Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume Concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect (1806)

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mmT

OBSERVATIONS ox THE

NATURE AND TENDENCY OF THE

DOCTRINE OF

Mr.

HUME,

CONCERNING

THE RELATION OF

CAUSE AND EFFECT. BY

THOMAS BROWN,

M. D.

Second Edition, enlarged.

EDINBURGH: PRINTED FOR MUNDELL AND •J

SO.V^

SOLD IN LONDON BY LONGMAN, HURST, RDES, & ORAIFPVTr.R-NOSTER ROW, J. MURRAY, FLEET-STR EI, ^>r» T. OSTLLL, AVE-MARIA. LANE. i"

From

the very considerable length of

Author the

regrets, that,

first

if

many of

the Notes,

perusal of the work, they destroy that continuity of ar~

gument, which

it

Avas his great

wish to preserv e.

He would have

placed them at the close of the Volume, had he

extent in sufficient time relate to

the

read in their present situation, during

;

Mr. Hume's original Treatise of

not written the press.

till

known

their

but those of greatest length, which

Human

Nature, were

a very large part of the work had passed through

He

must therefore leave

it

to the kindness of his

Readers to rectify the error, and must request them to follow the continued text, without interrupting and suspending the ar-

gument, by attention to the Notes.

These, being rather discus-

sions of subjects connected with the general argument, than ne-

cessary elucidations of

it,

may be

afterwards read, as

if

appended.

ERRATA. Page ap, ••

line 14.

For

the philosophers, re3.d philosophers.

— 134? —— 6 of the note, for ehrvaticns, read observations.

QO syeooo

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

X HE

Author of the following Observations

too sensible of the respect which Public, not to feel to

it

the

work of

it

first

due to the

reluctance, in giving

a few days.

question seems, at in

some

is

is

A metaphysical

view, to have so

little

of local or temporary interest, that,

when

no opportunity of discussing

com-

there

is

pletely,

it

may be

it

delayed without any

loss.

But, in the present case, there are circumstances,

which claim, even for one of the abstrus-

est questions

of metaphysics, the indulgence

usually given to the fleeting matters of the day.

6

A

PHILOSOPHER, of great and deserved

scientific

celebrity, recently appointed

to the

chair of mathematics in the university of Edin-

burgh, has been opposed, for his approbation of Mr. Hume's Essay on necessary connection,

by a body of men, who, from the general terary character fession,

and the

li-

sanctity of their pro-

may be presumed

to

be

at

once well

acquainted with the nature of heresy, and cha^ ritably sparing in the imputation of

it.

On

a

reference from them, this subject, unquestionably of the greatest importance,

come

about to

for decision before the highest ecclesiasti-

cal court in Scotland.

to the

is

It

occurred, therefore,

Author of the following pages,

would not be ly the steps

uninteresting, to

by which Mr.

that

it

examine minute-

Hume was

led to his

general conclusion on the Nature of Cause and Effect, that,

by appreciating the value of the

sepiarate propositions,

we might be

the better

able to discover the truth or the falsehood, as

7 well as the tendency, of the whole connected doctrine.

voured

In this investigation, he has endea-

to avoid every allusion to the personal

circumstances which called

it

forth,

the question exactly in the same

and

to treat

manner

as

he

would have done, had no reference on the subject

be?n pending before any tribunal.

A 2

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

JL

HE Essay which

follows

is

now

presented to

the lovers of metaphysical disquisition, in a larger

form than

appeared.

As

it

that

ject of

which

it

was then written

the view of giving public mind,

in

some

to

chiefly with

satisfaction

on an obscure and

controversy,

originally

to the

difficult

sub-

which peculiar

cir-

cumstances had attracted a very general interest, it

was

limited, as strictly

as

possible, to

an

examination of the theory on which the controversy had arisen. I

In the present

edition^,

have ventured occasionally to take a wider

range, and to add such reasonings and reflec-

A 3

10

seemed necessary

as

tions,

to elucidate fully

the very important questions which are involv-

ed in the philosophy of cause and the same time, thing, light

I

trust that I

which does not serve

to

At

effect.

have added no-

throw additional

on those peculiar opinions of Mr. Hume:^

which

it

Of the magnify

my

was

primary object to discuss.

error which has led philosophers to

his scepticism,

by representing him

as:

denying, not merely the perception or hiference of power, as a quality of bodies, but the

very idea of power, as an existing phenomenon

of mind, no notice was taken in the former edition

;

ment of

as

it

was thought that a simple

his real doctrine

to correct the error.

Its

would be

state-

sufficient

universal prevalence,

however, pei'haps required a more particular confutation

;

and, accordingly, in the present

edition, the mistake of

be supposed

to

Dr. Reid, which

may

have had the chief influence in

11 prejudicing the public sentiment on the subject, is

examined

at considerable length.

on the metaphysical

If the criticism

Mr.

Hume

of

be severer than coincides with the

general opinion, to

style

trust

I

it

be supposed

will not

have arisen from any wish of detracting

from the reputation of

The

pher.

that

eminent philoso-

which he undoubtedly pos-

talents,

sessed, are of so high a rank, that he

bear to merit

;

may

well

be estimated according to his real

and

it

would be

as absurd to

deny

his

acuteness and subtlety, and the easy graces of his composition,

as

it

fame, to assert, that his

is

unnecessary for his

mode of

scientific de-

monstration

is

possible to

imagine a more convincing proof

faultless.

It is,

indeed, scarcely

of that want of regularity and perspicuity of statement, which

— —

than the fact to be a fact

I

if,

that,

have ventured to object,

on examination,

from the

first

it

be found

appearance

12 of his theory of causation

till

now, he has been a proposition,

universally believed to assert

which

is

not merely altogether different from the

real doctrine of his

work, but

tradiction to the great

vades

is

in direct con-

argument which per-

it.

^^HE

analysis of the particular theory

is at-

tempted to be so conducted in the following Essay, as to be in truth an analysis of our belief

of causation, and, consequently, of our idea

of power. this

A

series

of analytical inquiries of

kind, if conducted with precision, would

probably remove at present

much of

that obscurity

darkens our metaphysics

must not assent

to

:

which

for

the opinion of those,

we

who

consider the discussions of metaphysics as relating only to verbal

definition

of phenomena

previously understood, and to the mere arrange-

ments of nomenclature, which afford no addition to our real

knowledge.

It is a science which ^

13

though

it

may

not deserve those extravagant

honours that were once lavished on

But

edly a science of no vulgar rank. science

expectation

it is

as

a

to

its

v^e look with great

of improve-

susceptibility

There may undoubtedly be

thesis in

ideas

assur-

of analysis^ that the philosophy of mind

must be considered, wh.en

ment.

it, is

miind, as well as

may be

direct syn-

matter.

in

New

presented to our understanding,

and new objects of emotion to our passions.

The whole

process of education

tinued synthesis

on previous skilfully

;

but

it is

analysis,

indeed a con-

is

a synthesis

and, even

founded

when most

conducted, resembles more the opera-

tion of an ingenious artisr, in

his attempt to

produce, in the shortest and easiest manner, a

known

result,

who forms

than of a philosophic chemist,

combinations of bodies, in the con-

fidence of deriving from

gether new.

That

vve

them a product shall

alto-

be able, by any

intentional or accidental union of circumstan-

14 ces, to

produce phenomena of mind, generical-

ly different

from those which the mind has yet

exhibited,

it

scarcely reasonable to hope;

is

though of species already known we may multiply instances

The

indefinitely.

application

of new substances to our organs of sense excite in us

new

will of

new remembrances,

course be productive of

new

and these

sensations,

and new comparisons.

desires,

original

thought, whatever be

itself a

new phenomenon

which have been long

may

;

its

Every

subject,

and even

ideas,

may be

familiar to us,

variously and beautifully combined

is

by the ima-

gination, in almost inexhaustible series of as-

semblages. are only

known that

Yet

it

must be confessed,

new phenomena of

to us,

we

these,

shall

species already

and give us no reason

to hope,

become acquainted with

of phenomena, so

little

classes

similar to the past, as

not to be referable to any of those, which

we

have comprehended under the general names

15 oi sensation, memory^ imagination, judgmenl:^

and the various other terms of thought or emotion, in the nomenclature of mind.

It is

that

not by synthetic experiment, therefore,

eypect our knowledge of mind to

we can

be^ greatly improved

;

account to suppose that

impossibility of the

nomy, because *

Though

in the

is

on

that

not improvable

Newtonian system of

was not

direct experiment

importance

less

it

it

are not

:

equal reason, assert the

we might, with

for

we

but

in the

is

astro-

power of

its

undoubtedly of much

physics of mind, than the analysis,

and even than the generalization, of those phenomena

which spontaneously

arise, it

must not be considered,

even in that science, as an instrument of little value. In the

department of

and

by

in the

it

which

is

included in medical pathology',

mental excitement and depression produced

certain classes of medicines,

interesting

many

subjects of very

experiment present themselves.

Even on

phenomena, which seem to be more simple and constant,

much

light

may

thus be thrown.

ear, for instance,

lar an

anomaly,

general law,

which

The want

of musical

at present appears so very singu-

may perhaps be reduced to some

familiar

by experiments which have not yet occur-

red to inquirers in physiologv.

16 great

discoverer,

disarrange

to

and subject

at his will,

Experiment

riment.

their is

planets

motions to expe-

indeed valuable, not

as furnishing us with results, essential

the

which are

any

in

circumstance different from those of

observation, but only as increasing, in cases in

which we

them, the number of

chiefly desire

observations.

The

difference

tual change, but in the

the change

;

and the

is

not in the ac-

power which produces

definitions of each there-

fore admit of mutual conversion.

say of any

new

experiment^ that

servation of those

it

We is

may

an ob-

phenomena, which nature

presents to us at our desire, and of any otservatio72y that

it is

new

the witnessing of an

e.r-

periment^ which nature herself has instituted

and performs before

us.

But

if

from experi-

ment, or from reasoning on experiment, derive an accession to our knowledge, surely of

it

we is

no consequence, whether the ex-

periment have been performed by ourselves

17

by

or

deed,

it is

known us,

may if

others.

to

In

the

case

of mind, in-

urged, that the functions must be us, because they are

exercised by

and are exercised equally well, though we never have reflected on their nature

our exercise of a function was, of

sufficient

itself,

proof of our knowledge of

circumstances which combine in

it.

as

;

all

a

the

The most

minute acquaintance with the laws of our corporeal physiology does not enable us to invent

a single

vital function,

or to perform the ordi-

nary functions in any respect better, than they are exercised by the rudest of our race

even though

it

had no

disease, physiology interest

and

;

yet,

relation to the cure of

would be a science of much

instruction.

It is surely

then by a

very singular prejudice, that the physiology of

mind has been sometimes represented, science which can teach us nothing,

mere circumstance, paind are exercised

that the

as a

from the

same functions of

by the ignorant and the

18 All philosophy

learned.

operations of synthesis in the complicated

IS

;

is

not confined to the

and of

analysis, there

phenomena of mind an

almost inexhaustible source, which, in

many

cases, furnishes results as wonderful, as

any of

which the furnace and the prism have

those,

In the mind of man,

exhibited.

To remember^ to

gation.

hope, idea

all

all is

compare, to

aggre-

fear, to

imply more than the simple original

which

is

their subject

;

aad often

form

to

a single judgment, or a single passion, innumerable circumstances have concurred.

It is

in the

power of analysis to retrace those circumstances j and,though we cannot decompose thecompound,

and exhibit

it

in definite parts,

we

can state the

order of combination, and discover, in some of the leading circumstances, analogies which

connect the * aggregate with other compound *

It

is

not meant to be asserted, that any conception

or passion of the ideai or desires,

mind

is

the union of a

number of

which have actual separate existence.

The most complex

of our feelings

is still,

we have

every

19 That, by a process of

feelings.

perform

in niind

an office similar, in

to that of the chemist in

scarcely perceived

by us

;

effect,

external matter,

is

because the frequent

use of material solvents, with

and

the vivid

marked changes which they present

well

we

this kind,

to

our

organs of sense, tends to induce the belief, that,

where such solvents are not employed,

there

is

no

analysis

but reason

:

strument of analysis in mind.

is

To

reason to believe, but one affection.

It

the in-

itself

require, that

is

termed

poundt rather as being preceded by certain ideas, consisting of them.

But,

in

such cases,

we

tf-

com-> •

i

as

id by

are

the very constitution of our nature, to considtr the af. fection as equhalent to certain others,

ner as

if it

actually involved them.

m

the sa-r" man-

It

is

on

tin.

Ten-

dency that the mathematical sciences are wholly fou ded.

Though our

idea o^ ten

as our idea of one,

the other

when we in

;

we

is

as

much one

consider

affection of

as involving

it

and we perfectly understand what

are told that one

this sense

only, as

a

is

mind,

many of i:.

meant,

a fraction of ten.

It

is

feeling of equivalence, rather

than a perception of number, that I speak of the ana. jytic

power of the mind.

that relation

But to the mind, which

of equivalence,

it

is

precisely the

feels

same

thing, as the perception and separation of actual number.

20 it

should decompose

hibit

them

its

compounds, and

in parts to the eye, or to

organ of external sense,

mand

;

for the process

is

ex=^

any other

an absurd

is

de-

wholly internal, and

has regard, not to actual number, but only to those relations of our ideas, of which

we

are

conscious, and which exist only in our con-

The

sciousness. it

is

subject

and the instrument,

confessed, are different

other respect, the parallel

is

;

but in every

complete.

analyse our thoughts, by reflection, as lyse matter,

mere

we

by the use of other matter.

We ana-

The

functions, indeed, as the powers of me-

monj and comparison^ we do not attempt thus to simplify, but only the ideas

remembered and

compared: for the functions themselves are in truth nothing

more than

the names of certain

general circumstances of resemblance, in classes

of the phenomena of mind,

like

the general

circumstances of resemblance, in the material

world, to which

we

give the ilame of laws of

21 action

;

and we never attempt

to analyse cor-

puscular attraction or repulsion^ but only to separate the heterogeneous particles, which are

attracted or repelled. tion,

It is

some general func-

however, that most readily occurs to us,

when we think of mind

;

and, as

all

men

knovvr

equally well that they

remember and compare,

a superficial thinker

may

ceive, that all

men know

thus be led to con-

equally well the com-

plex intellectual phenomena included in those functions.

An

error of this kind could not

have arisen, had any of the more complex

phenomena of mind been consideration.

The

originally taken into

feelings

of taste and of

moral approhation, for instance, but

how few

exist in all

are conscious of the

and emotions, associated perhaps

at

many

j

ideas

very distant

times, which mingle in the feelings. In the

same

manner, every one perceives rocks and flowers,

and the various other bodies on the surface of the earth,

though he may be wholly incapable of

a: :

The

distinguishing their elemental constituents.

separation of these elements

is

operation of ingenious labour

;

confessedly an

but

it

requires

a process of analysis, at least as refined, to fix the theories of taste and of moral approbation

and the only difference difference

which

our admiration,

To

cases,—

certainly should not diminish

—

is,

process

that the

formed, without any apparatus.

in these last

visible

is

per-

and complicated

say, that all the materials of the

process exist, and have always existed, in our consciousness,

Is

no more than

to say, that the

materials of combustion, the theory of

which

has only of late been opened to us, exist, and

have always existed, in our

The

common

fires.

very same materials were used, for the

dally purposes of

life,

long before philosophers

had Inferred the laws of

their

combination

from discoveries made by the addi-

nor was

It

tion of

any new substance, that the modern

theory of combustion arose, but only from

at«

23 tentlon paid to circumstances, which,

though

before disregarded, had been always open to

our observation, and from the

just neglect of

circumstances, which had been imagined with-

There

out proof.

is

surely, therefore, nothing

absurd in the supposition, that, by attention to circumstances before unregarded, and perhaps too by the omission of at present

we may

some hypotheses which

may have been

discover

new

too easily admitted,

analogies and relations of

thought.

The

various prejudices, to which even the

most philosophic mind is a

sufficient proof, that

subject, are themselves

man, though conscious

of every aggregate conception, as one existing

compound,

is

parts.

often a single idea in the

It is

not conscious of

the presence of which

by

is

all its

elemental

compound,

wholly unsuspected

us, that decides the feeling of approbation

or disapprobation, of truth or of falsehood,

B 2

;

0^4

with which the

compound

is

viewed

;

and the

opinion would, in such cases, be altogether reversed,

if

could be

the presence of the extraneous idea

made sufficiently

comprehended

in the

apparent.

The

ideas,

word government^ are

perhaps not the same in any two individuals

and

still

more probable

individual

is

accuracy, his is,

is it,

that not a single

able to analyse to himself, with

own very general

however, a good or a bad

conception.

citizen,

He

independ-

ently of that analysis, and merely as the great-

er

number of images, of

curity

and peace, prevail

oppression, or of sein the

compound, so

as to excite the feeling of respect or of disaffection.

Even

liberty itself, that truly British

name, has often become a term of unjust suspicion, even to

men who have been disinterest-

ed and virtuous, and desirous of the happiness of their race, in those unfortunate times, when the name, which they would otherwise have

revered, has been profaned, by the turbulence

^6 of faction, and associated with any recent and therefore lively images of the horrors of revolutionary licentiousness.

To make all men con-

scious of the elemental parts of their various

conceptions and belief, would be, in truth, to destroy the empire of prejudice over the hu-

man

understanding.

The

feeling of astonishment

may be always

considered, as a proof of the discovery of some striking circumstance before

mere learning of is

acquired with

ment and ;

The

unknown.

new name, where no

a it,

idea

never produces astonish-

therefore, if the philosophy of

mind

were only the invention of names, for ideas already conceived and understood in relations, its

most refined

not surprised, w^hen we hear, for the

y^b,

that

is

their

disquisitions w^ould

be received by us without emotion.

ih^X judgment

all

We first

are

time,

a substantive and to judge

animus

is

2i

the Latin synonime of

B 3

26 mind^ and memoire the French of memory

and though the

citizen, in Moliere's

was astonished

to find, that

prose

without knowing

all his life

f

comedy^

he had spoken it,

his aston-

ishment did not arise from the mere name, but

from the discovery,

that a

word, which he had

formerly considered as expressive of some mysterious excellence of language,

We are

had so very

astonished,

when

we

learn, that a part of the tasteless air

which

we

breathe

simple a meaning.

is

the source of acidity

ing learned that property,

we

feel

;

but, hav-

no prolonga-

tion of our astonishment, in being told, that

the

name oxygene

the atmosphere.

is

given to that portion of

It is sufficient, therefore, for

the present argument, that surprise in us

by the results of analytical inquiry

and excited

in

many

excited

is

in

mind,

cases as strongly, as

by

those discoveries in chemical analysis, which are universally allowed to -add to our ledge.

The

know-

vulgar would gaze with astonish-

3

21 were they to perceive an

tnent,

flame gunpowder with an

would not be

less

electrician in-

icicle

;

but they

confounded by those dazzl-

ing subtleties, with which metaphysicians would

persuade them, that the very actions, which they feel to be benevolent and disinterested,

had

their source in the

ishness,

of

principle of self-

which makes man a knave or a

.Whether false, is

same

that particular doctrine

of no consequence

:

are nearly as wonderful

;

be true or

the whole theory

moral sentiments presents

oiir

tyrant.

results,

and indeed the

ness of any particular doctrine

is itself

mena

men had

false-

one of

the strongest arguments that can be urged if all

hich

v>

:

for,

equal knowledge of the pheno-

of their mind, no one could advance an

opinion on the subject, with real belief of

which another could discover

to

it,

be erroneous

In the different stages of the growth of a pas' sion,

what a variety of appearances does

sume

5

and how

it

as-

difficult is it often to trace, in

'2S

the confusion and complication of the paroxysm,

those calm and simple emotions, in which, in

many

cases,

it

originated

!

A very small num.ber

of circumstances, which have perhaps nothing in themselves that

seems capable of any great

and v/hich would probably have been

influence,

and have passed away in

slightly felt,

ference, if they had

indif-

occurred to others, are

often sufficient to determine to vice, or virtue, that

which

is

as yet

nothing more, than an ob-

scure and indefinite desire of something unpossessed.

The

love of domestic praise,

and

of the parental smile of approbation, which

gave excellence to the

may expand,

with

first efforts

little

of the child,

variation,

into the

love of honest and honourable fame, or, in

more unhappy circumstances, may shoot from

its

natural direction, into

all

and madness of atrocious ambition. cases, the self-deception

is

out,

the guilt In

many

even greater, than

the mistakes of unphilosophic observers.

That

1>9

which

a contradiction in language, and even

IS

in thought, has

human

gance of

been

verified in the extrava-

passion.

same moment, and even love

at the

tensely,

when

it is

is

The

very fury of jea-

often nothing more, than the ardour of

affection, united with

ces,

some

trifling

of dread, and suspicion,

vanity

;

m.ost in-

conscious of nothing but of

malignant resentment. lousy

can love and hate,

It

but the

circumstan-

and mortified

compound emotion

resemblance to that which

is its

bears

little

great constitu-

How

different is the passion of the miser,

as viewed

by himself, by the vulgar, and by

ent.

the philosophers ly of the

!

He

is

conscious himself on-

accuracy of his reasonings on the

probabiHties of future poverty, of a love of

economy and of temperance, and perhaps justice.

To common

observers he

lover of money.

They

the passion in

mature

its

is

too of

only a

content themselves with state

;

and

it

would not

be easy to convince them, that the most

self-

30 denying avarice involves as

its

essence, or at

least originally involved, the love

of those very

pleasures and accommodations, which are sacrificed to

it

without the

least

now

apparent re-

luctance.

The

theory of taste

is

as that of the passions.

at least as

The

feeling of beauty,

so various and yet so immediate, to us with

all

men

;

complicated

is

common

but philosophers are

still

contending, as to the circumstances which combine in producing as

much an

it,

while to the vulgar it seems

absolute quality of objects, as their

colour, or even their stature and form.

The

great national differences of Miaste, as exempli-

fying the

power of the

associating principle in

producing them, strike upon our conviction^ with

irresistible

force; but even

within the

same range of mountains, the same trict,

ly

the same family, the variety

conspicuous.

little

dis-

is

sufficient-

To comprehend

fully the

SI pleasure, art^

which

results

from any one work of

or scene of nature,

it

would perhaps be

necessary, that the whole series of sensations

and emotions

in the individual,

from the

first

enjoyments of his infancy, should be laid open to

There

our discrimination.

manent and unbounded something which

is,

in the per-

loveliness of nature,

and

strikes us, as too great

sublime, to have sprung from our

own

thoughts, and fugitive enjoyments.

When we

first

consider these as

learn to

its

little

source,

wq

have, in a greater degree, that half-incredulous

astonishment, which must have been experi-

enced by those, who, having cast their eyes for the

first

time on a temple of ancient Greece,

and feeling a sentiment of more than earthly awe, as

if

it

were the dwelling of the Thunder-

er himself, found,

who was

inhabited

it,

on entering,

that the

though imaged by Praxiteles,

only a

frail

and

blance of their

own

imperfect humanity.

sdll

God

finite

form, the resem-

32 If the

were

knowledge of the mental phenomena

in all

men

of the same kind, the only

dif-

ference in individuals would be in the number of their ideas

;

and there could be no

difference, in

that discernment of the relations ofideas, in

we suppose sagacity, and

invention, and

higher powers of the mind to consist

we

admit, that one

man

:

which all

the

for, if

m.ay discern better than

another the relations of those ideas which both equally possess,

we must

admit, that one

man

may discern innumerable relations, which others have not perceived, and therefore, that the science of m-ind, which

is

the science of those

relations, is capable of a degree of

ment, to which

Even

in

we

cannot

fix

improve-

any bound.

phenomena, which seem so simple, as

scarcely to have admitted combination,

wonders have been developed by quiry

!

Perception

itself,

what

scientific in-

that primary function

of the mind, which was surely the same before Berkeley examined the laws of vision as

33

now

at present, is

regarded by us very

ently, in relation to the

organs ; and all

it

differ-

most important of

would not be easy

its

amid

to find,

the brilliant discoveries of modern chemistry,

and even

in the

whole range of the physics of

matter, a proposition

more completely

ing to popular belief, than that which

revolt-

now

it is

easy to demonstrate, that the sense of sight,

which seems

to bring

the farthest hills of the

most extended landscape, and the very boundlessness of space, before utterly incapable of

our view,

is,

of

shewing us a single

itself,

line

of

longitudinal distance.

^ro attempt to enumerate the various lectual lysis,

phenomena, which are capable of ana-

would be a waste of labour.

preceding reasoning

may

unnecessarily minute its

intel-

tediousness

is

my

:

Even

the

perhaps have appeared

and

my only apology for

anxiety, that the science of

mind, to the future progress of which

I

cannot

54 look with indifference,

which

is

—

perhaps better

as the progress of that fitted

than any other

science, to give a general elevation to our faculties

and

pursuits,

and a steadiness and pre-

cision to those amiable propensities of

ture, which, without the

our na-

knowledge of

away

importaiit end, might pass

their

in false,

short, and frivolous benevolence,

and

—should be

rescued from the influence of a prejudice, which, if unfortunately received, w^ould

dour of

intellectual

quench

investigation.

all ar-

The

opi-

nion, which asserts the real knowledge of the

phenomena of mind in

all,

lliat

it

has indeed so

to

be alike and uniform

little

semblance of truth,

even a single argument in confutation of

may be thought

liave not

superfluous

;

and,

if all

the same knowledge of the pheno-

mena, the science of mind provable science, and

may

is

evidently an im-

continue to receive

light

from further inquiry,

9S

has already received light from inquiries

it

which are

past.

in the

same manner

35

The

our belief of cause and

which, in conformity with

fect, is

analysis of

this principle,

attempted in the following essay,

hoped, throw some additional

The

very important theory. in this,

as

in

many

which terminates

ef-

will, it ia

light

on

question

that

is

not

other speculations, one

in itself, but

connected

is

with every other inquiry, in the physics both

of matter and of mind.

From

a single mis-

conception, on this subject, arose

all

those hy-

potheses and abstractions, which wasted, for so

many

ages, the labour of ingenious

men,

in

rendering physics either a jargon of unintelli^

romance of an

gible sounds, or the It is

no small part of

quainted with

its

science, to

between phenomena, the mind of its

be well ac-

boundaries of inquiry.

long as any mysterious connection

from

ideal world.

is

As

supposed

man

must,

very nature, be curious to investigate

that mysterious tie

;

nor

^nge^ that the discovery

will the simple assuris

impossible, be suf-

ficieiiL

to destroy the curiosity,

and thus to pre-

vent the mvestigation that seeks to gratify It is

cf

much consequence

know,

to

it.

that the

invariablcness of antecedence and consequence,

which tion,

is

is

represented as only the sign of causaitself

the only essential circumstance

of causation, that

we

are not merely ignorant

of any thing third and intermediate, but have in truth

ing,

no reason

and that

this

to suppose

it

as really exist-

simple theory, instead of be-

ing in opposition to the sublime doctrines of religion,

is

equally favourable to

more mysterious

make

them

theory, or rather tends to

the great doctrines of religion

telligible

as the

more

in-

and sublime, by simplifying the ana-

logies of

hum.an order and

volition,

and by

destroying that supposed circumstance between the will cf Deity and the creation of the w^orld, which;, if

it

will, at least

be not greater than the creating seems

to divide with

it

deur and the glory of the magnificent

the graneffect.

;

OBSERVATION'S

CAUSE AND EFFECT.

That

Mr. Hume was an

acute thinker

taphysics, there are probably none, his

most daring antagonists,

to deny.

That he was

who

will

m me-

even of venture

also a perspicuous

me-

taphysical writer^ has been generally admitted

but

it

has been admitted, chiefly as a conse-

quence of the former

membrance of other respects,

that

praise, or

power of

from the

style,

re-

which, in

he unquestionably possessed.

In his shorter details of historical reasoning, no defect

is

perceived

;

because these afford

for the display of acute conjecture,

room

and of a

happy combination of those loose circumstances, which

to

common

observers appear altogether

unconnected, rather than for regular consecuc

38 tive

But, as a metaphysical

demonstration.

writer,

Hume

Mr.

is

in

no degree superemi-

nent in those qualities, which the devehpement

of an abstruse and complicated science pecu-

He

liarly requires.

seize s a first prin ciple, in-

deed, with singuSrrapidity ther exhibits

than brings

it

it

but, to us, he ra-

;

gracefully at different distances,

regularly and directly to the best

point of vision

:

and though,

the separate

in

views which he gives us of a subject,

we

are

always struck with the acuteness of his discern-

ment, and are often charmed with an ease of language and a pointedness of remark, which, without the levity of humour, have ful graces,

still,

v»^hen

we

expositor of a theory,

want of

strict

consider

we

methodical

all its

him

play-

as the

are sensible of a

arrangement,

for

which subtlety of thought, and grace of composition, are not able fully to atone.

most discover, that

his

We al-

mind had not been con-

versant with the close and continuous investigations of mathematical science that

it is

;

and we

feel,

the genius of his style, to illustrate^

rather than to establish.

39

The want

of strictness of method

may

per-

haps also be traced in part to those habits of

seems to have

refined scepticism, in which

it

been the early and

passion

Hume's mind

lasting

to indulge.

detection of fallacies in

of

belief,

was more

It

common

the

Mr.

of

in the

systems

than in the discovery of truths which

might be added

to

them, that he loved to ex-

ercise his metaphysical ingenuity

the detection of fallacies was

or, rather,

;

species of

that

discovery of truth, in which he chiefly delighted.

It

is

by the love of

which usually accompanies daring

curiosity, not

this unlimited

by the

that the intellectual character is

however,

display,

and

curiosity

itself,

vitiated.

There

is

a calm and silent scepticism of an inquisitive

spirit,

which has nothing

able, either to

in

it

that

unfavour-

is

closeness of reasoning in the

discovery of truth, or to exactness of theoretical

arrangement, in the communication of

to others. all

Such a

spirit is

even so essential to

inquiry, that the absence of

may be

it

it

in

any one

considered as a sufficient proof, that

he has not the genius of a metaphysician

c2

:

for

40 the science of metaphysics alysis

is

a science of an-

and we carry on our

;

when we

suspect that

ed a simple element.

analysis,

we have It is

only

not yet obtain-

not, therefore,

from

such doubts as have only further inquiry in view, that any important evil can arise

but there

:

is

a very great difference between the scepticism,

which seeks

first

principles only to

know where

inquiry must terminate, and that which seeks

them, only to discover and proclaim their apparent inconsistencies. is

thus produced

that there

is

;

and,

Astonishment indeed it

must be confessed,

a sort of triumphant delight in

the production of astonishment, which

it is

not

easy to resist, especially in that* early period

of

when

life,

the love of fame

is

little

more

than the love of present wonder and admiration.

But he who indulges

and seeks, with an

in the pleasure,

idle vanity

of acuteness, to

dazzle, rather than to enlighten, will find, that

though he may have improved *

We

Human ^ollegx!.

his subtlety,

by Mr. Hume, that

by

his Treatise

on

Nature was projected by him before he had

left

are told

41 exercises of nice and unprofitable discernment,

he has improved

the expence of those

at

it

powers of patient investigation, which give to subtlety

chief value.

its

sideration

of

to

perpetual con-

of the insufficiency of

inquiry,

all

may

from inconsistencies which

as deduced

seem

The

be involved

belief, is

in

some of our

more encouraging

than to perseverance

;

principles

to indolence

and though, from the

principle of curiosity, which, in our mental constitution, has almost the force of appetite,

it

intellectual

may

an animal

not be able to preclude the

exercise of our faculties,

it

will

tend to seduce them into a luxurious slothfulness of occupation, which prefers short and brilliant novelties, to truths

of permanent

lity,

but of more laborious research.

that

it is

To

uti-

shew,

not from any logical inference, or di-

rect induction, that

we have

derived

many of

those opinions, which, by the very constitution

of our nature,

it

is

impossible for us not to

hold, requires indeed a perspicacity and quickness of glance, but does not require any process of long continued reasoning.

c 3

The very

:

42 habit of ratiocination

which

subtlety,

and

antithesis

naturally

is,

:

is

odium attached

in

cessity,

thus apt to yield to a

almost refined into point

is

and

this

still

tendency, strong as

it

increased by the popular

to infidelity, in the great ar-

of general

ticles

is

belief,

many

which induces the ne-

cases, of exhibiting subjects

only by glimpses, and of hinting, rather than enforcing

a

A

proof.

long habituated to

mind, ahat has been

this rapid

and

lively species

of remark, does not readily submit to the regularity

of slow disquisition.

better fitted, for

;

immediately acute, or subtle,

that

is

grasping a single

than for unfolding a theory

but

It

we have some

evidently principle,

and we term

it

or ingenious

hesitation, in ascribing to

it

peculiar quality of intellect, which sees

through a long clusion, sential

train of

and separating

thought a distant conat

every stage the es-

from the accessory circumstances, and

gathering and combining analogies as itproceeds, arrives at truth.

length at a system of harmonious

It is

cessary, but

a quality to which acuteness

which

is

not

is

ne-

itself necessarily

im.

43 plied in acuteness

or rather

;

tion of qualities, for

a combina-

it is

which we have not yet an

exact name, but which forms a peculiar cha-

and

racter of genius,

of

is

in truth the very spirit

philosophic investigation.

all

Whatever may have been the source of the very manifest imperfection of arrangement in the

physics, there

no portion of

is

which the objection

is

more

trine, all the parts

The

The

ed to us. incessantly, tical

effect in a single

doubts

;'

mode

in

which

it is

repetition of the

and, even

same

when

irre-

present-

train of propositions is

by a

to

general doc-

obscured and perplexed, by the

gular and dilatory

'

works

of which might apparently

have been stated with greater is

his

applicable, than to

the essays on causation.

essay,

Hume's meta-

of Mr.

part

theoretical

the

broken '

scep-

whole

doctrine has been presented to us, the whole doctrine

is

formally delivered to us again, in

another long essay ^

in

'

on the idea of necessary

connexion,' v/hich differs in title,

little

from those which preceded

more than it.

From

44 this

confusion

which

has happened, that a theory,

it

in part indubitably true,

is

and

in part

indubitably false, has been either adopted altogether, or rejected altogether, without any discrimination of It

errors and

its

its

excellence.

therefore, be expedient, in our ex-

will,

amination of ficiency,

positions,

to attempt to

it,

by arranging

it

remedy

this de-

into a series of pro-

and considering each of these

in

its

regular order.

A cause may be defined * The word

the object^ or event^*"

event might, in strictness

be omitted, and

popular distinction

of language*

retained only in compliance with a

is :

for an event

is

nothing more than

the sudden existence of an object in those particular

cumstances

When

it

in

which alone

precedes

think only of the tion.

Thus,

it

it, in all

circumstances, even the vulgar

object itselfy in

as the sun

cir-

precedes some other object.

is

their reference of causa-

never visible without an in-

crease of heat, they have no hesitation in saying, that the sun is a cause

of heat.

But, when

it is

only in cer-

tain circumstances that one object precedes another,

almost lose sight of the object

itself,

we

and transfer the

causation to some term^ expressive merely of that change

of circumstances, by which the object begins to exist

in

of antecedence.

of

ts particular state

It

is the explosion

gunpowder,

45 which immediately precedes any change, and ivhichy existing

again

in

similar circumstances^

gun-powder, not the mere existence of the gaseous product in

common sion, to

state of

its

we

that

elasticity,

assign, in

language, as the cause of the violent concus-

which the

eventy rather is,

high

To

elasticity gives rise.

than an

as the cause of

object,

consider an

any change,

however, only to go back an additional step

reference,

and to ascribe the

stances immediately preceding

language, are termed

the

in

our

not to those circum-

effect,

which,

it,

in scholastic

proximate cause, but to the cir-

cumstances immediately preceding that proximate cause.

To the

universal priority of causes, there

at least, one apparent exception, in the

in

is,

mode of

name

consider-

ing the phenomena of the world, in relation to the sup-

posed will of the Supreme Being; signed, not to the prior, but to

The Jinal cause Thus, ties

of mind

those

of any thing

as adversity rouses

who

in

is

as the

term

is

then as-

the subsequent, event.

the good \v}i:ch folio zcs

and exercises the heroic

it.

quali-

the sufferer, and the benevolent qualities in

are witnessess of his suffering, a philosophic

optimist considers the production and strengthening of

those virtues, as the final cause of every physical

But

it is

evil.

evident, that, even in this application of the

term, the real impHed cause a double

metonymy, that

The two

events observed

is

it

prior

by us

placed for those circumstances,

have preceded them

in the

;

and

it is

only from

appears to be subsequent. are,

in the expression,

which we suppose to

divine

mind

only, that the consideration of that virtue,

;

and we mean

which adversity

would

46 he always immediately followed hy a

tvill

milar change.

si-

the sequence ob-

Priority in

served, and invariableness of antecedence in

the future sequences supposed, are

the ele-

ments which constitute the idea of a cause.

By

we

a conversion of terms,

obtain a defini-

tion of the correlative effect,*

would tend

to produce,

by which

Ikiofif

was the cause of that divine vo-

adversity exists.

It

is

the

in relation to

Deity alone, that the phrase

is

in relation to his design, that

good, which we term the

final cause,

at all inteUigible

and not the instrumental

observation appears to precede

it,

evil,

was

;

and,

which, to our

in truth the prior

circumstance.

* *

*

Mr Hume,

Similar objects,' says

Of

conjoined with similar.

*

Suitably to this experience,

<

cause to be an

*

objects,

*

the second. Or, in other

*

not been, the second never

*

are always

we have experience. therefore, we may define a this

olject, foilowed by another,

and where all the

similar to thejirst, are followed by objects similar to

words, where, if the first

had

existed^

stance, if very rigidly examined,

just definition of a cause

;

as

it

is

This

object

last

had

circum-

not admissible into a

excludes the possible

agency of co-existing objects, which separately might have been able to produce the existence or appearance of the second object.

With

the possibility, in

many

cases,

of such co-existence, even our present very -limited knowledge of the phenomena of nature, has made us sufficient4

Iv

47

may be

It

stated as the first proposition of

Mr. Hume's theory,

and

effect

that the relation of cause

cannot he discovered a priori.

In

every case, the second phenomenon must have

been previously witnessed thing in the

no-

is

appearance of any object,

first

which can lead us

for there

:

to predict the

appearance of

a particular object, rather than of any other, as immediately successive.

pation possible,

all

losophers, and birth.

into

A

men would be

equally phi-

would be philosophers

all

at

something more than an ugly stone.

of iron, and

A hand, for example,

may approach

ly the same direction, and city, as that

a loadstone

we regard

the loadstone,

it.

may hold with

it,

in

It

a piece

exact-

with exactly the same velo-

with which the iron,

have approached

would

if free,

itself

:n this case, t is evident, that,

whe-

the motion as produced by the hand, or the first ohject might

The

second might have existed. this

this antici-

lucky chance converted the magnet

ly acquainted.

ther

Were

circumstance,

is,

mt have

heeriy

and yet

by the

addition or omission of

however, of no essential conse-

quence to the theory of causation, which depends only

on the invariableness of the sequence fore, ventured to omit

given.

it,

in the

;

and

definition

t

have, there-

which

I

have

48 is

by experience alone we know,

like that

which

heap of sand, into

an

and

falls

is

raise a

will

that a spark,

extinguished on a

heap of gunpowder

irresistible conflagration.

perience alone

we know,

that

It is

the

by exof

sight

wretchedness will cause in one bosom no emotion, while

it

most equals

melts another into pity, that

al-

sorrow the grief which

de-

in

Without

plores.

with equal

we might

that experience,

reason

it

have imagined, that the

spark would have been extinguished on the

gunpowder, and

would

selves,

Of

in us

may be

unfelt

by our-

have excited no emotion.

the truth of this

stances as the

pain,

that

given, as

phenomena of

first

proposition, in-

numerous and various

nature.

The preceding

are taken from mind, as well as from matter, to

shew, as far as actual knowledge

is

the exact similarity of both cases. ter case, indeed,

priori, a

we may

often

seem

concerned, In the

lat-

to have,

knowledge of succeeding events

;

a as

motions are made in apparent adaptation to circumstances that are about to follow, before

49 the existence of those circumstances can have

By what com-

been learned from experience. plicated muscular action

acquired

first

Yet we have no reason

!

that an infant, to his

the

is

who

food of

life

to imagine,

for the first time applied

is

mother's breast, has any idea of the

milky stream that his little

vacuum

to flow^,

is

for

when he forms

The

reception.

its

ne-

cessary motions are the result of an instinct,

unerring, because accidents of

and est

perfect, because

left to

it is

follows the

it

not

arm

known

believed

will

is

concern-

same laws, whether That the

be followed by

to the

provident

arranged hy the high-

matter or in mind. his

the capricious

Wherever knowledge

wisdom.

moving is

not

human knowledge, and

ed, however, ^n

it is

desire of

its

motion,

swaddled babe, and

by the impotent

paralytic.

The

is

plea-

sure w^hich the contemplation of works of intellectual excellence inspires, has

never entered

into the imagination of the illiterate.

The

sions of love, ambition, avarice, are/e/^ lover, the hero, the miser

ture

is

;

by others

pas-

by the

their na-

learned from description, in the same

50 manner

we

as

acquire our knowledge of the

We think,

serpents and tigers of the East.

indeed, that the

phenomena of mind

are less

dependent on experience, than those of matter, because the greater number of emotions, and

even of passions, are, in some degree, to us so early, that

when

we have

known

forgotten the time

the experience was acquired

while the

;

external world presents to us a never-ending series

of

new

objects,

permanence, keeps our presses

on

it

and

at

memory

alive,

it

obliges us to

Yet, uniform as the mental phenomena

use.

most circumstances must be, how

even as

to

many

tries

to

!

different,

of these, would be the predic-

tions of individuals of different ages

tel,

and im-

the difficulty of discovery, by the

complicated apparatus which

in

once, by their

and coun-

No Roman would have scrupled to

that the

combat of

gladiators,

fore-

which was

be exhibited on the morrow, would be wit-

nessed with delight, by the most gentle and delicate of the virgins of

unaquainted with that

and

civilization,

Rome.

To

a Briton,

mixture of barbarism

such an assertion would seem

51 not

less

change

absurd, than if

in

the well-known order of material

What

phenomena. the world,

and,

when

tion, of

one

had predicted a

it

is

called

is

knowledge of

knowledge of the human mind

;

the address, and nice discrimina-

who

has spent a long

life

in scenes

of business, are contrasted with the artlessness

of a child, or even with the simplicity of a retired philosopher, feel, that, like all

intellectual

it is

impossible for us not to

other knowledge, that of our

and moral frame

is

dependent on

experience.

So

different,

however, has the nature of suc-

cession been considered, in the

mind and of matter,

that

on

phenomena of has

this difference

been founded a theory of power, which has

met with very general acceptance. from mind alone

asserted, that

idea of

power

;

and that the

the consciousness of our

It

has been

w^e derive

our

idea, acquired

own exertion, is

by

trans-

ferred to the apparent changes of external matter.

to

But, unless

lue

suppose the idea ofpoiver

have been otherzvise acquired^ what

we

call

52 fxertion^

is

nothing more than the sequence of

muscular motion

magnetism

to desire, as

the

is

sequence of the motion of iron to the approach

We

of a loadstone.

have, in each case, two

phenomena, but we have no more as

little

and we

;

we

ascribe desire to the loadstone, as

suppose the approach of a loadstone to have preceded our muscular motion.

we

ascribe, not desire^ but

stone,

we beg

If

power ^

the question

we

say that

to the load-

for power,

:

which

has a relation to future cases, as well as to the present,

is

something more than the mere

and motion, which

quence of

desire

took place

in exertion

and,

;

if

se-

that

is all

from one

se-

quence any inference may be made, as to the recurrence of sequences,

much from

it

may be made

the motion of iron, as from the

motion of a limb.

If

what we

feel

evidently desire which

be trans-

we

ferred,

it

Till the

muscular motion has taken place,

is

desire alone fore the

;

first

or, if

we

feel. it is

suppose, that, even be-

exertion, there

expectation of the result,

bined with

as

it is

belief, that the

is

an instinctive

only desire, com-

motion

will follow

5

55 it

is

combined with the

afterwards desire,

knowledge

that a

muscular motion has been

consequence, and with belief that

be followed by the motion

will again

it

but neither

:

its

is

the

combination of belief and desire transferred to the loadstone, nor, after magnetism has been

observed,

there less knowledge of

is

a past event, nor less expectation of

future similarity of event,

general principle all

as a fu-

appear, the inference, as to

will afterwards

to

it

too, as

In both cases, indeed, as

ture consequence.

mon

it

but

:

it

sequences,

is

is

made from one

a principle

com-

and which, we have

every reason to believe, would operate in the

same manner, though man were wholly incapable of muscular exertion*

It

is,

perhaps,

which Mr.

Hume

even too

authority,

gives to this error,

animal

allows, that the

much

perience, enters very

nisus^

much

It

feeling of

this

animal nisus,

from cases

in

is

which we ex-

into

the vulgar

more probable,

idea of power.

when he

that the

thoagh derived

which the exertion has eventual-

54 ly succeeded, enters largely into the vulgar

idea of restraint, or want of power.

But, that

the great and general error should have been

adopted by philosophers, countable

common

j

as

it is

is

peculiarly unac-

impossible to attend to the

language of the science of mind, with-

out perceiving

its

innumerable derivations from

the analogies of matter.

The phenomena of

mind succeed each other

in a certain order

phenomena o^ matter

the

culiar order

:

but, were

also

we

-

have their pe-

to judge,

by the

language of each, from which of the two se-

quences our idea of power bability It is

is

would seem on the

derived, the pro-

side of the latter.

only in poetry, that wishes and volitions

are given to inanimate objects, while, even in

common desires

we never speak

and passions of the

series of

around

conversation,

soul,

of the

without a

metaphors, taken from the objects

us.

And, indeed, when we

consider,

not the language only, but the very thoughts

and

we

abstractions, of

which theories are made,

discover innumerable attempts to material-

ize every operation of the mind, but very few

attempts to spiritualize the operations of matter.

How much

have

we

heard, of images,

in the sensorium, of

and impulses, and traces vibrations,

and vibratiuncles, of animal

electricity,

and galvanism

a single

!

There

is

spirits,

scarcely

new generalization of those phenomena

of matter which have been long familiar to us, or a single power in matter inferred from the observation of

new phenomena, which

has not

been immediately seized by philosophers, and applied to

mind

;

as if

it

were the great busi-

ness of metaphysical science, to

the slight analogies

!

of metaphor,

those internal processes, of which scious, could

systematize

and

we

as

if

are con-

be simplified, by the interposition

of additional processes, of which

we

are not

conscious, and which are themselves equally inexplicable, as the

adduced

phenomena, which they are

to explain.

That there to animate

is

in the nature

of man a tendency

and personify every object around

him, has indeed been sometimes urged, as a proof of

the^

general belief of the immediate agency of

D 2

56 mind. In

all

Planets,

it is

spirits

;

the changes of the material world.

contended, have had their regent

and Oreads, Dryads, and Naiads, have

formed a part of popular mythology.

In such

cases of supposed belief, however, there

is

often

nothing but a mere figure of rhetoric, or a gay

pomp

of worship

itself

almost rhetorical, which

may be considered as little more than a very lively prosopopoeia. But, even in those cases of real belief,

in

which the personification has not arisen

from allegory and

poetic embellishment,

it is

easy to trace the source of the supposed agency: for the

nymphs of

classical superstition, like the

fays,

and other shadowy beings, of our own

local

mythology, are usually represented, raover

ther as Inhabitants of certain districts,

which they preside, and sionally appear,

in

when any

which they occa-

great part

Is

to

be

performed, than as connecting and carrying on all

the regular and uniform natural processes,

which are exhibited is

to

our daily view.

It

only where great and unusual phenomena

occur, and no visible cause the immediate agency qf

Is

discerned, that

spirits is

supposed.

It

5? is

a digjius vindice nodiis^ and a god

fore introduced, because mind,

only power that

is

itself

is

which

thereis

the

altogether invisible,

furnishes the only analogy to which recourse

When

can be had.

sounds, therefore, are

heard from the mountain, the grove, or the stream, while around the hearer no blast stirring

5

when

aloud, and

fire flashes

many thunders

stilness,

not wonderful, that the heart and knee of

man

should

of a mighty result of

fall

prostrate, as in the presence

But

spirit.

this belief is

only the

an analogical reasoning, which, in a

certain stage of physical science,

and

cries

from clouds, which, the

moment before, were one gloomy

very it is

a voice of

is

differs not, in the slightest

is

irresistible,

degree, from a

thousand other reasonings of analogy in physicsj,

in

which the cause supposed

ual but material. cases,

in

which

It

the

is

from

that

general

not

spirit-

confined to certain

analogy of

striking than any other,

is

and

theory,

is

life is

more

very different

which ascribes a

supposed living power to the production of every change.

The Roman, who heard D 3

Jupi-

58 t^r

rjeigned,

and acknowledged

sky,

the

in

that he

saw and recognised an endless suc-

cession of material causes, in the

more common

spontaneous changes of nature, and in the daily arts of life

;

and while

in the public field of

exercise he drove the ball, or watched fell

it,

as

it

and rebounded from the earth, he never

once imagined^ that a god was

at all

concerned

in the operation.

The

most probable source of the error, as

relating, not

merely to cases of inferred ana-

logy, but to every instance of change in matter^ is

the continuance of apparent rest in bodies,

when not under ternal force.

the influence of a manifest ex-

The

rock, which,

many

ages

ago, was swept from the mountain's side, re-

mains

still,

received

it,

in the

and

is

same spot of the valley which scarcely distinguishable

from

the fragments, which the desolation of yester-

day has spread around ive

power of animals,

it

:

while the locomo-

as exerted

by

fits

of

longer or shorter duration, renders visible to

us the beginnings of motion from absolute

^59 rest

the whole train of vital changes being

;

composed, partly of motions, which are

and partly of

ible,

vis-

mind, which

affections of

are invisible, and the invisible affections being

neglected by us, in our consideration of the visible

only,

motions,

which appear

though, in

reality,

one continuous sequence.

they It

usual, to term matter inerty as

at

intervals

are

parts of

has thus been if

capable only

of continuing changes, and to distinguish mind as

alone

changes.

mind ing

active,

But

and capable of beginning

this

assumption of a quality to

instead of favouring,

distinction^,

the

by a new and

strik-

pure doctrine of imma-

terialism, tends only to furnish

its

antagonists

with a ground of triumph, by permitting them to suppose, that they

have shewn a complete

similarity of the principles of

mind and

when they have shewn nothing but hood of one

ent,

mind

is

that

enough^

which

is senti-

and that we have no reason

that our sensations

have any

the false-

It is

asserted difference.

to maintain, that

matter,

to suppose,

common

nature

with their unknov/n external causes, the

se^

60 parate existence of which,

however, though

undemonstrated, and undemonstrable, it

impossible not to believe.

But,

we

feel

when we

have admitted the existence of matter , as the

we

external cause of the sensations of mind^

are not justified by induction, in affirming, that

any created matter

is less

capable of beginning

changes, than any created mind.

All

is

only

a continuance of changes, and often of mutual changes. ter,

without the intervention of mat-

If,

thought arise after thought, and passion

after passion, as often, without the interven-

tion of

mind, does the motion of a few small

particles of matter

produce in other masses a

long series of elemental motions. If mind often act

upon matter,

as often does matter act

upon

mind; and though matter cannot begin a change of

itself,

when

all

the preceding circumstances

have continued the same, as

little,

when

all

the

preceding circumstances continue the same,

such a change possible in mind.

It

is

does not

perceive, without the occurrence of an object to

be perceived, nor

tion of

some

will,

without the sugges-

object of desire.

The

truth

is.

m mind

certain changes of

tliat

invariably pre-

cede certain other changes of mind, and certain

changes of matter certain other changes

of matter, and also that certain changes of

mind ter,

invariably precede certain changes of mat-

and certain changes of matter invariably

To

precede certain changes of mind. that

mind produces motion

in matter, while

matter cannot produce 7notion in mind,

an abuse of language

manner, be

said, that

cannot produce, in

:

for

mind

itself,

say,

it

is

is

but

might, in like

because

inert,

it

or in other minds,

that painful sensation of heat,

which

is

imme-

diately

produced by the contact of a burning

mass

or that

;

many

of the most powerful che-

mical solvents are inert, while another solvent alone

is

active,

because from the use of that

one solvent alone a particular product can be derived.

The

changes, produced by mind in

matter, are indeed

more obvious

to the per-

ception of others, and

more

able, than the changes,

produced by matter in

mind

;

but

it

is

directly

measur-

the simple production of a

change, not the nature of the change produced.

62 which

essential to the

is

apparent rest of matter

The

repose.

;

is

Even

and

the

action, rather than

particles of the quiescent

jire all attracting,

repelled

argument.

mass and

attracted, repelling,

and even the smallest indistinguish-

able element

is

modifying, by

joint instru-

its

mentality, the planetary motions of our system,

and

is

performing a part, which

sential to the

harmony of

is

perhaps

es-

the whole universe

of worlds.

The litions

distinction

which has been made of vo-

and desires is another circumstance, which

The

has in part contributed to the mistake.

number of

desires, of

which the mind

is

sus-

ceptible, are as various, as the objects of good.

Of

these,

however, only a certain number

ter-

minate in some direct and immediate motion,

and are

called

volitions ; while those,

which

have no such direct and immediate termination,

have the simple denomination of

Thus we

desires.

are said to desire wealth, and to

the motion of our hand

;

but,

if

ivill

the motion

of our hand had not followed our desire of

6S moving ;^o

we should then have been

it,

but to desire

will,

its

The

motion.

said,

not

distance,

or the immediate attainahleness of the good, thus the sole difference at

but, as the v\'ords are

present used, they have served to produce a

belief, is

:

is

that of

tJie

same immediate good there

both a desire and a volition

tion

;

that the volir

which moves the hand, for example,

is

something different from the mere desire of

moving

it,

the one particular motion being pre-

ceded by two affections of mind, a volition and a desire.

Of

we have no

this

double affection, however,

consciousness, the desire of

mov-

ing a limb, in the usual circumstances of health,

being always directly followed by

its

whatever interval of opposition there

motion,

may have

been, in the motives^ or desires of more distant

good, which preceded the desire of the particidar muscular motions, as that distant good. desires, as

It

is

indeed only in such

have no direct termination in mo-

tion, that the equilibrium is

means of obtaining

conceivable.

The

and pause of motives

^nd the ambitious

may

voluptuary

his love of pleasure with his

man

balance

love of health,

his love of

power with

64 his love of ease sires

and security, because the de-

of pleasure, and of health, and of power,

and of

may

ease,

any

separately exist without

immediate and invariable

suggesting oc-

effect,

casionally different objects of thought according

to the casual associations of ideas free

and healthy

state

:

but, in the

of the body, to desire

the motion of our hand

move

to

is

it.

The

which moves a muscle, considered,

volition

without reference to the muscle, as an affection

of the mind alone,

differs

not more from the

desire of any trifling object of distant enjoy-

ment, than the desire of ease desire of that

power

what we

diately

call

by some

what we

call

any

that

followed imme-

affection of

our body, and

our

arrangement

is,

is

a volition

is

followed immediately

affection of

quality of

from the

and the only difference

a desire

by some other in

;

differs

our mind.

It is

desires, therefore,

in the order

not

but in

of nature^ by

which certain corporeal changes follow certain desires^ that the distinction of volitions sires is

precedes

founded its

;

and de-

and the particular voHtion

particular muscular

modon,

in

no

pther manner, than any other change, material

65 or mental precedes the change, which to

it

it is

is

second

But, though

in the order of sequence.

thus apparent that our volitions- are only

short desires, which necessarily are not lasting,

because they are immediately followed by the attainment of their object, trace the circumstances,

not

it is

difficult to

which have led the

vulgar, and even philosophers, to consider the

mind, as

two

affections of

One

of the chief circumstances

essentially distinct. is

the confi-

dence, which, in the case of voluntary tion, is

combined with the

We desire the motion of the motion

that

therefore,

is

will

We desire

desire.

wealth, and do not believe that

it

will follow

our hand, and

follow.

The

:

:

know

volition,

desire combined ivith belief

mediate sequence

mo-

of im^

yet the belief does not arise

from any peculiar circumstance in the desire itself,

but merely from the experience of the

order of sequence, by which the desire has terminated in the particular motion

;

and

in the

case of sudden palsy, in which no motion fol-

lows

this

compound of

compound

and

belief, the

the same.

The term

desire

itself is exactly

5

66 ivill is

not denied to be a convenient term, for

distinguishing those desires, ivhich have instant

termination in the muscular motion that object,

directly

from those

is

their

ivhich relate to objects not

and immediatehj

attainable,

and

there-

fore not accompanied with the belief of direct

and immediate attainment

:

but

still

it

must

not be forgotten, that the mental part of the sequence, which exists in our consciousness alone,

is

a desire, that differs not from our

other desires, more than those others mutual-

Another circumstance, which has

ly differ.

contributed in a very important degree, to the

mistake,

is

the universal habit of confounding

the desire which immediately precedes muscular

motion, with those other desires, by which

may have been

itself

it

preceded, and of con-

sidering the will in the process of comparison

as

co-existing with the opposite desires, not

simply as that desire, vj\iich.folldws the perception

and belief of the greater good.

hence often said inaccurately, to sition to

our desire,

were onlv two

as if in the

affections of

We

will in

are

oppo-

process there*

mind, a desire and

:

67 a volition, so essentially diiFerent in their nature, that the will

was the choice of what was

Thus,

not desirable.

any one be compelled

if

weight in his outstretched arm,

to support a

under fear of a more painful punishment should draw

it

;

and,

if

he

back, he will soon experience

a degree of fatigue that able

if

almost insupport-

is

he continue to keep

tended, he will be said, in the

guage of philosophers,

his

arm ex-

common

lan-

to will the very pain,

which he cannot be supposed

to desire.

the direct object of his desire

not the motion

of his arm

;

it is

is

simply relief from pain

the direct object of his continued will

is

But

:

and

not the

continuance of pain, but simply the extension

of his arm. pain will

He

knows indeed that

relief

from

be immediately procured, by draw-

ing back his

arm

;

but he knows also, that a

severer punishment will follow that motion

and therefore, preferring the greater, he directly desires

nued extension of

his

ject of his desire

were not

arm.

less

pain to the

or wills the contiIf the direct obrelief

from

pain,

but actual muscular motion of his arm, there

— 68 can be no doubt, that the motion of his arm

The

would immediately ensue.

error of phi-

losophers thus evidently consists, in not distinguishing, with sufficient accuracy, the se-

parate sequences of events, in a complicated pro-

With regard

^

cess.

says Dr.

to

our own

Reid,—* we may

not will, and will what

desire

what we do

we do not

what we have a great aversion

actions,'

desire to.

;

A

nay,

man

athirst has a strong desire to drink, but, for

some

particular reason, he determines not to

A judge,

gratify his desire.

and

justice,

from a regard

to the duty of his office,

dooms

to

a

criminal to die, while, from humanity or particular affection,

he desires that he should

live,

A man for health may take a nauseous draught, for which he has sion. is

desire but a great aver-

Desire therefore, even

some

ment

no

action of our

to will, but

it

is

own,

desire to do.'

adduced by Dr. Reid,

In his

may be all

its

object

only an incite-

not volition.

termination of the mind

what we

is

when

The

de-

not to do

these instances

mistake consists in

neglecting or forgetting that part of the pro-

69 cess, in

which there

is

a real opposition of de-

and supposing an opposition,

sires,

in another

part of the process, in which there really

none

for, in not

:

one of the instances,

is

is

there

the smallest opposition in that particular desire,

which must, according

to his

denominated by him the

mind never

tion of the to do

ivill. is,

own

system, be

The

determina-

and never can be,

what we do not desire

When we

to do.

take a nauseous draught, there

a

is

dislike,

indeed, of the sensation which follows the tion, self^

but there

is

no

dislike of the

motion

which alone depends upon our

which

is

desired

by

us, not

ivill^

from any

it-

and

love of

the disagreeable sensation which follows that

mo-

for

it,

would be an absurd contradiction of terms,

but from our greater dislike of that continuance of bad health, which

we suppose

to

the probable consequence of omitting the tion.

The

desire of

be

mo-

moving the hand and the

muscles of deglutition

is

a desire, as

much

se-

parate and different from the dislike of bad health, as is

a

new

from the

dislike

desire, arising

of the draught.

from the

It

belief of less

70 one of two unavoidable

evil, in

In like

evils.

manner, a judge, who condemns a criminal

when,

death,

if

he yielded to

humanity

his

would spare him, does not

alone, he

which he

single actio?!,

is

desires, of

which

may have

:

has a

he has a desire of the public good,

and of acting station

He

from death an unfortunate

desire of saving ;

a

his will is not

a part, but only the consequence.

individual

will

not desirous of per-

forming, whatever opposition there

been in those

to

in a

manner worthy of

his

high

both these desires exist previously to

those that are termed his volitions, by which

alone he

dooms

litions arising

the criminal to death

;

the vo-

only from the belief of a greater

good, in the same manner, as the desire of

fame

arises

from the contemplation of fame,

or any other desire from the contemplation of its

object.

That the

another desire, stance in

is

will is a desire following

true

common

:

but

with

which are not considered culiar determination, the

it

has that circum-

many

other desires,

as involving

any pe-

desire of ease per-

haps inducing immediately the desire of wealth.

71

and the desire of fame, the ambition of power.

Nor

of any consequence to the distinction,

is it

that those

muscular contractions,

in

which our

volitions terminate, are objects of trifling

in themselves,

and are desired, only

of obtaining a

more

as

distant but greater

good

means good

:

for this circumstance, also, our volitions have

common with many of our other desires. He is indeed a miser of no vulgar proficiency In avarice, who loves gold for its own sake in

alone

:

and, though the love of fame be not

and universal passion, which

that sole

been described by the

satirist,

sured, that at least the greater

it

has

we may be

as-

number of

the

objects of our apparently selfish

and luxuri-

ous desires, which have no reference to the happiness of our fellow creatures, and which are sought

our

lives,

by us

in all the restless business of

and changed and renewed, with an

ever-varying desire of elegance and comfort, as if for

our

own

personal enjoyment, are va-

lued by us, not for the

which we are

little

to receive

the means, which they

direct enjoyment,

from them, but for

seem

to

offer,

E 2

of in-

72 creasing, at

however dear a

tion in the respect

which we

For I

cost,

our estima^

and regard of the

society in

live.

the sake of simplicity and conciseness,

have confined the argument to those mani-

fest

and indisputable

muscular motion.

volitions,

am

I

what has been termed

which precede

not ignorant, that

the will

is

supposed to

possess an empire over the affections of the

mind, as well as over the subject muscles, and therefore not to terminate uniformly in the pro-

duction of motion

:.

which are applicable

but the same arguments, to the motions of muscles,

are applicable also to those supposed volitions,

which precede

The

certain thoughts.

in truth only another

name

for desire;

are not conscious, in such cases, sire,

and afterwards of

desire

more or

less

volition,

first

and we of de-

but only of

permanent and

the will had the power, which

will is

lively.

it is

supposed

to exercise, over the course of thought,

it

must

consist, either in causing the existence of idea,

If

which would not otherwise have

an

arisen^

7S or in preventing the existence of an idea^ which

would have

arisen, in the

To

ous association.

of a particular idea

istence

is

will directly the existence

surely to have that idea

is

To

already present.

order of spontane-

will directly its

a contradiction in terms

;

as the

will implies the existence of the idea

make

the idea

imply

its

more

in

peculiar liveliness.

but

;

still

up other

we have no

will ideas

is

admitted,

such direct

we have

:

by

indirectly ^

which we know

ideas,

connected with them direct will

It is

they affirm, that

our power, to

calling

and the

or rather would

lively,

indeed, by many, that

it

;

very

of such a desire would tend only to

liveliness

influence

non-ex-

be

to

yet the supposed in-

nothing but the existence of desire,

attended by the usual ideas of association, or is

another expression of that direct volition of

an idea, which

Thus,

if I

which

w^as

I

it

am

is

confessed to be impossible.

wish to remember a piece of news,

communicated

said to call

to

me by

up the ideas which

have been associated with

it

in place

a friend,

I

know

and time,

the idea of the person, of the spot, of the

e3

to

atti-

74 tude, of the other circumstances which

the subject of conversation

:

but to will the

existence of any one of those ideas

the idea directly

and,

;

if I

were

can

to will

is

will the idea

of

the person, or of the spot, without any idea of

my

the person, or of the spot, implied in lition, I

known

may

idea,

as readily will

which

Indirect volition

is,

is

once the un-

the object of

my

search.

therefore, exactly the

thing, as direct vohtion ries

at

;

vo-

or rather

it

is

same a se-

of direct volitions, and cannot therefore

be adduced, with the view of getting rid of any inconsistencies,

which may be implied

direct volition of a particular idea

The

us.

*

in the

unknown

to

true and simple theory of the recolto

be found in the permanence of the

lection

is

desire,

and the natural order of the associated

A desire,

ideas.

which passes away, without

the suggestion of any ideas associated V7ith object,

desire tion, Its

;

is

by every one allowed

but,

if it

to

be a simple

be of any considerable dura-

during which such associated ideas

name

termed a

is

its

immediately changed, and

volition.

arise. it

is

In the case of recollection

75 already instanced,

I

do not

call

up the ideas of

the person, the spot, the attitude, and the vari-

ous circumstances communicated to

me

but

:

I

have a desire of remembering something which

was

told

me by my friend, at a

and

certain time;

the spot, the attitude, the circumstances, rise

The

according to the usual order of association.

remembrance of these suggests the idea of something said at the time.

If it suggest that par-

ticular part of the conversation

which

is

wish-

ed, the desire of course ceases with the gratification of it.

If it suggest

any other part of

me

desire continuing keeps before

remember what

the occurrence

of

new

manner, we are sometimes banish

them

is

knowing

that

another,

we may

Avith the

either

I

gratification,

objects.

evidently

or

In like

said voluntarily to

To

disagreeable reflections. directly

till

the

all

wish, or the wish itself die

I

away, in the hopelessness of in

the

the idea of

the person and the place, and allows ideas naturally associated to arise,

it,

impossible

banish :

but,

one idea awakes by association voluntarily take

hope of being led by

it

E 4

up a book, into a

new

i6 order of thoughts, or give ourselves to any oc-

may

cupation, which

In

step, for,

there

this,

all

induce trains of

its

nothing but

the

is

first

which can be considered as voluntary

when

new

the

train has

begun,

ready relieved us, without our will

we

own.

have that

will

has

it

;

al-

and that

:

or desire, which precedes the

muscular actions necessary for taking up a book, and fixing our eyes on

its

pages,

We are said indeed, also, to

denied.

the book. Attention

is

rise

immediately.

that there

is

tend to

We

desire

;

we expect

are led to believe,

a peculiar volition in

from the mere

attend to

merely the lively and per-

inanent desire of those ideas^ zvhich to

not

is

because,

it,

different

when we

at-

any particular object, our attention :

but

the nonexistence of foreign ideas does

not

seems to us

arise

to exclude every foreign idea

from any

will

attempting to exclude

them, which would in truth imply their

exist-

ence, but from the simple fact, that no foreign ideas are associated with the object of the peculiar

desire.

That desire of perusing the

pages of the book in our hands, which

is

term-

77 ed our attention to

book

it,

is

associated with the

more than with any other book,

itself,

or any other subject of thought

and

;

it is

not

wonderful, therefore, that the attention should

be uninterrupted, as long as the object of desire is

not fully attained.

Sometimes, indeed,

which the pages suggest, awake

the ideas,

other ideas, so lively, as to occupy us with the temporary reverie still

more the

;

constitutes

book

itself,

recal

and, in spite of such occa-

we

sional distractions, till

but our attitude, and

sight of the

our original desire

volume,

:

continue to peruse our

the desire of perusing

it,

which

our attention, be either overcome

by some stronger

desire, or terminate in the

final

and complete gratification of our

The

attention of composition

same kind.

It

ately writing

on a

is

is

curiosity.

exactly of the

only the desire of immedicertain subject, which, be-

ing of course associated with the ideas con-

nected with that subject, more than with any other ideas, that are not connected with the subject,

seems to exclude those foreign ideas,

merely because

it

does not

suggest

them.

78

When, however,

they occasionally occur, the

which we

feeling of the posture in

sight of the implements of writing,

books and other objects before

common

vivid than the cal

sit,

and the

and of the

us, being

ideas of

more

memory,

re-

us speedily to our original design, and^

therefore, to the ideas connected with that de-

sign

and we

;

finish

our composition, without

the intervention of any other

phenomena of

mind, than the permanent desire of writing on the subject;, the occurrence of the usual ideas

of association, and that sense of their truth or falsehood, their propriety or impropriety, which

depends only on the co-existence of the ideas,

and it

is

is

altogether independent of our desire,

unnecessary, to carry this examination,

through tary

all

command

would be, desire

the supposed instances of volun-

The argument

of thought.

in all, exactly

of the same kind.

which does not pass away, without sug-

gesting ideas of association, and which

companied with the

belief,

object will speedily follow, cases,

A

we

shall

is

or hope, that

is all

acits

which, in such

be able to discover.

19

The

various circumstances of supposed dif-

we may

ference in our desires and volitions,

therefore conclude, are not such as establish

any

The

essential distinction.

will

a desire,

is

of the same class with our other desires, and

term of use only

to denote the belief

combining with

diate attainment, as belief,

desire

however, which itself,

The

a

of immedesire,

a

not involved in the

but arises from the observ^ed

that a certain it.

is

is

fact,

motion has immediately followed

belief of the essential

difference of

volition has, ho\tever, contributed very large-

hhe

ly to the

theory of the idea of power,

which supposes

it

to

be derived exclusively

from the changes produced by the mind

which

is

is.

the

mere wish of something

common

lieve, that it,

for,

which we are originally conscious in

as all, of

voHtion,

:

to

our

all

what remains

in

it,

desires,

future,

we

be-

and distinguishes

must be something very mysterious, and

very great, to which

it is

peculiar manner, the

force,

or poiuer,

easy to attach, in a

name of

connection^ or

or any other name, which

scholastic philosophers

may have

devised.

80 TriE idea of power,

I

elude,

we may

therefore C5n-^

not derived from the invariable con-

is

nection of certain motions with our will, or

from any other phenomena of mind, more than from the common phenomena of matter, both which furnish

trains

only as their

own

respective sequences differ

themselves.

The very feeling of power,

among

or of connection,

of sequences,

if it

were

that differ,

to arise, as is as-

from our consciousness of the opera-

serted, tions of

our mind, would be

part of a

itself

only a

more complicated mental sequence.

In neither case can the antecedent alone, out experience, inform us of that which follow

;

and therefore the

first

of cause and

effect

with-^ is

to

proposition of

Mr. Hume's theory must be admitted, relation

new

that the

cannot he discover--

ed a priori.

The theory tion

second proposition of Mr. Hume's is,/

that^ even after experience, the rela-

of cause and

by reason. the past.

effect

cannot he discovered

Experience can inform us only of

But the

relation of cause

and

effect

81 has reference to future and invariable antece^

dence and sequence, of which no experience can inform sistibly

;

us.

We

it is

:

He who

opposes.

A will always

more than he who

ways been followed by tion

indeed, irre-

and

as-

be followed

by B,

as-

asserts, that

A has

al-

B

and

;

it

is

this addi-

which forms the very essence of the

tion of cause

on^

found the belief on reason

this proposition

serts, that

serts

it,

and the belief is not denied

ly the attempt to

which

believe

effect.

rela-

Neither of the pro-

positions includes the other

;

and, as they have

no agreement, reason, which

is

the sense of

agreement, cannot be applied to them. use the language of logic, there

is

To

no major

proposition expressed or understood, for there is

no middle term

;

and the syllogism

the source of our belief, ;

there-

In the hope of discovering

fore Imperfect.

induction

is

to the

we may widen our

phenomena, which ourselves

have witnessed, we may add those which Nature has exhibited, since the creation of the

universe:

may

be,

it

but,

however large our induction

cannot be made to comprehend those

82 changes, which have not yet begun to exist. Till

it

be shewn, therefore, that the future

involved in the past,

we must

is

allow the truth

of the second proposition, that, even after experience, the relation of cause

and

effect can-

not be discovered by reason.

It has been contended, indeed, by some,

very eminent philosophers,

that,

although our

knowledge of the greater number of

facts in

physics be unquestionably derived from experience, so as not to

have been acquirable by

reasoning a priori^ there class

of

facts,

is

a very extensive

which are altogether indepen-

dent of experience, and of the laws of thought

immediately connected with experience, and

which are therefore capable of being inferred, before observation, with complete and inde-

dependent certainty of the ertia

of matter, and the phenomt»na

composition of forces, and of

statics,

urged, as instances of this kind. cases of supposed belief, sible,

The

result.

or at least very

it

is

in-

of the

have been

In

all

such

almost impos-

difficult, to

separate the

from the

subject,

ideas,

which we have ac*

quired by the experience of our whole

But, admitting that

we

have, as

and independent

original

of matter,

it is

life.

asserted,

is

an

belief of the inertia

evidently only an instance of

by which we be«

that general law of intuition

circumstances of two events

lieve, that, all the

being the same, the effect of those circumstances will be the

same

the inertia of matter,

observed

its rest,

or

we must

its

To

in both.

previously have

motion, and must con-

which the

ceive, that all the circumstances, in rest or

tered.

conceive

motion was observed, continue unalIf,

therefore,

it

be a law of thought,

immediately connected with our experience, that,

from similar circumstances, we expect

similar

circumstances, the belief of the con-

tinuance of the same rectilinear motion, or of rest,

*

may be

This

the case of

considered

as

original belief of the rest,

continues during

inertia life,

no apparent inconsistencies observed

phenomena; but with the other the

observed

phenomena

are

originally un-

'^

of bodies, in

because there are

in

any subsequent

case of

apparently

inertia

all

inconsistent,

the velocity of bodies being continually retarded,

by

friction

84

The

avoidable.

mena of

belief of

the composition of forces,

however be confessed,

not

is

strictly

same law of thought,

to the inertia

any of the pheno-

of matter

menon of the

as

it

reducible

that of the

since the resulting

;

composition

is

must

pheno-

more than the mere

continuance, or repetition, of any fact before

observed to infer

:

and therefore, a priori,

it

it

if it

be in our power,

must be allowed, to form

an exception to the universal necessity of experience in physics.

When,

motion in the same streight to a

body

at rest

having observed

line

communicated

by a moving body, we contwo equal bodies mov-

sider the possibility of

ing with equal velocity, in sides of a parafriction

and other resistance, and the

when above

changed by the tendency of

comes fact,

h

is

difficult, to separate in

gravitation.

It thus

be-

our imagination the simple

from the phenomena which concur with

it

;

since

of the concurring phenomena alone, that we have

uniformly that

rectilinear motion,

the surface of the earth, being continually

had experience

those,

who

and accordingly we

:

readily

assent to

find,

the proposition,

that a body, at rest, will for ever remain at rest, unless

put

dulous,

in

motion by some force applied, arc very incre-

when they

hear, that

cation of force, to prevent a

taining

its

velocity for ever.

it

requires an equal appli-

body

in

motion, from re«

:

and meeting

lellograiii,

at

a third body,

we

are supposed, to be able to infer, a priori^ the

But we

diagonal motion of the third body. are not entitled, in this case, to

two of the bodies,

served alone. tuation,

as

when

the two w^ere ob-

Three bodies,

may have

altogether

existing in exactly the

as

same circumstances,

consider any

in

a

attractions, or

certain

si-

repulsions,

from those, which take

different

place in two; as, in chemistry, a small increase

or diminution of the quantity of oxygene, com-

bined with a^ote, produces similarity to the past

:

;

may be

ous.

potash burns ani-

the two bodies, in combination,

do not burn animal matter. it

have no

observed action. Sulphuric

acid burns animal matter

mal matter

effects, which

In this instance,

said, the bodies are

not homogene-

But, in the phenomena of comm.on mo-

tion, the

homogeneous or heterogeneous na-

ture of the masses

is

never taken into account

and, if we had no experience of the general

facts of chemistry^ and no experience of the composition of forces^ fer,

we should

as readily in-

from the separate action of sulphuric F

acid

86

and of potash, a

compound,

as

we should

infer,

nomena of simple impulse, tion of a body, impelled

The same

directions.

forms us that the

of action in the

similarity

from the phe-

mo-

the diagonal

at

once in different

experience, which

particles of matter,

in-

by chang-

ing their place, in certain combinations, receive different properties, informs us, that the

of matter, brought into various

solid masses

properties

:

the same

continue to possess

combinations,

but

still it is

experience which thus

enables us to form a separate science of che-

mistry; and, without that experience, as readily

we might

have inferred a variation in the ap-

parent qualities of the masses, on the introduction of a third mass, as of the particles, on the admixture of

new

particles.

Even homo-

geneous masses, acting on each other, without decomposition, have their mutual action varied,

by a

slight

difference

of place

though the difference occur only vicinity,

it

in

:

and,

very close

might have been imagined, before

experience, to occur as readily at one distance, as at another,

and

to consist as

much,

in the

y

87

mere termination of that repulsion, by which impulse

produced, as

is

the mutual conver-

and repulsion.

sions of attraction all

rii

bodies seem to

fall,

they

till

tual contact with the earth

:

To the come

vulgar,

into ac-

yet w^e have every

reason to believe, that no such actual contact takes place, and that even two bodies, which, at

all visible

homogeneous

distances, attract

each other strongly, produce in each other, by the change of a single invisible line of distance,

a tendency to motion, which

The apparent

posite.

stances

is

altogether op-

difference of

circum-

not greater, in such a case, than in

is

the co-existsnce of three instead of tv/o bodies

and

;

if

tendencies to motion exactly op,

posite can

be produced by a single

tance,

surely not

it is

that they should be

of a that

new body. it is

duced

:

more wonderful,

of

dis-

a priori

produced by the presence

Experience, indeed,

tells us,

the former case only, not in the

in

that the

latter,

line

but

still

change of tendency

is

we must

it is

confess, that

proex-

perience alone^ which gives us this information

;

and

that, if the

change of tendency had F

2

:

88 been produced stance,

in

both cases, the only circurA-

from which the diagonal motion

is

sup-

posed to be deducible, would have been destroyed.

When

two bodies meet,

at a third,

we

are not to

in directions exactly opposite,

consider the state of the third alone, but the

whole phenomenon, of which the third a part.

The

but

presence of a third body

is

may

perhaps, in such circumstances, suspend, or variously change the repulsion, which was ob-

served between the two alone.

may remain

may

To

at rest,

give the

it

or the two external bodies

return, with various degrees of velocity.

name of

to such cases,

as

All the bodies

is

the composition offorces^

in truth to

beg the question

;

takes for granted, that \he forces remain,

though the

situation of the bodies

be

different

and yet how much has been founded on

mere verbal assumption

!

The

real inquiry

whether we can have absolute priori^ that, in such

cases

of

composed.

certainty,

new

tions of circumstances, there are to he

this is,

a

combina-^

any forces,

There may no longer be a

single /orce in existence.

All which our sup-

89 position

can assume with certainty^

there

a meeting

is

is,

that

of bodies, v/hicb, in dif-

ferent circumstances of combination, possess-

But a meeting of

ed certain forces.

from the assumed

a very different thing position of forces

;

as

rience, to determine, It is

bodies

it still

coin-

sends us to expe-

whether any forces

exist.

unnecessary to repeat the argument, in

application to the Vv'hich

is

its

phenomena of equilibrium,

are exactly of the same kind, as the

meeting of three or more bodies, considered

under the more general doctrine of the composition

and opposition of

evident, that, in

ference of cases

may

all

forces.

It is

phenomena a

priori^

whatever those

be, the very supposition of inference

implies, that the circumstances, in

bodies are imagmed, are nev/ circumstances, tainty, that

;

we cannot have

which the

and, in newabsolute cer-

the qualities, before observed in

different circumstances, is

indeed

cases of the supposed in-

remain unaltered. There

always, however, a tacit supposition,

by those who

assert the possibility -of

ferences, that the bodies, in the

F3

made

such in-

new circum-

90 stances in

have any

which they are imagined, are not to which were not observed

qualities,

in the prior circumstances to

assume a

license

but

:

this

is

surely

of supposition, beyond

that of strict philosophy.

That a very

slight

difference of the circumstances of bodies pro-

duces, or, which

is

to us the sam.e thing, ren

•

ders apparent to our senses, qualities altogether dissimilar

from those with which we were be-

fore acquainted, sics,

is

the very peculiarity of phy-

which renders experience

essential to just

belief; and, therefore, to take for granted, in

our enunciation of a physical doctrine, that bodies in

new

any new

qualities,

circumstances are not to have

and afterwards

on the mere assumption, sibility

to

attempt,

to establish the pos-

of inferring, a priori^ the phenomena,

which those bodies would

exhibit, in the

circumstances supposed,

is

a

new

paralogism in

physics, as gross, as that opposite error in

ma-

thematics, which asserts the actual measure-

ment of the angles of to

triangles of various kinds,

be necessary to our

belief, that

the three

91 angles of any triangle whatever are together

equal to two right angles.

It thus appears, that the very

which

absolute and independent

the

asserts

some

certainty of

false opinion,

physical inferences, derives

whatever semblance of probability

it

may

have,

from the assumption of the very circumstance^ which doubt.

in physics

is

There are

the great object of our

many

which

situations, in

bodies appear to possess the same qualities there are

many

seem no longer and seem even

other situations, in which they to possess the to possess

opposite to the past. situations

is

the

qualities,

discriminate these

work of experience

of combination, are new, infer the

same

quahties which are

To

where the circumstances,

to

;

;

and,

either of position, or

we

are not entitled

permanence of any

quality, ob-

served in different positions, or in different combinations.

But, though the opinion were not

liable to this objection,

to that great is

common

it

would

still

be

liable

and fundamental objection, which

to every case of physical causation.

92

Though we should

admit, that, from the ob-

servation of simple impulse

we may be

led to

suppose the diagonal direction of the motion of a third body, impelled by bodies moving in

we

the sides of a pararellogram,

not be led to suppose

it,

than that, with which

certainly can-

with greater assurance,

we

believe a repetition

of the rectilinear motion to be produced by a repetition of the simple impulse lief

of

and our be-

impulse

this future rectilinear

inference

:

from any induction of the

is

not an

past,

how-

ever frequent our observation of cases exactly similar

may have

been.

Unless, in similar

cir.

Gumstances, the future be exactly similar to rectilinear

mo-

from the impulse of one body, nor

dia-

the past, there will be neither tion,

gonal motion, from the impulse of two bodies.

To

predict any one event, with logical cer-

tainty,

would be

in either case impossible.

the continuance of gravitation, in

ail

If

the fu-

ture time before us, be not a necessary truth, it

any of the future

surely cannot be said, of

unobserved phenomena of

pend on

the

coiitimiance

statics,

of

uhich de-

grci'vitatio'n^ that

;

93 they are not contingent, but of absolute inde-

We

pendent certainty.

might thus infer the

certain existence of that, which, for

son that can be given by

There

existence.

is

may never have

no phenomenon whatever,

of which the prediction after

us;'

any rea-

not contingent, even

is

innumerable instances of

it,

as a past se-

quence, have been witnessed by us

:

and, be-

fore the sequence has been witnessed

by

us,

the uncertainty cannot in any instance be less,

but must, on the contrary, be m^uch greater as,

even in the cases, in which alone the

ference

is

supposed to be possible,

on an assumption, which

is

it

in-

proceeds

contradicted by

our general physical knowledge, that bodies, in

new circumstances of combination, always ret?dn their

former properties, and have no additional

properties,

which can modify

their joint action.

The

cases of imagined inference a priori^

may

therefore conclude,

tion to the proposition of

form no

in

real excep-

Mr. Hume's theory,

which has been considered by is

we

us.

every case necessary to our

Experience strict

un-

doubting belief; and, to repeat the Vvords of

94 the proposition, even after experience the relation

of cause and

effect

cannot be discovered

by reason^

The is,

that the relation

object

of cause and

The

of belief alone.

ledges,

Mr. Hume's theory

third proposition of

is

irresistible,

principle of our

but

derived from

only, and not

the qualities of external things. proposition if

we have

it is

To

it

to the

of any quality, which

from

this third

iriferred,

preceding two

for,

incapable of being

is

our

:

belief,

however

ed and certain, can result only from that stinctive principle

of

faith,

dence of things not seen. therefore,

is

a

impossible to deny our assent,

given

perceived or

he acknow-

belief, is

own nature

an

effect is

which

is

fix-

in-

the evi-

Of this behef alone,

the relation of cause and effect an

object*

The

three propositions, already considered,

form a whole, independently of those which follow.

They comprehend

theory, on which Mr.

all

Hume

that part of the

has unfortunate-

95 ly dra\^Ti unjust suspicion,

by giving

which the vanity and

and

folly

guilt

have taught us to hold in dread. ed

it

sceptical doubts ; but

derate

scepticism,

it is

which

He

of genius has term-

suffers

us to take

which

at all

deserves our approbation. In every

reasoning, however small positions, there

tion

belief,

only part of the theory

in truth, the

is,

mo-

a mild and

shelter in a first principle of intuitive

and

name^

a

it

its

number of pro-

must always be one proposi-

assumed without proof ; and

it is

not won-

derful, therefore, that, in our reasonings con-

cerning matters of fact, Mr.

been able

we

believe^ rather

cover^ the relation of cause

had

it

He

and

than

dis-

But

effect.

been true, that the relation of cause and

effect is is

should have

such a proposition.

to point out

has shewn us, that

Hume

immediately perceptible in objects, or

fairly discoverable

have been

in the

some other

by reason,

it

would

power of scepticism

to

still

shew

principle, which, in

our reasonings

we

believe, rather

concerning matters of than discover.

Mr.

that every reasoning,

fact,

Hume

has indeed shewn,

which implies the

belief

;

96 of causation,

in

is,

some degree,

hypothetical,

and depends on the truth of that faith by which

we suppose

the relation of cause and effect

but the reasoning must have been, hypothetical, and have depended

at

any rate,

on the truth

of some assumed principle, not more general-

This remark will be afterwards

ly admitted.

of more importance, when

we

the

consider

dangerous consequences, which have been supposed to flow from Mr. Hume's theory.

It is

a remark, of which, apparently, he was not

He

aware himself. sible fallacy of

to

seems to consider the pos-

our reasoning on matters of

fact

depend wholly on the assumption of the

fu-

ture similarity of antecedents and consequents, as if struck with

'^LYid,

sition

should be believed

to give a

which

wonder, that a propo-

is,

*

intuitively, attem^pts

sceptical solution' of the mystery,

in truth,

no

solution, but only an

unwarranted limitation and modification of

and which, though still

to

leave

some

it

it,

were perfectly just, would

intuitive belief, as mysterious,

be wondered

future inquirers*

at,

but not to be solved, by

97

At

were confined fect,

our inquiry might

this point,

and

to the relation of cause

ef-

without reference to the particular opi-

nions of any theorist.

We

belief of that relation, for tion,

rest, if it

have traced our

which no percep-

nor inference, can directly account,

to its

source, in the constitution of our mind, and

we have

thus discovered the origin of that idea

of poiveVy for the developement of which,

we a

shall afterwards find,

much

ir«

Hume

supposes

longer and more complicated process

Power

to be necessary.

that

Mr.

invariahleness

is

nothing more, than

of antecedence^ which

The

implied in the belief of causation. lief,

as

indeed,

is

instinctive

;

is

be-

but the ideas, whick

flow from that belief, must be the same, whether it

be founded on immediate perception, or on

the slower results of reasoning, or on the instinctive feelings

of our mind. If v/e consider a

loadstone, not merely as that, the appearance

of which preceded the motion of a piece of iron in

its

of which

vicinity, but, as that, the will, in all future time,

by the motion of

appearance

be followed

a piece of iron in

its

vicinity.

;

98

we have

as clear

of the loadstone,

a conception of this quality

—

its

Newtonian sense of its

dusky hue

:

for,

aitraction^ in the strict

that term,

—

we have oF

as

without such a conception,

our belief o{ the future unexisting fact would be impossible.

It

may be

said, indeed, that the idea

of attraction is an affection of our mind only, not derived from any similar affection or separate existence of external matter; but the idea of colour is

nothing more than an affection of our mind,

and,

if it

be impossible for us not

one to external

objects,

it is

to ascribe the

equally impossible

for us not to ascribe the other.

Of this

of the loadstone magrietism

the particular

name, from which power

is

differs

quality

only as

it is

general name, including, with magnetism,

a

all

cases of future invariable antecedence, w?hat-

ever the antecedents and consequents

We

know

not what

it is,

may

which renders

it

be.

im-

possible for us, not to ascribe this particular

antecedence to the loadstone more than to but as

little

do we know what

ders the dusky loadstone,

it is,

flint

which ren,

more than snow, an

absorber of certain incident rays of

light.

The

99 idea of power, in

it

may even be

every other idea, or, at

we

the words which

we speak

said, is implied

least,

is

implied in

use to express them.

When

of the whiteness of snow, the heavi-

ness of iron, the ductility of gold,

we

allude

to these, not as past sensations only, but as fu-

We

ture qualities.

take for granted that

si-

milarity * of the future to the past which, re-

ferred to a particular object,

*

An

is

powder

and we

j

attempt has been made to found an argument

on the etymology of many of the words of causation

common

But

and consequence. the

thing

meaning,

before,

may

it

should be remembered, that

when nothing

signify

is

is

much

added to

the thinp; ^which

nvays be before, as the thing nvh'ich has alivays

Even though

in

signifying originally only antecedence

use, as

this

odify

its

ivill

aU

hem before.

objection were om.rLted;, aud tho' --h

every word, significant of power, were? sliev/n to r.can

only antecedence, the argument would be cf very

weight

;

for,

little

whatever be our theory of the relation of

antecedents and consequents, as closely or loosely conioined, a cause

must

still

be a thing before; and

a circumstance of obvious distinction alone, or

equally obvious, which ers

we must suppose

it is

such

some other

the rude fram-

of language to have adopted in their classification of

events.

To how

coarse and heavy an original have

many

of our most refined and avinged words been traced by the acuteness of mode; n philology

!

lOO

mean

to assert, that

snow

to-morrow and

will,

for ever, be white, iron heavy, gold ductile.

The

something stronger, than

belief, that

mere precession however

certain

implied in power, and in expressions of

all

agency and

arisen, in a great

and

similar, is

the synonimou^

production,

has

measure, from our habit of

applying sequence, and other similar terms, ra-

phenomena which

ther to the successions of

are past, than to those which are to come.

the past,

we have known

uniform sequences

;

casual, as well as

and, as the peculiar

cumstance of uniformity

is

In

cir-

comprehended with

proximity in the single word cause,

we

are ac-

customed, for conciseness, to adopt that word alone, or

some other

single

word of the same

meaning, when the great circumstance of ^'ariableness

and

is

meant

to

be strongly expressed,

to apply the terms of

ly to those events, in

casual.

mere

succession, on-

which we have no regard

to uniformity of order,

cessions, therefore,

in-

and in which the suc-

may have been

altogether

Cause and sequence thus assume to

101

our mind an appearance of opposition, rather than of similarity.

When, however,

our

in

speculations on the connections of events,

reduce cmise^ by analytic definition, to

its

we two

elements of immediate priority and invariableness,

we

are obliged, as

we cannot

use any of

those single words which are exactly tautolo-

gous, to revert to the use of the term sequence^

and

to qualify

Yet the

by some appropriate

adjective.

influence of the former habit of op-

position first

it

still

remains

;

and therefore, on the

enunciation of the proposition, that cause

we

and

effect are

feel

a sort of discrepancy, in the words cause

but a species of sequence,

and sequence^ which the mere addition of the adjective invariable

is

not able to remove.

from want of

hesitation, in part also, arises sufficient

Our

attention to the difference of unijorm

and invariable antecedence.

Uniform antece-

dence, which has reference to the past only,

does not imply the idea of power able antecedence,

merely to the

;

but invarir

which has reference, not

past, but to every future case^ is

^he most exact definition, which can be given,

G

;

102 of power.

this

we have an accurate

and of more than

Ception^

veption

Of

:

for,

this

we do

we have knowledge

to assert, that

tual existence of a third

ty,

we have no

not

mean

of the ac-

intermediate object

would only transfer a supposed

from one

con-

though we speak metaphorically

of a bond connecting events,

as this

con-^

difficul-

object to another, and leave, be-

tween the new antecedent and

its

consequent,

an invariableness of sequence, as inexplicable as before.

It

is,

in truth, not as expressing

more than invariableness of sequence^ but merely as being the strongestfigurative expression

invariableness of sequence^ that bond^ and

of its

various synonimes, have been introduced into

the popular philosophy of cause and effect

:

for

the only circumstance^ in which two bodies,

bound

together, differ

from two

which are not bound together,

similar bodies, is,

that

in the

former case the appearance of one of the bodies

is

a

mark of

the immediate appearance of

the other, in future time as well as in the present, while, in the latter case, nity, that is perceived

by

us,

any casual

vici-

may be broken

103 by the

A

slightest accident

strict

of the next moment,

examination of our

own

feelings

be confessed to furnish, in a case of the most satisfactory evidence.

we have no our heart tard

its

;

this

power over the motion of

direct

because the wish to quicken or re-

motion

not followed by an increased

is

are convinced, that

we have

no foreign obstacle

sire

its

to

we

because

;

moving

believe, that the desire of

be always followed by

but

:

in health a direct

power over the muscles of our arm

is

kind,

We believe, that

or diminished velocity of circulation

we

must

motion,

impede

it.

it

when

will

there

The

de-

and the motion are immediately successive;

and the

belief of the invariableness of this sue*

cession of the motion to our desire constitutes

the belief of our muscular power.

who

contend for

it,

as

Let those,

implying invariableness

of sequence, but as involving also something

more mysterious parate in their

as essential to the belief, se-

mind the circumstances

involv-

ed, and imagine an individual, such as their antagonists represent the whole constituted^ that,

human

race, so

mthout the presence of

G 2

the

104 mysterious circumstance supposed^ the motion

of his muscles

is

immediately and invariably

successive to his desire of

moving them

:

ac-

cording to their supposition, this anomalous being, though he be admitted to possess experience of the past immediate sequence of the

motion to

and complete assurance,

his desire,

that the sequence will be always the same, can still

have no greater

over his

own

belief, that

he has power

muscles, than that he has power

over the motions of the planetary system, since

he

is,

by supposition,

destitute of that,

which

they contend to be essential to the idea of

power

;

yet

it

surely impossible for us to

is

imagine, that, in such circumstances, no belief

of power would be

that he

is,

ly

from

is

creation,

in

his

felt

by him,

any respect, constituted different-

brethren of mankind. That power

no one supposes.

Though

merable successions of causes and taken place, the

effects

innu-

have

particles, v^hich constitute the

present world, are,

we have

believe, exactly the

same

stituted the

or, indeed,

world

at

every reason to

particles,

the time of

which con-

its

creatiori.

105 Certain particles, however, have often changed their place,

and have always followed the change

of place of certain other

This

particles.

But

merely uniform, or unvaried^ sequence.

he who,

is

in addition to this, believes in invari-

able, as well

as

uniform, sequence, bL4ieves,

by the very force of the term which he useSj that the past antecedent will always be follow-

ed by the past consequent^ or, in other words, that,

when

the circumstances are the same, the

former change never can take place

ivithout be^

Events which are

ing followed by the second.

invariable cannot be considered as loose casual

J

for these are the very qualities to

invariableness effects^ in

is

opposed

:

They

and

the strictest sense of those terms.

in(^uire

;

what the mutual matter

which

are causes

In what their invariableness consists,

surd to

and

consist.

case, that a

as

it is

absurd

it

io

ab^

to inquire, in

attractions of the particles of

We

body

is

in

believe,

heavy

;

we

the

latter

believe, in

the former case, that the body will always b^

heavy

;

and with the nature of the

attraction,

or with the nature of the perpetual simiiaruy

Q 3

10(>

of the attraction, no experiment nor reasoning

can ever

make

us

more

intimately acquainted*

TTo attempt to account for them, by the assertion of a7> operating principle in causes^

be

satisfied

with a change of sound, when, as

far as that

change

the idea

the

is

significant

is

same

for, if

:

and

intelligible,

be

difficult to

it

comprehend invariableness of proximity, tached to the word cause, to

to

is

comprehend

it is

We

operating principle.

to the

on the gravity of bodies, by

ciple in a cause is

a

who

should

had thrown much

that he

consists in their iveight

word^

should not think

highly of the philosophy of him, flatter himself,

:

at-*

equally difficult

as attached

it,

as

light

asserting, that

it

and an operating prin-

tautology , equally inele-

a

gant, and equally unsatisfactory.

It

sweet-making principle in

and aprin^

ciple in

siveetness,

redness which mahes

it

red

:

is

like

redness,

sweetness, invariableness of antecedence, are all

which can be understood.

This

definition of

power,

«rged, however applicable

it

it

will

perhaps be

may seem

to the*

•

z'

107

phenomena of the subordinate inapplicable to that

the

universe,

is

mighty agency, from which

phenomena of the subordinate universe

ceived their origin

;

yet

and,

of agency, with which

if it

re-

there be any species is

inconsistent, the

general definition of power cannot be received.

As the ideas, which we form, of the nature of the Deity, are drawn from the phenomena, which are

more immediately

tion,

and

mind,

—

chiefly

his

present to our observa-

from the analogy of our own

goodness, as conceived by us, be-

ing only a greater degree of that goodness, of

which we have the consciousness and the idea of

his designing

in ourselves,

power, as mani-

fested in the beautiful order of the universe,

being only an inference from that order which ourselves produce, that

—

it

seems scarcely possible,

our conception of power, as applied to

the Supreme Being, should be altogether ferent his

from our conception of

creatures

:

it,

dif-

as applied to

and indeed, when we analyse

those great but obscure ideas, which rise in

our mind, when we attempt to creation of things,

we

ihirxk

of the

feel, that it is sdll

only

/

108

we

a sequence of events, which ing,

consider-'

Sire

though of events, the magnitude of which

allows us no comparison, because

common

thing in

which

fall

has no-

it

with those earthly changes,

beneath our view*

We do

not see

any third circumstance, existing intermediately,

and bindings

:

we

made

of the

wei-e, the will

see only the

visible to

divine will

Om*

moment,

evident, that^ in the case

as if

itself,

our imagination, and

ture, at the very is

it

Creator to the things which are to

nipotent

be

as

na-

all

rising around.

It

of the divine agency,

as well as in every other instance of causation,

the introduction of any circumstance, as a

bond

of closer connection, would only furnish a

phenomenon, though

it

to

be

itself

were possible

connected

:

new

but, even

to conceive the closer

connection of such a third circumstance, as

is

supposed, between the will of the Creator and the rise of the universe,

deed, but

it

it

would diminish

certainly cannot be

supposed to

elevate the majesty of the person

scene.

Our

feeling of his

in-

and of the

omnipotence

is

not

rendered stronger, by the slowness of the com-

:

109 plicated process

it

:

is,

on the contrary, the

immediate succession of the object to the desire,

which impresses the force of the omni-

The

potence on our mind.

impression, thus produced,

and sublimity of scriptive

of the

liveliness

the very

is

charm

that passage of Genesis, de-

of the creation of light, so often

quoted, and so often read with admiration *

And God

was

light.'

said, let there It

from

is

be

light

stating

;

and there

nothing more

than the antecedent and consequent, that the majestic simplicity of the description

God

speaks, and

it is

thing intermediate. tion of his power,

done.

is

We imagine

no-

In our highest contempla-

we

believe only that,

he willed creation, a world arose, and all

derived.

when

that, in

future time, his will to create cannot exist

without being followed by the

rise

of worlds

that his will to destroy will be, in like

followed by destruction

;

and

;

manner,

his will to

vary

the course of things, by miraculous appearances.

The

will is the only necessary previous

change;

and that Being has aimighti/ power, whose

ever^^

lid will is

immediately and invariahly followed bV

the existence of

The

its

object.

adoption of

this

simple definition of

creative, as well as created,

from much of

power, relieves us

that confusion, in

which the phi-

losophy of cause and effect has been involved

by

There

scholastic phraseology.

in

is,

the

strictness of language, but one cause, the proxi-

mate event, or the proximate combination

of'

circumstances, in the order of priority; though, as the proximate event has other circumstances,

which invariably precede

mote cause may be allowed circumstances, is

when

is

remote

to those

a single order of events

considered abstractly.

of B, which

the term re-

it,

A, being the cause

the cause of C^

termed a remote cause of C.

may It

itself

be

must be

re-

membered, however,

that the

term

not as expressing any

new and

different species

is

allowed^

of relation, but merely for the sake of conciseness, to prevent the necessity of

naming every

intermediate event in the order

;

there

is

and

that, as

a perpetual interferenoe of such ordersr

ill

of events, in

the

of simultaneous

variety

changes which nature exhibits, the uncertainty

of any practical confidence in remote causes

must

increase, in a very high proportion, with

The terms pre-

their distance of antecedence.

disposing in like

and occasional cause may be allowed,

manner, for the convenient expression

of those circumstances of longer continuance^

and of immediate occurrence^ the combination of which

is,

in certain cases, necessary for the

production of an

membered,

effect

:

but

still it

must be

re-

that these are not separate causes,

but parts only, and that the real cause,

—

the

proximate event, of which alone the relation of invariable priority can be asserted,

—

is

the

aggregate of circumstances, thus combined.

The is

distinction of physical

not equally allowable.

of useful abreviation

;

and

It

and

efficient

causes

serves no purpose

it

has tended,

more

than any other circumstance, to keep ahve the belief of

some mysterious intermediate

ence between events.

It

the purity of theism, that

is

exist-

not necessary to

we should suppose

something divine and incomprehensible to be

interposed,

amid

all

those obvious and regular

changes which we observe

we be

fully impressed

sufficient, that

it is

:

with the necessity of a

Creator, and trace the universe, with

and beauty,

regularity

one great

as

of the Deity modifies immediately"^

usual course of

its

events,

is

sional interference,

is

asserts the necessity

efficient^

are

thesuc-

cause of

But the

the-

such occa-

very different from that, which

of the perpetual and uniform

all

in

of

varying the

vi'hich asserts

terference, as the immediatey or, as

whether displayed

in

not denied.

ory of the divine government,

which

all

will

possibility of tlie occasional interference

that power which created the world,

the

its

effect, to

That the

the almighty source of being.

* The

all

it

The

events.

in-

has been termed, will of the

Deity,

those obvious variations of events,

termed miracks, or inferred from those sup-

posed secret and

invisible

ed to ^^\% providence y

is

changes, which are ascribe

itself,

in

circumstance of physical causation^

all

such cases, a

new

from which a difference

of result may naturally be imagined, on the same principle as that,

on which we expect a change of product,

from any other new combination of physical circunistances.

It

is

this

which forms the true answer to the very

erroneous doctrine of Mr-

Hume's

celebrated Essay on

Miracles, the great mistake of which does not consist^ ^s has

been imagined,

in a miscalculation

of the force of

testimony

y

113 cessions of events, has

proved

certainly never

and the supposition

;

been

probably only

is

testimony : for the principle of the calculation must be conceded to him, that, whatever be the source of our early faith in testimony, the rational credit, which \vc

afterwards give to

it,

depends on our belief of the

less

improbability of the facts reported, than oF the ignor-

The

ance or fraud of the reporter. essay

lies still

which, though perhaps not expressed

guage, It

is

is

sophistry of the

deeper, in that false definition of a miracle, in

very strict lan-

implied in the whole course of the reasoning.

represented

by him,

as a violation

nature, implying a difference of effect,

of the laws of

when

a miracle,

it

truth with testimony

proof, since the connection of

is less

constant, than of phenomena

which have been, by supposition, unvaried.

by the very confession of

out of the

Of such

must be allowed, that no testimony can be

evidence amounting to

cle,

pre-

all tlie

vious circumstances have been exactly similar.

common

But

assertors,

its

is

a mira-

an event

course of nature, but not contrary

to that course, in the same manner as the shock of an

earthquake, and the descent of stones from the sky, are not

violations

of any law of nature, though they are phe-

nomena of very liar

rare occurrence,

which require a pecu-

combination of the circumstances, that physically

precede thern.

Such a new and peculiar circumstance,

or combination of circumstances, assertors of a miracle.

They do

is

supposed by the

not contend, that

all

ihe previous circumstances were similar, but, on the contrary, that the difference

of

thf» effect

implies a

new

firc^imstancc

114 another shape of that very erroneous theory,

which supposes the idea of power able only

to

be acquir-

from the changes produced by the

mind

operations of

even though the

but,

:

supposition were admitted to be just,

would

it

not be necessary, on that account, to adopt a

new

The

language.

will

of the Deity, being

the immediate antecedent, would then be self the true physical cause

which the circumstances to us to

it-

of every event, of

that at present appear

be the physical or proximate cause,

circumstance of causation

which appear,

divine volition,

cumstances.

;

and, as

all

the circumstances,

are the same, they have recourse as the

That

to the

most probable of unknown

a quantity of

ly as inert as the dust on which

cir-

gunpowder, apparent-

we

tread, should sud-

denly turn into a force of the most destructive kind, the previous

circumstances continuing the same,

indeed, contrary to the course of nature

not be contrary to

it,

if

be more contrary,

it

would

the change were preceded

the application of a single spark

of that Being, to

but

;

:

it

all

wohM be by

would surely not

if the neiv circumstance

whom, we have been

were the

led

will

by the most

convincing argument, to refer the very existence of the

mass 3t

itself,

operates.

and of

all

the surrounding bodies, on which

115 would be only the remote cause, being thrown in the series of causation

one step back, if

we should

co-exist

:

or,

suppose, that these circumstances

with the will of the Deity, in the pro-

duction of the

effect,

the whole

would then

form one aggregate of causation, and the physical

and

cause would thus be

efficient

the

same, being nothing more than that combination of circumstances,

which immediately pre-

The proper

cedes an event.

doubt, therefore, in those

may be

there event,

is

expression of

who

imagine, that

a divine interposition in every

not, that they are a(;:quainted with the

physical^ and ignorant of the efficient cause,

but merely, that they are not certain, as to the exact nature and

which combine,

number of in

the circumstances,

forming the true physical

cause.

The

proposition, that every thing which be-

gins to exist must have ence^

had a cause of

its exist"

which has been always considered,

separate and pecuUar axiom,

form qf expressing

is

as a

only another

that single fact,

which the

116

mind

exhibits, in

tion.

We believe

its

of causa-

intuitive belief

every change to be invariablT/

connected with circumstances immediatelT/ prior ;

and

this belief involves as

much

the great event

of beginning existence, as the subsequent revolutions of existing things

when we

for,

:

think of the world, as beginning to exist,

when

think also of that prior time, existence

and we have thus the

;

By our

change.

had no

it

feeling of

we

very nature,

we a

cannot but

consider this change, as invariably connected

But with

with some preceding circumstance. that prior nothings

which seems

to our imagination,

we know,

to offer itself

that the

sudden

existence cannot be invariably connected

;

be-

cause, in the great portions of the wide space

ground in

us, nothing exists,

our perception, by the

very infinity this

one

of space

supposition, infinite

have

and

is

rise

itself

of things

is

a

\

the

become immediately

The

phenomenon,

from those phenomena, which we witness

:

must, indeed, on

and immovable mass.

ning of existence

not followed,

and the cause of it,

if

begin-

different

at present

similar circum-r

ill stances

be invariably connected,

in

manner,

like

phenomena.

It

which cannot

by

We,

must be something, however, without being followed

exist,

therefore,

of a creating cause appearances

nifest

which, though

:

which we term creabelieve the existence

and,

of

from those maand

order

design,

infinitely greater, are still analo-

gous to our own, we

infer that the creating

cause was the will of an intelligent mind. all this

be,

from the present

different

that rise of being,

tion.

must

In

reasoning, no circumstance of intuitive

faith is implied,

which

not

is

common

to all

our reasonings, on the more frequent and obvious

phenomena of

causation

;

and we may

therefore conclude, that the proposition, Evert/

thing which begins to exist must have had a

cause of its existence, ent axiom, but al

is

not

itself

an independ-

reducible to this

more gener-

is

law of thought, Eueri/ change has had a

caiise

of its

combination prior.

We

cause,

from

existence, in

some circumstance, or

of circumstances, believe, that

it

immediatelij

must have had a

that necessity in our

own nature^

118

by

"which

it

is

impossible for us, to conceive

We

without one.

cannot consider any change

without considering

something prior

;

it

and

surely

it

we

ful, therefore, that

as the

it,

is

sequence of not wonder-

cannot conceive, with-

out something prior, that greatest of all changes,

which

It

consists in the beginning of existence.

is

law of thought, which involves

this

the whole doctrine of causation, and from

shewn, our idea of power

as has been already

immediately is

rises,

or rather our idea of power

necessarily implied in

it.

gin of the idea, however, Mr. ing to admit.

it,

This simple

Hume

is

ori-

unwill-

His theory of ideas obhges him

to find, for every* idea, an impression, as its

AH

*

our ideas

according to Mr.

are,

Hume,

faint

copies of more lively previous feelings, whether of per-

ception or emotion.

the

name of

To these

impressions,

previous feelings he gives

and supposes their comparative

vividness to be the only circumstance, es

them from

name, not of a with is

of

idea of

ideas. class,

Idea

is

which distinguish-

thus used

but of an order.

by him, It

is

memory , as used by other writers

synonimous with their

as

the

synonimous :

impressien

idea of sense or ofperception,

and

consciousness or reflection*

In

119 prototype

we

and, therefore, as he admits that

;

possess an idea of necessary connection, he

labours

which

may be

it

some impression, from

discover

to

In the qualities of

derived.

considered singly, and

bodies,

the

inferences

tual

changes, he finds

In the strictness of

as

if

mu-

their

and, therefore, as

;

which denies the

not, either in whole, or in

is

copy of a former impression

seems to triumph,

in

impossible, to dis-

it

his nominalism,

existence of any idea, that

*

from

of reason

cover any such impression

parts, a

the

in

of their mutual chancres, or

observation

its

even

Hume

Mr.

he had discovered a mode of

rendering every dispute equally inteUigible, and banishthat jargon

which has so long taken possession

*

ing

*

of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon

*

them.'

him.,

all

We

have nothing more to do, according to

we

than to ask ourselves, when

is

employed without meaning,

—

is

that supposed idea derived

?'

at present, to

It

is

make any comments, on

falsehood, of that

the necessity

suspect that a term

from what impression

<

which

opinion. it

It

is

not

my

purpose

the truth, or the

sufficient to

imposes on Mr.

Hume,

remark of dis-

covering some impression, of which the idea of power

be

supposed to be a copy,

o\ir

wonder,

which, as

may

— a necessity, which diminishes

at the little similarity of the prototype, in

we

shall afterwards find,

has detected the wished resemblance.

H

2

he thinks that he

120 it is

easier for a theorist, to struggle with

most subborn discrepancy, than

to

the

abandon a

favourite system, he has recourse to circumstances, which,

same

though they leave precisely the before, are at least

difficulty as

more

complicated, and therefore better fitted to hide

an inconsistency, from the author himself, as well as from those his

whom

he addresses.

mind not been prepossessed by

Hume

Had

a rash ge-

neralization,

Mr.

difficulty, in

admitting, that the belief of causa-

tion,

would have found no

and therefore the idea of power, may

arise intuitively

and immediately, from the ob-

servation of a change certain^

is

;

which, if the fact he

not more mysterious, than the ap-

pearance of the wide world of light, which

fol-

lows a simple affection of the small optic nerve^ or the existence of any of those ideas, which

he supposes pressions.

to follow their corresponding

There

is

im-

confessedly nothing, but

the experience of the fact, which prevents our

wonder,

at the

spontaneous

rise

as successive to any impression,

no

idea, of

which

-the

succession

of any idea^

and there is

more

is

cer-

121

and universal, than

tain

power

idea of

The

to the observation of a change.

which excludes such

generalization^ however,

and

original

formed were

that of the

;

immediate ideas, was

and

to

sacrificed.

it

all

We

already

apparent contradictions shall

in the remaining part of

accordingly find,

Mr. Hume's theory

of causation, a constant labour to avoid a truth, vi^hich is for

ever forcing

while the acuteness of

its

upon

itself

which could thus blind, to

sistencies^ a

view

;

author's discernment

serves only to render the delusion ing,

his

its

more

own

strik-

incon-

mind of the most unsparing quick-

ness, in detecting the errors of others.

The ory

is,

fourth proposition of Mr. that the relation

Hume's

of cause and

the-

effect

is

believed to exist betiveen objects, only ajter their

customary conjunction

he maintains,

belief,

mind

after

is

known

it is

result

us.

The

does not arise in

our

a single instance of sequence, but

after repeated instances of the

for

to

same sequence

;

not on one observation, nor on one

of experiment, that we rely, when

H 3

we

122 have

But,

a cause.

Hume

we have

confidence, that

full

is

it

not

obvious,

discovered that

argument from a

derives his

Mr.

state of

the mind, very different from that, in which the

first trains

Among

so

us,

?

many unconnected, hnt co-existing

phenomena, around

of events were observed by us

are

as

it is

perpetually takijig place

impossible, that, in the multi-

tude of trains of sequences, the parts of one train alone should

be always observed by us

j

and the mind, therefore, even though originally led to believe causation^

milarity in every sequence,

dered doubtful of

its

or invariable

si-

must soon be ren-

first belief,

when, from

the confusion of parts of trains, the expected

sequence

Hume

is

found

confesses,

however long and future

similarity

to

be

different.

If, as

no experience of the

Mr. past,

certain, entitle us to infer a

of result, in the

unknown

time before us, with any greater evidence to

our reason, than may be drawn from the

first

single instance of sequence, the probabiHty is

not dependent on ex-

At whatever

stage of observatioi^

that the original belief

perience.

is,

123 our belief begin, whether

at the first

or the

thousandth succession of the same events, the belief itself

positions,

must

B

still

be intuitive

has once succeeded

;

A^ and

for ever succeed A, are not more the propositions,

ceeded

A^ and

belief, also, at

B

B

for the pro-

B

different

will

than

has a thousand times suc-

luillfor ever succeed

whatever stage

it

A, The

begin,

must

be allowed to be capable of being counteracted in particular cases

;

for

we

often cease to be-

which has for

lieve in causes, the reality of

years formed a part of our philosophic creed.

The

only question then seems to be, whether

the beHef, equally intuitive on both suppositions, arise at

and

another;

one stage of observation or as,

on both

at

suppositions, the

mature mind, often expecting and often deceived, but deceived always less frequently as

the same succession has been

more frequently

observed, would learn to feel the value of experience, and to withhold till

that

given,

important

it is

little

complete assent,

confirmation

evident, that,

vanced years,

its

on the

should be

feelings of ad-

reliance can be placed in

124 the question.

We have thus perhaps, at best,

only a comparison of probabilities probabilities are surely side,

which

much

but the

;

stronger

asserts the feeling of

on

that

sequence to

be originally followed with the belief of power,

Does the num-

or invariable future similarity.

ber of believed causes increase with our years

Do we

not rather remember a time, when, if

without contrary experience,

dency

to

we had

*

my

The argument,

as stated above,

was

*

when

wrltterij

work which he himself

sole-

desires

regarded as alone containing his philosophical

sentiments and principles.*

Since the publication of the

edition of these Obervations, I have

osity, to

in-

to"^

knowledge of Mr. Hume's theory was derived

to be

had the

NATUR.E, Mr. Hume's original work, which not sanctioned by

its

it

in the light

commentary on that exposition of

\vhich he has delivered in his Essays,

permitted me, to

make

relates to

and, though, as

author's later judgment,

myself entitled to consider

legitimate

;

it

curi-

human

examine that part of the treatise of

the question of cause and effect

feel

The

?

of age seems to have been, not

ly from his Essays, the

first

a ten-

combine, as necessarily consecutive,

the most loose and unconnected events effect

?

I

it

was

do not

even of a

his system,

may perhaps be

occasional reference to

it in

a

note.

125

number

crease, but to diminish, the

by shewing

convictions,

At

note.

us, that

the same time, I beg

my own

many

oui,

events,

to be understood,

it

made by me, only

that the occasional remarks are lustration of

of

in

il-

view of the subject, and not as

furnishing any just additional confutation of those doctrines of his maturer reflection,

which alone Mr.

Hume

has acknowledged.

The

objection, arising from the belief of causation

sequences, seems to have struck himself.

after single

Instead of denying the fact,

however, which indeed

would have been impossible, he admits vours to reconcile

— he says— common

*

it

with his system.

and endea-

it, *

*Tiii certain,*

that not only in philosophy, but even in

life,

ticular cause

we may

knowledge of

attain the

merely by

a par-

one experiment, provided

it

be made with judgment, and after a careful removal ofall foreign and superfluous circumstances.'

Vol.

I, p.

He

185.

however, of determining, wj6^/ are

The

jluous circumstances.

Treatise,

does not furnish us with any mode,

truth

is,

the foreign

and super -

that the superfluous

circumstances are merely those, of which wc have had contrary experience, having observed them before, with-

out the succession of the effect plex sequence the ,

is

same kind, as

had no

:

when the com-

and,

stripped of these,

it

becomes exactly of

the first sequence ohsermed by us, luhen ive

experience either of essential or of superfluous circum-

stances.

If

by one

observation, provided

it

be made with

judgment, we can attain the knowledge of a particular cause,

we can

attain

tion, in the prior of

it,

only as being led to believe causa-

two

events,

where there

is

no contrary

126 which we considered as necessarily antecedent of others, have not been followed by them. trary experience

;

and,

if

we be

led to believe

it,

in

such

circumstances, the observation of sequence must have Ijeen originally and immediately accompanied with the belief of causation.

It

is

not from the experience of

custom, that we form our conclusion that experience

which that

B

is

tells

the real

us, is not that

for

;

A

is

all,

which

the cause

of X,

phenomenon considered, but merely

and C, which co-exist with A, are not the cause

of X, but are foreign and superfluous circumstances, since they have been often observed before, without the suc-

The argument, by which Mr. Hume

X.

cession of

endeavours to systematize this anomaly,

truly singular^

is

when considered in relation to that very nice scepticism, on which his own system is founded. He acknowledges, that the connection of the ideas of the objects of a sequence

is

ment, bat contends, that the connection ed

we

The

*

difficulty,'

consider, that

—he

though we

observes

like cjfects ;

placed In Uke circumstances,

and

as this principle

a sufficient custom,

it

this

by

will vanish,

we

this principle, that luill

always produce

has established itself by

bestows an evidence and firmness

on any opinion, to which

phism of

*

particular effect, yet

have many millions to convince us of like objects f

—

are here suppos'd to have

had only one experiment of a

ings,

comprehend-

is

another, which has been previously acquired

in

habit. if

and second

first

not habitual, after one experi-

it

can be apply'd.'

argument consists

in the

The

different

which may be attached to the phrase

so-

meanr

like objects.

It

12^

When .we

mix two

uncom-

substances, before

bined, and a peculiar product appears, what

the state of our mind

Do we

?

is

consider the

mixture and the product, as two loose pheno-

mena, unconnected,

as completely, as the ap-

new chemical

pearance of the

substance in our

and the appearance of a

vessel,

friend,

accidentally enters our appartment at the

It

may

many

signify the

like objects,

had customary experience, or objects,

of which

it

signify

we have had no customary

In the former sense only, can

it

mo-

we have all like

of which

may

who

experience.

be said, that

we have

milHons of experiments to convince us of the truth of the principle asserted it

;

but

be of any aid to Mr.

in the latter sense only,

The

Hume.

can

experience of a

go beyond a million sequences ; we may know, that A has been a miUion

million sequences cannot

and, though

times followed by X, and

on Mr. Hume's own infer

from these

priority of is

B by

strict

Y, we are not

C, of the

dissimilar sequences, that

which we have had no customary experience,

the cause of Z.

It surely

would be no very great

extension of this concession, to suppose, that

has a million times pr^<:eded X,

ed again, be again followed by

macy of Hume's is

entitled,

principles of scepticism, to

this inference

scepticism

X

;

be admitted,

would, and, all

if

if

A, which it

the force of

on the relation of cause and

immediately destroyed.

exist-

the legiti-

Mr.

cfFet^t

128 nient

It is this

?

state

of mind alone, which

can be reconciled with Mr. Hume's supposition

but

;

is

it

surely not the state of

He

the chemist.

mind of

beheves the product to be

the effect of the mixture, or,

if he

have not ab-

solute assurance, the want of conviction arises

only from the doubts which are suggested by his

The

past experience.

accidental changes of

temperature, the impurity of the substances used, the presence of air, or of other foreign matters, in the vessel, and the peculiar ties

of the vessel

itself,

occur to him as causes

which may have modified the he turns

his attention.

riation of these,

may

result.

By some

To

these

possible va-

he believes, that the event

possibly be different

;

but, were he cer-

these circumstances

tain, that all

affini-

would

for

ever be the same, he would have no doubt, that the resulting product also

be the same. cumstances after

The

exact similarity of

being supposed,

his

one experiment, would be,

spect, as complete, as after a

^ons.

would for ever

It is

all cir-

conviction, in every re-

thousand repeti-

not necessary, to be a practised cxt

—

:

129 perimentallst, to have

Mr. Hume's theory. stances of gle,

life,

how

felt this

common

In the

we

often have

between our tendency

confutation of

felt

circuma strug-

to conjoin events,

and the past experience, which shews us that they have no necessary connection struggle, like that

which we

that

is

lake, to

from

optical instrument,

on a landscape

The

us.

but

we have

church, and the to us indeed

a stronger conviction,

past experience, that they are far off

and we do not hasten, to

a

with another

feel

and its hanging w^ood, appear ;

is

when we look

familiar to

be near

It

belief,

very strong principle of

through an

?

meet the

at the

friend,

as if

whom

he were before us, approaching

w^e see

very end of our telescope.

Did one

train of phenomena alone take place in nature, it is

probable, that our conviction would be in

every case undoubting

;

we

but

learn,

from

varied disappointment, that innumerable trains

are taking place together, and

of certainty,

hut

it

is

we

feel a

want

in this onhj^ that

we

are ignorant, to ivhich of the trains the particular

phenomenon

belongs.

The very know-

ledgik,

that there are separate trains of phe-

nomena,

is itself

one of the

that the belief of causation

strongest' proofs,

immediate.

is

seldom that one simple sensation rather,

no sensation

ous objects

is

exists

form an aggregate, which

;

or,

Vari-

entirely simple.

same moment

at the

It is

affect us,

and

probably, at no

is,

other period exactly the same.

If,

therefore,

the return of antecedents and consequents, exactly similar, lief

could

were necessary, before any be-

arise,

it

never would arise

there was no presumption that

;

as, if

A, which once

before succeeded X, would succeed

it

again,

more than B, or C, which we had never fore observed to succeed possible,

X,

when X, Y, Z, were,

be-

it

would be im-

at

one moment,

producing A, B, C, to determine, of which part of the aggregate the renewed

consequence.

The

depend only on the

which followed

the'

and

analysis

A was

distribution

or presumption,

belief,

observation of the

quence.

Without

would be

as loose as before

this,

the

first se-

mixed sequence

the ;

and- hence, the

very supposition, that custom has any effect in

ISl determining our belief.

Is

an avowal, that a

Even with

previous anticipation existed.

the doubts, which the experience of

has given us, in

cases,

we never

which we

to believe,

trains,

Hume,

belief

hesitate, in

years

simpler

suspect concurring

less

where, according to Mr.

The organ

impossible.

is

many

all

of

for instance. Is of easy limitation, with

taste,

chance of the admixture of foreign bodies.

little

When apply

a

new

fruit is

presented to us, and

to that organ,

it

we

though altogether de-

prived of the aid of customary connection, and therefore, according to

Mr. Hume, incapable

of forming any opinion, but that of casual se-

we have no

quence,

new

sensation to the

that

it is

cure,

scruple in ascribing the

new

who

relishes a

before him, and, is

to that

twenty

The

sweet, or acid, or bitter.

new

ragout,

that the source of his pleasure

it

and we say,

object,

new

if

dish

well,

in the dish

he wish to enjoy

it

again,

alone he returns, though

objects be

flower, which

is

knows

epi-

around

we have never

it.

We pluck a

before seen

are sensible of a disagreeable odour

;

;

we

and we

132

throw away the flower, arose.

The

a bee, and

boy,

who

from

as if

for the

first

astonished to feel

is

its

it

the odour

time catches sting, does

not wait for a second and third application

of the poison, before he learn to fear

Whether

future.

reason,

is

his belief

not the inquiry.

it

in

be consistent with has been already

It

admitted, that the similarity of future events

is

not a conclusion of reason, derived from the perceived agreement of propositions, but single unconnected

judged, that with

a

proposition, believed, not

rises in the

mind, inevitably, and

irresistible conviction.

Whether

false, the belief is in these cases felt, felt

is

true or

and

it

is

without even the possibility of a perceived

customary conjunction.

Would Mr. Hume

himself have considered the sequences as purely accidental

has

felt

?

He

owns,

'

that,

when

a child

the sensation of pain from touching

the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his

hand near any candle

:'

yet the child,

even though old enough, to have acquired an accurate knowledge of the plaices of objects^

and thus

to

be certain that

it is

the candle

whicb

133 is

burning him, should, in such circumstances,

think no more of removing his finger from the flame, than of shaking off the bandage of

As

his foot.

the question

not concerning

is

the justness of belief, but concerning the period

of

its

rise,

there

one case^ which may be

is

considered, as almost decisive of see a

phenomenon, for the

first

it.

We

often

time, without

having attended to the particular circumstances,

which preceded

If

it.

it

be the experience of

custom alone, w^hich can give us connection, by w^hich

an

effect^

we

we denominate

are, in this case, not

out a customary sequence a single case of

;

is

if

no suspense, and

what

object, in the

of succession, was

we

effect, as

he had witnessed every pre-

On

ceding circumstance. in

not even

no one, who

does not believe the change to be an completely as

a change

merely with-

we have

Yet there

it.

that belief of

this

one point he

is

waits, only to discover

uniform and regular order its

then to assert, that

correlative cause. all

Are

phenomena, before

repeated experience of their particular conjunctions,

appear to us equally loose, and that the I

134 supposition of a peculiar connection can in instance arise,

till

been customary

?

no

the observed conjunction has

Do

not

all

the circumstances

of our belief rather support the contrary opinion, that a peculiar connection

may be

posed, even after a single sequence

;

sup-

that, as

innumerable trains of phenomena are taking place together, and mingling in our observation, the primary effect

of experience has been,

not to increase, but to weaken, our belief of the connection of events, by presenting to us, as

a regular train of consequents, irregular

portions of different co-existing trains

;

that,

our expectation of uniformity being thus often disappointed, a habit of doubt has arisen, and

the secondary influence of experience begins to operate, which,

by shewing us the custom-

ary successions of events, though

not our

first

it

give us

notion of the connection of trains

of phenomena, mforms us, with greater certainty, to

particular

which, of

many

co-existing trains, a

phenomenon belongs

;

that

hence

the belief of connection, which, according to

Mr. Hume, should,

in every case,

depend on

IBS the

number of

more,

observations, and

more or

is

according to the

less early,

nature of the particular

phenomena observed,

as these furnish greater or less

number of concurring

gining a

on nothing

room

for ima-

being

trains,

immediate, or almost immediate, where the new-

sequence

simple, and of longer suspense^

is

where the sequence

is

complex.

If the preceding reasoning

Hume

of Mr.

be

just, the error

evidently consists, not in affirm-

ing too much, but in affirming too

little

for,

:

any succession of events can suggest the ex-

if

pectation of future similarity, there

is

surely

nothing in the frequent recurrence of the suc^ cession, It

may

which can diminish the expectation.

not be greater, after

confirmed, but the theory

is

it

it

has been often

certainly cannot be less

;

and

therefore objectionable, only as

confining, to sequences that have been often

observed, a belief, which, originally at is

common

by

to

least,

them with other sequences. Yet,

a singular mistake,

Hume

Mr.

censured by his opponents, as I

if his

2

has been affirmation

136 had been too

Thus,

large.

it

tained, that there are cases of

which the

sion, in

uniform succes-

belief of causation

is

never

from the very commencement of

since,

felt,

has been main-

our existence, ^ day has succeeded night in endless return, without any supposition arising, that night

is

the cause of day.

be remembered, that

it

should

and night are not

daj/

words which denote two

But

particular

phenomena,

but are words invented by us to express long

What

phenomena.

series of

various appear-

ances of nature, from the freshness of the

morning beam,

first

to the last languor of the even-

ing sky, changing with the progress of the

and dependent on the accidents of

seasons,

temperature, and vapour, and wind, are in-

cluded in every day cause the * is

*

The

These are not one, be-

!

word which expresses them third

argument

is,

that

what we

is

call a

one

^

causcp

only something antecedent to^ and always conjoined

with the

we may

effect.

learn

—

here to observe, that

It is sufficient

from

it

that night

day the cause of night

:

is

for no

the cause of day

;

and

two things have more

constantly followed each other since the beginning of

the world.*

chap.

6.

Reid, on the Intellectual Powers, Essay

vi,

131 and

it is

the believed relation of single events'

not the arbitrary combinations of language,

which Mr.

Hume

professes to explain.

If,

therefore, there be any force in the objection,

must be shewn,

it

that, notwithstanding the

customary conjunction, we do not believe the relation of cause

and

effect to

the successive * pairs

of that multitude of

* The mistake of Dr. Reid cies

between

exist,

is

an instance of a spe-

of inaccuracy, perhaps the most

common

in the

present advanced period of science, and the least easy to be prevented,

by any

cism can prescribe.

rules,

The

readily understood, and

which philosophic

criti-

great principle of induction

is

To

of obvious application.

is

point out the absurdity of imagining causes, which no observation, nor experiment has developed, difficult

ing a

;

not very

is

and the very imagination of euch a cause,

new circumstance of thought,

is

felt

be?-

immediately

by

the mind itself: but the generalizations of language

are

made

for us

without any

by

others, and our

definite analysis,

receives the simple

mind

receives

them,

almost as readily, as

separate co-existing phenomena, and the

separate

quences of a long succession of events, which

found convenient to comprehend

in

it

it

The

names of persons and things.

se^

has been

a single word, are

thus, from the constant use of that single word, regard-

ed by the mind, almost

in the

same manner, as

were only one phenomenon, or one event. J

3

The

if

they

advant-

sge

138

we denominate

events, which

What

night and day.

then are the great events included in

age of the verbal abbreviation

indeed evident

is

;

as a

many sequences, is thus easily rewhen a variety of names, expressive

process, consisting of

membered by of the

us,

different

sequences, v^^ould have been altogether

"burthensome to the memory, and would probably have been, in part at least, forgotten is

but the abbreviation

:

not on that account less dangerous to our accuracy

of reasoning, by leading us to consider, as tlW

common

to

the parts of a long and complicated process, the ciri

cumstances, which belong only to particular parts of the

The most common form of this deception is when we ascribe to the prior sequences that ultimate

series.

result,

which belongs only to the

last

sequence of the

order: but, even thioughout the whole order, us,

by

a similar generalization of

what

is

it

leadg

particular,

to

suppose relations, where there are none, and to neglect

them, where they

are.

There

is

hence a cause of per-

petual retardation to the progress of science, existing in the circumstances of the progress itself

finements of language, to which

it

;

the very rci

necessarily gives rise,

seducing us insensibly into an error, of exactly the same kind, as that which

is

produced more obviously, by the

rude and scanty observations, with which science begins.

we

In both cases, though from very different causes,

pass frequently from the most striking phenomena,

to other striking phenomena, without regarding the in-

numerable phenomena which intervene are, in the one case, not observed

by

;

because these

us, and, in

the

othery

139 those terms

?

If

we

cally, they are the

tion to the sun, at

consider

them philosophi-

series of positions in rela-

which the earth

arrives, in

other, form a forgotten or neglected part of that whole,

There

wliich our general term expresses.

partments of physics,

in

is

scarcely a

any one of the de-

single controversy, in the history of

which the confusion has not

in a great

measure arisen from some very simple error of

this kind,

by which that which was true, of a part of when asserted of the whole pro-

a process, was false, cess

:

and indeed we find the contest, to be more usually

an opposition of errors, than of truth and error

opponents differing only

which they considered

in

;

the

the parts of the process,

as representing the whole.

A

habit of constant and quick analysis of the general words

presented to us

is

in effect, to use the

very Striking phrase

of Lord Bacon, the acquisition by the mind of a new

The

organ.

generahzations of language are thus

made

to answer the only useful purposes, for which they were devised, that of conciseness, in tions,

and

artificial

in

own

our

silent

reflec-

our communications to others, and of an

memory, suggesting

phenomena comprehended

in

to

us

them.

by

association the

To

have thus com-

command every term of the daily nomenclature which we use, however slightly such a power may be estimated by superficial thinkers, would be indeed to have a dominion of no common kind for it

pletely under our

:

would be

to have the mastery of that,

which

subjects, in

some degree, even the most philosophic understandings, and which enslaves, and

fetters

with innumerable pre-

judices, the ^ess discriminating multitudes of our race.

140 the course of this,

diurnal revolution

its

view, there

surely

is

;

and, in

no one, who doubts,

that the motion of the earth, immediately be-

fore sun-rise,

is

the cause of the position, which

renders that glorious luminary visible to us. If

we consider the phenomena of night and day,

in a

more vulgar

sense, they include various

degrees of darkness and light, with some of the chief changes of appearance in the heaven-

Even

ly bodies.

who

in this sense, there

doubts, that the rising of the sun

cause of the light which follows setting

is

light

it,

be

the

and that

its

:

and,

if

they did

their belief, instead of confirming

the truth of Mr. to

is

mutually produce each

other, they do not believe believe

it,

no one

the cause of the subsequent darkness.

That darkness and

it

is

false

;

as

Hume's it

theory, would prove

would prove the

relation of

cause and effect to be supposed, where there has been no customary connection*

How often,

during a long and sleepless night, does the sensation of darkness exist, without being follow-

ed by the sensation of light

gloom

y

—we

feel

our

own

!

We perceive the

position in bed, or

141

some bodily or mental pose; in

pain,

which prevents

—innumerable thoughts

re-*

arise, at intervals,

our mind, and with these the perception of

gloom

is

occasionally mingled, without being

followed by the perception of light

light.

perceived, and, as mingled with

is

occupations and pleasures,

is

At

last

all

our

perceived innum-

erable times during the day, without having, for

its

immediate consequence, the sensation of

darkness.

Can we then be

said, to

have an

uniform experience of the conjunction of the

two sensations

?

Do

they not rather appear to

follow each other loosely and variously, like those irregular successions of events, which

denominate accidental

?

we

In the vulgar, there-

fore, as well as in the philosophic sense of the

terms, the recurrence of day and night furnishes

no

valid objection to

The

general

which we are

conclusion,

led,

accordingly,

to

on the fourth proposition,

that the experience of

is,

is

Mr. Hume's theory.

customary succession

not necessary to the belief of future similar-

ity

of sequence

j

but that, where, from a sup-

142 4X)sed concurrence of separate trains of pheno-

mena, any doubt

is

the influence of the

felt,

experience of customary succession

is

always

to diminish the doubt.

The is

of

proposition of

fifth

less

consequence, as

Mr. Hume's theory proceeds on the

it

belief of the fourth, of the falsehood of which,

however,

be additional evidence,

will

it

also be found to be false

mode, if it

in which,

it

states the

he maintains, that experience,

be the cause of

belief,

must be supposed

|He does not maintain, how-

to have influence. ever, that, after

since

;

if this

the beHef

all,

is

not instinctive,

but only that certain circumstances are necessary, before the instinctive feehng arise. tivo

objects

have been frequently observed in

succession^ the

mind passes

of one

to the idea

dency

to transition,

ness

When

readily from the idea

of the other

and from

:

from

this ten-

the greater vivid-

of the idea thus more readily suggested^

there arises effect

itself

a

belief of the relation

between them

;

of cause and

the transition^ in the

being the impression^

mind

from which

the

143 idea of the necessary connection of the objects^

and

as cause

sum

Hume's

of Mr.

derived.

is

effect^

professed

Such

is

the as

solution,

given by him in his

fifth

a solution, which,

when examined narrowly,

and seventh

sections,

appears too absurd to have satisfied even

it^

author, and which strikes us with double aston-

ishment,

when we

Mr. Hume.

consider, that

That

it

its

author was

mo»

has been even for a

ment received by others, can be accounted only from

the

shelter,

for,

which the errors of

thought have received from the confusion of the statement

for,

:

though undoubtedly

his is

not a name, of which any philosopher can

speak

lightly,

ence, which

and

to the

respects,

and though is

due

I

feel all the rever-

to his general acuteness,

wonderful

he possessed,

talents 1

which, in

must confess,

many

that the

essays, in which, after having given his sceptical

doubts, he proceeds to explain the origin

of our belief of causation, are, in the impartial estimate which

I

should form of that part of

the theory considered alone, to be ranked with

pur

least

perfect specimens of

metaphysica,!

f

— 144 All

disquisition.

perplexity of language,

is

and hypothesis, which

is

most every

fact

if at

gine, that

we have

;

and,

those

it

is

with

al-

any time we ima-

discovered the acuteness,

which before delighted us, of the theory,

at variance

in the sceptical part

only in the repetitions of

very doubts, which

are

occasionally

sprinkled over the less ingenious attempt to solve them.

Before

the

fifth

ciently understood,

proposition can be suffix it

be necessary to ex-

will

amine another more general doctrine, which

Mr.

Hume

has mingled with

it.

—

^

The

dif-

ference between fiction and belief,' he says, ^

lies

some sentiment or

in

annexed

feeling,

which

former

to the latter, not to the

;'

is

and

he then, with some labour of reasoning, demonstrates, that the sentiment thus annexed to belief,

and constituting

belief,

from

Belief itself distinguishes belief or, in other words, fiction is

certainly just

better, at

j

is

but would

not it

beliefs

is

fiction

belief.

;

This

not have been

once to own, that the feelings of 4

145 reality

fiction are

and

ferent, than,

by

their very nature dif-

even for a moment, to consider

the difference as susceptible of proof, since the

proof must be only a repetition of the ence

?

Belief he afterwards defines, to be

thing but a

more

imagination alone

He

*

adds

:

—

*

is

no-

what the

ever able to attain.** That

may

This variety of terms, which

so unphilosophical,

is

intended only to express that

act of the mind, which renders realities, or for such,

'

vivid, lively, forcible, firm,

steady, conception of an object, than

seem

differ-

more present to us than

what

is

taken

them

fictions, causes

to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence

on the passions anS imagination.

agree about the thing, the terms. its ideas,

ways all

The

it

is

command

and can join and mix and vary them,

possible.

It

may

manner before our

over

in all

all

the

conceive fictitious objects, with

may

set

them

eyes, in their true colours, just as

they might have existed.

But

as it

this faculty of imagination can ever, lief, it is

we

needless to dispute about

imagination has the

the circumstances of place and time. It

ma

Provided

is

of

impossible, that itself,

reach be-

evident, that belief consists not in the peculiar

nature or order of ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their fcehng to the mind.'

This

an example of reasoning

in

order to shew

what

realities

it is,

fictions,

//

which renders assumes

it

a circle,

as, in

is

partly

more present to us than

to he impQsslbley

that the imagination

can

146 imagination

sometimes able to

is

attain

what*

ever qualities are essential to belief, the phe-

nomena of reverie and of dreaming ly shew.

But, omitting

definition,

can

we

this smaller

only to a single class of

has reference ?

Mr. Hume's

it

does not ex-

realities

perfectly just,

is

error of

acquiesce in a statement of

the essentials of belief, which

doctrine

sufficient-

when

tend beyond the present moment, but fined to the objects tually present to

tions

we

con-

is

which we believe to be ac-

our senses

for,

:

when

sensa-

and ideas of imagination occur together,

ascribe

external ahd independent reality^

only to the more vivid of the two case, except

are the

and

;

in every

impassioned reverie, sensations

more

vivid.

But

belief of reality is

not confined to the objects, that are consider-

ed by us, as actually present cases of belief,

can ever, of

itself,

diction to itself, as

it

is

;

all

other

the effect of reasoning, or

reach belief, and it

and, in

is

partly a contra-

supposes, that imagination can set

objects before us in their true colours fjust as they might hive existed, ifl

and yet supposes

being

less

vivid^

fictions to differ

from

realities,

147 of former conviction, or of testimony, not of

any

peculiar

That

it

tion,'

mitted

implies a peculiar

and :

of

quality

'

the

for belief

same

But Mr. Hume, though

he occasionally overshadow

pomp

must be ad-

certainly not the

is

ideas.

manner of concep-

'

feeling to the mind,'

feeling as disbelief.

the

present

subject, with

his

of such words of sound, that signi-

fy nothing, must, if his theory have any consistency, confine

and

liveliness

with others.

it

the peculiar steadiness

to

of certain conceptions, compared

The

sole question, therefore,

whether, in every case of tions of objects, as real, ly, forcible, firm,

belief,

be more

steady,' than

ceive

them, as feigned.

after

having almost

our concep'

vivid, live-

when we con-

When we

forgotten

is\,

his

believe, exploits,

without being informed of a single feature of his face, or

knowing even whether he was

tall

or short, that Arminius, the assertor of the liberty of

Germany,

existed

;

and,

when we

acknowledge, as wholly feigned, the existence of the heroine of a fashionable novel, of whose exact stature, and proportions, and graces, and

-

248 dimples, and whiteness of teeth, and languish-

ing blueness of eyes, a brilliant portraiture

we

given us, and whose mournful adventures are able to

detail, in

the very succession in

which

their author has represented

when

the conviction

is

so different,

them is

it

;

different species

writing, that our judgment

is

a juster theory of our

cases, that

we

believe,

and

formed

Or

?

we

is

disbelieve, because

than that of the ancient hero

is

Have

?

a less firm conception of Othello, than of

the humble soldiers

of Agincourt

;

that great day is

of

sentiment in both

our conception of the modern heroine less lively,

—

not

from our knowledge of the

it

is

the

who

and, is

when

the conqueror of

represented in our theatres,

mimic king, or

steadily before us

fought in the battle

?

How many are

there,

who,

spent in a foreign country,

during a long

life

have

their pictures of

lost, in

more

his real prototype,

remembrance,

almost every trace of the friends of their youth!

Yet the

them it is

faint conceptions that arise are

still,

not as

fictions,

but as

not from any fading of

dear to

realities

memory

;

and

that they

149^

when they

tremble,

whom

fear, that the friends, for

The

they are anxious, exist no more.

information, in such circumstances, of the ac-

any one, and the sad

tual death of

which

accompanied, do not destroy, nor

it is

impair, a single remembrance,

many were

with

belief,

but brighten

fading images, and recal others which

and seem

lost,

to restore the full idea of

the person, in the certainty that he

no longer

in existence.

extended to

all

is

himself

The remark may be

our passions.

Desire impHes

the present non-existence of the good which its

object

:

but

it

surely implies peculiar vivid-

ness of the idea of

he

who

fails

is

tlie

in his

unexisting good

and

;

endeavour to realize

it,

whatever the object may be, has, in the regret

and

mortification,

which follow the

fixed a conception of the object, as bition

had been

cases, in

fully gratified.

if his

Even

am-

in those

which we have no personal concern,

and are led along lief

failure, as

in passive

sympathy, our be=

has no connection with distinctness or in^

distinctness

of imagination.

The very

wild-

ness and wonderfnlness of romance, as thev

K

150 excite peculiar emotion, are indeed a cause not

of

but of more lively conception

less

when we

;

and,

are interested in our knight, the tower

and the giant

before us in stronger colours,

rise

than the host and his inn on a modern high-

How

way.

a friend of

very readily, on the testimony of

known

veracity,

do we assent to

the truth of circumstances, which are so obscurely present to our mind, that ly

be said to conceive them

how

faith of this kind,

our knowledge

since

;

:

we can

scarce-

and, without a

very limited would be

must be confined to

it

come under our own

the objects, which have

senses, excluding all that infinity of objects,

from

which

is

time!

Greece, and

its rival

time,

distant

chiefs,

us, either in place or

Italy,

and Pharsalia, and

and even the heroes of our own

whom we

have never had an opportunity

of seeing, and the greater part of the very island in

which we

shadowy existence strongest of

all

live, ix).

have but a

our thought.

belief, that

which

faint

and

Even the is

accom-

panied with conviction of the absurdity of any opposite proposition,

is

conversant in abstrac-

— 151

which are the

tions,

Who

least

lively

of

ideas*

there, that can readily picture to him-

is

polygon of a thousand sides

self a

all

derstand, indeed, what

is

?

We

un-

meant by mathema-

hnes and surfaces, or w^e could not un-

tical

derstand the properties of mathematical lines

and surfaces selves are so

:

little

from

different

but the generalizations themvivid, that their existence, as

particular

ideas,

seems

now

to

be denied by the greater number of philosophers ly

-^

*

;

though undoubtedly,

Much

we had

on-^

we never could under-

particular ideas,

*

if

of the ridicule which has been thrown on

the defenders of general ideas/ as I have elsewhere re-

marked,

*

has been occasioned

the indefinite article.

To

idea of a triangle^ which scalene,

is

indeed absurd

is

by the improper use of

say, that

we have

a general

not equilateral, isosceles, nor for a triangle

:

must be

cular, and, consequently, of one of these species

parti;

and

we cannot have a general idea of a particular existence. But we may, notwithstanding, have a general idea of the nature of triangles

;

mon

objects of thought, without any

properties

may be

or, in

other words, their com-

Observations ON THE ZOONOMIA OF ErASMUS DaRWIN, M. D.

reference to their particular degrees.'

p.

150. V-

2

As

152 ?tand, so as to

proposition.

As

deny or assent to any universal

The

and the un-

varice plumes^

the existence of general ideas, with the complete

>^ conviction attached in mathematics to cveTy demonsti*ation

of their properties,

is

one of the strongest objections to

Mr. Hume's theory of extend the quotation

more

ty, the

which

may

belief,

still

farther

readily, because

I

I

be permitted, to

I use

the opportuni-

qiiotc

from a work,

?

not professedly written on the subject of ge-

is

nfral ideas, and because the nominalism,

the most prevalent heresy of

them,

is

sics.

Not content with denying

which excludes

modern metaphy-

that separate external

essence of general images,

which was once absurdly sup-

posed,

intellectual conceptions

denies even the

it

selves, as

affections of

mind

the words which express them. suredly, are not insignificant

Yet general terms,

and,

:

them-

existing independently of

if

as-

they be sigMificant,

the implied relation in each cannot be supposed to de-

pend on the word, but the word must have been invented, to express the implied relation. ed, that, in neral,

It

is

indeed assert-

mathematics, the proposition becomes ge-

not because any term

in

the demonstration

understood generally, but because nothing in the demonstration,

diagram

we have ties

;

in ^it'iv, in

is

is itself

expressed

limited to one particular idea, for

example, which

our demonstration of the proper-

of triangles, be that of an isosceles rectangular

angle, the §ides of

we

which

that, although the

is

which

tri-

are of a determinate length,

are, notwithstanding, certain that the

demonstration

extends to triangles of every species and magnitude, be-

cause

15S membra^ which Horace supposes

clique collaia

to

much

be presented to us by a painter, are as

cause there

hypothesis,

no allusion

is

which alone

is *

in it, to that particular species,

On

the object of our conception.

this

be admitted, that the right angle,

will

it

and the equality of two of the

sides,

and the deter-

minate length of the whole, are not expressed

words of the demonstration

the

in

but words are of conse-

;

quence, only as they suggest ideas, and the ideas, suggested by the demonstration, are the same, as particular relations of the triangle at every step.

It

is

if

these

had been mentioned,

not said, that the three angles are

equal to two right angles, because one of them angle, or because the

is

a right

which comprehend that

sides,

angle, are of the same length

;

but

it

is

proved, that

the three angles of the triangle, which has one of angles a right angle, and the sides, which

that angle, of equal length, are together equal to

This particular demonstration

right angles.

is

cable only to triangles, of one particular form.

not infer from

it

its

comprehend

two

appliI can-

the existence of the same property, in

figures, essentially different

for, unless

;

we admit

the

existence of general ideas, an equilateral triangle differs as

much from

square. son.

To

a scalene rectangular triangle, as from a

In both cases, there say, that the

two

is

no m.edium of compari-

triangles agree, in having

three sides, and three angles,

is

to say, that there arc

general ideas of sides, and angles ticularized,

and

meant equal

if

sides,

by the words

:

for, if sideSi

and equal angles, K 3

they be par-

and

it is

angleSf

be

evident, that

the

i54 an object of our

mere verbal

disbelief, in the

were actually depicted

description, as if they

the two triangles, do not agree, in the slightest circum-*

Admitting, therefore, that I can enunciate a

stance.

general proposition, the conception of which

impos-

is

be certain, that the three angles of every

I can

sible,

two right

angles, only

triangle

are together equal to

when

has been demonstrated of triangles, of every

it

variety of figure

have

*

my

it in

The

<*

and chain down

ima-^

which considered

idea,

itself is parti,

in

becomes general, by being made to represent

**

or stand for

*'

To make

"

metrician

"

line in

" black

limit space,

suggesting indifferently a multitude of other

in

An

*'

cular,

and, before this can be done, I must

generahty of an idea consists, according to

Berkeley, ideas.

;

power to

other particular ideas

all

this plain

two equal

He

parts.

draws, for instance, a

of an inch in length, this which in itself nevertheless with regard to

**

is

**

signification general, since as

**

presents

"

is

"

in

"

particular line

a particular line,

all

a geo-

demonstrating the method, of cutting a

is

line,

of the fame fort,

by an example, suppose

is

it is

there used,

particular lines whatsoever

demonstrated of

it,

is

;

so that

demonstrated of

its

re-

what

all lines, or,

And

other words, of a line in general.

it

as that

becomes general, by being made a the name line, which taken absolutely is par

*'

sign, so

<^

ticular,

«<

former owes

by being its

a sign

is

made

general.

generality, not to

its

And

as the

being the sign «*

of

V

155 before us, in the

liveliest

colours of art.

our conception/ says Mr. Hume, " of an

abstract or general line, but of

may

•*

right lines that

**

be thought to derive

**

cause, namely,

"

indifferently

possibly exist its

'

all

we

particular

what

meant by the

is

of the sign to ideas, of the fame fort

sign alone,

own

principle,

;

for,

:

limita-

since, ac-

the application of the

it is

which constitutes the

sort

We

?

capnot have

a conception of the circumstances of resemblance that would be an abstract general idea

rangement, the naturalist

it

This statement evidently

takes for granted the existence of general ideas

tion

must

generality from the same

the various particular lines vi^hich

denotes." *

unless that be admitted,

cording to his

can

so the latter

;

In

'

;

:

for

so that, in

ar-

should study terms, rather

than qualities, and consider bodies, expressed by similar sound, and orthography, as necessarily belonging to the

same

class.

In the instance adduced, unless

sider the evenness,

gard to length, or shortness,

it

:

for, considered absolutely,

different

from a yard.

draws a straight

much

line,

When

impossible that

is

should ever become general, even sense

we can con-

between extreme points, without re-

in

line

Bishop Berkeley's,

an inch

is

essentially

a geometer, therefore,

an inch in length,

it

may, with

as

reason, represent a circle, as another straight line,

a yard in length nature of a line

j

:

unless he have an abstract idea of the

and to say, that the inch

particular lines nvhatfoever.,

reprefents all

without assigning any reason

of that general representation,

is

to

vo!.

i,

take for granted the

* Berkeley's Works,

p. lo.

;

156 join the head of a

but

man

to the

body of a horse;

not in our power to believe that such

it is

an animal has ever have not the power, ly true, that

That we

really existed.' is

true; but

our conception

not equaU

it is

is less lively.

We

picture * Bottom, the weaver, as readily, after his transmutation of head, as before

we may

it ;

though

not be enamoured of him, after his

metamorphosis, like the fairy Queen.

The

Centaurs of the ancient fable appear before us as distinctly, in the combat, as the Lapithas,

who

are opposed to them.

deed,

who have

There are few,

in-

not a more accurate idea of

the body of a horse with the head of a man,

than of a hippopotamus, or an ouran-outang the truth of the opinion, against which the Instance

Even

adduced.

if

by suggesting

general,

is

a Hne were supposed to be rendered indifferently various magnitudes,

the power of suggesting must be allowed to be different

from the suggestion gested,

is

itself.

The

idea of an inch, sug-

equally particular, whether

we

allow, or deny,

that the same sign might also have suggested different

magnitudes possible,

;

and general demonstration

on either hypothesis.'

will thus be

p. 142.

*

im?

Observations, &c,

Midsummer Night's Dream.

O

and easy would

It

ledge of botany,

and

a more

be to acquire a perfect know-

if

of every exotic, whose

we have

existence

I

learned,

distinct conception,

we had

name

already

than of a tree, ex-

actly similar in the shape of

parts to the

its

oak or the elm before our door, but with a trunk of gold, and branches and leaves of

By

silver.

various nations, various objects are

believed to exist

there

is

5

—

in the multitude of beings,

one alone, whose existence

ject of universal belief

:

—

incomprehensible Being,

our adoration of tremble to

fix

his

it

is

is

an ob-

that great, but

on whom, even

goodness,

in

we almost

our imagination.

Belief, then, arising often from testimony, in events

which we have never had an oppor-

tunity of witnessing, or

from the

faint

memory

of former conviction, or from the calm results

pf abstract reasoning,

from a

vivid

From

his

is

something different

and firm conception of an

theory of

belief,

Mr.

object.

Hume

de-

duces a theory of probability^ which he holds

158

on the

to depend, not

abstract

knowledge of

the greater number of chances, but on the jseparate effect

conception.

of each chance, in brightening

He

supposes,

number of chances mind

carried

is

than to

its

is

greater

on one

more frequently

opposite.

'

where the

that,

side, the

one idea,

to

The concurrence of

these several views or glimpses imprints the

more

Idea it

strongly on the imagination

superior force and vigour

fluence on the passions and sensible

renders

;

gives

;

affections

its

in-

more

and, in a word, begets that reliance

;

or security, which constitutes the nature of

and opinion.*

belief

not suffer from such stractly, is

we

What theorem would a corollary! When, ab-

prefer five chances to one, what

the idea to which the

ried

If

?

versed.

it

mind

is

five times car-

be unity, our choice should be

When we

re-

consider a thousand chances

as having greater probability of success than

nine hundred and ninety-nine, ried*

is

the

mind

car-

one thousand nine hundred and ninety^

* In his Treatise of

Human

Nature, Mr.

deatours to account for our preference,

in

Hume

en-

such cases,

by

159 nine times to the diiFerent ideas

?

work of

a

have a paralell

in-

parison and the preference are the

by the

influence o{ general rules.

he observes,

stance,'

that

when an

*

in

*

We

The com«

the affections.

'Tis

object produces any passion in

evident,

us,

which

varies according to the different quantity of the object

I say, is

;

eyident, that the passion, properly speaking,

'tis

not a simple emotion, but a compounded one, of a great

number of weaker

passions, deriv'd

from a view of each

For otherwise 'twere Impossible the

part of the object.

passion shou'd increase by the increase of these parts.

Thus

a man,

ality a

who

desires a

thousand pound, has

in re-

thousand or more desires, which uniting together,

seem to make only one passion

thoV the composition

;

evidently betrays itself upon every alteration of the object,

by the preference he

gives to the larger number, if

by an unite.

Yet nothing can be more

superior only

certain, than that so small a difference wou'd not be discernible. In

the passions, nor cou'd render

stinguishable from each other. fore, of

our conduct

The

in preferring

them

di-

difference, there-

the greater, depends

rot upon our passions, but upon custom, and general rules

We have

found

in

a multitude of instances, that

the augmenting the numbers of any passion,

when

The mind

sensible.

sum augments the

the numbers are precise and the difference

can perceive from

its

immediate

feehng, that three guineas produce a greater passion

than two

;

and

this it

transfers to larger numbers, because

of the resemblance

;

thousand guineas,

a stronger passion

and by a general rule assigns to a than to nine hun-

dred

160

The

moment.

feeling of probability,

on the

hypothesis assumed, would be susceptible of

Vol.

dred and ninety-nine.' cumstance, which Mr. is itself

Hume

i,

The

p. 248.

very cir-

thus adduces in illustration,

When we

a most erroneous hypothesis.

desire

a thousand pounds, we have not a thousand separate desires,

but one desire of that which will obtain us many

objects of our wants, the composition being not in the

mere pounds, but in the wants, which a large sum of money will gratify. It might be said, with equal truth, that we have twenty thousand desires, or two hundred and forty thousand thousand

desires, or nine

hundred and sixty

because there are so

desires,

pence and farthings

in

a thousand

many

pounds

;

shillings

and that,

the exchangable value of the whole sum remaining the

same, the desire of

it

would be converted immediately

into a different affection of mind,

of our coinage.

The

truth

is,

by

a minuter division

that the desire of a thou-

sand pounds, and the desire of nine hundred and ninetynine pounds, irfone lar

sum,

who

is

in

no direct want of a particu-

are, considered absolutely as simple affections

of

the mind, exactly the same passion, being nothing more,

than the desire of that which will give him a great deal

of accommodation.

To

those,

who,

for

any particular

purpose, are in want of a thousand pounds, the desire of nine hundred

because

it

and

ninety-nine

pounds would be

different

would be compounded with the painful

ing of inadequacy.

In

like

;

feel-

manner, when both sums

are offered together, to our choice, or to our imagination, the

two

desires are not the

same

;

because

tj»c

ge-

neral

161 perpetual increase, though

it

were known,

that

the external circumstances of the compari-^

all

neral desire of the

power of accommodation, which

is all

when each sum is considered absolutely, is, in the r^f/zj/zwconsideration, compounded with the idea of that

is felt,

greater

and

less

The

power.

at all concerned,

is

o^ good we prefer more to It

is

only general

less,

and of

enough, for our preference,

know, that the the good

truth, that

which

is

evil less to

more.

any comparison, to

in

objects are good, and that in one case

greater

is

rule,

the very obvious and simple one, that

and

;

we have

might be

it

said,

with as

much

a stronger passion for three guineas

than for two, because we have a stronger passion for a

thousand guineas than for nine hundred and ninety-nine, stronger, for the greater of these

as that the passion

is

two sums, because

it is

for two.

It

possible for the will procure as

nine,

and

stronger for three guineas than

in the very nature of

Is,

much good,

as nine

more,

will also procure

preference of the greater sum.

and two

is

to

X

X

;

priority.

as the letter

Is

Immediate

difference of three

A

is

usually taught before the

A, or that in the knowledge of any other difference, than that of arbitrary The

simple preference of more to

easily conceivable it

The

but we never think of saying, that we transfer

whatever the good may be,

ed^

hundred and ninety-

vi-ithout the

our knowledge of

A there is

passion, im-

indeed an earlier piece of arithmetic, in the

same manner letter

human

mind to know, that a thousand guineas

;

and.

less

good,

is

surely a circumstance that

If it

be not easy to be conceiv-

cannot be said of the explanation

which Mr.

Hume hai

162

n remained

By

the same.

frequently sug-

gesting one idea without even attempting to

lias

given, that

has rendered the preference at

it

all

more

intelh'gible.

f"

But, though

it

be conceded to him, that his doctrine

of the opposition of desires

is

and that

just,

it

has the

analogy, which he affirms, to the calculation of chances, there

still

remains the strongest of

theory of our belief of probability, supposed, that fesses to

it

is

objections to his

on each

greater probability,

of glimpses f which

less.

it

pro-

In those cases, in which the number side very great, it

is

is

confessed

is

him, that the idea of the object, to which

in cases, in

which

leaves the very difficulty,

remove.

of chances

all

in the particular case

we

by

assign the

not brightened by that concurrence

the asserted cause of the brightness,

which the number of chances

In the two comparisons, as far as

on consciousness, there

is

no difference

is

on each

side

we can depend the assent be-

;

ing equally immediate, and of the same kind,

when we

prefer a thousand cYi^nces to Jive hundred ^ and fzvo to one.

But, even though deceives sary, that

it

be admitted, that our consciousness

us in this apparent similarity,

ing, in the greater comparison,

peated glimpses, to v/hich, is

it is still

some circumstauce be pointed out;

ascribed.

the place of those re-

in the less, so

The supposed

neces-

as supply-

genera/ rult

much influence is

nothing more

than the remembered brightness of past conceptions

but the brightness of one idea another ^dea.

The

greater

is

:

not the brightness of

number of

glimpses, in

one

comparison.

163

remove any of the circumstances

in

which

it

is

opposed by another idea, we might reverse the may hare

comparison,

more

object

rendered our conception of one

vivid than of another

:

but

cannot transfer

it

this effect to dissimilar objects, existing in a situation al-

If the effect be transferable,

together dissimilar.

be communicated

as

much

hundred and ninety-nine,

The

sand chances. should not,

is,

But,

the two.

to the object which has nine

which has

as to that

number

the mere circumstance of greater

readily account for the in

of probabilities,

very supposition of more chances

and implies

it,

is

as

In every

indeed

is

nothing

The

less.

implies greater

proba-

v;ithout any relation to the vivid-

ness of the ideas compared, and even vividness of ideas

num-

may

it

supposed.

there

more, than the simple preference of more to

bility,

it

preference of three chances to

the original comparison

calculation

thou-

the greater of

is

ber be sufficient to account for the difference,

tiuOi

a

only supposable reason, that

that the latter if

may

it

on the opposite

where the greater

side

;

as in

many of

those calculations of moral chances, in which our wishes are on one side, and our belief on the other.

At

best,

Mr. Hume's theory of probability

but to render very complicated what simple.

The

is

in

serves

itself

very

supposition of the influence oi general rules

involves also the inconsistency of supposing the feeling

of probability to be something parative vividness of an idea

be nothing more.

It

is

;

different from, the

though

it

com-

be defined to

not merely, v/hen they are op-

posed

164 belief of the

most accurate

would soon be converted

pectation

and despair

tainty,

itself

Ex-

calculator.

would be

into

cer-

lost in

the

continual contemplation and desire of that im-

probable good which

The

is its

object.

general doctrine of belief is introduced

by Mr. Hume,

to illustrate the particular in-

After two objects have

stance of causation.

been observed by us often

other, he supposes, that there sition

succeed each

to is

an easy tran-

of the mind, from one to the other

;

and

that, in all

such cases of easy transition to an

object,

the

'

mind reaches a

posed to each other,

in the

and

chances of a result, that ob-

jects are comparatively vivid.

ous, in

steadier

They

innumerable other respects

:

are infinitely vari-

and therefore,

probability be nothing but greater vividness,

it

if

may be

supposed to be influenced as much by the remembered liveliness

of the whiter or warmer of two objects, as by

the remembered hveliness of any other idea, which had been before accompanied with the feeling of probability, it is

only from chances to chances, however, that the

transferred brightness

position

is

is

supposed

;

and the very sup-

thus a tacit avowal, that probability

the mere comparative vividnesa of an idea.

is

not

165 stronger conception of

it,

would have been able

it

than what otherwise

ceding theory of belief were true, that, admitting the

If the pre-

to attain/

fact

it is

obvious,

we

as stated,

should

indeed believe the second object to have real existence, but

we should

believe

the only effect of the transition that stronger

is

for

as

to give us

how, by

But

supposed to depend.

the fact, as stated by :

is

;

and steadier conception, on which

belief of reality

ing

no more

Mr. Hume, has no mean-

transition,

can the mind

at-

tain a steadier

and stronger conception of an

object, than

otherwise luould have been able

to attain,

his

own

it

when

the idea of an object, to use

sense of that term, can be attained, in

no other luay, than by such a transition as that described; and impressiom are allowed to be stronger than ideas, however vivid

!

There

is,

therefore, no possible ground of comparison. If

it

*

be not absurd to talk of* laws of associa-

The

by Mr.

cases of transition, or association of ideas, are

Hume

divided into three classes, as they are re-

ferable to reseml)lance, contiguity in time cause and

effect.

It

is

not a

little singular,

L

and place, and that he

who

thus

forms

166 do not

tion, ideas

therefore, if

it

rise

by chance

rise at all,

must

:

every idea,

rise

according

to those very principles of association, a//, it is

which

contended, have the power of render-

ing our ideas

more

vivid than they

would have

been, or, in other words, more vivid than nonentities.

But, even though

we were

to admit

the existence of unsuggested ideas, with which

suggested ideas might be compared, as of more strong

and steady conception, Mr. Hume's

proposition would be scarcely less nugatory,

and M'ould be equally inconsistent with the Instead of an or-

other parts of his doctrine.

der of associations of causes and associations

effects, all

would be accompanied with the

belief of causation forms a separate

because

;

class of causes

would

all

'

and effects, should,

carry in

the

next section, attempt to shew, that they are only uni-

form

contiguity.

It

may be

said, indeed, that the third

class has reference to contiguity, not as casual

but as invariable and future, stinctive belief of causation.

tiguity of causes and effects sociations in our

fluous

;

second.

mind

as erery case

:

in

But

it

only the past con«

it is

which can have formed

and the

of

and past,

accordance with the in-

class

would

is

still

as-

therefore super-

be implied

in

the

167 the mind' to the conception of the correlative,

and therefore

fix

it

the conception, with

in

greater steadiness and strength. a person

who

of the place

The

sight of

resembles our friend, the sight at

which we parted from our

book which our

friend, the sight of the

friend

wrote, or of the landscape which he painted^ all

agree in this respect, that they suggest to

immediately the idea of our friend.

us

If,

therefore, the suggestion, and consequent vivid-

ness of the suggested idea, be

uniform sequence produces causation,

we should

* In the Treatise of

which

by which an

in us the belief

of

believe the relation of*

Human

tempt to obviate the force of ings,

all,

Nature, there

this objection,

are one continued

jf)etitio

is

by

an atreason-

principif assuming,

throughout, that difference of the relations of cause and effect,

and of resemblance and contiguity, the discovery

of which

is

the very circumstance objected.

The

pre-

liminary part of the argument, which does nothing more,

than repeat,

in

many words,

that there are relations of

cause and effect and of resemblance and contiguity, I omit, and quote the only passages which have even the

semblance of reasoning.

A sort

of

attempted to be drawn between the

line

of distinction

relations.

'

is

Where

upon the appearance of an impression, we not only feigu another object, but likewise arbitrarily, and of our mere L 2

good

IG8 cause and eitect to exist, between our friend,

and the person, and the place, good

v/ill

and pleasure, give

as

much

as be-

a particular relation to

it

the impression, this can have but a small effect upon the

mind

nor

;

is

there any reason,

the same object

in

the same relation to

manner of necessity

as little necessity for

it

and

;

of cause and

The

tages.

The

objects

it

it

;

no

has

all

itself to

the

The

re-

*

the opposite advan-

presents are fixt and unalterable.

impressions of the

conoiderable degree

with

effect,

is

feigns such, there

if it

always to confine

same, without any difference or variation.' lation

to place

There

it.

mind to feign any resembl-

for the

ing and contiguous objects is

why, upon the return of

we shou'd be determined

the same impression,

memory

never change in any

and each inipression draws along

which takes

a precise idea,

place in the ima-

its

gination, as something solid and real, certain and invariable.

The thought

always determined to pass from

is

the impression to the idea, and from that particular im* pression to that particular idea, without any choice or hesitation.'

Vol.

1, p,

Is

1(.)4.

even this distinction, w^hich

is

not obvious, that

it

attempted to be made^

implies the previous belief of causation in objects, indc'

For, in the

pendently of ihe qualities of the present ideas ? ideas themselves, there solid,

and

real ;

mort fixed and

is

nothing peculiarly

nor can the external unalterable,

when they suggest causation,

The

than when they suggest resemblance. gested by resemblance are not

mind,

in its associations,

than by the relation

and

^rjf^/j-f,

be said to be

objects

less

vivid

less influenced

of cause and

by

;

ideas

nor

sug.

is

the

that relation,

effect.

There

is,

therefore,

169

<ween our friend, and the book, and the land-

To

scape.

which can distinguish the cases of

therefore, nothing, transition, unless

ence, which

is

any circumstance,

suppose that

we have

a

knowledge of their

differ-

Mr.

Hume

independent of the transition.

seems to think, that there

a

is

pass uniformly from cause

tendency

in

the mind, to

or from effect to

to effect,

cause, and not uniformly from resembling objects to each

other

but there

:

posed

no such peculiar tendency, as

is

possible

effects,

often, suggesting

sometimes

sup-

some

Even though

similar object, or circumstance,

by mere casual

it

vicini-

there were a peculiar tendency in the

case of cause and effect,

on Mr. Hume's

its

and, at least as

cause,

its

which was once connected with ty.

is

the sight of an object sometimes suggesting

;

uot a general tendency , which,

it is

any influence on

principles, can have

present belief, but merely the particular transition and the

V/hen we

particular existing idea. will

be admitted, that

our mere good

will

we do

little

is

mere transition

choice and hesitation,

there any :

our possession suggests the person

when

suggests the

we be

artist

who

it

and of rela-

choice and

*

but there

when the

as

case can

arbitrarily

*

in

it

causation,

believe

and pleasure give a particular

tion to the impression,' nor hesitation' in the

not

is

surely as

picture of a friend

whom

painted

it

resembles,

it.

?n neither

said to feel a necessity of confining our-

might have sug-

selves to

one object

gested

any co-existing circumstances of place and time,

;

:

for the picture

as well as the subject or the artist.

We believe

undoubt-

edly, that the artist alone, not any other person, -^ause

of the existence of the painting L 3

:

was the

but the reason of

170 which

is

not

common

to

the belief,

cessary to

Hume's explanation that nothing

more

is

these cases,

all

false

is

ne-

admit, that Mr.

to

is

is

and

;

necessary,

suppose

to

to suppose,

is

the thoughts of our mind, in our end-

that

all

less

day-dreams of memory and imagination,

appear to us a series of

effects,

Whether they be

effects

or causes

on Mr. Hume's

principles,

determined.

The son

the father the son ture,

is,

indeed,

impossible to be

suggests the father, and

the

;

or of causes.

artist

and the picture the

suggests the pic-

artist.

previously

If,

to the liveliness of the ideas of suggestion, the

two objects do not appear the father and the

artist

have the relation of

may seem

effects, as

son and the picture, the

of our belief of thiscausation is

true,

much

to

of suggestion

In like manner,

of conception alone be necessary,

our external impressions,

ory

as

of causes, to the

liveliness

being in both cases the same. if liveliness

be related,

to us to

but that

it is

is

false

;

differing

not that Mr.

from our Hume^s

the-

the beh'ef depending only

on the known immediate sequence, and being altogether independent of the transition and vividness of particular ideas.

Tdeas in nothing but greater

liveliness,

should

seem, whenever they disturb the course of our associated ideas, to have the relation of effect to that object, the idea of

which immediately

preceded the impression.

Mr. Hume, indeed, very inconsistently, iinds in the succession of ideas, something

which succeed.

ideas

more than

In considering them, he

loses all his unwillingness to discover connexion. §

The

transition itself,

he supposes

from

be

to

be derived.

we feel

in the

felt,

to another,

third thing,

as a

relation,

this felt '

from one idea

and

our idea of power to

This connexion, therefore, which

mind,

this

customary transition

of the imagination from one object to

its

usual

attendant, ia the sentiment or impression

from

which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.'

'

When many

appear, and the same object

by

the

uniform instances is

always followed

same event, we then begin

to

the notion of cause and connexion.

feel a

new

entertain

We then

sentiment or impression, to-wit, a

customary connexion in the thought or imagination

between one object and

its

usual attend-

172 ant

and

;

this

idea which

we

though

that,

sentiment

A

seek

But

for.'

suggest

customary connexion

%

the original of tha^'*

is

is

B

a thousand times, a

no niore/elt between

these two ideas, than between any

They

are

still,

to

evident,

is

it

two events.

use Mr. Hume's language,

only conjoined^ as proximate in a sequence^

We know only, that B

has followed

sand times ; and neither

A nor B

power.

B may

are conscious only of

a thou-

the idea of

is

be suggested by

A

A

;

but

we

A, and afterwards of B,

not of the suggestion, nor of any thing intermediate.

Were we

connexion, the

full

conscious of suggestion, or

conception of power would association of the hu-

be involved in the

first

man mind, and

the scepticism of

all

would be nugatory. felt,

If,

Mr.

Hume

then, connexion be

and the existence of an external world

have been admitted, the connexion may be conceived as

much between

between our own thoughts connexion, is

h\xt

external objects, as ;

and,

if

there be

no

proximity onhj^ the proximity

not closer between our ideas, than betvv^een

those changes of external matter, which are

173 admitted by us to have preceded our percep-

To

tion.

find in the knowledge

quence, even of that of our

of any past

own

se*

thoughts, a

prototype of the feeling of future invariable sequence

There

impossible.

is

be found in the

tion to

belief,

an assump-

is

but not a copy.

That, after the customary sequence of jects,

the

'

mind upon the appearance cf one and forms immediately

anticipates the senses,

the idea of the other,'

This,

if it

mory,

is,

of no consequence.

is

be any thing more than mere meat

most, only expectation

idea, or copy, of this impression, for that

is

something more, but

In short, Mr. the idea of

;

only a fainter

either proceeds

istence of the idea of belief,

or supposes

which

it is

it

expectation.

to be a

that the

sequence

our idea of power

origin of

on the ex-

power, in our previous

copy of that from

completely difftrent.

know,

and the

not power,

Hume's account of the

power

tecedence and

is

is

remembrance of

expectation, or a

for us to

ob-

tv/o

enough

It is

belief of similar anis

arises

instinctive

from our

;

—

that

belief of

that future similarity of events, or rather

is

in-

174 volved in the

belief,

and

is

only the feeling of

invariable antecedence, attached to a particular

another object, as

object, in reference to

its

invariable consequent.

It thus appears, that, as the circumstances,

supposed by Mr.

Hume

to

be peculiar to the

phenomena which we term causes and are,

on

with

all

his

own

the other

principles,

common

effects,

them,

to

phenomena of mind,

all those

phenomena, or none, should be accompanied with the belief of causation.

Unless he have

previously taken for granted a distinction of certain objects only, as causes

and

his

effects,

attempted explanation must be unintelligible and,

if

he have previously taken

ed, his attempted explanation truth is

is,

that every

for grant-

useless.

is

The

endeavour to explain, what

allowed to be instinctive,

trifling,

it

;

is

a species

of

which may perhaps approach the na-

ture of wit, but which never can be philosophy.

A

simple statement of the fact

in such a case,

Mn

is

allowed us

Hume's laboured

'

is all,

;

solution'

which,

and, though

were

as tru?

175 as

it

is

the same di^culty, which

false,

his

^cuteness before pointed out, would follow his

reasoning through

Whether

steps.

all its

the

ideas be faint or vivid, the resemblance of the

future to the past, the great and only circum-

stance which perplexes us, must

still

be assum-

from preceding phenomena.

ed, not inferred

Against the possibility of such a theory as that of Mr.

Hume,

nature seemed to have

ciently guarded,

by giving

us, without

suili-

any re-

ference to causation, a succession of trains of ideas, of every variety,

from the

full force

of

vivid perception, to the faintest shadowings of

remembrance.

What

innumerable images arise

every hour in the tpost unpoetic fancy

how

small a part of

life

and

;

composed of the

is

actual impressions of external

objects

Re-

!

semblances, contiguities, and a thousand

cir-

cumstances, which cannot be included in any

formal class of associations,

away

to

wander,

the

world within.

as if led along

intellectual

of thought,

call

us perpetually

But, while

by the

spell of

inchantment, in that

we

fairy

we

some world

are not always philosophizing,

^nd fixing every

rising idea, as the effect of a

176

The brightness, with which they

preceding one.

and

more

the illusion

How

ful.

make our

only to

rise, serves

painful, or

then has Mr.

deceive even himself?

speak quaintly,

reverie longer,

—

Hume

If I

more

been able to

may be allowed

it

lief

which

from being perceived by

acute discernment

to

perhaps, the very circum-

it is,

stance of the greatness of his error,

has prevented

delight-

words, the be-

in other

:

of the relation

is

his

and so

so immediate,

completely independent of the circumstances stated tive,

by him,

how

own

instinc-

inadequate the circumstances

statement were, to the original pro-

duction of the

It

having already an

but accurate conception of causation, he

did not feel, in his

that,

may be

belief.

concluded, therefore, that firm-

ness and liveliness of conception ought not to

form any part of causation.

The

a theory

of the belief of

consideration of exents^ as im-

mediately prior and subsequent^

is all

which

is

necessary to the belief, that the priority and subsequence

ivill

be in all future cases the same.

177 Such,

was probably the

at least,

of the mind

and such

;

original state

would have

it

conti-

nued, had only one event succeeded one event.

The mode, belief

is

which

in

this original

weakened, was stated in the considera-

tion of the fourth proposition of

theory.

It

experience its first

tendency to

was then shewn, is

Mr. Hume's

that the effect of

diiTerent in different stages

tendency

is

that

;

to diminish the belief of fu-

ture similarity, by presenting to us, in apparent

sequence, parts of different co-existing trains

of events follows

;

is

that,

not,

however, even the doubt which

whether an event be an

effect

of a preceding one, but merely, of what preceding event

it is

the effect

;

determination in this respect,

that, to aid is

our

the secondary

operation of experience, which informs us, in

what particular cases

v/e

have not been disap-

pointed in our original expectation

with the frequent renewal of

our doubt, or suspense,

It was

is

this

;

and

that,

conhrmationj

gradually removed.

in his attention only to the

operation of experience, that

secondary

Mr. Hume's great

But

error consisted.

it is

an error which doe^

not afFect the truth of the theory. fifth

first

part of his

Rejecting, therefore, the fourth and

propositions,

we may admit the three which

precede them, and believe, with him, that the

and

relation of cause

between any two

effect

events cdinnoi he perceived, a priori, first

alone

is

presented to us

;

that,

when the

even

when

both have taken place, the relation of future

connexion cannot be inferred by reason that the belief of

it,

;

but

immediate and universal,

the effect of an instinctive principle of our

is

nature^

In the preceding statement of the theory^

and the endeavour of

it

office

to discriminate those parts

which alone deserve our approbation, the of philosophic criticism

fulfilled.

But

it is

is :

conception of

it

also, '

what

it is

to

be

not enough, to have shewn,

what Mr. Hume's theory it

may seem

renders

not.

the universal mis-

necessary, to

The author of the

shew

Essay,

on the idea of necessary connexion,' has been

uniformly represented, as denying the exist-

;

179 ence of the very idea of necessary connexion

and though, since the publication of the work, which contained

his inquiry into

the

origin

of the idea of power, nearly seventy years

have elapsed, the

it is still

word poiuer

is

necessary to shew, that

not considered by him, as

altogether without meaning.

maintain

to

it,

meaning,

is

That he does

be a word altogether without

the positive assertion of Dr. Reid,

and of the other philosophers, by doctrine was originally opposed

;

whom

and

the

this opi-

nion, under the authority of respectable names,

has become a sort of traditionary article of faith,

and of wonder

human

at the possible extent

of

scepticism, so as to preclude even that

very slight examination, which alone seems necessary to confute

That we

it.

have no idea of power whatever,

which can enable us

to

form any

distinction

of

the sequences of events, as casual or invariable,

is,

indeed, so completely opposite to every

feeling of

our mind, that the presumption

is

very strong, against the possibility of such an

ISO opinion.

In the case of

sumption

1

\

is

we have an

He

verified.

idea of

ority in sequences

perceive or infer

Mr. Hume,

this

pre-

does not deny, that

power or of invariable prihe denies only that

:

we can

as a quality inherent in the

it,

subjects of a sequence.

All

our ideas are considered by him, as

A

copies of impressions.

very simple syllo-

gism has therefore been formed for him have no idea

ivhlcJi

is

:

not a copy of some im-

pression; luc have no impression of poiver ; therefore have no idea of power.

proposition of this syllogism

maintained by him

:

We

is

we

The major

unquestionably

and to those, who know

nothing more of Mr. Hume's doctrine, than that

he held that proposition, and had also

some

peculiar opinions on the subject of power,

the

remaining propositions of the syllogism

may be ference.

allowed to occur, as a very natural in-

But,

when

the

mind has not been

prepossessed by such an inference, scarcely possible to read the Essays ject,

it

seems

on the sub-

without immediately perceiving, that the

181

minor and the conclusion should be reversed.

The

syllogism, which

Hume's

reasoning,

no idea which

is

is

the following

not a

is

truly involved in :

Mr.

JVe have

copy of some impres-

i ti

we have an

sion; hut

idea

of poiver

;

there

must therefore he some impression^ from which that idea

which is

is

derived.

The major

proposition,

drawn from too narrow an induction,

is

obviously false

:

but the mode, in which

it

has rendered his subsequent reasoning inaccurate,

very different from what has been

is

supposed.

of power

It

has not led him to deny the idea

but

;

it

cessity of finding

has led him, from the neits

corresponding impression,

to satisfy himself with a very erroneous theory

of the idea, and to imagine that he had covered

its

real prototype,

dis-

where, but for the

want of better resemblance, he would not have imagined that he had discovered the smallest similarity.

In

his

Essays on the subject, Mr.

States first his

'

sceptical doubts,' in

Hume

which he

establishes the impossibility of perceiving

M

or

|

182 inferring any necessary connection in the parts

of a sequence, an impossibility, which seems to render

then

He

power a word without meaning.

states

his

sceptical

'

solution

of these

doubts/ in which he argues, that power

be copied,

it

not

we have an

a word without meaning, since impression, from which

is

may be supposed

in the feeling of a

to

customary con-

nection of ideas, by which, after the experi-

ence of the sequence of two objects, the mind passes readily

from the idea of one

the idea of the other. lion

which

idea of

the sceptical solu^

asserts the actual existence of the

power

is,

by being the

section, separated

which

That

object to

assert the

from

subject of a

new

the sceptical doubts^

seeming non-existence of the

idea of power, cannot surely disquaHfy

it

from

being considered as a part of the theory, which is

composed of both

section

j

and indeed,

in the single

of the idea of necessary connection,'

'

they are recapitulated, in one continuous ar-

gument.

Yet, by an oversight that

is

altoge-

ther unaccountable, Dr. Reid, and the other writers

who have

considered

Mr, Hume'i:

183 theory, neglect the solution of the doubts, as if it

formed no part of the theory, and thus

gain an easy triumph over a scepticism, which

author himself had been the

its

first to

over-

throw.

It

is

surely no very

uncommon mode by

analytic disquisition, to proceed, step

in the search of a particular idea at intervals, that

;

to

of

step,

remark

there as yet seems to be

no

such idea, hut that in our remaining progress

we

shall

perhaps discover

it

and afterwards

;

we have now

to conclude with remarking, that

discovered the idea which ail

such cases,

considered

would be,

if

we sought

:

yet, in

a part of the analysis were

the indisputable inference

alone,

that the existence of the idea

denied by the very sceptical inquirer.

mode

of investigation described

which Mr.

Hume

has pursued.

is

was

The

exactly that,

He

first

seeks

the source of the idea of necessaryconnectiona in single instances

of sequence

:

but in these

he observes only one event preceding another, without being able to

perceive any circunv

M

2

184 stance,

from which he can

their future successions.

infer similarity of

Such are the sceptu

cal doubts that arise at one stage of the inquiry.

'

separate.

All events seem entirely loose and

One

event follows another

we

but

;

never can observe any tye between them. They

seem conjoined^ but never connected.

we

And

as

can have no idea of any thing, which never

appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that

we have no

at all,

and

idea of connexion or

that these

out any meaning,

power

words are absolutely with-

when employed

either in phi-

common life. But THERE STILL REMAINS ONE METHOD OF AVOIDING THIS CONCLUSION, AND ONE

losophical reasonings, or

SOURCE WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET EXAMINED. is

When

presented,

it is

any natural object or event impossible for us,

by any

sa-

gacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, result

from

that object,

the

it,

what event

will

or to carry our foresight beyond

which

memory and

is

immediately present to

senses.

Even

after

one

in-

18^ where we have observed

Stance or experiment,

a particular event to follow upon another,

we

are not entitled to form a general rule, or fore-

what

tel

will

happen

justly esteemed an

in

like cases

;

it

being

unpardonable temerity to

judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment,

But

ivlien

always^ in another^

however accurate or certain.

one particular species of event has all

instances^ been

conjoined with

we make no longer any scruple offore-

telling one

upon the appearance of the other^

and of employing

that reasonings which can

alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence.

then call the one object,

We

cause

;

the

that there SOME connexion BETWEEN THEM SOME

other, IS

We

EFFECT*

POWER

suppose,

;

IN

THE ONE, BY WHICH

IT INFALLI-

BLY PRODUCES THE OTHER, AND OPERATES WITH THE GREATEST CERTAINTY AND

STRONGEST NECESSITY.

It

appears, then, that

THIS IDEA OF A NECESSARY

AMONG EVENTS lar instances,

aHses from a

CONNEXION

number of

simi-

which occur, of the constant con-

M

3

1S6 ]

He who

unction of these events.' ^

thus en-

deavours to shew, how the idea of necessary * Whatever strength of evidence there may be sup« posed to be,

in

the reasoning quoted ^bdve,

scarcely possible to adduce

it in

which considers Mr. Hume,

as

and it

connection, to

it

seems

favour of that opinion^

denying power, and causd

be words that have a meaning : and yet

has been adduced, not to prove, as might have been

expected, that Mr.

Hume

denies the existence

of any of the ideas, which are sup-

posed to be expressed this single passage*

in

ajjirm^,

but to prove, that he

those words

this passage,

;

forming the whole basis of a late

memorable argument, at the bar of the General Assembly of the National Church, the acuteness of those,

vanced,

it

by

In justice, however, to

whoiii the argument was ad-

must be remembered, that the whole passage

was not quoted by them. That part of it alone was brought forward, which contains the simple recapitulation of the

*

sceptical doubts

;'

and the speakers had

the uniform good fortune, to stop at the printed in capitals, the very passage, at

first

passage

which,

it

was

To

altogether necessary for their argument, to stop.

have proceeded to the very sentence, it

first

words of the very next

would have completely destroyed

would then have appeared,

its

force

;

as

that, although, at one stage

of investigation, the necessary conclusion seemed to be, that

power was

a

word without meaning,

malned one method of avoiding yet unexamined, in

which

tifjirmed to he found.

the

this conclusion,

Idea

The word

of power

there still re^

and is

one source

afterwards

seems f being printed

by

Mr.

187 connection arises^

is

and believed to

asserted

deny, that we have any idea^ which can thus

Mr.

Hume

that

it

to the

was

in Italics,

so

word

might have induced a suspicion,

marked, to denote, by a peculiar opposition ij-,

power

that the rejection of the idea of

was only an apparent conclusion,

at

one stage of inquiry.

Fortunately, however, for the argument of the opponents of the doctrine, their mind.

no such suspicion was induced

Instead of being led

of the expression, to consider

it in

by

reference to the suc-

ceeding sentence, they, were led by cise

word

only to an exer-

it,

of ingenuity, in endeavouring to seems,

though

so printed

shew, that the

by Mr. Hume, was meant

by him to have exactly the same meaning, er word,

That liberately

which

is

in

the doubtfulness

usually opposed to

as that strong-

it.

the partial quotation was intentionally and de°

made,

be accounted

it

for,

none of the party,

would be uncandid to think.

It

may

more charitably, by supposing, that

who took

the lead in the alarm, and

in the ecclesiastical prosecution of the doctrine, had ever

read the context of the passage which they quoted, ot

had paid any attention to the condemned.

original

Edsay which they

In the works of Dr. Reid, there

amination 'of the Essay, which seems to

is

an ex-

fui lish,

at less

cxpence of thought, both a statement of

and an exposure of

its

fallacies.

It

is,

its

doctrine,

therefore, not

improbable, that this easier mode, of studying by proxy a very obscure doctrine,

had been preferred, and

having aft'erwards accidentally opened

thi^

that,

Essay on Ne, cessary

138

He

arise.

proceeds to point out more parti-

cularly the original impression^ in that

con-

cessary Connection, at the unfortunate passage quoted

by them, and having found vious opinion

thought

it

to coincide with the pre-

from Dr. Reid, they had not

received

to examine the context, or to ex-

it necessary'^,

tend their perusal of the Essay

itself,

to a single addi-

tional sentence.

It

we

make

impossibe to

is

supposition, to which

this

without reflecting

are in charity led,

how much

very

unpleasant animosity might have been spared, but for a single mistake,

by

made

a philosopher

those, still

who took

at a considerable distance of time,

who

is

no more,

— or perhaps even had

unnecessary alarm at the doctrine of a

but extended their reading to one

earlier writer,

sentence of the very Essay which was the object

^vIngle

of their dread, and of their public and zealous reprobation.

It

is

with extreme reluctance,

proceedings that are past.

I

The

make

this allusion to

circumstances of the

controversy, which they involved, were such, as every sincere friend of religion deprecated and lamented.

I

do

not wish to bring those circumstances again to memory.

But, as a

'

Report' of the argument to which I allude has

been published, and

is

in

general circulation,

it

becomes

necessary, for the interest of libcrahty and philosophy, to point out the fallacy of a mis-statement, which has the

semblance, as

it is

a charge, that

is

at present read,

of giving strength to

altogether destitute of support,

when

stripped of the aid of false quotation.

%

Even

189 nection of the Ideas of objects which he sup-

poses to be

felt

by the mind,

after experience

of their sequence, and remarks, in a passage already quoted

which we

feel

'

:

in

This connexion therefore the mind, this customary

transition of the imagination

to

usual attendant,

its

EvEN made, thus

to those,

may be

it

is

from one object

the sentiment or im-

by whom the false quotation was happy circumstance to be

ultimately a

cited to a perusal of the whole of that ve.y short

e:

summary of

reasoning, of which they had before attend-

ed only to a part

;

as

they wJl have the comfort of

dis-

covering, that the doctrine, which they justly considered

most alarming one, has

as a

least has

.n

truth no existence, or at

no existence derived from the Essay on Neces-

sary Connection.

It

was stated by them,

theological objection to that Essay, that

as the great

its

author,

by

denying the existence of the very idea of power, denied, in consequence, the po-sibility of the

behef of divine

It must, therefore, be consoling, to find, that,

power.

tjlaowever false his theory of the origin of the idea of poiv£r

.maybe, he

and

still

asserts, that

<we

have an idea ofpoiver-^

that, hence, the asserted impossibility of the idea of

divine

power does not follow from

other

his

theory; since he

we are led to call one object cause, and anEFFECT ; and to suppose that there is some connec-

allows, that

'

^

tion, ^f/wff« them, some

in the one, by

produces the other, and operates certainty and strongest necessity.

infallibly

mreatest

power

which ivith

it

the

190

from which we form the idea

pression

OF it

POWER OR NECESSARY CONNEXION.'

be

of

requisite, to

still

as an affection of the

existence,

mary of

it

sum-

'

To

of

recapitulate, there-

this

section

:

every

copied from some preceding impression

or sentiment impression, idea.

in the short

actual

the whole doctrine, with which he

the reasonings is

mind which has

may be found,

concludes the Essay.

idea

produce further evidence

acknowledgment of the idea of power,

his

fore,

If

In

and where we cannot find any

;

we may be

all

certain that there

no

of the operation

single instances

of bodies or minds, there

is

nothing that pro-

is

duces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea, of power or necessary con-

But when many uniform

nexion.

pear, and the

same object

is

instances ap-

always followed

we then begin to entertain THE NOTION OF CAUSE AND CON-

by the same event;

NEXION.

We

then feel a

new

sentiment or

impression, to-wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one obiect

and

its

usual attendant;

and

this senti-

.

191

MENT IS THE ORIGINAL OF THAT IDEA WHICH

WE SEEK

The whole argument

FOR.'

is

no-

thing more, than an expansion of that syllo-

gism, which was formerly proposed, as the key

Mr. Hume's

to all

W^

have no idea

impression is

; ive

therefore

on the subject

speculation^

wUch

mot a copy of sorne

is

have an idea of

an impression of

there,

po,y).er ;

it,

to

be sorae^

where found.

As

the doctrine

was not

originally delivered

by Mr. Hume, in\he form, appears in his Essays,

it

in

which

it

now

may perhaps be thought,

that

some considerable change was made

and

that, originally,

it

may have been

in

it^

such,

as with reason to give rise to the opinion of it,

which

still

the Treatise of

prevails.

Yet,

Human

Nature,

if

we examine

we

shall find

the doctrine to be the same, implying through*

out the belief of the idea of power, and ap-

pearing its

sceptically, at certain stages, to

existence,

doubt

only because at certain stages

the supposed requisite prototype has not been

found.

The

section

'

Of the

idea of necessary

19^

commences with the following

connections^

summary

Having thus explained the man-

«

:

ner, in which impressions^

we reason beyond our immediate

and conclude

that such particular

causes must have such particular effects

must now return upon our amine

that question

which

and which we dropt

occurred to us,

first

our idea of necessity ^ ivhen

what

viz,

head

I

repeat,

what

I

have often had ocidea^ that

not derived from an impression,

we must

find

some impression,

idea of necessity, if

such an idea.

what to

Upon

we have no

casion to observe, that as is

is

say that two ob*

ive

jects are necessarily connected together. this

we

footsteps to ex-

our way,

in

;

;

and

we have

assert

In order to this is

and finding that

to causes jects

we

objects necessity

be

that gives rise to this

effects, I

I

really

consider,

m

commonly supposed it

turn

is

always ascribed

my eye to

two ob-

supposed to be placed in that relation

and examine them which they are

in

all

the situations

susceptible.

I

of

immediately

perceive that they are contiguous in time and place,

and that the object we

call cause,

pre-

193 cedes the other

stance can

for

me

we

go any

I

to discover

these objects.

comprehend like objects

I

farther,

same

a

therefore enlarge

on

but

little

to

my

first

;

sight this

new

idea.

quent repetition,

But upon farther inquiry not in every parti-

new

impres-

IDEA,

WHICH

I find,

that

For

after a fre-

upon the appear-

ance of one of the objects, the mind

mined by custom

to consider

its

its

is

deter*

usual attend-

in a stronger light

upon

relation to the first object.

'Tis

to consider

account of

The

and therefore can never give

AND BY THAT MEANS THE

and

I find

several instances only repeats the

AT PRESENT EXAMINE.

ant,

view to

purpose.

cular the same, but produces a

I

my

where

At

I find, that the repetition is

sion;

possible

it

always existing in like relations of

objects

rise to

is

several instances;

to serve

reflection

nor

any third relation betwixt

contiguity and succession.

seems

In no one in-

call effect.

it

|

this impression, then, or determination,

which

f

j

AFFORDS ME THE IDEA OF NECESSITY.'

In

innumerable other passages of the Treatise, th^ existence

of the idea of power

is

equally

194^

affinned

;

and, even

when doubts of

rstence are expressed, they

exv

its

are qualified

by

phrases, that limit the application of the doubt

mere words of mystery, which our

to those scholastic

nomenclature has combined with

in-

variableness of antecedence.

The

history of the origin

power J which is,

as I

is

of the idea of

Hume,

thus delivered by Mr.

have endeavoured to shew

former

in a

part of this work, altogether inaccurate and

The

inadmissible.

belief of

diately intuitive, not

power

imme-

is

borrowed from any

semblance in the transitions of thought.

re^

But^

whether the theory of power advanced by him he a just theori/^

deny that question. tion,

in the

ive

is

one question

have any idea of power,

He may

and be wrong

is

another

be right in the

latter

ques*

in the former.

An

error

former question does not necessarily

volve any dangerous consequences

be

ivhvther he

:

irresistibly

;

for, if

in-

we

determined, as he allows, to

ascribe to the prior objects of a sequence that invariableness

of priority,

which

consitutes

195

we have

power,

all

which

necessary to any

is

arguments, that are founded on the belief of

power

:

the denial of the idea, in the latter

question, necessarily involves the most danger-

ous consequences; sible, that

it

for, if we

can conceive it pos-

should be adopted by any one,

must immediately deprive him of

that

measurable by no earthly enjoyment, solation I

may

which

and the peace, and the happiness, and,

add, the virtue of a

therefore,

security in the

filial

It

no common misrepresentation of

a theory, to ascribe to idea of

power

;

of Mr.

Hume

is

The

is

—the con-

existence of the great Father of mankind. is,

it

and

it

falsely a denial

to ascribe

it

of the

to the theory

assuredly a misrepresentation.

circumstances,

which Dr, Reid has

urged, in opposition to this almost inconceivable

scepticism,

Hume,

are, w^e shall accordingly find, equally

consistent with that this

which he ascribes to -Mr.

Mr. Hume's theory,

which he has himself

harmony of the

for, that

we

asserted.

theories at

all

as with

Nor

is

wonderful

are determined by an irresistible

196 instinct, to the belief

allowed by Mr.

cedence^

is

belief of

power

Dr. Reid,

of invariahleness of ante'

is

—and,

Hume,

—

our

that

intuitive, is the opinion

however opposite

his

of

lan-

guage may be, invariahleness of antecedence

is

the very poiuer for which Dr. Reid contends.

His arguments for the existence of the idea of power, therefore, instead of being, as he supposed, demonstrative of the falseness of Mr.

Hume's

reasoning, must be allowed to form a

strong addititional support of

since

it ;

will

it

appear, on examination, that the behef of invariableness of antecedence

is

all

which

is

es-

sentially

comprized in those very arguments,

that are

adduced as involving necessarily the

existence of the idea oi power.

For

the purpose

of examination,

from Dr. Reid the paragraph,

in

I

copy

which he

re-

capitulates his arguments.

*

The arguments

from these things that

five topics

we can

have adduced, are taken

I :

1

.

That there are many

affirm or

deny concerning

powei*, with understanding. are, in all languages,

signifying, not on-

words

power, but signifying many other things

ly

that imply power, such as action

cause and 3.

That there

2.

That

is a;n

effect,

energy, operation, and others.

in the structure of all languages, there

active

and passive form

and a

ticiples,

in verbs

be given, but that tinguish action

many

from

passion.

man come

and necessary

no account can

has been intended to

it

to

4.

dis-

That there

human mind

operations of the

every

liar to

and par-

different construction adapted to

these forms, of which diversity

are

and passion,

fami-

the use of reason,

in the ordinary

conduct of

lifey

which imply a conviction of some degree of

power

in ourselves

the desire of power sions of

human

POWEP.S, Ess.

It

is

and is

others.

5.

That

one of the strongest pas-

nature.' I,

in

CHAP.

Essays on the Act. 2.

scarcely possible to read these argu-

ments, without perceiving immediately, that they confound loose and variable with invariable sequences.

If there

be any bold sceptic.

198

who

denies that

larity

we

expect, in future, a simi-

of result, from circumstances similar to

the past, the force of the proof

must be

lowed to be

of no force,

when

irresistible

but

:

it is

al-

directed against that very different the-

ory, which allows that

we

are determined

by

the very nature of our mind, to expect, in

all

future time, from similar circumstances a similarity

of result.

That affirm or

there are

many

things that

we can

deny concerning power, with under-

standing,'

is

an evident consequence of

We

principle. it

'

may

say,

this

of a loadstone^ that

has the poiver of attracting iron, which gold

has not

;

because

we have observed

difference of the sequence,

when,

the past

after

making

the experiment wdth gold, a loadstone was substituted,

and because we believe, that the ap-

proach of a loadstone

will

lowed by the motion of hejore^ will

suffer to

manner we

rely

one man,

continue to be fol-

iron,

remain

which gold, as at

rest.

In like

on the muscular strength of

as greater than the strength

of an-

199

we have

other, because

seen the one to sink

beneath a burthen, which the other sustained

The

with ease.

observations on power, includ-

ed by Dr. Reid in the reasonings of

ment,

may

attention.

this

argu-

perhaps be thought to deserve our '

1.

Power

is

not an object of any

of our external senses, nor even an object of

This agrees completely with

consciousness.'

what has been

Mr. Hume's tion

is.

That

we have

stated, as the first proposition o^

theory.

'

as there are

2.

A second

observa-

some things of which

a direct, and others of

which^we have

only a relative conception, power belongs to the latter class. relative to

one thing

its

;

its

— Our

conception of power

exertions, or effects.

exertion

is

Power

another thing.'

is is

This

is

only to say, that invar iahleness of antecedence

is

one thing, and one single fact of antecedence

is

another thing.

is

a quality, and cannot exist without a subject

to

no

which

it

'

3. It is

belongs.'

evident that

power

Assuredly, there can be

invariableness of sequence, without antece-

dents and consequents.

'

4.

clude the want of power from

We its

n2

cannot con-

not being ex-

200 erted

nor from the exertion of a

;

we conclude

of power, can

is

From

when

the

but

we

cir^

cannot predict

the circumstances are different.

mere

infer that he

;

no

Invariableness

supposed, when the previous

cumstances are similar events,

degree

that there is

greater degree in the subject/

of sequence

less

is

silence

dumb

ganic imperfection.

of any one,

we cannot

in consequence of or-

He may

be

silent,

only be*

cause he has no desire of speaking, not because

speech would not have followed his desire it is

and

not with the mere existence of any one, but

with his desire of speakings that

when

who

has

of speaking, has, in truth and in

desire

strictness

we suppose

A man,

utterance to be connected.

no

:

of language, no power of speaking^

mind

in that state of

;

since he has not

a circumstance, which, as immediately prior, is

essential to speech

power,

as

sire arises,

:

but, since he has that

soon as the new circumstance of de-

and

as the presence or absence of

the desire cannot be perceived but in fects, there

mon

is

its

ef-

no inconvenience in the com-

language, which ascribes the power, as

if

201 it

were possessed

at

cumstances of mind nothing more

some

This

cir-

meant, than that the desire ex-

is

qualities that

that have not

kind.'

;

all

though, unquestionably,

be followed by utterance.

isting will

are

times, and in

all

*

5.

There

have a contrary, others

;

Power

is

a proposition of

a quality of the latter

is

no value, and

has no relation to the general argument.

In

all

languages, there must be such words,

as action^ passion^ cause, effect, &c. if in all

nations the sequences of events be supposed to

be invariable.

That, which existing

followed by a change, that of

is

is

always

very different from

which the change always follows some-

thing prior

;

and

ful that different

it,

therefore,

not wonder-

names should have been

vented, to express the flagration of

is

gunpowder

difference. will

The

in-

de-

be expected from

the contact of a spark, with equal certainty,

whether we say, that a spark, stances,

is

in

such circum-

always followed by deflagration, or,

merely using different words,

say,

N 3

that the

202 spark has an active power of deflagrating gun-

powder.

To

Ic

powder It is as

principle are to be traced the

A spark kindles

forms of verbs.

different

active

same

the

gunpowder

:

r^":

kindled hy a

is

gun*

spark.

wonderful, that there should be

little

and passive verbs,

be such words,

as

before

as that there

and after y

should

first

and

second.

We

proceed on the belief of power, both

and others, because we proceed

in ourselves

on the

belief, that

similar circumstances will

always have similar

my

with

friend

of moving

motion

pany

I

:

me

;

my

;

for

results. I

resolve to

believe, that

I

my

that the

desire

friend will accom-

believe, that in

him there wiU

be a similar sequence of motions

and

my

walk

limbs will be followed by their

trust, that

for

I

separate

desires,

to

desires,

which precede

the separate motions, will follow his general

expressed intention, in the same manner as

they have usually followed

it.

203

Ambition bition

is

desire of

the desire of

is

a passion that

power

is

lar

;

am-

But the

us.

and we

:

certain circumstances,

the multitude

by

md

;

nothing more than the de-

of being obeyed

sire

is felt

power

we

because

trust, that, in

be obeyed by

shall

we

believe, that simi-

motives of fear and hope will continue to

we

be followed by similar actions.

If

those sequences to be invariable,

it is

believe

not

more

wonderful, that power should be desired, and thus be a passion of ambi-

that there should tion,

than that food should be desired by the

hungry or by the luxurious, who expect from it

the same relief from uneasiness, and the same

pleasure, which they

received from

Such

remember

to

have before

it.

are the arguments of Dr. Reid, which,

though they may be allowed

were necessary,

that

we do

to prove, if

proof

not consider the

succession of events, as altogether irregular,

cannot surely be considered, as implying any circumstance, which

of Mr. Hume.

is

not implied in the theory

P
is

only a shorter sy-

204 nonimous expression of invariableness tecedence lity

and the invariableness

;

is

an-

of'

not a qua-

of bodies, capable of being perceived or

inferred, but

is

ascribed to

them only by our

intuitive belief.

however, our belief of power be thus

If,

shewn

to

depend, not on perception, nor on

reason, but this

on an

instinctive feeling,

may

not

statement give rise to the denial of power,

and may not atheism

itself,

and wretchedness, be made

That

this

with

;

though

accustomed

it

may be

is

indeed unac-

easily account-

who, being

to philosophical inquiry,

never have attended to the nature of that

dence on which

Many

it ?

objection should have been at any

ed for in those looser thinkers, little

guilt

its

flow from

to

time made by philosophers, countable

all

of Mr.

all

may evi-

inquiry ultimately rests.

Hume's

indeed

doctrines are

dangerous in the extreme, as destructive of Christianity, of belief in a future state,

and of

every sublime conception of Deity

would

;

but

it

be dilBcult to mention any great general theory.

203 either of matter or of practical

mind, from which

danger can be supposed

to flow,

less

than

from the preceding simple theory of causation.

The whole supposed danger

ed in

this

proposition,

cause and effect lief alone,

ous, Is

is is

relation of

that the

an object of universal be-

is

not of perception, nor of reason.

be

If the instinct

there

includ-

is

no power

fallacious,

but,

;

it

may be

if instinct

be

said,

fallaci-

there power, whatever be our theory

?

not the truth of our perception, the truth

of our reasonings, and every physical truth^

dependent on the belief of certain principles

?

And

confined to Mr. possible, even

is

the supposed danger to be

Hume's

for

intuitive

theory,

if it

our imagination,

be im-

to devise

pne, to which exactly the same objection equally appUcable

?

is

not

Let us suppose, that, in-

stead of his sceptical negations, every propo^ sition

had been affirmative

;

—

let

us

first

pose him to have maintained power to be

supdis-

coverable, a priori^ in short, to be perceived like light

and sound

jstatenient,

;

would the

truth of this

even though w^e admitted

it

without

206 and independent, or ra«

objection, be absolute

ther would

it

not

still

be dependent on a prin-

we

involved in the belief, which

ciple,

attach

an absurd and

unintelli-

gible proposition, that the external

qualities,

to perception

?

Is

it

which we consider

may

perceive

own,

to

exist

It

?

is

which no one assents

ceivable proposition

;

principle of our nature^

not to believe, thaF that the realities,

a proposition, :

but

it is

we

we

is,

find

that, it

a con-

from a

impossible

perceive realities, and

which we perceive,

perceive them.

I

and the only reason of

our withholding our assent

we

do not

us,

or even that the very opposite of what

exist,

we

by

as perceived

In like manner,

exist

it is

as

a con-

ceivable proposition, that, notwithstanding the

most frequent and uniform proximity

the

in

succession of two objects, the relation of cause

and

effect,

may

not exist between them

or of invariable future sequence,

position, which, in like lieve

that, it

',

:

but

a pro-

manner, we cannot be-

and the only reason of our

from a

it is

disbelief

principle of our nature,

we

is

find

impossible, in such circumstances^ not to be-

207 I

Let us next suppose, that

Keve the relation.

Mr.

Hume

had maintained the

discoverable

relation to

by a process of reasoning, and

truth of his theory was admitted

that the

us as logically demonstrated this truth, that

could

;

able contingency

?

—

It

said of this also, that

say of

all

imagin-

must on the contrary be it

depends on the truth

That the proposi-

of an instinctive principle.

may

vv^e

by

in the strictest sense of the

it is

terms, absolute and indepeiident of

tions

be

between which we perceive agreement, yet have

no agreement,

gible proposition instance,

;

is

and why,

do we not assent

to

not an unintelli-

any particular

in it ?

It is

not from

the perceived agreement of any other propositions

;

must equally proceed on the

for that

sumption

:

it is

only because, by a principle of

our nature, we find

it

impossible not to believe

the absolute truth of that which ly to

is

relative on-

our individual powers of comparison.

this less

Is

an instinctive principle, than that by

which we are

led inevitably to the belief of the

relation of cause versal,

as-

and

and the other

effect

?

Is it

partial

?

Or,

alone uniif

there be

20S degrees, have belief, that

effect

we not

an event, which we witness,

is

an

of some preceding change, than that the

result of

any of our

logical inferences

the appearances of things It is

more undoubting

rather a

is

from

absolutely true

?

conceivable, without any difference of those

mental affections which form the whole of our consciousness, that

man might have been

creat-

ed, capable of perceiving, or rather of ima-

gining

he perceived external

that

qualities,

—of inferring agreement, none, — of supposing causation,

where there are none, where there

is

where there

is

he was so created, cases cases,

;

and

in all alike,

and

to

it

cannot think, that

any one of these three

in

but, that he cannot,

principle,

we

He

none.

is,

in all the three

owing to an

instinctive

What

then shall

alone.

say of the danger of negations, which re-

mains exactly the same, when the negations are reversed

?

If the

ultimate evidence be of

the same kind, the possibility of mistake

diminished, but increased, by the propositions fie

;

and, therefore, Mr.

had asserted the

belief of

is

not

number of

Hume,

power

if

to arise

209 from a

and unerring process of

strict

nation, not

from an immediate

ratioci-

instinct,

would

have asserted a theory, the truth of which was not

certainly

less

and which,

dependent,

more

there were any difference, was even

if

liable

to mistake.

may be remarked

It

of reasoning,

tions

also,

that,

of the demonstra-

in

addition to

the

general instinctive principle of belief involved the separate propositions, there

in

some primary is

as

proposition, of

much assumed

always

is

which the truth

as that of causation,

which

serves as the basis of the propositions that fol-

The force of the objection is

low.

when

applied to any theory, which derives the

belief of

power from a process of reasoning.

To assert it

thus doubled^

the instinctive origin of the beHef,

appears then,

on the

is,

if the instinct

firmest

be

real, to

possible

foundation.

Whatever may be thought of the

truth of the

fix

it

assertion,

it

is

surely not to be confounded

with that vain and frivolous scepticism, which

would

affect to

deny the

reality

of the instinct

^

210 and

from the opposition which has been

yet,

made

to the

theory,

it

Hume's

simple analysis in Mr.

might be supposed,

that, not con-

tent with denying the possibility of perceiving,

a priori^ or of inferring by reason, the invariable future sequence of any two objects, he

had denied

such a sequence

also, that

this part

out.

an

is

The misconception of

object of our belief.

of his doctrine has been already pointed

The*

and the

univensality of the instinct,

irresistible influence

duct, with w^hich

on our reasoning and con-

it is

accompanied, are brought

forward by him on every occasion, and are, in truth, as has

been shewn, the very

which, inconsistently indeed, but indus-

ty,

triously,

On

he labours to solve.

* Nothing can be stronger, and more the language of * is

difficul-

Hume

Mr.

:

*

This

cumstances.

It

is

explicit, than

belief,'

the necessary result of placing the

whiitever

mind

he observes, such

in

cir-

when we

an operation of the soul,

are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion love,

when we

meet

v,uth

of natural

receive benefits

;

or hatred,

of

when we

injuries.

All these operations are a species

instincts,

which no reasoning or process of

the thought and understanding

duce, or to prevent.'

is

able, either

Section V, Part

L

to pro-

211 principle the force of experience depend,

none

'

but a fool or a madman,' he observes,

'

will

ever pretend to dispute the authority of experi-

human

ence, or to reject that great guide of

Of

life.'

our

principles, indeed,

first

it

may

be remarked, that the very supposition of them, -^fundamental laws of

as

of any system of reason-

plies the inefficiency

which would exclude them from our be-

ing, lief

and even the

5

words attacks

in

human heUef im-

which

libertine scepticism,

their very existence,

is

dan-

gerous, not by destroying the force of those principles,

are

which

is

impossible, as long as

men, but only by diminishing,

by a general analogy, and

in the cases

as

it

we

were

of moral

religious restraint, that awful reverence for

the best impressions of our early belief, which

f

I

presses

borrow the phrase from Mr. Stewart, who ex-

by

it,

with

much

greater elegance and precision,

those intuitive truths, which were by Dr. Reid ascribed to the principle of common sense. originally used

by Dr. Reid

Had

himself,

the phrase been

how much would

have been spared of that verbal declamation about a

name, which assumed, with very

false pretensions, the

honourable shape of a philosophic controversy

!

212 arises,

from

not so

much from

their never having

the scepticism of Mr.

feet,—if

the

must be given losophic

ceitamty, as

their

been questioned. But

Hume

suspicions

on cause and

name of

ef.

scepticism

to a question of the justest phi-

analysis,

—

not in

consists,

denying

any one of our hrst principles, but in tracing to

one of them,

source, the

as the ultimate

on cause and

force of our various reasonings effect.

When

Bishop Berkeley, not content with

hesitathig as to the

grounds of our

external worlds boldly denied

belief in an

its

existence,

what dangerous consequences might have been supposed

to flow

from the

denial

!

How absurd

did moral virtue become, to

man, who was for

ever in a state of solitude

and what magnifi-

;

cent argiunents for the existence of a Deity

were annihilated

in the general desolation pro-

duced by a few propositions

!

These

desolat-^

ing propositions are, in the strictness and

ac-.

curacy of mere logic, completely unanswerable.

No

evil

consequence, indeed, can flow

213 from them

but

;

only because they are

it is

at

variance, not with strict demonstrative truth,

but with that instinctive the uhimate source of

mount

all

conviction,

demonstration.

to

which, as

beliefs

The

is

it

is

para-

instinct,

by

which we consider the sensations of our mind, as

marks of the existence of an external world,

is

too powerful, to be weakened

ory

and even the celebrated

;

posed

it,

by any

sceptic

who

inconsistently but amiably pious

the-

op-

and

benevolent, was, at the time of his opposition, so completely under

its

influence, as to deliver

his theory, professedly for the confutation of

those very freethinkers and atheists, whose actual nonexistence his theory implied.

When we address a philosopher, whoknows, that

it

is

to

an instinctive principle alone our

sensations are evidence of things external, believe, as

much

as

when we

gar, that he will be

things

;

because

source of

it,

it is

address the vul-

moved by

which are founded on the

we

the reasonings

belief of external

his belief alone, not the

which we address. o

If that belief

214 be the same, whether

it

be

intuitive, or de-

monstrative, his emotions and actions will be the

He

same.

and

spise,

tion of cause

and de-

fear,

In the

a philosopher believe the rela-

if

and

effect,

every reasoning, found-

belief, will

be the same, whether

the relation be intuitive,

and we have exactly that the

and

love, alike in either case.

same manner,

ed on that

will hate,

common

the

or demonstrative

same reason

duties of social

altogether omitted

will

life

be

by him, because he knows

that his belief of external existence as that he will

;

to fear,

is

intuitive,

deny any power whatever, be-

cause he regards as intuitive his belief of cause

may be

and

effect.

that

by the knowledge of the

It

belief, the influence

diminished

;

perhaps,

imagined, real

of the belief

but to know, that

source of

itself will it

is

founded

on an

universal and irresistible instinct,

know

that

it

How

many

is

has the surest foundation,

which demonstration itself can be

be

to

on

built.

perplexities are involved, in the

whole doctrine of

infinities!

Yet we do not

215 less believe bility

of matter, because the most ludicrous

may be

absurdities It

the doctrine of the infinite divisi-

may be proved unanswerably,

tion

from

logically inferred

that

it.

no por-

of the earth's surface, however small in

appearance, can ever be traversed by a moving body, however rapid for to pass

time,

from one point

however small,

fore, as the space ible, to pass

requisite

infinite

is

;

and there-

infinitely divis-

number of

number of

infinite

:

some

to another,

supposed

over an

must require an

is

motion may be

its

parts

times.

Yet, though the conclusion be logically irresistible, it is a

only, without admitting

should be astonished mathematician,

we

conclusion, at which

who

at

it

;

smile

and we certainly

the zeal of any devout

should be shocked with

the dangerous consequences of the doctrine of

the infinite divisibility of matter,

might be shewn from Israel

it,

because

that the children of

must have spent a whole

eternitv, before

they could have passed through the

There are

Red

sea.

principles of independent feeling, in

the hum.an mind, which save 3

it

it

from the foK 2

216 lies

of

its

own

By

ratiocinations.

can believe, where there

these,

we

no argument, and

is

can disbelieve, where there

is

argument with-

out a single demonstrative imperfection.

In ascribing the an it

and

belief of cause

instinctive principle,

Hume

Mr.

effect to

has placed

on the same foundation, wdth our

belief of

an external world, and even of our

What

tity.

daring atheist

he,

is

own idenwho has ever

truly disbeheved the existence of himself

others

he

is

?

an

For

it is

who can

he alone,

Mr. Hume's doctrine may,

effect,

him who does

indeed, have been dangerous, to

not go to bed that he

may

sleep,

he may enjoy another day, nor

hand

to grasp

satisfy his

say, that

no relation of

atheist^ because there is

cause and

nor

rise that

stretch out his

an object, nor eat that he

hunger

and

:

but

it is

may

only to that won-

derful individual, as yet unimported to us

from

any foreign country, that the doctrine can have

had any

evil

consequence

;

for he

forms a single action of daily

on the

life,

who

per-

in reliance

similarity of the future to the past, has

217 already confessed the existence of God, as far

God

as the belief of the existence of

on the belief of causation. confesses,

none but a

'

none but

deny the

on

from

it,

by him, flow^s

row he

;

fool or a

a fool or a

The

will, therefore,

be

that fire will

it,

or, if

he

principle,

as

much

believed

which

warm him

also

to-mor-

in parts of the

doubt of that fundament-

by which alone, he can expect

warmth from as

will

the reason of his disbelief,

ratiocination, not his

ture,'

madman

affect to disbelieve the theism,

as

will state,

will

theism, which flows

some supposed inconsistency

al

madman'

as the simple proposition,

from

Hume

Mr.

which are founded

just reasonings,

that principle.

as

that principle, he con-

deny the authority of fesses, that

If,

depends

Mr.

the

fire

Hume

of to-morrow.

has well observed,

*

'

Nawill

always maintain her rights, and prevail, in the end, over any abstract reasoning whatsoever..

Though we should

conclude,

that, in all reasonings

from experience, there

is

a step taken

for instance,

by the mind, which

is

not sup-

ported by any argument or process of the un-

218 derstanding

there

;

no danger,

Is

reasonings, on which almost

all

that these

knowledge de-

pends, will ever be affected by such a discoIf the

very.

ment

to

make

some other authority

;

mind be not engaged by arguthis step, it

must be induced by weight and

principle, of equal

and that principle

human

influence as long as

will preserve its

nature remains the

same.*

When

we examine

which have been given

the theories of atheism, to the world,

and which

have produced any impression on the weak

and unfortunate minds, to their influence,

we

that have

find

been subject

many, which are

founded on narrow views of the universe,

an unwillingness creative design

very excess , lief

to

discover in

and goodness,

if it

may be

It

— on

marks of

—and even on

the

so term.ed, of the be-

of causation, which, supposing the par-

ticles

of matter to possess within themselves a

principle of mysterious agency, that connects

them with each other

in

all

their

various

changes, and operates, in this connection, by

219 eternal necessity, seems to allow ^ess perhaps the

no Deity, un-

god of Epicurus.

Theories

we

find

none which are founded on any general

dis-

of

these kinds

all

we

discover

and

satiety

of a Creator,

ment

and

;

to fear the

is

no

himself a designer every

reason

mo-

is

there, therefore,

atheistic effects

of any doctrine,

little

ivell stated,

in our

own continued

istence

of

the friend,

if the theological

from having of God, as

belief in the existence

or in the

who

he,

traces of the designs

ivhich does not prevent us,

argument he

Even

from food.

professes to discover

but

expect warmth fronx

belief, that forbids us to fire,

;

as

much

ive

have

existence, or in the ex-

who

is

sitting beside us,

warmth of fire, and

the coldness

of

snow.

The

suspicion, attached to this doctrine of

Mr. Hume, must have

arisen

from the general

character of his writings, not from attention to this single part

of them

;

for, as all are able to

catch a general character, and few are able to

weigh and appreciate the works from which

220 that character has arisen, there are

many, who

hate and dread a name, without knowing, for

what

particular circumstances the

The

be dreaded.

just

name should

and beautiful

which reduces our expectation of

analysis,

similarity in

the future trains of events to intuition,

we may

therefore safely adopt, without any fear of los-

ing a single argument for the existence of

God

;

—

^till

it

be shewn, that physical demonnot dependent on an instinct-

stration itself

is

ive principle,

and

that, hence, if the belief

power had depended, not on reason,

it

instinct.

would have rested on a

Printed by

But on

principle of

surer evidence.

h

of

Mundell an J Son,

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book

f^Xi

is

DUE

last

date stamped below.

tO-UH»

HUM 17

JUN12 \^V

MR

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MAY?

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