Multinationals on the Periphery Edited by
Gabriel R.G. Benito and Rajneesh Narula
Multinationals on the Periphery
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Multinationals on the Periphery Edited by
Gabriel R.G. Benito and Rajneesh Narula
Multinationals on the Periphery
Also by Gabriel R.G.Benito FOREIGN OPERATION METHODS: Theory, Analysis, Strategy (with Lawrence S.Welch and Bent Petersen) PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RESEARCH: Volume 1 (with Henrich R.Greve) Also by Rajneesh Narula UNDERSTANDING FDI-ASSISTED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (with Sanjaya Lall) MULTINATIONALS AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS: A New Agenda (with John Dunning) INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND THE ECLECTIC PARADIGM (with John Cantwell) GLOBALISATION AND TECHNOLOGY: Interdependence, Innovation Systems and Industrial Policy TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN A GLOBALISING WORLD MULTINATIONALS FROM THE NETHERLANDS (with Roger van Hoesel) FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GOVERNMENTS: Catalysts for Economic Restructuring (with John Dunning) MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: Globalisation and Competitiveness
Multinationals on the Periphery Edited by Gabriel R.G. Benito and Rajneesh Narula
Selection and editorial matter © Gabriel R.G. Benito and Rajneesh Narula 2007 Individual chapters © contributors 2007 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978-1-4039-9166-9 ISBN-10: 1-4039-9166-9 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Multinationals on the periphery / [edited by] Gabriel R.G. Benito, Rajneesh Narula. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-4039-9166-9 (alk. paper) 1. International business enterprises. 2. Industrial location 3. Globalisation—Economic aspects. I. Benito, Gabriel R. G. II. Narula, Rajneesh, 1963HD2755.5.M8457 2007 338.8⬘8—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 16 15 14 13 12 11
2007023074 4 10
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents List of Figures
vii
List of Tables
viii
Notes on the Contributors
x
Preface 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
xi
States and Firms on the Periphery: The Challenges of a Globalizing World Gabriel R.G. Benito and Rajneesh Narula Can Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms of Small Developing Economies Compete in a Liberalized Trading Environment? Lou Anne A. Barclay Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises: Are Foreign Investors Dictating the Rules of the Game? Ele Reiljan
1
25
48
The Internationalization Patterns of Norwegian Firms: Does Industry Matter? Birgitte Grøgaard and Gabriel R.G. Benito
74
The Pace of Internationalization for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Siv Marina Karlsen
98
Public Policy, FDI Attraction and Multinational Subsidiary Evolution: The Contrasting Cases of Ireland and Portugal Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann MNCs in the Periphery: DaimlerChrysler South Africa (DCSA), Human Capital Upgrading and Regional Economic Development Jochen Lorentzen
v
131
158
vi
8
9
10
Contents
Outside the Triad: An Examination of International R&D Investments within Peripheral Economies Björn Ambos and Tina C. Ambos Moving Out of the Country: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of Country, Cluster and Firm-related Factors Carl Arthur Solberg Centre and Periphery in the WTO: The Case of TRIPS Helene Hoggen
Index
188
206
228
269
List of Figures 1.1 1.2 3.1
Core and periphery in the world economy Different types of subsidiaries Foreign direct investment inflows into Estonia 1992–2003 (millions of kroons) 3.2 Distribution of foreign investments into Estonia by their primary motive 3.3 Value added per employee in Estonian manufacturing companies between 1995 and 2001 (1,000s of kroons) 3.4 Average number of foreign affiliates in different groups of firms 3.5 Estonian exports to Russia (millions of kroons) 3.6 Speed of internationalization in Estonian manufacturing industries 1996–2002 3.7 Share of export sales in net sales in Estonian manufacturing industry (%) 3.8 Changes in the export activities of Estonian manufacturing firms 1996–2002 3.9 Cost levels in sawmills in Europe 3.10 The share of subcontracting in Estonian textile and clothing industries (%) 3.11 Distribution of Krenfolm sales by target countries 2003 5.1 Different categories for firms undergoing internationalization 5.2 Trajectories of five case firms undergoing internationalization 6.1 FDI inflows to Ireland and Portugal 1990–2003 8.1 Internationalization of R&D over time 8.2 Internationalization of R&D overtime: the role of capability-augmenting investments 10.1 Continuum of perspectives
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4 13 50 50 50
52 55 57 58 60 60 62 66 66 117 119 134 194 194 243
List of Tables 2.1 2.2
2.3
2.4 3.1 3.2
3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2
4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.2
Selected indicators of CARICOM member states in 2002 Trade and investment agreements between the CARICOM countries and western hemisphere partners Proportional distribution of the volume of CARICOM’s intra-regional imports and exports among member states, 1990–2000 General characteristics of sampled firms Foreign share in the Estonian manufacturing industry 1995–2002 (% of all enterprises) Foreign direct investment stock abroad by main target countries 1998 and 2003 (thousands of kroons) Foreign direct investment stock abroad by field of activity 1998 and 2003 (thousands of kroons) Export to main target countries, 1995 and 2003 (millions of kroons) Foreign share in Estonian manufacturing industry 1995–2002 (% of all enterprises) Foreign share in Estonian manufacturing industry 1995–2002 (% of all enterprises) Foreign trade and investment in the Norwegian economy in the 1990s Indicators of internationalization for the 100 largest non-financial Norwegian firms 1990, 1995 and 2000 Correlations (Pearson) among dependent variables Correlations (Spearman’s Rho) among independent variables Regression results for FSALE 1990, 1995 and 2000 Regression results for FEMP 1990, 1995 and 2000 Regression results for FSUB 1990, 1995 and 2000 A summary of the key figures on dimensions that reflect the firm’s pace of internationalization Key findings viii
29
30
31 36 52
54 55 56 61 65 76
78 85 87 87 88 89 115 121
List of Tables
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 9.1 9.2 9.3 10.1 10.2 10.3
Relative importance of motivations for investment in Portugal and Ireland Evaluation of the importance of distinct subsidiary roles/strategies Degree of decision-making autonomy of subsidiary Nationality of main manager of subsidiary (% of cases) Technological activities carried out by subsidiaries (% of respondents) Relative level of technological sophistication of subsidiaries’ activities Percentage of inputs bought from local suppliers Evolution of proportion of inputs bought from local suppliers Collaborations developed by MNEs’ subsidiaries in Portugal and Ireland (%) Future evolution of subsidiaries relative to the following factors/challenges Evaluation of relative performance measures Capital flows, competitiveness and human resources Economic and social indicators of the Eastern Cape 2002 Interviews Key data Embeddedness, coordination and control and performance of TLs and NTLs Size distribution of the sample Distribution of relocation scores by firm size and origin Regression analyses of determinants of relocation (standardized regression coefficients) Trade rounds and selected ministerial meetings 1947–2005 Complaining parties in WTO disputes Responding parties in WTO disputes
ix
143 144 146 147 147 148 149 149 150 151 152 162 164 168 195 199 216 217 218 233 236 237
Notes on the Contributors Björn Ambos is Professor of International Management at Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration. Tina C. Ambos is Assistant Professor at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration. Lou Anne A. Barclay is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the Department of Management Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica. Gabriel R.G. Benito is Professor and Head of the Department of Strategy and Logistics, BI Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, Norway. Birgitte Grøgaard works in the Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Helene Hoggen is doctoral candidate at BI Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, Norway. Siv Marina Karlsen is Lecturer in the Faculty of Social Sciences, Oslo University College, Norway. Jochen Lorentzen is a chief research specialist in the Education, Science and Skills Development research programme, Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa. Rajneesh Narula is Professor and Director of the Centre of International Business and Strategy, University of Reading Business School, UK. Ele Reiljan works in the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Tartu, Estonia. Carl Arthur Solberg is Associate Professor at BI Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, Norway. Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann works in the Faculty of Economics CEMPRE, University of Porto, Portugal. Currently she is Pro-Vice Chancellor in charge of Strategic Planning and Entrepreneurial Relations.
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Preface The intellectual genesis of this book goes back to a series of wide-ranging conversations in the late 1990s, most of which – for completely inexplicable reasons – happened in various bars and restaurants in downtown Oslo. When comparing the Norwegian economy and its multinational enterprises with those of the developing world, both of us came to the realization that there was much more similar than one might have expected. Needless to say, we did nothing about it at the time, preferring to pursue our own agendas, although continuing to affirm our intention to put our ideas down on paper ‘sometime soon’. Formally, the direct origins of this book go back to 2000, the year when a research programme called ‘Globalization and internationalization of the Norwegian economy’ was launched, funded by the Norwegian Research Council (NFR project 139982/510). When it ended in 2005, this programme had sponsored five students through their doctoral studies, and supported several projects about the implications of globalization for small peripheral countries. Norway was the centrepiece of attention in the programme, even though some projects took a comparative view by also including other Nordic countries. Nevertheless, we still strongly believed there was scope for an edited volume that expanded the reach of the project beyond that of small and rich Nordic countries. And so the years passed, one after another, like sand in an hour glass (accompanied by the sporadic tinkling of wine glasses), until both of us accepted appointments at the Copenhagen Business School, and work on the book began in earnest. This goal was assisted greatly by Jackie Kippenberger’s generous offer to publish it. Alas, this momentum was not to last, punctuated by Rajneesh moving to the UK, and Gabriel returning to Oslo. As anyone who has ever tried to collaborate across borders will attest to, the ‘death of distance’ attributed to globalization is a greatly exaggerated phenomenon. We would
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Preface
like to thank our contributors, who all put up with numerous requests to re-write, shorten, improve, clean up, etc., and their seemingly saintlike patience while we dithered over the writing of the introduction. We apologize! We hope that the fanfare and adulation with which this book should be received by the general public will make up for it.
Oslo London
GABRIEL R.G. BENITO RAJNEESH NARULA
1 States and Firms on the Periphery: The Challenges of a Globalizing World Gabriel R.G. Benito and Rajneesh Narula
1. Introduction One of the primary features of globalization has been the growth and spread of multinational enterprises (MNEs), and their increasing significance in the economies of almost all countries, whether large or small, developing or industrialized. MNEs have sought to spatially distribute their value-adding activities globally to not only take advantage of market opportunities but also to exploit different specialized resources and capabilities that are unique to particular locations. In other words, in response to increasing cross-border competition and rivalry, firms have increasingly sought to organize their activities internationally to achieve greater efficiency in their value-adding activities, and thereby optimizing their market share and rent generation. However, there is considerable evidence that MNEs do not regard all locations as being equivalent. Smaller economies, less-developed countries and countries that are spatially or economically on the ‘periphery’ are not as attractive as destinations for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) because of their limited market size, or other under-developed location advantages. As such, the kinds of subsidiaries and the nature of the MNEs’ value-adding activities located in more peripheral regions and countries are also different, and tend to be considerably less integrated into their global operations. MNEs that originate from peripheral economies also behave differently from those emanating from core countries when internationalizing their operations. Not all these differences are associated specifically with the peculiarities of their peripheral location. Indeed, it can be argued that some of the differences in the nature, motivation and pace of inward and outward FDI derive primarily from being at an earlier stage of economic 1
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States and Firms on the Periphery
development. However, the ‘costs of being peripheral’ accrue also to countries that are not necessarily developing. A number of smaller developed countries tend to be host to different kinds of MNE affiliates, and MNEs from these countries internationalize in decidedly different ways compared to more core countries. There is a stream of research that argues that these differences are due to the resource constraints associated with small country size (see, e.g., the contributions to Van Den Bulcke and Verbeke, 2001). Nonetheless, Benito et al. (2002) have shown that even countries of similar size, geographic location and economic development still exhibit different extents of engagement in international business. As we shall highlight in this chapter, the primary differentiating factor between the core and periphery is interdependence, and this is determined by the extent of social, political and economic integration, and the extent to which there is reciprocity. This book also seeks to develop this theme, focusing on how MNE activity both to and from peripheral economies differs from MNE activity associated with core economies. Much of the literature on international management and business focuses on MNEs to and from core economies, or examines the differences as being primarily associated with country size. Another literature (associated with development economics) argues that economic development is the primary determinant. We argue that these two arguments are closely associated, because these locations are similarly handicapped. Countries such as Trinidad or South Africa – at least with regards MNE activity – share characteristics in common with Norway and Estonia.
2. What is ‘Peripheral’? The concept of a periphery has been with us a long time, and by its very definition, implies that it is relative to the existence of a ‘core’. Researchers in the area of ‘world systems theory’ have argued that the core-periphery dichotomy (in its current sense) among nations has been with us since at least the 16th century when the foundations of the modern capitalist system and international trade led to the beginning of the process of globalization and the increasing interdependence between nations through trade (see the various works of Wallerstein, e.g., 1974, 1979). This body of work is closely linked to dependency theory (see, e.g., Prebisch, 1962), which, building on the core-periphery argument, addresses the challenges for development and catch-up for the countries in the periphery – who are, by definition, economically or otherwise poorer or less technologically advanced than countries of the core. These theories
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focus on political, sociological and economic challenges that derive from the domination by the core, of the periphery. Defining the periphery is a task fraught with difficulty, because membership of the core (and of the periphery) changes over time. For the purposes of this contribution, we refer to countries that are peripheral (or core) in the sense of economic globalization. We regard globalization as an ongoing process, rather than an event, which has influenced different economic actors to varying extents. Globalization as used here implies the growing interdependence of locations and economic units across countries and regions (Narula, 2003). The key word here is interdependence. Cross-border linkages between economic entities do not imply globalization, merely internationalization. Integration and interdependence is about reciprocity, and the extent of this reciprocity. The concept of interdependence and reciprocity are crucial to understanding globalization and, by extension, the nature of the core-periphery dichotomy. ‘Simpler’ cross-border activity such as trade does not necessarily result in interdependence. It is the growth of FDI and the multinational corporation in the modern, complex cross-border hierarchical organizational form that plays a pivotal role in fostering economic interdependence. For, while international business activity was broad based through trade, it was dominated by the development of vertical linkages, with a flow of goods between locations, in response to varying elasticities of supply and demand. Raw materials were transported from one location to another, manufactured and transported to a third location for sale. Factors of production were immobile, and although capital did in fact get relocated, these were capital flows rather than capital embodied in physical assets or personnel, and (with a few notable exceptions) there was no significant integration of operations in disparate locations within the control and management of the same individuals until after world war II. Firms were international, but not multinational. International business and economic activity was extensive in the sense that the value of goods and capital exchanged were considerable, and involved numerous countries and actors, who were all dependent upon each other’s patronage. But it was not intensive, in that activities were largely not integrated across borders, with the possible exception of the large trading companies and other state-sanctioned de facto monopolies (Held et al., 1999). As with all dichotomies such as north-south, west-east, rich-poor, etc., there are numerous shades of grey between the two extremes, in general requiring gross simplifications of a continuum of intermediate levels. This is all the more the case with the core-periphery dichotomy, since countries have been integrated into the world economy to different
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States and Firms on the Periphery
extents, and this is continuously in flux, since it is a process. Hence, as indicated in Figure 1.1, it is more appropriate to treat core-periphery as a continuum. For instance, the last three decades have seen China and some East Asian economies (such as Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia) move closer to the core than the periphery, than, say, Laos, Vietnam, or Bangladesh. Much of Africa is firmly within the periphery (and one may even go so far as to say sub-Saharan Africa can be defined as being ‘on the periphery of the periphery’), although South Africa has moved towards the core. It is not about size, the lack of natural resources or markets. The Netherlands and Belgium are small in these terms, but are firmly in the
Circa 1977 Japan Korea Singapore Taiwan Hong Kong
Canada
‘The rest’ Denmark Italy Spain Sweden
Germany France UK Belgium Netherlands
Periphery
USA
Core
Circa 2007 Vietnam Egypt Pakistan etc.
‘The rest’
Figure 1.1
Korea Singapore Taiwan China India South Africa Russia Poland Czech Malaysia Thailand Turkey Norway Ireland Portugal
Denmark Italy Spain Sweden
Core and periphery in the world economy
USA Germany France UK Belgium Netherlands Japan Canada
Gabriel R.G. Benito and Rajneesh Narula
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core, whereas Norway, Finland and New Zealand are in the periphery, but are at varying distances from the core, in the sense that they are less integrated into the world economy. It is not simply about the level of industrial or economic development: much of the former Soviet Union (with the possible exception of Russia), while industrially developed and of relatively high GDP levels, are firmly within the periphery rather than the core. It is worth noting that while distance has historically been an important determining factor of peripheral-ness, technological improvements in transportation and communication technologies have played a significant role in making geographic distances less significant, although the costs of transportation of physical goods and people remains non-trivial. A peripheral economy can be said to be one that plays an insignificant role as either host or home to MNEs; engages in relatively little trade in intermediate and manufactured goods; contributes relatively little to innovation and scientific progress; is weakly linked or accessible physically to the core because of poor infrastructure, transport and communication links; does not play a significant role in decision-making within supra-national organizations; and does not share a significant number of formal institutions with the core countries. Globalization implies economic, political and social integration, in the sense that there is an ongoing relationship that involves reciprocity, and creates a longer-term ongoing interdependence between economic actors. Countries with limited participation in this global milieu, and for whom reciprocity is ‘unequal’, are de facto weakly integrated and hence peripheral to the world economy.
3. Why is it Important to Understand the Periphery? There are those who wish to understand why the world evolves into a core-periphery formation, taking a more positive (rather than normative) approach. Again, the history of economics is littered with such studies, and these go all the way back to include Adam Smith, Frederich List, David Ricardo, among others. What makes a particular area, region or state into a core location rather than a peripheral one, and vice versa? Indeed, this may be argued as being the primary objective of many of the social sciences. The core-periphery concept within the field of economics has – for a rather long time – been the remit of economic geography, building very much upon the insights of Alfred Marshall (1919), and much-divorced from the mainstream literature until Paul Krugman ‘re-invented’ what is known as the ‘new economic geography’ in his influential 1991 book. This has spurred a new literature which has embraced the core-periphery
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argument at its centre to answer the question, ‘what might economic integration across countries and regions mean for the spatial organization of economic activity? Does it increase concentration of economic activity in the core at the expense of the periphery, or does it eventually lead to greater dispersion?’ (see, e.g., Forslid and Wooton, 2003; Fujita and Thisse, 2003; Krugman, 1991; Krugman and Venables, 1995). This discussion has been couched within the discussion of how globalization affects economic disparities between regions and nations. Indeed, there is now a large literature that asks whether globalization will increase or decrease the polarization and inequalities between rich and poor. The important finding in this body of work is this: when there are declining costs of transportation and communication, as are associated with globalization, the resultant increased international commerce leads economic activity to re-organize itself between the trading regions along a core-periphery structure, to the detriment of economic activity in the periphery. That is, there will be a ‘hollowing out’ in the periphery, and an agglomeration of activity in the core, because firms will concentrate production where demand is greater, and where economies of scale can be gained. There are important nuances in the various models proposed, and differences in opinion as to whether the core-periphery model holds as costs decline further with a deepening of globalization. Does the periphery become more peripheral over time, or is there a point at which patterns of concentration reverse such that the periphery converges with the core? Most of these studies acknowledge the pivotal role of the MNE in shifting production (and therefore employment) from one location to another in response to changing prices, availability of factors of production and the presence of markets. However, the way in which production shifts from core to the periphery, the structure of global production of MNEs and the differences between firms from the core and the periphery has been a matter that has mainly been addressed by the international business literature. A significant quality of the early research in international business contrasted the internationalization behaviour of MNEs from the core and the periphery, and how the redistribution of production and innovation between the core and the periphery takes place. Vernon’s product life-cycle model (1966) examines this process, based on a single core country (the US), and how, over the life of a given product, production would gradually be transferred to increasingly peripheral locations, either by the innovating core country firms, or by firms based in peripheral economies.1
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4. Outward FDI from the Periphery Vernon’s work – as with much of the earlier research on internationalization of firms and the location of production – pays scant attention to the differences in the nature of MNEs of differing home countries. Affiliates of MNEs from the core would function abroad as ‘miniature replicas’ of their home-country operations, truncated in response to firmspecific characteristics and the host country characteristics. Likewise, it was assumed that firms from the periphery – as they moved economically towards the level of the core – would operate in a similar manner, both at home and abroad. This idea was challenged in response to the growing phenomenon of MNEs from the developing countries (see, e.g., Kumar and McLeod, 1981; Lall, 1983; Lecraw, 1977). As UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2006 attests, this literature has burgeoned quite considerably and has evolved a lot since the early work in this area. These concepts can be broadly applied beyond developing country MNEs to outward FDI from the periphery in general. The evidence on MNEs from the periphery has shown an evolution over time, and two different types of MNEs from the periphery, best described as being of two ‘waves’. Although this twowave approach was developed explicitly with developing-country MNEs in mind, the second wave in particular is associated with the characteristics of the MNEs, and their motivations apply equally to all peripheral home countries, whether developing or industrialized. The first wave sketched a description of a ‘different’ kind of MNE that – so it was argued – differed considerably from that of ‘conventional’ industrialized country MNEs, in terms of its ownership (O) advantages, motivation, geographical direction and mode of overseas activity. One of the features of developing-country MNE activity, as charted in the firstwave literature, was the direction and motivation of FDI, compared with ‘conventional’ MNEs (see, e.g., Lall, 1983). Much of the empirical work indicated a strong and marked trend for MNE from the periphery to focus their investments in neighbouring and other countries at a similar or an earlier stage of development. This preference was a direct result of their lack of international experience – these locations had offered resource endowments for markets that were broadly similar to those of their home countries. Furthermore, their O advantages were of a type most suited to these location (L) advantages (and often induced by them), and were based on technologies at the end of their product life cycles. In other words, these MNEs had few transaction-type ownership (Ot) advantages, and only the most basic form of asset-type O advantages (Oa) – those that
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States and Firms on the Periphery
derive from the efficient acquisition and adaptation of imported technologies. These O advantages were enhanced by the prevalence of importsubstituting, inward-looking policy regimes among most developing countries, which encouraged small-scale production, typical of that suited to these MNEs. The O advantages of these firms were primarily countryspecific, determined by the market distortions introduced by the home country policies, and only sustainable where similar L advantages existed in other countries. While some asset-seeking investment in industrialized countries was undertaken, it was relatively minor with many large investments representing flight capital or ‘round-trip investments’, as entrepreneurs utilized overseas subsidiaries to circumvent home country restrictions on outbound international capital movements. In particular cases, a large proportion of what is statistically recorded as outward FDI flows represented investments by the affiliates of ‘conventional’ MNEs. The growth of the ‘second wave’ of periphery MNEs can be traced to the late 1980s, and has also recently been expanded to include the growth of outward FDI from the former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe. The second-wave MNEs from the periphery tend to come from countries at a higher stage of industrial development, or those that have evolved structurally towards industrial sectors that are capital and knowledge intensive. These firms engage in outward FDI to less developed countries as a means of moving their natural-asset intensive activities to locations with appropriate comparative advantages, while, at the same time, they are engaging in both market and strategic assetseeking FDI towards the core countries. In other words, they are increasingly becoming global, demonstrating features of ‘conventional’ MNEs from the core. The evolution of the ‘second-wave’ MNEs from the periphery has been further enhanced by the fundamental (but gradual) change in the structure of the world economy, much of which is often generalized as being a direct result of globalization. These changes can be considered from the peripheral country perspective as being of two kinds. First, there are those that have been largely exogenous to these countries but that have affected their economic structure both as members of the world economic order and as individual economies. Whereas most core countries have been experiencing economic, technological and structural convergence, the majority of the peripheral countries, rather than converge with the lead countries, have tended to diverge. This simultaneous process of convergence and divergence has impacted on firms by creating broader and more competitive markets across countries due to similar consumption and production patterns. This has had two effects on the converging
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countries: (i) firms in each country are presented with larger markets, and this has led to developing global technologies that have large economies of scale and high minimum efficient scale. Firms in these industrial sectors need international markets to justify production (see Chapter 4 in this volume); and (ii) technologies have also converged, such that firms in certain sectors are now competing not just with other firms in the same country, but other firms in the same country but not necessarily in the same industry. In other words, firms need to have competitive advantages that are globally viable, rather than domestically or regionally so, and this has been further enhanced by the innovation of space-shrinking technologies (Narula and Dunning, 2000). Although the development of de facto and de jure economic blocs such as EU and NAFTA has primarily acted to enhance the positive effects of these developments for their members, they also represent barriers to entry to nonmembers and to developing countries in particular. Second, there have been structural changes within individual countries, often in direct response to these changes; as such they may be considered as endogenous to most peripheral economies. These endogenous changes are primarily associated with the actions and policies of governments. One of the most important of these changes over the past decade or so has been a fundamental shift in the policy orientation of developing countries from an import-substituting role (or a centrally planned one) to an export-oriented, outward-looking one. The extent of liberalization varies between countries: in some cases it is associated with a more proactive and market facilitating role, while in others it is simply reactive or even laissez-faire. Nonetheless, despite this broad spectrum of policy options, it is safe to generalize that the extent of government intervention embraces a much wider spectrum than was the case prior to 1990, and this variation is equally diverse regarding policy orientations towards MNE activity.
Multinationals from the periphery Certainly, the evidence on MNEs from the periphery would indicate that both waves of outward FDI from the periphery now occur simultaneously, from the same countries, regardless of their stage of economic development. The first-wave MNEs are focused towards resource-intensive activity (whether extractive, or labour-intensive), while the primary markets for the second-wave MNEs are in the core countries, and this is evidenced by the growth of FDI; there is increasing evidence that they wish to rapidly consolidate their presence in these locations. Growing competition means that these nascent MNEs do not have the privilege of
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slow and gradual overseas expansion any longer. A number of these MNEs have expanded through mergers and acquisitions, although this phenomenon is much smaller in relative terms than many observers have made out (Barnard, 2006). In other cases, they are ‘born global’, although the extent to which this is done may have less to do with their origin in a peripheral location than the industry-specific characteristics (see Chapter 5 in this volume). Whatever their reasons for doing so, a majority of these MNEs seek to present themselves not as MNEs from South Africa, India or China, but they adopt the modus operandi of ‘conventional’ MNEs from the core countries (ibid.; Mathews, 2006). Indeed, several of them relocate their headquarters to the US or the EU, and/or list themselves on stock markets there. Most peripheral economies have – as a means to overcome the inherent disadvantages and structural market imperfections associated with their home locations – nurtured state-owned enterprises and national champions as part of their economic and industrial policies. They have also often provided protection against competition and subsidized their outward expansion. Although various agreements within the WTO (combined with economic liberalization) have led to the dissolution – or at least a weakening of such state support – this has helped strengthen their O advantages, and provided these firms with the initial impetus to internationalize. However, as rents from protected home markets have dried up as a result of increased competition and privatization in a post-liberalization scenario, a number of such firms have experienced considerable restructuring of their foreign operations, sometimes withdrawing completely by selling off their foreign assets (Benito, 2005). Others have responded to the challenge by expanding abroad rapidly in a more aggressive way, and acting on commercial opportunities without fear punitive action on the part of their home country governments. These issues are discussed in greater detail in the policy section of this chapter.
5. Inward FDI to Peripheral Economies The liberalization of markets and the increasing cross-border interdependence between economies as a result of globalization has also led to a restructuring of inward FDI to these countries. The traditional picture of FDI flows has been that of capital, technology and competence moving between core countries of the Triad or to more peripheral ones within the triad, with those outside the triad largely being left out of the equation altogether (Dicken, 2003). In 2004, three-quarters of total stock of FDI in the world remained concentrated in Europe and North
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America (UNCTAD, 2005). Even though there are several cases of small peripheral countries that have been highly successful in attracting FDI – Ireland probably being the prime example in recent times (the value of the stock of inward foreign direct investment amounted to 126 per cent of Ireland’s GDP in 2004, see ibid) – there is a tendency for FDI to agglomerate in large countries, such as the United States, Germany, the UK and, increasingly, China. The United States has, over time, actually strengthened its current position as the largest recipient of FDI, closely followed by the EU, which experienced substantial inflows as a result of further economic integration throughout the last two decades. Another example of how economic integration may promote inward FDI is Mexico, which has become an increasingly important host for the operations of MNEs – partly as a result of the establishment of North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The picture has been particularly striking in the case of horizontal FDI, which to a considerable extent is of a market-seeking nature. The large markets of the core Triad economies have consequently been the main sources of FDI as well as the main recipients of such investments. Despite the high purchasing power of individual consumers, the reduction of trade costs as a result of trade liberalization should generally have made the smaller and more peripheral Triad countries less attractive as destinations for horizontal FDI: it has become easier and cheaper to serve these markets through exports. Vertical FDI, which is motivated by access to inputs and improving competitiveness through more efficient production, has historically been less prone to being concentrated among the large core countries: for example, before world war II two-thirds of the world’s FDI was located in developing countries (Dicken, 2003), and a majority of that FDI was of a vertical kind. However, in relative terms developing countries became evermore marginalized as host countries in the decades following the world war II. Less than a third of the world’s FDI stock in 2000 was located in developing countries. For small, peripheral, but rich and developed countries, such as those in the Nordic region, in Oceania and in Western and Southern Europe there has been a continuous flow of vertical FDI. Nevertheless, developments have been uneven. For example, whereas MNE industries such as shoes, textiles and apparel and various consumer goods were attracted by low labour costs in Southern Europe in the 1960–80 period, the cost advantage of that part of Europe was gradually lost in subsequent decades and much of the manufacturing capacity hence migrated to Asia. Only selected parts of production – those in which manufacturers were able to significantly upgrade local skills and
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competence – remain in the area. Other regions, such as the Nordic countries, also lost much of their traditional industrial manufacturing base (some of which was foreign owned), but in many industries their relative cost position did not deteriorate as much (see Chapter 9 in this volume); partly due to investments in technology and organization that has brought about significant productivity gains, and partly due to further specialization into areas where their cost position is less threatened. The general high cost position of the Nordic countries has been balanced by the development of good physical, social and educational infrastructures, and a well-educated workforce. Highly skilled human resources, such as engineers and scientists, have actually been relatively modestly paid. Some peripheral countries – and Ireland is a prime example – have been successful with pursuing deliberate policy efforts aimed at promoting inward FDI. Credible long-term policies that included favourable tax schemes and considerable infrastructural investment, combined with their position as a gateway to the EU, led to the creation of the Celtic Tiger (Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Finally, vertical inward FDI has in many instances been motivated by countries’ endowments of natural resources, such as energy and mineral, as testified by the presence of many MNEs in Latin America, South Africa and Oceania.
MNE affiliates in the periphery Acknowledging that FDI is not simply a commodity, but that what foreignowned subsidiaries actually do in a country matters, there is now a rich literature on various aspects of subsidiary roles and development (see, e.g., Benito et al., 2003; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Holm and Pedersen, 2000). It is useful to look at the combination of activity scope and competence levels when discussing subsidiary roles. Figure 1.2 illustrates the different subsidiary roles that unfold from the various combinations of scope and competence levels. Because internationalization is inherently risky, initial investments tend to be small, perhaps in a sales subsidiary or a small-scale production unit. Subsequent development may, if it occurs, proceed along either one or both dimensions. As shown in Figure 1.2, subsidiaries with many activities but low competence levels are defined as ‘miniature replicas’, which basically mirror the parent organization. These subsidiaries are typically found in areas that are strategic for locating the entire value chain to achieve economies of scale and scope. Subsidiaries with few activities but high levels of competence, on the other hand, are highly specialized units that add value through their knowledge and competence to the rest of the MNE. Such subsidiaries are often related to R&D activities. There will, without doubt, always be several different combinations creating a
Gabriel R.G. Benito and Rajneesh Narula Level of competence High
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Strategic centre
Highly specialized unit, e.g. R&D Multi-activity unit, e.g. production and sales subsidiary
Low
Single-activity unit, e.g. sales subsidiary Few value activities
Miniature replica
Many value activities
Scope of activities
Figure 1.2 Different types of subsidiaries Source: Benito et al., 2003.
variety of roles, as illustrated by multi-activity units. That defines a ‘midground’ of subsidiary roles where probably the majority of subsidiaries can be placed. Finally, ‘strategic centres’ represent subsidiaries with a wide scope of activities as well as high competence levels. We expect that it is generally more beneficial – from the viewpoint of subsidiary development – to be located in the core than outside it. Units in the larger markets are, ceteris paribus, in a better position than those in the periphery to exploit economies of scale as well as economies of scope. Because liberalization of trade and factor movements often results in an intensification of competition, there will usually be a shakeout of lessefficient actors (see Chapters 2 and 8 in this volume). Those that remain in an industry are, hence, likely to be the most competitive ones. Of course, competitive processes are never at a standstill and units must – regardless of their location – strive to better their performance, efficiency or innovativeness. Units in peripheral locations may clearly also develop high levels of competence, especially if they are part of strong local industrial clusters or if they enjoy favourable access to unique resources of various kinds: special circumstances may make particular locations well suited for certain activities. However, whenever operations are predominantly oriented towards the local market, factors like weaker competition, smaller markets and more peripheral positions in the corporate network of the parent MNE, work against subsidiaries developing more advanced roles (see Chapter 8 in this volume). Subsidiaries in peripheral locations with the characteristics of, say, ‘strategic centres’ are hence more likely to be the ‘special case’ rather than the ‘general case’.
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Countries on the periphery suffer from their smaller markets and distance to the core. Historically, they have tended to overcome such disadvantages by instituting industrial policies that promote import-substituting type of investments by MNEs. As a result, they have tended to host subsidiaries that are ‘miniature replicas’. The MNEs have been able and willing to offset the disadvantages associated with small market size and inefficient scale economies inter alia by obtaining opportunities associated with privileged access to restricted markets. A deep regional integration scheme, of which the EU is a prime example, may considerably affect the location advantages associated with peripheral countries. Upon membership of deep integration schemes, ‘insider’ peripheral countries experience a decline of their location advantages associated with such privileges, since the state must re-orient their economies to the supra-regional norms established by the core, which is assumed to be offset by an industrial redistribution within the region based on comparative advantage, and potential access to a larger unified market. ‘Outsider’ countries, on the other hand, experience a decline in their location advantages, not because of industrial redistribution, but by virtue of being marginalized relative to neighbouring ‘insider’ countries. However, Tavares (Chapter 6 in this volume) shows that the development trajectories of ‘insider’ countries – that would seem relatively similar at the outset – may well differ.
6. Policy Issues There are a number of policy issues that arise, which can be classified as being: (1) policy issues associated with the peripheral nature of these economies per se; and (2) policy issues associated with the MNEs that invest into and from peripheral economies. These are intricately related, and we discuss two different areas of interest: those associated with domestic national policies, and those associated with supra-national policies.
Domestic policy issues Peripheral economies tend to be limited in their industrial policy space because of the inherent limitations of their economy. As discussed earlier, their economies tend to have competitive advantages in just a few sectors, and these tend to be sectors that take advantage of their natural assets. We argue here that peripheral economies – which tend to be both supplyand demand-constrained – are increasingly seeking to overcome these limitations by aggressively creating interdependencies with the core through rapid internationalization. This process has been considerably
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accentuated as countries have come to accept the new realities of economic liberalization that have necessitated an outward-looking, pro-FDI, political and economic policy orientation. The end to protectionism and state support that went well with the inward-looking import substituting stance, coupled with the resultant rapid inflow of FDI from the core economies, has forced domestic economic actors (both firms and states) to respond by looking to aggressively internationalize (Chapter 3 in this volume discusses in some detail the interaction between inward FDI and the internationalization of Estonian firms). From a demand perspective, the relatively limited domestic market size meant – in the days of inward-looking policies – that if such MNEs were to achieve economies of scale in production, they sought additional markets to that of their home location in order to increase their de facto market size (Bellak and Cantwell, 1997).2 This has not changed, except that the imperative is now greater with increased international competition. From a supply perspective, the smallness of their economies means that they have limited resources, in terms of capital (both financial and human) as well as in terms of natural and created assets, such that firms from these countries tend to specialized in a few sectors. The industrial structure of peripheral economies tends to demonstrate a ‘niche’ character, with a high level of specialization in few areas, where firms act as specialist suppliers and thereby show a low level of product diversification. Bellak and Cantwell (1997) posit that it is in such sectors that they can achieve price-setter positions. Industrial policy in these countries has often supported this specialization, because governments have a choice between spreading their limited resources thinly across many industries or concentrating them in a few targeted industries. Some governments have seen the internationalization of their firms as a ‘vote of no confidence’ in their home economy, and have actively sought to dissuade companies from internationalization. However, a problem for many firms from peripheral economies is that they need inputs that are not available locally, which they must therefore seek in foreign locations. Policies in the past have tended to involve intervention to micromanage the economy by trying to pick sectors to support, and the creation of national champions. However, this option can only be partially successful. It is expensive, and not sustainable on the long term, especially as WTO protocols such as the agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures (SCM) have reduced this avenue for intervention. Furthermore, though, despite the best intentions of governments, they cannot always pick national champions who will be ‘winners’ at the technological frontier because, by definition, the potential of one technological paradigm
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over another is very much unpredictable. In addition, peripheral country governments have limited resources, and not just financial capital. One of the primary reasons firms go abroad is to seek diversity of ideas and knowledge. This can hardly be overcome through techno-nationalism (Narula, 2003). The only real option open to policy-makers in this era of globalization is to accept the inevitable and help firms overcome market failure in markets for knowledge, as well as reduce the inherent risks of internationalization for their MNEs. This requires a proactive industrial policy, which should include allowing for the cross-border flow of new ideas through human capital: by far the most cost-effective means of such flows. Most important, it provides industry with the means to internalize and absorb technologies and ideas acquired from elsewhere, thereby developing a skilled workforce of international quality. This entails investing more in the quality of tertiary education and public institutions. Formal policies on inward FDI have to a large extent been liberalized, although considerable differences exist in the extent to which ‘MNEfriendly’ actions are de facto implemented. Given the considerable reliance of peripheral economies on FDI as a source of capital and technology, the kinds of FDI that are attracted, and the nature of MNE subsidiaries’ scope and scale is of prime importance. It is well acknowledged that the net benefits from FDI vary, by the kinds of activities undertaken in a given location, and that different subsidiaries may have widely different roles, ranging from performing relatively simple distribution tasks to having responsibility for a range of activities, including research, development and manufacturing. Although a number of peripheral economies play host to strategic subsidiaries, in general, subsidiaries in these economies tend to be less well integrated within the MNE’s hierarchy (see Chapter 8 in this volume). As Kottaridi (2005), among others, has shown, there are non-trivial benefits from being in the core rather than being in the periphery, whether in the sense of being peripheral to the core (such as say, Norway), or being peripheral within the periphery (such as, say, Laos). It is worth stressing that, except in sectors where there are important and dynamic industrial clusters, peripheral countries may experience a decline in MNE subsidiary activity both in terms of scope and competence levels (Benito et al., 2003). In general, most countries now actively seek inward FDI. However, while the potential for MNE-related spillovers is clear, the nature, level and extent of the benefits vary considerably, and the outcomes from a FDI-assisted industrial policy are not always positive (Lall and Narula,
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2004), and require considerable engagement by policy-makers in developing human capital, infrastructure and creating the appropriate milieu to promote positive outcomes from FDI inflows. As Lorentzen (Chapter 7 in this volume) implies in his South African study, the quality of the location advantages and the extent to which spillovers occur from inward FDI are crucially interrelated. It is not always sufficiently acknowledged that inward FDI can also have negative effects. For instance, in many peripheral economies, increased FDI has had negative effects on competition. First, conventional ‘crowding out’ has occurred: as MNEs increase competitive pressure on the domestic sector, domestic firms that have been unable to face this pressure choose – if they at all survive – to deskill the labour force and move to cheaper niches in the market. Those that survive, struggle to compete with foreign competitors (see Chapter 2 in this volume). Second, MNEs often acquire the most technologically competitive domestic firms. Thus, these firms can be regarded as also exiting, as ownership has been transferred from domestic to foreign. There is limited real movement of workers from the MNE sector to the domestic sector in the host country, due in part to the higher salaries paid by MNEs subsidiaries in order to keep their qualified workers and prevent dissemination of their superior knowledge (Fosfuri et al., 2001). In other cases, spillovers occur primarily between MNE affiliates and the domestic firms that they have acquired. MNEs tend to acquire the most technologically competitive among the domestic firms, with the highest absorptive capacity prior to acquisition, they would be in the best position to benefit from spillovers (Narula and Marin, 2005). The motive of investment and the structure of MNEs’ global configuration influence the extent to which subsidiaries are embedded, and the quality of spillovers. The fact that FDI activities do not always demonstrate significant spillovers to the economy at large indicates that not all FDI provides the same opportunities for spillovers and linkages. For instance, resource-exploiting investments (say, in mining) seek to provide unprocessed raw materials (a relatively low value-adding activity), which act as inputs to other affiliates that may be located elsewhere. Resourceseeking FDI may employ a large workforce and be capital intensive, but the potential for spillovers to domestic firms may be small. While potentially important, FDI is not a sine qua non for economic development. MNEs and FDI may well lead to an increase in productivity and exports, but they do not necessarily result in increased competitiveness of the domestic sector or increased industrial capacity, which ultimately determines economic growth in the long run (Lall and Narula, 2004).
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To be sure, upgrading of technological capabilities of domestic firms can no longer be pursued in quite the same way in a globalizing world. International competition is a given, and there can be no return to the infant industry model. Nonetheless, market forces cannot substitute for the role of governments in developing and promoting a proactive industrial policy (see Chapter 7 in this volume). Firms necessarily take a shorterterm, profit-maximizing view because they are largely risk averse. FDI per se does not provide growth opportunities unless a domestic industrial sector exists that has the necessary technological capacity to profit from the externalities from MNE activity (Chapter 2 in this volume). This is well illustrated by the inability of many Asian countries, which have relied on a passive FDI-dependent strategy to upgrade their industrial development. FDI, domestic capabilities and a domestic sector need to be concatenated and properly phased if positive results are to be achieved.
Supra-national policy issues An important outcome of globalization has been the increasingly blurred identity of the nation-state. On the one hand, countries remain sovereign and independent, while, on the other hand, they are increasingly swayed by extra-national developments. At the same time, there are clearly defined characteristics and patterns that are history-dependent and idiosyncratic, such as areas of specialization, technological competences, structure of markets, consumption patterns and culture. Government policies have to tread a thin line between responding to extra-national developments and to domestic priorities. This has led to what is best described as de facto economic integration. That is to say, unintended national-level economic integration has occurred, and this has gradually been acknowledged by de jure integration. The growing intensity of international production has followed a natural co-evolutionary path with that of de facto economic integration, which in turn has been reinforced by de jure integration. Supra-national agreements such as the EU, NAFTA, WTO have reinforced, accelerated and created standardized regulation for economic activity, acting as a virtuous circle with regards economic integration that had been occurring as a matter of course. While interdependence, de facto integration and economic growth allow countries to catch up, there are a wider set of issues to do with reciprocity and being politically peripheral in the international arena. This is most obviously noted within supra-national organizations such as the WTO. Agreements such as SCM, Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
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have severely limited the policy space for countries, as issues such as tariffs, subsidies, incentives and so forth are decided in a supra-national arena. Malhotra (2006) argues that multilateral and bilateral investment agreements have dubious benefits since they restrict the policy autonomy of developing countries, and may increase transaction costs, while simultaneously increasing opportunity costs. As Helene Hoggen discusses in Chapter 10, peripheral economies are in an uneven bargaining position vis-à-vis the core economies. Despite the fact that the peripheral economies dominate the membership of the WTO in terms of sheer numbers, the political and economic clout of the EU and the US tends to give them the advantage, as they are able to skew the agenda in their own favour, in many cases using a proliferation of bilateral agreements with individual countries to overcome resistance to their proposed reforms. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) coalition was intended to create a united front on behalf of the peripheral economies in the WTO negotiations, but its failure to get concessions from the core economies for reciprocal access underlines the relative bargaining positions of the core and the periphery.
7. Overview of the Book This book gives extensive treatments of pertinent aspects of being peripheral in an increasingly global economy. It starts with four studies of outward internationalization – by trade as well as investment – by firms from small and peripheral economies. Lou Anne Barclay (Chapter 2) examines the competitive strategies implemented by successful Trinidadian exporters in the context of a liberalized trading environment. Her starting point is that, while developing countries have been liberalizing their trade regimes since the end of the 1990s, it is uncertain whether such countries always benefit from trade liberalization. The manufacturing sector of small, developing countries is especially vulnerable to the consequences of liberalized trade. Thus, the future viability of their local manufacturing firms is questionable. Her analysis suggests that many of the firms studied might not be able to compete in a liberalized trading environment. Indeed, the future viability of Trinidad’s manufacturing sector rests on the actions of both policymakers and firms. Ele Reiljan (Chapter 3) analyzes the role of foreign owners in the internationalization of manufacturing enterprises in Estonia, one of the small emerging economies in the Baltic. Foreign investors have a significant share in several branches of the Estonian manufacturing industry
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and therefore it is likely that they influence the development of these branches by dictating the rules not only in the Estonian market but also in determining the structure of the export markets, the share of foreign activities, commitment to the foreign markets, choice between subcontracting activities and own export, and several other strategic issues that influence the overall pattern of foreign expansion. As Reiljan concludes this has had an impact on the sustainability of competitiveness of the Estonian enterprises and the whole economy. Grøgaard and Benito (Chapter 4) use data from Norway, a rich albeit small country in the northern periphery of Europe, to investigate the role of industry factors as drivers of companies’ internationalization. They argue that the bulk of literature on companies’ internationalization has focused on firm-level and country-level factors in order to explain firms’ cross-border activities. With the exception of a limited number of studies looking at rivalistic behaviour in oligopolistic industries, industry factors have been neglected as potential important determinants of internationalization. Specifically, Grøgaard and Benito look at whether differences across industries with regard to competition level, research intensity, tangibility of the products and the existence of clusters influence the impetus and opportunities to internationalize. They use an extensive data set covering the internationalization patterns of the 100 largest non-financial Norwegian companies over the period 1990–2000. The results suggest that industry factors contribute significantly to explaining the companies’ internationalization, and that the effects of industry factors remain strong when firm-level characteristics are taken into account. In contrast to Gørgaard and Benito who focus on relatively large companies, the study by Siv Marina Karlsen (Chapter 5) describes the process of internationalization of 12 small and medium-sized enterprises in Norway. Her study explores the factors that influence the pace of internationalization, in particular why some firms gradually become international while others are ‘born global’. She finds that some high value-adding manufacturing firms, in spite of their small size and lack of experience in international transactions, are capable of outrunning their larger, more resourceful counterparts in foreign markets. Firms originating from small countries seem to be more exposed to forces pushing them out: partly due to small domestic markets and partly due to fear of future competition from firms originating from larger countries. In the three subsequent chapters, the perspective is changed from an outward to an inward view of internationalization. Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann (Chapter 6) examines the cases of two small open EU economies (Ireland and Portugal). These two countries in
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the EU periphery have had very different performances in their FDI attraction, both in terms of magnitude of FDI inflows and regarding the quality of multinationals’ operations. Based on a survey of more than 600 foreignowned subsidiaries in Portugal and Ireland, the study highlights issues related to the quality and scope of MNE subsidiaries’ activities, providing evidence on subsidiary strategic evolution, the motivations underlying investment and characterizing the qualitative dimensions linked to observed evolutionary processes. Tavares connects different subsidiary evolutionary paths to host country development impact. She looks at subsidiaries’ value-added scope and the density and quality of local linkages as key determinants of host country impact, and makes an explicit link between subsidiary evolution and public policy towards MNEs. The policy stances of the two host economies are compared, showing that Ireland was far more focused, consistent and effective in terms of promoting and sustaining high-quality inward investment, leading to an expected greater ability to withstand future global challenges. The chapter by Jochen Lorentzen (Chapter 7) presents a South African case study looking into the relationship between human capital in host economies and international capital inflows. Lorentzen’s study describes how DaimlerChrysler upgraded human resources in the area around its East London plant in one of South Africa’s least developed provinces, where the company manufactures the Mercedes C-Class model for export. It shows the extent and depth of the upgrading along and beyond the automotive supply chain, and its repercussions on local education and training institutions. It also analyzes how and why this virtuous interaction between FDI and local industrial development in the short and medium term may, in the absence of proper regional economic planning, turn into a much less desirable outcome in the longer term. Björn and Tina Ambos (Chapter 8) look at corporate R&D, traditionally one of the most protected and most centralized activities in companies, but which has experienced a rapid internationalization over the 10–15 years. In contrast to earlier studies, which have focused on R&D activities in core Triad countries, their study also provides novel insights about R&D units in non-Triad nations. The study, which builds on survey data from 49 leading German MNEs that collectively account for two-thirds of the country’s privately funded R&D expenditures, reveals some interesting patterns. An important finding is that units in the Triad, as well as peripheral locations, are increasingly equipped with global market mandates, which indicates that the times when R&D was simply carried out for local markets are over. However, despite a steady growth of inward investment, it seems that non-Triad nations are unable to catch up with the core. The study
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also shows that the MNEs manage their units in peripheral and in core countries in different ways: units in peripheral locations display much higher interdependencies with corporate headquarters, are granted much less autonomy, and are much less innovative (measured by patents per annum) than units in core locations. Whereas previous chapters focus either at local firms’ outward internationalization or at foreign firms’ entry and subsequent development of operations in a country, the chapter by Carl Arthur Solberg (Chapter 9) looks at both domestic and foreign companies in his study of relocation. He proposes a model for analyzing relocation of business activities, with a focus on three groups of factors: country, industry cluster and company factors. His study of the Norwegian offshore supply sector indicates that country and internal company factors are particularly important in explaining firms’ relocation of business activities. However, the strength of cluster factors does not seem to play any significant direct role in this context. His findings also indicate that there is no difference between local and foreign firms in their proclivity to relocate. In the final chapter, Helene Hoggen (Chapter 10) takes the level of analysis up from that of firms and industries to that of countries and their relationships. Looking at the WTO, she argues that formal rules and dispute settlement cases are not precise indicators of which member states’ companies benefit from the WTO system. It is also debatable whether the system is beneficial first and foremost for industry or whether it protects consumers – in peripheral as well as central WTO member states. She argues that it is important to observe ongoing negotiations continuously in order to determine ‘who gets what and how’. The WTO is a very special organization and the trade rules laid down in the WTO agreements are continuously being renegotiated. The WTO system is more complex than it may seem at first glance and traditional rationalist perspectives are not necessarily the best equipped to explain WTO dynamics. In essence, her chapter deals with the challenge of being a country or a company in the periphery of the WTO system, as compared to being a central actor in the WTO. Her analysis suggests that, while coercion is a viable weapon of the strong, principled argument can be a potent asset for the weak to bring about desired change.
Notes 1. 2.
Cantwell (1995) generalizes Vernon’s ideas, extending them to include multiple core locations, and the role of technological change in this process. The issue here is to seek access to markets, which firms may do either through exports or FDI.
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References Barnard, H. (2006) ‘Investment from less to more developed countries as a mechanism for capability upgrading in developing country firms’, unpublished PhD dissertation, Newark: Rutgers University. Bellak, C. and Cantwell, J. (1997) ‘Small latecomer countries in a globalising environment: constraints and opportunities for catching-up’, Development and International Cooperation, 13: 139–79. Benito, G.R.G. (2005) ‘Divestment and international business strategy’, Journal of Economic Geography, 5: 235–51. Benito, G.R.G., Larimo, J., Narula, R. and Pedersen, T. (2002) ‘Multinational enterprises from small economies: internationalization patterns of large companies from Denmark, Finland, and Norway’, International Studies of Management and Organization, 32(1): 57–78. Benito, G.R.G., Grøgaard, B. and R. Narula (2003) ‘Environmental influences on MNE subsidiary roles: Economic integration and the Nordic countries’, Journal of International Business Studies, 34(5): 443–56. Birkinshaw, J. and N. Hood (eds) (1998) Multinational Corporate Evolution and Subsidiary Development, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Cantwell, J. (1995) ‘The globalization of technology: What remains of the product cycle model?’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19: 155–74. Dicken, P. (2003) Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century, 4th edn, London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage. Dunning, J.H., Narula, R. and Van Hoesel, R. (1998) ‘Third world multinationals revisited: New developments and theoretical implications’, in Dunning, J.H. (ed.) Globalisation, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, Oxford: Elsevier. Forslid, R. and Wooton, I. (2003) ‘Comparative advantage and the location of Production’, Review of International Economics, 11(4): 588–603. Fosfuri, A., Motta, M. and Ronde, T. (2001) ‘Foreign direct investment and spillovers through workers’ mobility’, Journal of International Economics, 53(1): 205–22. Fujita, M. and Thisse, J. (2003) ‘Does geographical agglomeration foster economic growth? And who gains and loses from it?’, Japanese Economic Review, 54(2): 121–45. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press. Hoesel, R. van (1999) New Multinational Enterprises from Korea and Taiwan, London: Routledge. Hoesel, R. van and Narula, R. (eds) (1999) Multinationals from the Netherlands, London: Routledge. Holm, U. and T. Pedersen (eds) (2000), The Emergence and Impact of MNC Centres of Excellence, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Kottaridi, C. (2005) ‘The “core-periphery” pattern of FDI-led growth and production Structure’, Applied Economics, 37: 99–113. Krugman, P. (1991) Geography and Trade, Leuven/Cambridge, MA: Leuven University Press/MIT Press. Krugman, P. and Venables, A. (1995) ‘Globalization and the inequality of nations’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(4): 857–80. Kumar, K and McLeod, G. (eds) (1981) Multinationals from Developing Countries, Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co. Lall, S. (1983) Third World Multinationals, Chichester: John Wiley.
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Lall, S. and Narula, R. (2004) ‘FDI and its role in economic development: Do we need a new agenda?’, European Journal of Development Research, 16: 447–64. Lecraw, D. (1977) ‘Direct investment by firms from less developed countries’, Oxford Economic Papers, 29(3): 442–57. Malhotra, K. (2006) ‘Will a trade and investment link in the global trade regime be good for human development?’, in R. Narula and S. Lall (eds) Understanding FDI-Assisted Economic Development, London: Routledge. Marshall, A. (1919) Industry and Trade; A Study of Industrial Technique and Business Organization, and of their Influences on the Conditions of Various Classes and Nations, London: Macmillan. Mathews, J. (2006) ‘Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century globalization’, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23: 139–41. Narula, R. (2003) Globalisation and Technology, Cambridge: Polity Press. Narula, R. and Dunning, J.H. (2000) ‘Industrial development, globalization and multinational enterprises: new realities for developing countries’, Oxford Development Studies, 28(2): 141–67. Narula, R. and Marin, A. (2005) ‘Exploring the relationship between direct and indirect spillovers from FDI in Argentina’, MERIT Research Memorandum 2005–16. Navaretti, G.B. and Venables, A.J. (2004) Multinational Firms in the World Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Prebisch, R. (1962) The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, New York: United Nations. UNCTAD (2005) World Investment Report 2005, Geneva: United Nations. ——— (2006) World Investment Report 2006, Geneva: United Nations. Van Den Bulcke, D. and Verbeke, A. (eds) (2001) Globalization and the Small Open Economy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Vernon, R. (1966) ‘International investment and international trade in the product cycle’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80: 190–207. Wallerstein, I. (1974), The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York: Academic Press. ——— (1979) The Capitalist World Economy: Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2 Can Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms of Small Developing Economies Compete in a Liberalized Trading Environment? Lou Anne A. Barclay
1. Introduction Within the past two decades, developing countries have been liberalizing their trade regimes. However, the beneficial effects of liberalized trade are still to be empirically substantiated. Yet, it is evident that small, developing countries are especially vulnerable to the consequences of a liberalized trading environment (Armstrong and Read, 1998). Moreover, it is the manufacturing sector of these economies that is particularly vulnerable to liberalized trade (ibid). This thus begs the question as to what the future viability of the local manufacturing firms of small, developing countries is in an increasingly liberalized trading environment. This chapter seeks to provide answers to this question by examining the competitive strategies implemented by local firms in the manufacturing industry of Trinidad and Tobago. It will also analyze the manner in which policy-makers, in their new facilitative role, are attempting to increase the competitiveness of these firms. The outline of this chapter is as follows. The subsequent section explores the extant literature on trade liberalization and economic development. The third section examines the trade liberalization initiatives implemented in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of which Trinidad and Tobago has been a member since the inception of this regional trading arrangement in 1975. It also discusses Trinidad and Tobago’s present dominance of intra-regional trade. The fourth section discusses the sampling and data collection methods used for this study. It also analyzes the characteristics of the sampled firms, including their motivations to engage in international business activity. The fifth section examines the strategies these firms used for international competition, while the sixth section discusses 25
26
Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
the role that the enabling home country plays in increasing the competitiveness of these firms. Finally, the seventh section presents the conclusion.
2. Trade Liberalization and Economic Growth in Developing Countries In recent times, developing countries have increasingly perceived trade liberalization to be the panacea for economic development. Indeed, the extant literature suggests that the potential benefits arising from liberalized trade are myriad. Some researchers argue that its immediate effect is improved factor allocation as resources shift from inefficient capitalintensive, import-substituting activities to efficient labour-intensive, export-oriented ones. They also posit that the long-term effects of liberalized trade are seen in the accumulation process, capital formation and the growth of real output and trade (e.g., Greenaway, 1998). Other researchers add the improved access to superior technology, imports and intermediate goods, the transfer of know-how and the development of a more economical market structure (Dornbusch, 1992). A number of empirical studies, which sought to investigate the above propositions, have been conducted. These studies reveal that trade liberalization results in a rapid growth of exports (e.g., Santos-Paulino, 2002) and a more rapid growth of real GDP (Papageorgiou et al., 1991; Wacziarg and Welch, 2003). Others concur with the growth-enhancing aspects of trade liberalization, however, they argue that this growth is not instantaneous; it is lagged (Greenaway et al., 1998). Studies have also shown that trade liberalization results in an improvement in investment (Harrigan and Mosley, 1981). In addition, others cite the improved productivity and efficiency of local firms that benefit from easier access to technology and heightened import competition (Devarajan and Rodrik, 1989; Pavcnik, 2002). However, several studies do not adopt such a sanguine perspective to trade liberalization. Indeed, it is argued that in the short term, trade liberalization does have ‘some undesirable but inevitable’ side effects; unemployment may increase and fiscal depletion may occur (Greenaway, 1998). Further, the proposed short-term effect of trade liberalization of improved factor allocation has not been supported by empirical investigation (e.g., Davis, 1996). In fact, some researchers emphasize the importance of including the effect of agglomeration economies on the location of activity among liberalized economies (Amiti, 1998). It seems that the effect of agglomeration economies is to reinforce the existing concentration of knowledge-intensive activities within countries as well as to relocate more footloose activities to large, domestic markets (Hanson, 1994).
Lou Anne A. Barclay
27
In addition, the proposition that trade liberalization results in economic growth is subject to controversy. The conclusions of some of the empirical studies supporting this claim have been challenged.1 Indeed, Greenaway et al. (1998), examining the extant literature, note that both positive and negative growth impacts have been recorded. Hence, in some instances, economic growth does deteriorate after trade liberalization. In addition, they note that several countries experience investment slumps subsequent to trade liberalization. It seems that the privatization initiatives mounted by the public sector are not accompanied by an increase in investment by the private sector since the latter questions the credibility of these reforms (Greenaway, 1998). Further, the notion that trade liberalization results in the improved productivity and efficiency of local firms has been disputed (e.g., Rodrik, 1988). Researchers also posit that these empirical studies suffer from ‘identification problems’ (ibid). Trade liberalization has been accompanied by ‘sensible’ macro-economic policies such as realistic exchange rates and fiscal discipline, which are often implemented under the auspices of the stabilization and structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank (ibid., p. 27). Hence, it is difficult to ascertain the beneficial effects to an economy from it solely liberalizing its trade regime. Clearly, the economic consequences of developing countries implementing trade liberalization programmes are uncertain. Interestingly enough, the literature is relatively silent on the impact of trade liberalization on the smaller, developing countries, which are likely to be especially vulnerable to the consequences of a liberalized trading environment.2 It is noteworthy that one study that examines this issue also emphasizes the uncertain impacts of trade liberalization (Armstrong and Read, 1998). Most importantly, this study revealed that liberalized trade would have a negative effect on the local manufacturing sector because of the erosion of preference margins (ibid., p. 560). Other researchers prophesy the death of the local firms in smaller, developing economies, which would be unable to compete with the ‘economic juggernauts’ from the larger, more developed economies (Reubens, 2003). The vulnerability of local manufacturing firms to liberalized trade is noteworthy since many small, developing countries have implemented the strategy of trade liberalization in tandem with the World Bankinspired orthodoxy of private sector-led development. Thus, in this newly liberalized trading environment, it is the private sector, not the government, that is the agent of economic transformation. The government’s role in economic development is merely that of facilitating the activities of the private sector.
28
Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the beneficial effects of the trade liberalization initiatives presently being implemented by many developing countries are uncertain. Moreover, it is ironic that given the present orthodoxy of private sector-led development, it is the manufacturing sector of small, developing countries that is especially vulnerable to liberalized trade. This thus has tremendous implications for the future viability of local manufacturing firms in small, developing countries. As was earlier discussed, this chapter seeks to examine this issue. To this end, it will analyze the competitive strategies, which are being implemented by Trinidadian manufacturing firms, in response to an increasingly liberalized trading environment. It will also examine the manner in which policy-makers, in their new facilitative role, are attempting to increase the competitiveness of these firms. The following section discusses the trade liberalization initiatives implemented in the Caribbean Community, the regional integration arrangement to which Trinidad and Tobago belongs. In addition, it examines the country’s emergence as a ‘regional hub and export engine’ (CARICOM, 2000, p. 77).
3. The Emergence of Trinidadian Firms in a Liberalized Trading Environment Trinidad and Tobago is a member of the 15-country grouping that comprises the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),3 which consists of a number of small states juxtaposed with micro-nations and economies (Wint, 2003)4 (see Table 2.1). Since the mid-1980s, these countries have been progressively reforming and opening their economies. The Common External Tariff (CET), which ranged between 0 and 45 per cent in the pre-1990 period, has since been standardized and lowered to a range of 0 to 25 per cent for all products, with the exception of agricultural goods, and non-tariff measures have been substantially reduced (ECLAC, 2001). Recent attempts were made to deepen the integration process through the creation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).5 Further, initiatives have been made towards liberalizing trade with countries outside of the Caribbean Community. CARICOM countries have formalized bilateral trade and investment agreements with the countries in the western hemisphere (see Table 2.2). Complementing these initiatives have been the continued negotiations to establish the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA). Notwithstanding these measures, intra-regional trade as well as trade with the western hemisphere partners has remained persistently low. In fact, for the period 1990–7, intra-regional imports comprised less than 10 per cent of
Lou Anne A. Barclay Table 2.1
29
Selected indicators of CARICOM member states in 2002
Country
Area (Km2)
Population
GDP at current market price (EC$M)
GDP per capita at current market price (EC$M)
Anguilla Antigua and Barbuda The Bahamas Barbados Belize Dominica Grenada Guyana Haiti Jamaica Montserrat St Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia St Vincent and the Grenadines Surinam Trinidad and Tobago
91 442
11,561* 76,485
298* 1,947
25,776 25,450
13,939 431 22,966 750 345 21,4970 27,750 10,991 103 269
31,200 275,320 257,310* 71,079 102,638 774,800 8,357,000 2,618,600 4,501 46,710
8,287** 7,015 2,572 685 1,084 1,961 12,797 22,897 103 953
29,718** 25,906 9,700 9,640 10,560 2,531 1,531 8,744 22,908 20,397
616 389
159,133 109,164
1,815 975
11,404 8,931
16,3820 5,128
441,356* 1,276,000
429 29,181
1,264* 22,754
Notes: * ⫽ 2001, ** ⫽ 1995, EC$ 2 ⫽ US$ 1. Source: CARICOM, 2003.
total imports. In subsequent years, this figure barely crossed the 10 per cent barrier, with intra-regional imports totalling 11.1 per cent of total imports in 2000 (CARICOM, 2003). This trade is dominated by Trinidad and Tobago. As Table 2.3 demonstrates, during the period, 1990–1997, Trinidad and Tobago accounted for more than 50 per cent of intra-CARICOM trade, with this figure escalating to 79 per cent in 2000. This country enjoys a substantial trading surplus in manufacturing products with every CARICOM country (CARICOM, 2000, p. 92). Trinidad’s dominance is also extended to extra-CARICOM trade, accounting for 48 per cent of CARICOM’s exports to Latin America during 1996–1998 (CARICOM, 2000). Since the mid-1990s, Trinidad and Tobago, like many other developing countries, has implemented a strategy of private sector-led development (Barclay, 2004). Hence, it is privately owned firms that are driving Trinidad’s aggressive international business activity. These firms share some common
30
Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
Table 2.2 Trade and investment agreements between the CARICOM countries and western hemisphere partners Agreement
CARICOM-USA CARICOM-Canada CARICOM-Colombia CARICOM-Dominica Republic CARICOM-Cuba CARICOM-Venezuela Dominica RepublicCARICOM Barbados-Venezuela Barbados-Canada Grenada-USA Haiti-USA Jamaica-USA Jamaica-Argentina Trinidad and Tobago-USA Trinidad and TobagoArgentina
Date concluded
Trade agreement
1984 1986 1994 1998
X X X X
2000 1992 1998
X X X
1994 1996 1986 1983 1994 1994 1994 1995
Bilateral investment
X X X X X X X X
Source: ECLAC, 2001, Table 1.
characteristics.6 First, some of them, significantly those involved in financial services, presently operate in a large number of countries. Second, these firms are large by regional standards. Indeed, most of the major conglomerates in Trinidad and Tobago are involved in this trade. Third, in most cases, their overseas investment takes place through inter-corporate linkages, such as mergers and acquisition, rather than greenfield investment. However, it is the locally owned, export-oriented, manufacturing firms of Trinidad and Tobago that are the subject of this study. The following section discusses the sampling and data collection methods employed, and introduces the firms used for this study.
4. Method: Sampling of Manufacturing Firms and Data Collection The choice of research method was dictated by the need to provide definitive answers to the question: what is the future viability of local manufacturing Trinidadian firms in an increasingly liberalized trading environment? Hence, a qualitative method was employed. Qualitative
Table 2.3 Proportional distribution of the volume of CARICOM’s intra-regional imports and exports among member states, 1990–2000 CARICOM member states Year
Merchandise trade
1990
Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f. Exports f.o.b.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
CARICOM
MDCs
Barbados
Guyana
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.3 94.0 99.2 93.1 99.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 89.0 94.2 98.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60.2 81.4 58.4 80.8 56.7 81.0 59.5 84.6 61.9 88.3 70.8 90.6 71.6 91.8 64.7 85.9 75.3 91.1 72.8 91.0 73.1 92.7
31.9 13.0 21.0 14.8 19.8 13.2 19.5 13.2 18.5 9.6 17.5 10.6 16.5 11.5 12.9 10.3 18.2 10.6 14.8 10.6 22.3 9.6
4.9 2.7 6.5 – 8.6 – 9.8 – 10.4 4.0 – – – – – – 10.8 4.8 7.0 5.0 0.0 0.0
Jamaica
17.5 13.8 14.0 13.8 13.3 13.0 20.8 11.2 23.4 8.7 35.4 7.0 37.7 6.1 32.9 4.7 34.7 4.2 33.2 3.8 38.7 3.9
Suriname
– – – – – – – – – – 6.9 1.4 6.8 2.7 8.7 3.8 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.9 0.0 0.0
Trinidad and Tobago 15.8 52.0 16.8 52.2 15.0 53.9 9.4 60.2 9.6 65.9 11.0 71.6 11.1 71.5 10.2 67.2 11.8 71.4 11.8 66.6 12.2 79.2
LDCs
Belize
39.8 18.6 41.6 19.2 43.3 17.3 34.5 14.6 31.3 11.2 29.2 9.4 28.4 8.2 24.3 8.3 23.3 8.9 27.2 9.0 26.9 7.3
2.6 1.7 1.4 1.6 2.1 1.3 1.9 0.9 1.8 0.8 1.8 8.7 1.4 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.3 0.7
31
Notes: —— not available. Source: CARICOM, 2002, Table 1.01(b).
32
Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
methods are specifically used in international business because of their capability to ‘study the non-linear, interactive, interdependent phenomena that make up this field’ (Wright, 1996, pp. 69–70). In this study, a case study was done of seven manufacturing firms operating in the non-oil sector of Trinidad and Tobago. One of the dangers of using case studies is the difficulty in generalizing to larger populations. Attempts were made to minimize this drawback by using more than one case and matching cases according to specific criteria (Wright, 1996). In this study, the criteria used were wholly owned, local manufacturing firms operating in the non-oil sector,7 which were exporting and/or engaging in foreign direct investment. The data for this study was obtained from the Trinidad and Tobago Export Directory Media and Editorial Project 3, 2001, which provides a comprehensive listing of Trinidad-based firms involved in international business activity. This database identified a total of 573 manufacturing firms engaging in such activity in 2001. Firms were randomly selected from this database, with every 20th firm being chosen for inclusion in the sample list. A total of 28 firms were selected. However, further analysis of these firms revealed that five of them were involved solely in distribution activities. The objective of this study is to examine locally owned Trinidadian firms that are engaged in both manufacturing and international business (exporting and/or foreign direct investment). Thus, these five firms were eliminated from the sample. This study also sought to examine manufacturing firms that operated outside Trinidad’s energy sector. Hence, eight of the firms were excluded from the list. Thus, the sample was reduced to fifteen firms, which all operated in the non-oil sector and were involved in both manufacturing and international business. However, seven of these firms declined to participate in this study, reducing the sample size to eight firms. Further, one company owned two of the selected firms.8 Hence, a total of seven firms were eventually examined. The majority of these firms are the dominant producers and exporters in their industry. The main research instrument employed in this study was a questionnaire consisting of ten semi-structured questions that required open-ended responses. Respondents were top-level executives such as chief executive officers or marketing executives. In most cases, face-to-face interviews were conducted. However, for two firms, the exigencies of time influenced the use of telephone interviews. These firm-level interviews were complemented by interviews held with key policy-makers. A questionnaire consisting of six semi-structured questions requiring open-ended responses was used for this purpose.
Lou Anne A. Barclay
33
General characteristics of sampled firms As Table 2.4 illustrates, a diverse group of firms was examined. The age of these firms varied from 23–83 years. They also varied in size: two firms were relatively large with 1,000 employees, while the others possessed between 60 and 500 employees. The products manufactured and exported were also diverse: three exported brand name food products, two brand name drinks, while the others were involved in speciality spices, plastic packaging bags, water tanks and construction-related products. Half of these firms, significantly, the smaller ones, used dedicated distributors to enter the export market. The others used inter-corporate linkages, mainly mergers and acquisitions, for this purpose. Finally, most firms had international business activities that extended beyond the CARICOM market. The majority operated in several markets including the US, Canada, Central and South America, Europe and India. It is also noteworthy that these firms had various motivations for becoming involved in international business activity. They will be examined in the subsequent section.
The drivers for international business activity Generally, most of the firms studied have been involved in international business activity for more than ten years. It seems that the favourable enabling environment of Trinidad and Tobago in the mid-1980s is what initially motivated these firms to export. As Wint (1998) notes, in the mid-1980s, the government of Trinidad and Tobago designed and implemented policies to stabilize the macro-economic environment in which the local manufacturing firms operated, as well as to encourage them to export.9 However, other factors subsequently influenced the export-led activities of the firms studied. First, for the larger firms studied, the motivation to engage in exports was part of a long-term strategic plan to dominate the CARICOM market. In so doing, some of these firms acquired other Caribbean firms to preempt foreign rivals from entering this market. Second, the majority of the firms perceived the CARICOM market to be simply an extension of the domestic market. These firms, significantly, those involved in the manufacture of brand name food, had limited prospects for expansion in the Trinidadian market. They thus became involved in export-led activity and, in some cases, foreign direct investment in the neighbouring CARICOM market. Third, it seems that the ‘opportunistic pursuit for profit opportunities’ (Farrell, 2003) also motivated the international business activities of several firms studied. Three of the larger firms, which were engaged in activities as diverse as the manufacture of brand name food to the manufacture of construction-related products, acquired privatized firms in
34
Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
their respective industries. Finally, there appears to be a pattern of ‘followthe-leader’ investment, especially among the smaller firms studied, which are attempting to emulate the exporting activities of the larger Trinidadian firms. This behaviour was, to a large extent, encouraged by the generous incentive programme for export-led activity, which was in place until 2003. Interestingly enough, it seems that the locational choices made by the majority of the firms examined are very similar to those suggested by theorists such as Johanson and Vahlne (1977; 1990) and used by other developing country firms (e.g., Yeung, 1997). Several of the Trinidadian firms examined initially adopted an ‘intra-regional focus’ (Farrell, 2003, p. 37) exporting to the CARICOM market, which is culturally similar and geographically close to their home market. Some of these firms, significantly, those in the food and beverage industries, subsequently acquired their Caribbean-based rivals. They extended their international business activity by exporting the products manufactured by the parent company and the acquired firms to the West Indian diaspora markets in Canada, the UK and the US.10 Further, a minority has successfully managed to penetrate the Asian and the continental European markets. It is instructive to examine the strategies these firms used to compete as they progressively became more internationalizd. In the subsequent section, we will examine the evolution of these strategies.
5. Strategies Trinidadian Firms Use for International Competition Competing in the CARICOM market The competitive strategies initially employed in the CARICOM market were based on competencies, which the firms had earlier successfully developed and leveraged in their home market. Indeed, one of the competencies that most of the food and beverage companies enjoyed was distribution. One company studied developed the competencies needed for the sophisticated management of its supply chain. In so doing, it has achieved the enviable target of having its product manufactured and consumed within 30 days. These competencies were subsequently transferred to the Caribbean market, where the firm established sales offices to manage product distribution and provided local staff with customized training. Other executives in the food and beverage industry also spoke of their ‘world class’ distribution network, which was first developed in Trinidad and later transferred to the CARICOM markets. Another competence, which was initially developed in Trinidad and later formed the basis of several firms’ regional competitive strategy, was
Lou Anne A. Barclay
35
production efficiency. This competence was realized in their ability to produce a quality product. Several firms in manufacturing activities as diverse as food and beverage, and plastics created a competitive strategy that was based on the delivery of a competitively priced, high-quality product. It is significant to note that for the food and beverage companies, this was often a brand name product. In some cases, it appears that the source of this competitive advantage can be traced to the firms’ relationships with foreign companies. For example, one firm was previously owned by a leading food multinational, which was instrumental in developing its present export product. As noted earlier, several of the firms studied had acquired rival firms in CARICOM markets. With their acquisitions in these markets, it seems that these firms sought to also use production efficiency as a source of competitive advantage. To this end, several deployed senior managerial and production staff to the acquired companies in order to improve their production efficiency. In one case, in an attempt at enhancing capitalization levels, a company made significant capital investments to upgrade the equipment and technology of its acquired plants. Yet, it is significant to note that at this stage of internationalization, the competitive strategies being developed do not seem to be part of a comprehensive plan to consolidate corporate-wide technologies, together with production, marketing and distribution capabilities into core competencies that will empower each business unit to quickly adapt to the changing business environment (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Rather, there seems to be little rationalization of production centres, products, including their brands, and distribution networks to match the companies’ competitive strategy. This situation partly reflects the failure of many of these companies to develop an integrated production network, which spans the CARICOM region, judiciously using the locational advantages of one country for the development of corporate-wide competencies. As Farrell (2003, p. 12) notes, the competitive strategy that several food companies use for their acquisitions has been generally to continue production and marketing using the original product brands in both the host country and export markets. Simultaneously, these companies have continued to use product quality and a superior distribution network as the basis of their competitive strategy for the exported, home-based product. Interestingly, in many instances, these products compete in similar markets.
Competing beyond the CARICOM market As Table 2.4 shows, most of the firms studied have successfully entered the extra-CARICOM market. In fact, some of these firms have been operating
36
Table 2.4
General characteristics of sampled firms
Firm
Years of establishment
Size (number of employees in 2004)
Export product
Number of foreign affiliates or subsidiaries
Export market
Firm 1 Firm 2
23 80
150 1,000
Brand name food Brand name drink
– 4 subsidiaries
Firm 3
47
300
–
Firm 4
25
60
Firm 5
50
1,000
Firm 6
27
240
Firm 7
83
500
Speciality spices, Brand name food, Natural products Plastic packaging bags Cement Construction Material slings, Paper sacks, Bulk packaging products Plastic bottles, Water tanks, Brand name drinks Brand name food
CARICOM CARICOM, Central America, Asia, Canada and USA CARICOM, USA, Canada, Europe, Indias
1 strategic partner 3 subsidiaries 2 joint ventures
CARICOM (OECS) CARICOM South America
–
CARICOM South America
2 subsidiaries
CARICOM, Canada, US Europe
Lou Anne A. Barclay
37
in these markets for more than 20 years. It is noteworthy, however, that for the majority of firms studied, the strategies used for competition in the regional market are very similar to those implemented in the international ones. Most of the food and beverage companies sought to compete on the basis of a competitively priced, brand name product, which is distributed in a timely manner to consumers. These products were generally marketed to the West Indian diaspora in the larger cities of the US, Canada and the UK. It is also noteworthy that none of these companies studied owned or operated production centres or distribution networks in these locations. Rather, the products were generally exported from the main production centres in CARICOM, and distributed by means of foreign, third parties into the international markets. Further, in general, little product modification was done to satisfy the idiosyncratic needs of the international market. Rather, these companies sought to appeal to the nostalgic sentiments of the overseas West Indian. Hence, the features of the product, including its brand name and packaging, were generally maintained to gain product recognition in the diaspora market. It is also significant that there were generally few attempts to move the exported product beyond the diaspora market. Only one of the firms examined had conducted market research in order to determine the peculiar needs of the Canadian consumer. As a result of this research, this company modified its product in order to reach the wider Canadian market. The seven firms studied are clearly competitive. They have all emerged from a small, developing country and, in most cases, managed to achieve sustained export growth. Undoubtedly, the source of their competitiveness in the CARICOM and international markets was generally based on their operational effectiveness; that is, their ability to perform similar activities better than rivals (Porter, 1996). Through efficiencies gained in production, these firms are able to deliver a competitively priced and, in some cases, brand name, quality product in a timely manner to consumers.11 Yet, is it possible for these firms to sustain their export performance in an environment that is becoming increasingly liberalized? The answer to this question partly lies in the sustainability of the competitive strategies employed by these seven firms. This is the subject of the following section.
The sustainability of the competitive strategies pursued by the Trinidadian firms Porter (ibid.) notes that while operational efficiency is necessary for a firm to achieve a superior performance, it is not usually sufficient. He
38
Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
posits that a firm needs to have a well-designed competitive strategy, which is essentially the deliberate choice of a different set of activities that delivers a unique mix of values to the consumer. Further, Porter postulates that the firm’s functional activities need to ‘fit’ with its competitive strategy. A ‘strategic fit’ among the firm’s activities is fundamental to the sustainability of its competitive advantage since it is more difficult for rivals to imitate an array of interlocking activities than any specific activity (ibid., p. 63). Indeed, Porter (ibid., pp. 64–5) defines a competitive strategy as follows: Strategy is creating fit among a company’s activities. The success of a strategy depends on doing many things well – not just a few – and integration among them. If there is no fit among activities, there is no distinctive strategy and little sustainability. Management reverts to the simpler task of overseeing independent functions, and operational effectiveness determines an organisation’s relative performance. [Emphasis mine] Given the above, it is questionable whether many of the firms examined have implemented strategies that will allow them to withstand competition in increasingly liberalized markets. Undoubtedly, the firms studied have devised and implemented strategies, which allowed them to compete in a home market that became progressively liberalized.12 In so doing, they achieved efficiencies in production, which resulted in a competitively priced, often brand name, quality product that was distributed in a timely manner to consumers. They subsequently managed to successfully leverage these competencies in the neighbouring CARICOM market. However, it appears that these firms are now unable to modify their competitive strategy to match changing corporate circumstances and market conditions. As noted earlier, several of the larger firms studied acquired rival firms in CARICOM markets. However, for these firms, there was little rationalization of products, including brand name ones, production centres and distribution networks to fit with a well-designed competitive strategy. Indeed, there seemed to be little attempt to rethink the existing strategy of competing in the CARICOM market. These companies appear to have made little effort to use their advantageous presence in the major markets of CARICOM to realign their functional activities in a manner that will create unique value to the consumer. There thus seems to be little attempt made at devising and implementing strategies for either lowering costs across regional operations or creating defined
Lou Anne A. Barclay
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synergies among operations in different countries. Moreover, there appears to be little attempt to re-organize the functional activities performed in different countries in a manner that will serve the needs of a targeted segment of the industry. As a result, many of these companies seem to be presently producing disparate, brand name products in different, and sometimes autonomous, production centres scattered throughout Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad, which are all subsequently marketed in the CARICOM and diaspora markets. A similar situation exists in international markets. It was earlier noted that several firms, specifically those in the food industry, exported their brand name products to diaspora markets in the US, Canada and the UK. It seems that these markets are simply an extension of the home market since the same competitive strategies employed at home were used in these markets. These companies all competed on the basis of a competitively priced, brand name product, which is distributed to the customers in a timely manner. However, there appear to be no attempts to move beyond the strategy of passively exporting a product, which appeals to the nostalgic sentiments of the overseas West Indian. There is little evidence of attempts made to identify the possible changing needs of this market, or to move the product beyond its safe confines. Further, there was no evidence of firms attempting to capture more segments of the value chain. They neither engaged in distribution nor operated any production centres in these countries. A few of the firms studied exported to the South American market. The source of these firms’ competitiveness was production efficiency. It is interesting to note that the products exported to the South American market were not part of these firms’ core activities. In consequence, it appears that the firms’ activity in these markets were not integrated into an overall strategy for competing internationally. In fact, in one instance, it was the firm’s surplus production that was actually exported to South America. All in all, it seems that these firms are yet to devise and implement sustainable competitive strategies. Evidently, this will affect their ability to compete with ‘economic juggernauts’ from the larger, more developed economies (Reubens, 2003). The present preoccupation of the majority of the firms studied appears to be increasing their operational efficiency. In the case of one firm, this was realized through its emphasis on quality – it presently operates a structured quality programme that is in compliance with the requirements of both the American Petroleum Institute (API) QI and ISO Standard 9002. In addition, it is implementing a ‘manufacturing excellence transformation programme’, which aims to transform performance and build capacity in its three plants. Despite these ongoing
40
Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
initiatives, this firm is still unable to compete against imported products from rival firms in the Far East, which the company alleges are dumping. However, one firm studied appears to have formulated and implemented a sustainable competitive strategy. This strategy is based on a realistic knowledge of its corporate strengths as well as a sound understanding of the industry in which it operates. In consequence, this company has positioned itself to be least vulnerable to competition arising from an increasingly liberalized trading environment. The focus of this strategy was creating and marketing a product for an underserved segment of the domestic, regional and international market. One executive compared this competitive strategy to peeling away layers of an onion. Indeed, the competitive strategy involved four distinct stages. The firm first sought to dominate the domestic market with a specific brand name product. Second, it sought to enter the Caribbean market with this product, creating a pan-Caribbean brand. The third stage involved it leveraging this brand name product in the extra-Caribbean market, specifically, North and South America. The final stage involved the company entering other international markets with this brand name product, thereby creating an international brand. This company, through market research, realized that there was no product in its industry that was specifically developed for children. It thus sought to enter this underserved segment of the industry. In so doing, it developed processes and operating systems, which were strategyspecific. The roots of its competitive strategy rest on four core competencies: low cost, technology-intensive production; sophisticated distribution; marketing; and social operating systems. The firm is presently the largest, low-cost producer of plastic bottles in the region, and has one of the most technically advanced soft drink plants in the Caribbean. The company sought to gain production efficiencies in both the bottling and filling aspects of its operations. It thus made significant investments in state-of-the-art plastic blowing machinery, which conferred the company with the distinct advantage of being able to produce large quantities of bottles at a high level of efficiency with a minimum wastage and low energy consumption. Undoubtedly, these production efficiencies have given the firm a competitive edge in the industry. However, the firm also sought to create a fit between its production efficiencies and its competitive strategy. In so doing, it sought to produce a lightweight, bottle that is ideally suited for children. Its brand name drink is packaged in a 250 ml uniquely designed, patented PET bottle. At present, 50 per cent of the firm’s production capacity is engaged in producing this brand name drink.13
Lou Anne A. Barclay
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The company also sought to gain efficiency in distribution. To this end, it has developed a sophisticated distribution network in the CARICOM market, which one executive claims is the best in the region. However, in an attempt to overcome the formidable costs and scale economies involved in creating its own international bottling network, this company sought to take advantage of its unique product, by franchising its bottling and distribution to a foreign company. The company has also aligned its marketing to its competitive strategy. To this end, it produces an array of drinks with flavours and colours that especially appeal to children. This strategy is buttressed by aggressive advertising and promotional campaigns, which employ a flexible localized approach that capitalizes on the culture of each country in which the brand name drink is marketed. The company also sought to tailor its operating systems to its competitive strategy. Interestingly enough, it has not adopted the approach postulated by business scholars such as Porter (ibid.). Rather, the company has introduced spirituality into the workplace. As one executive revealed, the business of this company is achieving ‘economies of souls’. This firm clearly has a sustainable competitive strategy. At present, its brand name product is marketed in more than 100 countries worldwide. The company has achieved the enviable reputation of being the first developing country with a global brand. Moreover, it has even stirred the ire of industry commentators. Indeed, one commentator stated: ‘Firms like [X] are taking their lead from American companies, and rampaging down their own little warpaths of expansion without limits’ (Norton, 2000). While this company is presently well positioned to withstand the onslaught of competition arising from liberalizing markets, many of the other firms studied may not be able to do so. This thus begs the question as to what policymakers could and should do to increase the competitiveness of the local manufacturing firms. This issue will be discussed in the following section.
6. The Role of the Enabling Home Country Environment in Increasing the Competitiveness of Trinidadian Firms As was earlier discussed, the enabling environment of Trinidad and Tobago in the mid-1980s is what initially motivated several of the firms studied to engage in export-led activity. However, it seems that as the firms became increasingly internationalized this environment has not evolved in a manner to fully support their requirements. Several of the firms studied complained about the inadequacy of the environment in which they operate, specifically, its infrastructure.
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Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
Concerns were raised about the quality and costs of infrastructural services such as port, customs and utilities. The smaller firms cited the inadequacy of the existing investment incentive programme, as well as the dearth of credit facilities, as contributing to the inefficiencies of the country’s enabling environment. Other firms spoke of the need to enhance the existing legislative and regulatory framework to meet the demands of the new trading environment. One executive noted the urgency of increasing the capabilities of support institutions, such as the Bureau of Standards, which are not able to effectively deal with issues such as dumping. It is significant to note that most of the firms studied spoke of the naivety of policy-makers to the realities of their competing in a liberalized trading environment. Many spoke of the potential challenges of competing against international rivals that enjoy the benefits of subsidized inputs, economies of scale and supportive governments, which are willing to impose non-tariff barriers to protect their markets. Yet, most of the policy-makers interviewed were dubious of the ability of the local manufacturing firms to compete in a liberalized trading environment. They noted that many of these firms would need support in areas such as R&D, technological upgrade, packaging, market-related information and complying with international standards. There was also a clear recognition that several aspects of the country’s enabling environment need to be improved. First, there appears to be an absence of systems for the generation, analysis and dissemination of information in a timely manner to the local manufacturers. Indeed, many firms lacked the capability to benchmark themselves against their international rivals, or the knowledge of what is required to operate in international markets. Second, it appears that the present incentive programme and its accompanying legislation are outdated. Incentives such as tax holidays are dependent on the firm’s profitability. Moreover, these incentives favour highly capital-intensive activities, such as the petrochemical industry, not the local manufacturing industry. Nonetheless, plans are afoot to modify the existing incentive programme, which is generalized to all industries, to one that is more sector-specific. Other areas of weaknesses in the enabling environment are also being addressed. In an attempt at modernizing and improving the efficiency of customs, one local business association has introduced a computerized system for the processing of customs documents for its members. Users are now able to process their documents in less than 48 hours. In addition, the government is involved in the Inter-American Bank Trade Support programme, which started in 2005, that aims to identify weaknesses in particular industries and devise policies to correct them.
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There are other initiatives that do necessarily enhance the competitiveness of the enabling environment but are aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the local manufacturing firms. The government has established a standing committee with members drawn from the public and private sector to formulate a development plan for eight strategic industries, including the manufacturing industry. This plan will be incorporated into the national development plan. In addition, staff of selected ministries are presently receiving training on trade-related issues. Further, the government and the local business associations have launched trade missions to some of the countries with which Trinidad and Tobago has signed bilateral trading agreements. It is important to note that these initiatives are being implemented in the context of the phased liberalization of the economy. Policy-makers reveal that in the ongoing FTAA negotiations, their posture is that CARICOM products should be given a grace period of more than ten years. They suggest that the firms in the manufacturing industry will, thus, have adequate time to enhance their international competitiveness.
7. Conclusions This chapter sought to examine the future viability of local manufacturing Trinidadian firms in the context of an increasingly liberalized trading environment. This study concludes that while a few of these firms may withstand the onslaught of competition arising from trade liberalization, many would not be able to do so. The chapter suggests that there are several reasons for this. Clearly, the home environment from which these firms emerged played a critical role in the success of their initial international business activity. Since the mid-1980s, the Trinidadian government, through its programme of investment incentives, has been successfully able to reduce the risks associated with the upgrading of technological and productive capacity, accessing working capital and capital financing, and penetrating export markets (Wint, 1998). However, some of these incentives have been recently discontinued, with adverse consequences on a few of the firms studied. Further, it seems that the home environment has not been able to evolve in a manner to meet the changing needs of the successful exporters. However, several recent government-led initiatives have been implemented that seem to address some of these issues. Nonetheless, the present challenge facing the Trinidadian government is a serious, ‘managerial’ one (ibid., p. 297). It needs to implement that mix of policies that, while being WTO-compliant, still manages to catalyze the local manufacturing firms, which are already successful exporters, to
44
Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
implement those strategies that would ensure their sustainable international competitiveness. This evidently has tremendous implications for the capabilities (education and training) of present policy-makers. Yet, while enhancing the enabling environment is necessary for the local manufacturing firms to achieve sustainable international competitiveness, it is not sufficient. As this chapter has shown, these firms need to implement competitive strategies, which would allow them to survive in a liberalized trading environment. Many firms studied need to rethink their strategies of competing in the CARICOM and international markets. Production centres in the CARICOM markets need to be integrated, distribution networks need to be rationalized and the strategy of marketing disparate, brand name products need to be re-examined. In addition, attempts need to be made to move the exported, brand name products beyond the cocoon of the diaspora market. Indeed, these firms need to ‘fit’ their competitive strategy with the functional activities performed in the domestic, CARICOM and international markets. As this chapter has demonstrated, little attempt seems to have been made at crafting and implementing strategies for either lowering costs across regional operations or creating defined synergies among them. There was also little attempt to organize the functional activities performed in different countries in a manner that will serve the needs of a targeted segment of the industry. In consequence, the majority of the firms studied did not possess competitive strategies that will allow them to survive competition in a liberalized trading environment. However, developing a sustainable competitive strategy has tremendous implications for these firms’ emergent organizational structure, human resource requirements, technological and operational capabilities and innovatory capability. This in turn has significant implications for government’s policies on issues such as education and training, technology and the provision of venture capital. Clearly, the future viability of the local manufacturing firms in Trinidad and Tobago rests on the concerted and purposeful actions of both the firms and the government.
Notes 1. The Papageorgiou et al. (1991) study is one that has been challenged by other researchers. For example, Greenaway (1993) has found weaknesses in the methodology used in this study. 2. Small countries, as measured by population, landmass or national income, have open economies as seen in the share of trade in their GNP or GDP, which is often over 100 per cent. This high degree of trade means that these countries are extremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks in the international
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4.
5.
6. 7.
8.
9.
10. 11.
12.
45
environment, and thus are highly sensitive to changes in global trading environment. Hence, they would be extremely vulnerable to the increasing liberalization of trade. For further discussion on this issue, see Armstrong and Read, 1998. CARICOM, which was formed in 1973, grew out of the Caribbean Fee Trade Association (CARITFA), created in 1968. CARICOM presently includes the following member states: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago. Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos are associate members of the Caribbean Community. The commonly used measure of country size is population because it is the most easily available variable (Armstrong and Read, 1998). However, it is the threshold to be used that is the subject of debate. Some researchers use an upper limit of 3 million (ibid.), while others use less than 5 million (Demas, 1965). Countries with populations of less than 1 million are invariably characterized as micro-states (Caldwell et al., 1980). The main objective of the creation of the CSME, which was established in 2006, is to integrate the CARICOM economies into a single market in which people, goods, services and capital can move freely in a single economy governed by the same coordinated and harmonised economic policies (INTAL, 2002). This section draws heavily from Farrell, 2003. The exclusion of firms in the energy sector is a deliberate one. There is a relatively paucity of academic work that examines the competitive strategies of wholly owned, local manufacturing firms that operate outside of Trinidad’s energy sector. This study is an attempt to fill this lacuna. This firm owned two companies that were engaged in the same activity. It seemed that the competitive strategies used by these companies in export markets were designed and implemented by the firm interviewed. The government designed and implemented a comprehensive incentive programme to facilitate export activity. This included accelerated depreciation of capital equipment; flexible export allowances where the firms received tax relief in direct proportion to their exports; a marketing grant scheme for penetrating extra-regional markets; tax deductions on promotion expenses; and measures to ensure that input costs were at international levels. For further discussion on this issue, see Wint (1998). The incentives designed to promote export activity, such as the flexible export allowance, which are now considered to be not compliant with the rulings of the World Trade Organization, were discontinued in 2003. Some of the acquired Caribbean firms were exporting to the diaspora market before their acquisition by the Trinidadian firms. It is instructive to note that these firms’ ability to compete on the basis of superior production efficiency is largely a result of government’s incentives, such as the accelerated depreciation allowances, which have been implemented since the mid-1980s. Trade policy was also a crucial element of the government’s incentive programme to facilitate export activity. Since the mid-1980s, the Trinidadian government has gradually liberalized trade as well as concluded several free
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Domestically Owned Manufacturing Firms
trade agreements with neighbouring Latin American countries. For further discussion of this issue, see Wint (1998). 13. This company manufactures and distributes seven brand name drinks for the domestic and CARICOM markets. However, three of its seven drinks are also marketed internationally.
References Armstrong, H.W. and Read, R. (1998) ‘Trade and growth in small states: The impact of global trade liberalization’, The World Economy, 21(4): 563–85. Amiti, M. (1998) ‘Trade liberalization and the location of manufacturing firms’, The World Economy, 21(7): 953–62. Barclay, L.A.A. (2004) ‘FDI-facilitated development: The case of the natural gas industry of Trinidad and Tobago’, Oxford Development Studies, 32(4): 485–505. Caldwell, J., Harrison, G. and Quissin, P. (1980) ‘The demography of small states’, World Development, 8(12): 953–67. Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat (2000) Trade and Investment: Dynamic Interface of Regionalism and Globalisation. Georgetown, Guyana Kingston, Jamaica: CARICOM Secretariat Ian Randle. ——— (2002) CARICOM’s Intra-Regional Trade Volume 1, 1990–2000, Georgetown, Guyana: CARICOM Secretariat. ——— (2003) CARICOM Statistics, http://caricomstats.org/Files/Databases/ Selected. Accessed 17 March 2004. Davis, D.R. (1996) ‘Trade liberalization and income distribution’, NBER Working Papers, No. 5693. Demas, W.G. (1965) The Economics of Development in Small Countries: With Special Reference to the Caribbean, Montreal: McGill University Press. Devarajan, S. and Rodrik, D. (1989) ‘Trade liberalization in developing countries: Do imperfect competition and scale economies matter?’, American Economic Review, 79(2): 283–7. Dornbusch, R. (1992) ‘The case for trade liberalization in developing countries’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(1): 60–85. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2001) Trade and Investment Flows Between the Caribbean and the Rest of the Hemisphere in the Context of FTAA, LC/CAR/G.664, 12 November. Farrell, T.M.A. (2003) ‘Caribbean economic integration – What is happening now; what needs to be done’, paper presented at CARICOM 30th Anniversary Conference, ‘Regional Governance and Integrated Development’, 17–19 October, Mona, Jamaica. Greenaway, D. (1993) ‘Liberalising foreign trade through rose tinted glasses’, The Economic Journal, 105: 208–27. ——— (1998) ‘Does trade liberalization promote economic development?’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45(5): 491–511. Greenaway, D., Morgan, W. and Wright, P. (1998) ‘Trade reform, adjustment and growth: What does the evidence tell us?’, The Economic Journal, 108: 1547–91. Hanson, G. (1994) ‘Regional adjustment to trade liberalization’, NBER Working Papers, No. 4713.
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Harrigan, J. and Mosley, P. (1981) ‘Evaluating the impact of World Bank structural adjustment lending: 1980–87’, Journal of Development Studies, 27: 63–94. Harrigan, K.R. (1983) ‘Research methodologies for contingency approaches to business strategy’, Academy of Management Review, 8(3): 398–405. Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL) (2002) CARICOM Report No. 1, Argentina: Integration and Regional Programs Department, Inter-American Development Bank. Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J.E. (1977) ‘The internationalization process of the firm – a model of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments’, Journal of International Business Studies, 8(1): 23–32. ——— (1990) ‘The mechanisms of internationalisation’, International Marketing Review, 7(4): 11–24. Media and Editorial Projects (2001) Trinidad and Tobago Export Directory, http://tnt_export_directory:4001/index.php. Accessed 23 February 2004. Norton, J. (2000) ‘Chubby made by S.M. Jaleel’, Flak Magazine, 6 October, http://www.flaxma.com/misc/chubby.html. Accessed 4 May 2004. Papageorgiou, D., Michaely, M. and Choksi, A. (eds) (1991) Liberalising Foreign Trade, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pavcnik, N. (2002) ‘Trade liberalization, exit, and productivity improvements: Evidence from Chilean plants’, Review of Economic Studies, 69: 245–76. Porter, M.E. (1996) On Competition, Boston: Harvard Business Review. Prahalad, C.K. and Hamel, G. (1990) ‘The core competence of the corporation’, Harvard Business Review, May–June: 79–91. Reubens, E. (2003) ‘Free trade, or countervailing power of the Americas’, Challenge, 46(4): 54–70. Rodrik, D. (1988) ‘Closing the technology gap: Does trade liberalization really help?’, NBER Working Papers, No. 2654. Santos-Paulino, A.U. (2002) ‘Trade liberalization and export performance in selected developing countries’, Journal of Developing Studies, 39(1): 140–64. S.M. Jaleel & Co. Ltd, – A Thirst for Perfection http://w2.chubbysd.com/chubby files/chubby.htm. Accessed 4 May 2004. Solow, R.M. (1957) ‘Technical change and the aggregate production function’, Review of Economic and Statistics, 31: 312–20. Wacziarg, R. and Welch, K.H. (2003) ‘Trade liberalization and growth: New evidence’, NBER Working Papers, No. 10152. Wint, A.G. (1998) ‘The role of government in enhancing the competitiveness of developing countries: Selective functional intervention in the Caribbean’, International Journal of Public Sector Management, 11(4): 281–99. ——— (2003) Competitiveness in Small Developing Economies, Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press. Wright, L.R. (1996) ‘Qualitative international management research’, in B.J. Punnett and O. Shenkar (eds) Handbook for International Management, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell: 63–81. Yeung, H.W. (1997) ‘Transnational corporations from Asian developing countries: Their characteristics and competitive Edge’, in H. Vernon-Wortzel and L.H. Wortzel (eds), Strategic Management in the Global Economy, New York: John Wiley.
3 Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises: Are Foreign Investors Dictating the Rules of the Game? Ele Reiljan
1. Introduction Internationalization of Estonian enterprises started at the beginning of the 1990s. Several development plans and strategies that were suggested by Estonian businessmen and politicians at the beginning of 1990s considered Estonia’s role to be a link between East and West, namely between Western European countries and Russia. In reality, Estonia’s role has been to create a linkage between the Nordic countries and Latvia and Lithuania. Therefore, rather than acting as a mediator between two regions with a huge market potential, Estonian firms have limited their activities to meeting the demand of relatively small countries (Sweden, Finland Latvia, and Lithuania). This shift in strategies was mainly caused by the Russian crisis and implementation of double tariffs by Russia. Another reason for the selection of smaller target markets lies in the foreign owners’ strategies – they considered the risk level in the Russian market to be too high and chose to enter the Baltic countries. This chapter attempts to identify the role of foreign owners in the internationalization of the Estonian manufacturing enterprises. Foreign investors have a significant share in several branches of the Estonian manufacturing industry and therefore it is likely that they influence the development of these branches by dictating the rules not only in the Estonian market but also in determining the structure of the export markets, the share of foreign activities, commitment to the foreign markets, choice between subcontracting activities and own export, and several other strategic issues that influence the overall pattern of foreign expansion. This, in turn, has an impact on the sustainability of competitiveness of the Estonian enterprises and the whole economy. 48
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The analysis of foreign operations in this chapter is limited to export and foreign investment data, since licensing and franchising activities are almost absent and, unfortunately, there are no reliable data about all branches of the manufacturing industry that would allow distinguishing between subcontracting and own export. Another limitation of the analysis is that it exclusively concentrates on the manufacturing industry and comparisons with service industry, wherever possible, are drawn only at an aggregate level. This approach derives from the fact that most of the internationalization of service industries in Estonia is covered by the foreign activities of a few big enterprises active in Latvia and Lithuania. This choice was also motivated by lack of detailed data about the service industry that would have allowed us to identify the role of foreign investors in the internationalization pattern of Estonian service firms. The third limitation of the analysis herein derives from the nature of available data, which do not allow distinguishing between alternative organizational modes within the export and foreign investment activities. The chapter starts with discussion of the main trends and motives for inward foreign investments in Estonia at an aggregate level. Next, the international activities of the Estonian manufacturing industries are described and the role of foreign owners in shaping the internationalization pattern is analyzed. Finally, two case studies are presented in order to illustrate the role of multinational firms in the internationalization processes of the Estonian firms. The company in the first case study, Krenholm, was selected since it has the largest number of employees among the manufacturing firms belonging to the top 50 firms by their total volume of foreign investment. Sylvester, on the other hand, has attracted one of the most sizable foreign investments ever made in Estonian manufacturing industry.
2. Foreign Direct Investments Inflows into Estonia In the early 1990s, investments into Estonia were relatively modest in absolute terms (see Figure 3.1) but, compared to several other transition countries, their level per capita was high (Reiljan, 2001, p. 60). In 1998, they were twice as large as the year before, but the Russian crisis that started at the end of 1998 affected the whole region and some of the investors postponed their investment projects, considering the uncertainty level to be too high. After that no clear trend has been observable in foreign direct investment inflows into Estonia, despite the continuous development of the economy. Instead, some big investment projects (for instance, acquisition of the Sylvester Group by Stora Enso in 2003) and also integration
50
Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises 14,000
12,471
Millions of kroons
12,000 9,430
10,000
8,071
8,000
6,645
6,000
2,000
3,694
2,819
4,000 997
2,153
4,800
4,448
2,313 1,814
0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Foreign direct investment inflow Figure 3.1 Foreign direct investment inflows into Estonia 1992–2003 (millions of kroons) Source: ‘Structure of Direct Investment Flows’, 2004.
Naturalresourcesseeking 10%
Strategicassetsseeking 7%
Marketseeking 65%
Efficiencyseeking 18% Figure 3.2
Distribution of foreign investments into Estonia by their primary motive
Source: Reiljan, 2002: 112.
into the European Union (investments in agriculture during 2003) have mainly influenced the foreign direct investment inflows. The classification suggested by Dunning divides the motives behind foreign direct investments into four main groups (see, e.g., Dunning, 1994, p. 36). Most of the foreign investors in Estonia have reported that their main motive for entering the market was to meet the local demand (see Figure 3.2). There are several studies about other transition countries, too, that have reached similar conclusions (see, e.g., Lankes and Stern, 1998; Marinov and Marinova, 1999; Meyer, 1995; Pye, 1997). This result, however, seems somewhat doubtful, as in the case of transition countries low-cost production inputs are often pointed out as the main competitive advantage in attracting foreign investors. However, in the first years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and opening of the
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new markets, the perceived risk level in these countries was too high for most of the companies from developed countries, who therefore preferred to establish small subsidiaries in the potential target markets, avoiding large-scale investments into production activities. Consequently, efficiency-seeking investments gained importance as the risk level related to these countries decreased. Unfortunately, there are no recent studies about the foreign investors’ motives in Estonia, but the developments suggest that most investors now have an efficiency- or strategic-assetsseeking nature. The importance of the low-cost production inputs is evident as during the 1990s most of the export in transition countries was based on low labour costs. The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries did not have remarkable differences in labour costs between themselves, whereas the differences with the developed countries were significant. For example, in 1995 the wages and salaries in the Finnish manufacturing industry were on average 10.5 times higher than in Estonia (Reiljan and Varblane, 2001, p. 8), which resulted in the relocation of several activities from Finland to Estonia. Similarly, Swedish enterprises transferred the manufacture of many labour-intensive products into Estonia. Cost advantages made it also possible to reorient the exports to the Western European markets, especially in the case of industries that were able to provide high quality goods. However, continuous development over the years and integration with the European Union have resulted in rising labour costs and therefore several labour-intensive industries are losing their competitive edge in international markets (Tamm, 2004). Moreover, emergence of the new production opportunities in Asia facilitates this process even more. This decline in competitiveness should be compensated for by switching over to the manufacture of capital-intensive and/or high-technology products, but in this area it is not easy to compete with the highly developed countries. Therefore, drawbacks in terms of export activities and change in the prevailing motives for investing in transition countries can be expected to occur in several industries in the forthcoming years. These potential developments can have a significant influence on the whole Estonian economy since the share of companies with foreign participation is high at the moment and they can determine the trends both in the local market and international activities. Table 3.1 indicates that despite the small share of foreign-owned firms in terms of the number of companies, they constitute a high share in the number of employees, net sales and, especially, export sales. Thus, the small Estonian economy is highly dependent on the foreign investors’ strategies, sourcing and production decisions and potential relocation of activities into the Asian
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Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
Table 3.1 Foreign share in the Estonian manufacturing industry 1995–2002 (% of all enterprises)
Number of companies Number of employees Export sales Net sales
1995
1996
1997
1998 1999
2000 2001 2002
12.6 9.5 25.4 20.1
10.0 16.8 32.5 26.6
9.6 18.8 32.1 27.1
9.5 20.8 35.2 28.2
9.8 27.3 44.9 34.3
9.5 25.0 43.3 32.7
10.2 30.8 48.5 36.7
9.6 32.2 51.5 38.8
Value added per employee (thousands of kroons)
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, 2004a.
140 120 100 80 60 40 20 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
All companies Companies with foreign ownership Domestic companies Figure 3.3 Value added per employee in Estonian manufacturing companies between 1995 and 2001 (1,000s of krnoos) Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, 2004a.
countries. If the labour-intensive production is transferred to Asia, unemployment is likely to increase significantly. Moreover, export sales are in this case likely to decrease; this will generate even higher pressure on the Estonian economy, which suffered a high trade balance deficit level until the beginning of the transition process. Besides the penetration of foreign-owned enterprises into Estonian manufacturing industry, the contribution of these firms to the economy is of great interest. Figure 3.3 shows that the value added per employee has been constantly lower in the domestic companies and there is no notable convergence between locally and foreign-owned firms. However, in some industries the value added by companies with foreign participation is modest. One such example is Elcoteq, which constitutes a high share of
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both Estonian exports and imports; the value added here is small and therefore the contribution to the local economy is not as high as could be expected.
3. International Activities of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises By comparison with developed Western European countries, the differences in the internationalization processes in transition countries derive from the experience and knowledge that the enterprises have. Enterprises from Western European countries have developed sequentially (the original idea of sequential development of international operations was suggested in Luostarinen, 1982; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) and have had time to get used to the globalization processes of the world economy. Knowledge about foreign markets and commitment to international markets has increased step-by-step during a relatively long period of time. Most CEE countries, on the other hand, had neither private ownership nor knowledge about business routines characteristic of market economies until recent. There were differences even between the transition countries themselves – the starting positions of the CEE economies were by no means equal when the transition processes started. For example, in the case of Estonia, all foreign trade was coordinated by Moscow and there was no knowledge about foreign activities, while at the same time, the Central European socialist countries were experienced exporters. Moreover, while private enterprises were allowed in several countries (for example, Poland and Hungary), others had no experience with market economy. Therefore, there was not only lack of foreign market experience but also lack of knowledge about the local market. At the same time, due to the globalization and integration processes several firms in the transition economies, especially in small countries, were experiencing pressure to internationalize and their pace of internationalization was faster than predicted by the traditional sequential internationalization theories (Svetlic ic and Rojec, 2003, p. xxix). To date, most Estonian enterprises have used export for entering foreign markets. The outflows of foreign direct investments are increasing but they are still significantly smaller than the volume of export. In the case of outward foreign direct investments, the composition of main target markets has not changed considerably during the years and the fluctuations in terms of the relative share of different markets have been small. The most interesting target country for foreign investments is Cyprus.
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Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
Table 3.2 Foreign direct investment stock abroad by main target countries 1998 and 2003 (thousands of kroons) Country Lithuania Latvia Cyprus Italy Russia Ukraine Finland TOTAL
1998
%
612,256 1,403,143 352,956
23.0 52.7 13.3
13,905 80,949 8,860 2,660,300
0.5 3.0 0.3 100.0
2003 5,656,729 3,576,404 1,738,473 551,353 371,784 341,068 166,671 12,668,000
% 44.7 28.2 13.7 4.4 2.9 2.7 1.3 100.0
Source: ‘Direct Investment Stock by Countries’, 2004.
In this case the investments are not related with money laundering or capital flight but indicate registration of Estonian ships. However, most of the foreign direct investments have been targeted to the neighbouring countries of Latvia and Lithuania (see Table 3.2). Such a choice of the target markets could be expected, since these are Estonia’s neighbouring countries with a similar level of economic development. Also, during the Soviet period, strong linkages with these countries were established. Concentration on these markets has also been facilitated by the foreign owners of Estonian enterprises who wish to be present in all three Baltic States and have, in a number of cases, used Estonia as a platform for entering the Latvian and Lithuanian markets. However, limited scope of Estonian enterprises’ foreign experiences involves problems that may hinder further internationalization activities. As the focus of this chapter is on analyzing Estonian manufacturing enterprises, the share of outward investments into the manufacturing sector is of great interest. Table 3.3 indicates that only 7.3 per cent of foreign direct investment stock is targeted to this sector. The volume of investments has increased but the share has been stable. Over the last years, main developments have taken place in the fields of transport, storage, communication and real estate. The relatively modest position of investments into manufacturing could be the result of foreign owners’ policy, weaknesses or lack of competitive advantages and/or lack of financial resources. Data from an unpublished survey ‘Outward Foreign Direct Investment in Estonia 2001’, containing information about 70 enterprises that represent 46 per cent of the stock of Estonian foreign investments abroad, indicate some differences between locally and foreign-owned firms in
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Table 3.3 Foreign direct investment stock abroad by field of activity 1998 and 2003 (thousands of kroons) Field of activity Finance Transport, storage, communication Real estate, renting and business activities Manufacturing Wholesale, retail trade Construction TOTAL
1998
%
2003
%
1,519,350 509,100
57.1 19.1
4,822, 253 3, 211,155
38.1 25.3
199,147
7.5
2,316,725
18.3
191,777 184,933 21,537 2,660,300
7.2 7.0 0.8 100.0
925,297 933,679 135,932 12,668,000
7.3 7.4 1.1 100.0
Source: ‘Direct Investment Stock by Fields of Activity’, 2004.
Number of affiliates
3
2.6
2.4
2.2
2.0
2.3
2.0
2
1
0 All
Local capital 1997
Figure 3.4
Foreign owned
2000
Average number of foreign affiliates in different groups of firms
Source: ‘Outward Foreign Direct Investment in Estonia 2001’, unpublished survey.
terms of the number of foreign affiliates (see Figure 3.4). The number is slightly bigger in case of foreign-owned firms. An interesting result is that the number of locally owned firms’ affiliates has remained the same, while in the case of firms with foreign ownership the average number of subsidiaries has decreased. Taking into account the fact that during the period 1997–2000 the stock of outward foreign direct investments in Estonia increased, it can be suggested that firms have mostly concentrated on developing and expanding their existing subsidiaries. Decrease in the number of subsidiaries may be due to the fact that during the Russian crisis, several foreign operations were closed down (this applies especially to subsidiaries in Russia and the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) markets).
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Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
Table 3.4
Export to main target countries 1995 and 2003 (millions of kroons)
Country Finland Sweden Germany Latvia Great Britain Denmark Russia Lithuania Norway Netherlands USA TOTAL
1995
%
2003
%
4,431.2 2,250.3 1,388.4 1,417.9 627.6 625.8 3,114.0 852.9 362.0 827.8 482.9 19,042.6
23.3 11.8 7.3 7.4 3.3 3.3 16.4 4.5 1.9 4.3 2.5
16,203.5 9,520.3 6,177.4 4,393.7 2,610.7 2,444.8 2,439.9 2,340.5 2,245.7 1,890.1 1,552.8 62,531.4
25.9 15.2 9.9 7.0 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.0 2.5
Source: ‘General Exports and Imports by Trading Partner Countries by HS Commodity Chapter’, 2004.
Table 3.4 presents an overview of the main developments in Estonian exporting activities. As can be seen, the export volume has increased in most cases. The only exception is Russia, which has faced a significant decrease in its export volume. Accordingly, its share among Estonia’s main export partners has declined. There have been mainly positive developments in other markets. It was pointed out earlier that, in the case of outward foreign investment, Estonian enterprises have mainly concentrated on Latvia and Lithuania. Data about export activities indicate similar tendencies – 41 per cent of the foreign sales are targeted to Finland and Sweden. This concentration is in many cases inevitable, either due to the foreign owners’ policies or the limited production capacity of the Estonian enterprises that do not allow servicing several markets simultaneously. Moreover, it enables gathering of detailed market-specific knowledge, thus increasing competitiveness in these markets. On the other hand, Estonian enterprises are highly dependent on the growth of these markets and negative developments in the target markets have a wider influence than the success of foreign activities. Some industries have already faced several drawbacks in demand in these markets and have been forced to diversify their foreign activities by increasing the number of target markets. However, this is not easy under the time pressure deriving from recession in demand, since the international experience is still relatively poor and application of the knowledge gathered from the neighbouring countries that are relatively well known is difficult in other regions.
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Estonian enterprises have already faced difficulties in their foreign activities in one market they were familiar with and had strong trade linkages with, inherited from the Soviet times. A drastic fall in exports to Russia occurred in 1998–9 during the Russian crisis, after which exports have not recovered yet (see the developments in export volume in Figure 3.5). The main sectors that lost their positions in the Russian market are food manufacturing – the export of meat, fish and dairy products declined significantly. Before the crisis, these sectors constituted a high share in the exports to the Eastern market. Now, after the crisis, the Russian market is growing but it is difficult to find a competitive edge in it because the production costs in these sectors of the manufacturing industry have increased due to the investments made to meet the high sanitary standards set by the European Union. Moreover, there were double tariffs that Russia imposed on Estonian production. Taking into account these aspects, Estonian companies have no price advantages in this target market. On the basis of the country-of-origin effect, other countries have more advantages than Estonia in most product categories (one of the exceptions is dairy products, in which Estonian goods have a good reputation and are highly valued). Therefore, it is not easy to find a competitive edge and suitable niche in the Russian market. Also, a number of Estonian businessmen tend to be overly confident about their knowledge of the Russian market and overlook the changes that have taken place over the last decade (similar tendencies are also reported in the case of US firms entering
3,500 Millions of kroons
3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Estonian exports to Russia Figure 3.5
Estonian exports to Russia (millions of kroons)
Source: ‘General Exports and Imports by Trading Partner Countries by HS Commodity Chapter’, 2004.
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Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
the Canadian market – see O’Grady and Lane [1996] for a detailed discussion). This overconfidence often results in poor analysis of the market and therefore several firms have failed to (re-)enter this market. The share of export sales in turnover varies significantly between the sectors of the manufacturing industry. Tanning and dressing of leather, and manufacture of motor vehicles and transport equipment were highly internationalized sectors already in 1996, while most other sectors and enterprises were only starting their international activities then. The speed of internationalization is also an important aspect to be taken into account. Figure 3.6 indicates that the highest speed has been reached by the textile manufacturers, followed by wood processing and office, electrical, radio and medical equipment producers. The main reason for the rapid increase in the importance of foreign markets in these sectors is the activities of foreign investors, who use the production of these industries as an input for their production plants in other countries or guarantee the market for the production through their distribution channels. In the
Textiles Wood Office, electrical, radio and medical equipment Furniture, others, recycling Tanning and dressing of leather Paper and paper products Manufacturing Chemicals and coke Machinery and equipment Apparel Metals and products Publishing, printing Rubber and plastic Motor vehicles and transport equipment Food products, beverages Other non-metallic minerals
⫺10.0
0.0
10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0
Speed of internationalization (%) Figure 3.6 Speed of internationalization1 in Estonian manufacturing industries 1996–2002 Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, 2004a.
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textile industry, Borås Wäfveri has transferred all of its production from Sweden to Krenholm, Estonia, whose production has been marketed in several foreign countries. Since Krenholm constitutes about 35 per cent of the net sales of the industry, its activities significantly influence all the data of this sector. A similar situation prevails in the two other abovementioned industries. In the wood sector, Stora Enso acquired majority ownership of the leading Estonian wood manufacturer Sylvester in 2003 and, after that, a rapid increase in international activities has taken place. In the case of office, electrical, radio and medical equipment manufacturing, Elcoteq Tallinn, a subsidiary of Elcoteq Network Corporation, determines the trends in the sector. It is interesting to note that, while, in most sectors, the share of exports in turnover has increased, there are two – food products and beverages and non-metallic minerals – where there has been a decline and focusing on the local market has taken place. In the case of the food industry, net sales rose 1.4 times during the period 1996–2002 and in the home market growth as considerable as 1.5 times was reported. During the period, the manufacture of other non-metallic minerals has faced even higher growth rates both in net sales (2.6 times) and especially in the sales on the home market (2.9 times). The home market growth and presumably also the limited production capacity have caused a decrease in the ratio of export sales to turnover. However, as pointed out above, these industries have also suffered due to the Russian crisis, without which their development would have been more impressive. Therefore, various reasons have simultaneously influenced the internationalization of these industries. It is often argued that the international activities of Estonian enterprises depend on the existence of foreign owners and on foreign owners’ strategies: see, for example, Lättemägi (2003, p. 245), Reiljan (2003, p. 150), Roolaht (2002, pp. 125–6) and Vissak (2003, p. 135). Figure 3.7 summarizes the export propensities of Estonian manufacturing firms. The data indicate that foreign firms export a higher share of their production than firms with local owners and the difference between these two groups of firms is growing. We can therefore suggest that the influence of foreign ownership can easily serve as the main explanatory variable for a more rapid pace of internationalization. The existence of differences in the internationalization processes between firms with foreign ownership and locally owned enterprises can be analyzed on the basis of the database containing the balance sheet and income statement data of 307 Estonian manufacturing enterprises for the period 1996–2002. Figure 3.8 indicates that during these years most firms, both locally and foreign owned, increased their commitment to
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Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
Share of export sales in net sales (%)
70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Companies with foreign ownership Domestic companies All companies Figure 3.7
Share of export sales in net sales in Estonian manufacturing industry (%)
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, 2004a.
Locally owned
Foreign owned
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Increase both in export volume and share Export volume increases, share decreases Export volume decreases, share increases Decrease both in export volume and share Figure 3.8 Changes in the export activities of Estonian manufacturing firms 1996–2002 Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, 2004b.
foreign markets. However, calculations reveal that about 25 per cent of the locally owned firms withdrew (some of) their export activities, while in the case of foreign owners this indicator is significantly lower. Moreover, foreign-owned firms constitute only 13 per cent of the enterprises that have decreased their commitment to international markets. On the basis of these results, it can be suggested that foreign investors contribute to increasing the stability of international operations.
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To sum up, in the case of foreign-owned enterprises, their better access to foreign distribution channels, knowledge of international markets, integration into the parent company’s value chain activities and investments into updating the technology and increasing the efficiency are likely to contribute to their international activities in a way that locally owned firms cannot match. However, the role of foreign owners in the international activities of the Estonian enterprises will be further analyzed in the following parts of this chapter.
4. The Activities of Two Multinationals in Estonia Stora Enso’s acquisition of Sylvester Since independence was regained, the Estonian wood industry has undergone rapid developments. It started its international activities by exporting roundwood in the first half of the 1990s, but more recently the focus has shifted to timber refining and adding a higher value to the products. For example, over the last five years, the manufacture of sawn timber has doubled and the export of gluewood has increased significantly (‘Saetööstuse toodang, 1998–2003’, 2004). The wood industry constitutes 16 per cent of the whole of manufacturing industry and 18 per cent of exports in Estonia (Statistical Office of Estonia, 2004a); thus, it influences the whole economy to a large extent. In the world context, the production capacity of Estonia is quite small but, taking into consideration the size of the country, it constitutes a significant share as Estonian sawmills produced 1.86 million m3 in 2003 and this is around 2.2 per cent of the EU production and 0.5 per cent of the world production of sawn wood (‘EFIA presentation’, 2004). Foreign-owned companies constitute about 33 per cent in terms of the number of employees, export sales and net sales of this sector (see Table 3.5), but their influence has increased significantly after the acquisition of Sylvester by Stora Enso.
Table 3.5 Foreign share in Estonian manufacturing industry 1995–2002 (% of all enterprises) 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000 2001
2002
Number of companies 7.4 Number of employees 5.7 Export sales 38.0 Net sales 28.6
7.6 9.8 12.6 11.5
5.8 12.4 18.8 15.2
5.6 11.7 24.9 16.3
5.8 18.4 30.7 22.7
5.7 18.9 32.7 24.8
5.5 21.3 32.4 23.2
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, 2004a.
7.1 21.7 33.2 25.1
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Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
AS Sylvester was the largest locally owned forestry company in Estonia until 2003. In 2002, 26 per cent of the wood industry turnover was generated by Sylvester Group, which had 7.6 per cent of the industry’s workforce, but in terms of sawn wood production its share was even larger – 40 per cent of the whole production. Before acquisition by Stora Enso, it had six production plants in Estonia and one in Latvia, the establishment of a production plant in Lithuania was in progress and the company had further expansion plans both to Latvia and Russia. The main export markets for AS Sylvester were Finland, Egypt, Algeria and Sweden, which made up 38 per cent of its net turnover. Before 2001, AS Sylvester was mainly focused on servicing the local market, Finland and Sweden, and therefore did not pay much attention to the Latvian and Lithuanian markets – the share of these markets in its turnover constituted 0.6 per cent in 1999 and 1.3 per cent in 2000. There were two main reasons for this choice of target markets. At first, the price level in all three Baltic markets was almost equal, which is why it was not easy to find competitive advantages over the local producers, whereas there were significant advantages in the markets of developed countries. Second, the developments in this industry in all three Baltic States had a similar pace and so there was a relative lack of ownership advantages. However, due to the intensive competition in the Estonian market and rising timber prices, in 2001 AS Sylvester decided to establish a new softwood sawmill in Latvia, which was launched and started its activities in March 2002. At the same time Stora Enso, one of the world’s leading paper, packaging and forest products manufacturers, was looking for investment opportunities in the Baltic States and Russia, as in these regions both the raw material and production costs are lower than in Western Europe (see Figure 3.9).
Nordic and Central Europe ⫽ 100
100 80 60 40 20 0 Raw material costs Nordic and Central Europe Figure 3.9
Cost levels in sawmills in Europe
Note: Nordic and Central Europe ⫽ 100. Source: Hägglund, 2003.
Production costs Baltic Countries
Russia
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Moreover, this region has about a quarter of the world’s wood resources (Hägglund, 2002), hence providing good growth opportunities and being a solid base for meeting the demand in Europe. In February 2003, Stora Enso completed an acquisition of 66 per cent of the sawmilling operations and 100 per cent of the wood procurement operations of Sylvester. This was one of the main events for Stora Enso in this year, enabling it to become the world’s second-largest producer of sawn softwood and the largest producer in Europe, with an annual production of 7.4 million m3 and further processing capacity of 2.8 million m3 (‘Creating Value’, 2003). The following motivations behind the acquisition of Sylvester were pointed out by Stora Enso (Hägglund, 2003): • It was the biggest sawmilling and wood procurement company in the Baltic States; • Sylvester has modern assets and an up-to-date technological base; • It supports both expansion in the Baltic States and further expansion to Russia; • There are significant cost advantages and synergies; • It secures access to the fibre resources for Stora Enso; • This acquisition strengthens Stora Enso Timber’s position in wood products markets. There were two main reasons for the former owners’ decision to sell the shares of Sylvester Group. First, they wanted to focus on developing other industries as the sawmilling operations had reached the maximum possible capacity in Estonia. Second, the dominance of Stora Enso in the European market was obvious and therefore integration of Sylvester Group into Stora Enso’s value chain seemed to be the best opportunity for guaranteeing further growth of the enterprise. The main effects of having a big multinational company in the Estonian wood sector are twofold. First, the establishment of a pulp mill that had been planned for many years was postponed since Stora Enso has its own mills in the Nordic countries and is interested in supplying them with the raw materials. For example, the projects for the year 2006 foresee the future of the Baltic countries as suppliers of Swedish pulp- and sawmills, while the role of Russia would be to compensate for the decrease in availability of wood in Finland after 2005 (‘Stora Enso Annual Report’, 2003, p. 27). Therefore, the target markets have been determined by the parent company. Besides this redirection of trade in terms of target markets, Stora Enso’s strategy to use most of the production of its sawmills within the group
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Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
has caused problems in several related industries (for example, blockhouse manufacturers) in Estonia. Many small enterprises have been forced to find new suppliers of raw materials, but it has been a difficult task as Stora Enso controls a significant part of the wood industry in Europe. One of the possible source countries is Russia; unfortunately, the Russian government has impeded wood exports to Estonia. Moreover, Stora Enso is now present also in Russia and has focused its activities mainly on the regions, which are the main suppliers of the Estonian enterprises. Thus, the problems with availability and price of the raw materials are likely to become even more serious in the near future. On the positive side, Stora Enso invests significant amounts of money to further processing activities, introducing new technologies to Estonia. As a result, value added to the products is expected to rise in the near future. Projections for the year 2006 predicted a drop of rough-sawn materials in Stora Enso’s production from the present 80 per cent to 40 per cent. After its acquisition of Sylvester, Stora Enso invested 30 million euros in enhancing the efficiency, production capacity and further production activities of its Estonian and Latvian production plants (‘Stora Enso investeerib järeltöötlemisse 470 miljonit’, 2003). Stora Enso has implemented most of the expansion strategy formulated by Sylvester Group before the acquisition, and over 2003 and 2004 it rapidly expanded its activities in the Baltic States and Russia. Opening of the new sawmill in Lithuania in September 2003 was the result of Sylvester’s activities, as the plant was almost ready for operation at the time of acquisition. Stora Enso has also established two production plants in Russia and it has further development plans both in Russia and in Latvia. Therefore, after gaining the leading position in Estonia, Stora Enso has concentrated on strengthening its positions in the other Baltic States and Russia, as these countries provide a better growth potential for the future than Estonia, where the maximum capacity of producing sawn wood has already been reached. However, the risk level in Russia is still perceived to be relatively high. Despite the potential of this market, Stora Enso prefers fewer capital-intensive investments and concentrates on gaining experience of the business environment and legislation (Härmälä, 2003).
Borås Wäfveri’s operations in Estonia The Estonian textile industry has long traditions, one of the oldest textile manufacturers, whose history goes back to the year 1857, being Krenholm. This enterprise was established by Ludwig Knoop in the Estonian town of Narva, situated at the border of Russia and Estonia. During the privatization
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Table 3.6 Foreign share in Estonian manufacturing industry 1995–2002 (% of all enterprises)
Number of companies Number of employees Export sales Net sales
1995 1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
18.2 26.3 64.5 40.5
14.0 55.4 69.5 76.9
16.7 55.9 60.7 70.5
14.4 55.2 49.1 62.2
17.2 54.0 54.8 58.4
15.4 63.3 62.7 55.8
15.6 71.3 82.7 75.1
18.8 58.8 72.0 78.4
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, 2004a.
of the enterprise in 1994, the Swedish firm Borås Wäfveri AB acquired majority ownership in Krenholm. Since 1999, it has had 100 per cent ownership of Krenholm (‘About Krenholm’, 2004), which has been one of the largest enterprises in terms of net sales, exports and number of employees in Estonia for years. Since Krenholm is the biggest enterprise in the field, its acquisition influenced the whole industry (see Table 3.6). Foreign penetration in this industry is remarkably higher than the manufacturing industry average (see Table 3.1) and therefore the strategies implemented by the management of Krenholm significantly influence all textile manufacturers in Estonia. Krenholm produces finished cotton fabrics, bed-linen, towels, curtains, cotton baby napkins and several other textile products. At the time of privatization, Krenholm had a large production capacity and was able to supply large quantities at low prices. This made it possible to rapidly reorient the trade from Russia to developed countries shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the beginning of its international activities, Krenholm concentrated mainly on subcontracting and indirect export activities, but as these were not profitable enough and the domestic market did not provide a sufficient base for development, further expansion to foreign markets and introduction of new products was defined as a strategy for sustaining the competitive edge. In several sectors of the Estonian manufacturing industry, subcontracting activities constitute most exports. Subcontracting has also intensified in the manufacture of textiles (2.9 times growth during the period), but both the volume and share of these export activities are still significantly lower than, for example, in the clothing industry (see Figure 3.10). Thus, the instability arising from the dependence on foreign customers and risk of terminating contracts is smaller. Figure 3.11 presents the data about the distribution of Krenholm’s foreign sales by the main target countries in 2003. There are two main
Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
Share of subcontracting in exports (%)
66
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1996
1997
1998
1999
Textile industry
2000
2001
2002
Clothing industry
Figure 3.10 The share of subcontracting in Estonian textile and clothing industries (%) Source: ‘Eseti rõivatööstuse ja tekstiilitööstuse ü levaade’, 2003; 8.
Other 29%
Finland 9%
Figure 3.11
USA 20%
Germany 16% Estonia 11%
Sweden 15%
Distribution of Krenholm sales by target countries 2003
Source: Kängsepp, 2004a.
changes in terms of target markets that have taken place over the years. First, the share of the domestic market has increased significantly and, second, the share of the USA has dropped from 55 per cent in 1995 to only 20 per cent in 2003. In the USA, Krenholm is selling its products under the label Gerber, through a subcontracting agreement. In 2000, it held 67 per cent of the cotton napkins market there. Besides napkins, Krenholm has also exported small quantities of fabrics to this market (Rozental, 2002). Therefore, despite the fact that Krenholm was a dominant player in the US cotton baby napkins market, it concentrated its activities on developing sales in other regions rather than in North America. This was mainly the result of Krenholm’s management strategy of higher diversification of their target markets.
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Krenholm’s diversification strategy was supported by setting up sales subsidiaries in several countries. The process started with establishing sales subsidiaries in Sweden and Norway in 1995 and continued with opening an office in Germany in 1997 (Vissak, 2003, p. 85). At this time, both Krenholm and Borås Wäfveri saw the main expansion opportunities in the European markets and thus wanted to increase their production capacity and acquire well-known brand names. They considered the privatization of another manufacturing plant in Lithuania in 1997 (‘Borås Wäfveri huvitub Leedust’, 1997). In 1998 an opportunity for acquiring a well-known producer of bedclothes in the Netherlands appeared and this would have given Krenholm a chance to increase their presence in the Benelux countries, but the negotiations did not result in a positive outcome (Ranne, 1998a). However, in 1998 they succeeded in establishing a sales subsidiary in Great Britain (Ranne, 1998b). Diversification of the target markets was only one part of the strategy developed by Borås Wäfveri and Krenholm. Other actions included the transfer of production operations from Sweden to Estonia and also the diversification of production activities. The latter concept was introduced in 2002. Ambitious plans about entering the clothing market were announced and investments of about 57 million kroons were made in order to produce casual and working clothes (‘Kreenholm kavandab rõivanootnist’, 2002). Unfortunately, these plans were not realized because of intense competition in the world’s clothing market. Relocation of production from Sweden to Estonia was discussed in the newspapers of both countries. There were mainly positive comments in the Estonian media, as these processes enabled the country to avoid, or at least postpone, a social catastrophe in the North-eastern part of Estonia, where the level of unemployment is very high and Krenholm is still one of the main employers. On the other hand, closing down the production plants in Skene, Sweden, was accompanied by the laid-off workers’ demonstration and a negative campaign in the Swedish media, which criticized the working conditions in Estonia as being extremely bad and out of date (Toomsalu, 2001). However, despite these reactions, relocation of the activities continued and, at present, most of Borås Wäfveri’s activities are carried out in Estonia. In the first years of the restructuring there was a rapid increase in Krenholm’s turnover but since 1997, because of the developments in the world markets, and especially the growing importance of Asia, as well as the overly optimistic ways of management, the enterprise has experienced stagnation. The optimism and extensive expansion plans that were expressed in the earlier years are no longer characteristic of the enterprise’s
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Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
statements as it faced significant losses in 2002 and 2003, but its profitability had already diminished a few years earlier. As a result, a more conservative strategy was needed and Borås Wäfveri took Krenholm under its direct control. This reaction is understandable, since all the developments in Krenholm significantly influence its parent company: Krenholm constitutes most of its turnover and losses, 60 per cent and 71 per cent respectively in 2003 (Kängsepp, 2004b). Difficult times were also reflected in extensive lay-offs (the number of employees dropped from 11,000 in the early 1990s to 5,700 in 1995 and 4,400 in 2003), and closing down those production operations that were most inefficient.
5. Discussion and Conclusions Estonia is a small country on the periphery of the European Union bordering Russia. Due to the Russian crisis and Russia’s discriminative tariff policy imposed on Estonian goods, the Russian market has been almost entirely closed to Estonian enterprises during the last decade. Therefore the latter have acknowledged an urgent need to focus on the European market. However, there are also several obstacles in the way of companies trying to enter the Central and Western European markets. For example, the distances between Estonia and these countries are great both in geographic and psychic terms. Therefore, Estonian firms have to compete with other producers from the CEE transition countries who can similarly boast low production costs and, in most cases, larger production volumes, while having lower transportation costs and smaller cultural differences. Estonian manufacturing enterprises have mostly internationalized through export activities and their flows of outward foreign investments have been modest. Therefore, their experience of operating production affiliates abroad is either small or even absent in the case of several industries. On the other hand, most manufacturing enterprises have exported their production to foreign markets, and several industries’ and enterprises’ commitment to the international market is high. Two case studies serve to illustrate that foreign investors can have a significant role in influencing the internationalization patterns of Estonian manufacturing enterprises. The above discussion indicates that Sylvester Group constituted a significant part of both the wood industry and the manufacturing industry of Estonia, and its developments influenced the whole economy. Sylvester was experienced in international markets as it had foreign sales in many countries with both small and large psychic distances. By comparison with most other Estonian manufacturing enterprises, it had also the knowledge
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of establishing and running a production plant in the foreign market. Therefore, we can conclude that Sylvester Group was one of the leading enterprises in Estonia in terms of international activities. This is remarkable, considering the fact that the firm was established in the 1990s and had local owners. Its rapid growth was the result of a clearly determined strategy, investment in up-to-date technology and favourable developments in the world markets. Acquisition of AS Sylvester provided for Stora Enso a solid base for entry to the Eastern European region as Sylvester was the biggest producer in the region, which had modern technology, control over raw material supply in Estonia and know-how about successful restructuring and establishment of sawmills in Estonia and Latvia. Therefore, in this case the positive effect of the foreign investor has been relatively modest as there was no need to update the technology, restructure the enterprise or implement a new strategy. According to the classification suggested by Dunning, Stora Enso’s investment into Estonia has the characteristic features of efficiency-, raw-materials- and strategic-assets-seeking investment. Servicing of the local market is not the objective for the parent company and therefore several other Estonian enterprises in the related industries have suffered in the new conditions due to the problems with getting access to the raw material. Consequently, while this acquisition is definitely beneficial for Stora Enso, from the viewpoint of the Estonian economy, positive effects are almost absent and negative effects seem to prevail. The activities of Krenholm and Borås Wäfveri shed light on the other side of the coin. In this case, the enterprise was privatized to the foreign owner and restructuring was the sole responsibility of the Swedish parent company. Borås Wäfveri acquired a highly inefficient firm that had lost its market in Russia. Naturally, its first task was to find at least some new markets, after which it concentrated on increasing the efficiency by restructuring the enterprise and introducing new technologies. As the business environment was at these times considered to be too risky, the local management, with modest international experience, had a strong impact on strategy development. There were three main pillars in the new strategy – expansion to the new markets, diversification of production activities and relocation of production from Sweden to Estonia. Over the years, significant amounts of money have been invested in these activities. Borås Wäfveri’s main motivation for foreign investment into Estonia was making good use of the advantage of low labour costs. This investment can therefore be classified as efficiency-seeking. This motivation is, thus, characteristic of both Stora Enso and Borås Wäfveri. However, while Stora Enso acquired an efficiently functioning enterprise, Borås Wäfveri
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Internationalization of Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises
had to concentrate on restructuring the unit. Hence, the contribution of foreign investment to the development of enterprise and also the Estonian economy is significant. Moreover, as Krenholm is situated in the region with a high unemployment rate and its influence on the whole area is remarkable, Borås Wäfveri’s efforts in applying a new strategy, searching for new opportunities and laying off as few people as possible have also significantly contributed to the advancement of the region. On the other hand, the gains of this acquisition to the parent company are not so clear, since the high growth and significant profits that were apparent during the first years have by now been replaced by stagnation and high losses. Nor are the latest developments in the world markets favourable for the textile producers who are located here and face a rapid increase in salaries. Therefore, it is a struggle to turn Krenholm profitable again. Thus, this foreign investment seems to be more beneficial for Krenholm and the Estonian economy than for the parent company. From the viewpoint of foreign owners’ impact on the internationalization of Sylvester and Krenholm, there are several differences. First, while Stora Enso acquired a company that was experienced in foreign markets, in the case of Krenholm the parent company had to transfer knowledge about international activities and was forced to find new markets. This leads us to the second distinctive feature; namely, Borås Wäfveri had the opportunity to determine the internationalization pattern of its Estonian subsidiary, but Stora Enso is reorienting its export now in order to supply its plants in Sweden and Finland. Hence, it provides a demand for the production by integrating Estonian operations into its value chain, while Borås Wäfveri does not have this opportunity and therefore instability, above, related with its international activities is significantly higher. There are also differences in terms of the autonomy that the Estonian subsidiaries have. In the case of Krenholm, the decisions about local and international strategies were made in Estonia until 2002 and Borås Wäfveri’s various lines of businesses were rather separated. On the other hand, Stora Enso was interested in creating synergies between its different lines of business and therefore a tight integration of the Estonian activities took place immediately after acquisition. To sum up, Stora Enso has dictated the rules to the Estonian subsidiary from the very start of its operations here, while Borås Wäfveri allowed relative independence for a long time but has taken the subsidiary under its close control now. It can be concluded that foreign investors have definitely influenced the internationalization processes of Estonian enterprises. The export propensity of the foreign-owned companies is significantly higher than that of the local ones and companies with foreign participation constitute
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more than a half of the export sales of the manufacturing industry, while their share in terms of the number of companies is much smaller. The above analysis of two companies indicates that there has been a shift in the foreign owner’s role in determining the strategy for the Estonian subsidiary. During the first decade of regained independence, several investors considered the risk level here to be high and, therefore, they often allowed the subsidiary to have a relatively high degree of autonomy. Since the risk level has decreased considerably and the local conditions are no longer so different from those in the Nordic countries, the foreign owners now tend to integrate the local subsidiaries tightly into their structures and dictate the strategy for both local and international markets. Estonia has been fortunate since its peripheral location in respect of the large Central and Eastern European markets has not made its enterprises confine themselves to servicing the local market and suffer because of lack of international experience and investment in restructuring. Foreign investors from Finland and Sweden were attracted by the country’s close proximity and tempting new investment opportunities. This has enabled Estonian enterprises to gather first experience from the foreign markets but has also caused their intensive concentration on servicing only nearby markets. Therefore, now it is important that Estonia, as well as other peripheral economies in a similar situation, should find new target markets and development opportunities in other regions, too. Otherwise, the positive influence of Nordic investors that facilitated its entry to the foreign markets at the beginning of the 1990s may turn into a negative experience and the downside of being situated on the periphery of the European market may prove to be a real hindrance.
Note 1. Wagner defines speed of internationalization as a change in the degree of internationalization (foreign sales divided by the total sales) during the period under examination (Wagner, 2004, p. 452).
References ‘About Krenholm’ (2004) http://www.kreenholm.ee. Accessed 7 September. ‘Borås Wäfveri huvitub Leedust’ (1997) Äripäev. ‘Creating Value – Stora Enso Key Facts’ (2003) http://www.storaenso.com. Accessed 5 September 2004. ‘Direct Investment Stock by Countries’ (2004) http://www.eestipank.info/dynamic/ itp1/. Accessed 20 August 2004. ‘Direct Investment Stock by Fields of Activity’ (2004) http://www.eestipank.info/ dynamic/itp1/. Accessed 20 August.
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Dunning, J.H. (1994) ‘Re-Evaluating the Benefits of Foreign Direct Investments’, Transnational Corporations, 3(1): 23–51. ‘Eesti rõivatööstuse ja tekstiilitööstuse ülevaade’ (2003) Eesti Rõiva- ja Tekstiililiidu Infoleht. ‘EFIA presentation’ (2004) http://www.emtl.ee/?id⫽502. Accessed 5 September. ‘General Exports and Imports by Trading Partner Countries by HS Commodity Chapter’ (2004) http://www.stat.ee/statistika. Accessed 25 April. Hägglund, B. (2002) ‘Fibre Strategy’ http://www.storaenso.com. Accessed 21 September 2003. ——— (2003) ‘Responsibility & Performance’ http://www.storaenso.com. Accessed 5 July. Härmälä, J. (2003) ‘Responsibility & Performance: Stora Enso’s Key Strategic Issues’ http://www.storaenso.com. Accessed 4 December. Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J.E. (1977) ‘The internationalisation process of the firm – a model of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitment’, Journal of International Business Studies, 8(1): 23–32. Johanson, J. and Wiedersheim-Paul, F. (1975) ‘The Internationalisation of a Firm – Four Swedish Cases’, Journal of Management Studies, 12(83): 305–22. Kängsepp, L. (2004a) ‘Kahjumis Kreenholm koondab tänavu iga seitsmenda töötaja’, Äripäev. ——— (2004b) ‘Kreenholm teenis esimeses kvartalis 3 mln kahjumit’, Äripäev. ‘Kreenholm kavandab rõivatootmist’ (2002), Äripäev. Lankes, H.-P. and Stern, N. (1998) ‘Capital Flows to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union’, EBRD Working Paper, 27. Lättemägi, R. (2003) ‘Direct and Indirect Impact of Foreign Direct investment on Export in Estonia’, Estonian Economic Policy on the Way Towards the European Union, Tallin: Mattimor, Luostarinen, R. (1982) Foreign Operations of the Firm, Helsinki: Helsingin Kauppakokeakoulun Kuvalaitos. Marinov, M. and Marinova, S. (1999) ‘Foreign Direct Investment Motives and Marketing Strategies in Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of East-West Business, 5(1–2): 25–55. Meyer, K. (1995) ‘Direct Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe: The Role of Labour Costs’, Comparative Economic Studies, 37(4): 69–88. O’Grady, S. and Lane, H.W. (1996) ‘The Psychic Distance Paradox’, Journal of International Business Studies, 27(2): 309–33. Pye, R.B.K. (1997) ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia): Results from a Survey of Major Western Investors’, CUBS Finance Working Paper. Ranne, R. (1998a) ‘Kreenholm ostab Hollandi firma’, Äripäev. ——— (1998b) ‘Kreenholmi Valduse AS teeb oma müügiesinduse Inglismaale’, Äripäev. Reiljan, E. (2001) ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Estonia’, Foreign Direct Investments in the Estonian Economy, Tartu: Tartu University Press: 31–90. ——— (2002) ‘Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment Determinants in Estonia’, Journal of East-West Business, 8(3–4): 103–21. ——— (2003) ‘Determinants of Export Success in the Estonian Manufacturing Enterprises’, Estonian Economic Policy on the Way Towards the European Union, Tallinn: Mattimor.
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Reiljan, E. and Varblane, U. (2001) ‘Differences in Labour Costs between Estonia and Finland as a Determinant for Relocation of Economic Activities’, States and Markets: Forging Partnerships for Sustainable Development. Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Global Business and Economic Development, Bratislava. Roolaht, T. (2002) ‘The internationalisation of Estonian Companies: An Exploratory Study of Relationship Aspects’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Tartu, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. Rozental, V. (2002) ‘Kreenholm: USA annab endiselt ligi veerandi müügikäibest’, Äripäev. ‘Saetööstuse toodang 1998–2003’(2004) http://www.emtl.ee/?id⫽612. Accessed 5 September. Statistical Office of Estonia (2004a) ‘Aggregated data of the Estonian manufacturing industry’, database. Statistical Office of Estonia (2004b) ‘Estonian manufacturing Enterprises 1996–2002’, database. ‘Stora Enso Annual Report’ (2003) http://www.storaenso.com. Accessed 5 September. ‘Stora Enso investeerib järeltöötlemisse 470 miljonit’ (2003), Postimees. ‘Structure of direct investment flows’ (2004) http://www.eestipank.info/ dynamic/itp1/. Accessed 20 August. Svetlic ic , M.and Rojec, M. (2003) ‘Introduction’, in M. Svetlicic and M. Rojec (eds), Facilitating Transition By Internationalisation: Outward Direct Investment from Central European Economies in Transition, Aldershot: Ashgate: xxvii–xxxv. Tamm, D. (2004) ‘Sustainability of Estonian Manufacturing Industry’s Labour Costs Based Export Competitiveness’, International Business in Transition Economies: International Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Competitiveness in the Transforming and Enlarging Europe. Proceedings of the third International Conference, Riga. Toomsalu, Ü. (2001) ‘Töö kadumine Rootsis tõi Kreenholmi tüli’, Äripäev. Vissak, T. (2003) ‘The Internationalisation of Foreign-owned Enterprises in Estonia: An Extended Network Perspective’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Tartu, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. Wagner, H. (2004) ‘Internationalization Speed and Cost Efficiency: Evidence from Germany’, International Business Review, 13(4): 447–63.
4 The Internationalization Patterns of Norwegian Firms: Does Industry Matter? Birgitte Grøgaard and Gabriel R.G. Benito
1. Introduction Previous research has shown that firms from small economies are prone to internationalize quicker and to a larger extent than firms from larger countries. In general, their international activities are largely influenced by the limited size of their domestic markets (Krugman, 1991). The lack of strong local forces that retain activities at home further pushes firms to move activities, sometimes even those of strategic character, to foreign locations (Benito et al., 2002). Indeed, small and peripheral countries often actively try to attract and retain inward foreign direct investment (FDI), albeit with mixed results (see Chapter 6, this volume). It is generally recognized that both internal and external factors influence firms’ internationalization patterns. However, most of the research literature has hitherto focused on firm-specific (internal) issues and on countrylevel (external) issues. Internationalization has traditionally been seen as a reflection of home country advantages (Kogut, 1991; Porter, 1990) and of decision-makers’ (entrepreneurs’) willingness to act upon market opportunities abroad (Andersson, 2000; Cavusgil, 1980; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Industry factors are often overlooked, generalized too much, or inadequately measured (Makhija et al., 1997). After decades of research on the internationalization of business activities, we still have limited knowledge about the influence of industry-specific factors on firms’ internationalization patterns. External factors generate costs and uncertainties such as political and macro-economic issues, tariffs, socio-cultural differences, and competitive and industry structures (Davidson, 1980; Hirsch, 1976). They can act as both centrifugal and centripetal forces for the internationalization of firms from small economies (Benito et al., 2002). For example, oligopolistic 74
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market structures are supposed to have an especially strong impact on firms with small domestic markets since the influence on the competitive situation may be more immediate. External factors are typically analyzed from the perspective of firms and, in particular, decision-makers’ perceptions of potential costs or disadvantages of organizing and performing activities in various locations. Key economics approaches such as transaction cost theory (Hennart, 1982; 2000), internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976) and the eclectic framework (Dunning, 2001) treat decisions to internationalize as being dependent on firms’ identification of relevant alternatives, awareness of uncertainties and willingness to take risks. Studies focusing on managerial behaviour and internal organizational processes also accentuate a perceptual view on external factors. The internationalization process perspective, for instance, filters the influence of external factors through the notion of psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Starting from a point of strong perceived uncertainty a firm gradually increases its ‘comfort zone’ of foreign markets; its level of uncertainty is reduced through accumulation of experience and learning. Firms within the same industry may, thus, be expected to follow fairly different internationalization paths since external factors become marginalized over time and their influence is contingent on the perceptions of decision-makers. Some scholars argue that industry characteristics strongly shape firm strategies and that they constrain the strategic options open to firms (Ghoshal, 1987; Porter, 1986). Theories of oligopolistic reaction argue that firms are strongly influenced by the strategic moves of their competitors. Hence, if one competitor internationalizes, others are prone to follow (Graham, 2000; Knickerbocker, 1973). The international strategy literature also addresses industry-related characteristics in the global integration/local responsiveness framework in terms of various pressures in the firms’ competitive environment (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad and Doz, 1987). A few studies propose ways of identifying the globality of industries by looking at structural characteristics, such as research intensity (Kobrin, 1991), or outcome-oriented variables, such as international linkages and the integration of value-chain activities (Makhija et al., 1997). The main argument is that, in some industries, firms are pushed to pursue global strategies in order to capitalize on dispersed resource endowments and scale economies (Morrison and Roth, 1993; Porter, 1980). One could then expect to find many similarities in the internationalization patterns among firms within the same industry. Pursuing strategies that do not fit the industry characteristics would create disadvantages in the long run. The success of firms’ internationalization
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strategies could be highly dependent on industry characteristics: for example, Porter argues that ‘in a multi-domestic industry, company internationalization is discretionary… in a global industry, a firm must in some way integrate its activities on a worldwide basis to capture the linkages among countries’ (Porter, 1986, p. 12). In all, scarce attention has been given to the influence of underlying industry factors on the internationalization patterns of firms. The present study addresses this gap by analyzing the influence of industry characteristics on firms’ internationalization strategies. The empirical context of the study is Norwegian companies over the decade 1990–2000. We first briefly look at some indicators at an aggregate level of the degree of internationalization of Norwegian firms in that period. We then identify key internationalization measures and industry characteristics, which we analyze using a sample of the 100 largest non-financial Norwegian firms. We find that even in a small economy such as Norway, where the influence of macro-level factors is considerable, the internationalization of firms is evidently also influenced by industry characteristics.
2. The Internationalization of Norwegian Firms Moving from an inward-looking and highly protective posture in the years immediately following World War II, the Norwegian authorities gradually increased the openness of its economy. The EFTA agreement in 1960 was particularly conducive in perpetuating an increasingly liberal policy towards foreign trade and investment throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Starting from an already fairly high level in 1990, the Norwegian economy nevertheless experienced a noticeable increase in its overall degree of internationalization during the 1990s. As can be seen from Table 4.1, outward FDI as a percentage of GDP tripled and exports
Table 4.1 1990s
Foreign trade and investment in the Norwegian economy in the
Total exports as % of GDP Total imports as % of GDP Outward FDI stock as % of GDP Inward FDI stock as % of GDP
1990
1995
2000
32.0 25.7 9.4 10.7
38.3 32.3 15.4 12.8
46.6 30.4 27.3 18.8
Sources: World Investment Report, 2002, and Norwegian Statistical Yearbooks, 1991, 1996 and 2001.
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increased by 50 per cent over the ten-year period. This indicates a strong overall growth in international activities among Norwegian companies. Similarly, inward FDI and imports increased by almost 80 per cent and 20 per cent respectively, which suggests that while Norwegian firms have sought foreign markets more actively they have, at the same time, experienced more international competition in their home market.
The internationalization of large Norwegian firms, 1990–2000 Firms from small open economies (SMOPECs), such as Norway, are generally expected to internationalize quicker and more extensively than firms from larger home markets for obvious reasons, such as limited market size or their quest for scale, scope and resources (Benito et al., 2002). Table 4.2 shows aggregate internationalization measures for our sample of the 100 largest Norwegian firms over the period 1990–2000. On average, the data show an increased level of the international activity (sales) of these firms as well as an increase in firms moving value activities to foreign markets (employees and subsidiaries). Although the average figures show a steady growth in international activities, such figures mask considerable variation across the firms, as the median figures suggest. Roughly a third of the firms had more than 50 per cent of total sales outside Norway in 1990, but as much as 45 per cent of the firms studied did not have any foreign sales at all at that point. The number of firms with foreign sales exceeding domestic sales had grown to 45 per cent by the year 2000, simultaneously reducing the number of purely domestic firms to a quarter of the total sample. There has also been a considerable development in the number of employees outside Norway. In 1990, two-thirds of the firms studied did not have any employees outside Norway. In 2000, over 70 per cent of the firms had employees in foreign locations. Furthermore, foreign employees had by then become a significantly larger part of the total workforce: in over 40 per cent of the firms foreign employees exceed a quarter of their total workforce. This is an increase of more than 80 per cent in the tenyear period. Indeed, by the end of the period almost a third of the firms have more than half of their workforce located in foreign countries. While the largest growth in the number of firms with foreign sales activities occurred in the first half of the 1990s, the growth of foreign employees primarily occurred in the later part of the 1990s. The data also show an increasing development in the localization and geographic spread of activities outside Norway. Almost 80 per cent of the firms studied had established foreign subsidiaries by the year 2000, a noteworthy increase from only one third of the firms in 1990.
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Table 4.2 Indicators of internationalization for the 100 largest non-financial Norwegian firms 1990, 1995 and 2000
Percentage of firms with foreign sales Average ratio of foreign sales to total sales (median) (%) Percentage firms with over 25% foreign sales Percentage firms with over 50% foreign sales Percentage firms with foreign employees Average ratio of foreign employees to total employees (median) (%) Percentage firms with over 25% foreign employees Percentage firms with over 50% foreign employees Number of firms with foreign subsidiaries Average number of foreign subsidiaries (median) Number of firms with foreign subsidiaries located in minimum three continents (%) Number of firms localized in the Nordic region (%) Number of firms localized in rest of Europe (%) Number of firms localized in North America (%) Number of firms localized in Asia (%) Number of firms localized in rest of world (%)
1990
1995
2000
54.3 32.1 (6.0)
72.2 39.6 (30.0)
76.3 43.4 (38.0)
45.7
53.6
52.6
37.0
42.3
45.4
31.5
48.5
73.2
11.8 (0.0)
17.9 (0.0)
29.4 (16.0)
22.8
32.0
41.2
7.6
15.5
28.9
54
75
34 6.9 (0.0)
9.8 (2.0)
14.7 (5.0)
15 (44.1)
22 (40.7)
26 (34.7)
26 (76.1)
41 (75.9)
61 (81.3)
27 (79.4)
43 (79.6)
52 (69.3)
22 (64.7)
29 (53.7)
39 (52.0)
15 (44.1) 11 (32.4)
23 (42.6) 15 (27.8)
33 (44.0) 26 (34.7)
Note: *The percentages (in parentheses) are calculated from the total number of firms with foreign subsidiaries, not from the total sample.
As detailed in Table 4.2, the nearby Nordic and European markets continue to dominate the international activities of Norwegian firms, but the number of firms localizing activities in more distant markets have more than doubled in the ten-year period. The relative ratio of firms located in each geographic region has remained fairly stable, with only a small decline in the European and North American markets. Hence, the geographic spread of the firms’ international activities has not changed significantly.
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3. Industry Factors and the Internationalization of Firms A sizable part of the diversity in internationalization patterns observed among the firms in the Norwegian sample is likely to be firm-specific and reflects firms’ strategic decision-making and competitiveness. If most of the variation can be explained by firm-specific factors, one should not expect to find major differences across industries. Conversely, if industry factors do in fact influence the patterns of firms’ internationalization, similar patterns should be observed among firms within the same industries. Previous studies, albeit scarce, suggest that four industry characteristics in particular may influence firms’ propensity to internationalize and the consequent development of their foreign activities (Andersson et al., 2004; Benito et al., 2002; Contractor et al., 2003; Porter, 1990; Yu and Ito, 1988): (i) the level of competition, (ii) research intensity, (iii) tangibility of the products and (iv) existence of clusters in the domestic market. Each industry characteristic is described in more detail below.
Level of competition in the domestic market A competitive domestic arena generally helps strengthen the ways in which firms perform value activities (Grant et al., 1988). Intense rivalry is particularly effective in sharpening firms’ commercial skills (Porter, 1990). Often, however, the rivalry comes from foreign firms entering the domestic market. Based on earlier studies of oligopolistic rivalry across national borders (Graham, 1978), we could, thus, expect Norwegian firms to internationalize as a response to foreign firms entering their home market. Internationalization can also result from a direct countermove to competitors internationalizing, creating a chain of interdependent moves (Knickerbocker, 1973). While firms in oligopolistic industries tend to react vigorously to competitors’ moves, firms operating in industries with large numbers of incumbents are less motivated to follow their competitors (Yu and Ito, 1988). The motive behind internationalization is not always directly related to domestic competition (e.g., FDI motivated by efficiency seeking), but empirical studies indicate that competitive home country environments increase the probability of successful internationalization of firms (see e.g., Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). In all, we expect the degree of competition in an industry, as expressed in its concentration ratio, to positively influence incumbent firms’ propensity to internationalize.
Research intensity A firm’s ability to achieve competitive advantage is rooted in its ability to innovate. The innovative skills can be either technological or market
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oriented (Porter, 1990). By operating in a dynamic and innovationintensive environment, firms develop organizational capabilities that serve as the foundation for successful long-term strategies (Grant, 1996). Firms with the highest technological competencies would thus have the resources and capabilities needed to manage international activities (Cantwell and Janne, 1999).1 Research-intensive firms may internationalize for a number of reasons, such as seeking new markets or moving production to lower-cost locations (Vernon, 1966). A reason for internationalizing activities can also be the need to adapt goods or processes to local markets and provide local technology support (Patel and Vega, 1999). These reasons for internationalizing are not necessarily driven by high industry levels of research intensity per se, and do not sufficiently explain why research intensity would push firms to internationalize. Nonetheless, operating in a researchintensive environment may generally strengthen the firm’s competitiveness in general, which in turn could induce firms to compete outside their domestic markets (Porter, 1990). Indeed, most firms tend to internationalize technologies that made them particularly strong in their home markets (Patel and Vega, 1999). Research intensity has been identified as a key structural determinant for global integration in industries (Kobrin, 1991). Firms competing in research-intensive industries are generally pushed at some point to internationalize in order to support their R&D expenditures and access sufficient qualified personnel to further develop their complex technologies (ibid.). Barring some national differences, a positive relationship has been identified between industry average R&D and export sales due to technology spillovers (Ito and Rose, 1999). Recent studies also show an increasing tendency of research-intensive firms to engage in international activities in order to monitor and gain access to technological developments outside their home market (Patel and Vega, 1999). In all, this suggests that firms with high research intensities may also have higher propensities to seek international markets.
Tangibility of resources and product offer Service firms have traditionally remained local and, thus, been less internationalized than manufacturing firms (Contractor et al., 2003). This can be explained by a number of reasons. First, internationalization drivers and motives differ between goods and services. While the relocation of production facilities to foreign sites is largely driven by the search for lower costs and access to resources or distribution channels (Dunning, 2001; Vernon, 1966; Yip, 1989), service firms rarely compete
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across borders primarily on price or costs and depend more on simultaneous customer interaction (Lovelock and Yip, 1996; Løwendahl, 2000). Second, significant non-tariff barriers often create real and perceived difficulties for service firms in marketing outside their original local markets (Grönroos, 1999). While manufacturing firms battle with issues of balancing standardization against local customization, service firms deliver a ‘performance’ that requires customer involvement in the delivery (Lovelock and Yip, 1996). We recognize that industry-specific characteristics will influence both service and manufacturing firms (Porter, 1986), but the influence of industry factors is likely to differ between these two types of firms (Løwendahl, 2000). Increased recognition of the diversity among service firms has led some researchers to divide them further into sub-groups (Contractor et al., 2003; Lovelock and Yip, 1996). Our purpose here, however, is simply to examine whether potential differences between firms in their propensity to internationalize depend on the tangibility of their product offer.
Clusters With the increasing focus on cross-border activities, one could expect a diminishing focus on geographical location. Yet, many studies reveal that the proliferation of certain dynamic geographical areas – so-called clusters – fostering technology development and fierce competitiveness coexist with many other areas that perform less illustriously. Although several studies focus on identifying clusters, limited research has so far analyzed their impact on the internationalization of firms (Brown and Bell, 2001). The potential impact of clusters is essentially twofold. On the one hand, a dynamic local environment might attract new firms interested in learning through a strong local network. Clusters may then act as a centripetal force for attracting foreign firms (Benito et al., 2002; Porter and Sölvell, 1998). MNEs that are seeking out information, technology and/or advanced marketplaces are likely to be attracted to clusters when they locate activities to particular geographic areas (Enright, 2000). On the other hand, clusters may also act as driving forces for internationalization as firms strengthen their competitiveness and know-how by belonging to them (Brown and Bell, 2001; Mariotti and Piscitello, 2001; Porter, 1998). Competitiveness results from strong domestic rivals, aggressive home-based suppliers and demanding local customers (Porter, 1990), all of which are typically found in strong local clusters. Subsidiary research has identified that subsidiaries in leading-edge clusters are, in fact, more internationally oriented that subsidiaries in other industry sectors (Birkinshaw and Hood, 2000). Hence, we could expect a higher
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internationalization propensity among firms located within strong clusters. Some even argue that firms without this sharpened competitiveness derived from cluster environments will have greater difficulties competing internationally (Mariotti and Piscitello, 2001).
4. Methods Data The study has been designed as a longitudinal study where a database containing detailed information about the 100 largest non-financial Norwegian companies was compiled for the period 1990–2000. The bulk of the database is made up of information taken from secondary data sources, such as annual reports, websites, books and presentations. Additional data has also been collected through direct contact with selected firms. The firms were selected from Kapital’s listing of the 500 largest firms in Norway, in 2000. The list was modified to exclude (a) financial firms that have traditionally been bound by strict regulations, (b) foreignowned firms and (c) government-owned organizations with narrowly defined scope of activities and restricted strategic autonomy. Since the firms were selected from the 2000 ranking and data was collected retrospectively, the potential for survival bias needs to be addressed. Indeed, the selected sample only includes large firms that have succeeded over time and, thus, fails to capture some of the dynamics that occurred in the particular period. This could be problematic if a large portion of the firms over time actually had ceased to exist due to bankruptcies and the like. It turns out that only 6 per cent would have disappeared by the end of the observation period (i.e., in 2000) due to poor economic performance if we had used the 1990 ranking: 36 per cent of the companies appear on both lists under the same name and 38 per cent reappear under different names (mainly due to mergers and acquisitions).2 For the remaining 20 per cent of firms, majority ownership had been sold off to foreign owners. The potential survival bias3 was hence judged to be small and of little consequence, especially in comparison to the problems posed by building a dataset (based on the 1990 ranking) containing substantial amounts of industrial dynamics that lie outside the scope of this study.
Measures The study seeks to identify the influence of industry characteristics on the internationalization of firms. In order to examine such developments and whether and to what extent industry influences firms’ internationalization,
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we focus on three distinct measures that fit the objectives of this particular study.4 By using these three measures we circumvent some of the limitations and misrepresentations of one-sided measures,5 while at the same time generating a multidimensional understanding of internationality. The first measure of internationalization is the percentage ratio of foreign sales to total sales (Contractor et al., 2003; Ramaswamy et al., 1996), which primarily identifies the amount of international activities (FSALE). Foreign sales ratio is commonly used to measure the degree of internationalization. Although it has been criticized as a stand-alone measure (Sullivan, 1994), it provides a straightforward statistic of whether the bulk of the firm’s activities are aimed at the domestic or foreign markets. Because the foreign sales ratio indicator does not distinguish well between exports and deeper commitments in foreign markets, two other measures were included to better describe the extent of international activities. The second dependent variable is the ratio of foreign employees to total employees (Contractor et al., 2003), which captures the extent of internationalization in terms of physical presence in foreign markets (FEMP). Foreign employment not only confirms actual presence in foreign markets but also gives an indication of the balance between management challenges in the domestic and foreign markets. This indicator is commonly used as a structural internationalization indicator (Dörrenbacher, 2000). Finally, we use the number of foreign subsidiaries (FSUB) as a measure of internationalization, to map in more detail companies’ commitments abroad and identify to some extent the geographical spread of their activities.6 Although this does not in itself detail the geographical or cultural diversity, it indicates the degree of complexity related to whether the foreign activities are centred in one or many locations. All firms were categorized according to International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) (Rev. 3) codes. We use four independent variables to measure key characteristics of industries. The variable TYPE identifies whether the company is in service or manufacturing industries. Specifically, we use a dummy variable with 1 indicating manufacturing firms and 0 indicating service firms. Second, the concentration of competitors in an industry, COMP, is measured as the market concentration of the four largest firms in a given industry. The definition of an industry was taken down to four-digit level ISIC codes to ensure that the variable measured the actual degree of concentration confronting firms in their immediate competitive arena. Sales figures were collected from the annual volume Norges Største Bedrifter (Norway’s Largest Firms) for 1995 and 2000. Third, research and development intensity, TECHINT, is
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measured as the average R&D intensity in an industry at the two-digit ISIC level. Industry level data for Norway for the years 1990 and 1997 were provided by the OECD. Fourth, the variable CLUSTER identifies whether a firm operates in an industry with cluster characteristics. Our classifications are based on two large-scale studies of clusters in Norway (Reve and Jakobsen, 2001; Reve et al., 1992). These studies identify a group of strong clusters and a few additional industries that had some of the characteristics commonly attributed to clusters. The latter group was labelled ‘weak clusters’. This leaves us with a trichotomy of strong, weak and no clusters, coded 2, 1, and 0 respectively. Firm-specific variables were added as controls. The variable CONGL identifies conglomerate companies, i.e., firms operating in multiple industries with ISIC codes that are not directly related. This means that firms may have multiple industry codes without being classified as a conglomerate. For example, firms with industry codes 05 (fisheries), 15 (food manufacturing) and 51 (food retailing) were not classified as conglomerates since these activities represent different aspects of the same value chain. Firm size is measured by TSALE; the total sales for each of the companies for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000.
5. Results and Analysis We have complete datasets for almost all of the 100 firms in the original sample, which means that for most analyses there are only a few missing cases. From our previous discussion, we expected to find significant differences in internationalization patterns across the industry groups. A Kruskal–Wallis test was conducted to check for differences across industries (at the 1-digit level) in relation to the three dependent variables. It turned out that there are, in fact, statistically significant industry differences on all three dimensions of internationalization.7 This prompted further investigation into whether particular dimensions of industry characteristics influence firms’ internationalization patterns differently across industries. Specifically, we run regressions with the selected independent variables to investigate why internationalization patterns differ across industries. The basic regression model is as follows: 4
2
i⫽1
j⫽1
ykt ⫽ ␣i ⫹ ∑ bi Industryi ⫹ ∑ g j Firm j ⫹ tij
(1)
where subscript k specifies the focal measure of internationalization (FSALE, FEMP, FSUB), subscript t denotes year of analyses (1990, 1995
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and 2000), a, b and g are regression coefficients, Industry refers to the set {TYPE, COMPt, TECHINT, CLUSTER} of industry characteristics of industry i, Firm represents the set {TSALESt, CONGL} of firm characteristics of firm j, and denotes the error term. Based on our theoretical arguments, we expect a positive relationship between the industry factors and internationalization patterns, i.e., bi ⬎ 0, but make no predictions about the g coefficients. Given the possibility of ‘path dependence’ effects in internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), where the observed levels and types of internationalization in a given period partly reflect firms’ internationalization in earlier periods, we run additional regressions with variables that capture the level of the dependent variables ykt-1 in the previously measured period. In effect, these variables, called PREVSALE, PREVFEMP and PREVSUB, are lagged versions of the dependent variable, albeit we use relatively long lags of five years:8 ykt ⫽ ␣i ⫹
4
2
i⫽1
j⫽1
∑ bi Industryi ⫹ ∑ g j Firmj ⫹ kt ykt⫺1 ⫹ tij
(2)
A correlation matrix was generated to check whether the dependent variables in the study really reflect separate dimensions of internationalization. Some degree of correlation between the dependent variables ought to be expected, but very high values would suggest that the various measures were merely replicating each other. The correlations given in Table 4.3 indicate that the three dependent variables seem to capture different aspects of firms’ internationalization. Hence, it makes sense to examine each of them separately.9 As shown in Table 4.4, correlations among the independent variables were generally low, with the exception of research intensity, which is moderately correlated with the indicator for type of firm. One would expect these two variables to be somewhat interrelated since R&D tends to be more important for manufacturing firms. A correlation of 0.58 does not per se suggest any harmful collinearity. However, additional tests were Table 4.3
Correlations (Pearson) among dependent variables
Variables
Mean
Std dev.
1
2
3
1. FSALE 2. FEMP 3. FSUB
0.388 0.206 10.35
0.388 0.280 19.385
1.00 0.683** 0.436**
1.00 0.627**
1.00
Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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conducted to ensure that multicollinearity was not a problem. Neither the variance inflation factors (VIF) nor the condition index indicated problems, both being within common threshold values (Hair et al., 1998).10 Both variables were therefore kept in the analyses. Separate base models for each of the three dependent variables were run for each year in the database. These base models include industry variables and firm-level variables. Table 4.5 displays the results for FSALE, whereas Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the results for FEMP and FSUB respectively. The base model regressions have modest to moderate explanatory power: models with FSALE as the dependent variable produce the best results with adjusted R2 values in the range of 0.41–0.52. Turning to the impact of the various independent variables, although all the four industry characteristics display significant effects on internationalization patterns, effects vary, depending partly on the internationalization dimension being analyzed and partly on the year of analysis. First, type of industry influences foreign sales ratios and the number of foreign subsidiaries positively, but not the foreign employment ratio. Service firms internationalize less than manufacturing firms in terms of foreign sales and FDI, but their foreign employment ratios are comparable to those of manufacturing firms. Thus, while this generally indicates lower internationalization propensities among service firms, whenever they do move abroad it is with a personnel intensity that is equivalent to that of manufacturing firms. Second, the coefficients of COMP are consistently significant in models with FSUB as the dependent variable, but do not show any significant effects on either foreign sales or foreign employees. This suggests that while high concentration ratios in the home market lead firms to establish subsidiaries abroad, they do not necessarily provide a general impetus to internationalization. This finding is in agreement with the idea of rivalistic behaviour in oligopolistic industries, which suggests that in such industries firms tend to carefully monitor the moves of their closest competitors. The domestic market is usually the single most important market to the firms, but if key competitors venture abroad other firms may be tempted to follow to mitigate possible adverse effects on their domestic competitive position. Third, industries’ research intensity appears to have had few effects on the internationalization of the firms in the sample. The clearest results concern the effects on foreign sales ratios, where the estimated positive coefficients of TECHINT are significant for the years 1990 and 2000. TECHINT also returns a significant positive coefficient in the model predicting foreign employment ratios
Table 4.4
Correlations (Spearman’s Rho) among independent variables
Variables
Mean
Std dev.
1
2
3
1. TYPE 2. COMP 3. TECHINT 4. CLUSTER 5. CONGL 6. YEAR 7. TSALE
0.49 0.443 3.677 0.71 0.07 1934.06 5903.47
0.501 0.249 9.433 0.898 0.259 45.576 18131.18
1.00 0.283** 0.576** 0.074 0.202** 0.222** 0.092
1.00 0.321** 0.037 0.094 0.176** 0.370*
1.00 0.239** 0.303** ⫺0.139* 0.168**
4
5
6
7
1.00 0.123* 0.205** 0.062
1.00 ⫺0.107 0.214**
1.00 ⫺0.329**
1.00
Notes: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 4.5
Regression results for FSALE 1990, 1995 and 2000 Standardized regression coefficients 1990 0.380*** ⫺0.078 0.232*** 0.466*** 0.098 ⫺0.175
0.366*** ⫺0.096 0.248*** 0.480*** 0.096 ⫺0.180** 0.077
0.427*** 0.036 0.121 0.540*** 0.033 ⫺0.187**
2000 0.102 0.073 0.018 0.234*** ⫺0.039 ⫺0.077*
0.322*** 0.049 0.209*** 0.563*** 0.015 ⫺0.117
0.719*** 95 0.41 11.865***
Note: *p ⭐ 0.10, ** p ⭐ 0.05, *** p ⭐ 0.01.
95 0.41 10.263***
97 0.52 18.172***
96 0.84 74.480***
0.012 0.008 0.110** 0.165** 0.010 0.010 0.734***
95 0.48 15.645***
95 0.75 41.014***
87
TYPE COMP TECHINT CLUSTER TSALES CONGL YEAR PREVFSALE Model statistics: n Adjusted R2 F statistic
1995
88
Table 4.6
Regression results for FEMP 1990, 1995 and 2000 Standardized regression coefficients 1990
TYPE COMP TECHINT CLUSTER TSALES CONGL YEAR PREVFEMP Model statistics: n Adjusted R2 F statistic
0.155 ⫺0.045 0.158 0.217** 0.199* ⫺0.108
1995 0.102 ⫺0.113 0.216** 0.261** 0.198* ⫺0.125 0.257**
0.153 0.080 0.107 0.263** 0.131 ⫺0.128
2000 ⫺0.017 0.119** 0.053 0.068 ⫺0.040 ⫺0.026
0.106 0.041 0.229** 0.304*** 0.044 ⫺0.092
0.848*** 91 0.10 2.615**
Note: * p ⭐ 0.10, ** p ⭐ 0.05, *** p ⭐ 0.01.
92 0.15 3.216***
93 0.12 3.072***
91 0.76 42.313***
⫺0.021 0.067 0.145** 0.074 ⫺0.026 ⫺0.011 0.756***
94 0.13 3.336***
93 0.64 24.229***
Table 4.7
Regression results for FSUB 1990, 1995 and 2000 Standardized regression coefficients 1990
TYPE COMP TECHINT CLUSTER TSALES CONGL YEAR PREVFSUB Model statistics: n Adjusted R2 F statistic
0.170* 0.191* ⫺0.045 ⫺0.022 0.372*** 0.050
1995 0.132 0.142 ⫺0.002 0.015 0.369*** 0.035 0.204*
0.191* 0.250** ⫺0.043 ⫺0.024 0.173 0.065
2000 0.056 0.103 0.021 0.001 ⫺0.169** 0.051
⫺0.003 0.259** 0.089 0.079 0.149 0.175*
0.806*** 92 0.25 6.189***
93 0.28 6.175***
94 0.16 3.962***
93 0.62 22.401**
⫺0.121 0.171* 0.078 0.079 0.095 0.108 0.507***
94 0.12 3.022***
93 0.34 7.666***
Note: * p ⭐ 0.10, ** p ⭐ 0.05, *** p ⭐ 0.01.
89
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in the year 2000. All in all, though, the results for this variable are inconclusive in the regression runs for the base models. Fourth, the existence of industrial clusters has positive effects on firms’ foreign sales as well as on their foreign employment ratios. All models with FSALE and FEMP as dependent variables display positive and strongly significant coefficients for the CLUSTER variable, with particularly pronounced effects for the foreign sales ratio. Interestingly, no effect was found for the CLUSTER variable in the FSUB models: in other words, belonging to an industrial cluster seemingly boosts the international competitiveness of its incumbent firms (Brown and Bell, 2001; Mariotti and Piscitello, 2001; Porter, 1998), but does not lead them to establish an extensive network of units abroad. This indicates, in line with other studies of industrial clusters, that clusters are successful both in attracting business to certain locations and in retaining those firms that are already established there (Enright, 2000; Reve and Jakobsen, 2001). The estimations produced few significant effects for the firm-level variables that were introduced as controls, which indicates that neither size nor diversification have clear effects on internationalization patterns. The regression runs of the base models indicate that industry factors indeed have an impact on the internationalization of the firms in the sample but only account for a fraction of the variation in the data. We took the investigation further by incorporating potential ‘path dependence’ effects. It has been noted that firms’ internationalization patterns may be ‘path dependent’ (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977); i.e., that the firms’ degree of internationalization at a given point reflects the corresponding degree of internationalization at some earlier point. We account for such potential effects by including lagged variables of the dependent variables; i.e., previous levels of foreign sales ratios, previous levels of foreign employment ratios, and the number of subsidiaries in the previous period.11 As one would expect, these lagged variables are correlated with the dependent variables. However, since we use a fairly long lag of five years, the highest correlations are in fact just about 0.7. We tested for autocorrelation in the autoregressive models by using the Durbin-Watson h-statistic,12 which does not indicate any signs of autocorrelation.13 Running regression models with the expanded set of variables demonstrates that including all variables gives a noticeable increase in the explanatory power of the models. All lagged variable coefficients are positive and strongly significant, thereby substantiating the alleged path-dependence in firms’ internationalization. More importantly,
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while some of the industry effects estimated through the base models are changed, most changes are marginal. On the whole, industry effects remain strong, which provides further support to the main thesis of this chapter.
6. Summary and Discussion This study has examined the influence of industry factors on the propensity of firms to internationalize. Based on a dataset of the 100 largest Norwegian companies over the period 1990–2000, we find that firms differ considerably in their degree of internationalization and that such differences are significantly related to characteristics of the industries in which they operate. This is particularly interesting to see in an empirical context (SMOPEC) where industry factors could potentially have been overshadowed by the impact of more macro-level issues such as the limitations of a small domestic market generally pushing firms to internationalize or local embeddedness acting as a centripetal force for international activity (Benito et al., 2002). Previous studies on internationalization have largely neglected industry-level characteristics and instead focused on firm-level and country-level factors. Our findings demonstrate that leaving out industry factors restricts our understanding of firms’ internationalization patterns. Merely using aggregate measures to identify global industries (Makhija et al., 1997) may also fail to capture important variations among different industry variables. Three distinct measures have been used to capture the scale and scope of international activities. The results indicate substantial heterogeneity in how industry characteristics influence different aspects of internationalization, hence supporting the use of multidimensional measures of internationalization (Dörrenbacher, 2000). First, in line with oligopolistic behaviour frameworks (Flowers, 1976; Graham, 1978; Knickerbocker, 1973) we find that concentrated home markets push firms to establishing subsidiaries abroad. Second, in agreement with previous studies of service firms’ internationalization (see e.g. Contractor et al., 2003) we find that service firms generally exhibit lower foreign sales levels and have fewer foreign subsidiaries than manufacturing firms. However, their foreign employment ratios are equivalent to those of manufacturing firms, indicating that the extent of their physical presence abroad (in terms of employees) is comparable to that of manufacturing firms. This supports the idea that service firms generally require substantial direct contact and interaction with their customers. Third, we find that while being part of an industry cluster drives up firms’ foreign sale and foreign employee
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intensities, indicating improved competitiveness (Porter, 1990), industrial clustering did not per se have an impact on the establishment of foreign subsidiaries. The local embeddedness generated by local clusters may, however, have prevented some relocation of units to foreign markets (Benito et al., 2002). Finally, in line with Ito and Rose (1999), there is a positive association between industries’ research intensity and sales in foreign markets. However, this variable had no clear effect on other aspects of internationalization. High research intensities have indeed been found to make all firms more competitive, regardless of whether they are local firms or MNCs (see Chapter 6 in this volume). Since local firms become equally focused on R&D activities in research-intensive industries, it seems expected that exports would increase due to new innovations in need of larger markets, but firms would not necessarily be motivated to move units to foreign locations. The inconclusive results on the effects of research intensity could be due to measuring the variable at the two-digit ISIC level, which may have been too aggregate to accurately reflect the focus on R&D facing the firm in its immediate competitive environment. The control variables indicate that the results are robust. This strengthens our argument that we may be overlooking critical internationalization factors if industry issues are ignored. Since the specific industry factors identified in this study only account for a small, although significant, portion of the explained variance in firms’ internationalization patterns, other industry variables should also be studied in future studies. Controlling for firm-specific factors further reveals that there are strong path dependencies in firms’ internationalization. Firms that already have internationalized thereby exert a greater propensity to internationalize further, and their degree of internationalization at a given point in time strongly reflects firms’ internationalization at previous points. While we agree with Porter (1986) that industry factors are essential in order to understand the propensity of firms to internationalize, our study suggests that once internationalization has been set in motion the subsequent development of firms’ international activities can be more influenced by firm-specific characteristics such as previous experiences and market perceptions. Industry factors may push or hold back firms from crossing some internationalization threshold, but we have not yet explored their impact over time once the critical initial barriers have been overcome. One avenue that could be explored further, in order to assess the influence of industry factors over time, is to examine differences across industries in internationalization strategies and subsidiary roles. According to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), internationalization
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strategies and subsequent subsidiary roles are highly related to industry factors and could thus be expected to vary across industries, as some industries require local adaptation and others more global integration. These issues have yet to be examined in detail. Although the results demonstrate the fruitfulness of including industry factors in models of firms’ internationalization, the limitations of the present study should be noted. Collecting the data retrospectively has advantages as well as drawbacks. The approach makes data collection somewhat easier and reduces much of the ‘noise’ arising from industry dynamics such as company restructuring and bankruptcies. This is in part positive, since such dynamics per se lie outside the scope of the study, but such an approach also introduces some degree of success and/or survival bias in the sample. An additional issue is that the data were collected for three points in time, with five-year intervals, which may introduce potentially important information gaps in the dataset. Annually collected data would have been better both in order to capture small gradual changes in firms’ internationalization, and to uncover significant disruptions in-between data collection points.
Notes 1. This does not necessarily imply that firms with high research intensities are more inclined to internationalize, nor does this suggest that R&D are activities that are often moved to foreign locations. Even though Guellec and de la Potterie (2001) have recently argued that there is an increasing trend of technology transfer across borders, there has, in fact, traditionally been a low degree of internationalization of R&D (Zander, 1999). 2. It is important to note that the 38 per cent that underwent mergers or acquisitions were largely merged into a few companies that were already on the list of the largest firms in 1990. 3. In the 2000 sample, only 6 per cent have no ties back to 1990. 4. Although there are several ways of measuring internationalization, commonly accepted measures are lacking. Previous efforts have been criticized for not being sufficiently reliable or definitive (Sullivan, 1994). A number of multi-item aggregate indices have thus been developed to avoid the limitations of single-item measures and create a multidimensional understanding (ibid.; Ietto-Gillies, 1998). It is questionable, however, whether an existing index can be theoretically justified or methodologically appropriate for subsequent studies (Ramaswamy et al., 1996). 5. For example a reduction in foreign employees may indicate increased efficiency rather than reduced international activity. Similarly, a reduction in foreign subsidiaries may merely reflect a concentration of activities with increased emphasis on fewer geographical areas rather than a reduction of international activities per se.
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6. For a given company j at time t we have; FSALEjt ⫽ (foreign salest / total salesst); FEMPjt ⫽ (foreign employmentt / total employmentt); and FSUBjt ⫽ # foreign subsidiaries. 7. The Kruskal-Wallis tests reveal that differences in internationalization patterns between industry groups related to all three dependent variables are significant at the 0.001 level. 8. For example, PREVFSALE1995 ⫽ FSALE1990, and PREVFSALE2000 ⫽ FSALE1995. Similar computations were made for PREVFEMP and PREVFSUB. 9. The three dependent variables are indeed correlated but the coefficients are in the region of 0.44–0.68, which does not indicate alarmingly strong correlations. 10. VIF values were in the range of 1.065–1.698 (2.142) and the condition index values range from 2.026–5.565 (9.310), with the values for the lagged dependent variables in parenthesis. 11. Since our dataset lacks information prior to 1990, lagged variables could not be computed for analysis of 1990 data. Instead, we use the number of years since the firm was established (YEARS) as a way of capturing path-dependence effects. 12. The more commonly used Durbin-Watson d-statistic may be unreliable for detecting first-order autocorrelations in autoregressive models (Gujarati, 1994). The Durbin-Watson h-statistic is calculated as h ⫽ (1 – 1/2d) 冑n/(1⫺n[var(␣2)]) where d is the usual Durbin-Watson statistic. 13. The calculated values range from ⫺0.11–0.03, which are safely within the 5 per cent range of ⫺1.96 and ⫹1.96.
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5 The Pace of Internationalization for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Siv Marina Karlsen
1. Introduction The purpose of this study is to describe the process of internationalization of SMEs and to explore the reasons for the differences in the pace of internationalization of firms. Empirical evidence, from many countries, supports the notion that firms often internationalize by benefiting from what they learn by experience, i.e., their market knowledge increases gradually and uncertainty and risk is reduced over time for each new country. However, in 1988 Johanson and Mattson pointed out that some firms follow other internationalization patterns. They argued that the degree of internationalization of markets (i.e., the frequency, intensity and integration of relationships across borders in the particular industry market) has an impact on the internationalization process of the individual firm. In highly internationalized markets, firms may leapfrog some of the stages in the learning process. More recently, many authors (e.g., Knight and Cavusgil, 1996; Madsen et al., 2000; Oviatt and McDougall, 1994) have found empirical evidence of yet another type. Some exporters are born global. These are firms that aim at international markets or even the global market from their inception. They do not seem to follow any kind of staged learning process leading to internationalization, i.e., their behaviour is beyond leapfrogging. Knight and Cavusgil (1996) argue that the slowness of the process described in traditional internationalization literature may be an indication of management’s aversion to risk-taking and their inability to acquire relevant knowledge and information. The fact that the process seems to be speeded up now may partly be explained by the notion that management in rapidly globalizing firms are less risk-averse and/or have better access to relevant information. The environment has changed a lot since the 98
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‘traditional internationalization theories’ were developed, e.g., the increased level of globalization in many industries may constitute an explanation for the observed increase in the pace of internationalization of firms. This increased globalization, which is believed to lead people to perceive the world as being smaller, may also induce managers to perceive the risk of entering foreign markets as being lower. One driver of globalization is believed to be the development of advanced communication technology, i.e., an industry described as having a high degree of globalization will by definition be characterized by having information transferred more easily and faster than in less global industries. This increased access to information may decrease the psychic distance between countries, which has previously been seen as a major obstacle for the international expansion of firms (e.g., Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Oviatt and McDougall (1994) state that recent technological innovation and the presence of increasing numbers of employees with international business experience have established new foundations for multinational enterprises (MNEs). Traditionally, these were developed from large, ‘mature’ domestic firms, but the increased use of low-cost communication technology and transportation means that the ability to discover and take advantage of business opportunities in multiple countries is not the prerogative of large, mature corporations any more. Crick and Jones (2000), for instance, found that several firms were set up by managers who have experience operating in international markets from previous employment. They have experience in dealing with the complexities of international operations and have acquired an appreciation of the risks and resource implications. Finally, but not less important, they have developed a network of customers and contacts that they can use and rely upon when setting up their own firms. Whatever the reasons are, there is increasing evidence that shows that in spite of small size and inexperience in international transactions, high value-adding manufacturing firms are capable of outrunning their larger, more resourceful counterparts in foreign markets. According to Bradley (1995), there are basically two dimensions which represent the key strategic decisions in connection with a firm’s internationalization: (i) international market selection; and (ii) choice of entry mode. With regard to the market selection dimension, born-global firms (BGs) often start activities in many markets simultaneously and do not always prefer starting in those markets that are closest. The product is developed for a global/international market (Madsen et al., 2000). Bell (1995) explains this in the following way: ‘psychic distance has become much less relevant as global communication and transportation infrastructures improve and as markets become increasingly homogeneous’
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(p. 62). According to Pedersen and Petersen (1998) the pace by which firms commit resources may differ substantially, but the tendency is for firms to increase their resource commitment to a foreign market over a period of time, starting to serve foreign markets with agents and later internalizing the activity by changing to wholly owned subsidiaries. It is assumed that the internationalization process of firms is currently proceeding faster on both dimensions (Hedlund and Kverneland, 1985) than traditional theory predicts. Thus, the research questions addressed in this study are: which factors influence the pace for SMEs to gradually increase their resource commitment to a foreign market and which factors influence the pace for entering new country markets?
2. Conceptual Framework The existing literature shows no agreement regarding the conceptual framework and constructs that should be used to explain a firm’s internationalization (Andersen, 1997). The present framework will be based upon some of the most important contributions for explaining the pace of internationalization of SMEs. Bloodgood et al. (1996) argue that new ventures will seek an international presence for two reasons: (i) industry conditions (e.g., increased globalization) may require an international presence for the company to be competitive, and (ii) a venture may seek a global presence to capitalize on its unique set of resources (e.g., the management team’s experience in global markets, new technologies or innovations). According to the same authors, these conditions must be present for rapid internationalization to be viable. One reason for the differences observed in the speeds by which traditional MNEs and fast-globalizing firms become international/global, is due to different environmental conditions: ‘the slowness of the whole process is a consequence of incremental adaptations to changing firm and environmental conditions rather than the result of a deliberate strategy’ (Knight and Cavusgil, 1996, p. 13). In other words, when the environmental conditions rapidly change, as they do when there is increased globalization, the process of internationalization is likely to speed up as well. In a closed domestic industry, a company accustomed to weak competitors and undemanding customers has little to fear – there are no new competitors that might grow strong in more demanding competitive arenas. In an open global industry, new and strong competitors abound (Yip, 1992). As a consequence, it is important to understand just how the industry globalization drivers affect the competitive environment of SMEs. When moving to the industry and company level, it has been argued (by, e.g., Lindqvist, 1991) that increasing speed in the development of new
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technologies has led to shorter product life cycles (PLCs) and higher innovation intensity, which in turn leads to intensified global competition. The shorter PLCs have led to more emphasis on R&D, and on recognizing new opportunities and exploiting them as rapidly as possible with successful timing (e.g., PCs and mobile phones). In short, product characteristics are another aspect to be considered. For firms with small home markets it may be difficult to achieve competitive advantage in terms of economies of scale. In the case of some products, significant economies can be achieved only by operating in multiple countries. The shorter the PLC, the shorter the time period for returns on investments for product development. Consequently, companies with small domestic markets need global volume, so that the costs for product development can be apportioned. On the other hand, new and improved technology may aid firms with small home markets in that economies of scale are no longer a key factor to succeed globally. The improved production technology makes it possible to produce and sell smaller quantities at a profit. In addition, for the unique and differentiated products that most of the case firms sell, the price and thus cost is not vital. It is the unique features that is important and for which the niche buyers are willing to pay well. As some of the founders stated, ‘Once they have tried our product, they will not return to the older, outdated product used earlier’ (interviews with Fjerdingstad and Vedeld in 2002). The experience and background of founders and their relationships are important resources for a firm and are important drivers or facilitators of internationalization. International experience is defined as the understanding and realistic perceptions of foreign operations, risks and returns in foreign markets (Aulakh and Kotabe, 1997). The reasoning here, which is based on the organizational capability of the firm, is that firms are initially risk-averse when entering new markets, and therefore not willing to invest substantial resources in unfamiliar terrain. As a firm’s management gets a better feel for the foreign markets, it gains better understanding of the risks and returns, and becomes more confident and aggressive, but also more realistic. This may be manifested by a willingness to commit more resources, but it may also enable management to make better investment decisions. For firms, international experience has traditionally been measured by making an assessment of the geographic scope and depth of the firm’s experience. This is done by registering the number of different countries in which a firm is active and the length of experience in each of those countries (Erramilli, 1991). In the present study, the variable will be analyzed at the individual level. Information about the founder(s)’ and/or other key employees’ international experience will be collected. Several
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studies (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; Reuber and Fischer, 1997; Ellis, 2000) show that key employees in BGs very often have extensive international experience from previous employment. Furthermore, Reuber and Fischer (1997) argue that decision-makers with more international experience are more likely to have a foreign business network in place and are more likely to have developed the skills needed to identify and negotiate with firms in a different culture. Oviatt and McDougall (1994) further argue that partnerships provide concrete critical resources, i.e., specific skills and finances, as well as more abstract resources, such as legitimacy and market power. These resources are seen as being particularly important when a new and young firm, with relatively small resources, attempts to increase foreign sales. The founders’ or other key employees’ relationships from previous employment may enable these firms to enter new markets at a faster rate than would otherwise be possible (e.g., by providing the firm with complementary resources and by opening up markets). This view is supported by Ellis’s (2000) findings, which support the notion that awareness of foreign market opportunities (which has been identified as being a critical antecedent of foreign-market entry) is commonly acquired via existing social ties. McGaughey et al. (1997) also emphasize the important role of personal networks in triggering initial export enquiries or orders. They found that the network’s key individuals importantly affected the case company’s international activities. These people were critical for both the content and direction of the company’s internationalization: ‘much of the ability of the company to initiate and carry through international operations resided in the decisionmakers’ personal networks’ (p. 179). From this discussion, a conceptual framework is proposed where four main factors are posited as having an impact upon the firm’s pace of internationalization. These factors are: (i) the experience and background of the firm’s founders or other key employees; (ii) the same person’s network; (iii) the type of industry in which a firm does its business; and (iv) different product characteristics. Boundaries between domestic and international markets are becoming less relevant as businesses increase their activities abroad. A global industry is, in this thesis, conceptualized as follows: ‘an industry in which a firm’s competitive position in one country is significantly affected by its position in other countries or vice versa’ (Makhija et al., 1997, p. 680). In this regard, the global industry ‘is not merely a collection of domestic industries, but a series of linked domestic industries in which rivals compete against each other on a truly worldwide basis’ (Porter, 1986, p. 18). In order to find an explanation as to why some SMEs still follow a more step-by-step approach, while others choose a faster and more erratic
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approach that leapfrogs over many stages, Madsen et al. (2000) argue that globalization may enable firms to more freely choose their own model for becoming international. International sales both become easier and more difficult, in the sense that international markets have become more accessible for most firms, but the level of competition and the demand for international competence have increased. There is both a ‘positive’ pressure, from the increased level of globalization, in the form of an increase in the accessibility to markets, and a ‘negative’ pressure from tougher competition, since it has become a necessity for a host of new companies to be present in many markets. Both of these pressures work to increase the pace of internationalization. The positive pressure lures the company to new territory, while the negative pressure forces the company to find new markets. These pressures may work differently depending upon the size of the home market. According to Bloodgood et al. (1996), new European firms are more likely to consider internationalizing some of their activities when their enterprise is initiated compared with new US firms. One reason is the fact that a new US firm, operating in a 500-mile radius around its base, may do so without crossing borders, a European firm, with the same operating radius around its base, may have to deal with five or six other countries. Luostarinen and Gabrielsson (2001) state that global firms from large countries globalize because of the demand-based pull forces in global markets, but global firms from small and open economies globalize because they are pushed. Small domestic markets and the fear of expected future competition, from global firms in large countries, puts a lot of pressure on these firms, pushing them to find new markets. According to Hamel and Prahalad (1985), companies that safely nestle in their home beds will increasingly experience a resource disadvantage. ‘They will be unable to marshal [the] forces required for a defence of the home market’ (p. 146).
3. Methods Research design The data have been gathered from in-depth interviews of key informants. Case studies within business research are a very demanding exercise and, for that reason, only 12 cases were chosen. The founder/CEO or another key employee (who has been in the company from the start) of the firm was contacted, with a request to participate in the study. The potential case companies were selected by using procedures that are appropriate for samples that are needed for theoretical purposes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Yin,
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1998). The logic that justifies the use of samples for theoretical purposes is different from the logic of sampling for statistical purposes, which often requires random selection. Purposive sampling to explore theoretical considerations does not require too great a concern for sample size. The size of the sample is relatively unimportant. What is important is the potential of each case to aid the development of theoretical insights into the dynamics of the internationalization process being studied. The interviews lasted approximately two to four hours and were, with one exception (Optoflow), tape-recorded. A semi-structured interview style was used, where the interviewees were allowed to tell their story relatively freely, but were given cues if they wandered too far off the topic of interest. After a few months, when the transcripts were made and the comparisons of the cases started, about half of the interviewees were contacted by e-mail and/or telephone in order to clarify some of the information and also to ask some additional questions. The case companies were selected from a pool of respondents to a survey that was carried out in the autumn of 2001. The population of that survey was defined as being SMEs in Norway, founded after 1990 (and registered in the ‘Kompass database’). SMEs are defined as being firms with less than 100 employees. The reason for choosing recently established firms is to ensure that the details surrounding the founding of the firm are not lost to history. The focus on SMEs is due to the fact that several studies have found that most of the rapidly internationalizing firms have far less than 100 employees (see e.g., Knight et al., 2004). In addition, Solberg (1988) found successful exporters to be significantly smaller than unsuccessful exporters. This finding led him to suggest that smaller units are better able to create the right atmosphere for successful exporting, necessitating a closeness to the market and an open-minded organization, not always present in large corporations with rigid bureaucratic decisionmaking procedures. Finally, firms that were stand-alone entities were preferred. This preference was due to the expectation that sub-units of larger firms have greater access to resources, i.e., capital, human resources and information (Harveston, 2000). Despite this, three of the cases chosen were not independent, partly because the dichotomy between dependence and independence is not always that simple to determine, and because it might be useful to have some cases that are not independent for reasons of comparison. A relatively wide population was chosen at the outset, in order to enable a continuum to be drawn with firms that have a gradual pace of internationalization, at one extreme and true born-global firms, at the other.
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Operational concerns The definition and use of concepts and measurements in empirical contexts is the primary operational concern. While measures of imprecise concepts are never completely valid or reliable, researchers strive to maximize these qualities (Knight, 1997). Measuring the pace of internationalization was achieved by identifying how many regions an SME enters during a specific time period, which types of region the firm enters and in what order (close or far away from the home market in terms of psychic distance). In addition, the export rate of the firms three years after founding was measured, since this is a common cut-off point for defining so-called born-global firms (Harveston, 2000; Junkkari, 2000; Knight, 1997; Knight and Cavusgil, 1996; Madsen et al., 2000). More specifically, these same authors define born-global firms as SMEs with an export rate of more than 25 per cent within three years of their founding. Finally, this research identified the entry mode that was initially used when the firm entered its first foreign market and the foreign operation modes that were currently being used. This was done to measure the rate of resources committed to the market over time. Globalization may be conceptualized in terms of a continuum from low to high, along which different industries fall (Porter, 1986). An industry at the very low end of globalization is highly independent of industries in other countries. An industry at the very high end is significantly linked to similar industries in multiple countries in which its various value-added activities are located. The extent to which an industry is characterized by international linkages within the industry is seen as being an important indication of its level of globalization (Makhija et al., 1997). It is rather difficult to find good measures of an industry’s global characteristics. However, according to Porter (1986) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), establishing the extent to which an industry is global is a necessary first step, before one can adequately examine global strategies. Each industry’s unique blend of competitive pressures is likely to result in varying levels of globalization, which in turn are reflected in the strategies the firm utilizes in these industries (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Yip, 1992). One way to measure this is to use the ranking of different industries in Yip (1992, p. 34), but in this study subjective measures have been used. That is, the managers in the SMEs are asked how they perceive their industry, according to a certain set of dimensions that aim at revealing the industry’s global characteristics (Solberg, 1997, p. 5). These dimensions are: industry structure (oligopoly or fragmented), which is influenced by the strength of globalization drivers (trade barriers, internationalization of customers/suppliers,
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international demand pattern) and the interdependence of national markets (international price sensitivity, intra-industry trade). Product characteristics, it has already been pointed out, are believed to be influenced by macro factors, such as the competitive conditions within an industry. Questions were asked about the product’s life cycle and about its uniqueness when compared to competitive products. (‘Is it one of a kind?’) The degree of specialization of the product (Madsen and Servais, 1997) was also queried. The research asked managers to classify the product as being either an industrial product or a consumer product. Top management experience is defined as the amount of experience that a manager has accumulated in an international context. Harveston et al. (2000) state that most studies using this construct have used the amount of time spent in foreign countries as an indicator. This indicator includes time spent at foreign assignments, at foreign educational facilities and on vacation in foreign countries, as measures of international experience. This indicator accounts for one dimension of the construct: length. The second dimension is scope. From which continent(s) do key employees have experience? Have these key employees mainly worked abroad or at home? Another measure of foreign experience gauges the extent to which the manager has engaged in foreign travel. They are asked about the number of languages that the manager speaks and how fluent he or she is in those languages. Was the top decision-maker born abroad? Has s/he lived abroad (Miesenbock, 1988; Reid, 1981)? What was the mindset of the founder at start-up (Harveston, et al., 2000)? In this study, international experience was measured by determining how long the founder(s) had been abroad, in which countries they had worked or studied and what position(s) they held while living abroad. In addition, the foreign languages that were mastered were identified. According to Solberg (1997, p. 16), the more global the industry structure is, the more important is the presence of an active and widespread network. Motives for entering a new market were investigated and the characteristics of prior relationships and the role they have played have been sought. Personal relationships, studied in this chapter, were relationships that key employees define as having an impact on their road to internationalization. These are either relationships in their home country or relationships in the target country, established when previously working or studying abroad, or developed from their previous work assignments in their home country. What types of relationships exist between the key employees and the network of people they identify as being most important? How close are these relationships? This can be measured by documenting the frequency of contact (daily, weekly, once a month) and the
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type of contact (face to face, telephone, e-mail). We assume that the more frequent the contact and the closer the type of contact is (e.g., face to face), the more trust exists between the parties. Whether the contact is formal or informal may also be of some importance. It is assumed that the more informal the contact is, the closer the relationship, and the more closeness, the more trust. The interviewees were asked to elaborate upon the relationships they considered to be important for the development of the firm: how and on what occasion the parties first met, and in what way those relations contributed to the firm’s internationalization process. In addition, interviewees were asked to characterize the type of contact they have at present.
4. Case Descriptions The analysis in this section is based on 12 cases. The analysis will be segmented into four topics: (i) experience/background of founders; (ii) personal networks; (iii) global characteristics of the industry; and (iv) product characteristics. In the interviews, the focus was on understanding the drivers for the international character of the SMEs in greater detail. Within-case analysis as well as cross-pattern search (Eisenhardt, 1989) are used to analyze the data. Data and interview notes were coded by the author using the software HyperResearch. This was done for each firm along a number of dimensions. This makes it easier to identify the different statements that represent each dimension studied, because in the left margin of the document you see the codewords and the corresponding statement is then marked. Since data displays help the researcher see patterns (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 433), critical events of each case’s history are drawn up (see below).
ColorMatic AS – inkdoser Year
Important events
1983
Thronrud Engineering AS (parent company) was established Two printers, Mr Randsberg and Mr Bjelland, started to develop the concept of an inkdosing machine The prototype was ready and the two printers approached Mr Thronrud
1991 1995
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1996
1997
1998 1999
2000 2001
ColorMatic 2000 presented at the Grafex and Nordgraf fair in Stockholm – no success – the machines were considered too large, complicated and expensive and thus difficult to sell (sold only five or six machines) Thronrud AS bought all the patents and ColorMatic AS was established – Thronrud AS is to produce the machines and ColorMatic AS to market and sell them The prototype of Inkdoser 2500 was presented at the Ipex fair in Birmingham The first machines were sold to England, Belgium, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand. Contact with the buyers was made in Birmingham Mr Schaefer (the interviewee) was employed to strengthen the marketing effort USA, Germany and France were entered They are presently in 22 countries, mainly using low-commitment modes such as direct export and distributors. They have one employee abroad, at a sales office in England Their focus for the future is on the US and the Japanese markets
Dolphin AS – hardware Year
Important events
1991/92
Dolphin AS was established by 20 previous employees of Norsk Data Direct export started to the US market Ownership of Dolphin AS moved abroad to the US, i.e., parent company located in the US, but the owners are the same as at the outset Buy-up in the US Dolphin AS established an agent in France Dolphin AS established an agent in England Dolphin AS established an agent in Germany Their focus for the future is on the US and the Chinese market
1992 1994
1996 1997 2000 2002
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Fras AS – fluid sampler Year
Important events
1975
Mr Fjerdingstad (founder of Fras) established a subsidiary of Parker Haneyfin in Norway Mr Fjerdingstad established a subsidiary of Hägglunds Drive in Norway The first step for the product was to follow a customer out – namely they followed Norske Skog to France Mr Fjerdingstad was employed at Veritas as a strategy to prepare a a platform for the product Fras AS was established by Mr Fjerdingstad Fras AS established contact with Lloyds of London Fras AS sold licences to Germany Fras AS followed Statoil to China Fras AS is currently looking for new investors They do not focus on country markets but on product markets: offshore, ships, process industry and energy production
1986 1990 1991 1996 1998 1999 2000 2003
ICAS AS – smoke detectors Year
Important events
1989 1990/91
ICAS AS was established by Mr Olving Legislation required that all homes in Norway have smoke detectors. ICAS AS started production in Norway All production moved to the Czech Republic (55 employees) – only marketing and sales in Norway (five employees) Established agent in Finland Started selling to Sweden – considered as the most important market for ICAS AS Some sporadic sales to Australia Some sporadic sales to South Africa Established subsidiary with one employee in England The markets they will focus on in the future are Germany and England
1991
1993 1997 2000 2001 2003
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IRTech AS – surface inspection systems Year
Important events
1980s
Elkem AS developed a system to detect cracks in the surface of steel First system sold to Germany by direct export System sold to the Czech Republic Systems sold to France, USA and Germany System sold to South Korea Systems sold to England and China Systems sold to South Korea and Japan Systems sold to England, Taiwan, Sweden, Turkey and Germany System sold to USA Systems sold to USA and Australia Last system sold to Italy. Elkem AS considered the market to be saturated and wanted out A licence agreement made with Daido Steel Ltd in Japan IRTech AS was established by Mr Hovland who had been employed in Elkem Technology AS on this system since 1981 – IRTech AS now took on the responsibility to give support to the about 20 systems around the world IRTech AS did some upgrading of a system in England. They changed the old electronics for new One plant has been closed in Australia, one in Sweden, one in South Korea and one in Taiwan Mr Hovland is currently using agents from the time in Elkem in South Korea, Japan and the Czech Republic. To the rest of the world he travels himself. Mr Hovland would like to build and sell new systems, but the firm is currently too small and lacks financial resources
1982/83 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995
1999 2002
Incatel AS – software Year
Important events
1959
The founder of Incatel AS, Mr Vedeld made his first computer program
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1987
1989
1991
1992
1993/94
1997 1999 2001 2002
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Mr Vedeld started to work for IBM There was a pilot (INKA) in what was then called Televerket – the idea was based on the fact that if you could keep track of accounts by using computers it should be possible to keep track of a telephone network as well A firm called SysScan won a bid from Televerket to deliver a computer solution that should manage the telephone network – the solution was not complete A new company with former employees from SysSan was established, it was called Amis. It was to complete the product development. IBM had entered the scene and was to supply Amis with the Unix platform on which Televerket had demanded INKA to be developed – IBM Europe agreed to funding the product development in exchange for the marketing rights all over the world Amis demanded more funding, which IBM refused – and it thus went bankrupt. The owners of Amis had put money into the project with intellectual property rights as security without IBM’s knowledge – they moved these rights into an American