The Melancholy Science An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno
Gillian Rose
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Gillian.
Th
I.
Congress Cataloging
·
melancholy science.
(E uro pean perspectives) Bibli gra phy: p. I n lud•s index. t. Adorno, Theodor W., 1 903-1 969. 2. Frankfurt I o I r soc i ology. 3· Communism and society. Titl•.
HM22.G3A37 1 978 ISBN Q-23 I 4584--{)
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Contents Acknowledgements
VII
Preface 1
IX
The Crisis in Culture
The Frankfurt School, 1923-50 The Frankfurt School, rg5o-6g Adorno 2
6 8 II
The Search for Style
The Essay as Form
II 14
Minima Moralia
I6
Morality and Style
3
The Tradition of Irony
I8
The Lament over Reification
27
Reification as a Sociological Category
27
Historical
28
The Abuse of 'Reification'
28
Misattributions of 'Reification' Si mmel and Reification The Young Lukacs and the Young Benjamin
32
Against Lukacs and Against Benjamin
35 40
Adorno and Reification
43 43
Analytical
Nega t ive Dialectic Rcifica t ion How is Critical Theory Possible? 4
30
44 46 48
A Changed Concept of Dialectic
The Crilique of
lk
52 52 56
Ph ilosophy
d
62 6s r
70
7 77 77
Contents 8'2 86 9I 95 I0'2 I09 I09
6
I I4 I I8 I'2 I I30 I38
'
,'los
ar'
List of Abbrev£ations of Titles
otes
and R�ferences
I49 I55 I 59
ibliograplzy
I93
'ubj t Index
20 7
Index
2IO
ame
Acknowledgements
Many people have inspired, helped and criticised this work at various stages. I wish to thank especially Sir Isaiah Berlin, Julius C arle bach, Leszek Kolakowski, Steven Lukes and Sabine MacCormack. I wish to thank the following people who read and comme nted on all or part of the manuscript in its final stages: Zev Barbu, Tom Bottomore , Frank Glover-Smith, E. F . N . Jephcott. In addition I wish to thank U lrike Meinhof, who checked all my translations and retranslations from the German, and Rogers Ragavan who gave me unstinting assistance in secre tarial and practical matters. I am also grateful to the Librarian of St Antony's College , Oxford, for her patience in supplying books over the past few years, and to St Antony's College for their support. I wish to thank the Social Science Research Council, the University of Sussex and the Deutsche Akade mische Austauschdienst for financial help during the course of the research, which was partly conducted at the Free University, West Berlin, and at the University of Constance, West Germany. My special thanks are given to Stefan Collini, Herminio Martins, john Raffan and Jacqueline Rose .
Preface
'The melancholy science' which this book expounds is not a pessimistic science. By introducing Minima Moralia as an offering from his 'me lancholy science' -an inversion of Nietzsche's 'joyful science' - Adorno undermines and inverts the sanguine and total claims of philosophy and sociology, and rejects any dichotomy such as optimistic/pessimistic for it implies an inherently fixed and static view. Adorno's work draws on traditions inherited from Marxian and non Marxian criticism of Hegel's philosophy, and on the pre-Marxian writings ofLukacs and ofBenjamin as much as on their Marxian writings. Interpretation of Adorno suffers when his aims and achievements are related solely to Marx or to a Marxian tradition which is sometimes undefined and sometimes overdefined, and, equally, when he is judged solely as a sociologist. Here, Adorno's thought is introduced and discussed in its own right, 'immanently', to use his own term. Where appropriate, Adorno's engagement with and transformation of the many intellectual traditions which inform his work is examined. Adorno's thought depends fundamentally on the category of re ification. This category has attained a strangely dominant role in much neo-Marxist and phenomenological literature and in recent sociological amalgams of these two traditions. I t is used to evoke, often by mere suggestion or allusion, a very peculiar and complex epistemological setting which is rarely examined further or justified. I n the Marxian tradition 'reification' is most often employed as a way of generalising Ma.rx's theory of value with the aim of producing a critical theory of social institutions and of culture, but frequently any critical force is lost in th e process of generalisation.
(r an
w rk, th m st ambitious and im portant to have emerged th Institut fl r ial R ·s · ar h b for 1969, is the most abstruse, in pit� fi t influ n , still th m st misund rst d. his is ul t ly li d I h 1 nd fl ' ' I u l I
Adorn 's m ,
·
.
Preface
X
ruable. Yet, as I try to show, Adorno's CEuvre forms a unity even though it om posed of fragments. In the last five years all the major works and m ny of the minor works of Adorno, Lukacs and Benjamin have been tr nslated or are in the process of being translated into English. In spite of t his in reasing recognition of the ir importance there exists as yet little yst matic study of their work. I h a v e not attempted to be exhaustive in my treatment of Adorno's work. In particular, his writings on music, which constitute over half of his published work, do not receive detailed attention. Although Adorno kno wledged the importance of his collaboration with Horkheimer, his bat s with Lukacs and with Benjamin reveal more of the inspiration whi h structures his thought, and I have therefore concentrated on those ts. While I argue that Adorno's texts must be read from a th o logical point of view with close attention to stylistic features, I v nev rtheless, reconstructed his ideas in standard expository format. i
,
Chapter
1
The Crisis in Culture
The Frankfurt School, 1923-50
All the tensions within the German academic community which accompanied the changes in political, cultural and intellectual life in Germany since 18go were reproduced in the I nstitute for Social Research from its inception in Frankfurt in 1 923 . 1 These changes were widely diagnosed as a 'crisis in culture' .2 By this very definition the 'crisis' was deplored yet exacerbated. The I nstitute carried these tensions with it into exile and when it returned to Germany after the war and found itself the sole heir to a discredited tradition the inherited tensions became even more acute. These tensions are evident in the work of most of the School's members, and most clearly, self-consciously and importantly in the work of Theodor W. Adorno.
-
The Melancholy Science _.
N o-Marxist, it was not deterred by academic cries against
ri !ism' and 'materialist' methods. On the other hand, the School f lt r d i n i ts attempt to redefine Marxism inte llectually and politically it g n e ra t ion . By the early thirties, it had dropped its orientation w r s t h e workers' movement, a process which was capped by the I men t of Carl Grunberg by Max Horkheimer as director of the t i t u t , and by the substitution of the .Zeitschrift fiir Sozialjorschung ( urnal for Social Research) edited by Horkheimer for Grunberg's l
hivfilr die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung (Archive for
r
i
i t ry of Socialism and the Workers' Movement) .5 It eve n dropped 'n t r st i n c lass analysis and increasingly turned its atte ntion to the n lysis f ulture and authority. Instead of politicising acade mia, it mis d politics. 6 This transposition became the basis for its subn t a hievements. Yet time and time again, the history of the School l t h i tension: as an institution, it reaffirmed and reinforced those f erman life which it criticised and aimed to change , just as it d and rei nfor ced those aspects of the inte llectual universe which nll i d and aimed to change . Only if this is realised can the goals, I i v ments and failures of the School and of the work of Adorno be
h
•
fi
3
The Crisis in Culture
during the twenties. ;Like Lukacs, the School considered that to be consistent with Marx, it was necessary to take account offlourishing non dialectical philosophies and sociologies, u j ust as Marx had scanned the philosophy and political economy which flourished in his day·: On the one hand, the School was dismayed that the social sciences had developed soy separately from each other and so1,1ght to combat this fragmentation On the other hand, Horkheimer did not believe that one man alone could undertake research in all the relevant fields.1 2 The members of the School tended to specialise while, at the same time, breaking down the established barriers between philosophy and sociology in their particular areas. Horkheimer was particularly concerned to take advantage of the developments in empirical research techniques which in Germany had occurred quite apart from developments in theoretical sociology and at a time when almost every German professor of sociology considered it incumbent on him to produce a theoretical sociology. 1 3 By combining several empirical methods in any inquiry, he believed that the evils of too restricted an empiricism could be avoided . This unity underlying the work ofthe members of the School is evident in the various publications of the thirties, in the ,Zeitschrift and most clearly in joint works such as Autoritiit und Familie (Authority and the Family) . 1 4 However, from the outset, the inheritance of non-Marxist critical traditions affected the style and presentation of many of the contributors. This inheritance from non Marxist criticisms of Hegel's system, for example, those ofSchopenhauer and Nietzsche, tolerates idiosyncracy and hence makes for another kind of fragmentation. It is this inheritance from a tradition which has itself never been widely understood even within Germany which, paradoxi cally, has often increased the School's appeal, while at the same time, exposing it to misinterpretation. But it has prevented the work of the School from having a more cogent and continual impact on sociology. Many of these non-Marxist influences, Hegelian and post-Hegelian, were present in Lukacs' writings too, especially up to 1923.15 The School rejected many of Lukacs' assumptions and theories, particularly the idea of the working class as the subject/object of history and the notion of 'imputed' class consciousness. However, a subject/object dichotomy was retained, and ideas from the non-Marxist critical traditions de veloped in a way which affected the style of the work of many members of the School. Many of Lukacs' central concepts were thus retained, such as 'subject', 'object', 'fetishism' and 'reification', but they attained a quite d i£ferent status. The School sought to define Marxism as a mode of the assumption that there is no longer any gn i t i f t hat gnit ion, any un iver$al class. 1 6 The i nfluence or privil I h b n b th und rest i mat d17 and v ruk
-y'
s and dis ontinuiti
b
.n
The Melancholy Science 'imilar l y, 1
the continuity of the dispute, which has become notorious
4 as the Positivismusstreit (the Positivist dispute) , 19 with the
undertaken by the School since its earliest days, has been ked . This has contributed to the many failures on the part of the l ' s opponents to understand the terms of the later debate . 2 ° From l t t wenties, members of the School conducted disputes with various f philosophical and sociological absolute systems, positivisms and m I t ivism .2 1 I t may be said that some form of dispute concerning itivism' is as old as Marxism itself. After 1 950 the adversaries han d, but the enterprise did not. I t involves demonstrating the social ity o f the position which is criticised, while rejecting, in more id nt tones, its claim to absolute validity. Th, d i ontinuity in the membership of the School, especially after the r wh n very few returned to Germany, has meant that the School's r I theory of change in the social organisation of production, which rl i s all its other work, is difficult to identify. In the post-war writing rkh imer and Adorno the theory of change in late capitalism is l i i t bu t not directly presented in any one place. These ideas were "g i n l ly formed in the attempt to analyse the development and success r t h Nazis in Germany, and always bore the mark of this origin.22 F i dri h Pollock's article 'State Capitalism' , written in I 94 1 , 2 3 offers an · mp l of the difficulties which beset the School's analysis of capitalism whi h reappear in Adorno's works in an indirect and inverted form . 1 1 k pictured state capitalism as a system where the state has taken v r t h organisation of production and replaced price and market h ni ms by its own plans. Power to command instead of the profit tiv becomes the motor of this system, which has taken over from ly apitalism and which may proceed under a totalitarian or ·r t ic political structure. An image of a static and stable regime ges, although it is not clear to what extent this 'ideal-type' is nd d to offer an historical analysis or a prediction. 2 4 Pollock relies in ·onsist 'n t ly on Marx's method for analysing capitalism and his account I : !I o n y b�cause of this. He presupposes Marx's theory of value and commod i t y production and hence, however unemphatically, the distinc tio n b t ween use-value and exchange-value, .but he does not go on to I v lop on t h is basis a notion of labour- power and of the extraction of Hurr Ius v· lu and t hus of class !ormation . I nstead, the state appears as a lin·c Jui generis in Polio k's ac o u n t and t here is no at tempt to relate the jo.i t d c hang·· i n i tsrol lo t h und r l y i ngpro ss·s fp r d uc tion .Th ese t I n r p ra t iv . T h is l aves r m r ly d' I r ' t i fit t ry t h it w'l l l ry f t h i s
·
I
qu
Lh
The Crisis in Culture
5
United States in the early 1 940s, might be considered the School's response to Marx's critique of political economy.25 In this book Horkheimer and Adorno attempt to decode the history of the philosophi cal subject as the dom ination of nature whether under the guise of myth or of enlightened reason.2 6 The book is concerned with 'instrumental reason' , or, as it is also called, 'technological' reason, but not with technologies for the domination of nature.27 I nstrumental reason is seen as a feature of both pre-capitalist and capitalist societies, although it only becomes a structuring principle in capitalist societies. Ideas are de veloped here which Adorno was investigating in his empirical work at the same time, especially the 'culture industry' and 'anti-semitism', but he did not share Horkheimer's concern with instrumental reason and the logic of domination. The concept of reification and Marx's theory of value are much more important in Adorno's analysis of society. Adorno a nd Horkheimer fused - each in his own way in his individual works - the Nietzschean and Weberian hyperbole which is so evident in Dialectic of Enlightenment. During the years of the School's exile in America, especially in the late thirties and during the forties, the conflict in its position was particularly acute : it was more critical than' ever of German society while at the same time more concerned than ever to carry on and develop those aspects of that society and its culture which it deemed worthy of defence.28 This was a brave stance in a dilemma shared by other German emigre intellectuals and writers. However, it resulted in serious lacunae in the School's work, visible most clearly in the separation which occurred between their theoretical and empirical work. The membership of the School changed considerably during its years in America due to the departure of several members. Horkheimer carried on publishing the Zeitschrift in German until 1 940.29 Meanwhile he and Adorno were engaged in empirical work which was published in English. Throughout the forties they both continued writing and publishing their theoretical work in German and their empirical work in English. From 1 94 1 -4 especially, they did no empirical work and wrote together in German. This partly reflects the fact that the empirical work was commissioned and Adorno, especially, needed the money- but it also reflects a deeper ambivalence. Horkheimer had always been more sympathetic to learn ing about and using empirical techniques than Adorno. 30 Adorno, in fact, conducted in collaboration with others more empirical work than Horkheimer during these years, yet he displayed the split in the School's pos i tio n m st learly. He was most hostile to American culture and tr n ly id ntifi d with rman culture duri�,g these years.31 Later, in t riti i m f h i w rk n Am ri an p pular music and n m i nism, h [I rr t th ir lh r ti al un I q/ E1�ti lit rzm nla� whi h,
(j
The Melancholy Science
rman . These conditions led to Adorno's worst work on jazz and pular culture. The Frankfurt School, 1950 -69
Th h istory of the Institute in Germany after 1 9 50 is the most important om plex but the least documented . Horkheimer, Adorno and n I o l i o k ret urned to \Vest Germany and re-established the I nstitute for S ial R esearch in Frankfurt. Horkheimer became the rector of the niv rsity of Frankfurt, and in 1 9 53 Adorno too accepted a chair at the u iv ·rsity. Thus the activity of the Institute was no longer to be explicitly iv or d from teaching. This turned out to be both an advantage and a lis dv ntage. It increased the intellectual and political influence of the I nst i t u te i n t he fifties but also contributed to its decline in the sixties. uring t hese two decades the tension between the I nstitute's role as part r stablished academia, which it now increasingly became, and as critic r rman society was at its most acute. By the mid-sixties the I nstitute w s u ncomfortable in many ways, unable to satisfy the state or its t u d nts. This has caused its achievement to be underestimated. Th story of the School after 1 9 5 0 is the story of Horkheimer and rno and the ideas which they brought back with them from America. W h i l many early members of the Institute had drifted away from it and mai ned in America after the war, Horkheimer and Adorno had in ny ways drawn closer together.33 They decided to 1\eturn to West rmany, unlike Ernst Bloch and Bertolt Brecht who returned to East rmany,:l4 because they were committed to redefining 'critical theory' 111 w a y t hat would take account of the experience of the previous twenty y rs. This meant for them combating the official communism of Eastern Europ as much as fascism and the 'culture industry', which were the s ial phenomena associated more in their minds with \\'estern Europe nd A merica. The two me n took up and propagated a position which deli d t h t erms of the Cold War. They were equally critical of East and Wes t a n d did n ot succumb to the ideological excesses characteristic of the 1 . r i od oi"German reconstruction. This isolated them and the faculties of so � i o l ogy and philosophy of the University of Frankfurt. Not only did they pres rve and continue a Marxist discourse, but they resisted the irllcllc t ual t ide in G rmany which disowned Nietzsche and even, for a 1 eriod, Max Weber along wi t h most of the t radition of theoretical . �iol > y. By on L r L , Luka s, n w i n H u ngary, d isc redi ted both nd W b r and erm n so i a l t h o • h t in g n r a l in his book Ni t zs h Z r ttl 1m ri r rnurift (1 h ti r n ) :3 I n m t W st ' 1 1 n i 11 i I h. I .ti . iti t d r I
:1
II'
The Crisis in Culture
7
of the war on family structure and adolescent socialisation and to assist the rebuilding of the infrastructure of the country. This was in marked contrast to the heterogeneous mushrooming of sociological systems which had preceded the Nazi seizure of power. In Frankfurt too, research techniques developed in America were imported and others were developed. Further studies on prejudice were carried out as well as · research in other branches of empirical sociology. Concern with the establishment of democracy in Germany was evident in some of these works. 36 At the same time Adorno was very hostile to the use of empirical techniques divorced from any critical concern. 37 The Frankfurt School continued their pre-war emphasis on the mixed use of such techniques within an interdisciplinary theoretical approach. Students at Frankfurt University in the fifties were taught sociology, philosophy and psycho analysis in a way which reproduced the peculiar perspective of the School.38 A precarious and short-lived independence was achieved, and throughout the fifties the I nstitute was vigorous in its publishing and the professors confid ent in their teaching. 39 At the same time, the attitudes which were gradually to isolate Horkheimer and Adorno from their students were discernible. I n many ways the two men never recovered from the war, and their courage and originality in redefining a role for the School in West Germany were always allied with ideas which remained more hidebound. The book Aspects of Sociology, published under Horkheimer's and Adorno's aus pices and largely written by them, reveals some of the problems.40 I t is an introductory text in sociology written in a clear and simple style, which discusses the key sociological concepts of the time. There is no chapter on the concept of class. The method employed is to retrace the history of each concept usually from its original, substantive meaning in the Greek. According to the authors, as such concepts are made into sociological ones, they tend to become rigidified into positivistic and formal categories. The book aims to recover and release the substantive connotations of the concepts by thus criticising their static, ahistorical use in contemporary sociology. This 'restitutive' approach, while it had considerable critical power, produced essays in the tradition of cultural criticism, but no overall strategy for a unified sociology. I t displayed the authors' preoccupation with fascism and the 'culture industry' and how their views on these matters had not developed any further after their return to Germany. Horkheimer and Adorno produced much more important works after 1950 than this small, unpretentious volume, but each evolved his own idiosyncratic brand of criticism and wrote la�ely in essay form.4 1 Yet th ir int ll tual d velopm n t was not similar. Adorno became increas ingly inv lv in writin h i s A theti che Theorie (A sth ti Th ory )42 in th t F nkfu w r in , in ly di s tisfi with i ti . Th
8
The Melancholy Science rkheimer's and Adorno's withdrawal from sociology and their willingness to commit themselves to any political activity.43 Although y t h la te sixtiesjiirgen Habermas was also under fire from students for l i t i at reticence, it is evident that Habermas' work marks a radical k wi t h the School on several other scores. I t is not dialectical, nor yistic, nor is it concerned with questions of aesthetics. It also marks a
H
p break
with Horkheimer and Adorno's work on many epistemologi-
1 is�ues, but a strong continuity lies in its engagement with Marx.
By)t h e end of 1 969 Horkheimer was no longer active due to ill-health, d rno had died, and Habermas had withdrawn from teaching after the t ud nt occupation of that year. Horkheimer and Adorno appear to have '0 t he last great 'mandarins' . They created an academy precisely to i t i ise traditions which the academic community abused or ignored. Y t n i t h r men, Adorno least of all, was a 'public' man. They were not uit d for responsibility in the sense of providing any platform. Hence t y seemed to recreate the evils of the old academic community in u lging in intense, idiosyncratic cultural criticism deeply imbedded in th ho lar ly and institutional constraints which they were committed to tr 1 scend.41 Adorno
t ensions noted in the institutional character of the School are p ially evident in Adorno's writings, above all in the way he defi ned I 's r lat ionship to tradition. On the one hand he was opposed to all h il phical and sociological systems, yet on the other, he wanted his f gm n ts to be read as if they were systematic.45 He stressed the necessity r understanding social phenomena from the perspective of the 'totality' ' y t d nied the possibility of grasping the 'totality ' . On the one hand, he w· always searching for a style for philosophy and sociology which w uld be the equivalent of the search for a modernist style which has n rned twentieth-century musicians and novelists; on the other hand, h prod u d cultural criticism which greatly circumscribed and criticised ny u h s arch. He turned Marxism into a search for style, and yet <: >mbin d this with the old Hegelian and Marxist claims that he was f >Und ing t he one valid science. Adorno was born in Frankfurt am Main in 1 903, t he son of a Jewish wint mer h an t whose name, Wiesengrund, he bore until the war years wh 'O h, b arne k n ow n by his mother's maiden name, Adorno.46 He was i t r st d in musi and philosophy from his early teens 17 and studied h'l hy t th niv r i t y f Frankfurt , wh r• his t a h rs w re t 'v fth £ n n ism whi I) d minat d h 24 h ·
,
l'u
9
The Crisis in Culture
sity philosophy faculty.48 From early I925 to I928, he studied music in Vienna as a pupil of Alban Berg. At the same time he wrote his Habili tation on Kant and Freud, submitted it for examination in Frankfurt in I92 7 , but withdrew it again before it was examined. This was partly due to his growing involvement with Marxism and especially to the influence of his friendships with Walter Benjamin and Max Hork heimer. After his return to Frankfurt in I928, Adorno worked on a book on Kierkegaard which he hoped to submit as his new Habilitation.49 He started teaching philosophy at the university in I93 I but was not a member of the I nstitute until I938 when he went to New York. He was editor of the Musikbliitter des Anbruchs, a music journal published in Vienna, from I928 until late I930.50 In September I933> on his thirtieth birthday, he was deprived of his venia legendi (right to teach) by the N azis and moved to Berlin. 51 In the spring of I9 3 4 he left Germany and came to London. He really wanted to return to Vienna, but his application to continue his studies at the University of Vienna was rejected by the philosophy department. By October he was ensconced in Oxford, where he remained for over three years, hoping to obtain the Oxford D .Phil., which he regarded as the nearest equivalent to the German Habilitation.52 After a brief visit to New York in June I937, he finally moved there in February 1 938 without submitting for the Oxford degree. Meanwhile Horkheimer had found work for him with Paul Lazarsfeld on the Princeton Radio Research Proj ect. 53 Although Adorno had by now published several pieces in the :{,eitschrijt, it was only after his arrival in America that he became a member of the Institute, working half for it and half for the Radio Project. In I94 1 , he went with Horkheimer and other members of the Institute to live in California where he collaborated with Horkheimer, Hanns Eisler, Thomas Mann and the research team of The Authoritarian Personality on projects in philosophy, music, literature and sociology. In late 1 949 he went back to West Germany, to the University of Frankfurt, returning to America briefly i n 195 1 and for a year to Los Angeles, I952 - 3, in both cases to o r ganise research projects which he had undertaken to complete. He I aught at the University of Frankfurt and was the director of the Institute 1111t i l his d e a th in 1 969.54 Every y ea r fi·om 1 920, his seventeenth, to 1 969, the year of his death, Adorno p u bl ished on music. These writings range from minor reviews and art icles t o major books. Ad orn o' s ideas on the complex relationship IH't wccn the uthor as ompos r and the author as critic are clearer in I h<· ntsc ol' m asi · than in the ase of philosophy and soci ology. For where lllUsic i� : on ·ern ·d h' lw·tys onsid er d hims If to be both composer and niti ·.� : i len ifi ·losdy with the Vi nna f' hool of neue Musik, and tit<· l'Li it >I' ·or p >. i r � within tlw n ·w st I: nd ofd·finin th n w Li · I
H
r
I
<' •
11
I ·c rr
· in .
r·
I
tiv' i
10
The Melancholy Science
for him. 5 6 At the same time, Adorno was one of the sternest critics of this music from both a musical and a sociological standpoint.57 Where philosophy and sociology are concerned it is not so easy to distinguish the 'composer' from the 'critic' but it is equally important to do so, for Adorno's criticism of philosophy and sociology is deeply allied to his search for a new style for these enterprises as it is more obviously in the case of his work in music. Adorno's collected works will comprise twenty-two volumes. He wrote in many forms and produced essays, reviews, radio broadcasts, slim volumes of short articles, monographs and long books. Half of his published work is on music. Only two volumes in the collected works are called by their editors 'sociological writings'.58 The first of these volumes contains Adorno's criticism of sociology, the second, his empirical work. Yet, as the editors warn, the work in these two volumes is not ' merely' sociological, nor do they contain the whole of Adorno's 'sociology'. 59 The philosophical arid sociological principles which structure his criticism of philosophy, sociology, music and literature are always the same. Adorno tried to develop a critique of society by producing a critique of its intellectual and artistic products.
Chapter
2
The Search for Style
Morality and Style It is impossible to understand Adorno's ideas without understanding the ways in which he presents them, that is, his style, and without u nderstanding the reasons for his preoccupation with style. It is, however, Adorno's theory of society which determines his style, and that theory can only be understood if one knows how to read his texts. This chapter is ·oncerned with the relationship between Adorno's ideas and their heterogeneous presentation; the subsequent chapters are concerned with the grounding of the ideas. The glossary included at the end of the book may be consulted at this stage for a protreptic account of terms mentioned in this chapter. Adorno explicates his style most fully in the essay Der i�!.·say als F�rm (The Essay as Form) ,1 and in the book Minima Moralia.2 It iH in these that his engagement with Nietzsche is most evident. Much of Adorno's critique of philosophy and of sociology is drawn from his n·ception of Nietzsche's philosophy. Adorno opposed the separation of philosophy from sociology since it nrnounted, in his opinion, to the separation of substantial issues from the d� v Jopment of methodology and empirical techniques. His own concern with 'm th od ' and 'style' was of a diffe rent order. Adorno's 'methods' pre:lent s minal id as; they are not devices imposed on material in order x plain it. 'M thod' (and even more 'style' ) means for tw "11 i a and the composition of texts. It does no t
G r
I
plying th fn
tiv
ries.
12
The Melancholy Science
concepts, and the relation of a thought or a concept to what it is intended to cover, its object, is problematic. It follows from this that standard modes of communication are also inadequate, since they depend on the ordinary use of concepts. The question of communicating his ideas becomes the question of what the reader should experience when confronting the text, and Adorno insists that expressing the relation of the thought to its object should be prior to any concern with ease of communicating that thought. As he tersely puts it, 'Truth is objective, not plausible' .3 He is not unconcerned with communication, but aims to find alternative modes of communication. Criticism and composition in Adorno's works are thus inseparable. Adorno describes his programme, as presented in his book Negative Dialectic, as an anti-system, 4 and his texts may be equally well described as anti-texts- as he in fact describes Hegel's texts.5 Most of Adorno's books consist of reprinted articles which were first published in journals as essays, articles, notes, mopographs or reviews. Others were originally radio broadcasts, and a few were introductions to or synopses of academic conferences.6 He gave them titles which stress their fragmentary nature, such as 'notes', 'prisms', 'models' . 7 Adorno wrote in a variety of styles, some more, some less abstruse. He is, however, notorious for his esoteric style. There is less unity in his style than this reputation suggests, and his ideas are presented in both more and less accessible ways. I t is difficult to understand this reputation because Adorno discussed his method and style in everything he wrote, often at the expense of discussing the ostensible subject of the piece. In addition he wrote specific essays on titles, 8 on punctuation, 9 on his use offoreign words, 10 on different kinds of texts, 1 1 on form, 12 on syntax and on semantics. 1 3 His articles on literature are largely concerned with language and style.l4 Writers, musicians, philosophers and sociologists are discussed by Adorno as if they shared his preoccupation with style. Every critical essay on another's work emphasises the relation between thought and its presentation. This concern is equally evident in his major works which display, primafacie, more continuous texts.15 Almost every page of these works includes a self conscious reference to method and style. Adorno uses several stylistic strategies in the attempt to present the object of his thought and to 'see beyond' the subject.1 6 When he discusses 'thought' and 'mind' he uses impersonal and passive constructions. 'Thought' and 'mind' are not attributed to 'us' but are frequently personified, sometimes by dramatic metaphor .17 Other stylistic strategies are directed at the experience of the reader. He describes these strategies as 'shock', 18 'exaggeration', 19 'fantasy' , 20 or 'provocative formulations' . 21 An idea 'provocatively formulated' may be left and not enlarged up n, but may be restated later in the text with many diffe rent emp h as s. Thi giv san im ression of con fusion but in fa t amounts t as t fpn aU ,
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'3 apparent displacements of an obj ect due to changes of observation point. This is quite consistent with the idea that the object cannot be captured, and that a set of presentations may best approximate it. Adorno sometimes calls this a 'constellation' , 22 and he also describes this way of composing texts as 'para tactic', 23 'concentric' , 2 4 'as a spider's web', 2 5 and as a 'densely woven carpet' .26 In letters to Rolf Tiedemann, Adorno explained the construction of his Asthetische Theorie (Aesthetic Theory) , and although he says that his previous books were conventional by comparison, the difference is only one of degree.27 The Asthetische Theorie was written 'concentrically, in equally weighted, paratactic parts which are ordered around a middle point which is expressed by the constellation of the parts' . 28 'Parataxis' means placing propositions one after the other without indicating relations of co-ordination or subordination between them. In another letter he explains why he writes in this paratactic manner . . . from my theorem that there are no philosophical first prin ciples, it follows that one cannot construct a continuous argument with the usual stages, but one must assemble the whole from a series of partial complexes . . . whose constellation not [logical] sequence produces the idea. 29 Adorno explains in several places why he disregards the norms of st andard philosophical argument, 30 but he does not describe the mode, half way between argument and trope, which he puts in its place chiasmus. (Chiasmus is a grammatical figure by which the order of words in one clause is inverted in a second clause.) Adorno usually inverts the tcrms of the second of two antitheses in order to turn them into a d iasmus, 3 I thus: ab ba. Each antithesis is usually a tautology which has iuq o rta n ce in itself. The use of chiasmus stresses the transmutation of 1 ro sses into entities which is the fundamental theme of Adorno's work. He pres ·nts this theme in this way in order to avoid turning processes into 11 1 iti s hi mself. Sometimes he uses chiasmus directly, for example, 'the NIJI�i<� t is th o�j ect , the object is the subject'; or, 'history i s nature, nature iH hi!! tory' . At other times it can be seen to inform the whole structure of a j1i1·cc. His arti leon static and dynamic as sociological categories depends 11V1'r I I on th dev lopm nt of the chiasmus 'static presupposes dynamic, dyu mi suits in stati '.n This chiasmus reveals a more general one wlti ·I , i . ny v r i ns, u nderli s all Adorno's thinking and which Ml w h w h li· riti ism finl II tual and artistic produ ts to ty f i y. h n I
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The Melancholy Science
bj ect ( in non-dialectical sciences) : ( what has happened to) the object has determined methodology .
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The Essay as Form
Adorno considered his essay of this title, written between 1 954 and 1 958/14 to be one of the earliest statements of his programme. 3 5 This is a st range judgement because the piece is concerned with issues raised by Adorno since 1 93 1 ,36 but it does indicate the importance which he attached to it. The title alludes to Lukacs' essay 'On the Nature and Form of the Essay' which introduced Lukacs' book Soul and Form, published in Hungarian in 1 9 1 0 and in German in 1 9 1 1 .37 Adorno's essay introduces the first of his four small volumes of notes on literature. He repeats many of Lukacs' points, especially the idea that the essay is a 'modest' form which makes no claim to capture the ultimate, or the actuality of life.38 Lukacs was developing Georg Simmel's distinction between life and form, 3 9 whereas Adorno considers the essay to be the form best suited to a philosophy which has renounced the philosophical system.4 0 In both discussions there is little or no reference to society. Adorno justifies the use of the essay in several ways. It is best suited for criticism of cultural products ( Gebilde, 'forms' ) without itself relying on any notion of origin, first principles, the given or the immutable.41 While he considers that the essays of Simmel, Lukacs, Benjamin and Rudolf Kassner shared features with his essays, he is in fact prescribing how the essay should be constructed and how it should function. 4 2 An essay always takes a cultural product as its object, interprets such products as social and historical formations43 and assesses their truth content from that perspective.44 However, Adorno says much less about how the essay should examine a work than he does about how it should proceed itself. He states that the theme of the essay is the relation between culture and nat ure,45 but that this theme must be presented in a way which does not r<'produce a cultural form of the kind which is being examined . The essay has all the feat!lres of the 'anti-system' . I t proceeds by way of parallaxes w h ic h Adorno describes here as 'experimenting': 'For whoever seeks to l'ri l icise must necessarily experiment. He must create conditions under w h ich an object becomes visible anew . . . '46 Adorno enlarges his position by pitting it against three of Descartes' lilllr rules of method in his Discourse on Method.47 He thus opposes the !I� ond rule, to divide the object 'into as many parts as possible, and as s ems necessary in order to resolve it in the best way',48 as a version of the traditional theory that analysis of elements is the same as the analysis of the st ructure ofbeing, or that an ordering schema of concepts corresponds t th rd r f r ality.49 He rej ects Descart s' third rule, 'to pr d
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according to my thoughts, thus commencing with objects that were the most simple and easy to understand, in order to rise gradually as it were by degrees to knowledge of the most complex' .50 Thinking for Adorno starts from the complex and is not separated into progressive stages. The fourth rule is also disputed, 'to make enumerations so complete and summations so general "that one would be sure to have left nothing out" ' .51 Adorno starts from the assumption of a split and antagonistic reality which cannot be adequately represented by any system which makes its goals unity and simplicity or clarity.52 The essay, on the other hand, 'thinks in breaks ( in Briichen) because reality is brittle (briichig) and finds its unity through the breaks, not by smoothing them over' .5 3 It lies between art and science, 54 and, since it takes historical and cultural products as its object, results in a philosophy of culture (Kulturphilosophie) .55 Adorno claims that this does not diminish its value, but that the essay is the 'critical form par excellence' . 56 Adorno is well aware that any form which abandons the conventions of discursiveness runs the risk of being obscure or arbitrary or even a vehicle for shallow thinking, and of smudging the distinctions between these faults.57 Adorno's dicta concerning the relation between thought and style also apply to the use of language. Hence the distinction between the expression (Ausdruck) of truth and communication ( Mitteilung) of it58 affects the use of words as well as the overall structure of Adorno's texts.59 One outcome of this is his refusal to define terms, 60 another is that the same term is used in many different senses. He believes that it is impossible to eliminate the 'mythical remainder' from language and that therefore this aspect of language must be enlisted in the expression of truth, and not expunged from it.61 By 'mythical remainder', Adorno means that history is congealed in language and that to rationalise language by purifying words of acquired connotations is impossible. Therefore any attempt to do so merely results in creating another kind of myth.6 2 The demand that ideas should be expressed clearly and simply amounts to a demand that 'expressive residues' should be eliminated for the sake of ease of communication, according to Adorno. This does not result in an 'objective', 'scientific' style but in a kind of distortion. Conversely, whenever he examines a work ofphilosophy, sociology or art, he is as much concerned with its linguistic features as with any other feature. One of his best known books, Jargon rifAuthenticity, 63 is a criticism of a particular use of language. Criticism of language (Sprachkritik) , like ri t i ism of cu l tural forms (Kulturkri!Jk) , is philosophy and criticism of so i ty for Ad rn o .
The Melancholy Science Minima Moralia
Moralia is Adorno's best-written book and the most successful tyli t i all y . It was written between 1 944 and 1 94 7 in German when he s in A merica. It consists of three parts divided according to when they r written. Each part is divided into around fifty sections and each t i n is numbered and headed by a title. Adorno subtitled the whole k ' R eflections from Damaged Life' and each section contains a 0 t ion or an 'essay' in the sense of a short tentative on a theme. Most ns over o.nly a page or less, although a few are several pages long. A n is often connected closely with the succeeding one . In the i a t ion, Adorno justifies the form of the book in much the same way in whi h he justified the essay in Der Essay als Form. The book was written ' f m t h standpoint of subjective experience' . 6 4 It contains reflections on r nal experiences, on society, on art, on philosophy, on psychology, d n a host of related topics. H Minima Moralia is written from 'the subjective standpoint', then gative Dialectic is written from 'the objective standpoint' . 6 5 The second r t h s books, although fragmentary like the first, constitutes the most i t s t a t e ment of Adorno's ideas, free of irony. Minima Moralia is much I s formal in its tone and often lyrical in style and relies greatly on ' i i r t m e t hods', especially ironic inversion. 66 This indirect and more i i s yn ratic way of presenting his ideas is what Adorno means by 'the u t iv · standpoint' . In Minima Moralia Adorno's use of ironic inv r i n is most explicit, while in other texts the inverted ways in which h r n t s his ideas about society are less obvious because the irony is less vi us. A dorno, like many essayists and ironists, has thus been read far lit rall y , and this is partly because some of his texts are stylistically h mor meticulous than others. 1inima Moralia is ironic in the two standard senses of the word: ' x r sion of meaning by use of words normally conveying the opposite ing ', and 'apparent perversity of fate or circum!'itance' . Adorno es w 11-known titles of works, phrases and ideas and changes one or t wo words so as t o convey the opposite meaning. He proceeds to expound t h . id a i nvolved as if he took the new meaning literally. This device is l· ign d in fa t to revert attention to the original idea and thus to reassess i t . Som tim s he uses the original phrase and conveys the ironic inversion i n hi i ussion. Som t i mes h e just states the inversion and does not i t . Furt h rmor , all t h s inv rsion of w l l-known id as imply x t r m ly p fat , and has t u rn d i ty h ny lil r I f his i I Minima
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nor pure validity', and he warns that 'dialectical knowledge is taken all too literally by its opponents' .67 If someone asks that we do not take him literally, then we should, presumably, not take the advice not to take him literally, literally. To follow the original injunction consistently means both that we must sometimes not take it literally and that sometimes we must. This would seem a chaotic principle for exegesis, but in fact Adorno usually undermines his own hyperbole and auxesis quite clearly him self.68 In this way Adorno manages to criticise society and present his ideas without grounding them in any of the ways which he considers illegitimate. n ��ample of ironic inversion is 'The Health unto Death',69 the title of\-.a/ section and an inversion of Kierkegaard's title The Sickness unto Death, 70 and which introduces reflections on society's definition of health and normality.71 Another example is 'This side of the pleasure prin ciple', 72 an inversion of the title of Freud's book Beyond the Pleasure Principle.73 The whole book, however, is based on three key inversions. The first is indicated by the title Minima Moralia which alludes to Aristotle's Magna Moralia and also suggests Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil. 74 The second major inversion is 'The whole is the false', 75 an inversion ofHegel's principle 'the whole is the true' . 76 The third inversion is contained in his description of the book as 'the melancholy science' ( die traurige Wissenschajt) 77 which is an allusion to Nietzsche's book The Joyful Science (die frohliche Wissenschajt) . 78 Sometimes Adorno makes the in version of a theme clear by setting one section up as the direct antithesis of another, usually the preceding one79 and by also making it clear that neither are to be taken literally .80 As in all his texts, some passages contain explicit directions for reading the book, 81 and in other places he describes his method
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. . . limitation and reservation are no way to present the dialectic.7 Rather, the dialectic advances by way of extremes, driving thoughts C> with the utmost consequence to the point where they turn back on ', themselves, instead of qualifying them.8 2 Adorno discusses irony too 'by way of extremes'. He defines irony as 'the difference between ideology and reality', and says that this difference 'has disappeared' .83 Hence the classic procedure of irony which 'convicts its object by presenting it as what it purports to be . . . and without passing judgement . 8 4 is no longer possible, because there is no point in u n m as k i ng fai lure to measure up to a standard when the standard is ' i t s If a li 8 Yet Adorno does believe that some standards are not lies; he d dd i n t rpr"t at i n t ir ny, and h doe use iron y in the way in ays t ha t i t i s n I n r p ssibl t i t . F r h is fin whi h h ' h fi ' ' r · h wh I 1"-w h r· .
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The Melancholy Science
immanent method': if' Irony says: such it [ideology] claims to be, but such [ rcal i ty] is', 8 6 then irony works in the same way as the 'immanent' 1 o cdure which takes the 'objective idea'8i of a work, whether philosophical, sociological, literary or musical, and 'confronts it with the 1 orms w h ich it itselfhas crystallized' .88 Adorno explains the rationale of t h is ' i mmanent procedure'89 in terms which are identical with his d · l i n e a t ion of 'irony's medium' as 'the difference between ideology and t�ality', namely, 'It takes seriously the principle that it is not ideology in i tsd l" wh ich is untrue butrather its pretension to correspond to reality' .H0 Thes 1 rocedures, however named, are 'objectivist' ones, that is, they are designed to make the object 'speak for itself' . Thus whether Adorno wri t es from the 'subjective standpoint' or from the objective standpoint, 9 1 h is m e t hod s turn out to be fundamentally the same. This d iscussion of Adorno's method in Minima Moralia is not intended t t n d own the ideas or to deflect attention from what Adorno says. Minima Moralia is the book in which Adorno most appears to describe society. H owever, if one reads it literally, it appears to be selfontrad ictory and self-defeating, owing to the prevalence of ideas such as ' t lw t o t a l society', 'the end of the individual', and 'complete reification', w h i h imply that no critical consciousness is possible. In order to see that t h is is n ot t he case, it is necessary to know how to interpret these id7as, in �hort , to u nderstand the workings of Adorno's dialectic. iL
'I he Tradition of Irony
Adorno's engagement with Nietzsche is evident throughout his work. He l .l it•ved t h at he was confronted by the same paradox which beset N i t zsche, namely, how to present or ground a philosophy or point of vi w w h e n t he aim of that philosophy is to criticise reality or society al t oge t her a nd thus the prevailing norms of philosophical or sociological d is o u rse as wel l . Both writers, therefore, according to Adorno use ' i n l i r t met hods'!l2 to express their criticism and to avoid grounding t h r i r p h i losoph y in the ways which they deem undesirable. Adorno self <"< llsc iously but unobtrusively weaves many of Nietzsche's positions into h is own t hough t , often by inverting them as a way of appropriating them. l1or c·xample, Adorno's pronouncement that 'Life does not live' (Das /.rhm Lebt nicht) ,11:l w h ic h introduces the first part of Minima Moralia, is an i n version of t he message which runs through Nietzsche's philosophy - the rot n rnand m e n t t o ' l ive l i fe ' . These connections between Nietzsche and I no i n form a l l of t h l a t t r's oeuvre, b u t they are most explicit i n Minima Moralia.
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and ungroundable . Yet both Nietzsche and Adorno undercut and contradict even their most sacred assertions and provide instructions for interpreting their strongly-voiced claim The works of both must be read from a methodological point of view and not literally. In both cases too, their work was designed to resist popularisation, but in effect encouraged it. They tried, in very different ways, to make their style esoteric in order to defy the norms which they opposed, and they wrote in essays or in fragments to avoid the appearance and presuppositions of the traditional philosophical system. Yet fragments and aphorisms are easily detachable and equally . easily misunderstood, since their significance can only be appreciated on the basis of an understanding of the whole of which they are the fragments - hence the paradoxes that such idiosyncratic and radical thinkers can be so widely and quickly assimilated but so often misunderstood. Nietzsche wrote for the most part a lapidary, brilliant German which was often deceptively clear, while Adorno's German ranges from the poetic to the obtuse. Both men, nevertheless, fired the imagination of the younger generation, and had a strong effect on the work of their respective epigoni. Adorno shared Nietzsche's programme of a 'tr<}nsvaluation of all values' .94 'Morality', 'values' and 'norms' do not imply a moral dimension d�stinct from other dimensions but characterise the con struction and imposition of 'reality'. N ietzsche, according to Adorno, refused 'complicity with the world'95 which, where Adorno is concerned, comes to mean rejecting the prevalent norms and values of society on the grounds that they have come to legitimise a society that in no way ,_ corresponds to them - they have become 'lies'. 96 Adorno shared Nietz� sche's epistemological aim to demonstrate that the apparent fixity of the world or values arises from the systematic debasement of dynamic aspects of reality in our thinking and philosophy. Like Nietzsche, Adorno was a moralist, concerned to find a method by which his alternative moral perspective could be conveyed, but he faces the difficulties of justifying a moral position when he has apparently rejected all morality, of stating that position when he has rej ected the prevalent norms of communication, and of adhering to any position at all without reaffirm ing the superior status of static as opposed to dynamic ways of thinking. Nietzsche called one of his books by the provocative title Beyond Good and Evil, but its theme is 'the conscience of method' .97 Similarly Minima Moralia is preoccupied with 'the morality of thinking'9 8 and with 'morality and s tyle' .99 In t h e book Dialectic of Enlightenment, which Horkheimer and Adorno wrote toge the r they developed the idea that so�:;iety, culture and la nguag as a w hole are ideological or a 'lie' . This amounted to an n t t h a t t h · pr vai ling id eology is impenetrable and that n · v ·rsa l Ia whi h is t h' arri r f privil ged alternative
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The Melancholy Science
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knowledge . They also exposed ambivalences in the original ideals of the ' l i h tenment to show how it is that an ideology which describes society KO inadequately and incorrectly has yet attained unchallenged he !( ·mony . T_hey trace the icl�a of'enlightenment' from the Kantian notions of autonomy and organisation 100 to Nietzsche ' s exposure of 'enlighten nwn t ' as the unity of reason and domination. 101 The dialectic is between two aspects of the concept of reason (in Kant) , one which
as t he transcendental, supraindividual self, . . . comprises the idea of a f ree h uman social life in which men organize themselves as the universal subject and overcome the conflict between pure and ·mpirical reason in the conscious solidarity of the whole. This r presents the idea of true universality: utopia. At the same time, however, reason constitutes the court of judgement of calculation, which adjusts the world for the ends of self-preservation and recognizes 1 o fu nction other than the preparation of the object from mere sensory material in order to make it the material of subjugation.1 0 2 This duality is the Enlightenment's notion of reason between freedom and
ubj ugation, a duality heightened in the subsequent course of history, h s given rise to a 'dialectic of enlightenment' .1°3 The second aspect of r ason has informed men's activiry, while the first set of conno· 1. t i ns has prevailed as the ideal which masks that activity. This int ·rpretation ofreason ( Vernunft) owes a lot to Nietzsche and the authors 'f d i t h i m with this, 'Nietzsche was one of the few after Hegel who r . · gn ized the dialectic of enlightenment' 1 0 4 They quote Nietzsche's vi �w t hat . . . princes and statesmen should be unmistakably aware that ry t hing they do is an intentional lie . . . ' .105 lt_is a 'lie' or 'false' ause it involves 'the reduction and malleability of men', 1 06 but also use Nietzsche has an instrumental theory of truth. Truth is whatever is i mposed as truth and thus has no ultimate validity. Truth, for N i t zsche, is 'will to power ' . Thus when he says that something is 'false' or . · ' l i ' he t oo is using 'false' as an instrument and imposition. Hyperbole is t hus · f(>rm employed obliquely to counteract the prevailing imposition, an I t he con t e n t of any proposition presented by such means is not to be t ak e n l i t e ral ly . Although Horkheimer and Adorno did not subscribe to an i n. t r u m c n t a l t heory of truth they took over Nietzsche's position in a way which cnabl d t hem to point out the universality of domination. I n A l/inirna Moralia, A d or n o argues that in order to avoid the 'lie' or 'Kh �r fa ! h d' and to expose it for what it is, Nietzsche pretends to be m >n l l i t who r j ts t h moral distinct ions of the world, sometimes by I I r t h imm ral ist, wh ing t l ppos s what t h w rid h t i a l l y ndors s what . A orno i il s, . !k t .
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even Proust prejudice and falsify the image of the world in order to shake off falsehood and prejudice?' . 1 07 He considers that he is the amoralist for his own time as Nietzsche was for his, •As a guarantee of his undiminished resistance, he [the amoralist] is still as alone in this as in the days when he turned the mask of evil upon the normal world, to teach the norm to fear its own perversity' .108 The position of the amoralist is a profoundly moral one, 'Anti-morality, in rej ecting what is immoral in morality, . inherits morality's deepest concern . .' . 1 0 9 The way in which Adorno describes Nietzsche's position is very close to his own discussion of irony and of the immanent method: �
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Nietzsche belongs to that tradition of bourgeois thinkers who since the Renaissance have revolted against the untruth of society and cynically played its reality [deren Wahrheit] as an 'ideal' against its ideal, and by the critical power of the confrontation have helped that other truth [i.e. its ideal] which they mock most fiercely as the untruth . . .U0 Pitting reality against ideals is a way to criticise both the ideals and the reality without assuming a different fixed reality or a dogmatic stand point . Adorno, of course, belongs to this tradition too. -F-or both Nietzsche and Adorno, according to the latter, it is necessary to show how entities are constructed out of the dynamic processes of the world or of society in order to explain how the ideas and beliefs (or 'norms' or 'values' ) about the world which are the targets of their criticism have attained hegemony . To examine the formation of beliefs about the world or about society is equally to examine the formation of the world or of society and, ex hypothesi, to criticise such beliefs is to criticise society or the world. For example, the mode of production of com modities gives rise to systematically mistaken beliefs about them, such as that (exchange) value is a property of the commodity. This belief is inseparable from the formation of the commodity qua commodity, that is, from the production of value in exchange. The processes which underlie the formation must not be made into ontological principles since they would then display precisely those features of reality which are being exposed as apparent. In Nietzsche's case, 'will to power' constitutes the world and our mode of thought; in Adorno's case, processes of production (mode of production) constitute society and our mode of thought . Both r writers stress an underlying 'reality' as process or, as they call it, Werden L ( becoming) . 'Becoming' is a notoriously vague emphasis shared by many phi losophers and sociologists but meaning manydifferent things. Neither N ietz: he nor Adorno refers to it as the principle of reality, nor do they nd i t to r f< r to events rather than entities. d viv d N i tzs h 's emphasis on Werden as the basis of his . p s i i l i t of gr u n in phil s phy r so iology on a
The Melancholy Science l i st principle, and of his cnticism of the traditional subject/object
eli h ot o m y.
Marx and most post-Hegelian philosophical and social may also be construed as refusing such grounds.l 1 1 Adorno considered, however, that Nietzsche's version was the most successful and a p p ro p r iat e for his time, because he believed that only the ironist or the K t y l is t consistently refuses to reground his thought. Adorno, like Lukacs, is known for having developed a Hegelianised Marxism . However, Adorno's thought cannot be understood unless it is realised that any '' H egel ian' terminology is reintroduced on the basis of a Nietzschean ' nvcrsion . ' 1 2 This is not true of Lukacs' work. Adorno was concerned to show, t oo, that fresh attempts to ground philosophy and sociology on ind u bi t ab l e first principles which had occurred since Nietzsche and J .u kacs wrote were just as illegitimate as the classical ones. Adorno in fact considered that Lukacs' Marxist writing constituted precisely such an at tempt . The main targets of Adorno's criticism were the twentieth ·en t u r y a tt e m pts to break out of philosophical idealism which he believed had r el a p sed back into it, such as the philosophy of Husser! and of H c i d cgge r , and sociological 'relativisms' which rely on classificatory pri n c ip l es to ground their object, for example, the 'situational' aspects of I arl M an nhei m's concept of total ideology.1 13 H nee, for Adorno, Nietzsche's 'liberating act, a true turning point of Western thought . . .', that he 'refuses homage to the speculative con cpt , t he hypostasis of the mind' 1 14 is still pertinent and valid for the crit icism of philosophical and social thought. Adorno means that 'mind' (UI'isl) has been falsely made into the autonomous foundation of now ledge i n philosophical systems. The notion of'mind' itself is merely a co n s t ru c t , a formation, which has acquired the status of an eternal and il!lmutable principle. 'Truth' (and identity) does not consist of cor n•s pon d e n ce between consciousness and reality or between concepts and t h t' i r objects, it is an instrument imposed on the reality which it cons t ru ts. Adorno thus developed Nietzsche's criticism of 'identity p h i l osop h y ' in his own restatement of the Marxian criticism of Hegel and p h i loso p h y and sociology. He is perhaps the only nco-Marxist to make N it·t zschc's cri t icism of logic (identity) into social criticism . Adorno's cri ticism of our usual way of thinking, which he calls 'identity t h i n k i ng', is based on an instrumental notion of logic, on a 'will to id!'l l t i t y ' and, as i n N ietzsche's case, this does not involve denying the laws or t hough t . T h is crit icism at tempts to yield insight into the way rol lccpts a re G rm d and i m posed . Adorno q uo tes Nietzsche's at t ack on t h !' t r a d i t ion a l idea of logi , ' N o t h i ng o curs i n real i t y w h ic h s t ri t ly . p ds t l g i ' ' 1 nd end rs s t h i s p i n t , a l t h u h h on des ·I' t h lt it iN ( t t h � M m s ri t i i r tr diti n l l j . A d rn is t l w ug h t
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emphasis that to say that two things are identical is to assume incorrectly that they are independent of each other . Many passages in Negative Dialectic allude to Nietzsche's strictures on logic and Adorno's position is only cogent when understood in this light. He exposes the motive behind the construction of philosophical and sociological systems as a will to control the entire world by construing it as identical to the concepts of the system
,
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Great philosophy was accompanied by a paranoid zeal to tolerat nothing else and to pursue everything else . . . The slightest remnant o,/ non-identity sufficed to deny an identity conceived as total. 1 1 6 Adorno considers that this 'desire to control' determines every individual judgement as well as the impulse to construct systems, ' . . . the will to identify works in every synthesis' . 1 1 7 Although Adorno relates this interpretation of identity to a specific historical mode of production, 11 8 he also bases it on a more gener:al ' �nthropological' account which is not attributable to any specifiable carder, man or class. Adorno exclaims, somewhat rhetorically, that desite for the u nity ofthought has its origin in the battle for self-preservation. It ahses fr�m the impulse to devour anything which is different and which is th\ls considered to be inferior. Hence, 'The system is the belly turned mind, and rage is the mark of each and every idealism' . 1 1 9 Adorno attributes this insight to Nietzsche. 12 ° For example, 'It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and the For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule.'l2-1 Adorno calls the function of thought which constructs and controls nature (the world, society) the 'pragmatic' aspect of identifying. 122 He does not deny that this aspect of identifying is necessary for thinking, but he dramatises it by calling it 'false', because any thinking which is determined by the desire to control the world cannot qualify Tor tlie status of 'truth' in the conventional, disinterested sense of truth. He occasionally describes the 'necessary illusions' of capitalist society, an idea and phrase wh ich come from Marx, in very Nietzschean terms, ' Illusion is the most ejficacious [das Allerwirklichste] reality' . 123 dorno uses this Nietzschean perspect ive to emphasise that concepts are imposed. He considers that a per ·pe t i v based on a theory of interests or 'will' yields more insight into so ial m chanisms th a n for instance, Durkheim's structural approach, be a use it is able to s e the u n i ve rsal coercive mechanism of thought as a lbrma t i n , w h r ·a Durkheim ·ou ld only consider the coercive function ol' t h u h t s a ' iven ' . 1 2 4 Ni tz h
)A
,
lull
-
The Melancholy Science I L is axiomatic ( for a transformed aesthetics) that what has become can als b e t rue [dass auch das Gewordene wahr sein kann]. This mode of co n i t ion was developed in the late works ofNietzsche in opposition to l d i t ional philosophy. The traditional view which was demolished by h i m , should be turned on its head thus: only what has become is true [ Walzrheit is t einzig als Gewordenes] .126
dorno was impressed by Nietzsche's accusation that traditional phil 'the very idea of becoming . . . What is, does not become; is not . . . ' .127 In his essay Der Essay als Form, Adorno m · k e s t he sam e point ' I t [the essay] escapes the dictate of attributes which h e b n ascribed to ideas since the definition of the Symposium, "of b i n e t rnal and neither becoming nor passing away, neither changing t or de reasing"; "a Being which is by itself, for itself, eternal and of one lc> m " . . . ' . 1 2 8 Nietzsche demonstrated that many of the most cherished p h i l so p h i c a l concepts such as 'cause' and 'effect', 'ego', 'reason' , 'being', 'subj t ' and 'object' were 'reifications' and 'fetishes', constructions based on sp cific prejudices of philosophers which lead to faulty thinking. 12 9 N ictzs I e ac t ually used the word Verdinglichung and his work is certainly on of t h l ost sources of the concept. The role i t performs in Adorno's wo k ow es much to Nietzsche. Adorno adoP-ted Nietzsche�s w�_y- of p e c n t i ng con cepts so as to avoid th;-�-;��mptions under attack. H� thus el'u s s to d efine concepts and frequently quotes Nietzsche to explain this, 'all t hose concepts in which a total process is semiotically [semiotisch] mbra d escape definition; only that is definable which has no h istory ' . 1 3° For Adorno, to define a concept would be to use the kind of t h i n k i n g w hich he is criticising. Adorno tries to make Nietzsche's point l b ut h i s t ory into one about society too. He takes over Nietzsche's idea th l n epts are 'masks' and that they hide their origins and asserts that t l is is du to 'real domination' . 1 3 1 N v r t h el ess, Nietzsche and Adorno each found a way to assert I t rnat iv values, by demonstrating that apparently eternal values have hr<'n r ted i n a way which hides their formation. Adorno sometimes r pr .ss s h is position by dissenting vigorously from the one to which Nirtzs h adhered . At the �ery end of his essay on form, he quotes a p lHS ge from N i etzs che, ' If we affirm one single mo m e n t we t h u s affi rm 1101 o n l y ours l v s b ut all existence . . . and i n t h is single mom n t of allirm t i n, a l l terni ty was all d d , r d m , just i f i d, a nd h i nst n t f l i fe, of l iv Hi ' . m Ni tzs h 's 'm I i it w r t rn l, ' . . . t , to r ali e in t l j y b will t li
osop h rs 'hate' what b comes,
,
,
•
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h I
X
The Search for Style values arose from his belief that they 'denied life' . Nietzsche entitled one of his books The Joyful Science and his 'method' ( the science) is ddigned to convey these values. Adorno rej ects not the method, nor the emphasis on instants as opposed to the eternal verities of traditional philosophy, but the affirmation of 'life' . This is why the first words of the dedication of Minima Moralia describe the work as 'the melancholy science', why the book is subtitled 'Reflections from Damaged Life ' , and why the aphorism 'Life does not live' introduces the first part of the book. Furthermore, it is only from the Nietzschean perspective that sense can be made of Adorno's combination of a commitment to process and formation with the lack of any proleptic account of history. Adorno rejects all forms of historicism, whether empiricist or Hegelian. He is thus engaged in 'interventions' (Eingrif.fe) , the title of one of his essay collections, designed to prevent the affirmation of society . He comments on Nietzsche's alternative in the concluding paragraph of the essay on form, 'For the happiness of the instant which was sacred to Nietzsche, it [the essay] knows only the name of the negative' . 1 36 Adorno interprets Nietzsche's teaching as amor fati and as consecration of a new myth (as Nietzsche intended) , because such teaching continues to mask the society which underlies it.137 Both Nietzsche and Adorno resisted assimilation of their work by the __£ulture which they were criticising, but Nietzsche did not refuse to affirm 'life' because he could not affirm his culture. For Adorno 'life' could not be affirmed as something apart from the lif� 9f a culture or�_�pc!eiy-and its possibilities. Nietzsche in this sense-had no concept or theor)' ofsociety. Adoriio-too seeks to affirm 'life' but, given the present society, to affirm life is to affirm that society and thus a 'life which does not live' . Adorno instead affirms hope for a 'life (that is, a society) which lives' . He accuses Nietzsche of bowing down before 'the powers that be' 138 and ofdenying the validity of the hope that existence might be better.139 Yet Adorno is aware ofNietzsche's argument against hope; it is t he argument against philosophical idealism:
/
Nietzsche in the Antichrist voiced the strongest argument not merely against theology but against metaphysics, that hope is mistaken for t ruth; that the impossibility of living happily, or even living at all,
without the thought of the absolute, does not vouch for the legitimacy of t hat t hou g h t 1 4 0 .
The Melancholy Science ' i n t rventions'. He says that they should not glorify the past, nor set a l t rnative dogmas. To avoid such absurdity, they should be n t a n t l y provocative .142 Thus the notion of a 'dialectic of enlightenment' is an interpretation of N i ·tzs he, and not of Max vVeber, 14 3 and the emphasis on the social i sit ion of concepts is also based on an interpretation of Nietzsche not urkheim. However, Adorno's work displays the serious difficulties r nt in any attempt to make Nietzsche's ideas into sociological ones, wh t h r within a Marxist cr non-Marxist context. Adorno is aware that N ' tz he has no general concept of society nor thus of a specific kind of i t y , fo r example, capitalist society. Nietzsche's criticism of 'values' hi xposure of the 'will to power' by which concepts and ideas are d , do not logically depend on being located in a subject, social or ial, nor thus in a social group or class.l44 I t is precisely such p s i tions which Nietzsche was refusing. Sociologically, his per iv has often been used to stress the universality and impersonality of i nat i n, but it cannot provide any sociological theory of the origin or w k i n of that 'domination', that is, any theory of power . 1 45 Dialectic rif ''nlighten ment illustrates the difficulty of linking a general theory of the inat ion of' nature with a theory of a specific kind of society. In rn 's work the link is established by the theory of reification which u p r ts to describe the mechanism of domination in a specific mode of u t i o n . This theory, too, is presented in a variety of ways, some of apparently self-contradictory, such as 'total reification' , 'total 1', ' t he end of the individual' . For Adorno is dramatising these , p rese n t i ng them as if they were absolutely and literally true, in \ t u n d er m ine them more effectively. '
Chapter 3 The Lament over Reificati on
Reification as a Sociological Category
The concept of reification has been overworked in sociology and thus made to bear an enormous amount of theoretical responsibility. The reasons for this need to be recovered in order to reassess the suitability of 'reification' for such a central theoretical role. Marx reconstructed the way specific social relations between men result in a definite mode of production (or form of society) which he also described as a social form .I Where capitalism is concerned, Marx started his analysis from the commodity form as the most elementary and crucial social form: What I started out from is the simplest social form in which the labour product is presented in contemporary society, and this is the 'com modity' . I analyse it, and right from the beginning, in theform in which it appears.2
The Melancholy Science
The concept of reification in the later neo-Marxist tradition was .vi d i n order to generalise Marx's theory of value as the model of p i t a li s ti c social forms, and to apply it to social institutions and to u l t ur . Emphasis on the theory of commodity fetishism has obfuscated t h importance of the structure of the theory of value on which the ncy of 'commodity fetishism' depends. 'Reification' has often been u d in order to generalise the theory of value and of commodity fetishism w i t hout taking up the theory of surplus value or any theory of class � rmation, and without developing any theory of power and the state. ·
Historical
he Abuse of 'Reijication' n l i ke t he Marxian concept of 'alienation' and the Durkheimian p t of 'anomie', 6 'reification' has no canonical source, and it has me prominent and debased as much by insinuation as by scrupulous amination . Frequently, most of nineteenth-century German social t h ught has been construed as contributing to the debate over reification: 'Th onc ept of reification, one of the most important legacies of the rman i ntellectual tradition to modern social thought . . . , 7 and Marx n as merely one of the contributors, 'Though Schiller, Hegel, Marx, m I , and others have worked with the idea (if not always the term) of i 1 - - i r n . . . ' . 8 This debate concerns the origin and demise of i 1 t ion, t h e point in history at which reification irrupted into society, d t h possibility or impossibility of overcoming reification. Reification i n t h is on text stands for the divisiveness and fragmentation of modern · i �t y w hich is usually dated from the end of Greek antiquity! Herder, Fi h t , Schiller, Hegel and Nietzsche are said to have defined the terms of t hi u rported debate.9 On inspection those terms have not included the word Verdinglichung. More specifically sociological descriptions of modnity which arose as a response to the development of capitalism in rmany , and which dichotomise history into, for example, Gemeinschaft nd Gesellschajt, probably owe less to this earlier philosophical tradition t h· n is laimed . ·o n
'
'
29
The Lament over Reification
ation usually by using the terms synonymously .11 This has added nothing to the issue of whether there is a Marxian concept of human nature or to the analysis of the four aspects of alienation. It has merely compounded the terminological confusion which often accompanies the ostensibly most fastidious exegeses of Marx's work.12 Mitzman has launched an ambitious dichotomy between reification and alienation, designed to pick out different assumptions about individual personality and the development of mbdern society. Social . theorists who 'value . . . the creativity of the personality' and the power of the will to dominate nature, see the ' threat' of modern society in 'the unified power of culture' (reification) .13 They are contrasted with social theorists who value the harmonious personality 'which seeks not mastery over, but reconciliation with, nature' and see the 'threat' to the personality in the 'divisiveness of modern culture' and the increasing estrangement of men from their own activity (alienation) .14 Mitzman considers that Nietzsche, Simmel, Weber and Sombart were concerned with reification rather than alienation. In both cases he defines 'the threat' as the increase in 'goal-oriented activity' and in 'rationalisation' .15 However, the distinction between the two types is too rigid and it frequently breaks down in Mitzman's discussion. His inability to assign Marx to one side or the other illustrates the problem.16 Most of the theorists whom Mitzman discusses presupposed both activity and harmony, defined the divisiveness and solidity of society ( Gesellschaft) in terms of each other and recommended some sort of struggle in order t . attain communality ( Gemeinschaft) . The two types turn out to be very similar, both presupposing the loss of the possibility of exercising human abilitiesY Mitzman is in fact most concerned to establish the status sui generis of 'the sociology of reification' . Weber's sociology provides him w i th the ideal-type of this sociology, I 8 but he has no hesitation in assimilating the work of many other theorists to this ideal-type:
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Sombart's analysis of the world created by the capitalist spirit, Tonnies view of Gesellschajt, Weber's perception of inescapable bureaucrat ization, and Simmel's notion of objektiver Geist, in their suggestion of reiB. d .s.tructures hostile to the emotional and aesthetic qualities of_the h � man spirit, �r� all fundam�ntally of a p�ece with th���Y-Q.� , N 1etzsche's bnlhant aper�u mto the desiccatiQn of _ _ j}u_J:[l_�I_i: emot ion . . . 1 9 _
I n t ·ad f making t he concept o f reification more rigorous, Mitzman i n h rits and a t all t h va ari s associated w i th the term and extends t h . us' ( tl m i n a way whi h adds a C. w m re vagaries of his own . '
The Melancholy Science I 1i ·attr ibutions
of ' Reification'
-� ngl ish language and in German language works, reification is si t n t ly attributed wrongly to Hegel and to Marx. 20 Lukacs' famous t i :le, ' Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', 2 1 is the ur e f t he error that Marx used the word Verdinglichung in his section in t he f i rs t volume of Capital on the fetishism of commodities, and Herbert M ar us 's account of Hegel's philosophy in Reason and Revolution may be t he source of the mistaken belief that Hegel used the word.22 This wi lcspread misattribution has contributed to the debasement of the l • rn . A t worst, it has enabled writers to use reification as a catchword for M rx's - pis temology construed in the most general way so that reification b .ornes synonymous with objectification and does not even pertain any I u t o a specific mode ofproduction. 2 3 At best, some writers have used i f i t ion, following Lukacs, in order to generalise Marx's theory of < mmod i t y fetishism,24 but without making it their task to rehearse rx's t heory of value and thus to assess the various different ways in w h i .h t he t heory might be generalised .25 This usually results in more or I RM u ncri t i cal and faint imitations of Lukacs. In fact Lukacs, Benjamin u d Adorno each construed Marx's theory of value differently and · I t hough t he differences may appear, primafacie, to be merely differences >l' mphasis, t hey disclose profound differences of principle. The d i fleren t interpretations of Marx's theory of value arise out of the ri us emphases that Marx himself put on that theory in Capital, 26 in Tluorie.r q/ Surplus Value27 and in the Grundrisse.28 At the beginning of ,'rljJitrzl M a rx analyses the commodity as a use-value or useful object and K • 'v l u c ' . H e demonstrates that 'value' is not a natural property of the • 1 mod i t y b u t appears when products are exchanged . 2 9 This 'value' 1 t$ t ' n ts h uman labour in the abstract. Marx describes the illusions wl i � h acc o m p a n y the capitalist production and exchange of com ' 10 l i t it · s i n several ways: .
L \ 1 our ca paci t y has appropriated for itself only the subjective cond i t ions of necessary labour . . . separated from the conditions of its c·;l l izat ion [ t he objective conditions) - and it has posited these con l i t ions t h 'mselves as things, values, which confront it in an alien, rom m a nd i ng personificat ion . 3 u
The Lament over Reification
description of commodity fetishism: alienation from the activity of labour, and from the product of labour. Marx notes these aspects in the Grundrisse in the same place in which he states the proposition which contains the germ of commodity fetishism and which is repeated in Capital: The social character of activity, as well as the social form of the roduct, and the share of individuals in production here appears as something alien and objective . . . I n exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things . . . 34 The same proposition with an additional emphasis occurs in Capital. It is mistranslated in the standard English edition and this has obscured the additional emphasis. The standard English translation is ' . . . A definite social relation between men . . . assumes . . . the fantastic form of a relation between things' . 3 5 The German translated as 'the fantastic form' is die phantasmagorische Jorm36 which should be translated as 'the phantasmagoric form' in English. The epithet 'phantasmagoric' stresses the personifications as well as the strangeness of the form in which the relations between men appear. 'Phantasmagoria' means a crowd or succession of dim or doubtfully real persons. The word was coined in England in 1 802 and was taken over later into German. In the sentences which follow, Marx develops the idea of commodities as phantasmagoric: I n order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities . . . 37 Marx meant this literally. I t is not easy to appreciate this when English language translators and commentators use the standard (incorrect) translation .38 --Lukacs started his discussion of reification from the way men's productive act i vi t y becomes alien and obj ective to them under capitalism w h i c h i s why he earned the reputation of having anticipated the d i s overy of M arx's theo ry of alienation when the 1844 Manuscripts were !at r fou n d . 39 B njamin was most interested in the phantasmagoric and p r n i f i d f, rm [ o m modi t i es and the life they lead as such. Adorno w s t i n t ·r ·st d i n t h w ay a r lat ion betw en men appears in t h e I( m I' f l t u I propcr t of a t h i ng.
The Melancholy Science , 'immrl and Reification
·l's highly syncretic work fuses aspects of the philosophy of Kant, M arx and Nietzsche.40 He developed a philosophy of culture from w h i h h derived the principles of his historical sociology .41 I n turn, his work ha.d a profound influence on Weber and Lukacs and on subsequent I n menological and Marxist sociology. Many of the problems which I l ·r t tend reification as a sociological category in Marxist and non M rxist sociology are discernible in his work. Simmel deserves the reputation of being the first to claim to have n ralised Marx and to have thoroughly sociologised Nietzsche in order produce a general theory of social forms and oflife as the will to create h u r . His concept of form is complex and unifies his various h i ! s p h i cal and sociological studies. I t depends on a notion of man as a J t who acts on the world so as to engender structures which attain an u l n my independent ofhis will.4 2 Form is thus activity ofvarious kinds; nly way men can be in the world; and the products of activity, w h i h, once created, follows objective laws which pertain to them .43 The l ism which Simmel states in various ways, as life/form, subject/object, 1� 1 lly resolved in the process by which the individual may attain ' · u lt u r · ' . 4 4 This process would depend on the 'indigenous drive'45 of the ' n ividual and would 'lead the soul to itself' .46 Most of Simmel's work n i s ts of examining those historical features of modern society which r such a resolution of the dualism increasingly unlikely. Hence, gh his ideal for the resolution of the divisiveness inherent in life and p n d s on notions of drives and self-reference or self-creation, his ly i f the forces prohibiting this resolution gives rise to the simple, w I rised account ofsocial institutions, such as art, religion, cognition, w , as ' p i r i t objectified' .47 Simmel's sociology of form as human ·t i i l y and as social products, is weakened by the over-simplistic subject/ 1 lJ l di hotomy on which it depends, not, as has been frequently u , b ause of its overly formalistic nature.48 Simmel characterises I ·s' i n a similar way. A value is genuinely 'cultural' when it represents n i n lc r p n tration between 'supra-personal forms' and the development >I' t h individual subject or soul. According to Simmel, however, this r r •ly o · u rs and 'values' acquire an existence in themselves. Although Sim nwl opp sed this tendency, the process of creating values in this way waH an i n t gr a l part of the creation of objective forms.49 l is pr is Jy this mphasis on t he sui generis status of 'values' which 1 1 1 k ij ' i m I' laim tha t his sociolo y f [l rm r pr n t a g n ralisMar · d i av w us, 10 tl pp r nt li m f M r I,
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The Lament over Reijication
33
historical period, the economic forces produce a form of production which is appropriate to them, inside which, however, they grow to an extent which can no longer be accommodated in that form but burst it and create a new one - this schema is valid far beyond the economic sphere.50 Simmel saw that the realm in which his theory of forms had an affinity with Marx was in the realm of work and alienation. He drew from Capital:51 ' [the object] isolates and alienates itself from the working subject through the division of labour . . . The finished effort contains emphases, relationships, values which the worker did not intend' , 5 2 and explicitly relates his theories to commodity fetishism: The 'fetishism' which Marx assigned to economic commodities represents only a special case of this general fate of contents of culture. With the increase in culture these contents more and more stand under a paradox: they were originally created by subjects and for subjects: but their intermediate form of objectivity, which they take on in addition to the two extreme instances, they follow an immanent logic of development. In so doing they estrange themselves from their origin as well as from their purpose.53 Simmel's further claim that he is generalising Marx's theory of com modity fetishism is dubious, since he explicitly rejects a labour theory of value which he construes however as a physical theory.54 This argument illustrates his sociologically undifferentiated and individualistic notions of the subject and of the object. His challenge to Marx's theory of the value-form and the money-form in Capital is presented most fully in his Philosophic des Geldes ( Philosophy of Money) where he develops his own theory of value, of changes in the division of labour, and a theory of money, and where he clearly repudiates Marx. In this book on the philosophy of money, Simmel does not presuppose money as an object in itself, but as a social form to be derived from more basic social forms. The exchange form, and money as the means of exchange, is conceived as the social form by means ofwhich the subjective value with which an object is endowed attains an objective expression. 55 H sk t h es an ideal theory of increasingly complex modes of possession w h i h an advanced money economy may facilitate, such as control over obj t s w h i h ar n o t in immediate possession. 56 Possession is seen as the f t he individual will, as its realisation, but n a nd n h a n ·
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The Melancholy Science mple. Simmel then examines the division of labour which has d since the nineteenth century, for the role of money can only be st ood in that context. 58 In fact the division oflabour has caused the s m e n t of individual culture and personality, rather than its n han ement, a 'culture of things' has grown rampant.59 Simmel 1 1 lyses the separation of the worker from his product, the creation by h w rker of only part of the product, and the impersonal way in which p u ts are consumed.6 0 He now considers the division of labour from t l p i n t of view of the worker or creator and not from the point ofview of t l po sessor. The scientist as much as the factory worker is covered by the t ry of worker. Simmel's contention that all social activity involves t l pr du c tion of forms prevents him from distinguishing between we rker and artist or scientist, and from distinguishing between the sellers 1'1 b u r and the owners of capital, even though his work strains towards I d is ti n ction. Thus he reaches divergent views when he considers an v n d e co n om y from the perspective of possibilities of possession and t h perspective of work. ft •r u tlining the separation of objective from subjective culture, wh' h results from the increased specialisation of work in industrial ' ty, and the subsequent poverty of inner life, Simmel reconsiders the I f money He suggests that money may enable the inner, private life n uri h agai n by leaving men an exclusively personal sphere removed m t he sphere ofindifferent objects.61 If this occurs, and that depends on n t on money, 6 2 then money could constitute a significant nt rt endency to the general one. On the other hand, money may n t i n u to make men even more heteronomous, beholden to the rule of l , u a T he re are many indications that Simmel believed that the l ·nd n y would continue and that money would not play a I tl li ti role.64 I t is the passage i n which Simmel half-heartedly ts t l at money might provide a counter-force which Lukacs quotes I is s y on ' Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' . I t is . < n l y pa sage which Lukacs quotes in his essay in which an instance of L h t• w e r I 'reifi ation' actually occurs. •
.
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.
Thus S i m mel has this to say about the ideological structure of r!' i f i ·at ion i n consciousness: 'And therefore once these counter tenden c ies a r adopt ed, they may strive toward an ideal of absolu tely pure �1 ara t i n : very o bj e ct i ve content of life will become more objective f 11 I i m p 'rs nal so t hat t he n on reif i abl e remainder may become a l l the rnor ' p ·r onal and a l l t h mor i n d isputably t h e pr p rt y of th g .
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The Lament over Reijication
35
word 'reify' or its parts. The ambiguities in his notion of culture, which sometimes means 'spirit objectified', sometimes a relation between transcendent forms and personal cultivation, sometimes objects or things devoid of substantive significance, arise from a piecemeal social ontology which consists of things as well as objects considered as objectifications. These ambiguities prefigure ambiguities in reification as a sociological category, but there is no justification for implying that Simmel was concerned with reification as such. Simmel provides enough equivo cations in his orienting concepts. There is no need to add more. The Young Lukacs and the Young Benjamin
'----l:;ukacs, Benjamin and Adorno all reacted against their formal neo Kantian philosophical training by immersing themselves in non-Marxist nineteenth-century criticisms of Hegel's philosophy or of romanticism before they adopted versions of Marxism, and each produced major works in the non-Marxist tradition. They each centred their later wprk on Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, construed in a way which displayed continuities with their earlier work and with the other critical traditions which they had inherited, but in a way which evinced a deeper grounding in Marx than is evident in Simmel's writings. In each case the discovery of Marx encompassed the discovery of society, that is, of the social determinations of human activity, and made it necessary for the writer to define his relationship with the sociological tradition. Each accomplished this and maintained continuity with his earlier work by revising the other critical philosophical traditions in a sociological direction. The most important continuity was the interest in c ure rather than society. After the adoption of Marxism, 'culture' was predicated on the theory of commodity fetishism and hence on a specific mode of production or kind of society, but the notion of 'culture' retained the more general or universal connotations. In each case, too, 'reification' was elevated over the theory of commodity fetishism and made to do more general sociological work in a way which had important theoretical consequences. It meant that the distinction between abstract and concrete labour, on which the theory of value and of commodity fetishism logically depends, received no emphasis and thus no theory of surplus value was adopted. The theoretical foundations for a theory of class conflict or for a Marxian theory of power and the state were thereby t t enuated or abandoned.
3
The Melancholy Science
t ionships between the 'soul' and cultural form as affording partial ssib'lities for recapturing an inherently split and uncapturable total ' i t y .07 he interest in 'totality' and in cultur� continued after Lukacs had do t ed Marxism . In Soul and Form the connection with Simmel is more one of vocabulary than of approach, for Lukacs was toying equally with a Kierkegaardian irony in his examination of aesthetic forms. In some of t he essays a debate between different philosophical theories of 'form' and totality is clearly and dramatically presented .68 As Lukacs became more int erested in Marx and in sociology he also tried to use Simmel's sociology more intensively as a way of unifying these perspectives. I n an article published in Hungarian in 1 9 1 0, 'Theory of the History of Literature' ,69 Lukacs grappled with 'form' in the attempt to unite aesthetic and s iological perspectives. 'Form' is now seen as that which makes l i t rature a social fact; 7 0 while sociology, according to Simmel's definition o Ci t as the science of the forms of sociation ( Formen der Vergesellschajtung) , nd, as in Simmel's Philosophy of Money, an eminent example, 'is esponsible for everything which Marxism calls ideology' . 71 The second or t hree essential points of contact between sociology and philosophical st hetics which Lukacs makes in this article informs the structure and on rns ofhis Theory ofthe Novel, 7 2 namely, the question of which literary forms are possible in which epochs. 7 3 The theme is still treated in the book in a predominantly philosophical vein. An article published in 1 920, 'The I u l t ure and the new culture', 74 and written from an explicitly Marxist vi wpoint, reveals clearly the limitations in Lukacs' fusion of Marxism d t he Simmelian notion of culture which was to dog his later work. The ld not ion of culture as a value in itself, as everything which is not ' t inted' by the material processes of society, is preserved in Lukacs' a g u m e n t that culture will only be possible when capitalism has ended nd cuh ure can become 'autonomous' again . Lukacs owes the idea of the f' ag m c n t a t i on of products under capitalism to Simmel's criticism of the ' :ul t urc of things' .75 This position is quite different from Benjamin's and Adorno's analysis of capitalism as precisely creating the conditions which 1 k e cult ure 'autonomous' by severing cultural forms from other social nst i l u t ions. I n t he latter case 'culture' is not a designation reserved for what is 'a v a l u e in itself' but always designates a relation between a mode of' p od uct ion and cultural forms. Adorn was deeply impressed by Benjamin from his youth .76 After the Second World War, it was largely Adorno's editing and publishing of B .njam i n 's work w h i ch created the reputation ofBenjamin's a:uvre17 as a phil phi t.l ndeavour consisting of commentaries on and criticisms of li ry t t .7H Ad rn 's i n t rpr tat ion of Be nj a mi n ' s work was mor ft nj 's d t h t han it was t t h t i m wh n Ad rn ft Ii i n t I I .t I id 1 ti t nj I th i ·
•
37
The Lament over Reification
Marxist and ' Marxist' writings.8 0 He construed the pre-Marxist writings, especially Origin of German Tragic Drama, 81 in a tendentious quasi Hegelian way, depending on notions of mediation and an essence/ appearance dichotomy and he tried to force these perspectives on Benjamin's ' Marxist' writings.8 2 Benjamin was never a Hegelian . He developpd his ideas on the basis of a critique of Kant before he had read Hegel.8 On the other hand, the most apparently 'Hegelian' aspects of Adorno s materialism, such as his concern with the 'concrete' and with 'identity' were always too imbued with Benjamin's ideas to make sense from a Hegelian perspective. Missing from Adorno's work is the Hegelian notion of 'self-reference'; missing from the Marxism of both men is any notion of human activity orpraxis: ···-Benjamin's early work shows an increasing integration of sociological concerns into philosophically defined interests, prior to the explicit adoption of a Marxian position. In his doctoral thesis, Der Begrif.f der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik (The concept of art criticism in German Romanticism) , 84 he considered the Romantic theory of art to be a theory of artistic form as the medium of reflection, and assessed the relation of the fragmentary work ofNovalis and Schlegel to the systematic philosophy ofFichte. 85 Benjamin was never impressed with the Romantic response to Kant's philosophy, which depended on notions of conscious ness and self-reflection, 8 6 and he attempted instead to revise Kant's notions of experience and knowledge in his own manner.87 He did this partly by taking Goethe's notion of Urphiinomenen, which Goethe applied to the realm of nature, and applying it to the realm ofhistory,88 and also by taking Nietzsche's notions of myth and of the eternal return of the same. These Nietzschean themes, and the notions of Ursprung and Urgeschichte, provide the unity between Benjamin's pre-Marxist and his Marxist work: his search for an historical hermeneutics. Ur as a prefix in German means 'original', 'primeval', and hence 'archetypal', 'archaic' . Benjamin used the notion of the 'origin' or the 'idea' to mean the essential attributes of a thing. He sought to avoid the conventional notion of 'concept' and of 'essence' which imply the abstraction of attributes common to phenomena. Instead the 'origin' or 'idea' might be found by examining antithetical exemplars of a genre, such as Tragiidie and Trauerspiel in drama:
L
--
· ······
The history of philosophy as the science of the origin is the form which, from d istan t extremes and from apparent excesses of development, p rmits t h e emergence of the configuration of the idea as a totality h ra t r i z d by t b • p s i bi l i t y of a m e a n i ngfu l j u x tapos i t i o n of such t r m .�u an t i t h s ·s i n l r nl i n t h ·s p osi n g ll
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The Melancholy Science d y a nd Baroque Trauerspiel are each determined by their tjme in the they present the predominant myth of the time.90; Trauerspiel m n a 'melancholy' or 'mourning' play; 'funereal pageant'twould be a I liS l i t ral rendering. The myth comprises the history of the significance w l i h t he society of the time has given to nature, 91 and, as a myth, •sen ts that significance as eternal. Benjamin calls this Naturgeschichte (th his to ry of nature) .9 2 In seventeenth-century German drama, his tori al events are the subject of the plays which are thus apparently s . u la r . 9 : 1 However, Benjamin shows that the historical life of the time is 1 r ·s n t ed t hrough the contemporary theological situation and that the mblcms of ruins, relics, death-heads, have an allegorical or religious i g- 1 i f i ance: H . t ha t
T h is i s the kernel of the allegorical view, the baroque, earth-bound X [ osition of history as the story of the world's suffering; it is only si ni f i cant in the stations of its decay.94 The melancholy portrayal of objects and persons in baroque drama ·onve y the prevalent attitude to the natural world at the time. I n the , se of baroque drama the world is seen by dramatists as the history of its r ll nd thus the seemingly secular drama is a religious allegory or myth. •njamin took up in this work Lukacs' question of which literary forms p ssible in which epochs, but avoided any historicism in the way he l d his answer. Adorno, too, became involved in Marxism and in sociology as a result of' d i ssa t i s faction with academic philosophy. A generation younger than L u k {t ·s and Benjamin, his education in philosophy included the early W< r ks o f .Sch�le_r,_�s�rL and Heid�gger. These philosophers sought to l �· k away from traditional philosophical idealism, both the nineteenth �<'l l t u ry t radi tion and the early twentieth-century neo-Kantian schools. They d id no t do so by developing a social criticism of philosophy, either M rxist or sociological, or by a radical critique of the philosophical Kys l e t n i n t he manner ofKierkegaard or Nietzsche, but b £1 unding �w i n I of pure philosop�y -� ontology. Adorno found in the pre-Marxist work of Lu kacs and ofBenjamin· �n alternative to the new philosophy. He was e s p e c i a l l y impressed by Benjamin's notion of Naturgeschichte and com b i n d t h i s with motifs from Lukacs' Theory of the Novel in the early 1 ! J:los. H was , t hough, a lready c r itica l of t h e i r early work . Although he la l t'r t ook ov'r t he t erm VerdingLiclzung from Lu kacs into his own Marxist wo k , h s u h t t t ran fl rm i t n t h basis of i nsist e n t opposi t ion t o t he M i s t w rk f t h u k s a1 d f B nj amin . N ver t h e l ss t h t h mes r - M arxist w rk i n a l t u r , Die idee m wl i h A n li I in t l i I' l l h i t o f ' n t u r · ) , 11 whi I I rin .1· hi lzt ( ' 'I _ _
·
I
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39
The Lament over Reification
In that lecture, Adorno attempted to redefine 'nature' and 'history' . 'Nature' did not have any connotations of physical nature but meant 'myth' or 'what human history bears as fatefully structured, pregiven', 96 while 'history' refers to the sphere of human behaviour in which change occurs.97 These notions of nature and of history were developed to avoid the formality of Heidegger's notion of historical Being ( das geschichtliche Sein) .9 8 The second half of Adorno's lecture consists of an attempt to explicate a boldly-stated chiasmus which stands exactly at its mid-point: historical being should be understood as nature-like; nature should be understood as historical being.99 Adorno draws on the ideas of Benjamin and ofLukacs in order to elaborate this proposition and at the very end of the lecture claims that he was undertaking an exposition of the elements of a materialist dialectic.1 00 He is, however, severely hampered because he has no concept or theory of society or of a mode of production. Instead he fastens on to a notion of 'second nature' as the world of convention, which Lukacs reformulated in The Theory of the Novel and argues that Benjamin's notion of Naturgeschichte illuminates the issue. Adorno quotes a very Simmelian passage from Lukacs' book in which Lukacs explains how men encounter a world of things created by themselves but lost to them, because they have 'lost their obvious roots in superpersonal ideal necessities' . 1 0 1 This is the world of convention or second nature. It has significance, but the significance has 'become rigid and strange, . . . it no longer awakens interiority; it is a charnel-house of long-dead in- j;/ teriorities' . 1 Q( Adorno comments that Lukacs has seen how the 'historical, as what has passed, is formed into an apparent nature' and how 'rigidified history is nature' , but that he offers no way to decipher this. 10 3 Benjamin does - by defining nature itself as transitory, as passing, and therefore as intrinsically historical . Adorno generalises Benjamin's theory of seventeenth-century Trauerspiel, so that all history is the history of the fall of nature. Each generation sees this history on the face of nature. 104 By 'nature' is meant the significance which is given to objects, which Lukacs called 'second nature' or the world of convention. The a l legorical meaning given to emblems of death and decay in the seventeenth century is applicable to what Lukacs described as 'a charnel house of long-dead interiorities' . 1 °5 The meaning is the return of the pri meval theme of history (urgeschichtliche Motive) : the fall and decay of nat u re . Adorno was attracted to Benjamin's way of defining nature as i n t r i n s i ca l l y h is t orical since i t offered a radical alternative to historical H eidegger's n o t i o n of history as the ground of the structure of on to logy Be i ng ( Dasein) . 1 0 11 He w as repe l l ed by the idea of the return of the archaic ,_
or
y t h i a l in h is t ry nd by a l l t h s t a t i c , p l a t o n i c aspect s of Benj am i n 's y. 107 N u l h fu l l y pt B nj a m i n 's st rang r ast i ng f t h 1:1. r n L U N t u r B nj l th L i t h s is of u l t u r I n t th w I N tu ef' r I i
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The Melancholy Science
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·
self, the history of the significance which has been given to the world . 1\t the end of the lecture, Adorno suggests that any archaic or m y th · al theme only attains significance if it is seen as part of a specific historical process and that myth might therefore be redefined as 'h ist orically produced illusion' .)-08 For Benjamin's notion of myth as the ret urn of the archaic, he substitutes the idea of reconcilement as the 'decisive, transcending theme of myth' . 1°9 Eventually Adorno rejected both t he notion of history as the return of the archaic and the H�s-�Ean Lukacsian notion of history as �he possibility or promise
Lukacs and Against Benjamin
Adorno judged that the concept of reification which was predominant in t he explicitly Marxist work of Lukacs and of Benjamin and grounded in Marx's t heory of commodity fetishism assumed the theoretical role which (second) nature had played in their earlier works. He rejected their use of rei f i a t io n but sought to develop a concept of reification which would avo i I t he theoretical weaknesses which he discerned in their work. A co rd i n g to Adorno, Lukacs' concept of reificatwn presupposes the r onc i l e ment of subject and object and thus relapses into idealism, nd fa i l s to found a truly materialist dialectic; while Benjamin's concept ofr i f i c a tion designates the phantasmagoric form of commodity fetishism as t h mode of the return of the archaic in the modern age. I t thus loses t h h i storical and theoretical specificity on which it was founded . Lu kacs' concept of reification presupposes a subject/object dichotomy i n several senses. He criticises the division oflabour under capitalism and t i le c o n s eq u ent fragmentation of the commodity into an 'alien thing', in a way w h i ch , according to Adorno, verges on a criticism of 'thingness' as such . 1 1 11 As a critique of philosophical consciousness, it implies that the d ic h o t o m i es of bourgeois thought can be simply eliminated . 1 1 1 As a l l w o ry of class struggle, it claims that the proletariat is the subject/object / ol" h i s t o r y and the privileged carrier of such knowledge. l 12 Adorno charged Lu k acs with thus accepting the ���Jist vision ofreconc;il�_ment as t h e goa l of h is tory, but also as its origin. For when the subject/object d ic h o to m y is pos i t e d as characteristic ofcapitalism, it implies that in pre capi t a l is t s o c i e t y a non-coercive harmony prevailed . 1 1 :l Adorno seems to t h i n k that Lu kacs' theory of capitalism has more in common with nostalgi Gemeinschajt/Gesellschafl antitheses t h a n wi th a t ypology of m d s of pr d u t i n. L u ka s h i m I f, in b is r g6 7 ' Pr fa ' to t h new .d i l i f I-Ii tor and 'La s 'on ciou nes , n d 'S l i l t h , b k is marr d iii n w i t! li by h i11 h ·
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The Lament over Reification
of reification. Nor is Lukacs' recantation necessarily to be given much credit. However, he does veer in the book from a simplistic subject/object ontology to a more complex theory of mediation. In any case the point supports Adorno's argument. Adorno considered that a further effect of Lukacs' dichotomy was that reification appears to be a fact of conscious ness, and that Lukacs' approach is grounded in philosophical sub jectivity. 1 1 5 'Above all, Adorno feared that the work was haunted by the old ambiti' n of philosophy: to tolerate nothing which is unassimilable to its concepts - the will to identity .11 6 Adorno's differences with Lukacs were political as well as theoretical, but they can all be derived from the difference in their concepts of reific ation. The core of Adorno's criticism of the concept of reification in Benjamin's work is to be found in their renowned correspondence of the 1 930s. 1 1 7 In that correspondence, which mostly concerns Benjamin's writings on the Paris Arcades and his study of Baudelaire, Adorno often induces Benjamin to be inore theoretical. As Adorno's later essays on Benjamin reveal, he was well aware that Benjamin's work was highly theoretical, and in the earlier period he was in effect prevailing on Benjamin to change his theory.1 18 Benjamin had set out the aim ofhis work in an outline written in I 935 · Its task was to show how reference to the reified representation of culture, to new creations and forms of life especially determined by the production of commodities . . . is a reference to the ensemble of a phantas magoria. 1 1 9 He defined phantasmagoria as 'the image that it [society] produces of itself and which it generally inscribes as its culture . . . when it abstracts from the fact that it is producing commodities' . 120 Benjamin called these images 'dialectical images', and the methodological task was to interpret them. He did so by conceiving them as allegories of modernity in his analyses of Baudelaire's poems and in his imaginative recreation of the experience of the jlaneur in nineteenth-century Paris. The bazaar, the col lector, the prostitute, the experience of hashish, were 'dialectical images - aspects of modern society which constituted its phantasma goria . Be nja m i n used the ideas of J ung and Klages to interpret the col lective consc iou s ness as the archaic which returns in the new mode of prod uct ion . 1 2 1 Adorno told Benjamin that he had made reification into a stati oncept by con ent rat i ng on t hi ngs and not deciphering them, that he h d pr d u ed ar h a i not d ialect ical i mages, and t hat he was leaving hi!i wo k n t l ·rossroads b · t w n magi a nd posi t ivi m ' . 1 2 2 Ad rna i n f >r·m · l I ·n j· 1 st · rn l ' t h · l I is Baroq ue book was l ei t er M , r ism r I l n t II fl t h b h vi u r I th I i '
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The Melancholy Science
ft�u i l letonists' .123 In the earlier book Benjamin had had no concept of soc i e t y , but Adorno believed that the perspective on nature as ( the) h ist ory (of society) came closer to revealing 'mediation through the total soc i a l process' than his later work.124 A l t hough Benjamin took Adorno's advice regarding one article, 125 he
stood up for his interpretation of commodity fetishism as producing hall ucinations of identity ( Gleichheit) out of which appear the ph an tasma goria of men and commodities as weird, personified types.12 6 Adorno
never granted this enterprise validity. He realised that Benjamin was the allcgorist of commodity fetishism: revealing the return of the primeval theme of history in the petrified objects of the nineteenth-century, as the seven teenth-century allegorists had done with the emblems of their t i me. 1 2' He maintained that Benjamin had 'sworn loyalty to reification instead of flatly rejecting it', 128 and contended that 'the liquidation of phant asmagoria can only be accomplished with true profundity if they arc t reated as an objective-philosophical category and not as a "vision" of social characters' .129 As a " 'vision" of social characters', Benjamin made rcif i a t ion into a 'content of consciousness', that is, into a subjective cat egory . 1 30 This, as far as Adorno was concerned, was to increase the i l l usion t hat commodities are immediate use-values, when they are values in cxchange . l !l l Such an approach hides and does not reveal the mode of p rod u c t i o n . Yet Benjamin represented to Adorno the most radical failure in t h · a t t empt on the part of twentieth-century philosophy to break out of tr c l i t ion a! philosophy and to turn to the 'concrete' . Adorno rejected the w· y Benjamin tried to accomplish this, his Urgeschichte der Moderne (prit lt'val h i s t o r y of modernity) .13 The theoretical reasons for Adorno's rt:ic · t ion of Benjamin's mode of analysis and description of society i 1 l l i b i t c l h i m fro m producing any direct analysis or description of society I in xdl '. Adorno made it clear later that his article on fetishism in music 1 33 w H response to Benjamin's article on art and mechanical repro! c t ion, 1 :1� but Minima Moralia can equally well be read as a response to Beu j a 1 1 1 i n 's Passagenarbeit.135 Thus Lu kacs' concept of reification was too general and Benjamin's was t oo circumscribed . Adorno believed the very different philosophy of hist ory w h ich t he concept served in each case to be wrong. He accepted t h!' ai i l l t o base the analysis of cultural forms on the model of commodity fH ish isnJ i n a way which would make any crude distinction between s u bst ru c t u r e and superstructure otiose . He thus sought to use the concept of' rt'il icat ion i n an al ternative way. •
The Lament over Reification
43
Analytical
Adorno and Reification
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After 1 9 2 3 many different neo-Marxist writers used the term reification sporadically and casually in their writings. It appears in the work of Bloch, Brecht, 13 6 WittfogeP37 and Grossmann138 (and Heidegger) .139 It does not, however, play any systematic or major role in their work, 1 40 but usually implies an unexamined reference to commodity fetishism combined with the standard dictionary connotation of 'to reify' - to convert mentally into a thing. In Adorno's work, on the contrary, it abounds. After 1 93 2. it is the cen.trifuge 9f all his !Jlajor wpr_ks and of his many shorter articles.l4 1 The obsession is evident in his published c�;respo-ndence \:Vith Ernst Krenek, 142 and in his posthumously published lectures.143 Primafacie, Adorno seems inconsistent and eclectic is his appeal to the concept of reification. In one place he proclaims that 'The dialectic means intransigence to all reification' , 144 while in another he avers that 'the causes of human suffering are . . . glossed over not denounced in the lament over reification' . 145 In places he uses reification in the over extended manner examined above as a feature of all human activity and of all kinds of societies.14 6 He misattributes it to Hegel. l 47 However, Adorno's concept of reification is consistent and original. Many of the apparent confusions arise from his quest to avoid grounding thought in the traditional ways and from the stylistic procedures which he adopted to achieve this. Adorno's theory of reification was based on commodity fetishism in a way which depended not on Marx's theory of work or the labour-process (alienation) but on Marx's theory of value, especially on the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. He was par t icularly concerned that reification should not be conceptualised as a 'fact of consciousness', a subjective or socio-psychological category. He indicted many critics of reification for this mistake, and tended to be even harsher with those writers who had tried to define and oppose reification in t h e i r work than with those non-dialectical writers who 'endorsed' it. H e t ried , too, in his sociological work, to make reification into an l:m p i rical category . I n w h a t follows, t he literal core of Adorno's theory of reification is ext ra t d , 1-arg ly from Negative DiaLectic, the book w hi c h contains t h e most ir ct tat m e n t f h i · t h ori s, and from t he essays on soci o l og y. M u ·h in t rpr t ti n nd re nst ru t ion h s t h e r for b n n ssary in ' ·n t r 1 i eas. · t hi t t mpt L t n il Ad rn
The Melancholy Science .Nep, a tive Dialectic Theory . . . must transform the concepts which it, as it were, brings in l'rom outside into those which the object has by itself, into that which t he object would itself like to be, and confront it with what it is.148
Adorno emphasises this idea of 'conceptuality prevailing in the object i tsel f' 1 4 9 This seems to imply that the object can be known independently or t heoretical concepts, which are then to be transformed into 'those which the object has by itself' . What does it mean to say that an object has ·on epts 'by itself'? How can we know that it does, and how can we know w hat they are? In sum, what is Adorno's notion of'the concept' , and what is h i s notion of 'the object'? I n English, a concept is taken to be that which a person possesses when h g ra s ps the sense of a word. This is the universal. In German Begriff may m n t he referent of a predicate, or what we in English would call a pr p rty, this is, a real attribute. This is not to say that the question of the status of concepts is unequivocally decided by language . Nevertheless the 'real' notion of concepts is, in German, as natural an understanding of co n ce p t as the understanding more familiar to the English-speaking world . Thus when in German it is said that 'an object falls under a :on ept', the English equivalent might be to say that 'an object has a p p r t y . A concept, on this view, is what a predicate stands for. C n epts, like properties, pertain to objects. This is important for un rst anding what Adorno means by 'concept' and 'object' . , r d i n g to Adorno, there are three ways of thinking: identity t l in i n g , non-identity thinking, and rational identity thinking.150 The f i t , identity thinking, occurs when we use a concept paradigmatically to u t t hose particulars it denotes.151 It is the relation between rs I a n d particular. Adorno is not concerned primarily with this t or i d e nt i ty thinking. He is not proposing a theory of meaning. A M < r·c i m p o rt a n tly this aspect of identifying is the pragmatic, nature con t rol l i n g function of thought. However, concepts also refer to their o l jc . ts, a n d by this he means to the conditions of their ideal existence. T h is is t h ut op ia n aspect of identifying. For the concept to identify its o l � j c t in t h is sense the particular object would have to have all the propert i es of i t s ideal state. Adorno calls this condition rational identity ( rationale ldentitiit ) . 1 52 But identity thinking, which is our normal mode of t h i n k i ng, i m p l ies t h a t the concept is rationally identical with its object. H< wt�v r, i v en t he presen t s t a t of so c iety (the capitalist mode of n pt ann t i d n t i fy i t s t ru object. The conscious c u t i n ) , t he 1 n M whi h r i v 'R t h i i 7!011-identit ' think ing r negat ive dialectic. Ad rn H i l it r t l ir i g J i l l ' n t l from I" pa ra d i m t i :1 i H t l ll t l I t f' t i n i : I ' I' t h i iN i I .
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The Lament over Reification
. . . cognition of non-identity lies exactly in that it also identifies, but to a greater extent and in a different way from identity thinking. This cognition seeks to say what something is, while identity thinking says under what something falls, of what it is a specimen or representative, what it thus is not itself.15'3
_
For example, 'the judgement that someone is a free man refers to the concept of freedom' . 154 This is rational identity, the utopian moment, the condition when the 'free man' would really have the property of being free, when the concept would be identical with its object. 'The concept does not only say that it can be applied to all men defined as free' .155 That it applies, however, to all men defined as free is not denied by Adorno. Such defining or identifying is identity thinking, the paradigmatic mode of thinking. To see that the concept says more than this is to see the non identity in the concept as it is currently applied. This is not to deny that objects subsumed under a class have definitions not contained in the definitions of the class. It does not deny that the concept is a universal, what a person possesses when he grasps the sense of a word . It is to affirm that the concept is more than is predicated of any man. The concept is the referent of the predicate - that set of properties which would make it identical with its object. It is important to understand that this is not a semantics, nor does it involve any denial or criticism of the laws of identity and non-contradiction. ____:.:::,y-lferefore to say that concepts 'must be transformed into those which the object has by itself, into that which the object would itself like to be, and confront it [the object] with what it is' , 156 means, if the object is society, that society as it is now is an object which does not fulfil its concept. The concept is not equal to nor congruent with the object which it identifies. But that concept is what the object has 'by itself, that is, the properties it could potentially have. These properties are what it 'would like to be' . The personification of the object entailed by 'like to be' is a stylistic way of presenting the objective, utopian moment. This would be t he condition of rational identity. To confront it, present society, with what ' i t is' , that is, to compare it with the condition ofits rational identity, is to see t he non-identity in the relation between the concept and the object. Thus Adorno is not saying that the object can be known indep�ndently of our con epts. F ur t he rm o re , given that the object is ex hypothesi what really ful l i ls i t s � :>n ept , ' I t is poi ntless to ask whether these essential relat ionships are real or simply onceptual constructs', 1 57 because by 'f i n i t i n, t h · r I is id n t i al w i t h , or ' not y t ' identical with, i ts t . Th r al i conceptual b u t n t a con tntct. N ow, t h r is no logi al d fini t i n r th l a th bj l n [ t l � t I r t h ·o >
The Melancholy Science
t hus 'constructs' is still pertinent. The basic question of what the object is also remains to be considered . Reification
Adorno's concept of reification can be grounded in Marx's criticism of apparent freedom and in his theory of value. To avoid the static implications of 'grounding' the concept, Adorno called Marx's theory of value variously the Urphiinomen, the Urgeschichte, and the Urmodell of merely
eification . 1 58
I dentity thinking is reified thinking - not only our paradigmatic mode
or t h i n k i ng, but also the mode of thinking of non-dialectical sciences. I den t i ty thinking makes unlike things alike. To believe that a concept rea l ly covers its object, when it does not, is to believe falsely that the object is the equal of its concept. According to Marx, emancipation, for example, is not real, human emancipation, if it is merely political ema nc i pation. 1 59 Adorno reaffirms this. To claim that the concept
' mancipation' correctly describes a state of affairs, when it is not real emancipation, is to make unequal things equal. 160 Adorno construes the process of commodity exchange as involving an analogous mechanism: The exchange principle, the reduction of human labour to its abstract universal concept of average labour-time, has the same origin as the princi ples of identification. It has its social model in exchange and exchange would be nothing without identification. l 61 Marx considered that to make individual qualities of labour into homoge neous human labour, . . . labour-power expended without re gard to i t s mode of expenditure' 162 in the process of commodity exchange and hence in the equalisation of commodities to a monetary value or priec, l (l :l is t o make unlike things alike. Value appears to be a natural p ro pe rl y of t h e commodity; but only use values are properties. As Marx id, '
It
is
t h rough its own properties, its own qualities that a thing is use
value . . . as v a l ues commodities are social magnitudes, that is to say :mmc t h i ng absol u tely diflerent from their properties as things. Where la bo r is om m u nal, the relations of men do not manifest themselves as of t h i ngs. 1 6 4
u :values'
. 47
The Lament over Reification
definite social relation between men . . . assumes the phantasmagoric form of a relation between things', 1 65 is not the most crucial aspect to be stressed. The idea that value appears to be the property of a commodity, or the idea that the object is thought to fulfil its concept when in fact only use-values are properties, or the concept has a different object, is more important. Yet, as Marx said, 'exchange value is the only form in which the value of a commodity can manifest itself or be expressed' .1 66 This is the origin of reification. It is thus unnecessary to construe the theory of reification as a compounding of Marx's theory of commodity fetishism and Hegel's ideas on the development of consciousness. Reification is a social category. I t refers to the way in which consciousness is determined. Thus, to say that something is reified is not to emphasise that a relation between men appears as a relation between things. It is to emphasise that a relation between men appears in the form of a property of a thing. To be non-reified, then, is really to be a property of a thing, or, by analogy, to be a use-value. In Marx's terms, 'it is through its own properties, its own qualities that a thing is a use-value', 1 6 7 or in Adorno's terms, something is non-reified when the concept is identical with its object. Now, which concepts does the object have 'by itself'? It has the reified concepts of non-dialectical sociologies and philosophies by means of which the non reified concepts can be derived . In capitalist society, reified concepts are the only form in which non-reified properties can appear. Adorno ascribes this to bourgeois society in which 'All categories are objectified and become independent . . . They are cut off from the living subjects which constitute the substance ofconcepts' . 1 6 8 The non-reified concepts of critical theory are derived from the reified form in which they appear. These reified concepts originate, as Marx said of the origin of value, from the living subjects who labour to produce use-values: 'A use-value or useful article therefore has value (in exchange] only because human labour in the abstract has been embodied or materialised in it' . 1 6 9 In capitalist society a concept such as (exchange) value can only appear in that form . Reified concepts describe social phenomena, the appearance of society, as if it has the properties to which the concepts refer. As this elaboration of Adorno's theory of reification indicates, the . theory is grounded in Marx's theory of value in a highly selective fashion. I t does not mobilise Marx's distinction between abstract and concrete labour·, nor does it lead to any theory of the extraction of surplus value. furthermore, Adorno's theory of reification does not apply to all oncepts. Some concepts, whether theoretical such as 'value', or non t beor t i al su h as money , havt: no non-reified application and no ssibl to n on - i de nti t y thinking. For exampl , m m nl a pt f valu a ' h t r m us' r i f i c a t i n w h n i t ll d i 1 gy . By t h i h v lu d '
'
The Melancholy Science obta i ns when the concept is rationally identical with its object. The d ist i n t i o n between. concepts which do have a non-reified application and t hose which do not is presumably based on the traditional distinction i n K a n t an d Hegel between the fundamental categories and ordinary con ept:s. Adorno is not clear on this but he entitles the central section of Negative Dialectic 'Negative Dialectic Concept and Categories' . The thesis of 'rational' identity is not empirical, nor is it an historical r rcd i c t ion. If it were a theory of history, it would relapse into the idealist assu m pt i ons of reconcilement and of the identity of thought with the world . The 'utopian' aspect of thinking, or 'rational identity', stress that con p t s as ordinarily used are 'formations' (ein Gewordenes, ein A'ntsprungenes) .170 The model of the historical mechanism by which they a . formed is provided by the distinction between use-value and .x hange-value, or, in Adorno's terms, by identity and non-identity l i i n k i ng. 'To want substance in cognition is to want Utopia' . 1 7 1 'Utopia' is not her way of naming the thesis that non-dialectical thought is closed t h ugh t , because it implies that the object is already captured. To see that t he object is not captured is to see 'utopia' .
How
b '
i Critical Theory Possible?
dorno s t ates repeatedly that society and consciousness of society have om e increasingly reified . I n places, he says that they have become ompletely reified' . To say that society is 'completely reified' is to say that
th
omination of the exchange process has increased to the point where
�on l rols i ns t i t utions, behaviour and class formation in such a way that it r .ven ts t he formation of any independent and critical consciousness. To H y t h · t c ons c i ousness is 'completely reified' is to say that it is capable only ( r k now i ng the appearance of society, of describing institutions and b h av i our as i f their current mode of functioning were an inherent and ' n ri · n t haracteristic or property, as if they, as objects, 'fulfil their .on ·epts' . Therefore, to say that consciousness of society is completely Hied i m pl i es that no critical consciousness or theory is possible. It is to H a y t ha t t he underlying processes of society are completely hidden and t hal t he u l opian possibilities within it are inconceivable. The mind (Geist) iH i l n J o l c n t ; t he object is inaccessible. The thesis of complete reification is ! hC'rclbrc u nst:atable, because if it were true it could not be known, and c lorno em ploys st rategies to avoid such a paradox. He states the thesis at l i f li:o n�n t d egrees of i n tensi ty. The most extreme statement is 'complete r·r i f i �· t ior ': t h one p t 's appar nt identity with its object has become k bl · . n t h · t h r h a t d, h r affirms t hat t here must a l wa y s b a unb l' n n - i n t i t y ri t i 1 t h u gh t : ' N mat t r t w h a t xt n t p 11s i i l i t i fi ] , i t i i pl i s t t h m t im h u t I' l l I t I i d is ' t il ' y r ' t' , m ts ·h nfli il
The Lament over Reification
49
ing theses in order to induce in his reader the development of the latent capacity for non-identity thought - the perspective that the concept is not identical with its object. This is an attempt to prevent the complete reification which is imminent. He also presents conflicting theses in order to avoid 'grounding' the concept ofreification in any of the ways in which he is criticising philosophy and sociology for grounding their concepts as first principles, as static, invariant or indubitable and for thereby producing concepts which are dependent on the mind and thus subj ective. Reification is not a 'concept', like, for example, society, subject, freedom . To see 'reification' involves a 'change of perspective' of the sort which Adorno had discerned in Benjamin's notion of Naturgeschichte. As a social process, 'reification' determines consciousness but, like commodity fetishism, it is not in origin a fact of consciousness. Adorno considered that most reactions to reification, whether philosophi cal, sociological or artistic, were reified, often because they grounded the concept. Adorno does expound the thesis of total reification or total control in terms of a change in the relation between use-value and value in exchange. The thesis that human needs are now totally controlled is equivalent to saying that the 'use-value of commodities has lost its last spontaneous [naturwuchsig] self-evidence' 173 or if commodities consist of exchange-value and use-value, then in advanced capitalist society an illusion of pure use-value, as displayed by cultural goods, has been substituted for pure exchange-value . This exchange-value has deceptively taken over the function of use value .l74 Adorno believes that there is no satisfactory theory ofadvanced capitalist society because there is no longer a satisfactory theory of valueJ75 The difficulties in grounding the formation of classes without a theory of surplus value are prohibitiveJ7 6 There is no free market and hence no genuine exchange in the sense of Marx's description of 'fair' exchange: 'Everything is one [Alles ist eins] . . . today the forces of production and the relations of production are one . . . material production, distribution, consumption are ruled together' .177 Primajacie, a Durkheimian model of society emerges. 'The still unindividuated tribal spirit of primitive soc i e t i es , pressed by the civilized ones to reproduce itself in them, is p l a n n d and re l e ased by postindividual collectivism' . 1 78 The 'total on t ro l ' of s cial relat ions i m p l i s t h a t exchange relations no longer p nd n -r
11
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ly
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1 of
a
d
a
totally
50
The Melancholy Science
on epts and imposes their hold on us. 180 However, Adorno stresses that it is quite different to postulate total control in pre-individualistic and post- individualistic society: I am not maintaining anything similar to the tendency in cultural anthropology to transfer by means of a specified system of coordinates, t h e centralizing and total character of many primitive societies to wes t ern civilization. Even when one cherishes so few illusions as I do about the gravitations towards total forms and the decline of the i nd ividual, the differences between a pre-individual and a post individual society are still decisive.181
proposition that reification increases according to the increase in but it does not have the explanatory force which Adorno seems to claim for it. If commodi ties are increasingly produced on the basis of technological or pol itical imperatives, which no longer depend on freely-alienable forces o l " prod uction, labour and capital, then it should still be possible to reveal t h e so ial relations underlying the organisation of commodity production and t he interests which determine the concomitant political organisation ol'soc i e t y . Otherwise the whole notion of a mode of production based on a l ht�ory of value has, in effect, been abandoned, and the political o ganisat ion of society has become an autonomous force.l82 Adorno i n t roduces a politically diffuse concept of control, unpacks it to show a lr.r ·n e to the exchange mechanism, and, as he admits, offers no a l l rnat ive theory of value nor a theory of the operation of power. This :onst i t u tes another way in which he tries to designate the fundamental r occss which determines society, a change in the relation between use v l uc a nd exchange-value, without grounding the process in a subject n c o t or carrier, whether class or individual. The status of the proposition of increasing reification as an historical t h sis is a lso very difficult to assess. I t is deeply entwined with Adorno's th .ori s a bo ut the development of art and the 'culture industry' . As a kind of' h istorical thesis, it has more in common with Weber's thesis of inc c sing rationality in the organisation of capitalism than with any dat eable or empirically quantifiable thesis. For Weber too did not date o spc ify t he rate of increase in (goal) rationality but posited its increase H t�u d e mi in the development of a specific mode of authority . H owever, a historicist approach, whether teleological or relativist, is d by Ad rn . The th sis of total reification is presented and ing int rv n t io n ' as mu h as a thesis which s n ' h a har pat h b · t w n B I h n !' t l uk ' vi w h Th
t he dominance of exchange-value over use-value is intelligible,
l t
The Lament over Reification
sr
'imputed' as the end of history. Adorno's position is encapsulated in the aphorism 'Universal history must be construed and denied' . 183 It must be construed because it is the only perspective from which the socio historical formation of society and thought can be grasped; it must be denied because the world has no telos and capitalism has developed new means of enslavement, not of liberation . Adorno tried to break out of the paradox of reification, but he also applied it ruthlessly to his own work. For Adorno there is a genuine interplay between knowing society by means of theory, and cognition by means of analysing reified concepts and theories. For Marx, to know 'theoretically' meant to know how social relations in capitalist society are determined by the production of commodities, and to endorse this analysis as the potential perspective of a universal class - the proletariat. Cognition by means of the analysis of the theories and concepts of classical political economy was indirect by comparison . Such cognition involved deriving the state ofsociety from its appearance in those theories and concepts. According to Adorno, theoretical knowledge in the former sense, to know how social relations are determined by the exchange mechanism, is now almost impossible. The theoretical perspective remains in his writings as a series of images and metaphors which intrude, often dramatically, into the main analyses of philosophies, sociologies, litera ture, and music. This notion of theory will be further discussed in Chapter Five. Thus Adorno does not accept Marx's ideas as an a priori theory of society, but presents a dialectic: he shows how various modes of cognition, Marxist and non-Marxist, are inadequate and distorting when taken in isolation; and how by confronting them with each other precisely on the basis of an awareness of their individual limitations, they may neverthe less yield insight into social processes. This approach, the analysis of reified theories and concepts, Adorno calls the 'immanent method'. Such a method is not analogous to the traditional Marxian understanding of art, law, and the state as superstructural phenomena. But it is analogous to the Marxian tradition of criticising ideology (ldeologiekirtik) . For Marx, political economy both revealed and distorted the true social relations of men, while his thought and ultimately that of the proletarian class had a chance of understanding the true relations. For Adorno there is only one ideology, bourgeois ideology, which both reveals and distorts those relations. Hence, to return to the themes of Chapter Two, even an all em brac i ng ideology is n o t a ' l ie' tout court.
C hapter 4
A Changed Concept of Dialectic
The Critique of Philosophy
For M arx, and many later Marxists, the critique of philosophy was eq u a l l y t h e critique of society. This w,;;l.s. qot accomplished by rela..t}ng the cla i ms of philosophy to theinocial origin and thereby ungermining their val idit y in a relativist fashion, but by demonstrating that the philosop_hy in qu st ion was wrong: self-contradictory, fundamentally inconsistent m: n t i no m i al and.thus inherently self-defeating. A new notion of theory as l he nal ysis of society was developed and the relation between philosophy a t h o r y and philosophy as a form of practice defined. Adorno took this L sk u pon h i m self seeking to show that philosophy is impossible but HHe n t ia l ·- as t h eory but that even as theory of society, it is bound to be sdl � d cle ati ng 1 Adorno u sed the term 'philosophy' in a deliberately equivocal sense. On t he one han d, he used the term to refer to the philosophy of, inter alia, H usst�rl and Heidegger, and these flourishing philosophies were the lurgt�ls of h is cri ticism . On the other hand, he used it elliptically to refer to t hr ' l i q u idat ion ' 2 of philosophical concerns in the realm of the individual Ho · i a l sc i c n es, and the aim of his workwas to reverse this separation . He Nought to show t h at latter-day p h i l osophy which raised the traditional c l i ms of' p h i lo ophy, a l be i t in new forms, w as as i n heren t ly antinomical llH da!!H i ca l G erman p h i l o ophy had bee n . H e b l i eved , however, that the nrw p h i losophy d id not ra ise su bs!' n t iv, and mora l i ss u es as p rol o u nd ly l H i h c : 1 ss' ·al t rad i t i! n ·h n , nd 1 l l h is w s pa rt l y b caus l' t h I s i n s whi ·h h �r som of I s r t 1 r i t divid Iw J > l l 1. 1 I f' t l i l > hy . • t h l i ng•n l l t I 'I > I y io of' � ,
-
.
·
· ·
·
A Changed Concept qf Dialectic
53 or formally scientific realm . . . , 3 and to produce theory which would reunite philosophical and sociological concerns, that is, criticism of society. Yet Adorno realised that such criticism must be as antinomical as the philosophies which he criticised, 'entwined in its own impossibility' .4 This is because as long as philosophy or theory raises claims apart from any praxis, it is bound to be self-contradictory; while if philosophy or theory understands itself as a form of praxis or intervention, its aims are then partly indirect, and the presentation of them as philosophy or theory will give rise to contradictory features. Adorno subscribed to both of these positions and this contributes to the complexity of his criticism of philosophy. Adorno's criticism of philosophy is to be found largely in two forms. His short essays, the first one given as his inaugural lecture as a Privatdozent in the philosophy faculty at the U niversity of Frankfurt in 1 9 3 1 , entitled Die Aktualitiit der Philosophie (The Relevance of Philosophy) ,5 and, the last one posthumously published, entitled Kritik,6 were addressed to the prop osition 'Why more philosophy' ( Wozu noch Philosophie) , which was also the title of one of them. 7 In these pieces Adorno discusses some of the philosophy which was being produced in Germany at the time and asks what sort of philosophy, if any, should be produced. He always tried, on the one hand, to delineate the 'philosophical need' which informed new philosophies, including his own, and, at the same time, to pick out those features of society which made such philosophy self-contradictory and impotent. The other form in which Adorno's criticism of philosophy appears comprises major studies of individual philosophers, such as Kierkegaard, Husser! and Heidegger. He also published his studies of Hegel's philosophy with the intention 'of preparing a changed concept of dialectic' .8 This ambition attained its most mature statement in Negative Dialectic. In spite of the attention paid to Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness in the socialist and communist camps when it was first published9 and the success d'estime which it enjoyed among certain philosophically-inclined Marxists, 10 the book's renown did not assuage the general dissatisfaction with prevailing schools of neo-Kantianism within academic and extra academic philosophical circles in Germany in the mid-twenties. Certain minor philosophers sought a philosophy of 'Being' which the anti metaphysical proclivity ofneo-Kantianism precluded, and they seized on the intuitionist aspects of Husserl's Wesenschau (intuition of essence) , while o t hers pro posed to construct a philosophy of 'totality' which would 'overcome t h e d ua l i t y of mind and matter' . 1 1 Adorno discerned three s t ag s in t h d v l o p m n t of t h is p h i losoph ical confusion . Firs t , 'B r g ·n r l i n a l s i m m I , H u ss rl a nd h I r - y arn d i n '
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The Melancholy Science
54
'l'arriers of philosophical modernism' . 1 4 A working definition of idealism is o!lered by Adorno's description of it as any 'philosophy which tries to base s u c h notions as reality or truth on an analysis of consciousness' . 1 5 Second l y , after 1 925, this 'yearning' resulted in the dissemination of a p h i los op hical jargon drawn from the works of these philosophers, which Adorno examined in his book Jargon of Authenticiry. 1 6 Thirdly, a new concern i s added to The an ti-relativism that goes back to H usserl . . . [it] blends with an aversion to static, thing-like thought [dinghajtes Denken] . The philo sop h i ca l need . . . has turned into a need to resist the reification of the mind which society has carried out and categorically dictated to its mcm bersY H c i degger
is
the prime representative of this opposition to static,
ahistorical thinking.
The
' on to logical
need' thus amounts to the desire by philosophers of a
Hpt•d fic period to break out of traditional philosophy, especially its neo
Kantian re v ival, but this outbreak did not involve a reinvigorated Hegelian a ttack on neo-Kantian philosophy nor a Marxian one. It did involve an a t t ack on philosophical subjectivism and on philosophical and pKy c ho l og ica l relativism, and it did aim to found an objective reality. All tht�sc a i m s were paramount to Adorno. The 'outbreak' resulted, however, in t he f o u n d i n g of 'ontology' , not dialectical materialism, and Adorno
devoted m u c h of his criticism of this philosophy to showing that it rt• l a pse d i n t o t h e very idealism which it was designed to avoid. I t was an
outbreak ' i n to t h e mirror' , 1 8 a dramatic pun on
the idea of breaking out of of reflection. He does relate this philosophy to the socio h iHturica l s i t u a t io n in Germany, especially when considering the 'j argon', bu t his m os t i m por t ant arguments attend to the internal construction of t h e philoso p h ies for the lacunae, and antinomies therein reveal the mi1111ing d i m ension of social criticism. Many of t he s t yl is tic features discussed in Chapter Two can be d iHcr.rncd i n Adorno's criticism of philosophy. The texts are not based on il'Onic inversion and anecdotal illustration ofobverse themes, as is Minima Momlifl, b u t on.an t i nom i cal construal of the ideas of the philosophy under «'Xatllinat ion . An an t i n o m y is a conflict of two arguments or doctrines, cuch of' w h ich t aken in i tse lf is cogent, but they cannot both be v al i d , 1 1 1 1 d one cannot es t a b l i s h su perio r i ty over t h e other. Adorno presents w ha t t•vtT p h i l osophy h e is d iscuss i n g so as to expose i ts basic an t i no m i es . H . th .n shows t hat o n l y a d iale t i a l approa h c a n r so lve t h a n t i n m y , o f l . by t n i ng i t i n t h i asmus, nd t h a t t h is mu t i n v lv a r fl r n e L ls 'e . I II his ' 1 1 wi g t h I f l ifi • h i I ' h I t lw
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A Changed Concept rif Dialectic
55
'the occasion not the goal' of the debate.20 Although Adorno retains an Hegelian vocabulary- subject, object, mediation - his reception of Hegel's philosophy is structured by his reception ofNietzsche's philosophy as well as that of Marx. It is striking that in his discussion of Hegel's philosophy, Adorno does not start from Hegel's moral and political philosophy as, for example, Marx did. He does not criticise Hegel's theory of the state or religion at all. This is because Adorno had adopted features of Nietzsche's philosophy, and developed a sociologically diffuse concept of power which seemed to absolve him of any further examination of the political process. His adaptation of Nietzsche's criticism of the traditional philosophical subject determined his own criticism and reintroduction of the term. Nietzsche rejected the philosophical system 'on the grounds that the totality of the world is not appropriate to our forms of consciousness' . 2 1 This reason for rejecting the philosophical system is equivalent for Adorno to judging that any such system attributes a role to the subject which it cannot ssume. 22 Adorno's criticism of identity thinking means that he has ejected an Hegelian notion of the subject as the unity of the universal nd the particular. Nevertheless he reinstates the term in his criticism of hilosophy, especially of philosophy which eliminates any notion of the subject. He thus reintroduces a concept of the subject in his attempt to give priority to the object, to make 'being a subject' part of the meaning of 'being an object' . 23 Criticism of philosophy for Adorno is criticism of various forms of identity thinking, of reification. As discussed in Chapter Three, Adorno was concerned not to reground his criticism in a theory of reification which would make the theory of value into a theory of consciousness or a relativist principle to which all his points could be referred and i nterpreted. 2 4 He thus, quite consistently, avoids intruding the theory of value or commodity fetishism as a principle of interpretation, but aims to how that the modes of thinking which he examines conform to the a t t e rn of thinking outlined in the theory of value, especially in the way n w h ic h th e y are abstract and ahistoricaJ . 2 5 As he admits in the preface to ' J�'ingrijfe ( I n te rve nti ons ) , the phrase 'reified consciousness' occurs like a ca tc h word i n h is articles, 2(; but this almost loose use of it has a most st ri ngen t u nderpi n n i ng. I n all of his discussions of individual phil oso l he rs t oo, Adorno i nd icts t he ir t hough t for i ts reified structure, and in w hat follows t he w i gh t: of t h is charge w i l l be examined and assessed. It al w ay s d es i g n a t s s om e k i nd of d islocation i n the philosophy under
1 �
l ion i n t h r lat ion bet w n t h s u bj e t and the object: a denial of t h p h i losophy on t h I of t h r I t i n, nd/or a f i un Sll � t /o�j h tom ron I I 0 I a n ' t l •m J l lO a v i ·
ii
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The Melancholy Science literature and music, h.dorno is battling to redefine the Marxian
problematic of the relation between 'being and consciousness' or thought .
Thought, for Adorno, i s not self-grounding in either a n Hegelian o r a Lukacsian sense. It is not simple reflection of social existence with no autonomy of its own . It is not simply activity, or 'mental labour' Mcparated from physical labour . As identity thinking, it is the analogue of Adorno's construal and generalisation of Marx's theory of value. Both poles of the analogy, social exchange and thought, are real. The relation is not one of determination but of two processes with the same internal struct ure. As non-identity thinking (or negative dialectic) , or rational iden t i t y thinking, thought attains a certain autonomy, not in the sense t h at it is outside the social process, but in the sense that it is the social p ocess as the immanently demonstrable truth of identity thinking, which revea ls t h e underlying social processes and the utopian possibilities, or i m possi bilities, j ust as the theory of value does. Adorno's philosophical altl bi t ion was to redefine the subject and the object, and their rela t i o n s h i p , without presupposing their identity, and to show that this can o n l y be accomplished if the subject and the object are understood as 11odal processes and not as the presuppositions of pure epistemology . He is far more successful in demonstrating the impossibility of philosophy than in demonst rating that the various subject/object relationships which he cri t ic ises can only be interpreted as social criticism. This makes for better criticism of philosophy but for less convincing elucidation of the rt' l a t ionship between philosophy and society.
l
1111/(l'l dorno's thought, like that of many Marxists, has a self-conscious and uncaMy relation to Hegel's philosophy. In some respects the issues which prt·occupy h i m are the conventional ones: the distinction between H egel ' s method and his system; the criticism of the relation between the individual and society in Hegel's political philosophy; the rejection of l l c·gd's p h i l osop hy of world history . In other respects the issues are less lil l n i l iar: the obsession with how to read Hegel's texts; the concentration on l l <'gd 's t heoret ical philosophy at the expense of any engagement with h i � moral or pol i t ical philosophy; and the attempt to turn Hegel's t ' l' i t k ism of Kant against both latter-day empirical sociology and p h i losophical on tology . H owever, even where the more fam i l i ar issues are < '< H H't' I'II C d , A d o rn o gives his construal of t he m and h i s a nswer to t he m an origi n al 1 w i s l .
Two of t he t h ree p rts of Ado no's book on H ·ge l arc o n rn d w i t h how t o rc· d H •g i'H t ts, CH ci· l l y t h . J lumommology oJ Mind ' nd t he t ) /,ogi , ol ' t h M n t i l l cl Skottino.r oder Wiu ;u lrsrn .reiY (g blind ' . k , d 11k , I a 11M ' Skolt�i,lll.l' i11 ( l r k c r I
A Changed Concept of Dialectic Oder wie zu lesen sei means 'or how to read ' . Another part is entitled Erjahrungsgehalt28 which means 'the substance of experience', and it equally
concerns the way in which Hegel's texts should be approached . Adorno argues that Hegel's philosophy is not constructed on a first principle or on transcendental subj ectivity;29 that it is presented in a form which reveals the self-cognition of the obj ect, 30 and that this results in texts which defy our usual habits of reading . 3 1 The reader is both merely 'looking on' (blosses <:,usehenrl2 and entering into a new intellectual experience (geistige Erfahrung) . 33 This experience involves the realisation that the subject is part of the object to be apprehended, but that the subj ect does not construct that obj ect. This experience is negative in the nse that it does not consist of individual judgements by the subj ect, but of the process of becoming aware of the limitations of such j udgements, nd the gradual cognition of totality. 34 Unfortunately much of Adorno's discussion of Hegel's philosophy consists of general statements of its metaphysical intent which remain far removed from any detailed reconstruction of the process of any one or other of Hegel's texts. This is because Adorno is more interested in finding in Hegel's thought a basis for d istinguishing between theoretical and empirical thinking than in finding in it a basis for distinguishing between theoretical and practical philosophy or praxis . Adorno echoes Engels' description of the conflict in Hegel's philosophy between 'the whole dogmatic content of the Hegelian system [which} is declared to be absolute truth, in contradiction to his dialectical method, which dissolves all dogmatism' .35 Adorno makes a series of similar points when he._ �ses Hegel X<:>r:.. .e.�t
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The Melancholy Science
ments) as such . . . They insist, in opposition to Hegel's practice and t in accordance with his thought, on negativity' .41 t the very beginning of his book on Hegel, Adornojustifies his interest i n H gel in a way reminiscent of Marx's Critique qf Hegel's 'Philosophy qf Right', by accrediting Hegel with insight into the inevitability of ont radictions in bourgeois society and the problem of how they may be r on iled .4 2 However, Adorno judges this to be an important theoretical hi vement since it arises on the basis of a speculative perspective, and n l merely on the basis of an empirical perspectiv . The 'speculation' whi h yields a perspective which is both empirical and critical is that of t h riginal, self-splitting and reuniting identity of subject and object.43 This t heme informs much of Adorno's discussion of Hegel. Adorno finds H g · l ' s the retical philosophy more radical than his practical or political I i l osop hy Whenever he refers to Hegel's Philosophy qfRight, his aim is to n t rast classificatory with dialectical thinking, or to contrast the value of l i op inion with truth, or to distinguish between grounding moral h i ! s phy in pure subjectivity and a notion of subject as mediated or t r mi ned by social processes. He never discusses Hegel's theories of the M l ' \ l �, property or religion, or criticises Hegel's theory of the bureauc y a t he universal class as Marx did .44 Thus, for example, he quotes the f( II w i n g passage from the Philosophy qf Right: ·
onsider particular laws as they appear and develop in time is a u r ly hi storical task. Like acquaintance with what can be logically d ·d u ced from a comparison of these laws with previously existing legal prin iples, this task is appreciated and rewarded in its own sphere and has no relat ion whatever to the philosophical study of the subject . . . A part icular law may be shown to be wholly grounded in and :onsist en t w i t h existing legally established institutions, and yet it may l c wrong and i rrational i n its essential character, . . . But even if 1 an i ular laws are both right and reasonable, still it is one thing to prove t hat t hey have that character - which c,;annot be truly done except by n H'a ns of t h e concept - and quite another to describe their appearance in h i s t ory or the circumstances, contingencies, needs and events which brough t a bout t heir e nac t m e n t . . . 15
A Changed Concept of Dialectic
59
over Hegel's assumption of identity or totality as reconcilement in history. In the first and best essay in his book on Hegel, Aspekte, Adorno claims that Hegel's thought is reified by demonstrating how a central antinomy in Hegel's philosophy of mind (Geist) , 'imitates a central antinomy of bourgeois society' .48 He does this by turning the antinomy in Hegel's philosophy into a chiasmus: put simply, the antinomy is between Hegel's definition of the mind as activity or process and as absolute or free. Thus, Hegel separated abstract activity as logical coercion from concrete labour: society is separated into abstract exchange and concrete activity (that is, Hegel's philosophy presupposes (wrongly) that society is (inherently) divided: society is in fact, at present, divided and this appears immortalised in Hegel's philosophy. The relation between the antinomy and the chiasmus is established by showing that Hegel's t hinking proceeds in a manner analogous to the model ofsocial processes explicated by the theory of value. Adorno's exposition ofHegel's thought is logically prior to the reintroduction of such concepts as subject and object (also essence/appearance, universal/particular) in the second part of Negative Dialectic. The exposition of the antinomy depends mostly on the chapter on the master and slave in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. The thesis laconically stated in Negative Dialectic, is elaborated here, . . . Hegel, in his chapter on the master and the slave, develops the genesis of self-consciousness from the relation of work, and he shows t his by the way in which the ego adjusts to its self-determined goal as m uch as to heteronomous material. The origin of the ego in the non ego is thereby disclosed . I t is looked up in the real process of l i fe . . . Thereafter, Hegel hypostatizes the mind, but in vain.49
6o
The Melancholy Science
of use-value' and work is only the origin of use-'value and thus of wealth w hen men own the means of production on which they work.54 In capi talist society, this is not the case. Similarly, Adorno argues, Hegel mistook work, defined as opposition to nature, for an absolute origin.55 Then Adorno develops the chiasmus. He says that this 'absolutising' of work is both correct and incorrect. 56 It is correct because labour is a u n iversal and abstract principle in capitalist society, but it is incorrect because this philosophical expression of labour does not disclose the eci fic mode of production which gives rise to the kind of labour in ucst ion.57 This is how 'mind' comes to be seen as free and self ctcrmin ing in Hegel's philosophy, whereas 'mind' is in fact under the ocrcion of labour. It is also the basis on which Hegel's dialectic of the s u bjec t a nd the object is grounded in the subject which reappears as Jomi nation.58 Adorno sought to redefine the subject/object dichotomy in a way which would avoid these implications. The dichotomy cannot be si mp l y rej ected because it does correspond to a real social process. /Adorno's most fundamental criticism of Hegel's philosophy consists in his cri t i c ism of Hegel's theory of identity. Adorno expressed this in many d ifferent ways, some of which are intelligible, others of which miscarry. Th us t o deny the possibility of reconcilement of subject and object in h istory and to charge Hegel with transmuting the 'negation of the n egat ion into an acceptance of the status quo, 59 are intelligible but simple and u no ri g i nal criticisms of Hegel's philosophy. However, Adorno's own t lwory of i den t it y non-identity and rational identity thinking cannot be i n t • l l igi bl y construed as a reformulation of Hegel's logic.6 0 It is easy to 1 isu nderst a nd Negative Dialectic on this issue, because Adorno does I resen t t he idea of negative dialectic in two different and fundamentally i rt� ·on i l a b le ways. Sometimes he suggests that he is trying to express the 'i t e l l ' bl ' ,�> 1 t h e 'non-conceptual', the 'concre.t e' .6 2 This longing is part i c u larl y evident in the 'Introduction' . It is Adorno's concession to 'the on LOlogi al nee d and closely related to the same theme as he discerned it in H id gger's and in Benjamin's work. It has nothing to do with Hegel. The not ion of the 'concrete' conflates philosophical and sociological connotat ions. Adorno uses it in at least four distinguishable ways. One 11cnsc of'concrete' is the Hegelian-Marxian one: 'The concrete is concrete bt�<�a usc it is the sum of many determinations, and therefore a unity of divNsi t y ' .u :J I n t h i s case, the 'concrete' refers to the individual as 'the artual start i ng poin t of conceptualisation, and, secondly, as the result of n nsid ring t h i nd ividual i n rela t ion to a ll i ts determinations. A s cond 1 1 0 ion of on r t ' i n Adorno's wri t i ngs is more loose, and m r l y ty. T in l v s r r r n t an b. t ' n r t l y ' i t s i t as
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'concrete' is whatever is irreducibly material, that which resists any assimilation to our concepts or our consciousness, 'blind, intentionless material' .65 The second aspect ofBenjamin's notion of the 'concrete' is his theory of 'ideas' or 'origin' .66 'Ideas' as given by the names of things present the 'concrete' in his first sense. These 'ideas' are not concepts, for 'concepts' depend on the distinction between the general and the particular and describe phenomena. Benjamin compares 'ideas' with Platonic forms, since they are more real than phenomena which appear and which can be assimilated to our consciousness. He preferred, however, to think of Adam who first gave things their names, not Plato's theory of forms, as the analogue of his notion of 'ideas' .67 Although Adorno was extremely critical of both of these aspects of Benjamin's r notion of the 'concrete', 68 the first part ofNegative Dialectic depends on the; idea that concepts cannot capture the concrete in Benjamin's sense of th� world as material. However, in the central part of the book Adorno adds · fourth, 'utopian' sense to this: a concept would be 'concrete' if it reall�. covered its object (rational identity) . --1-n this central section of }legative Dialectic Adorno explicates his notions of identity. His concern is with the relation between concept and object under the conditions of identity and non-identity thinking and the relation of these kinds of thinking to each other. The idea of rational identity, when the concept would be fulfilled by its object, is logically essential to Adorno's theory but is tempered in that no society need be conceivable in which that kind of identity would hold. Adorno's account depends instead on a structure analogous to the theory of value in which the central process of society is explained, the distinction between use value and (exchange) value, without any reference to a posited future society. Thus even the notion of rational identity is not a restatement of Hegel. Adorno's idea of what constitutes an adequate relation between concept and object is nonsense from an Hegelian perspective. This central part of Negative Dialectic is called 'Negative Dialectic: Concept and Categories' . After Adorno has explicated his theory of identity, he does reintroduce certain quasi-Hegelian categories, inter alia, subject/object and mediation.69 He sought to provide a philosophical and sociological basis for establishing the priority of the object and the med i a t ion of the subject and the object, without relapsing into a position w h ich gives priori t y t o t he subject. However, it is difficult to give 'priority lo the o � j e t ' ; ociologi ally, this would mean considering the social process as on t ai n i n as wel l as ond i t io n i ng our experience of it. The
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The Melancholy Science s u bject that is not an object; but we can conceive an object that is not a s u bjec t . To be an object is part of the meaning of subjectivity; but it is not eq ually part of the meaning of objectivity to be a subj ect. 70 Adorno relied on the notion of mediation to reformulate the relation bet ween subject and object, but 'mediation' should not be misunderstood s · n e x t ern al relation, as a third term, nor, conversely, in a way which e-cst abl ishes the identity of the subject and object. For a relation of m i t ion is not one of identity:
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A orno's criticism of post-Hegelian philosophy (and his criticism of · i l y) onsisted of demonstrating that any philosophy (or sociology) w h i · h d i d not involve a notion of subject and object and their mediation r 1 1 i n t an tinomies which can be derived from the social processes which nd rli t he theoretical thinking in question. Such philosophy depends Luo n id n t i ty thinking ( reification) . >
Ki rkegaard
A Changed Concept cif Dialectic
Kierkegaard's central concepts and then showing that these antinomies can be interpreted as antinomies in society, and that the mode of reasoning which gives rise to the antinomies has the same structure as the theory of value. In the article 'On Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Love', 74 Adorno stated his general approach: All Kierkegaard's gloomy motives have good critical sense as soon as they are interpreted in terms of social critique. Many of his positive assertions gain the concrete significance [which] they otherwise lack as soon as one translates them into concepts of a right society.75 The antinomies in Kierkegaard's notion of the individual reveal the 'decisive character features of the typical individual of modern society' .76 Philosophy constitutes a negative stage in Kierkegaard's development of his theology7 7 which is founded on belief rather than reason ( Vernunft) .78 Within philosophy, the aesthetic stage is accorded no genuine cognitive value.'9 I t is defined as the sphere in which men live in the present, 'in which [man] is immediately what he is',80 and in which men relate to objects, to works of art, that is, aesthetics in the narrower sense of the term .81 The realm of the aesthetic is based on a subject/ object dichotomy but Kierkegaard rejects a subject/object dialectic as the basis of an Hegelian progression to absolute knowledge.8 2 Adorno argued that Kierkegaard's 'objectless dialectic'83 relapsed into many of the assumptions it was designed to resist, as any thought will if it seeks to eliminate any notion of the object. Adorno was most sympathetic, however, to Kierkegaard's refusal to posit identity between thought and reality and to his deposing of the 'autonomous ratio' as the foundation of knowledge. 84 Adorno argued that Kierkegaard's notion of the individual, and of the individual's inwardness and existence, turns out on examination to be bstract, absolute and invariant. The subject is the scene (Schauplatz) , 85 not t he bas i s of Kierkegaard's dialectic, which takes place between inward l l ss and its meaning (Sinn) 86 - the act of faith.87 This meaning is not i m manent to the individual, it is not the individual's object, but J U a l i t a t ivel y different from him, although it can only be attained by 'the rdl · l ion of i n wardness' . 8 8 The world of things and of objective mind ({J,!iJt) i s i rr I v a n t t o K ie rkegaard s inner dialectic, s u but Adorno shows t h · l a not ion ofhistory and of man k i nd were essen tial to Kierkegaard and t h· l t h r for h i n t i n f t h i n d i v i d u a l is abstract. Becoming a 1 n t l u t i n I i rk gaard's t hought , but a n v r- nding l 's i n n r I i t ry i t h ( ph i l phi al ) basis f t h 'h · 1 v 1 f f l i h .ou T l i n i id Ih hi t y u �h i '
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uniqueness of the individual in history and his sin;92 on the it presupposes an extra-historical notion of sin as the first e ve n t of human history. 93 But Kierkegaard did not wish to endorse this srcond notion of history because it presupposes the sin of each generation and t h us robs the inner dialectic of the individual of its significance.94 He had t herefore to concede that there are qualitatively different periods of history i n order to grant the individual the significance of his own inner h istor y . u s But this implies a notion of real or external history and thus .on t radicts Kierkegaard's intention to describe a dialectic with no rdcren ce to the objective world. Since Kierkegaard refuses any category or m e d i a t i o n to solve the paradoxes of his thouglit, the individual can only hav t he s t a t us of an abstract pole of his dialectic, 96 and appears wrongly lo b a bso l u te and immediate.97 This is wrong in the sense that Kicr k egaa rd rejected any absolute, and the categories of immediacy and m d ia t io n were irrelevant to him. The individual is 'absolutised' by I i er kegaa rd because the latter's philosophy depends on notions to which Kierkegaard c a n n ot admit, and is thus irredeemably antinomical. Adorno argues that this 'absolutising' of the individual corresponds to a real so ial process by which the individual is 'absolutised', and he attempts to t o u t the correspondence. He offers a weak, second-order argument according to which Kierkegaard's apparent neglect of the external world or of social reality should be interpreted as a rejection of society as a w h ol , d ue to the development of early capitalism and to the effect which t h is devel opment was having on the individual .9 8 A closer statement of th para l l e l between Kierkegaard's notion of the individual and the th o y of value occurs in Adorno's discussion ofKierkegaard's doctrine of l ove. K i e r k eg aard ' s explication of the command to 'love thy neighbour' rxdud s any a tt e ntion to the particular qualities of the individual involved and any expectation of reciprocity oflove. 99 The other person as 11uch 'b om s a mere "stumbling block" to subjective inwardness', for ' t lw s u bs t an t i a l quality of love is "objectless" ' . 1 °0 The 'neighbour' accor d i ng to K i e r kegaard is the first man whom you see 'When you open t he door b h i nd which you have prayed to God and walk out . . . ' .1°1 The ' ndgh bo u r' is t h us a bst r a c t and 'given', and loving him does not alter the world in a ny way whatsoever. Kierkegaard considers that individual men ar·r ol� jccts, t ha t is, f i n ite, and thus barriers to love which must be infinite. Hr t h us red f i nes i n d ivid ua l i t y as a bso l u te e q u a l i t y , as lack of d i fTerences hr t wrcn m n , and in t h is sens i nd i v i d u a l men , re not o bj t s (of love, a n d so o n ) . Adorno argues t hat I i c r k ga rd 's i n i t i a l pos i t i o n a nd h i s Ullt ' ; Hi� t h l n i l ' f jfi · t ' iaJ a t ors d f , , n means t h e
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Kierkegaard's notion of the neighbour is in marked contrast with the 'neighbour' of the Gospels which . . . implies fishermen and peasants, herdsmen and publicans, people whom one knows and who have their established locus in a life of simple production which can be realized adequately by immediate experience . . . Kierkegaard has [taken] the abstract concept of ma of his own period and substitutes it for the Christian neighbour wh) belongs to a different society _ I oa
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Kierkegaard's notion of the individual, whether it refers to he who loves or he who is loved, is abstract. I t abstracts from individual qualities of men and thus 'absolutises' them by making them completely equal. Pari passu, the formal equality of a mode of production which separates men from a nexus of immediate relations with each other of the kind which obtains in a life of simple production, isolates them and 'absolutises' them as abstract individuals. Adorno's discussion of Kierkegaard's thought and his theory of the individual incidentally reveals two different concerns in Adorno's own theory of the changing relationship between the individual and societY :, e criticises 'abstract equality' both on the grounds that it masks real' nequality and on the grounds that it amounts to a mode of domination hich turns men into the mass of individuals and (somehow) destroys the 'individual' as such. This becomes more than a difference of emphasis and will be considered further in Chapter Five.
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Adorno's book on Husserl is subtitled Matacritique if Epistemology (..(ur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie) . In this book Adorno explains what he understands by epistemology and why any philosophy which depends on a f i rst p r i n c ipl e or ground (das absolute Erste) is illegitimate. He alludes to t he soc ial basis of this criticism of epistemology and introduces the reasons lor h is circumscribed but eventual defence of epistemology. The bulk of t he book consists of unremitting exposures of antinomies in Husserl's phi losophy, bu t i t also lays the groundwork for Adorno's attack on H eidcgger's phi losophy a nd this is .partly accomplished by qualified su pport for H usserl's enterp rise . Where Husserl's phenomenology is concerned Adorno has to est ablish i n t h e f irst place t ha t it is j ustifiable to i t I gy, sin ph n m n I gy does not propose a sim i ! t it t ppr h nd a ts of gnit ion as t h y wl ut I t th or
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The Melancholy Science
·st p r i n ciple. Adorno demonstrates that in any given case such p h i l osop h y will involve a subject/object dualism which will be resolved l y iving priority to subj ectivity; by basing the reality of being (Sein) and of m e an i n g (Sinn) on the subject. This is equally true whether the pl i l osop hy in question is an Immanenz philosophy, that is, based in the lm of possible experience, or a Transzendenz philosophy, that is, ell l ' bl ishes its grounds beyond the realm of experience. It is equally true ev n when the philosophy in question is empiricist or ontological and thus d is poses prima facie with any first principle and with any notion of KU � t i v ity . 10 5 Adorno's shows that the central concepts and propositions r t hese philosophies contain antinomies, and that the philosophies rely n id n t i ty thinking (reification) . Again, Adorno presents his own F si t i n i n antinomical fashion: epistemology is inherently self n t rad i c tory; epistemology is nevertheless necessary. Although Adorno v als t ha t all non-dialectical philosopbi.es are in .some way gro_JJ_n9e<:J jn � t i v i ty , he argues that those which have an explicit notion of the H bj t are superior to those with no ostensible notion of the subject. Ep i s t m o lo gy of the former kind is 'necessary' in the sense that, as socially p rod u e d illusion, it is more accurate than any kind which has no notion SUbject. I 06 . (' t h dorno uses three different arguments to prove that any mode of t h >ught justified by a first principle is always self-contradictory. These u m n ts are taken from traditional philosophy and are transformed into p r i n c iples of social criticism by use of the figure of chiasmus: gum nts which expose illegitimate abstraction in philosophy reveal in i ples of abstraction in society; arguments which expose the illegi t il ' t do mi nance of the subject in philosophy reveal modes of social dOl i nat ion . Adorno indicts philosophy for these inversions with the :h · rgc of re i f i ca tion . He also offers a general but brief interpretation of t h so ial g e n e s i s of the raising of these invalid philosophical claims, that is, oi' Geist ( m i nd) . 1 0 7 I t is not accidental that Adorno uses the term 'antinomy' rather than t h � t erm ' a m ph i boly ' or 'paralogism' . Each ofthese terms names a section in t he 'Trans n den t al Dialectic' of Kant's Critique rif Pure Reason, in w h i ·h 1 an t exposes an illusion of pure reason, and each may be taken to 1 1 1 .an loo" ly a co n f l ic t of two equally cogent arguments. Adorno refers 1 rt i ·u l · rly t o ' t he a n t i nomy of pure reason' because in that section Kant hows t hat 1i
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the transcendental unity (or identity) o he ego, and in the irreducible givenness of the categories. 1 0 9 Similarly, Adorno argues, Husserl's philo sophy relies on a notion of 'givenness' an bases truth on a transcendental structure and thereby restricts it in effect to the (immanent) constructions of a subject.11 0..A\lthough Adorno does not endorse Kant's distinction between the understanding and pure reason, he draws on Kant's demonstration of the logical absurdity of the inference contained in the proposition That if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned . . . is also given. 1 1 1 as one o f the arguments against first principles i n philosophy. The second kind of argument used by Adorno draws on Hegel's criticism of an absolute or immediate beginning or principle in philosophy. Adorno concedes that Hegel's theory of mediation is quite irrelevant to Husserl's phenomenological reduction, 112 and reaffirms the necessity of criticising philosophy in its own terms, that is, of 'immanent criticism' .113 It is the importance of the notion of 'givenness' (Gegebenheit) in Husserl's philosophy (and in empiricist and rationalist epistemology generally) which affords the basis for Hegelian criticism . For any philosophy which posits 'givenness' (that is, what is given) as immediate is mistakenly positing it as a substantial conce t �hen it is a relational one, or, in other words, when it is mediated.l14 Empiricist epistemology which posits 'givenness' as its principle thereby ontradicts the empiricist requirement that there can be no general first principle, while rationalist epistemology reduces 'givenness' to the mind which it posits as its first principle. Neither Geist ( mind) not 'givenness' can provide an inde pendent basis for epistemology because they are relational concepts which mediate each other.115 Husserl's philosophy was an explicit a ttempt to 'reconquer the objectivity of truth as against relativist psychologism', 11 6 that is, not to base truth on an empirical-psychological analysis of consciousness. Adorno shows by examining Husserl's notion of given ness t h a t the latter's thought did nonetheless presuppose the unity of
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consciousness . 1 1 7 T h e t h i rd k i nd o f a rgu m ent which Adorno uses i n his metacritique of epistemology is a N ie t zschean argument against first principles in p h i l osophy , w h ic h is d signed to reveal th e idealist implications of ont I gy . Adorno q uot es N i t zs h t o t h effect t hat ' t rue Bei ng' is a mental < 1 s t r u t on t h b sis < r w h i h our b · l ief in an x ternal world of t h i ngs is ' l ·d . 1 1 H I n or t h i s posi t ion , usserl 's d ist in . t ion b t w n y he I > n ns . nd I h n m .no lo y is n g l i i I , l i t . 1 1 11 N i . '1. � 1 ' 11 i . t s g inst t h ti , I 1 I wh L in ·
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The Melancholy Science
· nd aga i n s t t he
elevation of static, self-grounding concepts to the realm of abstract and empty 'truth', are marshalled against Husserl's pred i l ec t ion for an a priori, invariant philosophy, 120 t l w rc by
. . . t h e last and the first are confused . . . the 'highest concepts', that is, t h e most general . . . are placed . . . at the beginning, as the b g i n n i ng . . . Moral: everything of the first rank must be causa sui. Th origin out of something else is regarded as an objection, as a sign of qu st ionable value.l21
' 'his violent act (Gewalttat) on the part of philosophical method arises from t he social division of mental and physical labour.12 2 Geist, or m e t ap h ys i cs as transsubjective being, mistakes itself for an absolute. Adorno does not use the distinction between mental and physical labour in order to s tress that mind is· a form of labour, but in order to stress the mistake on which philosophy is predicated: /hat thought is a discrete, self contained activity when it is in fact a societal activity./rhis ' "'�� _?rno · and (su ggests, is a reflex on the part of the mind due to its actual impotence lu nc ·rta i n t y . For it does not contribute to the real reproduction oflife, nor t o t h e real domination of men, but provides methods - the means of dominat ion -- for those who dominate.123 In this book Adorno had not yet c k v c lope d the theory of negative dialectic fully, that is, the theory of the intercon nection between modes of thinking and the specific mode of p odu t io n . ·..A lthough Adorno demonstrates that Husser! did not succeed in breaking out of traditional epistemology, he begins and ends the book w i th a de fe n c e of Husser! in opposition to the subsequent development of o n t ol ogy, especially the philosophy of Heidegger. Husserl's attempt fiti lr.d because he used the categories of the idealist analysis of conscious nell!!, such as 'transcendental ego', in his attempt to reject the assumptions of' ' const i t u t iVe subjectivity ' , of /mmanenz philosophy. 1 24 He did indeed N t al'l t he t u rn to on t ology . Adorno defends Husser! for his initial retrieval of" a uotion of philosophical truth which was opposed to e mpiricist pHyr hologism, t ha t i s to philosophical relativism. 12 5 He defends him u l t i l l l a t d y i n s p i t e of, or because of, Husserl's relapse into idealism, for u l l t' I I I J >l i n).l" nevert h e l ess ' t o dest roy i d e a l is m from within' . 1 2 !> Adorno ili'J.{ l i <'S t ha t a p h i loso p h y w h ic h d e pends on a s u bjective ratio is more coh t'l'<' l l l and more desirable t han one w h i c h rej ec t s s u c h a not ion t ' ol t t pk t < ' l y . He t h us d ·lends H uss rl 's f( m n a l i s m ag a i n s t H e i d cg g e r ' s 'Hnn:l t l ' >r t h · o n :rew', and h . d l e n d s H uss rl 's i d e a of i n n ova t ion in i r st H d •gg 's . 1 � 7 t on f- HIH' r i 'M .a r t i es t t r I du p te H i n t l w I > ·on : n < I i · I w >rk, l.oJii ·al lnvr.,·tiNalirms ( 1 .) >) . I n t h t• l i rHt 1 wo i I I ) n l lowll · loll I H Ill . l 'll l�riJIIIJO m na to /1rm l.u ic ' Y" I I ,
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6g
A Changed Concept of Dialectic
the second lnvestigation129 (respectively) and exposes antinomies in Husserl's early statement of lo_gi9J_ �E�2Lt!�m and in his notion of 'species' . In the third chapter :(,ur Dialektik der erkenntnistheoretische Begriffe (On the dialectic of epistemological concepts) , Adorno casts his net more widely and demonstrates repeatedly that Husserl's notions of immediacy are either irrevocably antinomical or that they are categories of reflection . This means that in Husserl's attempt to develop a transcen dental philosophy and thus abolish any gap between knowing and what is known, Husserl confected notions which are either contradictory, because they presuppose what they set out to prove, or which, in order to have any meaning, presuppose that there is a gap between knowing and what is known, and thus still need a theory of mediation (categories of reflection) to bridge the gap. -Adorno deals with Husserl's notions of 'givenness' and of in tentionality' in both of these ways. Husserl separated psychic acts from logical norms, that is, the realm of the real from the realm of the ideal. 1ao Logical truths and their meaning are 'given' in inner experience. U nlike in Kant's philosophy, 'phenomena' do not result from the combination of the categories and sensuous intuition.131 For Husserl, phenomena are the objects of transcendental acts; they are the 'intentions' of such acts.132 Hence, what is 'given' becomes the achievement of intentionality, and the idea of'givenness' collapses into a pre-Kantian notion of identity with the subject.133 On the other hand, Adorno argues that Husserl's various ways of distinguishing between the act of cognition and its content, such as noesis/noema, or the earlier distinction, perception/sensation ( Wahrnehrung/Empjindung) still imply that ideas are 'reflections' of o�j ects . 1 3 4 F r example, what is purely self-given is distinct from the act of kn owi n g it. But it is only by virtue of being known that what is given acq u i res m aning. Hence what is given is mediated, if only by the act which bestows meaning, and what is mediated - even if the mediation is part of i ts constitution - must in some sense exist before the act of med iat ion . 1 a5 ' I ntentionality' is used to abolish the gap between subject and obj e c t , since ' bei ng ' becomes a predicate of intentional meaning. H ussn-l ' s not ion of 'givenness' does not remain a simple and immediate not ion, b u t is i n t egra t ed into a t heory o f kn owing, that is, into an epistemolog-y . 1 :w Adorno descri bes ' i n ten t io na l i t y ' as an extreme case of ' re i l icat ion ' , t b a t is, of re d u c i n g ex ist ence to t he e p istemological subject, b u t he docs not u n pac k t he barge of 'rc i f icat ion' soc io l ogi c a l l y , in t h is book, an I I( H· oo I r ·aso n . Adorno io s i nd i L H us rl 's pi i t osoph y for abdi a t i ng ri t i i s m of t l � so t H< i t w i t h phil soph y w h i h dcp �nds r m a m e n ta l l y on t h e I �, H u M· I '� I I i l < phy is n l ri l i l in t he Nu l j · iv . ratio. •'o r th i l l u H i J I I H l!' un Cll l l ld . I i og . wl i ·h ( ' illli I .1 n wl t 't 1 t a h __
�
The Melancholy Science d minance of whatever is 'given' because, in Husserl's,.llnature work, ry universal qualifies equally for the status of noema.13 t )Of the major h i loso p hi es which Adorno criticised, Husserl's contains the least social con t n t , although it has had a great effect on sociology, mainly through t h · w rk of Alfred Schutz . Adorno does not discuss anything written by H usserl a ft er 1 93 1 and the works by Husserl which he does discuss do not i n . l u de even peripheral remarks about society to which Adorno might · t t · h m ore central theoretical importance, nor do they contain any sust in d moral or practical philosophy, and this is why Adorno is so . i olog i c a l ly cautious. To attain a perspective on 'the social prefor m· L io n f t he contingent experience of the individual', 138 it would not be Hu f l i ·i n t t o expose Husserl's abstract and pure subject as an empirical H I ' , nor to solve the overly-privileged position of the subject by a 'O J m e n u rable or prior notion of the object, nor indeed by posing the u l · t /object dichotomy as general and invariant. All these solutions w u ld s u bs t i t u te another form of identity for the one rejected .139 r
v
lleidegge1'
lorno was s t ro ng ly impressed by Heidegger's philosophy, especially by t h · lat t er' m ajor work Being and Time.140 He respected and even shared s > m e of H ei de gger s philosophical interests. For Heidegger, too, was opp · 'd to traditional epistemology and aimed in his own work to give 1 io r i t y t a living object and to historical reality. Furthermore, his philosophy was designed to reveal its author's awareness of its intrinsic l im i t · t i n . Nevertheless Adorno subjected Heidegger's philosophy to t h • m >Sl s rious and unsympathetic criticism . He argued that H id ger's ontology also relapsed into a kind of idealism by showing t h l i ts s •m i nal not io ns are antinomical. However, in the case of this hi I !! >phy, Ad o rno had strong social and political objections to the 1 t i .u h r f( >rm of identity thinking which it evinced. He analysed the l wgu · gc o f ' H eidegger's work as a particularly distinguished rep1' s n l ' t i v of one of t h e ideologies which prevailed in Germany after 1 J:�o. T h is i d e olog y , found by Adorno in the works of many writers of this t i me, t u rns out: to be another vers io n of a p hi losophy of private virtues ( ' u t h c n t i ci t y ( Eigentlichkeit) , and 'inwardness' ( lrmerlichkeit) ) which is pr!'� .n t d s if it repr s n t d t he realisat ion of p u b l i c virt u and po l i t ical t c t ion ."1 1 A lorno i n t erpret s t h is idcol gy and t he phi l osoph y on w h i c h i t p rt i u l r l y perni ious iH 1 a t l I s d , as · mou n t i ng i n ffect t o K n �t i n n I i t im l iot >f n t h > it i n tatu quo . .i if1 II n t w it '
'
'
fi
A Changed Concept of Dialectic
Heidegger's work, briefly or at length, in all of the articles or books in which he examined the state of philosophy generally, and in all those in which he examined, at least ostensibly, the work of individual phil osophers. He also took issue with Heidegger's interpretation of Holderlin's poetry in one of his 'notes' on litcrature.143 �ccording to Adorno, Heidegger sought to base his philosophy on concrete, determinate, existing being (Dasein) , in opposition to Husserl's preoccupation with a realm of essences which are established in a way which is indifferent to the realm of the natural world of existence; and in opposition to all post-Socratic philosophy which, due to its emphasis on the theory ofknowledge, has not granted priority to the question ofbeing (die Frage nach dem Sein) .144 Dasein is Heidegger's term for 'the entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being' .145 Dasein takes priority over other entities in the question of Being. That question is the question of the meaning (Sinn) of Being. Heidegger redefined the problem of meaning in opposition to Husserl's theory of intentional meaning, and in a way which would also avoid basing the analysis of meaning on the relationship of being and consciousness. l46 Adorno argued that to make the question of Being i rreducible and to grant it ontological primacy was to found another Ursprungsphilosophie, an absolute first.147 For Heidegger, Being is not only 'present-at-hand' (vorhanden) but belongs to historical reality. History provides the basic structure of Heidegger's ontology, 148 thereby resisting �he erernal and static presuppositions of Husserl's thought . According to Adorno, Heidegger's notion of 'historicality' as the presupposition of Dasein, and his notion of 'facticity' as the realm offacts, are 'ontologised' notions, that is, notions pertaining to a theory of the ontical. 149 They thus become notions of essence, of the attributes of history as such, and fail to capt ure empirical or contingent history.150 Nor do they provide a theory of t h e relation between history and nature (Dasein) as they seem, ge r min al l y, to promise. -Adorno demonstrates that Heidegger's attempt to develop a new kind of p h i losoph y beyon d subject and object, beyond concept and entity', 151 'to del i m i t zealously his version of ontology from objectivism, and his a n t i -ideal ist s t a n d from realism, whether critical or naive', 15 2 also rel apsed i n t o id ealism . I t is idealist according to Adorno because it u l t i ma t el y d is p lays a bso l ute pri n i p l es abstracting procedures, and not ions w h i h pr suppose t he priori t y of subjectivity. However, the parli ·u l· r k i n or id n t i t y t l i n k i ng which Adorno discerned in I l t·id gg �r ' s w rk did not dcp nd on ny on pt f r ason ( Vemurift) , r a t l y ir um cri b d ri t rion n i nv rt d lUI l t h s i n t tr li ol' l: i i I ·
'
,
·
The Melancholy Science
7'J. H . . id gg e r
is not able to establish that the meaning of Being is beyond
. n L i L y and thingness: U nder no circumstances is Being to be a thing, and yet, as the m e t aphors
keep indicating, it is to be the 'ground' and something
solid . 1 "" T h is not only indicates that Heidegger relied on connotations which ra y ed the 'meaning' assigned to Being, but also that he based his 1 I i l osophy on an absolute principle: ·
-1 ·
[ H e i d egger ] . . . says that neither the subject nor the object are
and ultimate; but he . . . reaches for something immediate p r i m ar y beyond subject and object.l55
i m mediate
an I
nd cri ticism is that Heidegger's attempt to show that the
nonconceptual makes Being meaningless: Heidegger precedent to each abstraction, is no concept', 156 yet
i n of B i n g is
t hat
' B e i ng,
a rc L o conceive Being as the absolute, but it is the absolute only be ·a use we can not conceive it.l57 W�
� . /l
H · id c ggc r demands th a t we think without a concept, and this can ly cv· pora t c i n to 'a know not what', into a pathos of i nvocation.158 'he t h i rd ri t i c ism is t h a t if Being has a meaning, it must depend on abstract hou h L , a nd thus t h e meaning ofBeing reverts to categories of essence. It is · l s l ra c L because t o establish the meaning of Being by stripping it o all
>
n·((.•rt· ncc t o enti ties, 'strips Being of everything other than pure
· t hou�l l l , 1 r o � > an l such t h ought is 'blind to the moment of synthesis in the s u bs t ra t e' , 1 110 b l ind that is, to the complex process of mental abstraction and s y n t hes i s necessary in order to be able to conceive of 'Being'. --� kide!l,'gc r reso l v es the problem that there is no Being without entity by llHtki ng ex i s te n ce t h at is, the being of entity, into the essence ofBeing:161 ,
,
•'
l 'he essence of Dasein l i es in its existence.' 1 6 2 Hence Heidegger's Being is
a n t i n o 1 1 1 ica l : i f
i t is i mmediate, primeval and non-conceptual, it is
I I H'a l l i nglcss; i f i t acq u i res a m e an i ng , it is not immediate, primordial and
l tot i·COIIt:cp t u al , b u t is ( eq ua l to) i ts essence, and is thus a concept of rdh'l ' t iol l . A d o rn o was esp i a l l y i n t r s t d i n the part i cular form of i d l'n t i t y ( rci f i 'al ion ) n w h i h H i d gg r's on p t f B ing and oth r t'ot H't' l t s i n h is p h i l oso p l y such as ' u t h e n l i i t y ' d 'P r d . I "id gg r's ispl · ys id ' I l i l y L h i t I i n l lo l i lll or B · in
A Changed Concept of Dialectic
73
No judgement can be made of this Being, that is, nothing can be predicated of it. Thus no non-identity can be perceived, even in the simple, grammatical sense that subject and predicate are never com pletely identical with each other.164 Just as in Husserl's philosophy, no distinctions of relative validity can be made between noemae, so in Heidegger's philosophy, no distinctions can be made between different kinds of entities or existences. However, Adorno believed that Heidegger's approach had less heuristic validity than Husserl's. The identity thinking embraced by Heidegger's notion of 'authenticity', and the presuppositions pertaining to subjectivity which underpin the notion, amount, in Adorno's view, to an extremely quiescent social philosophy . . --Dasein, according to Heidegger, 'belongs to itself'; it is ' "in each case mine" ' .165 t he distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity 'depends on whether this element of being, Dasein, chooses itself, its mineness' . 1 66 Adorno objects that Heidegger's principle of 'choosing oneselP is empty . It does not contain any reference to the social and poli tical organisation of the world as the realisation of the ego (or will ) , which thereby refers to, or chooses, itself.167 The principle has no object, t hat is, no theory of what the self is, and thus provides no criterion by which to judge that the self has been chosen.168 Furthermore, this pproach reaffirms the status quo: ' . . . the ego posits itself as higher than t h world and becomes subjected to the . world precisely because of t his' _ t H I) for, Su h a philosophy need no longer be concerned with how far society and psychology allow a man to be himself or become himself, or w h t her in the concept of such selfness the old evil is concentrated one mor � t i me. The societal relation, which seals itself offin the identity of t he s u bj ec t, is desocietalized [entgesellschaftet] into an in-itselfY0
/)a.rf.in p r s u pposes absolute unity of subject and reality. In this it is like t h l' t rad i t ional a b so l u te ego, but it is unlike it in having no theory of '
ra 1 i o na l i t y
in t h e pract ical or moral sphere. Dasein is said to be twofold:
'ot l l i c , namel y, d e t e rm i n ed by existence and "ontological" , because c· x is t t' l l Ct' is t h us determinat ive for i t ' . 1 7 1 This distinction might be c·q l l i v a l <'l l l to a dis t i n L ion bet w een o n c c p t (or subject) and reality, but it 1 1 1 1 11 I H'<'I I rene� :d b y t h · d e f i n i t i o n oi' Dasein's existence as essence which
1 1 1 1 111 ptTN U I I oscs t he abso l u t e i ! en t i t y of t h e s u bject . 1 7 2 domo :h · rg ·s 1-l ·id ·g ·r w i t h 'rei l y i ng' h i s once p l s and u n packs t I I n l gy w i t h t h t l ory of' val u e . H b ! t iN :h 11 t l Ls i m p ly s i 1 t h ·ory w h i h r t h 1 i t a inn s · i · 1 H ·i .g • ·I
(
M i l l !(
t hi
The Melancholy Science
7·
whi �h exists 'in-itself' . They are not relational categories. But H wh o accepts the world of commodities as the in-itself, which it pretends to be, is deceived by the mechanisms which Marx analysed in t h chapter on fetishes. He who neglects this in-itself, value in ·x hange, as mere illusion, gives in to the ideology of universal h umanity.173
For example, the notion of authenticity (although Heidegger does not nalyse it socially) implies a social condition in which relations to others and t h us to oneself are simple and transparent.174 To advance such a pos i t i o n in a society in which social relations are not simple and transparent lends support to the mode of domination in that society. Adorno suggests that the absence of any theory of action in Heidegger's ph ilosophy corresponds to the real social impotence of the individual in ·
KO iety. 1 75
I nstead of developing a theory of action, Heidegger uses language in a way which pre-empts the need for any social or political action . Adorno cal ls t his use of words a 'jargon':
_....
. . the jargon acquires its defining character by the way it imputes its tru t h . I t does this by making an intended object present - as though this object were Being without any tension towards the subject.1 7 6 _ .
'.J argon' i s thus a particularly strong type of identity thinking. I n fact, it is a kind of rational identity thinking, 'Everyday or philosophical language is s pok en here and now as if it were the sacred one' . 1 7 7 Adorno's theses of t he t h ree kinds of thinking pertain to concepts and objects, not words or
language. Yet words can be used in ways which reinforce identity t hi n k i ng:
. . . jargon obliterates the difference between [the] more for which tan uage gropes and the in-itself of this more . . . 1 78 B u t t hey ca n also be used in ways which detract from the concept's p pare n t iden t i t y wi t h i t s o bj ec t:
a
Language be om s a measure of t ru t h o n l y when we are ons i o u s of t he non- id n t i t y or a n express ion w i t h w ha t we mea n . 1 711
A Changed Concept of Dialectic
75
Heidegger's work. The choice of seminal words and the way in which such words are used in these works reinforces an 'ideology of universal humanity', by invoking a condition of rational identity as if it obtained in present society. For example, Adorno quotes from Bollnow's book Neue Geborgenheit (The New Security) 18 0 to show how . . . security, as an existential value, turns from something longed for and denied into a presence which is here and now, and is independent of what prevents it from being.181 The notion of 'inwardness' performs a similar function in Jaspers' writing: [it transposes] a historical state of affairs into the pure essence of Man [which] becomes affirmed and eternalized at the same time. In this way the jargon plunders the concept of Man, who is to be sublime because of his nothingness. It robs him of precisely those traits which have as their content the criticism of states of affairs, which preclude t he divine right of souls. 182 Thus when Adorno says 'Man is the ideology of dehumanization',183 he means that to imply that humanity is realised in the present society is to reinforce and reaffirm all those features of that society which prevent the realisation of man. He shows too how this is frequently accomplished by appeals to archaic images of social relations.184 Al t hough Adorno offers no explicit thesis about the extent of its prevalence or political influence, this jargon is another case of the peculiarly strong cross-fertilisation in Germany between philosophical c u l t u re and general culture. Adorno revealed the ways in which this 1 hilosophy reinforced a parapolitical ideology and this is one of the rc· so n s why he wanted to pitch the case for his alternative as a rival to the und rly i ng philosophy. 11
Changed Concept of Dialectic185
Any phi losophy w h ich systematically denies one pole of the dialectic, the ��� l �ject or t he objec t , or which, conversely, is grounded in one to the l c•lll rmt: n t of t he t h r, w i l l fall into antinomies, will reify its concepts. domo so u g h t a p rspe l ive from which t he separation of the subject and ol�j t' l could be s en t o b · a h arac vri sa t ion of the object and not t: C'ot t i l u t c·d b y th � su bj
7
The Melancholy Science
n1y oci a l theory guarantees this perspective, a theory furthermore of a Hp �d f i society . The Urbild is the model of social relations explicated by l1 t heory of value, and by Adorno's extrapolation of that theory into a t l ry of modes of thinking. He was most opposed to Husserl's theory of i n t e n t ional meaning and to Heidegger's theory of the meaning ofBeing. N i t h r of these theories were able to see that the mind is at work in the nings which confront it, but that it does not constitute those meanings by i t self. Adorno generalised the theory of value in a way that would s t i s fy t hese criteria. He sometimes called this approach 'natural history', which is the history of the interaction of specifiable kinds of societies with nat u re, of their culture as a mode of domination . Adorno's critique of philosophy is not always convincing. The philohical weaknesses which he exposes have often been discerned by critics w i t ing from quite different positions. He succeeds in this sense even t l ugh he never takes the philosophy with which he is engaging entirely m its own terms. It is difficult, however, to j udge the move from revealing i · oncilable antinomies in central concepts to establishing the social o i ins of those antinomies. This is partly because the move is always omplished by means of chiasmus and analogy, and partly because t h r are no criteria by which to judge that this move is the only one w h i h an account for the antinomies discerned, nor any reason why the bj t /o bj ect relation should be considered uniquely as a social 1 L i r ts h ip. The only partial criterion is the internal cogency of the · n · 1 gy. The most successful strategy draws out the antinomies into w l i h ph i losophies fall when they try to establish indubitable and o l u L firs t principies. The sociological decoding i s only convincing w h n t h philosophy in question is examined 'immanently' i n this way. t, v · n at its most 'immanent', this form of critique succeeds at the 1 ·n e of transforming all philosophy into epistemology, even when KU h philosophy consists of a radical attempt to renounce epistemology. There is a gap between Adorno's critique of philosophy and his social Tit ique w h ic h is only filled in by his aesthetics or sociology of art. In this l w d ·v · lops an alternative theory of the social structuring of meaning ( i l l usion) w hich can be seen as a Marxian and sociological answer to the 1 h i \ o soph i a! theories of meaning which he abhorred . Adorno's well t aken revelat ion of a gap between Heidegger's moral and political phi l os phy is m barrass i ng, for t her i a similar gap in Adorno's own t hou h t .
Chapter 5 The Dispute over Positivism
The Critique of Sociolvgy
Adorno carried on his search for a changed concept of dialectic by ri ticising sociology. The various non-dialectical notions of 'constitutive subjectivity', or denials of subjectivity at the epistemological level in so iology display the same inability discerned in philosophy to ap pr bend the way in which the social process 'constitutes' any cognition of so iety. At the more substantive level, Adorno sought to show that only a t h eory based on the critique of such sociology could understand the way in which specific social processes constitute the individual. This theory was no t to be sociological in the narrow sense of a strict empiricism, nor in ny nse which would forsake those themes also essential for an adequate n ption of 'the subject' and which Adorno considered to be intrinsi : l l y philosophical, such as, 'totality', 'nature', and essence/appearance. -1 n Adorno not only exposed antinomies in theoretical and empirical o : i o logy but attempted himself to adumbrate a theory of the individual nd so ial change, and to conduct empirical research. However, al t hough t h i s body of work is less oblique than most ofhis other work, the rC' I f i n i n g of sociological conc ep ts and theories and the empirical rrHtar h is not as substantial as might be expected from its status as com k m n t ar y t t h c r it iq u e of philosophy on the one hand, and to the 11odol y of art , n t h � o t h r. ' l 'h n tw n t h various approach s i pli n und r t h nam fs i I I , tl t h y I I , i n n way r ano t h r, d a l w i t h pwem.1mc:na. Tl uni 1 n i I r in h i ,
'
The Melancholy Science Adorno stressed the lack of homogeneity in sociology, and he discussed some of t he different kinds of sociology in detail, but he also developed a
general argument which delineates what counts as reified sociology:
For sociology has a double character: as the subject of all knowledge, p reci sely as society, the bearer of logical universality, it is at the same time t h e object. Society is subjective because it refers to the men who form i t . Its principle of organization refers to subjective conscious ness . . . Society is objective because of its underlying structure, because its own subjectivity is not transparent to it, because it has no total subject and because its organization prevents the formation of one. This double character alters the relation of social scientific cog n i t ion to its object, but positivist sociology [non-dialectical or non cri t ical sociology] does not perceive this. It treats society as if it were an obj ct which can be defined from the outside even though it is pote n t i al l y a self-determining subject. Such sociology thereby makes i n to an object that which causes objectification and by which obj ect i f ication may be explained . This substitution ofsociety as subject b y soc iety as object constitutes the reified consciousness of sociology. 2 Adorno d oe s not merely propose that it follows from the double nature of so ·iet y as subject and as object of knowledge that any sociology which operates solel y on the basis of society as object, takes what is, in effect, a del .rm i n i ng process to be a predetermined object. The thesis that the bj . t is not t ra nsparent to subjectivity is a thesis about a specific society,
<
.apilal is m , whose particular objectivity and subjectivity are structured/ by lh c prod uct ion of value in exchange. The theory of value which rxpl ai ns l he u n d e rl yi n g law of capitalist society explains too how Hm�io l< y I� i ls to see i tsel f at work in the object which it cognises. For such
Hodol >gy des ri bes t h e appearance of society correctly. It is incorrect in at t ri b u t i ng t he properties which it classifies to society as if they were n l u I a nd i n var i a nt properties instead of examining the processes of thd f(> mat ion . I t is on t h e basis of a theory of change in the production of v a l u<� i n exchange t hat Adorno sought to base his theory of change in Horial organisat ion and th e individual. Adorno j udged t h a t t he ' i ntrinsic tension'a of sociology is between
The Dispute over Positivism
79
that the concept 'society' is one which is not identical with its object and which therefore requires non-identity thinking in order to examine it; secondly, that a correct view of the mediation between subject and object is needed; thirdly, that these notions cannot be translated, tout court, into empirical terms because, fourthly, they depend on a notion oftotality and 'a view of the totality is necessarily philosophical' . 5 1/he concept of 'totality' occurs a lot in Adorno's writings on sociology. Jt adds little or nothing, however, to the theory of value (reification) ami to the theory of identity and non-identity thinking. It is simply another way ofstating the basic characteristic of non-identity thinking. The critical perspective of totality 'seeks to save or helps to bring forth, what does not obey the totality, what contradicts it or what first forms itself as the potential of individuation which does not yet exist' , 6 that is, to perceive the mediation of the individual by the totality (or, of the appearance by the essence) is to perceive how the existence of individuals, or the far;ade of society, does not fulfil its concept, how unequal things are made equal by the prevailing form of commodity exchange and by the corresponding conceptual apparatus of that society.7 'Totality' in Adorno's usage is neither a 'comprehensive principle of explanation', 8 nor is it 'ontol ogized' , made into primeval reality, 9 'an arbitrary globalism' .10 It should not be confused with his substantive thesis that capitalist society has become more total, that it increasingly controls and constrains in dividuals, ll nor with the concomitant thesis that philosophy and sociology can no longer grasp the totality, neither the whole of existing society nor all its possibilities. The concept of nature and the phrase 'the domination of nature' occur frequently in Adorno's criticism of sociology. 'Nature' is always a relational term for Adorno. He does not discuss any issues pertaining to t h e technological domination of the natural world, 12 nor the question of t h e relation of society to nature in a free society which has appeared in the work of some Marxist writers as the 'apotheosis' ofnature.l3 Adorno does d ist i nguish his approach from A science which hopes to extract and crystallize 'the social' by
t ion from the problems entailed in the relationship of social process of society's own self-preservation, [and which] is comp II d t o fetishize what remains as 'inter-personal' relations, 14
ab:> t ra
f o r ·cs t o t he
So
The Melancholy Science
s I t fr m a specific mode of social interaction, while 'the domination of t u r•' refers to the mode of domination of men structured by the same
u nderl y i n g mechanism . 1 7 Adorno's concept of 'nature' is philosophical ,
b u s i t is used t o encapsulate the perspective of the transmutation of hi. t ori al processes of formation into 'apparent' nature. I t is also, n L ri usly, a systematically ambiguous notion, and Adorno exploits its biguities: M n k ind commits more of a sacrilege by perm1ttmg its claim to su pr macy to repress all thought of its nature as a species [Naturwesen],
nd by thus perpetuating the blind spontaneity of nature [ alurwiichsigkeit], than by reminding itself that it is a part of nature [ aturhajtigkeit] 'Sociology is not a cultural science [Geistes wi enschajt]' . * To the extent that the hardening [sic] of society reduces i n r asingly to objects and transforms this condition into a 'second t u r > (zweite Natur]', methods which testify to this are not sacrilegious. Th unfr edom of the methods bear silent witness to the unfreedom t h t pr vails in reality . 1 8 .
.
The Dispute over Positivism
81
conducted under the auspices of the Princeton Radio Research Proj ect when he first arrived in the United States ( 1 938 - g) and which so greatly coloured his subsequent opinions about social research is not included in either of these volumes. 2 0 The essays on sociological theory deal with three sorts of issues: topical controversies in sociology, for example, social conflict, the individual and organisation; the interpretation of Freudian theory for sociology; and empirical social research and questions of objectivity in social science. 2 1 These articles were mostly written to introduce or summarise con ferences, as radio broadcasts, as introductions to books containing articles by various authors, and as contributions to polemics. They are short and slight, and are among Adorno's stylistically least accom plished or composed pieces, although they often depend on stylistic devices, such as chiasmus, to establish their seminal point. However, this part of Adorno's work is consistent with the rest of his thinking and it does add to the ideas which are crucial throughout his work, even if not as much as it might. Adorno considered it more important to practise his kind of sociology in the realms of music and literature than to criticise current sociology. He paid particular attention to the sociology practised in Germany in the fifties and was well informed on this and on the sociology which he had encountered in the United States. Most of his articles criticising sociology were written in the fifties. In the sixties he was increasingly preoccupied with major projects such as Negative Dialectic, and, especially in the mid- and late sixties, with his work on aesthetic theory. Tiedemann maintains that Adorno's writing on sociology in the sixties was a 'distraction' from the latter's main work, although welcomed by Adorno as a 'healthy corrective' .22 The distracted but passionate inspiration of this work is evident. It is thus regrettable that this part of Adorno's work has received the most widespread attention in Germany as part of a Positivismusstreit ( dis pute over Positivism) , as a result of the controversies arising out of the ·onference on the logic of the social sciences which was held by the ( J rman Sociological Association in Tubingen in 1 9 6 1 and of the volume 1 ubl ished much later ( 1 9 69 ) which collected and republished polemical art i les written in response to the conference.23 It looks as if similar a t t en t ion may be pai d to the English translation of this volume.24 For even w i t h i n his riticism of sociology, Adorno was not most interested in ng ing w i t h posit i vist philosop hy of social science, and the lack of any MUst a i n d n a m n t w i t h pos i t ivist epistemology in his criticism of I L t -.r- ay phil hy is l l'iking t . H is ontri b u t i n to the book consists .J ial r s r h , nd on n th I i of t h s ial y c J' I I h t thr ' . Th ·y ar h with u 'I h t . Th ·h i I o lh t t
The Melancholy Science
t he cryptic and elliptical references to identity and non-identity to reification which abound in the articles by Adorno whiCh pp ar in the book. The criticism of empirical social research is best u nderstood in terms of Adorno's own ambitions in empirical sociology and i n relation to his aim to develop a theory of the relation between the individual and society. n
tl
i k i ng a nd
Durkheim and Weber
A orno construes the maj or methodological precepts of the sociology of D rkheim and of Weber as an antinomy, and argues, by the use of hi m u s , that the antinomy arises from the structure of society. 2 5 His i n t rpretation of these precepts is one-sided and tendentious, and p n ds on transcribing the relevant concepts in Durkheim's and in W b r's work into concepts of reason ( Vernunft) . Unlike other nco Marxist critiques of Weber's sociology, Adorno does not indict \Veber's nol i n of goal-rationality for being an apology for the instrumentality of ap i tal ist society. 26 I nstead he takes Weber's definition of sociological inq uiry at the beginning of Economy and Sociery, as the interpretation of ubje t ively meaningful social action ( Verstehen) to be a substantive and es ript ive thesis that social action should be intelligible as the reali at ion of men's will, as rational. Weber's instruction to unpack social i nsti t u t ions so as to reveal the individual's orientation to them is not m rely a methodological device but a theory of what constitutes u tonomy.27 Men are free and social institutions are rational to the extent th a t th �y express men's will and are understood to do so, to the extent that t l y ar transparent. In a society in which social relations between men c d termined by the production of value in exchange, the social in ti t u t ions which arise cannot be intelligible in the sense specified b aus of commodity fetishism .28 urkheim's definition of social facts as external constraint in The Rules qfSo iological Method, and of the realm of sociological inquiry as starting from u h fa t s , is construed by Adorno not merely as a methodological clr.vi . , but as a substantive thesis, the converse of Weber's, that social i n11 t i t u t ions are not intelligible to men because they do not represent men' will and are thus 'impenetrable [sic]' by their reason. 29 Durkheim 1 r . ibes t hat t he realm of men's heteronomy should be the concern of M! .iology . H r ognis�s corT ctl y t hat m n ar not free and that social i 1 tituti
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The Dispute over Positivism
each individual primarily as that which is not identical, as 'coercion' . To that extent reflection on society would begin where intelligibility [or comprehensibility, Verstehbarkeit] ends. The method of natural science defended by Durkheim registers the . . . 'second nature' into which society congeals against its living members. This antithesis to Weber is as one-sided as the latter's thesis [that society is compre hensible]: it takes comfort in incomprehensibility as much as Weber takes comfort in comprehensibility. Instead incomprehensibility should be comprehended, which would be to derive relationships which have grown independent and impenetrable . . . from the relations between men. 30 Since social action in such a society is not the expression of the free individual nor intelligible as such, society is not identical 'with the individual', that is, not rationally identical with the concept of the individual. Adorno judges that Weber's position is correct but un realistic, given the nature of capitalist society, while Durkheim correctly describes the appearance of society, but sanctions that status quo, 'society as a mechanism of collective constraint' .31 This is partly because at this level of primary methodological structures, neither Durkheim nor Weber grant any role to theory . Weber emphasised Verstehen, the interpretation of social action by the reconstruction of ends-means ideal-types, but society cannot be explained by 'singular acts or by ideal-type constructs, with no regard for the totality of society from which the phenomena to be understood alone receive meaning' .32 Durkheim's emphasis on social facts, and on their collation and comparison, prevents him from developing any theory which would explain those facts, their formation and the mechanism of coercion.33 Where the question of value judgements in sociology is concerned, the positions of Durkheim and of Weber are also antinomical, although on t his issue they reverse positions: 34 that is, Durkheim comes closer to a substantive notion of rationality. Any sociology which separates judge ments of fact from judgements of value is bound to be inconsistent. Adorno's point is not that these judgements are inseparable. I t is that the very que s t ion of their separability or inseparability is illegitimate. This ll:>llows from the basic characteristic in identity thinking: 'The claim to tru t h and the rej ec tion of untruth of the simple logical judgement is a i r ady ons t i t u t ed in t h e procedure which the cliche allots to values 11 p rat from t h i r b as ' . a5 Non-id nti t y thinking is not a separable form of v l u t i n u t 'a n r t pr ss f gnit ion wh re what is decided f1 nt t i n ft t hi n w i t h wh t it !aims t b a c ord i n t i t s y tl t, i th i t i i m ' .30 W r had a n t i n f t i n sh l ( V mu'lfl) i· I . I
I
h
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84
bj t i v i ty in cognition. I t was thus inconsistent ofhim even to raise the st ion of values, since these precepts imply a substantive position that m a k s such an issue irrelevant. 37 In spite ofDurkheim's emphasis on facts nd h i lack of any notion of the social subject, he believed that 'There are n > l t wo ways of thinking and judging, one for establishing existence and n for i ts estimation' . 38 This position is possible for Durkheim because of L l p c u l iar nature of his positivism, the stress ori social facts which goes l lg t h r w i th 'the normative hypostasis of the collective mind'.39 Du r k h i m raises the question ofvalue j udgements, but he interprets it as a q �s t i on of ideals and their corresponding value systems. 40 He specifically uccts a Kantian separation of the ideal and the real.4 1 The desire and I � w i l l for an ideal to be real are intrinsic to the ideal: 'Concepts are u L l y constructions of the mind and consequently ideals . . . all j dg m n ts bring ideals into play. There cannot be more than one faculty > f j u d ge m e n t 42 Durkheim's position on this issue is nearer to a notion of s bst ant ive reason than Weber's, that is, to the view that men realise and c ogn ise t h emselv es freely in social institutions and social life. For D u r k h i m t ak es over collectively sanctioned values, equates their :c I I · L i v i t y w i th their obj ectivity, and thereby dispenses with the u s t io n of their moral possibility .'43 D r k h e i m s sociology, nevertheless, is riddled with the antinomies w h ich arise w h e n the attem_w is made to reconcile a positivist notion of 'so ·i· I fa ts' as the moral norms of a given society, with an idealist notion o i l t ive consciousness which transcends the consciousness of 1 1' ' 1 ivid uals.44 For Durkheim's central concepts are designed in a way wl i h v n t s examination of processes of social formation and of any t h im p l s t relation between consciousness and social reality, and w l i · I p l u a n y notion of the individual or subject. On the one hand, I I e ' m t i p u l a t s t h a t the collective consciousness cannot be reduced h i n ividual consciousnesses or to the statistical average, yet on I e < I , I a l de pends on the statistical average as an indicator of the t: l ie l i on i o us n ss.45 He has no way of resolving this discrepancy h , : u h has l i m i t d h i ms e lf to registering the moral facts of society and to m I ing t he objectivity of the totality which they form: ' [Durkheim's Lh o y ] mov s t h e obj ctivity of the collective consciousness into the place ol' t h obj ec t i v i t y of t h e u n d e rly i n g social life processes', 46 and thus can m no d i t i n t ion b t w n what a society appears to be and what i t xamin t h e processes of med iation by l't' l l y is, nor, t h refore, an h t pp a r t t h individual r subj t t b t h whi · h t h L l i l y d i n t h " p p i t i ns f r i ty. ' ·h 1 t r
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The Dispute over Positivism
to a morality other than that which is related to the state of our society', 47 although the individual may escape the existing rules of society so long as he desires society as it is and not as it appears to itself . . . and not to justify an historically outmoded state . . . The principle of opposition is thus the same as that of conformity. 48 Durkheim reaches this position by 'opposing to the collectivity . . . the collectivity itself, . one, however, more or less conscious of itself' .49 But Durkheim has no way of conceptualising a collectivity 'more or less conscious of itself' . The collective mind can only be a factual and static one for Durkheim, not one which can undergo any process of 'becoming more conscious ofitself' . 50 This is partly because of the insufficiency of the kind of relationship which Durkheim posits between the individual and society. I ncreasing self-consciousness could only come about via the consciousness of individuals, but Durkheim will concede no such possibility. 51 Durkheim 'reifies the collective mind', by which Adorno means that he makes it into a notion of a social subject sui generis, in itself. 5 2 Durkheim cannot develop a theory of the mediation of the individual and the collective consciousness for fear of abandoning the factual perspective. He thus personifies the collective mind 'which thinks, feels,_ wills' , 53 and then simply equates the universality ( the ideal humanity) of the collectivity with the universality of the individual, which is distinguished from the individual's 'empirical, sensuous' being.54 He is unable to develop any more complex perspective of the mediation between the collectivity and the individual which would not depend on this egregious 'dichotomy, nor on such a simplistic equation. Adorno maintains that in The Division rif Labour in Society ( I 893 ) , Durkheim did have a notion of social life-processes and that h e derived ivilisation from the struggle for existence and examined the problems of d i ffe re n t kinds of social cohesion arising out of different forms of the d iv ision of labour. However, he did not develop, nor did he sustain this i n s i g ht i n to h i s t o r i ca l l y different kinds of society, nor into the division of la bou r as a process u nderlying the formation of social institutions and w h i h h as t o be on t i nuously mai n tai ned . I nstead he concentrates in his I a t r work, T he ELementary Forms of the Religious Life ( I 9 1 5 ) , on the forms of col ic t i v ons iou. n ess and on so ial i ns t i t u tions. He d i d not treat them h is tori a l l y b u t as pri meval phe n om n a ( Urphanomenen) , and he became upi ·d w i t h pri m i t iv r l a t i ns as protot ypical for all ly pr-• s L h ' I ·m · n L r [ I rm '. T h u '
86
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also is, natural history, although [to him] a history of the mind Y' Social relations are then posited by Durkheim as invariant, and natural, regardless of whether a given society is based on a simple or an advanced d ivision oflabour. This approach is particularly inadequate for analysing a society based on commodity exchange, since it attributes inherent properties to institutions which those institutions only possess because of the specific mode of production. This approach thus makes 'second nature', that is, institutions which arise from the production of value in exchange, into 'first nature', that is, makes them appear to be institutions which would exist in a society which only produced use-values. Durkheim furthermore turns 'natural history', the formation of social relations by the underlying mode of production in any historically specific society, into the story of the collective consciousness ( ' the mind' ) . Adorno was interested in Durkheim's work because, prima facie, many of their positions were similar. But Durkheim's original commitment to posit ivist methodology and to granting sociology an unique object in relation to other social sciences, resulted in a sociology which had weak conceptual poles and which was incapable of generating theories to examine the social relations structuring the societies which Durkheim observed . Class and Organisation Th · results of Adorno's discussions of sociological theories of class and or a n is a t io n are elusive, and prima facie, not very original. Marx's theory of I · s provided a theory of the appearance or early formation of the p
olctariat, but not an adequate theory of the later integration of the
prol t ariat into capitalist society. Adorno sought to examine the
m l ion of t he 'masses' in 'post-individualistic' 'post-market' society, 57 ' but h a l so shied away from theories of 'mass society' and sought to develo p a relational notion of the masses, namely, the relation between t he mode of domination and the formation of the individual. Adorno's fusi ng of a t heory of reification and a theory of domination or mode of organisa t ion has little in common with Lukacs' comparisons between the alienat ion of industrial work and the alienation of bureaucratic work, or betw ·en t he formal rationality demanded by the capitalist economy and that d e m a nd d by legal-rational bureaucracy. 58 In spite of Adorno's !llrt!ss on orga n i sa t ion rat h r t han n class, his theory has even less in ·ommon wi t h Dahr nd rf' t h ry of t h e n t ra l i m p r ta n e of relations I nd las. onfli t in f I h of th i ty G r th f t h I g i t i m y of · pit I ' t i ty. 0 r)
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The Dispute over Positivism
that is, the production of value in exchange, not value for use. Adorno states that the relations of production predominate over the forces of production, and that they are incapable of generating revolutionary social change.60 He means that the production ofvalue in exchange is still the underlying mechanism of society, but in a society in which there is no real market, the result is an impersonal, anonymous mode ofdomination, and no distinction can really be maintained between forces and relations ofproduction.61 He produced no theory of science and technology as new forms of control as Marcuse has done, 6 2 nor any theory of the changed role of political power as Habermas has done.63 He was concerned to dissolve notions of agency, while retaining the notion of a mode of production and used Freudian theory to accomplish this. Adorno discussed Marx's concept of class in an unpublished essay which he wrote in 1 942 .64 Marx's concept of class only ever convincingly designated a formal or 'negative' unity of function.65 Just as the idea of the equal right and the equal chance of all to compete in the market was a fiction, so is the idea of the bourgeois or proletarian class as a real unity arising out of the equal position shared by the owners of the means of production, or by the sellers of labour-power.66 Real unity within, for example, the bourgeois class, can only arise out of a relation of domination within the class: . . . the law of equal exchange and its legal and political forms of reflection . . . is the contract which silently rules the relation between the kernel of the class and its majority, the bourgeois vassals, in the sense of relations of power.67 Adorno does not specify the 'kernel' but elaborates this 'double character of [the bourgeois] class' . 68 On the one hand, its character consists of the 'negative' unity which has the function of oppressing the proletariat as well as the control of its own class. On the other hand it is a real unity in Marx's sense as long as the class is actively presenting its particular interests as the interests of the whole society. The unity is 'negative' in the sense that it hides the privileges of the rulers within the dominant class, and unites the proletariat only by oppressing its members. This is to affirm that the specific mode of production determines the basic class distinction but in a formal rather than a substantive way. I n the early stages of the development of capitalist society unity within the bourgeois class and within the proletarian class is visible, the potential lack of unity latent'. In late or monopoly capitalism, the lack of real unity between mem hers of the same class is vis i ble, but the underlying formal unity is not visibl .1i9 I n ot h r words, t h e m de of production sti l l d e ter m i nes the r nd ppr sed, b u t t h m aj ri t y f . . 1 al r I t i n tw I to n !' 1 1 t R I .s H . 1 1111. d o no n l t h i11 •
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The Melancholy Science
point by discussing Marx's prediction of the increasing impoverishment or t he masses: The prognosis of the theory of the few property owners and the overwhelming mass of propertyless is fulfilled, but instead of this resulting in the essence of class society becoming obvious, the essence has been mystified by mass society in which class society terminates. 70 Adorno rejects a revisionist interpretation of the theory of increasing i mpoverishment, for example, that 'relative impoverishment' persists bet ween classes.71 He proposes that as long as 'liberalism' continued, by whi h he seems to mean competition between workers in the market for labour, Marx's prediction was correct.72 The price paid to labour would (all as long as the market system operated anonymously and without the ·onscious direction of the bourgeoisie. I nstead, domination has been exercised outside the realm of the economy in order to incorporate the proletariat into the system by transferring a part of monopoly profits. Everyone has been 'impoverished' by being subject to this incorpor a tion .n Having rejected a revisionist interpretation of Marx's theory, it is odd that Adorno opts for such a figurative one. But Adorno suggests t hat M arx's theory of alienation provided insight into the social basis of t he li kely impotence of the proletariat.74 The theory of the brutalising of t he worker by the nature of work, and of his separation from the me ·han ised work process, made highly problematic the question of how Huch a worker would become capable of political action which would ckrnand insight into the whole organisation of production and also � t rcme self-sacrifice. 75 Marx quite rightly did not produce a psychology of t he worker and, in his critique of political economy, he rejected the very not ion of 'individuality' on which any psychology could be based. The i ncreased division of labour and the diminished role of the market hru tal ises t he worker less, but the social organisation of production is no more i n telligible than it was: 'This impotence results in revolution as little all naked poverty did before' .76 Adorno does not say that the increase in t hr division of labour results in the splitting of the function of the <'apit alist, for example, the separation of ownership and control, and of 1 hl' fu n tion of wage-labour, for example, an increase in white-collar work . H e is saying that the increasing concentration of capital has made t•vc·ryone into a function of capital. Sev -raJ poi n t s are unclear in this essay. The change from a market economy t monopoly, i n a society which is based on the production of h ng , is m bi uou . om petition as 'free' competition in the v I f t h h an • is not lw y n i l l i n ; t h u t h I t h ry fvalu A o n I II lu . n h i n
8g
The Dispute over Positivism
any more of Marx's theory. Adorno depicts a change in domination which consists in a change from an earlier stage of capitalist society in which the agent of domination is conceivable and the class of dominators identifiable, to a later stage in which the agent of domination is not identifiable, and domination is .only conceivable as a theory of the formation of the individual, not as a relation between classes. He accomplishes this by a theory which makes the agent of domination less easily identifiable than at the earlier stage! In an essay on social conflict, 77 Adorno enlarges the notion of 'the double relation of the proletariat to bourgeois society', 78 to explain how it was reasonable to predict social conflict between classes in the early stages of the formation of the industrial proletariat, but how the early situation also contained the germ of the subsequent development which has not led to overt class conflict. The proletariat was recruited from 'exter ritorials' , 79 peasant farmers and craftsmen, who were objects of exploi tation and never autonomous subjects of the total social process of capitalism: ' [The proletariat] existed outside the concept of a society which sought to be free and emancipated' .8 0 On the other hand, the proletariat were also, 'as the producers [productive labour] of social wealth, immanent to society, the epitome of its productive forces' .81 This relation of labour to capital has been the crucial one. The influence of capital expanded into the spheres of mind and public opinion 'and always occupied the consciousness and unconsciousness of the fourth estate' .82 Class consciousness has to be created, as Marx and many later Marxists realise. The objective basis of class antagonism has not disappeared, but the basis on which such antagonism would erupt has been neutralised and displaced .83 Marx's prediction that social conflict would arise as the conflict of interests between classes became evident to the proletariat in the work place, presupposes that social relations would become more intelligible or transparent in the work place, in spite of commodity ICt ishism which distorts the appearance of social relations and makes t hem l ess not more transparent. The increasing complexity of the division oflabour makes individuals, whether workers or managers, into ' personifications, phantoms'84 of capitalism, so that individuals and the social relat ions b e twee n them become more abstract and unintelligible. Soci a l conflict is d isplaced to the relations between these abstract ind i v i d uals, and concerns 'socially marginal phenomena' .85 I n an ·ssay on t h e individ ual and organisation, 8 1; Adorno says that or a n isat ion .ann t b examined separat e l y from t he whole social p < • ·ss but n v r t h less ll' rs a d f i n i t ion of organisation as a 'conH :i >wily r· l !I S · i· t i on, ori nt d L a on t roll d goal . g al subs t an t i v t w ist b 1'1 t i 1 1 lit iM ���H 1 t i · l1 .H7 • gi cs t h is d f i n i t ion Nt il h k I Ia r r t h li t . r it ( h ,
.
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The Melancholy Science
t ermined goal. I t cannot, therefore, be 'consciously created' , or, at t , not by those who are subjected to it. This, he affirms, is reification, t is, social relations between men are expressed as a goal which p rs to exist for its own sake, while the underlying processes which give ris to these relations is negleded. The spread of organisation is pr ted as a spread in this kind of social relation, not as the spread of ucratic organisation as particularly suited to the goal-means r li nali ty of capitalist society. Adorno confirms this by rejecting the is t hat the spread of organisation to all spheres of society is v idable. He interprets this thesis of the increase in bureaucracy as a tom of what needs to be examined, as 'a scapegoat'88 for the increase nomic and social integration, and as another expression of our ility to penetrate the anonymity of our society. Similarly, he rej ects th si that 'the present state of organization . . .. threatens men', 89 it implies that there could be a notion of man apart from the t i n of men by organisation. Adorno suggests that we abandon the i t ional concept of the individual as, even in some circumscribed ns , u tonomous. The increased fragmentation of the division oflabour h not only continued to make men into parts of the machinery of i t l ism but has induced them to become tools to themselves, to gn is and treat themselves as means rather than as ends.90 This is w h t Ac\ rno seems to mean by 'the extension of organization' but his use c f' ·h on c p t of organisation is extremely vague. It does not refer 11 iii I I y to t he work process, nor to the principles of bureaucracy. He i l . r ds it t d raw attention to the problem of how to conceive of the · I i n lat capitalist society. He says: it l i t t l organisation where organisation should be necessary, f t he conditions of material life and the relations tw en m n d epend i ng on them, and too much organisation in the t sph r ' i n which consciousness is formed.91 . 's .
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The Dispute over Positivism
series of approximate presentations of an object which is not directly accessible . . . . . . by gathering concepts round the central one that is sought [for example, capitalism], they [ideal-types] attempt to express what that concept aims at, not to circumscribe it to operative ends' . 94 This is another way in which Adorno applies his own theses to his own endeavour: . . . the capitalist system's increasingly integrative trend, the fact that its elements entwine into a more and more total context offunctions, is precisely what makes the old question about the cause - as opposed to the constellation - more and more precarious.95 'The old question about the cause' might be the question of the origin of capitalism, ofits basic mechanism - the production of commodities - and of change in the relation between class consciousness and class conflict. To inquire instead into the 'constellation' which characterises latter-day capitalism might be to examine the set of conditions constituted by the same basic mechanism, by the formation of individuals to fit a highly complex division of labour, yet without positing class consciousness and wi thout any theory predicting change. T heory of the Individual
Adorno was one of the earliest writers to recognise the importance of psychoanalytic theory for certain philosophical problems and for sociological analysis. I n his original Habilitation, on which he worked from 1 92 4 - 7 but which he withdrew before it was examined, 96 he argued t hat psychoanalysis offered a theory which resolved the Kantian paralogism between the transcendental theory of the soul (die Seele, the J.3yche) and empirical psychology .97 It answered the question of how, si nce the 'unconscious' is not an empirical notion, there can be an rmpirical science of the unconscious.98 This interest in psychoanalysis predated Adorno's involvement with Marxism. However, he took up pre isely t his question of the empirical potential of psychoanalysis when he lat r ondu c ted empirical sociological research within the aims and \. !IU m pt ions of c ri t ic al theory . Adorno al w a ys defended a strong, orthodox interpretation of Freud, aga i nst t h , l a l r i ' r u d hims I f, agai n s t the nco-Freudian revisionists, and l l Par ns . H based his i n t erpretation of Freud on the 1 g i r !!l Tal I l l ' s •, rli · r w rk n l n his !at r, m r xpli itly so io-cultural works. n ·h f w h ·h r fr uclian th ry analys s t ' li h 1 w h ' t h r it ·
The Melancholy Science
pts whose analytical power went a long way in uncovering the s es of socio-psychological formation in capitalist society, while in t h respects, the theory presupposed features of the society which it ught to examine. He defended his interpretation of Freudian theory gai n t t h early revisions of it by psychologists who sought to give the t h •o y a greater sociological content, but who, in his view, merely , u ed t he impact of Freudian concepts for any sociological analysis. He Is d e fe n d ed it against Parsons' interpretation of the division between 1 y hology and sociology and he criticised Parsons' adaptation of F ud i n ideas for sociological analysis too. dorno used Freudian theory to illuminate two questions: first, how eopl orne to accept any 'ideology which is contrary to their rational t sts but adapted to reality', 99 for example, Fascist ideology. n t rary t o t heir rational interests' means that the ideology in question, e a m ple, plays on people's unconscious mechanisms and hence is not fl l l y int lligible to them; 100 'adapted to reality' means that such behaviour m y l n · vertheless goal-rational, that is, oriented to predetermined and p v· I n t oc i a l goals.101 This question is inseparable from the other more gen r I one of the change in the socio-psychological formation of the it ividual, 'the loss of autonomy', which Adorno sought to define Hociol gi ally. The definition of this 'loss' depends on a theory of on my. Freudian theory does not posit the individual as existing in hi s 11: but conceives of the development of the so-called autonomous i ivi u I s a n achievement, and thus offers a cogent basis for a theory of ' I 1111 c f u tono m y ' which does not idealise what counts as autonomy in the
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93
importance given to competition between individuals.107 Adorno appeals instead to the loss of autonomy and spontaneity which the individual suffers owing to the reduction of competition. Competition, or lack of it, cannot be the basis ofa theoretical explanation in any case because it has always been a phenomenon of the fa<;ade of capitalist society .108 Adorno finds the obverse, Parsons' attempt to make use of psy choanalysis in his sociology, equally inadequate. First, Parsons under stood the province of sociology, namely 'the institutional structure' 109 of society, and the province of psychology, namely, 'the personality structure' 110 to be different, because of the different concerns of the disciplines in question and their relatively immature state.l 1 1 Adorno derives the state of the disciplines from the state of society. For the realm of the psychological is increasingly split from the realm of the sociological, which means, loosely, that what is purely personal in the individual is diminished ·in relation to what is socialised, in other terms, the id, as the realm of drives, is increasingly governed by the ego: For what characterized the specifically social dimension is eman cipation from psychology through the interpolation of abstract determination between people, principally the exchange of equiva lents, and through the hegemony of a rational faculty [the ego] modelled on such abstractions from human psychology.11 2 Hence no psychological explanation can in principle be given for what does not derive from the individual psyche, and any science which based i tself on the 'psychological' as such would have no object. I ndividual behaviour is commensurable because ' the actual process of socialization is based on the fact that as economic subjects they [individuals] do not relate to each other at all immediately but act according to the dictates of exchange value' . 113 Parsons does use some psychoanalytical concepts 'at the level of abst raction' which he deems necessary for sociological analysis.114 Ex hypothesi, he is thus assuming that there is no conflict between the 'levels' of t he psychological and the sociological.115 He employs the concept of t he superego without the concept of repression. It is thus impossible to analy se the process of formation which the concepts were designed to anal yse or t o discern any lack o f social integration or the presence of any k i n l or so i a l o n f l i t :
94
The Melancholy Science
Adorno uses Freud's model of the psychology of the ego to explain the l�ss of individual autonomy' and to explain how the individual adjusts to HO ial reality in a way which makes his action less intelligible to h i m s lf. 1 1 7 The model of the development of the autonomous ego is that t h ( male) child fears and hates his father, but identifies with him and th · r c fo re redirects this aggression against himself, takes over the role of t h e fat her, and thereby becomes autonomous. If the child, for some rc son , does not aspire to become the father, he may continue to fear and !IU m i t t o authority without introjecting it, identifying with it in such a w y t hat i t remains external to him, 'more powerful and less in a l i z d ' , 1 1 8 and an autonomous ego will not be formed. This kind of l d v 1 >pment might occur:, for example, if the father is experienced by the c h i l d · s i m potent but authoritarian, as might be the case in a society with I i hly m p lex division oflabour, but with a high degree of uniformity in h w rk process, and a low degree of market competition. Th o n 'pt of the ego is twofold: it is supposed to arrest the play of it 1 li>r ·s ( ' d r i ves ) and test them against outer reality. l l9 It is thus 'psy hi ' and 'ext rapsychic', 'a quantum of libido and the representative I' u lsidc r ·al i ty ' . 1 2 0 Adorno does not discuss the notion of the superego, but hows how t he complex operations of the ego makes the question of wl l o u n ts as social integration problematic. He does this by comparing t l • n t i o n of go and id with the no tions of conscious and unconscious.l21 T l •go is bot h, qua consciousness, the opposite of repression, and, qua ns i usness, the repressive agency itself. 122 To be able to assert itself l i t y, t he go has to understand reality and act consciously, 123 that is, · , 1 1 i prohibit ions and identify with them. Instead, Adorno claims, >l' l 1 1 c renunciat ions are n o t intelligible to the ego, 124 that is, the ego J 11 not i d en t i fy w i t h and internalise the prohibitions, but simply sets ll p in t h � unconscious and thus remains largely confined to the lUI �01 111 :iouK, t h a t is, t o t h e heteronomous rule of the unconscious. '
•
'
•
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•
·ogni t ivc activity, performed in the interest of self has t o be const antly reversed, and self-awareness forgone, i l l l t' rcst or sclf:.preservation . 1 2 5 o'H
'Ht• v at i on ,
in th
The Dispute over Positivism
95
forms of regression' .1 2 9 These were, firstly, fascism, as the prototype of those kinds of domination which do not give rise to the kind of identification which results in the development of a strong ego, but in this case, to narcissistic identification, 1 30 and, secondly, the 'culture industry', as the extension ofthe principle ofexchange value into the organisation of leisure which creates and feeds the desire for instinctual gratification . Adorno's engagement with psychoanalytic theory remains one-sided. Psychoanalytic theory provided the way to examine the mediation between the individual and society, an explication of the view that 'the individual is at the same time, universal and particular', 131 without diminishing the reality of either the individual or society. He taxed both philosophies and sociologies for failing to do this. Heidegger, for example, did not allow adequately for the mediation of men by social institutions but established a theory of 'man' (Dasein) as such; while Durkheim, for example, concentrated on the reality of social institutions to the detriment ofany theory of how they mediate the individual. Yet Adorno's emphasis on the formation or deformation of the individual did replace any further definition of the macro-factor, the form of domination. He might at least have detailed the mechanisms by which power has become diffuse but omnipotent, and how that is related to change in the organisation of production. Ideology, domination, and reification are simply equated with each other, and the individual is not satisfactorily reinserted into the socio-political context. Sociology and Empirical Research
Adorno originally defined 'positivist' epistemology in social science as any mode of cognition which grants theoretical priority to 'what is at hand, what is given as fact' .132 In response to Karl Popper's objection to t h is as a designation of his position, Adorno redefined the issue as 'scientism' , by which he meant any epistemology of social science which grants priority to its own cognitive procedures.133 He argued that any p h il osophy of social science which founds its criterion of validity on the i n t rnal consistency of a set of theoretical propositions, or on the l�llsifiability of hypotheses will be inherently contradictory, and that this arises from t he inability of such philosophy to apprehend the social const i t u t ion of t he cognitive values espoused . He discussed Popper's vcrsi n of 's i n t ism' i n t wo articles, but wrote about empirical social r s ar h i n t I s t s •v ·n pi s . l 3� Empirical social research is narrowly t l fi nd n t 1 d in th 1 t x t f an m p i ri al soc io logy whi h h
1 1
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The Melancholy Science
met hods, although not in a way which would aim to confirm or dis onfirm hypotheses or theories by examining relations posited to hold b tween observables under specified conditions. Several traditions of mpirical social research are relevant to Adorno's ambition. They are: th pre-Second World War tradition in Germany; the Frankfurt School tr c l i tion; the development of social research in America in the 1 930s and 4 ·; and the development of empirical sociology in Germany after the w r i n the fifties. The use of empirical research techniques predated the development of so iology in Germany.135 As early as the late eighteenth century, social statist ics was a substantive discipline which collected data on social and . · no m i c change.l36 By comparison, according to Adorno, the later al l mpts to adapt empirical research to the demands of the ideal of n· tural science narrowed the purview of social research.l37 For only those r ts selected for their· relevance in establishing hypotheses were of i n t . r st, whereas previously all available information had been gathered . The Frankfurt School in the early thirties continued, in a sense, the earlier · t ion . Horkheimer explained, in the first edition of the Z,eitschrift, why l th I n · t i t u te was called the 'Institute for Social Research' .138 One reason w s t hat social research was not going to be used solely in the service of p oblems conceived according to the domain of one discipline, empirical ·i logy, but for the cognition of the whole of society, which might in vol v t he realms ofpsychology, economics, and so on . 1 39 Conversely, no on et hod could produce conclusive results concerning any object of i n ves t iga t ion, but the results of several methods, qualitative as well as qu n t i t at iv , would need to be collated.l40 Above all, empirical methods wr r. not go i ng to be used to eliminate inconsistencies and contradictions in tht�o y by on fining their operations to examining only whatever could ily t ra n ribed into empirical terms.141 n d is t i ng ui s h ed three causes which contributed to the great nsi n nd d e v el op ment of empirical social research in the 1 9 30s and 1 940 : J ar e indust rial enterprises needed increasingly to use it in order to 1 I n t h ·ir mark ts; governments used it to manage their war effort; and t h e n e w forms of mass communications utilised it.14 2 Adorno called this
The Dispute over Positivism
- 97 Adorno insists that empirical research as described and the techniques listed, must be distinguished from 'theory', 145 reserving 'theory' to mean a commitment to a view of the production of value in exchange as the underlying process in society in relation to which all other phenomena are to be understood. He deplores the use of empirical research apart from such theory. However, he lists techniques for ascertaining beliefs, . attitudes, and behaviour, including those which he used himself, in isolation from theory. In some of his other discussions of sociology and empirical research, 146 he persists in presenting empirical sociology as hostile to theory, and as confining itself to ascertaining opinions. He tends not to discuss sociology which has used empirical methods to investigate theories, for example, the sociology of class or the sociology of organ isations, although he was well informed about such work.147 One of the origins of Adorno's argument is his experience on Paul Lazarsfeld's Princeton Radio Research Project.148 The aim of this project 'was to try to determine eventually the role of radio in the lives ofdifferent types of listeners, the value of radio to people psychologically, and the various reasons why they like it' .149 Adorno judged that the project
. . . was concerned with the collection of data, which was supposed to benefit the planning departments in the field of the mass media, whether in industry itself or in cultural advisory boards and similar bodies.150 He defined the work as 'administrative research' since it was expressly stipulated in the project's charter 'that the investigations must be performed within the limits of the commercial radio system prevailing in the United States' .151 Adorno took this to mean that ' . . . the system itself, its cultural and sociological consequences and its social and economic presuppositions were not to be analyzed' .15 2 The research took as axiomatic 'to proceed from the subjects' reactions as if they were a primary and final source ofsociological knowledge' .153 Adorno later drew on the procedure of this project as a general model of empirical sociology. Sociology, according to this model, merely concerns itself with ascertain ing 'reactions', independent of any corpus of theory and makes the individual its ultimate point of reference and explanation. Adorno opposed to the approach of the Princeton Project one which would
g8
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H e f i rmly asserted that 'the apparently primary, immediate reactions [ arc ] insufficient as a basis for sociological knowledge because they [are] t hemselves conditioned' .155 However, he conceded that 'motivation anal ysis' provided a means for 'penetrating the pre-conditions of the su bjective reactions through additional detailed, qualitative studies', 1 5 6 a l t hough he remained sceptical that such studies could 'really proceed from t he opinions and reactions of individuals to the social structure and 1 he soc i al essence' . 1 57 I t is striking that he did not advocate empirical i nvest iga t ion of the 'pre-conditions' themselves. In fact he remained con v i nced that 'the structures of the total society resist direct empirical t cat ment' . 1 58 He did devise complex theories about the radio system w h i ·h i mpressed Lazarsfeld, but neither men were successful in translat ing t h e concept of 'fetish' into empirical terms.159 Lazarsfeld introduced the first issue of the 1 94 1 ,Zeitschrift , in which Hcveral pieces of the Project were published, by trying to summarise the di llcrcnce between 'administrative and critical communications re st•arch ' , 1 �;o associating the latter with Adorno and the I nstitute for Social R esearc h . He suggests that administrative research would observe pl'ople's d aily habits and the effect of the media on their lives; 1 61 critical n·search might ask whether people's attitude to reality was profoundly t' hangcd by the media, how the media are controlled and organised, and how ' i n t heir institutional set-up, is the trend toward centralization, HL un l ard ization and promotional pressure expressed? In what form, h > W v r d isguised, are they threatening human values?' 162 He breaks own t he 'operation' of critical research into stages: ) A t h eory about the prevailing trends toward a 'promotional · ul t ur ' is i ntroduced on the basis of general observations . . . b) A sp ial study of any phenomenon consists in determining how it ,x p ss s t hese prevailing trends . . . and contributes to reinforcing l h m. c) The onsequences of b) in stamping human personalities in mod rn, i nd ustrial society are brought to the foreground and scruti nized from the viewpoint of more or less explicit ideas of what endangers and what preserves the dignity, freedom and values of h u man bei ngs . . . 1 6 3
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theory. Paradoxically, once he abandoned the attempt to quantify over alternative theoretical terms, such as 'fetish', he did not advocate such special studies of phenomena, but accepted the results of mere 'opinion research' as the basis for theoretical elucidation.165 Another influence on Adorno's assessment of the possibilities and limitations of empirical research was the development of sociology in Germany in the post-war period. The pre-war emphasis on more or less formal sociological systems was discredited and instead research tech niques imported from the United States were undiscriminatingly es poused, 'to meet the tasks of planning which arose after total defeat' .166 An example of this kind of work was a study into 'whether and to what degree the family resisted the uprooting of entire population strata in the post-war period' .167 Adorno describes this work as atheoretical and aphilosophical, by which he means not that theories were not devised and tested, but that the research merely 'registers single facts' instead of 'thinking comprehensively' ( iibergreifendes Denken) in a way which would surpass registering facts and would therefore necessarily be critical.168 'Comprehensive thinking' is one of the many indirect phrases which Adorno employs to refer to the production of value in exchange as the fundamental mechanism of society which gives rise to systematically mistaken beliefs about it. Adorno often obscurely calls the process of the production of value in exchange 'the essence' of society, and the mistaken beliefs to which it gives rise, 'the appearance', that is, the form in which the underlying process appears to people. When he accuses the later post war sociology, which was more theoretical and which examined, for example, changes in class consciousness among industrial workers, of being atheoretical too, he does not mean that such sociology lacks theoretical perspectives, but that it has eliminated any theory of society as a whole from its consideration. Thus the apparent shift of emphasis in the sociology of industry to the individual unit, the enterprise, and to the group as the object ofsociology, amounts to a change in principle not to locate industrial relations within the context of the forces of production and the social relations of production. 169 This sociology declares its intention of . . . [separating] 'life processes' from 'work processes' in the economic organisation - as if the objective structure of work, and its character as a co mm od i ty had nothing to do with the life of the worker.170 ,
Adorno argu s furt h r t hat t h is app roac h supports 'the supremacy of is t i n r lat i ns' . 1 7 1 H n v ises t h us of mpiri al m t hod n i n ipl ., but t h i r b ing h l su h li it d fr 1 w rk . ·
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The Melancholy Science
enterprise, which determines the obj ective functions of the wor kers . . . to reduce the object of the sociology of the enterprise to those omponents of the worker's behaviour not immediately determined by t he end of the enterprise . . . means to eliminate from the object of sociology the compulsion to which individuals must submit in order to preserve their lives and the life of the society .17 2 Adorno also discussed the 'preference for subjective investigations . . . confi rmed by a survey of the voluminous literature on post-war German youtb' . 173 By 'subjective', he means that Very little significance is attributed to the objective life conditions of t his generation: most of the works deal with the attitudes and behaviour of the young, and only rarely are these interpreted by reference to the social structure. l 74 This l i terature is quite theoretical: the absence of class consciousness175 and t he presence of alienation are themes which pervade 'nearly the ent i re l iterature' .176 Alienation is 'described . . . in terms of the " Labyrinth" of modern society, which makes very difficult an "inner relat ionship" to the state' .177 Adorno comments:
1 t could be asked if modern society is in fact as opaque as the sociol og ists depict it, above all as opaque as the sociologists themselves seem
to find it? In the era of large scale organisations the tendency to
(•l i minate complicated intermediate mechanisms has perhaps made
many t hings simpler than when liberalism flourished; perhaps there vei l i ng mechanisms of a particular kind, which make society l ppear i m possible to understand; and perhaps we ought now to study t h ose mechan isms? The alleged labyrinthine character of society may w �11 be i nterpreted as a projective image of the impotent, who are now unable to do that which was once termed 'making one's own way' .178 arc
I ns t ead of l ess competition (an 'intermediate mechanism' ) for example, bt"t ween workers making social relations more transparent, they have I H·come more o p aque. Social relations have become more opaque partly hl'causc in t he sphere of consumption, they can seem more intelligible t han t h e y are, 'an illusion of pure use-val ue, as displayed by cultural �oods, has b en subst i t uted for pure exchange-value. This exchange v · l u · has d ept iv ly t ak n ov r t h function of use-val ue' . 1 79 At the have become less i I h r • of work, in l l f th d ivisi n of g1 th I
t nd n y l'
of
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uncovering 'veiling mechanisms' which concern the very formation of the individual, but which cannot be discerned as long as analysis is confined to mere description of adaptive behaviour. Adorno's more general critiques of sociology and empirical research and of 'scientistic' notions of objectivity can only be understood in the light of these contexts. Furthermore, his understanding of concepts and of 'experience' make it impossible for him to countenance a sociology which would quantify over clearly defined terms. He declined to define concepts because to do so would be to construct the object by the concepts of the science and to attribute static, invariant properties to it. He shuns investigating 'an obj ect with an instrument which, through its own construction, decides in advance just what the object is - a simple case of circularity' .18 2 Definitions are thus omitted, because to define a concept would be to stipulate what the object is, which would be to imply that the· concept is rationally identical with its object. Ex hypothesi, empirical reality or experience of it cannot be specified apart from concepts. Experience of social reality is mediated by concepts, thus there is no independently definable reality to pit against concepts in order to 'test' them.183 This" notion of experience is complex, it both connotes the empirical, reality itself, and the possibility of knowing reality.l84 Adorno does not thereby debase experience. On the contrary, it is the basis of any cognition. But to stipulate a pr-·Jri, that is apart from experience, what is to count as empirical evidence tor a concept, is merely to register what the methodology is equipped to register.l85 The lamented hiatus between theoretical and empirical sociology is misconstrued according to this view: for theory and experience necessarily interact.186 This does not imply that theory is supreme. A circle is unavoidable: . . . there can be no experience which is not mediated by - often unarticulated - theoretical conceptions, there can be no conception of any use which is not founded in experience and continuously judged by it. The circle cannot be concealed . . . .187
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ha v io u r of individuals, and sometimes to the institutions which arise on b sis
of the underlying process of society and which are misunder
Htood by people. Theory investigates the basis of the deviation not the
correlat ion between the 'essence' and the 'appearance' of society:
. . . decisive structures of the social process, such as the inequality of the a l l ged equivalence of exchange, cannot become apparent without the i n t r v en ti on of theory.191 T h is pos i t i on
is incompatible with the idea of formulating and testing
hypot heses . 1 92 It illuminates esoteric assertions, such as, 'concealed esse nce is non-essence': 193 'essence' refers to the production of value in ex ha nge ; the production of value in exchange structures the appearance or 0 i t y ; exchange value appears to be a real attribute of commodities a l t hough it is not a real attribute; it is therefore not really an essence, but 'non· ss n e ' .
Adorno's major criticism of scientistic sociology and of certain kinds of e m piri c a l research is that they reduplicate, instead of explaining what th y o bserve . Any theory which stipulates what is to be tested will then p ' ·k o u t o n l y what is thus more or less narrowly defined. Empirical esearch whic h simply ascertains people's opinions reproduces the mistaken beliefs which people hold, instead of explaining how they come Lo ho l d such beliefs. l94 However, such theories and such empirical work do h ave a cog n i tive status for Adorno: they provide the place where his r u l ys i s s t a r t s . He quotes Hegel's aggressive assertion approvingly ' Publ i opi n ion deserves to be respected and despised'. 195 For the Mt: ' . 1 i11t k pproa c h describes the appearance of society more accurately t lu 1, (br ex ampl e , t h e verstehende approach, which cannot capture the p .n t l y ! i x e d , invariant, unintelligible appearance of society.196 A I J no's own approach is more helpfully called Deutung than 'Lh .o y' . 1 11 7 Deutung is translated as 'interpretation' in the English l run11l l i on of T he Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, but 'elucidation' wou l i bt• be t t e r because Adorno distinguished his position so clearly from Vrr.l'telm u w h ic h is often translated as (subj ective) interpretation.l9 8 ' Ado no's proced u re is best described as an 'indirect method', 199 or as the phyKiognomy of app arance', 200 since it involves the elucidation of the rr l a l ion be t w ee n t he u nderl y i ng process of so c i e ty and t he forms i n w hic h l he· process a pp ea rs people's per ept ion of i t , t he m · t ho lologies of non d in lre l i cal sociologies, and ot her c u l t ural f o r m s .
'toward.1· arl Empirical Sociology
The Dispute over Positivism
empirical social research . I n his major areas of research he established and examined typologies, for example, types of musical behaviour, and types of more and less authoritarian character. These typologies are not intended to provide classificatory schemata which could be tested, or ideal-types in the sense of refined concepts against which reality could be measured. The beliefs and behaviour of people in particular spheres of social action are observed to be rigid and stereotyped in a specifiable and limited number of ways. These 'types' are then shown to be determined by the underlying process of society, the mode of production. The production of value in exchange and the concomitant mode of domi nation in late capitalism give rise to 'typed' behaviour which tends to be generally or universally prevalent. 'Indirect methods' have to be used to demonstrate the mechanism by which such behaviour is determined and thus the question of how adequately concepts are translated into empirical terms and the question of circularity in the argument are irrelevant or need to be posed in a very different way. Adorno was always alive to 'the danger of a methodological circle' .2 0 1 . . . that in order to grasp the phenomenon of cultural reification according to the prevalent norms of empirical sociology one would have to use reified methods . 20 2 .
.
and that to translate concepts into empirical terms amounted to attempting to 'square the circle' . 2 0 3 He took care to try and avoid this inconsistency in his work. Adorno's first major piece of empirical work was his collaboration on the Princeton Radio Research Project. In his capacity as collaborator he continued to elaborate theoretical themes on which he had published before joining the Project, especially the phenomenon of fetishism in musical production and reception, 2 0 4 conducted an analysis of radio symphonies, 2 0 5 and developed a typology of musical behaviour. 2 0 6 I t was during the course of this work that he developed the notions of 'standardization' and 'pseudo-individualism' foreshadowing the notion of 'personalization' which 'later played a significant role in The Authoritarian Personality . . . . 2 0 7 Studies of 'authoritarianism' constituted his other major research activity. In The Authoritarian Personality he was in dividually responsible for the 'qualitative' analyses, although he also helped to construct the ' Fascism (F) Scale'. He contributed the qualitative work to another major study of authoritarianism conducted aft r t h war i n rmany which used experimental methods but which I a pr d m i n an t l y q uant i tativ · t udy, Gruppenexperiment. 208 He v r 1 f rt h r f n t n t an l y i , am ng t h m n n st rol gy l m n th r n t l (' tor,2oo t he t I vi ·o I y , u 1 Theac> '
·
·
•
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studies used psychoanalytical concepts to examine how standardised and often commercialised techniques exploit certain contradictions in the mentality of their potential 'clients', which are themselves traceable to social contradictions, in order to reinforce standardised patterns of behaviour.212 The collaborative projects always utilise a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. It was thought that this plurality would prevent the research techniques from being given more import ance than the phenomenon under investigation. The joint project The Authoritarian Personality is well known as a piece of em pirical sociology which claims that it measures the anti-democratic potential of the individual, locating a specified disposition by utilising a range of related interview scales. The major criticisms of the book, that t he notion of 'fascist' or authoritarian personality is presupposed but not demonstrated by the empirical tests, and that it fails to explain au t horitarianism at the macro-level, relying instead on depicting a psychological syndrome, are well known too. Adorno responded in two ways to criticism of The Authoritarian Personality. He referred to the macro-theory which was published elsewhere, 213 and he explicated the idea of the role of empirical research on w h i c h the book had been based. This wa:s somewhat disingenuous because the theory, a chapter in Dialectic of Enlightenment, although wri t t en between 1 94 1 and 1 945 in America, had been purposely published in German, 214 and the later replies to critics were all written in German too, although the book aroused most interest and controversy in th U n i t ed States. 215 The relevant chapter in Dialectic of Enlightenment, 'Elements of Anti Sem i t ism : Limits of Enlightenment' displays affinities with the 'Research Pn�jt•t:l o n Anti-Semitism' which was announced and outlined in the ;:_,it ·cllrijt in 1 94 1 .216 I t consisted of an historical outline of anti-semitism nd mass movements, and included a typology of 'Types of Present Day Ami-Scm i t ism ' . The chapter in the Dialectic of Enlightenment circles o u nd t he proposition that 'Bourgeois anti-semitism has a specific r. :onom i · reason : the concealment of domination in production' . 217 The c pi t a l i s t is j udged to engage in productive labour, but, as Marx argue'd, prol i l , t he return to capital, is not correctly regarded as a return to prod uct ive labour.218 The Jews were� for a long time, excluded from ow n i ng t he means of production but owned much of the circulation H<' C t o r . � 1 11 This role as 'middle man', as intermediary, is more visible to the worker in t he sphere of commerce and consumption than the role of the C' pit alist, b u t less i n t el l igi b le to him as an essential function of capitalism: it issi r l u nd r t and th im mediate function of the production o f y l u nd r t a n d h i n t rm d iary fu n t ion of , l ss ·
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1 05
between the worker's own productive labour and the wages received for it. 221 Hence the 'economic inj ustice ofthe whole [that is, capitalist] class is attributed to them (the Jews)' 222 and they are regarded by the masses as non-productive parasites: 22 3 The merchant [the Jew] presents them [the workers] with the bill which they have signed away to the manufacturer. The merchant is the bailiff of the whole system and takes · the hatred of others upon himself. The responsibility of the circulation sector is a socially necessary pretence. 2 24 The growth of large . organisations diminished the role of the in ' termediary, the sphere of circulation, since production and distribution come to be dominated and controlled by 'strong centralized agencies' . 22 5 Hence there was no longer any economic need for the jews, but there was certainly a need to attribute to them the crises of the whole system, such as those of the interwar period, by reviving the image of the non-productive parasite. 226 The rest of the chapter in Dialectic rif Enlightenment develops a psychoanalytic theory of anti-semitism as a projection of the change in the mode of domination on to the Jews, as the projection of a new form of impotence, as Marx revealed religion itself to be a projection of so<;:ial impotence. 'Projection' is not only a projection in Marx's sense of what is denied (power) , but also a projection of what is desired and feared. 'Projection' is not only in Marx's sense a projection which controls the exploited, but it also expresses the needs and fears of the exploiters. The theory of projection is predicated on the general theory of the individual's loss of autonomy. Fascism is understood as an extreme case of such loss of autonomy, which Adorno explicated by means of the model of narcissistic identification. 227 Fascist propaganda mobilised 'unconscious, regressive processes' in a specific way which did not represent 'the return of the archaic, but its reproduction in and by civilization itself in a planned and calculated way.2 2 8 Adorno used Freudian theory to examine anti semitism and fascist propaganda precisely in order to show that ' psychological' processes are not in themselves determining processes:
The Melancholy Science
1 0G
roo prod uced a 'negative psychology', as i t were. His criticism of pi i t soph ies and sociologies which had no notion of the subj ect or of p is t m logical subjectivity and of those which granted complete u t onomy t o the subject was undertaken for the sake of a subject which has lost i t s substance', which has lost i ts autonomy. Sociologists fail to ur d st and their own epistemological subjectivity for the same reason L h l t h y fai l to develop a satisfactory theory of the individual. Adorno g v up th e proletariat as the subject-object of history, as cogniser and i r of h istory, but he was devoted to locating and analysing the fate of t he ind ivid ual, of the lost subj ect of society. Thus i t was a serious iRun rst anding, as far as he was concerned, when The Authoritarian l'l!r.ronalil) was accused by critics of offering no theory of anti-semitism, or or b i ng i t s explanation on psychological and subjective factors. 230 I t is I ar from the 'Introduction' to The Authoritarian Personalif) that r v lence o f anti-semitic ideology is assumed, and that the question is, why and how do some individuals succumb to it more readily n ot h rs. 2 3 1 The question which i nterests the authors is not why is one kind or i n d ivid ua l more susceptible than another kind, but the more gr. l q uest ion concerning the nature of the widespread susceptibility l l l i n id o lo g i es in our society, or the reasons for the prevalence of sud i col gies. 2:1 2 Th mpiri al work was not intended to 'prove or disprove' 2 33 the l eo y. I t was i n t e nd ed to aid the analysis of the underlying mechanisms whi h ak i ndividuals susceptible to certain ideologies. It used indirect m .th ds, for t h Fascism ( F) Scale depended on taking indirect questions to s of pot e n t ial susceptibility to Fascism. Although it was l t h t t l F -scale correlated with the other scales which l d b 1i fs m r directly, this was never held to validate the F n i n ic" tor o f Fascist pot ential. I n fact i t was judged that the scales should not be too high, since i t was n th ' m bet w l h l r eopl would adm i t to certain beliefs more readily when c l i l i : l ·on te n l was less explicit .n4 The work with the scales l id eas w h i h were d e v el o ped in the course of detailed case rx t l l Nl 1 l irN P11ycho nalyt ic on epts were em ployed to examine the relation hrlwcrn t:xpcricncc of a u t hori t y and ego formation. The charge of l ' i rc u l t ri t y was not denied . I t was d n ied t ha t t he research was narrow l y l i m i tt'd to what t h e t h ory already pr suppos d, si nce th t heory went far b yo n d L l w bou n ds of w h l c ou l d be va l idated by empiri al work . I t was h a l d i ln·rcn t k i nds f i ·ul · i n d 1 • s . t s i ri a l work 11d 1 i t t • I L t I k th m b u_ h l t I t hr w l ig ht n . n t I t h ·
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The Dispute over Positivism
strictest criteria gains in plausibility . . . we never regarded the theory simply as a set of hypotheses but in some sense standing on its own feet, and therefore did not intend to prove or disprove it through our findings but only to derive from it concrete questions for in vestigation . . . and demonstrate certain prevalent socio-psychological structures. Of course, the critic ism of the F -scale is not to be gainsaid, that to establish tendencies indirectly that cannot be got at directly owing to fear of censoring mechanisms coming into play, presupposes that one has first confirmed the existence of the tendencies that one assumes the subjects hesitated to proclaim. 2 35 However, this does not imply that the theory and the results of the research were arbitrary. The whole range of scores was developed into a typology by Adorno. 2 36 The typology was understood to be real, 'Our typology has to be a critical typology in the sense that it comprehends the typification of men itself as a social function'. 2 37 'There is reason to look for psychological types because the world in which we live is typed and "produces" different "types" of persons' . 2 38 However, Adorno only suggests what the social principle of stereotyping is. He distinguishes between the non-authoritarian and authoritarian personality and pro poses that the authoritarian personality is J?Ore of a 'type' than the non authoritarian personality: The more rigid a type, the more deeply does he show the hallmarks of social rubber stamps. This is in accordance with the characterization of our high scorers by traits such as rigidity and stereotypical thinking. Here lies the ultimate principle of our whole typology. I ts major dichotomy lies in the question of whether a person is standardized himself and thinks in a standardized way, or whether he is truly 'individualized' and opposes standardization in the sphere of human experience, 2 39 add i ng a note to emphasise the substantive point which he is making: l t should be s t r essed that two concepts of types have to be distin g u ished . On t he one hand, t here are those who are types in the proper sense, t ypified persons, i nd i vidual s who are largely reflecting set pa t t erns and so ial me hanisms, and on the other hand, persons who can only b all d t y p s in t he form al ogi al sense and who may often be by t h absence of st andard q ua l i t i s . . . 2 4 0
f th
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Stereotypy misses reality in so far as it dodges the concrete and contents i t self with preconceived, rigid, and overgeneralized ideas to which the ind ividual attributes a kind of magical omnipotence. Conversely, personalization dodges the real abstractness, that is to say, the 'reification' of a social reality which is determined by property relations and in which human beings themselves are, as it were, mere appendages. Stereotypy and personalization are two divergent parts of an actually non-experienced world . . . 241 Adorno even proposes that these equally inadequate ways of dealing with l i t y are due to the conflict between the unintelligibility caused by the ase in industrial standardisation with the illusion of intelligibility giv n by modern mass communications, 242 but, disappointingly, the x lanation stops at this provocative point. Th problem with The Authoritarian Personality is also evident in A rn o ' s criticism of sociology. Inadvertently he undermines his comi l m nt to objective, macro-processes (for example, 'the social principle of t r otypy', and 'reification') because he does not enlarge on the ways i whi h such processes determine different spheres of social life. As a u l t the overall perspective is easily lost. Adorno remains close to the i l ists whom he criticises for finding society so opaque, since l t h >Ugh he provides a very general explanation of why society appears 1p· q u ', he does not make good his implicit offer to dissolve the u n ss at the level of theory by examining its causes. His tantalising ti n, also to be found in some of his articles, that in advanced i 1' t . i ty the work process is such that society appears less 1 1 ' i 1 whil the realm of leisure (culture) acquires an illusory l l i ' i l i t y is developed only in the sphere of leisure and thus a antith sis remains latent.
Chapter 6 The Dispute over M odernism
The Sociology of Culture
Adorno explored change in the mode of production domination in the sphere of culture, especially music and literature, not in the sphere of work. 'Culture' does not merely designate the realm of consumption, nor the organisation of leisure according to the principle of commodity exchange. Adorno developed a general theory of culture predicated on his use of Marx's theory of value by transcribing the range of Marx's categories of production (composition) , distribution (reproduction) , exchange ( the culture industry) and consumption (reception) . 'Production' does not refer to the organisation of work or manufacturing; 'reproduction' does not refer to technology; 'the culture industry' does not refer to industry. In this part of his writing Adorno steps outside immanent analyses of intellectual and artistic works to proffer explicit general strictures on method for sociology. These general prescriptions were, however, derived from his analyses of works. In this part, too, he wrote as a composer, as a critic, as a sociologist, and as all three together. For the task of the composer or writer is explicitly or implicitly analogous to that of the sociologist.1 He chooses a form in which to work, and all form expresses society in a more or less critical way. The sociologist is explicitly or i m pl i c i t l y a composer. His method is more or less critical of society, and t his is xpr ssed by t h form i n which he chooses to write. The sociology of u l t u r is ins parabl als from riticism (aesthetics) because the soc i a l n nl fu l i f rk of art an only b fully und rs t d rk, t h t is, t h w y i ts f th ilUI.<,&Ul\JI;Il\
The Melancholy Science
I 10
con t ext of a work of art cannot limit itself to questions offact and absolve its If from questions of evaluation. I do not want to ignore the question of quality for the sake of the 'socially functional or dysfunctional question ' . But, quite the contrary, I seek to show, in opposition to vulgar sociology, that the sociological question can be meaningfully formulated only on the basis of the question of aesthetic quality. In other words, sociology should not ask how music functions but how music stands in relation to the underlying antinomies in society: whether music confronts them, overcomes them, leaves them as they are or indeed hides them . Only an immanent qu st ion concerned with the form of works will lead to this.2
T h 'question of quality' is the question of the form of a work. Form is
constructed on the basis of a stance towards society which can be decoded in any given work. Adorno's writings in the sociology of culture are here somewhat rbi t rari ly conjoined . Adorno republished some of his essays and review rssays on music and literature in slim volumes which he subtitled 'Critical M od Is', 3 and he republished much of the rest of his writing on music and l i t erat u re in the same format.4 The essays deal with a wide range of u l t ura l t o pics including education and the media, as well as consisting of pit� ·es on cultural critics, 5 and more general theoretical rubrics. 6 The major w r it i n gs on music consist of a series of monographs; on Wagner,7 on M u h l c r,H on Stravinsky,9 on Schonberg,1 0 and on Berg. 11 The most fit o u s of t hese are the ones on Stravinsky and Schonberg which were 1 u h l is hrd t oge ther with a critical introduction as The Philosophy of New MuJir: . 1 2 T here are two volumes entitled aesthetics: the small aesthetics w h ic h co n s is ts of republished essays,13 and the voluminous Asthetische ' I luwrif. ( Aest hetic Theory) which was unfinished when Adorno died and publ ished posthumously . 1 4 He also wrote a series of introductory lectures on t he so iology of music, and a series on aesthetics.l5 Adorno a l so composed music for most of his life. He composed before ht• w<�nt to Vienna in 1 925 to study under Berg and Eduard S!!•uerrna n n . 1 6 He continued composing after his return to Germany in 1 �)1111, and his correspondence with the composer Ernst Krenek indicates t hat he ·o n t i n u ed to compose during his exile in England and America in t hr 1 9 30s. 1 7 l n Oxford in the thirties he was known as a musician, 1 8 and Th J l as M a n n nfirms i n T he Genesis of a Novel th a t he was co m posing l i � rnia in th 1 40s. 1 0 He w r t v raJ pi s a f t r t h war I f m p sin u i in th H �� p ri d , 2 0 a n d h t i t h f i i U � n t h 11i t i . ' 1 7 ( , Ia ) l > lh f'h' ll ( 1 ,. ) t ·
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III
The Dispute over Modernism
these reviews were very short, occasional pieces which were never republished . 21 From I 928 - 3 I Adorno was editor ofDer Anbruch, a famous monthly journal published in Vienna, and the organ of 'new music' . In the I 920s in Vienna, neue Musik stood for the progressive Austro-German musicians, Schonberg and his school above all, but also Paul Hindemith and Krenek, as opposed to the more conservative faction headed by Hans Pfitzner. From the early twenties there had been a dispute over methodology, a Methodenstreit, as it were, between the schools. Schonberg's pupil, Berg, replied in Der Anbruch to Pfitzner's tirades against 'the new aesthetic' and against the possibility of intellectual and sociological analysis of music. 22 Adorno always associated himself with the school of new music, with creating and defining the new idiom as composer and as critic . Adorno's writings on music and on literature are heterogeneous in style. The main analyses of individual works and reuvres are florid and dense, full of elliptical references to his general philosophical and sociological ideas, such as reification, identity and non-identity thinking, and the fate of the individual. Over the range of this large body ofwriting, including the more theoretical work, the distinction between easier and harder texts does not always correspond to the distinction between directly and indirectly written texts. For example, the introductory lectures on music23 contain a straightforward, simply written account of how the sociology of music might proceed, in contrast to the monographs on music which demand a high level of expertise in the history of muslc theory in order to follow the details of Adorno's argument, although the broad points are clear. Yet the essay ldeen zur Musiksoziologie (Ideas on the Sociology of Music) 24 is much more complex and profound than the lectures, but it still contains a direct statement of Adorno's position in contrast to the essay Musikalische Warenanarysen (Analysis of :Musical Commodities) . 25 The latter proceeds in the manner of Minima Moralia, with short anecdotes ridiculing various social modes of reception (consumption) of classical and romantic music in order to illuminate the transmutation of such music into commodities, and is interspersed with theoretical conclusions. 26 In one book, entitled Quasi Una Fantasia after a piece of music by Beethoven, the essays are reorganised in sections in a way which imitates the organisation of a musical compositionY The first section is called lmprovisationen ( 'Improvisations') , the second is called Vergegenwiirtigungen ( 'Representations' ) and consists of essays which re pres ent t h m s n w h i ·h Adorno had already written, bringing his work on M ah J r and t ravi nsky up t o date, while t he t h i rd is cal led Finale. A rn s u ht t d v I p a s i o l ogy f art ist i fl rm.2 8 M usi , t h st m 1 t b u ' t i n n· n ' P ·u 1 , int r st d him m st . 'h I n th h n , i t Ci to t ' n f' I' h ' hi igu I' I I' r o I' e · 1 e' '
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The Melancholy Science
ieties and their relation to social life, such as liturgical and secular music, or opera and chamber music. Sociological investigation of musical forms in this sense has affinities with Durkheim's approach to the elementary forms of religious life, with the way in which Durkheim argues that religious forms present (reinforce) and represent (interpret) so i ty . 2 9 On the other hand, form refers to the internal organisation of music, to melody, harmony and even the tonic system itself. Analysis of lorm in this sense would examine the conjunction between particular features of musical technique and principles of social organisation in t her areas of social life in a way homologous with \Veber's examination f t he increasing 'rationalization' ofW estern harmonic chord music and t he relation between its rational and affective features .30 These two not i ns of form are not always distinct: After the idea of a hierarchic [ecclesiastic] authority had been submerged by that of a community formed by individuals with equal rights, [the community forming] function was then transferred to [s cular] society itself. From then on society 'represents' itself musically in a dual sense: it represents its own life processes in the forms of great m usic with their internal movement, and confirms itself as the aut hority which has replaced the old one, by means of the power and impressiveness of these forms.31 D i ! t re n t societies, for example, theocratic and secular, with different
m
n
d s of social control and different musical forms, such as plainchant symp ho ny, respectively, are contrasted here with form as the
' i r l t� nal movement' of music. Two notions of 'represent' are also � lll l l d . The first is that society represents musically 'its own life
1 l �ss s', t hat i t expresses and interprets social reality, although it may conv • t ha t so ial reality is antinomical or contradictory. The second is t h a t so i t y ' onfirms itself' musically as authority, that dramatising itself 1 usi ally m ay have the function of legitimising existing social re I t i ns h i ps or i t may undermine, criticise and disconfirm them. A ro n t ad i t ion i n social reality is, for example, that bourgeois society forms tot a l i t y by virtue of the opposition of the interests of individuals and d asses si n e i t is based on the production of value in exchange, but •
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I I3
The Dispute over Modernism
This function of music might be interpreted as a longing for the past, an aspiration lor the future, or a legitimation of the status quo, depending on the general conditions of production, exchange and reception of music. Adorno's sociology of music depends on the assumption that social 'meaning' can be predicated of music but not as its 'content' . He opposed any sociology of art which assumes that the experience of any work of art is a primary datum, 33 or that such experience constitutes a subjective reflex to effects intended by the content of any work of art. 34 On the one hand, the sociology of art should investigate how the relation between society and art 'crystallizes' 35 in the work of art, on the other hand, it should investigate the mechanisms of distribution and control which determine the reception ('experience') of works of art. 36 Radical disjunction may occur between the composition and reception of works, and this can be given a sociological explanation. Therefore, the sociology of art must not limit itself to examining only those works which attain wide dissemination, because [If] works of art of the highest order . . . do not attain any import ant social effect, this is a social fact just as much as the opposite case.3i The social 'meaning' of a piece of music and its social function may diverge or contradict each other.38 For example, given the prevalent conditions of (musical) production and distribution in a particular period, a piece of music may express aspirations for a changed society, but in another period, with different conditions of exchange and distribution, the same piece of music may come to legitimise existing social relations. 39 Under the same conditions of production and distribution, different musical forms may develop, some of which resist legitimising prevalent norms of communication and others which conform to and confirm such norms. Thus Adorno does not judge that the 'meaning' of the music under altered conditions changes. 'Meaning' in this unusual sense does not refer to the intentions of the composer, or to any ahistorical or fixed notion of the meaning of a work. These general ideas provide the framework for detailed analysis of musical technique. Musical technique must be understood more so ciologically than is usual in the conventional academic study of music, but more musically than the exogenous application of sociological categories to music might imply.4 0 It is not a matter of discovering the social origins of musical technique in any period, but of determining how t h ese elemen ts are used i n co mpos ition to make musical (and social ) 'm : 'Th f, rmal nst i t ut in [ ic] of m usi [al m aning ] , u l t imat ly its I n t d ny t l t t k i I i lly' .'1 1 dorno d f it 1
p
The Melancholy Science c l monstrates that it can.4 2 However, the 'autonomy' of music must itself
understood as a social fact, as determined by a particular kind of iety. Only if such a perspective is adopted will the stance of any music t s ciety become discernible: l
110
The unsolved antagonisms of reality reoccur in the work of art as the i m manent problem of its form. This, not the entry of objective moments, defines the relation of art to society .43 Adorno thus sought a theory of culture, of the status of culture in part icular kinds ofsocieties and of change in the relation between culture nd society. The Dispute over Modernism
The d ispute over modernism refers here to some of the conflicting theories u l t ure and of cultural change and the related aesthetics, developed by a number of nco-Marxist writers largely on the basis of polemical in terchange with each other, since the r g2os. For some of these writers the di p u t e had implications for their creation or composition of works, p rt icularly for Brecht and Adorno. Lukacs, Brecht, Benjamin and Ad rno were most directly involved, but Bloch, 44 Horkheimer, 45 Mar use, 4 6 Hanns Eisler47 and Karl Wittfogel48 made important theor tical contributions to the debate as well. This dispute is far more important than the dispute over positivism . The issue which preoccupied these writers after the First World War, d u ri ng their years in exile before the Second World War, and after the S nd World War, was known originally as the 'dispute over expresi nism and realism'.49 The opposition of Naturalism to Expressionism in rman aesthetics and literature before the First World War was f u nd a men tally redefined by the engagement of neo-Marxists in the � n t r v rsy in the 1 920s. Put crudely, 'Naturalism', especially in l i t rat u re, stood for a realist aesthetic, the accurate depiction of reality, n fi r s icntific progress and social reform.50 'Expressionism' stood for t h revolt against realism, against materialism and bourgeois society, and l(lr an aesthetic which stressed the priority of the mind (Geist) and new forms of abstraction in art not beholden to representing the laws of nat ur ; 6 1 this type of anti-bourgeois revolutionism meant not only sl p rupt ur with socio-political institutions but also with all social of
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The Dispute over Modernism
excited by the new formal and technical possibilities in art and believed that they had progressive political potential.53 In the late twenties, the controversy reached its most explicit statement in Die Linkskurve, the journal of the Union of Proletarian Revolutionary Writers, founded in Berlin in 1 9 28, in which Lukacs published articles denigrating Brecht's work. 54 The final edition of the journal in 1 93 2 was devoted to a series of articles by various authors against dramatists and writers influenced by Brecht.55 The dispute continued in journals published in exile, 56 focused on the question as to whether expressionism was an anti-fascist, revolutionary force, or whether it had helped to prepare the way for the triumph of fascism .57 The question of 'Expressionism' is thus highly complex. On the one hand, it meant the cult of the mind, and the disassociation of art from any social base or political responsibility, while, on the other hand, in the nco Marxist camps, it meant the adoption and development of new forms of non-realist art in order to exploit their political potential for the mass age.58 Adorno was critical of both of these positions and his own stance represents yet another alternative based on a rejection of 'realism' . These original parameters reappear in the later literature under many different labels. They have continued to structure much debate about the relation between society and art in the twentieth century and to influence the analyses of specific works.59 Adorno's criticisms of Lukacs' and ofBenjamin's notion of culture and of cultural change were the most germinal for his own ideas.6 0 Their theories of culture are consistent with their respective philosophies of history and with their respective generalisations ofMarx's theory of value ( reification) , and their detailed analyses of specific works are consistent with the theories of cultural change and modernity. Lukacs defined culture as products and abilities separate from the immediate maintenance of life.61 Culture is only possible in a society in which 'production is a unified and self-contained process' . 62 The capitalist mode of production destroys the previous autonomy of culture by turning cultural products into commodities and by splitting up the work process.63 In the twentieth century, 'the era of finance capital', 64 culture has collapsed because even the apparent basis in reality of the bourgeois ideology of freedom (free competition and so on) no longer exists. The possibility of culture, for Lukacs, depends on conditions of 'organic unity' and the (now lost) ideal ofharmony. He expresses this by saying that 'the form and content of cultural expression enter into contradiction w i t h each other' . 6 5 For example, the form or ideology is t hat man i an nd in h i m If, whil th cont n t or material (that whi h i fl d) i t h t , u nd t h a pi t a l ist m d f pr d u ,00
'ul u l isl
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The Melancholy Science
t heory of reification as primarily a thesis about the work process, and with his philosophy of history as the search for the basis of reconciliation, for rest itution of the unity of subject and object. I t is also the basis for his comparisons of old and new literary forms, and for his special concern for reconciliation in the novel. Adorno rejects the view that culture is Geist (mind) , understood as that which transcends the material reproduction of life.68 Pre-capitalist society is not contrasted with capitalist in terms of the destruction of autonomous culture, instead the 'autonomy' of cultural forms is only achieved under capitalism.69 When works of art are exchanged as commodities, they become detached from the context of social use and rit ual and thus become 'autonomous' . Culture does not presuppose organic unity in a society, but always arises on the basis of the mode of production and concomitant social organisation of a society and expresses the contradictions of that society. 'Culture is the perennial protest of the part icular against the universal as long as the universal is unreconciled with t he particular' . 70 If, for example, the universal is reconciled with the part icular when man is an end in himself, culture will express the reality t hat man is not an end in himself. Thus Lukacs' criterion for the dest ruction of the possibility of culture is Adorno's criterion for the possibility of its existence. Adorno therefore rejects the idea that the increase in organisation at t h expense of the ideology of freedom has finally 'destroyed' culture as t he powers of fragmentation and specialisation take over from the wholeness and unity of culture.71 Organisation 'represents . . . the universal against the particular', 72 that is, if the universal - the actual st ru t uring principle of society - treats men as means, then it is opposed t o t he i nterest of the particular, man as an end in himself. The 'increase in organization' amounts to an increase in the power of the organising principle of society, and hence to an increase in unity not an increase in divisiveness. Culture is partly neutralised. I t is less autonomous in the Hr.nsc t hat it is reinserted into a social context of apparently immediate use an i ri t ual . However, since the increase in unifying power is still founded on a cont radiction, the production of value in exchange, culture partly n·sist . i n tegrat ion in new ways.73 The question is not whether culture has loH I i ts u n i t y, but whether the possibility of expressing disunity may have I H'<'ll l os t . I t was B njamin's ideas on the technological reproduction of works of a r t , csp ially photography and the cinema,74 which led Adorno to I v �1 p his id as n t he ways in which change in the social relations of l i st i b u t i n , h a n , n d nsumpt i n w u ld affect production and fi 1 f .76 Jamin t ra d th hangin social l . ·h f' , w rk f art s i t •
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The Dispute over Modernism
I I7
'aura' of magical authority. Secondly, art practices are emancipated from ritual and works are presented for exhibition, thereby attaining a semblance of autonomy.77 As long as criteria of authenticity and uniqueness are applicable to them, they still retain the 'aura' of tradition and its authority. 'Aura' for Benjamin means the illusions created by the (realist) work of art which are based on the harmonious representation and reconciliation of social contradictions. Mechanical reproduction destroys this aura by detaching 'the reproduced object from the domain of tradition' .78 It thus destroys the authority of the perception (illusion) of the uniqueness and permanence of obj ects and reveals 'the universal equality of things', 79 and it also destroys the semblance of their autonomy. Benjamin could not stress enough his belief that the entire function of art is thereby changed . 80 This new way of perceiving turns art into the service of the interests of the masses.81 It helps them to understand their position and to emancipate themselves from tradition and authority: ' . . . the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice - politics' .8 2 Benjamin was aware that in fact the development of the cinema had proceeded differently, inducing the participation of the masses in new ways ofrecreating old illusions, 'the phony spell' of commodities. 83 But he was sanguine that new forms of collective experience and of progressive reaction would be achieved as 'To an even greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility', 84 that the new production and reception of works could and would coincide for revolutionary ends.85 These emphases on the magical and on the technological, on different relations to objects and on the masses as such, are further instances of Benjamin's interest in atheoretical ways of illuminating (reified) things afresh. His optimism about the new possibilities of the age of the masses is compatible with his view of history as the return of the archaic or 'original' in the wholly new forms of the present: To bring about the consolidation of experience with history, which is original [that is, a return to the origin] for every present, is the task of historical materialism/[It] explodes the epqch out of its reified 'historical continuity' ./Yet this . . . results in .the preservation and removal of the course of history in the epoch. ss
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The Melancholy Science
p t io n of works, that is, in new forms of social behaviour. 88 He believed developments constituted a new form of social and political n t ro l , not a new possibility for emancipation.89 He was not only i n t r sted in how ' . . . the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility', but how new forms of production ( m position in music) develop, which do not succumb to the new dominant mode of distribution. The realm of the former so-called ut 1 omous' art is the realm in which this occurs, in which significant h a ng in techniques occur, as much as in the realm of mechanical du t ion.90 Adorno thus disagreed with Benjamin that 'autonomous' wo s of art were defined by their possession of 'aura' and were n arily counter-revolutionary.91 On the one hand, he believed that B nj m i n xaggerated the change brought about by technical repro ti n ; G r example, the cinema relied on conventional realist effects n did not ex ploit its purported abstract, 'alienating' possibilities.92 On t h r hand, Benjamin underestimated the extent to which art forms h ll tr c l i t ion of autonomous art could abandon 'aura' and develop new u . 03 As an example, Adorno referred Benjamin to the music of r .04 Adorno also considered that Benjamin was naive to expect, s , t hat the proletariat would be immediately affected by the r ptual changes associated with mechanical reproduction, and · u d him of 'the anarchistic romanticism of blind confidence in the 8p n ta n ous power of the proletariat' .95 Adorno himself expressed neit h"r o m ple �e confidence in new techniques, nor complete despair in lh n w fo rms of mass exchange and distribution of art. He insisted above I I th a t avant-garde art and popular art should be examined in relation to h o t h r, since 'Both are torn halves of an integral freedom, to which e I w ver t h ey do not add up' .96 In his sociology of music and literature nd in h i s aesthetic theory, Adorno used materialist concepts to examine t he r I t ionship of the 'torn halves' systematically, centred on the theory or co m mod i t y fetishism (reification) . t h t t h se
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The Dispute over Modernism
money', namely, the totaliry of the social process defined as a unity of exchange by abstract labour time, then, in an exact sense, capitalism has made art into a commodity together with men. The commodity character of art as the obj ective side, and the destruction of 'human dignity' as the subj ective side are equivalent and cannot be torn apart from each other. 97 Adorno stresses the abstract nature of the exchange of cultural commodities in opposition to the perspective put forward by Krenek, 98 and to that of Benjamin.99 First, the relation which results from the exchange and the concomitant consumption of what is exchanged is not an immediate or an intelligible one in the same sense in which Marx contrasted the intelligibility of exchange in non-commodity producing societies with its unintelligibility in capitalist society. Where music is concerned, the illusion that exchange and consumption is intelligible is particularly strong due to its apparently immediate value in use.l 00 Secondly, the abstract nature of exchange is emphasised as the premise for examining any other features of the relationship between society and music, for example production, reproduction, and consumption. This approach would do more justice to the objective preconditions of the 'subjective' modes of reception of art, and would avoid Krenek's too simple view that art is distorted by being incorporated into the process of capitalism, 1 0 1 and Benjamin's view that an enlightened consciousness would triumph from the immediate effects of new technology. Adorno employed the distinction between forces of production and relations of production because then exchange and reproduction fall on both sides of the distinction in a way that is analytically preferable to consigning them implicitly to one side of the distinction or to the other. Furthermore, the central thesis of his sociology of art is that there is a contradiction between t he forces and the relations of production in the realm of culture. Therefore, Adorno starts from the commodity character of music, the fact t hat it is exchanged in a way which gives rise to fetishism, that is, the social relations between men which underlie the product appear to be the nat ura l property of the object produced, that is, its value.l02 The development of means of mechanical reproduction increases the volume of exch ange of c u l tural products and gives rise to new furms of art, but it does not alter i n pri nciple t he commodity character of such products.10 3 As a for e f pr du t ion, m ec han i cal reproduction may be considered f t h t hnolo y whi h 1 rod u ces the radio, the cinema, the r I t i n f produ tion i t must be cons id ered as a t t i n w h i h pr u p s s t h d minan t m f ty. Th h ni 1 r u ti n l i
i
,.
1 20
The Melancholy Science
norms of exchange, thereby increasing their commodity character .1°4 Change in the realm of 'production' of works of art also depends on the pr valent conditions of exchange, hence on the dominant mode of production of all other commodities in society .105 Adorno does not say what that is in terms of the social relations of work, manufacturing or the buying and selling oflabour-power. He divides 'production' of music into t wo types: composition, the development of new techniques designed to avoid the prevailing norms of exchange, distribution and consumption, and ' the culture industry', the producing of works for reproduction and
mass consumption.106 Composition, in this sense, is a force of production as mu h as mechanical reproduction. The 'culture industry', in this sense, is
ri n ted to the prevalent relations of production, that is, to the wide pread norms of reception and consumption of music in society.107
Thi
perspective is odd in several ways. Music is counted partly as
p oduction when in standard Marxist terms it would be counted as part
f th
superstructure and hence fall under the relations of production.
I nnovation in (artistic and musical) production is j udged in terms of the
ignif1 ance accorded to the dominant relations of production, and the d ig na t ion 'force of production' is really reserved for what resists those r lations and not for new techniques or for new technology as such.
'om p sition is not, however, a relational term i n the way work or
' l b ur�power' are for Marx. In the realm of consumption, the 'culture i nd u t ry' is a force of production in the sense that it constitutes a changed fl m f social domination and control, while considered under the
1 ·
ns
f production, it is responsible for new kinds of social behaviour
wh' h A orno examined by using Freudian categories. A n ' sociology of literature and music is devoted mainly to inin g nres and individual works of art in the light of the thesis that nl di ·ti n has developed between the forces and the relations of ·tion . On the one hand, there will always be a disjunction between
produ · l i o n and consumption of art in a society based on the production of ·ommod i t ics, t hat is, under the conditions which produce so�called ulonomous art . For the criterion of artistic production (composition) t h t a work is authentic, will be more or less at odds with the demands of
<:onKu m p t ion ( reception) that it should be intelligible . 108 On the other
hand, in t he presen t
age,
wl i
I
121
The Dispute over Modernism
combined with the new forms of distribution (reproduction) results in a dislocation in the realm ofculture. This notion ofcontradiction, however, is odd. It implies displacement between production and consumption which determines the status quo but does not change it, and which appears to be a permanent rather than an inherently unstable situation. The notion of forces of production and the notion of relations of production are not really commensurable. By 'forces of]:noduction', Adorno means the specialist's skill of composition, whether for the market or not, and the techniques and technology which both determine and are the tools of composition. He does not refer to the general preconditions ofbuying and selling labour-power, or of the labour-process. But by the 'relations of production', he means something approaching the conventional Mar xist notion, namely, life styles and habits of consumption, consciousness shared and differentiated according to class position. Although Adorno is only concerned with cultural goods, he implies that the relations of production which are generally dominant determine the consumption and reception of those products, but without specifying what those relations are. Conversely, he implies that the social control exercised by the production and distribution of such goods ('the culture industry' ) determines social behaviour in the sphere of the relations of production to a large extent. The Notes on Literature
A l t hough Adorno's analyses of literature are set within his theoretical framework, they concentrate on one side ofthe sets ofrelations posited, on t he formation and structure of 'new' literature and not specifically on di fferent genres, nor on their distribution and reception. His sociology of l i terature i s therefore more schematic than his sociology of music, which encompasses both 'new' and popular music, has a more clearly defined and intensive historical range - from Wagner to Berg - and contains more detailed technical analyses to illustrate sociological theses. In music, t h e notion ofa 'crisis in meaning' can be established more precisely in tech n i c al terms, while sociological interpretation of it is more specu l at ive. Yet the performance, distribution and reception of music, w h i c h Adorno calls 'music life', are more amenable to sociological invest igat ion . How ver, even t h ough the writings on literature are less Mystemat i , t h y o ffer a si g nificant and important alternative to the work of' L u ka s, nja m in, Br h t a nd Sartre i n t h is field . I n w-f i rn us k w h i h Luka s w rot aft r t he Second World W 1 Wid r d n mi r; r tandtm n Reali mu ( Against misund rst d R al·
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The Melancholy Science r ss i on ism' as in the earlier dispute) , and summed up by the choice t i cal l y urged by Lukacs upon his readers in the central essay of the k, ' Franz Kafka or Thomas Mann', l ll as representatives of the two I s o f his distinction. Adorno wrote a very hostile essay on Lukacs' k, 'Erpresste Versohnung' (Extorted Reconciliation) , uz which, together w i t h his own essay on Kafkal l 3 and the documents ofhis collaboration in t l • 1 940s with Thomas Mann on the latter's book Doctor Faustus, amount t a s u bs t a ntial challenge to Lukacs' position. m
.
·
Lukacs defended 'realism' against 'modernism' in the novel. The n is one of style, and of underlying ideology which is the ' [I t i v principle' of style.114 Since Lukacs considered that pre u"''' " ' '"''a t i n with style was one of the symptoms of 'modernism' , he o ial meaning - a 'view of the world'115 - from characteristics of nd ailed it 'content': 'style . . . is the specific form of a specific n t ' . 1 1 6 'Realism' is committed to a view of man as an essentially I nd p ol i t ical being, formed by his society and striving to attain st nd i ng of i ts contradictions in order to act on it.l1 7 Texts written t h is t d i t i n portray the lives of individuals, firmly rooted in specified n t i f i a b l e space and time, and the complex tissue of their i ti n w i t h their environment, in a way which is universal and e t e . 1 1 H By 'u niversal' , Lukacs means typical and also harmonious in nse f t ransce ndirlg a particularist view;u9 by 'concrete', he means · � o rd in g to t h e real possibilities of people in the given situation. l2 0 ' R l ism ' i n t h i s way aims at 'a truthful reflection of reality ' . l 2 1 ' Modern ism' i s based on a view that man is 'by nature solitary, asocial, 1 ble to n t er into relationships with other human beings', 1 22 not co 1 rn d with understanding social reality or with acting on it. Texts or t h is k ind port ray individuals ' "thrown-into-the-world" : meaning lt'Hs l y , unfat homably', 1 23 without any development of personality and h .n s a t i a l l y a nd ahistorically. They concentrate on the abstract ot n t i l i t i 'S of t he ind iv i dual s life - his rich imaginings - which are 1 t'l '. .d to so ial reali ties . I t is thus intensely subjective literature which ·ol l u 1 .M in he d ist rt ion of reali ty instead of fighting it by its obsession w i t h s t y le s t o on v ey such subjective experience. Lukacs calls such w ri t i n 'decadent ' and j udges that i t heralds th e end of literature . 1 24 K a l ka's wo r k is, for Lukacs, t he protot ype of modernist art . I ts tt'd m i q u s b t ra y a vi w of man t e rri f i ed in t he presence of 'utterly H t r· n and h st i l r al i t y' , 1 25 and r du d t ' t otal impot n e, [and] p · lysis in t h f i f t h unin l li ibl p w r f ir umstan e ' 126 This t ifi with l i t y it · I f. K afka's ClltPn t i 1 1 iffi r
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The Dispute over Modernism
1 23
are not; as in realism, the nodal points of individual or social life; they are cryptic symbols of an unfathomable transcendence. The stronger their evocative power, the deeper is the abyss, the more evident the allegorical gap between meaning and existence. l 28 According to Lukacs, Thomas Mann deals with distortion in society in a different way. The settings of his novels are 'free from transcendental reference', 129 and his characterisation of individuals is based on his desire to probe 'into the complexity of present-day reality' .130 These individuals represent different aspects of the whole. Mann made the insight that the artist is one of the main mediators of people's experience of the 'underworld of the human mind' and of social reality into the object of many of his books, from Tonio Kroger ( 1 903 ) to Doctor Faustus ( 1 94 7 ) , not by stylistic experimentation, but by 'increasingly rigorous studies of the problem in its social context' .131 Doctor Faustus is the apogee of such treatment. Within the novel two perspectives are contained, that of Faust, Adrian Leverkiihn, the musician who inhabits the small world of the isolated artist, 132 and that of the narrator, Serenus Zeitblom, who is located in strictly observed social and historical time. A 'rounded' , realist novel is created on the theme of examining 'the tragedy of modern art' . 133 The tragedy is that while the artist knows that his stylistic problems are determined by the real historical situation ofhis culture, he is determined to concede nothing to them, and to work independently of them, thereby creating a highly formal art which is at the same time subjective, 'the concentrated expression of intellectual and moral decadence' .134 Mann questions the work of art itself by examining its social and historical genesis and shows 'how the purely subj ective, that which is estranged l'rom and despises all community [because it is not conducive to art] is rooted in the modern bourgeois individualism of the imperialist cpoc h ' , 1 35 and how t he same situation creates a longing for synthesis, for control, for order and organization, though such a longing has no real foundation in popular life, in the social world, but is the product of the same s u bjec t i v i ty which c rea t e s the disintegration . . . hence it destroys i t �clf. 1 ao
The Melancholy Science
The Dispute over Modernism
1 25
or not, and to judge how successful it is as a work of art. The criteria on which this judgement is made are whether a philosophy, sociology or work of art denies subjectivity and, implicitly or explicitly, presents objective reality as absolute, or conversely, whether it presents sub jectivity as absolute, and implicitly or explicitly denies objective reality. For Adorno, therefore, there is no need to choose between Franz Kafka and Thomas Mann. He scorns the interpretation of Kafka which sees in the writing a vision of 'nothingness' and impotence, accomplished by means of 'realistic symbolism' .147 Instead he pays close attention to various features ofKafka's style, emphasising how the texts are structured in ways which undermine conventional habits of reading and modes of communicating meaning. For example, he points out, with close reference to, and quotation from, Kafka's texts, how the latter frequently pits gestures against dialogue so as to undermine the intention of the words spoken,148 how he uses narrative form but eschews traditional pro gression in the narrative by substituting various forms of repetition of events, places and so on .149 He thus produces 'tortuous epics' in which the 'boundary between what is human and the world of things becomes blurred' .150 This style yields the contours of Kafka's subjectivity. It is an extreme and absolute subjectivity, which does. not connect with the external world - 'objectless inwardness' - and therefore cannot distinguish itselffrom the world . Thus, first, to withdraw into absolute subj ectivity is, st rictly speaking, impossible because words and sentences break any illusion of absolute immediacy, and Kafka's style is designed to avoid this paradox, but, secondly, such withdrawal succumbs to the very estrange men t which it is attempting to escape: 'The subject seeks to break the spell ofreification by reifying itself' .151 Adorno therefore, like Lukacs, sees the subjectivity in Kafka's texts and sees a sense in which the texts collude in t he d istortion to which they bear witness. However, by focusing on the process of Kafka's style and on the complex antinomies evinced in the atlcmpt to express extreme subjectivity, Adorno is able to explain 'terror' and ' isolation' as effects, instead of resorting to them as the ultimate I ht'mcs of t he texts. I t is t he same lack of attention to style which vitiates Lukacs' i n t t'rprc t at ion ofThomas M ann's n ove l s . Adorno points out how Lukacs l ri<·s to explain away M an n 's experiments w i t h different perspectives of l i mr in T he Magic Mountain and in Doctor Faustus, and how he fails to a ppn•ci · tc M a n n 's use of i rony as a m ed i u m for creating aesthetic d iM t at c . in h is t way of using a nd u nd rmining realist i llusions in work I s l y w i t h Adorno on Doctor Faustus and th 1 < .1 . 1 M ti im r ss . y Ad rn 's b k, Philo ophy of New lm i b . .n . 1 �a I I t t t rn , M (fi m Mu.1·ic b hi 1 o to Fau tu ·, wh · h h • 11 l �. t r 11
The Melancholy Science
illusions, so that 'palpable reality was for ever indistinguishably merging into painted perspectives and illusions' . 1 54 He described this as a 'playful'155 approach and endorsed Adorno's criticism of the formal pr i n c i ple of Wagner's work, whereby 'the production [of the work] is hidden by the appearance of the product' .156 Mann was also opposed to this principle, and declared to Adorno that The illusionary character of the work of art as something real is completely alien to me and has never aroused my ambitions. My relat ionship to the 'work' was too honourably ironic, and I have always l i k d humorously compromising the [process of] production .157 In light of this, Lukacs has mistakenly taken Mann's novels literally.l58 F r Mann was not 'in search ofbourgeois man',159 but in search ofa style
appr priate to 'modern' art as he understood it. Lu kacs' interpretation of Doctor Faustus is particularly ill-conceived . Ad o rno o bjects to Lukacs' reference to his (Adorno's) essay on 'The Ag i ng [ ic] of New Music' in support of the argument that modern art is d ad n t . 1 110 Adorno's point in that essay and in Philosophy ofNew Music w s t hat new music is not the 'pure expression [of] terror', 161 as Lukacs i n l 'r reted him, but a certain stylistic principle which should submit its I f to ' insistent self-criticism' .162 Mann based Doctor Faustus on A rn 's Philosophy of New Music.163 Adrian Leverkiihn speaks large h u n ks taken from Adorno's text to explain his style of composition, and l h m usic t h eo ry expounded by another character in the book, Kret11 ·I mar, is a l so based on Adorno's ideas . l 64 However, it is not j ust music theory b u t A lorna's sociological interpretation of new art which is :on l i ncd i n t h e book, and these ideas are not merely quoted in a way wh' : 1 iH rest ricted to th e isolated Leverkiihn whose problems are ' by M nn w i t h i n the framework of a 'realist' novel, as Lukacs 'Il l 1 i B l , s M a n n explicitly stated, the whole novel is composed on the l i N < (' t l s· m prin iples and antinomies which structure the possibility c I' M I in n w musi : ' . . . to portray the whole cultural crisis in addition lo l h · isi o f m u i was the fundamental motif of my book . . . I felt d rl y t hat my book i tsel f would have to become the thing it dealt with: 11 m r l y , . . const ruct ivist music.' 1 M Hence Lukacs' exposition of 'the l l' lgt'dy of mod rn art ' in re l ati o n to Doctor Faustus is as wrong as his ideas about modernism d iffe r from Adorno's idea about new music. More f1 1 1 1 d m c:n t all y, L uk a s was wrong to r ad s ial omm nt fro m what he ron i ler d to b t h ' ont n t ' r t h b k, sin h t h r b y ign r d t h k, a b k, I . i · I i nifi t b r fT fJ m t h t yl f t h l li t i , whi I li i I 't I tw '
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The Dispute over Modernism
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all living in exile in California.166 He considered that the Institute had defused Marxism, and thus contributed to the evils of society which it sought merely to diagnose.167 Yet Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno, whatever their differences, all wrote sociological analyses of literature as authors or composers, unlike Lukacs, and were interested both in the sociological problems which were involved in composing and also in the social effect or reception of works. Brecht also rejected Lukacs' notions of critical and socialist realism in all forms of literature. Socialist realism, according to Lukacs, also portrays 'rounded' and 'harmonious' characters 'from the inside . . . whose energies are devoted to the building of a different future, and whose psychological and moral make-up is determined by this' .168 Brecht thought that this was aesthetically and politically undesirable, but also that it was a hidebound and restricted notion of realism. In the theatre, he believed that characterisation should not be based on the creation of harmonious individuals who invite the audience to participate vicariously in their overcoming ofsocial contradictions, but that dramatisation should dissolve such habits in the spectator by presenting social reality in a way which accentuates 'the contradiction between every-day appearance and what is historically possible and realizable', 169 primarily through revealing the 'strangeness' of what passes for normality. Benjamin, who wrote as Brecht's spokesman on the latter's theory of epic theatre, stressed the use of montage techniques to achieve this effect.l7° By montage, he meant various ways ofjuxtaposing reality and fiction in order to expose both tlte illusions of fiction and the illusions of social reality, such as interrupting action, and pitting verbal against gestural action, as ways of challenging the norms of discursive meaning. Brecht understood this as 'a realism for his time', for the truth about sociai reality can be conveyed in many different forms and styles, and he denied that he was advocating a formalist or constructivist view as Lukacs charged him: Realistic means: discovering the causal complexes of society/ unmasking the prevailing view of things as the view of those who rule it/writing from the standpoint of the class which offers the broadest solutions for the pressing difficulties in which human society is caught/ emphasizing the element of development/making possible the con crete, and making possible abstractions from it.171
The Melancholy Science
which was based on Brecht's essay, Funf Schwierigkeiten beim Schreiben der Wahrheit (Five Difficulties in Writing the Truth ) , and in which he acknowledged the same difficulties as Brecht in finding a way to challenge the prevailing norms of exchange and reception of art.173 Adorno had, however, come to be critical of Brecht's solution, of the very idea that there is a 'solution' to the antinomical relation of art to society, although Adorno had not perceived Brecht's earlier work as the presentation of a dogmatic solution.174 Adorno's argument concerns Brecht's actual plays, as opposed to his theory of the epic theatre. When Brecht translates the re-education of the audiehce into dramatic terms by eliminating the traditional concept of character, his style establishes another set of unintended and equally undesirable illusions in place of the ones destroyedY5 This criticism is similar to Adorno's criticism of new epistemologies in philosophy and sociology, in that any aesthetic which seeks completely to deny the illusory power of the subject will tend indirectly to reinstate that illusion even more than one which overstates the power of the subject. Adorno points to the prevalence of traditional cathartic efforts in Brecht's plays, to the theatricality of their plain-spokenness, and to the frequently pantomime effect produced by their explicit political commitment.176 In fact, Brecht was not able to practice Veifremdung in his plays as he preached it. He does not make social reality look strange, he makes it appear straightforward and thus creates another fiction which he ratifies by stating it in a coercive and dictatorial fashion.177 Brecht tries to reject established meaning and modes of communication in the theatre instead of undermining them on their own ground . His commandeering of dramaturgy in the cause of anti-illusionist theatre only affects the old meanings and hence new meaning in a very external and formal way.178 Thus Brecht does not destroy 'autonomous' art and put a new functional art in its place. On the contrary, he makes art even more autonomous, because, by using it didactically, emphasising the 'primacy of lesson over . . . form', he makes it even more formal instead of more effective.l79 . . . the artistic principle of simplification not only purged real politics of the illusory distinctions projected by subjective reflection into social objectivity, as Brecht intended, but it also falsified the very objectivity which didactic drama laboured to d istil . 1 B0
The Dispute over Modernism
12
content' is the relation between subj ect and object structured by styl , and that relation can only be reformulated by works which change t h relation to illusion, not b y attempting a direct escape from it: ' h organizing, unifying principle of each and every work of art is borrow from that very rationality, whose claim to totality it seeks to defy . 1 3 Adorno thus seeks to demonstrate that Brecht's attempt in drama t avoid representation of subjectivity is as self-contradictory as Kafk ' attempt to withdraw into absolute subjectivity. He criticises Sart r ' dramaturgy on the same grounds as he criticises Brecht's: for deman i a changed attitude instead of compelling it, although Sartre's demand i 1 of course, quite different from Brecht's.l 8 4 Adorno is opposed to a rt ' i and literary thematics, that is, to composing or criticising works t according to interpretations of their ostensible 'themes' . He is t h r" equally critical of Lukacs' reading of modernist style accordi existential themes as he is of Brecht's composing of plays in the u political themes, and as he is of Sartre's composing of plays ace r in explicit existential themes. These explicit commitments tend t r t ture meaning (style) in a way which reinstates precisely what t h t h intends to eliminate, usually some form of subjectivity . For xampl 1 t theme of Sartre's plays is the 'absurdity' and 'meaning! s n ' existence, but, by making this theme into the clear messag [ hi he confers on it a positive meaning and thereby cont rad i ts h i intention.1 8 5 The mistake common to Sartre and Brech t i s t h t h y t y destroy the 'autonomy' of artistic meaning, that is, they t ry t v i (act that meaning in literature is based on the i llusi n t h t li ordinary word once used i n a fictional text retains i t s l i t ral m entirely. They seek to renounce the change in meaning whi h words are, as it were, transcribed into a work ofart . l 86 But , b u do not concede the necessity of illusion, they 'assimilat t h ms 1 mere existence', 187 instead of arming themselves against wh t v r g i ves verisimilitude to illusion. They thus con t ri bute t ' t h a i ·i the subject' 188 which they abhor. Sartre seeks to nthron th it subject; Brecht, the proletariat. A work of art w h ic h would not fall into t hes p a rad x w u l d h presen t t he risis in m a n i ng and the rest ru t urin [ m ni problem of i ts for m , as part of the obj e t ive nd i t i ns w h i h t he a priori p ssi b i l i t y of t he work, not m r l y as d vi t i n on t h l k tt ·hi v an a b rrant u bj t . Adorno b l i v d t hat in som of h i pl a .ys . I HO Be k 'l l av id d t h r f u in I lk . ' w i t i m l ( lu t iv' I b 'i l ' )
The Melancholy Science
meaning in order to restructure such meaning.l90 I n a close analysis of Beckett's play Endgame, Adorno traces the way in whi h Beckett does this.191 Adorno distinguishes three levels of'meaning' i n d rama, which, conventionally, create unity between the overall intent ion of a play and its action: the metaphysical meaning, the overall in tention or meaning of the piay, and the meaning ofwords and sentences t t he level of dialogue. Once the first of these, metaphysical meaning, is b a nd on ed, the other two levels are fundamentally changed .l92 Beckett's · ·h ievement is to have restructured meaning at the level of dialogue in a w y which strains towards overall meaning but which is continually Mt y m i d, and thus does not reconstruct a positive metaphysical meaning v n one of 'absurdity' or 'nothingness' .193 In this way, Beckett is nsi te n t (Adorno compares him to Mann in The Magic Mountain and in Do tor Faustus) , for the relation of art to society .is presented as the in s a n t problem of the form of the work and is not simply stated or the k iv n a new 'function' . 1 94 Adorno examines the dialogue of the play w w h i l is largely duologue, emphasising Beckett's use of parody, inversion o r m • a ni n g , use of gesture, although he does not suggest that Beckett relies on h ig h l y formal or constructivist techniques.195 He draws, in the course or t l is n a lysis, the outline of a master/slave dialectic, imprisoned in the mi d l f d ad nature, in which the slave can no longer control the master, l t h u g h t he master is in no way reconciled with himself.19 6 The m · ta phys i al meaning eschewed by the play would be the reconciliation or t 'r' l av e and nature, the overall meaning which it strains toward is · on v ·y d by an impending catastrophe which never occurs, and these i ngs are structured by the dialogue, which is quite open-ended . I n t h s analyses of works of literature, Adorno pursues the view that ·i I i t iq uc is - and can only be - imbedded in the form of a work, not i · r t ' ' n t 'n t ' . T hi s i s not to emphasise form as such, but meaning J 11 1 ili " t , • s a relation between subjectivity and social obj ectivity. As ·, l ' c i t iq u c r philosophy and his critique of sociology Adorno I � < nHl l ,s nd p res ribes in his critique ofliterature the importance of 1 11 It· H I H i d i ng and working fro m necessary illusion, on pain of otherwise 1"1 1 l i ng i n t o con t ra d i t ions. The illusions o f l iterature, like the illusions of 1 h i lo ophy an I of o iology, are de t e r m i n ed by the reified structure of t he i l l usions of fictional
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.Nm1 Music artd Social Illusion
The Dispute over Modernism
and the new possibilities of exchange and distribution. As a result, first, classical and romantic music were exchanged and distributed, for example, on the radio and in live performances, in ways which emphasised those features of their form (internal structure of meaning) most amenable to such modes ofdistribution and reception at the expense of the original integrity of their form. Secondly, new kinds of music were developed in conjunction with the new modes of reproduction and exchange, for example, music for films and popular music. Thirdly, new music was composed on the basis of new techniques, and designed to avoid the new modes of distribution, for example, the music of the first Vienna School.197 Yet such music, owing to its esoteric nature, was fated to display 'the same disastrous pattern' 1 9 8 which it sought to combat. The 'contradiction' occurs between those kinds of music which adapt to the prevalent modes of exchange and reception and music which resists them, and also within the latter kind ofmusic. Under the relations ofproduction Adorno looks at music which adapts, and under forces of production he looks at music which resists adaptation. The business of the sociology of music is to investigate the relation between music and the person who listens to music, considered as a socialised individual.199 This does not involve simply ascertaining consumer responses to music by empirical means. For such responses will convey nothing about the form in which the music is being received, and thus nothing about its social meaning, or anything about how the reception of music affects people. For example, enthusiasm expressed by people for classical music heard on the radio tells us nothing about how that music is being broadcast, how its meaning and reception are altered by the medium. 200 When Adorno examines the musical relations of production he therefore always examines the relation between the formal structure of the music and its reception. ' Music life' is one of the arenas which Adorno discusses under the relations of production. The phrase refers to the live performance of music, and 'official music life' to the great centres of musical perfor mance, especially Vienna and Paris, as the former arbiters of general public taste.2 01 Adorno explains what he means by 'contradiction' in this realm too. He argues that the overall function of music in society has c h a n g ed, and that this change affects every aspect of music. Music has lost its previous 'autonomy' . This 'autonomy' was determined by the em a n ipation of m usic from an immediate context of use and ritual and i t s a q u iri ng value i n xcha nge. The resul t was music which partly I ' it imi d t h ial rd r w h i h produ d i t and whi h part ly c r i t i ised ' t hat rd r. y t, th r h t w n t h s fu n t i n h . b · s I' m 1 m I th s i I I' 11 l'z ' I · I I )i ·
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2
The Melancholy Science
t ion has become so far removed from general reception that it no r exercises an effective critical role. 2 0 2 An illusion of immediacy and u and hence of intelligibility surrounds the reception of totally f u n t ionalised music, whereas such music is entirely determined by its val ue i n exchange. 20 3 Production and reproduction have always been r la t i v el y divorced in music in the sense that music has to be performed, nd t he interpretation expressed by the performance may contradict the int n t ion of the work. The likelihood of this discrepancy is one of the ways in w hich Adorno explains how music could both legitimise and oppose t h so ial structure. Performance of music takes place according to the pr val n t norms of capitalist society and the privileged participation in musi even when the aesthetic meaning of music has universal impliti n .204 Since participation in music has increased, the principles w h i h guide performance have become even more divorced from the m n ing of the music. Composers try increasingly to control the way their m usi is performed, while in fact the interpretation of it is increasingly t ken out of their hands. 205 Ad rno also offers a more technical exposition of these hypotheses, of how t h meaning of music may be altered by the medium of repro d u t i n, whet her the music is performed in the concert hall or broadcast on t he rad io. 206 This exposition depends on the contrast between the t • h n i al notion of i ntelligibility established by classical music and the i l l! r n t norm of intelligibility which tends to be demanded when music i r iv d by the untrained ear. Adorno's argument is that given the u cnt m de of exchange and distribution of music, music is adjusted at the s tage of reprodu c tion in order to attain the greatest intelligibility in thr !IC .ond ns , which may amount to the least intelligibility in the first. I n · I s i I music, especially the symphonic form of the sonata, the i n t•1 t igil i l i t y of the whole composition depends on the development of omplish d by details which have an independent life but th L } emc, · w hi ·I r ultimat el y apprehended in terms of the overall structure of the 1 i .<: r , . . . t he m ·lodi con tent of the basic rhythm, that is to say, the i n t rrvals w h i h onst i t u te it, change perpetually . . . ' 20 7 Romantic t t l ltHic, by con t rast, detaches the detail by increased use of chromaticism, HO t hat t he det ail i tself rat her t han its relation to the whole becomes the I ng
·
·
.
'
The Dispute over Modernism
1 33
easily memorisable elements are loosened from the whole. 2 1 0 Works become 'conglomerates of tunes of both sensual richness and structural poverty' which render 'unnecessary the process ofthinking' 2 11 which was needed to comprehend the overall structure of classical music. In the case of the older music, an attitude is produced in the listener which leads him to seek color and stimulating sounds. Music, however, composed in structural rather than coloristic terms, does not satisfy these mechanized claims. 2 1 2 Popular music, by which Adorno understood jazz and other forms of 'light' or entertainment music, is composed according to 'these mech anized claims' . Adorno describes it as 'standardized' too. Standardiz ation' in this kind of music means that the overall theme is clearly stated at the beginning of the piece but that the details do not develop the . theme, they merely repeat it, and have no special status within the whole work. Hence the emphasis on 'beat', repeatable rhythm . This 'standard ization' is hidden by devices which Adorno names 'pseudo-indi vidualization' because they are designed to give the appearance that detail really has an autonomous role in composition, and thus endow the piece 'with the halo of free choice or open market on the basis of standardization itself'. 2 13 In fact the stated form of the music determines the way it must be listened to, 'The composition hears for the listener' . 2 1 4 Understanding such music means accepting these commands for listening. 2 1 5 Adorno suggests that the desire for these forms of easily intelligible music is determined by the mode of production and the work-process. People are themselves 'products of the same mechanisms which de termine the production of popular music' . 2 16 They treat their spare time as a means to reproduce their working activity and They want standardized goods and pseudo-individualization, because leisure is an escape from work and at the same time is molded after those psychological attitudes to which their workaday world ex clusively habituates them. 2 17
The Melancholy Science
1 34
FiLms,220 criticism of the current abuse of music in films is more than balanced by suggestions as to how music might be used differently in this m d i u m . The contrast is drawn between the stereotyped depiction of social reality enhanced by standardised music, and the possibility of rad i cal ly changing people's perception of social reality with the aid of advanced musical effects, using both the new techniques and the new technology.221 Adorno was also interested in altering the use of radio in t he broadcasting of music. He recommended, for example, that re h arsals of music should be broadcast and music made as accessible as poss i b l e by exposing and explaining the processes of composition and rformance not by the process of standardisation.222 n t he other hand, Adorno was not able to accept that, given the u rr nt mode of production, any art form with a popular basis could be l i t i ally invigorating, and hence he analysed jazz and popular music as or upt styles of the traditional forms of music, not as entirely new forms of m i . He was so insistent on looking at the form of music and not merely tr t ions to it that he failed to differentiate between the very different f r actions aroused by different forms ofjazz and popular music. ver, in the typology of musical behaviour which Adorno devised in r t xamine the various relations between types of music and types of l ist n rs, t he jazz composer and the jazz fan are delineated in terms of a p ns agai ns t official music life.223 However, this response, like many ot l r i n l ud i ng new music, does not constitute a consistently critical t n . As a response to reification, it is particularly reified, that is, it i spl a ys t h features which it seeks to criticise in a very evident w
y ,aa4
'N w m u s i c ' was, for Adorno, a form of composing which did not, i i i 11 , ad a pt to the prevalent mode of exchange and reception of m i . Th n m 'new music' was a deliberately polemical appellation
in V i�nna i n the early twenties when the 'International Society si ' was established, and intended to disassociate the Society t h n w G rman, impressionist and other nineteenth-century ls of musi . 22 6 The question ofwhy the music of this period and the m us i . of' t h se ond Vienna School has continued to be known as 'new m usic' and has not been absorbed into the mainstream, in contrast to the ncw pai n t i ng of t h is pe r i od , is, for Adorno, a sociological one.22() It is not a q uest ion wh ich an be answered by reference to the social origins and 110 �ial l'u n t ion f t h m u s i , an approach w h ich woul l t end to dismiss it is' and 'd n t ' .227 Th fai l u r f t his m usi t o be generally pti n st 1 t t th � m f th m usi , � r t h · Ir nd 1 it t
N w M
1 35
The Dispute over Modernism
music as it succumbs to the demands of social recognition and thereby defuses its social significance: The guiding category of contradiction is twofold: that works formulate contradiction and thereby reveal it in the markings of their imperfec tions, is the measure of their success, while at the same time the force of contradiction mocks formulation and destroys works.228 Adorno developed a typology of music which avoids the demands of the market for the traditional idiom of intelligibility. The criteria of the typology are, first, how explicitly the composer is aware of his social isolation ( alienation, Enifremdung), secondly, how social isolation is expressed in the work, thirdly, whether the work seeks to overcome isolation or not.22 9 He distinguishes four types of music in this way: first that of Schonberg which, unaware of its social position, never theless presents most radically the social antinomies which structure it; secondly, the neo-classicism of Stravinsky which is explicitly aware of 'alienation', and seeks to present a reconciled community in the music; thirdly, a type of music between the first two, which is based on knowledge of alienation, but which knows, too, that any 'solution' is only an illusion. This applies to the middle work of Stravinsky and to the collaboration of Kurt Weill and Brecht. The fourth type is Gebrauchsmusik or Gemeinschaftsmusik, which tries to break alienation by creating music designed to be broadly and simply intelligible, for example, the work of Hindemith and some of the work of Eisler.230 Adorno devoted most attention to Schonberg's work. He saw in the evolution of Schonberg's music from free atonality to the twelve tone system a change from a music which challenged most radically the norms of intelligibility in both composing and listening, to a music which attempted to found itself on a new orthodoxy and escape the destructive estrangement of its initial challenge. By means of detailed technical analyses of Schonberg's early work, Adorno shows the ways in which Schonberg's music brings out many features of music which had been Latent in earlier music but dissolves the apparent naturalness of those features. At the same time, the music makes revolutionary demands on t h e listener in view of the prevalent reception of the tradition, and in view of t h e complex ways in which its 'ideas' are developed.231 Adorno calls this Verfremdung in music, making apparent musical normality appear strange .2n U n l ike innovation at other periods, the new music does not rc reate an ultimat ly affirmative idiom , not even lor an alternative h "" n b r ' s first phase, was relentl ssly visi n f i ty . 2:1a N n -g tiv c l d,
' I
in th nd th fit
du r • [I r
r th
d
The Melancholy Science p i t ion is inherently unstable. Composition tends to settle in a
way. I t was Schonberg's attempt to codify this tendency which Adorno interpreted as a return to a rigid system, as a way of gran t i ng a 'method' of composing priority over its critical relation to its material, and thus fixing its relation to society by creating the appearance of synthesis between the work of art ( the aesthetic subject) and social object ivity. 2 34 Adorno demonstrates the effect which this had on Schonberg's later work by analysing it in great technical detail. 2 35 He s eks to show that Schonberg's 'solution' is a false one, partly because it resu l t s i n inferior work and thus does not bring the artist any nearer the publi c . 2 3 t; Origi nally Schonberg exposed the illusions of musical normality but c< mposed in a way which was unintelligible to his audience. He resisted t h reification of musical material, that is, resisted appealing to the p •va l e n t norms of intelligibility, at the cost of opening up a chasm bt�t we n the music and the public. 2 37 His work was therefore reified by 80 i ty, in the sense that it remained divorced from the possibility of ·h nging musical consciousness. Schonberg's subsequent development of 11crial ism amounted to a reification of his own work in the sense that he r .i nstat ed t he authority of a method over the material. His work I en · fo rt h displayed the same kind ofreification it had originally sought to omba t . I n t his part o f Adorno's work reification i s most clearly explicated l t h I vel of meaning, illusion and intelligibility. He construes the t h ory of value, that social relations between men appear in the form or a pro p e r t y of a thing, so that it provides a model and criterion for " yin t hat something may appear to be intelligible when it is not, and o . s · l y, t hat omething may appear to be unintelligible when it is i n l I I i i bl c . Commodity fetishism does not only imply that people mi u n de rs t an d t he social relations underlying commodities, but that soda! re l a t i o n s appear intelligible because value appears to be the propt�rt y of' t he commodity, just as use values really are properties of the co mmod i t y . Thus the social relations of consumption seem immediate and t ransparent . Adorno connects the ways in which social relations of <' c hange ap pear i ntelligible with illusions of intelligibility in music. Musk w h i h is reproduced and/or produced according to prevalent uorm11 of t h e most widespread i n t e ll igi b ili t y m is takenly appears in l <· l l igible bot h in t rms f t h so ial relati ns of i ts prod u tion and in its I f. F r xample, t u r i n g f m anin i n t h 1 nm ol' t h int IIi i I t th l i t n s t h r mant i is d It I I y h 11 '
d t erminate
•
The Dispute over Modernism
1 37
guarantee instant intelligibility and this creates an illusion of immediate value in use. New music is a contrasting case for its idiom is intelligible in musical terms since it relies on traditional musical language but dissolves the apparent 'naturalness' of that language. It seems, however, unin telligible to its listeners because it does not conform to the prevalent norms of immediate intelligibility and thus immediate value in use. By giving reification various meanings in terms of musical technique, Adorno established a correlation between the illusion ofintelligibility (or unintelligibility) within music and the illusion that the social relations of music are intelligible. This perspective is sociological because the criterion of real intelligibility or unintelligibility of a work is given by the relation of the cultural product in question to the norms of shared meaning and intelligibility both in the sphere of composition and in the sphere of reception. Yet the real or apparent intelligibility and unin telligibility is not the object of the inquiry. The object is the relation between the social formation of the work and its reception in music, and between the way the work of art forms social relations and the structuring of meaning in texts in both music and literature .
Chapter 7 The Melancholy Science
Th
Dialectic of Enlightenment reveals the paradox of the late eighteenth 'Cn tu ry concept of reason: instead of bringing emancipation as it
mised, it turned out to be a new form of domination. Adorno,
h w ver, reveals more persistently the paradoxes of new philosophical
nd t heoretical movements of the twentieth century which promise
m ancipati on, 'the dialectic of humanism' . Adorno and many other G r m an writers - of the inter-war period were attracted to an antih u m n ist stance.1 They rejected the humanist legacy of historicism, p h i losophi al anthropology, 'realism' in art, and epistemology, for these w
s
n as bankrupt, incapable of providing any analysis of a much-
. h ng d h is to ri cal reality. Adorno held that these varieties of 'anti nism' were enslaving rather than liberating because they recreated h th
.
.ry viis which they sought to define and eschew. He thus recognised
'd i J t i of humanism' and showed how the 'new' philosophy, > i lo gy, and literary theory relapsed into the assumptions which they d -( lor d . He attributed this partly to the resurrection of the old ambition of p h i losophy to establish indubitable grounds for its own endeavour, and
unrealistic attempt to make no concessions at all to the ol d i l l usions and their social basis. This belief, that i u t c l l ccl u al and social transformation can only be effective i f the power of t ra d i t io n s is co n ed d, was always t he m eas u re of the radicalism of Adorno and t h · Frank furt S hool and not of t heir equivo at ion . Adorno's ori i n a l i t y i · t a kn w l c t h · t h . h i ms � l f is also b und to xa e r b a t I t t l · n r m whi h h , th p l i at i n f tl t i l' i n f pt i ng a p r t l y to t he
powt�r of t he
·
I g
I I
f I
I ·I i
s of
> t >I'
1 39
The Melancholy Science
the paradox of 'anti-humanism' by undermining humanism on its own grounds . His response is preoccupation with style. 'Style' is not uniform or codified, not elevated over the material which it forms, but stands for continual vigilance to the mode in which theory is presented, thereby recasting the relation between theory and praxis. If Lukacs has turned Marxism into method, Adorno has turned it into the search for style.2 Social analysis is approached as the immanent question of 'the conceptual mediation' of social reality.3 Adorno construes Marx's theory of value so that it describes the process which structures social reality at the level of meaning, or, more accurately, at the level of illusion. This process is the production and exchange of commodities which entails 'the reduction of the products to be exchanged to their equivalents, to something abstract', 4 and, that which is abstract, in this sense, is conceptual. This 'conceptual entity' Adorno calls 'illusion' .5 Reality is thereby presented to people in a way which 'prevents them from becoming conscious of the conditions under which they live' .6 This perspective cuts across the distinction between naturalism and anti naturalism, or, in other terms, between Erkliiren and Verstehen. For it insists on the systematic formation of social reality according to a principle which can be specified without any reference to the meaning conferred on that reality by individuals, and yet this principle produces i llusions which need to be interpreted at the level of meaning. ' Meaning' refers to the ways in which the social structure seems intelligible when it is not, and unintelligible when it is. ' Meaning' is not predicated of the intentional action of individuals, nor does it refer to the negotiation of shared meanings by social actors. ' Meaning' or 'conceptuality" is a property of the social structure. I n the realm of art Adorno distinguishes bet ween the 'meaning' of a work and its communication or reception; ' m e a n i n g ' corresponds here to the process of production and thus to the way i n which the work represents the relation between subj ectivity and 110 i a l objectivity. The sphere of production is contrasted with the sphere of ex change and consumption in which commodity fetishism may int ervene and obscure the meaning of a work of art. The production of meaning is t h us opposed to its communication (illusion ) ; in this case 't lleani ng' is con t rast d w i t h i l l usion . M ore general ly, however, 'mean ing' is iden t i f ied w i t h t he i l l usor y way in w h i ch the social structure appr. rs to b i n t l ligibl or u n i n t e l l igi b le . T h is is w h y Adorno prefers to mil meaning ' on e p t ua. l i t y' , for ' m a n i n ' i mplies directness and ( I" I lK ( " '11 y . ' I l l si n ' f f' rs t h r (" f tO t h m i leadi ng a p pea r ance of th n 'rlyin r s f'pr du ti n . Ad N! �i . 1 l'ty t f' ' I I i n y n l y• i n t h und rl yi n I · tl I ' t' ti f il l u i n n t h ·
t
on l'lJ i
h
W
t h t I ·t
The Melancholy Science
t his negotiation of illusion, but, in that book, the underlying process w hich imposes illusion is introduced in such an inhibited fashion that Adorno fails to make a convincing connection. Adorno's construal of Marx's theory of value develops an interesting am biguity in Marx's theory of the formation of proletarian class onsciousness. The conventional interpretation of the formation of proletarian class-consciousness in capitalist society is that as workers who I I t h eir labour-power come together to share the same workplace, so t heir common interests as a class in relation to another class, the owners of th means of production, become increasingly apparent to them. In other terms, the underlying social relations which determine the social stru t u re become visible and intelligible to them as a result of their x p� rie n ce in the workplace. In pre-capitalist, feudal society, by contrast, p asants, isolated in the desmesne of their lord, had no chance of coming to r a lise their common interests. Yet, in the earlier mode of production, t l s cia! relations of exploitation between peasant and lord were per na l and direct, and thus transparent and intelligible - in all areas of 110 ial life, not only in the organisation of work. It is this duality in the way in w h i h social relations are intelligible and the way in which they are not int l l i g ib l e within the same kind of society which recurs in Marx's ' ·ount of capitalist society. For, according to Marx, commodity p d u t io n depends on freely alienable forces of production and thus on t h d v lopment of markets which intervene increasingly in the relations b t we e n men and obscure those relations, giving them the appearance of el lions between things (commodity fetishism) . If this aspect of Marx's th ory of value is stressed, then as markets become more complex, social I t io n s between men become less visible and less intelligible to them, I t h inside and outside the workplace. Adorno takes up this aspect of M rx's anal ysis as a framework for the understanding oflate capitalism. He i s i n t erested in the new forms by which social reality is obscured in late · a p ita l is t so i t y , and the centrality of 'illusion' in his analyses is a way of lo m u t at i n g t he problem of ideological domination without any reference to ·lass- onsciousness, alienation, hegemony or legitimation . As a result, however, he does not differentiate between the experiences which people have of ' i l l u s ion ' ; social inequality can not be co ncept u a l is ed . Adorno re v i t al i s es static notions of ' base' and 'superstructure' by t urning ba k to a di t i n t ion between pro esses and resul tant social forms. Yt·t he co n cc nt r a t 'S n u l t u ra l f rm , i n t e l l t ual and art ist i work s , not Ill th a n a log o us so ial forms su h as t h wa c- fo r m o r t h e m on y-form . T h ill · · h h th v nt t h i n t ·1 1 t I w rk I, · I I i h n fl I' , h, f Jurm · d II I J n' i ·i I o • · I ·
·
n
r
r.
·
1
11
N' )
The Melancholy Science
as well as the continuities which may arise between cultural form and social reception are defined as the province of sociological inquiry. However, the neglect of those social forms on which the analogy of cultural form depends is serious. Adorno declares that change has occurred in the organisation of production and in markets for labour and goods, with the result that in the market for labour and in the workplace, the social structure has remained unintelligible, while, in the market for cultural goods and in the sphere of leisure, it has acquired an illusory intelligibility. Although he indicts sociologists for finding society opaque, Adorno himself only investigates the opaqueness as it appears in the sphere of culture. Thus, although his investigations into the possibility of cultural experience are based on a fully-fledged theory of artistic production, exchange and consumption, they are conducted in a theoretical vacuum. Adorno's neglect of social forms diminishes his ability to offer a compelling analysis of political organisation and of relations of power in capitalist society. Throughout his work, power in society is paramount but elusive. This is another result of the way in which Marx's theory of value is generalised as 'reification' with minimal reference to the actual productive relations between men, and without any identification of a social subject. Hence the process of production is emphasised as all powerful, and reification becomes a synonym for the principle of power which is universal but unlocatable, and which affects everyone equally. Adorno indicts Heidegger for his alleged voluntarism, for implying that the fulfilment and realisation of man depends on an act of personal choice. Heidegger's prescription, according to Adorno, ignores the power of social and political-institutions which determine men and hence which circumscribe any possibility of self-determination or autonomy. Yet Adorno is himself in a similar predicament: he too makes it impossible to reinsert the 'individual' into a socio-political context. He redefines M arx ' s theory of class in a way which renders domination within the c lass, as well as between classes, less amenable to analysis, cripples the conce p t of organisation, and adapts Freudian concepts in a way which pro m i ses to be rad ica l l y sociological, but which stops short at the point w here t h ose concepts m i g h t be t rans fo rm ed i n to a theory ofsocio-political a ct ion This i nconsistency bet ween h i s critique of Heidegger and his own � l ane · arises bec a u s e Adorno p rov i d es no account of those social forms w h i ch wou ld hav to be S J ified prior to a n y account of corresponding po l i t ic I (orms. H h s t hus sa rif i ee l t h u n i q u adv a n tage of a M a rx ia n iv· ti n I' li i al r lat i n and of th stat from an 1 ro· ·h : t h 1 I is l' l i I lat ion of s ifi kind f i ty. lth u h h Thi i 1 r h w l i I ' li t , h.h ' l I' I II .
'
The Melancholy Science
'4·2
result, the state is a force sui generis, and the relation between state and society is conceived by reducing it, ultimately, to the question of the legitimacy of the state. Thus it is impossible to ask if the separation of the pol i tical sphere from the socio-economic sphere, and the relative
� tonomy of the state is real or merely apparent.
/ The idea that Adorno is an Hegelian Marxist is a misleading f oversimplification. His relatio11 to Hegel is not comparable to that of
(
�
'
}
Lukacs. Adorno rejects Lukacs' solution to the irresolvable antinomies of .
t rad i t ional epistemology - to grant primacy to a new constitutive subject, t he proletariat. He does not reject the question of constitution as such, or t he subject/object dichotomy. Unlike some thinkers, such as Heidegger or
A l t husser, who devise a new terminology in order to discard the old presuppositions, Adorno regards the antinomies of philosophy and of t heory as real and powerful, to be redefined, but not to be circumvented r abrogated except on pain of contradiction. Adorno interprets these n t i nomies as arising from the misrecognition of the relationship between t hought and social reality, between subject and object. For all ph i losophy - and all sociology and art - is interpreted by Adorno as ognit ive activity which gives form to such a relationship, as epistemology, even when the philosophy in question consists of a radical attempt to bj ure epistemology. In this general sens� of 'sublating' the tradition, not res inding it, Adorno betrays an Hegelian inspiration, but his conceptual apparatus, such as the criticism of identity thinking, negative dialectic, rcifi at ion, is never Hegelian in origin. Adorno's notion of the 'subject' is a residual one. He presents the view t hat a no ti on of the subject, whether individual or class, must be ' .onst rued and denied' .8 It must be denied as 'the unity of the universal nd t h particular in any Hegelian sense, or as the class whose particular i wr •sts represent the interests of the whole society, the universal class, in any M arxian or Lukacsian sense. However, it is sociologically and lo kal ly wrong not to construe some notion of the 'subject'. It is sociological ly wrong, because social formation and deformation cannot bt� .on .civcd otherwise, and, as a result, i t is logically wrong, because i t kads t o a n t in o m i es in theory . Y e t Adorno mourns the 'subject' which has lo11 t i ts s u bst ance and his t ho ught is haunted by this ghostly, missing '
'
The Melancholy Science
Adorno himself drew attention to another charge of left-wing Hegelianism to which he appeare� more vulnerable: that he overem phasised theory, and that he related thought to society as a whole, instead of relating thought to the productive activity of men and thus to a particular class society.1° Adorno's answer to this charge is that his analysis of the underlying processes ofsociety is not based on any notion of society 'as a whole' . The emphasis on commodity exchange means that the 'whole' ofsociety cannot be the object of analysis. He admits that the process of production and the resultant social forms, and not productive activity or the agency of social classes or individuals, are the objects of his analysis. His answer to the question of the status of theory was to make more explicit how the 'melancholy science' is precisely an attempt to redefine the relation between theory and praxis. Adorno is best known for offering critical theory as an alternative to positivism in sociology, but he deserves even more attention for offering an alternative to those positions which also reject positivism, such as Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutics. His criticism of phenomenology and hermeneutics has equal force in relation to their sociological offspring, phenomenological and hermeneutic sociology, and 'reflexive' sociology .11 This so-called 'reflexive' sociology evinces an epis temological concern with the ground of its own activity arising from a critical awareness of the way in which conventional sociology 'con stitutes' its object in its theorising or in its talk.12 All these kinds of philosophical sociology make cognitive processes, not moral facts or shared values, into the obj ect of their inquiry.13 Adorno's argument against phenomenology or phenomenological sociology is that it repeats more-or-less explicitly what positivism does implicitly, namely, bases t ruth or reality on the analysis of consciousness, and thereby reduces social reality to a demonstrably constricted consciousness of it. He thus avoids the paradox of sociological reflexivity: because a reference to self is j udged logically prior to a reference to society, society and history are lost in an infinite regress of self-constitution. R eification has been employed as a critical category in this phenome nological tradition as well as in the nco-Marxist tradition, and in sociological amaigams of the two traditions, with the resuit that it has become highly ambiguous. There are two distinct uses of reification whi h ar fr q u n t l y confused and even conftated: a use which locates the ori1 in fkn wl dg f s ial reality solely in our minds, and a use which lo : t s i t i n a d t n n i na t iv s ial process . u I n the flrst case, reification is ns i usn ·ss, in t h s ond . lity f 1 i il f 1 i 'I I pr ·s whi h T
,
The Melancholy Science
1 44
t hought of as abstract. These uses have been conflated in recent attempts in sociology to generalise Marx's theory of value by using the category of
rei fication.15 The confusion may have arisen because in English we u nderstand 'abstract' to mean unreal, and 'real' or 'concrete' to mean tangible or thing-like, while in the German tradition 'concrete' may mean the sum of relations which characterise a thing, and 'abstract' may mean the exclusion of some of these relations. Marx's theory of commodity fetishism implies that concrete social relations between men · re �tructured and presented in a way which excludes some of these relat ions, and hence the commodity seems to exist by itself. But, in Eng l is h , what exists by itself tends to be interpreted as something real or concrete (tangible or thing-like) , and Marx is taken to be stressing that · somet h i ng is wrongly believed to be real. In this way the emphasis on how one set of relations is transformed into another, each of which is real, is lost. Th us the explication of an objective and historically specific social pro ss is turned into a universal way of thinking. . The ategory of reific ation has also found its way into sociological l i terat u re as an ostensibly critical category via Talcott Parsons' decision to transl ate Weber's phrase Begrif.fsrealismus (conceptual realism) , as 'r ificat ion' . 1 6 Outside the Marxist tradition, use of the category of rci f i at ion can also give rise to problems of interpretation. Weber is opposing the ascribing of reality to theoretical concepts when such con pts can only have the status of ideal-types, the sociologist's tools, which i n corporate no judgement about their reality. Yet 'reification' has al o b en u sed to describe how sets of relations or properties come to be thoug h t of 'abstractly' , in the sense that their reality is obscuredY W her, h owev e r , did not propose that there is another reality, knowable in an a l t e rn ati v e way, but distorted by our scientific constructs. Much crhi ism of sociology is conducted on the basis of a casual charge of eificat ion which merely implies that an 'abstract' concept, proposition or theory has atta i ned an illegitimate status. 1 8 This apparently damning charge adds n o thi ng to the particular mistakes adduced because no criteria of ad eq u a te theory formation are offered. Such appeals t 'rcil icat ion ' as a so p h is t ica t ed critical tool are specious. A dorno p ro v i d es an antidote to these confusions and shows how th y ari:u�. H e does not u ndermine pos i t i v ist sociology by argu i n g that su h K
1
.he
1
g
t h L once i i
wh ' I
p
r
li
t
t h t th mind i
't, I
tw r i
by w h i t wh' h w'l l I
The Melancholy Science
1 45
the intentional acts of individuals, even if conceived as an intersubjective intentionality, and the view that social meaning can be interpreted merely by submission to the multiple hermeneutic circles in which it is implicated. He exposes contradictions in Husserl's notion of intentional meaning and in Heideggerian hermeneutic meaning, and would have considered their sociological epigoni profoundly asociological. Adorno's notion of 'conceptuality' as socially-produced illusion is designed to rival any theory of the constitution of meaning which suggests that 'meaning' is direct or immediately intelligible. This is why he prefers to call his object 'conceptuality' rather .than to call it 'meaning' . According to Adorno the 'knowing subject' in sociology is part of the object to be apprehended, and this remains unrecognised by phenome nological sociology as much as by positivist sociology. Any sociology partially constitutes the meanings which it imputes to society, but it does not follow that those meanings are reducible to a 'knowing subject', and to reduce them to a subject is another form of misrecognition. Adorno's account of reification and of identity thinking explain how the mind works on the meaning of received concepts without implying that it devised those concepts in the first place. According to this account, society imposes concepts on us, which we then reimpose on society. The systematic misrecognition of the relation between concepts and underly ing social reality (illusion) is due to a social process, the production of value in exchange. 'Meaning' is thus opaque. Adorno's opposition to phenomenological and to hermeneutic ac counts of meaning also explains his, prima facie, strange separation of empirical sociological research techniques from their conventional use and interpretation. Since our access to empirical reality and our conceptual apparatus are inseparable and equally restricted, the idea of testing theoretical propositions by means of independently-defined i ndicators is incoherent . However, Adorno does not therefore abandon empirical research as irremediably circular, but utilises a range of empirical means to explore the divergences between the ways in which social reality is understood and the ways in which this illusory i n t e lli gibi li t y is determined . This exploitation of empirical procedures is d esigned to eschew not o n l y the 'scientistic' understanding of them, but a lso any ada p t a t ion of them which takes account merely of an i n t erpre t ive c i rc l bet ween t heory a n d i ts d es ign a t ed indicators.19 T h is i nsist en on t h ' con e p t u a l med iat ion of real i ty and not on ' rnt�a n i n as su h u aran tees t h at history can never be lost. 20 History '
appc rs t h ough u t Ado no's t he ught i n t h s nse t ha t i t depends on t h
ti
f
·
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i
l ly
Hi
i e ty b
i t n t'
I
d on t h
pr du ti f t h hi t h
f I
r
The Melancholy Science
intellectual and artistic, which reformulate the changing relation b t ween subject and object. Adorno is adamant that history should not ppear as any kind of historicism: 'Historicism slanders its own principle, t he force of history' .21 By 'historicism' Adorno understands any philo sophy of history which posits a teleology of reconcilement in historical t i me, and also historical relativism in the simple sense of interpreting ph nomena in relation to the period in which they occur. Conventionally, Marxism has drawn its strength from its ability to unite t h se two perspectives. The historically new schism between processes of production and modes of distribution and consumption means, for Adorn o , that it is truer to 'the force of history' to examine the ont radictions and discontinuities between intellectual and artistic works nd t heir 'time' and not the continuities. In Adorno's view this was to s h w historicism in the sense of any appeal to the development and resolu tion of contradictions as the principle or motor of historical change. But , haracteristically, it amounts to a form of inverted historicism, for, to ex· m i ne the contradictions and discontinuities between a work and its time, between the process of production and cultural formation, is still to assu me a determinate, negative, relation between a work and its time. dorno preferred an inverted historicism to Benjamin's outright re je t i n ofhistoricism. 22 For Benjamin was only able to redeem the force of history by founding a new ontology. H abermas' work is well-known for offering an alternative to the short omings of Adorno's thought. 2 3 He accuses Adorno of confusing the ri t iq ue of ideology with a theory of late capitalist society; of making t l o y impossible by basing it on 'the whole is the false', a proposition whi h must preclude any determinate negation. Habermas, furthermore, eni t he possibility of'immanent critique' because late capitalist society no I ng r offers any norms, values or cultural forms to which an 'imman n t critique' might appeal . 2 4 Habermas interprets Adorno's ·ri tiq ue of id e n t i ty as Hegelian, and understands his thought as based on id s o f re onc i liation and 'the resurrection of nature' . He appears to I v t ken Adorno's proposition 'the whole is the false' too literally, ovr rloo k ing t h e dialectical play in it. He grants no validity to Adorno's gt� n e ra l is at i on of M arx's theory of value to produce a sociology of illusion in l a t t� ca pi t a li st soci ty. He d oes not see that Adorno's critique of identity ix 1 101 H e eli an, and t hat far from def i ni ng a probl rn of t he res u rrec t io n ol' n a t u , Adorn r d f i n 'n t ur ' t m a n ' t h h i s t o ry f u l t u r ', and .m pl ally � ny p th osis of ny r n i i i t ion i n h ist
1 47
The Melancholy Science
·
own constitution cannot then be explained as a formation within an historically specific society. His theory of 'communicative competence' and of an 'ideal speech situation' recreates a form of identity thinking and depends on the possibility of reconciliation in history. 2 6 Adorno's notion of 'immanent critique' was precisely designed to avoid falling back into these presuppositions. To say that there is no longer any basis for 'immanent critique' in late capitalist society is to admit that the old presuppositions of philosophy cannot be avoided, and thus to undermine the possibility of theory in a far more devastating way than Adorno ever desired to do. Similarly, the debate between Adorno and Benjamin still deserves attention. Like the more recent debate between Habermas and Gadamer, 27 the earlier one amounts to the pitting of a critique ofideology against an hermeneutics. However, Benj amin's hermeneutics, unlike Gadamer's, is based on an interpretation of advanced capitalist society. The positions of Adorno and Benjamin are more incompatible and the issues at stake more substantial than in the debate between Habermas and Gadamer, which is methodological by comparison. lf'thinking . . . teaches itself that part of its meaning is what, in turn, is not a thought [then] its prison has windows' .28 The 'emphatic concept of thinking' which Adorno here defines is a form of praxis.29 But even as praxis, it is inherently limited . 'Praxis', however, is even more ambiguous when predicated of thought or theory than when opposed to it. 'Praxis', when predicated of theory, may mean that theory is a form of social activity defined in terms of its goal, that it is an instrument, or it may mean that theory is a form of social intervention as opposed to an autonomous and passive contemplation . For Adorno the relation between theory and praxis must depend on the relation between subject and object. The possibility and validity of any praxis, even understood as action directed to a specific end, can only be decided on the basis of a theoretical analysis of the subject/object relation, that is, of social reality; otherwise such action is undertaken blindly and is futile. Adorno called such action 'pseudo-activity' .30 Thus 'praxis' is a theoretical notion.31 Theory must have priority over praxis in this sense, but cannot have p ri or i ty over the object. For theory is not capable of healing the split bet ween subject and object by its own means. There is a sense, however, in w h i c h ' praxis' as t h e power of the object, is stronger than and separate from t heory . 3 2 A d o rn o was convinced of the necessity of redefining theory as a fon n of so ial a t iv i t y w i t hou t thereby conceiving that activity as i nst ru m n t a l . The t i t le Negative Dialectic is i n tended to cut across the conv 'n t i 1 a! t h ry/praxis d ist i n t ion by d e l i n a t ing t h eory as a form o f s of iden t i t y t h i n k i n , i n te v 1 t i n w hi h b t pr val n t m wi I
II
wi ·h II
ity
tw
t
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pts nd r a l i t y . A h yi t I t' th tw
t t m k
The Melancholy Science
the subject and sodal objectiyity. It is therefore inefficacious and regressive, exacerbating the very conditions it seeks to overthrow. This t ask of recasting theory as a form of praxis without overstating its claims to be a revolutionary weapon is, for Adorno, 'the morality of thinking'. It was for establishing new dogmas, new forms ofidentity, that Adorno riticised Lukacs and Benjamin. He exposed the dogma in their work by paying close attention to the form in which they presented their thought, to their style. While Adorno admired Lukacs' early work, including History and Class Consciousness, he was most opposed to the principles of Lukacs' later literary criticism, and particularly disparaged his inability to understand modernism in art. Adorno traced the inadequacies of Lukacs' notion of realism to his acceptance of the official Soviet doctrine of art as the simple reflection of social reality, and to his acceptance of so ialist realism, which, as applied to Russia, implies that the Soviet poli t ical system is a free society .33 Lukacs dubbed Adorno along with the lit erary avant-garde as 'anti-humanist' and 'decadent', unable to understand the reasons for Adorno's attention to style . 34 Adorno demonstrates that this insensitivity on Lukacs' part is matched by the latter's own indifference to style which follows from his crude idea of the r l at ion between art and social reality.35 Lukacs succumbs to the ills whi h he deplores far more than does the work of those against whom he inv ighs, by allowing his work to serve a dogmatic and regressive praxis. Adorno believed that the excitement of Brecht and Benjamin over the n ·w possibilities of art, which 'instead of being based on ritual . . . begins to b based on another practice - politics' , 36 was another way ofseeing art · nd t h e ory as an instrument. Their view was based on an under est imat ion of the power of the object and as such was hopelessly naive. In his d isc ussions of their work, Adorno displayed the paradoxes and u l t imate impotence which must arise from such a 'functionalized' view of art and theory . Adorno himself, however, was never able to distinguish b t w ee n the political effects of different forms of popular art. The m e lanchol y science is not resigned, quiescent or pessimistic. I t re aso ns t ha t theory, j ust like the philosophy i t was designed to replace, t e n ds to overreach i ts elf, with dubious political consequences. The social r a l i t y of advanced capitalist society is more intractable than such theory is w i l ling to concede, and Adorno had a fine d ial ec t i c a l sense for its paradox s. Adorno was p la n n i n g a work of moral philosophy w hen he dicd .a7 H is 'mor l i t y' is a pr x i f t hou h t not a r ip for social and pol i t i al act ion . .
Glossary
A glossary which lists concepts and dichotomies separately from considerations of style and argument necessarily glosses over those concepts and dichotomies as much as it provides glosses on them. Adorno's holophrastic, elliptical and inconsistent use of terms is central to his thought, and the body of this book is devoted to a discussion of his use of terms. The following glossary is therefore intended to offer preliminary and provisional orientations and to introduce the reader to difficulties of translation and interpretation. Three criteria have guided the choice of terms for inclusion. First, terms which are always difficult to translate adequately into English, for example, Geist, Vernunft; secondly, terms which Adorno uses frequently and in a special way, for example, 'antinomy'; thirdly, terms which occur frequently in Adorno's texts and which present no special difficulties of translation but which, nevertheless, are conceptually complex, for example, consciousness, mediation. No attempt has been made to adumbrate the origin and history of these terms in the tradition of German philosophy and social thought; this occurs in the main text where necessary." Abstract/Concrete (Abstrakt/Konkret) Loosely, a concrete individual is one considered in its relations to a totality, and as related to itself. This is the Marxian or Hegelian concrete as the 'sum of determinations' . Even more loosely, a concrete experience may mean the wholeness of a moment of experience. Hence 'concrete' does not carry the usual English connotations of discrete, tangible, individuality or thingness. Adorno uses the dichotomy in a further sense. The degree of abstractness/concreteness of a concept (q.v.) is not determined by the level of its generality, which would mean, for example, that the concept 'animal' as genus or class is more abstract than the concept 'man' as species or sub-class. I t is not determined by the relation between the universal and the particular, which would mean, for example, that the concept 'rationality' is more abstract than particular . instances of 'rationality'. I t is determined by the relation between a concept as formally defined and any individual which is posited as a pa rticu l a r instance of the concept. When the individual does not instantiate the co n cept , the concept is abst rac t . See Concept. Appearance ( Schein , Erscheimmg) The German verb scheinen means both to 'seem' and to 'shine'. Mere app a ra n c, app arance which is not as it seems to be, or which hides som · t h i ng mor sse n t i I, and app ·anu1cc which is what it seems to be, or the shining ( C. rt h) f what is s nti I, q ually ·onv y d by t h rman. Schein and Ersclteinung ulti .H. Sclt�in is Rom .t i m s trans I t t�d as ' i l l usion ' ; Erscheinung mp s t h R m
n '. · 1 nlinomi1) I
E
Glossary society, meaning, loosely, contradictions in social reality. I t sometimes means, more specifically, that a concept is not 'fulfilled' by the individual which it is used to cover, a l t h o u gh the concept is not invalid, and the individual not unreal. Adorno also calls this an immanent (q.v.) contradiction, or an aporia. See G.S. 1 2 PNM p. 2 7 , tr. p. 1 8. Becoming (Gewordenheit, Gewordenes, Gewordensein) These noun forms of the past pa r t i ci ple of werden, to become, convey that a process of formation has occurred . A nat u ral English translation using 'formation' and its derivatives would obscure the contrast within the words themselves between process and formation. See G.S. 1 I N P · 357, G .S. 7 PP · 1 2 - 1 3 . Concept ( Begrifj) The concept i s not only the universal, that is, what we possess when wr grasp the sense of a word, but the properties which the object (q.v.) or individual r ·lerred to ideally possesses. Concepts are thus real, substantively conceived, and not mere ide as or ideal-types. Where Adorno refers more loosely to the 'concept' of an rtisti or intellectual work, he means the guiding or central idea. OD8ciousness (Bewusstsein) Adorno uses this term without predicating it of any class or individual, and without making its intentionality clear. I t refers both to wns .iousness of society and to consciousness on the part of society. This consciousness m y b, m a ni fes t by a particular discipline or by an art work, or it may be the ·uns iuusness which is diffuse and prevalent in a society at a given time. rlt ical Theory ( Kritische Theorie) Adorno uses the phrases 'critical theory' and ' d i It ti a l t heory' i nterchangeably. Sometimes he uses them interchangeably with ph ilosoph y and with sociology as well - all become names for the enterprise in which he iH e ngaged . At other times, 'critical theory' is distinguished from philosophy and "odulog y . I n those cases 'philosophy' and 'sociology' refer to non-dialectical philo su ph i s and sociologies. Critical theory is not a theory in the standard sense of a set of i n t · rre la ted propositions designed to explain observed or observable facts. ·t nninate Negation ( bestimmte Negation) Loosely, negation is criticism of society w h i h is pos i t iv e (determinate) in that it aims to attain and present knowledge of HO i c t y insofar a s that is possible, but not positive in the sense that it confirms or " nct ions what i t criticises. Similarly, the word 'negative' in 'Negative Dialectic' (Nt/l,ative Dialektik) stresses that criticism does not reproduce what is criticised. rivadon/Deduction (Ableitung) Adorno uses this term in a more general sense than in Htan la rd log ic . l n standard logic an argument is deductively valid if, when its prem ises are t rue, its conclusion is unfailingly true as well. For Adorno, a deduction ds from a cont radiction in a work to the underlying processes which give rise to it. p o Th• ·ri t eri a of the d ed u ction are generated in each case by the contradiction in CJU 8 t i o n . Experience ( Erjalmmg) A t t ai n i n g know ledge, lor Ad o rno , depends o n a concept of t' 1wrirncc, b u t not i n t he way in w h i c h it does for the empiricist theory of knowledge. ' l 'hf' r rn p i r icist axioms are t ha t claims to knowledge are only ju st i f i ed by experience which i uvolvcs con t rolled observation, and that w hatever is known by ex pe rie nc e could hnvr be n ot h e r wise . For Adorno, knowledge is a process, coming to know ( erkennen ) , 110t a body of rec e i ve d f i n d i ngs, or a set of t h eories w i t h met hods for t es t ing t hem . T h i s proct:KK or acq u i ring knowledge, w h ich is sdl�rcflc t ivl', a nd occurs in st ages, i s cal led 't'X P<'r i !'I H'<' ' . Cont rary t.o s ta n l a rd Engl is h usage, t h is not ion of ·xpcri c ncc does not i n 1 pl y d i rl' · t • H:ss or i m m<:d i a t c ncss . K nowledge d ·ptnds on t ht: realisa t ion t h a t r x p ri 1· n cc iH m l i · l ed ( l · v . ) . Su ( J .S . U ] u E i" p. 54 "• r So � pp. • (i . n ( W6scn) i\c l n l UM .H t h d i1lin •t ion bNwc n .ss .n a nd pp r 11 ·e ( l ·v .) to h l y , u th isti l 1 tw . . n mod of p u L ion 1 d Mo · j I r l a t i o ns 1 ltl d M 1( 1 1 tr l h uiJ t' l ( t .v .) ol' h • n I • • · ty I 1
(II
'
I
I
Glossary multiple, discrete essences. The forms in which these processes appear are called a 'fac;ade' or 'appearance' by Adorno, corresponding to the 'superstructure' in standard Marxian terms. This 'fac;ade' comprises commodities, social institutions, intellectual and artistic works. Fonn (Form, Gestalt) Form is contrasted not with .content but with process and with 'essence' (q.v.) . Form is the mode (or modes) of appearance of a social relation or of an idea. A social form (or formation) is contrasted with the social relations between men (the social process) which determine it. The 'form' of an intellectual or artistic work is the mode of expression appropriate to its essential or basic idea. Identity ThinlriagfNegative Dialectic (identifizierendes Denken/Negative Dialektik) Identity thinking consists in the use of a concept (q.v.) as if the individual which it denotes instantiates it when it does not. For example, the concept 'free' is not fulfilled when the individual to which it is applied does not possess the attribute of freedom. Such a veiling use of a concept is called 'identity thinking'. The criteria which specify when a concept is not fulfilled are given by a theory of society. This theory is called 'non-identity thinking', or 'negative dialectic'. lmmanent/tnmsc:endent (immanentftranszendent) 'Immanent criticism' accepts the presuppositions and terms of a society or work. Such criticism j udges a work by its own standards and ideals and confronts it with its own consequences. 'Transcendent criticism' brings alternative and external concepts and criteria to bear, approaching a society or work from a particular standpoint. Marxist sociology is often considered to employ 'transcendent' theory, but Adorno seeks to show that materialist and dialectical criticism must be immanent. See Prisms pp. 25- 3 1 , tr. pp. 3 1 -4. llllDlecliate/mecliate (unvermitteltfvermittelt) 'Immediate' does not have a temporal referent as in English. It means 'without intermediary', or, 'not a result'. Anything which appears to be immediate is always mediated . ' Mediated' means 'brought about by an agent', or, 'the result of a process'. Mediation is not an external relation, but a relation of constitution. See OL KS pp. 1 02 - 3, tr. p. 1 28. Logic (Logik) This term is used more generally in German than it is in English. The English equivalent of the German phrase Logik der Sozialwissenschaften is 'the epistemology and methodology of the social sciences' . Within a particular discipline, Adorno calls this 'material' logic. 'Logic' therefore does not only refer to the formal structure of the laws of thought. See PTI pp. 72 - 3, PTII pp. 95 -6. Moment (Das Moment) A moment is one of the elements of a complex unity. It is not temporal. (Der Moment is a moment of time.) The English word 'element' does not stress the intrinsic connection with the totality as the German does. Miad (Geist) The English translation of Geist is usually 'mind', or, less often, 'spirit', or 'intellect' . 'Mind', however, has too many connotations of psychological and empiricist epistemology. Geistig, the adjective, is translated as 'mental', 'spiritual', or, more frequently, 'intellectual' . The last of these three causes further confusion, because the English 'intellect' is nearer the German Verstand; the latter is usually translated as 'understanding', although Verstiindnis is more correctly translated as 'understanding' . 'Understanding' and 'intellect' are poor renderings ofGeist or its derivatives due to their connotations of a limited faculty. Moreover, geistig often means simply 'of, or, -pertaining to the mind' rather than 'intellectual' . Adorno uses Geist and ' onsciousness' almost interchangeably, although Geist has a high ··r sta tus than ns iousness (q.v.) . Geist imp l i es t he possibi l i t y of self d ·t rmination, or fr»d m. ns iousness which has attained sclf�determinat ion or fr�•d m w uld b• Gei t. ' Mi nd ' , fi r Ad rno, Is bot h form•d by so i • t y and has a pa •·ti 1 ut n my. Ad rn I ·· I n I
l
pp
s d t phil s phi·s nnd s ut h Is lly pp s d t
i I phil
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'mind'
Glossary The phrase 'natural history' is used by Adorno to stress that the underlying processes of a mode of production cannot be understood as the result of the intentions of individuals. These processes, however, are not 'natural laws', in the sense ofinvariant, deterministic regularities, but pertain to a historically-specific society. The phrase 'history of nature' is used by Adorno to draw attention to the concepts of nature held by an historically-specific society. These concepts of nature, whether of human nature, or of the physical world, or of the 'naturalness' of social institutions are cultural forms which appear immutable and ahistorical, but are historically determined. Negative Dialectic (Negative Dialektik) See Determinate Negation and Identity Thinking. Object/Subject (ObjektfSubjekt) Objekt, Gegenstand, Sache, may all be translated as 'object' . Sache may be translated as 'object'; 'subject' in the sense of a discipline; 'thing' or 'matter' . The convention of calling a discipline a 'subject' prevents an emphasis being placed on the object of study, or a contrast being made between the object of study and the subject as the consciousness to which the epistemology of any discipline may be attributed. Die Sache selbst is usually translated as 'the object itself' . However, this translation has a too-material ring about it. 'Object' in English usually means a thing existing in time and space, a natural object which would be Gegenstand in German. Die Sache selbst or Objekt is that condition where an individual has the properties ascribed to it by its concept (q.v.) . The object also refers to the underlying processes of production. Adorno tries to dissolve our perception of the apparent object, the· status quo, to reveal its formation and its possibilities. 'Objectivity', in this sense, refers to the structure of social reality, not to the logic of validatiori. Adorno criticises the criteria of'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' in philosophies and in sociologies and in works of art. Any discipline which denies its objective elements or which bases its claim to objectivity on a constitutive subjectivity, although possibly unaware of so doing, is subjective. 'Objectivity' can only be attained by recognising that the object is mediated by subjective factors. Adorno therefore inverts the subjective/objective dichotomy, or, rather, claims that the terms of the dichotomy have, in effect, been inverted. A so-called 'objective' method which seeks to eliminate all traces of subjectivity is subjective, whereas an idiosyncratic method may attain greater 'objectivity'. See MM p. 84, tr. p. 6g. Philosophy, Sociology, Scleuce (Philosophie, Soziologie, Wissenschaft) Philosophy/ Science. Adorno contrasts philosophy with individual disciplines (die Wissenschaften) . Philosophy is the enterprise which transcends the prevailing intellectual division of ' labour and is accorded the status of genuine knowledge (die Wissenschajt) . Philosophy/Sociology. One of Adorno's books is entitled 'The Philosophy of New Music', another 'The Sociology of Music', another 'Aesthetic Theory' . In each case Adorno is referring to his own enterprise which is always the same. He is usually guided by the predominance of the discipline which he is criticising: he calls his own work 'philosophy' when he is criticising philosophy, and 'sociology' when he is criticising sociology. He, nevertheless, rejects these titles as names of discrete disciplines and uses a h rn p rchensively as gen u i ne knowledge (die Wissenschaji) . Rea- ( Vemurifl, Verstand, Rationalit/it, Grrmd) Thes ' four G ·rman wo rds are all (requ ntly t ranslnt d by th' n • ngHsh w rd r •ason , whi h d s not t rans la te any Natural History/History of Nature (Naturgeschichte)
n• f h m b tt r t n I r land, d at
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Glossary
1 53
'understanding' too, implies quite the opposite of Verstand. 'Interpretive understand ing' is contrasted by Weber with sciences which employ merely functional or causal explanations; the latter are thus nearer to the meaning of Verstand. Vemurift is nearer Weber's notion of Werlrationalitiit, value rationality, although they are substantive in different ways. Verstand has been assimilated to Weber's Zweckrationalitiit, goal rationality, as instrumental rationality, in the Frankfurt School literature. This last conflation is particularly dubious and pervasive. Hence two different English words, . 'intellect' and 'understanding', are needed to translate Versland and Verstehen; and two, 'freedom' and 'reason', to translate Vernunji and ( Wert) Rationalitiit.
List of Abbreviations of Titles
Adorno's Works Published by Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main ( FaM ) , unless otherwise specified. Gesammelte Schriften, 1 97 1 Collected Works, nine volumes of the planned twenty-two volumes have already been published ( 1976) . References are to the Collected Works where available, edited by Rolf Tiedemann. The contents of each volume are listed here in German and in English, the original date of publication is given and details of any English translation. Where the volume or the books republished in it consist of articles, some of these are separately listed and abbreviated . A date in brackets indicates that a work was not previously published or that a work was written a considerable time before it was published.
G.S.
Volume 1 Philosophishe Friihschriften (Early Philosophical Writings) . Not pre viously published. T Die Trans;:;endenz des Dinglichen und Noematishen in Husserls Phiinomenologie {The Transcendence of the thing-like and the noematic in H usserl's phenomenology) ( 1 924) · BU Der Begri.ff des Unbewussten in der trans;:;endentalen Seelenlehre (The concept of the unconscious in the transcendental theory of the soul) ( 1 92 7 ) . AP Die Aktualitiit der Philosophie 1 93 1 Trans. 'The Actuality of Philosophy', Telos, 3 1 , 1977· IN Die Idee der Naturgeschichte (The idea of the history of nature) ( 1 932 ) . SP Thesen iiber die Sprache des Philosophen (Theses on the language of the philosopher) ( 1 930) .
G.S.I
G.S.5 Volume 5· Husserl ,(ur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie Studien iiber Husser/ und die phiinomenologishen
Antinomien The Metacriticism of epistemology Studies ofHusserl and the antinomies of phenomenology) 1 956. Hegel Drei Studien ;:;u Hegel ( Th ree Studies on Hegel) 1 963.
G.S.6 Volume 6. NO Negative Dialektilc 1 9 K
n
Trans. E. B.
Paul, 1 73) .
Ash ton , Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge
Jargon der • iger;tlichbit: .{ur de11tsche" ldeologie 1 64 Trans. K n u t Tarnowski and i Will, Jar on of Aut/IMti il ( ond n : u tl dg & K -gnn Paul, 1 73) ,
Fr d
, •7
lum
7
'
tit ti It
fttoril
(
'h
y)
1
7 ,
List of Abbreviations of Titles G.S.8 Volume 8 So;;.iologische Schrijten I (Sociological Writings I ) . Gesellschaft Gesellschajt I 966 Trans. F . Jameson, 'Society', i n Salmagundi,
1 96g - 70·
10 - 1 1,
Psychoanalyse Die revidierte Psychoanalyse (Revisionist psychoanalysis) ( I 946) I 962. i(um Verhiiltnis von So;;.iologie und Psychologic I 955 Trans. Irving N . Wohlfarth, 'Sociology and Psychology', New Left Review, 46, I 967, and 47, I 968. SuP-PS Postcriptum I 966. l Wb Theorie der Halbbildung (Theory of Semi-education) I 959 · K ultur Kultur und Verwaltung (Culture and Control) I 96o. Aberglaube Aberglaube aus ;:;weiter Hand (Superstition at second-hand) ( I 959) · Kooftikt Anmerkungen ;;.urn so;:;ialen Konfiikt heute (Remarks on social conflict today) SuP
68 .
I
SuEF '
(
uD
So;:;iologie und empirische Forschung I 957 Trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby, in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology
iology and Empirical Research', ndon: Heinemann, I 976) .
Ober
und Dynamik als so;:;iologische Kategorien (Static and Dynamic as
Statik
iological categories) I 956. Obj ktivitli.t Notiz:. iiber soz:.ialwissenschajtliche Objektivitiit ( Notes on objectivity in social i n e) 1 96 5. Du..khebn Einleitung z:.u Emile Durkheim, 'So;:;iologie und Philosophic' (Introduction to ' m i le Durkheim 'Sociology and Philosophy') I 967. o..treit Einleitung ;:;urn 'Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Sociologic' I 969 Trans. ' l nt r du t ion' in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. Sol pl1tkapitalismus oder lndustriegesellschajt? (Late capitalist or industrial society?) I 968. s
ueo
Rejlexionen
z:.ur Klassentheorie (Reflections on the theory of classes) { I 942) .
lk\dO.rfiaia Thesen iiber Bediirfnis (Theses on need) ( I 942 ) . 11 !1 i•t I Anti-semitism and Fascist Propaganda I 946. ttll It D Freudian Theory and the Pattern rif Fascist Propaganda I 95 I .
PuN
Bemerkungtn
iiber Politik und Neurose (Remarks on Politics and Neurosis) I 954·
lu Individuum und Organization (The individual and organisation) I 953· ld olo Beitrag z:.ur ldeologienlehre I 954 Trans. John Viertal, Aspects of Sociology ( md n : H ·i n ·mann, 1 973) ch. xii 'Ideology'.
M1
�ur
Stellung der empirischen So;:;ialjorschung in Deutschland (The current research in Germany) I 952. camwork in der Soz:.ialforschung (Teamwork in social research) I 957· IJ!IIlWIJrligetl Stand der deutschen Soz:.iologie I 959 Trans. Norman Birnbaum, ry German Sociology', in Transactions rif the Fourth World Congress of o
g�gtnwllrtigen
t on f wo·k
�um
' ; nt
m piri al soc ia l
( Lond n, 1 959) . S io/o MoO Mein1mgJjorschung und O.ffentlichkeit (Interviews and Public Opinion) 1 964. G1 ell chajtstheorie und empirische Forschung ( Sociological Theory and empirical R r h ) 1 969.
�ur Logik der So;:;ialwissenschajten I 96 I Trans. 'On the Logic of the Social Sciences', in
"II;, Po itivist Dispute in German Sociology. Vol u rn
9
1 So;:;·iologis lte
hrijten
c
11
Erste Holjte (
o iol gi al Writi ngs
I
1 First
I W t r i( R ll
List of Abbreviations of Titles
1 57
The Stars Down to Earth 1 95 7 . SaA Schuld und Abwehr 1 955 (Guilt and Defence) Ch. 5 from Gruppenexperiment. Ein Studienbericht Bearbeitet von Friedrich Pollock. ES Empirische Sozialjorschung (Empirical Social Research) 1 954 co-authored.
Stars
G.S.n Volume 1 1 Nolen zur Literatur (Notes on Literature) Trans. forthcoming. NzL I Nolen zur Literatur 1 1 958. NzL D Nolen zur Literatur 11 1 96 1 . NzL m Nolen zur Literatur Ill 1 965. NzL IV Nolen zur Literatur IV 1 974. The individual essays in each volume and the other essays m G.S . 1 1 and any translations are detailed where necessary.
Volume 1 2 Philosophie der neuen Musik 1 949 Trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Bloomster, Philosophy of Modern Music (London: Sheed and Ward, 1 973) .
G.S. u PNM
G.S. 13 Volume 1 3 Die Musikalischen Monographien (The monographs on music). Wagner Versuch iiber Wagner (A study of Wagner) 1 952 Trans. forthcoming. _Mahler Mahler Eine musikalische Physiognomik (Mahler A musical physiognomy) 1 960
Trans. forthcoming. Berg Berg Der Meister des Kleinsten Obergangs (Berg Master of the smallest modulation) ( 1 965 ) . G.S. l.f Volume 14. Diss Dissonanzen Musik in der verwalteten Welt (Dissonances Music in the controll"ed
world) 1 956. FuR Ober den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Horers (Fetishism in music and the regression of the listner) 1 938. eMS Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie 1 962 Trans. E. B. Ashton, Introduction to the Sociology rif Music (New York: Seabury, forthcoming) . Volume 1 5 . with Hans Eisler, Kompositionfiir den Film first published 1 947 under Eisler's name only, Composing for the Films (New York: Oxford U niversity Press) . GK Der getreue Korrepetitor Lehrschriften zur musikalischen Praxis (The faithful Repetiteur Handbook for musical practice) 1 963.
G.S. 15 KF
Further Works by Adorno German editions published by Suhrkamp, FaM, unless otherwise specified. Where the date of original publication differs from the date of copyright, the former is given. The English translations tend to give the latter only. Abbreviations are in alphabetical order. DofE Dialektik der Aujkliirung by Max Horkheimer and Adorno ( 1 947) 1 97 1 , S. Fischer. Trans. J o hn Cummings, Dialectic rif Enlightenment (New York: Herder and Herder, 1 972 ) . Eingriffe Eingrifft Neun Kritische Madelle 1 963 ( Interventions Nine Critical Models) . eSoz Vorle ung �ur Einleitung in die Soz iologie • 973 (Junius) ( Introductory lectures on so i I y). Kierkegaard t i 11
.)
8
List of Abbreviations of Titles'
( riticism. Small Writings on Society) . I bid . 'Thesen zur Kunstsoziologie' 1 967 Trans. Brian Trench, 'Theses on the ociology of Art', in Birmingham Cultural Studies, 2 ( 1 972 ) . M M Minima Moralia 1 9 5 1 Trans. E. F . N . Jephcott, Minima Moralia (London: New L ft Books, 1 974) . OL Ohne Leitbild Parva Aesthetica 1 967 (Without I mage Small Aesthetics) . Prisms Prismen Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft 1 955 Trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber, I risms (London: Neville Spearman, 1 967) . PTI Philosophische Terminologie 1 1 973 (Philosophical Terminology 1 ) . TU Philosophische Terminologie 11 1974 (Philosophical Terminology n ) . tichworte Stichworte Kritische Modelle 2 1 969 (Catchwords Critical Models 2 ) . WB Ober Walter Benjamin 1 970 (On Walter Benjamin) Rolf Tiedemann (ed.) . WE 'Wissenschaftliche Erfahrung in Amerika' 1 969 in Stichworte, Trans. Donald Fl ming, 'Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America', Donald Fleming d Bernard Bailyn (eds.), The Intellectual Migration Europe and A merica I9JO - I!fio ( 'ambridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press, 1 969) , pp. 338- 70.
KS
Further Abbreviation zrs
.<eit chrift fiir So
Notes and References
References to Adorno's works are to the German edition in the Gesammelte Schriften, where already available, as in the list of abbreviations of titles, and to the English translation where available. Further works by Adorno appear in the list of abbreviations of titles in alphabetical order. Where there is no English translation I have translated the titles of books and articles in order to assist the reader with no German. Where the date of first publication is significantly different from the publication date of the edition which I have used, I give the date of the first publication in brackets. Since I frequently paraphrase, I have given references to the sources of paraphrases so that they may be located. Where retranslation has been necessary, this is indicated by (G.R.) . References to the German edition ofworks by other authors are given where the argument depends on a point which may be obscured in the English translation. Otherwise references are to the standard translation.
Chapter 1 1 . Since the membership of the Institute changed so much from 1 923 to 1 96g, I use the phrase 'the School' to refer to the Institute and its members at any given time. Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock and Adorno were the longest standing members during this period. For an internal account of the School to 1 950, see Martin jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923 - 1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1 9 73) . 2. See Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Communiry, 18go - 1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 96g) and see Fritz Stern, The Politics ofCultural Despair (University of California Press, 1 963) br a discussion of a strain in German intellectual life which presents cultural diagnoses as political
1 60
Notes and References to Pages
2 -5
Culture. The Outsider as insider (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) pp. 30 - 1 , 40 - 3 . See lntemationa/ lnstitute ofSocial Research. A Short Description of its History and Aims ( New York: n .d . 1 93 �)?) .
6. Horkheimer, 'Die Schwache der deutsche Arbeiterklasse' (The Weakness of the Working Class) 1 934, in Notiz;en 1950 - 1959 und Diimmerung ( 1 934) (FaM: S.
( Iaman
Fi8cher, 1 974) .
7 . Studien iiber Autoritiit und Familie (Paris: Alcan, 1 936) a joint publication. There was l�o an uncompleted study of workers, see Jay, The Dialectical imagination, pp. 1 1 6 - 1 7; S!'had, Empirical Social Research in Weimar Germany, pp. 82 - 9 1 . 8 . A l fred Schmidt (ed.), Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie (FaM: S . Fischel', 1 968) 1 and 11.
a reprint of articles first published, with one excep tion in ZfS, although in some
This is
su bs t a n t i al l y altered. A selection from this edition has been published in English:
R
ns. M a t t h e w .J .
l
1 ! ) 7 �) .
O'Connell and others, Critical Theory (New York: Herder and Herder,
g. R i nger, T he Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 384 - 404. 1 o. K a r l M arx,
'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1 844', in Karl Marx and
F d ri k Eng ·Is, Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1 975) vol. 3, p. 327 ( ; . l .) . 1 1 . Ho kh i mer,
1 :1 . I bid . I
,
'Die gegenwartige Lage . . . ', in Soz;ialphilosophische Studien, pp.
p p . 42 - 3 .
R i ng r, T he
Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 2 2 7 - 4 1 ; Schad, op.cit., pp. 1 0 -
1 4 - • Studien iiber A utoritiit
1 �.
I st v a n
n uli g 1
und Familie. Lukacs' Concept of Dialectic (London: Merlin, 1 972)
M eszaros,
a p h y , p p . 1 53 - 60. • H r k l p i mer, 'Traditionelle
und Kritische Theorie', in ZfS, vi ( 1 937) reprinted in
riti elle Tltcorie u , 1 37 - 200, tr. pp. 1 88 - 243 · 1 7 . S M a r t i n J a y , 'The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism', Social Jimarc!J, KKX I X ( 1 9 7 2 ) 285 305 . r H. S ( ; . or gc Lic h t heim, ' From Marx to Hegel', in From Marx to Hegel and Other ',u r.r ( Lon I o n : Orba h and Chambers, 1 97 1 ) pp. 1 - 49· 1 , St• lorno el at., Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (Neuwied: I I h n , 1 9 7 2 ( 1 969 ) ) , and trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby, The Positivist Dispute ' rman 'o iololl) ( London: H e i n e m a n n , 1 976) . 1o1 1. I d ., Kt't' t he ·o n t ri b u t i ons by Hans Al be rt and the piece i nc l uded in the tr., Karl
, 1 '1 1 pt•r, ' I cason or Re:volution'', pp. 288 - 300. Gr iinbergs A rchiv and t he ZfS. lol l . , ' Ioi ii . �� J ay, T he D ialectiwl Imagination, ch . 5 · il:i· zrs, I X ( ' 94· 1 ) 200 2 5 - Sec G iacomo M arramao, 'Political Economy and Critical ' l h l'ury , in T elos, 24 ( 1 9 7 5 ) 56 -- 8o. '
'
'
11 4 . l 'o l l o< " k , Z l , ,
IX
( 1 94 . 1 )
·200
n.
•J.� . D o i' E , ' ! ! 4 7 , l r. , 1 9 7 2 . •J h . A dorno, C .S.6 N O, p . dJ6, t r . , p . 1 85 . "J. 7 , < :1' . W i l l iam L ·is , 7 '/te Domination qf Nature ( N ew Y o r k : Gwrgt: Brazilkr, 1 9 7 >1) I' r t T wo , ' h . 7 , pp. 1 45 - 65 . •J II, Srt• H o r k ht• i r n t· I ' V t: wor t ' , zrs, "' ( l ! J:-1 7 ) I : i · W!J. Z!.', V I I I ( l 3 4U) ' :.I I . :in · I u l :r; fI n im izrl, h . l p d ! I In dtu wi h 11 m pil'i : I wo r k . M zrs, 1 x ( 1 4. 1 l , :P · aw.
r6r
JVotes and References to Pages 6 - 9
the English translation: 'Then again The Philosophy ofNeu! Music, actually completed in America, was essential for everything which I wrote on music after that . . . , pp. 355 -6. 33· They had written DofE together. Adorno acknowledged the influence of Horkheimer's article 'Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung: zur Anthropologie des burger lichen Zeitalters' ZfS, v ( I 936) I 6 I - 234 on his work on Wagner which he began in I 93 7 -8, G. S . I3 Wagner p. g. He said that PNM, written in I94I and I 948, 'should be regarded as an extended appendix to Dialectic rif Enlightenment', PNM p. 7, tr. pp. xvii xviii (G.R.) and see MM pp. I I - I 2, tr. p. I 8. 34· In I g6 I Bloch left East Germany and went to live in West Germany. 35· Published simultaneously in Hungary and Germany (Berlin, Aufbau) in I 954· Trans. forthcoming. 36. Commissioned by the Institute and published as a series Frankfurter Beitriige zur So;:.iologie ( Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology) (FaM, Europiiische Verlaganstalt ) . See vol. 3, Betriebsklima ( I 955) vol. I , Gruppenexperiment, ( I 955 ) , a joint work, and vol. 5, Friedrich Pollock, Automation ( I 956) ; vol. I 3, Ludwig von Friedeburg, So;:.iologie des Betriebsklimas, ( I 963) . See too Adorno's essays on education, Er;:.iehung zur Miindigkeit (FaM: Suhrkamp, I 9 7 2 ) . 3 7 · G .S.8 SuEF, tr. eS, dS, GuEF. 38. Personal interviews conducted in West Berlin, I 972, with Sebastian Herkommer and Lothar Hack, both sociologists. Some of Adorno's lecture series on philosophy, sociology, and aesthetics have been published: Vorlesung zur Einleitung in die Erkenntnistheorie (FaM: Junius, I 957 - 8 ) , Vorlesungen ;:.ur Asthetik 1967 - 8 (Zurich: H . Mayer Nachfdger, I 973) PTI , PTI I ; eSoz. 39· See Sociologica I ( 1 954) and Horkheimer's (ed . ) , ;:,eugnisse, I 963 ( FaM: Euro piiische Verlaganstalt) dedicated to Horkheimer's and to Adorno's sixtieth birthdays respectively; and Sociologica 11 ( I g62) reprinted articles by each of them. 40. So;:.iologische Exkurse, vol. 4 of the Frankfurter Beitriige, ( I 956) trans. John Viertal, Aspects of Sociology ( London: Heinemann, I 973l · 4 I . See Werner Post, Kritische Theorie und metaphysicher Pessimismus. ;:urn Spiitwerk Max Horkheimers ( M unch en, Kosel, I97 I ) . 42 . Published posthumously as G.S. 7 , the first of the collected works to be published. 43· M. Clemenz, 'Theorie als Praxis?' , in neue politische literatur, 2 ( I g68) I 78 - I g4; W. F. S. Schoeller (ed . ) , Die neue Linke nach Adorno ( Munchen: Kindler, I g6g) Gunter Rohrmoser, Das Elend der Kritischen Theorie (Frieburg: Rombach, I 970) . 44· For discussions of the School's work in this period, see Clauss Grossner, 'Anfang und Ende der Frankfurter Schule' and 'Keine Ende der "Frankfurter Schule"?' In Veifall der Philosophie Politik deutscher Philosophen (Hamburg: Wegner, I 97 I ) pp. 1 06 - I 2, 255 - 6 I ; Arnold Kunzli, Aujkliirung und Dialektik. Politische Philosophie von Hobbes bis Adorno (Frieburg: Rombach, I 97 I ) Die Linke antwortet Jurgen Habermas (FaM: Europiiische Verlaganstalt, I g6g) Bernhard Schiifers (ed . ) , Thesen ;:.ur Kritik der So;:.iologie FaM: Suhrkamp, I g6g) . 45· Inter alia, G .S .6 ND. pp. 3 I - 3, 35 - 6, tr. pp. 20 - 2, 24 - 6. 46. See Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, pp. 22 - 4, for more details of Adorno's early '
·
l i fe .
4·7 · G .S . I I 4.8. 4·9·
50.
I I I , 'Der wundcrliche Realist', on Siegfried Kracauer pp. 388 - g . E d i t orisc he Nachbemerkung', i n G .S. I , p, 382. K r •nek, I 2 . Adorno t o Krenek, 7 Oct I 934, p. 44· I b id ., 3 · Adorno t o K r •n• k , 8 Oc t I 930, p. 20. N zL
R o l f Tiedemann ,
I bid .,
1
W
F
r :.1.
Adorno t o Kr n ·k , 7 Oct I 934• pp. 4 3 -- 4 .
id .
l
•
p . 1 1 6, t1
'
1
unl
, p.
•
f
4· t . Thr rc t of t h i p r gr. ph d p nds n t iP r st d u' p u llt , lc barm , ' r
Notes and Riferences to Pages 9 - 13 Subjektivitat und verwilderte Selbstbehauptung' in Philosophish-politisclu Prqfile ( FaM: ' u h rkamp , I 9 7 I ( I 969) ) pp. I 88 - 9; and Paul Lazarsfeld, 'An Episode in the History of ial Research: A Memoir', in Fleming and Bailyn, Tlu Intellectual Migration, pp. 300- I nd 332 - 5; and Thomas Mann, The Genesis I![ a Novel (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1 ( 1 949) ) trans. Richard and Clara Winston, passim; and Mann, Briife, Erika Mann 1 ( d . ) ( faM: S. Fischer, I 963, 1 965) , vols. I I and I I I , letters to Adorno, passim, some of whi h appear in Mann, Letters, trans. R. and C . Winston (Harmondsworth: P� nguin, I 7 ). 5 · Sec Krenek, passim. 6. i11ter alia, see Krenek; and G .S . 1 3 Berg. Errinncrung ( Memoir), pp. 335-67; and hwi rigkeiten 1 Beim Komponieren 11 In der Auffassung neuer Musik' ( Difficulties I I n p sing n In understanding New Music), in Impromptus (FaM: Suhrkamp, I 973 ( I 964, ) and G .S . I5 GK. 7 · For example, G.S. 1 2 , PNM . 8. .S.8 and G .S. 9 I and 11. usan Buck-Morss und RolfTiedemann (eds.) , 'Editorische Nachbemerkung', in
,'hapter 2 1.
',
. 1 1 N zLI , pp.
9 - 33, first published 1 958 .
�.
M M 1 95 1 , tr. I 974·
4·
I bid.,
; . . 6 ND p .
. ·5
52, tr. p. 4 I .
P · 1 0, tr.
P · XX.
p. 35 I . . S .9 n 'Editorische Nachbemerkung', pp. 404- I 4, and G .S . I I ' Editorische N hb mcrkung', pp. 697 - 70 I and pp. 706 - 7 . 7 · For example, 'Notes o n Literature'; 'Prisms'; ' Interventions'; 'Nine Critical Mo Is'; Do i'E is subtitled in German 'Philosophische Fragmente' (Philosophical F n n t s) , bu t this subtitle is omitted, quite arbitrarily, from the English translation. List of Abbreviations for details of these works. S 8. . . 1 1 N zL 1 1 1 'Titel' , pp. 325 - 34· g . NzL 1 ' at zzeichen' , pp. 1 06 - I 3. 1 I bid ., N z L 11 'Wor tcr aus der Fremde', pp. 2 I 6 - 3 2 . 1 1 . I bi d ., N z L 11 1 'Bibliographische Grillen', pp. 345 - 5 7 . 1 :.1 . I bid., N z L 1 ' Der Essay als Form', pp. 9 - 33. 1 3 . M M passim; 'Auf die Frage: was ist deutsch' in Stichworte, pp. 1 02 - I 2 . H egel
•
14· l
. 1 6.
. .8 I sst reit p. 3 1 9, t r . p . 3 5 ·
.I .
Notes and References to Pages 13 � 16 2 7 . G .S.7 'Editorische Nachbemerkung', p . 54 I . 28. Ibid . 29. I bid. 30. G .S . I I NzLI 'Der Essay als Form', passim; G .S.5 Hegel pp. 326 - 75; G .S.8 Posstreit pp. 280 - 353 passim, tr. pp. I -67. 3 1 . Cf. Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L . A . Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 967) pp. lxviii - lxxii . 32. G .S.8 SuD pp. 2 I 7 - 3 7 · 3 3 · For example, ibid ., SuP p . 45ff., tr. pp. 69 - 70; and ibid., Posstreit p. 3 I 5f., tr. p . 32f. 34· G .S . I I NzLI 'Der Essay als Form', pp. 9 - 33 . 35 · G .S.5 'Editorische Nachbemerkung', p . 386. 36. See G .S . I especially SP p. 366. 37· Trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin, I 974) 'On the Nature and Form of the Essay' , pp. I - I 8, and see Meszaros, Lukacs' Concept of Dialectic, pp. 1 20, I 55· 38. Soul and Form, tr. pp. 9 - 1 0 . 39· See, for example, Georg Simmel, 'Der Begriff und die Tragodie der Kultur', in Philosophie der Kultur: Gesammelte Essais (Leipzig: Werner Klindhardt, I 9 I I ) pp. 245 - 7 7, trans. K. Peter Elzkorn, 'On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture', in Georg Simmel, Coriflict in Culture and Other Essays (New York: Columbia Teachers College, I 968) , pp. 2 7 - 46 . See, too, Georg Simmel, Briicke und Tiir (Stuttgart: Koehler, I 957 ( 1 896 - I 92 I ) ) especially Geschichte und Kultur, pp. 43 - I 04. 40. G .S . I I NzLI p. I 6f., p. 20. 4 I . Ibid., passim. 42 . Ibid., p. g. 43· I bid . , pp. I6- I 7, pp. I 8 ..:. I gf. 44· I bid . 45· I bid ., p. 28. 46. G .S . I I NzLI p. 27, quoted with approval from Max Bense, 'Uber den Essay und seine Prosa', in Merkur I ( I 947) 4 I 8. 47· I bid ., p. 22. See The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. T. Ross (Cambridge University Press, 1 967) I , p. 92. 48. G .S . I I NzLI p. 2 2 . 49· Ibid. 50. I bid. 5 1 . Ibid ., p . 23. 52 . Ibid ., pp. 2 3 - 4 . 53 · I bid., p. 25. 54· I bid ., P· I 3ff. 55· I bid., p. I 8. 56. I bid., p. 2 7 . 5 7 · I bid ., pp. 1 2 - I 3; cf. MM pp. I 05 - 9, tr. pp. 85 - 7. 58. G.S. 1 I NzLl pp. 2 0 - 1 . 59· For example, see G .S.8 P oss t re i t p . 30 1 note 2 I , tr. p. 20 note 2 1 . 6o. G . S . 1 1 N z LI pp. 1 9 - 20. 6 1 . Sec C . . 6 J E p p . 44 1 - 2 , l r . p. 4 2 . 6 2 . G . . 1 1 NzLI pp. 1 9 2 0 ; and K renek 1 1, Adorno t o Krenek, 30 S e p t 1 932, p . 3 9 · 6 3 . C . S .6 J E pp.
I ll, I
0
P· 1 8 . I I, I
0
PP · i
I
4
.!Votes and Riferences to Pages 16-20
66. Sec Dieter Schnebel, 'Komposition von Sprache - sprachliche Gestaltung von M usi k in Adorno's Werk', in Hermann Schweppenhauser (ed . ) , Theodor W. Adorno zum
Gnll.lchtnis ( FaM: Suhrkamp, 1 97 1 ) pp. 1 29 - 45, in which he analyses, inter alia, MM§78, p . 1 58, t r . pp. 1 2 1 -3, as a poetic and musical composition and demonstrates how subtle l h . process of the style is, especially the reversal of themes. Even a translation as good as . J ph ot t 's must detract from these features of composition. 67. G .S.8 Posstreit pp. 3 1 7 - 1 8, tr. pp. 34 - 5 . 68. 'Auxesis' is a form o f hyperbole which intensifies as it proceeds. 6g. M M p. 68, tr. p. 58. 7 . 0rcn Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death ( 1 843) traps. Walter Lowrie, 1 94 1 (New or k : A n hor, 1 954) . 7 ' . M M pp. 68 - 7 1 , tr. pp. 58 -6o. 7 � . I bid., p. 7 1 , tr. p. 6o. n · igmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle ( 1 920) trans. James Strachey, ( Lund n: Hogarth, 1 953 - 73) Standard Edition, xvm 7 · 74- · Ni t zs he, Beyond Good and Evil ( 1 886) trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
11(.
1
7? ·
. F.W. H egel, Phenomenology of Mind ( 1 807) trans. James Baillie ( London: Allen 1 3 1 ) p. 8 1 . M M p. 7, t r . p. ' 5 · 1 88 7 , t rans. Kaufmann, The Gay Science (New York: Vintage, 1974) . F r •xample, MM§5 and §6, pp. 2 1 - 4 ; tr . pp. 2 5 - 8 . I bid ., p p . 330 - 33, tr. pp. 244 - 7 . I bid., pp. ' s - 9 , tr. P P · 8s - 7 · I bid., p. 107, t r. p. 86 (G.R.) . I bid., p. 282, tr. p. 2 I t .
nwin,
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M M p. 57, t r . p. 5o .
I bid ., p. 280, t r . p. 2 10 . I b i d ., p. 282, t r . p. 2 I I . B 1 1 id . (<' . 1 .) . n , . /'ri.r mJ p. 2. t r . p. 3 ' . HJ. I t I l. , p . "J. 7 , t r p . 3 2 . fl, )• l b ' p. I d . J , Th q uot 1 l ion� from PriJm.f a p p ly equally well to ND and other works. I ' I ' 1 p . . ·; Ni t zsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 50 - I . On the question of a dialectic t il: · h '• wn k, sec Alli·ed Schmidt, 'Zur Frage der Dialektik in Nietzsches Er 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 th o i in Max Horkhcimer ( cd . ) , <:_eugnisse, pp. I I 5 -32, and Jiirgen I I l rm ' N i t z"rhr: Erkcnnt nist hcorctischc Sch ri f t cn', in A rbeit, Erkenntnis, Fortschritt ( m•l r l m : d M u nt r , 1 970) PP· 356 - 7s- On thc rclation betwecn N ictzsche and the Fl'll u k lilr l Srhool, N!'e I ctcr Piitz, ' N ie t zsche im Lich t dcr Kritischcn Thcoric', in Nietzsche Siurlium :l ( Bt·r l i t l : de Gruytcr, 1 974- ) pp. I 75 - 9 1 , and J ay, T he Dialectic Imagination,
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Notes and Riferences to Pages 20 - 5 the domination of nature. 1 02 . I bid., p. 76, tr. pp. 83 - 4 . 1 03 . Horkheimer and Adorno admit, a t the beginning o f the paragraph from which the quotation comes, that there are 'difficulties in the concept of reason [ Vernunfl]'. They exploit the interconnections of Verstand, Vernunfl, Rationalitiit, in a way which is obvious in the German but lost in the translation. I 04 · I bid., pp. 42 -3, tr. p. 44· 105. Ibid. (G.R.) . 1 06 . I bid . I 0 7 . MM p. 8g , tr. p. 73· 108. Ibid., P · I 22, tr. P· 97. 1 09. I bid ., p . I I g, tr. p. 95· I I O. G.S.8 Klassen pp. 386 - 7 . 1 1 1 . Cf. J . Habermas, 'Wozu noch Philosophic?' , in Philosophisch-politische Prrfile, pp. 1 1 - 36, trans. E. B. Ashton, 'Why more Philosophy?', in Social Research, 38 ( I 97 1 ) , 633 55, where Habermas makes this point. I t could be argued that Hegel too was avoiding 'first' principles. 1 1 2 . For discussion of issues raised in this paragraph, see Chapter Four below. I I 3 · See Prisms, 'Das Bewusstsein der \'Vissensoziologie', pp. 32 - 50, tr. pp. 3 7 - 49. 1 1 4. G .S.6 ND p. 34, tr. p. 23. 1 1 5 . G.S.5 Hegel p. 3 1 4. 1 1 6 . G.S.6 ND p. 33, tr. pp. 2 2 - 3 . I 1 7 . Ibid ., p. 1 5 1 , tr. p. 1 48. I 1 8 . Ibid., pp. 1 49 - 5 1 , tr. pp. 1 46 - 8, and see Chapter Three below. 1 1 9· Ibid ., P· 34> tr. P· 23· I 2o. I bid. 1 2 1 . Nietzsche, The Will to Power (Notebooks 1 883 -8) trans. W . Kaufmann and R . J . Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1 968) p. 267, and see pp. 2 7 7 , 2 78. 1 22 . G.S.6 ND p. 1 53, tr. p. 1 50 . 1 23 . G.S.8 SuEF p. 2og, t r . p. 8o ( G . R . , m y emphasis) . 1 24. DofE p . 23, tr. p . 2 1 . 1 25. G.S.8 SuD p . 236. 1 26. G.S.7 p. 1 2, my round brackets. 1 27 . Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols ( 1 888) trans. R . J . Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1 968) p. 35 (G.R.) . Adorno quotes a very similar passage from p. 37 (G.R.) in G.S.5 Husser! p. 26. 1 28. G.S . 1 1 NzLI pp. 32 - 3 . 1 29. See Bryond Good and Evil, tr. pp. 28- 3o; Twilight ofthe ldols, pp. 1 20 - 2 and passim. 1 30. G .S.8 p. 30 1 ; and cf. Soziologische Exkurse, p. 22, tr. p. 16 (G.R . ) ; Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, I 969) p. 8o (G.R .) . 'Semiology' meant the branch of medicine concerned with symptoms. 1 3 1 . G .S.6 NO p. I 93, tr. p. 1 92; G .S.5 Husser! p. 26. 1 32 . G .S . t 1 NzLI p. 33, from Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. pp. 532 - 3 . 1 33 · Nietzsche, T1.vilight of the Idols, p. 1 I O . ' 34· I bi d . , p. I I 0 (G . R .) . ' 35 · I bi d . , p . J Og . . I 1 N z LI p . 33· 1 36. M M pp. 1 2 3 - 4 , t r. p . 8. ' 37· 8. I . , p. 1 ::1 3, t r. p. 8. I bid . , PP · I Ilii 4 · l . I . 97 8 . .
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Notes and References to Pages 26-30
1 42 . See ' Musik und Technik', in Klangfiguren, 1 959, p. 350. • 43 · However, the relation between the work of Nietzsche and the work of Weber has n t bee n explored sufficiently, in spite of Eugene Fleischmann, 'De Weber a Nietzsche', in European Journal of Sociology, v ( 1 964) ; and in spite of Mitzman's remarks in Sociology and l;'strangement, pp. 6 - 7, note, and p. 34: Mitzman's, The Iron Cage An Historical Interpretation of Ma x Weber (New York: Knopf, 1 970), contains much of interest on this point, pp. 1 8 1 306, passim . 1 4 4- Cf. Max Scheler's attempt to ground Nietzsche's notion of 'ressentiment'
iologically, Ressentiment ( 1 9 1 2 ) trans. William W. Holdheim (New York: Schocken,
HO I
72 ) .
' 45· Pace, W . Leiss, The Domination rlj' Nature, p .
107 .
'11apter 3
•
Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie (Frankfurt: Europaische Verlagan
1.
Bl
h, n.d. 1 953?) pp. 23- 5, and tr. Terrell Carver, Karl Marx: Texts on Method (Oxford: kw II, 1 975)
' I ntroduction' to the 'Grundrisse�, pp.
75-8.
Q , 'Notes on Adolf Wagner', tr. Carver, op. cit., p. 1 98 . apital A Critique rlj' Political Economy, 1 867, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward
v
n
ling ( London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1 9 70) i, 38, my emphasis, and cf. the new trans. wkes ( Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1 976) p. 1 28.
•
4 · 'Notes on Wagner', op. cit., p. 202 .
. But 5et
Art ( !'I (
d ), 7· .
Lee Baxandell and Stefan
Morawski (eds.) , Marx and Engels on Literature and
w York: International General, 1 974) .
f. Steven Lukes, 'Alienation and Anomie', in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman Philoso/)lty, Politics a11d S()(;it� (Oxford University Press, 1 967) Series 1 1 1 , 1 34 - 56. M l t� man , Tltt fro�� Cage, p. 4, note.
bid. Heinrich Popitz,
Mensch, ,Zeitkritik und Geschichtsphilosophie des und Gesel lsch aft, 1 953) and see Hans Freyer, Die 1 lung dtr I Virlst:lt� im philosophischen Denken des neunzehnten ]ahrhunderts ( Leipzig:
1111.9111 \V I I
Marx
lm
•
Der
Enifremdete
( Duel: Verlag ftir Recht
ngclmann, 1 9� 1 ) .
nomic and Phi looop hical Manuscripts of 1 844', in Collected Works, vol. 3 , 2 70. ·r � ts are helpfully s.ummarised by Lukes, 'Alienation and Anomie', p. 1 3 7 . 1 lng Fets her, Karl .�arx und der .\1arxismus Von der Philosophie des Proletariats zur p ol1lari h I! W;ltallstlttJuung ch. n (Miinchen: Piper, 1 973) ( 1 967 ) ; and Bertrell Oilman, Alilllal'on ( ambridg Univer5ity Press, 1 97 1 ) pp. 1 98 - 228 passim ; Ja y , The Dialectical lm r'nal'on, P · 1 6 1 . 1 11 . M zai'OIJ, Marx's Theory ofAlienation ( London : Merlin, 1 970) pp. 1 40 - 6; Paul W It n a nd Andr w G a mble , From Alienation to Surplus Value (London: Shccd and Ward,
7 1 ) pp . 1 ?Q), p.
I
- 0 1 , Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Geistige und kOrperliche Arbeit ( FaM: Suhrkamp, . Trans. fo rthcomi ng. 1 3 . M l zman, Sociology and Estrangement, p. 6, p. 1 3 . q . I bid ., p . 10, p . 1 3 . 1
' · . I bid ., p. 6, p. I Q. r h . l bl . , pp. a ' 7 · l b .• r fl . M h z m M
Notes and References to Page 30 surplus-value, etc.), and those that come out of the 'vulgate', having been brought to light or invented by the Marxists of the end of the last century or the beginning of the present one (such as alienation, mystification, reification, etc) .'-'France: The Neo-Marxists', in Leo Labedz (ed.), Revisionism ( New York: Praeger, 1 962) p. 320. Meszaros suggests that sich verdingen as used by Kant means 'to make into a thing, to reify', Marx's Theory of Alienation, pp. 33 - 6. But although in German as in English, 'to alienate' may mean 'to sell or transfer property', there is no etymological basis for translating Verdingung as 'reification', and no philosophical basis for considering sich verdingen to be the origin of Verdinglichung. The only place, to my knowledge, where Marx uses the actual word Verdinglichung is Kapital, III, Marx-Engels Werke, p. 838, tr. Capital, Ill ( London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1 97 1 ) p. 830. However, it does not appear in the English translation as 'reification' , but as 'conversion . . . into things'. 2 1 . Published in History and Class Consciousness, 1 923, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1 967) pp. 86, 93, 209, n. 1 6. Marx did use the verb versachlichtn in Grundrisse, p. 1 2 , p. 866, tr. p. 59· It means 'to materialise', and is nearer vergegenstiindlichen than to Verdinglichung. 22. Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise ofSocial Theory, 1 94 1 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1 969) p. 1 1 2 . Marcuse concedes, although mistakenly, that he is borrowing the word from Marx in order to explicate Hegel's philosophy. Lukacs, The Young Hegel Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, I 948, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1975) and Giinter Rohrmoser in his reply to Lukacs, Subjekturtiit und Verdinglichung Theologie und Gesellschaft im Denken des jungen Hegel (Giitersloh: G. Mohn, 1 96 1 ) , are responsible for the persistence of this mistake. 23. Peter Berger, 'Response' (to Ben Brewster's 'Comment' on Berger and Stanley Pullberg, 'Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness'), in New Left Review 35 ( 1 966) 75- 7 . Cf. the debate about whether H egel equated objectification and alienation: Marx, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic' in 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of I 844', Collected Works, vol. 3, 326 - 46 and endorsed by Lukacs in his 1 967 'Preface' to History and Class Consciousness, tr. p. xxiii. Marcuse refuted this interpretation of Hegel, 'The Foundation of Historical Materialism', I 932, in trans.Jons de Bres, Studies in Critical Philosophy (London: New Left Books, 1 9 72 ) , pp. I - 48; and see too John O'Neill's ' Introduction' to his trans. of Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel (London: Heinemann, 1 969 ( I 955) ) , pp. xi-xix. 24. For an account of Marx's theory of value, see Hans-Georg Backhaus, 'Zur Dialektik der Wertform' in Alfred Schmidt (ed.) , Beitriige zur marxistischtn Erkenntnistheorie (FaM: Suhrkamp, 1 97 I ), pp. I 28 - 52; and parts m - v \ of Carver, 'Marx's Commodity Fetishism', in Inquiry ( 1 975) 1 8, 42 - 54. 25. Lucien Goldmann, 'La Reification' , in Recherches Dialectiques ( Paris: Gallimard, I 959) , pp. 64- 1 06, is an interesting exception. Andrew Arato, 'Lukacs' Theory of Reification', in Telos, 2 ( I 97 2 ) , 2 7 , and Lucio Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, trans. John Merrington and Judith White ( London: New Left Books, 1 972 ( 1 969) ) , pp. 1 3 I - 5, construe 'reification' in a very general way, as a fus ion of Hegel's phenomenology of mind and Marx's theory of commodity fetishism. See too t he L u kacsia n discussion by Pier Aldo Rovau i , ' Fetishism and Economic Categories', in Telos, 1 4 ( I 97 2 ) , 87 - 1 05 . 26. Vol. I , Ch. 1 . 2 7 . 1 862 - 3 ( London, Lawrence and Wishart . 1 96 3 - 7 • ) , Part I, Part n, Part 1 1 1 . 28. T h e Grundri.rse was not available until 1 939 and 1 94 1 . Capi ta l, v I . 1 , 72ff, l r . 1 976, • 4.ff. Grundris e, pp. 452 - 3, t rans. �1, rtin Ni ol a us ( 1-larmondsw n h: P'nguin, 1 97 3 ) , P·
F
, :apital,
vol .
1, 7.,;.,
, (irundri.t'.I'O, p . .)
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Notes and References to Pages 30 - 6
33·
4-5 2 ·
For example, Theories of Surplus Value, Part m , pp. 295-6; Grundrisse, p. 356, tr. p.
I bid., P· 75 , tr. P· I 5 7 · 35· Capital, vol. I, p. 72 tr. I 976 I 65. 3 6 . Das Kapital, Marx-Engels Werke (Berlin: Dietz, I 956 et seq.), vol. 23, p. 86. 37· I bid., tr. p. 72. 38. For example, Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, tr. p . 86; Frederic Jameson, Marxism and Form (Princeton University Press, I 97 I ) p. 296. Even the new translation of Capital, i, repeats this mistake, p. I 65. 39 · First complete edition I 932. 4 . Simmel, Hauptprobleme der Philosophie, I910 (Berlin: Goschen, I 969) ; and see Si�gfried Kracauer, 'Georg Simmel', Logos, IX ( I 92o), 309-38; and Rudolph H . W i ngartner, Experience and Culture: The Philosophy rif Georg Simmel (Connecticut: W I yan U niversity Press, I 96o) . 4. 1 . Fo r a chronological list ofSimmel's works, see Bibliography below. See Friedrich nbruck, 'Georg Simmel ( I 858- I 9 I 8) ', KOlner Zeitschriftfiir Soziologie, 10 ( I 958) , 8 7- 6 1 4 ; and Nicholas J . Spykman, The Social Theory of Georg Simmel ( University of 34·
•
.
�hi ago Press, I 925) ·
411 . Simmcl, 'On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture', I 9 I I , tr. Cor!fiict in Culture and tll�r Essays, p. 2 7 ; and 'Wandel der Kulturformen', in Briicke und Tiir, pp. 86-94· 4 . immcl, 'On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture', p. 39·
H· I bi d . , p . 29.
4 "·
I bid .
46. I bid .
47
·
I bid., p. 30.
48. Donald N. Levine makes a similar point in his ' Introduction' to Georg Simmel, On .
Individuality and Social Forms
i - lxv ;
S('l'
Simm�l lis.rays on Sociology,
(I
..
( Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, I 97 I ) pp.
too t he essays by Levine and by Weingartner in Kurt H. Wolff (ed . ) , Georg
Philosophy and Aesthetics ( New York: Harper and Row,
I 965
g) ) .
imm I , op.cit . , p . 42, and Philosophie des Geldes, Ch. I , Part 1 1 , pp. 30 - 6 1 . ' \V n dc l der Kulturlormen', p . 98. '( n d w Co nce pt and Tragedy of Culture', tr. pp. 4 1 - 2 . I bid ., pp. 4 0 - 1 . I l l ., p . 4 . 2 .
l !tilo.fophie des Gelrles, p. 4 5 7ff.
I hi 1 . , pp. 30- 40.
I I id . , p. 3 36 and pp. 357 - 86. ! hid ., PP· 3 2 2 - 54, 438- 55· I bid ., p.
I
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I h i d . , p. 5o2fl'. I hid . , pp. 1 1 - 2 1 , and 'On t he Concept and I hid ., .p . 53 1 .
I hid . l hi d . , p. 53'l.
I hi I .
Tragedy ofCulture', pp. 40- 1 , 45 - 6 .
Notes and Riferences to Pages 36-9
r6g
(Miinchen: Richard Boorberg, I 973) pp. 52 -64. 68. Soul and Form, for example, ' Richness, Chaos and Form', tr. pp. 1 24 - 5 L 69. Translated into German b y Denes Zalan, 'Zur Theorie der Literaturgeschichte', Text + Kritik, pp. 24 - 5 1 . 70. Ibid ., p. 29. 7 1 . Ibid., p . 3 1 . 72. First published 1 920. Subtitled 'A historico-philosophical essay on the forms of great epic literature', trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin, 1 97 I ) . 73· 'Zur Theorie der Literaturgeschichte', p . 32. 74· Trans. Telos, 5 ( I 970) , 2 I - 30, reprinted in Marxism and Human Liberation Essays on History, Culture and Revolution, E . San juan Jr. (ed.) (New York: Delta, I 973l · 75· Ibid., p. 23. 76. For Adorno and Benjamin's personal relationship, see Adorno, WB, a collection of his writings on Benjamin (originally published elsewhere in most cases) , pp. 67-74; and Hannah Arendt, ' Introduction' to Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn ( London: Fontana, I 970) , especially pp. 2, 1 0- 1 1 ; and Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin - die Geschichte einer Freundschaft (FaM: Suhrkamp , 1 975) passim. See, too, Susan Buck-Morss, 'The Dialectic of Theodor W. Adorno', Telos, 1 4 ( 1 972), 1 37 - 44. 7 7 · Especially Benjamin, Schrijten ( FaM: Suhrkamp, 1 955) , vols. 1 and u. Adorno (ed . ) . The complete works of Benjamin are now appearing in six volumes, Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhiiuser (eds ) , Schriften ( FaM: Suhrkamp,' I g74 ) , vols, I, 111 and IV have already been published. 78. WB p. g. 7g. I bid., p. 33 and cf. pp. 33-55 with 1 03 - 6 1 and with I 1 -2g. Adorno was accused of suppressing Benjamin's involvement with communism, see pp. g 1 -5. So. Ibid., passim. 8 1 . Ursprung der deutschen Trauerspiel, 1 g28, Schriften I . I , trans. John Osborne ( London: New Left Books, I g77) . 82 . There is a unity in Benjamin's work, albeit not of the kind which Adorno sought. Cf. Burkhardt Lindner, ' "Naturgeschichte" - Geschichtsphilosophie und Welterfahrung in Benjamins Schriften', in Text + Kritik. Walter Benjamin, Burkhardt Lindner (ed.) ( Munich: Richard Boorberg, l g7 I) P P · 4 I -58. 83. Rolf Tiedemann, Studien zur Philosophic Walter Benjamins ( FaM: Suhrkamp, I g73 ( I g64) ) , p . 3on. 84. Schriften, I 1 ( I g2o) , pp. 7 I - 1 22 . 85. Ibid., pp. I 8- 6 1 . 86. Origin . . . , pp. 2 1 5 - I 8, tr. pp. 35-8; Tiedemann, Studien zur Philosophic Walter Benjamins, pp. 23 -42. 87. ' O ber die Wahrnehmung 1 Erfahrung und Erkenntnis', unpublished, quoted by Tiedemann, ibid., pp. 1 5 -68, passim. 88. Unpublished postscript to Ursprung der deutschen Trauerspiel, quoted in ibid., p . 7g. 8g. Benjamin, Origin . . . , p . 227, tr. 47 (G.R.) . go . Origin . . . , pp. 228-32, 2ggfT., tr. pp. 48- 5 I , I 2ofT; Tiedemann, op.cit., pp. g4- 8 . g " Origin . . . , PP· 343 - 4, tr. PP· I 66 - 7 . g2 . Origin . . , pp. 2gg, 353· tr. p p·. I 2 0 , I n; and see Lindner, 'Nat ur-Geschichte . . . i n Walter Benjamin Text -1- Kritik, p. 4-3 · 9 3 · Origin . . . , pp. 242 - 5 , 2 55 7 2 53, tr. pp. 6 2 - 4, 76- 8. 9 4 · · I bid., p . 343, tr. p. 1 6 (G.R . ) . 9 . G . 1 I N pp. ·•I· 9 . I b id . p. 3 4·
.
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Notes and Riferences to Pages 39 - 43
99· I bid., PP · 354 - 5 . 1 00 . I bid., p. 365. 1 0 1 . I bid., p. 355; Lukacs, Joe. cit., tr. p. 62. 102. G.S.1 I N pp. 356 - 7, Lukacs, p. 64. 1 03 . G .S . 1 I N p. 357· 1 04. I bid.; Benjamin, Origin . . . , p. 355, tr. . p. 1 79· 105. G.S . 1 IN p. 360. 106. I bid., p. 346, p. 350. 1 0 7 . I bid., pp. 36 1 - 3 . See also Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', 1 940, in Illuminations, pp. 255- 66. 1 08. Adorno, ibid., p. 364. 109. Ibid., p. 365. 1 1 0. G.S.6 ND pp. 1 92 - 3, tr. pp. 1 9 1 - 2; and, for example, Lukacs, History and Class 'onsciousness, tr. p. 88. 1 1 1 . G .S .6 ND pp. 367 - 8, tr. pp. 374 - 5; and, for example, Lukacs, op. cit., p. •57· 1 1 2 . G .S.6 ND p. 1 5, p. 50, tr. p. 3, p . 40. 1 1 3. I bid., p. 1 92, tr. p. 1 9 1 . 1 1 �� - Loc. cit., tr. p . xxiv. 1 1 . For example, G.S.6 ND p. 1 9 1 , tr. p. 1 90 . 1 1 6. I bid., p. 1 9 1 , tr. p p . 1 90- 1 . 1 1 7 . Benjamin, Brieje, Gershom Scholem and Adorno (eds) (FaM: Suhrkamp, 1 966), v I. 2 passim. Some ofAdorno's letters to Benjamin are included in WB pp. 1 03 - 6 1 . A few Ire t r ans la t ed by Harry Zohn in New Left Review, 8 1 ( • 973) , ss-8o. 1 1 8. WB ( 1 950) p. 1 7, and in Prisms p . 289, tr. p. 233· 1 1 . Qu ot ed in Peter Krumme, 'Zur Konzeption der dialektischen Bilder', m T o I + Kritik, p. 74 · 1 20. Quoted in Tiedemann, Studien zur Philosophic Walter Benjamins, p. 1 3 1 . 1 2 1 . 1 935 Expose, some of which was published in the 1 955 edition ofBenjamin's work, ' hrijttn, 2 vols., Adorno (ed . ) , (FaM) , and trans. in Charles Baudelaire. The manuscripts h v y t to appear in the Schriften, vol. 5, Das Passagen- Werk; and see Adorno to Benjamin, 2 Aug 1 935 in WB PP · I I I - 25, tr. PP · ss - 63 . l !l2 . Adorno t o Benjamin 1 0 Nov 1 938, ibid., p p . 1 38 -42, t r . p p . 70 - 2 . 1 2 . I bid ., p . 1 42, tr. p. 7 2 . 1 24 . I bid ., p. , ,p , tr. p. 7 2 . 1 2 . ' b'r inig Motive bei Baudclaire' ( • 939) , Schriften, l . 2, pp. 6os - s3, tr. 'Some M t ifl in Baud·lair ·' in C/zarles Baudelaire, pp. 1 07-54· Briife, vo l. 2, Benjamin to Adorno, 23 Feb 1 939, pp. 8os -6. 1Q H l 7 · Ad rn lO Benjamin, 2 Aug 1 935, in WB, p . I 1 6, tr. P · s8; and WB, P· 1 7, tr. ,
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NMes and RifererJces to Pages
43 -9
�37· Karl Wj{tfogel, Oriental Despotism, 1 928 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 957)-,. p. 38Y. 1 38. Henryk Grossmann, 'Die gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen der mechanistischen Philosophic und die Manufaktur', in ZfS IV ( 1 935), 1 62 . • 39· Martin Heidegger, Sein und :(eit, 1 9 2 7 (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1 972) pp. 46, 420, 437, trans. john Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1 967) pp. 72, 472, 487; and see Yousseflshaghpour (ed.), Lucien Goldmann, Lukacs et Heidegger (Paris: Denod, 1 973) F P · 9 1 - 1 05 . 1 40. B u t see Eugene Lunn, ' Marxism and Art i n the Era o f Stalin and Hitler: A Comparison of Brecht and Lukacs', in .New German Critique, 3 ( 1 974) , 1 2 - 44, who construes and contrasts the ideas of Lukacs and Brecht around the concept. 1 4 1 . He also used it in his withdrawn Habilitation, 1 927, G .S . I BU p. 228, p. 240, in the sense of'hypostatize', which he accredits (p. 82) to Horkheimer's Habilitation, Uber Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1 925) . jay fails to see the importance of 'reification' in Adorno's work, 'The Concept of Totality in Lukacs and Adorno', Telos, 32, •977· 142. Krenek, especially Adorno to Krenek, 30 Sept 1 932, p. 36; and Adorno to Krenek, 7 Aug 1 934, p. 45, p. 47; and Adorno to Krenek, 26 May 1 935, p. 85. 1 43· PT 1, PT n, eSoz, passim. 1 44 . Prisms p. 25, tr. p. 3 1 . 1 45 · G .S.6 ND p. 1 9 1 , tr. p . 1 90 (G.R.) . 1 46. Prisms p. 1 26, tr. p. 1 06. 147. G .S.s Hegel p. 3 1 2 . 1 48. G .S.8 SuEF p. 197, tr. p . 69 (G.R.) . 1 49. Ibid., p. 2og, tr. p. 8o (G.R.) . 1 50. G.S.6 ND pp. 1 52 - 4, tr. pp. 1 48 - s • · 1 5 1 . 'paradigmatically', that is, 'typically and generally', not a paradigm case nor a scientific paradigm. 152. Ibid., p. 148, tr. p. •47· • 53 · Ibid., p. 1 52, tr. p. 1 49 (G.R.) . • 54· Ibid., p. 1 53, tr. p. 1 50 (G.R.) . • SS · Ibid., pp. 1 53-4, tr. p. r so (G.R.). 1 56. G.S.8 SuEF p. 1 97, tr. p . 69 (G.R.) . • 57 · Ibid., p. 2o8, tr. p. 79 (G.R.). 1 58. G.S.8 Posstreit p. 347 and p. 302, tr. p. 62 and p. 2 1 . See G.S. 1 4 Diss FuR pp. 24-5 for the earliest development of this theme. ' 59· 'On the jewish Question', 1 843, in Collected Works, vol. 3, 1 5 1 - 2 . 1 6o. G.S.6 N D pp. 1 49 - 5 1 , tr. pp . 1 46 - 8. 1 6 1 . Ibid., p. 1 49, tr. p. 1 46 (G.R.) . 162. Capital, vol. 1 , 38, tr. 1 9 76, 1 28. 163. Ibid., 69, tr. 1 976, 1 62 . 1 64. Theories rif Surplus Value, Part 3 , 1 29. 1 65. Capital, vol. 1 , 72, tr. 1 976 1 65 (G .R.) . 1 66. I bid., 38, tr. 1 976 1 28, my em phasis . 1 6 7 . Theories rif Surplus Value, Part 3 , 1 29. 1 68. . .8 M u PP· 5 33 -4·· 1 69. Capital, vol. 1 , 38, t r. 1 7· 1 2 . PT II P · 2 ' pp� :tB I -2. N p. , . p. ( . R .) . Pri " p: i• L p. ' •
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Notes and References to Pages 49 -55
1 75. G.S.8 Sol p. 359· I 76. Ibid., P · 359· I 77 - Ibid., P · 369. 1 78 . G.S. 6 ND p. 30::!, tr. p. 307. 1 7 9 · Cf. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford niversity Press, I 962) p . 49· 1 80. Cf. Ernest Gellner, 'Concepts and Society', in Dorothy Emmet and Alasdair Ma i n tyre (eds.) , Sociological Theory and Philosophical Anarysis (New York: Macmillan, 1 70) , pp. I I 9 - 20 and p. I 47 · t 8 t . G .S.8 LS p. 549, tr. p. 107 (G.R.) . 1 82 . The work ofj iirgen Habermas moves explicitly in this direction. See for example, ' ' hnik und Wissenschaft als " Ideologic" ', in book of the same title, pp. 48 - 1 03 (FaM: u h r k a mp, 1 970 ( I 968 ) ) tqms. Jeremy J. Shapiro, Towards a Rational Society Student Protest, i�fl(e and Politics (London: Heinemann, I 9 7 I ) , pp. 8 I - I 22 (not all the same articles as in l h•
·rrnan) .
. .6 ND p. 3 I 4, tr. p. 320.
'llapter 4 h wort e ,
Marginalien <;u Theorie und Praxis, I 969, pp. I 69 - 9 1 . p . I 24· . ND P· 10, tr. P · XX. 3· 4 .. Prisms p . 2 7, tr. p. 32. n 7 M a y • 93 • · Not published before its appearance in the collected works, but a publi at ion was planned at the time, with a dedication to Walter Benjamin. See G .S . t ' · d i t orische Nachbemerkung', p. 383. This has been translated a s 'The Actuality of Philosophy', Telos, 3 I , I 9 7 7 · Kritik, pp. Io:... I 9 · 7 · 1 962, Eingriffe, pp. I I - 28. 8. .S.6 H egel p. 250, two of the studies were originally lectures delivered in I 956 and 3. A l l three were published together in I 963. M eszaros, Lukacs' Concept rif Dialectic, p. I 34· 1 e I bid . , p. I 33; and Benjamin to Gershom Scholem, I 3 june I 924, Briife I , p. 3 o, nd Bet'Uarnin's brief review of the book, in Schriften III, p. I 7 I , I 929. I t. · · Ringer, The Decline rif the German Mandarins, pp. 3 1 0, 37 I - 2 . 6 ND p. 57, tr. p. 47 (G.R . ) . 11:1. 1 3 . I bid . , p. 7 5 , t r . p. 6 7 . 1 4 . [ bid ., p . 20, tr. p . 8 , and cf. G.S . I I Anhang 'Henkel, Krug und friihe Erfahrung' (t ) , pp. 558, 562. 1 . 'I usserl and the Problem ofldealism', The Journal ofPhilosophy, xxxcn, I ( I 940) , 5· 1 6. .6 J E p . 475, tr. p. 92. Adorno initially intended the text to be part of Negative I .
. I A P p. 33 I tr.
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.Notes and References to Pages 56- 61
1 73
G.S.s Hegel pp. 326 - 75. Ibid., pp. 295 - 325. Ibid., p. 304. Ibid., p. 359· Ibid., p. 358. Ibid., p. 255· 33· Ibid., p. 295· 34· Ibid., pp. 256-6o. 35· Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy 1 888, (C. P. Dutt (ed . ) , New York: International Publishers, 1970 ( 1 94 1 ) ) , p. 1 3 , my emphasis. g6. For example, G .S.s Hegel pp. 257-6o, 265f, 2 73f. 37· For example, ibid., pp. 253- 7 and 259- 6 1 . g8. For example, ibid., pp. 275-7 and 274· 39· For example, G .S.6 N D pp. 3 1 - 3 , tr. pp. 20- 2, and p. g6, tr. p. 2 7 . 40. For example, ibid., p p . 23-4, tr. pp. I I - 1 2, and p . g8, tr. p. 28. 4 1 . MM p . g, tr. p. 16, my emphasis. 42. G.S.s Hegel p. 14 and see Joseph O'Malley (ed .) , Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Oxford U niversity Press, 1 967) pp. 1 6 - 1 7 · 43 · G.S.5 Hegel pp. 252 - 3 . 44· For example, G.S.s Hegel pp. 288-g2. 45· Ibid., p . 356, and trans. T . M . Knox, Hegel's Philosophy ofRight (Oxford University Press, 1 967) pp. 1 6 - 1 7. 46. G.S.s Hegel pp. 355 -6. 47· Ibid., p . 256. 48. G.S.6 ND p. 37, tr. p . 26. 49· Ibid., pp. 1 98-g, tr. p . 1 98 (G.R.) . so. G.S.s Hegel p. 265. S I . Ibid., pp. 265-6. 52. Ibid., pp. 266 - 7 . Arbeit can be translated both as 'work' and as 'labour' . 53· Ibid., pp. 267- 8. 54· Ibid., p . 270. 55· Ibid., pp. 27(F- 1 . 56. Ibid., p. 272. 57· Ibid. 58. Ibid., pp. 2 7 2 - 3 . 59· G.S.6 N D pp. 1 6 1 - 3, tr. pp. 1 58- 6 I , 'Critique of Positive Negation' . . 6o. For an example of the absurdities which result if it is so interpreted, see Raymond Geuss, 'Review of .Negative Dialectic', The Journal of Philosophy, LXXII, 6 ( 1 975), 1 67-75· 6 1 . G .S.6 ND for example, p. 20, tr. p. 8. 62. Ibid., PP· 2 3 - 4. tr. PP· 1 1 - 1 2 . 6g. Marx, ' "Introduction" to the "Grundrisse" ' , in Karl Marx: Texts on Method, p. 72. 64. For example, PT1 p. 1 44. 65. WB pp. g, 40, 6g -70. See too, Tiedemann, Studien zur Philosophie Walter Be,Yamins, p. 36. B ·njamin is opposing th Husserlian position that con scious n ess is intentional and 27. 28. 29. go. g1. 32.
t hat its a na l y s is will produ e knowledge of essences. 66. B njamin Origin . . . , p. 2 1 4 , t r . p. 34·· 1 7· I bid ., p. 2 1 7 , t r. p. 37 · 8 . WB p. 6a . . It i
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Notes and Riferences to Pages 62 -7 70. G .S.6 ND p. I 84, tr. p. I 8g . 7 1 . I bid., p. I 72, tr. p. I 7o (G.R.) . 72. ' Kierkegaard noch Einmal', I 963, in Kierkegaard (pp. 295 -3 I 8) p. 299· 7 3 · First published in I 933· Second and third editions, I 962, I 966; each with the addition of one article. 74 · First published in English in ZfS, 8 ( I 939) , 4 I 3 - 29. Published later in German as n appendix to the I 962 edition of Kierkegaard, pp. 267 -9 1 . It is shorter and somewhat It red in the German. 75· I bid., 423, cf. the German rendition, pp. 2 8 I - 2 . 76. I bid. 77. Kierkegaard p. 305. 7a. I bid . , P· I 3 · 7 . I bid., p . 2 7 . 8 . I bid., p . 29. 1 . I bid., p. 28. :l . I bid . , PP · 44 - 5 . 8 . I bid., p . 59· 4 · I bid., p. 49· B . I bid., p. 46. B I bid., p. 56. 7 · I bid., p. 55· I bid., pp. 1 26 - 7 . I bid., pp. 3 1 0 - 1 I , and 55· .
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p. 53· pp. 302, go6, go8. p. 302. ZfS, 8, 4 1 7, (Kierkegaard pp. 272 -3). 1 00. I bid ., 415 ( Kierkegaard p. 270) . 1 0 1 . I bid., 4 ' 5 (Kierkegaard p. 275) . 1 02 . I b id . 420 (cf. Kierkegaard pp. 277-8) . 1 03 . I bid., 4.2 1 ( Kierkegaard p. 278) . ' 4 S e Vorles1mg ;:;ur Einleitu11g in die Erkenntnistheorie (FaM: Junius-Drucke, I 957 - 8) p. ll. This argument has been put in various ways by Husserl's critics. For an early n i !Hrmcnt of i t , sec . J . P, Sartrc, The Transcendence rif the Ego, 1 936 - 7, trans. Forrest W i l l i a ms and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1 957); and for 11 I' c n t , p •llu id one, sec Lcszck Kolakowski, Husser/ a11d the Search for Certitude (New H lVt'n a nd London: Yale U niversity Press, 1 975) . C hs . 1 , u, a nd IV of Adorno's book on l l uA erl w'l' wri t t en in 1 93 7 , t he I n t rod uc t ion and Ch. m i n 1 956. 10 f. . ·5 H uss rl pp. 30 - 3 . ,
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1 75
1 1 2 . G.S.5 Husser! p. 1 3 . 1 1 3 . I bid., p. 1 4. I I 4. I bid., p. 3 2 . I I 5 · I bid., p p . 3 I - 2 . I I 6. 'Husser! and the Problem of Idealism', p. 8 . I I 7 . I bid., p. 6. I I 8 . G.S.5 Husser! p. 1 6. See Chapter Two above, for Adorno's debt to Nietzsche on these issues. I 1 9 . I bid . 1 20. Ibid., pp. 24- 7 . I 2 1 . G .S.5 Husser! pp. 25-6; Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 3 7 (G.R.) . I 22 . G.S.5 Husser! p. 20. I 23 . Ibid., p. 23. I 24. I bid., p. 193. 1 25 . I bid., pp. I 5, 3 I , I 94· 1 26. 'Husser! and the Problem of Idealism', p. 6 . I 27 . G .S.5 Husser! pp. 40, 45 - 7 , discussed further below. I 28. The first volume of the three German volumes of the Logical Investigations, trans. ] . N . Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, I 970, 2 vols. ) I, 53 - 266. I 29 · I nvestigation 11 'The Ideal Unity of the Species and Modern Theories of Abstraction', Vol. I , pp. 337 - 432. I 3o. G .S.5 Husser! pp. 1 3 1 - 3 . I 3 I . I bid., pp. I 7o - 1 . I 32 . I bid., pp. 1 34 - 5 . I 33 · I bid., p. I 72 . I 34· I bid., p. I 45 · I 35 · I bid., pp. I 59, I 65. 1 36. Ibid ., p. I 4o. 1 37 . Ibid ., p. I 8 I . 1 38. Ibid., PP· I 60- I . 1 39. Ibid., p. I 6 I . 1 40. Sein und .Zeit, first published I927. I have used the 1 2th (unchanged) German edition (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, I972), trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, I 967) . I 4 1 . Cf. J . P. Stern, Hitler, The Fuhrer and the People (London: Fontana, 1 975) , pp. 2 3 7·
1 44. 1 45 · 1 46. 1 47 · I
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Notes and References to Pages 72-9 · I s6. I bid., p. go, tr. p. 83 and cf. note p. I I 3, tr. pp. 1 06 - 7, 'Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every entity. I ts 'universality' is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every ntity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the. transcendens pure and simple' . Heidegger, Sein und <:,eit, p. 38, tr. p. 62, and cf. the note on Dasein, p. I I 4, t r. pp. I o 7 - 8. 1 !)7 · I bid., P· I I , tr. P· 1 04. I !)8. I bid., p. I O!), tr. p. g8. ' 59 · I bid ., p. 94, tr. p. 8 7 . r 6o. I bid., p. g i , tr. p : 84. I 6 I . I bid., p. I 22, tr. p. I I 6 . 1 2 . I bid., p. I 23, tr. p. I I 7, Heidegger, Sein und <:,eit, p. 4 2 , tr. p. 6 7 . I 63 . G .S.6 N D p. I I I , tr. p. I 04 (G.R.) . I 64 . I bid ., pp. I IO and 1 09 - IO note, tr. pp. I 03-4 and I 03 note. I 5· G .S.6 J E p. 489, tr. p. I I4 (Heidegger, Sein und <:,eit, pp. 42-3, tr. p. 68) . . I bid . 1 7· I bid ., p. 462, tr. p. 73· This criticism ofHeidegger applies with even greater force a r t re ' s appropriation of Heidegger. r 68. I bid., p. 490, tr. p. I I !). r 6g. I bid ., p. 462, tr. p. 73· J 70- I bid ., P· 490, tr. P · I I !) . I 7 I . I bid., p. 49 I , tr. p . I I 7, the second clause is quoted from Heidegger, Sein und <:,eit, P· I 3 , tr. p. 34· 1 7 2 - I bid ., PP· 49 I - 2, tr. PP· I I 6 - I 7 1 7 3 · I bid., pp. 454 - 5, tr. p. 62 (G.R.) . 1 74 . I bid ., pp. 484 - 5, tr. p. 107. 1 7 . f r example, ibid., p. 508, tr. p. I 42 . 1 7 . I bid ., p . 496, tr. p. 85. 1 7 7 · I bid., p . ·�2 I , tr. p. I 2 . I 7 8. I bid . 1 7 . ' . . N D p. I I 7, tr. p. I I r . 'cborgcnheil ma y be translated as 'security' or 'safety'. I t is unnecessary to use the I ' h It r dness' as in the English translation . .. . J E p. HO, t r . p. 26 ( G . R . ) . I i . , p . �� , tr. p . 6 5 ( G . R . ) . id ., P · 4 �. t r . P· 59·
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.Notes and References to' Pages 79 - 83 1 0 . I bid., pp. 320- 1 , tr. p. 3 7 (G.R.) . 1 1 . Ibid.; p. 292, tr. p. 1 2 . 1 2 . Cf. Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man ( London: Sphere Books, 1 968 ( 1 964) ) . 1 3. See Michael Theunissen, Gessellschaft und Geschichte, .(ur Kritik der kritishen Theorie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1 969) for an excellent discussion ofHorkheimer and of Habermas on this issue. 1 4 . G .S.8 dS p. 504, tr. p. 36. 1 5. Ibid. 1 6 . G .S.6 ND p. 348, tr. p. 355· 1 7 . See G .S.6 ND pp. 347 - 5 1 , tr. pp. 354 - 8. 18. G .S.8 SuEF p. 202, tr. pp. 73 - 4 (G.R.) . (The reference* is to 'Sociology and Empirical Research', in Soziologische Exkurse, p. 1 1 2 , tr. p. 1 24 ( G .R.) .) 1 9 - Ibid ., tr. P · 73 (G.R.) . 20. See WE passim. _2 1 . See List of Abbreviations of Titles, pp. 1 55 - 8, for a list of essays in G .S.8 plus English translations of the titles. 2 2 . G .S.7, 'Editorisches Nachwort', p. 540; and see G.S.9 n 'Editorische N achbemer kung', pp. 40 1 - 3. 23. Heinz Maus and Friedrich Furstenberg (eds. ) , Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie. (Neuwied und Berlin: Luchterhand, 1 969) tr. 1 976. 24. See David Frisby, ' I ntroduction to the English Translation', ibid ., tr. pp. ix -xiv. Frisby says least about Adorno's contributions; but see too Frisby, 'The Popper - Adorno Controversy: the Methodological Dispute in German Sociology', Philosophy qf the Social Sciences, 2, 2 ( 1 972), 1 05 - 1 9; and 'The Frankfurt School: critical theory <1-nd positivism', in John Rex (ed . ) , Approaches to Sociology (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1 974) pp. 205 - 29 . See also Anthony Giddens, ' Introduction' to Giddens (ed.) Positivism and Sociology ( London: Heinemann, 1 974) , pp. 1 7 - 2 1 ; and John O'Neill, 'Scientism Historicism and the Problem of Rationality', in O'Neill (ed.) Modes of lndividualism and Collectivism (London: Heinemann, 1 973) , p. 3f. 25. Adorno's discussion ofDurkheim and Weber occurs in several places, among them, eSoz pp. 38 - 4o; i 25 - 33 · 2 6 . See Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse ofReason (New York: Seabury, 1 974 ( 1 947 ) ) ; and Herbert Marcuse, ' Industrialization and Capitalism', in Otto Stammer (ed . ) , Max Weber a11d Sociology Today (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1 9 7 1 ( 1 965) ) pp. 1 33 - 5 1 . 2 7 . G.S.8 dS p. 503, tr. p. 35· The point is confusing because Adorno uses ' to under-stand' with connotations of reason ( Vemunji) , although verstehen (to understand) does not carry such implications normally. See Glossary, Reason (s.v .) . Debate about how formally or substantively to interpret Weber's methodology has occurred outside the M arxist tradition. For a famous interpretation which emphasises Weber's concern with autonomy, see, trans. Salvator Attanasio, Karl Lowith, 'Weber's Interpretation of the Bourgeois-Capitalistic World in Terms of the Guiding Principle of "Rationalization" ', in D�:nnis Wrong (cd . ) Max Weber Makers of Modern Social Scimce (New Jersey: Englewood Cii tls, 1 97o) , PP· 1 0 1 - 2 2 . � 8 . Sec G .S.8 Gesellschaft p p . 1 3 - 1 9, tr. pp. 1 48 - 53 · � g . I bid ., Durkhcim p. :.150. · o. l bi 1 . , G s lis haft p. 1 :.1 , 1 r . p . 1 4 -7 ( G . R .) . :i i . I bid . 3'J . I bid ., t r . ( G . R . ) . :B · I bid . 3 4 · l l id . , l u kh i rn , � U . ��- . l b i ., p . il, • :i ' , l b .
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Notes and References to Pages 84 - 8 3 7 . I bid., p. 258. The question of whether 'value-relatedness' i n Weber's methodology is limited to the selection of problems or extends into theory formation and validation has
been widely discussed. See, for example, the essay by Talcott Parsons and the discussion on 'Value-freedom and objectivity', in Max Weber and Sociology Today, op.cit., pp. 2 7 - 82. 38. Emile Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy trans. David Peacock (New York: The Fn:c Press, 1 974 ( 1 953) ) P· 95· 39· G .S.8 Durkheim p. 258. ,� o . 'Value Judgements and J udgements of Reality', the third essay in Sociology and J>hilosofJhy, pp. 96 - 7. • P . I bid., p. 92. 42 . I bid ., p. 95· 4·3· G .S.8 Durkheim pp. 258 - 9. H· G .S.8 Durkheim. This essay is Adorno's introduction to the German translation of I u r k h · i rn 's Sociology and Philosophy, 1 967 (first published as a book in 1 924) . Adorno on ent rates on Durkheim's notion of 'collective consciousness', although after the latter h d written The Division of Labour in Society, he used the notion of 'collective r pr sentations', see Lukes, Emile Durkheim, pp. 4 - 8. However, Durkheim continued to u phrases such as 'the collectivity', 'collective feelings' . 4 " . G .S.8 Durkheim p. 2 76. Adorno quotes Durkheim's statement that ' . . . there i s a lu th r reason why objective and average evaluation should not be confused: namely, b a usc the reactions of the individual remain individual reactions . . . There exists no ·ntial diflerence between the propositions I want that and A definite number of us want that' ( nglish tr. p. 83 ( G .R.) ) . 4 . I bid., p . 247· 4 7 · Quoted by Adorno, ibid., p. 263 (tr. p. 61 (G.R .) ) . 48. Quoted by Adorno, ibid., pp. 275-6 (tr. p. 65 (G.R.) ) . 4 9 · Quoted by Adorno, ibid ., p . 253 (tr. p . 66 (G.R . ) ) . o . I bid . I . I bid . , P· 255· 2 . l. bid ., p. 253· I bid., p. 253 ( tr. p. 36) . I bid . , p. 254 . G .$. 8 Durkheim p.. 25 1 . I bid . , p . 250.
"7· G .S.8 LS p. 549, tr. p. 107 (G.R.) . 8. f. Luka s, 'Rcification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', in History and C'la.rs 'onJciouSIIess, pp. 98 - 1 00, 1 02 - 3 . . 9· 'I'. G . . 8 Konflikt, in which Adorno discusses, inter alia, RalfDahrendort; Class and Class Conflict i11 lrulustria l Society ( London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1 967 ( 1 957) ) . !io. C .S.8 o l pp. 367 - 70. ! i 1. I bid . (iii . M a rc use, One Dimensiorwl Man, pp. 19 - 3 1 . ( i;� . . J i. i rgcn H a berrnas, 'Technology a nd Science as " I deology" ' , i n Towards a Rational Soti�(Y, <"NP ially pp. 1 1 3 2 2 . (i � . G .S.8 K l ass n , ( ' Rcfl t ions o n t h e T h ory o f Class s') . T h d i t rs d o not It r uy r<' non w h y t h is s ay remained un p u bl ished . •
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Notes and References to Pages 88-93
1 79
7 1 . Ibid., p. 384. 72. Adorno seems to have no more specific concept of liberalism . 73· Ibid., p. 386. 74· Ibid., p. 388. 75· Ibid., p. 389. 76. Ibid ., p. 390. 77· G .S.8 Konflikt 1 968 ( 'Remarks on Social Conflict Today') . 7 8 . Ibid ., p. 1 83 . 7 9 · Ibid. 8o. Ibid . 8 1 . I bid . 82 . Ibid., p. 1 84 . 8 3 . I bid ., pp. 1 84- 5 . 84. Ibid., p. 1 88 . 8 5 . Ibid. 86. G .S .8 I uO 1 953 ( 'The I ndividual and Organization' ) . 8 7 . Ibid., p. 44 1 . 88. I bid ., p. 446. 89. I bid ., PP · 443- 4; 447 - 8 . 90. Ibid., p. 45 1 . 9 1 . Ibid., p. 455· 92. Ibid. 93· G.S.6 NO pp. 1 64 - 6, tr. pp. 1 62 - 3 . 9 4 · I bid., p . 1 68, tr. pp. 1 65 - 6 . 95· I bid., p. 1 68, t r . p. 1 66. 96. G .S. 1 BU ('The Concept of the Unconscious in the Transcendental Theory of the Soul') . First published in the collected works, 1 973. 97· Ibid., p. 225. 98. I t is surprising that Adorno did not extend this argument to his criticism of Husserl's philosophy, since it could equally well be applied to Husserl's distinction between empirical and transcendental psychology. 99· G .S .8 Fascist 1 p. 40 1 ; G.S.9 1 1 'Vorurteil und Charakter' p. 36 1 . 1 00. G .S.8 Fascist 1 p. 397· 1 0 1 . I bid., PuN pp. 437 - 8. 1 02 . G .S.8 Psychoanalyse. Written in English in 1 946, first published in German, 1 962 ( 'Revisionist Psychoanalysis') . 1 03 . London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1 939· Translated into German, 1 95 1 . 1 04 . G.S.8 Psychoanalyse p. 27. 1 05. Ibid . 1 06 . I bid., p. 28. 1 0 7 . Ibid ., p. 3 1 . 1 08. Ibid ., p. 32. Cf. Marx, 'Competition generally, this essential locomotive force of t he bourgeois economy, docs not establish its laws, but is rather their executor. Unlimited com pet it i on is t herefore not the presupposition for the truth of the economic laws, but rat her I. he conseq uence - the form of appearance in which their necessity realizes itselr . (;rundriJse, p. 4.50, 1 r. p . 55 2 . 109. G .S .8 S u P p. 46, l r. p. 70, with rclcrence to Parsons, 'Psychoanalysis and the ·o i I ' t ru l u re', in T he Ps clloonolytic Qporterly, XIX, 3 ( 1 950), 373· 1 1 0.
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' 4 · I bi d . , p. 44· tr. P· 69. 1 1 5 . I bid . 1 1 6. I bid., p. 45, tr. p. 70. 1 1 7 . I bi d . , pp. 53 - 4, tr. p. 76. I 1 8. cr. Max Horkheimer, 'Sociological Background of the Psychoanalytic A pproach ', in Ernst Simmel, (ed . ) , Anti-Semitism. A Social Disease (New York: I n t ernational U niversities Press, 1 946) pp. 8 - 9. 1 1 9 . G .S . 8 SuP p. 70, tr. p. 86. 1 :20. I bid. 1 2 1 . I bid., pp. 70- I , tr. pp. 86 - 7. ' t · . n I bid., p. 70, tr. p. 86. I :J ::S · I bid., P· 7 I , tr. p. 87. l :l
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1 59· I bid., p. 1 23, tr. p. 348; and Lazarsfeld, op.cit., pp. 323- 4· I t is not clear to what extent Adorno concurred in this effort. 1 60. 'Administrative and Critical Communications Research', zrs IX ( 1 94 1 ) , 2 - 1 6 . 1 6 1 . Ibid., 16. 1 62 . Ibid., 16 and 10. 1 63 . Ibid., 1 2 - 1 3 . 1 64. WE p . 1 2 1 , tr. p . 346. 1 65. Cf. SuEF§ 7 · 1 66. G.S.8 dS. 1 67 . I bid., p. 506, tr. p. 3 7 · 1 68. Ibid., p. 507, t r . p. 38. 1 69. Ibid., P· 5 ' 3· tr. PP· 42- 3 . 1 70 . I bid ., p . 5 1 5, tr. P· 43· 1 7 1 . Ibid., p. 5 1 2, tr. p. 42 . 1 72 . Ibid., p. 5 1 5, tr. p. 44 (G.R.) . ' 73 · Ibid., p. 5 ' 7• tr. P · 45· ' 74· Ibid. ' 75· Ibid ., p. 523, tr. p. 50. 1 76. Ibid. 1 77 - Ibid. 1 78. G .S . 1 4 Diss FuR p. 25. ' 79· G .S. 1 4 Diss FuR 25. 1 80. G .S.8 dS p. 53 1 , tr. p. 55· 1 8 1 . Ibid., p. 529, tr. p. 54· 1 82 . I bid., SuEF p . 20 1 , tr. p. 73 (G.R.) . 1 83 . Ibid. 1 84. G.S.8 Posstreit pp. 342 - 4, tr. pp. 57- 9. 1 85. eSoz p. 26. Adorno's stipulation that concepts cannot be defined independently of experience, is open to the charge that it is a priori too. His response might be (roughly) that the stipulation arises from examining the antinomies which occur if one tries to proceed otherwise. 1 86. G .S.8 Konftikt p. 1 86 . 1 87. Ibid. 1 88. eSoz p. 2 7 . 1 89. For example, G.S.8 Posstreit p. 291 , tr. p. 1 1 ; SuEF p. 209, tr. p. 8o. 1 90 . For example, G.E.9 n p. 356. 1 9 1 . G.S.8 Posstreit p. 29 1 , tr. p. 1 1 (G.R.) . 1 92 . cr. ibid ., P· 326, tr. P · 42 . ' 93· I bid., p. 29 1 , tr. p. 1 1 . ' 94· Ibid., SuEF § 2 . �95 · Ibid., p . 2 1 5, tr. p . 85; and Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 3 1 8, 205. 1 96 . G.S.8 SuEF pp. 202 - 3 , tr. p. 74· 1 9 7 . I b id . , Posstreit p. 3 1 5, tr. p. 3 2 . 1 98. I bid. , p. 320, t r . p. 38. 1 99. I b id . , SuEF p. 2 1 4., t r . p . 85. 200. I bi d . , Poss t r ·it p . 3 1 5, t r . p. 32. 20 1 . W E p. 1 23, t r . p . 374 · 202 . I bid. I bid . I bid . , PP ·
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Notes and References to Pages 103 - 9 206. 'On popular Music', ZfS IX ( 1 94 1 ) , 1 7- 48; further developed in eMS pp. 1 2- 30. 207. WE p. 1 27 , tr. p. 35 1 . 208. G.S.9 II Ch. 5 PP· 1 2 1 - 329 ( 1 955) · 209. G.S.9 1 'The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Addresses', 1 942, previously unpublished, pp. 7 - 1 4 1 . 2 1 0 . G.S.9 II 'The Stars down to Earth', 1 952 - 3, first published 1 957, pp. 7 - 1 20. 2 1 1 . 'Fernsehen als ldeologie', Frankfurter Hifte, 1 0, 1 ( 1 955) 25- 33; reprinted slightly alt ered in Eingriffe, pp. 8 1 - 98. 2 1 2 . WE p. 1 43, tr. p. 366. 2 1 3 . I bid ., p. 1 32, tr. pp. 355- 6; and G.S.9 II 'Starrheit und Integration', p. 376. :.! 1 4 . Amsterdam, Querido Verlag, 1 947. 2 1 5 . See Richard Christie and Mariejahoda (eds.) Studies in the Scope and Method of' The Authoritarian Personality' (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1 954) ; and see too Rupert Wilkinson, T he Broken Rebel. A Study in Culture, Politics and Authoritarian Character (New York: Harper and Row, 1 972), especially pp. 1 - 6. 2 1 6. ZfS IX ( 1 94 1 ) , 1 24 - 43 · 2 1 7 . DofE p . 1 55, tr. p. 1 73 . 2 1 8. I bid., pp. 1 55 - 6, tr. p . 1 73; and cf. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part m, Addenda p. 453ff. 2 1 9. DofE p. 1 56, tr. p. 1 74. 220. C f. 'Research Project on Anti-Semitism', ZfS IX, 1 37 - 8. :I 'l l . DofE P· I 56, tr. P· 1 74· '.1 2 '2 . I bid. 2 2 3 . ZfS IX, art.cit. 1 37 . 224 . DofE p. 1 56, tr. p. 1 74 (G.R. ) . 2 2 5 . Cf. Horkheimer, 'Sociological Background to the Psychoanalytical Approach', I . 8. 226. DofE p. 1 78, tr. p. 1 99· 2 2 7 . Cf. G .S.8 Fascism II p. 4 1 7ff. :.128. I bid ., p. 4 1 4. 229. I bid., p. 43 1 . '.! JO. G . S .8 GuEF pp. 542 -3; G .S.9 II 'Vorurteil und Charakter' pp. 370 - 3 ; and see ' R uss•JI ja oby, 'Negative Psychoanalysis and Marxism', Telos, 1 4 ( 1 97 2 ) , 1 - 22 . 2 3 1 . R fe re nc es to The Authoritarian Personality (AP) are to the New York, Norton Li b ary Edition, 1 969; the chapters which Adorno wrote himself and Chs. 1, VII written joi n t ly ar reprinted in G .S.9 1 pp. 1 43-508. 2 3 2 . G.S.g 11 'Vorurteil und Charakter' pp. 37 1 - 2 . :.!:13 · WE p. 1 40, tr. p. 363. '.1 3 4 · AP p. 224. :.! 3 5 · WE pp. 1 j 8 - g/4o , tr. pp. 36 1 - 3 . 'J 36. AP C h . XIX 'Types and Syndromes'. <� : 1 7 · I bid ., p. 7 49 · ·.t :1H. I b id . , p. 7 4 7 · ·.t :l9· I bid . , p. 749· I bid., P · 7 4 · 9 1 1 . I bid ., pp. G
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Notes and References to Pages I 10 - I 2 Adorno insists that art is a cognitive activity sui generis and that it is commensurable with sociological theory. 2. Adorno to Krenek, 30 Sept I 932 in Krenek, I I , pp. 35 -6. These propositions apply to literature as well as to music. 3· Stichworte; Eingriffe. 4· For example, Dissonan.<;en (Diss) ; Klangfiguren [Figures of Sound] Musikalische Schrijten I ( FaM: Suhrkamp, I 959) ; .two books onj music published under titles of compositions by Franz Schubert: MoTTUints Musicaux, op.94 (FaM: Suhrkamp, I 964, containing essays first published from I 928 onwards) ; lmpromptus, \op.9o and op. I 42 (FaM: Suhrkamp, I 968, containing essays first published from I 922 onwards) . 5 · For example, on Aldous Huxley, and on Thorstein, Veblen, i n Prisms. 6. For example, 'Cultural Criticism and Society',. in ibid. 7· Written I 937 -8, first published complete I 952. 8. First published I 96o. 9· Written in I 948. I O . Written in I 94 I . I I . First published I 968. Vols 2 I and 2 2 will consist of miscellaneous writings on Beethoven. I 2 . Published in I 949· The title ofthe English translation is wrong: Philosophy ofModern Music. I 3 · Ohne Leitbild Parua Aesthetica, I 967, containing essays first published from I 958 onwards. I 4· Volume 7 of the collected works, buuhe first of the works to be published, I 970. I5· The lectures on music were delivered at the University of Frankfurt, I 96 I - 2 ; the lectures on aesthetics were delivered I 967 - 8 . I 6 . See Rene Leibowitz, 'Der Komponist Theodor W . Adorno' i n .<:,eugnisse, p p . 355 59· I 7 . Krenek passim. I 8 . This is based on conversations and correspondence with the late Gilbert Ryle, and with A. J . Ayer, Isaiah Berlin and Stuart Hampshire in Oxford, I 972 - 4. I 9· Thomas Mann ( I 949) The Genesis tif a Novel, trans. Richard and Clara Winston ( London: Seeker and Warburg, I 96 I ) p. 39· 20. 'Schwierigkeiten I Beim Komponieren', in Impromptus, pp. 93 - 1 1 1 . 2 I . For a complete list see Klaus Schultz, 'Vorlaufige Bibliographie der Schriften Thcodor W. Adornos' in Theodor W. Adorno .<;um Gediichtnis, pp. I 7 7 - 239· 22. See Mosco Carner, Alban Berg: The Man and The Work (London: Duckworth, I975) PP· 36, 48. 2 3 . G .S. I 4 eMS. 2 4·· In Klan!!figuren, I 958, pp. 9 - 3 1 . ;! 5 . I n Q.uasi una Fantasia Musikalische Schriften II ( FaM: Suhrkamp, I 963) written I 93'� - 40, first published 1 955· :l6. I use these terms in the conventional sense: 'classical' music refers to music of c . I 750 to c . 1 82o; 'romantic' music to music of c . 1 82o to c . I 9 1 0. 2 7 . Sonata quasi una Fantasia is the name of Beethoven's Sonatas, op.27/I and 2; th s ond of these i n C Sharp Minor has come to be known as the ' Moonlight Sonat ' .
Notes and References to Pages 112 - 15 30. See Weber, The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, trans. Don.Martindale et.al. (Carbondale: Southern I llinois University Press, I 969) . Published posthumously and now included as an appendix to the German edition of Economy and Society, but unfortunately not included in the English translation. 3 1 . Aspects of Sociology, Ch. VII, 'Sociology of Art and Music', p. 99, tr. p. 109 . 32. Aspects of Sociology, p. 99, tr. p. 1 09. 33· See OL KS p. 96, tr. p. I 23 . 34 · See ibid., p . 97, tr. p. I 243 . See ibid ., pp. 98- 9, tr. p. I 25 . 36. See ibid., p. 94, tr. p. I 2 I . 37· See ibid., p. 97, tr. pp. I 23 - 4· 38. See ' Ideen zur Musiksoziologie', in Klangfiguren pp. I O- I I . 39 · I bid .
4.0. S ee ibid., p. I 4· 4 ' · I bid., pp. 25, I 4. e ib id ., p . 26. 42 . 43·
44··
G .S.7 P · I 6. e, for example, his 'Diskussionen iiber Expressionismus', Das Wort, 6 ( I 938)
- 1 2. 4 . S'e h is 'Art and Mass Culture', in English in ZfS, IX ( I 94 I ) 290- 304, republished in Critical T heory, pp. I 88 - 243· j ()
4-6 . See his 'Uber den Affirmative Charakter der Kultur', ZfS, VI ( I 93 7 ) 54 - 94, trans. my J . Shapiro, 'The Affirmative Character of Culture', Negations (Harmondsworth: I eng uin, I 968) , pp. 88 - I 33 · 4 7 · Sec Ernst Bloch and Hanns Eisler, 'Die Kunst z u Erben', Die Neue Weltbiihne, I ( 1 38) I 3 - t 8 . 4. B . See Karl Wittfogel, 'Zur frage einer marxistischen Asthetik', Die Links/curve, I J I I ( May - November I 930) . 1·9 · See Helga Gallas, Marxistische Literaturtheorie Kontroversen im Bund proletarisch rt�olutionlirer Schriftsteller (Neuwied und Berlin: Luchterhand, I 97 I ) p. I 8. 50. S ec Roy Pascal, From Naturalism to Expressionism: German Literature and Society I88o/.I)IH ( Lo nd o n: Weidenfield and Nicolson, I 973) pp. 59-60. 5 ' . See ibid ., pp. 62-5.
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56 . Listed in ibid., p. I 83; and see Brecht, 'Against Georg Lukacs', trans. Stuart Hood, New l.tjl Review , 8 4 ( 1 9 74) 39 - 5 3 · ;17 . Sec Gallas, Marxistische Literalurtheorie, pp. I 8 - • 9· 511. Brec h t ' s relation to e x p ress i on is m is complex: he both disparaged expressi onis t dra t na and acknow ledged a debt to i t . See the a n ony mo u s ' I nt rod uct ion' to Brecht , o p .ri t ., 33 - 8; and Brech t ' s t ex t , ib i d . , 44.; sec too Hans M a ye r, ' M ann and Brecht: t\nat01ny o f an Antagonism ' , .New (:mnan Critique, 6 ( ' 9 75) 1 ' 2 . 9· Luk s' work in t h is l i ld u l m i n t d i n his A thetik , o fw h i h I ll� o nl y omplctcd t he , fi t ( r Lh c p �c l d p r t ' I it Eiamart dDS IYstlittiscltM, ( N c u w i d und Darmst a d t : Lu h I , W u , 1 ) Ci
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Ibid ., 23. I bid. I bid., 25. Ibid., 26. Ibid. I bid. G.S.8 Kultur p. I 22 . Ibid., P · I 28. Ibid . I bid., p. I 2 7. Ibid., p. I 28. Ibid., p. I 3 L . 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', I 936, trans. Harry in Illuminations (London: Fontana, I 973) . WE P· I I 7. tr. P· 342 · 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', p. 223. Ibid., p. 227. I bid ., p. 223. I bid., p. 225. S o . I bid., p. 226. 8 1 . lbid., p. 24 1 . 82 . I bid., p. 226. 8 3 . I bid., p. 233· 84. I bid., p. 226. 85. Ibid., pp. 243 - 4. 86. 'Eduard Fuchs: Collector and Historian', ZfS VI ( I 937) 348 and see n . I , trans. Knut Tarnowski, New German Critique, 5 ( I 975) 29 (G.R.) and n .3 . 117. See the essays o n Kafka in Illuminations and o n Brecht i n Understanding Brecht, trans. A n na Hostock (London: New Left Books, I 97 3 ) · 11 8 . This paragraph is based on Adorno's letter to Benjamin, I8 March I 936, in \VB pp r :.�6 - 34, tr. New Left Review, 8 I ( I 973) 63 --8. Hg. Sec ibid., pp. I 3o; I , tr. 66. go. Sec ibid., p. I 28, tr. 65. g r . I bid ., pp. I 3 I - 2, tr. 67. By 'alienating', I mean Verfremdung, Brecht's idea. I t rn r n s 'making strange or alien' and should not b e confused with Enifremdung which is uau lly translated as 'alienation'. ga. I bid ., p. I 32, tr. 67. 93 · I bid ., p. I 3 I , tr. 67. 94· I bid . , pp. I 29 - 30, tr. I 66. 9� · I bid . )6. I bid ., p. 1 2 9 , tr. I 66. The phrase avant-garde is inappropriate since Adorno's point is t luu 1 his avant docs not lead a garde. Habermas simplifies Adorno's position in a misleading w y when he argu ·s t h a t , in relation to Benjamin, Adorno interpreted the mass art arising out of new t' hniqu' 8 of reproduction as a 'degeneration of art'. See Habermas, 'It W UIIII I JO h nd od r r tt nd Kritik - die Aktualitiit Walter Benjamin', in Siegfried I f narl l ( d . ) , .(;ur Akl!lalitiil Walter Benjamin ( Fa M : Suhrkamp, I 972) p. I 9 I . pt 1 932, K rene k p. 36 . !17 · Adorno t o K r n k, )11. I n k t o Ad pt 1 32, i bid ., pp . 28 - 39· ·
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1 03 . See 'Resume tiber Kulturindustrie' in OL p . 6o, trans. Anson G . Rabinbach, ' ulture Industry Reconsidered', New German Critique 6 ( 1 975) 12 . This essay was written to counteract misinterpretation of the chapter 'The Culture I ndustry: Enlightenment or M ass Deception' in DofE. Adorno effectively abandons the phrase because it refers, in an overly compressed way, to production, reproduction and distribution but not at all to i nd us try. 1 04. Ibid., p. 6 1 , tr. p. ' 7 · 105. G .S . 1 4 eMS p. 425 and n . 1 06. ' Resume tiber Kulturindustrie', p p . 63- 4, tr. p p . 1 4- 1 5 . 1 07 . I bid., pp. 62- 3, tr. p. ' 4 · 108. 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', n, ZfS, 1 ( 1 932) 356. 109. G.S. 1 4 eMS p. 429. 1 1 . Published 1 958, trans. john and Necke Mander, with many omissions, as Realism in Our T ime (New York: Harper and Row, 1 964) . 1 1 1 . ' franz Kafka or Thomas Mann?' ibid., p. 9 2 . 1 1 :1 . S u b t i t l ed Zu Georg Lukacs: ' Wider der missverstandenen Realismus', 1 958, G.S. 1 1
NzL 11.
1 1 • 'Aufzcichnungen zu Kafka', written 1 942 - 53, published in Prisms, tr. 'Notes on fk ' . 1 1 4 . 'The I d eol og y of Modernism', i n Realism in our Time, p . 1 9 .
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Ibid., p. 262 . Ibid., p. 266. Ibid., p. 261 . G.S.6 ND p. g8, tr. p. 9 1 (G.R.) . 'Notes on Kafka', Prisms, pp. 302 -3, tr. p. 245· I bid., pp. 308 - 9, tr. pp. 248 -9. I bid., pp. 3 1 4 - 1 S , 332 - 3, tr. pp. 252 - 3, 265 -6. I bid., p. 329, tr. p. 262. I S ! . Ibid., p. 327, tr. p. 26 1 . I 52 · G.S. 1 1 NzL 11 'Erpresste Versohnung', pp. 273 -4. I 53· See The Genesis of a Novel, p. 38, and Mann's letter to Adorno, 30 Oct 1 952, in Thomas Mann Briefe 1948 -55, Erika Mann (ed.) (FaM: S . Fisher, 1 965) pp. 2 74 - 6. Mann wrote The Genesis of a Novel, 1 949, to acknowledge Adorno's assistance with Doctor Faustus, see Mann to A. M. Frey, 1 9 ]an 1 952, ibid., p. 240, tr"ns. Richard "nd Clara Winston, The Letters � Thomas Mann ( Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1 975) ( 1 970) ) p. 448. I 54· Mann to Adorno, 30 Dec 1 945, Brieje 1937- 47 ( 1 963), pp. 46g- 72, tr. 360 - 3 ; and see The Genesis of a Novel, p. 29. 1 55 . Ibid. I 56. G.S. 1 3 Wagner p. 82, quoted by Mann to Adorno, 30 Oct 1 952, Brieje, p. 2 75 · I 57 · Ibid. I 58. In this and the following paragraph, I extrapolate Adorno's position. I 59· The title of Lukacs' first essay on Mann (n.d.) in Essays on Thomas Mann. I 6o. G.S. 1 I NzL 11 'Erpresste Versohnung', pp. 26g- 7o, and see G.S. 1 4 Diss 'Das A l t ern der Neuen Musik', pp. 1 43-67. I 6 I . G.S. 1 1 ibid., p. 269. 1 62 . Ibid. 163. See Gunilla Bergsten, Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus: The Sources and Structure of the Nouel, I 963, trans. Clara Winston (Chicago University Press, 1969) ch. 2 , ' The Basis of the !v /ontage Technique', p. 99f. 1 64 . See Mann, The Genesis � a Novel, p. 40, and Bergsten, op.cit., pp. 79- 8 1 . I 65. Mann, The Genesis � a Novel, pp. 54 - 5 (G.R . ) . 1 6. Sec Iring Fetscher, 'Bertolt Brecht and America', Salmagundi, I O - I I ( 1 969 - 70) �()· -- . d i7 . I b i d., 264.
1 68. Lukacs, 'Critical Realism and Socialist Realism', in Realism in our Time, pp. 95-6. 1 6g. Sec Eugene Lunn, 'Marxism and Art in the Era of Stalin and Hitler: the Brecht-
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Debate', New German Critique, 3 ( 1 974) 1 5 .
1 711. c 'The Author as Producer', 1 934, i n Understanding BEecht, pp. gg- 1 00 and ' \V h I is Epic Theatre?' 1 939, ibid., pp. 1 5- 2 2 . 1 7 1 . D r c ht , 'Against Georg Lukacs', New Left Review, 84, 50.
1 7 � . Adorno, 'Zur Frankfurter Aulftihrung der " Dreigroschenoper" ', 1 928, and 'Zur Dreigros henopcr', 1 929, i n Bertolt Brecht's Dreigroschenhuch (FaM: Suhrkamp, l l)lio) pp. 1 8 3- 7 ; ' Mahagonny', 1 930, in Moments Musicaux, pp. 1 3 1 - 40. l 7:i. Adorno, 1 964., i n lmpromfJlus, pp. 93; 1 1 3, with reference to Brecht, 1 93/5, Schrifien (Ill l.itnatur und Krmsl, 2 , 1 934 - 4 1 ( F a M : uhrkamp, 1 967) pp. I I - 34· ' 7 '1 · A d o rn , 'Zur g s s lis haft l ich n Lage der M usik', I , ZfS, I , ( I 932) 1 08 -9. 1 7 , · Ad rno, ' • n a m•n t ' , 1 62, . . I I NzL in pp. I 5 - I 6, trans. Francis M 11 i k der
n h, . ITII'ni t m n t ', cw Lllft Rcvicw, 87 - 8 ( 1 74- ) 8o. 7 '. I d ., PP· ,,, I j II, ,,,II ' l 8tJ. , 8 ? 7 • b ., . 4 1 1 l , 7, . 7 A lit li Ie lteorie p . 1? .
c
•
�ru'
.
8,
.
611 .
1 88
Notes and References to Pages 128 -34
1 8o. Ibid., p. 4 1 9, tr. 82 . 1 8 1 . G.S.7 p. 368. 1 82 . lbid., p. 367 . 1 83. 'Engagement', p. 427, tr. 87. 1 84. I bid ., p. 426, tr. 86- 7 . 1 85. Ibid., p. 4 1 1 , tr. 7 7 · 1 86. Ibid., pp. 409 - 1 o , tr. 76. 1 87. Ibid., p. 409, tr. 76 (G.R . ) . 1 88. Ibid., p. 425, tr. 86. d l9. Adorno's Asthetische Theorie was to have been dedicated to Beckett. See G.S.7 ' Editorisches Nachwort', p. 544· 1 90. G.S. 1 1 NzL II pp. 290- 3 . 1 9 1 . 'Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen' ( A n Attempt t o Understand Endgame) , 1 , in G.S. 1 1 NzL II . . 1 92. I bid., p. 282. 1 93 · G.S.7 P· 230· ' 94· G.S. 1 1 NzL 111 p. 283. Cf. G.S.7 p. 23 1 . 1 9• . .I bid., p. 232. 1 96. See ibid., pp. 370- 1 , and G .S. 1 1 ibid., p. 3 1 2 and passim. 1 7· The expression 'the first Vienna School' refers to the work of Schonberg and his pupils, Berg and We bern, 1 908 - 1 3; and 'the second Vienna School' to the work of the m •n in the 1 920s which was based on Schonberg's development of serialism. This I was notoriously hostile to the contemporary school of Stravinsky in Paris. See :h I s R sen's brief account, Schoenberg ( London: Fontana, 1 976) . 1 98. Adorno, Minima Moralia, p. 7 1 , tr. p. 6o. 1 9 . G .S: 1 4 eMS p. 1 78. ilOO. I bid ., pp. 1 78-g. il 1 . I bid ., h . VIII ' M usikleben', p. 3 1 2L !lO:.t . I bid., h . Ill ' Funktion', p. 22 1 . :zo:� · I bid ., p . 2 2 1 and Diss FuR pp. 24- 6. l bid ., M S pp. 308 - g. :w S Adorno 'Zur gcsellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', 1 1 ZfS, 1 ( 1 932) 355 - 78. IZ f . I bid ., 1 1 ' R e p rod u kt i o n , Konsum', 355 - 78, 'The Radio Sympony: An IW Exp .ri m nt in Theory', in Radio Research, pp. I I 0- 39· :zo7. I bid ., p. 1 2 1 . :zo8. I bid ., pp. 1 24 - 7 . ' 09 . Tit I · of Adorno's essay , ' Fetishism in M usic and the Regression of the listener', I !l:lll, but h analysed t h e syndrome as 'regression of listening' not of the listener, s ; ,s . . . ,. Diss FuR p. 341'. � 1 0. 'The R adio Symp hony', pp. 1 29- 33. 11 1 1 . I bid ., p. ' 3 " · :l i 'J . I bi d . , p. 1 36. � 1 : 1 · Adorno, w i t h t h e assist ance of •corgc S i m pson, 'On Popular M usic ' , Zf , 1 ( 1 ! 11- 1 ) , 11 5 \1 1 1). • I bid ., � 'l .
�I
•
I bid . , 26.
2 1 6. I bid .. :J!l. l bi I. b b
(N w
tw
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I
I
Notes and References to Pages 134-8
r8g
editions and a German edition (Miinchen: Rogner & Bernhard, I 969) contain the same text. Eisler published a changed version under his name alone in East Germany ( East Berlin: Henschel, I 949) . See Adorno's account of the various texts, G .S. I 5 KF pp. I 44 -6. I n its original editions the book demonstrates the theoretical compatibility of a Brechtian and an Adornitian position, but in practice this compatibility was precarious as the fate of the text testifies. See, too, Hartmut Liick, 'Adornos Zusammenarbeii mit Eisler', in Wilfred F. Schoeller (ed.), Die neue Linke nach Adorno ( Miinchen: Kindler, I 969) pp. 1 4 1 - 57· 22 I . G .S . I 5 KF and Composing for the Films, chs. VI - VIII. 2 2 2 . See Adorno, 'Neue Musik, I nterpretation, Publikum', 1 957 Nervenpunkte der neuen Musik (Hamburg: Rowolt, I 969, contains extracts from Klangfiguren) pp. I 6 - 3o, trans. ' New Music and the Public: Some Problems of I nterpretation', in Rollo Myers (ed . ) , T wentieth Century Music: A Symposium (London: John Calder, I 96o) pp. 40 - 5 1 . Most of " Der getreue Korrepetitor is devoted to detailed technical 'Directions for listening to new music', G .S . I 5 GK pp. 1 88 - 368. 223. G .S . I 4 eMS ch. I 'Typen Musikalische Verhaltens', pp. 1 78 - 98. 2 2 4 . I bid ., PP· I 90 - 2 . 225. Adorno remarks how the English title of the society was changed to ' International Society for Contemporary Music' (SCM ) , to a neutral, chronological epithet from a spec ific, polemical one. See 'Musik und neue Musik', I 96o, in �asi una Fantasia, pp. : 1::1 9 40. Hence the English translation of Philosophie der neuen Musik as Philosophy of Modern Music does a double disservice to Adorno. It substitutes a general term for a polemical one, w h i l e 'modern' in much debate on literature and music is dated from the mid-nineteenth cen t u ry not from c. I 908. See G .S.7 pp. 3 I - 56. 226. 'Musik und neue Musik', p . 339f. 2 2 7 . G .S . I 2 PNM p. 32, tr. p. 25. .12 : 8. I bid., p. 34, tr. p . 2 7 (G.R.) . 229. 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musrk', p. 1 08. This essay contains the lr.ast polemical statement of Adorno's position, while PNM contains the most partisan pos i t io n . �:1o. I bid., 1 08 - 9 and f. :.13_1 . Schonberg preferred to refer to his 'ideas' rather than to his style. See Arnold Sc hi in berg, Style and Idea (London: Faber and Faber, 1 975) . For Adorno's analysis, see ( ; ,S , , :.t P N M pp. 55 - 1 0 1 , tr. pp. 5 1 - I 04. J :! � ' M us ik und neue Musik', p . 360. •J : I : l · I bi d . , p p . 348 -9 . � :1·1 · Sec Adorno, 'Arnold Schonberg ( 1 884 -- I 95 I ) ' , 1 953, Prisms, p p . 202 - 4, tr. •
-
I ' l l · ( i. J 5 · •J :!;, . Sl:e in add i t ion to PNM, 'Der Dialektische Komponist' , I 934, in Impromptus PI'· : m · ·1 4 ; and 'Sakralcs fragment. Ober Schonbergs Moses and Aron', I 963, in Quasi IIIII/ Ftlllill.l'ill, p p . 306 - 3 8 . •J : ! h . 1\s
w a s a wa re , Schonberg opposed the commercialisation of music and of t ec h n i q u e . Sec Adorno, 'Kiassik, Romantik, neue Musik', 1 959, in \ n lirllfillllkif rier neue// Musik , p . :z, � . J :I? < : r . G .S . 1 2 P N M p. ' 7 • t r . p . 8.
I i tt· •
Adorno
h y posl a l isa t ion ·
Tr an.rc�ndetuo/
Notes and References to Pages 139 - 45 " H umanismus" ' , I 946, in Wegmarken (FaM: Klostermann, I g67) pp. I 45 -94· For lis ussions of Adorno and 'Humanism', see Schmidt, 'Adorno - ein Philosoph des realen H umanismus', in Theodor W. Adorno zum Gediichtnis, pp. 52 - 75, and jay, 'The Frankfurt hool's Critique of Marxist Humanism', in Social Research, XXXIX ( I 972) 285 - 305. 2. Cf. Tom Bottomore, 'Class structure and social consciousness', in Meszaros ( ed .) Aspects of History and Class Consciousness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, I 97 I ) pp. 4·9 -64. 3· G .S.8 SuEF p. 2og, tr. p. So. 4 .. I bid.
I bid. I bid., p. 2 1 0, tr. p. 8 1 . 7 . ''C, for example, Habermas, 'What does a crisis mean today? Legitimation p bl 'ms in late capitalism', in Social Research XL ( I 973) 643 - 67, and Legitimation Crisis, 1 973, t rans. Thomas McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1 976) . However, Claus Offe has c-est blished the connection between commodity analysis and the state. See Strukturprob/une des Kapitalistischen Staates (FaM: Suhrkamp, 1 972) and Offe and Volker Ronge, 'Th s s on the Theory of the State', .New German Critique, 6, 1 975· 8 . I adapt Adorno's dictum, 'Universal history must be construed and denied', G .S.6 NO p. 3 1 4, tr. p. 320. .S.6 JE P· 452, tr. P · 59· 9· 1 0. ' R elation to Left-Wing Hegelianism' , in G .S.6 ND pp. 1 46 - 7, tr. pp. 1 43 - 4. 1 1 . I draw here on Adorno's lectures on sociology, eSoz, and extrapolate from his i ti i m of sociology. 1 :.1 . 'ec, for example, Peter McHugh et al., On the Beginning of Social Inquiry (London: out l dg & K egan Paul, 1 974) and Alan Blum, Theorizing (London: Heinemann, •
6.
I
7<1-) .
H rminio Martins has called this 'the cognitive paradigm', 'Time and Theory in y ' , i n j ohn Rex (ed . ) , Approaches to Sociology An Introduction to major trends in British ( ndon: Rout ledge & Kegan Paul, 1 9 74) pp. 25 1 , 263. See, too, Aaron V . . I , 'ogttitiue Sociology ( Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1 973) . I l l cat and . J oh n Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge & Keg an us ' 'I · u l , 1 !)7. ) , .h . B, make a similar distinction, but then go on to make the mistake which I
1
•
I
. I flof' . mpl , P t er L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of I �. F { �I n w rth: P ·nguin, 1 97 1 ) pp. 1 06, '2 '2 '2 , 225, and Berger and Stanl•y I /i
I a us , 1
I ullb
,
L ion and t h e Sociological Critique o f Consciousness', I g6s, .New Left - 7 1 and 36, 76 - 7; and sec Geoff Pearson, 'Misfit Sociology and th i liz l ion', i n I an Taylor et al. (eds) , Critical Criminology ( London: Routledg• l i Y l , I 7 • ) p . 1 4.8f. t t P rsons (ed . and tr.), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization ( N · w m i l l a n , 1 94 ·7 ) p. 1 03, and Weber, Wissenschaftslehre (Tiibingcn: Mohr, 1 973) p.
� {1
fi
)
Notes and References to Pages 146 - 8 'process' , and the Marxism a concern with history, but at the thematic level rather than at the substantive level; see Martins, 'Time and Theory in Sociology' , pp. 246 � 50 . 2 1 . G .S . 1 4 Diss 'Tradition' , 1 g6 1 , p. 1 4 1 . 2 2 . Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', 1 940, Illuminations, pp. 255 � 66. 23. Habermas, 'Urgeschichte der Subjektivitat und verwilderte Selbstbehauptung', Philosophisch-politische Prifile, pp. 1 84 �gg. 24. Habermas, 'Einleitung: Historischer Materialismus und die Entwicklung norma liver Strukturen', Zur Rekonstruktion des Historisclien Materialismus (FaM: Suhrkamp, 1 976) P P· JO� I I . 25. See, Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 1 968, trans. Jeremy J . Shapiro ( London: Heinemann, 1 972) esp. 'Appendix' ( 1 g65) . 26. Habermas, 'Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence', Recent Sociology no. 2 Patterns of Communicative Behaviour, Hans Peter Dreitzel (ed.) (New York: Macmillan, 1 970) PP· 1 1 4 � 48. 2 7 . See Habermas' and Gadamer's contributions to Karl-Otto Ape! et al., Hermeneutik uru/ ldeologiekritik (FaM: Suhrkamp, 1 97 1 ) . 28. G.S.8 Posstreit p . 306, tr. p . 24. 2 9 . 'Marginalien zu Theorie und Praxis', in Stichworte, p. 1 7 1 , and 'Resignation', in Kritik, pp. 1 49�5o. 30. ' Marginalien . . . ', p. 1 8 1 , and 'Resignation', p. 1 47 . 3 ' · G.S. 6 N b p. 1 47, tr. p . 1 44. 3 2 . G.S . 1 AP p. 338; Prisms p. 28, tr. pp. 32 � 3 . 33 · G.S. 1 1 N z L n 'Erpresste Versi:ihnung', p. 2 7 7 and passim. 34· Lukacs, Realism in our Time, p. 37, and Adorno, op. cit., p . 257· 35· Ibid., PP· 254 �5. 36. Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', p. 226. 37· See, G .S.7 'Editorisches Nachwort', p. 537·
Bibliography
Adorno's Works This list of Adorno's works is not complete. For a complete list see Klaus Schultz, 'Vorlaufige Bibliographie der Schriften Theodor W. Adornos', in Hermann Schweppenhauser (ed.), Theodor W. Adorno zum Gediichtnis (FaM: Suhrkamp) . Schultz's list does not include some of the works published after Adorno's death. English translations are noted thus (tr.) and listed together. I 924 'Die Transzendenz des Dinglichen und Noematischen m Husserls Phanomenologie', G.S. 1 . I 927 'Der Begriff des Unbewussten in der Transzendentalen Sedenlehre', G .S. I . I 930 'Thesen iiher die Sprache der Philosophen', G .S . 1 . I 93 I 'Die Aktualitat der Philosophic', G .S. 1 . I 932a 'Die Idee der Naturgeschichte', G.S. 1 . I 932b 'Zur Gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', ZfS, 1 . I 933 Kierkegaard Konstruktion des Asthetischen (Tiibingen: J . C. B. Mohr) . I 936 ' O ber Jazz', ZfS, 5 · I 937 Contributor to Willi Reich (ed.) Alban Berg (Vienna: Reichner) . I 938 ' O ber den Fetischcharacter in der Musik und die Regression des Hiirers, G.S. I 4· 1 939 'Fragmente tiber Wagner', ZfS, 8. 1 94.0a 'Husser! and the Problem of Idealism', The Journal of Philosophy, 37 ( I ) . 1 940b 'On Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Love', ZfS, 8. 1 94 1 a With George Simpson 'On Popular Music', ZfS, g. 1 94· 1 b 'The Radio Symphony. An Experiment in Theory' , Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton (eds), Radio Research (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce) . 1 94 1 c 'Spengler Today', ZfS, 9· 1 94 1 d ' Veblen's Attack on Culture', ZfS, 9· ' 94 2 ' Fur Ernst Bloc h ' , A ujbau - Recon.rtruction, 8. 1 9<�5a 'A So ial Crit ique of Radio M usic', Kenyon Review, 7 · 1 94 b ' T h s s upon A r t and R ligi n Today', Ker!JOYI Review, 7 · 'A n t i-s m i t ism nd Fa ist Propa g anda', Ernst S imm 'I (eel . ) , A nti-semitism: A 1 94 Soc ial Disco d ( N w Y rk: I n t rn t ional U n iv rsi t i s Press) G . . 8.
1
• 1·7 ( ·
With l
d
Ma m:
lhi lo oph i d ·z I I h
rkh i m 'I\
I
Dialcktik
id , ( l r .) ) . r n u n 1u.ik (T h
1 ',
der
Aujk lllnmg
n: J . ' · . M h ldv )' r l 'hi/O'O/Jili , 3.
bi
Philosophi chc .
1101
(
.
)
Frog monte
1 9 4·
Bibliography
With Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J . Levinson, R . Nevitt Sanford, The Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers) G.S. 9 1 . 19 1 Minima Moralia Rgiexionen aus dem Beschii.digten Leben (FaM: Suhrkamp, (tr.) ) . 1 9 'J.a Versuch iiber Wagner (Berlin and FaM: Suhrkamp) G.S. 13 (tr. forthcoming) . 'Zur gegenwartigen Stellung der empirischen Sozialforschung in Deutschland', 1 952/J EmfJirische Soz:.ialjorschung (FaM: Wissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe des lnstituts zur Ford erung offentlicher Angelegenheiten) G .S . 8. 1 952c With Max Horkheimer, 'Vorurteil und Charakter', Frankfurter Hefte 7, G.S. 9 2 . 1 9 2d 'Zum Verhaltnis von Psychoanalyse und Gesellschaftstheorie', Psyche 6, G.S. 8. 1 9 3 'F ernsehen als Ideologic', Rundfunk und Fernsehen 9 · 4- a ' I ndividuum und Organisation', Fritz Neumark (ed.) Individuu m und Organisation ( a rm stad t ) G.S. 8. 1 9 4.b 'Television and the Patterns of Mass Culture', Q.uarterry of Film, Radio and Television, vm. 1 9 r.a Prismen Kulturkritik und Gesellschajt, (Berlin und FaM: Suhrkamp) . 1 g b 'Z u m Verhaltnis von Soziologie und Psychologic' , with Walter Dirks ( eds.) 'ociologica Aufsatz:.e, Max Horkheimer z:.um Sechz:.igsten Geburtstag gewidmet, Frankfurter B i t dige zur Sociologic, vol 1 (FaM: Europaische Verlaganstalt) G.S. 8 (tr.) . Friedrich Pollock, Gruppenexperiment Ein 'Studimbericht, Frankfurter Beitrage zur zi I gic, vol 2, ch 5 by Adorno, G.S. 9 2 . a Disso rw nz:.en Musik in der uerwalteten Welt (Gottingen, Vandenhoeck und upre h t ) G .S. 1 4 . 'b ..(ur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie Studien iiber Husser/ und die phanomenologischen 11tinorrU:en (Stuttgart: W . Kohlhammcr) G.S. 5 · 'B mcrkungen i.iber Statik und Dynamik in der Gesellschaft' Kiilner ..(eitschriftfiir So(.iologic rmd Soz:.ialpsychologie, 8, G.S. 8. · d W i t h M ax Horkheimer ( eds.) Soz:.iologische Exkurse Nach Vortriigen und Diskussionen, F , nkfurtcr Beitragc zur Soziologie, vol 4 (FaM: E uropaische Verlaganstalt) (tr.) G.S.
1 950
Authoritarian
.
h. xu. 'Th t ars Down to Earth: The Los Angeles Times Astrology Column. A Study in dnry uperstit ion', Jahrbuch jur Americastudien 2, G.S. 8 and G.S. 9 2 .
8,
7
oltll
,cur Literatur I , (Berlin und FaM) G.S. 1 1 (tr. forthcoming) .
la11g/igrmrr
MriSikalische Schrijien I (Berlin und FaM; Suhrkamp) .
t , rrh ·it und I ntegration', Psychologische Rundschau 1 0, G.S. 9 2 . ' Z u m g ·g en wa rt igen Stand der deutschen Soziologie', Kiil��er ..(eitichriji jur •
'o(.iologic rmd So,c ia lpsychologie
1 ! JI'O
1 ! )0 1 1 96•
a
1 1 , G.S . 8 (tr.) .
Maltier Eirte Musikalische Plrysiog11omik (FaM: Suhrkamp, G.S. 1 3 ( tr. forthcoming) . . olen V.ll' Literatur II ( Fa M : Suhrkamp) G.S. 1 1 (tr. forthcoming) . l�inlcitrmg in
die Musiksoz:.iologie ..(wolf theoretische Vorlesungen (FaM: Suhrkamp)
' .S. 1 ,� ( t r . forth ·oming) .
W i t h Max Horkheimcr, Soc iolog ica II Reden und Vortrage, Frankfurter Beitrage zur So:tiologic, vol 10 ( Fa M : E uropa isc he Verlaganstalt) G .S . 8 ( tr. ) . /Jrei Studien z:.u Hegel ( Fa M : Suhrkamp) C.S. 5· I ! Jii:la l1'ingrijji: Ncurt Kritisclre Madelle ( Fa M : uhrkamp) . q)li:ib t ! )ti:v Der 1/elr eue Kompetitor , Lchrsclrriftnn z:.ur m us ikali clrcn Pm i.r ( Fa M : S . Fis h ·r) 1 ! )lhb
,
1 95
Bibliography
I 967b ' Introduction', Emile Durkheim, Soziologie und Philosophie ( FaM: Suhrkamp) G.S. 8. I 968a Berg Der Meister des kleinsten Ubergangs (Vienna: Elisabeth Lafite) G .S. I 3 · I 968b Impromptus .(weite Folge neu gedruckter musikalischer Aufsiitze ( FaM: Suhrkamp) . I 968c With UrsulaJaerisch, 'Anmerkungen zum sozialen Konflikt heute', Heinz Maus (ed.) Gesellschajt, Recht und Politik (Neuwied und Berlin) G.S. 8. I 9fi9a With Hanns Eisler, Kompositionfiir den Film (Miinchen: Rogner und Bernhard) G .S . I 5 ( English first edition) . I 969b Stichworte Kritische Madelle 2 (FaM: Suhrkamp) (tr.) . I 9fi9c I ntroduction and Contributions, Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (Neuwied und Berlin: Luchterhand) G .S. 8 (tr .) . I 969d Nrvenpunkte der neuen Musik ( Hambourg: Rowohlt) .
Posthumous Publications
I 970a Asthetische Theorie, Gretel Adorno and RolfTiedemann (eds.) ( FaM: Suhrkamp) G.S. 7 · I 97ob Aufsiitze zur Gesellschajtstheorie und Methodologie ( FaM: Suhrkamp) G .S . 8 (tr.) . I 970c Erziehung zur Mundigkeit Vortriige und Gespriiche mit Hellmut Becker 1959 - 196!) , Gerd Kadelbach (ed.) (FaM: Suhrkamp) . I970d Uber Walter Benjamin, Rolf Tiedemann (ed.) (FaM: Suhrkamp) . I 97 I Kritik. Kleine Schrijien zur Gesellschajt, Rolf Tiedemann (ed .) (FaM: Suhrkamp) . 1 972 Contribution to Autoritiit - Organisation - Revolution (The Netherlands: Van E verskijck) . I 973a Vorlesungen zur Asthetik 1967 -8 (Zurich: H. Mayer Nachfolger) . I 973b Vorlesung zur Einleitung in die Soziologie ( FaM: Junius) . I 973C Philosophische Terminologie .(ur Einleitung, vol I , Rudolf zur Lippe (ed.) ( FaM: Suhrkamp) . I 973d Adorno and Ernst Bloch, Gesprach iiber die Utopie (Die Waage: Zollikerberg) . I 974a Philosophische Terminologie .(ur Einleitung, vol II, Rudolf zur Lippe (ed.) (FaM: Suhrkamp) . I 974b Theodor W. Adorno und Ernest Krenek Briejivechsel, Wolfgang Rogge (ed.) (FaM: Suhrkamp) . 1 974c Nolen zur Literatur IV, Rolf Tiedemann (ed.) ( FaM: Suhrkamp) G.S. I I ( tr. forthcoming) . n.d. Vorlesung zur Einleitung in die Erkenntnistheorie 1957 -8 (FaM: Junius) . 1 975 L. Goldmann, Th. W. Adorno: 'Discussion . . . sur Ia sociologic de Ia litterature', in Lucien Goldmann et la sociologie de la littirature ( Editions de I' U niversite de Bruxelles) .
English Translations of Adorno's Works
'! 'he t ranslations a re listed in chronological order of the German edition as given in the list of Adorno's works above. The Actuality of Philosophy' , Telos, 3 I , I 97 7 ·
' 93 ' 1 94 7
Dia lec tic of Enlightenment, t ra ns . john Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, .
' ! l, 1 9
Philosophy of Modem Music, t rans. Anne G . M it c he l l and Wes ley W. Bloomster
1 97 2 ) .
( Lond o n :
heed an
I
VVard ) . This t ransla t ion is atrocious.
1 9, 1 a Mim'mo Mo r al ia , t rans. E . F . N . . J ·ph o t t ( London: New Left Books , I 974) · T h is t un l a t io n is ex e l l n t . a n . mu<�l n I ' h i 1· r y W b r ( L n n: N evilk p a r m n, 1 7 ) . nd I R · I olo�y ' , t r n . J ving N . Wohlf rt h , New Leji Review, 'I· 7 b
( I (j(' - ? )
•
Bibliography
t g6
1 9 6d Aspects of Sociology, trans. John Viertel (London: Heinemann, 1 973) . 1 95 8 ' Lyric Poetry and Society', trans. Bruce Mayo, Telos, 20 ( 1 974) . I ! J 9a 'New Music and the Public: Some problems o f lnterpretation', Rollo H. Myers ( cd . ) , Twentieth Century Music (London: John Calder, 1 96o) . 1 9 gb 'M usic and Technique', trans. Wes Bloomster, Telos, 32, 1 97 7 . 19 ' Contemporary German Sociology', trans. Norman Birnbaum, Translations of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology ( 1 959) . 1 96 a )argor1 of A uthenticity, trans. Knu� Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London: Rou t ledge & Kegan Paul, 1 973) . 1 96, � b 'Alienated Masterpiece: The Missa Solemnis ( 1 959) ', trans. Duncan Smith, Telos,
118 ( 1 976) . 1 96 'Commitment', trans. Francis Mcdonagh, New Leji Review, 87-8 ( 1 974) . 1 9liG Nega t ive Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, 1973· For comments on the translation, see
my ' R evi w of Negative Dialectics' , A merican Political Science Review, 70 ( 1 976) 598 -9. 19 "7a 'Culture I ndustry Reconsidered', trans. Anson G . Rabinbach, New German .'ritirtue, 6 ( 1975) . 1 9 ' 7b 'Th scs on t he Sociology of Art', trans. Brian Trench, Birmingham Cultural Studies, 11 , ( 1 97 2 ) . 1 969a H a n ns Eisler, Composingfor the Films (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 947) lir t p ub lis h ed in English. 1 · b 'S icntific Experiences of a European Scholar in America', trans. Donald Flt•ming, Donald Fl eming and Bernard Bailyn (eds) , The Intellectual Migration. Europe and tl merica 1930 - 1g00 (Cambridge (Mass) : Harvard University Press, 1 969) . 1 ! J(it c The Posi ti vist Dispute in German Sociology, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby ( Lon on: H einemann, 1976) . Maladroit translations of Adorno's contributions. 'So i t:t y ' ( 1 966) , t rans. F. R . Jameson, Salmagundi, t O - I t , ( 1 969 - 70) . qnob 1 ,170d ' L ttcrs to W a! t e r Benjamin', trans. Harry Zohn, New Leji Review, 8 1 , ( 1 973) . 1 97 in Luci n Goldmann, Cultural Creation in Modern Society, trans. Bart Grahl (St. LouiN: Tt
S ltctld Secondar Literature on Adorno ' l' h lint a h I I K I tive, l i m i ted largely to German works on Adorno most of which t't nMl�t 1 f , 11 . ! inns of art icles. For bibliographies of works on Adorno, see Vber Theodor W. dor1111, . 1 4.3 g, a n d Friedemann Grenz, A do rno 's Philosophic in Grundbegrijfen, pp. II r . t h r workN on Adorno arc listed in the bibliography below.
lmun I W i l h d rn , 1 970, Vier Kritiken: Heidegger, Sartre, Adorno, Lukacs, Cologne, Klrin Bibliothrk Politik Wisscnschaft Zukunft 5· lll ll·kc·l munn, Fr 11k ( 1 9 7 2 ) Ober Marx u n d Ado mo Schwierigkeitm der spiitmarxistischen Theo rie II y r, I
! Fu M : Makol ) .
1 >11 Wydow , . J uri ( 1 9 7 1 ) Die s i It ulb.,·t negiereudc Dialeklik Kn:tik der Musik theorie Theodor ildomo.l ( Bt
.J 1
ll 'urMikritik ( n : I >UV ) • :�, N ' ( l 7 ) 'l/t,ndur W, I I l 1) ' ( 1 7 ) J, jumi ,
durnu: r/,
ldltilo .i1 ,,
'1 h
i1 d1 I. '
or u -tw'i �·1 di n (I"
M:
. I•'
·I
rt ( I ' ),
riB: U nion
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Koch, Traugotl, et al. ( I 973) .Negative Dialektik und die Idee Der Versiihnung. Eine Kontroverse fiber Theodor W. Adorno (Stuttgart: W . Kohlhammer) . Kritik und Interpretation der Kritischen Theorie ( I 975) (Giessen: Achenbach) . Kunzli, Arnold ( I 97 I ) Aujkliirung und Dialektik Politische Philosophic von Hobbes bis Adorno ( Freiburg: Rombach) . Massing, Otwin ( I 970) Adorno und die Folgen Ober das ' Hermetische Prin::_ip' der kritischen Theorie (Neuwied und Berlin: Luchterhand) . Paetzold, Heinz ( I 974) Neomarxistische Aesthetik, vol I and u (Dusseldorf: Schwan) . Rohrmoser, Gunter ( I 970) Das Elend der kritischen Theorie ( Freiburg: Rombach) . Schmidt, Alfred, and Rusconi, Gian Enrico ( I 97 I ) La Scuola di Francoforte, Origini e Signijicato Attuale (Bari: de Donato) . Schoeller, Wilfried F. ( I 96g) Die neue Linke nach Adorno ( Munchen: Kindler) . Schweppenhauser, Hermann (ed.) ( I 97 I ) Theodor W. Adorno ;:_urn Gediichtnis (FaM: Suhrkamp) . -- et al. ( I 975) Presences d'Adorno, Revue d'Esthitique, I (Paris: Union Generale d'Editions) . ( I 968) Ober Theodor W. Adorno ( FaM: Suhrkamp) . Vacatello, Marzio ( I 972) Th. W. Adorno: il rinvio della prassi (Firenze: La Nuova l talia) . Vincent, jean-Marie ( I 973) Fetichisme et Societi (Paris: Editions Anthropos) . ·
Other German Sources and Translations The following list is restricted to works cited in the text and notes and to some of the other related works which I have found important in the course of my work. Albert, Hans ( I 972) Konstruktion und Kritik Aufsiit::_e ..(:ur Philosophie des kritischen Rationalismus (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe) . -- ( I 97 I ) Pliidoyer fur kritischen Rationalismus ( Munchen: R. Piper) . Ape!, Karl-Otto ( I 972) Hermeneutik und ldeologiekritik (FaM: Suhrkamp) . Benjamin, Walter. For a bibliography, see Rolf Tiedemann, 'Bibliographie der Erstdrucke von Benjamins Schriften', Siegfried Unseld (ed.), ..(:ur Aktualitiit Walter Benjamins (FaM: Suhrkamp, I 972) . References here are to first, often posthumous, editions and to English translations, not to the collected works. ( I 928) Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (Berlin: Rowohlt) , Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: New Left Books, I977) . - - ( I 928) Einbahnstrasse (Berlin: Rowohlt) (tr. forthcoming) . - - ( I 93 I ) 'Left-Wing Melancholia', trans. Ben Brewster, Screen, I 5 ( I 974) 2 . --- ( I 956) Berliner Kindheit urn Neun;:.ehnhundert ( FaM: Suhrkamp) . ( I 966) Briefe r, 2, Gershom Scholem and Adorno (eds.) (FaM: Suhrkamp) . - ( 1 969) Ober Literatur ( FaM: Suhrkamp) . ( I 969,) Ober Kinder, Jugend und Er::_iehung (FaM: Suhrkamp) (tr. forthcoming) . -- ( 1 973) Charles Baudelaire: a Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, trans. Harry Zohn ( London: New Left Books) . ( 1 973) Understanding Brecht, trans. Anna Bostock (London: New Left Books) . ( 1 973) Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana) . ( ' 97'l) 'Eduard Fuchs: Col l ec tor and Historian', New German Critique, 5· ( ' !)()B) Ober Walter Benja m in ( Fa M : Suhrkamp ) . Srholcm, G rshom ( 1 975) Walter Benjamin - Die Geschichte einer Freundschaft (FaM: - ·-
- ·-
·
Su hrkamp ) . Hlo ·h , Ern('Mt ( 1 �.)70) 11 / hilosoph of tlu Futuo·e ( N w Y o r k : H erd r & H ·rd 1' ) . --- ( I , 7 1 ) On K arl Mar ( N w ork: H rd r nd d ). I ·I t , I w i t ( I ' 7 ) ' hriji n (llr l.itoratur und K u11st 11 1934 ISJ,J I , ( F M : uh k mp) l
ill
Bibliography 'Against Georg Lukacs', New Left Review, 84 ( 1 974) . ( 1 968) Das Dreigroschenbuch ( FaM: Suhrkamp) . Engels, Frederick ( 1 94 1 ) Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, (ed .) Dutt C. P., (New York: I nternational Publishers) . ' adamcr, Hans-Georg ( 1 960) Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1 975) . Habcrmas, Jiirgcn ( 1 968) Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro ( L ndon: Heinemann, 1 97 2 ) . - ( 1 g68) Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse (FaM: Suhrkamp) . - ( 1 968) Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologic' (FaM: Suhrkamp) Towards a Rational So iery , trans. Jeremy J . Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1 97 1 ) . ( 1 970) Arbeit Erkenntnis Fortschritt Aufsii.tze 1954 - 1970 (Amsterdam: De munter) . ( 1 970) .(:ur Logik der SozialwissenschafCen (FaM: Suhrkamp) . ( ' 97 ' ) Philosophisch - Politische Pr'!file (FaM: Suhrkamp) 'Why More Philosophy?' , t rans. E . B. Ashton, Social Research, 38. ( 1 7 1 ) T heory and Practice, trans. John Viertel ( London: Heinemann, 1974) . ( 1 973) 'What does a crisis mean today? Legitimation Problems in Late Capitalism', ' o ial Research, 40. ( 1 7 3 ) Legitimationsproblem im Spiitkapitalismus (FaM: Suhrkamp) Legitimation Crisis, l n . Thomas M cCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1 976) . ( 1 7 ) .(:ur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (FaM: Suhrkamp) . H g I, U . F. W. ( 1 807) Phenomenology of Mind, trans. James Baillie (London: Allen and ·-
--
·
"
nwin, 1 3 1 ) . ( 1 811 1 ) Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 :.1 ) . id gg r , Martin ( 1 927) Being and Time, trans.John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson ( f, rd : Basil Blackwell, 1 967) . ( 1 29) T he l!.'ssence of Reasons, trans. Terrence Mazik (Evanston: Northwestern niv rsi t y Pr ss, 1 969) . 1 ) Nietz sche , vols. 1 and 11 (Pfullingen) . (1 , M a x ( 1 925) Ober Kanis Kritik der Urteilskraft als Bindeglied zwischen theorelischer Hn h i
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( 1 .)3 6) Studien aber Autoritiit und Familie (Paris: Alcan) . ( I .) 7 ) Eclipu of Reason ( New York: Seabury) . ( I , 6• ) ��unni.rJe T hco do r W. Adorno zum sechzigsten Geburtstag, (FaM: Europaische
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·-·-
1
· h k
m
).
( 1 97 I )
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tr n . ).
v lop mtnl qj '
Ianda
(ur
·
IIi
It
n
'riti
a/
und
Bibliography Simmel, Ernst (ed.) ( 1 946) Anti-Semitism. A Social Disease (New York: I nternational Universities Press ) . Slater, Phil ( 1 977) Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) . Spykman, Nicholas J . ( 1 925) The Social Theory of Georg Simmel (University of Chicago Press) . Stammer, Otto (ed .) ( 1 97 1 ) Max Weber and Sociology Today (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) . Stern, Fritz ( 1 963) The Politics of Cultural Despair ( University of California Press) . Stern, ] , P. ( 1 975) Hitler. The Fuhrer and the People (London: Fontana) . Taylor, Ian, and Walton, Paul, and Young, Jock (ed.) ( 1 976) Critical Criminology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) . Tenbruck, Friedrich ( 1 958) 'Georg Simmel ( 1 858 - 1 9 1 8) ', Kolner ,Zeitschrififiir Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 1 o. Therborn, Goran ( 1 970) 'Frankfurt Marxism: A Critique', New Leji Review, 63. Theunissen, Michael ( 1 969) Gesellschaft und Geschichte ;cur Kritik der Kritischer Theorie (Berlin: de Gruyter) . Tiedemann, Rolf ( 1 973) Studien ;cur Philosophic Walter Benjamins (FaM: Suhrkamp) . Unseld, Siegfried (ed.) ( 1 972) ,Zur Aktualitiit Walter Benjamins (FaM: Suhrkamp) . Wawrzyn, Lienhard ( 1 973) Walter Benjamins Kunsttheorie Kritik einer Rezeption (Darmstadt und Neuwied: Luchterhand) . Weingartner, Rudolf H ( 1 960) Experience and Culture: The Philosophy of George Simmel (Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press) . Wellmer, Albrecht ( 1 97 1 ) Critical Theory of Socie!J, trans. john Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder) . Whitehead, A. N . ( 1 926) Science and the Modern World ( London: Fontana, 1 975) . Witte Bernd ( 1 975) 'Benjamin and Lukacs: Historical Notes on their Political and Aesthetic Theories', New German Critique, 5· Wittfogel, Karl ( 1 928) Oriental Despotism ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 957) . Wolff, Kurt H . (ed.) ( 1 959) Georg Simmel Essays on Sociology, Philosophy and Aesthetics ( New York: Harper and Row, 1 965) . Wolff, Kurt H. and Moore, Barrington J r ( 1 967) The Critical Spirit Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon) . Wrong, Dennis (ed.) ( 1 970) Max Weber, Makers of Modern Social Science ( New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs) .
Subj ect Index
absolute 5 7 , 59, 6o, 64-5, 66-8 abstract g5, 4 7 , 59 -6o, 62 - 6, 70, 7 2, 89, 1 08, 1 18 - 1 9, 1 22, 1 24, 1 27, 1 g9, 1 42 -4, 1 49 action social 82-g theory of 74 aesthetics 24, g5, g6, 62 -g, 76, 1 09 - 1 1 , 1 14, 1 18, 1 24 alienation 28-g 1 , gg, 40, 4g, 86, 88, 100, 1 g5, 1 40, 1 85n allegory 38 -42, 1 22 - 3 anomie 28 antinomy 54, 57, 59, 62 -6, 69, 7 5 - 6, 77 , 82, 1 1 0, 1 1 2, 1 25, 1 g5, 1 42, 1 49, 1 8 m anti-semitism 5, 1 04-6 appearance 1 49; see also essence art 50, 1 1 4 - 1 5, 1 1 7 - 18, 1 28, 1 48 sociology of 76, 77 , 109, 1 1 g, 1 1 9 authenticity 54, 70, 7 2 -4 authoritarianism 5, So, 10g becoming ( Werden)
2 1 , 24, 1 50
capitalism 1 - 2, 4 - 5, 2g, 2 7 , 28-9, go, g6, 40, 47. 49 -5 1 , 6o, 64, 78, 8g, 86-9g, I Og -5, 108, 1 1 5- 1 6, 1 1 8 - 1 9, 1 32, 1 40- 1 , 1 46 - 8 chiasmus 1 g, g9, 54, 59, 6o, 66, 76, 8 1 , 82 cinema I 1 6- 1 8, ' 34 class 2 -4, 7 , 19, 23, 28, g5, 5 1 , 58, 86 - 7 , 97, 1 1 2, • 33. 1 40 - g consciousness 3 , 89, 9 1 , 99 - 1 00, 1 40 commodity fet ishis m g, 2 7 -8, go - 1 , g3 , g5, 40, 4·2, 4 3 · 46 - 7, 49, 55. 74 . 79. 82, 98 - 9, 1 03, • • B - • 9. 1 30, I 32 , • 36, 1 39 -40 , 1 44
romprch �on cpt
nsivc thinking
58, 99 1 1 - 1 2 , 24., 4 4 - 9, 1 , 7 2, 75, 84., 1 0 1 , •B•n '
, , 4· 2 ,
4Q> 4 7 > fl4 (j
94.0,
I,
8 , 1 22, 1 2 4 ,
4· 6, [l, {),j.,
I
1 2 7, 0
constellation 13, go- 1 critical theory 6, 9 1 , 1 43, 1 50; see also theory culture 1 , 6 - 8, 1 4, 27, 32 - 5, 36, 39 - 40, 7 5, 92, Iog, 1 1 4 - 15, 1 19, 1 4 1 , 1 46 philosophy of ix, 1 5, 32 sociology of 1og - 1 0 culture industry 5 , 6 - 7, 50, 95, I og, 1 20 - 1 , 1 85n Dasein 7 1 -3, 95 Deutung 1 02
dialectic 2, 53, 5 7 , 63 -4, 75, 77 negative 1 1 - I 2, 44-5, 53, 56, 6o, 68, 1 42, ' 5 ' · 1 52 of enlightenment 4 -5, 1 9 - 20, 26, I 38 of humanism I 38 domination 5, 20, 24, 26, 59-60, 65-6, 68, 7 4, 76, Bo, 86 - 90, 92, 95, 103 - 5, 1 og, · 1 20, 1 38, 1 40- I ego 24, 59, 6 7 , 7 3, 93 - 5, 1 06, I 42 empmc1sm 3, 66- 7 epistemology ix, g5, 56, 65 - 70, 7 6, 77 , B I , 95, 1 38, 1 42 -g, 1 46 equality 64-5, 87, 1 40 essence/appearance 37, 59, 77, 79, 99, IOI - 2, I 50 existentialism 62, 75, 1 29 experience 5 7 , I O I , 1 08, 1 1 7 , 1 50 Expressionism I 1 4- 1 5, I 22, 1 29 Fascism Bo, 92, 95, 1 03 - 6, 1 1 5 form 32, 36, 1 1 0 - 1 4, 1 23 -4, I 29 - 3 1 , 1 g4 -5, 1 40, 1 5 1 cultural 1 4., 35 - 6, 42, 79, I 02, 1 16, 140- I , 1 4.6 inl 2 7 ·- 8, 3 2 - 4 , 1 40 - 1 , ' 43 so
iol
gy
Frankfurt
f
32
·hool
ix,
1 -8 ,
9
,
0,
1 Q6
· 7,
Subject Index
208
hermeneutics 37, 1 43, 1 45, 1 47 historicism 25, 38, 50, 1 38, 1 46 h is tory 24, 37 -9, 50- 1 , 63-4, 7 1 , 1 1 6- 1 7, '43. 145 -6 humanism 1 38-g, 1 42, 1 48 Benjamin 37, 6 1 2 , 22-3, 25, 38, 40, 53-4, 62, 67 - 8, 70 - 1, 84 id al-t ypes 29, 83, go- 1 , 103 id n t i t y 2 2, 37, 42, 6o-2, 63, 67, 69, 70, 72, 82, go, ' 4 7 t hinking 23, 44- 9, ss-6, 6o-2, 66, 70-s, 82, 83, I I I , 142, 1 45-8, 1 5 1 will t o 22 - 3, 4 1 id� 1 gy 2 2 , 3 6, 70, 74-5, 92, 95, 1 1 5, 1 42 ritique or 5 1 , 146 illusi n o, 4.0 , 7 5, 1 29 - 30, 1 39, 1 40, 1 49 ssary 23 n s ial 23, 42, 66, 75-6, 88, 1 00, 108, 1 1 7, I 1 9 , 1 24., 1 2 7, 1 30, 1 36 - 7, 1 38 - 4 1 , idea in
idealism
m g s
1 45-6
dinlc
tical
4'
18, 2 1, 5 1 , 54, 67, 76, 83, 146 - 7, 1 5 1 lmmarwl{f!hilosophie 66, 68 r 8 , 2 6 , 49-50, 56, 62 -5, 70, 74, Individual 7 7 - 5, g7 , 1 00, 1 03 - 6, I I I, I 1 2, 122-3, imm ncnt method I
1 4., 1 39,
·· 1 01
82 · 3. 88 - g, 8, 1 1 9 ·· 2 0,
1 07
4 , 74
argon
92, 94. 100, 1 02, 1 3 2 - 7 , ' 39 - 4 ' ·
•
1 , 7 0, 7 4 , 1 2 9 lung u g I isur c 9 , 1 00, 1 08, 1 g, 133, ' 4 ' libt�rolism 88, t oo, 1 78 n life �·l • l.ink.rk11rvt, di• 1 1
l i t rruturc lofli .
lovr
3 , 81 , 10
�� 3, li4. �
I
I
1 1, 121
method I I - 1 2, 1 7, 1 9, 57, 68, So, 82-3, 96, 1 09, I I I , 1 36 indirect r 8, 1 02 - 3 mind (Geist) 1 2, 22, 48, 57, sg - 6o, 66 - 8, 76, 84, 86, 1 1 4 - 1 6, ' 5 1 modernism 8 , 54, 1 1 4, 1 22, 1 24, 1 29 montage 1 25, 1 2 7 morality 1 9 - 2 1 , 70, 76, 84 - 5, 1 48 practical philosophy 57 - 8, 70, 73 music 8 1 , 1 09- 14, 1 19, 1 2 1 new 9 , 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 , 1 26, 1 3 1 , 1 34-5, 1 37, 1 89n popular s-6, 133-4. 1 3 7 sociology o f I I 0- 1 4, 1 3 1 Musikbliitter des Anbruchs 9 , 1 1 1 myth 5, 37 -40 naturalism 1 1 4 nature 1 4, 39, 6o, 77, 79-So, 85, 1 30, 1 46 domination of 5, 26, 79-80 fall of 39 history of 37-40, 42, 49, 76, 86, 1 52 second 39, 40, 79 -80, 83, 85-6 negative dialectic see dialectic neo�Kantianism 2, 8, 35, 38, 53, 54 non�identity thinking 44- 5, 47-9, 56, 6o- 1 , 73, 79, 82 - 3, I I I object 3 · 44 - s, ss-7, 60 - 2, 72, 1 47. 1 52 objective standpoint 1 6, 1 8 ontology 38 -9, 54· s6, 6o, 66 - 7, 70-3, 79 . 1 24, 1 46 opinion research g6- 7, 1 02 organisation 8 1 , 86, 88 - go, 97, 1 1 6, 1 23, 1 4 1 parataxis 1 3 phantasmagoria 3 1 , 40-2, 47 phenomenology ix, 65, 67 - 8, 1 43, 1 45 philosophy 52 -6, 1 52· political I , 2, 8, 25, 41 , so, ss -6, s8, 70, 74 - s. 76, 88, 95, I 00, 1 14- I 5, I I 7- I 8, I 28, 1 341 1 38, 1 4 1 -2, 148 positivism 2, 4, 4 1 , 8 1 , 84, 95, 1 43 - 5 dispute over 4, 8 1 , 1 1 4 power 26, 28, 35·, 50, 55, 87, 95, 1 4 1 praxis 3 7 , 52 - 3, 57, 1 39, 143, 1 47 -8 Prin ceton Radio Research Project 9, 8 1 , 97 8, 1 03
prod uction forces or (production/rcproductifln)
59. 8 7 , t S, 1 1 8 - 2 1 , r 26, I 0 • 21 I 36, I 39 4. 1 , I 4 6 mode r 2 1 , 2 , 2 7 , 3 · 4· � · 4 - !)0, 6 , 6 , 1 6, I I I 13 6!1, B ' 06�-7. I ot ' I I 1 09 ,
1 1 2 - 1 3,
1 1
209
Subject Index rational identity thinking
44 - 5, 48, 56, 6o - 1 ,
74 - 5, 83 rationality goal
7 1 , 73, 83, 86
7 1 , I I 4 - 1 5, 1 2 1 - 7, 1 38, 1 48
reason
( Vemurift) (ratio) 63,
reflection
68 - g
54, 59, 63, 6g, 72
regression
ix, 3, 5, 24, 26, 2 7 - 30, 34 - 5, 38, 40 - 2 , 43> 46 - 5 1 , 55 > 62, 64, 66 , 6g , 72 - 3, 75, 78 - g , 82, 85, 86, 90, 95, 1 05, 1 08, I l l ,
1 1 6 - t S, 1 24 - 5, 1 28, 1 30, 1 34 , 1 36 - 7, 1 38,
1 29 - 30, 1 39 constitutive 68- g, 77 system 8, 1 4, 23, 55, 57 I I , 25, 39, 44, 48, 5 1 ' 52 - 53, 76, 83, 97 - 1 02 , 1 08, 1 42 - 3, 1 46 - 8 totality 2 , 8, 36 - 7, 53, 57, 7 7 , 79, 83 - 4, 1 1 2 , 1 1 9, 1 29, 1 3 2 , 1 49
theory
Trans;;_enden;r_philosophie
1 4 1 - 5 , 1 67n
typology sin
understanding
social facts
36, 82 -4, 1 1 4
1 8, 2 1 , 24, 35, 52 , 56, 59, 63, 78 - 85, go,
1 00 - 1 , 1 1 4 - 1 5, 1 36, 1 43 sociology
2 - 3 , 1 0, 62, n - 82, 1 52
empirical
and psychoanalysis
style
91 -3.
1 43
of reification state
( Verstehen)
Ursprung 37 Ursprungsphi/osophie
82 - 3,
1 02,
1 39 ,
65, 7 1
2 0, 44 , 47 - 8, 6 1
5, 6 - 7, 77, So - 2 , 95 - 1 02 , t o2 -
8, 1 45 reflexive
1 52 , 1 77 n
utopia
66
1 03 - 4, 1 07 - 8, 1 34 - 5, t 86n
95, 1 0 1 - 2 , 1 45
63 - 4
society
1 6, 1 8
4 1 , 57 - 8, 66, 7 t , 78, 1 06, 1 24 - 5,
95, 105, 1 32 , 1 48
reification
scientism
40, 50, 6o, 1 06, 1 1 6
subjective standpoint subjectivity
20, 24, 7 1 , 82-3, 1 38 , 1 52 , 1 65n
3, 22, 32, 40- I , 5 5 -
6 , 6o - 1 , 63, 66, 70, 76, 1 42, 1 47, 1 52 reconciliation of
82, 8g-go, 92
realism
1 42 , 1 45, 1 46, 1 52 subject/object dichotomy
29
4 , 28, 35, 58, 1 00 , 1 4 1 - 2 8, 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 5, 25, 1 2 2 -g, 1 39 , 1 48 3, 26, 50, 55, 5 7 - 8, 6 1 - 2 , 63 , 66, 70, 72 - 3, 75, 7 7 - s , 84, 1 06, 1 25, 1 28 ·- g, 1 39,
value t g , 2 1 , 24, 26, 32 - 3, 4 7 , 84, g8, 1 46 judgements 83 - 4 theory of ix, 4 - 5, 2 7 - 8, 30, 35, 43, 46 - 7, 56, 6 t , 63 - 4 , 73, 76, 78 - g, 82, 88, 1 1 8 - t g, 1 39 - 4 1 , 1 44, 1 46 Vienna School g, I I I , 1 3 1 , 1 34, t 88n
109,
subject
:(eitschriftfiir So;r.iaiforschung
2, 5, g, g6, g8, 1 04
Name Index
6r
Adam
A l b n , H ans
r 6on , r 8on 1 42
A l t h usscr, Louis
A r end t , H an nah
Eisler, Hanns
r 6gn
y r, A . J .
r 66n
g, 1 1 4, 1 33, 1 35, 184n, r 88n 57 , I 73"
Engels, Friedrich
17
Arist t ic
Duvignand, Jean
r 83n
Fetscher, Iring
r 66n, r 8 7 n 1 42
Feuerbach, Ludwig Fichte, J. G.
28, 3 7
Fleischmann, Eugene
r 66n g, 1 7, 8 r , 8 7 , 9 1 - '2 , 94, 1 05, Freud, Sigmund 1 20, 1 4 1 , 1 42 , r 64n t hoven, Ludwig van
n nj
O,
49
0,
I , 90, r 6gn, 1 7011,
60 -
g,
1
I I I , 1 83n
i x - x, g, 1 4, 30 - I , 35 - 42,
m i n , W a l vr
1 10 on
I I 4 - I 9, 1 2 1 , 1 27 , 1 72n, 1 73n, 1 85n,
Freyer, Hans
r 66n
Friedeburg, Ludwig von Frisby, David
Gadamer, Hans-Georg Gallas, Helga
-·
1 1 , 1 2 1 , r 88n
r66n
1 59n
Gellner , Ernest
'3
1 47 , r g m
r 84n
Gamble, Andrew Gay, Peter
r6rn
1 77 n
1 7 2n
Giddens, Anthony
1 7 7n Goethe, Wolfgang von 3 7 Goldmann, Lucien
r 67n, 1 7 I n 43, 1 7 1 n
Grossmann, Henryk Grossner, Claus
r6m.
Grunberg, Carl
2 , 1 59n
Habermas, Jiirgcn
8, 87 ,
1 4 1 , 1 46 - 7 , r 6 r n, 1 78n, r 8on, r 85n ,
r 64n, r 65n, 1 72n , 1 7 7 11,
C
r 8gn, n
r 83 1 1
, M os o
;a r ve r ,
Tc
1 6711
rell
Chr i�t it• , R ichard
Cicourrl , A ron
V.
.1
02 n r gon
1 6 1 11 1 on
I
?n
r gon, r g r n r 6 u1
H a k , Lothar Hampshire,
' tuart
Hcgci, G . F. W .
43, 4 7 , •fO, r 6, 1 n , 1(j
ide
r1 M
g,
rt 1 1
r 8gn
1 2 , I 7, 2 2 , 2 0 , 30, 3 2 , g•, 37 , - 62 , 67 , 1 0:1, r o , 1 42 , l •f , 7"
tin
1 01 70 ' I7 1 I7
I
14
I
2I I
Name Index HO!derlin, Friedrich Horkheimer, M'ax
71 x , 2 - 9, 1 9, 96, 1
q,
Martins, Herminia 1 59n,
1 6on, 1 6 m , 1 65n, 1 7 7n, 1 Son, 1 S2n Horney, Karen
92
Husser!, Edmund
S, 2 2 , 3S, 52 - 4, 65 - 70, 7 1 ,
7 3 . 76, 1 0 1 , 1 43 . 1 45 · I 73n, 1 74n, I 7 sn, 1 79n, 1 8gn
Huxley, Aldous
1 S3n
Jacoby, Russell
1 S2n
Jahoda, Maria
1 S2 n
1 90n
Marx, Karl ix, 3 - 5, 22, 23, 2 7 - 33, 35 , 40, 46 - 7, 5 1 , ss - 6, ss , 62, 74, S7 - 9, I o4 - s, 1 09, I I S - 1 9, 1 40 - 1 , 1 44, 1 46, 1 6on, I 63n, I 66n, I 67n, I 68n, I 73n, I 79n
Mayer, Hans Meszaros,
I 84n
Istvan
1 6on,
Mitzman, Arthur
Jameson, Frederick
62, 74 - 5 1 590, 1 6on, I 6 I n, 1 66n, 1 7 1 n,
1 S9n
20, 1 1 7, 1 22 , 1 2 5 , 1 29, 1 S5n Kant, Immanuel 9, 32, 37, 4s , 56, 66 - 7,
6g,
S4, 9 1
Kolakowski, Leszek
1 74n
Kracauer, Siegfried
1 6 m, 1 6Sn, 1 S4n
43,
I I O - I I , I I S - 1 9,
Krumme, Peter
I 70n
Kiinzli, Arnold
16m
Leibowitz, Rene Leiss, William
16m,
9, 97 - S, 1 6on, 1 62n, 1 Son 1 S3n 1 6Sn
Lichtheim, George
1 6on
Lindner, Burckhardt
1 66n , 1 7Sn, 1 S3n
Lunn, Eugene
1 7 1 n, 1 S 7 n
9, 1 1 0 , 1 22 ·· 6, 1 62 n , 1 S3n ,
I S7n
1
Riicker , Silvie
1
mn
I67n
1 6Sn 1 S3n 1 2 1 , 1 29, I 74n, I 76n 1 59n, 1 6on, I Son 16m
3S, 53, 1 66n 2S, 1 63n
Schlegel, Friedrich Schmidt, Alfred
37
I 6on, I 64n, 1 S9n
Schnebel, Dieter
I 63n
Schoeller, W. F. S.
I6m I 69n, 1 72n • 1 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 I S, 1 3 5 - 6, 1 SSn,
1 S9n
M a n n , Th mas
om
Rovatti, Pier Aldo Ryle, Gilbert
16In
1 SSn
Schopenhauer, Arthur
M a hler, Gustav
8 7 , t i <J.,
1 59n, I 6on, I 72n
Schonberg, Arnold
1 7 211 1 1o - 1 1
Mllnnh .i m , K arl 22 M r u , Herbert 30,
1 gon
I 64n
Scholem, Gerschom
C. B.
ll
Piitz, Peter
Schiller, Friedrich
1 90n
Lukes, S t eve n
21
Pullberg, Stanley
Scheler, Max
1 SSn
1 S4 n, 1S7n, 1 9 1 n
1,
I6m
Schafers, Bernhard
1 29, 1 39, 1 42, 1 4S, 1 67n, 1 6Sn, 1 70n, 1 7Sn,
1 7 7n, 1 7H n
95, 1 6on
Post, Werner
Schad, Susan Petra_
Lukacs, Georg ix, 2 - 3, 6, 1 4, 22, 30 - 1 , 34, 35 - 42, so, 53, s6, S6, 1 1 4 - 16, 1 2 1 - 7 ,
M
Popper, Karl
Sartre, Jean-Paul
I 6gn
1 77n
Luckmann, Thomas
Macpherson,
4 , 6 , I 59n, I 6on I 66n
Rosen, Charles
1 6on, 1 66n
Liick, Hartmut
Pollock, Friedrich
Rohrmoser, Gii n ther
1 64n
Levine, Donald N.
Lowith, Karl
111
6I
Ringer, Fritz
Kiirnberger, Ferdinand Lazarsfeld, Paul
Plato
9 I - 3, 1 44, 1 7 7n, I 90n
I S4n
Proust, Marcel
20
1 62n, 1 S2 n
Parsons, Talcott
Popitz, Heinrich
41
Krenek, Ernst
1 66n
I 67n, 1 77n
Pfitzner, Hans 9, 1 7, 36, 3S, 53, 62 - 5,
1 64n Klages, Ludwig
O'Neill, John
Pascal, Roy
14
1 gon
Kraus, Karl
190n
Ollmann, Bertrell
Kafka, Franz
Keat, Russell
2 9 , 1 66n
37
Novalis
Offe, Claus
4I
Kierkegaard, Soren
1 67n,
ix, 3, 6, I 1 , 1 7 - 25, 2S, 29, 32, 37, 38, 55, 67, 1 64n, 1 65n, I 66n, 1 7sn
Jaspers, Karl
Kassner, Rudolf
1 66n,
Nietzsche, Friedrich
1 6Sn, 1 S3n
Jay, Martin Jung, C , G .
1 63n,
I 72 n
1 67 n ,
• 76n,
Schultz, Klaus
1 S3n
Schutz, Alfred
70
3
Schwcppcnhiiuscr, Hermann
S i m m cl , Georg 1
Sn
1 64n 1 4 , 28, 29, 32 - 6,
Soh n· R et h I , Alfred ornbart, W n
1 66n
53, 1 63 n ,
212
Name Index
Sonnenmann, Ulrich
74
pykman, Nicholas J. tern, Fritz
1 59n
tern,
1 75n
J.
P.
1 10
T n bruc h, Friedrich H . 1 68n Th •unisscn, Michael 1 77n 13, 8 1 ,
1 6gn, 1 70n , 1 73n 0 ·an C . 190n
Tipps,
T
'
n n ies ,
Ferdinand
29
1 83n
Wagner, Richard
1 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 35 , 1 88n
Tied mann, Rolf
1 gon
Veblen, Thorstein
Stcucrmann, Eduard travinsky, Igor
Urry, John
168n
1 55,
Walton, Paul Weber, Max
1 1 0, 1 1 2, 1 2 1 , 1 25 - 6
1 66n 6, 26, 29, 32, 82 - 4, go, 1 1 2, 1 44,
1 66n, 1 77n, 1 83n, 1 gon Webern, Anton 1 6 m,
1 62n,
Weill, Kurt
1 88n
1 35
Weingartner, Rudolf H. Wilkinson, Rupert Wittfogel, Karl
1 68n
1 82n
43, 1 1 4, 1 7 1 n, 184n
