PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Henry Pietersma
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Henry Pietersma
New York
Oxford
Oxford University Press 2000
Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris Sao Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan
Copyright © 2000 by Henry Pietersma Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise. without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicalion Data Pietersma, Henry. Phenomenological episternology / Henry Pietersma, p cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-513190-8 1. Husserl, Edmund, [859-1938—Contributions in theory knowlege, 2. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976 Contributions in theory of knowledge. 3. Mericau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908-1961—Contributions in theory of knowledge. 4. Knowlege. Theory of—History—2Oth
century.I. Title. b3279.h94p467 2000
'121'094'0904 dc2T
99-20502
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO A N N I E
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PREFACE
T
his study is both historical and systematic in nature. Its historical character may be seen from the fact that the three central chapters of the book are an attempt to come to grips with the views of Husserl, Heidegger, and MerleauPonty, three towering figures from the recent history of philosophy. In these parts of the book, I offer an historical interpretation of each of their epistemological doctrines. Each doctrine has its own power, excitement, and charm, which I have tried to capture in my exposition. Each chapter, I think, has enough integrity to be studied with profit without reading the others, if the pressure of time and circumstance should require it. I compare these doctrines with one another only to the extent necessary in light of the fact that both Heidegger and MerleauPonty developed their views in criticism of Husserl. But I have tried not to let comparisons of this kind come in the way of exposition of each philosopher's doctrine for its own sake. These chapters, as one would expect, are concerned to do justice to the relevant texts and are therefore essentially expository and historical in nature. When it comes to making comparisons, I give more attention to the affinity between the three philosophers than to their differences from one another. It seems to me that it is particularly interesting to see them together and to relate them as a group to the general history of epistemology. Seeing them against this background, it became clear to me how deeply all three are indebted to the transcendental epistemology of Kant. Each of the three philosophers criticizes
him (or some of his followers) in very important ways, but beneath all this there remains an affinity which all three have with transcendental philosophy, be it that of Kant himself or that of post-Kantian idealism. In spite of everything, Kant remains canonical for them, But since Kant's philosophy marks a very important turn in the history of philosophy, I have also ventured further into the past to give the transcendental turn its proper historical context. I leave much of this at the level of broad outline and without extensive documentation, but I suggest that in appreciating this context of Kant's turn it is well not to stop at Hume, Berkeley, Locke, and Descartes, but to go as far back into history as Plato and Aristotle. In short, 1 read Kant as opponent of what I call classical realism. My book accordingly compares Husserl with Plato as well as with Kant, and I contrast Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty with both Plato and Aristotle as well as with Husserl and Kant. What is new and original about my book is, first of all, that 1 focus on the epistemological views held by the three philosophers, which is a story that has never been told in an epistemologically responsible manner. I call the approach of all three epistemologies phenomenological, taking this term in a broad sense that I will try to explain in the introduction. As noted, I also emphasize the transcendental character of their epistemology, which I likewise discuss in considerable detail in the introduction. The systematic side of my book is apparent in its attempt to relate these doctrines of knowledge to historical and contemporary epistemology. My intention here is not only to compare and contrast but also to engage the three historical figures in contemporary discussions, particularly those involving realism and antirealism. The systematic side remains secondary in relation to the book's historical concerns, at least in the sense that, except for the introduction and the conclusion, discussions of systematic issues are woven into doctrinal exposition as it proceeds in the chapters of the book. I believe my contribution in the discussion of these three philosophers is important, because epistemology is not a topic which is at present accorded the place it should have in scholarly work. Studies of Husserl do generally touch on epistemological issues because for him the theory of knowledge was central among the philosophical disciplines. Commentators, however, seldom confront his doctrines with other theories because they keep the epistemological discussion within the bounds of Husserlian language and thought. Even epistemological discussions of Descartes, Hume, and Kant are packaged in the same language. The scholarly literature on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty shows even less concern for epistemology, presumably because these philosophers themselves are on record as having rejected epistemology. Heidegger, for example, treats knowledge as merely a derivative mode of being-in-the-world and shows little but contempt for epistemology. No attempt has thus far been made, however, to identify and discuss the doctrine of knowledge implied by such a negative attitude. My first chapter is a lengthy introduction in which I try to set forth the general framework of the discussion, indicating what fundamental questions I pursue and how I understand them. Since I emphasize the transcendental character of the thought of all three philosophers, and since I construe transcendental thought as an opposition to classical realism, I devote a great deal of viii
Preface
attention to the relation of transcendentalism to realism. One could say that the dominant feature of my book is an attempt to introduce realism as a partner in the discussion of phenomenological-transcendental epistemology. I begin by discussing the nature of a phenomenological epistemology in contrast with epistemological externalism. The second question I discuss has to do with the relation between transcendental and other epistemologies, especially those associated with realism. I give here a broad characterization of a realist epistemology and contrast it with one that is transcendental in nature. The historical role of scepticism in the formation of Kant's epistemology is here discussed. I argue that Kant saw realism as giving rise to scepticism and therefore held the view that it ought to be rejected in the interests of a transcendental theory of knowledge. The role and nature of the concept in human knowledge—already at issue in the medieval debate about universals—emerges from this discussion as a matter of crucial importance. The views of Kant and Hegel on this matter are briefly discussed and contrasted with a realist view. Since a transcendental epistemology concentrates its attention on the idea of a conceptual framework, I devote a section to this idea, arguing that it is central in the philosophies I deal with in this book. Another thesis I argue for in this book is that Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty emphasize the search for truth as an activity to such a degree that the nature of truth itself is lost from sight. I am inclined to think that this, too, is a tendency inherent in the transcendental tradition since Kant. Since Heidegger's much-discussed doctrine of truth elaborates such a view as a criticism of the correspondence view associated with realism, I discuss then in the introduction a few texts from Plato and Aristotle and other matters relating to the general philosophical debate about truth, trying to defend the view that the nature of truth should be distinguished from the search for it. The introduction concludes with a general consideration of the most important differences between Husserl and the two other philosophers. I venture to think that the importance I give to realism broadens the scope of interest of this book, for neither the philosophers under discussion nor their followers and commentators have deemed realism worthy of philosophical interest. The reason for this opinion, as we will see, is a strange but persistent confusion of realism with the objectivism and naturalism they saw, understandably enough, as fundamentally at odds with their own phenomenology, I reject such a view of realism and therefore discuss at great length the question whether realism as such is compatible with phenomenology, particularly if the latter is developed as a transcendental philosophy. Although my primary aim is epistemological, metaphysical issues could not be avoided. All three philosophers have a doctrine of being which enters into their epistemologies at crucial points. In fact, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty often write as though what they mainly want to present is a doctrine of being. This is especially true of Heidegger. Nothing seems to have been further from his mind than to offer a theory of knowledge. To a considerable extent, then, I had to construe their epistemological doctrine by an examination of their ontology or metaphysics. It proved to be very difficult to establish what Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty held with regard to knowledge. In their case, one sometimes has Preface
ix
to read not only the text but also between the lines, often piecing together a doctrine only alluded to in widely dispersed passages. Although these textual expositions require close attention from the reader, I have done my best to keep the general line of thought clear throughout the discussion. Throughout my book, I have tried to make the epistemological focus as sharp as I could. What to include in my discussion was not always obvious. The epistemological import of Husserl's doctrine of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction is made fairly clear by the author himself. The same holds for Heidegger's doctrine about the founded character of knowledge and Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the primacy of perception. But it took me quite a long time to decide that on account of its epistemological ramifications I had to discuss, for instance, the topic of essences, not only in connection with Husserl but also in connection with the other two philosophers. The central chapters are exegetical, although I have tried not to lose sight of systematic problems. In my exposition of doctrines, I avoid as much as possible the technical vocabulary used by these philosophers, but when I do introduce the reader to a technical term, I explain what I take it to mean and generally proceed without making much use of it. The final chapter has been kept short. I clarify my criticism and return to a further discussion of the questions that have come up throughout the book, and especially in the first chapter. It is essentially meant to tie things together at the end. I thank James C. Morrison, David Carr, and J. N. Mohanty for reading an earlier version of my book and serving me with their observations and criticisms. I thank Graeme Nicholson for discussing with me early versions of my chapter on Heidegger and David Jopling lor reading the final version of the introductory chapter.
May 1999 Toronto, Ontario
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Preface
H. P.
CONTENTS
1. Introduction 3 Phenomenology and Externalism 3 Transcendentalism and Realism 13 Conceptual Frameworks 21 Metaphysical Issues 26 Truth and the Search for It 28 Cognitive and Other Attitudes 32 2. Husserl 36 Introduction 36 Intention and Fulfilment 39 The Transcendental Turn 49 Epistemology of Perception 60 Knowledge of Essences 68 The Problem of History 78 3. Heidegger 85 Introduction 85 The Place of the Transcendental The Ontological Difference 89 The Cognitive Attitude 95
87
Subject and Predicate 100 Essences 106 The Question of Truth 111 The Open Space 117 Untruth and Concealment 121 Summary 124 4. Merleau-Ponty 126 Introduction 126 Sensation and Perception 129 Perception and Meaning 130 Nature and Scope of Reflection 132 Perception and the Body 135 Appearance and Reality 137 External Reality 141 Objectification and Predication 147 Perceptual Knowledge and Truth 152 Essences 154 Metaphysics and Epistemology 158 Merleau-Ponty's Idealism 163 Summary 167 5. Conclusions 168 Transcendentalism and Realism Revisited 168 Transcendentalism in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty Notes
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Select Bibliography Index
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Contents
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1 INTRODUCTION
Phenomenology and Externalism What does it mean to adopt a phenomenological attitude, or follow the associated method, in matters epistemological? Husserl, the father of phenomenology, often starts by contrasting the phenomenological with what he calls the natural attitude, which is that of common sense and science. And in his doctrine of knowledge, he criticizes epistemologists who presuppose the validity of the natural attitude and are in whole or in part, implicitly or explicitly, indebted to it. Phenomenological epistemology, he argues, breaks with that attitude and focuses its attention differently: not on objects, but on their experience. It is supposed to find its subject matter by reflection on our cognitive experience, which is the reason he often develops his own thoughts by starting with some laudatory comments about Descartes. Let us therefore start off by saying that the standpoint of phenomenology is that of reflection and that it approaches cognitive experience from within, i.e., from a first-person point of view. Since this formulation implies some sort of contrast with a nonreflective, third-person approach to the subject matter of epistemology, it does not help us very much until we have a sense of this contrast. Before going into the distinctively philosophical or epistemological debates surrounding this matter, I want to discuss a contrast of attitudes that is already familiar to cognitive experience long before there is any fully systematic or phil-
5
osophical episternology. Here too, I suggest, we come across the two approaches which I mentioned a moment ago in a first approximation. One person approaches a given belief, or system of beliefs, from the outside, another from the inside. On one occasion, 1 take the one approach, while on a different occasion I take the other. In the former case, I consider the belief simply with regard to its truth-value and, on the basis of what I know, I come to the conclusion, say, that it is false. Without seriously entering into the frame of mind of the person who holds the belief, I take myself to be in a position to pronounce it to be false. I simply look at the facts that are known to me, and I conclude that the belief does not square with those facts. I need not dwell on why that person held the belief in question or on the meaning it has for her. But there may also be circumstances in which the question of the truth or falsity of beliefs recedes into the background somewhat, and in which my primary interest is to know a person's mind. 1 now ask questions such as these: Why does she believe this or that? By what principles or methods did she arrive at that belief? What was the background of belief which shaped those principles as well as the particular belief in question? What else would she have had to have experienced for her to come to this belief? How different is her world from mine? Is it different only in that it has something which my world lacks? Or is it different in a more pervasive way? To find answers to such questions, one is likely to do a great deal of listening to what that person has to say about her beliefs, rather than talk about them from one's own point of view. The interest here bears some resemblance to that of a friend or a counsellor. A psychiatrist, for instance, may spend considerable time trying to find out his patient's possibly bizarre view of the world. That it is not a correct view may be without question, but the psychiatrist is not interested in that question when he wants to get to know his patient. It is for that reason that he listens to what the patient has to say and how he describes the way he sees the world. While this concern is with an individual person and subserves a practical end—namely some therapeutic improvement—the so-called human sciences offer many examples of attempts to attain theoretical knowledge of human beings. And unless such beings are reduced to scientific objects, in such inquiries the human scientist's approach is bound to be, in whole or in part, phenomenological. One tries to get a picture of a form of life as actually lived by certain groups or communities, a world as it exists in the communal awareness of those human beings, if nowhere else. An anthropologist, being not at all concerned to evaluate worldviews as to their truth, may be satisfied by understanding a particular view as it exists in the community under study.1 What is particularly important for an understanding of these different attitudes is the role played, on the one hand, by the appraiser's own knowledge or beliefs and, on the other, by the convictions and beliefs held by the person under study. If we approach the beliefs from the outside, we base what we say about it largely on knowledge available to us, on our own unquestioned possession of truth; we feel no need to rely on the believer's point of view. One might be inclined to say that, if the purpose is cognitive appraisal in the sense of truthevaluation, this approach almost goes without saying, since it would seem that no belief, or system of beliefs, can be so evaluated on the basis of its own content. 4
Phenomenological Episternology
A belief held by a certain person cannot be a part of that on the strength of which I appraise its truth-value. If it, is true, we generally think, it is true by virtue of something external to its own content or the mental history which accounts for the holding of the belief. When we consider it from the inside, however, a certain reversal takes place. The scale tips the other way and the believer's own point of view becomes paramount, while the appraiser's independent information plays a minor role, or no role at all. I now want to know what the world is like according to the perspective of certain persons. If we think of appraisal as having to do only with truth, we might be inclined to say that the element of appraisal is completely absent in such a situation. For if I do not allow extrinsic information to play a role, how can I possibly appraise the truth or falsity of what is being believed? All that remains is an interest in describing it purely from the inside, which is to say, from the believing subject's perspective. What goes on in an everyday, nonphilosophical appraisal of beliefs suggests that the two approaches are complementary, rather than incompatible, for the practice of cognitive appraisal embraces both. Let us take as an example a cognitive appraisal motivated by doubt; somebody says something which I doubt and proceed to appraise. Since I doubt that the object of a certain belief exists, it goes without saying that I cannot point to it directly but will refer to it as that which so and so believes, i.e., the object as internal to the latter's belief. In other words, an object the status of which remains in question is introduced into the discourse of appraisal by including in the way I refer to it an indication to the effect that it is an object believed to exist by a certain specified person (or group). I refer to the object as what, is being thought of by so and so, as an object in a certain description, constructed, so to speak, in the doxastic situation of that person from the materials available to him—in short, an object represented in that subject's perspective. The effect of this is just what is needed: I introduce the object for the purpose of appraisal, but at the same time I dissociate myself from the belief itself, since I do not (or not yet) believe in the existence of its object. Let us say that the belief in question is one held by, for example, my friend David T. Steen. This kind of situation led to locutions to the effect that that object or state of affairs exists in Steen's mind. Philosophers might now want to ask what kind of being it has in his mind, but since we are trying to envisage what goes on in a prephilosophical process of appraisal, it is perhaps wise not to worry too much about ontology. After all, the appraiser has not yet given the object in David Steen's mind a permanent home. Its present subjective status is simply a function of a cognitive manoeuvre, namely, that of cognitive appraisal. When we talk about an object as existing in Steen's mind, we want it to be understood that we are not yet finished with the job of assigning it an ontological status. To fix the object of evaluative interest, then, the appraiser begins with a kind of focus on ivhat is believed in a certain believer's mind, that is, on what the latter sincerely says he believes. The only status David Steen's object has within the appraiser's universe of discourse is that of an intentional object: it exists in David's mind, even if it does not exist anywhere else. Whether he is right or wrong still remains to be decided. 2 An appraiser takes such an object, to be nothing more than what is believed in the specific mental state mentioned, Introduction
5
namely, David Steen's mind. But that does not make it identical with that mental state. The properties assigned to an intentional object are different from those assigned to the mental state, even if they are precisely the same properties ascribed to it by the person in that state. The properties an appraiser ascribes to an intentional object are properties of an object that may very well exist quite independently. Now an appraisal is generally supposed to have an outcome, either positive or negative; we expect a decision as to whether the object in question really exists. In the case of a positive outcome, the indexing of the object with reference to Steen's mind is dropped; the object is set free of its subjective determinants. What is believed is thereby, as it were, removed from the context of a specific believer's mind and given a name and a place in the appraiser's world of truth. The latter accordingly identifies it with one of things that exist in that world and adds the properties David Steen assigned to it to those which, in his view, it already possessed objectively. (In that case, we say that he has learned something about the object from Stcen.) The object's subjective context and background in Steen's mind drop, as it were, out of focus for lack of any further cognitive interest. And in such a case, the belief appraised is held to be true in very much the same sort of sense in which the external approach considers truth and falsity. What I have so far discussed, in a somewhat abstract and simplistic way, are things pertaining to a contrast in attitudes and the differences made by one or the other attitude. I chose to begin this way because I want to highlight certain abstract but fundamental features of the situation before we get into details. To get a more realistic picture, we have to remember that when we talk about the belief held by someone, we are talking about an actual person, though the perspective in which we view that person tends to constrict our consideration. The perspective on knowledge leaves out of consideration a great many things that make up an actual person or an actual society. Our focus is simply on what is believed, but that does not mean that we hold this person to be a being that has no practical interests, values, or emotions. But even when we bear in mind our general perspective on knowledge, we still come face to face with the fact that believing something or other engages a great deal more than a particular belief. A person holds a particular belief for certain reasons he knows. And that, in turn, means that he holds all kinds of other beliefs as well. Some of them may be general beliefs he is scarcely aware of holding. They may be beliefs to the effect that beliefs of a certain kind, of which a particular belief is a member, are justified under such and such circumstances. In the light of that general, higherorder belief, the particular belief that p recommends itself to him as justified, warranted, acceptable, rational, or whatever gives it cognitive status. The belief to be appraised, therefore, is part of a much wider context of belief. And the holding of these latter beliefs will imply yet further beliefs. In fact, as all three philosophers to be discussed in this book emphasize, that believer's awareness is, in the last analysis, an awareness of an entire world, using "world" to designate a holistic system rather than an aggregate of entities. In what follows, I shall often speak of that kind of system as a conceptual framework. More about that later. 6
PhenomenoLogical Episternology
A complete dissociation of the appraiser from the believer, which may have been suggested by some parts of the discussion, is also an abstraction. As pragmatist philosophers particularly, and also Heidegger, would emphasize, cognitive appraisal is usually an affair between members of a community. Accordingly, there is bound to be far-reaching agreement between the appraiser and the person whose particular belief is being appraised. In fact, it is easy to see that the very nature of cognitive appraisal presupposes a community of agreement between appraiser and appraised. Take the particular state of affairs which a certain belief is supposed to be about. If I am to determine the truth or falsity of the belief, I must be able to determine whether that: object exists and/or whether it has the property which it is said to have. How can I do this, unless I know where to look for it? 1 naturally look for it where I know it is supposed to be, or where the person whose belief is in question says it is. Just looking somewhere or other and not finding the object of the belief is irrelevant to the truth-value of the belief. That place must therefore be known to me, so that I can look there. In other words, if 1 am to undertake an epistemic appraisal of somebody's belief, I have to share with that person enough of a world to look for the object in the right place. Cognitive appraisal thus assumes that there exists between us agreement about an implied context or world. Looking for something in the right place should not be interpreted too simplistically, as if it involved only spatial places one can walk to in a fairly straightforward sense. What is required depends largely on the kind of thing involved. When something has been said about a sentence in a book, the place to check is that book. When something is said about the result of an arithmetical operation, what is called for is obviously a calculation. The general point at issue is this: whatever the particular moves might be, they all have in common that after their performance we are in a situation which entitles us to pronounce about the truth or falsity of the belief we set out to examine. Another point, already noted, needs further elaboration. When it comes to appraising a belief with respect to its truth or falsity, not only is the external approach customary but also it, seems to be, in fact, altogether appropriate. Our intuitive sense of things is that a belief's being true, in distinction from its being justified or warranted, owes nothing to the believer's mind. If a belief is true, so our practice of appraisal suggests, it is so by virtue of something altogether external to the mind of the believer, namely, an existing entity being what it is. Even though, as I indicated, an external approach to a person's beliefs ignores the letter's sense of subjectivity and might hurt his feelings of being a significant agent, it is in this respect consonant with our other prcphilosophical convictions. Although there is a distinction, the two approaches are connected and complementary. For the external approach, it is the truth of a belief that matters. On such an approach, knowledge is just a relation between a knower and an object. That the corresponding belief is actually held for reasons appreciated by the person who holds that belief is a decidedly secondary issue. That the truth in question should, on a certain occasion, have been attained by luck or a disposition of nature, rather than by a diligent search, is a question that will only be important only to those who put a premium on what is found as a result of seeking. The emphasis inherent in the external approach is on truth as a posIntroduction
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session and knowledge as a state, even if that state was brought about by some causal influence. In short, taken strictly as such, the emphasis seems to exclude the recognition that the cognitive subject actively participates in the matter, for the appraiser naturally assumes that she is competent to appraise the truth of his beliefs without him. The other approach, by contrast, views the subject as active, for example, as engaged in justifying the beliefs he holds, as basing moral and political ideals on them, and as acting to realize those goals. The subject is an agent who seeks and finds truth, who makes use of whatever truth is already available at a particular time to seek another truth, and so on. Truth as object of search tends to overshadow truth as possession. Knowing is seen as an activity, rather than a state of being related to an independent reality. Now let us try to state Husserl's case for a phenomenological epistemology as an explicitly philosophical discipline, approaching cognitive experience from a reflective point of view. Like anyone else engaged in a theoretical enterprise, the phenomenological epistemologist, of course, tries to be objective with regard to her subject matter, but, what gives her approach its phenomenological character is that she objectifies the internal structure of cognitive experience. Her focus is the first-person point of view, whether that of an individual as such or the communal sense of the individual. The phenomenological theorist describes or articulates cognitive experience from the standpoint of the cognizer, thinking of it as though it were her own, imagining it as if she herself actually had it. Her primary questions include: What are the beliefs of this cognizer? How strongly are they held? What grounds does he give for them? How does he connect them with one another into the whole of his experience? As an actual person, the phenomenologist, of course, has her own convictions about what exists or does not, but her phenomenological approach demands that they should not play a role in the way she describes the cognitive experience under discussion. If she thinks that the state of affairs believed to obtain by the cognizer does not obtain at all, that the belief is wildly wrong, she will not describe the belief as false or hallucinatory or as based on imagination, if by doing so she would contradict the cognizer's sense of it; the latter may take it to be firmly rooted in what he takes to be a perception. The state of affairs she mentions by way of indicating what the belief is about is therefore, in a certain sense, created by the cognitive awareness under study; it is the state of affairs from the subject's perspective. One could also say that it is internal to a specific knower's belief, or rather his system of beliefs, in the sense that one can determine from the inside, as it were, what object a given belief has. Beliefs, of course, do not come singly, one at a time; they do not form in their totality a mere aggregate, but a framework or context of meaning in which they are internally related to one another. The holding of one belief as correct means that another is set aside as incorrect. One belief has relevance to another, a relation that is itself a matter of belief about the other beliefs. There is, for example, the epistemic notion of one belief being verified, confirmed, falsified, or made dubitable by another. A belief based on a perception may count as verifying a belief of some other provenance. Within the system as a whole, certain beliefs are accordingly distinguished as doubtful, undecided, or probably false, others as definitely untrue or incorrect or based on hallucination, while still others are 8
Phenomenological Epistemology
accepted as true because they are held to be based on perceptions. All this amounts to saying that some parts of the framework are, by their very nature, critical of other parts; the whole functions as a self-critical system. Doubt, a favourite topic in traditional epistemology, is clearly an internal aspect of such a system. A phenomenological description will then, of course, follow suit and take such distinctions and relations into account, but (to repeat) what makes it phenomenological is the fact that they are described as made within the system; the criticisms they imply are not imported into it from elsewhere by the phenomenological epistemologist on the strength of her own convictions or beliefs. Since Husserl's time, phenomenologists have tended to be fastidious in the matter of indicating which objects are being referred to in a phenomenological discussion, often going so far as to insist on rebaptizing them, giving them a new name, lest they be confused with other objects. They often say that their discourse is about meanings, rather than objects. If the language they speak is not English, you may catch words like Sinne or noemata. But as readers we have to keep in mind that this vocabulary is used only to send us a clear signal as to the distinctive focus of their discourse. Like all other theoretical discourse, it is about objects, but they call the objects they focus on meanings, because their perspective is second-order. They want to describe an experience of objects. Such language can nevertheless work misleadingly. It is not to be taken as suggesting that this experience is itself cognitively concerned about meanings, rather than objects in a straightforward sense. "Meaning" is a term used by the phenomenologist to indicate the distinctive perspective of his own discourse, rather than to describe the intrinsic character of the cognitive experience under discussion. An object becomes a meaning in the context of discourse that focuses on our cognitive access to objects, rather than on the object as such. Instead of considering something as simply a tree or a house, she considers such objects strictly as what a percipient takes to exist in his environment, including the subjective mode of its being so taken. That object has now become a meaning, in the sense that it is specified only by reference to a certain form of consciousness. In contrast with phenomenological epistemologists, there are those who would describe cognitive experience from, a vantage point outside it, a locution that may sound strange but must, be understood in the light of my preceding discussion. My three philosophers generally call this naturalism. 3 In contemporary epistemological literature, it is called externalism, because such an epistemologist adopts a stance like that of an external observer who reports on the relations of a cognitive subject to his or her environment. As D. M. Armstrong writes: According to 'Externalist' accounts of non-inferential knowledge, what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between the belief-state, Bap (to be read as 'A believes that p" (H. P.)), and the situation which makes the belief true. It is a matter of a certain relation holding between the believer and the world.4 Such accounts, as Armstrong says, result in causal or reliability theories. According to a causal theory, a belief counts as knowledge if it is true and if the Introduction
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situation that makes it true is causally responsible for the holding of the belief. According to reliability theories, a belief counts as knowledge if it is produced and sustained by a reliable mechanism, a process that, at least most of the time, produces true beliefs. What gives such theories an externalist character is the presumption that knowledge and justified belief can be done justice to without concerning ourselves with the cognitive subject's interpretation of the cognitive situation, e.g., what reasons he would give for holding something to be true or false. According to such a view, it is possible for a belief to be true without having any relation at all to the subject's other beliefs. A purely externalist view, it is clear, has no use for phenomenology. Knowledge is construed as a possession of truth, as the having of correct information, but how a subject comes to have a true, rather than a false, belief is to be explained, if at all, by an external observer, ideally, of course, by a scientist who is supposed to know about such matters as causes or lawlike connections. 5 From the perspective of the subject, the possession of truth is simply a matter of luck, something accidental that came about for no reasons he knew, although a scientific observer might well know it to be an instance of a lawlike connection. According to Armstrong, for example, a true, noninf'erential belief that amounts to knowledge may be compared to the reading of a properly working thermometer, which informs the user of a particular temperature in the environment. 6 Having knowledge, accordingly, is a form of registering truth. According to such a view, if one possesses knowledge, one does so by having come into possession of the truth in the same sort of way as a properly working thermometer has come to give an accurate reading of a particular temperature. As Keith Lehrer, himself a staunch opponent of externalism, has put it, "it is not our conception of how we are related to a fact that yields knowledge but simply our being so related to it." 7 Husserl's phenomenological theory of knowledge is critical of this way of doing epistemology. As he puts it in his Formal and Transcendental Logic (§§ 5960, 105—6), knowledge is here construed from above (von oben her), namely, by starting from a naively presupposed truth-in-itself. It is argued by such externalists that, if we are to have truth and knowledge, there must be a cognitive experience which "absolutely guarantees" our possession of it. But, Husserl points out, this experience ends up being conceived as having a hold on truth in complete isolation from its concrete context in our cognitive experience, i.e., in abstraction from the belief's being justified by other experiences. As noted, it is in principle possible for a belief to amount to knowledge without the support of the believer's other beliefs. One could therefore say that such externalism completely ignores the important topic of justification. 8 Husserl would be sympathetic to this suggestion, but in the passages alluded to simply notes that, for his part, he wants to start from below, from within the whole of our experience. It is clear that he wants to free cognitive experience from the jurisdiction of such an external observer-critic. When discussing prephilosophical epistemic practices, it seemed altogether plausible to think that the two attitudes are connected and complementary, each expressing a distinctive epistemic concern. One and the same cognitive agent can adopt with a clear conscience one or the other, as circumstances require. Far from being incompatible, one might say that the one adds a perspective or di-
10
Phenomena logical Epistemology
mension which is not open to the other. Their philosophical counterparts, however, display hostility to one another; each is sharply critical of the other. Husserl's phenomenological epistemology, for instance, adopts a very hostile attitude to externalism, denying to it any competence whatever in epistemology. To be sure, conciliatory notes are not entirely absent. His theory is said to aim at clarification, rather than explanation. It professes to be merely descriptive, a return to lived experience from the vantage point of reflection, which is subject matter that is usually passed over in neglect. We are told that, absorbed in its cognitive interest in objects, the subject is oblivious of its own subjectivity; objectawareness is bought at the price of being unaware of itself. Phenomenological epistemology describes our subjective modes of access to objects; it articulates the framework of meanings or concepts which we always and everywhere make use of but which we take for granted without objectifying it. In short, Husserl's theory comports itself as if it merely wanted to add a dimension of reflection to our unreflective life. Its objective seems to be to enlarge the domain of our awareness, rather than to impugn the legitimacy of any other stance or attitude. Suppose a cognitive attitude which is unreflective in this sense; objective claims are made without mentioning or giving details about the subject. The presumption is that such a claim is true with regard to the object as such and that, if it is actually true, the objective state of affairs is what it is regardless of the subjective state of the knower. For all that has been said a moment ago, this insouciance need not count as a fault or deficiency in that cognitive stance. Phenomenological epistemology becomes critical, however, when it becomes transcendental, for Husserl then demands that nothing should count as real knowledge for the epistemologist until it has been subjected to a phenomenological critique. The latter should not presuppose any other claims to knowledge, as was the case with externalism, but is itself able to convert all other cognitive claims into real knowledge. The primary and most explicit targets of his criticism are naturalism (particularly in its psychologistic version), physicalist objectivism, and historicism. These criticisms are discussed in their appropriate place in this study, but I want to give special attention to the relation of transcendentalphenomenological epistemology to what I call classical realism. As I said in the preface, I want to examine the doctrines of the three philosophers against the background of this realism. A proper focus on realism is not so easy to attain because the philosophers under discussion in this book use the term "realism" sometimes as synonymous with "objectivism" or "naturalism," sometimes to refer to certain specific philosophers, such as Descartes and Locke. According to phenomenologists, these philosophers combine a metaphysical realism with a peculiarly subjectivist theory of knowledge; they hold that there is an outside world, but the mind's access to it is held to be restricted to its own ideas or representations. Given this representationalism, their metaphysical realism could be based only on some sort of argument from ideas to a reality outside the mind. The question that now becomes important is whether there is such an argument, which is henceforward supposed to be the central problem of knowledge. If the answer is in the negative, as Berkeley and Hume concluded on the basis of Locke's doctrine, we should abandon realism and embrace either Berkeley's idealism or Hume's scepticism.l; Introduction
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As Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty frequently argue on phenomenological grounds, the view that the mind has access only to subjective states of mind, and the scepticism to which that view leads, are nothing but elementary distortions of the manifest character of our experience. Our perceptions are of objects, not private sensations or mental pictures. We undeniably hear the sounds of a robin and touch the material surfaces of objects. Our minimal awareness, according to Merleau-Ponty, is one of a figure against a background, i.e., of an object in a field. According to Husserl's well-known formulation, we perceive the object "in person" or "in the flesh" (leibhaftig). A careful phenornenological description can show that a sceptic is just wrong, if the latter holds that this is not so. At first blush, it seems that the three phenomenologists substitute one version of realism for another. While rejecting the version that makes scepticism (or subjective idealism) unavoidable, they replace it with one that is more in tune with our actual experience, a realism that is apparently justified by phenomenological description of experience. Now I think that it is true that realism is not necessarily yoked with a representationalist epistemology, as we can see from Plato and Aristotle, and even more clearly from Thomas Reid, who strongly and persuasively argued against that epistemology and what he called its way of ideas. The view that the mind apprehends only its own ideas seems, indeed, to lead to scepticism, but why should a realist embrace such a view? More about that later. What 1 want to examine very carefully is the nature of such a phenornenologically justified realism. Even if one were to grant that it is a kind of realism, is it what one would call classical realism? Does phenomenological reflection simply add a dimension of awareness? Does it simply restore realism to us after clearing away the previously mentioned confusions of representationalism? The question becomes very serious when phenomenological epistemology takes on a transcendental role. Husserl, for example, makes clear that he wants his phenomenology to give a transcendental critique of knowledge and thus show the possibility of knowledge, as had been the purpose of Kant before him. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty criticize both the Husserlian version of transcendental philosophy and its Kantian original, but the question remains whether they really free themselves of their transcendental tradition. I will argue that, although their views differ on significant points from Husserlian phenomenology, they still adhere to the basic transcendental view, a thesis that becomes particularly clear if we also hold up their views against the background of classical realism. If I want to use realism as a partner in my discussion of phenomenological epistemology, and if you will grant me (for the time being) the thesis that all three doctrines to be examined are transcendental in character, the crucial questions I ought to pursue have to do with the character of transcendental epistemology and its relation to realism. As I glossed it a moment ago, transcendental epistemology wants to demonstrate the possibility of knowledge. Its point of departure is that knowledge is not something the possession of which we can assume as unproblematic at the beginning of our doctrine of knowledge. This explains its opposition to all externalist doctrines, because it became clear in our earlier discussion that an external appraiser has to have an independent cognitive
12
Plienomenological. Epistemology
vantage point. In the passages from Husserl cited earlier, the opposition to externalism is clearly and succinctly formulated: start from below, not from the possession of truths. Another way of saying the same thing: take scepticism seriously by demonstrating the possibility of knowledge by way of a refutation of the sceptic; that is to say, the transcendental approach in epistemology presupposes some version of scepticism, which it takes seriously and which it intends to refute. What is the nature of this scepticism? It is not the scepticism, sometimes called methodological, which is not so much a theory as an internal aspect of any framework of inquiry. It is part and parcel of the human search for truth, for there would be no search if we were never in any doubt as to what we hold to be true. Methodological doubt is a matter of experience and as such a very important theme of phenomcnological-epistemological description. In fact, as we will see, the search for truth can very well be said to be its principal theme. The scepticism in question is also not to be confused with that which, as we noted a while ago, can be refuted rather easily on purely phenomenological grounds, inasmuch as it gives an obviously wrong description of the character of our experience. The scepticism which the transcendental epistemologist wants to confront is what in this book I call radical scepticism. A sceptic of this kind may well agree with the phenomenological critic that in sense perception we are aware of objects, rather than sensations or images. That we experience objects, she may agree, is indeed the basic conviction we all have in both common sense and science. She remains a sceptic, however, because in reflecting deeply on our experience she cannot help wondering whether the whole of experience is anything more than a conviction or a vast web of beliefs to which we adhere. In the course of the following discussion of transcendentalism and realism, we will see more of this radical sceptic, in particular, the transcendental philosopher's confrontation with her.
Transcendentalism and Realism The classical realist, I take it, is a philosopher according to whose concept of being an entity has its own being, no matter whether it is known to have that being or not. It is a being which entities would have, even if there had been no human beings at all. I also think that a realist has the conviction that the mind is suitably equipped to know some entities that have that kind of being and thus exist outside the mind that knows them. He holds that in certain circumstances we can say that an entity exists, that it has such and such a property or is related to other entities in a certain way. That is his Archimedean point, if you like. Such a philosopher need not deny what Kantians make so much of—namely, the presence of epistemic conditions for the possibility of experience—but what he does deny is that such conditions always and everywhere stand in the way of knowing the things themselves. The need to use concepts, for example, is not a problem for the realist; on the contrary, it is a way of apprehending what we could not have cognitive access to in any other way, namely the general properties of things. 10 One may, of course, at times be mistaken in what one says Introduction
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about a particular entity, but the existence and properties of entities can, in principle, be known and spoken of, and if what: is said is true, the entity is what it is said to be, and that ends the matter.11 We sometimes have to defend a belief and indicate its source. To enable others to appreciate our claim, we may elaborate on how we came to it, but, in principle, there is nothing problematic or naive about a statement in which I predicate a property of an entity. What is the transcendentalist's starting point? I have suggested that it is the position of radical scepticism, or at least something close to it. That is not to say that he is prepared to resign himself to scepticism as his own position, but that he wants to demonstrate the possibility of knowledge in the face of scepticism. The sceptic says that it is very problematic whether we know anything—whether we apprehend anything truly external to the mind. I think it is very important to observe that the sceptic has a realist concept of being. 12 As she understands it, the being of things is something that is independent of the mind of the knower; in other words, if there were such things, she would hold them to be mind-independent. What she doubts is whether this concept of being has any legitimate application, i.e., whether there is anything external to the mind. The sceptic will hold, for example, that our use of whatever cognitive powers we may be said to have is compatible with there not being anything real corresponding to them and known by them. Her view is that what we think we find, for example, in perception, is in some profound sense nothing but mental. In other words, our manifest conviction that we sometimes meet with something mindindependent is, in spite of what we think, fundamentally problematic. As I said, the typical transcendentalist takes his point of departure from somewhere in neighbourhood of the radical sceptic. Without categorically rejecting a realist position, he refuses to use it as a starting point but will argue that realism must first be shown to be possible, a demonstration which will actually amount to the rejection of the sceptic's realist concept of a completely mind-independent object an sich. If we retained that conception, if the object and the human knower were external to one another, we could not but be sceptics, because knowledge would be impossible. The realist assumption that the mind is, by its very nature, equipped to know what is external is na'ive, until we have scrutinized the concept of an object an sich from a transcendental standpoint. According to the transcendentalist, everything that has to do with the subject's episternic conditions—conceptualization, for instance—is for that very reason extrinsic to reality as given. If the cognitive subject forms concepts, these can be only an addition to what is given. According to Kant, order and conceptual form are additions, because what is given does not itself have order or form. What is given does not, for example, exemplify concepts; the given does not comprise things that have properties. We therefore cannot say that concepts can be abstracted in the old Aristotelian fashion, that they are born from insight into the nature of things, for we do not have such insight. How, then, does a transcendentalist think knowledge of objects is possible? By objectifying and conceptualizing the given, by going beyond the latter and imposing concepts upon it, to begin with that of an object as such. Objects, once established as such, are understood as independent, as having their own being over and against a subject; alternatively stated, they are items which a subject 14
Phenomenoiogical Episternology
now distinguishes from itself as having their own properties and standing in relations to one another. The crucial idea for the transcendentalist is clearly that of a concept because only conceptualization can transform the given into an object. As is particularly clear from Kant, the supremely important process is that of objectiflcation, and the crucial instruments involved in it are concepts, the so-called categories. Since there would be no objects whatever without those concepts, the latter cannot be abstracted from objects, a circumstance which gives them their distinctively transcendental status. The transcendental epistemologist will therefore not justify them by deriving them from an insight into the nature of reality, but will rather argue that they are instruments required to transform the given into objects, that they are necessary for the possibility of an experience of objects such as we have. Although transcendental concepts are imposed without being constrained by the given, they are saved from being merely whimsical and arbitrary by the fact that they are necessary for the acquisition of other concepts. In short, according to Kant, knowledge is possible by virtue of the imposition of concepts upon the given. The controversy between realism and transcendental philosophy brings to the fore the discussion of the nature of concepts, which was already begun in the medieval debate about universals. A realist, I said a while ago, holds without further ado that the mind is well equipped to know things outside itself. By means of concepts, a realist will therefore say, the mind knows what general or universal properties things have and in what relations they stand to one another. Concepts are ways of apprehending properties and kinds, and recognizing particulars as instantiating properties and as belonging to kinds. This view underlies the traditional doctrine, according to which concepts may be abstracted from things. According to the Kantian perspective, however, concepts—especially those called transcendental—are not arrived at by abstraction but are imposed on what is itself preconceptual. 1 ' (Intuitions, he says, are blind, i.e. devoid of conceptual content.) Conceptualization makes out of what is given something new and different, namely, objects. Conceptualization is therefore always an elaboration (or interpretation) of the given, even where the given, as in ordinary experience, already has conceptual content as a result of earlier conceptualizations. What has already been conceptualized is then subsumed under a still higher conceptual unity. Therefore, strictly speaking, only those concepts which Kant calls transcendental are imposed on the preconceptual, but it is still true, I think, that for Kant the subsuming of something under a concept in the course of some inquiry or other always involves going further than what is given, i.e., elaborating and interpreting it by means of a more general concept. When, as commentators, we say that Kant holds that concepts are basically instruments for the ordering and unification of what is given, and that he therefore takes concepts to be imposed on data alien to them, rather than discovered in them, we should bear in mind that we ourselves are speaking as realists in a broad sense. Our way of speaking implies the conviction that there really are data that are organized by a conceptual framework. In fact, it was on these grounds that Kant himself was accused of remaining caught up in a remnant of realism. If, as we imply, there is a preconceptual and uninterpreted Introduction
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reality, how do we know it by means of our concepts? Fichte and others asked: if Kant was right in saying that our a priori concepts derive from the understanding, what assurance did he give that: they apply to our sensible intuitions? Does not scepticism still threaten the possibility of knowledge? Hegel's solution to this problem was to reject Kant's idea of the supposedly preconceptual thing-in-itself altogether and to substitute a clearly antirealist concept of being. Since this entails the rejection of the very idea of something given, it is no longer appropriate to say, from a fully philosophical standpoint, that there is anything which is real and upon which concepts are imposed. Hegel regards Kant's view that concepts are applied to data alien to them as ultimately subjectivist, i.e., as something which a cognitive subject adds to those data. Concepts in the proper sense, he argues, should not be thought of as applied by some cognitive subject to an alien object. Concepts apply themselves, as it were; if has also been formulated by saying that they create their own objects. As he himself puts it, they determine and particularize themselves. 14 We therefore always have before us a reality that is already conceptualized. We do not begin by seeking application for a concept but by finding it realized in things. What in ordinary parlance we call the given is not strictly given but rather the conceptualized state of affairs which we treat as given, because we start from it in a particular search for new truth. But what we so accept as given has already been conceptualized before us in a process of conceptualization which has already been going on a long time. Beginning with what is given is therefore not at all a beginning with the uninterpreted. In the Hegelian view, then, conceptual form is intrinsic to the very being of whatever we encounter in the world. Consequently, there does not exist for him any doubt that the real is intelligible by virtue of concepts and that we discover concepts in things, rather than subsuming things under concepts we bring to them. In terminology familiar from the medieval debate about universals, universals or essences exist in what, we experience as objects. In the traditional terminology of that debate, the Kantian view must be called conceptualist: universals exist only in the mind; in Hegel's view, they exist in things as well. One can say that, in a certain sense, he restored to the realm of being that which answers to our use of concepts, the objects they uniquely apprehend, namely, universals or essences. In fact, in a universe constituted by conceptual thought, they enjoy being par excellence. What used to be regarded as individual entities are only "moments" of the being of the (concrete) universal, a point on which Kierkegaard attacked Hegel. From the point of view of classical realism, Hegel's realism with respect to universals is only apparent. As a form of transcendental thought, idealism holds that the being of universals is not absolutely independent of consciousness. It is an independence undergirded by the unity that makes up the life of Absolute Spirit, the process of conceptualization mentioned a moment ago. Cognitive claims about objects as such, and therefore also those about objective universals, are condemned as dogmatic, one-sided, nai've, and abstract because they imply that their objects are independent, which to an idealist means that they have been torn out of context. It is a violation of the underlying unity of the absolute process of conceptualization. Statements about such "abstract" universals fall
16
Phenornenological, Epi.sternology
under the same condemnation as other objective statements. Because they imply that objects are independent of the subject, they make knowledge vulnerable to the scepticism from which Kant had sought to rescue human knowledge, an attempt: which Hegel thought he had himself completed in his criticism of Kant. Categorical statements to the effect that S is P are condemned as being, in principle, dogmatic, na'ive, one-sided, and abstract. Calling a particular statement of that form dogmatic might be taken to imply that the statement is made on the basis of insufficient evidence or that it should be subjected to further criticism in a fairly straightforward manner. But that is not the real intent of the idealist charge of dogmatism. Even if it has been subjected to thorough criticism and survived, even if the evidence is deemed to be more than sufficient, it is still called dogmatic, simply on the ground that it is a statement of the form S is P; that is to say, it is a statement in which a person abstracts from himself and simply claims that an object has a certain property and implies that his claim is true, if and only if there is such an object, truth being understood in the old Platonic-Aristotelian manner, namely, as agreement with a given fact. Such a statement is naive, it is alleged, because the one who makes it assumes that she is suitably equipped to make it but has not thought about the equipment she brings with her into an epistemic situation. She looked, as it were, exclusively at the state of affairs and not at the subject who makes the statement. Knowing is accordingly understood in a realist manner, namely, as being related to objects of knowledge that are external. Any designation of something as an sich represents a one-sided abstraction because the idealist alleges that such statements have been torn out of context, namely, the unitary process of the selfobjedification of the Absolute Spirit and its return to itself. A person whose attention is focused exclusively on an object and who makes a purely objective statement about it in a spirit of realism implies that, if the proposition expressed by it is true, it is true without qualification, true regardless of the knower. As a Hegelian philosopher sees it, such implications are too much in the spirit of classical realism for him to be able to allow such statements to stand without criticism. He recommends that we rephrase such statements in such a way that a mention of the subject is included in the reference to an object. There is a sense in which for Hegel objects exist independently of the cognitive subject. He has room for objects which (in terms of an old metaphor) enter consciousness from without. What is to be noted, however, is that Hegel, while acknowledging such a realist point of view, at the same time relegates it to a prephilosophical, inferior level of cognition. The subject-object duality is thus said to be characteristic of finite consciousness, which we have just heard exists by virtue of self-forgetiulness. For infinite consciousness, there is unity, rather than duality. In short, Hegel's realism is one that exists only within the bounds of a transcendental philosophy. As should be obvious by now, the realist epistemologist and his transcendentalist colleague have quite different starting points. Let us illustrate this difference by way of a well-known debate in epistemology. Some beliefs, it is commonly said, are justified on the basis of being inferred (in a broad sense) from beliefs that are already justified, but there are also beliefs that are held to be justified because they are based on a trustworthy source of knowledge, such as sense Introduction
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perception or rational insight. In the latter case, one is justified in holding a belief to be true, so to speak, on the authority of the deliverance of perception or reason. Such beliefs are therefore said to be based on what is given. Since the beliefs will involve concepts, one could rephrase this by saying that the believer recognizes that what is given exemplifies the concepts applied to it by the belief. Such a train of thought is altogether congenial to a realist, inasmuch as he is not at all inclined to doubt the human mind's capacity to get in touch with an external state of affairs. It is characteristic of the transcendentalist, however, to object to this portrayal of our human search for truth, especially if the account claims to be a fully philosophical one, i.e., more than an epistemologically naive characterization of our natural, pretranscendental cognitive experience. What is the reason for his objection? Simply stated, the objection is that this account makes it appear as though our search for truth ends by accepting something as given, by acknowledging sources of knowledge. To repeat, that may be all right as a prephilosophical account, say, a phenomcnological description of the natural attitude; as we just saw from Hegel, transcendental thought always has room for inferior modes of thought beside itself. If we were to think, however, that it is a fully philosophical or epistemological account, the transcendental philosopher will observe that it does not take scepticism as seriously as it should. It begs the question against the sceptic, rather than granting the legitimacy of his scepticism. For the transcendental epistemologist, that is a very serious allegation, for he would not adopt a transcendental position if it were not for the fact that scepticism should be taken seriously. What does this mean, for instance, with regard to perception? It means that as serious epistemologists we cannot say that perception is an awareness of the thing itself and that it therefore bestows justification on beliefs, for such an asseveration is based on the assumption that perception is a generally reliable source of knowledge. What the transcendentalist wants us to do is to show that it is. He wants to show its possibility. Obviously, he is not going to try to do this by introducing something like a superior, rational insight that would validate sense perception. That would once again be a failure to take scepticism seriously, because it would involve an appeal to reason as a (superior) source of knowledge. The only way the transcendental epistemologist can give status to perception is by introducing the framework or context of concepts within which it functions and which therefore gives it this status. For the thinkers in discussion in this book, something like the account Husserl gives of perception—in the Logical Investigations and later works—is canonical. Perception is described as an awareness of the object "in the flesh," which as such justifies belief. To understand this further, however, we must describe perception in its proper context, i.e., by way of seeing how its intrinsic character consists in relations to other beliefs. Perception as a cognitively distinctive act, so the argument goes, is internally related to other objective acts in such a way that it functions as their fulfilment. Other acts directed upon an object—e.g., referring to it by means of words, signs, pictures—count for us as empty, unsatisfied intentions until they achieve cognitive fulfilment in the recognition of their object in a perceptual mode of givenness. The percipient is aware of apprehending an object of a certain kind in this manner because the perceptual 18
Phenornenological Epistemology
apprehension compares favourably with a certain range of indirect apprehensions of that kind of object. If it counts for us as being an apprehension of an object "in the flesh," we imply that we do not merely see it on a television screen or present it to ourselves in some other way, for example, by way of understanding a sentence. In terms an epistemologist might use, it counts as justifying belief, but it has this epistemic property only because it has the property of being suitably related to similar intentional acts. In short, there is a background of belief to which perceptions owe their achievement character. What is noteworthy about this kind of argument is that the givenness of the object in a source of knowledge is redefined in coherentist terms, i.e., in terms of a context of beliefs. One might say that the argument transforms a perception into a complex of particular and general beliefs. At the centre of it, there is a particular belief about some concrete event or state of affairs, for instance, the belief that there is a blue jay perched on the bench of my sundeck. But this particular belief is surrounded by other beliefs, all of them supporting it in one way or another, for example, the general belief that beliefs of the kind exemplified by that particular belief about the blue jay count as observational beliefs of our environment. Perception no longer depends on the givenness of an object, but rather on the kinds of beliefs that form its background. A transcendentalist account does not stop here. The entire conceptual framework within which perception functions must itself be subjected to a transcendental critique. It cannot be taken as ultimate because radical scepticism focuses its doubt, not on this or that particular perception, but on the capacity of perception in general. In consequence, it is not a doubt that can be overcome by further perceptual inquiry, which is precisely what distinguishes radical from methodological scepticism. The radical sceptic asks: is not that entire framework merely a set of deep-seated beliefs that is perhaps shared by all human beings but has no basis in fact? What is the transcendental epistemologist to do. if he is to take such scepticism seriously? He will have to turn his back on the entire framework in which perception has such an epistemically important role. But he obviously cannot take an externalist position of the sort I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, for such externalism presupposes at least some knowledge and is, to that extent, not taking scepticism completely seriously. The transcendentalist can only take his refuge in a conceptual framework that is wider than that of perception but does not presuppose the epistemic validity of it. Husserl opens up this further direction of epistemological inquiry by urging the need for what he calls a transcendental reduction. As he sees it, the entire perceptual framework or "world" must itself be shown to be "constituted" within such a wider framework, which (as he sees it) in last analysis coincides with the life of a consciousness that is absolute. This turn to a transcendental consciousness on account of radical scepticism about perception must not be misunderstood. 1 therefore repeat a point already briefly noted earlier. Suppose that we call into question our perceptual capacity in the name of a cognitive capacity which we assume to be superior; this superior cognitive capacity might be called reason or thought. Modern philosophy since Descartes has many examples of this kind of scepticism. But such positions are Introduction
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not forms of radical scepticism. If we think that the capacity of reason to yield truth is superior to that of perception, we still think of ourselves as capable of finding truth, namely, by reason. Scepticism has led us from perception to reliance on reason, but we still have a cognitive power that can give us truth. Although we may be convinced that we can no longer rely on anything we previously thought we had learned from perception, we can still know what is the case. We may downgrade perception, but if we still have reason on our side, we need not despair of the attainment of truth. Radical scepticism shows its true colours when even our faculty of reason is called into question, while no superior capacity is available to us. The radical sceptic wonders whether even our best efforts (which might be our purely rational efforts) can give us truth. What is peculiar about this radical sceptic is that such a person does not claim to appeal to a cognitive power of which we had not hitherto made use, in which case we would, of course, respond by using that hitherto neglected power. No, the radical sceptic also calls into question reason's capacities for truth, assuming this to be our highest faculty. This is the sceptic whom the transcendental epistemologist wants to confront and refute. The turn to consciousness is therefore not to be taken as a turn from sense perception to purely rational insight. It is a turning to a wider conceptual framework. The identification of the ultimate framework with consciousness is an extremely controversial matter within the epistemological tradition in discussion. As we shall see, both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty will have nothing to do with such a thesis. A very important question I pursue in this book is whether this means that they completely break with the transcendental tradition, f do not think so because they continue to argue for a primordial context of meaning which ultimately unifies everything, although their account of it is different from Husserl's. Besides, their attitude toward realism is not appreciably different. I will come back to this in a separate section later in this chapter. What is the verdict on realism which the transcendentalist can be expected to give? As I presented it, realism posits knowledge as an external relation between a subject and an object. A necessary (though probably not a sufficient) condition of knowledge is a relation of a believer to an object in which the latter is an sich; a true belief is one which requires there to be an object corresponding to it. I also mentioned that the realist does not regard such an external relation as a ditch too wide for the human mind to leap over. Such a statement of the position, the transcendentalist tells us, is epistemologically unsatisfactory, or, to use terms that have been given wide currency in the tradition by Hegelians, naive, one-sided, and abstract. While expressing disapproval or something even stronger, none of these expressions is meant to suggest that realism is just plainly false and therefore to be repudiated altogether. Instead, what they call for is a critique; what they advocate is a more philosophical statement of it. The transcendental epistemologist refuses to embrace it in the form in which it was just stated; in that form, he will accept it only as the expression of an inferior standpoint, a prephilosophical mode of thought to be subjected to a transcendental critique or, as he might prefer to say, a clarification. In fact, he deems such a critique es2.0
Phenornenological Epistemology
sential to safeguard the realist mode of thought, particularly in its scientific manifestation, against radical scepticism. The critique begins by calling attention to all assumptions which the radical sceptic finds problematic. As we saw, although the sceptic operates with a realist concept of being, she claims that she cannot find anything exemplifying such a concept. In deference to the sceptic, therefore, a transcendental epistemologist holds any view that supposes the human mind capable of knowing a mindindependent object to be unacceptable, at least as a philosophical position. Realism as a metaphysical, fully philosophical doctrine has to be rejected and give way to transcendental idealism, if there is to be any chance of refuting the sceptic, who considers the realist concept of being as meaningful. Again, the transcendentalist will not reject the concept of a mind-independent object altogether; if he did, he could not make much sense of natural science and its inherent realism. He will, as I said, relegate it to a prephilosophical level and proceed to show how such a concept was arrived at. In her prephilosophical thought, he argues, the realist operates with concepts of various kinds but is unaware of this fact. She lakes herself to have some knowledge of a reality an sich, but being exclusively object-oriented, she fails to take into account her own condition or state. As he sees it, the realist is oblivious of something she could, and should, be aware of, namely, the concepts she brings into a cognitive situation from her past, not only her personal past but also that of the cultural tradition of which she is a part. She discourses of entities as if they were entities an sich but seems to be unaware of the fact that the concept of such an mindindependent object is itself a transcendental concept. In the language used earlier, realism is abstract because it abstracts from the knower and thus tears the object out of context; it is one-sided because it attends to the object-to-be-known without attending to the knowing subject, and it is naive, inasmuch as it is unaware of what it is actually doing.
Conceptual Frameworks The idea of a conceptual framework is very important in a consideration of the three philosophers in discussion, which is the reason I want to discuss it as a separate topic. Although Husserl and Heidegger use the term Sinnzusammenhang (context of meaning), rather than Begriffsrahmen, the idea profoundly shapes their thought, which I interpret as another indication of their affinity with the transcendental tradition. What is a conceptual framework? 15 As a first step, we can say quite simply that it is an extensive interpretative scheme in terms of which the factual data of a domain of entities are conceptualized or understood. What it consists of, we might initially say, are concepts whose cognitive standing is, in traditional terminology, a priori and whose role is transcendental (in a broad sense). Both terms clearly require the complement "with respect to whatever entities are supposed to fall within the framework specified." If the framework in question is one used for some kind of empirical inquiry, the entities falling within it will become known by empirical inquiry, various concepts being applied, tested, and either rejected or accepted in the spirit of such an inquiry.
Introduction
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Here sentences accepted as true are held to be contingent, since they simply capture what, as a matter of fact, the actual world is like, or what it seems to be like on the basis of our experience. The concepts constitutive of the framework, however, will be a priori in the sense of remaining fixed; sentences about them, if true, are necessarily true. They are transcendental, relative to that framework, because they make a given kind of inquiry possible. As Carnap has pointed out, such a framework will have two complementary aspects. It will indicate the fundamental kinds of entities in the framework but also the fundamental ways in which they can come to be known. Husserl, in fact, already made this point in his Logical Investigations: every object has its distinctive mode of being perceived. Each kind of object is correlated with a kind of cognitive situation in which particulars of that kind may be recognized as such ("seen," as he tends to put it) and in which statements are accordingly evaluated as true or false. Material objects of the kind recognized in common sense are "seen" for what they are in sense perception, but universals or essences, it is generally agreed, are not perceived by sense organs. If within a given framework universals are acknowledged as entities, that framework will also indicate how universals can be "seen" in a nonsensible manner. While different from sense perception, such "seeing" nonetheless functions in that framework as the way in which beliefs about universals are evaluated as either true or false. When we noted a while back that within the perceptual framework the general capacity of sense perception as the way in which to attain truth is taken for granted, we could say that we just made a remark to the effect that sense perception is part of that conceptual framework. A framework, then, is a kind of mutual accommodation of object and subject. They form a unity in the sense that neither can be considered in abstraction from the other. Given a specific framework, both are defined in an a priori correlation of the one to the other: given such and such a kind of object (within a specific framework), there necessarily exist ways in which particulars belonging to that kind are accessible to a cognitive subject. In other words, in a framework there are no objects that are unknowable. The subject-object relation is thus not external—merely a matter-of-fact conjunction—but internal, which is precisely why the framework is called conceptual. It is a framework the coherence of which is conceptual; the connection between its constituent elements is conceptual rather than merely factual. It is important to highlight this because it explains why transcendental epistemologists give so much attention to conceptual frameworks. The metaphysical realism implied by the radical sceptic posits an external relation of subject and object. The transcendental epistemologist, therefore, thinks that one cannot get rid of scepticism without also rejecting metaphysical realism, and he accordingly undertakes to show that the subject-object relation is ultimately not external. This will be accomplished by showing that this relation subsists within a conceptual framework and is therefore internal. The object is different from the subject, in some cases indeed independent, but since they are related to one another within a conceptual framework, they can no longer be considered separately (as the realist assumes) or torn apart (as radical scepticism does). Any such attempt will be condemned as an abstraction. A valuable side benefit of this way of reasoning is that such epistemologists can 22
Phenomenological Epistemology
still pay their respects to an empirical realism of the sort that flourishes in natural science, the latter being no more than an inferior cognitive attitude confined to a conceptual framework. For those who love a paradox, this conceptual framework is precisely such that those who work within it use realist language and speak of entities that are mind-independent or an sich. Another important point Carnap made with regard to conceptual frameworks is the difference between the internal and the external aspects of such a framework. The internal aspect is that of the user, and the external aspect that of the person who considers it as itself an object of cognitive interest and study. The former works within it and strives to gain knowledge of the particular entities to which it supposedly gives access. It is very likely that such a person is not even aware of the presence of a framework. The latter is sometimes discussed as consisting of background beliefs—beliefs one uses without being aware of actually holding them. As noted earlier, some of the so-called background beliefs are higher-order beliefs about; beliefs. Background beliefs are, in the nature of the case, relatively fixed, since we do not actually form and evaluate them in the light of available facts. For the user, a framework is like an instrument, for example, one's glasses. He uses it to form his beliefs, but these are not about the instrument or explicitly based on an investigation of it. What he says is about the objects. The instrument does not call attention to itself, because in actual use it is assumed to be a suitable vehicle for the purpose at hand. One could say that the user of a framework, by definition, has no doubt that he has good cognitive access to the entities of the domain to which his cognitive interest is directed. But, as noted, we can also adopt the stance of one who does not use the framework but considers it from an external point of view. The framework itself is now the object of cognitive interest, rather than the instrument that is serving the knowledge of other objects. In fact, use of the phrase "conceptual framework" in common scholarly parlance usually implies such an external point of view, as when we speak of the Ptolemaic or Marxist frameworks. Now given this external vantage point, all kinds of questions can be asked about the framework that were not asked by the user. If such an external observer-critic has independent access to the objects under study, if he confronts the framework as a whole with reality as he knows it without use of that framework, the question can arise whether it is an instrument that might conceivably fail to deliver what it is used for. We can also become interested in its historical origins or its sociological context. The phenomena interpreted according to a Marxist interpretation, for example, are also open to those who are not Marxists. Those phenomena, and presumably some of their properties, are then assumed to be independent of the framework in question. Such entities can be said to enter that framework, but it is understood that they might not. In any event, they do not owe all their properties to the modes of inquiry defined by that framework. A conceptual framework can also be considered with a view to its historical or sociological origins. We then try to find out when and how the framework came to be adopted, what motivations were at work when it was initially established, and what circumstances account for the fact that it was adhered to for a certain period of time. Introduction
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When this is undertaken, the concepts held to be a priori by virtue of their role within a given framework of inquiry become empirical, because in a historicalsociological investigation we are no longer working within it. We have left the framework, as it were, behind us and now consider those concepts as themselves having been arrived at on the basis of some kind of experience. One might say that in such a history the framework as a whole is treated as a very complex object that is now to be studied, rather than as an instrument of discovery. The framework has lost its status of being beyond question. I have thus far generally illustrated the use of the expression "conceptual framework" by referring to explicitly cognitive activities or practices, for example, those characteristic of scientific work. I should point out, however, that this may be misleading in the following way. We have to bear in mind that it is an expression typically used by an interpreter or critic and that its use is formal, rather than material. An interpreter refers to something as a conceptual framework when she wants to indicate that it is a constellation of elements that are related to one another conceptually, rather than merely factually. By calling it a conceptual framework, she is not speaking about the nature of the constituent elements but about the manner in which they are related to one another. What she has in mind may be activities aimed at obtaining theoretical knowledge, but they may also be practices that do not at all have that aim. Heidegger's beingin-the-world may quite properly be called a conceptual framework, but when we do so, we do not imply that it is a mode of life dominated by conceptualization and the search for theoretical knowledge. We simply mean that it is a whole or totality comprising the various factors that Heidegger discusses in Being and Time as forming a unitary context of meaning. Again, Merleau-Ponty's primordial perception may be called a conceptual framework, even though he emphasizes that it is a movement in which concepts play no role at all. When as interpreters we nevertheless designate it as a conceptual framework, we consider it in its integrality, as it were, from a point of view outside it. We mean to say that each distinct element is defined by the contribution it makes to the whole and, for conceptual reasons, cannot be considered apart from all the other elements that belong to it. The transcendental philosophy of Kant also employs the idea of a conceptual framework, but in this case the framework is understood as wider in scope, as being constitutive of our very experience of objects. It is that in the absence of which there would be no awareness of objects at all. Kant's forms of sensibility and categories of understanding outline a framework that is a priori and transcendental with respect to any objects whatever. The very being or existence of objects consists in being accessible within this framework. Needless to say, there is no clear way to step outside such a framework to consider its genesis or its adequacy. Tn my earlier characterization of the realist position. I emphasized that the latter takes for granted the fact that the mind is suitably equipped to know things external to it. As the transcendentalist sees it, she is oblivious of the relevant conceptual framework. She talks of entities as if they were external, but if she were to speak more concretely, she would mention the transcendental framework by virtue of which she can refer to objects at all. The realist, for her part, thinks
24
Phenornenological Epist.ernolagy
that it is perfectly all right not to do so. She will confess to using concepts, but she holds that this does not necessarily prevent knowledge of extramental things, that in fact some concepts actually apprehend what is given. The transcendentalist does not directly attack any one of her particular knowledge claims in everyday perception or science, for that would be to lapse into pretranscendental discourse, but he argues in a most urgent manner that any statement about an objective state of affairs ought to be expanded and qualified by a complete disclosure of its provenance. In her statement, the realist makes reference to an object and says something about it, for example, that it has a certain property or stands in a relation, period. Holding that the object is independent of the subject, she believes that it ought to be possible to speak about it as such. But according to a transcendentalist, this leaves out a dimension that ought to be specified and is therefore wrong in principle.1'1 Full concreteness involves the disclosure of all frameworks im'olved, in particular, the framework that is considered to be transcendental in the strong sense. One might say that full concreteness demands that all forms of knowledge be explicitly relativized to a framework. To think concretely, i.e., philosophically, we have to ascend, or (as a realist might put it) withdraw, to a semantic plane and add to the supposedly objective statement a specification of the discourse or framework of interpretation to which it belongs. We have to specify the cognitive situation of the person who makes the claim and indicate what conceptual material she brings into it out of her history and tradition. We have to add the premises (or motivations) for the making of the statement, even if these are for the most part concealed from the person who makes the statement. In short, the statement should be rephrased so that it comes to include reference to that person's conceptual framework. Nobody can deny, it is true, that we often speak without bothering to go beyond a simple objective statement, both in everyday common sense and in scientific contexts. But that indicates to the transcendentalist just how much our language and thought are in need of a transcendental critique. And until it has been rendered, a body of belief cannot really be said to constitute knowledge in the full sense. This has given rise to the idea that philosophy is really the only science. When in the first section of this chapter 1 characterized the phenomenologist's approach to experience by saying that she wants to describe it from the inside, [ had in mind a description of the user's perspective. But when this phenomenologist puts on his transcendentalist hat, he begins to talk of things that he admits lie beyond the circle of the ordinary knower's awareness. He is now talking about that knower's transcendental conceptual framework (if you prefer a Husserlian phrase, the general structures of transcendental consciousness), supposedly in an effort to explain how the ordinary knower's awareness is possible. Is that a description or an explanation of the letter's experience? That is a moot point, although the transcendentalisms point of departure compels him to hold that what he articulates is, in some sense or other, implicit in our experience, that the conceptual framework which is transcendental (in the strong, Kantian sense) is, in principle, accessible in reflection. Transcendental consciousness does not exist outside ordinary human consciousness. Transcendental consciousness is, in fact, at work within the human, so that it is accessible by Introduction
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reflection carried out in a certain systematic way. When Husserl, for example, moves to a consideration of the perceptual world from a different, i.e., transcendental, point of view—a move which he calls a reduction or e.poche—the latter only seems to be an external point of view with regard to the perceptual framework. In any event, the framework, which the transcendental phenomenologist objectifies, articulates in conceptual form, is not as such present in the awareness of a user. In terms we used a while ago, it consists of background beliefs. Giving the general idea of a conceptual framework such an important role is one of the hallmarks of the Kantian tradition. Although clearly discernible in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, it is quite prominent and crucial in Husserl. He holds that transcendental consciousness is not an object of physics or any other form of pretranscendental experience. His argument for this can be formulated quite simply in terms of the logic of conceptual frameworks. If a framework is supposed to be that which enables one to study certain entities, that framework itself cannot be an object of investigation within itself for the simple reason that it is the enabling condition for such an investigation. Entities falling within a specific framework are to be distinguished from the framework itself. Inasmuch as the latter has the distinctive role of giving us access to those entities, it cannot be identified with any one of them. But I will contend that the distinction just mentioned is also central in Heidegger, namely, as the so-called ontological difference. For reasons I will briefly discuss in the following section, he characterizes the access-giving framework as being, so that he formulates the distinction as one between being and entities: being, he contends, is neither an entity nor a property which an entity can be discovered to possess by those who stand within what he calls the disclosure of being. As we shall see, Heidegger spends a great deal of time emphasizing how being is not manifest to us in our usual preoccupations with entities. It seems to me that his point is best appreciated when we take it as applying to our conceptual framework.
Metaphysical Issues
Aristotle and Aquinas held that metaphysics is a doctrine of being in the same straightforward sense that physics is a doctrine about physical entities. Metaphysics yields knowledge of the most general and pervasive features of reality, runs parallel to the knowledge attained by science, and adds to what the sciences teach us about reality. Those who think that philosophy is transcendental, however, will hold this to be impossible. Reason is not a faculty of knowledge, as Kant is assumed to have definitively shown. Philosophy must approach things from a second-order perspective. One way of summing up my discussion so far is to say that the transcendental philosopher, whether metaphysician or epistemologist, makes assertions only about conceptual frameworks in the sense of the preceding section. Having abandoned the concept of being in the sense of classical realism, the transcendental philosopher turns his attention to conceptual frameworks or contexts of meaning. This formulation, it may be objected, embodies a realist prejudice in the choice 26
PhenornenologicaL Episternology
of words used. The characterization of the philosopher's subject matter by means of the expressions "conceptual framework" or "context of meaning" seems to attribute a subjectivist view to transcendental philosophy. Their use implies a realist way of looking at things. Discourse about frameworks and meanings, it is implied, does not directly engage the being of things, but rather abstracts from it. According to the realist, it is still an open question whether such a framework of concepts is true of reality. The same is true of the word "meaning" and expressions formed around it. 17 A transcendental philosopher, however, will not, at least need not, admit that the preoccupation with concepts and meanings represents in any sense a subjectivism. The implied realism is. in fact, precisely what he has repudiated. There is no being with which to contrast a conceptual framework. Once the transcendentalist has gotten rid of the concept of being as externally related to the subject's conceptualization, the being of things can no longer be conceived of as an open question, let alone as something we might invoke to ask critical questions or to generate doubt about our concepts or meanings, for it no longer makes sense to speak of a being independent of them. To be is to be in a framework, inasmuch as in a framework certain kinds of entities are assumed to exist. Having thus gotten rid of the concept of being in the sense of classical realism, the transcendentalist can concentrate on meanings and concepts without feeling any sense of missing out on anything. If the very being of objects consists in their being accessible within a framework that is transcendental, then metaphysics is a doctrine of being precisely because it is discourse about the internal structure of our framework and the meanings constituent of it. Being is accessible in no other way than from such a point of view. There is no question of being which is left open by considering a conceptual framework. Without a realist concept of being, I noted, radical scepticism does not really make sense. For it to be intelligible, one has to have at least the concept of something existing without being thought or known. Even if one doubts that there actually are such things, one nonetheless thinks it is possible. Now transcendental epistemology wants to demonstrate the possibility of knowledge and thus refute scepticism, which it undertakes to do by repudiating the concept of being that makes scepticism intelligible and proposing an alternative concept. Putting it very generally, this alternative concept of being implies that the being of things cannot be considered in abstraction from the being that knows them. In terms introduced in the preceding section, the implication is that being a certain kind of entity and being known in a certain kind of way are so intimately connected as to form a unitary conceptual framework. All three authors discussed in this book propose an alternative concept of being to that of realism. Their introduction of a new metaphysics, I suggest, is meant to make their rejection of classical realism explicit. They felt that they had to affirm that, being itself falls within the scope of a transcendental framework, if their own proposals of such a framework were to escape the charge of subjectivism that might come from the sceptic.18 Although Husserl already clearly saw the need for such a new concept of being, Heidegger surely deserves the credit for having made the concern about ontology prominent. MerleauPonty also proposes a new concept of being, especially in his last work, The Visible Introduction
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and the Invisible. There are important differences between them, but in each case, as we will see, it is a concept arrived at by transcendental considerations; that is to say, it is designed in such a way as to establish the surt of intimate correlation between subject and object they hold to be demanded by knowledge. With this new concept of being in hand they can now say that what brings these two together is nothing short of the unity of being itself. This antirealist concept of being enables them to claim that their phenomenological descriptions have metaphysical or ontological import. Their philosophies are thus no longer disturbed or haunted by the sceptic who uses a concept of being according to which their primordial context of meaning might well fall far short of capturing the nature of things as they are, for as their new metaphysics has it, the being of things is internal to that context.
Truth and the Search for It In the first section, I noted two very different views of truth. In one view (that of externalism), truth tends to be seen as a possession and knowledge as a state of being related to what makes for truth. In the other (phenomenological) view, truth is seen as something that constantly engages our powers of inquiry, either as the product of striving in the past or as the starting point for a new inquiry. I observed that here truth as object of search tends to overshadow truth as possession. Subsequent discussion led us to the debate between a realist and a transcendenlalist epistemology. The former tends to side with the first view of truth, while the latter favours the second. The realist holds that the nature of truth is a matter of agreement (or correspondence) between what is thought (or believed) and what is the case; as an old definition has it, it is a relation of adequation between thought and object. This correspondence view of truth, the transcendental-phenomenological epistemologist replies, is unsatisfactory and needs to be reinterpreted. The reason why she finds the correspondence view, stated as a relation obtaining between a belief and a mind-independent state of affairs, unsatisfactory can be gathered fairly easily from the preceding discussion. Her complaint, basically, is that it is not epistemological enough. It states what the nature of truth is, but it does not show how we seek and find truth. The proposed rcinterpretation is intended to remedy this by showing how, in the course of our search for truth, we establish agreement or correspondence. As I will argue, this critical reserve with regard to truth as a relation and the epistemological preoccupation with truth as object of search brings to the fore yet another feature of transcendental epistemology. The cognitive subject that we meet with in that epistemology is primarily seen as cognitive agent, which is the fundamental reason why knowledge is construed as inquiry, truth as object of inquiry. One can read Critique of Pure Reason as making the seeker for knowledge primordial. The cognitive agent begins with himself, which means that from the outset he cannot but accept at least some concepts as valid beyond question. They are very general concepts pertaining both to himself as cognitive agent and to the objects he wants to come to know better by means of his activity. A constituent of the idea of search is the pre28
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sumption that, one has a firm hold on truth at least in regard to one's competence as an inquirer. If one did not hold oneself to be a competent and reliable observer at least in some respects, inquiry would obviously never begin. According to Kant (in this reading), this knowledge consists of the categories of the understanding and the forms of sensibility. The primordial agent might not have any idea as to whether anything in reality corresponds to these concepts, but he certainly can begin his search for further knowledge, notwithstanding his ignorance about the Ding an sich. The most historically oriented of my three philosophers, Heidegger, has generated an intensive discussion of the Platonic-Aristotelian definition of truth, generally regarded as a version of the correspondence view of truth. Since the nature of truth defined in that way will be very important in my discussion as a whole, I think it will be useful to consider briefly the texts that have shaped that traditional view of truth. What exactly do Plato and Aristotle say? In Plato's dialogue The Sophist (2638), we read that a true statement states the things that are as they are (legei ta onto, hoos e.stiri). The same phrase is used in Cratylus (3853), while in Euthydernus (284A), truth is defined simply as legein ta onta. If we also take into account what is earlier said about error in The Sophist (24OD-E), we have substantially what Aristotle says in his Metaphysics (iniib 26-27), where we read: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not, is true." I want to begin by highlighting what they do not say, because this will turn out to be extremely important in our consideration of Heidegger's views. As I think we can clearly see, and as the context shows, there is not even a hint of a concern to describe a state of mind or the justification of believing this or that to be true. Neither do they discuss the search for truth and what our chances are of finding truth. These are apparently for Plato and Aristotle matters about which we should try to become clear from a different perspective. Their definitions say what truth is, not how we find it. What they said, in effect, is that truth consists in agreement or correspondence between thought and reality, but they did not give the relation a name and left it otherwise unspecified. I used the term "thought," but they put the matter in terms of saying things. But if they had used the term I used, they would probably have meant by it no more than a proposition entertained in a state of mind, leaving that state otherwise unspecified. Apparently, all they meant was that what we say or believe is true if, and only if, what we say is. in fact, as we say it is, it being, of course, understood that what we are saying does not cause or produce that about which we are saying something. To be enlightened by these philosophers about how a believer manages to attain truth, we have to turn to other texts. In his Phaedo, in which the concept of truth as correspondence is implied but not stated, Plato, in fact, says that our ability to know the Forms is based on a kinship of the soul with such objects. And in ])e Anima, Aristotle says that the material object has to be modified or transformed into an immaterial form, if the mind is to receive it within itself and know it. In the third book, particularly chapters 4 through 8, we learn that, according to Aristotle, the cognitive soul must be "unaffected but capable of Introduction
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receiving the form, and potentially such as it, although not identical with it," and that it can have "no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity" (4293). We need not: here examine what these formulae mean exactly, because the simple point I want to make is that Aristotle gave his definition of truth in passages in which he made no mention of all this. In short, Plato and Aristotle apparently did not think that their definition of the nature of truth had any epistemological implications. But, as we will see in the following chapters, phenomenological philosophers, in particular Heidegger, have insisted on interpreting that Platonic-Aristotelian definition epistemologically, i.e., as addressing the question of the possibility of knowledge. More precisely, they want to understand the correspondence or agreement which figures in that definition as the kind of agreement we often enough establish in our search for truth. At the end of an inquiry, we often say something to the effect that we have found that what we thought or said agrees with the facts; we recognize the latter as corresponding to what we had thought. Husserl already identified the recognition of the agreement of what we say with the state of affairs we are talking about with the relation of correspondence. Heidegger continues on this path by raising the (typically transcendental) question as to how such recognition is possible, to which he offers his doctrine of truth as disclosure as answer. Epistemological interpretations of the correspondence view of truth are not original with phenomenological philosophers. Post-Kantian idealists, as I understand them, shared Kant's concern to ensure the possibility of knowledge in the face of radical skepticism. They approached the traditional definition of truth in the expectation of finding enlightenment on how we attain knowledge, and when they did not get it, they suggested alternative definitions of truth. Truth was said to consist in some kind of coherence among beliefs, because those idealists saw, in a sense quite correctly, that considerations of coherence play an important role when we come to accept a belief as true. Kant apparently subscribed to the correspondence theory of truth, according to a few brief remarks in his Critique of Pure Reason (B 82, 136, 670). But as I see it, these remarks should be understood in much the same way as his acknowledgement of empirical realism, [n the latter case, he acknowledges that there is such a thing as a realist stance, for example, in science. That means that there is also a correspondence view of truth. In empirical inquiry, we do, indeed, work with the idea that our concepts may or may not correspond to their objects. Kant's remarks should not be taken to mean that he also affirmed that theory of truth from the transcendental, i.e., fully philosophical point of view. As we will see, Heidegger similarly acknowledges what he calls the correctness-view of truth. That a correspondence view of truth should not fare particularly well, when considered from the perspective of the search for truth, is not surprising. If we take it as giving us direction in the search for truth, it seems to suggest that we must establish a relation of correspondence between a specific thought and a state of affairs which we admittedly can only get at by thought, namely, the reality which corresponds to that thought. How can the mind be required to undertake such an impossible task? To those to whom Kant had bequeathed a 30
Phenomenological Epistemology
preoccupation with the transcendental problem of demonstrating to Hume the possibility of attaining knowledge and truth, it seemed useless or worse. Truth viewed as the subsistence of a relation between thought and a relatum external to it is scarcely an asset in the arsenal of a transcendental epistemologist who wants to demonstrate the accessibility of objects. If one wants to speak about what makes the attainment of knowledge possible, one should examine the cognitive capacities that enable the forming of beliefs. Or to put this in a different way, one should construe the idea of a field or matrix within which cognition can reach the thing as it really is. Another way of viewing the matter has to do with the concept of relation. A realist, we saw, understands the correspondence view of truth as designating an external relation. That is to say, correspondence is a relation of thought and reality such that it is not necessary for either relatum to stand in the relation in which it stands in the case of actual knowledge; they might not have stood in the relation in which they do stand. This means, on the one hand, that entities do not have to be related to human thought as its objects, and on the other, that thought may well be without an object. Spelling out, the second half of the idea, we can say that no matter what the intrinsic virtues of a thought may be, no matter how well supported by other thoughts and research, it may still lack something corresponding to it in reality. The realist holds that even a completely justified belief can be false. Since this is often thought to force us into a position of radical scepticism, it is important to note that the possibility mentioned here is purely logical. That is to say, if I were to state all the reasons for holding a certain belief to be true, including in my statement a mention of the fact that the believer had satisfied the highest standards of justification available to him, and then went on to say that the belief is nonetheless false, I would not have stated something selfcontradictory. A belief, whatever its nature, can always (logically speaking) lack an external object. This is not to be understood, however, as meaning that whenever I believe something on good or even excellent grounds, I always have some reason to believe that the belief in question is not true. What is expressed by saying that it can be false does not represent an assessment of the evidence for the truth of the belief. That evidence may be such that it is perfectly reasonable to hold it to be true—in fact, utterly unreasonable to believe otherwise.19 We might again call to mind that truth as defined in a realist manner, for example, by Plato and Aristotle, does not raise or answer questions having to do with the search for it, i.e., questions about justification. And when we say that a belief can always be false, we are only talking about what truth is. As the realist understands it, if a belief is so related to a state of affairs as to agree with it, the relation in question is nonetheless external. He will, in fact, be prepared to add that what is known is always external to the believer. But we have already seen in the course of the preceding discussion that, since Kant, external relations have been in bad repute, particularly when it came to such a crucial case as the relation between the knower and the known. Kant's answer to the question "How is experience of objects possible?" may be understood as an attempt to substitute an internal relation, namely, a unitary context—a conceptual framework—to which both relata belong. His forms of senIntroduction
31
sibility and categories of the understanding are a scheme in which the accessibility of objects is guaranteed, fn such a view, truth as an external relation has disappeared. More precisely stated, contexts where it does undeniably appear—for example, in science—arc interpreted as derivative, as a conceptual framework that is not primordial, as manifesting a prcphilosophical mode of thought that needs to be reinterpreted by philosophy. The abandonment of the old definition of truth clearly has the virtue of dealing with the radical scepticism that nourishes itself from that definition and is meaningful only in terms of it. We can then proceed to stipulate that the truth of a statement does not require that it stand in a relation to an external state of affairs, that it requires nothing over and above the grounds we can have for holding it to be true. Henceforth, a belief or statement is related only to other statements or beliefs, namely, those which in some way lend support to it or justify it. This amounts to a coherence theory of truth, although the abandonment of the old definition of truth has also led some philosophers to a so-called pragmatic theory of truth.
Cognitive arid Other Attitudes It is not unfair to say that an actual elaboration of a phenomenological epistemology is found only in Husserl. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty were not concerned to offer a distinctive and independent epistemology in that sense. The focus of their interest is not justification and related matters, but cognitive activity in relation to other kinds of human activity. Their doctrine of knowledge has to do with the contrast between theory and practice, rather than the internal structure and articulation of the cognitive attitude as such. What they focus on is not the knower purely as such, but the human being who engages, among other things, in cognitive activities. Knowledge, they say in agreement with Husserl and Kant, represents a broadly theoretical stance characterized by objectification and conceptualization. But what Heidegger tries to show in Being and Time is that such a distinctively cognitive attitude derives from practical interests and attitudes; it is abkiinftig, acquired, or learned. The domain of practical interests is called being-in-the-world. He does not deny that such interests are in their own way cognitive, but he calls particular attention to the fact that they do not involve objectification and conceptualization. In a similar vein, MerleauPonty argues for the basicality of a world without: concepts and objects, namely, the world of embodied perception. Clearly, the interest of both of them is focused on the wider context in which distinctively cognitive activity takes place. Husserl's basic concept may be said to be the knower as such in relation to entities-!o-he-known. In his view, the cognitive attitude par excellence is theoretical in the sense that, it is objective and disinterested, adopted for its own sake. To know something in this sense is incompatible with acting upon the objectto-be-known. Practical attitudes may be based on what we know, but the cognitive interest, considered purely as such, is not concerned with action in the broad sense. It should be carefully noted that this does not mean that Husserl construes the knower as passive. On the contrary, what all three have in common 32
Pfienomenological, hpisternology
is the characteristic emphasis on the search for knowledge which I commented on in the preceding section. Husserl's truth seeker is very much an agent with the self-ascribed capacities the attainment of the goal requires. In Husserl, however, objects are correlated with distinctively intellectual capacities and practices, for example, those operative in theoretical or scientific work. For this reason it will not do simply to say that, according to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, knowledge is intimately related to practices, for the general doctrine so formulated can also be found in Husserl. What distinguishes them from Husserl is the emphasis on nontheoretical practices. While they clearly acknowledge intellectual practices, their principal objective is to trace their origin back to more aboriginal practices and powers. The intellectual capacities and practices Husserl has in mind are themselves open to scrutiny and critical assessment, inasmuch as they are the powers of a consciousness which is, in principle, transparent to itself. While any given cognitive activity displays powers that in the ongoing activity remain unexamined, Husserl held that those powers can be described and examined in a higher-level analysis or transcendental reflection. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, however, hold that, in last analysis, those activities bring powers into play that in principle cannot be objectified. If knowledge involves objectification, the nature of what; is known by us as agents cannot: be known objectively. They are ours as we make use of them, but we can only acknowledge them as given. Merleau-Ponty, for example, emphatically teaches that the cognitive activities of an embodied percipient display capacities that cannot but be accepted as such. It is said, therefore, that our distinctively intellectual activities, all of which involve objectification and conceptualization, emerge out of a background that remains obscure from the vantage point of even our most strenuous and radical reflections. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty reject the primacy of the theoretical attitude and proceed to contextualize the attitude of objectification. Again, we have to be careful, for there is a sense in which it may be said that both Husserl and Kant did something like that, too. Kant argued that objectification arises from the application of transcendental concepts. And Husserl argued, in a more descriptive style of analysis, for the origin of objectification in transcendental subjectivity or consciousness. Going back to origins, in this sense, is a distinguishing mark of any transcendental philosopher. What is distinctive about Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty is where they look for origins. Heidegger calls it being-in-the-world; Merleau-Ponty, primordial perception. In either case, we are referred to an ultimate context of meaning in terms of which cognitive activities are to be explained. As already noted, in this context there is no objectification and conceptualization, since its dominant feature is practice, not theory. The subject is a practical agent, endowed with practical knowledge; the object is something in the nature of a tool or instrument (in a very broad sense of those terms). (Heidegger himself avoids the use of the terms "subject" and "object" in speaking of this framework.) Whereas theoretical knowledge involves activities such as objectification and predication, the stance characteristic of the practical knower does not involve objective detachment; one does not ask whether a thing exists or whether it has this or that property. This practical knowledge does not call for scrutiny of individual items as such, trying Introduction
33
to decide what concept to apply to them. It is a matter of having goals and knowing how or when to do this or that in the pursuit of those goals. Things are here quite literally given as already interpreted, because the knower is an agent who has goals. As Heidegger puts it, practical things are ready for use. Agency is a matter of involvement and participation, rather than detachment and scrutiny. For what is known in the practical sense is part and parcel of the active being of the knower as agent. Things are ready for use, because they are the tools an agent is aware she needs to act with a view to a particular end. Using them without asking questions or raising problems is here not a matter of haste, superficiality, thoughtlessness, or credulity on our part; they are not failings which deserve epistemic censure or admonition. When knowing is viewed as a genuinely human activity—or, as Heidegger would prefer to say, a mode of being of Dasein—such censure is out of place. This is the sort of context of meaning out of which theoretical knowledge arises. The most important feature of their doctrines, however, is not simply the thesis that the practical precedes the theoretical. Plato and Aristotle would have admitted that without any difficulty. If we were not first, in some sense, practical beings, we would probably never become theoretical. The theoretical knowledge we call science today requires a great many practical skills, but the same was always true of the attainment of knowledge. It always called for some efforts to get in touch with reality. In spite of this, however, there exists a long tradition of thought in which it has been claimed that the theoretical stance gives us knowledge of what is really there. Using Plato's famous metaphor, it leads us out of the cave of opinion and illusion into the sun, where we behold the truth of ousia ontoos ousa. In Plato's view, that we were once in the cave of opinion does not tell against our ability to know the truth. What is most important is that, according to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, the origin of our knowledge is always with us as transcendental condition, i.e., a condition in the absence of which knowledge would not be possible. In the nature of the case, we are not usually aware of it; a primordial perception, Merleau-Ponty writes, is a rare experience, and Heidegger makes much of the theme of self-forgetfulness. As transcendental philosophers, they tell us that, because of this failure to be aware of our being-in-the-world or our primordial percipience, we have gone wrong in our assessment of the nature and scope of theoretical or scientific knowledge. In other words, they tell us that this assessment is problematic and calls for a transcendental critique, particularly its realism. Their account of the origins of knowledge, then, is not intended to leave it untouched, but to show us the limits of its scope. The transcendentalist character of their strategy becomes particularly clear from their attempts to delineate a new metaphysics or ontology. In view of their critical perspective on theoretical knowledge, one would not expect them to construe their concept of being on the basis of that kind of knowledge, for example, by taking the nature of reality to be reflected in the subject-predicate propositions characteristic of theoretical knowledge. But their approach is otherwise typically transcendental; their envisaged metaphysics is just as clearly second-order as that of Husserl and Kant. The concept of being, they argue, should be construed on the basis of the transcendental origins of theoretical knowledge. Being, as 34
Phenomenological. Episternology
they see it, does not first come to be known in theoretical knowledge but is already preontologically "understood" by us in our being-in-the-world or our embodied percipience. For the purpose of arriving at a doctrine of being, we should concentrate on this unitary context of meaning. Heidegger argues that practices have their own kind of knowledge with their own kind of "objects." What we meet with here are not objects-to-be-known, but tools and their use by practical agents. Tools, however, have their own distinctive kind of being, for which Heidegger coins a special term, "being-readyto-hand." But being "useful" is not to be considered as a supervenient predicate of material or natural things. As tools, they already reveal or disclose being. And making use of them is itself a distinct mode of being, namely, that of being concerned about being, one's own in particular. Objects-to-be-known (in a broadly theoretical sense) are derivative, construed entities. The necessary conditions of their construal as objects are to be found in being-in-the-world. In many of his texts, he argues in a similar vein that the primordial locus of truth is not the judgment or belief but the unitary context that is their transcendental origin, namely, being-in-the-world, which is accordingly described as being-inthe-truth. In Merleau-Ponty's view, reality is discerned in primordial perception, which is a process of constantly going beyond appearances in a search for reality or, more simply, taking them as appearances of reality. We are told to conceive of this as a movement of transcendence that does not as such comprise anything in the nature of stable or relatively permanent objects of which we might be said to have possession in the sense of knowing them. Caught up in the movement of transcendence, appearances are not objects in their own right, but rather stages of the active search for reality. Objects are the product of objectiflcation; they appear only when the movement is arrested and appearances are converted into objects of cognitive interest. Another way of saying the same thing: objects are abstractions in the fairly literal sense of having been drawn out of the movement characteristic of primordial perceptions. But as MerleauPonty would have it, when we gain objects and objective knowledge, we lose our hold on being or reality. Metaphysical philosophy is for him the attempt to regain it, which requires that we turn away from objects and seek out their transcendental origins in primordial perception.
Introduction
35
2 HUSSERL
Introduction For reasons already given in the previous chapter, Husserl's doctrine of knowledge plays a central role in this study. Because he attached a greater importance to a theory of knowledge than either Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty, he developed it with greater care than they did. In fact, his epistemology introduced most of the concepts and terms which" Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty made use of in writing about epistemic matters, whether to agree or to disagree with him. The doctrines of knowledge which they developed are therefore not intelligible without a thorough study of Husserl's doctrine. In my presentation and discussion of it, I am not going to be very concerned about the chronological order of the composition of Husserl's works. Nor do I claim to present anything like an exposition of all the relevant texts; only the most important texts will be actually cited and expounded. My presentation will be designed to bring out the lines of thought underlying the texts and the doctrine as a whole in its systematic connections. If a particular statement in an early text leaves much unstated, though fairly clearly implied, I will not hesitate at such a point to introduce later texts that do state what was earlier implied. As I see it, Husserl's epistemological thinking began with a certain schematic conception, such as that of the contrast between intentions and fulfilments, the implications of which are often fairly clear to a philosophical reader who enjoys
36
the benefits of hindsight, although not all of them may have been entirely clear to Husserl at first. I argue, for example, that the important concept of the horizons of intentional acts was certainly implied by his early statements of the contrast just mentioned, but he worked it out and gave it a name only at a later time. For a historical account of his development, it would be very important to scrutinize the textual record, as Theodore de Boer did in The Development of Husserl's Thought, but such matters would encumber an exposition like this. And in any case, an interpretation of a stated doctrine in abstraction from what it quite clearly implies, as later texts often confirm, seemed to me to lead to unnecessary repetitions. I also want to say that, for the sake of giving a clear and readable exposition of Husserl's doctrine. I introduce the reader to as little of Husserl's technical vocabulary as possible. He used a vast number of technical terms, often explicitly introduced by definitions, which give his texts, whether in German or in translation, an intimidating appearance. Moreover, his vocabulary developed and changed in time. To inflict all of it on my readers seemed to me unnecessary and confusing. His extraordinarily frequent use of "essential" (wesensmassig or eidetisch) is a case in point. Rather than taking up space by introducing the full arsenal of Husserl's vocabulary, I have chosen to devote that space to interpretation of his basic ideas. I therefore often paraphrase rather than quote a text, because it allowed me to omit adjectives or qualifications that for my purpose were unnecessary. I should also not fail to admit in a general way that in working out what I see as implications of Husserlian statements I occasionally say things which it would be very difficult for me to document from actual texts. These are risks of which I am aware but which I took for the sake of giving as powerful a presentation of the doctrine as I am able to give. Finally, even when I do give textual documentation for particular assertions of mine, I have not, in general, tried to give an exhaustive listing of passages in Husserl's texts. Another point on which I want to beg the reader's indulgence is the concentration of all the attention on what is, at least in my view, distinctively epistemological. I have omitted whatever I thought could be missed in my study. In regard to the famous transcendental reduction, for example, I probably present what some will call an incomplete, possibly somewhat austere picture because 1 focus on its epistemological role, which I am, in fact, inclined to think was its most important role in Husserl's own thought. But I admit that I may not have done full justice, for example, to its hermeneutical, existential, or other features. Husserl's philosophy, it seems to me. is fundamentally shaped by his epistemology. At the outset, he. of course, developed it by making use of certain phenomenological analyses which he had already arrived at before he presented his theory of knowledge, for example, the analysis of the intentionality of consciousness. But when he had conceived that theory, he not only tried to justify his phenomenological claims in the terms of the theory but also he used it to argue that philosophy as a whole has to be phenomenological in character. For example, in the lectures he delivered in .1907, posthumously published under the title The Idea of Phenomenology, he introduced what he then began to call transcendental phenomenology, as an approach necessary for epistemological reasons, namely, to give an answer to what he conceived to be the problem of knowledge. Husserl.
57
If that problem is to be dealt with, he thought, this can only be done by developing a phenomenology of that cognitive experience which is transcendental in relation to all other knowledge. In these lectures, the phenomenological or transcendental reduction is designated as an epistemological reduction (Hua 2, 39i'f. [IP, 3ifi'.]).' In the final analysis, it is epistemology that determines Husserl's general strategy and his philosophical vision. His metaphysics, accordingly, is determined by his epistemology. As we will see, the being of something is defined by the ideal epistemic situation for asserting it. What can be asserted with absolute justification has absolute being, everything else only being in relation to that which exists absolutely.2 Husserl saw appraisal and criticism of beliefs as having a fundamental humanizing role. For us to be human is to examine our beliefs. Our very humanity, he thought, demands of us that we examine our beliefs. The requirement to seek knowledge is for Husserl a kind of moral imperative (Hua 8, 230, 296, 352; 6, 2OT. 324 [C, 197, 279]).' Like many other epistemologists since Descartes, he gives his doctrine a somewhat deontological tone. We have epistemic duties, just as we have moral duties. Furthermore, he clearly subscribes to the traditional view that our actions are to be guided by knowledge; the values we acknowledge in our actions are to be critically examined. The human being is basically a knower, not in the sense that the human being desires nothing but knowledge but in the sense that everything else is to be based on knowledge, a view that gives the search for knowledge that culminates in philosophy great importance for human life. In formulating his epistemology, Husserl makes use of a certain amount of phenomenological material he had already worked out in his general analyses. Their central tenet is that of the intentionality of consciousness, a doctrine he inherited from his teacher, Brentano. Quite apart from any question as to whether there actually exists an object outside of an act or state of awareness, the latter is intrinsically object directed. Whenever we want to describe such an act or state, we have to mention something like an object, which is that upon which it is directed. As we saw in the first chapter, when we focus on a belief in order to appraise it as to its correctness or its justification, we have to begin by understanding the belief as having an object, though the appraisal may show that this object exists only "in the mind" of the believer. My belief about a house may well turn out to be erroneous in several ways, but even as we set out to describe or appraise a belief we cannot get away from saying that, in that belief something is thought of as being, for example, a house of a particular kind in a particular location, etc. One could say that the belief contains that house in the sense that, if at the beginning of my appraisal I base what I say merely on the belief, I know on the basis of its content what has to be the case, if it is to be a correct belief. Having introduced this general idea of intentionality, Husserl proceeded to make further distinctions. A multiplicity of different acts can be directed upon one and the same object, but in each of them the object is intended—described, broadly speaking—in a different way (Hua 19/1, 414 [LI, 578], 425-30 [LI, 58689]). In slightly different terms, the specific way in which an act intends an object or person counts as a mode of givenness of an object or person that may 38
Phenomenological
Epistemology
also be given to us in a different way. We therefore have to distinguish an object from its modes of being given. Venus may be "intended" as the Evening Star or as the Morning Star; Napoleon may be "intended" either as the Conqueror of Jena or as the loser of Waterloo. The same sort of situation obtains when an object such as a house is given to us as the reference of a purely linguistic act, in which case it is presented differently from the way that same house is presented in a picture, which is again different from the way it is presented in direct perception. A person's particular way of being intentionally directed upon an object is thus embedded in a context in which other ways of being directed upon it are open to him. Intentional acts do not occur in isolation or follow one another merely as a matter of fact. They are intrinsically related to one another, so that, in a sense, one mode of access invites and leads into another, which for its part fulfils it. Aware of this context of different modes of givenness, a subject can be aware of being presented with one and the same object. One can also put it this way: we notice how an act in which one actually perceives an object is essentially accompanied by capacities for further perceptions. A perceiver ascribes to herself capacities, which give her a sense of environment and context. She knows that she can do things other than what she is doing at the moment, which gives her a sense of her powers of inquiry. She is therefore convinced that her actual awareness of an object at a given time takes place in a context of other ways of being aware of it, namely, those in which the same object would be apprehended under a different description or from a different perspective. In short, no intentional act is an isolated act; no object can simply be identified with one mode of givenness. Such brief observations should, of course, be expanded, if the phenomenological account is to become fully convincing, as the rich detail of Husserl's own texts testify. But they will be enough to suggest the kind of general phenomenology Husserl presupposes, when he begins to state his theory of knowledge in the sixth and last of his Logical Investigations. In this theory, he begins by calling attention to a new range of differences in the manner in which intentional acts are directed to objects, or rather differences in the modes in which objects are given to us. In some cases, we refer to an object or a state of affairs by purely linguistic means. We utter words by means of which we refer to something that is not perceptually present at all. In other cases, we actually see what we mean in that we see the object itself. We recognize what we mean or think in what we see. And Husserl then proceeds to note that in matters of knowledge we give preferred status to the latter and regard the former way of referring to the object or state of affairs as inferior. He assumes, it is clear, that from our own experiences we are already familiar with something like a distinction between knowledge and belief and know what it is like to attain knowledge.
Intention and Fulfilment In the traditional view, knowledge is a form of belief, but it is better than a mere belief, even if the latter, by chance or whatever, is, in fact, true. Knowledge has Husserll
gg
often been said to be a true belief that is also justified. Husserl generally speaks of such a belief as one that is evident to the believer.4 The status of being evident may accrue to a belief because it can somehow be inferred—in a broad sense of the term—from other beliefs that are supposedly justified, and the latter may again have to be shown to be justified by going further baek to other beliefs. Ultimately, however, we have to have beliefs whose justification is no longer a matter of being in some way inferred from, or supported by, other beliefs. For their justification, these beliefs can, as it were, stand on their own, i.e., without support from other beliefs. They are said to be noninferentially justified, justified because they are intuitive or by the circumstance that they are directly based on what is given in a source of knowledge such as perception, introspection, or memory. Descartes, for example, held that the justification of such a belief comes from the circumstance that it is clear and distinct. This at least is the way a long tradition in epistemology has conceived it, namely, the foundationalist tradition. At first, Husserl appears to be such a foundationalist. The source of knowledge, according to him, is to be found in what is immediately evident (Hua 3/1, § 141). The justification of all other beliefs derives in one way or another from this. And as we will see, he speaks of the evident as being a matter of the givenness of the object or state of affairs. But this first impression will turn out to be deceiving. We will see that the phenomenological directness of perception, which gives us the sense of seeing the object itself, gains its epistemic importance from background beliefs, which give the Husserlian account a more coherentist character. The sixth of the Logical Investigations is entitled "Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge." Knowledge, Husserl says, requires the sense on the part of a believer that something is evident to him or her. Already in the first volume of the Investigations, the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic," we read: In knowledge, however, we possess truth. In actual knowledge . . . we possess truth as the object of a correct judgement. But this alone is not enough, since not every correct judgement, every affirmation or rejection of a state of affairs that accords with truth, represents knowledge of the being or non-being of this state of affairs. Rather we may say that, if it is to be called "knowledge" in the narrowest, strictest sense, it requires to be evident, to have the luminous certainty that what we have acknowledged is, that what we have rejected is not, a certainty distinguished in familiar fashion from blind belief, from vague opining, however firm and decided, if we are not to be shattered on the rocks of extreme scepticism. (Hua 18. 28-29 [LI. 60-61]) The question Husserl addresses has been familiar to philosophers since Plato's Theaetetus: what distinguishes knowledge from a mere belief? According to Husserl, the distinction between true belief and knowledge is a matter of our experience. Knowing involves being in some sense aware of the contrast of a present belief with various epistemically inferior beliefs. And as the passage just cited has it, knowing is also a state of being in a position to reject doubt, i.e., to have grounds for certainty rather than doubt. In other words, if knowledge is to be possible, some beliefs must be defensible, i.e. justifiable, presumably because it is evident to the believer that things are what he believes them to be.5
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But how are we to understand this relation of something being evident to someone? This is the question Husserl tries to answer in the sixth of the Logical Investigations. This is where he gives his first, though not his final, statement of a theory of knowledge.'1 Knowledge, he tells us, is the attainment of some sort of recognitional vision of the object of our belief. Often we are directed to an object by having at our disposal only a linguistic sign signifying it; at other times, we see it by way of a picture or mental image, but there are also times when the same object is present without that presence being mediated in any of the ways just mentioned. Husserl calls that seli-givenness or self-presence. In such a case, I recognize the object as such and say that I now perceive it. Tt is then evident to me that the situation I claimed to exist really does exist. In typically Husserlian language, I see the object itself. The account implies much that was not made explicit until later. The most important matters are the ideas of context and of cognitive agency. The context of particular acts later came to be captured by the concept of horizons. But from what he does say in the Logical Investigations, it is clear that he was aware of its role. From the fact that his account views the knower as one who seeks knowledge and truth we can see that he wants us to think of the knower as an agent already motivated to seek truth and therefore seeing himself as equipped with capacities for such a search. As the doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness has it, the object of the search is already before the mind. And the knower envisages things that he can and is required to do. Husserl views matters from the perspective of one who seeks knowledge, would like to know whether his beliefs are correct, and looks for ways to find out. Knowledge is discussed as the goal of a search, rather than as a possession. He, of course, speaks also of knowledge as the possession of truth, but rather than considering it as a relation obtaining between knower and reality, he relates it intimately to the search, namely, as the achievement of its goal. As Husserl sees it, the distinction between belief and knowledge is made by seekers of truth. To that extent, it accounts for the inner dynamic of our cognitive life. I want to emphasize that Husserl's statement of a theory of knowledge in the last of his Logical Investigations, begins in medias res, as it were. He starts with a discussion that implies a knower already engaged. He does not assume a passive mind, a tabula rasa, on which in the fullness of time objects impinge. We are not asked to imagine a mind which has not yet, experienced anything. The mind is not confronted with mere data, something merely given and waiting to be conceptualized and interpreted. On the contrary, what presents itself to the mind are objects that have already been conceptualized to a certain extent. His account invites us to transport ourselves into a setting in which we already assume to have a certain amount of knowledge. Things already present themselves to us with a certain character, and we therefore have words to refer to them and are able to recognize the latter as being what we mean by those words. Sometimes we speak, while the things we mean come into view only later, in which case we experience a peculiar satisfaction, just as when an expectation we had is fulfilled by recognizing what we expected. I already mentioned the concept of cognitive agency. That concept entails that
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various kinds of capacities are acknowledged by the truth seeker as capacities which she undoubtedly has and which are therefore, unproblematically and without further thought, ready to be used—for example, the capacities to refer to objects by uttering words or sentences and, if appropriate, to move to a particular location to see if the object spoken of is really there. Such a truth seeker already operates with a global sense of how the various objects within the scope of her experience may be referred to or apprehended. She believes that, when it comes to acquiring knowledge, specific steps have to be taken to lead us to the object, while others are to be avoided as leading us away from that goal. In other words, she has a sense of what counts as the best epistemic situation. As one might put it. Husscrl's account articulates the subject-object correlation as a search for truth, and the truth seeker he envisages is one who has an implicit ontology and epistemology, which a phenomenological epistemology begins by describing. From the point of view of such an epistemologist, there is no such entity as a truth seeker, if we cannot begin by describing him as endowed with some sort of prephilosophical ontology and epistemology. Husserl implies that the ultimate motivation for the search for knowledge arises from a sense of differences and contrasts between modes of givenness. Part of what is distinctive of a cognitive agent is the fact that he or she works with such a distinction between various acts of awareness. In certain situations, such an agent will have a sense of dissatisfaction about his or her grasp of an object or state of affairs. In others, by contrast, that agent has a sense of satisfaction of having grasped an object in an optimal manner. Dissatisfaction will be accompanied by a sense of certain specific steps which might be taken to improve the cognitive situation. And actually taking one or more of such steps will accordingly give the agent a sense of fulfilment or, as the case might be, disappointment. In fulfilment, something gets recognized, i.e., identified, as being (or not being) what was earlier meant or thought. Beginning an epistemological account in this manner, we, of course, have to dissociate ourselves from the noncognitive connotations of "fulfilment" and "disappointment," for example, those primarily connected with wishes, hopes, and apprehensions. We should think of a person's interest as purely cognitive, as an interest in what is given, rather than in changing things. What is sought is knowledge and truth, nothing else. Fulfilment is to be understood as progress on a line that measures, not quality of life or whatever, but just the attainment of knowledge in the sense of justified belief. The ideal we seek is knowledge of what is the case, regardless of emotional or other attitudes we may have with respect to the object to be known. The intentions that find fulfilment, which Husserl calls empty or purely signitive, are shown to be correct by the fact that in the fulfilling intention one recognizes an object—using "object" in a broad sense—as being the one which was intended, so that the full intention can be said to confirm or verify the empty intention. Fulfilment is a matter of identifying, or recognizing, something as being the object or state of affairs which one earlier thought of and referred to. It has a sense which might be expressed by exclaiming, "That's it." The perceived tree, let's say, is recognized as the tree meant by a linguistic expression that was uttered by a speaker some time ago or merely as something exemplifying what
4,2
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The object is then given, or present, both terms to be understood in correlation with contrasting situations. It is given or present in contrast to being merely referred to with words, conjectured on the basis of some sort of sign, or projected by an image, illustration, or model. As Husserl uses the expression, "being given" also means that its givenness is not produced—intentions do not contrive their own fulfilment—or inferred in one way or another. "Emptiness," then, does not mean an absence of belief, for the account assumes that consciousness is intentional, that there is already an awareness directed upon an object or state of affairs. Phenomenologically speaking, the object terminally given in a fulfilment does not make its first appearance there, for in some sense it already occupies the mind, namely, as the intentional object of an empty intention. And as to an empty intention, it is crucially important not to interpret an intention of this sort as if it had, in fact, a present image or mental state as its object. Neither is it the case that, if the belief is expressed in words, the latter serve as substitutes for the object upon which one is directed, ff that were the case, how would we then interpret the fact that, in spite of the presence of words and images, we feel a need for fulfilment? What we encounter in a fulfilment, then, is not a new object, but the object we already sought in a new and distinctive mode of givenness, namely, self-givenness. The intensive pronouns in the locutions "self-givenness" and "seeing the thing itself" are meant to indicate just that. Since "fulfilment" is used by Husserl in what one might call a theory of justification, or whatever we call that which gives positive status to our beliefs or claims, fulfilment must not be confused with an increase in information or detailed knowledge about an object. What is at issue is justification. It is not a matter of becoming better acquainted with an object initially known only in part, but rather of gaining status for a given claim to knowledge. The question is: what is that by virtue of which a given belief or claim has cognitive status and may be called justified? That it is not the former but the latter that is episternically important is easily overlooked, since an actual perception of an object, earlier only mentioned in a statement, frequently also increases our knowledge about the object. An actual perception will give all kinds of additional and unforeseen details—thus leading to new beliefs—about a particular object as well as fulfilling or confirming an earlier reference and thus justifying a cognitive claim about that object. In the course of an inquiry, we generally come to apprehend more and more of an object's properties. From a very general and sketchy notion we proceed to detailed knowledge, even knowledge of what is unique about an individual thing or person. But this is not what Husserl has in mind with his concept of fulfilment. Strictly conceived, fulfilment does not bring a new object, nor does it add new aspects to what is already intended. Husserl emphasizes in this connection that the identification of the object should not be understood as involving a reflective, conceptually mediated comparison of the object's different modes of being referred to (§ 7). It is an experience of identity that can, but need not, be explicitly stated. Recognition (Erkennen) is a matter of appreciating the fittingness or appropriateness of what we say or believe to what we encounter in experience, and vice versa. It will not Husserl,
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do, he argues, to postulate a hidden mental mechanism by virtue of which as a matter of fact a certain perception is generally accompanied by the uttering of a word. As a result of linguistic training, a perception might often, or generally, be followed by the uttering of a word. But to hold that the perception is the cause of a verbal utterance does not account for our sense that by our use of a proper name like "Hans" at a particular time we mean a person we perceive on that occasion, or our ability to recognize a particular percept as an example of what we mean by the word "red." In the absence of such recognition, however, a person would not appreciate their connection and fail to see that the word refers to what is perceii'ed. The speaker would not see the latter as what she meant in the uttering of a name or as showing the correctness of a belief which she held and expressed by the uttering of a sentence. The recognition can indeed be expressed in the form of an explicit statement of identity. It is "a priori possible" to compare the object in its different modes of givenncss and come to the conclusion that it is the same object on two or more occasions. But here the same kind of recognition would be called for, if that statement of identity is to be seen as stating an identity which actually exists. Husserl observes that the cognitive interest is directed on the object and its characteristics, not on the fact of its being identical with the object meant (§ 8). It is a claim, for example, about: a perceptual object that is shown to be justified, rather than the closely related, but clearly different claim about its identity on different occasions of givenness. As we might also put it, the identity is implied but not stated. Husserl also makes this point in his discussion of the relation between the evident and the true (§ 39). He states that the evident is the experience of correspondence. It is, once again, a recognition of a perception, for example, as being cognitively relevant to a belief in the sense of showing its correctness. This experience, however, is not to be equated with a statement to the effect that there exists an objective correspondence between something meant or thought, on the one hand, and a state of affairs perceived, on the other. One can, of course, make such a statement (Hua 19/2, 652 [LI, 766]), but for the latter claim to be evident, to be itself appreciated as justified, the person who makes it has to have the same unexpressed and as yet unconceptualized experience, this time recognizing the objective fact of correspondence as justifying the statement to that effect. What we should note for the sake of future reference is the fact that, in describing this recognition or experience of correspondence, Husserl uses on two occasions the traditional definition of truth: "adaequatio inrellectus et rei" (Hua 19/2, 540, 647!'. [LI, 640, 762]). In the light of the preceding, that is not difficult to understand. One does, indeed, find that a thought or a sentence is adequate to what is perceptually given to us and thus corresponds to it. As I argued in the introductory chapter, the important question is whether we may assume that this is what was intended by the term adaequatio in the traditional formulation. My contention is that this is not the case. I hold that the traditional view of the nature of truth, first formulated by Plato and Aristotle, should not be made to serve in a discussion of the search for truth. If we want to follow Husserl and highlight the experience of correspondence, the latter should not be identified 44
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with truth. On my view, then, Husserl is taking here a rather fateful step, but we can see how a doctrine about fulfilment such as his tempts one to take it. As we will see in the next chapter, Heidegger followed Husserl's lead on this point. Something being evident to me, says Husserl, is for me to experience truth, i.e., to be aware of the correspondence of what is (or was) meant and what is given. What is given is known, or recognized (crkannt), as what is meant or merely believed. Husserl calls it being in the sense of the true, that is, being as that which makes a belief or statement about being or truth justified. Husserl mentions in this same connection three other concepts of truth. Their differences emerge quite readily from the different ways in which the experience of truth can be objectified: truth can be spoken of as the ideal relation instantiated by the experience of truth (Evidenz), in which case truth is like a universal. Truth can also be defined as what is evident (i.e., the object or state of affairs which is seen) and finally as correctness of the intention, or rather of its prepositional content. From an epistemological perspective, we need not discuss them in detail. In the text of the sixth of the Logical Investigations, Husserl presents much of his epistemological doctrine in a discussion of perceptible objects apprehended in various ways. In the light of the foregoing discussion, however, it will be clear that what a fulfilment concretely consists in will depend on the kind of object targeted in the empty or signitive intentions, as well as the specific capacities deemed appropriate to reach such objects. In other words, it will be relative to the implicit ontology and epistemology. What: seeing an F means depends on the concept of being an F. "Seeing" is used by Husserl to mark a contrast: with various ways of not seeing F. With regard to houses, ordinary perception will do, but, as we shall see, that need not be the case when it comes to other categories of objects, for example, numbers or essences. What is at: issue is a purely general relation between intentional acts. It is a relation which can hold between variously characterized acts, depending on the network or context to which they belong. It is a functional relation that may also hold between acts that are descriptively different from those which were first singled out as exemplifying that relation. The frequently used phrases "seeing the object that was meant" or "seeing the object itself" do not describe any particular kind of act. but rather a role which, given a specific context, an act plays for an act of mere belief, namely, the role of giving it fullness or fulfilment, thereby putting a knower in a cognitively better position with respect to whatever object that person desires to know. As Husserl argues in the second half of the sixth investigation, there are many objects that cannot be apprehended in ordinary sense perception. A predicative statement to the effect that something has or exemplifies a property can be justified only by a different kind of intuition or seeing.7 It performs the same cognitive role as ordinary perceptions, namely, the role of justifying beliefs, though in relation to intentional acts of greater complexity. Furthermore, there arc acts which are not at all about perceptual particulars but about properties or essences (as discussed later). In all this, it is important to keep a firm grasp on the Husserlian sense of the term "intuition"; intuiting or seeing an essence is not as simple a matter as directing our eye upon the colour of a flower. Husserll
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If we are to sum up the preceding discussion, we can say that Husserl has distinguished knowledge from mere belief by considering various cognitive stages we go through in the search for knowledge: for example, from word to image, to perception (which he calls cognitive levels [Erkenntnisstufen]). (In many texts he simply talks about empty intentions and fulfilled intentions, because that is the epistemologically important contrast.) He has in mind a cognitive agent who knows how to work his way from one cognitive situation to another, until he or she is satisfied that the object itself has been reached. What is in question, then, is a scale, the highest point on which constitutes knowledge in the sense in which that is contrasted with mere belief. What is measured on such a scale, to repeat a point made earlier, are degrees of justification. The logic of Husserl's doctrine naturally generates the idea of an ultimate, terminating fulfilment, a cognitive situation in which nothing remains to be done because we are really in touch with the being of things. This is, of course, an ideal situation, but precisely as such it indicates the kind of goal we are after in the search for truth. We could say that it is an extrapolation from our cognitive practices (Hua 8, 363-68). It is that in the light of which any particular claim to knowledge should be evaluated. Whether we ever find ourselves in such a situation remains to be decided by evaluative criticism. As we will see in the following section, however, Husserl holds that it cannot be reached without taking a transcendental turn. Before we turn to further elaborations of Husserl's episternology, we should note an aspect of the earlier account that is often passed over or mentioned only in passing. The fulfilment of empty intentions is the schema he uses to account for the discovery of truth, but he also uses it to account for the discovery of error, which he speaks of as the disappointment of intentions. And in doing so, he foreshadows what is often considered to be a concept characteristic of his later doctrine: the idea of horizon. An empty intention can, of course, be disappointed rather than fulfilled. But Husserl points out that such disappointment can only be partial. It is possible only within a wider context of fulfilment (Hua 19/2, 574-81 [LI, 701-6]). What this implies is that an empty intention is directed upon an object in a context: we not only refer to an object or state of affairs, but we also co-intend—i.e., implicitly refer to—its place or context. There is discovery of error, for example, when what is claimed and expected turns out not to be in the place where it was thought to be. That means that the place is recognized as being that of the object referred to, but we discover that the object is not there. Fie also argues that we can recognize the object to be there, although it turns out to have a quality different from what it was claimed to have. In such a case, too, there is disappointment within a wider context of fulfilment. As Husserl clearly saw, simply failing to find something or finding something different will not have the kind of cognitive relevance for a belief that is assumed to be in error. What is found must have relevance, which is secured by the general context of the belief. What this shows is that the cognitive subject implied by Husserl's stated account of knowledge is a subject whose beliefs form a network and whose intentional references implicitly locate their objects in the context circumscribed by those beliefs. Discovery of error or a mistake in regard to a particular object is
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possible only if its co-intended context remains unchanged. If we are to discover error, we can do so only against the backdrop of what is taken to be truth and knowledge. We may at times have doubts, but that is only possible on the basis of knowledge we have. 1 shall come back to this matter later in this chapter. It is therefore clear that intending is more than being directed upon an object in isolation. Intention places its object in a world, as this term has come to be used in the phenomenological tradition. This is not a Heidcggerean discovery or an insight Husserl reached only late in his life, but a fairly straightforward implication of the phenomenology of the search for truth which he had already formulated in Logical Investigations* The evident, Husserl argued, should not be construed simply in terms of truth, as a state in which one possesses truth. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic (§§ 59. 105-6), he called this a dogmatic theory of the evident, because it construes the evident in terms of a presupposed truth-in-itself. An adherent of such a theory might even hold that the belief is in some sense a direct result of the fact which makes it true. What makes a mere belief knowledge would simply be the fact that it is true, a case of possessing truth. Husserl holds that this view is a construction, because it is clear that it takes no account of the phenomenological nature of the cognitive situation. It implies that the subjective appreciation which a cognizing being has of her situation is unimportant. The account gives no attention to the way in which she formed the belief and evaluates its relation to other belief's of hers; in short, this looks like a version of pure epistemological externalism. As Husserl says, it leads to the view that the awareness of something as evident is isolated from the rest of our experience. As he puts it in the text, it is torn out of the concrete, essentially unified context of a subject's experience (FTL, § 59). And thus the only alternatives we are left with arc these: either it is altogether without significance from a cognitive point of view, or it has to be interpreted as an apprehension of truth that is infallible for the simple reason that it cannot be criticized from alternative points of view or overridden by later experience. The general point is clearly of a piece with the doctrine discussed so far. I noted at the outset Husserl's interest in truth as an object of search. Such a search is possible only if the agent is familiar with the context of her cognitive experience and the object's "place" in it. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic, we read: We have already touched on the fact that self-givenness is, like every other single intentional experience, a function in the all-embracing nexus of consciousness. The achievement of a single experience, in particular its achievement as an instance of self-givenness, the achievement of the evident, is not finished when the event is over. A single self-giving, by virtue of its own distinctive intentionality, implicitly calls for, and can point to, further self-givings to complete its objectification. (Hua 17, 168 [FTL, 159-60, translation changed]) It is stated even more clearly in § 27 of the Cartesian Meditations, where he says that a situation in which something is evident to me establishes (stiftet) for me a possession which I presume to be permanent, but it does so only within an
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implicit context or horizon. This context is ranged over by my (self-ascribed) capacity to come back to it and assert the same thing again with the same degree of justification. When on a particular occasion I make a claim to truth on the basis of the evident, I presume that I can do this again. Because the evident is embedded in a context, it is fallible. The context permits it to be confirmed or repudiated, so that any particular truth claim, based on something taken to be evident by a person in a situation, can be found to be in error.'' Any particular expectation springing from the presumption that [ can come back and recognize the same claim as still justified can be disappointed. In Formal and Transcendental Logic we read that even a so-called apodictic claim— i.e., a claim about an eidetic state of affairs—is defeasible (Rua 17, 164 [FTL, 156-57]). Though the justification of such a claim is generated by reason rather than by sense experience, memory, or introspection, and though, if such a claim is true, it is necessarily true, the manner in which it is made and justified—i.e., its Evidenz—is, in principle, subject to critical scrutiny, as when an alleged insight or proof is subjected to criticism. 10 In other words, with respect to both kinds of knowledge, Husserl maintains that one can have an experience of truth in the form of a belief that is evident and therefore be justified in one's believing, but one does riot have knowledge if the experience is in one way or another defeated. The point does not imply that there are no necessary truths, that the distinction between them arid contingent truths has disappeared, for in the case of claims justified a priori, error is discovered by reason, independent of sense experience. In other words, the discovery can be made only in the form of another apodictic claim with regard to what is necessarily true. 11 Although Husserl has described the evident as a situation that has a subjective component, namely, the recognition of something seen as being what is (or was) meant—which he called the experience (Erkbnis) of truth—the situation cannot be interpreted in purely subjective terms. A mere feeling of cognitive fulfilment is not sufficient. As he puts it in the Ideas, it is not a voice heard within the mind and telling us of the presence of truth (§ 145). The feeling theory would have it that the truly optimal situation is a belief accompanied by a characteristic feeling of truth, e.g., a powerful, nearly irresistible inclination to accept it. It is supposed by those who subscribe to such a theory that this sort of feeling functions as a reliable sign of the existence of the state of affairs to which the belief is directed. Husserl rejects such an account, noting that this knowledge of signs as reliable presupposes independent access to the state of affairs of which, under certain conditions, the feeling is supposed to be a reliable indicator. In his view, sign talk is parasitic on talk in which things themselves are addressed. To bring into focus the more epistemological implications of the feeling theory, hoxi'ever, we should note that to insist that such a feeling is the best we can expect to attain in our search for knowledge leads directly to radical scepticism. When applied to an optimal, ie., terminal situation, it results in radical scepticism. Ex hypothesi, we cannot improve on that kind of cognitive situation. All relevant powers of inquiry or exploration are assumed to have been fully exploited. Nothing further can be done to secure a claim to knowledge. Now if you then proceed and interpret that kind of situation in the mariner suggested by the feeling theory, a subject in such a situation cannot but wonder whether in 48
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some other mind, or in some possible world, the same kind of feeling might not be associated with a belief contradictory to his own belief. And this amounts to wondering whether his mind has been tampered with by a Cartesian demon, although the question remains without answer. He can never find out, again ex hypothesi, whether in actual fact there exists such a conflict of opinion. The result will therefore be a doubt that cannot be resolved through criticism or further inquiry. The awareness of something as evident is not a psychological indicator, but a distinctive mode of assertion or positing (eigentiimlicher Setzun0smodus).]2 And positing an object as existing, or a state of affairs as obtaining, is to be correlated with the characteristic mode of givenness of a kind of object. An optimal mode of givenness, sell'-givenness, "rationally motivates" the act of assertion (Ideas L, § 136). Husserl writes that self-givenness (of an object) and acceptance of the object: as real, i.e., positing it, are experienced as belonging together. This belonging together must itself be a matter of experience, so that we can say that the justified belief has its justifying ground in that mode of givenness. ft will not do to say that, as a matter of fact, the one is accompanied by the other or that there is a relation of cause and effect between them. Such a relation might obtain without any awareness on the part of the knower that the mode of givenness is cognitively relevant to her believing. Husserl captures all this in what he calls the principle of all principles (Ideas I, § 24). According to it, whenever we see something in the epistemologically fundamental sense of something being evident to us, we are justified in believing; that mode of givenness generates justification for the corresponding belief; what is so given should be accepted as it gives itself, although, of course, our claim should not go beyond what is so given. No theory, Husserl says, should make us lose sight of this principle. The evident: is to be trusted as far as it goes, but it must prove its trustworthiness by defeating criticism.
The Transcendental Turn The search for truth has thus far been considered as the attainment of justification for a belief. Justifying was seen as activity on the part of a cognitive agent who, as I put it, works with an implicit ontology and epistemology. This justification consists in a seeing of what we believe, for example, seeing with our own eyes the object of our belief. Seeing the object itself is a state which may also be interpreted as one in which the object itself is given, ff we state this in terms of perception, this amounts to saying that beliefs are justified when they are based on perception. Alternatively, sense perception can convert mere belief into knowledge. Now according to common sense, perception is for that reason counted as a source of knowledge. The justification of some beliefs may come from other beliefs, but there are a great many beliefs whose justification comes from what is taken to be a source of knowledge. When perception functions as a source of knowledge, it does not itself function as a belief for which a justification needs to be given, but as that which generates justification for a belief. In a sense, the Husserll
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agent's justifying activity ends with perception. Common sense assumes that perception is a generally reliable source of knowledge, and we mostly accept what presents itself in that way. All such convictions, we might say, are embodied in the implicit ontological and epistemological contours of common sense. Now the theory of knowledge presented in the preceding section, particularly the basic doctrine about intentions and their fulfilments which Husserl presented in his Logical Investigations, is based on reflection, but it is reflection within the bounds of common sense. As Husserl at times put it, it is natural or psychological reflection. This means that the cpistemologist's reflections still share the basie convictions of common sense which I just: sketched. The knower is seen as a human being in contact with the world around him through his sense organs. The justiiication of a belief about that world is based on the data of sense perception. Husserl, however, thought that epistemological reflection on knowledge claims ought to go still further, so that we may attain for them what he calls absolute justification. To be absolute, it would have to be a justification in which no use is made of a cognitive power, the status of which is assumed as a given, and remains unexamined for that reason. To put it differently, what he recommends is that, if a specific search of truth assumes a source of knowledge (e.g., sense perception), that search should not end there but go on, although its direction should be changed. As he explains, our attention has been fixed on inquiry regarding objects as such—positive knowledge, as he calls it (cf. Hua 8, zjff.). 11 As f glossed this point in chapter T, the knowing mind takes its ability to know things other than itself for granted and, in that sense, could be said to abstract from itself. But the search for truth with its goal of absolute justification demands that cognitive claims should be evident in every respect, even if this means that we adopt a critical attitude toward what is normally taken for granted (Hua 8, 31). Suppose that, in a given direction of cognitive interest, everything about the object has become evident, so that nothing further needs to be done. Inquiry should now be directed toward the knower, more specifically, to what the latter took to be his faculty of knowledge, e.g., perception. What Husserl asks for at this point is that epistemology become transcendental. The general ground Husserl gives for this demand is the threat of scepticism, particularly that implied by scientific naturalism. 14 That it is the threat of scepticism which motivates the transcendental move in his epistemology is, of course, completely in line with the broadly Kantian background of his thought. Kant's own thought was, at least in good part, an attempt to refute Humean scepticism. In Husserl's view, the plausibility of scepticism is largely due to the fact that philosophers have neglected the study of the cognitive subject, or at least not pursued it far enough. As long as we remain in the dark with respect to the nature and being of that subject, sceptics will exploit that ignorance and, as h says, alarm us with their wild theories about it. I take it that examples of such a "wild" theory, according to Husserl, are the view that all beliefs are ultimately the effects of causes in the physical world and the view that the human being is nothing but a product of natural selection and chance. In any case, Husserl's point is that we must therefore shake off our "transcendental naivete" (Hua 8, 38). He urges that we distinguish between what is evident from a "positive" point
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Phenomenoiogical Kpistemalogy
of view (Evidenz der Positivitdt) and what is evident from a point of view of transcendental clarity about origins (Evidenz der transzendentalen Ursprungsklarheit) (HIM 8, 30). Even if we assume that in a specific direction a cognitive agent has done all she could and needed to do in view of the object-to-be-known, her search for truth cannot be accepted as finished without the transcendental turn. The cognitive subject, whose ability to gain knowledge has been assumed in the "positive" direction of inquiry, should now be targeted in a new inquiry, the goal of which is to secure it from sceptical attacks. What we should note here in particular is the universality of the demand. Husserl's point does not pertain to the circumstance that a given direction of inquiry is empirical in nature, although he has a great deal to say about its empirical nature and often gives the impression of being particularly concerned about the dubitability of sense perception. His point applies likewise to mathematics and logic, for they are also "positive" disciplines and therefore in need of transcendental clarification of what they take to be evident. It is the nai've directness of the inquiry (its naiv gerade Erkenntnisrichtung), the lack of selfknowledge on the part of the knowcr, that Husserl sees as calling for further criticism and demanding the transcendental turn. Any objective inquiry is vulnerable simply by virtue of being objective. One could say that it is vulnerable by virtue of its intrinsic realism about the being of its objects. As stated before, such inquiry trusts sources of knowledge that have not been examined as to their trustworthiness. The new epistemological orientation which Husserl calls for entails that it is not enough to reflect, if in the last analysis we still see ourselves as beings endowed with faculties of knowledge such as perception or reason, if at the end of the day we still hold on to the belief that we are psychological beings in the world who depend for knowledge on being affected by external objects; this is what Husserl calls the natural attitude, which is exploited in scientific naturalism or physicalism. In his reflective stance, the epistcmologist should dissociate himself from that attitude. As Husserl would have it, this means that he should stick to the direction of inquiry involved in reflection but continue it to the end, i.e., until he reaches the transcendental subject. Unlike the human knower, the transcendental subject does not see herself as an entity affected by other entities but as one who constitutes all entities. In a nutshell, dissociation from the natural attitude is the so-called transcendental-phenomenological reduction. Pursuing reflection as far as it will take us. the epistemologist gives up such presuppositions as that perception is a source of knowledge in the sense I specified earlier. Perception as a source of knowledge becomes a theme of transcendental-epistemological reflection, which, in effect, analyzes it into a complex of beliefs. It was considered as a source of knowledge, justifying beliefs about the spatiotemporal world; now it will be shown to owe its own cognitive status to beliefs about perception. The principal question for the epistemologist has now become: what are the background beliefs which constitute perception? in slightly different terms: what are the implied beliefs which make us treat perception as a source for knowledge about the external world? The epistemologist withdraws to a transcendental plane, i.e., a point of view which is not controlled by that presupposition but sees perception as embedded in a framework of beliefs that Husserll
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deline it. As we have already seen, within this framework a perception stands out by way of contrast to other modes of awareness; it is what the latter point to as their fulfilment or goal, from which they derive the justification for their claims to knowledge. In a well-known study, Eugcn Fink, a close associate of Husserl in his last years, suggested that it might be helpful in this connection to distinguish three egos. 15 Freely adapting his suggestion, it comes to this. There is, first of all, the natural ego, i.e., the cognitive agent pursuing his search for truth in a manner not affected by philosophical questions. But we also have the epistemological ego, who is the person engaged in developing a philosophical doctrine of knowledge. He is already well under way on the reflective path, but let's assume that he has not yet entirely freed himself from the natural ego's outlook, the so-called natural attitude. He has studied epistemic practices "from within" and presented something like the intention-fulfilment doctrine we examined in the previous section. But still subscribing to the natural attitude, and its tendencies toward naturalism, the epistemological ego ascribes this practice to the natural ego, which is to say, you and me in our everyday life and scientific engagements. He is still inclined to think of epistemology as a kind of psychology, a study of the inner world of the mind. As Husserl sees it, he has not yet performed the epistemologieal move par excellence, namely, the transcendental move. The knower in the natural attitude, not even aware of the possibility of any different attitude, would not come up with the idea of such a move, let alone the reasons for making it. It is the epistemologisf who conceives the idea that an individual human knower, captive to the natural attitude, is not the cognitive subject in the ultimate sense, that he is not, so to speak, alone in his confrontation with all there is to be known, that a great deal of work is actually being done for him by a cognitive subject that is not human. The epistemologist baptizes this subject: as the transcendental subject, which is therefore the third ego. As the epistemologist sees it, this is the subject to which we should, in last analysis, ascribe the achievement of knowledge. Although the epistemological ego started out with a concentration on the cognitive experience of human beings, the reflective approach transforms itself—through the previously mentioned reduction—into a way of gaining access to the transcendental subject. Having made the transcendental move, this epistemological ego (ego number two) now takes himself to be the reflective, impartial observer-reporter of the cognitive experience of the transcendental subject (ego number three), rather than that of the human being with which he began (ego number one). But: isn't this transcendental turn at the same time a big jump as well? We move from reflecting on human experience to reflecting on an experience that has an altogether different feel to it, from a cognitive experience dependent on sources of knowledge (e.g., perception) to one which is an experiencing ego for which everything known is completely its own achievement. In the latter kind of experience, there are no instances of a belief which derives its justification from what is given but only beliefs justified by other beliefs. Many of these beliefs, the transcendental epistemologist will in fact admit, are not consciously entertained by human beings; they lie, as it were, too deeply concealed. Yet he will
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insist that there are such belief's and that there is a transcendental subject who holds them. There are various ways of reacting to this question. In the previously mentioned study, Fink makes much of the fact that, since to get beyond the natural attitude we have to make use of what is available within it, we are in danger of interpreting what the transcendental attitude reveals in terms of what has all along been familiar in the natural attitude. But since the transcendental attitude is supposed to reveal precisely what was concealed by the natural attitude, problems of transcendental phenomenology are distinctive and new, rather than already familiar (Studien, 108). The problems we naturally have about knowledge, for example, should not dictate to us our understanding of ego number three. He also argues that in the natural attitude the capacity for adopting a transcendental attitude is not at all one we all know we have (Studien, no). We naturally see ourselves as capable of reflecting on our human experience, but as we just saw, transcendental reflection does not delimit its domain as human consciousness. These points are well taken, but we must not overlook the profound continuity between the two attitudes, the unity within the trinity of the three egos. If Husserl is right, we can say that the natural ego turns inward in reflection and on that path of reflection he ultimately finds the life of the transcendental ego. The transcendental standpoint is not that of external observer-critic in the sense of the epistemological externalist. The transcendental turn is a radically new departure, but it is not an altogether alien and external point of view. The transcendental subject which the epistemolegist discovers is therefore, in a sense, his own subjectivity. However much one may accentuate its difference from the natural attitude, it does not bring to bear on the latter a truth altogether alien to it, possibly even harmful and destructive. The obvious fact that human beings can become philosophers shows that by means of capacities we already have we can discover capacities perhaps hitherto unknown, as xvell as problems of which we were not aware in the natural attitude. We might say that the spirit of philosophy is already operative within us, capable of making us envisage goals we can apparently attain, for example, the goal of absolute justification, although their attainment lies beyond the scope of the natural attitude. The cognitive ideal of absolute justification confronts the human knower in the natural attitude, but he cannot attain it as long as he persists in that. And what one discovers by virtue of the transcendental turn, Husserl would say, is epistemically relevant to the natural attitude. Naivete, positivity, and dogmatism are, according to Husserl, defects shown by the natural attitude, although the latter generally does not see that. I therefore think that there must be continuity, if we are to be able to say, as apparently we must, that the one is a response to the problems affecting the other. 16 According to Husserl, then, the pursuit of knowledge, in and through criticism, brings us to the realization that we can, and should, go further and adopt a transcendental attitude. In the text under discussion and elsewhere, he argues in various ways that we should adopt a transcendental attitude. He called these arguments ways to the reduction, as they have been designated in the scholarship ever since.17 The withdrawal to the transcendental plane, then, will enable
Husserl
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the knower to become ultimately clear as to his being and to give a critique of supposed forms of knowledge that would distort and conceal it. The percipient, for example, is not an evolutionary product of nature but constituted by beliefs held by the transcendental subject. (Husserl speaks here of the latter as objectifying himself—i.e., interpreting himself—in the form of an empirical, psychological, and biological entity.) Perception, which was considered a source of knowledge justifying all other beliefs about the spatiotemporal world, will now be shown to owe its cognitive status to beliefs about perception on the part of that transcendental subject. I therefore said earlier that: transcendental consideration reduces it to a complex of beliefs. Let us consider a text in which Husserl argues for the transcendental turn on the basis of what he calls the problem of knowledge. The text is that of a few lectures he delivered in 1907, posthumously published under the title The Idea of Phenomenology.18 Historically, it is his first formulation of the famous, muchdebated doctrine of phenomenological reduction or epoche. The general argument is that there is a problem of knowledge which cannot be solved as long as it is stated in the way it usually is, namely, as a problem about the existence of an external relation between two entities, a human mind and an extramental object. True to the transcendental tradition, Husserl then reformulates the problem by moving to the transcendental plane, which eliminates that relation. As Husserl sees it, the natural attitude is in conflict with itself, because in common sense and science it assumes without question the possibility of knowledge, but as a result of reflection, which gives rise to the science of psychology, it becomes uncertain and is in danger of falling into scepticism. This reflection still shares the natural attitude and interprets cognition as a psychological experience of human beings. Human beings are entities within the world, and their experience is a process that takes place between them and their environment and is accessible to scientific explanations. More strongly still, Husserl writes, a theory such as the biological theory of evolution cannot but assume that it embodies knowledge, but the upshot of the theory itself destroys its very possibility. Our human search for knowledge thus destroys itself. He goes to considerable lengths to argue that the question of knowledge should be taken seriously, but that it is absurd to expect an answer to it from any of the positive sciences (including psychology) or, for that matter, from any other accepted source of knowledge. No causal argument will help to answer it because it would beg the question, for if we are to show that a causal, i.e, external, relation exists between subject and object, we necessarily have to assume that we have access to the object as well as the subject. If, in view of this difficulty, we abandon our initial realism with respect the world and reduce everything to mental representations, we end up with solipsism. (In later texts, he attributes this sort of reduction to Berkeley and Hume and calls it psychological idealism.) Already in the first lecture, Husserl suggests that, if we are to answer the epistemological question, we need to consider the metaphysical question of being (Hua 2, 23 [IP. 18]). In fact, his construal of the problem of knowledge and the threat of scepticism clearly shows not only that the natural attitude is realist in character but also that its concept of being is held to be in part responsible for this threat. Realism is not mentioned by name, however, because Husserl sees
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the threat as coming from its naturalistic versions, ultimately physicalistic objectivism. It is also significant that Hume receives emphatic mention in this lecture as the representative sceptic. (Descartes does not make an appearance until the second lecture.) It is the combination of realism with Hume's philosophy of mind, or something along that line, that generates the problem. The cognitive subject is a mind in possession only of representations of things, so that the question of knowledge becomes that of how that mind can know something outside itself. In other words, Husserl thinks of the external nature of the cognitive subject-object relation as consorting with a view of the mind which gives to that relation the appearance of a gulf that cannot be bridged. As already noted, the problem can be dealt with only by setting it aside or reformulating it. Although Kant has not been mentioned by name so far, can his paradigmatic reaction to Hume's scepticism be far from Husserl's mind? Husserl's commitment to a phenomenological-internalist approach to epistemology remains clear. The path of reflection must be continued. Epistemology cannot make use of knowledge external to the cognitive situation but must begin "with some cognition which it does not take unexamined from elsewhere but which it rather provides for itself and posits as primal" (Hua., 29 [IP, 22, transl. altered]). At this point, Descartes is, of course, called in to testify that what is unproblematic is the givenness of mental representations. The path of reflection, already taken by the natural attitude in the development of a psychology, is to be followed far beyond the point where psychological reflection stops, which, as we saw, leads to the transcendental turn, alternatively put, the performance of the phenomenological reduction. Psychological reflection still held on to the belief that human experience takes place within the context of the world at large, but transcendental reflection suspends that belief. Accordingly, the possibility of knowledge will be demonstrated to the sceptic by reflection on consciousness, i.e., by recourse to what is unproblematically available. Such a demonstration, Husserl says, requires that the epistcmologist see, as it were, with his own eyes— which are the eyes of reflection—what the relation is between knower and known (Hua 2, 37 [IP, 30]). The first part of the demonstration has already been accomplished by the intention-fulfilment doctrine, which I discussed previously. The doctrine was set forth in terms of modes of givenness or, if you prefer, intentions. According to that account, the quest for knowledge ends with the cognitive agent recognizing his object in what is given, for example, in sense perception. In the present section, I have tried to suggest why, in Husserl's view, that doctrine could not be the whole story, because it leaves in doubt the cognitive status or worth of selfgivenness and leaves open the question whether there are "transcendent" objects and whether we can know them. If their being is interpreted according to a realist concept of being, those objects exist quite independently of our experience, which means that the problem of knowledge, as Husserl understands it in line with the transcendental tradition, has not been settled. This problem cannot be settled as long as the realist concept of being remains uncontested; in other words, the metaphysical question of being has to be addressed. As I see it, Husserl does precisely that when he urges that we move to the transcendental plane, that is to say, perform the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. Husserl l
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Toward the end of the second lecture, Husser] argues that the problem of knowledge as formulated by means of the term "transcendent" is unclear because of the ambiguity of that term and its companion "immanent" (Hua 2, 35 [IP, 27-28]). To help matters, he distinguishes two quite different meanings that may be attached to them. In one sense of the term "transcendent," it simply designates a class of objects, namely, those existing outside consciousness. Physical objects are, in this sense, said to be transcendent because they exist in their own right outside the mind, and the relation in which they stand to the mind is external. But Husscrl suggests that there is an altogether different sense in which "transcendent" and "immanent" may be taken. In this sense, they designate modes of givenness of an object. When we use the terms in the second sense, we do not talk about an object directly, but rather about a kind of episternic situation that we may find ourselves in with regard to an object. In this second sense, it is important to note, both terms can be understood with the help of the intention-fulfilment doctrine: in terms of this doctrine, "transcendent" designates a mode of givenness: the object: is referred to all right, but it still escapes our grasp at the moment. "Immanent" likewise characterizes a mode of givenness: it means that the object is seen or given in the mode of self-givenness. In Husserl's view, the question of how knowledge is possible can be answered only in terms of modes of givenness. Assurances to the effect that there is a transcendent object external to the knower are of no use when it comes to showing how knowledge is possible. The reason that epistemological reflection, in a Cartesian spirit, can accept a mental act is not that it exists within the mind (although that is true) but that it is given in a certain manner, in an immediate seeing of what is meant. The performance of the reduction is therefore precisely the move which properly focuses the episternologist's view, namely, on subjective modes of givenness and their correlative intentional acts. During the earlier stage of reflection—the so-called natural or psychological reflection—she still shared the natural knower's belief in the existence of mind-independent objects, perhaps even adhering to scientific objectivism and holding that cognitive states are the effects of purely material causes, but with the reduction she has put all such beliefs out of action and resolutely interpreted consciousness as transcendental. The net effect of all this is the reinstatement, as it were, of the earlier doctrine, for that which had cast doubt on its scope and effectiveness—the realist concept of being—has now been set aside by the move to the transcendental plane. The problem of knowledge, as Husserl saw it, now has a solution. The question "How can a cognition be a claim about something that is not self-given?" can now be answered exclusively by appeal to modes of givenness. As the earlier doctrine had it, it is an example of an empty but fulfilment-seeking intention embedded in an implicit context or horizon of other acts we can perform. Transcendence, as the term is now understood, designates a mode of givenness in an episternic situation that is within our reach, not the existence of an object outside the mind. It is, as he sometimes puts it, a transcendence within immanence. Whether something is immanent or transcendent—alternatively, how an object is given—is a function of the totality of the experience of transcendental consciousness, which it is the task of epistemological reflection to analyze and describe. 56
Plienomenological, Kpistemology
Transcendental reflection is an extension, or continuation, of natural or psychological reflection. Because of this starting point, it may create the impression of being a narrowing of our focus, an abstraction from a whole for the sake of concentrating on a part. But if we have carefully noted the metaphysical transaction implied by the transcendental reduction, we can appreciate why this is not at all the way Husserl wants us to interpret it. He claims that by turning away from the natural attitude we do not lose anything and gain the whole of absolute being (Hua 3/1,107 [ID T, 113]). All we got rid of is what he regards as the mistaken realist view that the object is independent of the subject. To rephrase this in terms of his critique of scientific objectivism, we have destroyed the view that the real world is the imperceptible material world of mathematical physics. His view is that transcendental reflection gives access to the real being of things, inasmuch as their being consists in their being constituted in transcendental consciousness. What we attain by adopting the transcendental attitude is not something second best but the real thing in its true being, or, as he puts it in his Formal and Transcendental Logic, "Everything outside is what it is within this inside and has its true being in the self-presentations and confirmations within this inside" (Hua 17, 257 [FTL, 250]). Such language presupposes the rejection of metaphysical realism. Given his anti-realist, transcendentalidealist interpretation of being, statements to the effect that we have not lost anything are quite in order. Let us look at this a bit more closely. Because the transcendental epistemologisf turns away from the natural attitude and adopts the standpoint of reflection, one is inclined to say that her peculiar object is a meaning or a construct of meaning (Sinn or Noema, Sinngebilde), rather than the object simply as such, the Gegenstand schkchthin, that she speaks of intentional rather than real objects. Such vocabulary reflects the natural attitude. It aptly expresses the impression initially created by the fact that phenornenological reflection begins as a psychological reflection, which in the natural attitude we understand as a turning away from objects to our consciousness of them. The person engaged in such reflection thinks that now she has only consciousness of the world left, which she accordingly interprets as being no more than a representation of the world in its real and true being. The latter, she probably assumes, is the subject matter of the natural sciences, not of phenomenology. Such an interpretation implies that, although she has turned away from the world, the latter still exists by itself, constituting perhaps the subject matter of physics. But it should be noted that, as long as an episternologist thinks in this way, the problem of knowledge has not gone away. If one still holds on to that realist metaphysics, but at the same time suspects the ability of the human consciousness to grasp something other than itself, as did Descartes, Hume, and even Kant, the problem of knowledge persists. The question remains: How can we bring being and consciousness together into the kind of unitary context typically sought by transcendental reflection? In Husserl's view of the matter, both ideas have to be modified. Human consciousness has to be abandoned in favour of absolute consciousness, and being has to be conceived of as internal to the latter. Both modifications are accomplished by the ascent to the transcendental plane, if we interpret it in Husserl's Husserl l
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sense. What happens with this ascent? The person engaged in reflection, i.e., the epistemologist, dissociates herself from her earlier conception; she performs the transcendental-phenomenological reduction or epoche. She now takes herself to be reflecting on the experience of the transcendental subject, absolute consciousness. But as we saw. this change of view would not help with the alleged problem of knowledge, if she did not also play her ontological card at the same time, i.e., if she did not address the question of being. The consciousness of the transcendental subject, which she now says is to be her subject matter, is not externally related to the being of things. As Husserl puts it, the latter is "constituted" in that consciousness. It will be recalled that when I first introduced phenomenology in chapter I, I introduced it as using the vocabulary of meanings in order to signify its subject matter. We now see that the epistemologist's admission that she deals directly only with meanings (noemata, modes of givenness, appearances, etc.) is a selfinterpretation forced on her by her latent metaphysical realism. It looked like a self-limitation, but once we consciously reject realism, its sense will have to undergo a radical reinterpretation. We now have to understand if as actually being a claim to the effect that she speaks of the very being of things. Things simply are their meaning for transcendental consciousness, If she earlier said that she could speak only of consciousness, she was the victim of the realist view that being is independent of the knowing mind. Now that she has ascended to the transcendental plane, she realizes that she spoke the dialect of the prephilosophical herd, to which the philosophical realist also belongs. What she earlier designated as meaning and ascribed to a human consciousness—which has no objects unless they are given to it, as it were, from outside—, she now ascribes to a transcendental subject, for which no objects are so given. For the latter, an object is constituted in consciousness. What a person in the natural attitude believes or says about being—that it is independent, or something to that effect—is a mistake due to ignorance of the transcendental dimension of knowledge. What such a person in her epistemic practice appeals to as sources of knowledge (perception, memory, introspection, reason) are not natural faculties of knowledge. Knowledge drawn from them seems to such a person to be a matter of receptivity, or even passivity, but transcendental critique shows that those faculties are constituted by transcendental beliefs. Perception, as already rioted a number of times, is constituted by a complex of beliefs. Whose beliefs? Those of transcendental consciousness. The beliefs we ordinarily ascribe to a percipient get their justification or cognitive status from perception and other sources of knowledge. But such a percipient does not constitute the faculty of perception; on the contrary, she depends on it and the other faculties she makes use of. The beliefs that constitute perception itself are to be ascribed to transcendental consciousness. Since Kant, the term "realism" has been used as a designation of a standpoint or attitude that is compatible with transcendental idealism. Kant himself called it empirical realism. Not only is it compatible with transcendental idealism but also one can say that it is justified by it. In fact, if we take into account that Kant's idealism is introduced to explain, among other things, the possibility of objective knowledge, one could perhaps say that transcendental idealism is in-
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troduced precisely to safeguard the realism which is a natural ingredient of objective, nonphilosophical knowledge. Whether the realism that emerges from the transcendental treatment is to be equated with classical realism is controversial in the highest degree, as I have suggested in the preceding chapter. Husserl's attitude to realism is very similar. One may say that he defends realism against, for example, the subjectivist views that in perception we apprehend only sensations, and that the apprehension of objects can be based only on inference. Husserl counters such views by stating the obvious: we hear the bird's song, not acoustic sensations. And it is equally clear that perception is not a matter of having a sign or image representing something else. In perception, the object is clearly taken to be distinct from the experience directed upon it. We see a distant object where it is, which is not where we are. The object of perception is not a constituent of our mental perceiving of it, but, as he says, transcendent in relation to it, i.e., apprehended in a perceiving but never exhausted by it. This realist flavour of his account, however, should not mislead us. 1 " Husserl did not see himself as denying realism in the way Berkeley and Hume denied it. He characterizes their position as psychological idealism because it declares the world to be an idea of the psychological subject. This is the idealism he wants us to regard as the opponent of realism. As he then goes on to point out, the battle between them is fought "auf dem natiirlichen Boden." But he assures us that his own transcendental idealism does not engage in a struggle with realism (Hua I, 118 [CM, 86]). He assures us that he himself does not deny the real existence of the world (Hua 5, 152-54). More strongly yet, he writes that genuine transcendental philosophy would not dream of contesting the world of experience or of taking away from it any of the meaning (Sinn) which it really has in the actuality of experience. It is not a "Philosophic des Als ob." The independent being (An-sich-Seiri) of the world is an undoubted fact (Hua 7, 246-48). He adds very significantly, however, that transcendental philosophy does reserve for itself the right to say what all that really means. As I put it in the previous chapter, it is a realism within the bounds of a transcendental philosophy. Using the idea of framework, let us put it this way. Realism is an internal feature of the framework of the natural attitude in general. As Hegel, for example, had already pointed out, natural consciousness distinguishes its object from itself. The integrity of this realism must be respected, which Berkeley and Hume allegedly failed to do. The framework in which such a distinction is made, however, is not ultimate; the self-interpretation of the natural cognizer is not the last word on knowledge and being. It needs to be reinterpreted transcendentally, namely, as itself constituted by absolute consciousness. The ordinary realist's understanding of himself, according to Husserl, needs to be scrutinized within the wider framework of a transcendental vantage point (Hua 6, 190-91 [C, 187]). It turns out that the realist has gone wrong because he has forgotten the origins or roots of his realist framework. 20 Because of my emphasis on the influence of Kant, I should call attention to an important difference between Husserl and Kant. Husserl does not view transcendental consciousness as limiting its constitutive activity to, say, a priori forms, leaving out a posteriori content. For him, there is no thing-in-itself which Husserl
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gets its form, but not its content, from the transcendental concepts of reason. If Kant's talk about a thing-in-itself makes him a realist, as has sometimes been alleged by idealists, there is no realism of that kind in Husserl. 21 Whatever may be the meaning of "constitution," it certainly implies the denial that transcendental subjectivity is, in any respect, a receptive consciousness. To wind up this discussion of Husserl's general doctrine of knowledge, it has now become clear to us that knowledge, as he would define it, requires that all claims or beliefs about objects be based on their being evident to us, but it also requires that it be evident to us that the cognitive capacities employed are trustworthy or reliable. As Husserl puts it, absolute justification comprises two sides (Hua 8, 31). Knowledge so conceived is, of course, an achievement through criticism; all legitimate criticism or scepticism has to be faced. In fact, such knowledge is not so much a possible possession as an object of an unending search. In an optimal situation, however, the knower, according to Husserl, must be able to defend his or her claim as follows. When I see something as I do now and keep this fact before my mind. I simply cannot conceive the possibility that what I see might not exist or that it might be different from what I see it to be. If I try to negate, or generate doubts about, what I hold with regard to an object, it becomes immediately altogether evident to me that its nonexistence or its being doubtful is impossible. I cannot imagine that doubt might be warranted in the present situation. Neither can I imagine that the object's being or so-being might be merely possible (in the sense that something could also be said on the opposite side). I cannot conceive the possibility that it might subsequently turn out that what I now see did not exist. Such things are, to be sure, conceivable in one sense, for I can acknowledge the nonexistence of the object or state of affairs as an evident possibility. But I can admit this only if at the same time I do not take into account the fact that I am now seeing it: the way I do. In this latter case, I do not, of course, call my present situation into question, since ex hypothesi I ignore it or assume that I do not find myself in it. 22 This completes Husserl's definition of the nature of knowledge, which is, in actual fact, a definition of the ideal that governs the search for knowledge. What is described as the optimal situation is the goal which keeps that search alive and makes it meaningful. It remains the standard in the light of which even our best attainments, even those of transcendental-phenomenological philosophy itself, are to be evaluated. It is, of course, not attained by the mere performance of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. The idea of it, however, can be extrapolated from our cognitive practice and set forth in clear and compelling terms, which is exactly what Husserl claims to have done in the theory I have expounded.
Epistemology of Perception We have already discussed this topic on several occasions, because Husserl stated his general theory of knowledge largely in terms of perception. The search for knowledge was illustrated by the search to apprehend an object perceptually. 60
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Much material of great interest, however, remains to be discussed. Let us begin with a terminological point. Husserl frequently designates the world of sensible, spatiotemporal particulars as the real world, using the German word "real." In a similar vein, he talks about real objects, in contrast to the ideal or irreal objects, such as mathematical or abstract objects. "Reality" (Realitdt) accordingly means a domain of entities. In an epistemological discussion, however, the noun "reality" and the adjective "real" obviously mean something quite different. In such a discussion, we want to be able to say that something really exists, when we mean that its existence is not merely apparent, conjectured, or fictional. We want to be able to speak of something existing in truth and reality, not: just in somebody's mind. The entity in question might not be real in the sense of being a perceptible object or event; it might be a mathematical state of affairs, but we may nonetheless want to say that it does really or truly exist, that it is not simply a case of something somebody imagines. When he had to formulate such an epistemological matter, he used a range of Germanic words such as wirklich, wirklich seiend, or wahre Wirklichkeit, which the English language renders with the use of "real" and "reality." In my discussion, I shall generally use the term "real" as a translation of wirklich rather than real. Husserl's best-known affirmation on the subject of perception is that it is a seeing of the object "in the flesh" (kibhaftig), an expression clearly designed to mark perceiving as a cognitive achievement. A belief with respect to a really existing object is here based on a mode of givenness which, in contrast to inferior modes, is that of self-givenness. The belief is thus justified, for in the terms used in my earlier discussion, the percipient seeker for truth has, in a certain sense, done all she could be expected to do. Beliefs about objects of a material sort cannot be better verified than by perception. In perceiving something, the believer is convinced that she has come into contact with what is not another belief or contrivance (e.g., a mental representation or image) but the existence of the object specified in the content of that belief. The perceiver takes it that here the object-to-be-known presents itself. The sense of achievement is, in fact, so strong that to express it in the third person, as one of course does in a philosophical or phenomenological discussion of it, seems to detract from it. If I say, mindful of the fact that it is only a matter of the iritentionality of an act, that a certain person takes the object to be there, I seem to detract from the sense of achievement intrinsic to that person's own, first-person perceiving, for that person does not have the sense that there is anything hypothetical or iffy about it. Recognition of something as self-given is the conviction or belief that we perceive or, in the broad sense of the term, see the object or state of affairs in its real or true being. Rephrasing this from a strictly transcendental point of view, we would have to say that this conviction is a high-level belief to the effect that any belief formed in a perceptual situation counts as giving information, but in the framework of the ordinary percipient it means that one is in touch with a spatiotemporal entity that is real in the sense of not being either an inference drawn from earlier beliefs or in some other way a product of a belief. This is what I think Husserl was getting at, when he spoke of the object as being present "in the flesh" ( (leibhaftig). Husserll
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But, as Husserl hardly ever fails to add at once, the percipient knows that there is more to a material object than can be perceived in a single perception. Such an object not only has spatial parts but also has causal properties not manifest in a given perception. In fact, such an object serves as Husserl's paradigm of an object that is "transcendent," taking this term in the sense stipulated by Husserl, namely, as indicative of a mode of givenness. A perceptual belief goes beyond what is immanent (taking this term in the same way) to encompass the object also in regard to what is actually not perceived and even relatively unfamiliar. In Logical Investigations, we read that perception presents its object in one stroke (in einem Schlage), but it takes the form of a temporal process of perceiving a material object from various points of view (Hua 19/2, 673-81 [LI, 786-92]). As he further explicates this, what is actually perceived (in the cognitive achievement sense) in any single perception of an object is surrounded by interpretative intentions directed upon the parts of the object that are not so perceived. What is actually fulfilled in a perception is therefore accompanied by as yet unfulfilled intentions. Nevertheless, according to the percipient, what really exists is the object: as a whole, not just the part that is actually perceived (Hua 3/1, 319 [ID I, 331]). To put it somewhat dramatically, the percipient does not wait for atomic bits of information to come in to synthesize them in a subsequent act." This means that sense perception is essentially fallible. Although a perceptual belief that there is a cat in front of me is rational or justified by seeing such an animal a few feet away, the justified belief is defeasible. Since what is taken to be given is the cat, not the mode in which it appears at the time of a particular perception, and since that cat is a unity in which different modes of givenness are to come harmoniously together, it; is possible that doubt might arise, if, in reaching out, I do not feel the furry animal. And if all further perceptions speak against there being a cat, the original belief is abandoned. A justified perceptual belief may thus be defeated or outweighed, when subsequent perceptions cannot be harmonized with it. What was co-intended in the earlier perception with respect to the cat: may be disappointed rather than fulfilled. It also means that beliefs can be strengthened by the fact that they are coherent. As Husserl says, a rational positing gains weight when it is constantly confirmed by later perceptions (Hua 3/1, § 138). In the terms of his epistemology, the justification which a belief already has from a perception can increase as I acquire new perceptual beliefs that support the earlier one. This is not a contingent circumstance of our perceptual capacities that might conceivably be overcome. It might be said that our perspectival perceptions do not really have access to a material object itself, that we have only an image or sign of the latter, but that there might be a different and superior cognitive access to material objects, for example, one which God has. In § 43 of the Ideas, Husserl brands such a view as an error of principle. It belongs to the essence of material objects to be so given. "Not merely for human beings but also for God" material objects can be known only through appearances (Hua 3/1, 351 [ID I, 362]). If we somehow acquired radically different powers of sense perception, then we would no longer experience what we now call material objects. In other words, the distinctive manner in which material objects are given is to be taken as 62
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definitive of their very being. In a nutshell, perspectival perception and material objects belong together in one conceptual framework. Husserl offers in this connection a remarkable criticism of Descartes (Hua 17, 288 [FTL, 282]). The Cartesian critique of sense experience, he says, led to a complete rejection of it because of the heavy emphasis placed on its deficiencies. Descartes made so much of the possibility of error and the shortcomings of any perception taken in isolation that he lost sight of the fact that perception is experience in the sense that in perception spatiotemporal objects do give themselves. Descartes failed to ask how we should think of such entities and assumed from the outset that they possess absolute being, a being which, Husserl comments ironically, floats high above the clouds of our cognitive enterprise. An intentional analysis of the stream of our sense experience would have shown Descartes how the world of experience is constituted. It is a being which is always subject to correction; the world as we think of it exists as a presumption justified in relation to our sense experience. It is a world the meaning of whose being comprises an essential relativity. Blindness for the distinctive self-giving role of perception results in a need being felt for inferential argument. He says that all "transcendental-realist theories" undertake to infer an extramental world from an immanent domain of inner experience. Descartes, for instance, had to resort to hypotheses and arguments for the veracity of God to get rid of that relativity and to snatch, as Husserl put it, "the phantom of a transcendent being an sich." He therefore argues that we should see the fallibility of perception, not as a defect, but as constitutive of the nature of its object. The supreme principle of Husserl's epistemology, we heard, is that every case of self-givenness justifies a claim to knowledge, it being understood that the claim in question does not extend its scope beyond the limits of the self-given. What is given must be adequate to what is claimed, for the claim derives its justification or reasonableness (Vernunftcharakter) solely from self-givenness (Ideas, § 136). In perceptions of material objects, however, there is inadequacy because perceptual beliefs are epistemically transcendent: they extend their scope beyond selfgivenness. Fallible perception nonetheless gives us the right to believe, as long as we continue to have perceptual experiences. More strongly put, it would be utterly unreasonable not to do so. Or, as Husserl also puts it, it is an apodictic impossibility to believe that something does not exist while we have a coherent perceptual experience of it (Hua 3 [1950], log). 24 That a situation in which a claim is made allows for the possibility that doubt should arise does not mean that there is now already a legitimate ground for doubt. In fact, doubt could not conceivably arise, if we did not continue to adhere to the principle that perception in general is a justifying ground for belief. For doubt to arise, we have to perceive things which are incompatible with earlier perceptions but which we take to be really perceived. The fallibility of a given perception therefore does not endanger the cognitive worth of perception in general. The point can be made more clearly if we recall what Husserl said about the possibility of cognitive disappointment of an intention in Logical Investigations. We can discover the error of a particular belief—more generally, observe that something is absent—provided that we know the circumstances in which we would see it, if it were there. That means that we accept as undoubtedly existing Husserl l
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the context to which the belief, implicitly or explicitly, refers. If somebody says, "The maple trees on Fairview Avenue are all diseased," it is usually clear from the context where we have to go to find out whether this is true or false. That person may be wrong about the maples, but, if we do not take her to be partly right we will never find out that she was, There are maples on Fairview Avenue; if not, there is at least a street with that name. And as we go to it, we generally recognize it as being the one where the trees were said to be diseased. The same account holds for fallible perceptions, f must be able to walk to a different point of view, namely, the place where I should be able to perceive again the same object, if the given perception is veridical. Here, too, 1 accept as given, and as undoubtedly what it is believed to be, the environment in which the object may be expected to be visible. When [ get there and do not see it, I am convinced that the circumstances are such that I would see the object if it were there. In general, then, discovery of error and the correction and change of belief are possible only by accepting a great many other beliefs as true. If the object of a belief is not where if was claimed to be or if it is different from what was believed—if there is disappointment rather than fulfilment—we fill in the gap, so to speak, with what we find there instead. We thus correct our belief and restore, for the time being, the harmony of our world (cf. Hua 8, 4647). As f pointed out, this implies that an intentional act, in this case a belief with respect to a perceptual object or state of affairs, "co-intends" the location in the world of that object or state of affairs. Husserl calls this aspect of the belief its horizon or Mitmeinimg, an idea already familiar to us from earlier in this chapter. Therefore, although a particular belief may be an error of some sort, we are not trapped in our error as long as we hold on to the supporting belief that there is a context or world which remains sufficiently constant to examine the belief in question. Whenever we find a belief to be in error, we come to it, as it were, from a wider context of accepted belief. Thus any discovered error, no matter how extensive, presupposes what Husserl later called world-belief, which is the assumption that the structure of experience, by virtue of which percipients attain truth in and through doubt and error, will remain. This world-belief is unshakable simply because it is presupposed in every discovery of error (Hua 8, 54). In that sense, the world cannot itself be discovered to be nothing but a drearn. Even if large portions of what we now take to be the world were to turn out to be completely illusory, we believe that we could still establish what the world is really like: there is a world out there that can be further explored to resolve our doubts, however extensive these might: be. This can, of course, also be stated by saying simply that we continue to trust our general capacity to perceive. A belief in the real existence of the world beyond errors is unshakable from the percipient's point of view because to doubt that the world exists is tantamount to doubting whether she herself exists as a percipient being capable of finding truth beyond error. Within the perceptual framework, there is no place for a doubt about that perceptual capacity because it is constitutive of the framework as such. As Husserl himself usually puts it, as long as this structure of perceptual experience continues, the percipient is necessarily certain of the real existence of the world. In the lectures on First 64
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Philosophy, he states emphatically that "nothing speaks for the non-existence of the world and everything speaks for its existence" (Hua 8, 54). All this, however, is no more than an expression of the perceiving subject's point of view; the certainty about there being a real world is constitutive of the percipient's framework and, more strongly still, of the letter's status as percipient. The latter cannot give up this certainty without also losing in her own eyes her status as truth seeker. But Husserl thought that this framework had to be secured against scientific naturalism and other externalist-sceptical attacks. Earlier discussion showed that, according to his epistemology, the basic vulnerability of perception, as of other cognitive acts, lies1 in its failure to examine the cognitive agent. This one-sidedness is to be overcome by the phenomenologist, who asks the perceiver how she arrived at making claims about independently existing objects. What convictions or beliefs support her certainty that in perception she is in touch with material objects? (Alternatively stated, what is the sense of her realism with regard to such objects?) The latter can give part of the answer by becoming more reflective about herself. I take it that, according to Husserl, the phenomenological doctrine about intentions and their fulfilments that he presented in Logical investigations is essentially a formulation of the kind of answer the perceiver would be able to give. But there comes a point where the percipient rests her case. In everything she says to satisfy the epistemologist's questions as to how perception is possible, or what it is like to perceive, she takes for granted the basic capacities and the contexts (or frameworks) in which they can be exercised. Her confidence to be able to overcome possible errors, for example, is due to her ever-present awareness of horizons, in particular, the world as co-intended in her beliefs. We noted that, in explaining her capacity to get beyond linguistic expressions and appearances to grasp a material object in its real being, she assumes that the general structure of her experience will continue to be as she has described it. Yes, she can know on the basis of perception what things are really like, if that assumption continues to be confirmed, i/ she continues to be able to recognize an object as the same, or, at any rate, correct her mistakes and restore the coherence of her world. From Husserl's epistemological perspective, the assumption remains to be examined. It should already be clear that the assumption cannot have an empirical basis because it underlies all empirical inquiry. In relation to all such inquiry, it is a priori, a feature of the conceptual framework underlying such inquiry; it cannot be revised on the basis of the results of such inquiry. That perception can give us knowledge cannot be counted as just another matter of fact because it is constitutive of the framework. Is it then a priori in an absolute sense? The phenomenological epistemologisf turns his attention from the perceiving to the transcendental subject to let the latter, as it were, pronounce on that fundamental assumption which makes percipience a source of knowledge. That is to say, he brings in a framework wider than that of perceptual consciousness but nonetheless comprehending the latter. We accordingly find in Husserl's oeuvre many statements to the effect that the givenness of the world in chains of coherent perceptions does not exclude its nonexistence. Perceptual experience can break up into radical incoherence.
Husserl,
GK
This is not the perceiver reflectively speaking about herself, but it implies a point of view outside the framework of perception, namely, the transcendental point of view. In a merely natural, psychological reflection, a transcendental subject has not yet been identified, but according to Husserl there is a sense in which the perceiver can attain a transcendental point of view. She can take distance with respect to herself and speak about perception from that external standpoint. Husser] often speaks as though the percipient, while still enjoying a generally coherent perceptual experience, can envisage the dissolution of her perceptual experience into a chaos of appearances (e.g., Hua 3, § 46; 8, 53). Or he will say that this is a possibility left open by experience. But when he does, he usually also warns his readers that the belief in the existence of a real world beyond error and mere appearance does not have room for even the slightest suggestion to the contrary, and that the possibility is not one the percipient envisages on the strength of available evidence. The annihilation of the world, mentioned in § 49 of the Ideas, is not a foreseeable or empirically possible catastrophe that we should reckon with. In fact, nothing empirical speaks in favour of the nonexistence of the world (Hua 8, 54). Empirically speaking, the existence of the world is indubitable, because in the face of a generally harmonious experience it is apodictically impossible to believe in the nonexistence of things and the world as a whole. Then again, neither can we empirically demonstrate the existence of an ordered world, since the necessary data are never all in (Hua 3 [195°]. 109). And unless we abandon the empirical stance and resort to construing future data in conformity with our beliefs, for all we know, future data might be utterly chaotic, recalcitrant to any reasonable interpretation. The possibility of nonexistence really exists, but we can see it only from a transcendental point of view. We are told that neither the existence nor the nonexistence of the world is absolutely evident; what is so evident is the possibility of either alternative. But to repeat, it is evident, not to the percipient as such but to the transcendental ego, who can see the possible nonexistence, inasmuch as that ego can see that sense experience can be such that every experiential certainty is repudiated, rather than confirmed, by new experiences. That ego can conceive a course of experience in which it is impossible to hold on to a unity of an experienced world. But that ego can, of course, also see that the structure of my actual experience might, in fact, remain unchanged: although certain things turn out to be mere appearances, in the long run, a unity without change is established (Hua 7, 336-37). It is apparent that we are not to understand this as an affirmation of the traditional metaphysical view regarding contingency of the world, as if Husserl meant to say that, while it is a fact that the world exists, it might not have existed. Husserl calls it an epistemic contingency (Erkenntniskontinge.nz), which he explains as follows: a generally harmonious experience of the world never excludes its nonexistence (Hua 8, 50). Our perceptual certainty with regard to the existence of the world is compatible with the statement that the world is a pure nothing or a transcendental deception (Schein). Neither should Husserl's point be confused with a realist affirmation to the effect that, since the being of entities is independent of the knower, it is logically possible that we might not 66
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have any knowledge whatever. The possibility of such an affirmation has already been eliminated by the transcendental turn and the rejection of metaphysical realism it entails. But what, then, is the being of the world according to transcendental consciousness? As we saw, the epistemologist cannot evade that question. He will begin by acknowledging the percipient's realism as altogether reasonable from such a person's point of view. Given that person's assumption that experience will continue to be as it now is, constantly confirming the belief in a real world beyond appearance and error, the world can indeed be said to exist. In his phenomenological descriptions, the epistemologist will acknowledge that this is so, but this must not be taken to indicate that he endorses its realism from his own standpoint. Speaking from the point of view of absolute consciousness, the epistemologist himself can assert only that the world exists, while adding an important qualification. His complete answer is this: the world exists as the correlate of a consciousness that has the specific structure actually displayed in our perceptual experience of the world. In Ideas, we read that its being or reality (WirkHchkeit) is only "presumptive" (Hua 3/1, § 46). A few pages later, he affirms that the entire spatiotemporal world has only intentional being, in the sense that it has only the secondary, relative kind of being which is typical of a "being for a consciousness." Its being, according to Husserl, is posited by consciousness. The idea that an entity might possess this being also outside consciousness is roundly declared to be absurd: The whole spatio-temporal world in which man and the human ego claim to belong as subordinate singular realities, is according to its own meaning (Sinn) mere intentional being, a being, therefore, which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being which consciousness in its own experiences posits, and is, in principle, intuitable and determinable only as the element common to manifolds of motivated experiences, but over and beyond this it is just nothing at all. (Hua 3/1, 106 (ID I, H2) 2 5 One can give a paradoxical twist to this and say that the absolute being of the world is its being relative to a specific form of consciousness. Moreover, in the terms of Husserl's general theory of knowledge, this statement is evident, indeed, completely justified. Empirical statements have a scope such that they are never fully justified: the real world always extends beyond what we see of it. The transcendental epistemologist, however, does not directly address entities in the empirical world. From a point of view outside the actual world, he speaks of structures and meanings. In perceptual experience, complete givenness is sought but never attained. It is rather an Idea in the Kantian sense: something which it makes sense to continue to seek but which is, by nature, unattainable. Only the Idea as an essence can be clearly and completely given, because it is accessible to the transcendental subject. The search for empirical knowledge is motivated by a realist conviction: the world to be known is surely there, even if we know it only incompletely and in a fallible manner. This conviction, according to Husserl, is a reasonable one, given the fact that the truth seeker makes the assumption that our ability to rise above appearance and error cannot be frustrated by any possible course of Husserll
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experience. We are not aware of that assumption, which makes for the "positivity" of empirical claims to knowledge. But Husserl's theory of knowledge requires that the search for knowledge should not merely assume the reliability of certain given capacities for knowledge—in this case, perception—but become reflective. And the demand for reflection, as we have seen, eventually leads to transcendental-phenomcnological epochs. The realism of perception, then, is due to its one-sidedness, its failure to inquire into its own transcendental conditions. Only by being complemented and corrected by the transcendental view can it be elevated to the status of real knowledge.
Knowledge of Essences Experience in the customary sense posits what is individual—i.e., what exists at a particular time in a particular place—but what is so posited has a content (Realitcitsgehalt) which could exist at another time in another place, where it might characterize a numerically different individual. In other words, the object of experience is the factual exemplification of a conceptual content that could have other exemplifications. Everything actually existent—i.e., existing in the mode of individuality or factuality—has a whatness of which the existent is an actual case or exemplification. In ordinary sense experience, cognitive interest tends to be focused on the individual, but Husserl holds that it can be focused on that whatness, which thus becomes an object of a distinctive cognitive inquiry, namely, the desire to see it in the sense Husserl's general theory of knowledge has specified. This whatness may be taken as comprising only an abstract or general property of an individual existent, for example, tone, colour, shape, or size. But we can also conceive a whatness that is nothing short of the "full concretion" of an existent individual. The latter is then the one and only exemplification of that whatness, but it is for all that to be distinguished from it, inasmuch as that same concrete essence might be exemplified in some world other than this actual one. When things undergo change, they do so by exchanging whatnesses; when in spite of change they remain essentially the same, they last by virtue of exemplifying the same whatness or character throughout. In the former case, the individual thing possesses whatnesses due to circumstances (accidentally, as Aristotle said); in the latter, essentially—i.e., regardless of circumstances. This is how Husserl began his discussion of essences in paragraph two of Ideas I. He spoke of essences, rather than whatnesses or properties; he also frequently used Plato's Greek word eidos, from which he formed the adjective "eidetic." In distinctively Husserlian language, that red is a colour and justice a virtue are two eidetic states of affairs. Redness and justice are essences, i.e., objects about which we can gain knowledge. While other philosophers use in this connection the term "concept," speaking of propositions that can be seen to be true by virtue of the concepts involved, Husserl generally avoids such terminology for fear of psychologism. He also did not speak of seeing something to be true by virtue of the meanings of the words involved because, according to his theory of knowledge, when we see a statement or proposition to be true, 68
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our minds are directed upon eidetic states of affairs rather than the words used or their meanings (Hua 17, 65-66 [FTL 60-61]). In the following exposition, I shall nonetheless make use of some of this alternative vocabulary, including the term "universal." According to Husserl, essences are objects, just as individual entities are objects. When we talk about individuals, we understand them as having certain properties, but as already noted, Husserl's distinctive doctrine is that we can likewise talk about properties as such, or concepts as such, although such talk implies what one might call a shift of cognitive interest. Talking about a property as such is to ignore the empirical question of whether there exist individual things exemplifying it. We can in fact come to know certain things that are true of properties, even if no actual individuals exist that have them. Similarly, when we talk about a concept as such, we may not at all be concerned about whether there actually are things that may be subsumed under that concept. Essences (Husserl's preferred term) are to be recognized as objects because, as he says, we recognize truths that pertain to them as such, propositions that remain true wherever or whenever they are exemplified, if exemplified at all (Hua 19/1, 106, 124-25 [LI, 330, 348-49]). Therefore, if statements about essences are true, they are necessarily true, unlike those whose truth depends on contingent matters of fact. Traditional philosophy spoke here of truths of reason or a priori truths. They were considered truths of reason because it was thought that we gain such truths from a source other than sense perception. That they are a priori means that we do not apprehend them as a result of empirical knowledge. We have already seen that Husserl's epistemology has no difficulty accommodating such objects. He interpreted the epistemic situation of something's being evident to someone, and thus being justifiably believable, in a functional way. The evident was thus characterized in terms of the role it plays in a given context or framework of experience. In each context, there are cognitive situations which perform the role of justifying beliefs or statements about the objects that belong to it and modes of criticizing them. In the framework of spatiotemporal particulars, justification is typically found in perceptions; in that of essences, however, the role of justifying belief is performed by a nonsensuous awareness. Given his general theory of knowledge and the obviously technical use of the term, it is perfectly in order to talk about seeing essences. But already in the second of the Logical Investigations, he warns his readers that he does not want to be taken as one who embraces a Platonic realism with regard to so-called ideal objects (Hua 19/1, 127 [LI, 350]). The mistakes of such a view, he notes, have been pointed out long ago, so that it calls for no further consideration. In view of the importance I have given to the position of realism, this passage cannot be overlooked, as it often is when his antipsychologism is taken to be tantamount to Platonism. 26 But as we will see, the fact that essences or universals are not mental in nature does not entail that they exist independently of the mind. Husserl certainly held the view that universality or generality is an irreducible feature of experience. But the fact that we subsume particulars under general concepts does not reflect, as Plato thought, a reality where particulars participate in Forms altogether independently of a mind. Because the latter held this view, he is considered a realist with respect to universals. From Husserl
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a point of view such as his, to call something a horse amounts to the recognition that that particular participates in the Form called horseness. While a locution such as "subsuming something under a concept" suggests that we do something to it, namely, that we classify it, a realist would claim that the locution is, to that extent, misleading. It would be better to speak of "recognizing something as falling under a concept," for he would hold that applying the concept is simply a matter of getting in touch with an entity which in its individual existence exemplifies the property of being a horse, or exists as a member of the kind Horse. To be sure, Husserl uses Platonic terminology, in particular the term eidos, and he does on occasion speak of particulars participating in an eidos. But this should not cause us to overlook the fundamental difference in the position of the two philosophers. As Husserl puts it in his Experience and Judgment: Despite all the Platonic turns of phrase by which we have described its relation to the particular, the ideality of the universal must not: be understood as if it were a question here of a being-in-itself devoid of reference to any subject. On the contrary, like all objectivities of understanding, it refers essentially to the processes of productive spontaneity which belong to it correlatively and in which it comes to original givenness. The being of the universal in its different levels is essentially a being-constituted in these processes. (397 [EJ, 33o]) 27 This passage clearly reflects the transcendental position which we examined earlier. The idea of production entails that essences or universals would not exist, if absolute consciousness did not exist. According to Husserl, then, using concepts is not an activity of grasping entities which in their very own existence already exemplify properties and belong to species or kinds, but rather of creating such a reality. He would have it that using concepts is like constituting new objects. We create (schopfen) essences out of what is individual (Hua 17, 220 [FTL, 212]). They would not exist if mental activities did not create them. 28 In spite of appearances, Husserl's position is closer to that of Kant. It is noteworthy that the Kantian distinction between receptivity and spontaneity or activity is found throughout the work from which I just quoted, a work which is specially devoted to the genealogy of ideal objects. 29 Forms or conceptual unities (using Kantian rather than Husserlian language) are introduced into experience by the mind. The passage just cited is from a text of the later Husserl, 30 but it should be borne in mind that his well-known argument against the nominalism of the British empiricists in the second of his Logical Investigations has a rather conceptualist conclusion, namely, that universality is to be recognized as an irreducible feature of our experience. He argues, as Kant also did, that there is no experience of objects without conceptualization. But that does not mean that there is a reality an sich corresponding to our conceptualization. What gives Husserl's doctrine a realist tone is his vigorous defence of the thesis that universals or essences are objects. To identify them with the mental activities to which they owe their existence would be psychologism (Hua 19/2, 665-70 [LI, 780-84]), a view he espoused in his early Philosophy of Arithmetic. Neither a state of affairs (Sachverhalt) nor a judgment (in the objective, logical 70
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sense of proposition) is the same thing as the predicative act of subsuming objects under concepts. To apprehend a state of affairs as such, he writes, we need not reflect on this predicative act. Husserl's talk of seeing essences themselves and of beliefs that are justified by their givenness is, of course, a strong invitation to a realist interpretation, but in the preceding chapter I have already suggested reasons to decline it. It is clear that the doctrine that essences are objects is altogether compatible with Husserl's transcendentalism. When he wrote Logical Investigations, this transcendentalism had not yet been explicitly formulated, but from the first book of Ideas we can see that both are represented side by side. His view with regard to essences merely amounts to saying that there are contexts of thought or conceptual frameworks in which essences function as objects, just as there are conceptual frameworks in which individuals function as objects of our predominant interest. Although frameworks or object domains are distinct from one another, according to Husserl, they are also related. Within the total context of experience, one framework arises from another; in his technical language, one is founded upon another. What gives rise to a new and distinctive domain is the ever-present power of objectification. Thus sense particulars are transformed into states of affairs. And by a shift of cognitive interest, particular states of affairs, which involve sense particulars, are transformed into those which involve only universals or essences. Whereas ordinary sense perceptions are first level and apparently apprehend their object without support: from cognitively prior acts, there are higher level acts which presuppose ordinary perceptions (with their corresponding objects) but also go beyond them to constitute a new object, namely, a state of affairs. In the latter, a particular object is taken as exemplifying a property or standing in a relation; alternatively, as belonging to a general kind. Higher level acts constitute new objects, but they can do so only by presupposing lower level acts that already have their own distinct objects. He therefore granted to spatiotemporal particulars an ontic priority (Seinsvorzug), as he expressly stated in Formal and Transcendental Logic (Hua 17, 177 [FTL, 168]). The higher level act is not conceivable without the first-level act upon which it is accordingly said to be founded. This relation of dependence is not contingent but necessary." A singular predication, such as "This paper is white," is inconceivable without an underlying perception, inasmuch as it says something about a perceived object. As Husserl puts it, the perceptual object is included within the state of affairs, although it now plays a new role, i.e., that of an individual existent exemplifying a property. As I read him, Husserl holds that perceptions posit their objects as particular through and through, whereas predicative statements introduce a universal as the property of a particular entity. While the cognitive interest of the person who makes the statement is still focused on the particular, she is implicitly aware that, without affecting the truth of what she says at the time, she can apply the same predicate term to other objects. She is aware that "red" is a predicate applicable to many possible individuals (Hua 19/1, 151-54 [LI, 371-73]).)2 And this awareness of an identity in spite of difference, according to Husserl, suggests to the knower that she can shift her cognitive interest from the perceived object, which she has till now taken to be an actually Husserl
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existing particular, to the property as such, objectifying it in order to inquire, without further interest in actually existing particulars, what is true of this object. The capacity to thematize a universal is also manifest in statements about all As, some As, or some A or other. Here universality belongs to "the form of the act itself" (Hua 19/1, 151-54 [LI, 371-73]). An act of that form "relates itself to each member of the extension through its 'content,'" "not in a real but in an ideal, logical manner." All As are here "conceptually presented," i.e., by whatever conceptual content A stands for (Hua 19/1 183 [LI, 397]). What Husserl clearly has in mind is an extension or class specified, not by actual enumeration or itemization, but by a concept (Erfahrung und Urteil |EJ], §§ 43d and 62). 3i Such a class may nonetheless be spoken of as having an intrinsic unity because all possible As are, so to speak, tied together in a conceptual unity. No possible member of it can fail to have whatever character A stands for. In a similar vein, he argues that a statement about some As cannot be identified with a sum of acts in each of which a single A is pointed out or named, or with an act of enumeration in which we collect into a group the items enumerated. If in a certain situation some As are in fact given, the statement we make may in effect be such that we cannot identify these As, either singly or as a group, with what we refer to in expressions of the form "some As." The indefiniteness or generality of the reference is in such a case an essential feature of the reference itself. In all such cases, we do not point to or enumerate individuals, but we refer to them by means of the concept symbolized by A. They are conceptual objects, i.e., objects referred to as falling under a specific concept, as possible but not as actually existent. A class so specified will obviously not be affected by the nonexistence of actually existing members. A "purely conceptual extension" may be empty in the sense of not having any actually existing members, but given the specific cognitive interest in essences, it is none the worse for that. When in a subject-predicate statement we subsume a particular under a concept, the cognitive interest in actually existing particulars is still alive. It continues to be alive when we corne to make general statements about classes of things or events, as in empirical inquiry. Here concepts are employed, but the concepts in question are intended to have application to what we find in such inquiry. We speak about all or some individual objects by using concepts, but the latter are emphatically treated as empirical. That means that we here generalize about what actually exists, so that, if our statements are to be true, they must draw their justification from actual matters of fact. If A stands for an empirical concept, a claim about all As will be defeated by experiences that contradict it. There are, however, categorial acts in which this cognitive interest in what actually exists has altogether lapsed. In such a case, as Husserl puts it, the objects of the founding acts do not enter into the intention of the founded act (Hua ig/ 2, 690 [LI 799-800]). To put it more epistemologically, the experience on the basis of which we became acquainted with those objects does not play a justificatory role with respect to the founded act. What counts for the justification of this latter act is the concept as such, not the time or the circumstances in which we acquired it. It is an act directed upon conceptual relations and draws its justification from the understanding of the concepts involved, however or when72 Phenomenological hpistemology
ever these may have been acquired. As a consequence of this shift of cognitive interest, observation and perception cease to be decisive in regard to the cognitive claims and their justification. The question of whether a property is in actual fact instantiated, and not merely imagined as such, lapses for lack of cognitive interest. What may in fact be perceived functions only as an example or illustration of the kind of thing we want to know. Hence, an imagined situation would do just as well, as Husserl frequently points out. We might say that, when we are interested in a kind as such, wanting to know the concepts defining it, we are ipso facto no longer pursuing an interest, on other occasions lively enough, in the question of whether there are individuals in space and time which, in fact, exemplify that kind. Such an act accordingly speaks of possible objects, i.e., objects conceived of as being of a certain kind or as exemplifying a certain property. Now we already noted that, according to Husserl, in predicating, a person is aware that the same thing she now predicates of a given particular might be predicated of other particulars. She has a sense of something that is possibly true of other particulars as well as the one now before her. What is that something? What is it to be an F? This predicated property may be understood simply as the meaning of a word or a string of words, but in such a case that property is far from being self-given as an object in its own right, ft may also be assumed to be a property exemplified in the actual world, in which case the inquiry is factual or empirical. But when knowledge of a pure essence becomes the aim of an inquiry, the important question is this: can the cognizer get into a cognitive position to make a justified claim about that which she initially predicated of a particular and was prepared to predicate of other particulars as well? How can one come to see the concept as an object in its own right? As we saw, if such a concept is to gain the status of an object in its own right, there must be statements which arguably refer to such an object and predicate of it something we can see to be true of it. One might want to say that what is at issue is the content of concepts, but since Husserl's discussion has in mind the objectification of concepts, it is better to speak here of objects, provided we keep in mind that these are objects viewed purely as determined by concepts; they are, as Husserl occasionally calls them, purely conceptual objects (Begriffsgegenstande).M34 Now let us return to a point already noted more than once, namely, that when we apply a concept to a particular object (let's call it F), we can redirect our cognitive interest in such a manner as to objectify the concept and ask what precisely it contains: what it is to be an F? In our actual experience, however, this conceptual content does not present itself as an object by itself. Most of the time it is not at all an object but a way of characterizing an object by mentioning one of its properties. As such, it is conjoined with all the other things we can say about that particular object. In traditional Aristotelian terminology, any substance always has both accidental and essential properties, but we usually apply concepts without carefully distinguishing them into empirical and essential ones. What, then, is it to be an F? To find an answer, one looks for other things we are inclined to call F, noting what generally accrues to an object by virtue of being an F. Thus we discover what may be the empirical concept of F, allowing Husserl
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us to claim what (presumably) all Fs are like. But the properties unified by an empirical concept do not necessarily form a unity among themselves. In that case, we say that the complex of properties which forms the unity of its content is contingent, meaning that in worlds other than this one they do not come together. Even if it continues to be exemplified as a unity throughout perceptual experience, it is still only a unity a posteriori. At best, it designates a certain state of our actual world. If there is such a thing as a pure essence, however, it is supposed to be an object such that what is true of it is so independent of sense experience (which I shall here take to include memory and introspection). Otherwise, we have nothing but a thernatization of an empirical concept. A triangle is a rectilinear figure of two dimensions in all worlds in which triangles exist, but an apple presumably forms a unity of properties only in the actual world. Essences, which are to be conceived of as pure, i.e., nonempirical kinds or species, exist in all possible worlds, even in those in which they are unexemplified. Initially, however, empirical and pure concepts are presented to us as concepts we apply in experience to particular entities or processes without clearly distinguishing them from one another. Since the latter do not offer themselves to us in their purity, they have to be freed, as Husserl puts it, from the admixture of empirical circumstances. To gain knowledge of essences, then, is a matter of trying to discern clusters of properties that do not come together merely by virtue of empirical, contingent circumstances, that do not simply come together in the contingent being of entities in the actual world, but belong together by necessity. How can we come to see essences for what they are in their own right? Pure concepts or essences represent properties that are necessarily conjoined with one another, for example, the properties of being red and being coloured, being coloured and being extended. Properties are related to one another necessarily. They also necessarily exclude others: the property of being a colour, for example, excludes the property of being a prime number. The knowledge attainable with respect to such essences is said to be a priori, because we do not expect justification for our belief from further experience. How do our eidetic beliefs get justification? As Husserl argues, particular objects always present themselves as examples of kinds, and as falling under concepts. Every new thing we meet presents itself within a horizon of antecedent familiarity. A concept, therefore, is familiar to us from the outset as invariant relative to a multiplicity of examples, as an identity in differences. But as noted just now, the epistemological question is: which of them can be objectified and known us essences? When a concept word gets applied to a particular in a concrete situation, it is not yet apparent precisely what it includes and what it excludes. The purely conceptual unity lacks sharp distinction from accidental, contingent unity. To see clearly what belongs to it requires inspection of different examples so as to find out what it captures in the various applications of the concept. Exemplifications of concepts can, of course, be found in experience without having to search for them very strenuously. But as the empirical search for knowledge makes abundantly clear, we also at times deliberately seek out further examples. In empirical science, the search for examples is tantamount to the 74
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search for observations of a suitably important kind. In the search for essences, as distinct from empirical concepts, the deliberate element in the search for examples is further accentuated. Given this direction of our cognitive interest, we no longer are content with what experience in the usual sense can offer us. The truths sought are not supposed to be peculiar to the world in which we actually live. The conjunctions of properties sought are supposed to persist through all possible worlds. To free ourselves of the merely empirical, Husserl recommends that we use "free, imaginative variation of examples." i5 In some respects, it is a method as old as the Platonic-Socratic search for Forms free from the admixture of temporal accident and circumstance. As Plato already suggested, it is also the method followed by the geometer in his study of spatial configurations. But the most important thing to note is that it is the method Husserl himself used in his phenomenological inquiries, as many texts in Logical Investigations and other works show. Although it shows obvious affinities with induction, the method differs from empirical research in that we seek examples without restricting ourselves to what ordinary experience shows to be the case. From the outset, we take leave from perception in that we do not take any particular to be an actual existent in the world. Therefore, the sameness envisaged in an imaginative variation of examples is not that of an individual object which, like an Aristotelian substance, remains the same in spite of change, but rather a property, or a complex of properties, that is recognized as the same in all exemplifications and would be recognized in any further examples. We take an individual object, then, to be merely an exemplification of a concept or a group of concepts. But, given that we seek knowledge of a concept or essence, an imagined particular can just as well serve as our initial example of being an F as an actually perceived one. Its characteristic matrix of operations is the imagination, the realm of the conceivable. In a discussion of the essence of materiality, Husserl notes (Hua 3/1, 345 [ID I, 356—57]), we freely imagine winged horses, white ravens, and golden mountains, because these are clearly objects of a material kind, though absent from the actual world. We "play ball with known physical properties and laws about them," imagining what are, from the point of view of present-day science, the most incredible monstrosities (Hua 5, 29!'.). Having at the outset what we take to be an example of an F, we try to conceive how this example might be different while nonetheless being an exemplification of F. What would a particular have to be by virtue of being an F? The Fs are what Husserl calls empty possibilities because they have no relation to present fact. The various Fs do not have to fit together to make up a unified world; they need to lit together only as exemplifications of the same concept F. Furthermore, the extension of Fs is not an arbitrary plurality of Fs already given or enumerated in some way or other, but the infinity of possible particulars falling under that concept. The totality of Fs is conceptually presented, rather than by enumeration or itemization. The variation of examples can. in principle, always be continued, although in actual fact we have to stop at some point. But the examples actually produced on a given occasion are, rightly or wrongly, taken to be merely a sample of what Husserl
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a seeker for essences could produce, if he so decided. In any event, that which we recognize as the same in all examples is the essence, which, in Husserl's terminology, can then be objectified and seen for what it is. In sum, the conceptual content, we already envisaged in our use of the corresponding predicate term we now recognize as being the same as this objective essence. What we have here are "material" essences (sachhaltige Wesen); each constitutes a kind of object (using this latter term in the broadest sense), for example, material thing, spatial extension, redness, colour, sound. Husserl envisaged many more essences and entire sciences dealing \vith them—e.g., an ontology of nature—but, as noted, phenomenology itself is also eidetic in its procedure. Many of Husserl's texts, but particularly his Logical Investigations, clearly show how diligently he explored conceivabilities in order to scrutinize examples before he ventured to come up with a conclusion with respect to essences such as those of perception, memory, imagination, judgment, and relations that hold between them. All essences are objects in their own right, which is to say, according to Husserl, that statements about them can be evaluated as true or false. If true, such statements are necessarily true or apodictic, e.g., that a cube is a shape or that beliefs have intentionality. Since the propositions involved are true no matter what, we can in principle always, as it were, come back to them to reevaluate the statements we earlier made about them. Needless to say, such statements are no more beyond criticism than any others. One may be charged with having envisaged too few examples, so that as a consequence one has included in an essence what is a feature of some of its exemplifications but not part of the essence in its purity. The charge would be that we have not yet completely freed ourselves from empirical presuppositions. Husserl would then say that we can and should continue the variation of examples in order to correct such errors. There is no doubt, as he might add, that we can free ourselves of empirical assumptions; eidetic insight is attainable. There is thus, according to Husserl, knowledge of essences, which he called ontology, either formal or regional. Just as in the case of empirical knowledge, Husserl argues for a transcendental-epistemological critique of eidetic knowledge. A cognitive inquiry directed upon essences cannot be regarded as yielding genuine knowledge without such a critique, for it is object oriented and therefore one-sided or positive. It takes for granted that we have a certain cognitive faculty, namely, the faculty to apprehend the essential structures of reality, but this remains only an assumption, not even recognized as such. And in regard to eidetic knowledge, psychologism is a particularly tempting error. The naive ontologist is like those whom Kant reproached for thinking that concepts as such can be used by human reason to attain insight into the nature of things in themselves. It: is therefore no surprise that Husserl is not prepared to let such ontology have the last word. As I said previously in this chapter, the dynamic of the search for knowledge includes a transcendental thematization of the subject of knowledge. Mere ontology tempts us to think that essences have real being in the way the Platonic tradition saw it, that necessity and possibility are real features of reality. The necessity inherent in essences, in Husserl's view, cannot be left in its de re formulation. An ontologist innocent of transcendental philosophy might
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make such a claim, but Husserl would call it dogmatic. De re necessity has to be reduced to a feature of transcendental consciousness. A transcendental critique shows the possibility of knowledge of objects, whether particulars or universals, by a reflective thematization of the subjectobject relation in a broadly Kantian perspective. In Husserl's interpretation of it, this thematization, of course, involves the phenomenological reduction, which is to say that objects undergo the peculiar modification by virtue of which they are henceforth specified as meanings, as correlates of transcendental consciousness. Now if a transcendental reflection considers how the object is related to the subject or, alternatively, how the object is constituted in the subject, then this discussion of how we acquire knowledge of essences is certainly part of this transcendental account. The justification of our beliefs about essences as objects is to be discussed in correlation with specific forms of consciousness. That is why in telling that story Husserl gives so much emphasis to the fact that one really can free oneself from presuppositions pertaining to the actual world, vary this world within the limits of conceivability, and thus apprehend something that has being in all possible worlds and thus represents an indefeasible rule of experience. But while this demonstrates the possibility of knowledge of such objects, it also shows, in opposition to realist claims with regard to universals, that the necessity of essences is really nothing more than a reflection of indefeasible rules inherent in transcendental consciousness. According to the presentation of his doctrine, for example, in the final paragraphs of the Ideas, the would-be objective essences are to be reinterpreted as essential structures of consciousness. Essences, to be sure, are not objects falling within the scope of empirical inquiry; the concepts of essences are not general concepts whose justification must come from being verified by experience. But that does not mean that their justification is based on rational insight into the nature of things. Husserl is not a realist with respect to universals. According to him, their validity is derived from consciousness. As I noted at the beginning of this section, it is a position nearer to Kant than to Plato. For Kant, too, it will be recalled from my discussion in chapter i, concepts, in particular those which are a priori, are rules for combination or synthesis; and such combination "does not lie in objects, but is an affair of the understanding alone" (Critique, 6135). What seems to be distinctive of Husserl is his more resolute and explicit doctrine that objectified concepts function in our pretranscendental experience as objects. The consciousness in correlation with which essences are described cannot be a subject defined in empirical, psychological terms. We cannot define essences in terms that reflect the way the world is actually experienced in perception and science, which are matters of fact accessible to an empirical psychology. Psychologism represents the position that consciousness is part of the actual world accessible to science. As he argued with special cogency in his Formal and Transcendental Logic, psychologism is a particularly attractive theory with respect to higher order objects such as universals, since such objects admittedly do not exist in space and time. In fact, as we saw, Husserl himself rejected realism with respect to universals and held that in some sense or other they are constructed Husserl
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by the mind. As I formulated Husseii's position, such objects would not exist if there were no mental activities. The last battle to be fought by a Husserlian epistemologist is about the mind or consciousness.
The Problem of History What I want to discuss in this final section of the chapter are epistemological issues connected with what in Husserlian scholarship is known as the contrast between static and genetic phenomenology. The later Husserl, it is said, shifted his emphasis to matters of history, development, and process. 36 What implications did this have for his epistemology? What we have seen thus far is that Husserl's theory of knowledge was transcendental. What he saw as the fundamental dynamic of the search for knowledge must eventually turn to the transcendental conditions that make possible purely object-oriented forms of inquiry, whether empirical or a priori, if the search for knowledge is to be made secure against such sceptical attacks as come from natural science and psychology. But as Husserl was aware, there is also the threat of historicism, a phenomenon particularly well represented in nineteenthcentury German thought, and historical relativism is, of course, also an epistemological issue. He addressed it in his characteristic thoroughness, most ambitiously toward the very end of his life, in a work that remained unfinished but was nonetheless published, for the most part posthumously, as The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy. The best way to sketch this phase of Husserl's epistemological thought is to return to the idea of a conceptual framework. As the term suggests, a framework has a certain stability in relation to the activities made possible by it. It could not play its transcendental role if it did not have a more or less fixed structure. That structure comprises, as I put it, an implicit ontology and epistemology, roughly a systematic correlation of subject and object. That is to say, a given framework is one in which certain kinds or categories of objects are recognized as existing and as correlative with the epistemic situation in which they become known. Relative to particular perceptions, for example, the framework correlating material objects to sense perception has to remain fixed if it is to function as their transcendental condition. Another way of making the same point, a framework is intrinsically a priori relative to an a posteriori. A framework, however, can also be considered from a point of view outside it, as when we talk about it in a philosophical discussion such as the present one. We might consider questions about its origin, about the way it developed, and so on. These considerations are obviously genetic, in a fairly straightforward sense of that term. In other words, a phenomenology of a framework is static or genetic, depending on the sorts of questions that are dealt with. A framework appears stable, unchanging, ready-made, from the point of view of those who do not think about it but use it to form beliefs about what they encounter in their experience; it will also appear stable and unchanging to a phenomenologist who wants to describe it from the user's point of vantage. To an external critic,
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however, it may appear as a peculiar product of history, something that came to be in a certain way and, if it is an everyday sort of framework like Freudianism, may, in fact, some day pass away. As Husserl portrays the search for truth, it always begins within a framework, a context of meaning with its unconsciously made assumptions. As the search progresses, however, critical questions about the framework arise—for example, those of radical scepticism—and to confront those questions, we adopt an external point of view. Its underlying assumptions are made explicit, and examined. But to consider a framework from a critical point of view, it first has to be thoroughly understood. In fact, this phenomenological understanding has to be more profound and systematic than that of the average nonphilosophical person who works with it. We thus noticed in Husserl, on the one hand, a concern to describe a framework and, on the other, a concern to critique and/or defend it from a point of view not sharing its assumptions. Perceptual consciousness was meticulously described and then subjected to an evaluation from a nonperceptual point of view, which was called transcendental. From the latter point of view, the perceptual world appeared as a product rather than as something already in place. Essences were described and an apparently realist view of them was defended, as in the first volume of Logical Investigations, but that view was later subjected to a transcendental evaluation, most clearly in Formal and Transcendental Logic. Briefly put, the transcendental point of view considers everything in terms of an absolute consciousness, which is not part of the world, but comprises the entire world within itself. This transcendental-phenomenological framework of absolute consciousness, indeed, claims to be more than a framework: it claims to be the truth about being. Let's think of the distinctively genetic or historical question as being addressed to this supposedly absolute framework: Whence does it originate? The transcendental subject may well be startled by this question, but in any event she will begin to wonder whether she is indeed a product of historical development. In that case, her supposedly absolute standpoint would be reduced to a mere historical point of view. Each statement would have to be indexed with reference to the historical period in which it was uttered. And that amounts to the threat of historical relativism. Can Husserl secure the search for truth in the face of this threat? I think that the salient features of Husserl's position on this point can be made clear by a study of "On the Origin of Geometry," published as an appendix to the main text of Crisis. The text is clearly intended to illustrate the relation between a cognitive situation and its historical background. I should begin by quoting the passage that announces in a general way the epistemological position which is to be argued. It reads as follows: The ruling dogma of the separation in principle between epistemological clarification (Aufklarung) and historical, even humanistic-psychological explanation (Erklaruny), between epistemological and genetic origin, is fundamentally mistaken, unless one inadmissibly limits, as is customary, the concepts of "history," "historical explanation," and "genesis." (Hua 6, 379 [C, 370])
Husserl
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It is a remarkable statement in the light of HusseiTs earlier views on the subject of the relationship between epistemology and historicisrn, particularly those expressed in Philosophy as a Rigorous Science (1911). He had then categorically rejected matters of history as having any relevance for epistemology. It is important to note, however, that there was not a basic change in his position. As we can already see from the passage just cited, he dissociates himself from the usual sense of the terms "history" and "historical explanation." Clearly, if that sense were adhered to, epistemology and history would still be held to be incompatible. In stating the importance of historical origins for epistemology, he does not conceive history as a purely empirical, contingent process which might very well run its course without those who are caught up in it knowing anything about it. If our cognitive achievements were to be embedded in an environment external to themselves, it is hard to see how that environment could strengthen our confidence in those achievements. Neither can it be a history presided over by a World Spirit heedless of our cognitive efforts, for that would also be external to our consciousness. In the essay I want to discuss, we hear that the history from which our cognitions arise must be understood as an internal history. This idea, too, is not at all foreign to the train of epistemological thought we have discussed. From the very beginning of my account of Husserl's theory of knowledge, it was clear that the distinctively cognitive status of a belief came from its history or origin. In the last analysis, it has status because of its origin in transcendental consciousness. What is new is the idea of relating this consciousness itself to some kind of history. What is crucial to his new theory is the fact that this origin is internal (in the sense of being cognitivcly accessible). How a belief arises is a story that can, in principle, be told by a sufficiently reflective knower, who is the transcendental philosopher. "On the Origin of Geometry" seems to be about the situation of a geometer working within the age-old tradition of geometry and coming up with a new insight. The question Husserl pursues has to do with the cognitive dimensions of such a person's situation in the history of geometry, but 1 take it that the question is really more general. 1 shall here interpret the essay as a geneticphenomenological clarification of a typical cognitive situation, which Husserl wants to illustrate by the situation of the geometer. Husserl's interest is clearly transcendentalist in its focus on the question, "How is a geometrical insight possible?" But the formulation of the answer is significantly different from what we have thus far encountered. Instead of talking explicitly about transcendental beliefs or forms of consciousness that enable us to have knowledge, Husserl talks about the role of tradition in cognitive practice. A practising geometer can have knowledge because she stands in a tradition of geometrical thought. It is clear that Husserl now speaks of tradition as performing a role similar to that which he earlier simply assigned to transcendental consciousness, namely, that of being a necessary condition for the possibility of a cognitive act. He does not repudiate transcendental consciousness, but he adds the historical dimension to the transcendental point of view. In a sense to be clarified in the essay under discussion, that consciousness bears within itself the transcendental conditions of knowledge in the form of tradition or historical
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acquisition. Consequently, the philosophical reflection that is needed to uncover such conditions will now have to include a consideration of history. As Husserl's account of the geometer implies, if we did not leave the past behind us, we would not ever be able to come up with a new insight. We would waste our energies in rediscovering, reinventing, reenactment (nachvolhieheri). But it is also true that such new insights could not be born if we did not take the past with us as acquisition, as capacities, mastered practices, skills and habits, on the one hand, and as propositions, handed-down belief content, on the other. Within the cognitive subject, acquisition takes the form of capacities and competencies, on the strength of which a cognitive agent at a later time can do what is required to apprehend something new, something that is evident to us by virtue of our capacities and competencies. If the past were simply lost, we would confront experience as Kant thought we would confront intuitions if we did not have the categories of the understanding. "On the Origin of Geometry" emphasizes the distance that is constantly being created between a geometer's new insights—for example, some ancient Greek's "primal establishment" (Urstiftung, Hua 6, 366 [C, 354]) of the science of geometry—and those who later follow in her tradition and make use of her insights to arrive at their own. Acquisitions are, in that sense, modifications of the selfgivenness of the evident. The evident becomes something, the truth of which is later simply taken for granted, which is available only in linguistic form, written marks on paper—expressions for which the original meaning is sometimes a matter of uncertain interpretation. And since tradition is a process involving many contingent factors of history—e.g., the state of preservation of ancient manuscripts in dead languages—a "primal establishment" may not be preserved by tradition without distortion of one kind or another. The emphasis put on modification serves Husserl to prepare the ground for his contention that it is something that must be eliminated in reenactment or re-creation. To be sure, competence in a cognitive practice such as geometry does not depend on such reenactment. The ordinary practising geometer—who represents, I take it, every ordinary knower—gets along well enough without reenacting past history. In fact, as stated a while back, re-creation would have an altogether disabling effect on the geometer's performance of her work. If she did try, she would never make any progress in her particular pursuit of mathematical truth. But it is also true that geometry cannot become genuine knowledge, in Husserl's sense, without being raised above the level of mere technical competence. In the terms familiar to us from the preceding discussion, sciences cannot get along without assumptions, but if they are to attain the status of genuine knowledge, those assumptions have to be recognized and examined, a task that can be undertaken only by transcendental epistemology. The beliefs of the earliest geometer must therefore be formed again (nachvoUziehen) and, of course, on the same grounds that originally justified them. The habits of thought that have been acquired by a mathematician in training, being recommended to her as the paradigmatic way to think, which, of course, made that person a competent mathematician, have to be scrutinized as to how they themselves were originally devised.
Husserl
8J
From an epistemological point of view, then, the distance is unsatisfactory; those insights that cons