Naturalism vs. Theism: The Carrier-Wanchick Debate

Naturalism vs. Theism: The CarrierWanchick Debate (2006) Does God exist? Or is nature all there is? Richard Carrier and Tom Wanchick debate this question.

 

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Who We Are (2006) Richard Carrier: Richard Carrier is a published historian and philosopher, with a several degrees in intellectual history, including an M.Phil. from Columbia University, where he is currently working on his doctorate in ancient science. He is the author of Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism and a contributing author to The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave. Richard is a secular humanist and metaphysical naturalist who has taught and debated his views before audiences across the country and on national television. He has written articles for several print publications and academic journals, as well as for the Secular Web, where he once served as Editor-in-Chief and where he remains one of the most read authors. For more on Richard Carrier's views and work, see his author page in the Secular Web Modern Library and his own page on Naturalism as a Worldview. Tom Wanchick: Tom Wanchick is a certified public accountant by day and a Christian writer and apologist by night. Residing in Lewiston, New York, Wanchick's personal research interests include philosophical theology and Christian apologetics, and his writings on these subjects have been published in Christian Research Journal and Think. He's also had a Secular Web exchange with famed atheist philosopher Michael Martin on the plausibility of Heaven. Wanchick thinks naturalism is like most other ideologies endorsed in public schools and universities: dangerous and clearly false. He occasionally addresses these issues on his weblog The Good Fight.

 

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What We Are Debating (2006)

Welcome to Naturalism vs. Theism: The Carrier-Wanchick Debate. Here Richard and Tom cowrote and approved a joint statement stating as clearly as is reasonable what claims each intends to defend here. JOINT STATEMENT

In the present debate Richard Carrier and Tom Wanchick will each be defending a different thesis against the other. Wanchick will argue that God exists, in a meaningful and nontrivial sense, while Carrier will argue that only nature exists, in a meaningful and nontrivial sense. To specify exactly what they mean, Wanchick and Carrier composed the following statement jointly and approved its final form. Wanchick holds that from the extant data of philosophy, history, science, and personal human experience, it can be shown that the existence of God is more probable than His nonexistence. God, as Wanchick understands Him for this debate, is a nonphysical, conscious mind having power, intelligence, and a morally good nature, all far beyond that of any human. This God is distinct from, and the creator of, the universe, and can act upon the universe by simply willing so. We shall label this Basic Theism (or BT). By "nonphysical" Wanchick means God is nonmaterial (not consisting of matter) and without spatial location. By "mind" Wanchick means no more than an entity that has a conscious intelligence and the power to act (or the capacities for these). And by "morally good nature" Wanchick means that God only acts in ways consistent with the moral code most Christians accept. In contrast to Wanchick's thesis, Carrier says that naturalism is most probably true, and therefore no gods or spirits exist in any traditional

 

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or supernatural sense. In precise form, the proposition Carrier intends to defend is this: given the information available up to now, more likely than not naturalism is true, where "naturalism" means that everything everyone has observed or claimed to observe is the product of fundamentally mindless arrangements and interactions of matter-energy in space-time, leaving no sufficient reason to believe that anything else exists. By "fundamentally mindless" Carrier means that any mental properties, powers, or entities that exist are causally derived from, and ontologically dependent on, systems of nonmental properties, powers, or entities. In technical terms, that means naturalism is false if any distinctly mental property, power, or entity exists that is not ontologically dependent on some arrangement of nonmental things, or that is not causally derived from some arrangement of nonmental things, or that has causal effects without the involvement of any arrangement of nonmental things which are otherwise causally sufficient to produce that effect. In somewhat plainer English, what this means is this: if Carrier Naturalism (or CN) is true, then all minds, and all the contents and powers and effects of minds, are entirely caused by natural phenomena. But if naturalism is false, then some minds, or some of the contents or powers or effects of minds, are causally independent of nature. In other words, such things would then be partly or wholly caused by themselves, or exist or operate directly or fundamentally on their own. This summarizes more precisely and concisely what Carrier has argued elsewhere.[1] CN does not entail any particular position regarding the existence of immaterial or nonphysical things, except that if there is any thing (any Q) that is "nonphysical" or "immaterial" (in any meaningfullydefined sense), and if naturalism is true as defined above, then Q is ontologically and causally dependent on space-time or on matterenergy in space-time, such that some arrangement of space-time or of matter-energy in space-time is a sufficient cause of the existence of Q. And (again if naturalism is true as defined above) in the absence of that arrangement of space-time, or of matter-energy in space-time, the corresponding Q will not exist. Carrier also distinguishes things that potentially exist from things that actually exist: all things potentially exist whenever all the elements necessary to form them exist, but nothing actually exists until all the elements necessary to form them actually form them. Finally, Carrier believes that some mental and moral properties exist, in the sense that, like any other Q, they exist potentially or actually as properties that are ontologically dependent on and entirely caused  

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by particular arrangements of matter-energy in space-time, as explained above for any other Q. Carrier has articulated elsewhere how arrangements of matter-energy in space-time manifest mental and moral properties.[2] He holds that such properties potentially exist and are actually realized in the same way as geometric, economic, and social properties. These are properties that potentially exist everywhere they could in principle be realized, and actually exist wherever they are in fact realized.

[1] Richard Carrier, Defending Naturalism as a Worldview: A Rebuttal to Michael Rea's World Without Design (2003), available in the Secular Web Modern Library; Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), available at AuthorHouse and Amazon, pp. 65-70, 119-34, 211-12. [2] Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 124-50, 177-202, 313-48. See also: Richard Carrier, Critical Review of Victor Reppert's Defense of the Argument from Reason (2004) and Fundamental Flaws in Mark Steiner's Challenge to Naturalism in The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (2003), both available in the Secular Web Modern Library, and Richard Carrier, "Establishing Ethics as a Science," forthcoming.

 

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The Rules We Followed (2006)

Welcome to Naturalism vs. Theism: The Carrier-Wanchick Debate. Here Richard and Tom explain the rules of debate they both agreed to follow.

(1) The parties to the debate composed a joint statement specifying the proposition to be defended and defining every term in that proposition to the reasonable satisfaction of both parties. This statement in its entirety was agreed upon by both parties and written together. It will define what shall be debated and will be the first entry to be published. (2) When the moderator simultaneously informs both parties that the above statement has been published, each party will simultaneously submit to the moderator an opening statement defending their side of the debated proposition as thus defined. Once the moderator has both opening statements, he will post them both simultaneously and at the same time announce to each party the deadline for their rebuttal. In all, this procedure will be repeated for an opening statement, one rebuttal, one counter-rebuttal, then a closing statement. (3) In every case the deadline between the moderator's announcement of the last entry's publication and submission of the next entry shall be two weeks. (4) Every submission will be held to a pre-agreed limit of 3000 words. This word limit will not apply to footnotes, but footnotes shall contain no argument or digression or assessment or any other content except what is needed to identify a source of information or quote so the reader can find it if he bothers to look for it. (5) Both parties agreed not to attack each other's character or competence, but only the facts and arguments as presented, and they agreed not to use disparaging words or tones but to phrase everything as congenially and honestly as they can manage. They

 

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will behave like gentlemen and set a standard of polite debate others can emulate. (6) Both parties agreed upon a moderator, and both parties agreed that their chosen moderator can force them to comply with the above rules, especially word limits and footnote contents and etiquette, and this moderator will have the right to correct spelling and other trivial errors that each party misses, and he will complete any necessary HTML coding. The moderator may also offer suggestions for improving wording or clarity or source citation and so on, but such advice will not be binding on either party. (7) Four judges were selected and agreed upon by both parties. After the publication of the closing statements for the debate, a page will be launched announcing the judges and their qualifications and a deadline by which all the judges will submit an assessment of the entire debate. Each judge will write an assessment of the debate in 600 words or less, declaring who they think won the debate, and by what margin (using a scale defined below), with some brief comments on what they believe to be the most important merits and problems with each side. The judges have been instructed to assess who won based on who was able to better defend their own and rebut the other's arguments in this particular debate, regardless of whether the judges themselves agree or disagree with those arguments or conclusions. For example, even a fallacious argument will be counted as a successful argument if it is not effectively rebutted. When all the judges' assessments have been submitted, the judges' page will be updated to include all four assessments, plus an average score for the whole debate (as explained below), and as with all other entries, this update will be announced on the What's New page of the Secular Web. (8) A judge may declare neither party the winner, which rates a score of zero. Or a judge may declare one party the winner and assign a score between 1 and 4 as follows: {1} only barely won the debate, {2} won the debate by a significant margin, {3} won the debate by a large margin, {4} won the debate by a decisive margin. An average score will also be calculated based on all four assessments as follows: the scores given to each party will be added up and if the two totals are equal, the average score will be a tie (neither side won); if they are not equal, the party with the higher total is announced as the winner, by a margin equal to the difference between the two scores divided by four and rounded up. For example, if one side is given scores that total 4 and the other side totals 5, then the latter won by a margin equal to the difference of 1 point divided by 4 and then rounded up, for a final score of 1, which means that that party only barely won the debate according to the combined assessment of all four judges.  

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Wanchick's Opening Statement (2006)

Leibnizian Cosmological Argument It seems reasonable to believe that every substance[1]has an explanation for its existence: it was either caused by something else, or exists necessarily (it cannot not exist). This premise is evidently more plausible than its denial, for if confronted with a new substance, everyone would assume it has an explanation before they assumed it didn't. Absurdly, if the latter presumption were equally plausible, we could justifiably pronounce everything to be a brute given, making science, philosophy, etc. frivolous. Indeed, the general assumption that objects have explanations has been successfully confirmed so often that those wishing to reject it must provide good reason for doing so. Additionally, if we have an adequate explanation for an object, it would clearly be unreasonable to conclude instead that that object was unexplained. Again, explanation is prima facie more reasonable than nonexplanation. Thus, Quentin Smith, the foremost atheist expert on cosmological arguments, admits that if naturalism cannot explain the universe like theism can, that is evidence for theism over naturalism.[2] Now, interestingly, the universe itself is a substance having properties: density, temperature, etc. Therefore, like all substances, it has an explanation. Indeed, scientists have long assumed this in cosmological studies, as they've developed myriad theories as to how the universe exists. Thus, we construct this argument: 1. Every substance has an explanation of its existence either in an external cause or in the necessity of its own nature. 2. The universe is a substance. 3. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence either in  

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an external cause or in the necessity of its own nature. 4. The universe does not exist necessarily. 5. Therefore, the explanation of the universe is an external cause. This conclusion follows from the premises. I've justified 1 and 2 above. Premise 4 requires little argument, since the universe appears obviously contingent. Scientists even tell us that it had a beginning and will end somewhere in the future. Being non-necessary, then, it finds its explanation in an outside cause. This cause can exist timelessly and spacelessly, since it can cause the space-time universe. Moreover, it must be immaterial, since it is nonspatial. And it must also be a mind, since only minds and abstract objects can exist timelessly and immaterially, and only the former can cause anything. Furthermore, the only two types of explanation are natural/mechanistic and personal; and since there was no nature prior to the universe, its cause is personal. Moreover, the ultimate cause cannot itself be a contingent reality. As Charles Taliaferro notes, "If contingent object A is explained by B which is explained by C and so on into infinity, we will never get a complete or fully satisfactory explanation of A."[3]Thus, the explanation of the universe must be a metaphysically necessary, uncaused being. My first argument therefore proves the reality of a transcendent, timeless, and spaceless mind that exists necessarily and has the ability and know-how to cause and sustain the universe.

Kalam Cosmological Argument Like the universe's existence, its origin too needs explaining.[4] Leading philosophers and scientists confirm that the universe came into existence from nothing. Currently, the big bang model leads the pack among cosmological theories and entails a definite beginning of space-time. Renowned physicist Stephen Hawking admits, "almost everyone now believes that the universe, and time itself, had a beginning at the Big Bang."[5] Carrier concurs.[6] An eternal universe is disconfirmed philosophically, too, for it implies that there are infinite past events. But it would be impossible to reach the last event in this series--i.e., the present. We could literally never reach the end of infinity; no matter how many events we traversed, there'd always be infinite to go. But since we have reached the end, the set of past events must be finite.

 

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Moreover, an infinite set of things entails metaphysically impossibility. If we have infinite things numbered 1 through infinity and subtract all even ones, we would have an infinite number remaining. But if we subtract only those marked over #5, we would be left with 5. Since it is metaphysically impossible to subtract equal quantities and get contradictory answers, it must be impossible for an infinite to exist. Thus, the number of past events in the universe is finite. The universe had a beginning. This is significant, since, as we all know, objects cannot just pop into being from nothing, uncaused. Imagine finding a whale or a stadium simply appearing willy-nilly on your doorstep! David Hume even announced, "But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause."[7] Inductively, of course, no one in all of history has witnessed an object leap into reality this way. If this is possible, it's strikingly curious that it's never occurred. Indeed, the inductive evidence simply accords with sound metaphysics, for if nothing existed without the universe, then not even the potentiality for it existed. But how can something come into existence if there was no potential for it? Carrier's own view is that "things exist potentially wherever the elements necessary to form them exist."[8] But since nothing existed without the universe given naturalism, neither did its potential, thereby ruling out its actuality on that view. Thus: 6. Every substance that begins to 7. The universe began 8. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

exist

has to

a

cause. exist.

Premise 6 and 7 are more reasonable than their negations, as argued above. And since the argument is valid, the conclusion follows unavoidably. As noted in the prior argument, the cause of the universe will be an uncaused, timeless, spaceless, and nonphysical mind. However, other significant qualities come through here: its incomprehensible power and knowledge. This creator has the awe-inspiring power and knowledge to create whole universes from nothing. It's hard to see, then, what power or knowledge he lacks.[9]

Design of/in the Universe

 

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In the past 30 years, science has revealed the razor thin conditions that make life in our universe possible. The universe is "fine-tuned" for life.[10] Indeed, there are dozens of factors that must be set precisely in order for life to exist here. With their slightest alteration, life would be impossible. Thus, while there are millions of ways the universe could physically be, very few of them are life-permitting. Robin Collins sums up the scientific consensus: Scientists have increasingly come to realize how the initial conditions of the universe and the basic constants of physics must be balanced on a razor's edge for intelligent life to evolve.... Calculations show that if the constants of physics--such as the physical constant governing the strength of gravity--were slightly different, the evolution of complex, embodied life forms of comparable intelligence to ourselves would be seriously inhibited, if not rendered impossible.[11] But the unimaginably precise fine-tuning appears more epistemically probable[12] given theism than it does given naturalism. For because conscious life is good, it's not surprising that God would make a world containing it. But why would we ever expect the world to have life-permitting conditions if naturalism were true? Indeed, this appears wholly improbable, since the possible universes that disallow life incomprehensibly outnumber those that allow it. It's like picking the prize-winning white marble out of a barrel of black ones. Thus: 9. Fine-tuning is not improbable given theism. 10. Fine-tuning is improbable given naturalism. 11. Thus, fine-tuning is more probable on theism than naturalism. In other words, fine-tuning provides evidence that theism is more probable than naturalism. Knowability and Discoverability Additionally, many things within the universe indicate a God-like designer. Scholars have documented that our universe is not only fine-tuned for sentient life, but also for scientific discovery and knowability.[13] The universe is structured in just the right way to allow the study of natural laws and phenomena, greatly adding to our scientific knowledge. Such features make sense if God wants us to discover and enjoy creation; but why would these features exist on naturalism? Beauty

 

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Collins notes that "beauty is widely recognized by physicists as being an important characteristic of the laws of nature, one which has served as a highly selective guide to discovering the fundamental laws of nature in the twentieth century."[14] Moreover, the laws of nature (and many things in nature) exhibit simplicity, harmony, and elegance. It wouldn't be surprising for a creator to make such a universe, but, again, why would this be so if naturalism is true? Evil Typically, if an object is undesigned or serves a purpose only accidentally (e.g., a hillside serving as a stage), we conclude that it cannot be used correctly or incorrectly. Design or intention appears to be a necessary condition for proper function. A bike can be used properly; a fallen meteor cannot. It's interesting to apply this insight to sentient beings. Can they be misused? The obvious answer is 'yes.' Humans shouldn't be used as slaves, for instance; doing so is evil. Indeed, the misuse of beings seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition for evil. Evil events involve a patient out of its proper state. So evil is a departure from the way things ought to exist.[15] But this contradicts naturalism, wherein every living thing is like the hillside: accidental byproducts having no design plan, no proper state. Objectors might hold that if we used the hillside as a stage long enough, this would become its conventional function, and to stop doing so would seem a misuse. Thus, objects can acquire proper function accidentally over time. But this seems false for at least sentient beings, for no matter how long humans are enslaved, they should never be used as such. Their function is inherent rather than conventional. Evil obviously exists; think of child pornography or rape. And since evil entails that the universe and its inhabitants have a specific function or purpose, it follows that they were designed by an intelligent being having the knowledge, ability, and intention to build a world with purposeful and moral dimensions.

Moral Argument But what makes us obliged not to mistreat humans? After all, if naturalism is true, "a human being is a biological animal,"[16] as naturalist Julian Baggini admits. But unless humans have unique moral worth not had by beasts, it seems objective moral truth wouldn't exist. It wouldn't, for instance, be immoral to rape or kill,  

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for animals do so to each other regularly with no moral significance.[17] Paul Draper pinpoints the problem such properties would cause for naturalism: "every human being has a special sort of inherent value that no animal has, and every human has an equal amount of this value. Such equality is possible despite the great differences among humans, because the value in question does not supervene on any natural properties. It is a nonnatural property that all (and only) humans possess."[18] The great naturalist philosopher J.L. Mackie, and myriad others, agree. Unfortunately, to defend naturalism, Draper and Mackie (like Carrier) have to absurdly deny that humans have such unique inherent worth.[19] Carrier even says some animals are more morally valuable than certain humans in virtue of their superior intellect, rationality, etc.[20] But such positions are obviously false. Humans have moral worth not found in animals, regardless of their comparative capabilities, and the failure to recognize this is simply a lack of moral insight. But since these moral properties obviously do exist in human beings and aren't natural, they must have a supernatural source. And since moral properties exist only in persons, the source of moral properties must be a supernatural person. The moral order, then, is evidence of a supernatural person who grounds moral truth. Additionally, at least some moral truths are necessary, and thus their foundation must be a necessary being grounding moral facts in all possible worlds.[21]

Ontological Argument Philosophically, to say something can possibly exist is to say it could exist in at least one 'possible world' (PW). PWs (including our own) are simply possible total states of affairs. (These are not necessarily possibleuniverses--e.g., God existing alone is a PW excluding any universe.) By definition, a necessary being is one existing in allPWs. Obviously, if such a being were found in our (actual) world we would know that it exists in all PWs. The reverse also holds. Label our world X and another PW Y. Assume Y holds a necessary being. Inhabitants of Y would know that that being would exist in X too, since it would exist in all PWs. Thus, if any PW holds a necessary being (i.e., if that necessary being is possible), then that being must exist in the actual world, too.  

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Some theists have seen God as a necessary being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. He is maximally great (MG). But then if God is possible, He is actual. Theists have developed this ontological argument[22]: 12. It is possible that an MG being exists. 13. If it is possible that an MG being exists, then an MG being exists in some PW. 14. If an MG being exists in some PW, then it exists in all PWs. 15. If an MG being exists in all PWs, then it exists in the actual world. The argument is valid. The question is, why think an MG metaphysically possible? First, nothing about this being seems impossible: He appears compatible with our modal intuitions. Much of mankind has indeed thought He exists. In the absence of a defeater, there seems no reason to reject our intuitions. Moreover, my prior arguments establish 12. The Leibnizian argument proves a necessary mind who caused the universe. This being is seemingly omnipotent and omniscient given the kalam and design arguments. And He is the necessary source of moral goodness and truth, as shown in the moral argument. So my case reveals the reality and thus the possibility of an MG being. Indeed, even if the arguments aren't sound, their conclusions appear at least metaphysically possible. One doesn't simply look at the conclusion and see its obvious falsity; quite the opposite. The beings entailed appears possible, and thus the argument must be evaluated. But if the beings in those arguments are possible, then why is it impossible for one being with all those properties to exist? Since this surely does seem possible, then that person must actually exist. The MG God is a reality.

Resurrection of Jesus Despite media rumors, there is wide agreement among New Testament specialists regarding the events surrounding Jesus' death. Even a minimal list of almost universally affirmed facts among liberal and conservative scholars provides sufficient evidence that Jesus really was resurrected.[23] (a) Jesus died by crucifixion around 30 AD. Even radically liberal Crossan confesses, "That [Jesus] was crucified is as sure as anything historical can ever be."[24] (b) The tomb where Jesus was buried was empty days after His  

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death. There are almost two dozen arguments for this: (i) If the tomb weren't empty, Christianity would've been defeated in Jerusalem by Jewish authorities revealing so. (ii) Women are the first witnesses to the empty tomb. However, women's testimony in Jesus' culture was considered generally unreliable and far inferior to that of men. If the empty tomb story were fabricated, why insert women as the primary witnesses? (iii) The empty tomb is noted by Paul in the 1 Corinthians 15:3-5 creed originating within three years of Jesus' death, far too early to be legend. (iv)The Jewish denial of the empty tomb implies its reality. Why concoct stories accounting for a tomb that's full?(v) The story is benignly straightforward, unlike legendary stories of Jesus' era. (c) Jesus appeared visually to various people days after His death, as independently attested in early creeds, Paul, the Gospels, and nonbiblical sources. Paul tells of his and the other disciples' appearances in 1 Corinthians 15, explaining his personal verification of their accounts. Lüdemann concludes, "It may be taken as historically certain that Peter and the disciples had experiences after Jesus' death in which Jesus appeared to them as the risen Christ."[25] (d) James and Paul both believed Jesus was resurrected after seeing Him postcrucifixion. These appearances must have vividly occurred for such dedicated opponents of Christ to convert. Paul went from the main persecutor of Christianity to its main apostle! And James turned from confirmed skeptic to an early church pillar. If the Resurrection occurred, this series of facts can be explained plausibly and coherently. But what coherent natural explanation can be offered? Moreover, without the Resurrection, how does one account for Christianity's origin? A lone resurrection of an executed Messiah was utterly foreign to pre-Christian Jews and blatantly contradicted their Messianic expectations. It seems impossible that any would've conceived of, let alone invented, the resurrection account. There were various other Messianic movements before and after Jesus, but they uniformly died with their founders. Only Jesus was claimed to have risen. Only His followers, who saw Him afterwards, turned from a failed group to a vibrant movement proclaiming resurrection unto death. Something remarkable must've occurred to motivate the transformation. Only the Resurrection seems sufficient. Again, these facts are affirmed among virtually all scholars, Christian or liberal. As Craig notes, in denying any of them or that resurrection is their best explanation, Carrier will have to "believe that the  

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majority of the world's historians who have studied the life of Jesus are mistaken about the historicity of his empty tomb, postmortem appearances, and the origin of the Christian Way, or else embrace some naturalistic explanation of these facts which has been overwhelmingly rejected by historical scholars."[26] But since men cannot rise from death naturally, the Resurrection must've had a supernatural cause. And since Jesus claimed allegiance with the Old Testament God, the most plausible cause of Jesus' rising is precisely He. Collectively, then, I've demonstrated the reality of a transcendent, immaterial, uncaused, metaphysically necessary, and morally perfect mind of unsurpassable power and knowledge who has revealed Himself in Jesus. My arguments, in effect, demonstrate the reality of not only God, but, alas, the God of Christianity.[27]

[1] This argument, finding its roots in 17th-century philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, has recently been ably articulated by Stephen T. Davis, "The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status of Belief in God,"Philosophia Christi, NS1 (1999), pp. 5-15. See also William Lane Craig, "The Ontological Argument," in To Everyone an Answer, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, J.P. Moreland, and William Lane Craig (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004). [2] Quentin Smith, "Time Was Created by a Timeless Point," in God and Time, ed. David Woodruff (New York: Oxford University Press: 2002), p. 95. [3] Charles Taliaferro, Does the Idea of God Make Sense?(Ravi Zacharias International Ministries: 2002). [4] See William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979). See also Craig's many article-length defenses of this powerful argument at his website www.williamlanecraig.com. [5] Stephen Hawking, The Nature of Space and Time, The Isaac Newton Institute Series of Lectures (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 20. [6] Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness Without God(Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2005), p. 74.

 

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[7] David Hume to John Stewart, Feb. 1754, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), Vol. 1: p. 187. [8] Richard Carrier and Tom Wanchick, "Joint Statement: What We Are Debating," . [9] Douglas Groothuis makes this point in his chapter, "Metaphysical Implications of Cosmological Arguments: Exorcising the Ghost of Hume," in In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment, ed. Douglas Groothuis and James Sennet (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), pp. 112-119. [10] The literature on fine-tuning has exploded in recent years. Important works include: John Leslie, Universes(New York: Routledge, 1989); Peter Ward and Donald Brownlee, Rare Earth (New York: Copernicus, 2000); Robin Collins, "The Teleological Argument," in The Rationality of Theism, ed. Paul K. Moser and Paul Copan (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 132-148; cf., "A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God," in Reason for the Hope Within, ed. Michael J. Murray (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 47-75; cf. "The Evidence for Fine-Tuning," in God and Design, ed. Neil Manson (New York: Routledge, 2003) and "The Argument from Design and the Many-Worlds Hypothesis," in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002). See also Collins's website at www.finetuning.org. William Lane Craig has a fine defense of the argument in his "A Reply to Objections" in Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate, ed. Stan Wallace (London: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 163-168. [11] Collins, "The Teleological Argument," p. 133. [12] On epistemic probability see Collins, "Hume, Fine-Tuning, and the 'Who Designed God Objection,' in In Defense of Natural Theology, ed. Groothuis and Sennett, p. 192. [13] Collins discusses this in "The Design Argument and the Many Worlds Hypothesis," pp. 137-143. For a very important book on this theme, see Jay Wesley Richards and Guillermo Gonzalez, The Privileged Planet(Washington, DC: Regnery, 2004). [14] Collins, "The Design Argument and the Many Worlds Hypothesis," p. 137. [15] I borrow this argument from R. Douglas Geivett, "A Theistic Argument from Evil," unpublished.  

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[16] Julian Baggini, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 17. [17] Good resources on the moral argument include: Paul Copan, "The Moral Argument," in The Rationality of Theism, ed. Moser and Copan; Copan, "Can Michael Martin Be A Moral Realist?: Sic et Non," Philosophia Christi, Series 2, 1/2 (1999): pp. 45-72. cf. "Atheistic Goodness Revisited: A Personal Reply to Michael Martin," Philosophia Christi NS 2/1 (2000): pp. 91-104 and "Hume and the Moral Argument," in In Defense of Natural Theology, ed. Groothuis and Sennet, pp. 200-225. See also William Lane Craig's insightful defense in "A Reply to Objections," pp. 168-173. [18] Paul Draper, "Craig's Case for God's Existence," inDoes God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate, p. 147. [19] Ibid. [20] Carrier, Sense and Goodness, p. 330. [21] On the necessity of at least some moral truths see, for instance, the comments of even the atheist contributors (Rowe, Draper, et al.) in Does God Exist, ed. Stan Wallace. [22] Excellent defenses of the ontological argument can be found in contemporary philosophers such as: Stephen T. Davis, "The Ontological Argument," in The Rationality of Theism, ed. Moser and Copan; William Lane Craig, "The Ontological Argument," in To Everyone an Answer, ed. Beckwith, et al.; Stephen E. Parrish, God and Necessity (Lanham, MD: American University Press, 1997). [23] Philosopher and resurrection scholar Gary Habermas is credited with formulating this "minimal facts" approach to the evidence for the Resurrection. Habermas documents his extensive research and the widespread agreement on these facts in "Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present: What are Critical Scholars Saying?," Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 2005). Habermas takes this approach in most of his writings. See, for example: Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2004); Habermas,The Historical Jesus (Joplin, MO: College Press, 1996); cf.The Risen Jesus and Future Hope (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); "Evidential Apologetics," in Five Views on Apologetics, ed. Steven Cowan (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), pp. 91-147. [24] John Dominic Crossan, Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 145.  

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[25] Gerd Lüdemann, What Really Happened to Jesus? A Historical Approach to the Resurrection, ed. John Bowden, trans. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1995), p. 80. [26] William Lane Craig, "Has Science Found God? (Book Review)," Journal of Church and State, January 1, 2005. [27] Readers should note that with these six arguments, I've only hit the tip of the iceberg. The arguments for theism are varied and very numerous. Theistic arguments not mentioned in my case include: arguments from reason, the argument from mind, the argument from consciousness, other versions of the cosmological and design arguments, other versions of the moral argument, the argument from religious experience, the conceptualist argument, the argument from desire, the trilemma argument (for Christ's deity), the transcendental argument, and so on. Many of these arguments are nicely discussed in: Alvin Plantinga, "Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments," ; The Rationality of Theism, ed. Moser and Copan; Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate, ed. Wallace (see especially Craig's last chapter);To Everyone an Answer, ed. Beckwith, et al.; William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, God?(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); In Defense of Natural Theology, ed. Groothuis and Sennet; Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. Craig; William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003). On arguments from reason I recommend Victor Reppert, C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003) and Naturalism Defeated?, ed. James K. Beilby (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

 

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Carrier's Opening Statement (2006)

Naturalism Is True, Theism is Not Method If we want all our beliefs to be more likely true than false, then we must proportion our beliefs to the evidence. So if our reasons to believe are few and unreliable, our confidence should be low, and if our reasons to believe are many and reliable, our confidence should be high, with an appropriate continuum between. That means if we have no reason to believe something, then we should not believe it, and if we have much better reasons to believe something than we have not to, then we should believe it.

Basic Argument for Naturalism (BAN) The cause of lightning was once thought to be God's wrath, but turned out to be the unintelligent outcome of mindless natural forces. We once thought an intelligent being must have arranged and maintained the amazingly ordered motions of the solar system, but now we know it's all the inevitable outcome of mindless natural forces. Disease was once thought to be the mischief of supernatural demons, but now we know that tiny, unintelligent organisms are the cause, which reproduce and infect us according to mindless natural forces. In case after case, without exception, the trend has been to find that purely natural causes underlie any phenomena. Not once has the cause of anything turned out to really be God's wrath or intelligent meddling, or demonic mischief, or anything supernatural at all. The collective weight of these observations is enormous: supernaturalism has been tested at least a million times and has always lost; naturalism has been tested at least a million times and has always won. A horse that runs a million races and never loses is about to run yet another race with a horse that has lost every single one of the million races it has run. Which horse should we bet on? The answer is obvious. That's the basic argument for naturalism. Naturalism (N) is the belief that there is nothing supernatural. Carrier Naturalism (CN) is a variety of N.[1] Other varieties of N either add to or subtract from the  

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elements of CN, so we shall label these NMore and NLess. If N is true and all observed phenomena are explained by CN, then there is no reason to believe anything in addition to what is countenanced by CN, and therefore no reason to believe in any NMore. If N is true and every kind of phenomenon entailed by CN is observed, then there is no reason to believe anything less than CN, and therefore no reason to believe any NLess. I assert that N is true and that all observed phenomena are explained by CN, and every kind of phenomenon entailed by CN is observed.[2] For the purposes of this debate, any elements of this assertion that remain unchallenged should stand. We should believe CN unless we find a very compelling reason not to, since we should not believe any proposition established on less reliable methods that contradicts a proposition established on more reliable methods. Moreover, CN is currently the only worldview implied by all the findings of the most reliable methods of science, history, and critical investigation. Formally: P1: We should believe any proposition that follows from the findings of more reliable methods over any proposition that follows from the findings of less reliable methods. P2: CN is the only worldview that follows from the findings of the most reliable methods. C1: Therefore, we should believe CN. I shall assume only P2 will be challenged. That P2 is true follows from the fact that all claims and phenomena that have been thoroughly investigated, using the best methods available to us for ascertaining the truth, have verified and conformed to CN, without any confirmed exception despite hundreds of years of searching, involving countless observations by countless qualified experts. Yet things did not have to turn out that way. If these most reliable methods had turned up abundant, or indeed any confirmed evidence of the supernatural, then we would have to believe supernaturalism unless we found very compelling evidence to the contrary. And had that happened, then N would have a much greater burden of proof before it would ever be reasonable to believe it. However, things turned out quite the opposite, so it is any supernatural worldview that bears a greater burden of proof than CN, enough to refute P2. So if P2 is not successfully refuted in this debate, BAN stands.

Basic Argument to Naturalism as the Best Explanation (BANBE) If E constitutes a small collection of things we know to be true, and B constitutes all other things we know to be true, such that the sum of  

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E and B constitutes everything we know to be true, then I assert that CN explains E better than any known alternative, and that no known alternative explains B better than CN. And if that is true, then we have more reason to believe CN than any alternative. By "better" here I mean in the formal sense explained below. So: P3: If any worldview W explains E better than any other known worldview, and we know of no other worldview that explains B better than W, then we have more reason to believe W than any other known worldview. P4: CN explains E better than any other known worldview, and we know of no other worldview that explains B better than CN. C2: Therefore, we have more reason to believe CN than any other known worldview. P5: BT (basic theism) is another known worldview.[3] C3: Therefore, we have more reason to believe CN than we have to believe BT. I shall assume only P4 will be challenged, so the truth of P4 requires further empirical defense, which shall consume most of the remainder of my opening argument. But if no observation is presented in this debate that is better explained by a worldview other than CN, and at least one observation is presented that is better explained by CN than any other view presented here, then BANBE stands. Since I am under a strict word limit, I can only present a case for a few members of E.[4] For the purposes of this debate, I assert that everything else lies in B until any evidence is offered to the contrary. For this debate, the use of the adverb "better" in P3 and P4 is meant solely in a formal Bayesian sense. This entails (among other things) that, given all our accepted background knowledge, if any explanation H of a set of observations O is initially as or more probable than any other explanation, and is more likely to have produced the entire contents of O than any other explanation, then H is a better explanation of O. But if H is not initially more probable, nor more likely to have produced the entire contents of O, then H is not a better explanation. CN explanations are no less initially probable than BT explanations, so the following arguments independently establish P4 for elements of E.

Argument from Divine Inaction (ADI)

 

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The moral code accepted by most Christians entails it is a duty upon every moral person to protect the innocent from harm, heal the sick, provide means to the impoverished, feed the hungry, build safe and healthy homes and workplaces, and tell everyone who asks what they need to know to achieve a happy life here and hereafter (which set of duties we shall label D). There is no evidence that God does any of these things, yet according to BT he has the means to do them and always obeys the same moral duty that most Christians accept. In contrast, that the natural world is brutal, dangerous, harmful, indifferent, and unsafe is the only way the natural world could be if CN is true. Therefore, the evidence refutes BT and confirms CN. For people starving to death is expected on CN but not on BT; innocent people frequently coming to harm is expected on CN but not on BT; sick people who never recover is expected on CN but not on BT; and so on. CN explains all these things and makes them highly probable. But BT doesn't explain any of them, leaving a lot of what we observe highly improbable. Formally: P6: The moral code accepted by most Christians entails a set of duties D. P7: A BT God only acts in ways consistent with the moral code most Christians accept. C3: A BT God only acts in ways consistent with D. P8: There is no evidence that any God acts in ways consistent with D. C4: Therefore, there is no evidence that a BT God exists. Moreover: P9: If CN is true, the actual state of misery, ignorance and injustice that we observe is exactly what we would expect. P10: If BT is true, the actual state of misery, ignorance and injustice that we observe is not what we would expect. C5: Therefore, CN explains what we observe better than BT.

The Argument from Mind-Brain Dysteleology (AMBD) The scientific evidence confirming the necessity of a functioning human brain for human consciousness to exist is vast and secure.[5] We have identified where in a brain different kinds of memories are stored, where emotions and reason operate, where each kind of  

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sensory experience is processed, and so on. We have observed that if we physically remove or deactivate any one of these parts, the memories or abilities it contains then cease. It follows that if we take away all the parts, everything that we are will cease. Naturalism predicts this must be the case, since on N there is no other way to have consciousness except as the product of a large, delicate and complex physical system (lying at the end of an extremely long, meandering, faulty process of trial and error over billions of years). But this is not what we'd expect if BT were true, since BT entails that consciousness can exist and function without a brain, and there is no known reason a BT God would imbue us with any other kind of mind, and good reason to expect he wouldn't. CN thus predicts exactly what we observe, while BT predicts the opposite: that we would instead be made "in God's image," which is not what we observe. If BT is true, then (a) a brainless mind is possible, (b) God could have imbued humans with one, (c) no mind exists that was not deliberately created or allowed by God, and (d) in choosing what to do or allow, God would have obeyed the same moral code that a majority of Christians obey. From this it follows that: P11: Instead of the embodied mind we actually have (EM), God could have provided every human being with a brainless mind (BM) that (a) always operates correctly without need of food or oxygen, (b) is incapable of being damaged by any wounds or disease,(c) always perceives and reasons correctly, (d) doesn't pose a physical threat to a mother's life or health during delivery (as human brains do, in contrast with all other mammalian brains), and (e) is otherwise in every respect the same as our current mind. I am certain a clear majority of Christians, given the choice between bestowing a child in the womb with a BM or an EM, would choose the BM. And rightly so, since regardless of what drawbacks a BM might have, an EM will always have more. And surely the Golden Rule (GR), "love thy neighbor as thyself," is the most universal moral dictate in the whole of Christendom.[6] So if God adheres to "the moral code most Christians accept," then he must adhere to GR. Most people would want a BM rather than an EM and would thus choose one for themselves if they could. Therefore, anyone who adheres to GR must want their neighbor to have a BM instead of an EM, too. Therefore: P12: Any moral person adhering to GR would, if able, bestow a BM upon all children and an EM on none. P13: By definition, a BT God is a moral person adhering to GR and is  

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able to bestow a BM upon all children and an EM on none. C6: Therefore, a BT God would have bestowed a BM upon all children and an EM on none. P14: If C6, then we would observe everyone to have a BM, and no one an EM. P15: We observe no one to have a BM and everyone to have an EM. P16: If we observe exactly the opposite of what we expect on BT (or CN), then BT (or CN) does not explain very well what we observe. P17: If P15, then we observe exactly the opposite of what we expect on BT. C7: Therefore, BT does not explain very well what we observe. P18: If CN is true, then we would observe no one to have a BM and everyone to have an EM. P19: We observe no one to have a BM and everyone to have an EM. P20: If we observe exactly what we expect on CN (or BT), then CN (or BT) explains well what we observe. C8: Therefore, CN explains well what we observe. C9: If C7 and C8, per logicum, CN explains what we observe better than BT.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument (ACA) The universe is almost entirely lethal to life. By far, most of existence is a radiation-filled vacuum, and there are easily a trillion times more dead worlds than life-bearing planets. Life is clearly an extremely rare and unusual product of the universe. We also know it took the universe billions of years to finally produce any life anywhere, and then only an extremely simple single-celled life form. Then it took billions more years of a long, meandering and often catastrophically failing process of evolutionary trial-and-error to finally produce human beings. CN explains this state of affairs better than BT, since this state of affairs is highly probable on CN but not particularly probable on BT. Even if a God might have some reason to build a universe this way, he had many other ways he could have chosen (like the way the Bible  

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literally depicts and early Christians believed), and some make more sense on BT (a God has no need of a universe so old or big, for example). But we know of only one way CN could produce human beings: pretty much the way they were, with vast ages of unguided trial-and-error spanning across vast stretches of life-killing space. For example, if CN, then (a) life could only be an accidental byproduct of the organization of the universe, but (b) the only way life could then exist is if the universe were so incredibly old and big that something as improbable as the origin of life would be possible, yet (c) that is exactly the universe we find ourselves in. We have no comparably good explanation for why the universe would be so old and big on BT, or for many other peculiar features of our universe. Therefore, CN is a good explanation for why we observe what we do, while BT is not. Formally: P21: If CN is true, the nature and scale of the universe, and the history of life that we actually observe, is the only possible way we could exist that we know of, and is therefore what we would expect to observe. P22: If BT is true, the nature and scale of the universe, and the history of life that we actually observe, is one of countless possible ways we could exist that we know of, including some that make more sense, and is therefore not what we would expect. C10: Therefore, per logicum, CN explains what we observe better than BT. Many more arguments could be added to support P4 if room were available. Instead, I must close with two special arguments against BT.

Argument from Nonlocality (ANL) According to Wanchick, God in BT has no spatial location. But if God has no location, then by definition there is no location at which God exists. And if there is no location at which God exists, then God exists nowhere, which entails that God does not exist. For the proposition "there is nowhere that God exists" is literally synonymous with "God does not exist." From any intelligible definition of being, in order for anything to exist, it must exist somewhere--even if that somewhere is everywhere, or some location other than space. So God in BT must have some location other than space. But there is no place we know of except space, so we have no reason to believe any other place exists (even if one does). Therefore, if God does not exist in any location in space, we have no reason to believe God exists.

 

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Argument from Physical Minds (APM) According to Wanchick, God is nonmaterial (not consisting of matter), but has a conscious intelligence and the power to act. We have confirmed no instance of any C (consciousness, intelligence, or conscious or intelligent action) occurring in the absence of a required material, and all observed instances of C have occurred in the presence of a required material. These observations must number beyond the millions, including countless observations made under the best conditions, subject to the most reliable means and methods of inquiry. Therefore, regardless of what may be possible, we have no reason to believe that any elements of C ever do occur without a required material. Since a BT God by definition cannot have the required material, we therefore have no reason to believe that any BT God exists. Given the argument from nonlocality (ANL) and the argument from physical minds (APM), we should not believe basic theism (BT). But given the basic argumentfor naturalism (BAN) and the basic argument tonaturalism as the best explanation (BANBE), we should believe Carrier naturalism (CN). Q.E.D.

[1] See this debate's joint statement. [2] See Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005) and its companion website Naturalism as a Worldview. [3] See Wanchick's definition of BT in this debate's joint statement. [4] See this debate's rule number 4. [5] In addition to the brief summary provided in Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 135-57, see: V. S. Ramachandran, A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness: From Impostor Poodles to Purple Numbers (2004); Encyclopedia of the Human Brain(2002); Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind (1999); Gerald Edelman, Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness (2004); Steven Johnson, Mind Wide Open: Your Brain and the Neuroscience of Everyday Life (2004); Christof Koch,The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach (2004); Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: An Introduction (2003); Joseph Ledoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (2002); John Ratey, A User's Guide to the Brain:  

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Perception, Attention and the Four Theaters of the Brain (2001); Bernard Baars and James Newman, eds., Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2001); Gerald Woerlee, Mortal Minds: A Biology of the Soul and the Dying Experience(2003); Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, and Other Clinical Tales (1998); Frederick Schiffer, Of Two Minds: The Revolutionary Science of Dual-Brain Psychology (1998). [6] Leviticus 19:18; Mark 12:31-33; Matthew 10:27; Romans 13:9-10; Galatians 5:14; James 2:8.        

 

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19:19, 22:39;Luke

Carrier's First Rebuttal (2006)

Wanchick's Case Is Insufficient I don't have room to rebut every false or dubious claim Wanchick makes in his opening statement, so I will focus only on essentials.

Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (LCA) Wanchick proposes that (i) "the universe does not exist necessarily," so (ii) it must have an "external cause," which (iii) is impossible on naturalism. But he doesn't establish the truth of either (i) or (ii). First, Wanchick has not shown that the universe does not exist necessarily. Contrary to what Wanchick falsely claims, scientists now agree that we cannot know whether the whole of existence had a beginning, even if the observable part of it did, nor do scientists agree that everything that exists (including all space-time) will end, even if the present cosmos will.[1] Yet these claims are the only "evidence" Wanchick offers that the universe is "non-necessary." Since his evidence hasn't been established, he hasn't established his conclusion. And Wanchick's evidence wouldn't have lead to that conclusion anyway, since he didn't demonstrate that a necessary being cannot have a beginning and end. Second, Wanchick has not shown that "every substance [including the universe] has an explanation." Wanchick only offers as evidence our observations regarding theeffects of a universe. But he hasn't demonstrated that these observations hold for a universe itself. The only way we can logically infer that what is true of "the effects of a universe" is probably true of the universe itself is if we assume the universe is an effect, since otherwise we only have knowledge of effects, and whether the universe is an effect is precisely the matter in dispute. Wanchick hasn't demonstrated that the universe is an effect, and if the universe is not an effect, what we conclude about effects within a universe will not necessarily apply to the universe. Third, Wanchick claims "only minds" can cause any time or location to exist, but this cannot be true. It is logically impossible for a mind to think or act without a time in which to think or act, and a mind  

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that has no location exists nowhere and what exists nowhere does not exist.[2] Therefore, he has offered no logical explanation for space-time. Likewise, Wanchick claims "there was no nature prior to the universe" as a reason to reject natural causes of the universe. But if "the universe" includes time, then there can never be a time when the universe didn't exist--even if the universe began--and therefore it is logically impossible for anything to exist at any time "before" the universe, whether a person or a thing. So if there was no nature prior to the universe, there was no person, either. Finally, it's not logically impossible that "it is in the nature of a universe to exist," and if it's in the nature of this universe to exist, then the existence of this universe is self-explanatory. Even if we accept that "the explanation of the universe must be a metaphysically necessary, uncaused being," which "metaphysically necessary, uncaused being" would that be? Wanchick hasn't demonstrated that this "being" can't be the universe (or some part of it), nor that it could be a god. And he jumps without justification from effects within a universe to the universe itself, which might not be an effect. The truth is, we simply don't know whether universes are the sorts of things that have explanations.

Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) Wanchick's claim that "leading philosophers and scientists confirm that the universe came into existence from nothing" is false. Scientists have abandoned the certainty of that conviction, and philosophers can reach no agreement on it (and should defer to cosmological scientists on this question anyway).[3] Hawking is one of few left who still think it likely, and even he is no longer certain, conceding "there may well be other regions of the universe or other universes" different from this one.[4] Wanchick even falsely claims I agree with him, evidently confusing a theory about the origin of "the universe we can see" (italics in original) with a theory about the origin of time.[5] The truth is, there are no longer any facts confirming that everything "began to exist," as my book explains. Wanchick also attempts "logical" arguments against an eternal universe, but these arguments contradict the sound analysis of experts in transfinite mathematics.[6] First he argues that if there were "infinite past events" then "it would be impossible to reach" the present. Therefore, "since we have reached the end, the set of past events must be finite." But this argument requires the assumption of a starting point, which requires abandoning the premise to be disproved (that the series of past events is infinite, and therefore there was no starting point), rendering his argument fallaciously circular. For if there has been an infinite series of events, then there  

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are an infinite number of actual places we could have appeared in that series, up to and including now. So our existence cannot argue against our being elements within an infinite series. Wanchick then engages invalid mathematical reasoning by treating infinities as if they obeyed the mathematics of finite numbers. Experts in transfinite mathematics have come to exactly the opposite conclusion from Wanchick, with confirmed mathematical proofs. As both Vilenkin and Rucker explain, "the mathematics of infinity is different from that of ordinary numbers," such that "a part is less than the whole" is "indisputably true for finite sets" but not infinite sets. As Bertrand Russell explains, "the similarity of whole and part could be proved to be impossible for every finite whole," but "for infinite wholes, where the impossibility could not be proved, there was in fact no such impossibility." After providing the requisite proofs, he concludes that the usual "objections to infinite numbers, and classes, and series, and the notion that the infinite as such is selfcontradictory, may thus be dismissed as groundless."[7] So Wanchick's examples only show that finite arithmetic is invalid for transfinite numbers, not that infinities don't exist. That means Wanchick has no evidence or valid arguments establishing "the universe had a beginning." Whether it did is simply unknown. But if space-time did begin, Wanchick claims it must then have had a cause, on the grounds that we never observe anything to appear uncaused. But we only observe what is the normwithin our universe, and only now that the universe is in a particular state. We have no knowledge of what might hold outside the controls of the known universe, and physicists are agreed that the conditions realized during and shortly after the Big Bang were categorically different from conditions at present, with many physical laws operating quite differently than we are used to.[8] Therefore, Wanchick doesn't have evidence that every"substance that begins to exist has a cause" in every possible circumstance, especially the circumstances relevant to the origin of the universe, which we know for a fact to be categorically different from circumstances now. And since we only know of causesin time, we have no reason to believe causes can exist outside time. Therefore, Wanchick hasn't demonstrated the truth of either premise of his KCA, and therefore hasn't demonstrated its conclusion. And though Wanchick also argues "since nothing existed without the universe given naturalism, neither did its potential," this produces no argument against naturalism. For on naturalism, even if the universe began, then there was never a time when the universe didn't exist. So there was no "place" or "time" where there was "no potential for it" to exist, rendering Wanchick's objection irrelevant.  

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Cosmological Design Argument (CDA) Wanchick claims that "the unimaginably precise fine-tuning" of the laws of physics "appears more epistemically probable given theism than it does given naturalism," since "there are dozens of factors that must be set precisely in order for life to exist here." He says "with their slightest alteration, life would be impossible," and "while there are millions of ways the universe could physically be, very few of them are life-permitting." Wanchick hasn't demonstrated this last claim. Stephen Hawking says exactly the opposite, that "the present state of the universe could have arisen from quite a large number of different initial configurations ... so the initial state of the part of the universe that we inhabit did not have to be chosen with great care" and that, in addition, "there may well be other regions of the universe or other universes" with different physical properties.[9] Either way, this means the configuration of our universe has not been proved improbable. In fact, "some version of a multiverse is reasonable given the current world view of physics" according to Paul Davies, a view shared by many in the field, including John Barrow and England's Astronomer Royal, Martin Rees.[10] And current multiverse cosmological models predict that our kind of universe is probable.[11] In fact, this universe appears more epistemically probable given naturalism than it does given basic theism (BT).[12] In the words of cosmologists Hawley and Holcomb, "if the intent of the universe is to create life, then it has done so in a very inefficient manner," e.g. "Aristotle's cosmos would ... [have given] a much greater amount of life per cubic centimeter."[13] In fact, I've made the same point before: A universe perfectly designed for life would easily, readily, and abundantly produce and sustain it. Most of the contents of that universe would be conducive to life or benefit life. Yet that's not what we see. Instead, almost the entire universe is lethal to life--in fact, if we put all the lethal vacuum of outer space swamped with deadly radiation into an area the size of a house, you would never find the comparably microscopic speck of area that sustains life.[14] In other words, that we appear to be an extremely rare, chance byproduct of a vast, ancient universe almost entirely inhospitable to life is exactly what naturalism predicts, but not at all what BT predicts.[15]

Arguments from Knowability (AFK) and Beauty (AFB)

 

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Despite Wanchick's amazement, I cannot imagine any possible universe in which intelligent life-forms could evolve which would be incapable of being understood by those life-forms, so I see nothing here that needs to be explained.[16] And in spite of Wanchick's claim that God has made it easy to understand, the universe actually operates contrary to human common sense (consider relativity theory and quantum mechanics) and understanding it requires extremely advanced mathematical and conceptual background knowledge that most human beings will never attain. Far from being easy, the universe has been particularly difficult to understand, so no claim that it has been "finely tuned" to be understood has merit. The same holds for the idea that "beauty" is a valid criterion for true physical theories. What scientists call "beautiful" and "elegant" is in fact nightmarishly complicated to everyone else, and reflects a learned appreciation, not an innate truth-detector. As I explain elsewhere: Far from a "beautiful and convenient" chemistry of four elements, we discovered in the end an incredibly ugly, messy, and inconvenient Periodic Table of over ninety elements and counting (never mind the mind-boggling complexity of the Standard Model of particle physics); far from the "beautiful and convenient" planetary theory of Copernicus, the paths and velocities of the planets are so ugly and inconvenient that we need supercomputers to handle the messy intersection of Newtonian, Keplerian, Einsteinian, Thermodynamic, and Chaotic effects.[17]

Argument from Evil (AFE) and the Moral Argument (MAG) On naturalism, good and evil are human values, not properties of the universe independent of human needs and desires. Since this is logically possible, the existence of human valuations of good and evil cannot entail the existence of anyone but human valuators, which is exactly what we expect on naturalism.[18] And since Wanchick has presented no evidence demonstrating anything more than this, neither his AFE nor his MAG establishes its conclusion. For example, merely asserting that he has moral opinions contrary to mine establishes nothing more than that he has moral opinions contrary to mine. He also misrepresents my moral opinions, but regardless, I am sure he and I disagree on many issues of morality. But since he hasn't presented any method by which we can determine which moral opinion is actually "true" (much less "necessarily true"), he hasn't demonstrated that his opinion is true and mine is false (much less that his opinion is "necessarily true").[19]

 

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Wanchick's Ontological Argument (WOA) "Nothing" is a "possible total state of affairs" and is therefore a possible world, called PWN. PWN lacks a god, and everything else. Therefore, if a "necessary being" must exist in all PWs, then no thing can be a necessary being, since there is no being in PWN. If "nothing" is an impossible state of affairs, then a universe is the only thing shared by every PW, since every PW would then have some kind of universe; yet we can imagine many PWs without a god (e.g. a Taoist world). Therefore, only a universe can be a necessary being, not a god. Since Wanchick's WOA only holds for beings that are necessary in all PWs, and no being can be necessary in all PWs if "nothing" is possible, his WOA fails (as Wanchick has not shown "nothing" to be impossible). And even if "nothing" is impossible, a god cannot be necessary in all PWs, but a universe can, so Wanchick's WOA still fails. Finally, we can just as easily redefine Wanchick's MG (maximally good being) asME, "a necessary being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly evil," and Wanchick has stated no reason why the WOA would hold for MG but not for ME. Therefore, if Wanchick accepts the WOA for MG, he must believe in ME as well, which I doubt he would grant.[20]

Argument to the Resurrection of Jesus (ARJ) There is no consensus "among liberal and conservative scholars" whether historical evidence demonstrates that Jesus rose supernaturally from the grave, and Wanchick has not shown that "the majority of the world's historians who have studied the life of Jesus" have concluded that he did. Therefore, Wanchick cannot argue from a consensus of experts that he did. Wanchick's own source, Gary Habermas, claims that fully a quarter of experts don't even believe there was an empty tomb, which means there is no consensus even on that.[21] So we must examine Wanchick's evidence on our own. But much of what he says is false or ignores mitigating facts. First, the tomb. Wanchick claims "if the tomb weren't empty, Christianity would've been defeated in Jerusalem by Jewish authorities revealing so," but (i) evidence from other fanatical movements suggests that disliked authorities can rarely sway believers and their sympathizers, because evidence can always be denounced as fabricated;[22] (ii) a significant number of experts conclude the earliest Christians did not claim the tomb was empty;[23] and (iii) we know two ways a body can turn up missing: theft and misplacement.[24] Wanchick claims "women's testimony in Jesus' culture was considered generally unreliable and far inferior to that of men," so they wouldn't invent it, but that's false: the testimony of women was not so undervalued, and there were reasons to invent  

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it.[25] Wanchick states "the empty tomb is noted by Paul" in 1 Corinthians 15:3-5, but that's false: there is no mention of any tomb being found or becoming empty there, or anywhere in Paul. Wanchick then asserts "the Jewish denial of the empty tomb implies its reality," but it doesn't, because no Jewish or contemporary source mentions such a denial (even Acts fails to mention it), nor can the Christian report of this denial be confidently dated to the time of Christ, and there is evidence Christians invented it.[26] Wanchick claims "the story is benignly straightforward, unlike legendary stories of Jesus' era," but this is false and impertinent: it's false because some versions of the story contain flying angels, earthquakes, and risen corpses, and all contain mysterious men and vanished bodies, and it is impertinent because many "benignly straightforward" stories in Jesus' day were also false. Conclusion: Wanchick's evidence is insufficient to establish that there even was an empty tomb, much less that the body wasn't stolen or misplaced. Second, the appearances. That religious people in antiquity had "experiences" of their gods or deceased heroes is not in doubt: we have ample evidence this was relatively common then (e.g. numerous cases of pagans seeing gods or deceased persons are on record, and this was often accepted as normal) and scientists have identified natural psychological, cultural, and neurophysiological causes of such experiences.[27] But scientists have not confirmed a single experience at any time in history as having a genuine supernatural source. Since the findings of more reliable methods should supercede the less reliable, early Christians probably experienced natural hallucinations just like their pagan neighbors, or claimed to have, in order to acquire the authority that such experiences conferred in their culture, which Christians would have desired in order to morally reform society.[28] There are also many natural reasons only a scant few opponents and doubters would join a cause or have experiences convincing them to.[29] Conclusion: Wanchick's evidence is insufficient to establish that any supernatural beings appeared to any Christians. Third, Wanchick claims "a lone resurrection of an executed Messiah was utterly foreign to pre-Christian Jews and blatantly contradicted their Messianic expectations," but that's false: an executed messiah is explicitly predicted in Daniel 9:25-26, and there is evidence Jews had many reasons to expect their messiah to be executed yet vindicated. Moreover, they were not so monolithic that they weren't reconceptualizing their faith in dozens of novel ways.[30] Christianity was explicitly Hellenistic (its earliest literature is in Greek and shows influences from Hellenistic philosophy and religion) and resurrected saviors were a fashion of the time, a natural inspiration for syncretism in reconceptualizing the Jewish savior,  

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consciously or not.[31] Conclusion: Wanchick's evidence is insufficient to establish that anything unnatural occurred in producing Christianity.[32] So whether Jesus rose from the dead cannot be known from present historical evidence. And even if he did, Wanchick has not shown that a BT God was responsible.

[1] See quotations and references in Richard Carrier, "The Truth about Singularities" and "The Truth about Smolin Multiverse Theory," subsections of Richard Carrier, "The Big Debate: Comments on the Barker-Carrier vs. Corey-Rajabali Team Debate" (2004) on the Secular Web. [2] See the "Argument from Nonlocality" (ANL) in myopening statement for this debate. [3] See G. Veneziano, "The Myth of the Beginning of Time," Scientific American 290.5 (2004): pp. 54-65, and further discussion in the sources cited in above and the relevant essays on the cosmological arguments page of the Secular Web modern library. [4] Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time: The Updated and Expanded Tenth Anniversary Edition(1998), p. 182. [5] Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 71-88. [6] For example: Graham Oppy, "Inverse Operations With Transfinite Numbers And The Kalam Cosmological Argument" (1995), International Philosophical Quarterly 35.2: pp. 219-21; Eric Sotnak, "The Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Possibility of an Actually Infinite Future" (1999), Philo2.2: pp. 41-52; Arnold Guminski, "The Kalam Cosmological Argument: The Question of the Metaphysical Possibility of an Infinite Set of Real Entities" (2003), Philo 5.2: pp. 196-215; and Guminski's supplementary articles on the Secular Web: "The Kalam Cosmological Argument Yet Again: The Question of the Metaphysical Possibility of an Infinite Temporal Series" (2003) and "The Kalam Cosmological Argument as Amended: The Question of the Metaphysical Possibility of an Infinite Temporal Series of Finite Duration" (2004). [7] Rudy Rucker, Infinity and the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinite (1982), p. 296; N. Ya. Vilenkin, In Search of Infinity (1995), pp. 50-69; Bertrand Russell, The Principles of  

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Mathematics, 2nd edn. (1937), esp. § 3.23 and all of § 5 (e.g. 5.43). In addition, see the expert commentaries cited in above, and the reference entries: "Is there really such a thing as infinity? from the University of Toronto Mathematics Network; "Infinity" from the History of Mathematics Archive; and "Continuity and Infinitesimals" from theStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [8] This is explained by Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time: The Updated and Expanded Tenth Anniversary Edition (1998); Joseph Silk, The Big Bang, 3rd edn. (2000), esp. pp. 85-123; and John Hawley and Katherine Holcomb, Foundations of Modern Cosmology, 2nd edn. (2005). [9] Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time: The Updated and Expanded Tenth Anniversary Edition(1998), p. 137, 182. I discuss these and other conceptual problems with fine-tuning arguments in Richard Carrier, "Response to James Hannam's 'In Defense of the Fine Tuning Design Argument'" (2001). [10] Paul Davies, "Multiverse Cosmological Models,"Modern Physics Letters A, 19:10 (2004), pp. 727-743. For Barrow, Rees, and others, see: "The Truth about Smolin Multiverse Theory," subsection of Richard Carrier, "The Big Debate: Comments on the Barker-Carrier vs. Corey-Rajabali Team Debate" (2004) on the Secular Web; and G. Veneziano, "The Myth of the Beginning of Time," Scientific American 290.5 (2004): pp. 54-65. [11] See above. [12] For Wanchick's definition of BT, see this debate'sJoint Statement. [13] John Hawley and Katherine Holcomb, Foundations of Modern Cosmology, 2nd edn. (2005), p. 158. Coincidentally, I independently demonstrated this same conclusion, in greater detail, in the source cited in below. [14] Richard Carrier, "Christianity Predicts a Different Universe," Point 4 of "Why I Am Not a Christian" (2006) on the Secular Web. [15] See my Atheistic Cosmological Argument (ACA) in my opening statement for this debate and my discussion, using the Smolin multiverse theory as an example, in Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism(2005), 71-88.

 

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[16] See my discussions of the evolution of reason in Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 173-91; and in Richard Carrier, "Argument from Reliability of Rational Faculties (AfRF)," "Reliablism," "Five Axioms of Science?," and "We Should Attack Rocks?," all subsections of Richard Carrier, "Critical Review of Victor Reppert's Defense of the Argument from Reason" (2004) on the Secular Web. [17] See the whole discussion of this very subject in Richard Carrier, "Fundamental Flaws in Mark Steiner's Challenge to Naturalism in The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem" (2003) on the Secular Web. See also my discussion of the evidence that human concepts of "beauty" in general are partly evolved by natural selection, and partly learned from personal and cultural experience, in Richard Carrier,Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 349-66; and on the alleged criterion of 'simplicity', see the pages referenced in the index, s.v. "simplicity," ibid., pp. 422-23. [18] See "Defining Good and Evil" in Richard Carrier,Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 337-39, and for this and the arguments to follow, see the whole of Part V, "Natural Morality," ibid., pp. 291-348. [19] Like, for example, my naturalistic method of determining moral truth that I outline, defend, and employ in Part V, "Natural Morality," of Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 291-348. [20] See Michael Martin, "The Coherence of the Hypothesis of an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Free and Perfectly Evil Being," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 17.3 (1985): pp. 185-91. [21] See Gary Habermas, "Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present: What are Critical Scholars Saying?,"Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 3.2 (June 2005): pp. 135-153; and Gary Habermas, "The Late Twentieth-Century Resurgence of Naturalistic Responses to Jesus' Resurrection," Trinity Journal 22.2 (2001): pp. 179-196. [22] See examples and discussion in: Richard Carrier, "The Plausibility of Theft" in The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005) ed. Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, esp. pp. 355-57; Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb" in ibid., esp. pp. 170-79, 198 n. 3; Jeffery Jay Lowder, "Historical Evidence and the Empty Tomb Story," in ibid., esp. pp. 287-90. See also Richard Carrier, "Would the Facts Be  

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Checked?" and "Was Christianity Highly Vulnerable to Inspection and Disproof?," chapters 13 and 7 (respectively) of "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005), though other chapters of that work are also relevant. [23] See Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb" in The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005) ed. by Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, pp. 105233, with its corresponding Spiritual Body FAQ. See also: Peter Lampe, "Paul's Concept of a Spiritual Body" inResurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments(2002), ed. by Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker: pp. 103-14; Gregory Riley, Resurrection Reconsidered: Thomas and John in Controversy (1995); Dale Martin, The Corinthian Body (1995); Adela Collins, "The Empty Tomb in the Gospel According to Mark" inHermes and Athena: Biblical Exegesis and Philosophical Theology (1993) ed. by Eleanor Stump and Thomas P. Flint: pp. 10740; C.F. Moule, "St. Paul and Dualism: The Pauline Conception of the Resurrection," New Testament Studies 12 (1966): pp. 106-23. [24] See Richard Carrier, "The Plausibility of Theft" inThe Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005) ed. by Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder: pp. 349-68, with its corresponding Plausibility of Theft FAQ, and Richard Carrier, "The Burial of Jesus in Light of Jewish Law," ibid., pp. 369-92, with its corresponding Burial of Jesus FAQ. See also: Jeffery Jay Lowder, "Historical Evidence and the Empty Tomb Story," ibid., pp. 261-306, and Peter Kirby, "The Case Against the Empty Tomb," ibid., pp. 233-60. [25] See Richard Carrier, "Did No One Trust Women?," chapter 11 of "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005). [26] I present all the evidence on this matter in Richard Carrier, "The Plausibility of Theft" in The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005) ed. by Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, pp. 34968, with its corresponding Plausibility of Theft FAQ. [27] See evidence and sources in Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb," The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave(2005), esp. pp. 170-97, and Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 202-208. [28] See discussion and scholarship in Richard Carrier, "Malina & Neyrey on the Role of Revelation," part 4 of chapter 10 ("Would Groupthinkers Never Switch Groups?") of "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005), and in the sources cited in the  

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footnotes there (14, 15, 16). From the same work see also chapter 13 ("Would the Facts Be Checked?"). For discussion of possible natural causes of the first visions, see Richard Carrier, "The Burial of Jesus in Light of Jewish Law" inThe Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005) ed. by Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, esp. pp. 386-88, with corresponding endnotes on pp. 391-92. For examples of Christians having or claiming authority-granting hallucinations, see Acts 7:55-56, 10:1-7, 11:5-14,12:6-11, 16:9-10, 22:17-21. And on the methodological principle that more reliable methods should supercede lesser, see my Basic Argument for Naturalism in myopening statement for this debate, and Richard Carrier,Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 49-62. [29] Discussed throughout the sources cited in above; with Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb" in The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005) ed. by Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, esp. pp. 194-95. [30] See Richard Carrier, "Many Converts Expected a Humiliated Savior," part 4 of chapter 1 ("Who Would Buy One Crucified?") of "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005), with the relevant entries in chapter 19 of the same work ("Responses to Critics"). On Jews reconceptualizing their faith in novel ways, see Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb" in The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005) ed. by Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, esp. pp. 107-118. [31] See Richard Carrier, "Was Resurrection Deemed Impossible?," chapter 3 of "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005), with the relevant entries in chapter 19 of the same work ("Responses to Critics"). See also the issues raised throughout Richard Carrier, "Why I Don't Buy the Resurrection Story" (6th edn., 2006) and "Why I Am Not a Christian" (2006). [32] For thorough treatment of whether anything unnatural (much less a BT God specifically) was required for the origin or success of Christianity, see Richard Carrier, "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005), "Why I Am Not a Christian" (2006), and "Why I Don't Buy the Resurrection Story" (6th edn., 2006).    

 

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Wanchick's First Rebuttal (2006)

Basic Argument for Naturalism (BAN) It's hard to make sense of Carrier's opening argument. He aptly labels it his basic argument for naturalism (BAN). Unfortunately, its lack of depth apparently stems from his failure to justify its premises. P1 says propositions entailed by reliable methods trump those supported by less reliable ones. By this Carrier seems to mean if a certain worldview is better substantiated by science, history, and "critical investigation" (whatever that means), that's what we should believe. This, however, begs the question as to why these disciplines would be the "most reliable methods" for inquiry. If another worldview were better vindicated than CN in other areas, why not believe that? Moreover, P1 presupposes a peculiar epistemology: only beliefs for which we have reliable evidence or good arguments should be strongly believed. Ironically, Carrier provides no evidence for this evidentialism. In fact, such a theory of knowledge is quite controversial. Many philosophers hold that we can often be rationally justified in holding beliefs that have little or no evidence, or which even contradict the evidence, as long as those beliefs are properly basic and have enough warrant to overcome defeaters.[1] Unless Carrier can prove his epistemology true or most plausible, P1 has nothing recommending it, making BAN unsound. Finally, why believe P2? Carrier asserts that "CN is the only worldview that follows from the findings of the most reliable methods," and offers as evidence that there have been "millions" of cases where these methods allegedly confirmed naturalism over supernaturalism. But what millions is he talking about? He only specifies three. Oddly, however, they do nothing to confirm naturalism over theism. For classical theism doesn't hold that lightning, disease, or the order/maintenance of the solar system are generally products of direct supernatural intervention.[2] Alas, far from millions, I can't recall even one instance where scholarship confirmed naturalistic predictions over theistic ones. I can recall, though, myriad examples of the reverse: the discovery of the universe's origin, life's incalculable complexity/order, the lack of  

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transitional fossils and sudden appearance of animal kinds in geology, the universe's delicate fine-tuning, the recalcitrance of mental and moral properties to materialistic explanation, the historicity of Jesus' resurrection, etc. The winning bet appears, then, to be theism. BAN, at least, does nothing for CN's cause.

Basic Argument to Naturalism as the Best Explanation (BANBE) In his second syllogism, Carrier attempts to overcome naturalism's embarrassing intellectual history by arguing that since CN successfully explains more of the world than does any other worldview, it alone reigns as the true hypothesis. BANBE (which resembles a mere restatement of BAN), however, presupposes the same unestablished epistemological theory as BAN does. For P3 says any worldview that explains the world best should be believed over any worldview that doesn't. But, again, such an idea is unpopular among epistemologists. For P3 to be believed, he'd have to show his epistemology superior to that of Plantinga and others, or show that theistic belief can't be properly basic. Nevertheless, even if P3 were true, this would still leave Carrier the challenging task of establishing the dubiousP4, which he attempts in the form of additional arguments for CN.

Argument from Divine Inaction (ADI) Carrier's ADI contains a plurality of problems beginning with P6. It says Christianity entails a set of duties for "every moral person": feed the hungry, etc. This is inaccurate, though, since Christianity never demands that every person do these things, but only those in the correct context or circumstance. One should not, for instance, feed the hungry if he must kill his kids to do so. As it stands, then, P6 is false as it fails to understand the nuances of a Christian meta-ethic. P8 also falters. What "evidence" is Carrier looking for? He never explains. But if we don't know what to look for, how do we know it's not there? He never even justifies his call for evidence. If God is morally perfect, why expect evidence of this? The premise is doubly question-begging. Perhaps from P6 and P7 he's inferring if God exists, He would always heal the sick, etc. and there'd be no evil or suffering. The lack thereof would be the "evidence." But this is problematic, first, because P6 is false, and second, because ADI would then amount to the defeated logical argument from evil.[3] For the theist can just say

 

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that possibly, God has a sufficient reason to allow evil. A theistic world containing evil, therefore, could possibly exist. If Carrier is merely saying that suffering, etc., would be far less in a theistic universe, he's begging the question, for nothing in his preceding discussion or premises proves that claim. From the mere fact that God is perfectly good, it doesn't follow that He won't allow evil. Furthermore, P8 is false, since we do have evidence of God healing the sick, protecting people, etc. People have always testified that God acts in human lives in the ways Carrier details. As such, P8 contradicts millions upon millions of testimonies throughout time, and is overwhelmed by contrary inductive evidence. Note that these testimonies don't have to be proven in order to defeat P8; their mere existence is an undercutting defeater of P8 that Carrier must disprove. Alas, even if P8 were true, ADI is invalid since C4 doesn't follow from the preceding premises. For the alleged fact that we don't see God acting consistently with D doesn't imply that there's no evidence for theism. For instance, a sound version of the argument from desire would supply evidence for theism, even if we had no evidence of God's moral acts. C4 would follow only if evidence of God's moral action is a necessary condition for having evidence for theism, which is false. P9 too has problems. Why believe that ignorance, misery, etc., would predominate in a naturalistic world? Indeed, if CN is true, why would we even expect a universe, a life-permitting universe, a lifeproducing universe, a universe with sentient life, one with selfconscious beings, or one with beings who can experience misery or suffering? As I note in my opening statement, the fine-tuning of the universe is overwhelmingly improbable on CN. In his opening statement, Carrier admits that the origin of life is vastly improbable given CN.[4] But then, of course, since fine-tuning and life exist, CN is vastly improbable--not to mention the essentially zero probability that humans would arise on CN.[5] Moreover, why isn't the universe more pleasant if CN is true? Or why isn't it more hideous? P9 is thus both unsupported and false. As my discussion of P6 and P8 makes clear, P10 is never established by Carrier. If we wouldn't expect misery, ignorance, and injustice given theism, Carrier hasn't demonstrated why. Thus, Carrier's first argument fails since it contains both unestablished and false premises.

 

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The Argument from Mind-Brain Dysteleology (AMBD) AMBD quickly derails itself too, as Carrier claims that God could've created us with immaterial "brainless minds" (BMs). This entails that human minds are disembodied in some possible world (PW); consequently, human minds are possibly disembodied in every PW. But if anything can possibly exist disembodied, it is not a material substance, since material substances can't exist without matter. Therefore, human minds are immaterial substances. But since CN requires that consciousness arises only from a "complex physical system," CN is false and theism is bolstered. Moreover, there's no reason to believe P11. Carrier's attempted support for it is that BMs could be unharmed by disease, etc., and thus will always be superior to embodied minds (EMs). But this seems false, since there could be invincible EMs. Would most people choose an invincible EM or BM? Carrier presents no reason to think they'd choose the latter, and I don't know how he'd know it if they did. Thus, P11 is without justification and AMBD is invalid. Moreover, even if most humans would want a BM, why believe God would want this? Indeed, on Christian theology, God (Christ) has a body. So, the Christian God wouldn't eschew embodiment. Carrier could alter the argument and say most people adhering to the golden rule (GR) would give all children a perfect mind (PM), whether EM or BM. Since God adheres to GR, He would do this. But since Carrier is not permitted to bring up new arguments in later rebuttals, and AMBD is defeated, neither it nor its offspring can play a further role in this debate. Furthermore, Carrier fails to see that GR doesn't apply in God's creative act. GR says we should do to others as we would want done to us. But, of course, because God is necessarily uncreated, it makes no sense to say He would want to be created with a PM. For that would be equivalent to God saying, "If I didn't exist, I'd like to have a BM," which is incoherent. And an omniscient God doesn't affirm incoherent statements. Finally, Carrier again fails to understand that moral principles are inapplicable in certain contexts. Different persons can act morally in different ways depending on their respective circumstances. Thus, while a doctor is obligated to perform emergency surgery, a mailman isn't. So if allowing a person to suffer an illness leads to a greater good than healing him would (e.g., salvation), then God has a morally sufficient reason not to heal him. Therefore, even if it were true that God would prefer to give humans PMs, theists can merely  

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maintain that possibly God had a morally sufficient reason not to do so. To defeat this objection, Carrier must show that this is false or implausible. P18 is similarly troublesome, since Carrier again just assumes that we would find things as they are if CN were true. But, as I noted above, there's no reason to expect our world rather than any other given CN. Indeed, there seems to be zero probability this world would materialize.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument (ACA) Carrier's statement of ACA is strange, as he never justifies the crucial P21, which conveniently asserts that if CN is true, we would expect precisely our universe. Carrier simply says that the dimensions, age, and life history of our universe are the only ones that could generate life on CN, therefore we'd expect to observe these things if CN were true. But anyone can see that the consequent in this premise doesn't follow from the antecedent. For even if only this type of universe could generate life on CN, that doesn't provide any reason to think such a world would materialize on CN thereby allowing us to observe it. Analogously, if God created our universe, we necessarily wouldn't see Him, since He's essentially invisible. But obviously from this truth, it doesn't follow that our inability to see God in our universe proves He is its cause! In order to show P21 true, Carrier would have to somehow demonstrate that if CN is true, we'd expect to see our universe rather than any other. But as I've noted, the possibilities are countless and Carrier supplies no reason to think our universe is more probable than any other given CN. P21 is also false since both the existence of fine-tuning and the origin of any life are so improbable on CN as to be virtually impossible. And the probability that human life would arise on CN is so incalculably low as to be inconceivable. Since all of these exist, it is virtually impossible that CN is true. Moreover, P21 also falsely claims that, if CN were true, "the history of life that we actually observe is the only possible way we could exist." But CN is compatible with an eternal universe which has always contained life, or with a world where life develops by rapid large-scale mutations rather than "meandering" processes, or where life is just part of the furniture of the universe, and myriad other possibilities. Thus ACA is unsound.  

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P22 is likewise problematic. It claims that since God could make various universes with different histories and dimensions, we wouldn't expect this one. Of course, even if P22 were plausible, it does nothing to aid CN, since as we saw, CN itself could result in countless other worlds, giving us no expectation that ours would actualize. Secondly, how can Carrier know that we shouldn't expect such a universe from God? The mere fact that God has many possibilities does nothing to show that this is improbable. For if God prefers this world for some reason, it's not improbable. How does he know God wouldn't prefer this? The only support Carrier presents for P22 is that the universe wouldn't be so big or old on theism, because allegedly God would have "no need" of a large or old universe. But God doesn't need any universe. This, however, indicates nothing about what size or shape God would make the universe. Moreover, it makes no sense to say the universe is old and big. Compared to what is it old or big? It could be ten billions times bigger and older than it is, but from that perspective, it's small and young and thus theism is confirmed over CN. Additionally, Carrier's assertion that earth history reflects CN over theism presupposes Darwinism is true. But he never presents reason for thinking so. Indeed, this theory is contradicted by many facts: the virtual impossibility of abiogenesis, the lack of transitional forms and sudden appearance of fully formed species in the geological record, the irreducible and specified complexity of life, mental events and properties, moral properties, etc. Carrier's earlier confirmation of substance dualism also disproves it. Carrier should provide reason to adopt his origins story, rather than just asserting it. Indeed, given the actual evidence, it appears this naturalistic story is false.

Argument from Nonlocality (ANL) Carrier's ANL fails because he never proves that "God exists nowhere" is logically equivalent to or entails "God doesn't exist." Why think that nonspatial existence is impossible? The assertion is without proof. Additionally, that nonspatial existence is impossible surely seems false. The greatest philosophers, both theists and nontheists, have believed in nonspatial realities. Many believe that laws of logic, numbers, universals, sets, propositions, or other abstract objects exist. For instance, Carrier's fellow Internet Infidel, Jeff Lowder, has believed such things to be real.[6] Time, mental events, consciousness, emotions, love, and many other things also exist, but have no spatial location. Indeed, the Big Bang implies that the universe exists in no space.

 

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Moreover, even if none of these things actually exist, it seems conceivable that something like them could. But then it seems possible for a being to have no spatial location. For his argument to succeed, Carrier would have to show this to be impossible.

Argument from Physical Minds (APM) In his final argument, Carrier says since we have never observed a conscious intelligence operating without "required matter," we have "no reason to believe" such intelligence exists. Unfortunately, even if we grant this inductive generalization, the conclusion doesn't follow. For we could consistently experience only matter-related minds, but still have evidence that immaterial minds exist. This would be so, for instance, if we only experienced material minds and yet the ontological argument were sound. So APM's conclusion doesn't even follow inductively and therefore APM is not cogent. Secondly, Carrier begs the question when he says all instances of intelligence we find have a "required material" basis. What if something like substance dualism is true?[7] Then matter is not required for intelligence, although the intelligences we experienced would be embodied. Carrier himself confesses this is possible when he says, "regardless of what may be possible" we never actually see such minds. Translation: While disembodied intelligence is possible, we allegedly never see it. But if it is possible, then matter isn't required for intelligence and his premise is false. Indeed, unless Carrier can prove that substance dualism is false or that materialism explains our inductive experience better, there's no reason to prefer the latter over the former. Even top materialists have noted that substance dualism is the default metaphysical position on personhood and the burden falls on materialists to prove their perspective superior.[8] Carrier merely claims we have discovered that mental realities are in the brain and we are material beings. But making assertions proves nothing, and substance dualists have argued precisely the opposite. Many of the greatest thinkers from Plato to Plantinga have in fact argued so. Carrier's inductive premise, then, is question-begging if it entails materialism. And if it allows substance dualism, the inductive facts could just as easily falsify CN, thus nullifying APM. But in fact Carrier himself has already conceded that substance dualism is true. For we saw in AMBD that human minds are necessarily nonmaterial. But then CN is false and theism strongly suggests itself.

 

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Moreover, even if Carrier were right that the minds we typically observe are material, this doesn't demonstrate that probably no immaterial minds exist, for there are other plausible explanations for this fact. Similarly, we've never observed intelligences outside of Earth. But does this strongly imply that no such life exists? Of course not, since this lack of observance could just as easily be explained by such beings inaccessible to us. The same could be said for immaterial intelligences; perhaps they exist but simply don't interact with us or are inaccessible. How does Carrier know his explanation is better than these? Indeed, the only immaterial intelligence theists would ever expect to experience is God. And this supplies yet another objection to APM. Carrier asserts that we have no confirmed instances of experiencing purely immaterial minds. But this strangely overlooks the millions upon millions of people throughout time who would testify that they have experienced such minds. Whether it's God, demons, Satan, angels, or near-death experiences, thousands of such events have occurred daily throughout history and act as counterexamples to Carrier's claim. Theists can even allow that many in nontheistic religions have experienced such beings, since they could, for example, misinterpret an experience of God. Carrier will have to plausibly explain away all such occurrences lest his premise be undercut.[9]

[1] See: Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). [2] On the science vs. theism myth, see: Robert Koons, "Theism and Science: Concord, Not Conflict" in The Rationality of Theism ed. Paul Copan and Paul Moser (New York: Routledge, 2003); Nancy Pearcey, Total Truth (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2004); Uncommon Dissented. William Dembski (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2004). [3] See Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977). [4] On the origin of life, see the various publications of intelligent design theorist Stephen C. Meyer. See also Walter C. Bradley and Charles Thaxton, The Mystery of Life's Origin (Philosophical Library, 1984), and Hugh Ross and Fuz Rana, Origins of Life (Colorado Springs: NavPress, 2004).  

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[5] For such calculations see John Barrow and Frank Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). [6] See the Lowder-Fernandes fromwww.biblicaldefense.org.

Debate available

[7] Good defenses of substance dualism are found in: J.P. Moreland, Body and Soul (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000); Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); David H. Lund, The Conscious Self (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2005); William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the Mind of God(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). [8] Moreland documents this in Body and Soul, for instance. [9] Good stories of such encounters are in Corrie Ten Boom, The Hiding Place (New York: Bantam, 1984); cf.Tramp for the Lord (New York: Jove Books, 1986). For philosophical defenses of such experiences, see R. Douglas Geivett, "The Argument from Religious Experience" in The Rationality of Theism (New York: Routledge, 2003), and William Alston, Perceiving God(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).  

 

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Wanchick's Second Rebuttal (2006)

Leibnizian Cosmological Argument Carrier says the "only evidence" I offer that the universe is nonnecessary is scientific. Not at all; I first noted that "the universe appears obviously contingent": we can easily conceive of its nonexistence. Carrier never challenges this. Alas, he concedes it, stating that possibly nothing or a different (e.g., Taoist) world could exist. But admitting the universe's possible nonexistence concedes its contingency. Indeed, Carrier can't think space-time is explained by necessity, as he writes, "something must exist without any explanation at all, so it may as well be the multiverse."[1] Moreover, why believe "scientists now agree that we cannot know whether the whole of existence had a beginning"? This is false in light of Hawking's confession that most scientists (himself included) hold that space and time had a beginning. Does Carrier know the consensus better than Hawking? To support his claim, he merely footnotes his statements about the respectability of "multiverse" theory. But Carrier there admits "multiverse theories" are not a "consensus position."[2] He must reject them, too, since his ANL disqualifies belief in other spaces. Moreover, Carrier's only scientific support is the chaotic inflationary and "Smolin selection" models. However, in his book he says the latter is less plausible than the former, and that chaotic inflation has no evidence supporting it over rivals.[3] Even fellow naturalist Jeff Lowder thinks such theories are "highly speculative" and do nothing to support CN.[4] Regardless, even if the chaotic inflationary model were plausible, its originator admits it entails a beginning.[5] Carrier's unsubstantiated proclamation that cosmological singularities are rejected by most scientists does nothing to circumvent the universe's origin. A singularity is not necessary for space-time's finitude; time could begin without a beginning point, as Barrow and others observe.[6] Ultimately, as Carrier admits, the Big Bang model has strong evidence and multiverse theories don't. We're then left with good

 

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scientific reason to accept only the former. The contingency of the cosmos confronts us scientifically. Carrier asserts that possibly a being whose existence begins or ends is necessary. But the only way an originating being can be necessary is if it's necessarily created by a necessary being. But then a metaphysically necessary transcendent cause exists and CN is false. Moreover, a being that can cease isn't necessary, since there's a possible world where it's nonexistent. He then says I didn't show that every substance has an explanation, alleging my only support for this is based on our "observations regarding the effects of the universe." Again, not so; I first said the plausibility of this initially stems from the a priori reasonableness of explanation over nonexplanation. Confronted with any substance (inside or outside the universe), everyone would presume it has an explanation rather than not. Carrier himself says, "The important questions that remain are why the Big Bang happened ... and produced this particular universe."[7] He also concedes that immaterial minds and other universes would have explanations, though they're not effects of the universe. Thus, rather than challenging my claim about such a priori probability, he confirms it. Moreover, for any substance, no one would accept nonexplanation when there is even a tentative credible explanation available. However, if explanation and nonexplanation are equally plausible, this wouldn't hold. Thus, unless Carrier can posit a plausible naturalistic explanation, or show a supernatural one untenable, it's most reasonable to accept the latter. Carrier does assert the impossibility of a timeless, spaceless agent, but provides no argument. Indeed, such a concept is prima facie coherent. He also says since there is no time without the universe there could be no prior cause. But this only implies that there can't be a causetemporally prior; it doesn't show the impossibility of an ontologically prior one. Furthermore, why is the inductive evidence for this premise insufficient? Surely, our unfailing experience that objects have explanations supports it. If unexplainable substances can exist, why don't we find any? Carrier says we can't extrapolate from our experience to reality as a whole. But he routinely does so, e.g., in his arguments against immaterial minds and atemporal causes. He can't therefore dismiss my inductive arguments for making such extrapolations; he'll have to criticize them on independent grounds (as I've done with his). Since he doesn't, the argument remains cogent.  

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Finally, Carrier says the universe could be explained by the fact that "it is in the nature of the universe to exist." This, however, implies a necessary universe, which we found false. His claim that the universe could cause itself makes no sense: A thing must exist in order to cause something. As for his question concerning which metaphysically necessary being would've caused the universe, I answered that previously: an immaterial mind having unsurpassed knowledge and power, transcending space-time.

Kalam Cosmological Argument Carrier tries dismissing the scientific evidence for the universe's origin, but as we saw, he's unsuccessful. I also mentioned philosophical reasons for believing space-time finite. An infinite series can't be crossed. But since the end--the present--has been reached, the set of past events is finite. Carrier says this begs the question by presuming a "starting point." But the argument says no such thing. In fact, the lack thereof only means one could never begin traversing an infinite and so would certainly never finish.[8] Carrier's claim that if there are infinite past events "there are an infinite number of actual places we could have appeared in that series" is false, since events (e.g., our origin) occur at the present--the last event. Regardless, as I highlighted, wherever one is in an infinite series of things, there will always be infinite ahead such that the end won't be reached. I also argued that an infinite set of things can't exist because it results in metaphysical absurdities. We could, e.g., subtract infinite cars from infinite cars and have varying remainders. Carrier responds that we do this in mathematics. But that's irrelevant, for I noted that those procedures are inapplicable to real things. I can subtract eight from two and get negative six mathematically; not so with objects. Thus, I follow Craig in saying "my argument does not require ... that mathematical theories of the infinite are incoherent. It is the real existence of the actual infinite I reject."[9] Carrier also challenges my first premise. But given our constant experience, surely it's most plausible that all originating objects have causes. Carrier disputes this only by claiming that "we have no knowledge of what might hold outside the controls of the known universe." But as I noted, Carrier himself routinely claims such knowledge (e.g., no timeless causation). Moreover, we obviously know that, e.g., lions and spaceships couldn't arise if nothing else existed. So the objection is simply false. Of course, Carrier never challenges my earlier defense stating we have a metaphysical intuition affirming this premise. Per Craig,  

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"since metaphysical intuitions are indispensable, we have no recourse but to accept those that press upon us and for which we have no defeaters."[10] Lastly, I argued that since CN disallows any potential universe, then, in accord with Carrier's statements on potentiality, it disallows an actual one.[11] Carrier only responds that the potential didn't exist because there was no time or place for it. Right; therefore CN disallows such potential and the universe would've never become actual. Since it is actual, CN is false; the universe had a supernatural cause existing timelessly and immaterially without it. Carrier inconsistently extrapolates from space-time's lack of temporal causes that we "have no reason" to think they exist at all. But we do: there was no time without the universe and thus the cause of the universe existed timelessly. Moreover, the cause could've occurred simultaneously with the start of the universe, therefore occurring temporally. Even prominent atheists find this argument fallacious.[12]

Design of/in the Universe Fine-Tuning Carrier says Hawking does not find a life-permitting cosmos improbable. But, as I noted, the vast scientific consensus would disagree, as Robin Collins, the foremost expert on fine-tuning, notes. Thus, scholarship sides with me, not Carrier. Indeed, Carrier doesn't view Hawking as sufficiently authoritative anyway, for Carrier himself rejects Hawking's position that space-time has an origin. Regardless, Hawking here is simply suggesting Linde's chaotic inflationary model, which we found wanting.[13] Anyway, this hypothesis requires fine-tuning anyway: the Pauli exclusion principle, the correct cosmological constant, etc.[14] Finally, his declaration that our universe is more epistemically probable given CN carries no support. Why expect such a universe given CN? The argument also presumes that if God produced a lifebearing universe, it would contain more life than it does. Why think so? Knowability and Discoverability Carrier's complaint that the universe apparently wasn't made for easy comprehension is irrelevant. Good literature isn't easy, but is surely designed for comprehension.  

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At minimum, our universe is amenable to human discovery, as Carrier often lauds science's success. But as Gonzalez extensively documents, if the universe hosted intelligent life almost anywhere else, the vast information from solar eclipses, geological findings, cosmic background radiation, etc., couldn't be obtained.[15] Why do life and discoverability overlap so well? Theism can explain this; naturalism cannot. Beauty Carrier says the beauty of scientific theories is a "learned appreciation." Even if this unsupported claim were true, it doesn't show that there's no such objective beauty, as widely recognized by scientists. Often, classical music and fine art, e.g., are only appreciated by the learned, but they indisputably contain beauty and elegance. Indeed, we can only learn to appreciate a thing if there's something to appreciate. Thus Carrier's response fails to discount beauty's objectivity and ultimately affirms it. He never controverts my statement that such features suggest design. Evil Carrier thinks evil depends on human needs or desires. But this is question-begging since he never answers my argument that evil is a departure from design. It's false too, since acts of rape, e.g., are evil regardless of needs or desires. Evil thus points to the reality of an incomprehensibly intelligent and powerful designer desiring moral, purposeful life.

Moral Argument Virtually no one has a "method" for discerning moral truth, but virtually everyone knows courage and altruism, e.g., are good.[16] Similarly, how can anyone deny that humans are more morally valuable than beasts? Carrier himself seems embarrassed to deny it, falsely saying I misstated his view. My arguments concerning the uniqueness of human worth and moral value, and their supernatural ground, stand unscathed, and my conclusion holds. Carrier alleges that the logical possibility of CN morality shows it to be non-necessary. But, as Plantinga notes,The prime minister is a prime number is logically possible, however, there's no possible world where such a being exists. Only if CN morality is metaphysically possible can it be possibly true.[17] This is unestablished, and contradicts even prominent atheist moral theorists, who accept metaphysically necessary morality.[18] There

 

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appears no possible world, e.g., where rape is morally neutral. Thus the supernatural ground of morality is metaphysically necessary.

Ontological Argument Carrier's assertion that "nothing" is a "possible state of affairs" is contradictory, for a state of affairs is something, and a world containing it thus contains something. Additionally, if there's a possible world with nothing, it wouldn't even contain laws of logic. But then contradictory propositions could be true, which is absurd. He also asserts that even if something has to exist, it would be a universe, not a deity. But we've seen good reason to think no universe is necessary. As to Carrier's claim that the possibility of ME is just as apparent as MG's, we should note that this would falsify naturalism. So even Carrier cannot think ME is possible. Anyway, ME is impossible on both Carrier's definition of evil and mine. For him, evil requires human existence; but then an evil being would need humans and thus wouldn't be necessary (since humans aren't necessary). For me, evil is a departure from a design plan. But then an ME would require a design plan to exist. But if ME existed, design wouldn't be necessary; ME could refrain from designing. Thus, an ME can't exist. Since Carrier fails to undermine the possibility of an MG or any additional premises, my ontological argument remains sound.

Resurrection I did show the Old Testament God the cause of Resurrection: if the risen Christ cited this God, why question Him?[19] A consensus of New Testament scholars accepts the death, empty tomb, and appearances or conversions of Paul and James, almost universally rejecting naturalistic accounts of these, and stopping short of miracles only because they're supposedly beyond historical conclusion. But that does nothing to show resurrection is not the best explanation, historical or otherwise. Carrier concedes all but the empty tomb. Undercutting the empty tomb account, though, is insufficient to refute Resurrection, since one could lack proof of it and yet still prove Jesus appeared after death.[20] Carrier correctly says 75% of scholars accept the empty tomb, but that favors me: why would 75% of predominately nonChristian scholars uphold it without substantive evidence? Carrier's arguments against resurrection are refuted:

 

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•

(i) Carrier says the Jews would've revealed Jesus' body, but suggests the "fanatical movement" would've survived.

But Jews in Jerusalem weren't initially part of the movement, nor did they "hate" the authorities. Surely, they wouldn't have abandoned their dearest Judaic traditions to follow someone revealed dead by their own leaders! The Way wouldn't have caught on. Secondly, what level of "fanaticism" is needed for such obstinacy, and why believe Christians attained it? Carrier never says. Third, Christian leaders were open to refutation, as shown by the universally confirmed fact that they abandoned their faith after Jesus died.[21] Lastly, Carrier ignores my earlier statement about such messianic movements. N.T. Wright reports that thesealways died with their leaders; they were falsifiable.[22] Christianity uniquely survived because there was no falsifying evidence. •

(ii) Christians did proclaim the empty tomb, as inActs 13:2831 (resurrected bodies couldn't occupy tombs).

And even if they didn't, the Jews would've still revealed Jesus to refute the Resurrection. •

(iii) To posit theft/misplacement concedes the empty tomb.

But virtually no scholar accepts these, nor can they explain the appearances.[23] •

(iv) Carrier's point about the women is incoherent.

If the empty tomb wasn't proclaimed, including women in the account couldn't help evangelize them.[24] The scholarly majority affirms that Jews undervalued female testimony. Carrier doesn't dispute that male testimony was considered superior. But then men would've been invented as first witnesses. Also, men were as important as women in early Christianity; they were in fact the leaders. So there's no reason to think women would be treated specially. Even if Christians wanted to increase female membership, why not give them different roles? Why make them witnesses, especially first ones? •

(v) 1 Corinthians is a deliberate four-part Passion account paralleling the Acts sermons (13:28-31) and Gospels (Mark 15:37-16:7).

These are the same formulas given by different authors.[25] Paul was thus including the empty tomb. Carrier doesn't dispute that this

 

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would then be strikingly early, multiply attested, and thus probably true. •

(vi) Why would Jews use a late Christian polemic?

It plausibly dates to authorities concurrent with Jesus' death, as it concords with their inability to reveal the body.[26] •

(vii) Earthquakes and risen corpses aren't part of the empty tomb account simpliciter.

Excising angels only makes the core story more benign. "Mysterious" men and missing corpses happen in real life. And if the story doesn't appear legendary, we should believe it, since it has independent, multiple attestation.[27] The Appearances That pagans had visions does nothing to undermine Jesus' appearances, for we have no reason to think they were similar. Indeed, we know they weren't: the latter were experiences of bodily resurrection by nonpagans. Carrier's citation of pagans exclusively simply highlights that Jews of that era weren't prone to false visions. As I said, various messianic movements died out with their leaders. Only Christians had bodily appearances afterwards. Can Carrier explain why they were unique? Finally, that pagan visions had no association with Jews is shown by the fact that scholars widely denounce hallucination theories of Jesus' appearances. The suggestion that some pretended to have appearances in order to "reform society" incredibly implies that the apostles died for their own lie. No scholar thinks the appearances were fraudulent.[28] Indeed, they have early eyewitness testimony and independent attestation. We're ultimately left without reason to adopt Carrier's hallucination idea. Indeed, we have good reason to reject it. Jesus appeared to groups, while hallucinations are private. The appearances occurred on many occasions, in many places, to various kinds of persons. Why would these varied contexts give way to identical visions? It's surely more plausible that the appearances were veridical.[29] And since the appearances occurred and there's no reason to believe they were hallucinatory, the only option is to believe they were veridical. Christianity's Origin

 

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Lastly, since Jews never expected an executed, resurrected messiah, the apostles would've never conceived of, let alone invented, one. Carrier replies that Jews had "many reasons" to expect an executed messiah. But he never refutes the fact that they didn't expect it. He actually admits they didn't.[30] Also, Carrier doesn't challenge my claim that a loneresurrection was unexpected. He says they had reason to expect a "vindicated" messiah. But again given their Scripture interpretation, they didn't actually expect one. Moreover, vindication is not necessarily resurrection. Indeed, that Jews didn't derive any expectation of a dying or rising messiah from the Torah is admitted by Carrier when he suggests they acquired those ideas from Hellenists instead. But first, he provides no evidence this is true. Second, this view is rejected almost unanimously by scholars. Third, we have independent, multiple attestation, and eyewitness testimony, that the appearances triggered those beliefs, not pagan myths. But Carrier gives no good reason to reject the appearances. Lastly, if Jews were so prone to starting messianic cults with dying or rising saviors, why is Christianity the only such Jewish movement we know of? Why didn't Jews start any other such Hellenist-like faiths?[31] Christianity attracted them because it was plausibly true.

[1] Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness Without God(AuthorHouse: 2004), p. 82. [2] Carrier, "The Truth about Singularities,"www.infidels.org. [3] Carrier, Sense and Goodness, p. 77. [4] Jeff Lowder, post atwww.secularoutpost.blogspot.com, "Sophisticated Critique of Many-Worlds Explanation of FineTuning," dated February 18, 2006. [5] Andrei Linde, Dmitri Linde, and Arthur Mezhlumian, "From the Big Bang Theory to a Theory of a Stationary Universe," Physical Review D 49 (1994), pp. 1783-1826. [6] See William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, "Does God Exist?" athttp://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craigsmith_harvard00.html; cf. Smith, "Time Was Created by a Timeless Point" in God and Time, ed. David Woodruff (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); cf. John Barrow, Theories of Everything  

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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 68; cf. William Lane Craig and Paul Copan, Creation Ex Nihilo (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2004). [7] Carrier, Sense and Goodness, p. 74. [8] Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979). [9] Craig, "A Reply to Objections," in Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003), p. 158. [10] Ibid., p. 157. [11] Richard Carrier and Tom Wanchick, "Joint Statement: What We Are Debating." [12] See Keith Parsons' "Lively Answers to Theists" and Quentin Smith's "Time Was Created by a Timeless Point." [13] Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time: Expanded and Updated Edition, Ch. 8, online at . [14] See Robin Collins, "The Evidence of Physics" in The Case for a Creator, ed. Lee Strobel (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), and Craig, "A Reply to Objections" inThe Case for a Creator, pp. 166-167. [15] Jay Wesley Richards and Guillermo Gonzalez, The Privileged Planet (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2004). Cf. "The Evidence of Astronomy" in The Case for a Creator. [16] See C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (various versions). [17] Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity. Cf. Craig, "A Reply to Objections," pp. 162-163. [18] See the essays of William Rowe, Paul Draper, and Antony Flew in Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate. See also the writings of Michael Ruse. [19] On this topic see, Gary Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2003). [20] Habermas, The Historical Jesus (Joplin, MO: College Press, 1996). [21] Ibid. Cf. Gary Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), and Habermas

 

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and Flew, Resurrected? An Atheist and Theist Dialogue (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). [22] N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God(Minneapolis, MN: 2003), pp. 700-701. [23] Habermas, Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel). [24] Carrier, "Did No One Trust Women?" .

at

[25] William Lane Craig, "Closing Response" in Jesus' Resurrection: Fact or Figment?, ed. Paul Copan and Ronald Tacelli (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999), pp. 164-166. [26] See Craig, "The Guard at the Tomb." New Testament Studies 30 (1984): 273-81, available online at . [27] On these points, see ibid, p. 176. [28] Habermas points this out in various writings. [29] On hallucination theory, see Craig, "Closing Response," and various writings by Gary Habermas. [30] On these issues, see Wright, Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003), and Craig, "Closing Response." [31] On this, see: Craig, "Reply to Evan Fales: On the Empty Tomb of Jesus." Philosophia Christi 3 (2001): 67-76; Wright, Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003); Habermas, Risen Jesus and Future Hope (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Ronald Nash, The Gospel and the Greeks (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2003, 2nd edn.)  

 

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Carrier's Second Rebuttal (2006)

Wanchick Gets It Wrong Basic Argument for Naturalism (BAN) Wanchick thinks I "beg the question" when claiming scientific methods are the most reliable ones known for resolving questions of fact. Evidence of the superiority of science in ascertaining the truth in every matter of fact is so vast and undeniable that I find his rejection of it bizarre. Does he really believe there's a better way for discovering the facts of biology, astrophysics, and psychology? There's no evidence confirming any better method. No university teaches one. If scientific methods soundly confirm all disease is caused by germs, by what method could we justify believing that, nevertheless, all disease is still caused by demons? If it were caused by demons, science would have found that out by now. So, too, for any other fact.[1] Wanchick claims I think "only beliefs for which we have reliable evidence or good arguments should be strongly believed." But I only said that something inferred from methods known to be more reliable cannot be disbelieved on the findings of less reliable methods. I didn't say we shouldn't believe the conclusions of less reliable methods when they don't contradict science. Unless Wanchick can demonstrate some nonscientific method justifying disbelief in the established findings of science, he cannot claim any such method exists. Yet he hasn't even proposed one. We can't have "properly basic beliefs" contrary to the findings of science, for example, because the findings of science derive from our basic beliefs (and thus cannot even in principle contradict them), and it remains a historically established fact that scientific methods are the most reliable known for ascertaining what can be concluded from them.[2] Wanchick then claims my examples "do nothing to confirm naturalism over theism," but I said they represent cases where naturalism was confirmed oversupernaturalism. If no form of supernaturalism (not even theism) has been vindicated by science, but naturalism has been consistently vindicated countless times in every field of inquiry, that argues for naturalism. Unlike  

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naturalism, no claims uniquely implied or entailed by BT have been confirmed scientifically.[3] That's why Wanchick must refute P2 before we can believe theism over naturalism. Otherwise, scientific methods have never found a nonphysical mind, nor confirmed the universe was created or can be acted upon by any supernatural will. All it has ever found, when able to look, are natural materials and forces. Even if BT doesn't contradict those findings, it still doesn't follow from the findings of the most reliable methods known, whereas CN does.[4] Thus, whenever BT contradicts CN, we have more reason to believe CN. It doesn't matter that "classical theism doesn't hold that lightning, disease," etc., are caused by God. It used to, and only abandoned those theories when they were refuted--which is my point: its horse kept losing. But what matters is that in every case when anysupernatural theory went up against a natural one, and the most reliable methods known were applied, the natural theory won, without exception. Therefore, CN has vast support from the most reliable methods known, while BT doesn't. Therefore, we presently have more and better reason to believe CN is true than BT. Wanchick does claim "examples of the reverse," which can only mean examples of the best known methods confirming a supernatural theory over natural ones, but none of his examples qualify. For instance, "the discovery of the universe's origin," "life's incalculable complexity," and "the universe's delicate fine-tuning" don't tell us whether the causes of these things were natural or supernatural.[5] Nor do any gaps in the fossil record contradict the predictions of naturalistic evolution.[6] And neither "the recalcitrance of mental and moral properties to materialistic explanation" nor "the historicity of Jesus' resurrection" are conclusions established by scientific methods, but rather by dubious or inferior methods.[7]

Basic Argument to Naturalism as the Best Explanation (BANBE) Wanchick claims the principle that "any worldview that explains the world best should be believed over any worldview that doesn't" is "unpopular among epistemologists." I don't believe that. Wanchick fails to show that even Plantinga has abandoned this principle, and doesn't name any relevant philosopher who does (much less show that most do). Nor has he articulated any good reason for us to abandon it. In contrast, I don'thave to "show that theistic belief can't be properly basic." What "can" be the case is irrelevant. If Wanchick wishes to assert that BT is a properly basic belief, then let's see him do so. Otherwise, his objection is irrelevant to BANBE.

 

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Argument from Divine Inaction (ADI) Wanchick strangely claims I haven't "demonstrated why" we "wouldn't expect misery, ignorance, and injustice given" BT. That's exactly what the ADI doesdemonstrate. Wanchick presents no valid rebuttal. He argues moral rules have exceptions, so "one should not, for instance, feed the hungry if he must kill his kids to do so," but that's not a valid objection to the ADI. Wanchick hasn't demonstrated that God is in any such circumstance, and he certainly cannot presume he is--any more than a jury can "presume" the defendant had a really good excuse for killing his wife, though he doesn't provide any and they can't think of one. But even if Wanchick demonstrated that some excuse applies, that still wouldn't be relevant to any premise in the ADI, because he still would have no evidence of God acting morally; yet he must in order to refute the ADI. Wanchick seems to think the ADI's conclusion does not follow from its premises because the fact that "we don't see God acting consistently with D doesn't imply that there's no evidence for theism." But the ADI is not formulated against "theism." It's formulated against BT, and Wanchick's own definition entails "evidence of God's moral action" is "a necessary condition for having evidence" of BT. Hence the ADI concludes "there is no evidence that a BT God exists." Evidence of a God without evidence of his moral character would be evidence for a non-BT God, but there would still be no evidence of a BT God, as the ADI concludes. Indeed, when Wanchick claims not to know "what to look for," he is admitting he can find no evidence of a BT God. Likewise, refuting the ADI doesn't require proving there is "no evil or suffering" at all. All it requires is proof that God acts as BT requires.[8] Wanchick has provided none. His appeal to alleged evidence of "God healing the sick, protecting people, etc." does not survive examination, for none of this includes the one thing required: evidence that God was the responsible agent. Wanchick doesn't even cite a single actual case for us to examine. In contrast, Wanchick claims not to know why "ignorance, misery, etc., would predominate in a naturalistic world," as if it wasn't obvious: on naturalism, apart from human intervention, goods and ills will be distributed blindly without regard to merit (other than the merit of brute survival). Likewise, asking "why isn't the universe more pleasant" or "more hideous" is irrelevant to the ADI, which only refers to the general state of things, not their precise degree.

 

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Finally, Wanchick asks, "if CN is true, why would we even expect" a "universe with sentient life" that "can experience misery or suffering?" By definition, CN proposes that "everything everyone has observed" has natural causes.[9] Therefore, the existence of the life we observe is entailed by CN. The only question is whether CN is true, which here comes down to whether CN's explanation of that life coming to be is more probably true than BT's. The ADI says yes. For the evolution of a sentient ability to feel misery has demonstrable survival value, and its gradual development through the animal kingdom can be traced scientifically.[10] And in an uncaring universe, that entails a lot of misery for any conscious being evolved to feel it and not consistently able to avoid it. BT has nothing like that excuse. Wanchick also claims "the origin of life" and humans "is vastly improbable given CN," therefore "CN is vastly improbable," but this is a non sequitur, as I have already explained.[11]

The Argument from Mind-Brain Dysteleology (AMBD) Wanchick claims if "human minds are disembodied in some possible world" then they're "possibly disembodied in every" world, but that's a non sequitur. Being possible requires the underlying ontological architecture, which by definition not all possible worlds share. For example, given what we know, it's not possible to travel faster than light in this world--it would only be possible in worlds structurally different from this one. We may be mistaken about the structure of the world we're in, but we can't assume we are. Wanchick hasn't shown that our world is structured to allow disembodied minds, nor has he shown that any such world exists or even could exist. The best evidence so far suggests that we don't live in such a world, or that humans don't have such minds even if something else does.[12] Wanchick also claims "if anything can possibly exist disembodied" then it can't be material and therefore "human minds are immaterial substances," but that's also a non sequitur. That something could be red doesn't entail that it can't be green. Likewise, even if some mindcould be disembodied, that doesn't entail all minds are, or even that any are. Just as a computer can be made from circuits or metal gears, so could a mind be made of flesh or an immaterial soul (if such a thing is even possible). Thus, whether any given mind is made of flesh or soul is an empirical question, just as whether any given computer is made of gears or circuits. Science has found the only minds we know to be flesh. Wanchick incorrectly claims P11 is false because "there could be invincible" embodied minds, but that's irrelevant. P11 only states that  

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God could have given us a "brainless mind" (BM), which remains true no matter what else he could have done. Likewise, P12 only says people would choose a BM over an EM, where P11 defines EM as "the embodied mind we actually have," not as any possible embodied mind. The possibility of invincible embodied minds is also not entailed by any proposition Wanchick or I have committed to, but the existence of disembodied minds is entailed by Wanchick's definition of BT, and therefore he must accept their existence or abandon BT.[13] Astonishingly, Wanchick claims God "has a body" and so "the Christian God wouldn't eschew embodiment" of his own mind, but that contradicts Wanchick's own definition of God, that "God is nonmaterial" and "without spatial location."[14] If Wanchick is now claiming a BT God doesn't exist, he has lost this debate. Otherwise, P11, P12 and P13 already answer his question "why believe God would want this?" The fact that God can't be harmed doesn't justify God not caring if we are harmed. Thus, no matter how different he is from us, a God who adheres to the Golden Rule would still want others to have a BM rather than an EM as defined in P11, for the same reason we would in P12. Therefore P13 remains true. Wanchick also claims my P18 simply "assumes that we would find things as they are if CN were true," but that's false: P18 follows necessarily from my definition of CN, as explained in the first paragraph of the AMBD.[15] Since minds are by definition complex and organized, and complex organization is logically impossible on CN without a complex physical mechanism and cause, P18 is necessarily true for the "general characteristics" of an organ necessary for consciousness. Finally, Wanchick claims "possibly God had a morally sufficient reason not" to act according to P13, so I must "show that this [possibility] is false or implausible." That's incorrect. The burden is on the claimant. Wanchick must show that God has such a reason. The mere possibility is irrelevant, since we can only draw conclusions from what we know, not what we don't.[16] So far as we know, there is no such reason limiting God, just as there is none limiting us. Therefore, so far as we know, he is able to act according to P13, and thus C6 is true. Only when we know otherwise can we concludeotherwise.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument (ACA) Wanchick says my P21 "asserts that if CN is true, we would expect precisely our universe." That's incorrect. P21 only asserts the observed "nature and scale of the universe" and "history of life" is  

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"the only possible way we could exist that we know of." So this is limited to what we know and to the evidence presented in the first paragraph, which was not a precise description of our universe, but only certain general characteristics of its "nature, scale, and history." I took this as implied, but unpacking P21 and P22 would clarify it. Otherwise, Wanchick again assumes I must "deduce" all known facts from CN, even though he cannot do this from BT, either.[17] At question is whether CN or BT provides the best explanation of what we observe, not whether they predict every detail. Neither one can. So when Wanchick says I supply "no reason to think our universe is more probable than any other given CN," he is wrong: the ACA provides exactly such a reason, not by claiming that CN or BT predict any exact particulars, but by claiming they do or don't predict certain general characteristics. Thus, when I say the universe must be as old, lethal, and big as it is on CN (in general scale, not exact quantity), this follows necessarily from the definition of CN in conjunction not with what "might" be possible, but with what we know is possible. Wanchick has provided no case to the contrary, nor any reason for us to expect so old, lethal, and large a universe on BT. And we still have reason to expect otherwise: A God who created a universe for the purpose of life would most probably make a universe that was immediately and universallyhospitable to life.[18] In other words, BT does not explain why the universe is like it is, but CN does. I already refuted Wanchick's argument from fine-tuning. And his claim that the origin of life is too improbable on CN remains unsubstantiated.[19] Wanchick also complains that I give no reason for believing "Darwinism" true. Though Wanchick embraced the authority of established science in his opening statement, now that it's inconvenient he chooses to reject it. I argued we should trust the results of scientific methods over inferior methods, and nearly all biologists, and every major and respected scientific association on Earth, concludes that evolution by natural selection best explains the origin of all species.[20] No objection maintained against this conclusion has been subjected to proper scientific method. No scientific research has ever demonstrated any actual "irreducible complexity of life" or the nonevolutionary origin of any mental or moral properties, while any "sudden appearance of fully formed species in the geological record" doesn't even imply those species didn't evolve over time, since the chronological gap between recorded forms remains sufficiently vast.[21] Consequently, even when advocates of intelligent design (ID) defended it under oath:

 

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Not a single expert witness over the course of the six week trial identified one major scientific association, society or organization that endorsed ID as science. What is more, defense experts concede that ID is not a theory as that term is defined by the NAS and admit that ID is at best "fringe science" which has achieved no acceptance in the scientific community.[22] Evolution is thoroughly backed by authoritative science. ID is not. End of story.[23]

Argument from Nonlocality (ANL) I didn't argue that "nonspatial existence is impossible," but that we have no reason to believe any nonspatial locations exist. So we have no reason to believe there is anything, God or otherwise, located in some place we don't know exists. All the examples Wanchick gives, for example, have known locations, some existing throughout spacetime, others in specific regions thereof, so they bear no analogy to Wanchick's God. The universe, for example, by definition exists at every point of space and time. It therefore has location. Likewise, my love for my wife exists in the space-time region of my brain. Abstractions are potential patterns of arrangement, which exist at every space-time location those potentials obtain, including within human brains.[24] No one has proven anything to exist anywhere else. And it's obviously tautological that if something does not exist anywhere, it does not exist at all. Just as "faeries do not exist anywhere" literally means "faeries do not exist," so, too, for God.

Argument from Physical Minds (APM) The "required material" in my APM is not "logically" required, but a material we've observed to be required for mental phenomena--such that we have no reason to believe any minds exist without it (as we've never observed any). By analogy, we've never observed an object changing velocity without an applied force, so we have no reason to believe objects can change velocity without a force. Hence this is an empirical argument, not a logical one. Nor does it require a rejection of substance dualism (SD), since the APM is not an argument for CN but against BT. Even if SD is true, the evidence still establishes that, as far as we know, no mental phenomena exist without a certain required material. Wanchick's counterexamples fail. We know alien minds could exist because we know from physical and astrophysical observations that everything necessary to form them probably exists in many places in the universe. But we don't know anything justifying a similar inference for disembodied minds. So far as we know, they don't exist  

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anywhere, just as, so far as we know, objects changing velocity without a force don't exist anywhere. Finally, Wanchick's appeal to religious experience provides no evidence of what's required: that what was experienced was a disembodied mind. These experiences have better naturalistic explanations anyway, as I've already explained.[25]

[1] See "A Digression on Method" in Richard Carrier, "Why I Am Not a Christian" (2006), and my extensive discussion of how to assess the relative merits of different methods in my book Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism(2005), pp. 49-62. On the supreme merits of science in particular, see ibid., pp. 54-55, 211-52. [2] See relevant discussions of basic beliefs and the nature of warrant, particularly contrary to Plantinga, in Richard Carrier, "Defending Naturalism as a Worldview: A Rebuttal to Michael Rea's World Without Design" (2003), and Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 4347. See also: Evan Fales, "Critical Discussion of Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief," Nous 37 (2003), pp. 353-370; Fales, "Proper Basicality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004), pp. 373-383; Fales, "Reformed Epistemology and Biblical Hermeneutics," in Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, eds., The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005), pp. 469-90; Keith Parsons, "Plantinga and the Rationality of Theism" inGod and the Burden of Proof: Plantinga, Swinburne, and the Analytic Defense of Theism (1990), pp. 19-62; Stewart Goetz, "Belief in God is Not Properly Basic" in R. Douglas Geivett & Brendan Sweetman, eds.,Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology(1992), pp. 168-77. [3] For Wanchick's definition of BT, "basic theism," see this debate's joint statement. [4] For my definition of CN, "Carrier Naturalism," see this debate's joint statement. [5] See my rebuttals to Wanchick's Leibnizian cosmological argument, Kalam cosmological argument, and cosmological design argument in my first rebuttalfor this debate. [6] See the University of California at Berkeley FAQ "Misconceptions about Evolution and the Mechanisms of Evolution," especially "Gaps in the fossil record disprove evolution." For the science  

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backing this authoritative response, consult the resources available in the Secular Web Library oncreationism. See also my brief discussion and bibliography in Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism(2005), pp. 168-73. [7] See argument and references in my argument from mind-brain dysteleology and my argument from physical minds in my opening statement for this debate, as well as my rebuttal to Wanchick's moral argument and his argument to the resurrection of Jesus in my first rebuttal for this debate. [8] See my complete discussion of the problem in Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 273-75, 277-82. [9] See my definition of CN, "Carrier naturalism," in this debate's joint statement. [10] On the evolution of mind and things like beauty and pain responses, see my discussion and bibliography in Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 168-76, 183-86, 302-12, 326-28, 337-39, 349-66. [11] In addition to my discussion later in this rebuttal, see my rebuttal to the cosmological design argument in my first rebuttal for this debate, and my atheistic cosmological argument in my opening statement for this debate. [12] As I explained in my argument from mind-brain dysteleology and my argument from physical minds, and as is proven by the resources in note 5 of myopening statement for this debate. [13] For Wanchick's definition of BT (basic theism), see this debate's joint statement. [14] See this debate's joint statement. [15] See this debate's joint statement for my definition of CN, and my first rebuttal in this debate for my AMBD. [16] See "A Digression on Method" in Richard Carrier, "Why I Am Not a Christian" (2006). [17] For Wanchick's definition of BT ("basic theism") and my definition of CN ("Carrier naturalism"), see this debate's joint statement.  

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[18] Besides the atheistic cosmological argument in myopening statement for this debate, see my relevant quotation and discussion of Hawley and Holcomb in my rebuttal to Wanchick's cosmological design argument in my first rebuttal for this debate. [19] See my rebuttal to the cosmological design argument in my first rebuttal for this debate, and my brief remarks in my presentation of the ACA in myopening statement for this debate. For details on the probability of a natural origin of life, see: Richard Carrier, "The Argument from Biogenesis: Probabilities against a Natural Origin of Life," Biology & Philosophy19.5 (November, 2004), pp. 739-64; Richard Carrier,Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 166-68; Richard Carrier, "Are the Odds Against the Origin of Life Too Great to Accept? (2000). [20] See my basic argument for naturalism in myopening statement for this debate. For the positions of major scientific associations, see the "Statements from Scientific and Scholarly Organizations" collected by the National Center for Science Education, especially those of the largest and most prestigious, such as the National Academy of Sciences and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. [21] Again, see references in note 6 and note 7 above, as well as my arguments and bibliographies regarding the evolution of moral sentiments, and the physical origin of mental properties, in Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 135-60, 173-76, 309-12, 326-28. [22] Judge John E. Jones, "Memorandum Opinion" (PDF), Tammy Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover Area School District (20 December 2005), p. 70. [23] On this failure of the ID movement see: Taner Edis & Matt Young, eds., Why Intelligent Design Fails: A Scientific Critique of the New Creationism (2004); Mark Perakh, Unintelligent Design (2003); Richard Wein, "Not a Free Lunch But a Box of Chocolates: A Critique of William Dembski's Book No Free Lunch" (2002); Ian Musgrave, "Evolution of the Bacterial Flagella" (2000); Kenneth Miller, "Answering the Biochemical Argument from Design" (2003); Richard Lenski, et al., "The Evolutionary Origin of Complex Features," Nature423 (8 May 2003), pp. 139-44; and the numerous books available on "evolution vs. creationism" in the Secular Web Bookstore, as well as the articles and resources in the Secular Web Library on creationism. [24] Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 124-34. See also ibid.,  

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"abstraction and abstract objects" in the index, p. 415, and pp. 193201. And see my definition of "potential" in our joint statement for this debate. [25] See my discussion of "visions" in my rebuttal to Wanchick's argument to the resurrection of Jesus in myfirst rebuttal for this debate, with references in the corresponding note 27 there.    

 

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Carrier's Closing Statement (2006)

Wanchick Failed to Make His Case Naturalism Is True The best methods known for ascertaining the facts have only discovered results corresponding to naturalism. Wanchick hasn't shown otherwise. The results of inferior methods cannot supercede the results of superior methods, because, by definition, the probability of an inferior result being false is always higher than that of a superior result being false. Wanchick hasn't shown otherwise. Therefore, we should believe what superior methods confirm over what they don't, so we should believe naturalism rather than not. Wanchick hasn't shown otherwise. BAN stands. Wanchick hasn't presented any fact that's better explained by basic theism (BT) than by Carrier naturalism (CN). But I've presented several facts that are better explained by CN than BT, including: (a) the absence of clear evidence for the expected moral activity of a BT God (ADI); (b) that humans have vulnerable, harmful, and inefficient brains instead of efficient, harmless, and invulnerable minds (AMBD); (c) the otherwise unexpected size, age, and lethality of the universe (ACA); and (d) the absence of clear evidence of direct creation rather than undirected physical processes of development (ACA). Since BT explains nothing better than CN, and CN explains several things better than BT, CN is a better explanation of what exists than BT. Wanchick hasn't shown otherwise. Since we should believe a better explanation over a worse one (again, Wanchick hasn't shown otherwise), we should believe CN and not BT. BANBE stands. Wanchick failed to explain how the proposition "God exists nowhere" can be logically compatible with the proposition "God exists." Nor has he provided sufficient reason to believe there is any place that God exists. ANLstands. He has also presented no evidence that anydisembodied mind exists, nor sufficient reason to believe a disembodied mind even could exist. All the evidence we have supports the conclusion that minds only exist when generated by a material system, and Wanchick hasn't proven minds can exist without one. Therefore, no evidence supports either the possibility or  

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the actuality of an immaterial God. Since demonstrating BT requires demonstrating the existence of an immaterial mind, and Wanchick hasn't done this, he hasn't demonstrated BT. APM stands.

Theism Isn't True Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (LCA)

I don't know whether "nothing exists" is logically possible.[1] Wanchick argues it isn't, because he claims God is a necessary being. But if any necessary being exists, it could be a universe or part of a universe as easily as a god. Wanchick still hasn't shown otherwise. Nor has he shown "nothing" is impossible. Insisting "a possible state of affairs" must contain "something" simply begs the question, for a zero-state is still a state. And since "nothing" would contain no propositions at all, he can't claim it would contain "contradictory propositions." Wanchick challenges my claim that there's no scientific consensus whether everything (including space-time) began, by falsely claiming I "merely footnote" my own claims about multiverse theory. But I linked to quotations of many scientists, including a Scientific American article, "The Myth of the Beginning of Time," all declaring a lack of consensus.[2] I later quoted Hawking himself, and other leading cosmologists, confirming that lack of consensus.[3] Nothing else Wanchick argues changes the fact that the scientific community isn't certain whether time began. Wanchick also claims my ANL refutes the existence of other universes. But other universes consist of spatial locations, and the ANL is only stated against nonspatial locations.[4] There is evidence supporting the existence of other regions of space not visible to us, including the possible existence of other universes.[5] If Wanchick wishes to concede that God exists in some other universe and thus has a spatial location after all, then he can avoid the ANL, but must abandon BT and lose this debate. Wanchick hasn't demonstrated "the only way an originating being can be necessary is if it's necessarily created by a necessary being." And he begs the question when he claims "a being that can cease isn't necessary, since there's a possible world where it's nonexistent." For if there's a necessary being that necessarily ceases, then there isn't a possible world where it's nonexistent. Wanchick says everyone assumes every substance has an explanation, but people also assumed the Sun revolved around the Earth. Facts often defy common sense.[6] Wanchick still hasn't demonstrated that "what we conclude about effects within a universe" will "necessarily apply to  

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the universe" itself, or that universes are the sorts of things that have explanations. And despite what Wanchick says, I've demonstrated elsewhere that it's logically impossible for any ultimate explanation to exist,[7] and I have presented plausible natural explanations for this universe.[8] Wanchick falsely claims I provided no argument for the impossibility of a timeless, spaceless agent. But I did.[9] He still hasn't provided an adequate response.[10] The ANL stands, and he still offers no explanation for how God could think about creating time before any time in which to think existed. Wanchick complains that I routinely "extrapolate from our experience to reality as a whole" yet allegedly claim this can't be done. Wrong. I only claim we cannot make assertions without evidence. Wanchick asserts that places and things exist that we have no evidence of. I don't. Wanchick also asserts, again without evidence, that something observed of one category of object or circumstance (effects in a universe) also applies to a completely different category or circumstance (events outside a universe)--a fallacy of false analogy. Thus his claims are fallacious or unsupported. Kalam (KCA)

Wanchick has provided no valid demonstration thateverything that begins must have a cause or even probably has one, nor has he proved the universe began. Wanchick falsely claims "the lack" of a starting point "only means one could never begin traversing an infinite" but that's the same fallacy as before. It assumes the conclusion: that there is no infinite series. But if we assume there is, then having no beginning is irrelevant.[11] Wanchick claims "the present" can only exist at the end of an infinite series, but that doesn't change the fact that, as I said, "there are an infinite number of actual places" where the end of an infinite series could be. That there are an infinity of numbers before the number eight on a number line doesn't mean the number eight cannot logically exist. So, too, "the present," if, like the number eight, it also stands at the end of an infinite series. Wanchick claims even though there are no logical contradictions in transfinite mathematics, nevertheless there are "metaphysical absurdities." He never explains what this means, or how it's so. He simply repeats the same fallacy of applying finite arithmetic to transfinite sets.[12] Wanchick never refutes the fact that "we have no knowledge of what might hold outside the controls of the known universe." He claims knowing there is "no timeless causation" counts, but that's a logical impossibility. Wanchick hasn't shown that it's logically impossible  

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for a universe to exist uncaused. And he can't argue for this inductively without committing the fallacy of false analogy.[13] Wanchick appeals to "intuition," but that's demonstrably unreliable when dealing with circumstances and objects with which we have little or no experience--like the origins of time or space, or the behavior of things at subatomic or astronomical scales (consider the counterintuitive facts of relativity theory and quantum mechanics).[14] Finally, Wanchick falsely claims I said "the potential" for nature to exist "didn't exist because there was no time or place for it." I said "there was never a time when the universe didn't exist," which means there was nevera time when its potential didn't exist. Then Wanchick claims he meant God is an "ontological" cause, not a temporal one. But if so, then he's failed to demonstrate his sixth premise, for we have not observed whether "every substance that begins to exist has a nontemporal ontological cause." In fact, the only "ontological cause" we have ever observed is a universe, and if Wanchick is now allowing that "the cause could've occurred simultaneously with the start of the universe," then that cause could be a part of that universe. Design (CDA)

Neither Wanchick nor Robin Collins has demonstrated a "vast scientific consensus" that "a life-permitting cosmos" is too improbable to have arisen without intelligent design. Collins has never published any peer-reviewed scientific research, not even in cosmological physics, so his statements cannot supercede those of actual accomplished cosmologists like Paul Davies or Martin Rees.[15] Even so, Collins says he's "at least sympathetic" to chaotic inflation theory, "it should be taken seriously," and in fact "it's by far the most popular theory today."[16] But contrary to what Collins and Wanchick claim, there's still no scientific demonstration that any multiverse theory requires intelligent fine-tuning. The Pauli-exclusion principle, for example, can't even be "finely" tuned, since it only has two values, on and off, and if it can be tuned at all, it is tuned bychaotic inflation, not for chaotic inflation. The same goes for the cosmological constant, which in chaotic inflation varies from one region of the universe to another, determining what forms there.[17] Finally, I have provided support for the conclusion that "our universe is more epistemically probable given CN."[18] Wanchick provides no reason to expect the universe to be as lethal, old, and large as it is if BT is true, nor to expect so much scientific evidence of natural causes of development and so little for direct acts of intelligent creation. If we've no reason to expect it, then the probability isn't high. In contrast, if CN is true, then these features constitute the only way we  

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know the universe could be, and therefore the probability is virtually 100%. Knowability (AFK) and Beauty (AFB)

Wanchick falsely claims "if the universe hosted intelligent life almost anywhere else, the vast information from solar eclipses, geological findings, cosmic background radiation, etc., couldn't be obtained." The cosmic background radiation is as observable from anywhere in the universe as anywhere in the universe is observable to us (which is pretty much everywhere civilization is likely to evolve). All nontrivial information gained from "solar eclipses" (like confirming that gravity bends light) or "active cores" (like seismographic studies of Earth's interior) can be gained without them, while any environment removing these resources (like a planet without a moon or active core) is statistically unlikely to evolve a civilization anyway.[19] Ultimately, Wanchick presents no evidence that Earth is in any better overall position to learn physics or chemistry, or any other facts of the universe, than any other planet on which civilization is likely to have evolved. Wanchick also hasn't demonstrated any principle of "objective beauty" that's been intelligently designed into the universe and aids in discovering true physical theories, or for any purpose at all. He hasn't given an example or demonstrated this claim is true for it. So this claim is unsupported. Scientists have instead found our beauty response to be partly evolved for its survival value and partly learned from our culture and experiences.[20] No scientific evidence confirms any other conclusion. Evil (AFE) and Morality (MAG)

Wanchick begged the question when he asserted evil must be a departure from design, and now he strangely accuses me of begging the question when I point this out. Wanchick's the one making the argument. So he's the one who must demonstrate evil is what he says it is and not something else. Instead, all he does is continue to beg the same question by simply asserting his moral opinions, without demonstrating they're anything other than his natural feelings derived from his needs and desires as a member of the social species Homo sapiens. Wanchick must demonstrate it probably isn't (or can't be) the latter. He hasn't. Psychologists and sociologists agree acts like rape entail psychological, physical, and social consequences that cause a net risk of harm to an actor's own happiness, while embodying virtues prohibiting such behavior, like respect and compassion, causes a net  

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increase in the probability of genuine happiness. This follows from our nature as conscious, social animals, as I've demonstrated elsewhere.[21] This means the moral value of human beings derives from two scientific facts not true of other animals: our consciousness of the consequences of our actions to others and ourselves, and being social animals dependent upon a functional civilization. Wanchick presents no evidence our moral value stems from any other fact. So he's failed to demonstrate any moral truth coming from any supernatural source. Ontological Argument (WOA)

Wanchick argues something is necessary, but he still hasn't proven God is that something, or that "nothing" is impossible.[22] We can still imagine possible worlds without a god in them (as in Taoism or a state of nothingness), therefore God cannot be a necessary being. And for all we know, the universe is a necessary being, or some part of the universe is, which caused everything else to exist. Until Wanchick proves this logically impossible, he can't claim God is logically necessary. Likewise, Wanchick cannot refute the existence of MEwithout also refuting the existence of MG.[23] Wanchick claims "evil requires human existence," but that can be no more true than "good requires human existence." Yet according to Wanchick's reasoning, if a good being "needs" humans, he "thus wouldn't be necessary (since humans aren't necessary)." Conversely, if "needed," theywould be necessary. Hence Wanchick cannot use this argument against ME without refuting MG. Likewise, even Wanchick admits his God "could refrain from designing,"[24] but adds if a god can so refrain, then that god cannot be necessary: so his God cannot be necessary. Again, Wanchick cannot use this argument against ME without refuting MG. Finally, Wanchick cannot claim evil is by definition a departure from some other design, because "evil" must be the opposite of "good," and Wanchick has already defined "morally good" as acting "in ways consistent with the moral code most Christians accept."[25] Therefore, ME would act in ways not consistent with that moral code, which doesn't require going against any previous design. Therefore, since Wanchick cannot refute ME without also refuting MG, and Wanchick doesn't accept ME, he cannot accept MG. Resurrection of Jesus (ARJ)

I haven't room to address every false or dubious claim Wanchick makes about the Resurrection. None of Wanchick's arguments  

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establish that the origin of Christianity is better explained by supernatural causes than natural ones. He concedes there's no expert consensus that it is, nor even a consensus whether the tomb of Jesus was found empty. Wanchick now claims "scholars widely denounce hallucination theories," but scholars also widely defend them. Again, there's no consensus for him to rest on. And since conclusions based on inferior methods cannot supercede those of superior ones, no argument for the supernatural can rest on shaky ground like this.[26] Wanchick hasn't proved the tomb was found empty, or that the body wasn't stolen or misplaced, even though when bodies go missing everyone rightly assumes those are by far the most probable explanations. Wanchick claims the actual visions launching Christianity were somehow different from others, but the evidence is insufficient to prove this. For example, Wanchick asks, "Why would these varied contexts give way to identical visions?" But there's no evidence they did. Every separate account we have of these visions differs from every other in many important details, and all are too imprecise to know how "identical" the remaining details really were.[27] And that's assuming the Gospels accurately record what anyone actually saw, which hasn't been demonstrated. Meanwhile, the only "eyewitness testimony" we have is Paul's, who clearly describes a mystical vision, never mentioning any appearance of a touchable risen corpse to anyone.[28] So there's insufficient evidence that what the first Christians actually saw wasn't the same natural phenomena experienced by other Jews and pagans.[29] Wanchick asks, "If the risen Christ cited [the Biblical] God, why question Him?" First, because he might've been mistaken or dishonest or misunderstood (as Wanchick would argue for the traditions of Islam or Mormonism), but more importantly, because it hasn't even been established that Jesus said those things. He never wrote them and we can't name the source used by anyone who did, much less prove they actually heard Jesus or reported correctly. In courts of law, such evidence is rejected on the hearsay rule. We don't even know for sure who's reporting this hearsay. That's how bad our sources are. Worse, what we have was only written generations later and preserved in an atmosphere charged with bitter dogmatic disputes leading to dishonesty in the creating or doctoring of records.[30] Finally, contrary to Wanchick, we can't prove the Gospels are independent of each other.[31] For all the same reasons, the Gospels aren't reliable evidence for an empty tomb, either. Wanchick falsely claims Acts 13:28-31 says Christians proclaimed an empty tomb. None is mentioned there. The only evidence it mentions are postmortem visions confirming Jesus rose in an incorruptible body. Paul says we "sow" the body that  

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"dies" but "that which you sow is not the body that will be" because God provides another one, which entails the corpse is left behind.[32] Wanchick fallaciously concludes that because later authors addedthe detail of an empty tomb, that "Paul was thus including the empty tomb." The women weren't included until two generations after Christianity began, so that's likewise moot.[33] And though Wanchick says the claim the body was stolen "plausibly dates" to the first authorities because "it concords with their inability to reveal the body," that argument presumes the conclusion (that the body was claimed missing), which is circular. There's no evidence the theft claim dates that early, and ample evidence against it. Not even Acts mentions it, despite being our earliest record of Jewish attacks on Christianity, by the only author in the New Testament claiming to write accurate history.[34] Finally, the argument that "Jews ... would've never conceived of, let alone invented" anything new is certainly false, as would be any implication that Jews are uncreative or inflexible or incapable of innovation.[35] There was nothing at all unnatural in their conceiving of the original Gospel.[36]

[1] As I made clear under "Wanchick's Ontological Argument" in my first rebuttal for this debate. [2] See the links in note 1 of my first rebuttal for this debate, as well as the sources cited again there in note 3and note 10. [3] See quotations under "Kalam Cosmological Argument" and "Cosmological Design Argument" in myfirst rebuttal for this debate. [4] See "Argument from Nonlocality" in my opening statement for this debate. [5] See the sources cited under "Cosmological Design Argument" in my first rebuttal for this debate. [6] See my examples under "Arguments from Knowability" in my first rebuttal for this debate. [7] Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), p. 73. [8] Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 75-88.

 

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[9] See the "Argument from Nonlocality" in my opening statement for this debate and my second-to-last paragraph under "Leibnizian Cosmological Argument" in my first rebuttal for this debate. [10] See the points I made under "Kalam Cosmological Argument" in my first rebuttal for this debate--and in the present statement above (my discussion of the ANL) and below (my discussion of Wanchick's claim that God is an "ontological" cause). [11] See my discussion under "Kalam Cosmological Argument" in my first rebuttal for this debate. [12] See my discussion under "Kalam Cosmological Argument" in my first rebuttal for this debate. [13] See my discussion in the last paragraph under "Leibnizian Cosmological Argument" in the present statement above. [14] On the nature and problems of "intuition," see Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 178-80, with relevant scientific references on p. 192. In connection with cosmology, see ibid., pp. 8485, 87, and the examples under "Arguments from Knowability" in my first rebuttal for this debate. [15] See my discussion under "Cosmological Design Argument" in my first rebuttal for this debate. [16] Interview with Robin Collins in Lee Strobel, "The Evidence of Physics," The Case for a Creator: A Journalist Investigates Scientific Evidence That Points Toward God (2004), p. 141 (hardcover edition). [17] See the Wikipedia entries for "Pauli Exclusion Principle," "Cosmological Constant," "Inflation Theory," and "Fine-Tuned Universes." See also: Steven Weinberg, "A Designer Universe?" New York Review of Books (21 October 1999); Andrew Liddle & David Lyth,Cosmological Inflation and Large-Scale Structure(2000); Andrei Linde, Inflation and Quantum Cosmology(1990); Scott Dodelson, Modern Cosmology, 2nd ed. (2003). [18] See my discussion under "Atheistic Cosmological Argument" in both my opening statement and my first rebuttal for this debate. [19] See Peter Ward & Donald Brownlee, Rare Earth: Why Complex Life Is Uncommon in the Universe (2000), and Richard Carrier, "Ten

 

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Things Wrong with Cosmological Creationism" (2000) in the Secular Web Modern Library. [20] See my discussion of the scientific study of the human beauty response in Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 349-66. As cited in the bibliography there, see: Caleb Crain, "The Artistic Animal," Lingua Franca (October, 2001), pp. 28-37; Ellen Dissanayake, What Is Art For? (1988), Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes from and Why (1992), and Art and Intimacy: How the Arts Began (2000); Margaret Livingstone, Vision and Art: The Biology of Seeing (2002); Semir Zeki, Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain (2000); Joseph Goguen, ed., Journal of Consciousness Studies: Art and the Brain: Controversies in Science and the Humanities (1999); Joseph Goguen and Erik Myin, eds., Journal of Consciousness Studies: Art and the Brain Part II: Investigations Into the Science of Art(2000); William Benzon, Beethoven's Anvil: Music in Mind and Culture (2001); Richard Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder (2000). [21] See Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism (2005), pp. 291-348. [22] See my discussion under "Leibnizian Cosmological Argument" above and in my first rebuttal for this debate. [23] For MG as "a necessary being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good," see Wanchick's "Ontological Argument" in his opening statement for this debate, and for ME as "a necessary being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly evil," see my rebuttal under "Wanchick's Ontological Argument" in my first rebuttal for this debate. [24] See Wanchick's statements "we can easily conceive of its nonexistence" in his second rebuttal, "God existing alone is a PW excluding any universe" in his opening statement, and "God doesn't need any universe" in hisfirst rebuttal in this debate. [25] See Wanchick's definition of "basic theism" in ourjoint statement for this debate. [26] See the first paragraph of this closing statement above, and look under "Basic Argument for Naturalism" in my opening statement and second rebuttal. [27] Compare the final chapters of all four Gospels with each other (Mark 16, Luke 24, Matthew 28, and John 20, and then 21) and with  

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Paul's experience as reported inGalatians 4 and Acts 9 and with the only record we have of an appearance to "all the brethren" in Acts 2. Then see the analysis in Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb" in Robert Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, eds., The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005), pp. 188-231, with the corresponding Spiritual Body FAQ. [28] See Galatians 1 and Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb" in Robert Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, eds., The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005), pp. 151-54, with the corresponding Spiritual Body FAQ. [29] See Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb" in Robert Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, eds., The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005), pp. 184-88, and esp. discussion of mass or group visions on pp. 194-95 & p. 188, with the corresponding Spiritual Body FAQ. See also Richard Carrier, "Habermas on Visions," part 4E ofReview of In Defense of Miracles (1999, 2005). [30] For all the above, see Bart Ehrman's library of scholarly studies: The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings, 3rd ed. (2003); Misquoting Jesus: The Story Behind Who Changed the Bible and Why (2005); The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture: The Effect of Early Christological Controversies on the Text of the New Testament (1996); The Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew (2003). See also the introductory chapters to every book recording the words of Jesus in The New Interpreter's Bible (1995), and the relevant entries for each such book in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd edn. (1997). [31] Compare John 21:1-13 with Luke 5:1-11, and John 20:1-2, 20:2-8, and 20:11-13 with Luke 24:1-2, 24:9-12, and 24:3-8. See also "Synoptic Problem" in Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible (2000), and in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd. ed. (1997). [32] 1 Corinthians 15:37. For evidence regarding two-body resurrection beliefs in and out of Christianity, see Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb" in Robert Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, eds., The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005), pp. 105-55, with notes on pp. 197-218, and the corresponding Spiritual Body FAQ. For a discussion of the record of early Christian claims in Acts, see Richard Carrier, "Would

 

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the Facts Be Checked?," chapter 13 of "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005). [33] Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb" in Robert Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, eds., The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005), pp. 155-232, with the corresponding Spiritual Body FAQ. Again, see Richard Carrier, "Did No One Trust Women?," chapter 11 of "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005). [34] For how and why the theft claim could have arisen, and all the evidence against it being early, see Richard Carrier, "The Plausibility of Theft" in Robert Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, eds., The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (2005), esp. pp. 358-64, along with the corresponding Plausibility of Theft FAQ. On Luke's unique claim to have written accurate history, see Luke 1:1-3 and the analysis in Richard Carrier, "Was Christianity Highly Vulnerable to Inspection and Disproof?," chapter 7 of "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005). [35] Again, see the evidence provided in the sources cited in note 30 of my first rebuttal for this debate. [36] See a complete analysis in Richard Carrier, "Was Christianity Too Improbable to be False?" (2005).

 

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Wanchick's Closing Statement (2006)

Basic Argument for Naturalism (BAN) Per Carrier, P1 assumes science specifically is the "most reliable method" for finding truth. Scientific indication is sufficient for belief. But Carrier's opening statement failed to demonstrate that science (or any discipline) provides a sufficient condition for belief. He now says it's obvious that science is best at "ascertaining the truth in every matter of fact." But even if it tells us about "astrophysics and biology," that doesn't mean it is the most reliable method for resolving all factual matters. If science conflicts with other disciplines, why believe science? Indeed, to say science tells us about all matters absurdly entails that it is the authority in literature, history, and ethics, too! Carrier ultimately gives no justification for scientism.[1] P1 is question-begging. Moreover, even if science were the best "method," that still wouldn't prove scientific support sufficient for belief. As I said, leading epistemologists find it possible to have properly basic beliefs not based on evidence or "methods." These could allegedly defeat scientific (or any) counterevidence.[2] Why accept Carrier's epistemology over these? He says it's impossible for properly basic beliefs to contradict science, since science is based on them. But he gives no reason to affirm that claim. He thus fails to substantiate his epistemology, leaving P1 unjustified. What about P2? Laughably, to demonstrate this highly controversial premise, Carrier just announces that naturalism has been scientifically vindicated "millions" of times, whereas theism has never been. However, he has merely mentioned three of these alleged "millions," and again, they don't touch BT, since it doesn't hold such views. Carrier claims it did until science disproved them. But where has he shown that?[3] He says unlike CN, no predictions "uniquely implied" by BT have been scientifically confirmed. But I already gave examples as "unique" as CN's alleged confirmations. And even if BT has no such confirmations, Carrier hasn't cited any plausible ones in CN's favor, either. That substance dualism and a supernatural creator aren't scientifically proven is irrelevant, as those are metaphysical claims, not scientific ones. Similarly, CN is a  

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metaphysical claim unprovable by science alone. Nonetheless, BT is superior scientifically: science aids philosophical theistic arguments (e.g., kalam, fine-tuning) and disconfirms CN's predictions. Carrier derides my examples of scientifically verified theistic predictions for failing to show a supernatural person as the cause. But I recite his rejoinder: naturalistsused to predict that the fossil record would contain myriad transitions[4], the universe was beginningless[5], and cellular life was simple[6], while theists predicted or were open to contradictory findings. In short, theism's predictions have been scientifically supported through the ages, while CN has been repeatedly disconfirmed. I also said contemporary confirmation of Jesus' resurrection and the existence of nonphysical properties[7] vindicate BT over CN. Carrier says these are unestablished, since they are supported by "dubious" disciplines. But who established that history and metaphysics are "less reliable" than science? Carrier himself said nonscientific conclusions are unobjectionable if they don't contradict science. But since he hasn't shown that the Resurrection or nonphysical properties contradict science, they count as evidence against CN.

Basic Argument to Naturalism as the Best Explanation (BANBE) BANBE says worldviews that explain the universe best should necessarily be believed. Carrier complains I never gave reason to disbelieve this. But I didn't have to, for again, Carrier hasn't given reason to believe it true. Why hold such an epistemological theory? The premise is question-begging. Carrier incorrectly says I never showed that Plantinga has abandoned P3. I cited his renowned books on the topic, which clearly dispute that premise, as do many epistemologists. Indeed, even if I couldn't cite top scholars, Carrier still hasn't justified P3. Finally, BANBE accomplishes nothing since Carrier never establishes P4. Of course, he goes on to argue that certain features support CN, but those are separate arguments standing on their own. Taken in isolation, BANBE just begs a huge question with its final premise.

Argument from Divine Inaction (ADI) Carrier says ADI demonstrates that, given BT, we wouldn't expect the suffering we find in the actual world. But that can't be ADI's conclusion, for that's one of its premises (P10). P10 is not even a subconclusion of premises P6 through P8, since they conclude merely  

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that "there is no evidence that a BT God exists." Even if that were true, it doesn't follow that the suffering in the world is unexpected given BT. Nothing in ADI even purports to prove that. Thus, as I noted, Carrier never substantiates P10. I also said P6 should be rejected, as it never mentions that duties vary depending on circumstance. Carrier now admits this, but says God won't have limiting circumstances. However, P6 originally made no moral qualifications. Refurbished opening arguments are disallowed in a debate context. P6 remains false. Even allowing the change, why believe God has no limiting moral circumstances? Carrier merely offers a courtroom analogy: if a person kills another, we can't presume he has a sufficient reason. The analogy fails, though, since God doesn't commit evils, but merely allows some. Moreover, we also cannot presume the person had no sufficient reason. We'd have to know beyond reasonable doubt he lacked such reason. Otherwise, we'd presume him innocent (until proven guilty). But then why affirm God has no good reason for allowing suffering? Carrier never says, thus begging the question. Indeed, Plantinga, Alston, and others have shown why we typically can't, without revelation, decipher why God would allow much suffering.[8] I also noted ADI's invalidity: C4 doesn't follow from P8. There are theistic arguments that possibly support BT without mentioning God's actions. So, at least in principle, one could have evidence of God regardless of His actions. Carrier responds that "evidence of a God without evidence of his moral character" falls short of BT. Two problems: (i) We can have evidence of God's moral character without evidence of His acts; hence, my examples of the argument from desire[9] or ontological arguments. Even moral arguments often achieve this.[10] (ii) We can have evidence of BT without evidence of God's moral nature. If I proved a Trinitarian, omniscient, omnipotent being created the universe from nothing, and became incarnate in Jesus, that would clearly be evidence of BT (a Christian form), although I haven't technically proven this being good. I also noted that P8 is question-begging: what evidence of God's moral action should we expect? Carrier says we need "proof that God acts as BT requires." But BT merely says God will act consistently with Christian ethics. This doesn't indicate that we'd see any more "evidence" of God's goodness than we already do. P8 is unestablished. I mentioned P8 is also undercut by millions of testimonies to God's moral acts.[11] Carrier has to show P8 more plausible than these. He  

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replies that such stories don't prove the BT God. But P8 only says we have no evidence of "any God" so acting. My examples disprove at least that. Moreover, people do have reason for thinking God is the cause: He's the One they worship and pray to. He is, therefore, prima facie, the best candidate. Carrier complains that I cite no cases to examine. But he's the one claiming to know that God's moral acts are never witnessed. This presumes all such experiences are false. Without reason to believe that, P8 is not more reasonable than its contradictory. I also questioned P9: why "expect" a world with miserable, suffering persons if only natural causes can exist? Why not millions of other naturalistic worlds? Carrier says P9 doesn't predict things to a "precise degree." That's false, though, since P9 says the "actual state" of suffering is "exactly" what we'd "expect" on CN. Because he can't prove this, Carrier tries changing the premise, again contradicting debating rules. Ultimately, Carrier admits he has to show his naturalistic explanation of suffering "more probable" than BT's. That repeats my prior point: why believe a suffering world is probable on CN? He just says sentience produces misery without supernaturalism. But that never justifies P9, for it never states the probability that naturalism would produce such a world, nor that naturalism makes this more probable than BT. Indeed, I already noted that P9 appears false, as fine-tuning, life, and humans are basically impossible given naturalism. If it is virtually impossible that natural causes would produce these things, then, given their reality, CN is virtually impossible.

The Argument from Mind-Brain Dysteleology (AMBD) P11 entails my human mind can exist immaterially in some PW. But if my mind is made of matter, as Carrier indicates, when "we take away all the parts, everything else will cease." Without matter, the mind can't exist. This means that those parts are necessary for my mind's existence. But that, by definition, means there's no PW where it exists without the parts. But since there is such a PW (as Carrier admits), it follows that human minds are immaterial, and CN is disproved.[12] I also remarked that just because BMs are more efficient than our minds, it doesn't follow that all moral persons would "bestow a BM upon all children and an EM on none." For those choices aren't exhaustive: maybe most would bestow humans with invincible EMs. Carrier complains that he was merely saying most would rather give BMs than our actual EMs. But P12 doesn't say that; it merely says

 

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most people would bestow BMs universally. But, again, we don't have reason for affirming that. Carrier could retort that God would give us either a BM or an invincible EM. But since he never made that argument originally, he can't alter it now. AMBD fails. Carrier says my affirmation that God has a body contradicts His immateriality. That's false, though: at best, God's body can exist physically; God Himself doesn't, since He's a soul. Moreover, Christ's body is non-natural and can seemingly transcend spatial location (e.g., John 20:26). Carrier never sufficiently answers my argument that basing AMBD on the Golden Rule (GR) makes no sense, for God is necessarily uncreated. He says God doesn't want us to be harmed. But why attribute that to an alleged adherence to GR? Rather, it seems based on God's loves for us. Carrier never overcomes my point that GR won't apply to God's creation. P13 is without support. I questioned P18, too: why think we'd observe physical minds on CN? Carrier just says the minds we observe must be physical lest CN be falsified. But that never shows that CN expects or explains such minds. Similarly, for BT to be true, it has to be true that God allows the suffering we find. But Carrier would not therefore say BT explains or predicts suffering. Since P18 never shows that CN predicts or explains EMs, CN can't be said to do so better than BT. Finally, even if God preferred to give us BMs, it doesn't necessarily follow that He would. Possibly, He has sufficient reason not to. Carrier says this is implausible, since we don't see such reason. But why believe we'd perceive God's reasons? Because Carrier never says, there's no reason to think God is able bestow us all with BMs given his considerations, motives, and circumstances. P13 is not more plausible than its negation.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument (ACA) Carrier summarizes ACA, saying it proves that CN predicts "certain general characteristics" of the universe that BT does not. He notes that since the universe must have the features it does to host naturalistic life, given life, we'd expect a naturalistic universe to have these features. But God can make life in a life-permitting universe with different characteristics. As I noted, the problem here is that this doesn't show that the conditions of life are more probable on CN than BT. For even if these conditions must exist for CN to produce life, what is the probability that natural forces alone would in fact  

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produce such a universe? Analogously, for suffering to exist on BT, God would have to allow it. But Carrier would never say BT "predicts" or explains suffering. Carrier says BT doesn't expect these features since God could make millions of different universes. But the same point confronts CN-natural causes could make millions of other worlds. Thus, the probability they'd make this one seems vanishingly small. But then there's no reason to think our universe is more probable on CN than BT. Even more, Carrier ignores my point that P21 seems untrue, as sentient life could exist in, say, an eternal universe or one with a history of rapid mutations. But then it's false that naturalism expects a Darwinian history for life, and P21 falters. Indeed, not only do we have no reason to expect such a world given naturalism, we have ample reason to believe it incomprehensibly improbable. For fine-tuning, the origin of life, and the origin of humans all have virtually zero probability without a deity. And a world with all three of these is even less probable. Since we have no reason to think these are improbable if God exists, BT makes such features more epistemically probable than CN does. Carrier's replies to my fine-tuning argument were weak. He admitted the origin of life is highly improbable in his opening statement. And he never disputed my claim that the reality of humans is virtually impossible given CN. I'm not inconsistent in denying Darwinism. I think it is unlike the Big Bang and fine-tuning: it is overridden by counterevidence. Alas, Carrier is inconsistent: he disputes the scientific consensus when it rejects multiverse theories, but follows it on Darwinism. Moreover, he didn't cite the authoritative support for Darwinism in his opening statement, and he opposes it on other scientific theories. He can't appeal to authority now, for that would be adding to opening arguments, which, again, is disallowed. At any rate, I previously gave evidence against evolutionism, which rebuts authority appeals. As such, Carrier never substantiates any alleged Darwinian Earth history, leaving P21 unsupported. Moreover, even given evolution, why believe it naturalistic? That's a philosophical claim not provable by science alone. Thus, evolution wouldn't indicate CN.[13] Carrier says irreducible or specified complexity has no "scientific research" as support, but this is false.[14] Science doesn't say mental or moral properties couldn't evolve; metaphysics tells us that. Carrier admits the fossil record doesn't show evolutionary development, but says that is irrelevant. But Darwin himself predicted vast transitional fossils, as have top  

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evolutionists ever since. Carrier says there's enough time between the fossils; undiscovered transitions could've occurred between. But that's false in many cases, like the Cambrian Explosion. Moreover, it's curious that we keep finding the nontransitional fossils and not the alleged millions of transitions. Evolutionism doesn't predict that; creation does.[15] Carrier tries to support P22, repeating his moniker that if God created the universe, it would be "immediately" and "universally" hospitable to life. He likewise repeats his failure to justify that assertion. He never even mentions my prior criticisms of it; P22 has no proven support.[16] Finally, philosophers of science--the experts on the definition of science--universally hold creation research to be valid science[17]; the NAS's opinions on the issue don't matter.

Argument from Nonlocality (ANL) Carrier did explicitly argue that if God is nonspatial, He's impossible. He said, "if God has no location ... [this] entails that God does not exist." Since he can't overcome my refutations, he now concedes the possibility of spaceless entities, but says we're without reason to think "nonspatial locations" exist. But that's irrelevant, since BT says God exists at nolocation, let alone a nonspatial one. Indeed, the idea of a nonspatial location is incoherent: space is a necessary condition for location. I also gave possible counterexamples to the idea that all things have locations. Carrier just declares that these exist spatially. But he never gives reason to believe so. Until he does, his claim that we have no reason to believe nonspatial things exist isn't more plausible than its denial. Carrier's fairy analogy should be discarded, for it works only if fairies are essentially spatial. If they are immaterial and nonspatial, then the statement "Fairies don't exist anywhere" would in fact be a true statement.

Argument from Physical Minds (APM) APM, is not, as Carrier asserts, an argument against BT. For it concludes that "we have no reason to believe that any BT God exists." Therefore, even if cogent, it wouldn't falsify BT, but merely show it without evidence. Unfortunately, as I noted, even the original  

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conclusion is a non sequitur: we could have reasons to believe theism without ever observing minds without matter. Carrier never addresses this criticism. It thus stands and APM is refuted. Carrier says APM neither implies nor requires the falsity of substance dualism. But, as I said, if minds are immaterial, CN is false, as Carrier admits that souls are metaphysically impossible on CN. Moreover, Carrier admits it isn't impossible for minds (like God's) to exist without matter. But then BT is possible, unlike CN. APM backfires. Alternatively, if APM says minds are material, it is question-begging, since Carrier hasn't justified materialism. Also, Carrier's explanation of our alleged failure to experience disembodied minds seems no better than rival explanations. We've never contacted, say, extraterrestrials, but that doesn't indicate their nonexistence. Why would our failure to contact disembodied minds indicate this? Carrier responds that we know extraterrestrials can exist. Even if true, that's unimportant. For if we are agnostic about their existence, our failure to experience extraterrestrials wouldn't show them improbable. Carrier merely repeats his statement that "so far as we know, [disembodied minds] don't exist anywhere." But the question is whether this indicates their nonexistence, or our failure to perceive them. Carrier fails to answer this, thus failing to show such minds inductively improbable. Against my appeal to the endless religious experiences had by humans, Carrier says they don't reveal a disembodied mind. But they do: God is the prima facie cause, since He's the deity the experiencing humans worship. Though his sources say such experiences are natural, I can cite better thinkers who argue otherwise.[18] Carrier gives no good reason to think immaterial minds have never been experienced.

[1] For good critiques of scientism, see: J.P. Moreland,Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1987); J.P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist?(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990); Paul Moser and David Yandell, "Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism" in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, ed. J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig (London: Routledge, 2000). See also Roderick Chisholm's works on epistemology. [2] See famously Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993);Warrant and Proper  

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Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). See also the epistemology articulated by William Lane Craig in his "Classical Apologetics" in Five Views on Apologetics, ed. Steven Cowan (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999), and William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2003). See the various important works by Roderick Chisholm, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and others in the reformed epistemology school, as well as Michael Bergmann's works. [3] For more on the science vs. theism myth, see: Robert Koons, "Science and Theism: Concord, Not Conflict" inThe Rationality of Theism, ed. Paul Copan and Paul Moser (New York: Routledge, 2003); J.P. Moreland,Christianity and the Nature of Science (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1989); Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay Wesley Richards, The Privileged Planet (Regnery, 2004); Nancy Pearcey, Total Truth (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2004). [4] Darwin noted this in On the Origin of Species. Other examples are in Henry Morris, That There Words May Be Used Against Them (Master Books, 1997), and Robert Carroll, Pattern and Processes of Vertebrate Paleontology(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), e.g., p. 391. See also the works of Stephen Jay Gould, James Valentine, and myriad other Darwinian scientists. [5] See, for example, the historical analysis on this issue in William Lane Craig, "Tough Questions About Science" in Who Made God?, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003). [6] See Michael Behe, Darwin's Black Box (New York: Free Press, 1996), and Michael Denton, Evolution: A Theory in Crisis. [7] See J.P. Moreland, "Naturalism and the Ontological Status of Properties" in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, and Paul Copan, "The Moral Argument" in The Rationality of Theism. [8] See The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), and Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief. [9] On the argument from desire, see Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, The Handbook of Christian Apologetics(Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994); cf. <www.peterkreeft.com>. [10] For example, my moral argument in "Wanchick's Opening Statement."  

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[11] For remarkable stories, see the works of Corrie Ten Boom. See also academic works like William Alston,Perceiving God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), and R. Douglas Geivett, "The Argument from Religious Experience" in The Rationality of Theism. [12] On this modal argument for dualism, see: J.P. Moreland, Body and Soul (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999); David H. Lund, The Conscious Self (Humanity Books, 2005); Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). [13] See the interesting comments by Craig in this regard in "Tough Questions About Science" in Who Made God?. [14] See the various works by Michael Behe, Scott Minnich, Stephen Meyer, and William Dembski in this regard. [15] Excellent nonevolutionary interpretations of the fossil record are found in Kurt Wise, "The Origins of Life's Major Groups" in The Creation Hypothesis, ed. J.P. Moreland (Downer's Grove: InterVarsity, 1994), and Wise's Faith, Form, and Time (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2004). See also the various essays in Mere Creation, ed. William Dembski (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998), and Duane Gish, Evolution? The Fossils Still Say No! (Masters Books, 1995). [16] Such arguments are refuted in philosopher James Sennett's "The Inefficient God: A Rebuttal of Quentin Smith's Atheistic Anthropic Argument." Philosophia Christi 4 (2002): 455-66. [17] Moreland references this in The Creation Hypothesis; see also Norman L. Geisler, Origins Science (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1987). [18] See the resources in note 11.

 

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Victor Reppert: Winner: No one Average Score: 0 General considerations:

Debates are very useful tools in getting a set of arguments on to the table, but they have serious weaknesses as indications of where the truth may lie. This is especially true when sides in the debate try to present too many arguments, and this was the case with both sides here. Because of the large number of arguments presented by both sides, none of the real issues in the debate were treated with enough depth to provide much in the way of illuminating the question of God's existence. That is not to say that some good points were not made along the way on both sides, but I view real debate as an attempt to get to the heart of the issues that divide the parties, and I didn't see a whole lot of that in this debate. My approach to burden of proof issues is simple: The burden of proof lies on the side of whatever your audience doesn't believe. I can't really give this debate to either side. I wish I could. Like Wanchick, I am a Christian theist, but it is the strength of argument that is at issue. Neither side, in my opinion, presented arguments that were developed well enough to merit a verdict of victory. Both sides simply had too many arguments to provide much of anything enhancing our understanding of the relevant complex issues posed by each argument. I know both cases were meant to be cumulative, but a realistic debate would have three arguments per side, no more. Wanchick's strongest points were made in his discussion of the Leibnizian cosmological argument. I'm not sure that the argument is precisely Leibniz's, since Leibniz uses a much stronger principle of sufficient reason (PSR)--one that requires that every contingent feature of the universe be explained in terms of a necessary being (which would make it impossible, for example, for God's creation of the universe to be free). The claim that "It seems reasonable to believe that every substance has an explanation for its existence: it was either caused by something else, or exists necessarily (it cannot not exist)" is not exactly Leibniz's PSR. I was not persuaded by Carrier's broadly Humean response that the relevant causal principle should only be applied to effects within the universe. We very often apply principles beyond the range within

 

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which we are immediately familiar, and I fear that Carrier's use of the term "universe" as a limiting condition is simply arbitrary. However, I have never been impressed by the argument that if we establish an external cause of the universe, it has to be a person. I wish the point about the knowability of the universehad been developed more, and in particular I wish I had seen some discussion of our development of mathematical skill far beyond our immediate practical needs. The resurrection debate simply covered old issues and quoted old sources, doing nothing to enhance our understanding. Carrier's strongest points were in showing the difficulty in reading evidence for religious claims off of science. C.S. Lewis warned long ago about the need for apologetic caution in the use of science, since science has a way of retracting its former certainties. This warning, though, should be given both to atheists and theists. And I am grateful to Carrier for calling the "Myth of the Beginning of Time" essay to my attention. (Though I can't help thinking that there has to be some reason why opponents of the Kalam cosmological argument have spent most of their efforts in the past 30 years trying to challenge the causal principle rather than the claim that the universe began to exist.) However, Carrier's attempt to come up with several arguments against theism did little good. The argument from nonlocality struck me as blatant question-begging: he just asserted that whatever exists must exist at a time and a place, and demanded that Wanchick prove otherwise. People making an impossibility claim normally have the burden of proof, I would have thought. Carrier relied on an argument from displacement, but it is the nature of science not to look for supernatural causes, or if so, to accept them as a last resort. It is like saying that the $100 bill you lost at the beach must have been stolen because after scouring the area with a metal detector, you didn't find it. Science is extremely good at telling us some things we need to know; there are other things it is not so good at, and it is far from proven that we ought to make science the measure of all things. As far as the argument from divine inaction is concerned, I saw nothing that moved the discussion forward with respect to the problem of evil. On mind-brain dysteleology I have no idea why Carrier thinks we would all be better off with brainless minds, since even on the strongest forms of dualism the brain is needed to interact with the world around us. (I'm not persuaded, though, by Wanchick's use of the modal argument for dualism in response.) And saying that all this life-killing space represents some sort of

 

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inefficiency on God's part would make sense if God were wasting his limited resources. But God does not have limited resources. So I am calling this debate even, and I hope that future debates will be more focused.

 

 

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