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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman At the beginning of his Metaphysics, Aristotle attributed several strange-sounding theses to Plato. Generations of Plato scholars have assumed that these could not be found in the dialogues. In heated arguments, they have debated the significance of these claims, some arguing that they constituted an “unwritten teaching” and others maintaining that Aristotle was mistaken in attributing them to Plato. In his previous book-length study on Plato’s late ontology, Kenneth M. Sayre demonstrated that, despite differences in terminology, these claims correspond to themes developed by Plato in the Parmenides and the Philebus. In this book, he shows how this correspondence can be extended to key, but previously obscure, passages in the Statesman. He also examines the interpretative consequences for other sections of that dialogue, particularly those concerned with the practice of dialectical inquiry. Kenneth M. Sayre is professor of philosophy and director of the Philosophic Institute at the University of Notre Dame. He has published sixteen previous books on a variety of philosophical topics, of which four are on Plato.
Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
KENNETH M. SAYRE University of Notre Dame
cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, S˜ao Paulo Cambridge University Press 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, ny 10013-2473, usa www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521866088 c Kenneth M. Sayre 2006
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2006 Printed in the United States of America A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Sayre, Kenneth M., 1928– Metaphysics and method in Plato’s statesman / Kenneth M. Sayre. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn-13 978-0-521-86608-8 hardback isbn-10 0-521-86608-1 hardback 1. Plato. Statesman. 2. Political science – Philosophy. 3. Dialectic. I. Title. jc71.p314s295 2007 321 .07–dc22 2006000511 isbn-13 978-0-521-86608-8 hardback isbn-10 0-521-86608-1 hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
To Patti and Michael once again always
Contents
Acknowledgments
page xi
Introduction
1.
2.
3.
4.
1
part i method Becoming Better Dialecticians 1.1 Topical Structure of the Dialogue 1.2 Some Initial Missteps 1.3 Emergence of the Shepherd Paradigm 1.4 Dialectical Contributions of the Myth of Cronus 1.5 The Main Purpose of the Dialogue Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist 2.1 Overview 2.2 Collection in the Phaedrus 2.3 Collection in the Sophist 2.4 Collection and the Identification of Necessary Features 2.5 Complications in the Philebus Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist 3.1 Subdivisions of Mental Derangement in the Phaedrus 3.2 The Paradigmatic Definition of Angling in the Sophist 3.3 The Possibility of Alternative Definitions 3.4 Five Faulty Definitions 3.5 The Sophist of Noble Descent 3.6 The Authentic Sophist 3.7 The Final Definition Collection Yields to Illustrative Paradigms 4.1 Platonic Uses of the Term vii
11 11 15 21 25 28 36 36 38 43 46 48 52 52 55 58 62 65 67 70 73 73
Contents
viii 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Paradigms Augmenting Collection in the Sophist A Paradigm to Illustrate the Use of Paradigms The Importance of Verbal Paradigms Paradigms and Necessary Conditions
5. The Weaver Paradigm 5.1 Antecedents to the Paradigm of Weaving 5.2 Intermingling Paradigms 5.3 How Defining Weaving Provides a Paradigm for Defining Statesmanship 5.4 The Definition of Weaving Dissected 5.5 Left-Hand Division 6. The Final Definition 6.1 Arts to Be Separated from Statesmanship 6.2 The Complete Sequence of Divisions 6.3 Nondichotomous Division 6.4 Division to the Left 6.5 The Statesman as Weaver
7.
8.
9.
10.
part ii metaphysics Excess and Deficiency in General 7.1 From Methodology to Metaphysics 7.2 Excess and Deficiency in Aristotle and His Commentators 7.3 Equivalent Expressions in These Ancient Authors The Great and the Small in Plato’s Dialogues 8.1 The Purpose of This Chapter 8.2 Three Synonymous Designations in the Philebus 8.3 The Definite, the Equal, and Their Privations 8.4 More and Less: Unlimited in Multitude 8.5 A Problematic Appearance in the Republic The Generation of Everything Good and Fair 9.1 Return to the Problems of Chapter 7 9.2 Excess and Deficiency Revisited 9.3 The Being Necessary for Generation 9.4 The First Kind of Measurement 9.5 The Second Kind of Measurement 9.6 The Interdependence of Art and Normative Measure Accuracy in the Art of Dialectic 10.1 Knowledge and Art in the Philebus 10.2 Division of Arts with Respect to Accuracy 10.3 Forms as Numbers 10.4 The Involvement of Dialectic in Numbers and Measures
74 77 81 85 92 92 96 100 103 109 113 113 120 124 126 131
139 139 149 150 154 154 156 159 162 168 171 171 173 176 179 182 188 191 191 193 197 203
Contents 11. Division According to Forms 11.1 Relevant Texts in Other Dialogues 11.2 What Gets Divided? Some Familiar Answers 11.3 Making Cuts through the Middle 11.4 Comparisons by Contraries and According to Measure 12. The Metaphysics of Division 12.1 Review of Outstanding Questions 12.2 Classes, Kinds, and Parts 12.3 Kinds Divided According to Forms 12.4 Cutting through the Middle Revisited 12.5 Cutting through the Middle and the Second Kind of Measurement 12.6 Cutting Kinds through the Middle 12.7 Increasing the Likelihood of Encountering Forms 12.8 The Accurate Use in Dialectic of Numbers and Measures
ix
206 206 209 214 219 223 223 225 228 230 232 235 238 240
Appendix: Equivalents for the Great and the Small in Aristotle and His Commentators
241
Bibliography
245
Index Locorum
249
Index of Names
261
General Index
263
Acknowledgments
Having been able to spend much of my career working with Plato’s dialogues is a privilege for which I am deeply grateful. This privilege is due in large part to the ample support provided through the years by the University of Notre Dame. It was through discussion with colleagues and friends such as Catesby Talliaferro, Frederick Crosson, and Robert Vacca that my fascination with Plato’s writings first emerged. And it was in the process of sharing insights about these writings with hundreds of Notre Dame students, both graduate and undergraduate, that Plato moved to the center of my scholarly interests. I am also grateful for the formative influence of visiting appointments at Princeton University (1966–67), Oxford University (1985), and Cambridge University (1996), which enabled frequent conversations with scholarly role models such as Gregory Vlastos, John Ackrill, and Myles Burnyeat. Lacking a distinct lineage of my own in Platonic studies, I am pleased to think of these eminent scholars as among my surrogate mentors. There are many others to thank in connection with my work on the Statesman specifically. My once casual interest in this dialogue began to take on focus during a conference on Plato’s trilogy directed by Catherine Zuckert in 1998. Although I had written previously on the methodology of the Theaetetus and the Sophist, this conference led me to realize that the Statesman has a great deal to say about Plato’s methodology as well. Shortly thereafter, I began working on the manuscript that developed into the present book. Excerpts from early versions of the manuscript were presented on various occasions over the next few years, leading to penetrating criticism xi
xii
Acknowledgments
by Ed Halper, Richard Patterson, Steven Strange, Jacob Howland, Ian Muller, ¨ and Apostolos Pierris, among others. A scholarly gift of extraordinary generosity was bestowed at this stage by Mitchell Miller, who read the then-current manuscript from start to finish and made numerous suggestions that were incorporated into the final version. Another conference on the Statesman was convened in 2004 at the University of Notre Dame, when the penultimate draft of the manuscript was nearing completion. Organized by Gretchen Reydams-Schils, this meeting brought together a number of experienced students of the dialogue including Christopher Rowe, Mary Louis Gill, Mitchell Miller, David Roochnik, and Dimitri El Murr, along with Catherine Zuckert and David O’Conner from Notre Dame’s own faculty. Sustained conversation with these experts convinced me that the manuscript as it stood required extensive reorganization. The transition into the final draft was mainly a matter of interchanging the two parts on metaphysics and method. Specific reasons for giving precedence to the chapters on method are explained in the Introduction. The final version of the manuscript was read with great care by Dimitri El Murr, whose perceptive comments led to a number of last-minute revisions. I am very grateful to Dr. El Murr for this service. I am also grateful for the helpful suggestions made by an anonymous reader for the Cambridge University Press. I wish finally to record my gratitude to Patti White Sayre and our son Michael for encouragement and support needed to put a book like this together. The artistry both exhibit in their lives has inspired me to regard writing books on Plato as an art form in itself.
Introduction
The two parts of this book require separate introductions. Although Part I (on method) comes first in order of presentation below, Part II (on metaphysics) was composed earlier and thus will be introduced first. Part II is a continuation of the inquiry into the metaphysics of Plato’s late period that resulted in the publication of Plato’s Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved (PLO) in 1983. PLO was concerned primarily with the once strange-sounding theses attributed to Plato in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics. Among them are the theses: (i) that numbers come from participation of the Great and the Small in Unity, (ii) that sensible things are constituted by Forms and the Great and Small, (iii) that Forms are composed of the Great and the Small and Unity, and (iv) that Forms are numbers. Prior to PLO, there were two radically opposed positions on the significance of Aristotle’s reports. One (represented by K. Gaiser and H. J. Kr¨amer of Tubingen, ¨ among others) held that Aristotle was reporting a set of doctrines passed on orally by Plato but never committed to writing – the so-called unwritten teachings. The other position was championed by Harold Cherniss in The Riddle of the Early Academy, to the effect that Aristotle simply did not understand Plato’s views and was reporting them erroneously. Opposed as they were in other respects, both camps maintained that the views attributed to Plato by Aristotle could not be found in Plato’s dialogues. PLO offered a third alternative. It argued that all of the theses attributed to Plato by Aristotle can be found in the Philebus. The reason they are not immediately apparent is that they are expressed in terms other than those used by Aristotle in reporting them. 1
2
Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
The argument for this intermediate position was based on the texts of several commentators on Aristotle writing in Greek during the fourth through sixth centuries a.d. (the “Greek Commentators”). While repeating the expressions (‘the Great and the Small’ and ‘the Indefinite Dyad’) used by Aristotle in reference to Plato’s views, these writers employed several other terms in the same referential capacity (notably ‘the Unlimited’, ‘the Unlimited Nature’, and ‘the More and Less’). These terms all play prominent roles in the Philebus, appearing in passages clearly answering to Aristotle’s claims on Plato’s behalf. So at least it was argued in PLO. As far as terminological overlaps with the Greek commentators are concerned, this previous work was focused primarily on the Philebus. Whereas other dialogues figure in the argument of PLO, the Statesman is scarcely mentioned. The Statesman came into the picture with the serendipitous discovery, over a decade later, that the term (in translation) ‘Excess and Deficiency’ is yet another synonym for the expressions used both by Aristotle and his commentators in reference to the Great and the Small. A striking feature of the Statesman is the dual appearance of the expression ‘Excess and Deficiency’ at either end of a sequence occupying the exact middle of the dialogue (283C–285C). This is the section in which the Eleatic Stranger undertakes an examination of the two kinds of measurement, one of contraries with respect to each other, the second of contraries with respect to fixed measure. Recent writers on the dialogue have found this section difficult to deal with. Some have passed it by as a mere distraction, while others have taken substantial liberties in translation to lend it a semblance of intelligibility. Such difficulties have led to an underestimation of the importance of this section in the structure of the dialogue overall. The key to bringing this central passage of the Statesman into focus is the realization that it has close connections with passages in the Philebus containing other expressions designating the Great and the Small. When these connections are traced out, it can be seen that the Philebus provides a background against which the Statesman’s recalcitrant section on measurement becomes almost transparent. As indicated by the corresponding theses (i) through (iv) attributed to Plato by Aristotle, this background from the Philebus is largely metaphysical in character. The overall purpose of Part II of this study is to lay out the metaphysical underpinning of the Stranger’s examination of measurement, along with that of other key sections of the Statesman. Toward this end, Chapter 7 presents a translation and preliminary discussion of the section on the two kinds of measurement, followed by a
Introduction
3
brief survey of alternative designations for the Great and the Small found in Aristotle and his commentators. The Appendix, titled “Equivalents for the Great and Small in Aristotle and His Commentators,” provides a more extensive listing of sources from which the survey is drawn. Chapter 8 continues the discussion with a selective look at other dialogues containing terminology of the Great and Small, including the Parmenides and possibly the Republic, along with the Philebus and now the Statesman. Chapter 9 returns to the section on measurement (283C–285C) with the intention of elucidating the two kinds of measurement in light of connections with the Philebus. A pivotal point in the dialogue comes with the Stranger’s remark, at the very middle of this section, that all the arts depend for their existence on the second kind of measurement. Explicitly mentioned in this regard are the arts of statesmanship and weaving, but the context makes it clear that dialectic is included as well. The stake of dialectic in the second kind of measurement is examined in Chapter 10. This chapter is primarily concerned with the depiction of dialectic in the Philebus as the most accurate of the arts in its use of numbers and measures. Among the theses attributed to Plato by Aristotle is the thesis that Forms are numbers. As argued in PLO (and again here), what this means is that Forms are numbers in the sense of measure. The superior accuracy of dialectic lies in its ability to make divisions according to Forms in the role of measures. Chapter 11 considers various other explanations offered by recent commentators of what division according to Forms amounts to. It tests these explanations against the Stranger’s remark in an earlier passage (262B) that one is more likely to encounter Forms or Ideas by making cuts through the middle, and finds them unable to account for the meaning of that remark. Important questions raised in the course of this discussion include: “What gets severed when cuts are made through the middle?” and “What results from such cuts?” Chapter 12 concludes Part II of the study with textually based answers to these and related questions. In the course of examining the Stranger’s distinction between parts and kinds (at 263B), it argues that kinds in the Statesman (but not always elsewhere) are classes of entities all sharing in the same Form. After making a connection between cutting things through the middle and the second kind of measurement, it then argues that kinds are what dialecticians are supposed to cut through the middle and that correct cuts produce other kinds in turn. The reason cuts through the middle are likely to encounter Forms is that the relevant middle is established by Forms initially. This is the answer the Stranger
4
Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
himself points out in his summary statement of the second kind of measurement at 284E. Immediately following the section on measurement, the Stranger discloses the main purpose of the dialogue (285D). Contrary to what might be expected, the main purpose is not to define the statesman but to make the participants in the dialogue better dialecticians. This brings us to the topic of dialectical method. As noted previously, the metaphysical part of the present work was developed before the part on method. The initial draft of the book followed this sequence, placing method after metaphysics. The order was reversed in the final draft for the following reasons. First is a matter of familiarity. To the best of my knowledge, there is no previous study of the metaphysics of Plato’s Statesman. Most recent commentaries on the dialogue nonetheless have had something to say about its method. A consequence is that students familiar with scholarly literature on the dialogue will tend to be more familiar with its methodological than with its metaphysical aspects. The sequence of method before metaphysics is dictated by the principle that a specialized book like this should begin with material familiar to its intended audience. Another reason has to do with the purpose of the dialogue. Becoming a better dialectician requires both increased competence in the techniques of correct division and increased understanding of what those techniques accomplish. The first gain is methodological (how to do it) and the second, theoretical (the significance of doing it). Beginning with the metaphysical would treat the theory in a practical vacuum. The budding dialectician must see the method in action to appreciate the questions it raises about the underlying metaphysics. Recent commentaries on the Statesman vary in the degree of attention they pay to the Stranger’s disclosure of purpose at 285D. One author allotting due consideration to this passage is Mitchell Miller, in his durable book The Philosopher in Plato’s Statesman. Frequent references are made to this work in the following discussion. Another scholar who has recognized the importance of this disclosure is Christopher Rowe, in his fine introduction to Reading the Statesman, which recently appeared under his editorship. Most commentators who approach the dialogue from a political perspective, however, give this passage short shrift or overlook it entirely. A case in point is Melissa Lane’s often brilliant Method and Metaphysics in Plato’s Statesman. Although this work contains many methodological insights, some of which figure in the discussion that follows, it neglects to mention the Stranger’s observation that the purpose of the dialogue is to produce better dialecticians.
Introduction
5
The Stranger’s disclosure of purpose serves as a point of departure for Part I of this study. Chapter 1 sets the stage with a summary description of the dialogue’s topical structure. As part of this summary, it is observed that most of the dialogue’s early divisions are flawed in an instructive manner, as is the paradigm of the kingly herdsman on which they are based. These flaws illustrate one respect in which the dialogue is set up to provide dialectical instruction. Other respects are discussed in subsequent chapters. The first chapter ends with a discussion of the text containing the disclosure of purpose itself. The Statesman is third in a sequence of dialogues employing the method of dialectical division. In both the Phaedrus and the Sophist, division is paired with a companion procedure of collection. To evaluate the absence of collection in the Statesman, it is helpful to look carefully at how it functions in these two previous dialogues. This is the purpose of Chapter 2. Also discussed in this chapter is the language of collection that appears in the Philebus, despite the absence of the corresponding methodological procedure. In similar fashion, Chapter 3 addresses the use of division in those two earlier dialogues. A notable feature of division in the Phaedrus is its use of nondichotomous distinctions, a feature which is absent in the Sophist but reappears in the Statesman. The Sophist contains eight fully developed lines of division in all, each of which is examined in the course of this chapter. Chapter 4 is concerned primarily with the paradigm for the use of paradigms introduced at 277D. As Lane notes (and as G. E. L. Owen noted previously), the Stranger’s treatment of the use of paradigms at this point ties in with his later discussion of the importance of verbal paradigms in dialectical inquiry. After a textual examination of the passages involved, the chapter ends with an explanation of the sense in which collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist is replaced by the use of paradigms in the Statesman. Among the subtleties often missed in the Stranger’s development of his paradigm for the use of paradigms is that it actually consists of a plurality of paradigms rolled into one. The key paradigm is the use of familiar symbols as paradigms in teaching letters to children, which serves in turn as a paradigm for the use of paradigms in the advancement of knowledge. In like fashion, although weaving is introduced as a paradigm for statesmanship itself, the main dialectical lesson in this regard comes with the use of the paradigm of weaving as a paradigm for the use of paradigms in dialectical inquiry generally. After carefully distinguishing the several paradigms involved, Chapter 5 undertakes a detailed examination of the paradigm
6
Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
of weaving in particular. As Miller has pointed out, the development of the definition of weaving closely parallels the ongoing development of the definition of statesmanship. These parallels are spelled out in detail by way of preparation for an analysis of the final definition of the kingly art. Three features of the final definition are particularly noteworthy. One, is the Stranger’s careful itemization and detailed description of the various arts that must be separated from statesmanship for the definition to be complete. Another, is his departure from the strictly dichotomous division that prevails in the Sophist and the first part of the Statesman. Third, is the fact that nondichotomous division occurs only in the leftward direction, contrary to the explicit instruction of Sophist 264E to restrict division to the right. Chapter 6 examines these three features and shows that they are intimately related. They are all part of what appears to be a new technique of definition (anticipated in the Sophist’s definition of not-Being) by way of a full specification of what the thing to be defined is not. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the sequel to the formal definition in the final pages of the dialogue (305E–311C), which describes parallels between the practical activites of the weaver and those of the statesman. Part I comes to a close with the suggestion that the formal definition relates to this final description as warp to woof and that both are needed to bring the portrait of the statesman to completion. A few disclaimers are in order regarding both the subject matter and the format of this study. Readers accustomed to approaching the Statesman as a political treatise will find relatively little in this book that responds to their interests. There is no fine-grained analysis of the Myth of Cronus, for example, nor is there much discussion of the political significance of the concluding definition of statesmanship. A consequence is that there is a considerable range of politically oriented commentary that this study does not take into account. As far as format is concerned, readers familiar with the text of the Statesman may find my frequent quotation of Greek terms somewhat disconcerting. The reason for these quotations is straightforward. As everyone involved in translation knows, one’s rendering of a given text can be strongly influenced by how one reads it. Although I have consulted other translations of the dialogue on a regular basis, the translations of the passages discussed here are my own responsibility. Frequent quotation of the Greek texts is intended mainly as an aid to readers who wish to check the accuracy of my translations. Stephanus numbering follows that presented in the electronic Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
Introduction
7
The book has been written with readers in mind who already have experience with the methodology of Plato’s late dialogues. At the same time, it seems not unreasonable to hope that it may be of some help as well to readers who have not yet savored the delights of Plato’s methodological investigations. Another reason for including ample quotations of the Greek is to acquaint less experienced readers with the music of Plato’s language. The more scholars are attracted to a careful study of these late dialogues, the better we should come eventually to understand them.
part i METHOD
1 Becoming Better Dialecticians
1.1 Topical Structure of the Dialogue The Statesman begins with Socrates thanking Theodorus for introducing him to Theaetetus and the Stranger ( )1 from Elea. After a bantering interchange on the relative values of sophistry, statesmanship, and philosophy, and after acquiescing to the Stranger’s request that Young Socrates (YS) serve as respondent in the ensuing discussion, Socrates announces his intention to converse with his younger namesake on another occasion and takes his seat among the audience. We hear nothing more from him until the final speech of the dialogue in which he compliments the Stranger for completing an excellent portrayal of the kingly art. The Stranger begins by assuming that the statesman, like the sophist before him, is someone possessing knowledge ( : 258B4). After securing YS’s agreement that the king, the slave master, and the household manager all share the same knowledge and exercise the same skill as the statesman (259C1–4), the Stranger identifies this knowledge
1
Translations of the Sophist (by Nicholas White) and the Statesman (by Christopher Rowe) in John Cooper (ed.) (1997) agree in rendering ‘visitor’. I prefer the more common translation ‘stranger’, which is compatible with the person in question remaining in the city for an extended period of time – perhaps as a metic or resident alien (the term appears to be used synonymously with at Laws 881B6; see also Laws 866B7 and Meno 80B6). This leaves open the possibility of viewing the Stranger as a symbolic stand-in for Plato as author, who may well have thought of himself as a “stranger in his own country” at the time these two dialogues were written. [In this regard, see Konrad Gaiser (1980).] Pursuant to this interpretation, the Eleatic connection could be explained in terms of Plato’s indebtedness to Parmenides’ conception of Being in his initial theory of Forms.
11
12
Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
as theoretical ( : 259C10) rather than practical (: 259D1). Theoretical knowledge is then divided into that responsible for making judgments and that responsible for giving directions, which latter is further divided into self-directive ( ) and a nameless kind concerned with promulgating the directions of others. Those guided by their own directions, in turn, might be concerned with bringing either inanimate or animate products into being ( at 261B13). Inasmuch as bringing animate things into being involves providing sustenance, that kind can be subdivided into those who rear animals individually and those who rear them in herds ( : 261E8). As characterized thus far, the statesman is someone with self-directive theoretical knowledge concerned with the collective rearing of living things. But there are many other skills that fit this description, including those of the shepherd and of the cowherd. When the Stranger asks YS to divide by half ( : 262A2) the field cordoned off by this description, YS comes up with the distinction between rearing of beasts and rearing of human beings. Although this distinction seems reasonable enough at first glance, the Stranger points out that humans constitute only a small part of the class of living things and proceeds to give YS a tutorial on making cuts “through the middle” ( : 262B6). The contents of this lesson are discussed in Chapter 11. To get the definition back on track, the Stranger observes that their previous reference to rearing carries with it a distinction between wild and tame animals and that the latter could be further divided in two ways to reach the class of human beings who are the primary beneficiaries of the statesman’s nurturing activity. The shorter of the two distinguishes human beings as featherless bipeds occupying dry land. Like YS’s initial attempt, however, this shorter way involves cutting things into smaller and larger portions (bipeds constitute a relatively small subclass of creatures living on dry land). By way of avoiding this error, the longer route divides dryland animals into those with and those without feet and singles out human beings as hornless noninterbreeding animals with two feet only. This accomplished, YS assumes (267A) that the definition of statesmanship has been completed. But as the Stranger points out, there are occupations besides statesmanship concerned with the collective rearing of human beings – merchants, farmers, millers, and so forth. Ostensibly to narrow the definition yet further, he recounts an elaborate myth about an age governed by Cronus in which the course of nature ran backward, and the needs of all
Becoming Better Dialecticians
13
living creatures were met effortlessly from the time they sprang full-grown from the earth to the time they vanished in helpless infancy. An immediate lesson drawn from the myth is that the definition of the statesman as it stands applies to a divine ruler at best, but not to a mortal ruler who requires political skill to ensure that the needs of his subjects are met. To capture the skill of a mortal statesman, more must be said about the manner ( : 275A4) in which he governs. One change required in the initial definition is that the role of rearing ( ) be expanded to caretaking ( : 275E6) generally, allowing that other occupations might be involved in providing rearing of more specific sorts. Other needed alterations involve distinguishing human from divine caretaking and specifying that the care provided by the statesman is voluntarily accepted. With these emendations in place, YS once again is confident (277A) that the definition of statesmanship has been accomplished. Once again, however, the Stranger demurs. Not only is the definition itself still lacking in clarity, but there are problems as well with the myth on which the recent emendations were based. One problem is that it contained an “astounding amount” (!" # $ : 277B4) of material, not all of which was required for the purpose at hand. Another serious shortcoming is that the myth was shaped around an unsuitable paradigm for the kingly art. Impressed by the importance of this august calling, the Stranger tells YS, they thought of it as calling for comparably exalted paradigms ( : 277B4). This explains the paradigm of the divine shepherd. Given that the definition to which it led still lacks clarity, however, a less pretentious paradigm appears to be needed. To set their bearings straight in this regard, the Stranger draws attention to a paradigmatic case of the use of paradigms. The paradigm offered is that of using letters in familiar syllables as examples to help beginning students of writing recognize the same letters in contexts that are still unfamiliar. Ramifications of this seemingly prosaic “paradigm of paradigms” are examined in Chapter 4. The immediate upshot of this brief lesson on the use of paradigms is the Stranger’s suggestion that the paradigm of the shepherd be replaced by that of the weaver (a suitably mundane practice) in their ongoing attempt to define the statesman. There follows (at 279A–283A) an elaborately detailed definition of weaving that anticipates numerous distinctive features of the definition of statesmanship achieved later in the
14
Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
dialogue. This paradigmatic definition of weaving is considered in length in Chapter 5. Although this shift in paradigms puts the search for the statesman back on course, the Stranger remains preoccupied with his earlier perception that the Myth of Cronus was longer than its purpose required. Even the treatment of weaving, he suggests, might seem longer than necessary. Ostensibly to adjudicate questions of this sort, he then launches into a surprisingly abstract discourse on “Excess and Deficiency in general” (the use of capitals is explained later). This discussion occupies the very center of the dialogue (283C–285C). Chapters 7, 8, and 9 are given over to an examination of its contents. Before applying the lessons of this general discussion to the particular issues that initiated it, the Stranger draws YS’s attention to the main purpose of the conversation at hand. Rather than being primarily concerned with an investigation of statesmanship as such, its overarching purpose is to make better dialecticians ( : 285D6) of its participants. Following this, there is a brief consideration of the need for verbal accounts when inquiring into important topics such as statesmanship, which brings back into view the previous question of whether their verbal definition of weaving might have been too long. Given the circuitous route taken in addressing this question, the Stranger’s answer is disarmingly simple: In the case of dialectical discussions, any length is warranted if the participants become better dialecticians ( : 287A3) as a result. At 287B, the Stranger returns to the task of defining statesmanship, which continues for almost twenty pages (to 305E). His first move here is to sanction nondichotomous division, a departure from the general practice of the Sophist and from the early definitions of the present dialogue. This provision is put to full use as the definition progresses. First, there is a division between arts directly responsible for civic caregiving and those indirectly responsible, the latter of which are shown to have multiple subclasses. Next, comes the divisions of directly responsible caregivers into those who command and those who serve, which latter again show up in various forms. Those who command are further divided into genuine and imitative (single, few, and many rulers, either lawless or constrained by law), and the former then subdivided between sovereign and subordinate (rhetoricians, generals, and judges). The authentic statesman is finally identified at 305E as sovereign among genuine commanders who are directly responsible for civic caregiving. These final divisions are examined in Chapter 6.
Becoming Better Dialecticians
15
Having finally arrived at a credible definition of statesmanship, the dialogue concludes with a discussion of the tasks involved in putting the statesman’s art into practice. The statesman’s primary task is to weave a harmonious and durable social fabric, using the courageous and moderate temperaments within the populace as warp and woof, respectively. This is to be accomplished by means such as a preliminary culling of unruly natures, marital arrangements aimed at blending opposing temperaments, and a judicious allotment of public praise and blame. Apparently pleased with these results, Socrates2 ends the conversation by complimenting the Stranger for an excellent portrayal of the kingly art. Let this suffice as a summary description of the topical structure of the dialogue. Our next concern is to look at the Stranger’s initial moves in his conversation with YS, bearing in mind the dialogue’s primary purpose of making its participants better dialecticians.
1.2 Some Initial Missteps Having secured YS’s agreement to serve as respondent at 258A, the Stranger launches immediately into a perfunctory definition of statesmanship. As noted in the previous summary, his first step is to assume (with YS’s approval) that the statesman – like the sophist previously – is among people possessing knowledge. The next step is to divide knowledge into practical and theoretical, locating statesmanship within the latter category. Subsequent divisions portray the statesman as someone possessing theoretical knowledge that is directive – more specifically, selfdirective – that is concerned with living creatures and that bears on the collective rearing of these creatures in herds. Before YS has had a chance to catch his breath, the following series of divisions has been set in place (see Figure 1.1). This abrupt beginning is in stark contrast to the initial moves in the Sophist in which almost three Stephanus pages are given over to a definition of angling by way of practicing the method to be used on the sophist. In calling for this preliminary exercise, the Stranger warns Theaetetus that the sophist is a difficult thing to look for and requires a lesser topic to serve as paradigm ( : 218D9). As an attentive reading of this earlier dialogue makes evident, angling serves as a paradigm for sophistry not only in resembling that more prominent activity (both are acquisitive) 2
Editors disagree on whether the last speech should be assigned to the younger or the elder Socrates. I side with those who attribute it to the Socrates who began the dialogue.
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman knowledge (258B4)
practical
theoretical (258E5)
critical
directive (260B4)
(nameless)
self-directive (260E5)
inanimate objects
individuals
living subjects (261C1)
herd-rearing (261E8)
figure 1.1. Division from 258B to 261E.
but also insofar as the method used in capturing the former proves useful in tracking down the latter as well. In this subsequent dialogue, however, the Stranger’s pursuit of the statesman gets underway without benefit of a practice definition or other explicit paradigm. Although YS might be expected to have learned something about the method to be employed from the morning’s conversation, it soon becomes apparent that he had not been listening very carefully. And although the Stranger eventually (at 279E) draws attention to their need for a small-scale paradigm sharing relevant features of statesmanship, the dialogue is nearly half finished before a suitable paradigm has been provided. Given such an improvident start, it is no surprise to find the early stages of the definition marred by a number of missteps. The first misstep comes with the Stranger’s assumption that the statesman, like the sophist, is someone who possesses knowledge. If YS had remembered the final moments of the morning’s conversation, he would not have agreed to that assumption. Quite apart from the statesman’s standing in that respect, it is emphasized repeatedly in the final pages of the previous dialogue that the sophist is someone lacking knowledge. At 267D, the sophist is classified as an unknowing ( % : 267D2) imitator, in contrast to others whose imitation is “accompanied by knowledge” ( & : 267E1). At 267E, the Stranger first says explicitly that the sophist “is not among those who know” ( ' ( : 267E4–5) and then characterizes him as a “belief-mimic” (
: 267E7) who thinks he knows (( : 268A1) things he only believes. To show that this crucial point has been driven home, Theaetetus explicitly acknowledges
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that the sophist knows nothing ( (: 268B10) at all. With YS’s unthinking agreement at 258B6 that the statesman is someone who also () % : 258B9) possesses knowledge, the definition accordingly gets off to a distinctly inauspicious start. A second problematic step is the assignment of statesmanship itself to the class of theoretical knowledge. As the Stranger points out, statesmanship indeed seems to have more in common with arithmetic, removed as it is from matters of practice ( * : 258D5), than with carpentry and other handicrafts bound up with practical action ( : 258D9). And to be sure, the power of kingship depends more on strength of mind than on manual arts and practical skills generally (+ : 259D1). The problem with this early classification of the kingly art as a form of theoretical knowledge becomes apparent only with the more reflective characterization of statesmanship achieved in the second half of the dialogue. Contrary to the initial stress on statesmanship as a theoretical skill, practical skills are emphasized in the final stages of the definition. At 284C, for example, the statesman is mentioned as someone whose “knowledge of practical subjects” () : 284C2) is dependent on a certain kind of measurement. In turning to the final series of divisions at 287B, moreover, the Stranger’s first move is to separate off skills that contribute raw materials, containers, vehicles, and so forth – all practical skills – from what is subsequently described as the practical activity ( : 289D1) associated with the art of the statesman and king. For this division to make sense, all forms of expertise involved must be practical in nature. In point of fact, as we shall see, the class within which this division takes place is that of “arts relative to all things people do” () * : 281D8–9), carried over from the paradigmatic definition of weaving. This implies that the exercise of statesmanship is a matter of practice. Also relevant in this regard is the fact that weaving itself is a practical art. Weaving would be a poor choice as paradigm for statesmanship if the two were not arts of comparable nature. Another indication that something is amiss in this initial approach to statesmanship comes with the Stranger’s request (at 258E8–11) that YS follow him in treating the statesman, the king, the slave master, and the household manager as possessing a single kind of art. Given that a prosperous Athenian household typically included slaves, it is plausible to assume that a household manager and a slave master employ some of the same skills. And the identity of the king and the statesman is maintained
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
consistently throughout the dialogue.3 But the assumption that the king and statesman practice the same art as the householder and the slave master, which the Stranger urges YS to adopt at 258E, becomes less and less credible as the dialogue progresses. At 276E, human caring for herds is divided into enforced and voluntary, which match the tyrant and the king, respectively. There should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that this division separates the slave master from the statesman as well. At 289D–E, moreover, people who deal with slaves are described as “those who least pretend to the kingly art” (, - " ": 289E1–2). Despite the Stranger’s suggestion at 258E that the names of the statesman and of the slave master refer to the same thing, it would border on the ludicrous if the present dialogue had been titled “slave master” instead. Although his conversation with YS has barely begun, the Stranger already appears guilty of three disconcerting false steps. He has intimated that sophistry involves knowledge, in direct contradiction with the final moments of his morning’s discussion. He has suggested that statecraft is a form of theoretical knowledge, in apparent tension with the emphasis on the statesman’s practical skills in the second half of the present dialogue. And he has encouraged YS’s acceptance of the highly dubious thesis that the statesman and the slave master employ the same kind of knowledge. This naturally gives rise to the question of why these seeming missteps on the Stranger’s part were written into the dialogue. Although it is of course conceivable that Plato himself was not aware of these apparent lapses and that their insertion into the dialogue was unintentional, it seems unlikely in the extreme that the contradiction between the final page of the Sophist and the beginning pages of the Statesman was inadvertent. Another possibility is that the author intends to represent his main character in the Statesman as philosophically inept, or as committed to opposing views of statecraft at different stages of the dialogue. But it is hard to believe that Plato intended to portray the Stranger in this dialogue as a philosophic novice after depicting him in the Sophist as “very much a philosopher” ( . . . : 216A4). A 3
This stance is not uniform throughout the corpus. While the art of kingship and that of statesmanship appear to be equated in the Euthydemus (see 291Cff.), the king and the statesman represent different levels of incarnation in the Phaedrus (248D4–5). The view that the king, the statesman, the household manager, and the slave master all practiced the same art, nonetheless, must have had some currency during Plato’s lifetime. It figures explicitly in the (probably spurious) Rival Lovers (138C); and Aristotle made a point of rejecting it at the beginning of his Politics (1252a11–12).
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much more satisfactory response to the previous question, surely, would reveal these lapses as part of the dialogue’s overall strategy of making its participants better dialecticians. Other commentators have noted that the initial definition of statesmanship gets off to a rocky start. Mitchell Miller, for example, has observed that the diaeresis leading up to the Myth of Cronus “yields an inadequate definition of statesmanship”4 and that the reasons for this inadequacy have to do with the method it employs. Two main faults of the initial procedure, in Miller’s view, are that it relies exclusively on dichotomous division (p. 16) – a matter we take up in Chapter 6 – and that it “is founded on a popular image – the herdsman or shepherd – which in fact misrepresents the statesman” (p. 34). On his view, the errors involved in the first definition of statesman have a distinct pedagogical purpose. Melissa Lane also traces the failure of the initial definition back to the common assumption that the statesman is a kind of herdsman dealing with human subjects.5 As she points out (pp. 45–46, 86), and as we have already noted, the definition begins without benefit of an explicit paradigm. It is instead guided by what she describes as the model “of the king as shepherd, which was common currency in the Homeric epics and in classical Greek thought” deriving from Homer (p. 45).6 The problem of this model, in her analysis, is that its tacit adoption leads to a definition in which statesmanship is distinguished from other modes of shepherding only with respect to “the kinds of herds it tends” (p. 40). A consequence is that this definition fails “to distinguish factors internal to the art of rule” (p. 44), such as the distinction in particular between the statesman and the tyrant (p. 86). As she sees it, this inadequacy cannot be addressed until shepherding is replaced by a more suitable model. Only after weaving has superseded shepherding as a paradigm for statesmanship do the methodological lessons of the false start begin to become clear (p. 61). Although neither Miller nor Lane deal with the missteps that concern us at present, we may follow their lead in viewing these lapses as having 4 5 6
Mitchell Miller (1980), p. 16. Other page numbers in this paragraph refer to this book. M. S. Lane (1998), pp. 121, passim. Other page numbers in this paragraph refer to Lane’s book. Lane observes that the traditional model of king as shepherd figures in other political dialogues by Plato as well, albeit with differing “polemical forces” (p. 45). (See, e.g., Republic 343B, Critias 109B, Laws 813D.) For a more detailed discussion of the role of the shepherd model in the Iliad and the Odyssey, see Miller (1980), pp. 40–41.
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
a pedagogical purpose. With regard to the factual error of designating sophistry as a kind of knowledge, this might be construed as a test of YS’s memory. His failure to catch this (presumably intentional) mistake may serve as an indication to the Stranger that a special effort will be required to secure his respondent’s full attention. It should also put a careful reader of the dialogue on notice that the Stranger’s interaction with YS may not go as smoothly as the interaction with Theaetetus in the morning’s conversation. But what of the two remaining missteps, which YS would not have been in a position to catch? We should now be ready to see that these two moves, problematic as they turn out to be, help the Stranger prepare the way for the disclosure of the initially implicit paradigm of herd-keeping to which Miller and Lane attach such importance. The key move in this regard is the initial depiction of statecraft as a form of theoretical knowledge. Given knowledge as the expertise to be divided, the other alternative was to classify statesmanship as practical knowledge. Although the practical aspects of statesmanship indeed are stressed later in the dialogue, however, characterizing it this way initially would have made the assimilation of statesmanship to herd-keeping counterintuitive. On the level of day-by-day practice, the activities of the statesman and of the shepherd have little in common. As Plato surely would have realized, there is little chance of encountering a shepherd going about his daily business and mistaking that person for a king or statesman. To make a mistake in the other direction, moreover, seems even less likely. As far as practical activity is concerned, it is hard to think of any occupations that are more dissimilar. Although suppressed initially, the conception of statecraft as a form of shepherding begins to surface at 261C with the specification of selfdirective knowledge concerned with living things. For this conception to play a credible role in the ongoing inquiry, it is necessary for both statecraft and shepherding to be presented in ways that abstract from the differences of their daily pursuits. This is accomplished by representing both as forms of theoretical knowledge. The Stranger thus paves the way for a very general description of the art of herding, with reference to which, as Lane noted, statesmanship may be distinguished from other forms of herd tending in terms of the kind of herd it tends. The initially puzzling claim that the statesman (and king) employ the same kind of knowledge as the slave master (and household manager), in turn, provides an illustrative example of diverse practical skills that can be accommodated under a single general description. Although the
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practice of statecraft and that of slave master differ radically in their daily routines, there is a very general sense in which they both involve skills of managing (“tending”) other human beings. If YS can grasp the sense in which these skills converge, the Stranger appears to be reasoning, he should be prepared to follow the series of ensuing divisions in which statecraft is treated as a form of herd-keeping.
1.3 Emergence of the Shepherd Paradigm The conception of statesmanship as a form of herd-keeping makes its first explicit appearance at 261D with the question of whether the statesman is concerned with rearing ( : 261D3) living creatures individually, like the groom or cowherd, or rather cares for them together in herds. When YS opts for the latter, the Stranger observes that “the shared rearing of many together” ( . " : 261E1–2) might be called “herd rearing” or “collective rearing” ( / : 261E2) and proceeds to subdivide self-directed concern with living subjects accordingly. Two further mistakes are made in this subdivision. One mistake is corrected by the Stranger two pages later when he observes that only tame creatures can be herded and points out that concern for living creatures should have been separated by tame and wild before making a distinction between rearing separately and rearing in herds. The instructional role of this mistake becomes apparent in the Stranger’s response to a similar mistake made by YS at 262A, which we shall consider momentarily. The second mistake is more subtle. In setting up the premature division between individual rearing and rearing in herds, the Stranger first observed that living creatures can be bred and reared individually and also can be cared for ( : 261D5) collectively in herds. The distinction that carries over from this observation, however, is between individual and collective rearing. In effect, he has shifted the reference from caring for herds at 261D5 to rearing ( ) herds at 261E2. The reason this is noteworthy is that he later tells YS that the designation ‘herd rearing’ was incorrect and recommends a designation conveying the sense of caring for herds instead. He thus returns to the terminology from which he had purposefully deviated at 261D. This about-face occurs immediately after the Myth of Cronus when the Stranger begins to criticize various steps in the line of divisions previously taken under the influence of the herdsman paradigm. As he points out in this regard (at 275D8–E1), the title ‘herd rearer’ applied in human
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
subjects is better deserved by a variety of experts, such as farmers, merchants, and doctors (from 267E), than by the statesman himself. What is needed to get the definition back on path, he says, is a more inclusive designation under which the art of statecraft can be separated from these other practices. He then mentions (275E5–6) three designations that would serve this purpose: ‘herd keeping’ ( ), ‘looking after’ (!" ), and ‘caring for’ ( ). This latter expression, as already noted, is none other than the one proposed at 261D5 and then rejected in favor of the ill-fated ‘herd rearing.’ When the line of division moves ahead with the category herd keeping after the Myth, we are left with the sense that much of what occupies the space between 261D and 275D would have been unnecessary if the Stranger had stuck with (the equally suitable term) ‘caring for ’ originally. Apart from the tutorial on dividing according to Forms at 262B–263B and the subsequent “trial” divisions driving the lesson home (the two routes signaled at 265A), the lion’s share of that space is taken up by the Myth itself. Given the Myth’s pivotal role, to which we return presently, the main reason for the Stranger’s legerdemain in shifting terminology at 261E may have been to provide an occasion for such a story. The next contribution to this series of instructive mistakes is made by YS. When asked by the Stranger whether he can conceive collective herd rearing as twofold in a way permitting it to be narrowed down by half, YS understands this correctly as a call for a dichotomous division. In view of the previous allusions to horse grooming and cow rearing, he naturally comes up with the distinction between rearing human beings and rearing beasts. While praising YS’s boldness in putting forward this division, the Stranger finds fault with his not having cut herd rearing “through the middle” ( : 262B6). In this respect, the Stranger points out, it is like dividing humanity into Greek and barbarians or dividing number into ten thousand and all the rest. Briefly put, the problem with not dividing “through the middle” is that it might result in cuts that are too narrow and that accordingly fail to engage Forms (262B1) or Ideas (262B7). Being able to divide in ways that correspond to Forms or Ideas, the Stranger continues, makes all the difference in the sort of inquiry they are now pursuing. The Stranger’s full response to YS’s error is discussed in Chapter 11. For the moment, it is enough to note that this error provides occasion for an important lesson in the conduct of dialectical inquiry: Correct division makes cuts according to Forms (& 0: 262D7). Stephanus pages 263E–268D test YS’s comprehension of this lesson on division. First comes the correction to the prior division noted earlier
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in which living creatures are divided retroactively into tame and wild, and concern for tame creatures is then divided into individual and collective. The significance of this move, which seems to pass YS by, is that the prior division (by the Stranger) of concern for living creatures directly into individual and collective rearing fails to “cut through the middle” no less than YS’s division of animals into men and beasts. A more direct test of YS’s comprehension of the lesson comes with the Stranger’s offer of two paths along which their divisions might continue. Both paths begin with a distinction between dry-land and aquatic rearing. The first then continues by setting off a smaller part against a larger, and thus is quicker, whereas the other involves “cutting through the middle” ( ' : 265A4), at the expense of being longer. When asked which path they should follow, YS should have chosen the latter at once. Instead he shows that he has not understood the lesson by suggesting that they follow both. The two paths in question are diagrammed in Figure 1.2. Without regard to relative merit, we should bear in mind that both routes are
(a) longer route (265B–266B) collective rearing (from 261E)
aquatic animals
dry-land animals (from 264D)
winged
ambulatory (from 264E)
horned
hornless (265B11)
interbreeding
noninterbreeding (265E8)
four footed
two footed (266B3)
(b) shorter route (266E) collective rearing (as above) aquatic animals
dry - land animals (as above)
four footed feathered
two footed (266E6) featherless (266E7)
figure 1.2. Alternative divisions 265B to 266E.
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
offered as possible replacements for YS’s overly hasty move from rearing of living creatures in herds to collective rearing of human beings. In effect, the two sets of divisions are being offered as alternative definitions of the human animal. It is hard to tell how seriously the Stranger (or Plato) intended these two alternatives to be taken. The shorter route is probably the source of the story in which Diogenes, reacting derisively to Plato’s definition of man as a featherless biped, plucked a chicken and presented it as a case in point. Although it is true that men have two feet and lack feathers, this characterization tells us little about the nature of human beings. By the same token, although kings deal with subjects that are bipedal and featherless, to point this out says little about the nature of kingship. Quite apart from its dialectical shortcomings, the shorter path does not appear to be a serious contender. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the longer route is more successful. The characterization of human beings as two-footed, noninterbreeding, hornless, and so forth may do a better job of “cutting through the middle,” but it says next to nothing about what it is to be a human being. A would-be Diogenes could take an unplucked chicken and present it as an example of “Plato’s man” as depicted in the longer path. Indeed, Plato may have had something like this in mind when he has the Stranger point out jokingly at 268C that, apart from the number of feet involved, the same characterization applies to pigs.7 Momentarily setting scruples of this sort aside, the Stranger cobbles together an interim definition of statesmanship (267A8–267C3) by drawing together the divisions depicted in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 (a). To counter YS’s impression that the task of their conversation has been completed, however, the Stranger immediately points out another difficulty. Statesmanship has been described as a skill dealing with the collective rearing of human herds. The problem is that there are many other ( " 1 : 268C2) skills that fit this description – those of merchants, farmers, millers, bakers, trainers, doctors, and so forth. To separate true statecraft from these many pretenders, YS is told, they must take a different 7
The Stranger’s description of the longer way ends with some contrived humor playing on “the power of two-footedness” ( " ": 266B3), which relates to YS’s supposed interest (with Theaetetus) in irrationals. For discussion, see Miller (1980), pp. 30ff.; Stanley Rosen (1995), p. 34; and Christopher Rowe’s footnote to 266B3 in John Cooper (ed.) (1997). A less esoteric joke is the punning characterization of the four-footed pig(s) as last (2; alternatively “most piggish”) to be separated from the two-footed human among collectively reared dry-land animals.
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route beginning at another starting point (268D5–6). This new starting point is introduced as part of the voluminous story ( " 3! ": 268D9) about the reign of Cronus.
1.4 Dialectical Contributions of the Myth of Cronus Reflections on the content of this story and its role in the dialogue have dominated discussion of the Statesman in much the manner that analysis of the “Third Man” arguments once dominated discussion of the Parmenides. One probable reason is that commentators on the Statesman have tended to be more interested in politics than in methodology and have been attracted to the myth by its bountiful insights on political order. Another may be that the story is lively and easy to read, which make it a welcome relief from the technical and generally tedious conversation preceding it. Be this as it may, our present concern is not with the content of the myth as such but with its bearing on the continuing attempt to define the statesman.8 The avowed purpose of the myth, once again, is to distinguish the statesman from merchants, farmers, bakers, doctors, and all the rest who contribute to the rearing of humans in groups. This is accomplished in the following manner. As interpreted by the Stranger, the myth shows that the only circumstances in which a ruler actually rears or nurtures () his human subjects, in the manner that a shepherd nurtures his flock, are those typified by the age of Cronus when the universe runs contrary to the course we find familiar. What invites confusion with the nurturing skills practiced by farmers and bakers, accordingly, is the divine kingship of Cronus, not the human kingship exercised during the present age of Zeus. During the present age, kings look after the political needs of their subjects but do not nurture them like a shepherd rearing his flock. It follows that by reconfiguring our conception of kingship to conform with human practices, statesmanship can be disentangled from the nurturing arts. An initial blunder in the preceding account of statesmanship thus was its division of concern with living creatures into the rearing of individuals and the rearing of herds. A more suitable division at this point would be in terms such as ‘herd-keeping’, ‘looking after’, or ‘caring for’ (275E5–6). If the kingly art were described as one of “caring for the 8
An excellent introduction to the myth and to its political significance can be found in Miller (1980), pp. 36–53. See also Rosen (1995), pp. 40–61.
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
entire human community together” (&4 . . . ! " : 276B7), the Stranger suggests, no other art would have a better claim to that description. The horde of contenders that challenged statesmanship in the previous account seemingly could be eliminated by replacing the category of herd rearing with that of herd-keeping. Subsequent divisions singling out features of footedness, winglessness, hornlessness, and so forth (276A4–5) should be retained.9 With the help of this revised line of division, the major error (275A1) of mistaking the divine rule of Cronus for human statesmanship apparently can be avoided by appending to the account a distinction between divine shepherd and human caretaker ( !* : 276D6). A lesser error in the previous account was its failure to specify the manner ( : 275A3) of kingly rule. In contrast with the tyrant, who rules by force, the king’s rule is accepted voluntarily. With a final division of human caretaking into enforced and voluntary (276E7–8), the definition of statesmanship begun at 258B is brought to an end. To augment the Stranger’s truncated summary at this point (276E10– 14), it is helpful to lay the definition out more fully in the manner shown in Figure 1.3. Although the initial line of divisions has been completed, the task of defining the authentic statesman nonetheless has not been finished. In response to YS’s expression of optimism that their search is over, the Stranger identifies several respects in which their inquiry thus far falls short of the mark. First and foremost, the king they have portrayed does not yet appear to have a complete form ( . . . 5 : 277A5–6). Just as sculptors sometimes lose time by adding more material to their work than is necessary, so progress on their definition has been retarded by relying on “large-scale paradigms” ( : 277B4) to demonstrate their previous mistakes. The “astonishing mass” (!" # $ : 277B4) of material in their myth has made their demonstration longer and yet has failed to complete the story. A consequence is that their discourse, although adequate in superficial appearance, lacks requisite brightness ( : 277C3) – the kind of brightness added to paintings by mixed colors and pigments. In sum, the definition diagrammed in Figure 1.3 is incompletely shaped, lacks clarity and luster, and suffers from reliance on a paradigm too grand for the task. One thing to note in passing is that defects of this sort are not likely to be remedied by adding further details to the definition as it currently stands. From one point of view, the statesman 9
Note that (winglessness) was not included in the summary of features at 267B. Its inclusion here in conjunction with 6 ' seems redundant.
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knowledge practical
theoretical
critical
directive
(nameless)
self-directive living subjects
inanimate objects
groups (herd keeping)
individuals aquatic
dry-land
winged
ambulatory
horned
hornless
interbreeding
noninterbreeding
four footed divine enforced
two footed human caretaker (276D6) voluntary (276E8) (= (?) statesman)
figure 1.3. Cumulative definition at 277E.
has been completely isolated by the line of divisions shown in Figure 1.3. As far as identifying a set of features that apply to statesmanship generally and to that skill alone, the definition is adequate in its present form. The problem is that statesmanship has been exhibited only in superficial appearance. The respect in which the portrayal falls short in completeness and brilliance will not be corrected by further divisions tacked on to the current series. The underlying source of the problem, as the Stranger’s next remark makes clear, is that the account thus far has been developed under the guidance of an improper paradigm. Like all important topics, the nature of statesmanship can be exhibited only through “speech and discourse” ( ) 7: 277C4) that incorporates the use of paradigms ( : 277D1). Thus far, their attempt to define statesmanship has relied on the paradigm ( : 275B4) of shepherding. This paradigm has shown itself inadequate by having led to a definition that
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
lacks luster and presents only surface appearances. To move beyond these shortcomings, they need to set aside this misleading paradigm in favor of another that is better suited to the task at hand. As far as the dialectical progression of the dialogue is concerned, the Stranger’s call for a new paradigm at 277D serves as a major turning point. Before this point, the Stranger’s joint inquiry with YS has been riddled by an unrelenting sequence of mistakes. Although each of these mistakes has a discernible pedagogic purpose of illustrating steps to be avoided, as we have seen, their cumulative effect has been a characterization of statesmanship that is flawed from start to finish. From this point onward, however, the Stranger leads the discussion through a series of positive lessons showing how dialectic ought to proceed, the outcome of which is deemed by the elder Socrates, at the end of the dialogue, to be an excellent (: 311C1) portrayal of statesmanship. The Stranger’s call for a new paradigm, of course, provides occasion for his treatment of the use of paradigms in learning letters as a paradigm for the use of paradigms generally (277D–278E). This is followed by a detailed development of the paradigm of weaving (279B– 283B) for use when they return to the definition of statesmanship. Next comes a succinct but far-reaching examination of the metaphysical underpinnings of dialectical division (283C–285C), leading into a discussion of criteria for evaluating the length of dialectical discussions (286B– 287B). The dialogue then returns at 287C to the task of defining the statesman, citing an alternative technique of division that will be needed for this purpose. After wrapping up what is presented as an adequate definition at 305E, the dialogue winds down with a discussion of the statesman’s practical task of weaving opposing temperaments into an integrated social fabric. Each of these topics is examined in subsequent chapters, although not always in the order of their appearance in the dialogue. Whether by way of illustrating mistakes to be avoided (before 277D) or procedures to be followed (after 277D), each major stage of the dialogue provides instruction in the practice of dialectic. This is just what we are led to expect by the Stranger’s disclosure at 285D of the dialogue’s main purpose.
1.5 The Main Purpose of the Dialogue Although various aspects of correct dialectical procedure have entered into the conversation previously (e.g., at 262B–E), neither dialectic nor
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its practitioners are mentioned before the following interchange. The topic mentioned at 285C4 is that of “Excess and Deficiency in general.” 285C4
285D
So after that topic, let us take up another that has to do both with the present inquiry and with the conduct of all discussions like this. What’s that? Regarding our instructional session for learning letters, what would we say if someone were to ask us about some student’s inquiry whether certain letters make up a word – that the student raises the query for the sake of that one problem in particular, or that it is raised with regard to spelling tasks in general? Obviously, with regard to the general case. What then about inquiry concerning the statesman in turn? Has it been undertaken for the sake of that topic itself, or with regard to our becoming better dialecticians on any topic? Once again, obviously with regard to the general case.
As the Stranger indicates, the new topic has to do with both the present inquiry and the conduct of similar discussions. The present inquiry, of course, is aimed at clarifying the nature of statesmanship. This is the main subject matter of the inquiry. As YS and we as readers are about to find out, however, the new topic concerns not the subject matter of the present inquiry but the conduct of the inquiry as such. The new topic has to do with the method of dialectical discussion itself of which the present discussion is an illustrative example. In broaching this new topic, the Stranger draws attention to certain instructional procedures described earlier (277E–278C) involving the use of paradigms. These procedures include the use of familiar examples in teaching the spelling of unfamiliar syllables which, as noted earlier, serves as a paradigm to help YS understand the use of paradigms in dialectic. Details of this procedure are examined in Chapter 4; but details are not necessary to get the point of the analogy. When a child is first learning to spell and asks for help in writing a particular word, the query is not just about how to spell the word on that particular occasion but is aimed at increasing his or her skill with letters generally. So at least the Stranger suggests with his rhetorical question at 285C8–D3; and YS is quick to agree.
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
But wouldn’t you say the same, the Stranger then asks, in the case of our present inquiry? Have the two of them undertaken to define the statesman just for the sake of that particular subject, or is their purpose to become better dialecticians ( : 285D6) generally?10 YS again is quick to affirm the more general alternative. It may be worth noting in passing that the Stranger’s analogy is less straightforward than YS seems to realize. The choice he was given in the case of the spelling student was between learning to spell correctly on a particular occasion and learning to spell well generally. Either way, it is clear that the learning session had to do primarily with spelling. In the case of their own conversation, however, the choice is between inquiry into a particular topic (statesmanship as distinct from sophistry, for example) and concern with the method of inquiry as such. And this latter is a choice between focusing on a particular topic and focusing on a methodological procedure, which is not a simple choice between degrees of generality. If it had been clear all along that their conversation was concerned primarily with the methodology of dialectic, then the Stranger could have offered a choice between (a) methodology in this particular inquiry and (b) dialectical methodology in general, which would have stood in direct analogy to the choice offered in the case of the spelling student. Before this point in the dialogue, however, neither YS nor the beginning reader has any particular reason to think that the conversation is supposed to be concerned primarily with dialectic. And now, halfway through the dialogue, we are instructed to begin looking at the conversation from an entirely new perspective. By maneuvering YS to go along with a deceptively simple analogy, the Stranger in effect has shifted the focus of the discussion for the remainder of the dialogue. There is another explicit mention of the goal of becoming better dialecticians at 287A, after the Stranger has returned to the topic of appropriate length for dialectical discussions. As we recall, this is the topic that provided the occasion of his examination of “Excess and Deficiency in general” (283C–285C), with particular application to the art of measurement. We shall look at 287A momentarily. At 286E, moreover, he observes that a discussion of any length is justified if it renders one
10
As observed in G. E. L. Owen (1973), the Eleatic Stranger, in comparing their inquiry into statesmanship with a “school spelling exercise,” is suggesting that the chief aim of the inquiry “is not to spell out the one thing, statecraft, but to make the group generally better at spelling – better dialecticians, that is, on any subject proposed” (p. 350).
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better able to make discoveries by dividing things according to Forms. Here is the passage leading up to this observation. 286B4
286C
286D
286E
Let us recall the reason why we have said all these things on these topics. What reason? Not least on account of our annoyance ("5) with a lengthy discussion of the art of weaving which was hard to accept, as well as that concerning the reversal of the universe and that concerning the being of not-Being pertaining to the sophist. Thinking they had excessive length, we reproached ourselves in each of these cases, for fear that what we were saying was superfluous and tedious at the same time. Please realize, then, that all our foregoing observations were for the sake of our not entertaining such misgivings in the future. So be it. Only say what follows. Then I say that you and I are really obligated to recall our observations just now and to assign blame or approval of shortness and length alike, no matter what we might be discussing, not by comparing lengths in relation to each other, but according to the part of the art of measurement we previously said ought to be remembered – that relating to what is fitting. Right. Yet not everything is subject to this principle. For we shall have no need at all for a length accommodating pleasure, except as a subordinate matter. Again, our principle dictates that we be content with the quickest and easiest solution to a problem posed for inquiry as a secondary but not primary consideration. Most emphatically, however, the principle assigns top value to the pursuit itself of the capacity to divide according to Forms. What is more, even though a discussion is very long but renders the hearer (# 3 ) better able to make discoveries, we should pursue that discourse eagerly and not be put off by its length; and so, conversely, if it is very short.
The ostensive reason for undertaking the examination of the art of measurement was the possibility that YS at some point might come to consider the definition of weaving unduly long (283B). Here that possibility is upgraded (somewhat disingenuously) to an annoyance with its
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
length; and the supposed annoyance is extended to the Myth of Cronus and the treatment of not-Being in the Sophist.11 Rhetorical exaggeration aside, it soon becomes clear that the Stranger’s concern in this passage is with appropriate length for dialectical discussions generally. Another remark to be taken with a grain of salt is the Stranger’s comment that this supposed annoyance was the reason for the intervening examination of “Excess and Deficiency in general.” Only a few lines earlier, he had told YS that all they had been saying then was for the sake of incorporeal things that are “best and greatest” ( . . . ) : 286A5–6), which require verbal accounts for their dialectical investigation – a concern quite different from the length of such verbal accounts themselves. Surely the Stranger is not asking YS to recall something that contradicts what he had said just a moment previously. Read without rhetorical overstatement, the sense of 286B4–5 must be that the uneasiness induced about the length of certain discussions provided the occasion for broaching the topics bound up with “Excess and Deficiency in general,” not that the latter was broached for the main purpose of relieving that uneasiness. As far as assessing the length of dialectical discourse is concerned, at any rate, the main lesson to be learned from their examination of the art of measurement is that such judgments are to be made on the basis of what is fitting (# : 286D2) rather than on a basis of relative comparison. To be sure, there are some purposes to which discourse might be put where the principle of fit measurement does not apply. Examples are discourse aimed at inducing pleasure (like that of a rhetorician) and discourse aimed at resolving problems in a fixed amount of time (like 11
By actual count, the discussion of weaving and the Myth of Cronus occupy roughly four and six Stephanus pages, respectively. While the Stranger himself expressed misgivings about the length of the Myth on methodological grounds, there are no signs of his being annoyed by his own story; and his misgivings about the length of the definition of weaving were entirely hypothetical. If any of the three discussions mentioned were to prove hard to accept ("5.: 286B9), it would be the discourse on not-Being that took up more than half of the Sophist. In point of fact, this is the second time the discussion of not-Being has come up in the last two Stephanus pages (counting 284B6–7 and C7 as one occurrence), and in both cases a point was made about its length. This might conceivably indicate a lingering preoccupation on the part of the author about his handling of that topic. On balance, however, that seems unlikely. Philosophically engaged readers of the Sophist generally find the treatment of not-Being and associated topics the most interesting part of that dialogue. It would be strange to suppose that the author thought otherwise. These considerations reinforce the perception that the Stranger’s expression of displeasure with these discussions at 286B is not to be read as entirely genuine.
Becoming Better Dialecticians
33
that of a lawyer who speaks with an eye on the clock). In the case of dialectical discourse, such purposes are secondary at best. In the case of dialectics, rather, the principle gives precedence to developing the ability to divide according to Forms (& 0 . . . ' : 286D9). Any discussion that renders the hearer better able to make discoveries on that basis should be pursued regardless of length. It will be noted that the passage from 286B4 through 286E3 contains no direct reference to dialecticians or the art of dialectic as such. Its concern rather is with discourse aimed at enhancing the hearer’s ability to make dialectical discoveries by dividing things according to Forms – discourse exemplified by the present dialogue itself. The second explicit mention of the goal of producing better dialecticians alluded to earlier occurs immediately before the discussants return to the topic of statesmanship. Picking up the discussion again at 286E3, we find the Stranger saying: 286E3
287A
287B
Moreover, if besides this someone raises objections regarding the length of such conversations and is not content with their circuitous course, such a person ought not be let go, in all haste and without further ado, with the simple complaint that the discussion is lengthy. We should consider it necessary for him to show in addition that a shorter conversation would have resulted in the discussants becoming better dialecticians, and better able to find ways of disclosing the truth of things in words. One should pay no heed to other sorts of blame and praise of other features of the discussion, nor even appear to listen to other considerations of this sort. Now enough of these things, if this is agreeable to you also. Let us return to the statesman, and bring to bear the previously mentioned example of weaving.
This final reference to the purpose of the dialogue overall begins with the objection of an imaginary critic of conversations like the present one, on the ground that they are lengthy and convoluted.12 The Stranger’s advice is to prevent a critic of this sort from leaving the scene having said no more than just that the conversation is too long. In the case 12
The expression 37 " at 286E5 presumably carries the same sense as ! 37 at 283B2–3, which alludes to the frequent interruptions and redirections of the inquiry up to that point. This provides closure to the section on metaphysics and methodology beginning at 283B.
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
of dialectical conversations, this by itself is not a worthy criticism. To make an objection of this sort worth listening to, what a critic must be prepared to show is that a shorter discussion would serve its purpose more adequately, the purpose being to enable its participants to become better dialecticians. This amounts to their being more capable of “disclosing the truth in words” ( . $ 7 *: 287A3), a reference back to the observation at 286A5–6 that the “best and greatest” things can be explained by discursive means alone. In dealing with conversations of this sort, to say it again, their effectiveness as dialectical exercises is the only criterion of appropriate length that should be taken into account. Praise or blame on other grounds should, so to speak, pass in one ear and out the other. This said, the Stranger returns to the task of defining statesmanship. Counting 286D8–E4, we have three distinct references to the production of better dialecticians, said at 285D5–7 to be the main purpose of the present conversation. Before leaving this topic, it is interesting to note what these three passages have to say about who is supposed to benefit from such conversations. At 285D5–7, the Stranger asks Young Socrates whether their ( ' : 285D4) inquiry concerning the statesman is being pursued for the sake of that subject or for the sake of their becoming better dialecticians. The only beneficiaries mentioned here are the participants in the discussion. At 287A2–3, once again, persons concerned with the length of a dialectical discussion are advised to show that a shorter conversation would make better dialecticians of the participants (" : 287A2). At 286D8–E4, however, the circle of beneficiaries is extended to include auditors (# 3 : 286E1) of the conversation as well. Among auditors of the present conversation are Theodorus and Theaetetus, along, of course, with the older Socrates. The implication is that all persons present are in a position to benefit, whether or not they contribute to the conversation itself. A natural extension is to think of subsequent readers of the dialogues themselves as potential beneficiaries. In a sense more than metaphorical, a fully engaged reader may be following the conversation as it develops no less intently than the auditors mentioned in the dialogue.13 So there is a sense also in which active readers are also participants in the conversation, insofar as their involvement helps determine what they find in the dialogue.14 Regardless of how the relation between reader and 13 14
Because the occasion of the dialogue was probably fictional, subsequent readers may be the only physically active participants in the conversation. This sense of participation is developed at length in Sayre (1995), ch. 1.
Becoming Better Dialecticians
35
dialogue is understood, it is clear that a serious reader stands to benefit from his or her participation in the written conversation. Let us assume that Plato wrote the dialogue between the Stranger and YS with the intent of helping his readers become better dialecticians as well.15 This assumption will figure throughout the remainder of this commentary. Before returning to the Statesman, however, we need to remind ourselves of how dialectic proceeds in the other two dialogues featuring the method of collection and division. With the intent of putting the dialectical lessons of the Statesman in proper perspective, the next two chapters discuss the dialectical method practised in the Phaedrus and the Sophist. 15
For reasons examined later, dialectic in the Statesman is primarily a matter of skilled division. An intriguing aspect of the dialogue is the extraordinarily large number of terms the Stranger uses in referring to this dialectical procedure. Although a sizeable list of terms for division can be compiled for both the Sophist and the Philebus (nine or so in each, with some overlap), no less than twenty-four terms are used for this purpose in the Statesman. This count is taken from Leonard Brandwood (1976) and the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, backed up by LS (1883) and LSJ (1968). The count should be considered provisional, not only because of possible oversights on the part of the present author but also because of occasional uncertainty whether a particular term used for division elsewhere is being so used in a given passage of the Statesman. In order of appearance, we can find: (1) - (258B6), (2) (258C4), (3) (258E4), (4) 6 (259D7), (5) 8 (260C7), (6) 6 (260D2), (7) " (261A8), (8) (261B11), (9) 6 (261C5), (10) 56 (262B2), (11) (262D7), (12) 56 (262E1), (13) 56 (262E7), (14) 56 (263A1), (15) 56 (264D5), (16) (265A4), (17) !3 (265D6), (18) (265E11), (19) 6 (266A2), (20) 56 (268C9), (21) 6 (280B3), (22) (280B7), (23) 6 (289C1), and (24) '5 (302E7). Of these twenty-four terms, six (7, 14, 15, 16, 23, and 24) occur only once in this dialogue, and three (15, 16, and 24) are found nowhere else in Plato’s corpus. As the reader may verify, fifteen of the twenty-four make their first appearance between 260C and 266A, in the middle of which comes the Stranger’s tutorial on dividing according to Forms. Although it is of course possible that Plato was unaware of using so many terms for this dialectical procedure in the dialogue, this seems unlikely for various reasons. One is that force of habit probably would have kept him to the more limited vocabulary of the Sophist unless he was aware of reaching beyond it. Another is that there seems to be no precedent in Plato’s writing for such a profusion of terminological equivalents. (Apart from the present case, the upper limit may be the ten different terms for the receptacle in the Timaeus.) Whatever other intention might lie behind this terminological display, its effect is like that of a spotlight cast on the passages dealing with dialectical division. At 363A5–8 of the Thirteenth Letter, its author describes the conversation of the Phaedo as the “dialogue on the soul.” If Plato had found occasion to cite the Statesman in similar fashion, a suitable description might have been the “dialogue on dialectical division.” This ties in nicely with the Stranger’s observation that the main purpose of the dialogue is to make its participants better dialecticians.
2 Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
2.1 Overview This chapter and the next deal with antecedents present in earlier dialogues of the dialectical method exhibited in the Statesman. These antecedents are found primarily in the Phaedrus and the Sophist. A brief overview of these antecedents will indicate why this and the following chapter are needed. The Sophist and the Statesman are the second and third members of a trilogy beginning with the Theaetetus. The method followed by Socrates in the Theaetetus is an integrated version of the method of hypothesis developed in progressive stages through the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Republic.1 When Socrates cuts off his conversation with Theaetetus to go meet his indictment, he steps down as discussion leader for the remainder of the trilogy. The Sophist takes up next morning with the introduction of the Stranger from Elea, who leads Theaetetus through the steps of a substantially different dialectical process. This process is commonly characterized as the method of collection and division. Lest too much be made of the association of different methods with different discussion leaders, we should not forget that the method of collection and division first appeared in the conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus.2 In point of fact, the Phaedrus is the only dialogue in which 1 2
See Sayre (1995), Appendix, section 5. Among commentators comfortable with the assumption that Plato’s dialogues can be arranged in chronological order of composition, it is standard to locate the Phaedrus before the Sophist. As far as the trilogy itself is concerned, it would be unprecedented to arrange its constituent dialogues in other than dramatic sequence. Ordering the
36
Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
37
collection and division are paired by name as companion procedures. Yet collection is the procedure featured most prominently in this earlier conversation, as we shall see in section 2.2. In the portion of the palinode extolling the benefits of a philosophic life, collection is equated with recollection ( : 249C2); at 266B7–9, it is expressly cited as a capacity typical of dialecticians. The two procedures continue to operate in tandem through most of the Sophist. After the “chance discovery” of the philosopher at 253C, both procedures are mentioned in a description of philosophic knowledge. Collection also plays a crucial role in setting up the line of division that leads to the authentic sophist at the end of the dialogue. For all this, one gets the sense by the end of the dialogue that collection no longer is the dominant procedure. This is indicated at 253D1–3, for example, where dialectical skill is characterized as the ability to divide according to Kinds, with no specific mention of collection as such. By the time of the Statesman, moreover, collection seems largely to have dropped out of view. Despite a brief mention (at 285B2–6) appended to a discussion of the importance of dividing according to Forms, collection plays no part in the Stranger’s dialectical lessons. As argued in Chapter 4, the role assigned to collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist is given over in the Statesman to the use of paradigms instead. Skill in dialectic involves the choice of suitable paradigms by which division can be guided in fruitful directions. As far as division is concerned, in turn, it not only becomes more prominent in the Sophist and the Statesman but also gains in sophistication. In the Phaedrus, division is limited to the specific task of distinguishing divine from hubristic love, which involves some conspicuously nondichotomous subdivisions along the way. It has no broader role in this context that pertains to the search for definitions. In the Sophist, by contrast, division contributes directly to the formulation of eight distinct definitions, including the apparently successful definition of sophistry achieved by the end of the dialogue. Moreover, division in the Sophist has been standardized into a highly regular procedure. To put it in a nutshell, divisions in this dialogue are invariably dichotomous, with the understanding that a two-part division is division into halves (221B). Dichotomous division continues to be the norm in the first part of the Statesman, along with the requirement that division make cuts “through dialogues by date of composition, of course, is compatible with the possibility that Plato made alterations in a given work after it had been made publicly available.
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman
the middle” (262B). As a glance at Figure 1.3 will verify, the initial definition of the statesman as a kind of herdsman results from a series of divisions that is dichotomous throughout. With the shift to the paradigm of weaving at 279B, however, a new pattern of division begins to emerge. The first sign of this new format is the (unannounced) appearance of a nondichotomous division in the definition of weaving (at 282A1–4), which is examined at length in Chapter 5. Having been explicitly sanctioned at 287C, nondichotomous division thereafter is employed extensively in arriving at the final definition of statesmanship. This leaves us with the question of whether the apparent success of this final definition depends on the shift to nondichotomous division. In one respect, of course, this manner of division is not really new, inasmuch as nondichotomous division appeared previously within the Phaedrus. But there is a considerable difference between its seemingly casual use by Socrates in this earlier dialogue and its studied use by the Stanger in defining the statesman. In order to evaluate the significance of the changes in method the Stranger represents, we need to look carefully at the methods practiced in the Phaedrus and the Sophist. This chapter deals with collection in these earlier contexts.
2.2 Collection in the Phaedrus There are three passages in the Phaedrus with distinct references to collection, each notable in its own right. The first is at 249B–C, where Socrates is discussing requirements a soul must meet to return from animal to human embodiment. These requirements stem from a need for the human person: to deliberate according to what we call Forms (" & 9 : 249B7),3 going from many perceptions to a unity ( . (# ! ( : : 249B7–C1) brought together by reasoning.
This process of understanding, Socrates continues, amounts to a recollection ( : 249C2) of things the soul perceived at some time in the company of a god. Recollection is mentioned again in the same context at 250A1, where the requirement is repeated that a soul must be capable 3
This is the only occurrence of & 9 (singular) in the corpus (however, see at Sophist 253E2). Most English translators opt to read 9 here as plural (as at Phaedrus 265E1, 273E1, 277B7, Statesman 262E3, 285A4, passim). For a rationale behind an alternative translation of this phrase as “to understand according to form that which is spoken,” see Charles Griswold (1986), p. 266, n. 51.
Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
39
of beholding reality in order to enter human form. Let us trace out this connection with recollection before focusing on Socrates’ depiction of collection as such. The pairing of collection with recollection in this passage should not be read as an identification of the two mental processes.4 Recollection is portrayed in the Meno and the Phaedo (the only other dialogues in which it figures explicitly) as a return of the soul to an immediate grasp of reality like it once enjoyed in a nonbodily state. Collection, on the other hand, is part of the dialectical process, aimed at discerning specific Forms with which its companion process of division might profitably begin. The point of associating collection with recollection at 249C must be rather that the two processes are similar in important respects. One respect in which they are similar is that both involve knowledge presumably gained prior to the beginning of a particular inquiry. In the Meno, for example, the slave boy’s grasp of the relation between the diagonal of a given square and another square of twice the area is taken as evidence that the boy had recollected knowledge from a prior existence. For an example of collection that is equally instructive, we may look ahead to the five faulty definitions in the first part of the Sophist.5 Despite their failure to isolate a set of features that apply to sophistry in general, each of these definitions picks out a particular branch of sophistry. The branches thus characterized serve as a set of examples among which a common property (production) is then identified that provides a beginning for the successful definition of sophistry that ensues. In order for the initial five definitions of sophistry to serve in this role, however, both Theaetetus and the Stranger must have been able to recognize the skill that each delineates as a form of sophistry. And this would require a knowledgeable grasp of sophistry antedating their joint inquiry. Without relying on the mythical account in the Meno of how this comes about, collection in subsequent dialogues requires some form of prior knowledge. Another overlap between collection and recollection appears by way of contrast with Aristotle’s brief account of perceptual induction at the end of the Posterior Analytics (100a10–100b5). According to Aristotle, the soul’s grasp of a general property is a matter of abstracting that property 4 5
In this I agree with Charles Griswold; see his thoughtful discussion of the two processes in (1986), pp. 116, 173–86. Details of the Stranger’s use of these faulty definitions for purposes of arriving at the common property of production (vs. acquisition) are examined more closely later in the chapter. For previous discussions of this matter by the present author, see Sayre (1969), pp. 54–57, and Sayre (1995), pp. 146–47.
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from repeated perceptions of things that possess it, until the property itself occupies the soul as an abstract universal stripped of the particularities of its individual instances. This process of abstracting the general property from particular perceptions, in Aristotle’s way of thinking, is made possible by his doctrine of the literal inherence of the general property in things possessing it. In Plato’s view, on the other hand, what Aristotle calls “universals” are present neither in perceptible instances nor in the perceiving mind and hence cannot pass from one to the other by any kind of induction. When discerning a common property by collection over instances, the manner in which the shared Form becomes present to the mind cannot be a matter of abstraction. What takes place instead must be something like the process of recollection as described at Phaedo 72E–76E. In the specific example given there, just as one might be reminded of Simmias by viewing his portrait, so one might be reminded of the Form Equality by perceiving an imperfect instance that in some way resembles it. Although perfect Equality is never present to sense perception, its prior presence to the mind can be reinstated by the perception of resembling instances. In similar fashion, when one collects together several instances of a given sort in hopes of discerning some common property, one is enabled to recognize these as instances of the thing to be defined by some antecedent understanding of what things of that sort are like. Without commitment to a particular account of how that understanding arises, we see again that collection engages some kind of preexistent knowledge. The second, and most prominent, discussion of collection in the Phaedrus occurs at 265D. By way of context, we are told that there were two fortunate aspects of Socrates’ preceding speech (his “palinode,” socalled at 257A4) the nature of which it would behoove us to grasp in a methodical fashion. The first of these, Socrates says, is to bring what is multiply dispersed ( 5; : 265D3–4) into a single Idea (4( . . . ( : 265D3), so that by defining each thing one can always make clear the topic about which one wishes to learn.
In the case of Socrates’ speech specifically, its topic was “made clear” by an exposition of four kinds of madness setting up a discussion of the madness (so-described at 249D5) of the lover who is reminded (< !: 250A1) of genuine Beauty. Whether good or bad, Socrates avows, it was the resulting definition of love that allowed his speech to achieve clarity and self-consistency.
Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
41
As might be anticipated, the second aspect of his speech to which Socrates next draws attention is the way it was able to partition ( : 265E1) madness “according to Forms” ( & 0: 265E1). This is tantamount to cutting a thing “according to its natural joints” ( & 1! =; " : 265E1–2), suggestive of the way a skilled butcher deals with an animal carcass. As Socrates describes it here, this process of division is accomplished by his two speeches on the lover’s madness together, the former cutting up the sinister ( : 266A5) branch of love and the palinode responding in kind along the right-hand side.6 Having thus identified these two complementary procedures, Socrates then provides a specific label for each. Continuing the theme of the preceding speeches, he declares himself a lover of these “divisions and collections ( ) " . : 266B4), claiming them as basis for his ability to speak and think prudently ( ) ' : 266B4–5). This leads directly to the third and final description of collection in the Phaedrus. Whenever he deems a person able to see as one (( : : 266B5) what naturally extends over many () "#! & . . . : 266B5–6),
he is ready to follow this person as if a god. Although this remark comes directly on the heels of a discussion of collection and division as cooperating activities, it is the former that is singled out in Socrates’ expression of admiration. This emphasis on collection in its first appearance by that name may help us appreciate the significance of its effective disappearance from the methodology employed in the Statesman by the Eleatic Stranger. When we ourselves perform a collection, as it were, over these three descriptions of collection, what we find as a common property is that each describes a movement from plurality to unity. At 249C, the process goes from many perceptions ( . ) to a unity (( : ) brought together by reasoning. At 265D, it begins with what is multiply dispersed ( 5>; ) and proceeds to a single Idea (( . . . ( ). And finally at 266B, it moves from what naturally extends over many () ) to what can be perceived as one (( : ). The essential mark of collection, one may say accordingly, is that it enables the mind to focus on a single Form through an initial awareness of several diverse instances. 6
Reference here to division on both “left and right sides” is relevant to the similarly “counterthrusting” divisions late in the Statesman, discussed in Chapter 6.
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Before moving on to see how this process figures in the Sophist, we should be aware that something closely resembling it is invoked in the Republic where Socrates introduces the simile of the sun as an offspring of the Good. We say that there are many beautiful things ( !: 507B2) and many good things, Socrates tells Glaucon, and that there are Beauty itself and Good itself as well. So generally, in the case of everything we count as many (? : 507B6) we turn about and posit a single Idea (( . . . ! : 507B6–7 to which it pertains and say that this constitutes “what it is” (@ A : 507B7) in each particular case. In Book X of the Republic, moreover, Socrates refers to this process of positing a single Form in the case of many similar instances as a “customary procedure” ((!" ! ": 596A6). As described there, the procedure is to posit (!!: 596A7) a single Form (9 . . . : : 596A6) in each case of many (B : 596A7) to which we give the same name. By way of illustration, says Socrates, there are many beds and tables, but only a single Idea of Bed and a single Idea of Table. So integral was this rationale for positing Forms as conceived in the middle period, apparently, that Plato saw fit to give it a prominent place in his arguments against this conception of the Forms in the first part of the Parmenides. In setting up the first of the so-called “Third Man” arguments at 132A, here is what Plato has Parmenides say: I imagine you believe there is a single Form (: . . . 9 : 132A1) in each case for some reason such as this: when some plurality ( & 1: 132A2) of things seems to you to be large, there . . . seems to be some one character ( . . . (: 132A2–3) that is the same when you look at them all, wherefore you suppose the Large to be one thing (: # ; 9 : 132A3).
Parmenides’ next move, of course, is to invoke the same procedure again, claiming that this Large in conjunction with the original large things calls for recognition of another Large in turn, and so forth. Although the movement from many instances to one Form in these passages seems indistinguishable from the process described in the Phaedrus, there is no use in the Republic of " in its methodological sense. Nor is there any suggestion that the single Form reached by this process might serve as a starting point for an ensuing division. To all appearances, at least, the pairing of this process with dialectical division was an innovation first mentioned in the Phaedrus.
Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
43
2.3 Collection in the Sophist Immediately following the encounter with the “free man’s knowledge”7 at Sophist 253C, the Stranger explains what he takes to be “the science of dialectic” ( . . . : 253D3). This is a matter of “dividing according to Kinds”8 ( '!: 253D1), not thinking of the same Form as different or the different as the same. Someone capable of this, he goes on to say, will adequately and distinctly perceive a single Idea ( ( : 253D5) extended through many ( . : 253D5–6) [Ideas], each one lying apart [from each other], and many ( : 253D7) [Ideas] different from each other embraced from without by a single ( C: 253D7) [Idea].
This appears to be a description, from complementary perspectives, of the perception achieved through collection. First is the perspective of the one, next that of the many. As a preparation sufficient for division according to Kinds, the Stranger seems to be saying, a dialectician must be able to see clearly a single Idea manifested in a plurality of different things. Put otherwise, the dialectician must be able to view these several different things as held together by a single Idea distinct from themselves. Thus enabled, the dialectician can get on with the business of division, which amounts in turn9 to perceiving a single Kind united “into one through many wholes” (+ . D ): 253D8), and many Kinds entirely set apart. The single Kind united into one through many wholes, presumably, is the final product of division, and the many Kinds set apart in the process are the Forms distinguished along the way from those implicated in the final definition. This particular discussion of methodology concludes with the remark that what the procedure amounts to is knowing how to discriminate, “Kind by Kind” ( : 253E2), how these several things can and cannot combine, along with the advice that only someone with a genuine love of wisdom ( % : 253E5) can be credited with this sort of dialectical skill. 7 8 9
This is an allusion to Theaetetus 172D1 where the philosopher is likened to a free man in contrast to speakers in law courts who are “enslaved” by demands of the legal process. Kinds at this point in the Sophist are equivalent to Forms, hence the capitalization. The contrasting use of for classes in the Statesman is discussed in Chapter 12. I read E at 253D8 as an indication that the Stranger’s description of dialectical method is turning from collection to division. The many wholes at 253D8 presumably are not the many things from which collection proceeds according to 253D5–7.
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Another reference to collection, albeit brief, occurs earlier at 234B, just before the Stranger launches into the series of divisions that yield the authentic sophist at the end of the dialogue. This reference takes the form of a remark by Theaetetus to the effect that the Stranger has just referred to a large and very diversified class (9F: 234B3), “collecting it all into a unity” (( : "-F : 234B3–4). Let us establish the context of this remark before considering its significance. After having worked out a fully articulated definition of angling as an illustrative example ( : 218D9, 221C5), the Stranger spins out six distinct definitions of sophistry in rapid succession. The first five depict sophistry as an acquisitive art, by way of either conquest (sophists I and V) or exchange of “wares” for money (sophists II, III, and IV). The sixth defines the “sophist of noble descent” (so-called at 231B9), who practices an art that purifies the soul of effects brought about by the acquisitive sophists. This sixth definition is usually taken by commentators to be description of Socratic elenchus. (All six definitions are laid out in Chapter 3.) Although each of the first five definitions characterizes a form of sophistry that presumably would be recognized by the immediate audience, however, none is broad enough to apply to sophistry in all its many forms. Each characterization, that is to say, is sufficient to pick out a specific form of sophistry, but none provides a characterization that applies to sophistry in general. Inasmuch as the stated task of the dialogue (218C) is to come up with a definition that explains the nature of sophistry as such, the first five definitions as they stand are deemed inadequate. The gist of their inadequacy, as the Stranger describes it, is that they do not enable one to see clearly (' : 232A4) the generic skill (5 : 232A4) in which all these forms of sophistry converge. Looking back over the five characterizations, the Stranger then observes that all of the various forms of sophistry they represent are involved in disputation (< # : 232B6) and that their practitioners can dispute on any topic. By way of drawing out the significance of that observation, he then proposes another illustrative paradigm ( : 233D3). The paradigm proposed is that of someone who claims “to know how to make and do all things by a single skill” ( ' ) C C7 5 ; " ! : 233D9–10). As the Stranger soon makes clear by alluding to various particular cases of production, the skill he has in mind is that of imitation ( : 234B2). The imitator, of course, is a maker of images, which sometimes (as in the case of an artist) can be sold for a modest sum (234A5).
Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
45
It is at this point that Theaetetus makes the remark cited earlier, observing that the Stranger has taken a large and diversified class of skills (those involved in producing imitations) and “collected it all into a unity” (234B3–4). Because the sophist has been included in this class as someone who engages in controversy on all topics and teaches this skill for a fee (234A8–10), the collection of all these skills under the single heading of imitation provides a single Kind under which sophistry can be further divided. As a result of working through this illustrative paradigm, the sophist emerges first and foremost as a practitioner of “the art of image making” ( ( 5 : 235B8–9). Let us look carefully at what this collection10 has accomplished. Definitions of the first five forms of sophistry all began with the acquisitive branch of art. Because their practitioners differ in manner of acquisition, none of these five definitions applies to sophistry in general. In seeking out a single skill that all five forms share, the Stranger has noticed that they all generate the impression of being knowledgeable on all topics. Being a sophist thus qualifies someone as belonging to the class of artful people who, in one way or another, are able to produce imitations of all things. It thus turns out that a single skill characteristic of sophists generally is that of image making, insofar as they are capable of creating semblances of all things in the form of words. Whereas the five kinds of sophistry were first defined as acquisitive artisans, as a result of collection they have now been displayed as artisans dealing in production as well. The Stranger thus reverts to the initial division of Art into Productive and Acquisitive and begins pursuing the sophist along that former branch instead. The dialogue ends with a definition depicting the sophist as a practitioner of productive art, with 10
One’s view of the role of collection in this dialogue can be distracted by the use of " and its synonym "-' in reference to other sorts of activities. At 230B there is mention of gathering together (" ) someone’s opinions as part of the process of elenchus. At 251D the Stranger considers the option of grouping together (" ) Being, Motion, and Rest as all capable of associating with one another. And at 224C, he proposes summing up (" ) the features attributed to sophistry of the second sort – acquisition, exchange, merchandizing, and so forth. As far as "-' is concerned, there is reference at 218C to the difficulty of grasping ("-' ) the tribe of sophists that Theaetetus and the Stranger are committed to find. At 235B–C the Stranger encourages Theaetetus to grasp ("-' ) the sophist by royal command of reason if they should happen upon him. At 250B there is the Stranger’s question whether in saying that there are both Rest and Motion one is taking them together ("-F ) as associating with Being. Once again we are led to the conclusion that Plato was not given to setting aside common terms like these as part of a technical vocabulary.
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specific traits added that apply to that skill uniquely. Collection has paved the way for a successful line of division, leading to the final capture of “the genuine sophist” (# $ : 268D3) at the end of the dialogue. There are two other fairly distinct uses of collection elsewhere in the Sophist. One is that “bringing under one heading” (" : 219B11) various forms of production at 219A–B, including agriculture, pottery, and the art of imitation ( at 219B1, anticipating its crucial role at 234B2). There is also mention at 267B1 of a collection (" ' ) left for someone else to do. The most distinctive use of collection in the dialogue, nonetheless, is the one we have just examined, in which skill in the production of images is discerned as a common feature of sophistry in general.
2.4 Collection and the Identification of Necessary Features As depicted in the Phaedrus, collection is a process of discerning a single Form manifested in a plurality of diverse instances. A striking illustration in the Sophist, we have noted, is where the production of images is picked out as a feature shared by all five types of sophistry that had previously been characterized as forms of acquisition. Insofar as this collection is successful, image making is essential to being a sophist. The problem with the five previous characterizations is that, although each describes a recognizable type of sophistry, no two types are acquisitive in the same respect. A consequence is that no one description applies to sophistry in general. In effect, none singles out features that are found in all cases of sophistry. None identifies features characteristic of sophists essentially. There are several respects in which an attempted collection might fail. One is that the instances from which the collection proceeds are not all genuine cases of the thing to be defined. If the “sophist of noble descent” had been factored into the collection, for instance, the Stranger would not have been able to find an identifying feature that applied equally and univocally to all (six) cases involved. As noted in section 2.2, successful collection resembles recollection ( ) in requiring prior knowledge of some sort regarding the thing to be defined. Unless Theaetetus and the Stranger had been able to recognize genuine instances of sophistry in advance, they could not have arrived at an essential feature necessary to get a dialectically sound definition of sophistry underway. Another respect in which collection can go wrong is in picking out some feature shared by all instances at hand that nonetheless is not
Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
47
required for their being what they are. By way of example, all five types of sophistry distinguished initially are engaged in making money (see 223B for sophist I; 223C for II; III, and IV; and 225E for sophist V). Despite the prevalence of this practice among sophists of Plato’s acquaintance, however, turning a profit need not be essential to sophistry in general. In giving a free demonstration, Gorgias would not cease to function as a sophist; the same would be true for Protagoras if he had stopped accepting fees. A successful collection must result in a feature that is necessary to the thing being defined, as distinct from an inessential concommitant. Another possible source of failure is that the collection might rely on an inadequately comprehensive group of representative instances. For example, sophists III and IV are both involved in retailing (223D6), which is not the case with the other three types. Although retailing may be essential for sophistry of those two sorts, it is not a feature required for sophistry at large. Hence a collection based on those two sorts alone might come up with a feature that is not generally requisite. The question of sample size becomes critical when we turn in Chapter 4 to the use of illustrative paradigms in the Statesman. Despite pitfalls like these along the way, the mark of collection successfully completed is that it produces a feature that is necessary to the thing being defined. The sense of necessity here is that in which the truth of a logical consequent is necessary to the truth of the antecedent entailing it. If being a husband entails being married, then being married is necessary to being a husband. In just the same fashion, being an angler entails being acquisitive, and being a sophist entails being a producer of images. The dialectical role of collection, in brief, is to come up with a feature entailed by being an instance of the thing ultimately to be defined. Once an essential feature of this sort is identified, the process of division takes over by way of completing the definition. Whereas the feature arrived at by collection is necessary for the thing being defined, that feature does not entail being the latter thing in turn. Not all acquisitive artisans are anglers, and not all image makers are sophists. This is to say that being an angler is not necessary for being an acquisitive artisan and that being a sophist is not necessary for being an image maker. The feature produced by collection is necessary for the thing being defined, but it is not sufficient. The role of division, in due order, is to qualify the feature picked out by collection in a stagewise fashion until a characterization is arrived at that is both necessary and sufficient. This characterization constitutes the definition at which the overall dialectical process is directed. Each
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feature articulated in the completed definition is necessary for the thing being defined. And all the features taken in combination are sufficient for being a thing of that kind. In a successfully completed definition, the set of defining features is logically equivalent to the kind of thing that has been defined. As indicated earlier, these observations on the logic of dialectical definition come into play when we turn in Chapter 4 to the use of paradigms in the Statesman. Before returning to the Statesman, however, there is another dialogue to consider in which the term " (to collect) plays a significant role. A brief discussion of the Philebus in this regard will help us understand how collection is replaced in the Statesman by the use of paradigms.
2.5 Complications in the Philebus In both the Phaedrus and the Sophist, collection is a process by which the dialectician perceives a single Form pervading many instances. While the Form itself remains a unit, its presence is somehow revealed in many sensible things. The many thus are one, and the one thus many. It is with an “amazing statement” (!" # 5! : 14C9) to this effect that the serious business of the Philebus gets underway. Suppose that someone undertakes to posit (!!: 15A5) the one Ox, the one Beautiful, or the one Good (# ! B : 15A5–6) and then seriously sets about to divide (: 15A7) such an entity. This would give rise, says Socrates, to disputes like the following:11 First, whether we ought to suppose that unities of this sort truly exist. Then next, how each of these, being one and always the same, and admitting neither generation nor destruction, can remain altogether and unshakably one and the same in the face of our having to posit (! : 15B6) it in things that come to be and are unlimited – whether it is scattered abroad and becomes many, or whether – and this would seem the most impossible of all – it is a whole itself apart from itself, becoming one and the same in one and many things at the same time.
It is problems like these, Socrates goes on to say, that bring satisfaction if properly resolved and cause all manner of difficulties otherwise. The “godly method” of 16C–17A, of course, is the way he recommends for resolving such problems. 11
Commentators have debated the number of distinct questions posed in the following passage. See Sayre (1983), pp. 291–92, n. 4, for my own opinion against a background of alternatives. For present purposes, the number of distinct questions is not relevant.
Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
49
More is said about the “godly method” in the second part of this study. The reason for not elaborating on it now is that it appears to be a method of division only. Neither the description of the method nor the passages leading up to it say anything about collection as such. Instead we hear about the positing (15A5, 15B6, 16D2) of some single Form to get things started and then about the division that follows when that Form has been laid down. In considering what to make of this, however, we must take into account the singular fact that collections are called for by name no less than six times in the discussion of the four basic kinds that follows a few Stephanus pages later. In each case, there is an acknowledged need to bring unity to some sort of multiplicity, and in each case collection (" ) is cited as the means by which this unity should be achieved. Pending the discussion in Chapter 8 of the four basic kinds in the Philebus, we may note that two of the basic kinds in question are the Unlimited and Limit. Third is the Mixture of these two, and fourth the Cause by which mixture comes about. At 23E, Socrates observes that both of the first two are scattered abroad ( : 23E512 ) and dispersed into many ( : 23E4), and calls for a collection (" : 23E5) of these multitudes into one ( : : 23E5). In this way, an observant person can see how each is both one and many (: ) : 23E6). Here we find something referred to as collection and described in the same terms used for describing collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist. It is a process by which multiplicity is brought into unity. The second mention of collection in this context is at 25A. Socrates has just identified “becoming more and less” (24E7–8) as the single mark of the Unlimited kind, and this is said to comply with their agreement to collect (" : 25A3) the scattered multitude of the Unlimited into a single unity (( : : 25A1–2). The remaining four references to collection come at 25D, in connection with the need to provide comparable collections for Limit and Mixture. Just as we collected the Unlimited into one ( % " " ( & : : 25D5–6), Socrates says, we should have collected the class of Limit but failed to do so ( % % " ' , " : 25D6–7). But as he goes on to say, by collecting both these two ( " : 25D8) the class of Mixture perhaps will become clear as well. The unifying feature of Limit, as identified at 25E1–2, is that it makes opposites commensurate and harmonious by the introduction of number. 12
The same term appears in the passage quoted at 15B6 and also at 25A3.
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At first glance, these several occurrences of the term " seem to show that, despite its not being mentioned specifically as part of the “godly method,” collection still has a substantial role to play in dialectical procedure. Before resting content with that conclusion, however, we should look carefully at how the several so-called collections actually function in this particular context. Arriving at “becoming more and less” as the unifying mark of the nature of the Unlimited, for one thing, is not a matter of identifying a single Form with which an ensuing process of division can auspiciously begin. Whatever the kind or class of the Unlimited amounts to, it is not a Form subjected subsequently to dialectical division. The same may also be said of Limit. Indeed, it would have been useful to the reader if Socrates had divided Limit into proper parts – numbers, measures, Forms, whatever. This might have been of considerable help toward figuring out how Limit should be understood in this context. And whatever one makes of the classifications of pleasure that occur later in the dialogue, these are not parts of a systemic division of the class of Mixture. To put it briefly, these several so-called collections do not function as part of an integrated method of collection and division of the sort praised in the Phaedrus and applied in the Sophist. To the contrary, the unified perceptions described as collections in this context appear to have the status of finished achievements in their own right. When Socrates and Protarchus single out “becoming more or less” as the unifying feature of the Unlimited, this is the culmination of a discussion taking up an entire Stephanus page. After that unifying mark has been identified, they proceed directly to a discussion of Limit and Measure. Discerning this common feature is an end in itself. It unmistakably is not a preliminary step in the course of an ongoing dialectical procedure. The apparent upshot is that although collection of some sort plays a role in the Philebus, it no longer functions as the complement of division in a two-stage dialectical process. Instead of relying on a collection over paradigmatic instances to get division off to an auspicious start, dialectic in this dialogue begins summarily with the “positing” of some appropriate Form. As described in the “godly method,” what we are supposed to do to get division underway is “to search for a single Form to posit in each and every case” ( ( ) # D ! " 6' : 16D1–2), and then to look for two, three, or some other number of Forms to be treated in the same way. This description harks back to 15A, where Socrates warns about the disputes that will arise when someone undertakes to posit (!!: 15A5)
Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
51
one Ox, one Beautiful, or one Good and then proceeds to divide that unified entity. One is also reminded of the recurrent theme in the Republic of positing single Forms on the basis of many similar instances (section 2.2), and of the method in the Phaedo that begins with the hypothesizing (G ! : 100B5) a thesis one judges to be strongest.13 Whatever we do with those associations, however, the fact remains that collection as practiced in the Sophist has faded from the scene by the time of the Philebus. What happened in the interim is the topic of Chapter 4. 13
See Phaedo 99E–100A and 101D–E. My views on the method of hypothesis are laid out in Sayre (1969), Ch. 1, and Sayre (1995), Ch. 5, sec. 2.
3 Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
3.1 Subdivisions of Mental Derangement in the Phaedrus With regard to dialectic, the pivotal passage in the Phaedrus is 265D–266C. The passage begins with reference to a pair of procedures, identified shortly thereafter as collection and division, and concludes by assigning the name ‘dialectician’ persons able to apply them. As already noted, collection is described here as a process of bringing what is multiply dispersed “into a single Idea” (4(s . . . ( : 265D3). Division is characterized in turn as a matter of “cleaving things according to Forms” ( & 0 . . . : 265E1) and likened to the technique of cutting “according to natural joints” (& 1! =; " : 265E1–2) practiced by a competent butcher. The treatment of collection in the Phaedrus has been discussed in the previous chapter, along with the relationship between collection and recollection ( ). Our present concern is with the other phase of the dialectical process in which things are partitioned according to Forms. This technique of cutting things along natural lines of cleavage, Socrates tells Phaedrus, has already been illustrated in his two speeches on love. After locating mental derangement (# . . . 1 : 265E3–4) under a single common Form (by collection), these two speeches then partitioned off the “left-handed” and the “right-handed” parts of mental derangement (termed at 266A2), analogously to the distinction between the left- and right-hand parts of the body. Let us examine the forms of mental derangement distinguished in these two speeches. 52
Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
53
Foreshadowing the contrast between the noble and the hubristic horse in the myth of the charioteer, the first speech distinguishes two principles by which human action is guided. On one hand is a natural desire for pleasure, on the other an acquired judgment that aspires to what is best. When the latter holds sway, the control it provides is called “moderation” ( 3 : 237E3). When the former prevails, however, it drags one irrationally toward pleasure; being ruled by this principle is known as “hubris” (2-: 238A2). The speech then proceeds by distinguishing various forms that hubris might take. When a person’s actions are dominated by a desire for the pleasures of food, the desire is known as gluttony, and the person involved will be named a glutton. When the dominant desire is for the pleasures of drink, the person will be known as a drunkard. And so on for other forms of overwhelming desire. Of particular interest in the first speech, however, is the overpowering desire for bodily beauty ( : 238C2). In this case, the domineering desire is known as lust (!" . : 238C2), which Socrates describes graphically as eros in the sense related to physical force (H* : 238C3). This is the form of mental derangement characterized as “left-hand love” ( . . . A) at 266A6. Love of the “right-hand” sort is singled out in the second speech (the palinode, so-called at 243B5). Far from being hubristic, this kind of love is characterized by Socrates as a kind of madness that is divine (!' : 266A7, following 249D1). As such, it is related to other forms of divine madness distinguished in the opening passages of this speech. First to be identified among these is the skill practiced by the ancient prophets ( : 244D2). Whereas present-day diviners purport to foretell the future by exercise of their own wits, relying on birds and other omens, the practice of the older prophets relied entirely on divine inspiration. In the recapitulation of the god-given forms of madness at 265B, prophetic inspiration is attributed to Apollo specifically. Second and third in order of mention are skills dependent on inspiration by Dionysus and the Muses, respectively. Although prophetic in a way, the second skill is concerned less with foretelling the future than with remedies for the amelioration of afflictions due to guilt for ancestral sins. Avenues of healing made available by this skill involve participation in mysteries (. : 244E2) and various rites of purification. The form of divine madness induced by the Muses, in turn, is that yielding lyric and other forms of poetry. Lyric poetry is singled out specifically as a means of glorifying great deeds of the past for the edification of future generations. In the ranking of incarnate souls laid out at
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248C–E, poets and other devotees of the Muses share top rank with lovers of wisdom.1 The fourth and highest form of divine madness is disclosed at 249D, in connection with the identification of recollection as a process of understanding according to Forms. So enraptured was the soul of the philosopher in its preincarnate vision of true Beauty that when it perceives beauty among mortals it takes flight in the madness of love, and the person touched by this madness is known as a lover. It is in this manner that the palinode leads to the “right-hand” love engendered by Aphrodite and Eros specifically. Socrates sums up the results of these two sets of divisions at 266A, by way of illustrating how severing things according to Forms amounts to cutting them along their natural joints. As he puts it, the two speeches provide an initial division of the single Form of mental derangement in two distinct directions. On the left-hand side is derangement of an hubristic sort, further differentiated in the first speech into gluttony, drunkenness, and lust. This last type of hubris, rooted in an overwhelming desire for beauty, is described as the left-hand part of love at 266A6. Along the right-hand side, madness is further divided into various forms of divinely induced frenzy ( at 245A1, 245B1, passim). In order treated, these are the madness of the prophet, inspired by Apollo; that of the mystic, due to Dionysus; that of the poet, induced by the Muses; and that of the lover, enthused by Aphrodite and Eros. Although this divinely gifted form of love goes by the same name as its left-hand counterpart, it is praised in the palinode as the source of the greatest human goods. It will be helpful to lay out this multiform division of madness in diagrammatic form, as follows (Figure 3.1). Given the common assumption that the Phaedrus is earlier than the Sophist and the Statesman, this is the first fully elaborated set of divisions in the Platonic corpus. Two features of Figure 3.1 should be noted in particular for comparison with divisions found in later dialogues. One is that the process of division is pursued through both the left- and the right-hand branches of the figure. This is required by the underlying purpose of contrasting the beneficent form of 1
Socrates invoked the Muses at the beginning of his first speech, and twice describes that speech as dithyrambic (hence lyrical); but the speech was too much under the influence of the blasphemous recitation by Phaedrus to count as divinely inspired. The palinode is more successful in this regard, as signaled by the story of the cicadas (258E–259D) who bear report to the Muses of human doings, in tandem with specific mention of Calliope and Urania as having a special interest in those pursuing a life of philosophy.
Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
55
madness hubris
gluttony drunkenness lust
divine frenzy prophecy mysticism poetry love
figure 3.1. Forms of madness.
love in the palinode with the sinister (left-hand) form found in Socrates’ initial speech. By way of contrast, all divisions undertaken in the Sophist (with a possible exception at 223D; see Figure 3.3) proceed along the right side only. This is in accord with the Stranger’s explicit call for righthand division at 264E as he enters the final phase in the definition of the authentic sophist. The second thing to note about Figure 3.1 is that both branches end up with nondichotomous subdivisions. On the left, hubris is divided into gluttony, drunkenness, and lust, whereas divine frenzy is separated on the right into four parts including beneficent love. Within their respective narrative contexts, neither set of multiple distinctions appears unusual or out of place. In point of fact, however, this is the only instance of nondichotomous division to be encountered until roughly halfway through the Statesman. A strict pattern of dichotomous division is maintained throughout the Sophist, to which we turn in the following section.
3.2 The Paradigmatic Definition of Angling in the Sophist The stated purpose of this conversation with the Stranger is to define ( !: 217B3) the sophist – to “give a clear account of what he is” ( 6 7 & A: 218C1). This is to be accomplished by a method ( ! : 218D5) first illustrated by defining the angler, consisting of multiple stages of “dividing by Form and name” (0 ) I : ; 220A8–9). The procedure is subsequently described as “dividing according to Kinds” ( '!: 253D1) and identified as “the science of dialectic” ( . . . : 253D2–3). Following the pattern established by the definition of the angler, seven distinct attempts are made to define the sophist. Numbered in order of occurrence, these are as follows: sophist I (221D–223B), sophist II (223C–224D), sophist III (224D–E), sophist IV (224D–E), sophist V
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(225A–226A), sophist VI (“the sophist of noble descent,” 226B–231B), and sophist VII (the “authentic sophist,” 234C through the remainder of the dialogue). These are discussed in the order indicated, beginning with the definition of the angler. Anticipating that the sophist will be hard to track down, the Stranger suggests that they practice their method on something easier. They should pick out something that is familiar, but less important, and use it as a paradigm ( : 218D9; also 221C5) for the more important topic. The Stranger proposes using an angler as the subject of their practice definition. The definition begins with their positing (! : 219A6) that angling is a skill or art (5 : 219A5). A twofold distinction is then made between arts such as farming, bodily care, construction, and imitation ( : 219B1), summed up under the title of productive art (J : 219B11), and arts such as learning, mental discovery, commerce, fighting, and hunting, brought together under the name of acquisitive art (: 219C7). This listing of kindred arts under their respective titles constitutes a collection of the sort discussed in the previous chapter.2 After observing that angling is an art of the acquisitive sort, the Stranger divides acquisitive art into conquest and willing exchange, conquest into hunting by stealth and open combat, and so forth. Nine divisions of this sort are made in sequence before the angler is finally isolated, yielding a definition in terms of ten distinctive features.3 These ten features are indicated in Figure 3.2, arranged in order of successive divisions. As summarized by the Stranger at 221B–C, half of art is acquisitive, half of the acquisitive part is conquest, half of conquest is by hunting, and so forth.4
2 3
4
Although occurring only infrequently in the corpus, the term " (to sum up) at 219B11 appears to provide a synonym for " in this context. The search for a definition of a practitioner of the art of angling (" at 218E4) ends with a definition of the art itself (" at 221C2). What gets divided as the definition progresses are kinds of skill, not kinds of people. But the result is easily convertible into a definition of the angler as such. The term , " (half ) occurs only once in this passage (221B3), but the grammatical structure indicates that division at each stage partitions things into halves. What dividing by half amounts to is not explained in the Sophist, but it seems natural to think of it as equivalent to cutting down the middle ( ) at 229B7 and cutting through the middle ( ) at Statesman 262B6. There is an attempt in Chapter 11 to pin down the sense of these expressions. Let it suffice for now to say that it does not amount to dividing things into equally numerous subclasses.
Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist Art (
productive
)
acquisitive (
by exchange
)
by conquest (subduing)(
(open) combat
57
)
(stealthy) hunting (
inanimate objects
)
animal hunting (
land animals
)
water animals (
fowl
)
fish (
by enclosure
nocturnal
from above
)
by striking (
)
diurnal (barbing) ( from below 5 (= Angling,
)
)
figure 3.2. Definition of angling.
The obvious intent of this series of divisions is to arrive at a unique description of the angler’s art that distinguishes it from other arts that are similar in various ways. This is accomplished by adding features to the description at each stage of division that are possessed by angling but not by the other arts in question. Although all anglers practice an art that is in some ways acquisitive, for example, there are other arts that are acquisitive as well. Angling is separated from a sizeable portion of these (“half,” according to 221B3) by the second-level distinction between exchange and conquest, and so on as the line of division progresses. At each stage of the procedure as diagrammed, of course, angling remains confined within the right-hand portion, while arts other than angling are dismissed to the left. 5
In what sense is angling supposed to deliver a blow from below? The technique is explained at Ion 538D as a matter of sinking a sharp prong to the bottom and then yanking it upward when a fish is auspiciously positioned above – a procedure normally requiring daytime vision.
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By the end of the procedure, if properly pursued, angling has been “captured” by the set of right-hand features, and all kindred arts have been eliminated. The net effect is that angling has been uniquely characterized by that combination of features. All anglers are characterized by those features in combination, and all practices with those features are cases of angling. Because all anglers are characterized by that combination of features, each is a necessary feature of angling. And because any practice with all those features is an instance of angling, possession of these features in combination is sufficient for being a practitioner of that specific art.6 It is in this way that division, successfully pursued, leads to definitions of the sort the Stranger requires. For Plato, a definition expresses the essence ( & A: 218C1) of the thing defined. The task of the remainder of the dialogue is to find a definition expressing the essence of the sophist.
3.3 The Possibility of Alternative Definitions The requirement that a definition express the essence or proper nature ( ( . . . 3 : 264E3–265A1) of the thing defined raises the question whether successful definitions of an activity like angling (or sophistry, or statesmanship) could be reached by alternative lines of division.7 If the Stranger’s series of divisions were slightly altered to eliminate the middle two features (animal hunting and hunting water animals), for instance, the resulting definition would seem no less adequate for leaving these out. This is because each of these two features is entailed by being a 6
7
To say that a definition expresses features that are necessary and sufficient for the thing defined is not to say that a definition should be expected to express all features of either sort. To show this in the case of sufficient conditions, it is enough to point to any of the five inadequate definitions of sophistry that follow. Each of these expresses features that in combination are sufficient for being a sophist but that do not appear in the final (successful) definition of sophistry. As far as necessary conditions are concerned, we should realize that there are many features necessary for the practice of angling that do not show up in the Stranger’s definition. Assuming that all fish absorb oxygen from water, for instance, it is a necessary condition for being an angler that one hunt animals that obtain oxygen in this fashion. And given the importance of fishing by daylight, it is necessary that angling be practiced by someone with sight. Because these features are entailed by others that appear explicitly, there is no need that they be cited for the definition to be successful. Other discussants of Plato’s method of division have recognized this possibility. For examples, see J. M. E. Moravcsik (1973), pp. 165, 172; and S. Marc Cohen (1973), p. 189.
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hunter of fish, so that they would still figure (implicatively) within the definition.8 A more substantive departure from the Stranger’s definition of angling might come with a division involving equivalent terms but in different order. Instead of distinguishing exchange and conquest at the third stage of division, suppose we were to divide acquisition directly into open and stealthy, stealthy acquisition into exchange (e.g., replacing a valuable painting clandestinely with a worthless copy) and conquest, and then stealthy acquisition by conquest into robbery and animal hunting.9 From there on the divisions would follow the order in the dialogue, yielding a definition in terms essentially the same as the Stranger’s save that animal hunting as a form of conquest by hunting has been replaced by animal hunting as a form of stealthy conquest. As an expression of the essence or nature of angling, the resulting definition seems no less apt than the original. Both specify features of angling that 8
9
The reason these two features are included in the definition as it stands may have to do with the apparent requirement that division split things down the middle. Dividing hunting (stage 4) directly into hunting fish (stage 7) and hunting other things (non-fish) would seem to be as lopsided as separating Greeks from non-Greeks at Statesman 262D. Pending further discussion of this requirement in Chapter 11, we should assume that it applies not only to the actual process of division but to the finished product as well. As far as the finished definition is concerned, explicit mention of animal hunting and hunting of water animals is nonetheless redundant. Removal of these redundancies does not reduce the definition’s effectiveness in separating angling from related activities. It remains necessary that an angler possess these two features, even though they are not cited explicitly. The division as altered to this point may be diagrammed as follows:
art
productive
acquisitive
open
stealthy
exchange
conquest
robbery
animal hunting
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are necessary and sufficient, regardless of the order in which they are mentioned. A possible objection to this rearranged definition arises from an alltoo-common interpretation of Platonic division according to which features cited earlier in the process are somehow more comprehensive than those cited later. One way of expressing this is in terms of classes and subclasses:10 as acquisitive art is a subclass of art in general, so the art of acquiring by conquest is a subclass of acquisitive art, and so forth. Another way of putting this is in terms of generality or breadth:11 art itself is more general than the art of acquisition, which in turn is more general than the art of conquest, and so forth. Perhaps the most common way of expressing this understanding of division, however, is in terms of the Aristotelian relation of genus and species.12 Art, on this reading, is a generic feature, production and acquisition are differentiae marking off species of this genus, and angling finally is an infima species – meaning a species not subject to further division. However expressed, the point is that the features cited in a proper definition are situated within a well-ordered hierarchy. In the Stranger’s definition of angling, art stands at the top of the hierarchy, followed by acquisition, conquest, hunting, and so forth. As a genus, art is the most general feature, establishing the class within which the various species are included as subclasses. Acquisition in turn is a differentiating feature, marking off a subclass of arts that has subclasses in turn, down to the subclass of angling, which is the least general of all.13 10
Thus Moravcsik (1973), p. 172, who writes with regard to the definition of sophistry: “Our generic class will be the class of all arts. One of the significant sub-classes of this class is the class of acquisitive arts. . . . [Next we] carve out a sub-class of the acquisitive arts, namely the acquisitive arts operating by exchange. This class is, of course, also a sub-class of the original generic class. We then repeat this procedure until we reach a class with only on element; namely sophistry.”
11 12 13
See also Nicholas P. White (1976), p. 120. What Moravcsik means by a class “with only one element,” White expresses as a class that “can no longer properly be divided.” For example, Nicholas White, ibid. For example, see Cornford (1935), pp. 270–71; Henry Teloh (1981), p. 182; and Constance C. Meinwald (1991), pp. 67–68. A seemingly natural way of diagramming this hierarchical arrangement is by a nest of concentric circles representing varying degrees of inclusiveness. In the case of the angler, art would be represented by the outermost circle, acquisition by the circle next to it, and then conquest, hunting, animal hunting, and so forth, down to the innermost circle representing barbing from below.
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The objection mentioned earlier to the alternative definition stems from this conception of an hierarchy among defining terms. If acquisition by conquest contains hunting as a subclass, then stealth (which distinguishes hunting from open combat) is less general than conquest among features of acquisitive art (see Figure 3.1). When the order of division is rearranged to make conquest a subclass of stealthy acquisition, accordingly, the less general appears to include the more general art. Given the constraints imposed by hierarchical division, a rearrangement of this sort is not permissible. But this conception of division as ordered by decreasing generality finds no support in Plato’s text and in fact seems contrary to the examples he has chosen. Let us look at some reasons why. As far as the definition of angling is concerned, there is no reason to consider art more general than acquisition in the first place (there are many forms of acquisition that are not at all artful). In the field of art at large, it is not clear that conquest is less general than acquisition (there are many artful sports, like boxing, involving conquest but not acquisition). Nor is it clear that stealthy art is less general than conquest (artful thievery typically does not involve force). What these observations show is not that Plato has made mistakes in his judgments of generality, surely, but that considerations of generality are not essential to the procedure of division. Another sign that something is wrong with the hierarchical interpretation is that it confines both open and stealthy acquisition to acquisition by conquest. But there are forms of both open and stealthy acquisition that fall under acquisition by exchange as well. Buying on the open market is an example of the former, whereas buying things that are illegal is usually done stealthily. Not only are the initial stages of the Stranger’s division not ordered by generality, but the features distinguished at a given level of division are not confined to just one branch of the division preceding.14 The indication once again is that Platonic division does not fit neatly within the Aristotelian mold.15 This is not to deny, of course, that the class of acquisitive arts is less inclusive than the class of arts generally or that artful acquisition by
14 15
In Aristotelian division by genus and species, coordinate genera have different differentiating features; see Categories 1b16–24. A more detailed criticism of the tendency to read Platonic division through Aristotelian lenses may be found in Sayre (1969), ch. 3, sec. 7.
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conquest is included among the acquisitive arts. Quite apart from the context of Platonic division, for any three (non-coextensive) properties A, B, and C, class AB is less inclusive than class A alone, and things that are ABC are included among things that are AB. As far as Platonic division is concerned specifically, the point is that the inclusion of acquisitive arts within the class of art generally is no more “natural” than their inclusion within acquisitive activities (artful and otherwise). Although AB is less inclusive than A itself, by the same token it is less inclusive than B as well.16 Theaetetus accepts the definition given of angling as adequate (K .: 221C4), with the Stranger’s implicit agreement. The foregoing considerations suggest that equally adequate definitions might have been reached through alternative pathways of division. The possibility that this is true generally becomes particularly relevant when we turn in Chapter 6 to the problem of relating the initial and the final definitions of statesmanship.
3.4 Five Faulty Definitions All five definitions of sophistry articulated between 221D and 226A pertain to a branch of acquisitive arts. In this respect, each definition is reached by divisions overlapping some part of the set of divisions leading to the definition of the angler. Sophist I employs the acquisitive art of subduing animals by stealth, differing from the angler primarily in hunting land instead of water animals. Sophists II, III, and IV employ arts of acquiring by exchange, unlike the angler who acquires by conquest. And sophist V, while dealing in an art that acquires by conquest like the angler, operates openly rather than by stealth. In Figure 3.3 below, each of these five acquisitive arts is characterized in a series of divisions picking up where it deviates from the line of divisions leading to the angler. The definitions shown in (b), it will be noted, are interactive in a rather complicated way. Sophist II is a wholesaler ( : 224D1) of mental wares produced by others, sophist III 16
Instead of representing the relation among features of a Platonic definition by an arrangement of concentric circles, it would be more suitable to represent the relation in the manner of intersecting Venn diagrams. In the case of the ten features involved in the Stranger’s definition, angling would be represented by the space in which all ten features (i.e., the figures representing them) overlap. A technique for representing an indefinite number of intersecting terms is developed in Anderson, Daniel E. and Cleaver, Frank L. (1965), pp. 113–18.
Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist open
of land animals tame
wild by violence
pugnacious
friendly
by persuasion
physical
private
public
63
for amusement
private
public
for hire
for gifts
verbal controversy
expert (eristic)
inexpert
for improvement (= sophist I)
for pleasure
(a)
for profit (= sophist V)
(c) by exchange giving
selling
own products as retailer (IV) bodily wares
others’ products
as wholesaler (II)
as retailer (III)
mental wares for show
bodily wares
for learning
aiding expertese
aiding virtue (= sophists II,III,IV)
(b)
figure 3.3. Faulty definitions of sophistry (as acquisitive art).
a retailer (# : 224E2) of the same wares, and sophist IV a seller ( : 224E2) of mental wares produced by himself. Although each of the three could be laid out individually, this would result in needless redundancy. Moreover, Plato himself treats III and IV together as appendages to II, devoting less than one quarter of a Stephanus page to their articulation.17 Apart from saving space, however, diagramming 17
Although Plato numbers the five sophists in the manner shown in Diagram 3.3 at 231D, he groups III and IV together at 224E. This accounts for sophist V being listed as the sophist’s fourth appearance at 225E. The reason for this discrepancy is unclear. As the
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them together in the manner of (b) shows that these three lines of division involve subdivisions in both the left- and the right-hand direction. This is the first of two departures from the pattern of right-hand division that otherwise prevails in the Sophist. It should be noted in passing that all division nonetheless remain dichotomous. After the multipartite divisions in the Phaedrus, we do not encounter such again until well into the Statesman. In his discussion of these five definitions, Cornford suggests that sophists I and V correspond to Protagoras and the Megarians, respectively, and that sophists II, III, and IV can be found among other major teachers of the fifth century (presumably including Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus).18 Questions of identity aside, the definitions are realistic enough that someone practicing an art characterized by any one of them could easily be recognized as a sophist. In effect, each definition specifies features that in combination are sufficient to distinguish the sophistry they characterize from similar callings. On the other hand, none of the five definitions comprehends a set of features all of which are shared by all sophists commonly. All sophists engage in acquisitive art, to be sure. But some acquire by exchange and some by conquest, some conquer openly and some by stealth, and so forth. The very fact that the five definitions distinguish different forms of sophistry guarantees that there might be sophists not sharing the entire following schema shows, however, combining III and IV still involves division in both left- and right-hand directions.
by exchange giving
selling
own products ?
others’ products
as retailer
bodily wares
mental wares
for show aiding expertese 18
as wholesaler
F. M. Cornford (1935), pp. 173–77.
bodily wares
for learning aiding virtue
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set of features circumscribed by any given one. A consequence is that none of the five definitions encompasses features all of which are necessary for being a sophist. This means that none succeeds in explicating the sophist’s essence or nature. In considering the role of these five definitions in the dialectical strategy of the dialogue we should not overlook the fact that all turn out to be inadequate. The positive role of these initial definitions is to serve in a collection over several representative forms of sophistry. As detailed in section 3 of Chapter 2, this collection reveals that all sophists are engaged in one specific sort of productive art. The final definition of sophistry, accordingly, reverts to the initial division of art into acquisitive and productive and follows the latter branch to a successful conclusion at the end of the dialogue.
3.5 The Sophist of Noble Descent As summarized at 231B, the art of “the sophist of noble descent” ( : 231B7–8) is a branch of education (engaged in eliminating stupidity through learning), which is a branch of teaching (removing ignorance), which in turn is an art separating better from worse by way of purifying the soul. By near consensus of commentators with a view on the matter, this is a description of the art of elenchus, and Socrates is paramount among its practitioners.19 At any rate, the art is deemed the “greatest and most important of purifications” (230D8) essential for the happiness ( : 230E3) of any soul. Let us consider the line of division by which the definition of sophist VI is generated (see Figure 3.4). It is interesting to compare this definition of sophist VI with those of the angler and of the five previous sophists. Like that of sophists III, IV, and V, this set of divisions proceeds along both the right and the left. This is the second departure from the practice of exclusively right-hand division found elsewhere in the Sophist. Particularly interesting in this regard is the complete symmetry between left and right beyond the specification of arts that separate better from 19
For reservations about the identification of Sophist VI with Socrates, see Noburu Notomi (1999), sec. 2.3. The Stranger’s diffident treatment of this definition may be due to its coinciding with (or closely approximating) a skill practiced preeminently by a member of his audience. Whatever its intended reference, the definition is disputed ( - : 231E4) but nonetheless conceded ("5 : 231E5) to be accurate.
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Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman art combinatory
separative
like from like
better from worse (purification)
bodily living
inward
nonliving
outward
mental (soul cleansing) of wickedness (discord)
of ignorance (teaching) (disproportion)
technical training
education
medicine gymnastics (heals discord) (heals disproportion)
refutation (= sophist VI)
figure 3.4. Definition of the “noble sophist.”
worse. This suggests some kind of correlation between bodily and mental purification, a matter to which we return shortly. One consequence of the parallel development of both branches of purification is that the divisions in Figure 3.4 provide definitions of medicine and gymnastics (226E–227A) as well as of the elenctic art itself. In this respect, the definition of the “noble sophist” is similar to the final definition of statesmanship in the following dialogue, which also leads to definitions of several kindred arts. Another notable aspect of this definition is that it begins with a different subdivision of the arts than the one involved in the six previous definitions. There is no immediately apparent reason why the original subdivision into acquisitive and productive could not serve in this case as well. Productive art could be divided into combinatory and separative (e.g., carding, which produces wool ready for spinning), leading by the path in Figure 3.4 to noble sophistry as an art conducive to learning. A possible explanation of the new subdivision of art with which this definition begins is that it signals the exclusion of this form of sophistry from the collection in which the other five participate. This exclusion is necessary because sophist VI removes the ignorance that the other five produce. Whatever Plato’s intentions in this regard, the fact that art is subjected to two distinct subdivisions within less than eight Stephanus pages shows that there is nothing privileged about either subdivision. Because both lead to apparently successful definitions (the angler and sophist VII for the first, the noble sophist for the second), this indicates that the dialectical requirement of dividing according to Forms does not preclude different subdivisions for different purposes.
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It is particularly interesting to note, furthermore, that this definition incorporates no “technical” name for the art of purifying souls as such. Purification in general is called !, and teaching (the removal of ignorance) is called , but the purification of souls is referred to only by definite description (227C2–3). What makes this worth noting is that there is a similar division of arts applying to the body and to the soul at Gorgias 464B–C and that in this earlier context the art of purifying souls is given a “technical” name. In both contexts, treatment of souls is divided into two parts, corresponding to medicine and gymnastics as two forms of bodily treatment. The main difference between the two contexts in this regard is that the treatment of souls in the Gorgias is labeled “statecraft” ( ), which is then subdivided into justice ( 3 : 464C1), corresponding to medicine as a physical therapy, and legislation ( ! : 464B9), corresponding to gymnastics. What corresponds to medicine in the Sophist, of course, is removal of discord or vice (228B8), whereas teaching is like gymnastics in removing the ugliness of ignorance (228D4, 229A8–9). Thus, the art of statecraft in the Gorgias parallels the art of purifying souls in the Sophist, with a more specific parallel between legislation and teaching. Roundabout as this comparison may be, it seems to throw further light upon the description of Socratic refutation as “sophistry of noble descent.” The Socratic art is a further specification of a kind of purification closely akin to the care of souls identified as statesmanship in the Gorgias. And statesmanship is one of the nobler arts ( ), so described at Statesman 261C9. In brief, the Socratic art of refutation is closely akin to the noble art of statesmanship – like sophistry in some respects, but nonetheless of noble kinship. This way of thinking about Socratic elenchus is further supported by Socrates’ description of himself in conversing with Callicles. I am the only one, he says, among contemporary Athenians to take up the true art of politics (; ? !. ; L5 :; Gorgias 521D7) – the only one to practice statesmanship ( : 521D7–8). When Socrates hears the Stranger describe his skill as one of noble sophistry at Sophist 231B, we can imagine him as smiling agreeably rather than taking offense.
3.6 The Authentic Sophist Approximately thirty-four Stephanus pages intervene between the disclosure of the sophist as a producer of images (234E) and the end of the dialogue. Of these, only about seven are directly concerned with the final definition of sophistry. These latter are broken up into two sections.
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Pages 234–37 reveal the sophist as someone who produces imitations in the form of false discourse, which pertains to what is not the case. In the view of Parmenides’ dictum that what is not cannot be intelligibly thought or spoken of, the Stranger finds it necessary to establish the intelligibility of the practice they are trying to define. This takes up roughly twenty-seven Stephanus pages (237A–264B), treating such philosophically crucial topics as Being and not-Being, truth and falsehood, and the nature of dialectic itself.20 Having removed the barrier imposed by Parmenides, Theaetetus and the Stranger return to the task of defining the sophist, which occupies the remaining four pages of the dialogue. Our present concern is with the divisions that generate this final definition. The sequence of divisions producing the definition of sophist VII can be schematized as follows (Figure 3.5). This sequence of divisions, it may be noted, begins with the partitioning of art into acquisitive and productive at 265A4 (repeated from 219B–C) and proceeds through six additional steps before ending at 268B3 with the division of insincere practices into public and private. All cuts in the sequence occur within 20
These topics have been extensively discussed in recent literature. For my views, see Sayre (1983), pp. 218–38.
art acquisitive
productive (265A4)
divine
human (265B6)
making originals
copy making (266A10)
likeness making
appearance making (266D9)
by tools
by imitation (267A10)
knowledgeable mimicry
semblance mimicry (267E1)
candid
insincere (268A7) public
private (268B3) (= sophist VII)
figure 3.5. (The authentic) sophist VII.
Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
69
these three pages in the order indicated. The entire definition of sophist VII, accordingly, is achieved within the final moments of the dialogue. This is worth noticing because it runs counter to what is probably the standard way of reading this particular definition. According to the standard reading, the definition begins with the discussion of artful imitation ensuing at 234B, is interrupted by the defense against Parmenides from 237A to 264B, and takes up again at 264C.21 If we look carefully at what happens between 234B and 237A, however, we find reason for thinking that the Stranger’s remarks leading up to Parmenides’ challenge are preliminary to, rather than part of, the final definition. One obvious consideration is that there is no distinction between divine and human production before 265B. Furthermore, although a distinction between production of originals and production of images may be implied when the Stranger starts talking about imitation at 234B, this distinction is not made explicit until 266B. The only distinction made prior to 237A that shows up in the final definition is that between the making of likenesses and the making of appearances. And even that distinction remains muddy in its initial treatment. Let us see why. The Stranger begins his discussion of sophistic deception by drawing attention to the art of imitation ( : 234B2), but almost immediately starts talking about the production of spoken copies (0 : 234C6) instead. Throughout this discussion the terms (imitation) and ( (copy making) are used interchangeably. At 235B, for example, the Stranger sets about to divide the art of copy making (( : 235B8), and ends up with what he calls two types of imitation ( : 235D1). Then, once the division has been elucidated in terms of imitation (236B1, C1), he returns to the former expression in reporting the results. Thus, he remarks at 236C6–7 that the two types of copy making (( : 236C6) in question are likeness making and the making of appearances (( ) : 236C7). Although use of synonyms should be unobjectionable in itself, a problem arises with the fact that imitation is two levels below copy making in the final system of divisions (Figure 3.5). An associated problem is that, whereas appearance making is represented as a part of imitation at 236C, in the final divisions imitation is part of appearance making instead. There is a similar problem with the way likeness making figures into this mix. At 236C, likeness making is subordinate to imitation. In the 21
Thus, for example, Cornford (1935), p. 197.
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final set of divisions, however, likeness making is separated on the left from appearance making on the right. And because imitation falls under appearance making, it is separated from likeness making as well. The upshot of these discrepancies, as I read it, is that the several forms of image making in question are treated differently before and after the Stranger’s response to Parmenides’ challenge. This response is not an interruption of an ongoing definition as the standard reading maintains. Rather, the final definition begins once the response has been completed. The Stranger’s discussion of image making between 234 and 237 is primarily an introduction to a range of problems that must be solved before the final definition can begin. As we shall see in returning to the Statesman later, there is a similar relation between the initial definition of statesmanship terminating at 276E and the final definition beginning at 287B. The former discloses issues that must be faced before a successful definition can be initiated, whereas the final definition begins afresh once these issues have been resolved.
3.7 The Final Definition Immediately before entering into the series of divisions leading to the final definition, the Stranger describes the method ( ! ": 265A2) they are about to follow. They are to “cut the Kind they have laid down into two” (56 5; # !L : 264D10–E1), “always following the right-hand part of the cut” ( 3! ) ) % ! : 264E1–2). In this manner, they are to hold onto characteristics in which the sophist partakes, until they have stripped off ( : 264E3) all he has in common with other things. This will leave behind “his own proper nature” ( ( . . . 3 : 264E3– 265A1). The proper nature of the sophist is revealed in the ensuing set of divisions (Figure 3.5), as summarized in the Stranger’s final speech (268C8–D4). This description stresses two methodological guidelines that for the most part have been observed through the Sophist. One is that division should be dichotomous. As indicated by a quick review of Figures 3.2 through 3.5, division in this dialogue has been dichotomous without exception. The other guideline calls for making cuts along the right as the series of successive divisions progresses. Although this guideline is observed for the most part, two exceptions have been pointed out earlier in our discussion. One is shown in Figure 3.3(b), where division both of selling one’s own products and of selling products made by others
Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist
71
continues in both leftward and rightward directions. The other exception is evident in Figure 3.4, where purification is further divided along both the right and the left. In the context of the Sophist, at least, it appears that the norm of dichotomous division is the more strict of the two methodological requirements. As already noted in Chapter 1, both guidelines remain in place up through 276E of the Statesman. But both are set aside in the final definition of statesmanship, as we shall see in Chapter 6. Before returning to the Statesman, however, we should consider a further indication of the relative unimportance of the right-hand requirement. The Kind said to be laid down at 264E1, of course, is that of art, which immediately thereafter is divided into productive and acquisitive. This division of art serves as the beginning of all definitions in this dialogue save that of the noble sophist. Let us combine these definitions in the following fashion (Figure 3.6).
art productive
acquisitive conquest
exchange
human
(II, III, IV) copy
appearance
selling (IV) own (III, IV)
imitation
retail
(II, III) others’
open
stealth
pugnacious
living
(II) wholesale
verbal
land
water
tame
fish
(II, III, IV) semblance
mental
private
insincere
learning
expert
private (= sophist VII)
virtue (= sophists II,III,IV)
persuasion striking
profit (= sophist V)
private
day
hire
below (= angler)
improvement (= sophist I)
figure 3.6. Overview of seven definitions.
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This diagram shows that when these several lines of division are collected together, it is arbitrary to view any one of them as proceeding exclusively in the right-hand direction. The divisions leading to the angler are rightmost in Figure 3.6 as it stands. But a mirror-image reversal would put sophist VII in that supposedly privileged position. Moreover, if the schema is reconfigured to bring sophist I to the right, all the other definitions involve leftward divisions. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for sophists II through V. This duly observed, we should be prepared for the abandonment of the right-hand requirement when we return for a close look at division in the Statesman.
4 Collection Yields to Illustrative Paradigms
4.1 Platonic Uses of the Term Use of in the standard sense of example can be found throughout the corpus. In the Apology, Socrates suggests that the oracle’s pronouncement about none surpassing him in wisdom is a matter of singling him out as an example ( : 23B1) to illustrate the wisdom of recognizing one’s own ignorance. In the Phaedrus, he cites his speeches on love as providing an example ( : 262D1) of how a knowledgeable orator can mislead his audience; in the Philebus, he alludes to examples ( : 13C8) of pleasures being at odds with one another; and so forth. While there is nothing idiosyncratic about Plato’s use of in the sense of example, there is another use of the term in several middle and late dialogues that is distinctly Platonic. For example, Socrates declares in the Republic that the philosophic rulers shall look upon the Form of the Good as a pattern ( : 540A9) for the right ordering of the state. At Theaetetus 176E3, he speaks of patterns (J ) of happiness and misery as making a stand in reality. Timaeus, in his namesake dialogue, identifies “patterns that are intelligible and always the same” ( . . . # ) ) % $ : 48E5–6). And the youthful Socrates, at Parmenides 132D1–2, expresses confidence in Forms as patterns ( ) fixed in nature. As each passage makes clear in its own way, the term in this second sense serves as an alternative designation for Forms or Ideas. But even this sense is not entirely novel. Inasmuch as Forms can be thought of as
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ideal exemplars, this second sense amounts to an extension of another common use of the term as pattern or model. A third and apparently novel sense of the term emerges in the Sophist and the Statesman. In neither of the more familiar senses just mentioned is the term’s meaning directly bound up with the dialectical process. Examples are employed in the procedure of collection, to be sure, but use of the term in the sense of example is not limited to that employment. And although knowledge of ideal exemplars can be understood as the aim of dialectic, the term carries the sense of pattern or model in many other contexts as well. In this third sense of , on the other hand, to serve as a paradigm ipso facto is to be involved in dialectical procedure. Let us label this the “dialectical sense” of the term. While the dialectical sense of is found only in the Sophist and the Statesman, moreover, different patterns of use prevail within the two dialogues. As detailed in section 4.2, the Sophist contains three uses in this special sense, along with three other occurrences with the common meaning either of model or of example. In the Statesman,1 by contrast, there are more than a dozen occurrences, in all of which the term carries the dialectical sense. The primary task of this chapter is to gain a clear overview of the role of paradigms in the dialectical method employed in the Statesman. One thing we shall find in the process is that the method of dialectic practiced in the Statesman differs substantially from its counterpart in the Sophist. The major difference, in a nutshell, is that the role played by collection in the earlier dialogue is taken over in the later by the use of paradigms. To prepare ourselves for an examination of this shift in procedures, we turn next to the role played by paradigms in the method of the Sophist.
4.2 Paradigms Augmenting Collection in the Sophist Having undertaken to define the nature of the sophist, the Stranger proposes trying out the method he intends to use on some lesser subject that will serve as a paradigm ( : 218D9). In the definition of angling that ensues, as we have seen, the Stranger begins with a 1
Differences in meaning aside, the term appears in a majority of Plato’s dialogues. Not surprisingly, the longer dialogues tend to have more occurrences (e.g., seventeen in the Laws, fifteen in the Republic). The largest number of appearances per page, however, is scored by the Statesman, with one occurrence on the average in every four pages (the Timaeus is next, with one in six).
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distinction between productive and acquisitive arts and with a survey of specific arts within the latter class – fighting, hunting, and trading, along with learning. This survey constitutes a collection over the acquisitive arts (see section 2.3) in which angling will show up as another member. The term occurs a second time in this sequence at 221C5, where the Stranger suggests that they follow the paradigm of the angler, which has just been completed, and proceed by looking into the nature of the sophist himself. As the Stranger observes to his evident satisfaction, the angler and the sophist share a number of features in common. The first definition of sophistry then proceeds with the division of animals hunted by land into wild and tame and pursues the latter branch to its (ultimately unsuccessful) conclusion. There are various things to note about this choice of angling as a paradigm for sophistry. One is that it is indeed a paradigm in the dialectical sense, as distinct from an example or an ideal pattern. Although angling and sophistry are both examples of acquisitive art, angling is not an example of sophistry as such. Nor is angling in any sense an ideal which the sophist might approximate. As the Stranger makes clear, the point of adopting the angler as a paradigm is to enable a trial run of the dialectical method to be used thereafter in defining the sophist. The paradigmatic relation between angling and sophistry, in brief, is entirely dependent on the dialectical context. This ties in with another aspect of the relation between angling and sophistry that is emphasized by the Stranger in introducing the paradigm. Compared with sophistry, angling is a trivial (3 : 218D8) calling. This is enough to ensure that angling is not an example of sophistry. If it were, it would not be trivial, inasmuch as sophistry is very important ( 6 : 218E3). Being unimportant ( : 218E3) as it is, moreover, angling cannot relate to sophistry as an ideal to be approximated. One thing that goes radically wrong with the initial definition of statesmanship in the next dialogue, we recall, is that it relies implicitly on the model of a divine shepherd who nurtures his flock. The hazards of inflated models like this, we are given to understand at Statesman 278E, can be avoided by choosing paradigms that are small ( : 278E6) and insignificant ( : 278E8). To repeat, angling is not a paradigm for sophistry in the manner of providing an example or model. Angling is a paradigm, rather, in providing the topic of a dialectical examination illustrating how the sophist should be examined in turn. As we shall see presently, the paradigm of angling in the Sophist serves much the same role as the paradigm of weaving in
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the Statesman. Both provide dialectical guidelines for the examination of the more important topics that follow. Another thing to note about the paradigm of angling is that it functions in cooperation with the process of collection rather than in any way replacing it. As we have seen, the definition of the angler’s art itself begins with a collection over the field of acquisitive arts in general. The dialectical procedure illustrated with the help of this paradigm incorporates a collection of the sort called for in the Phaedrus. As might be expected, the same cooperative interaction between paradigm and collection is involved in getting the subsequent definition of the genuine sophist underway. Chapter 2 laid out the details of the collection leading to the successful definition of sophist VII. By way of summary, the collection consists of the Stranger’s identification of five distinct forms of acquisitive sophistry and his observation that all five engage in the production of images. Another paradigm ( : 233D3) comes into play in the latter stage of this collection. The paradigm in this case is that of someone who professes the ability to produce all things by a single skill. As far as the paradigm itself is concerned, the relevant skill is illustrated by the painter who can reproduce anything in graphic form. Guided by the paradigm of artful imitation, the Stranger dubs the skill in question “the art of image making” ( ( 5 : 235B8–9) and proceeds to trace out the sort of image-making practiced by the sophist specifically. Here again we find a paradigm cooperating with the process of collection. In the first case, a collection over acquisitive arts initiated the paradigmatic definition of the angler. And in the present case, we have a paradigm playing an integral role in a collection over forms of sophistic image making. In light of the replacement of collection by use of paradigms in the subsequent dialogue, to which we turn presently, it is noteworthy that this development is not foreshadowed in the Sophist. There are three other occurrences of the term in the Sophist, none carrying a sense relating it directly to dialectic procedure. This despite the fact that one occurrence appears in the context of a collection underway. As a preliminary step in defining the “sophist of noble descent,” the Stranger lists various arts involved in separation – filtering, straining, winnowing, and so forth – leading Theaetetus to question the point of all these examples ( : 226C1). The Stranger’s response is that all are forms of dividing, whereupon he groups them under the general label “art of discrimination” (M : 226C8).
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This marshalling of examples, of course, serves as a collection providing direction to the subsequent process of division that culminates in an apparently successful definition of Socratic elenchus. Yet although each example contributes to the collection, none serves as a paradigm in the sense that angling is a paradigm for the art of sophistry. The remaining two occurrences are at 235D8, where the Stranger refers to an artist’s model as a , and at 251A7, where Theaetetus asks for a (example) of something remaining the same although called by different names. Neither of these latter is germane to dialectical procedure as such. By way of summary, three of the six occurrences of the term in the Sophist refer to paradigms of a sort capable of cooperating with collection in providing guidance to dialectical division. Given the way they are used, these paradigms show no sign of being able to replace collection in its dialectical role. A fourth occurrence conveys the standard sense of example. The examples in question (filtering, winnowing, etc.) contribute to an ongoing collection, but this role is incidental to the sense of the term. The remaining two occurrences are devoid of dialectical significance.
4.3 A Paradigm to Illustrate the Use of Paradigms Chapter 1 brought us to the end of the first attempt in the Statesman to arrive at a definition of the kingly art. When YS expresses satisfaction with the result (277A1–2), the Stranger points out that the account thus far, although superficially adequate, lacks the vividness of a finished product. The underlying problem is their assumption that the kingly art called for grandiose paradigms ( : 277B4), in this case that of a divine herdsman. A new paradigm is needed to direct their inquiry down a more auspicious path. In his response to YS’s request for an explanation of why the account is defective, the Stranger begins with an observation strongly reminiscent of recollection in the Meno, where the slave’s newly evoked beliefs are described as having a dreamlike (N $ : 85C9) quality. As the Stranger observes, when we venture as in a dream ( O $ : 277D3) to think we know everything, we wake up with the realization that we know nothing at all. This is why we cannot demonstrate such important things (as statesmanship) without use of paradigms ( : 277D1).
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When asked by YS what he means, the Stranger responds as follows: 277D9 277E
278A
278B
278C
Paradigm itself, my worthy fellow, for my part has need of a paradigm in turn. How so? Speak on, and don’t hold back for my sake. Speak I will, since you are so ready to follow. I suppose we realize that young children, when they are just becoming acquainted with the alphabet – What’s this? That they distinguish each letter well enough in the shortest and simplest syllables, and gain skill in perceiving what is true about them. How not? On the other hand, they are doubtful about the same letters in other syllables, and both judge and speak in error about them. Entirely so. So isn’t this the easiest and best way of leading them to what they don’t yet understand? What? Take them back first to the cases in which they were judging the same letters correctly. Having done that, then put these beside the syllables they do not yet recognize, and by comparison show the same structure equally present in both combinations – until ones that are judged correctly have been displayed next to all the unknown ones. Displayed to this end, the former become paradigms, and bring it about that each and every letter in all the syllables is called both different, insofar as different from the others, and the same, insofar as always the same and identical with itself. Altogether so. So have we not grasped this point sufficiently, that a paradigm comes into play whenever the same thing [as in the original case], correctly understood in another separate case and brought together [with the original case], yields a single true judgment for each as for both together? So it seems.
As is often the case in his discussions of methodology, Plato’s language here is highly elliptical. But the sense of the passage seems fairly clear.
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The recommended procedure begins with a situation in which certain letters are easily recognizable by the student in some contexts but not in others.2 Upon encountering an instance in which the student cannot recognize a letter’s occurrence in a given syllable, the teacher finds other occurrences of the same letter in syllables the student already knows how to spell. Showing the familiar in juxtaposition with the unfamiliar, the teacher indicates to the student their identical configuration. Successfully pursued, the result of this process is that the student’s ability to recognize this configuration in familiar contexts is transferred to contexts that were previously unfamiliar. The configuration in a familiar context serves as a paradigm by which its appearance in a novel case can be illuminated. Whereas the student before was able to make true judgments about its identity in familiar cases only, he or she now is capable of identifying it in the previously unfamiliar case as well. In the language of 278C, the student is now able to identify the letter in a single true judgment covering both cases together and each case individually. Prior ability to judge correctly in the paradigmatic case has been extended to a case in which it was previously lacking. To assist the learner in this way, needless to say, the teacher must be able to come up with paradigms the student will find helpful. This means that the teacher must know enough about the student’s situation to know which letters are causing difficulty. But it also requires knowing what familiar words or syllables would be appropriate for the learning task at hand. The teacher must be able to choose examples that will serve the student effectively as paradigms. What are the requirements for an effective paradigm? In the case of learning one’s letters, the requirements are relatively straightforward. Suppose that YS, at an even younger age, is having trouble recognizing the omega in the first syllable of , but knows how to spell his own name P. An obvious instructional tactic would be for the teacher to point out the first syllables of the two words together, indicating the occurrence of omega in each. One thing that 2
A parallel situation is envisioned in the final pages of the Theaetetus (207D–E), where Socrates and Theaetetus discuss the case of someone just learning to read and write who spells the same syllable sometimes with one letter and sometimes with another. An example mentioned is Theaetetus as a child spelling the first syllable of his name with a theta but the first syllable of ‘Theodorus’ with a tau. The point illustrated by the example is that an account consisting of an itemization of elements in a particular isolated case is not enough to turn true judgment into knowledge.
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makes the occurrence in his own name a suitable paradigm, of course, is its familiarity to the learner. Let us call this requirement (1). Another requirement is that the paradigmatic occurrence be comparable in nature to the occurrence of the letter causing difficulty. Allowing for differences in handwriting and the like, the two occurrences may not have identically the same configuration. But the paradigmatic occurrence at least must exhibit features that are typical of the letter in question. The paradigm need not have the same slant as the troublesome letter or be inscribed in the same medium with the same breadth of line. What is required is that the paradigm share features with the original letter that are responsible for both being inscriptions of the same letter. Requirement (2), in brief, is that a suitable paradigm share with the thing being learned salient features that are essential to the latter’s nature. Looking ahead to the topic of the next chapter, we can see that both requirements are instrumental in the choice of weaving as a paradigm for statesmanship at 279B. This choice is suitable not only because weaving presumably is more familiar to the audience than statesmanship itself (requirement (1)). Its suitability also rests on the fact that it involves an intertwining of contrasting components (warp and woof ) comparable to the statesman’s intertwining of courageous and well-behaved natures. Because intertwining of this sort is an essential part of both weaving and statesmanship, the paradigm of weaving meets the second requirement as well. To highlight the point, consider the case of a king who is given to providing entertainment for his people in the form of athletic contexts and who has become known for his knack of organizing panhellenic games. Inasmuch as this particular knack is not essential to kingship, however, the practice of organizing games would not serve as a suitable paradigm. When the Stranger casts about at 279A for a paradigm that involves the same undertakings ( : 279A8) as the statesman, we understand that he is looking for a comparable art that exhibits features substantially implicated in both.3 As it turns out, weaving not only involves an intertwining of disparate components of the sort essential to statesmanship, it exhibits other features that are essential to both arts as well. In particular, both are skills applied directly to their products, rather than contributing in some indirect fashion (see 281D11 for weaving, 287B7 for statesmanship). Other shared features are their use of 3
Sense II, 2 of C in “Middle Liddell” (1983) is “anything necessary or expedient” to an activity.
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contributory arts (281D10, 287B7) and their provision of services in the care of human society (passim). Another requirement, noted previously, is that the paradigm should be less significant than the primary topic of inquiry. This requirement (3) is not illustrated in the paradigm of the grammar student, but it is stressed both directly before (277B) and directly after (278E) the Stranger’s presentation of that paradigm. It was also emphasized, we recall, when dialectical paradigms were first introduced in the Sophist (218D–E); we shall encounter it again at Statesman 286B1–2.
4.4 The Importance of Verbal Paradigms There is yet a further requirement to be met by dialectical paradigms in particular. This requirement is briefly mentioned at 277C4–6 and then discussed at greater length at 285D10–286B2. Although the latter passage has attracted more attention among commentators, it is better for our purposes to begin with the former. The first passage comes immediately after the Stranger’s remark that the initial definition lacks the vividness sometimes achieved by pigments and the mixing of colors. As his next observation (277C4–6) makes clear, however, the present defect will not be remedied by means of more subtle portraiture as such. Here is that observation quoted in full: For those able to follow, it is more suitable to make every subject of depiction (6 )4 manifest by means of speech and discourse rather than by painting and manual crafts; although for others, manual crafts are more suitable.
The Stranger’s next speech contains the remark, cited at the beginning of the previous section, that the demonstration of very important things requires the use of paradigms. The speech at 277C4–6 says that discourse is the preferred way to exhibit things for those who can follow it. The subsequent speech says that it is hard to exhibit very important topics without using paradigms. Together, these passages convey the advice that verbal paradigms are required for the clarification of very important things – things with the stature of a king or statesman. This we can identify as requirement (4) for an effective paradigm. 4
The term 6 here is usually translated ‘animal’ or ‘living thing’. As indicated in LSJ (1968), however, in contexts of portraiture like painting and sculpture, the term can be synonymous with 3 , carrying the sense of figure or image generally. Thus the translation ‘subject of depiction’ at 277C4.
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Although there is nothing about dialectic as such in the paradigm of the grammar student, there are resonances in these passages that bring this philosophic enterprise to mind. First and foremost, the search for the statesman underway is a dialectical exercise, and we are told here that it requires the use of verbal paradigms. Verbal paradigms, for another thing, rely on competence in language, and the paradigm of the grammar students depicts someone in the process of gaining linguistic competence. We should not forget, moreover, that the characterization in the Sophist of the dialectician as someone capable of “dividing according to Kinds” ( '!: 253D1) was developed explicitly on the analogy of the art of grammar ( : 253A12). Inasmuch as YS was present at that earlier conversation, when the Stranger presents him with the paradigm of someone learning grammar in the current context it is not far-fetched to imagine him connecting that paradigm with his own situation as a learner of dialectic. In the longer discussion at 285D–286B, on the other hand, the connection with dialectic is explicit. In point of fact, this discussion follows immediately on the heels of the Stranger’s surprising revelation that the purpose of the dialogue is to produce better dialecticians. This passage also merits quotation in full. 285D10 But I think most people fail to notice that, on the one hand, some things are naturally provided with certain sensible 285E images that are easily understood, and not at all hard to point to when someone wants to give an easy demonstration 286A of these things to someone requiring an account that is uninvolved and free of language. For things that are greatest and most valuable, on the other hand, there is no image clearly evident to mankind, by display of which one might adequately resolve to satisfy the mind of an inquirer through means adapted to the senses. That is why we must exercise the ability to give and to receive an account ( ) of each thing. For the best and greatest things are incorporeal (* ), and can be clearly explained by discursive means (7) alone and none other. All we are saying now 286B is for their sake. In matters like this, however, it is always easier to practice with lesser than with greater things. The main distinction made in this passage is not hard to grasp. It has to do with the means available for explaining (demonstrating, setting forth; conveyed by ! at 285E4 and " at 286A7) certain topics,
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and in particular with the availability of sensible likeness. On one hand are topics easily illustrated by sensible images available in the normal course of events. Because images of this sort themselves are easy to grasp, they provide explanatory paradigms responsive to the needs of learners unequipped to follow complicated verbal accounts. On the other hand are topics for which sensible images are not naturally available and which hence cannot be explained “by means adapted to the senses” (# . !* : 286A3). Among such things are subjects that are “best and greatest” ( . . . ) : 286A5–6), which accordingly can be explained by discursive means alone. Because of the importance of these incorporeal subjects, the Stranger continues, we must exercise our ability both to give and to understand discursive explanations. All we are saying now – the present conversation ( % : 286A7) – is aimed at practicing this activity. By way of afterthought, the Stranger returns to a familiar theme in remarking that practice of this sort is always easier when we chose discourse “about lesser rather than greater things” ( C / ) 6: 286B1–2) for our verbal paradigms. Although there is nothing initially puzzling about the distinction itself, Plato has left it obscure what topics are supposed to fall under either heading. Among likely topics that can be illustrated by sensible images, one can assume, are the alphabetical symbols the student is trying to master in the instructional sessions described at 277E–278C and alluded to at 285C. The paradigms used for such purposes are sensible instances of the same symbols the student already understands in more familiar combinations. Other such topics, perhaps, will be arts such as clothes mending, carding, and spinning, involved in the definition of weaving itself. Topics that are “best and greatest” and that accordingly do not admit perceptible paradigms, on the other hand, presumably include Forms like the Good, the Beautiful, and the Just. One might plausibly consider the account of the sun at Republic 507A–509D to be a paradigm for the Good.5 There should be some sense in which Diotima’s discourse in the Symposium serves as a paradigm for the Beautiful. And one would think that the discussion of justice-in-the-state found in the Republic constitutes an illustrative paradigm for Justice itself. A case closer to hand is the topic 5
The sense in which the account of the sun might count as a paradigm for the Good is that of the Statesman, not that of the Republic itself. We should not forget that the term as used in the Republic generally refers to “best and greatest” things per se, rather than to paradigms useful in understanding them. For example, the Good itself is said at 540A8–9 to be a paradigm for the right ordering of the state and its citizens.
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of sophistry, explicitly said to be greater than its paradigm at 218D9 of the previous dialogue. Then, of course, there is the case of the statesman. Here is a topic explicitly said to be of greatest importance ( at 278E8, the same term as at 286A6), with the seeming result that it cannot be demonstrated by easily understandable sensible likenesses. But for someone recently confounded by the disclosure at 285D that the present conversation is not primarily about statesmanship, the status of this topic might seem to be less than crystal clear. Not only does statesmanship appear to have been upstaged by the topic of dialectic,6 but moreover the Stranger has chosen weaving to serve as its paradigm. An apparent problem in this regard is that weaving is an activity open to inspection by the senses. If statesmanship indeed is among things that are “greatest and most valuable” (285E4), then how could it have “sensible likenesses that are easily understood” (285D11–E1)? The problem, however, is only apparent. Merely having sensible likenesses does not ensure that these likenesses are useful in demonstrating the thing in question. The Stranger’s distinction in this passage is not just between things that are outstandingly important and things that have sensible likenesses. It is instead between things that have sensible images that can be pointed to by way of providing easy explanations and other things that can be explained only with the help of verbal accounts.7 Although the latter nonetheless might have sensible likenesses (the sun is said to be the 6
7
Inasmuch as dialectical skill is explicitly identified with philosophy at Sophist 253E4–5, it may also appear that philosophy has replaced statesmanship as the main topic of the dialogue. This runs counter to a common reading of the opening conversation according to which the philosopher is set aside for a subsequent conversation between older and younger Socrates (which happens never to have been written). As a careful reading of the opening will indicate, however, although the elder Socrates said he would converse with YS on another occasion, he does not say that philosophy would be the topic. Theodorus’ first speech suggests that the Stranger himself would deal with both the statesman and the philosopher, and there is no apparent reason why both might not be dealt with on equal footing within the same dialogue. In “Plato on the Undepictable” (op. cit., p. 360), Owen states that “the dichotomy of depictable-undepictable is drawn within the range of things that can be explained, that have a logos.” This seems at odds with the text. The Stranger refers at 285D9–E4 to things with sensible images that can be pointed to when someone wants an explanation (demonstration) that is free of language (5) "), and goes on in the very next passage to contrast such things with other things that are greatest and most valuable and that can be explained only by a verbal account ( at 286A4, 7 at 286A6). The dichotomy is drawn within the range of things that can be demonstrated and comes down to a distinction between things that can be explained (through sensible images) without logos and things that can be explained only with logos.
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likeness of the Good at Republic 506E4), such things cannot be explained merely by drawing those likenesses to someone’s attention (looking at the sun does not explain the Good). Such things are likely to be both incorporeal and of utmost worth as well. Again, however, the distinction does not hinge on their incorporeality or relative worth, but on the fact that they are explainable only by discursive means. Returning to the sensible status of weaving with this in mind, we see that the visibility of the activity chosen as a paradigm for statesmanship is largely irrelevant. The dialectician could not simply point to someone engaged in weaving, without commentary or discussion, and expect much help in explaining the nature of the statesman’s art. To be sure, the activities of weaving are like those of statecraft in many relevant ways (279A7–8). This is what makes weaving a suitable paradigm for statesmanship in dialectical inquiry. But these activities must be described in a certain manner to be of any use for dialectical purposes. Strictly speaking, it is the discursive account of weaving that provides the paradigm to be followed in pursuing the definition of statesmanship, rather than the (observable) activity of weaving itself. This is why we must exercise our ability to give and to receive verbal accounts. For things that are “greatest and best” can be explained only by discursive means. It is for the sake of such things, the Stranger says, that the present dialogue is being conducted (286A7). The art of statecraft most certainly is included among these superlative things. When the Stranger and YS return to the definition of this art at 287B, their eventual success is due to the availability of a discursive account of weaving as a paradigm.
4.5 Paradigms and Necessary Conditions The Stranger’s remark at 277D, that demonstration of very important things requires the use of paradigms, is followed by an image likening a self-deceiving lack of knowledge to a dreamlike state. As he puts it, whereas we seem to know everything in a dreamlike way, when awake we seem to know nothing at all. This image in turn leads directly into the account of the grammar student that is intended to illustrate the use of paradigms. The student initially is able to recognize a given letter in familiar syllables (the paradigms) but not in others. The role of paradigms in this account is to help the student arrive at true judgment (! : 278C6) in cases that were initially unfamiliar and eventually achieve knowledge ( : 277D7) in that regard.
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At the beginning of section 4.3, it was suggested that the grammar student’s initial dreamlike state can be likened to the dreamlike awareness of the slave boy in the Meno following his questioning by Socrates. As a result of this questioning, the boy has been led to true judgments (!' : 85C7) regarding the relation between the area of a given square and that of a square on its diagonal, but has not yet reached a state of knowledge. These judgments at present have a dreamlike quality (N $ : 85C9). But as Socrates points out, if questions like those he has been asking are put to the boy repeatedly in the future, the latter will end up knowing (: 85D1) that topic as accurately as anyone. It is in this sense, Socrates tells Meno, that the retrieval of knowledge within oneself amounts to recollection ( !: ; 85D7). In the Statesman, the learner’s dreamlike state gives way to knowledge as a result of the effective use of paradigms. In the Meno, progression from a dreamlike state to a state of knowledge is achieved by means of recollection. Substantially different as they are in other respects, the use of paradigms and the process of recollection play roughly equivalent roles in their respective contexts.8 Both incline the student’s mind in the direction of knowledge. Recollection is linked with collection in turn within the context of Socrates’ palinode in the Phaedrus. As observed in Chapter 2, the first mention of collection comes at Phaedrus 249B7–C1, where it is described as a matter of “going from many perceptions to a unity” brought together by reasoning (section 2.2). This process of understanding, Socrates says, is a recollection ( : 249C2) of things previously perceived by the soul while in the company of a god. In a subsequent mention of collection in the Phaedrus, it is explicitly paired with division (266B4) and said to be the business of dialecticians (266C1). Socrates’ apparent identification of collection with recollection at 249C2, of course, must be understood with substantial qualification. One major difference between them is that collection is not bound up with a preexisting soul as is recollection. This and other differences aside, however, both processes situate the mind in a position conducive to the onset of knowledge. With respect to their status as methodological aids, the role played by recollection in the Meno and the Phaedrus is comparable to that played by collection in the Sophist. 8
Kato (1995), p. 167, relates these two passages by observing that the dream metaphor is used in both “in exactly the same way, i.e., to describe the acquisition of a true belief as that of knowledge in a dream.”
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In this brief review of passages discussed previously, we see distinct methodological overlaps between recollection in the Meno and the use of paradigms in the Statesman, on one hand, and between recollection in the Meno and collection in the Sophist on the other. As far as the overlap between collection and the use of paradigms is concerned, moreover, we have found both processes working cooperatively in the Sophist (section 4.2). Each in its own context, the process of recollection, the procedure of collection, and the use of paradigms play very similar roles in philosophic inquiry. Let us attempt to pin down precisely what these three methodological operations have in common. For one thing, none is capable by itself of bringing an inquiry to completion. This is clear with both collection and the use of paradigms. The collection performed by the Stranger over different varieties of sophistry reveals that all employ an art of production, but this does not constitute a definition of the authentic sophist. To bring the paradigm of weaving to bear in the Statesman, similarly, is only the beginning of a successful inquiry into the statesman’s art. A further procedure is needed to complete the inquiry in both cases, consisting of a stagewise division according to relevant Forms. The status of recollection in this regard is more ambiguous. Whereas both collection and the marshalling of paradigms are followed by a subsequent series of divisions, Plato seems not to have thought of recollection itself as part of a two-stage procedure. Strictly speaking, recollection is not a methodological technique in the first place but rather a way of explaining how inquiry (learning) can arrive at a successful conclusion. The only demonstration of recollection in the dialogues is found in the interaction between Socrates and the slave boy, and in this instance the interchange between teacher and learner appears essential. The part of the process that involves a two-stage procedure is the conduct of this interaction rather than recollection itself. As illustrated in the slave-boy sequence, the teacher’s first task is to relieve the learner’s mind of false belief, something accomplished by the process of elenchus (the business of sophist VI). This is followed by a process of calculated questioning, leading first to true opinion and eventually to knowledge.9 Recollection 9
This process of questioning itself seems to involve two stages, neither of which Plato provided with an explicit designation. First comes the series of questions leading the subject to true opinion, which is the only stage illustrated in the Meno. The next stage is that leading finally to knowledge, which involves putting questions to the subject “on the same topics” ( %: 85C10–11) repeatedly and in various ways. The translation “on the same topics” here seems preferable over the standard “the same questions,”
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is not complete, presumably, until knowledge has been achieved. According to the Meno, however, recollection is also required to reach a state of true opinion (85C). The reason recollection by itself is not capable of producing knowledge is that the deft guidance of a teacher is required to lead it through these several steps to a successful conclusion. A second feature the use of paradigms shares with recollection in the Meno and collection in the Sophist is its function of guiding the inquiry it supports to a successful conclusion. As far as recollection is concerned, an effective teacher must make sure that the recall achieved in response to the initial set of questions prepares the learner’s mind to be receptive to subsequent disclosures. With regard to collection in the Sophist, the purpose of surveying diverse types of acquisitive sophistry is to redirect the inquiry to the forms of productive art that are typical of sophistry in general. And in the case of the Statesman, to which we return presently, we have seen in Chapter 1 that a new beginning is needed in the search for the statesman’s art that has been led astray by the initial paradigm of the nurturing shepherd. For the search to be resumed in a fruitful manner, it must be brought under the guidance of a more suitable paradigm. For present purposes, however, the most instructive feature shared by these three aids to inquiry is the following. In one manner or another, each draws on an initially incoherent (dreamlike) apprehension of the subject matter at hand, which it then marshals into a form enabling the inquiry to conclude with articulate knowledge. Let us recall how this works with recollection in the Phaedrus. In the part of his palinode tying collection to recollection, Socrates observes that a person’s humanity requires an ability to grasp things according to Forms, “going from many perceptions to a unity brought together by reasoning” (249B7–C1). The perceptions mentioned here are subsequently identified as sensible likenesses (Q : 250A6) or images (( : 250B5) of Forms the mind has perceived previously. In the case of many Forms, these likenesses are too obscure to be recognizable for what they are. One exception Socrates notes is the case of Beauty, our original vision of which was sufficiently bright that we can see it reflected in its sensible manifestations. In any case, Socrates says (250A), the soul is left to recollect the Forms on the basis of their sensible inasmuch as it is hard to see how repeating literally the same questions would have any beneficial effect. In this case, other problems involving incommensurables might qualify as included among the same topics. This seems to tie in with Socrates’ remark at 81D1–4 that all nature is akin and that when a man has recalled a single thing nothing prevents him from discovering all the rest.
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images. Recollection thus is a matter of proceeding from indistinct images in the sensible world to a renewed grasp of original Forms that is fully distinct. Collection in the Sophist begins in a similar manner with an indistinct apprehension of the relevant subject matter. To see how, consider the collection that leads into the final definition of sophistry. Having completed the practice definition of angling, the Stranger generates five separate characterizations of acquisitive sophistry. Each being different from the others, no depiction among them applies to sophistry in general. To make a start on a comprehension characterization, the Stranger helps Theaetetus see that each of these separate practices involves the production of images. At this point, the process of division takes over and leads eventually to a definition that isolates sophistry in general from other forms of image making. This final definition characterizes sophistry in terms of features that are both necessary (individually) and sufficient (collectively) for being a practitioner of the art in question. The contribution of collection to this achievement is to make explicit features that all types of sophistry have in common – features that are necessary for being a sophist. To accomplish this, the Stranger has to assemble a set of typical examples (the five acquisitive sophists) represented in verbal form. One cannot assemble a set of typical examples, however, without knowing something already about the subject being investigated. One must have some prior awareness of what a sophist is to ensure that only sophists are included in the set. The business of collection is to convert this preanalytic awareness into a form (the exhibition of necessary conditions) that can direct the inquiry toward its end of fully articulated knowledge (the final definition). What collection accomplishes, in brief, is a rendering in more explicit form of something the mind recognizes already in a less coherent manner. This is the respect in which collection is comparable to recollection in the Phaedrus. Each in its own way, both processes yield a more focused apprehension of something perceived previously in less distinct form. This brings us back to the primary concern of the present chapter. As part of our discussion of the paradigm of the language learner in section 4.3, several requirements were laid out for an effective paradigm. One is that in order to be suitable as an aid in a particular inquiry, a paradigm must exhibit features that are intrinsic to the subject being investigated. The suitability of weaving as a paradigm for statesmanship accordingly hinges on the fact that both arts involve the intertwining of contrasting elements. As the intertwining of warp and woof is essential to weaving, so
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an essential feature of statecraft is its interweaving of vigorous and gentle natures. Weaving thus exhibits an intrinsic feature that is necessary to the kingly art as well. Bringing necessary conditions to bear in this manner, the paradigm of the weaver in the Statesman plays a dialectical role very similar to that of collection in the Sophist. The main difference between the two lies in their employment of illustrative cases. This difference involves both (1) the number of cases and (2) the nature of the illustrations chosen. Collection in the Sophist begins with an assembling of (1) a plurality of instances and ends with the articulation of a feature those instances share in common. In the example we have been discussing, the instances assembled are (2) all cases of sophistry (sophists I through V), and the feature articulated (production) is essential to sophistry as such. The method of paradigm in the Statesman, on the other hand, employs (1) a single illustrative case, which is (2) an instance of something other than statesmanship itself. Although different from the topic being investigated, however, the illustrative case of weaving exhibits features that are essential to the subject of inquiry. In a sense, the use of paradigms is more “expeditious” than that of collection. What collection accomplishes with a survey of several instances, the method of paradigm accomplishes with only one. Both procedures serve as conceptual lenses, so to speak, by which the mind’s preanalytic awareness of the subject being investigated is focused into a more fully articulate form. In both procedures, moreover, the articulate grasp of the subject that results exhibits features that are essential to the thing in question. But whereas in collection this more explicit grasp involves something like what we call induction,10 in the other method it is accomplished with the choice of the paradigm itself. By way of summary, we have seen that the use of paradigms in the Statesman joins recollection and collection as aids to dialectical inquiry. Each of the three processes transforms an awareness of the subject matter that is initially obscure into a form of articulate knowledge. As collection seems to have replaced recollection in the Phaedrus, moreover, so the use of paradigms in the Statesman seems to have replaced collection in 10
Plato has no noun corresponding to our ‘induction’. The term used by Aristotle in this regard carries the sense of magical inducement for Plato (e.g., Republic 364C4, Laws 933D7). Interestingly enough, the one place Plato uses the term in a methodological sense is Statesman 278A5, in the Stranger’s remark that the method of paradigm he is about to introduce is the best way of leading ( ) learners of language to knowledge.
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turn. At any rate, collection plays no explicit role after the introduction of the weaver paradigm at Statesman 279B. The last occurrence of " as a term for collection occurs at the end of the paradigm illustrating the use of paradigms, with the Stranger’s remark that a paradigm comes into play whenever familiar and unfamiliar cases of the same thing are brought together (" 5!L : 278C5) yielding a single true judgment in either case. Our next task is to examine the role of the paradigm of weaving in the continuing investigation of the statesman’s art.
5 The Weaver Paradigm
5.1 Antecedents to the Paradigm of Weaving Having illustrated the use of paradigms with the modest example of their use in learning letters, the Stranger returns to the task of defining statesmanship. What they need to do next, he tells YS, is to bring a paradigm to bear in grasping the nature of “looking after those in the city” ( . ! : 278E9). In this way, that nature will become present to them “in a waking state instead of a dream”(2 & I : 278E10) – a clear allusion to the dreamlike state said at 277D1–4 to be remedied by the use of paradigms. A chronic problem with previous efforts to define statesmanship in the dialogue was an inability to distinguish it from a host of similar skills. At 268C2 there is reference to myriads of skills that lay claim to the title “rearer of the human herd,” several of which are specified at 267E7–8. According to 275B, this problem was one reason for introducing the Myth of Cronus. The reader is encouraged initially to think that the problem has been resolved, under the influence of the myth, by the replacement of herd rearing ( ) by herd keeping ( ) in the definition. Such at least appears to be the sense of the Stranger’s remark at 276B7–C2 that statesmanship has better claim than any other skill to providing civic care ( at 276B7, approximate synonym for according to 275E5–6). When the search for a definition takes up again at 279A, however, it turns out that the problem remains unresolved. For as the Stranger says there, we must return to the matter of myriads challenging kingship for “the role of caring for cities” ( ) : 279A2). It is precisely to separate kingship from these many contenders, the Stranger 92
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declares, that a paradigm other than herd keeping is needed. After YS’s perfunctory agreement, the Stranger poses the following questions: 279A7
279B
So what really small-scale paradigm, with the same business ( ) as statesmanship, can be set beside it so that we might satisfactorily gain what we are looking for? By Zeus, Socrates, does this suit you – if we don’t have another ready at hand, then what if we were to choose the art of weaving?
Just as the paradigm employed in learning letters was a familiar symbol juxtaposed to an unfamiliar instance, so the Stranger is looking for a kindred art with which statesmanship in turn can be compared. In accord with the requirements laid out in the previous chapter, this kindred art must be initially more familiar than statesmanship (requirement (1)), must involve the same “business” (share essential features; requirement (2)), and must be less significant than statesmanship itself (requirement (3)). The final requirement (4) is that the paradigm be verbally expressed, as distinct from something that can be grasped entirely by sensible means. The stage now is set for the deployment of the paradigm of weaving. This seemingly casual introduction of the weaver paradigm should not be read as an inspiration of the moment of the part of the Stranger. The mild oath # M that goes with it is reminiscent of the same expression at Sophist 253C7, where the Stranger pretends to have “stumbled unawares” on the “free man’s” (the philosopher’s) knowledge. Just as it would be incongruous to suppose that the author intended his Eleatic protagonist to be genuinely surprised by this encounter in the Sophist, so we should understand the introduction in the Statesman of the weaver paradigm as a carefully planned move in the project of defining statesmanship. In point of fact, there are reasons for thinking that the parallels between weaving and statesmanship had been on Plato’s mind for some time before writing this passage into the present dialogue. A background consideration is that weaving counts among Plato’s favorite examples of the arts and crafts, making roughly two dozen appearances before the Eleatic dialogues. Whereas in most of these earlier contexts it functions merely as an instance of a practical skill,1 however, in the 1
A possible exception is at Phaedo 87B–C, where Cebes raises an objection against one of Socrates’ arguments for immortality in which a cloak is analogous to the human body and its weaver analogous to the soul. Here the product of weaving and its use function as a key analogy in the argument and not as a mere example.
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Statesman it is elevated to a central role in the dialectical process underway. The nature of its role as illustrative paradigm should be more or less familiar, having been considered at length in the previous chapter. What may be less apparent are various subtle ways in which the art of weaving was being groomed for this role in the earlier conversation between the Stranger and Theaetetus. One of the more frequently discussed passages in the Sophist is 259E4– 6, the upshot of which is that discourse (Q ) owes its existence to “the weaving together of Forms with one another” ( . (. " ). This remark clearly applies to discourse in general. A similar remark a few pages later pertains to particular instances. In preparing to address the problem of truth and falsity in speech and judgment, the Stranger observes that the simplest sentences (e.g., “man learns” at 262C8) result from a combination (" : 262C6) of names and verbs. This observation is repeated at 262D4, where he says that speech accomplishes its results by “weaving together verbs and names” (" H ' I ). These remarks illustrate an underlying theme of the Sophist to the effect that speech, on whatever level of generality, depends on the weaving together of appropriate constituents. In this connection, we should recall that the stated goal of that dialogue is “to bring to light in a clear statement” ( 6 7: 218C1) what the sophist is. The goal of the present dialogue, of course, is to do the same for the statesman. Inasmuch as the purpose of both dialogues is to accomplish something through discourse, and inasmuch as discourse accomplishes its results by weaving together appropriate elements of speech, the ability of either dialogue to achieve its goal depends on success in this weaving process. A weaving of sorts thus is deeply implicated in the project of the Statesman before its first explicit mention at 279B2. Another notable appearance of the term " in the Sophist comes at 268C6, where the Stranger calls for a “plaiting together” (" R ) of the various features contributing to the definition of sophistry. Once these features have been woven together in a clear description, the task of the dialogue has been accomplished. Not only is the project of dialectical definition dependent on a kind of weaving for its initial feasibility, as noted previously, but a kind of weaving is also involved in bringing it to completion. Taken together, these observations suggest that when Plato was looking around for a paradigm to illustrate the kind of blending skill involved in genuine statesmanship, the art of weaving was close at hand. Weaving
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is an art that had already been put to work (metaphorically) in describing key aspects of dialectical procedure. And because the primary purpose in undertaking a dialectical definition of statesmanship was to make participants in the conversation better dialecticians (285D), nothing would be more suitable as an illustrative paradigm than an art that could be used to elucidate both statecraft and dialectic at the same time. Interestingly enough, the term G and its derivatives, which comprise the vocabulary most often used for weaving in the Statesman, do not appear in that role in the Sophist. Expressions used for this purpose in the earlier dialogue, as indicated earlier, stem from the nearsynonym " instead. Terminological overlap between the dialogues is established by the not infrequent appearance of expressions based on " in the Statesman as well. For example, weaving is describing at 281A3 as a sort of intertwining (" ); and at 282D5, the term " is used explicitly as an equivalent of G .2 This terminological overlap suggests that, in the author’s mind at least, (a) the combination of nouns and verbs (from the Sophist), (b) the blending of strong and mild characters (from the Statesman), and (c) the intertwining of warp and woof are different species of the same generic art. While reflecting on the sources of Plato’s main paradigm in the Statesman, we should also consider the literary precedent provided by Aristophanes’ Lysistrata. Written during the political turmoil following the disastrous defeat of the Athenean fleet at Syracuse, this play depicts an effort by the women of Athens, under the leadership of Lysistrata, to instruct certain male authorities on ways to unify the city and to arrange peace with Sparta. The women’s strategy is described in the language of wool working, calling both for cleansing the raw material (the populace) of sheep dung and burrs (political intrigues and demagogues) and for fashioning a final product serving all members of the polis. The comedy of the plot plays on a contrast between the martial skills of the men and the weaving skills of the women, as Lysistrata and her crew connive to replace the former by the latter in affairs of state. Comparison of the Statesman with the Lysistrata can be illuminating, with regard to both differences and similarities. One instructive difference is that the Statesman not only is devoid of sexual politics but
2
Other occurrences are the noun " used in reference to kingly weaving at 306A1 and 308E2, along with the verb " " at 306A2. Further, at 309E10 we find " referring to the weaving of courageous and moderate characters, along with " at 309B7.
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moreover portrays weaving in a manner that appears to be genderneutral.3 Although Plato certainly was aware of the stereotype associating women with weaving (Republic 455C), this preconception apparently was set aside in his choice of weaving as a paradigm for statecraft.4 Despite this and other differences, however, a striking similarity between the treatments of weaving by Aristophanes and Plato is the amount of attention each pays to technical detail.5 In the Lysistrata, the details in question correspond to particular steps needed to unify a shattered polis – eliminate impurities from the raw material, recognize the resources of the colonies, produce a social fabric serving all citizens (lines 574ff.), and so forth. Plato’s treatment in the Statesman, on the other hand, incorporates details corresponding to specific skills and functions implicated in governing a state. A particularly interesting aspect of Plato’s description of weaving is its incorporation of a substantial number of neologisms referring to specific technical skills. These occur mainly between 280C and 281B, in connection with the Stranger’s first definition of weaving after introducing the paradigm. We shall look at these neologisms in detail when we turn to a detailed examination of the definition of weaving in section 5.4.
5.2 Intermingling Paradigms When the Stranger observes at 277D that it is hard to demonstrate important things like statesmanship without using paradigms, YS asks what he means. The Stranger’s response is that paradigm itself stands in need of a paradigm. This leads to his account of how children are taught letters by using familiar cases as paradigms for comparison with unfamiliar cases. What stands in need of a paradigm initially is the use of paradigms in a dialectical definition of statesmanship. What responds to that need is a brief narrative about the use of paradigms in learning letters. Our present task is to pin down exactly the sense in which the use of paradigms in the narrative can serve as a paradigm for the dialectical use of paradigms. 3
4
5
Suppression of gender issues in the Statesman is consistent with the featured doctrine of the Republic that leadership roles should be open to both men and women. A useful discussion of attempts to explain the dialogue’s gender-neutrality, with regard to weaving in particular, can be found in Lane (1998), pp. 167–69. It should be noted that although the Stranger insists that a paradigm should be of lesser value than the thing it illustrates (278E, 286A–B), he nowhere intimates that weaving is inferior to statesmanship for reasons specifically involving gender. This point is noted and developed at length in El Murr (2002), pp. 61–69, 70–75.
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There is a tendency among translators to render the term in this context as ‘example’.6 This tendency should be resisted. Not only is the term used consistently throughout the Statesman in a specifically dialectical sense (section 4.1), which is not that of example, but moreover the generic translation ‘example’ makes a muddle of the passages we are considering. The familiar appearance of a letter in the case of the learner is not an example of its unfamiliar appearance (although both are instances and hence “examples” of the same letter). Weaving, similarly, is not an example of statesmanship. And there is no directly apparent aspect of the story of the learner that is an example of the use of paradigms in the dialectical treatment of important topics like statesmanship. To serve as an example is a matter of exemplification; and the paradigms at work in the Statesman do not exemplify things they are used to illuminate. To arrive at a clear understanding of how paradigms function in this context, it will be helpful to distinguish the various paradigms involved. We start with the more obvious. Apart from the paradigm of shepherding (so-called at 275B5 and 277B4), the first paradigm introduced as such in the dialogue is that of the letter appearing in a familiar syllable. Let us refer to this as paradigm A. Paradigm A is used by a teacher to prompt recognition of the same letter appearing in an initially unfamiliar context. Its role is not one of exemplifying that latter appearance, but rather one of rendering that appearance familiar in turn. If the teacher is successful in using the paradigm for this purpose, the student’s capacity to make correct judgments about the paradigm will be extended to the initially unfamiliar appearance of the letter as well. The second paradigm so identified in this set of passages is that of weaving, which we may refer to as paradigm B. Paradigm B serves as a prototype exhibiting features that figure prominently in the definition of statesmanship that follows. In this role, it functions as a sort of model – not in the sense of a model ship that copies (replicates) features of an actual vessel, but more in the manner that a dress rehearsal models (simulates) the circumstances of a regular performance. Paradigm B provides the subject of a practice definition, much as angling served as the subject of a practice definition in the Sophist. Let us return to the Stranger’s assertion that paradigm itself stands in need of a paradigm. As the context makes clear, the need arises from 6
For example, Jowett, Fowler, Skemp, and Benardete, among others. Waterfield uses ‘illustration’, which is similarly problematic. Rowe’s ‘model’ is preferable to these others, if read in the sense of ‘model for’ rather than ‘model of ’.
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YS’s puzzlement about what the Stranger meant in saying that it is hard to demonstrate important things without using paradigms. The observation that paradigm itself needs a paradigm is an elliptical way of saying that a paradigm is needed for the use of paradigms in the dialectical treatment of statesmanship. What exactly is the paradigm the Stranger offers in response to that need? Obviously enough, the paradigm in question is contained in the story about how children learn letters. But just as obviously, the paradigm in question is not paradigm A as such. The paradigm of a letter in a familiar syllable is not a suitable paradigm for the dialectical use of paradigms. There is an important difference, however, between paradigm A itself – the familiar letter – and the use of that paradigm for the purpose of extending the student’s competence in recognizing letters generally. In introducing the story of the learner, the Stranger is setting up a paradigm for the use of paradigms in defining the statesman. The paradigm thus provided is that of the use of paradigm A in learning letters. Let us refer to this paradigm of a paradigm in use as paradigm C. Paradigm C, in short, is the paradigm offered for the use of paradigms in defining the statesman. Paradigm B is the paradigm for statesmanship proposed by the Stranger at 279B. At the beginning of section 5.1 we noted reasons for thinking that weaving is an adequate paradigm for that purpose. We have now seen that paradigm C is the paradigm offered for the use of paradigm B in the dialectical definition of statesmanship. Let us consider the further question of whether paradigm C is adequate for this purpose in turn. Taking our requirements for a suitable paradigm in order, we observe first that whereas many children are familiar with the use of paradigms in learning letters, relatively few people ever experience the use of paradigms in dialectic. Paradigm C thus is more familiar than the use of weaving as a paradigm in defining statesmanship. The second requirement is that a suitable paradigm should exhibit features that are essential to the topic it is intended to illuminate. An essential feature of the use of paradigms in defining statesmanship is that the paradigm can be set beside (compared with, ! at 279A8) the thing being studied, which is also an essential feature of paradigm C. A further desideratum in the choice of paradigms, stressed at 278E– 279A, is that a paradigm should be less significant than the thing it helps to demonstrate. The Stranger himself assures that this requirement has been met with his description of paradigm C as “small and partial” ( : 278E6) and with his stress at 277D1–2 on the importance of
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using paradigms in dialectical demonstrations. The remaining requirement is that paradigms used in demonstrating important topics like statesmanship should be in verbal form. Insofar as paradigm C is developed as part of an on-going conversation, this requirement is met as a matter of course. Paradigms A, B, and C are all referred to by the Stranger explicitly as paradigms (at 278B4, 287B2, and 278E7, respectively). There is another paradigm importantly at work in this context, however, which is not explicitly designated as such. This is the use of weaving as a paradigm for statesmanship, which serves as a paradigm for the use of paradigms in dialectical inquiry generally. Let us refer to this as paradigm D. We need to be clear about how D differs from the other paradigms identified previously. To repeat, paradigm A is a letter in a familiar syllable, which serves as a paradigm for the same letter in an unfamiliar context. This paradigm is brought to bear in the process of teaching and learning letters. Paradigm B is the art of weaving, which serves as a paradigm for the art of statesmanship. This paradigm is brought to bear in the process of defining the latter art. Paradigm C, in turn, is the use of A in the learning process, and this serves as a paradigm for the use of weaving as a paradigm in the definition of the statesman’s art. Paradigm A is used by the teacher in helping the student recognize letters. Paradigm B is used by the Stranger as a means of identifying features essential to statesmanship. Paradigm C is also used by the Stranger, but in this case as a guide for bringing B to bear. This brings us back to paradigm D. Under the guidance of paradigm C, the Stranger employs the paradigm B of weaving in his development of the definition of statesmanship. This employment of B in the dialectical definition of statesmanship is what we have designated paradigm D. Paradigm D serves as a paradigm for the use of paradigms in dialectical inquiry generally. But who uses D in this capacity? There are two answers to this question, depending on one’s perspective on the dialogue. From an internal perspective, paradigm D is used by the Stranger to provide instruction in the dialectical use of paradigms. This ties in directly with the disclosure at 285D that the purpose of the dialogue is not merely to define the art of statesmanship, but to make its participants better dialecticians. Put otherwise, the main purpose of the dialogue is to instruct YS and others present in the procedures of dialectical inquiry, using the specific project of defining statesmanship as an illustrative paradigm (paradigm D). To the extent that YS is able
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to grasp the details of the procedures involved in the illustration, he is making progress toward becoming a better dialectician. From an external perspective, in turn, paradigm D is being used by Plato himself. As pointed out in section 1.5, there is a sense in which careful readers of the dialogue are also participants in the ongoing conversation. With this sense in view, we understand that the purpose of the dialogue is to make better dialecticians not only of YS and others present but of readers seriously engaged with the dialogue as well. From this external perspective, accordingly, paradigm D is being used by the author of the dialogue to enable his readers to become better dialecticians. In either case, the goal of making its participants better dialecticians is served only to the extent that they are able to follow the use of the weaver paradigm in step-by-step detail. The remainder of the chapter is given over to detailed examination of that paradigm.
5.3 How Defining Weaving Provides a Paradigm for Defining Statesmanship Paradigm D, once again, consists of the Stranger’s treatment of the definition of weaving as a paradigm for the subsequent definition of statesmanship. Weaving is defined in four Stephanus pages from 279C to 283B. The definition overall divides into three distinct parts: (i) a perfunctory initial definition between 279C and 280A, (ii) an account of the initial definition’s shortcomings between 280B and 281B, and (iii) an emended definition between 281D and 283B that avoids these shortcomings. The definition of statesmanship, on the other hand, occupies well over half of the dialogue. Interludes on methodology and metaphysics aside, it extends from 258B to 277A and again from 287B to 305E7 – a total of more than thirty-seven pages. The Stranger’s treatment of the paradigm of weaving is so contrived that the major stages in the cumulative definition of statesmanship are mirrored by stages in the definition of weaving.8 The purpose of this section is to trace out the general outlines of this mirroring relationship. The perfunctory definition of weaving begins with the division, according to purpose served, of everything we “make or acquire” ( " % 7 8
The last six Stephanus pages function as a coda illustrating the statesman’s task of weaving citizens with opposing character traits into a well-functioning polis. Essentially the same point is made in Miller (1980), pp. 60–64, employing the same metaphor of mirroring.
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) * !: 279C7–8). Things we make or acquire might be either for the sake of doing something (B % ' : 279C8) or to prevent something being done. The latter category goes through nine subsequent divisions in rapid sequence (see following Figure 5.1), after which the results are presented to YS as a definition of weaving for his reaction. Young Socrates accepts the definition without further ado (280A7). This initial definition of weaving corresponds to the extended definition of statesmanship as a version of shepherding, which culminated just prior to the Stranger’s call for a paradigm of paradigms and which YS had also accepted without question at 277A. The breathless character of this initial definition seems to reflect an effort on the Stranger’s part to maneuver his interlocutor into a similar state of acceptance as quickly as possible, providing time for a more leisurely explanation of what had been overlooked in both cases. As he noted repeatedly in connection with their initial attempt to define statesmanship (268C, 275B, 276B, 279A), the portrayal of kingship as the art of caring for human herds fits many other arts of caregiving within the polis as well. A similar problem affects the initial definition of weaving, as the Stranger now proceeds to demonstrate. The Stranger begins this second stage in his treatment of weaving with the observation that some people (notably YS) might consider the initial definition adequate because it separates off many related arts, even though weaving still has not been divided from yet other arts that cooperate with it. In response to YS’s lame question of what related arts he has in mind, the Stranger undertakes a detailed itemization of a dozen or so arts in question. This itemization of related arts is noteworthy in several respects. For one, the related arts identified by the Stranger are mentioned in reverse order from that of their original appearance in the definition. The Stranger is quite deliberate about this, saying that they must go back through the account of weaving “starting at the end” (5 # ": 280B6). Another aspect of some interest is that the Stranger employs a sizable number of neologisms in identifying these related arts. Several of these are terms found nowhere else in the extant Greek corpus. Yet another notable aspect of this sequence is that it focuses on arts that were separated off on the left side of the initial line of division. Rather than being set aside and passed by, as is the usual procedure in a sequence of standard dichotomous divisions, these features are emphasized in the Stranger’s reversal of the definition. For the moment, it is enough to note these distinctive aspects of the list of related arts spelled out between 280B and 281D. We return to
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these matters in the following section, both to fill in details and to assess their significance. The immediate relevance of this set of passages lies in its demonstration that the initial definition of weaving, like the faltering definition of statesmanship before it, fails to distinguish its subject from a variety of arts that cooperate with it. Other cooperative arts not yet distinguished from weaving include those of carding and fulling, along with those that make the weaver’s tools. We recall that the initial definition of weaving began with a distinction between things made or acquired for the sake of doing something and things made or acquired to prevent something happening to us. The art of weaving (identified with the art of clothes making at 280A3–5) has been characterized thus far with respect to its role in fabricating protective garments and has been distinguished from other preventive arts falling under the same general category. But the carder and the fuller are both concerned primarily with doing things to wool, and the tool makers in question are responsible for producing implements used in the actual process of weaving. In a word, these other arts from which weaving must now be distinguished fall under the general category of arts directed by the purpose of doing something. To distinguish weaving effectively from these other productive arts, it too must be characterized with respect to what it does. The second attempt to define weaving thus begins with a focus on things that artisans do (* : 281D9). The first distinction made under this general category is between direct causes and contributory causes (" : 281D11). Makers of tools used in weaving fall under the latter. Direct causes, on the other hand, are further divided between the art of the fuller and arts concerned with working the fulled wool itself. Wool working is further divided between arts of separating (by card or spindle) and arts of combining. This latter, finally, is divided between arts responsible for spinning warp and woof, and weaving itself by which warp and woof are intertwined. Weaving emerges from this final definition as the art directly responsible for working wool by the combining of warp and woof. This final definition of weaving corresponds to the final definition of statesmanship initiated at 287B and brought to a conclusion at 305E. Developed initially under the preconception of statecraft as a form of herd keeping, the attempt to define the statesman’s art began with the division of knowledge into practical ( : 258E5) and theoretical ( : 258E5). The art of the statesman (posited at 259B–C as identical to those of the king, the slave master, and the household manager)
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was assumed to fall under the latter. Further subdivisions under this category led to the flawed definition at 276E that gave rise to the Stranger’s call for a paradigm of paradigms. The persistent problem with this line of definition, as already noted, is that it has been unable to distinguished the statesman from “myriads” of competitors. Among competitors explicitly identified at 267E are merchants, farmers, bakers, trainers, and doctors, all of whom can lay claim to the role of providing care for people living in groups. Although no note was taken of this at the time, the skills practiced by these experts as a class tend distinctly more toward the practical than the theoretical. To distinguish the weaver from the spindle maker, as already observed, a categorical shift from “preventive art” to “art of doing” is required. Similarly, to distinguish the statesman from merchants, farmers, and bakers, it appears that a shift might be required from the general category of theoretical arts, with which this line of division began, to the opposite category of practical arts. This indeed is what happens when the definition of statesmanship is resumed at 287B. As a first move in this renewed effort, the Stranger repeats the distinction between direct causes and contributory causes that inaugurated the successful definition of weaving at 281D. Whether contributory or direct, the causes concerned in either case are for the sake of doing something. In the case of the statesman, this means that they pertain to the practical rather than the theoretical arts. To drive the point home, we note that the Stranger at 287D4 begins talking about the “products of the kingly art” (- A 5 ) and that by 289D1 he is speaking of kingship and statesmanship explicitly as a practical activity ( ). The category of practical arts ( ), set aside to the left as a first step in defining statesmanship at 258E, has now reappeared as the key category in an ultimately successful definition. We shall return to this apparent about-face in the following chapter. In the meanwhile, we should look more carefully at certain details in the definition of weaving.
5.4 The Definition of Weaving Dissected Part (i) of the process of definition consists of a series of ten divisions, crammed into a scant seventeen lines of text (279C7–280A1). A diagram of this series of divisions is provided in Figure 5.1. It will be noted that this series of divisions does not add up to a definition of weaving as such. What is defined, in effect, is woolen clothing. The art that has charge
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for sake of doing
defenses
charms
protections
armaments
deflectors of cold and heat
screens shelters spread under single piece stitched from vegetable fiber felted
bodily coverings wrapped around compounded unstitched from hair bound with hair (= product of the art of weaving)
figure 5.1. Initial definition of weaving (279C7–280A6).
of such clothing is designated the art of clothes making (K " ) at 280A3 and then identified with weaving (G : 280A3) itself. The Stranger’s rationale for this rather implausible move is that weaving constitutes the largest part of clothes making (280A3–4). This is enough to elicit YS’s wholehearted endorsement of the foregoing as a definition of weaving. Having maneuvered his interlocutor into accepting this perfunctory definition within the span of about one-half Stephanus page, the Stranger spends three times that much space in pointing out its shortcomings. This second stage of the overall definition consists of (a) a listing in reverse order of the related arts from which weaving has been separated in the initial definition (Table 5.1 following), and (b) a further listing of arts that cooperate with weaving from which it has yet to be distinguished. Before looking at these lists in detail, we should note two respects in which list (a) reverses the order of the initial definition. One respect, to repeat, is that the arts concerned are mentioned in (roughly) opposite order from that in which they were initially separated
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from the art of weaving. This presumably is what the Stranger means in saying at 280B7 that in going back again they must “start from the end.” The second respect is less direct. Regardless of order of mention, the several arts in question have been separated from weaving in the sense of having been set aside to the left as the series of divisions producing the initial definition progressed along successive right-hand branches (see Figure 5.1). By listing arts that have been set aside in this fashion, the Stranger in effect is restating the results of that series of divisions. But whereas the initial definition specified features that are characteristic of weaving, this second listing specifies features that weaving lacks. In short, the second listing reverses the initial definition by proceeding along the left-hand of the series of divisions rather than the right. By specifying features that weaving lacks, it singles out weaving by a process of elimination. To identify weaving uniquely, however, this reverse process must eliminate all kindred arts with which it shares distinctive features. The purpose of list (b) (in Table 5.2) is to complete this process of elimination. Following (Table 5.1) is a list of arts initially separated from weaving, showing both the sequence of mention at 280B–E (to the left) and order of elimination under the category of prevention in the course of the initial divisions (in parentheses to the right). It will be noted that the sequence of this list is not the exact reversal of the initial order of mention, inasmuch as the first art listed (that of fabricating blankets) is fifth in the initial order and the second and third arts remain in their initial sequence. Possibly of more interest than the order of listing is the fact that all save one (" ) of the terms used to designate specific arts in table 5.1. (a) Arts Initially Separated from Weaving (280A8–E4) (The art of fabricating) coverings spread under – e.g., blankets (The art of fabricating) garments from vegetable fiber – e.g., flax The art of felting [] The art of cobbling (" ) The art of working with single piece skins [ "]* The art of building shelters [)] The art of joining screens [ ]* The art of arms manufacture [Q ] – a branch of defense-production [ - "] 9. The art of magic [ "]*
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
(5) (8) (9) (7) (6) (4) (3) (2) (1)
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table 5.2. (b) Arts Yet to Be Separated (281A–D) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
The art of breaking (fibers, etc.) apart ["] The art of carding [ ] The art of manufacturing () warp and woof The fuller’s art [ "] The art of clothes mending () The arts of making tools used in weaving
this sequence appear to be neologisms.9 Whereas the first two arts are identified by description only, the last seven are assigned specific names. The neologisms among these are indicated by their inclusion in brackets. In three cases, the terms in question appear to have been used only by Plato and by him only once.10 These terms are marked by asterisks in Table 5.1. We return in the final section of this chapter to assess the significance (if any) of Plato’s striking reliance on neologisms in this section of the dialogue. Regardless of what we make of it, use of neologisms continues in the Stranger’s list of cooperative arts. The problem with the initial definition is that although it separates weaving from kindred arts having to do with prevention, there are other arts involved in the production of woolen garments from which weaving has yet to be distinguished. These cooperating arts are described and given names at 281A–D. They are mentioned in the order indicated in Table 5.2. As before, the names enclosed in brackets appear to have been coined by Plato. However, none of these is used in this passage exclusively. We have observed that all these cooperative arts are pursued for the sake of doing something, as distinct from preventing things from being done. To bring these auxiliary arts into account, the Stranger begins his second (and ultimately successful) definition of weaving by distinguishing two broad categories of art exercised for the end of doing 9
10
For present purposes, a term is counted as a neologism if it appears in no author prior to Plato in the canon of Greek authors included in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG), as indicated by a search of authors from the eighth to the fourth Centuries b.c. The present compilation of neologisms in these passages was arrived at independently of Campbell (1867) and contains three entries not found in that previous listing (made without benefit of electronics). I am indebted to Dimitri El Murr for bringing Campbell’s list to my attention. Use of a term is considered a sole occurrence (hapax legomenon) if it is used by no other author in the TLG canon and used by Plato only once. Given the nature of the technology, electronic searchs are not 100 percent reliable, and for present purposes have been cross-checked against LS (1883). Several neologisms (e.g., and Q ) that initially appeared in TLG to be hapax legomena have been eliminated on this basis.
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something, those of contributory cause (" : 281D11) and (direct) cause ( : 281D11). In this application, the distinction is applied specifically to the production of woolen clothing () C !: 281C9). The line of division continues as shown in Figure 5.2. The conventions introduced in Table 5.1 apply to this figure as well: neologisms are enclosed in brackets, and sole occurrences are marked with asterisks. There are several notable differences in format between Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Whereas the former is concerned with distinctions among protective devices, Figure 5.2 distinguishes specific arts with respect to what they accomplish. After the general distinction between contributing and directly responsible arts, particular arts are named specifically at each subsequent stage of division.
arts exercised in doing things contributory causes (arts making tools for other arts)
direct causes
the fuller's art [
art of clothes washing ] [
art of clothesmending [
art of furbishing clothes )
art of wool working (
art of separating ) ( art of carding ] [
"one-half of art of weaving” [ art of the shuttle
]:*
art of combining ( )
art of twisting ] [ ]* also [
art of warp spinning ] [
art of woof spinning [ ]* weaving proper ( )
figure 5.2. Final definition of weaving (281D8–283A8).
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Another salient difference between the two figures has to do with the distribution of divisions on opposite sides of the diagram. In Figure 5.1, all divisions appear on the right-hand side of the figure. In this respect, they are like most divisions in the Sophist (see Figures 3.3(b) and 3.4 for exceptions) and like all preceding divisions in the Statesman. In Figure 5.2, on the other hand, key divisions are made on both sides of the diagram. In point of fact, the overall configuration of Figure 5.2 gives the impression that most of the work in this series of divisions is done along the left-hand side. This impression is reinforced when we begin looking at details. The purported task of this sequence, stated at 281D1–4, is to distinguish weaving from the cooperating arts listed in Table 5.2. This is accomplished by a chain of division locating the arts in question along the left side of the figure. First to be set aside are the arts making tools used in weaving (number 6 in Table 5.2). Next is the fuller’s art (number 4), under which the Stranger includes the art of clothes mending (number 5). Then come the arts of breaking apart fibers and the like (number 1), and of carding (number 2), both of which are forms of separating. Last are the arts of manufacturing warp and woof (number 3), which fall under the more general art of twisting. In following through this process of elimination, one gets the sense that the distinctions made along the left are no less important than those along the right. Both sides contribute to the final definition of weaving. Another intriguing aspect of Figure 5.2 is its concentration of neologisms in the left-hand sector. Of the fourteen arts explicitly identified in this sequence as directly responsible for getting things done, eleven fall out to the left; and nine of these eleven are designated by neologisms. (No neologisms appear on the right.) Of these nine neologisms, moreover, three count as sole occurrences (by the criteria in note 10). Let us render our tally of neologisms current. There are seven neologisms listed in Table 5.1 and three more in Table 5.2, two of which latter are subsequently repeated in Figure 5.2. This leaves seven in Figure 5.2 which are not repetitions, adding up to a total of seventeen in this set of passage. Of this total, six appear to be terms found nowhere else in the extant Greek corpus. Let us recall also that all seventeen neologisms signify arts that are located in one way or another within the left-hand sectors of their respective lines of division. Table 5.1 lists arts identified in moving backward up the left side of Figure 5.1. Table 5.2 lists arts that, as of 280E, have not yet been separated from weaving in a comparable fashion. Figure 5.2 finally
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accomplishes this separation by providing a place for these arts to the left of weaving, which ultimately falls out at the lower right. In a nutshell, within the roughly two and one-half Stephanus pages from 280C to 283A, there are seventeen terms coined by Plato for the purposes at hand. One such purpose at least was to identify arts that in various ways are kindred to but distinct from weaving and to set them aside in a series of left-hand divisions. All seventeen terms in question are employed toward that end. It seems highly unlikely that this concentration of neologisms in these particular passages is coincidental.11 The task remaining for this chapter is to consider reasons why the author might have taken such extraordinary steps in the process of formulating his final definition of weaving.
5.5 Left-Hand Division After his extended analysis of not-Being in the Sophist, the Stranger calls Theaetetus back to the task of defining sophistry. The task is to be pursued by “dividing in two” (56 5: 264D10) the art of production, and thereafter “always holding to the right” ( ) ): 264E1) in subsequent divisions. These specifications are followed in all remaining divisions in the Sophist and in all divisions prior to the definition of weaving in the Statesman. With the series of divisions laid out in Figure 5.2, however, we have a procedure that does not adhere to these specifications. Although the initial division (of artful ways of doing things) indeed is pursued only to the right, all subsequent divisions along the right have counterpart divisions in the opposite direction. In one left-hand section (the fuller’s art), moreover, there is a further division into three separate arts (the art of clothes washing, that of clothes mending, and that of furbishing clothes). This is a clear deviation from the guideline of dichotomous division. Not only do the divisions shown in Figure 5.2 depart from the guidelines in the Sophist, but they occur in a section made conspicuous by innovations of a terminological sort as well. To be sure, the terminological innovations seem to highlight the departures of method. As noted earlier, all of the neologisms between 280C and 282B occur in connection with division in the leftward direction. Whatever else might lie behind this 11
Campbell (1867) lists some eight dozen neologisms in the Statesman overall, averaging less than two per page. Between 280C and 283A, the average is about seven per page.
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concentration of neologisms, the author surely was aware that it would catch the attention of his intended audience (or readership). He must have been aware at the same time that it would also draw attention to the contents of the passages in which the new coinages occur. In evaluating the significance of this pattern of coinciding terminological and methodological innovations, we should be aware of a sense in which innovations of both sorts appear unnecessary. As a glance at Figure 5.2 should disclose, weaving could be defined simply as the art directly responsible for working wool with respect to combining (as distinct from separating). Or as the Stranger himself points out to YS (283A4–8), weaving has been set forward as that part of wool working that produces something by the combining of warp and woof. Either way of summarizing their results at this point would amount to an accurate characterization of weaving, and neither way requires extending the pattern of division in the leftward direction. A consequence is that neither calls for coinage of the sizeable number of neologisms associated with these leftward divisions. If an abbreviated definition of some such sort would suffice, both the left-hand divisions and the neologisms that go with them would be extraneous. The natural question for us is why the left-hand divisions nonetheless were included. This is equivalent in effect to the question next posed to YS by the Stranger. Why, he asks (283A10–B2), didn’t we say directly that weaving is an intertwining of warp and woof, instead of going around in a circle distinguishing a great number of things needlessly? This question whether their definition of weaving was unnecessarily lengthy, of course, provides occasion for the Stranger’s examination of “Excess and Deficiency in general,” to which we return in Chapter 7. The answer that emerges at 286D–E is that no discussion is too long if it results in making its participants better dialecticians ( ": 287A3). This comes on the heels of the disclosure at 285D that the main purpose of the dialogue overall is to make better dialecticians of those involved (see section 1.5). By implication, we are told not only that the rather lengthy definition of weaving was dialectically appropriate but also that the left-hand divisions involved have their dialectical purpose. We are left with the question of what purpose they serve. A partial answer, presumably, is that the author is providing a preview of the format of division employed in the final definition of statesmanship. In point of fact, the innovations exhibited in Figure 5.2 reappear even more prominently in these final divisions. When the Stranger returns to the statesman at 287B, as commentators often point out, one of his first remarks is that they will no longer be able to rely on strictly dichotomous
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division. And as will become evident in the next chapter, most of the divisions contributing to the final definition occur in the leftward direction. By demonstrating the same methodological peculiarities as the upcoming definition of statesmanship, the definition of weaving is merely serving its role as a useful paradigm. But this is a partial answer at best. Given that both the definition of weaving and the definition of statesmanship rely extensively on left-hand division, the question of its dialectical purpose arises for both definitions. Why is “standard” right-hand division insufficient in this dialectical context? Or better, what dialectical role is served by left-hand division that division exclusively to the right would not serve equally well? My sense of the matter is that the Stranger’s focus on left-hand division in this context does not constitute a rejection of right-hand division as such. We should not forget that left-hand division was featured in the Phaedrus (section 3.1), whereas division to the right prevailed nonetheless through most of the Sophist. The point of left-hand division in the latter part of the Statesman, I suspect, has to do with alternative ways of arriving at successful definitions. As noted repeatedly in our earlier discussion, a successful definition specifies features that are both necessary and sufficient for the thing being defined. The task of finding necessary conditions falls to collection in the Sophist and to the use of paradigms in the Statesman. The task of arriving at sufficient conditions belongs to division in turn. In the methodology of the Sophist, division continues along the rightmost branch until a combination of features have been specified that belongs exclusively to the thing being characterized. The gist of this method is to keep adding features to the characterization until the thing in question has been completely isolated. An alternative way of arriving at the same result relies on a process of elimination. This way is illustrated by the Stranger’s procedure in the passages we have been considering. First he takes note of the related arts that have been separated from weaving in the initial definition (listed in Table 5.1). Then he mentions other (cooperating) arts that also must be set aside before the definition of weaving is complete (Table 5.2). The result (Figure 5.2) is a characterization of weaving by way of specifying what it is not. Weaving in effect is defined by eliminating other arts with which it shares relevant characteristics. To be sure, Figure 5.2 also shows weaving to be an art directly involved in wool working that combines warp and woof. By itself, however, this characterization does not seem particularly informative. And when the Stranger launches his discussion of “Excess and Deficiency in general”
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by asking YS why this shorter definition does not serve their purpose, we are put on notice that the alternative way – although roundabout – might sometimes be preferable. Obviously en