LETTERS Issn 0012-9976 Ever since the first issue in 1966, EPW has been India’s premier journal for comment on current affairs and research in the social sciences. It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949-1965), which was launched and shepherded by Sachin Chaudhuri, who was also the founder-editor of EPW. As editor for thirty-five years (1969-2004) Krishna Raj gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys.
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Lost Legitimacy
False Hope
Y
I
our editorial “Development with Brutality” (EPW, 15 October 2011), written in the context of an act of state terror against the opposition to the Dibang hydroelectric project in Arunachal Pradesh, raises a fundamental question concerning the legitimacy of the Indian state. The editorial highlights a growing trend in the use of the coercive power of the State against those resisting the destruction of their lives and livelihoods by super profit-driven corporate capitalists. Because of this trend, you contend that the State is liable to lose its legitimacy “sooner rather than later”. However, it is arguable that, in the perception of the people adversely affected by brutalised development, the State has already lost its legitimacy. It is doubtful whether the State possesses any legitimacy whatever among adivasis and others facing repression in, for example, the mining belts in Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and Jharkhand. The loss of legitimacy on the part of the State is discernible in other spheres too: in its handling of the nationality question, where the use of brute force takes precedence over politics, and the failure of its police and judicial institutions to deliver justice to the victims of pogroms among minorities. It is difficult to believe that the State enjoys even an iota of legitimacy in the eyes of the ordinary people in Jammu and Kashmir and in the north-east suffering everyday violence and prolonged repression due to the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act. Further, it is perhaps a truism that the legitimacy of the State would be in doubt among the survivors of large-scale targeted violence among minorities, including Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, who are unlikely to ever get justice. Overall, it seems to me that the legitimacy of the Indian state is confined principally to two overlapping categories of people: first, those deemed as “vested interests” in the editorial, “who consume high energy and high cost industrial products and profit out of its investment, production and distribution”; and second, the so-called middle classes. For the rest of the Indian people, the State is already perceived as an instrument of oppression. Anand Chakravarti New Delhi
can appreciate the point your editorial (“Marginalisation, Memory and Monuments”, EPW, 5 November 2011) made about the dalit rejection of the politics of paternalistic benevolence and social reform, and that should be. However, I am not sure whether one can expect support for this cause from a mother who cannot nourish her newborn baby but feeds her infant intoxicants so that she can do wage labour without being disturbed; whether young bonded labour at brick-kilns will appreciate this new constructed Rashtriya Dalit Prerna Sthal? Before rebuking the bourgeoisie’s culture we should check whether a bourgeois group is emerging within the dalit communities themselves. If this is the case, then it could be argued that the construction of the Rashtriya Dalit Prerna Sthal or similar acts are themselves a part of bourgeois culture. Then we should be wary of falling into the trap of praising these as part of dalit culture. Our energy then has to prepare the weakest dalits so that wellestablished dalits can be prevented from living off them. If we cannot ensure this then, I suspect, the poorest dalits will not be able to improve their conditions. This is not just my imagination, rather history is witness to capitalist movements against feudalism where peasants and slaves participated, but after victory all the fruits were taken away by the bourgeoisie. The construction of Rashtriya Dalit Prerna Sthal are a part of bourgeois culture and we need not fall into that trap. Rather we have to search for things and acts within dalit culture which can make us feel proud. Sanjeev Kumar New Delhi
Focusing on Inflation
F
ocusing monetatry policy on taming recalcitrant inflation, the Reserve Bank of India has raised its policy interest rates for the 13th time since March 2010. While the impact of the past monetary policy actions on prices is yet to unfold, its deleterious effect on growth is quite evident in the downward revision of the gross domestic product for the fiscal to 7.6% from 8%
november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
LETTERS
earlier. According to official analysis, Asia’s third largest economy continues to be exposed to high inflation risk, due to structural imbalances in agriculture, infrastructure bottlenecks, a fiscal deficit as also the public debt overhang. This would inevitably result in a continuing squeeze on the living standards of people. According to theoretical formulations, other factors remaining the same, an increase in real output lowers the price level and an increase in money supply raises the price level. Now one of the major factors influencing money supply growth is deficit financing or net Reserve Bank of India credit to the government. The deficit and the public debt of the Government of India have been rising over the years with no corresponding impact on investment and production. The resultant financial leakages go to streng then the parallel economy. It is only when the two blades of the policy scissor, namely, monetary and fiscal policies are sharp and functional, will the objective of policy be achieved. There is a limit to which monetary policy alone can accomplish things. If inflation is triggered by higher oil and commodity prices, and a high fiscal deficit, how can a rate rise influence prices to any meaningful extent? If monetary policy acts with a lag, or produces results with one, why should the monetary authorities tinker with interest rates at every monetary review? What prevents the RBI from using other credit policy measures? Perhaps it is time to look at the central bank’s armoury and see if policy instruments like a quantitative credit ceiling or qualitative methods like selective credit control, etc, have any relevance in the present context. A K Pat Mumbai
Democracy in Greece
T
he prime minister of Greece sprang a surprise by calling for a referendum on the proposed Greece rescue package. He has done well by looking for a democratic solution to the European problem. The first point to note is that the problem is one of the European Monetary Union (emu), not of Greece. In rushing to a common currency across many countries, and forcing them to give up the sovereignty of a monetary policy to a European Central
Bank a highly unstable situation was knowingly created in the interests of the strong European capital – banks in Germany and France that own most of the Greek debt. Italy is in trouble too, not because it is insolvent, but because there is no central bank in Italy. The second is to note that to make the Greeks pay for the sins of the EMU is, and always has been, grossly unfair. Unfair, however, is an ethical concept, not a market term. The markets do not understand the word at all. The way in which the Greek government was humiliated in recent months showed how unscrupulous these financial institutions are. It did not matter what happened to the Greeks, so long as their profits were protected. The prime minister of Greece put up with it with a brave face. But now, he has hit back. The financial institutions are in a tizzy, as it is most unlikely that the doomsday scenario of Europe will persuade the Greeks to bail them out. If the Greeks do reject the “package”, it will hurt the financial interests hard. The Greeks have been hit anyway and have nothing to lose. We have to see how demo cracy works now. Democracy flowered in Greece aeons ago; how is it now? Vinod Vyasulu Bangalore
Turning the Clock Back
T
hough it will be premature to argue too much about the restoration of pre1953 status to Jammu and Kashmir, the much-awaited report of the central government’s interlocutors, though still not made public, has started rumours about such a possibility. It has created much curiosity among various circles and a considerable section of the people in J&K do not believe that autonomy will ever be restored, as they feel the times gone by cannot be traversed again. The question remains, will the clock move backwards? I believe there is a need for a sincere and functional decision which will be based on the experience of long agony by the common people of the state. Such a decision should not be taken from a consensus among politicians – separatists or otherwise. The restoration of genuine internal autonomy to the state can definitely mark the beginning of a
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI nos 46
new era of peace. Restoring the status prior to 1953 by the Government of India will imply that the latter will control only defence, communication and foreign affairs. Whether autonomy will serve the purpose of restoring human rights, economic and social development and above all justice to the people is as yet an unknown factor. Adfar Rashid Shah, Jamia Millia Islamia New Delhi
Remembering M Y Ghorpade
T
he sad demise of eighty-year old M Y Ghorpade in Bangalore marks the end of a class of politicians who believed in governance with a human face. A Cambridge economist and a sibling of the Sandur royal family in Karnataka he was an MLA of Sandur. He was a minister for finance, science and technology, and pan chayati raj and rural development from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s when Karnataka was ruled by Congress chief ministers like M Nijalingappa, Veerendra Patil, Devraj Urs and S M Krishna. He had an eye for macro and micro economic situations in the state and as finance minister his innovative ideas to establish the Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology more than three decades ago showed his concern for bringing technology to the masses. As a panchayat raj minister his passion to decentralise the powers of the state government departments to the panchayats was well known. He shared his ideas on decentralised finances for local bodies in journals like EPW. His hobbies as a wildlife photographer did not affect his official duties as a minister. Indira Gandhi wrote a foreword for his famous book Sunlight and Shadow which is a remarkable compendium of wildlife photography and was the first to receive the World Wild Life Photo Master award. He was also a Fellow of the Royal Photographic Society. His Sandur Iron Ore Mines were not like the present scandalous Bellary mines which have hit the headlines for political and environmental corruption in the country. He was the first mining head in Karnataka who thought of labour welfare and environmental protection of the mining areas. Manu N Kulkarni Bangalore
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november 12, 2011
Jangalmahal: Receding Prospects of Dialogue Mamata Banerjee concurs with P Chidambaram’s counterinsurgency strategy.
S
he revels in rhetoric – Mamata Banerjee’s word of honour was parivartan (change). A large section of the people of West Bengal desperately wanted change, so parivartan brought her to the helm at Writers’ Building, with its Corinthian facade carrying over from the heyday of the East India Company, now, of course, the office and secretariat of the chief minister of West Bengal. But what did parivartan mean for the people of Jangalmahal, the forested belt of Paschim Medinipur, Bankura and Purulia? The astute politician that she is (and no one can accuse her of being a non-performing asset), she had, prior to the state assembly elections, spelt this out quite accurately. No wonder the Trinamool Congress (TMC) performed beyond its dreams in Jangalmahal in the assembly elections in AprilMay this year. Mamata Banerjee and the TMC she heads, as part of parivartan, promised the withdrawal of the Joint Forces (JF) that for the adivasis has been an occupying force since mid-June 2009, the unconditional release of all political prisoners, especially the hundreds of their own men, women and children arrested and dumped into jail in the course of the JF operations, and a dialogue with the Maoists who are leading the resistance there. As we said, she is not a non-performing asset. Every other day she is up to something, and the fourth estate, which usually sleeps late and gets up on the wrong side of the bed, late, is kept on its toes every morning, getting to know the chief minister’s route to Writers’ at the eleventh hour. So, with the usual spectacle, she has been disciplining the health service, but, predictably, has not bothered to even begin the process of reformulating public health policy to serve the needs of the majority who can ill afford what the mushrooming private sector has on offer. The Jangalmahal agenda ostensibly got off the ground very soon after she took office – she appointed a committee to review the cases of political prisoners and a team of interlocutors to get in touch with the Maoists on behalf of the government to facilitate a dialogue. Till date, not a single “Maoist” political prisoner has been released. Indeed, the hundreds of adivasis with false cases slapped on them are still languishing in jail. It goes to the credit of the first Left Front government that it did keep to its promise of an unconditional release of all political prisoners in West Bengal soon after it came to office in the aftermath of the Emergency in 1977. Economic & Political Weekly EPW November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
Early last month, Akash, the secretary of the West Bengal State Committee of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), in a signed statement with two of the state government-appointed inter locutors, offered a ceasefire for a month provided the West Bengal government directed the JF to cease operations during this period. Sure, this was a conditional ceasefire, but a positive step all the same, and it was now up to Mamata Banerjee to take the “peace” process forward. But, as minister of home affairs in the state cabinet, she did all she could to lay the blame for violation of the ceasefire on the Maoists. The home department continued to ban the holding of mass meetings by organisations the intelligence wing claimed were linked to the Maoists – even the Nari Ijjat Bachao Committee (Committee to Protect the Honour of Women) was not allowed to hold its meetings, while the Bhairav Bahini (translated as “terrible force”!), the newly formed vigilante wing of the TMC, was given a free rein. Just the day before the chief minister in a public meeting in Jhargram on 15 October castigated the Maoists, calling them “supari killers” (contractual killers) and “jangal mafia”, the JF, in a raid on the village of Sushnijubi in the Kakrajhor area of Belpahari block in Paschim Medinipur district, is reported to have raped a 28 year-old homemaker when men in khaki came searching for her husband with a warrant for his arrest. This crime created quite a furore because of what the victim did in its aftermath and the shameful behaviour of the district police thereafter, which deeply offended the dignity of the adivasi community. But the woman home minister had not a word to say about the incident even as she used the choicest invective to condemn the Maoists. Despite tall claims, what parivartan has the lady brought to Jangalmahal if her home department directs the police to arrest a doctor and his associate on 14 August when they were returning after having treated around 140 poor adivasis at a health camp at Patharchakri, charging the two medicos under Section 151 of the CrPC, which is meant to prevent the commission of cognisable offences? If there is going to be some parivartan in Jangalmahal, it is the recruitment of some 10,000 special police havildars (constables), on the lines of what the Chhattisgarh government did, and this, after the Supreme Court declared such a practice unconstitutional. And, the other change is, of course, that the TMC’s own Bhairav Bahini was assisting the JF just like the
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EDITORIALS
CPI(M)’s Harmads acted as collaborators of that occupational force. The lady talks of development, but how many new ration shops (fair price shops under the public distribution system) has her administration opened in Jangalmahal in areas where they are desperately needed? Frankly, she, in league with Union
Minister for Rural Development Jairam Ramesh is following the counterinsurgency strategy of Union Minister for Home Affairs, P Chidambaram, which stipulates that the Maoists have to be “flushed out” before “development” can begin. In the interim, development = the construction of roads.
Turning the Spotlight on the Media The media does need to look at its nexus with business interests; injured innocence will not do.
R
ecent remarks by the new chair of the Press Council of India, Justice (retired) M Katju, have sparked off some thing of a debate in the media. Katju’s comments on the intellectual capabilities of journalists and his low opinion of their abilities have predictably led to indignant protestations by media bodies. But regardless of the sweeping generalisation of Katju’s remarks, this is an issue that the media needs to introspect about as standards of reporting have declined noticeably. More relevant is the issue of media ethics, the lack of which was exposed by a report from the very Press Council that Katju now heads. The paid news saga that was exposed after the 2009 elections might today seem an old story. But its import remains relevant. And barring a couple of news organisations, no one has attempted to draw up stricter codes of ethics for journalists to abide by. Katju’s suggestion about bringing the electronic media within the purview of the Press Council and renaming it as the Media Council is the issue that requires greater debate. Regulating the growing, and increasingly powerful, electronic media has been on the government’s agenda for more than a few years. It began in 2008, when the Supreme Court urged the centre to lay down guidelines for the print and electronic media on covering criminal cases under investigation. This was prompted by a public interest litigation (PIL) on the television coverage of the Arushi murder case where one witnessed a virtual trial by the media. Later in the same year, television’s non-stop coverage of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack came in for a lot of criticism, especially when it became evident that it actually aided those managing the terror attacks from Pakistan. In response, the government amended the Cable Network Regulation Act to “regulate” crisis coverage. But when industry bodies protested, the prime minister intervened and put the amendment on hold. In fact, in the last couple of years, each time the government stepped in with some form of regulation, it just as quickly stepped back when objections were raised. The latest was the cabinet approval given last month to the guidelines formulated by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting that laid down that broadcasting licences could be renewed on condition that the channel had not violated any programme/advertising codes on more than five occasions. The guidelines were eventually withdrawn following strong objections from industry bodies like the News Broadcasters Association (NBA), which held that they violated the constitutional right to free speech and expression. The NBA (around 20 private broadcasters representing nearly 40 news
8
channels) has its own News Broadcasting Standards (Disputes Redressal) Authority headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice (retired) J S Verma and includes academicians and journalists. The Indian Broadcasting Foundation (IBF) with nearly 250 entertainment-based channels also has a complaints redressal mechanism. Both, the NBA and the IBF have argued that selfregulation is preferable to government control. Whether self-regulation can work or some regulation is needed can be debated. With an estimated 380 news channels, the electronic media now represents a powerful source of information for shaping public opinion. But apart from the issue of content, not enough attention has been paid to cross media ownership and convergence that is already restricting plurality of news and views. Equally, the nexus between business and media, through arrangements like “private treaties”, where media houses invest in equity in exchange for advertisements and favourable media coverage, remains in place and has not been questioned. Readers and viewers are now unable to distinguish between “news” as they have been conditioned to understand it to be, that is information gathered by professionally trained journalists who attempt to weed out bias when they assemble the information, and paid or sponsored news that is designed to present a viewpoint while being dressed up as “news”. The real danger to the future of the Indian media lies in the distortions of reality that are the result of such a media-business nexus. The paid news syndrome is an extension of this sponsored news phenomenon. It undercuts the very basis on which a free and independent media is premised – one that is supposed to have the ability to be critical equally of government and industry. In the current arrangements, while there is still a semblance of freedom from government regulation the same cannot be said about independence from business and industry. Indeed, in many ways, the corporatised media has become the voice of corporate India, openly or in covert ways. Katju’s suggestion of renaming the Press Council as the Media Council will do little to deal with this deeper problem of a lack of autonomy of the media from business interests and, by extension, political interests. The Press Council has been a virtually toothless body that has had little effect on the print media. Given this, it is unlikely that a Media Council will make any difference. What needs to be addressed is cross-media ownership, and the effect it is having on media content and plurality as well as the manipulation of news content that is the result of the cosy relationship between business, politics and media. November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EDITORIALS
CPI(M)’s Harmads acted as collaborators of that occupational force. The lady talks of development, but how many new ration shops (fair price shops under the public distribution system) has her administration opened in Jangalmahal in areas where they are desperately needed? Frankly, she, in league with Union
Minister for Rural Development Jairam Ramesh is following the counterinsurgency strategy of Union Minister for Home Affairs, P Chidambaram, which stipulates that the Maoists have to be “flushed out” before “development” can begin. In the interim, development = the construction of roads.
Turning the Spotlight on the Media The media does need to look at its nexus with business interests; injured innocence will not do.
R
ecent remarks by the new chair of the Press Council of India, Justice (retired) M Katju, have sparked off some thing of a debate in the media. Katju’s comments on the intellectual capabilities of journalists and his low opinion of their abilities have predictably led to indignant protestations by media bodies. But regardless of the sweeping generalisation of Katju’s remarks, this is an issue that the media needs to introspect about as standards of reporting have declined noticeably. More relevant is the issue of media ethics, the lack of which was exposed by a report from the very Press Council that Katju now heads. The paid news saga that was exposed after the 2009 elections might today seem an old story. But its import remains relevant. And barring a couple of news organisations, no one has attempted to draw up stricter codes of ethics for journalists to abide by. Katju’s suggestion about bringing the electronic media within the purview of the Press Council and renaming it as the Media Council is the issue that requires greater debate. Regulating the growing, and increasingly powerful, electronic media has been on the government’s agenda for more than a few years. It began in 2008, when the Supreme Court urged the centre to lay down guidelines for the print and electronic media on covering criminal cases under investigation. This was prompted by a public interest litigation (PIL) on the television coverage of the Arushi murder case where one witnessed a virtual trial by the media. Later in the same year, television’s non-stop coverage of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack came in for a lot of criticism, especially when it became evident that it actually aided those managing the terror attacks from Pakistan. In response, the government amended the Cable Network Regulation Act to “regulate” crisis coverage. But when industry bodies protested, the prime minister intervened and put the amendment on hold. In fact, in the last couple of years, each time the government stepped in with some form of regulation, it just as quickly stepped back when objections were raised. The latest was the cabinet approval given last month to the guidelines formulated by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting that laid down that broadcasting licences could be renewed on condition that the channel had not violated any programme/advertising codes on more than five occasions. The guidelines were eventually withdrawn following strong objections from industry bodies like the News Broadcasters Association (NBA), which held that they violated the constitutional right to free speech and expression. The NBA (around 20 private broadcasters representing nearly 40 news
8
channels) has its own News Broadcasting Standards (Disputes Redressal) Authority headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice (retired) J S Verma and includes academicians and journalists. The Indian Broadcasting Foundation (IBF) with nearly 250 entertainment-based channels also has a complaints redressal mechanism. Both, the NBA and the IBF have argued that selfregulation is preferable to government control. Whether self-regulation can work or some regulation is needed can be debated. With an estimated 380 news channels, the electronic media now represents a powerful source of information for shaping public opinion. But apart from the issue of content, not enough attention has been paid to cross media ownership and convergence that is already restricting plurality of news and views. Equally, the nexus between business and media, through arrangements like “private treaties”, where media houses invest in equity in exchange for advertisements and favourable media coverage, remains in place and has not been questioned. Readers and viewers are now unable to distinguish between “news” as they have been conditioned to understand it to be, that is information gathered by professionally trained journalists who attempt to weed out bias when they assemble the information, and paid or sponsored news that is designed to present a viewpoint while being dressed up as “news”. The real danger to the future of the Indian media lies in the distortions of reality that are the result of such a media-business nexus. The paid news syndrome is an extension of this sponsored news phenomenon. It undercuts the very basis on which a free and independent media is premised – one that is supposed to have the ability to be critical equally of government and industry. In the current arrangements, while there is still a semblance of freedom from government regulation the same cannot be said about independence from business and industry. Indeed, in many ways, the corporatised media has become the voice of corporate India, openly or in covert ways. Katju’s suggestion of renaming the Press Council as the Media Council will do little to deal with this deeper problem of a lack of autonomy of the media from business interests and, by extension, political interests. The Press Council has been a virtually toothless body that has had little effect on the print media. Given this, it is unlikely that a Media Council will make any difference. What needs to be addressed is cross-media ownership, and the effect it is having on media content and plurality as well as the manipulation of news content that is the result of the cosy relationship between business, politics and media. November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EDITORIALS
Seven Billion and Counting The problem is not population growth but the patterns of consumption.
O
n 31 October, Nargis, born to Vinita and Ajay in Danaur village in Uttar Pradesh, became the seventh billion resident of Planet Earth. For Nargis’ parents, her birth was a reason to celebrate for she was their first child. For India, Nargis symbolised not just one more mouth to feed in a country where every other child is malnourished, but also a girl child, an increasingly endangered species in a country where the child sex ratio has declined alarmingly to an all-time low of 914 girls to 1,000 boys. Although demographers cannot confirm with absolute certainty whether the seven billion mark has been crossed, it is a fair guess. And 31 October was as good a day as any to look again at the “population problem”. But is it a problem? Has our understanding of the challenges of an increasing population changed in these last decades as we acknowledge that the use and consumption of the world’s resources is an equal area of concern? Interestingly, despite the screaming headlines about the world’s population hitting seven billion, there was little talk of a “population explosion” as was witnessed in the past. Does this mean that the import of what women’s groups and others have been stressing for decades, that population growth and stabilisation must necessarily be rooted in women’s right to health and reproductive choice, has finally found its mark? The population question has at least two distinct sides. Stabilising population growth, an aim adopted universally, is based on the assumption that the earth cannot sustain more than a certain number of people. This assumption is rooted in calculations on what people can and do consume in terms of resources. According to some calculations, the earth’s population had already reached “ecological overshoot” in the 1970s. In other words, consumption had already exceeded what was deemed sustainable at that point. And yet, in the year 2011, with a population of seven billion, the earth has not deteriorated into a Malthusian nightmare of wars over scarce resources. Despite the rapid depletion of non-renewable resources, and their iniquitous distribution and use, seven billion people still have a toehold on the planet. But that toehold is increasingly precarious. And the reason is not only because there are more people inhabiting the earth today but also because of the unsustainable patterns of consumption adopted by a fairly small section of the population. The growing consciousness about global warming and climate change that began in the early 1990s was partly responsible for
From 50 Years Ago
Vol Xiii, No 46, november 18, 1961
weekly notes
No Room for Immigrants? Our London Correspondent writes: One of the most controversial pieces of legislation in recent years is the bill to impose restriction on Commonwealth immigration. Despite the legal
exposing the inequity in resource use and its consequences for the entire planet. The richest half billion people on earth, representing just 7% of the population, are responsible for half the carbon dioxide emissions each year while the poorest half billion on earth are responsible for only 7% of the emissions. This is just one of many examples of skewed consumption patterns – in water, food, many kinds of natural resources and manufactured products – that show it is not necessarily how many people live on earth but how much they consume. The other aspect concerns women, who bear the burden of reproduction and yet in many societies do not have the power to decide if and when to have children or how many. Posing population growth as something that requires state intervention inevitably results in coercive policies that have an adverse impact on women the most, policies such as compulsory sterilisation or setting a one or two child norm. Such policies have produced some short-term results, but have also led to significant longterm distortions. The skewed sex ratio in China, for instance, is one such example of the unplanned outcome of the one-child norm. In India, despite the government’s commitment to the 1994 United Nations agreement, millions of women are denied basic reproductive health choices. In many ways, the agreement reached by member nations of the UN in 1994 at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo holds good even today. As part of a 20-year Programme of Action, governments agreed that fertility, health, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and employment were all inextricably linked to population stabilisation. At its core, the agreement placed the centrality of women’s rights in any discussion on population. It was accepted that in the long term, women’s reproductive health and choice rather than government diktat would be a far more effective strategy to lower fertility rate and stabilise population growth. Occasionally, when numbers are thrown about, the sense of this approach is forgotten and some governments are tempted to take panic steps to produce instant results. Yet there is growing and convincing evidence from around the world, including from several states in India, that a strategy that respects women’s rights works best. The birth of Nargis should lead to a reiteration of this strategy by the Indian government.
verbiage with which this bill has been clothed, there is little doubt that whatever its declared intentions may be, it is in essence a bill that will weigh more heavily on coloured immigrants, for the simple reason that the bulk of immigrants happen to be coloured. The mainspring behind this bill is racial emotions and the anticolour group inside the Conservative Party associated with such names as Mr Norman Pannell. Sir Cyril Osborne and others, whose battle cry has been: “Do you want to see Britain go Black?”. Britain is now finding it difficult to face up to the colour problem; is this then
Economic & Political Weekly EPW November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
another step towards the disintegration of the Commonwealth?... Pandit Nehru, questioned about the bill at London airport on his arrival, said that he thought it was rather unfortunate that this kind of thing should be pursued now. Dr Cheddi Jagan was more outspoken and said that “the new bill can only be interpreted as a colour bar....”. Sir Crantley Adams, the West Indian Federal Prime Minister, has also come out sharply against the bill, saying that despite pious assurances to the contrary, it will in fact operate on a basis of race and colour…
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EDITORIALS
Seven Billion and Counting The problem is not population growth but the patterns of consumption.
O
n 31 October, Nargis, born to Vinita and Ajay in Danaur village in Uttar Pradesh, became the seventh billion resident of Planet Earth. For Nargis’ parents, her birth was a reason to celebrate for she was their first child. For India, Nargis symbolised not just one more mouth to feed in a country where every other child is malnourished, but also a girl child, an increasingly endangered species in a country where the child sex ratio has declined alarmingly to an all-time low of 914 girls to 1,000 boys. Although demographers cannot confirm with absolute certainty whether the seven billion mark has been crossed, it is a fair guess. And 31 October was as good a day as any to look again at the “population problem”. But is it a problem? Has our understanding of the challenges of an increasing population changed in these last decades as we acknowledge that the use and consumption of the world’s resources is an equal area of concern? Interestingly, despite the screaming headlines about the world’s population hitting seven billion, there was little talk of a “population explosion” as was witnessed in the past. Does this mean that the import of what women’s groups and others have been stressing for decades, that population growth and stabilisation must necessarily be rooted in women’s right to health and reproductive choice, has finally found its mark? The population question has at least two distinct sides. Stabilising population growth, an aim adopted universally, is based on the assumption that the earth cannot sustain more than a certain number of people. This assumption is rooted in calculations on what people can and do consume in terms of resources. According to some calculations, the earth’s population had already reached “ecological overshoot” in the 1970s. In other words, consumption had already exceeded what was deemed sustainable at that point. And yet, in the year 2011, with a population of seven billion, the earth has not deteriorated into a Malthusian nightmare of wars over scarce resources. Despite the rapid depletion of non-renewable resources, and their iniquitous distribution and use, seven billion people still have a toehold on the planet. But that toehold is increasingly precarious. And the reason is not only because there are more people inhabiting the earth today but also because of the unsustainable patterns of consumption adopted by a fairly small section of the population. The growing consciousness about global warming and climate change that began in the early 1990s was partly responsible for
From 50 Years Ago
Vol Xiii, No 46, november 18, 1961
weekly notes
No Room for Immigrants? Our London Correspondent writes: One of the most controversial pieces of legislation in recent years is the bill to impose restriction on Commonwealth immigration. Despite the legal
exposing the inequity in resource use and its consequences for the entire planet. The richest half billion people on earth, representing just 7% of the population, are responsible for half the carbon dioxide emissions each year while the poorest half billion on earth are responsible for only 7% of the emissions. This is just one of many examples of skewed consumption patterns – in water, food, many kinds of natural resources and manufactured products – that show it is not necessarily how many people live on earth but how much they consume. The other aspect concerns women, who bear the burden of reproduction and yet in many societies do not have the power to decide if and when to have children or how many. Posing population growth as something that requires state intervention inevitably results in coercive policies that have an adverse impact on women the most, policies such as compulsory sterilisation or setting a one or two child norm. Such policies have produced some short-term results, but have also led to significant longterm distortions. The skewed sex ratio in China, for instance, is one such example of the unplanned outcome of the one-child norm. In India, despite the government’s commitment to the 1994 United Nations agreement, millions of women are denied basic reproductive health choices. In many ways, the agreement reached by member nations of the UN in 1994 at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo holds good even today. As part of a 20-year Programme of Action, governments agreed that fertility, health, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and employment were all inextricably linked to population stabilisation. At its core, the agreement placed the centrality of women’s rights in any discussion on population. It was accepted that in the long term, women’s reproductive health and choice rather than government diktat would be a far more effective strategy to lower fertility rate and stabilise population growth. Occasionally, when numbers are thrown about, the sense of this approach is forgotten and some governments are tempted to take panic steps to produce instant results. Yet there is growing and convincing evidence from around the world, including from several states in India, that a strategy that respects women’s rights works best. The birth of Nargis should lead to a reiteration of this strategy by the Indian government.
verbiage with which this bill has been clothed, there is little doubt that whatever its declared intentions may be, it is in essence a bill that will weigh more heavily on coloured immigrants, for the simple reason that the bulk of immigrants happen to be coloured. The mainspring behind this bill is racial emotions and the anticolour group inside the Conservative Party associated with such names as Mr Norman Pannell. Sir Cyril Osborne and others, whose battle cry has been: “Do you want to see Britain go Black?”. Britain is now finding it difficult to face up to the colour problem; is this then
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another step towards the disintegration of the Commonwealth?... Pandit Nehru, questioned about the bill at London airport on his arrival, said that he thought it was rather unfortunate that this kind of thing should be pursued now. Dr Cheddi Jagan was more outspoken and said that “the new bill can only be interpreted as a colour bar....”. Sir Crantley Adams, the West Indian Federal Prime Minister, has also come out sharply against the bill, saying that despite pious assurances to the contrary, it will in fact operate on a basis of race and colour…
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MARGIN SPEAK
Jayalalithaa’s Sacrificial Lambs Anand Teltumbde
The killing of six dalits at Paramakudi, 35 km from Ramanathapuram in Tamil Nadu, as a result of police firing and brutality on 11 September 2011 can be ascribed to Chief Minister Jayalalithaa’s bid to appease the Thevars and draw them into the fold of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam by demonstrating that she can use state power to support them. She has thus undertaken a sacrificial offering of dalits to appease the Thevars!
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nimal sacrifice to propitiate the gods is said to have been a common ritual in Vedic times; today the powers that be gun down dalits to appease their vote bank. Yes, that is precisely what happened in Paramakudi, 35 km from Ramanatha puram, where six dalits were killed in police firing and the unleashing of police brutality on 11 September 2011. The Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa, faced with massive opposition – over the issue of death penalty to the alleged killers of Rajiv Gandhi – barely four months after she regained the reins of power, sacrificed the lives of dalits to propitiate the dominant community of Thevars (incidentally, meaning god, as the distortion of Sanskrit “deva”) in order to insure her powerbase. Unwittingly, in her immediate response to the incident, she justified the “police firing” as an attempt at putting an end to the clash between two communities.
Intricate Plot
This column is based on the author’s fact-finding visit as part of a team of concerned activists to Paramakudi on 2-3 October 2011. This team included Priyadarshini of Democratic Students Union, New Delhi, Lakshmi Prasanna of Caste Annihilation Liberation Front, Murugan, Kesavan and S Gopal of the Centre for Protection of Civil Liberties, Tamil Nadu. Anand Teltumbde (
[email protected]) is a writer and civil rights activist with the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights, Mumbai.
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Notwithstanding media reports, which rarely take pains to unearth the truth in cases where dalits are involved and unquestioningly portray the police version, our factfinding team came to the conclusion that the police action was absolutely unprovoked and was rather pre-planned to terrorise the dalits and appease the Thevars. Despite this, the incident was projected as “a battle field between the agitators and the police personnel” in which “scores of policemen were injured and a number of government vehicles including a riot control vehicle were torched down by the agitators” (The Hindu, 12 September 2011, reporting from Ramanathapuram, Madurai). The police version, of course, repeated its standard story that it had to resort to whatever action it took, in self-defence and to save the lives and property of others. The police version was that as the news of the arrest of the dalit leader John Pandian, who was on his way to Paramakudi, reached the crowd of people collected at the five-point junction to observe the martyrdom of Immanuel
Sekaran – a guru puja – it went berserk, resorting to stone pelting, arson and torching of vehicles. The police, according to its own version, had to lathi charge, but when the situation went out of hand, it had to open fire. So neat and clean! The facts based on the testimonies of eyewitnesses (those wounded and others) and the video recording of the entire episode screamed otherwise. As in previous years, everything appeared usual except for the large numbers of the police who were deployed there, laced with full anti-riot gear and a dreary armoured vehicle Vajra, because of a murder of a 16 year-old Pallar boy, Palanikumar, just two days ago. He was murdered by a group of 10 persons, allegedly for scribbling a derogatory remark on a wall against the Thevar leader Muthuramlinga Thevar. The falsification had begun right here: the wall in question was not normally accessible to dalits and second, the scribbling was at such a height that Palanikumar could not have even got his fingers there. In the light of the fact that there have been such murders on the eve of the guru pujas every year, this murder was not an unusual occurrence. But it perfectly served the purpose of mobilising the huge police force. Likewise, John Pandian, who had been granted special permission to come to Paramakudi, was arbitrarily detained so as to create the grounds for the story that dalits went berserk. As per the practice in previous years, since the traffic on the Madurai-Ramnad road was diverted, there was no question of any rasta roko; the police and the crowd of people were so proximate that stone pelting was not possible; and there being no vehicles around, damaging them was unlikely. While everything appeared normal, the police force suddenly burst into action at around 11.30 with a lathi charge, provoking people into stone pelting from distance. After a few minutes, the police moved in vajra and opened fire without any warning whatsoever, felling four persons. As though it was not enough, they randomly picked up 18 youth in the evening, when normalcy had been restored, and beat them so brutally that two of them died with the beating and the others survived with multiple fractures and broken skulls to tell
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the story of police brutality. At around the same time, on the outskirts of Madurai, a police inspector fired with his service revolver seriously injuring two Pallar boys. Their crime – they dared to argue with the police as to why they were prevented from going to Paramakudi.
Caste Clash and the State The conflict between Thevars, a landowning caste, and the Pallars, a dalit caste of landless labourers, has a long history. Over the years, the Pallars, taking advantage of the reservation policy, went in for higher education and got into government jobs, or migrated to countries in west Asia, Singapore and Malaysia. With their accumulated savings, they bought land, diversified into petty businesses and thus achieved economic independence from the Thevars. The Thevars, on the other hand, built their social capital on the basis of proximity to the powers that be, ignoring education, and stagnated economically. With their social and economic advancement, the Pallars no longer accepted the Thevars’ ideological hegemony, which provoked the latter to assert their dominance with violence. Earlier, in such violence, the Pallars were clearly at the receiving end. But now, they have begun to retaliate. Interestingly, both these communities have developed their respective mythologies to claim nobler lineage. The Thevars claim the regal lineage of Chera, Chola, and Pandians, while the Pallars claim direct descent from Indra, the king of gods. They therefore called themselves as Devendra Kula Vellalar and resented being clubbed with other dalits. The Thevars had an inspiring leader in U Muthuramalingam Thevar, who while mobilising resistance to the Criminal Tribes Act 1920 (some sub-castes of the Thevars had then been classified as “criminal tribes”), got catapulted into politics and became a prominent leader during the postIndependence period until his death in 1963. Pallars had a leader in Immanuel Sekaran, a military pensioner, who catalysed a signi ficant awakening among them. After the 1957 general elections, a major riot broke out between the Thevars, who largely supported the Forward Bloc, and the pro-Congress Pallars, that led to the killing of several persons and the torching of thousands of houses. After the riot, a “Peace Conference”
was held during which Muthuramlingam Thevar’s ego was hurt by Immanuel Sekaran who refused to stand up in a mark of respect for him like all others. Sekaran was murdered the following day and Thevar was arrested for having masterminded the murder but was acquitted of all charges and released in January 1959. After Sekaran’s martyrdom, the Pallars started observing his death anniversary as guru puja at Paramakudi where he was buried. Large numbers of people congregated every year to pay homage at his memorial. After the death of Muthuramlinga Thevar in 1963, his death anniversary became an occasion for Thevar guru puja. In order to claim the Thevar vote bank that was up for grabs after Muthuramlinga’s death, both the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) vied with each other in appealing to the Thevar sentiment by showering honours upon Muthu ramlingam through the state under them. In 1968 the Pasumpon Muthuramalingam Thevar College was founded in Usilampatti by the then DMK-led state government. His biography was included in the high-school textbooks in Tamil Nadu. In 1971 his cemetery in Pasumpon was converted into an official memorial by the AIADMK government and the guru puja became a state function. A life-size portrait of Thevar was installed in the Tamil Nadu Assembly in 1980. In 1984, after the bifurcation of the Ramnad district, the Pasumpon Muthuramalingam district was created. Greenways and Chamiers, two important arterial roads in Chennai, were renamed after Thevar, and his statue was installed at the intersection of his eponymous road with Anna Salai. Also, in Mumbai city, the old Sion-Mahim link road was renamed after him, obviously with the influence of the DMK. Naturally, it provoked the Pallars to demand the same status for Immanuel Sekaran’s memorial and their guru puja. This demand picked up momentum from 2007, when a large congregation of people attended the 50th anniversary of Sekaran’s martyrdom. In 2010, ostensibly with DMK’s mediation, the central government issued a postal stamp in his memory.
At the Altar of Power Numerically, the Thevars outnumber all other backward communities, including
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Pallars, and are thus electorally important. Right from the beginning, Jayalalithaa had realised this, and she has always been their patron. Perhaps, her soulmate Sasikala Natrajan, who belongs to the Thevar community, had a role in this. During her fiveyear tenure as chief minister from 1991 to 1996, Jayalalithaa had extended influential political and police positions to members of the Thevar caste, allowing them to further consolidate their powerbase. One of its fallouts is that a majority of the police force in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu hails from the Thevar caste. This does not however mean that all Thevars are supporters of the AIADMK. In fact, the electoral support of the Thevars is divided between the DMK and the AIADMK. The rout the DMK suffered in the last Assembly elections with an over 12% swing in favour of the AIADMK has presented an opportunity to Jayalalithaa to consolidate her support among the Thevars and thereby reduce her dependence on the smaller coalition parties, which were intrinsically unreliable. Much of her electoral success, in fact, was attributable to the desertion of the DMK bandwagon by these parties. In southern Tamil Nadu, the choice clearly falls on the Thevars. Though the rival Pallars had electorally allied with the AIADMK through Krishnasamy’s Puthiya Tamizhagam, they were not en bloc behind the latter. Their long-standing antagonism with Thevars rather overrode any political arrangement. Strategically, Jayalalithaa would any time prefer Thevar support to that of Pallars. From 2007, the sudden rise in scale of the Immanuel Sekaran’s guru puja has alarmed the Thevars. This is reflected in one of their outfits Aapanaattu Maravar Sangam (AMS) taking a formal note of the “number of people who attend the meeting” and exhorting its members “to stop it else it might become a state function like that of the guru puja of Thevar”. The AMS had called a meeting “to plan to sabotage the gathering on September 11 for the guru puja of Immanuel Sekaran” (AMS pamphlet). The situation provided an excellent opportunity for Jayalalithaa to appease the Thevars and draw them sentimentally to the AIADMK by demonstrating that it can use state power to support them. Thus, she has undertaken a sacrificial offering of dalits to appease the Thevars!
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COMMENTARY
Ramkatha, Rambhakts and the University Ashwin Anshu
The recent decision of Delhi University’s academic council to remove A K Ramanujan’s essay “Three Hundred Ramayanas” from its undergraduate syllabi has done violence to the university’s integrity and undermined the independence and autonomy of its academic life. Rather than stand by its own faculty, the university has pandered to right-wing violence. This is a dangerous precedent.
Ashwin Anshu (
[email protected]) is a doctoral student of Delhi University working on the “Ramkatha and the Construction of Hindu Identity”.
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n essay by the world-renowned Indian folklorist and linguist A K Ramanujan, “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts on Translation” has been at the centre of controversy ever since Delhi University’s history department office was vandalised in February 2008 by youth belonging to Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-affiliated Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) in protest against the introduction of that essay as part of undergraduate readings. Three years down the line, Delhi University, going against the recommendation of the expert committee established on the orders of Supreme Court, has set a perverse seal of legitimacy on that attack by shelving the essay from suggested readings. It is a well-known agenda of the Hindu right to control education in a way that supports its own anti-secular ideology. Earlier attempts were made via the rewriting of school textbooks. An even more sinister method is that of invoking “religious” or “popular sentiment” to attack writings that question the prevailing orthodoxies or put forward new perspectives. This is more dangerous as it erases the crucial line between the freedom of rational enquiry, which is basic to any academic pursuit, and the limitation of this freedom by ideologies which uphold the supremacy of religion and the religious community. The Hindu right wing has increasingly sought to curtail academic freedom by setting up this criteria of “religious sentiment”. The works of some of the best historians in this country, like the late R S Sharma, Romila Thapar and Sumit Sarkar, have been targeted in the past for hurting “religious” sentiments. This time it is Ramanujan’s essay. A brief summary of the background and context in which Ramanujan’s essay had been included in the syllabus will help remove misconceptions about the justification
for its inclusion in the undergraduate course. Delhi University, following extensive deliberations and due procedures, had put into place from July 2005 the restructured syllabi for undergraduate students for Honours courses. This was done by the academic council (AC) based on the report of the Bachelor of Arts (Honours) restructuring committee that had been set up by the vice chancellor on 11 October 2004. The major change effected was to do away with defunct subsidiary courses and replace them with a set of concurrent courses which sought to expose students “to a range of challenging academic debates in areas other than the one covered by the main subject”, considered necessary for students to acquire “critical social awareness” and avoid “over-specialisation”.
Why Ramanujan’s Essay? For students, from streams other than History, a range of disciplinary courses had been framed which included “Culture in India: A Historical Perspective” that had ancient, medieval and modern components. Ramanujan’s essay was included along with Irawati Karve’s novel Yuganta, based on the Mahabharata, for the sub-theme “Ramayana and Mahabharata: Stories, Character and Versions” for the ancient component of the course. These essays were selected in order to expose students from non-History backgrounds to the “best and most innovative historical scholarship” of an “interdisciplinary nature”. The inclusion of Ramanujan’s essay was thus in tune with the nature and purpose of the course that sought to instil a critical and historical understanding of a diverse and plural Indian culture.1 History as a discipline has been a favoured site for extra-academic and coercive interventions since it serves as an important tool for legitimising certain constellations of power or to question them. It is a matter of extreme concern when a secular state and its institutions buckle before the hooliganism of right-wing elements and endorse their undemocratic and anti-rational standpoint which subverts the very premises of a healthy academic environment. The recent decision of the AC of Delhi University to shelve that essay from the reading list of
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the undergraduate courses is precisely such an action. The question that arises is, who has the authority to decide whether a piece of writing hurts sentiments or not? Surely self-appointed groups, which are rising by the dozen in the country these days, cannot be given that authority. The correct thing to do in this case would have been to go by the recommendations of the committee appointed to look into this matter as a result of the Supreme Court order. What makes the AC decision a matter of concern is that three out of the four members of that committee did not find anything objectionable in Ramanujan’s essay, and yet the AC decided to remove it.
The Storytellers’ Reservoir The particular essay, rather than hurting religious sentiments or pronouncing moral judgments, is actually a creative effort, from an ”objective” standpoint to draw upon many pre-existing studies of the Ramkatha tradition and points out an important historical and cultural fact – the diversity of stories connected with Ramkatha. The title “Three Hundred Ramayanas” drew from the enumeration of 300 Ramayanas by one of the most well known of such surveys, that by Camille Bulcke, widely regarded as a classic of the Hindi literary sphere. There are different stories about Ram in different cultures, which reflect the beliefs and attitudes of these cultures. In Jaina Ramayana for example, Ravana rather than being a rakshasa (demon) is considered one of the 63 great Jaina heroes. It has been common to study Ram stories by setting up the Sanskrit Valmiki Ramayana as the standard and definitive Ramayana and to regard other versions as borrowings or distortions, depending upon how the story was presented. This view reinforced the perception that whatever was beautiful and good about Indian culture came from Sanskritic “great traditions”. Ramayana could thus also symbolise an Indian identity which was rooted in an “Aryan” past often seen as the “golden age” of Indian history. Ramanujan’s essay posed afresh the issue of the wide popularity as well as diversity of the Ramkatha tradition. Without diminishing the importance of the Valimiki Ramayana, Ramanujan proposed a level
at which Ramayana could be conceptualised as a cultural language through which different social groups have engaged in a cultural dialogue – the level of a “metaRamayana”. Drawing a beautiful analogy, he likened the Ramkatha tradition to a “pool” or “reservoir” which contains characters, plots, events, geography, incidents and relationships into which poets and storytellers have dipped to weave new stories relating to new contexts. It is for this reason that Ramkatha tradition remains a living and thriving tradition, which can travel in different cultures becoming part and parcel of different beliefs and attitudes. In explaining the ways in which different Ramayanas communicate with each other, Ramanujan chose five examples which represented five different contexts. He selected extracts from the Valmiki Ramayana representing the Hindu tradition, Paumachariyam representing the Jaina tradition, a Kannada folk tale representing an oral and dalit tradition, Kamban’s Iramavtaram representing a regional Tamil tradition and Ramakien representing a Thai south-east Asian example. He proceeded to analyse patterns of difference and similarities among these Ramayanas to explain the argument that each of these Rama stories, while sharing characters and plots nevertheless, are radically different as they relate to different contexts. The fact that Rama and Sita are not treated in an equally reverential manner in all these examples has been held as hurting religious sentiments. But the same charge can be levelled against the Valmiki Ramayana itself, which contains the story of Shambuka, a shudra child who was killed by Rama for performing Vedic austerities. Should dalits and other oppressed castes then demand that Valmiki Ramayana or its Uttar Kanda be taken off from syllabi of universities?
Ramayana among Historians Ramanujan’s essay provides a corrective to interpretations of cultural traditions that privilege dominant discourses. In the Indian context, the Valmiki Ramayana, and Tulsidas’ Ramcharitmanas in north India, are regarded as sacred texts. However, its significance is not the same for every social group. For example, for Kabirpanthis Ram represents nirguna Brahma and does
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not have any name and form. The Valmiki Ramayana too was not a sacred text to begin with, as Rama was represented as an exemplary man whose story or charit was the fittest of subjects for a great poetical work. Even in modern times, the human side of Rama has appealed to many, as Maithili Sharan Gupta wrote “Rama tumhara charita swayam hi kavya hai, koi kavi ban jaye yeh sahaj sambhavya hai” (Rama, your life/personality is itself a poem, those who recount it will be called poets). For historians, epic traditions like Ramkatha are important as the changes in narratives shed light on changing beliefs and attitudes. They cannot be guided by faith while interpreting these stories since their very work involves deconstructing sources to decode various and varying layers of information that can be gleaned. It is this critical study that led to the conclusion that there was no “Ramayana age” or a particular time in which the “Ramayana” was written. The Valmiki Ramayana continued to change and acquire new passages over a long period. Like Homer’s epics Ramayana was composed from floating oral legends and ballads which were given the shape of an epic by the genius of a great poet. There has never been historical evidence that the events narrated ever happened in reality. But for the Hindu right, Ramayana rather than being a mythological poem becomes a fact whose historicity cannot be questioned. Romila Thapar and many others have argued that the historical interest of epic traditions like Ramayana lies precisely for the information they provide about beliefs and attitudes of the social groups which produced the different stories. For a historian therefore, it becomes all the more relevant to pay attention to different versions of the Ramkatha in order to get a better picture of social and historical reality. The traditions of dalits, tribals, peasants, women and lower strata are not borrowed from Sanskrit Ramayana but from their own social experiences and values which are reflected in the Ramkathas that circulate among them.
Conclusions The controversy over Ramanujan’s essay highlights some key issues. One of them is the Hindu right’s claim to act as the
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custodian of Hindu identity and to assert its hegemony over all “Hindu” traditions is often successful due to the weaknesses of our institutions. The other is that the defence of academic freedom and autonomy is central to the life of a university. The supremacy of rational enquiry is the fundamental basis of all academic endeavours and undermining that destroys the basis of a university. If the logic of the criticism of Ramanujan’s essay is extended, then historical studies will be transformed into
theological works that discuss religion only from the theological rather than secular standpoint. If the aim of history education is to broaden minds and to infuse a critical understanding of the past then shelving of essays like that of Ramanujan on non-academic grounds does not help. The climate of intolerance will only be furthered. Therefore, it is the duty of all members of the university community, the larger academic community as well as citizens concerned
Beyond Ramanujan and the Ramayana
Kumkum Roy (
[email protected]) is with the Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
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Note 1 The details of this and other restructured courses, including the guidelines and objectives from which I have quoted, can be accessed at http://www.indiastudychannel.com/resources/22833-University-DelhiB-A-H-Restruc-Syllabus.aspx
would like to sort out for myself, and I hope for others, how these hundreds of tellings of a story in different cultures, languages, and religious traditions relate to each other; what gets translated, transplanted and transposed (Dharwadkar 1999: 133).
Kumkum Roy
Delhi University has removed A K Ramanujan’s essay, “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts on Translation” from its history syllabus. Ramanujan is an engrossing writer, drawing attention to a range of narratives related to the epic from Sanskrit to Kannada and Thai. Most importantly, he uses the different tellings of the Rama story as cultural artefacts that shape and are in turn shaped by our daily existence. Why then should young adult learners be prevented from learning about them?
about our secular public institutions to impress upon Delhi University authorities that they should not bow down to violence but defend their own faculty and academia and reinstate Ramanujan’s essay in the undergraduate syllabi.
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K Ramanujan’s essay, “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Exam ples and Three Thoughts on Trans lation”, originally written in 1987, has been in the headlines recently, because of the way in which it has been deleted from a teaching programme in Delhi University. What has attracted attention, predictably, and has been seized on in the polarised world we inhabit, is the purported possibility of hurting religious sentiments, an almost knee-jerk reaction the moment the Ramayana is mentioned. But are there other questions we need to raise, other issues that we can open up in exploring the significance of this essay? To start with, we need to underline how quickly and deftly Ramanujan demonstrates the futility of attempts to count the number of available Ramayanas. So, while mentioning 300 Ramayanas, he draws on a narrative from the Hindi tradition that demonstrates the impossibility of such a census – there are, in fact, countless tellings (the word Ramanujan privileges over versions), each of them rich and signi ficant in their own ways. The issue that he wishes to address then is different: not how many, but how are they related to one another. Perhaps his agenda is best stated in his own words: In this paper, indebted for its data to numerous previous translators and scholars, I
Note the generous acknowledgement of previous scholarship, and the way in which Ramanujan draws us into his intellectual voyage, as fellow travellers setting out to explore a complex set of issues. These are issues of communication, correspondence, and perhaps even conflict, issues that are of significance to our collective coexistence.
The Five Examples What do the five examples illustrate? The first, which draws on Valmiki’s telling of the Ahalya episode and juxtaposes it with the telling in Kampan’s Iramavataram, draws attention to the ways in which “the structure and sequence of events may be the same, but the style, details, tone, and texture – and therefore the import – may be vastly different” (p 134). The episode, to state its bald elements, deals with the seduction of the wife of the sage Gautama, named Ahalya, by Indra, the king of the gods, and her ultimate redemption by Rama. Ramanujan draws on the two renderings to highlight how the apparently “same” story can be told differently. More specifically, he points out how the dramatic transformations that can be wrought by bhakti are integral to Kampan’s telling, where Ahalya’s release is symbolic of a more general phenomenon: From now on, no more misery, Only release, for all things In this world (ibid: 137).
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of Hindu identity and to assert its hege mony over all “Hindu” traditions is often successful due to the weaknesses of our institutions. The other is the defence of academic freedom and autonomy is cen tral to the life of a university. The su premacy of rational enquiry is a funda mental basis of all academic endeavours and undermining that destroys the basis of a university. If the logic of the criticism of Ramanujan’s essay is extended, then historical studies will be transformed
into theological works that discuss reli gion only from theological rather than secular standpoint. If the aim of history education is to broaden minds and to infuse a critical under standing of past then shelving of essays like that of Ramanujan on non-academic grounds does not help. The climate of intolerance will only be furthered. There fore, it is a duty on all members of the uni versity community, the larger academic community as well as citizens concerned
Beyond Ramanujan and the Ramayana
Kumkum Roy (
[email protected]) is with the Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
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Note 1 The details of this and other restructured courses, including the guidelines and objectives from which I have quoted, can be accessed at http://www.indias tudychannel.com/resources/22833-University-DelhiB-A-H-Restruc-Syllabus.aspx
would like to sort out for myself, and I hope for others, how these hundreds of tellings of a story in different cultures, languages, and religious traditions relate to each other; what gets translated, transplanted and transposed (Dharwadkar 1999: 133).
Kumkum Roy
Delhi University has removed A K Ramanujan’s essay, “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts on Translation” from its history syllabus. Ramanujan is an engrossing writer, drawing attention to a range of narratives related to the epic from Sanskrit to Kannada and Thai. Most importantly, he uses the different tellings of the Rama story as cultural artefacts that shape and are in turn shaped by our daily existence. Why then should young adult learners be prevented from learning about them?
about our secular public institutions to impress upon Delhi University authorities that they should not bow down to violence but defend their own faculty and academia and reinstate Ramanujan’s essay in the undergraduate syllabi.
A
K Ramanujan’s essay, “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Exam ples and Three Thoughts on Trans lation”, originally written in 1987, has been in the headlines recently, because of the way in which it has been deleted from a teaching programme in Delhi University. What has attracted attention, predictably, and has been seized on in the polarised world we inhabit, is the purported possibility of hurting religious sentiments, an almost knee-jerk reaction the moment the Ramayana is mentioned. But are there other questions we need to raise, other issues that we can open up in exploring the significance of this essay? To start with, we need to underline how quickly and deftly Ramanujan demon strates the futility of attempts to count the number of available Ramayanas. So, while mentioning 300 Ramayanas, he draws on a narrative from the Hindi tradition that demonstrates the impossibility of such a census – there are, in fact, countless tell ings (the word Ramanujan privileges over versions), each of them rich and signi ficant in their own ways. The issue that he wishes to address then is different: not how many, but how are they related to one another. Perhaps his agenda is best stated in his own words: In this paper, indebted for its data to nu merous previous translators and scholars, I
Note the generous acknowledgement of previous scholarship, and the way in which Ramanujan draws us into his intel lectual voyage, as fellow travellers set ting out to explore a complex set of issues. These are issues of communication, cor respondence, and perhaps even conflict, issues that are of significance to our col lective coexistence.
The Five Examples What do the five examples illustrate? The first, which draws on Valmiki’s telling of the Ahalya episode and juxtaposes it with the telling in Kampan’s Iramavataram, draws attention to the ways in which “the structure and sequence of events may be the same, but the style, details, tone, and texture – and therefore the import – may be vastly different” (p 134). The episode, to state its bald elements, deals with the seduction of the wife of the sage Gautama, named Ahalya, by Indra, the king of the gods, and her ulti mate redemption by Rama. Ramanujan draws on the two renderings to highlight how the apparently “same” story can be told differently. More specifically, he points out how the dramatic transforma tions that can be wrought by bhakti are integral to Kampan’s telling, where Ahalya’s release is symbolic of a more general phenomenon: From now on, no more misery, Only release, for all things In this world (ibid: 137).
november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
In other words, Ramanujan provides us with tools to read the familiar with an eye for differences rather than sameness, and draws attention to the need to understand these differences in terms of their contexts, rather than evaluating them in judgmental categories of “better” or “worse”. The second example sharpens the ques tion of perspective – Ramanujan draws on Jaina tellings of the Ramayana to illus trate how Ravana can and has been con ceptualised differently, as a tragic figure. Within this tradition, Rama, as an evolved Jaina, does not kill Ravana; that task is as signed to Lakshmana. Ramanujan provides an exquisite thumbnail sketch of the salient features of Jaina narratives. Once more, the implicit plea seems to be to understand these variations rather than rank them hierarchically. We are also made aware of a shift – taken from the comfortable zone of apparent sameness to one where the differences are much more palpable, and therefore challenging. The third instance, drawn from oral traditions circulating in Kannada is a nar rative where Sita is Ravana’s daughter, born because he has broken a vow made to Siva. Ramanujan captures the rhythm of the oral narrative and opens up a new dimension – a narrative that centres around Sita, and one where the conflict between Ravana and Sita acquires distinct psychological overtones. In this powerful telling, the web of sameness is stretched to near breaking point – we can barely recognise parallels with Valmiki’s narra tion, and the differences allow us to think through the complexities of the fatherdaughter relationship, at once disturbing and exciting. The fourth, summarising Thai tellings of the epics highlights differences that may seem less striking – the text is popu lar, but not viewed as part of religious tra ditions. What are enjoyed most are the descriptions of warfare and Hanuman’s exploits. The narrative moves, as it were, along a different register. Ramanujan reverts to a comparison between Valmiki and Kampan in the fifth example. This is at once complex, dense and rich. The metaphors of dying birds and animals that occur at turning points in Valmiki’s narrative are contrasted with the imagery of the river, at once literal and
figurative, with which Kampan’s narrative begins. In other words, Ramanujan reiterates his argument about apparent sameness masking differences with a far more com plicated example – his own working through multiple traditions leads us to what seems to be a return to where we be gan, but we realise that we have actually been led up a spiral, to a deeper under standing through a consideration of these five examples.
The Three Thoughts This leads the reader to the three thoughts mentioned in the title of the article. These are categories Ramanujan introduces to allow us to make sense of the relationships that exist amongst these tellings, as well as of their distinctive features. The first is a relationship that he defines as iconic – one in which there is a conscious, deliberate attempt to ensure that there is a strong resemblance between the tellings/translations. The second category he introduces to enable us to understand the relationships is indexical – Kampan’s telling, he argues is at once iconic but not only iconic. To start with, it is longer, it uses different poetic devices, and it is located in a Tamil milieu. To appreciate it, then, we require a familiarity with the salient and distinctive features of that world. The third category, an intellectually more demanding one, invites us to ex plore the relationship as symbolic, where an apparently identical name can be in vested with a partially or even completely different identity. For instance, the Ravana of the Jaina tradition or of Kannada oral traditions may appear rather different from that of Valmiki. And yet, understanding the one requires prior knowledge of the other. Further, Ramanujan invites us to ex plore the possibility that all three ele ments may be and indeed are present, in varying degrees, in virtually every telling that we may turn to.
for our learners, and persuade them to read material for a variety of reasons. One would be whether the writing is engrossing, something that is capable of holding the attention span of a genera tion of learners whose modes of commu nication are often very different from what ours were. Here, Ramanujan’s ex traordinary skills in juxtaposing argu ment with narrative, in illuminating his concerns with vivid examples, would make him an exemplary and arguably irreplaceable author. A second concern would be in terms of relevance to the theme. In a course on cul ture, an essay that draws attention to a range of narratives related to the Ramayana – from Sanskrit to Kannada and Thai – with ease and felicity would be hard to find. But, significant as these are, these are relatively minor concerns. If we were to think of an article that is thought-provok ing, that introduces the concept of intertextuality, that provides us with the tools to identify inter-textual linkages in other contexts as well, Ramanujan’s contribu tion is virtually irreplaceable. While he uses tellings of the Rama story effortlessly, they are there not simply for their aesthetic merits or their striking imagery or their dramatic qualities, important as all of these are. They are there because Ram anujan is using them to illustrate his larger argument, the three thoughts on how to understand the relationship amongst texts, understood not simply as abstruse or rarefied literary creations but as cultural artefacts that shape and are in turn shaped by our daily existence. In other words, the connections Ram anujan laid out for us have wider implica tions – understanding, applying, refining
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If we reflect (which, assumptions to the contrary, teachers do when they find time to breathe after coping with academic workloads and mind-numbing adminis trative pressures), we try to choose readings
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
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COMMENTARY
and qualifying them can help us make sense of the communicative webs in which our lives are embedded. In denying students access to this rich resource we are not merely succumbing to pressures that threaten to suffocate intellectual spaces, but are also burying carefully crafted tools with which to investigate, understand and appreciate the world around us. Reinventing them would be an epic endeavour. One can, if one wishes, cull out socalled derogatory descriptions of gods from
the article, but then all these references are from texts that have been in circulation for centuries. Also, if we look at the contexts within which Ramanujan cites these, it is not to hold up the deities to ridicule, but rather to illustrate the point that they can and have been viewed from different perspectives that need to be understood and engaged with if we wish to come to terms with the diver sities of a polychrome world. If anything, young adult learners (the average under graduate students) need to be encouraged
The Hisar Bye-elections: Myth and Reality Ranbir Singh
Caste polarisation – a retrograde development in Haryana politics – and negative perceptions of the Congress government’s governance in the state were the key reasons for the defeat of the ruling party candidate in the recently held parliamentary bye-elections in Hisar in October 2011. Unlike what the electronic media projected it to be, the much touted anti-corruption issue and the Anna Hazare campaign were barely relevant factors.
Ranbir Singh (
[email protected]) retired from the department of political science in Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, Haryana.
16
K
uldeep Bishnoi of the Haryana Janhit Congress (HJC)-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) combine man aged a narrow win (by over 6,000 votes) over the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) candidate Ajay Chautala in the recently held parliamentary bye-elections in Hisar constituency in Haryana. The ruling Con gress Party’s candidate Jai Parkash managed only a distant third position and even lost his deposit, giving weight to the main talking point – especially in the electronic media – that the anti-corruption campaign by the Anna Hazare-led civil society team had played a decisive role in these elections.
Reality That this was a myth was clear, as Jai Parkash was relatively the least corrupt of the three main candidates, despite having been the chief of the “green brigade” be tween 1987 and 1989. He would have won the elections hands down if the issue of corruption was key in the elections. Instead the victor was Kuldeep Bishnoi, son of longtime and erstwhile Congress man Bhajan Lal who was well known as a politician who engineered the art of defections in Haryana elections and the runner-up was Ajay Chautala against whom charges in a case of alleged possession of property disproportionate to his known sources of income were framed.
to understand and appreciate these differ ences rather than be prevented from learning about them. The dangers of sup pressing the text in particular and the im plications of a policy of suppression of dis sent in general are far more threatening than any comments Ramanujan makes about Indra and Hanuman. Reference Vijay Dharwadkar, ed. (1999): The Collected Essays of A K Ramanujan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 131-60.
The reality is that the results were at tributed to reasons of sympathy for the Bhajan Lal family and other political fac tors, explained below. During Bhajan Lal’s tenure as chief minister from 1979-86 and 1991-96, the Hisar district had received priority over others in matters of develop ment and recruitment to government jobs; a factor that helped generate sympathy for his son, Bishnoi. Bhajan Lal had passed away in June 2011. The alliance with the BJP was also ben eficial as despite the latter’s narrow base in the district, the combine provided an alternative to non-Jat voters who wanted to ensure the defeat of the INLD – per ceived mainly as a party of the Jats. Infighting among the Congress Party was yet another contributing factor for Bishnoi’s win as Jai Parkash’s candidature was not accepted by dissident leaders of the party apart from local rank and file. This was substantiated by the fact that there was a negative swing even in the six assembly segments – Uklana, Hansi, Barwala, Hisar, Nalwa and Bawani Khera – held by the Congress Party (Table 1). Table 1: Segment-wise Swings in Hisar By-Poll Name of the Segment
HJC
INLD
Uchana Kalan
11.81
03.71
Congress (I)
-15.53
Adampur
07.05
06.53
-13.57 -10.76
Uklana
05.85
04.91
Narnaul
06.58
04.83
-11.44
Hansi
03.23
09.40
-12.64
Barwala
07.01
03.23
-10.24
Hisar
10.39
05.52
-15.89
05.87
07.80
-13.67
-04.52
07.91
-03.39
Nalwa Bawani Khera
Computed from the figures on the segment-wise votes poll by HJC, INLD and Congress(I) in 2009 Lok Sabha Election and 13 September 2011 by-poll given in the press reports.
november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
and qualifying them can help us make sense of the communicative webs in which our lives are embedded. In denying students access to this rich resource we are not merely succumbing to pressures that threaten to suffocate intellectual spaces, but are also burying carefully crafted tools with which to investigate, understand and appreciate the world around us. Reinventing them would be an epic endeavour. One can, if one wishes, cull out socalled derogatory descriptions of gods from
the article, but then all these references are from texts that have been in circulation for centuries. Also, if we look at the contexts within which Ramanujan cites these, it is not to hold up the deities to ridicule, but rather to illustrate the point that they can and have been viewed from different perspectives that need to be understood and engaged with if we wish to come to terms with the diversities of a polychrome world. If anything, young adult learners (the average undergraduate students) need to be encouraged
The Hisar Bye-elections: Myth and Reality Ranbir Singh
Caste polarisation – a retrograde development in Haryana politics – and negative perceptions of the Congress government’s governance in the state were the key reasons for the defeat of the ruling party candidate in the recently held parliamentary bye-elections in Hisar in October 2011. Unlike what the electronic media projected it to be, the much touted anti-corruption issue and the Anna Hazare campaign were barely relevant factors.
Ranbir Singh (
[email protected]) retired from the department of political science in Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, Haryana.
16
K
uldeep Bishnoi of the Haryana Janhit Congress (HJC)-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) combine managed a narrow win (by over 6,000 votes) over the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) candidate Ajay Chautala in the recently held parliamentary bye-elections in Hisar constituency in Haryana. The ruling Congress Party’s candidate Jai Parkash managed only a distant third position and even lost his deposit, giving weight to the main talking point – especially in the electronic media – that the anti-corruption campaign by the Anna Hazare-led civil society team had played a decisive role in these elections.
Reality That this was a myth was clear, as Jai Parkash was relatively the least corrupt of the three main candidates, despite having been the chief of the “green brigade” between 1987 and 1989. He would have won the elections hands down if the issue of corruption was key in the elections. Instead the victor was Kuldeep Bishnoi, son of longtime and erstwhile Congressman Bhajan Lal who was well known as a politician who engineered the art of defections in Haryana elections and the runner-up was Ajay Chautala against whom charges in a case of alleged possession of property disproportionate to his known sources of income were framed.
to understand and appreciate these differences rather than be prevented from learning about them. The dangers of suppressing the text in particular and the implications of a policy of suppression of dissent in general are far more threatening than any comments Ramanujan makes about Indra and Hanuman. Reference Vijay Dharwadkar, ed. (1999): The Collected Essays of A K Ramanujan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 131-60.
The reality is that the results were attributed to reasons of sympathy for the Bhajan Lal family and other political factors, explained below. During Bhajan Lal’s tenure as chief minister from 1979-86 and 1991-96, the Hisar district had received priority over others in matters of development and recruitment to government jobs; a factor that helped generate sympathy for his son, Bishnoi. Bhajan Lal had passed away in June 2011. The alliance with the BJP was also beneficial as despite the latter’s narrow base in the district, the combine provided an alternative to non-Jat voters who wanted to ensure the defeat of the INLD – perceived mainly as a party of the Jats. Infighting among the Congress Party was yet another contributing factor for Bishnoi’s win as Jai Parkash’s candidature was not accepted by dissident leaders of the party apart from local rank and file. This was substantiated by the fact that there was a negative swing even in the six assembly segments – Uklana, Hansi, Barwala, Hisar, Nalwa and Bawani Khera – held by the Congress Party (Table 1). Table 1: Segment-wise Swings in Hisar By-Poll Name of the Segment
HJC
INLD
Uchana Kalan
11.81
03.71
Congress (I)
-15.53
Adampur
07.05
06.53
-13.57 -10.76
Uklana
05.85
04.91
Narnaul
06.58
04.83
-11.44
Hansi
03.23
09.40
-12.64
Barwala
07.01
03.23
-10.24
Hisar
10.39
05.52
-15.89
05.87
07.80
-13.67
-04.52
07.91
-03.39
Nalwa Bawani Khera
Computed from the figures on the segment-wise votes poll by HJC, INLD and Congress(I) in 2009 Lok Sabha Election and 13 September 2011 by-poll given in the press reports.
november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
This happened even in the Hansi assembly segment, where the Congress member of legislative assembly had defected from the HJC. The swing was the highest in Uchana Kalan, a traditional stronghold of dissident leader Birender Singh and a seat held by INLD supremo, O P Chautala. The dismal performance of the Congress might also be a fallout of the Mirchpur incidents featuring atrocities against dalits in 2010. The negative swing against the Congress in Narnaul segment which included Mirchpur village was 11.44%. Dalits are a sizeable number in all the assembly segments in Hisar and it appears that there has been a significant drop in their votes for the Congress, a party that has been favoured by them in the past. The agitation by the Jat community for reservations also seems to have an adverse impact in the constituency for the Congress. The loss of close to 10.24% vote share in Barwala can be attributed to agitations by the Jat Arakshan Samiti. In January 2011, a police firing had led to the
death of a Jat youth in Mayyar village in this segment. Lastly and most importantly, the Congress was hit hard by the polarisation of the non-Jat voters in favour of the HJC-BJP combine candidate due to the factors which have already been mentioned. In the non-Jat dominated segments of Adampur, Hansi and Hisar, vote swing against the Congress was 13.57, 12.64 and 15.89% respectively. It may therefore be concluded that caste-based polarisation played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the Hisar by-poll. It was the success of the HJC-BJP combine in emerging as a credible alternative to the INLD that ensured its win and conversely polarised Jat voters in favour of the latter.
Caste Polarisation This leads us to the question: how does one explain this retrograde development of caste polarisation? The present Congressled government of Haryana should be blamed for the phenomenon because of its mishandling of the Mirchpur and the
Mayyar incidents. But the real causes are very deep-rooted. This is, in fact, the logical culmination of the paradox of economic development at a time of social decay which has been created by the failure of the successive political dispensations to give due attention to cultural development in the state. The leaders of the Congress, INLD, BJP, the Bahujan Samaj Party and the HJC will have to squarely share the blame as all of them have been using caste as an agency for garnering votes. The fact of the matter is that Haryana does not have an effective political party based on ideology and a cadre-based organisation. Political families dominate, deeply entrenched in the state’s neo-feudal society at all levels. It is in this sociocultural and political context in which the outcome of Hisar by-poll has to be seen. It cannot be explained by the role of the “Anna Hazare factor” and the issue of corruption which were conspicuous by their absence in all the assembly segments except the urban and semi-urban ones in Hisar and Hansi. And even there, these issues only had a marginal role.
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COMMENTARY
An Ambiguous Actor: ‘People’ in the Movements Paramjit S Judge
Social movements are often labelled “people’s movements” though the analytical value of the expression is ambiguous in a context where the word “people” is never all-inclusive and signifies different things to different people. It would be better if we stick to a classification that situates the subject of a movement at the centre of the discourse than an umbrella term that is loosely used to cover almost anything.
S
ocial movements are understood as organised collective efforts working towards achieving change. All social movements have an ideology to identify what is wrong with the present and what needs to be done in the future. However erroneous this understanding may be, it has to be remembered that a band of individuals have got together to right a wrong. Sociologically, there is no misunderstanding about the meaning of social movements though there could be disagreements with their ideologies and their orientations towards change. These issues, however, are marginal to an understanding of the concept of a social movement but crucial when it comes to the classification of various movements. An important dimension of contemporary social movements is the close relation they have with consciousness. Social scientists across disciplines and perspectives are of the view that movements can be consciously launched and their ideologies can be articulated in different sections of society. In other words, contemporary social movements tend to be consciously organised with well-defined strategies and tactics.
The Category
Paramjit S Judge (
[email protected]) teaches sociology at Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar.
Elaborate efforts have been made to classify social movements. We thus have various titles in the contemporary literature such as peasants’ movements, farmers’ movements, women’s movements, workers’ movements, and so on. Such a classification situates the subject at the centre of the discourse on movements. They could also be classified as revolutionary, reformist, revivalist, or value-based by situating their ideology at the centre of discussion. Characterising movements in terms of their subjects, it may be argued, constitute a way of understanding their classification and serve certain heuristic purposes. Yet, such a classification becomes heuristic only if clear, distinctive features of each type are identified and it is demonstrated that this
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46
heuristic device performs a particular function or adds to our understanding of an issue from an already existing but limited perspective. In the light of the above, the concept of a “people’s movement” poses serious problems because the analytical value of the expression is not unambiguous. The major difficulty is not with the word “movement”, but with the word “people”. The notion of “people” has remained quite vague, though it is frequently used in speech and writing to signify citizens in general. The word is also quite often used in the literature on social sciences. Subaltern historians use the term “people’s history” though the words “people” and “subalterns” seem to be interchangeable for them. One may ask: Who constitute the “people”? To write a history of the “people” is a problem unless certain markers are established, which could tell us how other kinds of history can be distinguished. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the first to use the word “people” in his important but controversial The Social Contract (1762). He was of the view that the sovereign ruled by virtue of his contract with the “people”. In a way, the view seems quite radical for the 18th century Enlightenment thinker who was opposed to Voltaire’s atheism. It is now clear, as Will Durant pointed out, that the notion of “people” in Rousseau is not inclusive. He never considered the poor and ignorant masses as worthy of being included in the category “people”. For that matter, many Enlightenment philosophers, particularly Voltaire, had disdain for the poor and illiterate. The contract between the sovereign and the “people” meant that governance was essentially based on an understanding between the ruler and the people who mattered in public life. The English Enlightenment had already conceptualised a sphere distinct from the polity and called it civil society. It was a product of the emergence of capitalism in which the divine basis of the sovereign was replaced by the notion of legitimacy. So “people” would comprise heterogeneous individuals and groups that did not have a common interest and an ideology based on their existential condition. The major issue for a social movement then would be forging the unity of heterogeneous people on a common issue. The unity of a social movement is not a temporary
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COMMENTARY
one like that of a crowd, which is highly unstable and unorganised. Creating sustained and durable collective behaviour requires leadership and a common ideology or interest. One could say that when leaders claim that a specific issue concerns the “people”, it is unlikely to get translated into collective action. A simple agitation does not constitute a movement; it is closer to crowd behaviour than a movement. Since the typology is based on the character of the participants, it is important that plausibility exists in the case of a movement that is christened a “people’s movement”. As mentioned, social movements are also classified in terms of their orientation towards the change they wish to bring about – such as revolutionary, reformist and revivalist. Or to use Neil Smelser’s ty pology, they can be norm-oriented or value-oriented. In a monocultural setting, it is possible to launch a movement that covers people from all walks of life but such a movement would tend to lack appeal. A movement of this sort is less probable because it presupposes a consensus of values. The functionalist paradigm presupposes social order to be predicated on a consensus of values, whereas the political economy perspective considers all forms of consensus to be coercive in nature. Coercion is regarded as inbuilt in the system due to the unequal distribution of resources and power in society. Therefore monoculture is a myth; it is generally linked to the prevailing ideas of a period, which, according to Karl Marx, are the ideas of the ruling class. From the Marxist perspective, the possi bility of consensus exists only in a classless society, which, many believe, is a utopia. The paradox involved in the organisation of a movement is that it is generally aimed at ameliorating conditions perceived to be unfavourable by its proponents. If there is a consensus of values, there is no plausibility to the emergence of a movement. It is considered an aberration, deviant and undesirable, something that can legitimately be suppressed by the state. So, there is only one axis along which it is possible to talk about a “people’s movement” – one in which the participants belong to different classes but share common interests or existential conditions. In these terms, race, caste or gender could be the common criteria of a movement. The civil rights movement
20
against racial discrimination in the US in the 1960s was one such example. Similarly, dalit movements or women’s movements in which dalits and women belonging to different classes participate could be regarded as “people’s movements”. But, when characterising across-class movements as black, dalit and women’s movements on the basis of the social character of the participants, it seems logically fallacious to group them under the vague category of “people’s movements”.
People and Civil Society This leads to a simple but theoretically pertinent question. Why has the idea of “people’s movement” emerged at all? It seems that it has something to do with the resurgence of the concept of civil society under the impact of a global world order in which socialism has been marginalised. Notably, the concept of civil society has undergone a radical change. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel conceptualised civil society by separating it from two other entities, family and state. He was of the view that the emergence of civil society could be understood in terms of the disintegration of family into a plurality of families. He wrote, The concrete person, who is himself the object of his particular aims, is, as a totality of wants and a mixture of caprice and physical necessity, one principle of civil society. But the particular person is essentially so related to other particular persons that each establishes himself and finds satisfaction by means of the others, and at the same time purely and simply by means of the form of universality, the second principle is here (Knox 1953: 122-23).
Accordingly, civil society has three dimensions – the system of needs, the administration of justice, and the police and the corporation. The emergence of the concept of civil society could be seen in terms of an arti culation of the desirability of what is required in post-communist societies. Kaviraj is of the view that three strands of conceptualisation exist in contemporary discussions on civil society (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001: 2). These are concerns to encourage institutions outside legal jurisdiction in postcommunist societies; the emphasis laid on the revival of “associative initiatives of non-state organisations in civil society” in the face of the retreat of the welfare state in capitalist countries where trade union
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The book by an author from across the border presents panorama of problems faced by the people of Pakistan. The issues like ethnic tensions within Sindh arising after creation of the state of Pakistan, the rise of spectres of sectarianism in Pakistan and communalism in India and their respective roles in hardening the attitudes of the governments of two countries towards each-other are discussed. Pakistan’s higher education plight versus the ascendency of the armed forces in the country is also investigated to the core, for it signifies a great relevance. At the end it recommends changes in political structure of Pakistan and the resultant foreign policy reorientation towards India, which will benefit people of both the neighbouring states who share a common geography, common history and probably a common destiny. At times the words of the book suggest that the relevant state is orphaned, with no effort by any hand to build it.
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State in India, Pakistan, Russia and Central Asia Rakesh Gupta
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Scene Changes in Kashmir, India and Pakistan Pran Chopra
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november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly The schedule for advt-4 is:
COMMENTARY
militancy cannot be revived; and the arguments for new social movements different from working-class ones. Two things emerge from this. First, the concept of civil society is linked to the collapse of the socialist system of the Soviet Union. Civil society is not what Hegel thought it to be. Civil society has now emerged as an alternative to working-class movements by becoming an associative initiative of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In other words, the concept of civil society has been delinked from the autonomy of the social sphere and linked to the juridical sphere. It is because of this that Chandoke says, “Civil society began where revolution ended” (2003: 29). Tandon makes it more explicit when he writes, “Civil society is a collection of individual and collective initiatives for the common public good” (2003: 64). Second, it is also a sphere of new social movements. These are not working-class movements questioning systems of exploitation. They perform their duties for the public good by making active interventions. So we have movements such as the Right to Information, Save the Tiger, environmental movements, and so on. It is quite clear that such movements do not threaten the existing arrangements of power and economic relations that are asymmetrical and oppressive. To support such movements led by NGOs (also called voluntary organisations), there are international agencies, industry, the state, the middle classes, and so on. Foreign money through the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and development aid from developed countries is poured into the NGO sector in a big way. There used to be a time when the same money was received by the Indian government and invested in various development schemes through its inefficient and also corrupt bureaucracy. Much before the arrival of globalisation, India witnessed a discourse in which the inefficiency of the public sector was denounced as an incurable disease and the private sector’s efficiency was glorified. NGOs gained from this discourse and it has to be admitted that there was better distribution of development aid by the government-run bureaucracy. What is now called civil society is nothing but an ineffective micro-level transformation process in which most of the money
goes to those who run the NGOs, accompanied by corruption in new shapes. This scenario suits the progressive sections among the upper-middle and upper classes because the youth and other change-oriented individuals can contribute to the transformation of the country without any harm to themselves. However, the problem remains, as can be seen in various movements like the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha (Chandoke 2003a) and others that question systems of exploitation. Such movements are not called “people’s movements”.
Three Illustrations But illustrations can be given from the Indian experience of various “people’s movements” whose objectives were presumably meant to cut across various categories or sections of society. Here are three of them. Anti-colonial and anti-imperialism move ments can be regarded as people’s movements because of the reason that a colonialist or imperialist country adversely affects the sovereignty and sense of national pride of the colonised people across castes, regions, religions, classes, genders, and so on. Even given that rulers always create a class loyal to them from among their subjects, the sense of sovereignty could prove to be more powerful. How a revolutionary struggle turns into a “people’s struggle” could best be described by looking at the Naxalite movement in 1969 when the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) was formed. The party’s programme thus described objective conditions in India, US imperialism and Soviet Social imperialism have brought the vital sectors of the economy of our country under their control. US imperialism collaborates mainly with private capitalism and is now penetrating into the industries in the state sector, while Soviet Social imperialism has brought under its control mainly the industries in the state sector and is at the same time trying to enter into collaboration with private capital (CPI-ML 1971: 61).
In view of the comprador character of the Indian state, the communist revolution was to essentially be a “People’s Democratic Revolution”. The use of the word “people” as a concept was highly qualified by the Naxalites but they tried to convince everyone that the category meant all the citizens of India. The recent emergence of environmental movements, which question the relevance
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46
of India’s development path, also claim to be “people’s movements”. Under the cover of saving the environment, we see diverse issues being raised by organisations that mostly comprise middle-class youth wanting to do something meaningful for society without getting into any physical danger. The Narmada Bachao Andolan, movements for the protection of wildlife, anti-nuclear test movements, water-related movements, and the like all fall in the category of environmental movements. These movements do create a discourse that provides a global perspective on the way our environment needs human intervention to save it. Both the national and international contexts are sufficient bases to argue that people from all walks of life should participate in the struggle to save the environment. The question, however, is: Who is the enemy? Baviskar argues that “the defining feature of ‘environmental movements’ in India is not that they represent an ‘environmentalism of the poor’, but that they emerge through collaborations with middle-class actors and audiences” (2005: 161). The word “people” is quite loosely used in common parlance. Take, for example, that Ratan Tata’s Nano car is meant to be a “People’s Car”, which is quite close to the way some historians say “people’s history”. Anything can be covered by such an umbrella term.
Conclusion In the end, whatever may be the level of the inclusiveness of such movements, certain sections are excluded from the category of “people’s movements”. It would make more sense to use better analytical terms to understand social and political movements in India. The concept of “people’s movements” is ambiguously structured and situating the subject/actor/agency in it becomes difficult, making a discursive analysis problematic. Coming to the plausibility of having a “people’s movement”, one can think of working-class movements and dalit movements, in the sense that both these could be oriented towards classless and casteless societies. But we all know that such a situation can be envisaged only in terms of actual consequences of the movements, not in terms of their objectives. Guru and Chakravarty (2005) have commented that movements aimed
21
COMMENTARY
at ending the caste system end up by becoming caste movements themselves. A similar argument may be made about women’s movements. It may therefore be wiser if we avoided becoming vague and ambiguous just to be different. References Baviskar, Amita (2005): “Red in Tooth and Claw? Looking for Class in Struggles over Nature” in Raka Ray and Mary F Katzenstein (ed.), Social
Movements in India: Poverty, Power, and Politics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 161-78. Chandoke, Neera (2003): “A Critique of the Notion of Civil Society as the ‘Third Sphere’” in Rajesh Tandon and Ranjita Mohanty (ed.), Does Civil Society Matter? Governance in Contemporary India (New Delhi: Sage). Chandoke, Neera (2003a): “When the Voiceless Speak: A Case Study of the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha” in Rajesh Tandon and Ranjita Mohanty (ed.), Does Civil Society Matter? Governance in Contemporary India (New Delhi: Sage). Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (1971): “Programme of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Adopted at the Party Congress Held in May 1970”, Liberation, 4 (4), pp 60-63.
Workers Commuting between the Rural and Urban: Estimates from NSSO Data S Chandrasekhar
How large is the workforce that resides in rural areas and commutes to urban areas and vice versa? This note examines this unnoticed issue and compares different aspects of the share of commuting workers in rural and urban workforce based on two National Sample Survey rounds in 2004-05 and 2009-10.
S Chandrasekhar (
[email protected]) is with the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai.
22
T
Guru, Gopal and Anuradha Chakravarty (2005): “Who Are the Country’s Poor? Social Movement Politics and Dalit Poverty” in Raka Ray and Mary F Katzenstein (ed.), Social Movements in India: Poverty, Power, and Politics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 135-60. Kaviraj, Sudipta and Sunil Khilnani, ed. (2001): Civil Society: History and Possibilities (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press). Knox, T M (trans) (1953): Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Tandon, Rajesh (2003): “The Civil Society-Governance Interface: An Indian Perspective” Rajesh Tandon and Ranjita Mohanty (ed.), Does Civil Society Matter? Governance in Contemporary India (New Delhi: Sage).
(rural, urban, no fixed place) of workers. This information is available for workers engaged in non-agricultural activities, i e, for persons employed in industry groups 012, 014, 015 and the National Informatics Centre (NIC) divisions 02-99. So what does the NSSO 2009-10 data say about the commuting worker? In 2009-10, a total number of 8.05 million workers not engaged in agriculture commuted from rural to urban areas for work, while 4.37 million workers not engaged in agriculture commuted from urban to rural areas for work (Table 1). Thus, a total of 12.42 million non- agricultural workers commuted across the rural-urban boundary, in one direction or the other, for work. These numbers need to be taken into account when arriving at the estimates of the rural and urban workforce. Typically, the size of the rural (urban) workforce is set equal to the number of workers living in rural (urban) areas. Mohanan (2008) is the only study that is devoted to the issue of the commuting worker in India and adjusting the size of the rural and urban workforce for 2004-05 to reflect the
he level of urbanisation and the factors contributing to urbanisation in India has been discussed in this journal by at least two recent articles (Bhagat 2011; Kundu 2011). At the same time, the release of numbers from the National Sample Survey Office’s (NSSO) survey of Employment and Unemployment (2009-10) sparked a discussion on implications of estimates of India’s workforce. Irrespective of whether the debate is based on census numbers or NSSO estimates, an issue that has typically slipped under the radar relates to the workforce that resides in rural areas and commutes to urban areas and vice versa. A possible reason for this is that these people are not migrants. In India, the size of the workforce is estimated by place Table 1: Workers* by Usual Place of Residence and Place of Work Place of Work of residence and not place of work. Residence Rural Urban Not Fixed Total However, it is only logical if the Rural 8,55,56,220 80,50,036 50,35,493 9,86,41,749 rural resident who works in urban Urban 43,70,678 7,69,47,337 71,77,731 8,84,95,746 areas is counted as part of the * Workers working in industry groups 012, 014, 015 and NIC divisions 02 – 99. urban workforce and not as part of the commuting worker. Other than this article, rural workforce. Similarly, adjustment there is little available in the literature on needs to be made to account for urban the commuting worker. In addition to those residents reporting that their place of who commute between rural-urban or work is a rural area. urban-rural, there exists another group, Estimates of the commuting workers i e, those without fixed place of work. can be generated by using a very relevant Over five million rural and seven million piece of information available from NSSO’s urban residents report that they do not survey of Employment and Unemploy- have a fixed place of work (Table 2, p 23). ment. The NSSO survey has information If one were to ignore the workers with no on residence (rural, urban) and workplace place of work, then for the year 2009-10, november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
at ending the caste system end up by becoming caste movements themselves. A similar argument may be made about women’s movements. It may therefore be wiser if we avoided becoming vague and ambiguous just to be different. References Baviskar, Amita (2005): “Red in Tooth and Claw? Looking for Class in Struggles over Nature” in Raka Ray and Mary F Katzenstein (ed.), Social
Movements in India: Poverty, Power, and Politics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 161-78. Chandoke, Neera (2003): “A Critique of the Notion of Civil Society as the ‘Third Sphere’” in Rajesh Tandon and Ranjita Mohanty (ed.), Does Civil Society Matter? Governance in Contemporary India (New Delhi: Sage). Chandoke, Neera (2003a): “When the Voiceless Speak: A Case Study of the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha” in Rajesh Tandon and Ranjita Mohanty (ed.), Does Civil Society Matter? Governance in Contemporary India (New Delhi: Sage). Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (1971): “Programme of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Adopted at the Party Congress Held in May 1970”, Liberation, 4 (4), pp 60-63.
Workers Commuting between the Rural and Urban: Estimates from NSSO Data S Chandrasekhar
How large is the workforce that resides in rural areas and commutes to urban areas and vice versa? This note examines this unnoticed issue and compares different aspects of the share of commuting workers in rural and urban workforce based on two National Sample Survey rounds in 2004-05 and 2009-10.
S Chandrasekhar (
[email protected]) is with the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai.
22
T
Guru, Gopal and Anuradha Chakravarty (2005): “Who Are the Country’s Poor? Social Movement Politics and Dalit Poverty” in Raka Ray and Mary F Katzenstein (ed.), Social Movements in India: Poverty, Power, and Politics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 135-60. Kaviraj, Sudipta and Sunil Khilnani, ed. (2001): Civil Society: History and Possibilities (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press). Knox, T M (trans) (1953): Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Tandon, Rajesh (2003): “The Civil Society-Governance Interface: An Indian Perspective” Rajesh Tandon and Ranjita Mohanty (ed.), Does Civil Society Matter? Governance in Contemporary India (New Delhi: Sage).
(rural, urban, no fixed place) of workers. This information is available for workers engaged in non-agricultural activities, i e, for persons employed in industry groups 012, 014, 015 and the National Informatics Centre (NIC) divisions 02-99. So what does the NSSO 2009-10 data say about the commuting worker? In 2009-10, a total number of 8.05 million workers not engaged in agriculture commuted from rural to urban areas for work, while 4.37 million workers not engaged in agriculture commuted from urban to rural areas for work (Table 1). Thus, a total of 12.42 million non- agricultural workers commuted across the rural-urban boundary, in one direction or the other, for work. These numbers need to be taken into account when arriving at the estimates of the rural and urban workforce. Typically, the size of the rural (urban) workforce is set equal to the number of workers living in rural (urban) areas. Mohanan (2008) is the only study that is devoted to the issue of the commuting worker in India and adjusting the size of the rural and urban workforce for 2004-05 to reflect the
he level of urbanisation and the factors contributing to urbanisation in India has been discussed in this journal by at least two recent articles (Bhagat 2011; Kundu 2011). At the same time, the release of numbers from the National Sample Survey Office’s (NSSO) survey of Employment and Unemployment (2009-10) sparked a discussion on implications of estimates of India’s workforce. Irrespective of whether the debate is based on census numbers or NSSO estimates, an issue that has typically slipped under the radar relates to the workforce that resides in rural areas and commutes to urban areas and vice versa. A possible reason for this is that these people are not migrants. In India, the size of the workforce is estimated by place Table 1: Workers* by Usual Place of Residence and Place of Work Place of Work of residence and not place of work. Residence Rural Urban Not Fixed Total However, it is only logical if the Rural 8,55,56,220 80,50,036 50,35,493 9,86,41,749 rural resident who works in urban Urban 43,70,678 7,69,47,337 71,77,731 8,84,95,746 areas is counted as part of the * Workers working in industry groups 012, 014, 015 and NIC divisions 02 – 99. urban workforce and not as part of the commuting worker. Other than this article, rural workforce. Similarly, adjustment there is little available in the literature on needs to be made to account for urban the commuting worker. In addition to those residents reporting that their place of who commute between rural-urban or work is a rural area. urban-rural, there exists another group, Estimates of the commuting workers i e, those without fixed place of work. can be generated by using a very relevant Over five million rural and seven million piece of information available from NSSO’s urban residents report that they do not survey of Employment and Unemploy- have a fixed place of work (Table 2, p 23). ment. The NSSO survey has information If one were to ignore the workers with no on residence (rural, urban) and workplace place of work, then for the year 2009-10, november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY Table 2: Estimates of the Commuting Worker
Rural
Jammu and Kashmir
Rural Residents Place of Work Urban Not Fixed
9,55,987 1,30,665 62,234
Total
22,714
11,09,366
57,970
11,45,968
Himachal Pradesh
10,25,764
Punjab
16,59,704 5,79,270 1,01,287 23,40,261
Rural
Urban Residents Place of Work Urban Not Fixed
Total
24,085
5,15,090
44,778
5,83,953
14,995
1,40,518
8,622
1,64,135
81,449 22,63,595 2,67,693
26,12,737
Chandigarh
29,626
20,986
2,467
53,079
5,240
2,32,448
14,131
2,51,819
Uttarakhand
8,97,741
25,313
12,131
9,35,185
10,802
6,22,925
48,624
6,82,351
58,728 20,53,102
1,91,015
23,02,845
0
2,19,427 1,71,865 32,75,204 2,00,533
36,47,602
63,47,802 4,48,659 2,41,135
Haryana
20,34,019 6,68,028 1,84,278 28,86,325
Delhi
1,69,563
Rajasthan
49,864
70,37,596 4,22,243 34,90,693 3,12,996
42,25,932
Uttar Pradesh
1,35,11,122 11,07,226 10,70,842 1,56,89,190 5,65,528 79,33,283 8,69,907
93,68,718
Bihar
48,86,388
16,18,266
3,16,541 3,99,528 56,02,457 2,57,043 11,58,352 2,02,871
Sikkim
87,689
4,766
4,279
96,734
12
20,787
3,691
24,490
Arunachal Pradesh
58,506
4,197
376
63,079
6,980
37,375
1,145
45,500
Nagaland
63,817
4,221
1,226
69,264
5,873
47,928
5,097
58,898
Manipur
2,01,115
13,760
6,243
2,21,118
6,215
1,09,140
8,018
1,23,373
Misoram Tripura Meghalaya
33,310
0
231
33,541
1,958
72,270
7,174
81,402
5,23,280
15,681
29,234
5,68,195
7,829
1,54,921
14,077
1,76,827
6,731
1,30,635
4,582
2,56,068
3,436
1,14,203
12,996
Assam
21,88,259
2,44,755
1,17,218 1,38,721
24,44,198
61,240
6,64,996
54,722
7,80,958
West Bengal
74,39,266
7,65,118 5,40,171
87,44,555 2,58,024 54,10,562 5,00,250
61,68,836 12,84,485
Jharkhand
22,14,613 2,76,250 4,90,070
29,80,933
Orissa
37,44,855 1,40,004 1,68,060
40,52,919 1,33,202 12,51,632
Chhattisgarh
43,075 10,36,080 2,05,330
15,52,583
9,44,077 1,36,064
93,815
11,73,956
10,15,166
95,715
11,62,958
Madhya Pradesh
31,14,202 2,80,726
53,685
34,48,613 2,76,531 34,63,135
3,11,880
40,51,546
Gujarat
37,00,080
43,14,048 1,83,672 63,23,188 6,22,992
71,29,852
4,43,161 1,70,807
52,077
1,67,749
Daman and Diu
21,756
3
788
22,547
0
22,697
5,343
28,040
Dadra Nagar Haveli
23,558
150
0
23,708
0
20,781
1,345
22,126
Maharashtra
53,35,175 4,29,371 1,60,574
59,25,120 5,24,054 1,26,64,355 8,36,076 1,40,24,485
Andhra Pradesh
86,23,130 3,98,231 3,60,619
93,81,980
3,14,956 63,61,025 6,45,666
73,21,647
Karnataka
37,85,337 2,98,042 2,24,096
43,07,475 3,71,071 55,00,332 4,59,986
63,31,389
Goa Lakshadweep
2,27,893
31,810
11,879
2,71,582
5,025
1,12,176
15,985
6,859
0
1,285
8,144
15
6,876
707
7,598
58,59,053 1,80,219 21,44,935 2,77,502
26,02,656
Kerala
49,65,128 6,48,568 2,45,357
Tamil Nadu
63,63,828 6,10,700 2,33,769 72,08,297
Pondicherry Andaman and Nicobar Islands All-India
3,14,218 84,26,329
1,33,186
7,51,060
94,91,607
77,809
13,349
2,759
93,917
7,933
2,35,649
10,233
2,53,815
50,207
3,129
515
53,851
1,085
45,589
1,822
48,496
8,55,56,220 80,50,036 50,35,493 9,86,41,749 43,70,678 7,69,47,337 71,77,731 8,84,95,746
the urban workforce needs to be adjusted upwards by 3.68 million (8.05 million ruralurban commuters less 4.37 million urban rural commuters) and the rural workforce will have to be adjusted downwards by
a similar magnitude. This number is lower than the adjustment arrived at by Mohanan (2008), who revised the urban workforce upwards by 5.29 million for the year 2004-05. A comparison of the Figure: Distribution of Workers by Place of Work: Rural and Urban Residents share of commuting work(2004-05 and 2009-10) 92 87 87 Place of work rural ers in rural and urban 80 workforce based on the NSSO’s two recent rounds of survey of Employment Place of work urban and Unemployment (66th round: July 2009-June 2010 Place of work not fixed and 61st round: July 200410 10 8 8 5 June 2005) reveals the fol5 4 4 lowing picture. Among rural 2004-05 2009-10 2004-05 2009-10 Rural residents Urban residents residents, the proportion of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46
individuals working in rural areas increased from 80% in 2004-05 to 87% in 2009-10. Among urban residents, the proportion of workers without a fixed workplace increased by 4 percentage points to 8% (see the Figure).
Characteristics The median age of the rural-urban commuter is 32 years and that of the worker commuting from urban to rural is 35 years. Nearly 11% of workers commuting across the rural-urban boundary are women, while 13% of urban-rural commuters are women. Among the rural residents commuting to urban areas, 40% worked as regular salaried/wage employees, while 36% were engaged in other types of work, not related to household enterprise. Among the urban residents commuting to rural areas, 49% worked as regular salaried/wage employees, while 15% were engaged in other types of work, not related to household enterprise. Combining both rural and urban residents who cross the rural-urban border for work, 48% worked as regular salaried/wage employees. Among the rural-urban (urbanrural) commuters, 12 (15)% work in government/public sector and 8 (11)% in public or private limited companies, respectively. Hence, this gives further credence to the idea of a commuting worker. An alternative way to slice the data would be to look at the occupation of the individuals. Among the rural-urban commuters 33% are engaged in elementary occupations,1 25% in craft and related trades,2 and 12% as service workers and in shop and market sales.3 These definitions are from the occupational descriptions available as part of the Revised Indian National Classification of Occupations – 2004. Based on the definitions, it is apparent that a third of the rural-urban commuters have very low skill levels. In contrast, 25% of the urban-rural commuters are officials, managers or professionals and hence have higher skill levels. The occupation profile gets mirrored in the educational attainment of the commuting workers. Among rural-urban commuters engaged in elementary occupations, 38% are not literate, 11% have not finished primary school, 20% have completed middle and secondary school, respectively.
23
COMMENTARY
Nearly 31% of rural-urban commuters are engaged in construction, 20.5% in manufacturing, 12% in wholesale and retail trade and nearly 10% in transport, storage and communication. The industrial distribution of workers commuting from urban to rural areas is slightly different. Nearly 28% are engaged in wholesale and retail trade, less than 15% in construction and nearly 24% in manufacturing (Table 3). Table 3: Industrial Distribution of Workers NIC Groups
Rural Residents Working in Urban Areas
Urban Residents Working in Rural Areas
D
20.59
23.74
F
30.87
14.69
G
12.02
27.73
I
9.96
7.24
K
1.32
3.14
L
7.91
4.27
M
4.79
6.46
N
2.01
1.54
O
2.54
3.42
Others
7.99
7.77
Total
100
100
D: Manufacturing, F: Construction, G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods, I: Transport, storage and communication, K: Real estate, renting and business activities, L: Public administration and defence; compulsory social security, M: Education, N: Health and social work, O: Other community, social and personal service activities.
Among rural-urban commuters without a fixed workplace, 30%, 15% and 29% are engaged in construction, wholesale and retail trade, and transport storage and communications sectors, respectively. These three sectors also dominate when one examines the distribution of sector of activity among those commuting from urban to rural areas. The fact that the abovementioned sectors are attracting workers should not come as a surprise. These sectors have been growing at a brisk pace that last five years. After all, the construction sector grew at 7% in 2009-10, manufacturing grew at 8.8% while trade, hotels, transport and communication grew at 9.7%.
The Sub-National Picture For the year 2009-10, a disaggregation of the number of commuter workers by state reveals patterns that fit popular perceptions. The states adjoining the National Capital Territory of Delhi, i e, Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh have a large number of rural residents reporting working in urban areas. Focus on the disaggregated analysis suggests that the National Sample Survey regions adjoining Delhi from these four states have a
24
sizeable number of workers reporting living in rural but working in urban areas. These four states account for nearly 35% of the workers (all-India) living in rural areas but working in urban areas. The data does suggest interesting commuting dynamics (rural-urban and urban-rural) in these four states and these needs to be explored in detail in the future. The four southern states – Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu – account for nearly 25% of such workers, while Maharashtra and Gujarat account for 11% of workers living in rural, but working in urban areas. These averages are not surprising since these states not only have higher level of urban population, but also sizeable urban centres that would attract the commuter worker. Individuals might be inclined to live in rural areas to take advantage of lower cost of living, in particular housing. The four southern states account for 27% of urban residents working in rural areas, while the share of Maharashtra and Gujarat is 16%. Thus, the movement of workers across the rural-urban or urban-rural corridor is in the urbanised states of India or where large urban centres act as magnets.
Size of Peri-Urban India Given the dichotomous definition of rural and urban areas followed in India, there exist no estimates of population or workers living in peripheral urban (peri-urban) areas. Literally, the word refers to an area around a city or town. At best, estimates of population residing in peri-urban areas can be inferred from the Census of India. Even then these estimates are far from precise. Despite the data deficit and without precisely defining what constitutes a peri-urban area, discussions typically veer
towards abject living conditions or people living in these areas. Conceptually, a peri-urban area is rural in nature, with diverse land-use and some or many of its residents commuting to work in the nearby urban area. One can use this concept in conjunction with the NSSO data. On the not-so-unreasonable assumption that people do not travel inordinately long distances for work, the estimate of workers commuting from rural to urban areas provide the size of workers living in the peri-urban areas. A total of 31.99 million individuals, accounting for 4.3% of India’s rural population, live in the households where one or more worker commutes from rural to urban areas.4 This provides a lower bound estimate of the total population living in peri-urban India. This is a lower bound since there are households living in peri-urban (rural) areas who do not have any member commuting to urban areas for work. Given that information on these households is not available in the NSSO data, what we are estimating as peri-urban population is a lower bound. It should be noted that Mohanan does not advance the numbers on those commuting from rural to urban areas for work as an estimate of the peri-urban population. Though he does state, “This excess movement of rural workers to urban areas is somewhat reinforced by the daily picture of overcrowded trains and buses bringing people to the cities and towns from the surrounding areas, sometimes called the floating population” (p 61).
Policy Implications In 2001, of the 5,161 towns in India, the four southern states along with Maharashtra and Gujarat accounted for 2,091 towns.
National Seminar Financing Health Services in India: Search for Alternatives 4-6 January 2012 Dept. of Economics, Government College for Women, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India Call for papers We are organising a national seminar on the topic Financing Health Services in India: Search for Alternatives in association with Indian Health Economics & Policy Association and Sree Chitra Tirunal Institute for Medical Sciences and Technology, Thiruvananthapuram supported by the University Grants Commission, New Delhi. We solicit you to contribute a paper on the theme. Selected papers would be published by a leading book company in India. For paper writers, up to 2ndAC train fare would be provided for presenting their work in the seminar besides boarding, lodging and an honorarium. Important dates: Submission of intention/abstract: November 24 Communication of review decision: November 28 Submission of full papers: December 24 E-mail: Dr. GODWIN S.K. (Co-ordinator)
[email protected],
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november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Of the 384 urban agglomerations, these states accounted for 161 urban agglo merations. Hence it is not surprising that along with the states adjoining the National Capital Territory of Delhi, the above-mentioned states account for bulk of rural-urban and urban-rural commuters. In this decade, three factors could lead to a steady stream of commuter workers. The first factor is an increase in the number of towns from 5,161 in 2001 to 7,935 towns in 2011. It is possible in many of the small towns the flow of workers would be from urban to rural. Second, an expansion in construction, manufacturing and the wholesale and retail trade sectors, will boost the phenomenon. The third factor is greater transport linkages between rural and urban India. The fact is that eventually 640 districts of India, the 5,924 sub-districts, the 7,935 towns and 6,40,867 villages spread across 35 states and union territories will be interlinked.
The dynamics between the rural and urban areas will be different across the towns and villages of India. Hence, it will be incorrect to focus only on urban engines of growth. What the NSSO data reveals is the size of the r ural-urban linkage. Hence, it is important to undertake rural and urban planning within an integrated framework. Notes 1 Elementary occupations consist of simple and routine tasks which mainly require the use of hand-held tools and often some physical effort. Most occupations in this division require skill at the first skill level. 2 Craft and related-trades workers apply their specific knowledge and skills in the fields of mining and construction, form metal, erect metal structures, set machine tools, or make, fit, maintain and repair machinery, equipment or tools, carry out printing work as well as produce or process foodstuffs, textiles, or wooden, metal and other articles, including handicraft goods. The work is carried out by hand and by hand powered and other tools, which are used to reduce the amount of physical effort and time required for specific tasks, as well as to improve
Where Next for a Europe in Crisis? Kirsty Hughes
The European Union summit of 27 October resulted in an apparent agreement on shoring up Greece’s finances. The details of the agreement are, yet to be fleshed out, but even if they are, it looks like a period of great uncertainty and change ahead for the European Union and the euro.
A
s the leaders of the eurozone strug gle to contain Europe’s financial crisis, big question marks are appearing both over whether the euro will actually survive as a single currency and over whether the euro crisis may split the European Union (EU) politically into two different groups – an inner core around the fragile euro, and an outer core (including the United Kingdom (UK)) losing influence and voice in the EU but less caught up in the immediate crisis.
The Euro in Crisis
Kirsty Hughes (
[email protected]) is a writer based in London.
It is almost two years since the solvency of one of the poorer and smaller members of the eurozone, Greece, has been severely challenged by markets. Greece has had to withdraw from markets for government debt and rely on its euro partners and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prop it up as it attempts to put its house in order. But the “austerity cure” imposed on
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46
the quality of the products. The tasks call for an understanding of all stages of the production process, the materials and tools used, and the nature and purpose of the final product. Most occupations in this division require skills at the second skill level. 3 Service workers and shop and market sales workers provide personal and protective services related to travel, housekeeping, catering, personal care, or protection against fire and unlawful acts, or they pose as models for artistic creation and display, or demonstrate and sell goods in wholesale or retail shops and similar establishments as well as at stalls and on markets. Most occupations in this division require skills at the second skill level. 4 A total of 15.44 million individuals accounting for 5.5% of India’s urban population live in a household where at least one member commutes from urban to rural area for work.
References Bhagat, R B (2011): “Emerging Pattern of Urbanisation in India”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 46, No 34, 20 August. Kundu, Amitabh (2011): “Politics and Economics of Urban Growth”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 46, No 20, 14 May. Mohanan, P C (2008): “Differentials in the RuralUrban Movement of Workers”, The Journal of Income and Wealth, Vol 30, No I, January.
Greece of huge public spending cuts, privatisation and tax increases is proving disastrous both economically as the economy shrinks faster than the government budget deficit and politically as tens of thousands take to the streets and strikes become a common occurrence. But the much wider challenge for the EU – or those 17 of its 27 members in the eurozone – has been the contagion effect to other euro countries. Portugal and Ireland are now also dependant on eurozone support as they implement austerity measures. And the markets are making it evermore costly to fund Italian and Spanish debt too. And while it has been a huge political effort, at a time of recession, for eurozone members to agree to bail out the relatively small economies of Greece, Ireland and Portugal – leading not least to much bad blood between Germany and Greece – it is Italy and Spain that are the politicians’ real nightmare. Italy and Spain are the third and fourth largest economies in the eurozone, and if markets drive their borrowing costs too high, the risk of a sovereign default by such core eurozone countries could destroy the euro, tip the eurozone into a huge economic crisis, and in the process create a renewed global crisis.
25
COMMENTARY
Of the 384 urban agglomerations, these states accounted for 161 urban agglo merations. Hence it is not surprising that along with the states adjoining the National Capital Territory of Delhi, the above-mentioned states account for bulk of rural-urban and urban-rural commuters. In this decade, three factors could lead to a steady stream of commuter workers. The first factor is an increase in the number of towns from 5,161 in 2001 to 7,935 towns in 2011. It is possible in many of the small towns the flow of workers would be from urban to rural. Second, an expansion in construction, manufacturing and the wholesale and retail trade sectors, will boost the phenomenon. The third factor is greater transport linkages be tween rural and urban India. The fact is that eventually 640 districts of India, the 5,924 sub-districts, the 7,935 towns and 6,40,867 villages spread across 35 states and union territories will be interlinked.
The dynamics between the rural and urban areas will be different across the towns and villages of India. Hence, it will be incorrect to focus only on urban engines of growth. What the NSSO data reveals is the size of the r ural-urban link age. Hence, it is important to undertake rural and urban planning within an integrated framework. Notes 1 Elementary occupations consist of simple and routine tasks which mainly require the use of hand-held tools and often some physical effort. Most occupations in this division require skill at the first skill level. 2 Craft and related-trades workers apply their specific knowledge and skills in the fields of mining and construction, form metal, erect metal structures, set machine tools, or make, fit, maintain and repair machinery, equipment or tools, carry out printing work as well as produce or process foodstuffs, textiles, or wooden, metal and other articles, including handicraft goods. The work is carried out by hand and by hand powered and other tools, which are used to re duce the amount of physical effort and time re quired for specific tasks, as well as to improve
Where Next for a Europe in Crisis? Kirsty Hughes
The European Union summit of 27 October resulted in an apparent agreement on shoring up Greece’s finances. The details of the agreement are, yet to be fleshed out, but even if they are, it looks like a period of great uncertainty and change ahead for the European Union and the euro.
A
s the leaders of the eurozone strug gle to contain Europe’s financial crisis, big question marks are ap pearing both over whether the euro will actually survive as a single currency and over whether the euro crisis may split the European Union (EU) politically into two different groups – an inner core around the fragile euro, and an outer core (includ ing the United Kingdom (UK)) losing influ ence and voice in the EU but less caught up in the immediate crisis.
The Euro in Crisis
Kirsty Hughes (
[email protected]) is a writer based in London.
It is almost two years since the solvency of one of the poorer and smaller members of the eurozone, Greece, has been severely challenged by markets. Greece has had to withdraw from markets for government debt and rely on its euro partners and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prop it up as it attempts to put its house in order. But the “austerity cure” imposed on
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46
the quality of the products. The tasks call for an understanding of all stages of the production process, the materials and tools used, and the nature and purpose of the final product. Most occupations in this division require skills at the second skill level. 3 Service workers and shop and market sales work ers provide personal and protective services re lated to travel, housekeeping, catering, personal care, or protection against fire and unlawful acts, or they pose as models for artistic creation and display, or demonstrate and sell goods in wholesale or retail shops and similar establish ments as well as at stalls and on markets. Most occupations in this division require skills at the second skill level. 4 A total of 15.44 million individuals accounting for 5.5% of India’s urban population live in a house hold where at least one member commutes from urban to rural area for work.
References Bhagat, R B (2011): “Emerging Pattern of Urbanisation in India”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 46, No 34, 20 August. Kundu, Amitabh (2011): “Politics and Economics of Urban Growth”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 46, No 20, 14 May. Mohanan, P C (2008): “Differentials in the RuralUrban Movement of Workers”, The Journal of Income and Wealth, Vol 30, No I, January.
Greece of huge public spending cuts, pri vatisation and tax increases is proving dis astrous both economically as the economy shrinks faster than the government budget deficit and politically as tens of thousands take to the streets and strikes become a common occurrence. But the much wider challenge for the EU – or those 17 of its 27 members in the eurozone – has been the contagion effect to other euro countries. Portugal and Ireland are now also dependant on eurozone sup port as they implement austerity meas ures. And the markets are making it ever more costly to fund Italian and Spanish debt too. And while it has been a huge political effort, at a time of recession, for eurozone members to agree to bail out the relatively small economies of Greece, Ireland and Portugal – leading not least to much bad blood between Germany and Greece – it is Italy and Spain that are the politicians’ real nightmare. Italy and Spain are the third and fourth largest economies in the eurozone, and if markets drive their borrowing costs too high, the risk of a sovereign default by such core eurozone countries could destroy the euro, tip the eurozone into a huge eco nomic crisis, and in the process create a renewed global crisis.
25
COMMENTARY
Europe’s leaders have held a series of summits desperately trying to solve the Greek problem, stop Greece defaulting, and stop contagion to other countries. Its latest and biggest effort – with the United States and the IMF also putting huge pres sure on euro leaders to come up with a so lution – was at the end on 27 October. After a summit that went on till 4 am in the morning, the two key leaders of the eurozone, Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Nikolas Sarkozy emerged tired but upbeat to proclaim a three-part deal had been agreed. First, Greece’s private creditors under big political pressure will accept a voluntary 50% reduction in the value of their Greek debt holdings (a so-called “haircut” in the markets’ jargon – crucially if strangely not meant to be called a default). Second, there will be a recapitalisation of Europe's banks to show the markets that even in countries like France, where banks are highly exposed to Greece’s debt, the banks can absorb the losses. And third, a “leveraging” up of the bailout fund the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
from its existing size of about ¤400 billion (of which ¤150 billion is already com mitted to Greece, Portugal and Ireland) to around ¤1.4 trillion through a process of leveraging up the existing amount (including, controversially, encouraging non-European economies such as China to invest in the fund). Markets went up in the first couple of days after the summit – but many details of this deal have yet to be finalised so no one is making any bets that the immediate crisis is over. And if the markets do stay calm, a big part of the eurozone policies for managing the crisis in the next couple of years is German-style budget stringency, with the summit also calling on eurozone countries to enshrine balanced budgets in their constitutions – a major intrusion into each country's national sovereignty and an economic approach that would have Keynes turning in his grave. As we go to press, Greece’s prime minister has called a referendum on the deal, leading to counter-calls from the opposition for resignation of the government, all of which
appears to put big question marks over the deal and so over the stability not only of Greece but of the entire eurozone.
European Politics at a Turning Point For now, most attention remains on the markets and the performance of the euro economies. But there are some big politi cal issues here too. And the one that is starting to attract more attention is the question of whether the EU is now effec tively fractured into a two-tier, two-speed block, with the 17 countries of the euro zone calling the shots, despite the euro crisis, and with the ten countries in the outer tier (including the UK, Sweden, Den mark and Poland) losing influence on EU policies and politics. Some are already calling it a parting of the ways between the 17 “ins” and the ten “outs”. The euro crisis has forced the 17 euro countries into much faster convergence of their national macroeconomic policies than they would have chosen. And so at their 27 October summit, they decided to
Recruitment of Director and Faculty for
INSTITUTE OF CHINESE STUDIES, 29 Rajpur Road, Delhi-110054 Applications are invited from scholars with vision and competence for the posts of Director, Assistant Director, Faculty and Research Associate for the Institute of Chinese Studies. Director Applicants/Nominees shall have the following qualifications: i. Qualifications as prescribed by the UGC for the appointment of Professor in a Central University. ii. Proven evidence of significant contribution to China Studies. iii. Evidence of administrative experience and leadership. iv. The candidate should be at least forty years of age and not more than seventy. Faculty Faculty at the level of Senior Fellow (Professor), Fellow (Associate Professor), Associate Fellow (Assistant Professor) and Research Associate. i. Fulfilling the qualifications as per the UGC norms at the appropriate level. ii. Evidence of substantial work in China Studies in Humanities or Social Sciences. iii. Proven capacity to undertake interdisciplinary research. iv. Knowledge of Chinese language is desirable. Assistant i. ii. iii.
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Applications/Nominations accompanied by a detailed C.V. and two published papers may be sent in hard as well as soft copies to the Hon. Director by 7 December 2011 (e-mail:
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COMMENTARY
strengthen their European level political structures to go along with this. The euro 17 heads of state and prime ministers agreed they will now meet at least twice a year, and quite likely more frequently, in a “Euro summit” without the other 10 leaders (just as they did at the October summit). These meetings will be prepared by the 17 euro finance ministers, and supported by the European Commission. Suddenly, there seems to be two European Unions – one that has summit meetings with 27 heads of state, and one that has parallel summit meetings and that is much more integrated with 17 heads of state.
The Outsiders Does any of this matter? Well the UK and others left in the outer group think so. Delighted though the eurosceptic British Conservative Party is to be, in their view, proved right that the euro was a disas trous project from the start, Prime Minis ter David Cameron is enough of a pragma tist to know you cannot wield power and influence over crucial decisions on EU trade, or the EU single market (which accounts for half the UK’s trade) if you are not in the room. And if you want, as he does, to limit what the EU does as a foreign policy actor on the world stage, you need to be a big player and in the room too. And while in principle any decisions on the single market or trade or foreign policy should still take place in summits of the 27, the UK, Sweden and others fear that the 17 euro “insiders” will caucus and plot and stitch things up in advance.
UK on the Margins David Cameron is left doing the splits. With extraordinarily inappropriate timing, two days before the crucial euro summit, his eurosceptic backbenchers forced a debate on whether the UK should have a referen dum on leaving the EU – they lost but not without Cameron facing half his back benchers voting against him, embarrassing him in European eyes, and adding to the stresses with his pro-European coalition partners the Liberal Democrats. Cameron says he wants to “repatriate” various EU powers back to the UK – including those that control parts of social and employment policy (and for example limit the length of the working week). But Brussels’ insiders
are unimpressed at the contradictory Brit ish demands that the UK should on the one hand still have a strong voice at the insid ers’ summit table (while refusing to con tribute any funds to the Greek and euro bailout funds) and on the other hand that the UK should have special treatment and not have to sign up to all the EU’s rules. Most of the other 10 “outsiders” apart from Denmark and Sweden are anyway due at some point to join the euro. And while they will not be doing that in a hurry, the UK’s euroscepticism is not shared by the other nine. So the outer 10 are not looking like a new cohesive political grouping; rather they look like losing influence and clout in the newly emerging Europe.
Germany in Charge? And for the 17 on the inside, there is much uncertainty too. Most of all, no one yet knows if the euro crisis is now on the way to a solution. And if it is, will the eurozone start to grow again – including in the hard est-hit countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal as well as in the northern economic heartlands of Germany and Netherlands? If not, the whole euro project – and so the whole European political venture that the EU represents – could be in doubt. Meanwhile, many of the 17 are looking askance at the dominant role of France and Germany – but above all Germany – in the decisions coming out of the Euro-summits.
Germany has the largest strongest economy and is paying most for the bailout – so it has dominated the decision-making. But EU countries, including smaller ones, are used to forming coalitions, bargaining, getting their way on some things and not on others. So how this inner core group of 17 will develop – with what sort of political dyna mics – remains for now an open question. If it moves beyond the euro crisis, Germany alone will not determine the EU’s political future and policies from trade and climate change to relationships with west Asia and north Africa or further afield with China and India. And while the EU has struggled to project a stronger foreign policy voice to match its trade and eco nomic weight, it may be that this new block of 17 countries, if it integrates more economically may in the coming years also integrate more politically. For now, a whole spectrum of outcomes are possible – a break-up of the eurozone, with countries reintroducing their old national currencies and political fragmen tation alongside, or a stagnant but still inte grated eurozone of 17, or a slowly recover ing eurozone of 17 with increasing political and economic dynamism. And whichever path the 17 end up on, for the coming period, the 10 “outs” including the UK are going to find their voices and influence increasingly marginalised in Europe. It is a time of great uncertainty but also one of big change.
Faculty Positions Centre for Culture and Development, Vadodara, is engaged in socially relevant research, mainly in Gujarat. Persons holding M.Phil. or Ph.D. in social sciences, having analytical skills, willing to carry out fieldwork related research, and having some research experience and publications, may apply with CV and two of one’s best publications. Preferred area of specialization: tribal ethnography, urban studies and education. Remuneration will match qualifications and experience. Applications should be sent before 10th Dec. 2011.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46
Director, Centre for Culture and Development Sevasi Post Vadodara, 391 101 Gujarat www.ccdgujarat.org Email:
[email protected] Phone 0265-2372001 27
FROM THE STATES
Migration, Money, Music
Jharkhand in 2000 that creates further complications for any calculation.
Proxy Indicator Ratnakar Tripathy
M
igrant labour from Bihar does not require an elaborate introduction in any part of India as they are spread from Kerala to the upper reaches of Ladakh, the grimy sweatshops of Ludhiana and Surat and even to Nagaland and Manipur. He keeps turning up in the local press as a target of violent attacks, as an accident victim at a construction site or in a complaint from the local chamber of commerce about labour shortage. These are some of the ways he suddenly becomes a visible figure, rather than the wellcamouflaged animal that he may well wish to remain. Otherwise, he quietly and single-mindedly keeps saving up his little hoard of cash to be carried home during the Holi or Chhath festivals.
Drops in an Ocean The first time I was able to get a good hold on the slippery tail of labour remittances in Bihar was during a study of Bhojpuri cinema and music industry in 2006. A largely lower class audience supposedly sustains the Bhojpuri film, music and concert industry. How does this work? To understand this let us look at the remittance economy. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the following assumption – approximately eight to 10 million Bihari migrant labourers send about Rs 1,000 home per month – would show that the sums involved are large when added up, even if each individual remittance is small. One can give this calculation some historical depth if we go backwards in time to the mid-1970s when outmigration among Bihari labour began acquiring scale and then adjust the monthly figures. Migration of labour from Bihar has been studied in slices of time and space for varying reasons related to its impact on development of the state, but no one has tried to estimate the total amounts injected into the state’s economy over the decades. The steady trickle for over four decades has indeed made a vital difference to Bihar.
What is this difference? In what I term the “trickle economy”, the time period is of essence! In a depressed economy, where a family tills one meagre acre of land, it is a constant struggle to ward off exigencies like starvation and illness. An infusion of even Rs 700 cash every month over time suddenly allows the family to visit a doctor, buy seed or foodgrain! This minor but longterm greasing of the economic engines of poor families often makes even a one acre farm economically viable, even if most of it is sharecropped. Part of the family takes care of the land and the rest earn money abroad, creating a meagre but essential buffer for bad times. With large numbers of local labour missing in migration, work in the village becomes more lucrative due to labour shortage. This is not a picture of great wellbeing, but one where despair has a simple and well-known remedy – run, migrate! During the massive Kosi floods in Bihar in 2008, a number of newspaper reports mentioned how entire villages from regions like Saharsa refused to stop at the nearby relief camps and instead headed for Patna railway station where they boarded trains for Delhi. Even under great stress, the villagers had a clear mind – Delhi is where their daily bread will come from! Unfortunately no economist has brought their methodological and econometric tools to study the issue of migrant remittances in Bihar and thus we have to stay with anecdotal and “back of the envelope” discussions. My own hunch is that towards the end of the 1990s, the four-decade long history of remittances – the “trickle economy” – began to reach a critical point, displaying its full cumulative potential. Newspaper reports occasionally give a glimpse into the current state of remittances. In one case, supposedly an eight-year old child told a reporter that he is able to send Rs 2,500 home every month – an indication of the chaos of typology of migration, figures, averages and magnitudes one is dealing with. An additional problem is the separation of
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Considering the general dearth of reliable or readily available data, it seems permissible to draw a parallel between the rise in general income/expenditure and a somewhat sudden growth of regional (Bhojpuri, Maithili, Magahi, etc) music industry in the late 1980s, and a similar spurt in Bhojpuri cinema in the 1990s. Expenditure on entertainment may indicate “luxury” spending in the specific context and also savings. The first to come on the scene was Bhojpuri music in the 1980s which requires relatively lower levels of investments by both the producers as well as the consumers. The Bhojpuri film industry emerged a decade later and live concerts have come up as a major industry in the 2000s. In terms of their financial size, the Bhojpuri film industry has an approximate turnover of Rs 100 crore, the music CD industry [for Bhojpuri and other dialects] is around 10 times bigger and the live concert industry appears to be much bigger than the music CD industry. These are figures arrived at after extensive fieldwork done in 2009-10 and consultations with members of the trade – the only data source available. We can only go this far with such proxy indicators. There is thus a dual task here – first, to quantify the remittances with as much historical depth as possible and second, to put the resulting figures in a broader sociological context. Global literature on labour remittances shows a great deal of variety in the role remittances play in the broader context of development. The one thing that can be said with sufficient clarity is that despite all its problems such as low productivity, Bihar’s agricultural economy would seem to be sustained and subsidised by the remittances sent by migrants. But this may be just the tip of an iceberg. The second aspect which needs more careful study is how these remittances may have radically transformed the caste dynamics in the region and provided the base for the currently touted “Growth Miracle” of Nitish Kumar. Ratnakar Tripathy (
[email protected]) is editor of the website http://www.bihardays.com
29
Gandhi’s Interrogation Rudolf C Heredia
F
rom the time of Mahavir and the Buddha, Indic civilisation has always responded to the authentic renouncer. This in the final analysis was the basis of Gandhi’s appeal to the masses. In turn he called them to selfless service or nishkamakarma. But we have no real Mahatmas among us today, just too many laghumanavas, small persons, all too comfortable questioning others, uncomfortable interrogating themselves. Given the present interest in Gandhi, this is a timely collection of essays across a wide spectrum of perspectives and issues. Understanding Gandhi is not just important for India and its national freedom movement. His theory and practice of ahimsa and satyagraha, swadeshi and swaraj, sarvodaya and sarva-dharma-samabhava have become reference points far beyond this country for any serious discourse on non-violence in our violent world.
Religion and Nationalism The first part of this collection contextualises Gandhi’s “historical life” (p 9). Yasmin Khan introduces us to “Gandhi’s World”. Porbandar, where Gandhi grew up, was at the crossroads of many historical currents. This gave young Mohandas, an observant and sensitive person, “the insight of a local boy matched with the global insight of an international observer” (p 27), from which vantage point he later sets out to reshape the freedom struggle in India. His professional legal training in England exposed him to a western civilisation he was not quite at ease with. With his Hind Swaraj (1909), he became its enduring countercultural critic. From the shy, failed lawyer on his return to Gujarat, Jonathan Hyslop’s essay traces “[t]he transnational emergence of a public figure” by the time he returned to India (p 30). Judith Brown concludes the first part with a presentation of “Gandhi as nationalist leader” (p 51). His self-image as a pilgrim in search of truth and a champion of
30
book review The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi edited by Judith M Brown and Anthony Parel (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press), 2011; pp 273, Rs 395.
non-violence is essential to any understanding of his vision of swaraj as self-rule and the new society he wanted Indians to build together. Though he successfully mobilised the masses with the many satyagrahas he launched, there were not many true Gandhians even in his own Congress Party; not many at the time understood, let alone accepted, his vision for independent India. Yet he remains a more crucial figure for India, and with a far wider significance outside the country, than any other Indian of that period and after. The second set of essays on “Gandhi: Thinker and Activist” (p 69) begins with Tridip Suhrud’s survey of “Gandhi’s key writings” (p 71). Gandhi was not a systematic thinker, and the thematic unity is not in his writing but rather in the way he lived out his thought and action. No wonder he could say: “my message is my life”! Akeel Bilgrami next discusses “Gandhi’s religion and its relation to his politics” (p 93), particularly Gandhi’s refusal to separate the two. Gandhi’s understanding of religion and his practice of politics brought the two together in a creative and innovative praxis. He insisted: “there could be no politics devoid of religion…. They subserve religion. Politics devoid of religion are a death trap because they kill the soul” (Young India, 24 March 1924). But Gandhi’s Hinduism was a “maverick mix” of AdvaitaVedantin ideas, Bhakti ideals, Jain anekantavada (many-sidedness) and syadvada (relatively) of truth. Buddha and Jesus were exemplars of ahimsa for him. His was an attempt to spiritualise power and humanise religion. This was clearly at odds with the realpolitik of the Westphalian nation state, so eagerly embraced by religious nationalist today: cuius regio, eius religio!
In his essay on “Conflict and Violence”, Ronald Terchek emphasises how Gandhi as an idealist still has “a compelling realism” (p 128) to his understanding of power and wants to empower persons to enhance their human dignity. This power must be domesticated and not allowed to dominate; it must be diffused, not concentrated at the expense of others, but made accountable and transparent. Thus Gandhi contextualises and “judges power by both the ends it serves and the means it employs” (p 129). Thomas Weber discusses “Gandhi’s moral economics”, tracing its inspiration to John Ruskin and Leo Tolstoy (p 135). Weber sets out the moral context for Gandhi’s critique of western materialism and its industrial civilisation, which he rejected as dehumani sing and exploitative. Gandhi’s ideas on bread, labour and non-consumerism, of nonpossession and trusteeship, of swadeshi and sarvodaya have been ridiculed and dismissed as utopian by both socialists and capitalists. And yet the collapse of socialist command economies and the most recent free-market meltdown should force a rethink of old hardened positions before they do irreversible damage to our world. “Gandhi and the State” by Anthony Parel elaborates Gandhi’s vision of a good state, “surajya” (p 166). He was against an aggressive, soulless machine-like state and also opposed to a Machiavellian subordination of all values to reason of state, the raison d’etat of realist politics. Though a religious person himself, he did not want a religion-based state. His state was not to be a homogeneous, organic community but a pluralistic, political one. The good state would protect rights, internal order and external security. It would not be a powerful nationalist state but a minimalist, ethical and moral one, supported by civil society and voluntary agencies. Tanika Sarkar’s critique “Gandhi and Social Relations” provides a useful counterpoint from the left to the other contri butions in this collection (p 173), in parti cular of Gandhi’s understanding of class and caste, his attitude to property and inequality, to adivasis and dalits, to gender and sexuality. For Sarkar, Gandhi’s politics “carried the seeds of self-transcendence
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BOOK REVIEW
and self-cancellation” (p 192). This seems rather harsh but it can also be read as an indictment of those who rendered lip service to his ideals and then compromised them rather shamefacedly. The third part is on “[t]he contemporary Gandhi” (p 197). Harish Trivedi’s survey of the “literary and visual portrayals of Gandhi” demonstrates how Gandhi’s legacy cannot be ignored even as India tries to come to terms with it (p 199). Anthony Parel takes this forward in his discussion on “Gandhi in contemporary India” (p 219) and describes the new political canon Gandhi left. Gandhi wanted his country to be non-violent, inclusive, egalitarian: sarvodaya was the way to surajya. Gandhi has left us an agenda and given us a framework within which to work at this goal. However, contemporary India has known violent divisions and secessionist movements, religious extremism and communal frenzies, endemic inequalities, and this even with rapid growth. Indeed, if we acknow ledge Gandhi as the father of the nation, then we are but his lost children now. In reviewing “Gandhi’s Global Legacy”, David Hardiman points to Gandhi’s “technique of non-violent civil resistance” or satyagraha, as his most important legacy (p 239). It has had an impact on the political discourse across the world and inspired similar movements on other continents, i e, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela and Aung San Suu Kyi. Though Marxists have disparaged and dismissed Gandhi, their own ideology has not proved any more durable. The contemporary ecological movement also finds inspiration in Gandhi though there is little in his published writings concerning nature. In a final “Conclusion”, Judith Brown recalls the many Gandhis presented in this collection and the different way in which they have been appropriated (p 258). However, in spite of the extraordinary impact of this Mahatma, the India of his dreams remains very much just that. And yet he still challenges those who encounter him to examine their fundamental values and how these work their way into society and polity.
Interrogating Gandhi This is a valuable Companion for those with some acquaintance with Gandhi who
want to engage in further encounter with Gandhian discourse. Most contemporary critics interrogate Gandhi with the convenience of hindsight and a rather generous helping of self-righteousness. Thus the modernists, who disparage his ahimsa as naively idealistic, have no real answer to the violence in our world except to use more violence to suppress it. A war of state terror against the terrorists only perpetuates a spiral of violence in an ever more violent world! Again, those who decry Gandhi’s aversion to class struggle have themselves been insensitive to other forms of inequality that lie beyond their ideological blinkers, like patriarchy and gender, race and caste. Moreover, those critical of his approach to dalits and tribes have not shown themselves to be above creating sub-caste divisions and partisan privileges even among scheduled castes and tribes. Nor are they above romanticising tribals rather than empowering them to take their place in the sun. On the other hand, the self-proclaimed Gandhians, isolated in their ashrams, have little credibility themselves when it come to engaging with the issues of the day, whether it be communal violence, endemic corruption or caste atro cities. It would seem they have reduced Gandhism to vegetarianism and satsang (prayer meetings)! We do need an authentic critique of Gandhi. All true Gandhians would welcome this. But more than interrogating Gandhi, we need to allow him to question us. Beyond moral platitudes and legal niceties that postpone rather than implement any real solutions, what is our answer to increasing levels of collective violence? Other than continuing disputations on how to define the poverty line, what do we have to say about the increasing inequality in shining India, especially to those below the poverty line? Other than idolising women rather hypocritically, how do we respond to issues of gender justice and atrocities against women? Other than using surveys to make more sophisticated projections, what stand do we take on the electoral manipulation of vote banks and patronage politics that perpetuate rather than address communal divides? Are our dalits and tribals any better off today
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
after all the programmes planned for them, and implemented more in the breach than in actuality? Inspired by Gandhi, back in 1973, E F Schumacher cogently argued in his Small Is Beautiful for a practical “economics as if people mattered”. We need to reassess our new economic policies and revisit Gandhian economics instead of uncritically embracing the market or dogmatically pursuing failed statist control. While command economies have run aground, the financial crisis precipitated by free-market financiers is characterised by greed, consumerism and lack of trust. The first, among financiers and those they financed and profited with, caused it; the second on all sides, of lenders and borrowers, fuelled it; the third, of bankers and investors, now perpetuates it.
Gandhi’s Critique We should allow Gandhian economics to suggest three key corresponding principles for a viable and sustainable economy. First, there is enough for every one’s need but not for everyone’s greed; plain living and high thinking for a better quality of life; all property must be held in trust as its necessary social and ethical imperative. Rarely are those who have caused a crisis the ones to remedy it. Yet we are trying to remedy the crisis with more of the same by the very persons who got us there in the first place! Gandhi rejected both the homo economicus and the homo politicus on which modern economies and state policies today are premised. So too we need to reread Hind Swaraj and see how far Gandhi’s critique of parliamentary democracy applies to our own elected representatives who are more adept at stalling Parliament and rushing to the speaker than at addressing and debating real issues. Instead of the vibrant panchayati raj on which Gandhi would have founded the state, we have an alienated and alienating top-heavy bureaucracy and a corrupt political class on top; instead of an economy premised on need, trust and frugality, we have a market-based, profit-driven consumerist economy; instead of a civil society that foregrounds duty, tolerance and inclusiveness, we have one that is increasingly demanding and self-referent, intolerant and
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ethnocentric. Surely we need to reassess our stance on collective political violence, whether by state or non-state actors, rather than take shelter in the ambiguities of recent work like Steven Pinker’s The
Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (Viking, 2012). We need a deeper engagement with Gandhi than the Bollywood version of “Gandhigiri”, best categorised as Gandhi-lite.
The ‘Problem Population’ of Colonial Bombay Swati Ghosh
C
odes of Misconduct is about law and prostitution in colonial Bombay. The book focuses on the colonial imperatives that informed legislation on prostitution and addresses the relationship between the State and prostitution from 1860 onwards. The attempt to look beyond the “rhetoricity of official sources” in the study has opened up new space for exploring the objectives of colonial lawmaking and the contradictions in enforcing regulations to contain the “problem population” – the prostitutes. This is not a linear analysis of legal intent conveyed through the texts of law or description of the effects of legislation upon the subjects of law, rather it points out the disjuncture between lawmaking and law enforcement with regard to prostitution of the colonial period. Ashwini Tambe is more interested in exploring the micro-practices of regulations that brings out the heterogeneity and limitations of colonial rule, different from the ethos of liberal individuality of lawmaking in the empire. The long period of regulation is divided into three distinct phases: the phase of the Contagious Disease Acts (CDAS) from around 1860s to 1890s, the anti-trafficking phase of early 20th century to 1920s and the abolitionist phase from around 1917 to 1947. This classification has set the discourse on prostitution in colonial India, perhaps for the first time, within a single strand of deliberation bringing several diversified issues together such as, the intent of lawmaking in India, consistent with the social and political events in the empire yet with a different mode of implementation followed in the colony, the reluctance often extending to opposition
32
Codes of Misconduct: Regulating Prostitution in Late Colonial Bombay by Ashwini Tambe (University of Minnesota Press), 2009; pp XXVII + 179, price not stated.
of the administrative functionaries in enforcing British state’s international commitment to anti-trafficking laws, the negotiations of the nationalist elites with respect to their moral position regarding prostitution, and emergence of an abject and criminalised status of the prostitute. The CDA of 1868 and its repeal in 1888 is no doubt a very significant moment in history of lawmaking in colonial India and has informed several studies on prostitution for different cities but this book points out the significance of other moments as no less coercive towards the process of consistent criminalisation of the prostitutes in colonial Bombay. The growth of the Kamathipura red light district in Bombay, which has turned out to be the “epicentre of AIDS pandemic in India” today, has been traced through a depiction of spatial reorganisation of the city which keenly maintained racial demarcations throughout the period of regulations. The role of the then city functionaries in enforcing legal action on the thriving sex trade, particularly during the anti-trafficking period of the early 20th century, and the opinion of the educated Indian elite against prostitution arising from a moralistic nationalist fervour provide an interesting read beyond mere description of historical facts.
Colonial Governmentality Tambe, at the very outset, pronounces her differences with the south Asian scholars (Guha 1997; Nair 1996; John and Nair 1998)
This collection of essays is a good companion for that journey. Rudolf C Heredia (
[email protected]) is an independent researcher based in Mumbai.
who have deployed Foucault’s “apparatus of sexuality” as a model to “understand” colonial sexuality in India. While consenting to the notion that prohibition enhanced the reach of state surveillance, her idea is that instead of analysing the influence of Victorian sexual morality on criminalisation of prostitutes, it is worthwhile to explore the strategy of racial stratification followed by the colonial government that institutionalised the process of criminalisation. Following Ann Stoler’s (1995) line of argument, the author focuses on the “management of whiteness” as the core anxiety of the British ruler that influenced the model of regulation. The techniques of colonial governmentality regarding prostitution was shaped by the “fear of racial disorder” and the three phases of regulation bear witness to this anxiety of the British in their attempt to control and criminalise prostitutes in India. The author estimates that the enforcement of the CDA from 1860s to 1890s was an experiment that failed in context of the brothels of Bombay. The law aimed to clean the city of sexually transmitted diseases (STD) by regulating the prostitutes but enforcement was “sporadic and selective”. The laws caused a rift between the police and the medical establishments with the European and Indian prostitutes as two separate constituencies of the oppressive order. The differential approach of the state-led reforms towards the Indian and European prostitutes was a form of coercion under protection that continued till the antitrafficking phase of the 1920s. The limitations of enforcing the CDA impelled further legislations to create the illusion of action being taken by the government to bring prostitutes under universal surveillance. Women in prostitution invented various ways to evade the law and the general public demanded spatial segregation of prostitutes away from residential areas. The personal zeal of police officers in selected areas was effective in getting the prostitutes registered but the incidence of STD did not decline among the sailors or soldiers – the male,
november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
BOOK REVIEW
ethnocentric. Surely we need to reassess our stance on collective political violence, whether by state or non-state actors, rather than take shelter in the ambiguities of recent work like Steven Pinker’s The
Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (Viking, 2012). We need a deeper engagement with Gandhi than the Bollywood version of “Gandhigiri”, best categorised as Gandhi-lite.
The ‘Problem Population’ of Colonial Bombay Swati Ghosh
C
odes of Misconduct is about law and prostitution in colonial Bombay. The book focuses on the colonial imperatives that informed legislation on prostitution and addresses the relationship between the State and prostitution from 1860 onwards. The attempt to look beyond the “rhetoricity of official sources” in the study has opened up new space for exploring the objectives of colonial lawmaking and the contradictions in enforcing regulations to contain the “problem population” – the prostitutes. This is not a linear analysis of legal intent conveyed through the texts of law or description of the effects of legislation upon the subjects of law, rather it points out the disjuncture between lawmaking and law enforcement with regard to prostitution of the colonial period. Ashwini Tambe is more interested in exploring the micro-practices of regulations that brings out the heterogeneity and limitations of colonial rule, different from the ethos of liberal individuality of lawmaking in the empire. The long period of regulation is divided into three distinct phases: the phase of the Contagious Disease Acts (CDAS) from around 1860s to 1890s, the anti-trafficking phase of early 20th century to 1920s and the abolitionist phase from around 1917 to 1947. This classification has set the discourse on prostitution in colonial India, perhaps for the first time, within a single strand of deliberation bringing several diversified issues together such as, the intent of lawmaking in India, consistent with the social and political events in the empire yet with a different mode of implementation followed in the colony, the reluctance often extending to opposition
32
Codes of Misconduct: Regulating Prostitution in Late Colonial Bombay by Ashwini Tambe (University of Minnesota Press), 2009; pp XXVII + 179, price not stated.
of the administrative functionaries in enforcing British state’s international commitment to anti-trafficking laws, the negotiations of the nationalist elites with respect to their moral position regarding prostitution, and emergence of an abject and criminalised status of the prostitute. The CDA of 1868 and its repeal in 1888 is no doubt a very significant moment in history of lawmaking in colonial India and has informed several studies on prostitution for different cities but this book points out the significance of other moments as no less coercive towards the process of consistent criminalisation of the prostitutes in colonial Bombay. The growth of the Kamathipura red light district in Bombay, which has turned out to be the “epicentre of AIDS pandemic in India” today, has been traced through a depiction of spatial reorganisation of the city which keenly maintained racial demarcations throughout the period of regulations. The role of the then city functionaries in enforcing legal action on the thriving sex trade, particularly during the anti-trafficking period of the early 20th century, and the opinion of the educated Indian elite against prostitution arising from a moralistic nationalist fervour provide an interesting read beyond mere description of historical facts.
Colonial Governmentality Tambe, at the very outset, pronounces her differences with the south Asian scholars (Guha 1997; Nair 1996; John and Nair 1998)
This collection of essays is a good companion for that journey. Rudolf C Heredia (
[email protected]) is an independent researcher based in Mumbai.
who have deployed Foucault’s “apparatus of sexuality” as a model to “understand” colonial sexuality in India. While consenting to the notion that prohibition enhanced the reach of state surveillance, her idea is that instead of analysing the influence of Victorian sexual morality on criminalisation of prostitutes, it is worthwhile to explore the strategy of racial stratification followed by the colonial government that institutionalised the process of criminalisation. Following Ann Stoler’s (1995) line of argument, the author focuses on the “management of whiteness” as the core anxiety of the British ruler that influenced the model of regulation. The techniques of colonial governmentality regarding prostitution was shaped by the “fear of racial disorder” and the three phases of regulation bear witness to this anxiety of the British in their attempt to control and criminalise prostitutes in India. The author estimates that the enforcement of the CDA from 1860s to 1890s was an experiment that failed in context of the brothels of Bombay. The law aimed to clean the city of sexually transmitted diseases (STD) by regulating the prostitutes but enforcement was “sporadic and selective”. The laws caused a rift between the police and the medical establishments with the European and Indian prostitutes as two separate constituencies of the oppressive order. The differential approach of the state-led reforms towards the Indian and European prostitutes was a form of coercion under protection that continued till the antitrafficking phase of the 1920s. The limitations of enforcing the CDA impelled further legislations to create the illusion of action being taken by the government to bring prostitutes under universal surveillance. Women in prostitution invented various ways to evade the law and the general public demanded spatial segregation of prostitutes away from residential areas. The personal zeal of police officers in selected areas was effective in getting the prostitutes registered but the incidence of STD did not decline among the sailors or soldiers – the male,
november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
BOOK REVIEW
white, non-Indian target population who received protection under the Act. The arrest of unregistered prostitutes implicated in the act became a motivation for the police, which according to the author, was a provocation in pornographic imaginations for the administrative authority. The engagement of the police in the face of the resistance by the prostitutes gave countenance to Foucault’s productive logic of prohibition. Prohibitions regularised the profession. As a result of institutionalisation, brothels turned out to be the preferred form of commercial sex with brothel-keeping a state protected activity. In the author’s view this theoretical concept was a specific historical instance taking place in the colonial context as it might have occurred, with little variation in other non-colonial situations, connecting the colony and the empire on a common theoretical plane. She does not cite history as a case in point to prove theory, which historians have often demonstrated with respect to south Asian context (Guha 1997; Nair 1996). The chapter on surveillance of the European prostitutes in Bombay illustrates author’s point on institutionalisation of the trade by weaving effects of lawmaking and the social mapping of the lanes and bye lanes of Kamathipura, evolving into a dense red light district between the 1880s and 1920s. European prostitutes were “aggressively herded together” by the Bombay police and strictly controlled with the cooperation of the brothel-keepers, which according to the author was, a regime of coercive protection by the State. To avoid inter-racial sex with Indian women, the colonial administrators preserved separate clusters of prostitutes of Indian origin. The racial stratification of the white, non-British prostitutes and the Japanese, Jews and East Europeans in separate enclaves within Kamathipura, classified according to income and social position and the tracking of the newcomers and the deported speaks for the selective mandate of colonial governmentality pursued by the State. The spatial allocation of the European prostitutes in Kamathipura in the area previously occupied by low caste sweepers and artisans converged into a site where people of lower moral and economic status were concentrated. The Jews and the East Europeans – associating their origin from
Polish, Russian or German surnames, such as Polsky, Puritz, Prevenziano, Greenberg, Feldman, Stern, Erlich, etc – although identified as enemy subjects were yet to be preserved as a “necessary evil” for British men. The Grant Road and Cursetji Suklaji street area developed into brothels of the European prostitutes commonly known as the safed galli (the white lane) where selective and rigorous surveillance was managed exclusively by British police officers in liaison with the brothel mistresses. The worldwide anti-trafficking measures of the early 20th century adopted to stop the white slavery of European women, was counterproductive in the context of Bombay because the interpretation of trafficking was constricted to enable European prostitution to survive the international legal measures. However, procuring and abduction of Indian prostitutes did not receive the attention that it deserved from the enforcing authority.
Small Voices The Indian brothel workers in contrast to the European prostitutes were “classic subaltern figures” in oppositional relation to the colonial and elite nationalist groups. In colonial official records they were represented in relation to criminal activities and in nationalist version they were identified for degrading the virtuous image of Indian women. The voice of the prostitutes was unheard and remained undocumented because of their marginal social position as criminals. This study brings out the ordered presence of the prostitutes in the 1920s and shows the structural limitations of their under-representation by taking up the case of a murder victim and offering a rereading of the testimonies. The infamous Duncan Road murder case to which the author devotes a chapter and more, opened a pandora’s box for brothel-based prostitution in Bombay under the colonial regime. Although Indian prostitutes were rarely represented in official records, the statements of prostitutes who were witnesses in this case, contains details of how long they worked, how much they earned and the power within the brothels where they lived. The everyday acts of violence against the women in brothels show their life of bondage and reflects the control of the brothel-keepers, moneylenders and pimps.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
The witness statements reveal that the crime was a result of a regular act of violence on a prostitute named Akootai who had been beaten and murdered mercilessly by the brothel-keepers. Her body was accidentally discovered by the police in Kamathipura and surprisingly the murderers were brought to task. The author believes that the testimonies of the prostitutes in a court trial held in 1917 provided more information about the circumstances in an Indian brothel than about the trial, although it became a standard referent for future legal reforms. Apart from testimonies of several of the brothel workers, the author has also used observations and tables prepared from the census data produced by the Prostitution Committee formed in the wake of the 1917 trial to prove her point that the victim’s life was not an anomaly. Her methodology invokes the possibilities of recovering a subaltern context with respect to the circumstances of prostitutes living in the brothels of Bombay in the early decades of the 20th century.
Abolitionist Phase The chapter on the abolitionist phase which covers a period of 30 years, from 1917 to 1947, is perhaps the most difficult and hurriedly explored part of the book. It brings to the fore the possible contexts such as moral, political and demographic, that contributed to laws favouring abolition of prostitution but falls short of expectations that the study raises in its historiographical analysis earlier. The effect of antipathy generated from the court case of the Duncan Road murder trial and the public opinion against prostitution as immoral has been captured through several references to letters and editorials published in the local dailies of the time. It shows that reformers, missionaries and public opinion were all against conceding residential space of the city for prostitution, and that women’s organisations blamed prostitutes for their sexually impure life and pitied them for their v ictimhood. The nationalist fervour in preserving women’s honour is represented in the mention of the agitation against the devadasi system and through a mere collation of several contradictory quotations revealing Gandhi’s views on prostitution. The critique
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of the nationalist position offered in the book is a mere deliberation of historians like Forbes (1996), Kumar (1993), Patel (1988) and others who have questioned the ideological construct of Indian women. The author’s view in this regard is a mere addition in a similar vein to theirs and does not raise any fundamental questions. As for the demographic shifts, the urban crowding in Bombay around the Kamathipura business district is briefly cited which if related to migration and occupational data of the “urban underclasses” would have provided immense material for explaining the anxieties of the time regarding the moral regulation of the public space. The later part of the chapter focuses on the Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act (BPPA) of 1923 that took shape as a result of social turbulence and was directed more towards removing the brothels from public view than prohibiting prostitution. It exemplifies the contradictions of the abolition laws by focusing particularly on the process of criminalisation of the
prostitute. In the author’s view, preservation of moral hygiene was an eyewash that several legislations and their amendments purportedly aimed to achieve during the decade since the Akootai murder case. In reality prostitution flourished. Although the Bombay Police Act pronounced brothel keeping and soliciting to be illegal, while prostitutes were arrested for soliciting the brothel-keepers were beyond the reach of the police. The organised trade continued with the same degree of violence against the prostitutes and in spite of occasional intervention by the police, the number of brothels did not reduce. Another of the author’s observation that substantiates the fact that the state power seized solely on the prostitutes is that immediately after the enforcement of a legal policy the presence of prostitutes in official documents, such as the census reports and prison records, showed a substantial decrease in numbers. These numbers got enhanced when enforcement became less stringent in the course of time. This was a clear evidence of criminalisation
induced by the State. The official documents identified prostitutes as professionals in disreputable/unproductive category associated with crime, but the prostitutes were less willing to disclose their profession when state power was active to bring them under the legal purview.
Postcolonial Reading Finally, the study relates to current regulations on prostitution in India and discusses the implications that it might hold for the contemporary situation. Evidently the imperatives of the postcolonial nation are much wider in their mandate than the colonial state’s and are reflected in upholding the rights and welfare of all its citizens. Bearing this in mind, the author brings in the context of a “new set of orthodoxies” such as the discourse of public health, trafficking and neo-liberalism that would re-inscribe the relation of state and prostitution. The role of the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) in proposing licensing for prostitutes in a desperate attempt to control the spread HIV or that of the local
UGC-SAP sponsored National Seminar on
DEMOCRACY AND DIVERSITY IN NORTH-EAST INDIA 9th and 10th Feb 2012
Organized by the Department of Political Science, Gauhati University, Guwahati 781014 The North-East India is one of the most diverse regions in India. This region comprises eight states and each state is unique in its sociocultural diversity. The region has been subjected to a process of political fission after independence to meet the demand of political autonomy and identity. In spite of the creation of several new states and a number of autonomous councils in different categories, the basic problems of integration and economic development could not be properly addressed. In this regard, discourse on diversity and policies adopted by the Centre and the State can provide some clues. Efficacy and credibility of democracy as a political system depends on how it functions and delivers. How does a political system deal with the differences that exist within it? How differences are embodied and protected? How diversity is accommodated with the experience of democracy and multiculturalism in the region? The objective of this seminar is to reflect on the complexity of the majority-minority relationship, the practices of multiculturalism and accommodation of minorities in the political system. Panels 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
related to the main theme are : Democratization: Consolidation and Contestation Unity in Diversity: Learning from each other Accommodating Diversities. Democracy and Federalism Multiculturalism Minority Rights and the Question of Autonomy Possibility of Reverse Wave of Democratization
Papers are invited for presentation on the above themes and beyond. The abstract should reach the organizer by 15th December 2011 and those selected will be invited to submit their full paper by 15th January 2012. Limited number of travel grant is available for the participants. Dr. Alaka Sarmah, Seminar Coordinator: Democracy and Diversity in North-East India Email:
[email protected] Dr.Jayanta Krishna Sarmah, Email:
[email protected]
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november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
PERSPECTIVES
Expert Group on Poverty: Confusion Worse Confounded M H Suryanarayana
A critique of the 2009 report of the expert group on poverty.
I
n recent years, there have been several studies on the authenticity of the offi cial estimates of poverty, reconciling findings on divergent trends in poverty and undernutrition, relevance of under lying norms and appropriateness of the methods and database. Given this context, the Planning Commission constituted an expert group to examine, inter alia, “alter native conceptualisation of poverty, and the associated technical aspects of proce dures of measurement and data base for empirical estimation including procedures for updating over time and across states” (GoI 2009).1 This note examines the expert group’s recommendations on poverty line and its estimation from the conceptual, methodo logical and database perspectives, and their implications. The article first sum marises the salient features of the report and its recommendations, followed by an evaluation of some of its major features.
Recommendations
This is a revised version of the key note address on “Poverty Estimation – Approaches and Methodologies” at the international seminar, Poverty in the Contemporary World, Centre for Scientific Socialism, Acharya Nagarjuna University, Nagarjuna Sagar, Andhra Pradesh on 18 August 2011. It is based partly on some of the arguments in Suryanarayana (2009 and 2012). M H Suryanarayana (
[email protected]) is at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai.
36
The expert group report cites three major problems with the existing official poverty lines (1973-74 as the base year) for all- India rural and urban sectors. They are (i) outdated consumption patterns and hence, weighting diagrams of the base year poverty lines; (ii) crude price adjust ments to obtain estimates for the subse quent years and, hence, implausible ruralurban poverty profiles for some major states; and (iii) failure to accommodate (a) changes in the weighting diagram due to increased private expenditures on health and education; and (b) increases in such expenditures in their price specifi cations. It has apparently looked into all the issues in detail and suggested a new methodology for working out state-wise and all-India estimates of poverty lines for the rural and urban sectors separately.2 This is done on the basis of the household
consumer expenditure data collected dur ing the 61st round of the National Sample Survey (NSS) (July 2004-June 2005). The salient features of the expert group report are as follows: (i) The expert group favours continuation of the existing practice of estimation of poverty based on private household consumer expenditure collected by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO). However, it recommends a shift from a uniform – 30-days’ reference period based – estimate of consumption to that based on mixed reference period (MRP).3 (ii) Association between estimates of calorie intake derived from the NSS data on house hold consumption and nutritional out come indicators from other specialised surveys is weak over time and across space. Hence, poverty line concept may be delinked from the calorie intake norm and based on some broad measure of consumption. (iii) The concept of poverty is defined with respect to social perception of depri vation on basic human needs. Listing the basic human needs in the material dimen sion, the focus gets confined to depriva tion in private consumption. Thus, abso lute (private) consumption poverty line refers to “the inability of an individual or household to afford a socially perceived normative minimal basket of basic human needs that is expected to be reflected in some normative minimal standard of liv ing that should be assured to every indi vidual/household” (GoI 2009: 4). “In the interest of continuity as well as in view of the consistency with broad external valid ity checks with respect to nutritional, edu cational and health outcomes, it was de cided to recommend MRP-equivalent of urban PLB (Poverty Line Basket) corre sponding to 25.7% urban headcount ratio as the new reference PLB to be provided to rural as well as urban population in all the states after adjusting it for within-state urban-relative-to-rural and rural and urban state-relative-to-all-India price differen tials” (Summary, pp 1-2). (iv) The proposed poverty lines are validated with reference to normative expenditures to meet nutritional, educa tional and health outcomes. For instance,
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urban households in the neighborhood of the poverty line have a calorie intake of 1,776 calories per capita as per the NSS 61st round findings. This tallies with the revised calorie intake norm of 1,770 per capita per day currently recommended for India by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). As regards rural India, the observed calorie intake of (1,999 calories per capita) rural households in a corresponding situa tion is higher than the FAO norm. (v) The revised poverty lines provide for private expenditure on transport and conveyance. (vi) Price indices for spatial and tempo ral estimates of poverty line are based on the household-level unit values worked out from the NSS 61st round data on household consumer expenditure on food, fuel and light, clothing and footwear at the most detailed level of disaggregation for as many items as possible. (vii) The all-India urban PLB would be the reference consumption bundle and state-sector specific poverty lines would be obtained with suitable purchasing power parity adjustments. (viii) Finally, “...even though the sug gested new methodology gives a higher estimate of rural headcount ratio at the all-India level for 2004-05, the extent of poverty reduction in comparable percent age point decline between 1993-94 and 2004-05 is not different from that inferred using the old methodology” (p 3).
Evaluation4 The report provides a description of the need for a norm based on social percep tion of deprivation and aggregated indi vidual preferences for defining a poverty line: “Fundamentally, the concept of pov erty is associated with socially perceived deprivation with respect to basic human needs. As a result, social perceptions are taken to play a dominant role in ascertain ing deprivation although self-perceptions cannot be ignored altogether and aggre gated individual preferences may have to be respected in satisfying any given need in most cases as we argue below in the context of consumption poverty” (p 2). Consistent with this emphasis, it defines absolute (private) consumption poverty line as “the inability of an individual or a household to afford a socially perceived
normative minimal basket of basic human needs that is expected to be reflected in some normative minimal standard of living that should be assured to every indi vidual/household. It should be obvious that social perceptions in respect of nor mative minimum living standard are not precisely numerically specifiable in quanti tative terms. However, for policy purposes, a uniquely specified numerical poverty line separating the poor from non-poor has been in use” (p 4). There are several issues, which need to be addressed. To begin with, one is not clear how does one define social percep tion about a PLB at the national level for a country like India which is a federation of states with diverse resource endowments, needs and preference, prices and hence, income-price-responses. The report is con fined largely to making price corrections for a chosen urban normative PLB. Simply because official estimates of poverty for the urban sector have been less controver sial or less commented upon than the cor responding estimates for the rural sector do not absolve the former of any limita tions. In fact, one of the background studies has raised questions about the validity of the specification of the aggregate Engel function used for deriving poverty lines for both rural and urban India in the old methodology (Suryanarayana 2009). This study also raised a question about the authenticity of the estimates because the reference NSS estimates for 1973-74 were not derived from a complete annual sur vey. In addition, it may be noted that social perceptions get formed with reference to observable realities and quantities. Identifying a PLB in terms of the con sumption profile of (approximately) the first quartile of all-India urban consump tion distribution would essentially involve a statistical aggregation of consumption of households across distant and diverse regions in the country. This bundle is not observable. It is not only arbitrary but also a statistical fiction. It is difficult to believe that social perceptions get formed based on such an academic statistical fiction, particularly so for the rural society, which may not have even an inkling of urban life styles. Still the report cites it as a point to validate the choice of the PLB since “it corresponds to the urban All India HCR of
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25.7% that is widely accepted as being reasonable” (p 7). As regards the shift in database from the one on uniform reference period (URP) to the one on the mixed reference period (MRP), the report has adopted the follow ing procedure: …the PLB was taken to be MRP equivalent of PCTE (per capita total consumer expendi ture) corresponding to 25.7% of the urban BPL population variously described as pov erty ratio (PR for short) or headcount ratio (HCR for short). As urban living standard is generally regarded as better than and pref erable to its rural counterpart, the Expert Group recommends that the purchasing power represented by the MRP-equivalent PCTE underlying the all-India urban HCR of 25.7% be taken as the new reference PLB for measuring poverty and made available to both the rural and the urban population in all the states after correcting for urban-rural price differentials as well as urban and rural state-relative-to-all-India price differentials (pp 6-7).
This procedure is valid only if popula tion ranking remains unaffected by choice of reference period for estimates of con sumption. Further, it would not make sense to impose the urban PLB on rural areas since the normative bundles as well as their overhead components would dif fer between the two regions. Most impor tant, one is not sure if the urban bundle, food in particular, would ever be qualita tively superior to the rural one and how simple price corrections would take care of such differences. The report debunks the calorie norm and at the end validates the revised pov erty line by citing its adequacy to buy the normative calorie amount. It reports ...a conscious decision was taken by the Ex pert Group to move away from anchoring the PL in calorie norm as in the past because (a) there is overwhelming evidence of down ward shift in calorie Engel curves over time and (b) calorie consumption intake calcu lated by converting the consumed quantities in the last 30 days as collected by NSS has not been found to be well correlated either over time or across States with the nutritional outcomes observed in other specialised nu trition outcome surveys such as the National Family Health Surveys…(pp 7-8).
In the same breath, the report justifies the PLB on the ground that “the revised minimum calorie norm for India recom mended by FAO is currently around 1,800
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calories per capita per day which is very close to the average calorie intake of those near the new poverty lines in urban areas (1,776 calories per capita) and higher than the revised FAO norm (1,999 calories per capita) in rural areas in the 61st round of NSS” (p 8). This is nothing but confusion. It validates its choice further with reference to nutritional, educational and health outcome estimates from specialised surveys: NFHS-III supplies three outcome indicators of malnutrition for three important segments of the population: (i) proportion of under weight children below five years of age with underweight defined as those whose weightfor-age was below twice the standard devia tion; (ii) proportion of men aged 15-49 years with low body mass index – norm of low BMI being lower than 18.5; and (iii) propor tion of women (excluding pregnant women and those who gave birth in the last two months) aged 15-49 years with low BMI. In the absence of objective criteria for assign ing unequal weights to the three population segments, equal weights were assigned to derive an aggregate index of malnutrition outcome. Consequently, a simple average of the three proportions above is taken to be an aggregate outcome indicator of malnutri tion. When estimated (state/rural/urban) population from NSS is ranked according to ascending size of food expenditure per capita, normative food expenditure per capita is defined by that level of food expenditure per capita that corresponds to cumulative share of population from NSS that equals the index of malnutrition derived from NFHS-III for that state (GoI 2009; Footnote # 3; p 8).
The above description may be stated as follows: Let φ (y) be the density function for food ex penditure (y) distribution. Let θi denote the indicator of malnutrition for population seg ment ‘i’ and θ be the simple average of their estimates for the three segments under re view. Then the normative consumer food ex penditure (y*) is proposed to be obtained as y
y* = y | Φ ( y) = ∫ φ(t) dt = θ 0
This has both conceptual and methodo logical limitations. Conceptually this exer cise would not make much sense since this involves relating short-run estimates of current consumption expenditure with estimates of essentially long-run nutritional outcome measures, which are a function of host of economic and non-economic variables. In other words, the nutritional outcome estimates for time t essentially reflect the cumulative impact of both
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e conomic and non-economic factors over the medium/long-term that cannot be related to estimates of current consumption. Fur ther, as is well known, use of arithmetic mean involves implicit assumption of perfect substitutability across population categories, which is not valid. Methodo logically it involves solving a food expend iture distribution function for a normative value with reference to a simple average of proportions (undernutrition indicators) with different denominators, which again does not make sense.
Focus on the Median The report seems to be based on some fancy for median without any justification. To begin with, it estimates normative level of expenditure on education as “the ex penditure required at state-specific medi an cost (derived from the 61st round employment-unemployment survey) for sending all school-going (in 5-15 year agegroup) children in the household at the poverty level of PCTE to school by state/ rural/urban population” (p 9). This is how footnote # 4 defines normative level of education expenditure (p 9). The defini tion is different elsewhere in the report where it recommends to “compute the me dian cost of education across households using NSS weights by state and sector” (Section C, Annexure C, p 22). It is not at all clear, if the group has really bothered to study the distribution of education ex penditure and if the use of median is really warranted. Even if it had, education ex penditure corresponding to the median household in the same sub-set or total population would have made better sense than median cost from economic and statistical perspectives. Similarly, the group uses median health expenditure to work out a norm for health expenditure.5 The report neither reveals its awareness about the distinction be tween median health cost and health cost of the median household nor explains its preference for the former over the latter. Most important limitation of this exercise is that it is based on NSS data obtained from a survey of just six months (January to June 2004). Morbidity and health expenses in India reveal statistically significant seasonal variations (Agrawal 2010). Hence, estimates from a survey for
six months would not provide a correct es timate for the whole year. One should also note that median is not additive and decomposable. Hence, one does not know what aggregates of median estimates of different components of household ex penditure would mean. The report estimates prices in terms of unit values. Unit values would not provide any correct estimate of prices since the NSS procedure values items of consump tion differently depending upon source. For instance, items from homegrown stock are valued at ex farm (farm harvest) prices while items from the market at re tail prices. Unit values, which are weight ed average of different prices, would vary across households/villages conditional on the extent of monetisation of the con sumption basket. In a strict sense, they would not measure prices. Further, one does not really understand the rationale behind using weighted average of median prices when median is not additive at all. The statistical exercises involved in veri fying outliers do not have any rationale. Price outliers are identified as those maxi mum prices exceeding minimum prices by 100 times while high (30-day reference period) consumption outliers are identified as those in excess of 10 times mean con sumption or 75, whichever is higher (p 19). Finally, the report points out that “…even though the level of 2004-05 allIndia headcount ratios using the new pov erty line basket appears higher at 41.8% (rural) and 37.2% (combined rural-urban) than the existing official poverty estimates of 28.3 and 27.5%, the comparable extent of poverty reduction between 1993-94 and 2004-05 is not very different from that inferred from using the old methodology” (p 14). It does not make any sense to jus tify the proposed-revised-methodology by
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comparing estimated poverty reductions with those by the current official method ology, for the following reasons. As per the current practice, (i) the norm does not provide for educational and health ex penses; and (ii) price indices do not ac count for the catastrophic increases in ed ucational and health expenses since the 1990s. Hence, an agreement in the find ings from the two different methods would not validate either of them; nor a disagreement can be taken as evidence to invalidate either of them.
Quality of 2004-05 Database Most fundamental is the issue pertaining to the database. In fact, a background study had pointed out that the NSS 61st round data for the year 2004-05, contrary to the general perception, was not robust (Suryanarayana 2009). The NSS tables show that the first four monthly per capita consumer expenditure (MPCE) classes account for the poorest 30% of the popula tion and hence, would exhaust the set of the poor. However, these expenditure classes account for only a minor subset of the set of households with Antyodaya or below poverty line (BPL) cardholders. More than half of the households in these MPCE classes do not have the Antyodaya or BPL ration cards. Majority of the house holds with Antyodaya or BPL ration cards are above the poverty line. The NSSO ex plains this feature as follows: “It should be mentioned here that the MPCE of a house hold is based on its consumption expendi ture during the last 30 days. A poor house hold that bought a durable good during the 30 days prior to the date of survey might conceivably be placed in a higher MPCE class than the class in which its usual MPCE lies” (GoI 2007, p 16; Footnote # 3). Since the majority of the “usually” poor households fall in the APL classes, this explanation would mean that the NSS esti mates of consumption distribution do not represent the “usual MPCE”. Much worse is to find in the NSS data base that the bottom 75% of the popu lation in all categories does not spend anything on durables and hence, there is no basis for the NSS explanation (Suryanarayana 2011). In sum, the expert group report seems to have confounded the confusion on concepts and estimates
of poverty and the policy imperatives for reducing deprivation in India.
Conclusions Making a case for conceptualisation of poverty with reference to public perception on deprivation in basic needs, the group has identified a poverty line consumption basket in terms of a statistical aggregation of urban consumption profiles across the country. Such profiles are not observable. Nor do the public, the rural in particular, have access to or knowledge of such statis tical profiles to form perceptions. One does not understand how the urban consump tion bundles, food in particular, would ever be qualitatively superior to the rural one and simple price corrections would ac count for such differences. The report is at its best when it comes to validation of its norm. It debunks the calo rie norm approach but validates the revi sed poverty line by citing its adequacy to buy the normative calorie amount. It re peats this performance by debunking what it calls the old methodology on pov erty estimation and validating its own new approach with reference to their sim ilar findings on the extent of poverty re duction between 1993-94 and 2004-05. In pursuit of validation, it (i) relates shortrun estimates of consumption with medi um/long-term outcome indicators of health status for a given point of time; and (ii) obtains costs of different items like health expenditure by adding up median estimates, which are not additive. Finally, all these exercises are based on a data set about which the data generator itself has no idea of the robustness and interpreta tions. In sum, we have “confusion worse confounded”. Notes 1 GoI Order No M-11019/10/2005-PP, Planning Commission (Perspective Planning Division) attached to GoI (2009). 2 Though the existing literature on poverty and the background studies have provided valuable in sights, the expert group seems to have missed an opportunity to focus on some fundamental issues. For instance, current academic discussion on child undernourishment seems to be misplaced. It is true there has hardly been any significant i mprovement in the child health status as revealed in the NFHS-II and NFHS-III findings. The high proportion of underweight children persists. An important reason for persistence of child malnutrition is the limited appreciation of and focus on healthcare during the first 1,000 days of pregnancy (Kumar 2007). Public policy
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interventions focus largely on children after age two years. This seems to be the major factor re sponsible for a stable high proportion of under weight children in India. The adult population too is undernourished as reflected in health status in dicators because such impacts are lasting and irreversible. Such issues would have profound implications for defining a poverty norm and the policy imperatives. 3 �������������������������������������������������� This is because the NSS has decided to collect in formation on household consumption based on a mixed recall period, that is, 365 days for low fre quency items (clothing, footwear, durables, edu cation and institutional health expenditure) and 30 days for all the remaining items in future. 4 For a comprehensive appreciation of the issues involved and the background, one should read Rath (1996). 5 “For normative consumer expenditure on health (NCEH for short), two components are distin guished, namely, (i) that on non-institutional healthcare (NCEH-N), that is, on treatments not requiring hospitalisation in 15 days preceding date of interview, and (ii) that on institutional healthcare (NCEH-I) requiring hospitalisation during 365 days preceding date of interview. Median cost per treatment and per case of hospi talisation has been derived from the 60th round (January-June 2005) NSS by state/rural/urban population. Age-specific incidence of treatment/ hospitalisation reported in the same survey has been multiplied by age-distribution of the popula tion to derive average incidence of treatment/ hospitalisation. Since onset of illness and hospi talisation are contingent events, the average inci dence of treatment/hospitalisation can be regard ed as probability of onset of illness requiring treatment/hospitalisation. When we multiply the average incidence by the median cost of treat ment/hospitalisation, we get expected normative expenditures to get treated/hospitalised which provide us with NCEH-N and NECH-I respectively sum of which gives us NCEH by state/rural/urban population” (Footnote # 4; p 9).
References Agrawal, Ankush (2010): Health Outcomes in India: Distribution, Determinants and Policy Options, PhD Thesis, Indira Gandhi Institute of Develop ment Research, Mumbai. Government of India (2007): Public Distribution System and Other Sources of Household Consumption 2004-05, Vol I, NSS 61st Round (July 2004-June 2005), Report No 510(61/1.0/3), National Sample Survey Organisation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, New Delhi. – (2009): Report of the Expert Group to Review the Methodology for Estimation of Poverty, Planning Commission, New Delhi (http://www.planning commission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_pov.pdf). Kumar, A K Shiva (2007): “Why Are Levels of Child Malnutrition Not Improving?”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 42, No 15, pp 1337-45. Rath, Nilakantha (1996): “Poverty in India Revisited”, Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol 1, Nos 1 and 2, pp 76-108. Suryanarayana, M H (2009): Nutritional Norms for Poverty: Issues and Implications, Background paper prepared for the Expert Group to Review the Methodology for Estimation of Poverty, Planning Commission, New Delhi (http://www.planning commission.nic.in/reports/genrep/surya.pdf). – (2011): “Policies for the Poor: Verifying the Infor mation Base”, Journal of Quantitative Economics, Vol 25, No 1, pp 73-88. – (2012): “Estimating Rural Poverty: Distributional Outcomes, Evaluations and Policy Responses” in Chetan Ghate (ed.), Handbook on Indian Eco nomy (New York: Oxford University Press) (forthcoming).
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World History and Its Politics Vinay Lal
World history as we have it now is the pertinent form of knowledge for our times, taking its place besides other dubious labels such as multiculturalism, globalisation, multilateralism, and the new world order. This paper points out that it is in various ways one of the 21st century’s pre-eminent forms of colonising knowledge – and all the more insidious in that it appears to be as benign and ecumenical an enterprise as one can imagine. An integrated history of one world sounds appealing, but we need to have a conception of many worlds, not just one world from the viewpoint of western exceptionalism.
Vinay Lal (
[email protected]) is at the University of California, Los Angeles.
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1 Prolegomenon to the Analytics of History
I
n his early 19th century History of British India, a voluminous work that not only remained until the end of the century the standard narrative of the Indian past but also exercised an incalculable influence on the “heavenly born” British civil servants for whom James Mill’s history was required reading, the father of John Stuart Mill set out to periodise Indian history.1 By his time, the distinction between ancient, medieval, and modern was quite commonplace,2 not even tempered by such phrases as “early modern”, and to an innocent reader Mill may not have appeared as effecting any kind of departure from the established template. He characterised ancient India as “Hindu” and rendered medieval India as “Mahomedan”. In English, of course, the word “medieval” has since long had overwhelmingly pejorative overtones. The medieval represents not merely a chronological stage of history, but even more so a state of mind – a state characterised by the lack of reason, disregard for progress, and primitivism in thought, belief, and conduct. Mill would not at all have hesitated in associating the medieval period, apparently corresponding to Europe’s “Middle Ages” or “dark ages”, predominantly with Islam. As Mill’s history demonstrates, he was fully aware that north India had, in the second millennium CE, come firmly under Muslim rule, commencing at least with the Delhi Sultanate; and he may even have had some knowledge of Muslim sultanates in the Deccan, though like most colonial (and many contemporary) historians and commentators of India, he had fallen into the habit of supposing that the history of north India could effortlessly be passed off as the history of the entirety of India. There were, as would be obvious to any student of Indian history, numerous grounds on which Mill’s characterisation of ancient India as “Hindu” and especially medieval India as “Mahomedan” might have been cogently contested. Though Islam gained many converts, Saivism, Vaishnavism, Shaktoism, and other strands absorbed into what later became known as Hinduism continued to maintain a formidable presence. Medieval India was far from being congruent with Islamic India, and Mill would only have had to read the equally voluminous work, Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan (1829-32), of his contemporary, James Tod, to get a sense of how far the Hindu presence remained, for instance, in western India.3 Groups in certain strata of Indian society embraced Islam much more readily than other social groups. If later historians were inclined to think that north India had fallen under the iron grip of Muslim rule from 1200 onwards, many contemporary Islamic theologians doubted that India could be characterised as a land governed under the Sharia. november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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Mill, moreover, made the mistake of assuming, and he was scarcely the only European writing on India who did so, that the periods of Indian history could be characterised by the religion of the rulers. Whatever the facile assumptions about the superior ratiocinative faculties of Europeans, there is little trace of logic in thinking that since the rulers of north India in the 13th century and thereafter were increasingly of Muslim faith, the people were to be characterised in like terms. Mill permitted his understanding of British and European history to furnish the terms of reference for studying the past of India, even as he adopted the view that the capacity to be objective and neutral is a trait only to be found among inheritors of the Judaeo-Christian civilisation of the west. Mill’s periodisation obviously cannot account for the unique Indo-Islamic synthesis forged in the supposedly dark period of Indian history. With the characteristic confidence, indeed arrogance, that marks and mars colonial (and some neocolonial) narratives of Indian history, Mill and many of his contemporaries assumed that “the dark ages” of Europe were “dark” everywhere. Mill was thus among those who contributed to the communalisation of Indian history. His prejudices were by no means exclusive, for in their racism and sneering hostility to others, Mill and his fellow Europeans were often catholic in their taste and inclinations. India was one among many “rude” and “barbarous” nations that peopled the earth; the Popish Irish, who were to be deplored for being ignorant and superstitious when they should have known better, occupied among the lowest rungs on the ladder of civilisation. Samuel Johnson had, after all, defined oats as something eaten by horses – and by humans, in Ireland. If Mill displayed an unremitting hostility to Islam, common to his ancestors and successors, he was even more vituperative in his condemnation of Hinduism as a barbarous religion of monkey gods and goddesses adorned with necklaces of human skulls. As Mill (1990) put it, in a chapter comparing “Mahomedan and Hindu Civilisation”, the nations, in the western parts of Asia; the Persians, the Arabs, and even the Turks; possessed a degree of intellectual faculties higher than the nations situated beyond them towards the east; were rather less deeply involved in the absurdities and weaknesses of a rude state of society; had in fact attained a stage of civilisation, in some little degree, higher than the inhabitants of that quarter of the globe.
Though, as I have suggested, there are many justifiable grounds for critiquing Mill, there is yet a more profound reason for viewing his writings with deep suspicion. Having designated the ancient and middle periods of Indian history as Hindu and Mahomedan, respectively, one can reasonably expect that Mill should have designated the modern period as Christian. By the time the first edition of Mill’s history was published in 1818, substantial portions of India had fallen under British rule. The charter of the East India Company had initially put a brake on Christian missionary activities in India, but the East India Company Act of 1813 opened the country to missionaries. There is, more over, no doubt that the Englishmen ruling India thought of themselves as representatives of a Christian power. When Charles Grant presented his tract, “Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain”, to the Company’s directors in 1797, it was a signal that the evangelicals had decided to join battle in turning British India into a fertile ground for Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46
Christian proselytisation. Grant was candid in the declaration of his faith that nothing was more calculated to lift the superstitious and ignorant Hindu from his adherence to hideous customs than persistent exposure to Christianity. It was “repugnant to the past experience of Europeans”, Grant wrote, to believe that the “obstinate attachment” of Hindus to their faith would prevent “their conversion to Christianity” (1813).
Template for the Rational If Britain was a Christian power, and Englishmen in India saw themselves upholding the ideals of Christianity, Mill should have in all honesty characterised the modern period in India as “Christian”, much as he rendered the ancient period as “Hindu” and the medieval period as “Mahomedan”. He, however, termed the modern phase of Indian history as “British”, and devoted twothirds of his work to the history of the British in India.4 There is cunning of reason here that speaks volumes, even today, about the exercise of power in the Christian West. For Mill, as for the greater bulk of his intellectual contemporaries, Protestant Christianity furnished the template for a proper, rational faith. Quite predictably, all other religions, even Catholicism, were judged against Protestantism and found terribly wanting. Yet the pretence that inspires Mill, and permits him the sleight of hand, is one where modern Britain is seen as having transcended religion. Mill was guided by several assumptions, beginning with the notion that religion was the predominant and inextricable element in the constitution of Indian society; whatever else might be said about India, religion and the battles over it had shaped its history. Second, the European Enlightenment had succeeded in establishing a division between church and state, and to be modern one had to embrace secularism. Third, cognisant of the fact that in Britain itself the evangelicals had come to occupy a significant space in the public sphere, Mill implicitly advocated a realist position that transformed religion into “the invisible hand”. In principle, it was all well and good to argue that religion, a private affair, was to be banished from the public sphere; but fidelity to realpolitik demanded that religion function somewhat as the uncrowned king. With this one example, I have sought to establish a number of fundamental principles. First, Europe’s history invariably serves as the template for all history, whether we are least aware of it or writing history in opposition to Eurocentric history. What is true of Indian history is true of nearly every national history: the categories – ancient, medieval, and modern, as an illustration – that have informed the study of European society are assumed to be the natural categories through which one might interpret any history. I would like to underscore the phrase “national history”, in part for the reason that history occupies a distinct place in the framework of the modern nation state. Moreover, we should recognise that there are traditions of non-European historiography that might have followed a different mode of periodisation but nonetheless betray some of those same features that we encountered in Mill’s History of British India. Older Tibetan chronicles, for example, suggest the presence of a historiographic tradition that divided the region’s religious history into four phases, commencing with the “pre-history” of
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Tibet before the arrival of Buddhism. The pre-history of Tibet is, predictably, rendered in Buddhist chronicles as a period when Tibetans were savages. This period is said to have been succeeded by two centuries, until the mid-ninth century, of enlightened rule under Buddhist kings, followed by a period of “darkness” when Buddhist imperial authority collapsed and adherents of the faith faced unrelenting oppression. In the late 10th century, however, Tibetan Buddhism would experience a renaissance.5 Though contemporary Tibetan histories might perhaps speak of a fifth phase, in which Tibetan Buddhism once again stands suppressed, this time under the firm rule of a communist regime that presents itself as the emancipator of a people living in “medieval serfdom”, what is notable is the tendency in the historiography of Tibet to render Buddhism as the opposite of “darkness” Mill, I suspect, would have understood the principle at work. Second, an order of temporal linearity is explicitly or tacitly the informing principle of all contemporary history. As we move from the ancient age to the modern age, it is assumed that we also gravitate from slavery to liberty, from the religious life to secularism, and from a life embedded in community to individualism. In this narrative, the bitterest contemporary conflicts readily become relics of the medieval age. Thus the “fanaticism” of the Serbian nationalist, the Hindu fundamentalist, or the Islamic terrorist is something that the perpetrator of atrocities has been unable to leave behind in his halting and existentially troubled journey towards modern freedom. Third, the enterprise of history perforce condemns the people outside Europe to live someone else’s history, with consequences that have been seen across all domains of life. Europe’s past is the present of those living in India or Africa. When, at long last, the native arrives at the destination, it is only to discover that the European has moved on to another station, leaving only his baggage to be collected by natives. Fourth, as a corollary of the above points, it becomes imperative to understand that much of history is not merely Eurocentric, but is European history. The histories of Latin America, Africa, or India are thus not merely ancillary histories, the limbs to the body of European history, rather they are illustrative of certain strands of European culture, thought, and sensibility that are invisible or only partially visible to Europe itself. We are reminded of those 19th century travellers who, on visiting India, Mexico, or the Maghreb, derived a peculiar satisfaction from having gained insight, as they imagined, into 16th or 17th century Europe, a Europe that could now only be encountered in Europe’s other. Fifth, the problem of Eurocentrism distorts not only the study of nonEuropean cultures, but also the understanding of the contours of the history of Europe and the entire west. It is remarkable that most British histories of Britain still remain largely oblivious to the history of colonialism. It is recognised, of course, that Britain had an empire, but the bulk of British historians work under the impression that Britain’s overseas history had little bearing on British history, culture, and politics. There is almost a morbid fear that if attention were lavished on Britain’s colonies, the motor of British history might have to be construed as lying outside Britain. To take another example, US exceptionalism, whatever its precise features, is a problem equally for those seeking to unravel the history of US history and culture as it is for those who have to
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bear the brunt of US foreign policy or contend with US “soft power”. I once put forth publicly an admittedly immodest proposal that every adult around the world ought to be permitted to vote in the elections for the US presidency (Lal 2008). Since the fate of much of the world, and certainly of its most vulnerable, smaller, or (in the language of the US and its camp followers) “rogue” nations, rests so much on who is elected to the most powerful office of the world, surely the victims of the US war machine must be permitted to choose the agent of their destruction? Iraqis, Afghans, Libyans, Somalians, Pakistanis, surely these and many other nationalities must be permitted the dignity at least of being allowed the choice of being bombed into submission if not extinction by Barack Obama, Newt Gingrich, Mitt Romney or Sarah Palin? But US exceptionalism has also prevented Americans from embracing the awareness that they have been a people of plenty. They may imagine that it is their supposed addiction to democracy that revolutionises the world, but the US’ attraction to the world may stem from a plurality of other considerations, from the country’s aggressive claims of “manifest destiny” to its unusual success in fostering an amnesia about the multiple horrors of genocide, slavery, and institutionalised racism that are stitched into the fabric of American society. We ought perhaps, then, to insist that national histories, insofar as such histories are at all attempted, should never be left entirely in the hands of the citizens of the nation state in question. In the matter of national histories, nearly everyone is a nationalist.
2 The Eurocentric Wolf in Sheep’s Clothes The perils of what are termed “Eurocentric history”, and some prospects for our emancipation from such problems, are, not so obviously, best gleaned by a reasonably lengthy account of the latest malaise in historiographic writing, namely, the recent renaissance, particularly in the US, of world history.6 The conference circuit in world history has witnessed rapid growth since the mid-1990s, job openings in this area have multiplied, and ambitious works in world history, such as Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (1997), David Landes’ The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (1998), and Niall Ferguson’s Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (2004), have garnered numerous accolades as well as an unusually wide readership. As the prolonged US recession diminishes the capacity of even the most affluent private universities to make new hires, or even replace those historians who have reached retirement, university history departments are increasingly looking to replenish their faculties with scholars whose expertise extends well beyond national history. Globalisation, the emergence of China, new polarities in world power, the rise of transnational civil society movements, and unprecedented information flows may be among the many factors that have given rise to a renewed appetite for world history. At the University of California, a multi-campus initiative in world history was launched more than a decade ago, and among its first products is a series, published by the university’s press, called “The California World History Library”. Though the series november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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may be marked by an aspiration to cover the entire globe, by no stretch of imagination can many of the volumes, which are akin to monographs, be described as enterprises in “world history”. The second volume in this series, Maps of Time (2004), is described as a work in “big history”; and its author, David Christian, characterises his intellectual endeavour as having originated from his feeling that scholarship has been enervated by the fragmented accounts of reality that have been in fashion over the last two decades, and that historians can learn from scientists. If scientists no longer find the idea of a “grand unified theory” absurd or preposterously vain, why should historians shun grand narratives? Christian (2004: 9-10) argues that “large stories” can provide a “sense of meaning”, and that intellectuals who disavow “grand narratives” do so at the risk of rendering themselves insignificant. Let us, for the moment, leave aside that Christian’s heady embrace of “grand narratives” is obviously precipitated by a profound disenchantment with the principal theoretical trajectories of the last few decades, many of which were in turn inspired by the desire that the grand narratives emanating from the traditions of western intellectual inquiry should be put into serious question, if not altogether jettisoned. What is striking is that Christian does not reflect on the other most obvious rejoinder, that the emulation of scientists has long been one of the principal problems in the social sciences; nor is there any degree of self- reflexivity on his part, or else he might have had to think about just how precisely an American trait it is to think big, all so that one might not be rendered insignificant. California is, after all, a big state – with an economy that dwarfs most nations – in an equally big nation state accustomed to throwing its weight around the world. It may not be evident to everyone, but Americans like everything big, from the “big slurp” to Home Depot and Wal-Mart stores that are larger than a few football fields put together. Those who come from countries such as Sri Lanka, Fiji, or Mauritius are much less likely to think “big”, which is scarcely to say that someone from these countries may not be asking “big” questions. The late Epeli Hau‘ofa of Suva, a thinker of much subtlety, asked profoundly interesting questions and put forward in his essay (1993) “Our Sea of Islands” the idea that Pacific islanders were connected rather than divided by the sea. I doubt, however, that he engaged in what Christian describes as “big” history. My point, as should now be apparent, is that big history and world history have, in myriad ways, their own political economy. From Oswald Spengler onwards, world history has been a conversation in which colonised, and now underdeveloped, subjects have had no place, except, of course, as the objects of the wise discourse of knowing subjects. In big places one’s pretensions are likely to be big as well, and it is inconceivable, at least at the present juncture of history, that world history would emanate from Khartoum, Tripoli, Dhaka, Kuala Lumpur, or Lima. In most formerly colonised parts of the world, the struggle to decolonise received narratives and take possession of the past is far from over. In some cases, people have been unable to abandon colonial frameworks of knowledge, in others the desired “national” narrative is deeply contested by groups within the country, and Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46
in yet other places most of the scholarly infrastructure required to rewrite history and have revisionist accounts widely accepted is still lacking. Indians may have taken charge of their history, as have (to howsoever lesser an extent) Africans of African history, but “world history”, which is generally represented as the playing field of more ecumenical minds, remains firmly within the provenance of the western scholar. The paraphernalia of almost any kind of modern scholarship is vast, but much vaster still are the array of texts, in diverse languages, that a world historian might require and they seldom are available to those outside the western academy. We might say, from the vantage point of political economy, that world history does not merely restore Europe as the hegemon of history – a restoration occurring in the midst of much anxiety about the loss of faith in grand narratives, the nefarious influence of those French diseases of the mind that go under the name of poststructuralism and Lacanian psychoanalysis, the demotion of scientific history, and the infusion of interpretive frameworks that steadfastly probe the nexus of knowledge and power – but rather returns history to its “proper” home. This occurs, moreover, in spite of the fact that many of the most liberal practitioners and advocates of world histories are themselves critical of the Eurocentrism of what passes for world history, and have made, as they see it, genuine attempts to generously accommodate Africa, China, Japan, India, south-east Asia, and Islam within the orbit of “world history.”7
Glimpses of World History Let us think, then, of a world history emanating from some place other than a metropolitan centre in the west. Between 1930 and 1933, Jawaharlal Nehru penned nearly 200 letters to his daughter Indira that offered, to invoke the title of the subsequent collection, Glimpses of World History (1982). It is apposite that those chained within prison walls should indulge in large canvases, and everywhere the sumptuous history of prison literature offers striking reminders of the often inverse relationship of the narrowness of one’s lodgings to the catholicity of thought; but rarely has someone, confined to a prison cell by the colonial regime, been able to command as expansive a conception of the world as Nehru did in Glimpses of World History. Nehru made no pretense at being a historian; nor did he suppose that his letters would teach his daughter history. He did not even presume to offer an account of “world history”; his canvas may be large, but Nehru was sage enough to realise that he could only furnish “glimpses” of a vast past. History’s practitioners seldom suppose that they are offering only “glimpses”, and “world historians” are quite candid that they are interested in the dissemination of the “big” picture. Nehru’s very title stands as a partial admonishment to those who take their “world history” too seriously. Yet he was clearly animated by other questions. How was he to convey to a 13-year-old girl the unspeakable horrors of famine in 19th century India, and sensitise her to the suffering of common people, and yet do so without filling her with “anger and great bitterness” for which there was time enough? He worried as well that he might have tarried too long on India, China, Russia, and Europe. Thus in one
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letter he reminds Indira that he last treated the history of Cambodia when it was under Hindu kings, but that is no reason to suppose that “exciting things” did not take place there in subsequent decades to which he had been unable to give his attention. As a relentless advocate of India’s cause, both before and after independence, Nehru was hardly a critic of the nation state system; and yet, as letters 129-34, where he allowed himself extended discussions of revolutions, literature, science, democracy, socialism, Marxism, and the growth of workers’ organisations, unequivocally show, he had foreseen the shortcomings of a world history centred on nation states. Like other colonised subjects, Nehru had been stirred by accounts of the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905; but, unusually for a nationalist of his time, he was determined that Japan’s triumph should not be construed as a model for India to emulate. “Japan not only followed Europe in industrial methods”, he commented, “but also in imperialist aggression. She was more than a faithful pupil of the European powers: she often improved on them” (1982: 457). There are moments, to be sure, when Nehru is writing as an Indian, or as an advocate of Fabian socialism. Yet he advises Indira, apropos of all the “isms” in circulation – “feudalism, capitalism, socialism, communism” – that “behind them all stalks opportunism” (1982: 947). This was in 1933: Germany was arming itself to the teeth, pogroms against Jews had intensified, but Europe was still far from being on the verge of war. Nehru nonetheless wrote, as he put it, in “The Shadow of the War”. Glimpses of World History is sweeping, literary, nuanced, playful, philologically minded – the word “Fabian”, Indira is informed, derives from the Roman general Fabius, who was not keen on engaging Hannibal in open conflict and sought to wear him down through attrition – and ecumenical, both in its conception of the “world” and “history”. This is the world history on which, growing up as a child in India, I was nurtured. It filled me with a vague desire that I should, sometime during the stage of fatherhood, do for my children what Nehru had done so admirably for Indira. Many years later, I was heartened to discover that my adolescent affection for this book was shared by more mature readers. British writer, journalist, and founder of the Left Review, Tom Wintringham (1949) gave it as his opinion that one could learn better English and better history by turning to the Glimpses rather than to Macaulay. But I have since also discovered that practitioners of world history in the academic establishment have received Nehru’s work with studied indifference. These same practitioners, while aware of the myriad ways – as an inspirational figure of anti-colonialism, as the first prime minister of an independent India, as a principled advocate of non-alignment, and as the supreme spokesperson in India for something like a humane modernity – in which Nehru calls attention as a world historical figure, appear to be entirely oblivious of his writings, especially Glimpses of World History. Even critiques of the Eurocentrism of world history seem unaware of Nehru’s unique foray into world history when it was far from being institutionalised as a subject of disciplined study.8 To the extent that world history has place for the likes of Nehru, it is as men of action rather than as originators of ideas. Even Mohandas Gandhi, in many respects the most arresting and
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original figure of the 20th century, has suffered the same fate. The world histories have room for a sanitised Gandhi, the “apostle” of non-violence and liberator of India, but none for his brilliant and withering critique of modernity, or his prescient understanding that oppression will increasingly be exercised through categories of knowledge.9 No world historian has dared to place Gandhi, whose collected writings run to nearly 100 volumes, alongside Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci or Sigmund Freud since the easy supposition is that he is to be counted among the “doers” rather than the “thinkers”, and of course his slim manifesto of 1909, Hind Swaraj, is barely known to the torchbearers of western intellectual traditions. One wonders, indeed, whether world history even at its best does not, particularly with reference to history in the 500 years subsequent to the beginning of European expansion, implicitly endorse the crass supposition, which frequently receives succor from scholars and writers who purport to study the big ideas of our times, that the faculties of reason and reflection have been most developed in the west.
Tethered to the Nation What conception of the “world”, then, does world history have? And, not less significantly, who is world history for, and what is the culture- and political-work of world history? In raising these questions, I am only marginally interested in certain predictable criticisms of world history, which, for all their worth, leave the political and epistemological project of world history unscathed. Large narratives are always susceptible to charges of generalisation, and most historians are barely equipped to write histories of nations, much less of the world. Indeed, even though figures such as H G Wells10 and, to take an example much closer to the interests of professional historians, Arnold Toynbee, acquired large public followings, the enterprise of universal history fell into disfavour in the aftermath of the second world war as it was seen to be deficient in scientific rigour and also inimical to national history. The last had found a new lease of life not only in the global south where anti-colonial resistance movements had succeeded in throwing off the yoke of colonial rule but also in countries such as the US, Germany, and the UK where different regimes of national consolidation had come into place. One can certainly quibble with many world histories on the grounds that these are largely histories of the west, or of European expansion; or that they are disproportionately focused on the modern world and the supposed scientific ingenuity of the moderns. More subtle critiques of the enterprise of world history point out that world history still remains tethered to the nation state, often centring on the nation state of the historian, and that world history has no more been able to do without nation states than the United Nations can be conceived outside the nation state system. But even this objection has less force than is commonly imagined, and at least a few practitioners of world history have attempted to structure their histories around global exchanges. One historian, Jerry Bentley (2003), has proposed a world history around “three realities of global experience and the relationships among them”: “rising human population, expanding technolo gical capacity, and increasing interaction between peoples of different societies”. That such a history – for instance, the account of november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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cross-cultural encounters – may still be excessively predicated on nations and certain nation states is a criticism to which Bentley pays little attention. If world histories take the holocaust perpetrated upon Jews to be paradigmatic of genocide, if that holocaust is “the holocaust” standing forth in singular and sinister isolation, then why should we not suppose that European encounters with the world will become the template for cross-cultural encounters around the world? We are asked to accede to the view, following the immense pleasure taken by many in crosscultural encounters, that since colonialism led the Europeans to “increasing interaction” with the world, it must have been a good thing – good at least for the Europeans, which is all that matters. What did the “increasing interaction” between white men and Australian aboriginals, or between white men and native Americans, accomplish except the near decimation of those brought face to face with the representatives of European Enlightenment? The “increasing interaction” of what are termed “tribal” populations in Africa, India and the Amazon Basin, many of whom sit atop large reserves of mineral and forest wealth, coal deposits or natural gas reserves, with functionaries of the state, corporate raiders and other modern mercenaries has led to the rapid erosion of lifestyles cultivated over the centuries and levels of exploitation reminiscent of the plunder of the Americas.11 When Bentley (2003) remarks that “generally speaking, the intensity and range of cross-cultural interactions have increased throughout history, albeit at irregular and inconsistent rates”, he wishes to lead us to the inescapable, if untenable, conclusion that these “interactions” have led the way to progress and a better and more integrated world. From the vantage point of a historian of India, the history of what Bentley and many others describe as “cross-cultural interactions” looks very different to me. Recent studies have restored the Indian Ocean world to its rightful place as the site of great civilisations and fruitful economic, cultural, and social exchanges,12 but even then no world history – as opposed to studies from specialists in Indian Ocean studies – that I am aware of has accorded any substantive recognition to the Gujarati thalassocracy from the 13th to the 16th centuries.13 Gujarati merchants roamed around the Indian Ocean for centuries,14 as early as the middle portion of the first Christian millennium, and were by the 13th century a permanent fixture in Malacca, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Kedah, Borneo, and the Moluccas, besides travelling to the east coast of Africa, Aden and the Gulf, and China. Though, to take another slice of history, north India came under the rule of Afghan kings in the 11th century, India’s interactions with A fghanistan, central Asia, and Iran were much older. One effect of European colonialism in India, the history of which until quite recently was habitually written as European cosmopolitanism running over native provincialism and medievalism, was to excise the memory of India’s long history of encounters, generally more productive and less exploitative, with central and west Asia, south-east Asia, east Africa, southern China, and the civilisations around the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf. In 19th century Bengal, the world began to revolve around the twin poles of the middle-class society of Calcutta and the metropolitan capital of London. If the former provided the Bengali Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46
bhadralok intellectual with emotional sustenance, his daily comforts, and the nurture of women, London was envisioned as the apotheosis of the intellectual and artistic life. “I had thought that the island of England”, Rabindranath Tagore recalled, was so small and the inhabitants so dedicated to learning that, before I arrived there, I expected the country from one end to the other would echo and re-echo with the lyrical essays of Tennyson; and I also thought that wherever I might be in this narrow island, I would hear constantly [William] Gladstone’s oratory, the explanation of the Vedas by Max Mueller, the scientific truth of [John] Tindall [sic], the profound thoughts of [Thomas] Carlyle and the philosophy of [Alexander] Bain.15
Ways of Seeing We need not dwell on Tagore’s disappointment, but should certainly ponder the persistence of this phenomenon today. It is my distinct impression that the world to most educated Indians means little more than India (and perhaps Pakistan) and the “West” (increasingly the US). When students in India apply for admission to overseas universities, they instinctively turn to the US. When the possibility for admission becomes remote for those equipped neither with wealth nor exceptional academic records, they turn their minds to Australia, Canada and even New Zealand. Australia is not part of the Indian imaginary, except as a place where one might possibly secure a quick MBA and a job offer. It may be that China, for obvious reasons, is slowly entering into their world view, but the possibility that Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia or Vietnam, to mention only countries in some proximity to India forming that mass which is dubbed Asia, ever evoking any interest among the Indian middle class is distinctly remote. I doubt if most educated Chinese entertain a picture of the world that is any different. The Chinese may be investing heavily in infrastructure projects all over Africa, indeed in nearly every nook and cranny of the world, but beyond China itself, the west remains the singular focus of their intellectual and cultural energies. Indian social scientists read their own kind and the work of their peers in the west, deriving their theories largely from academics in US universities; Chinese social scientists, in like fashion, know almost nothing of the world of Indian social science. One could easily furnish other examples, ad infinitum. The conception of the world, to put it bluntly, has narrowed very considerably for most people around the world, and this is certainly true of nearly all formerly colonised peoples. This conception of the “world” and of “history” has also informed what is called comparative history. Thus, when comparative history is evoked, it generally means that one studies India and the west, Africa and the west, west Asia and the west, and so on. Rare is that historian who would do a comparative study of India and Korea (as two countries with significant histories of Christian evangelical missions), or the Caribbean and the Indonesian archipelago (as two examples of civilisational clusters revolving around the interplay of islands and seas), and so on. In comparative history, one axis of the comparison (the west) is taken for granted, and the other is generally determined by the national origins of the historian, or by the historian’s specialisation in one kind of national history or another. Articulate and well-meaning advocates of world history such as Michael Adas have deplored the narrative of US exceptionalism.
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He argues (2003) that this narrative cannot be reconciled with the “ visions of America”, which he evidently shares, “as a model for the rest of humankind”. That the US – founded on slave labour, perpetrator of multiple genocides, and the best friend to countless despots – should rightfully be a “model” for anyone is itself a species, rather than contradiction, of US exceptionalism, but let such trivia pass. Other people at other times have thought of themselves as divinely ordained to free the world from oppression, or to bring light to the heathens and the blessings of civil isation to savages and barbarians, but Adas concedes that A mericans have unfortunately been more inclined than others to view themselves as a people whose thoughts and deeds are guided by god. Considering that American provincialism is proverbial around the world, who would want to disagree with Adas’ plea that world history can perhaps be the most useful antidote to the US inclination to be “out of step with time”? What place can there be for US exceptionalism in the era of globalisation? Yet the irony of calling for diversity, multiplicity of voices, and polyphonic histories in the US, even while it leads the world in stripping it of diversity under the aegis of globalisation, should not be lost on us. I see, however, little signs of such awareness in calls for world history, whose proponents appear to work with the notion that good intentions – not that we should grant that they are always propelled by good intentions – make for good outcomes. Thus when Bentley (2005) argues that critics of world history ignore the possibility that “through self-reflection and self-correction, scholars can deal more or less adequately with the problem of Eurocentrism”, he fails to understand that “self-reflection and self-correction” have themselves become the new form of the west’s exceptionalism. Whatever the faults and sins of the west, we have been assured, the west displays a unique capacity for self-correction and atonement. It is in this context that we might think of the epidemic of apologies in which we have been engulfed,16 not that any of those apologies has made an iota of difference to the many people in south Asia, west Asia, and Africa who have been at the receiving end of bombing campaigns and other inspired interventions.
Imperialism of Knowledge It is not surprising that Bentley (2009) goes on to claim that postcolonial critics of world history “have overlooked the point that like modern science, professional historical scholarship opens Notes 1 James Mill commenced work on the History of British India in 1806, the same year that John Stuart was born. The work, initially published in three volumes in 1818, was instrumental in procuring for him a position in the Office of the Examiner of Correspondence at the East India Company’s offices in London; some years later, John Stuart found employment in the same office. Both father and son rose through the ranks to occupy the post of Chief Examiner of Correspondence. See Bruce Mazlish (1975), James and John Stuart Mill: Father and Son in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Basic Books). There is a view, encountered with much persistence, that countries such as India are hospitable to nepotism, but the case of the Mills is only one of many which makes one wonder if the British were any less amenable to
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itself to examination and criticism from all angles, while myth, legend, memory, and other alternative approaches to the past make little or no space for criticism”. Here, in naked form, are mere reassertions of the orthodoxies about modern science and professional history that have held sway for generations. There is not the remotest awareness of the burgeoning literature in science studies that has effectively put into question the claims of modern science to monopolise knowledge, its apparent freedom from ideology, or its supposed fidelity to objectivity and notions of falsifiability. If self-correction amounts to nothing more than this, world history’s proponents have given almost every reason one might need to view their enterprise with deep suspicion. It is another form of US exceptionalism to believe that what is good for the US is perforce good for every other nation. The US doubtless requires many antidotes to its ferocious exceptionalism, but that can be no reason for supposing that everyone should be invested in its problems. World history will now be foisted upon the rest of the world, and the world will most likely not be able to resist this development. Those who make the attempt will be castigated as retrogrades, parochial, acting in violation of the spirit of what, with feigned innocence, is termed the “international community”. Such is the imperialism of modern knowledge. Advocates of world history might be puzzled that smaller or relatively insignificant nations – relative to the US, even India has been, and remains, quite insignificant, though the new forms of coolitude being championed by Thomas Friedman17 and others are calculated to put it within the orbit of the US and transform it into a useful member of the enlarged capitalist penumbra – are not grateful for entering into the horizon of “world history”, but one has only to remember the misfortunes of various nations when they fall under the gaze of colonising powers. World history is also the apposite form of knowledge for our times, taking its place besides multiculturalism, globalisation, multilateralism, and the new world order. It is thus one of the 21st century’s preeminent forms of colonising knowledge – and all the more insidious in that it appears to be as benign and ecumenical an enterprise as one can imagine. An integrated history of one world, our world, sounds appealing, but we need to have a conception of many worlds, not one world. There are many modes of com prehending the world outside history, and it is not sufficient to speak merely of diverse histories. But those are other stories, for other times.
arrangements designed to confer favours and advantages upon family members. The history of Mill’s History is a subject in itself, but it is generally recognised that it occupies a unique place in 19th century historiography of India. For one assessment of Mill’s History, see Ronald Inden (1990), Imagining India (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 2 On the history of this tripartite division, see William A Green (1992), “Periodisation in European and World History”, Journal of World History, 3 (1), pp 13-53. Mill was by no means the first person to write about the Muslim presence in India. Mahomed Kasim Ferishta, a Persian historian who came to Bijapur in 1589 and accepted the patronage of Shah Ibrahim Adil II, confined himself to the history of India under Muslim rulers, pre facing his work with an extraordinarily brief summary of India’s history, including the Arab conquests of western India, prior to the invasions
of Mahmud of Ghazni. See John Briggs (1990), History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India Till the Year AD 1612, translated from the original Persian of Mahomed Kasim Ferishta (1829; reprinted, New Delhi: Low Price Publications), 4 vols. Seid-Gholem Hossein-Khan, writing in the late 18th century, was similarly concerned only with the history of India under Muslim dynasties, except that his voluminous work was confined to a much smaller slice of Mughal history commencing with the death of Aurangzeb. See The Seir Mutaqherin or Review of Modern Times Being an History of India Containing in General the Reigns of the Seven Last Emperors of Hindostan, 4 vols (1789; New Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1990, being a reprint of the 1902 ed.). 3 Mill’s History of British India appeared in 1818, while the first volume of Tod’s Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan was published in 1829.
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Even the third edition of Mill’s History was published in 1826, before the appearance of Tod’s work; the fourth edition of Mill’s History, in 10 volumes, was published in 1848, with notes and a critical apparatus by Horace Hayman Wilson, but Mill died in 1836. My point, obviously, is not to berate Mill for being oblivious of the work of Tod, but rather to ask why it is that Mill persisted in the characterisation of “medieval” India as “Mahomedan” when clearly there was enough evidence to warrant a different interpretation. We may say that Mill’s thinking was apparently informed by the same principle that led Thomas Babington Macaulay to declare that “a single shelf” of a “good European library” outweighed the “whole native literature of India and Arabia”. Five decades of English rule, Mill would have said, were more important than the entirety of the Indian past. Mill could have had recourse to the argument that he had termed his work History of British India, and the reader could expect him to focus on British India; but that he devoted a volume to the Hindu and Islamic “periods” suggests that he had more than the history of the British in India in mind. How was he to establish the singularity, indeed achievements and blessings, of British rule except by contrasting the darkness under which Indians had suffered for the preceding three millennia or more? See Bryan Cuevas (2006), “Some Reflections on the Periodisation of Tibetan History”, Revue d’Etudes Tibetaines, No 10, pp 44-55. Portions of this section are drawn from my 2005 essay, “Much Ado about Something: The New Malaise of World History”, Radical History Review, No 91, pp 124-30. See, for example, Patrick O’Brian (2006), “Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of Global History”, Journal of Global History, No 1, pp 3-39, and Jerry H Bentley (2005), “Myths, Wagers, and Some Moral Implications of World History”, Journal of World History, 16 (1), pp 51-82. See, for example, J M Blaut (2000), Eight Eurocentric Historians, Vol 2 of The Colonizer’s Model of the World (London and New York: Guilford Press). I am aware of only one academic study of Glimpses in relatively recent years: David Kopf (1991), “A Look at Nehru’s World History from the Dark Side of Modernity”, Journal of World History, 2 (1), pp 47-63. For an earlier assessment of Glimpses, see Vinay Lal (1990), “Nehru as a Writer”, Indian Literature, No 135, pp 20-46. For a more detailed exposition of these arguments, see Vinay Lal (2002), Empire of Knowledge: Culture and Plurality in the Global Economy (London: Pluto Press). Though H G Wells became renowned as the premier writer of science fiction in his lifetime, one should not underestimate the immense popularity of his Outline of History, first published in 1920. It sold in the millions, and Wells published his book, sometimes published with the subtitle of “The Whole Story of Man” and at other times as “Being a Plain History of Life and Mankind” in numerous revised editions over the next two decades, in 1939 for the last time. An abridged version, A Short History of the World, was published in 1922 and similarly was a bestseller for years. After Wells’ death in 1946, new editions of Outline with notes by Raymond Postgate were published at frequent intervals, and the book still remains in print and is even available in a Kindle edition. The history of its reception is pertinent to my arguments at present: a committed socialist and freethinker, Wells displayed no partiality for Christianity and as a consequence attracted considerable criticism from those, particularly Catholic intellectuals such as G K Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc, who thought his ecumenism misplaced. In India, Wells’ generous estimation of Ashoka was widely remembered and I recall encountering it in history textbooks during my schooldays. “Amidst the tens of thousands of names of monarchs that
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crowd the columns of history”, wrote Wells, “their majesties and graciousnesses and serenities and royal highnesses and the like, the name of Asoka shines, and shines, almost alone, a star”. Padraig Carmody (2011), The New Scramble for Africa (Cambridge, Mass: Polity); Felix Padel and Samarendra Das (2010), Out of This Earth: East India Adivasis and the Aluminum Cartel (Delhi: Orient Blackswan). The scale of the plunder described by Padel and Das dwarfs any of the “scams” or “corruption” scandals that have lately enraged many people in India. In the many discussions on the war against ethnic minorities that has been ongoing in Burma for several decades, it is seldom mentioned that the targeted ethnic minorities sit atop the bulk of the country’s mineral wealth. Even most of the human rights reports on Burma, which are fixated on the fate of Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratic process, have paid little attention to the political economy of the conflict. It is, however, not only in the global south that mining has become the site of the most exploitative practices. For a study of the relentless appropriation of natural resources in the US, see David Bollier (2002), Silent Theft: The Private Plunder of Our Common Wealth (New York: Routledge). K N Chaudhuri (1990), Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP); Janet L Abu-Lughod (1989), Before European Hegemony: The World System AD 1250-1350 (New York: Oxford UP); M N Pearson (2003), The Indian Ocean (London: Routledge); M N Pearson (2005), The World of the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800: Studies in Economic, Social and Cultural History (London: Ashgate Variorum); and Amitav Ghosh (1992), In an Antique Land (New Delhi: Ravi Dayal Publishers). One world history that is somewhat attentive to Indian maritime traditions is Felipe FernandezArmesto (2001), Civilisations: Culture, Ambition, and the Transformation of Nature (New York: The Free Press), pp 337-42. See V K Jain (1990), Trade and Traders in Western India, AD 100-1300 (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers). Cited by William Halbfass (1988), India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press). See Vinay Lal (1999), “An Epidemic of Apologies”,
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Humanscape, 6 (4), pp 38-41, and “What Sorry Means”, Times of India, 15 March 2008, p 14. 17 Thomas L Friedman, “The Great Indian Dream”, New York Times, 11 March 2004, p A29; “Small and Smaller”, New York Times, 4 March 2004, p A31.
References Adas, Michael (2003): “Out of Step with Time: United States Exceptionalism in an Age of Globalisation” in Benedikt Stuchtey and Eckhardt Fuchs (ed.), Writing World History 1800-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press for the German Historical Institute, London), pp 137-54. Bentley, Jerry (2003): “World History and Grand Narrative” in Benedikt Stuchtey and Eckhardt Fuchs (ed.), Writing World History 1800-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press for the German Historical Institute, London), pp 47-65. Bentley, Jerry (2005): “Myths, Wagers, and Some Moral Implications of World History”, Journal of World History, Vol 16, No 1, pp 51-82. Christian, David (2004): Maps of Time (Berkeley: University of California Press). Mill, James (1990): The History of British India, 3 vol edition (Delhi: Atlantic Publishers), Vol I, p 697. Grant, Charles (1813): Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain, Particularly with Respect to Morals ... Written Chiefly in the Year 1792 (Ordered, to be Printed, by the House of Commons), p 88. Lal, Vinay (2008): “Our Fingers in the American Pie”, Hindustan Times, 7 February, p 14. Hau‘ofa, Epeli (1993): “Our Sea of Islands” in Epeli Hau‘ofa, Vijay Naidu and Eric Waddell (ed.), A New Oceania: Rediscovering Our Sea of Islands (Suva: University of the South Pacific). Nehru, Jawaharlal (1982): Glimpses of World History: Being Further Letters to His Daughter, Written in Prison, and Containing a Rambling Account of History for Young People (London, 1934; reprinted, New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Wintringham, Tom (1949): “Better History and Better English” in Nehru Abhinandan Granth: A Birthday Book (New Delhi: Nehru Abhinandan Granth Committee).
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Teaching Social Theory as Alternative Discourse Syed Farid Alatas
The social sciences are taught in the developing world in a Eurocentric manner. This has contributed to the alienation of social scientists from local and regional scholarly traditions. Further, courses in sociology and the other social sciences generally do not attempt to correct the Orientalist bias by introducing non-western thinkers. This paper highlights the contributions of Filipino thinker and activist José Rizal and draws attention to a course that used the theme of Eurocentrism to provide a critical stance from which to understand the discipline of sociology.
O
rientalism defines the content of education in such a way that the origins of the social sciences and the question of alternative points of view are not thematised. It is this lack of thematisation which makes it highly unlikely that the works of non-European thinkers would be given the same attention as European and American social theorists such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and others. Orientalism is a thought style that is not restricted to Europeans. The social sciences are taught in the third world in a Eurocentric manner. This has contributed to the alienation of social scientists from local and regional scholarly traditions. Further, courses in sociology and the other social sciences generally do not attempt to correct the Orientalist bias by introducing non-western thinkers. If we take the 19th century as an example, the impression given is that during the period that Europeans such as Marx, Weber, Durkheim and others were thinking about the nature of society and its development, there were no thinkers in Asia and Africa doing the same. The absence of non-European thinkers in these accounts is particularly glaring in cases where non-Europeans did influence the development of social thought. Typically, a history of social thought or a course on social thought and theory would cover theorists such as Montesquieu, Giovanni Battista Vico, Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Toennies, Werner Sombart, Karl Mannheim, Vilfredo Pareto, William Graham Sumner, Lester Ward, Albion Woodbury Small, and others. Generally, non-western thinkers are excluded. Here it is necessary to make a distinction between Orientalism as the blatantly stereotypical portrayal of the “Orient” that was so typical of 19th century scholarship, and the new Orientalism of today that is characterised by the neglect and silencing of non-western voices. If at all non-Europeans appear in the texts and courses, they are objects of study of European scholars and not knowing subjects; that is, sources of sociological theories and ideas. This is what is meant by the silencing or marginalisation of non-western thinkers.
Universalising the Canon
Syed Farid Alatas (
[email protected]) is at the National University of Singapore.
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It seems fitting, therefore, to provide examples of social theorists of non-European backgrounds who wrote on topics and theorised problems that would be of interest to those studying the broad range of macro processes that have become the hallmark of classical sociological thought and theory. In my own teaching, I have been concentrating on Ibn Khaldun and Jose Rizal (Alatas 2009). I would like to say a few words about the latter, as I believe that his work is of particular interest to us in south-east Asia. Filipino thinker and activist Rizal (1861-1896) was probably the first systematic social thinker in south-east Asia. As a social thinker, november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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he raised original problems and treated them in a creative way. He lived during the formative period of sociology but theorised about the nature of society in ways not done by western sociologists. He provides us with a different perspective on the colonial dimension of the emerging modernity of the 19th century. Rizal was born into a wealthy family. His father ran a sugar plantation on land leased from the Dominican order. As a result, he was able to attend the best schools in Manila. He continued his higher studies at the Ateneo de Manila University and then the University of Santo Thomas. In 1882, he departed for Spain, where he studied medicine and the humanities at the Universidad Central in Madrid. Rizal returned to the Philippines in 1887. This was also the year that his first novel, Noli Me Tangere (Touch Me Not) was published. The novel was a reflection of exploitative conditions under Spanish colonial rule and enraged the Spanish friars. It was a diagnosis of the problems of Filipino society and a reflection of the problems of exploitation in Filipino colonial society. His second novel, El Filibusterismo (The Revolution), published in 1891, examined the possibilities and consequences of revolution. If we were to construct a sociological theory from Rizal’s works, three broad aspects can be discerned. First, we have his theory of colonial society, a theory that explains the nature and conditions of colonial society. Second, there is his critique of colonial know ledge of the Philippines. Finally, there is his discourse on the meaning and requirements for emancipation. In Rizal’s thought, the corrupt Spanish colonial government and its officials oppressed and exploited Filipinos, while blaming their backwardness on their alleged laziness. His project was to show that the Filipinos were actually a relatively advanced society in precolonial times, and that their backwardness was a product of colonialism. This required a reinterpretation of Filipino history. During Rizal’s time, there was little critique of the state of knowledge about the Philippines among Spanish colonial and Filipino scholars. Being well acquainted with Orientalist scholarship in Europe, he was aware of what would today be referred to as Orientalist constructions. This can be seen from his annotation and republication of Antonio de Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Historical Events of the Philippine Islands), which first appeared in 1609. De Morga, a Spaniard, served eight years in the Philippines as lieutenant governor general and captain general and was also a justice of the supreme court of Manila (Audiencia Real de Manila) (1890-1962: xxxv). Rizal republished this work with his own annotation to correct what he saw as false reports and slanderous statements found in most Spanish works on the Philippines, as well as to bring to light the precolonial past that was wiped out from the memory of Filipinos by colonisation (1890-1962: vii). This included the destruction of pre-Spanish records such as artefacts that would have thrown light on the nature of pre-colonial society (Zaide 1993: 5). Rizal found Morga’s work apt as it was, according to Ocampo, the only civil history of the Philippines written during the Spanish colonial period, other works being mainly ecclesiastical histories (1998: 192). The problem with ecclesiastical histories, apart from falsifications and slander, was that they “abound in stories of devils, miracles, apparitions, etc, these forming the bulk of the voluminous histories of the Philippines” (de Morga, 1890-1962: 291 n 4). Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
For Rizal, therefore, existing histories of the Philippines were false and biased as well as unscientific and irrational. What his annotations accomplished were the following: • They provide examples of Filipino advances in agriculture and industry in precolonial times. • They provide the colonised’s point of view on various issues. • They point out the cruelties perpetrated by the colonisers. • They furnish instances of hypocrisy of the colonisers, parti cularly the Catholic church. • They expose the irrationalities of the church’s discourse on colonial topics. Rizal noted that the “‘miseries of a people without freedom should not be imputed to the people but to their rulers” (1963b: 31). His novels, political writings and letters provide examples such as the confiscation of lands, appropriation of labour of farmers, high taxes, forced labour without payment, and so on (1963c). Colonial policy was exploitative despite the claims or intentions of the colonial government and the Catholic church. Rizal was extremely critical of the “boasted ministers of God [the friars] and propagators of light (!) [who] have not sowed nor do they sow Christian morals, they have not taught religion, but rituals and superstitions” (1963b: 38). This position required him to critique colonial knowledge of the Filipinos. He went into history to address the colonial allegation concerning Filipino indolence. This led to an understanding of the conditions for emancipation and the possibilities of revolution.
Lazy Myths Bearing in mind the reinterpreted account of Filipino history, Rizal undertakes a critique of the discourse on the lazy Filipino that was perpetuated by the Spaniards. The theme of indolence in colonial scholarship is an important one that formed a vital part of the ideology of colonial capitalism. Rizal was probably the first to deal with it systematically. This concern was later taken up by Syed Hussein Alatas in his seminal work The Myth of the Lazy Native (1977), which contains a chapter entitled “The Indolence of the Filipinos”, in honour of Rizal’s essay of the same title (1963a). The basis of Rizal’s sociology is his critique of the myth of the indolent Filipino. It is this critique and the rejection of the idea that the backwardness of Filipino society was due to the Filipinos themselves that provide the proper background for understanding his criticisms of the clerical establishment and colonial administration. In his “The Indolence of the Filipinos” he defines indolence as “little love for work, lack of activity” (1963a: 111). He then refers to indolence in two senses. First, there is indolence in the sense of the lack of activity caused by the warm tropical climate of the Philippines that “requires quiet and rest for the individual, just as cold incites him to work and to action” (1963a: 113). His argument is as follows: The fact is that in the tropical countries severe work is not a good thing as in cold countries, for there it is annihilation, it is death, it is destruction. Nature, as a just mother knowing this, has therefore made the land more fertile, more productive, as a compensation. An hour’s work under that burning sun and in the midst of pernicious influences coming out of an active nature is equivalent to a day’s work in a temperate climate; it is proper then that the land yield a hundredfold! Moreover, don’t we see the active European who has gained
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What Rizal is referring to here is the physiological reaction to the heat of a tropical climate, which strictly speaking, as S H Alatas noted, is not consistent with his own definition of indolence; that is, “little love for work”. The adjustment of working habits to a tropical climate should not be understood to be a result of laziness or little love for work (Alatas 1977: 100). There is a second aspect to Rizal’s concept of indolence (1963a: 114) that is more significant, sociologically speaking. This is indolence in the real sense of the term; that is, little love for work or the lack of motivation to work. The evil is not that a more or less latent indolence [in the first sense, that is, the lack of activity] exists, but that it is fostered and magnified. Among men, as well as among nations, there exist not only aptitudes but also tendencies toward good and evil. To foster the good ones and aid them, as well as correct the bad ones and repress them would be the duty of society or of governments, if less noble thoughts did not absorb their attention. The evil is that indolence in the Philippines is a magnified indolence, a snowball indolence, if we may be permitted the expression, an evil which increases in direct proportion to the square of the periods of time, an effect of misgovernment and backwardness, as we said and not a cause of them.
A similar point was made by Gilberto Freyre (1956: 48) in the context of Brazil. And when all this practically useless population of caboclos and lightskinned mulattoes, worth more as clinical material than they are as an economic force, is discovered in the state of economic wretchedness and non-productive inertia in which Miguel Pereira and Belisário Penna found them living – in such a case those who lament our lack of racial purity and the fact that Brazil is not a temperate climate at once see in this wretchedness and inertia the result of intercourse, forever damned, between white men and black women, between Portuguese males and Indian women. In other words, the inertia and indolence are a matter of race ... All of which means little to this particular school of sociology. Which is more alarmed by the stigmata of miscegenation than it is by those of syphilis, which is more concerned with the effects of climate than it is with social causes that are susceptible to control or rectification; nor does it take into account the influence exerted upon mestizo populations – above all, the free ones – by the scarcity of foodstuffs resulting from monoculture and a system of slave labour, it disregards likewise the chemical poverty of the traditional foods that these peoples, or rather all Brazilians, with a regional exception here and there, have for more than three centuries consumed; it overlooks the irregularity of food supply and the prevailing lack of hygiene in the conservation and distribution of such products.
Rizal’s important sociological contribution was his raising the problem of indolence to begin with as well as his treatment of the subject, particularly his view that indolence was not a cause of the backwardness of Filipino society. Rather it was the backwardness and disorder of Filipino colonial society that caused indolence. For Rizal, indolence was a result of the social and historical experience of the Filipinos under Spanish rule. We may again take issue with him as to whether this actually constitutes indolence as opposed to a reluctance to work under exploitative conditions. What is important, however, is his attempt to deal
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with the theme systematically. He examined historical accounts by Europeans from centuries earlier which showed Filipinos to be industrious. This included de Morga’s writings. Therefore, indolence must have social causes and these were to be found in the nature of colonial rule. Rizal would have agreed with Freyre. It was not the “inferior race” that was the source of corruption, but the abuse of one race by another, an abuse that demanded a servile conformity on the part of the Negro to the appetites of the all-powerful lords of the land. Those appetites were stimulated by idleness, by a “wealth acquired without labour ...” (1956: 329)
Freyre suggested that it was the masters rather than the slaves who were idle and lazy. He referred to the slave being “at the service of his idle master’s economic interests and voluptuous pleasure” (1956: 329).
Correcting the Biases A course on social theory that corrects the Eurocentric bias should not just focus on non-western thinkers. It should also critically deal with western thinkers that make up the canon. This is what a colleague and I have done in our course on “Social Thought and Social Theory”, a discussion of which was carried out in the journal Teaching Sociology (Alatas and Sinha 2001). The discussion in the rest of this section is drawn from that paper. Given that sociological theory is of western origin, we decided that the theme of Eurocentrism was an appropriate, if not sole, point of orientation that could provide a critical stance from which to understand the discipline of sociology. We were very careful in defining Eurocentrism. We made it clear to the students that Eurocentrism was not confined to Europeans and Americans and that not all western scholars were necessarily Eurocentric. Further, Eurocentrism was commonly an attribute of non-western scholars. Eurocentrism refers to a particular position or perspective that is founded on a number of problematic claims and assumptions. We were also careful to point out that the various theorists discussed in the course were Eurocentric in different ways. For example, Marx and Weber made explicitly Eurocentric statements about the so-called Orient. Much of Durkheim’s Eurocentrism, on the other hand, has to do with his silence on non-western questions. It is also necessary to state that the recognition of Eurocentrism in the writings of western social thinkers such as Marx, Weber and Durkheim is neither surprising nor a recent discovery. What is surprising, however, is that the critique of Eurocentrism has till now failed to reshape or revolutionise the way we think about sociological theory and its history. Although many have claimed for some decades now that there are aspects of Marx’s, Weber’s and Durkheim’s writings that are Eurocentric, this awareness has not yet translated into new readings of social theory and the history of sociology. As a starting point for dealing with these issues, the students were required to read an essay by Immanuel Wallerstein on Eurocentrism (1996). While there is no new conceptualisation of Eurocentrism in this essay, it provides a concise and readable account of the ways in which the social sciences are Eurocentric. Eurocentric historiography yielded accounts according to which whatever Europe was dominant in (bureaucratisation, capitalism, democracy, and so on) was good and superior and that such november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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dominance was explained in terms of characteristics peculiar to Europeans. Thus Europe considered itself to be a unique civilisation in the sense that it was the site of the origin of modernity, the autonomy of the individual (vis-à-vis family, community, state, religion), and non-brutal behaviour in everyday life. The idea that European society was progressive (industrialisation, demo cracy, literacy, education) and that this progress would spread elsewhere became entrenched in the social sciences. Further, social science theories assumed that the development of modern capitalist society in Europe was not only good, but also would be replicated elsewhere and that, therefore, scientific theories were valid across time and space. Our objective in rereading social theory and its history was not merely to identify other founding “fathers” of sociology, such as Rizal, but also to ask how we should reread Marx, Weber or Durkheim from a non-Eurocentric perspective. It was therefore necessary to expose those aspects of their works that were clearly Eurocentric in their orientation and to suggest how it would be possible to have a Marxist, Weberian or Durkheimian understanding of society that was relieved of the Eurocentric assumptions. This was achieved by, for example, reading Marx on the Asiatic mode of production and colonialism in India (Marx and Engels 1968). While we did not exclude Marx’s many other writings, we did make it a point to include topics that continue to be routinely excluded in sociological theory courses and textbooks today. The need to revamp the teaching of sociological theory in this way can be seen to be all the more important when it is realised that Eurocentrism is not only found in European and North American scholarship, but also permeates the social sciences in Asia and Africa in various ways. (i) In the Ignorance of Our Own Histories: In textbooks used in Asia and Africa, there tends to be less information on these parts of the world because they are invariably written in the US or the UK. For example, we know more about the daily life of the European pre-modern family than that of our own. The European historical context is the defining one because sociology arose in the context of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Normal development is defined as a move from feudalism to capitalism, and that is the normal thing to study. The object of study is defined by this bias of normal development. In our own societies, while the priority is to study modern capitalist societies as well, the problem is that we begin with European pre-capitalist societies and draw attention to our own pre-capitalist societies to show that they constituted obstacles to modernisation. (ii) In Changing Constructions: Eurocentric constructions of our societies are so real and compelling and remain so until an alternative construction, which may be equally Eurocentric, is generated. For example, it was widely held that values, attitudes and cultural patterns as a whole change in the process of modernisation and that such change was inevitable (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967; Kahn 1979). However, the successful developmental experiences of East Asia in the 1980s and early 1990s led to the idea that it was traditional cultural patterns such as those founded on Confucianism that explained growth. But the Asian Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
financial crisis in 1997 laid that theory to rest and Confucianism and Asian values were even implicated in the economic decline. (iii) In the Imitation of Theories: The market being flooded with North American and British theoretical, methodological and empirical works, there tends to be a wholesale adoption of them and a consequential lack of originality, particularly in the areas of theory and methodology. There is an uncritical consumption of imported theories, techniques and research agendas. In view of these problems, we stressed to our students that they should be cognisant of the context in which social thought and theory emerged; gauge its utility for the study of non-western societies; and be conscious of the Eurocentric aspects of sociology because these detract from its scientific value. In dealing with the theme of Eurocentrism in the course, we presented to our students the assessments of specific aspects of the works of Marx, Weber and Durkheim. Here I discuss the example of Marx.
Non-European Marx There was no attempt on our part to do away with traditional topics such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism, circulation and production, alienation, class consciousness, the state, and ideology. What we did do, however, was to work into the readings and discussions the three objectives stated above. For example, we suggested to the students that the significance of Marx’s discussion on the transition from feudalism to capitalism is that it viewed an emergent bourgeois class and a weak decentralised state in feudal society as preconditions for the rise of capitalism. Students were asked to think about what this implied for non-European societies. Did it imply that these preconditions were non-existent in non-European societies? If this was Marx’s view, to what extent was it a fact? Or could it be seen as a Eurocentric view? In line with Eurocentric assumptions that Europe was unique, it was assumed that such prerequisites were not to be found outside Europe and that pre-capitalist modes of production outside Europe were obstacles to capitalist development. An example was the Asiatic mode of production on which students were assigned readings. We pointed out to the students that in Marx’s characterisation of the Asiatic mode of production, he was often factually wrong in his pronouncements on “Asiatic” economies and societies, and that informing his political economy were Orientalist assumptions that viewed non-European societies as backward contrasts to Europe. We also stressed that recognition of the problems associated with Marx’s characterisation of the Asiatic mode of production (India and Algeria) did not suggest that his concept of the “mode of production” has to be jettisoned from sociological theory. As a matter of fact, it was important to engage in a critique of Marx’s Asiatic mode of production thesis to separate it from the more valid concepts and ideas in his work. Discussions on the Eurocentric aspects of Marx’s thought would make it possible to engage in a more critical interpretation of our own histories while retaining the valid and universal aspects of Marx’s theory. An example is an article on colonial ideology in British Malaya that we assigned (Hirschman 1986). Through this article, we were able to show the usefulness of Marx’s concept of ideology for a critique of various Eurocentric ideas of the colonisers.
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Although conventional topics such as class consciousness, the state, and ideology were discussed, we always made it a point to include readings on contemporary third world societies to make it clear to students that there were universal aspects of the thought of Marx that are relevant to regions and areas outside his own. In other words, the exposé of Eurocentrism was both a critique of Marx, to the extent that his views were informed by the Orientalist “wisdom” of his time, and a rescue of Marx, to the extent that there are universal elements in his theoretical contributions.
The Captive Mind, Academic Dependency and Teaching My interest in this topic is due in large part to the lifelong concerns of my late father, Syed Hussein Alatas (1928-2007), with the role of intellectuals in developing societies. On this topic, he wrote a number of works that developed themes such as the captive mind (1969a, 1972, 1974) and intellectual imperialism (1969b, 2000). The idea of intellectual imperialism is an important starting point for the understanding of academic dependency. According to Alatas, intellectual imperialism is analogous to political and economic imperialism in that it refers to the “domination of one people by another in their world of thinking” (2000: 24). Intellectual imperialism was more direct in the colonial period, whereas today it has more to do with the control and influence the west exerts over the flow of social scientific knowledge rather than its ownership and control of academic institutions. Indeed, this form of hegemony was “not imposed by the West through colonial domination, but accepted willingly with confident enthusiasm by scholars and planners of the former colonial territories and even in the few countries that remained independent during that period” (Alatas, S H 2006: 7-8). Intellectual imperialism is the context within which academic dependency exists. Academic dependency theory theorises the global state of the social sciences. Academic dependency is defined as a condition in which knowledge production of certain social science communities are conditioned by the development and growth of knowledge of other scholarly communities to which the former is bound. The relations of interdependence between two or more scientific communities, and between these and global transactions in knowledge, assume the form of dependency when some scientific communities (those located in the knowledge powers) can expand according to certain criteria of development and progress, while other scientific communities (such as those in the developing societies) can only do this as a reflection of that expansion, which generally has negative effects on their development. This definition of academic dependency parallels that of economic dependency in the classic form, which Theotonio dos Santos pointed out, By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which the former is subjected. The relation of inter dependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of this expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development (1970: 231).
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The psychological dimension of this dependency, conceptua lised by S H Alatas as the captive mind (1969a, 1972, 1974), is that the academically dependent scholar is a passive recipient of research agendas, theories and methods from the knowledge powers (Alatas, S F 2003: 603). It is no coincidence that the great economic powers are also the great social science powers, according to Garreau (1985: 64, 81, 89) and Chekki (1987), although this is only partially true as some economic powers are actually marginal as social science knowledge producers, Japan being an interesting example. In earlier work, I had listed five dimensions of academic dependency. These are (a) dependence on ideas; (b) dependence on the media of ideas; (c) dependence on the technology of education; (d) dependence on aid for research and teaching; (e) dependence on investment in education; and (f) dependence of scholars in developing societies on demand in the knowledge powers for their skills (2003: 604). I would like to add a sixth dimension, dependence on recognition. Dependency on recognition of our works manifests itself in terms of the effort to enter our journals and universities into international ranking protocols. Our universities and journals strive to attain higher and higher places in the rankings. Institutional development as well as individual assessment are undertaken to achieve a higher status in the ranking system, with systems of rewards and punishments to provide the necessary incentives that centre on promotion, tenure and bonuses. The consequences of this form of dependency include a de-emphasis on publications in local journals, to the extent that they are not listed in international rankings. The result of this is the under development of social scientific discourse in local languages. The problem is not coming up with alternative ways of teaching the social sciences. Nor has it to do with difficulties of deve loping adequate or relevant textbooks and readings. These can be easily done. Rather, it has to do with the psychological problem of mental captivity and the structural constraints within which this takes place, that is, academic dependency.
Conclusion The idea behind promoting scholars such as Rizal and Ibn Khaldun and a host of other well-known and lesser-known thinkers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and also Europe and North America, is to contribute to the universalisation of sociology. Sociology may be a global discipline but it is not a universal one as long as the various civilisational voices that have something to say about society are not rendered audible by the institutions and practices of the discipline. While the critique of Orientalism in the social sciences is well known, this has yet to be reflected in the teaching of basic and mainstream social science course in most universities around the world. Basic introductory courses in the social sciences are generally biased in favour of American or British theoretical perspectives, illustrations and reading material. On the other hand, the logical consequence of the critique of Orientalism in the social sciences is the development of alternative concepts and theories that are not restricted to western civilisation as their source. But, for this to be done, the critique of Orientalism must become a widespread theme in the teaching of the social sciences. november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
MULTIVERSITY References Alatas, Syed Farid and Vineeta Sinha (2001): “Teaching Classical Sociological Theory in Singapore: The Context of Eurocentrism”, Teaching Sociology, 29 (3), pp 316-31. Alatas, Syed Farid (2003): “Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences”, Current Sociology, 51 (6), pp 599-613. – (2006): Alternative Discourses in Asian Social Science: Responses to Eurocentrism (New Delhi: Sage). – (2009): “Religion and Reform: Two Exemplars for Autonomous Sociology in the Non-Western Context” in Sujata Patel (ed.), The ISA Handbook of Diverse Sociological Traditions (London: Sage). Alatas, Syed Hussein (1969a): “The Captive Mind and Creative Development” in K B Madhava (ed.), International Development (New York: Oceania Publications). – (1969b): “Academic Imperialism”, Lecture at the History Society, University of Singapore, 26 September. – (1972): “The Captive Mind in Development Studies”, International Social Science Journal, 34 (1), pp 9-25. – (1974): “The Captive Mind and Creative Development”, International Social Science Journal, 36 (4), pp 691-99. – (1977): The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and Its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism (London: Frank Cass). – (2000): “Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and Problems”, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 28 (1), pp 23-45. – (2006): “The Autonomous, the Universal and the Future of Sociology”, Current Sociology, 54 (1), pp 7-23. Chekki, D A (1987): American Sociological Hegemony: Transnational Explorations (Lanham: University Press of America). de Morga, Antonio (1890-1962): Historical Events of the Philippine Islands by Dr Antonio de Morga, published in Mexico in 1609, Recently Brought to Light and Annotated by Jose Rizal, Preceded by a Prologue by Dr Ferdinand Blumentritt, Writings of Jose Rizal, Vol VI, National Historical Institute, Manila. Dos Santos, Teotonio (1970): “The Structure of Dependence”, American Economic Review, LX. Freyre, Gilberto (1956). The Masters and the Slaves (Casa-grande and Senzala): A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilisation (New York: Knopf). Garreau, Frederick H (1985): “The Multinational Version of Social Science with Emphasis upon the Discipline of Sociology”, Current Sociology, 33 (3), pp 1-169. Hirschman, Charles (1986): “The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology”, Sociological Forum, 1 (2), pp 330-61. Kahn, Herman (1979): World Economic Development: 1979 and Beyond (London: Croom Helm). Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels (1968): On Colonialism (Moscow: Progress Publishers), pp 35-41; 81-87. Ocampo, Ambeth R (1998): “Rizal’s Morga and Views of Philippine History”, Philippine Studies, 46, pp 184-214. Rizal, José (1963a): “The Indolence of the Filipino”, Political and Historical Writings, National Historical Institute, Manila, pp 111-39. – (1963b): “The Truth for All”, Political and Historical Writings, National Historical Institute, Manila, pp 31-38. Rudolph, Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph (1967): “The Place of Tradition in Modernisation”, Development Digest (Washington DC: National Planning Association), pp 62-66. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1996): “Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science”, Paper presented to Korean Sociological AssociationInternational Sociological Association East Asian
Regional Colloquium on “The Future of Sociology in East Asia”, Seoul, 22-23 November. Zaide, S (1993): “Historiography in the Spanish Period” in Philippine Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Quezon City: Philippine Social Science Council), pp 4-19.
Appendix National University of Singapore, Department of Sociology, Sc3101: Social Thought and Social Theory, Session 2005-2006 (Semester Ii), Lecturers and Tutors: Syed Farid Alatas and Vineeta Sinha, Lectures: Monday 8 am to 10 am; Venue: LT 9 Course Description This course aims to develop a critical appreciation of classical social thought and theory. We will concentrate on the contributions of five major thinkers, Harriet Martineau (1802-1876), Karl Marx (1818‑1883), Jose Rizal (1861-1896), Max Weber (1864‑1920) and Emile Durkheim (1857-1917). These thinkers, among others, offered novel analyses of the rise of modernity and the nature of modern society. What are the largescale sociological processes in the making of modern society? What are its antecedents? What are its characteristic tendencies? And what are its human consequences? What is the relevance of these theories to our own condition today? In attempting to address these basic questions, this course will take us back to the classics that have shaped the development of sociology. How did each theorist grapple with the problem of modernity? What are the affinities and contrasts in their analyses? What is living or dead in their works in the light of the contemporary world as we experience it? In what ways can their ideas and arguments, their concepts and methods, still inform our analyses of the world we live in? What is the practical value of social theory? And what does the discipline of sociology mean for us? These are questions that students are encouraged to pursue without settling for quick and easy answers.
Reference Irving M Zeitlin (1997): Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory, 6th ed, Upper Saddle River (New Jersey: Prentice Hall), available at NUS Coop.
Course Requirements In addition to lecture and tutorial attendance, students are required to complete a term paper. Details of the term paper can be found on the IVLE for this module. Tutorial attendance and participation (20%) and the term project (20%) comprise 40% of the final assessment. Students are also required to view the movies, Brazil, and Jose Rizal. Viewing times are announced in the course outline below but you may also view them on your own at other times. Lectures and Readings Note: All readings are required and are to be completed prior to attending lectures. A course reader will be available.
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Introduction to the Course Housekeeping matters (9 January 2006) Course outline Lecture and reading schedule Tutorials What Is Sociological Theory? (9 January 2006) Why only Marx, Weber and Durkheim? Modern capitalist society and its traits Social forces behind the rise of sociological theory European domination, Eurocentrism and androcentrism Non-western social thinkers Immanuel Wallerstein, “Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science”. Paper presented to the KSA-ISA Joint East Asian Colloquium on “The Future of Sociology in East Asia”, Seoul, November 22-23, 1996. Mary Jo Deegan, “Transcending a Patriarchal Past: Teaching the History of Women in Socio logy”, Teaching Sociology 16, 1988, 141-150. The Problem of Androcentrism Classical Theory Minus Gender (16 January 2006) Androcentrism Female invisibility Artemis March, “Female Invisibility in Androcentric Sociological Theory”, Insurgent Socio logist, Vol XI, 2, 1982, pp 99-107. R A Sydie, “Sex and the Sociological Fathers”, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol 31, 2, 1994, pp 117-138. Harriet Martineau (1802-1876) The First Woman Sociologist? (16 January 2006) Demarcating the object of study Martineau’s methodology: Science of morals and manners Paul L Riedesel, “Who Was Harriet Martineau?” Journal of the History of Sociology, 3, 2, 1981, pp 63-80. Harriet Martineau, How to Observe Morals and Manners, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1838/1988, pp 13-22, 71-77, 223-231. Martineau’s Sociological Insights (23 January 2006) Sociology of slavery Ethnic relations/racism Women’s studies Harriet Martineau, Society in America, edited by S M Lipset, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1836/1962, pp 47-56, 291-314, 355-357. Karl Marx (1818-1883) Feudalism, Capitalism and the Asiatic Mode of Production (23 January 2006) An outline of Marx’s sociological theory The feudal system The rise of the capitalist mode of production and its relevance Oriental despotism Karl Marx, “The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism” in R C Edwards, M Reich and T E Weisskopf (ed.), The Capitalist System: A Radical Analysis of American Society, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972, pp 61-66.
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MULTIVERSITY Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Colonialism (Moscow: Progress Publishers), 1968, pp 35-41; 81-87. Suniti Kumar Ghosh, “Marx on India”, Monthly Review, 35, 1984, pp 39-53. Alienation, Class and Class Consciousness (6 February 2006) The theory of surplus value The pauperisation thesis Alienation Bourgeois, proletarians, and communists Class consciousness Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York: International Publishers), 1982, pp 106-119. Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, T B Bottomore, trans (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1956, pp 178-191 [stop at line 2]; pp 200-201 [start at “The history ...”]. Capitalism and the State (6 February 2006) The capitalist state The ruling class Karl Marx, “The Relation of State and Law to Property” in The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers), 1970, pp 79-81. William Domhoff, “State and Ruling Class in Corporate America”, Insurgent Sociologist, 4, 3, 1974, pp 3-16. Ideology (13 February 2006) Ideology and the sociology of knowledge Colonial ideology Karl Marx, “Ruling Class and Ruling Ideas”, in The German Ideology, pp 64-68. Charles Hirschman, “The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology”, Sociological Forum, 1, 2, 1986, pp 330-61.
Max Weber (1864-1920) The Origins of Modern Capitalism (13 February 2006) An outline of Weber’s theory An idealist theory of the development of capitalism The Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism The metaphor of the iron cage Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons), 1958, ch 2, pp 47-53 [stop at “...before kings”]; ch 4, pp 95-128; ch 5, pp 170-183 [from “This worldly Protestant ...”]. 20 February 2006 – Film viewing session – Brazil in Theatrette I 8 am No lecture scheduled The Protestant Ethic Thesis and Southeast Asia (27 February 2006) Weberian Orientalism? Southeast Asian interpretations of Weber The relevance of Max Weber to Southeast Asian development Syed Hussein Alatas, “The Weber Thesis and Southeast Asia” in idem, Modernisation and Social Change: Studies in Social Change in Southeast Asia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson), 1972, pp 1-20. Andreas Buss, “Max Weber’s Heritage and Modern Southeast Asian Thinking on Development”, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 12, 1, 1984, pp 1-15.
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Rationalisation, Social Action and Bureaucracy (27 February 2006) The types of social action The types of rationalisation Bureaucracy and excessive rationalisation Weber, Economy and Society, Vol 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1978, pp 22-26, 85-86. Weber, “The Social Psychology of World Religions” in Hans H Gerth and C Wright Mills (ed.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press), 1958, p 293. Weber, Economy and Society, Vol 2, pp 956-58. Gerald E Caiden, “Excessive Bureaucratisation: The J-Curve Theory of Bureaucracy and Max Weber through the Looking Glass” in Ali Farazmand (ed.), Handbook of Bureaucracy (New York: Marcel Dekker), 1994, pp 29-40. Weber’s Comparative Sociology of Religion: “The Religion of China” (6 March 2006) Economic ethic Chinese traditionalism Confucian rationalism and Puritan rationalism Weber and Eurocentrism Weber, The Religion of China (New York: The Macmillan Press), 1964, pp 142-170. Stephen Molloy, “Max Weber and the Religions of China: Any Way Out of the Maze?”, British Journal of Sociology 31, 3, 1980, pp 377-400.
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) Durkheim’s Project: Defining Sociology (6 March 2006) The realm of the social Sociology as science Sociological explanation Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, Steven Lukes, ed., translated by W D Halls (New York: Free Press), 1895/1982, pp 50-59, 119-146, 175-208. Mike Gane, “A Fresh look at Durkheim’s Sociological Method” in Pickering and Martins (ed.), Debating Durkheim, 1994, pp 66-85. The Problem of Modernity (13 March 2006) Durkheim’s theoretical trajectory Mechanical and organic solidarity Colonialism and Durkheim’s theory of social change Normal division of labour Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York: Free Press), 1933, pp 79-82, 105-10, 200-06, 226-28. Edward Tiryakian, “Revisiting Sociology’s First Classic: The Division of Labour in Society and Its Actuality”, Sociological Forum, Vol 19, No 1, 1994, pp 3-15. The Problem of Modernity (cont’d) (13 March 2006) Abnormal division of labour Anomie, egoism and individualism Individual happiness and freedom Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York: Free Press), 1933, pp 353-57, 374-78, 389-93, 396-409. Stejpan G Mestrovic, “Anomie and the Unleashing of the Will”, Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield), 1988, ch 4.
20 March 2006 – Film viewing session – Jose Rizal in Theatrette I 8 am No lecture scheduled Applying Durkheim’s Method: Suicide (27 March 2006) Social integration Typology of suicide Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1952, pp 41-53, 145-151, 378-384. Steven Lukes, “Alienation and Anomie” in Peter Hamilton, Suggested Readings from Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments, Vol II (London: Routledge), 1990, pp 77-97.
Jose Rizal (1861-1896) The Development of Colonial Society (27 March 2006) Colonial exploitation The question of indolent natives Jose Rizal, “Filipino Farmers”, Political and Historical Writings, National Historical Institute, Manila, 1963, pp 19-22. Rizal, “The Truth for All”, Political and Historical Writings, National Historical Institute, Manila, 1963, pp 31-38. Rizal, “The Indolence of the Filipino”, Political and Historical Writings, National Historical Institute, Manila, 1963, pp 111-139. Rizal and the Enlightenment (3 April 2006) The Enlightenment and the Church Rizal and reason Raul J Bonoan, S J, The Rizal-Pastells Correspondence (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press), 1994, pp 40-57; 75-79. The Revolution (3 April 2006) El Filibusterismo Jose Rizal [video recording]; a GMA Network film, produced by Butch Jimenez, Jimmy Duavit and Marilou Diaz-Abaya; directed Marilou DiazAbaya, Manila, 1999. Jose Rizal, “Mi Último Adiós” (“My Last Farewell”), in Dr Jose Rizal’s Mi Último Adiós in Foreign and Local Translations, Vol 1, National Historical Institute, Manila, 1989, pp 1-3; 38-40. Conclusion Major Themes (10 April 2006) Eurocentrism and androcentrism Idealism and materialism The problem of freedom Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers), 1970, preface. Max Weber, General Economic History (New Brunswick: Transaction Books), 1981, ch 22. C Wright Mills, “Freedom and Reason” in The Sociological Imagination (London: Oxford University Press), 1959.
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Western Intellectual Imperialism in Malaysian Legal Education Shad Saleem Faruqi
An over-reliance on Western knowledge paradigms and the exclusion of traditional knowledge and indigenous cultures characterises legal education in Malaysia. The same could be said of education in most Asian and African universities. This paper holds that such educational enslavement must end and that genuine globalisation demands that we be open to the best from East and West. It argues that our very survival could hinge on resisting today’s Western intellectual imperialism and embarking on a voyage of discovery of our ancestors’ intellectual wanderings.
Shad Saleem Faruqi (
[email protected]) is at the Universiti Teknologi MARA, Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia. Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
D
uring British1 colonial days and till 1972 (15 years after independence), a Malaysian aspiring to become a lawyer had no choice but to travel to the UK, Ireland, Australia or New Zealand to obtain a foreign law degree recognised by the Malaysian Legal Profession Act. In 1972, in the face of considerable opposition from many English-oriented local gentlemen, the University of Malaya commenced the nation’s first bachelor of laws (LLB) degree. Other institutions, among them Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Malaysia and Universiti Utara Malaysia, followed suit with their own honours courses in Malaysian laws. Looking back over the last four decades, it is obvious that there have been some significant developments in legal education in Malaysia. With the launch of several Malaysian law degree courses, legal education has put down local roots. The ratio bet ween foreign law graduates and Malaysian-trained lawyers has shifted in favour of the latter. Many local law graduates have made a name for themselves in the legal fraternity. A few of them have been elevated as judges of the high court. Whether the increase in locally trained lawyers and judges will usher in a new jurisprudence in the courts, however, remains to be seen. In the 1980s, the qualifying board began a certificate in legal practice (CLP) course to provide a Malaysian-based “finishing” or “professional stage” to those with degrees from abroad (mostly the UK). With this new course, legal education was “repatriated”. It lost its elitist character and became available to the masses. Specially tailored need-based programmes and short-term courses for targeted groups are now offered occasionally (though not frequently enough) by most law faculties. Legal literacy is being promoted though regular newspaper columns devoted to the law.2 In some fields like constitutional law, the bar council’s constitutional law committee produces pamphlets for public consumption. Despite these wholesome developments, many debilitating drawbacks remain. Though local law programmes have existed since 1972, the Legal Profession Act continues to recognise foreign (mostly UK) law degrees and qualifications. Within the legal fraternity, the mystique of the London Inns of Court remains strong. This is understandable. What is scandalous is that a person can be called to the Malaysian bar or be appointed a Malaysian judge, chief justice, president or chief judge without having studied Malaysian law for a single day, without undergoing a “bridging course” and without studying the nation’s highest law, the federal constitution. Later years are supposed to take care of jurists developing an understanding of the philosophical and political underpinnings of
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local legislation. Almost 90% of the superior court judges and most of the senior members of the bar have been trained abroad. Most of them are steeped in the “English tradition” of parliamentary supremacy and that of an unwritten constitution. They are blissfully unfamiliar with constitutional jurisprudence and adroitly avoid or evade constitutional issues. In many monumental cases involving issues of constitutional supremacy, fundamental liberties, unenumerated (non-textual) rights, federal-state relations, implied limits on parliament’s powers and the issue of judicial independence, constitutional arguments are brushed aside and the case is reduced to one of administrative law’s doctrine of ultra vires. The Legal Profession Act permits foreign lawyers to be admitted on an ad hoc basis to argue special cases. A few years ago, Cherry Blair was invited by a Malaysian law firm as a human rights expert to argue a case that hundreds of local lawyers could have handled just as well, if not better. Fortunately, the judge was not an Uncle Tom and disallowed her application. Within the judiciary, nearly 80% of the superior court judges are British trained. Most are wedded to Austinian positivism and are content with the security and simplicity of Diceyan parliamentary sovereignty. Because of judicial subservience to parliament, the federal constitution of 1957 has neither become the chart and compass nor the sail and anchor of the nation’s legal endeavours. Instead of emulating wholesome precedents from other Asian countries with whom Malaysia shares a common destiny, a common history of colonial domination and a similar supreme constitutional charter, Malaysian judges proudly quote from the unwritten British constitution and reject precedents from countries such as India on constitutional law matters. In other areas of law too, the Civil Law Act 1956 enjoins judges, subject to some exceptions, to rely on British precedents. The umbilical cord that bound Malaya to the “mother country” in 1957 continues to nourish our legal appetite. The British adversarial system (though it is most unsuitable for a society in which up to 80% of cases in the lower courts are unrepresented) continues to remain with Malaysia. The common law doctrine of stare decisis continues to hold sway even though justice and fairness demand a “situation-sense”. Though a large number of the academic staff in Malaysian law faculties has obtained its first degree from local institutions, a colonial mindset persists. The favoured destination for masters’ courses is generally the UK or Australia. Centres of learning in Asia and Africa are avoided. The syllabi for most subjects are based on British blueprints. The external examiners and visiting professors are mostly from the UK, the US or Australia. Asian scholars are generally not considered for such honours. Speakers for a number of prestigious lecture series are invariably British or Australian. Asian jurists are not regarded as up to the mark. The intellectual grovelling before foreign experts (mostly from the West) was no worse in the days of the raj than today. A few years ago, Tony Blair, who the world knows lied about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to justify a war, was invited by the University of Malaya to deliver the Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture (the most prestigious law lecture series). He was also paid by a private organisation to give a talk at a private function. Obviously, mass murderers from the US and the UK still deserve worship but Malaysian voices of concern are raised when an African or Asian miscreant like Robert Mugabe or Bashar al-Assad seeks to visit the country.
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The following points are discussed in detail below.
• In line with London’s LLB model of legal education, Malaysian law faculties are too profession-oriented and insufficiently people-oriented.3 • Legal education in Malaysia is textbook-based rather than experience-based. • In its choice of subjects and aims, legal education in Malaysia is embarrassingly un-Asian and very West-centric. Fifty-four years after independence, a number of private universities continue to train Malaysians for British, Irish and Australian law degrees.
Profession-Oriented, Not People-Oriented In line with the legal tradition at the University of London and the Inns of Court, in Malaysia, law schools exist primarily to prepare students for practice in the courts. There is no rational basis for this narrow goal. Formal law constitutes only a portion of people’s legal experience. A large number of people live out their lives outside the courts and conduct their social affairs without the aid of lawyers. As for it being a career, a very large number of law graduates, perhaps 50%, find useful careers outside the law. Even if this were not so, a university (or multiversity), if it is worth its description, must have broader goals than just train recruits for employment at the bar, bench or in corporate life. A university is not a factory. Production of cogs for the industrial wheel is not its primary function. A university has many holistic goals. Producing good people with a social conscience and a social perspective is one of them. Instilling the habit of thought, a receptivity to beauty and humane feeling is another. Seeking change and reform to the basic structures of society, including the legal paradigms in operation, is yet another. Regrettably, Malaysian law faculties’ excessive reliance on the University of London’s traditional law syllabus prevents exposure to many areas of legal knowledge of relevance to Asia. The immersion of Malaysian lawyers and judges in British legal positivism inclines the country towards studying the law as it is rather than as it ought to be. Despite the Asian context, legal education in Malaysia does not emphasise need-based programmes. It does not highlight the burning issues of the time – the plight of the marginalised and downtrodden and issues of corruption and abuse of powers. Students are not trained or encouraged to walk in the valleys where the rays of justice do not penetrate. Legal education must not only involve studying dry, lifeless rules and procedures but also rendering service to society in some of the following ways. • The curriculum must be redesigned to provide for mandatory involvement of faculty members and students in legal aid and advice clinics. At least one day a week, each faculty member and a chosen group of students must be required to sit in a clinic after office hours and give free legal aid and advice to members of the community. • There must be a clinical legal education course involving fieldwork to examine the actual working of the law in society; preparing brochures on common areas of concern to the citizens; and visits to kampongs (villages) or squatter areas to impart legal literacy. • All university students, during at least one semester break, must be involved in voluntary work (unpaid) in adopted projects, adopted localities or communities. november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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• It should be part of the essential function of every law faculty to formulate and conduct special, tailor-made, short-term courses for targeted groups in society. These courses could be of two types. One, to provide continuing education to specialists so that their expertise is enhanced. Two, for the public to improve their legal literacy. The latter should not have any rigid entry requirement.
Textbook Based, Not Experience Based “True knowledge comes from experience and not from textbooks. Yet we allow daily…the overwriting of experience by textbooks, whose so-called knowledge is based on experience from countries differently organised from ours” (Idris 2005). There is always a gap between the theory of the law and the reality on the ground. To bridge this gap, universities must build town-gown and community-university relationships; encourage student and staff participation in community life so that they experience the law in action. To encourage self-education, learning situations have to be created outside the classroom. Classroom time must be reduced and the emphasis shifted to how to learn from what to learn (Alvares 2005). Paulo Freire (2005) argues in favour of “problem-posing education” (in which students and teachers interact with each other and engage in a process of transformation) and calls for the abolition of “the banking model of education” (in which the students merely receive, memorise and repeat their teachers’ deposits).
Too West-Centric If independence is the state or quality of being autonomous or free from the influence, guidance or control of another nation, then Malaysians are hardly free. The fundamental assumptions of the country’s political, economic and educational systems are dictated by Western, especially US, hegemony in the area. Politically, the nation is free but the enslavement of the mind has hardly ceased. Yusef Progler (2005) points out that whatever the field of study or regional location, a course of graduate or even postgraduate study in most universities today across the world will follow a similar trajectory. It will first identify the great white European or American men of each discipline and then drill their theories and practices as if these were universal, while ignoring or undermining most other forms of knowledge.
Whether it is biology, physics, algebra, philosophy, medicine, law, politics, economics, agriculture or healthcare, two tendencies are apparent. One, Malaysia blindly apes Western universities. Two, it is ignorant of the Asian and African roots of knowledge.4 This West-centrism or Euro-centrism is not necessarily re sorted to consciously. It is rooted in a slave mentality, a psycho logy of dependence on and reverence for everything Western. Syed Hussain Alatas called it “the captive mind”. Others have referred to it as the colonised mind. Ward Churchill (2002) refers to all modern intellectual discourse and all higher education as “White Studies”. Cheng (2010) describes the present state of affairs as “academic colonialism”. Perhaps it is difficult for Asian elites who are immersed in Western thought to envision “life beyond the hegemonic grip of Western modernity, its knowledge traditions and its socio-economic systems” (Progler 2009). There is “widespread acceptance of the idea that the motive force channelling the continued progress of the human species was the Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
self-propelled, inherent dynamism of the West. The West was the model in (the) light of which everything else was to be eliminated or superseded” (Alvares 2010).
Ignorance of Eastern Contributions Historical evidence proves that Chinese, Indian and Persian universities predated universities in Europe and provided paradigms for early Western education (Alvares 2005). Yet universities around the world, including those in Asia, ignore centuries of enlightenment in China, India, Japan, Persia and west Asia. It is as if all things good and wholesome and all great ideas originated in the crucible of Western civilisation and the East was, and is, an intellectual desert. It is as if Western knowledge is the sum total of all human knowledge (Progler 2009). As a matter of fact, a cultural and scientific renaissance flourished in the East long before the European renaissance. Everyone knows about the Gutenberg printing press. Very few know that Pi Sheng developed one much earlier in 1040. In science, Galileo Galilei, Issac Newton and Albert Einstein illuminate the firmament but not much is known about Al-hazen and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. Western chemistry had its predecessor in Eastern alchemy. Algebra had African roots. The philosophical musings of Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Paul Sartre and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe can be matched by Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, Mulla Sadra, Yanagita Kunio, Shenhui, al-Mutanabbi and Kalidasa. Emile Durkheim’s and Max Weber’s sociology must compete with Ibn Khaldun and Jalal al-Din Rumi. Freudian psychology had its corrective in Buddhist wisdom. The Cartesian medical model has its Eastern counterpart in the ayurvedic, unani and herbal methods. Very few are aware that Arab Muslims were central to the making of medieval Europe. From the 8th to the 13th centuries, Arab and Islamic cultures were at their zenith and were renowned for their science and learning. Aspiring scholars from all over the world flocked to these citadels of education. Arabic was the lingua franca of science and technology. A large number of texts written in Arabic were translated into Latin. They contributed immensely to the transfer of knowledge from the Islamic world to Europe. Libraries flourished in the Muslim world, notably in Baghdad and in Cordoba. Many European scholars translated Arabic works in medicine, mathematics and astronomy without acknowledging their sources. To deny the debt to Islamic intellectuals, the names of hundreds of Islamic scholars and scientists were Latinised or changed to obscure their identity and origin. Thus Ibnu Sina became Avicenna; al-Ghazali was changed to Algazel; Ibn Rushd was altered to Averroes and alRazi to Rhazes. Ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi became Alkindus, Al-Farabi was named Al-Pharabius and Al-Mawardi became Alboacen.5
Legal Curricula Despite 38 years of experimentation in legal education, the structure and content of Malaysia’s courses, the choice of core subjects, the categories of thought, the fundamentals, the methods of analysis and research, the history of each subject, the books and the icons – all remain Western. Legal education today is as much a colonial construct as it was during the days of the British raj. Centuries of enlightenment in Japan, China, India, Persia and west Asia are totally ignored.
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Jurisprudence In legal philosophy, for example, a book on American or English legal thought is referred to as “jurisprudence”. In contrast, a book on Islamic, Chinese or Hindu legal thought is described with the prefix “Islamic”, “Chinese” or “Hindu”.6 The assumption is that Western ideas are universal whereas the Asian ones are merely parochial. A typical course in jurisprudence in a Malaysian university begins with Plato, Aristotle, John Locke, John Austin, Jeremy Bentham, H L A Hart, Hans Kelsen, Roscoe Pound, Weber, Eugen Ehrlich, Durkheim, Karl Marx, Karl Olivecrona, and so on. The icons and the godfathers of knowledge are overwhelmingly Western. Titles written by scholars and thinkers from Asia, South America and Africa are nowhere to be found. The Mahabharata, Arthashastra, Book of Mencius, Analects of Confucius and the treatises of Ibn Khaldun, Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, Mulla Sadra, Jose Rizal, Benoy Kumar Sarkar, Yanagita Kunio and Naquib al-Attas do not appear in any syllabi.
Concept of Law In Austinian fashion, the concept of law is tied to the commands of the political sovereign even though most Asians and Africans feel the pull of religion and custom and regard them as part of the majestic network and seamless web of the law.
Categories of Law The rigid compartmentalisation of knowledge developed in Europe in the 19th century is preserved. As in the West, Malaysia separates law from morality, public law from private law and crime from tort even though such artificial dichotomies are alien to its traditions and are often impediments to justice. In most Asian and west Asia systems, the militant secularism of Europe and the US is rejected. Morality is legalised and legality is moralised. The law of crime is also the law of tort. Laws relating to rights and duties apply equally in the public and private spheres. Such a holistic approach has positive implication for human rights. The questionable divisions between criminal offences and civil wrongs, criminal procedure and civil procedure, public law and private law, and substantive law and procedure on which curricula are built do not approximate with real-life situations. A motor accident case, for example, may cut across a myriad of fields, including tort, crime, contract, road traffic law and insurance. An integrated approach to legal problems is, therefore, necessary to recognise the inter-connectedness of all fields of law. In the final year of law education, an integrated subject called “Litigation” should be introduced, combining elements of the law of evidence, criminal and civil procedure. Constitutional and administrative law could be combined in a subject called “Public Law”. Moots should be given greater emphasis. The scope of “Remedies” should include not only public and private law remedies but also non-judicial, parliamentary, administrative, non-legal, informal and traditional modes of providing redress to a complainant.
Magna Carta (1215), Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) and the US Declaration of Independence (1776). What is ignored is that the ideas of limited government, judicial independence and constitutionalism were also found in the religious doctrines of the East (Weeramantry 2010). Taking Islam as an example, we can point out that the denial of state sovereignty in Islamic jurisprudence preceded Locke’s and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s idea of the limits on state sovereignty by hundreds of years (Faruqi 2006). The idea of government as a trustee is mentioned in the Holy Qur’an (4:58). The citizen’s duty to obey the law is conditional to the duty of the ruler to obey the creator. Locke and Rousseau, Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King built on this idea to propound the theory of civil disobedience. In Islamic theory, political as well as socio-economic rights are given legitimacy. Prophet Muhammad’s sermon at Arafat is one of the world’s greatest human rights declarations. More than 1,400 years ago he spoke of liberty and property, racial equality, women’s rights and the ruler’s subjection to the law. If his words had been uttered by some Western luminary, they would have adorned the walls of law schools all over the world. In the Islamic criminal process there is a legal presumption of innocence. Evidence of agents provocateurs cannot be used. In the Holy Qur’an, religious tolerance is required and pluralism is permitted (2:256, 109:1-6, 10:99). Modern principles of administrative law like natural justice and proportionality have their basis in the Holy Qur’an. The concept of shura (3:159) or consultation paves the way for a whole regime of consultative processes. The ombudsman principle attributed to the genius of the Scandinavians was known to Islam through the system of Hisba, the office of the Muhtasib and the existence of Mazalim courts. Islam’s concept of the universal ummah is in line with the process of globalisation and the growing movement for international citizenship.
Alternative Dispute Resolution The subject of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) parrots a discourse on arbitration, conciliation and mediation and ignores many indigenous or informal institutions and procedures (like the village penghulu in Malaya and the panchayati raj and lok adalats in India) that have existed for resolving discord. These institutions and procedures should be studied afresh.
Law, Economics and Environmentalism The course on law and economics studies emerging international protocols but not the clear injunctions in Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism on environmental and consumer responsibility (Weeramantry 2007). Ibrahim Abdul-Matin informs us that there are deep and long-standing connections between Islamic teachings and environmentalism; that Islam has a profound dedication to humankind’s collective role as stewards of the Earth. He points out that Prophet Muhammad declared “the entire Earth is a mosque” (2010).
Growth of International Law Public Law Generations of students have been uncritically led to believe that the seeds of constitutional and administrative law were planted in Europe and North America by such historical documents as the
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The syllabi of public international law courses fail to mention that long before modern humanitarian law built protection for civilians, non-combatants and prisoners of war, many Eastern systems such as Islamic international law had already worked out a set of principles november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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for the conduct of war. Some of these principles exceed the standards of the venerated Geneva Conventions (Weeramantry 1988). Regrettably, Malaysian as well as Asian legal education fails to recognise that many of the law’s crowning glories actually originated in the East. Obviously, colonialism has left its indelible mark. The enslavement of captive minds leads to cooperation with the pervasive intellectual imperialism of the West. There is also a total failure to recognise and articulate how international law is used as a chambermaid for Western colonial interests. Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), a network group, seeks to expose this shameful reality. It studies the encounter between international law and colonised peoples and the role of international law institutions in facilitating and legitimising the subjugation and oppression of “Third World” peoples.7 Contemporary TWAIL scholars include Georges Abi-Saab, F Garcia-Amador, R P Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, Taslim O Elias, C H Alexandrowicz, Richard Falk, Fred A Boyle, Nico Schrijver and Martti Koskenniemi.
Building a Just World Despite the tradition of Austin, of legal positivism and empiricism that emphasise the is and not the ought, it should be a core function of Asian law faculties to study the concepts of law, justice and rights in all their dimensions – historical, economic, social, religious and political.
Concept of Human Rights In the context of Asia and Africa, the syllabi of human rights courses must move beyond traditional human rights concepts found in 20th century documents towards the following felt necessities in our part of the world. • Issues of sustainable development. • The impending environmental catastrophe, which is being hastened by the corporation-based society of the West. • “Rights of future generations”. • Third generation rights to development and poverty eradication. • The pervasive domination of Asian and African economies and social life by transnational corporations and Western hegemony. • The debt stranglehold of the North on the South. • Currency speculation and hedge funds that brought down the economies of several Asian societies in the late 1990s and impoverished millions. • Protection of indigenous resources against piracy by trans national corporations. • Cross-border violations of basic rights of developing nations by the more developed nations of the West. • The new wave of colonialism that has anointed itself with the name of globalisation. • The transfer of economic and political power from elected, national institutions to unelected, Western-controlled institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. • The dominance over world institutions by the Western militaryindustrial complex that has made our quest for peace elusive, engendered wars and overthrown unfriendly Asian regimes, with the dubious doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” as a mask. West Asia today is on fire not because of the Western desire to promote democracy and human rights but because of its desire to Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
replace leaders who were either an obstruction to its hegemony or had become an inconvenience. It is notable that some of the most oppressive but West-friendly regimes in that part of the world face no threats from the US, UK, France, the United Nations Security Council or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). • Western militarism and the nefarious West-dominated arms trade that impoverishes Asian economies, kills millions of innocent non-combatants and pollutes our soil. • The gross violations of humanitarian laws in the disguise of “the war against terrorism”. • Western control of and the lack of democracy and equality in most international institutions. • Threats to human dignity from private centres of tyranny. It is time for Asia to stop being ashamed of articulating its own perspectives on human rights. It is also time for us to expose the racism inherent in condemnations of the “Asian values” argument. If there is an American or Western or Christian or universal concept of human rights, then surely there is no justification for mocking an Asian, African, Islamic, Hindu or Buddhist version of human rights that may share much in common with others at the core but may stand apart with others on penumbral issues.
History of Human Rights and Wrongs The centrality of the human rights discourse today is a cause for celebration. However, besides a study of the concept and its emerging new dimensions, attention must also be turned towards the history of the quest for human rights, its great promoters and its worst violators. The Western record on human rights needs to be examined. We must remember our humiliations and sufferings. Past and continuing brutalisation of Asia, Africa and Latin America by Europe and North America needs to be known. The slavery, apartheid and genocide on our continents, the atrocities against people of other cultures and religions in Europe, and the continuing, horrendous violations of rights by Europe and North America in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya need to be documented. Any Asian must look with disdain on Western pontifications about human rights when all around is a story of Western brutalities against other cultures, religions and regions. It is as if T-Rex were giving the jungle folk a lecture on ahimsa. It is time that Asian law faculties sensitise citizens to the topsyturvy world we inhabit. It is time we turn people’s attention to the West-perpetuated genocides, wars, overthrows of elected regimes, economic blockades that cut off the basic necessities of life, pulverisation or exploitation of our economies and the slow strangulation of our cultures and ways of life. All these are sought to be justified by our Western overlords on the basis of some so-called benevolent goals set by them.
Conclusions All human beings are encapsulated by time and space. We are all susceptible to narrow religious, racial and communal perspectives. Our whole life is a process of expanding the horizons of thought and adding to islands of knowledge. Admittedly, Asian and African perspectives on life and law are not universal and comprehensive. Likewise, North American and European world views are also limited by their own social experience. However,
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due to their colonial ascendancy (which has not abated and has simply taken on new forms) and military and economic might, Western perspectives pass off as universal, transcendental and absolute.8 Eastern ideas and institutions are viewed through Western prisms and invariably regarded as primitive and in need of change. There should, therefore, be a concerted effort throughout the South to expose the sordid reality of Western intellectual imperialism and to re-educate colonised minds. We must revisit our syllabi and substitute or supplement imported mental baggage with our own treasury of thoughts. This indigenisation of our syllabi is not meant to shut out the West or to restrict the knowledge of the powerful but to “restore the suppressed knowledge of the powerless” (Alvares 2005). We must give our students a bigger picture of knowledge and increase their choices. Over- reliance on Western knowledge paradigms and exclusion of traditional knowledge and indigenous cultures from our universities has narrowed our knowledge base. Against the background of pervasive Western intellectual domination, benign though it is in some areas, indigenisation would assist a genuine globalisation. Academic boards of faculties, university senates and accreditation authorities may wish to go beyond form to the actual content of our syllabi. They must insist that our garlands of knowledge be made of flowers from both Eastern and Western gardens. A helpful website for some Third World titles is www.multiworldindia.org. There is no dearth of scholars from the South or with empathy for the South who could be co-opted to advise Malaysian universities on how to tackle the problem of educational enslavement.9 The aim should not be to shut out the West or be insular. Let the wearing of blinds be the speciality of others. The aim should be to be truly global, to give students a bigger picture of knowledge and to increase their choices. It should not be part of our agenda to try to Notes 1 It is acknowledged at the very outset that the terms East and West, South and North, orient and occident are not culturally exclusivist terms or binary opposites or water-tight compartments. Their waters mix. Further, neither region is free of value pluralism or relativity. The waters of life mix everywhere. There are shared, core values. However, surrounding the core, there is a large penumbra in which culture, religion and region are, and ought to be, recognised as relevant. For the purpose of this essay, a hermeneutic approach is adopted: the idea of East and West is studied in the light of how it is understood by the bulk of those who use it and who are affected by it. 2 The author pens a column “Reflecting on the Law” in The Star every other Wednesday. 3 Scintillating developments in community-based learning in some English faculties are, regrettably, not given adequate scrutiny. 4 This criticism is not fully applicable to the fouryear law course at the Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws at UIAM. The degree course at UIAM endeavours to provide a parallel education in Islamic law and jurisprudence on the one hand and all the traditional law subjects offered in other universities on the other. However, the course content of the “traditional” law subjects continues to rely heavily on Western paradigms, Western books and icons. 5 For a more detailed list, see Shad Saleem Faruqi (2006), Islam, Democracy and Development, UPENA, UiTM, pp 15-17. 6 Refer, for example, to the pioneering work of C G Weeramantry (1988) and A M Bhattacharjee
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ask European and US universities to include the treasures of the East in their syllabi. Whether their world view should be enriched by the insights and reflections of the East can be left to them. Further, the discovery of our treasures should not be seen as an exercise in flag-waving nationalism. Its aim is ameliorative. Diversity and pluralism of knowledge systems are vital for meeting many of the moral, social and economic challenges of our times. For example, Asia could offer a critique of the ethnocentrism of Western scholarship by pointing out that a middle-class Western lifestyle, and what that entails in terms of nuclear families, a consumer society, living in suburbia and extensive private space, may neither be workable nor desirable for the majority of the world’s population. The contemporary Western notion of development that requires the deliberate extermination of indigenous cultures and the giving up of modes of life that are psychologically and environmentally rich and rewarding requires critical examination. Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the cancer cell and some brakes on development policies and some reconsideration of what amounts to the good life are in order. Humanity must recognise that it is living on the verge of a precipice, afraid both to climb and to fall. But the ground is slipping beneath us. It is time for a dialogue between civilisations and a mutual process of learning. In sum, our goal should be that Asian universities shed their slavish mentality of blindly aping Western paradigms. We should give up our reluctance to check the historical veracity and moral legitimacy of assumptions in the Western framework. We must then embark on a voyage of discovery of our ancestors’ intellectual wanderings. We must seek to rediscover the intellectual wonders and heritage of China, India, Persia, Mesopotamia and other Eastern and African civilisations and subject them to a comparative analysis. Only in this way can we build a garland of knowledge with flowers from many gardens.
(1994), Hindu Law and the Constitution, Eastern Law House, 2nd ed. 7 Personally I find the term “Third World” demeaning. There is nothing “third” about Asia and Africa and “first” about Europe and the US. It is better to use terms such as Asia, Africa and South America or, collectively, “the South”. 8 It is conceded, however, that Western and Eastern juris prudence are not binary opposites. Each is more variegated than the simple terms East and West allow. Each shares many common core features with the other and with many other rich streams of thought. 9 Among them are Anwar Fazal, Naquib al-Attas, S M Mohamed Idris, Mohideen Kader, Gurdial Singh Nijhar, Martin Khor Kok Peng, K Bala Subramaniam, K R Panikkar, T Rajamoorthy, Chee Yoke Heong, Evelyne Hong, Lean Ka-Min (Malaysia), Claude Alvares, Vinay Lal, Ashis Nandy, C K Raju, A M Bhattacharjee, Vandana Shiva, Mira Shiva, Devinder Sharma, Ashim Roy (India), Seyed Abdulhassan Navvab, Hossein Doostdar, Sue San Ghahremani Ghajar (Iran), Roberto Bissio, Carlos Abin (Uruguay), Charles Abugre (Ghana), Yusuf Progler (Japan), Ziauddin Sardar, Daya Thussu, Kalinga Seneviratne, Reynaldo Ileto, Syed Farid Alatas (Singapore), Tony Weis (Canada), John C Raines, Roby Rajan (US) and Gustavao Esteva (Mexico). Other notable scholars and activists include Frederic Clairmont, Helena Norberg-Hodge, John Cavanagh, M Iqbal Asaria and Walden Bello.
References Abdul-Matin, Ibrahim (2010): Green Deen – What Islam Teaches about Protecting the Planet, BerrettKoehler Publishers, San Francisco.
Alvares, Claude (2005): “Why Multiversity”, Third World Resurgence, Nos 173-74, p 27. – (2010): “Resisting the West’s Intellectual Discourse” in Dominance of the West over the Rest, Citizens International, Penang. Cheng, Feng Shih (2010): “Academic Colonialism and the Struggle for Indigenous Knowledge Sy stems in Taiwan”, Social Alternatives, Vol 29, No 1, p 44. Churchill, Ward (2002): White Studies – The Intellectual Imperialism of Higher Education, REPS, Citizens International, Penang, p 3. Faruqi, Shad Saleem (2006): Islam, Democracy and Development, UPENA, UiTM, Selangor, pp 7-10. Freire, Paulo (2005): Pedagogy of the Oppressed – An Education for Humanization, REPS, Citizens International, Penang. Idris, Mohamed (2005): “The Dismal State of Social Sciences in the Third World”, Third World Resurgence, Nos 173-74, p 23. Progler, Yusef (2005): “White Studies and the University in Ruins”, Third World Resurgence, Nos 173-74, p 31. – (2009): Preface to Naquib al-Attas, The DeWesternization of Knowledge, REPS, Citizens International, Penang. Weeramantry, C G (1988): Islamic Jurisprudence – An International Perspective, Macmillan, London, p 13. – (2007): “Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and the Environment”, Asian Tribune, 7 July. – (2010): “Universal Principles for Judicial Ethics and Integrity”, The Sunday Times, 25 July.
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Missing the Woods for the Ore: Goa’s Development Myopia Pranab Mukhopadhyay, Gopal K Kadekodi
A recent report by the National Council of Applied Economic Research comparing benefits and costs of mining and forest services finds that mining benefits outweigh the costs they impose. A scrutiny of the methodology of the report suggests an overvaluation of social benefits and undervaluation of social costs. The report also deviates from received practices in environmental valuation of forest benefits. Its conclusions therefore are inaccurate and state policy must be cautious while allowing activities that may cause irreversible damages to Goa’s natural wealth.
Contents of this article are personal views of the authors and may not be attributed to either institution. The authors would like to acknowledge comments on an earlier draft from Rahul Basu, Haripriya Gundimeda, Pushpam Kumar, Ligia Noronha and members of Goa Foundation. The usual disclaimer applies. Pranab Mukhopadhyay (
[email protected]) is at the department of economics, Goa University. Gopal K Kadekodi (
[email protected]) is at the Centre for Multidisciplinary Development Research, Dharwad. Economic & Political Weekly EPW November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
1 Introduction
T
he ongoing debate on conservation and development invariably revolves around alternative uses for natural resources raising a basic question between the need for industrial growth and hence the demand for sub-soil resources on the one hand, and the need for maintaining and increasing our natural capital (Dasgupta 1982). Fossil fuels, coal, minerals, etc, are all nature’s bounties which are typically sub-soil resources that are extractable now or in the future. This extraction is not a neutral process because it causes irreversible damage to the surface environment consisting of forests, water and river bodies, arable lands, oceans and biodiversity, apart from damaging the sub-soil organic chemical properties, water and biodiversity (Kadekodi 2010). In this paper we critically examine the developmental role claimed for the mining industry by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) (2010) for Goa. The mining industry provides employment, contributes to gross domestic product (GDP) by production and has been the engine of growth for many economies. With growing domestic and international demand for metals, the expansion of the mining industry has been quite dramatic, especially in states where large mineral deposits exist. However, since these are sub-soil deposits, their extraction imposes a cost on the environment, other natural resources like water, and local human populations. The debate, therefore, involves a comparison of costs and benefits of this industry in the larger social context (World Bank 1998). NCAER (2010) provides a social cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of mining and forests in Goa and argues that the gross benefits from mining outweigh the losses that may be incurred from the loss of forests. The net gain from such a strategy is calculated to be Rs 1,842.2 crore per year (ibid: 50). Using a 12% social discount rate (SDR) and a time frame of 25 years it finds that the opportunity cost of mining is Rs 14,449 crore measured as net present value (NPV) of losses to be incurred if mining was disallowed.1 The values used by NCAER (2010: 29, 55) suggest that out of the 1,424 square kilometres2 of dense forest area, about 296 square kilometres (8% of geographical area or about 20% of dense forest area) is under mining;3 and the corresponding deforestation cost due to mining is estimated to be worth Rs 468 crore (at 2008-09 prices), which amounts to Rs 1.58 lakhs per hectare of forest area. This figure is rather small when compared with the range of ecosystem services that are derived from tropical natural forests (Kumar 2011).4 We argue that this report undervalues the environmental costs of mining and overvalues the benefits when examined in the light of received practices in environmental valuation. Its conclusions
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therefore are inaccurate. The needs of development often force policymakers to make difficult choices but state policy must be cautious while allowing activities that may cause irreversible damage to Goa’s natural wealth. The question we raise is whether the benefits from forests currently outweigh the benefits from an alternate land use.5 The NCAER (2010) report attempts to lay the economic justification for permitting further land use change of Goa’s forests in favour of mining. This paper fundamentally questions this wisdom, based on CBA of mineral extraction, apart from suggesting a comprehensive study on valuation of ecosystem services of forests, rivers and biodiversity in Goa.6
2 Issues in Valuation and Evaluation of Mining Activity The Western Ghats region in Goa, a biodiversity hotspot, contains dense tropical forests with one national park at Mollem and six wildlife sanctuaries (FSI 2009). This is the watershed for important water bodies such as the Kushawati, Kalay, Uguem, Khandepar, Advoi, Bicholim, Zuari, and Mandovi rivers. These rivers feed the world famous Goan ocean front with fresh water, and provide life support to aquatic and ocean biodiversity. Without a complete assessment of the value of these resources, a decision on alternate land use and the opportunity costs thereof would be imprudent. Thankfully, the techniques of valuation are constantly improving and economists have at their disposal a set of tools which allow them to make some reliable estimates (Freeman 2003; Kumar 2011). The Total Economic Value (TEV) method is a point for discussion in this context (Krutilla and Fisher 1975; Pearce and Turner 1990). The logic of TEV is that resources have multiple “use” (direct and indirect) and “non-use” benefits. If all these items could be added up then we would arrive at a composite value for one or more natural resources.7 A complete valuation of forest resources would require inclusion of timber and non-timber values (fuels and food from forests, non-timber forest products or NTFPs), the biodiversity values (including ecotourism, bioprospecting, flagship species non-use values) and ecological services (water augmentation and regulation, climate regulation, mitigation of flood damage and soil erosion, polli nation, waste absorption, etc). This is now a well established methodology in Natural Resource Accounting (Pagiola et al 2004).8 Evidently, the TEV refers to the ecosystem functions performed by the natural resources. The ecosystem functions provide ecosystem services. Examples such as fish in the Zuari or Mandovi rivers (an ecosystem function) providing food (an ecosystem service or good) can be given. Another example is regeneration and conservation of forests in Goa (an ecosystem function) enabling flood control for the downstream towns (an ecosystem service). Keeping human welfare as the basis of analysis, ecosystem services therefore are to be understood and measured as part of the CBA for mineral extraction. Social costs of mining would include the loss of an entire spectrum of ecosystem services while social benefits would include the value of minerals (both export and other processing values), employment generation, etc. One does not find such a methodo logy in the NCAER (2010) report. Only direct environmental costs such as air pollution, deforestation and damage to landscape due
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to mining are accounted for, ignoring the loss of an entire set of ecosystem services (ibid: 43). The denudation of forest resources in Goa could have dramatic effects on the hydrological cycle of the state which relies largely on perennial flow of fresh water from Mandovi and Zuari and other watersheds that lie in the Western Ghats (and are not fed by glacial melt as in the Gangetic system). If the moisture retention capacity of these watersheds declines, the entire life cycle of the state would be aggravated dramatically – increased floods in all urban and rural areas alongside the rivers during the monsoons, salinity ingress upstream in the non-monsoon period, and the drying of the rivers and closure of river navigation, loss of marine life, among other impacts. These impacts are over and above the known damages that mining causes – contamination or destruction of groundwater table, inundation of fields with mining waste and health problems associated with air and dust pollution (Nayak 2002). Forests services are typically classified as (i) direct use value; (ii) indirect use value; (iii) option value; and (iv) non-use value. The first three (i-iii) are the “use values” and all four components must be added to get the TEV (Adger et al 1995). With this methodological approach, we now examine some of the findings of NCAER (2010).
3 All About Forest Values Over the last decade, various monetary estimates for Indian forests’ stocks and flows have become available with increasing levels of sophistry. This is not the occasion to review that literature but we pick on some of the key estimates to demonstrate that the NCAER methodology is not in conformity with established procedure in this genre of economics. NCAER (2010: 61) claims to have adapted forest values generated by IRADE (2008) using Verma (2000) methodology. But curiously, both IRADE and NCAER deduct most of the benefits in their computation of the economic value of forests, whereas Verma and Verma et al (2006) have attempted to bring these into the NRA accounting framework. The IRADE and corresponding NCAER estimates are presented in Table 1. Both these studies arrive at much smaller values for Goa’s forests than estimates by the Green Accounting for Indian States Project (GAISP), namely, Gundimeda et al (2005, 2006, 2007) and Kumar et al (2006) as well as the ones from Supreme Court (2008).9 Table 1: Comparative Estimates of Forest Values (NPV in Rs crore)
IRADE (2008) NCAER (2010) GAISP Values Tables 4.23 Tables A7.1 Higher Bound Lower Bound and 4.25 and A7.2 (2001-02 Prices) (2001-02 Prices) (2004-05 Prices) (2004-05 Prices)
Total economic value (TEV, of which) 4,430 2,926 Timber 74 48.87 NTFP 9 5.94 Fodder 32.713 14.53 Fuelwood 3 1.9815
16,98810 1,638.1611 3112 7014 Computed as part of “Timber” above
10,878 1,63811 3112 70 Computed as part of “Timber”above
Ecotourism Watershed benefits Carbon sink
83616 2,631.617 903.0518
114 2,631.6 903.05
600 3,033 225
396.29 2,003.24 148.6
Bioprospecting 45219 298.5 5,912 20 Non-use values 4,965.521 Economic value22 550 363.2623
525 4,965
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Additionally, based on the TEV norms prescribed by the Supreme Court of India (Supreme Court 2008), as shown in Table 3 ahead, the estimated TEV of Goa’s forest values are Rs 18,606 crore. Since all these estimates refer to different time periods (2001-02, 2004-05, 2008) for purposes of fair comparison, they are adjusted to 2009-10 prices using the consumer price index (CPI) for urban non-manual employees.24 As shown in Table 2 (last row), in comparison to the other estimates (namely, Supreme Court or SC 2008 and the GAISP), the estimates from NCAER (2010) and IRADE (2008) are much lower. The Supreme Court values lie in between the high and lower bound TEV values obtained from the sensitivity analysis using the GAISP estimates. Table 2: Comparative TEV (Rs Crore) Valued at 2009-10 Prices (Using CPI UNME indices)
IRADE (2008) Total Economic Economic Value Value
NCAER (2010) Total Economic SC Economic Value Value (2008)
GAISP Values Higher Lower Bound Bound
2001-02 prices
16,988 10,878
2004-05 prices
4,430
550
2,925
363
2008-09 prices
18,606
2009-10 prices
5,454
677
4,067
505 21,027 27,617 17,684
CPI UNME is the consumer price index for urban non-manual employees. Figures for IRADE are from p 88; figures for NCAER are from p 42.
Evidently, IRADE (2008) and NCAER (2010) forest values are substantially smaller than those estimated by Gundimeda et al (2005, 2006, 2007) and Kumar et al (2006). The reasons for this are not hard to find. Some of the benefits from forests have been undervalued while some others have not entered the computation by NCAER. We next compare some of the individual item values estimated by NCAER with others available in the literature.
3.1 Ecotourism The NCAER report (2010) follows the IRADE report (2008) in establishing ecotourism benefits. Even though these reports estimate the values for ecotourism benefits in Goa, they do not add them to the total forest benefits claiming that these values reflect the beach-based ecotourism benefits. There is a problem with such an argument. There is 755 square kilometres of forestland under parks and sanctuaries in Goa (FSI 2009: 78). There is a reasonable amount of forest tourism and a number of ecotourism resorts have established themselves around these sanctuaries. Gundimeda et al (2006: 34) record that the NPV of ecotourism benefits of forests in Goa is Rs 73,710 per hectare (at 2001 prices) which aggregates to Rs 556.5 crore for 755 square kilometres under parks and sanctuaries, whereas IRADE (2008: 84) ignores this contribution.
3.2 Valuing Biodiversity Gundimeda et al (2006: 34) estimate the biodiversity benefits to be Rs 5,20,932 per hectare for Goa (at 2001-02 prices) aggregating to Rs 5,912 crore considering only the dense and very dense forest areas of Goa (at 2001-02 prices). IRADE (2008: 85) on the other hand estimates the biodiversity value in the range of Rs 20,964.74 per hectare (all forests) to Rs 36,015.93 per hectare (moderate dense forests). Their estimate of biodiversity value at Rs 452 crore is extrapolated from Verma (2000) at Rs 0.21 lakh per Economic & Political Weekly EPW November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
hectare for the entire forest area in Goa (2,156 hectare for their assessment).
3.3 Omission of Other Benefit Values Other than the problem of undervaluing ecotourism benefits, there are two significant benefit omissions in the computation matrix of NCAER (2010) for forests. Non-Use Values: Gundimeda et al (2006: 39) further suggest that the presence of tigers and elephants (or similar keystone species) add to the non-use value of forests by Rs 4,37,488 per hectare (at 2001-02 prices). There have been regular sighting of leopards and elephants (and occasional tiger sighting reports) in Goa’s forests and its buffer zones (Sarma and Easa 2006). The forest non-use benefits accordingly add up to Rs 4,965.5 crore (see Table 1, col 3). Resilience Value: The second component is “resilience”, which has been defined as the ability of a system to revert to its earlier state of equilibrium, if perturbed. Mäler et al (2008) have argued that “resilience” of a system is an inalienable component of natural capital and must form part of the ecosystem assessment. There is no available estimate of resilience value for Goa’s forests and this needs to be addressed by future research. We next present a thumb-rule alternative estimate of TEV that can be inferred from a landmark order of the Supreme Court (2008) that has relevance to the discussion at hand.
3.4 The Supreme Court and Forest Valuation In what has become known as the T N Godavarman case, the Supreme Court of India established NPV values for alteration in forestland (Supreme Court 2008). These are the NPVs based on the benefits that are derived from India’s forests which would be forgone if forestland use was changed and are therefore compensatory payments for benefits forgone. Based on the recommendations of the Central Empowered Committee (CEC), the Kanchan Chopra Expert Committee, and the Supreme Court order, we recalculate the NPV of Goa’s forests to be Rs 18,605.89 crore at 2008-09 prices (see Table 3 for calculations). Table 3: Amounts of Compensation Payable for Goa’s Forests as Per Supreme Court Mandated Values25 Type of Forests
Very dense forest
Amount (Rs) Per Hectarea
Area (Sq Kms)b
In Rs (Crore)c
10,43,000
511
5,329.73
Dense forest
9,39,000
624
58,593.6
Open forest
7,30,000
1,016
7,416.8
Total
2,151
18,605.89
Source: a: Supreme Court (2008); b: FSI (2009); c: Values of “a” multiplied by “b”.
The valuation of forests by this method is significantly larger than the economic value of forests at Rs 468 crore (at 2008-09 prices) calculated by NCAER (2010). Having demonstrated that the valuation of forests by NCAER is inaccurate and a gross underestimate, we next establish the there has been an overvaluation of benefits from mining activity and an undervaluation of costs imposed by it. The entry point for this discussion is the SDR which is supposed to be the rate at which society discounts the future benefits and costs.
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4 Appropriate Social Discount Rate NCAER (2010) has chosen a SDR of 12%. This is an outlier as far as environmental valuation is concerned where SDRs used typically range between 0% and 5% (see illustrative and non-exhaustive list of SDRs in Table 4, and Arrow et al (1996) for a detailed discussion). The problem with using a large SDR is that it makes future values look very small in the present and therefore prejudices choices in favour of the present belying the needs of the future. Environmental damage typically is found to have long-term consequences and therefore the need for a small SDR. We use 5% SDR for some of our alternate estimates discussed here (even this is considered to be high as demonstrated by the values given in Table 4). Table 4: SDRs Used in Some Studies (non-exhaustive list) SDR
Reference
0%
Ramsey (1928),26 Cline (1992)
1.4%
Stern (2007)
0-2%
Experts views to CEC for forest valuation (CEC 2007)
4%
Gundimeda et al (2006), Kumar et al (2006), Nordhaus (1994)
5%
Kanchan Chopra committee recommendation to CEC and Supreme Court for forest valuation (CEC 2007; Verma et al 2006; Kula 2004)
5 Overvaluation of Mining Benefits In order to enhance the social benefit estimates of mining, NCAER has listed various claims (Table 5) which on scrutiny we find ineligible to be counted as social benefits.
5.1 Transport of Ore The first in this list are the claims that pertain to the transport of ore. Iron ore in Goa is largely exported by sea and is transported from the mines to the Mor- Table 5: Benefit Calculation by NCAER (2010) Benefit Attributed mugao Port Trust (MPT) by Item (in Rs Crore) barges by way of river navCarbon credit 10.9 igation. NCAER (2010) has Subsidy on diesel 30.6 claimed carbon credits Forex benefits 908 worth Rs 10.9 crore for the State Tax 300 mining industry due to use Royalty Barge 12 of barges for transporting Road infra cess 50 iron ore from the mines Central tax and Rs 30.6 crore due to Export duty 250 reduced diesel subsidy for Corp tax difference 748 the same means of trans- Total 2309.5 port. The basis of this Source: NCAER (2010: 43). claim is that these benefits accrue because barges are a clean and more efficient transport alternative to trucks. We argue that these are false claims on the following counts. Carbon Credit: The carbon credit claim is invalid as the use of barges is the least cost-efficient alternative for the mining firms and no additional expense has been incurred by way of use of an eco-friendly alternative (to a polluting) transport option (NCAER 2002). Had the industry switched from polluting trucks to clean barges and in the process incurred an additional cost, a claim for social compensation would arise which is the basis for carbon credits. Industry experts opine that it is not possible for trucks to transport the ore from the mines as efficiently and as cheaply as the barges do in any case. Therefore, the mining industry is
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experiencing no cost escalation due to use of barges for which it needs to be compensated. Similarly, the benefits claimed for reduced subsidy for lower diesel consumption stands invalidated for the same reason. In fact, what needs to be added to the cost side of the calculation instead is the subsidy for diesel (which is a social cost) provided for use of barges (which provide a private benefit). Barge Tax: There is a claim of social benefits due to the annual barge tax of Rs 12 crore. Barges, when they travel down the river with their loads of mining ore, lead to quicker “wear and tear” of embankments. This imposes increased maintenance expenses and reduced productivity for the farmers near the river banks. It is not clear whether or not these damages are sufficiently compensated for by the amount of the barge tax and therefore whether or not this barge tax is efficient or not. Road Cess: A similar argument holds for the road infrastructure cess. Mining trucks are the main users of the roads in the forest areas and their heavy load on the major tarred roads of the state cause considerable damage. This cess payment needs to be treated as a compensation for the creation of road infrastructure for the industry and for the “wear and tear” the trucks cause on existing roads. Once again, it needs to be checked whether the road cess covers the entire damage cost. Foreign Exchange: The major item claimed as a benefit is a bonus for (10% of) foreign exchange earnings by the industry, Rs 908 crore.27 The import tax according to this claim supposedly reflects the scarcity value of foreign exchange. There are many reasons why import taxes are imposed and forex scarcity may be only one of the factors that may determine import tax rates, say, for example, the infant industry argument. In a flexible exchange rate system, the scarcity value of a currency is meant to be captured by the market price for that currency. In India, the scarcity of dollars does not seem to be the defining constraint in the economy any more. In fact, the increasing amount of forex deposits lying with the RBI is a reason for worry and is also a potential drain on our surplus (Sen 2005). We next look at the issue of royalty and the manner in which it should be included into the CBA.
5.2 Royalty The issue of royalty needs to be seen from a resource compensation principle. The equilibrium price for an exhaustible resource is: Exhaustible resource price = Marginal cost of ore extraction + Exhaustibility rent (same as royalty rent in theory).
NCAER (2010: 43) claims that the royalty paid by the firms is a net benefit to society (Rs 300 crore). This is an accounting fallacy since the royalty paid is supposed to be the resource rent for consuming a sub-soil asset – it is the opportunity cost of depletion of natural capital (see, for example, Fisher 1981: 14). The efficient royalty rate paid by the mining firms is not a net benefit to society, but actually a compensation for depleting its natural capital. Further, the royalty amounts currently being November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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paid are likely to be an underestimate of the true depletion value of natural capital since the mining licences were not auctioned and therefore are probably inefficient prices. By using the “first come first serve” principle for allotment of mining leases the state may have actually underpriced a social asset and allowed private firms to be subsidised.
5.3 Double Counting NCAER (2010) claims a number of central and state taxes as social benefit. However, all these taxes have already been added in the firms’ price of the ore. So the taxes and cesses should not be added to social benefits as it would lead to double counting. On the benefit side, what is relevant is only the net value added or net profit plus employment benefit by the industry that accrue to the state. In order to compute the present value of these private benefits we need a sense of the size of the resource since it is exhaustible. We discuss this in the next section.
20% profit margin, implies the net annual private benefit would be Rs 777 crore. We further assume that this benefit accrues every year till the ore is exhausted. The discounted sum of revenues (at 5% SDR) over nine years gives us the NPPV (net private present value of benefits) of Rs 5,527 crore (with a nine-year production frame). We next focus on the social costs that mining imposes.29 We need to check whether there are any costs attributable to mining other than what the firms have already internalised in their calculation of net revenues. If they have, then the private profit figure is not a good proxy for net social benefit.30
7 Undervaluation of Costs There seem to be two issues as far as social cost computations are concerned – items that have been included as costs but have been undervalued, and items that have not been included at all.
7.1 Health Cost: Air Pollution 6 Mineral Deposits and Recalculated Present Value Goa has numerous varieties of mineral deposits of which iron ore is probably the most valuable currently. NCAER (2002: 69) mentions that the estimated iron ore deposits from private sources is 2000 mega tonnes. However, the Geological Survey of India (GSI 2002) records iron ore reserves in Goa to be 712 mega tonnes of which 268 mega tonnes is proven reserves, 190 mega tonnes (probable) 254 mega tonnes (possible) as on 1 April 2005 (IBM 2009: 47-42). In 2008-09, Goa produced 33 mega tonnes of iron ore for an estimated value of Rs 38.8 billion (ibid: 47-16). Simple arithmetic suggests that for 712 mega tonnes of ore to be extracted at an annual rate of 33 mega tonnes would take only 21 years for the reserves to end. Given that two-thirds of these reserves are “probable” or “possible”, the industry may be looking at a much shorter time horizon of eight to nine years when “proven” reserves will exhaust. It may be noted that NCAER (2010) bases its CBA with a 25-year horizon which is an overly optimistic estimate given the current state of information on deposits. So if the ore is only going to last for a shorter time period, then the NPV must change accordingly. NCAER calculates the annual gross benefit from mining to be Rs 2,309.5 crore per year. However, if mining were to last until 2017, as inferred above, then the gross present value of benefits (i e, gross revenue) (in 2008) for the mining sector would be Rs 17,833 crore (with a 5% SDR) or Rs 13,049 crore (for 12% SDR, which NACER [2010] has used). As we argued above, we should compare the private net benefits against the externality costs to arrive at the net social gain from mining. Since the accounts of all the firms in the mining sector in Goa are not accessible we will rely on a rule of thumb to make guesstimates of the private net revenues. We assume that the industry incurs a cost of production which is 80% of the gross revenue, leaving 20% profit margins.28 It is easy to do a sensitivity analysis on this but even large variations in profit margins will not affect the CBA. The gross output of the iron ore sector in Goa for 2008-09 (P) was reported as Rs 3,888.482 crore (IBM 2009: 47-15). This, in a scenario of a Economic & Political Weekly EPW November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
NCAER claims that mining occupies less than 3% of Goa’s land area. Therefore, the cost of air pollution attributable to the mining industry should be no more than 10% of the total air pollution costs in the state. This projection is based on the assumption that pollution caused by industries in an area cannot exceed more than three times the area occupied by it (2010: 42). There are two reasons why such an assumption may be invalid: (a) First, the size of the industry or the area occupied by it need not have any link to the amount of pollution it causes (there are numerous examples, the UCC’s Bhopal gas leak, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the more recent Gulf of Mexico oil spill by BP). (b) Second, the area occupied by mining in Goa spreads across 700 square kilometers in four talukas. The 318 valid mining leases add up to 234 square kilometres (RPG 2011: 42). The NCAER report does not specify how it arrived at the estimate of 3% (land being occupied by mining) but one presumes this is the area under the 99 active mining leases (ibid: 42). Air pollution from mining is not limited to the area around the mines, it also spreads during transportation and so the effective area of air pollution may be much larger than recorded in NCAER (2010).31 Further, the area occupied by other industries currently is a small fraction of the area occupied by mining. Therefore, the share of air pollution attributable to mining may far exceed 10%.
7.2 Cost of Loss of Forests We have already indicated that the cost of forest loss caused by mining is substantial. The estimates of such losses (NPV) at 2009-10 prices range from Rs 17,684 (GAISP with low vales for biodiversity), Rs 21,027 crore (Supreme Court 2008), to Rs 27,617 crore (GAISP with high values for biodiversity). In comparison, the TEV estimates of IRADE (2008) and NCAER (2010) are Rs 5,454 and Rs 4,067 crore, respectively. But they attribute only Rs 677 crore and Rs 505 crore (respectively) as the “economic value” of the forests. As we have explained earlier, NCAER (2010) has grossly undervalued the benefits from (a) watershed, (b) ecotourism benefits, (c) biodiversity, (d) carbon sink, and (e) fodder benefits. Importantly, it has not added benefits from (a) the non-use values, and (b) resilience, which could be substantial by themselves.
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8 Conclusions Today, the mining industry is certainly very important for a state such as Goa. Being an exhaustible resource, however, the industry also faces a situation of redundancy as and when all the subsoil minerals are extracted. The minerals of Goa may soon approach such a situation. Under such conditions, it is time to think of alternatives for the development of the state, especially as the state also undertakes a process of regional planning. Goa’s forests are not only the lifeline of the state, they may also have large global benefits as an unexplored biodiversity repository. Short-run private interests must not overshadow inter generational social needs in the decision-making processes. The NCAER (2010) study makes a case for expediting the extraction of iron ore from the state. However, alternative strategies based on sustainable use of the natural capital, such as
Notes 1 It is not clear why a time frame of 25 years has been chosen unless the expectation is that the mining deposits would exhaust in that period at current rates of extraction. Our computations below do not confirm this. 2 Forest size used by NCAER (2010). 3 According to CSE (2008) about 825 mining leases are pending as applications covering an area of 678 square kilometres. The department’s website states that there are “334 mining leases in existence” (http://www.goadmg.gov.in/). 4 Supreme Court judgment on NPV (dated 28 March 2008) for tropical forests is in the range of Rs 7.3 to Rs 10.4 lakh per hectare; see judgment of Supreme Court, 3-Member Bench Comprising Chief Justice of India, K G Balakrishnan, Arijit Pasayat and S H Kapadia in Writ Petition (Civil) 202 of 1995 in the Supreme Court by Petitioner: T N Godavarman Thirumulpad against Respondent: Union of India and Ors (3 March 2008). http:// www.Fedmin.Com/Html/Npv08.Pdf, http://www. Forests.Tn.Nic.In/Graphics/Judgement%20case% 20202.Pdf (henceforth referred to as Supreme Court 2008). We discuss this in greater detail ahead. 5 The NCAER report states: “The opportunity cost of not having the iron ore mining industry in terms of employment would be very significant with unemployment levels hitting 13.8% of population” (2010: 49). Its objective is to “…. provide a comparison or the opportunity cost of not having the iron ore mining industry in terms of its contribution to state GDP, employment generation and present value of net benefits with the social costs of pollution and deforestation due to this industry” (ibid: Preface). 6 There has been a protracted debate on Goa’s development-environment interface (see Alvares 2002; Anonymous 2006; Goswami 2008). 7 Costanza et al (1997) in a much discussed paper put the value of the earth’s resources at $18-33 trillion. However, it is quite well known that such measures are not free from methodological limitations (Bockstael et al 2000); value of resources changes with the stock of natural wealth (Mäler et al 2008). The valuation of a resource in the presence of (i) limited information, (ii) thresholds, and (iii) irreversibility, needs careful consideration (Dasgupta 2009), must be done with the caveat that such values are a gross underestimate, what Toman (1998) called the “lower bound of infinity”. 8 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment too recognises that “Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems (which) …. in-
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9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16 17
marine, forest, watershed or biodiversity resources, could be more socially beneficial. Therefore, it is necessary to weigh the mining options against the other alternatives of development using opportunities of ecotourism, recreation, fishing, aquaculture, traditional medicines and bioprospecting. Our limited exercise in this article shows that the NCAER study grossly underestimated the natural capital of the state while overestimating the value of mineral resources. Since the mineral industry is going to have a very short lifespan, a long-term perspective for the state asks for proper valuation of natural resources such as forest, land, water bodies, marine and biodiversity resources, and a better designed development perspective for the state. A more detailed study would be able to provide a superior cost-benefit model of forestland-water-marine-biodiversity based development alternatives.
clude provisioning services such as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating services that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting ser vices such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient c ycling” (MEA 2005: v). The recent notable work on this is the series of studies under The Economics of Ecosytems and Biodiversity (see Kumar 2011). Gundimeda et al (2006, 2007) rightly include the expected benefits from bioprospecting which gives them a higher valuation of forests. This is arrived at by aggregating individual benefits listed in that column (the same applies to the 2001-02 lower bound price of Rs 10,878 crore for timber). The authors of these different estimates have not indicated that these benefits are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and therefore can be added up as they exist. We find that the TEV thus derived would be of the order of Rs 16,740 crore (at 2001-02 prices) if we use the high value estimates of Gundimeda et al (2006). It should be noted that Gundimeda et al (2006) have done sensitivity analysis for biodiversity and ecotourism. If we use the lowest values (after adjusting for errors in computation in their monograph) for bioprospecting and ecotourism, then the TEV works out to Rs 10,636 crore (at 2001-02 prices) as the lower bound (authors’ calculations). Even this value is an underestimate since waterrecharge benefits have not been accounted for in Kumar et al (2006). Gundimeda et al (2005, Table 10, p 22). The same source applies for the 2001-02 lower bound price of Rs 2,631.6 crore for watershed benefits. Ibid, Table 12, p 24. The same source applies for the 2001-02 lower bound price of Rs 114 crore for ecotourism The NCAER (2010), Table 4.25 in its calculation of EV only uses 30% of this value. The same applies to the 2001-02 lower bound price of Rs 903.05 crore for carbon sink. Gundimeda et al (2005, Table 8, p 18) and authors’ calculations. The same applies to the 200203 lower bound price of Rs 70 crore for fodder. NCAER (2010) Table A7.1 does not include this amount. We have added it here so that the TEV calculated by NCAER matches the sum of the line items in the same table and also conforms to IRADE (2008) calculations from where these estimates are borrowed. Gundimeda et al (2006, Table 14, p 35) and authors’ calculations. Kumar et al (2006, Table 19, p 27) and authors’ calculations. The estimate of Kumar et al did not
.
18 19 20 21 22
23
24
25
26
27
have any values for water recharge and his estimate of watershed benefits was Rs 2,389 crore which accounts for nutrient and flood control benefits but fails to account for water recharge benefits of Goa’s forests. In order to fill this gap we have extrapolated from the benefits derived by other states in this region, namely, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Kerala. Gundimeda et al (2005, Table 11, col 16, p 23). IRADE (2008: 85-86) reports this as biodiversity value. Gundimeda et al (2006, Table 14, p 35). Ibid, Table 14, p 35. EV = TEV (Ecotourism) – (Watershed) – (Carbon sink)-70% Fodder = (Timber) + (NTFP) + (Fuelwood) + (Bioprospecting) + (30% Fodder). The value of this is estimated to be Rs 467.62 crore at 2008-09 prices by NCAER (2010: 42). Inadvertently, they have also referred to this as Total Economic Value which must be a typing error (see p 33). These have not been adjusted for changes in stocks or relative price that may have occurred in the interim period. The area under forests stated by FSI (2009) differs from the figure of 1,424 square kilometres used by NCAER (2010) in their calculations. The logic of 0% SDR is that societies may value each generation equally and therefore any positive SDR tends to discount the welfare of future generations, which is not ethically acceptable (for a detailed recent discussion on discounting see Dasgupta 2009). Ten per cent of the foreign exchange revenue of
EPW Index An author-title index for EPW has been prepared for the years from 1968 to 2010. The PDFs of the Index have been uploaded, year-wise, on the EPW web site. Visitors can download the Index for all the years from the site. (The Index for a few years is yet to be prepared and will be uploaded when ready.) EPW would like to acknowledge the help of the staff of the library of the Indira Gandhi Institute for Development Research, Mumbai, in preparing the index under a project supported by the RD Tata Trust.
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SPECIAL ARTICLE the industry has been claimed as social benefit. 28 The profit margins assumed here are generous. See Balakrishnan and Babu (2003) for a discussion on profit trends in the 1990s. 29 We also would need to add any benefit that society derives (like a positive externality) other than what has been already included as part of the private benefit. Education is a well recognised case where there are significant positive externalities generated over and above the private benefit of education. However, such spillovers are not obvious in resource extraction industries. 30 We do not discuss private costs as these have already been accounted for while calculating net private benefit. 31 See also TERI (2000) and NCAER (2002).
References Adger, W Neil, Katrina Brown, Raffaello Cervigni and Dominic Moran (1995): “Total Economic Value of Forests in Mexico”, Ambio, 24(5): 286-96. Alvares, C, ed. (2002): Fish Curry and Rice: A Source Book on Goa, Its Ecology and Lifestyle, 4th edition (Mapusa: Goa Foundation). Anonymous (2006): “Goa Plan: People’s Protests”, Editorial, Economic & Political Weekly, 41(51): 5205. Arrow, K J, W R Cline, K G Mäler, M Munasinghe, R Squitieri and J E Stiglitz (1996): “Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency” in J P Bruce, H Lee and E F Haites (ed.), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Balakrishnan, P and M S Babu (2003): “Growth and Distribution in Indian Industries in the Nineties”, Economic & Political Weekly, 38(38): 3997-4005. Bockstael, N, A M Freeman III, R Kopp, P R Portney and V Kerry Smith (2000): “On Measuring Economic Values for Nature”, Environmental Science and Technology, 34(8): 1384-89. CEC (2007): Supplementary Report Regarding Calcula tion of Net Present Value (NPV) Payable on Use of Forest Land of Different Types for Non-Forest Purposes, Supplementary Report pursuant to Supreme Court order dated 28 November 2006 in IA No 826 in IA No 566, http://164.100.194.13/allied_forclr/htmls/CECReport/ReportofCEC.htm Cline, W R (1992): The Economics of Global Warming, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC. Costanza, Robert, R d’Arge, R de Groot, S Farber, M Grasso, B Hannon, K Limburg, S Naeem, R V O’Neill, J Paruelo, R G Raskin, P Sutton and M van den Belt (1997): “The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital”, Nature, 387(6630): 253-60. CSE (2008): Rich Lands Poor People: Is ‘Sustainable’ Mining Possible? Sixth Citizens’ Report (New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment). Dasgupta, P (1982): The Control of Resources (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). – (2009): “Discounting Climate Change”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 37(2-3): 141-69. Fisher, A C (1981): Resource and Environmental Eco nomics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Freeman III, A Myrick (2003): The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Value: Theory and Methods, 2nd Edition (Washington DC: Resources for the Future). FSI (2009): India State of Forest Report (Dehra Dun: Forest Survey of India). Goswami, Rahul (2008): “The Konkan Packaging Company of Goa”, Economic & Political Weekly, 48(6): 10-12. GSI (2002): Indian Mineral Yearbook, Geological Survey of India, Government of India (http://www.Portal.Gsi.Gov.In/Gsidoc/Pub/Did_Iron_Full_Mark. Pdf).
Gundimeda, Haripriya, Sanjeev Sanyal, Rajiv Sinha and Pavan Sukhdev (2005): The Value of Timber, Carbon, Fuelwood, and Non-Timber Forest Products in India’s Forests, Monograph 1, Green Accounting for Indian States Project (GAISP) (New Delhi: TERI Press). – (2006): The Value of Biodiversity in India’s Forests, Monograph 4, Green Accounting for Indian States Project (GAISP) (New Delhi: TERI Press). Gundimeda, Haripriya, Pavan Sukhdev, Rajiv K Sinha and Sanjeev Sanyal (2007): “Natural Resource Accounting for Indian States – Illustrating the Case of Forest Resources”, Ecological Economics, 61(4): 635-49. IBM (2009): Indian Minerals Year Book 2009, Advance Release, Indian Bureau of Mines, Ministry of Mines, Government of India, Nagpur, December, viewed on July 2011 (http://ibm.nic.in/imyb2009.htm), pp 47-2. IRADE (2008): Natural Resource Accounting in Goa, Phase II, Project Report of the Integrated Research and Action for Development, New Delhi, viewed on July 2011 (http://mospi.nic.in/Goa_report_ 21apr08.pdf). Kadekodi, Gopal K (2010): “Mineral Extraction and Impact on Common Property Land Resources”, Working paper, Centre for Multi-disciplinary Development Research, Dharwad (http://www. ecoinsee.org/IASCPjan2011/Paper-kadekodi.pdf). Kula, Erhun (2004): “Estimation of a Social Rate of Interest for India”, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 55(1): 91-99. Kumar, Pushpam, ed. (2011): The Economics of Eco systems and Biodiversity: Ecological and Economic Foundations (London: TEEB, Earthscan Publication). Kumar, Pushpam, Sanjeev Sanyal, Rajiv Sinha and Pavan Sukhdev (2006): “Accounting for the Ecological Services of India’s Forests: Soil Conservation, Water Augmentation, and Flood Prevention”, Monograph 7, Green Accounting for Indian States and Union Territories Project (New Delhi: TERI Press). Krutilla, J V and A C Fisher (1975): The Economics of Natural Environments, Resources for the Future (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). MEA (2005): Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Syn thesis (Washington DC: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Island Press). Mäler, Karl-Göran, Sara Aniyar and Åsa Jansson (2008): “Accounting for Ecosystem Services as a Way to Understand the Requirements for Sustainable Development”, PNAS, 105(28): 9501-06. Nayak, G N (2002): Impact of Mining on Environment in Goa (Delhi: India International Publishers). NCAER (2002): Role of Mineral Exports in the Economic Development of Goa: A Historical and Economic Enquiry (New Delhi: National Council of Applied Economic Research).
– (2010): A Study of Goan Iron Ore Mining Industry (New Delhi: National Council of Applied Economic Research). Nordhaus, W D (1994): Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Pagiola, Stefano, Konrad von Ritter and Joshua Bishop (2004): “Assessing the Economic Value of Eco system Conservation”, Environment Department Paper No 101, The World Bank in collaboration with The Nature Conservancy and IUCN – The World Conservation Union, Washington DC. Pearce, David and Kerry Turner (1990): Economic of Natural Resources and the Environment (HemelHempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf). Ramsey, F P (1928): “A Mathematical Theory of Saving”, Economic Journal, 38(4): 543-49. RPG (2011): Regional Plan For Goa – 2021, Release One, Final Report submitted by the State Level Committee for Regional Plan for Goa-2021, Government of Goa, Panaji. Sarma, Ujjal Kumar and P S Easa (2006): “Living with Giants: Understanding Human-Elephant Conflict in Maharashtra and Adjoining Areas”, Occasional Report No 22, Wildlife Trust of India, Noida. Sen, Partha (2005): “India’s Foreign Exchange Reserves: An Embarrassment of Riches”, Economic & Political Weekly, 40(20): 2018-19. Stern, Nicholas (2007): The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: University Press). Supreme Court of India (2008): T N Godavarman Thirumalpad v/s Union of India & Ors, IA No 1768 in WP(C) No 202/1995; final judgment of the Supreme Court with regard to fixation of net present value. TERI (2000): “Pilot Project on Natural Resources Accounting in Goa (Phase 1)”, TERI Project Report No 99RD61 (New Delhi: TERI). Toman, Michael (1998): “Why Not To Calculate the Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital”, Ecological Economics, 25(1): 57-70. Verma, Madhu (2000): “Economic Valuation of Forests of Himachal Pradesh”, mimeo (Bhopal: Indian Institute of Forest Management). Verma, Madhu, C V R S Vijay Kumar, B R Phukan, Akhilesh Kumar Yadav and Atanu Rakshit (2006): Natural Resource Accounting of Land and Forestry Sector (Excluding Mining) for the States of Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, Central Statistical Organisation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, New Delhi. World Bank (1998): Environmental Assessment of Mining Projects, Report No 22088, Environmental Assessment Sourcebook Updates, Environment Department, The World Bank, Washington DC.
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
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Regulatory Freedom under GATS: Financial Services Sector B K Zutshi
The 2008 financial crisis and the rescue of big firms, costing trillions of dollars to taxpayers, has created a strong global push for the restructuring and re-regulating of big banks and financial firms. This has produced two reactions: on the one side, heavy lobbying by banking and financial firms to block reforms and weaken enforcement. On the other side, a campaign by some northern NGOS, one or two members of the World Trade Organisation, and the latest by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, about the General Agreement on Trade in Services posing impediments for reform and the need for rule changes to overcome them. This paper finds the campaign to change GATS misguided and meritless. The GATS provides near-total freedom to regulate the financial services sector for prudential reasons and to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. The changes being proposed will be against developing country interests, mess up the GATS and impact its integrity as a viable trade agreement.
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n the context of the enhanced need for better regulation of financial services following the 2008 financial crisis, it is being argued in some quarters that the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) law, rules and scheduled financial services commitments, will stand in the way of carrying out regulatory reforms and interventions to address issues thrown up by this crisis or those that may arise from future crises. The GATS law, rules and financial services commitments are under scrutiny and debate in that context. A comprehensive articulation of this point of view is contained in the Barbados communication (JOB/SERV/38) to the WTO. There are also others, from some NGOs and civil society groups, mostly from developed countries, who subscribe to and promote this view and are seeking changes in the GATS law, which will amount to invalidating the GATS in its application to trade in the financial service sector. One such NGO is Citizen Watch from the United States (US) which is advocating changes in the GATS more or less on the same lines; its views are reflected in two memoranda.1 These very views find a place in the latest Trade and Development Report (TDR 2011) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).2 The following paragraphs test the validity of these claims about the alleged handicap of carrying out effective regulatory reforms and interventions in the sector within the existing GATS framework and the further claim that the proposed changes are in the interests of developing countries.
Genesis of 2008 Banking Crisis and Efforts at Reform
The author acknowledges the contribution of Charavarti Raghavan, editor emeritus, South-North Development Monitor, who had read an earlier draft of this paper. Views and interpretations in this paper are that of the author. B K Zutshi (
[email protected]) was India’s ambassador and permanent representative to the GATT from June 1989 to November 1994.
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Before embarking on that exercise, it would be pertinent to refer briefly to the consensus among scholars and commentators on the genesis of the 2008 crisis and to ask whether the GATS financial services commitments contributed to the crisis in any manner whatsoever. The consensus on the origins of the crisis traces it to the “efficient market” hypothesis, a core element of the “rational market” theory, more or less codified by the Chicago School in the late 1960s. Under this theory3 markets are best left to regulate themselves and do not need any oversight by the State; in fact, the theory views such oversight as curbing industry’s innovative and creative capacities, allegedly resulting in loss of efficiency. In the US, this led to the piecemeal dismantling (since about the 1980s) of the regulatory structures put in place after the Great Depression of the 1930s, ultimately resulting in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had placed a firewall between investment banking and intermediation activities of banks in relation to savings (deposits) november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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and lending (loans). Under this policy approach of attributing ultimate wisdom to the market, the role of prudence (and its lack) on the part of the operators was completely overlooked, resulting in poor enforcement of even the regulations still in place. The proximate cause of the crisis was the reckless sub-prime lending and their being pooled with other mortgage loans and securitised (somehow managing to secure in the process top investment grade ratings from the rating agencies), and marketed and sold off around the world to investors. In the US, the problems were compounded by traded “innovative” synthetic market instruments like over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives of different kinds – structured mortgage securities, collateralised debt obligations, etc, which even the originators and issuers (mostly banks, but also other financial institutions) themselves did not fully understand; and overly positive ratings of these toxic mortgage-related products given by rating agencies. 4 The connection between these products and the underlying assets was almost lost in the process of further market transactions. Over the years, from being the lubricant of the real economy, finance has acquired a life of its own, with most of the growth in the finance sector resulting from the financialisation of the economy. In the US, in 1978, the financial sector borrowed $13 in the credit markets for $100 borrowed by the real economy. By 2007, these borrowings had increased to $51. In other words, for the same amount of borrowing by households and nonfinancial companies, borrowing by financial institutions had quadrupled. Worldwide, over-the-counter derivatives (almost nonexistent in 1978) grew to over $33 trillion in market value by 2008.5
There are also serious allegations of deliberate suppression of facts about the true worth of these products in the extant market conditions, amounting to outright fraud on the part of the concerned financial institutions and the rating agencies.6 Apparently, the motivation for this conduct was greed: to, any which way, improve profitability (among other things, necessary to pay obscene sums as bonuses to bank executives and staff) of the banks and other financial institutions.7 Serious issues of conflict of interest were overlooked and no heed paid to the fiduciary duty owed by these financial service suppliers to their depositors, policyholders and investors. Unfortunately, the regulators also paid no heed, even when alarm bells were sounded by some commentators. The crisis, having originated in the US, quickly spread across the globe, affecting other markets and economies in varying degrees, depending on the nature and extent of their integration with the global financial service markets. It is obvious that this way of running and regulating the financial services sector was not dictated by members’ obligations and commitments under the GATS. Therefore, it can be averred, perhaps without any fear of contradiction, that there was no link between the crisis and the liberalisation in this sector under GATS, even for members with relatively the most liberal commitments, as in overall terms the GATS commitments in this sector are rather modest. Why then are changes being sought in the GATS law? Apparently, it is being argued that whatever may have been the origins of the crisis, members’ freedom of regulatory intervention to address the problem today is constrained by GATS Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
obligations and commitments. And, therefore, there is a need to make changes in the GATS law, with such changes projected as being particularly in the interests of developing countries. In the context of the need to avoid such crises arising in the future, it is pertinent to take note of the current efforts at regulatory reform in the two major trading blocs of the US and the European Union (EU). In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act is intended to strengthen regulatory oversight of the financial service sector; the EU (in the UK as well as in the continental Eurozone area) has also introduced and/or is proposing changes in its regulatory regime to the same effect. In both cases detailed regulations to give effect to the law are being formulated. These efforts, however, have been critiqued as being less than optimal to address the problem, and as a result, a lost opportunity (provided by the crisis) to undertake fundamental, root and branch reform of the financial services regulatory structure. (Even one of the authors of the US legislation, senator Dodd has been widely cited in the media as saying that the effectiveness of the reforms under the Dodd-Frank law would be known only in the next crisis!) Effective rule-making under, and implementation of, the Dodd-Frank Act appears to have lost traction already in the face of industry resistance through intense lobbying efforts. Some 300 mandated regulations under the Act are yet to be issued, but Wall Street firms are attempting, perhaps with some success, to block even these. Even enforcement of regulations already in place is apparently being sought to be diluted through the budgetary process of cutting funds for enforcement agencies.
GATS as a Part of the Multilateral Trading System The multilateral trading system (MTS), as embodied in the WTO presently (and previously in the GATT), is based on reciprocal exchange of concessions (with some strictly defined deviations), between members and subject to enforcement, if necessary, by way of trade sanctions through the inbuilt dispute settlement system. This provides essential integrity to the MTS and to trade relations between members of the WTO. That such exchanges of concessions involve some diminution of members’ available policy space (varying according to the extent and nature of concession for individual members), is inherent in the system. Therefore, the issue of loss of sovereignty, or shrinkage in available policy space (invoked as a slogan in this debate) has to be viewed as a cost-benefit equation in the multilateral trade exchanges by individual participants; the equation has to be balanced by each participant as between the cost of remaining out by not making any concession and thus retaining full sovereignty and thereby freedom of action on the subject, and the benefit expected to accrue by making the concession and accepting some constraints on policy freedom. In the absence of any ex ante criteria to judge the outcome, its impact on individual participants becomes a matter of political judgment. This is true of most negotiations except perhaps the tariff negotiations on goods, which can be quantitatively evaluated on the basis of trade statistics. In other areas, including in market access exchanges in the services sector, quantitative evaluation is not possible in the absence of comparable statistics. In spite of the fact that outcomes in several rounds, particularly in the Uruguay
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Round (UR), have been seen as unbalanced between groups of countries, particularly between the developed and developing countries, the system has served the international community well for over 60 years now. This, however, does not mean that it is perfect and cannot be improved. That, however, is a separate debate. This is also not to suggest that it is not legitimate for participants in negotiations to seek to preserve as much policy space as possible, but that has to be consistent with the basic tenets of the system; privileging, in the name of regulatory freedom, any sector or set of commitments from the application of the basic tenets themselves, as is being sought to be done in case of the financial services sector under the GATS, is an unacceptable assault on the integrity of the MTS. An equally plausible case can be made out for such privileging, in the name of freedom of regulatory intervention, in many other service sectors, and an even more plausible case can be made for such freedom in the TRIPS agreement’s obligations for developing countries. Potentially, this can unravel the whole MTS.
A key concern in respect of financial services in the UR negotiations was how to ensure freedom of action to participants, through regulatory intervention for, (a) prudential purposes, and (b) to protect and preserve the integrity and stability of the financial system, and, at the same time, make the sector a part of the framework agreement. This became a matter of crafting a provision with a right balance between these two objectives.8 That balance is reflected in paragraph 2 of the annex on financial services. The annex also elaborates on some other provisions of general application, like recognition and dispute settlement, and makes significant changes in some others, like the definition of “services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority” and domestic regulation, in their application to the financial services sector. For the purpose of this paper, the two relevant provisions of the annex are those on domestic regulations and dispute settlement. The analysis below is confined to these two provisions.
Domestic Regulations Regulatory Intervention Provisions in the GATS It is against this background that we will test the validity of the claim that GATS obligations in financial services constrain members’ freedom of regulatory intervention to address problems like those thrown up by the 2008 crisis. That calls for looking at and analysing the scope for regulatory intervention in the GATS in respect of all sectors in general, and that of the financial services sector, in particular. Regulation is a sine qua non for liberalisation in services, whether undertaken domestically or multilaterally, in order to address, among others, issues of market failure and public and social policy concerns. The GATS explicitly recognises members’ freedom to “regulate and to introduce new regulations” in serv ices (preamble). This freedom is practically unrestrained save the transparency obligation of publication and notification of regulations and their reasonable and impartial application, though it would not, of course, include the freedom to regulate in a manner as to violate, negate, or avoid specific commitments or do away with the general obligations, like the MFN obligation. This is applicable to all domestic regulations outside the scope of Article XVI (market access) and Article XVII (national treatment), which have to be scheduled, and those relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements. The latter will be subject to whatever disciplines may be eventually negotiated under Article VI: 4, on the basis of policy objectives and criteria mentioned therein. In the interim, domestic regulations in these areas are subject to disciplinary guidelines laid down in Article VI: 5, in respect of sectors where specific commitments have been undertaken. Article VI: 4 have a specific focus on the types of regulations which, in the absence of any disciplines, can be potentially used for circumvention of access commitments. More on Article VI: 4 later. In addition, in the case of financial services, there is near-total freedom for regulatory intervention for prudential reasons even if that results in violation of obligations under the agreement. This special dispensation for financial services was provided in recognition of the sector’s centrality to national economies.
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The provision on domestic regulations reads as under: 2 Domestic regulations (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s commitment or obligation under the Agreement (emphasis added).
This provision has been dubbed the “prudential measures defence” (PMD), and is considered insufficient, even contradictory, or at any rate, less than an iron-clad guarantee against a possible challenge under the dispute settlement (DS) provisions of the WTO. Doubts, fears and apprehensions of the provision’s efficacy as a regulatory tool run along the following lines: absence of definition of prudential measures; alleged contradictory nature of the text in that what it gives under the first sentence is taken away by the second sentence (italicised above); and lastly, on that account, and on account of a lack of definition of a prudential measure, a regulatory measure undertaken in terms of this provision will be challengeable under the DS provisions, resulting in uncertainty. The best way to start analysing the provision would be to engage with the text to see what it tells us and in that light see whether the doubts, fears and apprehensions about its efficacy as an enabling provision for intervention to address the regulatory challenges of the sector thrown up by the 2008 crisis, and any future crises in the sector, can stand scrutiny. Paragraph 2(a) of the annex is an overriding provision as it starts with the expression “notwithstanding any other provision of this agreement”. In the same sentence, it then provides for freedom of regulatory intervention for “prudential reasons” which are spelt out in some detail but prefaced by the word “including” making them illustrative and non-exhaustive (but also ensuring that all items mentioned thereafter are per se “prudential”). The wording thus provides scope for inclusion of other measures as long as they are for “prudential reasons”. The contention that “prudential” november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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covers only “micro-prudential” measures, and not macro or any other conceivable variety of “prudential” is far-fetched, and ignores that the ordinary meaning and usage of the term is comprehensive enough to include every adjectival sub-set. The second sentence begins with the expression “where such measures do not conform with the provisions of the agreement”, thereby further reinforcing the intent of allowing members to take regulatory measures for prudential reasons which may be contrary to their commitments and obligations under the agreement, but with the caveat that the provision is not abused for avoidance of a commitment or an obligation, in the name, and under the guise, of a measure taken for prudential reasons.
No Definition of Prudential Measure? Let us now turn to the elements on which the provision is being assaulted. The first is that there is no definition of a prudential measure. This is being seen as providing scope for uncertainty in the DS proceedings and leaving the matter in the hands of DS panels. This writer’s recollection is that the need and desirability of defining “prudential reasons” was debated during the negotiations,9 but the idea was abandoned because it was felt that a definition, howsoever exhaustive, would not necessarily capture all possible needs of the future and may, in fact, restrict the scope of remedial action. Since the objective was to give a broad-based authority to members for regulatory intervention, even to negate their commitments and obligations under the agreement, it was felt that a list of illustrative and non-exhaustive policy goals would give greater flexibility to members for such intervention. The expression “including for” ensures that the scope of the provision is not restricted to the stated policy goals and can cover other policy goals so long as they are for “prudential reasons”. This was, in fact, by way of abundant caution, even though during the negotiations no one came up with any examples of measures for prudential reasons which would not be captured by the stated policy goals in the provision. The provision is thus truly in the nature of a “carve out” of the financial service sector for prudential reasons. (It is unfortunate though that no negotiating history of the GATS was drawn up by the WTO secretariat in spite of requests to that effect by several delegations, including the Indian delegation. Such a negotiating history (as provided for in the Vienna Conventions on plenipotentiary diplomatic negotiating conferences) was drawn up in respect of the Tokyo Round, and was approved by the plenipotentiaries at the final meeting concluding that round. For the UR, before Marrakech, the secretariat is known to have put together all the material for drawing up a ne gotiating history, but for reasons that were not explained, a draft history was not placed before the Marrakech ministerial and its approval obtained. Even after coming into force of the Marrakech Treaty on 1 January 1995, several delegations had suggested to the secretarial to draw up a negotiating history of the framework agreement under the supervision of a representative group among the negotiators who were still around at that time and the memory of the whole negotiating process was still fresh in their minds. In that context it may be mentioned that the negotiating history of this provision mentioned in Tucker T memorandum10 Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
does not necessarily reflect the whole of this history as it does not take into account the many informal papers such as room documents which were used in the process of these negotiations, not only in respect of this provision, but also other provisions of the GATS, and even other agreements in the UR negotiations.) Next, let us look at the alleged contradiction between the two sentences of paragraph 2(a) of the annex. It is absurd to suggest that the second sentence of paragraph 2(a) contradicts the first sentence or that the two sentences cancel out each other. This flies in the face of the rules of interpretation of legal texts in terms of public international law, under which each expression (in a legal text) has to be ascribed a meaning and the whole text is to be read and interpreted harmoniously, so that no text or expression is rendered inutile. The second sentence is an essential anti-circumvention safeguard to ensure that there is no abusive use of the prudential carve out provisions with the intent of avoiding a commitment. In a featured article in the ILSP Law Journal11 on what may be an appropriate standard for jurisprudence on prudential measure under the GATS annex on financial services, Jung Byungsik does not see any contradiction between the two sentences of paragraph 2(a) and holds that “the prudential carve out provisions of the GATS annex on Financial Services 2(a) clearly states that a national authority has prudential discretion as long as the discretion is not abused. In other words the sole ground of violation of the prudential carve out is the abuse of discretion” (page 50). He then opines that the appropriate standard for jurisprudence on the issue would be the “good faith” standard and not the “least restrictive” standard, because the text of paragraph 2(a) does not subject it to the “necessity” test. This has been said by Jung with reference to financial derivative measures (p 55), but would be applicable across the board to all prudential measures taken under the annex. This makes eminent sense. There is nothing new or novel about such a caveat in this agreement, as the whole MTS is replete with anti-circumvention provisions. In fact, without this proviso, the agreement would be deeply flawed as that would amount to leaving the sector out of the purview of the dispute settlement provisions of the WTO in regard to the core obligations of the sector, which would in turn mean an assault on the integrity of the services agreement itself as a viable international trade agreement. As to the application of the caveat in practical terms, the facts and circumstances of individual cases under dispute will show whether or not a challenged measure was for prudential reasons or taken with the intent of avoiding a commitment. As an additional safeguard, and to ensure that panel findings on the subject are based on sound, expert knowledge, the annex mandates that “Panels for disputes on prudential issues and other financial matters shall have the necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial service under dispute” (paragraph 4 of the annex).
Search for Iron-Clad Guarantees Some advocates and commentators on the issue are looking for an iron-clad guarantee of certainty that all measures taken in the name of prudential reasons and requirements will not be challenged, or at least, not successfully. This would be a worry, if
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the DS system of the WTO was based on ex ante rather than post facto principles, that is, if members were required to get an authorisation for invoking a provision and introducing a measure. Since the system allows a member to interpret a provision and introduce a measure, leaving it to aggrieved parties to bring the matter before the Dispute Settlement Body, there is no uncertainty about a member’s ability to make the required intervention. Also, the burden of proof is on the member challenging a measure as being inconsistent with a particular provision. As to certainties in outcomes, there are no certainties even in one’s life (except death and taxes), much less in disputes on trade matters. A provision of the nature reflected in paragraph 2(a) of the annex, and for that matter any other provision of law, in its meaning and import, has to meet the test of understanding and interpretation by an ordinary person of prudence. And paragraph 2 of the annex more than meets that test. In the two advocacy pieces (memoranda) of Public Watch, one by Tucker T and the other by Wallach L and Tucker (both 2010), it has been proposed not only to delete the second sentence, but also add language to the first sentence to put the burden of proof on the challenging member about the contested measure not being for “prudential reasons”. This would be redundant as the burden to prove that the real intent of such a measure was the circumvention of the obligation (and not for prudential purpose) already rests on the challenging member, as brought out earlier. The suggested deletion of the second sentence of paragraph 2(a) of the annex would imply non-application of the DS provisions to the core obligations in this sector. This may be unacceptable to a majority of the WTO members, as it would deprive them of the valuable right of compelling their trading partners to live put to their obligations by invoking the DS system. It may be recalled that the developed countries at one stage in the UR negotiations wanted to take the sector out of the purview of the GATS and have it as a stand-alone agreement. This was totally unacceptable to developing country participants. Deleting the anti-circumvention safeguard from paragraph 2(a) of the annex will bring about somewhat of a similar situation, if not the same one, by invalidating the application of the GATS to the sector. The Barbados communication and comments from some other civil society groups have also given examples, which in their view are doubtful candidates for qualification under paragraph 2(a) of the annex. For instance, it has been suggested that restricting the size of banks to address the problem of “too big to fail” (TBTF) financial institutions may violate the provisions of Article XVI:2 (b) and/or (c) in case of members with no limitations under these provisions in their schedules of commitments. Given that paragraph 2(a) of the annex permits regulatory intervention even where it may involve violation of a commitment, as brought out in the preceding paragraphs, it is difficult to understand the logic of this view. In fact, addressing the problem of TBTF institutions by restricting their size, however that may be done, falls squarely within the scope of ensuring “the integrity and stability of the financial system”, if not also that of “protection of investors, depositors and policyholders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier”, provided, of course, the measure is applied on a non-discriminatory basis between
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foreign and domestic suppliers, in cases of full market access commitments. This is equally applicable to some of the other examples, like higher capitalisation requirements for large banks, or restrictions on short selling, “naked” or not. Even measures linked to capital management in Tucker T (2010), in cases where a member may have a specific commitment on capital movement, depending on facts and circumstances and the purpose of a particular regulatory intervention, can be covered under paragraph 2 (a) of the annex. An example would be to address the problems of sudden influx of “hot money” which may lead to appreciation of the receiving countries’ currency and create the potential for destabilising the financial markets by sudden outflows, thereby posing a threat to “the integrity and stability of the financial system”. Measures such as a tax on such inflow to moderate the influx would fall within the scope of the dispensation for prudential purposes in the annex. More on capital management techniques (CMT) and capital transactions tax later. In the understanding of this writer, in the prudential carve out provision of the annex, as analysed in the preceding paragraphs, there is hardly any room for uncertainty about their applicability to most of the examples given by the advocates of amendments to GATS law.
Critique of Suggested Changes to GATS Law The Barbados communication (with an annex of possible amendments) has also raised several other issues having to do with the basic architecture of the GATS and the way market access commitments were undertaken by the members in the UR, like questions about GATS provisions on market access and national treatment and their reflection in the commitment schedules on financial services in the case of a group of countries (mostly developed country members, but also by some developing country members), which had used the alternative, optional modality for making their commitments in this sector. The basic modality for making market access commitments was that laid down in Parts III and IV (Article XIX in particular) of the agreement. In case of the financial services sector, however, an alternative modality was provided for making commitments on a voluntary basis. This modality is to be found in the “Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services” (hereinafter referred to as the Understanding). Apart from changes in the annex on financial services, the Barbados communication proposes amendments to the provisions of the Understanding as well some GATS articles. This approach mixes several issues, which have to be treated separately given their different purposes, and differences in their legal status. For instance, it mixes the provision of Article XVI on market access (which it also misreads), with the particular (and optional) modality of undertaking commitments in terms of the Understanding. Another area in which there is the same problem of mixing of issues is that relating to capital controls and possible safeguard action for balance-of-payment (BOP) reasons. These issues would need to be untangled for a meaningful analysis, which in turn calls for an understanding of the GATS architecture and its distinguishing features from the GATT, the agreement on trade in goods. The GATS and the GATT share a common paradigm inasmuch as both agreements have a set of general provisions applicable november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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across-the-board to all sectors, and specific negotiated market access commitments reflected in individual member-country schedules which form an integral part of the concerned agreement. There is though a significant variation in the types of general provisions applicable to the GATS agreement in contrast with those that apply to the GATT agreement. In case of the GATT agreement, market access and national treatment are general, mandatory obligations, as there is a prohibition on quantitative restriction on imports and on discriminatory treatment between the goods of domestic and foreign origin, once imported. The only way to provide protection to domestic goods is by way of tariffs, which are subject to progressive reductions through negotiations and are then bound in the schedules attached to the GATT. Non-tariff barriers are also negotiable and subject to binding commitments. In case of the GATS, however, market access and national treatment are negotiated commitments and can be subject to limitations, conditions and qualifications as reflected in members’ schedules. The notion of market access in goods trade is based on the physical reality of goods having to cross inter-state borders. Given the nature of services transactions, there are no physical barriers to be crossed in inter-state trade in the sector. Therefore, the notion of market access in the GATS is an artificial construct. This is not the place to elaborate on how and why it came about that way except to say that it was seen by developing countries, along with the “bottom up” approach to service sector liberalisation, in contrast to the “top down” approach advocated by the developed countries, as an essential element in the notion of progressive liberalisation embodied in Part IV of the agreement, which in turn was perceived as a matter of balance of rights and obligations in the agreement between the developed and the developing countries. In fact, what Article XVI does is to define “full market access” as being the absence, in a member’s schedule of commitments, of any terms, limitations and conditions from the exhaustive and closed list of six types of measures listed in paragraph 2 of the Article; four types of these measures are quantitative in nature (including economic needs tests), and the remaining two types, qualitative, one on the legal form of commercial presence of foreign entities and another on limitations on foreign direct investment (FDI) in such entities, both being relevant only to mode 3 commitments. Members can, however, attach terms, limitations and conditions in respect of these measures, as may be negotiated, which will then have to be recorded in members’ schedules. The four quantitative types of restrictions have to be recorded separately for each mode of supply of a service. Likewise, Article XVII defines full national treatment as treatment “no less favourable” (either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment) between domestic services and service suppliers and like services and service suppliers of members in respect of all measure affecting the supply of services, but allows “conditions and qualifications” to be attached to it as may be negotiated, which are then recorded in members’ schedules. In the interests of completeness on scheduling, it may be mentioned that the agreement also provides for negotiating and scheduling, as additional commitments, measures outside the Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
scope of Articles XVI and XVII, which may also include measures falling under Article VI: 4. The notion of progressive liberalisation embodied in Part IV envisages increasing the level of specific commitments through successive rounds of negotiations, the first one beginning no later than five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO agreement, and periodically thereafter, by adding new sectors to, and progressively dropping existing limitations and conditions to market access and conditions and qualifications on national treatment in members’ schedules. In fact, under this mandate, services negotiations for further liberalisation were launched in January 2000 and subsequently got subsumed in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), where they are presently comatose along with the rest of the remaining (sans most of the so-called Singapore Issues), DDA.
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services It is in the backdrop of this architecture of the GATS agreement that we need to consider the position and legal status of the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services in order to understand the implications (and the feasibility) of amending the Understanding, as suggested in the Barbados communication and promoted by some other NGOs, for the ostensible purpose of providing greater flexibility to members to regulate the financial services sector. As pointed out earlier, specific commitments for liberalisation under Parts III and IV of the framework agreement are envisaged to be undertaken on the basis of the “bottom up” or the “positivelist” approach, and, in fact, that is what a majority of the members did in the UR. However, on the request of a group of developed country members, it was agreed to enable members, voluntarily and subject to their application on a most-favoured-nation basis, to undertake specific commitments in the financial services sector on the basis of what was known as the “top down” or the “negative list” approach, where commitments under the schedules would reflect only the reservations or deviations from an approved, standard liberalisation package. In this case, the modalities were negotiated by interested delegations and incorporated in the document, which came to be known as the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. The modalities laid down a standard liberalisation package, defining the financial services in respect of which commitments would be undertaken, as well as indicate the extent of liberalisation thereof. Members who opted to make commitments on the basis of the Understanding had the option of reproducing in their schedules the access commitment content of the Understanding, with or without reservations or deviations, or in the alternative, incorporate the Understanding in their schedules by reference and record only the reservations and deviations, if any. Most of the members who undertook commitments in terms of the Understanding did take reservations from the standard package, and that too in important respects, and by reference incorporated the Understanding in their schedules. The Understanding, however, is not an integral part of the GATS agreement, and, in fact, it is not a part of the legal documents of the UR protocol. Its status is no different than that of the modalities
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of liberalisation for, say the agriculture sector in the UR, or for the matter of the modalities on the basis of which commitments were made in the goods sector. The market access commitments in these sectors are only those reflected in the schedules of commitments. If members want to make changes in them, they cannot ask for changes in the modalities which formed the basis for those commitments, but have to take recourse to the provisions laid down in Article XXVIII of the GATT. The corresponding provisions for modification of GATS schedules are in Ar ticle XXI of the GATS. There are substantive difference in the rules and procedures (for modification of schedules) under the two agreements. In the case of the goods sector, negotiations are restricted to between the member seeking modification and the member with whom the original concession was negotiated (initial negotiating rights) and with any other member determined as having “a principal supplying interest”, which is defined on the basis of trade flows during the reference period. The basis for participation in these negotiations is the statistics of trade flows in the goods sector. In the services sector, UR commitments among participants were not negotiated based on any trade statistics under the different modes of supply, as there was no such comparable cross border trade statistics available. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics on “invisibles” only partially reflected services trade flows and that also did not correspond to mode-wise flows under the GATS. Hence the notions of “initial negotiating” rights and “principal supplier” interests could not be applied in the rules and procedures for modification of GATS schedules. In that light, Article XXI of the GATS leaves it to members to raise claims for negotiations with a modifying member on self-selection basis and provides for arbitration if the modifying member does not entertain any affected member’s claim for participation and/or for compensatory adjustment. In any such arbitration proceedings, all other members having claims in respect of the proposed modification are required to participate. Compared to the GATT law on the subject, Article XXI of the GATS is weighted in favour of the modifying member as, at the end of the day, the modifying member can modify or withdraw a commitment without further intervention on the part of an affected member, if the modification is in conformity with the arbitration award.
Absence of Trade Statistics It may be mentioned, in parenthesis, that the problem of lack of trade statistics in accordance with the definition of trade in ser vices through four different modes of supply remains unresolved to this day, even after over 15 years of the coming into force of the GATS agreement. During the UR negotiations, developing countries were of the view that in the absence of comparable trade statistics under different modes of service delivery, there was no way to meaningfully judge the balance in exchanged concessions. This posed a difficult choice: whether to postpone market access negotiations in services until such time that such statistics were built up and became available. Developing countries were in favour of doing so, but developed countries maintained that for them this would pose a serious problem and may prove a dealbreaker. It was, however, agreed that this issue would have to be
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addressed and that before the next round of further liberalisation, due in five years from the date of coming into force of the GATS, “an assessment of trade in services in overall terms and on a sectoral basis” would be carried out (Article XIX:3). This implied that within that period a methodology for collection of comparable data on trade in services in four modes would be evolved, and at least data collection on that basis would have started. In that light, it is unfortunate that not only does the problem remain unresolved, but no meaningful steps seems to have been taken to resolve it; the WTO and the concerned UN agencies have much to answer for in this regard.12 (The manual that has since been drawn up for collection of data is still based on the IMF’s BOP and EBOP criteria and gives the value of transactions between residents and non-residents, and not on the basis of the GATS definitions of trade in services.) Reverting back to the status of the Understanding in the scheme of the GATS agreement, the above analysis clearly establishes that it was only an alternative modality available to participants for making commitments on a purely voluntary basis and ceased to have any legal status after the commitment schedules were established. For members who made commitments, with or without reservations, in terms of the Understanding, their legal obligations on market access arise from their schedules as it does for others who made commitments under the provisions of Parts III and IV. Members that did not make their commitments in the sector under the provisions of the understanding have no legal obligations arising from the Understanding. For those who made commitments using the route of Understanding, the only way for individual members to change their scheduled obligations is to take recourse to Article XXI of the GATS for modification of schedules and not by retrospective amendment of the Understanding. The Barbados communication seems to be premised on the assumption that all those who have taken commitments under the Understanding have done so without any qualifications or reservations. This is far from the real position in this regard. A host of qualifications and reservations have been taken by members from specific elements of the Understanding. While some such reservations are common in all schedules, others are common in most schedules. For instance, all members in the group have taken horizontal commitments on temporary entry of personnel under mode 4 and not under paragraph 9 of the Understanding. In respect of the Standstill and New Financial Services obligations, most members have taken some kind of reservation from all or some elements of these obligations, or attached some qualifications to them. Mode 1 commitments are also absent in most cases, including in particular in the schedules of the US and the EU. Both the US and the EU have attached, through the head notes to the Financial Services Commitments section, qualifications to the provision of new financial services. In the case of the US, the qualification reads: “the offer of new financial services or products is subject, on a non-discriminatory basis, to relevant institutional and judicial form requirements”. And in case of the EU, it says: “The admission to the market of new financial services or products may be subject to the existence of, and consistency with, a regulatory framework aimed at achieving the objectives indicated in Article 2(a) of the Financial Services Annex”. november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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The point to be made here is that the amendments proposed in the Understanding, even if that were legally possible, will alter the rights and obligations of members differentially, both intra se among the members of the group and inter se between them and those that have taken commitments under Parts III and IV of the GATS. This will have implications for the balance of rights and obligations of WTO members, not only for the GATS agreement, but also for the UR outcome as a whole, since the outcome was finally accepted as a single undertaking. In any case it is clear from the analysis above that the freedom of regulatory intervention under the annex is more than sufficient to address all the issues raised in the Barbados communication and those raised by other civil society groups, and that there is no need for any amendments to Article XVI and the annex in order to provide greater flexibility or greater certainty in this regard. In fact, the proposed changes to Article XVI, based as they are on a misreading of the provision itself, will mess up the entire legal framework for multilateral liberalisation of the service sector. If any member, however, feels that it cannot live up to its current commitments in this sector, for whatever reason, it can take recourse to Article XXI to modify or withdraw them.
Proposed Changes in Other Articles of the GATS Article XVI is not the only article in which changes are being sought on the basis of its misreading. The same is true, in varying degrees, of the payments and transfers (Article XI) and balance of payments safeguard (Article XII) provisions; changes in these provisions are being sought for the ostensible purpose of addres sing such diverse issues as capital controls, exchange actions, high indebtedness, severe fiscal imbalances, financial service instability, etc. Another variant basis for seeking changes in A rticles XI and XII is the alleged conflict (Tucker T 2010) of these provisions with such policy instruments as the financial transactions tax (FTT) and CMT. This also finds a reflection in UNCTAD TDR (2011). This is a cocktail of issues, some more important than others; all of them, however, cannot be resolved through the mediation of the financial service sector, and certainly not by the proposed changes in the GATS law as will be demonstrated through an analysis of the GATS Articles XI and XII provisions in the following paragraphs. Article XI essentially deals with international payments and transfers for current transactions (as distinct from capital transactions) in relation to specific commitments of members under the GATS. It may be noted here that it is not special to the financial services sector, but is applicable across-the-board to all ser vice sectors in which commitments have been undertaken; it is an important component of the discipline to ensure that the right of access is not frustrated by any action in this area. A multilateral trade agreement would be deeply flawed in the absence of such a provision. In the case of the goods trade, the corresponding provision is Article XV of the GATT 1994. This provision is much more detailed and the rationale of the distinction between current and capital payments, exchange rate policy issues and the jurisdictional separation for dealing with them multilaterally comes through clearly in this provision. Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
On the lines of Article XV of the GATT in respect of the trade in the goods sector, the basic thrust of Article XI of the GATS is twofold: to prohibit restrictions on payments and transfers for current transactions related to members’ specific commitments and to re-emphasise the jurisdictional separation between the WTO and the IMF in regard to current and capital transactions. Since some financial services by their very nature involve capital movement, it extends the payments and transfers discipline to such transactions also, if there is a specific commitment in respect of such transactions. To tease this out a little further, Article XI: 1 prohibits restrictions on payments and transfers for current transactions in relation to members’ specific commitments unless covered by Article XII, if invoked. Article XI: 2 asserts IMF jurisdiction on capital transactions, including exchange actions, but permits restrictions on capital transactions only for balance-of-payments reasons under Article XII, or at the request of the IMF. In addition, it prohibits restrictions on any capital transactions inconsistently with members’ specific commitments regarding such transactions, as in the case of any financial service commitment involving capital movement under mode 1, and for FDI under mode 3. This is logical and is linked to the clarification in footnote 8 under Article XVI on market access. More on this a bit later. The Tucker T (2010) memorandum has faulted this provision on several grounds, one of which is the alleged differential standards of restriction on payments and transfers in respect of current transactions and those for capital transactions, based on differences in the language used in the text in the two subsections. The memorandum holds that the “GATS does not spell out how these substantive standards differ. The ‘relating to’ standard in Article XI (1) may be interpreted more broadly than the ‘inconsistently’ standard in Article XI (2). A ‘consistent imposition’ of capital controls under Article X1 (2) would likely be one that did not run afoul of countries’ commitments under Article XVI (1).” This is a misreading of the text of Article XI. If anything, expressions “relating to” and “inconsistently” are not standards of restrictions. There is complete prohibition on restrictions on current transfers and payments in respect of specific commitments; “relating to” defines the scope of application of the prohibition as being limited to specific commitments only, with no such obligation in respect of non-scheduled cross-border service transactions. Substituting “relating to” by “inconsistently” in Article XI (1) would change the entire meaning of the provision for consistency with specific commitment is not the issue being addressed here. Likewise, substituting “inconsistently” by “relating to” in subsection 2 would not convey the scope of restriction being applicable only to the transactions for which commitments have been made which may not be a full commitment in terms sector coverage and/or may have conditions or qualifications attached to it. To illustrate: suppose a mode 1 commitment in financial services is open for all transactions except for business-to-consumer (B2C) capital transactions. Among others, it would imply a commitment to allow business-to-business (B2B) capital transactions. In this case Article XI (2) discipline would mean that restrictions can be imposed on B2C capital transactions only and not on B2B or other types of transactions. However, as brought out earlier,
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B2B transactions can also be restricted under the circumstances, and for the reasons, envisaged in paragraph 2(a) of the annex or for BOP reasons under Article XII. The same memo raises the issue of lack of clarity in the classification of current and capital transactions and also points out, and rightly so, that while the IMF does not place any restrictions on members freedom to regulate capital movement, Article XI of GATS restrains members from imposing capital controls in case of commitments in the financial services sector. While it is desirable to gain greater clarity in defining, and distinguishing between, the two types of transactions, the responsibility for which lies on the IMF, the necessary disciplines to ensure that payment restriction do not stand in the way of members right to market access cannot be given a go-by until that utopia of clarity and unambiguity in this regard is achieved. In terms of the objective of this discipline, there is no difference between payments and transfers for current transactions relating to all other service sectors where commitments have been undertaken, and capital payments and transfers in respect of a financial service commitment which involves capital movement, to make sure that members’ access rights are not frustrated by restrictions on transfers and payments.
Blurring of Distinction Another issue raised in the Tucker T (2010) memorandum is the blurring of distinction between transactions under modes 1 and 2 because of the difficulty in ascertaining in some cases, whether in a transaction, it is the service or the consumer that moved cross-border in order to classify the transactions between these two modes. This has come about as a result of the development of e-commerce. At the time the definition of trade in services was negotiated, e-commerce was not even on the horizon. This is, therefore, an issue which needs to be addressed, but in doing so current commitments under both modes have to be protected, particularly since mode 2 commitments are much more preponderant than mode 1 commitments. However, the solution13 suggested in the memorandum will not resolve the issue, as in cases of no commitment under mode 1, the footnote under Article XVI would not apply, even if a mode 2 transaction were to be misclassified as a mode 1 transaction. The clarification would be redundant. In reverse, if a mode 1 transaction were to be misclassified as a mode 2 transaction in cases of “no commitments” under mode 2, it would not matter, but in cases of commitments under mode 2, although the footnote would not apply, it would be desirable to find a neater solution to this classification issue, at the very least to ensure that these misclassifications do not result in converting a commitment into a “no commitment” and vice versa. The suggestion14 of dropping footnote 8 to Article XVI will not make any difference to the rights and obligations of members in regard to commitments involving capital transactions. The footnote is by way of a clarification; the substantive obligation flows from the nature of the service which has been committed, and from Article XI (2) disciplines on payments and transfers. It may be mentioned in passing that this footnote, proposed by the EU, was debated at length (during the negotiations), in the context of its implications for substantive commitments under mode 1 in financial services and under mode 3 for FDI. It was agreed that
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there were no implications, one way or another, for the substantive market access obligations. Since, however, the EU delegation, reportedly at the behest of the financial services industry, was keen to have the clarification in regard to something that was perceived to have been substantively conceded, it was agreed to accommodate the proposal. Article XII on BOP safeguard restrictions is another provision in which changes are being sought. It has to be noted that this is a contingent protection provision and an exception to the general rule of not imposing restrictions on trade in services on which specific commitments have been made, including on payments and transfers related to such commitments. Its invocation is permissible only in conditions of “serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties or threat thereof” and subject to specific disciplines and periodic monitoring. IMF has a decisive say in the assessing the balance-of-payment and the external financial situation of a consulting member under Article XII.
Capital Controls In the Barbados communication, the apparent reason for seeking changes in Article XII is to gain authority to impose capital controls (by restrictions on trade in services), to prevent capital flight, among others, for reasons of “high indebtedness, severe fiscal imbalances, financial service instability, etc”. It may be noted here that the IMF, in assisting the BOP Committee to carry out an assessment of the balance-of-payments and the external financial situation of a consulting member, would already have factored in all the three elements relating to indebtedness, fiscal situation and the status of the financial service sector; such an assessment would have to necessarily include trade in goods also. Procedural requirements as well as substantive disciplines for safeguard action under Article XII of the GATS mirror the provisions of the goods trade agreement in this regard as laid down in Articles XII, XVIII-B and the Understanding on the Balance-ofPayments Provisions of the GATT 1994. The link between safeguard actions in the two trade agreements has been brought out through Article XII: 5, and footnote 4. This is only logical. Capital flight, the ostensible reason (in the Barbados communication) for seeking these changes, is a complex issue and cannot possibly be attributed to members’ commitments in financial services, even for those that have made relatively liberal commitments under the Understanding. If, however, it has created a balance-of-payments crisis or a threat thereof, safeguard action under Article XII is permissible, subject to its procedural requirements and substantive disciplines. It is also possible to address this issue by restrictions on capital movement, under paragraph 2(a) of the annex on financial services, “to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial service system”, depending on the nature and intensity of such capital flight or even inward capital movement (hot money), even though that may be in violation of a specific commitment in the financial services sector. In addition, the IMF has the authority under the GATS Article XI: 2 to request WTO members to impose capital controls in respect of specific commitments under the GATS agreement, apart from the authority on the subject it enjoys under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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There is also a proposal to involve the “BIS, or preferably the IMF”, in the consultation process with the BoP Committee under Article XII: 5 and authorise the selected institution to pronounce on the legality of any withdrawal of commitments. First, it is to be noted that IMF is already involved in these consultations to determine whether a member’s balance-of-payments and external financial situation is such as to warrant resort to the safeguard action of temporary restrictions on specific commitments undertaken by it under the GATS. Statistical and other facts presented by the IMF relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balance of payments have to be accepted and cannot be challenged; it is mandatory for the BOP Committee to base its assessment of the consulting member’s BOP and external financial situation on the statistics and facts presented by the IMF. What is new in the proposal is to give the IMF the authority to pronounce on the legality of the safeguard action taken with the approval of the committee, and thereby deprive other members’ of their right, under the dispute settlement system, to challenge the safeguard action on grounds of violation of their rights. This will amount to a serious violation of the WTO system itself. There is no good reason to do so as has been explained earlier in this paper: the DS system does not prevent a member from taking a measure, which is brought before the DS system post-facto. Even if it were possible to involve any external agency in the DS system, IMF would stand disqualified as an interested party because of its involvement in the assessment of the BOP situation of the consulting member. BIS cannot possibly be given any role in this regard, as its remit has nothing to do with trade matters and not all WTO members are members of the BIS. The Tucker T (2010) memorandum views disciplines envisaged for safeguard action for balance-of-payments reasons as adding draconian layers of restrictions on a member’s freedom to address capital management through such instruments as the FTT and CMTs. This way of appraising the issue ignores the rationale and the need for disciplines for such safeguard action, and without as much as a passing nod for the over 60-year experience of dealing with BOP issues in the GATT/WTO. These disciplines essentially seek to minimise, if not eliminate, abusive use of these safeguard provisions. A trade agreement with the facility of safeguard action and without any disciplines on that action would be a deeply flawed agreement. Admittedly, GATS has added a new dimension to this issue as a result of financial service being a part of the agreement with specific commitments in the sector, particularly since some financial services commitments involve capital movement. But that aspect of it has been addressed through special dispensation in the annex on financial services, unparalleled in a trade agreement. In order to place FTT and CMT types of interventions beyond any doubt and beyond the pale of a possible challenge under the WTO DS system, the Tucker memorandum has suggested a dispensation on the lines of the 2001 Doha Round “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”.15 It may be pointed out here that the Tucker memo for a declaration refers to the form through which substantive amendments to the GATS agreement are sought to be brought about. This paper has attempted to show that the proposed amendments are unnecessary for the purpose Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
for which they have been proposed, and, indeed, if they were brought about, they would adversely impact the integrity of the GATS as a viable trade agreement with consequences difficult to anticipate fully. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the TRIPS dispensation in regard to public health is far from a clean exemption from the pharmaceutical product patent obligations, riddled as it is with conditions and qualifications. For the sake of the argument if WTO were to go down that route, such a dispensation would have to have a caveat for non-abuse, minimally, and may require other conditions and qualifications to keep the GATS as a viable trade agreement. In contrast the dispensation under the annex is much cleaner and also broad-based in regard to the policy instruments that may be deployed to achieve the policy goals. The other memorandum of Citizen Watch by Wallach L and Tucker T on alleged unanswered questions about conflicts between financial service regulations and GATS law, has overlaps, with regard to the problems as well as proposed solutions, with Tucker’s memorandum about the use of FTT and CMT. It is not therefore necessary to go into most aspects of the issues raised therein as the same have been dealt with already in this paper in some detail. There are, however, two points that need to be clarified. The first is the quote16 from the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms in the International Monetary and Financial System chaired by the Noble Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz to the effect that “agreements that restrict a country’s ability to revise its regulatory regime” in the financial service sector would need to be changed. GATS have been mentioned as being one such agreement along with bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements. Since this paper has not analysed other agreements mentioned in the quote, the comments here are in regard to the GATS agreement only. The detailed analysis in this paper does not uphold, even by a long shot, this ex cathedra pronouncement in regard to the GATS. Quite to the contrary, it has shown how GATS provides ample scope for members to revise their regulatory regimes to meet a variety of policy goals, among them those of the prudential kind and of preserving the integrity and stability of the financial system, even when it leads to violations of their obligations and specific commitments under the agreement, subject only to the anticircumvention safeguard against abusive use of this dispensation with an intent to avoid an obligation or a specific commitment. The second point in this memorandum that needs to be clarified is about the alleged unsatisfactory and/or no response by the WTO Secretariat to questions on the alleged conflicts between financial services regulations and the GATT law, as reflected in the WTO Secretariat document, “Financial Services: Background Notes” dated 3 February 2010.17 The questions relate to the interpretation of certain specific provisions of the GATS, the interplay between these provisions themselves and with regulatory regimes of members (at least some of them), in the financial ser vices sector. Expectations of authoritative interpretations in this regard from the WTO Secretariat are misplaced, because the secretariat is not authorised to interpret WTO law. Authoritative interpretations can be given only by the WTO members acting jointly,18 or can come through jurisprudence, built over time, under the WTO dispute settlement system. In the case of the
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former, it will have to be based on a consensus among the members, which may be difficult to obtain, as it will involve a regular process of negotiations. The GATS is still a relatively young agreement and it will take time to build up the necessary jurisprudence for the agreement.
US-Antigua Gambling Dispute Outcome The Tucker T and Wallach L memoranda have cited the US-Antigua gambling dispute panel report 19 in the context of its views on Article XI; UNCTAD TDR reflects these views and also makes its own comments, which seem directed at the interpretation of several clauses like the general safeguard clause, (Article XIV) and the market access clause (Article XVI) of the GATS, in the panel report. The burden of these comments is the alleged inflexi bility (even unreasonableness), of the interpretations of these provisions, giving rise to apprehensions that such interpretations will stand in the way of members ability to intervene effectively to address the 2008-like crisis in the financial services sector and/or prevent such crises arising in the future. This needs some clarification, both in regard to the context as well as the assailed interpretations. (Before going any further though, there is a disclosure to be made here: this writer chaired the gambling panel.) To begin with it has to be noted that this dispute was about a commitment on “recreational sporting services” and not on financial services. Antigua had alleged that gambling was a part of the recreational sporting services on the basis of the classification of service sectors (W/120) used by the US to make the commitment in its schedule of specific commitments for this sector. It further alleged that, given the scheduled entry, which did not have any limitations or conditions on “national treatment”, the commitment covered remote supply of gambling services under mode 1. The panel found this to be the case, rejecting the US contention that since they had a long-standing ban on the remote supply of gambling services domestically, they could not have contemplated, much less intended, to make any commitment in these services, multilaterally. This argument of the US intention did not find favour with the panel on the ground that it could not second guess US intensions at the time the commitment was made; the only way the panel could proceed in this regard was to interpret and apply the GATS in the light of the facts and evidence before it. In appeal,20 this finding was upheld by the Appellate Body (AB), although (on technical grounds) under the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the AB classified the two documents (W/120 and the 1993 scheduling guidelines), relied upon by the panel for its finding, only as a part of the “negotiating history” of the GATS and not the “context” as per panel’s understanding. However, the AB relied upon these very documents to uphold the panel finding. As an alternative plea, the US invoked the general exception defence (Article XIV) to justify the ban on remote supply of gambling services on grounds of public morals and public order, which under Article XIV(a) is subject to a “necessity test”. The panel held that the US had not met the test as it had not entertained Antigua’s suggestions to explore the possibilities of using less trade restrictive measures to achieve the policy purpose of the ban. And that as a result there was discrimination between
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domestic and foreign suppliers of these services. The AB overruled this finding on the ground that Antigua should have proved its case for recourse to less restrictive alternative by the US in the panel proceedings and not merely in bilateral consultations with the US in the DS process. While the panel had held three US federal laws and several state laws as containing some provisions inconsistent with the US commitments for remote supply of gambling services and thereby resulting in discrimination between domestic and foreign suppliers of these services, the AB held that such discrimination between domestic and foreign suppliers of remote betting services was only for horse racing under the Interstate Horseracing Act.
Judicial Economy The panel had exercised judicial economy with respect to Antigua’s claims under Articles XI and XVII of the GATS, which means that these provisions were not interpreted by the panel in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. Judicial economy in respect of an issue or issues is exercised when findings on those aspects would not materially change the outcome in a case. (It may be noted here that Article XVII on national treatment in the GATS has not come up for interpretation in the DS process so far; given that there may be conditions attached to the national treatment commitment in some cases, the implications of the invocation of the general exception provision of the GATS will depend on facts and circumstances of individual cases.) It is in the light of this background of the outcome of the US-Antigua gambling dispute that we need to appraise the comments on these provisions of the GATS by the Citizen Watch and in the UNCTAD TDR. Having exercised judicial economy in regard to Article XI, the panel nonetheless made the observation that the discipline on payments and transfers in the provision was necessary to secure members’ rights under specific commitments. The Citizen Watch comment in this regard is that the observation is an indication of how the provision is likely to be interpreted in future cases, which will stand in the way of effective regulatory intervention. This provision has been analysed in detail already in this paper. There is no doubt that the provision embodies an important discipline for effective enforcement of market access obligations, and in fact, a trade agreement without this discipline will be a deeply flawed agreement, and therefore, depending on the facts and circumstances of individual cases, any and all DS proceedings will uphold this right. It has also been pointed out that since some financial services commitments involve capital transfers, it is logical to treat payment and transfer issues relating to them on the same lines as current transactions in other cases. However, as also pointed out earlier, regulatory intervention is still possible under the financial services annex, even to the extent of violation of a commitment for prudential reasons or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. In the TDR, the issues in this regard have been confused as bet ween payments and transfers for current transactions and capital transactions.21 The TDR also holds that the GATS market access rules prohibit government policies that limit the size or total number of financial service suppliers in covered sectors... Thus if countries have already committed to certain kind of deregulation, november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE they cannot easily undo them, even with regard to critical issues as the bank size. Under the same rules, a country may not ban highly risky financial service in a sector (i e, banking, insurance or other financial services) once it has been committed under the GATS rules (p 101).
This is also the argument advanced by advocacy groups and is based on a substantial misreading of the provisions of the GATS, as demonstrated already. The examples in the quote have been shown to be amenable to intervention under the prudential carve out provision of the annex on financial services. This has been further elaborated in the TDR in the notes (p 107). Note 5 states: The relevant case law provides some indication of how these rules may be interpreted in future. A WTO tribunal has already established a precedent of this rule’s strict application in its ruling on the US internet gambling ban, which prohibited both US and foreign companies from offering online gambling to US consumers. This ban was found to be a ‘zero quota’ and thus in violation of GATS market access requirements. This ruling was made even though the US government pleaded that internet gambling did not exist when the original commitment was made and, therefore, could not have been excluded from the commitment list (emphasis added).
The TDR quotation above, apart from being a distorted reading of the panel report and its findings, the pleading (italicised above) attributed to the US government is factually incorrect. The issue was not internet gambling per se, but cross-border remote supply of gambling services, that is, supply of a service “from the territory of one member into the territory of any other member” (mode 1 supply definition). The quote confuses the mode of delivery of a service with the means or a platform used for the delivery. Remote delivery is possible through other means like post, telegraph and telephone (for some services) and antedates the GATS; there would have been no mode 1 if it was only through internet as the technology was not even on the horizon when this definition was negotiated. In this regard, the panel report has maintained that mode 1 definition of supply is technologically neutral for means of delivery. This finding was not even appealed against by the US. The plea taken by the US has been mentioned already and it was that remote supply of gambling services was already prohibited domestically and therefore their making a commitment in this regard was not intended. The reading of the panel findings appears to be based on a misreading of Article XVI on market access, which has been analysed in great detail in this paper. So we will leave it at that.
Disciplines on Domestic Regulations: Article VI: 4 Incomplete GATS The GATS, as a trade agreement, remained incomplete in some important respects at the end of the UR negotiations. These related to Subsidies, Emergency Safeguard Measures, Government Procurement and Disciplines on Domestic Regulations under Article VI: 4. Negotiations on these issues were started way back in 1995 and continued through the market access liberalisation round for services launched in January 2000 until they got subsumed in the DDA negotiations, where they are presently stuck. Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
There is opposition from some quarters on developing and a pplying any disciplines on domestic regulations under Article VI: 4. The issue is examined in the following paragraphs. The importance of regulations in services has already been brought out earlier, as also GATS explicit recognition of members’ freedom to regulate and to introduce new regulations in services; special dispensation for financial services in this regard has also been covered in some detail. A few words about the need for disciplines in this area: the philosophy underlying Article VI: 4 is to ensure that regulations in the focused areas, which deal with consumer protection and related public policy concerns, are not used as non-tariff barrier(s) to deny or circumvent access in committed sectors. Article VI: 4 mandates development of necessary disciplines relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements with the objective of ensuring that such requirements are: (a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service; (b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; (c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service. Under a ministerial decision at Marrakech, a working party was mandated to examine and report with recommendations on the disciplines necessary to ensure the realisation of the objectives of Article VI: 4 in the case of professional services, priority being given to the accountancy sector. Based on the recommendations of this working party, the Decision on Disciplines relating to the Accountancy Sector was adopted by the Council for Trade in Services in December 1998.22 The acceptance of the decision by members was on a voluntary basis. Subsequently, by a decision in April 1999,23 the Trade in Services Council set up a Working Party on Domestic Regulations (WPDR) to develop any necessary disciplines under Article VI: 4 mandate. The mandate of the WPDR is to develop generally applicable disciplines for all sectors, but may also develop disciplines as appropriate for individual sectors or groups thereof, keeping open the issue of application of disciplines on horizontal or sectoral basis. The present status of these negotiations rests with the WPDR chairman’s draft document24 on disciplines on domestic regulations as a basis for further negotiations, but is presently in limbo along with the rest of the DDR agenda in services. This is not the place to critique the draft except to say it is a comprehensive document and should be a good basis for concluding these negotiations, although the draft has diluted the “necessity test” mandated in Article VI: 4(b), which is not warranted, as this test has proved an effective instrument in the case of the GATT agreement against imposition of non-tariff barriers in the name of freedom to regulate, and there is also sufficient jurisprudence on the subject built over more than 50 years to reassure members that this will not be a leap in the dark in case of the GATS. The only issue to address here is that of the objections being raised against developing disciplines on these specific regulatory issues. There is not any specific objection to fulfilling the mandate under Article VI: 4, except the vague and general argument that this will further curtail members’ policy space and will prove burdensome to them, particularly to the developing countries.
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The cost-benefit equation between loss of policy space in making a concession and loss of possible benefits in not doing so, inherent in all multilateral agreements, has been dealt with in some detail earlier in this paper; suffice it to say here that preservation of as much policy space as possible, however important it may seem on its own, has to be weighed against loss of possible benefits. It is this writer’s considered view that in this case the cost-benefit equation is decidedly in favour of accepting the disciplines, even though it may result in some diminution of the policy space and may prove burdensome to some extent.
Disciplines for Developing Countries The opposition to developing disciplines is also being promoted as of particular interest to developing countries. In fact, it is particularly in the interests of developing countries to have these disciplines. To understand and appreciate the underlying rationale for such disciplines, we have to ask ourselves the question about why we have accepted disciplines under technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and import licensing procedures agreements in the case of the goods trade and then to ask whether that rationale is not appropriate in the case of the services trade agreement. The rationale for these agreements is that while it is legitimate and necessary for members to regulate these aspects covered by these agreements for reasons of health, safety, etc, such regulations should be used to serve those policy purposes only and not be used to circumvent access rights of members under the trade in goods agreement by erecting
non-tariff barriers. If this rationale is good enough for trade in goods, then why is it not so for trade in services? This writer has not come across any argument to counter that. On the contrary, regulations on the issues listed in Article VI: 4 have even a greater rationale for disciplines in the service sector, because regulations play a much greater role in services trade. Robust and enforceable disciplines on these regulatory issues are of critical importance in the services sector for exploiting market access opportunities in areas of export interest to members, developed and developing countries alike. They are particularly so for developing countries in areas of export interest to them, like in professional services. These disciplines will be equally useful for them in importing services into their markets. In that light, I would reiterate that it would be in the interest of developing countries to generalise the application of a “Necessity Test” to regulatory instruments in all sectors. The present situation of the absence of disciplines on these regulations is distinctly weighed in favour of the developed country members. As to the burden of such disciplines, exaggerated as it is, can be eased by measures already included in the chairman’s draft text.
Developing Country Interests It may be observed that opposition to the development of disciplines under Article VI: 4 is not the only issue that is being promoted as being particularly in the interests of developing countries. The assault on the GATS on the alleged ground that it is
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Water Harvesting Traditions and the Social Milieu in India: A Second Look
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Irrigation in Telangana: The Rise and Fall of Tanks Farmers’ Suicides in Punjab: A Census Survey of the Two Most Affected Districts Reorienting Land Use Strategies for Socio-economic Development in Uttar Pradesh
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a hurdle in the way of better regulation of the financial service sector and, therefore, warranting significant changes on the suggested lines is also being promoted as being of particular benefit to the developing countries. It has been shown earlier in this paper that the thesis that some GATS provisions and financial service sector commitments, are effectively preventing WTO members from carrying out necessary financial service sector regulatory reforms in order to cope with the consequences of the 2008 crisis in the sector and to forestall such crises arising in the future, does not stand scrutiny. Quite to the contrary, GATS gives full freedom to members to regulate services, short of thereby causing breach of any specific commitments, applicable to all sectors; but in the case of the financial services sector it even permits violation of any obligation, including of specific commitments, for prudential reasons of protection of investors, depositors, etc, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system, except that this flexibility cannot be used to circumvent an obligation or a specific commitment in the sector. This provision in the annex on financial services is quite clear and there is no room for any uncertainty in this regard. It has also been shown that the examples of alleged impermissible regulatory interventions under the GATS are not correct. In fact, in all those examples interventions would be permissible. It has also been demonstrated that changes being proposed in Articles XI, XII and XVI are based on mixing of different issues, and misreading of these provisions. For instance issues relating to “capital transactions”, which are outside the scope of the trade agreements under the WTO, are being mixed with “current transactions”, of relevance to trade agreements and hence dealt with in these agreements, except for specific commitments on capital movement under the GATS, which have to be subject to its disciplines in order to preserve the integrity of the GATS as a trade agreement, but at the same time provides for regulatory intervention of unparalleled scope (for a trade agreement) under the annex on financial service. Otherwise also, multilaterally, capital movement and exchange policy issues are under the jurisdiction of the IMF. There is also the problem of mixing of modalities for making specific commitments with the actual specific commitments reflected in the schedules, like in the case of a group of members, overwhelmingly from developed countries, in terms of alter native modality recorded in the Understanding. The mixing is about how members who have taken specific commitments under the Understanding may seek modifications in those commitments. It has already been shown that members can seek modifications in their schedules only under the provisions of Article XXI, and that proposed changes to the provisions of the Understanding would amount to a retrospective amendment of this modality for changing commitments in the sector, which is not legally permissible and will result in changing the balance in the exchange of concessions, intra se between the members of the group and inter se between them and members who have used the original modality under Parts III and IV of the GATS for making their commitments. It has also been shown that if the objective is freedom for regulatory intervention, there is no need to resort to the ruse of modifying commitments themselves by changes in the Understanding. Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
That objective can be realised by the use of the flexibilities for regulatory intervention available for the sector in the annex. However, if any member feels that it cannot live up to any of its FS commitments, for whatever reasons, the only recourse is to seek modification of such a commitment under Article XXI. It is difficult to see what kind of benefits will accrue to the developing countries if the proposed changes to the GATS agreement were to materialise. On the contrary, the proposed changes in Articles XI, XII, and XVI will completely mess up the framework agreement, which is believed to be the most developing-countryfriendly agreement to have come out of the UR Round. That is not to say that the agreement is perfect and could not have been better, or cannot be improved in the future. But that will by no means happen through the proposed changes. There is a certain seductive allure for developing countries if changes in trade agreements in general, and the services agreement in particular, are promoted as being in their interests, though they get to see through the game sooner or later. Nevertheless, the propaganda value of this effort to seek changes in the GATS should not be underestimated and needs to be countered effectively. What is unfortunate in this though is that, for the purpose of strengthening regulatory oversight on the financial services sector, which is desperately needed, particularly in the US and the EU, the effort of seeking changes in the GATS is altogether misdirected. GATS commitments had nothing to do with the banking crisis of 2008, nor did they prevent necessary regulatory intervention. This effort should be directed towards countering the financial services industry’s frenetic lobbying against meaningful improvement in regulatory oversight of the industry through fundamental reform of the regulatory framework and its rigorous implementation in the US and EU, particularly the former.
Conclusions Changes in the GATS (mooted in the Barbados communication, and by some NGOs and most recently by the UNCTAD in TDR-201), ostensibly to provide freedom for WTO members for regulatory intervention in their financial service sector to meet the challenges in the sector to overcome the effects of the 2008 crisis and to prevent such crises in the future, will not serve that purpose; the effort in fact is misdirected. Specific commitments of members in the financial service sector were in no way responsible for the crisis; it started in the US, based on almost a religious faith in the “efficient market hypothesis”, resulting in reckless deregulation of the sector, compounded by lax regulatory oversight, the greed of the industry and its indifference to the fiduciary duty it owed to its investors and depositors. GATS obligations and commitments were neither responsible for the crisis, nor do they stand in the way of necessary regulatory reform in the sector. The GATS in fact provides full freedom to members to regulate all services sectors in which they have made specific commitments, but this freedom does not permit violation of obligations and commitments under the agreement. However, under the special dispensation provided for the financial service sector, such regulatory intervention may even
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result in violation of a specific commitment in the sector, but with a safeguard against any abusive use of this facility. None of the examples cited by some protagonists of regulatory changes that cannot be undertaken because of the GATS, stand scrutiny; all of them can be accommodated under the special dispensation for regulatory intervention provided in the GATS annex on financial services. Changes proposed to the Articles of the GATS, the annex on financial services and the Understanding on commitments in financial services mix up several issues like modalities for specific commitments with scheduled specific commitments, current transactions with capital transactions, etc. These changes, if carried out, will mess up the GATS altogether and may even destroy its integrity as a viable framework for trade in services. While it is not easy to amend a WTO agreement, the propaganda value Notes 1 T Tucker (2010): “The WTO Conflict with Financial Transactional Tax and Capital Management Techniques and How to Fix It”, Memorandum, Public Citizen, Washington DC, 9 July. Available at http://WWW.citizen.org./documents/Memos capital control pdf; and L Wallach and T Tucker (2010): “Answering Critical Questions about Conflicts between Financial Regulations and WTO Hitherto Unaddressed by the WTO Secretariat and Other Official Sources”, 22 June. Available at http://WWW.citizen.org./ documents/Memos %20 %20 Unanswered % 20 questions % 20 memo %20 for %20 Geneva pdf 2 UNCTAD/TDR/2011, pp 100-02. 3 The idea, with many caveats (often ignored in oversimplification) that the market sets a just price or the price is discovered in the market, has been around since the early classical economists. But its formulation/simplification and codification took on a life of its own as a result of the work of a range of economists at the Chicago School. See Justin Fox (2009): The Myth of the Rational Market (HarperCollins). 4 See Frank Partnoy (2004): Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Greed Corrupted the Financial Markets (Henry Holt); Partnoy (2009): FIASCO: Blood in the Water on Wall Street (W W Norton). 5 Simon Johnson and James Kwak (2010): 13 Bankers (First Vintage Books edition), pp 59-60. 6 There have been widespread reports in the mainstream media in the US, as well as posts in specialised weblogs like Nakedcapitalism, about the various civil and criminal litigations being launched or underway in several states in the US, and the scale of such fraudulent activities, as well as frantic efforts, so far unsuccessful, being made by leading Wall Street firms to reach some settlements involving some payments, but ensuring blanket immunity to the institutions against any further litigations. 7 Yves, Smith (2010): ECONned: How Unenlightened Self Interest Undermined Democracy and Corrupted Capitalism (Palgrave Macmillan). 8 It may be worth noting that talks and negotiations in “services” within the MTS, began with the 1982 GATT ministerial conference, and continued in the preparatory process for the Uruguay Round and ultimately found a place in its agenda, but on a separate track. That distinction, however, lost its original purpose once it was decided to set up a new organisation and make the whole UR outcome a single undertaking. Since even the notion of trade in services (considered by some as an oxymoron), was new, the task of crafting a multilateral framework agreement to cover the whole service sector regulated under a bewildering variety of rules and regulations, proved a daunting task. There was hardly any academic work on the
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of this effort should not be underestimated and needs to be countered effectively. While these changes are being promoted as being of particular benefit to developing countries, the analysis does not support that view. Inasmuch as the proposed changes will mess up the agreement, they are not of any benefit to members, whether developed or developing country members. Given that the agreement is considered as developing-country-friendly, any changes in it should not militate against that feature. Those promoting change to the GATS agreement in order to facilitate regulatory intervention in, and oversight of, the financial services sector should, if they want any real reform in the regulatory framework for the sector, instead direct their efforts at countering the financial services industry lobbies in the US and the EU.
subject at the time. Even the notion of trade in services in four modes of delivery took shape in the 1988-89 (mid-term review) process, and the actual definition of these modes as it appears in the GATS was settled only a few months before the 1990 Brussels ministerial conference. That draft text had a blank page for the financial serv ices annex. In respect of a large number of other provisions, the negotiators themselves were far from clear. If the round (by some miracle) had been concluded at Brussels, the services agreement would have had to be reopened. It was only during 1991-93, the period when political negotiations were more or less under suspension, that the Brussels draft text was further negotiated in the name of doing “technical work” on the draft. It was in this process that the provisions on financial services, among others, were negotiated. 9 Participants’ experts from finance ministries and central banks were deeply involved, along with trade negotiators, of both developing and deve loped countries, in the negotiating process for the framework agreement and on financial services. In fact, finance ministries had the final say in all matters relating to financial services. In that light, to contend, as some seem to do, that negotiators did not have a full understanding of the role of finance in the economy is, to say the least, disingenuous. 10 Pages 14-15 of the memo referenced at footnote 2. 11 Jung Byungsik, “Standard of Review for Jurisprudence on Prudential Measures”. Available at: http:// www.wcl.american.edu/journal/ilsp/v1/2/jung. pdf - 2009-10-06. 12 See Chakravarthi, Raghavan (2002): “Developing Countries and Services Trade: Chasing a Black Cat in a Dark Room, Blindfolded”, Third World Network, Penang, Malaysia. 13 “If a WTO member country has made commitments in a given sector for mode 2 but not for mode 1, the member is under no obligation to comply with the Market Access provisions of
footnote to GATS Article XVI(1). This would help protect the current and capital account regulations of nearly 40 countries with ample mode 2 but not mode 1 commitments” (P.17 of the first memorandum referenced at footnote 2). 14 Ibid: 17. 15 Ibid: 17. 16 “Agreements that restrict a country’s ability to revise its regulatory regime...In particular, there is concern that existing agreements under the WTO Financial Services Agreement might, were they enforced, impede countries revising their regulatory structures in ways that would promote growth, equity and stability….” (p 1 of L Wallach and T Tucker 2010). 17 WTO documents S/C/W/312 & S/FIN/W/73. 18 See Article IX: 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organisation. 19 “United States – Measures Affecting the Crossborder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services”, Report by the Panel WTO document WT/DS285/R, dated 10 November 2004. 20 “United States – Measures Affecting the Crossborder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services”, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO document WT/DS285/AB/R, dated 7 April 2005. 21 The TDR 2011 at page 100 mentions that “unless a serious balance-of-payments situation can be claimed, no restrictions on international payments and transfers to a country’s specific commitments are permitted”. It omits to mention that the restriction applies only to current payments relating to specific commitments. There is no discipline on capital transactions except where the committed service involves capital movement. 22 WTO document S/L/64, 17 December 1998. 23 WTO Document S/L/70, 28 April 1999. 24 Informal note by the chairman of WPDR, dated 20 March 2009 with a second revision of the draft Disciplines on Domestic Regulations Pursuant to the GATS Article VI: 4 (Room Document).
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DISCUSSION
People’s Movements and the Anna Upsurge: A Comment Birendra Kumar Nayak
Why has the Anna Hazare movement against corruption steered clear of people’s movements, and why have the latter behaved likewise towards the Hazare agitation? Manoranjan Mohanty (“People’s Movements and the Anna Upsurge”, EPW, 17 September 2011) is despondent about this gap between the two. The reasons are obvious and are to be found in the very observations Mohanty makes.
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eople’s Movements and the Anna Upsurge” by Manoranjan Mohanty (EPW, 17 September 2011) eloquently speaks of the author’s yearning for a grand alliance between various people’s movement (PM) groups and the “Anna Hazare campaign-against-corruption” (CAC). But his article expresses a sense of despon dency on his part, because the PM groups and CAC managers are keeping off each other. Mohanty is worried that it is the PM groups, which, by not recognising the “democratic element in Anna upsurge”, have missed a great opportunity, while the organisers of CAC, having seen the “massive groundswell of the support, were so preoccupied with the negotiation process with the government that they did not see the need to seek allies among people’s movement groups”. He assumes that PMs could “be strengthened by the anti-corruption measures proposed by the campaign”, whereas the “anti-state perspective of the people’s movements could have provided further ammunition to the Anna campaign’s effort to expose the hollowness of the official Lokpal Bill”. Why these two groups failed to see what the author expected is the moot question. But, interestingly, the answer to this question emerges when the very observations made in the article at different places are stitched together.
Yearning For a Grand Alliance
Birendra Kumar Nayak (bknatuu@yahoo. co.uk) is a retired faculty member of Utkal University, Bhubaneshwar.
Mohanty has not failed to see some non- governmental organisations (NGOs) providing the “backbone for Anna’s campaign”. But he points to the inescapability of such a scenario when he says, “that is a part of the contemporary reality of the neo-liberal economic process in Indian society” and “during past two decades all governments at the centre and the states have associated with NGOs in policymaking and delivery of services”. And, is it not visible, the author seems to be goading the readers, that, during
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the United Progressive Alliance’s (UPA) regime, the “National Advisory Council (NAC) headed by Sonia Gandhi has formalised this trend of integrating the NGO sector within the state process?” He, however, concedes that such integration is “promoted by the forces of globalisation and liberalisation”. From this discourse, it emerges that the integration with NGOs is the common factor between the government and CAC. On the other hand, PMs, particularly for life and livelihood and against displacement, have become more visible in the last 20 years of the economic regime that espouses the cause of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation (LPG). The antistate perspective, which the author has rightly seen in these PMs, is undeniably antagonistic towards this LPG. So it is hardly surprising that Anna’s team preferred negotiation with the govern ment to seeking allies among PM groups. It is, therefore, futile to expect that PMs, with their anti-state perspective, and Anna’s campaign, with its backbone streng thened by the forces of globalisations and liberalisation, would ever come together. Logic does not allow such a marriage; emotion may. But that neither succumbed to that weakness shows their firm, inde pendent and existential perceptions. Yet, one cannot fail to appreciate Mohanty’s irresistible yearning for a grand alliance.
Tackling Corruption The author, in his article, has delineated a three-pronged approach to tackle corruption. The third approach is “through moral values”, whereas the first two approaches are “at the political economy level” and “at the legal apparatus level”. While articulating the third approach “through moral values”, the author raises a very pertinent issue when he says, “If a parent has to pay Rs 10 lakh as capitation fee for the admission of his/her child to a professional school the child is groomed to make additional money to compensate for that investment”, and, in this context, invokes the relevance of “common school education, public universities and colleges with a clear commitment to values of integrity and service to society”.
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DISCUSSION
As against such an understanding of the author, when one is reminded of Anna Hazare being in Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology (KIIT) campus in Bhubaneswar on 16 August 2010,1 interacting with the students of KIIT International School and the inmates of Kalinga Institute of Social Sciences (KISS), which, according to the American ambassador, shares the values of the “American dream”,2 one wonders if Anna has ever given priority to the third approach of the author. It is well known that KIIT is a private deemed to be university, where the cost of education is much higher than the cost in public institutions, and that the cost in the KIIT International School is far above the cost of common school education. Further, Anna’s CAC receives contributions from corporations, which have assumed a predatory character and are responsible for causing conditions that have forced the emergence of PMs. It is well known that Jindal Aluminium had contributed Rs 20 lakh to Anna’s CAC when Anna sat on a fast on 5 April 2011. It is also known to the people of Odisha as to how the Jindals, with their industries in Angul, have been threatening the life and livelihood of locals and attracting protests from the people there. Anna, thus, appears to be unconcerned about the source of his campaign’s funding. The website3 of “India against Corruption” posting advertisements by Jindals also corroborates the closeness. Not strangely, therefore one finds that the ubiquitous NGOs and corporations are kept out of the Lokpal’s purview in Jan Lokpal Bill. The government version of the Lokpal, though, has NGOs under Lokpal’s purview; but, corporations are out of it. Justice N Santosh Hegde, former Karnataka Lokayukta and once a member of the joint drafting committee on behalf of the Anna Hazare group (but who now describes himself as a freelancer), favours the inclusion of NGOs and corporations under the Lokpal’s purview in Jan Lokpal Bill.4 So, if PM groups did not participate in Anna Hazare’s CAC, then it reveals a mature understanding of these groups. It is possible that they understood that the Anna group and they were a class apart. Significantly, it seems that the Anna group had also understood that. But the approach to tackle corruption “at the legal apparatus level” appears to be given
84
top priority by the Anna group when it insists on the passage of Jan Lokpal Bill, so that a strong Lokpal can be installed. In this sense, no difference exists between the approaches by the government and Anna except for the coverage of the apparatus each is suggesting. Nowhere does one find the Anna group unequivocally questioning the LPG regime of the economy, which, on the one hand, has immensely benefited NGOs and corporations and, on the other, has become the breed ing ground for unprecedented corruption, whereas the PM groups inherently and continually question this regime. That Anna Hazare and his group obsessively pitch for a strong Lokpal, however, conveys their anticipation of more corruption of much greater magnitude in the future, which is certain to occur, according to PM groups, if the current economic scenario continues. Therefore, unlike the Anna group, they challenge the present economic regime. If, as Thoreau said, “the best government is one which governs least”, then, Gandhi, who had acknowledged Thoreau as his teacher, must have looked forward to such a government and, therefore, in all probability, would not have agreed to the idea of a strong Lokpal, which “Gandhian” Anna Hazare is demanding.
‘Everything Is Not Lost’ In my considered opinion, the PM groups, by not associating themselves with Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption movement, have assured us that “everything is not lost”. Therefore, the author should not be despon dent about the failure of a grand alliance, because the alliance was not to be. Corruption can never be eliminated without reducing inequality in society and eliminating unhealthy competition and vulgar consumerism. As long as a billion dollar worth multistoried residential villa stares at us, more and more billionaire tread our land on which live more than 70% of the population with less than Rs 20/- a day per person, and private educational institutions proliferate with active support from the government and tacit support from the civil society, corruption is bound to be in the sleeves of many. Fasts or meetings cannot eliminate it. Euphoria against corruption has time and again risen, but corruption has refused to leave. It has caused a change in government and enactment of stronger laws, but shown no appreciable sign of decline, let alone extinction.
The author recalls that, in late 1960s in Odisha, the slogan of corruption-free clean administration was quite loud; the then Deputy Chief Minister Pabitra Mohan Pradhan had, as erstwhile Chief Minister Nilamani Routray records in his autobiography, held meetings at 375 places to create awareness against corruption and instituted commissions of enquiries. It provided fodder to media but did not at all result in a corruptionfree administration. The Jayaprakash movement, at the national level, was also against corruption and it could hardly change the scenario, except that no political party today is left to claim itself free from corruption. No political party today can raise a voice against corruption without running the risk of being shown its own indulgence towards corruption. Power has tainted every political party that has tasted power in the last four decades. A vacuum has risen against corruption. This vacuum has attracted Anna’s team and the likes to fill. The task of opposition political parties has been taken over by Anna Hazare with the ungrudging support of well-funded NGOs and rich corporations. History is witness to such an intermittent euphoric rise against corruption and its sad imminent fall, while, in between, serving as a weapon at the target. History has also time and again proved that corruption was always an alibi, never a target. Now who is the target? Apparently, the political class, the class which has been overzealously pursuing the World Bank dictated economic policy in the last two decades, whereas the opponent, the civil society is sharing the World Bank’s concern for corruption in developing countries.5 The World Bank has both the disease and the medicine in its hat. Interestingly, both the political class and civil society, though seem to be standing face to face today, are the clients of the World Bank. It is, therefore, gratifying to see that the PM groups have kept themselves out of this rigmarole and are engaged in their struggle that strikes at the World Bank dictated economic policies. Notes 1 http://www.kiit.ac.in/newsupdate/august.html 2 http://www.kiit.ac.in/photo/us.htm 3 www.indiaagainstcorruption.com/.../o-p-jindalglobal-university-adm 4 “Put Corporates under Jan Lokpal: Hegde” in www. indianexpress.com, posted on 28 September 2011. 5 Helping Developing Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (New York: Oxford University Press), 1997.
november 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
CURRENT STATISTICS
EPW Research Foundation
The RBI’s study of private limited companies reveals that the profitability of sample companies improved in 2009-10 after a dip in 2008-09. Gross profit increased to Rs 12,907 crore after a fall to Rs 7,622 crore and as a ratio of sales improved to 8.8% from 5.6%. Profit after tax jumped to Rs 6,725 crore after a dip to Rs 1,685 crore and as a ratio of net worth significantly improved to 10.4% from a low of 3.0%. Sales to gross fixed assets and export to sales however declined over the two years.
Macroeconomic Indicators Variation (in %): Point-to-Point Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices Weights 15 Oct Over Over 12 Months Fiscal Year So Far Full Financial Year (Base Year: 2004-05 = 100)^ 2011 Month 2011 2010 2011-12 2010-11 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 Primary Articles 20.1 204.5 0.9 11.7 17.9 8.5 9.8 13.1 22.4 5.3 9.1 Food Articles 14.3 200.8 1.8 11.4 14.2 12.1 9.6 8.9 21.1 7.5 5.8 Non-Food Articles 4.3 179.7 -2.8 7.7 26.8 -6.3 10.8 27.3 19.6 1.8 13.3 Fuel & Power 14.9 170.1 0.4 14.7 11.3 7.7 5.9 12.7 13.8 -4.9 9.2 Manufactured Products* 65.0 138.6 0.2 7.7 5.0 2.2 2.0 7.4 5.3 1.7 7.2 Food Products* 10.0 151.7 0.9 8.0 3.6 4.5 -0.9 2.4 15.1 6.3 8.4 Food Index (computed)* 24.3 178.1 1.2 8.8 11.5 7.9 5.9 6.8 18.5 7.3 6.7 All Commodities (point to point basis)* 100.0 155.8 0.6 9.7 9.0 4.2 4.2 9.7 10.4 1.6 7.8 All Commodities (Monthly average basis)* 100.0 153.8 – 9.4 8.5 9.6 9.9 9.6 3.8 8.1 4.9 * Data pertain to the month of September 2011 as weekly release of data discontinued wef 24 Oct 2009. ^The date of first release of data based on 2004-05 series wef 14 September 2010. Variation (in %): Point-to-Point Cost of Living Indices Latest Over Over 12 Months Fiscal Year So Far Full Fiscal Year Month 2011 Month 2011 2010 2011-12 2010-11 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 2006-07 9 Industrial Workers (IW) (2001=100) 197 1.5 10.1 9.8 6.5 5.3 8.8 14.9 8.0 7.9 6.7 9 Agricultural Labourers (AL) (1986-87=100) 615 0.8 9.4 9.1 5.1 4.9 9.1 15.8 9.5 7.9 9.5
2006-07 12.9 12.7 13.4 0.9 6.5 4.3 9.6 6.8 6.5
2005-06 5.3 5.3
Note: Superscript numeral denotes month to which figure relates, e g, superscript 9 stands for September. Money and Banking (Rs crore) 7 October Over Month Over Year 2011 2011 Money Supply (M3) 6962822 104884(1.5) 972390(16.2) Currency with Public 949232 -2293(-0.2) 115374(13.8) Deposits Money with Banks 6011223 108186(1.8) 859294(16.7) of which: Demand Deposits 651919 27457(4.4) -23948(-3.5) Time Deposits 5359304 80729(1.5) 883242(19.7) Net Bank Credit to Government 2157973 -9316(-0.4) 401850(22.9) Bank Credit to Commercial Sector 4445753 79283(1.8) 700934(18.7) Net Foreign Exchange Assets 1542066 43937(2.9) 195577(14.5) Banking Sector’s Net Non-Monetary Liabilities 1196281 9371(0.8) 327283(37.7) of which: RBI 518818 69127(15.4) 189542(57.6) Reserve Money (21 October 2011) 1389190 33231(2.5) 215531(18.4) Net RBI Credit to Centre 394346 38094(-) 190703(-) Scheduled Commercial Banks (7 October 2011) Aggregate Deposits 5624932 102897(1.9) 832080(17.4) Demand 572679 24267(4.4) -29411(-4.9) Time 5052253 78629(1.6) 861491(20.6) Investments (for SLR purposes) 1734778 25808(1.5) 257685(17.4) Bank Credit 4148598 74303(1.8) 675538(19.5) Non-Food Credit 4085282 84403(2.1) 661978(19.3) Commercial Investments 169275 12179(7.8) 18518(12.3) Total Bank Assistance to Comml Sector 4254557 96582(2.3) 680496(19.0)
Variation Fiscal Year So Far 2011-12 2010-11 463274(7.1) 387701(6.9) 35035(3.8) 66365(8.6) 429585(7.7) 320530(6.6) -65740(-9.2) -42102(-5.9) 495325(10.2) 362632(8.8) 175202(8.8) 86937(5.2) 210347(5.0) 253410(7.3) 148739(10.7) 65020(5.1) 71601(6.4) 18397(2.2) 150544(40.9) 27661(9.2) 12309(0.9) 17973(1.6) 311(-) -7938(-)
2010-11 896817 (16.0) 146704 (19.1) 750239 (15.5) -310 (-0.0) 750549 (18.2) 313584 (18.8) 743997 (21.3) 111858 (8.7) 274078 (32.2) 66660 (22.1) 221195 (19.1) 182453
Full Fiscal Year 2009-10 807920 (16.8) 102043 (15.3) 707606 (17.2) 129281 (22.0) 578325 (16.4) 391853 (30.7) 476516 (15.8) 367718 (-5.2) -9050 (-1.1) -86316 (-22.3) 167688 (17.0) 149821
2008-09 776930 (19.3) 97040 (17.1) 683375 (19.9) 10316 (1.8) 673059 (23.5) 377815 (42.0) 435904 (16.9) 57053 (4.4) 94672 (12.4) 177709 (84.5) 59696 (6.4) 176397
416963(8.0) -69026(-10.8) 485989(10.6) 233159(15.5) 206515(5.2) 207483(5.4) 21674(14.7) 229157(5.7)
715143 (15.9) -3905 (-0.6) 719048 (18.7) 116867 (8.4) 697294 (21.5) 681500 (21.3) 28872 (24.5) 710372 (21.4)
658716 (17.2) 122525 (23.4) 536191 (16.2) 218342 (18.7) 469239 (16.9) 466961 (17.1) 11654 (11.0) 478615 (16.9)
637170 (19.9) -1224 (-0.2) 638395 (23.9) 194694 (20.0) 413635 (17.5) 411825 (17.8) 10911 (11.4) 422736 (17.5)
300026(6.7) -43519(-6.7) 343546(8.9) 92341(6.7) 228271(7.0) 227006(7.1) 32686(27.7) 259692(7.8)
Note: Government Balances as on 31 March 2011 are after closure of accounts. Index Numbers of Industrial Production August Fiscal Year So Far Full Fiscal Year Averages (Base 2004-05=100) Weights 2011 2011-12 2010-11 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 2006-07 General Index 100.00 162.4(4.0) 166.5(5.6) 157.7(8.6) 165.4(8.2) 152.9(5.3) 145.2(2.5) 141.7(15.5) 122.6(12.9) Mining and Quarrying 14.157 117.6-(3.4) 125.2(0.1) 125.1(7.7) 131.0(5.2) 124.5(7.9) 115.4(2.6) 112.5(4.6) 107.6(5.2) Manufacturing 75.527 172.6(4.5) 176.7(6.0) 166.7(9.3) 175.6(8.9) 161.3(4.8) 153.8(2.5) 150.1(18.4) 126.8(15.0) Electricity 10.316 149.4(9.5) 149.0(9.5) 136.1(4.2) 138.0(5.6) 130.8(6.1) 123.3(2.8) 120.0(6.4) 112.8(7.3) Fiscal Year So Far 2010-11 End of Fiscal Year Capital Market 28 Oct 2011 Month Ago Year Ago Trough Peak Trough Peak 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 BSE Sensitive Index (1978-79=100) 17805(-10.7) 16446 19941(22.5) 15792 19702 16022 21005 19445(10.9) 17528(80.5) 9709(-37.9) BSE-100 (1983-84=100) 9235(-13.0) 8630 10618(24.4) 8283 10262 8540 11141 10096(8.6) 9300(88.2) 4943(-40.0) BSE-200 (1989-90=100) 2163(-14.8) 2033 2539(26.2) 1950 2427 2034 2753 2379(8.1) 2200(92.9) 1140(-41.0) S&P CNX Nifty (3 Nov 1995=1000) 5361(-10.5) 4946 5988(24.1) 4748 5912 4807 6312 5834(11.1) 5249(73.8) 3021(-36.2) Skindia GDR Index (2 Jan 1995=1000) 2375(-26.2) 2290 3216(34.9) 2146 3441 2477 3479 3151(9.3) 2883(134.2) 1153(-56.2) Net FII Investment in (US $ Mn Equities) - period end 101888(4.5) 101973 97531(40.2) – – – – 101454(31.5) 77159(43.1) 51669(-18.6) September* Fiscal Year So Far Full Fiscal Year Foreign Trade 2011 2011-12 2010-11 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 2006-07 2005-06 2004-05 Exports: Rs crore 118234 723432 (49.3) 484687 (23.2) 1118823 (32.3) 845534 (0.6) 840754(28.2) 655863(14.7) 571779(25.3) 456418(21.6) 375340(27.9) US $ mn 24822 160049 (52.1) 105241 (30.0) 245868 (37.5) 178751 (-3.5) 185295 (13.6) 163132(29.0) 126361(22.6) 103091(23.4) 83536(30.8) Imports: Rs crore 164759 1055339 (30.0) 811773 (30.4) 1596869 (17.1) 1363736 (-0.8) 1374434(35.8) 1012312(20.4) 840506(27.3) 660409(31.8) 501065(39.5) US $ mn 34589 233510 (32.4) 176360 (37.6) 350695 (21.6) 288373 (-5.0) 303696(20.7) 251654(35.5) 185749(24.5) 149166(33.8) 111517(42.7) Non-POL US $ mn (* Provisional figures) 25379 163161 (28.5) 126955 (40.0) 249006 (23.7) 201237 (-4.2) 210029(22.2) 171940(33.5) 128790(22.4) 105233(37.1) 76772(33.2) Balance of Trade: Rs crore -46525 -331907 -327085 -478047 -518202 -533680 -356449 -268727 -203991 -125725 US $ mn -9767 -73461 -71119 -104827 -109621 -118401 -88522 -59388 -46075 -27981 Variation Over Foreign Exchange Reserves (excluding 21 Oct 22 Oct 31 Mar Fiscal Year So Far Full Fiscal Year gold but including revaluation effects) 2011 2010 2011 Month Ago Year Ago 2011-12 2010-11 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 2006-07 Rs crore 1437292 1213188 1245284 39426 224104 192008 40942 73038 -57826 33975 359500 189270 US $ mn 287056 272872 278899 5625 14184 8157 13181 19208 18264 -57821 107324 46816 Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year. (–) not relevant. [Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates, as also the thematic notes and Special Statistics series, are available on our website: http://www.epwrf.in]. Economic & Political Weekly EPW November 12, 2011 vol xlvi no 46
85
Year (1)
Number of Companies (2)
Sales Total (3)
Rate of Growth in %
Value of Production (4)
Mfg Expenses (5)
A Finances of Non-Government Non-Financial Private Limited Companies 1990-91 905 2673 2720 1913 1991-92 1005 3475 30.0 3542 2509 1992-93 846 3081 -11.3 3115 2171 1993-94 839 3834 24.4 3851 2646 1994-95 880 4197 9.5 4301 2960 1995-96 853 3973 -5.3 4036 2748 1996-97 883 3337 -16.0 3371 2254 1997-98 890 3556 6.6 3596 2316 1998-99 947 4230 18.9 4242 2700 1999-00 1126 12549 196.7 12747 7947 2000-01 1242 20553 63.8 20847 14263 2001-02 1338 24411 18.8 24553 16928 2002-03 1357 26384 8.1 26535 18057 2003-04 1377 28173 6.8 28503 19746 2004-05 1257 37399 32.7 37986 26059 2005-06 1259 44585 19.2 44929 31340 2006-07 1224 57351 28.6 57836 39422 2007-08 1642 118256 106.2 120558 84388 2008-09 1642 136244 15.2 137411 95896 2009-10 1642 147110 8.0 147660 99018
Remuner- ation to Employees* (6)
260 312 301 348 376 379 347 367 433 1236 1726 2057 2025 2383 2750 3156 4659 11057 13168 14362
Other Expenses (7)
673 874 796 1039 1177 1127 938 1086 1302 4042 5562 6633 3734 3914 6192 6417 7894 17467 21760 22411
Depre- ciation Provision (8)
Gross Profit (9)
87 107 89 108 117 126 107 126 163 437 763 1126 1051 924 1184 1404 2295 4053 4728 5367
219 313 266 371 423 370 276 300 346 1069 1331 1671 2442 2394 2849 4045 5054 8550 7622 12907
Interest (10)
Operating Profit (11)
Non- operating Surplus(+)/ Deficit(-) (12)
121 176 154 170 172 180 133 146 178 376 701 843 767 539 495 664 1100 2334 3304 3467
98 137 113 201 251 204 143 154 168 694 630 828 1675 1856 2354 3380 3954 6216 4318 9440
28 24 27 34 35 37 12 10 11 43 70 249 115 64 51 212 66 648 -54 831
Profit Before Tax (13)
127 160 139 235 286 241 155 164 179 737 700 1077 1790 1920 2405 3592 4020 6863 4265 10271
Tax Provision (14)
Profit After Tax (15)
Dividend (16)
Profits Retained (17)
48 66 59 83 82 77 64 53 61 226 324 385 565 604 864 1161 1351 2711 2580 3546
79 94 80 152 204 164 91 111 118 510 376 692 1225 1316 1541 2432 2669 4152 1685 6725
12 16 18 28 33 25 27 27 32 121 218 356 527 297 363 394 1124 964 1045 1462
67 79 62 125 171 139 63 84 86 389 158 336 698 1019 1178 2037 1545 3188 640 5263
B Selected Financial Ratios (%) november 12, 2011 vol xlvI no 46 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
Year
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Debt to Equity
ST Borrow- ing to Inventories
Sundry Creditors to Net Working Capital
Sales to Gross Fixed Assets
Inventories to Sales
Sundry Debtors to Sales
Export to Sales
GVA to Gross Fixed Assets
Raw Mate- rials to Value of Production
Remuner- ation to Sales
Interest to Gross Profits
Tax Provision to Gross Profits
Gross Profits to Net Assets
Gross Profits to Sales
Profits after Tax to Net Worth
Tax Provision to PBT
Dividend Payout
69.5 66.6 56.3 45.1 36.6 28.9 31.0 27.2 28.0 22.8 32.5 29.8 30.6 22.3 24.3 25.3 22.1 28.0 36.6 28.6
85.8 74.1 77.9 64.2 66.5 66.7 66.5 66.9 80.5 70.1 59.5 71.3 70.1 61.3 49.0 67.1 100.1 84.9 73.3 79.2
.. .. .. .. 335.2 405.3 394.5 402.8 623.5 176.8 131.5 148.3 123.7 125.2 109.6 112.5 287.7 269.1 189.3 213.8
213.8 222.2 221.7 207.9 210.0 194.5 189.0 177.6 172.2 206.1 192.1 159.8 178.9 216.2 242.7 238.8 182.5 208.3 200.6 189.5
20.8 20.6 19.4 19.3 19.6 19.2 16.5 17.5 15.4 16.0 18.1 19.7 15.1 16.0 15.3 15.0 14.5 17.3 16.7 17.6
18.0 17.2 18.9 17.9 17.7 19.6 18.1 18.7 19.7 17.8 20.0 19.7 17.2 17.7 17.2 17.5 16.8 16.2 15.5 16.6
9.8 11.5 8.6 7.5 8.8 6.9 7.6 7.4 10.0 13.9 12.8 14.3 15.9 15.8 14.7 18.6 12.9 11.9 9.0 7.6
45.1 46.4 46.5 44.6 46.2 41.5 41.2 40.3 38.8 45.9 36.8 32.0 38.3 44.7 45.0 45.1 38.7 44.8 38.5 46.1
58.7 59.6 58.0 56.0 56.4 55.8 56.9 52.8 52.1 51.1 58.7 58.2 55.9 57.6 59.6 60.0 57.9 62.5 61.4 59.2
9.7 9.0 9.8 9.1 9.0 9.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 9.9 8.4 8.4 7.7 8.5 7.4 7.1 8.1 9.4 9.7 9.8
55.3 56.2 57.9 45.8 40.7 48.6 48.2 48.7 51.4 35.2 52.7 50.4 31.4 22.5 17.4 16.4 21.8 27.3 43.3 26.9
21.9 21.1 22.2 22.4 19.4 20.8 23.2 17.7 17.6 21.1 24.4 23.1 23.1 25.2 30.3 28.7 26.7 31.7 33.8 27.5
9.7 10.8 10.4 11.1 11.0 9.6 8.7 8.5 8.2 8.9 6.3 6.3 9.7 9.6 9.7 11.0 8.8 7.0 5.4 7.8
8.2 9.0 8.6 9.7 10.1 9.3 8.3 8.4 8.2 8.5 6.5 6.8 9.3 8.5 7.6 9.1 8.8 7.2 5.6 8.8
17.3 15.1 13.1 16.1 17.4 13.5 8.7 9.2 8.1 10.3 4.4 6.1 11.0 12.3 12.1 16.2 11.4 8.7 3.0 10.4
37.8 41.3 42.4 35.3 28.7 32.0 41.3 32.3 34.1 30.7 46.3 35.8 31.6 31.5 35.9 32.3 33.6 30.5 27.3 27.3
15.2 17.0 22.5 18.4 16.2 15.2 29.7 24.3 27.1 23.7 58.0 51.4 43.0 22.6 23.6 16.2 42.1 23.2 62.0 21.7
* Remuneration to employees comprises (a) salaries, wages and bonus, (b) provident fund, and (c) employees’ welfare expenses. Source: RBI (2011): Finances of Non-Govt Non-Financial Private Limited Companies, 2009-10, Reserve Bank of India Bullettin, September 2011 and various previous relevant issues.
STATISTICS
86
Trends in Corporate Finances – Finances of Non-Government Non-Financial Private Limited Companies (Rs crore)
