Multiple-conclusion Logic
Multiple-conclusion Logic
D. J. SHOESMITH Director, Test Development and Research Unit, University of Cambridge and
T. J. SMILEY Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Cambridge, and Fellow of Clare College
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE
LONDON NEW YORK NEW ROCHELLE MELBOURNE SYDNEY
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521217651 © Cambridge University Press 1978 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1978 Reprinted 1980 This digitally printed version 2008 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data. Shoesmith, D J Multiple—conclusion logic Bibliographyip. Includes index 1. Many-valued logic. I. Smiley, Timothy John, joint author. II Title. BC126.S5 551'.3 79-300388 ISBN 978-0-521-21765-1 hardback ISBN 978-0-521-09332-3 paperback
Contents
Preface Introduction
PART I 1
Consequence Compactness Rules of inference
28 36 39
Definition Extended proofs Adequacy
42 47 51
Multiple-conclusion calculi Single-conclusion calculi Decidability
57 62 69
Counterparts 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
6
11 21 25
Axiomatisability 4.1 4.2 4.3
5
Consequence Rules of inference Sequence proofs
Tree proofs 3.1 3.2 3.3
4
MULTIPLE AND SINGLE CONCLUSIONS
Multiple-conclusion calculi 2.1 .,2 2.3
3
1
Single-conclusion calculi 1.1 1.2 1.3
2
ix
The range of counterparts Compactness Axiomatisability Sign Disjunction
72 75 80 82 90
Infinite rules 6.1 6.2
Infinite rules and proofs Marking of theorems
95 98
vi
CONTENTS
PART II 7
GRAPH PROOFS
Graph arguments 7.1 Arguments 7.2 Graphs 7.3 Premisses and conclusions 7.4 Validity and form 7.5 Subproofs 7.6 Symmetry
8
Kneale proofs 8.1 8.2 8.3
9
Junction and election Cross-referenced Kneale proofs Cross-referenced circuits Other non-abstract proofs
148 154 158 163
Cornered-circuit proofs Conciseness Relevance Articulated tree proofs Abstract proofs in general
167 174 181 187 190
Single-conclusion proofs 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4
12
133 137 140
Abstract proofs 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5
11
Developments Validity Inadequacy
Cross-reference 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4
10
105 108 111 114 123 129
Single-conclusion arguments Proofs with circuits or corners Articulated sequence proofs Hilbert proofs
194 198 202 206
Infinite proofs 12.1 Infinite arguments 12.2 Kneale proofs 12.3 . Cornered-circuit proofs 12.4 Marking of theorems
212 219 232 236
CONTENTS
PART III 13
Cancellation Compact calculi Stability
270 273 277
Many-valued counterparts Principal matrices
283 293
Multiple-conclusion calculi Examples Single-conclusion calculi
297 302 306
Two-valued logic 18.1 18.2 18.3
19
256 258 262 265
Categoricity 17.1 17.2 17.3
18
Matrix functions Separability Equivalence Monadicity
Counterparts 16.1 16.2
17
245 247 251
Many-valuedness 15.1 15.2 15.3
16
Definitions Examples Compactness
Matrices 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4
15
MANY-VALUED LOGIC
Many-valued calculi 13.1 13.2 13.3
14
vii
Axiomatisation Duality Counterparts
312 314 316
Axiomatisation 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8
Finite axiomatisation Monadic matrices Examples Limitations The general case Further examples Single-conclusion calculi Rosser and Turquette
325 326 330 334 337 341 347 355
viii
CONTENTS
PART IV 20
NATURAL DEDUCTION
Natural deduction 20.1 20.2 20.3
Proof by cases Classical predicate calculus Intuitionist propositional calculus
361 366 374
Bibliography
386
Index
390
Preface
Logic is the science of argument, but ordinary arguments are lopsided: they can have any number of premisses but only one conclusion.
In multiple-conclusion logic we allow any number
of conclusions as well, regarding them (in Kneale's phrase) as setting out the field within which the truth must lie if the premisses are to be accepted.
Thus we count a step in
such an argument as valid if it is impossible for all its premisses to be true but all its conclusions false.
Anything
that can be said about premisses can now be said, mutatis mutandis, about conclusions.
(For example, just as adding a
member to a set of propositions makes more things follow from them, i.e. strengthens them as potential premisses, so it makes them follow from more things, i.e. weakens them as potential conclusions.)
The subject owes much of its interest
to the exploitation of this formal symmetry, while the contrasts between multiple- and single-conclusion calculi throw a fresh light on the conventional logic and its limitations.
Our subject is in its infancy.
Its germ can be found in
Gerhard Gentzen's celebrated Untersuchungen uber das logische Schliessen (1934) if one is prepared to interpret his calculus of csequents> as a metatheory for a multiple-conclusion logic, but this is contrary to Gentzen's own interpretation, and it was Rudolf Carnap who first consciously broached the subject in his book Formalization of logic (1943).
Carnap defined
consequence and introduced rules of inference for multiple
PREFACE
conclusions, but the first attempt to devise a proof technique to accommodate such rules was made by William Kneale in his paper The province of logic (1956).
Logicians in the subsequent decades appear to have ignored the lead of Carnap and Kneale.
Doubtless this is because
Kneale was mathematically an outsider and Carnap5s jargon deterred even insiders; but doubtless too it reflects the prevalent conception of logic as the study of logical truth rather than logical consequence, and the property of theoremhood (deducibility from axioms) rather than the relation of deducibility in general.
Such a climate is bound to be un-
congenial to the development of multiple-conclusion logic, whose parity of treatment between premisses and conclusions calls for the more general approach from the outset.
The
reception given to Carnap*s book by Church (1944) in his review is a notable case in point; but some recent Gentzeninspired work on multiple and single conclusions by Dana Scott, which we cite at the appropriate places in the text, is one of a number of welcome signs that things are changing.
Our book is in four parts, of which the second and third are independent of one another.
The aim of Part I is to redefine
the fundamental logical ideas so as to take account of multiple conclusions.
We begin by recalling four methods of de-
fining consequence for single-conclusion calculi, and abstract from them to produce four different though ultimately equivalent criteria for a relation to be a possible consequence relation.
We then devise the appropriate multiple-conclusion
analogues, paying special attention to the definition of proof and the somewhat complex sense in which consequence with multiple conclusions is transitive.
For both kinds of
calculus we discuss the theory of axiomatisability, which surprisingly is less straightforward for single-conclusion
PREFACE
xi
calculi than it is either for theories (sets of theorems) or for multiple-conclusion calculi; the idea of consequence by rules of inference, where this is defined in advance of any ideas of proof and indeed is used as a criterion for their adequacy; and rules with infinitely many premisses or conclusions.
The other main theme of Part I is the connection between multiple- and single-conclusion logic.
It turns out that each
multiple-conclusion calculus has a unique single-conclusion part, but each single-conclusion calculus has a range of multiple-conclusion counterparts.
We investigate the composition
of these ranges, the extent to which the properties of calculi of one kind can be predicted from their counterpart or counterparts of the other kind, and the connection between multiple conclusions and disjunction.
Part II starts from the observation that for an argument to be valid it is not enough that each of its component steps is valid in isolation: they must also relate to one another properly.
In order to discuss this generally overlooked in-
gredient of validity we need a way of formalising arguments that displays their steps explicitly and unambiguously, and for this purpose we introduce the idea of an argument as a graph of formulae.
This representation makes it possible to
define the form of an argument ('form5 being construed not with reference to any particular vocabulary of logical constants but as something shared by arguments of altogether different vocabularies) in purely syntactic terms.
On the
other hand our criterion of validity is ultimately semantic, involving the idea of consequence by rules introduced in Part I.
We therefore investigate the connection between form
and validity, looking for syntactic conditions for validity, trying to determine the adequacy or otherwise of various syn-
xii
PREFACE
tactically defined classes of proof, and discussing such topics as conciseness and relevance.
We do this first for
multiple-conclusion arguments (showing incidentally that Kneale's definition of proof is inadequate), then for singleconclusion ones and finally for arguments by infinite rules.
Our treatment of the subject so far is less concerned with particular calculi than with features of consequence and proof common to them all, but the remainder of the book introduces two specific applications.
In Part III we make a
detailed comparison between the multiple- and single-conclusion treatment of a particular topic.
We choose many-valued
logic as our example because it is well known and accessible, but there is also a historical reason.
For it was Carnap's
discovery of ^non-normal' interpretations of the classical propositional calculus - interpretations which fit the calculus but not the normal truth-tables - that led him to advocate multiple conclusions as the only fully satisfactory means of capturing truth-functional logic.
We therefore include
two-valued calculi in our discussion of many-valued ones, and investigate the multiple-conclusion counterparts of the classical calculus along with those of many-valued calculi in general.
We show that every finite-valued multiple-conclusion
propositional calculus is finitely axiomatisable and categorical (though virtually no single-conclusion calculus is categorical); and we pose the many-valuedness problem - the problem of distinguishing many-valued calculi from the rest by some intrinsic feature of their consequence relations.
In general it seems
that distinctions which were blurred in the single-conclusion case become sharp in the multiple-conclusion one, and results which needed qualification become unconditional.
On the other
hand it appears that a single-conclusion calculus displays a stability when its vocabulary is enlarged which a multipleconclusion one may not; and one result of this is that we have
PREFACE
xiii
had to leave the many-valuedness problem open for multipleconclusion calculi though it is solved for single-conclusion ones.
In Part IV we explore the possibility of replacing the indirect methods of 'natural deduction5 by direct proofs using multipleconclusion rules, and with it the possibility of obtaining within our theory such results as the subformula theorem.
We
illustrate these ideas for the classical predicate calculus in a purely rule-theoretic context, and in a proof-theoretic one (presupposing some of the ideas of Part II) for the intuitionist propositional calculus.
Our results are published here for the first time apart from a short abstract (1973), but we have worked together on and off over six years and Chapter 19 has its origin in Shoesmith's Ph.D. dissertation (1962).
We are much indebted to the trustees
of the Radcliffe Trust for giving one of us a welcome relief from the pressures of other work by their award of a Radcliffe Fellowship to Smiley for 1970 and 1971.
Cambridge, 1976
We have taken the opportunity provided by a reprinting to make some minor corrections, and to remedy our misuse of the term 'recursive proof procedure5 in Chapter 4, replacing it by 'recursive notion of proof5 .
Cambridge, 1979
Introduction
A multiple-conclusion proof can have a number of conclusions, say B-,...,B . It is not to be confused with a conventional proof whose conclusion is some one of the B., nor is it a bundle of conventional proofs having the various B. for their respective conclusions: none of the B. need be 'the' conclusion in the ordinary sense.
This fact led Kneale to speak of
c
the limits' of a 'development' of the premisses instead of the conclusions of a proof from them.
We prefer to extend
the sense of the existing terms, but hope to lessen one chance of misconstruction by speaking of a proof from A,,...,A to B-.....B instead of a proof of B..,...,B from l m l n In
The behaviour of multiple conclusions can best be understood by analogy with that of premisses. collectively: a proof from A-,,..,A
Premisses function is quite different from
a bundle of proofs, one from A.. , another from A« and so on. Moreover they function together in a conjunctive way: to say that B follows from A.,..#,A
is to say that B must be true
if A., and ... and A are true. Multiple conclusions also m 1 function collectively, but they do so in a disjunctive way: to say that B-,...,B follow from A-,...,A is to say that B- or ... or B must be true if all the A. are true, i n I It should not be inferred from this explanation that multiple conclusions can simply be equated with the components of a
INTRODUCTION
single disjunctive conclusion B..v.#.vB .
The objections to
such a facile reduction of multiple- to single-conclusion logic are the same as the objections to reducing the conventional logic to a logic of single premisses.
It is true
that any finite set of premisses is equivalent to a single conjunctive one, A ,...,A A..&...&A •
having the same joint force as
But this equivalence is only established by
appealing to the workings of the rule cfrom A,B infer A&B 5 , understood as involving two separate premisses (not one conjunctive one), and it would be circular to appeal to the equivalence to establish the dispensability of the rule.
In-
finite or empty sets of premisses could not in any case be treated in this way; nor do all calculi possess a conjunction. Moreover, the equivalence between a set of sentences and their conjunction is at best a partial one, for the conjunction, being a sentence itself, can be made a component of further sentences where a set cannot: contrast ~(A-&A2)
anc
^ H^A-,A«}.
Our remark is that considerations exactly analogous to these apply to multiple conclusions and disjunctions.
To see how multiple conclusions might invite the attention of the logician, imagine first a student assigned the modest task of devising axioms and rules for the propositional calculus. He sees that the truth-table for conjunction can be translated immediately into rules of inference, the stipulation that A&B is true when A and B are true producing the rule (1) c
from A,B infer A&B 5 , and similarly for (2) 'from A&B infer A 5
and (3) 'from A&B infer B 5 .
Not only are these rules justi-
fied by the truth-table, but they in turn dictate it: any interpretation of conjunction that fits the rules must fit the truth-table too, for by (1) A&B must be true if, and by (2) and (3) only if, A and B are both true.
Encouraged by
this start the student moves on to disjunction, where the three c true 5 cells in the truth-table immediately produce the
INTRODUCTION
rules 'from A infer AvB 5 and 'from B infer AvB 5 .
But when he
5
comes to the remaining one - the entry 'false when A and B are both false - the recipe fails.
Moreover, even if he does
find a complete set of rules, they cannot possibly dictate the intended interpretation of disjunction.
For it is easy to
show that all and only the tautologies and inferences of the propositional calculus are valid in the truth-tables below, where t stands for truth and f.. , f ~ and f ~ for subdivisions of falsity; yet AvB can be true when A and B are both false. Our student has heard of the difficulties of excluding nonstandard interpretations in the upper stories of mathematics; now he finds the same thing in the basement.
He sees too that,
if he could avail himself of it, the multiple-conclusion rule 'from AvB infer A,B 5 would both translate the fourth cell of the original truth-table and serve to dictate the intended interpretation of disjunction in the same way as the rules for conjunction do.
f
3
f
2
f 2
f
2
f
3
f f 3 3
f
3
f
2
3
V
t
f
t
t
t
t
t
t
f
3
3
f
i
t
f
t
f
l
1
f
2
3
f
2
t
t
f
2
f
2
f 2
f
l
f
3
t
f
f
2
f
3
M-l
l
1
f 3
M-l
M-l
f
f f 1 1
2
t
M-l
t
f
M-l
M-l
t
1
M-l
t
M-l
&
3
f 3
l
l
l
f
2
f
3
3
Alternatively, consider the ambitious project of defining logic as advocated by Popper, Kneale and Hacking (for references see the historical note at the end of Section 2.1). It is proposed that a logical constant is one whose meaning can be explained by conventions governing its inferential behaviour.
If the conventions are not merely to fix but to
explain the meaning they must take the form of introduction rule§, by which the behaviour of sentences containing the constant can be derived inductively from the behaviour of
INTRODUCTION
their constituents,
(For example, using h to symbolise con-
sequence and X for an arbitrary set of premisses, conjunction can be introduced by the rules 'if X h A and X h B then X h A&B' and «if X,A h C or X,B H C then X,A&B h C>; but an elimination rule like *if X h A&B then X h A5 is ineligible, as is an appeal to the transitivity of K )
Disjunction
causes no difficulty this time, but material implication does.
It turns out that the obvious introduction rules, cif
X,A h B then X h A^B 5 and «if X h A and X,B h C then X,A=>B h C 9 , characterise intuitionist, not classical implication; and to introduce the latter it is necessary to have multiple conclusions.
Indeed one would have to conclude that
classical logicians, like so many Monsieur Jourdains, have been speaking multiple conclusions all their lives without knowing it.
No branch of mathematical logic relies exclusively on actual argumentative practice for its justification.
We make use
of an informal multiple-conclusion proof in Section 18.3, and note that the formalisation of a multiple-conclusion metacalculus provides a nice method of proving compactness (Theorem 13.1), but it can hardly be said that multipleconclusion proofs form part of the everyday repertoire of mathematics.
Perhaps the nearest one comes to them is in
proof by cases, where one argues csuppose A. ... then B, ... , suppose A
... then B; but A-V...VA , so B 5 .
A dia-
grammatic representation of this argument exhibits the downwards branching which we shall see is typical of formalised multiple-conclusion proofs: A-VAov...vA 1 z m 1
2
m
INTRODUCTION
But the ordinary proof by cases is at best a degenerate form of multiple-conclusion argument, for the different conclusions are all the same (in our example they are all instances of the same formula B ) .
Why are multiple-conclusion argu-
ments not more prevalent?
One answer (suggested to us by Gareth Evans) concerns the difficulty of using multiple conclusions in an object-language as opposed to mentioning them in a metalanguage.
We can as-
C
sert a number of premisses as a series A-. A o . ... A .»
Each
12m stage 'A-. ... A..5 of this is complete in itself and independent of what may follow: the subsequent assertions merely add to the commitment represented by the previous ones.
But if we
C
tried to make a serial utterance B... B2» ... B .' in the way required for asserting multiple conclusions, as committing us to the truth of B- or of B^ ... or of B , we should be withdrawing by the utterance of B^ the unqualified commitment to B- into which we had apparently entered at the first stage, and so on.
The utterance will therefore have to be accom-
panied by a warning (e.g. a prefatory ^Either5) to suspend judgment until the whole series is finished, and we do not achieve a complete speech act until the utterance of the last B., duly marked as such.
But this is as much as to admit
that the various B. are functioning not as separate units of discourse but as components of a single disjunctive one. To avoid Evans1 point it is necessary to replace the unilinear flow of ordinary speech by discourse set in two or more dimensions, and all the notations we shall propose for multipleconclusion proofs are of this kind.
An example is our dia-
grammatic proof by cases above, where the convention would be that the inscription of sentences in different columns indicates a purely alternative commitment to their truth.
INTRODUCTION
Another answer to the question (suggested to us by David Mayers) is that we usually focus on a desired conclusion the quod erat demonstrandum - before devising an argument that leads to it, and if our interest were thus fixed on a (finite) set of multiple conclusions it would be a natural first step to replace them by a single disjunctive target. The situation is not symmetrical as between premisses and conclusions, since we do not usually know in advance what premisses we are going to need to prove a given conclusion. To redress the balance there would need to be more people engaged in arguing from given premisses in an attempt to refute them; i.e. more reductio ad absurdum proofs or more practising Popperians.
Notation
We try to use the same terminology for single- and
multiple-conclusion ideas, though since our principal concern is with the latter, terms like 'calculus' or 'rule5 are to be understood in the multiple-conclusion sense unless explicitly qualified by the adjective 'single-conclusion5 or unless the context is unequivocal, as in Chapter 1.
Simi-
larly we use a common notation whenever possible: for example h (used mainly for consequence relations) and R (for rules of inference) stand for binary relations between sets of premisses and individual conclusions in a single-conclusion context; between sets and sets in a multiple-conclusion one. Calculi of either kind are denoted by L, with or without a suffix or prime, and in this connection h stands for the consequence relation of L, h' that of 1/ and so on. the special suffix notations h , h
and h
In addition
signify consequence
relations determined respectively by a set I of interpretations, a set R of rules of inference and a matrix M: definitions are found in the text.
We write )/• for the complement
of h so that X }/• Y iff (if and only if) not X h Y.
NOTATION
We use A, B, C, D to stand for formulae of a calculus and T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z for sets of them, V being reserved for the set of all formulae of the calculus and T and U for complementary sets (i.e. a pair of disjoint sets whose union is V ) . We adopt the lambda notation for functions and the braces notation for sets, by which Axy.x+y is the addition function, {A ,... ,A } the set whose members are A_,...,A and 1 m 1 m {A: P(A)} the set of formulae satisfying P.
Other notation
from set theory is (x,y) for an ordered pair, c for set inclusion, X-Y for the set of formulae in X but not in Y, and A for the empty set.
(Some logicians use a symbol not un-
like A to stand for a particular cabsurd5 formula.
It will
appear that there is some similarity between an absurd formula and an empty set qua conclusion, but none qua premiss.) Wherever it is convenient to do so we adopt the usual elisions, suppressing braces and writing for example X-A for X-{A} and A..,,..,A
for {A-,...,A }.
When discussing multiple-conclusion
calculi we therefore write X h B when we should strictly write X h {B}, though we take care to retain the braces where (as in Chapter 5) the contrast between multiple- and single-conclusion calculi is the point at issue.
We often use commas
instead of the notation for set union, writing X,Y for XuY; and we make regular use of Frobenius notation for sets of formulae, writing for example X=>B for {A^B: AeX} and, where s is a substitution, s(X) for {s(A): AeX}. When the index set can be supplied from the context we write {X.} instead of {X.}. 1
c
for a family indexed by S (if necessary adding the
16 J
word cfamily5 to avoid confusion with the braces notation for a unit set or singleton), and similarly write U X . for the union of the various X..
Greek letters stand for arrays -
families of formulae or symbols - and in particular we use a for sequences, T for trees and IT for graphs.
8
INTRODUCTION
We call a member of a partially ordered set 'maximal5 if no other member is greater than it, and 'maximum9 if it is greater than every other member.
'Minimal9 and 'minimum' are dis-
tinguished in the same way.
Results are numbered consecutively within each chapter, and in the course of proofs we cite them by number alone, writing 'by 2.12' instead of 'by Lemma 2.12' when appealing to the twelfth result of Chapter 2.
For ease of reference, section
and theorem numbers are also noted at the head of each pair of pages.
Although we generally deal only with rules of in-
ference with finite sets of premisses and conclusions, we discuss infinite rules and proofs in Chapters 6 and 12, and with this in view mark with a t those results in the previous chapters which fail to carry over to the infinite case.
De-
finitions are not numbered but are easy to locate from the index, where the relevant page number appears first in the entry.
References to the bibliography are by author and date,
e.g. 'Carnap, 19439 or 'Carnap (1943)'.
Part I • Multiple and single conclusions
1 • Single-conclusion calculi
1.1
Consequence
We take mathematical logic to be the mathematical study of consequence and proof by means of formalised languages or calculi.
A single-conclusion calculus is constituted by a
universe of formulae and a relation of consequence, construed as a binary relation between a set of premisses and a conclusion.
We make no stipulations about the sort of entity
that can be a formula or what sort of internal structure the formulae may possess.
It is natural to assume that there is
at least one formula, though no result of importance appears to depend on this.
We make no other stipulation about the
number of formulae, though since we use the axiom of choice we shall be assuming that they can be well-ordered.
We write
V for the relevant universe of formulae, and use T, U, W, X, Y, Z to stand for sets of formulae (i.e. subsets of V ) , and A, B, C, D for formulae.
We write L for a calculus and H for
its consequence relation, adding a prime or suffix when necessary, so that for example h, stands for consequence in L-• By a single-conclusion relation we mean any binary relation between sets of formulae on the one hand and individual formulae on the other.
If R is a single-conclusion relation we
write X R B to indicate that R holds between the set X and the formula B, and whenever X R B we say that the pair (X,B) is an instance of R.
Several ways of defining consequence for particular calculi are to be found in the literature.
The 'semantic' method
12
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
requires us to lay down the range of admissible interpretations of the formulae (typically by giving a fixed meaning to the so-called logical symbols and an arbitrarily variable one to the remainder), and to define X h B to mean that B is true on every interpretation on which all the members of X are true.
At the opposite pole stands the definition of conse-
quence as deducibility.
Given certain formulae as axioms,
and given rules by which a formula may be inferred from others, one first defines a proof (typically as a sequence in which the premisses are linked to the conclusion by steps conforming to the axioms and rules), and then defines X h B to mean that there exists a proof of B from X,
Since the
axioms and rules are usually specified in terms of the shapes, not the meanings, of the relevant formulae, this sort of definition is purely syntactic.
Both methods are familiar to
every student of the propositional calculus, the first being typified by the truth-table definition of tautological consequence and the second by any axiomatic presentation.
Two other methods are less well known, the note following this section.)
(For their origins see
The idea of ^consequence by
rules', as we shall call it, mixes syntax with semantics by combining an appeal to axioms and rules with the idea of consequence as the transmission of truth.
The meaning of even
the logical symbols is taken to be arbitrarily variable, but attention is restricted to those interpretations that are sound in the sense that they make the axioms true and the rules truth-preserving, and X h B is defined to mean that B is true on every sound interpretation on which all the members of X are true.
This is reminiscent of the well-known
method of developing a mathematical theory in the abstract, whereby a sound interpretation is defined as one that makes the axioms true and the theorems are defined as the propositions that are true on every sound interpretation.
Section 1.1
CONSEQUENCE
There is however one important difference.
13
The development
of an axiomatic theory presupposes some underlying logic, which limits the range of (sound plus unsound) interpretations.
For example, in an abstract development of set theory
the meaning of <e' is free to vary but that of < = ' or 'all' is circumscribed by the (formalised or informal) underlying logic.
In the present case, by contrast, there is no need
to invoke an underlying logic, and the range of interpretations from which the sound ones are selected is absolutely untrammelled.
(If the reader insists on discerning an under-
lying logic even here, it can only be one that reflects the admission of every interpretation whatsoever, and since the wider the range of interpretations the fewer the formulae that follow from one another, it will be the weakest possible logic for the relevant universe.
Such 'minimum5 calculi are
discussed further in Part III; and cf. Popper, 1947.)
Finally there is the 'implicit' method of defining consequence.
The symbol h is introduced as a (metalinguistic)
variable subject to constraints represented by postulates. If there is a unique (or perhaps a least) relation which satisfies these constraints it is said to be implicitly defined by the postulates.
Typically, some of the postulates
will express generic properties such as the transitivity of consequence, while the remainder will be special to the calculus in question (e.g. <X h A&B iff X h A and X h B' or <X h
ADB
iff X,A h B ' ) .
Our own concern is less with the consequence relations of particular calculi than with what is common to them all, i.e. with the property of being a consequence relation.
We there-
fore take each of the four methods and abstract from it so as to obtain a corresponding criterion for a single-conclusion relation to be a consequence relation.
We shall show that
14
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
these criteria are equivalent to each other provided rules of inference are allowed to have infinitely many premisses, but in the present chapter we confine the discussion to rules with a finite number of premisses.
Our treatment of the semantic method is prompted by the following line of argument. (1)
To say that a conclusion follows from a given set of pre-
misses is to say that the conclusion must be true if the premisses are all true. (2)
The necessity with which conclusions follow is relative
to the presuppositions of an argument, and different arguments may have different presuppositions.
But whatever idea of nec-
essity is involved there is a corresponding idea of possibility, and we can use this to reformulate (1) as (3)
To say that a conclusion follows from some premisses is
to say that each possible state of affairs in which all the premisses are true is one in which the conclusion is true. (4)
Assuming the formulae of a calculus to be capable of
truth and untruth, each relevant state of affairs may be represented by the set T of formulae which are true in it. I be the set of all such T, and let X h T in I, if X c T then B e T. from X is to say that X h (5)
Let
B mean that for all
Then by (3) to say that B follows
B.
The only plausible way of generalising (4) to apply to an
arbitrary universe of formulae is to be prepared to allow any set of sets of formulae to play the part of I in (4). This step is supported by considering the indefinite variety of argumentative presuppositions envisaged in (2). (6)
We therefore say that H is a consequence relation if it
is of the form h^ for some set I of sets of formulae.
Without having any objection to (6) we prefer to reword it so as to bring out the analogy with our subsequent symmetrically
Section 1.1
CONSEQUENCE
15
worded definition of multiple-conclusion consequence.
To do
so we represent a state of affairs not simply by the set T of formulae which are true in it but, equivalently, by an ordered pair made up of the sets T and U of true and untrue formulae respectively.
With this in mind we reserve the letters T and
U to denote mutually complementary sets of formulae, and call any such pair (T,U) a partition.
We also say that one set
overlaps another if the two have a member in common.
In these
terms we can reformulate (4)-(6) as follows. A partition (T,U> satisfies (X,B> if B e T or X overlaps U. Otherwise, i.e. if X c T and B e U, the partition invalidates (X,B).
If (X,B> is satisfied by every partition in the set
I we say it is valid in I and write X h a consequence relation if h - h
B.
A relation h is
for some I, in which case we
say too that h is characterised by I. Turning to the implicit method, we formulate the following conditions on a relation h. Overlap
If B e X then X h B.
Dilution
If X' I- B and X" c x then X h B.
Cut for sets
If X,Z h B and X h A for every A in Z, then X H B.
The title ^overlap* reflects our desire to use the same terminology in the single- as in the multiple-conclusion case, where it is clearly appropriate.
^Dilution5 and «cut*
are translations of Gentzen's cVerdiinnung* and «Schnitt>, the former commonly but erroneously translated as c thinning J. Our first result will show that these three conditions provide an alternative criterion for a relation to be a consequence relation.
In stating the result, and subsequently through-
out the book, it is convenient to use the phrase 'is closed under overlap' instead of Satisfies the overlap condition5,
16
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Theorems 1.1-2
and similarly for dilution and cut.
Theorem 1.1
A single-conclusion relation is a consequence re-
lation iff it is closed under overlap, dilution and cut for sets.
Proof
It is immediate from the definition that any con-
sequence relation is closed under overlap and dilution. For cut, suppose that (i) X h A for each A in Z and (ii) X,Z f- B.
Let (T,U) be any member of the set of partitions
that characterises h.
If X c T then Z c T by (i) and so
B e T by (ii); hence X h B as required.
For the converse
let h be closed under overlap, dilution and cut for sets, and let I be the set of all partitions of the form (T(Y),U(Y)), where T(Y) = {A: YhA} and U(Y) = {A: Y^A}; If X M
then (T(X),U(X)) invalidates (X,B), since by
overlap X c T(X). On the other hand if any partition (T(Y),U(Y)) invalidates (X,B>, so that Y + B although YhA
for every A in X, then by cut for sets it follows
that Y,X ^ B and so by dilution that X ^ B.
Hence h is
the consequence relation h .
Our three conditions are suggested by rules devised by Hertz under the names 'triviality5, 'immediate inference5 and 'syllogism5 (see note).
He used the second to derive the 5
first from a 'tautology
corresponding to A h A, and simi-
larly by using dilution A h A could replace overlap in our list.
Hertz only envisaged finite sets of antecedents, and
the straightforward generalisation of his syllogism rule to cover an arbitrary number of premisses would be 'if X,Z h B and X. h A. for each A. in Z, then X , U X . h B 5 .
Formally
speaking cut for sets is a special case of this, obtained by equating each X. with X, but the two are clearly equivalent given dilution.
Yet another variant is 'if Z h B and X h A
for each A in Z, then X h B 5 , and indeed this together with
Section 1.1
CONSEQUENCE
17
overlap alone could replace our original three conditions, Gentzen follows Hertz in most respects (see note), but his cut condition is the special case of Hertz's syllogism in which Z is a unit set.
The two are equivalent in the finite
case, but this ceases to be true in the infinite case.
For
5
Gentzen s version still allows only one formula at a time to be ccut out', and even by iteration can deal with at most a finite number, whereas by taking Z to be infinite in Hertz's version infinitely many formulae can be cut out simultaneously. Theorem 1.3 will show that it is essential to adopt the latter rather than the former version if one is to obtain a condition strong enough to use in a discussion of consequence in general.
Given that arbitrary sets of premisses are permitted, a situation corresponding to the finite one treated by Hertz and Gentzen can be recreated by invoking the idea of compactness. A single-conclusion relation h is compact if whenever X h B there is a finite subset X' of X such that X' h B, and a compact calculus is one whose consequence relation is compact Consequence in a compact calculus is thus completely determined by consequence from finite sets of premisses, and Theorem 1.4 shows that in this case it makes no difference whether we formulate the cut condition so as to apply to formulae one at a time, or to a finite set, or to an infinite one.
In the theorems which summarise the preceding discussion cut for finite sets refers to the condition obtained from cut for sets by constraining Z (though not X) to range over finite sets only, and cut for formulae is the condition *if X h A and X,A h B then X h B', obtained by constraining Z to range over unit sets {A}.
Theorem 1.2
Cut for formulae is equivalent (granted dilution)
18
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Theorems 1.3-7
to cut for finite sets.
Theorem 2.3
Cut for finite sets is weaker (even granted over-
lap and dilution) than cut for sets.
Theorem 1.4
For compact single-conclusion relations cut for
formulae is equivalent (granted dilution) to cut for sets.
Theorem 1.5
A compact single-conclusion relation is a con-
sequence relation iff it is closed under overlap^ dilution and cut for formulae.
Proofs
For 1.2 we argue from cut for formulae to cut
for finite Z by induction on the number of formulae in Z. The result is tautological when Z is empty.
For the in-
duction step it is sufficient to establish cut for Zu{C} given cut for Z as follows: if X,Z,C h B and X h C and X h A for each A in Z then by dilution X,Z h C, whence X,Z h B by cut for C and X h B by cut for Z, as required. For 1.3 let X h B iff X is infinite or B e X or B + C, where C is some chosen formula.
It is easy to verify that
f- is closed under cut for finite sets, but when V is infinite h is never closed under cut for sets, since A i C although V-C h C and A h A for each A in V-C,
Since V is closed
under overlap and dilution this example shows that cut for finite sets cannot replace cut for sets in 1.1. For 1.4 let H be compact and closed under cut for formulae.
Suppose that X,Z h B and X V A for each A in Z.
By
compactness there exist finite sets X' and Z' such that X' c X and Z' c Z and X',Z' h B.
By dilution X,Z' h B,
and since by hypothesis X V A for each A in Z' it follows by 1.2 and cut for Z' that X h B as required. mediate from 1.4 and 1.1.
1.5 is im-
Section 1.1
HISTORICAL NOTE
19
If L- and L^ are single-conclusion calculi L- is said to be a subcalculus of L^ if h e
Theorem 1.6
Every single-conclusion calculus has a maximum
compact subcalculus.
Lemma 1.7
Every single-conclusion relation V has a maximum
compact subrelation h', and if H is closed under overlap, dilution and cut for formulae so is I-'.
Proofs
For 1.7 let h' be such that X h' B iff X h B and
X' h B for some finite subset X' of X.
It is then evident
that h' is a compact subrelation of h and that any compact relation contained in h is contained in h', as required. If h is closed under dilution the definition of h' can be simplified to: X h' B iff X' I- B for some finite subset X' of X.
Obviously h' too is closed under dilution; and it
is closed under overlap if h is, for if B e X then B e X' for some finite subset X' of X, whence X' h B and so X h' B. If moreover h is closed under cut for formulae so is h', for if X h' A and X,A h' B then for some finite subsets X X
and
of X we have that X- h A and (by dilution if necessary)
X ,A h B, whence by hypothesis X ,X? h B and so X h' B as required. For 1.6 it is sufficient to observe that the maximum compact subrelation of any consequence relation is also a consequence relation by 1.7r 1.1 and 1.5.
Historical note
In the second decade of the century C.I. Lewis
proposed an axiomatic treatment of consequence in the guise of a binary connective -3 , and when A 1 ,... 9 A h B is equated with 1 m his (A &...&A ) -3B the finite cases of our three conditions can I m certainly be recovered from his system of strict implication
20
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
(see e.g. Theorem 12.77 of Lewis and Langford, 1932).
For an
interesting reassessment of Lewis's project in the light of the present one see Scott, 1971 and 1974b.
Hertz (1923) developed a calculus with formulae of the form A..,...,A
-> B, and when the arrow is read as h each of his
rules becomes equivalent (with the qualifications mentioned in the text) to one of our conditions. 5
assertion of the 'trivial
For example, Hertz's
formula scheme A-,•..,A 1
comes the assertion A-,...,A condition.
-> A. bemi
H A . embodied in the overlap
This is not to say that Hertz himself interpreted
his calculus in this way.
On the contrary, his arrow is the
Hilbert school's notation for a connective like i>, and Hertz (1922) likens his own use of it to Russell's 3 , explaining that he restricts himself to formulae of this special sort in order to simplify his investigations into the independence of axiom systems. Gentzen (1932) offers a variety of readings of Hertz's arrow as a relation symbol (e.g. taking the A. as standing for events and reading -+ as 'causes'), including taking the A. as standing for propositions and reading •> as 'if the propositions ... are true then the proposition ... is true'.
But in Gentzen, 1934,
the arrow is read as a connective and A-,...,A
-> B equated with
(A..&...&A )^B. 1 m Tarski (1930a) is concerned with consequence in 'deductive disciplines', i.e. calculi characterised by rules of inference. He begins by defining the consequences of a set of formulae in any particular discipline to be the intersection of all the sets that include it and are closed under the relevant rules, where T is closed under R if B e T whenever X R B and X c T. This anticipates our definition of consequence by rules (h ) in the next section, since T is closed under R iff (T,U)
Section 1.2
satisfies R.
RULES OF INFERENCE
21
Tarski rather abruptly abandons this approach
with the remark that c on account of the intended generality of these investigations we have no alternative but to regard the concept of consequence as primitive5, but in fact such an alternative is readily available provided the mistaken first-level generalisations «X h B iff (3R)(X h_ B ) 5 or <X h B iff K (R)(X h B ) 5 do not obscure the correct second-level one K (cf. our Tneorem 1.12): c h is a consequence relation in Tarski's sense iff (3R)(h = h ) 5 .
The implicit definition
to which Tarski turns is couched in the language of functions compare the function T( ) used in the proof of Theorem 1.1 above - but the relevant axioms correspond to overlap (Axiom 2 ) , cut for sets (Axiom 3 ) , and dilution and compactness (Axiom 4 ) . To these Tarski (1930b) adds axioms relating consequence and the classical connectives.
Tarski takes the justification for his
Axiom 4, i.e. the compactness of consequence by rules, to be obvious from their finiteness; our Theorem 1.10 supplies a proof for those, like us, who do not find it obvious.
Tarski5s
implicit definition is reconsidered from a multiple-conclusion standpoint by Scott (1974a), who covers some of the ground of our Sections 2.2 and 5.2 in the process.
1.2
Rules of inference
No apology is needed for considering non-compact calculi, if only because the classical logic of second- and higher-order quantification, which has as good a claim as any to represent the underlying logic of the working mathematician, is not compact.
Nevertheless compact calculi have a special impor-
tance, reflected in the fact that only for a compact calculus is it possible to devise a finite proof technique.
The
conventional idea of a proof as a finite sequence of formulae governed by rules of inference presupposes that only a finite
22
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Theorems 1.8-11
number of formulae can figure in a rule.
We therefore con-
sider single-conclusion rules of inference of the form 'from X infer B if X R B } , where R is such that X R B can only hold if X is finite.
In Chapters 6 and 12 we look at 'rules' with
infinitely many premisses and 'proofs' designed to accommodate them, and with this in mind we mark our results with a t if they depend on the restriction to the finite case.
If X R B we call X the set of premisses and B the conclusion of the instance (X,B) of the rule; and we say that R defines the scope of the rule.
It may or may not be possible to in-
dicate the scope of a rule by means of formula schemes, as in the familiar formulation of modus ponens as 'from A,A=>B infer B5.
The essence of a rule evidently lies in the relation that
determines its scope, and we therefore make free use of the terminology of relations - inclusion, intersection, closure, etc. - as applying to rules.
Moreover a family of rules
{from X infer B if X R. B} is always equivalent to a single rule 'from X infer B if X U R . B 5 , and so we can talk indifferently of a rule, rules or a set of rules.
A partition (T,U> satisfies R if it satisfies every instance of R, and invalidates R if it invalidates some instance of it; and R is valid in a set I of partitions if it is satisfied by every member of I.
We write h for the consequence relation K
characterised by the set of partitions that satisfy R, and say that B is a consequence of X by R if X f-o B, i.e. if every partition that satisfies R satisfies (X,B). proof of Theorem 1.9 shows, h
As the
is the least consequence re-
lation containing R. The closure of R under a number of conditions is defined as the intersection of all the relations that contain R and satisfy the conditions.
Since if every one of a family of
Section 1.2
RULES OF INFERENCE
23
relations {h.} is closed under overlap (or dilution or cut) then so is their intersection Oh., it follows that the closure of R under any combination of these conditions is the least relation that contains R and is closed under the conditions in question.
In particular, R is closed under
overlap (dilution, cut) iff it is identical with its closure, so that our use of the word
Theorem 1.8
X h B iff (X,B) is valid whenever R is valid, K
Theorem 1.9
H
is the closure of R under overlap, dilution
and cut for sets.
Theorem 1.10
K. is compact. K
Theorem 1.11
h
is the closure of R under overlap, dilution
and cut for formulae.
Proofs
For 1.8, let (X,B) be valid in every set I in which
R is valid; then if (T,U> is any partition that satisfies R we see by taking I to be the unit set of (T,U) that (T,U) satisfies (X,B).
Hence X K, B, and the converse is immediate
from the definitions. For 1.9, since the various sets I in which R is valid characterise the various consequence relations h
that con-
tain R, it follows from 1.8 that X h_ B iff X h B for K. J. every such relation, whence the result by 1.1. For 1.10 and 1.11, let h be the closure of R under overlap, dilution and cut for formulae, and let h' be the maximum compact subrelation of h (cf. 1.7). Since R itself is a compact subrelation of h we have R c h' c h; since f-_ is closed under overlap, dilution and cut for K formulae we have h c h ; and since h' contains R and by K
24
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Theorems 1.12-13
1.4 and 1O7 is closed under overlap, dilution and cut for sets we have by 1.9 that h_ c h'. Hence h' = h = h_ as K K required. An obvious corollary is that h is the interK section of the compact consequence relations that contain R. (Note that when 1.4 and 1.10 are presupposed, 1.9 follows immediately from 1.11 but not vice versa, since the results before 1.11 do not exclude the possibility of a noncompact relation lying between R and h D and being closed under cut for formulae but not cut for sets.) A set of rules R characterises a calculus if I- is the conK sequence relation of the calculus.
We show that the calculi
which can be characterised by rules are precisely the compact ones. Theorem 1.12
A single-conclusion calculus is characterised
by rules of inference iff it is compact.
Proof
A calculus characterised by rules is compact by 1.10,.
Conversely, if the consequence relation h of a calculus is compact, let R be the rule *from X infer B if X is finite and X h B 5 .
If X h B then by compactness X' R B for some
finite subset X' of X and so X h B by 1.9; but by 1.9 h_ is R R the least consequence relation containing R and so h = h_. K We have not said anything so far about the validity of individual formulae, since we regard a calculus as a vehicle of inference, its governing idea being that of valid inference rather than valid formula.
But the omission is easily recti-
fied: a partition (T,U) satisfies B if it satisfies (A,B>, i.e. if B e T, and B is valid in a set I of partitions if it is satisfied by every member of I.
Having said this, however,
it is apparent that (as Carnap, 1937, observed) the validity of formulae is tantamount to a special case of the validity
Section 1.3
SEQUENCE PROOFS
25
of inferences, for B is valid in I iff (A,B) is, i.e. iff A \- B.
There is thus no need to continue with a separate
account of the validity of formulae, and we can use the familiar notation h B as an abbreviation for A h B.
Similarly
we have not yet treated the use of formulae as axioms in conjunction with rules of inference.
The definition of H can be K
extended in an obvious way to allow for the presence of axioms as well as rules, but when this is done it becomes apparent that postulating an axiom B is tantamount to postulating a rule of inference with zero premisses, viz. 'from A infer B 5 . There is thus no need to provide separately a systematic treatment of axioms.
1.3
Sequence proofs
A (sequence) proof of B from X by R is a finite sequence of formulae C.,...,C
such that C
= B and each C. is either a
member of X or the conclusion of an instance of R all of whose premisses occur in C-,...,C. -.
We say that B is
deducible from X by R if there exists a proof of B from X by R.
This definition assumes that axioms have been assimilated to rules in the way described above, and so does not contain the usual clause allowing C. to be an axiom. 'proof of B
?
We do not define
separately, since it can be subsumed under the
present definition as a proof of B from A.
Similarly theorem-
hood can be equated with deducibility from A and will not be given a separate treatment.
Theorem 1.13
Deducibility and consequence by the same single-
conclusion rules are the same relation.
26
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Proof
Let C.,...,C
Theorem 1.14
be a proof a of B from X by R, and
let (T,U) be any partition which invalidates (X,B>. C
Then
e U, so let C. be the first member of a to belong to U.
Since X and U are disjoint C. i X, so C. must be the conclusion of an instance of R whose premisses precede it in a and so are all in T.
Hence (T,U) invalidates R.
shows that deducibility by R is contained in h o .
This
For the
converse it is sufficient by 1,11 to show that deducibility by R contains R and is closed under overlap, dilution and cut for formulae.
For cut, if there are proofs a of A from X
and a' of B from X,A, then the sequence o9o' obtained by juxtaposing a and a' is a proof of B from X; for any occurrence of A in a' may be justified in o,o' in the same way as the final occurrence of A in a.
The other proper-
ties are immediate.
The definition of a proof as a sequence of formulae is not the only possible one, and we discuss a number of alternatives, including the Hilbert school's idea of a proof as a tree, in Chapter 11.
Each idea of proof carries with it a corresponding
idea of deducibility, and we shall say that a proposed definition of proof is adequate if, for all R, deducibility by R coincides with h .
Since deducibility by finite proofs is
necessarily a compact relation (e.g. any sequence proof from X is a proof from those members of X that actually occur in it), Theorem 1.10 becomes significant as a precondition of the adequacy of any sort of finite proof technique, while Theorem 1.13 shows that in particular
Theorem 1.14
Sequence proofs are adequate for single-conclu-
sion rules.
'Adequacy5 is sometimes encountered in the literature as a name for a property of rules of inference.
We may say that
Section 1.3
SEQUENCE PROOFS
27
a set of rules is adequate for a calculus if it is both sound and complete, where R is sound with respect to L if B is deducible from X by R only when X h B and complete if, conversely, B is deducible from X by R whenever X h B.
A
typical adequacy theorem for rules thus resembles an adequacy theorem for proofs in that each equates a syntactic idea with a (wholly or partly) semantic one, but where the first theorem concerns a particular set of rules the second is entirely general with regard to them.
And although the adequacy of
rules is invariably discussed with reference to sequence proofs, which as we have seen are adequate, it is possible for rules to be adequate for a calculus when - perhaps only when - they are coupled with an inadequate proof technique. (Theorem 20.7 can perhaps be seen as a case in point.)
Theorem 1.13 can also be regarded in a purely abstract light as the analogue of a historically significant result about the ancestral.
The straightforward way of defining the
ancestral *R of a binary relation R is to say that x *R y if there exists a finite sequence z,,...,z and z
is y and z. R z._
for each i.
such that z- is x
Frege's way is to say
that x *R y if y belongs to every set which contains x and is closed under R; and there is an obvious parallel between the first of these definitions and that of deducibility, and between the second and the idea of consequence by rules.
2 * Multiple-conclusion calculi
2.1
Consequence
A multiple-conclusion calculus is constituted by a universe V of formulae and a relation h of multiple-conclusion consequence.
As in Section 1.1 we assume that V is not empty,
though curiously enough with an empty universe of formulae there would still be two distinct multiple-conclusion calculi, in one of which A H A
and in the other A }/• A.
By a
multiple-conclusion relation we mean a binary relation between sets of formulae, and when such a relation R holds between sets X and Y we write X R Y and call the pair (X,Y) an instance of R.
We shall generally take the adjective cmultiple-conclu-
sion5 for granted and write simply * calculus5 to contrast with * single-conclusion calculus', and similarly with 'relation5 and other terms.
Our task in this and the succeeding chapter is to develop the appropriate multiple-conclusion analogues of the various definitions of consequence that we have produced for single conclusions.
First we say that a partition (T,U) satisfies
(X,Y> if X overlaps U or Y overlaps T.
Otherwise, i.e. if
X c T and Y c U, we say that (T,U> invalidates (X,Y>.
If
(X,Y) is satisfied by every partition in the set I we say it is valid in I and write X h, Y. relation if h = K
We say that h is a consequence
for some I, in which case we say too that h
is characterised by I.
If T and U consist of the true and un-
true formulae on some interpretation, (T,U) satisfies (X,Y) iff at least one member of X is untrue or at least one member of Y
Section 2.1
CONSEQUENCE
29
is true, this being the relation of cinvolution' defined by Carnap (see the note at the end of this section).
An important
difference between multiple- and single-conclusion satisfaction has to do with the possibility of amalgamating a number of satisfying partitions: if for each i (T.,U.) satisfies (X,B) then so does (PIT., UU.)> but there is no comparable result for the satisfaction of a pair (X,Y).
The difference shows
•itself in connection with argumentative structure in Chapter 11 and categoricity in Chapter 17,
In following out the second approach the only point of difficulty is the formulation of the cut condition.
Had we con-
strued multiple conclusions conjunctively we would have postulated transitivity in the literal sense - «if X h Y and Y h Z then X h Z»; but this is clearly inappropriate if the members of Y are to function conjunctively in Y f- Z but disjunctively in X h Y, and it turns out that we need a version that takes account of all the different ways of partitioning Y into a pair of subsets.
Consider, therefore, the following condi-
tions, where a partition of Z is any pair (Z-,Z«) such that Z-uZ« = Z and Z rfL~ = A.
(The word partition 5 on its own,
as opposed to partition of Z 5 , will be reserved for partitions of V, as in Section 1.1.) Overlap
If X overlaps Y then X h Y.
Dilution
If X' h Y', where X' c X and Y' c Y, then X h Y.
Cut for sets
If X,Z
h Z2,Y for each partition (Z ,Z2> of Z,
then X h Y.
As before, a relation is closed under these conditions if it satisfies them, and its closure under them is the intersection of all the relations containing it and satisfying them.
It is
again evident that a relation is closed iff it is identical with its closure.
30.
MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Theorem 2,1
Theorems 2.1-4
A relation is a consequence relation iff it is
closed under overlap, dilution and cut for sets.
Proof
Closure under overlap and dilution is immediate
from the definition of a consequence relation. let h
For cut,
be any consequence relation and suppose that
X |^ Y, so that some partition (T,U) in I invalidates (X,Y).
For any Z let Z
= ZnT and Z 2 = ZnU.
Then
\Z 1 ,Z 2 ) is a partition of Z and (T,U> invalidates (XuZ , Z 2 uY), i.e. X,Z- )/• Z2,Y as required. For the converse let h be closed under overlap, dilution and cut for sets: we show that h = h , where I is the set of partitions (T,U) such that T ^ U.
If X / Y
then by cut for V there exists a partition (T,U) such that X,T}/-U,Y.
Appealing to the overlap condition it
follows that X c T and Y c U, and hence (T,U> both belongs to I and invalidates (X,Y>.
On the other hand if X h Y
then by dilution X,T h U,Y for every partition (T,U) in I, and since T (^ U this means that either X overlaps U or Y overlaps T; i.e. (X,Y) is satisfied by every member of I.
In formulating cut for sets a condition is asserted for all X, Y, Z.
By confining it to a particular Z we obtain cut for
Z; by confining it to finite Z we obtain cut for finite sets; and by confining it to singletons Z = {A} we obtain cut for formulae, viz. if X,A h Y and X h A,Y then X h Y.
Cut for
formulae stands to the cut rule of Gentzen, 1934, in the same way as the corresponding single-conclusion condition does to that of Gentzen, 1932 (cf. Section 1.1 and the note at the end of this section).
The following results show how the
present cut conditions are related.
Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 have
single-conclusion analogues (Theorems 1.2 and 1.3), but Theorem 2.2 does not, since every single-conclusion relation is trivially closed under single-conclusion cut for V.
Section 2.1
CONSEQUENCE
Theorem 2.2
31
Cut for sets is equivalent (granted dilution)
to cut for V,
Theorem 2.3
Cut for formulae is equivalent (granted dilution)
to cut for finite sets.
Theorem 2.4
Cut for finite sets is weaker (even granted over-
lap and dilution) than cut for sets.
Proofs
For 2.2, if h is closed under cut for V then when-
ever X + Y there exists a partition (T,U) such that X,T ^ U,Y. For any Z let Z
= ZnT and Z
partition of Z such that Z
= ZnU; then (Z ,Z2> is a c T and Z
c U, whence by dilu-
tion X,Z- \f Z«,Y as required. For 2.3 suppose that h is closed under cut for formulae and that X ^ Y.
Let S be the set of pairs (W-,W2) of sub-
sets of a given finite set Z such that X,W- }/• W 2 ,Y.
Then S
is nonempty (since by hypothesis (A,A) c S ) , finite and partially ordered by the subpair relation c such that (W-.,W2) c (Wj,Wp iff W x c W | and W 2 c w£. member (Z1,Z >, and Z uZ
Hence S has a maximal
= Z since if A e Z-(Z uZ 2 ) then by
cut for A either X.Z^A ^ Z 2> Y or X,Z 1 ^ A,Z 2 ,Y, contradicting the maximality of ( Z - ^ ) .
By dilution, X,Z 1 ~Z 2 ^
Z
2>
Y
and as (Z - Z 2 , Z ) is a partition of Z it follows that h is closed under cut for Z, as required.
(Obviously any other
division of the overlap of Z- and Z 2 would serve the same purpose.) For 2.4, let V be infinite and let X h Y iff X or Y is infinite or X overlaps Y.
It is easily verified that H is
closed under overlap, dilution and cut for finite sets; but it is not closed under cut for sets, for A }/• A although T h U for every partition (T,U>.
Overlap and dilution have no plausible rivals as analogues
>
32
MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Theorems 2.5-7
of the corresponding single-conclusion conditions.
This is
not the case with cut, as the following series shows: Cut
If X h A,Y for each A in W and X,W h Y then X h Y.
Cut 2
If X,B h Y for each B in W and X h W,Y then X h Y.
Cut
If X h A,Y for each A in W x and X,B h Y for each B in W 2 and X,WX h W 2 ,Y, then X h Y.
Theorem 2.5
Cut1 and cut« are independent, but each is stronger
than cut for formulae.
Theorem 2.6
Cut,, is equivalent (granted dilution) to cut, and
cut« together, but stronger than either separately.
Theorem 2.7 cut
Cut for sets is stronger (granted dilution) than
3# Proofs
For 2.5 we note that cut for formulae is the special
case of cut- or cut^ in which W is taken to be a unit set. To show that there are no other implications between the three conditions, let V be infinite and let X h Y iff X is infinite or Y nonempty.
It is easily verified that h is
closed under overlap, dilution, cut^ and cut for formulae, but that cut- fails when X is finite, Y empty and W infinite. Similarly the relation h such that X h Y iff Y is infinite or X nonempty is closed under overlap, dilution, cut- and cut for formulae, but not under cut2» For 2.6 we obtain cut~ from cut-, cut^ and dilution thus: if X h A,Y for each A in W each A in W ^
then by dilution X h A,W2,Y for
If too X,W;[ h W 2 ,Y then X h W 2 ,Y by cut^ and
if also X,B h Y for each B in W 2 then X h Y by cut2.
Con-
versely cut- is the special case of cut« in which W 2 is empty, and cut2 is the case in which W- is empty.
Since by
2.5 neither cut. nor cut« implies the other, it follows that neither implies cut .
Section 2.1
HISTORICAL NOTE
33
For 2.7 let Z = W-.uW2 and note that every partition (Z ,Z«) of Z is such that either Z- contains a member B of W« or Z 2 contains a member A of W- or (only if W- and VL are disjoint) Z
= W- and Z 2 = W 2 .
Using dilution, cut,, is
obtained as a corollary of cut for this Z.
On the other hand
the counterexample of 2.4 shows that cut., does not imply cut for sets.
Since all the counterexamples used in proving Theorems 2.4-7 are of relations closed under overlap and dilution, they establish the crucial difference between cut for sets and its rivals, namely that only it is strong enough to sustain Theorem 2.1.
Historical note
Gentzen (1934) makes Hertz's notation sym-
metrical by introducing 'sequents' A..,..., A
-> B,,...,B .
On
what may be called the material interpretation of sequents the arrow is a connective (material implication) belonging to the same object-language as the A. and B., the sequent is a notation for a common or garden formula (A-&...&A )=>(B-v.. . VB ) , 1 m 1 n and the calculus of sequents LK is a variant of the conventional predicate calculus.
On the 'metalinguistic' interpre-
tation the arrow is a relation symbol, the sequent is the statement A-,...,A
h B-,...,B , and the calculus of sequents
is a (single-conclusion) metacalculus for a multiple-conclusion object-calculus.
On either interpretation Gentzen's rules are
single-conclusion rules: it is their content, not their form, that may involve multiple conclusions.
The choice between the
two interpretations has been a matter not so much of dispute as tacit disagreement.
Church (1956) speaks for one side in
saying categorically that 'Gentzen's arrow is not comparable to our syntactical notation h ', while Scott, 1971, (if one discounts his attempt to assimilate the metalinguistic and
34
MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
the Fregean use of h) speaks for the other side by taking the metalinguistic interpretation for granted.
It seems clear
enough that Gentzen himself interpreted his calculus in the material way.
He says as much (e.g. 1934, 1.2.4), but the
decisive evidence is his treatment of the equivalence between the sequent calculus and the conventional one (1934, V.I and 6),
(Passages pointing the other way are 1936, II.5.1 - though
the effect has been enhanced in translation - and 1938, 1.2 Explanatory remarks' on sequents without succedents; but in each case the material interpretation is reaffirmed on the same page of the original.)
If, however, one considers the
question as a logical rather than a historical one, the answer seems to be that although h and => differ both in grammar and strength, neither difference can be resolved inside the calculus of sequents. C
For example, a disjunction of sequents like
A -* B or A-> ~B', which could settle the matter of strength, is
simply inexpressible.
Similarly the arrow is both non-iterable,
like H, and only capable of holding between finitely many formulae, like 3.
If one set out deliberately to encapsulate just
the principles that are common to => and h (not to mention Lewis's -3 ) , one could hardly do it better than the sequent calculus.
But, granted this, the metalinguistic interpretation
is surely the more fruitful one.
Our only cavil (apart from
the artificiality of the restriction to a finite number of premisses and conclusions) is that studying multiple conclusions exclusively through a metacalculus of sequents is rather ,like waiting for Godot.
The time is profitably spent (in
establishing metametatheorems such as Gentzen's Hauptsatz), but the actual multiple-conclusion calculus remains offstage; and one could be forgiven for exploring, as Carnap and Kneale do, more mundane but less allusive ways of tackling the subject.
Carnap (1943) introduces multiple conclusions by taking as primitive the idea of a 'junctive', where a pair of junctives
Section 2.1
HISTORICAL NOTE
35
goes with each set of formulae; a 'conjunctive5 being, roughly speaking, a set construed conjunctively and a 'disjunctive' one construed disjunctively.
But we regard this as a false
start, and in the final section of the book Carnap himself briefly reworks his ideas in terms of plain sets.
Here, after
defining involution in the way mentioned in the text, he defines 'L-involution' as the relation which holds between X and Y iff X involves Y in every 'L-state' or possible state of affairs, thereby anticipating our b .
He then introduces
rules of inference (including infinite ones) and, in the absence of any conception of deducibility by multiple-conclusion proofs, defines 'C-involution' as the relation which holds between X and Y iff Y overlaps every T such that (a) X c T and (b) for all W and Z, if W c T and W R Z then Z overlaps T. C-involution is thus equivalent to consequence by R as defined in Section 2.3 below.
To the best of our knowledge the first person to put forward the inferential definability of the logical constants as the basis for a demarcation of logic was Popper (1947ff.), in a series of ambitious but confused papers: 'these bad and illfated papers', as he was to call them.
(See Popper, 1974, and
reviews indexed in the Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol.14, 1949).
The project was revived by Kneale, 1956, though he,
like Popper, assigns no special significance to introduction rules.
The origin of this is Gentzen's remark (1934, II.5.13)
that the introduction rules of his natural-deduction system NJ 'represent, as it were, the definitions of the symbols concerned, and the eliminations are no more, in the final analysis, than the consequences of these definitions'.
It is made
part of the demarcation of logic by Hacking (1979), who makes the whole project his own by pursuing it at a new level of sophistication and precision.
36
2.2
MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Theorems 2.8-10
Compactness
A relation h is compact if whenever X h Y there exist finite subsets X' and Y' of X and Y such that X' f-Y;; and a calculus is compact if its consequence relation is compact.
The term
entered the literature of single-conclusion logic from that of topology, and in passing it is worth seeing what analogy there is between compactness in multiple-conclusion logic and in topology.
Let h , then, be any consequence relation, let
I(X,Y) be the set of those members of I that satisfy (X,Y>, and let [I] be the set of all such sets.
The topology generated
by [I] is the topology on I whose open sets are the unions of finite intersections of members of [I], including I as I(V,V) and A as I(A,A).
A set of subsets of I covers I if the union
of its members is I, and a topology on I is compact if every set of open sets that covers I has a finite subset that also covers I.
Theorem 2.8
V
is compact iff the topology generated by [I]
is compact.
Proof
By a classical result (see e.g. Theorem 5.6 of
Kelley, 1955) the topology generated by [I] is compact iff every subset {I(X.,Y.): ieS} of [I] that covers I has a finite subset that also covers I.
This is equivalent
to the condition that if (JX. H UY. when the union is taken over S then UX. h finite subset of S.
U Y . when the union is taken over some Evidently this condition holds if h
is compact, and conversely we can demonstrate the compactness of h
by applying the condition in the case where
X.uY. is a singleton for each i in S.
For Theorem 2.8 to be more than a topological gloss the topology generated by [I] ought to have some independent logical
Section 2.2
COMPACTNESS
significance.
37
This is most plausible in the case of calculi
incorporating the multiple-conclusion version PC of the twovalued propositional calculus (cf. Chapter 18), for which the topology generated by [I] reduces to [I]. For in this case the union of any laembers of [I] is always in [I] since Ul(X i ,Y i ) = I C U X ^
U Y i ) , and the intersection of any two
members is also in [I] since I(X ,Y )nI(X2,Y2) = I(A, (~X1vY1)&(~X2vY2)).
The open sets of the topology are there-
fore the members of [I].
All this relates only to multiple-conclusion logic.
A single-
conclusion calculus is never characterised by a unique set of partitions, as Theorem 5.2 will show, and even in the case of the classical calculus some characteristic sets of partitions give rise to compact topologies (cf. Lyndon, 1964) and others to non-compact ones (cf. Section 18.3).
The most we have in
general is, by Theorems 2.8, 5.8 and 5.12, that a single-conclusion consequence relation h is compact iff the topology generated by [I] is compact for at least one I that characterises h.
Theorem 2.9
For compact relations cut for formulae is equiva-
lent (granted dilution) to cut for sets.
Theorem 2.10
A compact relation is a consequence relation iff
it is closed under overlap, dilution and cut for formulae.
Proofs
2.10 is immediate from 2.9 and 2.1.
The proof of
2.9 follows that of 2.3 except that we need to show that S has a maximal member even for infinite Z.
For this we
note that a pair belongs to S iff all its finite subpairs do so, since by compactness and dilution X,W- h W^,Y iff X,W' h W£,Y for some finite subsets W' of W
and W' of W 2 .
The result then follows by applying Tukey's lemma, which
38
MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Theorems 2.11-12
states that if a nonempty set S of sets is of 'finite character5, i.e. if a set belongs to S iff all its finite subsets do so, then S has a maximal member (cf. Kelley, 1955).
The application is achieved by considering a domain
of objects C (A' and
The result can also be proved directly, by an in-
ductive argument whose strategy is well known from its use by Lindenbaum (see Theorem 56 of Tarski, 1930a) and by Henkin (1949).
All the versions rely on the axiom of
choice unless V is already well-ordered. Leaving aside these variations, the use made of the argument as a whole is interestingly different in the multiple- and single-conclusion cases.
It is not needed
for the single-conclusion analogue of the present result (1.4), and therefore is not needed in order to show the adequacy of sequence proofs for single-conclusion rules; but it is of course needed for any Henkin-style proof of the completeness of a particular set of rules.
Contrari-
wise, the argument appears to be essential in the multipleconclusion case if we are to show the compactness of h_ and hence the adequacy of any finite technique of proof, but may not otherwise be needed when proving the completeness of particular rules (as for example in 18.1).
A calculus L
is a subcalculus of L
if h
c \-
Theorem 2.11
Every calculus has a maximum compact subcalculus.
Section 2.3
Lemma 2.12
RULES OF INFERENCE
39
Every relation h has a maximum compact subrelation
h', and if h is closed under overlap, dilution and cut for formulae so is h'.
Proofs
2.11 is a corollary of 2.12, using 2.1 and 2.10.
The proof of 2.12 follows that of 1.7, taking X h' Y iff (X h Y and) X' h Y' for some finite subsets X' and Y' of X and Y.
In particular, to show that h' is closed under
cut for formulae, suppose that X,A h' Y and X h' A,Y. Then for some finite subsets X, and X« of X and some finite subsets Y- and Y~ of Y we have (by dilution if necessary) that XX ,A h Y x and X 2 h A,Y 2 > whence by cut \>^2
h Y
1> Y 2
and so X h' Y as required.
2.3
Rules of inference
We consider rules of the form cfrom X infer Y if X R Y', where R is a relation such that if X R Y then X and Y are finite. If X R Y we call the members of X and Y the premisses and conclusions of the instance (X,Y) of the rule, and in practice we identify the rule with the relation R that determines its scope.
We consider rules with infinitely many premisses and
conclusions in Chapters 6 and 12, and meanwhile continue to mark theorems with a t if they hold only in the finite case. To illustrate the idea of a rule, including the use of formula schemes to convey its scope, we give a set of rules for the two-valued propositional calculus PC (cf. Chapter 18).
From A,A=>B infer B
From B infer A^B
From A infer A,A=>B
From A&B infer A
From A&B infer B
From A,B infer A&B
From A infer AvB
From B infer AvB
From AvB infer A,B
From A , ^ infer A
From A infer A,~A
40
MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
Theorems 2.13-18
These rules for PC are taken from Kneale, 1956, except that where we have rules with an empty set of premisses or conclusions he has rules permitting inference from or to any formula.
Thus his rules for negation are 'from A,~A infer B>
and 'from B infer A,~A>, and his third rule for material implication is 'from C infer A , A D B > .
It is clear from Kneale,
1962, that he does this not because of some settled policy of excluding the empty case, but because the distinction is not important to him.
For some of its implications, however, see
Section 3,1 and the discussion of the sign of calculi in Sections 5.4 and 16.1.
A partition (T,U) satisfies a relation R if it satisfies every instance of R and invalidates R if it invalidates some instance of it, and R is valid in a set I of partitions if it is satisfied by every member of I,
We write h
for the consequence
relation characterised by the set of partitions which satisfy R, and say that Y is a consequence of X by R if X h_ Y, i.e. K if every partition that satisfies R satisfies (X,Y). Theorem 2.13
X h Y iff (X,Y) is valid whenever R is valid. R
Theorem 2.14
H is the closure of R under overlap, dilution K and cut for sets. Theorem 2m15
h_ is compact. K
h n is the closure of R under overlap, dilution K and cut for formulae. Theorem 2.16
Proofs follow those of 1.8-11, using the corresponding multiple-conclusion results.
Immediate consequence by R is defined as the closure of R
Section 2.3
RULES OF INFERENCE
41
under overlap and dilution, i.e. Y is an immediate consequence of X iff they overlap or there exist subsets X' of X and Y' of Y such that X' R Y'.
Immediate consequence is generally
a much weaker relation than consequence by the same rules, but the two are equivalent in the special case where the premisses and conclusions form a partition of V:
Lemma 2.17
Proof
T h n U iff U is an immediate consequence of T by R. K
If T h_ U every partition that invalidates (T,U) K
invalidates R.
Since every partition invalidates itself,
it follows that (T,U) invalidates R and from this that U is an immediate consequence of T.
The converse is obvious
by 2.14. A set of rules R characterises a calculus if the consequence relation of the calculus is h D .
As in the singles-conclusion
case the calculi that can be characterised by rules of inference are precisely those that are compact.
Theorem 2,18
A calculus is characterised by rules of in-
ference iff it is compact.
Proof follows that of 1.12, using the rule .
3 • Tree proofs
3,1
Definition
Our first definition of proof for multiple-conclusion logic generalises the idea of a sequence proof in a manner suggested by the informal technique of proof by cases.
A proof will be
cast in the form of a tree of formulae: it will begin like a sequence but each time the application of a rule of inference introduces a number of conclusions the tree will split into a number of fresh branches.
The conclusions of the rule are
treated as if they represented alternative possibilities or cases, and the proof is therefore continued along each of the resulting branches independently.
In writing out such a proof
it is easiest to make it run down the page, adding horizontal lines where necessary to clarify the branching structure. this way, for example, Figure 3.1 shows how (A^B)i>B can be proved from AvB by the rules for PC set out in Section 2.3; and Figure 3.2 shows how ~A,B can be proved from A=>B by the rules for PC.
AvB A B
B (A3B)=>B
Figure 3.1
A B
-A
Figure 3.2
In
Section 3.1
DEFINITION
43
A tree of formulae, like a sequence, is a special case of what may be called an array.
An array is not simply a set
of formulae: once we recognise that the same formula can occur at different places in (say) a sequence, we must distinguish its occurrences from each other and so from the formula itself.
This is not to be confused with the 'type-token5 dis-
tinction between a symbol considered as an abstract entity or type and its occurrences (physical particulars or tokens). In a sequence consisting exclusively of symbol types the type-token distinction would be irrelevant but we should still need to draw the present one.
As usual there is more
than one way of treating the matter systematically: occurrence can be taken as an independent idea or it can be defined in other set-theoretic terms, and an array can be construed as something whose occurrences consist of occurrences of formulae or as something which itself consists of occurrences of formulae.
We adopt the second alternative in each case, de-
fining an occurrence of a formula A to be an ordered pair (i,A> for arbitrary index i, and an array to be a set of occurrences.
If the use of the same index with different
formulae is forbidden an array becomes identical with a family of formulae, given the customary treatment of a family as a function from a set of indices.
A structured
(e.g. well-ordered) array of formulae is a replica of another if there is an isomorphism between them in which corresponding elements are occurrences of the same formula.
We
use Greek letters for arrays, but for the moment use A, B, C to stand alike for formulae and their occurrences. c
5
clude the word occurrence
We in-
whenever it is needed to remove
an ambiguity, but in general we avail ourselves of the customary elliptical language; e.g. in the following definition the clause c
(j) is a branch ending in a formula in Y 5 is short for ^ 5
branch ending in an occurrence of a formula in Y .
is a
44
TREE PROOFS
Theorem 3.1
A sequence of formulae is a well-ordered array.
A tree of
formulae is a partially ordered array such that for each ocA
currence A the set A of occurrences that precede A is a sequence, and a branch is a maximal well-ordered subset of a tree (cf. e.g. Jech, 1971).
We define a file to be an initial
segment of a branch, and the rank p(<|>) succeeding a file <j> is the set of occurrences A such that A = <(>.
A (tree) proof from
X to Y by R is a finite tree of formulae such that for each file <J) either (i) p(<j>) consists of an occurrence of a formula in X or (ii) <j> is a branch ending in a formula in Y or (iii) p(())) consists of the conclusions of an instance of R whose premisses occur in <|>.
We say c a proof from X to Y9 in pre-
ference to 'a proof of Y from X 5 partly to avoid the suggestion that the members of Y are being proved individually and partly to provide a phrase in which premisses and conclusions are mentioned in that order, as they are in C X I- Y 5 .
It follows immediately from the definition that any replica of a proof from X to Y by R is also a proof from X to Y by R, and we illustrate the other ideas involved by verifying the claim that Figure 3*2 represents a proof from A^B to ~A,B by the rules for PC.
The tree in question has two branches,
namely ((>- = {A=>B,A,B} and (f>2 = { A D B , ~ A } .
Besides itself -
contains the three files (j)^ = A, $, = { A D B } , and <(>_ = {A3B,A}. The files in (f>2 are itself, <(>« and <|>,. Like all branches, <)>.. and <)>2 are succeeded by the empty rank, while the ranks succeeding the other files are p(<jO = {A=>B}, p($,) - {A,~A}, and p (<(>,-) = {B}.
It is now easy to see that each file satisfies
one of the conditions in the definition of proof: <)>.. and (j>2 satisfy (ii) since they end in one of the conclusions ~A and B; <(>,. satisfies (i) since p((K) is the premiss A=>B; and <\>, and (J)^ satisfy (iii) since p(((>,) consists of the conclusions of the rule *from A infer A,~A5 and p (<(>,-) is the conclusion of the rule cfrom A,A^B infer B 5 .
Section 3.1
DEFINITION
45
The difference in style between the definitions of sequence proof and tree proof calls for an explanation.
Certainly it
is easy to bring the former into line with the latter, for any sequence is a one-branch tree and so we have: a finite sequence of formulae is a proof of B from X by (single-conclusion) R if for each file <|> either (i) p(<|>) consists of a formula in X or (ii) $ is the entire sequence and ends in B, or (iii) p() consists of the conclusion of an instance of R whose premisses are in $.
Moreover the entire theory of se-
quence proofs can be reproduced in a multiple-conclusion context.
For to every single-conclusion rule R there corresponds
a singleton-conclusion rule R- such that X R- {B} iff X R B; proofs by R.. may branch (as on p.4 when A =...=A ) , but we have
Theorem 3,1
A sequence proof of B from X by single-conclusion
R is a tree proof from X to {B} by the corresponding singletonconclusion rules R, , and every branch of a tree proof from X to Y by R.. is a sequence proof of B from X by R for some B in Y.
Proof
Since there are no instances of R. with an empty
set of conclusions, every branch in a proof from X to Y by R- must end in a member of Y, and the result follows immediately from the definition of tree proof and the new definition of sequence proof.
If we had excluded rules with zero conclusions, as Kneale does, we could alternatively have brought the definition of tree proof into line with that of sequence proof.
For in this case
conditions (i) and (iii) cannot apply to a branch anyway, so nothing is lost by ignoring the empty rank associated with it. The remaining ranks are simply the equivalence classes determined by the relation chas the same predecessors as 5 , and a proof from X to Y by R is a finite tree of formulae such that
46
TREE PROOFS
every branch ends in a member of Y and each new-style 'rank5 consists either of an occurrence of a member of X or of the conclusions of an instance of R whose premisses are among the preceding formulae.
The original definition of sequence proof
corresponds to the special case of this where there is only one branch and so each 'rank5 consists of exactly one occurrence. When rules with zero conclusions are allowed, however, the empty rank following a branch of a tree proof may be justified by appeal to a zero-conclusion rule, so that the branch need not end in a conclusion: indeed it may even end in a premiss, as Figure 3.4 shows.
In such a case the device of treating
branches separately from proper files is no longer any help in harmonising the styles of the two definitions.
In writing out proofs that use zero-conclusion rules it is helpful to add a horizontal line below branches which terminate by virtue of such a rule.
In this way Figure 3.3 re-
presents a proof from ~(A&B) to ~Av~B by the rules for PC, and Figure 3.4 represents a proof from ~~B to B.
-(A&B) -A B
~B
B
~Av~B
~B —B
A&B ~Av~B
Figure 3.3
Figure 3.4
Zero-conclusion rules draw some support from the informal practice of proof by cases.
In proving B from ~~B by a con-
sideration of the alternative cases (i) B and (ii) ~B, the argument in case (ii) would, if we used Kneale's rule 'from A,~A infer C 5 , have to run '~B, but ~~B, so B 5 .
In practice
mathematicians argue more like this: '~B, but ~~B; this is
Section 3.2
EXTENDED PROOFS
a contradiction and so we need not pursue this case.5
47
It is
just this style of argument which is formalised by means of a zero-conclusion rule, as in Figure 3.4.
3.2
Extended proofs
There are several ideas of multiple-conclusion proof that have a claim to provide the natural analogue of the sequence proof, and we have chosen perhaps the most restrictive of them.
It can be relaxed in any or all of three respects.
In the first place there is no provision in our existing definition for the presence of a rank p() to be justified on the ground that it repeats one of the formulae in . Admittedly no similar provision is explicit in the definition of sequence proof, but there it would be otiose: in whatever way the first occurrence of a formula in a sequence proof is justified (i.e. whether as a premiss or an axiom or as being inferred by a rule from one or more preceding formulae), every subsequent occurrence of it can be justified in exactly the same way.
Our demonstration that single-conclusion deduci-
bility is closed under cut (Theorem 1.13) relied on this implicit provision for repetition to justify the claim that the juxtaposition of a proof of A from X with one of B from X,A produces a proof of B from X.
For tree proofs, on the
other hand, a provision for repetition is not otiose, and the juxtaposition of proofs does not necessarily produce a proof without it.
For example, taking X to be {A^B} and Y
to be {~A,B}, T- of Figure 3.5 is a proof from X to A,Y and T« a proof from X,A to Y by the rules for PC.
The tree T is
obtained by juxtaposing T.. and x^ in the obvious way, but T is not the expected proof from X to Y since there is no way
48
TREE PROOFS
of justifying the rank consisting of the second occurrence of A.
A
-A
A^B
A
~A
A
A=>B
B
A B
T
l
T
T
2
Figure 3.5
Secondly we might allow additional formulae to occur in a rank alongside a premiss of the proof, or alongside the conclusion of a rule, by replacing 'consists of 5 by 'contains5 in the relevant clauses (i) and (iii) of the definition.
The
motive for this proposal is the fact that a sequence proof can contain formulae which have nothing to do with the deduction of its conclusion, provided only that they follow from the premisses in the prescribed way.
For example, the se-
quence A&B,A,B is a perfectly acceptable sequence proof of B from A&B by the rules 'from A&B infer A 5 and 'from A&B infer B 5 , although its middle formula represents a dead end or digression as far as the deduction of B is concerned.
Since we already
allow this sort of digression in the files of a tree proof, why not also allow its ranks to contain formulae which are not deducible from the premisses, provided they lead on to the conclusions in the prescribed way? way
5
Since this 'prescribed
has the feature just mentioned, that not all the formulae
in a file need be used in the subsequent deduction, the proposal has the somewhat curious consequence that a formula can occur in a proof without playing any part in it, whether as a premiss or conclusion of the proof as a whole or of any inferential step in it.
For example, the tree shown in
Figure 3.6 would on the present proposal be a proof from A&B
Section 3.2
EXTENDED PROOFS
49
to B by the rules for PC, in which the formula C occurs in this wholly extraneous way.
The effect on proofs using zero-
conclusion rules is especially striking; e.g. the tree shown in Figure 3.4 would continue to be a proof from ~~B to B even when an arbitrary tree of formulae was grafted onto the tip of its right-hand branch. A&B B
C B
Figure 3.6
Thirdly, in the absence of zero-conclusion rules, our existing definition does not allow a file to be continued past a conclusion unless en route to a subsequent one.
In this it re-
sembles the definition of sequence proof, which does not allow A&B,B,A to count as a proof of B from A&B even when the final formula duly follows from the premiss.
Where, however, a file
contains the premisses of a zero-conclusion rule, the existing definition does allow the file to be continued past them, provided only that the subsequent material follows from the premisses (i.e. conforms to clause (i) or (iii) of the definition), This being so, it would seem reasonable to allow similarly for the continuation of files justified by rules with non-zero conclusions.
We might therefore relax the definition by
changing clause (ii) from c<j> is a branch ending in a formula in Y 5 to C<J) is a branch overlapping Y 5 - or even to *<|> overlaps Y 5 , which would permit an arbitrary continuation in the spirit of the previous variation.
These variations can be adopted or rejected independently. The connection with sequence proofs expressed by Theorem 3.1 is unaffected by the first of the suggested changes; to match the second we should replace cevery5 by 'some5 in the
50
TREE PROOFS
Theorems 3.2-4
statement of the theorem, and to match either form of the third we should replace cbranch* by cbranch ... contains a file which'.
Each notion of proof carries with it a cor-
responding relation of deducibility, such that Y is deducible from X by R iff there is a proof of the relevant kind from X to Y by R.
We show that all the variant definitions of tree
proof lead to the same deducibility relation.
We do this by
considering the broadest of them, which incorporates all three variations and exhibits an attractive verbal symmetry between rank and file.
Namely we say that a finite tree of
formulae is an extended (tree) proof from X to Y by R if for each file <j) either (i) p() overlaps X or (ii) $ overlaps Y or (iii) p() is an immediate consequence of $ by R.
Theorem 3.2
A proof from X to Y by R is an extended proof
from X to Y by R.
Theorem 3.3
An extended proof from X to Y by R contains as
a subtree a proof from X to Y by R.
Theorem 3.4
Tree proofs and extended proofs (and hence any
intermediate variety) determine the same relation of deducibility.
Proofs
3.2 is immediate from the definitions, and 3.4
from 3.2 and 3.3.
For 3.3, let T be an extended proof
from X to Y by R, and let T, be obtained by omitting everything subsequent to a formula in Y.
Then x, is an
extended proof from X to Y by R in which no formula in Y occurs in a file other than finally.
We may therefore
designate in each nonempty rank p(<|>) of T- one occurrence of a formula in X or of a formula occurring in cj>, or failing that one occurrence of each conclusion of an instance of R whose premisses all occur in <|>. Let x« be obtained
Section 3.3
ADEQUACY
51
from T- by pruning out all undesignated occurrences and anything subsequent to them.
Then x~ is a proof from X
to Y by the rule R' obtained by adding 'from A infer A» to R, and it has the property that no formula occurs more than once in each rank, that no formula in Y occurs more than once in each file, and that any occurrence preceded by another occurrence of the same formula is the sole member of a rank.
Let x~ be obtained by omitting all
repetitions of each formula subsequent to its first occurrence in each branch.
If <j> is a branch of x^ it is
contained in a branch $' of T«.
But <(>' either ends in an
occurrence of a member of Y (which must be in $ also), or contains the premisses of an instance of R' with zero conclusions.
Since the same formulae occur in (|> and <j)', the
justification of $' in x^ carries over in either case to justify in x~.
If on the other hand (j> is a file of x^
succeeded by a nonempty rank p (()>), let <J)' be the subtree of x« which is the union of the predecessors of members of p (<j>).
Then cj)7 is a file, since <j> = (t>'nx~ and no member of
any multi-membered rank of $' is omitted in constructing x~.
So p(<j>) is the rank succeeding $' in x«, and its justi-
fication in x^ can be carried over to x^ since the same formulae occur in <|> and <)>'. Hence x~ is a proof from X to Y by R' in which no formula occurs more than once in any file, and is therefore a proof by R as required.
3.3
Adequacy
By virtue of Theorem 3.4 we can use deducibility 5 ambiguously with reference to any of the varieties of proof we have considered, and in establishing the following results about deducibility we can appeal to whichever variety is most convenient for the purpose at hand.
52
TREE PROOFS
Theorem 3.5
Theorems 3.5-6
Deducibility and consequence by the same rules
are the same relation. Proof
If there is an extended proof x from X to Y by R,
let (T,U) be any partition that satisfies R.
There exist
files <|> (e.g. the empty file) such that <|) c T, so let <j) be a maximal file with this property.
Then p() c U.
Since
(T,U) satisfies R, the rank p() is not an immediate consequence of , so either p(<(>) overlaps X or (f overlaps Y. Hence either U overlaps X or T overlaps Y, so that (T,U) satisfies (X,Y).
Accordingly X h_. Y. For the converse K it is sufficient by 2.16 to show that deducibility by R (a) contains R and is closed under (b) overlap, (c) dilution and (d) cut for formulae.
For (a) it is easily veri-
fied that Figure 3.7 represents a proof from {A. ,.•.,A } to {B1,...,Bn> by R if {A 15 ...,A m } R { B ^ . . . ^ } .
For (b),
if A is common to X and Y, the array consisting of a single occurrence of A is a proof from X to Y by any R; and for (c) any proof from X 7 to Y' by R is a fortiori a proof from X to Y by R whenever X' c x and Y ; c Y.
For (d),
suppose that there is a proof T from X to A,Y by R, and let d)-,. . . ,d) be the branches of x that end in A (n>0). in o Suppose also that there is a proof from X,A to Y by R, and let x-,...,x
be n replicas of it, disjoint from each other
and from x . Let x be obtained by grafting x. onto $. for each i; i.e. let x be the union of x ,...,x , with an oco n currence B preceding B' in x iff B precedes B' in one of x ,...,x or, for some i, B e Y<j>. and B' e x.. We show that i l o' 'n ' ' x is an extended proof from X to Y by R, distinguishing two categories of file. The first category comprises the files of x other than 6-,...,6 ; these are justified in x as o In they are in x . The second consists of the files of the form ()>.,<(>, where if is a file of x..
Here the justification
of <j> in x. carries over to justify the new file in x, ex-
Section 3.3
ADEOUACY
53
cept where cf) is succeeded in x. by an occurrence of the premiss A of T..
In such a case, however, A occurs both in
the file <(>.,<)> and in the rank succeeding this in T, and the necessary justification is supplied by clause (iii) of the definition of extended proof. We have already noted (Figure 3.5) that T is not in general a proof from X to Y by R as defined in Section 3.1. Similarly the juxtaposition of extended proofs does not in general produce the required extended proof.
For example,
by the rules for PC the sequence A&A,A,B is an extended proof from A&A to A, and A,AvA is an extended proof from A to AvA, but A&A,A,B,A,AvA is not an extended proof from A&A to AvA.
To ensure that the juxtaposition of two proofs
does produce another of the same sort it is necessary to adopt an intermediate definition by incorporating the first variation discussed in Section 3.2 but not the third.
A
i
A
2
A m B
l ••• B n
Figure 3.7
As in the single-conclusion case, we say that a notion of proof is adequate if the corresponding relation of deducibility by R coincides, for each R, with h o .
So Theorems 3.4 and 3.5
show that all the varieties of tree proof are adequate; in particular
Theorem 3.6
Tree proofs are adequate.
54
TREE PROOFS
Theorem 3.7
Theorems 3.7-10
Extended proofs are adequate.
We conclude by defining a special subclass of 'universal* trees, one such tree T 7 being associated with each finite set Z.
We
Lt
show that the universal trees form an adequate class of allpurpose proofs in the sense that T_ is an extended proof from X to Y whenever Y is deducible from X using only members of Z, where 'deducible' refers to any kind of proof considered in this book; i.e. if TT is a tree proof or graph proof or whatever, and Z is the set of formulae appearing in TT, then x« can prove whatever IT proves.
B
C
A
C
A
B
C
B
C
A
B
A
Figure 3 . 8
The idea behind the construction of x 7 is that each rank p() Lt
should consist of one occurrence of every formula in Z-, as illustrated by Figure 3.8 for the case where Z = {A,B,C}.
It
is easy to show by induction that any two trees with this property are replicas of each other. For any finite Z, then, a universal tree T- is to consist of an occurrence A of each Z a A in Z for each sequence a of distinct members of Z-A, these occurrences being partially ordered by the stipulation that A
is to precede A', iff the sequence formed by a followed by
A is an initial segment of a'. predecessors of each A a; thus x
It is easy to see that the
form a sequence, in fact a replica of
is a finite tree of formulae.
Moreover the various
files of !„ are replicas of the various sequences a of distinct formulae in Z, the rank following such a file consisting of an occurrence A
of each formula A in Z-a. a rank p() is Z-, and
In other words each
Section 3.3
Lemma 3.8
ADEQUACY
55
The set of pairs (<|>,p(<|>)) of files and ranks of a
universal tree i- is the set of all partitions of Z. Lt
A universal proof from X to Y by R is a universal tree which is an extended proof from X to Y by R.
The result about de-
ducibility using only members of Z is best derived from one couched in terms of consequence.
Let R' comprise just those
instances of R whose premisses and conclusions are all in Z, let 1/ be the calculus with universe Z and characterised by R' and let X h| Y iff there exist subsets X' and Y' of X and Y such that X' h' Y'.
Then for any adequate concept of proof
h R coincides with deducibility by R using only members of Z. Note that it is closed under dilution but not overlap (and is thus not a consequence relation): Y may be deducible from X using only members of Z even if X or Y contains a formula A not in Z, provided A does not figure in the proof; but it is not in general possible to deduce A from A without invoking A.
Theorem 3.9
T« is a universal proof from X to Y by R iff
Theorem 3.10 Universal proofs are adequate. 7
Proofs
For 3.9, suppose that X h_ Y and let R' and 1/ be Z as described in the definition of h , whence X' h' Y' for some subsets X' and Y' of X and Y.
For each partition
(Z-,Z2) of Z either (a) X' overlaps Z^ or Y' overlaps Zor (b) X' c z
and Y' c Z^
In the latter case Z^ h' Z 2
by dilution, and applying 2.17 to 1/ it follows that Z~ is an immediate consequence of Z, by R'.
Hence by 3.8
T z is an extended proof from X' to Y' by R' and so from X to Y by R.
Conversely, if T_ is an extended proof from Lt
X to Y by R it is one from X' to Y' by R', where X' = XnZ and Y' - YnZ.
By 3.7 X' I-' Y 7 and hence X h^ Y.
56
TREE PROOFS
For 3.10, the adequacy of universal proofs follows from that of extended proofs in general (3.7), since by 3.7 and 3.9 there is a universal proof from X to Y by R iff there is an extended proof from X to Y by R.
4 • Axiomatisability
4.1
Multiple-conclusion calculi
The informal axiomatic method tries to relegate everything controversial in a theory to its axioms, and so requires that deduction from them shall be uncontroversial: given a putative proof of something from the axioms it must be an effective matter to decide whether it really is one or not.
The ana-
logous condition for a calculus governed by rules of inference is that there should be an effective procedure for deciding, for any X and Y, whether a putative proof from X to Y by the rules really is one or not.
Naturally this decision procedure
presupposes that information about X and Y is forthcoming. Thus we envisage a set of instructions which, when presented with a finite tree of formulae, determines a computation that proceeds algorithmically except that from time to time questions of the form cis A in X? 5 or cis A in Y? J may be asked, whereupon the correct answer is assumed to be supplied by some external agency or coracle5 (cf. Rogers, 1967, Sections 9.2 and 15.1).
The computation is to end with a verdict as to
whether or not the given tree is a proof from X to Y.
To make this condition precise in terms of the classical theory of recursiveness we need to assume a countable (i.e. finite or countably infinite) universe of formulae, and an effective numbering - a G6*del numbering - of them. formula with Godel number n.
We write A
for the
Godel numbers can then be assigned
to finite sets of formulae in the standard way, and we write
58
AXIOMATISABILITY
X or Y for the finite set with Go'del number n. n n
Finite trees
and sequences can similarly be numbered so that two arrays have the same number iff they are replicas, and we write T and a
for a finite tree and finite sequence with Go'del number n.
A condition on formulae is then said to be recursive if the corresponding numerical condition is recursive.
A condition on
sets of formulae may similarly be called recursive if the corresponding condition on sets of numbers is recursive.
Where,
however, a condition P applies exclusively to finite sets, there is a weaker sense in which it may plausibly be called recursive, namely as meaning that {n: P(X )} is recursive.
We
shall distinguish these two senses notationally by speaking of P(X) being recursive in the one case and P(X ) being recursive in the other.
Thus where the recursiveness of P(X) implies
the existence of a procedure for deciding whether an arbitrary set satisfies P, the recursiveness of P(X ) only implies a procedure for deciding whether an arbitrary finite set satisfies P.
Moreover where the first procedure necessarily re-
lies on an oracle for information about the set being tested, the second takes for granted a complete enumeration of its members (its Go'del number merely being a cipher for this) . It could happen that in the course of applying a decision procedure of the first kind to a particular finite set we might unwittingly enumerate all its members but, assuming an infinite universe of formulae, no finite number of questions of the form ( is A in X?' could ever assure us that we had done so.
As a result P(X) is never recursive (except in the trivial
cases of a finite universe or an unsatisfiable P) when P is true of finite sets only.
For suppose that P(X) is recursive,
where P is a satisfiable condition true of finite sets only. Then P(Y) for some Y, and we let Z consist of all formulae save those for which the question *is A in Y?* is put to the oracle and answered negatively in the process of deciding that
Section 4.1
P(Y).
MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
59
Then exactly the same process of questioning and com-
putation decides that P(Z), so that Z is finite and hence the universe too must be finite.
Since by definition rules of inference have finite sets of premisses and conclusions, it follows that there are no nontrivial rules which are recursive in the stronger sense, and only the weaker sense is appropriate.
We therefore say that
a rule R is recursive if X R Y is recursive. m n
Similar con-
siderations apply to tree proofs, which are by definition finite, though not to their sets of premisses and conclusions, which need not be finite.
We therefore say that tree proof
by R is recursive if the relation
C
T . is a tree proof from X
to Y by R», holding between j, X and Y, is recursive; and we say that tree proof is recursive if the relation *T. is a tree proof from X to Y by R } , holding between j, X, Y and R, is recursive. To say generally that there is a recursive notion of proof for a calculus L is to say that there is a notion of proof such that (i) the relation c j is the Go'del number of a proof from X to Y* is recursive, and (ii) X h Y iff there exists a proof from X to Y.
More particularly, therefore, we say that
there is a recursive notion of tree proof for a calculus if it is characterised by rules R such that tree proof by R is recursive.
We shall see that this condition is equivalent to
its being characterised by recursive rules, but it should be observed that there is no direct equivalence between the recursiveness of any given rules R and the recursiveness of tree proof by the same R.
For example, the rule cfrom X
infer Y
if P(X )* is not recursive unless P(X ) is, but tree n m m proof by this rule is recursive provided P(A), since every tree is then a proof from every X to every Y.
On the other
60
AXIOMATISABILITY
Theorems 4.1-4
hand tree proof by recursive rules is recursive, since
Theorem 4.1
Proof
Tree proof is recursive.
The description of an appropriate Turing oracle
machine is left to the reader, since it is sufficiently obvious from the definition that the concept of tree proof is an effective one.
A calculus is axiomatisable if it admits a recursive notion of proof, i.e. if there is a recursive relation P such that X h Y iff (aj)P(j,X,Y), i.e. if h is recursively enumerable.
Since
there are indenumerably many sets Recursively enumerable* is strictly a misnomer in connection with conditions on sets in general (cf. Rogers, 1967, Section 15.1), but it is defensible in the present case in view of
Theorem 4.2
A consequence relation h is recursively enumerable
iff it is compact and X H Y is recursively enumerable. m n Proof
Suppose that h is recursively enumerable, so that
there is a recursive P such that X h Y iff (aj)P(j,X,Y). Then P(j,Xm,Y ) is recursive too, so that X m h Y cursively enumerable.
is re-
To see that h is compact, suppose
that X h Y, i.e. that P(j,X,Y) for some j.
Let X' be the
set of formulae A about which the question c is A in X? 9 is asked and answered affirmatively in the course of the computation to decide P(j,X,Y), and let Y' be similarly defined.
Then X' and Y' are finite, and the computation
that establishes P(j,X,Y) also establishes P(j,X',Y'), so that X 7 h Y' as required.
For the converse, if h is com-
pact then, since any consequence relation is closed under dilution, we have X h Y iff (3m,n)(X c x and Y c Y and m n X h Y ) . Hence if X h Y is recursively enumerable we m n m n
Section 4,1
MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
have for some recursive P that X h Y iff (aj,m,n)(X and Y
c Y and P(j,m,n)).
61
c X
Since the condition within the
quantifiers is recursive, h is recursively enumerable.
By definition a calculus is axiomatisable iff h can be equated with deducibility based on some recursive proof relation P or other; but there are equivalent conditions which mention proofs of a particular kind, or which do not mention proof at all:
Theorem 4.3
A calculus is axiomatisable iff it is charac-
terised by recursive rules of inference.
Theorem 4.4
A calculus is axiomatisable iff there exists a
recursive notion of tree proof for it.
Proofs
If L is characterised by recursive rules R then
tree proof by R is recursive by 4.1 and so there exists a recursive notion of tree proof for L; and if there is a recursive notion of tree proof for L then for some rules R that characterise L the relation * T . is a tree proof from X to Y by R5 is recursive, so that h_ is reK cursively enumerable and L is axiomatisable.
To complete
the cycle of implications, and so prove both theorems, it remains to show that any axiomatisable calculus L is characterised by recursive rules.
By 4,2 there exists a recur-
sive relation P such that X
h Y
iff (3j)P(j,m,n).
Let
R be the rules Rl and m j n R2 'from X
if P(j,m,n) J .
infer A.,Y
Evidently R is re-
cursive, and to show that R characterises L it is sufficient to show that R c h c h . .K
IfXRY
then for some j, m and n,
X c X and Y c Y and P(j,m,n), so that X h Y , and by dim n m n lution X H Y; thus R c h. If on the other hand X h Y then by 4.2 there exist finite subsets X and Y of X and Y such m n that X h Y . So for some j, P(j,m,n) and consequently
62
AXIOMATISABILITY
X ,A. h_ Y
and X
Theorems 4.5-8
K, A.,Y .
By cut for A. it follows that
X h_ Y , and hence X h_ Y by dilution; thus h c h_ as rein K n R K quired.
Although Theorem 4.4 refers specifically to tree proofs, it ultimately depends only on the fact that they are adequate and recursive.
Similar definitions of recursiveness may be
formulated for other notions of proof, and a similar result will therefore hold for any that can be shown to be both adequate and recursive, e.g. the universal proofs of Section 3.3 or the varieties of graph proof introduced in Chapters 9 and 10.
4.2
Single-conclusion calculi
The definitions of Section 4.1 are readily adapted to the single-conclusion case.
For example we say that a single-
conclusion rule of inference R is recursive if X R B is m recursive; that sequence proof is recursive if the relation , holding between j, X, B and R, is recursive; and that a single-conclusion calculus is axiomatisable if its consequence relation is recursively enumerable, i.e. if there is a recursive relation P such that X h B iff (3j)P(j,X,B).
The first two results
carry over straightforwardly to the single-conclusion case, giving Theorem 4.5
Theorem 4.6
Sequence proof is recursive.
A single-conclusion consequence relation h is
recursively enumerable enumerable iff it is compact and X cursively enumerable.
h B is re-
Section 4.2
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
63
The two conditions given as equivalent to axiomatisability in Theorems 4.3 and 4.4, and hence equivalent to one another, are likewise equivalent to one another in the single-conclusion case:
Theorem 4.7
There exists a recursive notion of sequence proof
for a single-conclusion calculus iff it is characterised by recursive rules of inference.
Proof
If L is characterised by recursive rules R then
sequence proof by R is recursive by 4.5.
Conversely,
suppose that sequence proof by R is recursive for some rules R characterising L.
It does not necessarily follow
that R is recursive, but let R' be the rule cfrom X
infer m
B if B is an immediate consequence of X
by R>, where by
immediate consequence by R we mean, as in the multipleconclusion case, the closure of R under overlap and dilution.
A sequence obtained by arranging the members of X
in arbitrary order, followed by B, is a proof of B from X by R iff X
R' B.
Since sequence proof by R is recursive
it follows that R' is recursive, and since R c R' c h_ it K follows too that R' characterises L. A calculus satisfying either of these conditions will be axiomatisable, just as in the multiple-conclusion case, but at this point the parallels cease, for the converse proposition does not carry over from the multiple-conclusion case:
Theorem 4.8
There exists an axiomatisable single-conclusion
calculus which cannot be characterised by recursive rules of inference and for which there exists no recursive notion of sequence proof.
Proof
Let L have the same formulae as the classical pre-
64
AXIOMATISABILITY
Lemma 4.9
dicate calculus but let it be characterised by the rule 'from A&A infer AvA if A is a theorem of the predicate calculus'.
This rule is non-iterable in the sense that no
conclusion of any instance of the rule can ever be a premiss of that or any other instance of it.
For such rules
we have Lemma 4.9
Consequence and immediate consequence by a non-
iterable (multiple- or single-conclusion) rule coincide. To prove the lemma, suppose that Y is not an immediate consequence of X by a non-iterable rule R.
There is a
partition (Z.,Z2) of V-(XuY) such that no formula in Zever figures as a premiss to R, and none in Z» as a conclusion.
So Z~,Y is not an immediate consequence of X,Z~,
and by 2.17 X,Zn KD Z0,Y and hence X J* Y.
The result for
a single-conclusion rule R is a corollary, since the corresponding singleton-conclusion rule R- is also non-iterable and it is immediate from the definitions of \-n and K. K
that
Ri
X h_ {B} iff X h_ B. Ri
R
Applying the lemma to the rule given for L we have (1) X h B iff either B e X or, for some theorem A of the prem m dicate calculus, B • AvA and A&A e X . It follows that ' m X
h B is recursively enumerable and so by 1.12 and 4.6 L
is axiomatisable. L.
Now let R be any rules that characterise
Obviously if A&A R AvA then A&A h AvA.
Conversely, let
A&A H AvA and so let C-,...,C, be a proof of AvA from A&A by R. Not every C. is A&A, for C, is AvA, and so let C. be x k j the first of the C. that is not A&A.
Then C. must be the
conclusion of an instance of R whose premisses all precede it in the proof: hence either A R C . or A&A R C .
But
A R C . is excluded by (1), so A&A R C ; and so by (1) C. is AvA, i.e. A&A R AvA.
We have thus shown that A&A R AvA iff
A&A h AvA, i.e. by (1) that A&A R AvA iff A is a theorem of predicate calculus.
Since this latter is not a recursive
property it follows that R is not a recursive rule.
So L
Section 4.2
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
65
is not characterised by recursive rules, and by 4.7 there is no recursive notion of sequence proof for it. The situation exposed here is concealed if one thinks of calculi merely as sets of theorems, since every recursively enumerable set can be generated by recursive axioms and rules.
For if it is finite one can take all its members as
axioms; if infinite and enumerated by the recursive function f one can take rules of the form cfrom {f(k): k
See also Hermes, 1951.
A natural reaction would be to take this result as showing that our definition of axiomatisability simply fails to capture the informal idea: that we ought to have defined axiomatisability in terms of the existence of a recursive notion of sequence proof.
Theorem 4.8 would then merely state that not every cal-
culus with a recursively enumerable consequence relation is axiomatisable.
But to react in this way is to give unwarranted
pride of place to sequence proofs in preference to other eligible methods of proof, such as natural deduction, truth-table evaluation, or some suitably programmed Turing machine.
There
is no a priori reason for thinking that just because proof for a calculus can be effectively realised by one method it can be effectively realised by another. is a case in point.
The calculus of Theorem 4.8
For when Kneale introduced proofs using
multiple-conclusion rules he saw them primarily as providing a new method of single-conclusion proof, namely by treating a multiple-conclusion proof from X to {B} as constituting a proof of B from X, and his rules were chosen to suit a particular single-conclusion calculus (the classical predicate calculus) rather than any particular multiple-conclusion counterpart of it.
In this spirit it is easy to devise mul-
tiple-conclusion rules which provide a recursive notion of proof for the single-conclusion calculus of Theorem 4.8 (e.g. by applying the argument of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 to its axio-
66
AXIOMATISABILITY
Theorem 4.10
matisable multiple-conclusion counterpart described in Theorem 5.18), and we are thus justified in calling it axiomatisable after all.
Theorem 4.4 showed that if there is an effective notion of proof of any sort for a multiple-conclusion calculus, there is an effective notion of tree proof for it.
Theorem 4.8 shows
that sequence proofs do not have the same privileged position vis a vis single-conclusion calculi.
One remedy is to adapt
the definition of a sequence proof to suit rules of inference in which the multiplicity of occurrence of premisses is taken into account, i.e. in which the premisses of each instance of the rule are treated as forming an array rather than a set of formulae.
A rule of this kind is essentially a binary rela-
tion R between finite arrays and individual formulae; if X R B we say as in Section 1.2 that (x>B> is an instance of R, with B as its conclusion and the formulae occurring in x as its premisses.
To adapt the definition of sequence proof
we only need to tack a proviso about multiplicity onto the end of the definition of proof given in Section 1.3: A finite sequence of formulae C-,...,C X by R if C
is a proof of B from
is B and each C. is either a member of X or the
conclusion of an instance of R each of whose premisses occurs iin n CC-,...,C. C , at least as often as it occurs in the relevant
i
H
instance of R*
This treatment of rules is not without support from actual practice.
For example, there is at least as much inclination
to say that the rule of adjunction *from A,B infer A&B* always has two premisses as to say that it has sometimes one and sometimes two, depending on whether A = B or not. does this treatment of rules affect their strength.
Nor If we
B
take a partition (T,U> as satisfying an instance (x> ) when B € T or some member of U occurs in x, we can define h R as a
Section 4.2
SINGLE-CONCLUSION CALCULI
67
relation between a set and a formula (rather than between an array and a formula) exactly as in Section 1.2,
It is clear
that satisfaction - and so consequence by R - is unaffected by the multiplicity of occurrence of the premisses in R, and that each rule in which multiplicity is taken into account is equivalent to (characterises the same consequence relation as) the corresponding rule in which multiplicity is not taken into account.
Recursiveness is a different matter.
For ex-
ample, the rule of Theorem 4.8 is not recursive, but is equivalent to a rule in which multiplicity is taken into account and which is recursive, namely *for each n, from n occurrences of A&A infer AvA if A is the nth theorem of the predicate calculus'.
Deducibility, as determined by the revised definition of proof given above, is similarly a relation between a set and a formula (rather than between an array and a formula), and is similarly unaffected by the actual multiplicity of occurrence of the premisses of the rules, for it is easy to adapt the argument of Theorem 1.13 to show that deducibility by R is the same as h , i.e. that K Theorem 4.10
Sequence proofs are adequate for single-conclu-
sion rules in which multiplicity of occurrence of premisses is taken into account.
This result would have been forthcoming even if we had left the definition of proof unaltered; the point of the alteration is solely to ensure that proof by R is recursive whenever R is recursive.
Without the added proviso about multi-
plicity there would be no effective way of deciding, for example, whether or not an arbitrary sequence of the form A&A,AvA was a proof of AvA from A&A by the recursive rule cited in the paragraph above; given the proviso we need only examine the
68
AXIOMATISABILITY
Theorems 4.11-14
instance of the rule for which n = 1.
Theorem 4.11
We thus have
Sequence proof, using rules in which multiplicity
of occurrence of premisses is taken into account, is recursive.
With these modifications to the definitions we are able to show that if there is an effective notion of proof of any sort for a single-conclusion calculus there is an effective notion of sequence proof for it, and hence supply the desired singleconclusion analogues of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4.
Theorem 4.12
A single-conclusion calculus is axiomatisable iff
it is characterised by recursive rules in which the multiplicity of occurrence of premisses is taken into account.
Theorem 4.13
A single-conclusion calculus is axiomatisable iff
there exists a recursive notion of sequence proof for it, using rules in which multiplicity of occurrence of premisses is taken into account.
Proofs
By 4.10 and 4.11, if L is characterised by recursive
rules there exists a recursive notion of sequence proof for it.
If there exists a recursive notion of sequence proof
for L we have X h B iff (3j,m)(X
c X and a. is a sequence
proof of B from X ) , so that L is axiomatisable.
To com-
plete the cycle of implications we need to show that L is characterised by recursive rules on the supposition that it is axiomatisable, i.e. on the supposition that h is compact and there exists a recursive relation P such that X h B iff m (aj)P(j ,xn,B) .
If L has no theorems we posit the rule 'from
j+1 occurrences of each member of X
infer B if P(j,m,B) 5 .
This rule evidently characterises L, and is recursive since in the case of any given nonempty array of putative premisses there is an upper bound to the range of j and m that
Section 4.3
DECIDABILITY
69
need to be tested, while an empty array can be rejected out of hand since P(j,m,B) is never true for empty X , there being no theorems.
If on the other hand L has some theorems
we posit any one of them, A, as an axiom and posit the rule *from j occurrences of A and one occurrence of each member of X
infer B if P(j,m,B) 5 .
By cut for A these evidently
characterise L, and the rule is recursive since there is a bound to the range of i and m that need to be tested when assessing any given array of putative premisses, empty or not.
4.3
Decidability
We model our definition of decidability on the necessary and sufficient conditions for axiomatisability established in Theorems 4.2 and 4.6, and say that a calculus of either kind is decidable if (i) it is compact and (ii) X h Y (or X h B) r m n m is recursive.
The connection between decidability and axiom-
atisability is then immediate: Theorem 4.14
A decidable (multiple- or single-conclusion)
calculus is axiomatisable.
The use of (ii) on its own (as in Shoesmith and Smiley, 1971) would produce a weaker notion of decidability, for which Theorem 4.14 would only hold for compact calculi.
Alternatively
a definition of decidability might have been modelled directly on that of axiomatisability, i.e. we might have said that a calculus was decidable iff its consequence relation was recursive.
This would produce a stronger notion, for if X h Y or
X h B is recursive then (arguing as in Theorem 4.2 or 4.6) h must be compact and X
h Y or X h B recursive, but the conm n m verse implications do not hold, as can be seen from Theorems v
70
AXIOMATISABILITY
4.15 and 4.16 below.
Theorems 4.15-17
The first of these results shows that
decidability in this strong sense is not a serious possibility for multiple-conclusion calculi, and is a reason for proposing the intermediate definition.
Theorem 4.15
A consequence relation h is recursive iff V is
finite or X h Y for every X and Y.
Proof
Every relation defined over subsets of a finite V is
recursive, while there is a trivially affirmative decision procedure for h if X h Y for every X and Y. verse suppose that X ^ Y for some X and Y.
For the conIf there is a
decision procedure for h then for each A either *Is A in X?' or *Is A in Y?' must be asked in the process of deciding that X + Y, since otherwise the same process would decide that X,A K A,Y.
Hence V is finite.
By contrast there are non-trivial single-conclusion calculi with recursive consequence relations, notably those with rules in which every premiss is a subformula of the conclusion, but even these are exceptions.
The most striking example of a single-
conclusion calculus whose consequence relation is not recursive is the classical propositional calculus.
It is obviously decid-
able, for the relation of tautological consequence is compact and the truth-tables provide a decision procedure for X
h B;
but there is no effective method of deciding in general (i.e. given an oracle for X) whether or not X h B.
Theorem 4.16
Consequence in the classical propositional cal-
culus is not recursive.
Proof
Let L be the classical propositional calculus with
propositional variables p-jp^,*-*, and suppose that h is recursive.
If X is empty then X t p., and so let A be a
Section 4.3
DECIDABILITY
71
formula about which the question *Is A&p1 in X ? 5 is not asked in the process of deciding that X }/- p,.
Then the
same process will decide that A&p- ^ p-, which is absurd.
theorem 4.16 may also be proved as a corollary of the stronger result that
Theorem 4.17
There exists a recursive set X such that the set
of tautological consequences of X is not recursive.
Proof
Let L- be the predicate calculus (so that the con-
dition K
A is not recursive), and for any recursive set
of axioms and rules characterising L.. let X consist of (i) p for each axiom A and (ii) Fp. =>. ...=>.p. =>p for each F n n ii * i m *n rule instance *from A. ,... ,A. infer An ». Then any proof H im of A in L- can be matched by a proof of p from X in L using modus ponens; and conversely if ^- A X takes value t and p
takes value f wtjen we assign to
each p. the value t or f according as K Xhp
iff K
each member of
A. or not.
A , whence the result follows.
Thus
This idea
of translating a recursively unsolvable problem into the language of a propositional calculus was used by Linial and Post, 1949, to establish a number of undecidability results concerning sets of tautologies, the one closest in form to 4.17 being equivalent to the existence of an undecidable, finitely axiomatisable subcalculus of the classical one.
5 • Counterparts
5.1
The range of counterparts
We have so far treated multiple- and single-conclusion calculi separately, though on parallel lines.
We now try to establish
some direct connections between them.
For this purpose let L
stand for an arbitrary single-conclusion calculus and 1/ for an arbitrary multiple-conclusion one.
We have seen how a set
of partitions can be used to characterise a calculus of either kind, and when L and L' are characterised by the same set of partitions we shall say that they are counterparts of each other.
Since any partition satisfies (X,B) iff it satisfies
(X,{B}) an alternative criterion for two calculi to be counterparts can be formulated directly in terms of their consequence relations:
Theorem 5.1
A necessary and sufficient condition for a single-
conclusion calculus L and a multiple-conclusion calculus 1/ to be counterparts is that X h B iff X h' {B}.
Theorem 5.1 shows that there is only one counterpart L of each 1/ and that even though h is not literally a subrelation of h' it is the image of one, namely the subrelation comprising just those instances of h' whose conclusions are singletons.
(This subrelation is not itself a consequence relation
at all since it does not permit dilution.) L the single-conclusion part of 1/ .
We therefore call
But although a multiple-
conclusion calculus has a unique single-conclusion counter-
Section 5.1
THE RANGE OF COUNTERPARTS
part the converse is not true.
73
For whereas each multiple-
conclusion calculus is characterised by a unique set of partitions, the presence or absence of each pair (T,U) being dictated by the falsity or truth of T h U, several sets of partitions can characterise the same single-conclusion calculus, since unless U is a unit set there may be no way of ensuring the presence of (T,U) by means of a condition on a single-conclusion consequence relation.
Indeed the single-
conclusion part of a calculus is never sufficient to determine the remainder of it, for it is an immediate corollary of Theorem 5.25 below that
Theorem 5.2
Every single-conclusion calculus has at least
two counterparts.
Our first task is therefore to describe the range of counterparts possessed by any given single-conclusion calculus* h
and h
Let
stand for the intersection and union of the conse-
quence relations of the various counterparts of L.
Then we
have
Theorem 5.3
Proof
L and 1/ are counterparts iff h
Clearly if 1/ is a counterpart of L its consequence
relation lies between h that h c h ' c h . n u
and H .
IfXhB
For the converse, suppose
then by 5,1 X h {B} and so n
X h' {B}; while if X h' {B} then X h X h B.
c
{B}, so that by 5.1
Hence L and 1/ are counterparts by 5.1.
The problem thus reduces to that of describing h
and h .
In
particular we wish to know whether they are consequence relations themselves, for if so they will determine minimum and maximum counterparts of L.
74
COUNTERPARTS
Theorems 5.4-7
Theorem 5.4
X h
Y iff X h B for some B in Y.
Theorem 5.5
X h
Y iff, for all Z and B, if Z,A h B for every
A in Y then Z,X h B.
Proofs
For 5.4, if X h B for some B in Y then for every
counterpart 1/ of L we have X h' {B} by 5.1, and so X h' Y by dilution; and hence X H
Y.
For the converse let
X h' Y iff X h B for some B in Y.
Then h' is closed under
overlap and dilution since h is, while for cut we let (Z ,Z2) be the partition of Z in which Z- * Zn{A: X h A} and use cut for Z^ for h to show that if X,Z then X h' Y.
h' Z2,Y
By 5.1, therefore, h' determines a counter-
part of L, so that I- c (•', as required. For 5.5, suppose that X h
Y, so that X h
set of partitions I which characterises L.
Y for some
If Z,X ^ B
then for some (T,U) in I we have Z c T and X c T and B e U; but since (T,U> satisfies (X,Y) it follows that A e T for some A in Y and so Z,A \f B.
Conversely, suppose that X
and Y are such that Z,X h B whenever Z,A h B for every A in Y.
Let I be the set of partitions that satisfy both h
and (X,Y).
Then if Z h B each partition in I satisfies
(Z,B), so Z h
{B}.
On the other hand if Z ^ B then Z c T
and B € U for some partition (T,U) that satisfies h. (T,U) £ I then Z ^ so Z,X + B.
{B}.
If
If not then X c T and Y c u and
By hypothesis it follows that Z,A + B for
some A in Y, so that some partition (T'jU7) satisfies H but not (Zu{A}, B ) . A fortiori (T',LT/) invalidates (Z,B), and since A e Y and A e T' it follows that (T^U') e I. Thus in either case Z |^ {B}, so I characterises a counterpart of L.
Theorem 5.6 counterpart.
But X h
Y and hence X h
Y, as required.
Every single-conclusion calculus has a minimum
Section 5.2
COMPACTNESS
Theorem 5.7
75
Not every single-conclusion calculus has a maxi-
mum counterpart.
Proofs
For 5.6 we observe that given any family of conse-
quence relations characterised by sets I. of partitions, their intersection is also a consequence relation, namely Oh i
= h. . . . i
as required. that h
In particular h . n
is a consequence relation
Alternatively it is easy to show as in 5.4
is closed under overlap, dilution and cut for sets.
For 5,7, let V be infinite and let X h B iff B e X or X is infinite.
It is easily seen that H is closed under
overlap and dilution.
For cut, if X h A for every A in Z
then either X is infinite or Z c x, and in either case if X,Z H B then X h B. By 5.5 X ^
Hence h is a consequence relation.
Y iff there exist Z and B such that Z,X ^ B
although Z,A h B for every A in Y; i.e. iff there exist Z and B such that Z and X are finite and B t XuZ and B = A for every A in Y; i.e. iff X is finite and Y c {B} for some B not in X.
It follows that A jf-
B; but T h
U,B for
every partition (T,U), since either T or U is infinite. Hence h
is not closed under cut for V and so is not a
consequence relation. It may be noted that for every L, h cut for formulae.
is closed under
For if X,C h Y then whenever Z,A h B 9 u
for every A in Y, we have Z,X,C h B, so that by dilution Z,X,A h B for every A in Yu{C}. Z,X h B; and hence X h 5.2
If also X I- C,Y then
Y as required.
Compactness
The single-conclusion part of a compact calculus is always compact, as we shall see.
Conversely, a compact single-
conclusion calculus always has at least one compact counter-
76
COUNTERPARTS
Theorems 5.8-13
part but in general it will have non-compact ones as well, though some do have compact counterparts exclusively.
Unlike
single-conclusion calculi in general (Theorem 5.7), a compact one always has a maximum counterpart (and hence a maximum compact one, though the proof of Theorem 5.9 shows that the two need not coincide); and although by Theorem 5.2 it never has a unique counterpart it may well have a unique compact one.
The range of compact counterparts is discussed in effect
by Scott (1974a) who, though working a la Gentzen with finite sets of premisses and conclusions, proves results tantamount to Theorems 5.8, 5.10, 5.12 and a ^compact* version of 5.3-5.
Theorem 5.8
The single-conclusion part of a compact calculus
is compact.
Theorem 5.9
There exists a compact single-conclusion calculus
which has a non-compact counterpart.
Theorem 5.10
Every compact single-conclusion calculus has a
minimum compact counterpart, namely its minimum counterpart.
Theorem 5.11
Every compact single-conclusion calculus has a
maximum counterpart.
Theorem 5.12
Every compact single-conclusion calculus has a
maximum compact counterpart.
Theorem 5.13
There exists a compact single-conclusion calculus
which has a unique compact counterpart.
Proofs
5.8 is immediate from 5.1.
For 5.9 let L be the
intuitionist propositional calculus.
It is sufficient by
5.11 to show that h
If Z,A h B for every
is not compact.
A in the set Y of non-theorems of L then if Z includes
Section 5.2
COMPACTNESS
77
a non-theorem we have at once that Z h B; while if Z consists entirely of theorems we have A h B for every A in Y, so that in particular p h B for some variable p not appearing in B, whence by substitution p^p h B and again Z h B. Hence A h
Y by 5.5.
On the other hand when Z is empty
and B is the disjunction of the members of any finite subset Y' of Y we have Z,A h B for each A in Y', but Z #
by the well-known result of G6 del, 1932.
Hence A ^
M Y'
by 5.5. Another example for 5.9 is the implicative fragment of the intuitionist calculus, by 5.2 and 5.13; and so indeed (by 5.11, 5.25 and 5.28) is any compact calculus which, like it, is positive in the sense we define in Section 5.4. In all these cases it is the maximum counterpart that is shown not to be compact, but the classical propositional calculus has non-compact counterparts (Section 18.3) even though its maximum counterpart is compact by 18.4.
An
example of a calculus which has compact counterparts exclusively is one in which X h B for all X and B; this has just two counterparts, both compact (Section 13.2). For 5.10, if L is compact then h
is compact by 5.4,
whence by 5.6 the minimum counterpart of L is compact. For 5.11 we show that when L is compact h under overlap, dilution and cut for sets. ous for overlap and dilution. 5.7 that h
is closed
This is obvi-
We noted in the proof of
is always closed under cut for formulae, but
this is of no help here since h though h is.
need not be compact even
Instead we show that H
for V and use 2.2.
is closed under cut
Suppose then that X +
Y, so that there
exist Z and B such that Z,A h B for each A in Y but Z,X + B. Let S be {W: W,X,Z + B}; then S is nonempty since A i3 in it, and is of finite character since L is compact (cf. 2.9). By Tukey's lemma S therefore has a maximal member T, and evidently X c T and Z c T.
Let U be the complement of T;
78
COUNTERPARTS
Theorems 5.14-16
then T,A h B for each A in U by the maximality of T, and also for each A in Y by dilution. X,T +
But X,T ^ B, so that
U,Y as required.
For 5.12, if L is compact then by 2.11 and 5.11 the maximum counterpart of L has a maximum compact subcalculus I/.
By 5.10 h
determines a compact subcalculus of the
maximum counterpart, so that h
c h' c h .
Hence 1/ is a
counterpart of L by 5.3 and is therefore its maximum compact counterpart. For 5.13 we show that the implicational fragment of the intuitionist propositional calculus - Hilbert's positive implicational calculus - has a unique compact counterpart. Let L be any single-conclusion calculus in which modus ponens is valid, i.e. in which A,A=>B t- B; then the deduction theorem for -=> states that X H A3B if (and hence iff) X,A h B, and we have Lemma 5.14
If the deduction theorem holds for D then X h
Y
iff X , Y D B I- B for every B.
To prove the lemma we note that by modus ponens Y3B,A h B for every A in Y, and so by 5.5 if X ^ Conversely if X +
Y then X , Y D B h B.
Y there exist Z and B such that Z,A h B
for each A in Y but Z,X |f B.
Hence by dilution and the
deduction theorem Z,X h A=>B for each member A^B of Y3B, so that Z,X,YDB + B by cut for Y^B, and hence by dilution X,YDB +
B.
To prove the theorem, let L- be the intuitionist calculus and L its implicational fragment. maximum compact counterpart of L.
Let L 7 be the
We show that L' is al-
so its minimum counterpart, i.e. that if X h' Y then X h
Y.
Suppose then that X h' Y, so that there exist finite subsets X 7 and Y' of X and Y such that X' h" Y' and hence X7 h
Yx.
The deduction theorem holds for => in L, so by
5.14 we have X ' J Y ' D B h B for every B.
Taking B to be any
propositional variable p not appearing in any member of X'
Section 5.2
COMPACTNESS
or Y', we thus have that X',Y'i>p K
p.
79
Now Y' cannot be
empty, since (X',p) can be invalidated in the classical two-valued matrix, and so let Y' «• {B-,,..,B } where n^l. Substituting B-V...VB
for p we have that X 7 , Y'3(B1v...vB )
K B-V...VB and hence X' K B-V...VB . 1 1 n 1 1 n
But since v does
not occur in the formulae of L it follows by a result of Harrop, 1960, that X' K so X H
B. for some i.
Hence X' h B. and
Y as required.
Some results about compact counterparts can usefully be expressed in terms of rules of inference.
We noted earlier
that to every single-conclusion rule R there corresponds a singleton-conclusion rule R- such that X R- {B} iff X R B.
Theorem 5.15
If a single-conclusion calculus is characterised
by rules of inference, its minimum counterpart is characterised by the corresponding singleton-conclusion rules.
Theorem 5.16
Rules R (single-conclusion) and R' characterise
counterpart calculi iff (a) if X R B then X h , {B} and (b) if K. X R ' Y and Z,A h_ B for every A in Y, then Z,X h B. Proofs
5.15 follows at once from 3.1 and 5.4.
For 5,16,
let R characterise L; then by 5.3 R' characterises a counterpart of L iff h
c h n
K
c h . u
By 5.11 h is closed u
under overlap, dilution and cut for sets, and so by 2.14 h R / c h u iff R' c h u ? i.e. by 5.5 iff (b) holds. 5.15 in a similar argument, h
c h n
Using
iff the singleton-conK
elusion rule corresponding to R is contained in h ,, i.e. iff (a) holds. We note that when Y is a unit set (b) takes a simpler form analogous to (a), namely cif X R' {B} then X h_ B», and when Y is empty (b) reduces to cif X R' A then X K, B for every B*.
80
COUNTERPARTS
Theorems 5.17-22
5.3 Axiomatisability
For single-conclusion consequence relations the property of being characterised by recursive rules need not be the same as recursive enumerability (Theorem 4.8). We chose to call the latter caxiomatisability» and the following results about the axiomatisability of counterparts are to be understood accordingly.
If the other choice were made Theorems 5,18
and 5.19 would still hold but Theorem 5.17 would fail, for taken together with Theorem 4.3 and the present version of Theorem 5.18 it would contradict Theorem 4.8.
Theorem 5.17
The singles-conclusion part of an axiomatisable
calculus is axiomatisable.
Theorem 5.18
Every axiomatisable single-conclusion calculus
has a minimum axiomatisable counterpart, namely its minimum counterpart.
Theorem 5.19
Not every axiomatisable single-conclusion cal-
culus has a maximum axiomatisable counterpart.
Proofs
For 5.17, let 1/ be axiomatisable, so that X h' Y
iff (3])P'(j,X,Y) where P' is recursive; and let L be the single-conclusion part of 1/.
Then P too is recursive,
where P(j,X,B) iff P'(j,X,{B}), and so L is axiomatisable by 5.1. For 5.18 we are unable to appeal to 5.15 because of the gap between axiomatisability and recursive rules mentioned above.
Instead let L be an axiomatisable single-conclusion
calculus, so that X h B iff (aj)P(j,X,B), where P is recursive.
Then by 5.4 we have X h
P(j,X,B)), whence h lows.
Y iff (aj,B)(B e Y and
is axiomatisable and the result fol-
Section 5.3
AXIOMATISABILITY
81
For 5.19 we could use the calculus of 4.8, but we prefer an example that will serve whichever way axiomatisability is construed.
Let L, then, be the axiomatisable single-
conclusion calculus characterised by the non-iterable rules R: 'from A&A infer B=>B if P(A,B)» and cfrom AvA infer B^B if P(A,B)*, where P is any recursive relation such that (3B)P(A,B) is not recursive, i.e. such that cnot (3B)P(A,B)' is not recursively enumerable. /
has a maximum axioraatisable counterpart L •
Suppose that L If A h' A&A,AvA
there is no B such that P(A,B), for otherwise by cut for {A&A,AvA} and by 5.1 it would follow that h B^B, contradicting 4.9.
Conversely, if A +' A&A,AvA consider the calculus
L- characterised by the relevant instance of the rule cfrom A infer A&A,AvA* together with the singleton-conclusion rules corresponding to R.
By 4.3 L- is axiomatisable, but by the
maximality of L' it is not an axiomatisable counterpart of L.
Hence it is not a counterpart of L and so by 5.16 there
exist Z and C such that Z,A&A h C and Z,AvA h C but Z ^ C, whence by 4.9 it follows that C is of the form B=B where P(A,B).
Thus A h' A&A,AvA iff not (3B)P(A,B), contradicting
the hypothesis that h' is recursively enumerable.
Theorem 5.20
The single-conclusion part of a decidable
calculus is decidable.
Theorem 5.21
Every decidable single-conclusion calculus has
a minimum decidable counterpart, namely its minimum counterpart .
Theorem 5.22
Not every decidable single-conclusion calculus
has a maximum decidable counterpart.
Proofs
For 5.20, let L be the single-conclusion counter-
part of L'.
If h' is compact and X h' Y is recursive m n
82
COUNTERPARTS
Theorems 5.23-25
it follows by 5.1 that h is compact and X For 5.21, if h is compact and X
h B is recursive.
h B is recursive then
by 5.4 H is compact and X h Y is recursive. n m n n For 5.22 we use the example of 5.19, substituting c
decidable* for caxiomatisable9 throughout.
The only points
at which expansion is needed are the claims that L and Lare decidable.
Consider the relation which holds between
X and Y iff (for the given choice of A) X,A&A h B and X,AvA h C for some B and C in Y.
This relation is obviously
compact and contained in K , and it is easy to show that it contains the rules of L- and is closed under overlap, dilution and cut for formulae.
By 2.16 it coincides with K ,
and the decidability of L- is thus a corollary of the decidability of L, which in turn follows from 4.9.
5.4
Sign
We define the sign of a multiple-conclusion calculus to be negative or positive according as V h A or not, i.e. according as (V,A) is excluded from or included in the characterising set of partitions.
The calculus obtained by deleting
(V,A) from the set of partitions that characterises a positive calculus L, or adding it to the set that characterises a negative L, evidently has the opposite sign to that of L, and we call it the negative or positive variant of L as the case may be.
For an alternative criterion for sign, we recall that a set X of formulae is customarily said to be inconsistent in a single-conclusion calculus if X h B for every B.
Analogously
we say that X is inconsistent in a multiple-conclusion calculus if X H Y for every Y.
By dilution it follows that X
is inconsistent iff X h A, and hence iff X is unsatisfiable
Section 5.4
SIGN
83
in the set of partitions characterising L (where we say that (T,U> satisfies X if X c T and that X is satisfiable in a set I of partitions if it is satisfied by at least one of them; from which it follows that X is satisfiable in I iff X |^_ A) . Since by dilution V h A iff X h A for some X, it follows that a calculus is negative iff it contains inconsistent (or unsatisfiable) sets.
The inconsistent sets, being those X such
that X h A, determine what might be called the zero-conclusion part of a calculus.
Given the sign of a calculus, its zero-
conclusion part is uniquely determined by its single-conclusion part, for we have seen that a positive calculus has no inconsistent sets while our next theorem predicts those of a negative one.
Theorem 5.23
Inconsistency in a negative calculus is equi-
valent to inconsistency in its single-conclusion part.
Theorem 5.24
The (positive or negative) variant of a calcu-
lus L is the only calculus 1/ other than L such that X h' Y iff X h Y for all X and all nonempty Y.
Theorem 5.25
Every single-conclusion calculus has both posi-
tive and negative counterparts; in particular the minimum counterpart is positive and the maximum counterpart (where one exists) negative.
Proofs
For 5.23, let L be the single-conclusion part of
a negative calculus I/.
If X h' A then by dilution
X h' {B} for every B and so by 5.1 X h B for every B. Conversely if X ^
A then by cut X,T +' U for some parti-
tion (T,U), and U must be nonempty since by hypothesis V h' A.
Hence by dilution X +' {B} for some B and so by
5.1 X K B for some B. For 5.24, the variant of L has the property mentioned
84
COUNTERPARTS
Theorems 5.26-27
in the theorem since (V,A) invalidates (X,Y) only if Y is empty; and L and its variant are the only calculi with their respective signs to have the property since, as we have seen, the zero-conclusion part of a calculus is uniquely determined by its sign and its single-conclusion part. For 5.25, the minimum counterpart of any single-conclusion calculus is positive by 5.4, and its negative variant is also a counterpart by 5.24 and 5.1.
Since this is a
subcalculus of the maximum counterpart (if one exists), the latter is negative too.
Although it is easy to verify that the positive variant of a compact negative calculus must also be compact, the negative variant of a compact positive one need not be compact: for example, consider a positive calculus in which V is infinite and X H Y iff X and Y overlap.
Subject to this caveat,
Theorem 5.27 shows how rules for a calculus can be obtained from rules for its variant.
Theorem 5.26
A calculus characterised by rules of inference
is positive iff no instance of the rules has zero conclusions.
Theorem 5.27
If a negative calculus L and a positive calculus
1/ are variants of one another, rules R' for 1/ may be obtained from rules R for L by replacing every instance (X,A) by instances (X,{B}) for all B; and if L is compact (and so has a finite inconsistent set X ) rules R for L may be obtained from rules R' for 1/ by adding the single instance (X ,A).
Proofs
For 5.26, the calculus characterised by rules R is
positive iff V |^n A, i.e. iff some partition satisfies R but invalidates (V,A), i.e. iff (V,A) satisfies R, i.e. iff no instance of R has zero conclusions.
Section 5.4
SIGN
85
For 5.27, since L is negative V h A, and so if it is compact X
h A for some finite set X .
In both cases
covered by the theorem (V,A) satisfies R/ but not R, and every other partition satisfies R' iff it satisfies R, whence the result.
(In the second case, since by 5.24
X Q h' B, if (T,U) satisfies R' it satisfies ( X Q , B ) for all B and so either satisfies ( X Q , A ) or is (V,A).)
The term 'positive' first entered the literature as a way of describing single-conclusion calculi that lacked a negation: thus Hilbert's 'positive logic' is the negationless fragment of the intuitionist propositional calculus.
Our own defini-
tion of sign for multiple-conclusion calculi seems to fit nicely with this.
For instance by applying Theorem 5.26 to
the rules for PC listed in Section 2.3 we see that any selection containing the rules for negation characterises a negative calculus while any selection excluding them characterises a positive one.
And generally, since a positive calculus
admits an interpretation in which every formula is true it cannot contain a connective whose invariable effect is to convert truths into untruths.
By this criterion, however, all
single-conclusion calculi are positive, even if they contain what is supposed to be a negation; for every such calculus is satisfied by the partition (V,A) representing an interpretation on which any formula and its supposed negation are alike true.
This is one of the 'non-normal' interpretations which
led Carnap (1943) to reject the classical calculus as an inadequate formalisation of truth-functional logic.
To test for
the presence of inconsistent sets is no better than to appeal to negation: it makes every single-conclusion calculus negative since V is inconsistent in them all.
And the presence of un-
satisfiable sets is no test at all, since by Theorem 5.25 every single-conclusion calculus is characterised both by a set of partitions including (V,A), in which every set of formulae is
86
COUNTERPARTS
Theorems 5.28-30
satisfiable, and by one excluding (V,A), in which V is unsatisfiable.
It thus seems that there is no coherent way of drawing the desired distinction for single-conclusion calculi in general. There are however two significant classes of calculi for which a definition of sign can be formulated and defended. First there are the compact calculi.
Let a set of formulae
be said to be finitely inconsistent if it contains an inconsistent finite subset.
In a compact multiple-conclusion cal-
culus inconsistency and finite inconsistency are equivalent, since X h A iff X' h A for some finite subset X' of X.
The
equivalence fails in single-conclusion logic (e.g. V is not finitely inconsistent in Hilbert's positive logic), though if any inconsistent set is finitely inconsistent then all are (Theorem 5.29).
We therefore circumvent the difficulty about
the inevitable inconsistency of V by using finite inconsistency instead of inconsistency as a test for sign, saying that a compact single-conclusion calculus is negative or positive according as it does or does not contain any finitely inconsistent sets.
An equivalent criterion is the finite in-
consistency of V, or alternatively the presence or absence of finite inconsistent sets.
Theorem 5.28
A compact single-conclusion calculus is positive
iff every compact counterpart is positive.
Theorem 5.29
In a negative compact single-conclusion calcu-
lus, finite inconsistency is equivalent to inconsistency.
Theorem 5.30
Finite inconsistency in a compact single-con-
clusion calculus is equivalent to inconsistency in its maximum compact counterpart.
Section 5.4
Proofs
SIGN
For 5.28, let L be a compact single-conclusion
calculus. V K
87
If L has a negative compact counterpart L. then
A, so that there exists a finite set V
V' h 1 A.
By dilution V
h
such that
{B} for every B, so by 5.1
is inconsistent in L, whence L is negative.
V
For the con-
verse we define h' so that X h' Y iff X h B for some B in Y or X is finitely inconsistent in L.
Then h' is evidently
compact and closed under overlap and dilution.
For cut,
either X h A so that if X,A h' Y then X h' Y, or X ^ A so that if X h' A,Y then X h' Y.
By 2.10 h' determines a
calculus L' which by 5.1 is a compact counterpart of L. If L is negative it has a finitely inconsistent set, which is also inconsistent in 1/ by construction, so that 1/ is negative as required. For 5.29, any negative compact single-conclusion calculus L must contain a finite inconsistent set Y.
If X
is inconsistent in L then for each A. in Y we have X h A. l
l
and by compactness there is a finite subset X. of X such that X. H A . . By cut, UX. is a finite inconsistent subJ l
l
'
l
set of X, which is therefore finitely inconsistent, as required. For 5.30 every finitely inconsistent set in a compact single-conclusion calculus L, being inconsistent in the compact counterpart 1/ defined in 5.28, is therefore inconsistent in the maximum compact counterpart.
Conversely,
if a set is inconsistent in the maximum compact counterpart then that counterpart is negative and so the set is finitely inconsistent in L by 5.23, 5.28 and 5.29.
The other single-conclusion calculi between which a distinction of sign can be drawn are the propositional calculi (to be defined formally in Section 13.1).
Let a set of formulae of
a propositional calculus be said to be formally inconsistent if every substitution instance of it is inconsistent.
In a
88
COUNTERPARTS
Theorems 5.31-33
multiple-conclusion propositional calculus formal inconsistency is equivalent to inconsistency, for if X h A then s(X) H A for every substitution s.
This equivalence fails
in the single-conclusion case (e.g. V is not formally inconsistent in Hilbert's positive logic), though if any inconsistent set is formally inconsistent then all are (Theorem 5.32).
As before, this suggests the use of formal inconsis-
tency instead of inconsistency as a test for sign, a singleconclusion propositional calculus being negative or positive according as it does or does not contain any formally inconsistent sets.
An equivalent criterion is the formal incon-
sistency of V.
Theorem 5.31
A single-conclusion propositional calculus is
positive iff every propositional counterpart is positive.
Theorem 5.32
In a negative single-conclusion propositional
calculus formal inconsistency is equivalent to inconsistency.
Proofs
For 5.31, let L be a single-conclusion proposi-
tional calculus.
If L has a negative propositional cal-
culus L- as a counterpart then V K tution and dilution s(V) K
A, whence by substi-
{B} for every B and s.
But
by 5.1 s(V) is then inconsistent in L for every s, and so L is negative.
For the converse we define h' so that
X h' Y iff X h B for some B in Y or X is formally inconsistent in L.
Then if L is negative h' determines a nega-
tive counterpart 1/ of L as in 5.28, and 1/ is a propositional calculus since I-' is preserved under substitution. The proof of 5.32 runs parallel to that of 5.29.
The analogue of Theorem 5.30 fails for propositional calculi, since by Theorem 16.8 below and in contrast to Theorem 5.12, not every single-conclusion propositional calculus has a maxi-
Section 5.4
SIGN
mum propositional counterpart.
89
It can however be shown, fol-
lowing the lines of the proof of Theorem 5.30, that formal inconsistency in a single-conclusion propositional calculus is equivalent to inconsistency in its maximum propositional counterpart whenever the latter exists.
These tests succeed in drawing the desired distinction between, for example, the intuitionist propositional calculus, which is negative, and Hilbert's cpositive* fragment of it.
In the
classical case they distinguish nicely between connectives like conjunction and disjunction and material implication, whose truth-tables have value t when all their arguments are t, and connectives like negation whose truth-table has value f for argument t: the former give rise to a positive calculus, the inclusion of the latter to a negative one.
Equally im-
portant is the fact that whenever both tests are applicable they produce the same verdict:
Theorem 5.33
In a compact single-conclusion propositional
calculus, finite inconsistency and formal inconsistency are equivalent.
Proof
By definition, if X is finitely inconsistent it has
an inconsistent finite subset X'.
Let q be a propositional
variable not occurring in any member of X', and for any B and any substitution s, let s' be the substitution such that s'(q) = B and s'(p) = s(p) for all other variables p. Then since X' h q we have by substitution that s'(X') h s'(q), and so by dilution s(X) I- B; i.e. X is formally inconsistent.
Conversely if X is formally inconsistent
let p-,p 2 ,... be any listing of the propositional variables and let s(p.) = P-+i*
Since by hypothesis s(X) is
inconsistent, s(X) h p., whence by the compactness of h there exists a finite subset X' of X such that s(X') h p_.
90
COUNTERPARTS
Theorems 5.34-35
For any B let s'(p,) = B and s / (p. + 1 ) = p.. /
stitution s'(s(X')) h s (p 1 ), i.e. X' h B.
Then by subThus X is
finitely inconsistent.
5.5
Disjunction
We remarked in the introduction that multiple conclusions might be expected to have the same relation to disjunction as multiple premisses do to conjunction, and the remaining results explore this suggestion.
We say first that a single-
conclusion calculus contains a disjunction if for every pair of formulae A and B there exists a formula AvB such that X,AvB h C iff X,A h C and X,B h C. v should be a connective.
It is not required that
For example, in a calculus with
an axiom D but no rules one can take AvB to be D or A according as A and B are distinct or not; while the calculus of material implication contains a disjunction with AvB defined as (A=>B)=>B (though its intuitionist analogue, the positive implicational calculus, cannot contain a disjunction by Theorems 5.13 and 5.36).
We use A-V...VA to stand indifi m ferently for any of the formulae obtained by disjoining
A^...,A l m
, e.g.
for
( ( A - v A o ) v . . , ) v A a s w e l l a s A. v ( A o v ( . . . v A ) ) , l z m l/m
This systematic ambiguity is justified by Lemma 5.34
Proof
If each A. is a B. then A-V...VA h B..V...VB . l j 1 m 1 n
By iterating the defining condition for a disjunc-
tion we have that X,B-V...vB
h C iff X,B. h C for each j,
and that X,A..v...vA l m h C iff X,A.I h C for each i. If each A. is a B. it follows that if X,B.v...vB h C then X,A nv... l j 'In *1 ...vAm h C. The result follows by taking X = A and C B-V...VB . 1 n
Section 5.5
DISJUNCTION
91
The natural multiple-conclusion analogue of the given condition for a single-conclusion calculus to contain a disjunction is that X,AVB h Y iff X,A h Y and X,B h Y.
This is
equivalent to postulating that A h AvB and B h AvB and AvB h A,B, which are of course the duals of the familiar conditions for a single-conclusion calculus to contain a conjunction.
If now L is any single-conclusion calculus containing
a disjunction, it follows from Theorem 5.5 that the above conditions are satisfied by h
and hence by the maximum counter-
part of L whenever it exists.
In the compact case the result
can be carried a stage further, for just as in a compact singleconclusion calculus containing a conjunction we have (for nonempty X) that X h B iff A..&...&A h B for some A. ,... ,A in X, 1 m 1 m so we have (for nonempty Y) that in the maximum compact counterpart of one containing a disjunction X h Y iff X h B-V...VB some B-,...,B Theorem 5.35
for
in Y; or equivalently If 1/ is the maximum positive compact counter-
part of a compact single-conclusion calculus L containing a disjunction, then X h' Y iff X h' B-V...VB in in Y. Proof
for some B-,...,B in
Since 1/ is positive and compact, if X h' Y then
X h' B ,...,B
for some B-,,..,B
in Y; and since by 5.1
and 5.34 B. h' B-V...VB , it follows by cut for {B-,...,B } j 1 n In that X h' B-V...VB . For the converse we have by 5.5 that B ^ . ^ v B h B-,...,B and so, as in 2.12, B-V...VB h' Bn,...,B . So if X h' B-V...VB for some B.,...,B in Y In In 1* ' n it follows that X h' Y. These parallels, however, only hold for maximum counterparts. At the other end of the spectrum there is no special connection at all between disjunction and multiple conclusions in the minimum counterpart of a single-conclusion calculus that
92
COUNTERPARTS
contains a disjunction.
Theorems 5.36-38
And since there is in general a
whole range of intermediate counterparts there is room for a corresponding variety of connections of greater or less intimacy between disjunction and multiple conclusions.
For ex-
ample, does the addition of 'from AvB infer A,B> to the rules for the intuitionist calculus produce a stronger counterpart than the addition of cfrom Av~A infer A,~A5?
We have seen in Theorem 5.15 that there is a simple algorithm for converting rules of inference for a single-conclusion calculus into rules that characterise its minimum counterpart. In general, as Theorem 5.19 shows, there is no corresponding algorithm which produces rules for the maximum compact counterpart, but we can provide one in the case of calculi which contain a disjunction.
We give it in Theorem 5.36 as a method
of generating rules for the maximum positive compact counterpart; this covers the case of a positive calculus, by Theorem 5.28, and Theorem 5.27 shows how it can be adapted to the negative case by adding the rule 'from X
infer A' for an arbitrary
finite inconsistent set X . o Theorem 5.36
If the single-conclusion rules R characterise a
calculus L containing a disjunction, its maximum positive compact counterpart 1/ is characterised by the corresponding singleton-conclusion rules together with 'from AvB infer A,B*.
Theorem 5.37
If the multiple-conclusion rules R' characterise
a calculus L' whose single-conclusion counterpart L contains a disjunction, L is characterised by the rules Rl 'from XvC infer C if X R ' A J , R2 'from XvC infer B-V...VB vC if X R' {B-,...,B } and n>l>, and R3 'from A.v...vA infer B V...VB if each A. is 1 m 1 n I
Proofs
For 5.36, let R' be the multiple-conclusion rules
Section 5.5
DISJUNCTION
mentioned in the theorem.
93
Then R' c h' by 5.35, and hence
h_, c h'. Conversely if X h' Y we have by 5.35 that X h' K B-V...VB for some B-,...,B in Y, so that since L and 1/
in
in
are counterparts X h B v,,,vB . Since every partition K l n that satisfies R' satisfies R, it follows that X K,, K {B-V...VB }, and by repeated applications of the rule *from AvB infer A,B> we have X h_, Bn,...,B and hence X h o / Y, K i n K For 5.37 it is sufficient by 5.16 to show that (a) if X R B then X h_, {B} and (b) if X R' Y and Z,A h_ B for K K every A in Y, then Z,X h
B.
We use 5.1 throughout and
observe first that by 5.34 and the definition of disjunction, Z,AvC h_, BvC whenever Z,A K,, B. If (XvC,C> is an K . K instance of Rl then X H-, C, and applying our observation K to each member of X in turn, XvC h , CvCv...vC, whence by 5.34 XVC h o , C. If (XvC, B-V...VB vC) is an instance of K l n R2 then X ho/. B..,...,B ; and by 5.34 and cut for {Bn,...,B } K i n in we have X h o / B-V...VB ; and arguing as before, XvC h_, K i n K B-V...VB vC.
Finally if (X,B> is an instance of R3 then
X H R / B by 5.34. Lemma 5.38
This establishes (a). For (b) we need
If X h o B then XvC h_ BvC. K K
To prove the lemma we use induction on the length of a sequence proof of B from X, and for this it is sufficient to show that XvC h
BvC whenever X R B.
If (X,B) is an
instance of Rl then X - X'vB, say, and as (X'v(BvC), BvC) is also an instance of Rl it follows by R3 that XvC K. BvC. If K (X,B) is an instance / of
BvC by R3.
Finally if
(X,B) is an instance of R3 so too is (XvC,BvC). For the proof of (b) we note that R characterises a calculus containing a disjunction, for if X,AvB h
C then,
since A h_ AvB and B h_ AvB by R3, we have X,A h_ C and K K K X,B h_ C; and conversely if X,A h_ C and X,B h_ C then XvB, K K K AVB h R CvB and XvC,BvC h R CvC by 5.38, so that by R3 X,AvB
94
COUNTERPARTS
h_ BvC and X,BvC h_ C, whence by cut we have X,AvB h_ C. K K K Now if X R' A then XvB h- B by Rl and so Z,X h- B by R3. K K Moreover if X R' {A-,...,A } and n>l then XvA- h^ in IK
A . V . . . V A vA- b y R2 a n d s o X h_ A - V . . . V A by R3. l n JL K i n
If
also
Z,A. h B for each i, then Z,A-V...vA H B by the defini1 K l n K tion of disjunction.
Hence by cut for A-V...VA
we again
have Z,X H B, establishing (b) and hence the theorem. K Note that the dummy formula C in Rl and R2 cannot in general be suppressed without weakening the rules: we show in Section 19.7 that even Rl cannot be replaced by
When R2 contains axioms, however, (i.e. if X is ever
empty), the dummy formula can be suppressed in them without loss of strength.
For each axiom is of the form B-V...VB vC,
where A R' {B-,...,B }; and every instance of this form follows from B-V...VB
by R3, and conversely B-V...VB
from the instance in which C
=
B-.
follows by R3
6 • Infinite rules
6.1
Infinite rules and proofs
To develop a multiple-conclusion predicate calculus, Carnap and Kneale introduce the rule cfrom (3x)Fx infer Fx-,Fx2,Fx^,..•*, whose conclusions are meant to represent all values of the propositional function expressed by Fx (cf. Section 20.2).
Instances
of this rule may obviously have infinitely many conclusions, and the converse rule for the universal quantifier, *from Fx-,Fx«,... infer (x)Fx», raises a similar point for single- as well as multiple-conclusion calculi.
We shall briefly consider how the ad-
mission of such rules affects what we have said so far.
We there-
fore relax our previous requirement that a rule of inference must be finite in the sense that X R Y only if X and Y are finite, and allow rules of the form
An immediate effect of the change is that in general h longer compact.
is no
Hence every calculus, whether compact or not,
can be characterised by rules of inference, if necessary by taking the consequence relation of the calculus to be the rule.
Calling
a calculus conclusion-compact if whenever X h Y there is a finite subset Y' of Y such that X l - Y 7 , one might well suppose that when every instance of a set of rules has a finite set of conclusions the resulting calculus will at least be conclusion-compact. Curiously enough, this is not so.
Consider, for example, the
rules Rl *from A infer A,~A» and R2 «from ~ 0 v infer A*, where
96
INFINITE RULES
Theorem 6.1
V is infinite and ~ and 0 are any singulary connectives.
For
every partition (T,U> we have T h U, <>V, by Rl if ~ 0
v
U and by R2 otherwise.
On the other
Hence A h <0>V by cut for V.
overlaps
hand whenever U is finite (and so T nonempty) we have V - ( ~ O T u ^ U ) ^ ~ O T > O U by Lemma 2.17, and so by dilution A ^ <>U.
Finite proofs are obviously inadequate to deal with rules with infinitely many premisses or conclusions.
We therefore need to
make a similar relaxation in the various definitions of proof, by dropping the requirement that proofs must be finite and making transfinite sequences eligible either as single-conclusion proofs or as branches of multiple-conclusion ones.
This is sufficient
to ensure the continued adequacy of sequence proofs and the various kinds of tree proof.
In the case of sequence proofs this
can be shown by a straightforward generalisation of the method of Theorem 1.13.
In particular, to show that deducibility is closed
under cut for sets we suppose that there exist proofs a of B from X,Z and a. of A. from X for each A. in Z, and concatenate them to I l I * form the required sequence proof a-,0*2*... ,0* of B from X.
It is
possible similarly to generalise the method of Theorem 3.5 and demonstrate closure under cut in the multiple-conclusion case by grafting tree proofs onto one another to form a proof of the required kind, but it is a surprisingly intricate business and we can avoid it by tackling the results of Section 3.3 in a different order. We note first that a universal tree T_ may be defined for any Z exactly as in the finite case, and that it has the same properties as expressed by Lemma 3.8 and Theorem 3.9.
The definition of
universal proof carries over, and we show that each single tree T V is a universal proof from any X to any Y by any R, provided only that X K, Y:
Theorem 6.1
Any universal proof T V is adequate.
Section 6.1
Proof
INFINITE RULES AND PROOFS
97
We prove a cycle of implications which establishes not
only the adequacy of T V but the adequacy of tree proofs, extended proofs and universal proofs in general, i.e. the analogues of 3.5-7 and 3.10.
If X h_ Y then, arguing as in 3.9,
T V is a universal proof from X to Y by R.
If T
is a uni-
versal proof from X to Y by R then obviously a universal proof from X to Y by R exists; and by definition if there is a universal proof there is an extended proof.
If there is
an extended proof from X to Y by R then, arguing as for 3.3, it contains a tree proof from X to Y by R.
Finally, if there
is a tree proof from X to Y by R then by the argument of 3.5 it follows that X h_ Y. K This last step requires the existence of a maximal file of formulae in T, i.e. a branch of the subtree {A: A £ T and A c T}. The proposition that every tree has a branch is equivalent to the axiom of choice, without which the argument therefore fails and indeed the equation between h_ and deducibility by R no longer holds.
For if a tree without
branches were possible the corresponding tree consisting entirely of occurrences of A would constitute a proof from A to A by arbitrary rules R; but we do not have A h R A in general. The removal of the finiteness restriction on rules means a change in the sense in which it is appropriate to predicate recursiveness of them.
We shall now have to say that a rule R is
recursive if X R Y (rather than X R Y ) is recursive, and we m n shall have to treat proofs similarly.
It is scarcely surpri-
sing that the theory developed in Chapter 4 for the finite case collapses in the infinite one.
No comment is needed on the
results about counterparts in Chapter 5, except to note that although Theorem 5.16, which states conditions for multiple and single-conclusion rules to characterise counterpart calculi, fails in general, it continues to hold when the relevant
98
INFINITE RULES
single-conclusion calculus possesses a maximum counterpart.
6.2
Marking of theorems
We have already marked with a t those results in Chapters 1-5 that fail to carry over to the case of infinite rules and proofs.
We now supply the justification for this by sketch-
ing proofs of the unmarked theorems in the infinite case and disproofs of the marked ones.
The examples assume that V is
infinite.
1.1-7
These results do not involve rules of inference.
1.8-9
Proofs are as in the finite case.
1.10 -12
If R is cfrom X infer B if X is infinite* then X h_ B iff B £ X or X is infinite, so that h_ and K K the calculus characterised by R are not compact. If R is cfrom X infer B if X is infinite or B ^ C» for a given C, the proof of 1.3 shows that h
is
not the closure of R under overlap, dilution and cut for formulae. 1.13-14
Proof is as in the finite case, except that without 1.11 we need to establish that deducibility is closed under cut for sets in general, as is done in Section 6.1.
2.1-12
These results do not involve rules of inference.
2.13-14 t
2.15 -16
Proofs are as in the finite case. t
If R is
is not compact.
If R is cfrom X infer Y
if X or Y is infinite* the proof of 2.4 shows that h_ is not the closure of R under overlap, dilution K
Section 6.2
MARKING OF THEOREMS
99
and cut for formulae. 2.17
Proof is as in the finite case.
2.18
The counterexample for 2.15 provides a disproof here too.
3.1-4
Proofs are as in the finite case.
3.5-7
See proof of Theorem 6.1.
3.8-9
Proofs are as in the finite case.
3.10
See proof of Theorem 6.1.
4.1
The empty rule R is recursive, so if tree proof is recursive tree proof by R is too.
But an empty
tree is not a proof from A to A by R, and since V is infinite there is a formula A about which no questions are asked in deciding this.
Then the
same process decides that a tree consisting of a single occurrence of A is not a proof from A to A, which is absurd. 4.2
This result does not involve rules of inference.
4.3
Let L be the axiomatisable calculus in which X h Y iff Y is nonempty.
Suppose that L is characterised
by recursive rules R,
Consider the set S of pairs
(W^jW^) such that for every n there is an instance (X,Y) of R such that for each m
For each n there is an
instance (X.Y) of R such that A t Y for all m
Hence (A,A) £ S and
Moreover any totally ordered subset
of S has an upper bound in S, namely ( UW-, UVL)
where the unions are taken over all (W-,W2) in S , since for any n there is a member (Wf,W«) of S
such
100
INFINITE RULES
that for each m
Evidently T and U are disjoint, and
either A e T or A e U for every A.
(For since
(T,U) € S, there is for each n an instance of R, call it (X ,Y >, such that for each m£n, A e X if n n m n A e T but not if A e U, and A i Y . Either the m m m n values of n for which A e X , or those for which A i X , are unbounded.
In the first case (Tu{A},U)
e S and in the second (T,{A}t(U) e S; whence the result by the maximality of (T,U).)
N O W (T,A) is
not an instance of R since T }/• A, and in the process of deciding this questions about A
may only be asked
for finitely many m, say only for rn^n. Since (T,U) £ S, there is an instance (X,Y) of R such that for each m£n, A e X iff A e T, and A t Y; but the
m m
m
process that decides that (T,A) is not an instance of R will do the same for (X,Y>, and this provides the required contradiction. 4.4
The empty rule characterises an axiomatisable calculus L.
But given any rules R for L, tree proof by R
is not recursive by the argument for 4.1 4.5
above.
The empty rule R is recursive, so sequence proof by R is recursive if sequence proof is recursive.
But
the sequence A-,A2,A3,...;A- is a proof of A- from V by R, and, V being infinite, there is a formula A (other than A.) about which no questions are asked in deciding this.
Then the same process decides that
the same sequence is a proof of A- from V-A , which it is not. 4.6
This result does not involve rules of inference.
4.7
The empty rule is recursive, but by the argument for 4.5
above the resulting calculus is not characterised
Section 6.2
MARKING OF THEOREMS
101
by any rules R for which sequence proof by R is recursive. 4.8
We consider the same calculus as in the finite case, and show as there that it is axiomatisable but not characterised by recursive rules.
To show that it is
not characterised by any rules R for which sequence proof by R is recursive, we argue as for 4.5 choosing A
above,
not to be of the form AvA.
4.9
The proof is as in the finite case.
4.10
The proof is as for 1.14 above.
4.11
The disproof is as for 4.5
4.12
Consider the axiomatisable calculus with the vocabu-
above.
lary of the classical one but characterised by the non-iterable finite rule cfrom A&A infer BvB', where B is fixed. rules R.
Suppose it is characterised by recursive
In deciding that {A,BvB) is not an instance
of R there is a formula A about which the question c
does A&A occur as a premiss?5 is never asked.
Then
the same process decides that ( X > B V B ) is not an instance of R, where all the members of x rences of A&A. t 4.13
are
occur-
Hence the partition (A&A, V-A&A)
satisfies R but not h , which is absurd. . The empty rule characterises an axiomatisable calculus, but by the argument for 4.5
above there are no
rules R (whether or not multiplicity of premisses is taken into account) which characterise the calculus and for which sequence proof by R is recursive, 4.14-17
These results do not involve rules of inference.
5.1-14
These results do not involve rules.
5.15
Proof is as in the finite case.
5.16
The result holds good when the calculus characterised by R possesses a maximum counterpart, and the proof is as in the finite case.
But it fails in general:
102
INFINITE RULES
for example, take R to be the rule 'from X infer B if X is infinite5, and let R' be the corresponding singleton-conclusion rule plus 'from A infer A,B if A f B*.
Then R and R' satisfy the conditions of the
theorem but do not characterise counterparts, since by cut for V we have A h D / B for every B. 5.17-25
These results do not involve rules.
5.26-7
Proofs are as in the finite case.
In 5.27 the pro-
viso about compactness becomes redundant: rules R for L may in every case be obtained from rules R' for 1/ by adding 'from V infer A». 5.28-35
These results do not involve rules.
5.36
Where L is not compact it cannot by 5.8 have any compact counterpart.
5.37
Let R' be the singleton-conclusion rule corresponding to R3, plus 'from A infer A,AvA,AvAvA,... >. X h R , Y iff Y is nonempty.
Then
But the additional rule
cannot be reconstructed in R, which consists of R3 only. 5.38
Proof is as in the finite case.
Part II * Graph proofs
7 • Graph arguments
7.1
Arguments
Textbooks say that an argument is valid if the conclusion follows from the premisses, but this cannot be right.
It
would make Figure 7.1 into a valid scheme of argument even though both its steps (i.e. from 2 to 3, and from 1 and 3 to 4) are classic fallacies.
The textbook criterion is all
right for arguments consisting of a single step but it overlooks the fact that arguments are generally made up of a number of steps. Perhaps then an argument is valid if all its component steps are valid?
No, for this would make
Figure 7.2 a valid scheme of argument from any A to any B.
1
All a are b
premiss
2
All b are c
3
All c are b
4
All a are c
Figure 7.1
premiss
premiss
1 A 2 ADB
from 2
3
from 1,2
from 1,3
4 B
from 3
A&
from 3
Figure 7.2
Clearly the validity of an argument is the product of two factors: (i) the individual steps must be valid and (ii) they must be correctly arranged and articulated.
Thus
Figure 7.1 is invalid because it fails to satisfy (i) and Figure 7.2, with its vicious circle, is invalid because it fails to satisfy (ii). The following chapters are our attempt to elucidate and explore the idea behind (ii). If at the
106
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
same time we were going to discuss the other factor we should need to coin a distinctive name for this one: 'potential validity5, say, or 'structural validity'.
The two operate,
however, at quite different levels of generality.
Validity
of steps is relative to a given calculus - a step that is classically valid may be intuitionistically invalid, and so on - but the question of their correct arrangement is independent of the choice of calculus and even of the choice of formulae, as we shall see.
It is therefore possible to dis-
cuss either condition for validity in a self-contained way without bringing in the other.
This being so, we shall speak
of arguments as being simply 'valid5 or 'invalid5 with reference to (ii) alone.
A prerequisite of a theory of validity is a definition of arguments that takes due account of their structure. concept of a sequence proof is of no use here.
The
First, it is
too narrow: it rules out invalid arguments altogether and also as it happens many impeccably valid ones, as we note in Chapter 11.
Second, it is inherently indeterminate with re-
gard to argumentative structure.
The definition requires
that each formula in the sequence be a premiss or an axiom or derived from an (unspecified) selection of preceding formulae, but none of these alternative justifications is put forward as the one actually invoked by the proof.
Calculi can easily
be devised in which several or even all the possible alternatives are equally admissible, so that the same sequence ambiguously represents a number of different proofs.
For
example, in a calculus with the rule 'from C. ,...,C. infer 1 L 1 m C. if 0<m and i_<...
Similar objections apply to tree
proofs in the context of multiple conclusions.
Section 7.1
ARGUMENTS
107
The answer seems to be straightforward enough: take an argument to be an array of formulae structured by a cstep* relation so that a step from A.. ,. •. ,A l m
to B (or to B 19 ...,B in
as
the case may be) is represented by this relation holding between their occurrences.
This can be indicated informally by
annotations as in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, or by a diagram as in Figure 7.3 (which shows the same argument as Figure 7.2). A difficulty arises in handling the step relation systematically, however, since the number of premisses varies from step to step.
Thus the step relation does not have a fixed valency
(binary, ternary, etc.) but relates varying numbers of objects (doubly variable in the multiple-conclusion case); and there exists no developed theory of relations of this sort. It certainly cannot be treated as a binary relation holding between each A. and B or each B., since this fails to do justice to the way in which the premisses (and the conclusions in the multiple-conclusion case) function together.
There is
a vast difference between (a) inferring B from A- and A« and (b) inferring B from A. and from A«; but a relation holding between A- and B and between A« and B fails to mark the difference .
Figure 7.3
Figure 7.4(a)
Figure 7.4(b)
When discussing rules of inference and consequence relations we anticipated a similar difficulty by taking sets instead
108
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
of individual formulae as the objects of a (binary) relation, but here we propose a different solution.
This is to inter-
pose a fresh object between the premisses and conclusion(s) of the step, and to represent a step from A-,...,A B,,...,B
to
by a binary relation holding between each A. and
the mediating object and between it and each B..
The new
object can well be thought of as an occurrence of one of those words like *so» or 'therefore' which help to articulate our daily arguments.
(They also mark a distinctive kind of
linguistic activity, namely arguing, but this we do not pretend to discuss: an argument for us is an inanimate thing and not a live performance.)
We call the object an (inference)
stroke and in picturing arguments we symbolise it by a short horizontal line.
In this way Figure 7.4 shows how the am-
biguity mentioned above is resolved, for 7.4(a) represents a single step CA-, A« so B' while 7.4(b) represents a pair of steps «A- so B» and
We thus arrive at the idea of an argument as an array of formulae and inference strokes, structured by a relation between formulae and strokes and vice versa.
The theory of
orderings (e.g. of sequences or trees) is not an appropriate vehicle for developing this idea, since the key relation is not a transitive one, but the theory of graphs is ideally suited to it, for a directed graph is nothing other than a set structured by an arbitrary binary relation.
We shall
therefore introduce the basic apparatus of graph theory in the next section and go on to show how arguments can be described in terms of it.
7.2
Graphs
A (directed) graph is a set of vertices together with a binary
Section 7.2
GRAPHS
relation between them.
109
An instance (a,b) of this relation is
called an edge joining a and b; more exactly, it is the edge that goes from a to b.
A vertex is initial if no edge goes
to it and final if no edge goes from it, and a vertex which is neither initial nor final is intermediate*
A subgraph of
a graph is any graph contained in it, and we may denote it (somewhat loosely) by listing its vertices and edges between braces.
A redirection of a graph is obtained by changing the
direction (i.e. replacing (a,b) by (b,a)) of some or none or all of the edges; if all are reversed the redirection is the converse graph, whose edge relation is the converse of that of the original.
A bipartite graph is one whose vertices are
of two sorts, vertices joined by an edge always being of opposite sorts.
In particular no edge in a bipartite graph
goes from a vertex to itself (i.e. there are no loops).
Let a-,E-,ao,Eo,...,E - ,a be a finite sequence of alternate i l z z n—1 n vertices and edges in which each E. joins a. and a. - and no edge occurs more than once.
If n>l and no vertex occurs more
than once in the sequence, the corresponding subgraph {a-jE-, •..,a } is a path connecting its endpoints a- and a .
(The
endpoints are uniquely determined as the vertices adjoining just one edge in the path.)
If n>2 and a =a
but otherwise
no vertex occurs more than once, the corresponding subgraph is a circuit*
These definitions take no account of the direc-
tions of the edges; if in addition each E. goes from a. to a
the corresponding subgraph is a directed path from a- to or a directed circuit as the case may be. A graph is
connected if there exist paths connecting every pair of distinct vertices.
Two graphs are disjoint if they have no ver-
tex, and hence no edge, in common.
Any graph is thus the
union of zero or more disjoint nonempty connected graphs called its components.
110
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
Lemmas 7.1-2
In these definitions we have made our own selection from the variety of available terminology (e.g. Ore, 1962).
Paths
and circuits are usually defined as sequences, but it suits us better to take the corresponding subgraphs (and incidentally avoid the arbitrariness of stipulating a particular startingpoint for a circuit).
For us a finite graph is one with a
finite number of vertices, though some writers require merely that the number of edges be finite.
We use a, b, c as nota-
tion for vertices, E for edges, TT for graphs and graph arguments in general, y for circuits and a and 3 for paths.
We
also write (a,b) to denote any path connecting a and b, and observe that in a circuit-free graph there is at most one such path for each pair of vertices.
If the ancestral of the edge relation that determines a graph is a partial ordering we can dispense with an explicit notation for the direction of edges by adopting the convention that they run down the page.
By virtue of the next result
this covers all cases except the few which involve directed circuits; in these we will have to mark by an arrow any edges that run up the page.
Even a partial ordering of the vertices
does not mean that we can dispense with an explicit notation for the edges themselves, but we mention in Section 8.1 the special circumstances in which this too is possible.
Lemma 7.1
The ancestral of the edge relation is a partial
ordering iff there are no directed circuits.
Lemma 7.2
A nonempty finite bipartite graph with no directed
circuits has at least one initial and at least one final vertex.
Proofs
We write > for the ancestral of the edge relation.
Like all ancestrals it is reflexive and transitive, so for
Section 7.3
PREMISSES AND CONCLUSIONS
111
7.1 it is sufficient to show that it is antisymmetric iff there are no directed circuits.
If there is a directed
circuit {a1,E-,a2>...,a } we have a->a2 and a2^a a a. although a-^a2, i.e. > is not antisymmetric•
Conversely,
if there exist distinct a and b such that a>b and b^a, there are sequences an,En,...,a
11
and a ,E ,...,a
m
mm
such
n
that l<m
7.3
The result is then immediate from 7.1.
Premisses and conclusions
We suggested that arguments should be envisaged as arrays of formulae and inference strokes, structured by a relation between formulae and strokes.
It is assumed that the inference
stroke is never a formula, so in graphical terms the idea becomes that of a bipartite graph of formulae and strokes, i.e. one in which each vertex is an occurrence of a formula or of the inference stroke, and each edge goes from a formula vertex to a stroke vertex or vice versa.
The description of
an argument is however incomplete until we have identified its premisses and conclusions.
We therefore define a (graph)
argument to be a finite bipartite graph of formulae and strokes
112
GRAPH
ARGUMENTS
in which subsets of the initial and final formula vertices are specified as the premisses and conclusions respectively. In picturing graph arguments we represent the conclusions by triangles, premisses by inverted triangles, and other formula vertices by circles, as in Figures 7.5 and 7.6.
These notation
are adapted from the sport of orienteering, the physical equivalent of proof-tracing.
An isolated vertex, being both ini-
tial and final, can in principle be both a premiss and a conclusion, and in such a case we superimpose the two notations as in Figure 7.5.
A&B
V premiss
A
O
conclusion neither
both
Figure 7.5 Our stipulation as to which vertices are eligible to be the premisses and conclusions of a graph argument is a compromise. We could have made every formula vertex eligible, be it initial or final or intermediate, but by doing so we would not obtain any significantly wider class of graph proofs, as we shall show in Theorem 7.9.
Taking the opposite line we
might have required that all the initial formula vertices should be regarded as premisses and all the final ones as conclusions, and so incidentally dispense with the need for a special notation like our triangles.
As it is, we call an
argument satisfying these requirements standard.
Figure 7.6
is an example of a non-standard argument, but since it is the graphical equivalent of an ordinary sequence proof (viz. the sequence A&B,A,B construed as a proof of B from A&B by the rules cfrom A&B infer A* and cfrom A&B infer B ' ) , there is
Section 7.3
PREMISSES AND CONCLUSIONS
a prima facie case for including it.
113
One might propose its
exclusion on the ground that what Figure 7.6 really displays is a standard proof (the leg from A&B to B) with some irrelevant trimmings (the leg from A&B to A ) , and that we lose nothing by ignoring the latter.
But we shall see in Chapter
9 that there are proofs which are irreducibly non-standard, i.e. which have no standard subproof, and so do constitute a significantly wider class of proof than the standard ones* Any initial formula vertex that is not a premiss of the argument, and any final one that is not a conclusion, will be called non-standard.
All other vertices (including all
strokes and all intermediate formulae) are standard.
A
standard argument is thus one in which every vertex is standard.
The premisses and conclusions of a graph argument were defined in the first instance as formula vertices, i.e. occurrences of formulae rather than formulae themselves, and we need a notation for the corresponding formulae.
Let X
therefore
stand for the set of formulae which occur as premisses of the argument IT, and let Y
stand for the set of formulae
which occur as conclusions of TT.
Similarly if b is any stroke
vertex we write X, for the set of formulae from whose occurrences edges go to b, and Y, for the set of formulae to whose occurrences edges go from b.
We write R
for the rule cfrom
X, infer Y, if b is a stroke in IT', i.e. the rule which exactly covers the steps of TT. X
to Y
Obviously ir is an argument from
by R , and making the customary allowance for dilu-
tion we say that ir is an argument from X to Y by R iff X and Y
c Y and R
c x
c R.
Because we ignored questions of multiplicity in defining rules of inference, there is no restriction (other than finiteness) on the multiplicity with which the premisses and conclusions
114
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
Theorems 7.3-4
of an instance of a rule can occur as vertices in a corresponding graph argument.
For example, each of the three graphs
in Figure 7.7 would be admissible as part of an argument by the rule of adjunction cfrom A,B infer A&B 5 .
We mentioned
in Section 4.2 the alternative possibility of assigning a definite multiplicity to the premisses and conclusions of rules by defining rules in terms of arrays rather than sets, and it is easy to adapt the definition of 'argument by R» to match, since the formula vertices adjacent to the various inference strokes already form appropriate arrays.
As it hap-
pens none of our present results are affected by the decision to construe rules one way rather than the other, but we shall see in Chapter 12 that some theorems become affected when extended to cover the infinite case.
AQ
O
QA&A
A&A
A&A
A&A
A&A
Figure 7.7
7.4
Validity and form
Our concern is with arguments which are potentially or structurally valid in the sense that they can never be made to lead from true premisses to false conclusions by truth-preserving steps, however the formulae are interpreted.
If b
is an inference stroke the step represented by b is truthpreserving on a given interpretation iff (X- ,Y, ) is satisfied by the appropriate partition, whence all the steps in TT are truth-preserving iff R
is satisfied.
We therefore say
Section 7.4
VALIDITY AND FORM
that TT is valid if every partition that satisfies R
115
satisTT
fies (X ,Y ), i.e. if X TT
h_ TT R
TT
Y . Equivalently, by 2.13, TT is TT
valid iff (X ,Y ) is valid whenever R IT
IT
is valid.
It is also
TT
convenient to say that a partition satisfies TT unless it invalidates it in the sense that it both satisfies R
and TT
invalidates (X ,Y ), and in these terms TT is valid iff every partition satisfies it. A (graph) proof is a valid graph argument, and in particular a proof from X to Y by R is a valid argument from X to Y by R. For example, the arguments shown below in Figures 7,9-10 are proofs: if one disregards any clues to the intended meanings of the formulae and considers all the possible ways of labelling them as true or false, one can easily verify that it is impossible to make the premisses true and the conclusions false without similarly invalidating at least one of the steps.
For expository reasons we give examples whose indi-
vidual steps are sound when the formulae are construed in the obvious way, but as we stressed in Section 7.1 this is strictly beside the point.
The same considerations that show that the
standard one-step arguments of Figure 7.10 are valid show that any standard one-step argument by R is a proof by R, regardless of the acceptability of R itself.
For example, R
could equally well be the fallacious syllogistic rule used in Figure 7.1.
Theorem 7.3
An argument TT is valid iff X I- Y whenever TT is
an argument from X to Y by R.
Theorem 7.4
Proofs
Every graph proof is nonempty.
For 7.3, TT is valid iff X
h_ TT
whenever X
c X and Y TT
c Y and R TT
K_
Y , i.e. iff
X k Y
TT
l\
c R, i.e. iff X h D Y TT
whenever TT is an argument from X to Y by R.
R
For 7.4, every
116
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
partition invalidates the empty argument.
Note that al-
though tree proofs can be empty - the empty tree being a proof from any X to any Y by cfrom A infer A» - the corresponding graph proof is not empty but consists of an isolated inference stroke.
In the subsequent chapters we enquire how the validity of arguments is related to their form.
The form of a graph
argument is the resultant of two components.
One is its
broadly graphical structure, i.e. the distribution of the edges and of the various kinds of vertex (strokes, formulae, premisses, conclusions).
The other is the pattern of recur-
rence of its formulae, i.e. the distribution of the vertices that are occupied by the same formulae.
Analogous components
of form can be discerned in other contexts.
For example, the
validity of the tautology Av~A is due partly to the relevant combination of connectives and partly to the fact that the same formula occurs at the end as at the beginning.
Recur-
rence is normally a crucial factor in such cases: what tautologies are there in which no formula occurs more than once? By contrast there is a large and diverse class of graph proofs whose validity can be attributed solely to their graphical structure and owes nothing to the recurrence of formulae.
In
such a case we can abstract altogether from the formulae and exhibit a skeleton form of graph such that no matter how its vacant vertices are filled with formulae the resulting argument will be a proof.
For example, Figure 7.8 shows the ab-
stract form of proof exemplified in Figure 7.9 by (i) a proof from ~B,A3B to ~A by the rules for PC, and (ii) a proof, cast in the syllogistic mood Festino, by the rules of the square of opposition and Celarent.
Similarly Figure 7.10 shows that
proofs by rules as different as modus ponens and adjunction may nevertheless have the same abstract form.
Section 7.4
VALIDITY AND FORM
117
SoP
B
Figure 7,8
PeM
SiM
SeM
Figure 7.9
Figure 7.10
We can best approach the idea of abstract form by saying that two arguments are abstractly isomorphic if there is a one-one correspondence between them in which strokes correspond to strokes, formula vertices to formula vertices, premisses to premisses, conclusions to conclusions, and which preserves the edge relation (i.e. edges correspond to edges going to and from corresponding vertices).
An argument is abstractly
valid if every argument abstractly isomorphic to it is valid; and an abstractly valid argument is an abstract proof.
Ex-
amples of abstract proofs are provided by Figures 7.9-10.
A property is abstract if it is preserved under abstract isomorphism.
Not all the properties we consider are abstract.
118
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
In particular, validity is not an abstract property since recurrence may play a part in it; and so for example Figure 7.12 below shows pairs of abstractly isomorphic arguments such that one member of each pair is valid and the other not. Thus although every abstract proof is a proof, not every proof is an abstract proof, e.g. it- and ir^ in Figure 7.12.
In the definition of abstract isomorphism it is not required that the two arguments should draw their formulae from the same universe V.
If this is required certain results about
abstract validity will be affected, e.g. Theorem 7.7 will fail unless V is infinite; but the actual class of abstract proofs will not be affected provided V contains at least two formulae. For suppose an argument IT belonging to V has an invalid abstract isomorph IT' belonging to a different universe V , and let (T',U') be a partition of V' which invalidates TT'.
Then
if tr" is obtained from IT' by replacing each member of T' by one member of V and each member of U' by another, it is evident that I T " too is an invalid abstract isomorph of IT.
When both components of argumentative form are taken into account - recurrence of formulae as well as purely graphical structure - there is a choice of relations on which to base the idea of form.
We call them
c
isomorphism9 and 'conformity*.
We say that two arguments are isomorphic if (1) there is a one-one correspondence between them in which strokes correspond to strokes etc. and which preserves the edge relation (i.e. they are abstractly isomorphic), and (2) there is a one-one correspondence between their respective formulae such that corresponding vertices are occupied by corresponding formulae.
For example the arguments shown in Figure 7.10 are
generally isomorphic, using for (1) the obvious correspondence between their vertices, and for (2) making A, B and A^B correspond to A', A'&B' and B' respectively.
Note however that
Section 7.4
VALIDITY AND FORM
119
the second correspondence ceases to be one-one if A = B or A' = B', and in such cases the arguments are not isomorphic. Note too that the correspondence postulated under (2) does not have to be in any sense a translation and does not have to take any account of the composition of the formulae.
The
fact that A^B contains A and B as proper parts is only significant (if at all) in the context of a particular calculus, and our definition is designed to abstract from just this sort of thing.
We therefore do not require that the formula
chosen to correspond to A^B should be related in any way to those corresponding to A and B.
We say that one argument conforms to another if (1) there is a one-one correspondence between them in which strokes correspond to strokes etc. and which preserves the edge relation (i.e. they are abstractly isomorphic), and (2) there is a one-many correspondence between their respective formulae such that corresponding vertices are occupied by corresponding formulae.
Conformity is intermediate in strength between iso-
morphism and abstract isomorphism, and like them it is transitive, but unlike them it is not necessarily symmetric.
In
Figure 7.11, for example, assuming that A, B, C are distinct, it can be seen that it- to IT. are all abstractly isomorphic, 1 o but only TT. and it* are isomorphic; that both TT_ and TT^ conform to each of TT^, TT, and TT_, but not vice versa; and that each of TT- to TT. conforms to TJV but not vice versa. Isomorl J o phism and abstract isomorphism can each be defined in terms of conformity, for it can be shown that two arguments are abstractly isomorphic iff both conform to some third argument, and isomorphic iff each conforms to the other.
(When infinite
arguments are allowed, however, as in Chapter 12, two arguments may conform to one another without being isomorphic. For example, consider two sets of i isolated occurrences of n
120
A
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
for each n, where according as n is even or odd, i
is 1
or n in one case and n or 1 in the other.)
VA
VB
VB
6B
VB
VA
6A
6B
VA
AB "3
"4
Figure 7.11 An argument form can be associated either with the class of all arguments isomorphic to a given one, or, perhaps more plausibly, with the class of all arguments conforming to a given one.
Since each argument belongs to a unique isomorphism
class but may belong to several conformity classes, an argument will have a unique form if 'form5 is taken in the first sense, but not in the second.
For example, ir in Figure 7.11 can
plausibly be said to exemplify each of five forms of varying degrees of abstractness, represented by TT^ to IT,..
Similarly in calling a property formal one could mean that it is preserved under isomorphism or mean that it is preserved under conformity (i.e. whenever TT has the property so does any argument conforming to TT) .
The first sense is weaker than the
second; for example, invalidity is a formal property in the first sense but not in the second.
Validity, however, is for-
mal in both senses, as Theorem 7.5 will show.
In particular,
the fact that every argument isomorphic to a proof is also a proof means that (unlike the validity attributed to rules or
Section 7.4
VALIDITY AND FORM
121
steps, or to formulae) the aspect of validity we are concerned with is independent of the choice of calculus and even of vocabulary.
And the fact that every argument which conforms to
a proof is also a proof means that we can exhibit semi-abstract patterns of proof like those in Figure 7.12: provided identi-*cally numbered vertices are occupied by identical formulae (as they are in TT- and TT2 though not in IT' or TT') these patterns can be filled out with formulae in any way in the knowledge that the resulting arguments will be valid.
AVB
A&B
Figure 7.12
A graphical criterion for validity and abstract validity is available through the idea of a redirection of a graph; and the next two theorems show incidentally that validity and abstract validity are recursive properties. direction of the graph of an argument TT.
Let TT' be a re-
If for each formula
A, either all the edges adjoining occurrences of A are reversed or none is, ir' is said to be a formal redirection of TT.
If
for each formula vertex a either all the edges adjoining a are reversed or none is, TT' is an abstract redirection of TT. Every formal redirection is an abstract redirection but not vice versa.
122
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
Theorem 7.5
Theorems 7.5-9
An argument TT is valid iff every formal redirec-
tion has a final vertex standard in IT.
Theorem 7.6
An argument TT is abstractly valid iff every
abstract redirection has a final vertex standard in TT.
Proofs
To each partition (T,U) there corresponds a formal
redirection TT' of TT, obtained by reversing all edges adjoining occurrences of formulae of U; and conversely for each formal redirection there is at least one corresponding partition.
An inference stroke b is final in TT' iff X. c T
and Y, c u, i.e. iff (T,U) invalidates the relevant instance of R .
Similarly a formula vertex standard in TT is final in
TT' iff it is a final occurrence in TT of a formula in T and hence a conclusion, or an initial occurrence in TT of a formula in U and hence a premiss.
Thus some vertex standard
in TT is final in TT' iff (T,U) invalidates R
or satisfies
(X ,Y ). This establishes 7.5, and 7.6 follows since TT is TT TT
abstractly valid iff every formal redirection of every abstract isomorph TT7 of TT has a final vertex standard in TT', i.e. iff every abstract redirection of TT has a final vertex standard in TT. Theorem 7.7
An argument is abstractly valid iff it conforms
to a proof in which no formula occurs more than once.
Theorem 7.8
If TT is a proof (or an abstract proof) then so
is any argument TT' obtained by omitting edges from TT.
Theorem 7.9
If TT satisfies the conditions for being a proof
(or abstract proof) from X to Y by R, except that there are edges to some premisses or from some conclusions, the argument TT' obtained from TT by deleting these edges together with the strokes adjoining them and all edges adjoining these
Section 7.5
SUBPROOFS
123
strokes, is a proof (abstract proof) from X to Y by R.
Proofs
7.7 follows from 7.5 and 7.6, since if the vertices
of an argument are occupied by distinct formulae, the abstract redirections coincide with the formal ones. For 7.8, although TT' will not in general be an argument by the same rules as TT, each instance of R
is obtained by
dilution from an instance of R ,. Hence K, c t, and R * TT V since X , = X and Y , = Y it follows that X , h_ Y , TT
TT
TT
TT
and hence that IT' is valid.
T T R ^ / T T
The corresponding result for
abstract proofs follows by applying this result to every argument abstractly isomorphic to IT. For 7.9, it is evident that TT' is an argument and that X , = X IT'
and Y , = Y IT
IT'
and R , c R TT
and if b is a stroke of
T T ' Tf'
TT not in TT' either X, overlaps Y
or Y
overlaps X . Now
every partition (T,U) that invalidates (X ,,Y ,) invalidates (X ,Y ) and so, since TT is valid, invalidates R .
But
(T,U) certainly satisfies (X,,Y,) for each stroke b of TT not in IT', and so invalidates R ,.
Hence TT' is a proof, as re-
TT
quired.
When TT is an abstract proof the abstract validity
of TT' follows indefend the same as for 7.8. We are now able to theway stipulation in Section 7.3 that only initial occurrences of formulae may be premisses and only final ones conclusions.
For even if one were to admit argu-
ments - call them quasi-arguments - which violate this stipulation, Theorem 7.9 shows that every valid quasi-argument contains a valid argument in the strict sense.
7.5
Subproofs
We envisage a subargument as being obtained by omitting some or none or all of the steps in an argument, counting as steps
124
Theorem 7.10
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
not only (i) the application of a rule of inference but also (ii) the inscription of a formula and (iii) the positing of an inscribed formula as a premiss or conclusion of the argument.
A step of either of the first two kinds is represented
in graphical terms by the presence of a stroke or a formula vertex, and its omission will require the deletion of the relevant vertex and hence of any adjoining edges.
An omission
of the third kind does not affect the argument qua graph but only the status of the vertex (symbolised in our notation by the replacement of a triangle by a circle).
Figure 7,15 In general we do not allow the removal of edges alone to form a subargument: we do not accept that someone who argues from A and B to C has incidentally argued from B to C (Figure 7.13), On the other hand we should certainly allow the removal of edges where their presence merely reflects the looseness involved in construing rules in terms of sets, there being no difference between a rule cfrom A,A,B infer C9 and cfrom A,B infer C9 (Figure 7.14).
The problematic case is illustrated
in Figure 7.15, where ir' is obtained from it by an omission which would not be tolerable on its own (cf. Figure 7.13) but
Section 7.5
SUBPROOFS
125
which could be defended in the context of the argument as a whole, on the grounds that someone who argues from A,B to C and from B to C has incidentally argued from B to C.
Allow-
ing such a case would produce an elegant definition of subargument in terms of a requirement that R , c R , but in our view its defence rests on an equivocation and we choose to exclude it.
We therefore define a formal subgraph of a graph IT to be any subgraph IT' such that for each stroke b in TT' the sets X, and Y. are the same whether construed with reference to ir' or to D
IT.
That is to say, if b itself is retained when forming IT'
from ir, an edge to b from an occurrence of A may only be suppressed if some other edge to b from an occurrence of A is retained, as in Figure 7.14; and similarly for edges from b. A subargument of an argument TT is an argument whose graph is a formal subgraph of that of ir and whose premisses and conclusions are subsets of those of IT.
Unlike ^redirection5 and
Subgraph 3 , csubargument* has no prior usage in graph theory and so there is no need to include a distinguishing adjective like cformal5 here.
If any were needed *formal5 would be
the right one, for the relation of being a subargument - like the relation of being a formal subgraph or a formal redirection - is preserved under the kinds of correspondence envisaged in our definitions both of isomorphism and conformity. If IT' is a subargument of IT it follows from the definition that R , c R TT
and, applying what it says about premiss and
TT
conclusion vertices to the corresponding formulae, that X , c X and Y , c Y . We thus have IT
IT'
Theorem 7.10
TT
If TT' is a subargument of TT then IT' is an ar-
gument from X to Y by R whenever TT is.
The only aspect of the formation of subarguments that depends
126
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
Theorems 7,11-14
on the recurrence of formulae is the omission of edges illustrated in Figure 7.14, and by disallowing this we obtain the appropriate abstract analogue.
Thus an abstract subgraph of
IT is a subgraph which, for each stroke b that it contains, also contains every edge adjoining b in ir. An abstract subargument of an argument TT is an argument whose graph is an abstract subgraph of that of TT, and whose premisses and conclusions are subsets of those of TT. These definitions make no mention of validity.
A subargument
of an invalid argument cannot be valid (Theorems 7.3 and 7.10). A subargument of a proof, on the other hand, may or may not be valid, and we call a valid subargument a subproof.
Similarly
we call an abstractly valid abstract subargument an abstract subproof.
Only an abstract proof can have an abstract sub-
proof, but not every subproof of an abstract proof is an abstract subproof.
In Figure 7.16, for example, TT' is a valid
abstract subargument of TT but is not abstractly valid, and in Figure 7.17 TT' is an abstractly valid subargument of IT but is not an abstract subargument.
A=>A
AA
AA
Figure 7.16
ZAA&A
ZAA&A
Figure 7.17
We say that a subargument TT' of an argument TT is proper if TT' f TT, even if the difference lies only in the specification of their premisses and conclusions.
A proof is minimal if it
has no proper subproof of any kind: e.g. a minimal standard proof means a standard proof with no proper subproof, standard
Section 7.5
SUBPROOFS
or otherwise.
127
Although minimality presupposes the idea of
subargument, it is not difficult to show that it is unaffected by the decision not to count such cases as Figure 7.15 as subarguments.
A proof which is not strictly minimal may never-
theless exemplify a minimal form of proof; and we say that a proof is concise if it conforms to a minimal proof.
Every
minimal proof is concise, but not conversely, as the examples of Figures 7.16 and 7.17 show: in each case IT is not minimal, since it has the proper subproof TT', but it is concise since it exemplifies the minimal form shown in Figure 7.10.
Since
graph arguments are by definition finite, every proof has a minimal subproof and hence a concise one.
We also have for
the abstract case:
Theorem 7.11
An abstract proof is concise iff it has no
proper abstract subproof.
Theorem 7.12
Every abstract proof has a concise abstract
subproof.
Theorem 7.13
Every concise abstract proof is standard and
connected.
Theorem 7.14
Every abstract proof has a standard connected
abstract subproof.
Proofs
Any abstract proof IT conforms to an abstract proof
ir' in which no formula occurs more than once. proof of IT' is an abstract subproof of it.
Every sub-
So for 7.12,
any minimal subproof TT' of IT' is an abstract subproof by 7.7.
The corresponding subargument of IT is an abstract
subargument and is concise since it conforms to TT5. Similarly for 7.11, if TT has no proper abstract sutproof it follows that TT' has no proper subproof of any kind;
128
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
i.e. TT' is minimal and therefore IT is concise.
Conver-
sely if 7T is a concise abstract proof, it conforms to a minimal proof TT'.
Since IT and ir' are abstractly isomor-
phic, any proper abstract subproof of TT would be abstractly isomorphic to a proper subproof of TT', but there are none by hypothesis. For 7.13, if an abstract proof TT has a non-standard vertex b (say an initial formula vertex which is not a premiss) , let TT' be obtained from IT by specifying b as a (possibly) additional conclusion.
Then IT' satisfies the
conditions to be an abstract proof except that there may be edges from b.
By deleting strokes and their adjoining
edges, we obtain by 7.9 an abstract proof T T " in which b is an isolated non-standard vertex.
By 7.6 the argument
obtained from IT" by deleting b is an abstract proof, and hence a proper abstract subproof of TT.
Similarly if TT is
disconnected one of its components must be abstractly valid and so a proper abstract subproof, since otherwise each component independently could be abstractly redirected so as to have no final vertex standard in n, and the union of these redirections would show that IT' was not abstractly valid either.
In each case, therefore, TT is not concise by 7.11.
7.14 follows at once from 7.12 and 7.13.
Minimality is a formal property in the weaker but not the stronger sense.
Conciseness is a formal property in both
senses, and for all practical purposes it can be treated as an abstract one, because by Theorem 7.11 any abstract isomorph of a concise abstract proof is concise.
The same
theorem shows that conciseness is in practice the abstract analogue of minimality: e.g. Theorem 7.12 states the analogue for abstract proofs of the fact that every proof has a minimal subproof.
Note that Theorem 7.12 fails if 'concise' is
Section 7.6
SYMMETRY
129
replaced by 'minimal9, for Figure 7.16 shows an example of an abstract proof with no minimal abstract subproof.
7.6
Symmetry
Consequence in a single-conclusion calculus is a heterogeneous relation, holding between a set of formulae on the one side and an individual formula on the other.
The converse of such
a relation is therefore by definition ineligible to be a consequence relation.
The admission of multiple conclusions
makes consequence a homogeneous relation between sets of formulae, and so opens up possibilities of symmetry in the following sense.
We say that a property of binary relations is symmetrical if whenever a relation possesses the property so does its converse.
For example, transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity
are symmetrical (and so is asymmetry: whether a property is symmetrical has nothing to do with whether symmetrical relations possess it). The overlap, dilution and cut conditions are all symmetrical in this sense, for a relation is evidently closed under each of them iff its converse is.
Hence
by Theorem 2.1 the property of being a consequence relation is symmetrical.
As we said, this does not imply that a con-
sequence relation is identical to its converse, but simply that the converse is also a consequence relation.
In other
words, to every calculus L there corresponds a converse calculus L* such that h* is the converse of 1-. The set I of partitions characterising L may be construed as a relation, its converse I* comprising the partitions (U,T) for which (T,U) e I.
It is obvious that (T,U> satisfies (X,Y) iff
(U,T) satisfies (Y,X), and so L* is characterised by I*: converse calculi are characterised by converse sets of partitions.
130
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
Similarly, for each set of rules R there is a converse set determined by the converse relation R*.
Thus the converse of
«from X infer Y if X R Y' is «from X infer Y if X R* Y», or equivalently 'from Y infer X if X R Y>.
Since a relation
contains R iff its converse contains R*, it follows from Theorem 2.14 that consequence by R* is the converse of consequence by R: converse rules characterise converse calculi.
This observation suggests the possibility of devising converse proofs, where the converse of a given proof is to be a proof from Y to X by R* iff the original was a proof from X to Y by R.
Let the converse TT* of a graph argument TT be obtained by
forming the converse graph and taking the conclusions of TT as premisses of IT* and the premisses of TT as conclusions of TT*. Given our conventions for drawing diagrams of arguments, the diagram of IT* is obtained by simply inverting that of ir. It follows at once from the relevant definitions that TT is an argument from X to Y by R iff ir* is an argument from Y to X by R*, and that TT is valid iff TT* is valid.
Hence any valid
graph argument and its converse are converse proofs in the required sense.
This shows too that the concepts of graph
argument and graph proof are symmetrical ones, and likewise all the various species of argument we shall be considering in the next three chapters - standard, circuit-free, concise, abstractly valid, etc - are determined by symmetrical conditions.
Tree proofs, however, are ill suited to the formation of converses.
The obvious procedure is to take x* to be the same
array as T but with the converse ordering; but this fails, since in general x* is not even a tree, let alone a proof from Y to X by R*.
The definition of extended proof in
Section 3.2 has an appearance of symmetry between rank and file which is entirely spurious in this context, since rank
Section 7.6
SYMMETRY
131
and file are not converse notions with respect to the partial ordering that defines a tree.
It is not only this simple
recipe which fails to generate a converse proof: general no way of forming one.
there is in
The reason is the lack of
specificity inherent in the idea of tree proof which we noted in Section 7.1.
There must exist appropriate relationships
between the ranks and files of a tree proof, but they are loose enough for it to be a proof from X to Y by R and at the same time a proof from some other X' to some other Y' by some other R'; and when this happens it imposes conditions on a converse proof which generally cannot be met.
For ex-
ample, T in Figure 7.18 is a proof from A,~A to A by the rule c
from A,~A infer A', but is simultaneously a proof from A to
~A by the rule «from A infer ~A».
Its converse must be a
from A to A,~A by the rule cfrom A infer
proof (such as O
A,~A*, and so must have a branch ending in ~A; but it must also be a proof (such as T « ) from ~A to A by cfrom ~A infer A' and so can have no branch ending in ~A.
A
-A A
-A
-A
A
Figure 7.18
The moral we draw is that for a proof to have a converse it must either possess an unambiguous argumentative structure which the converse may be able to represent in mirror fashion, or it must have an even greater argumentative ambiguity than a tree proof, so that the converse may be capable of bearing all the requisite variety of argumentative constructions. have already explored the first alternative by introducing graph proofs, but we remark that the other is satisfied by
We
132
GRAPH ARGUMENTS
the universal proofs of Section 3.3.
Theorem 7.15
These are defined as ex-
tended tree proofs, and each is a proof from about as many sets of premisses to as many sets of conclusions by as many rules as is possible without obliterating the distinction between what can and cannot be proved; and we have
Theorem 7.15
Every universal proof is its own converse,
Z From the definition of h in Section 3.3 it is Z Z easily shown that H R ^ is the converse of H , whence the result follows by 3.9.
Proof
8 • Kneale proofs
8.1
Devel opmen t s
Kneale 5 s c tables of development 5 are the pioneer multipleconclusion proofs.
He introduces the idea in these terms:
«The general pattern of a table of development is
C
D
but between the initial formulae which express the premisses and the end formulae which express the limits there may be many intermediate expressions, i.e. expressions that occur both above and below lines' (1956, p.246).
Kneale's examples
make it clear how this works out in practice; e.g. Figure 8.1 shows a development leading from A^B to ~AvB by the rules for PC.
A=>B
A
-A -AvB
"'AvB
-AVBA Figure 8,1
Figure 8.2
134
KNEALE PROOFS
The horizontal lines in a table of development have a quite different role from the similar-looking lines used in Chapter 3 in picturing tree proofs.
There the lines were introduced
not as an integral part of the proofs but merely as a convenience to the reader in following them.
As such they were
more often used to bring out the branching structure of the proof than its inferential structure (not all rules of inference cause a tree proof to branch, and not all branching in an extended one is caused by rules).
Here the lines are
invariably associated with the application of a rule and, as our next quotation will show, they must be regarded as being genuine constituents of the development on a par with the formulae.
In short, Kneale*s lines play the part of in-
ference strokes.
Suppose then that we join each line in a development to the formulae lying immediately above and below it, by means of edges whose directions are taken to run down the page.
The result
will be a finite bipartite graph of formulae and inference strokes (compare Figure 8.1 with Figure 8.2), with a number of special features.
In the first place it will be nonempty and
connected; this is implicit in Kneale's account and is borne out by all his examples. free.
Secondly the graph will be circuit-
This is explicitly required by Kneale (1962, p. 543):
*In the working out of developments it is essential that token formulae which are already connected, either directly by one single horizontal line or indirectly through several horizontal lines, should not be connected again in any way. we may obtain such absurd patterns as AvB
A&B
For otherwise
Section 8.1
DEVELOPMENTS
135
This second feature exposes an additional reason, peculiar to multiple-conclusion logic, for incorporating inference strokes into the definition of an argument.
For if we do not do so -
if we really do regard the connection between the formulae immediately above and below a line in a development as being ^direct* - then it is impossible to satisfy Kneale's requirement when a rule has several conclusions as well as several premisses.
Thus in his original example of a development
(reproduced as IT in Figure 8,3), A and C are connected cdirectly by one single horizontal line5, and so too are A and D, and D and B, and B and C.
Hence A and C are connected again via D and
B, contrary to Kneale's stipulation.
If we represent develop-
ments by graphs of formulae alone, TT becomes TT- , which is a circuit.
However if the horizontal is treated as a genuine
part of the development the connections between the formulae above and below it cease to be literally direct, and we obtain instead the circuit-free graph TT^. c
absurd patterns
3
On the other hand Kneale's
are still excluded: his own example becomes
the graph shown in Figure 8.4, which has a forbidden circuit.
AvB B
A
D
C
Figure 8.3
The third feature of a graph derived from a development is that it will be corner-free, where by a corner in a bipartite graph of formulae and strokes we mean a set {E-,b,E2> in
136
KNEALE PROOFS
Theorems 8.1-3
which b is a formula vertex and E- and E« are distinct edges both going to b or both from it.
For example, the graph in
Figure 8,5 has a corner at B; but Figure 8.4 is corner-free, since the only vertices to (or from) which a pair of edges go are inference strokes.
There will be a corner in a
graph argument whenever the same occurrence of a formula figures as premiss (or as conclusion) in more than one step. A corner-free graph thus corresponds to a Kneale-style table of development in which only one line can occur immediately above (or below) any formula.
Tables can certainly be devised
in which this condition is broken; Figure 8,5 shows one example and shows too how the corresponding graph has a corner. But it is clear both from Kneale9s account and from his examples that he does not envisage tables of this kind, and even if they were allowed they would not constitute a significantly wider class of proofs, for we show in effect in Theorems 8.1 and 8.4 that every such table has an appropriate Kneale-style development as a sub-table (e.g. the table shown in Figure 8.5 contains the development shown in Figure 8.6).
B
C B&C
A&B A
A B&C
Figure 8.5
Figure 8.6
We call an argument based on a graph with these features a Kneale argument* A Kneale argument is thus connected, nonempty, circuit-free and corner-free.
It is clear from our
first quotation that in representing a development by a Kneale argument we should specify all the initial formula vertices as premisses and all the final ones as conclusions,
Section 8.2
VALIDITY
137
for what Kneale there calls the ^limits' of a development are just what we call conclusions.
Every development thus
corresponds to a standard Kneale argument.
Conversely, every
standard Kneale argument can be represented by a table of development, provided one is allowed to distort the vertical scale to deal with the more convoluted cases.
We can there-
fore safely assert that the developments and the standard Kneale arguments are essentially the same.
8.2
Validity
The soundness of the development as a form of argument is assured by
Theorem 8.1
Every standard nonempty circuit-free argument
is abstractly valid.
Proof
Any redirection of a nonempty circuit-free argument
IT is circuit-free, and so has a final vertex by 7.2.
If
all vertices in IT are standard it follows by 7.6 that IT is abstractly valid.
Standardness is a necessary as well as a sufficient condition for a Kneale argument to be abstractly valid:
Lemma 8.2
No connected corner-free argument has a proper
nonempty standard abstract subargument.
Theorem 8.3
A Kneale argument is an abstract proof iff it
is standard.
Proofs
For 8.2, let ir' be a proper nonempty standard ab-
stract subargument of a connected argument TT.
Since IT'
138
KNEALE PROOFS
Theorems 8.4-6
is standard the difference between TT and IT' cannot be just a difference in the specification of their premisses and conclusions, but must involve the omission of vertices or edges or both; and since TT is connected and TT' nonempty this means that there is a vertex b of TT' adjoining an edge E of 7T (going from b, say) such that E is not in TT'. Since TT' is an abstract subargument b is not a stroke, and is not a conclusion of TT and hence not of TT'.
But TT' is
standard, so b is not final in TT', i.e. some edge E' of TT' goes from it.
Hence TT contains the corner {E,b,E'}.
For 8.3, a standard Kneale argument is an abstract proof by 8.1.
Conversely a non-standard Kneale argument can have
no standard abstract subproof (not an improper one, by hypothesis, and not a proper one by 8.2 and 7.4), and so cannot be an abstract proof by 7.14.
We call a valid Kneale argument a Kneale proof, and an abstractly valid Kneale argument an abstract Kneale proof. The terms 'standard Kneale argument', 'abstract Kneale proof5, and 'standard Kneale proof are interchangeable by Theorem 8.3, and we generally use the last of the three.
These proofs
can be characterised in other ways too, as we now show.
Theorem 8.4
The standard Kneale proofs are the concise
circuit-free abstract proofs.
Theorem 8.5
The standard Kneale proofs are the concise
corner-free abstract proofs.
Theorem 8.6
The standard Kneale proofs are the connected
corner-free abstract proofs.
Proofs
For 8.4, a standard Kneale proof is circuit-free
by definition, an abstract proof by 8.3, and concise by
Section 8.2
VALIDITY
7.11, 7.14, 7.4 and 8.2.
139
Conversely any concise circuit-
free abstract proof TT is nonempty (by 7.4) and standard and connected (by 7.13); and so to show that it is a standard Kneale proof it is sufficient to show that it is corner-free.
If TT has a corner {E,b,E'}, where E joins b
and c, the argument obtained by deleting E is not connected and c is not in that component TT' which includes b, for otherwise there would be a path (b,c) in TT' and (b,c)u{E} would be a circuit in TT.
Now TT7 is a proper nonempty ab-
stract subargument of TT, and since {E,b,E'} is a corner, b is standard in TT' and hence IT' is standard.
It follows by
8.1 that TT' is a proper abstract subproof of IT, contrary to 7.11. For 8.5 and 8.6, we note that every standard Kneale proof is a concise corner-free abstract proof by 8.4, and every concise corner-free abstract proof is also connected by 7.13.
It is therefore sufficient to show that every
connected corner-free abstract proof ir is a standard Kneale proof.
By 7.4, TT is nonempty, and by 7.4 and 8.2 it has no
proper standard abstract subproof, and hence by 7.14 it must itself be standard. circuit-free.
It remains to show that TT is
If not, let E be an edge joining a formula
vertex b and a stroke c in some circuit y, and let IT' be obtained from IT by deleting E.
Since TT is corner-free b
is the unique non-standard vertex of IT', but IT' is connected since b and c are still connected by the path Yn7r'«
By 8.2,
TT' has no standard abstract subproof and so cannot be an abstract proof by 7.14.
So by 7.6 it has an abstract re-
direction in which there is no final vertex except perhaps b, and by redirecting E as necessary this can be extended to an abstract redirection of IT in which b must be final, by 7.6.
Hence the edges of y which adjoin b must form a
corner, contrary to hypothesis.
140
KNEALE PROOFS
Theorem 8.7
The analogue of Theorem 8.6 for circuit-free proofs is false: there are connected circuit-free abstract proofs which are not Kneale arguments, as Figure 8.7 shows.
Figure 8.7
The results of this section give us some purely syntactical criteria for abstract validity.
A circuit-free argument is
an abstract proof iff it has a standard nonempty abstract subargument (Theorems 7.4, 7.14 and 8.1); and a circuit-free or corner-free argument is an abstract proof iff it has a standard Kneale argument as an abstract subargument (Theorems 7.12 and 8.3-5).
8.3
Inadequacy
Kneale illustrated his rules for PC by constructing developments corresponding to the axioms and rules of the Principia Mathematica version of the propositional calculus.
Since
every tautology is deducible from the Principia' axioms by the Principia rules it ought to follow that there is a corresponding development for every tautology; but in fact it does not, and this failure exposes the inadequacy of the development as an instrument of proof.
To establish the fact we need to de-
fine two more properties of arguments: simplicity and normality.
Section 8.3
INADEQUACY
141
A graph of formulae and strokes is simple if there are never edges going from different occurrences of the same formula to one and the same stroke, or to different occurrences of the same formula from one and the same stroke. simple if it is based on a simple graph.
An argument is
For example, in each
of Figures 7.7 and 7.17 just one of the arguments is simple (and so is TT of Figure 7.16, since although two edges join occurrences of A and the same stroke, one is to the stroke and one from it). We have seen that in general it is necessary to distinguish between subarguments and abstract subarguments, but in the simple case the two coincide: a graph is simple iff every formal subgraph is an abstract one, and an argument is simple iff every subargument is an abstract one.
Theorem 8.7
Every proof has a simple subproof, and every
abstract proof has a simple, abstractly valid subproof.
Proof
If IT is any argument let IT' be obtained by deleting,
for each stroke, all edges in excess of one going to it from occurrences of the same formula and all edges in excess of one from it to occurrences of the same formula. Evidently IT' is simple and is a subargument of TT (though not in general an abstract subargument), and by 7.8 TT' is valid or abstractly valid if IT is.
It follows from this result that every minimal proof is simple, but a concise proof need not be simple, IT of Figure 7.17 being a case in point.
Simplicity is thus a formal property only
in the weaker sense.
Moreover a proof of a particular kind
need not have any simple subproofs of the same kind: for example Figure 8.8 shows a standard proof with no simple standard subproof, and a Kneale proof with no simple Kneale subproof.
Nevertheless every standard Kneale proof has a simple
142
KNEALE PROOFS
Theorems 8.8-9
standard Kneale subproof; for the deletion of, say, n edges as prescribed by Theorem 8,7 creates at most n non-standard vertices, but since the proof is circuit-free it creates n+1 components, one of which must therefore be standard and so valid by Theorem 8.3.
BvA
AvB
A&B
AvB
(AvB) & (AvB)
(A&B) & (A&B) Figure 8.8
The idea of normality depends on that of a subformula, and is therefore not a formal property in either sense.
In the case
of PC we shall take the subformula relation literally, as the ancestral of the relation which holds between A and each of A=>B, B^A, A&B, B&A, AvB, BvA and ~A; but when we come to deal with predicate calculus in Section 20.2 we shall follow Gentzen (1934) in allowing Fb to count as a subformula of (3x)Fx.
In-
deed any partial ordering of the formulae can be defined as the subformula relation for the purpose of establishing the c
subformula property' of normal proofs expressed by Theorem
8.8 below.
Given such a definition, and the idea of a proper
subformula of A as any subformula of A other than A itself, we may first divide the edges of any graph argument into major
Section 8.3
INADEQUACY
and minor ones as follows.
Let E-,...,E
143
be all the edges to
and from a stroke b, and let the other vertex of each E. be an occurrence of A.; then E. is minor if A. is a proper subformula of some A. and major otherwise.
An argument is normal if no
formula vertex has both a major edge to it and a major edge from it.
For examples of arguments which are abnormal in the
context of PC see Figure 9.7, where the occurrences of A&A and (A&B)&B have major edges both to and from them.
Theorem 8.8
Every formula that occurs in a standard normal
argument from X to Y is a subformula of a member of X or Y.
Proof
Let ir be any argument from X to Y and let Z be the
set of formulae which occur in IT but are not subformulae of members of X or Y.
Z is finite since TT is; hence if Z
is nonempty it has a maximal member A in the partial ordering determined by the subformula relation.
Every edge ad-
joining an occurrence of A is major, and TT therefore fails either to be normal or to be standard, according as the occurrence is or is not intermediate.
Theorem 8.9
Whenever there is a standard Kneale proof from X
to Y by the rules for PC there is one which is both simple and normal.
Proof
Let TT be a standard Kneale proof from X to Y by
the rules for PC, with the smallest possible number of edges.
Then IT is simple, since otherwise as we remarked
above it would have a (proper) simple standard Kneale subproof.
If 7T is not normal some formula vertex has a
major edge to it and a major edge from it.
An inspection
of the rules shows that IT must be of one of the nine forms sketched in tabular form in Figure 8.9, where in each case TT- and it * are Kneale arguments with the indicated occur-
144
KNEALE PROOFS
Theorem 8.10
rences of A as their only non-standard vertices.
But the
argument obtained from TT- and ir^ by identifying these occurrences (Figure 8.10) is a standard Kneale argument and so by 8.3 a standard Kneale proof - with fewer edges than TT, contrary to hypothesis.
A A A=>B A
BDA
B
A
A&A
B
B
A
B&A
A&B
B
A
A
A
AvA
AvB
BvA
A
A
B
B
Figure 8O9
Figure 8.10
A A
;
~A
A
Section 8.3
INADEQUACY
Theorem 8.10
145
There exists a tautology B such that there is
no standard Kneale proof from A to B by the rules for PC.
Proof
Take B to be (ADA)& (Av (ADA)), where A is a proposi-
tional variable.
By 8.9, if there is a standard Kneale
proof from A to B there is such a proof TT which is also simple and normal, so that by 8.8 every formula occurring in TT is B or one of its proper subformulae A V ( A D A ) , A D A and A.
Since TT is simple the only contexts in which an
inference stroke can occur are TT- to TTQ, shown in tabular form in Figure 8.11.
°
ADA
AV(ADA)
TT
_
*
IT
A
1
ADA
IT,
*
AV(ADA)
°
(ADA) & (Av (ADA) ) TT
A
A
TT
(ADA)&(AV(ADA))
AV (ADA)
AV(ADA)
A
( ADA) & (Av (ADA) ) TT g
ADA
ADA
*
AV(ADA)
Figure 8.11 Since ir is a standard proof from A no formula occurs initially. Since TT is normal occurrences of B cannot be intermediate, and so all must be final. can occur.
Hence only the contexts TT- to TT-
Similarly if there is an occurrence of AV(ADA)
in the context TT_ it cannot be initial and so must also belong to TT~ or TT_, contradicting the normality condition as before.
Hence only frn to IT. occur. 1 b
The same argument
prohibits the occurrence of A D A in the context T\,f so that only if- to TT,. can occur.
But now deleting the occurrences
of B (which, as we have seen, must be final) and the edges adjoining them leaves a nonempty graph in which exactly two edges adjoin each formula vertex (at least two since the
146
KNEALE PROOFS
Theorems 8,11-13
vertex, being standard, must be intermediate, and at most two since the graph is corner-free), and exactly two edges adjoin each stroke (by inspection of IT- to ir^).
Each com-
ponent of such a graph, being finite, must be a circuit, and hence IT contains a circuit, contrary to hypothesis. The proof is designed to go through whether or not the rules are construed having regard to multiplicity of occurrence (some passages in Kneale suggest the one course, some the other).
Both proof and result can easily be
modified to match Kneale's use of arbitrary formulae instead of A in rules and developments.
It follows from Theorem 8.10 that either the rules proposed for PC are incomplete or developments (standard Kneale proofs) are inadequate as a means of proof.
In fact the rules are
complete (Section 18.1), but it is not necessary to establish this in order to show that the trouble is due to the idea of proof and not the rules: it is sufficient to show that the particular tautology in question follows from A by the rules, and for this we only have to cite the tree proof shown in Figure 8.12.
A
ADA
ADA
AV(ADA)
Av ( A D A )
(ADA) &
(Av ( A D A ) )
(ADA)&(AV(ADA))
Figure 8.12
We have therefore provided an example of rules R and premisses X and conclusions Y such that X h_ Y but there is no standard K Kneale proof from X to Y by R.
Theorem 8.11
In other words:
Standard Kneale proofs are inadequatet
Section 8.3
INADEQUACY
147
It follows from Theorems 7.12 and 8.4 or 8.5 as the case may be, that
Theorem 8.12
Circuit-free abstract proofs are inadequate.
Theorem 8.13
Corner-free abstract proofs are inadequate.
We can similarly use Theorems 8.4 and 8.5 together to establish the inadequacy of the entire class of proofs which are (i) abstractly valid and (ii) circuit-free or corner-free or both.
If we are to obtain an adequate concept of proof we
must therefore abandon one or other of these features.
In
the next chapter we consider proofs which are circuit-free or corner-free or both, but which are not in general abstract proofs; and in Chapter 10 abstract proofs which may contain both circuits and corners.
9 - Cross-reference
9.1
Junction and election
We have seen that the standard Kneale proofs are inadequate. If we can discover the cause we may be able to remedy it. For a given set of rules R, therefore, let K_ be the relation which holds between X and Y iff there is a standard Kneale proof from X to Y by R.
Lemma 9.1
K- contains R and is closed under overlap and
dilution.
Proof
Closure under dilution follows at once from the
definition of a graph proof.
The other two properties
are demonstrated in Figure 9.1, IT being a standard Kneale proof from X to Y in the case where A is common to X and Y, and TT2 a similar proof from the premisses A_,..,,A of any rule to its conclusions B-,...,B .
Figure 9.1
Section 9.1
Since K_ c h
JUNCTION AND ELECTION
(Theorem 7.3) but K^ and h
149
are not in general
identical (Theorem 8.11), K^ must fail to be closed under cut for formulae (Theorem 2.16), let alone cut for sets in general. To see why cut fails, let TT and ir^ be arguments which have just one vertex b in common, b being a conclusion of TT^ and a premiss of TT^. We say that TT is the junction of TT and TT. if the graph of TT is the union of those of TT- and TU* the premisses of TT being those of TT (other than b) plus those of TT , and the conclusions of TT being those of TT (other than b) plus those of TT2.
Figure 9.2 illustrates the idea.
Figure 9.2
Theorem 9.2
Proof
Junction preserves validity and abstract validity.
Suppose that TT is the junction of proofs TT and TU
whose common vertex is an occurrence of A, say. is a consequence of X
by R TT -i
A,Y . X
h
TT
and so by dilution X TT-i
Similarly X ,A h_
TT
K_
Then Y h_ TT K « .
Y , and so by cut for A we have TT
Y ; i.e. TT is valid.
The preservation of abstract
validity follows, since any argument abstractly isomorphic to TT is the junction of arguments abstractly isomorphic to TT1
and TT2.
Now suppose that TT- is a standard Kneale proof from X to A,Y and TU is a standard Kneale proof from X,A to Y,
If A occurs
just once as a conclusion in TT- and just once as a premiss in IU, the junction of TT- and TT^ (or of suitably chosen replicas
150
CROSS-REFERENCE
Theorem 9.3
of them) will evidently be a standard Kneale proof from X to Y.
If A occurs several times in one role (say as conclusion
in T O but only once in the other, a single operation of junction will leave final occurrences of A outstanding as conclusions, but these can be dealt with by invoking appropriate replicas of TT^ and joining them as in Figure 9.3,
If these
were all the cases that could arise, K- would be closed under cut.
But if A occurs more than once as conclusion in TT- and
also more than once as premiss in TT^, then each time we invoke a replica of TT^ in order to neutralise an unwanted occurrence of A as a conclusion, we add other occurrences of A as premiss which call for neutralisation in their turn; and if we invoke fresh replicas of IT., to deal with them we create fresh conclusions, and so on, as in Figure 9.4.
Clearly we
shall never obtain a standard proof from X to Y in this way. One might exist independently, of course, but Theorem 8.11 excludes this as a general possibility.
6 A6 Figure 9.3
Figure 9.4
We can see in this the Achilles' heel of the strategy implicit in Kneale's Principia illustration.
It would be natural to
suppose that a development for any tautology could be obtained by junction from the developments corresponding to the various steps in its Principia proof, but Figure 9.5 shows why this breaks down in the case we considered in Theorem 8.10.
The table TT- is a development from A to A^A
and TT2 is a development from A^A to (A^A) & (Av (A^A)); but AsA occurs twice as premiss in TT2 and twice as conclusion in IT- ,
Section 9.1
JUNCTION AND ELECTION
151
and consequently their junction TT fails to supply the expected development from A to (ADA) & (Av (ADA) ). ADA
ADA
ADA
ADA
ADA
AV(ADA)
(ADA)
A
& (Av (ADA) )
ADA
ADA (ADA)
AV(ADA)
& (Av (ADA) )
Figure 9,5 Can TT be regarded as a proof from A to (ADA) & (Av (ADA) ) despite the presence of initial and final occurrences of ADA?
It
would have to be what we have called a non-standard proof, and Kneale's tabular notation is inadequate for non-standard arguments without some supplementation to indicate which of the initial and final occurrences of formulae are meant to be premisses or conclusions.
We therefore revert to our own
explicitly graphical notation.
Let TT' be a subargument of an argument TT, differing from it only in the specification of its premisses and conclusions, and such that X , = X TT
TT
and Y , = Y . TT
In other words the
TT
graphs of TT and TT' are the same but a premiss of TT need not be a premiss of TT' provided some other occurrence of the same formula is a premiss of TT'; and similarly with conclusions.
In such a case we say that TT' is obtained from TT by
the election of representative premisses and conclusions.
It
is immediate from the definition of validity that TT' is a proof from X to Y by R whenever TT is, so that Theorem 9.3
Election preserves validity.
Unlike junction, election does not preserve abstract validity, since its application exploits the recurrence of the elected
152
CROSS-REFERENCE
formulae.
Theorem 9.4
But it overcomes the difficulty about junction and
cut, for by election we can reduce the number of occurrences of a formula as premiss or conclusion to just one in each case, before applying junction.
Theorem 9.4
Thus we have
The closure of the standard Kneale proofs under
junction and election is an adequate class of proofs.
Proof
Let S be the closure of the standard Kneale proofs
under junction and election, and for any given R let X H Y mean that there is an argument in S from X to Y by R.
By
9.2 and 9.3 any argument in S is a proof, i.e. h c \K Since-K- c h, by 9.1 I- contains R and is closed under overlap; and it is evidently closed under dilution.
By
2.16 it only remains to show that h is closed under cut for formulae.
Suppose then that X h A,Y and X,A h Y, so
that there exist proofs TT- and TU in S from X to A,Y and from X,A to Y respectively.
If either is a proof from
X to Y then at once X h Y.
Otherwise let TT' and IT' be
obtained from TT- and TT^ by election, so that A occurs just once as a conclusion in TT' and just once as a premiss in TT'.
Then TT' and TT' are both in S, and the junc-
tion of appropriate replicas of them is the required proof from X to Y. Figure 9.6 illustrates these various ideas in the case we have been considering.
The graph proofs TT- and TT- corres-
pond to the developments TT and TT2 of Figure 9.5, and TT' and TT' are obtained from them by electing one of the two occurrences of A^A in each case.
The desired proof from A
to (A^A)&(Av(A^A)) can now be obtained by joining IT' and TT' to form TT as in the figure.
Whereas TT- and TT^ are stan-
dard abstract proofs, TT' TT' and TT are non-standard and, though proofs, are not abstract ones.
Someone arguing his
Section 9.1
JUNCTION AND ELECTION
153
way through IT', say, could justify the inscription of the non-standard occurrence of A^A on the ground that he was merely reiterating a formula which he had elsewhere posited as a premiss; but this sort of justification by cross-reference depends entirely on its being the same formula which occurs in both places, and so is not abstract.
VADA
OADA A=A
y p \
/Av(A=A)
OADA
A
QA=A
Figure 9.6
154
9.2
CROSS-REFERENCE
Cross-referenced Kneale proofs
Theorem 9.4 ensures incidentally that graph proofs as a whole are adequate, but its immediate interest lies in the challenge of finding a more explicit characterisation of the particular variety of proof which the theorem shows to be adequate but which it only describes inductively.
Whenever a vertex a is made non-standard as a result of election in a connected argument, there will be a path (a,b) connecting a and b, where b is a premiss or conclusion that is an occurrence of the same formula as a.
Since a and b
are both initial or both final in the argument as a whole, they are both initial or both final in (a,b).
If the argu-
ment is subsequently embedded by junction in a larger one, b may cease to have any distinctive status but the path (a,b) will survive as a reminder that a can be justified by cross-reference to b (cf. Figure 9.6). We therefore define a cross-reference path to be a path (a,b) such that a and b are occurrences of the same formula and are both initial or both final in the path.
The proofs described in Theorem 9.4 all
have the feature that every non-standard vertex belongs to a cross-reference path, but this alone is insufficient to characterise them.
For example, Figure 9.7 shows two Kneale
arguments which have this feature but are invalid - TT- being an argument from A to arbitrary A by the rules for PC, and TT2 an argument from arbitrary A to arbitrary B by the same rules.
Taken separately, either of the initial occurrences
of A in IT- could be justified by cross-reference to the other, but there is an obvious circularity in trying to justify them simultaneously in this way.
Similarly in ir- the initial oc-
currences of A&B and B can each be justified by cross-reference to the intermediate occurrence of the same formula, but again there is a circularity involved in doing both things at once:
Section 9.2
CROSS-REFERENCED KNEALE PROOFS
155
the initial occurrence of A&B is justified by cross-reference to the intermediate one, which in its turn is justified by being deduced from (inter alia) the initial occurrence of B, which is justified by cross-reference to the intermediate occurrence of B, which, completing the circle, is justified by being deduced from the initial occurrence of A&B,
OA&B
¥ A&B
Q (A&B)&B
Figure 9.7 We therefore say that a Kneale argument is cross-referenced if its non-standard vertices can be arranged in a sequence a-,...,a
such that there exist cross-reference paths
(a 1 ,b 1 ),...,(a n ,b n ), where no b^ appears in (a.,b.) for j>i unless b.=b..
In such a case we say that the sequence of
paths justifies the argument.
(An adequate class of proofs
may be obtained by omitting the concession for the case b.=b.
156
CROSS-REFERENCE
Theorems 9.5-6
and requiring that no b. shall appear in (a.,b.) for any j>i. But this unnaturally excludes proofs such as IT in Figure 9.6, in which two non-standard vertices are justified by crossreference to the same standard one.)
Theorem 9.5
The cross-referenced Kneale arguments are the
closure of the standard Kneale arguments under junction and election.
Proof
We have to show that the class of cross-referenced
Kneale arguments (i) contains the standard Kneale arguments and is closed under (ii) junction and (iii) election; and conversely that (iv) every cross-referenced Kneale argument belongs to the closure.
A standard Kneale argument
has no non-standard vertices, so (i) is immediate*
For
(ii), if TT- and TT^ are cross-referenced Kneale arguments justified by sequences of cross-reference paths a-,...,a and a +-,...,a , and if ir is obtained from them by junction, the sequence a-,...,a
justifies TT. For (iii), if TT is a
cross-referenced Kneale argument and TT' is obtained from TT by election, then the non-standard initial vertices a~,..,,a. of TT' that are standard in TT are occurrences of the same formulae as premisses b.,...,b, of TT', and the non-standard final vertices a, -,...,a
of TT' that are standard in TT are
occurrences of the same formulae as conclusions b,+-,...,b of TT'.
It follows that if the sequence (a - ,b . . , ) , . . . , m+i m+i
(a ,b ) justifies TT then (a-,b-),..., (a ,b ) justifies TT'; for since TT' is corner-free and since for each i (l£i£m) b. is standard and either initial or final in TT', b. can lie on a path only as an endpoint and b.^a. for each j. For (iv) we proceed by induction on the number n of nonstandard vertices in TT. If n=0, ir is a standard Kneale argument and hence in the closure.
If n^l, let (a-,b-),
...,(a ,b ) be a sequence of cross-reference paths which
Section 9.2
CROSS-REFERENCED KNEALE PROOFS
justifies TT.
157
Then b. is distinct from a. and by the con-
dition on the sequence it is also distinct from a 2 ,...,a n and so is standard.
Let TT. be the union of b. and the
paths of TT in which b. is a final endpoint, and TU the union of b. and the paths in which b- is an initial endpoint.
Each vertex is to be a premiss or conclusion of
TT- or TT2 if it is a premiss or conclusion of TT, and in addition b- is a conclusion of TT. and a premiss of T U . Evidently TT- and TT^ are connected and nonempty, and hence they are Kneale arguments.
Since TT is connected they
exhaust the vertices and edges of TT, and since IT is circuit-free they have only b- in common.
It follows that
TT is the junction of TT. and T U . Since b
is standard in
both TT. and TT9 we may suppose that a.,a. ,...,a.
and
a. ,...,a. (k>l) are the subsequences of a-,..., a that x x k+l n in comprise the non-standard vertices of TT- and TT2 respectively. Since b- lies on none of (ao,bo),...,(a ,b ) unless as an l z z n n endpoint, TT2 is a cross-referenced Kneale argument justi),...,(a. ,b. ) , and is fied by the sequence (a. ,b. L x k+l / n Ln # k+l in the closure by the induction hypothesis. Let TT' differ from TT- only in that a- is a premiss or conclusion according as it is initial or final in (a.,b-).
Then IT' too is
a cross-referenced Kneale argument justified by the sequence (a. ,b. ),...,(a. ,b. ) , and it too is in the closure by the induction hypothesis.
But now TT- is obtained from TT' by
election, and IT from TT- and TT2 by junction, so that TT is in the closure as required. Theorem 9.5 answers our question about the characterisation of the class of proofs introduced by Theorem 9.4, and from the two results (with Theorem 8.3) we have at once Theorem 9.6
Every cross-referenced Kneale argument is valid
158
CROSS-REFERENCE
Theorem 9.7
which means that we may use the terms ccross-referenced Kneale argument5 and ccross-referenced Kneale proof5 interchangeably, and
Theorem 9.7
9.3
Cross-referenced Kneale proofs are adequate.
Cross-referenced
circuits
We know from Theorems 8.1 and 8.12 that standard circuit-free proofs are inadequate, and consequently the cross-referenced Kneale proofs only achieve adequacy by sacrificing standardness.
In this section we show contrariwise that an adequate
class of standard corner-free proofs can be obtained provided we disregard Kneale's prohibition of circuits.
Given that
Kneale ignores questions of recurrence there is a good deal of justification for his position, for Theorem 8.5 shows that
Figure 9.8
Section 9.3
CROSS-REFERENCED CIRCUITS
159
a circuit in a corner-free abstract proof is never more than an excrescence.
If we are content with mere validity, how-
ever, a circuit can make an essential contribution to a proof. Even Kneale's example (reproduced as n. in Figure 9.8) is fallacious only if the formulae A and B are distinct; otherwise we have the proof ir2 exemplifying the valid form also shown in the figure.
We can see moreover how circuits of this sort can be utilised to solve the problem of junction and cut.
Consider our usual
example, where A^A occurs twice as premiss or conclusion in each of the standard proofs IT- and TT^ shown in Figure 9.6. By joining TT- and TU at both places simultaneously we obtain the argument of Figure 9.9, which contains a circuit but is a standard proof from A to (A=>A)&(Av(A^A)) by the rules for PC.
AV(ADA)
A (ADA)&(AV(ADA))
Figure 9.9 In general, let TT- and TT^ be arguments whose common vertices a. ,...,a, (k^l) are conclusions of IT- and premisses of TT^, and are all occurrences of the same formula.
We say that IT
160
Theorems 9.8-9
CROSS-REFERENCE
is the multiple junction of TT and TU if the graph of TT is the union of those of TT and TU, the premisses of TT being
those of TT2 (other than a . . . . . . ,a, ) plus those of TT , and the conclusions of TT being those of TT.. (other than a-,...,a.) plus those of TT2.
Figure 9.10 illustrates the idea.
We may argue
exactly as for Theorem 9.2 to show that
Theorem 9.8
Multiple junction preserves validity
but multiple junction does not in general preserve abstract validity since it exploits the recurrence of the formula occurring at the common vertices.
Figure 9.9 is a case in
point, where the multiple junction of a pair of abstract proofs is not itself abstractly valid.
m A
A
A
i
A
A
Figure 9.10 It was fortuitous that in this example A^A occurred exactly as often as a conclusion of TT as it did as a premiss of TT . In general the multiple junction of a pair of proofs will have unwanted occurrences of the relevant formula, as in Figure 9.10.
We have already come across a similar situa-
tion in Section 9.1 in the case of simple junction.
Here
however we can deal with it, as we could not do then, by coining sufficiently many replicas of the two proofs.
For
if the same formula occurs m times as a conclusion in TT. and
Section 9.3
CROSS-REFERENCED CIRCUITS
161
n times as a premiss in TT_, we can first bring these up to the same number nun by considering n replicas of IT and m o TT2, and then use multiple junction, as in Figure 9.11.
Figure 9.11
Theorem 9.9
The closure of the standard Kneale proofs under
multiple junction is an adequate class of proofs.
Proof
Let S be the closure of the standard Kneale proofs
under multiple junction.
It is sufficient to show that,
for any given rules, deducibility by means of proofs in S is closed under cut for formulae, the remainder of the argument following precisely the lines of 9.4.
So let TT-
be a proof in S from X to A,Y in which A occurs as conclusion as few times as possible, say m- times; and let ir^ be a proof in S from X,A to Y by the same rules in which A occurs as premiss as few times as possible, say nu times. Then either m- or nu is zero, since otherwise the multiple junction of appropriate replicas of TT- and TT? is a proof in S from X to A,Y with ^--iiu occurrences of A as conclusion, or else it is a proof from X,A to Y with nu-m-
occurrences
of A as premiss, contradicting the choice of TT- or TT^. Hence either TT. or TT^ is a proof from X to Y as required.
We call an argument a cross-referenced-circuit argument if it
162
Theorems 9.10-11
CROSS-REFERENCE
is connected, nonempty and corner-free, and every circuit contains a cross-reference path.
For example, every Kneale ar-
gument is one, as is the argument shown in Figure 9.9.
Theorem 9.10
Every standard cross-referenced-circuit argu-
ment is valid.
Proof
Every circuit in any formal redirection of such an
argument contains a cross-reference path and hence is not directed.
The result follows by 7.2 and 7.5.
Both the standard arguments and the cross-referenced-circuit arguments are closed under multiple junction (in the latter case because any circuit created as a result of multiple junction contains a cross-reference, and the stipulation in the definition that k>l ensures that the multiple junction of connected arguments is connected).
So the standard cross-
referenced-circuit proofs are closed under multiple junction, and by Theorem 9.9 we have
Theorem 9.11
Standard cross-referenced-circuit proofs are
adequate.
Figure 9.12
Section 9.4
OTHER NON-ABSTRACT PROOFS
163
Although the class of proofs defined in Theorem 9.9 consists exclusively of standard cross-referenced-circuit proofs it does not exhaust them, as Figure 9.12 shows.
9.4
Other non-abstract proofs
The proofs we have considered so far have all been cornerfree, but they do not exhaust the corner-free proofs.
The
cross-referenced Kneale proofs do not even exhaust the Kneale proofs, as the example of a concise Kneale proof in Figure 9.13 shows.
We leave to the reader the problem of finding
syntactical criteria for a Kneale argument to be (1) a proof and (2) a concise proof.
The second of these problems may
perhaps be solved by equating the concise Kneale proofs with the cross-referenced ones, in a suitably extended sense of *cross-referenced*.
For example, the idea of a cross-refer-
Av(A&A)
(AVA)&AA Figure 9.13
A&AA Figure 9.14
AA Figure 9.15
AA
164
CROSS-REFERENCE
ence path might be extended to include paths joining an initial and a final occurrence of the same formula, provided they contain cross-reference paths of the orthodox kind. The path joining the non-standard vertices in Figure 9.13 is like this, and the validity of arguments containing such paths can be explained by regarding them as cross-referencedcircuit proofs whose circuits have been prised open.
But any
solution along these lines would require us to take account of multiplicity of occurrence in rules of inference, or equivalent ly to redefine csubargument* to mean what we presently call an abstract subargument; for as things stand, even a cross-referenced proof of the orthodox kind need not be concise, as Figure 9.14 shows.
Since every proof has a concise subproof, it might be thought that a Kneale argument will be a proof iff it has a concise Kneale proof as a subargument, and hence that a solution to the second problem would automatically provide a solution to the first.
The fallacy here is the assumption that a sub-
proof of a Kneale proof must also be a Kneale proof, and Figure 9.15 provides a counterexample to this.
The Kneale
proof TT has a unique concise subproof, namely IT', but ir' is disconnected and so not a Kneale proof.
This example also
suggests that the first problem may be less tractable than the second.
For in general the more validity depends on ab-
stract graphical form (as opposed to recurrence of formulae) the easier it is to devise a satisfactory syntactical criterion for it.
But the validity of IT derives from that of
IT' , and the validity of a disconnected proof is sometimes attributable almost entirely to recurrence.
This is illus-
trated by Figure 9.16, where the validity of the pattern TT2, obtained by decomposing the abstractly valid pattern TT- into its various steps, is predominantly due to its numerous cross-references.
Section 9.4
OTHER NON-ABSTRACT PROOFS
165
S) A Figure 9.16
A&B
2)
A
Z\B&A
Figure 9.17
Figure 9.18
Figure 9.19
Cross-referenced-circuit proofs pose similar problems in the context of corner-free proofs in general.
The cross-referenced-
circuit proofs exhaust neither the standard connected cornerfree proofs (Figure 9.17), nor the standard concise corner-free
166
CROSS-REFERENCE
proofs (Figure 9.18).
The example TT in Figure 9*18 of a stan-
dard, concise but disconnected pattern of proof is particularly interesting since our previous examples of concise disconnected proofs in Figures 9.15 and 9.16 were circuit-free and so (by Theorems 7.13 and 8.1) necessarily non-standard.
Finally there are proofs which fall within the scope of this chapter because they are circuit-free, but which contain corners.
A good example is the proof from A&B to B&A by the
rules for PC shown in Figure 9.19.
The path joining the non-
standard vertices here is not a cross-reference path, even in the extended sense suggested in connection with Figure 9.13. It might be feasible to licence it by counting as a crossreference path any that connects two occurrences of the same formula, provided that the number of corners in the path is odd or even according as the number of its initial (or final) endpoints is.
But this is only a tentative suggestion and we
leave open the problem of finding syntactical criteria for a circuit-free argument to be a proof or a concise proof.
10 • Abstract proofs
10.1
Cornered-circuit proofs
We know from Theorems 8.12 and 8.13 that an adequate class of abstract proofs must permit the formation of both corners and circuits.
With this in mind we offer a third solution to the
problem of junction and cut posed in Section 9.1, by invoking the operation of identifying or coalescing different occurrences of the same formula in a proof.
We say that ir' is obtained from a graph argument TT by identification if it is the result of omitting vertices a*,..,^ from IT and replacing every edge to or from any of them by a corresponding edge to or from the vertex a.., where all the a. are occurrences of the same formula; provided that if any a. is a premiss (conclusion) then a., is a premiss (conclusion) and all the a. are initial (final).
For example, the pattern
shown in Figure 10.1 is obtained by identifying the samenumbered vertices in the pattern of Figure 9.18.
By prohibi-
ting the identification of premisses with non-initial vertices (or conclusions with non-final ones), the proviso in the definition ensures that the result of identification is always a graph argument; and by prohibiting the identification of a premiss a. with a non-premiss a- (or a conclusion with a nonconclusion a-) it ensures that X , = X
and Y , = Y
and hence,
since evidently R , = R , that identification preserves validity 7T
TT
Note that IT' may have fewer edges than TT, since if there are
168
ABSTRACT PROOFS.
Theorems 10.1-2
edges in IT from the same stroke to more than one of the a., they will be replaced by a single edge in IT'.
Figure
!Av(A=>A)
A
ADA
A A=A
A (A=>A)&(Av(A=>A))
Figure 10.2
Section 10.1
CORNERED-CIRCUIT PROOFS
169
It is sufficient for our immediate purpose to consider only the identification of premisses and conclusions, where the vertices to be identified are either all premisses or all conclusions.
For instance, returning to our stock example
from Theorem 8.10, TT' of Figure 10.2 is obtained from TT by identification of conclusions, and TT' from TT^ by identificaEvidently TT' is an abstract proof from
tion of premisses.
A to A^A and TT' from A^A to (A^A) & (Av (A^A)) , and as each has only one occurrence of A^A we can obtain by junction the desired abstract proof TT from A to (A=>A) & (Av (A^A) ) .
Theorem 10.1
Identification preserves validity and abstract
validity.
Theorem 10.2
The closure of the standard Kneale proofs under
identification of premisses and conclusions and junction is an adequate class of abstract proofs.
Proofs
For 10.1, we have shown in the text that identifi-
cation preserves validity, and since any argument abstractly isomorphic to one obtained by identification from TT can also be obtained by identification from one abstractly isomorphic to TT, identification preserves abstract validity also. For 10.2, every argument in the closure is an abstract proof by 8.3, 9.2 and 10.1, and as in the proof of 9.9 it is sufficient to show that if there are in the closure abstract proofs TT- from X to A,Y and TT^ from X,A to Y, then there is also in the closure an abstract proof from X to Y.
Let a.,...,a
be the occurrences of A as conclusions
of TT.. and let bn,...,b
1
misses of TT«.
in
be the occurrences of A as pre-
If m=0 or any of the b. is a conclusion of
TT« then ft- is the required proof from X to Y; and similarly
170
ABSTRACT PROOFS
Theorems 10.3-6
if n=0 or any of the a. is a premiss of TT- then ir2 is the required proof. a
Otherwise, choosing suitable replicas so
=
that -i b^ but TT- and TT^ have no other vertex in common, we may obtain a proof from X to Y by identifying a2,,,, with a.., identifying b2,...,b
with b-, and joining the
resulting arguments (cf. Figure 10.3).
7T/
1
Figure 10.3
When identification is confined to premisses and conclusions, and hence to vertices which are all initial or all final, any circuit formed as a result of identifications will necessarily be cornered, i.e. will contain a corner. circuits in Figure 10.2 are cornered.
For example, all the
A nonempty argument in
which every circuit is cornered we call a cornered-circuit argument.
Theorem 10.3
Every standard cornered-circuit argument is
abstractly valid.
Theorem 10.4
Proofs
Standard cornered-circuit proofs are adequate.
For 10.3, since abstract redirection converts cor-
Section 10.1
CORNERED-CIRCUIT PROOFS
171
ners into corners, every circuit in an abstract redirection ir' of a cornered-circuit argument IT is cornered and so not directed.
By 7.2 IT' therefore has a final vertex, and if
every vertex in TT is standard it follows by 7.6 that IT is abstractly valid. For 10.4, we have noted that the class of corneredcircuit arguments is closed under identification of premisses and conclusions, and it is closed too under junction, which never creates circuits.
Since every Kneale
proof is a cornered-circuit argument, and since both operations preserve standardness, it follows that every member of the class of proofs defined in 10.2 is a standard cornered-circuit proof, whence the result follows by 10.2,
The proof of Theorem 10.4 has shown that all the proofs that can be obtained from standard Kneale ones by identification of premisses and conclusions and junction are standard cprneredcircuit proofs, but the example of Figure 8,7 shows that they dp not exhaust the standard cornered-circuit proofs.
We return to
them in Theorem 10.12; meanwhile we show that the standard cornered-circuit proofs constitute the closure under the same two operations of a wider class than the standard Kneale proofs:
Theorem 10.5
The standard cornered-circuit arguments are the
closure of the standard nonempty circuit-free arguments under identification of premisses and conclusions and junction.
Lemma 10.6
If a cornered-circuit argument has any formula
vertices, it has one which is not intermediate in any circuit.
Proofs
For any graph IT let n(b,ir) be 1 or 0 according as
if does or does not contain a corner at b, and let n(ir) be the number of corners in IT.
For 10.6, let TT be a cornered-
circuit argument containing a formula vertex a-•
Suppose
172
ABSTRACT PROOFS
that each formula vertex b of ir is intermediate in some circuit y(b); where there is a choice we take y(b) to have as few corners as possible.
Starting at a- and moving
along Y(a-i) we trace out a walk a.. ,E-,a2,... through IT, leaving y(a.) only when we reach a vertex a. at which y(a.) has a corner and transferring to y(a.) in the direction that avoids the creation of a corner at a..
The walk is
to stop as soon as it reaches a vertex a, on a circuit y(a.) which the walk joined at a. and left at a. (a.^a, ) . i i J J K We have in this way defined three paths connecting a. and a, which have only their endpoints in common (Figure 10,4):
|6
Figure 10.4 the terminal portion a.,E.,...,a, of the walk, which we J J K shall call 6, and the two paths a and 3 which together make up y(a')»
By construction n(a.,au3) - 1 and n(a.,au6)
n(a.,3u6) = n(6) = 0.
Since 3u6 is cornered, 1 < n(3u6) =
n(3)+n(6)+n(a,,3u6)+n(a.,3u6) = n(3)+n(a^,3u6). n(a, ,au3)+l ^ n(a,,au6)+n(a, ,3u6), so n(a,,au6) <
Evidently
Section 10.1
CORNERED-CIRCUIT PROOFS
n(3)+n(ak,au3).
173
Hence n(au6) = n(a)+n(6)+n(a,,au6)+
n(a.,au6) < n(a)+n(3)+n(a,,au$)+n(a.,au3) = n(au3) K J J n(y(a.))«
Thus n(au6) < n(y(a.))> and similarly n(3u6) <
n(y(a.))»
It follows that a. is not intermediate either
in au6 or in $u6, since otherwise one of these circuits would have been chosen as y(a.)«
On the other hand a. is
intermediate in au$, which is y(a.)» and so is intermediate in (au6)u(3u6).
It must therefore be initial in otu6 and
final in $u6 or vice versa, so that there are at least two edges to it and at least two from it in the subgraph au$i)6. But this is impossible since a. adjoins at most three edges of the subgraph; hence the result follows by reductio ad absurdum.
(This proof is spelt out more fully and set
in a more general context in Shoesmith and Smiley, 1979.) For 10.5, since we know that the standard corneredcircuit arguments contain the standard nonempty circuitfree ones and are closed under identification of premisses and conclusions and junction, it is sufficient to show that every standard cornered-circuit argument IT belongs to the closure in question.
We proceed by induction on
the number of circuits in TT.
If there are none, ir is it-
self a standard nonempty circuit-free argument.
If there
are circuits in TT, their union TT' contains by 10.6 a formula vertex b which is intermediate in no circuit of TT' and hence in no circuit of IT.
It follows that the union
TT^ of b and paths of TT in which b is a final endpoint has only b in common with the union of b and paths in which it is an initial endpoint.
Let i\^ be this latter union
together with any components of TT that do not contain b. Then specifying b to be a conclusion in TT and a premiss in TT2, but otherwise treating their vertices as in TT, we have that TT is the junction of TT and TT^.
Every circuit of TT
is either wholly in TT- or wholly in TT^, and since b is in TT' it follows that some corner {E,b,E'} is in a circuit of
174
ABSTRACT PROOFS
7T-, say.
Theorem 10.7
Let ir' be the argument obtained from TT- by re-
placing E' by an edge to a new conclusion b', this being an occurrence of the same formula as b.
Then ir' has fever
circuits than TT- , and so Trf and TT^ have between them fewer circuits than IT.
Hence by the induction hypothesis each
of them belongs to the closure.
But IT. is obtained from
ft' by identification of the conclusion b' with b, and since TT is the junction of ir- and ^
it follows that IT is
in the closure, as required.
10.2
Conciseness
Although we know from Theorem 7.13 that a concise abstract proof is necessarily standard and connected, these conditions are not sufficient for conciseness even for cornered-circuit proofs.
For example, the proof shown in Figure 8.7 is stan-
dard and connected, but either leg is a proper abstract subproof.
We show that the concise cornered-circuit abstract
proofs comprise precisely the class of proofs defined inductively and shown to be adequate in Theorem 10.2, but first we establish a number of non-inductive conditions for a corneredcircuit argument to be a concise abstract proof: there are intriguingly many.
Given a graph argument TT, suppose we delete every edge in excess of one to each formula vertex, and every edge in excess of one from each formula vertex.
The result is a graph with
the same vertices as TT but without corners, and we call it a corner-free residue or simply a residue of TT.
A residue is,
in other words, a maximal corner-free subgraph.
In general
a graph has a number of different residues: indeed there is a unique residue iff the original graph is corner-free, when its only residue is itself.
The cornered-circuit property is
Section 10.2
CONCISENESS
175
equivalent to the requirement that every residue should be circuit-free.
We are concerned only with the residue as a
graph and not with its possible status as an argument, but we note that a formula vertex is initial, final or intermediate in a residue according as it is initial, final or intermediate in the original graph.
Theorem 10.7
An abstract proof in which every residue is
connected is concise.
Proof
Let ir be an abstract proof which is not concise.
By 7.11 7T has a proper abstract subproof, which in turn has a standard abstract subproof IT' by 7.14.
Let y' be
a residue of IT' and let y be a residue of ir that contains y'.
Since ir' is standard a formula vertex of y' is initial
(or final) in y' iff it is initial (final) in y.
So any
edge of y not in y' adjoins a formula vertex not in IT', and must join it and a stroke not in TT', since IT' is an abstract subargument of TT. a component of y.
Hence each component of y' is
But since TT' is standard and a proper
abstract subargument of TT, it must lack some stroke of IT, so that y' ^ y.
Since y' is nonempty it follows that y
is not connected.
In general the converse of this result fails: even a standard abstract proof may fail to have any connected residue and still be concise (Figure 10.11).
If however we restrict our
attention to cornered-circuit arguments we obtain a condition that is both necessary and sufficient.
In the statement of
this condition in Theorem 10.9 the ambiguity of 'any' is deliberate, being justified by Theorem 10.8.
Its effect is that
we can test for conciseness by drawing a residue at random and seeing whether or not it is connected.
176
ABSTRACT PROOFS
Theorem 10.8
Theorems 10.8-10
Either all residues of a cornered-circuit ar-
gument are connected or none is.
Theorem 10.9
A cornered-circuit argument is a concise ab-
stract proof iff it is standard and any residue is connected.
Proofs
For 10.8 it is sufficient to consider the special
case in which two residues differ by only one edge, the general result following by iteration.
Suppose then that
the residues y and y' of a cornered-circuit argument ir differ only in that y has an edge E joining a formula vertex a and a stroke b, while y' has an edge E' joining a and a stroke b', where {E,a,E'} is a corner. if y is connected then so is y'.
We show that
Since all residues of a
cornered-circuit argument are circuit-free, at most one path in y' (or in y) connects any two vertices.
The path
connecting a and b' in y' is {a,E',b'}, so the path which by hypothesis connects them in y cannot be contained in y' and so must include E; i.e. it is of the form {a,E,b,...,b'}. Accordingly b and b' are connected in y by a path excluding E, and hence a and b are connected in y'.
The connected-
ness of y' then follows from that of y. For 10.9, a standard cornered-circuit argument in which every residue is connected is abstractly valid by 10.3 and concise by 10.7.
Conversely a concise cornered-circuit
abstract proof ir is standard by 7.13.
Let y be a maximal
corner-free connected subgraph of TT, and let ir' be the subgraph of ir obtained by adding to y all edges of IT that join vertices of y.
If some formula vertex a of IT' is
initial (or final) in TT' but not in ir, then some edge E of IT goes to a from a stroke b (or vice versa), where b is not in y.
Also i