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Modular Evolution How Natural Selection Produces Biological Complexity Natural selection is more than the survival of the fittest: it is a force engendering higher biological complexity. Presenting a new explanation for the tendency of life to become more complex through evolution, this book offers an introduction to the key debates in evolutionary theory, including the role of genes and sex in evolution, the adaptive reasons for senescence and death and the origin of neural information. The author argues that biological complexity increased through the process of ‘modularity transfer’: modular phenotypes (proteins, somatic cells, learned behaviours) evolved into new modular information carriers (regulatory proteins, neural cells, words), giving rise to new information systems and higher levels of biological organisation. Modular Evolution makes sense of the unique place of humans in evolution, both as the pinnacle of biological complexity and as inventors of non-biological evolution. l ucio v inicius is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leverhulme Centre for Human Evolutionary Studies in Cambridge, UK. He has published articles in various fields including life history evolution, Drosophila genetics, brain evolution and human growth.
Modular Evolution How Natural Selection Produces Biological Complexity lucio vinicius Leverhulme Centre for Human Evolutionary Studies, Cambridge
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521429641 © L. Vinicius Castilho 2010 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2010
ISBN-13
978-0-521-42964-1
Hardback
ISBN-13
978-0-521-72877-5
Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Thus we cannot say that evolution consists simply in the development of higher from lower forms of life; it consists in raising the upper level of organization reached by living matter, while still permitting the lower types of organization to survive. This general direction to be found in evolution, this gradual rise in the upper level of control and independence to be observed in living things with the passage of time, may be called evolutionary or biological progress. It is obviously of great importance, and can be seen, on reflection, to be another necessary consequence of the struggle for existence. Haldane and Huxley (1927: 234), Animal Biology
Contents
Preface
page xi
1 From natural selection to the history of nature Nature after natural law Reductionism and emergence History and inheritance Darwinian progress: order at the macroevolutionary scale Macroevolution as history Contingency as the startling consensus Convergence The denial of ‘progress’: Darwinism’s prejudice against Darwin Biological complexity and information Organisms as DNA programs Major transitions: the aggregational mode of evolution Convergent aggregation, levels of selection and levels of organisation The evolution of biological order The evolution of order: macroevolutionary consequences 2 From the units of inheritance to the origin of species The gene as the module of inheritance The fundamental principle of natural selection Gradualism: the cost of biological complexity The adaptive walk in the real world Epistasis as a main legacy of particulate inheritance The shifting balance and the structure of real populations
1 2 4 7 10 12 15 18 20 22 25 27 30 32 35
38 40 43 46 51 55 58 vii
viii
Contents
Sex and the origins of species Speciation as adaptation: the evolution of xenophobia Speciation as an accident Speciation and particulate inheritance Levels of selection 3 Multicellularity and the developmental code Replication and reproduction Gene expression Multicellularity and the developmental code From gene expression to morphological pattern Regulatory regions and gene bureaucracy Is evolution mostly the evolution of regulatory regions? Modularity and microevolution The gradual evolution of homeotic mutations The origin of animal phyla The challenge of multicellularity 4 Life cycle evolution: life and death of the soma Weismann’s two insights Fisher’s second fundamental principle Medawar and accidental death Williams and the logic of trade-offs Hamilton: senescence beyond mortality and the return of the killer genes Growth and fitness The reproduction of soma: energy, time and trade-offs The end of reproduction: menopause and senescence Free radicals and molecular signalling Conclusion: multicellularity and the life cycle 5 Sex and its consequences: the transition that never happened The misleading cost of sex Advantages of genetic exchange The origin of separate sexes Too many males Sexual selection Why sexual dimorphism? Male ornaments as accidents Ornaments: animal signals of fitness
60 62 65 67 69 72 75 77 79 82 84 86 90 93 97 99 102 104 106 109 111 114 117 119 122 124 126
128 132 134 137 140 143 144 147 149
Contents
The phylogeny of sex and asex Sex and biological complexity 6 Animal societies: the case of incomplete evolutionary transitions The problem of co-operation Relatedness as the origin of true altruism Limitations of kin selection theory Selfish co-operation: an eye for an eye, a helping hand for a helping hand The conditions for selfish co-operation The birth of the selfless ape Scratching the strong reciprocator Conclusion: animal societies and biological complexity 7 The new ‘Chain of Being’: hierarchical evolution and biological complexity Thermodynamics versus biological information Schrödinger’s Principle and the evolution of order The historical transformation of selection The hierarchical nature of macroevolution Historical humans: the technological code and the end of evolution Hierarchical evolution and the roots of Darwinism
References Index
150 152
154 158 160 165 168 171 173 179 183
186 187 188 197 201 203 205
208 233
ix
Preface
This book deals with a classic problem in macroevolution: how do we reconcile the Darwinian ‘tree of life’, which implies that every single branch or living species is historically and adaptively unique, with apparent differences in levels of complexity between organisms such as bacteria and humans? The first author to deal with the issue was Darwin himself, at the same time a believer in the power of natural selection to create biological diversity and in evolutionary ‘progress’, or the emergence of complex organisms from humbler beginnings. Besides Darwin, I was also inspired by Erwin Schrödinger and his insightful definition of life; by J. B. S. Haldane, Julian Huxley, John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry and their aggregation model; by Marcello Barbieri, Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb and the study of biological codes of inheritance. This book is an attempt at melding together those ideas so as to present one possible answer to the problem of evolutionary complexity. My intention was to offer at the same time an update on classic themes (including the evolution of sex and the role of genes in adaptive evolution) and an introduction to new debates (in particular the controversies surrounding the comparisons between social behaviour in humans and other species). Many important topics could not be addressed: plants are rarely mentioned, as emphasis was given to animals, behaviour and communication; Price’s equation and Kimura’s neutral theory were not discussed; and the chapter on evolution and development is necessarily tentative due to the constant transformation of the field. However, the biases can be justified: my aim was not to present a thorough review of evolutionary theory but to develop a thesis: namely that the evolution of complexity should be understood as the transformation of Schrödinger ’s Principle of Order from Order. This thesis is meant to harmonise Darwinian evolution by natural xi
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Preface
selection with the concept of a dynamical Chain of Being in which organisms are characterised by different levels of complexity. This monograph resulted from a few years of study and work at Cambridge and grew out of an undergraduate course that I offer in the Department of Biological Anthropology. I would like to thank St John’s College and the Department of Zoology at Cambridge for their support during my PhD, and the Leverhulme Trust for funding my research at postdoctoral level. I am especially grateful to LCHES (the Leverhulme Centre for Human Evolutionary Studies) that has hosted me for the past few years. I am indebted to Professor Robert Foley for discussing some of the ideas in the book and for continuous support. Dr Marta Mirazon Lahr has inspired me as a teacher and convinced me that the book should be written in the first place, and I cannot express my gratitude highly enough. I am also grateful to Andrea Migliano and Rudy Schlaepfer and especially Philip Schlaepfer for useful suggestions. I am indebted to Dominic Lewis at the Cambridge University Press for his patience and assistance. Finally, I could not have finalised this project without the support of Hannah Mumby, and I am counting on her help in future endeavours.
1 From natural selection to the history of nature
For their key role in the revival of heliocentrism, we may certainly excuse Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo for being less successful at explaining why planets move. It was only 150 years after Copernicus anonymously circulated his pamphlet Commentariolus in 1510 that Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathematica offered a theory of planetary motion and established the first modern paradigm for celestial mechanics. Darwin’s theory of evolution represented a scientific revolution of the same importance and magnitude, but its historical development bears a crucial difference from heliocentrism. Despite a number of forerunners in Britain and France and the work of his contemporary Alfred Wallace, most of us associate both the substantiation of biological evolution as a fact, and the theory of natural selection as evolution’s first and only theoretical paradigm, with Charles Darwin and the Origin of Species (1859). First, Darwin made species intelligible by setting them in motion as Copernicus had done with the planets. Biological evolution, or the movement of species in time, implied that the ultimate cause of species features is their history. And second, Darwinism found its fundamental law of motion in the principle of natural selection, the consequence of variation and competition within populations. For his contributions to the facts and theory of evolution, Darwin can be seen both as the Copernicus and the Newton of biology (Padian, 2001). Although the triumph of Darwinism is denied by few, scientific revolutions also demonstrate that even the most successful and influential theories may be wrong or incomplete. The Newtonian paradigm, for example, started to crumble when some of its predictions at the very large (cosmological) and the very small (atomic) physical scales were refuted by experiments and theory; although still an 1
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From natural selection to the history of nature
essential component of physics, the Newtonian world picture is no longer accepted as a satisfactory account of the nature of space, time and physical causality (Penrose, 1989). For us, it is important to notice that the major debate involving Darwinism since its origin is also a matter of scale, namely the relationship between microevolution and macroevolution. This is more than coincidence. While natural selection is widely accepted as the microscopic cause of change in populations, when it comes to accounting for the big picture of life in all its forms, living and extinct, it has become commonplace to question the power of selection against a background of virtually infinite and unique events accumulating for billions of years in every line of descent, and then to appeal to contingency and history as the true cause of evolution at larger scales (Gould, 2002). In summary, while Darwinism introduced natural selection as a fundamental law of biological change, it established at the same time that nature had a history; for this reason, the main challenge of evolutionary theory since the Origin of Species has been to discover the missing links between the law of nature and the history of nature.
nature after natural law
The theory of evolution by natural selection was a late product of the Modern Scientific Revolution and its emphasis on efficient causes and natural law (Cohen, 1987). The rise of natural law meant that science should rely on purely mechanistic explanations, and the study of life should be no exception. The biologist, even when familiar with the appearance of design in living organisms, should ‘disregard for a time, as in physical philosophy, the immediate purposes of the adaptations which he witnesses; and must consider these adaptations as themselves but the results or ends of the general laws for which he should search’ (Carpenter, 1839: 461). The principle of natural selection provided biologists with a classic example of general law, but its formulation exhibited a distinguishing feature. Newtonian dynamics and the field theories of electromagnetism and general gravitation were originally formulated as sets of deterministic laws (Penrose, 1989). As such, their experimental predictions were meant to be exact (apart from measurement error): given similar conditions, all objects were expected to free-fall predictably, all negatively charged bodies were expected to respond equally to an electric field, and so on. In contrast, Darwin saw natural selection from the beginning as a statistical or probabilistic principle (Hempel, 1966). The aim of
Nature after natural law
statistical laws is to extract information from systems or populations when the behaviour of their components is either unknown or unpredictable (Menand, 2002). A good example of the logic of statistical laws is the analysis of radiocarbon decay into nitrogen (Bowman, 1990). A radiocarbon (14C) is a carbon atom with six protons and eight neutrons, instead of the six neutrons found in the more common and stable 12C isotope. In the Earth’s atmosphere, it is produced when a thermal neutron derived from cosmic rays collides with a 14N atom (the most common nitrogen isotope, with seven protons and seven neutrons) and converts one of its protons into an extra neutron. The resulting 14C atom is unstable and eventually decays back into 14N by emitting a β-particle. In living organisms, a constant ratio of 14C to 12C is maintained on the one hand by the absorption of new radiocarbons into organic matter through photosynthesis (and their subsequent transfer to organisms that feed on photosynthetic plants and algae), and on the other hand by their loss through decay. But after death there is no further absorption of radiocarbons, and the decay of the 14 C trapped into the dead organism causes their ratio to 12C to decrease gradually with time. The work of Willard Libby and collaborators (Arnold and Libby, 1949) showed that such decrease followed an exponential curve and could be used as a method for dating organic samples, provided only that the parameters or calibration of the curve were obtained from fossil or archaeological material of known dates. Among other things, Libby’s exponential model showed that 50% of the radiocarbon atoms trapped in a dead organism are expected to decay into nitrogen after 5568 ± 30 years. In other words, if we start with a sample of one million radiocarbon atoms, half a million are expected to disappear after 5568 years, plus or minus an error of 30 years. The error exists because the calibration method itself is based on a finite sample of 14C atoms: larger initial samples of radiocarbon atoms would reduce the error. Thus, provided the amount of organic material in the specimen (i.e. the trapped radiocarbon sample) is large enough, dating of fossils can be very precise. However, precision completely vanishes at the level of individual atoms (Gell-Mann, 1994). The reason is that radiocarbon decay is spontaneous and unpredictable: whether a particular 14C atom decays instantly after its formation in the atmosphere, decays after a thousand years, or never decays, depends on contingent factors – namely, the outcome of an unrehearsed and never-ceasing dance of particles in the atomic nucleus (Libby, 1955). For this reason, although we know almost with certainty that 50% of radiocarbon atoms in a large sample
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will decay in about 5568 years, all we can say about an individual radiocarbon atom is that the probability that it will decay in less than 5568 years is 50%; we cannot determine when the decay will happen, or whether it will happen at all. The point is that the principle of natural selection relies on the same distinction between population-level predictability and individuallevel uncertainty. Natural selection is, after all, a ‘statistical bias in the relative rates of survival of alternatives’ (Williams, 1966: 22). Based on the radiocarbon example, natural selection may be described as the decay or rise of allele frequencies across generations, of phenotypic traits towards certain character states, or of organisms towards higher levels of fitness. Provided certain conditions are met, it is even possible to predict fairly accurately the direction and speed of change in measurable traits or gene frequencies in populations (Charlesworth et al., 1982). However, as far as individual fate is concerned, the struggle for survival is to a large extent a matter of chance. This is because an individual carrying the genes and phenotype corresponding to a fitness peak may (and very often does) simply fail to survive or reproduce for a variety of contingent factors, such as an accident, a disease, or a competent predator. In other words, under the hypothesis of natural selection the link between individual variation and individual fitness was never meant to be deterministic. We can certainly describe or even sometimes predict changes in proportions of alleles or phenotypes in populations; and based on that, we may ascribe individuals a probability of reproductive success. But as in the case of radiocarbon decay, the difference between individual and population scale is all there is between chance and order.
reductionism and emergence
A possible interpretation of the differences between deterministic and statistical law is that they imply a distinction between exact and historical sciences. If natural selection or the law of evolution itself rests upon statistical ground, how can we avoid the conclusion that evolutionary history is to an even higher degree the domain of contingency and unpredictability? The view that historical sciences deal with subjects too complex to be grasped in terms of exact causality dates back at least to Laplace (1774): Chance has no reality in itself; it is only a term fit to designate our ignorance concerning the manner in which the different parts of a
Reductionism and emergence phenomenon are arranged among themselves and in relation to the rest of Nature.
According to Laplace, chance is not an objective property of things. Parts are always well ‘arranged among themselves’ as described by deterministic laws; the problem is that our brains are limited devices, able to calculate the outcomes of a few interactions, but not an exact event equation whenever the event consists of too many parts or interactions – that is, whenever the event is too complex. When too many parts or interactions are involved, Laplace argued that it was necessary to appeal to a statistical approach and to the use of averages and error estimates. In summary, chance and uncertainty are not objective properties of entities, but effects of scale transitions from simple to complex; in our mind, those transitions are manifested as the transition from determinism to probability. Despite its intuitive appeal, reasons for rejecting the Laplacean view have accumulated for more than a century. The advance of reductionism, the belief that ‘all the complex … things and processes that we observe in the world can be explained in terms of universal principles that govern their common ultimate constituents’ (Nagel, 1998), has provided compelling evidence that the very foundations of reality, or its ‘simplest’ elements, lie on uncertainty and probability (Feynman, 1965). The most fundamental laws of atomic physics and quantum mechanics, such as Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty, Pauli exclusion principle and Schrödinger’s wave function, are probabilistic laws; even when applied to a single electron, they imply respectively that simultaneous measurements of variables such as speed and position will necessarily exhibit greater-than-zero variance and confidence intervals, that there is only a probability that it will lie at a certain region around the atomic nucleus, and that there is a certain probability that it is at a given quantum state (Penrose, 1989). But if uncertainty is the fundamental rule of reality, why does the world around us appear so orderly? The current answer, which completely inverts the logic proposed by Laplace, is complexity itself: while simple parts or ultimate constituents of matter such as atoms or atomic particles are intrinsically uncertain, predictability often emerges at the larger macroscopic scale as a very special kind of statistical effect; this effect we call physical ‘order’. Only in the co-operation of an enormously large number of atoms do statistical laws begin to operate and control the behaviour of these assemblées with an accuracy increasing as the number of atoms
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From natural selection to the history of nature involved increases. It is in that way that the events acquire truly orderly features. All the physical and chemical laws that are known to play an important part in the life of organisms are of this statistical kind; any other kind of lawfulness and orderliness that one might think of is being perpetually disturbed and made inoperative by the unceasing heat motion of the atoms (Schrödinger, 1944: 10).
Thus, it is only because of the large number of atoms and their complex interactions in ordinary macroscopic objects such as a table that we grasp an appearance of order. Well before the expression became fashionable, Schrödinger was describing our surrounding reality as an ‘emergent property’ (Bunge, 2003) of a complex system of innumerable microscopic parts. He summarised his views in the classic ‘Principle of Order from Disorder’, or the origin of macroscopic predictability from microscopic uncertainty. Any other kind of lawfulness claimed by science – in particular the deterministic lawfulness implied by classical physics – was illusory, or just the name we give to our ignorance of the probabilistic roots of reality. As importantly, for Schrödinger the Principle of Order from Disorder was valid for physical laws too. An electromagnetic field, originally described by Maxwell through deterministic laws, is in a sense just like a table. It is produced when a source (for example an atomic nucleus) emits so many photons that both the probability of a passing electron absorbing them and the number of photons absorbed depend only on the position of the electron in space and time (Feynman, 1985: 122). For this reason, the predictable and seemingly deterministic response of any electron to a magnetic field is in fact the orderly appearance of a system involving countless probabilistic interactions between many photons and the passing electron. If in another example we replaced the photon source with the Sun, and the passing electrons with two glasses of water sitting on a beach, we see that although each interaction between photon and water molecule is unique and probabilistic, the liquid from each of the two glasses would take very similar times to evaporate. In summary, the dichotomy between chance and determinism proposed by Laplace was radically inverted by contemporary science. Rather than exact expressions of pure and deterministic physical laws, simple interactions and particles of reality are intrinsically uncertain and probabilistic; and rather than the cause of ignorance, complexity or the statistical composition of entities and their interactions is the very reason for predictability and order that we observe around us.
History and inheritance
Remarkably, Darwin seems to be closer to Schrödinger than to Laplace; in fact, his definition of natural selection in the Origin did not sound too far from the contemporary views on complexity and order: Then, considering the infinite complexity of the relations of all organic beings to each other and to their conditions of existence, causing an infinite diversity in structure, constitution, and habits, to be advantageous to them, I think it would be a most extraordinary fact if no variation ever had occurred useful to each being’s own welfare … But if variations useful to any organic being do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterised will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life … This principle of preservation, I have called, for the sake of brevity, Natural Selection (Darwin, 1859: 127).
For Darwin natural selection was a pattern or principle of preservation observed in populations and across generations, resulting from virtually infinite interactions among organic beings; but at the level of isolated individuals, the best we can do is to ascribe a better or worse chance of being preserved. Natural selection is another example of natural law, and of order emerging as a scaling effect against a background of individual events inextricably tangled with chance. history and inheritance
If the ultimate components of reality are intrinsically unpredictable, what is the appeal of the ‘simple’ in the natural sciences? In other words, why is reductionism so influential? The answer is that reductionism was never meant to be a tool against chance; it is a tool against history. An enlightening example is given by the work on antiparticles by the physicists John Wheeler and Richard Feynman. According to Dirac’s antiparticle theory, every existing electron implied the existence of a positive sister particle (a positron) somewhere in the universe (Wheeler and Ford, 1998: 117). Wheeler then proposed a very original explanation for why electrons and positrons existed in pairs: all observed electrons and positrons would be a single existing particle, travelling back and forth in time and drawing a continuous ‘world line’ or trajectory of its existence. This single electron could be seen many times simultaneously, as its swaying world line intersects the present multiple times and creates the perception of many existing electrons. When the world line crosses towards the future, an electron is observed, and a travel back to the past would correspond to a positron; hence their similar mass, but inverse charge. Finally, since
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there is a single continuous line moving back and forth, it follows that between two travels to the future there must necessarily occur a travel to the past; hence the existence of one positron for every electron. Although Wheeler’s idea of world lines was incorporated into quantum mechanics, explaining antiparticle theory as a cosmic déjà vu was considered too extreme. Wheeler was aware of flaws in the argument, but what matters for us was his justification for reducing all electrons and positrons to a single particle: We realized that such a way of thinking made sense because of the extreme simplicity of the electron. You can tell by looking into a person’s face something about what that person has been through. You cannot tell anything about an electron’s history by looking at it. Every electron is exactly like every other electron, unscarred by its past, not blessed with a memory – of either human or the computer variety (Wheeler and Ford, 1998: 348).
Since electrons do not have memory and do not bear a record of their past accidents and scars, they lack individuality. Exactly for this reason, they are the ideal starting point for the study of more complex macroscopic entities that do display physical memory and uniqueness. Reductionism thus serves two main purposes. The first is the understanding of things composite or complex, such as tables or electromagnetic fields. The second purpose is the conquest of history. While statistical composition generates order from disorder as claimed by Schrödinger, it may also generate history or a record of past events when time is a relevant variable (i.e. when systems are not in equilibrium). This category of problem has come to the fore only recently in the physical sciences as the study of dynamical systems (Nicolis and Nicolis, 2007) and shows that the concept of history can be extended well beyond its original use as a feature of human societies. Galaxies have persistently eluded cosmologists for their gigantic scale and morphological variability accumulated over billions of years. Spiral galaxies are currently the prevailing form in the universe, but the reasons for their larger number were not obvious (Smolin, 1997). Some sophisticated thermodynamic (n-body/gas dynamical) models have been proposed but were not particularly successful; surprisingly, until recently the best simulations of spiral arm dynamics were derived from evolutionary biology, more specifically from simulations of host–parasite interactions, with the forming stars in a spiral arm sweeping through the galaxy playing the role of infecting parasites,
History and inheritance
and the dark matter that becomes the material source of the forming stars playing the role of hosts. In a review suggestively named ‘The morphological evolution of galaxies’, Abraham and van den Bergh (2001) pointed to further similarities between cosmology and organic evolution. They recognise that cosmology also needs to cope with taxonomic problems (the standard ‘tuning fork’ classification scheme proposed by Hubble in 1926 fails to describe most of the distant galaxies), phylogenetic problems (spiral galaxies seem to be primitive, while elliptical galaxies are probably derived from collision of spirals; however, elliptical galaxies may revert back to spirals due to gas accretion) and especially evolutionary problems: At this stage, all that is clear is that the morphology of spiral galaxies is evolving rapidly and systematically, even at quite low redshifts [i.e. at shorter distances from the Earth]. Familiar types of galaxies, such as barred and grand-design spirals, appear to be relatively recent additions to the extragalactic zoo. The nature of the many morphologically peculiar galaxies at high redshift remains a complete mystery. These objects might be mergers, protogalaxies, new classes of evolved systems, or a combination of all three (Abraham and van den Bergh, 2001).
The use of various biological terms and the analogies with organic evolution is possible because galaxies are historical objects whose number, size and configuration depend not only on first principles, but on original conditions and accidental factors occurring over long periods of time. In other words, physical sciences also aim at the eventual conquest of complex historical entities, and this blurs the boundaries between ‘exact’ and ‘historical’ sciences. This also means that the reliance of evolutionary biology on the statistical law of natural selection does not tell it apart from the other natural sciences: first because natural laws are statistical, or attempts to grasp patterns against a background of contingency; and second because even the physical sciences aim at accounting for the history of nature. Undeniably there is a fundamental difference between physics and evolutionary biology, but contrary to the common belief it does not lie in a distinction between exact and historical sciences: the distinction is in the type of memory behind physical and organic history. Both galaxies and cells must bear some principle of order that opposes their decay towards randomly moving atoms and molecules; but the principles operating in living and non-living entities are different. As
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seen above, for Schrödinger the Principle of Order from Disorder operating in non-living matter is the result of statistical averaging, and ‘is never the consequence of a well-ordered configuration of atoms’. In contrast, Schrödinger postulated a second Principle (of ‘Order from Order’), unrelated to statistical averaging and derived from organisation at the level of atoms and molecules, perhaps in the form of ‘aperiodic crystals’ within chromosomes. Less than a decade later, the structure of DNA, the aperiodic crystal behind living organisation, was determined. It is now known that in all living organisms macroscopic order, or phenotype, is symbolically stored in a microscopic sequence of nucleotides or genotype. Since the possible configurations of DNA are virtually unlimited but resources are not, selection arises as the result of competition between alternatives (Eigen, 1971). As discussed below, unlimited inheritance, the material and functional distinction between genotype and phenotype, and competition in the form of natural selection explain why there is more history and complexity to a single cell than to a galaxy. darwinian progress: order at the macroevolutionary scale
Organic history is the record of the scars, accidents and contingent factors crossing the path of evolutionary lineages; but, as seen, contingency must coexist with the operation of the universal law of natural selection. Darwin believed that the logic of inheritable variation and competition would apply not only to individuals within species, but also to the origin, divergence, extinction and succession of species themselves. The title On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection is in fact a statement of Darwin’s controversial theory (which later became known as ‘reinforcement’) that speciation between sympatric (physically overlapping) populations can evolve as an adaptation, rather than as a consequence of other adaptations or of accidental factors (Coyne and Orr, 2004). Darwin did not deny that speciation occurs mostly due to allopatry (physical isolation) and therefore by accident, but emphasised that species resulting from allopatry derived their existence from the absence of competition rather than selection of the fittest. Owing their existence to luck, they were destined to play a secondary role in the history of life. I conclude that, although small isolated areas probably have been in some respects highly favourable for the production of new species,
Darwinian progress yet that the course of modification will generally have been more rapid on large areas; and what is more important, that the new forms produced on large areas, which already have been victorious over many competitors, will be those that will spread most widely, will give rise to most new varieties and species, and will thus play an important part in the changing history of the organic world (Darwin, 1859: 106).
In Darwin’s argument, it is clear that some species are ‘better’ than others due to selection; that those species change or set in motion organic history; and that organic history or macroevolution is a large-scale pattern or order bearing the signal of natural selection. Thus, Darwin postulated not only that natural selection was a pattern emerging within populations over time; he also suggested that organic history is a pattern that emerges from selective interactions among species. The extrapolation from microevolution to macroevolution occurs because Darwin strongly believed that competition took place not only between individuals, but also between populations or species. It is the most closely-allied forms, – varieties of the same species, and species of the same genus or of related genera, – which, from having nearly the same structure, constitution, and habits, generally come into the severest competition with each other. Consequently, each new variety or species, during the progress of its formation, will generally press hardest on its nearest kindred, and tend to exterminate them (Darwin, 1859: 110).
Darwin’s view was that while competition among individuals leads to adaptation, competitive extermination of intermediate varieties may lead to speciation. The extermination of species by natural selection has an obvious effect on the distribution of biodiversity and higher taxa: whereas intraspecific competition implies the supremacy of the fittest individuals, competition between species must lead to the supremacy of ‘higher’ forms at the macroevolutionary scale. But in one particular sense the more recent forms must, on my theory, be higher than the more ancient; for each new species is formed by having had some advantage in the struggle for life over other and preceding forms (Darwin, 1859: 336–7).
As in the case of individuals, the fate of a particular species is to a large extent a matter of chance; but with large numbers and long periods of time, competitive interactions between species generate a historical pattern: the appearance of organic ‘advance’ at the geological
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scale. When we describe population change driven by selection, we refer to adaptation. When we refer to species succession, Darwin was clear: we should name it progress. All the other great leading facts in palaeontology seem to me simply to follow on the theory of descent with modification through natural selection … The extinction of old forms is the almost inevitable consequence of the production of new forms. … The dominant species of the larger dominant groups tend to leave many modified descendants … As these are formed, the species of the less vigorous groups, from their inferiority inherited from a common progenitor, tend to become extinct together … The inhabitants of each successive period in the world’s history have beaten their predecessors in the race for life, and are, in so far, higher in the scale of nature; and this may account for the vague yet ill-defined sentiment, felt by many palaeontologists, that organisation has on the whole progressed (Darwin, 1859: 343–5).
For Darwin, both adaptation and progress were consequences of natural selection. Microevolution and macroevolutionary history were instances of order emerging from the interaction of many parts (individuals or species). But in the framework of Darwinism developed by his successors, adaptation remained a central concept whereas ‘progress’, frequently denounced as a Victorian or anthropocentric prejudice, became an almost forbidden word in evolutionary biology (Ruse, 1996). Ironically, the exclusion of the concept of progress from evolutionary theory was driven both by the enemies of Darwinism and by its most ardent supporters.
macroevolution as history
Darwin’s claim that evolutionary progress is an integral feature of macroevolution has been strongly rejected by most active evolutionary biologists (Ruse, 1996); as a rule, they prefer to assume that macroevolution is just the accumulation of microevolutionary processes at the level of populations, and not a separate level of order. As summarised by Dobzhansky (1937: 12), ‘there is no way toward an understanding of the mechanisms of macroevolutionary changes, which require time on a geological scale, other than through a full comprehension of the microevolutionary processes observable within the span of a human lifetime’. Later, Simpson’s (1944) account of modern horse evolution became a classic example of how ecological specialisation, speciation and extinction occurring over a period of 25 million years were
Macroevolution as history
reduced to a narrative of the workings of natural selection within populations – without any reference to higher forms or progress of any kind. For Simpson, the Equidae (the family that now includes horses, donkeys and zebras) underwent a transition from browsing (leaf eating) to grazing (grass eating) during the Miocene period as a response to selection for larger body size, which led to larger organs and structures such as teeth as a correlated outcome. Although only an indirect product of selection for increased body size, the larger and higher tooth crowns in ancestral browsing taxa (Mesohippus, Miohipus) ‘incidentally evolved in the direction of grazing adaptation’, and were then captured by natural selection: A segment of the population broke away, structurally, under this selection pressure [for grazing adaptations], climbed the grazing peak with relative rapidity during the Miocene, and by the end of the Miocene occupied its summit … the competition on both sides from the well-adapted groups caused the intermediate, relatively inadaptive animals on the saddle to become extinct. The browsing types … became extinct, while the grazing types persist today (Simpson, 1944: 92).
It is now known that intermediate types between browsing and grazing should not be described as inadaptive animals. Those extinct species are currently seen as a third niche of mixed browsers that evolved in parallel with the grazing types, displayed equivalent levels of diversity during the Eocene, and disappeared at the same time as the browsing taxa (McFadden, 2005). Despite some problems with the interpretation of fossils, Simpson’s account perfectly exemplifies the belief that the fossil record is a window into the selective forces that guided changes in populations and species in the past. But can the logic be inverted? In other words, can the knowledge of selection patterns or microevolution taking place in a population be used to predict history or macroevolution? Simpson made it clear that the answer is no; the reason is the set of material conditions under which selection operates. The cause of evolution thus includes all the genetic, structural, physiological, and behavioural states of populations right back to the origin of life. Even slight changes in earlier parts of the history would have profound cumulative effects on all descendant organisms through the succeeding millions of generations (Simpson, 1964: 773).
Even when the state of a population is well known, ‘it is impossible for population genetics to predict any pattern at all in the fossil record’ (Charlesworth et al., 1982), since after a few generations the
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present state will be altered by a number of chance events. For this reason, macroevolution is nothing more than historical reconstruction or recapitulation: although lineages are impossible to predict, they are at least accountable on hindsight when fossils are available to tell us the story. The human evolutionary lineage, for example, is a product of probabilities that make the evolution of a second ‘humanoid’ or human-like species extremely improbable, either on Earth or anywhere else in the universe. There are four successive probabilities to be judged: the probability that suitable planets do exist; the probability that life has arisen on them; the probability that such life has evolved in a predictable way; and the probability that such evolution would lead eventually to hominoids … the first probability is fair, the second far lower but appreciable, the third exceedingly small, and the fourth almost negligible. Each of these probabilities depends on that preceding it, so that they must be multiplied together to obtain the over-all probability of the final event, the emergence of hominoids. The product of these probabilities, each a fraction, is probably not significantly greater than zero (Simpson, 1964: 771).
Simpson’s conclusion will sound familiar to most readers: ‘evolution is not repeatable. No species or any larger group has ever evolved, or can ever evolve, twice’ (Simpson, 1964: 773). That would be, according to current mainstream Darwinism, the ultimate limit of macroevolution as a science. Watched from the Simpsonian perspective, the fate of any evolutionary lineage is similar to the decay of a single radiocarbon atom: dependent on contingent factors, unpredictable, and only accountable on hindsight. It should be clear that Simpson does not refer to a humanoid as a species exactly like ours (the evolution of which would in fact be unrepeatable): it simply denotes a ‘living organism with intelligence comparable to man’s in quantity and quality, hence with the possibility of rational communication with us. Its anatomy and indeed its means of communication are not defined as identical with ours’ (Simpson, 1964: 771). In other words, it is not just the evolution of Homo sapiens but also of human intelligence and language that are considered unique, unrepeatable, and mostly the product of chance. We must ask how Darwinians came to differ so much from Darwin in the subject of macroevolution. For Darwin, large numbers of individuals and their interactions generate natural selection as a statistical pattern, whereas large numbers of interacting species over long periods may generate evolutionary progress as a higher-order
Contingency as the startling consensus
statistical pattern or a sort of Order from Disorder in organic evolution. But although Dobzhansky, Simpson and others accepted that macroevolution is an extrapolation of natural selection, they rejected the idea of additional forms of order beyond the species level. In other words, the appearance of biological progress cannot be derived from the fundamental law of natural selection: progress can at best be accepted as a contingent feature of evolution (Simpson, 1949), or a mystery beyond science (Dobzhansky, 1967).
contingency as the startling consensus
Simpson’s argument defined evolutionary history or macroevolution as the scale at which natural selection becomes an insufficient power, so that the ‘states of populations’ themselves become the causes of evolution. This idea was reshaped by critics of Darwinism as the concept of evolutionary constraint. Organisms must be analyzed as integrated wholes, with baupläne so constrained by phyletic heritage, pathways of development, and general architecture that the constraints themselves become more interesting and more important in delimiting pathways of change than the selective force that may mediate change when it occurs (Gould and Lewontin, 1979: 147).
To use an analogy, natural selection is as irrelevant for understanding species diversity as gravitation is for explaining why river courses differ. The flow of water from high to low potential energy levels does require gravitation, but gravitation is virtually the same for all rivers: what makes the Thames different from the Nile is the unique topography of their surroundings. Now, if a given topography is turned upside down, we may interpret rivers as evolving lineages; and selection can be seen as the force constantly and universally driving populations, whether of green algae or arboreal primates, towards points of maximum fitness. The reason why algae and primate lineages end up at different points, despite moving in the same upward direction from a common ancestor and being driven by the same force, is that their lineages ran through different hills and valleys. Evolutionary constraints are the hills and valleys that guide or direct evolutionary lineages. A negative constraint (a hill in the evolutionary topography) is defined as a limitation to possible evolutionary outcomes, or the absence of inheritable variation in certain directions (Maynard Smith et al., 1985). Development is seen by many
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authors as a major source of negative constraints, as exemplified by the mechanism of body segmentation in British geophilomorph centipedes (Arthur and Kettle, 2001). Geophilomorph centipedes are among the few known organisms to exhibit both within- and between-species variation in leg-bearing segment numbers. Populations of centipedes show an approximately binomial distribution of segment number, suggesting stabilising selection. What is intriguing is that the number of leg-bearing segments in centipedes is always odd. It is not easy to understand how and why this pattern would result from natural selection; why would 49, 51 and 53 similar body segments be an advantage to an individual, but 48 or 50 segments a disadvantage? A possible explanation is that even-numbered mutants simply do not occur (or are much less frequent) in nature, as suggested by recent studies in the mechanisms of segmentation in Strigamia maritima (Chipman et al., 2004). In this centipede, segments are formed in a two-step process: first, segments are produced as a result of the growth of the anterior–posterior axis, and then subdivided into two due to intercalation of an additional boundary within the segment. If for some reason viable mutants exclusively occur at the first step but not at the second, then they will necessarily either gain or lose segments in pairs, and segments will necessarily jump numbers. Segment number variation in Strigamia maritima provides a convincing example of discontinuous phenotypic variation determined by developmental constraints rather than natural selection. It is true that the mechanism of double periodicity and segment subdivision must have evolved by natural selection; but it evolved as a mechanism of segmentation rather than segment number determination. For this reason, segment number jumps in centipedes would be a by-product of inherited ‘pathways of development’. Thus, although developmental constraints may result from the operation of selection in the past, their presence directs the evolution of a lineage in the future: Adaptations may then ‘congeal’ to limit directions of potential alteration in descendant taxa (the negative meanings), or to channel future change in preferred directions that often accelerate or grant easier access to adaptive solutions (the positive meanings) (Gould, 2002: 1173).
As much as topographies can be the source of rivers and waterfalls, constraints can also be positive (acting as valleys in the evolutionary topography); in other words, constraints might channel, direct or even accelerate evolutionary trajectories. For example, shared
Contingency as the startling consensus
developmental mechanisms might predispose evolutionary lineages towards similar directions or evolutionary outcomes. Accordingly, traditional examples of adaptive convergence, such as the allegedly independent evolution of eyes in six separate animal phyla (SalviniPlawen and Mayr, 1977), have been radically reinterpreted by some as ‘a case of homoplasy in final results based upon significant homology in underlying developmental architecture’ (Gould, 2002: 1128). Morphologically, the compound eyes of arthropods and the camera eyes of vertebrates are blatant examples of homoplasy or analogy (superficial similarity derived from convergence) rather than homology (similarity due to inheritance from a common ancestor). Even the more similar camera eyes of vertebrates and cephalopods develop in different ways (the former as a projection from the brain, the latter as a differentiated region of the epidermis). However, it was found that vertebrates and cephalopods share a homologous ‘master control gene’ known as Pax-6, whose expression in the embryo triggers the differentiation of cells into a fully formed adult eye (Gehring, 1998). This was soon interpreted as evidence that ‘absent an “internal” direction supplied by the pre-existing Pax-6 developmental channel, natural selection could not have crafted such exquisitely similar, and beautifully adapted, final products from scratch, and purely “from the outside”’ (Gould, 2002: 1129). The evolution of animal eyes would be just one example of the failure of natural selection to account for many aspects of organic diversity above the species level. Macroevolution cannot simply be scaled-up from microevolutionary mechanics if the phenomenology of this larger scale depends as much upon the potentials of evolvability as upon the impositions of selection (Gould, 2002: 1294).
In summary, while microevolution is the study of biases in the distribution of genotypes and phenotypes within populations, macroevolution is a science of a different kind: it is the historical study of how evolutionary constraints and random historical events have guided and commanded selection through unlikely and irreproducible walks. Evolutionary history should be seen as a sequence of hierarchical ‘tiers of time’: the first and lower tier is selection operating at the level of populations; the second is species competition; and the third and most important, represented by episodes of catastrophic mass extinction caused by extraneous factors such as asteroid collisions or radical climate change, results in random sampling of species and the actual pattern of biodiversity that we observe. Macroevolution has to be for
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this reason the science of ‘narrative explanations’ and the domain of contingency, ‘or the tendency of complex systems with substantial stochastic components, and intricate nonlinear interactions among components, to be unpredictable in principle from full knowledge of antecedent conditions, but fully explainable after time’s actual unfoldings’ (Gould, 2002: 46). Startlingly, the essentially anti-Darwinian concept of constrained macroevolution is remarkably similar to the views expressed earlier by Simpson. As surprisingly, Gould’s narrative view of macroevolution, based on the old-fashioned, Laplacean view of complexity as a source of unpredictability, is favoured by many Darwinians over the processual view proposed by Darwin and based on a more contemporary view of complexity as a source of order through composition. In summary, macroevolutionary theorising has been characterised by an unexpected consensus between ardent supporters of Darwinism and some of its most vociferous critics: all seem to agree that the history of life can only be described a posteriori as a procession of unique and unrepeatable lineages. convergence
Despite its wide acceptance, the apparent consensus over historical contingency may be unjustified. The reason is that it seems to depend on the assumption that the focus of analysis in macroevolution is the lineage itself; under this assumption, macroevolution is nothing more than the exhaustive or encyclopaedic study of evolutionary trajectories. Wind the tape of life back to Burgess times [over 500 million years ago], and let it play again. If Pikaia [a primitive chordate] does not survive in the replay, we are wiped out of future history … And so, if you wish to ask the question of the ages – why do humans exist? – a major part of the answer, touching those aspects of the issue that science can treat at all, must be: because Pikaia survived the Burgess decimation. This response does not cite a single law of nature; it embodies no statement about predictable evolutionary pathways, no calculation of probabilities based on general rules of anatomy or ecology. The survival of Pikaia was a contingency of ‘just history’ (Gould, 1989: 323).
Each evolving lineage is by definition unique, but does this prove that macroevolution must be the historical narrative of case studies? As seen above, nuclear physics is not limited to particle history narratives despite the fact that each β-decay event of 14C into 14N is unique
Convergence
and unpredictable. For the same reason, natural selection can be seen as an emerging statistical pattern or bias in populations. But can statistical composition be applied to evolutionary lineages too? In other words, if we strip species and lineages of their unique features and analyse them as data points from a large sample, do we observe any patterns or regularities at the larger scale of evolutionary history? A hint at the answer is offered by the phenomenon of evolutionary convergence, or independent evolution of functionally or morphologically similar traits (Haldane and Huxley, 1927; Simpson, 1953; Rensch, 1960). A much debated phenomenon, convergence, was recently reinstated by Conway Morris (2001, 2003) as an answer to Gould’s challenge. He convincingly argued that the tape of life has indeed been rerun not once, but multiple times: it was rerun when Cretacean mammals adapted to marine environments previously occupied by extinct Jurassic reptiles; it was rerun when ancestral mammals, isolated from each other in North America, South America and Australia by continental drift, were exposed to similar selection pressures; and it is rerun when different parasites adapt to different hosts (or to the same host multiple times). Those reruns frequently generate surprisingly similar outcomes: the incredibly similar placental wolf in North America and the marsupial Tasmanian wolf; the fusiform dolphins and ichthyosaurs; or the eyes, legs and wings that independently evolved in the most diverse taxa. Convergence conveys the idea that selection has repeatedly driven distinct species to the same evolutionary ends, irrespective of the particularities or historical scars of each lineage; it is therefore a cogent response to the positive constraint argument. When Gould (2002: 1129) pointed to the discovery of Pax-6 genes in a wide range of organisms, including even planarians whose eyes do not include lenses (Pineda et al., 2000), his conclusion was that ‘the basic genetic cascade had already been originated, and already regulated visual systems, indicating the pre-existence of the developmental pathway as a positive constraint of parallelism’. The fundamental problem with this argument is that conservation of genetic pathways does not mean predisposition towards parallel evolution: it is as often associated with evolutionary divergence. The pdm/apterous cascade, for example, is another conserved developmental cascade across arthropods, which instead of positively constraining taxa towards similar parallel evolution, evolved to specify limbs in crustaceans and wings in insects (Averof and Cohen, 1997). Since in insects wings are evolutionarily derived from ancestral dorsal limbs, the conservation of a
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developmental cascade was in this case a condition for divergence and innovation driven by selection. If parallelism, convergence and divergence are all possible outcomes of conserved developmental mechanisms, we may conclude that evolving lineages are not primarily channelled by constraints but guided by natural selection. But if all those results are possible, why does natural selection often lead to convergent results? The Earth is a finite environment offering a finite set of adaptive niches, and this may ask for a finite and repeatedly deployed set of adaptive solutions. From this perspective, it is not surprising that evolutionary history must sometimes repeat itself. Vermeij (2006) showed that in a set of 78 major evolutionary innovations (ranging from the genetic code to venom injection), 70% are convergences that evolved more than once. The remaining traits, or unique events in evolutionary history, had a significantly older origin than the convergent traits, suggesting that their uniqueness may result in some cases not from singular and contingent creation, but from loss or non-preservation of lineages that once exhibited convergent traits. In summary, it may be true that our existence depended on the unlikely survival of Pikaia. Nevertheless, had it not survived and chordates did not evolve, the Earth would not have been deprived of organisms exhibiting mineralised skeletons, muscularised appendages, image-forming eyes, teeth, bipedalism, endothermy, placentas and social behaviour; all those traits evolved in many other lineages.
the denial of
‘ p r o g r e s s ’ : d a r w i n i s m ’ s
prejudice
against darwin
The frequent occurrence of evolutionary convergence frontally challenges the prevailing scepticism regarding selection-driven macroevolutionary patterns. Other arguments suggest that evolutionary history is more than a random walk of living forms. A hypothetical visit to the Earth four billion years ago would reveal the presence of selfreplicating molecules in oceans or atmospheric water droplets (Hazen, 2005); three billion years ago, we would find unicellular organisms and the genetic code; half a billion years ago, macroscopic multicellular organisms resembling extant life were already present. Thirty million years ago, complex social networks had already evolved in insects, mammals and other animal groups; now, members of one species use words and written symbols to communicate. The evolution
The denial of ‘progress‘
from molecules to human societies seems to suggest that evolution has some sort of direction; but does it move ‘forward’ in any objective (and non-anthropocentric) sense? As seen above, Darwin was clearly sympathetic to the idea of evolutionary progression and believed that extant forms are better adapted than extinct ones; a few Darwinians such as Mayr (1982: 532) were also fully convinced that ‘on almost any measure one can think of a squid, a social bee, or primate, as more progressive than a prokaryote’. A main problem in the debate over evolutionary progress is the lack of agreement on how to define and measure it objectively. To be fair, even those who reject evolutionary progress are not clear about a definition. The denial of progress in evolution is commonly based on three different features: linearity, inevitability, and increase in complexity. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995: 4), for example, denounced the ‘fallacy of progress’ as the view of evolution as ‘a simple image of progress on a linear scale’; against that mistaken view, they argued that ‘life is better visualised as a branching tree than as a single ascending line’. Gould (2002: 1321), describing progress as the product of ‘anthropocentric hope and social tradition’, stated that evolution does not necessarily and linearly ‘ascend’: ‘after all, two of the three great boughs on life’s phyletic tree remain prokaryotic [Eubacteria and Archaea], while all three multicellular kingdoms extend as twigs from the terminus of the third bough’. However, arguments against linearity and inevitability in evolution are based on a straw man fallacy. The most vociferous and outspoken progressionists, starting with Darwin himself, recognise that evolution is a branching process: even Haeckel (1896), a symbol of anthropocentric progressionism (Ruse, 1996), placed humans not on top of a ladder but of a living tree alive from its unicellular roots to the human high canopy. Haldane and Huxley (1927: 234), also strong believers in evolutionary progress, never argued that evolution implies the replacement of lower forms; instead, evolution ‘consists in raising the upper level of organization reached by living matter, while still permitting the lower types of organization to survive’. Mayr (1988) expressed similar views: Who can deny that overall there is an advance from the prokaryotes that dominated the living world more than three billion years ago to the eukaryotes with their well organized nucleus and chromosomes as well as cytoplasmic organelles; from the single-celled eukaryotes to metaphytes and metazoans with a strict division of labour among their highly specialised organ systems; within the metazoans from
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Mayr was aware that metaphytes and metazoans represented two divergent branches descending from unicellular ancestors; and by referring to extant ectotherms and endotherms (and in general only to extant groups), Mayr acknowledges that the most ‘advanced’ form does not necessarily replace its ancestor. Moreover, when Ruse (1996: 419) interprets Mayr’s belief in biological progress as a product of ‘cultural convictions, especially those about scientific and technological progress’, he is right for the wrong reasons. Ruse’s remark that ‘there is no reason to think that nature – or biological theory – makes this progress mandatory’ is based on a misunderstanding: the belief that cultural progress itself is linear and inevitable. In fact, it appears that the history of technology and science can only suggest a useful parallel with biological evolution because they are not linear and inevitable. Homo sapiens evolved in Africa in the Middle Pleistocene (at present the earliest fossil evidence dates back to 200 000 years) and had dispersed as far as Australia at around 60 000 years ago (Lahr, 1996; Lewin and Foley, 2004). In Europe, modern humans made their first appearance over 40 000 years ago, bringing with them the Aurignacian stone tools that define what is known as the Upper Palaeolithic Revolution, characterised by a ‘Mode 4’ lithic technology for obtaining blades from prepared cores and use of alternative raw materials such as bone, ivory and antler. While in Europe this was only the first of a long series of revolutions, various human populations currently living in Australia, Asia, Africa and the Amazon remain in the Stone Age (Lee and Daly, 1999) – proving that technological change is not inevitable. A similar rationale applies to scientific theories. Heliocentrism (Thurston, 1994), atomism (Gregory, 1931) and relativity (Einstein and Infeld, 1938) were originally proposed in Antiquity, discarded or forgotten, and then reinstated, indicating that linearity is not a necessary rule of scientific progress. Rejecting evolutionary progress on the basis of inevitability and linearity does nothing but solve a pseudo-problem; linearity and inevitability are not the reason why Darwin, Mayr and others believe that biological organisation has on the whole progressed. biological complexity and information
Finally, progress is also frequently defined as an increase in biological complexity. Even those who denounce the fallacy of progress admit that ‘there is surely some sense in which elephants and oak trees are
Biological complexity and information
more complex than bacteria, and bacteria than the first replicating molecules’ (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995: 3), and ‘appreciate the appeal of an argument based on “ratcheting” for an accretion of levels of complexity through time’ (Gould, 2002: 1321). Contrary to linearity and inevitability, arguments for evolutionary increases in biological complexity are as a rule more sophisticated and resistant to criticism, and therefore more difficult to disqualify. Whereas Ruse’s (1996: 416) somewhat puzzling assertion that ‘ancient forms (like trilobites) were more complex even possibly than humans’ should not be taken too seriously (for a convincing demonstration, see Simpson, 1949: 254), more serious objections to evolutionary increases in complexity were made by Williams (1966) and McShea (1996). Both listed a series of possible definitions of complexity (including number of body parts, number of cell types, and phenotypic specialisation), analysed their distribution during evolutionary history, and then concluded that none provided any substantial support for the belief in a trend towards evolutionary increases in complexity. On closer inspection, the negative conclusions of Williams and McShea seem to derive from a fundamental deficiency in their own criteria of complexity. What the measures of complexity proposed by Williams and McShea have in common is their strictly phenotypic (or organisational) character, and a deliberate attempt to avoid possible genotypic (or informational) criteria which measure or define complexity based on the ‘information content’ in the DNA sequences (Wicken, 1987). For example, Williams (1966: 35–6) hastily discarded Kimura’s (1961) suggestion that increases in complexity could be measured as the accumulation of genetic information during the evolution of a lineage, criticising his proposals as naïve preconceptions, and then concluded without further justification that genetic information has ‘changed enormously since Cambrian time, and natural selection has guided these changes, but it need not have increased the total information content’. McShea (1996) also rejects genotypic measures of complexity, but bases his view on the unclear statement that ‘much of the information in development is cytoplasmic and not present in DNA’. He also appeals to what we might call the ‘Mayonnaise over DNA argument’ to demonstrate that the complexity of an organism cannot be measured by its information content or genetic recipe. McShea’s point is that the complexity of mayonnaise, ‘a simple, homogeneous substance (at ordinary scales of observation)’, will be highly overestimated when judged from the very complex recipe required to produce it. It is easy
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to see the fundamental problem in the argument: it assumes a priori that phenotypic or organisational criteria have priority over genotypic or informational ones, and then tries to prove the same point. In the example of mayonnaise, McShea implicitly and incorrectly assumed that homogeneous substances must be simple (an organisational criterion); therefore, organisational heterogeneity must be a standard for complexity. Given the importance of inheritance to both life and evolution, it would be surprising if genetic information played no role in a possibly objective definition of biological complexity. Addressing the problem of defining life, and inspired by Schrödinger, Crick (1981) proposed a distinction between the Earth’s geological history (the outcomes of physical and chemical processes, or all that depends on statistical averaging and Schrödinger’s Principle of Order from Disorder) and its biological history (life itself, or anything that requires genetic material or DNA; or all entities and processes that depend on Schrödinger’s Principle of Order from Order). That definition neatly grasped the inseparability of life from genetic inheritance, evolution and common descent. The distinction also offers the bonus of setting a lower boundary or root to the scale of biological complexity: viruses. Viruses are organisms that rely on phenotypes encoded by genes, store and transmit their ‘recipe’ across generations via DNA (or RNA), and share a nearly universal genetic code with other living beings (or more specifically with their specific hosts; Shackleton and Holmes, 2008). From this perspective, it is hard to imagine how one could ever think of viruses, despite their extreme phenotypic simplicity, as not being living organisms. However, those who prefer phenotypic definitions of life based on key metabolic or morphological features, such as cellular organisation or self-maintenance (autopoiesis), tend to exclude viruses from the domain of life. For Margulis and Sagan (2000: 18), viruses are ‘too small to self-maintain, they do not metabolize. Viruses do nothing until they enter an autopoietic entity; a bacterial cell, the cell of an animal, or of another live organism’. This argument has some clear weaknesses too. Margulis and Sagan explain in their own words why viruses do not metabolise: this is a consequence of their parasitic lifestyle. Parasites tend to rely on the phenotypic features of their hosts, thereby ‘stripping themselves down to bare essentials’ (Keeling, 2001). For example, intestinal parasites of vertebrates such as tapeworms live on food digested by the host, and therefore lost their guts completely; the same explains the loss of sensory and locomotory organs in other endoparasites (Ruppert and Barnes, 1994).
Organisms as DNA programs
To sum up, phenotypic redundancy with hosts is what often leads to simplification of parasites. It so happens that some organisms, including viruses, are endoparasites of cells; in this case, one predicts the absence of some structures present in the cellular host. Whether viruses lost such structures or never possessed them is still debatable (Burnet, 1945; Forterre, 2006). In some cases, loss of structures in cellular parasites was demonstrated. For example, the microsporidian Encephalitozoon cuniculi, a unicellular parasitic eukaryote that only lives inside animal cells, lacks key organelles such as mitochondria and peroxisomes (Katinka et al., 2001; Keeling, 2001). Structural simplification of microsporidians also occurred in the genome, with the loss of core eukaryotic genes and whole metabolic pathways. Genome size, gene number, protein size and cell size have been equally reduced and are comparable to what is found in some bacteria. Although highly atypical, E. cuniculi is undeniably a eukaryote, as shown by the presence of a nucleus and various eukaryotic genes and phylogenetic analysis indicating that microsporidians are in fact derived fungi (Hirt et al., 1997). But for being too small, unable to self-maintain, and unable to survive and replicate outside an animal cell, microsporidia (as well as viruses) probably do not qualify as living organisms in Margulis and Sagan’s scheme. In summary, it seems that definitions of life that exclusively rely on phenotypic criteria tend to be flawed. Genetic information must be taken into account in definitions of life, and as seen below, also of biological complexity.
organisms as dna programs
Biological information must be included in definitions of biological complexity, but analysing genetic information carries its own difficulties. It is possible to interpret a living organism as a DNA program (Mayr, 1974) and use information theory (Shannon, 1948; Avery, 2003) to estimate its information content from objective variables such as genome length, information entropy (a measure of the probability of a DNA sequence in a universe of possible ones), or algorithm complexity (the size of the algorithm necessary to generate an observed DNA sequence from a randomly generated one; Li and Vitanyi, 1997). However, comparisons using variables such as amount or size of DNA in species tend to yield counterintuitive estimates of complexity: lungfish carry over 50 times more DNA than other fish species or humans, while grasshoppers carry 80 times more DNA than fruit flies (Maynard
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Smith and Szathmáry, 1995). This is no surprise, since most DNA is ‘junk’ and does not code for protein (Orgel and Crick, 1980). Gene number is an alternative and in principle more appropriate measure of complexity, but existing evidence is equally frustrating: humans and chimpanzees differ little in both genome size and gene number (Mikkelsen et al., 2005). The main problem with strictly genetic comparisons is that the information content of a genome (however defined) cannot be an intrinsic property of the sequences themselves; it depends on its effect on a target or receiver (Wicken, 1987). In other words, the same DNA sequence may code for a product with different functional or structural effects when expressed in bacteria, a plant or a mammal; much as the same letter sequence ‘as’ conveys different meanings in English from German (meaning ‘ace’) or Dutch (‘axis’). Trying to incorporate the functional or adaptive effects of genetic information into the definition of biological information, Adami (2002) proposed the concept of ‘physical complexity’ as the ‘amount of information that an organism stores, in its genome, about the environment in which it evolves’. This definition has certain advantages, especially the link it establishes between increasing adaptation to a niche and increasing complexity. But such a link is also the reason for its intrinsic limitations. Physical complexity is a genetic mapping of niche complexity, and is therefore a niche-specific measure: one may be able to compare the complexity of two fish species living in the same lake, but not the complexity of a fish and a terrestrial mammal. As reckoned by Adami itself, physical complexity does not allow comparisons across adaptively divergent taxa, and such comparisons (between bacteria, chimpanzees and humans, or between unicellular and multicellular organisms) are exactly what evolutionary biologists expect from an objective measure of complexity. The same comment applies to the study of developmental complexity by Azevedo et al. (2005). Based on the Kolmogorov criterion (Li and Vitany, 1997), they proposed the length of the shortest algorithm required to specify a cell lineage in a developing multicellular organism as the measure of developmental complexity in metazoans; that algorithm specifies various commands such as the number of cell divisions in the cell lineage, the number and distribution of resulting cell fates, and the pattern of cell division. According to the authors, metazoan development was shown to be extremely simple: that is, near the shortest possible generative algorithm. However, their interpretation of complexity and simplicity is questionable.
Major transitions
The finding that selection seems to have favoured the evolution of the most parsimonious or simplest developmental pathways is hardly surprising, given the advantages cited by the authors themselves: it allows for faster development, and ‘might require less genetic information, and thus be more efficient’. The point is that efficiency is not what is meant by complexity in macroevolutionary debates. Rather than efficiency in the development of a cell lineage, it is the existence of genetic algorithms specifying cell lineages, or multicellularity itself, that suggests higher complexity in multicellular organisms. Azevedo et al.’s argument for selection as a process producing simplicity does not address a more fundamental question; as seen later, this question is the role that natural selection played in the evolution of ‘complex’ multicellular organisms from ‘simpler’ unicellular ancestors. m a j o r t r a n s i t i o n s : t h e a g g r e g a t i o n a l m o d e o f e v o l u t i o n
It seems that a sound definition of biological complexity cannot be based solely on either information criteria (genotype) or organisation criteria (phenotype). By offering a definition that integrates information and organisation, the most fruitful account of biological complexity is the theory of ‘major transitions’ presented in its most popular formulation by Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995, 1999). It is rarely acknowledged that the basic principles of the theory are found almost fully developed in Haldane and Huxley’s (1927) Animal Biology. Surprisingly, Maynard Smith and Szathmáry fail to cite or mention the book (although Maynard Smith was Haldane’s student and colleague at University College London). A possible reason for the neglect is the explicitly progressionist perspective of Animal Biology. Haldane and Huxley were firm believers in evolutionary progress, which would result from two processes. The first was individuation, or ‘improvement of the separate unit’ or organism, measured in terms of control over the environment; some examples are the origin of a central nervous system, sense organs, terrestrial life, instinct and intelligence, and reason and language, which place humans at the summit of evolutionary progress (Haldane and Huxley, 1927; see their Figure 77). The second process, evolution by ‘aggregation’, was a groundbreaking idea. Aggregation was the ‘joining together of a number of separate units to form a super-unit, as when coral polyps unite to form a colony’ (Haldane and Huxley, 1927: 235). Since individuation can turn the ‘mere aggregate into an individual’, the two processes act
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together in progressive evolution: aggregates may evolve new adaptations by individuation, and the improved units may merge into new aggregates. Unfortunately Haldane and Huxley’s book focuses almost exclusively on examples of individuation, but decades after its publication a series of works rescued the idea of aggregation as the key to the understanding of biological complexity. Buss (1987: 171) reinstated Haldane and Huxley’s case by proposing that ‘the history of life is the history of transitions between different units of selection’, represented by the sequence of self-replicating molecules, self-replicating complexes, cells, multigenomic cells, multicellular individuals, and kin groups. But it was the joint effort of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry that contributed the most to reviving aggregation by taking the concept to its logical and most general consequence. In redefining evolutionary aggregation, Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995: 6) proposed what is named here the biological unit concept (BUC): Entities that were capable of independent replication before the transition can replicate only as part of a larger whole after it.
The super-unit evolved by aggregation bears an implicit analogy with Mayr’s (1942) classic biological species concept (BSC). According to the BSC, a new species is formed when potentially or actually interbreeding natural populations become reproductively isolated from each other. Similarly, a major transition in evolution occurs when entities become reproductively isolated within a larger whole – that is, a new super-unit or level of biological organisation. The BUC is important for allowing the distinction between a mere aggregate or group (for example, a colony of unicellular organisms) and a true super-unit (for example, multicellular organisms that evolved from unicellular ancestors). Their list of eight major transitions starts with the origin of protocells (the transition from self-replicating molecules to compartmentalised populations of molecules) and ends with the relatively recent origin of human societies that communicate through language (Table 1.1). However, super-unit formation is not the only aspect of a major transition. For Maynard Smith and Szathmáry the function of gametes in sexually reproducing species, or queens in eusocial species, is the replication of the previously independent, turned-sterile components of an evolved super-unit; examples of sterile components are somatic cells in multicellular organisms and non-reproductive castes in eusocial insects. Thus, evolutionary transitions also ‘depended on a small number of major changes in the way in which information is
Major transitions
Table 1.1 The eight ‘major transitions in evolution’ (1) Replicating molecules (2) Independent replicators (3) RNA World (4) Prokaryotes (5) Asex (6) Protists
→ → → → → →
(7) Solitary individuals
→
(8) Primate societies
→
Protocells Chromosomes DNA World Eukaryotes Sex Multicellular animals, plants and fungi Colonies with non-reproductive castes Human societies
Adapted from Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995).
stored, transmitted, and translated’ (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1999: 16). Examples of new ways of transmitting information include the origin of template replication, the genetic code, developmental and epigenetic regulation, and human language. The theory of major transitions has the merit of defining evolutionary increases in complexity both at the phenotypic-organisational (the newly evolved super-units) and genotypic-informational (the new methods of transmitting biological information) levels. A second advantage is that it avoids anthropocentric criteria of complexity. For example, the genes required for the maintenance of individual cells are only a subset of the information transmitted by a eusocial queen to her descendants (other levels of information include multicellular organisation, and organisation of eusocial behaviour); the eusocial queen is more complex than a single-celled organism not because it is more similar to a human, but because its phenotype requires more types of biological information: a multicellular organism is more than a group of cells, and therefore cannot be less complex than separate cells. By implicitly appealing to the classic Aristotelian motto that ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’, major transitions imply that biological wholes (or super-units) must be more complex that the biological parts that preceded them in evolution. For this reason, social wholes must be more complex than their individual parts, and multicellular wholes must be more complex than single-celled organisms. Finally, since asocial organisms coexist with social ones, and unicellular organisms coexist with multicellular ones, major transitions imply neither linearity nor inevitability in evolution. Major transitions and the rationale they
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present for evolutionary increases in complexity suggest that Darwin’s belief in evolutionary progress was not completely unjustified. convergent aggregation, levels of selection and levels of organisation
The theory of major transitions is an appealing account of patterns in macroevolution, but it shows a conceptual flaw. According to Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, major transitions represent new super-units formed by aggregation of formerly independent units, maintained and replicated by new systems of biological information. However, it is clear that not all the proposed transitions exemplify both sides of this definition. 1
Not all transitions involved aggregation. The transition from primate to human societies has certainly required language as a new system of biological information, but human societies are not aggregates of primate societies. Although human societies may be qualitatively different from other primate societies, they do not bear a part-to-whole relationship exemplified by the unicellular–multicellular transition. 2 Not all transitions involved a new system of transmitting information – unless a ‘new system’ is vaguely defined. The definition of a ‘new system of transmission of biological information’ offered by Maynard Smith and Szathmáry is not precise enough. There is an obvious appeal to the idea that the information stored in genes and transmitted from ancestors to descendants is of a different nature from the information stored in animal brains and transmitted between organisms through learning, or from information stored in words and transmitted between humans via speech. In contrast, characterising German and Latin as ‘different systems of information’ would describe differences at a less fundamental level: they are just two variants of the ‘same’ human language. For the same reason, a visual display and a bird song can be seen as two forms of animal communication transmitting the same type of ‘behavioural’ information stored in animal brains (Jablonka and Lamb, 2006). From this perspective, some of the eight major transitions did not engender the origin of a truly new type of biological information. The symbiotic origin of the eukaryotic cell involved the aggregation of previously independent bacteria (Margulis, 1970);
Convergent aggregation
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4
but both bacteria and the first unicellular eukaryotes were transmitting the ‘same’ genetic (or protein-coding) information for maintenance and reproduction of their descendants. A similar argument applies to the comparison between asexual and sexual reproduction: both a sexually reproducing roundworm and an asexual bdelloid rotifer (Fontaneto et al., 2007) transmit to offspring the ‘same’ genetic (protein-coding) and developmental information (required for organising the multicellular body plan) and thus represent the same level of biological complexity. Some transitions describe a new level of selection, but not a new level of biological organisation. The origin of social groups from solitary individuals can at best describe a case of incomplete evolutionary transition. Many colonies of single-celled organisms are better interpreted as nearly multicellular: slime moulds, social amoebae and volvocine algae, for example, display some features of multicellular organisation (division of labour and reproductive specialisation), but their members are still independent individuals competing for reproductive success against each other (Buss, 1987; Bonner, 2006), contrary to somatic cells in a multicellular organism. The same is true for animal societies: there are various degrees of sociality between the hypothetical extremes of solitary living and full eusociality. In summary, groups of cooperative or even interdependent organisms (from lichens and slime moulds to social mammals and humans) can certainly be a product of selection as social life often increases the fitness of social individuals (Lewontin, 1970; Maynard Smith, 1988; Keller, 1999), but social groups (including eusocial ones as discussed later) are not a new level of organisation equivalent to a multicellular ‘super-unit’. In fact, the transition from unicellular to multicellular organisation is a rare example satisfying both aspects of a major transition (being a super-unit and requiring a new type of biological information). Aggregation is convergent rather than unique. Multicellular super-units have evolved independently in fungi, algae and plants, and animals (Gerhart and Kirschner, 1997; Bonner, 1998). Convergence also characterises eusociality, since sterile castes and division of labour occur not only in insects, but also in other groups such as crustaceans (Duffy, 1996) and vertebrates (O’Riain et al., 2000). This suggests that super-unit formation may be only one of the recurrent consequences of evolutionary increases
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in biological complexity, which may rest on much rarer and important macroevolutionary episodes. All the points above will be discussed in more depth in the following chapters. What can be concluded now is that the theory of major transitions proposed by Maynard Smith and Szathmáry has the merit of defining objective parameters for the study of biological complexity. However, it seems to imply a mismatch between the informational and organisational sides of transitions: while new types of biological information are rare and unique (with the genetic code and language, for example, evolving only once), aggregation processes (either complete or incomplete) are an exuberant example of evolutionary convergence. As argued below, an alternative equation between information and organisation can be derived from the very definition of life proposed by Schrödinger.
the evolution of biological order
Schrödinger’s Principle of Order from Order was a significant step in our understanding of life by pointing to nucleic acids as the source of order in living organisms. It has not been realised that the principle has another far-reaching consequence: it may also be an answer to the problem of biological complexity and its evolution. Schrödinger’s Principle of Order from Order defines life through a simple formula: it is the microscopic order of DNA that carries and transmits information about phenotypic order. However, the principle fails to capture another defining feature of life: evolutionary change. Can the static link between information and organisation found in living beings be dynamically established in macroevolution? The hypothesis presented here (and developed in more detail in the final chapter) is that evolutionary increases in complexity represent macroevolutionary transformations in Schrödinger’s Principle of Order from Order. The hypothesis consists of some elements. First, it states that the evolution of new ‘biological codes’ underlies changes in levels of biological complexity, in agreement with the views pioneered by Buss (1987) and Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995), and more recently given an explicit formulation by Barbieri (2003) and especially Jablonka and Lamb (2005, 2006). Second, new levels of complexity evolve with a new biological code or type of biological information, and then with a corresponding new type of phenotypic entity. For example, the genetic code consists of a system of DNA, RNA and amino acids, thus generating disposable
The evolution of biological order
Table 1.2 The four codes representing the transformation of Schrödinger’s Principle of Order from Order Information carrier Genetic code: genes (modified RNA) Developmental code: regulatory proteins (modified proteins) Behavioural code: neural cells (modified somatic cells) Linguistic code: words (modified behaviours)
Disposable phenotype
Proteins
Somatic cells
Learned behaviours
Human cultural traits
Source: Based on Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995) and Jablonka and Lamb (2006).
proteins as the first and most fundamental phenotypic tools used by all living organisms. Later, multicellularity brought about the origin of somatic cells as a new form of disposable phenotypic units, as a consequence of a new ‘developmental code’ based on transcription factors (modified proteins) and gene regulatory regions. A third category of phenotypic unit present only in animals is behaviour, which requires neural cells (modified somatic cells) and brains as sources of information and organisation. Finally, Homo sapiens has relied on words (modified vocalisations or behaviours) and language, a new mechanism for storing and transmitting human culture, our species-specific system of learned extended phenotypes and social norms. In other words, levels of organisation can be primarily defined by categories of phenotypes and their corresponding codes, rather than stages in aggregation of phenotypes. The list of four fundamental levels of organisation described above (genetic, developmental, behavioural and cultural), although implicit in previous works, was explicitly proposed by Jablonka and Lamb (2005, 2006) as the ‘four dimensions’ of evolution (Table 1.2). Third, new biological codes gradually evolve from previously existing ones, in contrast to the thesis of ‘sudden appearance’ (Barbieri, 2003: 235). It also seems that Jablonka and Lamb’s main interest was to argue that the existence of three systems of inheritance other than the
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genetic one was evidence for ‘Lamarckian’ or non-Darwinian aspects of evolution. This is probably why they were unable to present a model for the evolution of those new systems, a process that was essentially Darwinian. Thus, the evolutionary version of Schrödinger’s Principle proposes that a new biological code evolves when entities that originally performed phenotypic functions gradually evolve into informational carriers themselves. For being the ancestor to all codes, the genetic code poses a special problem (similar to accounting for the origin of life or the ‘first species’) and is given a special solution (the RNA World hypothesis; Gilbert, 1986). The genetic code, assumed as a starting point, converts information stored in DNA sequences into protein sequences. However, proteins gradually evolved new functions including a particular one: the function of information carriers in molecules such as transcription factors. The modulation of gene activity by transcription factors was the condition behind the multiple origins of multicellularity (Kirschner and Gerhart, 2005). The same applies to the gradual origin of the behavioural code from the developmental code: multicellularity implies differentiated somatic cells originally evolved as disposable units; but in some organisms, neural cells and their networks evolved with the function of storing and transmitting the information underlying animal behaviour. Finally, behaviour is a category of phenotype engendering forms of interaction with the environment and organisms from other species, as well as intraspecific interactions such as competition, co-operation, signalling and communication. In Homo sapiens, words evolved from modified vocalisations or behaviours and are the units of language, our unique system of information. Fourth, the gradual origin of new information carriers and their corresponding phenotypes is possible due to the process of modularity transfer. DNA is an efficient carrier of information due to its modular organisation consisting of nucleotide units, whose combination gives rise to potentially infinite combinations or sequences (or unlimited inheritance; Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1999). On the basis of the RNA World model, we may assume that DNA inherited its modular organisation from RNA. The genetic code implies not only that DNA is able to specify protein sequences; it implies at the same time that modular organisation is transferred to proteins (which are organised as amino acid sequences). This process has a crucial evolutionary consequence: if proteins are modularly organised like their DNA ‘hard copy’, they could at least in principle evolve into information carriers themselves. Thus, transcription factors, neural cells and brains, behaviour and cognition, and human language all derived their modular
The evolution of order
organisation from previously existing disposable, modularly organised phenotypic entities. Not by accident, the modularity of DNA and proteins (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1999), developmental processes (Wagner et al., 2007), brains and cognition (Fodor, 1983) and language (Nowak et al., 2000) are central concepts in evolutionary studies, but tend to be treated separately. The evolutionary formulation of Schrödinger’s Principle of Order from Order and the concept of modularity transfer unify those debates to a certain extent. All the biological codes are different manifestations of Schrödinger’s Principle of Order from Order: they are ways in which different types of microscopic order or information is converted into different forms of macroscopic or phenotypic order. The idea that the principle has evolved has another important consequence: it establishes a hierarchy of levels of organisation. the evolution of order: macroevolutionary consequences
The hypothesis that new biological codes evolve when phenotypic entities become carriers of information is based on Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s concept of new systems for transmitting biological information, but aims at being more precise in its definition of the new information carriers. For example, although the joint replication of genes in chromosomes was listed as one of their eight transitions in evolution, chromosome formation did not correspond to the origin of a new biological code but was simply a new form of replication of genetic information. The definition also excludes various codes proposed by Barbieri (2003), such as a ‘histone code’ or the ‘sugar code’, which are different ways of transmitting the ‘same’ type of information. A further consequence is that since the evolution of a new biological code relies on a previously existing one, a functional and evolutionary hierarchy is established between them. Barbieri (2003) pointed out that new organic codes do not replace previous ones, but the hypothesis that a new code derives from transformation of a previously existing phenotypic entity implies more than that: it implies that the previous code cannot disappear. The developmental code based on specialised proteins (transcription factors and others), for example, was built upon proteins that require the existence of the genetic code. Learned behavioural phenotypes depend on information processed by neural cells and brains, and for this reason cannot exist without somatic cells and the developmental code. The same is true for
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human language that requires the existence of learned behavioural phenotypes. Ultimately, the hierarchy of codes and dependence of levels of organisation on previously existing ones explain why human culture, despite being a phenotype inextricably linked to human language, rests simultaneously upon linguistic, behavioural, developmental and genetic foundation. Thus, the hierarchical structure of biological codes points to the continuity and complementarity of information systems. The hierarchy of codes proposed above may also provide a more powerful criterion of biological complexity than super-unit formation: more complex organisms may be defined as those whose phenotypes require more biological codes; four levels of biological complexity can be defined as genetic, genetic-developmental, geneticdevelopmental-behavioural, and genetic-developmental-behaviourallinguistic. Thus, biological complexity (or the evolution of Order from Order) is classified as a different phenomenon from physical complexity, which as seen previously results from statistical averaging (or Order from Disorder). The hierarchical view does not imply linearity or inevitability either: the genetic code, for example, does not necessarily lead to the developmental code, since transcription factors and other proteins still perform various functions unrelated to the transmission of information in unicellular organisms. Since the evolutionary version of Schrödinger’s Principle implies that new categories of phenotypic entities have been evolving since the origin of life, natural selection has also changed and adopted new forms with the emergence of new levels of biological organisation. Not accidentally, the most general principles of Darwinian evolutionary theory are statements about the operation of natural selection at a given level of organisation; they are equally crucial to an understanding of how phenotypic entities may have evolved into new information carriers. Thus, to each of the four levels of genes and proteins, development and multicellularity, animal brains and learned behaviour, and human language and culture, there corresponds a fundamental axiom of natural selection. The first is Fisher’s (1930) ‘fundamental principle of natural selection’, which would hold true even in a world exclusively consisting of genes as units of inheritance and proteins as units of phenotype. The second can be named as Weismann’s principle, and states that the power of natural selection decreases with age in multicellular organisms and rules the transformations of somatic bodies (Weismann, 1889). The third, more recent generalisation of the theories of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964)
The evolution of order
and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) is Dawkin’s memetic principle, according to which the animal brain became the host of ‘memes’ or units of information communicated between brains (Dawkins, 1976). Finally, the importance of cultural transmission via human language is expressed by the concept of ‘cultural group selection’ (Gintis et al., 2001) unique to our species. The next chapters will develop the thesis that the perception of evolutionary increases in complexity is neither an anthropocentric illusion nor a macroevolutionary accident: it is a historical product of the hierarchical operation of selection. Evolutionary changes in levels of biological complexity are fundamental changes in the character of life – in the nature and carriers of information, in the phenotypic entities that they code for, and in the way biological codes convert information into organisation. The challenge is to understand how the operation of selection has transformed Schrödinger’s Principle of Order from Order by setting it in motion.
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2 From the units of inheritance to the origin of species
By the time of Darwin and Wallace’s death the belief in evolution and descent with modification of species was well established, but enthusiasm for natural selection as the mechanism or law of evolution remained meagre until the 1930s (Bennettt, 1999). The most likely reason for scepticism was that the genetic theories considered by Darwin and other naturalists, including pangenesis (the origin of the hereditary material from the fusion of body organ samples or ‘gemules’; Darwin, 1868), Nägeli’s blending theory (the averaging of parents’ traits in sexually produced offspring; see Ospovat, 1980 and Berry, 2000) and inheritance of acquired characters (see Mayr and Provine, 1980) failed to account adequately for inheritable variation in natural populations and were at odds with experimental work done by geneticists (Osborn, 1926). Crampton (1928) believed that ‘little if any understanding of the origin of organic types can be gained through the study of genera, species or even varieties, after they have arisen … the geneticists and they alone are working on the fundamental dynamics of organic differentiation’. For this reason, natural selection was still struggling to gain respect among biologists 70 years after its birth: as summed up by Watson (1929), ‘the only two “theories of evolution” which have gained any general currency, those of Lamarck and of Darwin, rest on a most insecure basis’. Less than a decade after Watson’s remarks were published, natural selection had become the one and only theory of evolution for most biologists. In 1934, the previously sceptical American Society of Naturalists dedicated its annual dinner to the centenary of the birth of Weismann and Haeckel, respectively ‘the arch selectionist and the arch genealogist’; the meeting was described as an opportunity for selectionists to ‘pause to congratulate ourselves upon our accomplishments’. The reason for the enthusiasm was that ‘at the hands of Wright, Fisher 38
Units of inheritance and the origin of species
and Haldane, we are gradually being shown what the course of evolution must be in the light of the Mendelian mechanism’ (Shull, 1935). Mendel’s genetic theory published in 1866 was a breakthrough that postulated the existence of ‘constant characters’ or units of inheritance (which we now associate with genes), while his laws of dominance, segregation and independent assortment of constant characters successfully predicted distributions of phenotypic characters. However, although Mendel’s laws provided the safe foundation that genetics needed, they were derived from experiments based on small populations and a few generations of domesticated garden pea varieties. Thus, it was necessary to extrapolate the consequences of Mendel’s laws to larger, natural populations and to many generations before they could play any role in evolutionary debates. The theoretical extrapolation from Mendel’s garden to the course of evolution was mostly the product of Fisher’s The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930), Haldane’s The Causes of Evolution (1932) and Wright’s classic essays (1931, 1932), which jointly redefined Darwinism as the study of how natural selection and other demographic processes affect the survival and transmission of inheritance units in natural populations. Despite all the progress that followed the synthesis of natural selection with Mendelism, some controversy still surrounds Darwinism both at the microevolutionary and macroevolutionary scale. At the level of microevolution, debates are still ongoing as to how gradual or punctuated is the process of adaptive evolution (Orr, 2005). At the macroevolutionary level, the relative roles of selection versus physical isolation in the origin of new species also remain highly controversial (Coyne and Orr, 2004; Gavrilets, 2005). Underlying those controversies there is an even more important question: what is the most fundamental consequence of Mendelian or particulate inheritance for the evolutionary process? A popular answer is the ‘selfish gene’ hypothesis: since the gene is the unit or particle of inheritance, it must also be the unit of selection (Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976). A second and radically opposite answer is that the gene is a molecule playing a reduced role in evolution and only relevant for the chemistry of life (Goodwin, 1994). Both views seem to be incorrect: Mendelism and the discovery of genes are relevant for macroevolution because they revealed the existence of a modular system of biological information underlying inheritance and evolution. The principles behind the operation of genetic modularity and their far-reaching consequences for the evolution of biological complexity are discussed below.
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Units of inheritance and the origin of species the gene as the module of inheritance
Contrary to old and recent prejudice (Henig, 2000), the late fusion of Darwinian and Mendelian principles was probably not accidental (Mangelsdorf, 1967; Berry, 2000). Mendel’s classic study of garden peas was published in a journal circulated to about 120 libraries in the United States and Europe including England, and was cited in the influential botanical treatises of Hoffmann and Föcke that were held in Darwin’s library. Mendel travelled to London in 1862 (when his experiments with garden peas had already been finalised) and later read a German translation of the Origin. Since Darwin and his fellow naturalists were interested in evolution and continuous variation whereas Mendel was a creationist by faith and profession, it is more likely that mutual lack of interest and understanding prevented an early synthesis of evolution and Mendelian genetics. The first attempt at incorporating Mendelism into evolution is known as mutationism, and is associated with a rediscovery of Mendel in the early 1900s and a hostile attitude towards natural selection. The logic of mutationism was simple: mutation is the origin of new gene alleles (de Vries, 1906); different alleles produce different phenotypes; species and higher taxa are characterised by different phenotypes; therefore, mutations, rather than natural selection, must be the origin of new species. In summary, ‘the discontinuity of species follows from the discontinuity of variation’ (Bateson, 1894), and both derive from gene mutation. More than any other work, Fisher’s Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930) was responsible for the demonstration that natural selection is fully compatible with Mendelian laws. The book can be understood as a long argument against mutationism; for a secondary role of mutation in evolution; and for natural selection as the true creative power in evolution. The starting point of Fisher’s argument was the statement that the most important contribution of Mendelian genetics was the atomisation of inheritance into independent factors and an unambiguous rejection of all previous theories of soft inheritance (Mayr, 1980). Fisher showed that the ‘blending theory’ proposed by Nägeli and accepted by Darwin was not only wrong but also incompatible with natural selection. The reason is intuitively simple: in sexual organisms, blending theory proposed that inheritable factors were averaged in descendants, explaining for example why a tall and a short parent tend to generate offspring of average size. But blending creates a problem: it implies that the offspring of a mutant will be ‘less mutant’ and deviate less from the population average than the mutant parent. For this reason,
The gene as the module of inheritance
after a few generations of averaging, descendants of the original mutant will be virtually indistinguishable from non-mutants (Box 2.1). More specifically, Fisher showed that the genetic variance in phenotypic traits, the essential condition for the operation of natural selection, is reduced by half every generation under blending inheritance purely as a result of sexual reproduction. This was the reason why Darwin was forced to postulate high rates and multiple sources of mutations (use and disuse, environmental effects, nutrition habits) constantly replenishing populations with a minimum level of genetic variation required by selection. Fisher argued that the problem of vanishing genetic variation magically disappears under Mendelian genetics, which assumes that inheritance factors are transmitted as particles that do not blend in Box 2.1 The effect of mutations under blending inheritance Suppose a large, randomly mating population under the operation of blending inheritance. A body size mutant occurs and is larger than the population average size x by an amount e (the ‘average excess’), so that its size is x + e. If the mutant mates with a random member of the population of body size x, the expected size of their descendants will be the average of x + e and x, or x + (e/2). Therefore, descendants deviate from the population average by an amount e/2, half the original deviation e in the mutant parent. Now, if this descendant with body size x + (e/2) mates with another random member of the population, the expected size of their offspring is the average of x + (e/2) and x, or x + (e/4); the deviation between the mutant’s grandchild and the population average is e/4. Thus, the effect of the rare mutation under blending inheritance is quickly diluted across generations due to mating with non-mutant individuals. The deviation from the population average in the mutant lineage decreases by e/2n (where n is the number of generations) and the phenotypic effect of the original mutation rapidly tends to zero. It should also be noticed that the mutation e increases the average body size in the population. However, the effect on the average is e/N, where N is population size; thus, the effect approximates zero unless the population is unrealistically small. Under the assumption of blending inheritance, the effect of a mutation on the population where it occurs is as irrelevant as a drop of black ink in an ocean.
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descendants. As we now know, sexually reproducing species are typically diploid organisms carrying two separate alleles or copies of each gene (one paternal and one maternal). As demonstrated by the Hardy–Weinberg theorem (Fisher, 1930), frequencies of Mendelian factors and genotypic distributions remain in equilibrium in a randomly mating population, meaning that sexual reproduction by itself cannot destroy genetic variation. For this reason, much lower mutation rates are required to maintain variation in populations under the Mendelian scheme. By accepting Mendelism and the integrity of alleles and their phenotypic effects across generations, Fisher’s evolutionary genetics can be defined as the study of the effects of allelic variation on individual adaptation and population change. Fisher defined the average excess of an allele on a trait (for example, the effect of a given allele on body size) as the difference between the trait in individuals carrying the allele and those not carrying it (for example, the difference in average body size between carriers and non-carriers). Since alleles and their effect on traits are not diluted across generations under Mendelian inheritance, Fisher defined a second and related quantity, the ‘average phenotypic effect produced … by the substitution of one type of gene [an allele] for the other’ (Fisher, 1930: 31). This quantity is better understood as the effect that a mutant gene introduced into a population has on a trait average, and was named ‘genetic variance’ by Fisher; it is currently known as ‘additive genetic variance’ (additive means that only effects caused by the presence of the individual allele are considered, but not the effect of its interactions with other alleles such as dominance and epistasis). Additive genetic variance, or the power of alleles to affect phenotypes as a consequence of their mere presence, is in Fisher’s theory the most fundamental evolutionary consequence of genetic mechanisms. For this reason, the rejection of blending theory and the concept of additive genetic variance represented the true birth of the gene as a Darwinian concept. In the Fisherian scheme, the average effect manifests the essence of an allele in the same way that mass, charge or spin manifest the nature of an electron. This is why Mendelism was so crucial to the development of the theory of natural selection: it postulated the existence of inheritance factors which were constant, followed clear dynamical rules (the Mendelian laws), and manifested an essential or intrinsic power in the form of an observable phenotypic quantity (their additive effect). From this Mendelian or particulate foundation, Fisher was able to propose a
The fundamental principle of natural selection
complete reformulation of Darwin’s troubled hypothesis of natural selection.
the fundamental principle of natural selection
Particulate inheritance solved the problem faced by Darwin by showing that genetic variation is neither lost due to sexual reproduction nor created by environmental factors such as climate, nutrition or use and disuse of organs. Fisher no longer needed to postulate high mutation rates, and the first experimental studies in the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster confirmed that mutation rates were very low in that species (Morgan et al., 1925). But if genetic variation is created by mutations but not destroyed by blending, what prevents it from indefinitely accumulating in populations? The answer is natural selection itself; this is one of the meanings of Fisher’s (1930: 35) ‘fundamental principle of natural selection’. The rate of increase in fitness of any organism [i.e. population or species] at any time is equal to its [additive] genetic variance in fitness at that time.
The principle, one of the most important in evolutionary biology, makes intuitive sense: it states that the more variation in fitness is found in a population, the higher the gap between the fittest and the less fit individuals. Therefore, the faster the bias of selection towards the fittest operates, the faster the unfit are selectively outcompeted and wiped out. For this reason, Fisher’s fundamental principle implies that natural selection is a self-inhibiting process. As selection eliminates the unfit, only the fittest survive; among the survivors, selection proceeds in the following generations to keep only the fittest among the fittest; eventually, one expects a single allele at each locus to survive, corresponding to the survival of a single ‘fittest’ combination of alleles in an originally variable population. In other words, additive genetic variance in fitness is now predicted to vanish not as a result of sexual reproduction (as in the case of blending inheritance), but as a consequence of natural selection itself. For this reason, Fisher had to redefine the role of mutation in adaptive evolution: mutation provides the raw material upon which selection can act (Fisher, 1930: 48), or the fuel that continuously propels adaptation and prevents evolution from coming to a halt. If mutation fuels inheritable variation, one might conclude that an increase in mutation rates could increase genetic variation
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and therefore accelerate the rate of adaptive evolution. However, this interpretation is incorrect for various reasons. The first is that mutations introduce random deviations into organisms moulded by selection, and for this reason are mostly deleterious; this is why selection favours mechanisms that correct errors in DNA replication and reduce mutation rates (Cromie et al., 2001). But the main reason why mutation does not determine the rate of adaptation in populations is that the fundamental principle refers to genetic variance in fitness rather than genetic variance per se (or pure allele polymorphism). The difference between the two concepts is of key importance. For Fisher, additive genetic variance is a factor in adaptive evolution only when it produces effects on fitness. For example, a laboratory study might find genetic variation for resistance to subzero temperatures in a species of present-day Amazonian monkeys; this might be done by relocating a sample of monkeys from the Amazon to the Antarctica, by measuring individual survivorship, fertility and reproductive output in the new environment, and finally by identifying genes and alleles responsible for variation in fitness. However, even if genetic variation in response to low temperature existed in the species, it can never be actually expressed as variance in fitness in the native Amazonian habitat where temperatures never reach values under 0 °C. In other words, it is only the competitive context faced by individuals in their actual environment that converts some aspects of additive genetic variation into components of additive variance in fitness; it is selection itself, and the effect of different alleles in the struggle for survival, that determines the rate of adaptive change by relying on a ‘useful’ fraction of the stock of genetic variation and mutations found in all populations. Fisher’s fundamental principle therefore inverted the mutationist view according to which populations were interpreted as virtually waiting for the ‘right’ (adaptive) mutations for evolution to occur (for the classic formulation of ‘mutation pressure’, see Morgan, 1932; for contemporary and perhaps naïve examples, see Klein, 2000 and Stedman et al., 2004). In contrast, the view inspired by Fisher’s fundamental principle is that populations are constantly carrying a reserve of hidden inheritable variation with no immediate adaptive relevance, until a change in demography, environment or other factors creates an opportunity for alternative alleles to reveal some fitness effects. Barrett and Schluter (2008) have concluded that adaptation based on already present (or ‘standing’ genetic variation) is even expected to be faster than adaptation based on new mutations (although the two processes are complementary).
The fundamental principle of natural selection
In addition to the fundamental principle, Fisher offered other arguments against a major role for mutation in evolution; one of them refers to the role of the mutation event itself, or the moment of its first appearance. Fisher pointed out that the odds of survival of any mutant allele, however advantageous, are necessarily low due to genetic drift (or random loss due to change factors). Because a given mutation is represented by a single copy in the individual where it first occurs, the likelihood that it will be eliminated by change after a few generations is high (Box 2.2). Box 2.2 How important is the occurrence of a new advantageous mutation? Suppose that a new mutant allele occurs in a sexually reproducing, diploid species; that the mutation is neutral (i.e. has no effect of fitness); and that population size is large and constant. The individual carrying the mutation is expected to leave two descendants (the replacement rate in a constant sexual population). Mendel’s first law implies that the likelihood of the mutant allele being lost due to chance is ¼ or 25% after one generation, or the likelihood that it is absent both in the first and the second descendant (i.e. ½ times ½). This probability increases to ¼ + (¾ ∙ ½) = ⅝ or 62.5% after two generations; this is the probability of allele loss in the first generation (¼), plus the probability of allele survival in the first generation (¾) multiplied by the probability of allele loss in the second generation (½). Now suppose that the mutation is not neutral and confers an unrealistic fitness advantage of 50% to its carrier over the population average. This means that the mutation carrier is expected to leave three descendants (50% over the population average of two). Even in this case, the likelihood of loss due to drift (of one ninth or 11% in one generation) is still high. Fisher calculated the probabilities of loss of an advantageous mutation based on the more realistic value of a 1% fitness advantage, and showed that after only 15 generations the likelihood of its extinction is 88%, and about 97% after 100 generations. Therefore, even favourable mutations are mostly lost due to pure chance factors. But the prospect changes in the case of a recurrent mutation. For example, although the chance of loss faced by the mutation above is 97% after 100 generations, if it occurs 100 different times this likelihood is reduced to less than 5%; it does not survive only if it is lost in all 100 individuals, a probability of only 0.97100 = 0.048 or 4.8%).
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Does that mean that the alleles we carry, and by extension daptive evolution itself, result from a few lucky mutations that a escaped genetic drift? The answer is no; the reason is that an allele may be produced multiple times by new mutation events, until it eventually overcomes the statistical likelihood of its extinction (Fisher, 1930: 77). For example, the same mutant allele with a chance of extinction of 97% after 100 generations has a chance greater than 50% of avoiding loss by drift if it occurs 23 times in different individuals. It is true that multiple occurrences of the same mutation are unlikely, especially if we take into account that mutation rates are typically low. However, large populations can theoretically solve the problem, and are in fact a frequent assumption in Fisher’s model. Thus, whereas each single mutation event is random, individual and unique, the fixation of a new allele in a population should be seen not as an event, but as a demographic process under the control of selection. Fisher also made it clear that the random loss of new mutations does not establish genetic drift as a relevant factor in evolution. Random elimination of alleles only occurs at the stage of initial introduction due to the small numbers involved (Fisher, 1930: 87). When applied to alleles at frequencies greater than 0.25%, Fisher demonstrated that genetic drift would take 1.4 N generations to halve the additive genetic variance in a population of N individuals. If N is not unrealistically small, the power of genetic drift will be irrelevant in comparison to selection. Thus, mutations are required at low rates, are mostly deleterious, and only make adaptive sense in the light of a given selective context. In addition, mutation events and genetic drift play a limited role in adaptation. In summary, Fisher’s fundamental principle implies that evolution is under the strict control of natural selection. g r a d u a l i s m : t h e c o s t o f b i o l o g i c a l c o m p l e x i t y
Darwin was no natural born gradualist (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 225). In the Red Notebook written during his trip to South America, Darwin expressed an early enthusiasm for the saltationist views of evolutionists such as Geoffroy Saint Hilaire (who argued that birds could be generated at once from ancestral reptiles) and later revived by Bateson (1894), Osborn (1926), Goldschmidt (1940) and others in the form of mutationism. Speculating on the origins of sympatric (geographically overlapping) species of South American rheas, Darwin concluded that ‘change [was] not progress if produced at one blow’, and recognised
Gradualism: the cost of biological complexity
that the extraordinary and rare birth of a successful monster might ‘present an analogy to the production of species’. Such enthusiasm was short lived; by the time of the publication of the Origin, Darwin was already fully converted to a gradualist view of evolution. Natural selection can act only by the preservation and accumulation of infinitesimally small inherited modifications, each profitable to the preserved being; … so will natural selection, if it be a true principle, banish the belief of … any great and sudden modification in their structure (Darwin, 1859: 95).
With this argument Darwin was addressing the still controversial issue of ‘missing links’ in evolution and the impression of jumps between characters or closely related species. Against the temptations of saltationism, Darwin proposed the alternative gradualist explanation for the evolution of traits and species, including highly divergent ones. His rationale was that if a trait shows continuous distribution in populations, individuals may differ in those traits by infinitesimal amounts; for this reason ‘inherited modifications’ or mutations might also be of reduced magnitude; those small mutations and nothing else should be seen as the raw material of selection, and once and for all ‘banish the belief’ in evolutionary saltations. Fisher’s contribution was to offer a first mathematical demonstration of the gradualist argument, by showing that small mutations (micromutations) are the most likely to increase the fitness of their carriers. To understand Fisher’s argument, let us imagine a population of birds migrating to an island and still poorly adapted to their new habitat. For the sake of simplicity, let us neglect standing genetic variation and only consider the contribution of new mutations occurring after the arrival of founders to the island. Let us also focus on adaptive change in only one or two phenotypic traits affecting fitness. The question asked by Fisher was: how does the ‘size’ of a new mutation (i.e. its phenotypic effect) relate to its contribution to the adaptive evolution of the population (i.e. its fitness effect)? Let us begin with the one-dimensional case of a single phenotypic character such as body size (Figure 2.1). A representation of the level of maladaptation of the immigrant population to the new environment is the distance d separating the current character average (S0) (the average size of the migrant birds) and the value at the fitness or adaptive peak (SP) (the optimal body size favoured by selection on the island). It should be noticed that the fitness peak is empty until populations evolve and occupy it; Fisher was therefore defining it as the
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SP
S0
m 2d Figure 2.1 The effect of mutation size on single-trait evolution. The horizontal axis represents the magnitude of a trait such as body size; S0 is average body size in an adapting population; SP is optimal body size. Mutations increasing body size (dashed arrow) are necessarily deleterious; mutations reducing body size by the amount d are favoured by selection.
theoretical destination of the adapting population. Let us assume that the average body size of the newly introduced birds may be too large for the island by d grams. Suppose that a new mutation occurs and changes the body size of an average carrier (a bird with body size S0) by an amount m. It is clear that if m > 2d, the mutation is necessarily deleterious. If m is positive (i.e. if the mutation increases size by m), mutant body size is even larger than average and more distant from the fitness peak. If m is negative, the mutation decreases body size towards the adaptive peak, but its magnitude is so large that it overshoots the fitness peak: the parent is too large, but the mutant descendant is too small. Thus, according to Fisher’s argument, exceedingly large mutations are necessarily maladaptive. Now consider mutations with a smaller magnitude m < 2d. In this case, mutations increase fitness when m is negative (by reducing the size of the mutant bird and moving it towards the adaptive peak); but they reduce fitness when m is positive (increasing size and moving it away from the adaptive peak). Since the direction of mutations is random, the likelihood of mutations of magnitude m < 2d being negative, and therefore advantageous, is 50%. Thus, in the world of one-dimensional adaptive evolution, natural selection would favour ‘hopeful monsters’ (Goldschmidt, 1940) produced by relatively large mutations of magnitude d: that is, macromutations able to hit the adaptive target in one single blow. If mutations of the exact magnitude d
Gradualism: the cost of biological complexity
did not happen in the population, selection would be expected to favour the mutation with the magnitude closest to d. If this secondbest mutant allele is fixed, a new (and smaller) distance d1 to the adaptive peak would be defined. Although smaller jumps are favoured as adaptation proceeds, at any stage of adaptive evolution the optimal mutation size m favoured by selection would be the distance between current trait value and the adaptive peak. In other words, when a single trait is concerned, natural selection does not favour gradual evolution but saltationism. The scenario completely changes if we just add a second phenotypic trait (Figure 2.2). Let us now assume that both average body size and average bill size in the founding bird population are larger than the optimal value favoured by selection on the island, and that mutations in the two traits occur. Fisher’s model is compatible with mutant phenotypes being caused by a single pleiotropic gene (i.e. able to affect multiple traits) or by mutations in two different genes. With two phenotypic dimensions under consideration, Fisher represented the distance between the current state of the population and the adaptive peak as the radius d of a circle around the adaptive peak. Any mutant inside that circle is closer to the adaptive peak and exhibits higher-than-average fitness. Mutations of magnitude m must also be represented by a circle, in this case of radius m, around the non-mutant average; in other words, instead of only two directions (decrease or increase in body size) in the one-dimensional case, there are many possible combinations of changes in the two traits corresponding to (b)
(a)
d SP
�
m S0
�
m
Figure 2.2 The effect of mutation size on two-dimensional evolution. The likelihood that a random mutation of size m increases fitness (i.e. the likelihood that the mutant is inside the circle of radius d) is p = β/2π. (a) When the mutation of size m is similar to the distance d from current average (S0) to the adaptive peak (SP), the likelihood that it increases fitness is p ≈ 0.3. (b) When the mutation of size m is much smaller than d, the likelihood that it increases fitness is p ≈ 0.5.
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the same mutation size m. The question is: what now is the effect of the magnitude m on the adaptive evolution of a two-dimensional mutant? First, as in the one-dimensional case, if m > 2d, the mutation is necessarily deleterious: even if it points in the right direction (reducing both body and bill size), it overshoots the adaptive peak; geometrically, that means that the circles of radii d and m do not intersect. Second, if mutations are of smaller magnitude (m < 2d), a fraction (or arc) of the circle m will be inside the circle d, representing mutants closer to the adaptive peak. This arc can be calculated as the quotient between the central angle β (derived from the intersection of the circles d and m) and the full extension 2π of the circle m, thus, the fraction p of mutations that improve adaptation, or the probability that they increase fitness, is p = β/2π. Since β can be written as a function of d and m, Fisher could also estimate the relationship between mutation size m and the likelihood p that it will increase fitness. While the analytical solution is not simple (and will not be discussed), its meaning is straightforward: mutations of infinitesimally small size are the most likely to be favoured by natural selection. A geometrical and intuitive justification is that the arc of the circle d that intersects the circle of mutants m divides the latter into two regions: one inside the circle d, representing mutants closer to the adaptive peak; and an external maladaptive region. It is clear that as m decreases, the curvature of the arc of the circle d becomes less perceptible. This is why the floor underneath us looks virtually flat: we are too small compared with a much larger (although spherical) Earth. Therefore, when m approaches zero, the arc of the circle d becomes a straight line (the diameter of the mutant circle) dividing it into two virtually equal halves. Hence, the likelihood p of a mutation being on the adaptive side tends to a maximum value of 50% when its magnitude m tends to zero. For Fisher, the chance of winning the lottery of adaptation increases to 50% if one plays little money on the random roulette of mutation; for a chance event, those are extremely favourable odds. We should remember that this result only follows because of the addition of a second phenotypic dimension. When only body size was considered, large hopeful macromutants of magnitude m = d had a chance of 50% of being adaptive, the same as any other non-overshooting mutant. But when bill size is introduced, mutants of the same magnitude m = d see their chance of increasing fitness being reduced to less than 40%. More specifically, Fisher showed that the
The adaptive walk in the real world
probability that mutations of size m improve adaptation decreases by a factor √n, where n is the number of traits involved. Adding phenotypic dimensions significantly reduces the probability of improving adaptation, and this means that the larger the number of traits involved, the smaller the mutation size has to be in order to approach the maximum value of 50%; and we know that real organisms display a very large number of traits simultaneously affecting fitness. The result is the ‘cost of complexity’ (Orr, 2000): the more ‘complex’ (here meaning ‘multi-trait’) the organism, the more likely a mutation of a given size is deleterious: there is simply too much that can go wrong. Thus, evolution must rely on micromutations and on relatively smaller steps, even when populations are maladapted and distant from an adaptive peak. This is why adaptive evolution must be gradual rather than punctuated. In Fisher’s model, the evolution of complex organisms is gradual and slow because although mutations occur independently in separate genes or atoms of inheritance, from the point of view of selection the phenotypes encoded by genes are a unity: in our example, a given mutation size reflects changes both in body size and bill size. In the following chapter we will see how Fisher’s views on phenotypic integration were transformed by developmental genetics.
the adaptive walk in the real world
Under closer examination, Fisher’s gradualist argument exhibits a logical problem. Although it is true that the odds of winning the lottery of adaptation are maximised when the amount gambled (the size of the mutation) is minimal, it is also true that any prizes won (the increase in fitness), if proportional to the bet, will be equally microscopic; in other words, if micromutations have very small phenotypic effects, they will also tend to produce very small positive effects on fitness (m measures phenotypic effect in Fisher’s original argument, but it is reasonable to assume that m is proportional to fitness effect; see Orr, 1998). For this reason, they may be barely distinguishable from neutral mutations with no fitness effect. Fisher himself had shown that new mutations, even when significantly advantageous, are at a high risk of random loss; such risk has to be much higher for micromutations. Since mutations of small effect are the most likely to be advantageous, but are also the most likely to be eliminated by genetic drift, Kimura (1983) showed that the mutations contributing to adaptive evolution must be of intermediate size rather than micromutations.
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Later, Orr (1998, 2000) confirmed that the size distribution of adaptive mutations shows an intermediate peak, and significantly improved on Kimura’s argument by revealing new properties of the adaptive process. For example, we know that as adaptation occurs, the size of mutations improving adaptation decreases in magnitude; the distance d between the population average and the adaptive peak decreases, and the optimal mutation size m is accordingly scaled down. Therefore, d and m should remain proportional to each other. Orr demonstrated that during adaptation the size of the most advantageous mutations relative to the decreasing distance d is constant and surprisingly large. His conclusion is a direct challenge to the gradualism of Darwin and Fisher, and ‘flatly contradicts the intuition of most evolutionists (or at least those raised on micromutational dogma): Small random mutations do not yield the fastest adaptation’ (Orr, 2000: 18). Orr’s results are robust and significant, but they do not imply a rejection of gradualism. Orr’s findings seem to refute Fisher’s proof, but they do not say much about the original question that Darwin addressed with his gradualist hypothesis. Darwin postulated that gradualism could explain the evolution of most if not all biological structures; but his argument was clearly interested in those structures seen as highly divergent and unique. After all, it was those cases of extreme phenotypic divergence and of ‘complex’ traits, classically exemplified by the giraffe neck, the elephant trunk, the human brain and others that inspired the saltationist alternative. Unfortunately, the emphasis on what really needs to be explained, namely the apparent jumps and missing links in the distribution of adaptations and species, is absent in the theoretical work described above. When presenting his version of gradualism, Fisher chose the microscope to exemplify why sequences of small changes in settings have a much higher chance of improving adjustment than a large derangement, but he gave no biological example; Kimura and Orr preferred not to illustrate their conclusions with any hypothetical or empirical examples. As seen below, consideration of concrete examples can change our interpretation of their mathematical models. Let us examine one case study: the highly enlarged and derived brain of Homo sapiens. Fossil evidence suggests that brain size in the earliest hominin ancestors living more than 5–6 million years ago was around 400 g, similar to values observed in chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans (in those species, average brain size is in the 300–500 g range; Kappeler and Pereira, 2003). Modern humans show average
The adaptive walk in the real world
brain size of about 1400 g, or 1000 g larger (Cabana et al., 1993). Due to its significant enlargement, human brain size is about six times larger than expected for a mammal of similar body size (Jerison, 1973). The question of gradualism versus saltationism certainly applies to this case: did the evolution of human brain size from 400 g to about 1400 g occur by infinitesimally small steps; or did it mostly rely on relatively large steps as suggested by Orr; or did it involve a combination of a few large and many small steps in encephalisation? Although human brain size is extremely well documented by dozens of fossils and discussed in various studies (Vrba, 1998; Rice, 2002a; Vinicius, 2005; Robson and Wood, 2008), any attempt to elucidate its evolution though the models of Fisher and Orr seems destined to fail. The reason is simple: although early hominins with 400 g of brain were probably under selection for increased encephalisation, it is more reasonable to assume that they were adapting to an adaptive peak (i.e. an optimal brain size) somewhere in the vicinity of 400 g than to a then distant and virtually unattainable peak of 1400 g. An increase of 1000 g in brain size would probably involve unbearable costs to early hominins in terms of energetics (the brain is a highly expensive organ to maintain; Foley and Lee, 1991; Aiello et al., 2001), life history (larger brains imply an extended period of offspring dependency and later age of first reproduction; Kaplan et al., 2000) and morphology (larger cranial size created an ‘obstetrical dilemma’ and parturition difficulties in humans; Rosenberg and Trevathan, 1996); but the costs of smaller increases would have been more acceptable. Thus, although brain size in the human lineage starts and ends with the respective values of 400 g and 1400 g, early hominins were not evolving towards the current peak: our current brain size was invisible and intangible to them, and only in hindsight can we say that they were evolving towards us. Thus, it is reasonable to propose that early hominin brain size was probably evolving towards an optimal size close to 400 g; only a hominin ancestor with a much larger brain size – perhaps close to the modern value in Homo sapiens – could exhibit the conditions necessary for the evolution of our brain size. The point is that concepts of a ‘maladaptive population’ as a starting point and of an independent ‘adaptive peak’ as its evolutionary destination are easier to grasp and model mathematically; but they seem inappropriate to explain the evolution of traits that need proper elucidation such as the human brain. Under the ideal conditions of an artificial selection experiment, it may be possible to define
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an arbitrary adaptive peak (a given size, colour or behaviour chosen by the researcher) that populations must climb irrespective of potential costs and benefits; after all, the traits are not evolving by natural selection and therefore their potential effects on fitness are irrelevant. In this case, adaptive peaks are external to the artificially evolving population; but in the real world of energetic, developmental, ecological, social and other factors, adaptive peaks and their position also depend on the current state of adapting species and do not exist independently from them. In contrast, the independence and immobility of adaptive peaks during adaptive evolution is a fundamental assumption of the models proposed by Fisher (1930: 38) and Orr (2000: 14). The concept of a fixed adaptive peak is similar to the idea of ‘empty niche’ used by Simpson in his historical reconstructions of horse evolution. However, the ‘empty grazing niche’ did not actually exist: it is an abstraction, valid only in hindsight, referring to the now existing grazing niche before it was occupied by the modern horse and other grazing species (niches that have never been occupied such as talking plants or flying elephants are not empty but simply non-existent; after all, an adaptive peak is an alternative name for a selective pressure in a population). Thus, although Fisher’s and Orr’s models refer to the idea of empty adaptive peaks at the disposal of maladapted populations, real-life adaptation is closer to the image of a bouncy castle: when no one stands on it, surfaces are smooth and featureless; but when a subject steps in, a topo graphy with lows and highs is formed, and as a consequence a way up is defined. Walking on a bouncy castle moves the position of peaks and troughs (and the way up) at every step. This means that adaptive evolution may be gradual not because of the distribution of mutation sizes moving populations to fixed adaptive peaks, but because the current adaptive state of populations may gradually move adaptive peaks away from populations. Dynamical adaptive peaks clearly introduce a new theoretical problem, namely whether peaks themselves move gradually or not. Although an answer to this problem is unknown and has rarely been mathematically analysed, the conclusion is that the debate over gradualism and the size of adaptive mutations becomes the empirical matter of determining how populations relate to adaptive peaks and selection pressures in the real world. If most of the time species are under stabilising selection and close to their adaptive peak, Orr’s ‘intermediate size’ mutations will be of very small absolute size and evolution mostly gradual. But if populations are constantly adapting
Epistasis
to moving adaptive peaks, fast environmental change, or other evolving species (i.e. in cycles involving hosts and parasites, or predators and prey), then intermediate size will mean mutations with larger absolute magnitude and fitness effects. The conclusion is that whereas Fisher’s argument cannot prove gradualism true (due to the drawbacks pointed out by Kimura and Orr), Orr’s argument cannot prove gradualism wrong (due to the shared unrealistic assumption of fixed adaptive peaks). The apparent failure of Fisher to demonstrate the universal validity of Darwin’s gradualist insight solely on the basis of Mendelian laws is of deep significance. Fisher’s fundamental principle, which implies that adapted phenotypes cannot be transmitted verbatim and therefore must be coded and transmitted mainly in the form of additive effects, remains a powerful evolutionary generalisation. However, Fisher’s claim that the particulate character of inheritance implies per se that adaptive evolution must be gradual has not been established. The reason is that the demographic and ecological background in which natural selection takes place is a factor determining the pace and mode of adaptive evolution. As discussed below, Sewall Wright was the first evolutionary geneticist to explicitly take demography and ecology into account in adaptive models.
epistasis as a main legacy of particulate inheritance
Fisher’s model, by proposing that adaptive peaks represent fixed points, suggested a rather discomforting scenario: when populations reach their adaptive optimum, there is nowhere else to go, and selection is expected to act mostly as a conservative rather than creative force. This interpretation was originally presented by Sewall Wright (1931, 1932), who argued that Fisher’s ‘mass selection’ and the conditions it requires (large and non-fragmented populations, random mating, random recombination of loci) would necessarily trap populations onto adaptive peaks and prevent continual evolutionary change. In a panmictic population that has lived for a very long time under essentially the same conditions, the additive genetic variance becomes reduced to a minimum maintained by the rate of occurrence of novel favourable mutations, and evolution thus becomes extremely slow (Wright, 1977: 441).
However, Wright knew that evolution has no tendency to halt: the ‘fittest’ solution has been incessantly expressed in the form
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of countless new species and geographical varieties. For this reason, he believed that the main task of theories of adaptive evolution was to explain how species manage to escape the trap set by Fisher’s mass selection. Selection will easily carry the species to the nearest peak, but there may be innumerable other peaks which are higher but which are separated by ‘valleys’. The problem of evolution as I see it is that of a mechanism by which the species may continually find its way from lower to higher peaks in such a field (Wright, 1932).
The field of alternatives corresponds to an ‘adaptive landscape’ that, in Wright’s unique interpretation of Mendelism, is thoroughly explored during the evolutionary process. For Wright the most important consequence of particulate inheritance is that it multiplies the number of possible genotypes, or combinations of alternative alleles; thus, genes are relevant not for their intrinsic or additive value as proposed by Fisher, but for their combinatorial potential. It is interesting to notice the similarity between Wright’s original argument, which applies to combinations of alleles, and more recent interpretations of our DNA-based unlimited inheritance system. Given a million base pairs [and four types of DNA base pairs or nucleotides], there are 4 raised to the power one million possible structures that can be replicated, or many times the number of atoms in the Universe. It therefore provides an adequate basis for continued evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1999: 8).
As much as the four-letter alphabet of DNA is a source of unlimited numbers of possible new proteins, it is the virtually infinite number of possible combinations of alleles at each locus that guarantees the continued generation and evolution of new phenotypes in Wright’s theory. But as much as a single nucleotide makes genetic sense only as part of a full DNA coding sequence, an individual gene makes sense only as part of a full genotype. That was the essential message from Wright: the origin of living diversity was the very large number of possible genotypes made possible by its parts – the genes or particles of inheritance. Estimates of the total number of genes in the cells of higher organisms range from 1000 up … With 10 allelomorphs in each of 1000 loci, the number of possible combinations is 101000 which is a very large number. It has been estimated that the total number of electrons and protons in the whole visible universe is much less than 10100 (Wright, 1932).
Epistasis
For Wright, the problem is that most of those 101000 would not even be tried or tested under the operation of mass selection. To see why, let us suppose that a new mutation creates an eleventh allele at one of the 1000 loci above. Due to segregation and independent assortment, if the new allele has effects on fitness it will be exposed to competition with the other ten alleles; if deleterious, it is expected to be eliminated before it even appears in most possible genotypes. The essence of Wright’s theory of adaptation is that, contrary to the common sense of mass selection, deleterious alleles may favour adaptive evolution. The reason why a deleterious allele may under certain circumstances increase fitness is epistasis, or the interaction between the effects of two or more alleles (mysteriously named in many of Wright’s works as ‘pleiotropy’, which as seen previously refers to genes with effects on multiple traits). Epistasis implies that not only the resulting phenotype but also the fitness effect of a combination of two genes may be different from the sum of their individual additive effects. In extreme cases, the effect of an allele may change from deleterious to adaptive depending on the genotype in which it is found; the same allele may be advantageous to me, but deleterious to my sister. Epistasis and the combinatorial possibilities of genotypes were recognised by Fisher, but he believed that additive effects were more important. The reason would be the relatively lower inheritability of epistatic effects. Although by definition the additive effects of an allele are necessarily transmitted to offspring due to its presence, epistatic effects depend on the presence of alleles at other loci: what was an allele improving my adaptation may be neutral or deleterious to my descendants. In contrast, Wright argued that innovation in adaptive evolution would be easier to understand if we extended the idea of interaction between two genes to all of them; Wright uses the term ‘interaction systems’ to extend the concept of epistasis to the whole genome. The significant steps in evolution are shifts from control by one interaction system to control by a superior one, rather than addition or removal of single genes (Wright, 1932).
Returning to our previous example of maladapted migrating birds, let us assume that the population adapts to a diet based on a small seed type available on the island by evolving both smaller body size and bill size; let us simplify the argument by assuming that body size and bill size are regulated by two distinct genes, and that there is
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no growth correlation between the traits. Now imagine that a second tree species occurs on an isolated corner of the island, producing a much larger seed; in other words, it favours the opposite adaptive trend, namely the evolution of large body and bill size. Wright’s argument was that if only mass selection is in operation, the second niche will never be occupied. The reason is that although large body size mutants may constantly occur in the bird population, large size is neither favourable in exploring the original small seed, nor in exploring the newly evolved large seed (without an accompanying larger bill able to crack the seed); thus, a mutant allele causing large body size is eliminated by selection. The same is true for a large bill size mutation: although it allows birds to crack the larger seed, its interaction with small body size is deleterious, and selection opposes its spread. Since neither large body size nor bill size evolve in isolation, large seeds will rot on the trees while birds fight for the small ones. For this reason, Wright argued that the correct theory of adaptation cannot be mass selection, which favours or eliminates new alleles solely on the basis of their individual (additive) values, and fails to fully explore a universe of possible epistatic interactions.
the shifting balance and the structure of real populations
As seen earlier, transitions between adaptive peaks or cases in which unknown intermediate states are hard to conceive or maladaptive (for example, the intermediate state between quadrupedal ancestor and bipedal descendant) were a central concern of Darwin, to the point that the first two main difficulties with the hypothesis of selection discussed in the Origin (the rarity of transitional forms, and the low fitness of adaptive intermediates) relate to the problem. A possible explanation for crossing between peaks is that characters may evolve ‘from quite secondary causes, independently of natural selection’, such as growth correlations (Darwin, 1859: 196; Huxley, 1932). Wright’s solution, the ‘shifting balance’ theory, was an attempt at explaining how populations jump across maladaptive valleys; importantly, it was also based on secondary causes other than selection. In the shifting balance mechanism, the secondary cause of adaptive transitions is the demographic context in which selection operates. Wright saw species as sets of small, relatively isolated and genetically diverse groups or ‘demes’ regularly budding off from other demes and undergoing extinction. For this reason, the aim of his models
The shifting balance
of adaptive evolution was to explain the dynamics of demes and its consequences. Variables such as levels of physical isolation, migration and gene flow between demes, and demographic bottlenecks (in summary, population structure) were introduced by Wright in order to add a more realistic dimension to genetic models, in contrast to Fisher’s attempts to simplify demography with his frequent assumption of panmixia or large, randomly interbreeding populations. The rationale behind the shifting balance theory is that it is population structuring or subdivision that allows for the long-term persistence of epistatic combinations – the key to adaptive innovation; specifically, demographic fragmentation would even allow the momentary survival of combinations engendering unfit phenotypes. For Wright, this happens because partial isolation can slow down mass selection. Let us imagine again our bird population; as seen, any deviations from the adaptive peak of small body and bill size will be opposed by selection. However, if the bird population is structured into relatively isolated demes, suboptimal adaptation in demes may arise and persist for some time. For example, a large bill size mutation may occur in one peripheral small group; but instead of being quickly eliminated by selection, the mutation may persist due to the reduced competition from the optimal type found only in other demes; in other words, unfit mutants may be saved from competition with the fittest purely by accidental means. Furthermore, isolation may further favour increases in the frequency of mutations reducing fitness due to drift and inbreeding in small groups. Lower levels of gene flow and migration and higher levels of inbreeding may lead peripheral demes to drift away from a given adaptive peak; by reducing the interactions between competing individuals, demography opposes the statistical bias or signal from natural selection. The consequence of relaxing selection is that populations can explore a larger set of the combinatorial possibilities: large body and small bill, small body and large bill – and even large size and large bill. Wright proposes that a transition between adaptive peaks occurs when an accidental match happens between a lucky peripheral type on the one hand, and a potentially new niche or habitat on the other. In our example, the match is between a population carrying the two mutations for larger body size and larger bill size, and presence of the population on the isolated edge of the island where the large seed variety is found; it is only after the accidental match happens that mass selection for both larger body size and bill size can take place in the new niche. Under the shifting balance mechanism, the
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occupation of this new ‘large seed’ niche thus involves the selection of a brand new interaction system consisting in this case of only two alternative alleles, but of potentially many more. For Wright, mass selection still has a function in adaptation: once a match with a new niche is established, mass selection can operate on all other genes and traits favouring adaptation to the new habitat. Now the species occupies two adaptive peaks, and both are potential sources of relatively isolated demes connected by some level of migration and gene flow. If the new niche engenders higher rates of population growth (i.e. if the large seed niche is ‘superior’), the small bird phenotype may undergo extinction. If that happens, the species makes a jump to a higher adaptive peak. Despite his appealing use of population structure, Wright failed to convince most evolutionary biologists that the shifting balance theory represented an advance in our understanding of adaptation (Whitlock and Phillips, 2000). The main reason is that it may address a non-existing problem: the idea that mass selection traps populations and prevents continuous occupation of new niches is far from popular (Coyne et al., 1997). Selective traps might work if adaptive landscapes were static: but as argued above, adaptive peaks may constantly move relative to one another, and adaptive valleys may widen or shrink. Simpson’s account of horse evolution makes explicit reference to a decrease in the distance between the grazing and the browsing types during the Miocene in one phenotypic dimension: for some unknown reason, larger body size was favoured in the originally small browsing lineage. Once a single trait makes a crossing between peaks, other interacting traits (tooth crown height in that case) are no longer the cause of negative epistasis, and may be selected towards the new alternative peak (in Simpson’s example higher tooth crowns evolved due to their growth correlation with body size). According to Fisher, organisms are complex and exhibit much more than two traits contributing to fitness; for this reason, it is almost inevitable that at least one of them will eventually cross the valley between two adaptive peaks, and that, although slowly, adaptive evolution never stops.
sex and the origins of species
Although the shifting balance mechanism has never been widely accepted as a theory of adaptation, it was much more influential in the development of speciation theory. Understanding the differences between the processes of adaptation and speciation requires a
Sex and the origins of species
discussion of sex, or more specifically of one of its most important consequences: sexual reproduction (Stearns, 1987). Sexual reproduction distinguishes the mystery of speciation from the more trivial problem of population divergence, and at the same time restricts the speciation debate mostly to sexual species. To see why asexual species cannot truly speciate (or at least not in the same way sexual species do), let us consider an asexual species undergoing evolutionary changes over time. In the absence of sex, the only available source of genetic variation in evolving lineages is mutation; this also means that new mutations remain exclusively in the lineages in which they originally occur. For this reason, a purely asexual genealogy would exclusively evolve through mutation-driven divergence. Distinct mutations may create phenotypic differentiation of various degrees between asexual lineages. In Figure 2.3, lineages A and B differ by a single mutation. In contrast, a much higher level of genetic and possibly phenotypic differentiation has accumulated between lineages A and C. In this hypothetical world of asexual reproduction, the asexual lineages A and C might be as phenotypically divergent as Escherichia coli and Homo sapiens. Thus, divergent adaptation to different environments and niches is fully compatible with asexual reproduction. The problem is that although we might be tempted to interpret the highly divergent lineages A and C as two different species, and classify the very similar pair A and B as similar varieties of the same species differing by a single mutation, the boundary between intraspecific and interspecific variation is purely arbitrary in the asexual context: there is no magic number of mutations that determines when speciation begins. This is no longer true for sexual species, in which genealogy involves convergence instead of divergence of lineages (Fisher, 1930;
Figure 2.3 Genetic differentiation in an asexual lineage. Grey dots represent independent mutations.
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Dobzhansky, 1955). For this reason, the origin of new sexual species is not just an arbitrary extrapolation of genealogical divergence: speciation must be a real evolutionary process that interrupts the convergence of genealogical lines caused by sexual reproduction, and as a consequence, produces divergent lines of phylogeny. It should be noticed that this includes ‘sexual speciation’ in bacteria, in which gene exchange and recombination are common (Fraser et al., 2007). This is the reason why species, originally identified by early taxonomists as units of diversity in nature, have been redefined in the language of sexual reproduction. Darwin (1859: 26) was one of the first to propose that the signature of speciation was the origin of reproductive isolation between populations or the sterility of their hybrids, and that sex or ‘intercrossing plays a very important part in nature in keeping the individuals of the same species, or of the same variety, true and uniform in character’ (Darwin, 1859: 104). This suggestion was later formalised as the biological species concept by Ernst Mayr (1942). As much as species, the speciation process received a new definition based on sex: it is the evolutionary process that generates barriers to previously interbreeding populations. From this perspective, it is possible to classify the various theories of speciation (for a comprehensive review, see Coyne and Orr, 2004) into two fundamental groups: one view is that natural selection directly causes speciation, so as to accelerate adaptive evolution to local conditions (as claimed by the theory of reinforcement of Darwin, Fisher and Dobzhansky); a second view is that speciation is an accident caused by the geographical distribution of species and its side effects, including local adaptation (the allopatric view of speciation by Wright, Mayr and others). The choice between the alternatives is a fundamental problem in speciation theory and one of the key controversies in evolutionary theory. s p e c i a t i o n a s a d a p t a t i o n : t h e e v o l u t i o n o f x e n o p h o b i a
The full title of the Origin contained more than one contentious statement. The first, the mutability or origin of species, seems to face opposition only from outside science in our time (Scott, 2005). His second claim that species arise ‘by means of natural selection’, or more precisely that speciation is a form of adaptation, remains extremely controversial. Darwin had no doubt that speciation could be an extension, rather than a mere side effect, of adaptive diversification. For this reason, the factors promoting the origin of new species would be the same that drive adaptation.
Speciation as adaptation Although I do not doubt that isolation is of considerable importance in the production of new species, on the whole I am inclined to believe that largeness of area is of more importance … Throughout a great and open area, not only will there be a better chance of favourable variations arising from the large number of individuals of the same species there supported, but the conditions of life are infinitely complex from the large number of already existing species (Darwin, 1859: 105).
As seen earlier, large numbers of individuals, open areas and widespread exchange of favourable variations (i.e. panmixia or random mating) are also the conditions for adaptive evolution according to Fisher. However, Fisher recognised that the problems of speciation and adaptation were not strictly the same. Differentiation between varieties of a species does not proceed smoothly towards speciation for the important reason discussed above – sex. Sexual species can work as an interconnected genetic network diffusing mutations into areas where they are favourable, and eliminating them from regions where their effects are deleterious; sex accelerates adaptation (as discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). However, sex also means that individuals remain part of a single genetic pool or species. The theory of reinforcement, pioneered by Darwin and Fisher and later championed by Dobzhansky (1937), was an attempt to explain why natural selection, which as a rule takes advantage of panmixia to produce adaptive evolution, might sometimes produce barriers to sexual reproduction that split species into new ones. Fisher’s argument was that under certain conditions gene exchange ceases to be an advantage. If species exhibit large populations, they may end up occupying larger and more variable environments. In this case, populations may be attracted towards multiple potential niches and climb different adaptive peaks. If populations from the same species evolve divergent, or even opposite adaptations, then gene exchange between them may be mutually disadvantageous. In our example where two populations of the same bird species adapt towards smaller body size in one area, and large size in the other, interbreeding would imply introducing genes for small size into the large size population, and vice versa. According to the theory of reinforcement, if the cost of introduction of ‘wrong’ genes from a neighbouring population is greater than the benefit of introducing possibly favourable mutations, panmixia or non-discriminatory mating becomes a hindrance to adaptive evolution. If adaptive divergence of populations implies low fitness of hybrids, the theory of reinforcement proposes that selection favours
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adaptations that directly prevent interbreeding (including pre-zygotic isolation mechanisms; Mayr, 1942). Traits capable of reducing the risk of hybridisation would include sedentary behaviour (which reduces the risk of mating with ‘foreigners’) and sexual discrimination based on geographical origin. In summary, Fisher believed that natural selection night lead to the evolution of sexual xenophobia: by only mating locally or with local types, hybrid offspring of lower fitness are avoided. Sexual discrimination is also predicted to include hybrids themselves, leading to their rejection as mating partners by members of either parental population. Ultimately, reinforcement proposes that speciation evolves as an adaptive solution to conflicting interests of diverging populations. The evolution of sexual discrimination should eventually create complete reproductive isolation due to a snowball or runaway effect and produce two different species. First, a few genes cause adaptive divergence between regional populations; those few genes and traits then cause hybrids between individuals from the two populations to be maladaptive; the low fitness of hybrids favours sexual xenophobia; once xenophobia evolves by selection and gene flow is further reduced by isolating mechanisms, other genes (in addition to the few ones that caused adaptive divergence) begin to accumulate differences between the populations; increased differentiation makes hybridisation or interbreeding even less advantageous. With gene flow reduced, mutations appearing in one population cannot be transferred to another, which also generates further differentiation at other genes. Thus, what begins as gradual differentiation involving a few loci and traits may eventually become a sharp phenotypic and genotypic boundary between two populations due to the invisible barrier of assortative mating. When incompatibilities between the two gene pools accumulate to a point in which hybrids become sterile or not viable (i.e. when post-zygotic reproductive isolation evolves), speciation is complete. This runaway process bears similarity with Fisher’s theory of sexual dimorphism (the peacock’s tail effect, as discussed in Chapter 5). Reinforcement has important theoretical consequences. The first is that speciation is seen as the culmination of a process of gradual accumulation of genetic diversity between populations. For this reason, even when speciation is recent, genetic differences between the new species should be observed at many genes. Second, generating hybrid offspring should be disadvantageous for all individuals. Reproductive isolation, although defined in terms of populations, evolves so as to prevent the influx of foreign genes into the individual
Speciation as an accident
offspring; in other words, speciation by reinforcement is not based on group selection. Finally, speciation prevents mutually negative interference during the adaptive process, so that more niches can be more quickly occupied by specialist species; speciation is therefore a necessary step in a progressive adaptive mapping of the world. Reinforcement has caused alternating waves of scepticism and enthusiasm among evolutionary biologists (Gavrilets, 2005). The hypothesis certainly has a strong theoretical appeal, since it unifies adaptation and speciation under the single umbrella of natural selection. But even some of its supporters recognise that the strong claims by Darwin, Fisher and Dobzhansky have not been corroborated by evidence (Hostert, 1997). The most optimistic views on reinforcement argue for its compatibility with existing data and as theoretically plausible but are far from claiming a role for reinforcement as the main mechanism of speciation, in regards to either pervasiveness or evolutionary relevance (Coyne and Orr, 2004; Doebeli et al., 2005). Many experimental studies of reinforcement consist of comparisons between levels of pre-zygotic and post-zygotic reproductive isolation among physically isolated (allopatric) and physically continuous (sympatric) taxa; but even those indicate that allopatry is unquestionably responsible for most cases of reproductive isolation. In conclusion, the failure of reinforcement is a challenge to the belief in the straightforward continuity between microevolution and macroevolution.
speciation as an accident
Despite their belief in natural selection as a direct cause of speciation, Darwin, Fisher and other proponents of adaptive speciation recognised that physical isolation very often leads to the origin of new species. One of Darwin’s favourite examples was the presence of highly diverse endemic or exclusive faunas in isolated areas such as Australia. Allopatric explanations for speciation are the most parsimonious and widely accepted (Coyne and Orr, 2004), since they do not require special conditions setting natural selection against the generally advantageous process of random mating; the beginning of allopatric speciation only requires the interruption of gene flow – for whatever reason. Physical or geographical isolation is a frequent and efficient factor preventing gene flow; but since it is a demographic accident, physical isolation may imply that the ‘the principal evolutionary mechanism in the origin of species must be an essentially nonadaptive one’ (Wright, 1932). Under the allopatric model developed by Mayr (1963)
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and others, physically isolated populations evolve into separate species with the help of chance factors that gradually increase interpopulational genetic divergence, such as genetic drift and the occurrence of new mutations not shared with other populations, eventually causing hybrids to be non-viable. Two main misunderstandings involve the idea of non-adaptive or allopatric adaptation. First, allopatric speciation does not completely deny a role to natural selection in speciation; in fact, the model assumes that genetic differentiation between populations can also be a side effect of divergent adaptation to local conditions; as much as genetic drift and new mutations, selection for different alleles will lead to genetic differentiation. What allopatric speciation denies is that speciation evolves as a product of selection for (previously non-existing) reproductive isolation itself: that is, that selection acts in cases where it has become advantageous for populations to interrupt free gene flow between them. An example of this misunderstanding was the review of recent speciation studies by Coyne and Orr (2004: 319). They showed that genes that cause post-zygotic reproductive isolation (hybrid nonviability or sterility) do not belong to any special functional class, are not characterised by the presence of large numbers of DNA repetitive sequences or transposons (which would be expected if differentiation were mostly caused by genetic drift), and more crucially, are quickly evolving by positive Darwinian selection. They concluded that ‘direct molecular data now support one of the central tenets of neoDarwinian view of evolution – that reproductive isolation results from natural selection within species’ (see also Barbash and Ashburner, 2003; Presgraves et al., 2003). However, their statement delivers less than what it promises: both reinforcement and allopatric speciation postulate that reproductive isolation may ‘result’ from natural selection. The real question, not elucidated by the data presented by Coyne and Orr, is whether such genes under selection evolved so as to directly cause reproductive isolation and speciation as proposed by Darwin, Fisher and Dobzhansky, or as ingredients of local adaptation that accidentally caused reproductive isolation and speciation as proposed by Wright and Mayr. A second misunderstanding comes from the challenge posed by sympatric models of speciation, which postulate the origin of new species without prior physical isolation (Schilthuizen, 2000; Mallet, 2001). For example, various studies have proposed that sympatric speciation can follow from adaptation to discrete niches or
Speciation and particulate inheritance
resources occurring in the same environment (Maynard Smith, 1966; Doebeli, 1996; Johnson and Gullberg, 1998; Kondrashov and Kondrashov, 1999) or of divergent sexual selection (Payne and Krakauer, 1997; van Doorn et al., 1998; Gavrilets and Waxman, 2002; Seehausen et al., 2008). The misunderstanding here is that sympatric models do not necessarily imply that pre- or post-zygotic reproductive isolation evolve in order to reduce gene flow between incipient species; they can still be seen either as a side effect of adaptive divergence to a heterogeneous (although the ‘same’) environment, or a side effect of differentiation in mating behaviour under sexual selection. In other words, most of the few credible cases of sympatric speciation simply reproduce the mechanisms of allopatric speciation in a microcosmos (Fitzpatrick et al., 2008); they are what Coyne and Orr themselves (2004) properly call ‘microallopatric speciation’. Since sympatric speciation also relies on the idea that speciation is a side effect of divergent adaptation, it represents a different model of speciation from reinforcement. Thus, although new studies may show that sympatric speciation is possible and that natural selection may cause genetic differentiation, the relevance of reinforcement, literally ‘the origin of species by means of natural selection’, remains unproven.
speciation and particulate inheritance
It was shown above that the first condition for speciation is sex; without it, the definition of species becomes necessarily arbitrary. The second condition assumed by theories of speciation is geography. Geography means in the first place possible discontinuous distributions and physical isolation between sexual populations. And second, geographical variation is also qualitative, and engenders changes in environments and selection pressures: populations of the same species may evolve distinct, and even opposite, adaptations to distinct environmental conditions. However, adaptive evolution may coexist with the absence of speciation. Homo sapiens is a good example: although natural selection played a significant role in the evolution of biological differences between the Inuit and Australian Aborigines, or between African pygmies and northern Europeans (Migliano et al., 2007), those are examples of within-species diversity. On the other hand, physical isolation does not necessarily promote speciation: Homo sapiens is again an example, with native populations from North America and SubSaharan Africa, or Northern Europe and South Africa and Australia
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being isolated from each other for thousands of years but showing no sign of hybrid non-viability or sterility. What makes sex a necessary condition for speciation? In a sense, reproductive isolation is another consequence of particulate inheritance. Reproductive isolation is caused by the incompatibility between regionally differentiated genotypes, which in combination results in non-viability or sterility. The origin of genotypic incompatibility results from the two fundamental evolutionary consequences of particulate inheritance: the first is the possibility of individual allele replacements as proposed by Fisher, and the second is epistasis as championed by Wright. The first, allele substitution, is possible due to the modular nature of both DNA (which consists of sequences of nucleotides); the second, epistasis, follows from the modularity of genotypes (which consist of gene sets). In other words, hybrid sterility is in essence a case of negative epistasis between alleles evolving under distinct selective pressures, a phenomenon originally formulated as ‘Dobzhansky–Muller incompatibilities’ (Dobzhansky, 1934; Muller, 1939; Gavrilets, 1997; Brideau et al., 2006). The level of genetic divergence (the number of gene replacements) between two regionally evolved genotypes required for reproductive isolation strictly refers to the nature of those differentiated alleles and genotypes. For this reason, whereas reinforcement implies that speciation results from various polymorphisms, the accidental allopatric view suggests that speciation might be in principle caused by a single allelic difference. Recent studies have shown that the number of genes involved in causing post-zygotic reproductive isolation in fact varies from one to more than a hundred (Coyne and Orr, 1998, 2004). However, the number of genes causing reproductive isolation may be overestimated because genetic divergence continues after speciation; for example, although over 70% of human and chimpanzee genes present at least one sequence difference (Coyne, 2005), most of the differences occurred after speciation over 6 million years ago. Reproductive isolation by a single gene is exemplified by hybrid rescue mutations in the Drosophila genus. Crosses between D. melanogaster and the closely related D. simulans, D. mauritiana and D. sechellia generate non-viable offspring (Sturtevant, 1920; Sawamura and Yamamoto, 1997; Hutter, 1997). By genetic manipulation, it is possible to obtain hybrids that are homozygous at a few identified loci. It was found that if hybrids carry two copies of the D. melanogaster allele at the Hmr gene, viable males and females are produced (Barbash and Ashburner, 2003). Alleles from other loci (Lhr, mhr, 167.7, Zhr) may
Levels of selection
also rescue hybrid viability or fertility in selected crosses (Watanabe, 1979; Davis et al., 1996). Therefore, the identity and number of genes involved in reproductive isolation and speciation are highly variable. In summary, speciation cannot be exclusively derived from the theory of natural selection; first because of the apparently stronger role played by geography and isolation in comparison with selection and reinforcement, and second because it depends ultimately on the two properties of particulate inheritance: negative epistasis and allelic replacement. The conclusion is that genes are relevant in the origin of species for being units of inheritance – not for being units of selection.
levels of selection
The debate over levels of selection in evolution received much attention in the 1960s following Wynne-Edwards’ (1962) reinstatement of group selection and Hamilton’s (1964) theory of kin selection, which proposed that maximisation of ‘inclusive’ (but still individual) fitness could account for apparent examples of group selection. A central idea in Williams’ Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), an explicit attempt to ‘purge biology’ from group selection, was the argument that ‘within a population, only the gene is stable enough to be effectively selected’. The reason is that whereas individual phenotypes and genotypes exist only once in sexual populations and never occur again, our individual alleles may be very ancient, jumping from our parents onto ourselves, and from ourselves onto our descendants. For this reason, although selection is a bias mediated through individual phenotypes, only alleles survive through generations (barring mutations) and are therefore the memory of such bias. Since the gene is the lasting particle of inheritance whereas its carriers are products of ephemeral genotypes, the gene must be not only the unit of inheritance, but also the unit of selection. Williams’ suggestion was made even more explicit a few years later by Dawkins and the selfish gene concept. The fundamental unit of selection, and therefore of self-interest, is not the species, nor the group, nor even strictly, the individual. It is the gene, the unit of heredity (Dawkins, 1976: 11).
It might be argued that Dawkins simply took Darwinism to its logical consequence and that the emphasis on natural selection and particulate inheritance by Fisher, Wright and Haldane’s evolutionary
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genetics would necessarily lead to the selfish gene. However, the view that the fundamental unit of selection is the gene is incorrect and the source of various misunderstandings (Reeve and Keller, 1999). Fisher, another critic of group selection, added a section named ‘The benefit of species’ to the second edition to the Genetical Theory in 1958 that made clear his views on the units of selection: The principle of Natural Selection … refers only to variation among individuals (or co-operative communities), and to the progressive modification of structure or function only in so far as variations in these are of advantage to the individual, in respect to his chances of death or reproduction. It thus affords a rational explanation of structures, reactions and instincts which can be recognized as profitable to their individual possessors (Fisher, 1930: 279).
Even to the ultra-selectionist Fisher, natural selection refers to phenotypes, not genes. It refers to phenotypes and its components as far as they affect the fitness of their carriers. Since individuals are born, die and reproduce much more frequently than species, they are the most affected by selection, but Fisher also accepts co-operative communities as a second level of selection. Some traits certainly differentiate communities among themselves and could be advantageous in cases of competition between groups. For this reason, Fisher even proposes that ‘the term Natural Selection should include not only the selective survival of individuals of the same species, but of mutually competing species of the same genus or family’. However, he argued that species selection, although plausible, must be of reduced importance. The relative unimportance of this [species selection] as an evolutionary factor would seem to follow decisively from the small number of closely related species which in fact do come in competition, as compared to the number of individuals in the same species; and from the vastly greater duration of the species compared to the individual (Fisher, 1930: 280).
Species selection is less important because small numbers are always bad news for selection, as they increase the power of random factors such as drift; in addition, for a single episode of extinction or speciation (which we could respectively associate with species death and reproduction) there are countless rounds of individual birth and death for selection to operate upon. This does not mean that species selection has no role; although the process takes longer, selection may be restored strongly enough to make its mark on macroevolution, as exemplified by convergence.
Levels of selection
The role for species selection in evolution points to a second important misunderstanding: the confusion between levels of selection and levels of organisation. A hierarchy of levels of selection will start from individuals and proceed to more inclusive units such as families (kin groups), groups and whole species. As seen earlier, the hierarchy of levels of organisation or complexity, however, includes different elements, such as cells, multicellular organisms, animals storing information in brains, and human societies. Thus, groups of organisms (including unicellular ones) or societies may be units of selection without being units or levels of biological organisation. The doubts about the direct role of natural selection as the guide to the origin and fate of species suggest that macroevolution might not carry the signal of selection. That interpretation would be incorrect. The origin of species is undeniably affected by factors such as accidental isolation; but the fate of individual lineages (or to use a previous example, of an individual radiocarbon) was always assumed to involve a degree of contingency. The key contribution of evolutionary genetics to the understanding of biological complexity was the exploration of the particulate or modular nature of inheritance, as captured by Fisher’s fundamental principle of natural selection and by Wright’s focus on epistasis. As discussed in the final chapter, natural selection by itself is unable to create higher organisation simply by generating ‘better’ or ‘higher’ species given enough time, contrary to the claims by Darwin and Fisher; transitions in biological complexity require a transformation not of species, but of modular inheritance systems by natural selection. Finally, the nature of adaptive evolution in multicellular organisms cannot be deduced from natural selection and mutation sizes alone; gradualism must be understood in the context of developmental modularity, as discussed next.
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3 Multicellularity and the developmental code
Despite the drawbacks of Fisher’s argument, evolutionary gradualism remains the most accepted explanation for organic diversity. Even Orr (2001: 121), who revealed the flaw in the micromutational approach, agrees that ‘alleles of large phenotypic effect (major genes) sometimes play a role in phenotypic evolution … but alleles of small effect are still more common than those of large effect’. Wright’s ideas were also a direct blow against saltationist views. Under his shifting balance mechanism, the discontinuity of species results not from the discontinuity of variation (although macromutations can be accommodated within the model; see Wright, 1977), but from the geographic discontinuity of real populations and environments. With genetics being absorbed into mainstream gradualism, saltationism had to seek refuge in what historically has been the most prolific source of anti-Darwinian ideas: developmental biology (Goldschmidt, 1940; Gould, 1977; Goodwin, 1994; Gilbert et al., 1996). Goldschmidt argued that the micromutations and allele polymorphisms studied by geneticists could only cause a limited degree of variation on a given species theme. But the origin of new species and body plans would require more radical phenotypic changes, triggered by factors exploring what he called the hidden ‘potentialities of development’. For Goldschmidt, mutations were relevant only as a source of systemic changes in development; however, those were not the more trivial micromutations studied by population geneticists but highly disruptive macromutations such as those known to cause the phenomenon of ‘homeosis’ (Bateson, 1894). Homeotic mutations result in body structures developing in the wrong place, as exemplified by ‘antennapedia’ flies in which legs develop in the place of 72
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antennae, and ‘bithorax’ flies in which a second pair of wings replaces the halteres (Gehring, 1998). Remarkably, it is now known that those two homeotic transformations result from mutations in single genes, respectively Antennapedia (Antp) and Ultrabithorax (Ubx) (McGinnis et al., 1984; Scott and Weiner, 1984). The discovery that a single defective gene can produce a whole new bithorax phenotype, which superficially bridges the morphological gap between two-winged dipterans (flies) and fourwinged insects, seemed to confirm Goldschmidt’s claim that ‘a single mutational step affecting the right process at the right moment can accomplish everything, providing that it is able to set in motion the ever-present potentialities of embryonic regulation’ (Goldschmidt, 1940: 297). Thus, although the development of genetics was essential to the neo-Darwinian synthesis, it has also kept alive the hopes of a saltationist resistance. The rather confrontational relationship between geneticists focusing on small mutations and developmental biologists emphasising radical morphological change has persisted for decades, but has been transformed in recent times due to a series of technical advances and discoveries. A first sign of change was a highly influential comparative study of chimpanzees and humans by King and Wilson (1975; see also Ohno, 1972), who argued on the basis of available evidence at the time that the two species exhibited almost identical proteins. Due to the similarity in building blocks or ‘ingredients’, they concluded that the phenotypic differences between the two species must have been caused by evolutionary changes in gene expression: that is, changes in where, when, and in which amount similar proteins are expressed during development – in other words, changes in the ‘recipe’ that builds organisms. King and Wilson’s genetic ‘expressionism’, based on the distinction between developmental ingredients (protein sequence) and developmental recipe (gene expression patterns) and on an emphasis on the latter as an important process in evolution, made an immediate impact in evolutionary biology. Gould (1977) realised that the argument could be extrapolated from the human–chimp case to species divergence in general and used as additional support for his version of heterochrony, the theory proposed by Haeckel (1896) that derives nongradual evolution from changes in developmental timing. However, at the time of the publication of King and Wilson’s review very little was known about the nature of mechanisms controlling gene expression.
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A better understanding of how the recipe for organisms is written in the genome and the definitive rise of developmental genetics started with the characterisation of the Hox gene cluster in Drosophila (Lewis, 1978) and of Ubx in particular (Bender et al., 1983). Ubx, the first gene responsible for a homeotic transformation (the bithorax fly) to have its DNA sequenced, was shown to be a very large gene coding for a very small product. The small Ubx protein is neither an enzyme catalysing reactions nor a structural molecule or building block; it is instead a protein that binds to ‘cis-regulatory’ regions lying in the vicinity of protein coding sequences, thereby affecting the likelihood that the gene product is expressed; in other words, it is a ‘transcription factor’ that switches other genes on and off (Lynch and Wagner, 2008). For its role in gene regulation and in homeotic transformations, Ubx was soon interpreted as one of the recipe genes that developmental biologists were searching for. Since then, many other recipe, regulatory or patterning genes have been identified (McGinnis, 1994). The role of regulatory genes in evolutionary innovation is the central question addressed by evolutionary developmental biology or ‘evo-devo’ (Raff, 1996; Stern, 2000; Kirschner and Gerhart, 2005; Carroll, 2008). Among other consequences, the discovery and deeper understanding of networks of regulatory genes (Davidson and Levine, 2008) required a reappraisal of the concept of homology. As seen previously, the conservation of Pax-6 genes (members of a family of regulatory or recipe genes) suggested a deeper level of homology of existing animal eyes (Gehring, 1998); similar examples led to the radical claim that the radiation of animal body plans in the Cambrian period (the ‘Cambrian Explosion’) might have been a consequence of (or at least required) the origin and prior diversification of patterning genes themselves (Peterson and Davidson, 2000; Sole et al., 2003; see Marshall, 2006 for a critical review). Those findings might again sound like good news for saltationist views; after all, patterning genes suggest that the basis for macroevolutionary change might ultimately rest not on the cumulative and gradual effect of small mutations, but on changes in a small set of genes with dramatic effects on body plan architecture. Recent progress in evo-devo is, however, showing the opposite, namely that developmental biology can provide definitive evidence for gradualism. A first emerging conclusion is that, in spite of its catalysing role in the past, King and Wilson’s ‘expressionism’ may be partially incorrect: in the following, it will be argued that although the contrast between patterning or recipe genes and ingredient or effector genes remains useful, the specific claim that changes in gene expression are
Replication and reproduction
the main factor behind the origin and divergence of species has not yet been corroborated (Hoekstra and Coyne, 2007). Second, developmental genetics is close to demonstrating that the diversification of animal body plans from pre-Cambrian times can only be understood within the framework of adaptation and microevolution (Marshall, 2006; Conway Morris, 2006). As much as Darwin’s insight showed that adaptive evolution may gradually produce new species provided a first ancestral species is postulated, recent developmental and fossil studies are now showing that under the assumption of a pre-Cambrian metazoan organism, diversification of body plans can be explained as a result of gradual adaptive change. Finally, patterning genes have been crucial to our understanding of the origins of the first multicellular organisms themselves. The cis-regulatory regions (DNA sequences adjacent to coding sequences of a gene, such as promoters, enhancers and silencers, to which transcription factors can bind and then control the gene; Carroll et al., 2001), found in virtually all genes, do not code for proteins, but store information on when and where proteins should be expressed; in multicellular organisms, this may be manifested as what is known as ‘positional information’ (Wolpert, 1969). Due to its role in organising metazoan multicellularity, the origin of the ‘developmental code’ represented one of the most important steps in the evolution of biological complexity. Multicellularity is the only unequivocal example of an evolutionary transition sensu Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995), by representing both the origin of a super-unit by aggregation of preexisting unicellular organisms, and of an underlying new system of biological information consisting of transcriptional factors and regulatory sequences with exclusively informational roles. The evolution of multicellularity from single cells required a series of gradual steps including three main innovations: reproduction, regulation of gene expression, and in some cases the clear distinction between germline and somatic lines that characterises full multicellularity as defined by Weismann (1889). The three innovations emerged as adaptations to unicellular life, but later became the foundation of animal development and its defining feature: the modular organisation of multicellular super-units.
replication and reproduction
Development can be defined as the origin of a new phenotype from a newly formed genotype; inversely, reproduction is the origin of new
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genotypes from developed or mature phenotypes. The alternation of these two complementary processes defines life cycles, which attained their most elaborate forms in multicellular organisms (Bonner, 1998). The origin of life cycles is synonymous with the origin of life itself and predated multicellularity; they represent the transition from a pre-biotic world of self-replicating molecules to our current world of living organisms that develop and reproduce (Hazen, 2005). The immediate pre-biotic ancestor to life and life cycles is widely believed to have been the RNA World (Gilbert, 1986) of self-replicating ribozymes (Cech, 2002), or RNA molecules able to catalyse reactions including replication (like protein enzymes) and to store information in its own nucleotide sequence (like DNA). The RNA World and its ribozymes are, however, pre-biotic instead of alive. The reason is that they lack a universal feature of all current life forms: the distinction, at the physical or molecular level, between genotype and phenotype. Ribozymes are good hypothetical ancestors to life exactly for not displaying such distinction; the nucleotide sequence of a ribozyme represented both hereditary information and catalytic function, and for this reason its replication was at the same time reproduction or the origin of a new genotype, and development of a new phenotype. In summary, life, our DNA World and cycles of development and reproduction are all aspects of a single process: the origin of the genetic code (Crick et al., 1961; Crick, 1970), which established separate functions for DNA (genotype or information), proteins (phenotype or function), and RNA (mediation between DNA and RNA and their regulation). As the immediate ancestor to life, the RNA World was the very stage where the evolution of the genetic code took place. Some hypotheses for the origin of the genetic code postulate associations between RNA and amino acids (acting as co-factors) available in the primitive Earth (Wong, 1991; Szathmáry and Maynard Smith, 1997); in this case, the association enhanced structural or catalytic properties of ribozymes and had no informational role. The ‘genomic tag hypothesis’ (Weiner and Maizels, 1987) by contrast postulates that ancestral ribozymes exhibited a specific 3′-tRNA-like terminal motif working as a simple telomere, similar to what is observed in some contemporary bacterial and plant RNA viruses (Rao et al., 1989). In the RNA World, basic (positive) amino acids would be able to bind to the negatively charged tRNA-like terminal tags, thereby increasing their affinity for ribozymes performing replication. Some ribozymes found in extant organisms can cleave such 3′-terminal tags (Guerrier-Takada et al., 1988), and if their ancestors
Gene expression
did the same in the RNA World two consequences would follow. First, untagged ribozyme molecules would lack an initiation site for replication, and be limited to an exclusively catalytic role; this would imply an original division of labour between genomic (tagged) and catalytic (untagged) subpopulations. Second, a by-product of tag cleavage would be free, small tRNA-like sequences bound to basic amino acids; those would be the precursors of current tRNAs. The origin of the genetic code would follow from the evolution of complementary base-pairing between ribozymes and tRNA precursors, eventually leading to elaboration of codon assignment and protein synthesis. At that point, hereditary material would be in fact coding for protein molecules. In other words, the genomic tag hypothesis implies an informational origin for the associations between amino acids and RNA. Finally, duplex DNA would eventually replace single-stranded RNA as a more efficient genomic template, perhaps as a strategy developed by ancient viruses to invade the first cells (Forterre, 2006). Whatever its origin, the association between amino acids and ribozymes was the precursor of the genetic code and of true life cycles. Current mechanisms of development are distant descendants of the first nucleic acid templates coding for a phenotypic skin of amino acid sequences; whereas reproduction evolved from early forms of proteinassisted template replication. However, with the known exception of viruses, genetic material does not reside in simple protein skins but in cells. Although the origin of cellular organisation is controversial (Woese, 2002), compartmentalisation created an extended genetic space under the exclusive influence of enclosed replicators. This brought about important consequences for the evolution of development: within an enclosed compartment or cytoplasm, encoded proteins and other phenotypic structures may evolve functions directly or indirectly contributing to successful replication. In unicellular organisms, those functions collectively constitute metabolism and reproduction; to what extent one may talk of proper development in unicellular organisms can only be understood in the light of the process of gene expression.
gene expression
Whereas in the pre-biotic RNA World the same self-replicating molecular entity performed the functions of genotype and phenotype, in our DNA World genotypes must be expressed or materialised as phenotypes. Under the condition of particulate gene inheritance, controlling
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how and when the materialisation of phenotypes occurs involves the control of expression of each particle of heredity; in other words, it takes the form of gene regulation. For decades, the standard example of gene regulation was the lactose operon of Escherichia coli (Jacob and Monod, 1961). In this bacterium, glucose is the most commonly used source of energy, but lactose is an alternative when glucose is not available. The use of lactose is possible because E. coli also carries the gene for the enzyme β-galactosidase, which cleaves lactose into galactosidase and glucose, which can then be used. The lactose operon, a small cluster of genes including β-galactosidase, functions in such a way that the enzyme is synthesised only when lactose is present. This is achieved through an efficient feedback mechanism. When lactose is absent, a repressor protein (a transcription factor produced by another gene in the operon) continuously binds to the β-galactosidase gene operator. The operator is a binding site in a gene (or part of its DNA sequence with affinity for regulatory proteins) that overlaps with the RNA polymerase binding site (the DNA sequence to which the polymerase binds so as to express its coding sequence as messenger RNA). When the operator is occupied by a repressor, the RNA polymerase cannot bind to its site and gene expression does not happen; in the lactose operon, a repressor therefore continuously silences or switches off the β-galactosidase gene. But when lactose is present, this arrangement changes. Lactose is converted into allolactose, which has the property of attaching to the repressor and releases it from the operator; RNA polymerase can then bind to its site, so that messenger RNA and then multiple copies of the β-galactosidase enzyme are synthesised. As a result, lactose molecules are cleaved and produce glucose molecules. The feedback is then established: as the active β-galactosidase enzymes cleave lactose molecules, the latter decrease in number and can no longer inactivate the repressor. This eventually causes the β-galactosidase gene to be switched back off again. Despite its simplicity, the lactose operon provides the metabolism of E. coli with the ability to respond efficiently to environmental variation. The regulation of ‘housekeeping’ genes such as β-galactosidase is required to maintain life in all species, but gene regulation gained the additional role of ‘housebuilding’ in developmental processes. As seen above, development is the process through which individual phenotypes are rebuilt from genetic scratch every generation. But species cannot be easily classified as either developers or non-developers; the reason is that they differ in the extent to which phenotypes are
Multicellularity and the developmental code
rebuilt from ancestors. In other words, phenotypic organisation in descendants may not be completely derived from a new genotype, and is often inherited (at least partially) from the parental phenotypes; this can be exemplified again by E. coli and its reproduction (Lewin, 2007). Bacteria reproduce by fission into two similar descendants (and by other forms of fission such as budding or size-asymmetrical fission, and fragmentation or simultaneous fission into multiple descendants). Although the products of binary fission are conventionally called daughter cells, from a genetic perspective the two resulting cells are not true sisters: they are in fact mother and offspring. The reason is that one of the cells (the mother cell) keeps the original chromosome or DNA molecule that existed before reproduction, whereas the other cell (the daughter cell) inherits a new copy of the chromosome and is therefore the true descendant. New mutations caused by incorrect replication of DNA can only be expressed in the daughter cell. This distinction at the genetic level holds even when cell division is perfectly symmetrical, or when the phenotypes of mother and daughter (and by extension the phenotypes at ‘birth’ and ‘maturity’) cannot be distinguished. If bacterial phenotypes barely differ between ‘birth’ and ‘adulthood’, to what extent do bacteria develop? To answer this question, let us consider a new mutation in a hypothetical gene coding for a cell wall protein. Immediately after division, the new mutation will be transferred to the daughter cell in a newly replicated chromosome; however, the daughter cell also inherits all its cellular structures from the maternal cell through fission, and indirectly from the maternal chromosome that synthesised them. The presence of parental products in the descendant organism is one example of what is known as a ‘maternal effect’ (Mosseau and Fox, 1998). However, with time and the expression of the mutant gene in the daughter cell, mutant cell wall proteins replace the fixed stock of proteins inherited from the mother cell. Thus, development in bacteria is nothing more than the gradual expression of new mutations against a background of inherited maternal effects; if the daughter chromosome carries no mutation, no proper development occurs, nothing new is built from genetic scratch, and a whole new phenotype is virtually inherited as a maternal effect; we would observe some housekeeping but no extensive housebuilding.
multicellularity and the developmental code
Unicellular organisms such as yeast (Queller, 2008; Smukalla et al., 2008), slime moulds (Strassmann et al., 2000; Bonner, 2008) and some
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bacteria (Galperin, 2008) may exhibit social behaviour and more sophisticated life cycles than E. coli, but development is most frequently studied in multicellular organisms and animals in particular. A main consequence of multicellularity was the evolution of cell types operating as disposable phenotypic entities. Disposable proteins are phenotypic units adopting various functions (enzymes, antigens, hormones and others) that can be replaced during the life cycle. Multicellularity engendered an additional division of labour between germline, the cells that give rise to gametes and perpetuate the units of inheritance, and somatic line, the class of all disposable cell types responsible for the functioning of the multicellular whole (Weismann, 1889); in humans, for example, the number of somatic cell types may exceed 400 (Vickaryous and Hall, 2006). All somatic cells derive from a single zygote (or from a single unfertilised egg in the case of asexual or parthenogenetic species), and this implies that despite their phenotypic and functional differences they are genetically identical in the same individual (with some exceptions; Vickaryous and Hall, 2006). If somatic cells do not differ in the genes they carry, they must differ mostly in the way their genes are expressed. We can think of all somatic cells as carrying a full encyclopaedia of genetic and developmental information; all animal cells must necessarily ‘read’ common volumes of the encyclopaedia (for example, the volume ‘How to be an animal cell’); but volumes such as ‘How to be a brain cell’ or ‘How to be a skin cell’ are read only by specific cell types, and this would explain how the differentiation between neurons and skin cells occurs. The essence of multicellularity is therefore the fragmentation in the use of genetic information by somatic cells. Fragmentation is possible because inheritance is particulate or encoded in individual genes (or discrete volumes of information) and because mechanisms of gene regulation (or control of genetic reading) had already evolved in unicellular organisms. How did gene regulation in unicellular organisms become developmental regulation in multicellular organisms? Multicellular development requires differential gene activation and regulation among cell types; but as Huxley and de Beer suggested in their classic Elements of Experimental Embryology (1934), this points to a logical dilemma. Their question was: how is the first or original asymmetry in gene expression established in a developing multicellular organism? We know that brain and liver cells are distinct because they express distinct genes (specific ‘brain cell’ genes and ‘liver cell’ genes), or express common genes in different ways; but what drives the expression of a
Multicellularity and the developmental code
brain gene exclusively in the future brain cells? A possible answer is simply a recipe or regulatory gene, whose function would be to switch a brain gene on and a liver gene off in a brain cell gene. The problem is that such a regulatory gene (like all others) is present in all cells; this raises the question of what activated the activating gene exclusively in brain cells in the first place. Appealing exclusively to genes as causes of cell differentiation leads to an infinite recursion, and for this reason Huxley and de Beer argued that asymmetrical gene expression cannot be explained by genes alone. At some stage, gene expression must be influenced by ‘epigenetic’ factors; their favourite examples were gravity or the entry point of sperm in the egg that might potentially cause an uneven distribution of substances or localised chemical change in a previously symmetrical egg. Time and genetic research have shown that Huxley and de Beer were only partially correct. Some genes do have an exclusive function of regulating other genes during development; they were also correct in pointing out that at some stage in embryonic development even regulatory genes need to be regulated. From the starting point provided by the Ubx gene a few decades ago, whole arrays of regulatory genes whose exclusive function is to manage other genes have now been characterised (Istrail and Davidson, 2005). We now know that an important source of original asymmetries in zygotic and embryonic gene expression are parents themselves; in various multicellular organisms, maternal effects establish the first co-ordinates of gene expression through the products of parental patterning genes, and this is how genes responsible for early development are placed out of the loop of infinite recursion. It should be noticed that the field of developmental genetics is highly dynamic and has recently witnessed a potential revolution with the discovery of RNA interference (RNAi), the process of gene regulation based on the direct binding of RNA molecules to target messenger RNAs (Siomi and Siomi, 2009; Carninci, 2009). RNAi is changing even our textbook examples of developmental regulation (for example, it is now known that Ubx itself is regulated by non-coding RNAs; SanchezElsner et al., 2006). Besides, developmental regulation may also depend on processes such as genomic imprinting via DNA methylation (Reik and Walter, 2001). With this in mind, the patterning of the anteroposterior body axis in the fruit fly Drosophila is used below to exemplify (in a simplified way and excluding some important genes and developmental steps) the building of a multicellular body plan from a few initial molecular cues.
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from gene expression to morphological pattern
A classic case study of how genes organise multicellularity in animals is the patterning of the antero-posterior (A-P) axis in Drosophila melanogaster (Lawrence, 1992). The formation of the Drosophila A-P axis is a parade of key patterning genes and a window into the elaborate flow of information between cells in the developing embryo. The A-P axis is established very early in fruit fly development. The Drosophila egg contains an oocyte (the zygote after fertilisation) and 15 nurse cells (which produce yolk and other nutrients transferred into the oocyte) and is surrounded by follicle cells derived from the maternal ovary. In the first minutes after deposition of the fertilised egg, endoreplication (nuclear division of the zygotic cell without the formation of cell membranes between the new nuclei) occurs. Due to the presence of yolk, the new nuclei float towards the surface of the egg to form a syncytial blastoderm (or monolayer of nuclei). At this stage, the egg is similar to a rugby ball, with a rigid corion membrane as the outer surface, the syncytial blastoderm as the internal surface, and yolk at its centre. When it reaches the blastoderm stage, the Drosophila egg begins to show the answer to the question posed by Huxley and de Beer. The original source of asymmetry in gene expression of the developing embryo will be the structural asymmetry of the egg itself, anteriorly occupied by the 15 nurse cells, and posteriorly by the fertilised oocyte. Due to this arrangement, the posterior follicle cells (but not those at the anterior end of the egg) receive the protein gurken produced by the oocyte. This protein is a signal protein that polarises the egg microtubule array, a system connecting anterior and posterior follicle cells that transports gene products across the egg. The polarised (i.e. ‘one-way’) microtubules then keep the messenger RNA from bicoid (a gene expressed by the maternally derived nurse cells) at the anterior end, whereas the messenger RNA from genes such as nanos and caudal (also produced by the nurse cells) are moved to the posterior end. The bicoid messenger RNA and bicoid protein are then present in higher concentration at the anterior end of the egg; nanos and caudal concentrate at the posterior end. Additionally, anterior bicoid codes for a transcription factor that inhibits translation of the posterior nanos maternal RNA, sharpening the differences in concentration. Thus, embryonic nuclei at the two ends of the egg end up surrounded by distinct chemical environments, and an asymmetry between ‘anterior’ and ‘posterior’ nuclei is established. It is from the positional cue established by oocyte and maternally expressed genes that the embryonic A-P axis is derived. The
From gene expression to morphological pattern
maternal cues are translated into embryonic architecture because nanos and bicoid regulate a set of early expressed zygotic genes, collectively known as ‘gap genes’. For example, the hunchback gap gene is expressed only when anteriorly found bicoid transcription factor is present, but is repressed by the posteriorly found nanos; therefore hunchback is observed only at the anterior end of the egg. Other gap genes respond to different concentrations of the maternally expressed genes, and are expressed at particular positions along the A-P axis. As a result, the embryonic map gains additional elements: in addition to the anterior and posterior poles, it develops four major gaps or broad territories. Another way of describing the pattern is to say that nuclei or cells from different territories are expressing different combinations of gap genes. Gap gene products are messenger molecules too, and regulate the expression of other target genes. Based on the particular combination of gap genes that they express, embryonic cells activate one of a few downstream targets known as ‘pair rule’ genes; the most important ones are the even skipped (eve) and fuji tarazu (ftz) genes, which are never expressed by the same cell. The result is an elegant pattern of 14 alternating stripes of eve and ftz or genetically differentiated cellular territories along the A-P axis. Whereas the seven eve stripe rules are defined independently (i.e. by a different combination of maternal and gap gene products), the seven ftz stripes are produced by an out-ofphase duplication of the eve pattern (Rivera-Pomar and Jackle, 1996). At this stage of embryonic development the boundaries between the 14 stripes are not sharply defined; in other words, some cells between eve and ftz stripes are in ‘nowhere land’. The fourth level of patterning gene expression, represented by ‘segment polarity’ genes such as engrailed, refines the pair rule pattern to establish clear boundaries between cell territories, eventually defining 14 adjacent segments. As a result, all cells of the embryo are given a clear regional identity in the embryo, or a cell territory address along the A-P axis. The processes described above do not have a clear counterpart at the cellular or phenotypic level. Artificial staining techniques are normally required to make cell territories visible in pictures, since the different identities of embryonic cells up to that stage mostly refer to the sets of invisible developmental genes that they express. It is the next set of patterning genes that initiates the translation of abstract genetic individuality into particular developmental fates and the structures that we see in the adult fly. This is the role of the well-known Hox genes: to activate genes directly responsible for the morphological
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identity of segments in the Drosophila embryo, and directly or indirectly for the identity, number and location of cells types, organs and appendages (Akam, 1998). For example, the interactions between the Hox genes Abdominal-A (Abd-A) and Ubx restrict the expression of the gene Distal-less (Dll) to three segments that eventually become the adult thorax (Vachon et al., 1992); the result is that legs develop only in those segments. Wing primordia in their turn are formed under high concentrations of the Hox gene Decapentaplagic (Dpp), whose expression is determined by a combination of the Hox genes Sex combs reduced (Scr), Ubx and Abd-A. Ubx also regulates genes responsible for the position of wing veins and leg bristles, among other structures. It is only at the stage when Hox genes and their targets are expressed that structural or functional genes specific to cell types or structures (or effector genes) are mobilised. Thus, leg or eye genes are expressed in the proper place only after a virtual scaffold or map of the adult body is drawn with the invisible ink provided by patterning genes. Similar mechanisms and various homologous genes explain the formation of the dorso-ventral axis in Drosophila (Carroll et al., 2001).
regulatory regions and gene bureaucracy
A-P axis specification in Drosophila exemplifies the nature and operation of the developmental code of multicellularity: it is a system that subordinates effector genes (the functional or efficient side of the genome) to a class of managerial genes. As a result, a positional map with the co-ordinates of a given body plan is established, and organs, territories and cell types develop in their specified addresses. A measure of the amount of information required for cells to process developmental instructions, and therefore commit to a specific developmental fate, is revealed in one important example: the determination of the second eve stripe in the Drosophila embryo (Small et al., 1992). As in the case of the A-P axis formation, a simplified description is presented below. Upstream to the coding region of the pair rule gene eve, a cisregulatory region of 480 base pairs was found with multiple binding sites for the transcription factors nanos, hunchback (maternally expressed), giant and Krüppel (gap genes). It was also revealed that those two gap genes repress eve expression; however, when nanos and hunchback are present and bound to their sites, they neutralise the effect of the repressors and eve is expressed. This is why the eve stripe 2 is expressed at the parasegment 3, since the cells in this territory express all four genes. In summary, transcription factors coded by
Regulatory regions and gene bureaucracy
four different regulatory genes and more than a dozen binding sites are required to determine a single eve stripe. The other six eve stripes expressed at the odd parasegments of the embryo are independently specified by a different combination of repressors and activators. A total of seven distinct regulatory regions are required to determine the seven eve stripes, including an autoregulatory region that responds to the eve product itself (Ludwig et al., 2005). The determination of eve stripes is another example of the role of regulatory proteins and regions in multicellular development. It has been known for some time that genomes do not contain only ‘meaningful’ sequences that code for proteins; they also include large amounts of junk or selfish DNA (Doolittle and Sapienza, 1980; Orgel and Crick, 1980). However, this distinction between coding and noncoding regions did not take regulatory regions into account; only recently, with the completion of whole genome sequencing, is the size and distribution of regulatory regions beginning to be estimated. The eve gene in Drosophila, for example, occupies a stretch of about 16 000 DNA base pairs, but its coding region extends for less than 1500 base pairs; less than 10% of the gene codes for protein. The seven regulatory regions on the other hand are about three times larger and comprise over 3500 base pairs. Although it is still true that most of the eve locus may be characterised as junk DNA, 70% of the 5000 base pairs of information stored by the gene eve refers to regulatory or developmental information rather than coding information. The same is true for our species, where at least 2–3% of the genome consists of cis-regulatory regions – more than the 2% coding for protein. In yeast, while 70% are represented by coding regions, about 15% represent cis-regulation (Kellis et al., 2003); but crucially, yeasts are unicellular and do not develop like multicellular organisms. In Drosophila the average size of regulatory regions is about 10 000 base pairs while the average coding region is only 3000 base pairs long (Levine and Tjian, 2003). This means that genes, especially in multicellular organisms, are more than their protein coding sequences (interspersed with parasitic or meaningless non-coding sequences): they are more properly described as information processing units whose output is not just a protein, but more exactly the location, quantity and timing of protein synthesis. In addition to cis-regulatory sequences, it is estimated that 5–10% of genes are regulatory proteins or transcription factors in metazoans; they amount to about 1000 genes in flies and worms, and 3000 genes (or 10% of the total), possibly controlling as many as 100 000 enhancers and silencers in humans (Pennisi,
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2004). Other examples are given by the first mappings of regulatory networks: for example, the expression of no less than 65 transcription factors and 26 other signalling molecules is required in the zygote of Ciona intestinalis (the sea squirt) only to take the embryo to the stage of gastrulation (Imai et al., 2004; Lemaire, 2006). Even more signs of regulation may be found in apparently junk DNA as the mechanisms of RNA interference are further elucidated. In summary, a whole dimension of genomes consists of ‘white collar’ genes and cis-regulatory regions that respond to them: downstream genes must ‘listen’ to positive or negative commands (induction or repression) from their superiors, and then make their own calls to subordinates. In analogy with historical human societies, a class of bureaucratic genes had to evolve so as to cope with the public or collective dimension of the multicellular society.
is evolution mostly the evolution of regulatory regions?
The discovery of a hierarchy of patterning genes with the role of regulating the expression of downstream effector genes seems to confirm King and Wilson’s (1975) distinction between developmental recipe and ingredients. Whereas King and Wilson pointed to the high conservation of macromolecules or effector genes between humans and chimpanzees and by extension between other species, conservation is now known to characterise patterning genes themselves (Gehring, 1998; Kirschner and Gerhart, 2005; Carroll, 2006). Transcription factors may remain extremely similar across widely divergent taxa: for example, the Pax-6 sequence is nearly similar in flies and mice (and still functional when transferred between the species; Quiring et al., 1994), and identical in humans and chimpanzees. Since both effector and patterning gene products tend to be conserved, the most obvious alternative to metazoan diversification would be the evolutionary diversification of cis-regulatory regions and gene regulation. This was the new form adopted by the expressionist hypothesis after the discovery and characterisation of the developmental code. However, despite the support of many evo-devo researchers (Wray, 2007; Carroll, 2008), and with the technical means for properly testing the hypothesis being now available, King and Wilson’s expressionism has not been fully vindicated (Hoekstra and Coyne, 2007). Technical advances occurred in two fronts. Whole-genome projects have supplied complete sequence data for various unicellular
Evolution and regulatory regions
and multicellular species, while DNA microarray techniques materialise the seemingly impossible task of comparing expression levels of homologous (i.e. the ‘same’) genes in related species (that amounts to almost 30 000 genes in the case of the human–chimpanzee pair). A first problem with the expressionist argument was identified in the genome sequences of humans and chimpanzees. Data confirmed a value of 99% similarity in DNA sequences between the two species; however, this result can be misleading since it cannot be extrapolated to gene identity (Coyne, 2005): a 99% similarity in the DNA of two species is in principle compatible with all of their genes being different by about 1%; in this case, all ingredients would differ between the species. In the real case of humans and chimpanzees, data indicate that 71% of the human genes exhibit at least one base pair change compared with chimpanzees (Mikkelsen et al., 2005), which frontally clashes with the claims of King and Wilson that most protein coding sequences would be conserved. A likely explanation for why they overestimated levels of protein conservation is that their sample of macromolecules was biased towards ancient genes under strong selection: enzymes such as haemoglobin, cytochrome c and DNA helicase are highly conserved among mammals in general, and not only between humans and chimpanzees (Miranda, 2006; Becerra et al., 2007). The conclusion is that phenotypic differences between humans and chimpanzees may well be the cumulative effect of a few substitutions in 71% of encoded proteins or ingredients, rather than in the developmental recipe or levels of expression of similar building blocks. However, microarray analysis has also shown that genes do differ in expression between the two species. Based on the study by Enard et al. (2002) revealing that 30% of genes show interspecific differences in expression levels, Carroll (2003) claimed that evidence was now available to suggest that regulatory changes are the main cause of phenotypic divergence between humans and chimps. Microarray analysis has also been applied to the particularly informative case of eusocial insect polyphenism (or discrete morphological variation among workers, soldiers, queens and other castes). Polyphenisms involve genetically similar organisms and are induced by environmental factors such as diet, revealing the existence of alternative developmental pathways within the same genome. The microarray technique might be able to reveal what patterning genes activate a ‘queen recipe’, a ‘worker recipe’ or a ‘soldier recipe’ depending on environmental inputs. However, studies have so far produced disappointing results. As a rule, the genes that stand out in comparisons of expression levels are low in the hierarchy
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of development (Miura et al., 1999; Sumner et al., 2006; Weil et al., 2009). In honey bees (Evans and Wheeler, 1999), five of seven genes showing highest divergence in expression among castes are ingredient genes; for example, genes involved in ovarian development and metabolism were obviously expressed at high rates in queens but not in the nonreproductive workers. The other two genes are not clearly involved in developmental regulation. Rather than bad luck, those results reveal a conceptual flaw in the use of microarrays to test King and Wilson’s expressionist hypothesis. As shown by the example of the A-P axis in Drosophila, developmental pathways may be controlled by very subtle variations in the timing, location and amount of a single or a few transcription factors; but when applied to the case of polyphenisms, those subtle signals are likely to be overwhelmed by large variation in effector genes coding for structural proteins or enzymes needed in larger quantities. While the microarray technique is undeniably useful in medical genetics, for example by identifying gene products expressed at levels in cancer cells as preferential targets for drug action (Li et al., 2008), so far it has not revealed much about the patterning genes that control morphological variation between castes. Returning to the case of interspecific variation, this means that although we predict differences in gene expression between humans and chimpanzees, the identity of the genes may disappoint. We know that hair proteins must be expressed at higher levels and in relatively more skin cells in chimpanzees because their bodies are fully covered; we can also predict that various genes coding for brain proteins must be expressed at higher levels in humans simply because our brain is larger and grows for longer (Vrba, 1998; Rice, 2002a; Vinicius, 2005). However, their specific claim of the expressionist argument is that changes in gene expression and not in protein sequence were the key or even single explanation for adaptive divergence. Recently Khaitovich et al. (2005) have investigated this claim in detail, with results that offered further reasons for scepticism. First, their study compared gene expression in organs that diverged the most (the brain) and the least (liver or heart) in phenotype between humans and chimpanzees. The results were unambiguous: contrary to the expressionist model, most variation in gene expression is found in the organs that evolved the least. Khaitovich et al. concluded that changes in gene expression are mostly neutral and less likely to occur in genes responsible for phenotypic divergence (although there are exceptions to this rule, such as genes related to
Evolution and regulatory regions
the X chromosome). In conclusion, microarrays may fail to identify the basis for developmental reprogramming between species for two reasons: because adaptive changes in gene expression are more pronounced in effector genes than in key patterning genes, and because changes in gene expression may not be adaptive at all. Secondly and more importantly, although the distinction between coding versus regulatory sequences makes fundamental sense, the question of which is the main stage of adaptive evolution may not have one straightforward answer. The reason is that Khaitovich et al. have also shown a strong correlation between changes in gene sequence and gene expression: genes whose expression diverges the most between humans and chimpanzees (probably in their cis-regulatory regions) are also those that differ the most in coding sequence. In a sense, this finding is far from surprising: for example, selection for darker skin pigmentation may lead both to the evolution of increased expression of an already existing dark pigment and to the evolution of an even darker pigment by changes in its gene sequence. Inversely, if selection is weak or absent, neutral variation is expected to accumulate in both cis-regulatory and coding regions, causing changes in gene expression and coding sequence. In contrast, Pollard et al. (2006) have identified a region of an RNA gene (HAR1), which is expressed in the human neocortex during early development, as the region with the most accelerated evolution in the human genome relative to chimpanzees; the gene probably regulates protein-coding genes required for brain development (through RNA interference rather than transcription factors). Prabhakar et al. (2006) have recently generalised their results, and emphasised the relevance of cis-regulation in trait evolution. However, it should be noticed that those studies focused on regulatory proteins and cis-regulation; other studies focusing on ingredients have even discovered a protein exclusively found in the human brain and not present in the chimpanzee genome (Hayakawa et al., 2005). The apparently contradictory results certainly indicate the need for further studies, but the conclusion seems to be that both cis-regulation and coding mutations are relevant during adaptive divergence, although some traits may be more likely to evolve through the former and others through the latter (Hoekstra and Coyne, 2007; Wray, 2007). In conclusion, although the distinction between cis-regulation and protein sequence is fundamental to genetic and developmental studies, there is not enough evidence for the hypothesis that cisregulatory changes are the only or most important cause of phenotypic
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divergence between closely related species such as chimpanzees and humans (Hill and Walsh, 2005). This is not the same as concluding that changes in regulatory mechanisms are not relevant; it means that the relationship between gene expression and microevolution is not necessarily the one portrayed by the expressionist argument. As seen below, the interaction between genetic and developmental information is important and implies why evolution in multicellular organisms may essentially be gradual.
modularity and microevolution
Consider a winged insect species under strong selection pressure to evolve terrestrial locomotion and lose its wings. Now suppose the existence of a mutation that enlarges the size of all appendages including wings and legs. It is easy to see that this mutation would be on the one hand advantageous for increasing leg size and favouring terrestrial locomotion, and on the other hand deleterious for increasing wing size instead of reducing it; in other words, the mutation causes ‘antagonistic pleiotropy’ (Williams, 1957). In this case, the fate of the mutant allele depends on its net effect on fitness: if the advantageous effect on leg size is stronger, the mutation may spread despite the associated deleterious effect on wing size. As seen in the previous chapter, Fisher’s argument for micromutations implied that the likelihood of a mutant phenotype being deleterious increases with the number of traits that it involves. Possible antagonistic pleiotropy may be also part of what Orr called the cost of complexity: in a more complex organism (which in Orr’s sense means an organism with more traits contributing to adaptation), it is more likely that a mutation increasing adaptation in one character may cause deleterious fitness effects on many other traits. If that is true, why has adaptive evolution not come to an absolute halt? The answer to that question is ‘developmental modularity’ (Wagner and Altenberg, 1996; Wagner et al., 2007), another consequence of patterning mechanisms. Development via specification of cellular modules, as exemplified by antero-posterior segmentation in Drosophila, is important in evolution for significantly reducing the cost of complexity discussed by Fisher and Orr. The main reason is that developmental modularity can neutralise one type of antagonistic pleiotropy, namely spatial pleiotropy. In simple terms, gene regulation may evolve so as to switch on or up-regulate a mutation in a module, organ or cell where its effects on fitness are positive, and at the same
Modularity and microevolution
time switch off or down-regulate the gene in places where its effects are deleterious. For this reason, patterning genes and cis-regulatory regions may facilitate the evolution of effector genes by controlling their expression levels, location and timing. Wagner and collaborators (2008) have offered further empirical corroboration to those conclusions, by studying pleiotropy in mice through quantitative trait loci (QTL) and showing that most mutations affect few traits in modularly organised animals. Developmental modularity thus explains the joint evolution of cis-regulatory and coding regions of genes identified by Khaitovich et al. (2005). Returning to the example of the winged insect under selection for terrestrial locomotion, we can imagine how a mutation causing appendage overgrowth might eventually evolve into a mutation causing only leg overgrowth (i.e. the mutation may lose its pleiotropic effects). For example, the gene involved may evolve a new binding site for a repressor in its cis-regulatory region; as exemplified by the eve stripe 2 mechanism, a repressor protein may be expressed only in the cell territory that develops into adult wings, but not in legs. In this case, the overgrowth mutation would in practice only ‘exist’ in leg cells; it would become an effector gene never used in the wings. An important conclusion is that due to developmental modularity the origin, evolution and disappearance of countless effector genes, signalling cascades and metabolic pathways may have taken place in a single body segment or organ, or a single cell type. Brain cells, bone cells or skin cells require particular subsets of genes, but those genes are likely to have disastrous effects on any other cell type. This means that both genes and phenotypic traits in multicellular organisms are to a certain extent fragmented into a series of developmentally independent units; each of those units responds for a fraction of the phenotypic dimensions of the whole organism, and for a fraction of the genome. For this reason, body plans, organs and cell types are less constrained to evolve and adapt (Wagner et al., 2008). Thus, if phenotypic change is slow and gradual as proposed by Fisher, it may be for reasons different from phenotypic ‘integration’ or complexity; as seen in the previous chapter, it may relate to ecological conditions such as the constant proximity of populations to adaptive peaks; when the conditions for adaptive radiations (or ‘adaptive revolutions’) are present, species seem able to evolve fast (Harmon et al., 2009). The role of developmental modularity in the microevolution and diversification of multicellular animals is exemplified in many ways; an interesting case is variation in bilateral symmetry. Whereas the
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left and right body sides frequently mirror each other in arthropods, vertebrates and other bilaterian taxa, in male fiddler crabs one of the two claws is enlarged and used in courtship of females and male contests (Rosenberg, 2001). Most fiddler crab species are antisymmetric, with half the population being right-handed and the remaining half left-handed. The claw that develops the larger size is randomly determined: soon after claw growth starts, one of the claws is lost, and the other develops large size. However, all species of the genus Gelasimus are right-handed, meaning that genetic determination of handedness has somehow evolved in the group. Nothing is known about the genetic or developmental mechanisms involved but it is believed that differential growth is achieved through mutual inhibition between the cell territories from which the two claws derive; this is only possible due to the modular nature of appendage development in crustaceans. Another example is morphometric diversification in vertebrate skeletons. Mammals typically exhibit seven cervical (neck) vertebrae, including giraffes where individual neck vertebrae grow much larger than thoracic (rib-bearing) vertebrae and larger than neck vertebrae in other mammals (Galis, 1999). The yet unknown genes behind the giraffe’s neck phenotype may be growth factors responding to the same patterning genes that induce morphological differentiation between neck and thoracic vertebrae early in development; those genes may be the vertebrate Hox gene homologues that specify the identity of vertebrate somites, the antero-posterior modules giving rise to vertebrae in chordates (Burke et al., 1995). The machinery of developmental modularity may have even evolved to perform a purely decorative function in some species. Intricate colour patterns in butterfly wings are produced by some patterning genes (Distal-less, Hedgehog) also involved in building the arthropod body plan (Brakefield et al., 1996; Keys et al., 1999). In panther chameleons, the coloured radial patterns, stripes, spots and even individual scales are to some extent a visualisation of the positional map of skin cells. Although the genes involved in the evolution of chameleon colouration are unknown, the patterning genes that organise body plan axes (antero-posterior, dorso-ventral, left–right) and morphology of appendages may have been deployed in skin cells to control pigment deposition in individual scales. The chameleon palette is extremely rich, including various shades of yellow, blue and red; these colours may have required both the evolution of exquisite pigments unique to chameleons (new ingredients and coding sequences) and changes in the expression of pigment genes (new recipe or binding sites in
The gradual evolution of homeotic mutations
cis-regulatory regions of pigment genes). The mechanism determining colour pattern in chameleons is highly sophisticated, including various cell types (some containing yellow and red pigments, others containing melanin, others reflecting blue light), besides the possibility of neurologically and hormonally regulated changes in colour (Schwab, 2001). Developmental modularity has thus contributed to the adaptive microevolution of multicellular body plans, as exemplified by an evergrowing list of examples (for summaries, see Kirschner and Gerhart, 2005 and Carroll, 2006). As seen below, it also offers an explanation for cases, most dear to the old mutationists, of apparent discontinuities in macroevolution.
the gradual evolution of homeotic mutations
Can the adaptive microevolution of modular body plans be the only or main source of their macroevolutionary diversity (i.e. the differences between arthropods and vertebrates, dipterans and four-winged insects and other cases of discontinuities)? A first look at the more than 30 extant animal phyla, most of them modularly organised (Gerhart and Kirschner, 1997; Carroll, 2006), might suggest that metazoan body plans are alternative combinations of the same structural elements (body axes, segments, appendages); even within the same phylum (arthropods being a clear example), variation in number and position of wings, legs, eyes and body segments explains a significant fraction of diversity (Raff, 1996). This means that the origin of new body plans may have relied to a large extent on the reshuffling of a small set of structural elements or modules. Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire originally proposed that new body plans had evolved by single-step mutational jumps, but as seen earlier it was due to Bateson (1894) and Goldschmidt (1940) that homeotic mutations, which replace or multiply whole body parts or segments, were postulated as possible agents of macroevolution. Given the analogy between homeosis on the one hand, and variation in number of body segments, wings, legs and eyes observed among dipterans, butterflies and spiders on the other, they could not avoid the conclusion that homeotic mutations were behind the sudden, although infrequent, origin of new body plans. Contrary to those expectations, developmental genetics has provided evidence that not only denies a role to homeotic mutations in macroevolution, but incorporates them into a fully gradualist view of
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evolution (Budd, 1999). This has occurred mostly due to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of ‘meristic’ variation, or changes across taxa in the number of similar structures such as vertebrae and appendages (Bateson, 1894; Stern, 2000). The repeated insect legs, arachnid eyes or dragonfly wings in a given species are more than just similar; they are in fact ‘serially homologous’ units derived from duplication of an original set of structures (Carroll et al., 2001). An example of meristic variation observed in the wild was given earlier by the variable segment numbers in British centipedes (where meristic variation is, however, derived; Arthur and Kettle, 2001); a case produced in laboratory conditions was the induction of extra eyes in Drosophila through the ectopic (i.e. misplaced) expression of the eye-inducing Pax-6 gene (McGinnis et al., 1984). The findings above are helping to clarify the macroevolutionary role of mutations able to change the number and position of body structures. The main conclusion is that meristic and homeotic variations are distinct, although related, phenomena. The familiar homeotic mutations discussed by geneticists must be meristic: by affecting segment identity, they also change numbers of at least two distinct structures (the bithorax mutation, for example, changes both leg and haltere numbers). However, meristic variation is not necessarily homeotic: there is no proper homeosis in British geophilomorph centipedes, since their middle segments vary in number but not in identity (the exception is the rarer example of homeosis affecting the terminal segments; Kettle et al., 1999). Furthermore, evidence from developmental biology, phylogenetic studies and palaeontology suggest that meristic variation and duplication of homologous structures or modules often precedes their differentiation; in other words, whereas meristic variation is primitive, homeosis seems to be a derived feature of the history of many animal lineages (Carroll et al., 2001). For example, instead of ‘horizontal’ (homeotic) links among wing morphologies of extant flies, butterflies and beetles proposed by mutationists, insect wing diversity is now seen as the result of gradual divergence from a common ancestor bearing two pairs of undifferentiated wings (Carroll et al., 1995). Phylogenetic analyses have shown that dragonflies, which display two undifferentiated wing pairs, retain the primitive morphology of this common ancestor (Carroll et al., 2001). Despite retaining a primitive undifferentiated pair of wings, the posterior wing pair in dragonflies develops in a segment already regulated by the homeotic gene Ubx, a feature also present in the more derived flies, butterflies
The gradual evolution of homeotic mutations
and beetles. The reason is that Ubx is responsible for other functions such as controlling differentiation between the second and third thoracic segments in general (Warren et al., 1994; Carroll et al., 1995). The fact that the posterior wing pair in all those taxa develops in Ubx territory is the key to revealing how distinct wing morphologies evolved. The differentiation of anterior and posterior wings in dipterans, butterflies and beetles occurred under the influence of effector genes under the control of Ubx. In other words, selection favoured genes taking a lift on Ubx or Antp, and causing the gradual differentiation between the originally similar wing pairs. This probably required the origin of new binding sites to Ubx and Antp in many low-order patterning genes and effector genes (for another gradualist scenario, see Budd, 1999). Thus, the same process of progressive modularisation of effector gene expression that explains the gradual evolution of elongated giraffe necks, asymmetrical claws in crabs, chameleon colours and many other cases of microevolutionary differentiation is also behind the differentiation of a primitive undifferentiated wing pair into the specialised structures found in derived winged insect groups. Fossil evidence revealed that even the dragonfly body architecture is a relatively derived arthropod body plan. The ancestor to all winged arthropods is now believed to have exhibited a series of similar segments along the A-P axis, produced by repeated duplication events (similar to what is observed in current British centipedes), each one bearing a pair of ventral legs and dorsal appendages (Kukalová-Peck, 1983); in other words, its morphology probably resembled that of a centipede with the addition of dorsal appendages. Dorsal projections are likely to have originally evolved to perform a respiratory function (Carroll et al., 1995), but in the extant winged insects they evolved into wings and appear in no more than two segments. Thus, the histories of body plan evolution and patterning gene diversification were closely connected in arthropods. Since the control of segment differentiation is a function of Hox genes, levels of segment differentiation should correspond to differences in spatial patterning of Hox gene expression (Akam, 1998; Gellon and McGinnis, 1998). For example, Hox gene expression should display a simpler spatial pattern in crustaceans (in which most A-P segments are fairly similar) than in the highly derived dipterans or butterflies with their highly specialised body segments and appendages. This was demonstrated by studies in the crustacean Artemia franciscana, in which Antp, Ubx and AbdA are expressed along most of the A-P axis in approximately the same developmental modules (Averof and Akam, 1995). In dragonflies,
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which exhibit a differentiation between thoracic segments (which carry wings and legs) and abdominal segments (with no appendages), one expects AbdA (which represses wings and legs in Drosophila) to be expressed only in abdominal segments; no data are available to test the prediction. Finally, in flies, butterflies and beetles, which show an even more elaborate differentiation between segments and appendages, the map of Hox gene expression is even more intricate, as revealed by the studies cited above. There is another consequence to the evolution of more derived body plans and differentiated appendages in arthropods: the gradual evolution of homeotic mutations. Based on the conclusions above, mutations in Ubx are unlikely to have a homeotic effect on dragonfly wings, since they are not differentiated. But in flies, where Ubx specifies the development of halteres only in the third thoracic segment, change in segment identity may – and does – occur due to mutations that inactivate Ubx. In other words, the homeotic mutations such as those creating the bithorax flies are a consequence rather than cause of body plan ‘individuation’ (Haldane and Huxley, 1927). It is also expected that those mutations become more deleterious, and therefore more difficult to be observed in viable organisms, as serially homologous segments and appendages of a body plan become more differentiated. This is the case of homeotic mutations in the number of cervical vertebrae in humans, which are associated with major morphological abnormalities and strongly opposed by selection for causing death before reproduction in almost all cases; this result is consistent with the strong conservation of cervical vertebrae number in all mammals except sloths and manatees (Galis et al., 2006). As homeotic effects become more likely in body plans displaying more differentiation and specialisation of segments and appendages, meristic variation is prevented and body plan architecture tends to ‘freeze’; for this reason, variation in segment number is found in natural populations of geophilomorph centipedes but not in flies or butterflies species. Thus, we may reanalyse the cost of complexity in the context of modular evolution: developmental modularity also means that the adaptive and gradual transformation of a given body plan is much less constrained than implied by Fisher’s and Orr’s ‘universal pleiotropy’, and eliminates the need for scenarios of evolutionary saltation between derived body plans – for example between four-winged insects as dipterans. In fact, it shows that such jumps are unlikely to happen. In summary, the evolution of developmental modularity was crucial to the organisation and evolution of metazoan multicellularity.
The origin of animal phyla
It opened the doors to the origin of differentiated segments, organs and other structures; to meristic variation and repeated deployment of structures once they emerged; and finally to further differentiation and specialisation of structures on physiological, morphological and adaptive grounds. As a final example, the cephalocordate Amphioxus may provide an idea of what the ancestral vertebrate looked like (Holland et al., 1992): the lancet presents the same pattern of antero-posterior segmentation and many repeated undifferentiated segments observed in crustaceans, geophilomorph centipedes and snakes (although in the last two groups the presence of many undifferentiated segments is derived). Basal vertebrates such as lampreys still preserve a body plan resembling this pattern, and it would be no surprise if meristic variation were observed in those groups. Meristic variation in fins is still observed in fish species (Angus and Shultz, 1983). Finally, the specialisation of individual vertebrae and vertebral regions in limb-bearing tetrapods has certainly limited meristic variation in vertebrae number (Narita and Kuratani, 2005). If it is true that appendages induce segment specialisation and conservation in antero-posterior segment number, snakes should be an exception to the rule. In fact, snake species are the only group of tetrapods displaying highly variable numbers of vertebrae across species (Cohn and Tickle, 1999), with some species having more than 500 vertebrae (Vonk and Richardson, 2008). Not surprisingly, snakes emulate centipedes and also present intraspecific variation in number of vertebrae (Peabody and Brodie, 1975).
the origin of animal phyla
Developmental genetics has also thrown light on a mystery that has intrigued biologists for almost two centuries. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire proposed that vertebrates and arthropods presented a fairly similar arrangement of structures and tissues along the dorsal-ventral (D-V) axis, namely a linear sequence of extra-embryonic epidermis, body coelom, gut, muscle wall, neural tube and ectodermic epidermis, except for an inversion of the axis; in other words, he interpreted chordates as arthropods sitting on their backs. Geoffroy postulated a deep homology of dorso-ventral organisation in the two taxa and claimed that only a hopeful monster (in current terminology, a macromutation) could explain the rare inversion event. Geoffroy’s hypothesis may be discarded on the basis that the structural elements being compared cannot be proven to be homologous (for
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the same reason nobody suggests an inside-out i nversion between the vertebrate endoskeleton and the arthropod exoskeleton). Surprisingly, studies showed that Geoffroy’s hypothesis cannot be simply dismissed. It was discovered that not only antero-posterior but also dorso-ventral structures in arthropods and vertebrates are derived from developmental modules controlled by homologous patterning genes. More dramatically, homologous patterning genes display inverted territories along the D-V axis in the two groups, suggesting an actual inversion of the axis (de Robertis and Sasai, 1996). However, demonstrating the existence of inverted gene expression is not the same as demonstrating a sudden axis inversion (Gerhart, 2000). Formulating an alternative gradual explanation is an equally difficult task, because the two phyla are evolutionarily distant and not much is known about their common bilaterian ancestor. For this reason, comparisons of vertebrates with their closer deuterostome relatives (especially echinoderms, urochordates and cephalochordates) should be more informative. The cephalochordate Amphioxus in particular displays various characteristics in common with the vertebrate body plan and is a good model for the general architecture of their common ancestor (GarciaFernández and Holland, 1994). Urochordata (which include ascidians and sea squirts) on the other hand are highly distinctive (Stach et al., 2008). They are classified as chordates on the basis of similarities during the larval stage, which presents chordate defining characteristics such as dorsal notochord and neural tube. But adults drastically depart this pattern and as a rule do not display bilateral symmetry (Swalla et al., 1999). Ascidians adopted a sessile lifestyle based on filtering, so that the larval mouth attaches to a substrate before metamorphosis takes place; as a result, the D-V axis cannot be clearly identified in the adult. Finally, echinoderms (which include sea urchins and starfish) are also known to relate to chordates due to similarities at larval stages but adults also depart from bilateral symmetry and in this case adopt a pentameric or fivefold radial pattern, and no proper dorsoventral axis can be identified (Peterson et al., 2000). The conclusion is that instead of one sudden episode of inversion, the D-V axis may have not existed at some point of the chordate lineage; an absent D-V axis characterises two of the three deuterostome groups described above. The three deuterostome groups also exhibit Hox gene clusters, but in echinoderms Hox genes are only expressed after the larval stages (Lowe and Wray, 1997; Martinez et al., 1999) and play a role different from the absent A-P axis organisation. For similar
The challenge of multicellularity
reasons, it is possible that the inverted D-V axis in vertebrates relative to arthropods was derived from an ancestor where the axis, but not the D-V molecular machinery shared with arthropods, was already absent (Gerhart, 2000; Matus et al., 2006). Thus, a combination of phylogenetic analysis and developmental genetics suggests a scenario where a radical body plan reorganisation occurs gradually rather than by a sudden mutational jump.
the challenge of multicellularity
The discovery of patterning genes, cis-regulatory regions and developmental modularity opened a window to a clearer understanding of how animal body plans evolve and are moulded by selection. Although the existence of a regulatory dimension in the genome (Davidson and Erwin, 2006) has changed our views on biological information, changes in regulation are not the only or predominant basis for evolution as implied by King and Wilson’s expressionist hypothesis. Patterning mechanisms are relevant for catalysing and facilitating evolutionary change, beginning with the very microstructure of the gene: developmental regulation led to the co-evolution of transcription factors coded by patterning genes on the one hand and of cis-regulatory regions and coding sequences of countless effector genes on the other; this implies the co-evolution of the genetic code and developmental code, and of developmental recipe and ingredients. This means that the evolution of multicellularity and its dependence on the developmental information did not imply that genetic information lost importance; on the contrary, multicellularity demonstrates that more complex organisms require the simultaneous contribution and joint evolution of multiple levels of biological information. Developmental genetics has also made a fundamental contribution to microevolutionary theory by showing how developmental modularity helps in overcoming the cost of complexity implied in Fisher and Orr’s concept of universal pleiotropy (Stern, 2000). Modularity has facilitated the evolution of new genes and proteins on the basis of their potential effect on a single structure (wing or eye genes) or cell type (brain cell or liver cell genes). Thus, the possibility of gradual evolution in animals cannot be easily derived from particulate inheritance (or genetic modularity) alone; it is more clearly understood as a consequence of both genetic and developmental modularity. At the macroevolutionary level, patterning mechanisms have revealed how the origin of extant animal body plans may have taken
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place without need for hopeful monsters (Akam, 1998). The derived animal architectures found in flies and butterflies, for example, seem to have evolved not from each other by major homeotic rearrangements, but from ancestors displaying less differentiated modules and weaker selection against meristic variation. It was the subsequent moulding of modular body plans that gradually led to the freezing of animal body plans and selective resistance to sudden structural change, and to the deleterious character of homeotic mutations observed in vertebrates and arthropods. Thus, the important role of changes in regulatory mechanisms do not mean, as potentially implied by the expressionist argument, that changes in ingredient genes are less relevant; it implies that macromutations are essentially unnecessary, and that the evolution of ingredients has extensively accompanied the evolution of derived body plans and disposable somatic cells. Finally, patterning mechanisms and developmental modularity provide key hints to the evolution of animal multicellularity itself. Multicellularity is ultimately an extension of the Principle of Order; from an original distinction between genotype and phenotype (or informational genes and functional proteins) that emerged with the DNA World, multicellularity evolved as a new form of phenotypic order (the soma or modular whole consisting of disposable somatic cells) derived from a new form of microscopic order (the developmental order mediated via informational proteins or transcription factors and cis-regulatory regions). Gene regulation via interacting transcription factors and cis-regulatory regions had their precursors in direct regulation by molecules present in the environment and simpler feedback mechanisms (such as the lac operon in E. coli), and then evolved towards regulation by molecules coded by organisms themselves: patterning genes and their products. Those products, the transcription factors, represented a fundamental evolutionary innovation: they are proteins that have no enzymatic or structural function and serve the sole purpose of connecting genes into networks of information. Developmental modularity therefore rests on the pillars set by genetic modularity; genetic inheritance is fragmented into independent genes, and genes themselves present modular cis-regulatory regions carrying binding sites able to arise, disappear and independently evolve (Carroll et al., 2001). It is important to notice that mechanisms of RNA interference do not invalidate the argument; regulatory RNA molecules act side by side with protein regulators, and since genes coding for regulatory RNAs must be stored in DNA molecules, they
The challenge of multicellularity
may be regulated via cis-regulatory regions and transcription factors like other genes (Holbert, 2008). In the following chapter, further consequences of the distinction between somatic and germline cells to the life cycle are discussed: especially, the processes of ageing and death that characterise multicellular organisms are shown to have evolved as the ultimate expression of somatic disposability.
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4 Life cycle evolution: life and death of the soma
The hypothesis of natural selection presented by Darwin in the Origin of Species offered a new solution to old mysteries such as adaptation and the origin of species and also offered breakthrough analyses of new mysteries such as male ornamentation and facial expressions in animals. It is surprising that Darwin, aware of the far-reaching consequences of natural selection, has thoroughly neglected a virtually universal feature of life: the inevitability of senescence and ‘natural’ death. The silence about the topic in Darwin’s writings is even more unexpected as we realise that ageing satisfies all conditions for evolutionary treatment. Senescence and death can be estimated both at the individual and population level through life tables, and measured in its physical or behavioural aspects (Stearns, 1992; Austad, 1993). Rates of ageing and individual longevity within species are influenced by genes and are partially inheritable, which means they are potential targets of selection (Korpelainen, 2000). Longevity is also highly variable across species (Carey and Judge, 2002); many of us are aware of the differences between longer-lived (cockatoos, elephants, humans) and shorter-lived species (warblers, mice, fruit flies). Finally, longevity is likely to affect fitness for obvious reasons: other things being equal, longer-lived individuals in a population are expected to leave more descendants (Stearns, 1992). If other inheritable traits affecting fitness such as body size, shape or behaviour have evolved by natural selection, longevity should be no exception. Perhaps the reason for Darwin’s neglect is the difficulty of considering death or senescence as adaptive and a product of natural selection in any palpable sense; after all, death is the final defeat in the struggle for survival. From this perspective, all we should know about ageing and death is that organisms are expected to evolve features to 102
Life cycle evolution: life and death of the soma
avoid or postpone them at any costs. However, species have failed to extend life indefinitely and are all mortal (although exceptions are possible in theory and perhaps even in nature, with ageing in bacteria being a particularly controversial issue; see Rose, 1991 and Stephens, 2005). Why has natural selection apparently failed to avoid senescence and natural death in almost all species? A first step towards the answer is to understand that there is more to biological ageing than wear and tear, and more to death than ultimate damage caused by extrinsic factors. Twenty-first-century humans, for example, have managed to create safe, almost diseasefree environments in which life of some individuals is everything but a struggle for survival, and yet death inevitably happens. Of the healthiest 100-year-old human beings living in Western societies, one third has a likelihood of dying before turning 101, and the likelihood of any of us surviving to age 140 is now still close to zero despite observed increases in life expectancy. The same is true for other animals as life in captivity rarely doubles the maximum longevity of a species in the wild (Carey and Judge, 2002). Death and senescence are inevitable because they seem to follow not only from accidents but also from ‘natural causes’ or intrinsic functional decay. Intrinsic or biological decay increases the likelihood of accidental death itself to occur: for example, diseases or infections that organisms can easily fend off at earlier ages become lethal at old age because of immunosenescence, or ageing of the immune system (Ginaldi et al., 2001; Palacios et al., 2007). In summary, the deleterious changes associated with senescence at old age seem to be as natural and important as the developmental changes that occur early in the life cycle. This suggests that genes may store not only the information guiding development from a fertilised egg to an adult organism, but may be responsible for the changes that make death more likely with increasing age. The fact that genes are behind the adaptations that help us in the struggle for survival, and at the same time seem to set us up for natural death, defines the evolutionary paradox of ageing. Based on the original insights of Weismann, the evolutionary theory of senescence built step by step by Fisher, Medawar, Williams, Hamilton, Kirkwood and others is seen as a solution to the paradox of natural death. Understanding the theory requires a change of perspective: while senescence explains the inevitability of death in development, in evolution it is the inevitability of death that explains senescence. Life history theory (Harvey and Nee, 1991; Stearns, 1992; Charnov, 1993) has extended evolutionary theory of senescence to the
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understanding of other key landmarks of animal life cycles such as birth, weaning, sexual maturity and menopause in animals (Harvey and Purvis, 1999; Hawkes and Paine, 2006). Together, the evolutionary theory of senescence and life history theory provide an explanation for why natural selection produced organisms that inevitably age and die, despite the apparent advantages of eternal youth. Finally, natural death is a product of evolution in an even more fundamental sense. Ageing and natural death in animals are intrinsically linked to the evolution of animal multicellularity, since they are the physiological expression of the somatic disposability. The origin of disposable multicellular phenotypes had another important consequence: the origin of a new evolutionary law, namely that the power of natural selection decreases with individual age. weismann’s two insights
The starting point of the evolutionary theory of senescence was August Weismann’s (1889) remarks on the division of labour between somatic cells and germline cells in multicellular organisms. Weismann’s argument can be better understood if a parallel is drawn to another key principle in biology, the ‘central dogma of molecular biology’ proposed by Crick (1970). The central dogma postulates a one-way flow of information in biological entities: information can only flow from DNA, through an RNA intermediate, to proteins. The fundamental dogma elucidates the distinction between genotype and phenotype at the molecular level, and is therefore a mechanistic rather than evolutionary principle. Weismann’s contribution was to propose that the germline versus soma distinction implies that the functional part of multicellular organisms (the soma, or different cell types, tissues and organs) is meant to die, so that another part (our germ cells and gametes) may replicate and survive across generations. Somatic cells were therefore an evolutionary extension of proteins: they evolved as purely functional units of the multicellular whole, and like proteins, may be as a rule continuously replaced by new ones. Germline cells are in contrast the eternal link between generations (Surani, 2007). For this reason, only mutations occurring in the germ cells can be transferred to descendants; mutations in somatic cells such as those causing cancer do not go beyond the individual and the generation in which they occur. Weismann correctly grasped the mechanistic distinction between informational germ cells and functional somatic cells, but there is a
Weismann’s two insights
crucial difference between the germline versus soma theory and the central dogma. In addition to the division of labour between DNA and protein, in multicellular organisms one finds a further division of labour among DNA molecules themselves: whereas the DNA molecules carried by germline cells store information required for reproduction, most DNA molecules are present in somatic cells. Despite being informational entities, somatic DNA is relegated to the same disposable and purely functional role of proteins and somatic cells. Thus, whereas disposable proteins cannot produce further copies of themselves, somatic cells (either differentiated cells such as skin cells or brain cells, or the stem cells that give rise to the former) carry their own DNA hard copy and can in principle rebuild themselves, replace proteins with new ones, and produce new copies typically by mitosis (cell cloning) during the whole life cycle or at least during development. The fact that somatic cells are disposable despite carrying DNA leads to a question: if a soma can continuously generate new somatic cells and rejuvenate itself, why do organisms die? Is it not expected that an organism that constantly replaces cells in the skin, muscles, liver or brain before organs show any sign of ageing can be an everlasting or potentially eternal source of gametes, and therefore fitter than any mortal competitor? According to Weismann, the reason for senescence and natural death in multicellular organisms was selection against old individuals. To understand his argument, consider a population with ages ranging from newborn to ‘old’. Natural selection is in action, so that all individuals compete against each other for survival; this includes competition between the young and the old. According to Weismann, the victory of the old in the struggle for survival would be a tragedy for the species, since it would mean diverting resources away from potentially more fertile individuals (the young) towards the less vigorous (the old). That would bring about an obvious cost to the group in terms of total offspring number and fitness. Weismann argued that senescence and natural death evolved as adaptations that eliminate the old, clearing the way for the youngest generations; the younger can do a much better job at successfully reproducing and transmitting genes into a new generation than senile individuals. Thus, for Weismann natural death occurs as a form of deliberate genetic homicide and implies the existence of ‘killer’ genes that specifically eliminate the selfish elderly who want to perpetuate themselves. Weismann’s argument was shown to be wrong (Medawar, 1952). Firstly, the argument appeals to group selection: it proposes that
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specific old-age killer genes would evolve due to a hypothetical advantage to the group, despite being unfavourable to (old) individuals. But as previously seen, there are more individuals than groups, and since the individual life cycle is faster than group cycles, natural selection operating on individuals is generally more effective (Williams, 1966). For this reason, even if Weismann were correct and old individuals were a liability to populations, selection would not necessarily lead to the evolution of senescence and natural death via killer genes. Secondly, Weismann’s logic was intrinsically circular: it tries to explain senescence and natural death by characterising the old as being less fit than the young, and therefore assumes as a starting point what it is trying to explain. In summary, Weismann’s two insights contributed in important but distinct ways to the development of evolutionary theory. The first (the germline versus soma distinction) ranks alongside Crick’s central dogma of biology as one of the crucial axioms of biology. The second insight (that senescence is the product of natural selection), although incorrectly explained by Weismann, inspired evolutionary biologists to find better explanations for ageing and natural death. fisher’s second fundamental principle
It took over 30 years until the first solid argument for natural death based on individual selection was formulated by Fisher (1930) in his Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. The breakthrough was his definition of fitness as a measure of the total or overall reproductive success of an individual during its life, a variable currently known as ‘lifetime reproductive success’ (Stearns, 1992); it is therefore a sum over the whole individual life cycle. At any given point of the individual life cycle, a fraction of the reproductive output has already been expressed as past reproduction, while a remaining fraction is yet to occur as future reproduction. The fraction of reproduction expected from an individual in the future was defined by Fisher as its ‘reproductive value’ at that age, and is the key variable to his argument. For example, the reproductive value of an individual at the start of sexual maturation must be relatively high since all its reproduction is yet to happen, while the reproductive value of a postmenopausal woman on the other hand is nil; reproductive value thus decreases as individuals approach the end of their life cycle. From the idea of age-dependent reproductive value, Fisher made a crucial statement about adaptive evolution by arguing that the power of
Fisher’s second fundamental principle
natural selection to distinguish between fit and unfit must also vary with age. The argument is clear if we use the language of allele competition. Suppose the existence of a wild-type or common allele at a given locus, and the occurrence of a new lethal mutant allele that when expressed causes immediate death. Let us assume that this mutant allele is expressed soon after birth. In this case, since the lethal mutation kills all its carriers at an early age before they reproduce, it simply cannot make it to a second generation: by killing an organism before its reproduction occurs, the mutation is virtually committing suicide. For this reason, selection will strongly oppose the spread of any lethal mutant that is expressed at early stages of the life cycle, when all of or most reproduction is still expected to occur (i.e. when reproductive value is high). Now let us assume the occurrence of the same lethal gene, with one single difference: it only manifests its deadly effect at older age, when most reproduction has already occurred (i.e. when reproductive value is low). In this case, individuals carrying the mutation may still have their fitness lowered since death interrupts reproduction. But the fact is that selection acts too late in this case. Since most of individual reproduction has already taken place, copies of the lethal mutation make it to the next generation before it kills its original carriers. Humans provide an extreme example of this process: in the case of a mutation that only manifests its lethal effect in women over the age of 50 (i.e. after menopause in most women), there is virtually no difference in reproduction between a carrier and a non-carrier of the lethal mutation. Since death occurs after the end of reproduction (i.e. when reproductive value is zero), the lethal mutation replicates as successfully as the wild-type allele. The conclusion is that the same lethal mutation may be strongly opposed in one case, and pass totally unnoticed by selection in another, purely as a function of its early or late timing; specifically, the power of selection to eliminate lethal or deleterious mutations decreases with individual age and reproductive value. This s