Nishida
a nd Wester
n Philoso
phy
For Virginia
Nishida and Western Philosophy
R ober t Wilki nso n The Open Uni...
77 downloads
2055 Views
2MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Nishida
a nd Wester
n Philoso
phy
For Virginia
Nishida and Western Philosophy
R ober t Wilki nso n The Open University in Scotland, UK
© R obert Wilkinson 2009 A ll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. R obert Wilkinson has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, D esigns and Patents Act, 1988, to be identi.ed as the author of this work. Published by A shgate Publishing L imited A shgate Publishing Company Wey Court E ast S uite 420 Union R oad 101 Cherry S treet Farnham B urlington S urrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 E ngland USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Wilkinson, R obert, 1948– Nishida and Western philosophy 1. Nishida, K itaro, 1870–1945 2. Zen B uddhism – Philosophy 3. B uddhism and philosophy 4. Philosophy, Comparative I. T itle 181.1’2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wilkinson, R obert, 1948– Nishida and Western philosophy / R obert Wilkinson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISB N 978-0-7546-5703-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Nishida, K itaro, 1870–1945. I. T itle. B 5244.N554W55 2009 181’.12—dc22 ISB N 978-0-7546-5703-3
2008032689
Nishida
a nd Wester
n Philoso
phy
Contents Preliminary Notes Introduction
vii 1
1 Nishida’s S tarting Point 2 R adical E mpiricism and Pure E xperience 3 Fichte, the Neo-K antians and B ergson 4 Nishida’s L ater Philosophy: T he L ogic of Place and S elf-Contradictory Identity
5 31 61 101
S ummary and Conclusions
151
Bibliography Index
163 169
This page has been left blank intentionally
Preliminary Notes T he following abbreviations are used for the titles of translated works by Nishida: AM: FPP: IG: IPN: IRSC: NKZ: NRWV:
Art and Morality Fundamental Problems of Philosophy An Inquiry into the Good Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness Intuition and Re.ection in Self-Consciousness Nishida Kitaro Zenshu: Nishida’s Complete Works in Japanese Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious World View
Chinese words are given in the pinyin romanization, except where they occur in the titles or texts of translations where that system is not used (usually because they predate it). In such cases I have not amended the texts in question: in no case is the meaning or reference in doubt. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Y ale University Press to quote from their edition of Nishida’s An Enquiry into the Good and to the S UNY Press to quote from their edition of Nishida’s Intuition and Reflection in Self-consciousness. A ll citations are made in accordance with conventions of fair use.
This page has been left blank intentionally
Introduction The principal aim of this essay is to examine Nishida Kitarō’s lifelong exploration of western philosophy from the standpoint of someone formed within Japanese culture, and in particular by the Zen element within that culture. S uch an encounter is of philosophical interest in itself, but beyond this has implications for the question of the extent to which cultures can meaningfully be blended at levels below the superficial. Nishida set out to do something unprecedented in intellectual history: to see whether the basic insights of Zen could be formulated in the terms and manner of the western philosophical tradition. T his was an undertaking of great intellectual boldness, for many Japanese would argue that the very attempt to articulate Zen insights within any conceptual framework is itself destructive of Zen spirituality. Nishida refused to accept this, and devoted his life to the task he had set himself. A s Nishida himself recognized, philosophical systems worth their salt, however abstract they may be, have at their root a governing intuition, a profound conviction of some kind about the way things are: in this respect, like good art, they articulate a genuine vision of what there is, one of the major options humanity has so far developed for itself of how things stand in the universe. T hese governing intuitions have been classified by historians of philosophy in various ways. For the purpose of this essay, the most illuminating point from which to begin is with a contrast of two of these deep intuitions. O n the one hand there are those thinkers, like Plotinus and, to some degree, Plato – and certain idealistic monists – who are convinced that reality is more deeply unified that it is variegated; who are convinced that differences are less important to a full understanding of the universe than a grasp of the deep unity which, they are convinced, is manifesting itself as this variety, in whatever way and for whatever reason. T hese are usually referred to as ‘one and many’ philosophies. O n the other hand, there are those, in a long tradition from A ristotle to the present day, whose basic conviction is that what there is consists ultimately of discrete individuals of some kind or kinds, standing in various relations to one another. In such philosophies, nature displays regularities, visible in the ways we codify its laws or those of science, but these regularities are not taken to be evidence of any deeper unity and many more distinctions are taken to be ontologically ultimate than is the case in ‘one and many’ systems. I will call these philosophies individualistic. T hese two types of philosophy have systematically different agendas, and for good logical reasons. T he individualistic systems have to address the issue of identifying individuals and kinds and of codifying their relations. Problems arise at once about the nature and reliability of perception, and so of our knowledge of the world and of truth – problems complicated by the adoption of a mind–body
Nishida and Western Philosophy
dualism. A gain, if the distinction between fact and value is taken to be ultimate, a set of familiar problems in the grounding of ethics is generated. In ‘one and many’ systems the prime focus is different: it is not intuitively obvious to persons other than mystics (and mysticism is a condition which admits of degrees) that there is a ‘one’ as well as a ‘many’, nor why the one should or could have given rise to the many, and so a great deal of time and effort has to go into trying to give an account of these matters. A gain, while the individualist philosopher is not especially concerned with how many ontologically ultimate differences reality may manifest, for the ‘one and many’ philosopher the issue is to show how a unity could give rise to such differences as we seem to find all around us; and this often takes the form of trying to minimize the differences in question, to show that they are more apparent or superficial than real. Nishida was most definitely among those who are deeply impressed with the unity of all things, and I will argue that this conviction was for him an empirical matter, derived from his Zen experience: his pupil Nishitani notes that from his earliest years Nishida felt that reality is absolute, something actualized in the deepest part of the self, well beyond the ordinary confines of the ego. It is this deep conviction about the way things ultimately are which gives Nishida’s thought its overall shape, generates its philosophical agenda and drives its development. H is general aim is to formulate a conceptual structure which accommodates this intuition of unity and shows how all philosophically significant distinctions can be accounted for within such a framework. H is philosophy is driven by the need to find unity beneath (as it were) all apparent difference, however ultimate-seeming the difference in question might be – including notably that between the self and the not-self. Each phase of Nishida’s development is a stage in his attempt to find a way of articulating the relation between the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ which was suggested to him by Zen. T his book is not designed to be an exhaustive exposition of Nishida’s thought (and even less of all his western sources), for which indeed more than one book would be needed. It is rather meant to test a number of related hypotheses, of which the first is that Nishida’s reactions to western thought are only intelligible if they are assumed to be expressions of a view of human experience formed mainly by Zen. Another is that the apparent difficulty of some of what Nishida has to say, especially in his later years, becomes much less opaque if it is construed as an attempt to recast certain B uddhist insights in a new vocabulary and to regard it in terms of a conception of the philosophical enterprise which has been deeply influenced by the philosophy of the west. The great Buddhist doctrines of impermanence, dependent origination, no-self and śūnyatā, for example, seem to me to lie behind a great deal of what Nishida has to say, though he always attempts to cast what he has to say in a western mould. Finally, there is the idea that, in the last analysis, what Nishida wanted to do could not be done, and this for deep and interesting logical reasons, which would only become apparent after the attempt
Nishitani 1991, p. 16.
Introduction
had been made. It seems to me likely that some of the ideas dear to Nishida have no western analogue: they are just incommensurable with western concepts and cannot be stated in them. If that is so, and because these ideas are manifestly capable of sustaining a viable way of being in the world, there arises an interesting question as to the grounds on which a choice between them might be made. The first chapter is a short statement of some of the major philosophical issues raised by Zen. T his is the outlook within which Nishida was formed, and it seems to me that his reactions to western philosophies, as they unfold over his career, are in large measure dictated, very consistently, by their conformity or otherwise with his basic point of view. H is thought manifests elements both of continuity and of change. T he basic Zen position never varies, while by contrast the concepts and arguments designed to articulate it are in a state of constant change. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 chart the major phases of these changes and the reactions to the western philosophies which occupied and inspired him mostly during each phase. T he book ends with a summary and a consideration of the implications of the overall argument.
This page has been left blank intentionally
Chapter 1
Nishida’s S tarting Point
…Western culture … regards form (eidos) as being and formation as good. H owever, at the basis of A sian culture … lies something that can be called seeing the form of the formless and hearing the sound of the soundless. O ur minds are compelled to seek for this. I would like to give a philosophical foundation to this demand.
Philosophies which are merely clever or erudite rarely inspire, and even less do they last, attracting the attention of later generations. T hose philosophies which endure do so not only because of their logical power and coherence, but also because they articulate an important perspective on human experience or some significant aspect of it. T he major philosophies of the world have behind them a genuine vision of human experience, a vision which strikes a chord with others and which articulates something we have felt or glimpsed but have not been able to set out so well. T he best of them set out a way of being human which has been found to be a genuine working possibility, a way of being in the world which is sustainable. Nishida did not approach his lifelong dialogue with western philosophy with a mind which was a tabula rasa, but on the contrary with a well-formed point of view. Nishida’s philosophy is an attempt to articulate this point of view: the view of human experience, which is constitutive of Zen. What is original about it is not the Zen vision itself, which had been refined over centuries in China and Japan, but rather the attempt to find a conceptual framework for such a vision at all; for most Zen masters would say that to attempt to do this would be in principle impossible and in practice destructive of Zen. Nishida’s thought is the product of a unique confluence of impulses, requiring the coincidence of the right man and a unique set of historical circumstances. L ike his lifelong friend the Zen scholar D .T . S uzuki, Nishida belonged in the last generation of Japanese to have been largely formed in the old (pre-Meiji) ways of Japanese culture, and at the same time he was one of the first who had access to the wide range of European thought which became available to the Japanese after the opening of their country to the West. Moreover, Nishida was by temperament a born philosopher, manifestly �������������������� Nishida: Preface to From the Actor to the Seer (1927), in NKZ, 4, p. 6; quoted in A be’s Introduction to his translation of IG, p. x. The western view is exemplified, for example, in A ristotle’s Rhetoric 1409a35, where indeterminacy in speech is condemned as unpleasant; Metaphysics 1078a30–5, where beauty is related to mathematics and so to order, proportion and limit. A lso relevant is Poetics 1450b–1451a, where beauty is defined as magnitude: an extremely small animal, whose form we cannot perceive, cannot be beautiful to humans.
Nishida and Western Philosophy
captivated by conceptual frameworks: the urge to articulate a set of concepts and beliefs which would do justice to his vision of life and the world never left him – he was thinking and writing about it from his schooldays until a day or two before his death. In the light of the assertions above, it may seem odd to western readers that Nishida very rarely refers explicitly to Zen beliefs, practices, texts or scholarship in his philosophical works: in my view this is because Zen was to him, as to all its genuine practitioners, not just a set of propositional convictions. It was (and is) much more than a philosophy in the current, western and academic, sense – that of a set of highly abstract beliefs arrived at by ratiocination and to be defended by the standard methods of argument and conceptual analysis. Philosophies of this kind generally engage only the reason, and hardly ever touch the other, deeper strata of a human being. T o state the obvious, Zen is a form of B uddhism, a religion which has as its goal a moulding of human nature at its deepest levels, in ways to be discussed more fully below. T o its genuine practitioners, Zen is constitutive of their whole mode of being, as constitutive as breathing or eating. O ne takes such things for granted: there is no need to refer to them in the same way as to the opinions worked out by professional philosophers. E qually, however, though he rarely refers to Zen or other B uddhist ideas in his works, there can be absolutely no doubt that Nishida was at the deepest level formed by Zen, practising it for many years. T o understand his work, then, it is necessary to be aware of the philosophical issues raised by Zen, since it is Zen that forms the starting point from which he begins, and remains the absolutely constant point of reference throughout his life. A ll the changes and developments in Nishida’s philosophy are changes only in order to try to articulate better the Zen outlook: that outlook itself never ceases to be the source of Nishida’s philosophical vision, and his adherence to it never wavered. A ll Nishida’s reactions to western thought are the reactions of a thinker assessing that thought as a potential vehicle for the articulation of a Zen outlook. T his is not quite to say that Nishida’s is a philosophy ‘based on’ Zen: ‘based on’ is too inexact a relational term to capture the complexity of the position. It is undoubtedly true that certain aspects of the Zen experience fall outside the scope of philosophy as a discipline which necessarily uses the methods of rational thought, and not all of the Zen experience can be (so to speak) philosophized. H owever, Nishida was (as has been said) a born philosopher, and his goal was to conceptualize his view of human experience as far as he could. H e was not content to throw in the towel and accept that no important aspects of Zen experience were amenable to a properly philosophical treatment. H e tried genuinely and constantly to philosophize about his experience. Y et, when he comes to philosophize, his whole thought, inescapably, is given its direction and colour by Zen, from his
�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� T here is abundant biographical evidence for this, set out in Y usa Michiko’s biography of Nishida. S ee Y usa 2002, passim.
Nishida’s Starting Point
basic question (what is the nature of the ultimate reality?) to the various answers he gives to it. It is to be stressed at the outset that one must not underestimate how very un-western the Zen point of view is. In my view, regarded in its philosophical dimension, it is simply incommensurable with the mainstream of western thought, for reasons I will return to at various points in the course of this essay. T he task Nishida set himself – that of exploring western thought to see if it could be made a suitable vehicle for the expounding of an experience formed by Zen – is one both of great intellectual daring (going against the received orthodoxy of his own culture) and of immense difficulty. There is no short way of substantiating these assertions, and indeed this whole essay is the evidence for them. H owever, before embarking on our investigation of Nishida’s reactions to western philosophy, it is necessary to say something, however briefly, about the philosophical aspect of the Zen vision of the human condition. T his will serve both as essential background to what follows and as a first piece of evidence for the assertion above that Zen is remarkably un-western. It is to be stressed that what follows in the remainder of this chapter concerns only the philosophical aspects of Zen: the various practical aspects of Zen – for example, the much written about and fashionable meditation practices (often involving koans) and the much less exciting and less written about but essential discipline of what one can call ‘acceptance practice’ (shugyō: egosuppressing monastic discipline) – are not relevant to this investigation.
Satori Central to the Zen outlook is an extraordinary experience, called in Chinese wu and in Japanese satori. T o have this experience is the ultimate goal of Zen practice. T o achieve it almost invariably requires an extended course of arduous physical and spiritual discipline, for which various methods have been devised, notably zazen (seated meditation) and/or the use of koans, both extensively discussed in the literature on Zen practice and always accompanied by monastic discipline. A n analysis of this experience is an appropriate starting point for our present investigation, since such an analysis reveals the key philosophical assertions involved in Zen. T hese assertions form the agenda of the Nishida tetsugaku (that is, Nishida’s philosophy), and it is therefore appropriate to begin with some basic
���������������������������������������������������������� It is interesting to note that, in S uzuki’s classic study The Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk (1934), four chapters are devoted to monastic work and routine and only one to meditation. A s in roughly analogous western monastic disciplines, various forms of self-denial and hard work are quite as important as prayer and meditation, a point often underplayed in western primers about Zen. Indeed, meditation on its own, outside the context of self-denying discipline, is often counter-productive, serving to reinforce egoawareness rather than to diminish it.
Nishida and Western Philosophy
data about satori. T he great Zen scholar S uzuki gives an analysis of satori under eight headings: Irrationality: satori cannot be achieved by reasoning. It is ineffable and is invariably mutilated whenever an attempt is made to explain or convey it by word (as in this present exposition) or by gesture. T his is because, to put the matter in metaphysical terms, what is revealed in satori is what is called in S anskrit śūnyatā and in Japanese mu, and variously translated as ‘emptiness’, ‘nothingness’ or ‘the Void’. It is a reality which is non-dual in nature, that is, something wholly undifferentiated and to which in consequence no concepts whatsoever apply. Concepts are precisely the means by which we articulate differences and divisions in our experience, and so they cannot in principle apply to what is revealed in satori. A gain, since reasoning is the paradigm of conceptual intellection, reasoning is useless as a means to satori, and indeed is a hindrance to it. O ne of the major functions of the Zen techniques mentioned above is precisely to stultify ordinary rationcination, which masks the non-dual nature of the real and prevents our apprehension of it. Noetic quality: despite the fact that satori reveals a non-dual reality, it is not an experience of mere vacancy. Certain meditative techniques can result in a condition in which consciousness is merely empty, but such a state is not satori. Zen adepts insist that what is revealed in satori is knowledge of the most complete and adequate kind available to the human mind, yet paradoxically this knowledge is in a strict sense ineffable: it is awareness which is not cognition. What is learned cannot be articulated in conceptual (or any other) terms, and so cannot be recorded or conveyed, only directly experienced. Authoritativeness: no amount of logical argument can refute satori. Its ineffability renders it immune to such criticism. From the psychological point of view, it has the tone of absolute certainty and unquestionability. It is a centre that holds, and appears to occur (so to speak) in the absolute innermost recesses of consciousness. Affirmation: satori ������������������������������������������������������������� involves an affirmative attitude to everything there is. (An experience which was authoritative but negative could not be final, since it would not provide a final resting place and so would be of no value to us.) Sense of the beyond: ����������������������� reality as revealed in satori is non-dual. From this it follows that, in common with all other distinctions, those between self and not-self, mind and body, are illusory. S trictly speaking, satori is not an experience had by an individual at all – it is not accurate to speak of ‘my’ or ‘your’ satori. E qually, it cannot be described as an intuition, an event in the mental life of an individual, since Derived ������������� from Suzuki ����������������� 1927, pp. 213–50; ������������������������������������������������ 1933, pp.16 sqq; 1982, ch. ii and 1983, ch. viii.
Nishida’s Starting Point
in the moment of satori there is properly speaking no individual and no mind. In the satori experience the normal condition of human consciousness, characterized (in K antian terms) by the transcendental unity of apperception and conceptual intellection, explodes and falls away. R ather, ‘[w]hen [reality] perceives itself as it is in itself there is a satori’. Yet what follows is not a terrible void; rather ‘[t]he feeling that follows is that of complete release or a complete rest – the feeling that one has arrived finally at the destination. As far as the psychology of satori is concerned, a sense of the Beyond is all we can say about it; to call this the Beyond, the A bsolute, or God, or a Person is to go further than the experience itself and to plunge into a theology or a metaphysics.’ Impersonal tone: ��������������������������������������������������������������� when describing comparable experiences in their own tradition, Christian mystics often use vocabulary which apparently indicates a personal, even a sensual aspect to their experiences, for instance spiritual matrimony; the fire of love; the bride of Christ. There is nothing comparable in Zen literature: satori is entirely impersonal in tone. Feeling of exaltation: ������������������������������������������������������������� the general feeling which accompanies all the activities of standard consciousness in daily experience is one of restriction and dependence. In satori, these shackles, often so deeply ingrained in our consciousness as to go unnoticed, fall away, and a feeling of exaltation results. Momentariness: satori ���������������������������������������������������������� comes upon us abruptly and is momentary. If an experience is not momentary, it is not satori. T his is a strict consequence of Zen metaphysics. R eality or being-as-is is prior not only to the division between self and not-self and mind and body, but also to space and to time. R eality, as it is in itself, is prior to both time and eternity, and, since time is the medium of change, reality must exist in a fashion which is time-less (but this is not to be confused with the notion of an everlasting being in time). S ince satori is direct apprehension of being-as-is, it cannot be an event in time. It is, as one is forced to say in language devised to deal with temporal existence, a timeless moment. In Zen vocabulary, satori occurs when consciousness realizes a state of ‘one thought’, in Japanese ichinen. Ichinen is an absolute point without duration. T hose who achieve satori are freed from the curse of the restrictions of ordinary time consciousness, in which we crave for something changeless amid the relentless mutability of the world. It will be clear that this extraordinary experience involves philosophical claims at the deepest levels. In the rest of this chapter I will examine some of the most philosophically important issues raised by satori. T his is equivalent to setting out Nishida’s central beliefs, the ones for which he sought to find a conceptual articulation in western thought. T he issues to be focused on are as follows:
������������������� S uzuki 1950, p. 50. ����������������������� S uzuki 1933, pp. 18–19.
Nishida and Western Philosophy
10
a. the nature of the emptiness which is revealed in the satori experience (since Nishida was Japanese, I will refer to it by its Japanese name mu); b. the relation of mu to the world ordinarily experienced by self-conscious persons in what I shall call, for short, standard experience: conceptualized in terms of spatio-temporal individuals and as characterized, (in K antian terms) by the transcendental unity of apperception. In B uddhist terms, this is the same as stating how the everyday world, the samsara, is related to nirvana, together with examining the implications of the Zen view for the philosophy of time; c. some important doctrines in the area of epistemology, notably concerning the nature of the self and the possibility of non-cognitive awareness; d. what it is like to experience the world after satori; the implications of the doctrine of mu for aesthetics and ethics (including the status and value of the historical world), and concerning immortality.
Mu or Emptiness Zen is a branch of Mahayana B uddhism which abjures so far as is possible the use of scriptures, relying instead on direct mind-to-mind transmission of religious truth from Zen master to pupil. T he reason for abjuring the scriptures is to avoid the tendency, inherent in any textual study, to become ever more deeply interested and involved in conceptual thought, which has to be overcome if mu is to be experienced in satori. Y et while this is so, there can be no doubt that the central notion of emptiness was developed in a number of key scriptures, together with the writings of one of the most important philosophers of the Mahayanist tradition, Nagarjuna (second century ce ). T he scriptures concerned are the prajňāpāramitā sutras. Prajňā is generally translated as ‘wisdom’, although, as will be seen presently, it is of a very unusual kind, and certainly not propositional. Pāramitā means literally ‘having reached the other shore’, and in this context is taken to mean perfection. A ccordingly, this set of Mahayana sutras is generally referred to as that of the Perfection of Wisdom sutras, expressing the most advanced Mahayanist teachings. It was noted above in the description of satori that what is revealed in that experience – that is, mu – is absolutely non-dual, in other words, undifferentiated in every way. It has to be noted as an initial caveat therefore that, strictly speaking, it cannot be characterized in language. T his is evident from the start of the Perfection of Wisdom tradition, and is crisply asserted in the Diamond Sutra: ‘T his dharma which the T athagata has fully known or demonstrated – it cannot be grasped, it cannot be talked about, it is neither a dharma nor a no-dharma.’ T he term dharma here means ‘reality’, and what is being asserted is that mu is beyond all conceptual classifications: it is neither a dharma nor a no-dharma. A ll the Diamond Sutra, ch. 7, in Conze 1958, p. 36.
Nishida’s Starting Point
11
points made in the present text and in the sources on which it is based, therefore, are to be interpreted merely as pointers to something which is ineffable: they are propositions, in this respect like those of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which make up a ladder to be thrown away when we have achieved the insight which is being aimed at. T his is not inconsistent: Zen teachers must, like all good teachers, begin from a point which their students can grasp, and more or less inevitably they have to begin by using language as a teaching medium, being always aware that what they are aiming at is an insight beyond the means of language to express. Mu can only be grasped via the existential, non-objective experience of satori. It cannot be objectified: it cannot be an object of the experience of an individual in a standard state of awareness, that is, subject to the transcendental unity of apperception – it cannot be a component in an intentional experience in B rentano’s sense of the term. T he implications of these statements will become clearer below. It is to be stressed that mu is not a term which denotes some transcendent realm or entity. T hough the word mu is linguistically a noun, and though predicates can be ascribed to it (notably formlessness), these linguistic necessities should not lead us to make the ontological assumptions which such grammatical forms all too often have caused philosophers to make. T here is no absolute in Mahayana B uddhism, no equivalent of the B rahman of H induism or of the god of the major monotheistic religions. In the Mahayana there is absolutely nothing that is held to be real and eternal ‘behind’, as it were, the mutable world revealed in standard experience. A gain, when mu is described as formless, one should beware of falling into the trap of thinking of it as form or thing which has been labelled ‘formless’ and thus unwittingly thinking of mu as if it were some sort of entity, albeit of an odd, unique kind. With the notion of formlessness in mind, it is appropriate here to repeat an important point made by one of Nishida’s successors in K yoto, A be Masao, namely that formlessness has no negative connotations in B uddhist thought. There is an unstated and pervasive preference in western thought for definability, clarity and definiteness, a preference present in the West at least from Plato, who called his transcendent realm of the real precisely the realm of Forms. A gain, in a different way, this preference for definiteness was hugely reinforced by the metaphysics of A ristotle, in which individuals are metaphysical ultimates. T o this day, formlessness is assumed in the West to be somehow less valuable than being which is formed, identifiable, individual or in some way definite. This preference is reversed in B uddhist thought, where animitta (freedom from form and colour) is regarded as a positive value. A nother misunderstanding easy to fall into is to regard mu as equivalent to what western philosophers mean when they use the term ‘not-being’ as opposed to ‘being’ – a state of absolute nothingness. T he statement quoted above from the ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Abe 1997, p. 145. This preference for the indefinite has implications right through the cultures influenced by the Mahayana. It has notable implications in Japanese aesthetics, for example. S ee Wilkinson 2001 for examples.
12
Nishida and Western Philosophy
Diamond Sutra reflects one aspect of a general assertion concerning mu, namely that it is beyond all dualities: it is neither being nor not-being. Mu is held to be the ground of both being and not-being, and is logically and ontologically prior to this and all other distinctions. It is important to spell out some of the more important dualities which do not apply to mu: life and death; self and not-self; being and becoming; form and formlessness; good and evil; time and eternity. There will be more to say about these as the argument proceeds; for the moment what needs to be stressed is what a truly extraordinary claim is being made here and how remote it is from nearly all western philosophical thought. Mu is not a divinity; not a transcendent good; not an eternal being; not a changeless entity; yet neither is it absolute nothingness. S o far, mu has only been characterized in negative terms, and this is a notoriously unsatisfying way of describing anything. Mahayanists realize that it is necessary to give some positive hints as to what they are trying to convey by this term (subject to the caveats noted above), and the first of these is that it is mindlike or spiritual, insofar as it is like anything. T he goal of Zen can be described as the realization of one’s true nature, variously described as the B uddha-nature, D harma-nature or B uddha-mind. T he principal reason for regarding mu as mind-like to some degree is that satori, in which it is manifested, is a conscious experience, though satori is not awareness of an object by a subject, but rather an awareness which is subjectless. It is an awareness which is not cognition; yet it is an awareness. It may seem odd, in the light of this, that another way of stating the goal of Zen is to say that it aims to achieve the state of mu-shin, literally ‘nomind’; but the contradiction is only apparent. The mind indicated by the term shin in this compound is the mind manifested in standard awareness, the mind of a selfconscious individual aware of an external world, such as we all experience it every day in our waking hours (unless we have had satori, that is).10 Satori can only come about when this mode of awareness is overcome and (as Zen masters are fond of saying) falls away. O nly when the self/not-self distinction is bypassed can mu be existentially realized. Consequently, though mu is mind-like, the likeness to individual consciousness cannot be pushed very far. Mu is said to be a perfectly clear and lucid, ever-present awareness, but it is absolutely non-dual. What in standard experience we call subject and object are in mu not distinct.11 A further positive characterization of mu is that it is dynamic. Indeed, granted its relation to the everyday world (to be discussed in the next section), it has to be, or the incessant change so greatly emphasized in B uddhist thought becomes unaccountable. It has been noted above that mu is beyond all dualities, yet it is also the unobjectifiable ground of all there is. Hence Mahayanists must assert that, for example, it assumes both form and formlessness at the same time; it includes both ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ T he closest western parallels are to certain mystical writers, notably E ckhart, but even here the similarity is not complete. S ee S uzuki 1988, Ch. 1. 10 �������������� T he notion of mu-shin is discussed at length in S uzuki 1969. 11 ������������������� S ee H isamatsu 1960.
Nishida’s Starting Point
13
time and eternity, good and evil (and so on), as is appropriate in the course of its expression. (O nce again, it is to be stressed that only linguistic necessity makes it necessary to use pronouns like ‘it’.) A be makes the persuasive point that, although it is customarily referred to by the noun mu, it would be better regarded as a verb denoting the pure activity of emptying. Mu empties everything, including itself, incessantly. A ll these connotations of mu are present when the term is used; and this considerable complexity, as with other key terms in oriental thought (notably the D ao), just has to be kept constantly in mind. It is now appropriate to indicate the way in which mu is claimed to be related to the everyday world.
Mu and the Everyday World Philosophers in both E ast and West have proposed a number of possible ways in which the Many – the everyday world we inhabit, the world of mutable individuals in constantly changing relations, coming into and passing out of existence – are related to the One – the ineffable unified reality without which (it has regularly been claimed) there could be no Many. Such solutions include appearance; selfmanifestation; causation and emanation. Philosophers have variously conceived of the O ne as transcending (being distinct from) the Many, and also as being immanent in the Many. O thers, like Nagarjuna, sought to show that all rationalist accounts of this relation (such as those just listed) lead to antinomies, and that the O ne can only be apprehended intuitively, not by rational cognition at all.12 T he Zen solution is arguably the most radical and intuitively one of the most difficult to understand, namely that the One and the Many are in a certain sense identical; the samsara and nirvana are one and the same. Nirvana is not a state attainable only after death – or, rather, many deaths; nor is it some other dimension to which we somehow transmigrate, some sort of heaven. In Zen thought, nirvana is the condition attained by those whose experience is enriched by the awareness of the identity of the phenomenal world with mu. T o the enlightened, it is here and now; it is the samsara, but viewed from the standpoint of one who has attained the prajňa which comes with satori. It is to be stressed that the claim of identity being made here is not one which satisfies Leibniz’ Law, namely that, for any x and for any y, if x and y are identical, whatever is true of x is true of y and vice versa. Indeed, since one term of the proposed identity is mu (which is non-dual) and the other is the world of individuals, the terms of the proposed identity relation could not be more dissimilar. T he formulation of the samsara–nirvana relation devised by Nishida late in life, of absolutely contradictory identity, gives a better indication of the paradox which is couched in this claim. Insofar as it can be verbalized rather than experienced, 12
������������������������������������������������� A ll these options are analysed in Copleston 1982.
Nishida and Western Philosophy
14
what is being claimed is that mu is fully present in every individual, which thus has properties which in A ristotelian terms are incompatible. T his view of the one/many relation is of considerable antiquity, being the central doctrine of the Perfection of Wisdom sutras referred to above, written down between perhaps the first century bce and the third or fourth century ce . For western readers, these sutras are, when first encountered, some of the most baffling documents in the religious literature of the world, since they embody a denial of one of the foundational laws of western A ristotelian logic: the law of non-contradiction. It seems that the spiritual experience on which these sutras are based, and to which they seek to lead those who read them, is such that it cannot be expressed in terms which satisfy this fundamental principle of A ristotelian logic. Understanding the doctrine of the identity of samsara and nirvana takes us to the heart of Zen. T o grasp fully what an extraordinary idea this is, it is appropriate to approach it via one of the cornerstones of B uddhist thought: the doctrine of pratītya samutpāda, variously translated as relationality, relational origination, dependent co-origination or dependent origination. (I shall use the last of these renderings, all of which, as usual in such cases, have advantages and disadvantages.) Intuitively grasped in the Perfection of Wisdom sutras, the doctrine of dependent origination was given its classic philosophical formulation by Nagarjuna, especially in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. T he overall aim of Nagarjuna’s arguments in this work is to establish that the unreflective belief that the individuals which make up the phenomenal world are real (a basic assertion, as has been said, of A ristotelian metaphysics) leads always to antinomies and has to be abandoned as false. T he positive thesis Nagarjuna wants to establish is that all things are (in his sense of the term) empty: the doctrine of mu or śūnyatā is the doctrine of dependent origination viewed from another angle. In order to make his arguments work, Nagarjuna uses the B uddhist presupposition that, to count as substantial or real, to have svabhāva (a real nature or own-being), an entity must be able to exist on its own. T hat is taken to be equivalent to being enduring, permanent, without change, and not subject to birthand-death. In other words, Nagarjuna equates having svabhāva with being a selfexistent substance. Granted as stiff a test for being real as this, Nagarjuna can proceed to argue that nothing in the world is real in this sense and that all things are empty, in other words unreal in his sense: all things come into being and pass away as the result of the interactions of other temporary beings, the process being assumed to be endless – that is, without end and also without beginning.13 A typical example of Nagarjuna’s dialectical method is his analysis of the concept of causation. He considers three possible positions: firstly, the thesis that cause and effect are identical or that the effect is included in the cause; secondly, that cause and effect are non-identical or that the effect is distinct from the cause; and, thirdly, the view that an effect is regarded as a consequence of a pre-existing cause in virtue of an external combination of conditions. Nagarjuna argues that all Svabhāva is discussed in ch. 15 of the kārikā, Nagarjuna 1991, pp. 228–34.
13
Nishida’s Starting Point
15
three views lead to contradictions. In the first case, if an effect is already part of the cause, then it cannot be produced; in the second, if the conditions which give rise to an effect are truly distinct from it, then there is no reason why any particular effect should follow (hence anything could cause anything); and the third case must succumb to the objections just advanced against the first two.14 Nagarjuna’s goal is to show that all the possible rational analyses of a given concept – in this case, causality – result in incoherence, and this is taken to legitimate the conclusion that no intelligible conceptualization of causality is possible. Nagarjuna applies this dialectical method to other important concepts, aiming by the cumulative effect of his arguments to show that our normal dualistic mode of conceptual thought gives rise to endless contradictions. T his procedure is far from nihilistic in intent, however: once he has shaken our confidence in our ordinary conceptual way of thinking and we are less attached to it, the way is open for the non-conceptual realization of mu/śūnyatā, which is his ultimate goal. It is not only Nagarjuna’s arguments that are of importance in the present context, but also his method. Typically, he will consider the affirmation of a given position; then its negation; then the affirmation of the position together with its negation; and, finally, the negation of both the affirmation and its negation. There are manifest echoes of this way of proceeding in Nishida’s thought at various points, and this goes some way towards explaining why he felt at home with the thought of H egel. Nishida uses this sort of dialectics from time to time, and it seems to me almost certain that the ultimate source is Nagarjuna. A nother key concept considered by Nagarjuna is time,15 and it is appropriate to note the conception of time involved in Zen. T here is a special focus, in B uddhism in general, on the importance of the present moment – a focus shared, unsurprisingly, by Zen. O ne of the most important qualities a Zen aspirant must cultivate is mindfulness. T o be mindful is to focus attention on the contents of the present moment – thoughts, sensations, emotions – indeed on all types of experience. Importantly, this focus is characterized by a spirit of complete detachment. T he contents of the mind are allowed to arise and dissipate (so to speak) as they please, just as they occur. Mindfulness is to be contrasted with the desire to cling on to certain experiences (and their causes) and to reject others, for neither the clinging nor the rejection can be achieved and the failure to achieve them is maddening, a prime cause of the dukkha from which the B uddha sought to free us. T he doctrine of mindfulness is coherent with the view that time is not a flowing medium independent of us and that what there is is better characterized as consisting of moment-states. T his itself coheres with the closely related doctrine of anatta, the absence of any abiding or enduring self within the realm of the conditioned. (It is not surprising that, as will be seen later, Nishida includes in his mature philosophy the claim that the self and the world must be described as a ‘continuity of discontinuity.’) Further, in this philosophy, it is entirely coherent to 14
������������������ Ibid., pp. 105–17. ����������������� Ibid., pp. 275–9.
15
16
Nishida and Western Philosophy
regard each moment as timeless or eternal. T his very sharp focus on the present, and the intuition that is has unlimited depth, together with the associated view that evenly-flowing clock time is an artifice, predispose Nishida to be attracted to western philosophies which take a comparable view of experience. T urning to Zen in particular, it is appropriate to refer to one of the major textual sources for Zen ideas about time: the Uji (Being–Time) fascicle of Zen master Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō (Treasury of the Eye of the True Dharma), a fascicle dating from 1240.16 O rdinarily we absorb the conceptualization of time embodied in our language. Generally such a conceptualization represents time as independent of us, evenly flowing, continuous, and unidirectional (it has an arrow). This is coherent with metaphysical assumptions about change, standardly conceived as being predicated of individuals which (or who) continue to exist through the changes, unless the latter are radical enough to destroy the identity of the individuals in question (according to the usual criteria for such identity). Zen teaching regards all these assertions as examples of avidya and seeks to free us from them. T he fundamental Zen assertion is that there is no absolute time: time is not (as it were) a long corridor in which all events are laid out in a unidirectional sequence – or, as Dōgen puts it, ‘past and present time doesn’t pile up, doesn’t accumulate in a row’.17 T here is no entity or framework denoted by the term ‘time’ which is distinct from the events which occur in it. T ime and things in time (events, etc.) are completely non-dual. Winter is not a time in which it tends to be cold, trees lose their leaves, and so on: these events are the time called winter. T ime is not something additional to the phenomena which occur within it: only grammatical necessity makes us frame sentences which make it look as if there is a something we call time which is discrete from events. Further, clock time is purely an abstraction, made for our convenience, from the real or living time constituted by events. B elief in the reality of clock time is an instance of attachment to concepts, and so an exemplification of avidya. Dōgen puts the point as follows: T he mountains are time, the oceans are time too. If they were not time, the mountains and oceans could not be. Y ou should not think there is no time in the immediate present of the mountains and oceans. If time disintegrates, mountains and oceans too disintegrate; if time is indestructible, mountains and oceans too are indestructible.18 16 References �������������� to Dōgen’s ������������������������������������������������������������������� thought can be found throughout Nishida’s works, and there are undoubted affinities between some of his ideas and those of the Soto master. For a summary, see H eine’s introduction to A be 1992, p. 2. 17 �������������������� Cleary 1986, p. 106. 18 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid. I have deleted the translator’s italics from this passage which in general indicate passages in Chinese in Dōgen’s text: in a way which deconstructionists have lately claimed as their novelty, Dōgen uses a whole arsenal of linguistic devices to shake up the consciousness of his readers and to stop them from fixing their attention on the text of what he has to say.
Nishida’s Starting Point
17
B y combining the two Japanese characters here romanized as uji, Dōgen means to assert, as has been noted, the absolute non-duality of time and phenomena.19 T he doctrine of the identity of being and time (or becoming) is of course another way of stating the doctrine of the identity of samsara and nirvana. When things are viewed in this light, there follows the (at first sight) startling assertion that mu cannot just be atemporal or eternal in the manner of a transcendent absolute or god. In the language of western philosophy, being and becoming are the same; in Zen terms, it follows that nirvana cannot just be timeless, since it is realized here and now by those who have attained the prajňa which comes with enlightenment: as Dōgen says, ‘even enlightenment and nirvana are only being-time which is merely the appearance of coming and going’.20 Mu is (as has been stated) prior to all distinctions, including that between the temporal and the eternal. T o have realized mu is to have attained nirvana, and so nirvana must in a sense be beyond both time and eternity; equally, it can be said to include them both without being in any way constrained or limited by them. A fter satori, samsaric time is experienced in conjunction with awareness of mu, though what it is like to experience time in this way is extremely difficult to describe. A s so often in descriptions of Zen experience, our ordinary language is here manifestly under considerable strain: what is being indicated in these difficult sayings is, and is acknowledged to be, at the limits of the sayable. A be Masao makes a helpful comment as follows: if the samsara and nirvana are the same, then eternity must be present below (as it were) every moment. E very moment has an infinite depth: eternity is realized in the midst of time, not at the end of it.21 It must be the case that, after satori, time -consciousness is radically modified so as to include an awareness of the infinite depth of what was before, simply, each moment in the unidirectional movement of a homogeneous time. Being–time has a property which Dōgen calls ‘passageless –passage’ (kyōraku), and a consideration of his remarks on this property will draw attention to another counter-intuitive but important aspect of the Zen philosophy of time. In Uji, Dōgen notes: ‘That is, it [being–time] passes from today to tomorrow, it passes from today to yesterday, it passes from yesterday to today, it passes from today to today, it passes from tomorrow to tomorrow.’22 What is notable here is that this passageless passage is not unidirectional: it passes both from yesterday to today and (counter-intuitively) from today to yesterday. T his is a hint of a further aspect of time consciousness post-satori, namely that time’s arrow has in a certain
19
���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� T he matter is made more complex by the fact that these two characters can also be read in Japanese as aru toki, meaning ‘sometimes’: once again, Dōgen is making use of the possibilities of language to shake up our ordinary habits of conceptualization, in this case by introducing a significant ambiguity. Cf. Dōgen 1997, p. 39. 20 �������������������� Cleary 1986, p. 107. 21 ����������������� A be 1997, p. 168. 22 �������������������� Cleary 1986, p. 106.
Nishida and Western Philosophy
18
sense been overcome. We can approach what is being asserted via some remarks in another (undated) fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō: Shōji (Birth and Death): It is a mistake to assume that one moves from birth to death. B irth, being one point in time, has a before and after; therefore in Buddhism birth is called unborn. E xtinction too, being one point in time, also has before and after, so it is said that extinction is nonextinction. T herefore when birth comes it is just birth, and when extinction comes it is just extinction. In facing birth and extinction, don’t reject, don’t long.23
It is to be noted that Dōgen claims we are making a mistake if we make the commonsense assumption that we are moving from birth to death. T he Zen position is rather that we are in a process of living–dying, that is, that we are living fully and dying fully at every moment. T his process of living–dying is held to be without either beginning or end. B ehind these remarks lies the revolution in time awareness which satori brings. What we ordinarily take to be moments which form a continuum is then realized to be a collection of elements unlinked and independent – every one from every other (passageless) – but eternal and of infinite depth. What is experienced in satori is nikon, the absolute present. E ach and every moment is both a beginning and an end: time begins and ends with each moment. S ince time is not a continuous, unidirectional movement but a series of independent moments, it follows that these moments have no special order and can move in any direction: nikon has no arrow. H ence the process of living–dying can be cut off by the realization of mu in satori. When this happens, time is transcended. A be comments that, when this occurs, one can grasp or embrace the entire process of living–dying without beginning and without end and thus can reverse the process. T he unidirectionality of time is thus overcome and the reversibility of time is realized from this bottomless depth of eternity.24
T he past/present/future division is a construction of the surface ego and a result of its preoccupations. The true self, to which Dōgen refers as the ‘Self prior to the universe sprouting any sign of itself’ has no preoccupations and (so to speak) it experiences time from the infinite depth of the absolute present. Zen writers often speak of the interpenetration of all times in all directions, and this is a way of attempting to indicate this post-satori grasp of time. What we ordinarily take to be passage is in reality passageless: the only secure experience of time we have is the present. 23
�������������� Ibid., p. 122. ����������������� A be 1997, p. 167.
24
Nishida’s Starting Point
19
T wo more points can be made about this conception of time before moving on. The first is that it is this conception of each moment as being independent and of infinite depth that is present in the haiku of Matsuo Bashō and in the other great masters of this form. T o the consciousness of the enlightened, all reality is manifest in what we ordinarily conceive of as a single, momentary event – the frog’s jump into a pond; the sight of thin old cat; an old scarecrow in a field or whatever it might be. T he brevity of the haiku form is, accordingly, no obstacle to the achievement of the prized quality of resonant depth, of poetry which lingers in the mind, slowly unfolding a significance without limit. The haiku form, indeed, with its necessary focus on the momentary, is perfectly adapted to this view of reality. A haiku describes the encounter of eternity with time. S econdly, the contention that ordinary, successive time consciousness is superficial and that the present is of infinite depth is by no means a doctrine unique to Zen, but occurs in other mystical or transcendentalist writings which exhibit a comparable logical pattern of beliefs. T o take one example from many, it occurs in the thought of E merson. A ccording to him, direct experience of reality (which he calls the revelation of the S oul, or of the O ne) abolishes ordinary time (and space) awareness. T hose who ask for a description of the mode of immortality of the soul, or for the state of the soul in heaven, he comments, are wholly misconceiving what spiritual life means, assimilating it to sublunary conceptions of time. A ny person who requires a defence of the doctrine of immortality through argument, he contends, has already fallen: No inspired man ever asks this question or condescends to these evidences. For the soul is true to itself, and the man in whom it is shed abroad cannot wander from the present, which is infinite, to a future which would be finite.25
Zen masters and others, like E merson, who put forward a similar point of view report this conception of time as an empirical matter, but it is also a matter of logic. In order to play the role it has to, the O ne must have a non-temporal mode of being: it must stand wholly outside time, or it would simply become another temporal entity requiring an origin. A ccordingly, whatever awareness of it we have must be radically different from the ordinary experience of unidirectional, successive time: hence the ‘timeless moment’ referred to by so many mystical writers. Nishida, like others of similar persuasion, has to regard ordinary time consciousness as only part of the story, and is predisposed to find congenial philosophies which question its commonsense status as the only possible mode of awareness of time.
����������������������������������� E merson, ‘T he O ver-S oul’, in idem, Essays 1954, p. 137.
25
20
Nishida and Western Philosophy
Some Aspects of Zen Epistemology T he issues I need to focus on in this section are not those that have tended to form the staple of epistemology in the western philosophical tradition. Zen thinkers have not tended to exercise themselves over defining knowledge, for example, or relating it to belief, or analysing the latter; nor are they greatly concerned with issues of the veracity of perception or with advancing (or combating) sceptical arguments such as those set out in D escartes’ First Meditation. T he reason for the absence of these topics from Zen thought is not inability on the part of Zen thinkers, but the fact that the fundamental doctrines of Zen dictate that the focus of interest is elsewhere. What Zen thinkers are principally concerned with is the question of the role and limits of reason, inseparably linked in Zen with questions of the nature of the self and of what one has to call levels of consciousness (while being careful not to read any ontological commitments into spatial metaphors like the one involved in the term ‘level’). T he question of the role and limits of reason arises directly from the doctrines of mu and satori. T he emptiness denoted by mu, as has been noted, is said to be prior to all discriminations. It cannot be conceptualized, and all the conceptual statements made about it by Zen teachers are, strictly speaking, false. (A s has been said, they are justifiable simply as unavoidable means by which to help the unenlightened on the path to enlightenment.) Moreover, rational thought – our ordinary ways of getting about in the world by dividing it up into individuals standing in specific relations to one another – is, by and large, an obstacle on the path to enlightenment because it deepens our habitual condition of avidya (‘ignorance’). T he kind of ignorance indicated by this term is not ignorance of specific areas of useful knowledge, or ignorance of identifiable beliefs (scriptural truths, for instance), but a ubiquitous lacuna present in all our normal thought. Avidya is the condition of those who do not experience the presence of mu in their daily life – note that this is precisely a matter of experience and not merely one of understanding. S ince emptiness is beyond description, it is beyond understanding also. B ecause rational thought is so spectacularly successful at allowing us to get about in the world in our daily lives, we tend too readily to assume that only such thought can give us access to reality. T his attitude can take the form of the philosophical varieties of rationalism, which dismiss any non-rational forms of experience as incapable of giving us knowledge of the truth. S uch doctrines are, from the Zen point of view, the high road leading directly away from enlightenment. S ome of the best-known aspects of Zen in the West are meditational techniques such as zazen (‘seated meditation’) and the use of the special mental exercises called koans, of which H akuin’s ‘what is the sound of one hand clapping?’ is the most frequently quoted.26 A koan is a type of problem which is insoluble through 26 ������� H akuin Yabukoji (1753), in Y ampolski 1971, p. 164. T he fame of this koan has brought it about that this work also has the alternative title Sekishu no onjo = ‘T he S ound of a S ingle H and’. T here is a full discussion of the use of koans in Miura and S asaki 1966.
Nishida’s Starting Point
21
the use of reason: it has no rational solution, and that is precisely where its value in Zen training lies. S o long as a Zen aspirant tries to solve it through the use of rational thought, it remains impenetrable: the only way to ‘solve’ a koan is to cease to think conceptually at all. T he goal of all these techniques is precisely to bring ratiocination to a dead stop, to its breaking point: once we stop ratiocinating, it is held, satori can occur and emptiness, ever-present but masked by rational thought, can be directly experienced. R eason, in Zen, is said to be limited in application to the samsara, and has to be overcome if emptiness is to be experienced directly. A dherence to rationalism prevents a complete grasp of what there is. O perating in the realm of individuals (the samsara), reason proceeds in characteristic ways to arrive at the segment of the truth to which it can give us access: careful gathering of observations; weighing of evidence; construction of arguments, and so forth. It does not, and does not intend to, grasp its objects without recourse to these means. B y contrast, satori involves none of this, and is characterized as a direct grasping of emptiness, though one has to be careful to remember that in satori there is no individual left to do the grasping. Predictably, therefore, one finds in Zen a preference for forms of awareness that are thus direct, and in general the term used to classify them is intuition (Nishida’s term is chokkan). E ven in the West, this term tends to be reserved for forms of comprehension which somehow bypass the more plodding forms of reasoning: leaps made we know not how, which lead to new forms of understanding. T he Zen usage of the term is analogous but not exactly the same, since in the western usages intuitions generally result in new and illuminating forms of conceptualization and do not occur in the context of the metaphysics of mu. A further and closely related aspect of these doctrines is in the thesis that there is at least one mode of awareness which is not cognitive, namely satori. Satori is a non-conceptual grasping or realization of mu, held to be entirely authoritative and psychologically unquestionable: it is the centre that holds. It is also held to be totally complete and wholly adequate. A s has been mentioned, however, satori cannot be said to be a state of mind of an individual, not a gasping of an object by a subject, and this leads us to a consideration of the central Zen doctrine of the nature of the true self or, as it is strikingly put, your original face before you were born. O ur everyday experience is based at the deepest level on the distinction we make between our self and everything else in the universe, the not-self, and this distinction, unsurprisingly, is reflected in the basic linguistic distinction between the persons of verbs. This everyday self has two principal aspects. The first is what one can call the primal nominative, the ‘I’ which has the experiences we call ours. T his ‘I’, which makes possible the transcendental unity of apperception, is the condition of self-awareness but can never itself be introspected: it can never become itself an object of the mode of individual awareness of the world it makes possible. T he aspect of the self which is introspectible is the accusative, the ‘me’ which has the emotions, thoughts, memories, and so forth which I call mine and which make up my life. T hese two elements together make up the self of everyday
22
Nishida and Western Philosophy
experience. A principal contention of Zen thought is that this self, and the self/notself distinction derived from it (like all conceptual distinctions), are non-ultimate: the assumption we ordinarily make that they are ultimate is a central instance of the condition of spiritual blindness called avidya. A t the moment of satori, this self falls away and what is revealed is the non-cognitive awareness described at various points above. T his can be described not only as mu but also as the Unborn (fusho) or the B uddha-mind (busshin). T his B uddha-mind is regarded in Zen as our ‘true’ self or (as has been said) our original face before we were born. In a sense, to call this B uddha-mind a self or face of any description is misleading, since it is not individual in any meaningful sense of that term: it is a non-cognitive, non-individual awareness. O f all the terms for it used in Zen, B uddha-mind is preferable, since it at least avoids obvious and inaccurate connotations of any sort of individual selfhood. For present purposes, what matters is to fasten on the basic point that Zen involves the doctrine that consciousness has layers or hidden depths which are obscured in standard self-conscious experience. R ealization of these depths is enlightenment.
Some Further Philosophical Aspects of Zen T o conclude this short survey of the elements of Zen which are of philosophical interest in the present context, it is appropriate to look at the following topics: what it is like to experience the world after enlightenment; the implications of Zen in ethics and aesthetics, the former including the issue of the status and importance of the everyday, historical world of the samsara; and the Zen attitude to death. T o be enlightened is to be aware of mu or busshin in all of one’s experience, and it is natural to ask if any hint can be given of what it is like to live like this. A s we have seen, the Zen doctrine claims that the samsara and nirvana are identical (the samsara–nirvana distinction, like all others, does not apply to mu) and so living in a state of enlightenment is something that must occur here and now, not in some post-mortem or otherwise future state. B ecause the non-ultimacy of the everyday ego has been experientially realized and its longings eliminated, the central change is that all phenomena are experienced absolutely, without any form of attachment. T o convey what this is like, many Zen masters borrow an image from Fazang’s treatise Return to the Source Consciousness, a work originating in the K egon (Chinese Huayan, ‘Flower Garland’) school of B uddhism but popular within the Zen community. T his image compares the enlightened mind to a perfectly calm ocean:
Nishida’s Starting Point
23
When delusion ends, the mind is clear and myriad forms equally appear; it is like the ocean, where waves are created by the wind – when the wind stops, the water of the ocean grows still and clear, reflecting all images.27
When the individual mind (the wind) falls away after enlightenment, consciousness (the ocean) becomes absolutely clear: it is totally unpossessive and merely reflects what impinges on it like a mirror. O rdinary experience is a distorting lens: the world is seen from the point of view of an individual with interests and desires, and such a point of view is partial. A fter enlightenment, desire and, with it, partiality have ceased: hence the complete detachment and total clarity ascribed to the experience of the enlightened. T ogether with this absolutely clear and impartial vision comes the capacity for an entirely spontaneous and always appropriate response to whatever situations present themselves (and it is well worth remembering that, if an appropriate response involves conceptualizing the situation, then that is what will occur). S uch responses are effortless and automatic: it is as if all responses become as sure and unhesitating as reflexes are. To give just a faint idea of what this is like, the great Zen master B ankei (1622–93 ce ) uses the example of peripheral perception. In ordinary perception, attention is almost invariably focused on one component of the experiential field; yet, while this takes place, elements of that field not thus focused upon are still being discerned. S uppose we are listening to one of B ankei’s dharma talks (sermons) and we are attending to what he says: while this is going on we still discriminate noises: dogs barking, birds singing, doors closing and so on. T his peripheral perception is both effortless and accurate, and in B ankei’s view manifests the working of the B uddha-mind: ‘Y ou are able to hear and distinguish sounds when they occur without consciously intending to hear them because you’re listening by means of Unborn B uddha-mind.’28 For the enlightened, all experience is thus undeliberative, effortless and appropriate. A s in the closely related D aoist analogue to this condition, it is hardly appropriate to speak of such responses as actions at all, for actions properly called so require an individual agent with an intention, and these conditions do not apply to the responses of the enlightened to their circumstances: the D aoist classics speak instead of wu-wei or actionless activity, and this description applies exactly to what Zen masters have in mind on this subject.29 O ne can see why ideas of this kind appealed so deeply to the samurai, since such sureness of response is a huge advantage in combat – especially in the lightning-fast, close-quarters combat �������� Fazang, Return to the Source Consciousness, in Cleary 1983, p. 152. Dōgen devoted a fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō to expounding this image, Kai-in zammai (Ocean Seal Concentration). 28 �������� B ankei, Ryumon-ji Sermons, in Waddell 1984, p. 36. 29 ���������������������������� O n the D aoist conception of wu-wei or actionless activity, cf. Wilkinson 1997, pp. xii ff., and Dao de jing, chs 2, 27 and 43. 27
Nishida and Western Philosophy
24
of classical Japanese times, where a split second of hesitation resulting from deliberation could mean death.30 B ankei comments on this in a letter addressed to a martial arts practitioner called Gesso, a devotee of the yari or Japanese lance. A nother way, mentioned above, of describing enlightenment is the condition of mu-shin or ‘no-mind’. B ankei comments: ‘In performing a movement, if you act with no-mind, the action will spring forth of itself.’31 For the Zen adept, combat, like any other form of what we would ordinarily call action, is a manifestation of pure spontaneity: the arrow shoots itself, because there is no ‘I’, no individual consciousness, left to shoot it. S uch a condition is at the limits of describability in ordinary language, as B ankei’s description shows: When, without thinking and without acting deliberately, you manifest the Unborn, you won’t have any fixed form. When you are without fixed form, no opponent will exist for you in the whole land. Not holding onto anything, not relying one-sidedly on anything, there is no ‘you’ and no ‘enemy.’ Whatever comes you just respond, with no traces left behind.32
No less startling than this condition of perfectly apt spontaneity of response is the key implication of Zen in the area of ethical theory, a further indication of how remote these ideas are from anything in the mainstream of western thought. We can approach the main point via a much quoted comment by the Zen master Nansen recorded in Case 19 of the great koan collection the Mumonkan (The Pass without a Gate). Joshu (788–897 ce ), later himself to be a prominent ch’an/Zen master of the T ang dynasty, asked Nansen (748–834 ce ) for advice on the path to E nlightenment. Nansen replied: T he path does not belong to the perception world, neither does it belong to the nonperception world. Cognition is a delusion and noncognition is senseless. If you want to reach the true path beyond doubt, place yourself in the same freedom as the sky. Y ou name it neither good nor bad.33
In this passage, Nansen is indicating that nirvana or awareness of mu is beyond all dualisms: perception/non-perception; cognition/non-cognition; and, importantly in the present context, good/evil. It is easy for westerners to fall into the error of assuming that nirvana is a summum bonum in the manner of western moral systems: contemplation of the Forms, identity with the will of god, or whatever it may be. Mu is prior to the good/evil distinction: paradoxically, it includes them 30
����������������������������������������������������� O n Zen and the samurai, see e.g. S uzuki 1959, ch. iv. �������� B ankei, Instructions to Layman Gesso, in H askel 1984, p. 138. 32 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid.; also Waddell 1984, pp. 138–9. These ideas lie behind the training described by E ugen H errigel in his well-known book on Zen and archery (1953). T he ideas can be closely paralleled in Daoist sources; see e.g. Zhuangzi, in Burton Watson 1968, p. 94. 33 ������������������ R eps 1971, p. 110. 31
Nishida’s Starting Point
25
both and both emerge from it. Mu does not give any type of priority to good over evil, any more than to being over not-being or to life over death. Mu is manifest alike in all these dualisms.34 T he moral codes followed by the unenlightened have their use, of course, for those who know only the samsara. Y et they also involve considerable potential as causes for strife: become wedded to these distinctions and, as B ankei often put it, the Buddha-mind is transformed into a fighting spirit. It might seem that loving good and hating evil is a necessary condition for living a moral life. From the Zen point of view, however, such attachments are like all attachments: they reinforce the ego and so prevent enlightenment. A s B ankei put it: Y ou think that good Means hating what is bad. What’s bad is T he hating mind itself. Good, you say, Means doing good B ad indeed T he mind that says so.35
H owever, it does not follow from these assertions that Zen licenses any form of conduct. T hose who are enlightened continue to live in the world – indeed there is no other world in which they can live – and their conduct is spontaneously and appropriately such as to promote the enlightenment of others. A n important part of the realization of this goal is the relief of suffering, and a Zen adept can always be relied upon to manifest compassion, this once again being a spontaneous movement of the spirit on the part of the enlightened. T his is the Zen form of the Mahayana ideal of the bodhisattva (literally, ‘[one who has] the mind for enlightenment’), a saint who does not withdraw from the world but continues to work in it for the good of all. T his ideal itself presupposes the basic Zen doctrine of the identity of the samsara and nirvana, and this doctrine has a consequence which it is appropriate to notice here, namely that Zen does not involve any doctrines asserting the unreality or unimportance of the samsara or (in Christian terms) of this world. Zen thinkers (Nishida included) deny that Zen is a form of mysticism.36 It is not other-worldly in the sense in which, for example, both Platonism and Christianity 34
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� It should be clear that Zen is not a form of Manichaeism either, with two co-basic principles, one of good and one of evil. Mu is more basic than either and the source of both. 35 �������� B ankei. Honshin no uta/Song of the Original Mind (1653), in H askel 1984, p. 128. 36 �������������� E .g. Nishida, NRWV, p. 115.
26
Nishida and Western Philosophy
can be said to be: there is nothing in Zen corresponding to the realm of Forms or to heaven. A s has been stated repeatedly, nirvana for the enlightened is the here and now experienced as a manifestation of mu. It follows that the samsara is not treated by Zennists as a thing of naught. O n the contrary, it is the arena in which the enlightened must seek to promote the enlightenment of others, since no other arena exists in Zen ontology. It will be clear from what has been said so far that Zen is a remarkably undogmatic system. It does not have a creed which has to be rehearsed or rituals which have to be adhered to; it does not even have an invariant method of training – the Zen spirit simply responds appropriately to whatever situation obtains. It is remarkably unprescriptive, and this is one of the qualities which have allowed it to have so widespread an influence on the culture, art and aesthetics of Japan. A gain, it is part of the metaphysics of Zen that mu is fully present in everything, and from this it follows that there is no area of culture, from martial art to garden design, in which it cannot manifest itself. T here is no type of art which it cannot inform, and no subject-matter which is either specially suitable or unsuitable for art or for practices with a strongly aesthetic content. T he Zen spirit can manifest itself in anything done or made by those who live in an awareness of mu. T here is a great body literature on Zen and the arts of Japan dealing with the manifestations of Zen in the tea ceremony, in the noh theatre, in the forms of Japanese literature and painting – and there is no need to add to it here. More appropriate is to notice the effects of the Zen belief on the aesthetics of Japan. T his subject will be treated at greater length in later chapters, when I will be dealing with the aesthetics which forms part of Nishida’s philosophy, but it is appropriate here to notice some basic points. In philosophies like Zen, where the phenomenal world is held to be, as it were, a surface only, covering an ordinarily hidden depth which is apparently limitless, certain aesthetic virtues tend to be regarded as important, principal among which is profundity or aesthetic depth. A esthetic objects which are profound are those which we find it impossible to sum up: they go on reverberating in our minds throughout life, exhibiting an inexhaustible capacity to suggest new and rewarding interpretations, revealing seemingly endless new vistas of meaning or significance. When reality itself is assumed to have infinite depth, it tends to be the case that works of art which have an analogous quality are highly valued. It is so in the classic Indian tradition of aesthetics, where dhvani or endless resonance is taken to be the defining property of poetic language; and this is equally true of the aesthetics of Japan, where the quality of yūgen – infinite depth – is highly prized (it is the goal of the noh theatre in the aesthetics of Zeami, for example).37 A gain, other important Japanese aesthetic virtue terms manifestly reflect the Zen world-view, for example the untranslatable term sabi. Works of art with sabi suggest a sense of the transitoriness of all things, tinged with sadness and combined with spontaneity 37 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� S ee Zeami 1984. O n the concept of profundity in oriental aesthetics, see Wilkinson 2006.
Nishida’s Starting Point
27
and a feeling of deep illimitable quietude. Sabi reflects the atmosphere generated when some individual thing fulfils its transient destiny in the vast expanse of the universe. Sabi is also said to have to do with the merging of the temporal and the eternal, of the mutable and the immutable: it involves seeing the infinite and eternal in the here and now, and so it is akin to satori. Manifestly and unsurprisingly, these (and other) aesthetic virtue terms are deeply rooted in the metaphysics of Zen, and reflect its values and beliefs in a form appropriate to aesthetic evaluation. They are different from their western analogues precisely because they manifest, with great exactness, a culture radically different from that of the mainstream western tradition.38 T he beliefs, attitudes and values constitutive of Zen noted in this chapter inform every aspect of the human condition, including the Zen response to death. A s A be points out, both Platonism and Christianity take the problem of death very seriously, and their solution is to argue that life is prolonged through the immortality of the soul.39 In Platonism, at the time of the death of the body the soul returns to the realm of Forms, and in Christianity individuals are resurrected to eternal life, with some form of individuation of the body. B oth approaches have in common the assumption that the life/death duality is real, an ontological ultimate, and the denial of the view that death is the absolute extinction of life. T he assumption of the reality of the life/death dualism is denied in Zen, as indeed is the ultimate reality of all distinctions: as we have seen repeatedly, mu is prior to all distinctions. Nirvana, accordingly, is not immortality or living-without-dying. Nirvana is being free from both birth and death in the sense of being entirely unattached to either, and so free from either desire for life or fear of death. B oth life and death are realized to emerge from the all-embracing mu. A s B ankei puts it: ‘When the time comes for [an enlightened person’s] physical elements to disperse in death, he will give himself completely to the dispersal and die without regret or attachment.’40 T his is not the same as the stoical acceptance of death on the part of those who believe in the absoluteness of death and who disbelieve in immortality of any kind: it is absolute indifference to death, deriving from the conviction that the life/death distinction ultimately has no meaning.
Conclusion T he above sketch of some of the principal points of philosophical doctrine involved in Zen has been necessary for two closely related reasons. The first, 38 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� O n the way in which the goal of nirvana or one of its close analogues shapes aesthetic thought, see Wilkinson 2001. O n the general issue of how the pursuit of nirvana (etc) shapes a culture, see Wilkinson 2003. 39 ��������������������� A be 1997, pp. 111–38. 40 �������� B ankei, Ryumon-ji Sermons, in Waddell 1984, p. 56.
28
Nishida and Western Philosophy
already mentioned, is that these ideas are Nishida’s starting point and constitute the invariant core of his thought, even if he rarely mentions them explicitly – and indeed, writing for a Japanese audience, he had no need to do so. It remains the case, however, that, unless these are ideas are understood, Nishida’s reactions to western philosophies, both positive and negative, are not fully understandable. T he second point is this: the subject of the present essay is Nishida’s reaction to the western tradition of philosophy, a tradition which he spent his life exploring and reflecting upon. Now when persons formed in one culture meet a radically different culture, one of the most natural of reactions is to try to find in the nonnative culture some idea or phenomenon which looks familiar, a point d’appui, a starting point: something recognizable, seemingly comprehensible or in some way culturally congenial. Perhaps one discovers, in the fullness of time and with deepening comprehension of the non-native culture, that this similarity was more apparent than real; yet without the initial point d’appui it is hard to see how the process of coming to understand a culture radically different from one’s own could begin. T his is one area of human understanding where the S chleiermacher–D ilthey notion of the hermeneutic circle fits very well. One can see in Nishida’s developing reflections on western thought the hermeneutic process of gradual deepening of understanding exemplified very fully. Granted the Zen starting point set out above, it is not difficult to see why Nishida, in his exploration of western philosophy, should have been predisposed to be sympathetic to philosophies which embody one or more of the following characteristics: a. the view that standard human awareness – which, in K antian terms, is subject to the forms of intuition, to conceptualization, to the transcendental unity of apperception, and produces judgements – is not the only possible form of experience; b. the view that another mode of experience is possible. S uch a mode is more fundamental than, or in some way prior to, standard experience. S uch a mode of experience is normally hidden from us but can be realized in special circumstances. It is presupposed that human experience can be characterized as having layers of different degrees of depth, which can be revealed in certain types of experience. T he depth which consciousness can manifest is without discernible limit. T his general outlook has an important correlative in the area of aesthetics, in a preference for works of art which manifest profundity, which in some way hint at, or stimulate, experience of the ordinarily hidden depths of consciousness; c. the view that conceptual ratiocination does not reveal this deeper stratum of experience but rather conceals it, and that, to realize this stratum, some more direct or intuitive mode of apprehension is needed and is possible. T his is not simple irrationalism, but rather the doctrine that reason has a
Nishida’s Starting Point
29
limited sphere of application, being restricted to standard awareness; d. the view that the ego of everyday experience, the self which exhibits the transcendental unity of apperception and which has the experiences I call mine, is among the constructions of reason. T o suppose that the experience of such an ego is the only possible mode of conscious awareness is false: a mode of non-cognitive awareness which does not include a self/not-self distinction is possible. T here is a true or real self which is the ultimate reality, the unifying power of the universe. T his self cannot be a content of the consciousness of an ego, but it is possible to come to be in accord with it. S uch accord cannot be arrived at by thinking, but only through what in Zen is called non-thinking; e. the view that our ordinary conception of time is mistaken: time is unreflectively taken to be independent of us and of events, evenly flowing and continuous; but special forms of experience reveal that this is not the case. T his is closely related to the belief that our ordinary conception of the self (described above) is also mistaken. T he idea of an enduring self which in some sense transcends an objective world is complementary to the view that time is as described above;41 f. the view that the law of non-contradiction is not sacrosanct; g. the related view that dichotomies often taken to be ultimate – self/not-self; mind/body; good/evil; life/death; one/many – are not so, but can be shown to be instances of some more general, embracing universal; h. the view that the historical, everyday world is important, and that otherworldliness is not an appropriate response in life. A s we will see, Nishida found in the western canon philosophies which (as he interpreted them) approached one or more of these positions to varying degrees. H is intellectual life was in effect a sustained exploration of western philosophies from an invariant Zen point of view, and with a single basic question always in mind: to what extent does this philosophy allow an accurate articulation of Zen experience? T he rest of this essay is devoted to exploring his answers to this question.
41
����������������������������� O n this point, see R aud 2004.
This page has been left blank intentionally
Chapter 2
R adical E mpiricism and Pure E xperience
Introduction Nishida’s first book, Zen no kenkyū (An Inquiry into the Good), was published in 1911. (T he ‘zen’ in the title is a homophone for the Zen of B uddhism but is written with a different character: it means ‘good’ or ‘goodness’.) Nishida was forty-one years old, and he had been working on it for a number of years. T his would be evident without independent evidence, from the content of the book alone: it is the first articulation of a philosophy already complete in its essentials, and Nishida was to spend the rest of his life refining it. As was to be the case with his later books, the chapters were composed as separate essays and finally assembled into a complete work. It might seem from the title that the content is primarily concerned with moral philosophy, but the Inquiry is a work of ethics in exactly the same way as the Ethics of S pinoza is. In his book Nishida does indeed put forward some views in moral philosophy, but not until he has set out a complete metaphysics designed to serve as a foundation for his ethical standpoint. For Nishida, this course of action was a logical necessity. In his philosophy, as also in the logically analogous case of D aoism, the good is not merely a way which characterizes the behaviour of human beings but also the way of reality; and this rests, in Buddhism, on the underlying assertion of the identity of one’s real nature (the ‘original face’ referred to in Zen works) with reality itself or B uddha-nature. T he central concept in the metaphysics of An Inquiry into the Good is that of pure experience. T his phrase had been adopted from the radical empiricist philosophy of William James. Nishida wrote in a letter to D . T . S uzuki: ‘I want to build my philosophy on the reality of the mind [shinri] instead of on abstract theory [ronri] on which most traditional philosophies have been based. In this connection I find William James’s “pure experience” quite interesting.’
������������������������������ O n this, see Y usa 2002, Ch. 7. �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� S pinoza’s work has been known to Nishida since his student days, and he greatly admired both it and its author. Y usa quotes from one of Nishida’s letters: ‘I think there is no one like S pinoza, who is an eminent model for us who engage in philosophy.’ L etter no. 2383, 9 May 1916, in NKZ 19, pp. 530–31; quoted in Yusa 2002, p. 158. �������������� L etter 55, in NKZ 18, p. 76; quoted in Yusa 2002, p. 89. James’s Essays in Radical Empiricism did not appear in book form until 1912, the year after Zen no kenkyū appeared. However, Nishida owned the first seven of the essays which make up James’s book as
32
Nishida and Western Philosophy
T he aim of this chapter is to investigate what each philosopher means by this phrase, and to investigate whether and how it changed as it moved from West to E ast.
Pure Experience in the Philosophy of William James James’s philosophy of radical empiricism was designed to solve certain problems which had arisen within the E uropean philosophical tradition, taking this description to include a reference to James’s immediate predecessors and contemporaries in A merica as well. A s will become clear, this background is not without interest in the context of an essay on comparative philosophy, and it is appropriate to say a little about it. T he main source of the problems James was addressing is the issue of the metaphysics of relations. T his issue had become a focus of attention in E uropean thought in the philosophy of L eibniz. T o him, the issue presented itself as the question of the location of relations: if two terms a and b stand in relation R , where is R ? If it is part of either term, it cannot link them; nor can it link them if it is merely some third entity in some way ‘between’ them, for then further relations would be needed to link R to both a and b. A ssuming that propositions of the form aR b have to be construed as ascribing a separate predicate to both a and b, the path to monadism is not difficult to reconstruct. This problem was further complicated by the atomistic psychology of classical empiricism. H ume asserts that all distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and further that the mind never perceives any real connexion between such distinct existences. T aken in conjunction with the assumption of some form of radical mind/body dualism, these assertions have had well-known and far-reaching consequences in E uropean thought, notably in respect of the nature of the self and of the analysis of causality. R econstructing the self in particular becomes extremely difficult on classical empiricist principles. E qually, in the context of the associated representationalist theories of perception, scepticism concerning the veracity of sense perception also comes to seem unavoidable, and some shifts are required to avoid solipsism. K nowledge of the external world becomes extraordinarily difficult to guarantee. T he K antian and subsequent idealist philosophies can be seen as direct responses to these problems, postulating as they do various kinds of extra-experiential, transcendental and/or transcendent entities as enduring subjects of experience and guarantors of knowledge. James’s radical empiricism is a direct response in particular to the idealism of his day: F. H . B radley’s Appearance and Reality had off-prints from their journal publication in 1904–5; he also owned James’s Principles of Psychology (1890), of which his annotated copy survives. S ee D ilworth 1969, p. 102. ������������������ H ume 1978, p. 636. ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� B erkeley’s philosophy, James argues, turns our lives into a ‘congeries of solipsisms’: James 1971, p. 42.
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
33
been published in 1893, with a second edition in 1897. A gain, James’s fellowprofessor at H arvard, Josiah R oyce, had published The World and the Individual in 1900. It was the former in particular whose ideas became a principal target for James: B radley’s arguments for the unreality of relations are repeatedly criticized by him, especially in the essay ‘T he T hing and its R elations’, but also in other parts of Essays in Radical Empiricism. It was in order to deal with the problem of relations, and with the destruction of the self and problems of scepticism involved in classical empiricism, that James formulated his radical empiricism. T he way to elude scepticism is to deny the classical dualism of perceiver and perceived, knower and known; the way to deal with relations is to insist that they are given as an element of primitive experience – they are the data, not constructions from data. T he concept of pure experience is the core of James’s proposed solutions to both these problems. James asserts that ‘there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed’; and this stuff James calls pure experience. In one respect the phrase is not a happy one, since the reference to experience might make it seem that James is heading for idealism, making his basic stuff mental in nature; but such an assumption would be quite wrong. James insists that pure experience is neither mental nor material in nature but neutral in that respect (the point is clearer in R ussell’s version of this philosophy, neutral monism). Pure experience is neither mind nor matter, neither subject nor object: The instant field of the present is at all times what I call ‘pure’ experience. It is only virtually or potentially either subject or object as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, a simple that.
T he dualistic division of what there is into mental and physical is not ontologically ultimate. Consciousness is not a name for a stuff or material of which thoughts are made: it is a name for a function which we ascribe to certain elements of pure experience, and that function is knowing. T o call something conscious is not to claim that it is a modification of some ghostly stuff: ‘To say that I am selfconscious, or conscious of putting forth volition, means only that certain contents, for which “self” and “effort of will” are the names, are not without witness when they occur.’ T he same element of pure experience can function both as knower and as known, according to the context, and indeed can be both at once. T he pure
����������������� James 1971, p. 5. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ S ee R ussell 1914, chs III and IV, and 1921, passim. R ussell discusses James’s views in Ch. I of R ussell 1921. A t one point in Essays in Radical Empiricism, James uses the phrase ‘neutral nature’ to describe pure experience (p. 117). Nishida did not have access to this essay when writing IG. ������������������� James 1971, p. 15. ��������������������������� Ibid., p. 6; cf. pp. 69–70.
Nishida and Western Philosophy
34
experience of a room, for example, can form part both of an individual’s mental biography and of the physical biography of the room. Pure experience can figure in the world both as material objects and as thoughts.10 James’s answer to the problem of the self raised by classical empiricism is a consequence of his treatment of relations. T he central claim in his argument is the assertion that relations are not constructed, but real and experienced directly: they are as ultimate as any other element of pure experience. T his he regards as a psychological datum: to deny it would be to deny the basic tenet of radical empiricism: T o be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system.11
T he atomism of the classical empiricists caused in them a blindness to the ultimacy of what James calls conjunctive relations, especially in the case of the ‘coconscious transition’,12 the passage from one experience in the mental life of an individual to the next. T he experience of this sort of continuity, in which one experience shades into the next without a break, is as real as the experience of discontinuities: as he puts it, the experience of continuity between my experiences is as real as the experience of the discontinuity between my experience and yours.13 H is answer to H ume is that, granted the seamless thread of the inner life, that consciousness in which experiences ‘compenetrate and suffuse each other’s being’,14 there is no need for some extra, enduring self over and above these elements: each passing thought is the thinker. T he self is a title assumed in succession by each event in the stream of consciousness. T he self is just this stream of memories, purposes, strivings, fulfilments and disappointments.15 A s Graham B ird has pointed out, one wonders whether there is in fact a great deal of difference between this view of the self and the classical empiricist account.16 B ehind this analysis of the self lies the thesis that all there is is pure experience, and James cannot go outside pure experience in his attempt to answer any of the major metaphysical and epistemological questions which form the subject of the Essays in Radical Empiricism. Just as he has to reconstruct the self from elements of pure experience, so he has to give an account of knowledge within the same 10
���������������������� Ibid, pp.7–10; cf. p. ���� 72. ���������� Ibid., p. 25; �������������������� James’s italics. 12 ������������� Ibid., p. 27. 13 ����� Ibid. 14 �������������� Ibid., p. 26. 15 ���������������� Ibid., pp. 26–7. 16 ������������������ B ird 1986, p. 82. 11
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
35
restraint. Within this restraint he must, and he does, argue that knower and known are, each, elements of pure experience, either the same element counted twice over in different contexts or two elements of the experience of the same subject, with conjunctive transitional material between them. Within the framework of radical empiricism, this is all that the knowing of a percept by an idea can possibly contain and signify.17 H e explains reference to an object in terms of a distinction between knowledge in transit and knowledge completed and confirmed. Conceptual knowledge is completed only when it is face to face, as it were, with the verifying percept. T he rest of the time, our knowledge is only provisional, and this is just a fact we have to live with.18 A gain, James gives an account of how two minds can experience the same object in comparable terms. L et us take the example of two people experiencing percepts of the same pen. T he original pure pen experience is not conscious: it just is. A s has been said, to be conscious (for James) is to be reported on, to have awareness added to one’s being. A ccordingly, awareness must be added to the original pen experience if any subject is to be conscious of it; and, if that is so, James argues, then there is no paradox in the supposition that there can be more than one awareness of it.19 T ruth likewise has to be accounted for within the realm of pure experience. James did not modify his pragmatist account of truth in developing the philosophy of radical empiricism: propositions are verified when they are confirmed by experience, when they have a cash value. Quite consistently with his principles, therefore, James argues that ‘the “truth” of our mental operations must always be an intra-experiential affair. A conception is reckoned true by common sense when it can be made to lead to a sensation.’20 It is not to the point here to evaluate this philosophy, so difficult as it is to state it convincingly in the absence of a vocabulary which furnishes a way of referring to experience in an ontologically neutral manner. More to the point is to investigate why this philosophy should so have appealed to Nishida that he used a phrase from it to designate the key concept in the first phase of his thought. Before moving to consider this use of the phrase ‘pure experience’, it is appropriate to introduce two further passages from James about that concept which will be of use in the subsequent discussion of Nishida’s thought: ‘Pure experience’ is the name which I give to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories. Only newborn babes, or men in semicoma from sleep, drugs, illnesses or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a that which is not yet any definite what, although ready to be all sorts of whats; full of both oneness and manyness, but in respects that don’t appear … Pure experience in this state 17
���������������������� James 1971, pp. 29–32. ����������������� Ibid., pp. 37–41. 19 ����������������� Ibid., pp. 67ff. 20 �������������� Ibid., p. 106. 18
Nishida and Western Philosophy
36
is but another name for feeling or sensation. But the flux no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases … so that experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions. Its purity is only a relative term, meaning the proportional amount of unverbalized sensation which it still embodies.21 S ince the acquisition of conscious quality on the part of an experience depends upon a context coming to it, it follows that the sum total of all experiences, having no context, cannot strictly be called conscious at all. It is a that, an A bsolute, a ‘pure’ experience on an enormous scale, undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing. T his the post-K antian idealists have always practically acknowledged by calling their doctrine an Identitätsphilosophie. T he question of the Beseelung of the A ll of things ought not, then, even to be asked. No more ought the question of its truth to be asked, for truth is a relation inside the sum total, obtaining between thoughts and something else, and these thoughts … can only be contextual things. In these respects the pure experiences of our philosophy are, in themselves considered, so many little absolutes, the philosophy of pure experience being only a more comminuted Identitätsphilosophie.22
I have selected these passages in part because they illustrate a persistent tension in James’s concept of pure experience (I am going to ignore for the moment the references to post-K antian German thought, which will be dealt with in subsequent chapters). In the opening sentences of the second passage, James sketches a concept of pure experience which represents the closest approximation to the oriental conception of nothingness, the entirely unlimited and so entirely uncharacterizable basis from which all there is emerges. (T he use of the term ‘A bsolute’ is odd in a philosopher who spends as much time as James does criticizing the arguments of absolute idealists.) Y et he at once goes on in this same passage to speak of pure experiences in the plural, of the philosophy of pure experience as a comminuted or pulverized absolutism. The same ambiguity is present in the first passage, where the possibility of a condition of experience which is entirely undifferentiated is acknowledged, though here it is described as abnormal. T he stress here, as in so many passages in James, is on the relentless mutability of pure experience, a mutability which presupposes that that experience is articulated and describable.23 T his ambiguity about the nature of pure experience is persistent and unresolved in James’s thought. B efore moving on to consider the concept of pure experience in Nishida, it is appropriate to summarize some points arising from this brief survey of radical 21
������������� Ibid., p. 50. ����������������� Ibid., pp. 70–71. 23 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� T he stress on the mutability of experience is evident right from the chapter in James’s Principles of Psychology in which he discusses the stream of consciousness: James 1890, Vol. I, pp. 229ff. 22
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
37
empiricism. T his philosophy was designed as a response to problems originating in the E uropean tradition of philosophy as it had developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, problems concerning relations, the self, and certain forms of scepticism consequent upon the adoption of mind/body dualism and representationalist theories of perception. T o eliminate the extra-experiential elements used by K ant and post-K antian philosophers in their attempt to solve these problems, James proposed a new form of empiricism, designed to abjure all extra-experiential elements yet to avoid the problems generated by its classical forms: all the major concepts and problems mentioned above were to be analysed and solved within the realm of pure experience alone. R adical empiricism is a secular philosophy designed to solve technical, philosophical problems. T here is no religious impulse behind it – not that James was in the least closed-minded about religion, as his work on religious experience shows abundantly; it is merely that religion and religious experience are not factors shaping James’s thought about radical empiricism.24 We can now turn to investigate what Nishida, a Japanese trying to articulate a world-view deeply shaped by Zen, made of the idea of pure experience.
Pure Experience in An Enquiry into the Good It is appropriate to begin this section with a reminder of Nishida’s position and goal at the time when he wrote his first book. Nishida was a man on the one hand formed by Zen, and on the other captivated by the methods and findings of E uropean philosophy. H is aim was to see if western philosophical methods and concepts could produce an account of Zen experience which would stand scrutiny purely as philosophy, judged by the standards of philosophy; and the importance of this last point is not to be underestimated. R eaders coming fresh to Nishida are often puzzled as to why he so infrequently refers to the various texts (some of them mentioned in the preceding chapter) which make up the classic written embodiment of Zen experience: the reason, I suggest, is that he wanted his thought to stand on its own as philosophy, in the western manner, and to be judged accordingly. H e did not want to be seen to be relying on authority to make his case: he wanted to articulate a philosophy which would be judged satisfactory as just that. A ccordingly, he looked about him for the approach which he thought would best suit this purpose, and his first judgement was that he had found it in the concept of pure (or direct: the terms are synonyms in this book) experience. T o put the matter as generally as possible, when rendered in philosophical terms, the intuitions at the heart of Zen require that there be an ultimate unity of some kind, underlying, or present in, all experience: a description of experience of an 24 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� In particular, James was not in the ranks of those philosophers who dismiss mysticism out of hand as undiscussable and hence of no philosophical interest. S ee James 1986, L ectures 16 and 17.
Nishida and Western Philosophy
38
A ristotelian cast, in which individuals are all there is, must be regarded from the Zen point of view as radically incomplete. A n ontology in which there are only individuals misses out the most important element of reality, whose nature Nishida tries to capture in his philosophy. T his section will set out the main argument of An Enquiry into the Good, paying special attention to the way in which the concept of pure/direct experience is deployed. The first part of An Inquiry into the Good was not the first to be written. Nishida tells us that parts II and III , headed respectively ‘R eality’ and ‘T he Good’, were written first, being followed by part I, ‘Pure Experience’ and finally by part IV, ‘R eligion’. T he core of the metaphysics is in part II , but Nishida clearly felt that the fundamental concept of pure experience needed a more detailed elaboration than it receives in that part.25 Part I gives his definition of ‘pure experience’, and then tries to show how three important aspects of mental life – thought, will, and what he terms intellectual intuition – are to be analysed in terms of it. A s is the case also with James in Essays in Radical Empiricism, Nishida begins by following a standard philosophical procedure, attempting to show how his chosen key concept is related to and can account for a number of ineludible philosophical issues or problems. Pure Experience Defined Nishida begins with this assertion: [B ]y pure I am referring to the state of experience just as it is without the least addition of deliberative discrimination. T he moment of seeing a color or hearing a sound, for example, is prior not only to the thought that the color or sound is the activity of an external object or that one is sensing it, but also to the judgment of what the color or sound might be … When one directly experiences one’s own state of consciousness, there is not yet a subject or an object, and knowing and its object are completely unified … A truly pure experience has no meaning whatsoever; it is simply a present consciousness of facts just as they are.26
There are a number of points to be made about this, of which the first concerns the force of the adjective ‘deliberative’. Granted the Zen background and the concept of mu, one might expect pure experience to be wholly unarticulated, but this is not (not at this point in the text, at any rate) what Nishida has in mind. Clearly, he means to exclude from pure experience all forms of conceptual judgement (judgement resulting from deliberation), and any relation of the pure experience to whatever nature the judging consciousness might have: it is precisely the relating of the content of an experience to one’s nature, and hence to one’s interests, that gives an experience meaning in Nishida’s sense. Y et for all that, it is clear that IG, Preface, p. xxix. ��������������� Ibid., pp. 3–4.
25 26
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
39
a pure experience as here defined is not wholly indeterminate. Pure experience is here defined in effect as non-dual, but not as unarticulated. It has something one has to call a content, for instance a shade of a colour or a sound, though it is not experienced under those descriptions: without this content it would be simply absolute nothingness, a pure nonentity. H owever, the experience is such that it is not an experience by a subject of an object, nor does it involve any reference to other experiences. Once an experience is classified, say, as of blue or of a birdsong, it involves reflection and ipso facto ceases to be pure. It is awareness of a somewhat, but not by someone. Nishida takes it for granted that such a condition is not only possible but instantiated. Indeed, as will be seen, it is the alpha and omega of consciousness, both its natural state and final goal.27 S uch consciousness is infinite, very close to what Hegel calls das Unendliche. Nishida accepts James’s view that the present has duration: it is a saddleback, not a knife-edge, as the latter puts it.28 T he purity of pure experience is not intended to exclude some complexity from the experience: because the present has duration, more than one object can be attended to in it: ‘T he directness and purity of pure experience derive not from the experience’s being simple, unanalyzable, or instantaneous, but from the strict unity of concrete consciousness.’29 H ence, as also in the case of James, pure experience can be of relations.30 T he concept of unity here introduced is of great importance to Nishida’s argument, and it is necessary to examine it before going on. What Nishida calls unity he regards as a necessary condition for consciousness of any kind: T he unity of consciousness is necessary for the establishment of consciousness and also its fundamental demand. A consciousness without a unity is no different from nothingness. Consciousness is established through conflicts in its content, and the more diversified the content becomes, the more consciousness requires a greater unity.31
It is to be noted that Nishida makes a distinction between unity tout court and what he calls ‘strict unity’: it is the latter that characterizes pure experience and applies in the non-dual but not wholly indeterminate experience just described. It is strict unity that is destroyed by reflection and replaced by unity:
27
����������������� Cf. ibid., p. 19. ��������������������������� James 1890, Vol. I, p. 609. 29 IG, p. 6. 30 ����������������������������������������������������������� Ibid., pp. 4–5. In a note, Nishida refers to James’s essay A World of Pure Experience (which became the second chapter in Essays in Radical Empiricism) as the source of this idea. 31 IG, p. 151. 28
Nishida and Western Philosophy
40
R egardless of its nature, as long as consciousness maintains a strict unity it is pure experience: it is simply a fact. B ut when the unity is broken and a present consciousness enters into a relation with other consciousnesses it generates meanings and judgments.32
When a present experience evokes a past experience, purity crumbles away, and disunity replaces strict unity. H owever, in Nishida’s view neither unity nor disunity is ever complete: behind a disunified consciousness there must be a unifying consciousness which makes the relations within the disunified consciousness possible, otherwise they would not be relations within the same consciousness. T hough Nishida never says so explicitly, he treats the assertion that unity is a necessary condition for consciousness as an a priori truth. Whether he can mean the same thing by ‘unity’ in all the applications of this premise is a point to reflect on. S ometimes he seems to designate by it the K antian transcendental unity of apperception; but this cannot be what is meant in the phrase ‘strict unity’, where ex hypothesi the experience embodies no self/not-self distinction. T his is a point which will arise again, since the notion of unity carries great weight throughout the argument of his book, including its theology. Defined in terms of strict unity in this way, it is clear that pure or direct experience is not a state of an individual. L ike James’s pure experience in this respect, this is Nishida’s ontological ultimate, and it is logically prior to individuals: ‘It is not that there is experience because there is an individual, but that there is an individual because there is experience. T he individual’s experience is simply a small, distinctive sphere of limited experience within true experience.’33 Thinking H aving chosen pure experience as his fundamental category, Nishida generates for himself a set of philosophical issues which he has to address and which necessitated the writing of the first part of the book. He has first to show how pure experience is related to major items of our mental life as they are usually classified. He considers that there are three major types of mental content which must thus be related to pure experience, namely thinking (that is, conceptual thought); the will; and what he calls intellectual intuition. His basic contention with regard to standard conceptual thought as manifested in judgements is that such judgements presuppose pure experience and are only possible on condition that there is pure experience. T his he contends to be true both of empirical and of a priori judgements. With regard to the former, he claims that, in making such a judgement, we are not connecting two independent representations but analysing a single representation in its entirety. When we say, for example, ‘the horse runs’, we are analysing a single representation, namely that of the running horse. 32
������������ Ibid., p. 9. ������������� Ibid., p. 19.
33
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
41
T his representation is a fact of pure experience, and ‘[f]acts of pure experience always underlie judgments, and for this reason we can connect subject and object representations in a judgment’.34 T his is hard to assess without a criterion for the identity of representations, but it is not easy to see how the claim that a single representation underlies all judgements can be sustained, for instance where the judgement is a comparison of two memories of events widely separated in time. Nishida would no doubt reply that such memories make up a single present experience when they are recalled together; but he still needs a non-arbitrary criterion of identity for experiences to make this work. Pure experience must also be the ground of a priori judgements (or ‘purely rational judgements’, as Nishida puts it). If pure experience is indeed ultimate, everything must be derivable from it, including the laws of logic and mathematics. H is argument here is explicitly indebted to L ocke:35 E ven the axioms of geometry are based on a kind of intuition. No matter how abstract two concepts might be, the experience of a unifying reality underlies the comparison and judgment of them. T his accounts for what is called necessity in thinking. A nd as noted earlier, if not only perceptions but also the consciousness of relations is ‘experience’, then we can argue that a fact of pure experience underlies a purely rational judgment as well.36
T he same argument is applied also to stages in a chain of deductive inference: each stage must be guaranteed by an intuitive apprehension of the entailment or nonentailment of premises and conclusion, what L ocke calls intuitive knowledge of agreement or disagreement. T he conclusion Nishida wants to establish by means of these arguments is that thinking and pure experience are not totally different types of mental experience, but rather ‘when we cast off dogma and consider the matter straightforwardly … we realize that the activity of thinking constitutes a kind of pure experience’.37 T he suppressed premise in the argument is that intuition of the kind required in order to grasp an entailment relation or to hold before the mind the elements of an empirical judgement are pure experiences. S upposing this to be true would yield the conclusion that pure experience is a condition for thought, rather than that thinking is a ‘kind of’ pure experience. Indeed, granted the way Nishida has defined pure experience in terms of strict unity, it is hard to see how, on these grounds, conceptual thought can be a species of it. T he value Nishida sets on unity as a property of consciousness and his anxiety to find as much unity as possible underlying apparent difference lie behind certain other 34
������������� Ibid., p. 11. ������� L ocke, Essay IV, ii, 7, referred to at IG, p. 12. 36 IG, p. 12. 37 ������������� Ibid., p. 13. 35
Nishida and Western Philosophy
42
points he makes about thinking. T hus he argues that the difference between internal and external, thought and perception, is not as absolute as is generally assumed: ‘People make this distinction simply because the mental images that constitute the material of thinking change with relative ease and shift on their own.’38 O nce it is accepted that all such distinctions must be made within the context of pure experience, the apparent difference appears much less dramatic and absolute. A gain, when thought is operating freely, it is based almost entirely on unconscious attention, in other words it is not characterized by self-awareness: Contrary to what one might expect, thinking becomes conscious when its advance is hindered. T hat which advances thinking is not voluntary activity, for thinking develops on its own; only when we rid ourselves of the self and merge with the object of thought or the problem – when we lose ourselves in the midst – does the thinking activity emerge.39
Much of this is well taken: we certainly do become more self-aware in proportion to the degree in which the self is in some way frustrated by the world. Nishida is also right to assert that that thought cannot be made to progress as a result of conscious resolutions of the will: one cannot remember, imagine, solve a problem or concentrate by an act of will, but rather (as any Zen master will testify) one must proceed by putting the body in the right state. Y et while these facts are consistent with the doctrine of pure experience, they do not entail it. Nishida does not establish the overall conclusion he wants in his treatment of thinking, namely that ‘thinking and experience are identical’.40 The Will Nishida turns next to consider the will, and gives an account of it within the context of reality conceived of as pure experience. A s is the case in his account of thinking, the general tenor of his arguments tends always to stress that willing is less different from, or separate from, other mental activities than is usually acknowledged, and this is part of his constant strategy of arguing that mental life is far more unified in various ways than ordinary mentalistic concepts make it appear. T his strategy is designed to buttress the doctrine of pure experience: pure experience is the most basic of conscious states, and it is a completely unified state. Nishida assumes that the more unified he can make consciousness appear, the less different from one another mental contents can be shown to be, the more the doctrine of pure experience will be confirmed. An important part of his strategy for finding unity in consciousness is to argue that types of mental state conventionally held to be different are in reality extremely similar. 38
������������� Ibid., p. 14. �������������� Ibid., p. 13. 40 ������������� Ibid., p. 19. 39
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
43
Consistently with this presupposition, Nishida begins by asserting that the will has no necessary relation to bodily action: ‘[T ]he will is a mental phenomenon that is distinct from external action, and action is not a necessary condition of the will.’41 D ecoupling the concepts of will and bodily action, if sustainable, is a strategy which would make it possible to give an account of the will which is not inherently dualistic, and so would buttress the doctrine of pure experience. H e claims that the will is ‘nothing more than the experience of shifting from one mental image to another. T o will something is to direct attention to it.’42 H e also claims that a representation becomes an object of the will according to the system of representations within which it occurs: if it is associated with bodily movements, it becomes an object of the will. H e appears to regard directing attention to a representation as both necessary and sufficient for willing it, though it is doubtful whether it can be more than necessary, since not all representations attended to become the object of volitions: some are simply contemplated. T he will is for Nishida the most fundamental aspect of consciousness, because the will lends unity to awareness, and so it is the most profound manifestation of the unifying power which Nishida regards as constitutive of consciousness.43 (T he view of the absolutely fundamental nature of the will was to grow in importance in Nishida’s thought, under the influence of Fichte, as will be seen in the next chapter.) T he will, Nishida claims, is an apperceptive activity of consciousness, in other words it is a cause of the union of ideas, appropriate (in the case of the will) for the realization of the self. Seeking consistently to confirm his basic premise that consciousness is unified, Nishida compares willing to other apperceptive activities, such as imagining and thinking. T he goal of the imagination (he announces) is the imitation of nature; the goal of thinking is truth, and the process is controlled by the laws of logic. B oth these activities are far more will-like than is generally realized. H is argument for assimilating will and imagination is this: A s in an artist’s imagination, if we attain to the realm of inspiration, we totally submerge the self in the thing; consequently the self and the thing are in complete congruence, and we feel the action of the thing to be the activity of our own will.44
To assimilate the will and thinking, he says: ‘A sufficient reason is always concealed behind the will. E ven if this reason is not perfect, the will always functions on the basis of a certain truth – that is, the will is established by thinking.’45 Neither of these arguments is conclusive: the assertion that the imagination just imitates nature is not argued for; nor does it sit happily with the other assertions 41
������������� Ibid., p. 20. ������������� Ibid., p. 21. 43 ���������������� Ibid., pp. 92–4. 44 ������������� Ibid., p. 90. 45 ����� Ibid. 42
Nishida and Western Philosophy
44
concerning the process of self-abnegation in creative thought, which read more like the ‘imagination penetrative’ view characteristic of many E uropean R omantics. T he second argument tries to derive the conclusion that thinking is will-like from the premise that willing is carried out on the basis of belief; but the conclusion simply does not follow. It is necessary at this point to digress briefly in order to outline Nishida’s philosophy of nature, of which his views on the question of the freedom of the will are in part a consequence. T he conventional view of nature is of a system of individuals and forces causally interacting as described by science, and quite independent of our will and consciousness. T here is no room (Nishida claims) for the idea that nature can function spontaneously and from within, or that it can be teleologically explained. S uch assumptions are incompatible with the philosophy of pure experience, which denies the ultimacy of the self/not-self dualism presupposed by all these assertions: Nature conceived of as an objective reality totally independent of our subjectivity is an abstract concept, not a true reality. T he noumenal aspect of nature is the fact of direct experience in which subject and object have not yet separated. For example, what we regard as true grass and trees are grass and trees with living color and forms – they are intuitive facts … What people usually refer to as nature is what remains after the subjective aspect, the unifying activity, is removed from concrete reality.46
Causal-inductive explanations of natural phenomena cannot on this view constitute an ultimate level in explanations of reality, because such explanations assume that matter, rather than pure experience, is ultimate. Pure experience is ontologically ultimate and a mode of consciousness. All things (in a way yet to be specified) emerge from it, nature included. S ince nature is a manifestation of pure experience, it must share the properties of pure experience: most importantly, it cannot ‘come into being without having a unifying activity. Nature therefore possesses a kind of self, too.’47 T his unifying power behind nature (unlike the K antian realm of noumena) is not beyond experience: it is the unifying power of consciousness.48 T his unifying power at the base or root of consciousness (a necessary condition for consciousness, as we have seen, in Nishida’s view) is not a product of nature: indeed, the reverse is true, in that nature (conceived of as a unified system) comes into being only because of it. T his unifying activity exists independently of necessary, causal laws of nature. H ence our will is free because it is a basic feature of consciousness, and it is prior to such laws.49 B oth libertarian and deterministic analyses of the will which presuppose the ontological ultimacy of causal laws 46
��������������������������������� Ibid., pp. 68–9; cf. pp. 159–60. ������������� Ibid., p. 70. 48 ������������� Ibid., p. 72. 49 ������������� Ibid., p. 99. 47
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
45
are consequently dismissed by Nishida.50 Nishida wishes to conclude, however, that the will is free, and so he has to find a sense of the term ‘freedom’ which is compatible with his analysis of nature and causality. H e has also to avoid simply making the will random, since that would be incompatible with the moral philosophy which is his ultimate concern in this book. H is solution is to claim that the will is free because it follows its own nature, which is in fact the basic nature of consciousness itself. T his nature is awareness both of what is happening and of other possibilities. Phenomena of consciousness, unlike natural phenomena, do not simply arise: we are aware of them. Further, knowing, or being conscious of, something always includes awareness of other possibilities: T o put it more exactly, consciousness always possesses a universal character – consciousness always includes an idealistic element, otherwise it is not consciousness … B eing actual yet including ideals, being idealistic and yet not separating from actuality, this is the distinctive character of consciousness.51
Consciousness is never controlled by things, Nishida claims, for it is always controlling them. It is questionable whether this sense of ‘freedom’ does the work Nishida wants it to do. H e has in effect made a will of some sort constitutive of pure experience or being-as-is, while pure experience is simply beyond categorization – as free, or determined in any sense approximating to the uses of those terms in ordinary discourse. T he grounding of Nishida’s moral beliefs in this type of metaphysics is an issue to be returned to later. It is in the context of this discussion of the will that Nishida raises the issues of truth and knowledge. L ike James, he has to analyse these concepts in a nondualistic way, such that they can be accounted for wholly within the context of the domain of pure experience. In both cases, it is the key concept of unity which is again deployed. We regard as truth, he claims, that which has unified our experiential facts, and objective truth is the system of representations that is most effective and most integrating. T o know the truth or to accord with it is to unify our experience; it is to proceed from a lesser to a greater unity. If we regard our authentic self as being this unifying activity, then to know the truth is to accord with this greater self, to actualize it.52
While the procedure here is Jamesian, the answer Nishida proposes is not: this looks initially as if it might be a version of the coherence theory of truth familiar from western idealist philosophies, with perhaps an element of pragmatism; but the mention of an ‘authentic self’ indicates a Zen origin for this doctrine, for the authentic self is the ‘original face’, the level of consciousness revealed in Zen 50
���������������� Ibid., pp. 98–9. ��������������������� Ibid., p. 98; cf. p. ��� 25. 52 ������������� Ibid., p. 24. 51
Nishida and Western Philosophy
46
experience. R eality is a unity, and so what brings consciousness to a greater unity must ipso facto bring it closer to what is ultimately real, and hence be true: T he standard of truth is not external, for it lies in our state of pure experience … It is in the state of direct experience – when subject and object merge with each other and we are unable, even if we try, to doubt the single actuality of the universe – that we have conviction about truth.53
A n analogous line of argument is present in Nishida’s account of knowledge. T he doctrine of pure experience entails that knower and known must both be elements of it: knowledge cannot consist in some sort of relation between representation and the external world. K nowledge again is construed as a type of unity: T o say that we know a thing simply means that the self unites with it. When one sees a flower, the self has become the flower. To investigate a flower and elucidate its basic nature means to discard all of the self’s subjective conjectures and thereby unite with the basic nature of the flower.54
Further, in the very possibility of knowledge, Nishida finds an additional confirmation of his belief in the existence of a fundamental unifying presence in the universe: ‘If the world were something different from the unity of our consciousness, we could never make contact with it. T he world we can know and understand is established by a unifying power identical to that of our consciousness.’55 Nishida is asserting that the world is knowable only because it is unified in a certain way, indeed in the same way as our consciousness. A s has been noted already, Nishida does not regard causal–inductive explanations of natural phenomena as ultimate. H e therefore does not consider here the view that consciousness has evolved as it has because it suits the way the world is – that is, from an evolutionary perspective. A s will be seen in the discussion of Nishida’s ethics below, he regards consciousness at its deepest level as having goals, and so for Nishida at this point in his development ultimate explanations are teleological. E volutionary explanations of natural phenomena, which regard the order of things as blind, are for him applicable only to the abstraction from pure experience which we ordinarily refer to as nature. Intellectual Intuition T he third type of mental operation which Nishida wishes to relate to pure experience is what he terms intellectual intuition, the phrase being almost certainly borrowed from the great German idealists. For Fichte, intellectual intuition is our 53
���������������� Ibid., pp. 26–7. ������������� Ibid., p. 73. 55 ������������� Ibid., p. 62. 54
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
47
only mode of awareness of the absolute E go as an activity within us, and H egel regards it as the one real and firm standpoint of philosophy, the identity of subject and object.56 T he term ‘intuition’ (chokkan), whether qualified or not, is important in Nishida’s epistemology, and it is important to have as firm a grip as possible on what he means by this term and its cognates. A gain, his discussion at this point of An Inquiry into the Good introduces some themes that grow in importance as his thought develops. H e introduces the concept here as follows: Intellectual intuition is … an intuition of ideal, usually trans-experiential things. It intuits that which can be known dialectically. E xamples of this are found in the intuition of artists and people of religion. With respect to the process of intuiting, intellectual intuition is identical to ordinary perception, but with respect to content, intellectual intuition is far richer and more profound.57
It is also held to resemble perception in in terms of depth, and also in being susceptible to enrichment by previous experience: ‘T he culmination of this profundity is found in the intuition possessed by a person of religion who, through human love, can intuit the oneness of self and other.”58 T he assimilation of the process of intellectual intuition to perception, it should be noted, is meant to emphasize its non-reflective immediacy: since intellectual intuition is of ideal objects (so to speak), it is not a form of sense-perception. We have seen already the value Nishida sets on unity as a property and goal of consciousness: intellectual intuition is of value precisely because it is (he claims) the most unified state of consciousness. This entails that it is the closest to pure experience, the alpha and omega of conscious states: ‘When a scholar achieves a new idea, the moral person a new motive, the artist a new ideal, the religious person a new awakening, such a unity is manifesting itself.’59 In Nishida’s view, an underlying unity is a necessary condition for any type of thought, and this unity is grasped by intellectual intuition. T he greater the depth and range of this intuition, the more profound the thought it unifies: 56
��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� In Fichte, the transcendental ego is the condition of experience which can never itself be experienced. What we can have, Fichte claims, is an intellectual intuition of it. S uch an intuition is neither a privileged mystical state nor an intuition of some sort of entity. R ather, it consists in our awareness of the pure I as an activity present in all selfconsciousness. E veryone who acts is aware of themselves acting, and this awareness is an intellectual intuition in Fichte’s sense, which is accordingly a constant element of selfconsciousness. H egel accepted this idea, glossing this activity as the identity of subject and object. Fichte 1846 (ed. I. H. Fichte), Vol. I, p. 463; Hegel 1927–40 (ed. H. Glockner), Vol. I, pp. 143–4. 57 IG, p. 30. 58 ������������� Ibid., p. 31. 59 ������������� Ibid., p. 32.
Nishida and Western Philosophy
48
T hinking is a type of system, and at its base there must be an intuition of unity … S tated broadly, a vast intuition functions behind such profound thought as the philosophies of Plato and S pinoza. In thought, a genius’s intuition differs not in quality but in degree from ordinary thinking, and it is simply a new, profound intuition of unity.60
It is to be stressed, however, that the content of intellectual intuition, though often ideal and trans-experiential, is not an abstract universality disconnected from facts (by which he means individuals). Nishida insists that what he calls true universality is not disconnected from, or in any way opposed to, facts: ‘We can express the true universal through the determination of individuality. E ach of the true artist’s exquisite brush strokes expresses the true meaning of the whole.’61 T his analogy from aesthetics is the first adumbration in Nishida’s thought of what was to become the key doctrine of the absolutely contradictory identity of universal and particular; of the infinite and the finite; of the eternal and the temporal, and it is Nishida’s way of conceptualizing one of the central experiences of Zen. What he here calls the ‘true’ universal is the unified reality fully present in, and contradictorily identical with, each particular. Nishida just takes it for granted that this sort of intuition occurs: he does not need to argue for its possibility or coherence because for him it was a fact of experience. It is precisely because his Zen background furnished him with such experiences that the concept of intuition was so important to him. S o far as he was concerned, standard perception and ratiocination, dealing in various ways with particulars and abstract universals, could only be a part of the epistemological story, and by no means the most important part. (T his will become abundantly clear in Chapter 4 below, in the discussion of the various basho, the planes in terms of which he came to analyse consciousness at a later point in the development of his thought.) H e needed a way of conceptualizing the experiences of unity of various kinds, which were to him necessary conditions for consciousness, and the concept of intuition was his way of dealing with this issue. In Nishida’s epistemology, intuition is a necessary condition for other modes of mental activity. A ll thought is established on the basis of intuition, and we cannot dispense with it: ‘A certain mystical reality is always hidden at the base of thought, and this pertains even to the axioms of geometry.’62 It follows that intuition is a necessary condition for (‘functions at the base of’, as Nishida puts it) the will: ‘T he will is established through this intuition because to will something is to intuit the oneness of subject and object.’63 Pure experience is the omega or final goal of consciousness, or, in other words, the goal of consciousness is the experience of an ultimate unity. S uch a unity is neither perceptible nor thinkable. It is no surprise, accordingly, to find that such a 60
������������� Ibid., p. 33. ����� Ibid. 62 ����� Ibid. 63 ����� Ibid. 61
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
49
condition – the achievement of which is a religious awakening – is only available to us via intuition: T rue religious awakening is neither an abstract knowledge based in thinking nor a blind feeling. In this awakening we realize with our whole being the profound unity at the base of knowledge and the will. It is a kind of intellectual intuition, a deep grasp of life. T he sword of logic cannot penetrate it and desire cannot move it.64
Nishida was later to deny that his views included mystical elements: there will be more to say about this issue in later chapters. For the moment, it is clear and certain that these remarks are not far removed from the language of mysticism. Ultimate Reality H aving described what he regards as the major elements of conscious life in terms of pure experience, Nishida now turns to using the concept so as to answer what was always his basic philosophical question: what is it that really exists? Nishida has a bold answer to this question: ‘[R ]eality is the activity of consciousness … I contend that reality comes into being through interrelationship and that the universe is the sole activity of the sole reality.’65 (T he translators point out that the Japanese term yui-itsu, here rendered as ‘sole’, also has the evaluative overtones of the E nglish terms ‘peerless’ and ‘one of a kind’.) T his sole reality is pure or direct experience: ‘T he state of consciousness in which subject and object have dissolved into the union of thinking, feeling, and willing is true reality. Independent self-sufficient true reality manifests itself in the form of this union.’66 This looks at first as if it is to be the first premise in an idealistic monism of a kind familiar from the history of western or Indian philosophy, the first stage in a one/many metaphysics for which parallels can be found outside Buddhism; but it soon becomes clear that it is not. A s in all philosophies which propose the existence of a one as well as of a many, Nishida has to give an account of how these terms are related and how the many come to exist at all. H e rejects views such as emanation or immanence (as the latter is usually understood in the West) in favour of what he later came to call contradictory identity, the view originating in the Perfection of Wisdom sutras (this concept is dealt with in Chapter 4, below): ‘T he fundamental mode of reality is such that reality is one while it is many and many while it is one; in the midst of equality it maintains distinctions, and in the midst of distinctions it maintains equality.’67 64
������������� Ibid., p. 34. ������������� Ibid., p. 59. 66 ������������� Ibid., p. 51. 67 ������������� Ibid., p. 57. 65
Nishida and Western Philosophy
50
In order for a ‘many’ to exist, the ultimate reality must be other than a characterless somewhat, for such a somewhat, like a consciousness without unity, would be no different from absolute nothingness. T he property of ultimate reality which gives rise to the many in Nishida’s thought is what he calls contradiction or opposition; however, this contradiction is merely unity viewed from another angle. T hey are two sides of the same coin: In the establishment of reality, then, both a unity at the base of reality and mutual opposition or contradiction are necessary … When these contradictions disappear, reality disappears as well. O n a fundamental level, contradiction and unity are simply two views of one and the same thing. B ecause there is unity there is contradiction, and because there is contradiction there is unity.68
B oth unity and contradiction (which in Nishida’s usage often means no more than differentiation) are argued for by means of a priori, conceptual considerations: a reality wholly without difference Nishida regards as logically impossible, no different from an absolute absence of anything. O f necessity, anything we can call a reality must exhibit some differentiation. O n the other hand, no differentiable aspect of the real can be wholly unrelated to other such aspects, since wholly unrelated aspects would necessarily not be parts of the same reality; and, in order for such aspects to be related, there must be a unity which relates them: ‘If all things are established through such opposition, then there must be a certain unifying reality concealed at their base.’69 Nishida assumes that the fact that individuals are related in certain ways entails that there is one unifying factor at the base of all things. O nce there is differentiation there is time, and so Nishida must give an account of how his ontological ultimate, pure experience, is related to time. T he conventional view, Nishida notes, is that conscious phenomena are temporal and subject to time’s arrow – and this is taken in conjunction with the belief that all consciousnesses are unique, even where they have the same content. From Nishida’s point of view this is a misconception of the relationship between being and time: [I]f we return to the base of direct experience, we see that the relationship between consciousness and time is the reverse. B ecause time is nothing more than a form that orders the content of our experience, the content of consciousness must first be able to be joined, be united, and become one in order for the idea of time to arise. O therwise we would not be able to link things sequentially and thereby think in terms of time. T he unifying activity of consciousness is not controlled
68
������������� Ibid., p. 56. ����� Ibid.
69
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
51
by time; on the contrary, time is established by the unifying activity. At the base of consciousness there is a transcendent, unchanging reality apart from time.70
T hat is, there logically cannot be a sequence of events in a consciousness unless the events are sufficiently unified to permit their being conceived of as part of a sequence. O nce again, it is the unity at the base of all things which is their precondition. T his mode of being is a precondition for time, not vice versa. A s is the case with other thinkers with a comparable metaphysics, Nishida cannot regard our ordinary beliefs about time as revelatory of reality at its deepest level. O rdinary descriptions of the temporal relations of individuals in nature he regards as abstractions from the basic, concrete level of pure experience. O ne more point must be made about the way reality develops through differentiation. Pure experience is ultimate. A ccordingly, it must itself be the origin of all the changes which it manifests: pure experience is all there is, and there is nothing other than it to be the source of change. A s Nishida puts it, what is really happening in all conscious phenomena is that ‘a certain total reality develops and completes itself from within.’71 Pure experience is creative, and, as we have seen, the mode of this creativity is what Nishida calls contradiction. Contradiction is the nature of reality itself: As I said before, while reality is infinite conflict, it is also infinite unity. Conflict is an indispensable aspect of unity, for it is through conflict that we advance to an even greater unity. O ur spirit, the unifying activity of reality, is conscious of itself not when that unity is functioning, but when there is conflict.72
H egel is regularly referred to in Nishida’s works, and it is easy to see why, on the basis of statements like the one just quoted, Nishida should have found H egelianism congenial. It is important to note, however, that, granted the Zen basis of his thought, he cannot accept all of the H egelian apparatus. In particular, he cannot accept that all contradictions are ultimately synthesized into a higher form of unity: reality is both one and many, temporal and eternal, being and becoming at the same time. R eality is permanently self-contradictory in nature. A s so often, Nishida can go some distance in agreeing with a western philosophy, but not all the way. T here will be more to say about Nishida’s views on H egel in Chapter 4 below. A s is the case with James, the doctrine of pure experience leads Nishida to regard the mind/matter, internal/external distinction as non-ultimate: [W]hen seen from the perspective of direct experience, all things are phenomena of consciousness, without distinction between internal and external. T hat which 70
����������������� Ibid., pp. 60–61. ������������� Ibid., p. 53. 72 ������������� Ibid., p. 75. 71
Nishida and Western Philosophy
52
we speak of as the internal, subjective spirit is a highly superficial and feeble spirit, an individual fancy. In contrast, great, deep spirit is the activity of the universe that is united with the truth of the universe.73
Y et while Nishida has his basic strategy in common with James, it will be clear that his Zen inspiration takes him a long way from James in regard to other matters: what is expressed here is the Zen distinction between superficial ego and original face, and neither of these doctrines is Jamesian. T he question inevitably arises how ultimate reality or pure experience in Nishida’s sense is related to his notion of god – a question to which he has a characteristically bold response. R eality or pure experience is an independent, self-fulfilled, infinite activity. We call the base of this infinite activity God. God is not something that transcends reality, God is the base of reality. God is that which dissolves the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity and unites spirit and nature.74
H e dismisses attempts to prove the existence of god by argument. T he only real proof is by direct experience of the self: ‘we can know the foundation of reality that forms the universe in the depths of our hearts – we can grasp the true face of God. The infinitely free activity of the human heart proves God directly.’75 Citing with approval the Indian assertion that atman (or individual soul) and B rahman are identical, Nishida claims that the deepest knowledge of god is achieved through ‘intuition realized in the inner soul’.76 Further, he refers with approval to the via negativa of Nicholas of Cusa: no positive affirmations can be true of god, since any affirmative statement must affirm a limited attribute, and any limitation must be false of god (this is the same thought which lies behind the characterization of the D ao as nameless and behind the advaitin (or nondualist) description of B rahman as non-dual rather than monistic, the latter being a limiting affirmation).77 God and our original self are the same, and we can never (in Nishida’s view) be satisfied with the condition of being merely an individual self with an everyday consciousness. T here is a fundamental demand in us for a mode of being which is a larger form of unity: O ur love for others is the demand for such a supra-individual unity with them. A ccordingly, we feel greater peace and joy in love for others than in love for ourselves. God, the unity of the universe, is the base of this unifying activity, the
73
������������� Ibid., p. 78. ������������� Ibid., p. 79. 75 ������������� Ibid., p. 81. 76 ����� Ibid. 77 ���������������� Ibid., pp. 81–2. 74
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
53
foundation of our love, the source of our joy. God is infinite love, infinite joy, and peace.78
T he use of the term ‘god’ can be misleading to western readers, with its overtones of individuality and personality which are absent from Nishida’s thought; for what is being spoken of here is not an individual of any kind. H e has recast in his own terminology the Zen doctrine of the presence in us, at the deepest level, of an original face. What is also abundantly clear is that this is very remote indeed from the Jamesian philosophy of pure experience and much closer to D aoism, to which Zen owes not a little. The Good H aving set out his vision of the order of things, Nishida turns next to the moral philosophy which is the raison d’être for his first book, and which he seeks to ground on the epistemology and metaphysics of Parts I and II . H e surveys and dismisses a number of ethical theories – intuitionism; heteronomist and autonomist theories, and hedonism, both egoistic and universalist (utilitarianism) – and then turns to his own positive doctrine. It will be recalled that, in this work, Nishida maintains that the most fundamental aspect of consciousness is the will – its deepest unifying activity and a direct manifestation of the unifying power Nishida finds (as he puts it) at the base of reality. A t the base of the will itself are innate demands which appear in consciousness as goal concepts that unify it. When these ideals are realized – when unification is completed – we feel satisfaction: B ecause that which determines the value of conduct lies wholly in these fundamental, innate demands of the will, when we completely realize these demands (our ideals) our conduct is praised as good, and when we act contrary to them, our conduct is censured as bad. A ccordingly, the good is the realization of our internal demands, our ideals; it is the development and completion of the will.79
Nishida regards this as a form of energetism such as is to be found in the philosophy of Plato and A ristotle: T he highest good, in other words, is for our spirit to develop its abilities and to achieve a perfect development. In this way, A ristotle’s entelechie is the good. For a human to display his or her innate nature – just as a bamboo plant or a
78
����� Ibid. �������������� Ibid., p. 123.
79
Nishida and Western Philosophy
54
pine displays its nature – is our good. S pinoza said that virtue is to function in accordance with the self’s own nature.80
It follows further from Nishida’s metaphysical premises that to achieve the good in this way is the same thing as to be in accord with reality. A s is the case in the closely analogous moral philosophy which is part of D aoism, to manifest goodness is to reflect the mode of being of reality itself (this is also why only one of the sections of this book, ostensibly devoted to ethics, is about goodness, the rest being about reality/consciousness): [T ]he development and completion of a thing is the fundamental mode of the establishment of all reality, and spirit, nature, and the universe come to exist by this mode. T he good, conceived of as the development and completion of the self, amounts to our obeying the laws of reality called the self. T hat is, to unite with the true reality of the self is the highest good.81
A n important consequence of this position, Nishida argues, is that it does away with the gap between facts and values and with the consequent is/ought problem: T he view of existence and value as separate comes from an abstraction that distinguishes objects of knowing from feeling and willing; but in concrete reality existence and value are fundamentally one. T hus to seek the good and to return to it is to know the true reality of the self.82
It will be obvious by now that, when Nishida refers to the reality or development of the self, the self he is referring to is not the surface ego (otherwise his moral philosophy would collapse into an egoism like that of S tirner), but the ‘original face’ of Zen, the ‘self’ which is manifest when the surface ego is overcome and dissipates. T he fundamental demand of this true self is for maximal union with what there is, for the overcoming of the subject/object division; and this cashes out in the human world as love of all things, in a manner to be described presently. It is also obvious that Nishida has to assume that the process of the unfolding of reality through contradiction is good in itself and requires no further justification. This is a version of a doctrine which occurs in certain other eastern philosophies, namely that what there is, the rerum natura, is good. Nishida simply adopts this view, no doubt on the grounds of Zen experience. From a philosophical perspective, the view generates a special version of the problem of evil: how is evil possible in a world of things which manifests goodness as its very nature? H is response is a version of what one may call the ‘partial perspective’ answer: 80
�������������� Ibid., p. 125. �������������� Ibid., p. 126. 82 ����� Ibid. 81
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
55
Falsehood, ugliness, and evil always arise in our viewing abstractly just one aspect of things while we are unaware of the whole, and in being partial to just one aspect of reality and thereby going against the unity of the whole.83
T he same apparent paradox arises, as Nishida indicates, with regard to beauty (since nothing can be allowed to be truly ugly) and other negative values. Nishida consistently accepts that ultimately nothing can be really ugly,84 and these claims as to the ultimate unreality of negative values can find parallels in the writings of visionaries and mystics from other traditions.85 It is salutary to reflect that, to these writers, these assertions are empirical truths, records of experience, not theoretical speculations or conceptual analyses. Without having had the experiences in question, especially of being in a condition of consciousness in which the fact/ value distinction has collapsed, these are hard sayings on which to form a sure opinion, though the consistency with which such thoughts occur in traditions which arose independently is very striking. O ne may comment that Nishida has not got to the heart of the matter, since he needs to say what it is about reality that makes it good (hence he still needs an analysis of goodness); but he could dismiss such comment as the response of someone who has not had the experience which lies behind his claim. Nishida amplifies his discussion of the good by describing it as the unity of a personality; but the turn of phrase is to a degree unfortunate, laden as it is with overtones of an individualism he absolutely abjures. Just as he makes a distinction between the surface ego and the true self, so he distinguishes between what we ordinarily term our personality and our ‘true’ personality. T he true personality could in fact be better described as an impersonality, since it is what is revealed when the surface personality (referred to in the following quotation as ‘oneself’) is dissipated: T he true unity of consciousness is a pure and simple activity that comes forth of itself, unhindered by oneself; it is the original state of independent, self-sufficient consciousness, with no distinction among knowledge, feeling, and volition, and no separation of subject and object. A t this time our true personality expresses itself in its entirety. A nd as I discussed in the section on reality, if we assume that phenomena of consciousness are the only reality, then our personalities are the activity of the unifying power of the universe. In other words, our personalities are the particular forms in which the sole reality – which transcends the distinction between mind and matter – manifests itself according to circumstances.86
83
�������������� Ibid., p. 143. ��������� Cf. e.g. AM, pp. 15–16 and 162. 85 ��������������������������������� T his doctrine is also present in The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana, in H akeda 1967, p. 29. 86 IG, pp. 130–31. 84
Nishida and Western Philosophy
56
T he demands of the true personality, Nishida adds, are exceedingly solemn, and following them is ‘an endeavour of difficulty and pain.’87 T hough Nishida does not say so explicitly, the reason for this last comment at least is easy to state, since the pre-requisite for allowing the true personality to manifest itself is the annulling of the surface ego, the absolute abandonment of its desires – which is the goal of Zen training and other advanced yogas. T he actualization of the true personality is the only absolute good: all other goods are conditional goods, valuable only insofar as they contribute to this realization. O ur true self or personality is identical with the ultimate reality. A ccordingly, if we know the true self (that is, if we experience it) we ‘fuse with the essence of the universe and unite with the will of God.’88 Nishida’s Inquiry leads naturally to a concluding section on religion in which the concept of pure experience is deployed in the context of philosophical theology. Religion R eligion as Nishida understands it is the demand for unity of consciousness, and this, as we have seen, is the same as the demand for union with the universe. R eligion thus conceived is the goal of human life, not a means to some further end, notably inner peace. S uch inner peace as it may furnish is a by-product of the religious life, not its goal.89 T he relation of god to the world is not like that of an artist to a work of art – that is, transcendent – but like that of noumenon to phenomenon, or of consciousness to its content. T he universe is not a creation of god but a manifestation of god, who is the unifying power at the base of both nature and the mind. T he distinction between mind and matter, like that between subject and object, Nishida cannot regard as ultimate: he argues, consistently, that both distinctions are imposed on pure experience. Matter, for example, cannot be known as a reality independent of our consciousness of it. T he facts of direct experience are the phenomena of our consciousness, and what we call nature, space and time are concepts designed to organize and explain these facts. What physicists call matter is a highly abstract concept, remote from concrete facts. T he order of natural phenomena is actually the order of the phenomena of our consciousness. S pirit and nature are not two kinds of reality, but different views of one and the same reality. A ll these concepts – space, time, nature, mind, matter – arise as a result of what Nishida calls reflection – that is, conceptual thought. T hey are epistemologically posterior to the level of pure experience, which is grasped, as we have seen, by what he terms intuition.90 Granted Nishida’s premises, he can characterize god as the foundation of the phenomena of consciousness, the unity at the base of the ultimately real: ‘T he 87
�������������� Ibid., p. 134. �������������� Ibid., p. 145. 89 ������������������ Ibid., pp. 149–52. 90 ������������������ Ibid., pp. 159–60. 88
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
57
relation between the universe and God is the relation between our phenomena of consciousness and their unity.’91 S pirit is not a mere collection of the activities of thinking, willing and feeling: it is rather a single unifying power which underlies these activities; and these in turn are its expression. God is the greatest and final unifier of our consciousness; our consciousness is one part of god’s consciousness and its unity comes from god’s unity. O ur ordinary condition of separate selfconsciousness is the result of reflection: Self-consciousness is a phenomenon that accompanies the unification of a partial system of consciousness in the center of the entirety of consciousness. Self-consciousness arises through reflection, and the reflection of the self is the activity that in this way seeks the center of consciousness. T he self is nothing other than the unifying activity of consciousness.92
Precisely how the individual self arises from the non-dual – if not undifferentiated – state of pure experience is not made clear in this book, and the attempt to be more precise on this key issue was to become a central driving force of the next phase of Nishida’s thought. S ince time is posterior to pure experience, Nishida’s god, who is the unity of this experience, transcends time. Consequently, for god everything is present, and so in god there is no reflection, no memory or hope, and nothing corresponding to ‘special self-consciousness’,93 that is, the type of everyday self-consciousness which is our normal mode of experience. Further, what we term the will of god is invariant, since it is outside time. God, Nishida claims, must be described as living: the existence of god is not a mere deduction from philosophical arguments but a fact of spiritual experience: ‘God can be seen as one great intellectual intuition at the foundation of the universe, as the unifier of the pure experience that envelops the universe.’94 Nishida’s god is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent and infinite, but not transcendent: Just as there is no world without God, there is no God without the world … the relation between God and the world is the relation between the unity of consciousness and its content. T he content of consciousness is established by unity, and there is no unity apart from the content of consciousness – they are not two separate things, but rather the two sides of a single reality. In direct experience all phenomena of consciousness are one activity – however, by
91
�������������� Ibid., p. 161. �������������� Ibid., p. 162. 93 �������������� Ibid., p. 163. 94 �������������� Ibid., p. 164. 92
Nishida and Western Philosophy
58
making this single activity the object of knowledge and reflecting upon it, the content is analyzed and distinguished in a variety of ways.’95
Nishida refers with approval to Boehme’s view that god reflects upon himself and so gives rise to the world. It does not follow, however, Nishida argues, that our limited individual personality is merely a phantasm; ‘rather, it is part of God’s development, one of God’s activities of differentiation’.96 T he notion that one is part (in some sense of the term) of the development of the divine is, of course, by no means without parallel in religious writing.97 In the present context, however, it is more germane to note the early hints of what was to become the doctrine of the contradictory identity of one and many in this theological assertion that god and the world are simply two aspects of a unified reality.
Conclusion It is not difficult to appreciate why Nishida was attracted to the concept of pure experience: he needed a concept with which to articulate his intuition of a reality which is a unified consciousness; in which no distinction between self and not-self, mind and matter, thought, feeling and willing can meaningfully be drawn. (S ee the second passage from James on p. 36 above.) T he use of the term ‘consciousness’, with its dualistic overtones, is unavoidable, but the term itself has to be understood in a neutral monist way in most of the contexts in which Nishida deploys it, if he is to be consistent. (Pure experience involves awareness, and irresistibly suggests the term ‘consciousness’.) Nishida found in James a thinker who had tried to give a philosophical account of the world of experience in terms of a recognizably similar concept, and to that extent his philosophy and that of James share one major feature in common. A gain, he adopts (as he must) the strategy also employed by James, of attempting to construe other key concepts in terms of pure experience, though this method, of course, is not specifically Jamesian: it is standard philosophical procedure, constitutive of the conception of the nature of the philosophical enterprise in the western tradition. T hus Nishida relates his concept of pure experience to the concepts of thought; of the will; of intellectual intuition; of knowledge; of truth; of the self; of time; of space; of nature; of goodness; and of god. He has adopted the western conception of what the philosophical enterprise must be for a thinker who adopts the starting point that he does, and this is one respect in which a key element of western thought was to remain a constant in Nishida’s system. 95
����������������� Ibid., pp. 168–9. �������������� Ibid., p. 170. 97 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� In the present context, it is relevant to refer to a case mentioned by William James, which also affirms the non-differentiation of feeling and knowledge in the religious experience. S ee James 1986, p. 392, note 1. 96
Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience
59
Yet when one examines his thought in detail, it is difficult to push the parallel much further in respect of the details of the content of Nishida’s philosophy at this stage of his development. T he stress in James’s account of pure experience is always on its burgeoning novelty, on its constant tendency to variegation and exfoliation, and, moreover, on regarding this tendency as normal and admirable – proof of the vitality of what there is. (See the first passage from James, pp. 35–6 above.) T here is no sense, in reading James, that this is a man who has discovered a stillness of limitless depth at the heart of things; nor does he lament the fact that he has not. James, in common with his universe (one feels), liked to be up and doing. (It will be recalled that James described the – by comparison with Nishida’s – mildly contemplative philosophy of his younger H arvard contemporary S antayana as the perfection of rottenness.)98 Pure experience may be the alpha in radical empiricism, but it is not the omega: there is no sense at all that James regards it as desirable or normal to return to a state of undifferentiated awareness. Indeed, in the first passage quoted above, he explicitly says that only infants or persons in the abnormal condition of semicoma do so. It is interesting to note that at various points in his argument Nishida reverses the evaluation present in this passage from James, regarding dreams or the experiences of babies as richer than the ordinary, conceptualized experience of a normal adult. Conceptual thought, indeed the whole elaborate structure we call the natural world, he regards as an impoverished abstraction from a richer pure experience – he describes it, for example, as ‘simply an incomplete state of pure experience’99 – and it is to the richer but less articulated state that we will seek to return if we follow his moral recommendations. T here is nothing in James’s thought corresponding to the stress Nishida places on the unity of consciousness, either as a fact or as a value (not that Nishida would ultimately admit these to be different), and this is no doubt due to the absence of a religious impulse in James’s radical empiricism. Zen experience formed Nishida at the deepest levels, and it becomes manifest very quickly, reading An Inquiry into the Good, that the parallel with S pinoza’s Ethics is exact with regard to the fact that a deeply religious view of the world shapes its philosophy. T he stress on unity, and above all the wish to return to it, is entirely comprehensible in a Zen context. A s has been noted once above, Nishida denied later in life that his philosophy is mystical, and perhaps if one construes the term ‘philosophy’ in a certain restricted sense this might be true; but it is equally undeniably true that much of what Nishida says in this first book would be intelligible to mystics the world over. The central moral recommendation of this book is that we should so conduct ourselves as to be in accord with the will of god. In Zen terms, this is to allow the original face to manifest itself; more generally, it is to be in accord with the Dao. This is no less than to follow the mystic’s path towards union with the divine, where such union requires the dissolution of the surface ego; and a key element in this dissolution is the suspension of all conceptual intellection. T his is the state to which western The Letters of William James, 1920, Vol. II , pp. 122–3. IG, p. 17.
98 99
60
Nishida and Western Philosophy
mystics since D ionysius the A reopagite refer to as the D arkness of Unknowing, the darkness beyond light. Pure experience, as Nishida describes it in this book, is not identical with the classic oriental notion of nothingness or mu (since it is not wholly unarticulated), but it is close to it, closer to it than to any western notion. James’s pure experience is not divine. T he most western aspects of An Inquiry into the Good are its method and the repertoire of problems acknowledged as problems, rather than as a debt to any single western philosopher. Nishida had been reading western philosophical and religious writers for some years before and during the writing of this book, and manifestly accepted that the problems which had so exercised these thinkers were indeed problems. H e had mastered a good deal of the western canon, from ancient Greeks to his own time, and internalized their thought. T he philosophical method and layout of the argument derive chiefly from western models. There are references to Plato, A ristotle and the S toics, S t T homas, D uns S cotus, D escartes, Pascal, H obbes, the B ritish E mpiricists up to Mill, and German thinkers from K ant to Nishida’s own time, H egel being cited most often with simple approval (entirely understandably in the estimation of a thinker who regards reality as being characterized by contradiction, in some sense of the term). Y et, while the form of this philosophical vessel may have been determined by European influences, the content is Japanese, unmistakably Zen in its emphasis. T he question Nishida posed himself throughout his life was whether the vessel and the contents suited each other as well as they might. A s he continued to read and to think after the publication of An Inquiry into the Good, he became convinced that the match was not good enough: the concept of pure experience came to seem to him too tainted with the overtones of individualistic psychology to be a suitable articulation for the governing intuition of his thought. H is conception of ultimate reality is remote indeed from any form of individualism, and he felt the need to try to find a better articulation for it. In the next phase of his thought he turned to the works of Bergson, Fichte and the neo-Kantians, in the hope of finding something better.
Chapter 3
Fichte, the Neo-K antians and B ergson
Introduction B y the end of An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida had established the main lines of a philosophy centred on the concept of pure experience; but he had not by any means completed the philosophical programme which such an endeavour involves. A s in the logically analogous cases of neutral monism or idealistic monism, Nishida has to show how a number of key, fundamental concepts and aspects of experience can be derived from his proposed ultimate or metaphysical first principle and, if possible, to show that his way of conceptualizing how things are is preferable to our commonsense and scientific way of viewing the world. Importantly, the commonsense view rests on the A ristotelian assumption that individuals are real and ultimate; that explanations of natural phenomena will be in terms of efficient causation; and that certain distinctions we take to be ultimate (e.g. between space and time, mind and body, subject and object, fact and meaning) are indeed ultimate, marking real and final divisions in the order of things. Granted his assertion of the ontological ultimacy of pure experience, Nishida has to reject all these claims, and has to try to show that all these concepts and distinctions can be convincingly derived from the notion of pure experience as he understands it. H e has to show how pure experience, a unity beyond conceptual grasp, gives rise to conceptual thought, whose central purpose is to mark and articulate differences in what there is, differences that make possible the meaning which all our experience has. Nishida was abundantly aware of these lacunae in his philosophy, and applied himself continually to filling them. His second major book, Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness (hereafter IRSC), which appeared in 1917, marks the next stage in his continuing effort to refine and complete his philosophy, and this chapter is devoted to a study of that work. T he Japanese title of the book is Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei, and it is necessary to say something about the term jikaku, rendered as ‘self-consciousness’ in the standard E nglish translation of the work. Jikaku can certainly mean ‘selfconsciousness’, but this way of rendering it can easily mislead readers of standard E nglish – and especially those trained in the western philosophical tradition – into thinking that by this term Nishida is referring to individual self-awareness of an ordinary kind, governed by the transcendental unity of apperception and subjected to conceptualization. This is in fact a simplified understanding of what Nishida has in mind when he employs the term jikaku. T he primary usage of this term in Japanese is in religious contexts, where it refers to a special type of awareness or awakening, in which subject and object are non-separate; and in this book jikaku
Nishida and Western Philosophy
62
is used to denote Nishida’s ontological ultimate, but viewed in a special way. Kaku means ‘awakening’, and jikaku is pure experience which has in some sense (to be made more precise, if possible) become aware of itself; has awakened to itself. T he standard usage of the term ‘self-consciousness’ in western philosophy would be considered by Nishida to refer to a condition of self-consciousness without selfawakening, self-consciousness unaware of its groundedness in pure experience. H is choice of the term is not at all surprising, given its connotations in Japanese. H owever, because the term ‘self-consciousness’ in current E nglish is by no means a lexical synonym for what Nishida intends (because there is no such lexical synonym), I will occasionally use the Japanese term jikaku, as a reminder of what Nishida is referring to. Of the other terms in the title, ‘reflection’ (hansei) is Nishida’s word for the mode of consciousness which obtains when the absolute unity of pure or immediate experience has been modified as a result of the working out of the latter’s inherent, dynamic tensions. A s he puts the matter towards the end of An Inquiry into the Good: … due to the conflicts in the system of reality, and as the necessary process of development, the system of reality comes to disintegrate; that is, reflection inevitably arises. B y this means, that which was actual becomes conceptual, that which was concrete becomes abstract, and that which was one becomes many.
Reflection is conceptual thought, and Nishida equates it with the Fall in Christian theology. In common with many other commentators, Nishida therefore considers the Fall not a single historical event but a condition manifested every moment in ordinary consciousness, the result of our separation from primal unity. It is not a condition to be lamented, however, since it is a path which leads us, Nishida claims, back to a condition of profound unity. Intuition (chokkan), by contrast, is a direct, non-reflective grasp of concrete reality, and the term continues to bear in the present work the sense it has in An Inquiry into the Good, where it is often qualified (as in Fichte) by the adjective ‘intellectual’, to make it clear that what is in question is not a form of sense experience (it will be recalled that for Nishida sensations are abstractions constructed from pure experience, and not, as in the case of classical empiricism for example, ultimate data). Intuition is consciousness of the unbroken progression of ultimate reality just as it is: the subject/object division has not arisen, and that
��������������������������������������������������������������������������� A ccordingly, some translators prefer ‘self-awakening’ as the way to render jikaku. S ee e.g. Ueda 1993 and T remblay (in B erque 2000, vol. 1), who prefers l’éveil à soi. IG, p. 169. In the terms of The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana, reflection is the state which follows the arising of a thought, i.e. the splitting of the O ne Mind into subject and object. S ee H akeda 1967, pp. 50–51 and L ai 1980, p. 45. ������������� Ibid, p. 170.
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
63
which knows and that which is known are one. (T his is not to be taken as implying that intuition transcends the operation of consciousness, rather that intuition establishes the operation of consciousness itself.) Since reflection is a mode of consciousness which stands outside this progression and views it, the question at once arises how this can occur. In K antian terms, Nishida’s fundamental question in this book is: how is reflection possible, since in a sense we can never go outside the realm of intuition. In other words, Nishida in this book is trying to establish how the one becomes manifest as the many; how conceptual experience arises. Further, in common with the other fundamental distinctions considered in IRSC, that between intuition and reflection has to be shown to be non-ultimate, in the sense that both have to be derivable from pure/immediate experience or jikaku: but this is to anticipate the argument. In the period after the publication of An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida continued to read widely in western philosophy. A s is evident from the text of IRSC, he studied and was greatly impressed by the ideas of Fichte and of Bergson; both are often referred to and will be considered at appropriate points below. H is most frequent references, however, are to a group of philosophers now hardly read in the West except by a few historians of philosophy and specialist scholars: the neo-K antians. A t the time he was thinking out the ideas presented in IRSC, neo-K antians occupied most if not all of the important chairs of philosophy in Germany. Their broad approach to philosophy was designed to fill the void left by the collapse of German idealism after the death of H egel, and was in part also a response to the metaphysical pretensions of the other main trend in postidealist German thought, materialism. R eading the neo-K antians was to Nishida what reading Wittgenstein and Quine (for example) was to philosophers in the A nglophone world in the latter half of the last century: they were the benchmarks against which to measure one’s ideas, especially if one bears in mind the deep impression made on the Japanese by German thought in general. (It was regarded as far more profound, for example, than the empiricist–utilitarian tradition.) If one studied E uropean philosophy at all, these thinkers had to be read. Individual issues in neo-Kantianism will be referred to as appropriate below; but since this school of thought has for the moment largely receded over the horizon of history, a very few basic introductory remarks are appropriate here as background. T hese thinkers were integral to the philosophical atmosphere Nishida breathed at the time of composition of IRSC, are regularly referred to in it, and he takes it for granted that their ideas are known to his readers.
Neo-Kantianism The phrase ‘Back to Kant!’ first appeared in Kant und die Epigonen (1865 Kant and the Epigones), by O tto L iebmann (1840–1912), and became the slogan for IRSC, p. 3. S ee also Nishida’s essay My Philosophical Path, in Y usa 2002, p. 301.
64
Nishida and Western Philosophy
a group of philosophers whose procedure was to adopt what one can call K ant’s general position (as they understood it), apply it to philosophical problems as they were conceived at the time, and see what happened. What happened proved to be fairly varied in terms of philosophical doctrine: it is not possible to produce a list of ideas that all those called neo-K antians would have agreed on, since each representative of the movement had his own particular convictions, with the result that neo-K antianism is less tightly knit as a movement than logical positivism (for example) was later to be. H owever, it is possible to make some useful generalizations about this approach to philosophy, especially in respect of certain common assumptions, if not in respect of doctrines derived based on them. T he neo-K antians can be broadly divided into the Marburg and B aden schools, each having different areas of philosophical interest. T he principal foci of the Marburg school were logic, epistemology and philosophical method, and its most important members were H ermann Cohen (1842–1918) and Paul Natorp (1854– 1924). Cohen’s central interest is the unity of cultural consciousness, coupled with a strong sense of its historical development: he refers constantly to the historical development of the ideas he discusses, to their cultural significance at different times in history. In his Die logischen Grundlagen der exacten Wissenschaften (1910: The Logical Foundations of the Exact Sciences) Natorp tries to prove that the logical development of mathematics does not require intuitions of space and time: as will be seen below, the philosophy of mathematics was one of the areas which preoccupied Nishida in the period leading up to the writing of IRSC, and mathematical issues and concepts occur repeatedly in this book. A gain, fundamental to the classical K antian standpoint is an absolute separation between being and thought, a separation which resulted in the doctrine of the thing in itself. Nishida would have been sympathetic to the efforts of both Cohen and Natorp to bridge this gap. Natorp’s fundamental assertion is that being and thought stand in a constant, mutual relation: being exists only as a process or activity intrinsically related to thought. B eing and thought, one might say, are regarded as polar points on a single scale, though, as Copleston points out, it is not entirely clear that this view is compatible with K antianism, and it readily collapses into idealism. T he main focus of the B aden or S outh-West German school was on the concept of value, though construed in a particular way. Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915) regarded the central task of philosophy to be the investigation of the principles and presuppositions of value judgements, together with the relation between the judging consciousness and the value in accordance with which the judgement is made. T his did not restrict philosophy to areas such as ethics and aesthetics, the normal loci of axiological judgements. Windelband argues that non-axiological judgements also presuppose a value, namely truth. T hus logic, ethics and aesthetics are claimed to presuppose the values of truth, goodness and beauty. T his in turn ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� In what follows I have drawn not only on the works of the neo-K antians themselves but also on Beck 1967; Copleston 1965 ; Dussort 1963; Köhnke 1992; and Willey 1978. ���������������������������������������������� Copleston 1965, pp. 136–7; Natorp 1921, p. 13.
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
65
is taken to warrant the postulation of a transcendental value-setting consciousness which lies (as it were) behind empirical consciousness. T o the extent that all individuals appeal to these fundamental values, this transcendental consciousness forms a living bond between individuals. Windelband further claims that absolute values require an anchor in reality, the suprasensible reality we call god. Windelband’s successor H einrich R ickert (1863–1936) took over his master’s assumption of the centrality of the notion of value to philosophy. In R ickert’s view, values have reality but cannot be said to exist. T hey are real because (he contends) we do not create them but we recognize them. In value judgements, the individual brings together the realm of values and the sensible world, giving valuational significance to things and events. Before being there is meaning, and all consciousness involves consciousness of a value, a claim which, as will be seen below, preoccupied Nishida a good deal. Further, R ickert accepted Windelband’s claim that science and history have a radically different philosophical structure. S cience is concerned with phenomena only insofar as they are of repeatable types. S cience is a nomothetic or law-positing activity, and so it focuses on aspects of the world which can satisfy laws. B y contrast, history is concerned with events and persons insofar as they are singular and unique: history (as he puts it) is idiographic. What all these philosophers shared were not areas of philosophical interest or positive convictions but certain assumptions, and it is these latter, as much as the neo-K antians’ positive convictions, that could not but interest and exercise Nishida, given his own starting point. In particular, the neo-K antians assume an absolute distinction between value and being, meaning and fact. T hese dualities they took to be ultimate features of the rerum natura; final, bedrock data from which philosophizing had to begin, not susceptible of further explanation. With these points in mind, we can now approach Nishida’s thought as is developed in IRSC. T he book was written without a preconceived plan, being published first as a series of essays in Japanese philosophical journals. It shows Nishida working out his ideas as he goes along, and indeed changing his mind on certain issues, including the best way of characterizing his ontological ultimate. T he standard E nglish version (to which I will refer) is a somewhat reorganized version of the Japanese text. I have followed a roughly logical order of topics, not at all the order Nishida follows in his text. B efore moving on I would like to pay tribute to the editors of the E nglish version of IRSC, who have performed a great service to Nishida scholars by tracing the sources of many of the ideas/quotations from neo-K antians and other philosophers referred to by Nishida, and have saved subsequent scholars a great deal of time as a result.
Self-consciousness/jikaku In An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida describes his ultimate reality as either pure experience or immediate experience. B y the time of writing IRSC, he has added
Nishida and Western Philosophy
66
another characterization, namely that reality is a self-conscious system or selfconsciousness: the self-consciousness of the transcendental ego, close to but not identical with what Fichte means by the term Tathandlung: ‘independent, self-existent concrete consciousness, or immediate experience, in both its basic structure and its process of development, takes the form of self-consciousness’. The term ‘system’ is not defined by him, and its use serves chiefly to emphasize that the development of jikaku, however it is to be characterized, is not (like that of the Will in S chopenhauer’s thought, for example) chaotic. Nishida’s thought is not pessimistic: all the differentiation to which the development of self-consciousness gives rise embodies the possibility of a return to an even deeper unity, a unity regarded as self-evidently good. T he very nature of self-consciousness is that it is a self-generating, unending progression: these features are intrinsic to the nature of consciousness as such as Nishida understands it, and constitute data not further explicable. T he self which is conscious is a self in much the same way that Fichte’s E go is an ego, that is, something entirely remote from individual self-awareness but the ultimate ground of its possibility. S ince self-consciousness is what there is, everything else in experience must derive from it. Further, since there is nothing else beside selfconsciousness, the most fundamental description of reality must be that the self makes its own activity its object and reflects on it. T he subject/object distinction is thus held to arise wholly from within self-consciousness, and does not imply the existence of extra-conscious entities of any kind co-ultimate with consciousness. H ence Nishida stresses that self-consciousness in his sense is a far more basic fact about what there is than anything dealt with in psychology. T he latter deals with different types of conscious states of individuals, and such states of individuals are possible only if there is a unifying consciousness which transcends each of them: ‘T he psychological view … is … founded on a trans-individual self-consciousness. (In Kantian terms, the scientific standpoint has as its condition the unity of pure apperception.)’10 No argument is given for the assertion that the unifying consciousness of which he speaks is trans-individual, nor for the accompanying claim that our ability to recollect the past and to think of it in historical concatenation is possible only if we presuppose a self-consciousness which transcends time,11 at least if by the term ‘transcends’ he means (as he appears to) something more than ‘is continuous in time’. Perhaps in his mind are the problems which arise in K antianism once the
IRSC, p. xix. ������������� Ibid., p. 35. ������������ Ibid., p. 3. 10 ���������������������������������������������������� Ibid., p. 4. H e has in mind here a passage from the Critique of Pure Reason, B 132, but it is questionable whether K ant’s remarks can be made to license the interpretation that self-consciousness is trans-individual. 11 ������������ Ibid., p. 4.
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
67
thing-in-itself is dispensed with, and which it would not have been necessary to reiterate at the time. H e goes on to assert at once that ‘T his unifying consciousness … takes the form of an internal “ought” (Sollen)’.12 Here he is manifesting the influence of the Marburg school, which was right at the heart of his thought at the time when he began writing IRSC, though with a significant modification. Nishida accepts the neo-K antian assertion that all consciousness includes consciousness of a value, of an ‘ought’ as R ickert puts it,13 but he cannot allow that these values have a mode of being which is co-ultimate with but discrete from that of self-consciousness. R ather, they must be an aspect of self-consciousness itself. H e accepts that a transcendental ‘ought’ or value grounds cognition, but this value is non-different from self-consciousness: self-consciousness is the ‘ought’ recognizing the ‘ought’ itself, one instance of the self taking its own activity as its object.14 B orrowing an argument from Fichte, Nishida contends that only if self-consciousness is thus construed as the merging of subject and object in intellectual intuition can an infinite regress be avoided. If self-consciousness is analysed in terms of a thinking self conscious of another self which is its object of thought, then there is no reason why the cognizing self should not be the possible object of another consciousness, and so on ad infinitum. Accordingly, since self-consciousness exists, it cannot be analysed in terms of the subject/object distinction. S elf-consciousness has to be a condition to which the subject/object distinction does not apply, an ultimate datum in which subject and object, nominative and accusative selves, are just a unity.15 Manifestly, this fundamental position generates for Nishida a philosophical programme similar to that adumbrated in An Inquiry into the Good, but which he needs to pursue in more detail than he did in his first book. He has to derive from self-consciousness all the fundamental concepts of the commonsense world view, and it is to these derivations that IRSC is devoted – though, as will be seen, his favoured description of his metaphysical ultimate has changed by the time we arrive at the end of the book. In IRSC, he attempts to derive from the notion of self-consciousness the basic ideas of logic and mathematics and the concepts of space, time, art and the scientific view of the world. He also has a good deal to say about the nature of sensation, knowledge and judgement, teleology and the mind/body relation, and he develops his idea of the subject/object distinction. In these discussions the ideas of Fichte, the neo-K antians and B ergson are constant presences, as (significantly) are those of certain major figures in the European mystical tradition. Nishida makes no explicit methodological statement as to how he intends to proceed. H e does not try (in the manner of certain E uropean idealists) to construct a wholly deductive system, as Fichte for example claimed he would do (and 12
��������������� Ibid., pp. 4–5. ������������������ Ibid., p. 174, n5. 14 ��������������� Ibid., pp. 6–7. 15 ���������������������������� Ibid., p. 7 and p. 175, n23. 13
Nishida and Western Philosophy
68
failed). T hough, as we have seen, his concept of pure experience is not close to that of William James, his general position and philosophical agenda at the period of his development we are considering are more like those of radical empiricism or neutral monism than like anything else in the E uropean philosophical tradition. Hence it is not surprising to find that much of IRSC is composed of arguments reminiscent of those which fill the pages of the classical empiricists or of James, arguments which attempt to derive basic concepts from the data of consciousness and from a few fundamental mental operations. T o repeat, although the German idealist tradition is a constant presence in his thought, he does not commit himself to the construction of a wholly deductive philosophy. B efore moving on to consider his arguments on the topics just mentioned, it is appropriate to mention one technical phrase Nishida uses constantly but does not define: this is ‘a priori’, which occurs throughout IRSC as a noun rather than an adverb or adjective, thus (from a summary towards the end of the book): ‘We have argued that reality is one immediate experience, and that oppositions of thought and experience, spirit and body, rational and irrational, necessary and contingent, are but differences of the a priori of experiential unity.’16 A n a priori, in this usage, is simply a way of conceptualizing experience. Elsewhere he refers to sensation and reflection, or the artistic imagination or the scientific view of the world, as different types of a priori or systems of experience.17 The term is no more precisely defined than are those of a form of life or a language game (for example), but I have not found a place in his argument where this particular vagueness makes a difference to the truth of whatever he is dealing with at the time.
Logic and Mathematics Nishida cannot allow that any element of what there is, of whatever kind, is independent of or co-ultimate with jikaku, and that includes the laws of logic. What exists is the development of self-conscious experience, and accordingly the laws of logic have to be derived, in some way, from that. Further, if Nishida can show that what are often regarded as purely formal types of knowledge, in conformity with which the rest of experience is configured, are in fact derived from some property of pure self-consciousness, he will have gone quite some way towards carrying out his philosophical programme. Nishida does not attempt to deal with all the laws of logic, but rather focuses on the most basic one, the law of identity, A is A . If a case can be made for that, he assumes, the rest will follow.18
16
�������������� Ibid., p. 162. �������������� Ibid., p. 156. 18 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Nishida retained this view of logic. It can be found, for example, in his late essay The Intelligible World, IPN, p. 88. 17
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
69
When the development of the contents of consciousness is viewed formally, in abstraction from the contents themselves, he begins, both logic and mathematics are founded (I will return to mathematics presently). H e claims that the selfidentity of any content of consciousness gives rise to the purely logical form ‘A is A ’. T he point being asserted is that it is not possible to regard the principle of identity as independent of the development of the contents of consciousness, the lived experience of thinking. A ll that is needed to ground this law in jikaku, Nishida assumes, is the power to fix and universalize. To abstract and fix any content of consciousness, e.g. awareness of black, is to universalize it, to consider the various particular blacks as differentiations of the universal black. Such fixing and universalizing itself expresses an ‘ought’ or a value and condition of thought. T he law of identity emerges as the precondition of universalizing itself. While Nishida can go so far with the neo-K antians’ assertion that all thought embodies an ought or a value, he must characteristically part company with them when they draw implications based on their assumption of the ontological co-ultimacy of these values with experience. T hus Nishida has to deny R ickert’s claim that truth is transcendent and does not depend on whether human beings think it or not. Nishida denies that a truth which totally transcends thinking can have any meaning for us.19 Nishida is committed also to denying the K antian view that empirical knowledge is constituted by a structuring of content in accordance with a priori forms which are independent of it, and that formal knowledge is established autonomously while empirical knowledge is established in conformity with it. If, as Nishida argues, even the laws of logic are derived from the nature of the objects of thought, then there is no such independence of the form from the content of experience. R ather, all the elements of our ordinary, evolved experience will be derived finally from pure or immediate experience as he understands it.20 T he issue of the validity of the form/content distinction will recur at various points below. A s one might expect in the light of the above, Nishida also denies that the basic logical distinction between relation and quality is ultimate; he considers it instead to be ‘only a difference in viewing a single content of consciousness’.21 Usually we assume that judgements of identity are founded on a relation, but, when we view what is being related as one thing, that is a quality. For example, to think ‘red’ as an independent thing, or by contrast to be conscious of the ‘ought’ whereby ‘red is red’, are just two sides of an originally identical experience. In immediate, concrete experience there is only the self-development of a certain content of consciousness. In one sense it would have suited Nishida if he could have accepted a logicist position in the philosophy of mathematics (as R ickert for example did),22 since he could then have avoided many pages of arguments devoted to the derivation of IRSC, pp. 27–8 and 40–41. ���������������� Ibid., pp. 44–5. 21 ������������� Ibid., p. 30. 22 ������������� Ibid., p. 99. 19 20
Nishida and Western Philosophy
70
basic mathematical concepts from self-consciousness or pure experience. H owever, he regards logicism as false. L ogic he regards as more formal and universal than mathematics, and the laws of mathematics (he claims) must conform to the laws of logic. H owever, mathematical truths cannot be deduced from those of logic, for mathematics has something which must be called a content.23 H ence Nishida must try to derive the basic notions of mathematics from jikaku. H is remarks on these matters are by no means as consistent or convincing as they might be. For example: self-consciousness (he notes) is a purely qualitative development of content. It includes within itself both relation with itself and relation with another, contradictorily. T his is what permits a move from the purely formal standpoint of logic to that of mathematics, and the qualitative something can become the quantitative notion of one. T he quantitative notion of one is both the numerical one and the point in geometry. H ence (he concludes) both these basic mathematical notions are manifestations of basic properties of jikaku. T he unstated premise in this argument is the assumption that the concept of relation with another presupposes that of individuation – in other words the concept of oneness.24 H owever, the assertion here made that the point of geometry is a quantitative notion is elsewhere denied: When a self-conscious system has determined itself, it is a geometric point … S ince a point lies in the state of ‘immediacy’ of a self-conscious system, we can say that a point is qualitative. T he point of pure geometry, from which quantitative aspects have been completely eliminated, is produced by abstracting the qualitative aspects of the elements of number.25
A part from the issue of consistency, it is not clear whether Nishida is committed to a realist ontology of some kind in geometry or not: it is not specified whether the point which remains after this process of abstraction is itself some highly etiolated aspect of pure experience, or just a concept without a denotation in pure experience. A gain, he spends some time on the derivation of the concept of a continuous straight line from the basic nature of self-consciousness. Nishida predictably has little patience with the accounts of consciousness of rectilinearity to be found in the works of the psychologists of his day, notably Wundt. A ccording to the latter, awareness of a straight line is constituted from sensations graded qualitatively and intensively. Nishida asks, however, what it is that binds these graded sensations together as awareness of one straight line: I think that it is precisely the developmental aspect of a self-conscious system. Introspection reveals the infinite possibilities of the development of the self, 23
������������� Ibid., p. 40. �������������� Ibid., p. 106. 25 �������������� Ibid., p. 103. 24
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
71
and this is the origin of the consciousness of rectilinearity; the notion of straightness reveals the being-in-itself, the state of immediacy, of self-conscious development.26
Put another way, Nishida claims that the form of any individual’s self-consciousness is one straight line. T he straight line of geometry is the extremely abstract selfconsciousness of an individual. Contentless, formal mathematical development exhibits the basic structure of self-conscious unity.27 It is not at all clear, however, why abstraction from the experience of self-awareness, interrupted by sleep and unconsciousness and subjected to multiple distractions, should give rise to the idea of a continuous, straight line. A gain, Nishida argues that there is no radical discontinuity or difference in kind between our mathematical conceptualizations of, for example, a curve or a circle and our sensible intuitions of them. T ake for example the experience of moving our hand from one place to another. T his cannot be categorized, Nishida contends, as just an individual sense-impression. It reveals, at a phenomenological level, an experiential equivalent of the mathematical conceptions of movement and continuity, and it suggests that the continuity constitutive of perception is essentially the same as that which is the object of mathematical thinking. More generally, he contends, this experience suggests that perception is constituted by thought.28 Much the same difficulties arise here as in other such claims by Nishida: experiences of particular circles (tokens) are not mathematical figures (types), and he gives no good argument for supposing that there is not a radical logical difference between the two of the kind he wants to avoid.
Space and Time It will be clear by now that the philosophy of pure experience/self-consciousness dictates Nishida’s basic position with regard to both space and time. H e cannot allow that either of them is co-ultimate with self-consciousness, but instead must argue that both are derived from it. A gain, as one would expect, he denies that space and time are in some way derived from perception, which is itself a complex construction from self-consciousness and, in his view, a considerable abstraction from it.29 It is worth quoting at length a typical passage in which his basic position is asserted: just as it provides the basis of pure time, self-consciousness also provides the basis of pure space … It confers on both time and space their a priori quality. 26
�������������� Ibid., p. 109. ����������������� Ibid., pp. 106–7. 28 ������������� Ibid., p. 87. 29 ������������� Ibid., p. 97. 27
Nishida and Western Philosophy
72
Whereas time and number express the infinite progression of self-consciousness, in endless relativity, flux, and indeterminateness, space is the determination of relationships, the positive manifestation of self-consciousness as the internal unity which grounds infinite relationships … Self-consciousness is at once the infinite progression of ‘reflection-qua-action’ and an unchanging unity. Thus it demands both infinite transition and infinite determination. Time manifests the contradictoriness of self-consciousness as infinite transition, while space manifests its absolute reality as creative action.30
Jikaku, like Bergson’s pure duration, is a single, internally unified experience, continuous and heterogeneous, in which each part has a particular position and significance: it is consciousness to which no reflective thought has been added. S uch a unity does not require the addition of any universal concepts. A ccordingly, combining or arranging its elements by reference to a homogeneous medium like space or clock time is extrinsic to it and constitutes an addition to it.31 S pace and time are not preconditions of jikaku, but constructions from it. Pure thought creates time and space: the former is its quantitative aspect, the latter its qualitative aspect. T ime is formed from the development of the self, space from the distinction of the directions of this development, and thinghood from the unity of both.32 T his position entails that Nishida has to deny a basic assertion of neoK antianism, namely that there is an absolute distinction in the nature of things between – on the one hand – immediate experience, unified from within, and – on the other – experience unified externally, through the forms of space and time. L ike all the other allegedly absolute distinctions proposed by the neo-K antians, this one is claimed by Nishida to be non-ultimate, both terms in its name being derivable from self-consciousness.33 While he can accept the K antian assertion that time is the form that unifies our experience, he adds the claim that the ability to unify experience in this way derives from the unifying function of transcendental apperception. T ime is, accordingly, founded on our consciousness of an ‘ought’ or value, it being understood that this value is constitutive of self-consciousness, and not a condition for it which is independent of it.34 A s one might expect, Nishida can agree with B ergson and H usserl that absolute time (the clock time used in scientific measurement, which flows evenly) is not the most basic manifestation of time. Prior to it is what B ergson calls pure duration and H usserl phenomenological time: the inner order of the élan vital, from which clock or absolute time is a convenient abstraction.35 Nishida believed 30
����� Ibid. ����������������� Ibid., pp. 17–18. 32 ����������������� Ibid., pp. 151–2. 33 ������������� Ibid., p. 25. 34 ����������������� Ibid., pp. 13–14. 35 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid., p. 161. H usserl also calls this ‘appearing time, appearing duration, as appearing’. H usserl 1991, p. 5. 31
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
73
that relativity theory provided support for this view, since he took it to show that the concept of an evenly flowing time had no secure basis in reality.36 (O ne wonders whether he had the right, on his own terms, to argue in this way, since relativity theory, in his view, is true only of the world of science, which he regards as an abstraction from the richness of pure experience rather than as a theory true of absolute reality as he conceived it.) T rying to use absolute time to order the changes in self-consciousness produces a fossilized picture of how ultimate reality functions. T hese changes do not occur in a straight line from past to future: they are better imaged as undulatory, spreading out in a circular manner from the present, regarded as a centre.37 T his view is consonant with remarks that Nishida makes concerning the phenomenology of time consciousness. O ne of the most important differences between matter and life resides in their relation to time. O nly living things know a unique present. Purely material, inanimate things do not have this relation to time; their condition at any given time is accidental to them. B y contrast, living things are in contact with the flow (as Nishida puts it) of an infinite self-consciousness, and bear its stamp.38 T he present, consequently, is of extreme importance to living things: ‘T he present is the center of gravity of the real because it is the point where our experience is in motion, and only that which is in motion is real.’39 T he importance Nishida attaches to the present does not, however, imply acceptance on his part of the B ergsonian doctrine of the absolute unrepeatability of the past, not even the past of a moment ago (though he does accept B ergson’s claim that absolute time arises from the mental habit of spatializing time, regarding it as an entirely homogeneous medium.40) It will be recalled that, for B ergson, duration is a wholly qualitative multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another. Put another way, the elements of duration interpenetrate one another. We should think of duration, B ergson claims, as ‘succession without distinction … as a mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought’.41 A n important consequence of this is that each phase of duration is unique and, hence, cannot be repeated. No phenomenon registered in duration can ever be exactly repeated, since all repetition involves the knowledge that it is a repetition. S uch awareness is qualitative and affects the nature of the repetition:
IRSC, p. 116. ����������������� Ibid., pp. 133–4. 38 ����������������� Ibid., pp. 124–5. 39 �������������� Ibid., p. 129. 40 �������������������������������������������� Ibid., p. 129. Cf, e.g. B ergson 1910, p. 99. 41 ��������������������� B ergson 1910, p. 101. 36 37
Nishida and Western Philosophy
74
even the simplest psychic elements possess a personality and life of their own, however superficial they may be; they are in a constant state of becoming, and the same feeling, by the mere fact of being repeated, is a new feeling.42
A gainst this, Nishida argues that B ergson’s claims about the unrepeatability of any content of consciousness themselves presuppose the possibility of a trans-temporal consciousness, because a consciousness of time which does not presuppose the transcendence of time is self-contradictory.43 Whether this is an important point depends on quite what Nishida means by ‘transcending time’. If he means only that the idea of consciousness without memory is to all intents unimaginable (if not unintelligible), then such an assertion would not have troubled B ergson, who shares this idea.44 E lsewhere Nishida observes that ‘[m]emory makes the past present; it thus transcends time’,45 and this appears to imply that the transcendence he has in mind is merely that of ordinary remembering, which is an event in time in which certain contents of past experiences are recalled. If he means something more by the term ‘transcends’, then we need to be told quite what, and we are not. A t all events, Nishida has another argument against B ergson’s unrepeatability thesis, namely this one: ‘What is unrepeatable here is a sensation on which we have already reflected, not the original sensation itself.’46 T his in turn presupposes (as Nishida knew47) that it is possible to identify an un-reflected upon sensation. To identify such a sensation must mean to discriminate it from others; but how this can be done in a way which does not involve reflection (thus satisfying Bergson’s definition of the unrepeatable) is not clear.
Sensation and Judgement H aving given an account of the origin of logic, mathematics, space and time from jikaku, Nishida turns his attention to other fundamental philosophical issues, which need to be similarly accounted for in terms of his ontological ultimate. It follows from his fundamental assertion of the ultimacy of pure experience that all consciousness contains its objects within itself. H e therefore has to analyse sensation from such a point of view, and in so doing he also goes some way towards redescribing the objective world, deriving it from pure experience. H e cannot accept (for example) the Kantian view that sensation is the unification 42
�������������� Ibid., p. 200. IRSC, pp. 47–8. 44 ������������ E .g. in his Introduction to Metaphysics: ‘there is no consciousness without memory’. B ergson 1946, p. 211. 45 IRSC, p. 133. 46 ������������� Ibid., p. 48. 47 ������������� Ibid., p. 46. 43
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
75
of the manifold of intuition of externally generated elements, or indeed any commonsense account of sensations as caused by external entities, knowable or otherwise. S ensation (like all other mental operations) has to be accounted for solely in terms of modifications of jikaku, and this he regards as a strength, not as a weakness. T he Marburg school of neo-K antians (he contends) put itself in an impossible position by denying any possibility of the immanence of the objects of cognition within consciousness.48 T he truly given is the self-deployment of the content of consciousness, and sensation (like all other forms of conscious activity) is a species or aspect of this self-deployment – what Nishida often calls a particular a priori or form of consciousness. What happens in what we call sensation is that in the concrete texture of immediate experience sensory content is a living force, which deploys itself according to an internal a priori in what we call the development of sensation. O nly an oblique approach, starting from the conventional premise that sensation arises from the operation of external things on the sense organs, leads us to think of sensation as given from without, or as resulting from the evolution of these sense organs.49
T he external, objective world, our own bodies and their sense organs, are, equally, constructions from pure experience, and the conventional view of sensation as a response to an external stimulus is merely one way – and not the most basic one – of viewing this situation. A s has been contended already, the preconditions of sensation, as the latter is conventionally analysed – time, space and quality – are themselves constructions founded on pure experience. A nother and more basic way of describing sensation is to view it as ‘the process, a kind of fieri, whereby a certain concrete universal determines itself’.50 Pure experience is not a particular, and so it must be a universal; it is not abstract, and so it must be concrete. When it deploys itself according to a certain a priori or form, what results is what we call sensation. A n important consequence of Nishida’s basic approach to the analysis of mental operations is that cognition and sensation, contrary to the opinion of many philosophers, cannot be radically different in kind, since both are manifestations of the self-deployment of a consciousness which contains its own objects. H ence Nishida asserts that to cognize the quality of a certain sensation is to unify it from a deeper position and to view it as the selfdetermination of a concrete universal. In the philosophy in which pure experience is the ultimate ground of all there is and the realm within which everything takes place, the consciousness of cognition is not different in kind from that of sensation. S ensory consciousness is a particular instance of cognitive consciousness, and the latter, though it seems to be chronologically later, is prior to sensory consciousness 48
������������� Ibid., p. 49. ������������� Ibid., p. 44. 50 ����������������� Ibid., pp. 49–50. 49
Nishida and Western Philosophy
76
in the realm of value. Granted our ordinary conception of time, this may seem nonsensical; but that is because, in Nishida’s view, our ordinary conception of time is incorrect in that time is non-ultimate: ‘the spatiotemporal order, no less than that of sensory quality, must have as its ground the unity of internal quality’.51 T hat is, it must have the quality internal to pure experience as it deploys itself, which entails that at its most basic level our experience is the unfolding of an internal meaning. A s in all philosophies which regard ultimate reality as mental in nature and the material world as in some way a manifestation of mind or consciousness, Nishida has to give a new sense to the concepts of objectivity and truth. H e has excluded from the class of theories to which he can consistently subscribe all subject/objectcorrespondence accounts, and, if he is to avoid solipsism, he has to give a sense to the idea of objectivity within the realm of self-consciousness alone: S ensation, since it is not the real, but only one form of the relationship between consciousness and its content, is similar in this respect to intuition and thinking. It becomes objective by our thinking it as the determination of a continuous unity, and then it is qualified to function as an element of knowledge within the system of experience.52
S ensations are not indications of the nature of an external world, but a type of modification of consciousness. They are truly understood only when regarded in this way. A s is the case in H egel’s thought, the content of experience in Nishida’s philosophy has to have its own nature, to take the place of the nature of the not-self in dualist philosophies, otherwise objectivity in judgements becomes impossible and experience becomes no better than a dream. Just as he has to give a special sense to the notion of sensation, so Nishida has also to work out his own theory of judgement. H e cannot accept a K antian model, in which empirical knowledge is constituted by the imposition of a form on the manifold generated entirely independently of it. A ll the elements and processes involved in judgement have to be derived from self-consciousness alone. T hus for him the judgement ‘T his is black’ is not constituted merely by the combination of two representations, but is always grounded on a prior synthesis. T his prior synthesis is constituted by the content ‘black’, an instance of the constructive, selfdeploying power of pure experience. Judgement is not constituted, as the K antians claim, by the conformity of content to a form which is utterly different from it. R ather, the judgement ‘T his is black’ is constituted by the force of the content ‘black’ itself, which imposes itself as a H usserlian essence. T his A ct founds the objectivity of factual judgments, just as a similar A ct founds the knowledge of logical form, and it also entitles 51
������������� Ibid., p. 51. ������������� Ibid., p. 53.
52
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
77
the content of knowledge to claim its own rights over against form. Immediate experience, that which is truly given, is the self-deployment of the content of consciousness, and it is this act which concretely constitutes judgment.53
Pure or immediate experience simply deploys itself, and it is this self-deployment that Nishida here characterizes by the term ‘A ct’, used in much the same sense as Fichte’s term Tathandlung. For him, both the form and the content of judgement are manifestations of the A ct, which is the activity of pure experience. Further, the distinction between the form and the content of judgement is not absolute in Nishida’s view. T he K antian view is that the formal element in judgement is established autonomously, while empirical knowledge is established in conformity with it. A s we have seen, the philosophy of pure experience leads Nishida to claim that even logic is derived from the nature of pure consciousness; and, since the content of experience is also thus derived, he is not inclined to regard the form and the content of judgement as entirely heterogeneous and independent of each other. H is claim is that (in the light of the assertions quoted in the preceding paragraph) judgement is not constituted by its form, but should be regarded as a development of its content, which is its real foundation. Indeed the content of experience can constrain its form, rather than vice versa: T he apparent independence of the experiential basis of factual judgment from transcendental a priori forms derives from the fact that experiential content inherently itself constitutes a system. B ecause it is inherently systematic, and because it also belongs within a larger system which comprises the logical system too, experience can constrain logical form.54
In other words, it is Nishida’s view that what K ant would call the manifold is not itself formless but rather a manifestation of the self-development of selfconsciousness/pure experience, a process of purely qualitative change which is not a chaos. B ecause pure experience is not formless but has a nature, this nature places a constraint on how it can be conceptualized. Precisely how this constraint operates we are not told. It is not enough for Nishida to argue that, because logic and the content of experience are, alike, manifestations of pure experience, they are bound to be harmonious; for he claims that pure experience manifests contradictions. T he point is unresolved.
Subject and Object A nother distinction usually construed as absolute by philosophers, and the one which most exercised Nishida throughout his career, is that between subject and 53
������������� Ibid., p. 43. ������������� Ibid., p. 45.
54
Nishida and Western Philosophy
78
object. A s is the case with other such distinctions, like those between fact and value or form and content, Nishida does not allow this distinction to be other than relative. B ecause he denies that there is any absolute distinction between immanent and transcendent objects of consciousness, he can claim that the distinction between subject and object is contingent.55 T he true subject is the constructive, unifying activity of consciousness, which cannot be made an object of reflection. T his subject is the foundation of the object, and its activity and content are not separate – the view that they are separate Nishida calls ‘abstract dualism’.56 T he synthesizing process of subjectivity is identical with the ‘act’ whereby the content of consciousness develops itself. S ubject is immanent object and object is immanent subject: subject and object are not discrete entities but aspects of the same, self-developing reality: ‘T he subject–object opposition is only a moment of this concrete reality, and the true subjectum in the mediaeval sense is this activity in which the opposition of subject and object is submerged.’57 T he reason for this is that pure experience in itself, the self-deployment of a concrete universal, is neither subjective nor objective, but prior to this distinction, which is only one of point of view: When [any] experience is viewed in terms of its continuity with the underlying comprehensive subject, its self-development now appears as subjective activity (whether thinking or seeing), and the point of origin of this activity, that is, the point of contact between the experienced activity and the underlying concrete subject, is the psychological self. In contrast, when this experience is unified as an object, that is, when it is viewed as part of the object world of the comprehensive subject, it is objective existence.58
L ike all the other major dualisms involved in non-monistic philosophies and in the commonsense view of the world, Nishida has to give an account of the subject/object distinction, which does not presuppose an object world external to consciousness; and this analysis, carried out in terms of points of view, is his way of so doing in IRSC.
Universals T hough it does not follow any of the best-known models, Nishida’s account of universals can be called a version of realism. H e certainly wants to avoid nominalism: universals formed by abstraction from similarities among particulars encountered in sense experience would be inert. In his system, universals are concrete and self55
������������� Ibid., p. 69. ������������� Ibid., p. 70. 57 ������������� Ibid., p. 71. 58 ��������������������������������������� Ibid., pp. 105–6; emphasis in original. 56
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
79
developing and, far from being abstractions from multiple sense experiences, they are a precondition for them. T his is an application of the view we have already encountered – that cognition is as basic a form of experience as sensation: for a particular red to be distinguished from other particular reds, there must be a comprehensive totality at their base; before distinction there must be synthesis, and before the distinction of particular qualities the consciousness of a universal must be operating. T he consciousness of the universal must be immediate, and simultaneous with the consciousness of particular qualities.59
T he relationship between a universal and a particular has generally been thought of as wholly qualitative, a particular being that wherein a certain quality has been added to a universal. For Nishida, by contrast (following L otze and B osanquet60), the true relationship between universal and particular lies in the development of systems of experience. This claim, Nishida argues, can be verified experientially. For example, the notion of a particular colour being subsumed under that of colour in general can be interpreted as the experiential development of colour in general (the Husserlian essence of colour); and the system of colours arises in this way. Colour is a concrete universal operating on itself: as Nishida puts the matter later in the book in B ergsonian terms, the experience of colour is a creative evolution, a manifestation of the élan vital manifested by pure experience.61 It is not at all the case that universalization consists in the quantitative division of an originally indivisible system of experience into independent and static elements which are then recombined.62 Nishida’s universals are real presences within the realm of jikaku.
Mind and Body With all the above in mind, it is now appropriate to turn to Nishida’s account of one of the most basic and important distinctions, one which is constitutive both of the commonsense and of the scientific world views: that between mind and body. O ur body is the most important object in our world, and in examining Nishida’s account of it in IRSC we will also consider his account of how what we ordinarily call the objective world, the not-self, comes to be constructed out of self-consciousness. Nishida was perfectly aware that his ontology of an ultimate pure experience/self-consciousness entails views which are in many respects the reverse of both common sense and science and gives rise to some hard questions – for instance, did the world not exist prior to the emergence of consciousness? H ow 59
������������� Ibid., p. 60. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The relevant texts by Lotze and Bosanquet are identified by the editors in the E nglish edition of IRSC, notes 43 and 44. 61 IRSC, pp. 114–15. 62 ����������������� Ibid., pp. 20–21. 60
Nishida and Western Philosophy
80
did consciousness arise? Is the scientific account of the evolution of the universe entirely false?63 (It should be recalled that this was written when relativity was a new theory and quantum mechanics in its infancy; about twenty years before it was known that there were any other galaxies beside our own; and about half a century before the big bang theory began to be widely discussed. What he has in mind when he refers to the scientific world view is a picture of the universe based on materialism and D arwinism.) T he view entailed by his philosophy is remote from the scientific world picture: ‘It is not the nebulae, but the history of personality, that is the origin of the world.’64 H e denies that there is such a thing as matter or material substance which is co-ultimate with consciousness, and so he removes all forms of two-substance dualism – interactive, parallelist or epiphenomenal – from his list of possible answers to the mind/body problem; and of course he denies materialistic monism. H is task is to give an account of the development of our concepts of mind and body, and of the objective material world in general, from jikaku alone. His first move is to argue that his view of the nature of things is conceptually less problematic than the alternatives, dualist or materialistic monist. If we begin from the material world, he claims, the way in which consciousness arises is a mystery, and generates problems well known in dualist accounts of the mind/body relation, for instance: how do changes in the eye give rise to the sensation of colour as it registers in the consciousness of an individual? From the scientific point of view, consciousness appears simply as a mysterious adjunct to physical phenomena. It is better to begin from the phenomena of consciousness. If one begins from them, what we call objective phenomena are simply an interpretation of them, a construction made out of them. What we call our body is itself one such construction. A ccordingly, the assertion that sensations depend on pre-existent sense organs means only that, with the emergence and destruction of certain aspects of consciousness which we call sense organs, certain other phenomena of consciousness (sensations) emerge or are destroyed.65 A ll statements about sensations and all statements about bodies (including our own) are really statements about changes in pure experience, the latter being construed in a way that, we find, allows us to make sense of experience. Nishida insists that mentalistic and physicalistic propositions simply register points of view we take on pure experience, rather than recording bedrock ontological differences. Commonsense individualism is just a point of view, and others, equally valid, are available: we can also adopt a purely logical viewpoint, and conceive all relationships as relationships of reasons and conclusions. O r we can proceed to an epistemological
63
������������������ Ibid., pp. 115–16. �������������� Ibid., p. 161. 65 ������������������ Ibid., pp. 116–18. 64
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
81
discussion of the grounds of knowledge and, with Fichte, H egel and Cohen, grasp spatial categories in terms of the creative development of thought.66
Nishida makes the unspoken, undefended assumption that such points of view are conceptually unproblematic. H e does not provide any good reason to believe that alternatives to commonsense individualism are co-basic with it. E ven if his preferred point of view sidesteps some of the intractable problems involved in dualist accounts of the mind/body problem, notably how interaction is possible, Nishida still has to give an account of how we come to associate one particular set of experiences (our own) with a particular body (our own). T he latter is ex hypothesi also a set of experiences construed from a particular point of view: how does it come about that these two sets of constructions from pure experience come to be so intimately linked? H ow and why do they come to be so tightly unified? It will be clear from what has been said already that in Nishida’s view the relationship of mind and body cannot be explained in mechanistic terms. Nor is vitalism an option for him, since all it does (he argues) is to postulate a force within cells which goes beyond chemical functions, and such a force is no better than a something-we-know-not-what. T he only viable account of the mind/body relation, Nishida claims, is in terms of teleology: if a body is to be linked intimately to spirit or consciousness, it must be as a teleological unity. What links mind and body is the activity of the will, and it is the will that has to be studied if we want to understand the mind/body relation. Were we not aware of volition, we could not distinguish our body from other material objects and we would have no reason to believe it to have a special relationship to consciousness.67 S ensation arises because our body is a teleological unity, a single functional entity. S uch teleological unity is a precondition of sensation.68 (T here can be little doubt that one of the principal reasons for the change, late in IRSC, in the description of Nishida’s ontological ultimate from self-consciousness to absolute free will is his need to give an account of the mind/body relation. I will return to this change presently.) When things are joined, there must be something in common between them, and, in the case of mind and body, what joins them is voluntary activity. We extract from the world of pure experience that which conforms to the will of the self, and this we conceive of as the self’s body, which can be regarded as a creation of the will.69 Granted the options left to him, it is not a surprise that Nishida should have fixed on the concept of the will in this way: he needs something non-physical to serve as an agent of union between two streams from the realm of jijaku, and unity of purpose is a reasonable choice in the circumstances. 66
�������������� Ibid., p. 116. ������������������ Ibid., pp. 119–20. 68 ������������������ Ibid., pp. 120–21. 69 �������������� Ibid., p. 121. 67
Nishida and Western Philosophy
82
T o complete this account, Nishida needs to say something about the nature of the self, of which the will has been claimed to be an aspect. H e approaches this issue by way of some remarks about apperception. A t one level, apperception is the internal development of conscious content itself – a basic fact which cannot be further explained: A t a deeper level, it is the consciousness of a self-conscious system which is the basic form of reality, and denotes the self-generative, self-developmental aspect of reality. O ne’s consciousness need not be termed particularly ‘mine’, for all content of which one is conscious is universal, and only the consciousness which accompanies this developmental activity of a certain content can be called the self.70
(T he doctrine of the primacy of pure experience is regarded by Nishida as having the consequence that all conscious contents are universal. What is being claimed, one supposes, is that a given awareness of redness or a specific sound could figure indifferently in more than one individual consciousness; but one wonders how plausible this thesis is with regard to, for example, personal memories.) T he self is the primal nominative, as it were, that which has the experiences and which can never itself be an object of consciousness; that which is aware of the development of conscious content. What we call our personal self is a bundle of psychological acts: Our conscious ego is the unity of various a priori as grasped in reflection from the standpoint of absolute will, and our body is the projection of this unity upon the object world of reflection (just as a sense organ is the objective projection of a certain sense experience).71
T he general lines of Nishida’s account of the individual self and of the mind/ body relation are clear enough from these remarks: the unity of the individual self is a result of the unification of purpose furnished by the will, and it is this same conation that unifies the two streams from the realm of jikaku which we call our mind and our body. H owever, Nishida has still not completed this part of his programme: those who accept the commonsense view and the scientific view of the world have a story to tell about how individuals come to be, a story of great complexity, but coherent and based on long chains of efficient causation within the material world. Nishida has rejected this account as merely one point of view, without special status. H is bedrock account of the way things come to be has to be different, and this issue leads to his views on teleology and on the will in the later stages of IRSC. 70
����� Ibid. �������������� Ibid., p. 157.
71
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
83
Absolute Free Will In the Preface to the first edition of IRSC, Nishida makes the comment that, ‘[I]f I have succeeded, I think I have shown that a new interpretation of Fichte can serve as the foundation of both K antian and B ergsonian thought’.72 T he new interpretation of Fichte comes to prominence in the later parts of the book, and points to Nishida’s adoption of the concept of absolute free will as his preferred way of characterizing his ontological ultimate, previously called pure or immediate experience or self-consciousness. A s has been mentioned, one reason for this change was undoubtedly Nishida’s need to find a way of characterizing the mind/ body relation within the terms of his philosophy; but he has other reasons for moving to the notion of absolute free will, and these can now be examined. No explanation can be given for the existence of the will. Nishida gives no arguments to account for it: he does not claim, for example, that it is a necessary existent. Its being is simply an ultimate datum, and is inexplicable: ‘T he cause of the will remains an incomprehensible mystery … No concept can capture and no quality can exhaust the self, which comes from, and returns to, creative nothingness.’73 (T his is nothingness in its Zen sense of mu, as explained in Chapter 1.) It is an absolute, truly creative reality, which is both everything and nothing, motion and rest. It is not correct to say that it is one or that it is many; that it changes or that it does not change. It is an unfathomable infinity. It eludes reflection yet is the ground for reflection. Like the god of Pseudo-Dionysius, the will is in everything but is not anything. It embraces infinite order, but is not itself characterized by any order. S ince it grounds causation, it cannot be governed by causal law.74 Even to call it absolute will is misleading; and in a rare quotation from a Zen source Nishida notes that ‘the moment one tries to explain it, one misses the target’.75 S uch a description is inapplicable to everything else that is, and hence to postulate such a thing at all may seem an unnecessary hypothesis. Its postulation is, however, necessary from the philosophical point of view, Nishida claims, and he gives two reasons for adopting this position. The first reason is that the ground for the proposition ‘A is A’ can be found neither in its subject nor in its predicate, nor in something apart from them, but only ‘in an underlying pre-cognitive concrete totality’.76 T he second reason is that the idea of a continuum is possible only if there is such a pre-cognitive ground, for such a concept cannot be arrived at through the idea of endless division.77 T he presupposition that every concept we devise must have a direct original in 72
�������������� Ibid., p. xix. �������������� Ibid., p. 134. 74 �������������� Ibid., p. 135. 75 ������������������������������������� Ibid., p. 139. T he quotation is from The Record of the Transmission of the Lamp/ Jingde zhuan deng lu, in D aoyuan 1990, B ook 5. 76 IRSC, p. 140. 77 ����� Ibid. 73
Nishida and Western Philosophy
84
experience may not at the present time seem compelling, and Nishida adds to these claims a direct appeal to introspection. T he will is pre-cognitive, but that does not entail that no form of awareness of it is possible. O n the contrary, we are constantly aware of it: ‘A s the eye cannot see the eye, nor the camera photograph itself, so it is impossible to capture this totality within the lens of the camera of cognition, yet it is immediately tangible as the freedom of the will.’78 A s he puts the matter elsewhere, we are aware through introspection that our will, while free at every point, is subsumed within one great free will. O ur self is free in its entirety, as the K antian kingdom of ends or as the H egelian Concept. E ach will is independently free, but all are included within absolute will.79 T his does not mean that the individual will, as objectified in the natural world, can break the laws which govern the natural world; but, at root, the will of an individual belongs to a deeper, more concrete stratum of experience, what K ant called the intelligible world.80 T his notion of the ultimate as a pre-cognitive, atemporal will, derived from Fichte, appealed to Nishida not only because of its promising role in the mind/ body relation but also because it allows him to account for the fact of change, one of the principal challenges in one-and-many philosophies. T he absolute will includes what Nishida calls disjunction or tension81 and is the immediate, absolute process of creation. O nce again, he regards this as almost a self-evident datum of experience: there is no fact more immediate and indubitable than the birth of being from non-being, which occurs constantly in the actuality of our experience … when we penetrate to the immediacy of that creative act which produces being from nothingness … we find absolute free will, and come in contact with infinite reality, with the will of God.82
T he term ‘act’ here is used in a sense much like Fichte’s term Tathandlung, and denotes an atemporal feature of the will, not an identifiable, single act of an individual in time. T hat the will is creative is once again just a datum: it is just so, and no explanation of this fact is possible. A gain, the term ‘non-being’ is used in the sense of the Japanese term mu, and does not denote an absolute nothingness, but the pre-conceptual ultimate from which all differentiated entities arise. T hat the absolute will is beyond conceptual grasp does not mean that it is unconnected with conceptual knowledge – manifestly, Nishida cannot allow such a logical gap in a system in which all aspects of experience have in some sense to be derivable 78
����� Ibid. �������������� Ibid., p. 166. 80 �������������� Ibid., p. 146. 81 �������������� Ibid., p. 140. 82 ������������������ Ibid., pp. 140–41. 79
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
85
from the will/self-consciousness/pure experience. H is response to this issue is to claim that the will includes knowledge within itself as one of its aspects: K nowledge expresses the will’s self-return, its regressus, and the world of the objects of knowledge is a mirror in which the will’s form is reflected. T his knowledge gives an image, not the substance of the thing itself, which is unknowable.83
Quite how this image resembles, or differs from, its original is not explained, perhaps because Nishida would regard such a question as unanswerable. A n absolute will thus conceived is claimed by Nishida to solve one of the deepest problems he is addressing in IRSC, namely how to move from, or relate, pure experience (a system of pure thought) to the experience of a public world of discrete selves and objects. T he problem stems partly from our habit of conceiving of a system of pure thought under abstract conceptual descriptions. We then inevitably assume that, as in K antianism, the content of experience is given contingently and extrinsically to the form of thought, and this Nishida regarded as introducing an unacceptable chasm into a realm of experience which he felt at the deepest level to be a unity. T he mistake consists in not discerning the ‘concrete subject’, common both to the realm of pure thought and to the realm of public experience. T his concrete subject is the absolute will, of which both realms are similar activities: in Nishida’s view, the concept of the will enables him not only to relate mind and body but to solve this general problem in his philosophy. Nishida presents a type of transcendental argument to back this claim: T he unity of this self [i.e. the absolute will] is above logic, and cannot be grasped within any of the a priori of pure thought which are its partial aspects. Y et without the experience of this unity it would be impossible to conceive in any way the relationship between the form and the content of knowledge.84
Without the fundamental unity constituted by the will, in Nishida’s view, there would be an unbridgeable bifurcation in what there is. A n important consequence of this general position is that, at the deepest level, explanations of what there is and of what occurs are teleological and not mechanistic. As we have seen, the commonsense and scientific public world is for Nishida not ontologically ultimate, but a partial abstraction from, and construction out of, pure experience. T ime, space, individuals and causation are all derivative from pure experience and, accordingly, neither they nor their relations can be used to explain reality at the most basic philosophical level:
83
�������������� Ibid., p. 148. �������������� Ibid., p. 144.
84
Nishida and Western Philosophy
86
T o seek to replace teleology with mechanistic explanation is to commit an error like that of the ancient analysts who tried to find the limit point by dividing infinitely; the goal is not to be constructed, but is given from the start, and advance to it is no more than its means. T he teleological goal is the concrete foundation of the object world, and as L otze says, organism is the goal of nature, and spirit is the goal of organism. Matter viewed in relation to the acts which are the immediate object of absolute will becomes teleological, and the point of junction between the two can be thought of as the center of life or as the point of union between spirit and body.85
T his position is unavoidable, granted the positions Nishida has taken up in IRSC. T he will/pure experience is the ground of causation and cannot be regarded as obeying laws of efficient causation. Explanations of phenomena in terms of efficient causation are confined to the world of objects described by science, an abstraction constructed from pure experience. T herefore, if there are going to be any explanations of what there is at a near-ultimate level, they will have to take another form, and it is hard to see what that form could be other than teleological. Even this breaks down at the final point, since, as we have seen, Nishida denies that any explanation can be given for the will itself, whose existence is just a mystery.
Bergson With this outline of Nishida’s position in IRSC in mind, we can now turn to examine in more detail his attitude to the western philosophies referred to most frequently in it, beginning with that of B ergson. In 1941, Nishida added a short Preface to a new edition of the book in which he noted that, at the time of the original composition of the work, ‘I was stirred by the works of B ergson, but again, despite my whole-hearted agreement with him, my ideas do not wholly coincide with his’.86 A gain, it will be recalled that, in the remarks quoted at the beginning of the previous section, Nishida hoped he had shown that a reinterpretation of Fichte could serve as the foundation for B ergson’s thought, a statement which presupposes the belief that B ergson’s thought as it stood was not (in Nishida’s estimation) properly founded and, accordingly, was in need of some reinforcement at the deepest level.87 A gain, we have already seen, in the section on space and time, that Nishida’s agreement was not so whole-hearted as to allow him to accept the key B ergsonian doctrine of the unrepeatability of any passage of la durée. H is 85
����������������� Ibid., pp. 157–8. �������������� Ibid., p. xxv. 87 �������������� Ibid., p. xiv. 86
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
87
position with regard to B ergson’s thought is in fact less straightforward than the phrase ‘whole-hearted agreement’ would suggest. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find reasons why Nishida would have found B ergson’s general position philosophically congenial. Firstly, B ergson (like William James) claims that standard experience – our conceptualized experience of a public world of spatio-temporal, causally interacting individuals – is remote from its philosophical bedrock: the seamless, wholly qualitative flow of duration. Duration is an organic evolution which is yet not an increasing quantity; a pure heterogeneity within which there are no distinct qualities. T he moments of duration are not external to one another; it is ‘succession without distinction … a mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought’.88 S econdly, we construct the public world of individuals (and so on) from duration because such a public world enables us to get about successfully in the environment: the public world is a construction we have found pragmatically effective. O ur mistake (which generates many philosophical problems) is to impose this manner of conceptualizing things on our inner life, to which it is entirely inappropriate: ‘little by little our sensations are distinguished from one another like the external causes which gave rise to them, and our feelings or ideas come to be separated like the sensations with which they are contemporaneous.’89 We construct an inaccurate and misleading image of our inner life as composed of atomic experiences, successively occurring in clock time – itself an intellectual construction resulting from the spatialization of time. T he effect of this is to lead to a third point which Nishida would have found congenial in B ergson, namely the latter’s assertion that the habit of applying external world categories inappropriately to the inner life causes us to develop a superficial self, which generally masks the deep, basic self whose experience is duration: below the self with well-defined states, [there is] a self in which succeeding each other means melting into one another and forming an organic whole. B ut we are generally content with the first, i.e. with the shadow of the self projected into homogeneous space. Consciousness, goaded by an insatiable desire to separate, substitutes symbol for reality, or perceives reality only through the symbol. A nd 88 ������������������������� B ergson 1910, p. 101. In Time and Free Will, duration is a property only of consciousness. B y the time B ergson came to write Matière et mémoire seven years later, he was ready to attribute real duration to objects in the external world, though he never acknowledged that he had made this basic change to his initial position. It is not clear whether Nishida would have accepted this change (to which he does not refer). T he problem is complicated by B ergson’s characterization of matter in the later work as far more mindlike than is generally the case in philosophy. 89 ��������������������� B ergson 1910, p. 126.
Nishida and Western Philosophy
88
the self thus refracted, and thereby broken to pieces, is much better adapted to the requirements of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness prefers it, and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self.90
T hough he does not go into detail on the matter, B ergson claims that the deep self, while generally lost sight of, is not inaccessible. A t one point he says that it can be recovered through a vigorous effort of analysis,91 or through deep introspection.92 What techniques are involved in this analysis/introspection we are not told. In the fourth place, anyone with a B uddhist background would have been at home with the principal epistemological doctrine of B ergson’s thought. T his is the doctrine that what B ergson calls intellect or intelligence (what most philosophers would call reason) does not acquaint us with the real processes which make up reality, but only with the conceptual constructions we have devised, which permit us to act appropriately in the world in which we find ourselves. If we are to be directly acquainted with reality (that is, with duration), another mode of experience is necessary, and B ergson calls this mode ‘intuition’. Intelligence and instinct he regards as faculties which had a common evolutionary origin, rather than treating the former as a development of the latter. What B ergson calls intuition is in his eyes a development of instinct. It is instinct which has become disinterested, selfconscious and capable of reflecting on its object, and it is confined to humans.93 Intelligence (reason) functions pragmatically: it divides the environment and the self into individuals with their states, and notices as much of the individuals thus identified as is necessary to guide the action appropriate for survival and for the running of society. Intuition, by contrast, grasps its object more completely than intelligence: in intuition, ‘the act of knowledge coincides with the act of generating reality’.94 It proceeds by sympathy and results in a complete grasp of its object from the inside. We can get an idea of what an intuitive grasp of things is like if we investigate art. In B ergson’s aesthetics, the artist has the gift of perceiving things for their own sake, and has the capacity to grasp their inner life. H e claims that ‘[a]rt always aims at what is individual’.95 Fifthly and finally, Nishida would have been at home with the doctrine of the élan vital, the force which brings about the creative evolution of all things. For him as for Nishida, ultimate reality is creative, even if for B ergson the élan has no specified or specifiable goal. Duration is relentlessly creative: it never repeats itself, and is cumulative in nature. (For Nishida, as we have seen, absolutely free will has a goal, namely the production of spirit: the claim that it has a goal is 90
�������������� Ibid., p. 128. �������������� Ibid., p. 129. 92 �������������� Ibid., p. 231. 93 ������������������������������������� Bergson 1911a, p. 186; 1972, p. 1150. 94 �������������� Ibid., p. 773. 95 ���������������������� B ergson 1911b, p. 161. 91
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
89
a precondition for the coherence of his assertion that ultimate explanations are teleological in form.) Even with so much he could sympathizes with, Nishida finds, however, a number of issues on which he disagrees with B ergson, and the reasons for these disagreements are of interest in the context of the present study. B ergson’s philosophy centres around the notion of time (and so of process: hence its regularly being mentioned in the same breath as that of Whitehead), and around his insistence that our notion of clock time, with its homogeneous flow, is not an absolute but a construction of intelligence/reason. T he root of Nishida’s disagreement with B ergson, and the reason for his claim that the latter’s philosophy lacks a proper foundation, lies in the fact that Nishida cannot accept that la durée is the ontological ultimate B ergson claims it to be. It was noted above that some of Nishida’s remarks concerning duration and the transcendence of time through memory are not as clear or conclusive as they might be. In the later stages of IRSC he changes his ground slightly, and his principal objection to B ergson’s concept of duration comes to be the claim that it is objectified.96 B y this he means that even duration has been conceived of – to a degree – in a conceptualized manner by B ergson. Nishida argues that the very thesis that duration cannot be repeated, even the duration of a moment ago, presupposes conceptualization. Nishida’s idea is that to assert even so much about duration shows that this notion is itself a product of reason, and on this basis he assumes that what B ergson is referring to by means of this term must itself be to a degree (however minimal) conceptualized, and hence not ultimate – it will be recalled that, for Nishida, the will/pure experience/self-conscious system is entirely beyond conceptualization and beyond the grasp of reason, and that any attempt to characterize it (his own included) misses the mark.97 It is far from obvious that Nishida’s objection is as conclusive as he evidently thought it was. It is quite open to B ergsonians to argue that B ergson’s position is far more similar to that of Nishida than the latter’s remarks here would suggest. Notably, B ergson would assert that his ultimate, duration, is beyond the grasp of reason, and that full awareness of it is possible only via the supra-rational mode of consciousness he calls intuition. Consequently, the move Nishida makes in his objection, from the concept of duration to the nature of its referent, is unsafe. L ike Nishida himself, B ergson is just doing his best (as many other thinkers, eastern and western, have done) to give us a hint of something incommunicable. Moreover, B ergson takes the view that the discipline which uses intuition is metaphysics, from which it follows that metaphysics is not a conceptual discipline. T his is a view with which Nishida should have had a great deal of sympathy. A s we have seen, he finds that the most apposite remarks on what is ultimate are to be found in the works of mystics like E riugena and Pseudo-D ionysius, who insist (like the chan masters) that no characterization of it is possible. It does not follow from this, however, that no experience of it is possible. IRSC, p. 166. �������������� Ibid., p. 139.
96 97
Nishida and Western Philosophy
90
Nishida considered that B ergson had gone a long way towards the truth: he (B ergson) had discovered that the material world results from the mind’s transformation of pure duration. Consciousness is not an emergent property or function of matter; it is rather that matter is arrived at by subtracting something from consciousness.98 H owever, what was needed in order to render B ergson’s thought ‘even more profound and universal’99 was to recast these views in terms of a self-conscious system. B ergson’s duration is better conceived of as the selfdevelopment of such a self-conscious system, where ‘meaning’ equals ‘being’ and ‘act’ equals ‘fact’. If duration were to be unrepeatable, the reason would have to be (Nishida claims) that there is something at its foundation which transcends time. It is B ergson’s ‘excessive attachment to the idea of time’100 that causes him overlook this aspect of unity, which transcends movement. A t the vanguard of the élan vital there is neither space nor time, but the development of reason itself. A t this point in IRSC, Nishida accepts the H egelian view that the real is the rational and that all reality is syllogistic.101 Whether Nishida should accept this view is another matter. It would entail a H egelian conception of the nature of the philosophical programme, namely the construction of a purely deductive philosophy, an ideal which H egel notoriously fails to implement. Nishida does not commit himself to this ideal explicitly anywhere in IRSC, nor does he attempt to implement it in this book. Granted his basic view of pre-cognitive reality as being beyond all predication, Nishida has no good reason to qualify it as rational in the manner of the H egelian absolute. H owever, even if certain details of the argument are not satisfactory, the chief ground for Nishida’s dissatisfaction with B ergson’s thought during the middle phase of his development is clear enough. In Nishida’s view, the doctrine of the unrepeatability of duration must presuppose that there is something that stands outside the flow of duration. Only memory could verify this doctrine, or indeed even give rise to it: the doctrine could not even be conceived of except in a consciousness which possesses a memory, and such a consciousness must be in a certain important sense the same consciousness, unified – as Nishida puts it. B ehind duration as B ergson describes it there must be something even deeper, an ultimate unified consciousness. One might say that, for Nishida, Bergson had got nine tenths of the way to reality but failed to grasp its ultimate depths – and this is a conclusion which Nishida came to with regard to more than one western philosophy. A lways behind Nishida’s remarks on the ultimate reality, even in this most technical and westernized phase of his thought, one senses the influence of the oriental concept of mu, a nothingness of infinite depth, which is more like a plenum of possibilities than a void; and this notion is quite absent from Bergson 98
������������������ Ibid., pp. 110–11. �������������� Ibid., p. 111. 100 ����� Ibid. 101 ������������������ Ibid., pp. 111–12. 99
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
91
(as it is from James). If this is so, it must inevitably have seemed to Nishida that a key dimension was absent from B ergson’s thought. This deduction is confirmed if one examines comments on Bergson’s philosophy which occur in works from the last phase of Nishida’s development – the phase in which he had arrived at his logic of the predicate and at his doctrine of the self-contradictory identity of the one and the many. Nishida’s late reflections on B ergson, as on many other western thinkers, are a record of deep disagreements between two worked-out philosophies and have a consistent theme: he finds B ergson’s views not so much wrong as incomplete in important ways. T hus, for example, Nishida takes issue with B ergson’s analysis of space as ‘the relaxation of pure duration’.102 S o long as space is thus conceptualized, Nishida argues, personality cannot be adequately described: it becomes dream-like rather than real. T he reason for this claim is that life in the self-contradictory historical world must be genuinely spatial: the environment must be as fully real as duration, for life is the mutual determination of individual and environment alike.103 For time to be true time (that is, properly understood as such), space cannot be merely the relaxation of time. It must rather be, like space, an absolute negation of nothingness. Were space to be considered as its ultimate point of relaxation, pure duration would be merely the extension of a dream. In Nishida’s view, true pure duration exists as the self-determination of the absolute present. E ternity is fully present in each moment, and each moment is a determination of timeless nothingness, and this is not the way in which B ergson conceives of la durée. T he same thought lies behind Nishida’s comment that the concept of pure duration does not and cannot include the point that life involves death. O nly when we fully face up to the fact of death and internalize the fact of our own eternal dissolution do we come to appreciate our own nothingness appropriately, for we will dissolve back into the mu from which we emerged as one of its expressions. Face to face with the nothingness at the base of our being we encounter the divine, a point Nishida regularly phrases by saying that we live by dying. T his dimension of analysis of the human condition is absent from B ergson’s thought. A gain, the doctrine of creative evolution includes the thesis that creativity is a process immanent in the nature of things. T he élan vital is pure duration existing within the very depths of the self, and this view can be contrasted with (for example) the concept of creativity included in theologies in which the world is made by a transcendent creator. It follows from the philosophy of absolutely contradictory identity that both these views are partial. T he world is the contradictory identity of the one and the many, and from this it follows that absolute immanence and absolute transcendence are one. Consequently, the proper conception of creativity is that it is the self-determination of a concrete universal. B ergson’s account includes only half the picture. Nishida’s final view of Bergson is epitomized in these words: ‘life FPP, p. 41. �������������� Ibid., p. 117.
102 103
Nishida and Western Philosophy
92
is the self-determination of the dialectical universal … B ergson’s concept of pure duration cannot be said to be true concrete life.’104
Neo-Kantianism T he neo-K antian philosophers are mentioned with great frequency in IRSC. O ccasionally Nishida accepts what they have to say, but more frequently he disagrees with their views. T he reason for this is straightforwardly logical: neo-K antianism involves the assertion of various dichotomies in what there is, and these dichotomies are held to be ontologically ultimate. S uch positions are incompatible with the philosophy of pure experience and hence must be rejected by Nishida. A number of these disagreements have already been noted in the preceding sections; it will be appropriate here to notice two further important areas not yet considered. It is worth repeating here the most basic point at issue, since Nishida’s debates with the neo-Kantians flow from it. Essential to the Kantian position is a basic distinction between thought and being: the mind imposes its own structure on being, which it can never know save as it appears when it is processed via the forms of intuition and the categories. In the neo-K antians, this position reappears as the assertion that meaning precedes being: meaning is the product of the application of the mind’s structure to a flow of experience which is independent of it. A n important consequence of this view is that all consciousness has meaning. H ence, meaning and being, value and fact, is an ultimate dichotomy in neo-K antianism – as has been noted, Natorp’s assertion of their being poles of a continuum is not compatible with a K antian position. Nishida can accept part of this basic position, namely the assertion that all consciousness manifests value or meaning: ‘The consciousness of an “ought” is the most immediate and concrete experience we have, most immediate because it precedes and founds the distinction between thinker and what is thought, and most concrete because it includes within itself various relations.’105 What he cannot accept, however, is the assertion that these values are in some sense ontologically distinct from consciousness, or R ickert’s thesis that they are inexistent (albeit objective and real). B y calling them ‘real’, R ickert means that we do not create these values but rather discover or recognize them.106 In R ickert’s view, when making a value judgement, the subject is bringing together the realm of inexistent values and the existent sensible world, thereby giving valuational significance to things and events. This view is incompatible with the doctrine of the absolute ultimacy of pure experience. For Nishida, value cannot be either prior to, or in any other way distinct from, pure experience, but is an aspect of it. Value is constitutive of and immanent in consciousness: ‘in the phenomenon of 104
������������� Ibid., p. 67. IRSC, p. 30. 106 ������������������ Rickert 1928; see IRSC, p. 177, notes 31 and 32. 105
Fichte, the Neo-Kantians and Bergson
93
consciousness the immanence of meaning is its essence. T here is no consciousness which does not possess meaning in some sense, and the unity and identity of meaning are necessary conditions of the constitution of consciousness.’107 O ur immediate consciousness always possesses meaning, in Nishida’s view. Moreover, he holds that to deny this is self-refuting, for to deny that consciousness has meaning is already to presuppose it.108 T he consciousness which denies meaningfulness is already meaningful. T he same logical imperative of denying a multiplicity of ultimates lies behind Nishida’s rejection of R ickert’s theory of judgement. For R ickert, judgement has two components: transcendent meaning on the one hand; and the act of judging – an aspect of the internal development of consciousness – on the other. H e further maintains that the former in no way depends upon the latter, the two being absolutely distinct. Meaning transcends acts of judgement and is coherently conceivable apart from such acts: the relation between the two components of judgement is contingent.109 Nishida objects that these two elements of judgement are not distinct in this way. H e maintains that there is an inseparable relationship between what he calls the phenomenology of judgement and meaning itself. Judgement is not properly conceived of as the expression of meaning but as its activity. Judgement is not an act extrinsic to meaning but the particularizing act necessary for meaning itself, without which meaning is inconceivable.110 Further, it will be recalled that for Nishida time is a construction from pure experience: time is founded on the development of the will, which is more fundamental than time and temporal events. S ince meaning is constitutive of the will, its development is an aspect of the development of the will. S ince judgement is the articulation of meaning, it follows that, in Nishida’s usage, judgement is ‘a far more basic fact of consciousness than can be brought under the category of time, consisting, as it does, in the unity of two objects of thought, or rather, in the self-differentiation of a single object’.111 T he experience of the internal development in the activity of judging transcends time, and so the consciousness of judgement cannot be identified with a class of temporal, psychological acts. R ather, consciousness of judgement, properly understood, enjoys an immediate and indissociable relationship with meaning itself, and together with it constitutes one concrete, logical consciousness. In his admirable book The Body, Y uasa Y asuo remarks that, at the beginning of the twentieth century (when Nishida was writing IRSC), K antianism was the western philosophy most in vogue in Japan and that in a way this was rather unfortunate for Nishida. E ven if, as I suggested above, it was to all intents historically unavoidable that Nishida should take account of neo-K antianism – it was just too big a rock to steer around at the time – his philosophy is not at root an idealistic rationalism of 107
������������� Ibid., p. 55. ������������� Ibid., p. 10. 109 ������������������ Rickert 1928; see IRSC, p. 180, note 48. 110 ������������� Ibid., p. 26. 111 ������������� Ibid., p. 27. 108
Nishida and Western Philosophy
94
a K antian or neo-K antian kind, but displays rather ‘a strongly religious tendency towards recognizing the value of nonrational intuition’.112 Neo-K antianism, with its insistence on a number of ontologically ultimate dichotomies, was not calculated to help Nishida greatly in his quest for a way of articulating a vision of the world in which such dichotomies are not ultimate, indeed are held to be steps on the path away from the ultimate reality; and one wonders what the development of Nishida’s thought might have been had he not spent so much time and effort in dialogue with a style of philosophy which was not of great assistance to him in his quest. T he philosophy of Fichte, less fashionable at the time, was much closer to what he needed.
Fichte Fichte’s ideas are not referred to in IRSC with the same frequency as those of the neo-K antians, though when Nishida does refer to them it is generally with a greater degree of agreement than is the case with the latter, and I would argue that it is not surprising that either of these states of affairs obtains. The influence of Fichte in this phase of Nishida’s thought is of great depth and goes beyond instances of individual arguments and doctrines, extending to the conception of the very nature of the philosophical enterprise itself. For Fichte, the goal and programme of philosophy is a complete deduction of all experience from the possibility of selfconsciousness, the term ‘deduction’ being used in the K antian sense: to deduce a concept is to show that the activity it designates is a necessary precondition for having the sort of experience we do in fact have.113 Fichte believed that we have immediate but non-sensible acquaintance with (that is, an intellectual intuition of) an absolute and infinite self. Accordingly, another way of putting the basic task of philosophy is the complete analysis of what is implicit in the concept of such a self. T he idealist programme consists in deriving from this concept all the structures of our experience, including (most importantly) our presentations and our conviction of their independence from our will; in Fichte’s view, Kant had failed to provide a convincing deduction either of the categories or of our presentations, and it was his intention to rectify these omissions. What Fichte sets out to do is to deduce (in his sense) all the elements of experience from an ontological ultimate. Further, since this ultimate is in an important sense a unity, Fichte is faced with the problem of deriving multiplicity from it in some way – deriving the many from the one. E very form of difference, up to and including contradiction, must be deduced from the one. A bsolute opposition, Fichte