No title

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Volume V (1972)

Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor

Published by The Society for Iranian Studies, P. 0. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U. S. A. Printed at the Boston College Press US ISSN 0021-0862

The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL Amin Banani Ali Banuazizi James A. Bill Jerome W. Clinton Gene R. Garthwaite Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary Kenneth A. Luther Jacqueline W. Mintz Ann Schulz, ex officio, Treasurer Majid Tehranian

IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Contents: Volume V (1972) ATICLES Farhad.

Daftary,

The Balance of Payments Deficit

and the Problem of Inflation

Doenecke, Justus D. visionism .. Keddie, Nikki R. 1800-1914, Overview.

Iran's

in Iran

.

.

Role in Cold War Rea * @

.

.

2-24

96-111

The Economic History of Iran, and Its Political Impact: An 8-78

Lieberman, Samuel S. Family Planning in Iran: Results of a Survey and a Mass Media .149-179 Camip Loraine, Michael B. Bahir in the Context of Revolution. Persian Constitutional

79-87

Nilsen,

Don L. F. Syntactic and Semantic Categories of Echo Words in Persian .88-95

Rotblat,

Howard J. Structural Impediments to Change in the Qazvin Bazaar.

130-148

Touba, Jacquiline Rudolph. The Relationship Between Urbanization and the Changing Status of Womenin Iran, 1956-1966

25-36

iii

BOOKREVIEWS Armajani, Yahya. Middle East: Past and Present (reviewed by Robert A. McDaniel) . . . . . . Dashti,

53-55

Ali. In Search of Khayyam (trans. by L. P. Elwell-Sutton) (reviewed by D. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112-119 Shojai).

De Fouch6cour, C.-H. La description de la nature dans la poesie lyrigue persane du xie inventaire et analyse des themes cik'cle: (reviewed

by William

L. Hanaway, Jr.).

. . .

49-52

Gregorian, Vartan. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and (reviewed by Modernization,_1880-1946 Firuz Kazemzadeh). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120-123 Radjabi Tabrizi, (1752-1779)

Parwis.

Iran unter Karim bain

(reviewed

by J.

R. Perry

. . . . 184-188

Roschanzamir, Mehdi. Die Zand-Dynastie . . . . . . (reviewed by J. R. Perry .184-188 The Successors of Genghis Tabib, Rashid al-Din. Khan (trans. by John Andrew Boyle) (reviewed by Romeyn Taylor) . . . . . . . . . . 189-192 Tikku, G. L. Persian Poetry in Kashmir,_ 13391846: An Introduction (reviewed by Michael B. Loraine). . 0 . . . . . . . . . . 180-184 Elite of Iran Zonis, Marvin. The Political (reviewed by T. Cuyler Young). . . . . . . .

37-49

MISCELLANEOUS A Directory of Teachers of Persian in the United States and Canada (compiled by M. A. . 193-199

Jazayery) .................

Letters

to the Editor

. . . . . . . . . .

iv

. . .

124-127

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Winter 1972

Volume Vb

Winter 1972

Volume

V

Number

I

The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL Amin Banani Los Angeles of California, University Ali Banuazizi Boston College James A. Bill of Texas at Austin University Jerome W. Clinton Tehran, Iran Richard W. Cottam of Pittsburgh University Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary New York University Kenneth A. Luther of Michigan University Jacqueline W. Mintz Yale University Ann Schulz, ex officio, Treasurer University of New Hampshire Majid Tehranian Tehran, Iran IRANIAN STUDIES Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor Copyright, 1972, The Society for Iranian Studies Printed at the Boston College Press Published in the U. S. A.

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Volume V

Winter 1972

Number 1

ARTICLES 2

2S

THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT ANDTHEPROBLEM OF INFLATIONIN IRAN, 1955-1962

Farhad Daftary

THERELATIONSHIP BETWEEN Jacquiline ANDTHE URBANIZATION CHANGING STATUSOF WOMEN IN IRAN, 1956-1966

Rudolph Touba

BOOKREVIEWS 37

MARVIN ZONIS: The Political Elite of Iran

49

C.-H. De FOUCHECOUR: La description de la nature dans la poEsie lyrique persane du xie ci8cle: inventaire et analyse des themes

53

YAHYA ARMAJANI:Middle East: Past and Present

T. Cuyler Young William L. Haraway, Jr.

Robert A. McDaniel

THE BALANCEOF PAYMENTDEFICIT AND THEPROBLEMOF INFLATION IN IRAN, 1955-1962 FARHAD DAFTARY

It is a commonly held view that development policies together with balance of paylead to domestic inflation mechanisms which in many underlying The ments problems. developing countries have made this view come true are Increased investment outlays lead to rather well-known. increased purchasing power and imports; prices rise, and, to the extent that aggregate output and real income actuwill further contribute to ally increase, this in itself in the country's balance of payments. the deterioration The time will soon come when the International Monetary Fund, as a precondition for extending short-term loans to support the country's depleted reserves of foreign exmeasures in order to change, will ask for deflationary Development will restore order to the country's finances. slow down, and if the balance of payments has deteriorated After a devaluation will be required. significantly,

Farhad Daftary is a Senior Economist at the Plan Organization, Tehran. The author would like to express his deep appreciation to Professor Bent Hansen of the University of California, Berkeley, for having read and made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. IRANIANSTUDIES

2

the country can embark on the next suitable interval, round of economic development and difficulties. The developments in the Iranian Economy during the Second Plan period (1955-1962) make it plausible to conclude that Iran provides yet another example for confirming the truth of the above-mentioned view. Undoubtedly, to some extent Iran's problems, during the period under conof the same so-called were the manifestations sideration, But the Iranian situ"'orthodox ailments of development." features which require special ation has some distinctive in light of substantial In particular, consideration. foreign exchange earnings of the oil sector, a severe foreign exchange crisis cannot be regarded as the "normal" Indeed, or "'unavoidable" result of development activities. as we shall discuss below, the development activities during the period under consideration could have been which actually pursued without many of the difficulties occurred. can, of course, occur with the adopDifficulties tion of a naive expansionist policy and lack of fiscal a country's no matter how plentiful responsibility, what This, as we shall see, is essentially resources. In addition, the problems were subhappened in Iran. stantially aggravated by an overwhelming lack of coordinaof the governtion between the various economic policies In with each other. ment, which were often inconsistent other words, the government did not attempt to use the various policy instruments at its disposal to achieve any including a target particular set of policy targets,1 rate of growth and a target for the balance of payments. Iran's First Development Plan, which had really never gained any momentum, collapsed almost completely with the loss of the country's oil revenues following the of Iran's Oil Industry in 1951. The ennationalization which lasted for more and economic crisis, suing political than three years, seriously disrupted the Iranian economy.. The disruptions had been so great that, when the oil crisis was finally settled in 1954, the government decided to make a fresh start on the basis of a new plan as soon as 3

WINTER1972

a plan which would also be more in line with the possible, country's increased oil revenues under the Oil Consortium Agreement of 1954. Consequently, the formulation of the Second Plan (September 1955 - September 1962) was completed in less than one year. of oil revenues After 1954, the renewed availability on a large and rapidly growing scale provided the main fuel for the expansion of the Iranian economy. Oil revenues, amounts of domestic and foreign together with substantial borrowing, permitted a rapid increase in public expendiand aided by extremely liberal Thus stimulated, tures. investment activities foreign trade and credit policies, an unprecedented experienced also sector in the private As a result, after more than boom after the mid-1950s. three years of stagnation the expansionary forces in the economy rapidly gained momentum. As already noted, however, the development of the Iranian economy did not take place in any smooth or susDifficulties tained manner during the Second Plan period. of inflaform occurred almost immediately, first in the of balance the in and soon afterwards tionary pressures large of in spite By 1960, as well. payments problems foreign exchange earnings from oil, the country's foreign exchange reserves were almost completely depleted, and the economy was plagued by both internal and external imbalthe Confronted with a foreign exchange crisis, ances. Iranian government was finally forced to implement a program in order to rectify the imbalances. stabilization measures succeeded in solving the difThe stabilization only at the high cost of plunging the economy ficulties which lasted until 1964. The into a severe recession, purpose of this paper is to review these developments and their major underlying causes. II The oil revenues in Iran provide a major source of easily controlled and mobilized revenue for the government. As a result, public expenditures can be financed to a IRANIANSTUDIES

4

increases in taxation and large extent without significant At the same time, the other domestic sources of revenue. oil revenues provide a supply of foreign exchange which permits a rapid rise in imports, while the non-oil exports In short, the oil revenues remain relatively stagnant. high rate of capital formation make possible a relatively and substantial imports. These advantages are far in excess of what could be expected in a country with Iran's production capacity and level of per capita income. The essential point in this context is that the oil revenues do, in principle, permit a rapid rise in aggregate expenditures and purchasing power, which, of course, need not be matched by proportional increases in the domestic supply of goods. Between 1955 and 1960 aggregate expenditures and purchasing power did indeed increase substantially. Furthermore, as we shall see, the increases were far in of the excess of the amounts warranted by the utilization oil revenues alone. From 1955 to 1960, the Plan Organization, while and implementing the Second Plan, succeeded in initiating sustaining a high level of investment expenditures financed by oil revenues as well as foreign borrowing. At the same time, the rest of the government also embarked on a high level of investment activity outside of the Second Plan.2 The public investments which took place beyond the scope of the Plan, accounting for about one-half of total public foreign financed. investments, were almost exclusively The foreign borrowings of the different ministries and government agencies, however, were done individually, This manner of foreign without any overall coordination. borrowing by itself created serious repayment problems when "it became clear that much of the uncontrolled borrowing consisted of medium-term suppliers' credits that would require heavily bunched debt repayments over These two sources of public investthe next few years."3 to increased ment expenditures contributed significantly purchasing power in the economy. But they did not result in proportionate increases in domestic production, since public investments were overwhelmingly concentrated in social overhead capital and public construction projects.4 S

WINTER1972

In addition to rapidly rising investment outlays, the ordinary expenditures of the government also increased without matching increases in taxes or substantially, Current expenditures increased other ordinary revenues. from 16 billion rials in 1956 to 37 billion in 1960. As a result, the ordinary budget of the government incurred which could not be fully covered deficits substantial amounts of oil revenues even after diverting significant from the Plan Organization's budget to the government's The government financed the remaining ordinary budget. of the ordinary budget by borrowing from the deficits Central Bank. It should perhaps be mentioned that much of the increase in the ordinary expenditures during this period was for military purposes, including the construction of military installations. tendencies In spite of the fact that inflationary after were becoming apparent in the economy (especially financing 1957), the government continued with its deficit In and its easy credit policy for the private sector. used not were policies monetary and fiscal words, other On the contrary, policy instruments. as counter-cyclical the expansionary measures were maintained while inflationary pressures were becoming even more accentuated.6 In sum, overall public expenditures increased oil revenues (which rapidly, and, in spite of substantial increased from 92 million dollars in 1955 to 288 million by deficit-financed in 1960),7 they were increasingly borrowing from the domestic banking system (especially the Central Bank) as well as from abroad. At the same time, as already noted, these expenditures contributed to increases in the domestic rather insignificantly supply of goods. Turning next to developments in the private sector, we noted that after the mid-1950s there occurred an unprecedented upsurge in private investment activities, The major factors mainly in industry and urban housing. responsible for the boom in private investment included high government spending, an extremely liberal credit policy, and easy access to breign exchange for all types IRANIANSTUDIES

6

of imports.8 Total private investment expenditures increased from about 10 billion rials in 1957 to almost 31 billion in 1959. The period 1957-1960 marked an unprecedented expansion of credits to the private sector. As the data in Table 1 show, the net claims of the banking systems on the private sector increased more than three-fold, from 8.2 billion rials in 1957 to almost 29 billion in 1960; during the same period the money supply increased by 60 percent. One of the principal sources of credit extension to the private sector was the so-called Revaluation Loan Fund (RLF), which made available, in a manner similar to printing new money, 7.1 billion rials ($95 million).9 The outstanding features of this particular loan program were its big size and the unusually easy terms under which credits were extended.10 Credit expansion was also stimulated by the growth of the banking system. Between 1956 and 1960, fifteen new banks were including the important Industrial and Mining established, Development Bank of Iran. The ready availability of loanable funds coupled with the alarmingly liberal monetary policy of the government, including the liberal lending policy of the National Bank (then the Central Bank) to other banks, gave rise to an unprecedented expansion of money and credit in the Iranian economy, an expansion that was bound to exert serious pressures on domestic prices and on the country's balance of payments. These, then, were the major forces stimulating private investment.11 Table 1 shows the net credit movements through the banking system (including the Central Bank and all commercial banks); it also shows the factors responsible for the expansion of the money supply (covering currency in The sectors considered circulation plus demand deposits). are the government (including the Treasury General, Plan Organization, and other government agencies) and the private sector, as well as foreign assets. Net borrowing by the government from the Central Bank increased steadily from 1954 to 1960, with the 7

WINTER1972

P4

~~~~~N

tt%D%O%O'tt LflLfnOr

cCz

rI

4 r-4 -

r4

~~~~~0

~~~~~~~~U) O/)

N

0

0) '0

tt

0

Z

i

Co

0

w

NetU0

Z

ZLU

I-'

CCd)r-

r-4 ~cn

rLU O

J S~~~

>-I< IZ

> r4~~~~k~~~4

~

LU

I

CU

44C N 4

o 4 flli

to

)Nc)NL

cnOLANvece E

tl--4P- p% r-4 s

<1@ IIUFI|o~~~~~~rC) Z

ha

Z OD

?~~~~~~~t

3o

or4

Cr4C'4WW0)~Q%O%0O O)

r-%oHo M Q

s0

CUD Oo

H,

p~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t

n

-o

CU z

i0

r"d

0

P4

Z

n Iq

a~~~~~~~V4C1 4

C

0U

I-A

C

4)qr

oto

A~Dfl-

rX s

0N Y> -4(Dr-

,-4

NO

bH

'

co>Cwu >_

(/)

44

00-

40

0WOtON0OflOOt

CU~~~~,-A0

U')>

N4

,

1-4

.

.

.

.

44 O

'4

Cr-40Nr4OCT

.

.

.

V

-4

I

0 o

a

Z Q

w

6-3

-

LLC c)

44

wc

4i~L

LI) LA CLA

0 O

cn

) -4

a

44~H C,)

ZH

0~~~~~~

LL, E/)

8

.

00 Lr) LAt '0'0 t

'0

exception of a small decline in 1959. This borrowing, for had an expansionary effect financing the budget deficits, on the money supply, since it was not offset by other transactions. However, as the data show, government borfactor than private rowing was a much less significant to the expansion of borrowing in terms of contributions the money supply. From 19S4 to 1960, out of a total net the private sector credit expansion of 35.7 billion rials, received 24.2 billion as against 11.5 billion going to the government. The net claims of the banking system on the rapidly between 1956 private sector increased particularly and 1960. Net lending to the private sector was indeed the major factor underlying the rapid increase of the money Regarding the supply during the years under consideration. causes underlying the developments in the country's net foreign assets, suffice it to note that until 1958 the extent of the net inflow of foreign capital was such that in the balance of current payments not only the deficits could be covered, but it also permitted some increase in the reserves of foreign exchange (which had become deThis crisis). pleted during the oil nationalization in 1959 situation, however, changed rather drastically and 1960, and the country's reserves began to decline rather rapidly. in As a result of these developments (particularly the money the net credit position of the private sector), supply increased by 88 percent from 1956 to 1960, or at On the other an average annual rate of 17.1 percent. hand, the real annual rate of growth of GNPdid not exceed 6 percent durlng the same period of time. Confronted with such developments in the money supply and aggregate production, one does not have to be a fanatical believer in the primitive "quantity theory of money" to realize that the government lacked financial soundness and that there would be mounting pressures on the general level of prices. In short, the economy was rapidly experiencing an internal with repercussions for the country's exdisequilibrium, We shall consider the developments in ternal balance. Iran's balance of payments below. Here, it is interesting to note that while the difficulties were becoming increasingly clear, the government did absolutely nothing 9

WINTER1972

to rectify

the internal

and external

imbalances.

As we have seen, imports rose very rapidly after domestic production of machinery 1954. With very little and equipment in Iran, the marginal propensity to import than in consumpis much larger in investment activities the case when the This is particularly tion activities. sector absorbs the bulk of the investments. industrial tends Consequently, an expansion of investment in itself to increase imports even if the level of aggregate expenditure remains unchanged. Imports increase more rapidly, of course, when the level of aggregate demand, Between 1955 and 1959, imports increased too, is rising. at the unprecedented average annual rate of almost 17 It should be mentioned, however, that although percent. capital goods accounted for the bulk of the increase, luxury items) also imports of consumer goods (especially As the non-oil exports continued increased significantly. stagnant, the merchandise trade defito remain relatively cit in the non-oil sector rose from about $200 million in 1955 to $410 million in 1959. The rapidly rising oil to cover these trade deficits, revenues were not sufficient in and the situation was worsened by the growing deficits the balance of invisibles. As a result of these developments, the outstanding feature of Iran's balance of foreign payments during these in both the expansionary years was the rising deficits of current the balance payments. Unand of trade balance were financed by foreign borrowing. til 1957, the deficits In fact, as already noted, the extent of the net inflow of foreign capital (during 1954-1957) was such that it also permitted the expansion of Iran's foreign exchange reThese reserves, however, have never been subserves. stantial. Consequently, when the inflow of foreign capital declined after 1957 (partly because of the rising repayments of the outstanding debts), the unfavorable impact on the country's foreign exchange reserves was drastic. tionary

It was precisely during the years of severe inflapressures and ever rising investment expenditures--

IRANIANSTUDIES

10

namely, 1958-1960--that the deficits in the balance of current payments were covered by drawings on the country's relatively small reserves of foreign assets. But once again, the government did not recognize the danger signs of the approaching crisis. Consequently, the reserves were rapidly depleted, and by mid-1960, for all practical purposes, Iran was almost completely out of foreign exchange reserves. Only then did the government realize the need for taking some corrective measures in order to rectify the internal and external disequilibria. However, even at that late hour the initiative had come from abroad. The International Monetary Fund, as a precondition for giving a short-term loan to support Iran's depleted foreign exchange reserves, made its standard policy recommendation of asking the Iranian government to institute a stabilization program. As already indicated, the rapidly growing public expenditures (increasingly deficit-financed by borrowing through the banking system and from abroad) as well as the unprecedented expansion of private investments (financed largely by borrowing from the banking system), resulted in a rapid increase in the stock of money and the general purchasing power in the economy. All in all, aggregate demand expanded much more rapidly than the domestic supply of goods and services. The net result of all this, as we have seen, was a persistent and growing deficit in the balance of current payments together with internal inflationary pressures. Indeed, the external imbalance was further aggravated by rises in domestic prices relative to foreign prices, while the rate of exchange remained unaltered. The "open-door" import policy, which permitted substantial increases in imports, undoubtedly had some effect on checking the domestic price rises. However, this by itself could not rectify both the internal and external imbalances while the excessively expansionary monetary and fiscal policies were maintained. The import policy merely slowed down domestic price rises at the in the balance of payexpense of still greater deficits ments. It is precisely under such circumstances that the 11

WINTER1972

use of a number of policy instruments (at least as many as the number of policy targets) is necessary in order to This, however, simultaneously. attain several objectives the eventual dewas not done. In a sense, therefore, pletion of the country's reserves of foreign exchange represented the "logical conclusion" to the course of events which was allowed to develop unchecked. As the data in Table 2 show, prices began to rise rather rapidly after 1957. The internal imbalance of the due to the excess demand for late 1950s was essentially The internal excess demand was goods and services.12 due to the excess demand for goods and seressentially pronounced in The imbalances were particularly vices.13 the markets for domestically produced consumer goods and Shortages of food products were particufood products. larly severe in 1959, a very bad year for agriculture due to abnormally sparse rainfall. In order to have a better understanding of the underlying causes of the domestic price rises in Iran, one would have to go beyond the consideration of the overall size of the excess demand, or the so-called gap." The composition of the excess demand "inflationary also played an important part in generating pressures on in The increased demand, originating domestic prices. for domestically the increased wage bill, was essentially The upward produced consumer goods and food items. pressure on domestic prices resulting from this source could not be relieved by imports because at the existing rate of exchange the import prices of these commodities were too high for the consumers in question, including The domestic production of the the civil servants.14 to fully satisfy same products was clearly insufficient the demand for them. As a result, the imbalance between the demand and supply in these commodity markets persisted and, indeed, grew with the rising expenditures of the public and private sectors. On the other hand, increases in the purchasing power of the upper income groups led to increased demand for consumer durables and non-durables of higher quality, IRANIANSTUDIES

12

TABLE2 PRICESANDTHECOSTOF LIVING, 1955-62 INDICESOF WHOLESALE (YEARBEGINS21 MARCH;1959=100)

WHOLESALE PRICES Home ProGeneral duced & Consumed Goods Index

COSTOF LIVING Food

General Index

Food

Rent

1955

94.0

79.6

90.0

77.1

80.8

72.0

1956

101.3

85.3

97.4

83.9

86.2

82.4

1957

99.4

88.9

93.5

87.6

87.9

88.9

1958

98.2

93.6

95.9

88.5

86.0

94.0

1959

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

1960

102.0

103.1

102.6

107.9

110.2

105.5

1961

102.2

102.7

104.3

109.6

112.4

109.6

1962

103.6

104.3

106.8

110.6

114.2

108.7

Source:

Central Bank of Iran, Bulletin, Vol. 8 (JanuaryFebruary, 1970), pp. 672-73 and 692-93.

and luxury items, most of which such as foreign textiles are imported. The rapid growth of imports largely reflected the rising purchasing power of the upper income and investing groups and their increased demand for both capital goods and certain types of consumer goods. Consequently, the prices of capital goods remained relatively 13

WINTER1972

stable, while the prices of consumer durables increased only moderately. However, due to the above-mentioned reason, the excess demand for domestically produced consumer goods and food products could not be satisfied by imports, and consequently the prices of these products continued to rise rather rapidly. The differential effects on prices of the increased demands for different types of consumer goods as well as for capital goods are clearly reflected in the lag of the wholesale price index behind the cost of living index. As the data in Table 2 show, between 1955 and 1960, cost of living increased by 40 percent, while the general index of wholesale prices rose by only 9 percent. The difference is baslcally attributable to the fact that the latter index is heavily weighted with imported goods, the prices of which actually declined by 15 percent. On the other hand, the wholesale price index of home produced and consumer goods, which is more comparable to the cost of living index, increased by almost 30 percent over the same period of time. It may be unnecessary to point out that irrespective of the existence or nonexistence of internal inflationary demand pressures, the total demand for commodities and services would exceed their total domestic supply by the amount of the deficit in the country's balance of current investments are also payments. Under such circumstances, in excess of domestic savings (both in an ex-ante sense) in the by the same amount. Whether or not the deficits balance of current payments should be regarded as manifestdemand pressures depends ations of internal inflationary on the particular set of circumstances. 5 If there is no need for corrective policy measure and the country has sufficient foreign financing available for covering the there is no cause for alarm. The Iranian deficits, government might not have been able to check the domestic price rises completely, but it could have kept them within more acceptable bounds. But this is another issue. The balance of payments problem that developed in the the late 1950s should be judged on its own terms, i.e., of funds for covering the deficits. In this availability IRANIANSTUDIES

14

sense, the Iranian government's failure to take any corrective measures when the country's reserves of foreign exchange were rapidly falling to extremely low levels cannot be justified. The government took no measures to influence the level and composition of aggregate demand. Neither the domestic price rises nor the rapidly falling foreign exchange reserves created any cause for alarm. Both types of imbalance were permitted to proceed unchecked, and the country, as was to be expected, ultimately ran out of rising foreign exchange reserves while prices were still point that emerThe essential high rates. at relatively g e s from our discussion is the government's overwhelming lack of understanding with respect to economic policy the government showed More particularly, in general. little understanding of the effects of expansionary and their repercussions in terms of domestic policies the country's balance of foreign payments. Indeed, the government seems to have been rather confused in terms As a result, the various of its economic objectives. policy means were not coordinated in order to attain any clearly specified set of economic ends. Therefore, it is safe to state that to a large extent the economic experienced during the Second Plan period difficulties were due to the government's poor performance in the general area of economic policy, both long- and shortterm. III In this concluding section we shall briefly discuss the stabilization program and the problem of recession that plagued the Iranian economy in the early Iran experienced a severe foreign 1960s. As indicated, exchange crisis in 1960. In September, 1960, the government requested a $35 million stand-by loan for a period of one year from the International Monetary Fund. In October, 1960, the loan request was approved, but it was made conditional on the implementation by the Iranian program for government of a financial stabilization 15

WINTER1972

rectifying the internal and external imbalances. After considerable opposition from various government circles, especially the Ministry of Finance, the government eventually decided to institute the recommended stabilization program, which was to be effective until March, 1962. The stabilization program included a number of monetary and fiscal measures.16 The liberal import policy of the preceding years was to be continued only with respect to capital goods. On the other hand, imports of non-essential and luxury items were to be discouraged through the imposition of higher import duties; no import quotas were envisaged. At first, the stabilization program was not closely observed, and as a result the pressures on domestic prices and on the balance of payments continued. By March, 1961, net credit expansion had exceeded the stipulated limits. Deficit-financing continued, and the net indebtedness of the Treasury General to the newly established Central Bank actually increased significantly, instead of declining by 2 billion rials as envisaged in the stabilization program. Indeed, the Central Bank, in the absence of overall governmental support, could exert very little influence over the expenditures of the ministries. The Iranian economy was approaching a serious crisis when the cabinet changed in May, 1961. At the same time, additional U.S. financial assistance for budgetary support was made available, and, in order to prevent further depletion of the country's foreign exchange reserves, imports of a large number of commodities were In July, 1961, an extension of the 1960 IMF prohibited. stand-by agreement was arranged, subject to the implementation of a revised stabilization program. The implementation of the revised stabilization The financial position program met with more success. of the public sector improved more than what was envisaged, while severe import restrictions on some 214 commodities contributed to the building up of the country's IRANIANSTUDIES

16

foreign exchange reserves in 1961. At the same time, these reserves received an indirect boost from the overall in the country. decline in investment activities Consequently, the program was once again revised in December, 1961, to allow for more relaxed credit extension to the private sector. Having finally succeeded in curbing the inflationary pressures and improving Iran's balance of payments, the stabilization program came to an end in March, 1962. The deflationary measures of the stabilization program, however, had an adverse effect on investments, current production, and the rate of growth in the economy. Consequently recessionary conditions appeared in 1961 and were accentuated in 1962 as credit and import restrictions were imposed on an economy accustomed to easy money and imports for almost any purpose. The reduction of investment activities was particularly pronounced in the private sector. Many of the private industrial and construction undertakings, which had started during the investment boom of the late 1950s had to be abandoned or, if already completed, found themselves short of working capital. The speculative boom in real estate transactions also collapsed, and unemployment rapidly became an alarming problem in the urban areas, in Tehran. To some extent these problems were especially the results of the excesses and the unsoundly based expansion of the late 1950s. Stockpiling of inventories, consumer indebtedness, hasty investments in construction, exacted their poorly planned and over-ambitious factories toll in terms of slackening of trade and depression of Indeed, the year 1341 (1962-63) business confidence.17 has been characterized as the year of "crisis of confidence."118 Some attempts were made to revive the conditions in the private sector through monetary policy.19 However, investors remained unresponsive, and demands for industAll in all, rial loans and permits continued to decline. to increase net the efforts of the monetary authorities lending to the private sector did not meet with much success, as the private sector showed a strong preference and expanded its savings and time deposits. for liquidity 17

WINTER1972

Meanwhile, the operations of the government further and contributed to the depressed investment activities, Public investstagnant conditions in the private sector. declined by the ministries, especially ment expenditures, implementation the in 1962. In addition, significantly of the Third Plan (September 1962-March 1968) got off to a slow start, and during the first two years of the Plan period actual investment expenditures fell significantly Once again, public inshort of what had been planned. vestments were being curtailed because current outlays continued to increase substantially. Signs of economic recovery did not appear until had proved to be mid-1964. Monetary policy by itself the recession of the in rectifying rather ineffective fiearly 1960s and had to be supplemented with deficit as well as expenditures, development nancing and rising The private sector finally a more liberal import policy. of responded favorably, and, with the reestablishment optimism and confidence in the sector, private investments began to increase. By 1965, having gone through four years of expansicn the Iranifollowed by an equally long period of recession, Since path. an expansionary on an economy was once again capital of foreign net inflows and revenues then, oil By 1350 (1971-72), indeed. have been very substantial for example, Iran's oil revenues had passed the high mark of $2 billion dollars per annum, while the net of foreign long-term credits exceeded $400 utilization But since 1967, Iran's net current account of million. the balance of payments has shown increasing deficits and the country's foreign exchange reserves have also tendenIn addition, inflationary had a downward trend.20 cies have also started to gain momentumduring the last It remains to be seen whether or not couple of years.21 in Iran will face another round of economic difficulties the Judging from the developments of the near future. last few years, as well as the current trends, this seems to be a very likely possibility.

IRANIANSTUDIES

18

NOTES 1.

For the underlying

concepts

and theories

of this modem

approach to formulating economic policy, which is primarily the work of Jan Tinbergen and his school of thought, see Jan Tinbergen, O the Theo of Economic Policy (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing and DecentraliCompany, 1952) and idem, Centralization zation in Economic Policy (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1954). See also Bent Hansen, The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy (London: George Allen G Unwin Ltd., 1958), especially Chap. 1. 2.

The Second Plan, like its predecessor was not a comprehensive plan. The partial nature of the Second Plan was not merely due to the exclusion of the private sector, regarding which nothing was said, but also because it did not cover all of the activities of of a the public sector. It consisted exclusively public investment program covering merely that portion of public investments which was to be controlled by the Plan Organization, a portion which in actuality accounted for only about 50 percent of total public

investments. The line of demarcation was determined on the basis of a rather arbitrary essentially arrangement for dividing the country's total oil revenues among the Plan Organization, the Ministry of Finance and the National Iranian Oil Company. 3.

George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 42.

4.

At this

juncture

it is helpful

to make a few remarks

some broad aspects of the investment concerning program embodied in the Second Plan. Generally speaking, the basic methodological shortcoming of the Second but the Plan was not its lack of comprehensiveness,

fact that the planning problem was approached in such a manner that it simply could not lead to optimal results. There is no evidence suggesting that the 19

WINTER1972

planners adopted any clearly defined planning methodology, including a method of ensuring internal consistency in the Plan. The investment decisions were made largely in an arbitrary fashion, and the of the investment projects embodied in the selection Plan did not follow from the application of any speAt the time, the overcific investment criterion. riding concern of the government was to launch an investment program of some sort as soon as possible. It was the size, rather than the composition, of the investment program which received the highest official Be that as it may, the proposed consideration. pattern of investments under the Second Plan was heavily biased towards investments in infrastructure Furthermore, the speciand social overhead capital. fic investments were dominated by a few highly capisuch as the and "monumental" projects, tal-intensive In contrast, multipurpose dams and the highways. in both agriculture directly productive activities, The large and industry, received low priorities. projects, degree of concentration on capital-intensive of course, prevented aggregate domestic output from Output increasing in proportion to investments. intended, increases were even less than originally although the original intentions were rather modest to begin with. This is revealed by the fact that roads and big dams absorbed almost 50 percent of actual investments, while according to original intentions the same programs were not supposed to absorb more than 20 percent of total planned investments. For further details see Farhad Daftary, t and Planning in Iran, 955-1967 Economic Develo University of California, (Ph.D. Asertation, Berkeley, 1971), pp. 345-392. S.

Until 1964, the preparation of the government's annual general budget, which is sometimes also called the "ordinary" or "current" budget, was the responsiOn the other hand, bility of the Ministry of Finance. the so-called development budget, covering the transactions of the Plan Organization was prepared separately by the latter body. The budget of the Plan

IRANIAN STUDIES

20

Organization was not a part of the government's general budget, but there was some overlap between the two. The general budget included some capital expenditures as well as some recurrent development outlays, while the budget of the Plan Organization covered some current expenditures. There was not a single capital, or development, budget as distinct from the ordinary budget in the country. Since 1964, the entire task of budgeting, in respect to both current and capital budgets, has been transferred to a special bureau, the Central Budget Bureau, in the Plan Organization. It should be noted, however, that still no close working relationship exists between planning and budgeting in general, and the preparation of the ordinary and capital budgets in particular. In other words, there still does not exist a unified and coordinated budget accounting for all of the government's revenues and expenditures. For further comments, see Farhad Daftary, "Development Planning and Budgeting in Iran,'" in CENTOSeminar on Budget Administration (Ankara: Central Treaty Organization, forthcoming). 6.

The government was basically unwilling to check its ordinary expenditures and planned for budgetary deficits, and deficit-financing, with respect to every single year during the Plan period. Actual deficits came to be even larger than the amounts anticipated by the government. See Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Second Seven Year Plan (in Persian, Tehran: Plan Organization, 1964), Tables 11-12.

7.

Excluding foreign exchange sold by the foreign oil companies operating in Iran to the Iranian government for rial expenditures in Iran.

8.

See Baldwin, op. cit., p. 99; and Richard E. Benedick, Industrial Finance in Iran (Boston: Graduate School Harvard University, of Business Administration, 1964), pp. 19-20.

21

WINTER1972

9.

The par value of rial, since

1946,

was devalued

which had remained unchanged in March 1956,

from 32.25

However, the price to 75.75 rials per U.S. dollar. of gold, which is used as 40 percent currency cover (with the remaining 60 percent mainly backed by the Crown Jewels), was not changed; the gold content "official" implied the pre-devaluation rate still In order to remedy the situation, exchange rate. the rial was revalued in terms of gold, according to the Note Reserve (Amendment) Act of May, 1957. The price of gold, held as note cover, was raised from 36.2901 to 85.2396 rials per gram. This revaluation did not affect the foreign trade sector. It only permitted the release of 7.1 billion rials, representing the difference between the old and the new value of the gold held as note cover, from the Issue Department to the Banking Department of the National Bank of Iran (then the Central Bank). The government decided to use the "windfall" revaluation fund as a loan program for the private sector. National Bank of Iran, Annual Report as of March 20 , 1958 (Tehran: National Bank of Iran, 1958), p. 5; and Henry J. Brutton, "Notes on Development in Iran," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 9 (July, 1961), p. 629. 10.

The basic rate of interest charged was 6 percent. This compares rather favorably with the customary rates of at least 12 percent in the commercial banking system and rates of 18-36 percent charged by the lenders in the Bazaar, which is an important finanand a major supplier of loanable cial institution funds in Iran. For more details of the RLF, see pp. 102-118. Benedick, 2p. cit.,

11.

Private investment received a further impetus from of income in favor of a change in the distribution the upper-income groups, with higher propensities See Plan Organization, Outline to save and invest. of the Third Plan (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1961), p. 11.

IRANIAN STUDIES

22

12.

For the relevant concepts and theories, see Bent Hansen, A Study in the Theory of Inflation (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951), especially Chaps. 1,3,7 and 9; idem, A Survey of General Equilibrium Systems (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970), Chaps. 9-10; and idem, Long- and Short-Term Planning in Underdeveloped Countries (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 41ff.

13.

During the same period, the supply of labor increased rather significantly, with the result that money wages and wage costs were in general kept down. This tendency was further reinforced in the absence of effective labor unions and the generally weak bargaining position of labor vis-a-vis management in Iran. Therefore, one cannot speak in terms of a with respect to the general cost-push inflation domestic price rises of the period under consideration. Plan,

See Plan Organization, p. 12.

Outline

of the Third

14.

See also P. Norregaard Brutton, p. 632. Mp. cit., Rasmussen, "On the Interrelationships between Growth of Income," in Jean Marchal and and the Distribution Bernard Ducros, eds., The Distribution of National Income (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp. 522-29.

15.

For example, see Bent Hansen and Girgis A. Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy in the UAR (Egypt) (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 196S), pp. 231-32.

16.

First, total credit expansion by the banking system for the years 1339 (1960-61) was to be cut sharply; and 1340 (1961-62), to 3 billion it was to be limited rials per annum. The minimum new credit requirements for the two years in question, of the private sector, at 10.S billion had meanwhile been estimated rials, or 4.5 billion in excess of the total amount rials in the stabilization specified program. Therefore, in order to observe the credit ceilings, the net 23

WINTER1972

indebtedness of the public sector to the Central Bank was to be reduced by 2 billion rials in 1960-61 and 2.5 billion rials in 1961-62. These declines increases in the governwould require significant ment's ordinary revenues and, more importantly, Secondly, in reductions in ordinary expenditures. addition to the above-mentioned change in its fiscal operations so as to achieve budgetary surpluses, the Ministry of Finance was also to transfer 1.9 billion rials (during the years in question) to the Plan The purpose of this transfer was to Organization. prevent further declines in the scope of the Second Plan. The full implementation of these measures would bring about surpluses in the ordinary budget, amounting to 2.75 billion rials in 1960-61 and 3.25 The full texts of the billion rials in 1961-62. program and its two subsequently restabilization vised versions are given in Central Bank of Iran, See 1963), pp. 24-33. Bulletin, Vol. 1 (Jan.-Feb., also idem, Annual Report as of March 20- 1962 (in Persian, Tehran: Central Bank of Iran, 1962), pp. 10-17. pj. cit.,

p. 15.

17.

Benedick,

18.

Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as of March 20, 1963 (Tehran: Central Bank of Iran, 1963), p. 9.

19.

For example, in 1962, the Central Bank reduced the ratio imposed on commercial banks in order liquidity and in 1963, to enhance their lending potentiality, to 4 percent. 6 from reduced was rate the rediscount

20.

See Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as of March 20, 1971 (Tehran: Central Bank of Iran, 1971), pp. 132-134.

21.

price indices, as calcuAccording to the official the general index of Bank, the Central lated by wholesale prices rose by 7 percent during 1350 (1971-1972).

IRANIAN STUDIES

24

THE REL4TIONSSHIP BETWEENURBANIZATION AND THE CHANGINGSTATUS OF WOMEN IN IRAN, 1956-1966 JACQUILINERUDOLPH TOUBA Rapid developments of the twentieth century have forced attention upon the changing status and role of women in all societies. As they have acquired a longer life expectancy, are having healthier children, and with the advancing technology, mass production and distribution contributing to their lessening housekeeping chores, women have acquired more and more leisure time. While the industrialized societies have been mostly concerned with the problem of leisure time for these women, and making optimum use of all human resources, both male and female, the developing countries have been facing the basic problem of illiteracy, and particularly illiteracy of their female population. There has always been a small

Jacquiline Rudolph Touba is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology, College of Social Sciences, University of Tehran, and Head of the Group on Family Research, Institute for Social Studies and Research, University of Tehran. An earlier version of this article was presented at the "Tenth International Seminar on Family Research," sponsored by the International Association and Sociological the Institute for Social Studies and Research, Tehran, March 5-12, 1968. 25

WINTER1972

segment of the female population in developing countries with as much, if not more, leisure time than those of the industrialized nations. However, they have been and often still are bound by a culture which has defined their position to be in the home, to be honored and respected but not to be heard publicly and often not seen publicly. Some developing nations have recognized the wasted labor potential for economic development of half their population. In addition some have recognized the injustice of keeping persons illiterate or not allowing development of intellectual talents because the ascribed status of female has traditionally required a subservient role in the society. Iran is one interesting example of a developing country that has recognized the aforementioned factors and is attempting to analyze the problem. Historical

Background of the Status of Womenin Iran

Iran has had a long tradition of equal rights for women dating back to the period of Zoroastrianism some 2,500 years ago. Even with the coming of Islam, the position of women in Iranian society was strengthened,l although this is not always visible in all present day Islamic societies. of Islam, which reThe principles spected women's status and granted rights still not granted to women in some Western nations, were appreciated in Iran. Some of these rights were equality in matters of commerce, mortgage of real estate, gifts of property, partnership and investment, religious endowments, leases, guarantees, deposits and The exercise entry into commercial practices. of woman's right to ownership or possession of property was made independent of the approval, control or guardianship of anyone, including her husband.2 The destructive changes in the position of women followed this early Islamic era and have been attributed to the The status of women Mongol invasion of the 13th century. IRANIANSTUDIES

26

in the period following was altered considerably and in some cases to almost that of a servant to her male masters. During the 19th century, Iran was again invaded, although more subtly than previously, as she came into the orbit of European politics and infiltration. A few of the more progressive families, who began to travel and study in the West, added to the new ideas that were disturbing to the traditional practices. The turn of the century witnessed the advent of the Constitutional Movement which gave women a chance to make a plea for a change in their position in the society. The irony of this movement, which was supposed to insure rights to all citizens of the country, was that it served to legally stifle woman's further participation in political For example, the Electoral Law, Article 10, affalrs. specifically stated, Those deprived of the right to vote shall consist of all females, minors and those under guardians; fraudulent bankrupts, beggars, and those who earn their living in a disreputable way; murderers, thieves, and other criminals punished under Islamic law. Thus women were put in the same category with beggars and criminals despite their level of education and family background. However, it must be remembered that this was not the only factor keeping her in a relatively unchanging Of equal importance were her imprisonment position. through illiteracy, the traditional practices of wellto-do families which did not allow her entrance into the labor market, and the non-acceptance of her into the more of the labor market even if she did prestigiousp.ositions gain entrance and was well qualified. Despite this, as more families sent their children abroad, and began moving the status away from strict adherence to older traditions, and role of women in some segments of the Iranian population gradually changed. As schools were built and 27

WINTER1972

were established, campaigns against illiteracy became more available, employment opportunities economically, began making themselves visible, and intellectually.

and as some women politically,

at home and Womenbegan studying at universities abroad, and could be found moving into the professions of sciences, medicine, and agricultural physical, biological religion and teaching, law, economics and statistics, Numerous and entertainment.3 welfare, art, literature types of women's organizations developed ranging from or political, those that were based on professional, midand spinsters for to those concerns philanthropic rights were given to In 1963, equal electoral wives. women by a decree of the Shah as part of his "White Revolution," and this same year marked the election of six women to the Majlis, of whomtwo were appointed to the Senate. In addition, women have become civil servants, members have been active in national sports of the armed services, competitions and have recently joined the traffic police force in the capital city. View of the Chang4ng_Status of A More Realistic Women: Urban-Rural Differences remains as to which segments of The question still the population have really been affected by changing of sertechnology, the improvements in and availability and new electoral vices, increased employment opportunities laws. Thus far reference has only been made to a few examples of women being able to join in the mainstream of Therefore, the remainder of this paper will Iranian life. attempt to take a broader view of the changing status of between urbanization women and examine the relationship and the changing status of women in Iran and five major urban centers from 1956 to 1966. Iran of many developing countries, A characteristic included, is the rapid growth of one major cultural center, often the capltal city, with growing but smaller urban The complexes in various sections of the country. IRANIANSTUDIES

28

remainder of the country usually includes a vast rural area hardly affected by the more modern practices and A corollary to this is the relatively attitudes. unchanging position of women in the rural areas. A. Literaci in Urban and Rural Iran.4 When the data for the country as a whole are examined, the change in the illiteracy of women can be estimated to be 11 percent from 1956 to 1966, the percentage of illiterate females being 91 percent in the former year. However, when the urban and rural areas are compared, there is an estimated 20 percent decrease in urban Iran from the 1956 illiteracy figure of 77 percent, while the illiteracy rate among women in rural areas has changed by only three percent, thus encompassing an estimated 95 percent of the total rural female population of 10 years and over by the 1966 census. B. Employment and Occutpational Status in Iran. A comparison of the employment status of Iranian women from 1956 to 1966 demonstrates a greater increase in the proportion of women in the labor force in the rural areas than in the urban areas. Of those women employed in the rural areas, the change has been estimated to be shifting toward greater employment in production, crafts and related fields, while decreasing in all other occupational groups. Meanwhile, the greatest changes in women's employment status in the urban areas were found to have There occurred in the professional and related fields. is only a slight increase in production work, a relatively high degree of change in the white-collar occupations since 1956 and a decrease in agriculture and service occupations. However, the assumption that the improvements are uniform for all urban areas may not be warranted. The Relationship Between City Size and Changing Status of Womenin Iran In the developing countries, improvements in the quality of population and increased availability of services are often assumed to occur in the capital city or 29

WINTER1972

It is preat least the largest cities of the country. sumed that as the concentration of population increases, roads, housing and schools will the need for hospitals, also increase, and the provision of these facilities will in turn attract just that type of population which Thus, one might expect will demand even more services. to see changes in the social environment of the city to vary directly with its increasing size. of the changing the relationship Investigating interesting, status of women to city size is particularly practices must change if the woman for many traditional Whether urbaniis to acquire a new role in the society. zation will contribute to changes in these traditional remains to be seen. A preliminary modes of orientation was done for analysis of the aforementioned relationship Tehran, 1966 population-five major Iranian cities: Tabriz, 1966 2,719,730; Esfahan, 1966 population--424,045; Abadan, 1966 population--272,962; population--403,413; Shiraz, 1966 population--269,865.5 A. Changes in the Literacy and Educational Status. In 1956, Tehran had the highest percentage of literacy among the female population ten years and over (35%). While Shiraz was second with (30%), Esfahan and Abadan female populacould boast of only a 17 percent literate In 1966, in was illiteracy. highest tion and Tabriz the findings demonstrated that the largest degree of existed in Tehran (52%) with Shiraz still literacy still second (50%). However, Abadan, with 42 percent of its made the greatest per1966 female population literate, Although centage change over its previous 1956 level. literacy among females in Esfahan and Tabriz increased from 1956 to 1966, the former demonstrated extensively among its female population nearly two-thirds illiteracy of the female had nearly three-fourths and Tabriz still (see Table 1). population illiterate the After a more detailed examination of literacy, same pattern occurred for the female population with some elementary education (1 to 6 years), those with some high school, those with some college and college graduates. IRANIANSTUDIES

30

For the female population with some elementary education, Shiraz had a higher percentage than Tehran, and Abadan again had the highest percent change over the 1956 figures. The percentage of the female population with some high school education in Shiraz also came very close to Tehran in 1966, and the percent change from 1956 was much higher than for Tehran. Abadan more than doubled its 1956 female Both Esfahan population with some high school education. and Tabriz had a high percent change since 1956 but the proportion of females with high school education twelve years ago was so low that the proportion in 1966 was less than half of that for Tehran and Shiraz. In 1966, Shiraz also exhibited nearly the same proportion of its female population with a college degree and increased about the same amount as Tehran. Despite the fact that Abadan was the only city with no university, a slightly larger percentage of its female population than that of Esfahan or Tabriz had attained a college degree or higher. Nevertheless, all of the cities had increased their college educated female population to only less than one percent of the total female population ten years and over (see Table 1). It is inB. Changes in the Occupational Status. teresting to note that the percentage of employed females ten years and over in Tehran actually decreased from 1956 to 1966, and the proportion in Abadan remained the same, although at a level much lower than that of the other cities. Tabriz had the largest proportion of employed women in 1966, and both Tabriz and Esfahan had a larger proportion of employed females than Tehran (see Table 2). When the specific occupational groups are examined, it is significant that more than half of the employed women in Esfahan and two-thirds of those employed in Tabriz were in production, crafts or related industries. from 1956 to 1966. These proportions increased extensively During the same period the proportion of females in prostable in duction, crafts, etc., remained relatively Tehran, Shiraz, and Abadan. All cities demonstrated a large decrease in the proportion of service workers in 31

WINTER1972

V. o^P

*

%O

0 U)

- OO LAe

rO

oo O

Ot

*.4.'....

ONu-4

Z

H

qr) a

0

0 44X

o

Lfoto

*

Gb

. ^t') Ln

.

.

.

o

OVn -4

Gb

N

@ @

.

.0.

0. t

CS

O CD

O OO

Ot

VVI

r, c4Ln

E~~~~~N

r-4

co6

CS z0 S~~~~~C r w 0d V0< o

F:

Ln OV
(n a4 0.G d%

En

.*

cut

Gb LA "4

OL r-(LA *

C4D-4N0 NAO'J-GGb4)

be?NsH~

Gb Ut

H V Gbl

H4 0U~~~

Ck

a U tm -r 0 no FLU~~~~~C -e

ZU) LI..

C)s O

tn

V1 N4''"4

r-4,-4 ooo qc

LA*

dAc' ;L~C hZX VC V9 'J

4 V

te

I4)8 C

w

CO eq tOO

a

IRi

4o0

U) N"

h

0 A> U)"VL

4-)

.1LN

D

9

r-IGb 4 t "0o o

n4

Q qc a 0

0

a

rV^ L ,-4

X r0 ON LA

U

*N

H)>

C0 t00~L

NO LOV VI Gb NO

O0

0\0 C) a

0

e,-d

>

0 4)\

4'N

U

N4 00 04 4' h) Z4) L 00 > 4'>~~~~~~~~~~~ r--400-4 n 4' O>..v-4r4>WU)N 4 i4 Z)$ Ot!) 0)/ 4N0'4 "4 \I tn0C,C>,C 4) 0 tm 04)0 40 > '-0I N4' NI)bO"d4 04

0

~

Z0 4

C

4_ "34

32

00

U

LA

aGb

0 rq >

L) C) r-- Ot 4

>,.

44

wV0

0 N"4

F1g Z0 LI..0~~~

"40 H *"4 4)

t*

C.

o4

e w

m4) U)

4'4

_

"4

4)tOQ0>?

C0

N*

C0

o

.b ocM

tONrt. IC4n

4

Lfl0O $ .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ao ON

LAr400r1

H4) ),h

0O

OC aO

Cot'

tHd

' 0>
r,1 4i

r '-4^

N

o

CA

v

*

e

00G N LAtO~~~~~~~~~-4

N

"~~~v40,

ONO\ 4)>

3 *

h ) 0C!

O

0

CJ)

l

sO

0

o

C 00a O

3~~~~~~~~~~~~t C JO NC r- OO C)

%eoL

O

LU

a NGbC C4G r-4

N

Ln

00

HOLU

O

V: t-a u,C4 n'c0JVe4OO O 4 NGb

,i

a

V

tOtO

000K) o-

? w

0q 0-o40

CNOOr co

Gb

X

> <

0

O 4

to

.n

C

C0 o

O

< SS<XLr)C)p

C

h

C

0f0

POICt

<.

- *to'

'fO

LA .) c1

a

4Q-

N.C

r-

O

g OF

NN> Or -O

LJ

V

0

4

VtOG*n nC o

4Vr"4

i

m

*

NC'JLA Ln C14

L

tn

11. 0

6eH .@...*

"400r\.

cH

r-

fl

V

ur

%O

%O m

X

V

r I

r-

No h =

)

H

'

U LI)c\0 1 0w

Va'?

f-~~~~~~~~~r 0 Cd

ZD

a

X

o~I

<

Q'H

OCI

r4 of

.

.I C

t)

I

M

-

loco

14

0 t .

Ln .

Co

4 tEl

C) C)

ao

\0

r-RI

C

*

0? V .

C

.

CU)N) un

o

Co

\0

*-.4*

N

r.4

'HN~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ U) '-

0

'-4

V "CC

-H

J

4-4

LU 0 -

i. L. 000 ) O

<

U) ? He Hn aE;

Z J) O 4

z HC HL O C)

O :U

.

.

H

CO

.

*

O '

-4

) 0

C O Ct

r-4

r 0o4

U

u

' HVU

s\0 Va'? 0)~

0

\0 I. so

qtt

.

oV'Htot

.

8

o

0

rr

N

'H

U U)CJVo Ln X \0 1uu oRo

'HCN 0 CL * s C0 1CN00co-4C00LnCD

oCN

'He,-

-Z

. .

r-I c4

U):~L -4'H

04 ,C

@

*

*

*

4

*

0l1 O

. '-n

tCO

X

i-4 )

6~~~

Ln

U) 0oo Ns

<

e'

U)

" C C V

00

H-

o't t)qe C

tX

0-

C

0 *o

Cd -H

IC -(

0$ -

4.-H

.* 01

"

00

*

'o

'

0

C V

VXo

C

\ 00

C o N Hc

_CaN C0 .

*

N C r-

Co000

V VC tlN01VN)m 0 01~~~~~>, OOt D CNC' -4w--4NriC) $4pH N '-4 'Hd ct YHV v-w S \0 )g\ 4 IttNo o CoeLn _%o 0(4 NtP?LE

C

H

V

C~VL 4 C t:

f*-4 0 ON)

U)a\a.''.48\~8 o O LO 0 'O Ln

N

0cd

\0J_ Otl_

\

'H

0% "d

0

4

1

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tn *HP-4H

Z >

3

%

.

C'HCCN '0000~~~~~~6 C V

HV

:U

%

I'H' Ln

V\

I.'00

$44-J.-*r\

d%

N

NtHV

Va'? s No M. 01

N rv

LL.W14

t1J LU H1 > H ^ C C-J2: X d w4 Q-i

U

o

CD

*~

G

.N H'HV0CV0 C8 ~~~~~~ oH 'oo L)

r-t

LUv

U)

\0

0

LU )

E-

0 00 0

H

*n LOa a0)~

V

C1 Co r-

* r-

U'H'Ho01Vl

LU

N

aE

1-N '-4

U)n

0.-4

c

s%O

0 .

. Ln

*

.t

o CO f_I '-4

s~~~~~~~~N Ln

Z

-4

.

4

z-4

C

. . . N'H0OHLI)C.-.

4F

gORe>

O-4 '-4- 4 >

0v

C

4CHH X O .? U0,,3u C Ok

0

-H

Y (D z '-40

t

,,,l>

*U XU '

0

0 C1 S

Z X

01 ?

O'

O LU -'

S gj

:,2

4)r

'r4 4'dUt)utr

0$4'-H Cd c4J0 -4h Ph O. 0f.0 0 4J h4 0i O1. 0eDun -r

-AH'H-i$4 O E '40U)U)cnU)0c !: V-4 d<e (- H Ur I)UCO-) 4

'HO

33

OUH4-I4JO

2:4-iC) .

'HH

IV cd 0f

O

*

fl

*o *

(tih 4)

?

H$-l

~~~~=

Ci)

*

* 0

oNa)O tn

rlr4

oo

-4O

tO

v-o bLf)

-4

LAv-ICGoNflOOt

0 z_

00 CNW4m

I-4

a aaaa

a.

totor4

*

00

00

C

e '0

tO

to

U)

rNC ( 00tOr4

4)

co

;a

U h $4oo Cd

+. ~ ~~~~~d 0

Z~ <

<;

<:

O

4

z

o

%O

(fla mOr4

H

$4Z

t

-P.

O 0

LU

4:

4

C Hc

0 z

uEn

Z a

A*

E0-

0vOs CUW

\' C

.

o

^ aa

^

t-t)

^

to

o 0

Q H4

Co 0

o

e)t

'0 c

b

v

-4O

N

toa

4

\0

Nto

' Cs v~~~~~~~~~~~-4

0D *~~~~~~~V'0OtoO\O 004 t~~~~~~~~~Ln r4 Ch

0

CO O C

(M C4 0}

ft

ft

6%

C

44

Oh

4%

cU

v-

v-_f\

u)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~e O.-

tl-

CO

Ce

ole n

<

C4'

0

t-C%n

Oc*r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~L q 4

J)

H

N

s

N

0 oo 00U)N a0aaaa t LN

CU

af

^

Aev

tl \0

* Ln P \0 @

h =~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2n 0E1 M [t 0 = \. ~~~~~~Cd to10 o4 Zt 4i 0 _H

LUH

-0 N

e

rL

Ln

r-

U)

0

0 L-

-

.0W0Z

h

-4N

T vtcoat f %

O *

LU v-4

a rn rn

0

00

4C

U)

C}

tot')

raw Ln PH OIL Av -I L v 0co

C

4 ,o

u

H &L%
d

f

0

C4

Ln

r-4v -

F-I tn 0

a

to

ft

ok

P-

00(

l

oa

t

ft

o

b

CUU

ZH

4

t

o)No r-O4A

v-

10V

h

c

4

'Zn

3 3 0(0 to0 N c0 040 >4 o -f C) -vO H O u

co

C $--

~U4)

Z

14U

*

H d HXk$4'rCU4)

'driH4)~ 4)4)0

>

$4t

34

to

O

O

0

0

0 4

this ten-year period. The largest increasing occupational group in Tehran, Shiraz, and Abadan was that of the professional, technical and related fields, with the percentage of employed females in these fields in the smaller cities of Abadan and Shiraz even greater than in Tehran (see Table 2). C. Marital Status of Employed Women. Since no information of this type for 1956 nor separate information for the cities within the shahrestans for 1966 was avail-

able, only a comparison of the five urban shahrestans for 1966 could be made. Tabriz Shahrestan had the largest proportion of married women employed (12%) with Shiraz Shahrestan second and the smallest percentage in Abadan Shahrestan. Esfahan Shahrestan had the largest proportion of single women employed (22%). Tehran Shahrestan had the largest proportion of divorcees employed (41%) followed by Esfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Abadan. The proportion of widowed females employed was about 12 percent for all the cities except Abadan (see Table 3). There did not seem to be any direct relationship between the size of the urban area and proportion of married, single, divorced, or widowed women employed in the shahrestan. Conclusions Despite token reference to the changing status of women in developing it is important that a countries, distinction be made between rural and urban areas when evaluating change of the status and role of women. In Iran, the most significant changes in the literacy and educational status of women have occurred in the urban areas. In addition, movement of women into prestige occupations such as the white collar and professional,

technical and related fields occurred in urban areas while rural areas demonstrated movement into production and craft industries. A further investigation of differences among five major urban centers yielded the conclusion that improvement in literacy, educational and employment status among 35

WINTER1972

women may occur in small urban centers as well as in the Since the changing nation's capital or its largest cities. status of women is not wholly dependent upon the size of the urban area, other social and economic conditions must Therefore, a more extensive look into the be operating. social structure and economic situation of urban areas is needed before adequate predictors of changing status of This leaves ample opportunity women may be established. such variables as for future research to investigate industforeign influence, migration, family traditions, of employment. rial development and availability NOTES 1.

Ramesh Sanghvi, Clifford German and David Missen, eds., Liberation of Women(London: Transorient, 1967), pp. 9 and 11; also Donald Wilbur, Iran, Past and Present Princeton University Press, 196$), p. 178. (New Jersey:

2.

Ibid.,

3.

of the First Census National and Province Statistics ofIran, November, 1956,_Social and Economic Character-

p. 12.

for Iran of the Inhabitants istics Vol. II (Tehran, 1962), Provinces, of the Statistics Census District sus of Iran, November 1956, Vols. (Tehran), Table 11.

and the Census Table 22; also First National Cen1, 3, 4,9 6, 7

4.

Status of and Employment and Occupational Literacy of the Urban and Rural Iran are based upon figures The 1956 Census and the 1966 One Percent Sample. have been adjusted to the for literacy 1966 figures the of ten years plus by subtracting 1956 criteria nine. to seven age group

S.

and Housing, November, Census of Population National 1966, Vols. X, XXIII, XLIII, XXXIV, and LXXI (Tehran).

IRANIANSTUDIES

36

Book

Reviews

The Political Elite of Iran. By Marvin Zonis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. vii-xvi + 389pp., 116 tables, 2 figures, selected bibliography, index, 2 appendices. $12.50. T. CUYLER YOUNG This work has its limitations, inherent in its methodology (to be discussed later) and self-imposed as the title indicates; but within this framework the execution of the study, in detail and depth, is well done. As the first attempt to apply to Iranian politics the social science techniques of carefully structured interviews in depth and in quantifying factor analysis of the respondents' data by computer, the author was wise in resisting the teuptation to attack the total field of politics, limiting himself to one section, but that admittedly the most important part of the whole, at least in the present Iranian scene. So, in his words, The basic assumption on which this study is based is that the attitudes and behavior of powerful individuals in societies whose political processes are less institutionalized within the formal structures of government are valid guides to political

T. Cuyler Young is Professor Emeritus of Oriental Studies at Princeton University. He is currently the President of the American Institute of Iranian Studies. 37

WINTER1972

change. Operating on such an assumption, we have examined the course of recent political development in Iran by analyzing its political elite (p. 5). This elite is empirically defined "as those members of Iranian society...who exercised and possessed political power to a greater degree than other members of Iranian society" (p. Sf). Emphasis is on power and resulting altered behavior, exercised by "those individuals whose behavior alters...the widest range of behavior of the largest set of persons within that society" (p. 6), and limited to those exercising their power within the political system, which is "that pattern of interactions among actors seeking to exercise power over the allocation of values at the most comprehensive level--the social system national, level" (idem). "Values," as used, refer to the desired and socially accepted rewards of those seeking and exercising political power. Identification of this elite, in Appendix I, is thus summarized:

outlined

in detail

First, holders of formal position within the Then the occupants government were identified. of key social roles--doctors, tribal leaders, members of the royal family, opposition leaders --were identified and a list of three thousand A panel of ten 'general elite' was constructed. then persons knowledgeable about Iranian politics attributed various levels of political power to the three thousand, and a rank ordering of these general elite was made. The 10 per cent of those who boasted the greatest reputations for politielite cal power were specified as the political (p. 7f). This sample was chosen "because we wished a universe large enough to allow for statements about the elite that could valid" (p. 8). Rightly, it be considered statistically was considered that one cannot speak of a "single political elite" since "the extraordinary power that the shah is able IRANIANSTUDIES

38

to wield vis-h-vis any other member of the elite suggests that Iranian politics can most fruitfully be analyzed through separate but complementary investigations of the shah on the one hand and the remainder of the elite on the other"

(p. 9).

The conclusion determines the nature of Chs. 2-4, devoted to a study of HIM, the shah, "and the composition of the political elite" (Ch. 2), "....and the counterelite"l (Ch. 3), and "...the elite" (Ch. 4), as a whole. But

first the author summarizes his interview efforts to 'code' of the Iranian political identify"the elite" thus: ... it

was clear

that

ideally

some form of pro-

jective tests, administered to the elite themselves, would be essential. Because of their ease of administration, it was decided to employ a series of projective questions that would allow the elite respondents maximal opportunities for externalizing subjective feelings. A search of already developed psychological testing instruments was conducted and a number of items, valid in the American context, were included in the questionnaire. standard items Additionally, pertaining to social background data, communications patterns, and political and social attitudes were included. After extensive pretesting, into Persian, more pretests, and retranslating visions throughout these stages, a final instrument with some 250 questions whose data were to fill eleven IBMcards was ready for administration (p. 10). The interview project was approved by the shah, who only and lamenexempted therefrom the military--a significant There were 167 respondents on whose retable omission. plies the analysis of the book rests, described as "present and past officeholders (including a large number of as well as those serving in the retired military officers Senate and the cabinet), supporters and opponents of the 'comers' and those whose political monarch, political star has clearly descended, members of the royal family, 39

WINTER1972

and commoners" (p. 11). To have secured this many responses on such a detailed questionnaire is a matter for to the author, who discusses the significongratulation cance of the non-respondents in relation to those interviewed and the validity of his study in Appendix II. There are 116 tables in the book: ten of these in Chs. 2-5 are general in nature, but most of the remainder are induced by factor analysis of the varied data secured in the interviews and certainly factored for a comprehensive spectrum of information on the "code" of the Most of these tables are found in Chs. 6elite studied. 9 which analyze first "the social backgrounds of the conelite" (Ch. 6) and then (Chs. 7-9 deal temporary political dimensions" that with the "four principal attitudinal orientations "represent the general characterological cynicism, per"political that underlie elite behavior": interpersonal and insecurity, manifest sonal mistrust, remarkably small set of significant exploitation"--'"a variables"

(p.

11).

In between the three chapters devoted to the shah and his relations with the elite and the four dealing with orientawith social backgrounds and the most significant tions of the elite is a short chapter (5), entitled "A Perspective on the Elite Nature of Iranian SoHistorical of this discussion is devoted to the Qajar Most city." and Pahlavi dynastic periods, which probably is just as well since one finds the single paragraph dealing with "the lengthy interegnum between the Sassanians and the Safavids" and two sentences on the Safavids woefully overMore analysis of this millesimplified and misleading. nium-plus, however, could have improved the discussion But there are a number of of Qajar social structure. and perceptive observations on general tradiinteresting practiced in recent history, and particutional politics The role of the ruling elite. larly on the traditional "the members of the author concludes that historically power elite have been allocated the rewards of political and other values available in their society in proportions sociebeyond which the populations of more equalitarian of "that the and to government ties are likely tolerate,," STUDIES IRANPIAN1

40

Iran historically

and for the elite"'

has been and continues

to be 'of,

by,

(p. 133).

To return to the three chapters analyzing the relation of the shah with the elite, the author's main conclusion in regard to the composition of the elite is His Majesty's success in controlling both its size and composition by the co-optation of the potential elites and counterelites, influencing the distribution of resources that serve as bases for the acquisition of political power, the most important of these sources being wealth and education, the allocation of which has continually occupied the king's pragmatic style of ruling. By these imperial

efforts,

the shah has been able to fashion an elite whose members remain fundamentally loyal to his throne. Simultaneously, the king strives to co-opt all individuals who have captured or been allowed to capture the power bases. For the recalcitrant, the potential counterelites, the techniques of seduction are employed, the basic relationship between the king and his elites being of inclusivity (p. 37f). Chapter 3 discusses the royal methods used to cope with those in the counterelite who persist in independence, refusing "to succumb to the blandishments of the court": the use of police power secret intelligence, known as SAVAK,the increasingly efficient armed forces, and the urban and rural police forces), censorship and control of the mass media, and support of a wide spectrum of other nations--more recently both of the West and East Europe, the latter including Russia and the former buttressed primarily by the United States. The regime has thereby restricted the limits of acceptable counterelite behavior....As a result, the unassimilated and unassimilatable counterelites have few options--the most likely are demoralization or deFor the individuals beset by the politicization. 41

WINTER1972

activities former of these two options, political continue to be pursued, but with a deep sense of pessimism, inefficacy, disarray, and hence, a lack on the other The depoliticized, of effectiveness. to hand, have entirely withdrawn from politics at the expense of any pursue personal interests who fail to sucCounterelites broader concerns. of their dilemcumb to these commonresolutions who indicate that they can act and act ma, i.e., fashion, are subject with dispatch in a political Exile (either gomeasures. to stringent regime assignment to foreign vernment- or self-imposed), imprior ultimately, posts, removal from office,

sonment may well be their fate (p. 40). by examples of Each of these categories is illustrated A spehandling some of the famous elite recalcitrants. efforts to cocial section is devoted to the persistent opt the National Front, noting that "only when other means of implementing the wishes of HIMhave failed" does the One notes, government resort to the use of physical force. of this illustrations however, the absence of any specific "last resort," the secret military trials of those accused recently and of treason and subsequent summary executions, more numerous, and admittedly on the increase ironically written. since the book was originally The central theme of Chapter 4 is the "monarch's basic style of rule," divide et impera--a policy with a is is explicated by in long and honored histo including treatment of the royal appointment policies, the frequent surprises and personal shakeups in administration; the "hedging of bets" by overlapping bureaucrathe single party system, even when tic responsibilities; trying to direct a show of a "royal opposiunsuccessfully tion"; the astute undermining of exceptional individuals the forcing of communications arising among the elite; within the bureaucracy in vertical rather than horizontal lines, with his own personal appointment and direction of in various the exploitation the key cabinet ministers; and unpredictable ways of the endemic corruption; and most nourishment, important of all by personal administration, IRANIANSTUDIES

42

and manipulation of the armed forces, which constitute the keystone of the basis of his power. The lengthy chapter analyzing the social backgrounds of the contemporary elite, one of the best and most timely in the book, can here only be summarized in its penultimate paragraph: As Tehran has come to dominate all aspects of so have the elite tended to be Iranian life, born in the capital in proportion greater than their own fathers and than the society as a whole. While the median age of the political elite bears no relation to the age distribution of the population at large, political power has begun to pass from the elders of the elite to younger men. Similarly, while the elite as a whole were born of families who claim disproportionately high social status and are extremely well educated, younger men of lower social status but with equally high education have found their way into elite ranks. The far-ranof ging foreign travel and language abilities the elite both reflect and foster the political ties of their country to Europe and the United States, frequently at the expense of Iran's immediate neighbors. Finally, the multiplicity and diversity of occupations pursued by the eliteare central factors in the game of politics of the government's and in the ineffectiveness bureaucracy (p. 198). No attempt is made to summarize Chs. 7-9 dealing with the orientations of the elite already mentioned. Rather this would seem to be the place to comment on the methods and results of the quantitative factoring of the 167 structured interviews personally administered by the author. Let it be at once stated that this reviewer, for some time now a member of the Social Science Research Council, is not unsympathetic with this application of the social science methodologies to the study of politics, this of the Iranian political elucidation and especially elite, 43

WINTER1972

Such orientations. this section on their personality efforts are to be welcomed by all students in the field, as is this, which is a brave and able pioneering endeavor. The comment that it does not really come off, at least for is this reader, perhaps overly sanguine in expectations, not so much applicable to Professor Zonis as it is to the still underdeveloped or imperfect state of the discipline. I cannot say that I learned so much new from the analysis of the Iranian elite as I did of the state of the field through the application of the work of comparative politics For this the in similar fields. of other social scientists and admiring of what apreviewer is stimulated, grateful, to be a oriented "orientalist" pears to this historically and of his discipline splendid commandof the literature of it for comparative purposes a perceptive exploitation of conclusions regarding the Iranian elite. and buttressing Such comment may well be unfair from one who first lived in Iran almost 45 years ago. The general reader, even the may be so much more enlightened by such younger specialist, a study than that of the reviewer's kind; and he would probably be much more knowledgeable now had he been exposed to such a study, say 30 years ago. Be that as it may, it is gratifying that this analycomplements, obsersis confirms, and therefore fruitfully vations and conclusions reached by methods many would certainly as less selfas less scientific, characterize hence and categorized as weighted consciously structured, humanistic disciplines. on the side of more traditional Although it is meant as a compliment yet likely to be reas otherwise, I would regarded by the social scientist the excellence and cord my conclusion that essentially validity of most of our author's factored conclusions stem and highly perceptive, intelligent, from his own sensitive, humane reactions to his respondents, well representative and generally reacting favorably to their honest and diAs a footnote example, one may ask plomatic interlocutor. how the subtle kinetics of interview communication can be captured and codified for an IBM card, howbeit these can than sophisticate often be more revealing to the sensitive the substance of replies.

IRANIANSTUDIES

44

Relevant to this, one may observe that the author in numerous places states that his conclusions are not new on modern Iran, which he documents by in the literature at least in the major Western exploiting this literature, languages, for which he deserves praise; also for the frank admissions of the tenuousness of some of his computerfactored results. Beyond this, one must observe that in some instances, too much trust is placed in certain replies of the respondents, with not enough pragmatic application of the documented discovery of cynicism as a major characteristic of the elite. Most orientals, and certainly Iranians, from peasant to elite, will answer any question the way he thinks the asker wishes rather than by what he knows On this practical point, one would have liked to be facts. to have seen a factored table comparing the older and the younger members of the elite. A computer can be very useful, of course, but generally admitted no better in answers than the question input, though it may cross-factor very interesting results and variations. Hence more experience in the Iranian milieu would certainly deepen the sophistication of the selected queries put to the respondent sample. So, despite what may seem to be discouraging strictures, one would hope that Professor Zonis will return to the research arena with valuable experience and improved techniques to attack again these disciplinary frontiers with the prospect of more of a breakthrough and occupying territory that will yield richer resources for the advancement of the contributions of social science. To conclude this particular discussion one may in approach observe that resolution of these differences will only come by mutual respect, tolerance, frankness, The work of the humility, and openminded collaboration. artist is ever improved with his increasing mastery of precision techniques; and the fashioner of more precise techniques will ever know that his aim must be a higher level of sophisticated interpretative artistry. Only Heifetz and Kriesler together can prove the maximumpocominstrument and interpretative tential of the violin, position. 45

WINTER1972

There are remarkably few errors of fact for such a detailed work, though one may often question the selection Although it is the norm of such for certain discussions. for the Qajar kings, it is surprising to read that "only one.. .has relinquished his throne through natural death at old age" (p. 128). There are a few slips in the proofproduced; reading, but the work as a whole is beautifully text. the accompany that notes for and one is grateful of Persian words occur, but citaStrange transliterations tions and comments are here omitted, only reference to another recent review by this author, who continues to hope for some consistency among American scholars accepting the Library of Congress and American Library Association system (JAOS, 92:1, 1972, 115f). Certain omissions in the selection of facts stand out. Certainly the speech of Ebtehaj at San Francisco was (p. 68), but equally so was the cause highly significant of the break between the shah and his Plan Organization Director when the latter dared, obeying the law, to report unfavorably to the joint supervisory commission of the Majlis and Senate on the royally approved proposal to plant near Shiraz instead of build the first fertilizer in Khuzistan, where the needed fuel gas was at hand, thus The local engineereliminating a long expensive pipeline. and lacking econobrief was Shiraz for ing position paper mic logic as compared with the Plan Organization's detailed famous Belgian firm. But in report from an internationally Shiraz, the Pahlavi Foundation's non-viable cement plant and the shah had needed fuel gas to become profitable; made his wishes clear to Ebtehaj, but he refused to be deflected from his parlimentary duty, and after his ouster expressed his adverse opinions of many of the consistently forum The international government's plans and policies. at San Francisco was, of course, too challenging and emYet long before this Aramesh had ransacked barrassing. the files of the Plan Organization for evidence against no legal avail, as finally his director predecessor--to if it A further footnote of interest: proved by events. it trouble, was the San Francisco forum that precipitated from was it questioning sharp later is widely believed that that Relations helped on Council Foreign the the floor of IRANIANSTUDIES

46

much to change the royal pressure

on Ebtehaj.

Puzzling to this reader is the ambiguous, at least simplistic and marginal references to the challenge of Musaddiq to the shah. Certain conclusions regarding the controversial events before 1953 are assumed, little hint of the complex issues involved that require careful and discriminating analysis and revolve around the basic question of political legitimacy and the necessary foundation for true modernization in a relatively free and open society. Only once is the reign, as contrasted to the rule, of the king mentioned (p. 74), when during the political ferment of 1961-62 the consistent demands of the National Front for cooperation, rather than royal co-optation, were rejected by the shah. It can be argued perhaps that the whole work is predicated on this style of cooptation after 1953; but it seems to this reviewer that for the general reader, unfamiliar with the real nature of early post-war politics in Iran, this lack of wrestling with the Musaddiq period of challenge and lucid exposition of it results in a less than realistic analysis of the most profound political issues that affect deeply the Iranian elite, with a tendency toward the blurring of these issues in the book's basic and commendable search for true perof spective and proportion in understanding the politics contemporary Iran. offered with some symYet despite this stricture, of any inand aware of the fragility pathetic diffidence of this kind, let it be balanced by expression vestigation of considerable satisfaction and agreement with the conin Iran." My cluding chapter on "The Costs of Politics only criticism of this is its brevity, stopping short of a full discussion of the implications of the book's findings for the explication of the profound problem of authentic modernization in Iran under the present regime, all proIran may indeed to the contrary notwithstanding. testations in its area and may enjoy a sigbe an island of stability nificant degree of free discussion as compared to other But what does this assert area Third World countries. positively or profoundly? This book's findings would seem to prove that in politics, and specifically for the section 47

WINTER1972

the present rule is brilliantly elite, of the political Iranian pattern of manipuin the traditional successful lation for royal rule, but quite the counterproductive framework opposite for any solid social and intellectual atmosphere prevails intellectual are such that a stifling if all aspects and which eventually becomes stultifying sections of a modernizing society are not developing in is highly Stability balanced pace and pattern. relatively can imply book this of desirable but as the conclusions creativity long-term in cost a high too at be purchased It is in this context and realization and social health. that the deeply concerned friend of Iran is disturbed and and unconvinced by those euphoric articles distressed; that have recently appeared to justify current political developments as representing such a break with tradition as to guarantee true modernization of the society and Current changes could so contribute if developed country. to nourish true freedom of speech and inquiry, but at this juncture authentic modernization, even in the special precious Persian pattern, the creation of which is devoutly to be desired, remains but a potential promise. This is the implication of this book's provocative and perceptive concluding paragraphs: that Iran has flounBut it is on this transition and elite orientations dered. The very policies rethat brought Iran to its present condition--a admirable one in the context of much of latively the developing world--hinder its moving on to a a commercial new stage in its development....Like enterprise beset by threatening competition, the government of Iran has responded by creating a cartel to insure its survival and profitability. But unlike monopolies, hedged by the tarrif systems walls of beneficent governments, political cannot insure themselves against competition from is Iran incapable of doabroad. More especially ing so. The press of foreign values and life styles, norms, cannot and conflicting of alien ideologies be excluded from Iran as might the wares of foreign And as long as that competition manufacturies. IRANIANSTUDIES

48

whose market is the mind bears on the ideologies, myths, and values of the present regime, its stability remains tenuous, and its power, problematic. To which one may add that the appreciative student and assayer of Iranian culture and civilization knows that over the long centuries of their history, the significant and to humanity have emanated abiding Iranian contributions from the life of the mind, not that of political power.

La description de la nature dans la poesie lyrique persane du xie sidcle: inventaire et analyse des themes. By C.-H. de Fouch6cour. Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1969. 262pp. (Travaux de l'Institute de'6tudes iraniennes de de Paris, 4). l'Universite WILLIAM L. HANAWAY, JR. is, by and large, The history of Persian literature As an inknown. What we must now study is its essence. creasing number of scholars become interested in the study new paths are being sought to approach of this literature, In C.-H. de Fouchecour's La description de la nature... it. techwe are shown an important and productive descriptive nique.

One of the aims of the literary critic is to evaand to discuss it in terms esthetically luate literature of the With the literatures comprehensible to others. Western world this is possible, to a large degree, but at this stage of our knowledge it is hardly possible with There is a Persian tradition of Persian literature. valid within the context criticism which was and is still

William L. Hanaway, Jr., is Assistant Professor of Persian Language and Literature at the University of Pennsylvania. 49

WINTER1972

This tratradition. of Persian society and intellectual is based on a different set of inteldition of criticism lectual and esthetic categories from Western literary and is expressed in a different kind of language, criticism, to the Western student of It thus remains inaccessible or tangential except in its superficial Persian literature which is writThe contemporary Persian literature aspects. ten in Western forms or on the basis of Western models can disbe discussed in much the same way that Western critics and therefore can be compared cuss their own literature, cannot be This modern literature with Western literature. discussed within the context of Persian culture in the is discussed, literature same terms that the classical today. hence the distress of many Persian intellectuals and rapidly growfirmly established With modern literature ing, we must ask how the coming generations of Persians will solve this dilemma. The book under review may point the way to a solution. excursion, one must Before embarking on a critical know what it is one is setting out to understand and evalumust be first described, That is to say, literature ate. then evaluated. One must be able to grasp the piece as a whole, both in terms of its outward form and in terms of What the reader has in its inner structure and content. M. de Fouchecour's book is the first step in the direction of a careful analysis of one segment of Persian poetry, the first exhaustive, precise, and non-subjective i.e., This is a book uf fundaattempt to describe this poetry. mental importance for a number of reasons, the two princiFirst, it provides us with a pal ones being as follows. method for the analysis of themes and motifs in classical Persian poetry, and second it provides us with the results of having applied this method to the description of nature and suggestive. The results are interesting in this poetry. the divins of M. de Fouchecour analyzes intensively 'Unsurli Farrukhl, and Maniichihri in the first section of In the second section he gives a briefer analyhis*book. sis of the poetry of Qatran, Azraql, and Mucizz'i and in the third section an even more rapid treatment of Labibi, 'Asjadi, Ni4ir Khusraw, and Masciid-i Sacd-i Salman. The IRANIANSTUDIES

50

second and third sections are modelled on the very thorough analysis descrlbed in the first section. After a statement about the forms of the description of nature in eleventh century poetry, he examines the fol"The Principal Descriptions of Nature," lowing categories: "Time," "Places Which are Covered by Vegetation," "Vegetation Described or Mentioned," "Natural Elements," "The Sky and the Stars," "Animals," and "The Poetic Perception of For each of the poets studied Nature [by these poets]." from their divans for in Part I, he gives exact citations This, in fact, forns each occurrence of a word or concept. provided. the bulk of the book, with thousands of citations are given and much In Parts II and III, fewer citations information is summarized. The results for individual poets are compared. In the final section of his book, M. de Fouchecour draws a number of detailed conclusions which can be summarized only in the most general way. He is at pains to invention from convention among the poets distinguish hitherto almost imposa distinction which he discusses, criteria sible to make using the largely impressionistic is the essenSuch a distinction applied. traditionally tial preliminary to an acceptable discussion of style in he has studied the More specifically, poetry. classical content of this poetry, and studied the form as it deterHis statement "Une poesie a la remines the content. cherche de la perfection formelle comme est la nttre, tendra necessairement a r6duire son contenu a ce qui est Dans la beaute forexprimable dans des formes parfaites. la beaute de la melle seul doit finalement transparaitre change nature," (p. 239) derives from the discernible which he found in the poetry from Farrukhi to Labibi and Masctid-i

SaCd.

The description of nature in this poetry can be become inseen as a process in which the descriptions The furand economical. creasingly abstract, stylized, ther studies which he rightly suggests will determine how this process applies to other important themes such as The task will be wine, the beloved, and the prince. 51

WINTER1972

enormous, involving the use of a computer as the author of poetic and undoubtedly did here. This quantification other verbal data seems incompatible with the usual notions but given the formal conventions of of literary criticism, Persian poetry, such an approach can be useful classical for the basic task of describing the corpus. At the end, the author sets his study in the larger and introduces observacontext of comparative literature, Again tions on medieval French and Chinese literature. the value of this book is immediately clear. Often-repeated and lead us to accept of Persian literature, book will move us to and this literature, eye. analytical

IRANIANSTUDIES

cliches usually remain unexamined As students them as proven truths. we should hope that this excellent re-examine certain of our ideas about look at it with a fresher and more

52

By Yahya Armajani. EngleMiddle East:Past and Present. 1970. xiv + 432pp. $8.95 wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, ROBERT A. McDANIEL Scholarly journals have rarely concerned themselves The textbook, in the view of most much with textbooks. editors, is a commercial venture and must succeed or fail In the Midaccording to the better mousetrap principle. The dle East things are a little different--as usual. number of texts available is small and the market for the letters in those in print so vague as hardly to riffle a respectable managing editor's "in" basket. In consequence, those who teach the history of the Middle East and feel the need for the kind of structured presentation of to choose from. The material a text provides have little most successful of the few texts available is Sydney N. Fisher's The Middle East: A History, which across the compromise. Stusixties has held place as a satisfactory dents find it dull, but scholars find it more or less correct, and where it is dated, it is at least a good foil. In this limited field, then, the advent of a new text should be welcomed and would be no doubt, if it were a better book. Students may find the writing in Professor Armajan'lls venture into the field of textbook writing a bit more sprightly, but scholars will find it not only dated in its conceptual framework, but pervaded by a kind of sloppiness of manufacture which is inexcusable in a work that must depend for its acceptance upon at least getting the facts straight. The book consists of four roughly equal sections and a brief introduction on where the Middle East is, why Although this brief we call it that, and who lives there. introduction is standard practice among the few texts on

Robert A. McDaniel is Assistant Purdue University. 53

Professor

of History at

WINTER1972

the market, Armajani's presentation does nothing to overand adds a few of its own. This come their deficiencies is an important chapter for the student who knows little he does of the area and must un-learn much of what little presentaanthropological his broken know. Armajani has One called "The People" refers tion into several parts. only to the three major language groups of the area while a later section under the rubric--much used of late and -"Diversity and Unity" deals never very satisfactorilywith the several principal forms of social organization: The two are sepaand the city. the tribe, the village, rated by a section on "Religious Groups," which includes only one paragraph on Islam on the legitimate ground that it will be discussed in the context of its development. however, is a secticn The last section of the introduction, called "Islam," which is really a discussion of the Arab Finally, conquests and the rise of Islamic civilization. the longest single section of the introduction is a murky discussion of nationalism from which I gain only that people in the Middle East love their countries even as you and I, but that they are terribly touchy about it. It is an awkward beginning and that awkwardness, despite occasional passages, persists throughout the book. Inaccuracies are so frequent that a catalogue of them is But far more the job of a good editor than a reviewer. more detrimental to its worth than this constant and irrito detail is the weakness of its explantating inattention atory frame. A good conceptual framework, after all, is one reason for choosing a text rather than a clutch of assigned readings from various books. An example may show In that weakness better than any general condemnation. the in interests European of explanation developing an "Arabic-speaking world" in the last half of the eighteenth century, Armajani says, "In 1770, Warren, the governor of the British company in Bengal, sent an expedition to Suez. The purpose was to use it as a base for shipment of goods overland to the Mediterranean" (p. 210). The facts that the date is a few years off and the then governor of Madras is mentioned by his first name only (in the Index he appears under: Hastings, Warren, (210) are in the long run not so detrimental to the book as a text as the failure IRANIANSTUDIES

54

to place these "facts" in their proper geopolitical, inand even cultural framework. Changes that stitutional, were occurring in India, continuing efforts to develop secure communications lines, political instability in the Middle East, and all the factors which must be considered in any explanation of British policy in the Middle East for nearly 200 years afterward are ignored and the student, who presumably lacks just the perspective that the historian should here be providing, is left with the impression that British contacts with the Middle East had to do with making money. This kind of spottiness occurs on page after page and makes the book nearly impossible to use--even as a foil. One final subject area deserves comment on this book as a text. One serious shortcoming of almost all the material available for classroom use is that it leaves Iran out nearly altogether. Armajani puts her back with a vengeance, and includes a few of her national foibles as well. He considers that by the eighteenth century a "cultured" person in the Ottoman, Safavid, or Mogul empires was "judged by his knowledge of the literature, history and mores of the Persians." And if such doubtful claims are not sufficient to confuse, he drags into the book that untidy business about whether Persian should be transliterated as Arabic because, after all, it sounds different. Persian Isma'ils become Esmalil, although their Arab namesakes are Isma'il. Maps (not Armajani's) and dictionaries show Isfahan, while Armajani knows only Esfahan. Finally, despite the claim that his viewpoint is that of a native, the framework in which he discusses the history of Iran is clearly that of whiggish Western historians. Such peculiarities are sure to increase the already large supply of misinformation that exists in introductory works on the Middle East, and the book cannot be recommended for classroom use, even those sections of it that pertain to Iran.

55

WINTER1972

QuarterlyJournal of EconomicResearch

e

eqiesidi tabqiqiltm VolumeVIII

Spring 1971

No.22

Study on the Excess Cost of Tied Economic Aid Given to Iran in Eprime Eshtag 1966/67 Attitudes of Ir3nian High School Graduates Towards Vocational Training and Industrial Work William H. Bartsch A Reconsideration of Land Reform Sigemochi Hirashima Special Drawing Rights: BackParviz Parsa ground and Analysis An Analysis of MalkamXan's Fereshteh Al. Nouraie Economic Ideas A Note on the Siahat-Nameh of dohsen Saba Ebrihim [Baik Bibliography of Economic Publications on Iran H7osseinAzimi

3

26 40 75 114 123 128

is published in Persian and English by EQTESADI TAHQIQAT-E the Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran. It is designed to serve as a forun primarily for discussions of

problems relating to the economy of Iran. The journal also on economics by Iranian and publishes original articles Short notes and preliminary research findings other authors. are welcome. and business corresManuscripts, books for review, editorial pondence should be sent to the Editor, Faculty of Economics,

University

of Tehran, P. 0. Box 14-1322, Tehran, Iran.

Note on the English Transliteration System The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDIES is based on the Persian Romanization System approved by the American Library Association, the Canadian Library Association, and the Library of Congress. Copies of the transliteration table may be obtained by writing to the Editor.

IranianStudies is publishedquarterlyby The Society for IranianStudies. It is distributedto membersof the Society as part of their membership.The annualsubscriptionrate for non-membersis $5.00; the price of single copies is $1.25 per issue. For institutions the subscriptionrate is $8.00 per annum. The opinions expressed by the contributorsare of the individualauthors and not necessarilythose of the Society or the editors of IranianStudies Articles for publication and all other communicationsshould be sent to the Editor, IranianStudies, Box E-154, Boston College, ChestnutHill, Massachusetts02167, U.S.A. Communicationsconcerningthe affairsof the Society should be addressedto the Secretary,The Society for IranianStudies, P.O. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A.

Cover:

Iranian

folk

calligraphy

The exclusive distributing agent for IRANIAN STUDIES in Iran is: Kharazmie Publishing & Distribution Shah Co., 229 Daneshgah Street, Avenue (P. 0. Box 14-1486), Tehran, Iran.

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Al

Spring-Summer 1972

Volume V

Numbers 2-3

COUNCIL OF THE SOCIETY FOR IRANIAN

STUDIES

Amin Banani, University of California, Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi, Boston College James A. Bill, University of Texas at Austin Jerome W. Clinton, American Institute of Iranian Studies Gene R. Garthwaite, Dartmouth College Farhad Kazemi, New York University Kenneth A. Luther, University of Michigan Jacqueline W. Mintz, Yale University Ann Schulz, ex officio, University of New Hampshire Majid Tehranian, Tehran Executive Committee Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary Ann Schulz, Treasurer Ali Banuazizi, Editor

IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor

Copyright,1973, The Society for IranianStudies Printedat the Boston College Press Publishedin the U. S. A. IRANIAN STUDIES Box E-154, Boston College Chestnut Hill, Mass. 02167

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Volume V

Spring-Summer

Numbers 2-3

1972

ARTICLES 58

HISTORYOF IRAN, THE ECONOMIC AND ITS POLITICAL 1800-1914, IMPACT: AN OVERVIEW

79

BAHARIN THE CONTEXTOF PERSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

88

SYNTACTICAND SEMANTIC CATEGORIESOF ECHOWORDS IN PERSIAN

96

IRAN'S ROLE IN COLDWAR REVISIONISM

Nikki

R. Keddie

B. Loraine

Michael

Don L. F. Nilsen

D. Doenecke

Justus

BOOKREVIEWS 112

ALI DASHTI: In Search of Khayyam (Trans. by L. P. Elwell-Sutton)

120

VARTANGREGORIAN: The Emerence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 18801946

124

LETTERSTO THE EDITOR

D. A. Shojai

Firuz

Kazemzadeh

THEECONOMIC HISTORY OF IRAN, 1800-1914, AND ITS POLITICALIMPACT AN OVERVIEW Nikki R. Keddie The economic history of Iran is a subject that has barely begun to receive the attention it deserves. Articles and parts of books on particular aspects of the subject appeared as early as the nineteenth century, but it is only since World War II that there have been extensive and serious studies in English, and these are still few and far between. Prof. Lambton's book Landlord and Peasant in Persia deserves to be singled out as a major pioneering study, and recently there has appeared Professor Charles Issawils edited volume, The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). This book brings together an outstanding collection of articles, excerpts, and sources, many of them translated from Persian, French, German, Russian, and Italian, that provide a basis for an understanding of the economic history of Iran in the nineteenth century. This essay will attempt a brief outline of the economic history of Iran from 1800 to 1914, using both Prof. Issawils book and other sources, and adding some conclusions about political interaction with economic developments. Although for many countries such an essay would be superfluous, the economic history of Iran is so underdeveloped a subject that no such generalizing

Nikki R. Keddie is Professor Los Angeles. of California,

of History at the University

IRANIANSTUDIES

58

essay or book yet exists in the English language. not footnoted below are from Issawi's book.)

(Figures

The first and perhaps most important impression that arises from an overview of the 1800-1914 period is the relative economic stagnation and very slow development of as conIran in the period under discussion, particularly trasted with the Middle Eastern countries that border on The latter countries were in close the Mediterranean. contact with Europe by ship and were opened up rapidly to a development that benefited primarily Western European nations, but also transformed the local society. The relatively rapid growth in the cultivation of cash crops, and of means of transport to handle them, and of large landownership to exploit them were Mediterranean features only palely reflected in Iran. By 1914 Egypt had some 250,000 European residents, while Iran had only some hundreds. At the same date Iran had less than 12 miles of railroads, no modern port, a few hundred miles of roads and a foreign investment below 30 of any description, million pounds including the national debt. Economic modernization, which in Egypt and Turkey got a serious start (however lopsided in favor of Europeans and reliin the nineteenth century, in Iran gious minorities) awaited the advent of Reza Shah in the 1920s. Several reasons may be cited for this relative stagnation. Among those noted by Issawi are Iran's distance from Western Europe--over 11,000 miles until the Suez Canal was opened, and still great after that event; the lesser authority of the government than in Turkey and Egypt, especially over nomadic tribes; the weakness of the military, and fiscal systems; the stultithe archaic administrative fying effect of the Anglo-Russian rivalry, with each country determined to thwart the schemes of the other; and the lack of large non-Muslim minorities with contact with Western ways. Here I will elaborate on a few factors which seem particularly crucial. One is the geography of Iran-not only its distance from Western Europe, but equally its rugged mountainous terrain and vast distances between population centers and its lack of navigable rivers except for the Karun in the South. This made Iran a less favorable 59

SPRING-SUIf4ER 1972

of trade than the countries for international territory the price of transincreasing greatly the Mediterranean, market. the development of a national port and restricting up a strong of setting Second, there was the difficulty government of the type that encouraged economic central In part this was a direct rechange in Egypt and Turkey. mentioned above, and in part factors sult of the geographic of noprevalence of these factors--the result an indirect Sir John Malcolm, estifollowing whom Issawi, madic tribes of Iran in the of the total population mates at one-half removed large areas from direct century, early nineteenth conducted their own ecoThese tribes government control. whatever they lacked from nearby getting nomic affairs, almost inand towns, and they were politically villages

right to name The shahs had a theoretical dependent. their chiefs, but these were always named from the ruling The shahs also relied on the nomadic tribes tribal family. for their cavalry, and were prudent enough not to try to with the internal workings of the tribes except inteifere Local governors were also in cases of open rebellion. independent of the central government as long virtually as they sent in their revenues, made the required annual or classes, The religious presents, and did not rebel. ulama, also retained considerable independence, based on their steady income from the Muslim community, their ownership of considerable land and property, their control of courts, and the respect in which education and religious The Qajar dynasty, they were held by the population. which ruled from 1796 to 1925, lacked any conspicuous ruler, and the few attempts at centralizing centralizing reforms met with opposition from the ulama and other vested and were generally soon abandoned or allowed to interests The old ruling classes--landlords, become dead letters. tribal khans, bureaucrats, and ulama--had a vested interest in keeping the central government from becoming too powerful and in maintaining the economic status- uo, while the center had less foreign and internal impetus, and fewer reforms than in talented individuals to push centralizing Turkey or Egypt. Despite these unfavorable factors, there was some increase in the power of the bureaucracy and of the central government in the course of the nineteenth century, with the latter half of that century seeing fewer IRANIANSTUDIES

60

feudal and tribal revolts than had the first half. This increase in power was not accompanied by any real diminution in the power of the tribes or of the ulama, however, as was clearly to be shown when both groups demonstrated their strength in the course of the constitutional revolution of 1905-1911. Nor was the increase accompanied by any meaningful efforts by the center at economic development. Issawils mention of Anglo-Russian rivalry should be elaborated. In several instances each country did all it could to keep the other from getting economic concessions and from exploiting those it did get. The most obvious examples of this are Russian opposition to the notorious Reuter concession of 1872 which gave Baron Julius de Reuter, a British subject, exclusive rights to exploit nearly all the economic resources of Iran. The concession was cancelled due to Russian and Iranian opposition, but the British then used Reuter's unfulfilled claims to block Russian railway concessions. The Russian government then having decided it did not want railways in Iran signed a secret agreement with Iran which in effect blocked the construction of railways there for ten years, and this agreement was later renewed. Russia also helped foment Iranian mass opposition to a British tobacco concession granted in 1890.1 In some of these instances the activities of the two powers coincided with Iranian anti-imperialism, but they also blocked some economic enterprises that could have led to a more rapid modernization of Iran, however exploitative they would probably have been. England and Russia both also often worked to block concessions by third powers. Finally, the enforced low tariffs and other privileges to foreigners combined with a social and economic system that stifled and penalized new forms of enterprise to help prevent rapid development from taking place. Despite this relative stagnation there was, Issawi a twelvefold rise in the value of Iranian forcalculates, eign trade in the period 1800-1914, an approximate doubling of Iran's population from about five million to ten million (both the trade and population rises are again much below Egypt and Turkey) and some important changes in the economic system. A study of the economic history of this period is 61

1972 SPRING-SUMMER

therefore not devoid of interest both for its revelation economic system worked of how one particular traditional and how these workings were slowly changed under the Western impact. Iran in the 16th and 17th centuries had reached reand prosperity under the lative heights of centralization Safavid dynasty which ruled from 1501 to 1722. In this period agents from the chief Western European mercantile countries opened trade relations with Iran, importing priThe power of a central gomarily silk and luxury items. vernment has always been precarious in Iran, however, primarily for the geographic reasons mentioned above which independence by tribal leaders and other encourage relative The Safavid central power rapidly local, vested interests. leaving declined in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, the country easy prey to Afghan tribal invaders who devastated the capital of Isfahan in 1722. This invasion was followed by a period of struggles and civil wars, based primarily on tribal forces, which ruined the formerly economic life of the country and brought great flourishing The externally glittering suffering to the population. conquests of Nadir Shah, including his plunder of Mogul India brought not riches but further exactions for the population, and his death left the country once more in anarchy, from which it was temporarily rescued by the short-lived but beloved Zand dynasty ruling from the souThe Zands were among the few rulers thern city of Shiraz. who tried to improve trade and the economic functioning of The Zands were overcome by another tribal their territory. condynasty, the Qajars, whose first ruler Aghi Muhammad quered Iran in battles between 1779 and his assassination in 1797. The Qajars were widely hated from the first and Nevertheless, they had no ruler of outstanding ability. their rescue of Iran from serious civil wars for over a century and the provision of relative internal peace and brought some recovery of the economy from the stability devastation of the 18th century and reduced the tribal raiding and brigandage that had added to that devastation. The gradual change in world trade routes since the back16th century made Iran something of an international IRANIANSTUDIES

62

water by the 18th century. Nonetheless, with the Napoleonic wars Great Power interest in Iran revived quickly, and along with political interest there soon went concern with reviving trade. Sir John Malcolm, sent by the East India Companyon political missions to Iran in the early 19th century, has left the best account of the economic and social system of Iran in that period. Here his account of the tax system will be summarized. According to some sources Aghi Muhammad Sh&hls successor, Fatl cAll Shah (1791-1834), doubled the land tax from 10%to 20% of the produce, but Malcolm states that the actual tax varied from 5% to 20%depending on the water supply. He says that crown lands were rented by the peasantry for roughly half their produce. He notes a great increase in crown lands due both to the confiscation of vaqgs (inalienable religious lands) by Nadir Shah and to the disappearance of landowners in the civil wars preceding the rise of the Qajars. Malcolm states that the fixed revenues, mentioned above, were fair and moderate, but that people were continually exposed to irregular and oppressive taxes. Among these were usual and extraordinary were forced to make on presents which all high officials In addition a present was always the Persian new year. so that the office might be made on appointment to office, said to be bought. Most oppressive of all was the public requisition: If an addition is made to the army; if the king desires to construct an aqueduct, or build a palace; if troops are marching through the country, and require to be furnished with provisions; if a foreign mission arrives in Persia; if one of the royal family is married; or, in short, on any occurrence not ordinary, an impost is laid, sometimes upon the whole kin~dom, and at other only on particular provinces. Malcolm estimated that the ordinary and extraordinary revenues amounted to about 3 million pounds each, and that the extraordinary revenue in particular fell oppressively on the population. He noted that it was the custom to pay the 63

1972 SPRING-SUMMER

and the royal household, and religious principal officials, He other pensioners by assignments on the public revenue. peasants often states that due to the public requisition had to sell their crops at a very low price while they were in the ground. The shah hoarded a considerable porstill tion of the national revenue. The picture presented by Malcolm is supplemented by conditions of later sources, but it is striking how little All taxation changed in the course of the 19th century. sources agree that nearly all taxation fell directly or ultimately on the peasantry, with a smaller amount paid by the tribes and by the town artisans. Bureaucrats, landlords, the upper ulama, and merchants were largely exempt. The land tax was estimated by Curzon to amount to about 25%of the produce on an average near the end of the cenrise since Malcolm's time.3 Villages, tury, a significant tribes, and city guilds were assessed as units, and it was to subdivide the assessment. the business of their officials the extraordinary taxes, In village taxes, and especially often had to be collected by force, but they could almost Internal and foreign customs duties were never be avoided. further sources of revenues, and these were farmed out. The Treaty of Turkomanchai which ended a war with Russia on Russian goods to 5% ad valorem, in 1828 limited tariffs and the same tariff was extended to other countries in Foreigners were also exempted from later trade treaties. the internal customs that Iranian merchants continued to have to pay. The government did not receive the full 5%, as they farmed out the customs, and customs farmers often vied with one another to lower customs in their area even below this level so as to attract more trade to their own Toward the late 19th century it was estimated that ports. the government received no more than 2-3%.4 Not only were irregular taxes standard and inequibut even the regular revenue tably divided by officials, obsolete assessments, so was based largely on increasingly There much harder than others. that it hit some districts of the revenue during the reorganization was no scientific despite some abortive efforts by period under discussion, the reforming crown prince cAbb&s MirzA in Azerbaijan early IRANIANSTUDIES

64

in the century; by the equally reforming prime minister Amir Kablr in the mid-19th century; and by N&sir al-Din Shah (1848-1896) later in the century. As the century went on there appears to have been some change from the rather fixed presents from government officials noted by Malcolm to a situation which was almost an annual auction of office. The effect on the local peasant population can be imagined, as office was sought almost exclusively for the revenue it brought, and with the uncertain duration of office it was an almost universal practice to extort as much as possible as quickly as possible. Landlords often subfarmed their own lands--i.e., paid a fixed sum for taxes rather than subject their lands to the exactions of government agents. One source estimates that tax collectors took about three times as much as ultimately reached the government.5 As the shahs' and courtiers' tastes for foreign trips and luxuries increased in the late 19th and early 20th centuries so did exactions on the peasants. Although Issawi believes it impossible to judge whether peasant conditions deteriorated in the course of the 19th century, travellers' and observers' reports suggest that they did-both Malcolm and James Fraser state that the peasants were rarely severely impoverished, whereas late 19th and early 20th century reports often speak of them as such. This was partly due to landlord exactions, which increased with the rise of cash crops and of investment in land, but it was also due to extortionate taxes. of the taxation system, Despite the oppressiveness the revenues that actually reached the central government were not large. Na5ir al-Din Shah at first appointed a reforming prime minister, Amir Kabir, who tried to eliminate the prevalent corruption and excesses in tax collection and introduce a regular system, which would have both benefited the peasantry and increased the revenues of the central government. This and other reform measures so of the ruling classes at antagonized the vested interests court, however, that they aroused the Shah's suspicions against his minister whomhe first dismissed and then had 65

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

murdered. Aside from the most elementary security measures taxation was not, throughout the period under discussion, used for public purposes and scarcely for self-strengthening. There were no roads at all in Iran until the very late 19th century, and those built then were almost entirely under concessions by the British and Russians for their own purposes. Bridges and caravanserais were rarely built, and then by private individuals. Individual charity was all the social security there was, while schools were built and run by the ulama. The Crown Prince cAbbAs Ml!rzd made an attempt to modernize his army in Azerbaijan with European instructors early in the 19th century, but with his death in 1833 modernization of the army virtually died too, despite some abortive attempts late in the century. Only the Russian-officered Cossack Brigade founded in 1879 and centering in Tehran was an efficient force, and aside from that the shahs continued to rely mainly on tribal levies. The regular army was almost a farce, as officers bought their positions and appropriated their men's pay, while conscripted troops were generally neither drilled nor equipped but were permitted to make their living in ordinary trades in the towns and villages. Expenditures on education were miniscule, with one modern school, the Dar al-Funuln at Tehran being the only one of Amir Kabilr's reforms allowed to continue, to be j'oined by a very few other modern schools at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Revenues were spent mostly on the shah, the court, the bureaucracy, and pensions to princes, religious figures and others. The public revenue and expenditure sents a more retrograde picture under the did at the height of the Safavid dynasty, made to promote trade and industry by the

system thus preQajars than it when efforts were government.

Another aspect of the financial situation that was oppressive to the masses of the population was the rapid depreciation of the currency and the rise in prices throughUntil the 1860s this was mainly due to out the century. the cutting of precious metals in the coinage, but after IRANIANSTUDIES

66

that it was even more owing to the world fall in the price of silver, the basis of Iran's coinage. This depreciation constituted a severe and indirect tax that hit the poor particularly, but it was also serious in its consequences for the Persian government itself, which kept raising its nominal revenues without its real revenues rising signifiIssawi notes that the exchange value of Persian cantly. coinage fell to 1/5 or less of its 1800 exchange rate with the pound sterling by 1914. The rise in prices of basic foodstuffs in the late 19th century was even more dramatic, and was not equalled by the rise in wages. The depreciation of coinage continued in the late 19th century, as control of the mint was farmed out to the highest bidder, who naturally tried to recoup as much as possible through depreciation of the currency. Silver coinage increasingly disappeared from the market and debased copper coinage took its place. The export and hoarding of silver created serious shortages of currency for internal and international trade.6 Harmful to both the government and the peasantry was the fixed exchange rate by which the government agreed to convert taxes in kind to those in cash. As the value of Persian currency declined and agricultural prices rose, this brought increased income to landlords and meant that the government had to keep raising taxes just to maintain the same real income. The period 1800-1914 saw increased private investment in land, the growth of large landownership, and of landlords' power over their peasants. Professor Lambton attributes these facts largely to the growing concentration of political, and economic power into the hands judicial, of landlords.7 Other causes may, however, be cited--chief among them the economic impact of the West. This impact led to a new demand for cash crops, a new possibility of the largest possible agricultural utilizing surplus to buy Western luxuries, and to new income in the hands of some merchants, who were eager to join the profitable business of investment in land and to exploit it as efficiently as possible. At the same time-the peasants, as Professor Lambton notes, were increasingly at the total mercy of 67

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

their own landlord and hence frequently lost their ownership and other rights to the land. As the government's need for money grew crown lands were more and more sold or sub-rented to new landlords who nearly always exploited them and their peasants more thoroughly and efficiently than had the government. A study by Robert A. McDaniel notes that the fall in the value of silver and also in world prices of agricultural goods from 1873 to the mid-1890s were factors in the inof peasants. The price of wheat on creased exploitation the world market fell from $1.50 a bushel in 1871 to $.23 in 1894, and though the amount of wheat exported from Bushire between 1869 and 1894 increased eight times, the value in terms of foreign exchange remained almost the same. According to the same study: the peasant was more tightly In agriculture, of the squeezed either by the tax collector landlord, or both. The long-range effect of this pressure was to cause a steady accumulation of the land in the hands of the powerful. Although there are no detailed studies of this phenomenon, the general trend of the period seems to indicate that the peasant proprietor could less and less stand on his own. He needed a The 'friend' was usually a friend at court. influence and used that man who had political 8 influence to extend his landholdings.... The rise in cash crops for export to Europe and the Far East, although less dramatic than in Mediterranean counand is well covered by tries, was nonetheless significant, could Only increased production and exploitation Issawi. begin to pay for imports and make up for deteriorating in There was a revival of silk cultivation terms of trade. relations increasingly entered, Gilan, in which capitalist chiefly Armenian, entering in to lend with speculators, to the landlords and peasants against the eggs and money enterprise was devastated by next crop. This profitable the ruinous silkworm disease of the 1860s, from which it gradually recovered by the end of the century, only to face IRANIANSTUDIES

68

the competition of cheap Japanese silk, so that it never regained its former profits. Another major cash crop was opium, which had earlier been grown in small amounts, but from the mid-19th century was encouraged especially by the British for export to the Far East. It was estimated to return three times as much revenue as wheat on the same land. The cultivation of opium on former wheat lands combined with a series of droughts to produce the terrible famine of 1871-72 in which estimates of deaths range as high as 10%of the population or over. The opium habit also spread increasingly among the Persian population. Other important export crops were rice, cotton, tobacco, dried fruits and nuts. The export of wheat greatly raised its price in Iran. Cotton became Iran's chief export, responding primarily to the demands of the Russian market, and was encouraged by Russian cotton speculators who distributed improved cotton seeds in return for a lien on the crop.9 In a few areas plantation methods were used for tea and other crops, but in general sharecropping continued to be the dominant method of exploitation. Persian sharecropping was traditionally based on a consideration of who supplied each of five key factors of production--land, labor, water, seeds, and tools and oxen. The actual rents paid varied considerably despite these guidelines, however, and seem to have been based on providing the sharecropper with a minimumof subsistence. travellers' Nineteenth-century accounts tell of the reluctance of the peasant to adopt means that would increase his production because of his expectation that the entire surplus would go to the landlord or tax collector. The system thus discouraged initiative or modernization, and many of the gains that were made in cash crops appear to have been due to increased exploitation and the rise in population, although there were ways to induce peasants to grow more profitable cash crops. Despite the small percentage of Iranian land that was actually cultivated it was not simple to extend cultivation, as cultivation depended on irrigation, generally supplied by the expensive underwater aqueduct (qLnat) system. Although Iran appeared underpopulated, there was in fact considerable emigration from Iran to areas of higher wages once opportunities 69

1972 SPRING-SLMMER

opened up, and it is estimated that over 200,000 persons a year emigrated to Russia in the years before World War I (though many of these also returned).10 Peasant conditions differed in different parts of the country, with the peasants being most prosperous in the high rainfall areas of the Northwest, where some peasants paid a fixed cash rent and profited from any increase in production, and poorest in the dry and tribally populated Southeast. There was also the beginning of significant class differentiation of the peasantry, with a few peasants, espcially village headmen, able to enter the class of small owners, while others fell to the status of casual day laborers. These trends were initiated by the introduction of capitalist relations on top of the former largely feudal cnes. 11 The government did very little to encourage agricultural production. ?4uhammad Shah's (1834-1848) prime minister to Iiijji Mirz: Aq&sl extended silk cultivation Kerman, while the ubiquitous Amir Kabir helped bring dead lands into cultivation and repair irrigation works. After the mid-19th century, however, the government hardly took any steps, except to lease out or sell crown lands. As to the economic structure of the cities, it should be noted that these were the residences of the ruling classes--the chief government officials, the leading ulama, the landlords, the merchants, and even some of the tribal khans. These were the untaxed classes for whose consumption, as well as for the royal court, taxes were collected. The chief productive classes in the cities were the merchants and artisans, both of whomwere organized into largely selfThe artisan guilds set up standards for regulating guilds. tests for becoming a master craftsproduction, established man, regulated disputes among their members or between and guilds, kept a treasury for their own social services, apportioned taxes among their members. They also played a The merchants apparently paid and social role. religious no regular taxes, but only a rent on their bazaar offices, plus the road taxes involved in transporting goods from Merchants were among the most reone city to another. IRANIANSTUDIES

70

spected classes in the community and, unlike their social superiors, were noted for their financial honesty, so that large sums and valuable goods would be entrusted to their care without any qualms. Merchants also played the role of bankers and moneylenders in the absence of a modern banking system, and often supplied money to the government and its representatives. In the course of the 19th century most crafts and some merchants were severely hit by the progress of European trade. In the first half of the 19th century Great Britain rapidly entered the Persian market with cheap industrial goods, mostly textiles, which began to undermine Persian handicraft production. As early as 1836 the shah tried fruitlessly to end the use of European cloth among his courtiers, and Issawi notes appeals from groups of craftsmen and merchants from 1837 on to the shah to forbid European imports. Even had he wanted to do this, he was forbidden by the trade treaties he had signed with European powers. Late in the period there were renewed demands for boycotts on Western goods, some of which were successful.12 The decline in handicrafts continued throughout the 180C-1914 period, and was only partially compensated for by the rise of European demand for Persian carpets which began to be an important export only in the last quarter of the 19th century. European firms systematized the production and export of carpets. The guilds suffered both from the decline of handicrafts and from the rise of the central government's judicial and administrative powers. On the other hand some Persian merchants were able to take advantage of the new relations with Europe. Even though Persian merchants were at a severe disadvantage compared to European merchants because they had to pay internal customs duties which the Europeans did not, some managed through fair means or bribery to carry on both international and internal trade at a considerable profit. Some bought the protection of European consuls. Wealthy merchants and craftsmen were able to build up some relatively large manufactories to cater to domestic and international demand. Beginning in the 1880s there was also a development of Persian merchant companies combining several 71

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

merchants, or representing a single wealthy merchant with The wealthiest merchant family was manifold activities. that of the Anin al-Zarb, or mint master, of Tehran who in addition to farming the mint controlled a network of interwith several merchant enterprises, nal and international offices abroad, which when he died in 1897 was inherited by his son, also known as the Amin al-;arb. Domestic and foreign efforts to set up modern industries were far less successful than were manufactories, of transport and the imprimarily because of difficulties Aside from some relaof protective tariffs. possibility tively successful gun and cannon foundries beginning with cAbbds Mirz&'s work in the 1820s, almost no domestic inindustries were successful although numerous attempts were made. The Amir Kabir tried to set up several factories and sent Persians abroad to be trained for them, but his efforts were abortive as were almost all succeeding ones. At least one sugar factory failed because of Russian underdid not Even European concessionaires cutting of prices.13 although some gas and electric do well with factories, Iran had to await the 1930s before works did succeed. modern factories were seriously begun. The The situation in transport was scarcely better. only railroad built in the period under discussion was a short line from Tehran to the nearby shrine of Shah CAbdul cAzim, built by a Belgian company which also brought horsedrawn trams to Tehran. The British succeeded in getting the Shah to open the Karun River to navigation as late as 1888, and a British and a Persian comLpanymade use of this. Late in the period the Russians got various road building concessions and built over 500 miles of roads, while the British also built some, but these were only a bare start towards an adequate road network. Animal pack remained by far the dominant mode of transport throughout the 18001914 period. As for foreign trade, although it increased about twelvefold during the 1800-1914 period, the balance of unfavorable to the Iranians. trade became increasingly The period, like subsequent ones, brought a deterioration IRANIANSTUDIES

72

of the terms of trade as the price of Iranian raw materials fell relative to those of the manufactured goods that Iran chiefly imported. Added to the falling price of silver, this meant hardship for Iran, which must have been partially overcome by a rise in agricultural production. Real wages and salaries fell significantly in the last half of the 19th century. Scarcely any source discusses the impact of the large-scale presence of nomadic tribes on the Iranian economy. Issawi estimates that the proportion of nomads in the 1800-1914 period fell from about one-half to about one-quarter of the total population. Given his estimate of a doubling of the population in this period, this would mean a static absolute number. In some important ways the nomads contributed to the economy, providing large numbers of sheep and goats with all their important by-products. On the other hand, the use for grazing of cultivable land and nomadic raiding of the peasantry, or exploitation of peasant villages, cut down on agricultural productivity, and it is difficult to judge which of these effects was the more significant. The period 1800-1914 saw increased economic conflict between Iranians and Europeans, which eventually went from the economic into the political sphere. The rise in European trading companies in Iran, beginning with the Greek Ralli brothers in 1837, was looked on with jealousy by some Iranian traders, although others cooperated with or worked for Europeans. European concessions beginning later in the century were similarly the occasion of mixed reactions. The first concession, for the Indo-European telegraph line, was generally regarded as helpful, and the spread of foreign and state controlled telegraphs increased the central government's control over the provinces. Later concessions were more a mixed story. The notorious Reuter concession, mentioned above, was negotiated with the help of two Iranian reforming ministers--Mirzf Husayn Khan Sipahsalar-i Aczam and MalkumKhan. It met with Iranian from the majority of informed opinion, however, hostility which helped bring its cancellation. The British company navigating the Karun River also faced Iranian merchant 73

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

did the Brtish Imperial Bank So particularly opposition. of Persia, begun in 1889 as partial compensation for the cancelled Reuter concession, which was given exclusive These rights annoyed Persian rights of banknote issue. bankers, who had been accustomed to giving out their own bills of exchange and tried to continue to do so, but were forbidden to. The British (and the soon-founded Russian) banks' taking over of many loans also competed with Perbankers, and the latter organized runs on sian traditional the British bank's specie, some of which came close to success. came with the The most dramatic economic conflict concession of a monopoly over the purchase, production, and sale of all Iranian tobacco given to a British subject of Iranian tobacco growers and in 1890. Here the interests merchants were directly touched, and they played a prominent part in the nation-wide protest movement that brought about of the concession early in 1892. There grew a cancellation up a feeling among Iranians that their government was selling the resources of the country to foreign powers for petty personal profit, and this was a large factor in various protest movements that culminated in the constitutional at this time not Interestingly revolution of 1905-1911. much opposition was aroused by the later center of controversy--the oil concession to a British subject, D'Arcy, in modern in1901. This culminated in the only large-scale dustry to be set up in Iran before World War I. British and Russian merchants and their governments had a strong interest in promoting their own economic position in Iran, and this they did with considerable vigor. In the first half of the 19th century the British had the advantage, despite their distance from Iran, due to a relative lack of Russian industry or communications to Iran. With the growth of Russian industry and the building of the Transcaucasian and Transcaspian Railways in the 1870s and 1880s, however, the Russians gained the advantage, and Russian goods took over from British ones in northern and even parts of central Iran. It was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries also that communications and transport concessions were given to the nationals of both powers, IRANIANSTUDIES

74

and the increased Russian and British economic and political power were felt to be galling by many Iranians. Russian rebates and bounties to manufacturers who exported to Iran meantthat many Russian goods sold more cheaply which made not only British there than in Russia itself, but Iranian competition increasingly difficult. The Russian government vigorously promoted trade and concessions for political reasons, and the growth of Russian resented.14 economic control was increasingly Added to the feeling against foreign banks and concessions came that against foreign loans. Here again Iran entered the path of borrowing later than Turkey or Egypt, but Iran also used its loans less productively. The first foreign loan, for 500,000 pounds, was from England to pay the compensation demanded by the British tobacco company for its cancelled concession. Later much larger loans were made from Russia, primarily to pay for wasteful trips to Europe by Muzaffar al-Din Sh&h (1896-1907). Late in the 19th century also Belgians began to be hired to take over customs collection, which they did more efficiently than the Iranian customs farmers, but at greater expense to Iranian merchants, who were not slow to complain. Iran seemed to its merchants, artisans, and others to be falling more and more into the Russian and British economic and political grip, and the government appeared to be abetting this. It was, significantly, the beating of a merchant on the orders of the governor of Tehran in December, 1905, that set off the first demonstration of the constitutional revolution. Throughout that revolution merchants, including both the small and the wealthy, and artisans, played a leading role. Their interests were often voiced by the ulama, with whomthe guilds and city dwellers had traditionally had close ties. Where traditionally a member of the ulama might intervene for an individual guildsman with the governmental authorities, now large numbers of the ulama helped express both their own and the merchants' anti-governmental and anti-foreign interests. During the two parliaments that met in the course of the constitutional revolution there were significant 75

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

Feudal landin the economic sphere. reforms legislated holdings, or tuyuls were abolished, taxes were regularized, gendarmerie was set up, a an independent tax collecting true national bank was voted for, pensions and sinecures were greatly cut, and a national budget was introduced for the first time. Unfortunately the parliaments had neither the military nor the financial means truly to enforce this forces The continued power of decentralizing legislation. was shown by the raiding of nomadic tribes and the relucWhen the American tance of the provinces to send in taxes. financial advisor, Morgan Shuster, tried to enforce the economic control of the central government over the whole country, the Russians accused him of ignoring the terms of their agreement with the British of 1907 dividing Iran and a Russian ultimatum, backed into spheres of influence, by the British, followed by a Russian invasion early in The consti1912 broughtabout the end of the revolution. tution it had provided remained, although henceforth it was more honored in the breach than the observance. Merchant and artisan demands for a more independent national economy were partly met after the rise of Riga Shah to power beginning in 1921. During his twenty-year rule he built up a strong army and bureaucracy, reduced the power of tribal leaders, ulama, and independent landwork lords, gained tariff autonomy, and began significant This was all done at much in communications and industry. cost to the commonpeople, with a heavy burden of indirect taxation on items of mass consumption, but it laid the development of Iran. foundations for the current capitalist However stagnant the period 1800-1914 may look in comparison to the half century that followed, there is no question but that the roots of later developments are to The impact of the West be found in the earlier period. The period on Iran's economy was already significant. into the international market, brought Iran definitively and making it self-sufficiency ending its former relative Some landlords began trade. dependent on international to produce for the world market and to feel the need for Some and transport. means of exploitation more efficient merchants were able to take advantage of new conditions IRANIANSTUDIES

76

to tie themselves to Western trade, while others were embittered against Western competition and sought to gain a The power of greater measure of national independence. with their heavy stake in decenthe old ruling classes, and a weak central government was gradually tralization undermined, as more and more Persians became aware that a new type of government was needed to keep Iran from being swallowed up by the West. economically and politically Economic changes during the 1800-1914 period followed by the disruption and famine brought by World War I form some upheavals that of the basic causes of the Iranian political characterized the period 1905-1925 and culminated in a dicand modernizing government. centralizing, tatorial, NOTES 1.

See Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 (London: Frank Cass ! Co., 1966); and Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and BriA Study in Imperialism tain in Persia, 1864-1914: (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

2.

Sir John Malcolm, The History of Persia, from the Most Early Period to the Present Time, Vol. II (London, 1815), pp. 479-480.

3.

George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Vol. II (London, 1892), p. 471.

4.

Joseph Rabino, "An Economist's Notes on Persia," printed from the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, LXIV, Pt. II (June 29, 1901), p. 4.

re-

S.

Muhammad Ali Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaygan (Berlin, 17), p. 122.

1916-

6.

Rabino, pR. cit.,

7.

A. K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 143-145.

p. 9.

77

SPRING-SUMER 1972

8.

Robert A. McDaniel, "Economic Change and Economic Rein 19th Century Persia," Iranian Studies, siliency Vol. IV, No. 1 (Winter, 1971), pp. 40-41.

9.

Ibid.,

p. 41.

10.

Marvin L. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, University of Florida Fla.: 1828-1914 (Gainesville, Press, 1965), p. 60.

11.

and Nikki R. Keddie, "Capitalism, Stratification, Before and Social Control in Iranian Agriculture, After Land Reform," in R. Antoun and I. Flarik, eds., and Social Change in the Middle East Rural Politics Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1972). (loomington,

12.

Persian books and the British Foreign Office record some of these movements, particularly

13.

Jamalzadeh, 22. cit.,

14.

EntnerJ pR. cit.; Kazemzadeh, 2p. cit.; Gukasov, Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie v Persii (St. Petersburg, 1916).

IRANIAN STUDIES

documents in Isfahan.

pp. 99-100.

78

and G. I. Terinteresy Rossii

BAHA4RIN THECONTEXTOF PERSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION Michael B. Loraine

Bahar provides an unusual example of a writer belonging to different periods of Persian literature. He began writing early and lived long enough to pass through several admittedly rapid stages in modern Persian history. Thus he is known as one of the poets of the Constitutional period, whose poems were chanted and recited by the overthrowers of the old autocracy, even more by those who counteracted the Lesser Autocracy of Mubammad CAli Shah, as well as the poet, journalist, scholar and teacher of the restored constitution, the reign of Rizj Shah and just after. A close look at the Divlnl reveals a third period, less important from the literary point of view, but which preceded the others and gave Bahar a stamp he was never wholly to lose, even though he was acutely sensitive to the rapid changes Persian society and culture were to undergo during his life. It was his early training, education and experience which made him a literary conservative even though he became a political progressive. title

Bahar was no poet by accident. of Malik al-Shucar&Li Astanah-i

His father had the Quds-i Razavi, i.e.,

M. B. Loraine is Assistant Professor in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literature at the University of Washington. 79

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

stipendiary chief poet for the shrine of the Eighth Imam in Mashhad, $abirl, as Bah&rls father was known, was a member of the literary circle in Mashhad, in which not only was the craft of verse taught and encouraged, but the theories and practice of B&zgasht-i Adabi,3 the movement of return to the style of the ancient Khuras&nl poets of the Samanid and Ghaznavid periods; this movement had begun as a reaction, even in the eighteenth century, against the so-called Indian style. By December, 1886, when Bah&r was born,4 his father was official poet to the shrine and thus almost court poet to the Qajar prince-governor of Khurasan. By 1904, when aabfrlr died, Bahlr, who took this takhallus from Bahar of Shirvan, a less known poet who had died in SabOri's house,5 was already established in the literary circle of Mashhad and was promoted to his father's post, not without overcoming competition and jealous rivalry. Mu;affar al-Din from Shah, on receiving an appropriate _qa4dah of panegyric the poet of the shrine, awarded him the title of Malik alfor the whole country. Shucara' absolutely, The title of titles, stuck, even after Ri;a Sh&h's abolition though or pracin any official it never meant Bahar was laureate sense. tical The manuscript of Bahar's poetry is still jealously Most of its contents have been pubguarded by his widow. lished in two volumes by his brother, MuhammadMalikzadah. is now Volume I, Ga?idahs, Musammats, Tarklb/Tarjic-bands available in a second edition, slightly improved and a Volume II, asnav1s, little less coy than the first. Ghazals, Qilcahs, Rubacls 4 Du-bayis, Muyayibas, Dialect

in its first edition, including poems and Ta?nifs is still an appendix (mul.hagt) of poems now in the second edition of Volume I. Volume I is in roughly chronological order, but Volume II groups the poems according to type, the maanavts being further grouped by metre. Malikz&dah's coments usually give a date, with or without some reference to historical events, but the smaller poems in Volume The II are difficult or impossible to date in most cases. manuscript may eventually cast more light.

IRANIANSTUDIES

80

the Dlvan provides an unusually clear Nevertheless, The earliest exposition of Baharls poetical development. Then come poems written poems are elegies for his father. Not surprisingly in his capacity of poet of the shrine. for one who had astonished his mentors by his facility in imitating the style of early Khurasani poets, the influence of the idiom of these poets is strong. Also evident in the religious poetry is the hymnodic style of the religious verse developed in $afawid times, of which Hatif's Tarjlc-band is a famous example.6 The panegyric addressed to Muzaffar al-DinSh&h is from "the Servants of the Court of Sanctity to the threshold of the King, the Enlightened Prince," and has nothing to do with the popularity of this king with progressives because of his granting of the constitution several years later, despite Malikz&dah's comment. 7 These and the other early poems, including what can be called private, as opposed to public poems, all reflect the thoroughly formal, traditional nature of Bah&r's formation. He was born and trained in what may be called the end of Persia's Middle Ages. Bahar's work is proof that the tradition was not dead or purely formalistic. Even in the panegyrics to the king, the new governor of Qiich&n,8 etc., the element of counsel (pand-u andarz) is frequent, and this element is contemporary in reference, though the In one of Bahar's elegies for his style is traditional. father, the sense of genuine grief is plainly expressed, istiqbAl of one by Khiqani.9 though the poem is an explicit This fusion of the personal with the traditional remained ever typical of Bahar, and in this- he is not apart from the best poets of the classical from the earlitradition, est onwards, with whom Bahir always felt at one. Though the constitutional movement in Persia owes its origin to the ideas coming into the country from various sources, the chief influence, or rather igniter of kindling laid already was that of emigres from Russia after It was the notorious Haydar Khan the 1905 revolution. CAmil-Ughli, who came to Mashhad and helped to organize the Democrat Party there.10 However, it was not until 1909, just before the Nationalist capture of Tehran in July, that 81

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

Bahar gave vent to political feelings in verse. In a wellknown passage in his History of Political Parties in Persia, Bah&r claims that his first political verses were printed in the newspaper Khurasan, which he helped to publish.11 In the two years between *abUrl's death in 1904, and the granting of the Constitution in 1906, BahArls attitude to the king and ministers or governors matured, as can be seen in the poems addressed to such men. From uncritical, formal panegyric, he moved to increase the personal urging in his counsel. His optimistic advice slowly changes to cAll Shah, and flowers into the poems disgust with Mhuhammad of exhortation and celebration for the triumphant Constitutionalists.12 The progress of the Constitutionalist triumph, from the advance on Tehran onwards, can almost be chronicled in Bah&r's verse written at the time. In the few years between his father's death and the capture of Tehran in 1909, Bahar became a poet of the movement, even of the party. He was not alone, for Dih-Khuda and Ashraf of Gilan preceded him, among others. Bahar chose strophic types of verse, or verse with a refrain for his poems of stirring exhortation or celebration, but it is interesting that his most famous poem of this sort, the mustazad, Kar-i Iran b& Khud&st,13 published in the paper Khurasan in May-June, 1909, is a contrasting imitation of one by Ashraf, published in Naslm-i Shumal, 20 January, 1908. Bah&r himself calls this the nmost important of his political poems.14 To him, Ashraf was as good a poet to "answer" as an earlihas classier one. The form, though not commonearlier, cal precedent, but proved admirable for Bahar's purpose, as for Ashraf's, though the latter's poem is despondent and Bahar's is optimistic. Having, largely through this poem, achieved recognition as poet of the Nationalists, he proceeded to celebrate their successes in a number of poems, most of them in the stropic forms of tarkib-band, tarjlc-band or musammat. Some of these poems were used for recitation at parades of such mixed elements as madrasah students, Khurasan National Volunteers (muj&hidin), and Turkoman tribesmen, previously a menace to the settled population, who all took part, watched by the whole of the citizenry of Mashhad. In one such poem, all the different IRANIANSTUDIES

82

elements are given their due, including the ulama and even the Eighth Im&m,beloved of all Mashhadis.15 A more formal reception resulted in a long qas!dah, an istipbal of a well-known poem of Farrukhi which celebrates the victory of Mahmudof Ghazna at Sumnat, while Bahrl's hero is the Sipahdar-i Aczam.l6 The whole poem presupposes familiarity with that of Farrukhi, as the Sipahd&r is praised as having risked himself for the sake of others, while Mahmild's conquests were for himself. Interestingly, the poem also reveals knowledge of modern history or European knowledge of ancient history. Mh4ammadcAll defeated, BahAr turned to counsel the electorate. Before he had counselled rulers. Now, power was with the people. But reaction still lurked in unsurprising places and a biting satire mocks the reactionary mujtahids by putting in the mouth of one such an anthropomorphic view of the kind of hell deserved by all except some ulama and the shicah;l7 those who wear European dress, and especially Bahar, will burn, along with all who work in official departments, become deputies in the Majlis, speak of the constitution, write for newspapers or understand modern affairs. The ridicule of this poem is heightened by the Swiftian irony, and the wit is strengthened by the skillful use of metre and rhyme, both classical. A number of satirical poems flowed from Bah&r's pen between 1909 and 1912, indeed from 1910 they are more numerous than other poems. He did not entirely reject his function as local shrine and court poet, but he now saw himself as counsellor of the people and voice of the country's emotions. He was not above attacking anyone in his satires, and he adjusted his language according to his victims. A hard-hitting tarjlc-band,lS probably written during the disturbed summer of 1910, makes deliberate use of colloquialisms to express disgust wlth the self-defeating divisions in society. Hle blames ignorance for these and makes it his chief object of attack. The criticism is destructive, but it is self-criticism: God save us from me and thee. Other objects of satire include Mashhad's muddy streets and those who live parasitically 83

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

off vaQf funds. All this time, Bahdr was still producing formal poem, but this becomes increasthe odd occasional, What is notable is that in his satires, ingly exceptional. lyrical writing, Bahar's his vLalaniy1t, his reflective, poetic diction expands to include the modern, the colloquial, the neologism, all without abandoning traditional Thus, form or classical, even archaic classical language. tarjiC-band, "Vatan dar Khatar Ast,"119 is an interesting in its use of stock diction to excite curiously effective patriotic fervor, though it ends with a note of despair. A gapidah, "?AyVatan-i Man,",20 is a lament full of such It is an istiq &l of a poem by Mianflchihr!. The despair. formal imitation is very close, though Bah&r's purpose is to He uses the literary association quite different. produce a bitter irony, e.g., Manfichihri's shirt is soaked in wine, BahAr's in his own blood, for no one will listen to him. Bahar saluted the birthday of the young AhmadShah in August 1911 in aqaPidahusing a poem of Farrukhi in the same way as he did with Manfichihri. l The whole poem uses tradition and history to counsel the young king, and panegBy now, Bah&r hadabandoned formal panegyyric is absent. ric. Almost exactly contemporary is a tarj band, wittily at the expense of ex-kingIhlubammad cAl, after satirical This, like the 1910 his attempt to regain the throne.22 is strongly related to a poem published by tarilc-band Browne in his Press and Poetry, taken from Nasim-i Shumal, and probably by Ashraf.Z By now, the major changes brought about by the conCAli s counter-blow, revolution, stitutionalist Mubammad the increasing the second constitutionalist vilctory, division between so-called Democrats and Moderates, the veiled despotism of N&sir al-Hulk's regency and finally the trauma of 1912, when Bah&r was exiled to Tehran through Russian pressure, and the shrine was shelled soon after, Persia's tempestuous modern history had were complete. Just bebegun, and with it Bahar had reached maturity. fore his birth in Mashhad, E. G. Browne was travelling around the last peaceful days of Nd*ir al-Din Sh&h's The turmoil of the B&bi rebellion was over, and reign. IRANIANSTUDIES

84

belongs to the pre-modern age. As Bahar grew, the modern age was born and grew with him. It is possible to follow the next forty years of Persia's history in Bahar's poetry, but his poetic development coincided exactly with the conmovement and received its imprint while constitutional For in 1909, as in 1849 or any other tributing to it. To meet the new time, poetry and poets matter in Persia. of his time, Bah&r added the ideas and lancircumstances and to the stock of traditional notions guage necessary he had acquired in the conservatively poetic diction He never gave up school of Mashhad literati. classical At the same time he is unmistakheritage. the classical As he was contemporary with, and part of, ably a modern. he never perceived and government, the changes in society past For him, and in his poetry, any break with the past. While this is true of some and present form a whole. BahAr lived longer and poets, other constitutionalist When other poets remained a poet longer than any of them. new forms of verse, and with totally began experimenting in which European influnew use of language, radically To the Bahar remained uninterested. ence is evident, poet contemporary with the modern last he was a classical world, which he saw with eyes unfogged by reading European The last poem of his life was to be an istigbal languages. of portrait a stylized of Manfichihri,24 but it contains guns, tanks, aircraft, modern war in all its horrors:

even Flying Fortresses and the atomic bomb. Then he died, the last Malik al-ShuCar&', who never served a royal court. NOTES 1.

Dlv&n-i AshC&r-i ShAdrav&nMuhammad Taci Bahar, "Malik al-ShuCar, "t edited by Muhammad Malikzidah, Vol. I (2nd ed.) (Tehran, A.H.S. 1344/A.D. 1965); Vol. II (1st ed.) (Tehran, A.H.S. 1336/A.D. 1957).

2.

Sabirl's Divan has also been published (Tehran, A.H.S. 1342/A.D. 1964).

3.

Bahar himself claims responsibility for the term, Sabkshinasi, Vol. III, pp. 316-317 and n. (Tehran, A.H.S. 85

by Malikzadah

SPRING-SMER

1972

1337/A.D. 1958). 4.

See the biographical (2nd ed.), p. x.

note in Vol. I of Bahar's Dlv&n

S.

Bahar, Dlv&n II, p. 498.

6.

E.g., Dar Madt-i Amlr-i Mu'minan, Dlv&n, Vol. I, p. p. 123.

7.

DivAn, I, p. 3.

8.

Divan, I, p. 17.

9.

Divan,

1, p. 4.

10.

See Bah&r, Tarikh-i Ahzflb-i Siyasi 1323/A.D. 1944), p. v.

11.

Ibid.,

12.

E.g.,

13.

Dlvin,

14.

T&rikh-i A4zab-i SiyasL,

15.

Divin,

16.

Dlvan, I, p. 171.

17.

Div&n, 1, p. 165.

18.

Divan, I, p. 190.

19.

Dlv&n, I, p. 190.

20.

Dlv&n, I, p. 216.

21.

Divin, I, p. 217. Malikz&dah's note to the effect that this poem celebrates a defeat of Mu4ammad CAll,

(Tehran, A.II.S.

p. ii.

Dlvin I, p. 45; p. 127; 146; 147. I, p. 146. p. ii.

I, p. 157.

IRANIAN STUDIES

86

the ex-king, when he attempted to return with Russian help "in 128911A.H.S. does not suit the matter well. See E. G. Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia (Cambridge, 1914), p. 279. 22.

Dlv&n, I, p. 208.

23.

E. G. Browne, Press and Poetry,

24.

Divin,

194.

I, p. 796.

87

SPRING-SUMER 1972

SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTICCATEGORIES OF ECHOWORDSIN PERSIAN Don L. F. Nilsen

The entire Persian-speaking world, including Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, has had a very long and colorful tradition in oral literature. Since memorization has long been an integral part of Persian culture, rhyming as an aid to memorization has been especially prevalent in Persian literature. Because of this, and because of the oral tradition in general, Persian speakers have long been It is the purconscious of rhyming patterns. especially what morphological and pose of this paper to investigate syntactic devices are used to form rhyming patterns (as

and TeachDon L. F. Nilsen is the Director of Linguistics ing English as a Foreign Language at the University of Northern Iowa in Cedar Falls. An earlier version of this paper was presented in the Convention Panel of the MIESA Language and Linguistics in Denver, Colorado in November, 1971. The author would like to express his appreciation to Gernot Windfuhr (University of Michigan), Iraj Bashiri (University of MinnesoAli Jazayery (University of Texas), and Ali ta), Mohammad Banuazizi (Boston College) for reading preliminary verinfluencing its sions of the paper and for significantly In an attempt to conserve space, only a few revision. Anyone who is examples from each category were given. in obtaining additional examples should coninterested tact the author. IRANIAN STUDIES

88

and assonance patterns) in Persian, well as alliteration the effect that these rhyming patterns and to investigate have on Persian grammar. In addition, the paper will attempt to determine what semantic categories are especially amenable to echo-word formation. and probably the least deliThe least significant, berate of syntactic devices for echo-word formation in Persian, is the use of various suffixes and prefixes. Because of their frequency, the suffixes -in (meaning l"plural"), and -1 (meaning "related to") are the ones most likely to result in echo words, such as mann, meaning jnn, "Isweethearts," dian&y$n"wise persons," for "they, the former and hashishI, "addicted to hashish,," barlrt, related to the latter. "political," "silken," and slyasl, Other suffixes also result in echo words, however, such as the manner suffix -&nah, as in dinishmandRnah "wisely," and the locative suffix -zAr, as in khirzak "thicket" "place of thorns").' Examples of prepositions (literally,, and prefixes which result in echo words are dardary, "in "comet" (literthe sea, dam-i.dAr "at the door," zguzanlaL

ally,

"with a tail"),

ment" (literally,

and zavatuazatb lpercussion instru-

"with beating").

Another type of echo-word formation in Persian is "whether... such as chah...chah conjunctions, alternative "either...or,"i or," khv&h...khv&h "whether... or," yff..l

or its negative so on.

counterpart

nah.. .nah "neither...nor,"

and

If a Persian speaker wishes to stress the continuor habitual aspect of a particular action, ing, repetitive, he will often form an echo word by repeating a present(that is, an -_n) form. Thus, kishankishan participial means "dragging"; and davAndavan means running. This particular device, as with many other echo devices in Persian, Persian than in foris more frequently used in colloquial mal literary Persian. are also frequently used to form Past participles echo words. Examples of this particular echo-word forming "earthquake victim" device would include zilzilahzadah, 89

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

(literally, "quake-struck"), dunyadidah, "experienced person" (literally, "earth-seen"), dildldah, "enamoured person" (literally, and khudad&d(ah) "granted "heart-given"), by God," usually used as a name. Another commondevice for forming echo words in Persian is to attach a past stem to a present stem. When the past and present stems are used together, there is an intervening coordinate conjunction, as in justujil, meaning search, from Lustan "to seek," tUkhtut&z, meaning invasion, from tlkhtan "to rush," rufturiub, meaning "sweeping," from ruftan "to sweep," guftugil "conversation" from guftan "ito speak," dfikhtudiiz "sewing and stitching," from dakhtan "to sew,"1 and kandukAv "digging and searching," from kandan "to excavate," and kavidan "to dig." More often, however, only the present stem is used as a suffix in such echo formations. When this happens, there is no possibility of an intervening coordinate conjunction. I shall cite only a few of the many examples of this latter type of formation: "heart liker"), kh&tirkhv&h "lover" (literally barbar "porter" (literally "load bearer"), khamigir "kneader" (literally "dough puller"), gardanzan "executioner" (literally "neck hitter"), khlrdar "thorny" (literally "having thorns"), pishandish l"provident" (literally "fearer in advance"), and many others. It is a commonpractice among Persian speakers to fake the above pattern by using a legitimate first syllable, If the and making up a second syllable that alliterates. second syllable contains assonance as well as alliteration, but this is not a it will rhyme with the first syllable, necessary condition for this process. Examples of echo include the folwords containing made-up last syllables lowing: takutulk "sporadic," dulul "two," and khushubish "introduction to a conversation." Regardless of the type of connection between the of retwo echoing parts, there is often the possibility versing the two parts without changing the meaning or the echo effect. Examples include tibutab "glowing," which can also be pronounced tabut&b. In the same way, bikhudibastuband yi khud and khudbikhud both mean "automatically"; IRANIANSTUDIES

90

and bandubast both mean "fastening"; dandandard and dard-i dandan both mean "toothache"; dildard and dard-i dil both mean "heartache"; and sardard and dard-i sar both mean inconvenience.1

One of the most fascinating facts about the syntax of Persian echo words is that there is evidently a special connective that is used no place in the entire Persian language except as a connector of a repeated (and therefore echoing) morpheme. This connector is pronounced -aand can be seen in such words as kishakish "1struggle,"1garmpam n"fresh," chikachik "clanking noise," baribar "equal," bayn'bayn "in the middle," pishflpsh "'beforehand," damfdam "incessant(ly),"1 gunagfin "diverse," rangarang "many colored," girdigird "all around," sarisar "everywhere," and diiradiir "from afar." Of course there are many other syntactic devices for the formation of echo words in Persian. For example, it is often possible for words in modificational to relationship be echoic, as in chlrdivar; and it is also possible for particular verbal compounds to have a special echoic effect, as in dastkish dast kardan, and furthermore, there are interesting echoic expressions in Persian such as khush khat-u khil "having beautiful stripes and spots"l that don't fit into any of the particular categories I am considering here. There are furthermore, proverbs in Persian with special echo effects, such as dlvlr mush dArad; mush gush dirad "Walls have ears," or more precisely, "Walls have mice; mice have ears." But these echoic devices, although they are important, will merely be-noted, and will not be discussed further in this particular paper. Another type of echoic expression which is beyond the scope of this paper is the repetition of adjectives or adverbs for a special emphasis, as in yavash yav&sh barf zad "He spoke slowly, slowly," or hayvanhflyi kulchulu kuch010 tund midavand "The tiny tiny animals run swiftly." Such echoic expressions are excluded because this paper is primarily concerned with the syntactic and semantic constraints that are placed on echo formations as these are without constraint--or if there are constraints, they are 91

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

too subtle

for me to see at present.

Finally, the last set of echo words that are excluded from this paper are those which could not possibly be consciously formed, because they contain no internal Such happenstance echo words as barldar structure at all. "brother," and palindromes, such as dAmAd"bridgroom," fall into this category. To this point, I have been discussing the various syntactic devices by which echo words can be formed in as these syntactic devices might Persian. As interesting be, they do not explain why Persians are motivated to use into some of An investigation echo words so frequently. the semantic constraints on Persian echo words will proIn general, echo vide a partial answer to that question. words are used to express a fixed number of semantic conas in taptap "throbcepts. They can indicate repetition, as in tightjghi bing" (this would include plurality, as "prickly," from Ugh "razor or thorn," and patterning, in khlnah khAnah "checkered" from khlnah "house";) they as in firufir "continual" from can indicate continuation, of fir "turn"; they can be onomatopoetic representations a sound, as in shurshur "murmuring"; they can be used for where noise is involved, as especially intensification, as in qiluqgl; they can be used for special poetic effect, in bulbul "nightingale"; they can be used to indicate the manner in which something is done, as in kamkam"gradually" or they can represent child "little by little"); (literally speech, as in bib& "daddy." But this is not a complete picture of the semantic on echo words. There are particular semantic constraints amenable to echo word formations. areas that are especially Consider, for example, the three senses of touch, light, and sound. Such echo words as daghdaghah "tickling," and garmigarm "hot" represent the ghilghilak "tickling," sfl'sal "twinkling," dabdabah "pomp," and sense of touch. And zarLuUarg "igaudiness" represent the sense of sight. jazjiz "crackle," parpar "flutter," and jighjighah "ratchet" represent the sense of sound. Sound echo-words can be further subdivided into a number of subsets including IRANIANSTUDIES

92

the onomatopoetic representation of animal sounds, such as vizviz and "buzz," v-cay "bark"; the onoikjilk "chirp," matopoetic representation of various human sounds, such as minmin "mutter," ghurghur "grumble," or pichpich "chatter"; and the onomatopoetic representation of various inanimate sounds, such as ghulghul "gurgle," jighjigh "rattle, and taghtagh "knock," etc. Of course a general confusion would include aural, visual, and possibly tactile stimulation as well. There are a great many echo words in Persian which have the general meaning of tumult, uproar, fuss, clamor, or confusion. Without attempting to distinguish the slight nuances of these various words, they include the following: junbujush, t&rum&r, hay&hii, hamhamah, harjumarj, qJlulya, qalmaql , ghugha, sarEuid&, darhambarham, and many others. There are many adverbial concepts that can be represented as echo expressions. Adverbials of place would include darbarabar "in front of," baynabayn "halfway," pasupish "back and forth," etc. Adverbials of time would include pusht dar pusht "from generation to generation," and dirdir "seldom." There are a number of echo expressions which mean "from time to time," or "occasionally," including dafcah-dafcah, gahgeh, gaihghi, and gihubligh. There are also a lot of time expressions that mean "continuously" or "incessantly." These include dambidam or damadam (literally "breath to breath"), payMpa (literally "foot to foot"), etc. Such concepts as ''incessantly,'' can be classed either as temporal, or as manner expressions. In fact, one of the largest semantic categories of echo words in Persian is in the area of manner adverbials. Often for such expressions, the repetition of an adjective results in a manner adverbial. Thus narm means "gentle," and narmnarm means l"very gently"; buland means "loud," and bulandbuland means l"very loudly." Or else the repetition represents a repeated pattern of action, as in yak4yaki "one at a time," or barfbiharf "letter by letter." The most commonsubset of manner adverbials is that meaning "gradually," or "little by little." Among others, this subset includes 93

SPRING-SUIMER 1972

khurdkhurd, khushkhush, Larahzarah, narmnarmak, yavashAlthough kamkam, etc. yavash,ahistahahistah,andakandak, meanings, like all of these words have more literal etc., the "degree-degree," "step-step," "'piece-piece," important point here is that after the echo expression has been formed, the meaning becomes "gradually" in all of these cases. But echo words are not confined to the senses, and There are also various types of adverbial expressions. some very important nominal concepts that are frequently In Persian, as in expressed by echo words in Persian. language is full of echo words. most languages, children's Thus, the Persian child uses such expressions as p4pE igrandfather," bibi "grandmother," bAbA "father," nanah child," kiki "mother," mima "midwife," kuchiilii "little "fold slave," dadah "young Negro nurse," d&dI "old nurse," and even nini "crybaby."' ChildrenJs games also exhibit Examples include firfirah echo-properties. "top,." akirdukir "hopscotch," alakdulak "a Persian game," and ruruh "gocart.

11

And noun-echoing is not confined to children's Another important semantic category of noun language. These include ylbflyet&tO echo words in Persian is animals. "swallow," bulbul "night"pony3" laklak "stork," chilchilah Still ingale," badbadak l"quail," jilrjirak "cricket," etc. another productive area relates to various body parts, including nini, "corner of the eye"; or to various foods, "pepper," ilfibilil "black cherry," kishmish such as filfil etc. ''raisin,' semantic areas for echo One of the most interesting khal is "spot," and words is that related to patterns. khflkhUl means "speckled or polka dotted"; khesht is is "road," "brick," and kheshtkhesht means "chequered"; r khat is line, and and rahrah means "striped"; and finally, khalkhat means "striped." As a final point, let us consider two very common methods of echo word formation which are constrained by It is semantic as well as syntactic considerations. IRANIANSTUDIES

94

extremely commonfor Persians to make echo words out of either synonyms or antonyms. Although examples of this type of echo formation have been mentioned earlier in this paper, they have not been previously discussed as a class; therefore, let me end this paper by listing a few examples of each type. Examples of synonym-echoing include tarutazah "fresh," (literally "wet and fresh," tundutiz "pungent," (literally "sharp and sharp," nistunabud "nonexistence," literally "nothing and nothing"), etc. Examples of antonym-echoing include tundukundkun "speed regulator" (literally "speed and slowness maker"; kishmakish "conflict" (literally This last example "pulling, not pulling"; etc. illustrates that antonyms are sometimes based on the positive and negated form of the same expression. I hope that I have been able to show In conclusion, that, in Persian, echo words are neither infrequent nor random; that they occur not only in informal, colloquial speech, but also in very formal speech; that there are certain syntactic devices which Persians frequently use in echo-word formation, and that there are certain semantic categories that are especially conducive to echo-word formation. But the primary purpose of this paper has not, in fact, been to provide a definitive statement on any of these matters. Rather, its primary purpose has been to suggest that echo words in Persian can be a fascinating and very productive area of grammatical investigation, in the hope that Persian scholars will lead further investigations into this important field.

95

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

IRAN'SROLE IN COLDWAR REVISIONISM

Justus D. Doenecke It has long been accepted, almost as a Cold War truism, that the first direct confrontation between Soviet Russia and the United States took place over Iran in February, 1946. According to the traditional picture of Cold War origins, Russia's refusal to evacuate her forces--together with her simultaneous efforts to establish a puppet regime in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan--tipped the West off as to her global intentions. America and Great Britain promptly registered protests within and outside the United Nations, and, in the first effort at containment, prevented direct Soviet penetration of the entire Middle East. After Iran, the West was forewarned. As a leading textbook notes, in pointing to Russia's reluctance to withdraw, "Soviet power was prepared to move into any position that the Western states were not willing to defend."11 Most memoirs of American policy-makers stress that the United States had responded, and responded of necessity, to Russian incentive. Truman notes the immediate emergency. Indeed, he claims to have perceived "a giant pincer movement against the oil rich areas of the Near East and the warm water ports of the Mediterranean," with Turkey's security, Iran's sovereignty, and "the raw

Justus D. Doenecke is Associate New College. IRANIANSTUDIES

96

Professor

of History at

material balance of the world" all at stake. Dean Acheson, Under-Secretary of State during the crisis, notes the historic threats to the Middle East's safety. The Russians, in aiming to secure the Turkish Straits and Iran, were following the "route of invasion by barbarians against classical Greece and Rome and later of the tzar to warm water." The Near East, in fact, had held a special lure for empire builders from the medieval days of the Islamic conquerors to the time of Kaiser Wilhelm II. The immediate Russian threat was only the latest installment. Secretary of State James Byrnes saw the Iranian crisis as the litmus paper test of the credibility of the newly-founded United Nations. Had the United Nations refused to listen to Persia's plea, the new world organization would have been "crippled from birth. "2 Only with the birth of Cold War revisionism has the picture of Iran as the site of a simplistic "action-reaction"--of Soviet imperialistic penetration met by America's disinterested resistance--been challenged. Beginning in 1961 with Denna Frank Fleming's The Cold War and Its Origins, a new school of historians has emerged. Critical of America's supposed "hawklike" activities during this period, these historians have often claimed that the United States was actually seeking commercial and ideological domination of disputed areas of the globe. Turning George F. Kennan's famous X articlof 1947 on its head, the revisionist group--sometimes called the "New Left"-asserts that it was American economic imperialism which was the real "fluid stream," striving to fill "every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power.",3 Among these critics of the Cold War are included, Barton J. Bernstein, Stephen E. Ambrose, Walter LaFeber, Thomas G. Paterson, and William Appleman Williams. By the early 1970s such books as Lloyd C. Gardner's Architects of Illusion (1970) and Gabriel and Joyce Kolkols The Limits of Powers (1972) were so frequently cited that a new orthodoxy might be in the offing. With regard to Iran, the revisionists claim that the United States, far from serving the country as a disinterested power, had specific material objectives. True, 97

SPRING-SUMER1972

Roosevelt had told Secretary of State Cordell Hull in January, 1944, that he was "rather thrilled with the idea of using Iran as an example of what we could do by an unefforts Yet, the President's selfish American policy."'4 to implement this dream had a decided economic thrust. sent Patrick Hurley and Herbert Hoover, His administration Jr., two diplomats with strong ties to American oil companies, to secure petroleum concessions for the United Indeed, America's efforts were so aggressive in States. this regard that even the special State Department advisor to Iran, Arthur C. Millspaugh--a man devoted to cementing shock at the fact that America's ties to Persia--expressed no accord had been sought with the Russians on this issue.5 At the same time, however, America opposed similar oil With an eye to concessions for Russia and Great Britain. Gabriel between "appearance" and "reality," distinguishing Kolko asserts that given the "already predominant position of the United States in the world oil economy," Open Door diplomacy meant a near monopoly for America of the globe's resource.6 most critical argue that Russian Furthermore, the revisionists in the Middle East was basically defensive. intervention Lloyd Gardner, for example, claims that Russia was merely responding to America's "forward movement" in the entire Middle East when, in September, 1944, she demanded oil It was, said Gardner (speaking of concessions in Iran. "when hey _learned about the American oil the Soviets), policy" that the Russians made their own demands.7 According to New Left writers, Russian demands were Stephen E. Ambrose comments that, "To quite justifiable. the Russians it seemed only fair that they be allowed to of Iranian oil, all the in the exploitation participate more so since the terms they wanted were less favorable than those enjoyed by the Anglo-American oil companies." Denna Fleming asserts that given the "fabulous holdings" of the West in such nations as Iran, Arabia, and Iraq, Russia naturally desired to share in Middle Eastern rethe use of Her expanding economy necessitated sources. much fuel, and many of her oil fields had been damaged by "jugular vein"--lay only war. Russia's Baku wells--her IRANIANSTUDIES

98

an hour from an Iran subject to heavy American penetration and Soviet petroleum might in time be drained by wells just across the Iranian border.8 Mhuchis made of Russia's need for security. The Kolkos argue that Russia had plenty of oil at home but saw threats in a nation traditionally allied to her enenmies. Here the Kolkos point to Riza Shah, who had allowed Germany to dominate Iran's foreign trade. It was, in fact, Riza Shah's rejection of an Allied ultimatum in 1941--demanding that he expel German agents from Iran--which led to Iran's occupation by British and Russian (and lateT American) troops. Denna Fleming, also stressing the security factor, notes that during the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, France and England had considered using the Middle East as a base from which to bomb the Baku reserves. Even after World War II, Fleming notes, Russia was denied a share in the military control of the Dardenelles. Hence, domination of Azerbaijan would lead her somewhat closer to her traditional goal of warm water ports.9 Russia's legitimate anxieties, according to the New Left, were bound to lead to Iranian and American hostility. Wallace Murray, American Ambassador to Iran, warned in September, 1945, that Soviet domination of Iran "would end of an American oil concession" in the area. all possibility It would, as well, create a "potential threat to our immensely rich oil holdings in Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, and Kuwait." The Iranian government, on its part, continually encouraged the American presence, with the shah's ambassador even telling Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew on January 31, 1945, that Iran occupied an important position as a backdoor to Russia."110 Another revisionist argument is made by the Kolkos, who assert that Russian-based Azerbaijani and Kurdish independence movements had genuine popular support. While the separatist Azerbaijan regime was backed by the proComunist Tudeh party, the people of the area disliked both the Russians and the corrupt central regime at Tehran. The American Embassy itself reported that most people in the north were not Communists but favored the reforms 99

1972 SPRING-SUMMER

and social services suddenly brought to the neglected area. The Kurdish regime was a conservative one being led by and tribal leaders.Il traditional religious merit in find little In contrast, the revisionists the Teheran government. Fleming writes that in 1945, "Iran governed by feudal landlords, who kept the people was still He in a state of squalor hardly equalled on the globe." cites the reports of Clifton Daniel of The New York Times, who described a nation with less than one percent of the land owned by small holders, while absentee landlords posMalaria, insessed property exceeding 100 square miles. corruption, the absence of any land tax-fant mortality, all contributed to what Daniel called a "nation in rags.",12 The question of Russian evacuation, according to was resolved by normal diplomacy, and the revisionists, the role of the United Nations, if any, was obstructive. By independently negotiating with AhmadQavam, Iran's prime minister during the crisis of spring, 1946, Russia had agreed to evacuate Persia by May 6. As part of the agreement, a joint Soviet-Iran oil firm was created (subject to the approval of the Majlis), and the Teheran government was tacitly given authority to reimpose its control over Azer(Within a year, Iran, firmly backed by the United baijan. States, failed to ratify the Russian oil agreement and sent troops, led by American advisors, to reimpose her rule over both the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds.) According to the Kolkos, the United States, by urging a reluctant Iran to take the matter to the Security Council, turned the United Nations from an impartial arbiter into "an unabashed instrument of American diplomacy which gave By making Russia a deno quarter to Soviet interests." fendant at the very first meeting of the Security Council, the United Nations was made, in Kolkols words, into "an Efforts instrument for advancing American objectives."1 to use the peace-making machinery as a genuine "tool for solving problems" were forgotten.13 In pointing to the theme of Western hypocrisy, moreover, the Kolkos note that during the Moscow Conference of December, 1945, Molotov linked withdrawal of Russian troops IRANIANSTUDIES

100

from Iran to American and British departures from China and Greece. Fleming cites an Associated Press correspondent who reported that the Russians were asking why Soviet troops had to be expelled from Iran, while Western armies remained in a dozen far-flung places throughout the globe.14 The Greek-Turkish crisis of Spring, 1947, is now The seeds of containment placed in a far wider context. In 1948 Acheson had already been sown the year before. cited the Iranian crisis of 1946 as evidence that the Russians would exploit all "opportunities offered by weak and unstable situations.. But, noting how the Russians backed down, Gardner can say with some justice that "Far from justifying the Truman Doctrine, the Iranian episode revealed that it was possible to extend American interests even to the goorstep of the Soviet Union without effective challenge." also assert that the Truman Doctrine Revisionists was as much aimed at securing Western control of itself Middle Eastern oil as it was in halting the revolutionary insurgency in Greece. Indeed, the Kolkos declare that American oil companies used the Greek crisis to begin their concerted effort to dominate the area's petroleum. Barton J. Bernstein also stresses the factor of Middle Eastern oil, claiming that America wanted to retain access (in the words of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, "The Mediterranean must remain a free highway"), while Clark Clifford's denying this resource to the Russians.16 draft of Truman's crucial March 12 message to Congress pointed to the natural resources of the specifically assistant declaring that Middle East, the presidential such resources "must be accessible to all nations and must not be under the exclusive control or domination of Although Acheson insisted that such any single nation."17 and economic interests be deleted-references to strategic lest, in the words of the Under-Secretary, it sound like is no doubt that many 'lan investment prospectus''--there policy-makers agreed with Will Clayton, Under-Secretary "If Greece and Turkey of State for Economic Affairs: Combining succumb the whole Middle East will be lost." interests with the now familiar theory strategic specific 101

1972 SPRING-SUMMER

of the domino, Clayton went on to say that all Western Or, as Secretary Europe and North Africa might follow. of State George Marshall told Congressional leaders, the fall of Greece and Turkey might lead to Soviet domination "over the entire Middle East and Asia."18 even go so far as to argue that Some revisionists the Truman Doctrine was not aimed at clearing Russian power threat, from the Balkans and the Middle East (a negligible Rather it staked out America's claim to supthey argue). plant the British Empire as the mainstay of counter-revolunoted that the United States tion. Business Week itself for policing much was ''replacing Britain's responsibility of the world," just stopping short of "replacing Britain as the dominant force supporting western capitalism in the "IGreece," 'middle world' between the U.S. and Russia." say the Kolkos, "was a paltry excuse for a vast undertaking," nothing less than "America's determination to resist transformations in regions radical social and political whether or not deemed vital to United States interests, 9 those upheavals were the result of purely internal forces. influence in the Given America's newly-established of Premier Mohammad fall find the Middle East, revisionists In 1951, Dr. May, inevitable. in 1953, August, Mossadeq the holdings of the powerful Mossadeq had nationalized Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The United States, anxious (in New Left eyes) to seize British petroleum privileges, Walter Lahad encouraged him to make this confiscation. Feber notes that as the British government had received more taxes from the company than did the Iranian govern"the company consequently provided a very ment itself, convenient target in an impoverished land where five hunYet the dred babies died out of every thousand births.",20 United States, finding the premier impossible to control, As oil had provided thirty boycotted Iranian oil. itself percent of Iran's total income, the boycott crippled her economy. Iran appeared to be drifting rapidly leftward. Rumors began to circulate of a pending Soviet loan, and 99.4 percent support for the Premier's a plebiscitegiving was judged by President Eisenhower policies confiscatory The fearful Communist influence. of increased as evidence IRANIANSTUDIES

102

United States retaliated by cutting off all aid, and the American ambassador openly backed Mossadeqls opponents. Revisionists offer their own picture of the fall of Mossadeq. In August, 1953, an American-backed coup21 overthrew Mossadeq's government, replacing it with that of General Fazlullah Zahedi. (Torkild Rieber, who had been forced to resign as chairman of the board of the Texas Company for allegedly pro-German sympathies, became special Zahedi's government, now ruling a adviser to the regime.) nation impoverished by three years of American and British boycott, soon gave in to Western demands. While it did not, to be sure, denationalize the confiscated AngloIranian holdings (a politically unpopular move), it established a new petroleum consortium. Acting under the grace of the shah and the counsel of the American oil expert Herbert Hoover, Jr., the consortium gave the United States forty percent of Persia's oil industry,22 directed Iran's future oil development, and tied the nation firmly to the Western camp. The ambitions of the Truman Doctrine were Write the Kolkos, "The British Empire in the realized. Middle East had given way to the American."'23 Long before the oil crisis of the early 1950s, some had expressed considerable misgivings about isolationists the continued American presence in Iran. Congressman Karl Mundt of South Dakota, noting that the American colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf headed the Iranian gendarmery of 21,000 men, warned against American sponsorship of "little sattelite foreign armies and interior police squadrons scattered about the world." Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton of Ohio said that if the tables were turned, the United States would oppose such Russian penetration of Mexico.24 Much Truman Doctrine revisionism was also voiced by isolaof the time. Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, tionists the noting penetration of ESSO and Socony-Vacuum into Iran and Saudi Arabia, denied that "the American flag must fly from the highest derrick," while former congressman Hamilton Fish of New York State saw no reason to fight for "British or American oil interests in the Near East." Congressman George Bender of Ohio feared that "Every old, worn-out, moth-eaten sheik in the Middle East will be 103

1972 SPRING-SUMMER

his pockets with our tax money," and Representative filling Harold Knutson of Minnesota declared, "If these pools of oil are necessary for our security let us act, but let us act like men rather than crawling worms.",25 Hence, while revisionist writers may well have made a strong contribution both in stressing economic factors only touched on by other commentators and in inadvertently showing the prophetic role of the often discredited isolationists, they frequently do not supply a wide enough context to offer a full explanation. To read the Kolkos, for example, one would not suspect that several leading Iranian specialists argue that Riza Shah, a strong nationalist and modernizer, was not the lackey of any foreign government; that his pro-German policies were rooted in opposition to British encroachment rather than pro-Nazism; and that these policies were an excuse--not the primary reason--for the British and the Russians, Iran's two traditional invaders, to dominate the area.26 Nor would one learn that the Soviet occupation of northern Iran totally sealed off the area from the rest of the nation (even prohibiting foreign correspondents from visiting the area), and that it was Dr. Mossadeq himself who first in 1944 and then in 1947 opposed concessions to the Soviets.27 The "autonomous" movement in Azerbaijan is also subject to different interpretation. The Azerbaijani regime, led by MohammedPishevari, was, according to Professor Richard Cottam's standard work on Iranian nationalism, a Soviet puppet government. (The Kolkos cite Cottam only when Cottam's observations support their own. Other wise Cottam's observations and claims are ignored).28 Although Pishevarils government at first possessed mass support as it paved streets and erected schools and hospieven its tals, lack of permanent land reform disillusioned most fervent backers. Indeed the Azerbaijan incident did Tudeh Party. The arrival the Stalinist much to discredit of Iranian forces was preceded by a spontaneous rising of the population and the slaughter of Communist government 29 officials. Similarly, IRANIANSTUDIES

there might be far more to the overthrow 104

of Mossadeq than the machinations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Both Richard Cottam and Donald N. Wilber, for example, find the coup of August, 1953, rooted in the approaches to premier's failure to develop constructive historians neglect to tell Revisionist Iran's problems. their readers that both the Tudeh Party and the Soviets attacked Dr. Mossadeq for being pro-American. Nor does blackmailed the United one learn that Mossadeq foolishly States by threatening that Iran would go Communist unless she could sell her oil to America. Mossadeq's plebecite might well have been as much of a travesty as the Greek on the status of March, 1946, or the plebiscite elections in November.30 To of monarchy held by the Greek rightists one would never have susread the New Left historians, pected that Mossadeq had resorted to such measures as extension of martial law; appointment of military commanders personally loyal to him; imposition of a stringent public security law; prohibition of strikes by government employees and public service workers; suspension of the Senate; suspenfor the Majlis; the decree of sion of elections a very strict press law and the arrest of newsof the Supreme Court; paper editors; dissolution and arbitrary retirement of government officials; on movements of citizens and the restrictions foreigners within the oil producing area.31 Cottam asserts that "Mossadeq could not have been overelements of the population had not thrown if significant Such former backers of lost faith in his leadership.",32 Mossadeqls National Front as Hossein Maki, the hero of who symbolically turned off the valve nationalization shutting off the oil flow at Abadan, Dr. Muzaffar Baqai, leader of the Toilers Party, and Abolqasem Kashani, the leader, all had strong support within powerful religious the Teheran populace and all in time defected from his regime.33

In some ways Cold War revisionism has made a highly contribution. Because of the work of such significant historians as the Kolkos, Gardner, and LaFeber, few can 105

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

describe United States foreign policy as simply still threats. rooted in defensive responses to "totalitarian" and Rather, such phrases as "world responsibilities" used by textbook authors, l"global leadership"--often campaigners, and commencement speakers--bear political In their connotations. specific material and strategic have shed light brief period of writing, revisionists on several issues concerning Iran: the wartime drive the posof the United States for petroleum concessions; as oil prisible legitimacy of such Russian aspirations vileges similar to those obtained by the Western powers and to a secure southern frontier; America's use of United Nations machinery to embarrass the Russians; a Middle Eastern focus to the Truman Doctrine; and United States of Mossadeq's overthrow to secure major oil exploitation privileges.

might be misleading. In other ways, the revisionists In dealing with the nature of the Azerbaijan regime and are handled with dethe coup of 1953, complex situations be due to an overthis In may part, ceptive simplicity. In part, however, it might reliance upon American sources. also be due to writing within such a rigidly determined framework that facts which do not fit a general argument The Kolkos, for example, are relegated to the sidelines. see the basic global aim of the United States as involving the imposing of subservient regimes "throughout the globel' in order to permit American business to profit "without anywhere" in the world.34 Hence, controrestrictions versies dealing with Iranian's internal affairs not only importance. have little place, but are per se of little On the other hand, if one sees a variety of factors at which American ecowork within Iran's recent history--in nomic interest is only one, and not always the predominating one--then the more conventional accounts of Iran's and accurate picture. past can often offer a more realistic Given the repeated references to Iran in revisionist it is hoped that more comprehensive works on writings, Iran's role in the Cold War, drawing heavily from Iranian sources, will be in the offing.

IRANIANSTUDIES

106

NOTES 1.

C. E. Black and E. C. Helmreich, Twentieth Century Europe (3rd ed.; New York: Knopf, 1966), p. 797.

2.

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I: Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 523; Dean My Years in the Acheson, Present At the Creation: State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 197, 499; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 304.

3.

"X"' [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV (July, 1947), pp. 566-582.

4.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1949), p. 180.

5.

Millspaugh cited in Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Relations, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), pp. 210-211.

6.

Gabriel Kolko, The World and United States Foreign Policy, Vol. I: The Politics of War, 1943-1945 (New York: RandomHouse, 1968), p. 303. For coverage of the revisionist account of Iran during World War II, see Justus D. Doenecke, "Revisionists, Oil and Cold War Diplomacy," Iranian Studies, Vol. III, No. 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 23-33. John DeNovo promises a full account of American Middle Eastern oil policy during World War II. For some of DeNovo's preliminary findings as applied to Iran, see his unpublished paper, "American Relations with the Middle East during World War II: Another Watershed?" (delivered at Institute for HumaneStudies symposium on New Deal Foreign Policy, August 30-September 3, 1971, Gibson Is land, Mlaryland).

7.

Gardner, p. 211.

Emphasis Gardner's. 107

SPRING-SUMER 1972

8.

Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Penguin, 1971), Foreign Policy, 1938-1970 (Baltimore: p. 131; Denna F. Fleming, Vol. I: The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1950 (GardernCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961),

9.

pp. 341,

346.

of War, p. 298; Joyce and Gabriel G. Kolko, Politics Kolko, The World and United States Foreign Policy, Vol. II: The Limits of Power1 1945-1954 (New York: cited as "Kolkos, Harper, 1972), p. 236 (hereinafter III'); Fleming, I, pp. 340-341.

10.

Kolkos, II, p. 237; Gardner, p. 211.

11.

Kolkos, II, p. 237.

12.

Fleming, I, p. 341.

13.

Here Fleming, who has deKolkos, II, pp. 240-241. organization since the 1920s, fended international The Kolkos differs from the Kolkos' interpretation. rely heavily upon the State Department publication of documents, Foreign Relations of the United States, for the years 1945 and 1946 in an attempt to show that Iran was reluctant to bring her case to the Security Council but was strongly pressured by the Fleming, on the other hand, claims United States. that America and Britain were both reluctant to have the Security Council "hale Russia before it as its Fleming, 1, p. 342. Fleming, who perfirst act." sonally observed the Security Council sessions at that Lake Success, declared that it was essential Iran's case be heard. While asserting that there was'Inuch to be said" for Russia's concern over AzerIbid., pp. 346baijan, her conduct was "illegal." 347.

14.

Kolkos, II, p. 238; Fleming,

15.

Gardner, p. 215.

16.

Barton J. Bernstein,

IRANIAN STUDIES

I, pp. 345-346.

Acheson cited

in Gardner, p. 207.

"American Foreign Policy 108

and the

Origins of the Cold War," in B. J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), p. 56; Kolkos, II, p. 414. 17.

Clifford cited in Thomas G. Paterson, "The Quest for Peace and Prosperity: International Trade, Communism, and the Marshall Plan," in B. J. Bernstein, pp. 91-92.

18.

Acheson cited in Lloyd C. Gardner, "From Liberation to Containment, 1945-1953,"' in William Appleman Williams, ed., From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations (New York: John Wiley, 1972), p. 351; Clayton cited in Bernstein essay, p. 57.

19.

Kolkos, II, p. 339. The reference is from ibid., p. 343.

20.

Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1971 (2nd ed.; New York: John Wiley, 1972), p. 155.

21.

The Kolkos refer to it as a "CIA-directed coup," while Fleming calls it "our CIA coup in Iran." See Kolkos, II, p. 419; Fleming, Vol. II of The Cold War and Its Origins, 1950-1960 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. 926. LaFeber points to the American guns, trucks, armored cars, and radio communications used by the shah's forces, see p. 156. Gardner asserts that the CIA was "deeply involved," although "the details remain shrouded in mystery." See Gardner in Williams, p. 409.

22.

firms included such American companies Participating as Gulf, Socony-Vacuum, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Texaco; such British firms as Anglo-Iranian; and Royal Dutch Shell and French Petroleum. See LaFeber, p. 157.

23.

The discussion in the above paragraph is based upon the Kolkos, II, pp. 417-420. The quotation is from

109

to Business Week

SPRING- SUMMER1972

p. 420. 24.

The arguments of Mundt and Bolton are found in Congressional Record, 79:1 (December 3, 1945), pp. 1136111365. For additional protest, made by Congressman Francis Case of South Dakota, see ibid., 79:1 (November 27, 1945), pp. 11061-11062.

25.

For Johnson, see ibid., 80:1 (April 15, 1947), p. 3398, and statement made on Blair Moody's Radio Forum, ibid., Appendix, 81:1 (entered April 22, 1947), A1821-1822. For Fish see U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistance to Greece and Turkeys 80:1 Hearings: (March 31, 1947), p. 197. For Bender and Knutson, see Congressional Record, 80:1 (May 6, 1947), pp. 4612, 4641.

26.

For brief descriptions of the regime of Riza Shah, see Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), pp. 20-21, 195-196; and Donald N. Wilber, Iran, Past and Princeton University Press, Present (Princeton, N.J.: 1967), pp. 98-99.

27.

Cottam, pp. 196-197; Wilber, p. 113.

28.

The Kolkos footnote Cottam concerning Russian demands about northern Iran but fail to deal with Cottam's See Kolkos, II, assertions concerning Azerbaijan. p. 743, n. 35. The Kolkos similarly use George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), to voice Russian demands that she must have an Iran friendly to her. See Kolkos, II, p. 743, n. 33. Yet when Lenczowski claims to territerror" in the Soviet-organized find "political tory or an Azerbaijani regime possessing a secret police'fnodeled after N.K.V.D. patterns," such comSee Lenczowski, pp. 197, 290. ments are ignored.

29.

Cottam, pp. 73, 126-129, 208. Cottam does note that with the arrival of Iranian forces, "the general policy

IRANIAN STUDIES

110

of sloth, corruption, and neglect returned." See p. 129. Cottam also declares that the Soviet-supported Kurdish regime, led by the highly respected leftist Qazi MIohammed, received genuine popular support. See pp. 70-73. 30.

On the Tudeh Party, see Cottam, pp. 212-213; on Soviet opinion, see p. 222; on Mossadeq's blackmailing, see pp. 215-216; on the plebecite, see p. 282.

31.

Wilber, p. 120.

32.

Cottam, p. 229.

33.

Cottam, p. 279; Wilber, p. 121. Cottam blames an article by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mlysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, November 6, 1954, pp. 66-68, for greatly exaggerating America's role in the coup. See Cottam, pp. 227-229. Cottam, however, does declare that "enough evidence is available" to indicate that the United States encouraged the coup. See p. 318. Wilber simply refers to "a spontaneous uprising of the masses." See p. 124. Cottam also finds Mossadeq "an honest and sincerely patriotic man" and declares that from 1954 to 1960 the shah moved in the direction of totalitarianism, ruling through the gendarmery, police, army, and an Iranian equivalent of the Gestapo. See pp. 287-288.

34.

Kolkos, II, p. 2.

(Emphasis mine.)

111

SPRING-SUMMR 1972

BOOKREVIEWS

In Search of Khayyam. By Ali Dashti (translated by L. P. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Elwell-Sutton), 276pp. $11.00. D. A. Shojai I must confess that when I first heard about L. P. of Ali Dashti's In Search of translation Elwell-Sutton's Why reaction was one of puzzlement. Khayyam, my initial work should anyone want to translate yet another critical on Khayyam? Were there not enough studies on his poetry in view of the meager coverage given already--especially It seemed that Khayyam to other major Iranian writers? attention in the West long enough. had monopolized critical Another thought came to mind: I had read the original in Persian shortly after the printing of the second It had not occurred to me then that this edition (1966). was a book which cried out for translation. Was I so wrong on both counts? If my biases are as commonas I imagine they might be, we have Elwell-Sutton to thank for taking a very dif-

D. A. Shojai is Assistant Professor ture at California State University, IRANIANSTUDIES

112

of Comparative LiteraSan Diego.

ferent attitude. As his introduction points out, the need to reexamine Khayyamis underscored by the ambiguity still shrouding the man and his works. Basically, he argues, we see Khayyamas a poet rather than as a philosopher or a whereas the inescapable fact remains-that "conscientist, temporary writers who know Khayyamdo not speak of him as a poet and certainly quote none of his verse." Khayyam, then, was not a "professional" poet, "a poet first and foremost," and his Rubaiyat do not fall within the context of a collected works or div&n: "for it has never been suggested that he wrote gasides, ghazals, Qetalat, or masnavis." Moreover, of the Rubaiyat that are available to us--the earliest reliable collation being made no sooner than two hundred years after his death--the question still remains as to how many are genuine. lience the need to seek out the man and the poet and to identify the "authentic" strains of his verse. Appropriately, the title of the book is changed from "a moment with" (dami b&...) to "a search for" Khayyam. And the person Elwell-Sutton sees as being "uniquely" qualified for the search is Ali Dashti: a writer of "talent, sound scholarship and extensive knowledge of the combined with his wide experience of human chaclassics, racter and affairs as politician, diplomat and journalist." And above all a Persian, whose insight is not only native but free from the direction which Western criticism has taken. So much for the case made in the introduction: Elwell-Sutton's point is undeniably valid. Now some words about the translation: if Elwell-Sutton is fortunate in having found Dashti as his guide to Khayyam, Dashti is also fortunate in having Elwell-Sutton as his translator. The prose is both limpid and lively. Furthermore--judged on the basis of a few random comparisons--it is accurate. So I have nothing but praise for Elwell-Sutton's prose: he even makes some of Dashtils more heated remarks ring more dispassionately convincing. But as for the poetry-well, it is clear and succinct. Elwell-Sutton himself assesses its value: his versions, he says,

113

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

while corrected in metrical (but unrhymed) form for easier reading, have had fidelity to the original as their first priority; it is hoped that they will not be compared, to their obvious disadvantage, with the work of a poetic genius like Fitzgerald. One tries stronger.

to keep this plea in mind, but instincts

are

A final note in connection with the translator's work: the edition in English has the distinct advantage of having appendices providing biographical notes and a glossary of technical terms, both compiled by ElwellSutton, plus an index, which is necessary for a critical work of this kind. These additions--which are missing in the original--together with the translator's introduction, make the volume in English a more erudite piece of scholarship than the ones in Persian. But the book itself belongs to Ali Dashti. The viewpoint is as well-defined and personalized as it is characteristically Persian. In Persian literary criticism, one's judgment is measured in terms of one's ability to absorb the artist's philosophy, and in so doing to discern the authentic nature of his style--which means, ulbetween what timately, being able not only to distinguish he wrote and what he is claimed to have written, but to take a stand on what he could have or even would have written. Such is the case in dealing with poets who have in manuscript form. come down to us through variations He reAnd so it is with Dashti, the discerning critic. of recennot so much on the authenticity lies, finally, sions--which he rightly pegs as being the major preoccuon his analytical pation of Western scholars--but ability to read into Khayyam. the first is desigThe book is in three parts: nated as a search for the poet, the second as a search the message contained in them--and for his quatrains--or IRANIANSTUDIES

114

the third, which is titled "RandomThoughts," is an attempt man in to relate both poet and works to the llth-century arriving at a coherent view of his philosophy. Yet, as Dashti points out, it is not the scholarly researches of the first two parts which have made him arrive at the conclusions of the third, but rather the other way round: the third part was actually "the first to take shape"' in his mind, causing him "to set down on paper" his "personal vision of Khayyam." Parts One and Two were then written "as a formal introduction. Herein lies the distinctive quality of this book: it conveys the predominant "vision" of the critic, supThe ported and qualified by the work of the scholar. conclusions which are given at the end precede the actual work of analysis, and analysis then becomes a matter of well-defined critical defending an intrinsically position. The impact of the poet on the critic is thus registered throughout. One might be inclined to view Dashti, on this And the account, as an impressionist or a romantic. Hiis approach to Khayyam labels are not altogether inapt. has at least one resemblance to that of Fitzgerald, in that both seek to convey a coherent, intelligible, and finally pithy view of the poet-scientist based upon a selective reading of his verse. But what is more cogent is that Dashti's approach also reflects the critical tradition he worked within and drew from. As Dashti himself indicates, his reading of Khayyam is preceded by--though not necessarily based on--the commentaries and selections of Sadeq Hedayat and Mohammad Ali Forughi. Hedayat's study includes a selection of 143 of the quatrains, which he found to be characteristic authentic Khayyamin termns of both theme and style. Forughi based his reading on a narrow core of 66, which he used as a basis for his larger collection of 184. Both critics, then, were concerned with arriving at a definitive reading of Khayyamthrough a quintessential view of the poet and his works. 115

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

Dashti's Khayyamfollows the pattern, though as suggests, his approach is rather a "blend" Elwell-Sutton of the two: 36 quatrains that He accepts as unchallengeable On the basis sources. appear in the earliest of these quatrains, Khayyam's philosophical writings and, above all, contemporary and nearcontemporary

accouInts

of Khayyam the man, he

builds up a... picture of his personality and outlook; this he uses as a touchstone by which to select those quatrains that could most reasonably be thought to have been composed by such a man. This approach enables him to list 102 quatrains in all, though it is interesting that only 53 of these are commonto both Hedayat's and Forughi's selections. In the process, one should add, he uses as a sort of checklist the compilations made by scholars in the West, such and Friedrich as V. A. Zhukovsky, Arthur Christiansen, Rosen. So much, then, for Dashti's method. What of his view of Khayyam? Certainly it balances quintessential prefaces, the view given by Fitzgerald in his introduction, Here is no brooding malcontent whose and translation. study of nature has turned him into an introverted nihiseeking solace in wine. Here is a genuine skeptic list, and philosophical who refuses to accept the religious of his time: a mathematician first and speculations The foremost, guided by reasoning and skilled in logic. difference between them is all the difference between the commitment to life man who has abandoned his intellectual than more keenly ever, to susand the one who strives, the a as to drink turns one If panacea, the tain it. not other sips his wine to sharpen his taste for living: to cloud his mind. The man in these quatrains, then, is preeminently and Dashti refers to the ones he selects an intellectual, He also calls as "the random thoughts of an intellectual." IRANIANSTUDIES

116

them "whispers of a sorrowful spirit," in that the intellect at work "whirls vainly through many different planes of speculation" without finding "rest and peace" in any of them. Does Dashti regard this a limitation? Not at all, for the value of Khayyamemerges with seeing the way his mind works--not only in the questions he asks but in the uncertainties they lead to. "Khayyam's greatest contribution to man's understanding of the world around him," "was in this very doubt and perplexity, Dashti states, in the very fact that he did not know." Khayyam, thus, becomes to Dashti the embodiment of the spirit of doubt in his age. Chapters three, four, and five of Part Three attempt to crystallize this view. Each has as its title a significant quote from Khayyam. Chapter three, "A Tiny Gnat Appears--and Disappears," establishes Khayyamas a doubting thinker--a natural scientist ahead of his time, viewing things mathematically and seeing "neither beginning nor end in creation." Chapter four, "The Withered Tulip Never Blooms Again," deals with Khayyam's theology and conception of man's relationship to God (which, incidentally, refines Fitzgerald's treatment of the subject). And Chapter five, "Whether This Breath I Take Will Be My Last," goes into why Khayyamwrote poetry: namely, to inspire conviction in today--to live life to the fullest now. His theology, Dashti asserts, was much broader than the doctrinaire thinking around him. He wrote not "to destroy the faith of others, or to encourage irreligion,"

but to "urge people

to enjoy

the passing

moment," which is a good point for the book to end on, though the gist, to me, of Dashti's view is given at the end of Chapter three: Khayyam's philosophical position was not of the kind to fill him "with disgust or anger"; rather it helped him "to face the future with patience. Instead of railing at the harshness of fate, he looked at life with the carefreeness of Diogenes and the calmness of Epicurus; like the stoics he made light of the unkindness of Destiny, and so life became endurable for him." Perhaps the major criticism one can aim at this reading is that it tends to give an altogether too coherent a view of Khayyam. Dashti himself admits the drawback 117

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

inherent in the conclusion he has reached: "The more we know about Khayyamand the closer our acquaintance with his poetry, the smaller becomes the number of quatrains assigned to him."' that can be confidently The fact remains, however, that a fairly large assigned to him; as result number of quatrains are still the poet of the manuscripts emerges as a much more elusive and baffling figure than the one in this critical study. Also Dashti indulges in a good deal of speculation in dealing with Khayyam's character and mode of thought (chapter three, Part One: "Meanness or CommonSense"). And he tends to overstate his case about Khayyambeing sensible in not raising issues which would have only gotten him into trouble (chapter four, Part One: "Hero or Martyr"). Dashti is on much firmer ground when discussing a specific work, such as Khayynam's essay on "Existence and Obligation," or when he accepts the authorship of his Arabic poems but not the Nawriz Namah, which has been commonly attributed to him. Other points which he makes to his purpose: in his chapter on Sufism, he compares Ghazzali's position with that of Khayyamand concludes by accepting Khayyamas a Sufi, but only in the broadest sense of the term. And in the the chapter on Ismicllism he rejects categorically notion that Khayyamwas a member of that sect--Khayyam being "above," as he puts it, such "sectarian wrangles." Part Two contains the 36 quatrains which Dashti selects as "having the greatest likelihood of authority." His explanation as to why so few appeared before 1339, Chapter two, "The Axis however, is somewhat baffling. the major theme in these of Life and Death," explicates Chapter three, "Khayyam's Literary Style," quatrains. makes some excellent points, but randomly, without much The end result of chapter four, attention to structure. "Khayyamand his Imitators," is to elevate Khayyamto the between status of a worthwhile poet by distinguishing Chapter six, "Khayyam "good verses" and "bad imitations." IRANIANSTUDIES

118

as Seen by the West," goes further to show Dashti's concern with distilling the quintessence of Khayyamby underscoring problems in manuscript reading. He rejects the Cambridge And in the concluding two and Beatty mss. as forgeries. chapters of Part Two the reader is given the larger selection of quatrains most likely to be in keeping with the quintessential 36. To me, though, the most entertaining--and perhaps innovatively daring--section of the book is chapter two of Part Three, in which Dashti treats the reader to a masterly piece of satire. He falls asleep and has an almost Chaucerian dream involving an imaginary debate between Shaykh Najmuddin and the logician MuCinuddinover the poetry of Khayyamat the court of the Seljug ruler, Kayqubad b. Kaykhusraw b. Qilij Arsal&n (1219-36). The poor Shaykh, who opposes Khayyam, is put down in a manner which is truly squelching, and which places all too vividly the poetry of Khayyamwithin the general context of religious issues of his age. Again Dashtils point is to show that the function of Khayyam's poetry is to cast doubt on all systems. As a Dashti not only makes his view clear, but he leaves critic, his indelible mark. What Fitzgerald's translation does is to make us aware that Khayyamis truly a poet; what Dashti's criticism shows is that the poet is truly a thinker: a man of his time who refused to be drawn into the systems--the categorical his age. In both one way of thinking--of discerns the quintessential Khayyam.

119

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

of Reform The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics StanBy Vartan Gregorian. and Modernization, 1880-1946. ford: Stanford University Press, 1969. 398pp. $17.50. Firuz Kazemzadeh

Until recently Afghanistan has been one of the least explored nations of the world. Russian Iranists paid but little attention to Iran's cousin; European scholars ignored her, and even the British, whose concern was active and direct, relied upon the commendable, though productions of Anglo-Indian offinot entirely reliable, cials. No one did for Afghanistan what Edward G. Browne has done for Persia. Professor Vartan Gregorian has filled an enormous gap in our knowledge of the Middle East and has done it and verve. His intelligence, with exemplary diligence, book is far superior to any work on modern Afghanistan It divests the last hundred years known to this reviewer. of Afghan history of the aura of mystery that inevitably clings to the unfamiliar and exotic subjects. The book begins with the briefest survey of the history of Afghanistan up to the nineteenth century, then plunges into an examination of "Divisive Forces: Ethnic Social Organization" (chapter 2). Diversity, Secterianism, In some twenty-seven pages packed with information Professor Gregorian reveals the staggering complexity of Afghanistan's make-up: diverse ethnic groups (Pashtuns, a multiTajiks, Uzbeks, Turkomans, Hazaras, Qizil-Bash), several sects each of and clans within tude of tribes them, and unstable relations between various of Islam, difficult groups of the population, and the absence of a vital idea or principle that could forge a unitary nation out of all this human material.

Firuz Kazemzadeh is Professor IRANIANSTUDIES

of History at Yale University. 120

"Afghanistan, like all Central Asia in the early nineteenth century, was in a state of cultural decay" (p. Professor Gregorian shows that from 1800 on Afghani69). stan regressed rather than moved forward. It is indicative of the general state of the country that "whereas in 1312 there were three madrassas in Kabul, with instructors who taught Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and perhaps some scholastic science, in the 1830ies there was reportedly only one, and it had neither endowment nor scholars" (p. 70). The closest parallel to this sad state of things was to be found in the isolated and backward khanates of Bukhara, Khokand, and Khiva. By comparison, Naser ed-Din Shah's Iran was a progressive developing country. Domestic decline coincided with the appearance on Afghan borders of two formidable antagonists. Britain was the first on the scene. Obsessed with fears for the safety of India, the British began by supporting Afghanistan's independence against Iran and ended by imposing upon the Afghans a form of protectorate that to a large extent robbed them of independence. The Russians, whose much feared advance repeatedly provoked the British to illconsidered action, were not permitted to march beyond Mary, thus never becoming an immediate threat. Even the massacre of hundreds of Afghan soldiers at Panjdeh was not a prelude to invasion, since St. Petersburg was aware that an invasion would inevitably lead to war with England. Professor Gregorian points out that contrary to the opinion of some Afghan historians and statesmen, imperialism was not an entirely negative force in Afghan history. Anglo-Russian rivalry helped preserve at least a modicum of independence for the country, while the wars with Britain aroused national feeling among the Afghans and helped create at least some sense of unity among the peoples and tribes. Though sporadic attempts at reform were made in the reign of Abdur RahmanKhan, they were minor and insignificant. That he was a strong and able ruler is not in dispute. However, his achievement was that of an old-fashioned Central Asian despot. He was a successor of medieval Khans,

121

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

not a precursor of Ataturk or Reza Shah. His policy was During the twenty-one years archaist and isolationist. of his reign, from 1880 to 1901, Afghanistan changed less than almost any Asian state with the possible exception of Tibet. It was in the reign of Habibullah Khan, Abdur Rahman's successor, that modernity began to penetrate ever Mahmud so slowly the mountain fastness of Afghanistan. European to exposed of other Afghans a number Tarzi, and began to spread ideas of innovation and change. influence, These inmediately came into direct and bitter conflict Islamic and tribal values of Afghan with the traditional Habibullah Khan's successor, Amanullah, deeply society. committed to modernization and entranced by the example of Turkey and Iran, tried to use the power of the monarchy losing his throne in the to enforce change but failed, The fact of the matter was that Afghanistan in process. 1929 was less ready for Westernization that Persia had been in 1850, Turkey in 1800, or Russia in 1700. Though Amanullah Khan's failure led to the triumph of reaction, the process of modernization, however slow Neither Nader Shah nor could not be stayed. and hesitant, Moreover, forces Zaher Shah was a reactionary. Muhammad of change could not be resisted as contacts with the outside world multiplied and exigencies of defense dictated ever increasing borrowing of Western technology, science, Professor Greprocedure. medicine, and administrative gorian concludes that of power, the emergence increased centralization the difof the state as a national institution, inof political and specialization ferentiation the weakening or transformation of stitutions, sources of authority, the addithe traditional tion of the army as a new national institution, and the development of nationalism as a force working for socio-economic reform, developments of the last were among the most significant He has ably traced these changes and produced a century. IRANIANSTUDIES

122

major work that will long remain indispensible student of the Middle East.

for every

In a study as large and as complex as this, one can always find some errors, misprints, and stylistics gaffs. Professor Gregorian has not solved the problem of transliteration that plagues every writer on Middle Eastern subjects, nor has he been consistent in this respect. Moreover, while this reviewer cannot vouch for Afghan usage, in Persian it would not do to refer to M2uhammad Zaher Shah as Zaher Shah (cf. Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah, Muhammad Ali Shah). Perhaps of a Shah and Muhammad more serious nature is the problem of terminology. To refer to nineteenth century Hazara and other tribal chiefs as "feudal lords" is to invite comparison with the barons who struggled against King John, the Dukes of Burgundy, or the nobility of the Holy RomanEmpire. Such a comparison would, of course, show that the term feudal was applied to Afghanistan in a sense that had almost nothing in common with its original European meaning. These, however, are minor points that do not detract from the great value and general excellence of this erudite, thoughtful, and useful book.

123

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

LETTERSTO THEEDITOR On Robert McDaniel's Review of Middle East: Past and Present To The Editor: enough to appear in print, Anyone who is reckless must expect to be criin a general textbook, especially to please everyIt is impossible ticized by all comers. I the other condemns. Usually what one praises one. course. expected as much when I set out on this perilous But I was naive enough to think that even a most critical Professor and edifying. review would be constructive Past and Prereview of my book, Middle East: McDaniel's (Winter, 1972), has been most sent, in Iranian Studies statements, His flippant tone, affected disappointing. are neither constructive generalities and exaggerated I describe For example, in the Introduction nor edifying. in of nationalism what seems to me to be the ingredients (2) feeling the Middle East, namely (1) pride in the past, about the present, (4) sus(3) secularism, of inferiority Dr. of choice. picion of the west, and (5) confusion but how in the McDaniel may not agree with my analysis, world can he deduce from the above that all I said was as you 'ipeople in the Middle East love their countries and I," only a psychiatrist may know. miss-spellings, Although the number of misprints, etc. has been by the reexaggerated dates, transposed to me and I accept full they are most distressing viewer, as to how "Hastings" I am still mystified responsibility. after the indexer saw it on p. 212 and redisappeared corded it in the index! IRANIAN STUDIES

124

Going through the morass of innuendoes and flippant statements, two criticisms deserve comment. One is McDaniel 's contention that I have not provided the students a historical For a good example he claims perspective. that I should have mentioned the whole gamut of the problems relating to India such as defence, communications, etc., when I relate that Warren Hastings established a trading post in Cairo. In the first place reference to the pages where India is mentioned will reveal that I have discussed a number of these problems where they become relevant. These simply were not the issues during the eighteenth century. It was after the British Government assumed control of India in 1857 that it became interested in buying shares of the Suez Canal and building the London-Delhi telegraph line, etc. The East India Company was basically a business establishment and its concerns were limited. Furthermore, British contacts with the Middle East were not only via India, as McDaniel clearly implies. Be that as it may, Prof. McDaniel is wrong when he states that I have "ignored" these problems, and when he follows that by saying that this "occurs on page after page," he is downright irresponsible. The other subject is the role I give Iran in the development of Middle East history. Prof. McDaniel is not against it but apparently believes that I should have done it inobtrusively while no one was looking! He accuses me of doing this "with a vengeance" plus some Iranian 'inational foibles.' For a good example of this 'foible'' he has chosen my statement that at the beginning of the eighteenth century and some 300 years before that the destiny of the Middle East and India were in the hands of the Ottomans, Safavids and Moguls--all Turks--and that "a cultured person was judged by his knowledge of the literature, history, art, and mores of the Persians." I wish I had space to discuss this matter fully but anyone who knows anything about Indian history knows that Persian was the language of the Mogul court and it was not until late eighteenth century that Urdu began to come into vogue. Nevertheless in mid-nineteenth century when the Mogul empire fell, English replaced Persian in schools, etc. As to the Ottoman empire, it may suffice to offices,

125

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

quote Serif Mardin in The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (p. 123) that as late as the middle of the nineteenth century "fluency in this language [Persian] was an important Now if this was true for advancement.... ." qualification in the mid-nineteenth century, what is so confusing or out of line about the beginning of the eighteenth century and before that? The real problem is that generally American books ignore Iran. For instance, -on the Middle East consistently the text written by Prof. Sydney Fisher does not have one blessed page on Iran from the advent of Islam until the All references to Iran are incidental twentieth century. Consequently and adjunct to Arab and Ottoman histories. when readers see a book that has given a third of the space to Iran they are tempted to think that it is exIf the author happens to be a Persian, the temptcessive. ation to think so becomes greater, and their reaction to Consider, it becomes emotional and sometimes irrational. for example, Prcf. McDaniel's reaction to my transliteraEvery one knows that "Muhammad,""Uthman," "Ahmad," tion. etc. are spelled that way because the Arabs pronounce them that way. When it comes to Ottoman history, however, these same names are spelled by me and many others as McDaniel does not find "Mehmed," "Osman," "Ahmed,,"etc. in this because, after all, the anything objectionable Turks have the right to pronounce words their own way. But when I do exactly the same thing in dealing with Persian history and write "Esmalil," and "Esfahan," etc., Dr. McDaniel is emotionally wrought up and finds it an is absolutely irrational. His criticism iluntidy business.-" By the way, I am not the only one (see Russia and Britain in Persia, by Firuz Kazemzadeh; but then he is another Persian with "foibles"'!) Actually Prof. McDaniel should not be blamed for After all, the official this unreasonable attitude. journal of the Middle East Studies Association is no better. for it has two variations In the guide for transliteration Turkish but has lumped Arabic and Persian together in favor It is nearly three years that my of Arabic, of course. IRANIANSTUDIES

126

objections and suggestions have been ignored, and the silence has been as absolute as it has been contemptuous. It is so much easier to go along with the establishment and be called a scholar than run the risk of being one. Yahya Armajani

127

SPRING-SUMMER 1972

Note on the English Transliteration System The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STU1)IES is based on the Persian Romanization System approved by the American Library Association, the Canadian Library Association, and the Library of Congress. Copies of the transliteration table may be obtained by writing to the Editor.

Iranian Studies is published quarterly by The Society for Iranian Studies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membership. The annual subscription rate for non-members is $5.00; the price of single copies is $1.25 per issue. For institutions the subscription rate is $8.00 per annum. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the editors of Iranian Studies Articles for publication and all other communications should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, P.O. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A.

cover:

Malik al-ShuCarat_i

The exclusive distributing agent for IRANIAN STUDIES in Iran is: Kharazmie Publishing 4 Shah Distribution Co., 229 Daneshgah Street, Avenue (P. 0. Box 14-1486), Tehran, Iran.

Bahar

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Autumn 1972

Volume V

Number 4

7h~-SocttjfrJaii.$s4s COUNCIL Amin Banani, University of California, Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi, Boston College James A. Bill, University of Texas at Austin Jerome W. Clinton, American Institute of Iranian Studies Gene R. Garthwaite, Dartmouth College Farhad Kazemi, New York University Kenneth A. Luther, University of Michigan Jacqueline W. Mintz, Yale University Ann Schulz, ex officio, Clark University Majid Tehranian, Industrial Management Institute and University of Tehran EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE

Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary Ann Schulz, Treasurer Ali Banuazizi, Editor

IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor Copyright,1973, The Society for IranianStudies Printedat the Boston College Press Publishedin the U. S. A. US ISSN 0021-0862 Addressall communicationsto IRANIAN STUDIES, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts02167, U. S. A.

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Volume V

Autumn 1972

Number 4

ARTICLES 130

IMPEDIMENTS TO CHANGE Howard J. Rotbiat STRUCTURAL IN THEQAZVINBAZAAR

149

IN IRAN: FAMILYPLANNING RESULTSOF A SURVEY ANDA MASSMEDIACAMPAIGN

Samuel S. Lieberman

BOOKREVIEWS 180

G. L. TIKKU: Persian Poetry in Kashmir, 1339-1846: An Introduction

184

PARWISRADJABITABRIZI: Iran unter Karim Ua1n (1752-1779

Michael B. Loraine

J. R. Perry

MEHDIROSCHANZAMIR: Die Zand-Dynastie 189

RASHIDAL-DIN TABIB: The Successors RomeynTaylor of Genghis Khan (Trans. by John Andrew Boyle)

OF TEACHERS 193 A DIRECTORY OF PERSIANIN THEUNITEDSTATESANDCANADA (Compiled by M. A. Jazayery)

STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TOCHANGE IN THEQAZV1NBAZAAR

HOWARDJ. ROTBLAT the prei.e., The belief that entrepreneurship, and innovative behavior towards risk-taking disposition is the key factor in economic in commercial situations, and widely held by social scientists development is still Based upon the theoretidevelopmental planning experts. cal positions of economists, such as Schumpeter, entrethe occurand many sociologists, preneurial historians2 rence of economic development is explained by the presence of individuals whose actions promote capital accumulation, of resources, and the like for their rational allocation own benefit and, as a consequence, for the benefit of Often intertwined is the belief that the shaping society. force behind the structure of society and its processes of change are values exemplified by We er's The Protestant the classic statement Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, of this position. Implicit in this position is the belief that a failure to develop economically is due to the society's talent and values which cannot, absence of entrepreneurial or will not, appear without exposure to outside, "modern" The remedy for stimulating development is to influences.

Howard J. Rotblat is Assistant Professor of Sociology the University of Massachusetts at Boston. IRANIANSTUDIES

130

at

of "modern" enthe values characteristic teach businessmen occupational as well as train them in specific trepreneurs exwith the technical skills and/or provide role-models the necessary values to direct and appropriate pertise traits character such time as the necessary changes until to produce through the population diffused are sufficiently These views can be applied development. self-sustaining development but also to macro-level not only to national, inthe development of particular change, e.g., micro-level Such economic organizations. or other small-scale dustries proexperimental are embodied in the small-scale solutions executhe "Peace Corps" of retired grams of McClelland,4 tives (the "Paunch Corps") and the aid programs of the and other international the United Nations, United States, bodies. are with this perspective Two problems associated the it should be noted that evident. immediately First, and "modernity" is unlikely between "tradition" polarity nonto be so great that elements of one are ever totally Weber himself observed,, "The impulse to acquiexistent. nothing of gain, of money, has in itself sition, pursuit One may say that it has been common to do with capitalism.... of men at all times and in all to all sorts and conditions

countries of the earth, wherever the objective of it is or has been given."i6

possibility

as the key entrepreneurship Second, emphasizing ignores the soin economic development virtually variable context within which indivicial, economic, and political and values dual behavior occurs and from which attitudes since is necessary conditions of social An analysis arise. or impede change, independent facilitate these can either by structuring and values, on attitudes of their influences behavior in specific and channeling rewards and controls

directions.7 Analyses of Iranian development have tended to For emphasize the central role of attitudes and values.8 originating example, the problems of resource distribution in or associated with the marketing system are frequently attributed

to the anachronistic 131

behavior

and inflexible, AUTUMN1972

values of the bazaar merchants. These values traditional are seen as clashing with the rational economic attitude patterns needed to generate capital surpluses which can be used for capital investment, expansion of business operaAs a consequence, the and the like.9 tions, advertising, those in the provinces, are perceived bazaars, especially incapable of adapting to curinstitutions as traditional rent market exigencies which must be circumvented to the extent possible and eventually replaced by more modern marketing arrangements. On the other hand, evidence from a case study of of tradithe Qazvin Bazaar has shown that the persistence tional marketing arrangements is in large part based upon of that marketplace the structural features characteristic which impinge upon institutions and the socio-political the This analysis has been applied to illustrate it.10 of kinship and religion upon effects of the institutions the behavior of the merchants in the Bazaar and reduce the The present discusfor innovative behavior.11 potential upon those structural impedision will focus specifically ments to development which arise from the mode of operations found in the Qazvin Bazaar--impediments which severely restrict the economic rewards derived from innovative behavior, thereby suppressing its appearance. Marketplace development, as it is used here, involves: (1) the expansion in the scope of the market; such of marketplace enterprises, (2) the reorganization as changes of scale, increases in operating efficiency, for labor-intenof capital-intensive and the substitution sive techniques; and (3) the formulation of normative controls, both formal and informal, appropriate to the aforeupon The operational limitations mentioned changes.12 economic benefits most directly affect the individual bazaar merchant's ability to expand and reorganize his Under these circumstances, the need for operations. changes in business norms is less crucial, since the in operating patterns which may apminimal alterations pear can be dealt with by the existing mechanisms of social control. IRANIANSTUDIES

132

Instead of attempting to illustrate the structural impediments which are faced in all sections of the Qazvin Bazaar, attention here will focus on the operations of the for several reasons. produce commission agent, the callif,l3 Although demographic changes have reduced the importance of the traditional provincial bazaars as centers for local, urban consumers' retail trade, these marketplaces have retained their place as the primary link in the flow of agricultural produce from the peasant farmer to the urban consumer. The commission agent is the most important occupation in this chain since the largest share of wholesale produce business is transacted in their shops (callifls). The key role played by the Callafs is reflected in the name given to the one-half kilometer Produce Bazaar, the bazir-i Callifha.

Furthermore, being the link between the agricultural sector and the Iranian urban markets, changes in the former are likely to be quickly reflected in the operations of the commission agent. Finally, the commission agent is an occupation which can be expected to retain its importance into the future as the provincial bazaars continue to shed their general retailing functions and become specialized in local wholesale and inter-regional trade. eighteen 1970).

The data for this discussion were collected during months of field work in the city of Qazvin (1969-

Since the Callafi is the main point of entry of produce into the Bazaar, the commission agent's workpace is highly dependent upon the seasonal cycles and the types of goods which he handles. Except for the few bread bakeries located in the Bazaar, the callifi, of all the different businesses, opens the earliest. During the slow winter months, the business day may begin as late as 7:30 or 8:00 in the morning as the callafs draw back their doors, sweep the area fronting their shops, and arrange the display of gunny sacks containing goods which had not been sold on the previous day. In suPmmer,when activities in the produce market are at a peak, the shops open as early as 4:30 a.m. 133

AUTUMN 1972

In all seasons, business begins when the farmers make their way into the Bazaar bringing their produce to As the Calllfs begin to arshops for sale. the Callifs' range this produce for display among the previously placed produce, the retail grocers, vegetable and fruit sellers, already and itinerant peddlers join the crowds of villagers in the Produce Bazaar to make their purchases for the day. The greatest volume of business, both in terms of produce and purchases made by the rebrought from the villages is conducted between opening time and noon. This tailers, must be back at their shops in is because the retailers time to meet the demand for the mid-day meal, traditionally must the largest meal of the Iranian day. The villagers also do their shopping or conduct their business with offices in town before the lunchtime break if they intend to return to their homes before sundown. Therefore, by the time the city's mosques sound the mid-day call to prayer, the crowds of farmers and shoppers and the hawking of the peddlers in the Bazaar have waned appreciably. The commission agent, having conducted the major portion of the day's business before noon, will spend the afternoon either clearing up bookwork which has accumulated during the morning's peak business hours, conducting other with friends personal or work-related business, or visiting who come to see him. Because of the higher volume of business in the peak summer and early autumn months, the CallIfs must often work on their accounts late into the night, and it is not unusual for them to lock their shops after midnight or even to sleep in their shops. During opportunity for socialthese times, the agent has little izing because of the demanding workpace. During the winter, in contrast, the shops are closed shortly after sundown and the absence of customers in the late afternoon allows for greater leisure. Since the operation and workpace of the Call&fs are dependent upon their sources of supply and their customers, it would be useful to examine the agents' mode of transacting business by following the movement of one proThis example will duct from the village to the retailer. IRANIANSTUDIES

134

use the transactions

the sale

involving

of butter,

since

this is a commodity showing only minor seasonal variations (usuin supply and demand, is supplied in small quantities ally no more than three kilograms of butter are in any single consignment), and is purchased in similarly small quantities. Thus, the complete process from producer to retailer normally takes place within a single day. The market cycle begins with the peasant transporting the butter, which he has placed in an aluminum pot, to the agent's shop. There it is "accepted" and placed on display among the other containers of butter brought by other farmers the same morning. If the day's supply is heavy, the Callaf will mark each container with the farmer's name to assure that there is no confusion over whose proWhen the supply is light, the comperty is being sold. mission agent merely makes a mental note of the location As the goods arrive, the Callif of each farmer's container. will usually examine and taste the butter to ascertain its the agent may even differentiate quality. When possible, the various consignments according to this estimation, placing all goods of similar quality together, thereby making easier his attempts to get prices commensurate with his estimate of their worth. The agent's "acceptance" of the consignment constitutes an unspoken agreement with the farmer under which he is obligated to take responsibility for the commodity, sell it at the best possible price, and deliver payment to the the farmer pays the farmer. In return for these services, agent a fixed percentage of the selling price as a commission fee. Once the peasant has consigned his produce to the callif, he is free to take care of other affairs. As the day's supplies enter the Bazaar, the retail grocers begin to make the round of the shops looking for the items to stock their stores. Should a shop have the good for which a grocer is looking, he will stop to examine it, and if it is of the desired quality, quantity, and price the (ignoring the complex process of price determination), When grocer will indicate his interest in purchasing it. this occurs, the gross weight of the consignment is taken 135

1972 AUTUMN

and the first written entries in the commission agent's books are made. Since all wholesale transactions by the a second bookkeeping entry Callaf are credit transactions, is also made. The first (daily) register is a record of each transaction according to consignee, type of produce, The segross weight, unit price, and name of purchaser. cond ledger contains a record of the purchase by date, product, gross weight, and unit price grouped according to the buyer's name so that the money due may be collected at a a record of the purchase with later time. Occasionally, the same information will be given to the buyer, but for the entries in the comthe vast majority of transactions, mission agent's books (devoid of any acknowledgment by the buyer) are the only proof that the transaction has occurred. Having made a purchase, the retail grocer sees that it is delivered to his store, empties the butter into another container, and sends the original container back to the net The agent then weighs it, calculates the Callafl. weight and total selling price, and adds these figures to the previous entries in his books. When the peasant is ready to start back to the vilreclaims his vessels and lage, he returns to the Callfit, The commission agent sacks, and has his account settled. totals the selling price of the butter and any other produce which has been sold, subtracts the appropriate commisFinally, a sion fees, and pays the farmer the balance. notation is made in the daily register that payment has Except for minor variabeen made on the transaction.14 tions with different products, the operations just described are followed for all commodities brought to the Callafl. operations which present Aspects of the callifst structural impediments to marketplace development are evitypical mode of dent from this description of the callifs' These factors contribute to the fact transacting business. incapable of changing the that the agents are virtually Perhaps the scale and organization of their enterprises. bemost important of these arise from the relationships farmers. the their peasant suppliers, tween the agents and

IRANIANSTUDIES

136

Produce flows into the market in the form of relatively small consignments from individual farmers. The especially farmers, lacking adequate storage facilities, and having a constant need for cash to for perishables, support both their farming operations and their households, are forced to bring their produce to market whenever they Each for selling. have accumulated a quantity sufficient must be handled of these consignments commission agents since the customary

individually by the rules of operation

under which the agents transact business prevent them from sorting, bulking, or otherwise processing their clients' also prevent such proPractical considerations property. except in the case of grains, am The quantities, cessing. to usually too small to allow for quality differentiations be made. Moreover, the agent lacks the mechanical facilities to grade, sort, or clean the goods as well as the manpower to do this. Being forced to handle consignments in this way, the agents are in no position to introduce efficiencies The amount of labor necessary to into their operations. handle consignments shows only a small range of variation that can be done to reduce the amount since there is little The amount of work required for each one, large or small. of bookkeeping is the same for each, as is the amount of In addition labor required to sell any given consignments. any expansion in the number of producers served by one agent or any change in the type of goods being brought may actuof the Callif's If labor. ally decrease the efficiency there are only a small number of consignments in the shop at any one time the agent is able to remember to whom each belongs, his assessment of the quality of each unit, etc. When their numbers increase, the agent must resort to using intermediate records to insure the proper handling of his With an increase in the flow of fresh clients' accounts. produce through the market, as happens during the harvest season, even more careful handling and greater effort is necessary in the sale of these goods. The highly fragmented nature of the supply patterns in introducing economies of and the attendant difficulties scale are repeated and reinforced by the predominance of 137

1972 AUTUMN

who come to buy in the Prosmall-scale produce retailers beduce Bazaar. If the agents cannot be more efficient they similarly cause they deal with many small suppliers, of transactions with many cannot increase the efficiency This prevents them from decreasing the small customers. amount of labor expended in selling a consignment of the bookkeeping and handling which each consignment requires. This is, however, less determined than is the situone buyer will purOccasionally, ation on the supply side. chase the consignments from several different farmers. This represents a crude form of bulking and is more efficient than the normal transaction involving a lesser quanThe agents, however, have no control over the occurtity. In fact, bulk sales (except for rence of these instances. grains) such as those to produce speculators which occasionally take place, are more likely to occur when the market for the commodity is bad and the prices low. In the lower absolute commissions offset these instances, whatever gains are realized because of greater efficiency. The agents do have some control over the number of transactions into which they enter by avoiding sales to private consumers. Since these usually involve purchases of less than one whole consignment, numerous transactions of this type would also result in lower operating efficiency, although the agents may sell to retail customers if the market is slow. Once again, the increases in efficithe number of transactions do ency gained by controlling not increase the absolute commissions received. The fact that the consignments from the farmers come into the Bazaar at irregular intervals also makes for the agents to maximize their operating it difficult They have no control over the pace of their efficiency. manpower needs. Alwork and therefore face fluctuating though the increased commercialization of peasant agriculture has spread produce marketing more evenly over the a considerable decline in trading year, there is still volume from late autumn to early spring followed by a sharp increase as the weather warms, fruit in the orchards As noted above, during is picked, and the grains harvested. IRANIANSTUDIES

138

the slow business period most of the trade is concentrated between the opening of the shops and early afternoon. Thus, for more than one-half of the year, the marketing of produce requires no more manpower than the agent and one assistant. During the peak marketing season from mid-summer to the end of the harvest, more labor is needed in the shops. The additional labor, however, requires no special skills if they are old since the agent's full-time assistants, enough and have had sufficient experience, can supply the For these relaextra skilled manpower which is necessary. tively short peak periods, older children in the agent's family are usually enlisted since they are the most readily available and cheapest source of labor. Another impediment to the appearance of larger scale enterprises in the Produce Bazaar is the relative inability of the agents to acquire new sources of supply since the upper limit to the volume of business which the Callif can transact is a function of the number of suppliers which he has. These client relationships have their origins in the system of landownership patterns and tenancy rights which existed prior to Land Reform.15 Until the beginning of Land Reform, the majority of the harvests in Iran was marketed by the landowners. The traditional formula for dividing the crops awarded the landlord the largest share of the harvest, while that amount belonging to the peasant was barely enough to cover his family's consumption needs and the amounts needed to repay loans or credit extended to him. The landlord, or his representative where the owner had particularly extensive holdings, would collect the crop from each peasant, perform bulking and sorting operations, and transport it to the Bazaar for sale by an callif. The callif sold the crops of each village as a unit, thus giving rise to reputations for specializing in certain types of The villager, crops. normally having little to sell, only transacted business with the agent or had contact with him on the rare occasions when he went to the city. When the peasant was allowed to go to the city, he was instructed to see the agent for his village. Although at present the peasant farmer has greater choice in making his own marketing 139

AUTUMN 1972

is to continue the relationarrangements, his inclination Only infrequently do vilship with which he is familiar. lagers seek out new agents, and as long as they remain that they are not being cheated, they are not satisfied likely to do so. between agents and As a consequence, relationships The Callaf can do little their suppliers are very stable. to enlarge his base of supply, but rather must concentrate already eshis energies on maintaining the relationships He accomplishes this by maintaining the reputablished. While a good tation for dealing fairly with his clients. reputation may serve as a means through which a farmer, might be with his present trade relationship dissatisfied attracted to another shop, the shopkeeper cannot actively Any such attempt would, in fact, promote his own virtues. make his motives very suspect in the eyes of the villagers and his fellow traders. by which suppliers have become disThe traditions commission agents and the stabitributed among different inability of these patterns contributes to the Callif's with retail lity to establish exclusive trade relationships grocers who buy from them. The Callifs cannot risk passwith the expectation that a ing up a sale to one retailer will be coming to make a purchase, while second retailer the grocers cannot expect the callafs to reserve a quantity for them because they are limited in their ability to preBoth the agents and dict their customers' daily needs. the grocers also know that the supply of produce on any is given day, and the quality of that which is available, These conditions introduce ununpredictable. virtually at all levels of the marketing chain and precertainties of or an increase in the efficiency vent reorganization business enterprises. It is also evident that the operations described for competition between the here limit the possibilities The casual observer is likely to believe that call&fs. in the same types all commission agents deal essentially existing in the of goods with very little specialization Produce Bazaar. This impression arises as one walks past IRANIANSTUDIES

140

shop after shop in which chaotic arrangements of gunny sacks containing grains, potatoes, and onions are drawn open to reveal their contents; groups of metal and earthenware pots filled with dairy products, honey, and syrups are displayed; and baskets of fruits and nuts overflow into the avenue already crowded with people, pushThis notion is, however, carts, scootervans, and animals. incorrect. Because, as noted previously, landowners tended to form long-term, exclusive trade relationships with a particular agent, the agents became identified as the sources for crops grown in particular villages. Differe nce s in cropping patterns due to the variations in soil, topography, and weather conditions in the Qazvin Plain in the types of crops marketed resulted in differences through the commission agents. Consequently, the CallIfs gained specializations in different commodities. Sometimes a landowner would even split the harvest from a village between several shops, giving one crop to one shop and a second to another depending upon the specializations which had already evolved. In such instances, the were more strongly reinforced. specializations S-ince the supply patterns persisted after Land Reform, the agents' identification with the produce from particular villages and the attendant specializations have continued. One consequence of this specialization is that the amount and saliency of competition among agents is greatly attenuated. Commission agents will freely direct shoppers to places where a given good may be purchased if he himself does not sell it. More importantly, grocers looking for a particular commodity will go to those agents who are known to specialize in it before trying to find it in shops without such a reputation. This means that a commission agent who received a consignment for which he is not reputed to be a specialist will have a harder time selling that good. This low degree of competition for customers matches the similarly low degree of competition over suppliers which has already been described.

141

AUTUMN 1972

In addition, the agents are limited in their ability to manipulate other variables of their operations which in the existing market patmight give rise to alterations Selling another development. marketplace terns and, hence, person's property on commission rather than selling one's price competition own goods for profit severely restricts between Callifs dealing in the same commodity. To fulfill the agent must obtain, at his obligation to his suppliers, minimum, the prevailing market price for a good in any giinterIt is obviously in the Callif's ven transaction.16 ests to see that he gets this price because he not only receives the highest absolute amount in commissions in this way but also demonstrates to his suppliers that he deserves Should he attempt to sell betheir continuing patronage. low the market price to attract buyers, he would very quickly lose his sources of supply.17 Varying the commission rate charged for performing services for clients in order to increase an agent's supply base is also impossible under the existing operating procommission rates vary between one The traditional cedures. and ten percent (although most cluster at either five or ten The rate percent) depending upon the commodity being sold. variations take into account a number of different factors; in selling the three main variables being the difficulty the commodity (in part, a function of demand), the relative of the commodity. sale price range, and the perishability Grains and nuts, for example, are sold for five percent commissions, while commissions on fresh fruits and vegetables and dairy products (with the exception of butter) are calculated at the maximumrate. The origins of these rates are uncertain since no informant could remember when or how the rates came into but all said that they have been used for genexistence, Given current knowledge concerning governmental erations. a plausible and guild authority in the ancient bazaars,) explanation is that the rates evolved as a compromise bein controlling prices and the tween governmental interests expressed through their guild authorities. agents' interests

IRANIANSTUDIES

142

Since the commissions obtained by the agents must be used to cover their various operating expenses as well as to provide them with an income, the agents see the exFor reasons isting rates as being the lowest possible. unstated by the informants, it is easy to see why their view is correct. The Callif would be risking a loss should he try to manipulate his commission fees. Were these losses likely to be short-term, an agent who had reached the limit of his capacity to capture a share of the market and who had a sufficient reserve of capital would probably take the short-term risk in order to benefit from the long-term of the suppliers to gains. But, given the inclination maintain their established trade relationships, and the probability that commission manipulation would be looked upon with a great deal of suspicion, it does not appear that shifts in the base of supply would occur quickly enough to compensate for the losses which the agent would incur. The agents' ability to sustain losses obviously presupposes that they are able to accumulate "a sufficient reserve of capital." This is unlikely in most cases, howIn markets where the total volume of trade is diever. vided among large numbers of traders, such capital accuThis is true in the Qazvin mulation is highly unlikely.19 Produce Bazaar in spite of the commodity specialization which reduces, to some extent, the competition among callifs.

of capital also inhiThe general unavailability bits an callif's purchasing the business of a fellow tradesman in order to increase the scale of his operaThe lack of capital is only one factor in explaintions. ing the rarity of this type of business expansion, since the returns for attempting this are also uncertain. Because the larger enterprise would still be faced with many small-scale suppliers and buyers, no economies of scale could be effected through expansion. Furthermore, since the peasant suppliers are not bound to an Callaf by contract, there is no assurance that they would necessarily trade with the new shopowner.

143

1972 AUTUMN

While these are factors which reduce the potential for capital accumulation, this does not mean that it does not occur. However, because of the existing structural impediments which have been noted, the agents have few this capital in their enterfor reinvesting incentives to their marketing prises in ways directly beneficial Some agents have used their surpluses to reoperations. novate their shops, replacing the timber posts and beams with steel, building lofts for storage, plastering and and even lighting, painting the walls, adding fluorescent offices where they can do building small glass-enclosed Such "'modernitheir bookkeeping in silence and comfort. zation" does not in any way alter the patterns of operaOther outlets for surplus tion which have been discussed. capital are pilgrimages to Mecca,20 investments in orchards, vineyards, or urban real estate, and increases in personal or family consumption or saving. To summarize, the structural impediments to development due to the commission agents' mode of operations are: of small-scale producers agricultural (1) the multiplicity of smallserving the Qazvin market; (2) the multiplicity of scale buyers; (3) the uncertainty and irregularity on bulking and processing of supply; (4) the restrictions on competition among aconsignments; (5) the limitations of supply patterns, (b) gents caused by (a) the stability and (c) the the existence of commodity specialization, to manipulate prices or commission rates; and inability on accumulating surplus capital which (6) the limitations or other forms of reinvestment. can be used for risk-taking Similar impediments face other occupations in the Produce Bazaar as well as those in the retail and crafts of these structural limitaThe pervasiveness bazaars. every tions and the extent to which they touch virtually aspect of business operations greatly inhibits innovative behavior directed towards gaining competitive advantage or that would contribute to the overall marketplace deIn addition, the constraints on commercial velopment. practices which arise from the ''non-economic1" social and further reduce the probability of institutions political IRANIANSTUDIES

144

developmental

changes in the marketplace,

as they have

been defined previously. Given these impediments, it is difficult, incorrect,

to ascribe

if not

the lack of development of the ba-

zaar to the absence of entrepreneurial talent or values. of the bazaar Since these conditions were characteristic in the past, the absence of modern entrepreneurship and were they to be found, its supporting value-orientations, could more validly be explained by seeing the structural arrangements as having led to the suppression of these patterns during the socializabehavioral and attitudinal tion of young bazaar merchants. Consequently, any attempt to solve the problems of the Iranian marketing sector cannot be based on the facile assumption that the bazaar merchants are incapable of adapting their behavior to the needs of a modern economy. At the same time, it is obvious that training in achievement a sufmotivation and marketing skills cannot constitute developficient program for stimulating self-sustaining Instead, adequate planning must ment in the bazaars. recognize the existence of structural patterns which inhibit development and propose methods for altering them. NOTES 1.

J. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development (Galaxy Books ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1961).

2.

See for example the journal EL lorations preneurial History.

3.

M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

4.

D. C. McClelland and D. G. Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement (Free Press Paperback; New York: The Free Press, 1969).

145

in Entre-

AUTUMN1972

5.

See, for example, the arguments of R. Bendix, Nation (Anchor Books; Doubleday and Building and Citizenship Company, 1969); L. Rudolph and S. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago in "Post-Traditional Press, 1967); and the articles Daedalus, Vinter, 1973). Societies,"

6.

M. Weber, 2p. cit.,

7.

M. Nash, "Some Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic Development," Economic Develomment and Cultural Change, 7 (1959), pp. 137-1-0; M. Nash, "The Social Context of Choice in a Small-Scale Society," Man, 61 (1961), pp. 186-191; and C. Geertz, Peddlers and Princes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963).

8.

N. Jacobs, The Sociology of Development: Iran as a Case Study (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); and D. C. McClelland, "National Character and Economic Growth in Turkey and Iran," Communications and National Development, ed. L. W. Pye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

9.

"Problems of the 'Bazaar,"' Echo of Iran, Echo's Economic Reports No. 119, 1965.

p. 17.

10.

and Change in an Iranian H. J. Rotblat, "Stability Provincial Bazaar" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1972).

11.

H. J. Rotblat, "Social Organization and Development in an Iranian Provincial Bazaar," Economic Develoment and Cultural Change, forthcoming.

12.

and see H. J. Rotblat, "Stability For an explanation, Bazaar," 6-18. Provincial Iranian in an pp. Change

13.

The occupation derives its name from the callif meaning grass, fodder or forage. of Callafi is corn chandler. translation 2 vols. New Persian-English Dictiona.r. Librairie Beroukhim, 1962); and A. K. S.

IRANIAN STUDIES

146

Arabic word A common S. Haim, (Tehran: Lambton,

The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966 (London: Clarendon Press, 1969). The dictionary definition does not, however, convey the notion that a wide variety of goods are normally sold in the Call&fi. Therefore "commission agent" will be used here as the English equivalent. It should be noted that the use of Callif to mean a wholesale commission agent is characteristic of the Qazvin Bazaar and may carry different connotations in other cities. 14.

Payment to the farmer is made prior to and independent of any payment made by the buyer. Failure to collect on credit extended to the buyers is an operating loss which the agent must absorb. He cannot pass this to his clients or customers.

15.

A. K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953); A. K. S. Lambtmn, The Persian Land Reform., 1962-1966 (London: Claremdon, Press, 1969); and C. Gharatchehdaghi, Distribution of Land in Varamin (Publication of German Orient Institute) (Opladen: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1967).

16.

Because prices are determined under conditions approximating a "free market," the prevailing market price is also the "best" price which the agent can reasonably expect to obtain in any given transaction.

17.

One of the most important effects of Land Reform has been to increase the freedom of movement given the peasants. Not only can they come to the city more but they can also interact more with frequently, other villagers. This increased contact with the marketplace and the people in it enables the peasants to acquire information about the state of the market and market prices. Thus, the possibility of a villager's being cheated by his agent is greatly minimized--something of importance for the welfare of the poor peasants.

18.

G. Baer, "The Administrative, Functions of Turkish Guilds," 147

Economic and Social International Journal AUTUMN 1972

of Middle Eastern Studies, 1 (1970), pp. 28-50; G. Baer, "Guilds in Middle Eastern History," Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 11-30; and A. Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Boureoisie in Iran," Iranian Studies, II (1969), pp. 54-79. 19.

C. S. Belshaw, Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).

20.

This may be indirectly beneficial to the agent because of the prestige accorded to bearers of the title and the implications it has for personal reputation. See H. J. Rotblat, "Social Organization and Development in an Iranian Provincial Bazaar." But the positive results of piety may not be as important to the commission agent as it is to the retailer or craftsman, for whomreputation is a key element in the maintenance of a stable clientele.

IRANIAN STUDIES

148

FAMILYPLANNINGIN IRAN: RESUL7SOFA SURVEY AND A MASSM:EDL4 CAMPAIGN SAMUEL S, LIEBERMAN

Introduction

This article presents some of the general findings the information on family planning and, in particular, practice in Isfahan City and Ostan compiled in two phases of the Isfahan Communications Project (ICP).1 In terms of information generated, the project had two main stages: (1) the ostan-wide sample presurvey (May, 1970), and (2) the ostan-wide mass media campaign (August, 1970-March, 1971). The presurvey was made to obtain demographic information and data on the knowledge, attitudes, and practice (KAP) of family planning among the population and their exposure to the various media. The media campaign was directed at those couples who because of their media behavior and previous experiences with contraception were thought to be predisposed to adopt modern family planning methods. Samuel S. Lieberman is a Ph.D. candidate Harvard University.

in Economics at

Portions of this article, including most of the tables, appeared first in Studies in Family Planning (see Note 1). They are published here with the kind permission of the Population Council. The opinions expressed in the present article are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Population Council or any of its staff members. 149

AUTUM1972

Materials for the media campaign were pretested and selected in the summer of 1970. The mass media effort oc(1) from August 21 to November 21, curred in two stages: 1970 only radio was used; between November 22 and December 20 no media were used; (2) from December 21, 1970 to March 20, 1971 a complete treatment, including radio messages, was applied. banners, and newspaper-inserts films, leaflets, The impact of the campaign was assessed in several ways, including measurements of acceptances of contraceptives before, during, and after the media program. A second sample survey, designed to assure comparability with the results of the presurvey, was conducted in April, 1971. media Since some knowledge of the socioeconomic conditions, and existing family planning services in the availability to an underparticular setting of the Project is essential standing of its design and an evaluation of its findings, we shall begin by a brief description of the setting of the ICP. The Setting At the time of the survey (May, 1970) some 51 percent of the two million inhabitants of the ostan2 lived in Isfahan towns (greater than 5000 population) and cities. City had an estimated population of 515,000 in 1970. The estimated crude birth rate was 48 per thousand, the crude death rate 18 per thousand. Taking account of in-migration it is estimated that the cities of the ostan have been growAccording to the 1966 ing at an annual rate of 5 percent. Census of Housing and Population, those under 20 constituted Some 18 percent of the popu55 percent of the population. lation were married women in the reproductive age group (15 Half of all girls married by age 19, and 96 percent to 45). by age 24. On average, husbands were seven years older than The ICP presurvey (1970) found a literacy rate their wives. of 33 percent. Isfahan has long been known Economic development. handicrafts and prosperous peasant agrifor its textiles, the economy of the ostan has been More recently, culture. the establishment of an industrial with transformed virtually IRANIANSTUDIES

150

complex that includes a steel mill and related industries. Already trailing only Teheran it is projected that by 1977 Isfahan will be the principal industrial region of Iran. The weight of industry in the regional economy is expected to grow mainly at the expense of agriculture (Table 1). Yet the agriculture of Isfahan is not backward. Of all provinces, Isfahan records the highest average wheat yields on irrigated land (1830 kg./hectare). High yields in cereals, garden crops and dairy products are achieved on small and intensively farmed holdings: of the 210,000 units, 66 percent are less than five hectares in size. Nevertheless, yields and output levels have been static; to date, operators have not cooperated to obtain credits and to introduce modern management, inputs, and marketing of crops. TABLE1. BREAKDOWN OF GROSSREGIONAL PRODUCT FORISFAHANOSTANBY SECTOR OF ORIGIN, 1972-1973 ANDPROJECTED FOR1977-1978 Percent Sector Industry Agriculture Construction Transportation Social services Government Trade/commerce Utilities/communications Source:

1972-1973

1977-1978

29 19 10 9 6 5 18 4

34 13 9 8 4 5 22 5

Report to the Plan Organization, Tehran.

Government of Iran,

The distribution of the labor force of the ostan does not correspond closely to the breakdown of the regional product by sector of origin. Roughly 28 to 38 percent of the labor force are employed in agriculture. The modern sector, 151

AUTUMN 1972

is achieved, is expected where a higher labor productivity to continue to attract those who now work on the land. According to the 1966 Census of Population and Housrates for urban and rural ing the labor force participation women in Isfahan were among the highest in Iran. Furthermore, of those aged seven and older, S2 percent of the urban woman and 31 percent of all women in the ostan had received These proportions were the highest recorded some schooling. in Iran. of these diverse facts is the One interpretation The growth of the modern sector and the slower following. development of agriculture together with increased employfor women and educational opportunities ment opportunities lowered the purely economic beneprobably for children have fits of having many children and possibly raised the relaConditions are such that a growtive costs of parenthood. ing number of couples are inclined to limit the size of their families. The radio channels that are Media availability. heard easily in Isfahan Ostan are Radio Isfahan and Radio Iran. These are operated by the Ministry of Information and are broadcast from Isfahan and Tehran, respectively. of about each with a 1970 circulation Keyhan and Etella'at, Television programs ori5000, are the major newspapers. The 14 ginating in Teheran are transmitted in Isfahan. moviehouses in the ostan, 12 of which are in Isfahan City, Weekly magazines had a together seated 13,000 people. in the province of less than 13,000. total circulation Advertising was not widely employed. At the beFamily planning services and acceptors. ICP the of 1970) there action of the (August, phase ginning (all urban) in were 133 health stations and seven hospitals The family planning program of the government, the ostan. active since 1966, provided pills and condoms at 54 health and three Social Insurance Organione hospital, stations, as well as through eight Health zation (SIO) clinics,3 of the greater expense to users more In spite Corps teams. through private outlets than public distributed were pills IRANIANSTUDIES

152

services.4 This may be attributed to the longer hours and the greater number of pharmacies (77) than public faciliIn addition, it is believed that pills were ties (55). in drugstores. Following often sold without prescriptions policy the IUD was provided in only 11 clinics, official Use of this device by multiall located in Isfahan City. parous women was deemed unsuitable by medical opinion in Iran. Furthermore, doctors and midwives had had limited experience with the IUD, while female doctors, needed especially to attend rural women, were in very short supply. It is evident from this discussion that provision of services was (and remains) highly uneven. During the campaign 40 family planning centers along with the great majority of pharmacies were open in Isfahan City and its Only 15 centers were in existence in the other environs. eight shahrestans (see Table 2). These centers were all located in towns, while the respective target areas were far more rural than the population of Isfahan Shahrestan. TABLE 2.

Shahrestan (County) Isfahan Ardestan Semirom Feridan Najafabad Shahreza Golpaygan Nain Natanz Total

health

OF FAMILYPLANNINGSERVICES COVERAGE IN ISFAHANOSTAN, 1970

Estimated No. of Women Aged 15-45

Estimated No. of Villages 1,239 745 182 178 135 138 130 757 211 3,615

171,805 8,835 6,228 26,730 20,704 19,133 16,905 8,301 6,063 284,704

No. of Family Planning Services 40 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 55a

family planning premises: aTotal official stations and one in a hospital.

153

54 in

1972 AUTUI4N

The eight Health Corps teams made periodic visits to rural We may note locations without attracting many acceptors. finally that inventory levels of pills and condoms in the centers were highly variable because the process of distribution was never systematized. of the government program to the From the initiation beginning of the mass media project there were 31,450 reSome corded new acceptors, of which 25,000 received pills. benefiting were all in ostan the of couples 2.6 percent In 1970, the average from government provided services. family planning acceptor was a 32 year old female with five She thought the ideal number of children was four, children. of The distribution and wanted no more children herself. average number of living children by age of acceptor resembled that of all child bearing women in Isfahan (see Tables 3 and 4). OF LIVINGCHILDREN AGEANDNUMBER OF IN-CLINIC ACCEPTORS

TABLE3.

Average Number of Living Children

Age of Acceptor

1.54 2.61 3.87 5.02 5.96 6.47

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40 and older Source: Clinic

records,

IRANIANSTUDIES

Ministry of Health,

154

Isfahan,

Iran.

t C ')

*1CC'

t-.

cC'J

CVj

co ttLi

) (00 L

'I- C')C')

r(0in~

r00

1(6

<0V

1

0) (0 LinO L()co

u0

Dc)

0)

vrC'J C%( OD

1C'J

't 0) V D

P-(0ro I rC) CO)

O

co C')

-C) D

-wC\'J6v

N-i--

r co0

cor

CDLt. ~~~~~~~~~~~L)VCr)

v c0

nC

04\0

(0

1010

)

-)CO

\

coG

00N-r

104

*

c

l0

C)

0) n0

co t(')

CL

4 u10

'

0

)

**10qt

N -0

rD

co

r-n O)

a')

cr(0(1

10)

0(0 to

0

DC -

a a0O-~~~~U z 20?

-

al.

O0

0OD0C

l.0

Len

0

Lo10*

0

>-

cL

~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0

00

ta CL

C'

Ct

&4 0 0_ S C3L

0 EE

<

UZu..

co4)

.a0

00 10 10. W~~~

155>

W> In

4

>

tm-

E co

~

0

-DEN@)-0 a

0 0

L

CDL

1972 AUTIJ4N

The Design of the Presurvey Beginning in May, 1970, the presurvey of 1000 married individuals was carried out in Isfahan City and Ostan. In general, the pattern of responses for the men (419) and the The presurvey inquired into perwomen (581) was similar. knowledge, attitudes and practice of sonal characteristics, family planning, media behavior, community participation, The questionnaire was long (231 motives. and fertility but important questions were repeated several questions), Eight Health Corpswomen times using different wordings. They were supervised by the were trained as interviewers. Deputy Director of the Isfahan Health Department and the Population Council resident adviser. Respondents were chosen randomly from a universe of of Isfahan Ostan like one million (autonomous districts Yazd were not covered), and grouped into urban and rural Some 424 interviews were made in Isfahan City segments. among towns and viland the remaining 576 were distributed lages in proportion to the total number of people living in Within these population groupcommunities of various sizes. drawn according to social and economic criings, clusters, teria, were chosen at random. Within each cluster the husband or wife from each household was interviewed. Apart from checks built into the survey (see below) of the sample was evaluated by comparing the distributions respondents by age, occupation, and education with similar data obtained from 1966 census data and clinical profiles Only one important discrepancy was noted. on acceptors. of male respondents was weighted disThe age distribution For this reason, in favor of older cohorts. proportionately involving age data were made for fethe cross-tabulations male respondents alone (see Table 4). The effect of this between age and age bias was minimal. The relationships the family size, KAP, and other variables shown for women in Table 4 were similar to those of the male respondents, and they follow a pattern discovered in KAPstudies done elsewhere.

IRANIANSTUDIES

156

Characteristics

of Respondents

For male and female respondents history. Fertility the mean and median number of living children was 4.0. For female respondents and the wives of males respondents the mean number of pregnancies was 5.6. Fifty six percent of the women covered in the survey had been pregnant in the last two years, 70 percent in the previous three; 14 percent were pregnant at the time of interview. Sixty five percent of the respondents desired their or their spouse's last pregnancy, but for those with one or more living children this proportion declined with number of living children (Table 5). Two-thirds of those interviewed believed they were still fertile. Twenty-eight percent of the women covered had had a miscarriage or a stillbirth.5 Over half had experienced the death of at least one child, one-fifth two or more. For all couples the number of living children varied directly with the number of child deaths experienced (Table 6). TABLE5. PERCENT WITHSPECIFIEDCHARACTERISTICS BY NUMBER OF LIVINGCHILDREN,ISFAHANOSTAN, MAY1970 PRESURVEY Number of living children Characteristica Expecting old age support from children Desired last pregnancy Would pledge to have no more children Would have taken the pill on the spot Use of contraceptives Ever used Currently using e

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

84 62

96 95

96 77

93 69

98 69

98 54

96 45

95 42

100 38

100 37

92 65

22

8

22

31

42

40

66

46

52

47

35

16

16

24

23

27

35

24

33

21

42

26

32 19

31 26

45 39

44 38

45 36

34 29

46 37

40 27

41 38

32 37

41 33

9 Total

For female respondentor wife of male respondent.

FamilZ size norm. On the average, men desired 3.8 children, women 3.7; 17 percent left family size to the will of God. As shown in Table 6, the norm fell with succeeding

157

AUTUMN 1972

TABLE 6. AVERAGENUMBEROF LIVING CHILDREN AND AVERAGEIDEAL FAMILYSIZE BY NUMBEROF CHILD DEATHS, ISFAHANOSTAN, MAY1970 PRESURVEY Number of Child Deaths

Average Living

Number of Children

Ideal

Family Size

0 1 2 3 4+

3.3 3.9 4.6 4.8 4.9

3.5 3.8 4.2 4.1 4.2

Total

4.0

3.7

Number of Respondents

483 202 147 76 92 1,000

by a single defining characterisWhen classified cohorts. tic the following groups had lower norms: professionals, army and government employees (Table 7), urban residents (Table 8), and families with few child deaths (Table 6). Over half of those Awareness of population trends. interviewed thought that the rate of population growth was excessive (Table 7), but perception of mortality trends Fifty seven percent felt that more, and varied widely. 40 percent that fewer, children were surviving than in the Two-thirds feared some of their own offspring would past. Acute awareness of declining mortality was not assodie. ciated with any groups whether defined by age, education, or occupation.

lagers

However,

had perceived

compared with

a decline

city

dwellers,

vil-

in child mortality.

Some questions framed in an motivation. Fertility ferfashion attempted to elicit experimental and tentative and true-false, of Yes-no, respondents. motives tility open-ended questions, as well as rank-order techniques were attitudes employed. The results suggested that fertility were related closely to perceived demands of the environment. Thus nearly all respondents expected their children's help as laborers and as sources of support in old age. Yet most respondents readily associated the notion IRANIANSTUDIES

158

WITHSPECIFIEDCHARACTERISTICS TABLE7. PERCENT OF WOMEN; BY OCCUPATION FORMENANDHUSBANDS ISFAHANOSTAN,MAY1970 PRESURVEY

Clharacteristic

GovernSpecialment ists/docem- Army, Teach- Shop- tors/biisiWork- Farmployees police ers keepers nessmen Total ers ers

84 Number of respondents 317 265 Family size attitudes Ever discussed 88 family size 77 60 Ideal number of children 3 Left to God 13 32 3.3 Number (average) 3.8 4.3 Wants work force sup99 85 96 port from children Expects old age sup84 92 96 port from children Thought population 27 70 growth excessive 59 Family planning attitudes and knowledge Had heard of the family 23 13 46 planning program Approves of family 83 69 98 planning 94 Knew methods 83 65 Practice of family planning 42 17 71 Ever used 12 61 Used currently 35 10 Used pill currentlya 8 16 Used withdrawal 47 29 9 currently

23

35

215

16

960

70

74

78

88

74

13 2.7

14 3.6

14 3.6

87

94

97

75

96

78

80

93

62

92

83

60

58

56

52

61

60

21

62

62

87 91

94 97

89 85

100 100

83 80

70 65 13

74 54 3

45 39 9

81 75 62

41 33 10

57

54

31

81

28

0 3.0

17 3.7

?Or, whose spouse used the pill currently.

of declining fertility on their part with improvements in For example, 69 percent of farmers and 57 their situation. percent of workers interviewed stated a preference for more mechanical aids rather than children to assist them in their work. Fifty-seven percent of respondents agreed with a statement linking the two-to-three child family to government provided old age support. Nearly all expressed the belief that large families ought to pay higher taxes, while 80 percent approved of a hypothetical plan in which child allowances declined with number of living children. Nearly all agreed that small families should be rewarded; 52 percent mentioned education and 25 percent cash as suitable rewards. 159

AUTUMN 1972

TABLE 8. PERCENTWITH SPECIFIED CHARACTERISTICS BY PLACE OF RESIDENCEAND SEX: ISFAHANOSTAN, MAY 1970 PRESURVEY 1sfahan City

Other cities

Villages

Women

Men

Women

255 Number of respondents Family size attitudes Ideal number of children Left to God 5 3.5 Number (average) Wanted old age support from children 88 Wanted work aid support from children 93 47 Perceived mortalitydecline Thought population growth excessive 65 Family planning attitudes and knowledge Approved of family planning 95 Thought Islam approved 87 Would pledge to have 2 or 3 children 45 Would have taken pill on the spot 24 Had heard of the family planning program 72

160

50

60

10 3.3

18 3.7

24 4.8

88

90

89

94 42

98 62

92 51

58

76

90 78 37

item

Contraceptive knowledge Knew Pill IUD Withdrawal Sterilization Condom Contraceptive use Ever used contraceptives Currently used contraceptives Ever used pill Currently using pill Ever used withdrawal

7 3.4

Men Women 251

Men

Total

213

989

30 4.4

17 3.7

94

97

92

98 68

100 72

96 57

67

41

36

52

98 84

89 80

72 57

69 47

83 70

38

25

32

26

35

26

18

15

29

25

26

70

80

69

53

47

62

97 81 48 42 82

91 67 48 42 80

92 82 56 42 84

80 72 39 54 77

84 46 30 24 51

46 29 23 22 51

84 49 51 27 60

69 62 30 12 53

63 54 23 12 46

48 30 22 8 34

44 32 20 5 34

18 11 12 8 8

15 12 10 7 5

41 33 19 10 22

Note: Place of residence was illegible on 11 questionnaires;they were not used in this table.

With respect to the probKAPof contraception. lem of realizing their fertility aims, 80 percent of the conrespondents knew at least one method of fertility trol; by method, women were more aware than men (Table 9). Knowledge varied slightly by age (Table 4), but significant differences by occupation were found (Table 7)--farmers had

IRANIANSTUDIES

160

the least awareness. Of those who had heard of the pill, 40 percent had heard "bad" reports. Nearly 80 percent expressed the desire to obtain more information. TABLE9.

OF EACHCONTRACEPTIVE KNOWLEDGE METHOD, OF THOSEWHOKNEW A METHOD Percent

Method Pill IUD Withdrawal Sterilization Condom

Men

Women

All Respondents

77 39 48 27 55

89 56 53 27 64

84 49 51 27 60

Respondents registered high approval of the use of contraceptives. However, 93 percent stated that the approval of their spouse was a prerequisite to practice. Although most had discussed family size with their mate, only 52 percent believed that their spouse's approval would be forthcoming. Seventy percent thought that Islam approved of contraception. Significantly, fewer rural (53 percent) than urban (82 percent) respondents held such a view. Forty-one percent of the respondents had previously practiced contraception (44 percent of the women). Of all respondents, 19 percent had used the pill and 22 percent had practiced withdrawal. Half of those interviewed had friends or relatives who had attempted to limit their family sizes at some time. Yet, of those who stated that they did not want their (or their spouse's) last pregnancy, only 46 percent were currently using a method of control. There were disparities in the contraceptive practice of groups defined in various and often overlapping ways. Villagers (Table lOB) and especially peasants (Tables lOA 161

AUTUMN 1972

AND FAMILYPLANNINGCHARACTERISTICS TABLE 10. DEMOGRAPHIC AGED 35 (A) BY OCCUPATIONFOR MENOR HUSBANDSOF WOMEN OR OVERAND (B) BY RESIDENCEAND SEX FOR THOSE AGED 35 OR OVER, ISFAHAN OSTAN, MAY 1970 A. By occupation

Characteristic Number of respondents

Farmer

Worker 124

Government employee

102

35

Tradesman 77

Average Number of living children Number of pregnancies

4.7 7.2

4.5 6.2

-Percent

--

With more than 7 children Ever used contraceptives Currently usingb IUD Pill Sterilization Condom Withdrawal

4.8 8.1

5.1 6.7

25 18 12 0 8 1 1 5

26 68 56 3 21 0 15 29

Female

Maleb

Female

62

95

20 39 34 0 10 1 6 20

23 40 36 0 12 0 9 14

B. By residence and sex Rural Characteristic Number of respondents Number of living children Number of pregnancies With more than 7 children Ever used contraceptives Currently usingo IUD Pill Sterilization Condom Withdrawal

Urban

5.5 8.0

5.6 8.6

33 17 13 0 10 0 1 4

23 19 11 3 6 3 0 2

o

36 Average 6.1 8.3 Percent 39 58 47 0 17 0 25 22

Maleb 102 5.6 7.5 24 61 53 3 13 0 5 36

Breakdownsof users by method do not sum to 100 because of use of methods not specified here and because of inconsistentresponses. b For males aged 40 or over.

IRANIAN STUDIES

162

and 7), and those who had received no formal education were unlikely to have used any methods. The differences by edumethods cation were due mainly to greater use of traditional since the IUD and the pill were used by respondents with no and three or more years of education to about the same exincreased with suc"Current use" of contraceptives tent. ceeding cohorts, while "ever-use" showed an irregular pattern. difIt is remarkable that in spite of substantial ferences in their use of contraceptive methods, urban, rural, and occupational groups still arrived at similar average completed family sizes and average numbers of pregnancies experienced (Table 10A). Until comparable data are available for other regions of Iran, these results must be conOne possible explanation sidered to be highly tentative. of this lack of significant fertility differentials-is the reliance on traditional methods and an inability to use these methods effectively by those attempting to limit their family sizes.6 Exposure to mass media. Information on media behavior was essential, of course, in designing a complete publicity campaign. Radio. Seventy-five percent of the respondents lisand 65 percent owned a set. tened at least occasionally, Most listened at home, on Fridays, and to Radio Iran (originating in Tehran). The news (44 percent), dramas (40 percent), music (23 percent) and educational offerings (15 percent) were the programs most preferred. Twenty seven percent had heard family planning information on the radio before the campaign began. Mail. Fifty-nine percent received mail at least monthly (but only 6 percent daily) and 58 percent had home delivery. Television. Thirty-six percent watched occasionally, and 12 percent owned a set. "Peyton Place" and "Sarkar Ostovar" (a comedy about a police sergeant) were program followed by news, films, and musical programs. favorites, 163

AUTUt 1972

Newspapers. Thirty-three percent of the respondents were able to read newspapers, and 73 percent of these actually did; 36 percent of the latter group read daily and 24 Of the items read frequently the news and percent weekly. accidents were most often mentioned. the coverage of traffic In all, 14 percent had read something on family planning in the newspapers. Of Magazines. Twenty-six percent read magazines. these, 56 percent read Zan-i Ruz (Today's Woman)and 20 perHaftegi (Weekly Etella'at). cent Etella'at-i Contact with these communications channels varied with the age, education, and place of residence of respond(Tables 11 and 12). ents, although not always systematically As expected, inhabitants of Isfahan City were by far the most exposed to the mass media and were also more likely to have heard of family planning through these channels (Table 12). BY MEDIAEXPOSURE WITHSELECTED TABLE11. PERCENT ANDSEX, ISFAHANOSTAN,MAY1970 EDUCATION PRESURVEY 3 or more years education Media exposure

Men

Number of respondents Listened to radio Read newspapers Saw films Spouse saw films

157 90 65 53 40

Women 166 93 62 59 61

No formal educations Men

Women

216 60 10 14 6

339 67 2 2 16

Totalb 75 25 28 28

Respondentsmay have attended literacy classes. Total includes those with intermediateeducation and those with education unknown, not shown separately. a

IRANIANSTUDIES

164

BY WITHMEDIAEXPOSURE TABLE12. PERCENT ANDSEX, ISFAHANOSTAN, PLACEOF RESIDENCE MAY1970 PRESURVEY 1sfahan City

Media exposure Number of respondents Listened to radio Owned a radio Heard of family planning on the radio Able to read newspaper Read newspapers Had read of family planning in newspaper Read magazines

Women Men

Other cities

Women Men

Villages

Women Men

Total

255 89 87

160 85 76

50 68 60

60 67 56

251 59 45

213 66 50

989 75 65

40 59 38

39 51 39

20 14 10

18 51 39

13 7 5

15 28 22

27 33 25

24 37

13 33

6 13

8 28

4 4

2 14

14 21

and contraceptive Western consumption, fertility, The income data obtained in the presurvey were practice. To get a rough idea of the incomplete and unsatisfactory. between the material worth and the fertility relationship and contraceptive practice of couples the level of ownership of Western consumer goods was adopted as an index. Furthermore, it was recognized that "modern" consumption might also be an indicator of modernity in attitudes and to adopt mobehavior of couples and of a predisposition dern family planning methods. Ownership of consumer durables was associated with A higher proportion of curcurrent use of contraceptives. rent contraceptors owned each of ten different consumer (Table 13), durables than did current non-contraceptors and, conversely, a higher proportion of owners of each of than the ten durables were currently using contraceptives were nonowners. In addition, 56 percent of savers used as opposed to 30 percent of non-savers (not contraceptives shown in tables). The ownership of particular goods varies, of course, In order to conwith the wealth and tastes of households. jointly trol for these factors respondents were classified 165

1972 AUTUMN

DURABLESBY PERCENTOWNINGCONSUMER TABLE 13. BY USE, USING CONTRACEPTIVES CONTRACEPTIVE BY OWNING,AND SAVING BY OWNING,FOR SPECIFIED DURABLES, ISFAHANOSTAN, MAY1970 PRESURVEY

Consumer durable BicyElectric cle Radio Fan

Characteristic

RefrigSewing Machine erator

Owning each consumer durable All respondents Current contraceptors " noncontraceptors

38 44 35

65 89 57

36 62 24

42 69 29

23 45 12

Using contraception currently Owners of durable Nonowners of durable

38 27

43 17

57 20

54 18

65 24

Saving Owners of durable Nonowners of durable

23 13

21 8

32 8

30 7

41 10

by age (under 35 and 35 and older), place of residence (village and city) and number of consumer durables owned For these groups the average values for (0-3, 4-6, 7-9). certain demographic and family planning characteristics (Table 14). Briefly, for young city women were calculated norms existed between their fertility no strong relationship and the number of durable goods and reproductive histories, for young was found (inversely) owned. Such a relationship village women. Among older women the number of goods owned was related directly for village women, and in a U-shaped fashion for city women, to number of pregnancies and number of living

inversely

children.

related

IRANIANSTUDIES

In general,

ideal

family

size

was

to number of durable goods owned, but no

166

5~~~~~~~4 |r

12

)Uet

P-

! rD O~~~~~~~~~~ |-

|

0u ?

@_co S|

?

i

|

1, o ,

l

09

w

'7' Le r-_

14 > 1

X

ul

3f)

8Vs r>

Ex |

;

| o o er|CD

u

?\

4

v

90 Pr CD*

0

co

t V) C\O

i CY) Z MT

CD

s

, __

e
CY

o :nr_ cv

t

-

CNMt

_)(DreNz LO V CD

?

o P-

c

)

u1972

~

6

oM

vC

t

\

|E

CY ur PP

ir.r

CjC

Coco ev

- ut-Vs c

iC|Xa3WO

~

-1

1?

CV_

-n'0r

CO)

u

cs

f--I

0 c __ qt

CD

E

4%

IS

CY)

v

CM0t)

(d

9rsUvM oo I", tn

|

c\s 4

a)mrnc fl V

D

er

er

se1 110z>0 e~~~~~~~~~~~0 CD

uz

_

AU

commonto all relationship ship and fertility.

groups was found between owner-

These possibly paradoxical findings cannot be attriage use of contraception--within buted to the differential and residence controlled groups the practice of family planning was inversely related to ownership. The data support the observation that modernity in consumption was associand ferated with modernity in attitudes toward fertility Once again we encounter a group who practility control. fabut unsuccessfully--the ticed birth control willingly vorable attitudes of the modern consumers were manifested methods. In in their more extensive use of traditional and behavior patterns associated with short, the qualities ownership of modern goods were not such as to encourage the and constant use of withdrawal or other tradidisciplined tional methods. The results of this and previous sections may now be summarized. The respondents who were "modern" in consumption, educational background and/or occupation (traits which were highly correlated) were favorably inclined toward the practice of family planning and claimed to have used methods Yet these individuals exceeded their stated extensively. ideals and in that sense may be said to have practiced inrelative proseffectively. In addition to their literacy, perity, and favorable attitudes this group was regarded as a primary

target

for

a media campaign by virtue

of their

high media exposure, their extensive holdings of modern goods and their high savings rates (Table 14). On the basis of the economic trends noted earlier this potential target population seems likely to grow in size. There are a number of inand validity. Reliability accuracies and untruths wh'ich could have found their way into the results discussed above. Therefore, some obserand validity of the data are in vations on the reliability were rejected and educational All income statistics order. because of obvious discrepandata were used conservatively It is suspected that in general cies in some responses. the reported use of the pill was exaggerated, while, especially for the rural segment, the use of withdrawal was IRANIANSTUDIES

168

probably understated. tested the Simple cross-tabulations validity of data on contraceptive knowledge and practice. Only one minor error showed up: of the 37 respondents who had no living children 23 stated that they did not want their last pregnancy (Table 5). Fifteen of these had suffered the death of a child, but it is doubtful whether aborand stillbirths tions, miscarriages, could have made up the difference. A comment on abortion is appropriate. Based on the presurvey responses in which only 38 women admitted having had an abortion and 87 percent disapproved of providing abortion on demand, we should conclude that abortion is neither accepted nor practiced extensively. The survey taken after the media campaign yielded similar findings. Furthermore, the survey of the activities of doctors and midwives that formed part of the functionary phase of the ICP suggested that women turned to abortion infrequently. These findings are understandable in view of the fact that abortion is sanctioned by religion and state only when the health of the mother is endangered. Yet, casual evidence, the lengthy instructions for popular methods of abortion supplied by village midwives, and the findings of other studies7 indicate that abortion early in pregnancy is widely accepted and frequently attempted. The Campaign: Preparation

and Imlementation

The presurvey provided broad guidelines on what to say in a mass media campaign and to whom, when, and through what channels. The materials used in the campaign were selected on the basis of pretests using techniques of ranking and paired comparisons. These inputs--the campaign theme, the program symbol, the contents of radio spots and booklets, the composite poster depicting a prosperous two child family entering a family planning clinic--in their widespread dissemination and constant reiteration allowed the goals of the family planning program to be conceptualized and publicized in a striking way. To illustrate, consider the selection of a campaign theme. Some 102 women visiting health clinics were shown 24 slogans which had been divided 169

AUTUMN 1972

into four groups of related appeals for family planning. The first and last groups of messages were the ones preferred by most women. Within groups, slogans were again It became evievaluated by a paired comparison technique. dent that appeals for a two-or-three child family were quite popular and that women were concerned with the safety of contraceptive methods. From these and other findings the Persian slogan "Du ti si bachih bihtarah; gurs u kIalqah bizararah" (Two or three children are better; the pill and The slogan was printed on loop are safe") was developed. all materials--leaflets, posters, banners, mailings, newsbroadcast on radio, in paper and magazine inserts--and movie houses and from loudspeakers. The materials just mentioned were produced during the summer of 1970. Ninety radio items were prepared with and programmers. the cooperation of local scriptwriters announcements by the GoverThere were five-to-ten-minute nor General, the Director of Health and Education, and Materials were adapted for weekly leading gynecologists. A mailing programs directed to farmers, housewives, etc. and community leaders was prepared for 300 professionals a briefing on the population probof leaflets, consisting lem in Iran, and statements by the Shah and Muslim leaders backing the program. A second mailing for 1500 women who had recently given birth contained a covering letter (signed by the Deputy Director of the Isfahan Health Department), a return postcard and introleaflets on contraceptives, The Deputy Director discussed ductory cards for friends. the program with a group of newspaper publishers and journalists and arranged for the preparation and use of 30,000 A film clip and a tape for a sound truck were inserts. produced. These made use of the themes and symbols seThe film clip lasted 90 seconds lected in the pretests. and was shown before every movie--the camera zooms in on a poor family with many children; the narrator stresses that fewer children are dying than before and that two or three well educated children could provide ample support for old age. In addition, prints of the Walt Disney family planning film were shown in the larger cinema houses.

IRANIANSTUDIES

170

Before starting the intensive campaign in December, additional clearances had to be obtained from the approPermission was sought and received from priate officials. chief of police to hang banners from light posts at mathe The Director of and along busy streets. jor intersections Culture and Arts approved the showing of the Disney film The head of the Reand film clips in the cinema houses. Department released the names and addresses of gistration Postage was free women who had registered a recent birth. of charge once use of the government stamp was allowed. The Governor General called a meeting to inform business and government leaders of the program. Students placed 4500 posters around Isfahan City and in the towns of the ostan. The radio spots were changed monthly. The two largest newspapers ran a one-page family planning advertisement five times from December to March and carried 50 The sound truck related news items in the same period. was directed to patrol every street at least once. Results The two main sources of data in the evaluation of system maintained the campaign were the service statistics In addiand the post-campaign sample survey. by clinics tion, there were some evaluation mechanisms that were emThese included an analysis ployed on an experimental basis. and manof letters and telephone calls received, in-clinic reports of fieldinterviews, and unofficial in-the-street workers. The findings of these procedures are not discussed below since they confirmed fully what was learned from the service statistics and the postsurvey. The object of the evaluation was to determine changes in knowledge and practice of family planning, the impact of individual media, and the amount of discussion generated by the campaign. A tangible and significant reAcceptance levels. sult of the program was the increase in acceptances at the clinics. Three months prior to the project there were, on

171

1972 AUTUMIN

the average, 1273 new pill acceptors per month; during the radio programming this figure rose by 36 percent to 1731 per month; and during the intensive campaign the monthly total was 1960, an increase of 54 percent from before the campaign. The number of women returning for pills increased from 8155 per month, at the start of the campaign, to a monthly average of 1,465 during the final three months. The IUD acceptors increased from 69 per month, before the campaign, to 98 per month at the close of the campaign. Condomacceptors increased by 71 percent from a pre-campaign monthly average of 670 to a monthly average of 1184 In addition, the number of condoms during the last phase. issued each month more than doubled from 7345 at the beginning to 15,496 at the end of the campaign. The net increase in new acceptors of all methods was 54 percent from the three months prior to the campaign to the three months at the end of the campaign. In the first three months after the campaign the number of IUD acceptors fell to an average of 91 per month, but rose again to 136 per month in the next three months. but those coming for New pill acceptors declined slightly resupplies increased to 13,680 a month, four to six months after the campaign. Condomacceptors increased about five percent three months after the campaign. the ICP Although the comparison is only suggestive, seems to have engendered an increase in new acceptors in Isfahan Ostan that was greater than the increase in Iran as a whole, not only during but in the six months that followed the campaign. This survey was designed The postcampaign survey. of to measure changes in those attitudes and activities married individuals which had been noted in the presurvey. The names and addresses of the 968 individuals interviewed in the postcampaign survey were supplied by the Iran StaThose interviewed had been selected ranCenter. tistical domly for a household sample survey conducted by the Center. The postsurvey men and women were older and more likely to This feature than the presurvey respondents. be villagers

IRANIANSTUDIES

172

worked to understate the recorded effects of the campaign. To assess the extent of comparability of this sample with that of the presurvey, 10 percent of the presurvey individuals were asked postsurvey questions. With respect to difthe impact of the campaign there was no significant ference between the 10-percent sample and the postcampaign survey sample. Only those findings that were of use in evaluating the media campaign are presented in this article. A number of before and after comparisons are shown in Table 15. Results such as these leave little doubt that in informing the public the media campaign was successful about modern contraceptive methods and the nature of recent trends in infant and child mortality. The recorded family size norm moved in the desired direction although the change was of a smaller order. WITHFAMILYPLANNING TABLE15. PERCENT KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES,ANDPRACTICE,ISFAHANOSTAN,MAY1970 PRESURVEY ANDAPRIL 1971 POSTSURVEY Pereen t of total respondents Presurvey

Item Knowledge Knows of at least one contraceptive Knows of pill Knows of IUD Knows of family planning program Attitudes Expects to use a contraceptive in the future Wanted last pregnancy Believes more children are surviving today Fears the death of children Three or fewer children ideal Four or five children ideal Six or more children ideal Current use Pills IUD Condoms Withdrawal Total number of respondents

Postsurvev

77 77 49 62

89 82 66 85

38 35 57 68 42 45 13

47 37 90 43 54 39 7

10 1 1 17 1,000

14 1 2 14 968

Note:The respondentsin the presurveyare not the same individualsas those in the postsurvey.

173

AUTUMN1972

Following the media campaign withdrawal was still the most commonly used method of control, but fewer couples On balance, those who rejectnow relied on this practice. ed use of withdrawal seemed to adopt the pill and the condom (Table 15). The net increase of four percent in reported use of the pill implied an increase in new acceptors of about 11,000. The actual figure recorded in clinics was 8500. It is likely that the postsurvey overstated use of the pill to an extent, but some of the 2500 new acceptors may have acquired their supplies at pharmacies (for which sales data are not available). The increase in the use of the condom registered in the postsurvey corresponded to increased acceptances at clinics. Like the presurvey the postsurvey recorded a significant incidence of method failure: 75 of the 142 current users of withdrawal and 93 of the 135 current users of the pill claimed to have become pregnant while using those methods. The campaign slogans were known by 59 percent of the postsurvey respondents. Ignoring those who were beyond the transmission range of radio broadcasts, 69 percent heard the Some 90 percent of those with some media exposure slogan. heard the slogan. The family planning symbol was recognized by 39 percent of those interviewed. In general, the mass media effort was most effective in the cities and among women. Although the presurvey found that men had higher media exposure,women had a better recall of family planning messages. One factor that may be cited in explanation is this. The campaign inputs were pretested on women; the poster showed a female doctor displaying female methods to a family. In the postsurvey, 44 percent of the respondents said they talked with friends and neighbors about family planning. The proportion of individuals hearing about family planning on the radio increased from 27 percent in the presurvey to 57 percent in the postsurvey.

IRANIANSTUDIES

174

Cost of Program and Cost Per Acceptor The ICP in its $58,300

to the

entirety

Iranian

Ministry

was supported by a grant of of Health.

No estimate

is

and salaries of staff, available of the resources--wages costs of materials, imputed value of services and facilities provided without charge--contributed by the Iranian government. It is possible to estimate roughly the cost per new acceptor of the media campaign, given that radio time and postage were free. Inputs and costs are shown in Table 16. TABLE16.

EXPENDITURES BY ITEM

Item Banners Film clip: Mailings Newspaper: Exhibits Scriptwriters Translations, Overtime Total

Quantity 200 production prints

14 1500 60,000

inserts advertisements

20 printing

Cost ($) 410 2000 322 61 317 248 126 86 3708 1400 8678

Assuming that the project increased acceptances 40 percent more than would have occurred without a program the cost per new acceptor would be about $2.75. While this is not the place for a discussion of whether such an investment was worthwhile in some sense, it should be pointed out that the cost per new acceptor was likely to fall drastically in the expansion of the media campaign to other areas. Thus, if we again assume a 40 percent net increase in acceptors and allow for the preparation of 200 banners, 60,000 news175

AUTUMN 1972

2000 mailings, 20 hours of programing by paper inserts, 5000 posters and 500 man-hours contributed scriptwriters, by the Health Department, the costs would total to $1540 or less than $1.00 per new acceptor. Final Remarks Beginning in late 1972 and continuing in the present year the mass media project (together with further efforts to enlist the support of rural notables) was expanded to Tentatively, six ostans with a total of 12 million people. it appears that acceptances in most of these ostans have increased by 25 to 3S percent at an estimated cost per acIn view of these developments, ceptor of $.85 to $1.65. the lessons of the ICP remain quite germane. The ICP succeeded in creating messages relevant to Both rural and urmost segments of the local population. about the new contraban groups were informed effectively ceptive methods and some of the considerations--declining child mortality and increased educational opportunities-which bear on adoption of these methods. The project demonstrated that a mass media campaign can raise new acceptance rates. What remains unclear is what long-term effect the For several reasons media campaign will have on fertility. Alnote. we must conclude this article on a pessimistic in though the data have not been analyzed systematically that the program dropthis respect there are indications out rate is very high. A pre-campaign follow-up survey of acceptors in Isfahan conducted by the Ministry of Health found that 80 percent of pill acceptors and 50 percent of BeIUD acceptors had left the program after two years. in two vital aspects, the cause of program limitations sustained and widespread use of modern contraceptive methods may not come about. methods are First, the disadvantages of traditional of the condom, and pill, to some extent characteristics IUD--they are not permanent, and their use requires IRANIANSTUDIES

176

and persistence. discipline Use of the condom requires considerable motivation of course. Many women cannot use the IUD; of those who do some suffer side effects and perhaps 3 percent become pregnant anyway. Pill users may encounter side effects; they are also likely to find this method expensive and tiresome. At the time of the ICP sterilization was not a part of the Iranian family planning program, while medically safe abortions are still not available on demand. Secondly, contraceptive services in Isfahan Ostan were and remain limited to urban areas. The evaluation of the media campaign detected a significant rise in acceptances. However, the bulk of the new acceptors lived in urban settlements. It is likely that many potential acceptors who lived in remote areas were simply unable to utilize any of the proffered services. In addition, many pill acceptors were unable to maintain steady usage because of irregularities in the flow of resupplies. We do not know whether the publicity campaign which certainly stimulated increased acceptances in urban areas worked to motivate the rural segment to take such a course. Many peasants are simply not in touch with the mass media; because of the small size of the sample we cannot say with any confidence that residents of rural areas who were informed of the new contraceptives increased their acceptance rate significantly. We may close with the generalization that no communications program can succeed by itself unless distribution systems are established which are consistent with the needs and characteristics of target women. This leaves open the very important question, which will not be tackled here: What mode of distribution, if any, would serve effectively the rural areas of Iran? The mechanisms which are currently under consideration--construction of rural clinics, establishing depots or other distribution points for pills and condoms in villages, dispatching mobile health teams to the countryside, contracting with local functionaries to distribute pills and condoms and to contact new acceptors--take a technical view of the

177

AUTUMN 1972

The question of the existence, problem of distribution. demand for contraat the present time, of a significant level has been downgraded. ceptive services at the village NOTES

1.

The Isfahan Communications Project was an intensive family planning information and education project which was conducted under the auspices of the Population and Family Planning Division of the Iranian The project was supported with Ministry of Health. funds supplied by the United States Agency for International Development (AID). The AID funds were assigned to the Population Council on the understanding that the Council would make a sub-grant to the IraniAdvisor Only Robert Gillespie, an Ministry of Health. in Communications from the Population Council, was Mr. Gillespie was employed full time on the project. His counterresponsible for the experimental design. part and collaborator was Dr. Mehdi Loghmani, Deputy Director of the Isfahan Health Department. For a treatment of the ICP in its entirety the reader is and Loghmani, "The referred to Lieberman, Gillespie, Isfahan Communications Project," Studies in Family Planning IV(4), April, 1973.

2.

unit that corresponds Ostan is the Iranian territorial Ostans to the American state or the Canadian province. are divided into shahrestans.

3.

records were not available when this The SIO clinical are not article was written; hence, SIO activities covered in what follows.

4.

In pharmacies, pills cost $.75 per cycle compared to In and $.26 in urban clinics. $.13 in rural clinics was established. 1972, a policy of free distribution

5.

It is likely that this high proportion includes abortions. ber of women who had (illegal)

IRANIANSTUDIES

178

a num-

6.

Yet, urban and rural couples in other countries, for example nineteenth-century France, have used withdrawal and certain folk remedies to control their fertility. On this point, see C. H. Pouthas, La population de la France pendant la premiere moitie due XIXe siecle, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques: Travaux et Documents, Cahier No. 25, 1956, as well as articles by Gautier and Henry, Ganiage, and Valmary appearing in the same series.

7.

V. Abedin-Zadeh, "Survey of 786 interviews carried out in family planning clinics in Khuzestan, August, 1969," mimeographed, Ahwaz, Khuzestan, Khuzestan Health Department, 1970.

179

AUTUMN1972

BOOKREVIEWS

Persian Poetry in Kashmir, 1339-1846: An Introduction. gy University of CaliG. L. Tikku. Berkeley and Los Angeles: fornia Press, 1971. x + 321 pp. MICHAELB. LORAINE studied, less is still too little Persian literature than its great wealth and interest warrants, but the Persian PmQof India as a whole is still more neglected. literature fessor Tikku's contribution to making better known the extraordinary development of Persian literary culture in such place as Kashmir must be welcomed, a complex and interesting as there are no other works in English which more especially treat of the subject and cover the same ground. The author clearly had a mountainous task to face over several years in order to produce this book in English. odd to read, in his preface, that his two It is a little main goals were "to provide the Kashmiri reader with a extending over a long period specimen in his literature of time," and "to provide the Iranian reader with a specimen of Persian poetry, which formed an important aesthetic expression of a people and included elements of a tradition later, other than his own." Or is it, as he says a little

Michael B. Loraine is Assistant Professor in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literature at the University of Washington. IRANIANSTUDIES

180

the problems confronting the Kashmiri and "to investigate Iranian readers in the context of Irano-Kashmiri relations"? It is truly an inIn fact it is not so daunting. as the title page says. A short introduction troduction, surveys the field, which is then treated in some detail, chapter by chapter, in chronological and dynastic order. Persian was introduced into Kashmir late in the We are told that it was brought history of its literature. there in the early fourteenth century by Sayyids fleeing Islamic contacts appear to have been made persecution. much earlier, but the last Hindu king of Kashmir reigned 1310-1320, and the first Muslim dynasty, the Shahmiri, did not begin until 1349. The result of Muslim rule was predictable; some kinp were bigoted, some tolerant towards non-Muslims, but all attracted Muslim scholars and poets. the toSignificantly, lerant Zayn al-cAbidin (1420-70) established a Translation Bureau to render Sanskrit books in Persian, and Arabic and Persian into Kashmiri and Sanskrit. It would seem that Kashmiri literature also owes its origins to Muslim rulers' encouragement. We are introduced to some extremely interesting interactions between Persian SUfism and Kashmiri Hindu mysticism, as represented by Lal Did (Granny Lal) the first Kashmiri poet. Succeeding chapters follow the same pattern of historical accounts of rulers, illustrated by examples of poetic literature. The Chaks, 1561-89, encouraged Persian, at court, but outside it was the by now well established, Altheologians and mystics who "made poetry a passion." ready the Mogul court was a counter attraction for court poets, but we are given a fairly full account of Kashmir's It is interfirst major poet--in Kashmiri terms--Sarfi. esting that he helped the Mogul invasion of Kashmir under Akbar, whomhe praised, though mainly a religious writer, whose chief model was Ni;imn of Ganja. As a mathnawl and though ghazal writer, Sarfi is clearly worth investigating, it is too much to say he introduced romance and lyricism into Persian poetry. 181

AUTUMN 1972

The Mogul period, 1589-1751, brings Kashmir into the language wider world of Persian as the true international In this chapter the more familiar names of eastern Islam. of Kalim, 'Urfl, and above all, SA'ib, appear. For now Delhi was the main centre of Persian poetry, and Kashmir was Delhi's hill station, where, for example, a governor like ;afar Khln patronized several major poets, including aI'ib, and established poetical symposia. Here also were many if less famous, poets whose influence other interesting, Late in the Mogul period we find the only Hindu has lasted. poet of the time, Divinshih Adhar, who seems to have been closely associated with better known Juiyi, and to have been Several poets were steeped in Persian literary tradition. bilingual in Kashmiri and Persian, but Kashmiri was neglected. The last chapter covers the Afghans and Sikhs, whose Some governors peace to the valley. rules brought little encouraged poetry, like Sukh Jivan, but the standards were It is the more remarkable lower and the times uncertain. that so much Persian poetry continued to be written, some While the weight of which has only recently been unearthed. felt, Kashmir is once more a of Persian tradition is still Alongside imitations backwater, though not uninteresting. of Firdaws; are Hindu themes, as introduced by Dayaram Kachru, "Khushdil," 1743-1811, whose work is nevertheless The chapter, and permeated with Persian poetic tradition. book, end with another Pandit, Khushdil's son Birbal Kachru, d. 1865. His chief work is given in known as "Virasta," full, the strange Satinima, a story of love and self-immolation through the pract'ice usually spelled Sultee, which The British had already Virasta seems to have witnessed. abolished the practice in India and Kashmir is on the verge of the new order. Yet the ancient Hindu tradition has its last literary expression in Kashmir in Persian, where tradition is so strong that even a Pandit can use Magian (mubad) as synonymous with Hindu Priest, though he must This short mathnawI is one of the most have known better. Hinduism and Persian remarkable examples of cross-blending Islamic tradition in the book.

IRANIANSTUDIES

182

The book is packed and no review can do it full However, it has proved more tedious to review justice. than should have been necessary, because of the large numSome of these are simple misprints or misber of errors. spellings that the press's reader should have noticed. Some are a question of English style and vocabulary, esmost of which are adequate, pecially in the translations, though there are many cases of inexplainable mistranslation by the author with These errors could have been rectified colleague. the help of a long suffering but English-speaking What, for exThe task would be enormous but worthwhile. (p. 106)? ample, are we to make of "radiance-effulging" There are several cases of changing the meaning, or a good These matters can be metaphor, for no apparent reason. with the Persian checked by comparing the translations are too Even here, perplexities texts in the appendices. words left out, obvious misprints, lines jumbled frequent: In some cases the translation omits lines or conflated. present in the text, and in a few the text omits lines Most of the textual errors should have been translated. corrected in proof as they are due to apparent ignorance of Arabic. For example, p. 55, the expression jalla jaEven worse, in jall u jal:la. laluhu is transliterated of the Satinima, on p. 218 this occurs: the translation How can I describe the tale of her neck, her high shoulder blades? God alone knows. The text,

on p. 293, has: gardan-i i_ chun kunam sar tadith-i tacala sha'nuhu allahu akbar.

Not only are the shoulder blades produced by misreading the Arabic sha'nuhu, but allahu is missing a lAm and akbar does exaggeration, even not mean knowing, and the whole religious Further up, a Koranic reference to blasphemy, is missed. of the ra are the moon, and the significance splitting Further, in the book as a whole, errors of transmissed. literation abound.

183

1972 AUTUMN

These are just indications, with too few examples, of serious technical flaws marring an important and worthwhile book. How are we to expect accuracy and care from our students when the University of California Press can allow such errors to pass galley-proofs, and a scholar lets such carelessness pass in a study so dear to him, which has cost him such time and effort?

By Parwis Radjabi Tabrizi. Iran unter Karim U&n (1752-1779). submitted to Georg-August GSttingen (doctoral dissertation 1970. 205 pp. University), By Mehdi Roschanzamir. Hamburg: HartDie Zand-Dynastie. 1970 (Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftmut Ludke Verlag, 8). x + 229 pp., map. liche Dissertationen J. R. PERRY During the whole of the eighteenth century in Iran, there was hardly a decade when rival contenders for power were not churning the country into a bloody chaos or, having a hegemony, relaxed their oppression and exestablished actions long enough for their subjects to resume a life One outstanding exception was free from hunger and fear. the reign of Karim Khin Zand, a Zagros tribal chieftain with no pretensions of birth, education or prior military Between who never even took the title of shih. exploits, 1750 and 1765 this remarkable man overcame all opposition and in the anarchy following Nadir Shih's assassination for the next fourteen years presided from Shiraz as regent (vakil) of all Iran, with the exception of Khurls5n. His

J. R. Perry is Visiting Assistant the University of Chicago.

IRANIANSTUDIES

184

Professor

of Persian at

mild and just administration secured a much-needed period of comparative peace and prosperity, which was then ruined Karim Khan's by the internecine strife of his successors. valuable but unspectacular achievements have made him well loved in Iran to this day, but little studied by historians in either East or West. Only two full-scale works have been published in Tehran in recent years: Hidi Hid&yatils Thrikh-i Zandiyah in 1334/1955, and CAbdal-Husayn Navill's Karim Khin-i Zand in the Kitib-i Javinin series in 1344/ 1965. The two dissertations reviewed here deserve notice as so far the only studies of Iran in the Zand period to have been published in a Western language. Parwis Radjabi Tabrizi (PRT) has confined his work to the period of Karim Khinls rise to power and rule. As with Hid&yati and Navil', about half of the book is devoted to a summary narrative of the historical events of those years, and half to a survey of Iranian society at the time. Mehdi Roschanzamir (MR) has planned his approach in much the same way, but his terms of reference cover the whole Zand period to 1795, his historical summary is more deand the whole is supplemented by a somewhat skeletailed, tal map and an index. Both authors have on the whole reproduced the chronicle-style history of their chief sources, punctuated by chronograms, with little attempt at a thematic classification of material; and a great deal of their social and economic surveys seems too tenuously linked to the actual history, A glance at the if not irrelevant. authors' sources serves in part to explain these inadequacies. One of the three principal Persian chronicles of this period (Abull-Hasan Ghaff&rls Gulshan-i Murid, manuscripts in the Malik Library and the British Museum) is entirely ignored by PRT and almost entirely by MR. Neither author has consulted the records of the East India Company, which are of inestimable value in untangling the confused for any approach chronology of this period and essential to Iran's foreign relations or economic situation. Both writers are content with Amin Gulistanah's Muimal alTawirikh, 6adiq Nimils Tarikh-i Giti-Gushi, a few contemporary and near-contemporary biographies, tazkirahs,

185

AUTUMN 1972

the Chronicle of the and local histories, world histories Carmelites, memoirs of some of the contemporary European and a variety of secondary material. travelers, The most obvious manifestation of this dearth, parof relevant European sources, is in the authors' ticularly PRT generally avoids dating events, especially chronology. in the confused period of Karim Khan's rise to power, and where he does, too often omits an original hijr- date in The GombroonDiary would favor of its AD approximation. have shown him that the Zand clash with Azad Kh&nat Gulinkbid (p. 43) took place in spring 1756, not 1755 as implied Zak; Khan's misadventure on by the Mujmal al-Tawirikh. Hurmuz (pp. 68-69) took place not in 1180/1766-67 but in 1187/1773, as shown both by the EIC records and by a farmin of the Vakil reproduced in Sarlashkar Muqtadir's Kilid-i Both writers, through ignoKhalij-i Firs (pp. 733-34). CAbdal-Razzlq Dunbull's and Murld rance of the Gulshan-i Tajribat al-A&rlr (Majlis Library manuscript), omit all reference to the important battle of Marlghah between Az&d Both repeat the assumption Khan and Fath cAll Khln Afshlr. of the Persian chroniclers that Vehbi Efendi, the Ottoman envoy to Shiraz in 1775, was sent as a result of the Zand siege of Ba*ra (PRT p. 74, MRpp. 74 and 139), whereas a note in the British Foreign Office State Papers makes it clear that the envoy set off before the start of the siege and was entrusted only with a general renewal of diplomaMR, attempting a reasoned chronology from tic relations. The Gombroon his sources, produces many minor errors. Diary shows that CAll Mardin Khin ravaged Fars (p. 19) in not 1165/1752 as given in Fasal''s Firs1163-64/1750-51, the puppet king Ismacil III namah. On this expedition, accompanied CAll Mardan, until recovered by Karim Khin at the battle of Chahar Mabll (p. 21: presumably in 1752 by on the next page we read that "1165/ MR's reasoning)--yet on 1751 zog Karim Han mit Sah Ismicil nach Norden," i.e., Hasan Khin Qijir. his subsequent campaign against Muhd Examples MR's chronology is here at odds with itself. but this is only the framework, not could be multiplied; the substance of these dissertations.

IRANIANSTUDIES

186

Both writers' assessments of Iran's foreign relations in the Zand period suffer from the same deficiency. Garbled accounts from Persian chronicles are juxtaposed with remarks from European secondary sources of varying relevance, without much attempt to follow diplomatic and commercial MR's section on France, based processes or assess results. on Hidlyati's use of the French archives, is disproportionately large compared to that dealing with Britain; in fact for (as PRT correctly observes) it is totally irrelevant, the French never concluded any agreements with the Zands. MR's discussion of Georgia appears oddly under the heading of foreign relations, although Georgia was nominally an Iranian vassal state throughout this time; however this secuse tion, as that on Russia (p. 133f.), shows intelligent of secondary material. Strictly speaking, such detailed discussion of Russia is likewise irrelevant, since there was no Russian contact with Zand Iran before an inconclusive embassy to cAll Murad Khan in 1784. MR's "russische Handelsdelegation" of 1180/1766 (actually 1767)--repeated from Hidayati and/or Navi'i--was in reality a British EIC delegation under George Skipp ("Mister Iskip" in the Gulshani Murad, the original source of this misconception). PRT's British envoy of 1765 (p. 145) was not called Antony Marian-this was the name of the Carmelite brother who accompanied him, as is quite clear in the source. And so on. The copious sections on social history in both books often seem to reflect the writers' broad reading and personal interests rather than the political, social and economic conditions peculiar to late eighteenth-century Iran. MR's exposition of medieval Islamic medicine and judicial mutilation (p. 179f.), or PRT's endless generalities on Persian customs, costumes, ganits and cuisine (pp. 106-126) belong to the tradition of adab literature, not of historical scholarship. Are we meant to be surprised, or reassured, by the revelation (p. 122) that the Vakil's subjects ate lamb kebab, rice and bread with their fingers? Conversely, PRT devotes a mere three pages to the subject of government and administration, and three pages to literature, beginning with vague generalizations about the preceding period and ending with a list tout court of seventeen writers of the time. Out of several points of detail, 187

AUTUMN 1972

suffice it to remark that both writers (MRp. note 396) are puzzled by the nonce word mubas pears as the title of an urban administrative This is Hashim's Rustam al-Tawirikh: Muhammad reading

of muhassil,

184, PRT footis which apin official surely a mis-

"tax-collector."

etc. are Errors in orthography, transliteration, few. Both authors transcribe the Arabian terrirelatively form (MR, cUmmAn, tory of cUmin from its Persian colloquial from Arabic. transliterating of instead PRT 'Ommin, passlm) "Habib and 64) (p. "Quwait" PRT's include oddities Other Luy" (for Levi, p. 199); MR's "Zagag" (for ZIgag, p. 30). MR's very first footnote is missing, and on p. 2 his 6,000 kharvir should be equivalent to 1,800,000 kg., not 18,000kg. Several works referred to in his footnotes seem to be missing from his bibliography (Ua?firi, p. 11; "LAL," pp. 41 and PRT's notes appear all together at the 42; Bakdidi, p. 79). end of the book, 457 in number, and sometimes refer collectively to a whole paragraph of predigested data, making it to trace the source of individual statements. difficult Abbreviations are used from the outset, so one must identireferences by trial and error. fy bibliographical The fact that these are undoctored doctoral dissertaIt will not excuse tions might excuse such technicalities. inadequate research, however well padded with menus, wardBoth books are useful as robes and general reading lists. page, blow-bythirty-three of the period--MR's summaries CAll Khin, Lutf Zand (though history later of resume blow the most adventurous of all the Zands, is unaccountably a feat hitherto unattempted. dismissed in a few lines)--is contribuBut neither book can be considered a significant tion to Zand history.

IRANIANSTUDIES

188

The Successors of Genghis Khan. By Rashid al-Din Tabib. Translated by John Andrew Boyle. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. xi + 372 pp., map. ROMEYN TAYLOR This work of the fourteenth-century Persian historian is reviewed here from the perspective of a historian of China who has no competence either in Mongolian or in Perscholars sian. Fortunately, the work of more versatile such as Doerfer, Pelliot, Chavannes and Cleaves has already of the exposed much of the astonishing interpenetration Chinese, Mongolian and Turkish languages during the years of the Pax Mongolica. Rashid's knowledge of China was entirely at second or third hand, apparently, and derived from the Altan Debtor (Chinese version: Sheng-wu Ch'in-cheng lu) via Juvaini and the oral transmission of Bolad Ching-sang, and from other other documents and oral accounts in Tabriz of Sultaniya. When one considers that he completed his work during 13041316, his information appears to have been generally up-toHis list date, and on some points surprisingly detailed. of the levels of regional and local administration in China (pp. 277-278) even includes the sub-bureaucratic levels of chen and tslun- roughly town and village. (Could his second level be lu, rather than tu? "Tu"lmakes little sense in this series and lu, circuit, was an important level of administration which does not appear in his list. In my innocence of Mongolian and Persian, I do not know whether such a substitution would be orthographically permissible). of the secretariat Rashid's listing and the eleven branch secretariats (pp. 281-283) is at first sight puzzling

RomeynTaylor is Professor Minnesota.

of History at the University

189

of

1972 AUTUMN

because it does not correspond obviously with the informaIt might tion in the geography section of the Yuan-shih. be useful here to complete the comparison begjn by Professor Boyle: Rashid's "Khan-Baliq and Daidul is obviously the his "Jurche and or metropolitan secretariat; Chung-shu shn Solanqa" is Liao-yang (Est. 1287; Rashid's name for the seat is still His "Goli"l is Cheng-tung (Est. 1283). a puzzle). "Goli" is Ch. "Kao-li," K. "Koryo," modern Korea. The seat Cheng-tung was nominally was at K. Kaeson, Ch. K'ai-chleng. subjected to Yuan ruled by the Korean kings but extensively His administration and so counted as a branch secretariat. "Namging," Ch. Nan-ching, "Namging" is Honan (Est. 1293). His "Yangju"1is not smong refers to the seat, Klai-feng. the Yuan-shih's twelve, but Yang-chou was the seat of a during 1276-1284 and 1286-1291. Kiang-Huai branch secretariat His "Khingsaill is Kiang-che (Est. 1284). The seat was at Rashid's "Khingsai," which is modern Hangchow. Hsing-tslai, His "Fuju"l is not among the Yuan-shih's twelve, but a branch at Ch'uan-chou in 1278, moved to was established secretariat Fu-chou ("Fu-jull) in 1281, back to Ch'uan-chou in 1282, back to Fu-chou again in 1283, and was finally merged into Kiangthat Rashid knew that the che in 1285. It is interesting in Ch'uan-chou. Fu-chou office had first been established His "Lukin-Fu"l is Kiangsi (Est. 1277) with its seat at Lunghsing Fu, moved to Kan-chou in 1278, back to Lung-hsing in in 1280 1279, and merged into the Fu-chou branch secretariat in 1280 the office (wherein the Yuan-shih is inconsistent: The to have been in Ch'uan-chou). in question ought still in Lung-hsing in Kiangsi office was finally reestablished 1282. His "Kongil according to Pelliot and Boyle is a reading of Kuang-chou, modern Canton. Here Rashid seems There does not seem to have been to have been misinformed. in this city. His "Qara-Jang" is any branch secretariat by Pelliot and Boyle as Yunnan. Yuan-shih in identified in its list, established cludes a Yunnan branch secretariat A Shensi-Szechwan branch 1276. His "Kinjanfull is Shensi. was established in 1262 at modern Sian (called secretariat Ching-chlao until 1279, An-hsi until 1312, then Feng-yuan). This office was divided in 1286, the Shensi office remaining in An-hsi, and a Szechwan office being established at Ch' His "Qamju" is Kansu (Est. 1281). This leaves eng-tu. unaccounted three of the Yuan-shih's twelve secretariats IRANIANSTUDIES

190

for. One of these was Ling-pei, with its seat at QaraQorum, only established in 1307 and perhaps too late for Rashid to have known of it. Rashid's omission of Szechwan may be understood if its separation from Shensi had not The omission of Hu-kuang, been called to his attention. established at Wu-chlang in 1275 remains unexplained. One might conclude from this reconstruction that Rashid was working from a document or documents written after 1293 (establishment of Honan) but before 1307 (establishment of the obviously notable office of Ling-pei at Qara-Qorum). Rashid's Successors is rich in suggestions and inI was particularly sights. struck (no doubt in sharp contrast with the attitude of most Chinese historians) by the strong and generally approving stress upon the role of women in the rule of the Mongol empire. They stand forth most clearly in the succession crises when, as matriarchs and as managers of the deceased Khans' ordos, they held great and even decisive political power. A China historian may also be surprised at Rashid's dwelling approvingly on the subservience of some of the Khans to their wives or other female relations in matters of state, as in the case of Ogodei in his declining years. Most importantly, however, a reading of Rashid and Juvaini suggests the very rich and as yet largely unexplored possibilities for comparison of the social, and political cultural, processes of Mongol of East and West Asia. domination over the civilizations For one example, one might compare the application to the Ilkhanate and the Great Khanate of Mongke's measures of political centralization and administrative rationalization. Another task might be to compare the roles of Yeh-lu Ch'uts'ai and Juvaini as mediators between the Mongol rulers and their conquered subjects. And why not a comparison of Chinese and Persian historiography of fourteenth-century the empire? Professor Boyle's work appears from the Chinese side to have been done with great care and thoroughness. The of any consequence arise in the appended only difficulties table of the Great Khans. According to Boyle, genealogical Yesun Temur r. 1323-1328, was succeeded by a son, Toq-Temur r. 1328-1329, succeeded by a son of Qaishan r. 1307-1311,

191

AUTUMN 1972

Qutuqtu r. 1329-1332, succeeded by his son Irinchinbal r. 1332, succeeded by Toghan-Temur r. 1332-1370. But relying mainly on L. Hambis' translation of Yuan-shih ch. 108, and his tables, I find the following rather different succession: Yesun Temur (Yuan Emperor T'ai-ting r. 1323-1328) succeeded by a young son Rajapika (1328, not formally enthroned), succeeded by a son of Qaishan (Yuan Emperor Wutsung r. 1307-1311), Toq-Temur (Yuan Emperor Wen-tsung r. first 1328-1329), succeeded by another son of Qaishan, Qoshila (Yuan Emperor Ming-tsung r. 1329), followed by Toq-Temur again r. 1329-1332, followed successively by two sons of Qoshila, Irinchinbal (Yuan Emperor Ning-tsung r. 1332 and Toghan Temur (Yuan Emperor Shun-ti r. 13321370).

IRANIANSTUDIES

192

A DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS OF PERSIAN IN THEUNITEDSTATESAND CANADA

This Directory, compiled by Professor M. A. Jazayery, for the Committee on Persian Language Instruction, includes names, addresses, and fields of specialty of those involved in teaching It is based partly Persian. on the information provided by the persons listed and partly from other sources. There are bound to be inaccuracies and omissions, as well as names that might have

to be deleted. It is hoped that we will be able to publish an up-to-date Directory periodically. Please address all comments to: Professor M. A. Jazayery, Department of Oriental and African Languages and Literatures, University of Texas, 2601 University Avenue, Austin, Texas 78712. Adamec, Ludwig W., Oriental Studies Dept., University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz. 85721 (History of the Islamic World, Contemporary Persian). Alvi,

Algar,

Sajida, McGill University, Toronto mentary Persian and Urdu). Hamid, Dept.

of Near Eastern

of California, Berkeley, sian Literature). Ansari,

Mostafa, Adlai Stevenson of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

193

5, Canada (Ele-

Languages,

Calif.

University

94720 (Modern Per-

Institute, 60637.

The University

AUTUMN1972

Archer,

William, Near Eastern Program, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill. 61801 (Modern Persian Language and Literature).

Banani,

Amin, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages, University of California, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024 (Iranian history, Modern Persian Literature and Language).

Bashiri,

I., Dept. of Middle Eastern Languages, 155 Temof Minnesota, porary South of Folwell, University Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 (Iranian Linguistics).

Beck,

Lois Grant, Dept. of Classics, University chusetts, Amherst, Mass. 01002 (Cultural logy).

of MassaAnthropo-

Beeman, William, Dept. of Anthropology, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn. 06457 (Cultural Anthropology). Bodrogligeti, sity

A., Dept. of Near Eastern of California, Los Angeles,

(Iranian

Languages, UniverCalif. 90024

Languages and Literatures).

Chelkowski, Peter, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages, New York University, New York, N.Y. 10003 (Modern Persian Literature). Claffey-Nash'at, Guity, University 11. 60637. Clinton,

J.,

American Institute

Box 11-1885, ture). Dickson,

Din,

Tehran,

Iran

of Chicago, Chicago,

of Iranian Studies, (Modern Persian

P.O.

Litera-

Princeton M. B., Dept. of Oriental Studies, N.J. 08540 (History, MoUniversity, Princeton, dern Persian).

H. ud, Center University,

IRANIAN STUDIES

for Middle Eastern Studies, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

194

Harvard

Dresden, Mark J., 813 Williams Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104 (Pre-Islamic Iranian Languages & Literatures). Eaton, Richard M., Dept. of Oriental Studies, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz. 85721 (Sufism, History of IndoPakistani subcontinent). Farzan, M., Dept. of Middle East Languages and Cultures, 609 Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027 (Contemporary Persian Literature and Language, Islamic Persian Literature & Philosophy). Frye, R. N., Dept. of Near Eastern Languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138 (Iranian historical linguistics). Haery, Mohsen S., Defense Language Institute, West Coast Branch, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. 93940. Hanaway, William, Dept. of Oriental Studies, 841 Williams Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. 19174 (Islamic Persian Literature, Persian Popular Literature) . Hillman, Michael, The Academy of Language, 183 Shahreza Avenue, Hafez Intersection, Tehran, Iran (Contemporary Persian Fiction and Language: Medieval Persian Lyric Poetry). Hodge, Carleton, Ballentine Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. 47405 (Persian Linguistics and Language). Jahanbani, A., Dept. of Near Eastern Languages, New York New York, N.Y. 10003 (Persian Language, University, Islamic History and Culture). Jazayery, M. A., Dept. of Oriental & African Languages & Literatures, University of Texas, Austin, Tex. 78712 (Modern Persian Linguistics and Literature).

195

AUTUMN 1972

and Cultures, New York, N.Y.

Kashef,

M., Dept. of Middle East Languages 609 Kent Hall, Columbia University, 10027.

Latify,

Foreign Service Hafiz, Washington, D.C. 20520

Loraine,

M. B., Dept. of Near Eastern Languages & Literaof Washington, ture, 229-B Denny Hall, University Persian Literature Wash. 98195 (Islamic Seattle, and Language).

Lorentz,

Portland J. H., Center for Middle Eastern Studies, ConOre. 97207 (History, Portland, State University, temporary Persian Language & Literature).

Luther,

K. A., Dept. of Near Eastern Languages, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48104 (Iranian & EasPersian Literature). Classical tern Islamic History,

Maguire,

M., Dept. University, Literature).

Dept. of State, Institute, (Modern Persian, Dari).

of Near Eastern Languages, New York New York, N.Y. 10003 (Modern Persian

Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Mahmoudi, Jalil, of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 versity logy, Modern Persian). Marashi,

University M., Center for Middle Eastern Studies, of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 (Modern Persian Language & Linguistics).

Peter, Martinez, University (History, Mashiah,

Uni(Socio-

Yaakov, Columbus,

Faculty Tower, State Dept. of History, N.Y. 12561 of New York, New Paltz, Modern Persian). Romance Languages, Ohio State University, Ohio 43210 (Modern Persian Literature).

Mazzaoui, M., Language and Area Center for Near Eastern N.J. 08540 Princeton Studies, Princeton, University, (Modern Persian). IRANIAN STUDIES

196

Millward, W. G., American University in Cairo, 113 Sh. Kasr El-Aini, Cairo, Egypt, UAR (Persian Language and Contemporary Persian Literature). Mintz, Jacqueline W., 1002 Yale Station, 06520 (Persian Linguistics).

New Haven, Conn.

Moayyad, Heshmat, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 60637 (Modern Persian Literature & Language). Moezzi, MaryamK., Defense Language Institute, West Coast Branch, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. 93904 (Contemporary Persian). Mohandessi, M., Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Harvard

Morewedge, Parviz, Center for Near Eastern Languages, Baruch College, New York University, New York, N.Y. 10003 (Mystical Poetry, Philosophical & Logical Texts). Mostofi,

Khosrow, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 (Political Science, Modern Persian).

Motia-Esfahani, S., Center for Near Eastern Studies, New York University, 50 Washington Square South, New York, N.Y. 10003 (Modern Persian Literature). Mottahedeh, R. P., Language and Area Center for Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. 08540 (Iranian History). Page, Mary Ellen, Dept. of Oriental Studies, 841 Williams Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. 19174 (Islamic Literature, Folk Literature). Paper, H. H., Dept. of Linguistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48104 (Iranian Linguistics, Modern Persian). 197

AUTUMN 1972

Perry, John R., Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago, 1155 East 58th, Chicago, Ill. 60637 (18th and 19th Century Iranian History, Persian Language, Modern Persian Literature). Ricks, Thomas, P.O. Box 14-1245, Tehran, Iran (Iranian History, Contemporary Persian Literature). West Coast Brandc, Roohi, Rashad, Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. 93904. West Coast Saba, Siavoush, Defense Language Institute, Branch, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. 93904. Sadeghi,

B., Near Eastern Language & Area Center, UniverLos Angeles, Calif. 90024. sity of California,

West Coast Khosrow Z., Defense Language Institute, Branch, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. 93904 (Contemporary Persian Language).

Sadeghi,

Samiian, U., Near Eastern Language & Area Center, University Los Angeles, Calif. 90024. of California, Savory, R. M., Dept. of Islamic Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto 5, Canada (Modern Persian Literature & Language). Schimmel, Anne Marie, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Cambridge, Mass. 02138 (Modern Harvard University, Persian Literature). Schmidt, H. P., Dept. of Near Eastern Languages & Area Los Angeles, Center, University of California, Calif. 90024. Shojai,

D. A., 223 Plaza Del Norte, La Jolla, Calif. 92037 Contemporary Persian Litera(Comparative Literature, ture).

Shorish,

Mobin, College of Education, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Champaign, Ill. 61820.

IRANIANSTUDIES

198

Spooner, B., Dept. of Anthropology, University of PennsylPa. 19104 (Cultural Anthropology, vania, Philadelphia, Modern Persian). Stilo,

Don, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages, University of Los Angeles, Calif. 90024 (Iranian LinCalifornia, Modern Persian). guistics,

Stowasser, Karl, Dept. of History, University of Maryland, College Park, Md. 20742 (History, Modern Persian). West Coast Taba Tabai, Mahmood, Defense Language Institute, Branch, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. 93904. Teclaw, Ferdows, Defense Language Institute, Branch, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. temporary Persian).

West Coast 93904 (Con-

Tikku, G. L., Center for Asian Studies, University of Urbana, Ill. 61801 (Modern Persian LiIllinois, terature). Wickens, G. M., Dept. of Islamic Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto 5, Canada (Persian Language & Islamic Period). Literature, Classical Windfuhr, G., Dept. of Near Eastern Languages, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48104 (Iranian LinModern Persian). guistics, Yarshater, Ehsan, Dept. of Middle Eastemn Languages, New York, N.Y. 10027 (Iranian Columbia University, Modern Persian Literature). Linguistics, Young, T. Cuyler, Dept. of History, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. 08540 (Modern Persian Literature).

(compiled May, 1973)

199

AUTUMN 1972

CURRENT AND FORTHCOMING TITLES

Jerome W. Clinton The Divan of Manuchihri Damghani: A Critical Study Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures, 1 $5.00

Iraj Bashiri Persian for Beginners Middle Eastern Languages and Linguistics, I $5.00

Iraj Bashiri 'To Be' as the Origin of Syntax: A Persian Framework Middle Eastern Languages and Linguistics, 2 $9.00

Robert A. McDaniel The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution Studies in Middle Eastern History, 1 $12.50 Anthony

Welch

Late Sixteenth Century Painting in Iran Studies in Islamic Art and Architecture, 1 Forthcoming. Price to be announced.

Antiquarian and current books from and about Turkey, Iran, and the. Arab world. Please send for our latest catalog.

Box 14174 University Station / Minneapolis, Minn. 55414 / USA

IRANIAN STUDIES

200

Note on the English Transliteration System The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDIES is based on the Persian Romanization System approved by the American Library Association, the Canadian Library Association, and the Library of Congress. Copies of the transliteration table may be obtained by writing to the Editor.

Iranian Studies is publishedquarterly by The Society for IranianStudies. It

is distributedto membersof the Society as part of their membership.The annualsubscriptionrate for non-membersis $5.00; the price of single copies is $1.25 per issue. For institutions the subscriptionrate is $8.00 per annum. The opinions expressed by the contributorsare of the individualauthors and not necessarilythose of the Society or the editors of Iranian Studie& Articles for publication and all other communicationsshould be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box E-154, Boston College, ChestnutHill, Massachusetts02167, U.S.A. Communicationsconcerningthe affairsof the Society should be addressedto the Secretary,The Society for IranianStudies, P.O. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A. The exclusive distributing agent for IRANIAN STUDIES in Iran is: Kharazmie Publishing & Distribution Co., 229 Daneshgah Street, Shah Avenue (P. 0. Box 14-1486), Tehran, Iran.

COVER: Qazvin Bazaar Photo by H. J. Rotblat