MITIGATION
STUDIES IN PRAGMATICS General Editor: Bruce Fraser Associate Editors: Kerstin Fischer, Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen The Studies in Pragmatics series is dedicated to publishing innovative, authoritative monographs and edited collections from all micro-, macroand metapragmatic linguistic perspectives. Rooted in the interdisciplinary spirit of the Journal of Pragmatics, it welcomes not only book proposals from linguistics proper but also pragmatically-oriented proposals from neighboring disciplines such as interactional sociology, language philosophy, communication science, social psychology, cognitive science, and information science. The goal of the series is to provide a widely read and respected international forum for high quality theoretical, analytical, and applied pragmatic studies of all types. By publishing leading edge work on natural language practice, it seeks to extend our growing knowledge of the forms, functions, and foundations of human interaction.
Other titles in this series: FISCHER
Approaches to Discourse Particles
AIJMER & SIMONVANDENBERGEN
Pragmatic Markers in Contrast
FETZER & FISCHER
Lexical Markers of Common Grounds
Forthcoming: HABERLAND
Future Prospects for Pragmatics
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MITIGATION
CLAUDIA CAFFI University of Genoa, Italy Department of Italian, Romance Languages, Humanities and Arts (DIRAS)
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ISBN-13: 978-0-08-044334-8 ISBN-10: 0-08-044334-6 ISSN: 1750-368X For information on all Elsevier publications visit our website at books.elsevier.com Printed and bound in The Netherlands 07 08 09 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Studies in Pragmatics (SiP) General Editor Bruce Fraser Boston University, USA Associate Editors Kerstin Fischer University of Bremen, Germany Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen University of Copenhagen, Denmark Consulting Editor Jacob L. Mey University of Southern Denmark, Denmark Editorial Board Kent Bach, San Francisco State University, USA Diane Blakemore, University of Salford, UK Shoshana Blum-Kulka, Hebrew University, Israel Claudia Caffi, University of Genoa, Italy Alessandro Duranti, UCLA, USA Marjorie Goodwin, UCLA, USA Hartmut Haberland, University of Roskilde, Denmark William F. Hanks, University of California, USA Sachiko Ide, Tokyo Women’s University, Japan Mikhail Ilyin, Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Russian Federation (MGIMO), Russia Richard W. Janney, University of Munich, Germany Kasia Jaszczolt, University of Cambridge, UK Elizabeth Keating, University of Texas, USA Sotaro Kita, University of Bristol, UK Ron Kuzar, University of Haifa, Israel Alec McHoul, Murdoch University, Australia Brigitte Nerlich, Nottingham University, UK Etsuko Oishi, Fuji Women’s University, Japan Srikant Sarangi, Cardiff University, UK Marina Sbisà, University of Trieste, Italy Maxim Stamenov, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgaria Deborah Tannen, Georgetown University, USA
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To Elvira
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CONTENTS Acknowledgments
xv
Introduction
1
Foreword Presentation of the corpus Structure of the book Transcription conventions List of abbreviations List of metalinguistic abbreviations Glossary
Chapter 1 Pragmatics: subject and subjectivity 1.0. 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.3.1. 1.3.2. 1.3.3. 1.4. 1.5. 1.6. 1.7. 1.8. 1.9. 1.10.
Foreword Towards a psychostylistics of interaction A ‘loaded’ discipline The subjectivity of language The instance d’énonciation (Benveniste, 1966) The deictic origin (Bühler, 1934) The egocentric child (Piaget, 1989 [1926]) A complex subjectivity Stylistic markers Semiotic markers The function of identity maintance and ‘speech markers’ (Giles et al., 1979) Contextualizations cues (Gumperz, 1982a) Mitigation: first definitions Bridging the gap between linguistic pragmatics and self-psychology
1 3 5 9 9 10 11
13
13 15 21 24 24 25 26 28 29 35 36 38 40 43
x
Contents
Chapter 2 Mitigation: the background 2.0. 2.0.1. 2.0.2. 2.1. 2.1.1. 2.1.2. 2.1.3. 2.1.3.1. 2.1.3.2. 2.1.4. 2.1.4.1. 2.1.4.2. 2.1.4.3. 2.1.5. 2.1.6. 2.1.7. 2.1.8. 2.1.8.1. 2.1.8.2. 2.2. 2.2.1. 2.2.2. 2.3. 2.3.1. 2.3.2. 2.4.
Introduction Structure of the chapter Scopes of mitigating devices Ideas of mitigation Mitigation in different research areas: the empirical turn Hedges in Brown and Levinson (1987) Mitigation as vagueness: hedges Lakoff (1972) Bourdieu (1982) Mitigation as indirectedness (Fraser, 1975; Leech, 1983; Holmes, 1984) Fraser (1975) Leech (1983) Holmes (1984) Mitigation as de-focalization of deictic origin Mitigation as removal of unwelcome perlocutionary effects (Fraser, 1980) Prince, Frader, and Bosk (1982) The notion of weakening (Abschwächung) Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten (1982) Langner (1994) Intensity Intensity according to Bally (1970 [1909]) Intensity according to Strawson (1964) Towards an extended notion of mitigation Some conceptual distinctions The multidisciplinary relevance of mitigation Conclusions
Chapter 3 Pragmatics of mitigation: bushes, hedges and shields 3.0. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.3.1.
Introduction Mitigation as a bridging category Types of mitigating devices (Habermas, 1987 [1981]) The functioning of mitigation Bushes
47
47 47 49 51 51 53 56 56 60 61 61 63 64 66 66 69 70 71 72 73 74 76 80 80 87 89
91
91 93 95 97 98
Contents
3.3.2. 3.3.3. 3.3.4. 3.4. 3.5.
Hedges Combination of bushes and hedges Shields Other strategies of mitigation: quotational shields and topical shields Conclusions
Chapter 4 Mitigation and emotive communication: steps toward a psychostylistic approach
4.0. 4.1. 4.1.1. 4.1.2. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.4.1. 4.4.2. 4.4.3. 4.4.4. 4.5. 4.6. 4.7. 4.7.1. 4.7.2. 4.8. 4.8.1. 4.8.2. 4.9. 4.10.
Introduction Style as a psycholinguistic issue: the role of emotion Mitigation as an empathic strategy: attunement (Stern, 1985) The other edge of the sword: mitigation as an anti-empathic strategy On the conceptualization of emotion in linguistic theories A folk psychological category: involvement An approach to emotive communication (Caffi and Janney, 1994b) Emotive communication and emotional communication The notion of emotive contrast Types of emotive devices Emotive closeness and distance: empathic deixis Immediacy (Wiener and Mehrabian, 1968) Equivocation (Beavin Bavelas, 1985; Beavin Bavelas et al., 1990) Disqualification Haley (1959) Mitigation and diqualification Transactional disqualification (Sluzki et al., 1967) Types of transactional disqualification Reactive moves to transactional disqualification The Freudian concept of ‘undoing’(Ungeschehenmachen) Conclusions
Chapter 5 Doctor-patient dialogue: a case-study 5.0. 5.1. 5.2.
Introduction Analysis of a dialogue at a primary care physician’s The broader summary of the encounter: the fabula
xi
102 104 106 114 117
121
121 123 125 129 132 136 138 138 139 141 143 145 149 150 150 152 154 155 157 158 159
161
161 163 165
xii
Contents
5.2.1. 5.2.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. 5.8. 5.8.1. 5.8.2. 5.9. 5.10. 5.11. 5.12.
The phases of the encounter The recurrent trend of the phases Between fabula and plot: salient moments of the encounter Muldimensional microanalysis of TR1: the plot The argumentative layer The illocutionary layer: overall illocutionary description of the phases Mitigation and institutional politeness in TR1 Micro-sequences of (non)-attunement Topical and stylistic non-attunement Micro-sequences of stylistic attunement Distribution of mitigators Mitigation and monitoring of emotive distances Co-variance among parameters Conclusions
Chapter 6 Grammar of mitigation in doctor-patient dialogue 6.0. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.5.1. 6.5.2. 6.6. 6.6.1. 6.6.1.1. 6.6.1.2. 6.6.1.3. 6.6.2. 6.6.2.1. 6.6.2.2. 6.7. 6.7.1. 6.7.2. 6.7.3.
Introduction Preliminary questions Mitigation and institutional politeness Types of mitigation Between natural and non-natural mitigation: a transitional case Non-natural mitigation Lenitive mitigation Tempering mitigation Linguistic means of lenitive and tempering mitigation Linguistic means of lenitive mitigation Lenitive mitigation and deference Summary of linguistic means of lenitive mitigation Strategies of lenitive mitigation Linguistic means of tempering mitigation Prepositional phrases in tempering mitigation Summary of linguistic means of tempering mitigation Mitigation and felicity conditions (constitutive rules) Attenuation of compliance with essential rules Attenuation of compliance with preparatory rules Attenuation of compliance with the propositional content rule
167 168 171 176 185 186 189 192 192 195 197 200 202 204
207
207 209 212 216 217 220 220 222 226 226 236 238 240 242 251 254 255 256 256 257
Contents
6.7.4. 6.8.
Mitigation as side-effect of the reinforcement of the sincerity rule Conclusions: toward a pragmatic typology of mitigators
xiii
257 259
Conclusions
263
Bibliography
273
Appendices
299
Appendix A: TR1, dialogue at a primary care physician’s (Ch. 5) Appendix B: Examples from Chapter 6 A) ‘Lenitive’ mitigation (directive acts) B) ‘Tempering’ mitigation (assertive-verdictive acts) C) Other types of mitigation (other acts)
301 317 317 320 323
Name Index
325
Subject Index
333
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank all the colleagues, students and friends who have been sources of encouragement, constructive criticism and support. Covering the winding and obstacle-ridden path to this book – what with rethinking, shortening, and translating the original Italian version (Caffi, 2001) – has required a lot of time and effort. I now find it impossible to individually acknowledge all those who have been supportive along the way. I will thus mention only a few. Letizia Cirillo has greatly helped me at all the different stages of this time- and energyconsuming work, generously accompanying me from the first draft and tentative translation into English to the final editing of Chapters 1-4 and 6. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Richard W. Janney, who was ‘exposed’ to the first version of the book and gave me precious feedback. Among those whose help I have to mention are: Salvatore Attardo, Alessandra Fasulo, Shona Fowler, Sara Gesuato, Hartmut Haberland, Klaus Hölker, Giulio Lepschy, Margaret Malone, Jacob L. Mey, Bice Mortara Garavelli, Amanda Murphy, Marina Sbisà. I would like to thank Sarah Oates and Christopher Tancock of Elsevier for their support and patience. I also would like to thank the series editor, Bruce Fraser, who helped me to straighten out the line of reasoning of the book and enhance its cohesion and clarity. Any remaining faults and deficiencies are certainly only my own. Finally, I owe a special thanks to the anonymous doctors and patients who were willing to have their interactions recorded, thus making this research possible. I do hope that, at least in the long run, this work may be useful to them all.
Genoa, January 2006
Claudia Caffi
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INTRODUCTION o vita pauperum, deus meus, in cuius sinu non est contradictio, plue mihi mitigationes in cor, ut patienter tales feram. Aug., Conf. XII, XXV 34. O life of the poor, my God, in Whose bosom there is no contradiction, pour a rain of mitigations on my heart, so that I may bear those people with patience. (my translation, C.C.)
FOREWORD The key idea behind the present book is very simple: style is inherent in the use of language. However useful heuristically, the neutral, ‘gray’ expressions used as examples in linguistics, including pragmatics, do not exist but in the minds of linguists. In real life, our utterances are usually modulated, i.e. stylistically ‘colored’ in order to fit different contexts and to express our feelings. As real speakers, we do not normally say things like France is hexagonal. At best, if pressed, we may say If I’m not wrong, France is sort of hexagonal, isn’t it? Nor do we usually say The cat is on the mat. We are more likely to say something like Your damned cat is on my mat again, get it off right now, and so on. Even the most impersonal forms of communication such as warning notices seem to be touched by the need of coloring. For instance in New York, we may happen to be threatened not by the neutral No parking, but by the reinforced form Don’t even think of parking here. At other times we may feel the actual need to express our personal investment in what we say, that is, to convey more than the simple subscription to the truth of the propositional content of our utterances. This need also surfaces in stylistic choices. And it is precisely this need that makes Galileo say “And yet it moves”, (“Eppur si muove”),
2
Introduction
instead of a detached “the earth turns”, and risk his life. 1 Style is not only a matter of manners. If pragmatics is the discipline that deals with authentic language usage in the real world, as I think it is, it must necessarily take style into account. Talking about modulation is a pragmatic way of talking about style, which makes an otherwise excessively broad and conceptually loaded category fully operational. Unlike the general category ‘style’, ‘modulation’ foregrounds the active, intentional and personal dimension of stylistic choices. It refers to the operations that speakers perform to vary the intensity of their speech acts. Speakers constantly make their speech acts either ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’, that is, they vary the intensity of their utterances, as a pianist does with notes by using the pedal. 2 Variations of intensity that we constantly experience signal variations in emotive involvement, which is a pragmatic way of referring to the speakers’ inner world surfacing in their choices in discourse. In their goal-directed, communicative behavior, speakers usually modulate their utterances in two opposite directions, namely mitigation and reinforcement. Mitigation is the weakening direction of modulation. Its counterpart in the opposite, strengthening direction is reinforcement. The latter covers all the operations aimed at giving prominence to a given linguistic choice. In actual speech, it is often impossible to distinguish between the two: a formal mitigating device can be functionally reinforcing. Indeed, mitigation is inherently ambivalent. And this ambivalence is just one aspect of the rhetorical functioning of speech. Let us consider, for instance, a type of mitigation, a litotes such as “John is not bright”. How is the negative form to be interpreted? In such cases, it is up to the interlocutor, contextually, not only to decide on the illocutionary force of the utterance – whether it is an assertion, a piece of criticism, a piece of advice, etc. – but also to interpret its propositional content as being either weakened or reinforced. In the present example, the speaker may think that John may be a bit shy, just too uptight for his role, or simply dull. 3
1
This example can be found in Bally (1965 [1925]: 15), where he introduces the distinction between the intellectual mode (mode pur) and the affective mode (mode vécu) (cf. 2.2.1.). For a discussion, cf. Hübler (1987: 362 ff.). 2 This simile is found in Spitzer (1931 [1928]). 3 Litotes, double negatives, etc. have been the object of an impressive body of scholarship over the centuries and in recent pragmatics. I consider some of the relevant literature in Caffi (1990) and Caffi (1992) where, while rejecting the alleged automatic hyperbolic nature of litotes, I propose ‘indeterminacy’ among its constitutive pragmatic features. Here suffice it to mention the studies by Horn (in particular, Horn, 1989; Horn, 1991), a classic in this field of research, which, however, is still lacking an adequate empirical basis. Empirical evidence supporting the view that “negation markers hedge information rather than discard it”, i.e. data corroborating the ‘retention hypothesis’ as opposed to the ‘suppression hypothesis’, can be found in Giora et al. (2005a). According to this view, which has been put forward by many authors and is compatible with the traditional rhetorical treatment of litotes, “information introduced via negation would be retained and tinge the interpretation of the negated item so that the outcome is a mitigated product involving both the negativity of the negation marker and also the expressed meaning of the negated item” (ibid.). “He is a little…somewhat…not exceptionally
Introduction
3
Speakers mitigate out of uncertainty, caution, or consideration. Briefly put, they mitigate to attune with others. Mitigation is pervasive in speech, as speakers do not commit themselves more than is strictly necessary. Far from being limited to a matter of politeness, mitigation captures rationally grounded behavior mainly aimed at avoiding unnecessary risks, responsibilities and conflicts. At the same time, mitigation indexes the type of speaker we want to be taken for in a given encounter. In other words, mitigation is a way in which pragmatics addresses the issue of the linguistic co-construction of our (multiple, fragmented, uneven, even if not contradictory) identity. An issue of this kind can only be dealt with in an integrated interdisciplinary approach which combines rhetorical, stylistic, psychological and linguistic reflection on the actual functioning of human interaction. A speaker’s (mitigated) style encompasses the main pathways leading up to every linguistic action. These pathways are emotions, language, and relationships with others. Self psychology, linguistics, and sociology provide us with the analytical tools to guide us along these pathways. Pragmatics provides us with the tools to study the ways in which these very pathways intertwine in speech. In following this ‘labyrinth’ from the specific angle of (micro-) stylistic choices, I will use as a thread a botanical metaphor: ‘bushes’, ‘hedges’ and ‘shields’ are the labels of three basic mitigating strategies. Bushes are devices that introduce vagueness in the propositional content of an utterance. Hedges are mitigators centered on illocutionary force. Shields are the operations centered on the ‘I-here-now’ of the utterance, i.e. its deictic origin. By means of shields the source of the speech act is veiled, disguised or deleted. The different types of mitigators, which are investigated in Chapters 3 and 6, are taken from my corpus of doctor-patient interaction in spoken Italian.
PRESENTATION OF THE CORPUS My main concern in the present book is to set up an integrated pragmatic framework for the analysis of interactional strategies, and to describe mitigation strategies in spoken Italian within this framework. In order to avoid a generic and idealized analysis, it is necessary to limit the type of data to be examined, and to select it from a specific activity type. Verifying principles, categories, and explicative hypotheses ‘live’, so to speak, against real data, i.e. in situated communicative situations, is not a by-product of a theory, nor a mere testing of tools applied to a certain field. Rather, if we are not content with ‘desk-pragmatics’, such verification is a necessary step in the researcher’s back-and-forth movement between analysis and synthesis, that is, in her/his constant reflection on her/his data. In the psychological field, Freud saw an “inseparable bond” between theory and the method of bright” is an example discussed in Giora et al. (2005b), whose main goal is to show the hedging functions of negation markers in ironic remarks.
4
Introduction
treatment. Similarly, in an integrated pragmatic framework, theory and praxis cannot be separated, and in addition, their osmosis has to be brought to light. The choice of doctor-patient interaction is due to the fact that mitigation is clearly of great relevance to doctor-patient discourse, and to therapeutic discourse in general. In the present book I rely on my previous research into the subject which appeared in Caffi (2001). 4 On the whole, mitigation is obviously a way of being cautious with respect to words/actions that may entail risks, which are particularly evident in the asymmetrical context of doctor-patient interaction. In this shortened version of a book originally written in Italian, I have refrained from fully describing this type of institutional discourse as such.5 Much work has already been done on asymmetrical doctor-patient encounters (cf., among others, Haberland and Mey, 1981; Raffler-Engel, 1990; Ehlich et al., 1990; Todd and Fisher, 1993; Have, 1995b; Wodak, 1997; Cordella, 2004) and no attempt will be made in this book to review this literature. Nor will I endorse an orthodox conversational analytical methodology. Rather, my approach will combine several different perspectives. The data of this study consist of 25 transcripts of doctor-patient and psychotherapeutic conversations collected from 1993 to 2001 in two big towns of Northern Italy in different clinical settings (see below). The length of the recording is about 9 hours. The resulting corpus contains the following types of data: 17 transcripts of doctor-patient dialogues (TR1-TR17); 1 transcript of a psychiatric interview (TR18); 7 transcripts of psychotherapeutic dialogues (TR19-TR25). The dialogues are of variable length: the psychotherapeutic dialogues are often very long, lasting an average of 45 minutes; the doctor-patient dialogues are often very short, as in the case of the exchanges taking place during the ward-round at the hospital. However, they have all been transcribed in their entirety. The excerpts discussed in the present work (Chapters 3, 5, 6, and Conclusions) are taken from the following types of medical contexts: 5 4 3
dialogues at a primary care physician’s (TR1-TR5, PC); dialogues during visits at a specialist’s (TR6-TR9, SpV); dialogues during the round at the obstetrics ward at the hospital (TR10-TR12, WR);
4 The theoretical model as well as the typology of mitigators proposed in Caffi (2001) have been used and developed, also in a contrastive perspective, by Hölker (2003) and Schneider (forthcoming). 5 Linguistic aspects of institutional discourse are discussed in, among others, Drew and Heritage (1992); Gunnarsson, Linell and Nordberg (1997); Sarangi and Roberts (1999). On asymmetries in dialogue see, among other, Marková and Foppa (1991); De Swaan (1990).
Introduction
5 1 7
5
dialogues during post-operative examinations of patients who have undergone radiotherapy (for cancer) (TR13-TR17, Rt); dialogue during a psychiatric visit to a public institution (TR18, PsV); psychotherapy sessions held by three different psychotherapists (TR19-TR25, PsS).
The doctors involved had a micro-recorder running, which could be seen by the patients. The patients had previously been informed of the recording for research purposes and had given their permission. In the case of psychotherapy sessions, the recording was actually part of the professional’s routine practice. In order to further guarantee privacy and to avoid introducing distracting factors into the analysis, such as my personal acquaintance with the doctor, I have used materials obtained through third parties who acted as intermediaries and guarantors. This is an advantage, not only from an ethical point if view, but also from the point of view of the need for neutrality in observation, and it greatly outweighs the disadvantage of the lack of precise information on the interactional partners.
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK The structure of the book is as follows:
Chapter 1 Pragmatics: Subject and subjectivity sketches the general view of pragmatics that best suits an extended notion of mitigation. The chapter has three major goals. First, it recasts mitigation in a broad framework that enables us to consider the different dimensions of mitigated stylistic choices. Mitigation highlights the subjective quality inherent in speech. More precisely, it is a trace of the speaker’s ongoing process of adaptation to the hearer. Pragmatics can thus be defined as the study of the ways in which the subjective orientation of every speech act becomes intersubjective. Second, it lays the foundations of an integrated pragmatic approach. With this goal in mind, it is possible to gain important insights into subjectivity, which have a bearing on mitigation, by drawing on the works of such authors as Benveniste, Bühler and Piaget. Third, it is argued that mitigation lends itself to connecting practical needs and relational needs, which all contribute to determining the speaker’s linguistic choices. Indeed, different dimensions are convergent in these choices. They are: the identity-oriented dimension (relevant to the interlocutors’ social roles), the emotive dimension (relevant to the interpersonal distances geared by a given formal choice), and the emotional dimension (relevant to the subject’s inner world and various selves). Only an integrated pragmatic approach makes it
6
Introduction
possible to deal with this last dimension, whose central role has been recognized in principle as much as it has been neglected in practice.
Chapter 2 Mitigation: The background explores previous research on mitigation both historically and theoretically. First, it presents a selected overview of studies on mitigation produced in the last few decades. The criterion adopted for selection is deliberately focused: previous studies are clustered around the three scopes of mitigating devices, i.e. proposition, illocution, and deictic origin. In the first case, mitigation is basically seen as vagueness, in the second as indirectness, and in the third as deletion of the speaker as the actual source of the utterance. Second, a specific connection between stylistics and speech act theory is proposed. This connection, hinted at by Strawson (1964), is the notion of intensity, or its operational counterpart, namely (reinforcing or mitigating) modulation of illocutionary force. The crucial point is that our understanding of intensity phenomena is part and parcel of our understanding of speech acts. Finally, some conceptual distinctions (e.g. mitigation as a process vs. mitigation as a result, illocutionary vs. perlocutionary mitigation, etc.) are made with a view to shifting from a narrow to a broad concept of mitigation.
Chapter 3 Pragmatics of mitigation: Bushes, hedges and shields has the major goal of investigating the ways in which mitigation increases or reduces the speaker’s distance from both the utterance and her/his interlocutors. The chapter draws on the discussion of actual examples of mitigating strategies in spoken Italian to show that mitigation works in a multilevel, multidimensional way. In order to start building a typology of mitigating devices in spoken Italian, some of the examples to be discussed in Chapter 6 from a grammatical viewpoint, are discussed here from a functional viewpoint. Specifically, the three categories of mitigators, namely bushes, hedges and shields, are analyzed in their cognitive and emotive impact. ‘Quotational’ and ‘topical’ shields, which reveal the strategic mitigating potential of discourse texture, are presented. Finally, the correspondences between rhetorical, psychological, and pragmatic categories introduced throughout the book are summarized. These correspondences, however tentative, can be regarded as possible non-generic starting points for future research that aims at connecting fields that have for too long been unrelated. This chapter (and this book as a whole) is an attempt at rediscovering the unity of our knowledge about our words, ourselves, and our relationships with others that ancient rhetoric established as its main goal at its very outset.
Introduction
7
Chapter 4 Mitigation and emotive communication: Steps toward a psychostylistic approach investigates mitigation from the viewpoint of psychological research. It is a decisive step toward the construction of an integrated approach that takes into account emotive factors involved in mitigating processes. Key notions such as ‘involvement’ and ‘immediacy’, which lend themselves easily to bridging pragmatic and psychological research, are discussed. An important contribution to a better understanding of mitigation mechanisms is the notion of attunement as conceived by Stern (1985) in a developmental psychoanalytical framework. In everyday life, mitigation indexes the speaker’s attempt to tune in to her/his interlocutor. On the other hand, mitigation may increase distances, inasmuch as it aims at controlling the ongoing interaction and implicitly marks the speech act in which it occurs as potentially problematic. Hence mitigation runs the risk of being anti-empathic. Important evidence supporting this thesis is gathered from an independent field of research, namely research on schizophrenic speech. Conceptual categories elaborated in that field serve to describe and explain microparadoxes which punctuate verbal ‘normal’ exchanges. In particular, an insightful category is found in Haley’s (1959) and Sluzky et al.’s (1967) category of disqualification. The overall sense of this notion is the avoidance of responsibility in communication, and some types of mitigation perform precisely this task. The main point of the chapter is to show that psychological and linguistic insights in mitigation are heading toward this same conclusion.
Chapter 5 Doctor-patient dialogue: A case-study applies the views on mitigation set up in the previous chapters to the analysis of a whole doctor-patient dialogue. In particular, substantiating one of the tenets pointed out in Chapter 1, this chapter shows how mitigation, in the broad sense of stylistic downgrading choices, meets both instrumental and relational goals. The dialogue in question is a peculiar exchange in which the patient does not show the expected deference toward the expert and even seems to challenge his role. On his part, the doctor fails to attune to the patient’s style. A detailed, multi-layered analysis of the dialogue is provided, which zooms in on the text and comprises a global description of the macro-phases of the institutional encounter as well as a turn-by-turn reconstruction of the interlocutors’ interactional work. A recurrent pattern emerges: after a phase of potential conflict, the interlocutors reach a compromise. Sequences of interactional attunements or failures of attunement are identified. The interlocutors go through a difficult negotiation in order to avoid open conflict. The chapter aims at proving that, in describing, so to speak, in slow motion, the role of mitigation in this negotiation work, the sociolinguistic perspective must be integrated with the psycholinguistic perspective: style is the place where the interplay of social factors (power) and psychological factors (emotions) surfaces in discourse. To take into account this
8
Introduction
interplay is vital in order to reach an adequate, though inevitably tentative, reconstruction of the processes through which speakers (re)construct meanings and pursue their goals. In particular, the chapter stresses the role of emotive factors triggered by mitigation in the construction of meaning and in the mutual adjustment of relational distances.
Chapter 6 Grammar of mitigation in doctor-patient dialogue discusses excerpts taken from my corpus of transcribed doctor-patient conversations. From a descriptive standpoint, it offers an overview of the linguistic means (morphological, syntactic and prosodic) used in a standard variety of spoken Italian in a given institutional setting (therapeutic encounter) to obtain an attenuating modification of speech acts. These mitigators are clustered around two macro-types of speech acts: requests and statements. Mitigation is labeled ‘lenitive’ in the former case and ‘tempering’ in the latter. Lenitive (or deontic) mitigation accounts for the various cases in which the degree of imposition of the directive is weakened. Tempering (or epistemic) mitigation encompasses the various cases in which what is weakened is the commitment to the truth of the assertion. This overview leads to a theoretically relevant result. The analysis of formal devices of tempering mitigation in assertive-verdictive acts and of lenitive mitigation in exercitive-directive acts shows a structural analogy between these two types of mitigation. Further, the punctual reference to felicity conditions for both types of mitigation allows for the explanation of this analogy.
In a short conclusive chapter (Conclusions) the mitigation strategies in spoken Italian discussed in the book are listed in a final typology.
The book ends with two Appendices: the first Appendix (Appendix A) gives the transcript of the doctor-patient dialogue analyzed in Chapter 5 in the original Italian version and in its English translation. The numbering of lines in the English translation has been adapted so as to correspond as closely as possible to the Italian original. The second Appendix (Appendix B) lists the examples, both in the original Italian version and in English, on which the analysis carried out in Chapter 6 is based.
Introduction
TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS . ? , ! -: ƑƑxx xxx XXX °xxx° h = +xxx* (…?) ((xx)) […] >xxx< <xxx> xxx
falling intonation (statements) rising intonation (questions) suspensive intonation exclamations pause up to 2 seconds pause between 2 and 5 seconds lengthened sound truncated word unclear word word pronounced in a louder voice word pronounced in a lower voice audible breath latching overlapping (+ indicates where overlapping starts and * where it ends) reasonable guess at an unclear word/segment comments by the transcriber omission faster pace slower pace emphasis
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS D P Hp T C PC SpV PsV WR Rt PsS TR
doctor patient head physician therapist client visit at a primary care physician’s visit at a specialist’s psychiatric visit ward round radiation therapy psychotherapy session transcript
9
10
Introduction
LIST OF METALINGUISTIC ABBREVIATIONS DIM
ĺ
FEM ĺ FIG IFID EMD FTA IMD NP PMD SING SUBJ
ĺ ĺ ĺ ĺ ĺ ĺ ĺ ĺ ĺ
diminutive suffix feminine suffix figurative meaning illocutionary force indicating device enunciative mitigating device face-threatening act illocutionary mitigating device noun phrase propositional mitigating device singular subjunctive
Introduction
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GLOSSARY Classes of illocutionary acts (from Austin, 1962) Verdictives ĺ are typyfied by the giving of a verdict…by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire. But they need not be final. They may be, for example, an estimate, reckoning, or appraisal. Exercitives ĺ the exercising of powers, rights, or influence. Examples are appointing, voting, ordering, urging, advising, warning, etc. Commissives ĺ are typified by promising or otherwise undertaking; they commit you to doing something. Behabitives ĺ are a very miscellaneous group, and have to do with attitudes and social behaviour. Expositives ĺ they make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation, how we are using words, or, in general, are expository. Examples are ‘I reply’, ‘I argue’, ‘I concede’, ‘I illustrate’, ‘I assume’, ‘I postulate’. (adapted from Austin, 1975 [1962]: 151-152)
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1 PRAGMATICS: SUBJECT AND SUBJECTIVITY But if it is true, as De Saussure claimed, that the linguistic system is similar to the rules of chess, it also holds true that we must take into account not only the play but the player.* Terracini, 1976: 102; my translation, C.C.
1.0. FOREWORD We realize that something exists only when it fades, disguises itself or disappears. We know that ‘the subject’ 1 – to borrow a label from folk psychology – is there only when, while addressing the other, s/he is tiptoeing, stepping back, or preparing a way for retreat. These movements of approximation, subtraction, deletion or masking leave a number of traces on the surface of a discourse. Such traces and their interactional consequences are precisely what this book is about. It can also be said that the present book deals with the different ways in which speakers are on their guard, blurring their utterances, toning them down, and making them somehow revocable. Since these adjustments are usually carried out by means of modulations in intensity resulting in stylistic oscillations between weakening and reinforcing choices, it is difficult to distinguish clearly between the modes of cognitive and relational non-commitment and those,
* The original sentence is the following: “Ma se, come disse il Saussure, il sistema linguistico è simile alle regole degli scacchi, resta che oltre al gioco si debba tener presente il giocatore” (Terracini, 1976: 102). I am well aware of the shortcomings of this term and the ubiquitous ambiguity between (at least) its everyday meaning of ‘subject-matter’, ‘topic’, and the specialized meanings that linguistics has assigned to it. Nevertheless, in this chapter devoted to subjectivity, I have adopted the term ‘subject’, which is also employed in the English translation of Benveniste’s famous article, La subjectivité dans le langage (Benveniste, 1966, English transl. 1971), to mean ‘the speaking subject’. Possible alternates such as ‘the speaker’, ‘the utterer’, etc. should in principle be discarded because they are reductive, hence unsuitable for an integrated approach. Throughout this book, I employ such phrases for the sake of simplicity, since clarity has to be preferred over consistency. I am grateful to Giulio Lepschy and Salvatore Attardo for having discussed this point with me.
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on the contrary, of commitment and involvement. 2 In any case, the basic idea behind this book is that all these stylistic movements, regardless of their direction, are an integral part of the dynamics of discourse and share the same goal: the speaker’s adaptation to the hearer and the communicative situation. The idea of adaptation is at the very core of mitigation, the latter being the concept I have decided to use in order to capture part of the dynamics of discourse. The fact that, by communicating, interlocutors continually adjust to each other and build up the sense of their linguistic actions and their agreement about them, is one of the few generally shared assumptions of linguistic and pragmatic theories. Different versions of this assumption can be found across the centuries in philosophical, sociological and linguistic reflections on language. However, this assumption is rooted above all in classical rhetoric, and in the even older Homeric and Pythagorean notion of polytropy, the ability to speak in many different styles that Homer attributes to Ulysses. Ulysses was polÚtropoj because he could find the most suitable way of addressing his interlocutors. 3 This versatility indicates wisdom, whereas choosing a single discourse type regardless of one’s different interlocutors and situations betokens ignorance. Moreover, the speaker’s ability to adapt her/his discourse to others, an art which seems to have been mastered by Pythagoras as well, is typical of good medicine, in that care of patients must be polÚtropoj and adjusted to their different needs and characteristics (cf. Rostagni, 1955: 6). Polytropy, as praised by Homer, corresponds to communicative versatility, which is the ability to adjust to the other and her/his codes. Such an ability is at the very core of what was known as rhetoric in the past and is now known as pragmatics. Polytropy depends on the assessment of circumstances. The criterion used to choose the communicative option most suitable to the circumstances (i.e. what to say and how to say it) is what classical rhetoric calls pršpon (Lat. decorum), i.e. what is appropriate. If we master this competence, we will be able to find the right thing (to say and to do) at the right moment, seizing what the Greeks called 2
Definitions of ‘involvement’ will be presented in 4.3. As is well-known, commitment is a key notion in speech act theory both in Austin’s and in Searle’s versions: it is the notion both authors employ in order to capture the concept of responsibility for a speech act which in the present study is assigned a fundamental role. Within a philosophical theoretical framework, the notion of discursive commitment is at the center of Brandom’s study (1994). A differential comparison between commitment (a cognitive, dichotomous category) and involvement (an emotive, scalar category) is advanced by Katriel and Dascal (1989) (cf. 4.3.). 3 Homer defines Ulysses as polÚtropoj, i.e. as the man who can speak in many ways. Such an epithet, however, has also the negative meaning of ‘sly’ and ‘deceitful’, which does not match Homer’s praising intent in describing his hero. So why does the poet call Ulysses polÚtropoj? The answer to this question lies in the fact that Ulysses is a wise man, in that he possesses the ability to adapt discourse to different situations. As highlighted by Rostagni (1955), this is the substance of a fragment by Antisthenes, who was one of Gorgias’ disciples, the latter being the founder of rhetoric in the Magna Graecia of the 4th century B.C. Antisthenes’ fragment is part of a collection of Homeric questions assembled by Porphyry in the 3rd century A.D.
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kairÒj. Following Pythagoras, who first theorized it (cf. Rostagni, 1955: 11), kairÒj is related to metapragmatic awareness, i.e. to knowledge of both language and the world and the ability to fit one to the other (cf. Caffi, 1994a; 3.1.).4 Discourse has to vary in order to adapt to changing circumstances, including the different speaker and listener stances, times, places, persons referred to or addressed, and so on. It is therefore necessary to know the different forms of discourse in order to act appropriately and choose the types of discourse that comply with the situation. The idea of adaptation is assigned a fundamental role in seminal works at the beginning of the twentieth century both in sociology and linguistics. If, in the field of sociology, Max Weber (1922) placed the concept of adjustment at the center of his definition of ‘soziale Beziehung’ (social relation), in the same years, in the field of linguistics, Charles Bally developed his stylistics of language around the central idea of ‘adaptation au milieu’ (adaptation to the situation). Speakers, says Bally (1970 [1909]: 297; cf. 2.2.1.), boost or weaken their discourse in order to reach their interactional goals. This adjustment to the situation, in its broader sense of the speaker’s adjustment to a given interactional context is, precisely the main function of mitigation. Adaptation, which is also one of the key concepts in systemic theories (cf. Bertalanffy, von, 1968; Le Moigne, 1977; Le Moigne, 1995 [1990]), is so crucial in pragmatic approaches that some authors (e.g. Verschueren, 1987) have even interpreted pragmatics in its different levels and units of analysis as a theory of adaptation. In the present chapter I will present my general view of an integrated pragmatic approach. I would like to make the following points. First (Sections 1.2.-1.5.), I wish to point to the need to bridge the gap between pragmatics and individual psychology around an articulated idea of subject: pragmatics must take into account the emotive dimension which is crucial in the discursive building of identity. Second (Sections 1.6.-1.9.), I wish to argue that the bridging of this gap, far from being a generic aspiration, can be approached by considering the linguistic micro-choices which previous research has often conceptualized as broad categories of speech markers. Third (Section 1.10.), I wish to advance some preliminary definition of ‘mitigation’ starting from the idea that it meets practical as well as relational needs.
1.1. TOWARDS A PSYCHOSTYLISTICS OF INTERACTION The conceptual framework that I intend to propose in this book is centered on the pragmatic and rhetorical aspects of the co-construction of sense in interaction. The framework I have in mind aims at integrating different approaches to the study of communication, in particular 4
Interestingly, the concept of kairÒj as related to the ‘here and now’ subjective experience, is used in a non-orthodox psychoanalytic approach by Stern et al. (1998) and Stern (2004).
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rhetorical and psychological approaches, which tend to remain too distant from each other. The general view of communication I subscribe to is that of a complex system where many parameters – be they discrete or scalar, central or peripheral – interact. I will use the term ‘parameter’ in its everyday sense of “a quantity whose value varies with the circumstances of its application” (Webster’s new world dictionary, 1988: 980). The basic reason for adopting this term and its systemic theoretical framework is summarized by one of the premises of system theory applied to human communication, namely the assumption that the parameters of an open system are more important than the system’s initial conditions (cf. Watzlawick et al., 1967: 127). The advantage of this perspective lies in the fact that it allows a dynamic approach to the interaction insofar as the focus is on the system’s functioning and contextual organization. The basic meaning I ascribe to the concept of mitigation – which I use as a synonym for attenuation – is the result of a weakening operation on one of the interactional parameters. As said in the Introduction, mitigation is one of the two directions of modulation, as opposed and complementary to ‘reinforcement’. 5 The concept of modulation has its analogue in the concept of intensity (cf. Bally, 1970 [1909]; Labov, 1984; 2.2.). However, while the latter is static and objectivizing, both ‘modulation’ and ‘mitigation’, as action nouns, highlight the intentional process performed by an agent aiming at the attainment of specific goals. Modulation makes it possible to shift the focus from the immanent (a parte obiecti) idea of the stylistic gradient of texts or discourses to the idea (a parte subiecti) of a speaking subject making plans and employing strategies to accomplish them. 6 The subject I have in mind is not a monolithic, compact, entity, i.e. the psycho-physical subject which most pragmatic theories are content with. Though fragmented, s/he is an allround figure, as opposed to disembodied subjects of semiotic formalism and to the numerous ‘men without qualities’ that inhabit linguistics. Far from nurturing the illusion of a ‘natural’ nucleus of communication that precedes theorization, I subscribe to the idea of subject that we have all internalized as speakers and competent members of a given social group. This subject 5
The term ‘modulation’ is used by Halliday (1976: 200) to refer to “a kind of quasi-modality” and by Lyons (1977: 65) to refer to “the superimposing upon the utterance of a particular attitudinal coloring, indicative of the speaker’s involvement in what he is saying and his desire to impress and convince the hearer”. The term is also used in Georges Mounin’s works with reference to a technical procedure of translation. The term ‘modulation’ is also used to refer to different communicative styles in the field of psychoanalysis (cf. Meltzer, 1981) and developmental psychology. In the field of cognitive psychology, the phrase ‘emotional modulation’ is employed by Hugdahl and Stormark (2003) with reference to emotional influences on selective attention. Newman and Lorenz (2003) use the term ‘response modulation’ in dealing with the interrelations between deficient response modulation and psychopathology. My use of the term draws on physics, where modulus means ‘intensity’, which is a scalar parameter defining a measurable quantity (e.g. a force). 6 I have borrowed the a parte obiecti vs. a parte subiecti distinction from Conte (1999 [1988]), who introduced it to characterize two different notions of (textual) coherence.
Pragmatics: subject and subjectivity
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is endowed not only with linguistic competence – extended as it may be to include sociopragmatic aspects – but also with what can be called an ‘emotive competence’. One of my main purposes in trying to sketch an integrated theoretical framework is to give full weight to the emotive investment and impact of a given utterance, especially a mitigated one, in a given context. In other words, within a general framework that takes into account heterogeneous dimensions, it must be possible not only to ask the question of what the utterance act means from a (macro-)social point of view (as the product of an agent that plays different roles) and a micro-social point of view (as the product of an actor assuming various face-saving and facepromoting strategies), but also to take into consideration how much the utterance act matters to the speaker and to what extent s/he is involved in it. In fact, the listener also weighs the utterance act as the product of a psychologically complex subject, whose emotive involvement or non-involvement with her/his utterance and partner in communication is part and parcel of the here and now of her/his discourse. The available theories of politeness (for a discussion, cf., among others, Held, 1992; Eelen, 2001; Watts, 2003; Fraser, 2005) do not fully recognize that the social dimension of politeness is molded into an individual form, for instance into stylistic choices. This simple fact has been kept too much in the background, leading to the conclusion that pragmatics must take individual psychology into consideration. I consider two approaches particularly relevant to my idea of subject: the study of discourse (utterance, utterance act) in European pragmatic linguistics of the early eighties and the conversational approach in its beginnings. The reasons for their relevance lie in the fact that both these frameworks deconstruct, although in different ways, the monolithic idea of the subject into a fragmented and multifaceted notion. As to the former theory, the category of the utterance act makes it possible to investigate the notion of subjectivity as inherent to and interwoven into every type of discourse, even the apparently most neutral kind of speech. As Ducrot (1980: 40) put it, every time we speak, we are speaking about our discourse (“dès que l’on parle, on parle de sa parole”), i.e. the utterance act is a constitutive element of the utterance meaning. The existence of a unit of analysis called ‘utterance act’ does not necessarily imply the inclusion of a psychological dimension in pragmatics, but it is an important preliminary step toward such an inclusion, in that it opens up the possibility of using specific conceptual categories to better understand the links between language and subjects. An approach of this kind, however, remains essentially linguistic and monological, in which the speaker is still disembodied – a shadow projected onto her/his utterance by means of signs of reflexivity and polyphony that are often intangible. On the other hand, the conversational approach, which dismantles the flows of messages to capture recurring patterns, considers the subject a mask or face, i.e. “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact” (Goffman, 1967: 6). What is crucial for my line of reasoning is that not only does the person defend her/his face, but s/he also “becomes fond of it and feels an emotional attachment
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to it” (ibid.: 7). As Goffman claims: what the person protects and defends and invests his feelings in is an idea about himself, and ideas are vulnerable not to facts and things but to communications. Communications belong to a less punitive scheme than do facts, for communications can be by-passed, withdrawn from, disbelieved, conveniently misunderstood, and tactfully conveyed. (Goffman, 1967: 43)
As a consequence, communication must be approached very cautiously. Caution is brought about precisely by mitigation, with its inventory of adjustments, circumlocutions, evasions, seductions, sidestepping, disguising, etc. To use a Greek calque, mitigation is a form of eupraxia, which may entail the risk of dispraxia. In other words, the speaker who mitigates tries, in doing so, to foster the attainment of her/his goals but at the same time may run the risk of undoing what s/he is doing. This is the ‘other edge of the sword’ that will be specifically discussed in Chapter 4. In an integrated pragmatic approach that takes both linguistic and sociologic aspects into account, the speaker must be able to take on an identity – no matter how ephemeral – which s/he continuously negotiates with her/his partner in the interaction. In other words, in this approach, the psychological, emotive dimension of speech in context plays a crucial role. This psychological dimension must be regarded not as a datum, a substance, or a presupposed reality, but as a dialogic construction, a zigzag path that is uneven for most of the time, a process undergoing constant revision. The attention that one needs to pay to the surface of discourse, in its stylistic ripples and modulations, makes it possible to deal with the issue of identity from a partial, and precisely for this reason viable, perspective. 7 In pragmatics, identity can only be seen as a co-identity, i.e. an interactive construction process. The construction of one’s identity, no matter how partial and temporary (e.g. a given professional role), requires a contrastive focus on the constraints set by a given context with respect to an unlimited range of expectations about speakers’ behavior and their stylistic choices. In the present work, I will analyze excerpts of real interactions from a pragmatic-linguistic point of view. In so doing, I will address the question of how the interactional system in its various parameters works, making hypotheses as to what relational effects result from the different values assigned to such parameters. This type of analysis will confirm the salience of the emotive dimension within the system. One of the points I would like to make is precisely that emotion plays a crucial role in the system, in that it serves the adjustment of emotive distances (cf. Caffi, 2000). Further, its importance is usually realized ‘when something goes wrong’, i.e. 7
Within the interpersonal function, Fairclough (1992) distinguishes between relational and identity functions. According to the author, the latter, which has often been ignored by linguists, must not be overlooked or subsumed under the expressive function. In fact, the construction of identity through discourse is a function of language in its own right.
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in the interactions where this emotive ‘thermostat’ is defective. In this respect, a comparison with the distant field of psychoanalytical research in its later developments, when it pays more and more attention to the interactional dimension, is enlightening. According to a generally accepted hypothesis in psychoanalytical theories, the starting point of one’s relational story is the mother-child dyad: the child’s trauma is caused by the absence of attuned responses at an emotive level. In other words, the child’s trauma originates from the lack of an “affectintegrating, containing, and modulating intersubjective context” (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992: 54). 8 Should further studies in such fields as developmental and cognitive psychology prove this hypothesis, then the importance of an adequate calibration of emotive components and of the mutual attunement for the functioning of an interactional system would be confirmed. In the last few years, psychoanalysis has taken an interpersonal turn (cf. Mitchell, 1988). Similarly, but in the opposite direction, this book is meant to be a contribution to ‘an intrapersonal turn’ in pragmatics. Let me explain this point in greater detail. So far, pragmatics as a whole as well as in its different branches, has focused on the speaking subject and the world, dealing with the relation between the two in both directions, i.e. ‘ego vs. the world’ and ‘the world vs. ego’. Pragmatic studies have considered, on the one hand, how words can change the external world, and on the other hand, how the external world affects words. This is what Searle (1975) called ‘direction of fit’ (of words to the world and, vice versa, of the world to words), which has become one of the basic criteria used to classify speech acts. The subject has been mainly seen in her/his social dimension. It is not by chance that one of the key concepts of modern pragmatics is the transparent theatrical metaphor of ‘face’ and ‘persona’ in its original meaning of ‘mask’. Against this background, the two elements ‘subject’ and ‘world’ have been basically thought of as static and monolithic, whereas in reality it would seem more profitable to think of them as the result of mutual and often conflicting interrelations in which two basically nebulous concepts aggregate around a form no matter how temporary this might be. Secondly, Goffman’s metaphor of everyday life as the staging of a play – a metaphor dating back to baroque writers, Shakespeare and even earlier to the medieval and classical traditions – would seem to have been interpreted too literally. Indeed, the psychological aspects of the interaction have so far been either neglected or underestimated (cf. Caffi, 1992; Caffi and Janney, 1994b; 8
According to Stolorow and Atwood (1992: 31-32), “The shift from drives to affectivity as forming the basis for the dynamic unconscious is not merely a change in terminology [...] the regulation of affective experience is a property of the child-caregiver system of reciprocal mutual influence. [...] The child’s affective experience, for example, becomes increasingly differentiated and cognitively elaborated through the attuned responsiveness of caregivers to his emotional states and needs. [...] Such attunement must, of course, be communicated in a form that coincides with the child’s unfolding psychological capacities. It follows from this conception of consciousness becoming articulated within an intersubjective system that two closely interrelated forms of unconsciousness may develop from situations in which the requisite validating responsiveness is absent”.
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Caffi, 1999b; Caffi, 2000). As a result, the speaking subject of pragmatics has been reduced to a face, a ‘man without qualities’, to quote Musil’s title, that has the sole function of fulfilling a role, like Winnicott’s (1965) ‘false self’, who is just what others want her/him to be, i.e. a complaisant response to others’ expectations rather than a creative and original initiative. In short, face can be defined as ‘what society expects us to conform to’. I believe that modern pragmatics, which has gone beyond the stage where the anthropological, historical, and psychological subject had to be replaced by a formal structure, could adopt a less reductionistic attitude and rediscover the subject behind the qualities, the person behind the mask. In other words, it is high time that pragmatics raised the issue of the construction of identity in discourse, without thereby suffering a loss of disciplinary autonomy and being absorbed by psychology. Clearly, from a pragmatic perspective, identity has to be ratified by the interlocutor, and is, therefore, a co-identity that is constructed and negotiated within the interaction. Goffman (1959) himself distinguishes forms of behavior aimed at reaching certain practical goals from the supplementary, stylistic qualifications of such forms of behavior, which are used by the actors to represent the persona they want to be seen as. 9 Many anthropological and sociolinguistic studies on identity (e.g. Gumperz, 1982; Erickson and Shultz, 1982; Duranti, 1997), as well as philosophical works (e.g. Perry, 1975) and the social psychology of self-presentation (e.g. Tedeschi, 1981), are all important contributions in this sense. I suggest that the conceptual and theoretical space of pragmatic investigation should be expanded to describe with specific analytical tools the communicative dynamics that point in another direction, i.e. ego vs. internal world. This would acknowledge the importance of the intra-subjective, as opposed to the inter-subjective, dimension of communication, which can be inferred from surface cues – be they prominent or slight, predictable or unexpected – appearing in a given (co-)context. In other words, pragmatics has to extend its scope to include the psychological-emotive dimension. The aim should not be to venture into some kind of individual psychology, but to take into account, within a comprehensive study of communicative competence, what has been called “emotive capacity” (cf. Caffi and Janney, 1994b). This concerns the modes we use to construct, confirm, change and reinforce ourselves and our various ‘selves’ by means of discourse and communication. The social roles that we 9
This difference is the basis for Brown and Levinson’s (1987 [1978]: 100) distinction between rationality and face, which are considered two opposing interactional needs. Bange (1992: 68) suggests that a distinction should be made between two fundamental aspects of interactions, namely the rational, targeted, instrumental aspect, which concerns the use of means which are suitable to reach a goal, and the relational aspect, which includes a ceremonial or ritual component. According to Rom Harré (1985: 186), Goffman’s model lacks the basic notion of moral order against which the performance takes place. Self-presentation means showing oneself as compliant with a given image of value. In other words, “social personas are not given, they are constructed. And among the methods by which the construction is achieved is the choice of language. We present and define ourselves in everyday situations, using common rhetorical devices”.
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temporarily activate are affected by and intertwined with our different selves, subjective stances, feelings and emotions. The study of this still nebulous field of interrelation between communication and emotion requires an investigation into the links between psychological, sociological and linguistic interdependent variables within the system. So far, these variables have been mainly dealt with separately, without a systematic reference to their mutual connection, disjunction, neutralization or co-variance. In the next few chapters, I will try to map out some paths of what I would like to call the ‘psychostylistics’ of interaction. In so doing, I will use the rhetoric-pragmatic umbrella category of mitigation. Such a holistic and systemic approach must also encompass the affective components of the interactional system, in order to tackle the underestimated and almost totally suppressed dimension of ‘personal meaning’, or ‘meaning for the self’, which is always present in our communication with others and is foregrounded in therapeutic interactions. From a pragmatic perspective, this dimension may well be seen as an issue of emotive distances, with respect to both the content of communication and the interlocutor. These distances can be inferred from the analysis of enacted communicative choices. Without losing sight of the empirical need to anchor to the surface of texts, it is necessary here to retrace the less studied and conventionalized stages of the inferential process underlying the communicative exchange. This operation is indispensable, in that the management of psychological distances is inherent in communicative competence during both the encoding and the decoding of messages (cf. Frijda, 1982: 112). Moving away from the analysis of various types of mitigation, I will illustrate a multilevel, multi-dimensional, inferential process, where grammatical and semantic phenomena shade into pragmatic modalities, which, in turn, shade into psychological effects (cf. Givón, 1989). “Depth must be hidden. Where? On the surface”. This is what the Italian writer Italo Calvino (1988: 74; my translation, C.C.) stated quoting Hofmannsthal. The path I will try to outline, by retracing and making explicit what we continuously do as skilled interpreters when we communicate, starts precisely from the surface, i.e. from stylistic micro-choices, which represent stylistically and emotively relevant variations.
1.2. A ‘LOADED’ DISCIPLINE 10 If linguistics, as has been argued, is based on the choice of analytical radicalism, pragmatics is marked by an even more radical option. This is the impossible challenge of grasping the meaning of the utterance act, which involves a message addressed by a speaker to a hearer in a 10
Pragmatics: the loaded discipline was the title of the 3rd Rasmus Rask International Conference held in Odense, Denmark, on November 4-5 1996, the proceedings of which appeared as a special issue of the “Journal of Pragmatics”, Vol. 31, 1999.
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complex, unique context. This challenge is more or less present in the great variety of studies known as ‘pragmatics’. In fact, some ‘pragmatic’ approaches simply expand semantic investigations to include contextual variables. Here pragmatics is essentially a method. On the other hand, other approaches consider pragmatics to be a constitutionally multiple discipline that gives voice to the epistemological concerns of other fields of study, such as socio-linguistics, psycholinguistics, cognitive sciences, rhetoric, etc. The challenge for pragmatics is to capture “the point where language and the world meet” – if indeed they are ever separated – in the linguistic situation (Weinrich, 1966: 17, my translation, C.C.). In other words, pragmatics tries to capture discourse in its development, the unfolding linguistic action while it modifies (or attempts to modify) participant roles and contexts, whether they are assigned a merely discursive status or whether they are regarded as having an extralinguistic status. Since the object of study of pragmatics is communicative action and language in movement, the theoretical model to be constructed has to take into account dynamic, although to some extent idealized, objects. This does not entail the predominance of parole over langue – a dichotomy already challenged by Bally in his work on stylistics – but implies the search for typical contextualized patterns (like Wittgenstein’s ‘linguistic game within a form of life’, Searle’s ‘constitutive rule’, or Goffman’s ‘encounter’) from a cognitive-interactional, rather than normative, perspective. The best definition of the object of the study of pragmatics was given by Austin (1962: 52) and reads as follows: “the total situation in which the utterance is issued, the total speech-act”. The complex nature of this object requires pragmatics to be interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinarity – which also encompasses past disciplines, like rhetoric – is what makes pragmatics rich and ‘loaded’. Indeed, it is extremely hard to establish a connection with other disciplines, as this presupposes previous knowledge of them and the careful identification of possible relevant overlapping areas, before integrated insights can be produced. However, I believe that the link between pragmatics and other research fields does not simply respond to a generic theoretical vocation for multidisciplinarity. Rather, it is a clear theoretical and practical requirement. Pragmatics can and must play the role of the ecology of communication (Caffi, 1994a), by providing the necessary tools for enhancing the understanding of human communication in different contexts. For instance, while working with doctors and psychotherapists, I would provide them with a pragmatic reading of surface communicative dynamics, trying to integrate my perspective with theirs. To this extent there are external factors that make pragmatics a ‘loaded’ discipline. However, there are also internal, structural and methodological factors that make the task of pragmatics even more onerous. First of all, there is the general need to control theoretical instruments within authentic communicative contexts, or ‘activity types’, to use Levinson’s (1992) phrase. These specific contexts determine a number of constraints on interactional expectations, and require a continuous adjustment of the relevance and hierarchy of principles, maxims and inferences
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applying to ‘normal’ communication. Secondly, there is the need to motivate rules and provide explanations. For instance, why do mitigating devices mitigate (cf. Levinson, 1983: 274; R. Lakoff, 1980)? What social and psychological mechanisms are at work? Clearly, the answer cannot be only linguistic, but it must be integrated within a broader perspective and a systemic framework. Finally, the answer to the question why? is not enough. It is also necessary to explain how. For this reason, pragmatics cannot elude a fine-grained linguistic analysis. The detailed analysis of linguistic micro-phenomena, from both a structural and a stylistic point of view, is a requisite for the clarification of the link between linguistic choices and their potential effects on interaction, be they social or psychological. The discourse analyst plays the part of the interpreter, who is entitled by textual cues to make inferences and identify, within the latter, significant patterns of regularities. A common reader of pragmatics may think that language is essentially a response to practical needs, its major function being instrumental. In fact, we have learned from psychology that language also meets intertwined identity and relational needs. Mitigation is precisely what links these various interactional needs, and requires therefore an integrated socio- and psycholinguistic treatment. To sum up, the above-mentioned connections and ‘loads’ are necessary for pragmatics to deal with an extremely complex object, namely the ongoing process of human communication. It is vital not to lose sight of this complexity if one is to avoid hypostasis or mistaking a useful theoretical simplification for an ontological property of the object. Studies on complexity and the theory of chaos, which have flourished in the past ten years and have imposed themselves as the latest version of the 1970s system theory, move from the following basic assumption, which is also my starting point: in the study of complex phenomena, sacrificing the complexity of the object of analysis is tantamount to giving up the object itself. Against this background, mitigation can be seen as a form of optimization of the functioning of the system, insofar as it contributes to the adjustment of the latter to ever-changing contexts. Now, the first question to be raised in a pragmatic approach is to define who and what is ‘the subject’. Who is speaking in pragmatics? I suggest that we consider pragmatics as the theory of the discursive construction of subjectivity – rather, of situated subjects – no matter how fragmented and temporary this may be. Such a theory would make possible a semiotic treatment of the complexity of the self. I am fully aware of the utopian nature of this project, as well as of the impossibility of achieving it in this work. Nevertheless, I believe that pragmatic theories devoid of such a tension are poor: close as they are, by their very nature, to common sense, yet they do not preserve its holistic character and are trapped in the paradox of being at one and the same time the quintessence of everyday theorization and its regimentation. The present work intends to reflect common sense by means of ‘folk’ categories (cf. Cranach, von, et al., 1980), while avoiding both premature generalizations and reifying categorizations, and trying to clarify how some recurrent mechanisms of communicative action work in specific contexts.
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1.3. THE SUBJECTIVITY OF LANGUAGE In this section, I will mention three highly authoritative and famous contributions to the study of mitigation, which are fundamental to the formulation of the categories that I will introduce in Chapter 2. 1.3.1. The instance d’énonciation (Benveniste, 1966) Emile Benveniste’s work is a milestone in modern reflections on language and subjectivity. Let me quote one of his most famous tenets: It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject, because language alone establishes the concept of ‘ego’ in reality, in its reality which is that of the being. The ‘subjectivity we are discussing here is the capacity of the speaker to posit himself as ‘subject’. (Benveniste, 1971 [1966]: 224; original emphasis)
11
Statements of this kind appear to be icastic and exhaustive. In fact, Benveniste’s subjectivity is a precondition for subjectivity; it is a formal scheme that allows for the conversion of langue into discours. Specifically, if one takes subjectivity as referring literally to a subject ‘embodied’ in a communicative here-and-now, then we may well say that Benveniste’s subjectivity is a condition of subjectivity brought about by means of its grammatical marks. According to Benveniste, the speaking subject is nothing more than a formal apparatus that makes énonciation possible as the origin of all linguistic products: This formal apparatus makes it possible for the subject to manifest her/himself as such by taking on the mutually implying and reversible roles of ego and tu. Subjectivity in Benveniste’s theorization is in this sense the preliminary appropriation of langue on the part of a single speaker. It is the setting up of indexical categories in grammatical forms (paradigmatically, personal pronouns) that enables an ‘I’ to say ‘I’. In other words, it is the presence of the ‘communication’ system (or ‘discours’, to use Benveniste’s term) in the ‘language’ system. What Benveniste points out is the conversion from one system to the other, i.e. not the realization of a system, but its precondition. His subject remains in potentia; it is the formal frame of the utterance act, a mere silhouette which, however, still lacks the vital drive that can only be found in a contextualized choice by someone addressing someone else and planning to achieve some goals.
11
The original passage is the following: “C’est dans et par le langage que l’homme se constitue comme sujet; parce que le langage seul fonde en réalité, dans sa réalité qui est celle de l’être, le concept d’«ego»”. (Benveniste, 1966: 259, original emphasis).
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1.3.2. The deictic origin (Bühler, 1934) The other contribution to the study of subjectivity in language which it is important to mention here comes from Bühler. His notion of ‘deictic origin’ (cf. Bühler, 1934), which is composed of the triad ‘I-here-now’ at the basis of the utterance act, makes it possible to conceptualize the egocentric orientation of a communicative act within a semiotic theory. The deictic origin is at the center of a system of shared spatio-temporal coordinates that defines an indexical field (Zeigfeld), where references to persons and temporal or spatial deictic cues are used to guide (Steuerung) the hearer towards a correct interpretation of messages. The prototypical case of deixis is what Bühler calls deixis ad oculos, in which the perceptive space shared by speaker and hearer is real. This shared indexical field, however, can also be anamnestic (cf. Conte, 1999), in which case deixis is phantasmatic (am Phantasma, in Bühler’s terms). Such forms of deixis can be explained in terms of the speaker guiding the hearer towards joining her/him in an imaginary space through an act of conceptual transposition (Versetzung). Bühler’s work is very difficult and sometimes cryptic, and it certainly requires and merits further investigation. On the whole, a systematic study of deixis from different perspectives is still in its infancy. 12 Many points still have to be clarified. For instance, what exactly is the deictic origin of an utterance? Is it the zero-point of the spatio-temporal coordinates referred to in the utterance act? Is it the utterance act as a whole, or something different? When all is said and done, what does the concept of deictic origin consist in? According to Caffi and Janney (1994b), there is, in addition to Bühler’s classic phantasmatic deixis, a second kind of phantasmatic transposition to what we might call ‘inner space’, where the speaker invites the hearer to share her/his inner affective world. This world thus becomes a possible deictic origo, the zero-point of the reference act. Hence, the interlocutor and other objects of emotive communication are represented as being nearer to or farther from the speaker’s inner space. In other words, the ‘inner world’ is not just a selected topic in discourse, as in the case of self-disclosures (cf. Holtgraves, 1990 and other studies in social psychology) or any other instance of explicit reference to one’s own attitudes and feelings. The inner world can also be thought of as a formal part of discourse, particularly as the deictic framework 12
William F. Hanks (1992) highlights the lack of agreement on the meaning of deictic origin of utterances. Ostensive communication and indexical aspects of language in general are to a large extent still unknown. So far relatively little is known also about deixis linked to the reference act. We only know that what counts is the cognitive-perceptive, spatio-temporal access that the participants in the interaction have to the objects referred to in the actual discourse (ibid.: 60). Some interesting remarks on the role of deictics with respect to the notion of identity and self-identification can be found in Habermas (1987). Perry (1975) offers a review of the issue of identity in philosophical theories from Locke to Grice, whereas Perry (1996) provides an introduction to the philosophical issue of indexicality. Foundational contributions to the study of deixis can be found in Jarvella and Klein (1982).
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serving as a starting point for any reference act to the objects of a given communicative situation. One of the basic ideas of emotive communication, as shown by a number of studies in the psychology of emotions (e.g. Frijda, 1986), is the tendency to approach or withdraw from attitudinal objects. The ability to transmit and perceive these movements of approach and withdrawal is part and parcel of the above-mentioned emotive capacity. From a linguistic standpoint, establishing distances seems to be logically and chronologically prior to all other emotive activities, like for example evaluation and commitment. In this respect, proximity devices (cf. Caffi and Janney, 1994b; Chapter 4) are fundamental features of emotive communication: they make it possible to shift the deictic origin of utterances from points in the outer perceptual space to points in the inner subjective space, allowing us to express subtle variations of inner distance with respect to our topics, our partners, and our own acts of communication. In the next chapters, when analyzing communication in therapeutic settings, I will investigate how empathic sharing can be fostered or hindered by means of stylistically modulated choices. 1.3.3. The egocentric child (Piaget 1989 [1926]) Piaget’s seminal work on child egocentrism highlights a crucial developmental aspect, namely the shift from an almighty ‘I-here-now’ to a gradual acquisition of a ‘decentralizing’ ability. This is the capacity to adopt perspectives and strategies of categorization that are not directly linked to the time and space of the ongoing experience. In short, it is the ability to get over the egocentric ‘here and now’ so as to temporarily adopt the other’s point of view. Piaget (1989 [1926]) investigates the ontogenetic basis of deixis using the notions of egocentrism and decentralization and moving from the very first stage in the development of the child, when s/he is confined within a constraining ‘here and now’. As noted by Rommetveit (1974), the egocentric child’s communication seems to be based on the assumption that the world is unequivocal and monistic. The child’s immediate ‘here and now’ is the center of any world s/he might share with the others. For instance, s/he may refer to an object that is at the center of her/his field of observation as something that is accessible even to those who cannot, in fact, see it. Piaget’s egocentrism is a complex notion that includes logical and cognitive elements. These belong to a ‘syncretistic’ line of reasoning, which is far removed from abstractions and inadequate in explaining assertions or relational and social aspects. According to Piaget (ibid.: 261), the egocentrism surfacing in the child’s verbal production, although it does not exactly reflect her/his intellectual egocentrism, can be used to examine deeper stances, be they social or epistemic. The most important point for my line of reasoning here is that Piaget points out as a crucial feature of the egocentric stage the incapability of adopting the
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others’ perspective. 13 On the other hand, decentralization, as conceived by Piaget, is a very general and composite process, whereby a subject learns how to assume a variety of interconnected perspectives and strategies of categorization with respect to objects, events and states of things that are more and more complex and differentiated (cf. Rommetveit, 1974: 42). This ability to temporarily adopt the other’s point of view could be seen as the foundation of subjectivity in language. There is however another, more important, condition, which makes decentralization possible. As noted by Rommetveit, the main characteristic of schizophrenic communication, as described by Bateson et al. (1956), is not the incapacity for decentralization on the part of the schizophrenic subject. Rather, it is her/his lack of confidence in some kind of social acknowledgement of the reality that s/he experiences daily. The schizophrenic’s withdrawal from ‘ordinary’ life is, in Bateson’s ontogenetic double-bind perspective, a withdrawal from any kind of temporarily shared social reality (cf. Rommetveit, 1974: 53; my paraphrase, C.C.). Schizophrenic subjects ultimately lack the essential requirement of communication and subjectivity, i.e. the confidence in inter-subjectivity. Inter-subjectivity is first and foremost based on reciprocity in discourse roles, the possibility of exchanging roles and sharing something, even if temporarily, with others in terms of perceptions, an imagined world, or experience. What is undermined in schizophrenic communication is not just the ability to adjust to the other, but the very idea that a mutual adjustment is possible. These points will be further discussed in Chapter 4, when dealing with the connections between mitigation and some of the mechanisms of pathologic communication. The superordinate, multi-functional concept of mitigation can be used precisely to describe the various modes of mutual adjustment. Mitigation can be assigned the first broad meaning of attenuation of child egocentrism and can therefore be seen as the transition from subjectivity to inter-subjectivity, a compromise between the needs of the ego and the needs of the tu. Furthermore, it witnesses the dialogic willingness and the awareness that the direction of any act of communication is egocentric but in an alternate fashion. In this sense, mitigation is ubiquitous in communication, in that it consists in the provisional and reversible taking on of the role of subject, the giving up of a totally egocentric perspective, and the readiness to accept the other’s viewpoint – ultimately a prerequisite for interaction. Consistent with this line of reasoning, the dialogic exchange can be interpreted as the reduction of disagreement (cf. Coupland et al., 1991), rather than the construction of agreement. If we were to imagine the perfect antithesis to Piaget’s egocentric child, we could think of a subject that tries hard to 13
Piaget states: “Fundamentally, ego-centrism is thus neither a conscious phenomenon (ego-centrism, when self-conscious, is no longer ego-centrism), nor a phenomenon of social behavior (behavior is an indirect manifestation of ego-centrism but does not constitute it) but a kind of systematic and unconscious illusion, an illusion of perspective” (Piaget, 1989 [1926]: 268). In this respect, Kohut (1971) made some insightful remarks on so-called ‘mirror’ analyses by narcissistic subjects, who are unable to truly interact with others.
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identify with her/his interlocutors, by sharing their system of values and beliefs, while at the same time assuming their emotive stances, in a twofold, cognitive and empathic, effort. A subject like this is not a conceptual chimera, and was first described and designed in great detail by Carl Rogers in his ‘client-centered therapy’ (Rogers, 1951; Rogers and Kinget, 19651966. For a discussion cf. Caffi, 2001; 2002).
1.4. A COMPLEX SUBJECTIVITY At this point we can ask: What is the subject from a pragmatic and semiotic point of view? Although pragmatics has studied many aspects of subjectivity in language, it still lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework that encompasses the systematic relations between the predicates and modal attributes of the speaking subject (cf. Sbisà, 1989). Moreover, pragmatics needs to provide concepts that will enable us to account for these various aspects of subjectivity not only in theoretical but also in operational terms. In this section I will outline some steps that might well constitute the basis of an approach whereby the subject is not halved but ‘rounded’, and thus viewed as an embodied subject, to employ a phrase analogous to Clark’s (1997) ‘embodied mind’. I will therefore sum up in a provisional table some of the principal notions that belong – at least potentially – to related research areas that constitute a pragmatic perspective. It is possible to draw on these still relatively unexplored areas for ideas about the ways in which subjectivity pervades language in a constant tension between the psychological and the social dimensions, between intentions and conventions. Clearly, the various aspects of subjectivity are rooted in different theoretical fields. Some of these aspects can be encapsulated in predicates that are thought of as prototypical of the agent-protagonist of pragmatics. Each of these predicates corresponds to a key concept pertaining to some specific theory and these concepts as a whole outline the mise en discours of subjectivity. They all gather around themselves an area of disciplinary tensions. Table 1.1. below is intended to gather, approximately, some of the ideas of subjectivity that are at the center of certain major authors’ works. These ideas lend themselves to exploring still relatively under-researched areas concerning a non-monolithic notion or concept: a pragmatic approach to subjectivity would benefit from their mutual integration. This outline could provide some useful insights for an overall integrated conceptual framework regarding what the subject does – rather than what s/he is – i.e. her/his typical predicates. It is obvious that these do not fully represent the subject, but, at least, they make it possible to identify certain standard procedures with respect to the effects produced by her/his utterances. The multifaceted subject of integrated pragmatics is not “a substantial, more or less privatized entity
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that reveals and conceals, acts and reacts” (Brown and Rogers, 1991: 148); 14 rather, s/he is the result of an ongoing, sometimes uneven, process of construction. The self that is relevant to pragmatics is built up through a relationship with the other. The systematic integration of the various ideas of subject that I have laid out in Table 1.1. remains to be done. This is especially true of the connection between psychology on the one hand and analytical philosophy, logic, philosophy of language, and semiotics on the other. What is worth mentioning here is the equivalence between the indexicality and expressivity pointed out by Lyons (1977: 107) in the wake of Bühler, Jakobson and the Prague School. The two terms refer to the field of indices in Peirce’s sense, i.e. those signals that give information about their source. Lyons rejects the term ‘expressive’ in favor of ‘indexical’, since the former is overburdened in stylistics with other, often evaluative, meanings. Further, Lyons suggests that ‘expressive’ should be exclusively referred to those traits of the utterance whereby the speaker “establishes or reveals her/his individuality in a particularly original manner” (ibid.). In this sense – Lyons claims – expressivity would be part of creativity and fall within the scope of stylistics, rather than semantics. This solution, however, as noted by Lyons himself, implies relying on dichotomous trends in linguistics, which are as reassuring as they are unsatisfactory. In any case, Lyons’ remarks cannot but confirm and reinforce the link between a subjectivity enacted in a ‘here-and-now’ and the expressive choices that reveal it.
1.5. STYLISTIC MARKERS As mentioned in the previous section, Lyons considered the indexical and the expressive choices to be equivalent. On the whole, it must be noted that any clear-cut distinction between semantics and stylistics as far as expressivity is concerned is at the same time difficult and unfruitful, as witnessed by great authors’ works which, at the beginning of the twentieth century, laid the foundations for a psycho-stylistic approach. I am thinking here in particular of Bally and Spitzer. Bally’s (1970 [1909]) stylistics of language (langue) and Spitzer’s stylistics of the literary text together form a psycho-stylistic domain that is rich in insights and inspiring ideas that may well fit in with new categories and models of pragmatic analysis. The link, or even the equivalence, between stylistic aspects on the one hand and subjective and emotive aspects on the other is as old as the history of ‘style’ (for a general overview see Segre, 1988). 14
I am grateful to Sylvie Bruxelles for having pointed out to me (personal communication) that the label of integrated pragmatics (pragmatique intégrée) was introduced by Ducrot and Anscombre (1976) with reference to the integration of pragmatic factors within the grammatical description. In a philosophical framework, both the term and the concept were used by Parret (1982) with mainly programmatic purposes.
Table 1.1. Configurations of subjectivity
*
Analytical philosophy
Logics/philosophy of language
Semiotics
Psychology
Subject status
the one who acts (agent, actor)
the one who says ‘I’ by uttering ‘this utterance’
the one who interprets, infers and make others infer
Key ideas
action (Wittgenstein, Austin*, Searle)
indexicality (Bühler, Bar-Hillel, Reichenbach, Perry)
inferences (Peirce)
affect (basic dimensions: evaluation, potency, activity)
Connections with linguistics
discours (Benveniste)
shifters (Jakobson, Jespersen, Benveniste)
non-natural meaning, conversational implicatures (Grice)
affective meaning (Bally) emotive expressions (Marty)
Central dimension
responsibility
contextualization
rationality (of interlocutors) and interpretability of messages
intensity
Prototypical linguistic objects (locus classicus)
performative utterances, illocutionary acts, illocutionary force indicating devices
pronominal deictics, temporal and spatial deictics, address terms, allocutions
indirect speech acts, presuppositions, conventional implicatures, factive predicates, presuppositional triggers
lexicon (stylistics) suffixes (morphology) prosody, iconism in syntax, propositional attitudes, stylistic markers
Cognitive side
frames of action
access to a shared perceptive (or imagined) world
cognitive frames generating possible hierarchies of meaning (e.g. ‘background’ and ‘foreground’) for those meanings that are conveyed by means of presuppositions or by some types of implicit
appraisal (Lazarus)
Psychological side
intentionality
self-reference
intentionality
subject’s affective stances (Osgood)
Sociological side
conventionality
relativity of representations and social action
shared knowledge, frames of action that allow self- and other-protection from unnecessary risks
acknowledged social values (Weber, Habermas)
the one who is affectively oriented
In a review of ‘The Concept of a Person’ by Alfred Julius Ayer, Hilary Putnam (1975) challenges the widespread idea of a theoretical closeness between Wittgenstein and Austin. According to Putnam, the two philosophers and their ideas are deeply original and totally independent from each other. Further, their contributions to philosophy have not yet been given an ultimate interpretation and will therefore still be debated in the years to come.
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In this connection it is worth mentioning the famous definition of stylistics given by Bally: [Hence] stylistics studies the expressive facts of language from the point of view of their affective content, in other words it studies the expression of feelings through language and the influence of facts of language on feelings. (Bally, 1970 [1909]: 16; my translation, C.C.; italics in the original) 15
This statement, which radically changes the Saussurean perspective, opens up the path for the study of linguistic phenomena not only from a cognitive but also from an emotive viewpoint. Bally’s definition can be integrated with Spitzer’s (1928: 632) assumption in the field of literary stylistics, which reads as follows: in the field of expressivity, any emotion, i.e. any shift from our normal psychic state, is signaled by a shift from our normal linguistic use. And viceversa, Spitzer maintains that a shift from the usual language is symptomatic of an unusual psychic state. Although needing empirical evidence and contextualization in a non literary field, these are important starting points for a study of the intermingling between stylistics and subjectivity. As we will see in Chapter 4, in the field of individual and social psychology, these ideas are mirrored back by the identification of significant correlations between the cues in the actual messages and the intellectual, motivational and emotive characteristics of the utterers (cf. Osgood, 1960). Further, the basic notions presented above correspond in social psychology to the selection of stylistically marked choices as a starting point from which to make inferences about emotions, for instance those related to negative affect (cf. Wiener and Mehrabian, 1968). It must be stressed that stylistic choices are not limited to lexical choices. Rather, what I have in mind is a complex stylistic profile, a sort of relational temperature, which is close to Terracini’s (1976: 100) “diffuse expressive tonality” (my translation, C.C.), the latter being “the different degree of participation on the part of the subject to what s/he feels to be outside her/his self” (ibid.). According to Terracini, the expressive tonality has a correlate in the social tonality determining a given choice. Thus, “when we address our partners we are able to tune our discourse to their mentality and feelings”, since language “always means, at least potentially, coming closer to the other” (ibid.: 101). The intertwining of relational needs centered on the construction of identity and instrumental needs centered on the attainment of practical goals is precisely the kernel idea underlying my treatment of mitigation, which is ultimately an expression of linguistic freedom (cf. Terracini, 1963). The object of pragmatics is first and foremost ‘social tonality’, i.e. the inter-subjective aspect of communication. The main innovation brought about by pragmatics consists in seeing 15
The original statement is the following: “La stylistique étudie donc les faits d’expression du langage organisé au point de vue de leur contenu affectif, c’est-à-dire l’expression des faits de la sensibilité par le langage et l’action des faits de langage sur la sensibilité”.
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this inter-subjectivity not as a mere starting point or result, but as an inherent component of a bi-directional construction process. Recent studies (e.g. Selting, 1994) have put forward the idea that style is the result of interactional negotiated work between the interlocutors. The notion of style encompasses the notions of choice and norm. Stylistic choices can be assessed against a twofold norm, which is at the same time co-textual and contextual (cf. Caffi, 1990). On the one hand, it is “the speaker’s prior style [which functions] as an empirical tertium comparationis in relation to which successive styles are produced and interpreted” (Selting, 1994: 384). On the other hand, it is a norm related to a shared knowledge of language and the world, and it concerns the type of interaction and the ensuing expectations about the aims to be reached and the modes in which they are pursued. In Caffi (1990), I have used the term ‘modulation’ to refer to the formulation of a speech act along one of the two opposing stylistic directions of weakening and boosting (cf. Ravazzoli, 1981; Holmes, 1984). The use of the superordinate term ‘modulation’ highlights the fact that if we want to consider both form and function, content and style, in a given context, we have to look at the whole range of possible choices against which we can assess the chosen one in a constant, though not necessarily conscious, comparison (cf. Bally, 1970 [1909]: 22). It is worthwhile mentioning in passing that this fundamental idea in Bally’s stylistics has its counterparts in the cognitive psychology of perception and mind activity. In particular, it has been noted that all the classification and decoding activities underlying the ordering of reality into personal experience are part of a process of ‘contrast enhancement’ (cf., among others, Guidano, 1988: 33). It is precisely through a contrastive comparison that we organize experience and construct sense. The preferred expressive choice is contrasted with the other possible choices in the same cotext and context (cf. Caffi and Janney, 1994b). Therefore, mitigation and, as opposed to it, reinforcement, are neither additions to a hypothetical stable content nor, as has been claimed, simply different “ways to express one and the same thing” (Hickey, 1989: 8). Supporting such an idea implies considering the rhetorical-stylistic choice as an embellishment or a frill, as has often been done, thus discrediting the use of rhetoric. In fact, it is not possible in pragmatics to separate style and content, since any stylistic choice triggers different felicity conditions, pragmatic presuppositions and implicatures. Modulation is part and parcel of the production and reception of the act. It is what gives utterance its expressivity, i.e. the tonality that makes it real and capable of conveying a contextualized meaning and an emotive involvement. This contextualized meaning results from the co-occurrence of a number of indices that signal an illocutionary force (in terms of a contextual description), a sequential relevance (in terms of a cotextual description), a given intensity, and a stylistic contour. All these features together constitute the overall pragmatic character of a speech act (cf. Caffi, 1990; Bazzanella et al., 1991). Here we are dealing with a complex object of study, which requires an integrated semiotic approach that draws on insights from traditional rhetoric and stylistics, speech act theory, conversation
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analysis, and psycho-sociological studies on their interaction. This kind of analysis is compatible with Givón’s (1989) approach, which places speech acts on a continuum ranging from explicit, direct choices to ‘modulated’ choices. According to Givón, the three-or-four major syntactically-coded speech acts are just the more common, conventionalized (thus ‘grammaticalized’) prototype peaks, spanning a multi-dimensional mental space, one made of several non-discrete socio-psychological dimensions. (Givón, 1989: 152153; original emphasis)
Further, Givón (ibid.: 5) points out that pragmatic categories are not discrete; rather, they “may display shades and gradations”. These shades and gradations, which fall within the scope of stylistics and rhetoric, are precisely what I intend to analyze using the umbrella term and concept of mitigation. Stylistic choices raise the issue of the norm against which they can be assessed. This is the problem of the tertium comparationis, which has always been addressed but never solved in either stylistics or socio-linguistics. In recent pragmatics (cf. Selting, 1994; Caffi, 1992), this issue seems to have lost its relevance since another, strictly empirical concept of tertium comparationis imposed itself as a norm established and negotiated within interaction, namely the style adopted by the speakers in previous turns. 16 In this respect, it has been noted that in cooperative sequences, the style that has been previously used is preserved, whereas in antagonistic sequences, the abrupt shift from one style to another is employed to signal divergence from a coordinated dialogic development of the situation, which may therefore require a re-definition. This notion of an empirical, co-textual norm that is negotiated by the participants in the interaction has to be integrated with an external, contextual norm applying to a given activity type (the latter going beyond the limited microcosm of the enacted interaction). Clearly, conversational style is the result of the joint work of two parties. However, one of the reasons 16
My research on modulation (cf. Caffi, 1990) started with an analogy between language and music. In this respect, the elusive nature of a possible tertium comparationis is beautifully captured by the following passage from Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus: “Such a chord,” he said, “has of itself no tonality. Relationship is everything. And if you want to give it a more precise name, it is ambiguity.” To illustrate the meaning of the word, he played me chord-progressions belonging to no definite key; demonstrated for me how such a progression fluctuates between C major and G major, if one lives out the F, that in G major turns to F sharp; how it keeps the ear uncertain as to whether that progression is to be understood as belonging to C major or F major if one avoids the B, which in F major is flattened to B flat”. “You know what I find?” he asked “that music turns the equivocal into a system. Take this or that note. You can understand it so or respectively so. You can think of it as sharpened or flattened, and you can, if you are clever, take advantage of the double sense as much as you like.” (Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus. The life of the German composer Adrian Leverkühn. Translated by H. T. Lowe-Porter. Secker & Warburg: London, 1966, pp. 46-47).
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why this is possible is that the parties involved have absorbed linguistic and extra-linguistic norms of metapragmatic awareness (cf. Caffi, 1994a) within a complex system of expectations, and are therefore able to make and interpret unexpected choices. Divergence, which has its linguistic equivalent in markedness and its conversational counterpart in preference, is thus both syntagmatic or sequential (within a co-text) and paradigmatic or contextual (within a variety of linguistic usage in a communicative situation) (cf. Caffi, 1992). 17 Caffi and Janney (1994b) start from Sapir’s (1927: 893) idea of “nuclear patterns of behavior” to introduce that of “anticipatory schemata” (Caffi and Janney, 1994b: 351). This notion is useful in identifying the different frames determining whether a given choice can be considered unexpected and hence significant from both a cognitive and an emotive point of view. Caffi and Janney (ibid.) distinguish between linguistic, contextual, and co-textual anticipatory schemata against which a given communicative behavior can cause a contrast of some kind at a particular level of intensity. I will discuss this matter further in 4.4.2. Here it suffices to say that, from Aristotle’s ¢prosdÒkhton through Cicero’s praeter expectationem (beyond any expectations) to Bally’s (1965 [1925]: 69) above-mentioned definition of stylistics, the dialectic opposition between what is expected and what is unexpected is one of the key mechanisms at the basis of communication. In homeostatic terms, unexpected choices lead to a sort of interactive destabilization by automatically calling attention to themselves. The destabilization triggers a post-destabilization reorganization of interpretative assumptions, and leads to fresh interpretative hypotheses based on new assumptions (cf. Dijk, van and Kintsch, 1978; Janney, 1992). The unexpected, surprising choice is semantically, semiotically, and emotively significant, in that it depends on an interpreter and an intentionality. Interestingly enough, from the cybernetic point of view of information theory, and from the perspective of literary semiotics – as in Lotman’s (1976) – the informativeness of a message or artistic text rests upon its being either non inflated or breaking with a system of expectations, which, in a literary text, also implies a reorganization in a new, alternative system. Despite their different perspectives and purposes, both stylistics and social psychology move from the unexpected choice to make inferences about the speakers’ attitudes and emotions. Thus, in an integrated approach we have to start from the surface of the text, which is modulated by emotivity or, to quote Bally (1965 [1925]: 15; my translation, C.C.), is run 17
The productivity of the notion of markedness first advanced by the Prague School is proved among others by Levinson’s (2000: 1) work, which, moving from a reformulation of this concept, thoroughly explores “the presumptive meanings […] which are carried by the structure of utterances, given the structure of the language, and not by virtue of the particular contexts of utterance”. My main objection to Levinson’s approach is that markedness is by definition a relative concept, in that a linguistic structure is always marked in comparison to another that is expected in a given context. Dealing with language in use, rather than abstract constructions, implies being aware that implicit meanings are not carried only by Levinson’s ‘utterance-type meanings’, but also depend on the speaker aiming at specific goals and addressing a given hearer in a given activity type (for instance the medical interviews analyzed in this work). In other words, and to quote Terracini (1976; cf. exergue), one has to take into account both the play and the player.
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through by “an affective, no matter how light, vibration”. This claim is echoed by Terracini (1963: 133; my translation, C.C.), who states: “the uttered thought always bears a formal, though often impalpable, trace of subjectivity”.
1.6. SEMIOTIC MARKERS Stylistic markers, which some authors view contrastively as ‘style shifts’, can be associated with markers identifying the speaking subject (cf. Abercrombie, 1967: 7). Drawing on Peirce’s (1956) concept of index (which is part of his famous triad ‘icon-index-symbol’), Abercrombie suggests that these markers can be classified into: a) Markers indicating membership of a (regional or social) group; b) Markers characterizing the individual; c) Markers revealing speaker’s changes (transition phases), especially affective changes (cf. Abercrombie, 1967: 7-9). These classes of markers lend themselves to being compared to the expressive means studied by Bally (1970 [1909]). In particular, the first class can be associated with Bally’s ‘evoked effects’ (effets par évocation, ibid.: 203-249) while the second class can be associated with ‘affective features’(caractères affectifs; ibid.: 170-202), and the third class with style shifts. Abercrombie’s tripartite distinction is used by Lyons (1977: 108-109) and Laver and Trudgill (1979: 3 ff.). The latter identify social, physical and psychological markers, and emphasize Lyons’ (1977: 33) distinction between communicative and informative signals. As pointed out by Lyons, communicative signals are used by the speaker to make the receiver aware of something s/he did not know before the signal was produced. Whether a signal is communicative or not rests, then, upon the possibility of choice or selection […] ‘Communicative’ means “meaningful for the sender”. (Lyons, 1977: 33)
On the other hand, in order to complete the concept of meaningfulness, Lyons defines informative signals. Informative signals make the hearer aware of something s/he was not previously aware of, regardless of the speaker’s intentions. Hence, ‘informative’ means “meaningful to the receiver” (Lyons, 1977: 33). Lyons dwells on Abercrombie’s (1967) third class of markers, which he calls ‘symptoms’. Lyons’ interpretation of this category, as pointed out by Laver and Trudgill (1979: 4), goes beyond that of a group of markers signaling affective information. In fact, according to Lyons, markers belonging to Abercrombie’s first class are
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defined as: any information in a sign or signal which indicates to the receiver that the sender is in a particular state, whether this be an emotional state (fear, anger, sexual arousal or readiness etc.), a state of health (suffering from laryngitis etc.), a state of intoxication or whatever [can be] described as symptomatic of that state. (Lyons, 1977: 108)
These observations pave the way for some first tentative steps towards an integrated psychostylistic approach connecting various disciplinary perspectives. Against this background, my main objective is to contribute to the re-discovery of symptomatic, ‘informative’ aspects which can be inferred from contextualized choices and within different systems of expectation thanks to metapragmatic awareness (cf. Chapter 4).
1.7. THE FUNCTION OF IDENTITY MAINTENANCE AND ‘SPEECH MARKERS’ (GILES ET AL., 1979) Another important contribution to the premises of this book is the work of Giles et al. (1979), which provides some useful operational insights in a socio-psychological framework. The authors see the issue of identity as part of the broader issue of a typology of speech markers. These are not given a limited traditional linguistic interpretation, but are considered to be synonyms of speech. According to Giles et al. (ibid.: 343-344), speech markers function at two distinct levels. 1
on a first level, they have an overall function of maintenance of the social system. To be more specific, speech markers belonging to this group make it possible to identify the members of the system along with their different roles and statuses. Markers of this kind, which often appear together with paralinguistic markers, cannot be controlled insofar as they signal the speaker’s membership to specific biological, social, and psychological categories. For instance, they may reveal that a speaker is a woman, English, immigrant, etc.;
2
on a second level, which is more relevant from a psychological point of view, speech markers enable the interlocutors to communicate indirectly attitudes, beliefs, values and intentions regarding their social states, and to process the emotional sense of others’ social states. In this case, markers point out subtle, although not necessarily voluntary, social and psychological states. For instance, they allow inferences on how the speaker perceives her/his membership to a given category
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(women, English, immigrants, etc.) and which stance or emotive meaning s/he associates with this membership. Thus, what distinguishes markers of the first level from markers of the second level “is precisely the emotional significance of the social categories” (ibid.: 351). The various functions of second-level speech markers are grouped by Giles et al. into two main functions: one pertaining to cognitive organization and the other concerning identity maintenance. In other words, the authors (ibid.: 357) maintain that, among the functions of second-level markers, it is possible to distinguish between the efficiency of the interaction, on the one hand, and emotional needs, on the other. These two different sets of functions operate simultaneously (ibid.: 359) and can therefore be thought of, from an operational viewpoint, as interconnected communicative levels. In particular, the identity maintenance function is essentially aimed at self-presentation and self-protection (ibid.: 366 ff.), and corresponds to what has been variously labeled in socio-psychological literature as ‘self-image’, ‘self-esteem’, ‘ego-defense’, and ‘positive social identity’. Further, Giles et al. assign a crucial role to speech markers in the communication of stances or feelings that involve the person at a deep level or could threaten her/his image. This is typically the case of disclosures, as is pointed out in the following passage: Since disclosures are not communicated directly, they are inferred from subtle behaviours generally, and an important feature of these is level 2 speech markers. Thus, our fears, anxieties, affections and values are communicated and interpreted on the basis of subtle markers rather than direct statements. (Giles et al., 1979: 357)
In social interaction there are rules governing the disclosure and the elicitation of information about intimate facts. It is perhaps worth noting in passing that precisely these basic norms undergo significant changes in doctor-patient encounters: this is one of the reasons why Giles et al.’s (1979) work is relevant to the present work. Now, since we do not ask others directly about these intimate facts, and they may be reluctant to give us self-threatening information, the monitoring of speech markers is vital in order to retrieve this kind of information. Moreover, there are some stances or information regarding ourselves that we do not want to disclose, while there are other topics (e.g. our income, power, etc.) that we do want to disseminate without, however, addressing them directly. Again, the subtle use and monitoring of speech markers, insofar as they signal various psychological states, may be the most suitable mechanism for conveying emotionally loaded information retrievable by means of inferences. In the present book I will deal with a group of second-level speech markers, i.e. mitigators. In so doing, I will adopt the same dynamic perspective as Giles et al., who claim:
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speech markers can be viewed as dynamic, meaningfully anchored to an underlying baseline but continually being modulated to meet changing circumstances. The nature of these modulations will, of course, be reflections of the underlying organizational and identity maintenance functions. (Giles et al., 1979: 368-369)
1.8. CONTEXTUALIZATION CUES (GUMPERZ, 1982a) John Gumperz’s studies, especially from the end of the 1970s on, can certainly be numbered among the investigations that have best highlighted the inextricable tie between knowledge of language and knowledge of the world. In particular, the concept of ‘contextualization cues’, which draws inspiration from sociology and anthropology, has deeply influenced socio-linguistic and pragmatic research.18 This phrase is used by Gumperz to address the various signals implicitly connecting the content of a situated message to its surface form. Contextualization cues work on the basis of ‘co-occurrence expectations’, which are learnt during the interactional experience and are part of linguistic competence. These expectations make it possible to correlate interactive styles with contextual presuppositions. More precisely, constellations of surface features of message form are the means by which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how semantic content is to be understood and how each sentence relates to what precedes or follows. These features are referred to as contextualization cues. For the most part they are habitually used and perceived but rarely consciously noted and almost never talked about directly. Therefore they must be studied in process and in context rather than in abstract. (Gumperz, 1982a: 131; original emphasis)
The speaker’s repertoire of cues, which is historically, culturally and socially determined, can include processes of change of code, dialect and style, prosodic phenomena, lexical and syntactic choices, formulaic expressions, conversational strategies of openings and closings, etc. The meaning of these cues is implicit or, to be more precise, indexical, as it cannot be considered in isolation from its context use. This is the reason why the role of contextualization cues emerges clearly only when there is some sort of inconsistency between intention and interpretation, such as in misunderstandings. In these cases, as noted by Gumperz (ibid.: 132), the speaker’s communicative behavior tends to be interpreted in attitudinal terms, which means that the speaker can be seen as rude, non-cooperative, impudent, and so on. Even when the 18
For a thorough treatment of the notion of contextualization in Gumperz’ works and its relevance to sociolinguistic research, see Auer (1992). For further details, see also Gumperz (1992b): in this paper, which appeared in the collection edited and introduced by Auer and di Luzio, Gumperz discusses the contributions to the shaping of the notion of contextualization by different authors (among others, Bateson, Goffman, Brown and Gilman, Schütz, etc).
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speaker does not say what is expected, her/his behavior can be seen through an attitudinal lens (ibid.: 139): in other words, his/her unexpected behavior will be interpreted as motivated by some type of emotive stance. Here, it is first and foremost the shared interactional experience that can reduce uncertainties (ibid.: 144). Further, cues are typically scalar and linked to social conventions. More precisely: Conversationalists, for example, have conventional expectations about what count as normal and what count as marked kinds of rhythm, loudness, intonation and speech style. By signalling a speech activity, a speaker also signals the social presuppositions in terms of which a message is to be interpreted. Notions of normality differ within what, on other grounds, counts as a single speech community. When this is the case, and especially when participants think they understand each others’ words, miscommunication resulting in mutual frustration can occur. (Gumperz, 1982a: 132)
In Contextualization revisited, when dealing with code switching and prosody, Gumperz (1992b) underlines the fact that cues, though they imply some constraints on interpretation, are in some ways undetermined in character. As noted by the author, the same cues can perform different functions according to the context and co-text: What the interpretation is in any one case is a function of what has preceded and what happens afterwards in the interaction. It is only minimally dependent on the phonetic substance of the cues as such. (Gumperz, 1992b: 50)
Peter Auer (1992: 23), in his introduction to The contextualization of language, largely inspired by Gumperz’ work, points out that the notion of contextualization cues overlaps with Bateson et al.’s (1956) concept of metacommunication. I have examined the category of metacommunication, its explanatory power, and its compatibility with the category of illocution in Caffi (1984) and Caffi (1990). In these works I have made some suggestions that restrict the notion of metacommunication, in order to make it usable in non-idealistic pragmatic theory. Here, I will only mention the identity between ‘illocutionary’ and ‘metacommunicative’ as envisaged by Holly (1979), among others. In his attempt to integrate Watzlawick et al.’s (1967) model in speech act theory, Holly suggests that the relation component should coincide with illocution, whereas the content component should coincide with the propositional act. This interesting suggestion is discussed in Adamzik (1984).
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1.9. MITIGATION: FIRST DEFINITIONS The first technical usage of the action noun ‘mitigatio’, meaning the action of soothing passions, dates back to the Rhetorica ad Herennium, sometimes attributed to Cicero and sometimes to Cornificius (86-82 B.C.). This treatise of the second decade of the first century B.C. translates the Greek art of rhetoric into a technical manual, in the practical Roman spirit: The author describes the mitigating effects of deminutio and explains why this should be used as follows: Understatement occurs when we say that by nature, fortune, or diligence, we or our clients possess some exceptional advantage, and, in order to avoid the impression of arrogant display, we moderate and soften the statement of it […] For things of this sort, if you handle them indiscreetly, in life provoke jealousy and in a speech antipathy. Therefore just as by circumspection we escape jealousy in life, so by prudence we avoid antipathy in speaking. (Cicero, 1981: 355-357)
19
Cicero, in some passages of De Oratore, employs both “mitigatio” (De Oratore, III, XXX, 118) and “imminutio” (‘weakening’) (ibid.: III, LIV, 207). The latter term is also used by Quintilian in his Institutio Oratoria (VI, III, 53). In the present work, mitigation is considered a synonym of attenuation or downgrading (Abschwächung in German), and is defined as the result of the weakening of one of the interactional parameters. Mitigation is one of the two directions of modulation (cf. Caffi, 1990; Caffi, 2006), the latter being the stylistic-rhetorical realization of the utterance. Since the mitigating operation assigns a lesser (than expected) value to one of the interactional parameters, it involves the (re-)allocation and (re-)adjustment of the rights and duties determined by the speech act, and, more importantly, the weighing of their intensity and urgency. On the whole, mitigation reduces obligations for the interlocutors (cf. Wunderlich, 1976; Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten, 1982), thus making the attainment of the various interactional goals easier. In other words, mitigation permits a ‘smooth’ management of the interaction and reduces the risks that the participants may incur on various levels, for instance the risk of self-contradiction (on a discourse level), the risk of refusal, conflict, or losing face (on a social level), etc. This definition makes it possible to explain why in all the natural languages studied so far the number of linguistic means of mitigation is much larger than the
19
The original passage runs as follows: “Deminutio est cum aliquid inesse in nobis aut in iis quos defendimus aut natura aut fortuna aut industria dicemus egregium, quod, ne qua significeturs adrogans ostentatio, deminuitur et adtenuatur oratione. […] Nam eiusmodi res et invidiam contrahunt in vita et odium in oratione si inconsiderate tractes. Quare quemadmodum ratione in vivendo fugitur invidia, sic in dicendo consilio vitatur odium” (Rhet. Her. IV, XXXVIII, 50).
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number of linguistic means of reinforcement. For instance, in a study on requests in English and German, House and Kasper (1981) list eleven types of ‘downgraders’ and six of ‘upgraders’. I will argue that mitigation is multi-functional and affects various aspects of meaning production. Proceeding from the already mentioned distinction made by Giles et al. (1979; cf. 1.7. above), I suggest here a first broad classification based on two main dimensions, namely interactional efficiency and identity construction. Within the first dimension, mitigation responds to instrumental needs, as it is meant to make the attainment of interactional goals easier. Within the second dimension, mitigation meets relational needs insofar as it serves the monitoring of emotive distances. Clearly, this distinction draws on Brown and Levinson (1987), who, by proceeding in their turn from Goffman’s (1956) distinction between rational, goal-directed behaviors and relational, ritual behaviors, make a distinction between rationality and face. Another less known analogue distinction was made by Spitzer (1922) between politeness (Höflichkeit) and consideration (Rücksicht). According to Spitzer, the former refers to a strategy, a Trick used by the addresser to attain her/his goals, whereas the latter is linked to an affective consideration of the other, an empathic movement towards the hearer (or Entgegenkommen, ibid.: 115; Caffi, 2005; cf. 4.1.1.) 20 . Behind this distinction there is a more general polarity in the speaker’s communicative activities. This is the never-ending conflict between the need to be understood, on the one hand, and the need to express one’s emotivity on the other; the need to be clear and the need to give free rein to the self (cf. Spitzer, 1922; Terracini, 1963). This contrast could also be seen in the light of the traditional opposition between emotion and cognition, which is paralleled by Bühler’s (1934) opposition between the cognitive function (Appell) and the expressive function (Ausdruck) on the one hand and the referential function (Darstellung) on the other. The idea of the supremacy of one function over the others (as opposed to a dichotomy) within a given message was put forward by Jakobson (1960) and Halliday (1970). According to the latter, the ideational function (i.e. the cognitive meaning), the interpersonal function (i.e. the illocutionary force), and the textual function (i.e. the stylistic organization) coexist in the structure of every message. However, what these polarities do not account for is the discursive construction of identity (cf. Fairclough, 1992; 4.2.). In the present work, mitigation is dealt with as a bridging category between different paradigms; in particular, it is considered both an emotive and a cognitive category. These two dimensions (emotive and cognitive) are not thought of as language functions, which are achieved by various means in each language, but as macro-functions of the interaction on its various levels. It must be made clear that, while Giles et al. (1979) highlight functions of
20
Spitzer (1922: 115) states: “Wir gebrauchen für ‘höflich’ das Wort ‘entgegenkommend’, weil eben den Wünschen des andern entgegenzukommen als höflich gilt”.
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‘identity maintenance’, the functions that will be foregrounded here are of identity building through discourse. What is certainly worth retaining of Giles et al.’s thesis is the distinction whereby some functions of mitigation can be connected to interactional effectiveness, whereas others are linked to emotional needs. I will also argue that mitigation is a multi-level and multi-dimensional phenomenon insofar as it involves simultaneously both various linguistic levels and interactional dimensions. Mitigation usually accompanies a ‘face-threatening act’. However, the negativity of the act for the hearer is only one of the parameters involved. These can be either central or peripheral, depending on the type of interaction and its purposes. I will try to show how mitigation covers both interactional efficiency and identity-building dimensions, thus also encompassing psychological and emotive aspects that other studies on interaction have so far neglected so as to focus on sociological and sociolinguistic aspects. In particular, I will discuss a number of examples from a corpus of doctor-patient and psychotherapist-client conversations, to demonstrate how mitigation contributes to the emotive monitoring of the interaction by either increasing or reducing the psychological distance between the interlocutors: Communicators typically modify their messages to suit the characteristics of their audience. Demonstrations of this abound in the literature. What has not been considered in any detail is how communicators make inferences about the relative success or failure of their attempts, what adjustments they make for unsuccessful attempts and the extent to which these adjustments may vary according to the communicator’s goal (persuasion, impression management, task, etc.), type of recipient or the nature of their relationship. Research into these issues would serve to illustrate more of the ‘on-line’ nature of motivated communication. (McCann and Higgins, 1990: 25)
The analyst has to reconstruct the less conventionalized inferential steps. Sometimes these are subtle effets de sens obtained by means of implicature, which may be easy to grasp but never easy to describe. In any case, they are part and parcel of our communicative competence – be it active or passive – and play a crucial role in sensitive, emotionally loaded interactions such as those in therapeutic settings. There is still the need to account for these often underestimated inferential processes from a systemic perspective. This is just one aspect of an old problem, namely the integration of affective and emotive components in pragmatics. Without such an integration, any description of communicative dynamics runs the risk of getting close to metaphysics. 21
21
This issue was somewhat anticipated in Holly’s (1979) and Adamzik’s (1984) research on Imagearbeit and Beziehungsarbeit, where Goffman’s concept of ‘face-work’ has been further developed (although without a sound empirical basis).
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1.10. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN LINGUISTIC PRAGMATICS AND SELF-PSYCHOLOGY In the second half of the twentieth century, linguistics was characterized by the suppression of the psychological dimension from any account of linguistic phenomena. Since psychological phenomena cannot be easily encompassed in the domain of langue, they have been confined to parole and therefore ignored for fear of so-called ‘psychologistic’ tendencies. Yet, a careful reading of De Saussure’s Cours (1916; English translation, 1983), specifically paragraph 3.33., where the author defines semiology as a part of social psychology, reveals the absurdity of a ‘ban’ on psychology on the part of linguists. Such a ban is unacceptable from an integrated pragmatic perspective, which clearly emphasizes the constant interaction of social and psychological components in the making of discourse. Furthermore, the exclusion of the psychological dimension has encouraged a natural trend towards a defensive isolation on the part of a number of disciplines, including psychology. These disciplines have often considered linguistics a formalizing, somehow pedantic discipline, a technical metalanguage used to indicate words and sentences ‘without qualities’ that have been extrapolated from their ‘living’ usage. This prejudice has been strengthened by abstracting and idealizing certain tendencies that prevail in linguistics. On the whole, there is a paradox in the theoretical need to programmatically remove psychological factors that interfere with langue on the one hand, and the massive practical use of introspection, the artificial construction of data, the judgments of native speakers, and reliance on how their personal psychology reacts on the other. In the domain of psychology, language has often been seen in a rather naive way, and has only been investigated from an instrumental standpoint, usually as a lexicon, on the basis of words considered in isolation and having merely descriptive or narrative functions (in this respect, psychologists often use the category ‘reports’). Some recent psychological and sociopsychological literature on emotions (e.g. Stein et al., 1990; Giles and Robinson, 1990; Giles et al., 1979; Reilly and Seibert, 2003) reveals its distance from and lack of relatedness to linguistic literature. On the whole, it can be argued that the intermingling of the psychological dimension and other interactional dimensions, and the dynamic nature of this connection have not been adequately examined. As to the issue of affect, linguistics and psychology have basically ignored each other so far, as if there were no middle ground between nineteenth-century disciplinary interdependence and twentieth-century autonomy. Pragmatics may well be the conceptual space where linguistics and psychology can finally and fruitfully converge. A first step towards this convergence is the enlargement of the field of pragmatics to other motivational dimensions besides politeness, and other theoretical constructions besides face. The study of
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mitigation will be a means of investigating the link between actual linguistic choices and inferrable psychological effects. To employ the old-fashioned but still useful categories mentioned in 1.1., I will look at the utterances (as a product) to find the traces of the utterance acts (as a process). This last category will be assigned an extended meaning that includes all psychological processes pertaining to both self-presentation and the definition of the enacted relationship with the addressee in a ‘here and now’. With the aim of constructing an integrated approach, I will also draw on an often misunderstood area of pragmatics, i.e. speech act theory. The latter, perhaps due to its historical and theoretical links with the philosophy of law, highlights a key concept of linguistic behavior, namely commitment. This concept, which plays a crucial and often underestimated role in Austin (1962), allows us to take into account the issue of responsibility in discourse. 22 What is presupposed by the idea of commitment is the ethical dimension of saying-doing. In a field that is not too distant from that of analytical philosophy (cf. Hare, 1970), the concept of commitment has been conceived as dependent on the truth of the proposition and lexicalized by means of specific linguistic categories (for instance, modal adverbs and parenthetical verbs; cf. Urmson, 1952; Venier, 1991). On the whole, the felicity of a given act coincides with the fulfillment of external and internal conditions (with respect to the speaker) that the hearer can either assess or accept without questioning them, thus becoming the one who ratifies the speaker’s self-attribution of a role. This means that through her/his utterance act, the speaker commits her/himself not only to a content (a proposition), or a socially recognizable role indexed by an illocutionary forceindicating device (e.g. someone who is asking, ordering, giving a piece of advice, congratulating, etc.), but also to a given image of her/his self (e.g. a polite but detached professional, etc.). In a word, s/he is responsible for the image of the self conveyed by her/his discourse. The study of mitigation makes it possible to analyze the ways in which the subject can reduce her/his various kinds of responsibility towards both the utterance and the interlocutor. 22
The concept of responsibility has always been central to Austin’s work. This is a point which still needs further investigation in order to be fully appreciated. In A plea for excuses (1956) and Three ways of spilling ink (1966) (whose original title was ‘Responsibility’), both republished in Austin (1979 [1961]), the fundamental role of the notion of responsibility for philosophical reflections and for Austin’ speech act theory is stated very clearly, as can be gathered from the following passage, among others: “Briefly, it is the idea which Aristotle had in a primitive way, without having to fight free of the toils of sophistication that now encumber us: namely, that questions of whether a person was responsible for this or that are prior to questions of freedom. Whatever Aristotle’s idea may have been it worked this way: to discover whether someone acted freely or not, we must discover whether this, that, or the other plea will pass – for example, duress, or mistake, or accident, and so forth.” (Austin, 1979 [1961]: 273; original emphasis). In what now seems a distant historical context, Mikhail Bakhtin (1993) – with unexpected points of convergence – dealt with the problem of the responsibility of action in its connection with the theme of dialogue and otherness in a theoretical essay written in the early twenties, which came out in Russia in 1986.
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What is important for my line of reasoning is that a vital and underestimated component of communicative ‘felicity’ – that goes beyond Austin’s model – is the transmission and reception of a cognitive and affective commitment to both the utterance and the hearer. This subscription to what one is saying, together with its shades and slight variations, cannot be fully accounted for by the sincerity condition of speech act theories (cf. Chapter 4). In speech act theory, among the conditions that make the act felicitous, sincerity has a heterogeneous status. This is a dichotomous dimension that has been basically thought of in terms of the correspondence, or non-correspondence, between the state expressed by the proposition and the subject’s inner state. The fulfillment of the sincerity condition is not scalar and cannot be attenuated, but only reinforced. Thus, the concept of sincerity does not make it possible for us to capture either the various degrees of subscription to what is being said or the various degrees of involvement in the interaction. Nor does it allow us to take into consideration what may be called ‘the emotive temperature of the interaction’. Hence the need to combine the sincerity condition with something else. What I would like to suggest here, in line with Hübler’s proposition (1987), is the need to integrate Austin’s sincerity condition and Hare’s epistemic commitment with the notions of emotive involvement to the message and emotive closeness/distance with respect to the hearer. In this way, the focus would shift from an ethical and cognitive perspective to a rhetorical and stylistic one. The key concepts of responsibility (from a moral viewpoint), epistemic commitment (from a cognitive viewpoint), and sincerity (from a pragmatic viewpoint) would thus be complemented by the psycho-stylistic concept of the speaker’s identification with what the speaker is saying, i.e. a pragmatic counterpart of the psychological concepts of egonearness, immediacy, etc. Mitigation is a way of sensing the affective and stylistic dimension of communicative choices in its interplay with other dimensions. Mitigation can be used to calculate what we may call, by analogy with Piaget’s (1989 [1926]: 51) ‘coefficient of ego-centrism’, the ‘coefficient of emotive involvement in discourse’. This is, to a certain extent, connected to a ‘coefficient of indexicality’, which has been codified by classical rhetoric in various immediacy and vividness effects. As opposed to the model subject of early pragmatics, which is the source of strong performatives (e.g. ‘I swear’, ‘I bet’, ‘I promise’, etc.), the subject projected by mitigation is on her/his guard. As a matter of fact, these two ideas of subject are not conflicting but complementary: it is precisely because ‘saying’ is ‘doing’ that one needs to be cautious and weigh words by adjusting them to the context. The unit of pragmatics is an action unit, a pragmeme, to use Mey’s (2001: 221) label. Performativity is not an eccentric, logical curiosity, but a general feature of language, i.e. its capacity to set itself as action. Pragmatics has long addressed the question of why, under certain conditions, utterances can do what they say and say what they do, thus producing new states of things. We may now ask the reverse, i.e. why most pragmatic studies address utterances that
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seem to have lost their impact in respect of both the external and the internal world? How can the personal dimension of our discourse, i.e. what my utterance means to me as a person, be further ignored? The utterances studied by pragmatics often seem to illustrate routine, role-plays, scraps of Dasein; in any case they seem to have lost touch with the ‘self’ of the speaker uttering them. An abductive reading – both rhetorical and psychological – of textual cues, without aiming at interpreting them exhaustively, will assign more power to the mitigating subject as a producer of meaning. The subject mitigates since s/he has been forced to give up her/his egocentric omnipotence in order to become a subject capable of dialogue. S/he mitigates also because s/he is led by both caution and social conventions to protect and disguise her/himself behind ‘bushes’, ‘hedges’, and ‘shields’ (cf. Chapter 2). These are used to protect the speaker (as well as the hearer), but at the same time they iconically witness her/his presence. Clearly, the subject presupposed and projected by the present approach is one of the several possible theoretical constructions and not the ‘real’ subject. However, I believe that, if compared with the traditional, monolithical, unanalyzed psycho-physical subject, the multi-faceted, fragmented, wavering subject I have in mind will be somewhat closer to the experiencing subject, and its inner core.
2 MITIGATION: THE BACKGROUND Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human disclosure; seldom can it happen that something is not a little disguised, or a little mistaken. Jane Austen, Emma, London: Penguin, 1966 [1816], pp. 418-419.
2.0. INTRODUCTION 2.0.1. Structure of the chapter The present chapter aims at providing an extended framework of analysis by integrating categories and tools belonging to different research approaches to mitigation. Key concepts of traditional pragmatics, such as illocutionary force, can be harmonized with other approaches that lend themselves to account for contextual, sequential, and stylistic features of interaction. My working hypothesis is that stylistic cognitive and emotive modulating and mitigating devices constitute the interface between pragmatic and psychological aspects of interaction. The starting point will be to establish empirical criteria for distinguishing between various kinds of mitigation. These criteria will be based on the identification of different scopes of mitigating devices, i.e. the abstract range over which mitigators apply within the utterance (cf. 2.0.2. below). I will then put forward three basic questions which can be summarized by the following points: x
Among the research perspectives taken on mitigation so far, which are the most relevant for an integrated approach? In particular, how has mitigation been conceptualized? How has it been defined?
x
Is it possible to find insights within the historical core of speech act theory that allow us to address, at least in nuce, issues related to the stylistic features of the utterance? And if so, what are these and how can they be linked to stylistics?
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x
What theoretical distinctions must be drawn at the outset in order to construct, if not a comprehensive theoretical framework, at least an integrated approach?
The answers to these three questions correspond to the three main sections of the present chapter. In Section 2.1., a restricted selection of the main contributions to the study of mitigation is presented, adopting a theoretical rather than historical standpoint. 1 Instead, my main concern will be to integrate my own notion of mitigation into the pragmatic research studies of the last few decades, taking up only the suggestions that I deem most suitable to building an integrated approach without discussing them systematically. More specifically, I will give a short (necessarily partial) survey of studies centered on three types of mitigating strategies within the speech act unit which I call bushes, hedges, and shields. These three different types of ‘internal’ mitigation (cf. Blum-Kulka et al., 1989) serve as fairly objective criteria for clustering studies of mitigation around three main focuses of the downgrading operation. These three types of mitigation are, as it were, personified in the characters which will be presented in Chapter 3. For the present purposes, it should be firstly noted that mitigation is often viewed as part of the wider issue of ‘politeness’. In politeness research, the notion of mitigation has so far mainly been employed with reference to the set of strategies speakers use to attenuate the impact of what Brown and Levinson (1987) call ‘face-threatening acts’ (FTAs). In other words, mitigation has been understood in a narrow sense, as having its main focus on illocutionary directive acts, particularly on requests. In contrast, I take mitigation in a broader sense, as the result of the weakening of interactional parameters such as cognitive commitment, emotive involvement, topical salience, etc. I am aware that this formulation is approximate. However, it can hardly be otherwise, given the vastness of the object of study, i.e. contextualized human communication and the holistic, systemic-inspired, approach adopted here (cf. 1.2.). My general claim is that, by studying the stylistic nuances of communicative choices, we can fathom different interactional dimensions, which are simultaneously at work and provide a given choice with its specific significance and import. These dimensions are intra-subjective, i.e. concerning the subject’s inner world and her/his different selves, and inter-subjective, i.e. concerning the negotial co-construction of the subject’s identity through a given exchange. As previously noted, interaction is affected by instrumental and relational needs that go beyond those assumed to motivate face-work (cf. Chapter 1). In Section 2.2., I will narrow down the discussion on mitigation to ‘classic’ speech act theory: in particular, a specific connection between the perspectives of speech act theory and stylistics will be identified. This connection is the concept of intensity hinted at by Strawson 1
I will not discuss in detail the works of authors who have used the term/category ‘mitigation’ to refer to a wide variety of discourse phenomena ranging from softeners to sweeteners, from cajolers to disarmers, and so forth (cf. Edmondson and House, 1981).
The background
49
(1964) in his reading of Austin’s notion of illocutionary force. On the other side, from the stylistic standpoint, it was precisely about intensity that Bally (1970 [1909]) put forward remarks which capture the pervasive presence of upgraders and downgraders in speech. A natural language, says Bally, is intrinsically subjectively and emotively oriented: when people speak, they continuously reinforce or mitigate their discourse in order to express subjective and emotive stances. In this sense, the notion of intensity plays an important role in bridging the gap between pragmatics and stylistics. This bridging is in my view a prerequisite for an adequate account of real usages of language in that it makes it possible to deal with the ‘ripples’ on the discourse surface, its nuances and shadows, functioning as cues of the subject’s stances toward both what s/he saying and her/his interlocutor. The integrated pragmatics I have in mind is basically the study of the discursive construction of identity as a global effect resulting from/projected by the use of these stylistic choices. In Section 2.3., some conceptual distinctions will be drawn in order to clarify the different meanings of ‘mitigation’, and suggestions will be made as to how to move from a narrow view of mitigation to a broader one in which mitigation is seen as the surfacing of a calibration 2 of interactional distances that is rooted in metapragmatic awareness (Caffi, 1994a). 2.0.2. Scopes of mitigating devices In what follows, by analogy with the use of the notion of ‘scope of an operator’ in logical semantics, the notion of ‘scope of a mitigating device’ will be employed to refer to the range of linguistic elements over which the mitigator applies. In Caffi (1999a) I distinguish between three abstract scopes of mitigating devices which together serve as a basis for some working hypotheses. These three scopes, or domains on which mitigating devices operate, are the proposition (and within it, reference and predication), the illocution (e.g. illocutionary verbs, expressions modifying the strength of the illocution), and the deictic origin of the utterance (i.e., the I-here-now of the utterance). Mitigating devices of all types may be employed simultaneously and, conversely, a specific mitigating device (e.g. the use of a past tense or an impersonal construction) may affect more than just one scope of the speech act. Indeed, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6, in most cases, a single mitigating device affects different scopes. Expanding Lakoff’s metaphor (1972; cf. 2.1.3.1.), I have named the mitigators operating on propositions bushes (or propositional hedges), those operating on illocutionary act hedges, and those operating on the deictic origin of the utterance shields. In this respect, it must be stressed that this three-way distinction is of heuristic value only, since it is difficult, in an approach that goes beyond semantics, to isolate three distinct ‘objects’ (which would mean posit the 2
I use this concept in the sense put forward by Ray Birdwhistell in the following definition: “L’ajustement l’un à l’autre des membres d’une interaction” (quoted in Bateson and Winkin, 1981: 300).
Mitigation
50
existence of three hypostases) in each utterance. There are no clear-cut distinctions between the components of the speech act . The three classes of mitigators are heterogeneous. On the one hand, bushes and hedges are lexical expressions, sometimes desemantized, polyfunctional markers. As is well-known, markers are often syntactically not integrated into the sentence: hence the difficulty of ascribing them a single scope. On the other hand, shields do not contain explicit mitigating devices: the downgrading operation takes place at a deeper, more abstract level, affecting syntax – as with the passive transformation – or morphology – as in the switch from first person singular pronouns to other person pronouns (cf. 3.2.). In shields there is a shift of responsibility from the ‘I’ of the speaker, i.e. the agent of the utterance, to someone else or to an impersonal source (e.g. The histology report says that there’s nothing wrong, instead that I think that there’s nothing wrong). The ‘I’ is deleted. As we will see, shields index an overall cognitive and emotive non-committal to the speech act. 3 The threefold distinction outlined here serves as a criterion for a classification of the linguistic tools of mitigation. It is empirically grounded since it is anchored in actual discourse choices and has the advantage of avoiding the uncontrolled proliferation of maxims (e.g. ‘be optimistic’, ‘be tactful’, etc.) which are subject to the researcher’s feelings and creativity. In this book I will apply the distinction to the analysis of a number of conversations, of which some excerpts will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Meanwhile, in the next few sections, I will use the three types of scopes of mitigators to explore the complex geography of pragmatic studies in the last few decades, discussing: x
works where mitigation, centered on the proposition, is seen as vagueness;
x
works where mitigation, centered on illocutionary force, is seen as indirectedness;
x
works where mitigation, centered on the deictic origin of the utterance, is seen as reduction of the responsibility for the utterance.
Clearly, any effort to review and synthesize the findings in the above areas involves making arbitrary choices. A recurrent difficulty arises from the failure on the part of many authors to clearly explain the criteria behind their definitions of mitigation. In particular, while some authors (for instance, Brown and Levinson, 1987) have implicitly employed the abovementioned scopes, others (for instance, Leech, 1983; Holmes, 1984; Langner, 1994, etc.), despite focusing on one scope (specifically, illocution) have also actually dealt with mitigating operators falling within another scope, namely proposition. Finally, there is a fourth type of abstract scope of mitigating devices that is apparently left 3
As we will see (cf. 3.2.), Habermas (1987: 72 ff.), in his sociological approach to communication, proposes a similar threefold distinction. Habermas identifies within the speech act a propositional component, an illocutionary component, and an expressive component. This typology bears interesting analogies with Haley’s (1959) disqualification model, which will be discussed in 4.7.
The background
51
out of my distinction, namely where the scope falls within the domain of perlocution and is related to mitigating the unwelcome perlocutionary effects connected to the utterance of a speech act (Fraser, 1980). The possibility of identifying other scopes and the potential overlapping between them shows the limitations of my tripartition. However, the limitations can be at least partly overcome if one adopts a scalar view of pragmatic phenomena, particularly of illocutionary force (cf. Bazzanella et al., 1991), and assumes that any single illocutionary act results from a ‘bundle’ of features that are simultaneously involved in a linguistic choice. Ultimately, if one adopts a perspective that is radically pragmatic, one must give up on fulfilling the esprit de géométrie harbored by every researcher.
2.1. IDEAS OF MITIGATION 2.1.1. Mitigation in different research areas: the empirical turn The emergence of the concept of mitigation dates back to the late 1970s when the main concern of pragmatic research was the construction of models of discourse aimed at combining the concept of the illocutionary act with sequential analyses of discourse exchanges. The point I would like to stress is that the very idea of mitigation was developed in those research fields marked by a shift from a paradigm of introspection to one of empirical analysis. It began with the turn from the analysis of invented examples (a feature of early philosophical pragmatics) to the study of authentic speech. Indeed, the umbrella-category ‘mitigation’, regardless of its various meanings and uses at the time, was only introduced when pragmatic research moved away from the abstract ideal of the speech act to focus on its actual object of study, i.e. interaction in vivo (rather than in vitro). A number of seminal studies included pragmatic analyses that gave great relevance to the concept of mitigation, while adopting different terminology. Despite being very different from one another, all these studies shared a close bond between theoretical framework and empirical input, and had, among their aims, a practical application. In particular, I am referring here to the following works: (1) Labov and Fanshel’s (1977) work on psychotherapeutic encounters, (2) Edmondson’s (1981) model of discourse, and its pedagogic application in Edmondson and House’s (1981), and (3) Blum-Kulka et al.’s (1989) work in the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (CCSARP). In Edmondson’s (1981) theoretical model, the concept of mitigation is not explicitly referred to, but it is constantly used. In fact, Edmondson’s ‘H-supportive principle’, which he claims “governs our perception of conversational events, and underlies our perception and evaluation of social behavior in general” (1981: 25), assigns a crucial role to the interlocutors’ adjustments to one another. Interpersonal adjustment, as noted at the outset, is at the very core
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of mitigation. Instead of using the term ‘mitigation’, however, Edmondson puts forward three types of supportive moves, which he claims are functionally comparable to pre-sequences and can be defined as turn-internal acts with strategic functions relative to the head act. These moves he calls ‘grounders’, ‘expanders’, and ‘disarmers’ (1981: 115); they occur “only in conversational behavior (at the ‘surface’ level), not in underlying interactional structure” (1981: 122). The same three types of moves also appear in Blum-Kulka et al. (1989), as we will see below. In the ESL pedagogic grammar by Edmondson and House (1981), ‘grounders’, ‘sweeteners’, ‘disarmers’, and ‘expanders’ are strategic supportive moves employed by the speaker. The use of a grounder consists in giving grounds for a request. The use of a sweetener consists in softening an imposition on the addressee, thus avoiding possible objections. In the following example, as claimed by Edmondson and House, it easy to recognize two grounders and a sweetener: “John, can you lend me ten pounds – I’ve run out myself and the banks are closed – I can let you have it back tomorrow for sure” (1981: 46). A disarmer differs from a sweetener in that it is mainly concerned with the preventive removal of a potential offense, e.g. I don’t want to be boring, but…, I hope you don’t mind if…, etc. In using an ‘expander’, a speaker “quite simply gives more details about, say, a person he is describing, or provides a detailed account of how a state of affairs he has described came to be the case” (1981: 46). In Blum-Kulka et al.’s (1989) Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (CCSARP), requests and apologies are studied in different languages, including English, French, German, Danish, Spanish, and Israeli. In this work, the term ‘mitigation’ refers to the attenuating function of so-called ‘downgraders’, as opposed to the reinforcing function of ‘upgraders’. In the next few chapters, I will often make reference to distinctions highlighted by Blum-Kulka et al. (1989). In particular, I will use: x
the distinction between head act – corresponding to that part of the utterance which is, in itself, enough to perform the speech act – and other parts of the utterance, like ‘alerters’, ‘attention getters’, and ‘supportive moves’;
x
the distinction between internal mitigation (i.e. mitigation occurring within a speech act) and external mitigation (i.e. mitigation occurring outside the speech act), the latter corresponding to either pre-sequences or grounders;
x
the distinction, within the possible realizations of a request, between direct strategies, conventionally indirect strategies (e.g., suggestory formulae, query preparatories), and non-conventionally indirect strategies (e.g., strong and mild hints).
The research documented in Blum-Kulka et al. (1989) is influenced by Brown and Levinson’s (1987) model of politeness, which is addressed from a deliberately narrow standpoint in the next subsection: the only topic selected for review is their treatment of hedges.
The background
53
2.1.2. Hedges in Brown and Levinson (1987) I draw on Brown and Levinson (1987) for some key terms and concepts which have become part of the metapragmatic lexicon. I am referring here particularly to the notions of positive and negative politeness (based on Goffman’s distinction between positive and negative face), the concept of the face-threatening act (FTA), and the concept of redressive action. As said, the prototypical face-threatening act serving as a basis for the investigation of politeness strategies is the request. No attempt will be made here to review Brown and Levinson’s model systematically. Enough has been said on it, and its merits and shortcomings do not need further discussion. 4 Suffice it to say that the category ‘mitigation’ is not a possible substitute for ‘politeness’ as the authors imply in the 1987 version of their paper (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 42). In fact, a mitigating speaker can be perceived as impolite, and conversely, a nonmitigating, direct speaker can be perceived as exquisitely polite. My idea of politeness differs greatly from Brown and Levinson’s in many respects. In my view, politeness is not directly linked to linguistic choices, it is, for instance, not linked directly to the use of hedges, as the authors maintain. A given expression in a given language, e.g. a hedge, has many mitigating, downgrading functions which produce different effects. Politeness is one among the possible effects of a mitigating operation, an effect which is both calculable and uncertain, i.e. not guaranteed. This last point is not only a version of the widely recognized idea that politeness is a culturally-bounded matter, nor merely a version of the idea that it is a context-dependent matter, taking ‘context’ both in its macro and in its micro-sense. (Obviously, politeness in a macro-contextual sense refers to rituals of a given activity type, e.g. a medical interview whereas politeness in a micro-contextual sense refers to the situational features of a given encounter). Politeness is also an individual-dependent matter. In this respect, it is worth recalling the definition of the ‘model speaker’ Brown and Levinson have in mind: All our Model Person (MP) consists in is a willful fluent speaker of a natural language, further endowed with two special properties – rationality and face (p. 63).
This model person could, in principle, be assembled by an artificial intelligence scientist because it lacks one crucial property: feelings. The emotive quality of our communicative experience which is intertwined with our judgments on politeness is completely ignored by Brown and Levinson. Their model person is a non-person, the ‘man without qualities’ mentioned in Chapter 1. In fact, without emotive capacity, which is not fully covered by the notion of face, interaction is bound to collapse. Further, below a certain degree of emotive 4
For instance, increasingly detailed study of natural languages has shown that the claim of universality of Brown and Levinson’s model is simply unacceptable (cf., among others, Eelen, 2001; Fraser, 1990; Fraser, 2005; Janney and Arndt, 1993; Journal of Pragmatics 2003, Vol. 35, Nos. 10-11).
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Mitigation
involvement no rationality – for instance no inferential process – can even begin to function. With these premises, the cursory remarks that are advanced above aim only at reconstructing Brown and Levinson’s use of the term ‘hedge’ in order to compare and contrast it with my use of the term and the concept of mitigation. 5 Incidentally, the authors use the term to refer to both upgraders and downgraders, with a fair degree of distortion of the metalinguistic acception of the lexeme in everyday language by which the verb ‘hedge’ means ‘to hide or protect oneself’ and is therefore usually thought of as a downgrader only (cf. footnote 6). What is worth noting here is that in Brown and Levinson’s work the term ‘hedge’ refers to all three categories of mitigators that I have labeled ‘bushes’, ‘hedges’, and ‘shields’. In other words, Brown and Levinson, although they do not make any clear distinction at a theoretical level, actually employ the different scopes of mitigation I have identified within the speech act, i.e. proposition, illocutionary force, and deictic origin. However, of these three possible scopes of downgrading operations, only illocutionary force is explicitly mentioned by the authors (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1987: 151). First of all, the authors use ‘hedge’ as both a generic and a specific term. In the section devoted to positive politeness, the word ‘hedge’ is employed in a generic sense and is included in the sub-strategy ‘hedging opinions’ to exemplify the strategy ‘avoid disagreement’. The above-mentioned sub-strategy consists, say the authors, in the introduction of elements of vagueness when expressing opinions, as well as the avoidance of axionyms, i.e. strong evaluative terms. Brown and Levinson claim that this is the only function performed by hedges with respect to positive politeness, as they normally are, according to the authors, “a feature of negative politeness” (p. 121). Brown and Levinson also use ‘hedge’ in certain specific senses. As to hedges affecting the proposition – i.e. hedges that, according to George Lakoff (cf. 2.1.3.1.), signal that a given object does not fully belong to a class – they are first mentioned, together with ‘question’, in the outline of the second group of strategies of negative politeness. As to hedges affecting illocutionary force, in the section ‘Hedges on illocutionary force’, after hinting at hedges 5
Although the English term hedge has been part of the metalanguage of pragmatics for a while, it has been given a number of translations in different languages. In German the word Heckenausdrücke is also used (cf. Kolde, 1989). Alternatively, it can be replaced by the umbrella term Abschwächungsignale. Abschwächung as metalinguistic term was introduced by Spitzer (1922) as opposed to Verstärkung (cf. De Ferrari, 2001). This distinction is also made by Walther Azzalino in his Mittel der Verstärkung und Abschwächung eines sprachlichen Ausdrucks (Azzalino, 1954/55). In French the metaphoric term hedge (I have suggested as a possible French translation haie in Caffi, 2000) is often translated with the hyperonym atténuateur. KerbratOrecchioni (1992: Vol. 2, 196-223; 1994: Vol. 3, 43-44, 129) suggests adoucisseur as French translation for softener. Drawing on the concept of hedge as developed by George Lakoff, Roulet (1980) identifies some mitigating devices as atténuateurs and, while comparing them to prosodic factors, he describes them as items realizing an illocutionary act (ibid.: 93). An overview both of the term and the concept of hedge can be found in Markkanen and Schröder (1997) and Clemen (1997) that show how ‘hedge’ is overburdened with different, if not incompatible, meanings. Hence the need of further distinctions.
The background
55
encoded in particles, Brown and Levinson discuss (together with instances of indirect speech acts in which some felicity conditions are suspended) a number of cases of utterance modification. This can be obtained by means of so-called ‘dubitative particles’ (such as perhaps, I guess, I suppose, p. 159), i.e. epistemic modals and parenthetical verbs, or by turning the utterance from a statement into a question. The distinction between modification of force indicator and modification of propositional content is acknowledged, although implicitly, by Brown and Levinson. They hint at such a distinction when dealing with Tzeltal, in particular with particles, which “are usable either as performative hedges or as propositional hedges” (p. 164). The authors then move on to discuss adverbial-clause hedges (p. 167), such as in fact, in a sense, it seems to me, and various types of if-clauses. In addition, Brown and Levinson suggest a classification of hedges according to the Gricean maxims (pp. 169-176). Specifically, they identify: a)
b)
c) d)
Quality hedges (p. 169), which lessen the commitment to the truth of the proposition (e.g. cautionary premises like to the best of my recollection, parenthetical remarks, etc.); Quantity hedges (p. 171), which signal that the information provided is less precise than expected (e.g. roughly, more or less, approximately, to some extent, all in all, so to speak); Relevance hedges (p. 173), which introduce a shift in topic (p. 176) (e.g. this may not be relevant, but..., sorry, I’ve just thought..., by the way...); and Manner hedges (e.g. if you see what I’m getting at, to be succinct, more clearly ...).
Brown and Levinson also mention hedges addressed to politeness strategies (p. 176), which “function directly as notices of violations of face wants”. Among them we can find frankly, to be honest, I hate to have to say this, but..., although it is not clear why these mitigators are viewed as politeness strategies instead of being connected to the Gricean maxim of Quality. Finally, the authors mention prosodic and kinesic hedges, which signal the presence of an FTA. Briefly put, the first type of scope of mitigators, i.e. propositional content, is dealt with implicitly, while the second type of scope, i.e. illocutionary force, is explicitly mentioned. As to the third scope of mitigating devices, namely the deictic origin of the utterance, the implicit reference to it can be inferred from the fact that the following devices are introduced: impersonal verbs (p. 196); replacement of ‘I’ and ‘you’ by indefinites (p. 202); pluralization of ‘I’ and ‘you’ (p. 203); use of address terms as ‘you’ avoidance (p. 208); use of reference terms as ‘I’ avoidance (p. 209); point-of-view distancing (p. 209). In this respect, a major distinction is drawn to classify strategies affecting the deictic origin of the utterance. On the one hand, such operations may be subsumed under positive politeness strategies aimed at reducing the distance between speaker and hearer (p. 123). On the other
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hand, they may be negative politeness strategies aimed at increasing the distance between the interlocutors (pp. 209-211). The upshot of these remarks is that Brown and Levinson implicitly acknowledge the existence of three scopes of the mitigating operation (propositional content, force indicator, and deictic origin) that correspond to the three categories of mitigating devices identified here: bushes, hedges, and shields. This view is implicitly held by the authors, and is not recognized theoretically. As we will see in more detail in the next few sections, previous studies had isolated, either overtly or covertly, each of these three scopes, and had identified groups of mitigators operating within one scope – often by envisaging models of analysis not always compatible with one another. As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, no attempt will be made to compare the use of the category ‘mitigation’ by different authors. What is perhaps more fruitful is to cluster the most relevant contributions to early research on mitigation around the three different domains that have been pointed out, that is: proposition, illocution and deictic origin. With this purpose in mind, let us start by considering the foundational paper by Lakoff (1972) where mitigation is centered on proposition. 2.1.3. Mitigation as vagueness: hedges 2.1.3.1. Lakoff (1972). The term ‘hedge’ 6 entered the technical language of logical-linguistic semantics through a paper by George Lakoff published in 1972 (and reprinted in 1973). This paper prepared a switch, in the treatment of hedges, from semantics to pragmatics and introduced a topic that would be included in the field of research on discourse markers at a later stage (cf. Kolde, 1989). The main merit of the paper lies in the fact that it addresses 6
The fourth definition given to the entry ‘hedge’ by the Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary (1976: 884) is a figurative, metonymic, extended meaning: 4. A barrier, limit, defense; a means of protection.
This sense has probably marked the shift from the word’s primary meaning (“a row of bushes or low trees […] planted closely to form a boundary”) to the legal technical meaning of the verb to hedge (“to secure oneself against risk of loss by entering into a contract”), to the extended figurative meaning “to go aside from the straight way; to shift, shuffle, dodge; to leave open a way of retreat”. Also, according to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993: 1211), one of the meanings of the verb to hedge is: 5. avoid committing oneself, refuse to face an issue, evade the question This same entry informs us that formerly, between 1570 and 1599, to hedge also meant “to turn from the direct path; leave a way of retreat”. This last definition encapsulates the idea of topical shield, which, as will be explained later (cf. 3.4.), is exemplified by the strategic use of digressions. Thus, the idea of discourse hedge (Fr. atténuateur, Ger. Heckenausdruck, It. attenuatore) as a means of self defense seems to be not an invention of linguistics but the catachresis of a culture. For this reason, the history of the term ‘hedge’ definitely deserves further investigation.
The background
57
phenomena which warn against the application of bipolar logic (true vs. false) to linguistic research. Specifically, Lakoff shows the inadequacy of a semantic approach to propositional modifiers and illustrates the importance of a contextualized analysis of such phenomena. The starting point of Lakoff’s (1972) paper is the problem of the prototypicality of a given object, an issue, at the time, in cognitive psychological discussions of the notion of being part of a class. 7 Lakoff claims that a logic of vagueness is not only possible but also, in fact, necessary, pointing out a number of expressions “whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy” (1972: 195); he refers to these as hedges. The following list is a representative sample of the expressions mentioned by Lakoff (1972: 196): sort of, kind of, loosing speaking, more or less, roughly, pretty (much), relatively, somewhat, rather, mostly, technically, strictly speaking, so to say, practically.
After dealing with sort of as a predicative modifier, Lakoff provides a number of examples where hedges realize functions other than that of simply highlighting the degree of membership of a given object to a class. He concludes that “semantics cannot be taken to be independent of pragmatics, but that the two are inextricably tied together” (1972: 198). With respect to a pragmatic perspective, however, the perspective adopted by the author is too narrow in two major respects. First, from a methodological standpoint, no distinction is made between mitigators and their effects; indeed, ‘vagueness introducers’ produce effects of different kinds. 8 Second, from a theoretical standpoint, the issue of how to switch from a claim to truth to a claim to appropriateness is ignored. I will briefly clarify these two points. With respect to the first point, the main task performed by hedges, according to Lakoff, is to reduce precision of denotation, i.e. the relationship holding between a lexeme and an external non-linguistic object. Now, in the widely accepted definition, denotation is a context-free relationship, which holds independently of a particular context of usage. Reference, instead, is 7
For category formation and prototypicality see Rosch (1978). For a discussion of vagueness from a logical point of view see Ballmer and Pinkal (1983). For a general discussion of vagueness in English from the perspective of applied linguistics see Channell (1994). Vagueness as an interactional resource has been pointed out by several authors, among others, by Aijmer (1984); Adelswärd and Linell (1994); Jucker et al. (2003). It can be said that predicates and lexemes introducing vagueness produce a fuzzification of the utterance in which they are used. I will not use the term fuzzification, while in Chapter 3 I will employ, though a bit reluctantly given their awkwardness, the terms ‘eventualization’ and ‘fictionalization’ (cf. 3.3.4.). ‘Fuzzification’ is used in a logical-semantic background by Jayez (1990). Jayez aims at showing that some lexemes (adjectives like hot or clever, adverbs like almost) cannot be fully accounted for by a truth-functional approach. Rather, they can only be explained by means of contextualized descriptions. A similar point has been already raised by Sadock (1977). Finally, as to the opposite direction of modulation, i.e. reinforcement, Bolinger’s (1972) semantic treatment of intensifiers remains a classic. 8 This type of mitigation is dealt with in Chapter 6 under the category of secondary semantic mitigators.
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usually understood as the relationship holding between a speaker and a context of usage (cf. Lyons, 1977: 206-215). Given these premises, my argument can be summed up as follows: denotation, in the study of actual usages, cannot be separated from the actual reference act, the latter being in turn part and parcel of the proposition (Searle’s 1969 ‘propositional act’). So, hedges introducing elements of vagueness in denoting an object have the effect of reducing the claim to truth of the whole proposition, thus falling under the Gricean maxim of Quantity. The foregrounded ‘name-object’ relationship turns into a ‘speaker-truth’ relationship within the proposition. In this function as referential vagueness introducers, the use of hedges has repercussions on the whole speech act. The gap to be bridged between Lakoff’s account and a pragmatic account is that, once a pragmatic approach has been adopted, the denotationdenotatum relation (Lyons, 1977: 207) cannot be easily separated from either the uttererutterance relation or the utterer-utterance act relation. In fact, hedges make it possible to weaken the claim to appropriateness of the whole utterance, thus falling under the Gricean maxim of Quality. In other words, speakers can use referential vagueness to reduce both their commitment to the precision of denotation, hence of their reference act, and their epistemic endorsement of the truth of the proposition. Further, this weakening of responsibility, this ‘deresponsibilization’, will in turn affect the contextual appropriateness of the utterance. This multi-step, multi-inferential mechanism provides the foundation for the approach to mitigation presented in the present book. Such a mechanism has often been ignored or marginalized in subsequent investigations into discourse mitigators. In fact, as semantic phenomena, hedges often have been reductively viewed as stylistic markers indicating registers (formal vs. informal) or socially determined variations (cf. 2.1.3.2.). In other words, research has often overlooked the different levels of abstraction involved in the analysis of downgrading operations and the different inferential steps that must be reconstructed in order to understand the effects produced by mitigating devices. 9 9
An example of such a reductive interpretation is provided by Robin Lakoff’s (1973) paper on the logic of politeness. The acceptability of an utterance containing hedges, she notes rather cursorily, depends on the context in which the utterance occurs. For instance, the utterance “Nixon is sort of conservative” may be acceptable in an informal situation, when the speaker wants to mask her/his real opinion, but not in an official context like a New York Times editorial (1973: 300). According to the author, the reason why such an utterance would not be appropriate in an official context lies in the fact that the use of hedges implies a weak emotive subscription on the part of the speaker. The link between hedged expressions and emotive subscription is just hinted at by the author and, interesting as it may be I shall not dwell on this point. What I would like to stress is rather that appropriateness is only derivatively a matter of politeness. The fact that such an utterance can be acceptable or not does not depend on a rule of politeness, for instance ‘don’t impose’ which the author presents in the same paper. Politeness plays only a secondary role, by implicature. What plays a major role in determining the acceptability of an utterance is rather a series of chain reactions – a series of inferential steps – that are triggered by the approximator and justified by the context. In particular, contextual expectations influence both the extent to which Gricean maxims, especially the maxim of Quantity, must be applied, and the acceptability of an utterance containing hedges. Suffice it to mention here an example taken from my corpus which shows that acceptability is mainly a matter of contextual
The background
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In Chapters 5 and 6, I will discuss a number of examples taken from a corpus of doctorpatient conversations in order to show the co-existence of, and interrelation (sometimes synergic, sometimes conflicting) between, various interactional parameters. The latter operate simultaneously within the same communicative event and cannot be easily distinguished in the functioning of mitigation. Against this background, it must also be stressed that any pragmatic analysis aimed at explaining how acceptability can be achieved at different levels should try to identify the various operations associated with the different scopes of mitigators. Furthermore, I would like to stress the tentativeness of such an analysis. Indeed, it is difficult to neatly separate the different ranges of mitigation, since more than one interactional parameter, as well as more than one scope, may be involved at the same time. With respect to the second point, concerning the issue of how to switch from a claim to truth to a claim to appropriateness, it allows us to raise a question of particular importance for the approach adopted in this book. As just said, in a linguistic-pragmatic analysis which takes the utterance as a basic unit, it is extremely difficult to isolate both the different ways in which a mitigation device affects different logical-semantic scopes and the different effects it produces on different interactional dimensions, either directly or by multiple implicature. This difficulty, however, is not a symptom of theoretical weakness. On the contrary, it is due to the emergence of an object that an integrated pragmatic point of view allows to investigate, i.e. a complex multi-layered and multi-dimensional mechanism. Pragmatic research should shed some light on this mechanism, trying to separate the operations performed on different components of the utterance and to identify, whenever possible, the contribution of each operation to the construction of the global sense of the utterance. Using the well-known Gricean distinction between sentence meaning and utterance meaning (Grice, 1968), it can be said that hedges reflect the progressive shift from sentence meaning to utterance meaning and from utterance meaning to utterer’s meaning, or, to use Givón’s (1989; cf. 6.5.2.) categories, the shift from ‘modes of truth’ to ‘modes of manipulation’. A possible pragmatic counterpart of the logical-semantic notion of fuzziness (Lakoff, 1972) is the scalar ‘precision-vagueness’ dimension of illocutionary force proposed by Bazzanella et al. (1991). As to Lakoff’s hedges, they correspond to the notion of bushes introduced in Caffi (1999a) and in the present work (cf. 3.3.1.), because the mitigating action performed by bushes focuses on propositional content, particularly on the interactional parameter ‘precision’. In bushes, to use Austin’s (1962) categories, the locutionary (rhetic) act is made less precise. expectations. The example is the hedged utterance produced as a general comment on previous turns produced by the interlocutor to tell his health problems: “maybe it’s a sort of bad moment – something like that” (cf. Chapter 6, ex. 38; Appendix B, ex. 33). Clearly, this utterance can be either acceptable or not, depending on whether it is uttered by an acquaintance expressing generic concern for the interlocutor’s health or by a doctor addressing a patient, as is actually the case. Here, since the utterance is pronounced by an expert addressing a patient in need of a diagnosis, the lack of precision will make the utterance totally inadequate with respect to the interlocutor’s (contextually legitimated) expectations.
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This being said, the difficulty of distinguishing between markers affecting locution, markers affecting illocution and markers affecting the whole utterance must be stressed again. As we will see, this task is made even more difficult by the peculiar interrelation between bushes and quotation mitigators. 2.1.3.2. Bourdieu (1982). As we have seen, hedges were at first considered as semantic means used by speakers to make a locutionary act less precise by signaling its non-prototypicality. Subsequently, hedges became a widely-used discourse and pragmatic category. This evolution was not dependent on an accidental shift of perspective, as might be inferred from a number of studies (for instance, Kolde, 1989), but it was a consequence of the inherent multifunctionality of hedges. Hedges show the interplay between semantic and pragmatic aspects in a particularly striking manner. As I have maintained in 2.1.3.1., hedges work on both the proposition and the speech act. On the one hand, they lessen the propositional claim to truth by reducing precision of reference. On the other hand, they affect illocutionary force by weakening the utterance claim to appropriateness. Subsequent research could not shed light on this twofold operation, since most researchers limited themselves to considering the category of hedges as a pragmatic and conversation analytical tool and extending its scope beyond the limits of a single speech act. Brown and Levinson (1987: 174), for instance, refer to markers like by the way, incidentally, that reminds me, etc. that introduce digressive moves for which the speaker apologizes as ‘relevance hedges’, thus referring to the Gricean maxim of Relevance. In the course of time, the concept of hedging has had a number of applications in pragmatics and sociolinguistics, for instance in the work by Robin Lakoff on the logic of politeness (cf. footnote 9). I will not dwell here on the evolution and success of this concept. However, it is interesting to note what might be considered an extreme view in the sociological interpretation of the concept of hedge. I am referring here to the view held by the French sociologist Bourdieu (1982). According to Bourdieu, hedges are similar to discourse fillers and closely connected to phatic communication. At the same time they reflect oblique performances of speech acts. He regards hedges as techniques specifically employed to realize mitigating, disguising, and masking strategies (Bourdieu, 1982: 87 ff.). Bourdieu claims that the use of such expressions, which are the linguistic tools by which euphemism and censorship are achieved, increases as one climbs up the social ladder. In particular, hedges are usual for the upper class, whose members employ them not only in public and in official situations, but also in their daily exchanges. According to Bourdieu, the ensuing communicative style reflects a number of important functions. Significantly, not only are hedges and mitigators indices of a set of choices at the speaker’s disposal, but they also signal, at both meta-communicative and reflexive level, an ‘advanced’ meta-pragmatic competence, in that they
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function as practical metalanguage elements marking the neutralizing distance that is typical of the bourgeois relationship to language and society. Their effect is, according to Lakoff, one of elevating intermediate values while degrading extreme values, or, in Labov’s words, one of avoiding any mistake or exaggeration. These locutions express the ability to keep one’s distance from one’s own purposes – ultimately one’s own interests – and at the same time from those who, being unable to keep this distance, allow themselves to be guided by their purposes and give themselves up to expressive drives without any restraint. (Bourdieu, 1982: 89, my translation, C.C.) 10
Despite the ideologically grounded oversimplification of Bourdieu’s opinions, his view is interesting for two main reasons. On the one hand, it represents a tendency that can be found in sociolinguistic and pragmatic research to almost automatically associate any given communicative choice with a particular sociolect. On the other hand, Bourdieu’s view is relevant to the idea of mitigation developed in this book insofar as it represents an early intuition of the link between mitigated communicative style and emotional control of the interaction. I will not go into this important issue in detail at this point. I would only like to add that in his interesting criticisms of Talcott Parsons’ abstracting reductionism, Elias (1978 [1969]) – long before Bourdieu and with the aim of carrying out a historical and sociological analysis – had already highlighted the problem of finding a connection at the theoretical level between the ‘control over emotions’ and the idea of the gradual development of civilization. According to Elias, mitigation is part of the process of emotional tuning, and corresponds to a series of mutual adjustments and corrections that ultimately become the basis of the ‘civilization of good manners’. I would like here to take the argument back to its original trail. In order to do that, it is worth considering Fraser’s (1975) pragmatic interpretation of the concept of hedges in his discussion of illocutionary force indicating devices (IFID). 2.1.4. Mitigation as indirectedness (Fraser, 1975; Leech, 1983; Holmes, 1984) 2.1.4.1. Fraser (1975). It was Fraser (1975) who, while illustrating different types of hedges, shifted the scope of mitigators from the act of reference within the proposition to illocutionary 10
The original passage reads as follows: “[mitigators] fonctionnent, au titre d’éléments d’un métalangage pratique, comme marques de la distance neutralisante qui est une des caractéristiques du rapport bourgeois à la langue et au monde social: ayant pour effet, selon Lakoff ‘d’élever les valeurs intermédiaires et d’abaisser les valeurs extrêmes’, et, selon Labov, ‘d’éviter toute erreur ou exagération’, ces locutions sont une affirmation de la capacité de tenir ses distances à l’égard de ses propres propos, donc de ses propres intérêts, et du même coup à l’égard de ceux qui, ne sachant pas tenir cette distance, se laissent emporter par leurs propos, s’abandonnent sans retenue ni censure à la pulsion expressive”. (Bourdieu, 1982: 89)
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force indicating devices (IFID) corresponding to performative verbs. Typically, says Fraser, ‘hedged performatives’ occur when the illocutionary verb is introduced by a modal, as in the following sentences: I can promise you that we will be there on time, I must advise you to remain quiet, I wish to invite you to my party. Fraser calls these utterances ‘strongly performatives’, as opposed to ‘weakly performatives’ like I can claim that Henry IV is still alive, I must authorize you to leave now, I have to promise you that we will be there on time. 11 However, it is not my intention here to criticize either this distinction or Fraser’s suggestions for, a taxonomy of speech acts, the latter being the subject matter to which the paper is mainly devoted. Rather, what is interesting for my present purposes is the fact that Fraser (1975) shifts the scope of hedges, and he does so quite explicitly, starting from the title of the paper. Furthermore, Fraser’s work provides an opportunity for the following general remarks. According to Fraser (1975: 188), in early work influenced by generative semantic theories, some scholars tended to regard pragmatic phenomena (notably, performative utterances) as equivalents of syntactic phenomena (notably, performative sentences). For instance, Ross (1970) puts forward the well-known hypothesis of a performative hyper-sentence in the deep structure of each sentence. This enables him to make generalizations about the uses of some pronominal forms. Similarly, Sadock (1970) introduces the category ‘whimperatives’ to account for interrogative constructions like won’t you give me a drink?, which have directive illocutionary force and can hence be regarded as imperatives. These particularly influential works exemplify a tendency to identify syntactic realizations with pragmatic modes, forms with function, despite the lack of a one-to-one correspondence between them (cf. Caffi, 1982; Caffi, 1994a). Regardless of the importance of the above-mentioned studies for linguistic research, it is worth noting here that they derive from a major misunderstanding. In fact, Austin’s concept of performativity has progressively lost strength – especially after Searle’s (1969) interpretation – so that the action configuration of a given linguistic structure aimed at performing a specific communicative action is mistaken for a grammatical configuration. Performativity, which can be defined as the ability of language to become action, is first reduced to an illocutionary function, then watered down to the status of a grammatical indicator, and finally misled with a sentence type – most often an English sentence type. By contrast, between illocutionary and performative an inclusive relationship holds: the concept of performativity is more restricted than that of illocutionary force, the former is a special case of the latter. Every speech act has an illocutionary force. Only some illocutionary forces can be realized by a performative utterance or formula. Both performativity and illocutionary force, however, are labels to capture language general features which are lexicalized and realized in different ways in 11
Unfortunately, the expression ‘strongly performative’ seems to contradict the very idea of the hedged performative, which is intuitively linked to a somehow disguised performative utterance.
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different languages. Neither should be misled with grammatical structures, though they obviously have syntactic correlates. This misunderstanding can be avoided if the analyst keeps the following levels separated: x
levels of analysis (e.g. syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic);
x
levels of abstraction (emphasis on language, on langue, on single acts pertaining to the domain of parole, etc.);
x
language as the object of research versus language as the researcher’s own metalanguage.
The confusion of these different levels has led to identify mitigation with the attenuation of a directive illocutionary act. This identification results in a narrow concept of mitigation, which is restricted to matters of politeness. It can also be claimed that this identification has been furthered by the existence, in natural languages, of a wide range of grammatical devices used to mitigate directive acts. These devices have lent themselves easily to become a privileged area of inquiry. Although the ethnocentric approach, which mingles inputs (and outputs) of pragmatic research with those of pragmatic research specifically on English (cf., among others, Wierzbicka, 1985) has been abandoned, there is still a strong tendency to mistake performative utterances for syntactic and semantic phenomena. This tendency is evident in some logicalsemantic works (especially those following the motto ‘performatives are statements too’) and in more recent cognitive studies. One of the main merits of Fraser’s work is his attempt to counteract this tendency and to draw on Grice and Searle for his typology of illocutionary acts. 2.1.4.2. Leech (1983). Illocutionary force has been considered by a number of researchers as the focus of those mitigating operations that have a direct bearing on politeness. Geoffrey Leech (1983) is one of the linguists who have acknowledged the link between mitigation as indirectedness and mitigation as politeness. The comprehensive model proposed by Leech, particularly his distinction between textual rhetoric and interpersonal rhetoric, is a significant contribution to the development of multidimensional pragmatics. His maxims of politeness are all relevant to mitigation. It is therefore worth mentioning them here: Tact Maxim: Minimize cost to other / maximize benefit to other. Generosity Maxim: Minimize benefit to self / maximize cost to self. Approbation Maxim:
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Minimize dispraise of other / maximize praise of other. Modesty Maxim: Minimize praise of self / maximize dispraise of self. Agreement Maxim: Minimize disagreement between self and other / maximize agreement between self and other. Sympathy Maxim: Minimize antipathy between self and other / maximize sympathy between self and other. (Leech, 1983: 132)
12
With reference to the main lines of the argument presented in this book (which, as already pointed out, aims to integrate a number of ideas of mitigation in pragmatics around the different scopes of the utterance), I would like to stress the connection between politeness and indirectedness. This relationship reflects the formula ‘the more indirect, the more polite’. As Leech puts it: Indirect illocutions tend to be more polite a) because they increase the degree of optionality, and b) because the more indirect the illocution is, the more diminished and tentative its force tends to be. (Leech, 1983: 108)
Leech’s idea of the strategic indeterminacy of both propositions and illocutions is further developed by Hübler (1983), who adopts the distinction made by Hare (1970) between phrastic assertive acts (focusing on proposition) and neustic assertive acts (focusing on illocution). Hübler then moves on to claim that understatements result from a de-intensification of the phrastic component, whereas hedges result from a de-intensification of the neustic component. Thus, a similarity can be found between Hübler’s understatements and the concept of bushes in this book: both are means of reducing the speaker’s commitment to the propositional content of the utterance. In the same way, Hübler’s hedges are similar to the hedges described here, in that both serve as means of reducing the speaker’s endorsement of the illocutionary force of the utterance. Unfortunately, Hübler’s analysis, although insightful from a theoretical point of view, is restricted to assertive acts and is not backed by empirical evidence. 2.1.4.3. Holmes (1984). The work of Janet Holmes is centered around strategies attenuating (weakening) or boosting (emphasizing) illocutionary force. Accordingly, the author identifies two categories of mitigators: ‘downtoners’ and ‘boosters’. Moving from Fraser (1980) which will be dealt with in greater detail in the following 12
As Sifianou (1992b: 29) points out, Leech assigns more importance to sub-maxims of the first type than to those of the second type. Hence, his model is biased towards the ‘avoidance of disagreement’ rather than aimed at ‘seeking agreement’. As a consequence, strategies falling within the category labeled mitigation here are of paramount importance for the development of interaction.
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section, Holmes (1984) treats mitigation as a particular case of attenuation. Specifically, she claims that mitigation occurs when the predictable effects of a speech act are negative. In my review of her paper (Caffi, 1990), I point out her misleading use of ‘strength’ as a free variable of ‘force’. Here, a lexeme belonging to everyday English vocabulary is mistaken for a metalinguistic lexeme, thus merging a technical concept (i.e. illocutionary force) with a nontechnical one and ignoring de facto the heuristic character of the former. In this section I will confine myself to summarizing some of the attenuation strategies mentioned by Holmes. According to Holmes, attenuation devices affecting illocutionary force can be grouped into the following four categories: 1) prosodic devices (e.g. a falling-rising intonational contour to realize the epistemic mode in English, decreased emphasis, lower voice, etc.); 2) syntactic devices (e.g. tag questions, impersonal constructions, double negatives in formal discourse, etc.); 3) lexical devices; 4) discourse devices (e.g. digression indicators like by the way, which, as already observed by Brown and Levinson (1987: 174), reduce the relevance of the utterance they introduce). Lexical devices are further divided into: x
attenuating devices focusing on the speaker (for instance, parenthetical expressions such as I gather, I guess, I suppose);
x
attenuating devices focusing on the hearer (e.g. you know, if you don’t mind, if you are sure that it’s ok);
x
attenuating devices focusing on content or ‘other’.
This last category includes deresponsibilization mechanisms realized by epistemic adverbials like possibly and probably, or adverbials displacing the responsibility for what is being said to other sources (e.g. allegedly, reportedly, presumably). The membership of downtoners like possibly and probably to a different category from that of parenthetical expressions is questionable. Despite the fact that adverbs are more impersonal than verbs, as noted by Urmson (1952: 487), both downtoners and parenthetical forms have the proposition as their scope; in other words, both are means of realizing the epistemic attenuation in the degree of speaker’s commitment toward the truth of propositional content. Holmes’ study has the merit of being the first to have identified a link between the two complementary poles of modulation, namely mitigation and reinforcement, to have mentioned the ambivalence of some strategies that can be used for both weakening and emphasizing and to have pointed out the importance of context in disambiguating such ambivalence.
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2.1.5. Mitigation as de-focalization of deictic origin So far I have considered two scopes of mitigation, namely propositional content and illocutionary force. A third scope of mitigation is the deictic origin of the utterance. In 2.0.2. I labeled mitigators focusing on deictic origin ‘shields’. The strategic manipulation of one or more components of deictic origin to achieve mitigation has been investigated by different authors from different points of view. As already mentioned in 2.1.2., Brown and Levinson deal with such manipulation by observing the way it either increases or decreases the implied distance between speaker and hearer. Mitigating devices of this kind are subsumed under the category of ‘impersonalization mechanisms’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 273). In this connection, Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1992: 204) mentions désactualisateurs, while Havertake (1992) makes the first explicit reference to deictic origin as a scope of mitigation. The related notion of débrayage is introduced by Greimas and Courtés (1979) and can be seen as a forerunner of impersonalization and de-focalization mechanisms, although in the Greimasian semiotic perspective such a concept is supposed to apply only to written narratives. According to Greimas and Courtés, débrayage indicates the separation of the subject of the énoncé from the subject of the énonciation, i.e. the detachment of the utterance from its deictic origin. This notion is complementary to that of embrayage, which indicates the reverse process by which the utterance is ‘anchored’ to its deictic origin. A typical example of débrayage is the use of impersonal structures in scientific texts. 2.1.6. Mitigation as removal of unwelcome perlocutionary effects (Fraser, 1980) Fraser is the founder of the concept of mitigation in pragmatics. In his 1980 paper he defines mitigation as the modification of unwelcome effects on the addressee, as opposed to mitigation as a general weakening of the speech act (as suggested by Larry Horn in a personal communication quoted by the author). Fraser’s definition has been used by subsequent research without any significant change. Fraser focuses on the idea of conversational agreement, i.e. a set of mutual rights and obligations between speaker and hearer that can be renegotiated during conversation. The object of such renegotiation, he says, can be either the type of illocutionary act or the style of conversation. For instance, participants in a conversation can negotiate address terms. Moreover, Fraser introduces the distinction between ‘self-serving’ and ‘altruistic’ mitigation. These two kinds of mitigation can occur within the same act. However, while the former aims at removing negative effects for the speaker, the latter attenuates negative effects for the hearer. Therefore, in Fraser’s account, the privileged scope of mitigating operations is perlocution.
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The linguistic devices by which mitigation is realized have a common macro-function: speaker’s deresponsibilization. Among these devices are the following: x
indirect acts and justification moves;
x
non immediacy indicators, as defined by Wiener and Mehrabian (1968) and illustrated in 4.5. These include passive and impersonal constructions where references to speaker and hearer are deleted;
x
epistemic disclaimers (e.g. If I’m not wrong…) and non-epistemic disclaimers (e.g. I hate to do this, but…, If you wouldn’t mind…), parenthetical forms, and modal adverbs reducing commitment to the proposition;
x
tag-questions;
x
hedges, such as technically in contexts where adverbs of this kind are used “to move your displeasure from me, the conveyor of the information, to those who drew up the technical criteria” (Fraser, 1980: 349).
As pointed out by Fraser, the use of the above-listed devices does not automatically produce a mitigating effect. In fact, the hearer must decide on each occasion whether or not unwelcome effects have been mitigated. In this respect, knowledge of rhetoric seems to be a sine qua non for a pragmatic investigation of mitigation and analogous phenomena. Fraser defines mitigation as a strategy used to remove or sweeten the unwelcome effects of speech acts expressing orders, bad news, criticism, etc., thus shifting the focus from illocution to perlocution. This shift is facilitated by the notion of intended illocutionary force, which is very close to the Searlian concept of illocutionary point in that it mixes up intentionality and conventionality. Fraser does not draw any distinction between a speech act’s expected results (i.e. the perlocutionary effects usually associated with it) and its possible, although not predictable, results (i.e. its perlocutionary sequels). Basically, what Fraser seems to have in mind are perlocutionary objects like warning, annoying, offending, etc. The focus on perlocution raises various questions. First, which illocutionary acts must be mitigated? Second, what are the true objects of mitigation? For example, ordering, criticizing, dismissing, etc. all correspond to illocutionary acts. However, if we consider ‘giving bad news’, what is the object of mitigation: the illocution or the proposition? Third, which illocutionary acts are negative to speaker and hearer? And finally, since the rights and obligations of both speaker and hearer are affected by the actual execution of each speech act, is any speech act, at least in principle, completely free of negative perlocutionary effects? It should be noted that, in order to find answers to these questions, is necessary to reread Austin’s approach and clarify the distinction between illocution and perlocution. In particular, researchers must rethink the separation between the felicity of a given illocutionary act and its perlocutionary success (cf. Wunderlich, 1976: 115-118). At any rate, the distinction between illocution and perlocution should not be blurred. The illocution, as the conventional level of a
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speech act, ‘takes effect’, aims at achieving an effect and elicits a response (cf. Austin, 1962: 117-118). These aspects of the illocutionary act should not engender a confusion with the perlocutionary act, which consists in the achievement of a (factual or psychological) response, being it the response aimed at by the speaker or something different. It must also be noted, however, that distinguishing between the conventional effects of a given illocutionary act and its perlocutionary effects is not an easy task in the analysis of authentic speech. The major problem seems to be precisely finding a satisfactory balance between a philosophicallygrounded and an empirically-grounded treatment. A framework that takes illocution into account within an extended theory of action can probably help shed light on this theoretical problem. For instance, the relation between illocution and perlocution can be interpreted from a cognitive psychological perspective as an interdependence of high strategic levels and low operational levels. The former focus on general plans of action, while the latter center on the organization of specific strategies (cf. Cranach et al., 1980; Bange, 1992: 85-86). Besides, a satisfactory analysis must necessarily be based on large multilingual corpora of authentic speech. In this respect, as pointed out by Levinson (1983: 241), “there seems to be no clear reason why what is perlocution in one culture may not be an illocution in another”. Going back to Fraser’s definition, the view of mitigation as affecting perlocution is a transitional notion between natural and non-natural mitigation (cf. 2.3.1.). Such a definition is problematic in that perlocution is in itself non-conventional and each illocutionary act could cause unwelcome perlocutionary effects. Moreover, an act can be positive to the speaker, but at the same time it can be seen as an aggressive or face-threatening (hence potentially negative) act in terms of both its propositional content and illocutionary force. It may be not only possible but also advisable to mitigate acts that are positive to the hearer. As has been noted by many authors (Simmel, 1983 [1906]; Holly, 1979; Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1994, among others), there are acts such as compliments and expressions of appreciation or approval that are sometimes embarrassing to addressees and territorially somewhat invasive, which must therefore be attenuated. In conclusion, the possibly ‘unwelcome perlocution of the act’ – and with this, the face-threatening effect – is only one possible reason for mitigation. It is not a stable definitional criterion (with the exception of acts having negative effects per se, like reproach). In fact, such a notion does not account for the conventional nature of illocutions, being instead the result of arbitrary, personal, or idiosyncratic evaluations. In this respect, it must be noted here that mitigation is definitely associated with speakers’ strategic planning abilities and with their empathic ability to identify themselves with their hearers. For this reason, mitigation interfaces with other dimensions, particularly the emotive dimension. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a number of interactional parameters connected to illocution or to larger units are simultaneously affected by mitigation. This is exactly what I will try to show in the following chapters.
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2.1.7. Prince, Frader, and Bosk (1982) The short paper by Prince, Frader and Bosk (Prince et al., 1982) has some points in common with the present treatment. First, it addresses the problem of hedges starting from empirical data; second, the data are taken from a corpus of therapeutic interaction (i.e. physicianphysician discourse); third, the terminology used partly overlaps with the one adopted here. However, Prince et al.’s typology differs from mine in ways which are worth briefly discussing here. Leaving aside the insights concerning the interaction between doctors and the sources of their uncertainty and uneasiness, I will concentrate on Prince et al.’s theoretical proposals. Relying on a corpus of interactions among physicians in a pediatric intensive-care unit, the authors draw a basic distinction between two classes of hedges. The first class makes the propositional content fuzzy and corresponds to Lakoff’s (1972) definition of hedges. These expressions, which indicate non-prototypicalness with respect to class membership, e.g. His feet were sort of blue (p. 85), are called ‘approximators’. The second class, which “correlates with fuzziness in the relationship between the propositional content and the speaker” (p. 85), is called ‘shields’. The reason for distinguishing these two types of expressions is theoretically grounded: only the first class is formed by expressions that affect the truth conditions of the propositions associated with them. The second class leaves them unaltered. Hence, as argued by the authors, while the first class of hedges pertains to semantics, the second class pertains to pragmatics. Further distinctions within these two main classes are put forward. As to hedges on the propositional content, i.e. approximators, the authors claim that they can be divided in two subgroups. The first subgroup is called ‘adaptors’ and is made up by expressions which indicate that “the actual situation is close but not identical with the prototypical situation” (p. 88). The second subgroup of approximators is called ‘rounders’ and includes the expressions a speaker may use instead of a precise term, to indicate that there exists a range (over time, over methods, etc.) to which a given item belongs. As to expressions “conveying some markedness with respect to speaker’s commitment” (p. 86) that Prince et al. call ‘shields’, the authors draw a distinction between two subclasses: plausibility shields, e.g. I guess, it seems that, etc. which weaken the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition, 13 and attribution shields, which assign “the belief in question to someone else than the speaker, the speaker’s own degree of commitment being only indirectly inferrable” (p. 89). I have come to know Prince et al.’s paper only recently, after formulating my typology of mitigators, with the tripartition of bushes, hedges and shields. I was pleased to find points of convergence, including the use of the term ‘shield’ (though with a substantially different 13
Incidentally, Prince et al.’s (1982) ‘plausibility shields’ (‘hedges’ in my terms) roughly correspond to Urmson’s (1952) parenthetical verbs.
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meaning) for which I have been criticized. Let me briefly highlight the main divergences between Prince et al.’s approach and mine. I agree that it is possible to draw a distinction, at least in principle, between mitigators on the (act of reference within the) propositional content, i.e. approximators in Prince et al.’s terms, bushes in mine; and mitigators centered on the speaker’s commitment, i.e. shields in Prince et al.’s terms, hedges in mine. I have used the term ‘shields’ to refer to a third, different class of mitigators, i.e. mitigators centered on the deictic origin of the utterance (cf. 2.1.5.). This is not just a matter of terminology: I believe the authors fail to recognize that ‘plausibility shields’ and ‘attribution shields’ work on the basis of different mechanisms. While the former (which I have called ‘hedges’) are centered on one aspect of illocutionary force, i.e. the commitment to the truth of the expressed proposition – ‘neustic’ in Hare’s (1970) terms – the latter (which I have called ‘shields’) are employed to ascribe the whole utterance to someone else than the speaker. Moreover, ‘plausibility shields’ are scalar devices, covering different degrees of uncertainty on the part of the speaker, whereas ‘attribution shields’ are dichotomous devices. A drawback in Prince et al.’s treatment is the mixing up of form and function, specifically of abstract domains of the downgrading operation and resulting effects. Furthermore, in my approach there is no space for a sharp distinction between approximators belonging to semantics and shields belonging to pragmatics. As I claimed in 2.1.3.1., the operation of bushes on the propositional content has repercussions on the whole speech act. In other words, a weakened (marked) precision in the reference act has the effect of weakening the commitment to the truth of the proposition and this in turn has the effect of weakening the subscription to the whole speech act. Propositions are independent objects only in philosophers’ mind. In real usages, they cannot be isolated from the rest of the utterance in which they occur as there is not a locution without an illocution (cf. Austin, 1962; see footnote 16) within a goal-directed and contextually-constrained behavior. 2.1.8. The notion of weakening (Abschwächung) Some German linguists have described a concept that is similar to the notion of mitigation used in the present work. I am referring to a paper by Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten (1982) and to a book by Langner (1994). These two works show some similarities. First, they both employ the term Abschwächung, which can be translated as ‘weakening’ or ‘attenuation’. It should be noted that the definition provided by Langner, though more elaborate, is substantially the same as that as Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten’s. Second, they take illocutionary force of the speech act to be the privileged scope of weakening strategies. Third, they are both based on data collected in specific interactional contexts, i.e. psychotherapeutic conversations and Hochschulseminar (college classroom interaction) respectively. This last feature makes the two works compliant with a fundamental precondition for an integrated
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pragmatic approach: i.e. they meet the need to connect different kinds of mitigation and interaction to one another by formulating hypotheses that rely on a sound empirical basis. 2.1.8.1. Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten (1982). One of the merits of the work by MeyerHermann and Weingarten is that, in their discussion of mitigation, they address questions related both to the reduction of obligations and to the participants’ interactional expectations. As a starting point, the authors make some methodological remarks on the difference between their own approach and other studies on Abtönungspartikeln and Gradpartikeln. While research on the latter tends to concentrate on identifying the communicative functions of lexical units in isolation, the authors’ main concern is to find interactive categories for interpreting lexical devices and describing interaction among them. Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten’s definition of mitigation is the following: In a first approximation, we define the concept of weakening (Abschwächung) – relative to a hypothethical, less weakened variant of an utterance – as that function of an utterance or of part of an utterance that reduces the imposition of obligations or the commitment to obligations. (Meyer-Hermann e Weingarten, 1982: 242, my translation, C.C.)
14
Some of the questions raised by Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten are particularly interesting for the perspective adopted here, in particular, the question: “which components of the utterance act are affected by the modulating devices realizing weakened and emphasized utterances?” (“Worüber operieren Realisierungsmerkmale von abgeschwächten und verschärften Äußerungen?”, 1982: 251). This crucial issue will be addressed throughout the present book, but let us try now to specify this general point through the following questions which will be addressed in the following chapters:
14
a)
which linguistic scope, whether lexicalized or not, is affected by the mitigating operation?;
b)
is there a correlation between the abstract scope of the linguistic mitigating device and the inferrable effect with respect to the value assigned to a given interactional dimension?;
c)
how does each device contribute to Abschwächung?;
d)
do mitigating devices change according to speech act type? And, if so, how?;
e)
how do different kinds of mitigating devices interact? With which results? And finally,
The original passage reads as follows: “Das Konzept der ‘Abschwächung’ explizieren wir vorläufig als Funktion einer Äußerung bzw. eines Äußerungsteils, welche darin besteht, daß – relativ zu einer hypothetischen, weniger abgeschwächten Variante der Äußerung – schwächere Obligationen aufgebaut oder übernommen werden” (Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten, 1982: 242).
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f)
from a psychological point of view, what is the relationship between the use of different types of mitigation and speakers’ constructions of the ‘self’, i.e. their self-presentations beyond mere face-work (cf. Chapter 1)?
2.1.8.2. Langner (1994). Michael Langner’s definition of Abschwächung draws on the one given by Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten (1982) and on Brown and Levinson’s (1987) model. Langner says: I take Abschwächung, in a first approximation, to be a communicative strategy by which the participants in a (linguistic) interaction (e.g. communication during a university seminar) try to minimize territorial violations that would inevitably arise in case of more direct communication. (Langner, 1994: 22)
15
Langner identifies the following levels corresponding to the functional domains of the weakening operation: x
the level of obligations constructed and modified through lexical and grammatical elements;
x
the level of face, which can be threatened by specific interactional sequences;
x
the level of institutional conditions, further subdivided into speech acts peculiar to institutions and speech acts simply linked to institutions (1994: 50-51).
He then moves on to specify the following scopes of Abschwächung: x
weakening of the realization of the illocution;
x
weakening of the truth-value of a proposition, further subdivided into: weakening of the reference act (weakening of categorizations of objects or states); weakening of the predication (weakening of claims to truth of assertions about objects or states (1994: 57)).
According to Langner, Abschwächung is realized by the following linguistic means:
15
x
phenomena pertaining to modality (modal particles, modal adverbs, modal verbs, Konjunktiv II, modal use of future tense);
x
metacommunicative prefaces to utterances (e.g. wenn ich mich richtig erinnere);
x
use of sentence structures in which the syntactic mood and the pragmatic modality are incongruous (unterschiedlicher Satztypgebrauch), for instance the use of an
Langner’s original definition is the following: “Unter Abschwächung verstehe ich in einer ersten Annäherung eine Kommunikationsstrategie, mit der die Teilnehmer an einer (sprachlichen) Interaktion – z.B. in Hochschulseminar-Kommunikation – versuchen, die Territoriumsverletzungen zu minimieren, die sich bei direkterer Kommunikation zwangsläufig ergeben würden” (Langner, 1994: 22).
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interrogative sentence to make a request; x
means expressing a particular attitude towards the proposition (e.g. epistemic verbs, normative verbs, etc.);
x
impersonalization forms (e.g. the use of man, wir, etc. instead of ich);
x
hedges (Heckenausdrücke);
x
hedged performative utterances (verdeckte performative Äußerungen) (cf. Fraser, 1975);
x
use of verbs or nouns with a specific meaning within the proposition (e.g. “können Sie das mal erklären?” instead of beweisen);
x
bipartite structures, i.e. zweigliedrige Konstruktionen (e.g. “Ich freue mich sehr, wenn Sie heute abend kommen”);
x
marked register;
x
various kinds of reported speech;
x
use of definite articles, particularly with reference to a third person (e.g. “der Helmut Kohl, der Helmut”).
I will not dwell on the above-listed points. Suffice it to say that Langner’s work is an important reference for the framework developed in this book, as it is the first comprehensive empirical attempt at providing a systematic treatment of mitigating phenomena within a specific institutional activity type.
2.2. INTENSITY The discussion of hedges in Section 2.1. has emphasized the idea that no locutionary act can occur without an illocutionary act. When we refer exclusively to the former and disregard the latter, we are loosing sight of the total speech act that is the real object of pragmatics. This thesis, which was first advanced by Austin, is at the basis of the present work. 16 But if we move from theory to real language, how are illocutionary acts produced and recognized in everyday interaction? It is easily enough to admit that the understanding of the illocutionary force heavily relies on our metapragmatic competence. My claim here is that intensity factors that converge in the latter are an integral part of this understanding. How can this idea become an operational criterion? In Caffi (1990), the term ‘modulation’ is introduced to designate the rhetorical and stylistic form of the utterance. In that paper, mitigation is 16
The reference is, among others, to the following passage: “in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary is an abstraction only: every genuine speech-act is both” (Austin, 1962: 147). The idea that every locution is also an illocution is highlighted with interesting arguments by MorpurgoTagliabue (1972/1973: 71).
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described as one of the two possible and complementary directions of modulation, the other being ‘reinforcement’. My main concern at the time the paper was written was to devise a conceptual framework in which Austin’s ideas could be substantiated by authentic speech rather than simply by examples invented by linguists. I had in mind what Bally (1965 [1925]) calls ‘living language’, i.e. real language that is inherently affect-loaded, evocative, ambivalent, and able to convey subtle expressive nuances and shades, in a constant oscillation between downgrading and upgrading, attenuation and reinforcement. The term modulation was chosen to make specific reference to this tension between the opposite directions along an intensity scale which can be conceptualized by scalar aspects of illocutionary force, while remaining within the general metaphorical field of force. As we will see in 2.2.2. below, it was Strawson who opened up the issue of intensity within the speech act theoretical reflection. Before addressing this specific point of connection between speech act theory and stylistics, which is my main concern in this section, a brief look at Bally’s idea of intensity will be useful to introduce the stylistic perspective on the problem. 2.2.1. Intensity according to Bally (1970 [1909]) In this section I will briefly look at Bally’s remarks on intensity that are particularly relevant to the idea of mitigation discussed in this book. In the stylistics of langue (linguistic stylistics), which he founded, Bally assigns a crucial role to the notion of the intensity of expressive choices. Intensity is defined as a principle of classification holding for expressions that form an ideologically-oriented set (“norme de classement pour les expressions constitutives d’une rubrique idéologique” Bally, 1970 [1909]: 171) and reflects the convergence of intellectual and emotional factors, the latter prevailing over the former or vice versa. Bally’s inquiry centers on the lexicon – specifically, on expressive choices of synonyms. However, the speaker’s subjective stances are not only a matter of lexicon. In fact, in Bally’s work, the study of the lexicon is integrated with the study of syntactic dislocation and cleft structures of different kinds (Bally, 1965 [1932]) and their different expressive and emotive impact. 17 Moreover, Bally illustrates how different tournures (i.e. syntactic constructions) can often cover whole turns, sometimes corresponding to a sort of repartee following a dialogic microscript. His examples are taken from instances of spontaneous speech and legitimate the possibility, at least theoretically, of extending the idea of intensity to larger linguistic units such as discourse chunks. Although Bally neglects the illocutionary dimension of the utterance, his remarks have a pioneering pragmatic nature, also from the point of view of emotive 17
The theoretical core of Bally’s syntactic approach consists in the identification within the sentence of what he terms a modus and a dictum. This anticipates the distinction between modality and propositional content. By means of the modus vs. dictum distinction, the attitude of the speaker (modus) towards her/his utterance (dictum) is given an abstract representation.
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communication (cf. Caffi and Janney, 1994b: 333-335). In his seminal discussion of expressiveness, Bally (1970 [1909]: 250 ff.) draws a distinction between ‘direct’ (lexical) and ‘indirect’ (syntactic and prosodic) expressive linguistic choices. I will draw on this distinction later in the book. What is important at this juncture is to stress Bally’s idea of the pervasiveness of expressive resources in discourse: expressivity, subjectivity and affect are the intertwined distinctive features of spoken language which Bally sees as a goal-directed activity. 18 In his discussions of the concept of intensity in Traité de stylistique française (1909), Bally explicitly deals with attenuation. After illustrating the use of diminutive suffixes that, he notes, are much more widely used in Italian, he attributes the pervasiveness of attenuation in spoken language to social and emotional factors. Bally also recognizes that neither social nor emotional factors alone can account for the complex use of attenuating expressions as compared to unmarked expressions, which say things plainly as they are (“disent la chose telle qu’elle est”, 1970 [1909]: 175). In his discussion of different degrees of intensity in adjectives and semantically corresponding evaluative expressions, Bally puts forward the idea of a continuum of choices within an ascending and descending range resulting from a real transposition of the affective tone. Nobody denies the extremely delicate, sometimes subtle, nature of these nuances. However, we would like to have convinced the reader by now that a tendency [i.e. attenuation, C.C.] does exist and that this tendency affects the practice of language. (Bally, 1970 [1909]: 175, my translation, C.C.)
19
Bally often implies that the linguistic choice is influenced by a mixture of intellectual, emotional, and social factors. He distinguishes between two dialectically opposite modes of communication characterizing each message: the intellectual mode (mode pur) and the affective mode (mode vécu). In real language, Bally argues, mode vécu prevails over mode pur. The latter represents, above all, an abstract possibility which offers the identifying term. In other words, the intellectual, logical mode represents the neutral choice against which the expressive choice can be detected, compared and evaluated. As already mentioned in 1.5., Bally’s idea of a constant, often unconscious, comparative process at work in communication (“les mots ne sont compris et sentis que par une comparaison incessante et inconsciente qui se fait entre eux dans notre cerveau”, Bally, 1970 [1909]: 22) foreshadows recent developments in cognitive psychology. This idea provides early historical support for the claim that pragmatic categories are not discrete, but may, as Givón (1989: 5) says, “display shades and 18
This idea was later expanded by the Italian historical linguist Benvenuto Terracini (Terracini, 1963; cf. 1.5.), who dealt with the link between expressive tone and social tone. 19 The original passage is the following: “une gamme montante et descendante, résultat d’une vraie transposition du ton affectif. Que ces nuances soient extrêmement délicates, ténues, subtiles parfois, personne ne le nie; mais qu’il y a une tendance, et que cette tendance est en action dans la pratique du langage, voilà ce dont nous voudrions avoir convaincu le lecteur”. (Bally, 1970 [1909]: 175)
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gradations”. These very shades and gradations (both stylistic and pragmatic) can be understood thanks to the umbrella-category ‘mitigation’. Bally’s observations can be reframed within a wider framework that accounts for a view of language as action (thus shifting the focus from locution, Bally’s main concern, to illocution). This framework will also account for a view of interaction as negotiation (thus foregrounding the negotiating process of meaning construction and consensus-building). This framework will preserve, however, Bally’s kernel idea of style as something which is not added to the linguistic system but is inherent in it. Furthermore, Bally’s stylistics provides a set of criteria for focusing on the complex object of analysis of the present book, namely contextually and emotionally modulated linguistic action. In Bally’s vein, it is perhaps worth reaffirming here that mitigated choices are empirical in nature. They are not just lexicological or linguistic units but rather interactional units; and they are mitigated by virtue of some type of implicit comparison. The comparison process may be unconscious or it may involve evaluating a given mitigated choice against other possible and/or expected non-mitigated choices in that particular co-text and context. Mitigated choices can therefore be explained in terms of co-textual and contextual factors, notably in terms of different expectations shaped by the interactions in which these choices take place. Among the set of multiple expectations referred to here we can find expectations related to intensity: One of the linguistic variables about which we have expectations is intensity of the persuasive appeal. (McCann and Higgins, 1990: 20)
2.2.2. Intensity according to Strawson (1964) As already said, this section aims mainly at finding an answer to the following question: is it possible, within the historical theoretical core of analytical philosophy, to find a link between the concepts of modulation and illocutionary force? Austin (1962: 72-79) and Searle (1975: 348, 350) both hinted at the problem of intensity of illocutionary force. More precisely, Austin has basically in mind the strength of the attempt to reach the perlocutionary goal via an illocutionary act. In this connection, his considerations about the different realizations of a speech act (1962: 79 ff.) have a bearing on the issue of intensity. He says: We can qualify the force of ‘I shall’ by adding ‘probably’ – or in an opposite sense – by adding ‘without fail’ (p. 75) […] an imperative may be an order, a permission, a demand, a request, an entreaty, a suggestion, a recommendation, a warning. (pp. 76-77)
Though clearly Austin’s main concern is to compare different devices used to perform an
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illocutionary act, his attention to real linguistic usages brought him to touch on the problem of intensity. Degrees of intensity also underlie the list of expressions on p. 79 of How to do things with words, e.g. I thank vs. I am grateful vs. I feel grateful. As to Searle (1975), he recognized the role of intensity factors in two of his twelve dimensions of variation of illocutionary acts. The latter can differ one from another in “the force or strength with which the illocutionary point is presented” (p. 348). Also, according to Searle, illocutionary acts can differ in the style of their performance (p. 350). However, it was Strawson (1964) who first envisaged a non occasional connection between modulation and illocutionary force in his paper “Intention and convention in speech acts”. In this foundational paper, Strawson’s main goal is to put forward an account of illocutionary force and to clarify the bearing that speaker’s intentions and social conventions have on it. One major conclusion is that we have to distinguish between non-conventional illocutionary acts, where the appeal to convention is limited to the conventionality of linguistic means and where the notion of force is ‘exhausted’ by the notion of meaning, and conventional illocutionary acts (e.g. marrying, redoubling, giving out, pronouncing sentence, bringing in a verdict). Starting from Austin’s notion of ‘securing uptake’, i.e. the hearer’s understanding of the illocutionary force of an utterance, Strawson claims: We tentatively laid down as a necessary condition of securing understanding of the illocutionary force of an utterance that the speaker should succeed in bringing it about that the audience took him, in issuing his utterance, to have a complex intention of a certain kind, namely the intention that the audience should recognize (and recognize as intended to be recognized) his intention to induce a certain response in the audience. (Strawson, 1964: 454)
Another important point made by Strawson is that the intentions which make up illocutionary force must be avowable (p. 454). This essential feature explains why acts such as ‘showing off’ and ‘insinuating’ can not be seen as illocutionary acts. Against this background, Strawson considers the possibility of accounting for the difference between requests and entreaties in terms of illocutionary force. In so doing, the problem of the intensity of an illocutionary act within a given illocutionary type (e.g. exercitives in Austin’s terms, directives in Searle’s terms) is introduced. Strawson does not speak of ‘intensity’ but of “variation of an act” (p. 455). He maintains that: Entreaty, for example, is a matter of trying to secure the primary response not merely through audience recognition of the intention to secure it, but through audience recognition of a complex attitude of which this primary intention forms an integral part. A wish that someone should stay may be held in different ways: passionately or lightly, confidently or desperately; and it may, for different reasons, be part of a speaker’s intention to secure recognition of how he holds it. The most obvious reason, in the case of entreaty, is the belief, or hope, that such a revelation is more
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likely to secure the fulfillment of the primary intention. (Strawson, 1964: 455)
A major conclusion can be drawn from these considerations: the mode of performance, i.e. intensity, is part of the complex intention that is at the basis of illocutionary force. Moreover, the recognition of such a mode can contribute to the achievement of the complex primary response. In other words, variation of an act, which I call ‘modulation’, as that category that captures the mode of performance of an illocutionary act and makes the notion of intensity operational, is part of the intention held by the speaker which the hearer must recognize. To understand an illocutionary act amounts to, among other things, understanding its intensity. Intensity, it can be claimed, is not only a matter of stylistic choice: it can also facilitate the attainment of speaker’s goals. In Strawson’s terms, while in acts such as ‘insinuating’ the recognition of the intention to insinuate leads to a failure, in acts such as ‘entreaty’ the recognition of the intention, or more precisely, of that part of the speaker’s intention which concerns intensity factors, is not only avowable, but it “makes [it] more likely to secure the fulfillment of the primary intention” (p. 454). In keeping with Sbisà (1989), I disagree with Strawson on the general account of illocution he puts forward. Suffice it to say here that, first, he confines the notion of illocution to that of intention; second, he deals with force conventionality as if the latter were simply a matter of the conventionality of linguistic devices. As a result, the idea of illocutionary force is not clearly separated from that of meaning. Nevertheless, Strawson’s remarks prove useful in identifying a direct link between locution and illocution, formulation styles affecting the locutionary act and performance styles affecting the illocutionary act. In a word, he connects action style and action performance in the concept of intensity. As we can gather from the quotation above, according to Strawson, illocutionary force includes intensity factors that must be recognized by the addressee. And, crucially, the recognition of these makes the attainment of speech act goals easier. Less abstractly, what is crucial in the present context is how intensity, or its operational counterpart, i.e. modulation, is realized by different linguistic, prosodic and kinesic devices. Illocutionary force depends on a number of indicators and cues that shape the act as such and give it its overall and stylistic physiognomy. 20 In real communication, illocutionary acts are usually modulated. It is the non-modulated act that is the marked choice. Sometimes modulated illocution is given a name, as in the case of ‘prototype peaks’ (Givón, 1989: 152) like statements, questions, requests, or in the case of ‘entreaties’ mentioned by Strawson. In most cases, however, it is given no label, so that illocutions are qualified in various ways within our dictionaries and ‘folk taxonomies’. So, we easily recognize a request as ‘pressing’, an excuse 20
In a 1991 paper (Bazzanella et al., 1991), Carla Bazzanella, Marina Sbisà and myself pointed out that illocutionary force must be regarded as a scalar notion in order to account for intensity factors not envisaged in traditional speech act theory.
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as ‘heartfelt’, a statement as ‘categorical’ and so on. In other words, intensity factors are an integral part of our metapragmatic competence. In my view, there is no clear-cut distinction in the utterance between indicators of illocution and indicators of modulation (both in mitigating and in reinforcing directions). In addition, it is not possible to separate mitigation from multilayered and multi-dimensional processes of meaning construction and negotiation which pragmatics tries to unravel (be they illocutionary-related or not). Mitigation affects these processes in many ways. For instance, it influences content, as in conversational sequences or texts where topic-related moves may coincide with disqualification strategies (cf. Haley, 1959; Sluzki et al., 1967; Chapter 4). It can also influence style, producing slight propositional and morphosyntactic adjustments (e.g. use of diminutive suffixes). In any case, as noted by Strawson, modulation is part and parcel of the complex intention that the speaker wants the hearer to recognize. This leads us back to a question already raised in Chapter 1: which subjects do the terms ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’ (regardless of changes in what Goffman calls ‘footing’) refer to? In my view of pragmatics, the model subject is not only a speaker but also a competent participant in a given interaction, who knows which behavior is appropriate in a given situation and can interpret specific communicative practices. Interlocutors have more than one identity and constantly shape and (re)construct their selves through discourse. They are acknowledged players with an ability to act according to contextualized appropriateness criteria close to the notions of pršpon, or aptum in classical rhetoric (Lausberg, 1967: §48). In other words, speakers are endowed with a metapragmatic competence (cf. Caffi, 1994a) which is not only linguistic, but also semiotic, and constitutionally intertextual. Such competence refers to a knowledge which concerns not only language as social (culturally and historically determined) behavior, but also our ‘being in the world’, as philosophers throughout the twentieth century have put it. 21 This competence includes the understanding of illocutionary force as well as of its modulations. The whole issue of style, of what is appropriate in a given context, is rooted in this understanding. Illocutionary force – which associates forms with functions and gives them names within different folk taxonomies – can be thought of as an interface between language and world. Clearly, this is not the only interface we can think of. It must be complemented by the implicit metapragmatic awareness (i.e. the knowledge of how to do things) 22 evinced by mitigation strategies. Mitigation affects procedural aspects of implicit metapragmatic competence; we 21
The language/world metaphor runs through twentieth century philosophy from Heidegger to Wittgenstein and has deeply influenced Western ethnomethodology. In this respect, it must be noted that the connection between formal facts and meaning construction procedures stressed by Garfinkel (1967) dates back to Weber (1978 [1922]: 23 ff.), who, in his discussion of soziale Beziehungen, assigns a crucial role to the interplay between the construction of a particular meaning and a given behavior. 22 Knowing how to do things does not necessarily imply knowing how to explain the way things must be done (cf. Caffi, 1994a).
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know much more about language than we are actually able to make explicit. We are not only able to understand whether a given utterance expresses thanks or apologies, but we can also distinguish a formal apology from a remorseful expression of regret, or a heartfelt thanks from a mere mark of politeness. Moreover, relying on very subtle cues (cf. Chapter 4), we can even go so far as to guess whether apologies, thanks, etc. are sincere or not.
2.3. TOWARDS AN EXTENDED NOTION OF MITIGATION 2.3.1. Some conceptual distinctions In this section, I will look at some ways in which we can move from the restricted notion of mitigation based on Brown and Levinson’s (1987) narrow concept of face-threatening act (cf. 2.1.2.) to a broader idea of mitigation. In order to do this, some distinctions are required. My major goal in drawing the following distinctions is to lay the conceptual premises of this broader account. i)
Mitigation as a process versus mitigation as a result
First, the term ‘mitigation’, as an action noun (nomen actionis), can be used in two senses: to refer to the mitigating operation (or process) itself, or to refer to its result, i.e. the fact or condition of being mitigated. In the first sense, the mitigating strategy or action is foregrounded and its goal or outcome is backgrounded; in the second sense, the goal or projected outcome of mitigation is foregrounded and the strategy used to achieve it is backgrounded. Second, mitigation is a relational notion. From a logical point of view, it is a predicate with three arguments, i.e. (i) someone (ii) mitigates something (iii) by using something else. The present book deals with instances of mitigation in which one of the arguments involved in this predicate is the mitigating device (the Abschwächendes) while the other (the Abschwächtes) is an abstract component among the cluster of semantic-pragmatic features of the utterance (cf. Langner, 1994: 83). The presupposition linked to the lexeme ‘mitigation’ – both in its everyday sense and in its metalinguistic sense – is that its object, i.e. what is mitigated, is negative. This negative object may exist as an ontological reality (e.g. an action, event, process, or condition) or it may only be a possibility (e.g. a potentially unwelcome perlocutionary effect). For instance, a mild southern wind can mitigate the rigors of winter (both arguments being extralinguistic); an encouraging word can mitigate my anxiety (an argument being linguistic while the other being not); a reassuring circumlocution can mitigate a diagnosis (both arguments being linguistic).
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When the term ‘mitigation’ designates an ontological reality, it is being used in its everyday sense; when it designates objects that exist only as possibilities, it is being used in a technical, metalinguistic sense. The designated objects of mitigation in the everyday sense either exist at present or have already happened; those of mitigation in the metalinguistic sense have either already happened, in which case mitigation is co-extensive with repair, or they are about to happen, in which case it is an anticipatory strategy based on metapragmatic competence that is directed toward avoiding a possible negative result. The difference between repair and anticipatory mitigation can therefore be described in terms of the different ontological statuses of the objects of the two operations. In the case of repair, the object already exists and corresponds to some feature of a preceding sequence, while in the case of anticipatory mitigation, the object is only potential. In pre-sequences or grounders preceding the head act, the object of anticipatory mitigation has been planned, i.e. somehow calculated. ii)
Natural mitigation versus non-natural mitigation
The distinction that has just been drawn between ‘mitigation’ in its everyday sense and in its metalinguistic sense can be further expanded. On an analogy to the Gricean opposition between natural meaning and non-natural meaning, it is possible to refer to the former as ‘natural mitigation’ (MitN) and to the latter as ‘non-natural mitigation’ (MitNN). This opposition, however, could hardly be said to capture anything more than a general, ontologically grounded, conceptual difference, and it is reminiscent of the Gricean distinction only in a weak sense. To push the analogy any further would commit us to the view that a speaker successfully mitigates in a non-natural way when the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s intention to mitigate is part of the speaker’s complex intention to mitigate. Attractive as it may be from a speculative viewpoint, there is no evidence that a description of this kind is suitable for mitigating processes in the real world. It can even be hypothesized that in many cases such a recognition may hinder the mitigation to take place successfully. If we take mitigation as an all-embracing category which is useful to unlock the communicative dynamics affecting the stylistic quality of meaning construction, we are bound to adopt a weaker version of this distinction. In the real world, mitigation takes too many forms and plays too many functions involving too many intertwined variables to allow us any simplification, however elegant. So, all we can concede to idealization in this respect is to argue that the label ‘natural mitigation’ (MitN) covers all instances where the term ‘mitigation’ is used in its everyday sense (cf. above). In natural mitigation, the objects involved in the mitigating process (i.e. the mitigating device and the mitigated object) may be both non-linguistic. A smile, for instance, may mitigate a feeling of uneasiness between speaker and hearer. On the other hand, one object – the mitigating device – may be linguistic, while the other – the mitigated object, for instance
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a worry – may be non-linguistic. The label ‘non-natural mitigation’ covers all instances where the term ‘mitigation’ is used metalinguistically. In non-natural mitigation both objects involved are linguistic: the mitigating device is an actual linguistic choice and the mitigated object is an abstract component among the cluster of semantic-pragmatic features of the utterance, e.g. the precision of reference, the commitment to the truth of the proposition, the intensity of the illocutionary force, etc. The vast majority of mitigating strategies that have been studied in the literature as well as the examples that will be discussed in the present book (cf. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) are cases of non-natural mitigation. Between the two types of mitigation there are, however, transitional cases. Mitigation of speech acts whose propositional content is inherently negative for the hearer, typically the breaking of bad news, can be seen as a case of natural mitigation. Acts whose illocutionary force is inherently negative for the hearer (e.g. accusing, cursing, threatening, reprimanding, etc.), what Leech called “conflictive illocutionary functions” (Leech, 1983: 104-105), can be seen as transitional cases between natural mitigation and non-natural mitigation (an example of which will be discussed in 6.4.). This is because both cases of mitigation (in acts whose propositional content and in acts whose illocutionary force are inherently negative for the recipient) share the negative feature of the projected object, but differ with respect to the nature of this negativity. The basic function of natural (e.g. propositional) and non-natural (e.g. negative illocutionary acts) mitigation is the same: both weaken predictably unpleasant effects or unwelcome perlocutions ensuing from the speech act. The main difference between them, however, is the different status of the ‘negativity’ involved. In the case of natural mitigation, negativity is contextual: something is negative to someone in a given situation; the same content could be neutral or even positive if communicated to someone else. In the case of non-natural mitigation, on the other hand, the negativity is conventional: in particular, in illocutionary acts which are intrinsically negative for the recipient, the negativity is part of the stable, coded, context-independent meaning of the metalinguistic lexeme focusing on the illocution (e.g. ‘criticism’, ‘curse’, ‘accusation’ etc.). To put it differently: as to propositional mitigation, since every proposition and every act might in principle be negative to someone in some way, it is the degree of the shared knowledge (in particular, knowledge deriving from previous exchanges) that has a crucial role in determining whether or not a given act has potentially negative effects on the hearer and must therefore be mitigated by the speaker. For instance, a sentence like “You put on your gray jacket yesterday evening, darling”, which is neutral with respect both to proposition and to illocutionary force, can be a reproach (instead of a matter-offact statement), mitigated by the endearment term, if uttered by a wife reminding once more her husband that she hates seeing him in that jacket. In these cases, an act is projectively thought of by the speaker as negative for the hearer: ‘negativity’ is crucially connected with the
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interlocutors’ knowledge of, and their ability to empathize with, each other. By contrast, negativity is a stable feature of inherently negative illocutionary forces such as accusing or cursing. Non-natural mitigation – for instance, mitigation employed in invasive requests or requests that are difficult for the hearer to fulfill – is closely connected to the predictability of the consequences of discourse, which can also be thought of in terms of calculability of implicatures. In other words, non-natural mitigation is related to the ability to plan discourse and engage in strategic communicative prevention (cf. Caffi, 1990) by making choices from a wide repertoire of communicative options. As we will see, this is also related to the capacity for empathy on the part of the speaker (cf. Chapter 4). What has been said so far strongly supports the idea that there is a close connection between various types of mitigation and subjects’ shared knowledge of both the outer and the inner worlds, of things and how to do things and of people and the ways people and their different ‘selves’ enter into discourse. Such a connection can be conceptualized in terms of scripts, scenarios, schemata or other cognitive metaphors, or in terms of activity frames which “reflect conventionalized and stereotypical notions of interpersonal relationships” (Gumperz, 1992: 45). These different types of conceptualizations which could be employed in explaining mitigation phenomena, however, leave the personal, experiential and emotive side of this complex knowledge unaccounted for. The connection between mitigation and knowledge of the world can also be dealt with in terms of metapragmatic awareness, which encompasses (different forms of) social competence and (different forms of) emotive capacity (Caffi and Janney, 1994b). In the third sense of the term I have put forward in Caffi (1994a: 2464 ff.), metapragmatics is the management of discourse, based on common knowledge and reflexivity. 23 Mitigation can be thought of as deriving from a complex knowledge which also affects the possible deontic consequences of an illocutionary act for both speaker and hearer (for instance, the obligation on the part of the speaker to believe in what s/he is saying, the attempt at making the interlocutor believe something; cf. Sbisà, 2001). iii)
Illocutionary mitigation versus perlocutionary mitigation: mitigation of doing (prâxis mitigation) vs. mitigation of making ( poíesis mitigation)
As we have seen, potentially unpleasant consequences are implicit or explicit either in an utterance’s propositional content or in its type of illocution. Typical examples of propositional mitigation occur in connection with utterances expressing bad news, while typical examples of illocutionary mitigation occur in connection with inherently face-threatening illocutions such 23
The first two senses of ‘metapragmatics’ I have distinguished in Caffi (1994a) are the following: 1) the metatheoretical and epistemological reflection on pragmatics; 2) in a Kantian vein, the study of the possibility and felicity conditions of communication (e.g. research on dialogue-constitutive universals, or on the universals of the act of promising).
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as criticism or reproach. As already said, both forms of mitigation presuppose the negativity of the mitigated object and can be explained by resorting to the basic meaning of the verb to mitigate. Indeed, what is mitigated is an inconvenience, a potential damage or injury related to uneasy or embarrassing situations, negative circumstances, etc. In Fraser’s (1980) terms, both forms of mitigation can be regarded as ‘altruistic’, in that they aim at removing unwelcome perlocutionary effects on the interlocutor (for instance, when giving bad news, a speaker may want to mitigate the ensuing ‘alarm’ effect). This, of course, does not mean that altruistic forms of mitigation cannot at the same time be ‘self-serving’, as we will see later in the book, in that they reduce the speaker’s commitment to either proposition or illocution. Among the different cases covered by the notion of non-natural mitigation given above, different types of mitigation centered on locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts can be distinguished. Locutionary mitigation is related to the vagueness or weakening of the locutionary act (its reference act and its predication act respectively), illocutionary mitigation centers on the indirectness of the illocutionary act and perlocutionary mitigation is geared toward the attenuation of perlocutionary effects which are by definition non-conventional. An interesting way of thinking of the difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary mitigation is grounded in a passage from Aristotle. Drawing on the Nicomachean Ethics (VI, 4, 1140a, b; English translation pp. 334 ff.), 24 it can be said that mitigation of an illocution involves an attenuating action affecting the execution of the act, the doing, i.e. prâxis (Lat. actio, ‘practice’, doing). By contrast, mitigation of a perlocution involves an attenuating action implicitly affecting the goal of the act, the making, i.e. poíesis (Lat. factio, ‘production’, making). The former could be called ‘pragmatic mitigation’, while the latter could be called ‘praxeological mitigation’. Intriguing as it may be, the usefulness of this Aristotelian distinction in the analysis of real data remains to be assessed. Indeed, the major implication of such a distinction has probably to be sought in the fact that the two different cases it captures could lead to different kinds of misfires. Pragmatic mitigation runs the risk of making the act invalid (i.e. a given illocutionary act might no longer be recognized as such, and might thus fail to trigger its conventional effects), while praxeological mitigation runs the risk of making the act ineffective. What is important to stress is that, if saying is a form of action, it must be an effective 24
The passage of the Nicomachean Ethics that I am referring to is the following: “doing and making are generically different, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself: doing well is in itself the end” (VI, 4, 1140a, b.; English transl. pp. 334 ff.). Conte (1997) refers to Aristotle’s distinction in her discussion of counter-performativity. On this latter notion cf. also Azzoni (1998: 27-30). It must be noted, however, that the distinction referred to by Conte needs an adequate contextualization. In the Nicomachean Ethics (VI, 4, 1140a, b. English transl. pp. 334 ff.) the distinction between prâxis and poíesis is made with reference to the definition of prudence, or practical wisdom, and is associated with the distinction between science, whose object’s existence is said to be necessary and eternal, and art, whose object is said to be contingent.
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action. It seems reasonable to claim that mitigation links the pragmatic dimension to the praxeological dimension by connecting action with effective action, grammar with rhetoric, and illocution with perlocution (cf. Leech, 1983). iv) Lenitive mitigation versus tempering mitigation In Chapter 6 I will analyze non-natural mitigation in examples of a) exercitive-directive acts; and b) assertive-verdictive acts. 25 I will then borrow from the terminology of Matteo Peregrini’s seventeenth century treatise on rhetoric Trattato delle acutezze and call the first group ‘lenitive mitigation’ and the second group ‘tempering mitigation’. 26 Lenitive mitigation operates on illocutions pertaining to deontic modality, i.e. on illocutions that are more or less openly manipulative and invasive (e.g. directives) and affect relations between the interlocutors. Tempering mitigation, on the other hand, operates on assertiveverdictive illocutions pertaining to the epistemic-doxastic modality and mainly affects the relation between the speaker and the object of her/his utterance. In the former type of mitigation, the act relates to a state of affairs to be attained. To use one of Searle’s (1975) typological criteria, the direction of fit goes from words to the world. In the latter type of mitigation, the act relates to a state of affairs that has already been attained, and the direction of fit goes from the world to words. In lenitive mitigation there is above all a reduction of the act’s claim to validity and its ensuing obligations for the recipient. In tempering mitigation, on the other hand, there is a reduction of the act’s claim to truth and its ensuing obligations for the speaker, including those related to potential face-threats. To further clarify this distinction, we could state that tempering mitigation is realized by operations affecting the proposition and its connection to the speaker, whereas lenitive mitigation is realized by operations centered around perlocution. It seems reasonable here to make reference to the previously mentioned distinction taken by Conte from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, between prâxis (actio, practice, doing) and poíesis (factio, production, making). In tempering mitigation the weakening operation can be said to affect prâxis (i.e. the actual performance of the act), while in lenitive mitigation it can be said to affect poíesis (i.e. the attainment of a goal). The former, we could say, is a case of pragmatic mitigation, while the latter is a case of praxeological mitigation.
25
Sbisà (1994) rightly warns against a hasty identification of Austin’s exercitives with Searle’s directives. A meta-theoretical analysis of the issue of illocution typology can be found in Sbisà (1972). 26 I am referring here to the treatise Delle acutezze, che altrimenti spiriti, vivezze e concetti volgarmente si appellano by Matteo Peregrini (Peregrini, 1960 [1639]; cf. 6.3.), which introduces the concept of ‘tempering particles’; these can be re-defined as markers of metapragmatic awareness with approximating functions.
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v) Strategic mitigation versus formulaic mitigation Mitigating devices can be interpreted according to a non-dichotomous version of Jespersen’s (1924: 18) distinction between ‘free expressions’ and ‘formulas’. 27 ‘Free expressions’ are employed in ‘strategic’ mitigation, i.e. mitigation involving more or less conventional techniques used in complying both with global interactional frame-related expectations and goals and with expectations and goals emerging locally during the exchange. Formulas are employed in ritual mitigation, i.e mitigation typically realized by routine formulae or ‘indirect speech acts’ that have become catachreses, such as clichés expressing politeness. The corpus analyzed in the present study contains instances of strategic mitigation which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. It also includes instances of formulaic, ritual mitigation, e.g. requests realized by questions or by asking the permission of doing something, like in example A8, sentiamo i polmoni (…) (‘let’s have a listen to your lungs’ …). vi) Paradoxes of mitigation: mitigation as an aspect of analogic communication Since every instance of metalinguistic mitigation can be interpreted as an attempt to ‘smooth out’ the act in which it occurs, the mitigating operation itself can be seen as reflexively marking the mitigated act as potentially face threatening. Hence the potentially paradoxical nature of mitigation. As we will see in Chapter 4, some instances of mitigation can be described as cases of micro double-bind, to use Bateson et al.’s (1957) category (cf. Chapter 4, footnote 13). At the same time, at a meta-communicative level, mitigation presents the speaker as a tactful, considerate, obliging partner, someone who strives to comply with the interlocutor’s needs, someone who tries, to quote Spitzer (1922: 115; cf. 4.1.1.), to be entgegenkommend, i.e. helpful or forthcoming. But at this point another paradox lurks on the background: precisely this effort on the part of the speaker to behave thoughtfully and considerately can be seen as symptomatic of calculation, distance, or non-immediacy. Far from being an abstract subtlety, this double nature is probably the basic reason why there is a lack of agreement on the general definition of politeness, given the different weight assigned by different cultures to one aspect of mitigation, or its reverse. Wierzbicka’s observations (1985) on Polish, Blum-Kulka (1992) on Israeli, Rathmayr (1999) on Russian, as well as many papers in the recent volume edited by Lakoff and Ide (2005), to quote just a few among a vast range of studies, all point to this polarity. Recall the two macro-functions put forward by Giles et al. (1979) and applied to mitigation in Chapter 1. These are the instrumental function, which affects the style of performance, and the identity building or self-presentation function
27
Subtle remarks about methodological problems in explaining the shift from free expressions to formulas can be found in Nunberg (1981).
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(expressing the kind of people we want to appear to be; cf. Caffi, 1999a), which affects the way we interpret roles. It is interesting that the potentially positive effects of mitigating strategies with respect to such macro-functions are in no way guaranteed: mitigation at all times runs the risk of being self-defeating. It can be argued that the ambiguous, antiphrastic, paradoxical nature of mitigation is related to its being part of analogic communication. In Pragmatics of human communication, Watzlawick et al. (1967: 64 ff.) introduce the concepts of ‘digital’ module (carrying the ‘content’ aspects of communication) and analogic module (carrying the ‘relation’ aspects of communication). They illustrate analogic communication by means of the following examples: There are tears of sorrow and tears of joy, the clenched fist may signal aggression or constraint, a smile may convey sympathy or contempt, reticence can be interpreted as tactfulness or indifference, and we wonder if perhaps all analogic messages have this curiously ambiguous quality, reminiscent of Freud’s Gegensinn der Urworte (antithetical sense of primal words). (Watzlawick et al., 1967: 65)
As we will see in detail in the next few chapters, the main advantage of mitigation, i.e. minimizing responsibility, is counterbalanced by a major drawback, i.e. the fact that mitigation can be given opposite interpretations. 2.3.2. The multidisciplinary relevance of mitigation If mitigation calls for a broader account, this is chiefly because of the conceptual horizons opened up by the notion. Let me recall them briefly. As mentioned at the outset, mitigation has been traditionally subsumed under politeness research. In this research area, the a) sociological relevance of mitigation is widely acknowledged. However, mitigation is relevant to a number of other research areas as well. In fact, it has a: b) cognitive relevance The category ‘mitigation’ is closely connected to rationality of human action. In other words, it is linked to the use of cognitive schemes based on anticipatory strategies and aimed at achieving specific goals. Anticipatory strategies have been given different definitions. According to van Dijk: A strategy is a property of a ‘plan’, that is, a (cognitive) representation of an action sequence that will be executed. It is a property of a plan that guarantees that the action sequence is carried out effectively and optimally, given the (known or assumed) circumstances of the action itself. In
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other words, a strategy is a partial plan, about the way a goal can or should be reached (Dijk, van 1984: 115, my emphasis, C.C.).
This definition makes it possible to account for a number of interrelated factors. First of all, mitigation as partial plan corresponds to the choice of a specific strategy. Moreover, since it is related to the ability to predict the consequences of an action, by connecting locution to perlocution, i.e.