Memory and Imagination J. O. Urmson Mind, New Series, Vol. 80, No. 320. (Oct., 1971), p. 607. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28197110%292%3A80%3A320%3C607%3AMAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L Mind is currently published by Oxford University Press.
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MEM0R.Y AND IMAGINATION MY account of the difference between memory and imagination in MIND,vol. 74, pp. 83-91, is criticized by Mr. Zemach in his paper ' A Definition of Memory ' in MIND,vol. 77, on pp. 535-536. As he completely misunderstands my point, it apparently needs restating. Mr. Zemach says, correctly, that general verisimilitude and interestingness ' surely cannot be the relevant criteria for determining whether the production of a mental picture is or isnot a case ofimagining ', apparently thinking that I hold that they are. But I do not. I said, and say again, that what makes the production of mental images a case of imagining is the fact that such criteria as verisimilitude rather than correspondence to fact are relevant to determining its success. Thus if Mr. Zemach produces ' a mental picture of a three-legged, eleven-eyed monster ', it will be a case of imagination if the picture can be criticized on the ground that the eyes do not look very like eyes or that some of the legs look niore like arms, but cannot be criticized on the ground that Mr. Zemach has never seen anything like that. He thinks that I hold that we have a case of imagination only when a mental image is lifelike and interesting, otherwise not. In fact I hold that we have a case of imagination when some such criteria as these determine whether it was a successful piece of imagination. But unsuccessful imagination is still imagination, just as unsuccessful criticism is still criticism.
University of Oxford
J. 0. URNSOK
