Nations and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities

Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age From National to Transnational Ties and Identities

Richard Münch

Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age

Also by Richard Münch DAS PROJEKT EUROPA DEMOCRACY AT WORK DIALEKTIK DER KOMMUNIKATIONSGESELLSCHAFT DIE KULTUR DER MODERNE GLOBALE DYNAMIK, LOKALE LEBENSWELTEN RISIKOPOLITIK SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY THE ETHICS OF MODERNITY THEORIE DES HANDELNS

Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age From National to Transnational Ties and Identities Richard Münch Professor of Sociology University of Bamberg Germany

© Richard Münch 2001 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2001 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0–333–94552–2 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Münch, Richard, 1945– Nation and citizenship in the global age : from national to transnational ties and identities / Richard Münch. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–94552–2 1. National state. 2. Citizenship. 3. Transnationalism. I. Title. JC311 .M76 2001 320.1’094’09049—dc21 2001021190 10 10

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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Contents Preface and Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction: The Formation and Transformation of Nations, Collective Identities and Citizenship

1

1 Britain: A Nation Emerging from Civil Society

10

Historical roots Integration of immigrants Integration into Europe The civic community model of integration

11 14 21 23

2 France: A Nation Emerging from the State Historical roots Integration of immigrants Integration into Europe The statist model of integration

28 28 35 39 41

3 United States: A Nation Emerging from Voluntary Association Historical roots Integration of minorities Integration into the world: the foremost transnational nation The market model of integration 4 Germany: A Nation Emerging from Ethnic and Cultural Heritage Historical roots Integration of immigrants Integration into Europe The legalist model of integration 5 The Transformation of Collective Identities and Citizenship: toward European Civil Ties and Identity Preliminary remarks Identity formation through differentiation v

48 48 54 57 59 66 67 102 121 127 136 136 139

vi

Contents

Identity formation through internal homogenization Identity formation through inclusion: the differentiation and interconnection of center and periphery Europeanization, renationalization, reregionalization and globalization as intertwined movements The dialectic of identity gain and identity loss: identity growth Identity growth as a societal process of production: innovators, banks, entrepreneurs and speculators From primordial to medialized identity: economic fluctuations, inflation and deflation From medialized to virtual identity Concluding remarks

146 157 159 169 173 176 180 183

Conclusion: The Transformation of Solidarities and Citizenship on the Way from National to Transnational Ties

186

Bibliography

199

Index

235

Preface and Acknowledgments This book is a part of a series of historical and comparative studies on the rise and development of Western modernity that I have been committed to for the past 20 years. It includes studies on the development of core ideas like instrumental activism, rationalism, freedom, equality, democracy and the regulation of technical risks. Studies of European and global transformation and integration are also part of that research program. The book is devoted to the historical formation of nationhood and citizenship and their contemporary transformation on the way to transnational association. It looks at the patch of forming national bonds of citizenship and of transforming them into transnational civil ties in a historical-genetic and comparative way. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 draw on earlier, shorter German versions published in my book Das Projekt Europa (Münch 1993b), but have been updated, revised and largely extended for this publication in English. Chapter 4 is based on a far shorter text that appeared in Germany in Europe in the Nineties, edited by Bertel Heurlin (1996). The chapter included in this book is considerably longer. A German version of Chapter 5 was included in my book Globale Dynamik, lokale Lebenswelten (Münch 1998). For publication in English here, it has been updated and revised. I am grateful to Susan C. Madiedo for doing the translations of the earlier, shorter versions of Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 5 and to Brigitte Münzel for her editorial assistance. Earlier versions of the chapters in this work went through lively discussions at various conferences encouraging the continuation of arguments and calling for the revision of other arguments. I hope the discussions eventually helped to improve the book. I want to thank all those colleagues who contributed in public and private discussions to my learning process. Particularly helpful was the support given by my colleague Friedrich Heckmann, and his staff from the European Forum of Migration Studies at the Otto-Friedrich University of Bamberg. RICHARD MÜNCH

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Introduction: The Formation and Transformation of Nations, Collective Identities and Citizenship

Civil ties are undergoing tremendous changes in the upcoming global age. Modernity has brought about the nation state as that social unit which predominantly holds together people in civil ties based on civil, political and social rights to citizenship. In doing so the nation state has homogenized ethnic, cultural, religious, regional and class-based differences. In the best case this homogenization process produced equality in sharing rights to citizenship, in the worst case it leveled down differences through internal colonization (Marshall 1964; Parsons 1971; Turner 1990; Cohen and Arato 1992; Schnapper 1994; Heather 1999). At the beginning of the twenty-first century the nation state’s capacity for social integration is losing ground. We move toward ‘postnational membership’ (Soysal 1994; Isin and Wood 1999; Höffe 1999). The global economy is breaking up ties of solidarity and is widening the gap between winners and losers of modernization within the nation state. European integration is going to open up a new gap between the mobile élite of people moving toward a European identity and the less mobile people sticking to national solidarity. The nation state is no longer able to provide for social integration by itself. It is breaking apart into group particularism along class, ethnic, religious and regional lines to an extent not imaginable at the days of its highest achievements. Nationalistic movements are trying to restore national solidarity. However, they do not lead back to a situation of equal rights within the confines of the nation state, but fall back to primordial ethnic ties at the cost of excluding people from the civic community who do not conform to the narrowly defined criteria of belonging, long before being abandoned by the modern pluralistic understanding of citizenship. The result of this backward-oriented strategy is the heating 1

2 Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age

of social conflicts and not social integration (Marks et al. 1996; Zürn 1998; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999). The path to social integration has to be searched for beyond the borderlines of the nation state. This is, however, a difficult path, full of strains and barriers which have to be overcome. The difficulties begin with the reluctance of people to move beyond historically established national ties of citizenship, to allow for more ethnic heterogeneity within their borders and to bridge the gaps between national solidarities. They continue with the less developed capacity of the European Union to provide for social integration comparable to the level of integration achieved by the welfare state. And they are complemented by the still weaker ties of solidarity on the global level. A transnational regime will only be able to guarantee fairness in the transactions of the economy and minimal social standards of survival, but not welfare for everybody on the level achieved by the most advanced nation states. Social integration therefore will move away from equality of results in the sense of the European welfare states and toward equality of chances, exemplified by the US. Fairness will be the principle of inclusion, leaving much wider room for inequalities of result. For people acquainted to the common living standard of the European welfare states this will be a hard learning process. For people living in the thus far less privileged parts of the world this transformation of citizenship opens up chances they never had before. The new chances, however, have to be realized in a world of fiercest competition, always producing winners and losers. This study tries to point out the difficulties and strains of the outlined transformation of citizenship for the European nation states. I will begin with an account of the different paths on which those nation states moved toward national identity and national citizenship which exerted a most lasting influence on the emergence of modern Western culture: Great Britain, France, Germany and the US (see Münch 2001). The account of each country moves on to an investigation into their difficulties in transforming citizenship into a more ethnic heterogeneity caused by immigration under the condition of globalization. Our question is how the nation states cope with the challenges of internal pluralization and transnational integration. Two challenges serve as test cases: the integration of immigrants and integration in transnational (in Europe: European) cooperation (Duff et al. 1994; Miles and Tränhardt 1995; Rasmussen 1996). We will see that each country has placed special emphasis on a particular way of integration: civic community in Britain, state in France, market in the

Introduction 3

United States and law in Germany. Our interest is to find out how the different modes of integration work. At the end of each country review, we will point out the basic idea of integration, the character of the network of actors who organize integration, the basic institutional rules that guide the process, the professions involved with their peculiar world views and rationality principles and the underlying ideas of legitimation (see Münch et al. 2001). My central thesis is that the specific concepts of the nation and collective identities, that emerged in each country, are associated with specific modes of integrating immigrants and integrating Europe as well as integrating the country into Europe and that those modes of integration have specific integrative and disintegrative effects in each country, which themselves have a feedback on the nation. By association, I mean that certain types of nation concepts and collective identities match certain modes of integration. These modes of integration are, in turn, constituted by a pattern of mutually fitting components: basic idea, network of actors, institutional rules, professions involved and ideas of legitimation. Concepts of nations, collective identities and modes of integrationbuild up a pattern that has emerged and develops in the tension between the two opposing forces of institutional inertia and innovation. Between these two opposing forces, constructing consistency in order to reduce insecurity is a major task of institutionbuilding. This consistency construction in the process of institutional change is the central process that takes societies with a specific historically grown pattern of nation, collective identity and integration mode on to a specific track in the face of the same challenges of integrating immigrants, adjusting to ethnic and cultural heterogeneity and transnational integration. They cope with those challenges in different ways and thus produce different patterns of national and transnational integration adjusted to the new challenges. Whereas the paths of Great Britain, France and the US are described in their major distinctive aspects, the path of Germany is more broadly elaborated. The reason for my special focus on Germany is given by her peculiar difficulties and strains in this transformation process and by her earlier historical failure in the construction of a modern pluralistic nationhood. After having talked about the path of four nation states from national formation to transnational integration, we will look at this same process from the point of view of the formation of a European community of citizens with a shared European identity in the wider context of globalization and subnational differentiation. Our focus is on the historical construction of the nation and its deconstruction in

4 Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age

the process of supranational integration, the formation of national civil ties and their transformation on the way toward forming transnational civil ties. The more open the European Union and going beyond that, an even larger united Europe become in the course of the growing recognition of the rights of citizens and human rights for all people of this earth, inside and outside of Europe, the more the people have to get used to actually sharing the rights of citizens with people of very different origins in everyday life. Structures of solidarity and prejudices, however, stand in the way of this development. An understanding of societal communities and citizenship that is completely independent of one’s descent has still not been developed in most of the European nation states. Even though Great Britain and France show better historical prerequisites for this than Germany, each of these three EU states has enormous problems in dealing with ethnic heterogeneity and new immigrants and in proceeding with transnational European integration, shaped by their specific understanding of nationhood and citizenship. It is worthwhile to take a look at the historical conditions under which each of these three nation states developed their own understanding of nation and national identity. We can then know more about the causes of their problems in dealing with the pluralization of their ethnic composition and transnational integration in the course of the European-wide and global opening up of societal living together. We will also become more aware of the causes of their problems by an observation of the completely different development in the United States of America (Brubaker 1990; Hammar 1990; Turner 1990; Brubaker 1992; Heckmann 1992; Hailbronner 1992a; Bös 1993; Bauböck 1994; Soysal 1994; Todd 1994; Bös 1997; Behr 1998; Bommes 1999; Joppke 1999). As was frequently claimed but also questioned in the so-called ‘Sonderweg (special path) debate’, we will see that the German path to nationhood is indeed different to the paths taken by Great Britain, France and the US; and we will also realize that the idea of the nation is conceived of differently. However, all four nations have been formed in a specific way. A distinction has, therefore, not only to be drawn between Germany and the other Western nations, but also between these nations themselves. And we should not take one generalized Western concept of nationhood as a normative model from which the German model deviates as a special type (Sonderweg). We just have to recognize the differences and to look at how the different ideas of the nation shape the form and potential of internal and external social

Introduction 5

integration, of forming and transforming more or less inclusive citizenship within and beyond the boundaries of the nation. We also have to realize that there are two levels of analysis, namely the level of the ideal-typical construction of what distinguishes a specific historically formed idea of the nation from other ideas, and the level of concrete societal practice which always deviates from the ideal type and borrows elements from the other types. In this regard, ethniccultural elements of national self-perception are not only to be found in Germany, but also in Great Britain, France and the US, while there are civil-societal, political and associational pluralistic elements in the contemporary German practice of citizenship based on historical learning. This is why all four nations concretely experience similar problems and display similar conflicts with regard to coping with increased immigration, heterogeneity and transnational integration. Each one suffers from the tension between the ideal of an open and pluralistic conception of citizenship and, on the one hand, the tendency of established communities to close doors and to take their collective identity for the identity of a nation that has, in fact, become more diverse, and, on the other hand, the tendency of minorities to maintain their collective identity and to struggle for recognition. The results are group conflicts in societies which are assumed to be constituted by individual citizens who have left behind them all their primordial ties to their groups of origin. To bridge this gap between ideal and reality is a central task of the future for each of the societies in our study. Nevertheless, their different histories and historically formed ideas of the nation set a specific frame for each one to find specific solutions to the problem, which have, at least, to take up and possibly change the established vocabulary of nationhood and citizenship (see Brubaker 1992: 2–3). Thus, our position with regard to the debate on the German ‘Sonderweg’ is one of a differentiated ‘Sonderweg’ thesis: Each nation has gone its own ‘Sonderweg’. The ‘Sonderweg’ spells out what makes a path to the nation and the idea of a nation distinct in an exaggerated form. In a complementary way, we have, however, to acknowledge the real deviations of societal practice from the ideal ‘Sonderweg’ so that each real practice includes elements of other ideal types. And we have to take into account that each nation has to tackle the same central problems: (1) the conflict between majority and minorities, between insiders and outsiders, natives and immigrants; (2) the tendency of both majority and minorities to cling to their group instead of building a societal community of individual citizens beyond group ties. Each nation’s own ‘Sonderweg’ again sets the cultural frame within which solutions to

6 Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age

those problems have to be justified and negotiated. Thus we can follow neither a pure ‘Sonderweg’ thesis nor its complete rejection (for the ‘Sonderweg’ thesis, see Wehler 1973/94, 1987a, 1987b, 1995; for the critique see Blackbourn and Eley 1984; Nipperdey 1986, 1990/1992; Eley 1992, 1996; Blackbourn 1997; see also Münch 2001: 182–222). The approach adopted in this study to understand and explain the formation and transformation of nationhood and citizenship on the way to transnational integration is a systematic-interpretative one, which is historical-genetic in character (Münch 1993b). The main focus of our analysis is on the constructors of the nations and their collective identities, their definitions of the situation and their positions in society: intellectual representatives of civil society engaged in political practice in Britain, particularly during the Glorious Revolution of 1688; radical intellectuals in France, particularly during the Great Revolution of 1789; intellectual entrepreneurs in the United States, particularly in the founding years of the republic, 1776 to 1789; and literary intellectuals – writers, philosophers, historians – in Germany, particularly in the founding epoch from 1770 to 1870. Those intellectuals set the frame for the understanding of the nation from which further developments and changes have started. The framing of nation ideas took place in the context of factual nation formation that entails fundamental processes of l l

l

l

outward demarcation against competing nation states; inward homogenization through monopolizing force by the state, centralization, legal unification, bureaucratization, division of labor, mass education and mass communication; differentiation and interlinkage of center and periphery with the center in the lead and the periphery in inferior, partly follow-up and partly opposing positions; reduction of tensions and inequalities through welfare policies.

We will analyze the processes of nation formation in Britain, France, the United States and Germany from this systematic-interpretive and historical-genetic perspective (see Deutsch 1953/66; Bendix 1964; Deutsch 1969; Eisenstadt and Rokkan 1973; Tilly 1975; Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986; Brubaker 1989; Mommsen 1990; Hobsbawm 1990; Giesen 1991b, 1993; Eisenstadt 1991; Schieder 1991; Smith 1991; Brubaker 1992; Senghaas 1992; Schulze 1994; Soysal 1994; Brubaker 1996; Behr 1998; Bommes 1999; Giesen 1999; Joppke 1999). We will also make use of the outlined instrument of analysis afterwards in our investigation of transnational community and collective identity formation in the European Union (Haas 1964, 1968; Habermas 1992: 632–60; Haller

Introduction 7

and Richter 1994; Zetterholm 1994; Delanty 1995; Preston 1997; Habermas 1996, 1998; Davis and Sobisch 1997; Heather 1999: 115–54; Judt 1997; Moravcsik 1998;). A complete analysis of what is going on needs both the view from within the nation states and the view from above the nation states, that is Europe as a collectivity in the making. We have to look at the historical formation and contemporary transformation of the nations and at the formation of transnational European ties in order to reach a full understanding of the process. This is why we go on from the nations’ formation to their transformation and, finally, to the formation of Europe. The following subject matters are under scrutiny: l

nations as thus far most comprehensive strong communities that share a historical past and go on toward a shared future.

Nations are shaped by four basic forces: l l l l

ideas of the nation as intellectual constructions that define the outward boundaries and the constitutive elements of those communities; collective identities as commonly shared self-perceptions of nations in outward demarcation and inward constitution; citizenship as membership in a community that shares and coordinates citizens’ rights; nation state as a linkage between national community and state monopoly of force on a demarcated territory.

We assume that the intellectuals primarily define the idea of the nation and the collective identity. This is the symbolic side of nation-building. The material side of nation state and citizenship is produced by processes of outward demarcation, internal homogenization, differentiation between and interlinking of centre and periphery, and inequality reduction. The idea of the nation and collective identity, on the one hand, and nation state and citizenship on the other hand, build up a pattern of interdependent parts, a nationhood complex which is associated with a specific mode of internal and external integration. From this mode of integration, internally and externally integrative and disintegrative effects result that have a feedback on the nationhood complex (cf. Haller 1994) (see figure). Our analysis is based on the study of the following sources: l l

primary texts of intellectuals who framed the idea of the nation; documents available from agencies and actors in the fields of integrating immigrants and of integrating Europe;

Type and position of intellectuals Process of transnationalization

Idea of the nation or Europe

Citizenship

Collective identity Mode of internal and external integration

Nation or Europe Nation state or Europe

Internal and external distintegrative effects

Outward demarcation

Internal homogenization

Center–periphery differentiation and interlinkage Processes of immigration Reduction of inequalities

Figure: Scheme of analysis

Internal and external integrative effects

Introduction 9 l l

survey data and statistics; secondary research literature.

Our approach is the systematic-interpretive explanation of a process of historical formation and transformation. In doing so, we work in between the two poles of generalization toward abstract laws on the one hand, and individualization toward concrete historical phenomena on the other. We are neither on the side of natural science nor on the side of history. We conceive of sociology as a systematic-interpretive approach to historical reality that wants to understand and explain a historical process in its cultural significance as Max Weber (1973: 178–82) put it. In summary, the central problem addressed in this book can be focused on the question of how, in what form and with what accompanying effects social integration is possible in a world of shrinking distances, open spaces, heterogeneity of communities and cultures, changing and multiplying identities, on the way from the nation state to supranational and global societal formation. In order to find an answer to this question, we shall begin with a comparative investigation in the formation of nation state integration and ask about the capacities and forms of the individual nation states for integrating people of heterogeneous origin and of integrating themselves into a transnational (European) community. Then we shall turn to the question of how, in what form and with what effects a European collective identity is emerging beyond national identities as an element of transnational social integration. The Conclusion will sum up the results of our study.

1 Britain: A Nation Emerging from Civil Society

When we speak of the development of the nation as a civic community in Great Britain, we mean first of all the development in England and, then, after union with Wales (1536) and Scotland (1707) and also the subjugation of Ireland (1601), the development in the entire United Kingdom. This is why I refer to England at the beginning but Great Britain later on. In England, the aristocracy and the middle class united against royal absolutism and thus together became the carrier of the nation. The community of citizens emerged out of their uniting. The working class grew into this community of citizens only gradually and with opposition; however, it did so earlier, faster and more profoundly than in France and thus, also became the carrier of the nation. In 1689 the crown was limited by parliament to the role of symbolic representation of the nation. The philosophers provided the legitimizing idea that political power is rooted in the community of citizens which emerged from sovereign individuals voluntarily entering into a contract. For the conservative Hobbes (1651/1966), this was an irrevocable transfer of power to a responsible political authority, as long as the government ensured order. For the liberal Locke (1690/1966), this was only a limited transfer, with a division of powers simultaneously controlling the government. Out of a critical intellectual viewpoint, the question was posed in the further development of including more societal groups and of renewing respectively the societal contract (see for the general development in England: Marshall 1964; Kluxen 1968; Schulin 1971; Smith 1984; Newman 1987; Grabes 1991; Hill 1991; Uhlig 1991).

10

Britain 11

Historical roots In England and with limitations in Great Britain, the nation developed in the course of the inclusion of broader and broader sections of the population in the political community with corresponding rights to a share in social life. After the conquest by the Normans in 1066, the country was divided into a French-speaking Norman ruling class and the Anglo-Saxon-speaking mass of the population. The recognition of English as the official language of public transactions in the year 1362 started a development out of which a nation that differentiated by estates and later by social class nevertheless emerged more and more into a unified nation with a unified identity. In contrast to the medieval army of knights, the Hundred Years War with France included a broader section of the population. Simple archers became the backbone of the army. The English translation of the Bible, published in 1364, set in motion the cultural inclusion of broader sections of the population. The revolutions in the seventeenth century in which the aristocracy and the middle class united to fight against royal absolutism formed the high point of this development. Out of these revolutions after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the parliament elected by free and independent citizens emerged as the central ruling power. The imposition of the Common Law as the law of all the English, to which the king was also subjected, created the legal basis for the development of a national community beyond the boundaries of estates and social classes. The British idea of the nation was shaped by intellectual practitioners who were closely involved in practical politics. They did not construct anything completely new opposed to a reality of absolutist power and aristocratic privilege, as the French intellectuals of the Enlightenment and the revolution did. What they provided was a reflected description of what was really going on in Britain and practical advice for the shaping of that process. Outward demarcation was geared against the European continent, against Roman papacy and against Catholic France, above all in the Hundred Years War (1339–1453). Internal homogenization was accomplished by the establishment of Protestantism (Schilling 1991) and by the concentration of power in the sovereign parliament. England became the center of the British nation to which Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland related as peripheral regions. Imposition of the central English language and displacement of the peripheral Welsh and Gaelic languages was a major part of this process (Schultze 1980; Aitchison and Carter 1994). Reduction of inequality was thematized as the inclusion of the

12

Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age

working class in the fair sharing of wealth and power. The major problem was the broadening of the inclusion of the masses in the exercise of civil, political and social rights in T.H. Marshall’s (1964) terms. Inclusion should result in a citizenry well educated for participating in public affairs and further educated by participation, as John Stuart Mill (1977: 469–70) put it in an exemplary way. The center of the nation should be a civic community of people with a sense for the common good (Smith 1984; Turner 1986; Colley 1992; Marshall and Bottomore 1992; Bulmer and Rees 1996; Callan 1997; Faulks 1998). With the coming of the French Enlightenment and the French revolution, demarcating English identity against the French became again significant in the period between 1740 and 1830. ‘Sincerity’, with its components of innocence, honesty, originality, frankness and moral independence, was framed as a marker of English national identity, in demarcation from the ‘artificiality’ of the French (Newman 1987: 129–45; Langford 2000). The unification with Wales and Scotland as well as the colonization of Ireland created an extensive nation state with a national identity that has remained ambivalent and full of tension until today. The emergence of a British nation was particularly a matter of strengthening powers against France. British identity is, therefore, significant with regard to outward demarcation, while internally it is only a rather loose link between English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish identities. In terms of institutions and language, there is an English hegemony. However, just because of this hegemony, the Welsh, Scottish and Irish feelings and identities have not vanished but continued to exist in reaction to that (Bradshaw and Roberts 1998; Speck 1994). The Irish were only able to win partial independence in the Republic of Ireland (Hutchinson 1987). In Northern Ireland, the Catholic Irish live in long-term conflict with those of Protestant English and Scottish descent. The terrorism of the Irish Republican Army is the extreme expression of this (Bishop and Mallie 1987; Multhaupt 1988). Industrialization posed the problem of the inclusion of the working class. It was solved by external colonization and by the gradual granting of rights of participation in hard earned prosperity and in political power. In this way, the British working class developed a comparatively pronounced national conviction and a special national pride which is based on the position of Great Britain in the world and on the working class’s own part in working for this position. The marked British national pride is absolutely a matter of all societal classes. Between 82.2 and 91.8 per cent of the British expressed that they are proud of their country in surveys between 1982 and 1988. A relatively large portion of

Britain 13

the population classifies itself as belonging to the political middle. In 1973 only 43.9 per cent gave this classification; in the time period from 1976 to 1990 this varied between 55.8 and 66.4 per cent ( Thompson 1963; Marshall 1964; Hopkins 1979; Colley 1986; Dinwiddy 1988; Joyce 1991; Brettschneider et al. 1992: 551, 564; Joyce 1994). The end of the British colonial empire and the economic decline of Great Britain after the World War II (Kahler 1984; Gamble 1985), however, weakened this national pride and the corresponding feeling of solidarity. In the above-mentioned surveys, the lowest value for national pride was reached in 1988 with 82.2 per cent. The portion of negative answers on the question of national pride grew between 1982 and 1988 from 10 to 15.7 per cent. Internationally compared, the value for national pride is, however, still very high. This is, for example, corroborated by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted in 1995 ( Jowell et al. 1998: 1–17). Instead of working together for prosperity and dividing it up into fair portions, long-term strikes and disputes in the seventies over the distribution of prosperity trampled on what was left over of former prosperity. Strikes and lock-outs in 1960 came to a total of 2849 with 138 lost workdays per 1000 workers; this increased until 1970 to 3943 with 489 lost workdays per 1000 workers; in 1975 this reached 2282 with 261 lost workdays per 1000 workers; in 1980 there were still 1330 with 513 lost workdays per 1000 workers (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 509). In 1979, when Margaret Thatcher began to break the power of the trade unions, the national consensus had already been lost for a long time. Her policies of deregulation and liberalization of industry improved the chances for economic development of the country and in return, deliberately and officially cancelled the old consensus without being able to put a new consensus in its place. In 1987, the number of strikes and lock-outs dropped to 1016 with 322 lost workdays per 1000 workers. In surveys from 1985, only 38.1 per cent answered that one can trust most people after 49.2 per cent had answered that way in 1959. In 1981 and 1990 the percentages were at 43 and 44, still higher rates than in Germany and in France, but well below the rates in the Netherlands and in the Scandinavian countries, which were in the fifties and sixties. By 1997, the number of people who trust had shrunk to a mere 30 per cent and was below the level of West Germany, which was at 41 per cent, but above that of France at 24 per cent (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 505, 509, 510, 511, 517, 550; Immerfall 1997: 48; Inglehart 1999: 102). In light of the two-pronged development, Margaret Thatcher’s policies have remained controversial (Kavanagh 1987). She brought movement into the society, but also

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Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age

provoked new social class conflict. The lines of conflict no longer run, however, between capital and labor, but rather between the winners and the losers of modernization on both sides of the old fronts of conflict. This situation of conflict is mirrored by survey data that display stronger wishes for reducing income differences by the government and a sharper contrast between high and low income groups in this respect in Britain than in Germany: in 1996, 55 per cent of people with low income as against 14 per cent of people with high income said so in Britain, compared with 45 and 15 per cent respectively in Germany. Similar results are produced with regard to questions on the government’s responsibility for a decent standard of living for the unemployed: in general, greater need is articulated in Britain, though the contrast between high and low income groups is about the same this time. As far as other questions are concerned, a greater need for balancing inequalities is also articulated in Britain than in Germany: decent standard of living for the old, the sick and the unemployed, high social spending, creation of more jobs and their protection, more governmental responsibility in social and economic intervention ( Jowell et al. 1998: 44–9, 63–8). The data reflect the social tensions in British society in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, British society went through an integration crisis in the 1970s and 1980s so that it had also limited integration capacities with regard to the inclusion of immigrants, as we will see in the following section.

Integration of immigrants To what degree today a pluralistic understanding of the nation as a community of free individual citizens independent of their ethniccultural origin predominates in Great Britain is demonstrated in the comparatively high value which is attached to the rights of individuals and by the extent to which deviating minorities are tolerated. In a comparison of nine European countries in 1981, 62 per cent of the British gave the highest importance to tolerance and respect toward others, while 59 per cent of the French and only 42 per cent of the Germans did (at the end of the ranking list). In 1990, however, the British were only barely in the lead. Another matter is permissiveness. According to an index of permissiveness made up of a set of questions, in 1981, the British, with 262 points, ranked about the same as the Germans, under the European average and well behind the French with 317 points at the top. In 1990, the British were just above the average and clearly behind the Germans, who had become more

Britain 15

liberal. In fall 1997, the British were below EU average in the acceptance of asylum seekers: only 10 per cent were willing to accept them unrestrictedly, 56 per cent did so with certain restriction and 25 per cent not at all, as against 20, 55 and 18 per cent respectively in the EU average. In the same survey, however, 86 per cent claimed to have no problems with people of a different nationality or race, which was above the EU average of 83 and 81 per cent. With regard to granting voting rights in local elections to residents from other EU member states, we see greater reservation in Britain than in the EU average: 43 per cent were in favour of rights to vote, 35 per cent for rights to run as a candidate, as against 52 and 43 per cent in the EU average (European Commission 1997a: B16–17; 1997b: B71, 75, 77). The British naturalization law is an expression of an understanding of civic community that is relatively independent of ethnic-cultural origin. It is a conditional ius soli. According to British law, naturalization can be applied for after a five-year residency. Spouses of British citizens can do this after only three years. Children of foreign parents with unlimited permission to stay in the country become citizens automatically if they are born on British soil. If these prerequisites are not present when a child is born in Great Britain, the child holds a claim to British citizenship as soon as only one parent acquires the unlimited permission to stay. If the child spends the first ten years of his or her life in the United Kingdom, he or she thereby has a claim to naturalization (Malanczuk 1985: 968; Cohn-Bendit and Schmid 1992: 331–9). The British government reacted in several steps of legislation to waves of immigration by restrictions and by narrowing down the definition of nationality. The Aliens Act 1905 was designed to control, in particular, the immigration of Jews which had increased tremendously since the 1880s. Further controls were established in 1914. After World War II, the Labor government furthered immigration from Eastern Europe in order to overcome shortages on the labor market, but, rejection of immigration began with the growing arrival of colored immigrants from the West Indies. The British Nationality Act 1948 granted the 800 million subjects of the declining empire the right to settle in Britain. The more people made use of that right, the more British policies aimed at bringing down the number of such immigrants to zero. The generous understanding of citizenship in the Nationality Act 1948 was intended to facilitate the to and fro of mobile people between Britain and her former colonies, but not to open the doors for masses of immigrants, particularly black immigrants. With immigration rising, this understanding was out of reality, so that the conflict between the

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inclusive Commonwealth community and the exclusive British national community based on common ethnic and cultural roots became apparent and called for a settlement. Limitation of immigration from the former colonies and the New Commonwealth was put on the political agenda and was more and more completed to near exclusion in various immigration acts. The 1948 Act opened doors which were closed step by step in the Acts of 1962, 1971, 1981 and 1988. The 1981 Act reserves inherited citizenship from 1986 on merely to British-born children of British-born or naturalized British parents (Dunnet and Nicol 1990; Layton-Henry 1992; Cohen 1994; Feldman 1994; Cesarani 1996: 67; Spencer 1997: 129–51; Joppke 1999: 100–37). Strict immigration control at the few entries to Britain and the limitation of acknowledged reasons for naturalization as well as the restrictive handling of applications for asylum and of follow-up migration of families helped to keep down unwanted immigration. Acceptance for settlement in Britain from the New Commonwealth went down from 65 000 per year in 1976 to 28 000 in 1990 (Spencer 1997: 146). With regard to the immigrants who had settled in the country, the policy explicitly did not intend their assimilation, but their toleration as citizens of different national, cultural and religious origin. They were encouraged to maintain their culture of origin and were not expected to take on the historically grown culture of their country of residence as long as their conformity to the law was guaranteed. This liberal policy toward immigrants reflects the traditional policy of the empire not to educate their subjects to become Englishmen, but rather to make them better representatives of their own culture. This is very much in contrast with assimilationist French colonial rule as well as the French immigration regime. The building of the colonial empire implied a wide extension of belongingness in the political sense. The people in the colonies were all subjects of the crown. However, they were not conceived of as British and, consequently, not as part of British nationhood either. Thus, the definition of British nationhood retained an ethnic-cultural core. It was, above all, not intended that non-white subjects of the Crown in the colonies should be assimilated to British culture (Paul 1997). The character of the British nation can therefore by no means be defined as concretely as that of the French. It is rather a nation of nationalities, with the English one dominant, accompanied by vital Scottish, Welsh and Irish elements – the Irish contribution being still unresolved owing to the conflict in the six countries. Far more than the French idea of a strong republican nation and the German ethniccultural idea of the nation, this acknowledged multinational character

Britain 17

of the British nation allows for the toleration of different ethnic and national communities with different lifestyles within the framework of one all-embracing though loosely integrated nation. British nationhood does not entail a mission as we can recognize it in the French republican idea with its strong requirement of assimilation, or in the American idea of a new nation of immigrants presenting an exemplary character to the whole world. It is a much more relaxed idea of a framework of living together with ‘Englishness’ as the dominant culture, which, nevertheless, is self-conscious enough to let others share in its achievements and to let them carry on whatever they want to preserve of their culture of origin. How much Britain differs from France in this respect can be observed in the different treatments of Islamic religious practice (Poulter 1986, 1990). While the wearing of Islamic veils by girls in school was sanctioned by their displacement from school and precipitated a national debate in France, it is a matter of pragmatic local handling in Britain. Head covering is allowed as long as it conforms to the school colours, for example ( Joly 1995). Where conflicts occurred, such as in the case of a Sikh boy who was not admitted to school because his turban violated the school’s dress code, they were settled in favour of reducing discrimination based on the Race Relations Act 1976, in this case by a House of Lords ruling in Mandla v. Dowell Lee in 1983. The Common Law’s rationale is to be appropriate for the situation. This means that there is much more scope for practising minority customs, including exemptions from the law, as is, for instance, the case for turbaned Sikh construction workers who are exempted from wearing safety helmets at work (Poulter 1990: 102–6). The intention is not to assimilate immigrants to British culture but to provide for equal opportunities, tolerance and harmonious interracial relations with the particular aim of maintaining public order (Paul 1997: 178; Joppke 1999: 223–6, based on Banton 1985: 71). In the 1980s, anti-discriminatory politics were radicalized, particularly on the local level, under the leadership of the Labour Party and minority group activists, to produce rules of respecting minorities in schools, housing and private enterprises and to provide them with a share in the public space including government and administration, which came close to the provision of groups’ rights ( Joppke 1999: 237–45). British nationhood still bears the stamp of an empire, which unites a whole gathering of nations under one roof. The hegemony of the English is, however, tolerant with regard to living together with people who continue to practise their culture of origin. In economic terms, everything is open to immigrants: success in business as well as the

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benefits of the welfare state. The economic and social order, and also the political order, include everybody, however, according to the rules of a capitalist economy, a universalist welfare system and a political order based on the two-party competition for a majority of votes. Data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted in 1995 supply an impression of a limited belief in the working of assimilation and also of the lacking of willingness to support ethnic minority cultures: in Britain then, 52 per cent said that different cultures cannot become fully ‘national’, as against 44 per cent in West Germany; only 16 per cent – as against 41 per cent – were in favour of governmental support to preserve ethnic minority cultures; 55 per cent – as opposed to 69 per cent – thought that immigrants made culture more open. In a striking contrast, however, only 29 per cent – as compared with 54 per cent – feared that immigrants make crime rates rise. Immigrant cultures are tolerated, but neither assimilated nor explicitly supported. They can be tolerated because they are no danger for the national culture and social order ( Jowell et al. 1998: 14). With the Swann Report of the Secretary of State for Education and Science in 1985, the government acknowledged the fact that Britain has become a multiracial society. The report covers the very limited educational achievement of immigrant minorities and appropriate measures to improve this situation (Swann 1985; Mintzel 1997: 508–11). In intellectual debates, arguments for the acknowledgement of not only the multiracial but also the multicultural character of the society have been put forward. This position argues for unity in public affairs with the commitment to equal rights for all and diversity in private life (Rex 1992). However, official politics has not gone so far as to pursue policies which would explicitly establish multiculturalism. Multiracialism accompanied by multiculturalism has become a matter of fact in industrial centres, but is much more tolerated than actively pursued, based on the assumption that the hegemonic position of Englishness or Britishness is not challenged. As in every European society, immigrants – naturalized or not – do not constitute more than 10 per cent of the population. This is why multiculturalism is – as everywhere in Europe – far from being a reality as it is in the United States. Therefore, there is no supportive ground for official policies of multiculturalism. What is much more relevant, and has become a programme of the government in Britain, is anti-discrimination policies, particularly in the Race Relations Acts 1965, 1968 and 1976 (Baringhorst 1993). The unique combination of strict immigration control and economic, political and social inclusion of the immigrants, with tolerance

Britain 19

shown for them carrying on their culture of origin but without acknowledgement of their culture on equal terms, has been produced by the mutually supporting effects of several factors. First, there is the tradition of Britishness, coupling the Scottish, Welsh and Irish cultures with the dominant English culture; then there is the tradition of an empire which includes ‘foreign’ cultures under the roof of the British; and, also, there is the tradition of the New Commonwealth, which continues with the imperial tradition without political rule. These traditions describe the type of inclusion as tolerance on the basis of the primacy of an established culture. The territorial notion of welfare pertaining to the territorial rule of the welfare state is responsible for the inclusion of immigrants in the granting of social rights. The commitment to market liberalism supported the economic inclusion of immigrants in trade, business and industry. The clear-cut two-party competition for parliamentary majority allows political inclusion in voting rights without having to fear that a change in the population will change the political game. The decline of the British economy after World War II did not create any pressures to open the doors to immigrant workers in order to meet the growing demand for labour as was particularly the case in West Germany. The search for Eastern European workers immediately after World War II remained a singular event. Therefore, politics looking for a majority of votes was clearly framed by the fear of foreign competition on the part of the domestic workforce. Finally, the lack of human rights guarantees through a written constitution did not oblige the legal system to put into effect the human rights of immigrants as asylum seekers and as human beings with a right to have their families in their country of residence. The power of the Home Office in restricting immigration according to popular fears was, therefore, unchallenged by the courts. The situation was quite different in West Germany, where economic reasons favored the immigration of guest workers for a temporary stay, but the human rights guarantees of the constitution required the courts to support asylum seekers and immigrants in their efforts to stay in the country and also to bring their families to their country of residence (see Joppke 1999: 101–37, 223–59). The protectionist attitude against competition from the outside – in both economic and cultural terms – is clearly reflected by data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted in 1995: in Britain, 64 per cent were then for economic protectionism, as against 41 per cent in West Germany; 50 per cent as compared with 31 per cent wished to follow national interests in cases of international

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conflict; 74 per cent as opposed to 86 per cent supported the enforcement of international policies; 32 per cent as against 15 per cent wanted to ban foreign land purchase; 36 per cent as compared with 30 per cent gave preference to domestic television and films; 18 per cent as opposed to 42 per cent thought that immigrants are good for the economy. The only item receiving almost identical ratings was greater efforts in teaching languages, namely 81 as against 82 per cent. It is also striking to note that merely 43 per cent of the British were willing to allow political refugees to stay in their country, as against 80 per cent of the Germans, 67 per cent of the Swedes and 60 per cent of the Spanish ( Jowell et al. 1998: 11–15). Where immigration intensifies economic pressure, the limits to inclusion show themselves in Great Britain – as in other countries – in the form of periodic flare-ups of racial conflicts, though the British understanding of nation is, in principle, open to a broadening of inclusion. Historically, though, such kinds of broadening only advance very slowly and on the basis of the recognition of the contribution of the societal groups to national prosperity. Thus, the immigration from the former colonies gave living together with people of a foreign origin a certain historically evolved normality; however, as soon as this immigration drastically increased and started a competition for markets in times of economic crisis, the boundaries of the British principally open-for-inclusion understanding of nation became visible. Immigration was concentrated in the industrial centers of London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow, and this produced in the native resident populations a fear of being displaced (Richmond 1973; Ward 1983; Smith 1989; Solomos 1989; Holmes 1991; Saggar 1991). Therefore, in residential areas where immigrants made up a large portion of the population racial conflicts flared up time and again, with bloody street battles. Particularly violent were the riots in Nottingham in 1976, Southampton, Newcastle and London in 1981, Birmingham and Tottenham in 1985. In 1991 London’s Financial Times counted 7780 racist attacks in England and Wales alone (Der Spiegel 1992: 175). Attitudes and practices which discriminate against others were stimulated by the official publication of criminality statistics, which showed an above-average rate of criminality among blacks (Dürr 1982: 14–15; Gilroy 1987; Kushner 1996). Inclusion basically advances very slowly and is only granted in exchange for recognized services which help to bring about societal well-being. The gradual abandonment of the idea of a nation as an entity composed only of certain privileged groups defined by

Britain 21

descent, through the course of history, in favour of the expanding understanding of it as by definition including more than the traditional groups, indeed offers a basis of legitimation for the pluralized nation. The lengthiness of the process of inclusion, however, puts clear boundaries on such pluralization. Given that inclusion is understood as full integration into society, additional obstacles arise because the associations which determine societal life open themselves only very slowly – if at all – to immigrants. Moreover, in the ideal of the gentleman, the British identity has a traditionally valid model for mannered behaviour and self-confident understatement that can only be achieved imperfectly and with difficulty in speech and behavioral style by outsiders. Immigrants and social climbers hardly ever liberate themselves from the stigma of inferiority. In comparison with nine European countries in 1981, the British gave the absolutely highest value and, together with the Irish, the highest value by far, to good manners in choosing 5 out of 17 virtues which should be taught to children. Sixty-eight per cent of the British considered such teaching as important, as did 66 per cent of the Irish but only 42 per cent of the Germans and 21 per cent of the French. In 1990 in a selection of 5 out of 11 virtues, similar results were obtained: 89 per cent of the British chose good manners, as did 75 per cent of the Irish, 66 per cent of the Germans and 53 per cent of the French (Stoetzel 1983: 40; Ashford and Timms 1992: 63). The British ideal of a gentleman has been removed from its aristocratic origin and in this way has been maintained as the model of British identity. Further, this identity works as a barrier to full integration, making anyone who cannot live up to the ideal in speech, behavior and social memberships and relationships appear inferior.

Integration into Europe The importance the British give to the maintenance of their national characteristic features is expressed in their hesitation to fit completely into the European Community (Radice 1992; Papadakis 1999). In comparison with other EU member countries, they have ranked for years on the lower end of those supporting European unification, for example in spring 1999 with 31 compared with the 49 per cent EU average. The British are the strongest opponents of the euro: 55 per cent were against its introduction in spring 1999 as compared with the 28 per cent EU average. Asked then about three reasons out of a list of eleven for their scepticism about European integration, they quoted in first place – in sharp distinction to all other countries – the fear of losing their

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country’s national identity and culture at 68 per cent, far above the EU average of 46 per cent. Their trust at that time in the institutions of the European Union was the lowest, with only 20 per cent reporting trust as against the 39 per cent EU average. There was a huge gap between British satisfaction with national democracy at 64 per cent and that in the EU at 32 per cent; only the Danes and Swedes present a wider gap. In expressing a European identity, the British are bottom of all member states with 5 per cent self-perception as European only, 4 per cent as European and British, 27 per cent as British and European and 62 per cent as British only (European Commission 1998b: 59; 1999: 6–7, 43–45, 48, 61). In the United Kingdom we see less alienation than in Germany and less antagonism than in France, and instead a closer correspondence between élite integration and mass followership with regard to the country’s integration into Europe. Here, the élite and the masses share the resistance against an integration process that would relinquish the country’s identity, the sovereignty of the parliament and the autonomy of its government. In passing the European Communities Act 1972, the British Parliament gave preference to European law, but the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978 lays down that any extension of the European Parliament’s competences requires the consent of the British parliament, and this was indeed realized with regard to the Maastricht treaty by the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993. Thus Parliament as the representative body of the nation keeps strict control over the transmission of competences to the European level of politics (Müller-Graff and Reichel 1998: 412–13). In the widely shared British perspective, Europe should be no more than a Commonwealth of Nations in the future. A federation would mean a threat to the British nation and its representative democracy, as demonstrated by the reactions to German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer (2000) on the finality of the European Union in May 2000 (Blair 2000; Economist 2000; The Guardian 2000; The Times 2000; Diez 1998). European policy processes are organized in a complex set of interconnected fora spreading out from the inner circle of government committees via intermediate circles of advisory committees to the outer circles of consultation groups. There is a comprehensive and finely graded process of formal and particularly informal consultations in which technical expertise becomes, step by step, intermingled with the involvement of values, rights and interests. This step-by-step accommodation gives the élites less room to go ahead, and binds them more to compromising between various values, rights and interests,

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but also avoids the rupture between European élite integration and mass alienation and/or resistance. We can call this model of relating élite integration to mass inclusion accommodation between élites and masses. It is accommodative European integration.

The civic community model of integration The constructors of the British idea of the nation were intellectual representatives of a civil society with a strong associational life that was able to institute, for the first time in history, the principle of representative government against the claims to absolute power by the crown in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Representative government is responsible to society and has to promote its common good. The evolution of the nation has concentrated on the question of inclusion in that representation in terms of voting rights, particularly the inclusion of the working class (Marshall 1964). The debates on inclusion have always referred to education as part and parcel of this process. One must be sufficiently educated in order to participate in representative government and one becomes educated further by taking part in government. The institutions that link government to society – clubs, associations, organizations and fora – are of foremost importance for a vital civil society to which government has to respond. Civilian life organized by civic associations is the particular feature that marks British collective identity. Because this identity is formal rather than substantial, it is open enough for people of different ethnic and cultural origins to live together. The question with regard to foreigners is therefore not their assimilation to Britishness in any substantial sense, but the organization of a civilian life between natives and foreigners, including the maintenance of public order. With regard to European integration, the British approach stresses the responsibility of representative government to a strong civil society. Because such a civil society does not exist on the European level, Europe can be no more than a good partnership of nations. The British idea of the nation emerging from civil society is associated with a civic community model of integration, both with regard to integrating immigrants into society and with regard to integrating Britain into Europe. The British idea of the nation originated from civil society and its representation in parliament and government. It is based on the hegemonic position of Britishness, which is an extension of Englishness. It is shaped by a history of including the lower classes into citizenship by granting civil, political and social rights.

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Integration of immigrants With regard to immigrants, who arrived from the former colonies after World War II, the doors were increasingly closed, while those who were able to settle in Britain were taken into citizenship. The multiracial character of the nation has been acknowledged; however, no official policies of supporting multiculturality are being pursued. Governmental activities concentrated on reducing discrimination. The immigrants’ culture of origin is tolerated, but it is not taken as a part of Britishness. In distinction from France, Germany and the United States, the major vehicle of integrating immigrants into society is providing them with a place in the community of citizens and granting them a fair share in society. Communities are, however, determined by the inertia of established ties and cultural practices. It is, therefore, no surprise that there is special scepticism on the part of the native population with regard to the chances of assimilating immigrants to British culture, particularly in comparison with France, but also with West Germany. But neither is there any willingness to support minority ethnic cultures, because this would make them a separate community. What is, therefore, quite reasonable in this view is a relationship of accommodation and toleration between majority and minority cultures, that does not question the traditions of British/English culture, but gives minority groups a place and a fair share in the wider community and guards them against discrimination. The other, negative side of this coin is the seclusion of the established British communities from minority communities and the inertia of British cultural traditions which put members of minority groups in a position of inferiority. The integration of immigrants oscillates between accommodation and seclusion (Lewis 1994; Soysal 1994: 56–8, 73–5, 102–4; Joppke 1999: 233–40). The network of actors, which integrates people in the society and gives access to the government, is dominated by traditionally established circles, ‘old-boy’ networks that allow for limited access to outsiders only, and just inasmuch as they accommodate to the rules of the game and the requirements of decent behaviour and ‘appropriate’ claims that fit in the historically grown context of common-sense practice. One needs influence resulting from long-term relationships to be successful in this context. It is easy to imagine the limitations to integrating representatives of immigrants set by this type of network. However, in a slow process, the network can open doors a little bit, as is proven by the six black members of the House of Commons elected in 1997. On the national level, there is the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) founded in 1975, that is in charge of furthering good relations between

Britain 25

racial groups and equality of opportunity for the individual members of racial minorities. The commission has 12 members from different ethnic groups. The members are appointed by the Home Office as autonomous individuals having a broader perspective and experience, but not as representatives of groups. This typical British procedure helps to create a commission that is responsible to the common good of the whole civic community and therefore is widely respected and influential. The commission reports to the government, gives advice in racial politics, promotes research and aids individual persons (CRE 1983, 1998). On the local level, Community Relations Councils (CRCs), renamed Race Equality Councils (RECs) in 1990, are doing the practical work of helping in individual cases (Greenwich 1999). Originally white organizations, they, too, have become multiracial in their membership and form an important link between the people and local administrations and governmental bodies. What is peculiar to the British network is the strong position of the national and local commissions, with members of different ethnic groups as autonomous agents between government and people. Their primary means of being effective is influence on all sides, based on their work for the common good. Their work is practical and case by case and not political; it is primarily carried out at local level. Usually, this helps to maintain good relationships between racial groups and to rely on such relationships in times of tension and conflict (Gay and Young 1988). The estimated 2000 migrant organizations fit quite well in this pattern: their activities are primarily concentrated on the local level and on social support, education and cultural programmes (see, for example, Muslim Parliament 1992). Most of them conceive of themselves as partners of the RECs and help to organize the civic community (CRE 1985; Joly 1995; Jones 1996). The Race Relations Act 1976 put local governments in charge of promoting racial equality. This led to the mobilization of ethnic groups, above all on the local level, in the 1980s, supported in particular by local Labour Party politics. There were 1370 race relations officers in local governments in the early 1990s, but also about 1000 in central government and 300 elected local councillors representing ethnic minorities. By now, ethnic groups are represented fairly well in local government. They are not organized in larger racial groups, but internally fragmented into a multitude of subcategories. Thus, the British mode of integration promotes fair shares for racial groups, but also strengthens racial identity, so that it makes impossible the transcending of racial splits by a colour-blind community of citizens (Solomos and Back 1995; Modood and Berthoud 1997; Joppke 1999: 240–8).

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The basic institutional rule of integration is appropriateness. Strategies and measures of integration have to be appropriate in order to be successful; that is, they have to leave intact the established communities and cultural practices as well as the communities and cultural practices of the immigrants. The major professions in this process are those of social workers and charitable organizations. Their outlook is practical and concerned with the everyday problems of helping people and working against discrimination. The integration of immigrants, therefore, proceeds in many little acts of help, which is better organized than in France and Germany and more limited to everyday matters than in the United States. The underlying idea of legitimation is that of a civic community and a representative government responsible to that community. The living together of the native majority and the minorities has to be civilian in character, based on informal rules of respect and fair share. The government has to represent this civic community and to promote its civilian order, especially by working against discrimination. Integration into Europe With regard to Europe, the British are most reluctant to furthering their integration in the union. Their idea is to maintain British independence within a loosely integrated European framework. In the British view, transnationality is a matter of a civilized exchange between individuals on equal terms, but not a matter of constructing a political body beyond the boundaries of the nation state. This is why there is, from the British viewpoint, no need to build a political union that would complement the European single market. The position that the European Union shall be no more than a good ‘partnership of nations’ is widely shared by the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and also the Liberal Democrats, and it has been repeatedly emphasized by British governments from Thatcher to Major and Blair. The union is primarily an economic community and should be no more than that (Conservative Party 1994; Liberal Democrats 1994; Labour Party 1995; Great Britain 1999; see Jachtenfuchs 1999; Smith 1999; Wallace 1999). According to the British model, both European integration and also Britain’s integration into Europe have to be conceived of as a process of accommodation. The vehicle of integration is association in matters of mutual interest on the basis of mutually respecting the special cultural traditions of each partner in the association. Interests have to be accommodated in a series of smaller negotiations without producing too strong an intrusion into the sacred spheres of national traditions.

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The other side of this coin is the seclusion of established communities and historically grown traditions against intrusion from the outside, either by non-cooperation or by incorporating European law into British law that submits European to British law. Britain’s access to European decision-making through her members in the European Commission is used in order to guard British practices against European rulings, as was done, for instance, by the British chairman of the Brussels veterinary committee in safeguarding British farmers from European controls in the BSE affair. The British way of European integration thus oscillates between accommodation and seclusion. The network of actors who shape Britain’s relationship with Europe is dominated by established groups of practitioners with long-term relationships that help mutual accommodation. Long-term relationships are indispensable in order to exert influence in this network. Newcomers have to submit to the rules of the game and have to respect acknowledged traditions of practice. According to the basic institutional rule of appropriateness, strategies and measures to solve problems have to fit in with established practices or should, at least, allow for adaptation to such practices. This rule gives European rulings only limited and controlled access to British practices. The profession that shapes this process is that of practically experienced experts from various disciplines, who share a common language of common sense acquired in years of interdisciplinary committee work. Their rationality principle is not that of a special scientific discipline, but that of the incremental improvement of everyday practice based on the rule of practicality. The idea of legitimation that underlies this practice of European integration is that of Europe as a civic community, based on mutual respect for traditions of national culture and on granting every nation a fair share in this community. Europe is conceived of as a community of nations that are linked with each other by accommodation and by many little acts of negotiation and individual market exchange. The more detailed regulation of life should remain with the national governments because of their link of knowledge and responsibility with their national communities. This is why, from the British point of view, Europe will for a long time be composed of enduring nations (Diez 1998; Milfull 1999).

2 France: A Nation Emerging from the State

In France, statesmen were the architects of the nation. Their hall of honour reaches from Louis XIV to Napoleon and up to Charles de Gaulle. The middle class became the carrier of the nation in the Great Revolution of 1789 against the aristocracy and royal absolutism. The working class did not become part of this community of citoyens for a long time. The philosophers of the Enlightenment were the donors of the legitimation of the nation. The transfer of Rousseau’s (1762/1964) political theory of the city state to the large territorial state by the revolutionaries of 1789 turned the one and indivisible nation into the source of power of the state and the source of the general will of the people in contrast to that of the particular interests of single individuals and groups. For the critical intellectuals, a nation split into social classes then became the symbol of illegitimate political power (see for the development in France: Braudel 1986; Emsley 1988; Gauthier 1988; Hollier 1989; Brubaker 1990; Schnapper 1991; Thadden 1991; Brubaker 1992: 35–49, 85–113, 138–65; Behr 1998).

Historical roots Fustel de Coulanges clearly demonstrated the difference between the French conception of the nation and the German one, in the dispute with Theodor Mommsen about the national membership of the Alsace. For the French it does not depend, as it does for the Germans, on common descent and language, but rather on the sharing of thoughts, interests, tendencies, memories and hopes which result in a solidarity and a desire to go down a shared path together into the future (Fustel de Coulanges 1870; see also Finkielkraut 1987; von Thadden 1991: 498–9; Brubaker 1992: 35–49; Kallscheuer and Leggewie 1994). In 1882 28

France 29

in a lecture held at the Sorbonne, Ernest Renan (1947: 904) expressed this view of the nation in the statement that the existence of the nation is a daily plebiscite. The French understand the nation as being formed by citizens who have joined together in a common state and enjoy common rights of citizens, independent of their descent, language or religion. This understanding of the nation is closely related to the formation of the state. In France, a central absolutist power emerged from the competition between smaller territorial powers (Elias 1939/76; Parker 1983; Collins 1995). This sovereign territorial rule of the absolutist state was externally consolidated in the Hundred Years War with England (1339–1453) and internally corroborated by the rigorous imposition of Catholicism with the suppression of the Albigenses in the South in the thirteenth century and the expulsion of the Huguenots with the revocation in 1685 of the Edict of Nantes under which they had been tolerated since 1598 (Baier 1984; Thadden and Magdelaine 1985). Jean Bodin provided the corresponding political theory of absolutist state sovereignty (Bodin 1977; Franklin 1973). The Old Regime took away the rights of independence of regions and estates and thus promoted the development of a united nation under the central rule of the king. The French Revolution only completed this development, in which the idea of a community of independent citizens with equal rights was realized (Tocqueville 1966; Furet 1978; Stone 1994; Schwab and Jeanneney 1995). The nation was now this community of independent citizens with equal rights. Rousseau’s (1762/1964) theory of the social contract provided the legitimation for this. It is the idea of joining together individual, independent citizens with equal rights that has been decisive. These citizens form a unified community – la nation une et indivisible – and as a result, overcome every kind of particular formation of a group because the citizen joins the community as a free individual and not as a member of some ethnic group. It was the Abbé Sieyès (1970) who gave the sovereignty of the nation as against the absolutist sovereignty of the king and the privileges of the aristocracy the paradigmatic expression in his revolutionary text, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État?: ‘The Nation is prior to everything. It is the source of everything. Its will is always legal; indeed, it is the law itself’ (Sieyès 1963: 124; transl. from Sieyès 1970: 180; see Granston 1988). Article 3 of the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789 lays sovereignty in the hands of the nation. Title III of the constitution of 3 September 1791 speaks of the one, indivisible, unalienable and imprescriptible sovereignty that resides in the nation. In the present constitution of the Fifth Republic, the

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commitment of the French people to human rights, the principle of national sovereignty and the indivisible nature of the republic is declared right at the beginning (Boroumand 1990). The overcoming of group particularism is an essential prerequisite for the formation of the general will of the community of all citizens. The unity of the nation expresses itself politically in the republic. The establishment of a central army for the new state instead of fitting together regional armies for waging war provided an essential material basis for the formation of an integrated nation with an integrated identity (Bertaud 1979). Membership in the community of the state as an individual and independent citizen, regardless of descent, and the struggle for a common cause are the two decisive components of this political understanding of the French national identity. According to Rousseau and his revolutionary followers, the general will should find its expression directly in the assembly of the people. There should not even be a representation of the people by deputies, because this would distort the people’s general will. In this respect, Sieyès did not join Rousseau and his fellow revolutionaries, because he argued that a state with as large a population as France needed a representative government (Sieyès 1970: 179–91; Sewell 1994: 49–51). However, parliamentary representation is still suspected of particularism in today’s Fifth Republic, which is why the president and his government are in an extraordinarily strong position and can overrule parliamentary resistance with a whole series of measures. The French intellectuals of the Enlightenment and the revolution framed a radical idea of the nation: a united republic of citizens transcending any group division. This symbolic part of nation-building rested on a material basis that promoted unification by outward demarcation, particularly against England, and internal homogenization through the establishment of absolutist territorial rule, state sovereignty, bureaucratic centralization and the imposition of Catholicism. Central power overruled peripheral powers, so that there remained a latent conflict between center and periphery (Weber 1976). The center’s domination over the periphery is, for example, visible in the enforcement of French against a variety of peripheral languages – the various Occitanian languages, Breton, Flemish, Alsatian German and Corsican – with shrinking numbers of people who still master their provincial language (Gerdes 1980). Inclusion through reduction of inequalities has always been a very conflictual process throughout French history. The antagonism between the paternalism of employers and the radical trade unions (Gallie 1983; Tilly 1986) is of exemplary character for this conflictual process.

France 31

In the light of the republican understanding of the community of citizens, it can be seen why it was much easier for immigrants to acquire citizenship in France than it was in Germany until the reformulation of the laws in France in 1993 and in Germany in 1999. In both countries, the regulations that were formulated by the French law of 1889 and the German law of 1913 were essentially valid up to their reform in1993 and 1999 respectively. Even if the bill of the conservative government implied restrictions on the rights of naturalization starting in 1994, a fundamental difference still remained between the French and the German naturalization laws until 1999, when the German law changed. The French law is a conditional ius soli, the German law was originally a ius sanguinis and granted naturalization only under extremely restrictive conditions. Up until now, about four to five times more immigrants have been naturalized in France than in Germany. On the other hand, the French rate of naturalization is clearly behind those of the US, Sweden and Canada which are 10, 15 and 20 times respectively higher than the German rate. It remains to be seen whether the step toward a ius soli, which was made in Germany in 1999, will change that picture in the future (CostaLascoux 1989: 120; Brubaker 1990; Hailbronner and Renner 1991: 8; Knight and Kowalsky 1991: 86–9; Brubaker 1992). The French identification with the nation was born in the revolution and through the revolutionary wars up until the campaigns of Napoleon, and is kept alive by the state-organized cult of the ‘Grande Nation’ (Godechot 1983; Emsley 1988; Lüsebrink 1991; Höhne 1991; Fitzsimmons 1994). Charles de Gaulle understood this cult especially well as president of the Fifth Republic, celebrating it in his public appearances. In his television speeches to the nation he turned directly to the French men and women to unite them in important matters. With ‘Long live the republic and France’ – ‘Vive la république! Vive la France!’ – the declaration of belief in the Republic and the love of the nation were strengthened. His successors to the office of president have continued this practice without any break. By deliberate independence in foreign policy – for example in limiting the leadership role of the USA in the Western Alliance – and their strengthening through their own atomic weapons as well as an industrial policy aimed more at national sovereignty than at economic efficiency, de Gaulle and his successors strengthened the national pride of the French with the cult of the Grande Nation (Dannebom et al. 1984). In surveys of 1982 and 1988, 75.2 and 76.7 per cent stated that they were proud of their country, which is slightly below the EU average, well below the level of the

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UK, but far above that of West Germany (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 551). The nation state for the French should not be the carrier of a hostile nationalism in the context of international cooperation, rather inwardly it should be the trustee of a universalism which guarantees equal rights of freedom against the particularism of privileges specific to estate, social class or status group. Externally, it should be the advocate of the international cooperation of sovereign states aimed at charity, the guarantee of human rights, a mutual increase in prosperity and the assurance of peace. This idea sees the role of the state, inwardly, as a champion of the rights of citizens and, outwardly, as a champion of human rights. Secular education in the schools should generate good citizens of the republic. Émile Durkheim (1950/1969, 1973a, 1973b) formulated this idea in his sociology of the state at the time of the Third Republic. The final victory of the Republicans in the Dreyfus affair renewed this position and defended it against anti-liberal nationalism (Thalheimer 1963; Brubaker 1992: 98–103). This idea today decisively shapes the close network of nation, state and international cooperation in France, with the leading role going to the state. The great significance, at least in theory, given to the right to asylum belongs in this context. In Paris, all of this converges. Here is the center of the state, that on the one hand ensures the unity of the nation internally and on the other hand pursues openness externally. For the people in the provinces, Paris is not only the seat of the government but also a representative of the whole world. The international attraction makes Paris a cosmopolitan city into which the whole world flows together, works together, lives together and shapes the outstanding cultural vitality of the city. Thus, in Paris, national and multiethnic identities coincide as well as multicultural open-mindedness. The French do not even have to leave their country to experience the total complexity of the world. They only need to make their way to their capital city. Paris’s double role as a capital city and, simultaneously, as a cosmopolitan city, expresses the ease with which French national pride and openmindedness are brought together (von Thadden 1991: 506). A more recent victory of this coincidence of state, nation and cultural open-mindedness in Paris is the Académie Universelle des Cultures opened up in January 1993 by François Mitterand and Jack Lang in the Richelieu Wing of the Grand Louvre (Lepenies 1993: 128). In reality, there is, nevertheless, a stronger linkage between ethnos and demos, ethnic and political community than in theory. In Michelet’s history of France, for example, we see an attempt at tracing

France 33

back the French people to their Celtic and Gallic ancestors and a celebration of the French nation as the executor of a historical mission for humanity, which was very influential in the nineteenth century. The republican demos merges with the ethnically rooted nation that has to carry out a historical mission (Kohn 1948: 53–5; Michelet 1973; Behr 1998: 281–5). It would also be rash to conclude that this tight connection between the nation and the role of the state as champion of the rights of citizens and human rights as well as the connection between national pride and open-mindedness would have an immediate effect on the real politics of the state and the behavior of people in dealing with each other. Until the end of the colonial period, the idea of sovereignty characterized French foreign policy more in the sense of increasing power and maintaining it than in the sense of international cooperation for the assurance of peace and the realization of human rights. The struggle of the European nation states for power in Europe and for dominance in other continents was also led by France with chauvinistic arrogance – hostile nationalism towards competitors and exploitative colonialism outside Europe (Giradet 1966; Weber 1968; Rutkoff 1981, Lüsebrink 1991; Brubaker 1992: 100–3). Hostile nationalism, however, gradually made a place for the expansion of international cooperation after the end of the World War II, while colonialism was ended by the release of the colonies, though in the case of Algeria this led to hefty internal conflicts. Today one also cannot say that the connection of the nation to the state-guaranteed rights of citizens and human rights would protect against identity crises and exclusions. First of all, in comparison with Great Britain and Germany, the working class has been much less successfully integrated into the societal community. This is expressed in the broad support for the communist party and communist trade unions, which have put the legitimacy of the state in its given form in question for much longer than the labour parties in Great Britain and Germany. France has been a nation split into social classes for much longer than Great Britain and Germany, and the annual number of strikes and lockouts is in the top group internationally. Between 1960 and 1980, the number varied between 1494 and 3888, with 82 to 219 lost workdays per 1000 workers (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 509). A comparatively high percentage of those surveyed wanted to change society; in 1976, 13.5 per cent wanted to do so through revolution, 63.7 per cent through reform; in 1981, 7.5 per cent still chose revolution and 64.3 per cent, reform. A comparatively very small portion of those surveyed is satisfied with democracy; in 1973, only 40.6 per cent,

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in 1980, just 35.3. In 1982 only 23.4 per cent, the lowest value in the EC, agreed to the statement, ‘Everyone is equal before the law’. In comparison with Germany and Great Britain, fewer voters classify themselves as in the middle: in 1973 and 1980 in France only 43 and 52.1 per cent did so, while the figures for Germany were 56.3 and 63.7 per cent, those for Great Britain 43.9 and 62.7 per cent. The portion of citizens who express satisfaction with their life is comparatively low. Between 1973 and 1980 it was measured at 68.2 to 76.8 per cent. Only 23.1 per cent were able to trust most people according to a survey between 1981 and 1983, 70 per cent believed that one can never be too careful. In 1990, trust was still at only 23 per cent, much below the EU average of 40 per cent (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 509, 541, 542, 543, 546, 550, 564). Since 1981, however, the presidency of the socialist ‘monarchy’ of Mitterand has changed this situation (Uterwedde 1991). The number of annual strikes and lock-outs fell from 1980 to 1987 from 2118 to 1391 with 92 to 28 lost working days per 1000 workers. Between 1983 and 1992 strike minutes per employee declined from 35.7 to 29.3. The portion of the voters who classified themselves as in the middle, increased. In the time period from 1981 to 1990, it varied in France between 50.1 and 56.4 per cent, in Germany between 53 and 61.6 per cent, in Great Britain between 55.8 per cent and 66.4 per cent. The portion of citizens satisfied with their life increased from 70.2 per cent in 1980 to 79.9 per cent in 1990. In 1993, it was at 72 per cent, however, still sharing the low scores with the southern European countries. The portion of citizens satisfied with democracy showed an upswing from 35.3 to 59 per cent in spring 1999; 6.6 per cent still wanted a revolution, 64.4 per cent a reform in 1990; 41 per cent of the French, clearly more than the Germans with 29 per cent and the British with 33 per cent, believed that people in their country were living in poverty due to injustice (Ashford and Timms 1992: 26; Brettschneider et al. 1992: 510, 541, 542, 546, 564; European Commission 1993a: 4; Haller 1997: 395; Noll 1997: 459; Immerfall 1997: 148; European Commission 1999: 6; Inglehart 1999: 102, 114). Since then a classtranscending national consensus has been spoken about (Mendras and Cole 1991: 107–21). The dismantling of the split between the social classes and the intensification of solidarity is an achievement of Mitterand with and without the governmental activities of his socialist party, an achievement which remained even after the devastating election defeat of the socialists in March 1993 and which persists beyond the end of Mitterand’s presidency. This assessment had already been

France 35

confirmed by a television news report on the evening of the election of the second ballot for the parliamentary elections on 28 March 1993. Afterwards, over 50 per cent of the French clearly wanted to see Mitterand continue in the office of the president, even with a nonsocialist majority in parliament and the government. The break up of the Soviet empire caused a radical critique of the system of the communist party and communist trade unions. The increased prosperity also brought a pervasive integration of the working class into the national unity in France. Thus, in France, integration has advanced since World War II. Nevertheless, the integration of the Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb has become a problem that is still unsolved, as we will see in the following section.

Integration of immigrants Today in France the extent to which the nation is understood as a pluralistic community of free citizens, regardless of ethnic-cultural origin, can be tentatively read in the following survey data. In comparison with nine European countries in 1981, the French, in the importance of tolerance and the respect of others, ranked, with 59 per cent mentioning this virtue from a selection of 5 out of 17, in second place after the British, just before the Danes, Dutch and Irish, but far ahead of the Belgians, Spanish, Italians and Germans. A repetition of the survey in 1990 took the French still farther ahead with the third best results after the Dutch and the British. In fall 1997, the French were about EU average in the acceptance of asylum seekers and ahead of the Germans and British: 21 per cent were ready to accept them unrestrictedly, 53 per cent with certain restrictions, and 21 per cent not at all, as opposed to 20, 55 and 18 per cent respectively in the EU average. Acceptance of people of a different nationality in terms of not being disturbed by them was at 85 per cent, of a different race at 78 per cent, as opposed to 83 and 81 per cent in the EU average, which was about the same as in Germany, but a little lower than in Britain; 55 per cent were prepared to grant the right to vote in local elections to residents from other EU member states, 40 per cent to grant the right to run as a candidate, which was more than in Germany and Britain and about the EU average at 52 and 43 per cent respectively (European Commission 1997a: B16–17; 1997b: B71, 75, 77). The French naturalization law valid until 1993 was a conditional ius soli and expressed an understanding of the nation as a community of citizens which is relatively independent of ethnic-cultural origin.

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It made naturalization possible after a five-year residency in the country. The children of foreign parents became French citizens automatically when they reached the age of maturity if they were born in France, had lived in France for the previous five years up until then and were not found guilty of certain criminal activities. Children born in France are French citizens, if at least one parent was born in France. Children born in France became French citizens at birth at the request of their foreign parents. A law of the conservative government, however, introduced restrictions on the previous law. Thus, starting in 1994 the children of foreign parents born on French soil no longer automatically become French citizens when they turn 18; rather they should make the decision themselves between the ages of 16 and 21. Those who have committed a criminal offense that has a minimal sentence of six months in prison cannot become French citizens (see also, Bernard 1993; Bös 1993; Hollifield 1994; Rademacher 1993; Wölker 1985: 58–61; Brubaker 1990, 1992: 85–113, 138–65; Cohn-Bendit and Schmid 1992: 331–9). Immigration out of the former colonial regions, as well as the international cultural and economic attraction, has considerably increased, especially in Paris and its surrounding areas, the heterogeneity of the population according to origin, language and religion, and this heterogeneity still continues to grow (Noiriel 1988; Mestiri 1990; Kepel 1994). The natives of Paris are used to living together with people of different origins. The heterogeneity of the population is not a problem in the city. However, things are different in the suburbs, where immigrants step on the toes of social classes of the native population who are economically at risk. This is also true for other cities with a constantly growing number of foreigners, like for example, Marseille with a high portion of immigrants from North Africa (Ogden 1989; White 1989). The established institutions providing for inclusion, particularly the trade unions, are designed for the integration of the lower classes, but not for the integration of immigrants in the banlieus (Dubet and Lapeyronnie 1992; Jazouli 1995; Loch 1999). When it comes to competition for jobs and markets between the economically weak social classes and the immigrants, as well as among the immigrants, conflicts, xenophobia and racist violent acts increase to a concerning degree (Taguieff 1988; Freeman 1989; Todd 1994; Kastoryano 1996; Rey 1996). The call for peace and order is combined then with a call for a stop to immigration. In the eighties and nineties, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National thus won a considerable number of votes in elections on local, national and European levels (Höhne 1990; Bréchon and Kumar Mitra 1992; Wieviorka 1992; Mayer and Perrineau 1996; Schain 2000). His greatest potential for voters was

France 37

among the unemployed, workers, tradesmen and craftsmen who feared for their social position. Economically secure and educated voters also gave Le Pen their vote, though, to oppose the left. The willingness in France to also share nationality with people of different origins appears to be limited and declining. In comparison with surveys between 1981 and 1990, the French made a jump from far below the average to well above the average in regard to ethnic intolerance (Ashford and Timms 1992: 14, 15; Barker, Halman and Vloet 1992: 24). In 1968, 51 per cent agreed to the statement that too many foreigners from outside of the EC live in France. In 1984 this figure grew to 61 per cent; it was 56 per cent in1993 and 46 per cent in 1997, slightly above EU average, yet below Germany at 60 per cent and 52 per cent respectively in 1993 and 1997. In 1984 the percentage of those rejecting black Africans had grown from 18 to 41 per cent as against 1968, those rejecting North Africans from 62 to 66 per cent; the percentage of those rejecting Jews had dropped from 13 to 12 per cent, Spaniards from 27 to 19 per cent. Asians were not included in the 1968 survey and in 1984 they were met with rejection by 31 per cent of the population (Schain 1987: 238; European Commission 1992a: A41, A42; 1993a: A51, A54; 1997b: B71, 73; see also Brettschneider et al. 1992: 544; Riffault 1994: 208). The French understanding of the nation as a community of citizens includes the expectation that immigrants will assimilate to the French way of life. The reason for establishing the law of 1889, which is generous in granting citizenship, was to attain the commitment of resident immigrants to the Republic and their assimilation to French culture (Weil 1995, 1996). The tolerance for ethnic-cultural pluralism does not reach the extent that it does in the US where, however, the pressure for assimilation is much greater on the part of economic competition. The debate on the case of the three Muslim girls who were banned from education in school by the school director in fall 1989 for wearing their headscarves (foulards) in school, because this was seen as an attack (affront) against the secularism (laïcité) of public education, underlines precisely how the principle of assimilation is challenged in a situation of factually given multiculturalism. Though the Conseil d’État ruled that the girls had to be allowed to wear their headscarves as long as they didn’t proselytize, the pervasive sanctioning of this behaviour in the intellectual debate, which regarded it as a violation of the state’s commitment to secularism, particularly in its schools, reflects the expectation of assimilation to the basic principles of the republic and French civilization. In order to be an acknowledged part

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of the society, immigrants have to become Frenchmen in thought and in heart. For many, the headscarf in school was in itself a political sign incompatible with secularism, so that it was still justified to ban foulard-wearing Muslim girls from school. Two decrees by the Ministry of Education in 1992 and 1994 did not clear the situation, because they left it to the schools to interpret headscarves as provocatively disturbing regular education. Multiculturalists and nationalists argue bitterly over the understanding of the right to be culturally different (le droit à la différence) with the help of ‘emergency organizations’, SOS Racisme and SOS France. Multiculturalists want to concede this right to be different to everyone within the boundaries of the open Republic of France. Nationalists want every ethnic group to be recognized within the boundaries of their own country. Following the wishes of the new nationalists, the French should keep the right to stay to themselves. As the nationalists were successful in making use of the multiculturalist rhetoric, republicanism, which sets narrow limits to multiculturalism, has regained support on the part of liberal and leftist intellectuals (Finkielkraut 1987; Dubet 1989; Loch 1990; Knight and Kowalsky 1991: 89–105; Schnapper 1991; Silverman 1992; Ziebura 1992; Kastoryano 1996; Silverman 1996; Wieviorka 1996). Apparently, hostile nationalism and hostility toward foreigners cannot be prevented even by an understanding – oriented toward the rights of citizens and human rights – of the nation as a political community of citizens who want to go ahead together regardless of the origin of individual citizens. The realization of this idea is the responsibility of the state, which consequently liberates the people from doing it themselves (Ministre de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité 1998; Ministre de la Justice 2000). The idea is lacking a societal substructure of associations through which people are led into the shared shaping of their lives beyond the boundaries of their group of origin. In comparison with Germany, Great Britain or even more the United States, the independent organization of living together in clubs, associations, churches and other groups is less pronounced in France. The number of members in such associations in relation to the total population is clearly lower. In a survey carried out in 1981, only 27 per cent of the French mentioned a membership in an association in contrast to 50 per cent of the Germans and 52 per cent of the British. Together with Italians, 26 per cent of whom mentioned a membership, the French brought up the rear in comparison with nine European countries. Another approach of measuring membership in associations shows

France 39

57.7 per cent who did not join any association in 1990, much above the scores of West Germany with 43.0 and Britain with 38.8. Only the Southern Europeans were less organized (Crozier 1964, 1970; Stoetzel 1983: 285; Safran 1991: 106–24; Immerfall 1997: 152). Due to minimal involvement in voluntary associations and organizations, the mutual realization of the rights of citizens and human rights through common action beyond governmental intervention is hardly developed at all. On the contrary, where the state applies the rights of citizens and human rights to a new group of immigrants through a liberal immigration policy, it is probable that the dismayed population refuses to obey and reacts with opposition. The idea of the nation as a community, formed by the will of the individual citizens who want to go ahead together independently of their origin, indeed offers a better basis for legitimation for a nation with a pluralistic composition than does the idea of the nation as a community of those of common descent. The idea is ineffective, however, if it is pursued only as an intellectual matter or as strictly a matter of the state and its legislation, without any parallel in the life of the associations of the people. At the time of the French Revolution there was already a big discrepancy between the political rhetoric of the nation in Paris and the distance of the farmers in the country from this idea of the nation (Emsley 1988). The French idea of the republic and a nation based on political will is connected with strong requirements of assimilation. It was much easier for immigrants and their offspring to be included in French citizenship than in Germany. This does not mean, however, that immigrant citizens in fact became integrated parts of French society. Particularly the Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb, who started to arrive in the mid-fifties and who concentrated in the suburbs of Paris, Lyon and Marseille, did not obtain access to society. Though citizens, they are not accepted as truly French, because they do not fulfill the requirement of strong assimilation. In the opinion of an immigrant from Bulgaria, the alien runs up against a wall of non-acceptance (Kristeva 1989: 57–8; Leggewie 1993: 220).

Integration into Europe In France, it is difficult to accept a growing zone of intersection between nationals and non-nationals, citizens and non-citizens, a situation which has become much more a matter of fact in Germany, as we will see later on. Nevertheless, at least with regard to residents from other member states of the European Union, this will be increasingly the case

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in France, too. Certainly, acceptance of people from EU member states is much higher than that of people from outside the European Union, particularly the Maghreb. Nevertheless, sharing rights with other nationalities within the European Union is a challenge. The willingness to do so is supported by the intention to conceive of the European project as a means of securing the position of France within the union together with the partner states, particularly Germany, and against US American hegemony. The support of European integration is, therefore, quite evident from a French point of view. It has, however, to be kept within the limits of not challenging French sovereignty. The attitude toward closer integration is therefore ambivalent (European Commission 1998b: 27, 41, 43, 46, 50, 51, 54, 59, 60, 63). According to the various rulings of the Conseil d’État and the Conseil constitutionnel, European law overrules French law, because it results from the assent of the sovereign French state in agreement with the other member-states. Inasmuch as European legislation does not require this consent of sovereign states, it has to be questioned as long as there is no united European people (Müller-Graff and Reichel 1998: 378–98). The French have never seen membership in the European Community and Union as the abandonment of national sovereignty, but rather as a way of working together with neighboring countries with the goal of economic development and the assurance of peace for the well-being of France and Europe together, in the context of a confederation according to de Gaulle’s idea of a Europe of fatherlands. Thus, their national pride has fit without a problem in their cooperation within the context of the European Community and Union. Their understanding of working together within the EU does not disturb national sovereignty (Jung 1999; Schmidt 1999; Parsons 2000). According to a survey conducted in fall 1998, in the near future, 35 per cent will see themselves only as French, 49 per cent as French and European. In both cases the French are in the top group of European-oriented citizens. In spring 1999, the French hit exactly the average of 39 per cent of trusting the European Union, with Germany and the UK well below average at 31 and 20 per cent respectively (European Commission 1998b: 59; 1999: 48). In contrast, they were rather reserved in answering the concrete questions. In a survey taken in fall 1992, 17 per cent had strong and 32 per cent considerable fears regarding the effects of the EU single market, whereas 10 per cent were very and 34 per cent considerably hopeful; 7 per cent gave no answer. In the expression of fears, the French were way over the EU average with 10 per cent strong as well as 27 per cent moderate skeptics, 11 per cent

France 41

convinced optimists, 40 per cent moderate optimists and 12 per cent undecided. When choosing among 12 reasons for their attitude, 46 per cent of the skeptics cited growing unemployment; 34 per cent the loss of national identity; and 32 per cent too much immigration in one’s own country as the three most important reasons. The EU average for the first reason stood at 33 per cent, for the second at 29 per cent and for the third at 30 per cent (European Commission 1992b: A37–39). In spring 1999, the French were among the nations displaying most fears, particularly with regard to the transfer of jobs to other countries, difficulties for farmers and loss of social benefits at 76, 72 and 67 per cent (European Commission 1999: 45). In the willingness not to follow the decisions of the European Court of Justice, France together with Portugal, Luxembourg, Spain and the Netherlands reached the highest values. According to a survey from fall 1992, 11 per cent would oppose decisions, 19 per cent to a certain extent; 12 per cent want to completely follow the decisions, 34 per cent conditionally, while 16 per cent were undecided and 8 per cent gave no answer. On the EU average, we find 8 per cent determined opposition, 14 per cent moderate opposition, 34 per cent limited willingness and 17 per cent unlimited willingness to follow the decisions as well as 18 per cent undecided and 10 per cent declining to give an answer (European Commission 1992b: A49). It can be assumed that, for France as well as the other member states, European politics is similar in character to other policy fields in the country. Thus, we would expect a sharp antagonism between élite integration and mass opposition to European politics, and indeed it is what we observe in France. European policies are a matter of the selective concertation of the administrative élite, with leaders of privileged associations and organizations at the cost of a more open process of consultation. The systematic exclusion of less privileged groups produces a potential for protest which comes up regularly in heated form. The opposition against Maastricht and the soon-following defeat of the government in the referendum as well as the fierce opposition against European politics both from right and left has been a peculiar trait of French politics on European integration particularly since Maastricht. It is antagonistic European integration.

The statist model of integration The constructors of the French idea of the nation and of French collective identity were the intellectuals of the Enlightenment and the Great

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Revolution (Goodman 1994). In this revolutionary situation, they constructed an idea of the nation that became the embodiment of their missionary universalism: liberté, égalité and fraternité for everybody as against the lack of liberty, inequality and fragmentation into estates of the Old Regime. The republican life of the citoyen concerned with the general will in contrast to the particularist will of the various societal groups should be the true expression of the French collective identity. The virtues of the citoyen committed to the best of the republic represent French collective identity at its best. This was, however, an intellectual construction that gained only a partial foothold in society. Because of lacking roots in society, the state with its centralized administration, led by a technocratic élite, has taken the role of formulating and enforcing the general will, while the regions and groups carry on their difference and particularism as a vital underlife of official central republicanism. Because there is a lack of associational life between state and particular groups and regions, a gap exists between public republicanism and private particularism (Crozier 1964; Suleiman 1978; Bourdieu 1989). A double antagonism is characteristic of the French collective identity. First of all, the all-embracing republican identity is a matter of intellectual radicalism, on the one hand, and administrative technocratic and centralist rationalism on the other hand. While the administrative élite represents republicanism in its ordinary expression, the intellectuals enter the scene in times of crisis in sharp criticism of the administrative exploitation of the idea of republicanism. A second antagonism can be discovered in the relationship between state centralism, on the one hand, and the fragmentation of society into particularistic groups and regions on the other, that make use of any chance either to have preserved particular privileges through exclusive access to the state administration or to pass by or oppose central administrative ordering activity. This split, between a republican and a universalistic ideal of the nation and of French collective identity, and a real antagonism between the intellectuals and the state as well as the state and society, can also be observed in the particular problems France has to solve with regard to the integration of immigrants and the integration of Europe. The French idea of the nation emerging from the state is associated with a statist model of integration, both of integrating immigrants in the society and of integrating Europe including the integration of France into Europe. The French idea of the nation is a child of the revolution, based on bureaucratic centralization by the rule of absolutism. The nation was created and is embodied by the state. The unity of the

France 43

republic, that transcends any kind of group particularism, is the political expression of the nation. Below the representation by the state and its administration there is, however, little self-organization of the nation in a vital associational life beyond particularistic groups. There is a sharp juxtaposition of state universalism and societal particularism. What is lacking is a vital associational life between state and particularistic group organizations. There is no expression of the nation outside its representation by the organs of the state. This gap between state and society is responsible for the rather limited ability to integrate immigrants into the nation and to integrate the nation into Europe. Integration of immigrants As the nation is a matter of political construction, it is relatively easy to take people into citizenship independently of their origin. What is strongly required, however, is assimilation to the secularist nature of the French Republic, to French language and culture. The other side of this coin is the lack of institutions, that mediate between immigrant customs and French culture, simply because of the huge gap between state and society. The immigrants just add to the compartmentalization of the society into a plurality of particularistic groups who live a life of their own. Groups with a long tradition of organization enjoy privileged access to government and administration, that helps to preserve their privileges. It is extremely difficult for newcomers to get access to such privileged places. This is particularly apparent for the immigrants with their weak self-organization, which is very different from the minority organizations in the United States. Thus, we have the situation of the immigrants’ formal integration into citizenship without any substantial integration via self-organization, representation and participation. This lack of substantial integration is responsible for the conflict between Islamic self-assurance and secularist republicanism. The French commitment to universalism remains a matter of political form, but does not reach down to the real life of societal self-organization, at which level, because of the gap between state and society, it turns out to be a phrase empty of substance. In comparison with the other countries included in our study, the major vehicle of integrating immigrants into the society is the state – that is, entitlement to citizenship by the state. In order to make this formal entitlement a reality in the substantial terms of inclusion, power is needed, first of all, in the sense of access to the state and its administration, simply because of the state’s central role in this process.

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Activities intended to promote integration are guided by central state administrations and agencies. On the government level, the Directorate of Migrant Populations in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration is responsible for integration policies. An advisory body of nine experts is the High Council for Integration. The National Council for Immigrant Populations has existed since 1984, except for a break from 1986 to 1989. With its inclusion of representatives from selected migrant minorities, it is an attempt at building a bridge between the state and the migrant populations. However, the council suffers from lack of support and influence, because there is no tradition for such a body relating state and society in France. The implementation of integration policies is a matter of central agencies: the International Migration Office, the National Society for Housing, the Association of Social Assistance for Migrants, the Agency for the Development of Intercultural Relations and the Social Action Funds (Fondation d’Action Sociale, FAS). The last administers the budget provided for special integration programmes and gives money to organizations on the local level. We can say that in France it has a central importance similar to that of the Commission for Racial Equality in Britain, yet with a completely different position, membership and rationale. What in Britain is done by a multiracial representative body between government and society in order to provide for interracial harmony and accommodation in France is carried out by a purely administrative agency of state officials, in the position of absolute state sovereignty, to promote the assimilation of immigrants to French culture. The state officials collaborate with selected organizations that are put in a privileged position by the assignment of state funds. It is not surprising in such a context that migrant organizations make up only 7 per cent or less of all subsidized organizations and receive an even smaller part of the budget, namely only 2 per cent. Migrant organizations were prohibited until 1981, when the new socialist government adopted more liberal policies toward immigrants. Instead of migrant organizations, around 3000 solidarity associations of French nationals cared for immigrants. In the meantime, there are about 4200 migrant organizations. According to the style of French politics, they are widely fragmented, very small in membership, weakly organized and only sporadically and primarily politically active, particularly in situations of conflict claiming equal rights for immigrants as citizens of the republic (Soysal 1994: 77–9, 104–7; Ministre de l’emploi et de la solidarité 1998). The network of actors that regulates immigrant integration is shaped by the fusion between traditionally established and privileged groups and the state administration – trade unions, entrepreneurial and professional

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organizations – so that immigrant groups are in a hopelessly disadvantaged position in this game. Because integration through market achievement, communal association or legal dispute is in a secondary position compared with state-guided integration, lack of power is decisive for failing integration. The basic institutional rule that frames the struggle for integration is state sovereignty. This rule gives the state all the power needed to organize immigration and the integration of immigrants according to the general interest of the state. The dominant profession in this process is that of the state administrators. Their rationality principle is territorial rule and its rule-guided administration along with the maintenance of public order, particularly through police control. The basic idea of legitimation that is applied to justify policies and to claim rights is republican universalism. In the framework of this model, the integration of immigrants oscillates between the two antagonistic poles of assimilation and conflict. In reality, republican universalism requires assimilation to French culture and gives established groups in privileged fusion with the state administration the power to define the substantial meaning of republican life. Failing assimilation provokes conflict: rejection of immigrants because of their deviation from French culture, and rebellion of immigrants because of the imposed requirement of strong assimilation. The fact that assimilation does not acknowledge their own cultural roots and that they are excluded from the power network takes the attempts of immigrants to improve their situation out on to the streets (Behr 1998: 188–92). Integration into Europe A similar lack of integration can be discovered in the relationship between France and the European Union. It is particularly a matter of the government, but not a matter of the people’s transnational selforganization. De Gaulle’s idea that the patries (fatherlands) form the basic units of Europe is still valid. It implies that there is only a very weak underlife of transnational self-organization below the level of intergovernmental European decision-making. Europe is a platform for securing state sovereignty on the international level. In this perspective, there is no room for the development of a European society which transcends Europe’s division into cooperating sovereign nation states. According to this French model of European integration and state-society relationship, it is no surprise that access to the European Commission and its administration is less a matter of open representation and participation and more a matter of privileged consultation that sometimes includes the distribution of special benefits by the commissaries, as was revealed in spring 1999, when the entire commission had to resign.

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According to the French statist model of integration, the state is the major agent of handling the process of European integration. Therefore, the nation state has to retain its power in order to shape this process as long as there is no such power on the European level. A European Union having limited problem-solving capacity while the individual member states give up power will lead to a situation of diminishing power and thus to a much too limited capacity for enforcing the general interest against group particularism, as Jean Marie Guéhenno (1995) succinctly demonstrated from the point of view of French republicanism. The sovereignty of the nation state is sacred and has to be preserved in the very interest of republicanism. European integration, therefore, has to proceed along intensifying cooperation between sovereign states. A federal union that would set closer limits to the power of the nation states is inconceivable from the republican viewpoint, because it would not be able to transfer the republican model to the European level. The major dilemma of this model of integration is its oscillation between transnational cooperation and nationalist reaction. The more the élites intensify transnational cooperation and have to give up some of their national sovereignty, the more they endanger their support within the country, provoking in particular rebellion by groups that feel disadvantaged by decisions in Brussels. Of all member states, France is particularly torn between, on one hand, promoting European integration in order to retain the state’s capacity to solve problems in global competition and, on the other, nationalist counter-action, because this implies an unavoidable loss of sovereignty. There are two contradictory and conflicting positions. One of them is to preserve the sovereignty of the nation state with the effect of diminishing power to control the effects of global economic competition, so that this clinging to sovereignty in fact reduces the state’s performance capacity. Regarding the spectrum of the political parties, this position is held by the Gaullists, the communist party and the Front National. The other position is to realize the shrinking power of the nation state and to regain that power in a European Union that would carry on the mission of the French nation state. To be true to the republican idea, this position has to stress the European community of shared values, the distinctive European social model of society as outwardly distinct from the liberal American model. From this perspective, Europe has to be a republican and social union. A pluralistic federal union divided into nationalities and regional identities would not fulfil the requirements

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of strong European republicanism. The christian democrats, the socialists and the greens are the parties in the political spectrum that have made their way to this position via lengthy internal struggles. They reflect the dilemma of a nation committed to the idea of republicanism facing the realities of shrinking national power and European pluralism. Response to the speech of German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer (2000), on the future European federation in May 2000 was, therefore, ambivalent (Front National 1993; RPR/UDF 1993; PCF 1994; PS 1994; CDS 1991; Verts 1994; France 1999; see also Jachtenfuchs 1999; Jung 1999; Fischer and Chevènement 2000; Le Monde 2000; Vedrine 2000). The French network that relates the country to the European Union is characterized by the merger of traditionally established interest groups and the state administration. There is privileged consultation with selected groups at the disadvantage of excluded groups. Privileged access to state power is decisive in this process, while transnational integration through market achievement, economic cooperation, communal association and cooperation in arts, literature and science is much more limited than in any other member state. The preoccupation with power sets close limits to cooperation in unsettled situations outside established rank orders of power, including the power order in the arts, literature and science. The basic institutional rule that guides the integration process according to the statist model is state sovereignty. Therefore, the state has to be the agent of integration and everything that is done has to be accounted for in terms of preserving state sovereignty. The dominant profession in this process is that of the state administrators. In their view, Europe is a territory within which the coordinated sovereignty of the nation states has to be asserted in order to promote their position in the world. Territorial rule and its everyday administration according to principles of deductive rationality in the general interest are their guiding principles. The underlying legitimating idea is republican universalism. This is applied both by the state administrators to justify the state’s dominant role in organizing European integration, and by opposing groups which see its principles violated by a Europe favoring the rule of interest particularism, for example ruthless capitalism at the cost of the general interest. Rightwing and left-wing opposition both refer to the principles of republicanism, one in terms of revitalizing the nation as representing the ‘true’ republic, the other in terms of the humanitarian ideals embodied in the shrine of republicanism.

3 The United States: A Nation Emerging from Voluntary Association

The United States of America has gone the farthest in the development of a pluralistic community of citizens. It has developed as a country of immigrants in which people of every race, ethnic origin, language or religion from throughout the world meet in a societal community with equal rights of citizens for all in the true sense of citizenship (Tocqueville 1945; Lipset 1963/1979; Parsons 1971: 110–55). The US American naturalization law is correspondingly very open. It is an absolute ius soli. Whoever is born on US soil is an American citizen, no matter where the parents come from and no matter if they are in the country legally or illegally. In general, the prerequisites for the naturalization of an immigrant are five-year legal residence in the country, a ‘good moral character’, knowledge of American history and the willingness to uphold the constitution (Wolf 1985: 272–3). The basic idea is ‘E pluribus unum’, as is written on the state emblem and on the dollar note. This idea was originally framed to unite the first 13 colonies into one union. It then became the guideline for integrating people from every part of the world into a new nation (see Altman and Horn 1991; Lee and Verhoeven 1996; Behr 1998; DeSipio and de la Garza 1998; Joppke 1999: 23–61, 147–85; Hagenbüchle and Raab 2000).

Historical roots The founders of the American nation were moral entrepreneurs with an intellectual vision of a promised future. Outward demarcation crystallized, at first, in the Pilgrim Fathers’ covenant with God to erect a new society of an exemplary nature for the whole world in contradistinction to the traditional order in Europe (Niebuhr 1937; Miller 1956; Winthrop 1968: 282–95; Bellah 1970). Puritan New England was constructed in 48

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contradistinction to Anglican Old England. This transatlantic process of demarcation also set the frame for the internal conflicts with regard to right construction of the new society (Hebel 2000). The second crystallization of outward demarcation was the War of Independence of 1776 to 1783, when the revolutionaries envisioned a republic of citizens sharing the belief in liberty, equal opportunity and the pursuit of happiness in sharp demarcation against the motherland (Wills 1978). The founding fathers of the republic, people like Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, Tom Paine, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison or Alexander Hamilton were men of political practice with an intellectual vision of an exemplary nation moving toward a great future (Franklin 1944; Jefferson 1950; Hamilton et al. 1961: 97–100, 280–6; Pocock 1975; Bloch 1985; Dangle 1988; Mulford 1996; Rombes 1996; Heideking 2000). This shared vision of the future had to be corroborated in the Civil War of 1861 to 1865 to be a solid basis for the construction of the nation (Parish 1975). Internal homogenization resulted particularly from the participation of the masses in the increasing wealth of the society. Fordism, with its linkage of mass production and mass consumption, was the American answer to European socialism. The community of the first white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant settlers formed the center of society which pushed the further groups of immigrants of different origin, the native Indians and the black slaves into an inferior and peripheral position. Integration through reduction of inequality, therefore, primarily meant the realization of equal opportunities for minority groups. Civic republicanism is the moral core of a nation that is time and again invoked by the movements of moral renewal against the centrifugal effects of market competition, individual achievement and group struggles for group achievement (Myrdal 1944; Hartz 1955; Ellis 1993; Smith 1997). Most recently, the intellectual movement of communitarianism against exaggerated market liberalism and group division revitalized this tradition (Bellah et al. 1985; Etzioni 1993). With ongoing immigration from different countries of origin the idea of the melting pot became the prevailing self-description of the nation. According to the idea of the melting pot, the various ethnic groups on American soil should fuse together and thus produce their own American identity. At the same time, the predominating white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant frontier identity, taken as the American identity, was used as the starting point to which newly immigrated ethnic identities should attach themselves, so that a fusion of identities of various origins might produce a constant renewal, enlargement and expansion of the American identity without changing its core.

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The prerequisites are not bad in so far as the immigrants, as a rule, come with the idea of leaving their past behind and ‘making it’ in the US. Ideally, the immigrants experience in the country of their yearning a rebirth as a new person with a new identity (Sollors 1986). Surely in no other place on earth is there greater willingness either on the part of the immigrant to acquire the identity of the target country or on the part of the native residents to absorb the influx of a multitude of identities of different origins from around the world, for the purpose of social renewal. Generally, the expectation predominates that the selection through competition and the attractiveness of the ‘American way of life’ will turn everyone who enters the country into an achievementobsessed American. However, pessimistic voices have always warned that the ever larger waves of immigration from ever more foreign countries would in fact displace the American identity with the original identities of descent and produce a plurality of more or less, poorly or well coexisting identities (Wendler 1978). The founding fathers of the American Republic were already affected by these fears: Benjamin Franklin (1961: 120–1, 234, 477–85) was worried about the infiltration of Pennsylvania by the Palatinate farmers, while Thomas Jefferson (1975) wanted immigration in order to increase prosperity, but feared a decline of the republican-democratic virtues at the hands of the immigrants who came from the absolutist monarchies of Europe. The hopes and fears collide with each other time and again even today, especially when great waves of immigration occupy the public debate. A representative of the optimistic melting pot and rebirth theory is found in the Letters from an American Farmer (1782/1904) written by the French settler Crèvecoeur (1735–1813) in which the American is described as a new person regardless of origin who operates according to new principles: the free will to achieve and to strive for achievement for the benefit of oneself and all others. A representative of the idea of the domination by foreign influences is the poem ‘Unguarded Gates’ by Thomas Bailey Aldrich published in July 1892 in the Atlantic Monthly. For Aldrich, the fear of domination by foreign influences culminates in the vision of a conquest of the country by foreign hordes, just as Rome was taken by the Goths and vandals (Bischoff and Mania 1991: 517–22; see also Sollors 1991). The National Origins Act of 1924 stopped the wave of immigration which had swept into the country in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After World War II, immigration rose again, particularly after the Immigration Reform Act 1965, which was designed to terminate the preference for immigration from Northern European

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countries. Immigration should not look at the immigrant’s country of origin, but should give each individual person the same chance. Immigration should be equally divided between countries, offering immigrant visas for 170 000 people from the Eastern and 120 000 people from the Western Hemisphere per year; no more than 20 000 should come from one and the same country. In fact, this meant a restriction for Latin Americans and Canadians for whom immigration was unrestricted before, whereas the established blocking of immigration from Asia was abandoned. The result was growing legal immigration from Asia and growing illegal immigration from Latin America, particularly from Mexico, and from Third World countries in general. The intention of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986 was a limitation of illegal immigration, but after five years’ struggle and lobbying by interested parties, particularly Hispanic organizations and employers interested in hiring Hispanics, the Reform Act turned illegal immigrants who had entered the country before 1 January 1982 into citizens, and established only minor sanctions on employers who hire illegal immigrants. The act did not reduce the wave of illegal immigration. The Legal Immigration Act 1990 tried to shift legal immigration a step away from family reunification and toward skill-based immigration. The result of the accompanying lobbying of interest groups was an extension of the total number of immigrants to 700 000 for the first three years, and to 675 000 afterwards, so that no interested group suffered a sensitive reduction in immigration quota. As immigration policies were driven toward expanding quotas by the collaboration of the lobbying activities of immigrant groups and the liberal universalist philosophy of academics and intellectuals, jurisdiction on immigration law by the courts proceeded along the line of guaranteeing the rights of the immigrants as individual persons who should not be discriminated against. Therefore, in a number of decisions, courts ruled in favor of immigrants having the same right to due process and the same entitlement to education and welfare benefits as US citizens. Such judgments were in favor of legal permanent residents, illegal immigrants and asylum seekers alike. A particularly famous judgment was that made by the Supreme Court in the Plyler v. Doe case (1982) ruling that a Texas statute which barred illegal immigrants from free public education was invalid (Schuck 1984: 58; Joppke 1999: 46). On the basis of this liberal policy of open doors, and the corresponding legal reasoning in favor of the rights of individual persons independent of their citizen status, about 15.5 million legal immigrants settled in the country between 1971 and 1993. According to

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estimates, the number of illegal immigrants was 3 to 4 million in 1993, as much as ten years before (Papademetriou 1993: 325, cited by Joppke 1999: 38). A liberal philosophy of equal opportunity for everybody in a country with a mission for individual achievement, intensified lobbying activities of immigrant organizations and a strong legal system with courts used to fight discrimination and to pursue the aim of granting equal rights to every single person independent of his or her citizen status based on a strong liberal constitution – these were the major forces which contributed to the continuous reproduction of America as ‘a nation of immigrants,’ as John F. Kennedy (1958) put it in a book published in1958 in order to open the doors for immigrants from non-Protestant European countries (Joppke 1999: 23–61). These politics of open doors were, however, accompanied by growing fears in the wider public. According to Gallup polls, the percentage of people wishing to see immigration decrease rose from 33 in 1965 to 42 in 1977, 49 in 1986 and 65 in 1993 (Roll Call, 15 July 1993, cited by Joppke 1999: 54). Such fears led to initiatives aiming at a reduction of immigration. Proposition 187, passed by Californian voters to bar illegal immigrants from using public services, became most prominent. Addressed to such intentions, Congress passed the Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act 1996. Along with the Welfare Reform Act of the same year, the new immigration law limits the access of legal and illegal immigrants to welfare benefits and requires an income 125 per cent above the poverty line from sponsors of family immigrants. Nevertheless, the strength of liberal philosophy, the legal protection of the individual person and the client politics of immigrant organizations still work for open doors (Legonsky 1987; Karst 1989; Neumann 1996; Joppke 1999: 54–60). Today the discussion concentrates on the question of AngloAmerican versus ethnically diversified education in the schools and colleges. Should other languages – mainly Spanish – be given equal status, and should the curriculum reflect the ethnic plurality of the society or should it hold on to the previous dominance of the AngloAmerican language and culture? On the one hand, the loss of national identity and integration is feared if the curriculum is ethnically and culturally diversified. On the other hand, the inequality of opportunity also is criticized which results from the retention of the previous curriculum for the non-Anglo-Americans. There is a battle going on between conservative positions as articulated by Arthur Schlesinger Jr, arguing that the ‘cult of ethnicity’ will break the republic apart (Schlesinger 1992), and radical positions of multiculturalism like that

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of Marion Young, who wants the different groups to grant each other the space for pursuing their own lifestyles (Young 1990). The American societal community has drastically changed its face in regard to the various groups which have composed it since its beginning until today. Of the 248.710 million inhabitants in 1990, 80.3 per cent were white, 12.1 per cent black, 0.8 per cent Indian, Inuit or Aleut, 2.9 per cent Asiatic or pacific and 3.9 per cent of other racial backgrounds. Among the enumerated races, 9 per cent were calculated as having a Hispanic heritage (native tongue of recent ancestors). All the groups differentiate themselves again in a multitude of subgroups (US Bureau of the Census 1992a: 17). Today, the US is the most ethnically diversed country in the world. It has carried out the biggest social experiment in living together in a community that has ever been undertaken on this planet (see generally US Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997; Gibson and Lennon 1999). However, here too claims and reality are often poles apart. While from 1789 it took almost two hundred years for the black population to actually be given all formal rights, in regard to the material realization of these rights in everyday living together things look quite different, with reality lagging far behind the law (Blauner 1989). In fact, society looks like a collection of islands of homogeneous racial and ethnic groups which are also arranged according to their income level. At any rate, neighborhoods are formed that way. Where the different groups have to exist very close to each other – as in the big cities – and the waves of immigration come especially quickly one after the other, conflicts increase tremendously. Entire groups of the population eke out an existence in poverty. In recent international comparisons the difference of income between highest and lowest positions has been greatest in the US, the top 10 per cent having 5.9 times more than the 10 per cent at the bottom, compared with 3.79 in Great Britain, 3.48 in France and 3.0 in West Germany according to OECD-Data from 1995 (Hradil 1997: 493). The mean income of blacks was about 68 per cent of the mean income of non-Hispanic whites in 1980, and by 1990 it had even dropped to 65 per cent. Hispanic income is at 75 per cent, while native-born Asian income rose from 115 to 121 per cent between 1980 and 1990 and foreign-born Asian from 106 to 111. Mean white income was $35 119 in 1980 and $39 030 in 1990 (Farley 1996; 258). The percentage of people living below the poverty line dropped down from 24 per cent in 1960 to 11 per cent in 1973, to go up again to 15 per cent in 1983 and to oscillate after the mid-eighties between 13 and 15 per cent. For blacks the percentage of poor people fell from 90 per cent in the

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1940s to 31 and 30 per cent in the seventies, then rose again in the eighties and nineties to 38 per cent (Farley 1996: 255). On the average, 12.1 per cent of the students dropped out of high school in 1990; among the non-Hispanic Afro-Americans this was 13.2 per cent, among Hispanics 32.4 per cent. In the inner-city ghettos a dropout rate of 60 per cent was reached. In 1993, 21 per cent of the children lived below the poverty line in the US, 44 per cent of them being black, 37.9 per cent latinos and 16.2 per cent white, which is way above West European scores ranging between 3 and 10 per cent. The number one cause of death among blacks between the ages of 15 and 24 is murder. On any day of the year in 1991, 42 per cent of the black population of Washington between the ages of 18 and 35 years were in prison, on probation, awaiting trial or fleeing from a warrant for their arrest. The ‘subculture of violence’ has become a standard research topic of American sociology (Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967; Messner 1983; Wilson 1990; Caplow et al. 1991: 524; Huff-Corzine et al. 1991; US Bureau of the Census 1992b: 83, 85, 90, 160, 456; Gans 1995; Donziger 1996: 29). Drug dealing and gang criminality expand rapidly and monopolize whole parts of the city. The more different ethnic groups come in contact with each other, the more intensely they differentiate themselves from each other and the more severe the conflicts become. With such close contact, peaceful coexistence is more difficult than when people live further apart and each can avoid others if they want to.

Integration of minorities The struggle of racial and ethnic groups for their social position is associated with the American idea of success in competition with others; however, it undermines the idea that equal rights of citizens should be available to all individuals regardless of their previous group membership. In the nineties, conflicts radicalized and led to claims for multiculturalism in the sense of assigning rights on the basis of group membership which implies the deindividualization and the submission of the human individual to a pre-established group identity. The corresponding struggle between individualist pluralism and collectivist multiculturalism is still going on. We can see here that even in a society that is the most advanced as regards the construction of citizenship independently of origin and particularistic group, membership is not free from attempts to return to more primordial forms of belonging (Glazer 1987; Walzer 1994; Fischer et al. 1997; Schmidt 1997; Smelser and Alexander 1999; Rubio-Marin 2000).

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In the process of diversification in origin, the melting pot idea had been first challenged by the idea of cultural pluralism (Kallen 1956; Gordon 1964; Glazer and Moynihan 1970). According to this idea, America is no longer a melting pot which produces the American out of a variety of national origins, but a nation which has become pluralistic and continues to be so in racial, ethnic, national and religious terms. The people of different origins do not merge in one societal community, but maintain their community of origin on American soil so that America is a whole bunch of communities. The positive interpretation of this development argues that the nation’s diversity is a strength that should be acknowledged and supported. Nevertheless, the argument for cultural pluralism maintained the idea of universalism in terms of integrating the plurality of communities by a basic consensus embodied in the constitution with its Bill of Rights. At the core of this consensus is the belief that individual persons and not groups are the bearers of rights. This belief is challenged by radical multiculturalism, which intends to attribute rights on the basis of group membership. This change toward group rights has originated from the civil rights movement and the institutionalization of Affirmative Action as a program designed to remedy past discrimination of blacks. When this federal program was introduced in 1965, it was designed to promote the individual achievement of blacks. Subsequently, however, the program became the tool of any group that claimed past discrimination in order to obtain special quotas in admissions to schools, colleges and universities, or to have access to public administration and governmental contracting with private firms. This trend was supported, on the one hand, by the political system keeping open its doors to the lobbying activities of interest organizations – client politics – and, on the other hand, by the courts of a strong legal system with a strong liberal constitution, which are devoted to abandoning discrimination. In this process, society has become ‘racialized’ to a degree unknown before. Because the black community served as a model, lobbying worked on the listing of racial groups in the census in order to make claims on the basis of a discriminated race. In this process, people were made aware of their racial status who had never bothered about it before. Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, Inuits and Aleuts constitute racial groups with primary significance for the individuals who constitute them, though those categories do not reflect real communities. The same goes for the category of gender and the differentiation of men and women. Though there is always social construction at work, the turn towards the paradigm of race gives preference to a categorization that

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bears the mark of involuntariness and unchangeability, more than that of differentiation according to ethnicity and certainly more than that of differentiation according to national origin, religion or class. The race paradigm is producing a seemingly unremovable segregation that dominates over any other possible distinction and penetrates every area of social life (Joppke 1999: 150–3). In the meantime, the idea of cultural pluralism, once opposed to the melting pot ideal, has become the credo of liberals who oppose radical multiculturalism in favor of the revitalization of individualism, individual rights and individual achievement (Glazer 1997). In a number of rulings, the Supreme Court has set limits on Affirmative Action inasmuch as it implies ‘reverse’ discrimination, violates the rights of individual persons and hinders their individual achievement. The first case was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke in 1978, when the court ruled that it was not correct to run an admission program which leads to the exclusion of a candidate with higher scores than others who were admitted. In City of Richmond v. J.R. Croson Co. (1989), the court decided against a program of local government contracting which gave less competitive minority firms a preference over more competitive white firms. A similar conclusion was drawn in Adarand Construction v. Pena (1995) with regard to the federal government. The court requires strict scrutiny in the application of Affirmative Action so that it does not end in reverse discrimination (Horwitz 1993: 107; Eastland 1996: 214; Joppke 1999: 147–185). We can expect that the tension between constitutionally guaranteed individualism and the claimsmaking remedy of discrimination on the basis of group membership will continue to engage the country. Thus the nation which has based its origin on the claim of purely individual association has undergone a remarkable transformation toward a nation of racial groups, which claim groups rights to the disadvantage of individual liberty and achievement. This is particularly an image of the nation created by the intellectual leaders of group rights assignment. In everyday life, immigrant groups are still primarily networks which help to integrate the newcomers into the larger society. And such real-life immigrant communities are organized according to national origin and not according to an artificially constructed racial category (Joppke 1999: 182–5). As a society of immigration, the United States has been externally more inclusive than any other country in the world. Together with the prevailing liberal philosophy, this external inclusiveness contributed to the limitation of internal inclusion in terms of welfare provisions for equality of results. There is more inequality of income and more

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determination of living standards by individual achievement on the market in the United States than in the European welfare states (EspingAndersen 1990). Incoming immigrants have always exerted enormous pressure on the lower income groups and on small business people. Korean and Vietnamese immigrants in Los Angeles have, for example, extinguished former small black business. The consolidation of a black underclass in the inner cities with no hope for any achievement must at least partly be explained by the intensification of economic competition resulting from steady immigration. It is, therefore, no surprise that economic competition strengthened by immigration has also led to a sharpening political conflict on the access to measures of Affirmative Action between minorities as well as between minorities and the white majority. The paradoxical result of the country’s open doors based on its mission for offering equal chances of achievement to every individual from anywhere in the world, and the concentration of policies on Affirmative Action in order to further the chances of individuals thus far handicapped, is its fragmentation into racial and ethnic groups which have gained primacy over the individual person. The nation of individual citizens, who build a new community independent of their origin, has given way to a considerable degree to a compartmentalized nation of racial and ethnic groups which fight for the demarcation of group rights at the cost of national unity and individual autonomy. The intensified struggle for achievement makes the group a safe choice for improving one’s position under the umbrella of Affirmative Action. Once established, minority organizations maintain themselves because of the benefits they provide for leaders as well as rank-and-file members. Because they perceive the world in categories of group membership, their policy promotes group rights and works against individual autonomy. The incoming immigrants lean towards ties with people who share with them their roots of descent, so that there is a continuously working force that strengthens minority networks, and these networks are the nurturing basis of minority organizations. This unique group structure has also contributed to the fact that inequality is more salient in terms of race, ethnicity and gender than in terms of class and that there has never been a successful labor movement promoting socialism in the United States.

Integration into the world: the foremost transnational nation When John Winthrop sailed to the shores of New England on the Arbella from Old England in 1630 to establish the Massachusetts Bay

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Colony, he preached to his fellow pilgrims that their undertaking would be like a city on the hill, of exemplary character before the eyes of God and the whole world (Winthrop 1968: 295). This missionary character has remained crucial for the American nation’s relations to the world. On the one hand, it is open to everybody who is willing to share the great project at the frontier of humankind. Whatever resistance against immigrants there has been on the part of those who had settled, the foundation by immigration and the myths of frontier and mission along with their transmission to the constitution of the republic have always worked as strong forces in favor of opening doors for immigration. The same is true for America’s missionary role in the world in promoting the principles of freedom and democracy against tendencies to isolationism (Münch 2001: 223–49). With ongoing immigration, the American nation represents the whole world in itself, linking nationality and transnationality under one roof. The transnational integration of the society is promoted by a multitude of individual links across borders. Ultimately, it is driven by the special American promotion of free world trade and the corresponding growth of economic transactions and division of labor as well as by the myriad of actors involved in international proceedings: president, congress and lots of non-governmental organizations. In this process, transnational integration is modeled as a process of individual relationships in networks and not as a process of supranational state-building. At present, the United States is the foremost champion of liberalizing trade across borders. With exports amounting to around 11 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and imports to around 12.5 per cent of the GDP, and thus a deficit in foreign trade, the United States is interested in opening doors for its products not only in Asia, particularly Japan and China, but also in Europe. Negotiations with Japan and China have been intensified, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been concluded, the Uruguay round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been finalized and the World Trade Organization (WTO) instituted, all of them with special impetus from the United States. Ultimately, enterprises investing in developing countries are advised to apply a moral code of conduct with respect both to the rights of their employees and to the consequences for the environment that result from their activities. Moreover, being the one single superpower in the world after the end of the cold war, the United States has carried out its missionary role in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. What is not on the agenda, however, is supranational institution-building,

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for this does not fit the philosophy of a liberal global society driven by market competition, market exchange and the international division of labor. From such a point of view, too much global institution-building would fetter the liberating and peace-keeping powers of international trade. In other words, a good global society will emerge from free trade and the free circulation of information. As the American polity was itself designed by the founding fathers to avoid any concentration of power in one pair of hands, the global society too should conform to this ideal. The United States sees itself in a better position confronting the effects of globalization than the European nation states. The latter have had to question and reorganize their welfare systems, which were based on the principles of strong internal inclusion and external exclusiveness. The United States, on the other hand, can simply carry on with its philosophy of external inclusiveness accompanied by weak internal inclusion and introduce this philosophy as a model for organizing global society and even the restructuring of the European nation states. This is, indeed, the prevailing definition of the situation that pushes opposing statements in favor of a transmission of European welfare arrangements across the Atlantic to America into the background. Being the foremost transnational nation, America claims to be the model for a transnational society on the global level (Proff 1994; Medick-Krakau 1995; Schweigler 1998).

The market model of integration The constructors of the American idea of the nation and American collective identity have been moral entrepreneurs who acted according to an intellectual vision and moral mission in the extraordinary situation of a new beginning that should be of exemplary character for the whole world, including the Old World too. The Puritan pilgrims acted thus when building the New England colonies, as did the founding fathers of the republic in the War of American Independence against the British crown and when founding the United States and inaugurating the constitution. For them, American life has always been at the frontier, carrying out the moral mission of a good society that is devoted to the ideals of liberty and equality of opportunity for everybody. The nation is, therefore, a creation made by the association of individuals who have left behind their homeland origins in order to build the ‘first new nation’. Its collective identity is represented by the common commitment to its moral mission. The promotion of individual happiness is rooted in collective commitment, and the building of a

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good society needs the contribution of every single individual. In this way, collectivism and individualism do not contradict but rather support each other. The nation and its collective identity are nothing historically given, but something that is under permanent construction. Self-reflection on what the nation stands for is closely related to this permanent construction process. This is particularly the case with regard to the integration of immigrants and with regard to the transnational integration of the United States in world society. The American idea of the nation emerging from voluntary association is associated with a market model of integrating immigrants in the society and of the integration of the United States into institutions of international cooperation. In the United States, the nation originated from the voluntary association of people who left their home countries in order to build up a new nation. The birth of the nation was the war of the 13 colonies against the motherland and the establishment of the United States with the constitution as the sacred embodiment of the shared beliefs in individual rights and equal opportunities. The core of the nation was the community of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. This understanding of the nation was challenged by increasing immigration of people who were neither Anglo-Saxon nor Protestant and, later on, not even white. The first step toward a new framing of the nation was the idea of the melting pot, the second step the idea of cultural pluralism, the third one the idea of multiculturalism. Integration of immigrants The integration of immigrants into the nation proceeds on several levels. There is, first of all, the level of granting formal citizenship rights; second, there is the level of a strong legal system devoted to guarding the constitutionally guaranteed rights not only of citizens but also of other permanent and temporary residents; third, there is the level of societal self-organization and participation in political decision-making through lobbying by minority organizations; in fourth place comes the inclusion of newcomers in the networks of their minority; fifth, there is the strategic use of Affirmative Action; and sixth, the dynamics of competition for achievement, which leads the immigrant beyond his or her minority group with growing relationships across minority boundaries. Radical multiculturalism with its claim to group rights is a challenge to this so far working model of integration, but as long as there are open chances for individual achievement, radical multiculturalism will be more a matter of intellectual rhetoric and less a matter of real life.

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In a comparative perspective, the market serves as the primary vehicle for integrating immigrants into the society in the United States. Access to the market is most important. This focus on the market makes integration a matter of seizing chances for success and a matter of competition with members of the white majority as well as members of the other minorities. In the best case, integration is realized through market achievement, which opens the doors to all other areas of societal life: schools, colleges, universities, administrations, agencies, associations, families and so on. As there is little bureaucratic control of employment, the labor market is flexible enough to provide a wide range of chances for legal and illegal immigrants, from jobs with earnings below the poverty line up to jobs for well-paid specialists. Limited welfare provisions and little bureaucratic control of the labor market helped to open the country to successive waves of legal and illegal immigrants whose integration was left to the market. This type of integration does not provoke as much rejection of immigrants by those who have been in the country for generations as in the European welfare states. In fact, it does not need to extend strong national solidarity to newcomers but counts on individual achievement only, within a network of individuals having relatively weak ties of national solidarity. Failure of integration is also individualized. It is seen not as a failure of the receiving population, but as one of either too strongly closed markets or too little effort to achieve by the individual immigrant. The negative side of integration through market achievement is, therefore, not collective response in terms of rebellion, but the marginalization of the poor and the less competitive. Marginalization does not occur along minority lines, so that minority politics cannot be interpreted as a collective reaction to collective marginalization. The latter is much more an individual fate that occurs across the boundaries of minority groups. Immigration and the integration of immigrants together are, first of all, a battlefield for a variety of lobbying interest groups – various minority organizations, civil rights organizations, trade unions and employer organizations; a few examples are the black National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), the Hispanic National Council of La Raza (NCLR), the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asian Pacific Americans, the American Jewish Congress, the American Indian Movement, the National Immigration Forum, the Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform (FAIR), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Association of

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Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Business, the trade union center AFL-CIO and the American Farm Bureau Federation, all of which are very active (see, for example, NCLR 1992, 1999; National Immigration Forum 2000). A good illustration of what occurs on that battlefield is provided by the history of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (ICRA) 1986; its first draft was debated in 1982, but it was only after a lengthy process of toing and froing, dead ends, revigoration and changes according to the lobbying activities of the various interest groups that it was eventually passed in November 1986. Politics in favor of and against immigrants and their integration spreads out to almost all areas of social life. The US Commission on Immigration Reform is a battlefield for immigration policies on the federal level (see, for example, US Commission on Immigration Reform 1995). However, a number of committees and subcommittees of the Senate and the House of Representatives touched by immigration policies are also part of this struggle. There are the various offices in charge of Affirmative Action at federal, state and local levels, and the respective program in governmental administrations, schools, universities and private enterprises to care for the admission, appointment or contracting of minority groups. There are the Statistical Directive 15 of the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB), defining racial and ethnic categories on federal forms and statistics, and the US Bureau of the Census that gathers information on racial and ethnic terms. Both have become objects of lobbying activities in order to promote racial and ethnic categorization in favor of granting access to Affirmative Action claims. There are schools that have to use schoolbooks and carry out curricula in strict racial and ethnic balance; universities that have to apply racially and ethnically balanced admission programs for the students and appointment programs for their staff and have to offer special study and research programs dealing with minorities. Of crucial importance are the courts that are in charge of guarding constitutional rights and are thus important battlefields for claiming and enforcing the rights of minority groups. Committees that are built in order to produce solutions to conflicts do not simply bring together experts in a specific subject matter, but also to a considerable degree provide fora for racial and ethnic activists. Voting districts are objects of struggles for reorganization so that minorities can become majorities; the result is an increasing number of small single-member districts with representatives responsible to specific racial or ethnic constituencies (Joppke 1999: 22–61, 147–85).

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Compared with the European welfare states, the network of actors who operate in the field of integration policies is characterized by a great plurality of levels, arenas and participants so that integration is a multilevel and multi-arena battlefield of competition for the advancement of rights and interests, always involving the client politics of lobbying for special interests and also the entrepreneurial politics of mobilizing companions to gather money and votes, as well as appeals to the public at large when promoting one’s case in terms of equal opportunities for all. Originally, the programme of Affirmative Action was introduced in 1965 in order to put an end to the historically transmitted inequality of opportunity for blacks. In the further process, however, it became the major tool for every minority to improve its chances of achievement. In extreme form it turned out to be a means of assigning group rights at the cost of individual equality of opportunity. In fact, the program actually furthered the chances of the active and powerful members of the groups to the cost of the less active and less powerful, who became marginalized across group boundaries to form a category of people that is absent from the roster of struggles for ethnic equality and that lacks any powerful organization or representation in the political battlefield. The ethnic framing of the discourse on inequality has contributed to the marginalization of the weak and poor, because public attention was drawn away from inequality in terms of social class in favor of inequality in terms of ethnicity. Thus, since the mid-seventies, both class inequality and the number of people living below the poverty line have increased (Behr 1998: 176–82). Income inequality has always been higher in the United States than in the European welfare states. In recent years, it has also grown in states with deregulated markets and industrial relations, particularly in Britain, but not as much as in the United States. Concentration on ethnic inequality is but an additional force that combines with the forces of less restricted markets in the United States as compared to the European welfare states. The basic institutional rules that guide integration are equality of opportunity and fairness in competition for chances of achievement. This framing of the situation calls for individual empowerment or strong interest group organization, with effective client politics and lobbying activities as well as entrepreneurial politics in order to mobilize support. The most important professions in this battlefield of competition for achievement are lawyers, lobbyists and political entrepreneurs. The function of the lawyer is to use every legal means for the promotion of individual rights, that of the lobbyist to open every important political

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door in order to get access to political decision-making, and that of the political entrepreneur to see integration as a field for mobilizing private and public support for the furthering of a particular group’s access to market achievement. The idea of legitimation behind this model of integration is that of a liberal society that is open to everybody and should guarantee everybody equal opportunities for individual achievement. What is particularly remarkable is the fact that the United States represents a model of social integration that combines external inclusiveness and limited internal inclusion – that is, greater internal inequality of achievement in contradistinction to the European welfare states, which have combined strong internal inclusion and much more substantial equality with external exclusiveness (Faist 1996). The United States has established considerably more transnational links via immigration than any other country in the world. The nation represents the whole world in a nutshell and is, therefore, the new nation par excellence, combining national unity and transnational linkages in an exemplary way. However, for the foreseeable future, this type of linking nationality and transnationality will remain unique and will not be replicated by other countries. The European welfare states will still be shaped by their majorities of natives, with immigrant minorities of up to 10 per cent or slightly more. This allows for some continuation with the program of external exclusiveness and strong internal inclusion. Nevertheless, European integration, globalization and immigration exert pressures of change toward more external inclusiveness, which implies greater internal differentiation and inequality, that is a bit weaker internal inclusion. Integration into the world If we look at the transnational integration of American society into networks of international cooperation, we see a similar model of integration at work. There is, first of all, the strong belief that free world trade will improve everybody’s chances in the world, so that economic transactions will be the major vehicle of transnational integration. In this view, there is no need for anything like supranational government, either for the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) or for the world as a whole. From the point of view of a neoconservative economic philosophy, simply the smooth functioning of institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the NATO security alliance, the UN security council, the OECD or the G7 coordination network is needed to organize worldwide integration, which also follows the model of market achievement.

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The network of actors involved in this integration process is typically pluralistic, including not only the president but also both houses of Congress, as well as non-governmental organizations seeking to influence the process; the public is of greater importance and because of the Freedom of Information Act, has better access to decision-making in foreign affairs than in any other country, so that American foreign policy is often difficult to predict. The basic institutional rule is external and internal equality of opportunity and fairness in competition for achievement. This can be a chance for thus far disadvantaged groups, but it can also further the interests of perfectly organized particularistic groups to the detriment of people otherwise marginalized. The professions most active in this field of competition on foreign affairs are, once again, lawyers, lobbyists and political entrepreneurs promoting the interests of their clients. Behind this model of transnational integration, we can recognize once more the image of a liberal world society providing the idea of legitimation, which gives everybody his or her chance to achieve.

4 Germany: A Nation Emerging from Ethnic and Cultural Heritage

How do the Germans conceive of themselves, what is their understanding of nation and citizenship, how do they relate to other people, how do they see their role in the European Union and how are they perceived by other people? These are the questions which come up when we want to know what makes the specific German nation and identity; I will deal with them in six steps. First, I will look back to the formation of the idea of the German nation and of German identity in the historical process from the German Enlightenment, beginning in the 1770s, to the founding of the nation state in 1871 and to the further shaping of this idea by the Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic and the regime of Nazism. Then I will ask how the Germans related themselves to their nation and their identity after the defeat of the Nazi regime and after their separation in two states; and I will deal with the question how the Germans’ view of Nazism developed in the postwar decades from the fifties to the nineties. Afterwards, we will look into how the Germans’ values and their commitment to democracy have changed in the postwar decades. The topic of the next step will be the Germans’ relation to immigrants to their country. Later, we will turn to the Germans’ attitude toward the European Union. Finally, I will point out how the German culturalist and legalist integration model works (Plessner 1959; Dahrendorf 1968/71; Wehler 1987a,b; James 1989; Dumont 1991; Brubaker 1992; Dann 1993: 50–84; Doering-Manteuffel 1993; Giesen 1993; Kallscheuer and Leggewie 1994; Wehler 1995; Behr 1998; Rieger 1998; Joppke 1999; Rubio-Marin 2000).

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Historical roots Patriotism At the time when the Western European nation states of Spain, Britain, France and the Netherlands emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Germany remained divided into a plurality of individual states. There was no centralization of power and no corresponding establishment of an embracing political unit on a larger territory. The people were subjects of a monarch who exerted absolute power on his territory and they conceived of themselves as members of local, regional and state units but not as members of a larger unit of ‘Germans’ or ‘Germany’. The Holy Roman Empire of German Nation, created in the Middle Ages and formally existing until 1806, after its confirmation in 1648, did not penetrate the populations of individual states. It was a nation for the élites only who were able to communicate across the borders of the individual states (Conze 1963: 17–36). It was Martin Luther with his translation of the Bible into the German language who created a common language for the German people beyond their regional and local dialects and against the ruling Latin language as the means of communication of the clergy. However, Luther divided the Germans in religious terms. The religious split remained an obstacle for German unity up to the building of the first German nation state in 1871 (Rovan 1983: 237–40). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries France established a political and cultural hegemony on the European continent. This situation changed in the second half of the eighteenth century. There emerged an élite of writers who began to speak for the value of the German language and German culture against the French language and culture then dominating at the courts of the German kings and principalities. The language and culture of the aristocracy were French. According to the French ideas of the Enlightenment the German writers longed for the liberation of their own language and culture and claimed equal rights for any culture. According to their claim every language and culture has its own character and beauty, which deserve to be preserved and cultivated in their own right. Johann Gottfried Herder was the foremost one to argue in this way, celebrating this view in his collection of Volkslieder (folksongs) and in his articles on ‘German character and art’ (Herder 1891b). The movement for German language makes patriotism a central virtue. Patriotism establishes a link between people across the borders of the individual states. It creates a feeling of commonality between

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the people who still belong to different states, and it marks a difference between people who have a language and culture in common and those people who are united by other languages and culture. This patriotism of the German writers was not conceived in narrow particularistic terms. It rejected the dull celebration of Germanhood as well as the loss of the bonds of a common culture in an empty cosmopolitanism. The writers wanted their patriotism to be an educated and enlightened link between primordial Germanhood and an all-embracing cosmopolitanism. It was not understood as a rejection of cosmopolitanism but as a substantial component part of it. For Herder every language and every culture were valuable in their own right. The cultivation of one’s own language and culture would have to fit in a plurality of languages and cultures. True cosmopolitanism would not subject the world to the domination of one language and culture, but would acknowledge the right of any other language and culture and thus argue for a world of pluralism in languages and cultures (Herder 1891a,c, 1892). Because of this linking of patriotism and cosmopolitanism, drawing a demarcation line between the German and the then dominating French language and culture did not imply a sense of superiority. In the first instance, it was a line of defense in order to give the right of development to German language and culture. In the second instance, it was a line of comparison. By way of comparing French and German language, literature and arts one was enabled to understand the unique character and beauty of each one the better. Wilhelm von Humboldt and Goethe interpreted the comparison between French and German literature in this way. According to their view the growing conversation between the writers of different languages would contribute to a growing knowledge of the unique characters of the different national literatures. On the one hand, the nations would be enabled to find out what their specific identity is. On the other, they would be led to learn from one another. An all-embracing European civilization would emerge out of mutual comparison and learning. However, as Humboldt recognizes, this process would also contribute to a reflected individuation and mutual distinction between the different nations. Within the merging European civilization the different national cultures would try to survive as distinct cultures and would emphasize those qualities which made them unique and distinct. Goethe developed his notion of world literature in this context. In the process of mutual comparison, correction and learning, each different national literature would discover the way to its unique character and strength and learn to acknowledge the

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worth of other national literatures as measures for comparison and correction. Thus there would be a sense of one’s national identity, alongside the sense for a wider civilization of world literature. The national identity did not exist in and for itself, but only in its link with cosmopolitanism, with a sense of world citizenship (Bratranek 1876; Humboldt 1904/1968a: 387–99, 1905/1968b, 1905/1968c, 1907/1968d; Goethe 1953: 269, 361–4, 1900: 344; Schrimpf 1968; Oesterle 1991). Independently of this linkage of the idea of the German nation to cosmopolitanism, we have to draw a distinction here toward the Western European notions of the nation as they developed in Spain, Britain and France. There the demarcation line was political. The Spanish, British and French nations emerged in the process of state-building as a notion for the people who made up the population of greater states which included different people of different languages and culture formerly belonging to different smaller political units. Those nations were creations of state-builders who established a growing commonality between culturally different people by submitting them to one political, administrative and legal rule and to one educational system. Cultural homogenization came after political centralization by way of internal colonization in the process of making one language the dominating one, used in schools and in the administration of the country. The involvement of the people in external warfare contributed to the strengthening of internal bonds and to the identification of the people with the larger political unit. The same is true for the democratization of the political rule which was linked in its beginning to the growing involvement of the people in warfare. The more the identification with the nation state is founded on democratic rule the more Fustel de Coulanges’s (1870) argument in favor of a French Alsace-Lorraine will be right as against Theodor Mommsen’s justification of a German one in terms of common language and culture (Alff 1976: 27–41). And we can say with Ernest Renan (1882/1947: 904) that the existence of a nation is indeed a plebiscite day by day. In sharp distinction to this political notion of the nation, the German writers of the Enlightenment shaped a completely different cultural idea of the nation. As Friedrich Meinecke (1907/1962: 10) put it, the German idea of the nation was the ‘culture nation’, as distinct from the Western ‘state nation’ (Kohn 1962: 309–314, 550–3). The criterion of belonging to the culture nation is common language and culture. The criterion of belonging to the state nation is submission to one political rule – in absolutist terms – or the political will to maintain a common political rule – in democratic terms (Brubaker 1992: 50–72).

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Thus the German writers invented a German nation well before a German state was founded. And they introduced a criterion for being a nation that reached out across political boundaries. In the competition of the European states for supremacy, or at least for the maintenance of their positions, which sharpened in the nineteenth century, the cultural idea of the nation was used as an instrument for legitimizing the building of a unified German nation state according to the boundaries of language and culture. After the establishment of the German nation state it became a legitimating instrument for the rejection of people who do not fulfill the criterion of language and culture. This was the beginning of the so-called German ‘Sonderweg’ (‘special way’) to modernity (Plessner 1959; Bracher 1982; Schulze 1985; Grebing 1986; Münch 1986/1993a: 683–846). If we like, we can therefore say that the linkage between patriotism and cosmopolitanism was precarious in the eighteenth century and, as it were, we can even read some of the aggressive nationalism coming up in 1789 and, particularly, with the mobilization against Napoleon’s invasion of German lands, into parts of the literature praising German language and culture (Blitz 2000). However, the more we do that, the more we overlook the major difference between eighteenth-century patriotism and nineteenthcentury nationalism. The historical circumstances in which the German idea of the nation took shape can easily be recognized. While the constructors of the Spanish, British and French notions of the nation were statesmen, the constructors of the German idea of the nation were writers who wanted to claim equal rights for their own language in competition with the then dominant French. They were the spearhead of an educated bourgeoisie that was growing considerably in numbers in the eighteenth century, as each absolutist principality in the individual states expanded its administrations in order to secure its rule by penetrating the whole state with loyal civil servants. These civil servants had to be educated in state-controlled educational institutions, particularly in universities, which greatly outnumbered the French and British ones. This growing, educated bourgeoisie had to be geographically mobile and therefore had few personal links with the local petite bourgeoisie of artisans and small tradesmen. An also less locally rooted stratum of the bourgeoisie was built up by immigrants who were admitted after the Thirty Years War had depopulated large parts of the German states. In particular, French Huguenots, who fled from persecution, found a new place to live in German cities. The immigrants contributed considerably to the

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establishment of a new bourgeoisie of large tradesmen, bankers and manufacturers. Very often they lived on privileges granted by the principality, were submitted to special legal orders and were exempted from tax and military service. This legal separation was accompanied by social separation. Thus the bourgeoisie was divided into the petite bourgeoisie of artisans and small tradesmen, the well-to-do bourgeoisie of businessmen, bankers and manufacturers and the educated bourgeoisie of civil servants, teachers, professors, priests, lawyers and physicians. The writers were part of the educated élite. Some of them were civil servants, teachers or professors, while others lived from their writings, or on teaching in private households, or were assisted by private patrons. The educated bourgeoisie began to play a leading role. In distinction from the two other groups of the bourgeoisie it was closer to the power of the ruling principalities. Compared with the aristocracy, it was more open to the changes resulting from the Enlightenment and from the industrial and democratic revolutions. Thus it became the first modernizing élite in the German states. What came to be called ‘enlightened absolutism’, with its legal and educational reforms, was the work of that educated bourgeoisie. Because it was not linked with the bourgeoisie of artisans, businessmen and manufacturers – as it was much more the case in Britain and France – and because it was in loyal service to the ruling principalities, the German educated élite in the second half of the eighteenth century did not lead a broad movement toward political unification and democratic revolution. Instead, it was engaged in reforming the absolutist states by building legal codes – foremost the Allgemeine Preussische Landrecht (General Prussian Country Law) of 1794 – and establishing educational institutions. Beyond that, it was involved in the movement that created the German idea of the culture nation under the leadership of the writers who fought for respecting their own language. New associations emerged: Vereine (clubs) for the cultivation of patriotism, education, scholarship and literature. Between 1780 and 1800, 370 Lesegesellschaften (reading societies) were founded. These associations established bonds between the mobile educated people and allowed for the diffusion of literature with its message, particularly the message of patriotism (Kaiser 1961; Engelsing 1974; Haferkorn 1974; Nipperdey 1976b; Dann 1981; Prignitz 1981; Welke 1981; van Dülmen 1986; Lepsius 1987; Rüschemeyer 1987; Schmitt-Sasse 1987; Vierhaus 1987; Hughes 1988: 30–54; Tenbruck 1989; Wehler 1989; Woesler 1989; Giesen and Junge 1991; Giesen 1993: 102–29).

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Romanticism After the first shaping of the German idea of the nation by the movement of writers of the German Enlightenment and neoclassicism from Herder to Humboldt and Goethe, that idea was additionally shaped by the movements which followed later on under different historical circumstances. Next came the Romantic movement toward the end of the eighteenth century and into the beginning of the nineteenth (Kluckhohn 1958). Friedrich von Schlegel (1972; 1984; 411–728) and Novalis (1983) were spokesmen of the Romantic movement who gave the idea of the German nation an aesthetic turn; they not only compared German and French culture but also began to see in German culture the carrier of truth, morality and beauty, whereas French culture stood for the superficial and the untrue, for immorality, pretension, business and narcissism. The German became the door to what was called the Erhabene (sublime) that could only be grasped by being enlightened and levied on a higher position of perceiving, understanding and feeling. One turned inside into oneself and recognized in oneself the whole world, with which one united. In this process German culture showed the way to an all-embracing European or even world culture. Novalis dreamed of the return of Christian universalism into which the national cultures would be integrated. Schlegel wished in a first view the integration of the nation states into a world republic; in a second he looked for their submission to the universal rule of a Kaisertum (empire) for which German culture would provide the spiritual foundations. German culture would be better prepared for that role than the French culture’s expansion through Napoleon’s empire, which was motivated mainly by interest in establishing French hegemony by power politics. In distinction from that politically based hegemony, the German culture should provide the foundations for a universal spiritual rule. The universalism of the German Geist (spirit) would be the vehicle for the establishment of an empire that would transcend the narrow particularism of nation states. As a model for that, spiritual instead of political rule served Hellenistic culture in distinction to the politically constructed Roman Empire. We can see here how the new political constellation led the German Romantics away from Humboldt’s and Goethe’s program of the creation of a European civilization and even a cosmopolitan citizenship by way of communication across cultures and right into a struggle against French rule over German countries. The patriotic enthusiasts for the revolution of 1789, who expected more room for patriotism everywhere

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were as a consequence disillusioned, and turned to the struggle against subjection to foreign rule. After the establishment of Napoleonic rule in the German countries the Romantic movement became involved in the war to liberate those countries from it. In the winter of 1807 to 1808 the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1807/1955) delivered his famous speeches to the German nation where he glorified the nation as the incarnation of the eternal and divine in the world in distinction to the historically limited existence of any individual state. Ernst Moritz Arndt (1802/1940) preached the hatred of the French as a religion. Arndt and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1810) provided for the penetration of the people by the Romantic idea of the nation. Arndt served as the spiritual leader of the new Gesangsvereine (choral societies), Jahn as the founder of the new Turnvereine (gymnastic clubs). From 1808 on the Romantic writers engaged with their writing and/or as soldiers in Freikorps (corps of volunteers) in the war against Napoleon. Rückert, Schlegel, Eichendorff, Arndt, Görres and Arnim contributed songs and articles. Theodor Körner died as a member of a volunteer corps (Snyder 1952/1969: 21–74; Preitz 1957; Zimmer 1971; Hoffmann-Axthelm 1973; Brunschwig 1975; Mosse 1975/1991: 127–60; Düding 1984; Giesen 1993: 130–62; Behr 1998: 269–79).

Pre-March liberalism The time after the war against Napoleon was characterized by the enormous growth of voluntary associations, which went well beyond the educated bourgeoisie’s Lesegesellschaften (reading societies) of the late eighteenth century and involved a broader spectrum of the bourgeoisie. The Gesangsvereine (choral societies) and Turnvereine (gymnastic clubs) became major associations of civic life. For students, the Burschenschaften (students’ corps) played an important role in organizing the everyday life and education beyond the official academic curriculum. The celebration of Feste (festivities) became a central vehicle for associating people well beyond local communities and for awakening and reinforcing their feeling of commonality and of a German nation. Such Volksfeste (people’s festivities) were celebrated in growing number. Two of them have remained the most remembered: the Wartburgfest of the Burschenschaften in 1817 and the Hambacher Fest in 1832. The Wartburgfest aimed at renewing the national unity felt by the people in the war against Napoleon and at surmounting the division of Germany into a plurality of principalities – 43 states loosely connected in the Deutsche Bund (German confederation) – according

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to the decisions of 1815 under the direction of the Austrian statesman Metternich. The Hambacher Fest was influenced by the French Revolution of July 1830 and was directed toward national unification in a democratic state (Mosse 1975/1991: 73–99; Düding et al. 1988). There was also an economic element in the movement for national unity. With the tariff barriers between the states preventing the growth of industry and trade, and the country flooded by British products, it was Friedrich List who propagated the establishment of a united national market by means of a tariff union that was itself protected by tariffs against foreign competitors. List’s efforts led finally to the establishment of the Deutsche Zollverein (German Tariff Society) in 1834. His major theoretical work was Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie (1841/1950), where he argued for the formation of a nationally united economy that had to be protected against foreign competitors in order to grow to a level on which it would be strong enough to compete with the more advanced economies, particularly the then dominating British economy. Only on that level would the German national economy be prepared for free trade across its borders. In order to reach that level the national economy had to be advanced by its unification (Snyder 1952/1969: 75–100). The time between the revolutions in France of July 1830 and March 1848 is called ‘pre-March’, and was linked with the growth of a movement toward establishing a German democratic nation state. There were the writers of ‘Young Germany’, including Gutskow, Laube, Mundt and Wienbarg, who took Heinrich Heine (1797–1856) and Ludwig Börne (1786–1837) as models for their own work. Both Heine and Börne were leading critics of the situation in the German states under absolutist rule. Heine made a lasting contribution to German lyrical literature, and Börne’s verve and wit shaped the style of the feature article lastingly. Both emigrated to Paris, Börne in 1830, Heine in 1831. They went there to escape censorship at home and worked as correspondents for German newspapers and Jounals. Börne was better known than Heine at their time, whereas Heine had a more enduring impact on German literature. Both did not like each other. Börne was rather polemical about Heine, and Heine published a pamphlet on Börne after his death. The young German writers of pre-March, engaged in the struggle against the restoration of absolutist rule and had to migrate back and forth because of censorship and persecution by the state they attacked. They lived a Bohemian life and tried to awaken the ‘true’ Germany of a liberal and democratic state that lay beneath the surface of authoritarian rule and bourgeois conformism and submission to that rule (Hermand 1967;

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Koopmann 1970; Estermann 1972; Hohendahl 1974; Burchardt-Dose 1979; Börne 1981; Köster 1984; Plumpe 1985; Kruse and Kortländer 1987; Brandes 1991; Giesen 1993: 168–77; Jaeschke 1995; Hermand 1998). There were also the students of Hegel called the ‘Young Hegelians’ – philosophers like Strauss, Ruge, Echtermeyer, Vischer, Vatke, and Bruno and Edgar Bauer, Feuerbach, Stirner and Hess – who tried to draw the consequences of the philosophical system in political action. They wanted to transform their philosophical school into a political party that took the position of the absolute in order to integrate the divisions of society into a new, all-embracing unity. Karl Marx was connected with the young Hegelians but turned away from them when he moved toward communism under the influence of the French socialists (Giesen 1993: 174–84; Köster 1972; Eßbach 1988). Marx’s turn to the communist movement indicates that the masses of pauperized people on the countryside and in the cities had entered the scene. The upheaval of the weavers in Silesia in 1844 was the most dramatic event in this development. Besides Marx and his friend Engels, Hess, Grün and Büchner spoke for the pauperized masses (Marx and Engels 1848/1959). They formulated the idea of a nation that included the proletariat well before any bourgeois revolution had taken place in Germany. This revolution came in March 1848. The situation of the masses had contributed to its outbreak, and for a short time the masses of simple people and the different strata of the bourgeoisie formed a comprehensive national and democratic movement for a democratic German nation state against the repressive states of the principalities. However, this unity was short-lived because radical and socialist democrats remained a small minority in the formation of political action. In the Frankfurt national parliament only 6 per cent of the deputies belonged to the radical left and only 12 per cent to the moderate left. The overwhelming majority was liberal or conservative liberal in its program. The parliament was dominated by civil servants, professors and lawyers who argued predominantly in favor of a constitutional monarchy. The liberal majority was led by Heinrich von Gagern, who presided the Frankfurt parliament, the radical democratic minority by Friedrich Hecker of Baden, supported by his companions Struve, Herwegh and Welcker. The liberals did not want to break with the princes, while the radicals aimed at overthrowing the old dynasties and at reorganizing society completely. The disuniting of the major forces of the revolution, the lack of a charismatic leader, its scattered occurrence throughout the country with no concentration in a center of the revolution, and the separation of the Frankfurt parliament from

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the action on the streets, led finally to its failing, so that the principalities were able to restore their absolutist rule. However, the revolution failed not only because of the lacking unity of the revolutionary forces, but also because the balance of the European state system created by Metternich in 1815 would have been destroyed by a united German nation state. Prussia would have provoked a conflict with the European powers, particularly Russia, if it had taken the lead in establishing a German nation state (Snyder 1952/1969: 101–122; Nipperdey 1983: 366–402, 595–673; Stürmer 1983; Wehler 1987: 660–784; Hachtmann 1997; Freitag 1998; Hirschhausen1998). The Borussian historical school and the nation state In the Frankfurt parliament there was also a division between the supporters of the so-called greater German nation state which included Austria and the smaller German nation state without Austria. After the revolution had failed, the smaller German nation state was propagated by a new group of intellectuals, the Borussian historians, including Christoph Dahlmann (1785–1860), Maximilian Wolfgang Duncker (1811–66) and Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–84), who had been members of the Frankfurt parliament, and also Heinrich von Sybel (1817–95), Ludwig Häusser (1818–67) and Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96). The great master of historiography at that time was Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), who taught at Berlin University. He established the work in the archives as the indispensable precondition for historiographic work, in order to find out, according to his famous phrase, ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen ist’ (how it really happened). Ranke separated historiographic work clearly from political action, and this was exactly the point of divergence of those historians who formed the Borussian school; they admired Ranke, but wanted to write about history and to make history by advising princes and statesmen and by educating the people. Some of them taught at least for some time at universities outside Prussia, but they were nevertheless led primarily by the idea that Prussia had to bring about the German unified nation state (see, for example, Droysen 1855–86; Treitschke 1879–94, vol. 1: 24–86; Sybel 1889–94; Droysen 1977). In their view, the inclusion of Austria with its linkage to Hungary and with its territorial rule beyond the boundaries of German language and culture would have been a permanent source for disuniting processes. They also expected enough conflict between Prussia and Austria to put a newly founded nation state which included both of them always in danger of breaking apart again.

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The Borussian historians’ political perspective was not internal, focussing on questions of democratization, but external. The reason for this was the growing competition between the major European states, with France and Britain in the lead. Their idea of a nation was not that of the earlier intellectuals of the Enlightenment and the Romantic and democratic movements, searching for cultural and/or democratic unity, but rather of one made strong by a strong state in order to equip it to compete at an increasing degree of intesity with the other European states. This put it simply beyond their scope to serve as intellectual spokesmen for the internal unification of classes and for the unity of the liberal movement with the radical democratic and socialist ones. Because of the intensification of external competition the liberals turned to nationalism in the sense of forming a strong nation state which had to preserve the nation’s interests against its competitors. The radical democrats and socialists did not find an internal cocombatant, so they looked more for international cooperation. In doing so they contributed to the further nationalist radicalization of liberalism, which did not serve as an opponent to the suppression of the radical democratic and socialist movement by the authoritarian state. What the Borussian historians argued for was a state nation in the power-political sense that had to be strong enough to survive in the competitive European state system. This was neither the culture nation of the Enlightenment and Romantic intellectuals nor the democratic republic of the pre-March radical democrats nor the republican nation in the sense of the French revolution of 1789. They legitimated in their work and their lectures what was realized by Bismarck after the war against France in 1871 (Snyder 1952/1969: 123–52; Rüsen 1971; Iggers 1971: 120–63; Seier 1971; Sheehan 1989: 836–52; Hardtwig 1990: 103–60; Giesen 1993: 201–29). Bismarck united the Northern German principalities after the war against Austria in 1866 in the Northern German confederation of 1867 under the leadership of Prussia (Pflanze 1990). The war against France in 1870 and 1871 led to the founding of the German Kaiserreich (empire), which included also the Southern German states in 1871. External warfare was transformed into internal unification. Russia’s defeat on the Crimea (1853–56) by the Western European powers and the distraction of those powers by the American Civil War (1861–65) helped Bismarck in his unifying politics. And he was prudent enough to declare the new German nation state to be geographically complete and to create trust by his external policy of concluding agreements with competing states. The internal pressure of the masses he tried to keep under control with his welfare policies, which

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were accompanied however by the suppression of the labor movement. Thus, the state became a major force in defining the nation in the late nineteenth century in Germany, too, as it was from the beginning of nation-building in France. In this respect, the difference between the French state nation and the German ethnically rooted culture nation is not as sharp as it is frequently depicted (see Schieder 1961; Brubaker 1992: 220; Takenaka 1994). Bismarck’s successors unfortunately did not continue with his politics of keeping an external balance. Their policies of increasing armament and late-coming colonization stimulated a reaction of coalitionbuilding around Germany, which in turn led to the German fear of encirclement. This in due course produced the strategy of the German first strike, a ‘defensive move’ in their mind that in August 1914 however led straight into World War I. German foreign politics after Bismarck were directed toward the establishment of a world power, based on economic and military strength. These politics were not directed toward a war as their goal, but they took war into account as a possibility, which finally seems to have become an unavoidable necessity. In this regard German foreign policy before 1914 was not solely responsible for the outbreak of World War I, but it was this partially. The German historian Fritz Fischer initiated a fierce debate on this subject with the publication of his book Der Griff zur Weltmacht (1961). Discussion entered the public arena via the big newspapers and changed the prevailing historical consciousness in Germany, which until then had leaned toward the theory of encirclement with a much reduced responsibility of German foreign politics, but now had to acknowledge a much more active role of those politics in bringing about the First World War (Fischer 1961, 1969; Hillgruber 1971; Geiss 1972; Sywottek 1973; Moses 1975; Berghahn 1980; Jäger 1984). The work of the historian academics was to trace back the new German nation state to its roots in history. According to their credo, the past had to be interpreted from the point of view of the present. In terms of nation-building this meant that history had to be conceived as a process from which the German nation state finally emerged. The science of history provided the historical legitimation of the German nation state in this way. In the process of tracing back the history of the nation state to its historical roots the historian helps the nation to find to itself and to recognize its historically grown identity (Giesen 1993: 213–17). This historical foundation of the German nation state was made visible in symbolic form by the construction of historical monuments of the great figures of German history accompanied by the

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explanatory speeches of the historians. The most impressive monuments were the Arminius and Hermann memorial near Detmold (1875), which commemorates the defeat of Roman legions by the Teutonics in AD 9, the Niederwald monument (1883), looking down to the Rhine with Germania crowning herself, and the Kyffhäuser monument (1896) on the site of Barbarossa’s castle in the Harz, all dedicated to national unity (Nipperdey 1976a; Mosse 1975/1991: 47–72; Mai 1997). From that time on the German historians established themselves as the major intellectual group in shaping German identity. They have maintained that position up to the present. They see their task in pointing out the historical roots of present day situations and problems. It is this they share in a more generalized way with their Borussian ancestors, without necessarily being compelled to legitimize any state action by means of historical interpretation. Beyond that they contribute to identity formation in the sense that they interpret present situations in historical terms, so that the nation is enabled to keep in mind its historically formed identity and to act in consistency with that identity or at least to break consciously with it and to change its identity. Identity-shapers: literary men, civil servants, landowners, officers and large-scale industrialists With the founding of the German nation state by warfare in the competitive European state system, the educated bourgeoisie had to share its leading role with those forces that were able to guarantee the nation state’s position in that system: the Prussian landowners of the Eastern Provinces (the Junker), the Prussian officer corps, and the large-scale industrialists. Thus we have four major status groups on which the new nation state was grounded and which shaped the nation’s identity well into the twentieth century. Because of the predominance of these status groups the petite bourgeoisie of artisans and small businessmen did not grow into a self-assured role in society. The same is true of the small peasantry, while the workers had to struggle up to World War I to be accepted as citizens with equal rights. (The social democrats subscribed to the war budget of the government in August 1914 in order to achieve full acknowledgment.) The German idea of the nation and German identity were shaped in the Kaiserreich by the four major status groups. The influence of the educated bourgeoisie went back to the Enlightenment in the second half of the eighteenth century. Its contribution to German identity is the understanding of the nation as a cultural unit with a common language and cultural heritage. The vehicle for creating the corresponding sense of German nationhood is education in

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its language and culture. Education is the central virtue of the ‘good members’ of that nation. Through the struggle against French and British competitors, the German idea of culture and education was transformed into the claim of a higher validity and a deeper truth in German culture in distinction to French and British civilization. French culture was devalued as formal etiquette of courtiers without substance, British as the utility-seeking commercialism of tradesmen. In this way the culture nation was used as an instrument for rejecting foreign elements as dangers for the higher German culture, including the people who could introduce such foreign elements, and it became an instrument for legitimating the German crusade against French and British supremacy. Distinguishing German culture from French and British civilization became very common right into the twentieth century (Elias 1939/76). (Thus it was not by accident that a reputed writer like Thomas Mann cultivated this distinction in his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (1918/22).) A secondary trait of German identity rooted in the educated bourgeoisie but spreading well out into every stratum of the bourgeoisie in the process of trivialization is the love of Geselligkeit (conviviality) as it was first celebrated in the Lesegesellschaften (reading societies) of the educated bourgeoisie and then extended to the broader bourgeoisie by the Gesangsvereine (choral societies) and Turnvereine (gymnastic clubs). Along with the Geselligkeit (conviviality) of the Vereine (associations) came the Gemütlichkeit (coziness) enjoyed by people as they sat together drinking beer or wine and singing their Volkslieder (folk songs). The Romantic movement celebrated devotion to nature, which became trivialized into the love of the German land and its beauties. Another virtue cultivated by the Romantic movement was the devotion to true and deep love and friendship in distinction to merely legal marriage and to the French superficial and short-lived passion (Ringer 1969; Engelhardt 1986; Kocka 1989; Glaser 1993). The landowners’ (Junker’s) understanding of the nation was territorial in character. In their view the nation was linked intimately to a territory, and it needed space in order to secure its living. The competition between the nation states was for them a competition for space claimed by each nation in order to maintain its position in the state system. They saw the nation’s identity rooted in a commonly cultivated territory and the virtues of the good Germans in their rootedness in the soil of their homeland (Heimatland), in their commitment to the traditions of their homeland, in the cultivation of their land and in

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guarding that land against invaders. Their perspective on the link between nation and soil was expansive with regard to the land needed for bettering the competitive position of the nation in the interstate struggle and it was protective with regard to cultivating and defending the land against competitors. In its orientation toward the soil the landowners’ idea of the nation merged with the earlier Romantic devotion to nature as the Erhabene (sublime) into which one has to sink oneself (hineinversenken) for the sake of complete fulfilment (Erfüllung). That Romantic admiration of nature was transformed into the love of the German lands as it became increasingly trivialized in the process of diffusion throughout society. In this way commitment to one’s homeland and love of the German land including the protection of its beauty became a long-lasting element of German identity. Its linkage with the Prussian landowners’ commitment to the soil fueled Germany’s struggle with its competitors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Puhle 1967; Berdahl 1972; Puhle 1986). The contribution of the officer corps is the understanding of the nation as a unit prepared to fight against competitors who could endanger its position in the nation state system. It is the carrier of belligerent nationalism. In its view the nation stands together and becomes itself in warfare. The virtues here demanded from the good member of the nation are the soldier’s virtues of courage, fearlessness (Unerschrockenheit), discipline and obedience to orders from superiors. In the latter two elements the officer’s virtue merged with the discipline and obedience of the legally trained servant (Snyder 1952/1969: 227–54; Ringer 1967; Röhl 1967; Kitchen 1968; Elias 1989: 61–158, 271–3). The large-scale industrialists had direct access to the power center, and took part in preparing Germany for its struggle with its competitors in the European state system. They led their companies much as officers led their corps in warfare. Strategic planning, directing people in the interest of a higher goal, absolute devotion to that goal and perseverance in realizing it were the virtues they had to live up to. Their idea of the nation was one of busy workers submitting themselves to the leadership of statesmen and large-scale industrialists, who directed the ship of the nation through the storms of fierce competition in an expanding world economy in which states were the main economic and political units. Their ethical catalogue included the complementary virtues of leadership and obedience, strategic planning and busy working. Steel and iron became the symbols of the large-scale industrialists’ richness, of the strength of the army’s weapons and of the

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virtues of the German army’s officers and ordinary soldiers (Böhme 1966; Kaelble 1967; Dahrendorf 1968/1971: 39–55). It would certainly be wrong to assume that all German people conformed to the identity traits of education, true love and friendship, conviviality, coziness, courage, discipline, leadership and complementary obedience, strategic planning and hard work, commitment to the soil and love of the beauty of the German land. However, these virtues became identity traits that were considered as German by the leading status groups themselves and were attributed to German identity in reaction by their competitors in the European state system. This means that the French, the British, the Dutch, the Danes or the Poles considered these character traits as elements of German identity, independently of the conformity of the individual German to that attribution. Traits and virtues rooted in groups other than the leading status groups did not gain acknowledgement either by the latter within the country or with foreign observers outside. However, there are some traits of the less influential classes that have some relevance at least as secondary traits. There are for example the correctness and technical perfection of artisan work, the steady application of the workers, the solidarity of workers, the reliability of small businessmen, the creativity of inventors and artists, the knowledge of scientists and the perfection of technicians. The virtues of these status groups were themselves shaped by those of the leading groups, but they themselves contributed to the shaping of the primary virtues of the leading status groups. Stored in the collective memory and socialized from generation to generation, these virtues became part of the long-term German identity. From nationalism to National Socialism Three forces influenced the further development of the German idea of the nation and of German identity after the foundation of the German nation state in 1871: intensified international competition, social Darwinism, and mass culture (Eley 1991). There was, first of all, intensification of the economic and political competition in the European state system toward the end of the nineteenth century, to which growing German industry and the German politics of armament and late colonization contributed their part. There was, second, the success of Darwin’s theory of evolution. With economic and political competition increasing, the vulgarization of Darwin’s theory led to its transmission from biology to social and political theory. According to this view, the competition between the nation states was a process of natural selection, in which the fittest

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would survive and the weak die out. In narrow transformations of Darwinian evolutionary theory to social Darwinism the strength of the nation states in that struggle for survival was seen as rooted in the biological structure of the nations. Thus the nation became interpreted in biological terms as a biological species, as a community of common descent tied together by blood and linked in its existence to the soil that nurtured the species. The Kulturnation (culture nation) and the Staatsnation (state nation) now were primordially rooted in a Volksnation (folk nation). The Volk (folk) was not simply conceived as a collection of persons but as a community of common blood, the roots of which had to be traced back to its biological ancestors. The search for the first Germans was an expression of this understanding of the nation. The thirteenth-century epic the Nibelungenlied gained foremost importance in providing the nation with a myth of German origin. Richard Wagner’s Ring der Nibelungen was a great work of music, but it was also an expression of the search for the Germanic roots of the nation. Wagner (1914) himself was fascinated by the myth of the Germanic heroes and expressed frankly racist and antisemitic ideas (Snyder 1952/69: 153–79; Mosse 1975/91: 100–26; Becker 1990: 30–2). He was influenced by the racist philosophy of history of the French author Joseph Arthur Comte de Gobineau, which claimed that the great cultural works had been created by people that profited from the blood of the white race, of which the Germanic people have finally contributed the most sublime works. Gobineau expected Western culture to decline, because in his view the white race had become increasingly mixed up with the other races (Gobineau 1853–55; Becker 1990: 1–64). The Germanic myth was further celebrated by popular writers like Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn and Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Lagarde’s Deutsche Schriften (1878/1920), Langbehn’s Rembrandt als Erzieher (1890/1927) and Chamberlain’s Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts (1899/1941) gave the message that the Germans had a special mission in history to bring to the world the highest form of Christian religion and culture and the best virtues of the human individual. They believed in the German Volk (folk), with its Germanic roots, and propagated racist and antisemitic ideas. Chamberlain was an admirer of Wagner, publishing two books on him, marrying his youngest daughter Eva in 1908 after his divorce from his first wife in the same year, and subsequently going to live in Wagner’s Bayreuth (Field 1981). (Chamberlain’s work was of great importance to Alfred Rosenberg, Hitler’s chief ideologist, who published a book on

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Chamberlain in 1927 (Rosenberg 1927); his book Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts (1930/40) was much influenced by Chamberlain’s Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts.) The work of the Germanic writers was carried on well into the Weimar Republic by Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. His most important work, Das dritte Reich (1923/31), appeared in 1923. It was, unwittingly, a prophecy of Hitler’s Third Reich, though its author never saw what became of his idea, since he committed suicide in 1925. Van den Bruck’s aim was the renewal of the Germanic virtues, against the liberalism of the Weimar Republic, through a conservative revolution. There was, third, the growth of mass culture. This meant that an increasing number of writings was addressed no longer to an educated élite, but to growing numbers of people at large. Therefore the intellectuals – scholars, writers and artists – were replaced to a considerable degree by popular writers like Lagarde, Langbehn and Chamberlain in influencing public opinion. This change in the formation of public opinion implied that the reflection of the educated élites played a less important role, and simplification as well as dramatization a more important one. There was no civic and republican sense of the nation as a community of citizens. The idea of the Kulturnation (culture nation) became Germanized and bound to the Volksnation (folk nation) in the primordial sense of blood ties, and this Volksnation (folk nation) served as the substructure of a forceful Staatsnation (state nation). This was the linkage of Kulturnation, Volksnation and Staatsnation (Lepsius 1990) toward the end of the nineteenth century and before World War I. German identity moved toward an understanding of German virtues as biologically inherited and approved in an exemplary way by the Germanic heroes of the Nibelungenlied, particularly Siegfried, who was portrayed as the incarnation of a fearless, courageous and forceful man who devotes himself to the protection of his people in the fight against his adversaries. These were male virtues. The complementary female virtue was the submission of the wife to the leadership of her husband. But in Brunhilde and Sieglinde there are also active female heroes of the Germanic cultural legacy (Stern 1961; Mosse 1964; Wehler 1973/94; Becker 1990; Mommsen 1990). Nationalism was everywhere in Europe at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century; the linkage of the Kulturnation with the Volksnation and their realization in a forceful Staatsnation was the specifically German foundation of it. Though German nationalism, interdependently with that of the other competing European nation states, led directly into World War I, it was not completely discredited

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after the end of the war. The Weimar Republic was the second attempt in German history at building a nation of citizens, the first having taken place in the failed revolution of 1848/49, and, in the final result, after 14 years, it too was unsuccessful. Discredited by the myth of the defeat of an undefeated army by the democrats – by means of the socalled ‘stab in the back’ – who were blamed for accepting the Versailles treaty, which was seen as unjust, attacked by the extremists of right and left, suffering from several economic crises, and even itself providing the legal means for its destruction by its own extremist enemies, the Weimar state did not survive the global economic crisis that followed the collapse of the New York stock market in 1929 (Lepsius 1966; Sontheimer 1968; Holborn 1973; Nicholls 1979; Winkler 1993). Instead of being the republican concept of the nation, the idea of the Volksnation was brought to its extreme by Hitler’s National Socialism, legitimized by the racist interpretation of social Darwinism. According to racist ideology, the German ‘Volk’ had to prove itself powerful enough to withstand the competition of the other ‘Völker’. Any alien element was seen as a danger for the maintenance of the Germanic race’s power, which was most fatefully formulated in Hitler’s Mein Kampf (1925, 1927/33). This racist ideology provided the legitimation for the inconceivably terrible crime of the genocide of the Jews, Sinti and Roma, the excesses of euthanasia, and the murder of political opponents (Snyder 1952/69: 199–226; Mosse 1978b; Aly 1995; Weiss 1996; Benz et al. 1998). Nazism made the Germans a Volksnation in the most extreme form of blood ties and racist purity. That Volksnation received some legitimatory support as a Kulturnation by right-wing Hegelians like Julius Binder (1934) and Karl Larenz (1935) (Topitsch 1967). It was also put into the form of a thoroughly militarized Staatsnation that used capitalist industrial growth, modern science and technology to realize its end of German hegemony (Bracher 1971; Mosse 1978a; Pridham and Naakes 1983–84). Nazism wanted the Germans to be committed to their homeland, to their Volk, to be bold and courageous in the fight against its enemies. With the totalitarian penetration of society and the program of the Holocaust it produced people who took an active part in that self-imposition of the Germans as rulers of the world, because they believed in its ideology and/or because they wanted to be on the winner’s side. Such people passively let the Nazis do what they did because it was the more comfortable way to live, and while they may have felt that what was going on was not right, they were still unwilling to oppose, because they just wanted to avoid disadvantage, because they

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feared punishment and imprisonment or because they felt they were not powerful enough to bring about any change (Mühl-Benninghaus 1996). And the Holocaust was also possible because of the very large numbers of people who served the regime up to the end of the war. Nazism also produced, however, those Germans who emigrated and worked against the regime from outside, those who resisted and were imprisoned and murdered in concentration camps, and those who formed the resistance that finally failed (Rothfels 1961; Hoffman 1977). Thus a whole set of motives contributed to the realization of the Holocaust. It was not simply an unprovable, uniquely German eliminatory antisemitism which provided the final motive to collaborate in different ways in the Holocaust with the conviction that what was going on was right, as Daniel Jonah Goldhagen has put it in his provocative dissertation which became a media event in 1996 (Goldhagen 1996). Goldhagen’s major argument says that anti-semitism could be found throughout Europe, but that the German one was eliminatory as early as the nineteenth century, aiming at the complete elimination of the Jewish people. He tries to prove his thesis, above all, with the participation of average people in the Holocaust and with documents, which show that those people were convinced that they were doing right. Eliminatory anti-semitism provided the legitimation for their view. German nation and identity after National Socialism After the end of the Hitler regime in 1945 the questions ‘Who are the Germans?’ and ‘What is the German nation?’ were determined by two facts of history: the Holocaust and the division of the nation into two states, one part of the democratic West, the other part of the communist East (Dahrendorf 1968/71; Kaltenbrunner 1980; Schultz 1982; Willms 1982; Weidenfeld 1983; Wollfs 1986; Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1987; Weidenfeld 1989; Hättich 1990; James 1991; Scheuch 1991; Weidenfeld and Korte 1991; Weidenfeld 1993). Both the German linkage of Volksnation, Kulturnation and Staatsnation and the virtues that made up the German identity were discredited by the Holocaust. The German idea of the nation had been instrumentalized by racist ideology and Hitler’s politics of world domination, and the German virtues had been used by the Holocaust program. Too many welleducated, courageous, disciplined, hard-working, obedient, true-loveand-friendship-cultivating and homeland-loving Germans had carried out the program of the Holocaust. What was left of the German nation and the German identity that was not discredited? What would have been a source for a new beginning

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had failed in German history in 1848/49 and in 1919–33: the republican idea of the nation and the civic virtues. They were now introduced by the Western allies in West Germany, whereas in East Germany the socialist state was imposed by the Soviet Union. In the West the identity crisis was solved by the majority of the people by way of public disengagement, retreat to the private and concentration on the economic reconstruction of one’s personal situation and of the country. As discredited people they had become insecure with regard to showing overt commitment to their nation and to German virtues. The knowledge about that is still alive. A majority of 52 per cent of those interviewed in a survey conducted in December 1988/January 1989 in West Germany see in the Nazi regime the specific difference of German history compared with the history of other nations. It is, however, remarkable that only 4 per cent of the East Germans shared this view of German history according to a survey conducted in December 1990. For the East Germans, the partition of Germany after 1945 was of greatest importance. Both the West Germans and the East Germans gave the partition of Germany the highest importance for their history – 74 and 79 per cent – out of a list of 21 historical events in January 1989 and December 1990 respectively (Allensbach Archive 1988/89, 1990a). The much smaller number of East Germans mentioning the Nazi regime as the peculiar distinguishing event in German history could be interpreted as an indication of the fact that they had to suffer from partition much more than the West Germans, so that it is for them the most important distinguishing element in their history. It might also be an expression of the special role taken by official GDR politics toward National Socialism. But we have to be cautious with this interpretation. It could lead us in a wrong direction. The political leaders of the German Democratic Republic considered themselves as victims of that regime – which was in many cases personally correct – and made anti-fascism part of the official ideology. According to their Marxist ideology, fascism was the outcome of capitalism, and because socialism had superseded capitalism, GDR politics were anti-fascist by definition, and this much more rigorously than West German politics. Because of this official view of fascism, the people in the German Democratic Republic might have seen themselves much more the victims than the people in West Germany were able to do; and because of the definitional anti-fascism of GDR politics it was not the people’s task to take themselves the responsibility for the Nazi crimes and to work on restitution. The victims view and ideological anti-fascism were used by the GDR leaders to give legitimacy to their refusal to do anything in

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restitution of the Nazi crimes (Schubarth et al. 1991; Faulenbach 1992; Zimmermann 1992). However, it would be completely wrong to conclude that the East Germans are less immune to Nazi propaganda. In fact, the contrary is true, as we will see looking at attitudes toward National Socialism. The small number referring to the Nazi regime as the peculiar distinguishing fact of German history might be an artefact of research. Other data speak another language. Out of the list of 21 historical events, 32 per cent of East Germans, 30 per cent of West Germans mentioned the Nazi regime, as decisive for German history. Seventeen per cent of East Germans, but only 6 per cent of West Germans, referred to the fact that the Germans had begun wars time and again as the peculiar fact in German history (Allensbach Archive 1988/89, 1990a). Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that the East Germans recognized Germany’s responsibility for what had been done by the Nazi regime to a lesser degree than the West Germans. The awareness of the Nazi crimes is a major reason why we have found in Germany the lowest percentage of people saying they were proud of their nation in public opinion polls carried out at different times in the postwar period up to the present day. The expressed pride is lowest immediately after the war and has grown up to now, but is still below the rate of any other country in the polls. According to surveys, 57.2 per cent of West Germans were proud to be Germans in 1982, 63.9 in 1988, 66 in 1990. The East Germans’ figure was 68 per cent in 1990. The EC average of pride was 80.7 per cent in 1988. In the nineties national pride went down further. (Der Spiegel 1990: 114; Brettschneider et al.; Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1997: 484). What could have been a reason to be proud of being a German in the postwar decades? Not the political system, because it was not the Germans’ own achievement to have a democracy with freedom and equal rights for everybody. There was the remarkable economic reconstruction, the ‘economic miracle’, by which their country outshone all others. It is therefore quite logical that the polls showed the Germans having much more pride in their economic than their political achievements in the fifties and sixties. They were proud both of the economy itself and of the qualities of the people that had been demonstrated in the economic reconstruction of the country. In third place were the natural qualities of the country, a reminiscence of the Romantic glorification of nature. After that came the sciences and the arts. However, with the passing of the years and the formidable working of the West German democracy, pride in the political institutions grew enormously.

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Thus in 1959, 33 per cent referred to the economy, 36 to the characteristics of the people, 17 to physical attributes of the country, 12 to the sciences, 11 to the arts and only 7 to the political institutions as reasons for their pride (Almond and Verba 1963: 64), but by the end of the seventies the picture had changed in favor of the political and the welfare institutions, but with even more pride in the economy than before, whereas the character of the people fell back from first to third place: 40 per cent were proud of the economy, 31 in the polity, 25 in the people’s character, 18 in the welfare system, 14 in the natural qualities of the country, 13 in the sciences and 10 in the arts (Weidenfeld and Korte 1991: 132). In 1995, the German respondents to the International Social Survey program (ISSP) still lagged some way behind other countries, particularly Britain, in their general score of national pride. It was above all their history of which they were least proud – 34 per cent as against 89 per cent in Britain. Economic achievement still ranked highest at 83 per cent, as against only 43 per cent in Britain, while the way democracy works was approved by 68 per cent in Germany and 66 per cent in Britain (Jowell et al. 1998: 8–9). The Germans and National Socialism It took time for the Germans to work on their identity and on their idea of the nation. There was the denazification organized by the Allies – imposed by foreign powers and remaining superficial in its effect. Active work on the question why the Nazi crimes were able to happen was limited to small intellectual circles and did not penetrate society as a whole. The overwhelming majority concentrated on the economic reconstruction of their personal life, the German political leadership on the economic reconstruction of society. The economy gained primacy over culture and politics. A considerable part of the population needed longer to see fully what had been wrong with the Nazi regime (Heyl 1997). The majority of Germans were ashamed of the Nazi crimes, but not only a small minority saw in Nazism a good idea that was only realized in a wrong or bad way: 50 per cent of the respondents of a survey took this position in the early fifties; 63 per cent rejected the attribution of a collective responsibility for the Nazi crimes and therefore refused to be responsible for restitution (Merrit and Merrit 1980: 146, 150; cit. by Rausch 1983: 126). Even the first president of the German Federal Republic, the undoubtedly liberal Theodor Heuss, said that the Germans are collectively ashamed of what happened, but not collectively responsible for it (Braun 1982: 32; Rausch 1983: 126). The rejection of

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Nazism has, however, grown steadily up to the present time, partly because the older generations who were socialized in an authoritarian way are dying out and new democratically socialized generations have entered the scene. Thus 54 per cent of the respondents of a survey describing National Socialism as a criminal regime in 1964, and 71 per cent in 1978. In the latter year, 72 per cent thought National Socialism a wrong and bad idea, 26 per cent not so bad an idea, and 79 per cent voted against a new National Socialist party (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1977; cit. by Greiffenhagen and Greiffenhagen 1979: 334; Conradt 1978: 49; Rausch 1980: 36; Allensbach Archive 1992; Rausch 1983: 127). The statement ‘Without the War, Hitler would have been a great statesman’, was supported by 48 per cent in 1955, but only by 24 per cent in 1997. The characterization of the Nazi regime as criminal received support from 54 per cent in 1964, but by as many as 83 per cent in 1997 (Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1997: 514–15). A survey in May 1994 showed, however, that only 64 per cent considered the ideas of National Socialism as wrong and bad, and 24 per cent who still described them as not so bad. The same survey revealed the following attitudes: 77 per cent did not want to have a strong man as leader in Germany again, as against 15 per cent who would like to have such a leader; 56 per cent regarded Germany as solely responsible for World War II, 25 per cent the complicated international situation, 6 per cent all countries to the same degree, and 3 per cent other individual countries; 64 per cent considered it as good thing that Germany was defeated in the war, 13 per cent as a bad thing, 18 per cent as a partly good and partly bad thing; 67 per cent would not have liked to have lived in Germany had Hitler won the war, while only 14 per cent would have liked to; 69 per cent interpreted the end of the war as a liberation, 13 per cent as a defeat, and 14 per cent as both. No less than 94 per cent of those born after 1940 reported that their parents and grandparents had told them the truth about their role during the Nazi regime; 48 per cent opinioned that the Germans supported the Nazis voluntarily, 37 per cent that they were victims of the Nazis. According to 76 per cent the Nazi crimes were possible only because of the involvement of many parts of the administration, according to 15 per cent they were the work of a small clique; 91 per cent rejected the statement that the mass murders were a lie of the victorious powers, only 3 per cent supporting it. Even among the supporters of the right-wing extremist party of the Republicans, the proportions of non-believers and believers of that statement were 86 to 8 per cent. Finally, 53 per cent assumed that the present-day right-wing

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radicals had the same intentions as the Nazis, 21 per cent said ‘partly’, 16 per cent ‘no’ (Forsa 1994; Die Woche 1994). In May 1994, there was a clear effect of age and education on the attitudes toward National Socialism. Respondents born after 1940 rejected National Socialism throughout at a higher percentage. The same is true of the well educated: the higher the level of education the greater the rejection of National Socialism. Because of the change of generations and the rising level of education this effect has contributed and will contribute later to the sharper rejection of National Socialism. The East Germans are in the lead with anti-attitudes toward National Socialism. For example, 70 per cent have said they regard the ideas of National Socialism as wrong and bad, 19 per cent as not quite so bad. Therefore it cannot be claimed that the socialist regime with its officially declared antifascism has made them more open to right-wing extremism. In fact, the polls tell us the contrary. The East Germans reported a more comprehensive dealing with National Socialism at school than the West Germans; 70 per cent of the East Germans as against 53 per cent of the West Germans said they had studied the Naziperiod comprehensively at school (Die Woche 1994; Forsa 1994). Remarkable was the division of the country with regard to the question of putting an end to the Nazi past: 53 per cent vote for putting an end to it, 41 per cent against it. Here lay a great difference between East and West. In the East only 39 per cent were for an end, with 58 per cent against, in the West 56 for and 37 against. According to the general picture in relating to the Nazi regime, the vote against an end went up from the lowest to the middle and to the highest level of education from 23 to 45 to 61 per cent. A much larger majority than that which would like to put an end to the matter wanted to free the younger generation of those who were children in 1945 or were born later from bearing the responsibility for the Nazi crimes, with little difference between East and West and only a small difference between the educational levels: 76 per cent as against 12 per cent say so with 12 per cent answering ‘partly’, in the West 76 to 11 to 13, in the East 74 to 15 to 11. With rising educational level the support for not bearing responsibility fell from 79 to 67 per cent (Die Woche 1994; Forsa 1994). The division of the population on putting an end to the Nazi past reflects the intellectual debate of German historians on that topic in the mid-eighties, and the continuing conflict between right-wing conservative intellectuals and left-wing intellectuals after unification about regaining a national historical consciousness that gives the Nazi regime

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not the one and only accounted place but only one place beside other periods throughout German history (Augstein 1987; Diner 1987; Habermas 1987; Habermas 1990; Faulenbach 1992, 1993; Lillig et al. 1993: 354–360; Zitelmann 1993). One side of the debate argues that the nation has the right to establish a positive self-conception after it has paid for its guilt. Those who claim justice for this position base their claim on the comparative judgment on the Germans’ involvement in the Nazi crimes. They call for ‘comparable justice’ to be done by putting the Nazi crimes side by side with other major crimes of the twentieth century like the Osmanian Turks’ massacre of the Armenians or the Stalinist murder of masses of people who were seen as a danger to the regime. And they want to do so by embedding the Nazi regime in the context of German history as a whole, emphasizing Germany’s positive contributions to world history in the same way as its negative ones. In this way they would regain a positive identity for the Germans and their nation. The consequence of that re-established positive selfconception should be more self-consciousness by the Germans and their political representatives in playing their part and pursuing their interests in European and global politics. According to this view, German foreign politics should no longer be paralyzed by the selfnegation of the Holocaust identity. The other side of the debate argues that the claim for ‘comparable justice’ and the attempt at ‘historizing’ the Nazi regime would imply an external and internal relativization of the Holocaust, namely against the other collective crimes and against the other parts of German history. And this relativization could easily be misused in attempts at playing down Germany’s responsibility for the Nazi crimes. The Holocaust would lose its unique character and Germany its unique moral obligation to do everything to purge its guilt and to be particularly bound to moral standards in its politics. In this view, the Germans have to keep in mind the unique character of the Nazi crimes in order to feel their special moral obligation as part of working on the construction of a positive national identity for a better future. This should, however, not preclude the Germans trying to relate to and renew their positive contributions to world history. The sharp division of the whole nation in the question of putting an end to the Nazi past indicates that this debate will itself be part of the Germans’ construction and reconstruction of their identity for a long time to come. Germany will have to develop its identity and role in international politics neither by relativization of the Nazi crimes nor by reducing itself to the Holocaust identity forever, but by constructing

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a self-conception that includes the dark parts in its history as well as the light ones and that doesn’t shirk either responsibility for the Nazi crimes or the moral obligation arising from that responsibility in the process of creating a positive identity. The conflict between right-wing and left-wing intellectuals seems to be sharpened by their particular interests: the former would do away with the Holocaust identity in favor of a morally less constricted prosecution of Germany’s interests in European and global politics, while the latter would stay with the Holocaust identity in order to bind German politics to moral obligations as strictly and extensively as possible. Thus Germany’s identity formation will have to find a way between these two extreme positions of complete relativization and the complete absolutization of the Holocaust identity. The nation has the obligation not to forget the past, but it has also the right to be judged today according to its present performance. The successful resocialization that has taken place over half a century provides fairly good reasons for trust in Germany’s ability to live up to the standards of morally guided self-responsible action in its politics. Whenever right-wing extremist activities, crimes, movements and parties have cropped up in the decades since World War II, the question has been raised as to whether the Germans have indeed rejected National Socialism for ever and will be able to keep right-wing extremism under control. A study on latent right-wing world views published in 1981 revealed that 13 per cent of the respondents – which would mean 5 million Germans – have a strong right-wing extremist world view (SINUS-Institut 1981). These are people who prefer law and order, reject alien groups, have a closed mind and do not appreciate freedom rights and the open settlement of conflicts. However, as was pointed out, it would not be correct to draw the conclusion from this that 13 per cent of Germans were then still adherents of National Socialism and would have voted for such a regime if they could. According to surveys, in 1989 the West Germans occupied a middle rank in the percentage of voters showing right-wing extremist attitudes with 9 per cent, the same as in Portugal. Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland and Greece reached 10 to 19 per cent, France, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy and Britain 5 to 8 per cent (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 614; see, on political extremism of right and left, Backes and Jesse 1989). Right-wing extremist parties have won support in nearly every European country. West Germany and unified Germany do not occupy any outstanding role in this regard. The only distinguishing fact here is

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that right-wing movements are much more closely observed in Germany. And they are always interpreted in the light of German history, both inside and outside Germany. Inside Germany the special attention given to right-wing extremism has produced the effect that a majority of people refuse to have right-wing extremists as neighbours: 62 per cent of the respondents in a survey conducted in ten European countries in 1990 did so, the average of the ten countries being 38 per cent. With regard to left-wing extremism, the percentage in Germany lay at 51 per cent, with an average of 35 per cent in the ten countries (Ashford and Timms 1992: 14, 15; Barker et al. 1992: 23–37). The fact that intolerance is relatively high with regard to both types of political extremism in Germany refers to the special situation of the Germans: with regard to right-wing extremism they are warned by their history, while with regard to left-wing extremism they were the Eastern Front in the cold war. The change of values Has there been a change of the Germans’ character, of their values and attitudes and typical behaviors, of which the sharper rejection of National Socialism and a greater tolerance toward aliens is a reflection? If we look at the stereotypes used to characterize the Germans, both by others and by the Germans themselves, little seems to have changed. According to a survey conducted in seven Western European countries in 1963, the Germans then were particularly hard-working and busy, disciplined and self-controlled, scientific and exact, forceful, active and dynamic, but also not very reliable, not life-loving and sensuous, not humorous and cheerful, not romantic and emotional, not easily excitable and hotheaded, not chasing after the girls, not superficial and not given to flattery, not lazy and indolent. According to the Italians and French they were also cold and stiff. The Germans described themselves predominantly in the same way, except that they regarded themselves also as pretty reliable and not as cold and stiff as the Italians and the French do (Piel 1988: 180). Nearly 30 years later the Germans still described themselves with the same character traits: in 1991, more than 80 per cent said they were hard-working and busy, order-loving, clean and efficient; according to 62 per cent they were also disciplined. Less than 40 per cent characterized themselves by traits like life-loving and romantic (Allensbach Archive 1991). They saw themselves as particularly qualified for constructing cars, industrial plants and homes, a bit less for composing music, doing scientific research, constructing safe nuclear reactors,

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writing books and making inventions, but much less for staging theater pieces, cooking, painting, producing films and creating fashion (Allensbach Archive 1988/89; 1990a). The characterization of the Germans by others was not very different. According to a 1993 survey in 17 countries, the Germans were successful, hard-working and strong for more than 80 per cent, peaceful, modern, superior, democratic and respected for more than 70 per cent, however also arrogant, humorless, unpredictable, secretive and without feeling for 76 to 60 per cent, and intolerant, unsympathetic and not exemplary for 55 to 38 per cent (Focus 1993: 19–22, no. 9 of 1.3.1993). The hard core of German character traits – hard-working, successful, strong and disciplined – had been maintained. However, because of more than 40 years of peaceful exchange with the Germans those traits had regained a positive value compared with the years after their instrumentalization by the Nazi-regime. Therefore most nations have been fairly sympathetic to the Germans. Out of 150 sympathy points the Germans received between 117 and 139 in 1986, between 123 and 142 in 1989 and between 105 and 137 in 1992, with Japan, Russia and the US as the most sympathetic countries and Denmark, the Netherlands and Israel the least. We learn that sympathy was highest in 1989 and fell in 1992, presumably caused by uncertainty about the future role played by a stronger united Germany and by the growth of riots and violence against foreigners (Focus 1993). But how about the ideals, attitudes and dispositions to act of the Germans? Do they indicate more change than only a regained positive connotation of the German hard-core traits? A survey of 1990 revealed the highest preference of more than 60 per cent for security and protection, law and order, social justice, freedom and autonomy and cleanliness. Less than 35 per cent mentioned upward social mobility (achievement), high income, a faithful Christian life, technical-scientific progress and active participation in political life. The answers in East and West differed little (Allensbach Archive 1990b). At first sight, the results of this survey seem to have shown little change because of the still high ranking of security, law and order and cleanliness. However, there was also the high rank of fourth for freedom and autonomy, the relatively low rank of tenth for the willingness to be efficient and the low rank of twelfth for social achievement in the list of 16 items. These were unexpected results from the point of view of the dominating stereotype of the Germans both in others’ description of them and their own. That a change took indeed place in the values, attitudes and dispositions to act in the postwar decades was confirmed by a set of surveys.

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They reported a decline of hard work, discipline and obedience as well as law and order as dominating value orientations in favor of a growth of the emphasis on freedom and autonomy, self-realization, participation in decision-making, permissiveness and tolerance. According to surveys, the understanding of life as a task was expressed by 59 per cent of the respondents in 1959, by 60 per cent in 1964, 58 per cent in 1968, falling to 43 per cent in 1982 and continuing on that level with only a slight rise to 46 and 45 per cent in 1993 and 1996. The East started on the much higher level of 62 per cent in 1990, coming down to 54 per cent in 1996. The major change in the West took place between 1964 and 1973 and was particularly strongly promoted by the younger generation who grew up in the years of prosperity of the fifties and sixties. The change underlined by the data should not be interpreted as a decline in achievement motivation in general, but rather as a change in its meaning away from the fulfilment of imposed obligations and toward a self-determined life oriented to self-realization (Meulemann 1989: 118, 128–9, based on an Allensbach survey). The major change took place between the mid-sixties and the midseventies and was consolidated in the eighties. The nineties were characterized by continuity in the West and discrepancies between East and West, with the East being on a track of more or less conflictual ‘Westernization’ (Brähler et al. 1994; Meulemann 1995; Meulemann 1998; Schaub 1998; Westle 1999). The pressure on the welfare system exerted by the reunification process and the more open markets resulting from European integration and economic globalization has led to a new emphasis on social justice and a corresponding retreat from freedom and autonomy in the nineties. The same holds true for a renewed significance of law and order as well as the family. Both trends reflect the thematization of social justice, the loss of values and rising youth criminality in the media. Fears of this kind are particularly articulated in the East, but also in the West, so that we find the East in a leading position in this trend. However, these are waves of ups and downs which depend strongly on media talk and cannot be taken as longterm trends based on enduring transformations of the social structure. What can be taken as more enduring, in contrast, is the change away from collectivism, compliance, submission and conformity to individualism, autonomy and free will. This change is indicated by the goals of education. The percentage of people who want to teach obedience and submission to their children went down from 25 per cent in 1951 to 9 per cent in 1995, with the major change taking place between 1967 and 1976. In a complementary way, preference for autonomy and free

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will rose from 41 to 65 per cent, reaching the highest score of 67 per cent in 1989. A less dramatic change took place in the preference for love of order and hard work. This started at 41 per cent in 1951, reached 45 per cent in 1969 and continued on this level – with several ups and downs – until it finally dropped to 33 per cent in 1995. It is important to note that this slightly changed though still existing ‘secondary’ virtue nowadays serves as a basis for working on one’s self-realization and no longer for unreflected obedience (Emnid-Informationen 1951–1989; Klages and Gensicke 1993: 49; Gensicke 1996: 10; Klages 1996: 66). The people called ‘postmaterialists’ according to Inglehart’s terminology, who voted for participation in decision-making and the protection of free speech instead of law and order and fighting inflation when asked to select two of the four policies, increased their percentage from 9.9 to 20.3 between 1970 and 1990, the highest rate after Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in the European Community. The number representing a mixture of materialist and postmaterialist choices went up from 40.5 to 59.1 per cent (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 566–7). Asked to select 5 virtues from a list of 17 in 1981 and 11 in 1990 to the internalization of which children should be educated, the respondents mentioned tolerance and respect for others at 42 per cent in 1981 and 77 per cent in 1990; sense of responsibility at 63 per cent in 1981 and 85 per cent in 1990; independence at 46 per cent in 1981 and 73 per cent in 1990; imagination at 14 per cent in 1981 and 32 per cent in 1990. In tolerance and responsibility the Germans were average in 1990, but in autonomy they were far above average, which was 41 in 9 European nations (Stoetzel 1983: 40; Harding et al. 1986: 8, 9, 20, 21; Ashford and Timms 1992: 62; Barker et al. 1992: 32, 37). According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in spring 1993, in which the respondents had to select 3 of 15 virtues for education, the Germans were far above average in autonomy, with 62 per cent selecting that compared with only 29 in the EC average. Sense of responsibility was slightly above average, with 59 compared with 56 per cent. Good manners were below average, with 32 per cent as against 40, also hard work, with the very low rate of 5 per cent, compared with the also low EC rate of 11 per cent. Very little mentioned was obedience, with only 9 per cent, which is below the EC average of 13 per cent. Love of life was slightly above average with 33 per cent compared with 28. Remarkably, tolerance and respect for others ranged quite below average with 29 per cent, compared with 50 in the EC average (European Commission 1993a: A49).

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A survey on values conducted in 1997 saw partnership, good family life, self-responsibility, friendship, law and order, independence and imaginative creativity placed highest, while belief in God, high living standards, preserving tradition, pride in history, power and influence, political commitment and conforming behavior placed lowest in both East and West and in the same order, except that belief in God was ranked lowest in the East (Gensicke 1998: 88). This change away from collectivism and toward self-determination is corroborated by a set of surveys and can be taken as firmly rooted in society. Nevertheless, law and order, security and support as well as social justice were still important values which gained in relevance in the nineties in the face of transformations caused by reunification and fiercer competition in the European single market and the world market and the media’s giving preference to insecurities like unemployment, loss of values, organized crime and youth criminality. According to Allensbach surveys, law and order was given preference by 70.9 per cent of respondents in 1996, which is only slightly below the 74.1 per cent doing so in 1983. Preference for security and support dropped from 68.7 to 63.1 per cent between 1983 and 1986, and then increased again to 74.1 per cent in 1996. In this context of questions, the Allensbach respondents gave less and less preference to freedom and independence, going down from 71.1 per cent in 1983 to 61.4 per cent in 1992, the last year of purely West German data collection, and then to 58.0 per cent in 1995 with data from the East having been taken into consideration (Allensbach, Institut für Demoskopie 1983–96; Duncker 1998: 71–9). Similar results were yielded by a survey conducted in 1996/97 by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Family, sense of justice, consciousness of duty, securing the future, support, hard work, law and order were top, while pleasure in life, imagination and creativity, nationality, property, wealth and belief in God could be found at the bottom of the rankings (Schaub 1998: 110–11). If we don’t take some of the data from the nineties as indicators of an enduring backlash, there are two virtues in the appreciation of which the Germans differ from their neighbors most notably: autonomy, which is much more appreciated, and tolerance as well as respect for others, which is less emphasized. It seems to be that the Westernization of the German character has brought about a transformation of the successful person, who is less prepared for tolerance and respect for others than are his or her European neighbors, who dedicate themselves a bit less to autonomy and self-realization. It might be that autonomy with self-realization, on the one hand, cannot be

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appreciated at the same time to the same degree as tolerance and respect for others, on the other hand, with the effect that the Germans give more preference to the first virtue than the other European nations. If the data indeed represented differences in character, the Germans would have changed their character in the process of their integration into Western civilization, but they would have done so while maintaining an element of their traditional character, by way of advancing autonomy and self-realization at the cost of tolerance and respect for others. However, we have to acknowledge that a change toward more tolerance has nevertheless occurred, as the European Values Study indicates. The Eurobarometer data show the limits of that change without saying that no change has taken place. Let us look once more at the results of the European Values Study: according to an index of permissiveness, including the toleration of divorce, abortion, homosexuality, prostitution, extra-marital affairs and sexual intercourse in youth, the Germans corresponded nearly to the average of 0.00 with a value of 0.01 out of nine European nations in 1981, and were somewhat above average with the value of 0.28 in 1990 – for example below the French at 0.30 and 0.43, but above the British with90.04 and 0.03. In civil morality the Germans were below the average, with a value of 0.01 in 1981 and 90.13 in 1990 – more moralistic than the French at 90.43 and 90.50 and less moralistic in 1990 than the British with 0.01 and 0.03. Civil morality was indicated by the rejection of tax evasion, fare dodging, not reporting a minor collision at the parking place, rebellion against the police, falsely taking social welfare payments, corruption, buying stolen goods, hindering the freedom to work at strikes, lying in a difficult situation to the advantage of the liar, not returning lost property, political assassination and car joy-riding (Barker et al. 1992: 32, 37). Along with the decline of the conformist law-and-order mentality and the rise of autonomy and self-realization, participation in public affairs and the appreciation of democratic rights have become more and more important. A major visible change came with the student movement in the late sixties and the growth of participation in informal political groups, in citizens’ initiatives and new social movements in the seventies. Like other Western societies, Germany went through a ‘participatory’ revolution at that time (Kaase 1982). Almond’s and Verba’s (1963) Civic Culture Study revealed underdeveloped direct citizen participation in Germany compared with the United Kingdom and the US in 1959. The Germans participated predominantly in elections and in contacting the administration, but much less by way of directly

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addressing their political representatives and joining an informal group. During the 1970s this pattern changed toward much greater participation beyond elections in citizens’ initiatives and social movements. Eurobarometer surveys in 1982, 1984 and 1986 indicated the highest willingness to support the movement for peace, ecology, nature and anti-nuclear activities in West Germany within the European Community (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 580–1). In signing petitions and taking part in demonstrations the Germans have been shown to be about average (World Value Survey 1981–83; Brettschneider et al. 1992: 584–5). The changes in behaviour and behavioural dispositions in the seventies and eighties reflect long-term changes in attitudes toward political participation and democratic rights. The percentage of people reporting interest in politics increased from 27 to 47 per cent between 1952 and 1982. According to an index of political discussion measuring the frequency of political discussion the value for that frequency grew from 1.17 to 2.23 between 1953 and 1976. According to the Eurobarometer survey of spring 1999, the Germans were top in the European Union for saying they discussed politics frequently or occasionally, namely 16 and 66 per cent respectively (European Commission 1999: 2). In a national survey of 1996/97, 31 per cent in the West and 42 per cent in the East claimed to talk about politics frequently, 38 and 36 per cent to do so occasionally (Schaub 1998: 84–5). Asked about the active search for information about the European Union, the Germans recently ranked first among the member states in referring to a daily newspaper, mentioning this source of information at 45 per cent in spring 1999 (European Commission 1999: B66). The number of people who have a clear idea of democratic politics has increased, though there have been some perplexingly low percentages in ‘democratically correct’ answers: 19 per cent opposed the statement that the opposition should support the government in 1968, 29 in 1988; 18 per cent did not think that interest groups had a bad influence on the general welfare of society in 1968, 33 in 1988, 57 per cent supported the right of demonstrating for one’s convictions in 1968, 71 in 1988 (Meulemann 1989: 89). Looking at changes occurring between the fifties and the seventies and up to the early eighties we see a rise of those people who said that a number of political parties was better than only one from 53 to 92 per cent between 1950 and 1978, of those who stated that we needed a parliament from 69 to 82 per cent between 1956 and 1982, of those who thought that a number of politicians was better than only one from 55 to 61 between 1955 and 1967,

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of those who wanted to preserve federalism from 21 to 63 between 1952 and 1980 (Meulemann 1989: 109, based on Allensbach surveys). By 1992, we eventually find high percentages of people who supported the basic principles of a liberal democracy not only in the West, but nearly to the same degree and with nearly identical gradations in the East: freedom of press and opinion – 94 per cent in the West and 90 per cent in the East; several parties – 91 and 82 per cent respectively; regular free elections with secret ballots – 84 and 78 per cent respectively; independent courts judging exclusively according to the law – 78 and 78 per cent respectively; free practice of religion – 72 and 71 per cent respectively; free travel anywhere in the country – 76 and 65 per cent respectively; a strong opposition that keeps the government in check – 62 and 62 per cent respectively; no disadvantage because of belonging to an extreme party 31 and 27 per cent respectively (Rohrschneider 1999: 82, based on an Allensbach survey). What is remarkable, however, is the still widespread negative view of conflict and interest articulation by the mass public, while they were much more appreciated as a vital part of liberal democracy by the political élites, in both East and West: 94.9 per cent of the Eastern élites disagreed with the statement that the general welfare and the interests of the Federal Republic were seriously endangered by the continual clash of demands posed by interest groups in 1992, while 87.4 per cent of the Western élites did so, but only 46 and 49 per cent respectively of the mass publics (and even only 32 and 36 per cent respectively in 1993). The statement that a country’s general welfare should always override the special interests of groups and organizations was supported by 30.4 per cent of the Eastern and 17.3 per cent of the Western élites in 1992, by 93 and 92 per cent of the mass publics in 1992 and by 90 and 85 per cent of the mass publics in 1993 (Rohrschneider 1999: 145). As the surveys indicate, Germany has become a normal member of the Western democracies, with citizens who are committed to the rules of democracy and who make use of their rights to participate at least like the average and in some aspects more than the average of other European countries. How can the change in behaviour, behavioural dispositions, attitudes and values be explained? There is the Inglehart explanation that the value change is an effect of generational change. Because the younger generations grew up on a higher level of material well-being than the older ones they developed more interest in ‘higher’ cultural values like autonomy and participation in decision-making. Though Inglehart’s original data do not include time series, the thesis

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has some plausibility and is also supported by time series demonstrating an increasing percentage of postmaterialists and a decreasing percentage of materialists between 1970 and 1990 (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 566–7, based on Eurobarometer surveys). The time series show that there is a real change and not only a generational difference that could be the same any time. Nevertheless there are other, also plausible explanations, as Meulemann (1989: 122–83) has shown: the growth of education with an ever greater number of people reaching a higher educational level, the expansion of public communication by the mass media and the expansion of participation in public affairs. These three factors all imply that a greater number of people get more extensively used to democratic views and to the rules of the democratic game. The rising level of education, political communication and public participation has a universalizing effect on the moral consciousness of the people; they reach higher levels of morality according to Kohlberg’s (1969, 1987) model of three stages and six phases of the moral consciousness’s development. The masses follow the élites who played a leading role in the establishment of a liberal democratic culture. Élite surveys tell us indeed that the masses lagged behind the élites in supporting liberal democracy, but have closed up a step further in the meantime if we look at the appreciation given for freedom of speech and a comprehensively democratic society (Hoffmann-Lange and Bürklin 1999: 173). The closing of the gap is still incomplete, however, as other survey data show (Rohrschneider 1999: 145).

Integration of immigrants In the light of the German Holocaust identity it has always been important how the Germans deal with immigrants to their country. After the relatively unproblematic absorption of about 8 million German refugees from former German territory and from special areas of German settlement in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1950 (another 4 million settled in East Germany), three types of immigrants have attracted special attention in postwar West Germany: guest workers, resettlers of German origin and asylum seekers. Guest workers came into the country because of special agreements with Southern European countries since 1955 in order to meet the demand for less qualified labor force by an enormously growing economy. The number of guest workers rose from 100 000 in 1955 to 2.6 million in 1973. Further recruitment was stopped by a ban in 1973 as a reaction to the economic crisis in the early seventies. Since the end of the seventies

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immigration of resettlers and asylum seekers has grown, with about 50 000 resettlers and 30 000 to 100000 asylum seekers per year until 1987. From that year on there was a dramatical increase of immigration of first resettlers and then asylum seekers, up to 788 025 in 1992. The number of resettlers rose to almost 400 000 in 1990 and leveled off well above 200 000 in 1991 and 1992. The number of asylum seekers increased to 438 191 in 1992 (Statistisches Bundesamt 1993: 73; Lederer 1997: 181). A much debated change of the law in 1993 that allows the sending back of any asylum seeker intending to enter Germany from a so-called safe country right at the border without any right to apply, and a quota of 225 000 per year for resettlers, have turned the wave of immigration downwards. The number of asylum seekers in 1995 was 127 937, still the second highest number in the world after the US at 147 870 and far above the UK at 43 965 and France at 19 085. From 1985 – the first year of excess immigration after deduction of emigration since 1981 – to 1992, net immigration grew from 55 559 per year to 592 855, just to drop to 407 972 in 1995 (Lederer 1997: 84, 181, 296–7). By the end of 1997, the foreign population in Germany was 7.3 million, that is about 9 per cent of the total population, 97 per cent of the foreigners living in West Germany. The largest groups are the Turks with 1.97 million, the former Yugoslavs with 920 000, the Italians with 560 000, the Greeks with 350 000 and Poles with 290 000. In 1961 the foreign population had been no more than 686 200, that is 1.2 per cent of the total population. Together with Luxembourg, West Germany has shown by far the highest rate of immigration of the EU member states. Between 1960 and 1988 the balance of migration was ;4.7 per 1000 inhabitants. From 1989 to 1992 the rate grew to ;8 (Brettschneider et al. 1992: 489, 491; Statistisches Bundesamt 1993: 87; Lederer 1997: 84, 91; Münz et al. 1997). The influx of immigrants in those years was accompanied also by a dramatic increase in the number of attacks, riots and crimes against foreigners, reaching its peak between mid-1992 and mid-1993, and declining again since. Between 1985 and 1990, there was only a slight growth of reported right-wing violent acts, from 120 to 309 per year; in1991, the number jumped to 1492, to reach 2639 in 1992 and 2232 in 1993, declining to 781 in 1996. The same goes for attacks against immigrants, which increased from 50 to 152 between 1985 and 1990, rose to 1255 in 1991 and even to 2277 in 1992 and, finally, dropped to 441 in 1996. Between 1991 and 1993, the number of reported violations of law with a right-wing extremist background jumped up from

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2426 to 6721 to fall to 2232 again in 1996. Correspondingly, membership in right-wing extremist organizations rose from 20,000 in 1985 to 64,500 in 1993 and dropped again to 45,300 in 1996 (Lederer 1997: 166–9, 171). Public debate focussed on the dramatic growth of both immigration and right-wing extremism. Had the Germans again demonstrated their inability to accept aliens in their country? Was their idea of the nation as rooted in common origin and culture an obstacle to the integration of a society that has become ethnically and culturally pluralistic because of the Europeanization and globalization of modern life, pushed forward by economic growth and the expansion of communication? Did they fail in the integration of their society because they have called in guest workers for economic reasons, resettlers for political reasons and asylum seekers because of the formal humanism of their constitution, but are unprepared and unwilling to conceive of their community of citizens in the same pluralistic terms that correspond to the reality of the people living in Germany? Were they unable to transform the factual pluralism of their society into the normative pluralism of a civil society integrated by a notion of citizenship that was independent of ethnic and cultural origin? Were they unable to conceive of the nation as just that citizens’ community, because they had always interpreted the nation as a community of people tied together by common origin? Were they less prepared for such a pluralistic notion of citizenship in a multicultural society than other Western nations like France, Britain and the United States, which had much more experience in defining the nation as a community of citizens willing to live together, independent of their origin (see Behr 1998)? There is particularly the law that preserves citizenship predominantly for people of common origin. This law has been responsible for an insufficient integration of guest workers into German society thus far. The guest workers were expected to return to their home country, and so no special arrangements were made for their naturalization until 1991. However, most of them have not gone back but have stayed in the country with no status as citizens. Though foreigners share many rights with the native population, they lack political rights, so that they cannot participate in political decision-making. This is particularly a problem in the big cities with a foreign population of up to 26 per cent of the inhabitants (Deutscher Städtetag 1992: 26). Up until its reform in 1999, the German law on citizenship, which goes back to a statute of 1913, was a ius sanguinis and granted the right to citizenship only to the children of German parents, independently

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of the place of residence of the parents and the birthplace of the child. There was no right to citizenship because of birth on German territory (a ius soli ), or because of residence in the country for a number of years. Foreigners who had lived for at least ten years in Germany could be granted citizenship, but they had no right to it. After 1991, young foreigners between the age of 16 and 23 were taken into citizenship, if they applied for it and gave up their former citizenship (Hailbronner and Renner 1991; Brubaker 1992: 114–37, 165–78; Hailbronner 1992a; Tränhardt 1995). In international comparison, Germany has been one of the most restrictive countries with regard to the naturalization of immigrants into citizens, along with Switzerland. In 1987, for example, there were 23 781 naturalizations because of the right to it, which means German descent; 14 029 naturalizations were granted according to administrative discretion. The numbers correspond to the average of the decade between 1977 and 1987. With regard to the 4.2 million foreigners living in West Germany at that time, we note 8.92 naturalizations per 1000 foreigners, and only 3.31 if we don’t count the naturalizations by right, granted to resettlers based on ius sanguinis. In comparison, the corresponding rate in France was 13.18. In Sweden the rate was 42.67 in 1988 and 56.02 in 1991 (Institut National 1989: 88; Nordic Statistical Secretariat 1989/90: 39, 43, 72; 1993: 43, 50, 71; Statistisches Bundesamt 1992: 71–2). Until 1995, the number of naturalized resettlers with a claim to citizenship had increased to 281 718 per year, while naturalization according to discretion remained at the level of 31 888. This must be seen against the backdrop of 7.2 million foreigners in the same year. A comparison of naturalization on the basis of discretion and acquired rights shows 61 625 in 1994 for Germany, 77 515 for France, 44 033 for the United Kingdom and 407 398 for the US (Lederer 1997: 60, 77). The law and the restrictive practice show that Germany adhered to the idea of the Volksnation (folk nation) for a long time, taking blood ties as the criterion for citizenship and the national community. Germany’s preference for an ethnic-cultural definition of the nation should, however, not simply be explained by an unwillingness to adopt the standards set by the most liberal democracies and to abandon an idea of societal community which had been abused by the Nazi regime. A major reason for the maintenance of the ethnic-cultural definition of the nation before reunification was accomplished could be found in the country’s assuming of responsibility for former Germans who lived under the rule of communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

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Article 116 of the German Constitution entitles ethnic German refugees from communist regimes to German citizenship. With the influx of guest workers and their staying in the country, the growth in their numbers as a result of the uniting of family (even after the recruitment stop established during the oil crisis of 1973) and the waves of asylum seekers starting in the 1980s and culminating in the early 1990s, the conflict between liberals and conservatives as to who should belong to the nation sharpened. The liberals have argued for an acknowledegment of de facto immigration by a special immigration law, which determines rates of immigration on universalist grounds and puts an end to preferential treatment on ethnic grounds. The conservatives have maintained the position that ‘Germany is not a country of immigration’. For the guest workers, a restrictive foreigner law established by the Nazi regime was applied until 1965, when a new foreigner law was enacted which, however, was still rather restrictive in character. Continued settlement of foreigners depended on bureaucratic discretion. The precarious status of foreigners was improved by regulations in 1978, which allowed the granting of an unrestricted residence permit after a five-year stay in the country and the right of residence after eight years. After several unsuccessful attempts, it was finally Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble who succeeded in having a new foreigner law passed in 1990. This new law is much more liberal in respecting the rights of foreigners, reflecting the practice of court rulings up to the Constitutional Court, which have guarded the rights of foreigners against popular restrictive politics, particularly as far as continued settlement is concerned ( Joppke 1999: 62–99). The unabated influx of asylum seekers, along with the extremely long duration of procedures of acknowledgment of up to eight years, with rights thus acquired to stay in the country, all accompanied by waves of attacks on foreigners, drove the German democratic system into an exceptional situation of crisis. In a compromise between government (CDU/CSU–FDP) and opposition (SPD), with the Greens abstaining, the most liberal article 16 on asylum of the constitution was changed in 1993 to exclude access of asylum seekers from safe third states around Germany and safe home countries. In another wave, a limitation of immigration by resettlers to 225 000 per year and a termination of the granting of citizenship was set so that people born on foreign territory after 1 January 1993 are no longer automatically entitled to citizenship on the basis of having far-back German ancestors. This change away from the ethnic-cultural definition of the

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nation was made possible after the successful reunification and the end of the need to give ethnic Germans under communist rule a chance to join their German relatives in a free society. In recent years there was a discussion on allowing double citizenship for those foreigners who would fulfill the criteria for granting citizenship but do not want to give up their former citizenship. In particular the largest group of guest workers, the Turks, would profit from such an arrangement. The still undecided status of guest workers, of their children and even grandchildren in the second and third generations is a major block on the integration of society, a cause of alienation and lack of commitment on the part of the guest workers and for suspicion on the part of the native population. The newest reform of the law on citizenship, effective since 1 January 2000, has introduced an element of ius soli, has made naturalization easier and tolerates double citizenship at least for a limited time and for a wider scope of reasons. Children are considered German if one parent has their usual residence in the country and has been entitled to residence for three years or, rather, has an unlimited authorization. As this brings about double citizenship with a country that grants citizenship on the basis of descent, the young man or woman has to opt for one of the two (or even more) citizenships at the age of 18. Their German citizenship remains valid only as long as they have documented the abandoning of their other citizenship no later than at the age of 23. A prolongation beyond the age of 23 is possible, if an application for maintaining one’s citizenship status is filed before the age of 21. Further, there is now a right of naturalization after eight years of residence (it was 15 years before), and the toleration of reasons for multiple citizenship has been extended. Children aged up to ten years at the time of the new law’s coming into effect were granted the right to be naturalized, if they filed an application before the end of 2000 (Huber and Butzke 1999; Innenausschuß des Bundestages 1999). In terms of law, Germany is no longer any more restrictive with regard to granting citizenship than the most liberal Western states. And in terms of official policy, Germany has adopted the French idea of a nation united not by descent but by political will, as declared by Minister of the Interior Otto Schily (1999) when he approved Ernest Renan’s French definition of the nation of 1882 in his speech on the new citizenship law in the federal parliament on 7 May 1999. The boundaries between citizens and non-citizens are less sharply delineated than before. There is a broader zone in between, comprising ius soli citizens, naturalized immigrants with one single passport, citizens

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with two or more passports, and permanent or temporary residents who are not citizens but who share basic rights with citizens. This is what the law supplies. On the demand side, we see a corresponding differentiation within the various groups of immigrants according to the preference they give to one or the other of these different kinds of inclusion. At a time of increased individual mobility, many of them seize the chances offered by their country of residence without giving up the ties with their country of origin. Naturalization of foreigners has increased since 1991, when the law was liberalized for the first time, particularly as regards immigrants from Turkey, though practically not at all as far as immigrants from Italy are concerned. The reason for this difference is the fact that Italians are much less in need of this process than Turks because of their rights as EU citizens (Statistisches Bundesamt 1992: 72, 1999: 65). According to data from the Socioeconomic Panel, the intention to apply for naturalization has increased particularly with those who identify least with their home country, which is more the case with younger people. And the number of those who have such an intention is much higher if they can retain citizenship in their home country, namely roughly 60 per cent as against 25 per cent. Nevertheless, around 40 as opposed to 75 per cent would not apply for citizenship, even were double citizenship allowed to them (SOEP 1994, 1995 and 1996 waves 11 to 13, cited by Wobbe and Otte 2000: 451–3). There is a change in the acknowledgment of such a status between two or more countries. As long as the nation state was the sole guarantor of a citizen’s security, and as long as this security entailed a strict demarcation line of belongingness, everybody who was a person inbetween two or more nations was suspected of being potentially unreliable in situations of loyalty conflict. In a world of growing cooperation beyond national boundaries including cooperation between governments, non-governmental organizations, companies and single individuals, people in between are much less of a danger because of possible loyalty conflicts, but represent much more of a chance of furthering transnational integration to the advantage of national populations. This historical change in the situation has led to a wider willingness to supply equal rights in the zone of intersection between citizens and non-citizens and to a broader differentiation of the demand for rights in this zone of intersection on the part of the immigrants. This step toward deterritorialized supply and demand is, on the one hand, a result of the factual establishment of transnational ties and is, on the other hand, a promoter of the continued construction of

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such ties. The deconstruction of the nation to some degree and the construction of transnational integration go hand in hand (Kastoryano 1996). Even though Germany was especially restrictive in granting citizenship to its immigrants up until the latest reform, the strong support of basic human rights by the constitution, the idea of the welfare state which accomplishes welfare for everybody on its territory and strong independent courts have endowed immigrants with rights which come close to the rights of citizens, with the exception of voting rights. This can be called a kind of ‘postnational membership’ (Soysal 1994). The courts made the temporary guest workers a community of permanent residents, which expanded along with follow-up immigration through family integration (Neumann 1990; Joppke 1999: 62–99). The relevant argument says that foreigners receive the constitution’s legal protection in exercising rights, the longer they stay in the Federal Republic so that their rights come close to those of Germans (Isensee 1974; Schwerdtfeger 1980). In this respect, the practice of acknowledging rights has been especially liberal, which is contrary to the formal restriction in granting citizenship. Here we see a major tension in the German way of integrating immigrants. On the one hand, the ‘guest workers’ have been welcomed on the assumption of a temporary stay in terms of official politics and public opinion. On the other hand, the commitment to basic rights in the constitution and their enforcement by independent courts have created a new reality: a country with a considerable number of immigrants with permanent residence who share rights with the Germans, but who are not considered citizens in the formal sense. This undecided status prevents both the immigrants gaining full assimilation and the natives fully accepting them; this in turn supports both the attempts at ethnic revival by second-generation immigrants and the attempts at rejecting immigration by radical rightwing extremists (Joppke 1999: 186–222). However, it can be assumed that the liberalization of the citizenship law, with its effect of widening the zone of intersection between citizens and non-citizens, will contribute to integration in the long run. This will, however, not be an integration on the basis of clear-cut boundaries between insiders and outsiders, but one which rests exactly on a broader overlap between them. On the one hand, this gives immigrants a wider choice between modes of affiliation so that it is easier for them to live between two loyalty claims. On the other hand, the native population becomes more aware of the fact that there is no clear-cut demarcation between insiders and outsiders and learns to live better together with people at

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the margins of traditional nationhood. This will be by no means a process without conflicts, so that we cannot say that waves of xenophobia will no longer occur. However, inasmuch as open boundaries with a wider zone of intersection between citizens and non-citizens become a legitimized matter of fact, sanctions on xenophobic acts will be rooted in a broader consensus and will therefore be more effective. On the way toward such a more relaxed handling of open boundaries, Germany had to go through a serious crisis of integration in the 1990s, and today has to continue along a path strewn with conflicts. A major problem was raised by the dramatic growth in the number of asylum seekers, the crisis pointing to the contradiction between the formal humanism of the constitution and the marked shortcomings of the population in living up to that standard of humanism. The sheer number of asylum seekers has raised the question, of whether it is political persecution or economic expectation of a better living in Germany that is behind the applications. The fact that thus far no more than 5 per cent have been accepted as real refugees seems to support such doubts. We should also note that in no other European country have the numbers of people applying for asylum been comparable to those in Germany since the late seventies, and particularly in the late eighties and early nineties: 193 063 in 1990, 256 112 in 1991, 438 191 in 1992 and 127 937 in 1995. The numbers in the other larger European countries in 1992 were 28 872 in France, 32 300 in the United Kingdom and 2588 in Italy (Eurostat 1991: 18; Reermann 1992: 17, 21; Statistisches Bundesamt 1993: 73; Lederer 1997: 297), and though the riots and violent acts against foreigners in Germany in 1992 and 1993 have attracted most international attention, it cannot be said that there was really more xenophobia in Germany than in France, the United Kingdom or Italy in those years. According to a report in the Financial Times, 6559 racist violent acts were registered in England and Wales in 1991, that is four times more than in Germany in 1991, and three times more than in Germany in 1992 (Tränhardt 1993: 338). If we look at the data on attitudes toward foreigners we discover first a striking development. Contrary to the impression given by the wave of right-wing violence against foreigners, the acceptance of foreigners by the native population generally grew in the decade between 1980 and 1990 and remained on the level of 1990 in the early nineties or else increased or decreased only slightly, dependent on the foreign groups in question and the questions asked. According to Allbus surveys conducted in 1980, 1984, 1988 and 1990, restrictive attitudes

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toward guest workers went down from about 55 to about 35 per cent of the respondents. Four statements were combined to indicate a restrictive attitude: guest workers should (1) adjust better to the German style of living, (2) be sent back if jobs are needed, (3) not be allowed any political activity, (4) marry among their own kind (ZA 1980, 1984, 1988, 1990; Küchler 1994: 56). In 1990, a majority of 47 per cent saw the presence of guest workers as an advantage, 19 per cent as a disadvantage and 34 per cent were indifferent. The percentage of West German respondents who consider the guest workers as needed by the economy rose from 39 to over 75 per cent between 1986 and 1992. However, only a third of the East Germans gave this answer in 1992, certainly because of their high unemployment rate (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1986, 1987; ZA 1990; Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1992; Küchler 1994: 57–8). With regard to asylum seekers we have a similar situation. Surveys conducted by Politbarometer in 1986, 1988, 1989 and 1992 show an increase of the approval rate from 66 to 90 per cent in the West, with the figure in East Germany rising between 1991 and 1992 from 76 to 89 per cent. However, with the dramatic growth in the numbers of asylum seekers grew the suspicion that they came more for economic reasons than political persecution: 77 per cent of the West Germans attributed economic reasons to the asylum seekers in 1986 and wanted to apply more restrictive measures. In 1992 between 64.2 and 76.5 per cent in the West and between 75.7 and 88 per cent in the East believed that most asylum seekers misused Germany’s law on granting asylum; 60 per cent in the West and over 70 per cent in the East supported a constitutional change in a more restrictive direction. 75 per cent in the West and 90 per cent in the East expressed the opinion that Germany would no longer be able to accept all asylum seekers; 75 per cent of the West Germans approved the new rules introduced by a compromise between the CDU/CSU and FDP (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1986, 1992, 1993; Küchler 1994: 58–9; Ohlemacher 1994: 230). It is remarkable that the attitude toward resettlers has changed in the direction of more restriction. The dramatic surge of remigration by resettlers in the late eighties was accompanied by a decline of approval from about 56 to less than 40 per cent between November 1988 and August 1989 (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1988, 1989; Küchler 1994: 59). According to an Allensbach survey, resettlers are regarded as Germans only by 31 per cent of the respondents, with 40 per cent recognizing them only partly and 29 per cent seeing them not as Germans (Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1993: 520). The Ethnic Settlers

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Reintegration Act, effective since 1 July 1990, and the War Consequences Consolidation Act, effective since 1 January 1993, have restricted resettlement. Now up to 225 000 can remigrate to Germany per year, and nobody born after 1 January 1993 will be recognized as a German national (Küchler 1994: 50, 59). We discover here that the Germans do not want to privilege resettlers with regard to immigration. That is, they do not feel closer to them than to guest workers from Southern Europe or to asylum seekers. Contrary to the law, they do not include them in the German nation according to the principle of common origin. Many of them do not speak German and have lived far away from Germany, whereas Southern European guest workers have lived in West Germany for decades. Therefore, for most Germans it is no longer justified to treat resettlers differently, because of the ius sanguinis. This attitude can be read as indicating an increased openness of the Germans for a pluralistic notion of citizenship and for turning the primordial notion according to common origin slightly downwards in its importance. But it can also be taken as indicating the rejection of resettlers because of too great a cultural difference, which conforms to the cultural aspect of the traditional idea of the nation. It is most probable that both attitudes exist side by side, with even a predominance of the traditional one (for a qualitative study, see Honolka and Götz 1999). How do the Germans stand in their attitudes toward foreigners in comparison with other nations? Surveys conducted in a number of European countries give us an answer to this question. According to the European Values Studies, conducted in 1981 and 1990, the Germans were well above the average and joined the ethnically most intolerant nations in 1981, but they were about average in 1990. With an average of 0.00, they were at 0.30 in 1981 and 0.17 in 1990. The values for France were 90.18 and 0.08, the values for the United Kingdom 0.11 and 0.06. Intolerance with regard to deviant people – drug addicts, alcoholics, former criminals, homosexuals, aids-infected persons and emotionally unstable persons – remained unchanged slightly above average at 0.12 and 0.11. The values for France and the United Kingdom were 90.42 and 90.23, 0.09 and 0.10. The Germans are highest in their intolerance toward political extremists, with even more intolerance in 1990 than in 1981. The values were 0.48 in 1981 and 0.68 in 1990, in France 90.40 in 1981 and 90.01 in 1990, in the United Kingdom 90.09 in 1981 and 0.06 in 1990 (Ashford and Timms 1992: 14–15 Barker et al. 1992: 23–7 ). The change toward more ethnic tolerance corroborates the above noted change toward more acceptance of foreigners, and it

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demonstrates that the Germans are no different from their European neighbors in their attitudes toward foreigners. That there is no difference is supported also by data from a fall 1997 Eurobarometer survey on the feeling of people in the presence of aliens. Asked whether they are disturbed by the presence of people of another nationality or race, 13 per cent of the Germans say ‘Yes’ and 79 ‘No’ with regard to nationality, 15 per cent ‘Yes’, 76 per cent ‘No’ with regard to race, with nearly no difference between East and West. The numbers were at about the EU average of 13 to 83 and 15 to 81 per cent. In France, the figures with regard to nationality were 12 to 85, with regard to race 19 to 78. The United Kingdom was at 12 to 86 and 12 to 86 (European Commission 1997b: B75, 77). A similar picture is drawn by the reactions to the dramatic growth of immigration in the early nineties. In nearly each member state of the European Union the population was concerned with the problem of increased immigration. Between 1989 and 1993 the unweighted mean of respondents who say that too many foreigners (from outside the EC in 1991, 1992 and 1993) live in their country went up from 39 to 53 per cent in the following seven countries: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and Denmark. The exact figures by country were as follows: In East Germany the percentage increased from 45 to 57 between 1991 and 1993, in West Germany from 45 to 50 between 1989 and 1993. Between 1989 and 1993 the percentage grew in France from 44 to 56, in the United Kingdom from 45 to 50, in the Netherlands from 31 to 47, in Italy from 34 to 64, in Belgium from 43 to 54, in Denmark from 34 to 43 (European Commission 1989: 47; 1991: 42; 1992a: A41, 1993a: A51; Küchler 1994: 64). In fall 1997, the attitudes were once again a bit more favorable to foreigners. The ‘too many’ statement was supported by 52 per cent in Germany, 46 per cent in France and 42 per cent in the UK, the EU average accounting for 45 per cent (European Commission 1997b: B73). With regard to the acceptance of asylum seekers, the reactions in Germany are no different from those in the other EU countries faced with the problem. In 1993, in the EU average, 24 per cent wanted to accept them without restrictions, 51 with restrictions, 19 did not want to accept them at all, 6 did not know. In Germany the numbers were 22, 54, 21 and 4, respectively, with more acceptance in the East than in the West. The numbers in France were 21, 46, 30 and 4, respectively, in the United Kingdom 18, 57, 19 and 5. The least restrictive country was Denmark with 36, 55, 8 and 2 (European Commission 1993a, A54).

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In fall 1997, the percentages in Germany were 13, 61, 21 and 5, which is a bit more restrictive than the EU average of 20, 55, 18 and 7, but not more restrictive than France or the United Kingdom (European Commission 1997b: B71). The Germans were about average in accepting people from south of the Mediterranean to work in the EU: 15 per cent without restrictions, 56 with restrictions and 25 no acceptance. The rejection was here highest in France, namely 10, 50 and 37 in the same order of the questions. With regard to people from Eastern Europe wishing to work in the EU, the Germans were more restrictive than the average: 3 per cent wanted to welcome them without restrictions, 54 with restrictions and 37 not at all. The EU average was 12, 59 and 23 in the same order of the questions. The reason for the differences is different affections. The French are more affected by immigration from south of the Mediterranean, the Germans more by that from Eastern Europe. The results of the fall 1997 survey were the same (European Commission 1993a: A52, 53; 1997b: B67, 69). The data show that the reaction of the Germans to foreigners is no different from that of their European neighbors. Negative attitudes toward foreigners are more often expressed, if the population of a country is unfamiliar with foreigners. The impression that too many foreigners live in the country is more often given if their number is higher relative to the native population. A Eurobarometer survey of 1989 demonstrates, for example, that judgements about foreigners are relatively negative in Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain, where they are less than 1 per cent of the population, whereas the attitudes are less negative in France, Belgium and Germany, with 4 to 5.5 per cent foreigners. The explanation for the difference here is familiarity (Münch 1993b: 230–2). The impression that too many foreigners live in the country grew with the sheer number of foreigners relative to the native population. Less than 20 per cent said ‘too many foreigners’ in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece, with less than 1 per cent foreigners, 43 to 46 per cent do so in Belgium, France and West Germany with 4 to 5.5 per cent foreigners. West Germany ranked highest in both: 5.5 per cent foreigners and 46 per cent thinking they are too many. However, as a deviant case, in the United Kingdom we found 44 per cent were stating ‘too many’ but there were only 2.5 per cent foreigners. The results of the fall 1997 survey show that the feeling of having too many foreigners in one’s country had grown throughout the EU member states to 45 per cent compared with 1989, with Germany above the average at 52 per cent. France and the United Kingdom were around the average at 46 and 42 per cent. Greece (71), Belgium (60), Italy (53)

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and Austria (50) expressed most fears of too many foreigners, together with Germany. In comparison with 1993, the scores of 1997 had, however, dropped again from the EU average of 52 per cent (European Commission 1989: 45; Scheuch 1991: 162–3; European Commission 1997b: B73, 1993a: A51). Looking at specific foreigner groups which dominate in certain countries did not reveal much difference between German attitudes toward Turks, British attitudes toward Asians and West Indians and Dutch attitudes toward Turks and Surinamers, if we asked for sympathy, fear, irritation and admiration. This was the result of a survey in 1988. Sympathy for Turks was about 36, fear of them about 12, irritation for them about 20 and admiration about 15 per cent in Germany. The British natives showed about 30 per cent sympathy, 10 to 12 per cent fear, 31 per cent irritation and 25 per cent admiration with regard to Asians and West Indians, the Dutch about 30 per cent sympathy, 5 per cent fear, 19 to 20 per cent irritation and 15 to 21 per cent admiration with regard to Turks and Surinamers. The relationship of the French to the Africans and Asians was a bit different. They demonstrated about 42 per cent sympathy for Africans and 50 for Asians, 20 per cent fear of Africans and 4 of Asians, 28 per cent irritation regarding Africans and 4 regarding Asians, 14 per cent admiration for Africans and 32 for Asians (Küchler 1994). What we learned here about the Germans is that they were a bit higher in sympathy and lower in irritation, about equal in fear and a bit lower in admiration toward Turks than the British toward the Asians and West Indians. Their relationship to Turks was similar to the relationship of the Dutch to Turks and Surinamers, with a bit more sympathy and fear on the part of the Germans, and a bit more admiration for Turks by the Dutch. Compared with French relations with Africans, the Germans had a bit less sympathy, but also less fear and less irritation concerning Turks. Toward Asians, the French were more sympathetic and admiring than all other natives in respect of their major foreign groups. However, if we look at the preferred long-term policy as to the foreigners, we realize an effect of the official German policy which has regarded Turks as guest workers with only a temporary stay in Germany: 9.3 per cent wanted them all sent back in the long run, 16.6 per cent would return all foreign-born ones, 10.7 per cent wanted to keep them all. Only the French prefer that policy toward Africans to the same degree: 6.9 per cent voted to send back all, 19.3 to send back all foreign-born, 10.3 per cent to keep them all. The numbers for the French in respect of Asians were 3.3, 10.4 and 14.5,

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for the British regarding Asians 8.9, 11.6 and 15.4, with regard to the West Indians 5.3, 10.5 and 16.4, for the Dutch relating to Turks 5.0, 5.0 and 15.9, to Surinamers 3.4, 6.8 and 14.7 (Küchler 1994: 68; European Commission 1988: 64) Here we have a first real difference between the Germans’ relationship to their foreigners and that of the other nations, reflecting the official policy toward the guest workers. Official policy conceived of the nation in primordial terms of common origin up until the Reform Act which came into effect in January 2000. Article 116 (1) of the Basic Law considers the descendants of German farmers and craftsmen in Eastern Europe, particularly Russia and Romania, as Germans though their ancestors settled there as early as in the 18th century. The law of citizenship goes back to 1913 and was basically a ius sanguinis, however, with some change toward easier access to citizenship for young descendants of guest workers since the reforms of 1991 and 1999. Nevertheless, the foreigners enjoy the same rights as German citizens aside from political rights. And as the data demonstrate, German identity and the German idea of the nation do not make a difference with regard to the native population’s attitude toward foreigners. The explanation of the noted waves of xenophobia and violence against foreigners cannot be sought in the peculiarly German idea of the nation as a primordial group of common origin and in xenophobia as a specific element of German identity. A multivariate model of the above mentioned Allbus data explained negative attitudes toward foreigners in Germany by four main variables: the lower the educational level achieved, the more the political orientation leans toward the right, while the higher the level of relative deprivation, the more negative attitudes toward foreigners were expressed. This result was also corroborated for all member states of the European Union with a multivariate analysis of the above discussed Eurobarometer-data (Küchler 1994: 59–63, 68–9; see also Willems 1993: 247–67 and Rosar 2000). Thus the recent wave of xenophobia and violence against foreigners has to be explained by social-structural variables that have been effective in all countries, independently of the cultural differences. Contemporary German identity does not produce any more xenophobia, right-wing extremism and violence against foreigners than the other nations compared here, though there are still differences in the concept of the nation. An analysis of Eurobarometer surveys conducted for the late 1980s and the 1990s with regard to various aspects of ethnocentrism (attitudes toward the number of foreigners in the country,

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feeling disturbed by people of different nationality, race or religion, rejection of immigrants) reveals that Germany is not different from other European countries in a similar situation (Rosar 2000: 199–214). With regard to factual violence against foreigners beyond attitudes, at least spectacular incidents and follow-up crimes seem to signal that the way from attitude to violence is shorter in Germany than elsewhere. It is, however, difficult to prove this impression becaue of the very different methods applied for gathering data in the different countries. A comparison between Germany and the United States shows 10 or 0.12 right-wing extremist homicides per 1 million inhabitants and 13 or 0.16 per 1 million inhabitants for Germany, 20 or 0.16 and 12 or 0.05 homicides classified as hate crimes for the United States in 1995 and 1996. The figures for assault classified as right-wing extremist in Germany or hate crime in the United States were 509 or 6.23, 507 or 6.19 in Germany and 3064 or 15.47, 3206 or 14.35 in the United States (Rosar 2000: 17, based on Bundesministerium des Inneren 1997 and Federal Bureau of Investigation 1998). Reflecting about incidents of right-wing extremist violence in Germany, we also have to bear in mind that violence motivated by left-wing extremism was stronger in Germany than in other Western countries in the seventies and eighties. This German peculiarity could be eplained by the fact that the stronger rejection of left-wing and right-wing extremism by the political élite in Germany, supported by the majority of the people and by corresponding restrictions to their access to political representation have, more than anywhere else, channelled their articulation into violent forms. Possibly, spectacular incidents of political violence are the other side of the particularly strong rejection of political etremism in Germany, both left-wing and right-wing extremism. There has been an accommodation to living with foreigners over the decades since the first guest workers came to West Germany in the midfifties. However, relatively little contact has existed between natives and guest workers. The latter live in segregated neighborhoods and according to survey data of 1980, 1984, 1988 and 1990 not more than about 10 per cent of the respondents have had personal relationships with guest workers; 70 per cent say that there is no contact in the family, among friends, in the neighborhood or at the workplace. Where such contact is given, however, the attitude toward foreigners is more positive. Beyond that, the Germans are prepared to accept those foreigners for citizenship who have lived in the country for a long time: 80 per cent of the West Germans supported facilitating their naturalization in 1993 (ZA 1980, 1984, 1988, 1990; Küchler 1994: 56–7). A recent comprehensive analysis

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of available Allbus survey data shows that relationships between the native population and foreigners have considerably grown in number between 1980 and 1996. Correspondingly, negative attitudes toward foreigners have somewhat declined with regard to the denial of political activity, re-migration in case of lacking employment and rejetion of marriage between natives and foreigners, yet not with regard to requiring assimilation in life-style. A multivariate analysis clearly reveals that attitudes toward foreigners took a far more positive turn when relationships between natives and foreigners were established among one’s friends (Rosar 2000: 301) However, the accommodation of the majority of Germans to living together with foreigners and their increased willingness to facilitate their naturalization and to accept them as citizens by no means preclude the occurrence of xenophobia and violent action against foreigners. Modernization has always produced winners and losers. And those who fear being among the losers – whether they are right or not – have always joined movements that direct their aggression toward those people who are seen as the sources of negative changes: sharpened competition on income, jobs, housing and social welfare payments. Foreigners are a visible social group, which is least integrated in the solidarity network of the native population and has come ostensibly from the outside. Therefore, they are most likely to serve as targets for rising aggression when frustration grows and fears are intensified by rapid social change in the shape of economic crisis and sharpened competition. If this situation meets with a dramatic growth of immigration that is additionally made even more dramatic by over-representation in the media, xenophobia and violence against foreigners grow particularly among those who are least open-minded and feel least secure in their social status: the less educated and those who feel relatively deprived in comparison with others. Modernization involves the expansion of markets and therefore always deprives people of those privileges that to date have been stabilized under the protection of smaller local, regional and national markets. It also implies the equalization of chances to participate in the competition for income and social status. The enhanced equality of opportunity, however, sharpens competition and thus produces fear of losing one’s status or of not achieving as much as one would wish. The more that markets and the equality of opportunity are globalized, and the more that people are mobilized at a global level in the course of seeking better opportunities, so that migration increases, the more will people clash on the basis of ethnic solidarity, because ethnicity

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becomes the most visible aspect of group membership in a globally mobilized world. This is the situation that produces waves of xenophobia, violence against foreigners and ethnic conflicts again and again everywhere as part of the never ending process of modernization (Heitmeyer 1992; Otto and Merten 1993; Willems 1993; MüllerSchneider 1999). If there are majorities that are open-minded and willing to accept foreigners as members of a pluralistic community of citizens, if the democratic system is strong enough to settle the conflicts, if social policies provide for enough job security and compensations for relative deprivation, and if immigration is kept in balance with the capacity for integration with facilitating the acquisition of full citizenship, the conflicts unavoidably produced by modernization will be kept under control, but never completely precluded. The open-mindedness of the majority toward foreigners is even increasingly accompanied by the aggression against foreigners of the close-minded minority. At the extremes, love and hatred of foreigners coexist together. This tension is revealed by a comprehensive analysis of survey data (Rosar 2000). The idea of a pluralistic community of citizens as the basis of a nation – as has been furthest advanced in the United States – is certainly better accommodated to the conditions of modern life than the idea of a community of people with a common origin. The German idea of the nation will always at least provide the legitimation for constricting immigration and the naturalization of immigrants. As survey data show, however, this does not imply that the Germans are less able to live together with foreigners and to accept them as members of the national community than are other European nations. This is because no European society – nor even the United States – has completely institutionalized the idea of pluralistic citizenship; because in every European society the primordial concept of the nation as a community of common origin is still in effect; because postwar Germany has become more pluralistic by fact, which has moved the idea of the nation toward the pluralistic community of citizens; and because modernization produces ethnic conflicts for structural reasons, independently of cultural differences and of the officially declared idea of the nation. There is no longer a sharp difference between the political and the ethnic-cultural concept of nationhood and citizenship; instead, we find mixtures of them, weighted more or less to one side or the other, no matter whether we look at France, Britain, Germany or even the United States (Heckmann and Bosswick 1995; Soysal 1996: 17; Behr 1998).

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The factual pluralization of German society’s solidarity structure has been complemented by philosophical contributions to a new understanding of patriotism. According to a proposal first formulated by Dolf Sternberger (1982) and later on also advocated by Jürgen Habermas (1986), the Germans should give their first loyalty to the constitution, the Basic Law, which should replace the loyalty to the German nation in the primordial sense (Schwan 1989). However, such an idea will remain an empty philosophical phrase if there is no growth in the everyday contacts of the people across the boundaries of ethnic groups. Only as far as such a change occurs will primordial loyalties be weakened and non-primordial ones strengthened. Loyalty to the rules of a constitution can never replace solidarity between real people and their loyalty to a real, existing group of human beings. I will be able to grant the same constitutional rights only to those people with whom I feel a commonality, and I will feel a commonality only with those people with whom I am used to sharing a common life. And unavoidably this sharing of a common life always implies by definition drawing a distinction and establishing a boundary between those who belong to the community and those who do not belong. Even the most pluralistic community of citizens will draw such a distinction as long as it doesn’t dissolve in a world without boundaries. People coming later will always be foreigners for those who are already there. For the pluralistic nation of the United States, people from all over the world constitute the nation, yet nevertheless when waves of immigration have caused serious problems of integration since the beginning of the twentieth century that pluralistic nation also began to control the number and quota of immigrants and to reject immigrants, considered as too many from a certain area, for example, too many Mexicans from Mexico. The Germans tend to accept guest workers residing in Germany for 20, 30 or even 40 years as citizens with equal rights, however – together with their long-term immigrants – they tend to be more restrictive in numbers and quota with regard to granting citizenship to new immigrants. The major problem for the country is to settle the conflict that has arisen between, on one hand, official politics and its expression in the prevailing public attitude, which considers immigrants as guests who are in the country only temporarily and, on the other hand, the actual reality of an immigration that results in permanent residence supported by a liberal constitution and liberal courts. The Reform Act on citizenship, which became effective in January 2000, is a step toward the resolution of this conflict. There are three positions with regard to the factual pluralization of the nation and the growing zone of intersection between citizens and

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non-citizens: back to the nation of origin (Faul 1992); open republic (Oberndörfer 1994); and constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1992: 632–60; 1996). The first position places special emphasis on the homogeneity requirements of a working democracy; the second one on the universalist commitment of a republic; the third one on the linkage of moral universalism, rule of law and democracy and the integrative power of the constitution in a pluralistic society (Rieger 1998: 50–66).

Integration into Europe The Germans are considered promoters of European integration, and the Germans see themselves in the same way. In a survey conducted in 1986, the highest percentage of Europeans and Germans, namely 41 and 77 per cent, placed Germany first with regard to the country’s efforts in integrating Europe (Noelle-Neumann and Herdegen 1987; Weidenfeld and Korte 1991: 209). This might be a reflection of the real efforts of the German political leadership from Adenauer to Kohl, based on one of the premises of German foreign politics across all major parties: that acceptance of Germany after World War II and the Nazi crimes, support for Germany in its front position toward the Soviet block, and Germany’s own long-term goal of reunification had all to be secured by the country not only showing absolute loyalty to its Western allies but also playing a constructive role in building and maintaining supranational Western institutions. The latter meant particularly the European Community and NATO. Until the Soviet block broke down West German politics had been most of all directed toward keeping the European and the North Atlantic loyalties in balance. Since 1989, however, there has been a clear priority for the further development of the European Union, while the relationship to the US is now being unavoidably turned more in the direction of economic competition in the triangle of Japan, the US and the European Union. Compared with the priority of the European integration for the political leadership, the attitude of the German population to European integration is just on an average level, if we compare the individual member states in this regard. The difference between the political leadership and the population is complemented by a similar difference between the business élite and the population. Asked whether German unification or the EC Single Market is more important for them, the West German population choose unification at 53 and the single market at 20 per cent, the business managers unification at 19 and the

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single market at 63 per cent in 1989/90 (Weidenfeld and Korte 1991: 220, based on Allensbach survey). Looking at the support of European integration by the population, we see the Germans had increased their support from 70 to 85 per cent between 1981 and 1982; this went back to 70 in 1987, rose to 81 in 1989 and shrank again from 1991 to arrive at 70 in spring and fall 1994, which was below the EU average of 73 per cent (European Commission 1993b: 13, 16; 1995a: 13, 18). The level and changes of support represented by and large the average then within the European Union. The same went for considering the country’s EU membership as a good thing. The percentage of those expressing this view grew from 49 to 73 between 1981 and 1990, to fall back to 38 in 1997 and to recover to 44 per cent in spring 1999, which corresponded very much to the EU average until spring 1995, but was by then 5 per cent below that average. Those who thought the country benefited from membership augmented their percentage from 49 to 61 between 1981 and 1990, to return to 35 in 1999, which was 9 per cent below EU average (European Commission 1999: 31). Like the whole community the Germans have reacted with skepticism toward European integration, as awareness has grown of the transmission of political decision-making to Brussels. This awareness began to increase right before Maastricht and was fueled further by the Maastricht debate. Like their European companions the Germans have become aware of the limitations of national policies, because of the international, supranational and even global interdependencies. In fall 1997, from a list of 18 areas of political decision-making they selected 13 for the European Union and 5 for the national government as the most competent actors. This was exactly the EU average (European Commission 1997b: B34–36). The Germans joined the Scandinavian countries and the UK to give smallest support to a common European currency. The net vote for a single currency was at about95 per cent, 21 per cent below EU average in fall 1997 (European Commission 1997b: 45). Having changed their minds positively, in spring 1999 the Germans gave support to the single currency at 57 per cent, but they were still among the nations showing most reservations with regard to the euro, together with the Austrians, British, Danes and Swedes, and were below the EU average of 61 per cent (European Commission 1999: 62). In spring 1997 there were 55 per cent who were afraid of the chance that the richer countries would have to pay for the poorer ones, which is 15 per cent above EU average. And 71 per cent expected that this would happen, that is

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16 per cent above EU average (European Commission 1997b: B26–29). In spring 1999, the Germans were still among those articulating most fears about the integration process, however, in a general climate of strong fears in every member state (European Commission 1999: B31). The survey data thus far taken into account show a remarkable gap between the externally and internally attested merits of Germany in promoting European integration and the population’s attitude to that integration, which is not above average on the general question of integration and quite a bit below it on more specific questions like the single market and single European currency. The fears regarding a closer integration are in particular too much immigration, increasing criminality and very distinctively the presumed obligation to pay for the others. This gap between attested promotion of European integration and real reluctance in that regard with the population seems to give expression to a gap between the political leadership and the average citizens regarding European integration. The gap has resulted from the fact that the German political leaders have made special efforts in promoting European integration without mobilizing the German population to the same degree in that direction. In this respect the German relationship to the European Union is different from that in most other countries, where the political leaders have not gone so far ahead of the population and have been able to keep a balance between their European goals and the citizens’ ability to keep up with those goals. This characterization of the fragile German relationship to the European Union is supported by the fact that the Germans are below average with regard to their trust in the union and their support of further integration. In spring 1999 their trust in the European Union and its institutions was low, at 31 per cent, and close to the bottom represented by Sweden and the UK at 21 and 20 per cent respectively in spring 1999. The same holds true if we ask about specific institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament (European Commission 1999: 48–50). It is, therefore, no surprise that the Germans are below average in regretting an assumed failing of the European Union at 33 per cent, compared with 36 per cent of the EU average (European Commission 1998b: 46). The lower level of trust is accompanied by a lower level of identification with Europe, compared with most other countries. In fall 1998, Eurobarometer found the Germans quite a bit below the EU average of 4, 7, 43 and 43 per cent of those who saw themselves as purely European, European and national, national and European or only national. The results for Germany were 4, 9, 37 and 46 per cent

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(European Commission 1998b: 59). The Germans have also been found to be slightly less prepared than the average of EU members to share rights to vote or to be elected with citizens from other member states of the union: 29 per cent were for and 65 per cent against rights to be elected, 41 per cent for and 54 per cent against rights to vote, as opposed to 38 and 55, and 47 and 46 per cent respectively in the average of the EU in spring 1992. The results of the spring 1997 survey were more in favor of sharing rights, but still slightly below the EU average: 42 per cent for and 42 per cent against rights to be elected, with 48 per cent for and 37 per cent against rights to vote, as against 43 and 43, and 52 and 35 per cent (European Commission 1992a: A55; 1997a: B16–17). The lower rates of people identifying with Europe and of people wishing local and European voting rights across borders in Germany indicate the German citizens’ lack of linkage to the integrationist politics of their political leaders. This has been the case with regard to the Western European integration in the past, and it seems to take place with regard to the integration of the Eastern European nations in the European Union in the future. The German political leadership takes a leading role in opening the doors of the European Union for Eastern Europe. It aims at deepening and extending the integration of Europe at the same time, which calls for an integration process of ‘different speeds’. Such a policy has its complications and insecurities, which are feared by those member states that are more reluctant with regard to the integration of Eastern European countries. In pursuing it the German political leadership is once more well ahead of the rest of the population. In 1992 and 1997 the Germans were below the EU average with regard to welcoming most Eastern European countries as new members. There was, however, a striking difference between East and West Germans here. According to a fall 1992 survey the East Germans were more in favor than the EC average of the integration of Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Russia, Slovakia and the Ukraine, and to the same degree as the EC average with regard to Poland. However, the West Germans were above EC average only in welcoming only Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, and nearly as favorable as the EC average on Hungary. In all other cases they were quite below average (European Commission 1992b: A46–7). In spring 1997, the Germans favored only Hungary, Norway and Switzerland above the EU average out of 17 candidates for membership. Again the East Germans were more favorable to their former Eastern Block companions than the West Germans

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(European Commission 1997a: B20–1). In fall 1998, the Germans were well below the EU average of 42 per cent, with those accepting new member states at merely 34 per cent; only Austria at 30 per cent and Belgium at 28 per cent ranked lower (European Commission 1998b: 89). The gap between political leaders and citizens in identifying with Europe and advancing its integration calls for more inclusion of citizens in European matters. The media have the task of dealing more with European politics. Politics has to bring European matters back from the meetings of élite politicians and élite administrators to the national arena by including the national parliament much more in the process of decision-making. Public debate and political decisionmaking have to turn the ordinary citizen’s attention to the level of European politics in order to allow them to keep pace with the factual transmission of politics to the European level. This turn of the citizen’s attention to European politics has to be supported by long-term educational programs including much more teaching of European history and contemporary European politics together with world history and world politics and including an enormous extension of exchange programs between the members states of the European Union. Language programs on each level of education have to complement such a policy for the Europeanization of identities. With 35 per cent saying they speak English in spring 1994 the Germans were, at least in this universal language, above EU average. Nevertheless, they were far behind Denmark and the Netherlands, with 68 and 71 per cent speaking English, 47 and 60 per cent speaking German. In fall 1995, 10 per cent more reported speaking English, namely 45 per cent, with Denmark and the Netherlands also higher at 76 and 79 per cent English, 51 and 66 per cent German (European Commission 1994a: A39; 1996: B110). In fall 1998, there were 50 per cent of Germans who reported speaking a foreign language, which was just above the EU average of 45 per cent (European Commission 1998b: 108). As the data show, with the level of education the interest in European politics, the support of European integration and the identification with Europe all grow. The same is true for the younger and the better-paid people. This holds true for each member state of the European Union, including Germany (European Commission 1994a: A14–A27; 1998a: B18, 20, 27, 29; 1998b: B21, 23, 25, 29, 31; 1999: 3, B26–9). It can be expected that a program of Europeanizing German education, public communication by the media and parliamentary politics would contribute to bridging the gap between the German

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political leadership and the average citizen in the process of European integration. The gap between élite advancement of European integration and the lack of support of that advancement by a considerable position of the citizens reflects a pattern of political integration which can also be observed on the level of national politics in Germany. Policies are considered very much a matter of technical knowledge applied by experts, in whose hands therefore the formulation and implementation of policies must necessarily rest. In various policy areas we can in fact speak of a cartel of experts, who build up a wall against the inclusion of non-experts in the decision-making process. The wider public can only lay down only in very general terms what should stand on the agenda and can only be informed about the technically right policy-options. With the mobilization of the public by the media for the sake of receiving attention, the lack of a bridge between technical policy-making and public discourse gives rise to mutual distrust. The public loses trust in the policy-makers and becomes alienated. The policy-makers see in the public primarily the tendency of making claims without taking responsibility, and they accuse the media for stimulating emotions instead of informing the public for the sake of its enlightenment. The fact that there is no intention to allow for a referendum on major European agreements fits very well in this picture, and is regularly justified by reference to the Weimar Republic’s weakness. The author of this book and others have presented a study of this specific type of alienation between policy-makers and the public in an empirical survey of clean air policy in West Germany in comparison with France, the United Kingdom and the US (Münch et al. 2001). Apparently, it is also at work in the field of European politics – this is alienative European integration. A quite different model can be observed in the case of Denmark. That country is well known for the emphasis by the government-élite involved in European politics on preserving the rights of the country and its citizens and for the involvement of the national parliament as well as the citizens via public discourse and referenda in European politics. Denmark is therefore firm in its stances in negotiations at the European level, but also reliable in complying with EU law, which is proven by the relatively low numbers of EU proceedings against the country for non-compliance – this is interactive European integration. At the third extreme we find Italy, with little resistance in negotiations but also little compliance in the implementation of EU law. Here we have the model of cynicism in the relationship between élite-integration and mass inclusion. The élite of governmental and administrative

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officials participate in EU negotiations with little involvement of the national political forces in parties, voluntary associations and interest organizations which still play their game on the national level. Thus, the EU negotiators have no real mandate, but work on their own with little chance of committing the national political forces to what has been decided in Brussels. Thus, cynicism is everywhere: the EU negotiators act cynically with regard to their partners because they know that they cannot guarantee the implementation of the decisions made, and the national forces act cynically with regard to the EU negotiators because they let them do what they have to in Brussels, knowing that things are different at home – this is cynical European integration.

The legalist model of integration The German idea of the nation and the identity of Germany experienced a remarkable transformation without, however, doing completely away with their historical roots, if we look at the development from the 1770s to the 1990s. There was the transformation of the Kulturnation (culture nation) to the Staatsnation (state nation) from the 1770s to the 1870s, and of the Staatsnation to the Volksnation (folk nation) from the 1870s to 1945. Between 1770 and 1870 German identity was shaped by the educated bourgeoisie, placing classical education on first rank. This was complemented by Geselligkeit (conviviality, companionship) and Gemütlichkeit (coziness) promoted by the Vereine (societies, clubs) and by Romantic love as well as Romantic devotion to nature, contributed by the Romantic movement. After 1870, the educated bourgeoisie’s influence on society was limited by the rising influence of the Prussian officers’ corps, the Prussian bureaucracy, the landowners (Junker) of the Eastern provinces and the large-scale industrialists. The officer corps promoted the virtues of courage, fearlessness, discipline and obedience in carrying out commands, the civil servants discipline, reliability, obedience and devotion to state service, the landowners commitment to Germany’s soil and defending it against enemies, the large-scale industrialists strategic planning, the struggle against competitors and absolute devotion to the goal of success. These virtues grew in the Kaiserreich (empire), so that Germany was not prepared for the Weimar Republic, which was not able to bring about a change of character in favor of virtues needed in a free and democratic society. The Nazi regime turned the German virtues into the virtues of a better race destined to rule the world.

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The break in 1945 was deep. The influence of the old classes of the Prussian landowners and the large-scale industrialists was no longer there because of the loss of the Eastern lands and because of the destruction of the big concerns which had collaborated with the Nazi regime. The educated bourgeoisie and the civil servants remained influential, but had to compete with a growing plurality of influences that shaped German identity in the postwar decades: newly successful business people, technicians, the mass media, sports heroes and global pop stars, particularly from Britain and the US. The integration of West Germany in Western culture, promoted particularly by the mass media, exerted an enormous long-term effect on German identity. Obedience and discipline diminished as virtues, while autonomy and selfrealization were celebrated. The growing confrontation with the plurality of nations, cultures and lifestyles made the Germans much more tolerant and respectful toward others than before, though to a lesser degree than their change from obedience to autonomy. The German idea of the nation came under pressure from the various waves of immigration that made the great majority much more open toward and accommodated to living with foreigners, but the latter also brought xenophobic and violent reactions by a minority of people who felt relatively deprived and saw themselves losing in the competition for scarce resources. Acceptance and rejection of foreigners now exist side by side because of the different effects of the globalization of life on different strata of the population (Rosar 2000). The changes in the concept of the nation and in viewing life that took place in the postwar decades indicate that Germany will be able to cope with immigration as well as other European countries, if immigration is kept within manageable limits. This holds true, though the German law of citizenship, in distinction to those of other Western countries, was predominantly a ius sanguinis up until the reform of 1999, providing the legitimation for the restrictive practices of naturalization. This led to a growing gap between de facto immigration and the lack of naturalization for immigrants. In the big cities it became more and more of a problem that up to 26 per cent of their inhabitants are foreigners who were not included in exercising the rights and duties of citizenship (Deutscher Städtetag 1992: 26). There is also not enough association between natives and foreigners in order to further the integration of a de facto pluralized society. Here is a problem area that waits for integrative measures in the coming years. The Reform Act of 1999 regarding citizenship, which makes naturalization easier, including double citizenship for the young people, is a first step in this direction.

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We can assume that the great majority of the Germans is prepared for living in a pluralized society because of the changes in their mentality that took place in the postwar decades: the rejection of National Socialism and its ideology increased steadily. That development was complemented by changes toward a deepening commitment to the rules of democracy, toward more tolerance of foreigners and toward the appreciation of freedom and autonomy. The German idea of the nation emerging from an ethnic-cultural heritage forms the backdrop to a legalist model of integration that is applicable as much for the integration of immigrants into society as for the integration of Europe – including Germany’s integration into Europe. In order to move from the ethnic-cultural understanding of the nation to the legalist model of integration we need, however, an intermediate step: the rule of law and its anchorage in the legal profession. This linkage provokes a particular tension. There is, first of all, the derivation of exclusionary practices from article 116 of the constitution which defines as ‘German’ anyone who is a member of the German state and therefore possesses a German passport and anyone who has German ancestors. There is also the law of citizenship, which reserved citizenship for ethnic Germans and left little room for naturalization and no room for a ius soli up until 2000. And there is the special foreigner law. This constitutional and legal basis can be used to justify exclusionary policies and practices. However, this is only one side of the coin; the other is represented particularly by articles 1 to 7 of the constitution that grant basic and equal rights to everybody, independent of citizen status. It was possible, on this basis, to grant an immigrant rights of residence, family unification and social security without taking them into citizenship. In this sense, legal reasoning opened doors to inclusion. With regard to transnational European integration, a similarly ambivalent position can be observed. The conservative position refers to articles 116 and 20 to argue that the nation states are still the democratic embodiment of the people’s will; the liberal position votes for a European constitution that would provide a better legal basis for European law than intergovernmental cooperation only. This tension is reflected in the various rulings of the German Constitutional Court, particularly in its ruling on Maastricht (MüllerGraff and Reichel 1998: 365–78). Integration of immigrants As we compared with France, Britain and the United States, we will recognize in Germany, as major tools for integrating immigrants into the

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society, not only the law but also the application of the law by bureaucrats, lawyers and judges in conformity with the basic rights guaranteed by the constitution. The type of integration promoted in this process can be characterized as legalistic. This means that both the law and the constitution are interpreted by way of generalization, according to the principle of equal rights before the law, so that immigrants are extensively granted equal rights as compared with citizens, yet without having citizen status. This process of expert judicial generalization leads to integration on paper but lacks substantialization and support in the lay population, which is unaware of the requirements of consistent judicial decision-making. The result is a gap between expert acceptance and lay rejection of immigrants. Ordinary people suspect that immigrants are granted too many rights (Faist 1995: 189–93). This lay view was supported by the understanding of the nation as an ethnic-cultural community – which was also constitutionally and legally justified – so that the immigrants were held in an undecided status. It was this status that provoked the discrepancy between expert acceptance and lay rejection. The new citizenship law might possibly help to bridge the gap as the native population becomes more and more used to living together with people in a broader transnational zone that links citizens and non-citizens. In comparison with the other countries reviewed in our study, Germany has practically no special institutional arrangements for designing and implementing integration policies. This is, on the one hand, caused by the notorious declaration that Germany is not a country of immigration. On the other hand, it is a result of the widespread trust in the working of the established institutions of law, administration and semi-public welfare organizations that, indeed, do the integration work (Bundesministerium des Innern 1997, 1998). What is done in Britain by the representative Commission for Racial Equality at the national level, and the representative Race Equality Councils in local communities, is in Germany the task of the Commission for Foreigners at the federal, state and local city levels in terms of German administrative care for foreigners (Ausländerbeirat der Stadt Köln 1999; Beauftragte 1997, 2000a). Foreigners commissions are elected representative bodies, some at state level but most at the local, city level. They are expected to compensate for the lack of representation of foreigners in parliamentary bodies, but have not succeeded in playing an influential role, either for the German political representatives or for the foreign population. The low voter turnout mirrors this lack of influence. The integration of foreigners in terms of welfare is the task of 600

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counseling offices with 900 social workers (Bundesministerium des Innern 1998: 45; Beauftragte 2000b: 6). Lacking money as well as influence, the only thing a commission can do is draw public attention to the problem. Because foreigners’ affairs are a matter of federal and state governments, there is a Coordination Committee for Foreigners’ Policy, on which sit representatives from federal, state, local and semi-public welfare organizations to coordinate policies. The organizations of immigrants are almost exclusively oriented to their home countries, reflecting the fact that they play no role vis-à-vis the German administrative bodies responsible for foreigners’ affairs. For the Turks, in particular, Germany has become a battlefield on which political and/or religious organizations are in conflict and compete with each other on Turkish domestic matters (Binswanger and Sipahioglu 1988; Özcan 1989; Gür 1993). Since the mid-eighties, advisory councils for foreigners have been established in municipalities with larger populations of foreigners. They are still relatively weak, because they lack support from governmental bodies and migrant groups. The integration of the migrants is a matter of professional organization by administrative bodies and three large, semipublic welfare organizations: the Caritas of the Catholic Church cares for Catholic migrants, the Diakonisches Werk of the Protestant Church for the Protestants and the social-democratic Arbeiterwohlfahrt for Muslim ones. Here we can see the typical state-corporatist network of cooperation between administration and well-established semi-public welfare organizations. They constitute a cartel of welfare and keep down competition by other organizations, with the result that there is almost no associational life that could link natives and migrants outside the cartel. Because of this lack of integration outside bureaucracy and law, there is all the more demand for bureaucracy and law, a vicious circle of bureaucratizing and legalizing social relations. In the context of this institutional setting, integration policies concentrate on schooling and social service in order to promote integration into the market, but do not deal with accommodating native and migrant cultures (Hailbronner 1992b; Bade 1994; Soysal 1994: 77–9, 107–11; Joppke 1999: 186–222; Heckmann 2000). The network of actors responsible for organizing integration is dominated by bureaucratic administrations and semi-public welfare organizations, with no involvement of voluntary associations rooted in civil society. The value commitment of bureaucrats to the law and the constitution guarantees the formal inclusion of immigrant minorities without substantial roots in the society. The basic institutional rule that

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guides this process is legality. Immigrants are included or excluded according to the law and not according to practical requirements or appropriateness. The profession in charge is that of the jurists in bureaucracies, law firms and courts. Their outlook is shaped by the principle of conformity to the law regardless of circumstances and result. The underlying idea of legitimation is that of the rule of law, which includes equality before the law. Under this rule of law, Germany has included a relatively large group of immigrants by granting rights beyond the solidarity bonds of the native population, so that a representative, still ongoing learning process of loosening national ties in favor of establishing transnational ties is taking place. Integration into Europe The transformation of the German idea of the nation and of German identity was advanced further by Germany’s integration in the European Union. However, there is a perplexing gap between the German political leadership’s promotion of the European integration and the attitude of the population toward that process that is only average or even below average in comparison with the other member states of the European Union. Therefore the agenda for deepening Germany’s integration in the European Union calls for bringing European matters back to public communication by the mass media and back to the national parliament’s participation in European decision-making. Further, it calls for programs of education by giving European matters more space in the curriculum of schools, by expanding language courses and by extending exchange programs. In doing so, the German nation and German identity will be increasingly integrated in a European Union of nations and identities, which become more and more pluralized and individualized. National citizenship and identity will to some degree give way to transnational and, also, revitalized subnational identities. Amid this growing number of intersecting circles, the individuals will have to seize their extended chances for autonomy (Simmel 1908/1992: 456–511). This is, however, a rather conflictual process, because it is changing the structure of social integration. The internal inclusion of the German welfare state was originally supported by its external exclusiveness. This model was first challenged by the guest workers’ change of status, from temporary to permanent residents, and their inclusion in basic rights, including welfare benefits, because of the constitution’s guarantee of basic rights for every individual on German territory and because of independent courts that enforced such rights. The liberal

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granting of asylum by article 16 of the constitution, along with the influx of resettlers from Eastern Europe after the breakdown of the Soviet regime, made Germany one of the two top countries of immigration in the world during the 1990s, together with the United States, although the attitude that it is not a country of immigration is still widespread and indeed held by most of the population. This discrepancy, between an exclusive idea of the nation and a rather inclusive reality, an idea of an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation and the reality of heterogeneity, drove the country into a major identity crisis from which it recovered only slowly after the qualification of article 16 and the decreasing amount of immigration after 1993. There is, however still a conflict about social integration which is not limited to the discrepancy between the idea of a homogeneous nation and a heterogeneous reality (Behr 1998: 182–7). There is another side to it, namely the pressure to change the strong inclusion of the welfare state in favor of the chances that result for both sides from European integration and a free world market, namely the people inside the boundaries of the nation and those outside. Because expanding external integration necessarily breaks up internal integration and limits the sharing of national welfare, while, at the same time establishing individualized networks beyond the boundaries of nations, conflicts over decreasing national solidarities intensify. The nation is torn apart by European and global association, on the one hand, and nationalist reaction on the other hand. The strong welfare state with its anchorage in national solidarity has met its limits of integration, because it is an obstacle to further transnational integration. The conflicts that accompany this transformation process can be observed not only in Germany but also in every European welfare state residing on external exclusiveness. Germany is but one of many examples of this fundamental process of transformation. The nation is changing its face not only because of more heterogeneity and more overlap of citizens and noncitizens as a result of immigration, but also because of its moving away from stable class formations toward a plurality of loosely integrated settings. In the light of the German legalist model of integration, a constitution should be the basis of European integration in the long run. Nowhere else are the forces that aim at the establishment of such a constitution so strong as in Germany, where they include every party in the political spectrum. A federal union, as the end result of the ongoing integration process, has always been the policy of all German governments and parties, though with differences between and within

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parties and more cautiousness all round in the last decade (CDU 1999; CSU 1999; FDP 1999; see Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998; Jachtenfuchs 1999). Some shades of opinion in Germany attach greater emphasis to the EU as an entity above the member states, others to the representation of the nation states within the institutions of the union. The latter is, for example, required by the model of two parliamentary chambers both representing the nation states, as promoted by Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer (2000), in a widely acclaimed speech in May 2000. Hopes are pinned on a legal framework to a degree that is inconceivable from a British or French point of view. These spring from belief in the power of a written constitution and its application by legal experts, itself supported by the education that the Germans have gone through in the continuous implementation of the constitutionally granted rights in court decision-making, particularly in the Federal Constitutional Court. It cannot be denied that the European Court of Justice has thus far played an enormously important role in promoting integration through its rulings, particularly in terms of removing barriers to the free, border-transcending mobility of persons, goods, services and capital. Nevertheless, according to this model, European integration as a legal construction could well go beyond the limits of support by the population as it is indicated by Eurobarometer surveys in the aftermath of the Maastricht agreements of 1991. The German approach to European integration suffers from the gap between legal construction and real cooperation. It therefore still oscillates between expert promotion and lay rejection. What it does not provide, above all, is a feeling for the associational promotion of Europe and the mutual respect for national traditions of law that can be acquired in the dayto-day process of negotiation and cooperation in many small, individual projects. The German idea of Europe is one of a federation that is far ahead of reality and would simply enhance centralization without democratic control. A more realistic model would be multilevel governance with limited competences for the union, the control of power by checks and balances and open access of interests to decision-making by the European Commission and its numerous committees – that is, functional representation. What has emerged is governance in networks. Its legitimacy does not result from representation but from its open character and its control in a system of guarantees and counterbalancing influences (Kohler-Koch 1999, 2000). The network that links Germany to Europe is dominated by experts who represent government, administration, large-scale interest organizations and large-scale associations of scientists and engineers. It is a

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kind of corporatism transferred onto the European level, but a corporatism with a shrinking legitimacy and which needs to open doors to a wider variety of interests and expert views. The basic institutional rules that frame this process are legality and technical perfection through applying corroborated and undebatable expert knowledge. The predominant profession is that of jurists complemented by natural scientists and engineers in matters of standard-setting. Their rationality principles are consistent legislation and standard-setting, objectification by science as well as technical problem-solving away from political debate. In this way, hopes are pinned on an integration process that will be a purely technical matter (Majone 1989, 1994). This approach is intended to produce a legal framework that promotes the legal integration of Europe. The idea of legitimation that is in the background of this approach to European integration is that of the rule of law. It is expected that the law will embody the equal rights of the European citizens in a consistent framework of European law, so that conflict between rights and interests is minimized proactively. Conflict, it is intended, will be resolved by the law, so that the application of the law supplies objective technical solutions to any possible dispute. The factual process of integration is, however, far away from this ideal type of the rule of law. Because of the incremental process of European legislation, the acceleration of integration by the mutual recognition of regulative standards, the uneven application of European law in the different member states and the still ongoing process of accommodating European and national law, European integration is going to produce an inconsistent corpus of rulings that puts a lot of discretionary power in the hands of the courts. This is more similar to the British practice of accommodation than to the German practice of the standardized application of generally valid law.

5 The Transformation of Collective Identities and Citizenship: toward European Civil Ties and Identity

Preliminary remarks Public discussion is at present shaped by the pervasive, shared awareness that we are now living in a state of profound social upheaval. Under globalizing conditions almost all of the usual institutions of the nation state which have given us security have begun to crumble. In our search for help in this situation, we turn both hopefully and anxiously to the European Union. Can the union restore the lost unity to our lives and connect us to the world as a whole? It can accomplish that only in so far as it can produce a structural change in our identity, in our sense of belongingness and in our notion of citizenship beyond the establishment of the single European market and beyond the transfer of political authority to the union level. The process of European integration progresses at an increasing speed in the expansion of the single market and in the transfer of political decision-making authority to the level of the European Union. The process now demands, in increasing measure, the inclusion of citizens and the change of their identity to a more European one. That means that people need to get ready to see themselves not only as German, French, Belgian and so on, but also as European. They must be enabled to bring many far-reaching and diverse loyalties into harmony with each other. Their national identity has to be coordinated with the European identity. Without this identity change, the European project is threatened with failure because of the citizens’ lack of willingness to cooperate. How is such a structural change of identity carried out? What factors promote it? What factors hinder it? Is a dialectic between movement 136

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and countermovement appearing here just as it generally does in the modernization process? Which concomitants arise? What chances and risks result in this process? Such are the questions that face us today. The demand for ‘cultural identity’ is increasing these days. In times of great revolutions the need for self-ascertainment grows tremendously – that is, who one is, who one may be or who one wants to be. That is true for individuals as well as for collectives. Individuals change, end, begin or broaden memberships. Collectives repeatedly define themselves inwardly and outwardly. Who still belongs? Who is joining? Does the collective even continue to exist? Is it breaking into smaller units? Is it becoming absorbed by a larger collective? By the ‘identity’ of an individual we mean those attitudes which form a common core of all thoughts and behavior – that is, the unity – and that which differentiates the individual from other individuals – that is, the difference. This identity can be ascribed by oneself or by others. Both sides can converge and diverge. The more an individual gets involved in interactions with others and, in doing so, the more their relationships are in balance, the more chances exist for a convergence of the mutual attribution of identity traits. The identity of an individual can be thought of as more or less concrete or abstract, as allowing more or less room for changes in thinking and behavior. It can remain stable for a long time, but it can also change so fast that the limit is reached beyond which constant change becomes the only single characteristic of identity left. ‘Collective identity’ means the core of attitudes which all members of a collective have in common in their thoughts and behavior and which differentiates them from other collectives. The attitudes can be ascribed internally from individual, several or all members and externally from individual, several or all members of another collective. In regard to convergence or divergence of these attributes, the same is true as for the identity of an individual. They adjust themselves according to the extent and balance of interactions. Thus we are able to speak about a ‘European identity’ if common attitudes can be determined that exercise a strong influence on the thoughts and behavior of those people who we can denote as European. However, it is not easy. Who is a European? Are all the residents of the European continent Europeans, regardless of their origin, including then immigrants too? Are the residents who have lived in Europe for many (how many?) generations? Or are all of those who enjoyed a European upbringing regardless of where they now live? But what is a European upbringing? Is it the upbringing in the culture of a European country or the upbringing in the European culture beyond

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the boundaries of national cultures? What are the common attitudes of the French, British, Italian, Portuguese, German or Belgian which allow us to identify a European identity? What conclusion does this attempt at identification come to if we also include Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, or Ukrainians or Russians? Is there already a European identity, if a sufficient number of people answer the simple question on the Eurobarometer survey with a ‘Yes’? Is the question about ‘European identity’ perhaps easier to answer if we specify the question and concentrate on ‘cultural’ identity? Are we then independent of the attitudes of the subjects? In this case, can we limit ourselves solely to culture as a meaning system, for example to Christianity and Enlightenment as a European cultural heritage which creates a common identity within the European countries, but in which non-European countries are more or less able to share, too? European identity is thus an abstract concept that does not completely, undisputedly predominate (any more) in Europe and that has influenced entire continents outside of Europe, especially America. We can see by these difficulties in arriving at an agreement on a ‘European identity’, or a ‘European cultural identity’, that we would hardly be successful were we to try to give the concept substantial meaning. Such an attempt would be nothing other than a piece in a jigsaw puzzle in the realm of the continuous definition of identity that takes place in social processes. On the other hand, we can more easily try to study precisely these social processes which take part in the definition of a ‘European (cultural) identity.’ Thus, we ask: How does such an identity arise and change? How does it react to the continued existence of other identities? What kind of character does it take? In addition, we can answer the question about European cultural identity more easily if we limit ourselves to asking how far, due to which societal changes, in which form, in which processes, with which concomitants and with which consequences the people in Europe develop a European identity in the sense that they see themselves as European beyond the boundaries of their own national membership and identity and, because of this, are ready to limit their identity of origin. Individually this is a continuous process of identity formation which is shaped dialectically, dynamically and complexly. The intent of the following sections is to develop the complexity, dialectic and dynamic of these processes. Individually the following aspects will be dealt with:



differentiation from outside, below and above; internal homogenization;

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inclusion: differentiation of the center and the periphery; dialectic of identity gain and identity loss; identity growth; transformation from primordial to medialized identity; transformation from medialized to virtual identity.

A European cultural identity is formed in a global context in competition with, and in economic exchange with, the USA and Japan at the center of the world system and in economic exchange with the Third World countries in the outside periphery. At the same time, countermovements from below initiated by renationalization and reregionalization of cultural identities are taking place. Aimed upward, the modernizing avant garde reaches out beyond Europe and forms a countermovement of globalization. Cultural identity becomes correspondingly more complex and more full of tension. It is subject to quick change and situational and economic fluctuations, becomes the object of struggles for definition and is therefore extremely fragile (Haas 1964, 1968; Garcia 1993; Haller and Richter 1994; Zetterholm 1994; Delanty 1995; Duff et al. 1995; Hoffmann 1995; Preston 1995; Newman 1996; Davis and Sobisch 1997; Judt 1997; Habermas 1998; Wiener 1997; Moravcsik 1998; Schneider 1998; Rosamond 1999).

Identity formation through differentiation Thesis 1: European identity is formed through differentiation from the outside, below and above. The common identity of a collective is formed first by opportunities to differentiate itself from other collectives (Simmel 1908/92: 349–68). These opportunities can range from the mere perception of differences through economic competition, trade disputes and legal battles, and up to armed conflict (Giddens 1985). Has the new world order after the collapse of the Soviet empire brought about a change in this respect? This question can definitely be answered with ‘yes’. Differentiation from the outside The East–West conflict had the world divided into two big blocks, the boundaries of which ran straight through Europe and through a large part of the Third World. For Western Europeans, belonging to the Western Alliance was the outstanding feature of their collective identity after their national membership. The same applies to East Europeans with respect to their membership in the Eastern Alliance.

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After the big revolution of 1989, the situation changed very suddenly (Czempiel 1993; Stürmer 1993; v. Bredow and Jaeger 1994; Bornschier 1994). The East Block broke up. After decades of suppression national identities celebrated a revival. The liberation from Soviet domination went, by and large, hand in hand with the liberation from Russian domination and a corresponding revival of national identities. The ‘right to self-determination of the people’ offers the basis for the legitimation of new nationalism. Since the Soviet domination was largely a Russian domination, the liberation was inevitably steered in the direction of nationalism. The revival of national identity was accordingly strategically used by political and military élites. Ethnic origin was put to use as the basis for the definition of national membership. Furthermore, not only does conflict arise between Russian and non-Russian nationalities, but also between non-Russian nationalities themselves, to a certain extent as the result of the revival of ethnically defined national membership. In the Balkan region the main conflict is between the Serbs, whose domination was supported by the communist regime, and the other nationalities. Inevitably the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lasted the longest because that is where an ethnic mixture is found that can hardly be disintegrated. The same holds true for the Kosovo (Kappeler 1992; Mommsen 1992; Reuter 1992; Faulenbach and Timmermann 1993; Wandycz 1993; Nolte et al. 1994; Calic 1995; Hatschikjan 1995; Nolte 1995; Seewann 1995; Hatschikjan and Weilemann 1995). A new orientation toward Europe accompanies the new nationalism in the East. The common European heritage is evoked as the basis for a common identity with Western Europeans. The inclusion in NATO is sought as military security, especially against Russia. The entrance into the European Union is sought in the interest of an economic uplift and the political stabilization of the new democratic institutions (Deppe et al. 1991; Dienstbier 1991; Havel 1991; Michnik 1992; Meyer 1993; Wettig 1993; Weidenfeld 1995). Thus, the Western Europeans have new tasks which direct their attention quite a bit more to all of Europe than was the case before 1989. Therefore, Western Europe is put under pressure by East Europe in the development of a collective European identity. The Western Europeans, however, cannot devote themselves to all of Europe quite as fast as the East Europeans would like, precisely because first they look to themselves and over the Atlantic, and second they fear the enormous burden of reconstruction of the East (Merrit 1991, Pinder 1991; Ehrhart 1993; Welfens 1995).

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But there is also in Western Europe the beginning of a weakening of the old Western identity and the strengthening of a European identity. Now that the enemy in the East is gone, internal differences in the West can more easily surface and sooner become grounds for conflict. Before 1989 problems involving all of Europe were primarily security problems. They were managed solely with the help of NATO and the USA as a protective power. Today the problems involving all of Europe are more complex, and hopes in regard to the management of the problems are directed less at NATO than at the EU (Weston 1991; Fröhlich 1992; Lapins 1992; Wolf 1992; Tuschhoff 1993). An analysis and evaluation of relevant citations in the public discussion before and after 1989 would certainly be able to substantiate this thesis easily. That has to do with the fact that among the complex problems, the economic ones have won the upper hand over the security ones and the EU has since become one of the three largest economic powers along with the US and Japan (Laqueur 1992). A tri-polar center has been formed in the new economically defined world system. The rising countries in Southeast Asia and the ambitious countries in Eastern Europe form a group in the semi-periphery around this center, and the developing countries form the periphery. The differences of the EU, especially with regard to the US, receive a greater importance than before owing to the change from security-oriented politics to economy-oriented ones. Whereas Western Europe had to rely on the US during security politics, in economic politics the room for differences is much greater. Indeed both sides proclaim their belief in a market economy and in free trade. The concrete development of international trade, however, holds many causes for conflict, from agrarian politics to air travel. Furthermore, the main conflict exists in a greater preference for free trade on the American side. Individually though, both sides fight using a double strategy: protecting their own home industry from intruders and clearing the way for opening up foreign markets (Rode 1990; Weston 1991). Certainly, these struggles over economic policy in no way weld both sides together internally as tightly as the military confrontation forced alliances in the West and the East. In particular, the unity of the EU is frequently weakened by the specific interests of its member states. Nevertheless, the new world situation offers more reasons than before for the expression of any common economic and political interests of the EU which are in conflict with the US. Therefore we find, in day-to-day politics and in its public discussion, a greater number of cases in which membership of the EU brings us in conflict with the US.

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Because of the increased economic power of the EU, there are often bitter arguments and lengthy negotiations. The result of this development for the identity of individuals is that the Germans, French, Italians and others more often see each other as EU Europeans and are identified by the Americans as such. A similar development, though in detail a somewhat different one, is seen in relation to Japan. Here the change is not from a protective power to that of an economic competitor in the world market, but from a rising partner in trade to an economic power which can be regarded as endangering one’s own position and one’s own prosperity. This development also brings with it more heated and more frequent conflicts over trade regulations. Since the resolution of these conflicts has been transferred more and more from a national level to the EU level, a strengthened identification of the Germans, English, Portuguese, and others as EU Europeans has resulted internally and externally (Seitz 1992). The new world order has placed a leadership role for all of Europe in the European Union’s lap. Concentrated in the EU is economic power on a scale comparable to that of the USA and Japan. The shift from security-oriented politics to economy-oriented politics has pushed the EU to the fore as a supranational unit. The new East European democracies support the leadership role of the EU. The economic competition for markets with the USA and Japan demands a supranational trading partner for which only the EU can be considered. Thus an undertow is forming in Europe which forces all European countries, willy-nilly, into the wake of the European Union. The EU has stepped into a hegemonic position in which it authoritatively determines what happens in Europe. It forms the center of European cultural identity. If the discussion is about European cultural identity, what has correctly to be spoken about to an increasing extent is the identity of the European Union. Its policy of developing the single European market leads to a growing supranational interconnection of the economic division of labor, of the exchange of goods, of traffic, of mass communication and of political decisions. An intensification of trade results at the core around which the semi-peripheral and peripheral zones group. The intensification of trade and the development of a hegemonic core also restructure identity in the long run. Everyone looks at the core as the model of the good life. And today, with current methods of quantification, it is proven that in the economically intensified core not only is there the highest level of material well-being, but there is also the greatest cultural density determined by the number of museums, theaters, libraries and educational establishments, besides which the

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degree of social benefits is high, as is even the quality of the environment owing to the expensively pursued reduction of harmful emissions, so that even pollution may not darken the image of the brilliant center. Even in the question of security the periphery really does no better, because the prosperity of others is seen without at the same time giving those in the periphery the possibility to enjoy it to the full. There, especially unsafe conditions – measured by traffic accidents and criminality – are obviously created. Developments in East Germany, for example, show this. The way of life successfully established in the center accordingly defines the overall recognized cultural identity of Europe as desirable to an increasing extent. Poles, Czechs, Slovakians and Hungarians set out on the road toward national identity with the liberation campaign of 1989 and also produced a new nationalism. However, they are far from wanting particularly to preserve a national lifestyle of their own. They all strive much more to follow the example of the European Union. There is an unusually strong pressure to develop a standard European cultural identity. The identity of the center outshines the identities in the periphery, which are reduced by the devaluation of the basis for their continued existence (Plesu 1997). Differentiation from below The formation of a European identity led by the core of the European Union results not only from differentiation from the outside, but also from differentiation from below. The opportunities for the European Union to improve its image in relation to that of the individual member countries increase with the expansion of the single market and the necessary legal harmonization that accompanies it; and certainly this occurs not only in the realm of economics, but also in the related areas of the environment, traffic, research and technology, and communications. In this way, the European Commission assumes a special role which has been carried out to an increasing extent under Jacques Delors. This development can be seen in the commission’s role in initiating legal regulations and in the introduction of legal proceedings against member countries when EU laws are not put into practice. The yearly amount of guidelines, regulations and decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers increased between 1980 and 1990 from 371 to 907, while the yearly amount of legal proceedings initiated against individual member countries because of failure to carry out EU laws grew in the same time period from 256 to 960 (European Communities 1992; Snyder 1993: 29). The same holds true for the sessions of the

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Council of Ministers, their total number having grown from 2182 in 1960 to 7254 in 1975 and even to 9894 in 1990. The number of days used for sessions of the council increased from 44 in 1960 to 67.5 in 1975 and to 138 in 1990. The number of committees in the implementation stage of legislation rose from 10 in 1960 to 91 in 1975 and to 276 in 1990 (Wessels 1997: 51). In public discussions in the member countries during this period, the EU has been treated more frequently as the initiator of a decision or as the implied target of expectations. This has been due largely to the EU imposing its authority time and again in conflicts over the agrarian policy, but has come about also because of important, publicized decisions of the European Court of Justice on laws regarding food – for example for the composition of beers, sausages or noodles. The Single European Act of 1986, the single market at the end of 1992, the Maastricht treaty of 1991 and the monetary union of 1999 have considerably accelerated the speed of EU integration and have led to an increased presence of the EU in the everyday life of its citizens. This can be seen in the results of the Eurobarometer question about the significance of the EU for one’s own country. Already in 1975, 77 per cent of the EU gave an important or very important role to the EU for the future of their own country. That number had risen to 85 per cent by 1991; however, in the wake of the Maastricht debate of 1992 it dropped again to 80 per cent (European Commission 1994b: 179–80). Although a drop in these and in other figures has been established since Maastricht (European Commission 1992b: 24; 1993a: 6; 1993b: 66; 1994a: 8), this does not change the growing presence of the EU for the citizens of the individual member countries. All the same, they already allotted the European Union and not their own country the necessary authority to solve problems in a narrow majority of 10 out of 18 political areas in 1993, and even 12 out of 18 in spring 1999 (European Commission 1993b: A54; 1999: 54). This transfer of authority to the EU has caused more frequent conflicts within the EU, for example between the European Commission and the individual member countries; however, this need not hinder the development of an EU identity. These conflicts contribute directly to the image of the EU as a separate loyalty-demanding entity. As long as the conflicts between the EU and an individual member country can be resolved bilaterally, the other member countries can be swayed to the side of the EU. In this way, their EU identity is strengthened. A setback for EU identity can result from such conflicts only when various member states simultaneously take on an oppositional role and give

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mutual support to each other in that role. Limited bilateral conflict, however, strengthens EU identity. The more active the Commission becomes – for example in carrying out this role in legal proceedings – the more it contributes to the development of a European identity. From this perspective we can conclude that the simultaneous growth in both European and national identities is on no account in opposition to each other, but rather is made up of two interwoven processes. Of course there are two sides to every conflict. Just as the EU identity gains strength through and is fostered by conflict with the individual countries from below, these same conflicts also strengthen the individual countries’ awareness of their own national identity. For example, there are special German beer purity regulations, but many Germans have only just come to recognize this as a result of the conflict with the EU over them. In doing so, their attention has been turned to the preservation of their national identity in the EU process of integration. The construction of an EU identity and the revival of national identities – through the intensification of conflict and the renewal of nationalism – mutually strengthen each other in this sphere of conflict resolution. They are in a dialectical relationship to each other. Differentiation from above ‘Globalization’ has become a buzzword in the public discussion. What it conveys is that the big problems of the present and the future are of a global nature and that they require globally coordinated actions. Currents of goods, money, traffic, communication and harmful emissions reach around the whole earth and produce an immensely growing need for regulation on a global level, but the necessary global institutions have yet to be built up to a sufficient measure. The United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization (WTO) (the organization following the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)) become more important and also more active in connection with the incredibly fast pace of the globalization of the markets, though in a correspondingly slower pace in the construction of institutions (Porter 1989; Albrow and King 1990; Garnham 1990; Wallerstein 1991; Robertson 1992; Kühne 1993). It is primarily the nation states that are acting on the global stage, but the European Union is also gaining importance here as a supranational unit because the old great powers, Great Britain and France, the economic power, Germany, and most of all the smaller European states are too weak to be able to accomplish something within world politics. Because they want to be represented as strongly as possible in the new

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world politics, the individual states have to allow the European Union to represent their interests, even if Great Britain and France are not yet willing to give up their special role as independent global actors. At any rate, this development is resulting in the European Union increasingly being spoken of as the global actor for and representative of its member countries. Thus in global questions the individual states and their citizens see themselves as European with their own interests in world politics; and by those international organizations of the world society named above, the Europeans are perceived to a certain extent as a collective unit with common interests and its own identity. In global negotiations on the management of global conflicts and problems, the image of a European identity intensifies accordingly, both in the perception from the outside and in the internal perspective. The global organizations and the individual states identify Europe as a collective unit with its own interests and an identity of its own. The globalization of modern life fits us into the global community – not directly, but rather by leading our identity to an increasing extent toward Europeanization as a step between the nation states and the world community. On the one hand, European identity groups national identities together and brings them in a workable form into global politics. On the other hand, European identity absorbs a multitude of global problems, which then do not directly affect the individual countries, except for in a way which has already been filtered and handled by the European Union. In this sense, globalization and Europeanization reciprocally strengthen one another. Globalization, on the one hand, forces the packaging of national identities into a European identity, and the Europeanization of identities, on the other hand, gives the European Union a more active role as a rising global player.

Identity formation through internal homogenization Collective identity formation is not only a process of differentiation, but is also one which abolishes differences through internal homogenization. There is a series of processes involved in this which will be dealt with individually. Thesis 2: European identity is formed through internal homogenization and more specifically through the following:



economic exchange: homogenization of the standard of living; political centralization: homogenization of the law;

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border-transcending associations: homogenization of solidarity; border-transcending communication: homogenization of culture; individualization: homogenization of identity.

Economic exchange: homogenization of the standard of living The steady expansion of the single market is primarily responsible for a growing border-transcending flow of goods, services, capital and people. This results in a trend toward the homogenization of consumption. If one considers the extent to which consumption has become the ‘life world’ of everyday behavior, it is easy to recognize the homogenizing strength of the single market. The same goods tend to be consumed everywhere in Europe, because the most competitive products impose themselves in the single market. The acceleration in the growth of the economy by the expansion of the single European market has brought with it the ‘elevator effect’ of the general raising of the standard of living to the European level (Beck 1986: 121–60). The regions do not live their lives for themselves, but are classified as more or less advanced or underdeveloped, whereas it is taken for granted that the underdeveloped regions approximate more and more to the advanced ones and become like them. This situation is helped by structural and regional politics, where such evening out is resisted by excessive backwardness. That this evening out takes place is, however, the credo of European policy which is taken for granted everywhere. The homogenization of life worlds is pushed ahead, therefore, principally by the raising of the material standard of living and the raising of consumption to the level of the most advanced regions. Along with the standard of living and consumption of different regions becoming like each other, not only the external conditions of life become similar, but also the internal attitudes, thoughts, life goals and values. This transition is carried out throughout Europe, although not at the pace of the adaptation of East Germany to West Germany, where within only ten years of transition fairly large differences have clearly become small distinctions. However, this can be regarded as an exemplary case for the European process of evening out differences (Meulemann 1995). This is not to say that the European identity will not go beyond the sheer materialism of luxury consumption. Economic growth – flanked by targeted structural and regional help – is indeed the motor of the process of identities becoming like each other, but it is not the sole effective force. Of course, owing to the constraints of global competition,

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this the single most powerful almost irrestistable force for the convergence of identities. Associated with economic growth and luxury consumption are also increased opportunities for a broader section of the population for a share in the political, social and cultural goods of the advances. More and more people are enabled to gain education, to participate actively in politics, to take advantage of the services of solidarity of others and to participate in cultural events. The exercising of political, social and cultural rights has become a model of European modernity. The general raising of the standard of living takes care of the material prerequisites. In public discourse the rescuing of rights is constantly demanded by the intellectuals. Therefore, it is to be expected that the European cultural identity is strengthened in the pattern of luxury consumption combined with a constantly expanding understanding of civil, political, social and cultural rights. At the same time, there is increasingly less room for the maintenance of historically evolved cultural traditions. Thus, we can observe today, for example, the astonishing rise of Ireland out of centuries of poverty, but at the same time, too, the disappearance of its cultural identity, to the accompaniment both of the euphoric sounds of awakening and of laments over the disappearance of traditions (Kunisch 1997). Political centralization: homogenization of the law The process of the Europeanization of our identity is further supported by the transfer of political decision-making power to the level of the European Union, and the associated standardization of the legal system. Citizens look increasingly toward Brussels and there is more reporting about the decisions made there. National administrations need to employ EU law to an increasing extent. Naturally this is not a smooth-flowing process (Wildenmann 1991). The accompanying political centralization, the development of a hierarchy of European technocrats and the lacking democratic control will give occasion for the resistance to the further transfer of authority to Brussels for a long time. For a good while, national governments and administrations will put off and water down the implementation of EU law while bringing their own national legal traditions into line with that of the EU. Owing to the state of international competition, the development toward legal harmonization has, however, achieved such inherent dynamism that it can be held back only by the penalty of huge financial loss (Wildenmann 1991; Bulmer and Scott 1994; Marks et al. 1996; Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Peterson 2000; Peterson and Bomberg 1999).

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Border-transcending associations: homogenization of solidarity A growing number of new associations act internationally, form border-transcending networks and thus create nation-transcending relationships. Some of them – especially Greenpeace and Amnesty International – have become multinational entities, which can mobilize global support for their campaigns (Brand 1985; Brieskorn 1988). The enormous growth in the number of border-transcending associations in the seventies, eighties and nineties has contributed considerably to a transfer of loyalties and identifications away from the national and onto the European and global level. This is combined with a growing readiness to limit national identity and to take on a supranational identity. Therefore, more people than ever before see themselves not only as German, French, Italian, and so on, but also as European or, even farther-reaching, as a member of a world community. If the identification with Europe is limited, then it is only in decreasing measure out of a national point of view, yet in increasing measure out of a global perspective. Whereas the identification with Europe has long been a domain of the well-situated, prosperous citizen, the avant-garde of modernizers has already left Europe behind to turn to the whole world and its problems. The process of loosening old ties and the accompanying disintegration of the old society allows the necessary opportunities for integration on the European level and, with it, the development of a European identity of the individual citizen. Because the old obligations of loyalty are loosened, the construction of European obligations of loyalty and a European identity are more easily accomplished. And the more Europe makes us dependent on it, the more national ties are limited. The disintegration of national societies is both a prerequisite and a consequence of the transfer of loyalties and identifications to the European and beyond to the global level (Boli and Thomas 1999; Huemer et al. 1999). Border-transcending communication: homogenization of culture Communication is also crossing over national boundaries more frequently. From a personal level to that of the mass media, examples of border-transcending communication include personal conversations at meetings of European sister cities, the flow of tourists, student exchange programs, economic joint ventures, collaborations on the

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development of technology, cooperation in research, scientific conferences and border-transcending film and television production. Surely it is difficult for a cultural melting pot to emerge from the many and diverse European languages. Language remains the carrier of particular cultural traditions, ways of thinking, attitudes and points of view. People’s attitudes and behavior will continue to be distinguished by their language. This power of persistence and differentiation is, however, opposed by equally strong currents of cultural standardization which arise at first from the use of English as a border-transcending means of communication and from the trickling in of Anglicisms into the individual languages. Professional positions in the economy today can hardly be described without the help of English terminology and not only that: all essential internal events of a business and strategies directed outwards can still almost only be expressed in the English language. Multinational concerns need such a standard language, while smaller businesses have to use English terms out of reasons of comparability and prestige. Beyond that, English has long since imposed itself as the language of science and as the language of popular entertainment – most completely in song. In addition, the language of advertisement is more and more English. The number of English-speaking people in the population of the individual countries is growing. Therefore, language differences are increasingly less of a hindrance to border-transcending communication and to the corresponding approximation of the different cultures, with the result of a clear cultural standardization. The cultural events offered in Milan, Paris, London, Berlin, Copenhagen or Amsterdam are becoming more and more similar. The same concerts, musicals, plays and big art exhibitions are presented everywhere. The same bands, star tenors and ensembles appear everywhere. Not only do the big cities become more similar, but the provincial cities and villages do so as well, because they themselves participate in the big tours, and with the best connections of transportation and telecommunication they have the cultural events of the big cities within their immediate grasp anyway (Kaelble 1987; Hufen and Hall 1989). We are on a road here, though, that implies more than Europe and which leads to a global culture instead of a European one. Consumption is the forerunner. It is increasingly organized by global-acting enterprises such as GAP, Banana Republic, Orsay or H&M in the fashion industry, which can put on sale one and the same name-brand product everywhere in the world. In the starry sky of the world of global consumption one can look at the same labels from every place on earth.

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The world-wide marketing of the same products includes not only jeans, T-shirts, tennis raquets or perfumes, but also concerts, musicals, paintings, sculpture and literature. The global sale of cultural products demands corresponding logistics, marketing and products expenditures, which can only be produced by giant concerns. The world-wide expanded production of culture is concentrated, therefore, in an increasingly smaller number of concerns. They cause, on the one hand, a cultural standardization of the world, an approximation of cultures and a mutual understanding because everyone participates in the same culture and is influenced by the same models. On the other hand, they drive everything that opposes the global standardization of the world of consumption out into a peripheral and precarious existence. However, this does not necessarily mean the end of cultural diversity. The global culture in fact hungers for all of the still undiscovered things which can be used as marketing innovations. Colorful local culture is the arsenal out of which the global culture must constantly be created. Naturally, a fundamental change in the role of local culture accompanies this process. Local cultures will no longer be supported by established and repeatedly renewed traditions, but rather by the victualling-ship money of the industry of culture and its interest in extracting cultural raw material for cultural mass production (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/69). Homogenization by individualization ‘Individualization’ seems to be the keyword in which the common European identity is summed up in a single European market which has continued to advance beyond national relationships (Simmel 1908/92: 456–511, 791–816; Durkheim 1964: 283–303; Beck 1986: 205–19). If everyone became an independent individual, then people could also leave their national identity behind them more easily and open themselves up to the formation of a European identity. In fact, this presumption is confirmed by the fact that a change of direction to a European identity clearly increases with income, education and professional status. Asked about their self-perception in the near future, in fall 1998, the result for managers was 6 per cent European only, 11 per cent European and national, 55 per cent national and European, 26 per cent national only; for manual workers, the results were at 6, 6, 39 and 46 per cent in the same order; for the best educated, the scores were 5, 11, 54 and 27 per cent; for the least educated 4, 4, 33 and 58 percent; for younger people 5, 7, 51 and 33 per cent; for older people 5, 5, 35 and 54 per cent (European Commission 1998b: B40). In spring 1999,

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65 per cent of the managers regarded their country’s membership of the European Union as a good thing, but only 42 per cent of the manual workers; 64 per cent of the best educated, but only 40 per cent of the least educated; 51 per cent of the younger people, but only 44 per cent of the older people; 71 per cent of the best informed, but only 36 per cent of the least informed (European Commission 1999: B27). Based on the interpretation of these data, it can be assumed that the autonomy of the individuals varies with socio-demographical factors. As income grows, so does the latitude in budget disposition; with education, the ability to reflect; with professional status, the authority and responsibility for making decisions. These are all aspects of personal autonomy. The correlation between higher status and the development of a European identity consequently tells us that individualization and the formation of a European identity are related to each other. On the one hand, individualization prepares a fertile ground for Europeanization; on the other hand, it is pushed further ahead by Europeanization (Forsa 1992; European Commission 1992b: A20, A27; 1999: B26–9). The development of a far-reaching collective identity is always dependent on breaking the chains of group particularism. Therefore, people must free themselves of exclusive commitments to their group in order to be open to new, border-transcending ones. That inevitably requires a process of individualization. Individuals must be released from their loyalty to groups of origin to the extent to which they want to turn to other people beyond their group of origin. The development of personal independence, welfare-state-guaranteed social security independent of origin and the opening up of markets make this process of individualization possible. That is why it is wrong to see only the dissolution of communal relationships in this process. It is, rather, the prerequisite for the acceptance of new border-transcending commitments. In our case, individualization of national societies is the condition for the development of European thought and a European identity. What seems to be egoism from the perspective of the nation states proves to be a necessary prerequisite for the dispersion of a European identity from the European viewpoint. The nationally desired solidarity with the weak in the country can itself be anti-European solidarity because it keeps solidarity within the country when it is needed much more urgently in far poorer regions abroad. The same is true on a higher level in the relationship between European and global solidarity. But without the in-between stage of European solidarity, the global problems of solidarity also cannot be resolved, just as the resolution of national problems of solidarity has to precede the resolution of European problems.

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From these reflections it can be gathered that we draw a distorted image of individualization if we interpret it solely as isolation. The unattached individual who is lost and lonely among the masses, the unscrupulous egoism of career-people in the ‘society where only the strongest succeed’, the narcissism of self-realization aimed just at oneself, the hedonism of the fervent consumer, or the restlessness of the search for new experiences are the current negative images that are used to describe the shady side of the process of individualization. These images are not exactly wrong, but they are one-sided. They obscure the other side of the openness and the more extensive interconnection of social life – that is, individualization reinforces precisely these extensive interconnections, just as it itself is brought forward again by extensive interconnections which it itself initiates in a (self-catalyzing) process that advances and strengthens it. The integration of the individual in an extensive division of labor, in relationships of exchange and in communication networks minimizes his or her dependence on the group of origin and opens up new latitudes of freedom to him or her. The individual has a greater freedom of choice in the web of social relationships, through entering into relationships by which he or she becomes more purposeful, superficial, limited, and businesslike in character as well as usefulness, and costs are calculated much more. With individualization we usually combine the processes of the ‘destructuring’, ‘deobliging’ and ‘optionizing’ of life (Gross 1994). This image also shows only one side of the matter. On the other side are new structures, obligations and limitations of options. Their trademark is that they result from extensive interconnections: European and global relationships, obligations of loyalty, regulations and limitations on behavioral freedom. The birth of modernity is characterized by the mixing of individualization and the new formation of communities. The opening up of markets and communications accompanied a boom in the establishment of free associations of the most diverse nature, starting with reading circles, theater groups and museum societies, passing through sporting associations, singing groups and musical groups and going on to commercial associations and scientific and technical societies (Eder 1985). Their organizational principle was voluntary entrance and the opportunity for anyone to join regardless of origin. The dissolution of the traditional relationships of estates has been pressed ahead and made possible as a direct result of this new form of association. Individualization is thus totally unthinkable without the new formation of communities. And we can venture the thesis that all further

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pushes of individualization will run in a similar way because each individual is first pulled out of his or her group of origin by the entrance into new associations. Without this centrifugal power of the new, bordertranscending relationships, the individual would not be released from the centripetal force of his or her group of origin and thus not be liberated from those obligations, structures, and limitations. Individualization is absolutely unthinkable without the liberating power of new social relationships according to this argument. There is also empirical evidence for this: observed from a long-term perspective, the development of modernity is not characterized by a removal of the inclusion of individuals in associations, but rather directly by their increasing inclusion. The number of registered associations has grown steadily until today; it has not shrunk. The same can be said about the membership of individuals in associations: the trend is such that the number of associations any individual belongs to has not dropped, but rather has increased. A multitude of initiative groups can also be added under the heading of registered associations. Let’s look at a current example. Like everything in the old, maledominated society, the enthusiasm for club life was a male matter. But now, the more women exercise their rights for self-realization, the more they join associations for each and every reason that they like. Their emancipation takes away some of their loyalty to the family, which is why, from a conservative point of view, they are the cause of a good part of the weakening of family life and thus have been blamed for the disintegtation of the family. However, emancipated women in no way buzz around in social circles as isolated individuals – rather, they make their own contribution far more than before in the active organization of social life beyond the boundaries of the family. They do this precisely through membership of associations which was simply not available to them when they were confined to the home and the stove. The increasing emancipation of women is not the work of individuals struggling alone, but rather the work of their integration in new associations from which they first get the strength to remove themselves from the traditional domination of the family. The traditional obligations of women are thereby eased, the structure of their family life changes and their options are expanded, but this in no way results in release into a social space in which everything is possible and no woman knows what she should do. The options are not at all that numerous. Infact, there are exactly three: (1) child-rearing, (2) employment, (3) child-rearing and employment. The decision between the three options is made easier in that by choosing the third alternative the most expectations are

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met and so the highest degree of social conformity is achieved. Women today can only escape the double burden of child-rearing and profession at the cost of becoming socially disadvantaged. Therefore, their further efforts in emancipation have to be aimed inevitably at the creation of social services which relieve their burdens: day care centers, nursery schools, schools that last all day, organized play centers for children. Naturally, the sharing of housework and child-rearing with a husband also belongs on the agenda. No matter how long society may take to follow these demands, it is undoubtebly moving in this direction. This is shown by the fact that existing and new churches, organizations and associations are also expanding their activities in directions in which the liberated energy of women can develop, just like anywhere else. Associations have become both more numerous and more active than before and prove that we are by no means moving toward a completely atomized society without social ties (Beck-Gernsheim 1988; Meyer and Schulze 1989; Diezinger 1991; Schmerl 1993). In the light of these considerations, the thesis of individualization, which has become commonplace, should undergo a thorough revision. Unfortunately, when a thesis is employed frequently it often becomes so trivial that it is hardly useful. That seems to have happened with the thesis of individualization. Taken to its logical conclusion, it would mean we have to suffer from the breadth of our options as completely atomized individuals, while society suffers from our lack of relationships, so that we are threatened by both the collapse of the individual and the breakdown of society. That, however, is out of the question – the ones who suffer are the large, traditional organizations, churches and political parties, who complain about the decrease in their membership (Kleinert 1992; Wiesendahl 1992). As long as these see themselves as essential pillars of society, and others share in this understanding, there will be talk about symptoms of disintegration. However, this would be an erroneous viewpoint, concealing the reality that lies behind such developments – the simultaneous construction of new associations before our very eyes. These associations can develop because the established organizations make room for them; and with their drive for membership they contribute directly to the decrease in the numbers belonging to the old organizations. However, this occurrence need not be carried out as a zero-sum operation. The development goes ahead as before in the direction of increasing the total number of associations in which the average individual participates. As a rule, statistical observations establish on the one hand, the decrease in the membership of churches, trade unions and political parties, and the loss of loyal voters, and miss, on the other

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hand, the observation that in the same time period new religious communities, associations and political parties have emerged which for their part have won new members. Along with change in membership goes also multiplication of membership – for example, where a Protestant or Catholic church is not left, but where Buddhist rites are also participated in. Options are thereby expanded, though this inevitably implies the entering into of social relationships (Feige 1993; Ziebertz 1993). A multitude of new initiative groups have become active in the same time period in which the old, established churches, associations and political parties have shrunk. They organize help for neighborhoods, set up nursery schools, take care of the environment, fight against the arms trade and for the protection of animals, supervise programs for developmental aid and do what they can for human rights throughout the world. A multitude of people concentrate their involvement today less in the work of the established political parties, associations and churches and more in the participation of activities of the new associations. The loss of involvement in the old political parties, associations and churches is absorbed by the new associations and even converted into a growth in participation. Never before have so many citizens been active in associations as they are today. An atomized society, and the loss of social activities and social relationships are therefore out of the question. They are artefacts of a public discussion that seems hypnotized by the drop in membership of the old associations and does not register the growth in the new ones. According to a time-budget study of the German Federal Ministry of the Family from 1991/92, approximately 12 million people over 12 years of age in the Federal Republic of Germany performed voluntary services. In West Germany approximately 20 per cent of the population volunteered, in East Germany approximately 9 per cent. A survey in 1997 revealed that there were 39 per cent in the West and 35 per cent in the East who reported volunteering; 31 and 34 per cent respectively were interested in it, 30 and 31 per cent respectively were not (Klages 1998: 35). In West Germany the number of volunteer activities is known to have quadrupled since the beginning of the sixties. In connection with this there has been an enormous rise in the number of associations in which citizens are active as well as a structural change in volunteer work. Volunteer work by the prominent people in the traditional churches and associations that was done out of a sense of obligation has been displaced by volunteer work that people choose to do for the purpose of self-realization. While the traditional churches and associations complain about declining involvement, self-help groups are

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multiplying incessantly. The current number of such groups is judged to be over 60 000 in Germany (Deutscher Bundestag 1996: 10, 33). However, we have to realize that the quality of social relationships has changed. Spatial units such as neighborhood, municipality, city, state and country have lost importance, while in contrast associations for special interests have become more significant. Societal life is losing its core and shattering into individual fragments. As a result, it is becoming more difficult to come to a shared, binding agreement about how we would like to live.

Identity formation through inclusion: the differentiation and interconnection of center and periphery Thesis 3: European identity is formed through inclusion as a result of the differentiation and interconnection of center and periphery. In the process of Europeanization and globalization, the structural change of identity changes the relationship that the national cultural identities have with each other. Cultural identities – which at least previously existed to a considerable degree in and of themselves, reproduced themselves and had their own traditions to fall back on – are now pulled into and are dependent upon external relationships of exchange. The juxtaposition of relatively independent, self-reproducing cultures is increasingly being replaced by a widespread web of relationships in which the cultures are reproduced according to their worth in an exchange. Thus, they are more or less dependent on their ability to survive in, adapt to and impose themselves in economic competition. In the widespread web of relationships, the winners in economic competition make up the center around which the less successful gather in the semi-periphery and the periphery. The differentiation and interconnection between the center and the periphery, as the basic structure of the new system replaces the juxtaposition of cultures living in and of themselves (Hechter 1975; Shils 1975; Wallerstein 1984; Garnham 1990; Wallerstein 1991; Robertson 1992). Mutual learning and understanding are now possible, but they are carried out according to the law of competition for the best solutions. This means that the poorer solutions for problems are driven out by the better ones, and every success in solving a problem creates capital for further successes in problem-solving. This is true not only for economic competition, but also for cultural performances and even for artistic productions, scientific research, moral and legal regulations and religious teachings. All these have to assert themselves in competition which divides the world into

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the more or less successful. Moreover, past successes always fill the capital stockpile for investing in future successes. The differentiation between the center and the periphery that is produced is not quite fixed once and for all, but rather is constantly renewed and determined by competition. However, past successes can hinder innovations, too, and open up opportunities for hungry innovators in the periphery to push their way into the center, when those who were successful in the past no longer produce innovations and are pushed aside. The structure of the system remains intact; the roles alone are partially exchanged. Unified standards are now valid in the system. Accordingly, a unified cultural identity is developed. The standards are set in the center. The periphery strives to fulfill them and throws their old, competitively inferior standards of the good life overboard. Success in the competition of life worlds now decides over the continuation of cultural identities and leads to the concentration of cultural identity on a unified model. It would be one-sided to make only the economic interconnection of the center and the periphery, and the unimpeded development of the world economy, responsible for the selection of life worlds and cultural identities according to their success in surviving in competition. The expansion of moral and legal discourse has a very similar effect. It also starts a merciless competition in motion among the life worlds, whose continued existence is now dependent upon testing in practically unlimited discourse. Those life worlds which already have a longer experience with such discourse can play out their superiority, and the naive latecomers can do nothing other than take on the recipe for success from the advanced. They can hardly break out of this inferiority, because the advanced cultures have long since improved their recipe by the time the latecomers have learned the basics of the adopted recipe. This is valid for moral progress just as it is for scientific and economic progress. Moral universalism organizes the world as a relationship between the center and the periphery just as the globalization of markets does. The inequality in both cases is also quite similar. The world is dividing itself not only into the economically rich and poor, but also into the morally right and wrong. This is because life worlds now no longer exist by themselves, but rather need to withstand the moral judgment of the entire system, the headquarters of which is naturally found in the center. Certainly here, as in economics, advancement and demotion are not ruled out, even though a close relationship does exist between economic and moral changes in rank order. For example, Japan’s rise to the position of a leading economic power made the Americans and the Europeans curious not only about

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Japanese technical know-how, production concept and managerial methods, but also about the ethics of Japanese lifestyle and Japanese principles for living together in society. Also, in the present debate about which measures should be used to fight unemployment, US employment policy has undergone an astounding rehabilitation. For a long time, the hire-and-fire principle had been judged to be an expression of unreasonable social toughness, but now the great ease with which employment contracts are made and canceled in the US is seen as an essential reason for the country’s success in the continuous creation of new jobs and the minimization of unemployment. The hire-and-fire principle has thus gained a new moral quality, since it helps to fight unemployment (Hank 1995; Kurbjuweit 1996; Lewis and Petrella 1996).

Europeanization, renationalization, reregionalization and globalization as intertwined movements The process of Europeanization does not run smoothly and directly toward the goal of a united European identity. On the contrary, it provokes countermovements of nationalism and regionalism from below, as well as countermovements of globalism from above. The simultaneous increase in globalization, Europeanization, nationalism and regionalism is the hallmark of life today, an expression of the particular tension to which societal life is currently exposed. Leading elites of European identity formation Thesis 4: European identity is formed through the activities of the Europeanizing élite, and in particular by the following:





top managers of industry, experts (euro-technocrats), leading political figures and intellectuals,

and so tends to lose touch with the citizens. The change of direction toward Europe is the concern of the modernizers who invest in the opportunities for profit that accompany this change. That should not be interpreted only in an economic sense, but it also includes opportunities for development in a scientific-technical, political and cultural sense. That is why top managers are not the only ones to be considered as carriers of the Europeanization process. Experts, politicians and intellectuals are also included. They all form the network of a European élite which tends to become independent.

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Owing to the lack of attachment of the network members to their national communities, this network produces fears of an uncertain future in the citizens who are attached to their national communities. Fears arise whenever new phases of Europeanization take place and preoccupy the public. The Europe of top management Of course the opportunities for sales in the European single market are tempting. The management of an enterprise would not be doing their job if they did not use these opportunities and did not place themselves at the cutting edge of the movement for Europeanization. The program of the expansion of the single European market makes Europe first of all, then, a Europe of enterprises in which the top management defines the prevalent ideas. With the discussion about the economic position of Germany, top management has succeeded, in light of the new competitive situation in Europe and in the world, in going on the offensive once again after decades on the defensive, and in defining the situation (Rüchardt 1992; Stihl 1993). Those who at present want to be heard have to clothe their contributions to the discussion in the all-dominating notion of improving competitiveness. There is nothing else left for the trade unions, for example, other than the minimal amount of striking, and the accompanying great measure of social peace as a special quality of this or that location for flourishing enterprises to praise. The environmentalists have to sell environmental protection as the motor for new industrial growth with great opportunities for export. And theater directors should not get tired of selling good and well-subsidized or sponsored theater as a cultural infrastructure for traveling businesspeople and employees. In this respect, the change of direction toward Europe, and from there to the world, brings top managers to the forefront of the public discussion, since the well-being of entire regions and nations depends on their decisions about the location of an enterprise. In that discussion, the situation is defined and strategies for negotiation are thought out. A new power has been acquired by top management, which it now implements in public discourse as the power of definition. In the open world market, the location of an enterprise is now really anywhere it chooses, and precisely in that sense any location is eligible at any time. In another sense, of course, top management can no longer choose just any location for an enterprise: enterprises can be moved only to locations where the balance of advantages and disadvantages stands up to the competition on the world market. In reaching its decision on a

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location, top management does nothing other than carry out the law of the market. In light of the above-described development, the hard-won welfare state protections become, however, more and more useless because the scope of the market and the scope of social laws no longer coincide. Good social protection thus becomes a danger for the preservation of a workplace, so that in the end, when the workplace is gone, the social protection is not worth anything. Here we have to establish, too, a gradual depreciation of the power of the nation state and its laws. The law fulfills no purpose any more for those for whom it was once created. Well-intentioned social policy and properly designed social rights can have at most anti-social consequences because they increase the insecurity of the employee and do not reduce it. The Europe of experts Europe is, however, not only in the hands of firms, and Europeanization implies not only a shift in power to the level of top management; there are also the scientific and technical experts who, as representatives from industry, science, technology and ministerial bureaucracy, work on the harmonization of the European law in every imaginable speciality, from laws about foodstuffs through consumer protection to regulations covering the media. Through their regular activities in Brussels, these experts naturally regard Europe as the object of identification more than anything other. They think and behave in European categories. While they do of course represent the tradition of thinking, style of regulating and strategies for negotiation of their own countries of origin, nevertheless, by carrying out their activities in Brussels, they learn to see and to solve problems from a European perspective. Their Europe is a technically and legally standardized Europe in which everything fits together and all points of friction due to different systems of standardization have been removed, so that no technical or legal incompatibilities oppose the European trend. The policy pursued, of mutual recognition of different technical standards, itself forces standardization in the end, because in such an active market, the competition of regulations eliminates those rules which lead to reduced chances for sales ( Joerges 1991; Bach 1992; v. Senger and Etterlin 1992; Bach 1999; Page 1997). The Europe of experts does not lend itself to publicity. It operates behind closed doors for reasons of orientation, counseling and negotiations, and is mostly made up of dry technical and legal material. It is hardly appropriate that it should call the attention of the media to

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itself. At the most, strange decisions can now and again cause small storms of indignation, which mostly, however, recede again and are quickly forgotten. The popular masses do not know who the members of the European élite are. The latter hardly play a role in public debates, which is why they cannot pass on a European model to the masses. Their activity is also hardly suitable for the formulation of a lucrative model; it even has a rather repellant effect, by which it is characterized in public discussion, where political leaders use suitable phrasing to give a negative image of the European bureaucracy, in contradistinction to a Europe of citizens and democracy without, however, being able to guarantee that the latter will also become a reality. The standardization of the size and curvature of cucumbers is frequently cited as an outgrowth of the European obsession to regulate, after which is proffered immediately the idea of a better Europe, supposedly untouched by the irrationalities of bureaucratic regulation. Nothing is said, though, of the fact that the expansion of the single European market and technical standardization are two sides of the same coin, and that in many areas technical standardization is indispensable for the protection of the consumer, so that regulations also unavoidably creep in which appear to be bizarre when looked at individually. All good intentions purporting to only make sensible standardizations can indeed be seriously promised, but that does not change the fact that the volume of regulations also grows with the multitude of the products and, as a result, the number of bizarre regulations will also increase. The European bureaucracy of technocrats will also expand with the growing need for regulation on a European level. More and more laws will be put down. The design of these laws needs the agreement of the European expert élite to which the average citizen, simply because the official channels are further away, can gain access only with great difficulty. At the same time, this development tramples on the opposing need of the citizen for a far-reaching political say in decision-making. The alienation of the European-oriented élite of technical experts from the rather local-oriented average citizen is therefore practically unavoidable. This also implies an alienation of the average citizen from European law. Owing to the lack of democratic participation, the legitimation of the law is not easily made understandable to the citizen. The lack of democracy of the European Union has, therefore, become an important topic, without any truly promising strategies for its dismantling beginning to emerge. The tendency, indeed, is more in the direction of our giving up the conventional, nation-state-influenced ideas of legitimacy and democracy (Lepsius 1991; Reif 1992; Wieland 1992).

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The Europe of political top leadership The top managements of the firms and the technical experts have turned themselves to Europe, on the one hand, out of the necessity of the demands of the single European market and the global situation of competition, and, on the other hand, because of the need for regulation initiated by the agenda of the single European market. Europe as a project of unification has been, however, a matter of politics since the beginning. More precisely, it has been a matter of individual political leaders who have made the job of unification one of their tasks. The cooperation of the heads of government of the Federal Republic of Germany and France, starting with the teams of Adenauer–Schumann and Adenauer–de Gaulle and on up to the team of Kohl–Mitterand, has played a great role. (Right now nothing can be said about the current team of Schröder–Chirac.) The Europe of big politics is a Europe of summit meetings, banquets and statesmanlike gestures. Nevertheless, such occurrences give the idea an immense thrust which is used in the painstaking and detailed work of the previously mentioned countless rounds of experts. Through their influence and their power, the big politicians have set European unification on its way, forced it and constructed it, in a manner which would not have been achievable had they not at the same time gone a considerable way ahead of the readiness of the citizens themselves. The construction of Europe has always been a balancing act between large-scale political objectives and the willingness of the national populations to accept the consequences. It depends, therefore, on governmental heads who are relatively firmly set in the saddle, especially those of France and Germany, who act as the dynamos. This means that the heads of government invest a considerable measure of political credit in the European project without an immediate payment in interest, that is without being able to guarantee improved living conditions. Nothing else is to be judged by the program agreed upon for the construction of the single market in Maastricht 1991 and the realization of the monetary union in 1999. On the one hand, the program elicited resistance and, on the other hand, it exercised considerable pressure for increased unification, for countries to even out their differences, and for success, so that the process of unification is driven ahead this way or that, independent of whether all objectives have been truly reached within the given time-frame or not. Since the globalization of the conditions of competition, the problems of the environment and social problems have ended the era of national state sovereignty, and the dynamic of European unification is

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underway anyway, politics has no other choice than to do what it can for the process of unification. Politics has to put itself at the cutting edge of modernization, if it does not want to be overrun by it. As a result, politics alienates itself to an extent from the domestic public which undermines its support. Politics has to tear citizens away from their accustomed conditions of life and orient them to life in a European society and in a situation of global competition. But it also runs into a dilemma: on the supranational level, the liberalization of the markets hurries far ahead of social and ecological regulations, while on national levels the social security systems and ecological programs are no longer effective. Politics, though, is measured in dealing with these problems and suffers from a growing of lack of support crisis with increasing lack of performance. The construction of the single European market has been forced into existence by global competition. This construction, however, takes sovereignty away from national governments which need it to solve their problems. If the national governments are not successful in starting social and ecological campaigns for catching up at the European and global levels, they will fall into increasingly deeper political crises in their home countries. These campaigns for catching up, though, can hardly be won by the instant administering all through Europe of social and ecological security at the level reached by the most advanced countries. Therefore, politics has seriously to test the question of whether to reduce the European-wide and global pressure of competition so that ecologically appropriate prices for transportation eliminate the distortion of the existing price structure. Such a program would give local and regional markets new opportunities and would keep the destabilizing tendency of globalization under control. However, it would work against supranational integration and would cause conflicts about who has to pay how much of the prize of foregone chances of economic growth. The Europe of intellectuals Next to a Europe of top managers, experts and politicians, is there also a Europe of intellectuals that lend a cultural identity to the economic– technical–political construct? Certainly intellectuals have time and again made ‘Europe’ a subject of their thoughts (Morin 1987; Patocka 1991; Kearney 1992; Delanty 1995). If one considers the participation of intellectuals in the questions of the European programme for expansion, then this question has to be answered with ‘No’. Indeed, the future state of Europe is discussed in political science, but then again it is a discourse about technical and specialty-specific matters. The big

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intellectual debates have so far passed by the topic of Europe. That is mainly because Europe portrays a particularistic unity, but intellectuals feel responsible for that which is universal. The work of unification has, therefore remained extremely pale in intellectual character and persists on the pragmatic soil of the expansion of the single European market, of legal harmonization and of institutional expansion. Nevertheless, it cannot be flatly asserted that European unification is lacking in ideas. Without ideas, the project would not have been able to progress as far as it actually has. It is, most importantly, carried by one idea of raising material well-being through a common market and by another of displacing nationalism through supranational cooperation (Weisskirchen 1992; Delors 1993; Arnold 1995). Both ideas have become considerably intertwined. Within the boundaries of the European Union, material well-being and mutual understanding have steadily improved, so that actually a growing part of every national population places its national membership in the context of a European identity. The willingness to see oneself as European has increased. This is also most certainly due to the fact that the architects of the European Union succeeded in furnishing their program with an idea that reached beyond pragmatics and with which the citizen was able to identify. The developmental step which requires new efforts to legitimize the European project seems to have been reached. Citizens are experiencing drastic changes which do not always look positive in their eyes. They are now supposed to share their rights with other Europeans, who are not only useful buyers of their own products but also competitors for jobs and markets. In this way society is increasingly dividing into the group of modernization winners and the group of modernization losers. Owing to both the huge public debt of the state and the overburdening of the taxpayer, financial assets to provide the necessary aid to the losers in modernization are missing. Through the European single market and the simultaneous liberalization of the world market, the pressure to become competitive has intensified. This pressure is producing a social crisis, the extent of which could perhaps reach dimensions which presently have not yet been imagined. Policy-makers are being paralyzed from many sides in a situation where increased action is required. On the European and global side, nation states are having their necessary sovereignty taken away; on the national side, the necessary financial resources are lacking. The welfare state has come to a point where it can no longer finance itself exactly at a time at which new welfare policies are called for. The nation state therefore accumulates social problems, but lacks the financial means and sovereignty

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required in order to solve those problems. Therefore, these social problems increasingly put national societies to the acid test. New nationalism Thesis 5: European identity is formed in a relationship of tension with the countermovement of a new nationalism. In the situation described above, the heightening social tension between the modernization winners and the modernization losers generates national countermovements to an extent that seemed no longer to be possible from the point of view of a Europe which was thought of as peacefully growing together. Extremely European and global-minded strata and extremely nationalistic-oriented strata stand irreconcilably opposed to each other. According to the Eurobarometer survey of the 12 original EU member countries in fall 1994, on the average, 63 per cent of the population saw themselves as on the way to a European identity and of these 7 per cent saw their identity as European exclusively, 10 per cent as European ahead of their own nationality, with 46 per cent as European after their national identity; 4 per cent did not want to comment. At the same time, 43 per cent said that too many foreigners were living in their country. On a scale of very strong to very weak xenophobia, on the EU average, 21 per cent were classified as having very strong xenophobia, 27.5 per cent as strong, 28 per cent as weak and 24 per cent as very weak. In almost all EU member countries xenophobia has grown since the beginning of the nineties, even in countries with long-standing open citizenship laws, like France. There, as many as 55 per cent have fairly recently held the opinion that too many foreigners are living in the country, while just under the average, 40 per cent, felt this way in Germany (European Commission 1995a: 69–70, B50, 54). Here we certainly have to recognize that the reported xenophobia is directed almost exclusively toward foreigners from outside the EU member countries. It must also be taken into consideration that such attitudes demonstrate economic fluctuations. The crest of the xenophobic wave was been reached in 1992 when the topic of immigration received the greatest attention in the media. In spring 1992, 59 per cent of the EU citizens had the opinion that too many foreigners were living in their country. In Germany the figure was 55 per cent. The drop to 40 per cent in fall 1994 is especially striking (European Commission 1992a: A41, 42; 1995a: 69–70, B50, 54). The modernizers devote themselves to Europe and the world. They also work on the social integration of the new European society and beyond that of the global society. At the same time, they inevitably

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distance themselves from the those who are left behind, who as a counter-reaction to that development struggle back toward that which up until now has given them prosperity and security: national unity. Some dash ahead toward Europe and out into the world, others want to go back to the nation. The social fabric threatens to tear. As already established, the willingness to develop a European identity increases with social status and achieved educational level. In the opposite direction, identification is with one’s own nation. The EU averages of the first 12 member countries regarding pride in their own country are as follows: 86 per cent of the lowest status group and 79 per cent of those with the least education described themselves as fairly or very proud of their own country in the Eurobarometer survey in fall 1994. In contrast, only 64 per cent of the highest status group and 62 per cent of the best educated answered in that way. From those who described themselves as very proud of their own nation, 45 per cent saw themselves in the near future still exclusively as members of their nation; of those who did not show any kind of pride whatsoever, only 17 per cent did. In contrast, of those who were very proud, only 3 per cent leant toward an exclusively European identity in the future; but of those who were not proud at all, 24 per cent did not. These figures express the social tensions that accompany the Europeanization process (European Commission 1995a: B51, 52). The established political parties have not been successful in mending the rift that runs directly through the middle of society, and in bridging the widening gap. This is due to the previously described paralysis, which afflicts those with political responsibility. As a result, extreme right-wing populist parties and movements are taking advantage of the new situation. They have flourished particularly and entered parliaments in Austria, France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark and Norway. Having no political responsibility and not having to prove success, they tell the insecure citizen that a return to national solidarity and an exclusion of threatening foreigners would ensure work-places, prosperity and security. Out of the fear of foreigners, comes the hatred of foreigners which erupts time and time again in xenophobic campaigns (Greß et al. 1990; Betz 1991, Heitmeyer 1992; Willems 1993; Betz 1994, 1998). It seems like we cannot escape the Europeanization – renationalization dialectic because the integration of the new European unity follows the disintegration and removal of solidarity on the national level. Also, the national policy-makers have their hands tied by their loss of sovereignty and the practically unavoidable financial shortage, and the

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supranational policy-makers still lack the financial and institutional requisites to solve the new problems. New regionalism Thesis 6: European identity is formed in a relationship of tension with the countermovement of a new regionalism. The new awakening of regionalism is still another countermovement in the process of Europeanization. Regionalist movements are strengthened by the loss of sovereignty of the nation states, and by the mentioned processes of modernization in which the national tendency toward disintegration and the removal of solidarity takes its course on the road toward Europe and the world. Regionalist movements are especially strong where the gap between the modernization winners and the modernization losers separates entire regions from each other. This can be observed in Italy, for example, where the North would like to remove itself from the burden the South represents in order to take greater advantage of the new opportunities of the European single market. The better possibilities of articulation for the regions in Europe included in the Maastricht treaty can naturally be best used by those regions which have enough economic power and political leadership to make themselves noticed directly by those in Brussels, beyond the internal coordination of the nation state. In contrast, the weak regions feel threatened by the loss of support of the nation state, without being assured that the European regional and structural funds will have enough resources left for them. At any rate, the European Union is augmenting its responsibility here. However, to fulfill this responsibility it has to substantially increase the budget of its structural and regional aid (von Alemann et al. 1990; Sturm 1992; Weinacht 1995; Hueglin 1997). Globalism Thesis 7: European identity is formed in a relationship of tension with the countermovement of a new globalism. Less noticeable than the new nationalism and regionalism, yet within the logical development of countermovements leaning against the Europeanization of our identity, is globalism. The carrier of this countermovement is the cultural avant garde of the modernizers, who warn of the continuation of nationalism in the European Union up to a new supranational and therefore more powerful level. Here one needs to think only about the catchphrase ‘Fortress Europe’ and about the waves of xenophobia against immigrants from outside the EU member countries.

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From a Norwegian perspective, Johan Galtung (1973) sees the European Union as a new hegemonic power which gives its neighbors a de facto choice of either getting brushed aside or else being swallowed up as a new member state with a corresponding loss of sovereignty. Some loss of sovereignty already exists, in that they are no longer able to decide how they want to live and that they are not able to avoid the impact of the EU program of economic advances. Whether the neighbors, for example Norway or Switzerland, join or not, their opportunities for the future depend to a considerable extent on the politics of the European Union. From Galtung’s point of view, then, a larger Europe entailing the loose cooperation of sovereign states seems to be the better solution, because it would oppose the concentration of power in the center of the European Union. The European Union is, however, not only a European hegemonic power, but also a global economic power which is in competition in the world market and in exchange with other nations, and naturally needs to use its opportunities in this competition to its own advantage. Before the world problems of poverty and ecological over-exploitation can be solved, the EU has to solve its internal problems and ensure the loyalty of its citizens through economic and political successes. For the avant garde of the modernizers, who are trying to solve the problems of the world, the identification with Europe is at most a way-station on the road to a global identity. Weighing it too heavily could turn it into an obstacle to global thinking and behaving. Therefore, they prefer to turn directly to global organizations like Greenpeace or Amnesty International in order to lose no time on the way to solving world problems. From this viewpoint, the European identity once again requires a relativization from a global perspective in order to make room for the development of a global identity (Kühne 1991, 1993; Birg 1994; Brüne 1995; Schug 1995; Boli and Thomas 1999).

The dialectic of identity gain and identity loss: identity growth Thesis 8: European identity is formed in the context of a dialectic of identity gain and identity loss and, when successful, it implies identity growth. The transfer of identity traits from a national to a European level implies a dialectic of identity gain and identity loss. The modernizers rush ahead and transfer political events to a European level. In that way they set in motion a structural change of identity. The citizens of

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the individual European states will be pulled into the distinctions of the European Union from the outside, into the processes of the homogenization of economic, political and cultural affairs and into the homogenization of solidarity. Through these processes they will learn more and more how to think and act from a European perspective, how to see themselves in internal affairs with others as a European, how to differentiate themselves from others as a European in external affairs and finally how to separate out in themselves the European from the German or the French. The group of people is growing who see themselves as Europeans before, at the same time as or at least after their own national membership. In the Eurobarometer survey of fall 1998, on the average 4 per cent of the EU citizens saw themselves exclusively as European, 7 per cent as European and German, French, Belgian, and so on, 43 per cent as German, French, Belgian, and so on and European, 43 per cent only as German, French, Belgian, and so on; 2 per cent gave no answer (European Commission 1998b: 59). With the construction of a European identity, EU citizens are dismantling a good part of their own national identity. That means that a European identity gain follows a national identity loss. Correspondingly, this structural change of identity implies conflicts. The 51 per cent of the EU citizens who in spring 1997 had already turned themselves toward Europe can no longer accept without reservation belonging to the same group as the 45 per cent who stick to their national identity. The former must limit their loyalty to this 45 per cent in the context of their widened civic duties. In contrast, the 45 per cent who are national in their thinking expect an unlimited allegiance to the nation. External conflicts of allegiance between differently oriented citizens are increasing, while internal conflicts of allegiance within each individual citizen in regard to the question of which allegiance should be given priority in particular cases are also correspondingly piling up. The rift in society between Europeans and nationals is a symptom of identity transformation. The development of a European identity therefore, time and again, causes countermovements for the revival of national identities. The identity transfer from the nation up to Europe does not, however, have to become a zero-sum process. The cited Eurobarometer survey of fall 1998 revealed indeed a majority of 50 per cent who mentioned a double identity, both European and national. A special task of integration goes to this majority. They act as the mediating link between the 43 per cent who, on the EU average, see themselves as nationals and the 4 per cent who see themselves as

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Europeans; and in Germany between the 46 and the 4 per cent respectively (European Commission 1998b: 59). This same role must be played out by the great majority who consider themselves certainly not to be very proud but definitely fairly proud of their own nation, and nevertheless profess to a future European identity. In the EU the average for this was 66 per cent in fall 1994 – 53 per cent national and European, 9 per cent European and national, and 4 per cent who think only European. This majority have to mediate between the 45 per cent of their fellow citizens who think more nationally and are very proud, and the 24 per cent of their fellow citizens who think exclusively European and are not at all proud (European Commission 1995a: B51). The citizens of the wide middle are developing a European identity without giving up their national identity. Of course, they can no longer promote their national identity in the same exclusive way as before. The national identity will be limited in relation to the expansion of the European one; however, it does not have to be given up, nor does it have inevitably to shrink to the same degree to which the European identity grows. In fact, a growth in identity is taking place here. Those who move toward Europe, and learn how to think and act in a European way, expand their identity. This means that the horizons of thinking and acting will broaden. We will learn to reconcile a greater number of allegiances than before. We can accommodate, coordinate and fulfill more expectations. Our latitude in thinking and acting grows. The important thing here is a continuation of identity growth, which we recognize already from earlier stages in the development of a society and a person. Resources for thinking and behaving expand with growth in identity. These resources enable us to accomplish more tasks, such as coping with a greater range of identifications and civic duties. With the help of empirical data from the Eurobarometer surveys, we can illustrate the relationship described. The survey in fall 1994 told us, for example, that xenophobia and the change of direction toward Europe were negatively correlated. Of those who had the strongest xenophobic orientation, only 27 per cent put their hope in the new European Union according to Maastricht. Of the least xenophobic however, 57 per cent did (European Commission 1995a: 70). I interpret this lesser amount of xenophobia as increased sovereignty, accompanied by the ability to live with a greater number of people of different national origins without feeling a threat to one’s own personal identity. That the future orientation toward Europe does not have to result in the complete rejection of loyalty to fellow citizens of one’s own land is

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demonstrated by the following: of the surveyed, those who expressed more or less national pride also expressed no difference in hope regarding the new European Union (European Commission 1995a: 69). This result seems to contradict the finding that the greater was the identification with Europe, the less was the pride shown in one’s own nation. The difference between the two statements can be explained as meaning that the expression of hope with regard to the new European Union is a weaker change of direction toward Europe than perceiving oneself as European. The former is more compatible with national pride than the latter. By voicing hope in the new European Union, the first limitation of national identity in the greater European context is, however, also expressed. This is a step toward identity growth. From these data we can conclude that the development of a European identity is based on and promotes increased tolerance. The change of direction toward Europe need not inevitably result in the rejection of one’s own nation or in its rejection to the same degree to which one has turned toward Europe. Identity growth widens the scope of allegiances. However, this scope must be actively used and shaped by policymakers. Identity growth is an essential component of the development of modern society. The broadening of the network of interdependent actions in the process of globalization forces such an identity growth. Here we can establish Norbert Elias’s (1939/1976) theory of civilization in a broader sense. Out of growing interdependencies, Elias concluded that there is an increased obligation for controlled affect, growth of self-restraint and the growth of self-discipline. This is because in broad networks of actions, the only ones who have a chance for success and survival are those who have their affect under control and who are able to plan and organize their behavior rationally. This assumption, in my opinion, uses too narrow a picture of personality as a basis. Following the theories of personality from Durkheim (1965) to Mead (1934/1962), Parsons (1964), Piaget (1977) and Kohlberg (1969), we can recognize in the development of a modern identity of individual persons not only a growing capability of self-discipline, but also the generalization of identity. We have to place the growth of the capability to coordinate an increasing number of the most varied relationships and expectations, and the growth of the ability to make moral judgements, in the foreground (Giddens 1991). In light of the socialization theories of the above-mentioned authors, we are able to recognize, in the expansion of the network of interdependencies, only a stimulus for identity growth. This, in its turn requires a learning process during which the individual is constantly

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offered new opportunities for cooperation and identification on the next, higher level of living together socially. The Europeanization of our identity does not inevitably come with the expansion of the single European market. The process of Europeanization needs European role models, who in an outstanding way endeavor to work for Europe and who are able to commit the various national populations to the idea. The individual heads of government of single countries have played this role differently and for different amounts of time for their respective populations. However, the institutionalization of such a role is lacking on a European, nation-transcending level. As long as the president of the commission is chosen by the heads of government and is treated more as anadministrative head, it is not possible for citizens to identify with a representative of the community. The election of the president by the European Parliament or even by the populations would work in this direction (Reif 1992). The identification with Europe is a learning process which is carried out in many small steps and is dependent upon the further expansion of student exchange programs as well as on cooperation in all areas of life. The driving force is the international division of labor. Only in this way can an identification with Europe rooted in the citizens’ hearts emerge, instead of a forced Europeanization.

Identity growth as a societal process of production: innovators, banks, entrepreneurs and speculators Thesis 9: European identity is formed as identity growth in a societal process of value creation. This process requires the help of innovators, banks, entrepreneurs and speculators. Identity growth is a process of production which runs a course similar to that of economic growth, and has to rely on conditions similar to those found there. It requires investments in European projects, entrepreneurial spirit, the incessant upsurge of innovations, willingness to take risks, and even speculators who will invest in a project whose chances of success are still not entirely predictable. The European project can be advanced only to the extent that government leaders and other leading policy-makers can win the trust of their respective electorates in the form of extensive credit to be invested into the expansion of European institutions and the development of common activities that include even the ordinary citizen (Parsons 1969: 352–438; Münch 1995: 159–77). The European project thus encompasses numerous activities for further expansion through the respective

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treaties. These activities can be successful in involving citizens and not in just allowing them to look on. New projects to mobilize citizens must be started again and again. Many individual political entrepreneurs need to be recruited from universities, schools, businesses, government offices and municipalities and as many citizens as possible need to be moved to cooperate (Giesen 1983). In a time of rapid change the European project also needs constant innovations in many small individual projects. Just as in the economic process of production, we cannot expect each and every project to lead to success; rather, competition between the projects has to cause an increase in cooperation on the whole at European level. The growing openness of the world and the development of an avant garde of citizens, who are willing to involve themselves in border-transcending projects without immediately being able to calculate its benefit down to the last penny, today offer better opportunities than ever before to again organize societal living together. Young, open-minded citizens here play the role of speculators who invest the capital of their support not in the traditional enterprises for securing national solidarity – that is, in the established churches, political parties and voluntary associations – but rather in new enterprises whose prospects for success are still uncertain and are intended to be European and global. They are independent enough to be able to invest in riskier enterprises, but also ones that will possibly be more profitable. The willingness of the open-minded to give support can be interpreted as risk capital that is available to the innovative and uncertain political enterprises for the realization of the European project. The European project must compete, however, with a multitude of projects that are intended to be rather global and universal and which exceed the boundaries of the European project. The problems of the Third World, the maintenance of the global ecological balance and the imposition of human rights still need more support by open-minded citizens than the European project, because the process of solving these problems is even more difficult to predict. Identity growth depends on a process of value creation that sets in motion churches, political parties, voluntary associations, charitable organizations, clubs and initiative groups – that is, the so-called nonprofit organizations and non-governmental organizations; in this process the willingness of a multitude of citizens to identify with the organizations is bundled together and the organizations are thus supported. Identification with an organization can happen through membership fees, donations, endorsement or active participation in its

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work. The support for an organization can be seen as resembling a deposit in a bank, with each organization playing the role of a bank which manages the deposit in the fiduciary interest of the depositor and passes it on as credit to one or more profit-promising initiatives. Such enterprises are, for example, European cooperative projects in schools, universities, places of research and businesses; environmental projects; developmental aid; and the imposition of human rights. The organization concerned carries over the support and willingness of individuals to identify with a concrete project, and thus success (in European unification, in managing development aid, in protecting the environment or in imposing human rights) wins support among even more people, and with it their willingness to take on a new identity. The carrier benefits from this willingness to identify with others rather as a bank receives interest, which is passed on in turn to its depositors. The amount of interest earned by the depositors – the supporters – is determined by the effectiveness with which their support and willingness to identify with the group increases the number of people won over as sympathizers and fellow activists. With success, the depositors’ support and willingness to identify with the group acquires a greater value, and has more scope and effectiveness. Finally, an identity growth takes place in the sense that more people than before are on the way to a European or even a global identity. That is why the thinking and acting of more people than before allows itself to be adapted to and coordinated into a common identity. An identitiy broadens and passes previously existing boundaries without completely losing its origin. Ideally, the orginal identities are preserved in the new, broadened one, in a dialectical sense. The individual citizens experience a growth in identity because their bank investment brings them to a new stage in the coordination of their own and others’ behaviors. This coordination of the cooperation of new investors also causes a growth in identity because it leads to more successes in even more widely branching areas of behavior. Each identity broadens its reach through its own development and also through the simultaneous development of identity of others. The fiduciary activities of the identity banks – that is, churches, associations and clubs, particularly international non-governmental organizations – play a key role as political enterprises in this process of value creation, together with the activities of the innovative and risk-taking activists (Boli and Thomas 1999). On the basis of such a process of value creation, resulting in the extension of identities, people learn to mutually respect each other’s rights both as citizens of a political community and, on a broader scale,

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as human beings in general. They achieve the sharing of rights, within their national community, with non-nationals both from other member states of the European Union and from states outside the borders of that union, with Europeans within the union and with people everywhere in the world beyond the union. Rights undergo a process of abstraction, so that people can rely on them in ever wider circles of interaction far beyond national solidarities. The sharing functoins as might a European-wide and, eventually, a world-wide currency, to coordinate mutual respect and support on a scale broader than just national solidarities, independently of a person’s origin and primordial ties. European citizenship rights in their full development complement the European Monetary Union, human rights the world-wide expansion of free trade and its regulation by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Such rights acquire the character of generalized media of communication, with qualities similar to money (Parsons 1969; Münch 1995).

From primordial to medialized identity: economic fluctuations, inflation and deflation Thesis 10: European identity is formed as a medialized identity which implies economic upward and downward trends and crises caused by inflationary–deflationary spirals. The identity of people is releasing itself more and more from the chains of primordial communities in the context of the described dynamic movement of identity development. It is generalized, and takes on an exclusively symbolic quality. Familial identity comes from birth and determines once and for all who belongs to the group of relatives. It does not allow itself to be detached; however, it sets limitations in regard to newly won-over identities. Local identity, on the other hand, may change many times during a lifetime, until a completely separate identity, freed from any specific locality, is formed; this has become common today. In the same way, national identities lose their exclusivity in the process of modernization. The further this process advances, the more will identity become a matter of choice, its meaning definable in different ways. Ideas about identity then, become so widely generalized that they are only hollow shells, which can be filled with a great variety of contents. Identity becomes an abstraction, the concrete form of which is left up to and asked of each individual. This is also true for a social as well as a personal identity, if we may bring this differentiation of Goffman (1963) into consideration here. In my social identity as a German today, I have much more flexibility

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in defining that identity than my ancestors had. This is also true in my personal identity, as a person with a distinctive view of myself coming from myself in my relations with others. Also, my Ego identity – the third concept of Goffman – which is the center of my ability to reflect on my situation, offers me increasing flexibility in defining that identity. Identity frees itself from people and groups and becomes a symbolic and generalized medium of internal self-ascertainment and external communication. On the one hand, identity is defined in the processes of communication and self-ascertainment. On the other hand, a defined identity is used as a medium in these processes. If others and I were to make ourselves recognized as being people with particular identities – for example as convinced Europeans – we would then both open up and limit the opportunities to make ourselves understood about what we are or what we want to be. In the same way, I indicate to others what kind of thinking and acting they can expect from me. I offer the chance to coordinate different ways of thinking and acting. The more identity separates from and is freed from its national origin and becomes an abstraction, the more it takes on a character making it strictly a means of communication. My family identity runs irrevocably through my blood. My identity as a European is nothing other than a promise to solve concrete problems on given occasions so that they can come to carry and promote the European idea, and that I am capable accordingly of putting my German identity into the greater European context. Who knows if I even have the necessary knowledge and means to do it? The less my identity is put into concrete actions, the more steps are inserted into the thinking process; and the more other people are able to influence the success of my behavior, the greater is the danger that my identity is no more than a worthless symbol without any relationship to reality. And the more identity is used as a means of communication only for the sake of carrying on communication, without having to demonstrate its meaning through actions, the sooner will it be possible for communication about identity to be carried on with claims about identity that are worthless. We are moving toward a world now in which the multiplicity of graduations of communication about communication takes up an everbroadening space, so that the path from symbolic representations to their actualization in real behavior grows longer (Giesen 1991a). That is also true for communication about identity. The portion of communication about identity grows incessantly, whereas the portion of living out and giving full expression to identity itself does not always keep pace

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with the sheer growth in communication. The more the two sides drift apart from each other, the less is the value of the communicated identity. In a constantly moving society of communication it is not, however, a matter of steady conditions, but one of a dynamic process. Thus, we can talk about an inflation of identity when ideas about identity, to an increasing extent, are brought into circulation and their conversion into real behavior lags behind – or, more precisely, when at a point in time t1 a reference to a European identity is followed by less concrete European behavior than at a point in time t0; or, expressed in still another way, when at a point in time t1 the number of public declarations of belief in Europe (for instance, by counting the articles in the daily newspaper) in relation to a point in time t0 has grown more than the number of transfers of EU law into the individual member states. We can actually observe such an inflationary development, in the case of EU legislation having admittedly expanded tremendously, without its implementation in the individual nation states following at the suggested rate. This development is indicated by the legal proceedings against individual member countries. From 1975 to 1991, the number of guidelines, regulations and decisions grew from 1172 to 8198, the number of yearly introduced legal proceedings from 60 to 960. The ratio of legal proceedings to the existing scope of guidelines, regulations and decisions increased from 6.29 to 13.17 (Münch 1993b: 334). The inflationary process of the communication of identity generates mistrust, which can cause a retreat from communication. The concept of identity is then so depleted that it means less every day, and therefore can hardly be used for communication or for the coordination of behavior. Communication breaks down and leads to a recession accompanied by a deflationary spiral. The concept of identity is now used even less, so that when it is still used, it produces a higher output of communication and coordination. Due to its minimal use, however, the entire coordination of behavior has already sunk to a very low level. We can recall the course of European identity traits from Eurobarometer survey data. The survey taken between spring 1981 and spring 1991 showed an average increase from 50 to 72 per cent in affirmative answers to the question of whether the EU membership of one’s own country was a good thing. The course ran steadily upwards till in spring 1988 it experienced a short collapse, then from spring 1990 until spring 1991 it once again climbed steeply from 66 to 72 per cent. As compared with positive votes for membership, the opinion that membership of one’s own country has brought advantages is less positive,

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is subject to more fluctuations, and swings erratically up and down. The opinion of the 59 per cent that saw membership as advantageous came close in spring 1990 to the 65 per cent that voted positively for membership. The number holding an ‘advantageous’ opinion remained constantly at this level until 1991. In contrast, from spring 1990 to spring 1991 the opinion that the EU membership was a good thing shot up from 65 to 72 per cent. A disparity becomes apparent here, and in this respect an inflationary identification with the EU was demonstrated – the increase in identification is not accompanied by a recognition of the increased advantages. This development reached its high point in spring 1991. By fall 1991 this trend plunged downward in a deflationary way. Until spring 1996, endorsement of the statement that EU membership was a good thing dropped to 49 per cent. Simultaneously, the awareness of advantages now decreased. It sank between spring 1991 and fall 1993 from 59 to 44 per cent. In the meantime, the deflationary movement seems to have stopped. The statements regarding European integration as a good thing and of benefit to one’s country continued in small waves and were at 49 and 44 per cent respectively in spring 1999 (European Commission 1999: 25, 28). With the help of these data, the observed development reflects the politically induced acceleration of the integration processes which accompanied the Single European Act of 1986 and the realization of the single market by the last day of 1992. The associated increase in the public’s attention to the European Union was strikingly expressed in the greatly increased wish of the EU citizens for the European Parliament to play a more important role, a jump from 44 to 62 per cent between fall 1988 and spring 1991. One can presume that a growth in communication about the European Union is shown here. This growth in communication again promoted the change in direction toward the European Union. But also here in fall 1991 a change in trend began which led to the fall in value to 49 per cent in spring 1995 and yet further to 41 per cent in spring 1999 (European Commission 1995b: B49; 1999: 83). How can we interpret this course of the change of direction toward the European Union? I interpret the statement that EU membership of one’s own country was a good thing as an expressed change of direction toward the European Union and as an expression of a European identity. The more approval this statement receives, the more European identity traits are found in circulation. The statement that one’s own country has extracted benefits from EU membership expresses the subjectively felt material equivalent of European identity

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traits. If European identity traits hurry away from perceived benefits, inflation occurs. The identity traits lose value in the sense of perceived benefits. The more the two become polarized, the sooner the point will be reached where the willingness to take on European identity traits decreases and a deflationary, downward trend starts. The reduction of identity traits is accompanied by the perception of benefits now sinking even further. The European project is again put on the back burner until the recognition of new benefits once again allows the willingness to identify to increase and a new upward trend is set into motion. From fall 1993 there was increase of identification with Europe until fall 1994, but that dropped again in 1995 and since then has oscillated around the lower level. The same is true for the acknowledgment of local voting rights for EU foreigners. Rights to vote were acknowledged by 48 per cent, rights to be elected by 38 per cent in spring 1993, 54 and 45 per cent in fall 1995, 52 and 43 per cent in fall 1997 (European Commission 1997b: 48). Here can be seen that identity traits growing toward Europe carry along with them an increased willingness in the form of behavior that acknowledges equal rights for everyone. The growth of European identity traits which are found in circulation is accompanied by a growth in multilateral communication over equal rights. However, multilateral acknowledgment still lags conspicuously behind the claimed European identity. The more one’s word is put to the test, the sooner one’s word can be proven to be nothing more than an empty shell, revealing an inflationary swelling of one’s identity, and for a while a downward deflationary trend starts again in which both the willingness to identify with Europe as well as the multilateral communication and acknowledgement of equal rights shrink substantially. This precarious development is complemented by the corresponding fluctuation of the value pertaining to the rights of European citizenship. Without a corresponding extension of solidarities and identities, the real value of these rights would lag behind symbolic pretensions and slip easily into a spiral of inflation. The result would be a decline in trust in this currency and a turn to a deflationary spiral, with a flight into primordial ties of nationalism promoted by right-wing extremist movements (Betz 1994, 1998).

From medialized to virtual identity Thesis 11: European identity becomes a virtual identity the more communication about European identity proceeds independently of practical behavior and loses its connection to it.

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Along with the expected, immediate explosion of communication, the communication about identity is also subject to more and more dynamic processes with economic fluctuations upwards and downwards, inflations, deflations and recessions. Where everything is pulled into communication there is always the danger that much of it will disappear in the process and no longer appear in real behavior. Communication revolves around itself and links one declaration of identity with another without ever implying the examination of their value. The concepts of identity then, offer only the capability of connecting to previous and subsequent communication. They are passed from talk show to talk show, until they are so exploited that nobody is interested in them any longer. What has happened to them in the meantime, the real behavior they have caused, cannot be seen – because one has to attend to the next talk show! Thus, upward and downward fluctuations of declarations of identity are offered whose meaning in reality disappears into nothing. Since identity is only spoken about, but is hardly ever lived, we are moving toward a level of abstraction that is similar to negotiations with financial derivatives. A particular economic development is not directly speculated by ‘financial derivatives’, rather a stage of abstraction higher on the developmental course in the stock market for itself. The derivatives of identity concern the use of concepts of identity, not to achieve an understanding about oneself and others and to derive mutual behavior from them, but rather for the purposes of speculating on an increase in the value of the concept in the course of communication, as a result of which the opportunities to remain in further talks increase. The compulsion to stay in speech becomes independent and leads to a communication that only revolves around itself and which must be kept on a steady course of growth at any price. What is spoken about becomes unimportant; more and more important is that something is said. Similarly, it is more important for economic growth that something is produced and consumed than what is actually produced and consumed. Speech is spoken about for the sake of speech and for the sake of obtaining speech profits, just as production is produced for the sake of production and for the sake of monetary profits. By speech profits we mean the communication that a communicator sets in motion by his/her own communication. There is an immense increase in the dynamism of communication about identity taking place in the context described. In order to keep communication on a course of growth, there is a need for the constant innovation of products of identity in order to keep interest in

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communication alive. Along with the greater intensification of competition on the global communications market, there results from all this a merciless race for the fastest introduction possible of new lines of products as soon as the sales of an existing line of products stagnates or declines. Because competition boosts the business with new lines of products, businesses have to keep introducing new products. The economic fluctuations of an identity have to be kept in motion with increasingly shorter product cycles. In competition with other objects of identification, Europe has to stay in speech by an increasingly faster running sequence of newly issued programs for the strengthening and expansion of the union. The willingness of citizens to identify with and support the union would otherwise decrease and be absorbed by other offers for identification. In this way there is also a growing danger that the declaration of a European identity will lose its footing and becomes too overdrawn, so that it gets caught in an inflationary process and possibly in an inflationary–deflationary spiral. The more the declaration of a European identity becomes overdrawn, the more we move not only from a primordial to a medial identity, but also to a virtual identity where the difference between symbol and object, appearance and reality is completely abolished and we simply move in a closed world around which self-ascribing simulacra revolve and circle around themselves. For the sake of identity growth, identity has to be released from the context of life worlds and subject to a process of abstraction. Identity is then less and less made up of past experience and its implementation in concrete behavior, and is formed more and more from transferred, abstract attributions by oneself and others, from mass-media-produced identity derivatives and by identity derivatives called up in research surveys without an immediate guarantee of redemption. One knows less and less about what a declaration of belief in identity really means. This can happen to the European identity under these conditions. The identity can enjoy a lively upward swing, but have little European cooperation in actual behavior produced from it. From one round of talk shows to the next, a European identity is produced as a mere simulacrum, whose only effect is that in the next round of talk shows the idea will again be talked about, or simply due to a lack of novelty, the idea will be dropped. Conclusions regarding the behavior of governments, bureaucracies, associations and citizens can hardly be drawn from this (Baudrillard 1981, 1988). Slipping down into a circulation of communication that is running out of true meaning and into an inflationary–deflationary spiral is the negative side of a development which pushes itself ahead and naturally

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has its positive side: identity growth as an increase in the ability to coordinate more and more diverse expectations of self and others, loyalties and actions. The European project can make progress only if our willingness to identify with Europe is demanded time and again. At the same time, we can only avoid moving endlessly in an inflationary– deflationary spiral, making no headway, if the growth in European attributes of identity in the medial communication is accompanied by practical behavior such as the growth of border-transcending European projects in all areas of society. The European willingness for action is promoted in these projects as the equivalent of European speech. Only in this way can a real growth in identity take place instead of the multiplication of communicatively expressed pretensions of European identity that have no real equivalent in practice.

Concluding remarks In the new world situation there are good chances that the French, German, Spanish, Italian and other nations of Europe can continue to advance in the development of a common European (cultural) identity beyond the boundaries of their national identities. The reasons for shaping a European identity increase from outside as well as from below and above. The European Union grows into a leadership role for all of Europe as a result of which it is brought into a hegemonic position. The culture of the EU’s core becomes the model of European cultural identity. At the same time, the European cultures of the periphery are belittled as the roots of poverty, traditional persistence, authoritarianism and particularism. The culture of the center becomes the symbol for wealth, openness, democracy and universalism. The growth of European identity does not imply, however, the simultaneous shrinking of the ascertainment of one’s national identity; rather, it implies the mutual strengthening of both sides from below in the growing settlement of conflict between the European Union and the individual member states. European identity expresses itself upwards as a result of the processes of globalization and continues to contribute to its own imposition. The division of labor, the trafficking of goods, the offer of services and passenger transport create increasingly denser border-transcending interconnections in Europe. The culture of the center becomes the model of cultural identity in all of Europe and shines from the center into the furthest corners of the periphery. The process of individualization releases citizens to an increasing extent from particular national solidarities and opens them up to take on a European point of view and identity which, however, is

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once again relativized by the avant garde of modernization out of a global perspective. The process of individualization is immediately associated with a change in social organization away from national networks, and toward European and global ones. What seems to be the disintegration and atomization of people from the viewpoint of the established organizations proves to be, on closer observation, a change in the structure of social integration, that is the construction of social integration on a new, higher level. The process of developing a European identity is pushed ahead by the increasing transfer of political decision-making power to Brussels and by the EU policy of legal harmonization. Citizens look more and more toward Brussels, which results in a gradual change in identity, however much they may resist it. In the same way, increasingly denser, border-transcending communications networks are linked together. A unified culture of consumption emerges which does not spare the high culture of music, theater and literature. This culture of consumption, though, has gone beyond the borders of Europe a long time ago. As a global culture it has spread the same labels all over the whole earth. Local cultures are transformed by the globalization of the culture of consumption, although they are not razed to the ground. They lose, however, their traditional self-sufficiency and survive only as the raw material for global mass culture which has an insatiable appetite for innovations. The Europeanization of our lives brings a fundamental structural change in the relationship of the European societies to each other. The juxtaposition of life worlds which reproduce themselves out of their tradition and which exist by themselves is displaced by the differentiation and interconnection of center and periphery. The center is the headquarters of the standard for economic efficiency, political effectiveness, social security and cultural legitimacy, and determines the forthcoming model of a European cultural identity. Of course the process of Europeanization does not progress smoothly and without opposition. On the one hand, it is kept in motion by modernizing carrier social strata, by top management, experts, politicians and intellectuals. On the other hand, it produces countermovements of nationalism and regionalism from below, but also countermovements of globalism from above. The shifting of identity from a national to the European level, which is carried out in the process of Europeanization, follows a dialectic of identity gain and loss which does not necessarily turn out to be a zerosum process. Rather, identity growth makes possible the coordination of a greater number of identities on a higher level of abstraction.

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Identity growth can be understood as a societal process of production which is dependent upon the creation of values, innovation, political enterprise, speculation and risk capital. The described dynamic of the development of identity liberates the construction of identity from all primordial securities and limitations and makes it a medium of communication. As such a medium, identity opens itself to new opportunities for internal self-ascertainment and external communication. It is sensitive, though, to the societal processes of communication which imply turbulent economic upward and downward swings, as well as the deflation and inflation of the concept of identity. Medial identity can get caught up in the whirl of inflationary–deflationary spirals. A virtual identity tends to develop as a reality all of its own. In the modern society of communication, a European identity is formed in these medial processes with their opportunities for dynamic growth, but also with their risks of inflationary–deflationary spirals and virtualization in the sense of medial self-sufficiency. Identity becomes more varied, more complex, more full of tensions and more fragile. As a result, the Europeanization of our identity simply continues that which has always characterized the process of modernization: the dialectic of modernization gains and modernization losses.

Conclusion: The Transformation of Solidarities and Citizenship on the Way from National to Transnational Ties

The nation state, above all in its most highly developed form, has founded its internal inclusion on its external exclusiveness, as Rogers Brubaker (1992: 21–34) rightly put it. In a world which changes its character in particular through the extension of economic transactions, interstate agreements, supranational legislation, global regimes, global communications and a global popular culture, as well as a global market for local cultures and a global validity of the Western culture devoted to human rights, economic wealth and a share for everybody in social welfare, the nation state is no longer the single dominant unit of social integration. The nation embodied politically in the nation state and citizenship based on belonging to a nation are no longer the unquestioned expressions of solidarity. In the process of Europeanization and, beyond that, in the process of globalization, social relationships extend more and more beyond the boundaries of nation states and differentiate internally into ever more selective, functionally specific, situatioally and temporarily limited interactions. Neither large-scale organizations of trade unions, employer associations, welfare organizations and churches nor the nation state as such remain the central units of organizing social integration. The clear-cut demarcation between insiders and outsiders, citizens and non-citizens gives way to more finely graded overlapping zones reaching from temporary and permanent residents to naturalized immigrants with double or single citizenship. People in this zone of binational identity represent less and less a danger due to conflicting loyalty demands but increasingly more a chance for enhancing transnational integration. Global life will increasingly take place in between national boundaries and less and less within them. The zone of 186

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transnational cooperation will more and more be the center, that of national cooperation the periphery. The major force of transformation is the division of labor. It is pushed forward beyond and within the nation states, because it is the only effective means of reconciling the continuously intensifying competition for scarce resources, which is precipitated by the shrinking of distances between people; this shrinking process, in its turn, is promoted by the invention and application of transport and communication technologies. In this world of shrinking distances, everybody is competing with everybody, which leaves us as the strategies of survival nothing but specialization, ever faster product and service innovations and cycles, and the corresponding worldwide extension and differentiation of the division of labor. The nation state with its provision of social integration through the civil, political, social and cultural rights of citizenship is no longer the one and only unit of social integration. People unite beyond its boundaries and differentiate within them. People from all nations share a global consumer culture, a global responsibility for the preservation of resources necessary for human life and the global expansion of human rights. Global labor division, global environmental regimes and global human rights regimes engage a growing number of people beyond the boundaries of nations. At the same time, labor division, environmental preservation and human rights affairs become more differentiated within the nations and imply a growing fragmentation of interests, which can no longer be represented by large-scale organizations. Internal inclusion by external exclusion does not work any more, because the external becomes internalized. External labor division, environmental negotiations, developmental help and the realization of human rights all lead to transformations of the solidarity structure: away from a system of national solidarities and toward a network of specialized and individualized solidarities of ever more finely grained networks. The welfare of the whole nation as a primary unit of solidarity has to give way – at least to some extent – to the coordination of a larger set of rights and interests which reach beyond national welfare, such as the rights of all nations to fair trade, also to make use of environmental resources and to share in the globally produced wealth. Transnational integration proceeds along with a transformation of national integration based on strong citizenship. This does not necessarily mean that national integration is shrinking as long as transnational integration is growing. However, national integration will change its character. The link between external exclusion and strong internal inclusion no longer

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holds. We are moving toward more external inclusion while internal inclusion becomes more differentiated and individualized. The result will be greater balance between external and internal inclusion as both are differentiated and individualized in character. The driving force behind this change is the extension and opening of markets. Since markets can work only on the basis of mutually acknowledged rules, which guarantee equal opportunities, fair treatment and a fair share for everybody according to one’s own contribution, they will evolve only as much as such rules can be established. This is what the European Union is doing for the European single market by legal harmonization and what the World Trade Organization is doing by the extension of agreements on free trade. From the point of view which takes the national welfare state as the best world of social integration, this process is nothing but the enforcement of capitalism’s market logic and a danger to social integration at all, the triumph of unrestricted neo-liberalism. This is, however, only one side of the story, which ignores the external exclusionary effects of national welfarestate inclusion and with regard to the unavoidable transformation of social integration in this process. The complementing of market expansion by its legal regulation is bound to guaranteeing equal opportunities, fairness in agreements and fair shares according to one’s contribution. The transformation of the United Nation’s Environmental Program into an Organization for Environmental Protection as well as a strengthening of the binding character of agreements by the International Labor Organization would be the appropriate way for such a legal ‘embedding’ of global markets. However, such a legal construction will not simply transfer the achievements of the national welfare state to the European and even global level, because there is no longer a way to internal inclusion by external exclusion. The strong welfare provisions of the nation state were possible only as long as its labor market was secluded from external competition at the cost of all those who had no access to it. Such a seclusion of labor markets is no longer possible, not so much because of the actual migration of labor as because of the virtualization of markets via the Internet and the much greater chances for capital to be invested wherever it is more profitable. The latter process gives people chances they never had before, and robs others of their established privilege to be the only ones to profit from capital investment. Participation in economic growth becomes more inclusive worldwide, yet it is a matter of chance rather than of a guaranteed result, and therefore is distributed both outside and inside the nation state according to achievement. With

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outsiders having a chance of a share, the share of the former insiders will be distributed less equally and will entail a wider differentiation of income. Nevertheless, with a growing world economy, a slow process of transformation will allow the so-far privileged welfare states to differentiate income on a rather high general level, so that rising inequality should not drive those who are least competitive into poverty. Nevertheless, increased competition on the world market exerts pressure on the income of the least qualified, in particular, and sets closer limits to their support. Thus citizenship is changing its face. Being, in its modern sense, a product of the nation state with strong national solidarity it was strong and comprehensive, and guaranteed every citizen an extensive share in civil, political and social rights, so that up to 40 per cent of one’s living standard was collectively guaranteed on average, independently of individual market achievement (Esping-Andersen 1990: 52). In Durkheim’s (1964) terms, the welfare state exemplified mechanical solidarity on the most highly developed level of the division labor. The further international division of labor leads toward more organic solidarity, beyond and within the nation state. This means that relationships of mutual commitment and support become more differentiated and individualized. The rules that regulate the further-reaching and more individualized transactions become more abstract and limited to equal opportunity and fairness. The values shared by everybody become more abstract, and are put into practice not so much by concrete, onceand-for-all standardization but by formal procedures of situational interest coordination. This is what Durkheim called an abstract and generalized collective consciousness, which gives more room to individual autonomy and self-realization. In Max Weber’s (1923: 303–4) view, it is a step away from the differentiation between national ingroup morality and international out-group morality and toward a morality which holds for in-group and out-group interaction at the same time. In terms of citizenship, this process means that we arrive at a differentiation of the levels of citizenship: local, state, suprastate (European) and global citizenship under the shield of the United Nations. Nation state citizenship is, therefore, no longer exclusive but has to be coordinated with local, suprastate and global citizenship. The German national, for example, has to share welfare services with nonnationals residing in Germany, either because the constitution entitles them to basic human rights or because participation in the labor market also implies participation in its accompanying social regulation. The naturalization of immigrants implies that the native population

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has to share political rights with them and has to acknowledge their cultural right to their own lifestyle and religious practice. All this requires not the establishment of group rights, but simply the strict provision of individual rights, which help individuals, at the same time, to gain autonomy with regard to primordial ties and to practice different cultural traditions in their private lives. The strengthening of individual autonomy and tolerance for different cultural practices go hand in hand (Joppke 1999: 175–6). However, the sharing of rights with non-natives and a much wider scope of people goes well beyond the boundaries of the nation state. In their quality as EU citizens, the Germans, for instance, have to share all the freedoms of the European single market with other EU citizens, while as participants in the WTO agreements they have to do so with everybody else on the world market. The same is true with regard to global environmental regimes, which assign rights concerning environmental pollution. The concrete meaning of the rights of a nation state citizen is, therefore, not only decided by the nation state and by that citizen’s participation in the decision-making process, but also in supranational and global negotiations; the further this process goes, the more the rights to citizenship in general have to be shared with people far beyond national communities (Hammar 1990; Kymlicka 1995; Oommen 1997; Bommes 1999; Holz 2000). The promotion of this expanding admission to rights is particularly in the hands of courts which enact rights guaranteed by national constitutions and supranational agreements. Independent courts do not have to submit to majorities or pressure groups as governments do, but follow a discursive logic which goes in the direction of doing away with inequalities as regards the access to generally acknowledged rights. This is why the German courts have decided in favour of the rights of immigrants, and why the European Court rules against any unjustified limitation of market access, including the portability of welfare benefits. This extension of the access to citizens’ rights at the national, European and global levels sets certain limits to the substantial definition of such rights. It is clear that they have to become more abstract and can guarantee equal living conditions less concretely; they have rather to leave it to the individual to provide them for themselves. The individual’s need of being included is met by providing for open access, equal opportunities and fairness, but it cannot be satisfied by substantial guarantees as it was the case in the nation state’s welfare program. For such an arrangement, the relationships of solidarity are much too extended, differentiated and individualized. To that extent,

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the emergence of ‘postnational membership’, as argued by Soysal (1994: 136–62), is not just a supplement to national citizenship, but part of a more fundamental transformation in which the nation is relativized in a more complex network of solidarities, and citizenship is partly decoupled from the nation and differentiated into the levels of locality, nationality, supranationality and globality (Jacobson 1996). All this does not mean that the nation state will disappear, but it does imply that its role will change and will be a more limited one as a mediator between globality and supranationality, on the one hand, and locality on the other hand. It is right that globally valid human rights need strong national constitutions as well as independent national courts to be concretely enacted, as Joppke (1999: 260–80) argues. However, supranational and global agreements are the promoters of endowing legal systems and courts everywhere with the power to enact human rights. The establishment of supranational legal procedures – for which the European Court of Justice serves as a model – gives this process special impetus. This transformation of national solidarity and citizenship on the way to transnational solidarity and citizenship entails new conflicts on questions regarding who is to have access to the benefits of citizenship, with whom such benefits are to be shared, how the rights of citizens are to be defined on the different levels and how they are to be substantialized. What is going on is a process of creative destruction in Schumpeter’s (1950/93, 1911/64) sense. Outdated regulations have to be abandoned, new regulations to be established. At this point, wellintegrated nations become divided into modernizing élites who go ahead and establish transnational links while breaking up national solidarity, those who follow their lead and pin their hopes on a smooth transformation process with as little change as possible, and those who cannot stand intensified competition because they lack qualification, learning capacity and flexibility. The group of those who lose from modernization serves as a reservoir of support for growing right-wing populist movements and parties. There is no way out of this dilemma; it cannot be avoided, only limited in its negative effects by means of social policies which turn a step away from the comprehensive support of everybody and a step towards the empowerment and support of the most needy. The established institutions of the European welfare states were not designed for this task. Their obligation was the inclusion of the lower classes of the native population. Trade unions, churches and welfare organizations worked on this goal. It is difficult for them to extend their activities in favor of transnational integration both in

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terms of including immigrants and in terms of reaching beyond national boundaries. And as they are in an old-established position, they keep down new integrative forces – new humanitarian organizations – which could better adjust to the new situation. On the one hand, they are strong enough to slow down the process of institutional renewal. On the other hand, the crisis of integration, which the nation states have to undergo on their way to transnational integration, is particularly fuelled by the inertia of the established institutions and forces of integration. In conclusion, we may mediate between two opposing statements about national reactions to the challenges of transnationality, and argue for a third position that cares more for cultural differences and the impact of culture on integration. There is, on the one hand, Yasemin Soysal’s (1994) argument that the progress made by the global expansion and at least partial institutionalization of human rights discourses and regimes has put national governments under pressure to grant rights that were formerly reserved for nationals, at least to some extent, to non-nationals also. This creates ‘postnational’ membership as an indicator of the rising significance of transnationality and the declining significance of national belongingness for the life of the human individual. On the other hand, there is the argument launched by Christian Joppke (1999) that the granting of rights to non-nationals cannot be explained by global human rights discourses, but calls for an explanation by nation state institutions: constitutions and strong courts, as they exist in the United States and in Germany, help to extend rights to non-nationals. Where these institutional provisions are lacking, as in Britain, there is much less chance for such an extension; the stronger restrictions in Britain, with regard to immigration in favor of family unification and with regard to the acceptance of refugees, underline this. From such a point of view, the extension of citizens’ rights to non-nationals as well as the denial of such an extension proves the still existing sovereignty of nation states and the dependence of the individual’s rights, national or non-national, on nation state sovereignty. Only the transmission of such sovereignty to a supranational level with sovereign jurisdiction, as is now at least partly the case in the European Union, would establish transnational European rights in a strict sense. Thus, Britain would change its policies not because of any transnational human rights discourse, but only – and this with resistance – because of rulings of the European Court of Justice, or only after the adoption of a constitution that guarantees individual rights enforced by strong independent courts.

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Both positions overstate their arguments, though there is some truth in both standpoints. In a more moderate interpretation, both positions would complement each other. While transnational discourse and institution- building promote the extension of citizens’ rights to nonnationals, it still needs national political struggles and national constitutions with strong courts to realize such an extension. Both positions are far too one-sided and constricted in veiwpoint on the question of whether transnational discourses or national institutions are responsible for the extension of citizens’ rights to non-nationals, and whether this indicates the loss or preservation of nation state sovereignty. They distract our attention from the economic construction of transnational integration by international trade, labor migration and the division of labor. This process is of rather conflictual nature, because it enhances economic chances by intensified competition with a resulting split between élites and masses, winners and losers. What is not sufficiently recognized is the transformation of solidarity away from national mechanical to multilevel organical solidarity, from national homogeneity to national and transnational heterogeneity, from a strong and concrete collective consciousness to a weak and abstract one. This transformation implies that rights become more abstract and have less concrete meaning in substantive terms, for example social service. The extension of rights goes hand in hand with their abstraction, more external inclusiveness with less internal inclusion, the extension of civil ties with their simultaneous differentiation and individualization. The challenge of transnationality is not simply the transmission of rights from nationals to non-nationals, but a transformation of the whole solidarity structure and the meaning of rights. The latter acquire the character of generalized media of communication so that they stretch beyond national ties, but also undergo processes of inflation and deflation from time to time. Thus, there is more change in nation concepts, collective identities and modes of integration than is assumed by Rogers Brubaker, who stresses the revitalization of national regimes by the challenges of immigration (Brubaker 1992: 159–64; 176–89). This is only one side of the coin; the other is change through processes of adjustment. ‘A ius soli à la française is unimaginable in Germany,’ argued Brubaker (1992: 177), justifiably, in 1992. Nevertheless, contrary to the inertia of their historically grown forms of citizenship, France changed her citizenship law in 1993 to turn away from unconditional ius soli to conditional ius soli, and Germany abandoned her strict ius sanguinis to adopt a conditional ius soli in 1999. Thus, in terms of law, there is little difference now between France and Germany, and Britain,

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too. What still makes a difference between them, however, are their modes and practices of integration with their peculiar problems and conflicts. The process of transformation certainly does not blow away the different national modes of integration that have historically grown in the nation states along with the formation of their underlying ideas of the nation and their collective identity. At this point, we have to explain the different reactions to the challenges of immigration and transnational integration by the pressures of adjusting the established ideas of the nation, collective identities and modes of integration to the new situation. Thus, in Germany, it was the ethnic-cultural concept of the nation and the mode of legalistic integration that produced the integration of guest workers by extending rights to them and by concentrating on their inclusion in the wider society. The great number of non-citizens is a German peculiarity rooted in the growing gap between the cultural idea of an ethnic-cultural nation and the economic reality of a large transnational labor market. As the reforms of the citizenship law of 1991 and 1999 prove, this can be better interpreted as an intermediate step toward a more open understanding of citizenship that is compatible with more ethnic and cultural heterogeneity. Nevertheless, this legal change does not immediately abolish the historically grown idea of the nation and the legalistic mode of integration, with its accompanying effect of producing something on paper without a foothold in real social life. At least some elements of them will continue to exist for a longer time to come. What we observe in Germany is a peculiar strategy of coping with transnational labor market integration by adjusting its specific legalistic mode of integration under the conditions of its specific historically inherited idea of the nation and in the face of national and transnational discourses on citizenship and human rights. Germany is Soysal’s (1994) most prominent case; however, this is not simply because of the country’s exposure to transnational human rights discourses – as Soysal argues – but is due to the coincidence of a whole set of factors. And it has to be recognized that Germany’s solution to the problem creates tensions that call for further processes of adjustment, with the effect of reducing the number of non-nationals with membership rights but without citizenship by taking a greater part of them into citizenship. The other countries have reacted to pressures of immigration and integration of immigrants in different ways, in particular by not so much extending rights to non-citizens as including them into national citizenship. Their solution to the problem has not been to enlarge the

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number of non-nationals in ‘postnational’ membership. What they have done has to be interpreted as the adjustment of their established forms of nationhood and modes of integration to the challenges of immigration, heterogeneity and also transnational integration. In Britain, this has meant the accommodation of immigrants and their customs to British life in the interest of harmonious interracial relations on the basis of a fair share and within the framework of a civic community. It is not just the lack of a constitution and strong independent courts that would enforce the rights of immigrants against ‘populist’ majority politics that explains Britain’s restrictiveness with regard to immigration, as Joppke (1999: 134–7) argues. Whether or not the courts are weak in fact – and this can be disputed – what has to be taken into account is the fact that integration in Britain requires more than legal entitlement in the German sense; it needs inclusion in a civic community in the day-to-day work of race relations committees and voluntary associations on the local level. It is quite logical that such a mode of integration cannot be properly effected using the German way of legal entitlement. Because of its deeper understanding of integration, however, it has less capacity with regard to the number of immigrants that can be taken in. The difference between Germany and Britain, therefore, is not so much a matter of more or less restrictiveness, but much more a matter of depth according to their different modes of integration. Britain’s turn to constitutionally guaranteed rights and a corresponding legal system in the German sense would, however, not only allow for more follow-up immigration through family unification; such a more legalistic system would also narrow the space for flexible accommodation between the law and minority group customs. In France, the adjustment of the republican idea of the nation and the statist mode of assimilative integration to the integration of the Muslims from the Maghreb implied including them in citizenship with a strong requirement for assimilation, though without supportive civil societal links between the minority groups and the state as in Britain. Thus, France expects more from its immigrants, but gives less support that would help them meet these expectations. The result is intensified conflict and a dialectic of repulsion and rebellion. The country takes more immigrants into citizenship than do Britain and Germany, but puts them more under pressure to assimilate, with the result that more conflicts occur than in the two other countries. While accommodation in Britain and legal integration with subcultural segregation in Germany are, on the one hand, less generous in granting citizenship

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than France, these strategies are, on the other hand, better adjusted to the reality of cultural difference. The American idea of the nation as a voluntary association of people from different parts of the world and its combination with the mode of market integration have resulted in the peculiar nexus of external inclusiveness and weak internal inclusion, so that real participation in social life is a matter of achievement in competition. This is why there is so much struggle for scarce resources in every domain of social life. The fact that the inclusion of immigrant groups took on the form of a fight for quotas everywhere is strongly connected with the logic of this mode of integration, especially if we take into account that the framing of inequality has always been addressed in terms of the established white Anglo-Saxon and Protestant majority of the first settlers versus the later arriving minorities from other areas of the world. The civil rights movement for the blacks paved the way for a type of claims-making that turned the Affirmative Action program, which was intended to promote individual achievement, into a system of assigning quotas, simply because it is much too difficult to apply that program in a way that would always respect the individual case. As a consequence of this mode of integration, we can observe that the market has indeed included masses of immigrants on every level of success. That is, there is a very individualized form of market integration that has worked pretty well. The complementary opposite of this inclusion through market achievement is the relatively low level of collectively guaranteed welfare independent of market achievement, as compared with the European welfare states. This working integration through market achievement is, however, accompanied by struggles for quota promoted by minority group activists, who act according to the logic of the political system, namely by lobbying client interests. This is market competition of groups for shares in the political market. Since the political market entails competition on collective goods, it is no surprise that the outcome of such struggles in the field of assigning shares in collective goods is the assignment of quotas. Individual market achievement in the economy and group achievement in politics complement each other. A heterogeneous society with little pre-political and political integration of interests cannot establish a common good that would cut across the group boundaries that have become so salient in the process of continuous immigration. Thus, the United States has adjusted its idea of the nation and its mode of market integration to immigration by way of the generous inclusion of immigrants into citizenship with the effect of producing an internally

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extremely differentiated society according to class and racial as well as ethnic group. As a result, the rhetoric of race and ethnicity has turned attention away from the far more problematic production of an underclass, existing under the poverty line and across racial and ethnic differences. What we have proved with regard to the integration of immigrants and the coping with heterogeneity can also be demonstrated with regard to transnational (European) integration. The different ideas of the nation and modes of integration produce different forms of transnational integration: Europe as a civic community of communities sharing a common market for Britain; Europe as a union of sovereign nation states or as a reincarnation of nation state sovereignty on the higher European level based on shared values for France; Europe as a federal union with a constitution that clearly assigns competencies to local communities, regional states, nation states and the union for Germany. In the case of the United States, we arrive at the vision of a global market society that integrates through trade and the division of labor and needs little more than regulative institutions like the World Trade Organization. With increasing globalization, the American model of market integration becomes more than ever before a reality for the European welfare states, too. On the global level, the American mode of integration offers the advantage of requiring far less preconditions than any of the European modes of integration. The problem for the European welfare states is the fact that market integration on the global level exerts pressures of adjustment in terms of more internal differentiation in response to external integration on the national level. The established modes of integration have to be brought closer to market integration. This will, however, never be a simple adoption of the American model, but an adjustment of the historically grown models to the new situation, with ever new inconsistencies and unintended effects. On the European level, the British, French and German models compete with each other. It can be assumed that none of the three countries will accept the concept of the others. That means European integration will proceed as it has done in the past: in an incremental way. This way allows each country to look always for new chances of transferring elements of its concept to the European level so that there will never be a final state of completed integration. This feature of an ongoing process offers ample room for each country to carry on its own mode of European integration, and particularly of its own integration into Europe. The British élite can conceive of Europe as a partnership of

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nations, and integration as a process of accommodation with mutual respect for each other. The French élite may see Europe as a platform for enacting sovereignty either by cooperating sovereign states or by a new sovereign unity, and integration as a process of transmitting French universalist civilization onto the European level and of the periphery’s assimilation to the center. The German élite can regard Europe as an ideally constructed federation with a clear-cut division of competences and integration as a process of legal harmonization with a European law that meets all the requirements of consistency according to the principle of a state that does everything through law (the Rechtsstaat). There will be no unified European integration, but a multitude of European integrations according to the historically grown modes of integration of each member state: the British accommodationist and civic community mode; the French assimilationist and statist way; and the German federalist and legalist mode; as well as other modes that have been established in other member states.

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Index achievement 50, 188 equal chances of 57 group 49 individual 49, 57, 61, 64, 196 activities, volunteer 156 Adenauer, K. 163 Adorno, T. 151 Aitchison, J. 11 Albrow, M. 145 Aldrich, T.B. 50 Alemann, U. von 168 Alexander, J. 54 Alff, W. 69 alienation between policy-makers and the public 126 Almond, G. 89, 99 Altmann, I. 48 Aly, G. 85 Anderson, B. 6 anti-fascism of GDR politics 87 antisemitic ideas 83 antisemitism 86 Arndt, E.M. 73 Arnim, A. von 73 Arnold, H. 165 Ashford, S. 21, 34, 37, 94, 97, 112 assimilation 23, 37, 39, 44 associations 71, 153–7 new 156 voluntary 73, 174, 196 asylum 133 asylum seekers 19, 35, 51, 102–3, 106, 110–11, 113 Augstein, R. 92 autonomy 98–9 Bach, M. 161 Backes, U. 93 Bade, K. 131 Baier, L. 29 Banton, M. 17 Baringhorst, S. 18 Barker, D.H. 37, 94, 97, 99, 112

Bauböck, R. 4 Baudrillard, J. 182 Bauer, B. 75 Bauer, E. 75 Beck, U. 147, 151 Becker, P.E. 83–4 Beck-Gernsheim, E. 155 Behr, H. 4, 6, 28, 33, 45, 48, 63, 66, 73, 104, 119, 132 Bellah, R. 48–9 Bendix, R. 6 Benz, W. 85 Berdahl, R.M. 81 Berghahn, V. 78 Bernard, Ph. 36 Bertaud, J.-P. 30 Betz, H.G. 167, 180 Binder, J. 85 Binswanger, K. 131 Birg, H. 169 Bischoff, V. 50 Bishop, P. 12 Bismarck, O. von 77–8 Blackbourn, D. 6 Blair, T. 22 Blauner, B. 53 Blitz, H.-M. 70 Bloch, R. 49 Bodin, J. 29 Böhme, H. 82 Boli, J. 149, 169, 175 Bomberg, E. 148 Bommes, M. 4, 6, 190 border-transcending commitments 152 border-transcending means of communication, English as a 150 Börne, L. 74–5 Bornschier, V. 140 Boroumand, L. 30 Borussian historians 76–7 Bös, M. 4, 36 235

236 Index Bosswick, W. 119 Bourdieu, P. 42 bourgeoisie 71 educated 71, 79–80, 127–8 Bracher, K.D. 70, 85 Bradshaw, B. 12 Brähler, E. 96 Brand K.W. 149 Brandes, H. 75 Bratranek, F.T. 69 Braudel, F. 28 Braun, H. 89 Bréchon, P. 36 Bredow, W. von 140 Brettschneider, F. 13, 32–4, 37, 93, 97, 100, 102–3 Brieskorn, N. 149 Britishness 19, 23–4 Brubaker, W.R. 4–6, 28, 31–3, 36, 66, 69, 78, 105, 186, 193 Brüne, S. 169 Brunschwig, H. 73 Büchner, G. 75 Bulmer, S. 12, 148 Burchardt-Dose, H. 75 bureaucracy of technocrats, European 162 bureaucracy, Prussian 127 Butzke, K. 107 Calic, M.J. 140 Callan, E. 12 Caplow, Th. 54 center and periphery 157–8, 183 Cesarani, D. 16 Chamberlain, H.S. 83–4 change 95–8, 101–2 Chevènement, J.-P. 47 Chirac, J. 163 citizens, community of 5, 10, 25, 35, 38, 104 European-oriented 40 pluralistic community of 48, 119–20 citizenship 1, 2, 4–7, 15–16, 23, 31, 37, 39, 66, 104–9, 116, 119, 120, 129, 186, 189, 191, 194–6 double 107–8 European 180

law

104, 107, 109, 128–30, 166, 193 multiple 107 world 69 civic associations 23 community 12, 23, 25, 195 civilization, European 68 French 37 French and British 80 Cohen, J. 1 Cohen, R. 16 Cohn-Bendit, D. 15, 36 Colley, L. 12–13 Collins, J.B. 29 communication circulation of 182 dynamism of 181 explosion of 181 growth in 178 communications market, global 182 community, civic 27 competitiveness 160 conflict, EU with the US 141 Conradt, D.P. 90 consciousness, collective 189 constitutions and strong courts 192–3 Conze, W. 67 cooperation supranational 165 transnational 187 cosmopolitanism 68–9 Costa-Lascoux, J. 31 Crèvecoeur, J. 50 Crozier, M. 39, 42 cultural legacy, Germanic 84 standardization 150–1 culture nation 69, 77–8 culture British/English 24 common 69 French 43 German 66, 76, 80 global 150–1 liberal democratic 102 Czempiel, E.O. 140 Dahlmann, C. 76 Dahrendorf, R. 66, 82, 86

Index Dangle, T.L. 49 Dann, O. 66, 71 Dannebom, U. 31 Darwin, C. 82 Darwinism, social 83, 85 Davis, I. 7, 139 deflationary spiral 180 De Gaulle, C. 31, 40, 163 De la Garza, R.O. 48 Delanty, G. 7, 139, 164 Delors, J. 165 demarcation between insiders and outsiders 186 democracy of the European Union, lack of 162 liberal, principles of 101 rules of 101 Deppe, R. 140 DeSipio, L.D. 48 destruction, creative 191 Deutsch, K.W. 6 Dienstbier, J. 140 Diez, T. 22, 27 Diezinger, A. 155 differentiation from above 145 from below 143 from the outside 139 Diner, D. 92 Dinwiddy, J. 13 discrimination 18, 26, 52, 55–6 disintegration 155, 167 division of labor 187 international 189 Doering-Manteuffel, A. 66 Donziger, S.R. 54 Dreyfus affair 32 Droysen, J.G. 76 Dubet, F. 36, 38 Düding, D. 73–4 Duff, A. 2, 139 Dülmen, R. van 71 Dumont, L. 66 Duncker, C. 98 Duncker, M.W. 76 Dunnet, A. 16 Durkheim E. 32, 151, 172, 189 Dürr, K. 20

237

East Germans 87–8, 91, 111 Eastland, T. 56 Echtermeyer, E.T. 75 economy German national 74 global 1 Eder, K. 153 Eichendorff, J. von 73 Eisenstadt, S.N. 6 Eley, G. 6, 82 Elias, N. 29, 80–1, 172 Ellis, R.J. 49 elite European 162 German educated 71 and masses, split between 193 technocratic 42 emancipation of women 154 Emsley, C. 28, 31, 39 Engelhardt, U. 80 Engels, F. 75 Engelsing, R. 71 Englishness 17 enlightenment 28, 30, 41, 66, 69, 71, 77 German 72 entrepreneurs moral 48, 59 political 63, 65, 174 equal opportunities 17, 49, 52, 60, 64 rights 130 equality of opportunity 59, 65 Erhart, H.G. 140 Esping-Andersen, G. 57, 189 Eßbach, W. 75 Estermann, A. 75 ethnic framing 63 groups 25, 53, 54 minorities 25 tolerance 112 Etzioni, A. 49 EU integration, speed of 144 law 148 transfer of authority to 144 Europe construction of 163

238 Index Europe – continued of experts 161 of intellectuals 164 of political top leadership 163 of the top management 160 European behavior 178 commission 15, 22, 34–5, 37, 40–1, 97, 100, 113–16, 122–5, 144, 151–2, 166–7, 170–2, 179–80 Court of Justice 134, 190–2 federation 22 project 163, 165, 173–4, 183 union as a supranational unit 145 union, German relationship to 123 Europeanization 104, 146, 152, 157, 159–61, 167–8, 184 Europeans and nationals, rift between 170 evening out differences, European process of 147 extremism left-wing 94, 117 right-wing 93, 104, 117 fair share 25–6, 188, 195 fairness 2 Faist, T. 64, 130 Farley, R. 53–4 Faul, E. 121 Faulenbach, B. 88, 92, 140 Faulks, K. 12 Feige, A. 156 Feldman, D. 16 Ferracuti, F. 54 Feuerbach, L. 75 Fichte, J.G. 73 Field, G. 83 Finkielkraut, A. 28, 38 Fischer, F. 78 Fischer, J. 22, 47, 134 Fischer, W.C. 54 Fitzsimmons, M.P. 31 foreigner law 106 foreigners acceptance and rejection of 128 attitudes toward 110, 113, 115–18

reaction to 114 violence against 110, 116–17, 119 Frankfurt parliament 75 Franklin, B. 49 Franklin, J. 29 Freeman, G.P. 36 Freitag, S. 76 French Revolution 6, 29–30, 39, 41, 77 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 98 Fröhlich, S. 141 Furet, F. 29 Fustel de Coulange, N.D. 28, 69 Gagern, H. von 75 Gallie, D. 30 Galtung, J. 169 Gamble, A. 13 Gans, H.J. 54 Garcia, S. 139 Garnham, N. 145, 157 Gauthier, F. 28 Gay, P. 25 Geiss, I. 78 Gellner, E. 6 genocide 85 Gensicke, T. 97–8 Gerdes, D. 30 German Kaiserreich 77 Sonderweg 4, 70 Volk (folk) 83 Germanhood 68 Gibson, C.J. 53 Giddens, A. 139, 172 Giesen, B. 6, 66, 71, 73, 75, 174, 177 Gilroy, P. 20 Girardet, R. 33 Glaser, H. 80 Glazer, N. 54–6 global life 186 markets, legal ‘embedding’ of 188 globalism, new 168 globalization 3, 64, 104, 145–6, 157–8, 163–4, 172, 183, 186, 197 Gobineau, J.A.C. de 83 Godechot, J. 31 Goethe, J.W. von 68, 72

Index Goffman, E. 176 Goldhagen, D.J. 86 Goodman, D. 42 Gordon, M.M. 55 Görres, J.J. von 73 Götz, I. 112 Grabes, H. 10 Granston, M. 29 Grebing, H. 70 Greiffenhagen, M. 90 Greß, F.H. 167 groups ethnic 57 racial 57 Gross, P. 153 Grün, K. 75 Guéhenno, J.-M. 46 guest workers 102, 106, 111–12, 115 Gür, M. 131 Gutskow, K. 74 Haas, E.B. 6, 139 Habermas, J. 7, 92, 120–1, 139 Hachtmann, R. 76 Haferkorn, J. 71 Hagenbüchle R. 48 Hailbronner, K. 4, 31, 105, 131 Hall, P. 150 Haller, M. 6, 7, 34, 139 Hamilton, A. 49 Hammar, T. 4, 190 Hank, R. 159 Harding, S. 97 Hardtwig, W. 77 harmonization, legal 188 Hartz, L. 49 Hatschikjan, M.A. 140 Hättich, M. 86 Häusser, L. 76 Havel, V. 140 Heather, D. 1, 7 Hebel, U.J. 49 Hechter, M. 157 Hecker, F. 75 Heckmann, F. 4, 119, 131 hegemonic core 142 Heideking, J. 49 Heine, H. 74

Heitmeyer, W. 119, 167 Herder, J.G. 67–8, 72 Hermand, J. 74 Herwegh, G.F. 75 Hess, M. 75 Heuss, T. 89 Heyl, M. 89 Hill, C. 10 Hillgruber, A. 78 Hirschhausen, U. von 76 historians, German 79, 91 history, racist philosophy of 83 Hitler, A. 83–6, 90 Hobbes, T. 10 Hobsbawm, E.J. 6 Höffe, O. 1 Hoffman, P. 86 Hoffman-Axthelm, I. 73 Hoffmann, S. 139 Hoffmann-Lange, U. 102 Hohendahl, P.U. 75 Höhne, R. 31, 36 Holborn, H. 85 Hollier, D. 28 Hollifield, J.F. 36 Holmes, C. 20 holocaust 85–6, 92–3 Holz, K. 190 homogenization by individualization 151 of culture 149 of solidarity 149, 170 of the law 148 of the standard of living 147 internal 146 Honolka, H. 112 Hopkins, E. 13 Horkheimer, M. 151 Horn, J. 48 Horwitz, M.J. 56 Hradil, S. 53 Huber, P.M. 107 Hueglin, T.O. 168 Huemer G. 149 Hufen, F. 150 Huff-Corzine, L. 54 Hughes, M. 71 Humboldt, W. von 68, 72 Hutchinson, J. 12

239

240 Index identification with Europe 123–5, 149, 169, 173 with the EU, inflationary 179 identities 176–7 convergence of 148 cultural 157–8 Europeanization of 125 transnational 132 identity American 49 American collective 59 banks 175 British 21 collective 7, 137 collective European 9 collective, French 42 communication about 177 cultural 148 declaration of 181 EU 144–5 European 1, 3, 22, 137–8, 141, 145–6, 149, 151–2, 165, 167, 169–71, 175, 178–9, 180, 182 European cultural 138–9, 142–3 Europeanization of 185 gain 169 generalization of 172 German 79–82, 86, 93, 116, 127–8, 132 global 169, 175 growth 169, 171–2, 174–5, 183–5 inflationary process of the communication of 178 loss 169 mass-media-produced 182 national 2, 22, 41, 92, 143, 145–6, 149, 170, 172, 183 national, European 166 national, French 30 national, revival of 140 structural change of 136 virtual 180, 185 Western 141 ideology, racist 85 Iggers, G.G. 77 Immerfall, St. 13, 34, 39 immigrants, expert acceptance and lay rejection of 130

immigration 15, 19, 20, 36, 39, 45, 50–3, 57–8, 61–2, 103, 106, 109, 112–14, 118, 120, 130, 166, 193–4, 196 control 16, 18 country of 133 implementation of EU law, compliance in 126 inclusion 20, 36, 43, 56, 59, 64, 108, 132, 187–8, 193, 195–6 of immigrant minorities, formal 131 of immigrants 19 of the masses 12 of the working class 12 individualism 56, 60 individualization 151–5, 183–4 industrialists, large-scale 81 inequality in terms of ethnicity 63 of opportunity 52 inflation, spirals of 180 inflationary-deflationary spiral 176, 182 Inglehart, R. 13, 34 integration 3 European 1, 3, 21, 23, 26, 40–1, 45–7, 64, 121–4, 126–7, 133–6, 197–8 European, British way of 27 European, élite advancement of 126 European modes of 197 European, support of 125 of immigrants 61 national 187 national modes of 194 social 1, 2 transnational 2–4, 6, 9, 47, 58, 60, 64–5, 108–9, 187, 191–3, 197 intellectual vision 48 intellectuals 6–7, 28, 30, 41, 76, 77, 84, 91, 148, 164–5 Isensee J. 109 Isin, E.F. 1 Jachtenfuchs, M. 26, 47, 134 Jacobson, D. 190

Index Jaeschke, W. 75 Jäger, W. 78 Jahn, F.L. 73 James, H. 66, 86 Jay, J. 49 Jazouli, A. 36 Jefferson, T. 49–50 Joerges, Ch. 161 Joly, D. 17, 25 Jones, T. 25 Joppke, Ch. 4, 6, 16–17, 19, 24–5, 48, 51–2, 56, 62, 66, 106, 109, 131, 190–2, 195 Jowell, R. 13–14, 18–19, 89 Joyce, P. 13 Judt, T. 7, 139 Jung, S. 40, 47 Junge, K. 71 Kaase, M. 99 Kaelble, H. 82, 150 Kahler, M. 13 Kaiser, G. 71 Kallen, H. 55 Kallscheuer, O. 28, 66 Kaltenbrunner, K.G. 86 Kappeler, A. 140 Karst, K.L. 52 Kastoryano, R. 36, 38 Kavanagh, D. 13 Kearney, R. 164 Kennedy, J.F. 52 Kepel, G. 36 King, E. 145 Kitchen, M. 81 Klages, H. 97, 156 Kleinert, H. 155 Kluckhohn, P. 72 Kluxen, K. 10 Knight, U. 31, 38 Köcher, R. 88, 90, 111 Kocka, J. 80 Kohl, H. 163 Kohlberg, L. 102, 172 Kohler-Koch, B. 134 Kohn, H. 33, 69 Koopmann, H. 75 Körner, T. 73 Korte, K.-R. 86, 89, 121–2

241

Kortländer, B. 75 Köster, U. 75 Kristeva, J. 39 Kruse, J.A. 75 Küchler, M. 111–13, 115–17 Kühne, W. 145, 169 Kulturnation (culture nation) 83–6, 127 Kunisch, H.-P. 148 Kurbjuweit, D. 159 Kushner, T. 20 Kymlicka, W. 190 labor movement 78 Lagarde, P. de 83 landowners (Junkers) 80–1, 127 Lang, J. 32 Langbehn, J. 83 Langford, P. 12 language common 69 European 150 French 43 German 76 Lapins, W.-W. 141 Laqueur, W. 141 Larenz, K. 85 Laube, H. 74 Layton-Henry, Z. 16 Le Pen, J.M. 36–7 Lederer, H. 103–5, 110 Lee, A.R. 48 Leggewie, C. 39, 66 Legonsky, S.H. 52 Lennon, E. 53 Lepenies, W. 32 Lepsius, M.R. 71, 85, 162 Lewis, P. 24 Lewis, W. 159 liberalization of the markets 164 of the world market 165 life worlds 158 Lillig, T. 92 literature national 68 world 68–9 Lipset, S.M. 48 List, F. 74

242 Index lobbying 61–2 activities of immigrant groups Loch, D. 36, 38 Locke, J. 10 Lüsebrink, H.-J. 31, 33 Luther, M. 67

51

Madison, J. 49 Mai, G. 79 Majone, G. 135 Malanczuk, P. 15 Mania, M. 50 Mann, T. 80 market integration, American model of 197 markets, opening of 188 Marks, G. 2, 148 Marshall, Th.H. 1, 10, 12–13, 23 Marx, K. 75 Mayer, N. 36 McGrew, A. 2 Mead, G.H. 172 media of communication, generalized 176, 193 Medick-Krakau, M. 59 Meinecke, F. 69 melting pot 49–50, 55–6 Mendras, H. 34 Merritt, A.J. 89, 140 Merten, R. 119 Messner, S.F. 54 Mestiri, E. 36 Metternich, K. 74, 76 Meulemann, H. 96, 100–1, 147 Meyer, G. 140 Meyer, S. 155 Michelet, J. 32 Michnik, A. 140 Miles, R. 2 Milfull, J. 27 Mill, J.St. 12 Miller, P. 18, 48 minorities 14, 17, 24, 44, 54, 57, 60–4 minority ethnic 18 group 196 Mintzel, A. 18 Mitterand, F. 32, 34–5, 163

modernization 118, 164, 176, 191 losers in 165 Modood, J. 25 Moeller van den Bruck, A. 84 Mommsen, M. 140 Mommsen, T. 69 Mommsen, W.J. 6, 84 morality in-group 189 out-group 189 Moravcsik, A. 7, 139 Morin, E. 164 Moses, J.H. 78 Mosse, G.L. 73–4, 79, 83–5 Moynihan, D.P. 54 Mühl-Benninghaus, S. 86 Mulford, C. 49 Müller-Graff, P.-C. 22, 40, 129 Müller-Schneider, T. 119 Multhaupt, W.F. 12 multiculturalism 18, 37–8, 52, 54–5, 60 multiracialism 18 Münch, R. 2–3, 6, 58, 70, 126, 174, 176, 178 Mundt, T. 74 Münz, R. 103 Myrdal, G. 49 Napoleon Bonaparte 28, 31, 70, 72–3 nation 14, 28, 30, 32–3, 35, 43, 56, 60, 66, 78, 104, 133, 186 American 48 British 11–12, 16–17, 20 concept of 3, 116 deconstruction of 109 ethnic-cultural definition of 105–6 first new 59 formation 6 French 29, 31 French definition of 107 French understanding of 37 German 69–70, 86, 112 Germanic roots of 83 idea of 5, 7, 39, 194, 196 idea of, American 59, 196 idea of, British 11, 23 idea of, French 41–2

Index nation – continued idea of, German 16, 69–71, 79, 116, 127–9, 132, 134 idea of, landowners’ 81 idea of, republican 195 idea of, Romantic 73 multiracial character of 24 notions of 70 pluralization of the 120 political rhetoric of 39 republican concept of 85 republican idea of 87 republican sense of 84 universalistic ideal of 42 nation state 1, 2, 4, 7, 26, 32–3, 47, 70, 72, 108, 134, 145, 168, 186–7, 189, 191, 197 French 46 German 74–9, 82 competition between 82 national consensus 13, 34 cultures 72 pride 12–13, 32, 88–9, 172 Socialism 85, 90–1, 93–4 nationalism 32–3, 38, 77, 159, 165, 168 German 84 new 140, 143, 166 nationalistic movements 1 nation-building 7 nationhood 4, 6 British 16–17 concept of 119 German 79 German path to 4 modern pluralistic 3 nations community of 27 naturalization 104, 107, 117–18 law 15, 31, 35, 48 of foreigners 108 of immigrants 105, 119, 189 Nazi crimes 88–9, 91–2 regime 87, 92 Nazism 85, 89 neo-liberalism 188 networks, finely grained 187 Neumann, G.L. 52, 109

243

Newman, G. 10, 12 Newman, M. 139 Nicholls, A.J. 85 Niebuhr, H. 48 Nikol, A. 16 Nipperdey, T. 6, 71, 76, 79 Noelle-Neumann, E. 86, 88, 90, 111, 121 Noiriel, G. 36 Noll, H.H. 34 Nolte, H.H. 140 Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg) 72 Oberndörfer, D. 121 Oesterle, G. 69 officer corps 81, 127 Ogden, P.E. 36 Ohlemacher, T. 111 Oommen, T.K. 190 optionizing of life 153 Otte, R. 108 Otto, H.-U. 119 Özcan, E. 131 Page, E. 161 Paine, T. 49 Papadakis, E. 21 Papademetriou, D. 52 Parish, P. 49 Parker, D. 29 Parsons, C. 40 Parsons, T. 1, 48, 172–3, 176 participation in public affairs 99, 102 political 100 particularism 42–3, 72 Patocka, J. 164 patriotism 66, 68, 70–2 constitutional 121 Paul, K. 16–17 Peterson, J. 148 Petrella, R. 159 Pflanze, O. 77 philosophers 10 Piaget, J. 172 Piel, E. 94 Pinder, J. 140 Plessner, H. 66, 70

244 Index Plesu, A. 143 Plumpe, G. 75 pluralism cultural 56 individualist 54 Pocock, J.G.A. 49 politics anti-fascism of GDR 87 client 63 democratic 100 entrepreneurial 63 German foreign 78, 121 populist parties, right-wing 167 Porter, M.E. 145 postnational membership 109, 192 Poulter, S. 17 Preitz, M. 73 Preston, C. 7, 139 Pridham, G. 85 Prignitz, C. 71 Proff, H.V. 59 protectionism, economic 19 Puhle, H.J. 81 Raab, J. 48 race and ethnicity, rhetoric of 197 Relations Act 17 racial conflicts 20 equality 24–5, 44, 130 groups 25, 53, 55 ideas 83 Rademacher, H. 36 Radice, G. 21 Ranke, L. von 76 Rasmussen, H.K. 2 Rausch, H. 89–90 Reermann, O. 110 regionalism 159 new 168 regulations, social and ecological 164 Reif, K. 162, 173 Renan, E. 29, 69, 107 renationalization 167 Renner, G. 105 representative government 23 republic 30, 37–9, 42–3, 47, 49

republicanism 38, 42, 46–7, 49 resettlers 102–3, 111–12 respect 14, 98–9 Reuter, J. 140 Rex, J. 18 Rey, H. 36 Richmond, A.H. 20 Richter, R. 139 Rieger, G. 66, 121 Riffault, H. 37 rights of citizens 4, 29, 33, 39, 192–3 citizenship 60 civil, political and social 12, 23 equal 54 expanding admission to 190 group 55–6 human 4, 30, 33, 39, 109, 176, 187, 191–2 individual 60 membership 194 Ringer, F.K. 80–1 Robertson, R. 145, 157 Rode, R. 141 Röhl, J.C.G. 81 Rohrschneider, R. 101–2 romantic movement 72–3, 80, 127 romanticism 72 Rombes, N. 49 Rometsch, D. 148 Rosamond, B. 139 Rosar, U. 116–19, 128 Rosenberg, A. 83 Rothfels, H. 86 Rousseau, J.-J. 28–30 Rovan, J. 67 Rubio-Marin, R. 54, 66 Rüchardt, H. 160 Rückert, F. 73 Ruge, A. 75 Rüschemeyer, D. 71 Rüsen, J. 77 Rutkoff, P.M. 33 Safran, W. 39 Saggar, S. 20 Sandholtz, W. 148 Schain, M.A. 36–7 Schaub, G. 96, 98, 100

Index Schäuble, W. 106 Scheuch, E.K. 86, 115 Schieder, T. 6, 78 Schilling, H. 11 Schily, O. 107 Schlegel, F. von 72–3 Schlesinger, A.M. Jr. 52 Schmerl, C. 155 Schmidt, A.J. 54 Schmidt, V.A. 40 Schmitt-Sasse, J. 71 Schnapper, D. 1, 28, 38 Schneider, H. 139 Schrimpf, H.J. 69 Schröder, G. 163 Schubarth, W. 88 Schuck, P. 51 Schug, W. 169 Schulin, E. 10 Schultz, E. 86 Schultze, R.-O. 11 Schulze, E. 155 Schulze, G. 6 Schulze, H. 70 Schumann, R. 163 Schumpeter, J.A. 191 Schwab, G.M. 29 Schwan, A. 120 Schweigler, G. 59 Schwerdtfeger, G. 109 Scott, A. 148 secularism 37–8 Seewann, G. 140 segregation 56 subcultural 195 Seier, H. 77 Seitz, K. 142 self-realization 98–9 Senger und von Etterlin, S. 161 Senghaas, D. 6 Sewell, W.H. 30 sharing of rights with non-natives 190 Sheehan, J.J. 77 Shils, E. 157 Sieyes, E.J. 29–30 Silverman, M. 38 Simmel, G. 132, 139, 151 Sipahioglu, F. 131

245

Smelser, N.J. 54 Smith, A.D. 6 Smith, A.G.K. 10, 12 Smith, R.M. 26, 49 Smith, S.J. 20 Snyder, F. 76, 143 Snyder, L.L. 73–4, 77, 81, 83, 85 Sobisch, A. 139 society atomized 156 European 166 global 166 multiracial 18 pluralistic 121 transnational 59 solidarity 186 ethnic 118 individualized 187 mechanical 189 national 2, 133, 167, 176, 183, 187 networks of 191 relationships of 190 transformation of 193 Sollors, W. 50 Solomos, J. 20, 25 Sontheimer, K. 85 sovereignty 31, 40, 47, 168 national 46 national state 163 nation state 192, 197 of the nation 29 of the parliament 22 state 29–30, 45 Soysal, Y.N. 1, 24, 44, 109–10, 131, 191–4 Speck, W.A. 12 Spencer, I.R.G. 16 Staatsnation (state nation) 83–6, 127 standardization technical 162 state nation 69, 78 state system, European 76–7, 79, 82 stereotypes used to characterize the Germans 94 Stern, F. 84 Sternberger, D. 120 Stihl, H.P. 160 Stirner, M. 75

246 Index Stoetzel, J. 21, 39, 97 Stone, B. 29 Strauss, D.F. 75 Struve, G. von 75 Sturm, R. 168 Stürmer, M. 76, 140 Suleiman, E.N. 42 supranational agreements Swann, M. 18 Sybel, H. von 76 Sywottek, A. 78

190

Taguieff, P.-A. 36 Takenaka, A. 78 Tenbruck, F.H. 71 Thadden, R. von 28–9, 32 Thalheimer, S. 32 Thomas, G.M. 149, 169, 175 Thompson, E.P. 13 Tilly, C. 30 Timmermann, H. 140 Timms, N. 21, 34, 37, 94, 97, 112 Tocqueville, A. de 29, 48 Todd, E. 4 tolerance 14, 98–9 tolerance for different cultural practices 190 Topitsch, E. 85 Tränhardt, D. 105, 110 transnational European ties 7 transnationality 26, 58, 192 Treitschke, H. von 76 Turner, B.S. 1, 4, 12 Tuschoff, C. 141 Uhlig, C. 10 unification European 163, 165 universalism 43, 47, 55 Christian 72 moral 158 Uterwedde, H. 34 values 95–6, 98 change of 94 Vatke, W. 75 Vedrine, H. 47

Verba, S. 89, 99 Vierhaus, R. 71 virtues 97–8 civic 87 German 87, 127 Germanic 84 republican-democratic 50 Vischer, F.T. 75 Volksnation (folk nation) 84, 105, 127 Wagner, R. 83 Wallace, H. 26 Wallerstein, I. 145, 157 Walzer, M. 54 Wandycz, P. 140 Ward, R. 20 Washington, G. 49 Weber, E. 30, 33 Weber, M. 9, 189 Wehler, H.U. 66, 71, 76, 84 Weidenfeld, W. 86, 89, 121–2, 140 Weil, P. 37 Weilemann, P.R. 140 Weimar Republic 85 Weinacht, P.-L. 168 Weiss, J. 85 Weisskirchen, G. 165 Welcker, K.T. 75 welfare state 19, 57, 63, 133, 197 national 188 Welfens, P. 140 Welke, M. 71 Wendler, H.J. 50 Wessels, W. 144, 148 west and east 141 West Germans 87–8, 91, 93, 111 Western Europe 141 Europeans 140 westernization of the German character 98 Westle, B. 96 Weston, C. 141 Wettig, G. 140 White, P.E. 36 Wieland, B. 162 Wienbarg, L. 74 Wiener, A. 139 Wiesendahl, E. 155

Index Wieviorka, M. 36, 38 Wildenmann, R. 148 Willems, H. 116, 119, 167 Willms, B. 86 Wills, G. 49 Wilson, W.J. 54 Winkler, H.A. 85 Winthrop, J. 48, 57–8 Wobbe, T. 108 Woesler, W. 71 Wolf, J. 48 Wolf, R. 141 Wolffs, M. 86 Wolfgang, M.E. 54 Wölker, U. 36 Wood, P.K. 1 working class 33, 35

world market 189 writers German 66–7, 69–70, 84 popular 84 xenophobia 116, 118, 168, 171 xenophobic campaigns 167 Young, I.M.

53

Zetterholm, S. 7, 139 Ziebertz, H.G. 156 Ziebura, G. 38 Zimmer, H. 73 Zimmermann, M. 88 Zitelmann, R. 92 Zürn, M. 2

247