of Paunsdorf were supported by the remainder of Durutte's 32nd Division, which stood to the west of the village, behind a substantial battery. Despite this the attacking Prussians advanced their own batteries firing cannister to support their advance. The Prussian4th Reserve Regiment was joined by the Austrian 1/ Peters war diner Grenz Regiment and supported by the British rockets. Durutte's forces defending Paunsdorf were driven back toward Sellerhausen. Three field pieces were abandoned on the Wurzner road because their teams had been killed. In their enthusiasism, the l/,2/4th Reserve Infantry Regiment and the British rocket battery pursued the French back as far as Sellerhausen and united there, but quickly found themselves facing superior organized French forces. Kapitan Bogue was shot dead and the two Prussian battalions were driven back. The Prussian casualties were so heavy that they were unable to take further part in the battle on 18 October. It was the moment for the French counterattack. Reynier, with the Saxon 24th Division, stood south of Sellerhausen and made ready. However, a most unanticipated incident thwarted his intent. It was about 3:00 P.M. G£n£ral de division Reynier, who stood by the Saxons, ordered the withdrawal of the Saxon 12pdr battery behind the 2nd Brigade. When this order reached the artillery, instead it limbered up and moved in the opposite direction. It advanced in a column by sections towards the allies. The French cavalry behind it accompanied this evolution, which they took for an attack, and cried "Vive Yempereur!" Then the entire Saxon divison rolled forward. The Saxon flags flew and their drums pounded a military stacatto. The cries of Durutte's troops encouraged them forward in their seeming counter attack. The Saxons were defecting to the allies. Both Saxon infantry brigades and the greatly weakened hussar regiment followed the artillery and in an ever quickening pace moved into the area between Bubna's 2nd Light Division and Docturov's column. In vain Generalmajor von Zeschau and Reynier sought to stop the movement. Mounted Saxon officers hurried ahead of their advancing columns and announced their intentions to the allies, who opened their lines and allowed the Saxons to enter. It was 3:00 P.M. and the French were stunned by the betrayal of the Saxons. However, the defection was not complete. Parts of the Prince Anton and Friederich August Infantry Regiments were unable to defect with the rest of the division because they were in too close contact with Durutte's forces. In addition four guns of Birnbaum's horse battery did not escape. The Saxon forces were marched to the allied rear and distributed amongst the various allied corps. The Saxon cavalry went to Yorck's Corps, the von Sahr Battalion was assigned to the Swedish Army Corps. The Saxon artillery10 under Birnbaum also provided ammunition to the two Austrian batteries, that had earlier shot off their ammunition, permitting them to rejoin the battle. During the Saxon defection Durutte's forces pulled back to Sellerhausen and reestablished their line. The British rockets moved forward again and began to fire on Sellerhausen in order to set it afire. Another Prussian regiment advanced and began a firefight with them. On their right they were supported by Colonel Dieterich's Russian 12pdr Battery #7 and the Prussian Horse Battery #6, von Steinwehr. The further involvement of the Saxons in the battle was limited. Those units that did not defect were captured the following day when Leipzig fell to the victorious allied forces. The defection of the Saxons had an effect on the course of the battle, but not a major one. They had 91/4 battalions, totaling only 2,635 men, and 12 squadrons with a total of 630

men. In addition, they had 19 guns. This force totaled slightly more than the strength of three full strength infantry battalions and a weak cavalry regiment. The impact on the French was more one of morale than of the loss of significant forces. It was also ill timed, for at the same moment the Army of the North came into full view. The reasons for the Saxon defection are not clear. It was not a deep conspiracy, but apparently a grass-roots dissatisfaction with the Saxon subervience to France, in addition to the devastation of the Saxony by fighting armies, the constant drafts of new conscripts being fed into a war that nobody wanted, and the nationalism growing in Germany. The Saxons had seen the earlier defections during the battle of Leipzig. They knew 'of the defections of some Westphalian infantry formations and several squadrons of Westphalian hussars. Defection was in the air. The French were obviously losing the battle of Leipzig and certainly the Saxons wanted to join their fellow Germans. It is also probable that they wished to abandon France before things got much worse. Unfortunately, it was too late to escape without being severely punished, for Prussia was to claim large portions of Saxon land and much of the Saxon army as compensation for losses.

10

: /

Saxon Light Cavalry

Appendix I Staffing of the Army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw Late 1812 Minister of Wax Joseph Prince Poniatowski, Minister of War, Commander in Chief Chevalier of various orders, Officer of the Legion of Honor. Jean Bennet, Colonel, Secretary General Bogoumil Fechner, Chief of the First Section of Finances Joseph Rautenstrauch, Colonel, Chief of the Second Section of Military Operations Jacob Redel, Colonel, Chief of the Third Section of Artillery and Engineers. General Directorate of Administration of War Joseph Count Wielhorski, General de division. Director General Valentin Wilkoszewski, Director Secretary General Benedict Doney, Chief of the First Section of Military Hospitals Jean Suchodolski, Chief of the Second Section of Uniforms Henri Deybell, Chief of the Third Section of Supplies and Forage Directors An tome Darewski — Director Guilhelm Fiszer — Director Felix Moscicki — Director of Lithuania Commissioners of War 'st Qass Joseph Morawski, Albert Dobiecki, Adam Gorski, Ignace Chmielewski, Jan Dzierzanowski, and Etienne Swiniarski.

Ores

Theodor Pzerwic, Felix Wilski, Albert Boyarski, Stanislas Zablocki, Joseph Basson, Vincent Tarczvnski, Antoine Borowski, Fortunat Koncza, Joseph Bagowski, Joseph Ryminski, Michel Garlicki, and Martin Zdziarski.

of war in W u y u a

Pierre Jaroszewski and Jean Matuszewski Health Services Leopold Lafontaine, Inspector General of Health Services Joseph Puchalski, Inspector of Military Hospitals

Employ^ in Pi^sigpal Health ftnira

Charles Kuknel (physician), Onufry Lucy (surgeon), Przybylski (surgeon), and Joseph Skalski (pharmacist). General Staff for the Inspection of Military Reviews and Conscription Kajetan Hebdowski, General de brigade, Director General Joseph Wyszkowski, Inspector of Reviews, Chief of the Office of Management l^prctprs Qf favjgwg Mathias Miroslawski, FloryanKasinowski, KajetanHrymewicz, and CharlesSamowski (inspector in Lithuania). Assistant Inspectors of Reviews Michel Zevdel, Albert Graf en, Pierre Buhut, Theodor Radziejowski, Constantinjablonowski, Michel Skopowski, Francois Hampel,SabinSierawski, JeanKozlowski, Fiszer, Pierre Rubieszewski, Joseph Maiinowski, Stanislas Kontecki, and Joseph Grecz (assistant inspector in Lithuania) Military Paymaster

Joseph Wegierski, Paymaster General Divisional Paymasters Joseph Michalski, Antoine Rose, Adam Wegierski, Jean Ceizyngia General tie Staffdivision f l ^ s i o n a ! Generals) frfrrav*

Joseph Prince Poniatowski - Commander-in-chief of the Army Joseph Zajaczek (Zavonshek), Jean Henri Dabrowski, Louis Kamieniecki, Michel Sokolnicki, Stanislas Woyczynski, Joseph Wielhorski, Charles Kniaziewicz, and Amilcar Kosinski.

inspector Generals of Arms

Inspector General of Infantry (General S. Fiszer, killed in October 1812, at Tarutino) Alexander Rozniecki, G6n£ral de division. Inspector General of Cavalry Jean Pelletier, General de brigade, Inspector General of Engineer (taken prisoner on 3 November 1812 at Vyazma)

frfoftaux de frpgatie ffingarie Generals)

Vincent Axamitowski, Joseph Niemojewski, Isidor Krasinski, Kajetan Hebdowski, Maurice Hauke, Luc Bieganski, Michel Piotrowski, Ignace Kamienski, Stanislas Mielzvnski, Antoine Prince Sulkowski, Dominique Dziewanowski, Stanislas, Potocki, Casimir Tumo, Valentin Kwasniewski, Michel Prince Radziwill, Edouard Zoltowski, Joseph Wasilewski, Thadde Tyszkiewicz, Czeslaw Pakosz, Xaver Kossecki, Francois Paszkowski, Louis Kropinski, Stephan Grabowski, and Casimir Malachowski. Adjutants Attached to the Person of His Maiestv Hipolit Bleszynski, Colonel Mathias Strzyzowski, Major

TiU'iar Adjutants Attacheti to the Person of His Majesty Stanislas Potocki, General de brieade Casimir Turno G£n6ral de brigade Michel Prince Radziwill, General de brigade Command Adjutant Assistant Chief of the General Staff Joseph Rautenstrauch, Colonel Command Adjutants of the Divisional Staffs Colonels: Jean Weysenhoff, Antoine Cedrowski, Basile Wierzbicki, Joseph Szumlanski, Francois Morawski, and Joseph Nowicki (in Danzig). Adiudant Colonel attached to the Commander-in-Chief Antoine Potocki

Chi?f A d j u s t s of Squadrons

Stanislas Chlapowski, Adjutant to General Dabrowski Ignace, Jablkowski, Adjutant to General Zayonshek Michel Pelczynski, Adjutant to General Kamieniecki Joseph Gajewski, Adjutant to General Fiszer Venceslas Gutakowski, Adjutant to General Rozniecki Jean Kamieniecki, Adjudant to the Commander-in-Chief and Adjudant of the General Staff Joseph Krasinski, Adjutant to General Kniaziewicz LieV tenant C o ^ e l S Michel Sobieski, Broszkowski, Stanislas Donhoff Regimental Officers 1st Infantrv Regiment Colonel: Major: Chefs de Bataillon: 2nd Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major

Stephan Koszarski (from 1 0 / 2 1 / 1 2 ) Thadee Piotrowski Jacob Leszczynski Aljzy Biemawski Onufry Fontanna Jean Krukowiecki Joseph Szvmanowski

Chefs de Bataiilon: 3rd Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major. Chefs de Bataiilon: 4th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataiilon: 5th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataiilon: 6th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataiilon: 7th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataiilon: 8th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major. Chefs de Bataiilon: 9th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataiilon: 10th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major: Chefs de Bataiilon:

11th Infantrv Regiment Colonel: Major. Chefs de Bataiilon:

12th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataiilon: 13th Infantrv Regiment Colonel: Major

Jean Hoffmann Stanislas Zdarski Louis Boguslawski Ignace Blumer Mathias STraszewski Stanislas Kurcyusz Maxim Czaykowski Samouel Rozycki Thadee Wolinski Cypryan Zdzitowiecki Felix Rylski Ignace Bronisz Stephan Oskierko Joseph Czyzewski Jean Hoppen Louis Kaminski Felix Stokowski Jules Sierawski Ferdinand Boguslawski Kasper Grotowski Charles Geritz Joseph Rusiecki Paul Tremo (died of wounds early December 1812) Valentin Borowski Jakob Truszkowski Antoine Oranowski Kajetan Stuart Henri Dulfus Ferdynand Kossecki Felix Jerzmanowski Andree Kruszewski Michel Gchocki Felix Grotowski Joseph Gieyzler Paul Muchowski Felix Rynaszewski Henri Kamienski Nicholas Daine Francois Czyzewski Jean Kraszyn Joseph Meier Alexandre Chlebowski Andre Deskur Charles Joneman Casimir Pomianowski Pierre Szembek Joseph Potocki Mathias Wierzbinski Ignace Suchodolski Vincent Bialkowski Joseph Polonski Andre Bleszynski Francois Zymirski Joseph Obertynski

Chefs de Bataillon: 14th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataillon: 15th Infantry Regiment Colonei: Major Chefs de Bataillon: 16th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataillon: 17th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataillon:

18th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataillon: 19th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataillon: 20th Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataillon: 21st Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataillon: 22nd Infantry Regiment Colonel: Major Chefs de Bataillon:

Cavalry

Nepomucen Kasinowski Bardomiej Lanckoronski Leopold Koziobrodzki Euzebi Siemianowski Antoine Skalski Vincent Malinowski Jean Winnicki Mathias Bittner Kasper Miastkowski Leonard Reinhold Ignace Mvcielski Joseph Albrecht Martin Rybinski Cons tan tin Prince Czartoryski Ignace Bolesta Ignace Dobrogoyski Jean Wasilewski Martin Cwierczakiewicz Joseph Homowski Jean Kozubski Ignace Proszynski Chryzolog Domanski Stephan Mazurkiewicz Mathias Dabrowski Casimir Lux Andre Zawadzki Alexandre Chodkiewicz Michel Seihr Stanislas Trebicki Slupecki Rholand Tyzenhaus Pawlowski Radwan Ryminski Gorski Adam Biszping Glaser Milberg Walicki Placzynski unknown Wegierski Gorski Andrychiewicz Laszewski Czapski Hilchen Mieszkowski Jezierski Laszewski

1st Regiment (Chasseur & Cheval) Colonel: Cons tan tin Przebendowski Major Louis Montrezor Chefs d'escadron: Vincent Adamowski

Supernumerary: 2nd Regiment (Uhlan) Colonel: Major: Chefs d'escadron:

Mathias Dembirtski Cons tan tin Dembowski Louis Pac Jacob Piasecki Michel Kossecki unknown

3rd Regiment (Uhlan) Colonel: Major Chefs d'escadron:

Alexandre Radziminski Kajetan Rzuchowski Jean Suminski Jean Deskur 4th Regiment (Chasseur & Cheval) Colonel: Stanislas Dulfus Major Rafal Zajaczek Chefs d'escadron: Francois Gorski Ignace Lubowiecki 5th Regiment (Chasseur a Cheval) Colonel: Sigismond Kumatowski Maxim Fredro Major Thomas Siemiatkowski Chefs d'escadron: Andre Suchecki 6th Regiment (Uhlan) Michel Pagowski Colonel: Thadee Suchorzewski Major Martin Lojowski Chefs d'escadron: Casimir Oborski 7th Regiment (Uhlan) Auguste Zawadzki Colonel: Antoine Pracki Major Antoine Zaleski Chefs d'escadron: Joseph Konarski 8th Regiment (Uhlan) Dominique Prince Radziwill Colonel: Joseph Sokolnicki Major Gabryel Czamecki Chefs d'escadron: Norbert Obuch 9th Regiment (Uhlan) Felix Przyszychowski Colonel: Cons tan tin Krzycki Major: Stephan Ziemiecki Chefs d'escadron: Jacob Czosnowski 10th Regiment (Hussar) Nepomucen Uminski Colonel: Joseph Rzodkiewicz Major Stanislas Osipowski Chefs d'escadron: unknown 11th Regiment (Uhlan) unknown Colonel: Casimir Tanski Major Jean Tomicki Chefs d'escadron: unknown 12th Regiment (Uhlan) Joseph Rzyszczewski Colonel: Francois Brzechffa Major Vincent Borzecki Chefs d'escadron: Adam Nosarzewski 13th Regiment (Hussar) Joseph Tolinski Colonel: Alexandre Oborski Major: Stanislas Rojewski Chefs d'escadron: Thomas Zalewski 14th Regiment (Cuirassier) Stanislas Malachowski (Captured 11/12) Colonel: Casimir Dziekonski Major

Chefs d'escadron: 15th Regiment (Uhlan) Colonel: Major. Chefs d'escadron: 16th Regiment (Uhlan) Colonel: Major Chefs d'escadron: 17th Regiment (Uhlan) Colonel: Major Chefs d'escadron:

Ignace Jablonski (Killed at Borodino) unknown Auguste Trzecieski Jean Rostworowski Joseph Dwemicki Victor Psarski Martin Tamowski Michel Korytowski Fortunat Skarzynski Vincent Radziminski Tyszkiewicz Giedrovc Strowski Adam Soltan

18th Regiment (Uhlan)Charles Colonel: Charles Przezdziecki Major Trzcinski Chefs d'escadron: Ploszczynski Mamert Dluski 19th Regiment (Uhlan) Colonel: Rajecki Major Kaininski Chefs d'escadron: Rostworowski Potkanski 20th Regiment (Uhlan) Colonel: Obuchowicz Major Gutakowski Chefs d'escadron: Henri Zabiello Mikoszewski Artillery and Engineering Staff Jean Pelletier, General de brigade, Inspector General of Artillery and Engineers Pierre Bontemps, Colonel, Director of Artillery Jean Mallet, Colonel, Director of Engineers Alexander Alfons, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Topographical Office

Lieutenant Colonel Under Pirg^tgrs of Fortifications:

Leonard Jodko, Andre Trzeszczkowski, Theodor Kobyianski, and Joseph Reklewski Foot 'Artillery Ifcgimgnt: Colonel: Antoine Gorski Major. Jean Gugenmus Chefs de Bataiilon: Casimir Uszynski Antoine Ploszczynski Walewski Horse Artillery Regiment:

Colonel: Major

Joseph Hurtig Jean Krysinski Jean Szweryn Joseph Sowinski (lost a leg at Borodino)

SflPP?r Cores Commanding Major Mathias Kubicki Chefs de Bataiilon: Antoine Salacki Artur Potocki Auxiliary Artillery Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel: Charles Daret

frvaM find veterans Cores: Lieutenant Colonel:

Jerome Winner

Lieutenant Colonel:

Felix Hrymewicz

Miii twy Train fattaliorv

Annex No 1 of a report by Russian Major Prendel to the Russian Minister of War Barclay de Tolly May 1811

This transcription of part of the original report is enclosed because of the interesting insight, that of a contemporary military officer, which it provides into the personalities and capabilities of some members of the Polish general staff. It is an exact translation and should be understood to be the opinion of its author, Major Prendei General de division Zajonczek, J. Dombrowski, J.H. Kamieniecki, L. Sokolnicki, M. Fiszer, S. Rozniecki,A.

Man of intelligence Man of spirit and decision Good for nothing Reasonably intelligent, enterprising spirit To him is accorded no spirit but deceit dear-sighted, enterprising and decisive

General de brigade Axamitowski, V. Niemojewski, J. Woyczynski, S. KrasinskiJ. Hauke, M. Bieganski, L. Grabowski, M. Piotrowski, M. Kamienski, L Pelletier, J. Mielczynski,S. Sulkowski, A. Dziewanowski, D. Potocki, S. Turno, C Kwasniowski, V.

Intelligent and brave Insignificant Capable Insignificant Resolute, confidant Capable Of iron, immovable. A professional A peasant Cunning in all things Busy with his functions, without knowing how Very capable and enterprising Intelligent A zero Intelligent, capable, amiable Capable

Aides de camp to the King of Saxony Colonel Pakosz Cz. Good and sincere Colonel Paszkowski F. False, mean and crafty

Appendix II: Orders of Battle Saxon Left Wing at Jerux 14 October 1806 Left Wing: 2nd Division: Grand Duke von Zeschwitz 1st Brigade: Generalmajor von Burgsdorff (Saxon) Thummel Infantry Regiment (2) Prince Xavier Infantry Regiment (2) Friedrich August Infantry Regiment (2) 8pdr Heavy Battery Haussman (Saxon) 8pdr H e a w Battery Ernst (Saxon) 2nd Brigade: Generaimajor von Dyherm (Saxon) Low Infantry Regiment (2) Niesemeuscnel Infantry Regiment (2) 2/Belviaqua Infantry Regiment 12pdr Battery Bonniot Cavalrv: Generallieutenant von Kochhsky (Saxon) Carabinier Regiment (4) Prince Albert Chevauleger Regiment (4)(Saxon) Kochtitzky Cuirassier Regiment (4) Horse Artillery Battery Grossman Liyht Troops: Generallieutenant von Polentz Fusilier Battalion Boguslawsky Polenz Chevauleger Regiment (4) (Saxon) 1/2 Horse Artillery Battery Studnitz #14

Saxon 9th Corps 20 May 1809 Commanding Officer: Marechal Bernadotte 1st Saxon Division: Generallieutenant von Zezschwitz Leib-Garde Grenadiers (1)(318) von Hacke Grenadier Battalion (1)(404) von Hose Grenadier Battalion (I)(518) Konig Infantry Regiment (2)(919) von Dyherm Infantry Regiment (1)(440) Prinz Anton Infantry Regiment (2) (925) Prinz Maximilian Infantry Regiment (2)(952) Prinz Frederick Infantry Regiment (2)(908) von Metzsch Light Infantry Battalion (1)(540) 2nd Division: Generallieutenant von Polenz von Radelof Grenadier Battalion (1)(523) von Winkelmann Grenadier Battalion (1)(482) Niesemeuschel Infantry Regiment (2)(965) von Cerrini Infantry Regiment (2)(941) Prinz Clemens Infantry Regiment (2)(743) von Low Infantrv Regiment (2)(776) Obschelwitz Battalion 0)(442) Corps Cavlarv: Gardes du Corps (2)(281) Carabiniers (2)(I95) Leib-Garde Cuirassier Regiment (420) Prinz Clemens Chevau-leger Regiment (337) Prinz Johann Chevau-leger Regiment (425) Prinz Albert Chevau-leger Regiment (1)039) Hussar Regiment (3)(243) ^rtillerv: Foot Battery Bonniot (140)(4-8pdrs ic 2 Howitzers) Foot Battery von Hoyer (128)(4-8pdrs & 2 Howitzers) Foot Battery von Coudray (128)(4-8pdrs <Sc 2 Howitzers) Foot Battery von Huthste'iner (124)(4-8pdrs & 2 Howitzers) Saxon Army (VII Corps) in Russia 1 August 1812 Commander-in-Chief: Reynier, G£n£ral de division Chief of Staff: Goure, Adjudant Commandant 21st Division: Generallieutenant Le Coq Brigade: Generalmajor von Steindel Libenau Grenadier Battalion (l)(17/688) Prinz Frederick Infantrv Regiment ( 2 ) ( 3 3 / U 7 2 ) (Artillery co - 1 / 6 2 - 4-4pdrs) Prinz Oemens Infantrv Regiment (2)(38/1393) (Artillery co - 1 / 6 2 - 4-4pdrs)

Brigade: Generalmajor von Nostitz 1st Light Infantry Regiment (2)(34/l,384) Prinz Anton Infantrv Regiment ( 2 ) 0 8 / 1 3 7 3 ) (Artillery co - 1 / 6 2 - 4-4pdrs) Artillery: Major von Grossman 4th Foot Battery "Rouvroy" (4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers)(4/115) Park (3/110) Sapper Company ( 2 / 6 6 ) 22nd Division: Generallieu tenant von Funck Brigade: Generalmajor Klengel von Brause Grenadier Battalion (l)(17/692) Konig Infantry Regiment (2)(31/L309) (Artillery co - 1 / 6 2 - 4-4pdrs) Niesmeuschel Infantry Regiment (2)(33/1,300) (Artillery co -1/62 - 4-4pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor von Sahr von Spiegel Grenadier Battalion (1)07/647) Anger Grenadier Battalion (1)08/673) 2nd Light Infantry Regiment (2)(37/1346)

Artillery:

2nd Horse Battery "Hiller" (4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers)(3/87) Artillery Train 0 / 8 2 ) 3rd Foot Artillery Battery "Bonniof (4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers) (3/72) Artillery Train 0 / 4 2 ) Coros Cavalry: Generallieutenant von Thielmann 23rd Liyht Cavalry Brigade: Generalmajor von Gablenz Saxon Hussar Regiment (8)(35/780) Polenz Chevauxleger Regiment (4)(26/557) Prinz Clemens Uhlan Regiment (4)(31/592) 1st Horse Battery 'von Roth" (4/156)(4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers) Corps Artillery: Major Auenmuller 1st Foot Battery "von Brause" (4-12pdrs 6c 2 Howitzers)(l/73) 2nd Foot Battery "Sontag" (4-12pdrs & 2 Howitzers)(3/72)

Polish V Corps in Russia 1 August 1812 Commander-in-Chief: Prince Poniatowski, G£n£ral de division Chief of Staff: Fiszer, G£n6ral de division 16th Division: General de division Zayonchek Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Mielzynski 3rd Polish Line Regiment (3 + artillery co) (63/2,558) (2-3pdrs) 15th Polish Line Regiment (3 + artillery co)(59/Z6I6) (2-3pdrs) Brigade: G§n6ral de brigade Paszkowski 16th Polish Line Regiment (3 «• artillery co)(58/2313) (2-3pdrs) 13th Polish Line Regiment (3 • artillery co)(67/2,612) (2-3pdrs)

Artillery:

3rd Polish Foot Artillery Company (5/139) (4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers) 12th Polish Foot Artillery Company (4/153) (4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers) 3/Supplementary Artillery Battalion (1/56) Det. Polish Sapper Battalion 0 / 7 1 ) Det Polish Artillery Artisan Company (0/71) 17th Division: General de division Domorowski Brigade: General de brigade Zottowski 1st Polish Line Regiment (3 • artillery co)(60/2.336) (2-3pdrs) 6th Polish Line Regiment (4 «• artillery co)(54/2,489) (2-3pdrs) Brigade: General de brigade Krasinski 14th Polish Line Regiment (4 • artillery co)(55/2.489) (2-3pdrs) 17th Polish Line Regiment (4 • artillerv co)(60/2,606) (2-3pdrs) Artillerv: Chef de bataiilon Gugenmus 10th Polish Foot Artillery Company (5/162) (4-6pdrs it 2 Howitzers)

11th Polish Foot Artillery Company (5/170) (4-6pdrs &c 2 Howitzers) 1/Supplementary Artillery Battalion (1/55) Det Polish Sapper Battalion ( 2 / 6 9 ) Det Polish Artillery Artisian Company ( 0 / 7 ) 18th Division: G£n£rai de division Kniaziewicz Brigade: General de brigade Grabowski 2nd Polish Line Regiment (3 • artillery co)(56/2,364) (2-3pdrs) 8th Polish Line Regiment (3 > artillery co)(60/2362) (2-3pdrs) Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Pakosz 12th Polish Line Regiment (3 • artillery co)(33/2,173) (2-3pdrs)

Artillerv':

4th Polish Foot Artillery Company (5/l58)(4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers) 5th Polish Foot Artillery Company (5/I48)l(4-6pdrs ic 2 Howitzers) 2/Supplementary Battalion (1/56) Det Polish Sapper Battalion ( 2 / 5 9 ) Det Polish Artillery Artisian Company ( 0 / 7 ) Corns Cavalrv: G£n£ral de division Kaminski (later Sebastiani <5c Ufebvre-Desnoettes)

18th Light Brigade:

4th Polish Chasseur * Cheval Regiment (4)(38/748) 19th Light Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Tyskiewicz 1st Polish Chasseur * Cheval Regiment (4)(28/624) 12th Polish Uhlan Regiment (4)(30/467) 20th Light Brigade: General de de brigade briead Prince A. Sulkowski 5th Polish Chasseur & Cheval Regiment (4)(32/759) 13th Polish Hussar Regiment (4)(33/722) Reserve Artillerv: Colonel Gorski 2nd Polish Horse Artillery Company (5/147) (6-6pdrs) 14th Polish Foot Artillery Company (3/152) (6-12pdrs) 4/Supplementary Battalion (2/119) Det Polish Artillery Artisian Company ( 0 / 7 ) Bridging Train: Capitain Buialski Polish Pontooniers (3/118) Det. Supplementary Battalion (1/47) General Artillerv Park: 7th Polish Foot Artillery Company (5/164)(no guns) 8th Polish Foot Artillery Company (l/80)(no guns) 9th Polish Foot Artillery Company (l/85)(no guns) 13th Polish Foot Artillery Company (l/74)(no guns) 15th Polish Foot Artillery Company (2/87))(no guns) Det Polish Artillery Artisian Company ( 2 / 2 7 ) Combined Polish/Saxon 28th Division in Russia 1 August 1812 ffith Division: General de division Girard Brigade: General de brigade Ouviller 4th Polish Line Regiment (2 • artillery (37/1,294) (2-3pdrs) 7th Polish Line Regiment (2 • artillery (39/928) (2-3pdrs) 9th Polish Line Regiment (2 • artillery (44/1237) (2-3pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Klengel (joined later) Saxon von Low Infantry Regiment (2) Saxon von Rechten Infantry Regiment

Artillery-

co) co) co)

(2)

1st Polish Foot Battery ( 4 / 6 3 ) (4-6pdrs k 2 Howitzers) 2nd Polish Foot Battery (4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers) Polish Sappers ( 4 / 9 3 ) '

Combined Polish/Saxon IV Cavalry Corps in Russia 1 August 1812 rv Cavalrv Corns: General de division Latour-Maubourg 4th Liffht Cavalrv Division: General de division Rozniecki 28th Light Bngade: General de brigade Dziemanowski 7th Polish Uhlan Regiment (3)(33/639) 2nd Polish Uhlan Regiment (3)(25/57l) 11th Polish Uhlan Regiment (3)(27/524) 29th Light Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Tumo 3rd Polish Uhlan Regiment (3)(26/632) llth Polish Uhlan Regiment (3)(3l/657) 16th Polish Uhlan Regiment (3)(31/697)

Cuirassier Division: G£n£rai de division Lorge 1st Division: Generalmajor Thielemann Zastrow Cuirassier Regiment (4)(36/639) Saxon Garde du Corps (4)(36/639) 14th Polish Cuirassier Regiment (4) 2nd Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Lepel 1st Westphalian Cuirassier Regiment (4) 2nd Westphalian Cuirassier Regiment (4) Corps Artillerv: Chef d'escadron Schwerin 2nd Westphalian Horse Battery (3/66)(4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers) 2nd Westphalian Train Company (1/77) 2nd Saxon Horse Battery von Hiller (7/169) (4-6pdrs & 2 Howitzers) 3rd & 4th Polish Horse Artillery Batteries (ll/324)(4-6pdrs & 2 How ea)

Army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw I January 1813 Under Arms Men Off 15 683 404 28 26 336 319 15 604 22 23 805 54 Z249 558 25 32 496 30 440 26 644

1st Infantry Regiment 2nd Infantry Regiment 3rd Infantry Regiment 6th Infantry Regiment 8th Infantry Regiment 12th Infantry Regiment 13th Infantry Regiment 14th Infantry Regiment 15th Infantry Regiment 16th Infantry Regiment 17th Infantry Regiment

1st Regiment 2nd Regiment 3rd Regiment 4th Regiment 5 th Regiment 6th Regiment 7th Regiment 8th Regiment 10th Regimen 11th Regiment 12th Regiment i3th Regiment 14th Regiment 15 th Regiment 16th Regiment Foot Artillery Horse Artillery Supplementary Artillery Bn Pontooniers Sapper Bn Garrison of Zamosc Military Equippage Bn

Under Off 14 16 20 11 12 13 23 15 19 12 25 38 576 10 32

Arms Men 236 465 719 239 422 413 377 295 159 436 427 592 7 171 447

Horses Men Off 180 39 20 451 50 544 23 214 307 28 344 25 58 257 31 225 29 48 27 339 50 390 102 346 24 67 23 48 358

In Hospital Men Off 40 — 58 49 1 71 — 2 12 5 243 — 78 — 67 — 71 — 119 In Hospital Men Off 2 14 — 3 — 22 — 11 — 20 — 10 — 16 — 4 — 18 — 20 1 18 2 37 4 84 — 20 — 7

Effective Men 738 490 411 406 628 840 Z551 661 595 541 799

Effective Men frfcrsre 266 219 484 471 594 761 237 261 454 335 369 436 315 416 314 256 77 186 468 366 481 440 669 448 31 90 201 516 406

45 18

342 60

107 30

155 15

—

—

401 78

262 45

20 5 10

95 27 231

39 10 20

32

_

5 32 9

120 10 251

71 76

3,271

223

165

108

1

— -

56

—

13

_ 87 223 4 2305 675 it, levees, national guards, foot artillery and depot)

13

112

176

91

Saxon VII Corps I February 1813 Commanding General: General de division Reynier 21st Division: Generallieutenant von Lecoq 1st Brigade: Generalmajor von Steindel Liberiau Grenadier Battalion (12/347) 1/,2/Prinz Friederich Infantrv Regiment (4—lpdrs)(23/557) 1/,2/Prinz Cement Infantry Regiment (4—ipdrs)(29/810)

40

2nd Brigade: Generalmajor von Noslitz 1 / ^ / P r i n z Anton Infantry Regiment (4—4pdrs)(27/756) 1 / , 2 / l s t Ught (Lecoq) Infantrv Regiment (20/689) 1st Saxon Foot Artillery (6pdrs)(4/148) Divisional Park ( 3 / 7 2 ) ??nd Division- Generallieutenant von Funck l$t Brigade: Generalmajor von Sahr Eichelberg Grenadier Battalion (8/355) 1/,2/Kdnig Infantry Regiment (6/226) l / , 2 / Niesemeuschel Infantry Regiment (16/643)

2nd Brigade:

Spiegel Grenadier Battalion (10/281) von Anger Grenadier Battalion (9/406) I / , 2 / 2 n d Ught Infantry Regiment (20/703) 3rd Foot Battery (6pdrs)(5/115) Divisional Park ( 2 / 7 5 ) 32nd Division: General de division Durutte 1st Brigade: G£n6ral de brigade Devaux 1/35th Ugfcre Infantry Regiment (20/650) 2 / 3 5 t h ligdre Infantry Regiment (19/494) 2 / 3 6 t h L£g*re Infantry Regiment (18/394) 3 / 3 6 t h Ug^re Infantry Regiment (19/425) 2nd Brigade: 3/131st Infantry Regiment (21/509) 4/131st Infantry Regiment (17/551) 2/Wurzburg Infantry Regiment (16/321) 3/Wurzburg Infantry Regiment (16/279) 2/l32nd Infantry Regiment (15/351) 3/132nd Infantrv Regiment (15/412) 4/132nd Infantrv Regiment (12/334) 1/I33rd Infantry Regiment (23/361) 2/133rd Infantry Regiment (20/491) 3/133rd Infantry Regiment (16/348) Cavalrv:

Artillery:

6th Polish Uhlan Regiment ( 0 / 3 ) Uth Polish Uhlan Regiment (1/85) 22/1st Foot Artillery ( 2 / 7 7 ) 6 / 5 t h Foot Artillerv ( 3 / 7 8 ) 17/5th Foot Artillery ( 0 / 6 ) 4 / 9 t h Foot Artillery ( 3 / 7 5 ) Artillery Artisians ( 0 / 4 ) Det/2nd Principal Train Battalion Det/7th (bis) Train Battalion 2 / , 3 / , 4 / 9 t h (bis) Train Battalion Det/llth Principal Train Battalion Det/I3th (bis) Train Battalion Det/Italian Train Total Train (2/185)

Cnrps Cavalrv 23rd Brigade: Generalmajor Gablenz Saxon Hussar Regiment (8)(18/377) Prinz Qemens Uhlan Regiment (Saxon) (4) (8/168) von Polenz Chevauxleger Regiment (Saxon)(4)(16/393) Saxon Horse Artillery (4/140)

Artillery f a r k

2nd Saxon Foot Artillery ( 5 / 9 0 ) 4th Saxon Foot Artillery (4/91) Saxon Artillery Reserve (12/374) 1st Saxon Sapper Company ( 4 / 6 0 ) 1st Saxon Military Equipage Company ( 3 / 5 0 6 )

Saxon VII Corps 15 August 1813

v n Corps

r

Commander-in-Chief: Chief of Staff: Artillery Commander Commander of Engineers:

General de division Count Reynier General de brigade Gressot Colonel Verpeau

24th Division: Generalleutenant Lecoq (Saxon) 1st Brigade: Oberst von Brause 1/Saxon Guard Grenadier Regiment (13/710) 1 / l s t Saxon Light Infantry Regiment (14/617) 2 / 1 s t Saxon Ught Infantry Regiment (12/604)

1/Prince Maximilian Infantry Regiment (11/568) 2 / v o n Rechten Infantry Regiment ( 1 2 / 5 9 7 ) 1st Jager Company (3/133) 2nd Brigade: Generalmajor Mellentin Converged Saxon Grenadier Battalion Spiegel ( 1 0 / 6 5 8 ) 1/Prince Friederich Infantry Regiment ( 9 / 3 6 9 ) 2/Prince Friederich Infantry Regiment (11/462) 1/Steindel Infantry Regiment (16/575) 2/Steindel Infantry Regiment (15/546)

Artillery

1st Saxon Foot Battery "Dietrich" ( 4 / 1 6 8 ) 2nd Saxon Foot Battery "Zandt" ( 4 / 1 7 9 ) Saxon Train Det. (2/95) 25th Division: Generalleutenant von Sahr 1st Brigade: Oberst von Bosch Converged Saxon Grenadier Battalion Anger ( 1 2 / 6 6 8 ) l / 2 n d Saxon Light Regiment (von Sahr)(14/598) 2 / 2 n d Saxon Light Regiment (von Sahr)(10/545) 2/Konig Infantry Regiment (12/489) 1/Niesmeuchel Infantry Regiment ( 9 / 5 4 5 ) 2nd Brigade: Generalmajor von Ryssel 1 / L d w Infantry Regiment (12/547) 2 / L o w Infantry Regiment (11/519) 1/Prinz Anton Infantry Regiment (13/541) 2/Prinz Anton Infantry Regiment ( 1 2 / 5 2 0 )

Artillery

3rd Saxon Foot Battery (4/104) (6-6pdrs Sc 2-Spdr Howitzers) 4th Saxon Foot Battery (3/173) (6-6pdrs & 2-8pdr Howitzers) Saxon Train Det. ( 2 / 7 3 ) 32nd Division: G6n6ral de division Durutte 1st Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Devaux 1/35th Ugfcre Regiment (23/928) Det 2 / 3 5 t h L£g*re Regiment ( 3 / 9 9 ) 4 / 3 5 t h Ugfcre Regiment (15/650) 1/132nd Line Regiment (17/797) Det 2 / 1 3 2 n d Line Regiment ( 2 / 9 1 ) 3/132nd Line Regiment (21/727) 4/132nd Line Regiment (22/643) 2nd Brigade: G£n6ral de brigade Jarry 1 / 3 6 th L£g£re Regiment ( 1 5 / 8 % ) Det 3 / 3 6 t h Line Regiment ( 6 / 7 6 ) 4 / 3 6 t h Legdre Regiment (21/744) 1/131st Line Regiment ( 1 5 / 8 % ) 3/131st Line Regiment (20/762) 4/131st Line Regiment (18/774) 3rd Brigade: General de brigade Menu Det 2 / 1 3 3 r d Line Regiment ( 2 / 5 3 ) 3 / 1 3 3 r d Une Regiment (22/622) 4 / 1 3 3 r d Line Regiment (24/689) 2/Wurzburg Infantry Regiment (25/537) 3/Wurzburg Infantry Regiment ( 2 2 / 5 4 1 ) Artillerv

12/1st Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs & 2-24pdr Howitzers) 13/8th Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs & 2-24pdr Howitzers) Det 2/9th Principal Train Battalion (1/154) Det 4 / 9 t h Principal Train Battalion ( 2 / 1 0 4 ) 26th Light Cavalry Brigade: Colonel von Lindenau 1-8/Saxon Hussar Regiment (30/704)(728 horses) 1-5/Prinz Clemens Lancer Regiment (26/758)(879 horses)

Artillery

1st Saxon Horse Battery "Birnbaum" ( 4 / 1 7 2 ) (6-6pdrs <Sc 2-24pdr Howitzers) 2nd Saxon Horse Batterv "Probsthayn* ( 4 / 1 4 7 ) (6-6pdrs ic 2-l4pdr Howitzers)

R ^ s e r e and Grand Park

1st Saxon 12pdr Foot Battery "Rouvroy" ( 3 / 2 0 6 ) (6-12pdrs & 2-8pdr Howitzers) Saxon Sapper Company Saxon Train (4/74) Saxon Park (5/266)

Polish VIII Corps 15 August 1813 Vni Corps Commander-in-Chief: Prince Poniatowski Chief of Staff: G6n6ral de division Rozniecki Artillery Commander Colonel Redel Commander of Engineers: Colonel Mallet 26th Division: G£n6ral de division Kaminiecki 1st Brigade: G£n6ral de brigade Sierawski 1 / , 2 / l s t Polish Infantry Regiment l / , 2 / 1 6 t h Polish Infantry Reziment 2nd Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Malachowski l / , 2 / 8 t h Polish Infantry Regiment 1/^2/15th Polish Infantiy Regiment

Artillery

27th Division

2nd Polish Foot Artillery 1 / 2 5th Polish Foot Artillery 6th Polish Foot Artillery

1st Brigade: (In Wittenberg) 2nd Brigade: G£n£rai de brigade Grabowski l / , 2 / 1 2 t h Polish Infantry Regiment

Artillery

1 / 2 5th Polish Foot Artillery 3rd Polish Foot Artillery 27th Light Cavalrv Brigade: General de brigade Uminski l / , 2 / 1 4 t h Polish Cuirassier Regiment 1 / , 2 / , 3 / , 4 / K r a k u s Regiment Reserve and Grand Park 1st Polish Foot Artillery 4th Polish Foot Artillery 1 Polish Sapper Company Polish Equipage Train Det. Dombrowski's 27th (Polish) Division 15 August 1813 27th ^Polish) Division: G6n£ral de division Dombrowski 1st Brigade: General de brigade Zotowski l / , 2 / 2 n d Polish Infantry Regiment l / , 2 / 4 t h Polish Infantry Regiment 18th Light Cavalrv Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Krukowiecki l / / 2 / / 3 / , 4 / 2 n d Polish Uhlan Regiment l / , 2 / , 3 / , 4 / 4 t h Polish Chasseur Regiment Artillerv 1st Polish Horse Artillery Battery Polish Train Battalion Polish and Saxon Corps at Leizpig 16-19 October 1813 v n Corps: G£n£ral de division Reynier (12^37) 13th Division: G£n£ral de division Guilleminot Brigade: General de brigade Gruyer 4 / 1 s t LtoSre Regiment 2 / , 6 / 1 8 t h Ugfcre Regiment 3 / 7 t h Line Regiment 1 / 1 5 6 th Line Reziment Brigade: G£n6ral de brigade Lejeune 1/Illyrian Regiment 3 / 5 2 n d Line Regiment 3 / 6 7 t h Line Regiment 2 / , 3 / l O l s t Line Regiment

Artillery:

1 Foot Battery 32nd Division: G£n£ral de division Durutte Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Devaux l / 3 5 t h L6g£re Regiment 3 / 1 3 1 s t Line Regiment 3/132nd Line Regiment Brigade: General de brigade Jarry 1/36th L£g£re Regiment 3 / 133rd Line Regiment 3/Wurzburg Line Regiment Artillery: 1 Foot Battery 24th Division: General von Zeschau (3,679)

Brigade: G£n£ral Brause 1st (Lecoq) Ught Battalion ( 9 / 4 6 8 ) von Spiegel Grenadier Battalion (6/215) von Steindel Infantry Regiment (l)(14/332) Prinz Friederich Infantry Regiment (l)(14/557) 2 / v o n Rechten Infantry Regiment (1)(10/149) Brigade: G£n£ral Ryssel 2nd (von Sahr) Ught Battalion (13/705) von Anger Grenadier Battalion (5/176) 1/Niesemeuschel Infantry Regiment ( l ) ( 8 / 2 9 2 ) Saxon Jager Company Saxon Sapper Company ( 3 / 4 2 )

Artillery:

1 Saxon 6pdr Foot Battery ( 5 / 1 8 8 ) 1 Saxon 12pdr Foot Battery ( 4 / 1 4 0 ) Saxon Train Detachment 26th Light Cavalrv Brigade: von Lindenau (32/652) 1 / , 2 / , 3 / , 4 / , 5 / P r i n z Clement Uhlan Regiment Saxon Hussar Regiment (3 to 8 sqns) (sources vary)

fVrtillerv:

1st Saxon Horse Battery 2nd Saxon Horse Batterv Total (6/178) v n i Corps: G£n4ral de division Poniatowski ?6th Division: G6n£ral de division Kamienecki (5,000) Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Sierawski 1 / ^ / V i s t u l a Legion Regiment 1 / , 2 / l s t Polish Line Regiment l / , 2 / 1 6 t h Polish Line Regiment Brigade: G£n6ral de brigade Malachowski l / , 2 / 8 t h Polish Line Regiment l / , 2 / 1 5 t h Polish Une Regiment 1st Polish Foot Battery 2nd Polish Foot Battery 3rd Polish Foot Battery Brigade: G£n6ral de brigade Grabowski l / , 2 / 1 2 t h Polish Line Regiment l / , 2 / 1 4 t h Polish Line Regiment 4th Polish Foot Battery 1 / 2 unknown Polish Foot Battery 27th Light Cavalrv Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Uminski 1 / , 2 / 1 4 t h Polish Cuirassier Regiment 1 / , 2 / , 3 / , 4 / K r a s k u s Regiment 5th Polish Foot Battery 6th Polish Foot Battery 1 Polish Sapper Company Polish Equipage Train Detachment Dombrowski's 27th (Polish) Division at Leipzig 16-19 October 1813 Polish Division: G^nSral de division Dombrowski (2350) Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Zoltowski l / , 2 / 2 n d Polish Une Regiment l / , 2 / 4 t h Polish Une Regiment Brigade: G£n£ral de brigade Krukowski 1 / 2 / 2 / , 4 / 2 n d Polish Uhlan Regiment l / , 2 / / 3 / » 4 / 4 t h polish Chasseur * Cheval Regiment

Artillery:

1 Foot Battery 1st Polish Horse Battery Polish Artillery Train 1 Sapper Company

Footnotes for the Poles During the Napoleonic Wars 1 Poniatowski adopted the name "August" after he ascended the throne. 2 Acting commander was Major K. Przebendowski. 3 Although the theoretical strength of a company at this time was already at 140 men, the economic policies of maintaining units at the lower strength level 95 had prevented this number from being reached. 4 Later Col. A.Gielgud 5 The army was 8,000 men after detaching various garrisons. 6 Numbers are officers and men. 7 This organization for the IV Corps was prepared 10 days prior to Poniatowski's arrival in Zittau and, as a result, does not reflect the final organization of the corps. Krukowiecki's brigade remained with Dombrowski and Uminski was to command the advanced guard cavalry brigade in the Vm Corps. 8 Numbers are officers, men, and horses. 9 The 7th Chevaulegers was the Polish lancers who had earlier been part of the Vistula Legion and had been absorbed into the French line cavalry, though remaining entirely Polish in their make-up. 10 These adjutant-majors were captains. 11 The junior adjutants were lieutenants in the demi-battalions and and sous-lieutenants in the companies. 12 Raised to 22 in 1812 by the addition of an additional master artisan. There is some confusion over the actual declaration of the assignment of these personnel. Indications are that the 30 March 1810 decree directed the establishment of these positions, but, according to Poniatowski, these positions were not filled until 1812 13 Added in 1812. 14 According to Poniatowski's correspondance this was raised to 48 in 1812, but it also appears in the 1810 decree. 15 Total of 180 in 1812, or 181 with the additional captain. 16 Added in 1812. 17 Total of 127 in 1812. 18 Added in 1812. 19 Raised to 100 in 1811 20 With the additional captain the strength was 169. The total was raised to 181 in 1812. 21 Raised to 82 in 1812. 22 Raised to 132 in 1812. 23 Raised to 84, probably in 1811, and finally to 96 in 1812. 24 Total of 132 in 1811 and 144 in 1812. 25 Indicated as present only in Poniatowski's correspondance. 26 This figure is provided by Poniatowski. Other sources indicate that was 76. Poniatowski indicates another 20 added in 1812. 27 Raised to a total of 149 in 1812 This is as presented by Poniatowski in his correspondance. Other sources indicate 261st Qass Sappers and no Captain 2nd Qass. 28 To this should be added plus 318 in depots and 98 in staffs providing a grand total of 4,S06. 29 A large part of the 1,000 Polish members of the

Genoa garrison were captured by the Austrians when the city fell in May 1800. 30 The 1st Legion's depot was also in Marseilles and had been there prior to 13 March 1800. 31 One demi-brigade numbered 3,231 officers and soldiers organized inot one grenadier and eight fusilier companies per battalion. 32 One chef de bataillion was assigned to each battalion and the fourth was assigned to support with various administrative duties. 33 Zaremba gives the date of the transfer as 5 February 1802. 34 Not to be confused with Joseph Sulkowski, Bonaparte's ADC in Italy and Egypt or Antoni Sulkowski, another Polish general. 35 This was, in fact General de brigade H. Wolodkowicz, but his status was, for some unknown reason, unclear at this time. 36 One major served in the depot 37 One Adjudant-major served in the depot. 38 This gave the regiment a theoretical strength of 43 officers with 59 horses and 1,000 NCC^s and troopers with 996 horses. The depot was common for both regiments. The officers were transferred from the 1st Imperial Guard Chevaulegers. 39 The lowest theoretical strength of an infantry company in the Vistula Legion was 140 officers and men. 40 This sequence was introduced on 26 March 1799. Footnotes for the Saxons During the Napoleonic Wars 1 Formed from two companies from both the Kurfiirst and Langenau Infantry Regiments. 2 Formed from two companies from the Prinz Anton Regiment and two from the Prinz Clemens Regiment. 3 Formed from the Prinz Max and von Nostitz Regiments. 4 Formed from the Prinz Xaver & von der Heyde Regiments. 5 Formed from the Gotha & von Zanthier Regiments. 6 Formed from the von Lindt and von Niesemeuschel Regiments. 7 The Sperl Grenadier Battalion was formerly the Anger Grenadier Battalion. 8 This deployment and references to Devaux's and Jarry*s brigades in the battle would indicate that Menu's 3rd Brigade was not present, but this is not confirmed or denied by any of the sources consulted. 9 Durutte's division was formed from former penal regiments (formed entirely of pardoned deserters) and had a bad history of refusing to do things, like advance into battle/ 10 When this unit defected, only two 6pdr guns and two howitzers passed over to the allies.

Saxon

Bibliography

C e m n i di Monte Varchi. C F. X., P i c Feidzugg d c r S a c h s c n in den fahrrn 1812 ur.d 1 8 1 * a m der. b e w a h r t ^ t t r . O u c i l g n g w o g e n . Dresden 1821. Chandler, D C . . Pirtianarv or the Napoleonic Wars. N e w York. 1979. cxner, M ,

P a r t , r i p a h o n of'.he Roval Saxon A m v in the Campaign agairet Austria and the Military F v w n i r W . v

-r> m e Y t t f 130?. Dresden. 1894.

-ratten. liber Steliung und Bewegung f i n e r C o m r a e n i c und gmeiffataillnm. N'ach dem Konigl-ch S a c h i i s c h e n gxercir-Reglement. fur -une? Personen entworten. •lYtklw 31th ZM ftffiflCT CT1 frlitlrn ^gllffl. Dresden. 1809. von Funck. F.. In the Wake of Napoleon: Being the M f f i W i n (1807* 1809) of Ferdinand von Funck- L c u t r a n t C e n t a l in the

Armv , n d Adiutar.t General tn

'.hfi King ri toonY. London. 1931. w r a h i s h f t wtu gTEttmirtigrr Zustafri der K u r r i c h a u t h m A n r a t

18th Volume, D r e s d e n . 1802.

Hansch. Pr. L t , Ccschichfc des Koen-glich S a e c h s i s c h m Inecniguf- und P i o r a c r - K o r a . Pionier-Batallons Nr. 12).Dresden. 1898. Kersten. F.. Se Ortenburg, G., P i c Sachsische Armee von 1763 bis 1842. Bekum. 1982. von Knrfschmar, A.. Geschichte der Kurfuntlich und kocniglich S a c h s i v h e n FelJ-Artillerie von ^ X ) .

Berlin. 1876.

Mackav.S.. C a m r a i e n s of the A m i t t of Francc. in Pmssia. Saxony, and Poland, under the C o m m a n d of His Maiestv the Emperor and King, in M P C C C VT and VTI. Boston. 1808. von M o n t h * . A.. rHr C h u r a v h h l i c h e n T r j p c e n in Fcldzugc 1306

Dresden. 1860.

Russian General Staff. Ta G u r r r e N'aricmal del,SI 2. Paris. 1912. Saxon Army Stamm ur.d Rang Listes der Komglich Sachsischen Airr.ce Auf da< Tahr m m Dresden. 1803. Stamm und Rang Listes der Koniglich Sachsischcn Armee Auf das Fahr 1810. Dresden, 1810. Stsmm und Rang ' J s t e s der Komglich Sachsischen Armce Auf das Tar.r

Dresden. 1813.

Stamm und Rang t i
IMIFFLMNTFA » U 3

1 « A i ? i n FrinfliSCT

VoJ

IV, Lcs Saxons dans new r a n ^ . Paris. 1907.

Schuster. 0 . * Franck. F.A. Geschichte der - w h s i y h g n Armee. Leipzig, 1885, Vol 0 .

Polish

Bibliography

Belhomme, L t Coi. Histgire de 1'lnfanttng r n P r i n t s P « » Bochenski, Z "N'owe matenally do barwy wojsk Ksicstwa Warsaw skiego, "Sftidia i Matrrialv do Oririnw D a w n c g o L'zbroienia i U b i o n . Woiskowcoo 2 (1964) 3onaparte, N.. Corresoondance de Napoieon ler. Paris. 1861 3ukhari> £.. Napoleon's Cavaln-. Presidio P i r n San R a f a e l CA. 1979 von Cheiminsky, J. & Mali bran. A , L'Armce du Duche de Varsovte. Pans, 1918 Dai N a m przykJad Bonaparte. Wspomnienia i relacje zolmerzy polskich 1796-1815 Ed. Robert Bielecki and A.J T y s z k a , K r a k o w , W y d a w n i c t w o Literackie, 1984. Dundulb, B . . \ ' a n o ? e o n e t l a 1 ithuanie en 1812. France, 1940. de Fedorowicz, W.

C a m p a g n e dc Pologne d c o u i s le commencement iusou'a f r V r u p a t i o n de V a r ^ v i ^ Pans, 1911

Frcnch Archives, Carton C2-708 Crabowski. A , Wspomnienia. Vol 1, Cracow. 1909 Gembarzcwski, B , "Huzar Kalinowskiego z r. 1807.* Bron i 3arwa I S (1934) Gembarzewski, B., ZoLnjerz polski ubior uzbrowmie i oporzadzcn.-e od wieku xi do m l m

Vol UL W a r s a w , 1964

Head. M.C-Frencr. \-apoleonk Lancer Regirm-nb.. Almark Publications, Creat Britain. 1971. Kirkor, S . I ^ i a Vadwislanska 1808-1814. London: Oficyna Poetow i Malarzy, 1981. Kirkor, S-. Pod •.rtardarami Napoleona. London, Oficyna Poetow i Maiarzy, 1962 Kirkor, S., PfliaO" V rjgWgli a n e d y K i t : V latot.h

Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1981.

Kobielski, S , Polska bron. Bron Palna. Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy imienia O a o l i n s k i c h . 1975. K u k i e l M„ C>aSK ^Ygiska w l a l w g q V d a t a .Tflggtofflkiri i r ? M S l 5 > 2 vols, Warsaw: E. Wende i Ska. 1918-1920. K u k i e l M.. Woina 1312 roku. 2 vols. Krakow: Polska Akaderrua Urruejetnoeci. 1937. Vfargueron. Campagne dc Russie. Paris. 1897-1906. Nadoiski, A , Polska bron. Bron biala. Wroclaw: Zaklad Nardowy imiena Ossoiinskicn. 1974. OchiwKZ, G . Rok 1809. Poznan. 1925. Pachonsici. I I... Wn.na

franruskn-neapnlitanslca

17<*-1799 i -idrial w nr^ V y ^ n o w PnUlctrh. 2 vols, Cr»COW, 1947-1948.

PawlowskL B.. His ton a Woinv Pnlsko-Austriafkte 1809 Roku. Warsaw, 1935. Poniatowski, J., C . i r - r ^ n o n d a n d u F^r.ce fo-^ph Poruatowsk: avec

Poznan. 1929.

Skaikowski. A., Q czesc :miena pobkicgo. Lwow, 1908. Skalkowski, A , •Cfkerowie polscy 5tu Dni," Kwart.ilnix Historvcrnv (Lwow), 29 (1915) Soityk. R.. Relation i e s Ooerstions de TArrrce. Paris, 1841. Staszcwsla, J , "Mundur 9, pozniejszego 3 p.p. Ksiestwa Warszaw skiego z 18071." Bron i Barwa. 3 S (1936) Staszewski, J., "W sprawie mundurow wojsska Ksictwa Warszawskie go." 8ron i Barwa 3 5 (1936)

wiftretiaivanvg Saints IWangawlig«Q. Ahrr nvmatY^C n-iadZY MirYnitt, M. w. Bartel, J JCosim. W. Rostocki. V o l 4., Warsaw: Panstwowe W y d a w n i c t w o Naukowe, 1969.

Wesolowski. M , C^ra&SigTS gf ^

^fftflii

L>Ughy gf '-var3aVY. unpublished manuscript.

Wielhorski, J , ' L a n c a . ' Studia do P z i c o w Dawnego L'zbroterua i f b i o r u W o * k n w * g n f> (1974). Wimmer, J , Histona ?;echot\- polskie do roku 1964. Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa O b r o n y N a r o d o w e j , 1978. Z i r e m b a . A., "Bataiion poiski G w a n i d w 1813 r. 3ror. i Barwa, (London) 11 (1957). Z a m n b a . A , "1 i 2 pulk uianow p o U d e h w kampanii francuskiej 1814 r. "Studia do Drietow O^v^-n^o ' J r b r o ^ n i a , L ^ i o n i Wo^skowego 6 (1974). Zaremoa. A., "Polish Legions o f the Napoleonic Period." Adjutant's Call (New York) 6 3 4 (1969) Zaremba. A-. T h e 1st and 2nd Regiments o f Polish Lancers in the 1814 Campaign. Adjutant's

(New Y o r k ) 6-34 (1969)

Zvch, G.. Rok 1807 Wydawnictwo Ministersrwi Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, 1957. ZvgulskL Z. J u n , and Wielecki, H , Poiski mundur w g s k o w v . Krakow: Krajowa A g e n q a Wydawnicza. 1988

o D.J.V.

Foot Artillerist

Grand Duchy of Warsaw

(1808-1813) General de division Poniatowski Horse Artillerist

Krakus

towski

Krakus (1813)

Legion of the Danube

Legion of the North

;

Line Infantrv Grenadier

Grand Duchy of Warsaw Voltigeur

(1810-1813) Fusilier

Infantr

Grand Duchy of Warsaw Fusilier

Infantry Officer

Drummer

(1810-1813)

Standard Bearer

J

.5

hi

of Warsaw (1808-1813) Trooper, Elite Company, 4th Chasseur a Cheval Regiment Trooper, 13th Hussar Regiment (1812-1813) Trooper, 14th Cuirassier Regiment T

C1,

r

Grand

Duchy

Troopei

i

M

Grand Duchy of Warsaw (1808-1813) Trooper, 2nd Uhlan Regiment " Trumpeter, 11th Uhlan Regiment Trooper, 21st Uhlan Regiment ^

Infantrv Officer

Vistula Legion

(1810-1814)

Fusilier

Drummer

Artille

_s>

m.

b

m I I

i

i

\

V

I

Saxon Army Artillerist

(1810-1813)

Train Soldier

Generalleutnani

Foot Artillerist

Saxon Army

(1792-1806) Trooper, Zastrow Cuirassier Regiment Grenadier, Guard Grenadier Regiment

Muskets

r

i

jbc

iment

Saxon Army (1792-1806) Musketeer, Prinz Xavier Infantry Regiment Grenadier, Kurfurst Infantry Regiment

Schiitzen

Saxon Army (1792-1806) Kurfurst Infantrv7 Regiment, Officer * Drummer

Standard bearer

bearer

Saxon Army (1810-1813) vlusketeer, Prinz Anton Infantry Regiment Jager, von Sahr Light Infantry Regiment Musketeer, von Rechten Infantry Regiment

4

1

Saxon Army (1810-1813) Officer, Von Rechten Infantry Regiment Trooper, Prinz Clemens Uhlan Regiment Musketeer in great coat

Trooper

Saxon Army

eeiment o

(1792-1809) rooper, Saxon Hussar Regiment Trooper, Garde du Corps Regiment Trooper, von Polenz Chevauleger Regiment