Ought, Time, and the Deontic Paradoxes

Ought, Time, and the Deontic Paradoxes Hector-Neri Castaneda The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, No. 12. (Dec., 1977), pp. 775-791. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28197712%2974%3A12%3C775%3AOTATDP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J The Journal of Philosophy is currently published by Journal of Philosophy, Inc..

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must show that it was created by a rightful action. Chains of vindication are thus historical or temporally sequential in form. Finally, however, there is a significant caveat which must be entered with regard to the extendability of these chains of vindication. And this is of the utmost importance, not only to the logical completeness of a set of rights, but also to its moral evaluation. For it is clear that, although all the titles invoked to vindicate a title to an object must stand in a relation of sequential antecedence one to another, they cannot all be consequents one of another. Chains of title vindication must all terminate in original titles, which, therefore, cannot themselves have been created by exercises of rights. Those original titles are necessarily titles to objects the historically first uses of which constitute the earliest rightful actions performed with those objects. Thus, within the class of original titles required to vindicate any derivative title, there are some titles which-being necessarily nonderivative-are properly termed ultimately original titles. And although the formal conditions governing the compossibility of rights are logically sufficient to determine all derivative titles, they are not sufficient to determine the ultimately original titles that those conditions presuppose. More simply, once we have the class of ultimately original titles, what is required to infer the identities of all derivative titles is a set of (true) descriptive statements. But the class of ultimately original titles can be inferred only from a prescriptive statement-a principle-assigning objects to persons. This principle is properly viewed as the principle of distributive justice, and the titles it prescribes can be construed as individuals' natural rights.7 HILLEL STEINER

University of Manchester

OUGHT, TIME, AND DEONTIC PARADOXES Eine Hauptursache philosophischer Krankheiten -einseitige D i a t : m a n n a h r t sein Denken mit tlur einer A r t von Beispielen. -Ludwig Wittgenstein

Philosophische Untersz~clzungen,#593

When in doubt, complicate!

T

HE distinction between actions that are obligatory (required, wrong, right, permissible, forbidden, and the like) and the circumstances in which such actions are obligatory

7 For an account of this principle, see my "The Concept of Justice," op. cit.; and for an attempt to elicit some features of the natural rights it prescribes, see my "The Natural Right to the Means of Production," Philosophical Quarterly, XXVII, 106 (January 1977): 41-49.

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(required, etc.) is one of the most obvious anti most crucial in our recognition and attribution of duties, obligations, etc. The distinction is perplexing and can be easily lost. Not only is the concept of action difficult, but that distinction is not merely the distinction between actions and circumstances. An action, or the performance of an action, can be the circumstance that makes another action obligatory (required, permissible, etc.). We shall refer to our most crucial distinction as that between civcunzstances and actions (or acts) practically considered. T h a t crucial distinction has eluded most studies of the logical structure of ought and obligation, whether the studies consist of proposed formal systems for deontic logic or of informal discussions of topics about ought or obligation. One reason for that elusion is the customary concentration on limited and simple data. Here I want to argue for the proposition that a fundamental duality in our practical thinking, like that of circun~stancesand actions practically considered, must be treated for what it is: as a fundamental distinction. Otherwise we shall never attain full understanding of the logic of ordinary practical language or of the nature of our normative thinking. One corollary of the fundamentality of the distinction between actions practically considered and circumstances is the fall of the standing dogma that a deontic logic is simply a modal logic without the reflective axiom "If necessarily #, then p." The logic of oughts, norms, rules, interdictions, prohibitions, and the like, is two-sorted. The significance of this is such that, adopting a celebrated remark of David Hume's about the "ought-is" contrast and its impact on "the vulgar systems of morality," I cannot forebear adding [the] observation [that the constrast between actions practically considered and circumstances] should be observed a n d explained . . . But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend i t to the readers; and a m persuaded t h a t this small attention would subvert all the [standard deontic] systems [whether ordinary or conditional].'

3 l y project is not so much to construct a theory for deontic l o g i ~ . ~ l l y project is proto-philosophical: to gather and collect data that 1 David Huine, A Treatise of H u m a n Nature, 111, i: ii; the bracketed expressions are mine. For standard deontic calculi see Dagfinn F$llesdal and Risto Hilpinen, eds., Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971),Hans Lenk, ed., NormenEogik (Munich: Verlag Dokumentation, 1974),and most of the papers on deontic logic in the logic and philosophy journals. 2 Without considering the collection of data presented in this paper, I have formulated systems of deontic logic that conform with all of those data. See, for example, "Ethics and Logic: Stevensonian Emotivism Revisited," this JOURXAL LXIV, 20 (Oct. 26, 1967);671-683, pp. 678/9, and "Errata," ibid. 774; this is an APA symposium paper with comments by Robert Fogelin and by Lennart Aqvist, who both appreciated the two-sortedness of my calculus.

OUGHT,

TIME, Ah'D

777

DEONTIC PARADOXES

must be conforlnecl with by arty adequate theory of the logic of ought. In order to highlight the significance of the basic distinction, I will discuss a sophisticated recent semi-formal proposal for dealing with some so-called "deontic paradoxes." The proposal involves a natural connecting of time with obligation. But the fundamental distinction is more fundamental than the way time and obligation connect. This is a more important datum. I. CHISHOLM'S CONTRARY-TO-DUTY The significance of Chisholm's datum represented it1 his celebrated contrary-to-duty "paradox" has not been fully appreciated, even though it is one of the most widely discussed pieces of data about example, modified here so as to ~ ought and ~ b l i g a t i o n .Chisholm's highlight certain aspects, such as the scope of deontic expressions, is this : i

l

~

~

~

~

~

(1) Jones ought to do the following: assist his neighl~or.

(2) Jones ought t o d o t h e following: if he assists his neighbor, tell

him t h a t he is coming.

(3) If Jones does not assist his neighbor, he ought to do the following:

not tell him t h a t he is coming.

(4) Jones does not assist his neighbor.

Obviously, (1)-(4) form a logically consistent set. Now, on certain

deontic calculi, (1)-(4) are symbolized in ways that correspond to

the following English sentences, where the deontic operator ' 0 '

stands for something like "it ought to be brought about by the

relevant agents that" :

( l a ) O(Jones assists his neighbor).

(lb) ()P

(2a) O(Jones assists his neighbor 2 Jones tells his neighbor t h a t he

is coming). (2b) O ( P 2 P)

(3a) (Jones does not assist his neighbor) 3 0 ( J o n e s does not tell his

neighbor t h a t he is corning). (3b) ~ ~ 3 0 - q (4a) [the same as (4)].

(4b)

-P

I an1 discussing the matter both in English and in the standard formalism, because I want to make some points about the data contained in (1)-(4). Chisholm's paradox is this: from (1b)-(4b) a contradiction can be derived with the help of the following principles, which are 3 R. M. Chisholm, "Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic," Analy-

sis, XXIV, 2 (December 1963) : 33-36, pp. 43/5.



~

~

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theorems in most standard deontic calculi :

11. INITIAL DATA

Working with the symbolism on the right only, one can easily feel comfortable with the proposed symbolizations of (la)-(4a) as interpretations of (1)-(4). Those symbolizations faithfully preserve the scope distinctions highlighted by our scope indicator 'the following :'. Faced with the contradiction derived by Chisholm, one can naturally, but incorrectly, turn against the scope so carefully signaled in our example. This has been the standard favorite among the proposed solutions. I have, on the other hand, been struck by the elementary distortion in the move from (1)-(3) to (la)-(3a). That distortion suggests to me that (la)-(3a) cannot be the correct interpretations of (1)(3), regardless of how faithfully the formulas next to them represent (la)-(3a). Note how in our original sentences (1)-(3) the expression 'ought to do the following', which is our ordinary-language canonical ought operator, has in its scope infinitive clauses as formulations of what Jones is required to do. Those infinitive clauses are supplanted, without ado, with indicative clauses in (la)-(3a). Rut why? Infinitive clauses in ordinary deontic contexts go into subjunctive, but not into indicative clauses. Just consider the equivalence between "Jones is required or obliged to be (come, arrive) early" and "It is required or obligatory that Jones be (come, arrive) early." I t is not clear how one is to interpret (la)-(3a). The preceding clue or datum is very important. Although the lexicon of the language has very little philosophical value, the syntax-or, better, the syntactical contrasts-in each language has philosophical significance : syntactical contrasts are philosophical data. The reason is clear: the structure of our thinking is constituted, or presented, by the structure of the structural contrasts of the language we do our thinking with. But another datum is also evident in (1)-(3). Sentence (2) contains a duality of components in the scope of 'ought to do the following', namely: the duality of the injinitive clause 'tell him that he is coming' and the indicative clause 'he assists his neighbor'. Clearly, there is no distortion in the move from (2) to (2a) concerning the indicative antecedent, but the infinitive consequent i s distorted in (2a). The syntactical contrast inside (2) suggests something worth keeping track of. Let us move up to the semantics of that contrast

OUGHT, TJhlE, AND DEONTIC PARADOXES

779

between infinitive and indicative in (2). Isn't it patently clear that the indicative clause in (2), 'he assists his neighbor', is not the sort of thing that i n (2) expresses or denotes an action practically considered, but denotes only a circumstance? We can nail down this intuition by complicating our data with other examples. The indicative clause in (2) allows an internal form of modus ponens : (A) (2) Jones ought to do t h e following: if he assists his neighbor, tell him t h a t he is coming. ( 5 ) Jones will assist his neighbor.

Hence,

(6) Jones ought t o (do t h e following:) tell his neighbor t h a t he is coming.

On the other hand, the infinitive clause in (2) does'not allow the counterpart modus tollens : (B) (2) Jones ought to d o the following: if he assists his neighbor, tell him t h a t he is coming.

(7) Jones won't tell his neighbor t h a t he is coming.

Hence,

(8) Jones ought t o d o the following: not assist his neighbor.

The contrast in validity between inferences (A) and (B) clearly reveals what our syntactical intuition suggested : the conditional inside the scope of 'ought to do the following' in (2) is a heterogeneoz~s conditional: its components exhibit a crucial duality of roles. Perhaps a further contrast between the components of that conditional can help. T h a t conditional allows of contraposition, but only such as to preserve the difference in roles between the indicative clause (which formulates a circumstance) and the infinitive clause (which formulates an action practically considered), as follows: Incorrect contraposition: ( 2 / ) Jones ought to do the following: he does not assist his neighbor, if he [does?] not tell him t h a t he is coming.

Correct contrapositiorr: (2") Jones ought to do the following: only if he does not assist his neighbor, not tell him t h a t he is not coming.

This datum is interesting for another reason. The standard discussion of contraposition in the logic textbooks is that 'If p, then q' has as its contrapositive 'If not-q (i.e., it is not the case that q), then not-p (i.e., it is not the case that p'). This rule is, however, of no help when we are dealing with imperatives, with questions, or with the contents of obligation. Obviously, the contrapositive of "If she comes, talk to her" is not the non-sentence "If not talk to her, she

OUGHT, TIME, A N D DEONTIC PARADOXES

779

between infinitive and indicative in (2). Isn't it patently clear that the indicative clause in (2), 'he assists his neighbor', is not the sort of thing that in (2) expresses or denotes an action practically considered, but denotes only a circumstance? We can nail down this intuition by complicating our data with other examples. The indicative clause in (2) allows an internal form of modus ponens : (A) (2) Jones ought t o do t h e following: if he assists his neighbor, tell him t h a t he is coming.

( 5 ) Jones will assist his neighbor.

Hence,

(6) Jones ought t o (do t h e following:) tell his neighbor t h a t he is coming.

On the other hand, the infinitive clause in (2) does'not allow the counterpart modus tollens : (B) (2) Jones ought t o d o t h e following: if he assists his neighbor, tell him t h a t he is coming.

(7) Jones won't tell his neighbor t h a t he is coming.

Hence,

(8) Jones ought t o d o the following: not assist his neighbor.

The contrast in validity between inferences (A) and (B) clearly reveals what our syntactical intuition suggested : the conditional inside the scope of 'ought to do the following' in (2) is a heterogeneous conditional : its components exhibit a crucial duality of roles. Perhaps a further contrast between the components of that conditional can help. That conditional allows of contraposition, but only such as to preserve the difference in roles between the indicative clause (which formulates a circumstance) and the infinitive clause (which formulates an action practically considered), as follows: incorrect contraposition: (2' ) Jones ought t o do t h e following: he does not assist his neighbor, if he [does?] not tell him t h a t he is coming.

Correct contraposition : (2") Jones ought to d o t h e following: only if he does not assist his neighbor, not tell him t h a t he is not coming.

This datum is interesting for another reason. The standard discussion of contraposition in the logic textbooks is that 'If P, then q' has as its contrapositive 'If not-q (i.e., it is not the case that q), then not-p (i.e., it is not the case that 9'). This rule is, however, of no help when we are dealing with imperatives, with questions, or with the contents of obligation. Obviously, the contrapositive of "If she comes, talk to her" is not the non-sentence "If not talk to her, she

OUGHT, TIME, AND DEONTIC PARADOXES

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calculus, but she formulates several principles which, if she were correct, any adequate deontic logic would have to include. Her solution is rather complex: it temporalizes truth, tampers with principle (PI) above, introduces some new principles, and proposes a regimented interpretation of ordinary language : Og will be derivable from O ( p 3 q) a n d Up, where U p asserts p's u n alterable t r u t h (unalterable by t h e agent, I presume) at the time when these statements are made . . O p implies Up and U p . .. W e can now mark off detachable oughts as those covered b y 0 (p 2 q) where either O p o r U p holds-at one a n d t h e same time. Only such oughts, we now insist, are actually covered by p 3 Oq where p holds -some ordinary language parsings to the contrary. (265; except for those in 'unalterable', all italics a r e mine.)

.

-

--

The major complication of the proposal is the temporalization of truth values. But this is a view that many philosophers nowadays like, and it is certainly worth developing in any case. Thus, on this score, Greenspan's suggestion deserves attention. . )' to signify Let us for precision introduce the notation 'Ot( that the obligation statement "O( . . . )" is true a t time t, the time a t which "O( . . )" is made by the speaker. Similarly, the notation 'Ut(---)' signifies that the truth of the statement "(- - - )" is unalterable by the agent a t the time t of speech. Then the preceding quotation can be interpreted as introducing the following rules:

..

.

(G.l) O t p a n d Ot(p 3 g) imply Otq. (G.2) Utp and Ot(p 3 q) imply Otq. (G.3) O t p implies Utp & Ut p. (G.4) Ordinary conditionals, of t h e form 'If p, then X ought t o bring i t about t h a t q' are, in spite of "their ordinary parsing [look?]," logically of t h e form 'Ot(p 3 g ) ' , unless Utp, in which case they are of t h e form 'p 3 Otq'.

- - -

Armed with (G.l)-(G.4), Greenspan is able to offer a solution to Chisholm's "paradox." First (266), in accordance with (G.3) she interprets premise (3) as : (3b) O(Jones does not assist his neighbor 3 Jones does not tell his neighbor t h a t he is coming).

Second, she explains how the time a t which premise (4) becomes true makes a difference as to whether it can combine with (3b) and yield, in accordance with (G.2), the conclusion Ot q. There is no need to pursue the matter further. Greenspan's solution is tempting because of the important fact that most of our practical thinking is oriented toward the future. N

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Yet the view creates some serious problems. I t could be developed further, but the resulting complications, if the view were to deal with all the already collected data, would be depressing. IV. MORE REQUISITE DATA FOR DEONTIC LOGIC

Some of the difficulties I will discuss apply not only to Greenspan's solution to Chisholm's "paradox" but to most solutions already entrenched in existing deontic calculi. The reason is very simple. Standard deontic calculi are one-sorted: they have as primitive symbols : one denumerable set of propositional (sentential) variables, some deontic operators, and some ordinary connectives ; then a deontic well-formed formula is a formula of the form "O(Z)," where '0' is a deontic operator and 'Z' is a well-formed formula. Such calculi cannot distinguish between an action considered as a circumstance and an action practically considered, except when this distinction coincides with the distinction between formulas within and formulas without the scope of a deontic operator. The data collected above show conclusively that that won't do. So-called "dyadic" or "conditional" deontic logics represent a distinction of roles of propositional variables in the scope of deontic operators. This is an improvement, but it can handle only the simplest cases. I leave it as a challenge to the reader to find a system of so-called conditional deontic logic that can accommodate all the data discussed in this paper.'

1. Time and ought. Greenspan's correct intuition is that liability for obligations appears and disappears a t definite times. There is, undoubtedly, an intimate connection between time and obligation. But we must be very careful to distinguish among: (a) the time of the action one ought to d o ; (b) the time of the oughtness; (c) the time of the truth of an ought-statement; and (d) the time of utterance or of the making of an ought-statement. I have the vivid impression that, in the preceding quotation from Greenspan, as well as in other passages of her interesting essay, there is a blending of the four times. Consider the following example : (11) At 3 P.X. P a t ought to mail an apology t o Mary.

What is 3 P.M. the time of? Obviously it is not the time of the utterance, nor is it the time of the truth of "Pat ought to mail an apology 7 Data especially relevant to so-called dyadic or conditional deontic calculi appear in my "The Logic of Change, Action, and Norms," this JOURNAL, LXII, 13 (June 24, 1965): 333-344; and m y review of Nicholas Rescher's The Logic of Commands, Philosophical Review, L X X I X , 3 (July 1970): 439-446. See, further, Thinking and Doing, ch. 7.

OUGHT, TIME,

AND DEONTIC PARADOXES

783

to Mary." What does it mean for this (sentence) to be true a t some time or other? Obviously, 3 P.M. is the time of the mailing. By complicating our data somewhat we can establish the important datum : (P.PO) Principle of the present-tenseness of ought: The English verb 'ought' is always in the present tense, so t h a t : Once a n agent ought, according to rule R, to A , always thereafter he ought, according to R, to have A e d .

(Patently, the sense of 'ought' is the same in both occurrences.) Consider the following array of examples in support of (P.PO) : (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)

I ought to visit Mary next week. Next Sunday is when I now ought to visit Mary. Tomorrow is when I ought now t o visit Mary. Today is when, now, I ought t o visit Mary. Yesterday is when I ought, now, t o have visited Mary.

Note that none of (12)-(16) implies that the visit took place, nor that it did not take place. Of course, given the inherent presentness of 'ought', the word 'now' is redundant. The chief point is that times and tenses change around 'ought', times and tenses that belong in the subordinate clause in the scope of 'ought' ; 'ought' remains an unmovable bastion. The semantical unit of the array (12)-(16) requires a unitary account of the logic of ought that covers all of them, and respects the constant sense of 'ought' in them. 2. The past-tense paradox and Greensfian. The Chisholm "paradox" pertains to the ought-to-do, but there is, evidently, a past-tense version, i.e., a "paradox" about the ought-to-have-done. We want a solution that applies to all versions, regardless of tense. Now, Greenspan's (G.l)-(G.4) prevent the past-tense version of the "paradox" from arising. But they do it too well: they make past-tense oughtstatements false! Consider (16) above. The time of our making the statement is now, and there is no way I (the agent) can alter the truth (or the falsehood) of the subordinate clause 'I visited Mary yesterday'. Thus, given the tenses of (16), (16) implies "UnOw(I visited Mary yesterday) or UnOw (I did not visit Mary yesterday" ; hence, by Greenspan's proposed principle (G.3), (16) implies a contradiction. Hence, (16) is false on Greenspan's view of the logic of ought. Therefore, we must set aside (G.l)-(G.4) and depend instead upon the two-sortedness of the logic of ought.

3. Future ought-statements. There is a certain obscurity in the phrase used by Greenspan (265) to introduce her principles, namely, "p's unalterable truth (by the agent) a t the time when the statements are

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made." I t is tempting to interpret this as meaning that the truth of

p is in the past or a t the time of utterance. Yet it can also be interpreted as meaning that a t the time of utterance the truth of p is fixed, even it if lies in the future. In other u~orcls,the requirement can be one of past truth, or one of fixed truth. There is one passage that suggests the latter view : In everyday discussion, we often seem t o depart fro111 t h e time-bound view of oughts by treating as "fixed" or "given" some facts besides those which have already become unalterable (267; my italics).

But the word 'seems' precludes a clear choice. The discussion on the ensuing pages is tantalizingly indecisive on this point. There are signs of a proclivity to the fixed-truth view; but I find no definite endorsement of it. The fixed-truth view has the same dramatic consequence we saw for past-tense ought statements. Consider : (17) Every citizen ought to pay his taxes by April 1. (18) Jones is a citizen brought u p in such a way t h a t h e automatically does what he believes he ought t o do, and he believes t h a t he ought t o pay his taxes by April 1. Hence, (19) Jones, who will automatically pay his taxes by April 1, ought t o pay his taxes by April 1.

On the fixed-truth interpretation of Greenspan's view, (19) would be a contradiction, by virtue of (G.3). Clearly, (19) would imply "U,,, (Jones pay his taxes by April I)." On that view the ought disappears once the truth of its fulfillment, or nonfulfillment, is fixed. Thus, it ~vouldbe self-contradictory to say something of the form (20) I ought [now, a t t h e time of utterance] t o d o A tomorrow, but, since I a m inclined not t o d o A , I have arranged conclusively [past action] t o be in a situation in which I a m now (by being hypnotized, having taken drugs, asked somebody to drag me, etc.) such t h a t I will u~ravoidablydo A tomorrow.

Greenspan cannot, however, limit the trouble with her view to the past-tense ought-statements by adopting the past-tense interpretation of her constraints on the logic of ought. The past-tense interpretation invalidates perfectly valid inferences like : (21) Jones ought t o d o t h e following : if he comes tomorrow, call us today. (22) Jones will come tomorrow.

Hence,

(23) Jones ought t o call us today.

OUGHT, TIME, AND DEONTIC PARADOXES

785

On the past-tense interpretation, we cannot use (22) as a pre~nisebecause, (22) being in the future, we cannot have "U,,,(Jones will come tomorrow)." Xote further that, on the past-tense interpretation of 'Utp', Greenspan's (G.4) cannot allow the inference from (21a)&(22) to (23) in the version that replaces (21) with (21a) If Jones comes tomorrow, he ought t o call today.

In short, future-tense ought-statements are not adequately accounted for by Greenspan's (G.3)-(G.4), regardless of whether her unalterable truth is past-tense truth or generally fixed truth.

4. Conditional ought-statements. Greenspan's (G.4), as she herself notes in the first quotation, runs against the grain of ordinary language. But the discrepancy is much more serious than she has described. I t is not just that ordinary conditional sentences like(2la) have an ought-consequent, whereas (21) has an 'ought'- less conditional in the scope of 'ought'. If we concentrate on just the one kind of data of isolated conditionals like (21) and (21a), there is really little objection to her view as formalized in (G.4). But we must deal with other kinds of data. There is, for instance, the very important datum that (21) implies (21a), assuming the same references to times and persons. This equivalence has nothing to do with whether or not the truth of the antecedent is fixed or not, or with whether, if fixed, i t is fixed by its being past or by its being a determinate future. The reader can convince himlherself of this by changing the antecedent 'Jones (he) comes tomorrow' to different sentences, e.g., 'Jones (he) went to California' and 'Jones (he ) became ill'. Furthermore, the equivalence between (21) and (21a) does not depend on the antecedents of these sentences being about Jones or about somebody's actions. The equivalence is more general, as is shown by : (24) Jones ought to d o t h e following: if i t snowed last night, remove t h e snow from t h e sidewalk. (24a) If i t snowed last night, Jones ought to remove t h e snow from t h e sidewalk.

Greenspan does not want her principle (G.3) to apply to sentences like (24) and (24a) when the antecedent is a future event not alterable by the agent. Yet some of those events that are not alterable by the agent can very well be indeterminate a t the time the statements are made. Here one must recognize that what we need is a general, uniform, and simple account for all conditional ought-sentences (whether they are future-tense or past-tense conditionals, or whether

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they have as conditions actions by the same agent, or by another agent, or even events that are nobody's actions), and we want a theory that respects the equivalences recorded below. We have, therefore, as a crz~cinlproto-philosophical datztm for a n y adequate deontic logic: (P.CO) I n ordinary English, on t h e assumption of fixed references and meanings for all expressions, where t h e subscript 'i' signals a t y p e or kind or system of obligation or oughtness, e.g., as required by morality, b y a statute, b y a n ordinance, b y a contract, b y a promise: "X oughti t o d o t h e following: if fi, A" is equivalent t o "If 9, then X ought{ t o A."

This equivalence datum subverts all standard deontic calculi.

5. QuantiJication. We obviously want a theory of the logic of ought, and of norms, which elucidates the semantical unity of 'ought' ('obligation', 'duty', etc.) in both singular and universal ought-statements. We also want a theory that accounts for the validity of the above inference "(17)&(18), therefore (19)" simply by virtue of the general principles of quantification and propositional connectives. Yet this is not possible on many existing deontic calculi. In the case of Greenspan, we have the consequence that universal ought-statements that are not restricted to the future are false. This follows trivially from our discussion of past ought-statements. If her view is interpreted in the fixed-truth way, then even some future instances falsify many universal ought-statements we normally take to be true. For instance, the universal premise (17) turns out to be false on Greenspan's account. There is also a further problem about what the impact of (G.4) should be on the conditionals embedded in universal ought-statements. This and the falsehood of past-tense ought-statements in Greenspan's view make it very difficult to understand on her view the nature and the logical form of our most general principles of morality, which are universalizable in many respects, and hold for the future and for the past. 6. A conditional-biconditional datum: unother "paradox." We have seen the rewards of diversifying our data ; yet we have been dealing with simple conditionals. Let us consider now an example that is just a little complex: (25) Lydia oughtR to d o tlie followirlg : (a) arrive a t her office a t 8 A . M . ;

OUGHT, TIME, AND DEONTIC PARADOXES

787

(b) open her office to the public a t 9 A.M. ;

(c) just in case she does not open her ofice to the public at 9 A.M., post a note instructing the public t o go t o Room 311, etc.

Note: ought^' is short for 'ought according to rules R'. Clause (b) in (25) is not the same as the unnegated part of the italicized antecedent of (c). This is a fundamental point neglected by practically all proposed systems of deontic logic. Here we have the original duality between circumstances and actions practically considered which was discussed a t the beginning of this paper.

a. Evidently the conjunction (l)&(b)&(c) lies in the scope of the deontic operator 'Lydia ought^ to do the following' in (25). This is a tall hurdle for the scope solutions to the deontic "paradoxes," including Greenspan's principle (G.4). b. Undoubtedly, (25) is equivalent to : (26) (a') Lydia ought^ t o (do the following:) arrive a t her office a t 8 A.M., and (b') Lydia ought^ to (do the following:) open her office to the public a t 9 A.M.,a nd (c') Lydia oughtR to do the following: just in case she does not open her ofice to the public at 9 A.M., post a note instructing the public t o go t o Room 311, etc.

Furthermore, (26.c') is equivalent to (27.ct') below; so ( 2 6 ) , and also (2 5 ) , are equivalent to : (27) (a") = (a') (b") = (b') (c") just in case she does not open her ofice to the public at 9 A . M . , Lydia ought^ to do the following:

post a note instructing the public t o go to Room 311, etc.

c. Suppose that the italicized indicative in (c) and (c') formulated an action of Lydia's in the same way in which the infinitive clauses in (a) and (a') do. Then it would be incorrect to derive (27) from (26). Let us concentrate on (26). In the standard notation of onesorted systems, which do not distinguish between circumstances and actions practically considered, (26) is represented in abbreviated version as: (26') O(Lydia arrives a t her office) & O(Lydia opens her office) & O(Lydia does not open her office = Lydia posts a note).

By principles (PI) and (P2), unrestrictedly, or, if interpreted in the way Greenspan wants, by (G.1), where none of Lydia's actions are

unalterable by her at the time of speech, we can derive a "paradoxi-

788

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

call' result as follows : (26l.1) O(Lydia opens her office 3 Lydia does not post a note). From (26') by simplification. (26l.2) O(Lydia opens her office 3 Lydia does not post a note). From (26l.1) by propositional logic and distribution of '0' through 'b'. (26l.3) O(Lydia does not post a note). From (26'.2) and (26') by propositional logic, ( P I ) or (G.l).

This is a paradoxical result. Clearly, ( 2 5 ) , which is equivalent to (26)' does not imply that Lydia is not to post a note instructing the public to go to Room 311. This "paradox" has nothing to do with whether Lydia's actions are unalterable or not. The error lies in the identification of the action of Lydia in (b), to ofien her o$ce, with the circumstances in (c) of Lydia's opening her ofice! The "paradox" can be solved very simply by respecting the indicative-infinitive contrast present in (25) and in (26). This respect for ordinary language can also lead us to recognize both the equivalence between (26) and (27)' and the nonequivalence between (26) and (26'). CONCLUSION

There are many more cases, each one slightly more complex, which show in a powerful crescendo how standard deontic systems, which fail to distinguish between circumstances and actions practically considered, cannot provide a comprehensive illumination of the logic of ought. Theories without data are blind, and in philosophy, as much as in science, a fundamental methodological maxim is the principle of maximum evidence. An often neglected consequence of this is the principle of m a x i m z ~ mdata: One ought to theorize in view of the largest collection of data available a t the time. The data collected here are calculated to provide a balanced diet for well-fed theories of deontic logic. HECTOR-NERI CASTAREDA Indiana University APPENDIX. A TLVO-SORTED PROPOSITIONAL

DEONTIC CALCULUS*

The data for a theory of deontic logic collected in the preceding essay

make i t clear that deontic logic is two-sorted: one sort of formula must

represent actions prescriptively considered and another sort must repre-

sent actions considered as circumstances. This distinction between actions

is the one expressed by the contrast between the subordinate infinitive

* I am grateful to Charles Parsons for helpful advice concerning the intclligibility of this appendix.

OIJGHT, TIME, A N D DFONTIC PARA1)OXF.S

789

nnrl indicc~~ive clauses in (1) T h e Mellon Professor must (is obliged to, is required to), according t o University Rule R, d o the following: wear academic regalia if he attends commencements or t h e Honors Ceremony, a n d wear his ~lielloniltsignia only if he attends the Honors Ceremony. T h e granlmatical distinction is obvious, its theoretical and logical significance is established by t h e preceding essay. I theorize t h a t actions considered a s circumstances a r e propositional (or states of affairs, or factual) components of deontic judgments. Actions prescriptively considered, which a r e the locus of deontic operators, and are also present in commands, orders, requests, and the like (see pp. 778-780 above), we call practitions t o highlight their peculiar role in practical thinking. Thus, t h e two-sorted character of deontic logic may be described as the propositionpractition contrast crucial for deontic logic. Deontic judgments themselves are true or false. T h e y are propositions built on practitions. Thus, the non-iteration of deontic operators belongs t o t h e very formation rules of deoiltic logic. hIoreover, deontic judgments themselves can be circumstances of obligation or permission, a s i n :

(2) Each Name Professor is obliged according t o Rule R to d o the fol-

lowing: notify the Ceremonies Office of his intention to attend a n

academic ceremony, if he/she is obliged according to Rule R to a t -

tend the ceremony.

Clearly, (2) is equivalent t o : (3) Each Name Professor is such t h a t : if he/she is obligedR t o attend

a n academic ceremony, he/she is o b l i g e d ~to notify the Ceremonies

Office of his intention to attend.

\\ie have here, therefore, another instance of the principle (P. CO) above on page 786. T h e d a t a collected above, in the preceding essay, also show some peculiarities in t h e combination of quantifications with propositional deontic logic. For t h a t reason I have elsewheres formulated a quantificational system of deontic logic with identity. B u t the purely propositional segment may be of some interest, especially because i t may be applied t o other areas. For instance, given t h e normative background of our discrimination between causes and circumstances, this distinction requires a t least t h e complexity of two-sorted deontic logic. T h e causal juncture is distinguished from the rest of the features regarded as circumstances, which are propositional or factual components of the situation, so t h a t the causal juncture may be considered a s analogous to a practition. Just See, e.g., "Ethics and Logic" cited above, and most especially Thinking and Doing, chs. 8 and 9.

TIIF. JOIJRNAI. OF PHILOSOPHY

consider : (4) A great commotion was caused when George came rushing in, pushing himself through the crowd, wearing his usual friendly smile, and waving his arms a s he always does when he is enjoying himself. I t is likely t h a t a person who asserts (4) may want t o distinguish within t h e description of George those factors which are relevant t o his causing a commotion from those not so relevant. Perhaps the relevant factors include George's rushing and pushing, and the irrelevant George's wearing his usual friendly smile and waving his arms. I t is not essential for our point here t h a t this be t h e right distinction: t h e point here is t h a t t h e description of George is a hybrid: some factors are t h e focus of t h e causal claim, others are not. T h e former should be immovable within the scope of the causal connective or operator; b u t the latter should in certain circumstances (e.g., when related t o the former by mere conjunction) be removable t o the outside of t h e scope of t h e causal connective-just as circumstances are removable t o the outside of t h e scope of ought. See pp. 785/6 above. T h e propositional deontic system t o be formulated here is both isomorphic with t h e propositional fragment of m y other richer systems and is different, so as t o generalize t h e main distinction between circumstances and actions prescriptively considered, or causes, or items of justification, or items especially considered in some way.

Primitive Symbols of DC: Propositional variables (to stand for circumstances and other propositional components) ; special variable-forming operator t (which can in our deontic interpretation be considered as the infinitivizing operator, 't' being suggested by t h e infinitive sign 'to') ;' t h e regular propositional connectives '-' and '&'; t h e deontic operator 'OR9 (for 'it is obligatoryR for agent'), and parentheses. T h e other connectives are defined as usual.

Formation rules of DC: If Z is a propositional variable, then tZ is a n actional variable (or causal, etc.). Propositionql or circumstantial wffs of D C are: propositional variables standing alone; formulas of t h e forms (N Z ) , a n d ( Y & Z ) , where both Z and Y a r e propositional wffs, and formulas of the form ( O R Z ) ,where Z is a n actional wff. T h e actional wffs of D C a r e : actional (causal, etc.) variables standing alone, and formulas of t h e form (N Z), (Z&Y), (Y&Z), where Z is a n actional (causal, etc.) wff and Y is a n actional or a circumstantial wff of DC. W e drop parentheses as is customary.

Axioms of D C are wffs of t h e following forms, where 2,Y a n d X are a n y wffs, is a n y circumstantial wff, and A and B are actional (causal, etc.) For the equivalence between an operator on predicates and an operator on copulas in atomic formulas, see my Thinking and Doing; pp. 96ff.

NOTES AND NEWS

wffs :lo

<

RulesofDC: Modusponens:Z, Z 3 Y t Y ; a n d O G : I f fi&AIG*Az & . & A, 3 B, then p G* ORAIG* . . ORA, 3 ORB, for n > 0.

..

.

ItJodelsfor D C : Structures M = < wo, W, i >, where wo is t h e designated (real) world, wo EW,and W is the set of worlds, and i is a function assigning t o wffs of D C worlds wj EW,such t h a t : if wo e i(fi), then wj E i(p) for every wj e W ;wo E i(ORA), iff wj e i(A) for every wj # wo; wj e i(Z&Y), iff ~ iff wj g i(Z). W e evaluate in the both wj e i ( Z ) and wj E i ( Y ) ; wj e i ( Z), set (1,2), a s usual: u(Z,wj,i) = 1, iff wj E i(Z). Validity and satisfaction as usual. Z is valid iff Z is satisfied by the wo's of all models for DC. Completeness proof in the standard way: Z is valid 2. iff

NOTES AND NEWS T h e sudden death of Eunice Belgum is mourned by the members of the Society for Womeil in Philosophy and by many others of her colleagues. Professor Belgum was Treasurer of the Eastern Division of SWIP and would have become Executive Secretary in 1978. T h e Royal Institute of Philosophy will hold a conference on Law and Philosophy at the University of Lancaster Sept. 14-17, 1979. I t is intended that the program should include both commissioned symposia and a number of volunteered papers. T h e planning committee are especially interested in contributions that deal with specific concepts in contemporary law, o r pliilosophical discussions arising out of particular cases or decisions. Anyone wishing to write a paper for the committee's assessment o r desiring further information should communicate as soon as possible with the Organizing Secretary, R I . A. Stewart, Department of Philosophy, T h e University, Lancaster LA1 qYT, England. T h e third annual series of the Yehoshua Bar-Hillel hlemorial Lectures of Tel-Aviv University will take place on December 18, 19 and 21, 1977. T h e lectures will be delivered by J. M. Moravcsik (Stanford) and will be entitled: "Grammar, Mind, and Reality," "On Understanding," and "Essential Being and Aristotle's Ontology." T h e first series was delivered by Hilary Putnam (Harvard) and the second by P. T. Geach (Leeds). lo Axioms A1-A3 are generalizatiolls to practitions of those proposed by J. Barkley Rosser, Logic for Mathematicians (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 56, for a propositional calculus with negation and conjunction as primitives. On these primitives for imperatives and intentions, see Thinking and Doinz, ch. 4.