Material Virtue: Ethics And The Body In Early China (Sinica Leidensia)

MATERIAL VIRTUE

SINICA LEIDENSIA EDITED BY

W. L. IDEMA IN COOPERATION WITH

P.K. BOL • B.J. TER HAAR • D. R. KNECHTGES E.S. RAWSKI • E. ZÜRCHER • H.T. ZURNDORFER

VOLUME LXVI

MATERIAL VIRTUE Ethics and the Body in Early China BY

MARK CSIKSZENTMIHALYI

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2004

On the cover: A detail of slips one through twelve of the Guodian Wuxing, from Hubei sheng Jingmen shi bowuguan, Guodian Chumu zhujian (1998).

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISSN 0169-9563 ISBN 90 04 14196 0 © Copyright 2004 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

............................................................................

1

CHAPTER ONE BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE .. Virtues in the Ru context................................................................. Kongzi’s disciples and the unity of the Ru..................................... External criticisms of the Ru virtue discourse ...............................

13 14 22 32

CHAPTER TWO MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WUXING.............. Excavation of the Wuxing................................................................ Moral motivation in the Wuxing §1-9............................................. The anatomy of the virtues in the Wuxing §10-27 ......................... The identification of the Wuxing and the Zisi myth .......................

59 62 67 82 86

CHAPTER THREE

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY IN THE MENGZI...........................................................

The Mengzi and the Wuxing ............................................................ Problems of plural and conflicting values ...................................... The physiognomy and physiology of virtue in the Mengzi............ Metaphors for self-cultivation in the Mengzi .................................

101 103 113 127 141

CHAPTER FOUR THE SAGE’S TRANSCENDENT BODY .................. Nature and the origins of the sage’s culminant virtue ................... Being attuned to the Way: the sage and the jade chimestone ........ The Mengzi’s transtemporal sage ...................................................

161 162 178 192

CHAPTER FIVE MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE .......... The Wuxing commentary and the qi of the virtues......................... Jia Yi’s development of the Wuxing and Mengzi tradition............. Sage and state in early imperial China ...........................................

201 202 216 232

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................

251

APPENDIX ONE The reconstructed Zisi........................................ APPENDIX TWO The Guodian Wuxing......................................... APPENDIX THREE The Mawangdui Wuxing and commentary....

257 277 311

vi

CONTENTS

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................

373

INDEX ...............................................................................................

391

INTRODUCTION Over the past four decades, Chinese archaeology has yielded tremendous new resources for the study of ancient history. From the legal and administrative documents unearthed from tombs at Shuihudi ၨ‫ڴ‬ϙ, Juyan ‫ ע׍‬and Zhangjiashan ઠࣁʱ, to the wide variety of technical and philosophical works from Mawangdui ਠ̙੧, to the provocative mixture of divinatory and administrative texts from Baoshan ̸ʱ, Wangjiatai ̙ࣁ͓, and Yinwan ˄ᝯ, to the political and religious essays from Yinqueshan ჿఅʱ and Guodian ௱‫מ‬, multiple new vistas have been opened on early Chinese society. The influence of these discoveries may be measured in different ways. Using the most general scale, they have substantially expanded the textual record and provided new information about how texts were integrated into the material culture of tombs. Using a more sensitive measure, the new discoveries have augmented the record with different kinds of text, challenging received notions of school and genre. Because these new manuscripts were interred for reasons that likely had to do with the postmortem passages of the tomb occupants, they probably had personal or social significance that differed from that of public or archived texts that became the basis of the corpus that has been continuously transmitted to the present. Additionally, because excavated texts were not subjected to centuries of selection and redaction, they are free of some of the layers of interpretation and subtle recasting by writers embroiled in successive generations of intellectual controversies. As such, they reflect perhaps not an originary or pure moment in the history of Chinese literature, but at least one lacking some of the accumulated filters that have come to be seen as original aspects of the received corpus. In terms of method, how do we integrate these new resources into our understanding of early China? This question, too, may be answered in more than one way. It is possible to use the expansion of the textual record as an occasion to fill in lacunae in the received record: matching excavated texts with lost titles in transmitted records, attributing these texts to known personalities or identifying them with familiar schools and lineages. Consistent with the more nuanced reception outlined above, it is also possible to use them as an occasion to revise our

2

INTRODUCTION

understanding of the structures of traditional thought. Hybrid or novel content calls into question the appropriateness of traditional taxonomies, along with cherished assumptions about the production and transmission of texts. Formal features of excavated texts, including the frequent lack of explicit information on authorship or affiliation, compel us to begin to wrest these early texts from their popular association with hermetic Chinese philosophers, the kind so often portrayed anachronistically as lonely figures in “mountains and rivers” style paintings. A methodology that calls these structures into question, of course, may not only strike some as deliberately and unnecessarily provocative, it also requires the construction of new frameworks to make up for the newly created disorder. This study grows out of work on one recently excavated text that calls attention to previously unappreciated, or, occasionally, misunderstood aspects of the received record. In introducing this text, I set out to contextualize it in a revised account of the lively ethical and epistemological debates of its time. The most difficult stage of writing of this study was the point when a conversation about the nature of the virtues moved from background context for a study of an excavated text to the foreground. As a result, the subject became the more general study of the perceived materiality of the virtues based on multiple texts, both received and excavated. The resulting work is less an attempt to engage the legacies of the legendary philosophers of ancient China than a recasting of the written record (through which their biographies were constructed) as the partial account of a vital conversation that, taken as a whole, appears rather different from its constituent parts considered individually. Of course, the notion that one can extract a two thousand year old “conversation” out of the static of surviving received and excavated texts is not without its problems. Not only is it rare for a text to be explicit about its dialog with another text, but there is no reason to assume that the rules for conversations with which we are familiar would even apply to ancient China. Yet there are elements of this metaphor that are unquestionably useful. A “conversation” can usually be distinguished by factors such as a shared vocabulary, the engagement of common propositions and arguments, and appeals to common epistemological foundations. These considerations are the basis for the claim that there was an important conversation about the nature of the virtues in China from the fourth through the second centuries B.C.E., one that included the developing theory that virtues had material attributes inside the body. In order to introduce the specific topic of this study, it is perhaps best to begin with a story.

INTRODUCTION

3

In the summer of 481 B.C.E., an officer of the state of Qi named Tian Chang Ήગ arrested his own sovereign. The terse chronicle of events of the time called the Chunqiu ‫( ߲ݱ‬Spring and Autumn) records that later that year, Tian Chang went even further and had the ruler executed.1 This action soon divided the population of Qi between those loyal to the previous leader and those who supported his younger brother, now in place as Tian’s puppet.2 Tian addressed this division by inviting all the citizens of Qi to pledge their loyalty to him, vowing to kill those who did not do so along with their families. Those who had been loyal to the old ruler now faced a quandary, according to the second century B.C.E. Hanshi waizhuan ᓟ ༶ ͙ ෭ (Han’s Outer Commentary to the Odes). That work uses the words of a Qi official of the time named Shi Tuo Δ̧ to illustrate the predicament: ‫ڣ‬Ѽ̣η፶ ‫׫ۍ‬ʛ ૠ፶̣АѼ˃Ֆ ‫ۍ‬Ҩʛ ̧۱ʿ঻ ೸ʿຼ ‫ݵ‬ ଓѳ፶ʛ નʆЩຼ ‫ࠌݵ‬ѳѼʛ To abandon one’s ruler in order to preserve the lives of one’s parents is to deny loyalty. To abandon one’s parents in order to die in the service of one’s lord is to deny filial piety. For these reasons, I cannot (do either). Thus, not to pledge is the same as killing my parents, but to follow others and pledge is to turn my back on my ruler.3

Shi Tuo’s only recourse is to pledge his loyalty to the new ruler in order to spare his parents, and then impale himself on his sword in order to die for his lord. The commentary by Han Ying ᓟᏮ (fl. 150 B.C.E.) 1 2

Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhengyi 59.19a-b. (Cf. Legge 1895, v. 5, pages 838-40). The Zuozhuan ͣ෭ (Zuo commentary) records that in the neighboring state of Lu, an official named Kong Qiu ˱̞ was also troubled by the events in Qi, but saw the divisions in Qi as an opportunity for Lu’s military. The Zuo explanation of the Chunqiu records that Kong spent three days purifying himself by fasting (zhai ᄫ) and then requested that Lu attack Qi (Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhushu 59.19a-b). Kong’s actions are also the subject of a passage in the Lunyu ቈგ (Analects), where the differences between the Zuo and Analects accounts of his words have been the subject of considerable critical consternation. See Lunyu jishi 29.999-1002 (cf. Lau 1979, 126-7). 3 Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng (6.12) v. 2, 354-5 [cf. Hightower 1952, 202-3]. A parallel in the first century B.C.E. Xinxu ๘Һ (Xinxu jiaoshi 8.1011-3) is followed by an account of the dilemma of a Qi high official who is impaled on the horns of a dilemma between benevolence and courage (Xinxu jiaoshi 8.1013-4). The Zuozhuan passage just cited uses the rebel’s original name Chen Heng ௾‫ݔ‬, as do the Xinxu and chapter 41 of the Kongzi jiayu ˱ʪࣁგ. The Hanshi waizhuan and Shiji ͑৩ (32.1512) use the later name Tian Chang Ήગ. This difference can be explained by the facts that the surname Tian Ή was taken by the members of the Chen ௾ clan during Tian Chang’s term as Chancellor under Duke Ping ͦ of Qi (Shiji 32.1512, n.3), and that the word Heng ‫ ݔ‬was changed to Chang ગ in many texts following its taboo subsequent to the death of Liu Heng ᄸ‫ݔ‬, Emperor Wen of the Han Dynasty, in 179 B.C.E.

4

INTRODUCTION

continues by citing a couplet from the classic Shijing ༶໩ (Classic of Odes) to summarize Shi Tuo’s situation: ʆ Π Љ Ե න ਂ ႕ Զ “People have a saying: ‘Both advancing and retreating are problematic.’” This same couplet is used to comment on similar moral dilemmas, and its use here illustrates the way that, by Han Ying’s time, such dilemmas had become a conscious problem for writers about ethics.4 In this story, the crux of Shi Tuo’s dilemma is that his moral decision-making depends on following different scripts with respect to the different roles that he plays in society. Tian Chang’s coup d’état and subsequent attempts to consolidate power plunge Shi Tuo into a situation where acting with loyalty to his former lord and with filial piety to his parents call for different behaviors. Since “both advancing and retreating are problematic,” Shi Tuo chooses to die rather than be either unfilial or disloyal. The disposition of filial piety (xiao Ҩ) he had deliberately cultivated in the context of his home life and that of loyalty (zhong ‫ )׫‬specific to his service at court clash after leaving their original spheres. It is significant that the problem is portrayed in terms of competing dispositions or patterns of behavior, akin to what philosophers call “virtues,” and not the results of the actions themselves. His solution is neither to perform a cost-benefit analysis to select the course with the most positive consequences, nor yet is it to fall back on a set of maxims that he believes constitute human duty. These options are not open to him because he is operating in a context in which good actions flow from a set of virtues embodied in the behavior of exemplary figures in ancient times. Shi Tuo says as much in the preamble to the statement of his quandary: ͅ˃ՖѼ‫ ږ‬АմѼ ˃Ֆ “Serving one’s lord in ancient times was a matter of dying in service of one’s lord.”5 This way of thinking about right and wrong is 4 This line comes from “Sangrou” ट‫( ݾ‬Tender Mulberry, Mao 257), see Shijing zhuxi 875. This is the same phrase quoted by Shu Xiang ֋ώ in praise of Yanzi उʪ in the Yanzi chunqiu उʪ‫߲ݱ‬, after Yanzi explains how he is able to maintain both loyalty to even a lazy ruler and the deliberateness (xing м) which is a facet of his responsibility to the state’s subjects (Yanzi chunqiu jiaozhu 4.112-3). 5 Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng (6.12) v.2, 354 [cf. Hightower 1952, 202]. The same work records the testimony of a military officer whose father is held hostage by his enemies: ͸Ѽ˃ٗ ̣ଓմ̓ ʑ‫ۍ‬Ҩʪʛ “If I correctly apply the lord’s laws and in so doing kill my father, this would deny [what it means to be] a filial son.” In chapter ten of the Hanshi waizhuan, Han Ying invokes the same couplet from the Shijing to describe the dilemma of the brave major Shen Ming Όᄦ, whose enemies have taken his father hostage. Shen kills the enemies, but not before his father is also killed, at which point he takes his own life after a brief speech lamenting being unable to both be loyal and filial (Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng [10.24] v. 2, 468-9 [cf. Hightower 1952,

INTRODUCTION

5

characteristic of the general approach known as “virtue ethics,” and fruitful readings of early Chinese ethics as virtue ethics have been done in recent decades by Philip J. Ivanhoe, Lee Yearley, and Bryan W. Van Norden, to name a few.6 In this approach, conflicts between virtues may lead to genuine moral dilemmas, seemingly with no recourse to rationales that allow one to justify the abandonment of particular virtues. In this history of the discussion of the virtues, the Hanshi waizhuan’s analysis of Shi Tuo and cases like his signals a significant moment in early Chinese writing about ethics. It is one thing to talk about a specific action taken by the sage king Shun ൘ in the past (e.g., his insistence on proper conduct toward his family despite their repeated attempts to kill him) and to extol it as an example of a more general pattern of behavior or disposition called “filial piety.” It is another to leave the realm of the historical and treat two or more such patterns or dispositions in the abstract as prescriptive of different courses of action in the future. The first step is one of empirical classification and cultural memory. The second involves extracting the patterns from particular contexts in the exemplary stories that defined them and implicitly addressing a theoretical question: once contextually and locally defined patterns or dispositions are universalized, are they necessarily mutually consistent with each other? It is in this second sense, the extended discussion of virtues both abstracted from particular past actions and in the plural, that it is possible to refer to a “virtue discourse,” using the term “discourse” both in the literal sense of the “conversation” about the virtues and in its extended sense as the cultural patterns of meaning that underpin what is said and written about virtues in the period. It is in the context of the dynamic and multivocal virtue discourse of the fourth through second centuries B.C.E. that the contested concept of “material virtue” in the title of this book arose. The phrase “material virtue” refers narrowly to descriptions of the virtues in terms of their quasi-material properties. More generally, such descriptions are characteristic of the view that, once cultivated, the virtues manifest themselves through physiological changes in the body that may be observed by others. While from some philosophical perspectives questions such as: “What exactly is a virtue–is it animal, vegetable, or 344-5]). The seeming contradiction between the course of action dictated by loyalty and the one indicated by filial piety is similar to the dilemma faced by Shi Tuo. 6 See especially Yearley 1990, 1-23, and Ivanhoe 2000, 1-14. Van Norden 1996 provides an exemplary overview.

6

INTRODUCTION

mineral?” or “Can one tell a person’s moral qualities by looking him or her in the eye?” might appear pedantic or even bizarre, in some circles that sort of question was one that urgently mattered. Indeed, for some the virtues had specific quasi-material correlates in the body, and as such they were subject to physical processes such as accumulation, dissipation and disorder. The development of theories of material virtue may have been in part the result of external factors such as the influence of conceptions of the body and systematizing tendencies from outside the virtue discourse. Yet there were particular philosophical reasons for looking at the virtues in this way, too. Viewing the virtues as reducible to a common quasi-material substance metaphorically opened up the process of moral decision-making to the possibility of “measuring” the pulls of the different virtues on a person in the same way one weighed material objects on a balance. The potential for unifying the virtues inside the body held out the possibility of solving dilemmas such as Shi Tuo’s by imagining a condition in which measurable virtues were never truly in conflict. Indeed, many of the texts that develop the concept of material virtue are the same ones that hold out the possibility of reaching a level of moral perfection where moral reactions are spontaneous and genuine quandaries cannot arise. For example, when a sophist tries to trap Mengzi ׂʪ (Master Meng, late fourth and early third century B.C.E.) in a conundrum, the reply is that the correct course of action is so clear that one who does not follow it is not of the human race but actually a member of the chailang ৵॑, literally “jackals and wolves,” signifying a complete lack of moral impulses.7 For this reason, an account of material virtue in early China is an important part of the description of the paragon of moral perfection known at the time as sheng ໶ “sage.” The domain of this study of the concept of material virtue is a set of transmitted and archaeologically discovered texts from the late Warring States through the Han Dynasty. The virtue discourse developed along the lines summarized above in texts that have been transmitted over the millennia such as the Mengzi (early third century B.C.E.) and the Hanshi waizhuan (mid-second century B.C.E.) Owing to the archaeological discoveries of the past several decades, a number of works have surfaced that significantly expand our knowledge of early 7 Mengzi 4A17, Mengzi zhengyi 15.520-2 (cf. Lau 1970, 124-5). See chapter three for a more complete discussion of this passage.

INTRODUCTION

7

China, and of the virtue discourse in particular. Two previously lost works, the Wuxing ˉм (Five Kinds of Action) and a commentary to the Wuxing, provide a detailed moral psychology describing the process of the cultivation of the virtues, and they explain the virtues in terms similar to bodily humors. These two texts, recovered from tombs that had been sealed in the early third and second centuries B.C.E., shed light on the context and meaning of more familiar transmitted texts, and they also provide a valuable glimpse at aspects of early Chinese thought that were, for whatever reason, selected out of the transmission process. Taken together, the excavated and transmitted texts describe a sustained attempt to answer the question of what exactly a virtue is, and they wrestle with the problem of isolating a common dimension shared by all virtues that might allow a person to weigh them against each other, thereby addressing conflicts of virtue such as the one that led to Shi Tuo’s suicide. These texts not only make it possible to recover this interesting and original facet of ancient Chinese thought, but they also provide a rich set of materials for the comparative study of virtue ethics. The impulse to reduce the virtues to a common denominator is in part the result of a problem particular to systems of virtue ethics, especially ones in which virtues are role or context specific. The Wuxing, for instance, speaks of balancing the conflicting imperatives of ren ˋ (benevolence) and yi ໳ (righteousness or duty) in a judicial context. Even further, its title–Five Kinds of Action–points to its core concern with the relationship between five core virtues that it portrays as acting in concert under certain conditions. So too, in ancient Greece, the issue of the potential disagreement between the virtues was an important one. Socrates mentions the goal of a harmony, or a unity, of five core virtues in Plato’s Protagoras: “The question, if I am not mistaken, was this. Wisdom, temperance, courage, justice and holiness are five terms. Do they not stand for a single reality, or has each term a particular entity underlying it, a reality with its own separate function, each different for the other?”8 The similarity between these two texts from ancient Greece and ancient China indicates just how intrinsic the question of the unity of the virtues is to virtue ethics systems, in part because all such systems need to address the possibility that virtues could pull an actor in different directions. Intrinsic to both models is the idea that a good life is unified so that situations that appear to be conflicts to those outside actually are not conflicts to the actor. 8

349b, see Guthrie 1956, 85.

8

INTRODUCTION

Of course, it is also the case that the circumstances under which the theory of material virtue was formulated were unique to the society of fourth through second century B.C.E. China. While the solutions that texts like the Wuxing develop are rather different from the notions of unity in the systems of Plato or Aristotle, these differences are also instructive. For example, in China, the virtue discourse was being challenged by outside theories that raised the possibility of making false claims of acting out of virtue. In order to answer accusations of moral hypocrisy, the possibility of virtue having an observable material correlate was especially attractive. As a result, the notion that good behavior changed one’s appearance, either to the naked eye or to those who have special vision or who are trained in observation, developed and influenced later Chinese religious traditions. Another particular aspect of Chinese responses was the choice to envision the virtues in terms of humoral qi म (pneuma, internal energy) theory, no doubt a choice made in part because qi theory was developing at the same time in a number of technical discourses such as medicine and physiognomy. Attempts to unify the virtues became part of the broader project of developing new, totalizing discourses in these and other technical disciplines. While the questions that the texts at the center of this study attempt to answer are to some extent universal, the particulars of the answers they give are embedded in the concerns of their time. Instead of attempting to describe these developments as purely motivated by the need to answer ethical questions, or as the result of influences external to the history of ethics, this study will read a set of fourth through second century B.C.E. texts as part of a continuum that stretches from medicine, through religion and philosophy. An interdisciplinary approach to this subject is unavoidable for several reasons. First, such disciplinary categories took on the significance they hold today at a great distance in time and place from the subjects of this study. Second, a particular concern of this study is the way in which the virtues were explained in terms of bodily humors, and so it concerns precisely the intersections between contemporary disciplinary categories. Finally, the issue of whether philosophical questions catalyzed the development of categories of natural philosophy or whether those categories were appropriated by philosophers in need of new tools of argumentation is only interesting if one assumes a unidirectional model of influence that this study will demonstrate is inappropriate to the subject matter. For these reasons, this book will examine the development of this theory by providing the background to

INTRODUCTION

9

the virtue discourse and then performing a series of close readings of the aforementioned texts in close to chronological order: Wuxing, Mengzi, the Wuxing commentary, and then the Hanshi waizhuan and related texts of the early imperial period. Chapter one locates the virtues in the Ru ኵ (often translated as “Confucian”) discussion of self-cultivation and period critiques of that discussion. Debates about who the Ru were, why they wrote their texts, and the nature of their relationship with the figure known as Confucius are briefly introduced. Since the material virtue tradition appears in the historical record in the fourth and third centuries B.C.E., a key question for this study is: what happened at that time to cause some Ru to write about the virtues in this way? Chapter one argues that by that time, the authors of Ru texts such as Xunzi ৖ʪ (early third century B.C.E.) were reworking the tradition to address a set of external critiques made by writers working from the perspective of other theories of value. Chapter one outlines these critiques, providing a context for the concerns of the “material virtue” texts that follow. Chapters two through four look at the core texts of the material virtue tradition, the Wuxing and the Mengzi. Chapter two introduces the circumstances of the Wuxing’s discovery and looks at the reasons why it became the object of certain criticisms in the Xunzi. In introducing the individual sections of the text, I pay particular attention to its account of moral motivation and its psychology of the virtues. Chapter three focuses on the way in which the Wuxing’s account sheds light on aspects of the Mengzi’s moral theory, including its response to quandaries of the variety explored above, and its view that cultivating the virtues lead to observable changes in a person’s appearance. Underlying these ideas is a model of self-cultivation that drew on the materialistic model of humoral qi so central to technical discourses such as medicine and physiognomy to describe how the virtues could be cultivated in the body. Chapter four examines how these moral theories assume that moral perfection requires exposure to a sage and a connection with the non-human realm of tian ˭ (often translated as “Heaven”). This view of the semi-divine sage is the key to understanding the Mengzi’s dispensational theory of history. Taken together, chapters two through four show how the discovery of the Wuxing allows us to locate sections of the Mengzi that argue moral virtues have observable physical correlates inside an evolving discourse about ethics and the body. Chapter five looks at the influence of the material virtue tradition under the Qin and Han dynasties from the late third century B.C.E.

10

INTRODUCTION

through the second century C.E. It examines the development of the tradition in the commentary to the Wuxing found in a second century B.C.E. tomb at Mawangdui and in the writings of Jia Yi ཋሼ (200168 B.C.E.) as representative of early Han works that adopt the idea of material virtue into theories of how ritualization and education affect the body. Finally it speculates on how the connection between the sage and tian examined in the preceding chapters clashed with the political claims of the new empire, perhaps causing the Wuxing to fall out of mainstream Ru discourse. Nevertheless, some of that text’s vocabulary and view of the sage influenced texts on the political periphery, and material virtue theories emerged anew in Han period texts that are often labelled as “Daoist”. Informing this exploration is the question of why writers attempted to naturalize the virtues and what, historically, were the consequences of such a view for Chinese ethics. For these reasons, the conclusion tries to address the broader issue of why people began to ask what exactly the virtues were, and what that has to do with why people are asking that question today. The five chapters of this book complete a historical overview of the intersection between ethical theory and conceptions of the body, but they also represent an attempt to revise certain common assumptions about early China. By paying particular attention to critiques of Ru ethical theory, it seeks to portray early traditions as neither uniform nor static. In addition, this work makes two methodological assumptions that may not be obvious to a reader unfamiliar with scholarship on early China. First, it generally avoids the terms “Confucian” and “Daoist” in favor of labels that are more precise and less anachronistic in the study’s target period of the fourth through second centuries B.C.E. Indeed, one of the central claims is that with respect to the ideal of the sage, such categories only serve to obscure similarities in approach. Second, by privileging neither received nor excavated texts, it attempts to develop a description of early China that weaves together both categories of text. While there are no doubt different selection mechanisms that resulted both in the placement of certain texts in tombs and in the transmission of other texts continuously to the present day, current scholarship tends to treat these two categories of text in isolation from one another. The reader should keep this in mind and assume that the picture that emerges is at best a rough triangulation of the actual history of the period, one that attempts to use each category of text to offset the biases inherent in the method of selection of the other.

INTRODUCTION

11

This study is an attempt to apply what I have learned from my teachers to a new area, and it is to them my first thanks must go. This book began as a project at the National Humanities Center, where I was a Jesse Ball DuPont Fellow over the 1997-98 academic year. It was finished during a fellowship at the University of Wisconsin at Madison’s Institute for Research in the Humanities in 2002. The communities in these two places helped tremendously in the conceptualization of this project, as have my colleagues first in the department of Religion at Davidson College and then in East Asian Languages and Literature and Religious Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Among this group, personal thanks are especially due to W. Trent Foley, David Kaylor, Karl Plank, Lynne Poland, Charles Cohen, Jonathan W. Schofer and Robert Joe Cutter for encouragement and support. In the publishing process, Albert Hofstadt, Patricia Radder, Pat Crosby, Terry Nealon and Lynn Miles-Morillo also have been very helpful. I have also learned quite a bit from graduate students, and this work has benefited in particular from suggestions by Zhang Zhenjun, Guo Jue, Lee Yongyun and Eirik Harris. I have benefited from my connection with the Southeastern Early China Research Group, the Warring States Working Group, and the Tokyo University Chûgoku Shutsudo Shiryô Kenkyûkai. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Annie Hope, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Michael Nylan, Michael Puett and Jon Schofer have heroically read the entire manuscript and provided valuable comments. I dedicate this work to my family–especially Mihaly and Isabella, Chris, Emily, Henry, Kinga, and Annie–whose presence in my life daily enriches me.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE ‫ۍ‬ᔩˡඁ ‫ۍ‬ᔩˡ᛾ ‫ۍ‬ᔩˡԵ ‫ۍ‬ᔩˡੂ Do not look at what is contrary to the rites, do not listen to what is contrary to the rites, do not speak what is contrary to the rites, and make no move that is contrary to the rites. – Analects 12.11

The disciple Yan Yuan ᖄଫ once asked his teacher about the cardinal virtue of benevolence and was told that the way to practice benevolence is џʴ౭ᔩ “to control one’s self and return to li (i.e., the rites)”.2 Yan Yuan’s teacher was Kongzi ˱ʪ (Master Kong, trad. 551 to 479 B.C.E.), whose surname became the first syllable of the Latinization “Confucius”. According to a version of their conversation in the Lunyu ቈგ (Analects), the text that is today most closely associated with Kongzi, “returning to the rites” meant obeying the series of ominous warnings in the above epigram: Yan Yuan should not look, listen, speak or move in any way that goes against the rites. Behaving according to ritual, in this account, is at the heart of the cultivation of virtue, and hence at the heart of moral development. If Yan Yuan were a modern student he might fidget on his mat–how could following ritual conventions lead to the development of virtue? While the Analects itself provides at best a partial answer to this question, other works take up the question of the mechanisms through which a set of practices could foster the development of the virtues in much greater detail. Yet the connection between morality and practice, like the one between knowledge and action, is hard to pin down. Does ritual practice unerringly develop morality? Is it possible to be well 1

Lunyu jishi 24.817-24. In the Zuozhuan ͣ෭ entry for year 12 of Duke Zhao ‫ݲ‬, however, Confucius attributes this same phrase to the ancients: Ϋ̆͠ ͅʛЉӆ џʴ౭ᔩ ˋʛ ‫ۑ‬െ ‫ ۿ‬๤᝞̙ࠜ঻Ϩ‫ ݵ‬৴մ৾‫ؠ‬ਦᒫ “Zhong Ni said: ‘In ancient times, there was a principle: Self-discipline and returning to ritual propriety constitute benevolence. This is both trustworthy and excellent. If King Ling of Chu could have done this, how could he have come to shame at Qianxi?’” Here, context allows a narrower translation of keji џʴ as “self-discipline” rather than the more literal “control one’s self.” In this passage, it appears that the first line of Kongzi’s answer is a quotation of a more ancient text and the rest of it is his explanation of that quotation. For an excellent examination of cases like this in the context of canon formation in early China, see Chen Lai ௾գ (2001). 2

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versed in the rites and still be unconcerned with the feelings or needs of others? In the case of a person engaged in the cultivation of virtues that cannot be observed, is it possible to judge that person’s progress through observable correlates such as actions, demeanor, or affect? These very concerns were central to a set of texts written in China in the fourth through second centuries B.C.E. This study attempts to trace the historical development of their explanations of how the virtues, ritual and even politics, are linked. Some of the answers the texts offer to the questions above are predicated on the assumption that moral virtues are material–that is, they manifest themselves as observable physiological changes in the body. While this study limits itself to a set of texts from the centuries following the death of Kongzi, features of this early material virtue theory went on to exert significant influence on later traditions of Asian thought. To set the stage for a close examination of the texts that developed the theory that virtue had a material aspect, this chapter sets out to ground the development of the idea of material virtue in the general discussion of the virtues. It begins by locating the discourse on the virtues in the general development of a family of moral and political perspectives that grew out of the social role played by the followers of Kongzi. It then explores the ways in which that general discussion of virtue was criticized and defended in the Warring States period, paying particular attention to the set of questions outlined above. These questions were also posed by critics who challenged the virtue discourse as particularly prone to exploitation by hypocrites who performed the rites for their own personal gain. Chapter two will turn to one answer to these challenges and begin to outline the material virtue theory.

Virtues in the Ru context In visual art, deciding the right background against which to frame a subject is not always an easy task. This is also true when it comes to identifying the right background for the discussion of the virtues in early China, because there is considerable disagreement not only about the origins of the discussion, but even about what to call the tradition that specialized in it. Examinations of early Chinese ethics often begin with the Analects, and often treat later ethics as “originating” from that text. Yet the Analects contains very little that resembles the idea of “material virtue” at the core of this study. Looking for a more

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

15

comprehensive background to the early tradition of writing about the virtues, then, requires us to analyze early Chinese ethics without assuming it all originated with Kongzi and the Analects.3 As this section of the chapter will argue, recent work on early Chinese thought is producing a sea change in how such questions are being addressed. While perhaps not yet widely disseminated outside of the community of specialists, many scholars have begun to question the application of the term “Confucianism” to some aspects of premodern China on the grounds that it mistakenly suggests a tradition that grew out of the foundational teachings of one person. Actually, the traditions identified as Confucianism were and are diverse. By the Han Dynasty, Kongzi was identified as the architect of the political blueprint encoded in the chronicle Spring and Autumn, the exegete of the bible of literary culture called the Classic of Odes (hereafter, Odes), the conservator of Zhou dynasty institutions and rites, and the exemplar of a particular brand of moral persuasion. In addition, it is common to apply the label Confucianism to the educational and civil examination systems based on classic texts associated with Kongzi, and at times even to the imperial bureaucratic institutions that utilize those systems. Some people apply the term Confucianism to a traditional East Asian set of family dynamics, and still others (often pejoratively) to the projection of familial hierarchies onto the workplace or the wider social structure. Given the multiple and, at times, misleading connotations of the word “Confucian,” some scholars have begun to use more specific Chinese terms instead. In the context of pre-imperial China–the period before the unification under the Qin in 221 B.C.E.–the term most scholars writing in European languages have opted for is the Chinese word Ru ኵ, which originally seems to have described a social group who made a living by applying their knowledge of archaic cultural forms. The use of that term in writing attributed to Kongzi himself suggests that this was a category already present in the society into which he was born. In the Analects, he tells his disciple Zixia ʪࢬ that: ʩ޴Ѽʪኵ ೷޴ʮʆኵʛ “You should be a gentleman Ru, not a petty person Ru.”4 An early reference to Ru writings (“Ru shu” 3 Here it is important to note that in later historical contexts it perhaps makes more sense to approach Chinese ethics as in some sense flowing out of the Analects. In preimperial contexts, however, such an approach risks anachronism. 4 D.C. Lau (1979, 83) numbers this 6.13 and translates: “Be a gentleman [Ru], not a petty [Ru].” Many Song Dynasty readings of this passage, such as that of the Cheng ദ brothers (i.e., Cheng Yi ദᏅ, 1033-1107, and Cheng Hao ദᛑ, 1032-1085), hold

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ኵए) appears in the Zuo commentary to an event in the Spring and Autumn dated to the summer of the 21st year of the reign of Duke Ai ‫ ۼ‬of Kongzi’s home state of Lu.5 The Kongzi of the Analects, then, appears to have self-consciously identified himself with a Ru tradition, but also sought to differentiate the “gentleman’s” Ru from that of the “petty person.”6 More generally, Kongzi is often portrayed not as a founder but as a transmitter and internal critic of existing traditions, a nuance that is obliterated by the translation of Ru as “Confucian.” Although members of later traditions did come to identify Kongzi as a founder, in the centuries after his death writers appear to have been more wont to affect the same pose that Kongzi did in the Analects, identifying themselves as internal critics of the Ru tradition. For these reasons, the recent move away from the use of variations on the word “Confucian” by scholars writing in non-Asian languages and toward

that the gentleman studies for himself, while the petty person studies for others (see Lunyu jishi 11.389-90), drawing on an early commentary attributed to the Western Han figure Kong An’guo ˱ϯ੢, but which Liu Baonan ᄸᘽ๦ (1791-1855) thinks was actually the work of the third century writer He Yan щउ (190-249 C.E., see Lunyu zhengyi 6.228-9). That early reading turns on the idea that a desire for fame motivates the petty person but not the gentleman. Others have explained the core contrast in terms of civil versus marshal qualities (cf. Dawson 1993, 90), or elite vesus folk culture (Brooks and Brooks 1998, 34). The word wei ޴ also may be read “on behalf of”, making the sentence: “You should be a gentleman’s Ru, not a petty person’s Ru.” 5 Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhushu 60.16b [cf. Legge 1960, v. 5, 853]. On the reliability of the Zuozhuan as a resource for early Chinese thought, see Yuri Pines’ thesis that the patterns of usage of core concepts indicates that the commentary does reflect a historical development of ideas in his Foundations of Confucian Thought: Intellectual Life in the Chunqiu Period, 722-453 B. C. E. (2002). David Schaberg raises several interesting questions about this early appearance of the term Ru (2001, 309-10). 6 Robert Eno’s The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery argues that the term Ru does not appear prior to the time of Kongzi, and, in effect, that there was no earlier self-conscious Ru tradition (1990, 190-2). Despite the two quotations just cited, other occurences might be seen to support his assertion. Often when the term occurs in Warring States narratives, it is is clearly used to refer to a postKongzi phenomenon. This is the case for its use in Zhan’guoce ዢ੢യ 19, ღʅ “Zhao, part 2”: ኵ‫ږ‬ɾࣖЩᔩ୙ ˀ੢ψ۞Щ૥ᕹʑٜʱԶ˃‫“ ̢۔‬The Ru had one teacher but their ritual differs, the central states have the same customs but their instruction diverges–how much the moreso must this be true of what is appropriate for those in the mountains and valleys?” (Zhan’guoce zhushi 678). Other times, it is a later interpolation, as with Yanzi’s profession in the Yanzi chunqiu उʪ‫ ߲ݱ‬that: ֻѳૻ ኵЩ඙˃ ˑѳૻኵЩၝ˃ “In the beginning when I saw a Ru I valued him, but now when I see a Ru I doubt him.” In this case, Zhang Chunyi’s ઠঝɾ commentary notes that SunYirang ࢽ⌞᝖ (1848-1908) added the character ru based on a parallel in an Eastern Han text (Yanzi chunqiu jiaozhu 8.209). These examples indicate that Eno may be right that appearances of the term that occur in narratives from the time of Kongzi or before were retroprojections.

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

17

the use of the romanization “Ru” is a positive step in terms of historical accuracy. While the term “Ru” is less misleading than “Confucian,” what it actually connotes is far from clear. If the advantage of “Ru” is that it is used in many early Chinese texts, the disadvantage is that there are different accounts of who exactly the early Ru were. Part of the disagreement is the result of modern political and cultural debates. In China, the exact nature of the relationship between the social group of the Ru and the historical individual Kongzi has been hotly disputed, in no small part because the issue of the origins of the Ru tradition has been a key to contests over Chinese self-identity conducted amid the turbulent politics of the twentieth century. Lionel Jensen has argued that in much Chinese scholarship, the Ru “and Kongzi have been indistinguishable as symbols of cultural heritage,” and that certain early twentieth century interpretations have become “a master fiction through which [Ru] has been identified as a continuous presence in the lengthy passage of Chinese civilization.”7 The interpretations to which Jensen refers are those of Zhang Taiyan ఈ˯٬ (1869-1936) and Hu Shi ࠍ ቱ (1891-1962), both of whom sought to recover the original historical connotations of the Ru social group. Zhang’s 1909 essay “Yuan Ru” ࢍኵ (Tracing the source of the Ru) links the term to another graph today pronounced xu ᄔ that means “demand or require” and finds the origin of the group in the rain-seeking activities of early shamans.8 By contrast, Hu’s 1934 “Shuo Ru” იኵ (Explaining the Ru) identifies the Ru as members of the displaced Yin भ aristocracy who parlayed their knowledge of ritual and ceremony into an educational role under the new Zhou Dynasty polity.9 These two interpretations do not begin to exhaust either historical or contemporary understandings of the term. The pioneering commentator Huang Kan ߗդ (488-545) equated the term with the graph ru ᐩ “moisten”, explaining it as the effect of learning on the body: ஑ዕՖ ʙ۱ᐩᇁԽˀ ‫ݭ‬ᎂʙ஑‫޴ږ‬ኵʛ “If one undertakes the practice of study for a long time then it glosses and moistens into one’s body, and therefore those who practice for long time are called Ru.”10 Some contemporary scholars identify the earliest uses of the term with 7

Jensen 1997, 167 and 223. See Zhang Taiyan xuanji, 489-94, especially 490-1. Useful secondary studies include Jensen 1997, 151-215 and Wang Fansen ̙Мಷ 1985, 23-45. 9 See volume 15 of Hu Shi wencun ࠍቱ́ϫ (Hu Shi 1986, 5-119). 10 Huang’s Lunyu yishu ቈგ໳୚ commentary, cited in Lunyu jishi 11.390. 8

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CHAPTER ONE

particular aspects of Ru practice. Yan Buke ᎰӴџ has connected Ru practice with the office of the Yueshi ᆪࣖ or “music master”, while Ge Zhaoguang ༏εγ has written that the defining characteristic of the Ru is their use of self-consciously archaic clothing and ornaments.11 The range and number of such interpretations, both ancient and modern, suggests that there is not much agreement about common origins or characteristics shared by the Ru. In a recent study of relevant modern scholarship, Nicholas Zufferey has noted that while there is insufficient evidence to definitively characterize their origins, the Ru “were the ancestors of Confucius, not the other way round.”12 While the English term “Confucian” inaccurately suggests a unity based on a common descent from Kongzi, the search for corresponding unity underlying the Ru is a much more complex task. In other words, when we talk about Ru instead of Confucians, we are being more accurate, but less precise. Acknowledging that the essence of the Ru tradition is not clear, what might a methodology for investigating the pre-imperial Ru tradition look like? Unless the goal of the study is to discern “true” Ru (or “gentleman Ru”) from others, there is really no need to insist on definition of the Ru by a single feature. Indeed, there are reasons to suspect such a task might be impossible. When a tradition selfidentifies over generations, it is likely to be irreducible to a single doctrinal element. By contrast, when a tradition is defined in an ex post facto manner, especially if the salient criterion for membership in the tradition is the advocacy of a particular value or doctrine, its members by definition share a single feature. For this reason, it is possible that once the banner “Ru” was adopted, that name became the glue that bound the group together, and there was no longer any single idea or concern accepted by all Ru. In other words, whatever the etymology of the term and the original reason for its adoption by the followers of Kongzi, the subsequent history of the tradition did not necessarily share those initial characteristics. Instead of selecting one of the above single feature theories as correct, the following examination will treat the term Ru as if it were plural, concentrating less on its ultimate origins than on criticisms and defenses of it that reveal its meaning at particular times. The notion that the Ru tradition was plural in nature may be unpacked in several ways. One important sense in which the tradition was plural is found in descriptions of Ru practice that indicate both that 11 12

See Yan Buke 1995 and Ge Zhaoguang 2001, v. 3, 88-92. Zufferey 2003, 148.

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

19

there were multiple models of behavior or “scripts” for Ru performance and that the Ru used different scripts in different social forums. In daily practice, the early Ru taught and acted according to a set of archaic rites that constituted a system known as li ᔩ , thought to have been perfected in the halcyon days of the early Zhou dynasty. Proper ritual performance was seen as both a means to cultivate moral character and as a legitimator of political authority. For these reasons, Ru were sought out to serve in official capacities for the landed gentry of the central states of early China. When it came to literature, classics such as the Odes and Shu ए (the Shangshu ‫ ׋‬ए “Documents of the Precursors” or Shujing ए ໩ “Classic of Documents”, hereafter, Documents), in which the insights of the Zhou dynasty were embedded, served both as training curriculum and sacred text. In addition to the classics, the liuyi ˗ ᗟ (Six attainments) of rites, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and mathematics were also a mainstay of Ru training. Personal moral development was carried out in the manner of Kongzi, both through the example of his conduct and the content of his instruction to members of the landed gentry and to his disciples. The Analects includes a taxonomy of the strengths of ten of his major disciples, sometimes called the shizhe ʏ࢖ “ten perceptive ones,” along these lines. The taxonomy divides their strong points into several rather different areas of achievement: virtuous action, doctrines and discussion, political affairs, and the study of literature.13 Proper training for the early Ru, then, was defined contextually in several ways: it was consistent with ritual, immersed in the classics and modeled on the conduct of Kongzi. Because of the different Ru scripts, the virtues associated with the teachings of Kongzi were only one of their central concerns. The diversity of Ru training and expertise dovetailed with the different arenas in which Ru were called upon to act. In the political context, Ru texts reflect a facility with Zhou theories of political authority centered on the notion of legitimation through the ming ֡, “mandate” or “command”, of tian ˭ , the most powerful natural entity (often translated as “Heaven”). That the endorsement of a type of quasi-divine authority had been historically necessary for the maintenance of political control by particular clans was a central aspect of the message 13 Lunyu 11.3, see Lunyu jishi 22.742-6 (cf. Lau 1979, 106). By the Eastern Han, these four areas had become known as Kongzi’s “four classes” (sike ͗߰), as in the term’s use in a poem by Li Yan ᜉ٬ (150-177 C.E.), Hou Hanshu 80a.2648.

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CHAPTER ONE

associated with the Documents, a collection of orations attributed to the sage rulers of the past and their ministers, justifying their political authority. Its first person testimony is seen to contain both a guide for behavior for the sage ruler and methods empirically proven successful by those rulers.14 The function of the Ru as guardians of the narratives of political legitimacy was closely linked to a second area of Ru expertise: their proficiency in ancestral sacrifice and the ceremonies that surrounded it. In the latter context, the Ru’s attitude of jing ๖ “reverence” in the presence of the spirits of the ancestors was the same attitude that the words of the rulers of the past, such as those in the “Kang gao” છკ (Announcement of Kang) of the Documents, were supposed to generate in the current ruler.15 In particular, it is the attitude of uncertainty in light of the possibility of the withdrawal of tian’s mandate that caused the ruler to remain attentive to his own moral development and maintain judicial fairness. Both these aspects of Ru expertise are related to their service at court, where they often functioned as part of the legitimating apparatus for the ruling house. Nevertheless, the Ru vision of a normative social order was such that it could be invoked both in defence of and as a challenge to the status quo.16 For many contemporary writers, such as Herbert Fingarette, the most salient Ru script was not limited to the court and the political sphere but had to do with the daily performance of the rituals of the past.17 The Ru were experts in the details of the conventions of funerals, of daily contexts such as eating and gift exchange, and of other significant ritual locations. These details, which Ezra Pound described as “verses re length of the night-gown and the predilection for ginger,”18 are reputed 14 Two narratives are central to this and later Ru histories: the decision by the predynastic emperor Yao ూ to go outside the line of succession and pass on political authority to Shun ൘; and King Wu’s ‫ ن‬removal of the last corrupt ruler of the previous dynasty in the twelfth century B.C.E. to found the Zhou dynasty. Because Shun was deemed worthy to rule on the basis of his moral perfection, the first narrative became the standard of legitimation during a period of good government. By contrast, King Wu’s story complements that of Yao and Shun in that it narrates the intercession by tian, through the military actions of a virtuous person, to end a period of misrule. 15 On this aspect of the Shangshu and its role in Chinese political thought, see Herrlee G. Creel’s “The Mandate of Heaven” (1970, 81-100) and Liu Zehua’s ᄸጎൡ “Xi Zhou jingtian baomin yu tianxia wang you de zhengzhi sixiang” о֟๖˭ۘͺႩ ˭ʓ̙Љ‫ݬڄ‬٢‫( ึ݋‬1996, 16-39). 16 Sarah Allan (1981) perceptively analyses the role of Ru narratives in political legitimation. 17 Fingarette 1972. 18 Pound 1951, 191.

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

21

to have played an important part in the daily life of Kongzi himself. Part of the importance of this system was the way in which the ritual exchange system in which Kongzi required his followers to participate placed them outside the conventional exchange economy, causing them to be insulated from the potentially corrupting effects of that economy.19 As a result, his disciples were uniquely suited to fill various positions for the landed gentry. This ritual training not only made Kongzi’s disciples into dependable stewards of the resources of the gentry; it was also closely linked to the development of cultivated dispositions that made them into managers known by their subordinates for their reliability and trustworthiness, as well as into teachers known by their students for the utility of their moral instruction. The most significant script from the perspective of modern comparative philosophy may be the Ru’s cultivation of a set of ideal behaviors very similar to what Roman writers called the “virtues”. The Analects repeatedly returns to the need to cultivate the character traits of benevolence (ren ˋ, a sensitivity to the personhood of others), righteousness (yi ໳, an obligation to conduct oneself fairly), wisdom (zhi ನ , an ability to assess people and circumstances) and trustworthiness (xin ‫ۑ‬, being true to one’s word). One must also locate oneself correctly with respect to one’s family through filial piety (xiao Ҩ, caring for relatives as befits one’s role) and with respect to one’s community through ritual propriety (li ᔩ, regulating speech and demeanor as befits one’s status).20 In the Analects, many statements traditionally attributed to Kongzi treat these virtues as interdependent, although the exact nature of the relationship between them is unclear. For most Ru writers, the cultivation of these character traits is at the heart of the development of the multiple expertises outlined above. They are not merely something that secures the ruler political legitimacy, nor simply vocational training for potential officials, they are instead at the heart of the development of the excellences with which human beings were born.

19

See Csikszentmihalyi 2001, 265-273. The brief explanations provided for these virtues are intended to be specific to the connotations of these terms in the Analects. A perceptive discussion of the meanings of these terms is found in the work of David Hall and Roger Ames (1987) and a response to it by Philip J. Ivanhoe (1991). The most difficult of these terms is ren, which Takeuchi Teruo (1965) demonstrates is used in the Analects both to refer to a general highest sense of “virtue” and a specific compassion based on recognizing one’s similarity to others. 20

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While these components of the Ru program were often discussed in isolation, the Ru never looked at the cultivation of virtues as entirely distinct from politics and ritual. Indeed, the separation in the above paragraphs between the political, ritual and self-cultivation contexts of Ru doctrine and practice is ultimately artificial in the sense that many Ru texts conflate them, and centuries of commentaries on these writings have accepted the thesis that these different doctrines mutually imply one another. However, it is worth noting that the context for action in each of these cases is slightly different. In the early stages of the development of Ru doctrines and practices, it is quite possible that the connection between them might have been the result of the aggregation of a number of different expertises into the function of a single social entity. Despite the Ru specialization in a diverse set of practices and their claims to expertise in different arenas, the fact remains that the Ru tradition has long been seen as relatively uniform. The central reason for this view is that, over time, each of these aspects of Ru practice and learning has come to be associated with the figure of the historical Kongzi.

Kongzi’s disciples and the unity of the Ru From a very early time, the idea that the Ru were a single tradition that later split into fragments was encouraged by both Ru proponents and detractors. The corollary to this position has been that Kongzi was the first, or at least the definitive, Ru, and that the instantiation of the tradition in him was the original, or correct, version of it. Much of the evidence for these ideas, however, comes from sources that had clear interests in promoting the foundational role of Kongzi in the Ru tradition. It is necessary to examine this evidence critically, and to consider the possibility that aspects of Ru virtue discourse had no precedent in the teachings of the sage. Despite the widespread belief that it was originated or unified by Kongzi, the “unity” promoted by Ru genealogists tends to mask the traditions’s proven ability to adapt and appropriate outside elements to diverse ends. Some centuries after the death of Kongzi, the “Xianxue” ᜼ ዕ (Exhibiting Learning) chapter of the Han Feizi ᓟ‫ۍ‬ʪ, attributed to Prince Fei of the state of Han (c. 280-c. 233 B.C.E.), differentiated eight groups claiming to follow Kongzi: ֊‫˫ߟڣ‬ʿψ Щߖбᎂॲ ˱  “(what each group) adopted and discarded (from Kongzi) was

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

23

different and contradictory, but each claimed to represent the Authentic Kongzi.”21 Yet the contention that the Ru were once unified, and later split irreconcilably, served a clear rhetorical function in the Han Feizi. From its perspective, the inevitability of the fragmentation of knowledge was a sign that the way of Kongzi could not be recovered, and that the Ru’s archaic emphasis on the ways of the former kings was unverifiable and obsolete. The notion of the decay of the true message of the sage was also invoked within the Ru tradition, often in the course of identifying a single transmission of that message as the true one. Fan Ning ࠖ ≎ (339-401 C.E.) accepts a similar thesis about the degradation of knowledge of the ancient ways in his preface to the Guliang ᇯૼ commentary to the Spring and Autumn. There, Fan observes that: Ⴕʃ‫˜ޟ‬ЩัԵᓙ ୙ၷѕЩʨ໳Ք “Generally, the nine streams divided and the subtle doctrines became concealed, heresies were created and the great meaning became tainted.”22 However, although Kongzi’s “subtle” or “esoteric” (wei ั) doctrines had become hidden, Fan Ning argued that those intent on bringing them to light need only study the Guliang commentary to learn the Way of the former kings that Kongzi had encoded in the Spring and Autumn.23 While there is no doubt that Han Feizi and Fan Ning are right about the general idea that the integrity of messages degrades over time, their contention that the Ru tradition was once unified in the figure of Kongzi served a clear rhetorical purpose for both writers. The insistence on a “founding father” for the Ru tradition has, if anything, grown stronger over time. This is particularly true with respect to Kongzi’s role in valorizing a particular set of canonical texts–what nineteenth century Scottish Non-Conformist missionary 21

Han Feizi chapter 49, Han Feizi jishi 19.1080. See Chunqiu Guliangzhuan jingzhuan buzhu 7. Fan Ning is paraphasing Ying Shao’s ᏻᡣ preface to the Eastern Han Fengsu tongyi, which observes: ‫آ‬Ϋ͠ԅЩ ัԵᕸ ʁʏʪయЩʨ໳Ք “In the past, when Kongzi died, his subtle words were lost; and when the 70 [direct disciples] were buried, the great meaning was contaminated.” Ying was justifying his attention to popular customs, whose faults he traces back to the fragmentation of Kongzi’s message, see Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu 1. 23 Fan Ning holds that the appearance of a unicorn (in 481 B.C.E.) was a natural response to the stimulus of Kongzi’s bringing forth the Way of the former kings. This interpretation is very different from that of He Xiu щΩ (129-182 C.E.) in his Chunqiu Gongyang jiegu ‫ ˙ ߲ ݱ‬Х ༱ ඇ subcommentary on the commentary to Master Gongyang ˙Х (Gongyang Gao ˙Хਢ) to the Spring and Autumn. He Xiu says the unicorn is “the same category as the sage” but its capture and killing were a sign from Heaven of Kongzi’s own impending death. See year 1 of Duke Yin ᓙ, Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan zhushu 1.23a-b. On the status of the Spring and Autumn as a repository of the coded Way of the former kings, see Csikszentmihalyi 2002a. 22

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James Legge would christen the “Confucian Classics”. Writers in early China certainly understood the way that the attribution of a text to a particular author could add value to it. The “Xiuwu” ஙੀ (Discipline and facility) chapter of the second-century B.C.E. text Huainanzi ଵ۷ ʪ explains the mechanism by which particular persuaders, competing for authority, would give their own ideas ancient pedigrees: ̛۞˃ʆ ϠౚͅЩቓˑ ‫޴ݭ‬ལ‫ͫږ‬৯˃‫ؠ‬আའ෦ܹ Щ݈঻ʈი “Since most of the common people of the age hold antiquity in high esteem but look down on the present, those who would guide them find it necessary to falsely attribute things to Shen Nong and Huangdi, and only then allow them into their deliberations.”24 This ancient example of what Michel Foucault called the “authorship function” indicates the way in which early texts had to be attributed to culture heroes in order to become consumable.25 This has long been the case with Kongzi, but became even more marked as he was remade in the image of the influential examples of the Buddha in the first century C.E., and those of the founders of the Abrahamic traditions that started to filter into China half a millennium later.26 Huang Jinxing ෦න፞ has pointed out how Late Imperial Chinese efforts to resist European and American incursions often preached a resistance to Christianity, but also inevitably took Christianity as the blueprint for its revival of the message of Kongzi.27 24

Larre et al., (1993, 27) translates the title as “Exhortation to service”, which differs from both the late Han commentator Gao You’s ਢმ reading as “Spurring [oneself] to capitalize [on opportunities]” (invoking Yu’s ߮ single-minded pursuit of goals in the first chapter of the Huainanzi) and Yang Shuda’s ๫ዾཥ reading of “Discipline [of a vocation] and facility [in its techniques]” (invoking the parallel use of xiu and wu in the “Xiuwu” chapter) adopted here. See Huainanzi jiaoshi 19.1940, n.1 and 19.2008. 25 Foucault (1984, 107) wrote that “the fact that the discourse has an author’s name, that one can say ‘this was written by so-and-so’ or ‘so-and-so is its author’ shows that this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that merely comes and goes, not something that is immediately consumable. On the contrary, it is a speech that must be received in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status.” David Schaberg’s indictment of “biographical projection” in his review of The Cambridge History of Ancient China (2000, 494-8) is a perspicacious indictment of the need to associate early texts with authors in the study of early China. 26 The re-identification of the Ru along the lines of lines of Buddhism and postBuddhist Daoism are explored in Kobayashi 1990 and Kohn 1995. A particularly neat illustration of this process is Julia Murray’s studies of the way that cycles of images of Kongzi were made in the image of the Buddha (1995, 1996, 1997). Jensen (1997) examines several different alterations in the image of Kongzi to conform to images of Christ. On these issues and the impact of Weber’s picture of Confucianism on nonAsian reception of Kongzi, see Csikszentmihalyi (2001). 27 Huang Jinxing 2001, 51.

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

25

Kongzi’s importance as an indigenous “founder” on a par with these non-Chinese religious founders only added to the perception that his original message (if only it could be recovered) was not only coherent and intentional, but in many cases also prophetic and essentially Chinese. At times, the tide turned against the veneration of the Ru aspects of traditional culture, as during the Cultural Revolution’s Pi Lin pi Kong Ә ‫ ظ‬Ә ˱ (Criticize Lin [Biao] and Criticize Kong[zi]) campaign. At that time, the contrast between the petty person and the gentleman in Kongzi’s speech to Zixia quoted above was interpreted as fundamentally a class distinction, and so singled out for harsh criticism.28 Even then, however, Kongzi was still placed front and center as the “author” of traditional culture. In this and other ways, criticism of Kongzi as symbolic of traditional culture echoed a similar claim by many within that system. For supporters of traditional culture, the original position of Kongzi carried with it the possibility for recovery of an orthodox core of the tradition, while for opponents more accustomed to impugning character than to nuanced analysis of cultural systems, he was a convenient target. To move away from a model in which Kongzi is assumed to be the “author” or “founder” of Chinese traditional culture may then be seen as a remedy, but not one without its own problems. Minimizing the authorship role of Kongzi has the effect of pulling the rug out from under the usual narrative of what is often called the “history of thought” (sixiang shi ‫ )͑ึ݋‬of early China. As one example of the conventional view, the justly famous Lao Siguang డ‫݋‬ γ begins his history of Chinese philosophy with a chapter entitled “Kongzi and Ru studies” (Kongzi yu Ruxue ˱ʪႩኵዕ). In it, Lao criticizes analyses such as that of Hu Shi’s “Shuo Ru” for failing to acknowledge the primacy of Kongzi in the history of the Ru. Lao argues that Hu’s social explanation cannot explain the philosophical foundation of the Ru. His reasoning is that since Kongzi founded a xuepai ዕާ (study faction), the origins of the Ru cannot be seen in social terms but must be instead be explained in individual terms. As a result, Lao concludes that: “The basic direction and theory of Ru 28 See, e.g., Yang Rongguo ๫ဝ੢ 1973, 21. Yang still took Kongzi to be the author of the cultural tradition that afflicted China: ̧‫ึ݋ڄ‬Եቈʿ෮Ϛະइ୕Άʄ ᖢ‫ڄ‬ᅬᛏ Щ̝‫ޘޟ‬ˀ੢‫ڊ‬๡ʅʢϠ϶ռ୏ϚᒾԅЉҬηോଡ “His thought and sayings not only had a bad influence in his own times, but also has poisoned Chinese society for over two thousand years, and even today has not been completely cleansed,” (1973, 69).

26

CHAPTER ONE

studies were both advanced by Kongzi, so he must be seen as the founder of Ru studies.”29 In other words, because the Ru were an academic lineage they must have had a lineage founder, and since the only plausible founder is Kongzi, the Ru turn out to have been an academic lineage founded by Kongzi. This circular logic succinctly expresses the widespread assumption that the history of thought must be understood in terms of original thinkers and their followers. The implicit metaphor drawn from conceptions of biological heredity is as characteristic of Lao’s thinking as it is of the work of many practitioners of intellectual history anywhere. Without that metaphor, however, a new set of questions arise. Are there common positions and beliefs shared by all Ru? What is the relationship between the social role of the Ru and their doctrines and practices? What factors led people to self-identify as Ru? One possible alternative focus is on the disciple traditions of Kongzi. Disciple traditions emphasize different elements of the Ru tradition, and at times even appear to contradict each other. Statements in the Analects attributed to Zizhang ʪઠ emphasize an inclusivity that is sometimes at odds with the words of other disciples.30 Later texts associate other disciples with the idea of the malleability of human nature.31 By the Han dynasty, the disciple Zixia came to be closely associated with the interpretation of the Odes and Documents, and with the maintenance of an esoteric transmission from Kongzi.32 Several 29 See Lao Siguang (2001, 104): ኵዕ˃੪ʹ̄ώ˪୎ቈҔΊ˱ʪಏ̳‫ݭ‬ኵዕ ̣ͫ˱ʪ޴టܿʆ. 30 In his “Rujia bapai de pipan” ኵࣁʉާ‫ڄ‬Әѥ (Critical analysis of the eight factions of the Ru lineage), Guo Moruo ௱ٖࠜ has argued that criticisms in the Xunzi of Ru who are “indistinguishable from Mozi ኳʪ” are aimed at the followers of Zizhang, based on statements such as the one he makes in Analects 19.3 (1947, 109133). There, Zizhang disagrees with Zixia about those with whom the gentleman should associate by saying: Ѽ ʪ ౚ ቖ Щ ࣅ ୥  ࿂ െ Щ ߥ ʿ ঻ “The Gentleman honors worthies and countenances the masses, praises the good and sympathizes with the incapable.” See Lunyu zhengyi 38.1302-7 (cf. Lau 1979, 152). 31 The “Benxing” ʹ ‫ ׷‬chapter of the first century C.E. Lunheng ቈ ፰ associates Mi Zijian ᦅʪቓ and Qidiao Kai ွᎴළ with the doctrine that ‫׷‬ЉെЉ ౱ “human nature has good and bad in it,” see Lunheng jiaoshi 3.133 (cf. Forke 1962, v. 1, 384). On the various doctrines associated with Qidiao Kai, see Liu Weihua ᄸሜ ൡ 1996, 152-54. 32 An early association between Zixia and the interpretation of the classics is a memorial by Xu Fang ࣝՎ (fl. 75-106 C.E.): аႝ ༶एᔩᆪ ‫׆‬б˱ʪ ച‫ا‬ఈ͔ ֻ‫ؠ‬ʪࢬ “I heard that the Odes, Documents, Ritual and Music, were all established from the time of Kongzi. Explaining and clarifying by ‘sections and sentences’ began from Zixia,” (Hou Hanshu 44.1500). That Zixia wrote the Analects as a means of “making public” (gong θ) the subtle words of Kongzi is the contention of a “weft text” (weishu ሁए) to the Analects identified as the Lunyu chen ቈგ᝘ (Analects

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

27

early traditions outside the Analects concerning Zengzi ಫʪ highlight his filial piety, which is sometimes considered by other disciples to be excessive.33 Finally, the first- or second-generation disciple Zisi ʪ‫݋‬, who later came to be identified as Kongzi’s grandson, comes to be associated with a particular set of doctrines which are harshly criticized in the third century B.C.E. text Xunzi.34 The variety of the disciple traditions reflects a diversity that appears to have existed at most a generation after Kongzi’s death. Indeed, among the earliest excavated texts that bear on the Ru tradition are individual texts whose titles have been identified with particular disciples such as “Zigao” ʪ ধ , “Zengzi”, “Zilu” ʪཔ, and “Yan Yuan”.35 There are, then, patterns in the disciple traditions that might indicate a diversity even in the generation following Kongzi. Moving Kongzi out of the spotlight in the study of early China does not necessarily diminish his importance. Because the same texts will laud or excoriate him, and the same discerning words will remain attributed to him. Yet without Kongzi as founder, significant differences in the very earliest traditions are perhaps more comprehensible. There is no question that for the disciple traditions, Kongzi played a pivotal role as an authorizing figure. But, if not for the Analects, it would be the case that proof-text) or Lunyu chongjue chen ቈგઉᐷ᝘ (Analects exalted rank proof-text) cited in the seventh century C.E. commentary to the literary compendium Wenxuan ́ ᎚ (29.20a, 43.22a). See also Yasui Kôzan ϯ‫࡜׍‬ʱ and Nakamura Shôhachi ˀӫ ᇑʉ, (1971-92, rpt. 1994, 1079, and 1083). 33 In chapter eight of the second century B.C.E. Hanshi waizhuan, Kongzi himself takes Zengzi to task for excessive familial piety, arguing that a sage ought to be able to balance listening to one’s parents against (in the case of an extremely abusive parent) the self-preservation that is an expression of one’s righteousness. See Hanshi waizhuan shuzheng 8.417-8 (cf. Hightower 1952, 280-1). The DaDai liji ʨᐁᔩ৩ contains a number of chapters devoted to Zengzi’s familial piety: “Zengzi benxiao” ಫʪʹҨ (Zengzi on the root of familial piety), “Zengzi lixiao” ಫʪΘҨ (Zengzi on the establishment of familial piety), “Zengzi daxiao” ಫʪʨҨ (Zengzi on the highest form of familial piety), “Zengzi shi fumu” ಫʪՖ̓͹ (Zengzi on serving one’s parents). While in general the DaDai liji cannot be attested before the second century B.C.E., an unpublished manuscript dating to the fourth century entitled “Zengzi lixiao” has been identified as one of the Shanghai Museum bamboo slip texts (Cao Feng ૹ࣐ 1999). Bought by the Shanghai Museum in 1994, these texts are inscribed upon 1200 bamboo slips in Chu script from a Warring States period tomb that had been looted and whose contents had been sold abroad. This would indicate that the close association of Zengzi with filial piety probably dates at least back to the late fourth century B.C.E. See Ma Chengyuan, et al., 2001. 34 For issues relating to the identification of Zisi, see the appendix on Zisi. Both the doctrine and the criticism will be examined in detail beginning in the next chapter. 35 These names are cited as titles of texts among the Shanghai Museum finds, see Cao Feng 1999.

28

CHAPTER ONE

there would be little evidence for what Kongzi actually thought that was not apparently mediated through the disciple traditions. In point of fact, though, even the Analects appears to have been mediated through the disciple traditions. The earliest description of the formation of that text is from Ban Gu’s ॗ֣ (32-92 C.E.) Hanshu ် ए (History of the [Former] Han) where it is described in the following terms: ቈგ‫˱ ږ‬ʪᏻളҿʪइʆ ˪ҿʪߟႩԵ Щ૊ႝ‫ؠ‬ˮʪ˃გʛ ະइҿʪύЉ‫׿‬৩ ˮʪ‫ݰ‬ւ ‫ۃ‬ʆߟႩ᎓ Щቈⰱ ‫ݭ‬ᎂ˃ቈგ The Analects contains Kongzi’s answers to his disciples and contemporaries, conversations between the disciples, and discussions in which they passed on what they had heard from the master. At the time, each disciple kept his own records. After the master died, the secondgeneration disciples together collated them, then considered and selected from among them. Therefore it is called the “Considered conversations” [i.e., Lunyu].36

This summary of the composition of the Analects directly states that it is drawn from the records of individual disciples. Yet, in contrast with the way the synoptic gospels of the Bible follow a shared chronology of the life of Jesus, a key aspect of the disciple traditions is that Kongzi’s message to each of his disciples was rather different, and those messages were rarely indexed to a particular moment in the life of Kongzi.37 In part this is because the Analects was compiled at a greater distance in time from the life of Kongzi than the gospels were from the life of Jesus. Regardless of the reason, initial records of the disciple traditions appear to have differed significantly from one and other. Of course, it is also possible that the Analects exaggerates the differences between the disciple traditions, and masks the homogeneous nature of the Ru tradition. Yet historical records indicate the opposite: that the collation of the disciple traditions into the 36 Hanshu 30.1717. The wording of this passage is somewhat ambiguous. The first part could be parsed either as ᏻളҿʪइʆ˪ҿʪߟႩԵ “Kongzi’s answers to his disciples and contemporaries, and conversations between his disciples . . .” or ᏻളҿ ʪइʆ ˪ҿʪߟႩԵ “Kongzi’s answers to his disciples, and conversations between his contemporaries and disciples . . . ” 37 Many works from the Shiji onwards have attempted to arrange the information into a “life of Kongzi” style narrative. Most such attempts involve denaturing the original conversations: arranging the sayings of Kongzi in a temporal sequence rather than atemporally, and stripping them of the context usually provided by the person with whom Kongzi is speaking.

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

29

Analects had the effect of making them appear more, not less, uniform. That was certainly the case for the earliest treatment of the disciples, Sima Qian’s ͌ਠት (145-c.87 B.C.E.) “arranged traditions” (liezhuan λ ෭ ) of “Zhong Ni’s [i.e., Kongzi’s] disciples” Ϋ ͠ ҿʪ . In a postscript, Sima notes that he gathered information about the disciples directly from the Analects: њ̣ҿʪϏּ́Ϫય֊ቈგҿʪ੕ϵЎ ޴ᇺ ၝ‫ږ‬ᕸା “I have made this chapter by gathering information about the disciples’ full names, their speech and their writing, from the disciples’ questions in the Analects, and when anything was doubtful I have omitted it.”38 If the Shiji is any guide, centuries of collation were conducted under the assumption that the disciple traditions derived from a coherent and unified narrative, which could be recovered by omitting “doubtful” or contradictory passages. In the Han dynasty, the speech of the disciples was sometimes treated as interchangeable with that of Kongzi. The Qing dynasty historian Qian Daxin Ꭵʨ‫( ت‬17281804) observed that when the Hanshu said the origins of the Analects included the conversations disciples had with their master, ۱մԵߖ ˱ʪ‫֊׿‬ԡ ‫ݭ‬်ʆ˺ቈგ ᓛ୶ʪ˃Ե ߖᔏ˃˱ʪ ‫ۍ‬Ί৩ዞ˃ თ “this meant that their words were all something Kongzi accepted, so when Han dynasty writers quoted the Analects, even if it was the words of a disciple, they always attributed it to Kongzi, and it was not a mistake of memory.”39 This assumption, especially if it also existed in the period before the Han, shows that it is quite possible that many of the quotations attributed to Kongzi were actually originally statements made by particular disciples. And, over time, both of these hermeneutic principles would have had the effect of decreasing the differences between the disciple traditions in the received record because they both were intent on recreating an original text thought to be both unified and coherent. Recent archaeological discoveries have further highlighted the diversity in the early Ru tradition. They also have suggested that collation of these traditions in the Analects may not have happened as 38

Shiji 67.2226. That Analects is a title in this passage is suggested by the use of the same two graphs in a context where they clearly refer to the title of a book in the description of Wei Xuancheng’s ࡔ΁Ͼ early studies (Shiji 96.2688). It is noteworthy that Sima Qian uses the Analects to write about the disciples in his biographical chapter on the “Zhong Ni [i.e., Kongzi] disciples”, but has no biography of Kongzi, instead relating his life in the form of the “Hereditary house of Kongzi” ˱ʪ̛ࣁ. 39 Here, Qian is referring to the fact that, during the Han, the same sentence is attributed to both Kongzi and Zixia. This sentence is further discussed below. See Lunheng jiaoshi 1.24.

30

CHAPTER ONE

long ago as had once been thought. A number of discoveries have yielded short passages from the Analects that circulated independently of that text. As a result of one late fourth or early third century B.C.E. find, we know two sections of the Analects were part of a miscellaneous set of sayings circulating without the attribution “zi yue” ʪ̆ (the Master said), raising the possibility that some parts of the Analects were excerpted from unattributed sets of compact sayings, perhaps selected on the basis of whether or not they matched the image of Kongzi operant at the time the selection was made.40 At the very least, such finds show that collections of text later associated with Kongzi circulated in rather fluid form up to and into the first century B.C.E.41 That is the century in which an almost complete bamboo slip version of the Analects, recently found in the Hebei Province Ding county tomb of of Liu Xiu ᄸங (d. 55 B.C.E.), was buried.42 The Ding county version of the Analects was one of several first century B.C.E. attempts to re-collate and standardize that text, yet even as it was being compiled, parts of the Analects were still circulating independently as part of other collections. Another text buried in Ding county contains snatches of narratives found in the Analects, mixed in with stories about Kongzi and his disciples that are included in other anthologies, notable worthies like Guanzi ၸʪ and Yanzi उʪ, and

40 A set of unattributed quotations found at Guodian called the Yucong გᓳ contains two parallels to the Analects, corresponding closely to words attributed to Kongzi in Analects 7.6 and 9.4. In the former case, the Guodian text has no parallel to “The Master said,” while in the latter case, there is no parallel to the introductory phrase: “There were four things the Master would not do.” The four things are also presented in a different order. See Jingmenshi bowuguan ো‫ۃ‬឴త‫ٵ‬Ꮗ 1998, 211-2. A related phenomenon is seen in the Warring States text Congzheng ન‫( ݬ‬Applying Governance) held in the Shanghai Museum. A sentence that begins zi yue ʪ̆ “The Master said” in the Liji “Ziyi” is introduced by the phrase wen zhi yue ႝ˃̆ “I have heard it said.” (Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhanguo Chu zhujian, v.2, 213-4). For other examples of this phenomenon in received texts, see Chen Lai, 2001. 41 For a survey of archaeological finds relevant to the Analects prior to the Shanghai Museum finds, see Csikszentmihalyi 2002a. 42 Liu Xiu served as Prince Huai ᖩ of Zhongshan during the reign of Emperor Xuan ‫( ܬ‬r. 74-49 B.C.E.), a reign during which the imperial court ceased modeling itself on the example of the Qin dynasty (221-206 B.C.E.), and begin looking back to the Zhou, according to historian Michael Loewe (Loewe 1987, 198). For this reason, the instruction of the heir apparent in the institutions of the Zhou took on added importance, and so it was tutors to the crown prince who took up the task of standardizing, commenting on, and teaching the Analects (Csikszentmihalyi 2002a, 144-9). Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (1998) have translated the Ding county Analects into English.

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

31

sages like Kings Wen ́ and Tang ೢ.43 These recent discoveries are especially notable in light of the absence, underscored by Zhu Weizheng Ќ႕Ꭹ, of evidence in transmitted texts that the Analects existed in anything resembling its current form prior to the start of the first century B.C.E.44 The Analects, then, appears to be a selection from a body of diverse sayings and anecdotes written on bamboo slips that circulated in the Warring States and Early Imperial periods, and was not fixed in its current form until the second or first centuries B.C.E. This certainly leaves open the possibility that the “teachings of Kongzi” were first a number of rather different traditions and practices that were only later homogenized into an account of a “unity” that was then projected back into a time prior to their multiplicity.45 It is relatively easy to see how these new discoveries might call into question the long-held view that Ru subtraditions were variations within a “study faction” that branched out from the doctrines of the “founding father” Kongzi. What may be more difficult to agree on is a hypothesis that fits the new facts in such a way as to provide a new model for the development of “Early Confucianism.” One possibility is that Ru doctrines and practices were an accretion of relatively independent traditions that derived their authority from their association with Kongzi while maintaining a significant degree of separation from one and other throughout the Warring States period. Under this hypothesis, then, the core concerns of these disciple traditions might well differ from one and other in non-trivial ways, and not simply reflect divergent appropriations of elements of the coherent philosophy of a single teacher. Disciple traditions might focus to a greater or lesser degree on textual interpretation, on ritual practice, on rulership or on training for holding office. Some might be more conservative and resist adaptation and change, while others might engage or appropriate different elements of outside traditions.46 43

The brief proto-Analects passages in this latter text, dubbed Rujiazhe yan ኵࣁ ‫ږ‬Ե by its discoverers, differ in interesting ways from the Analects found at the same site, and the received version. The text was destroyed in an earthquake in 1976. For a transcription, see Guo Yi 1998, 494-509, and for differences with other versions of the Analects, see Csikszentmihalyi 2002a, 156n.39. 44 Zhu Weizheng 1986, 44. See also John Makeham 1996. 45 Li Xueqin Өዕ෺ makes a similar point about the need to consider excavated texts as equally reliable as the Analects in “The Confucian Texts from Guodian Tomb Number One: Their Date and Significance” in Sarah Allan and Crispin Williams 2000, 107-11. 46 Even if one rejects the need for a new hypothesis and continues to hold that there was a unity of Ru doctrine and practice under Kongzi, a model of meaningfully

32

CHAPTER ONE

The Ru virtue discourse, then, must be seen as more than the historical attempt to reconstitute Kongzi’s theory of the virtues, and Ru texts as more than the product of the degradation of an original message that was once unified and coherent. This means that a study of a subset of early Ru texts should not claim to describe positions that are “Confucian” or even represent the entire Ru tradition at any one time. Instead, the most this study might hope to do is describe the positions in a set of texts, interpreting them as tracing an arc across a period of time, intelligible because of a shared technical vocabulary, worldview, and common responses to criticisms offered by writers outside the broader Ru tradition. The set of diverse tenets of the broader Ru tradition is then the domain of the analysis, while the focus will be on the development of a particular theory of the virtues in that domain. Subsequent chapters of this monograph will describe the explanations made by some fourth through second century B.C.E. texts of how, as Huang Kan put it metaphorically above, certain practices may lead to changes in the body, fostering the development of the virtues.

External criticisms of the Ru virtue discourse Moving away from arguments about the essence or source of the Ru, toward a more historically contextualized description of the Ru as a social group, entails examining both Ru self-descriptions and locating them with respect to other groups. Indeed, in the late Warring States period, the cultivation of a set of virtues, a key aspect of the different areas of Ru expertise, was the object of vehement criticism from a number of external perspectives. The critiques paint a comprehensive (if partisan) picture of the Ru and impugn the virtue discourse as being hypocritical, inefficacious and generally wrongheaded. These attacks affected the development of Ru thinking on the topic, and for this reason, they form a crucial part of the background of the development of the virtue discourse. This chapter continues by outlining three sets of criticisms leveled at the early Ru and beginning to look at the development of Ru thinking in a dialogical framework.

divergent disciple traditions might be seen as a preferable way to look at the historical development of the Ru tradition on the grounds that it is a useful corrective to a patrilinear model in which the deviations in disciple traditions may only be read as “variations” on a consistent theme and not as genuine differences.

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

33

Early criticisms of the Ru came from a number of different perspectives, but three have been especially influential. In many ways, the most blistering are found in the collection Mozi ኳʪ, associated with the late fifth and early fourth century B.C.E. figure Mo Di ኳႜ. Criticisms of the Ru in the Mozi are spread throughout that composite work, but are central to several individual sections: “Fei ming” ‫֡ۍ‬ (Condemning fatalism), “Fei Ru” ‫ ۍ‬ኵ (Condemning Ru), “Gongmeng” ˙ׂ, “Lu wen” ኬ੕ (Questions in Lu) and “Gongshu” ˙᎔. Many scholars today see the first two of these chapters as part of the core section of the Mozi, presumably dating to the fourth century B.C.E., although some have suggested that the last three may actually have been written earlier than the core section.47 A more indirect set of criticisms of the Ru is found in the Zhuangzi பʪ, which attacks what it sees as Ru moral absolutism from several viewpoints. While an appeal to the precedence of innate nature is present throughout the Zhuangzi sections usually considered oldest, the most notable direct attacks on the motives of the Ru are found in the later “Dao Zhi” ഞ⌳ (Robber Zhi) and “Yufu” ၈̓ (Elder Fisherman) chapters. While the earliest sections of the Zhuangzi likely date to the fourth century B.C.E., “Dao Zhi” and “Yufu” may have been composed as late as the start of the second century B.C.E., and are mentioned by name in the Shiji,

47 By “core” chapters, scholars generally mean chapters 8-37 of the extant Mozi, ten sets of chapters organized in triads, long felt to have been products of the three sects of later Mohism described in the Han Feizi (Han Feizi jijie 19.1080, see also A.C. Graham 1985). For a summary of the general opinion on the core chapters, see Graham’s entry on the Mozi in Loewe 1993, 336-41. Liang Qichao ૼ૧ඟ (18731929), in his Mozi xue’an ኳʪዕक, divides the received Mozi into six categories, concluding that of the chapters considered here, Mozi only wrote the “Fei ming”. Following an argument originally made by Bi Yuan ୘Ӽ (1730-97), Liang separates out the “Fei Ru” chapter from the other core chapters based on the absence of the phrase ʪኳʪ̆ “Master Mozi says” (1957, 7). Jiang Boqian ሢїᆻ, however, concludes that the three chapters “Gongmeng”, “Luwen” and “Gongshu” are part of the earliest stratum of the text, written in the period between the Analects and the Mengzi, while the “Fei ming” chapter reflects an important position of Mozi recorded after the movement had split into three parts, and the “Fei Ru” chapter was a product of the later followers of Mozi, perhaps co-temporal with the anti-Mohist passages in the Mengzi (1985, 475-9). Most recently, Erik W. Maeder (1992) has built on the work of Stephen Durrant and Graham in studying lexical variations in the different core chapters, and concluded that these chapters utilize a shared set of urtexts that were shorter than chapter length (pian ᇺ) but closer to paragraphs (what he calls ce ̰, “bound sets of bamboo slips”). This approach would imply that dating the text by existing chapter titles is problematic, because the oldest stratum of the text appears as the kernel of many chapters, surrounded by later argument and elaboration.

34

CHAPTER ONE

composed around 100 B.C.E.48 The third such critique is found in the Han Feizi and includes substantive criticisms of the Ru in “Wudu” ˉ ᝔ (Five vermin), “Xianxue,” and “Zhongxiao” ‫׫‬Ҩ (Loyalty and familial piety) chapters, numbered as chapters 49-51. These essays probably do not predate the text’s putative author Prince Fei of Han, who flourished in the middle of the third century B.C.E. They probably were not written much later, either, since at least the first two are written from the perspective of pre-unification China (i.e., prior to 221 B.C.E.) and the “Wudu” was reportedly quoted by an emperor of the state of Qin in the middle of the third century B.C.E., and it is summarized and identified by title in chapter 63 of the Shiji.49 The attacks on the Ru preserved in the above mentioned sections of these three classic works show that Ru behavior and doctrine were the object of significant criticism in the fourth and third centuries B.C.E. Each one of these three texts is written from the perspective of a particular theory of value that both informs its prescriptions for the ruler and forms the background for its criticisms of the Ru. The following pages briefly describe their individual theories, prescriptions and criticisms and then focus on a set of general criticisms that are common to all these texts. The general criticisms, offered from widely different perspectives, are first, that the Ru’s approach to training and ritual is superficial or hypocritical; second, that the project of selfcultivation is hopeless because human behavior is determined by factors outside of individual control; and third, that even if successful, the enterprise of cultivating virtue runs contrary to the interests of society as a whole. These potential problems were not only a staple of anti-Ru writings, they also were recognized by the Ru and affected the subsequent development of Ru thinking.

48 Shiji 63.2143. Harold Roth, building on the work of Angus Graham and Guan Feng ᘕኇ, attributes the “inner chapters” of the Zhuangzi to the fourth century figure Zhuang Zhou ப֟, while “Dao Zhi” and “Yufu” chapters are part of a complex of “Individualist” writings attributed to the followers of Yang Zhu ๫Ќ at the start of the second century B.C.E. (1991, 80-2). Wang Shumin ̙֋‫ ׏‬shares this assessment of the “Dao Zhi” chapter, but groups “Yufu” with the meditation-related inner chapters 4 and 6 (Zhuangzi jiaoquan 1444-5). 49 Kanaya 1960, 38-40. In the “Laozi Han Fei liezhuan” Чʪᓟ‫ۍ‬λ෭, the Shiji summarizes a main argument of the “Wudu”, that traditional literati (wen) and military (wu) values cause people to violate the model laid out by the sovereign: ̣޴ኵ‫́·ږ‬ ෩ٗ Щ‫΀ن̣ږە‬໖ “He held that the Ru use wen to disorder proper models, and the knights errant use wu to violate proscriptions.” The chapter also mentions the title “Wudu” twice. See Shiji 63.2147 and 2155.

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Probably the earliest and certainly the most pointed descriptions of Ru practice and thought are found in the corpus of writings that developed out of the tradition of Mo Di. Like the Ru, the fourth century B.C.E. followers of Mo Di (Mozhe ኳ ‫ ) ږ‬maintained a social organization separate from conventional society.50 The rules of Mohist subculture could perhaps be explained by the personal experience of Mo Di, identified in the Shiji as: ҭ˃ʨˮ െϭጺ ޴໢· “a high officer in the state of Song who excelled at defensive warfare and who practiced the frugal use of resources.”51 The text that bears his name contains sections on defensive warfare and develops a social theory predicated on the need to conserve and equitably distribute scarce resources. Mozi’s theory is best described as Consequentialist in the sense of a system in which the moral rightness of an act is determined solely by the goodness of that act’s consequences.52 In this respect, Mozi’s prescriptions for society differ radically from those of the Ru, who generally were more concerned with evaluating the morality of individuals and less interested in consequences of actions than in their psychological backgrounds. This contrast is seen most clearly in Mozi’s doctrine of jian’ai ࡾื (impartial caring), which holds that resource allocation is maximized by the widespread acceptance of the principle that ͫ޴մ˩˃Խ ࠜ޴մԽ ޴մ˩˃፶ ࠜ޴մ፶ “one must treat one’s friend’s body as if it were one’s own, and one must treat one’s friend’s parent as if he or she were one’s own.”53 The followers 50 The mid-third century B.C.E. Lüshi chunqiu ѻ̏‫ ߲ݱ‬contains a number of stories about the followers of Mozi that reveal aspects of their social organization after the death of Mozi in the early fourth century B.C.E. According to that text, Mohists served as advisors to rulers, but maintained an independent social organization. The non-hereditary leader of a group of Mohists was a juzi ྃʪ, to whom individual followers owed absolute allegiance and for whom they were willing to give their lives. In the “Shangde” ʕᅭ (Highest virtue) chapter of the Lüshi chunqiu, the prospect of the death of the juzi in 380 B.C.E. initially threatens to ഽኳ‫“ ̛ؠږ‬cut off the Mohists off in [this] generation”, but the title is transferred. The “Qusi” ̓ Ԣ (Dispensing with selfishness) chapter recounts the case of a juzi executing his son for murdering a man despite the contrary ruling of the King Hui of the state of Qin (r. 337324 B.C.E.) See Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi 1.55-6, 19.1257-8 (cf. Knoblock and Riegel 2000 [1/5.5, 19/3.4], pp. 75, 487-8). 51 Shiji 74.2350. Less than two centuries later, the Hanshu says the reason the Mohists valued moderation came out of their roles as the protectors of the ancestral temples. After listing six texts that it classifies as Mohist, the Hanshu lauds a number of Mohist doctrines, criticizing only their condemnation of the rites for being overly motivated by economy, and their impartial caring for not understanding the distinction between close and distant relations. See Hanshu 30.1738. 52 This discussion is indebted to Philip J. Ivanhoe’s work on the Mozi, summarized in Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2001, 55-7. 53 Chapter 16 of Mozi xiangu 4.73.

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of Master Mo believed that an ideal society would result once the ruler adopted this maxim. This would result in a change in the behavior of his subjects, who, through a variety of mechanisms, would be transformed just as clothes are colored by a strong dye. When the entire society was so transformed, there would no longer be an unequal distribution of resources caused by favoritism based on affiliation with friends, family or community. For Ru writers, however, it is precisely the impulse to partial caring, and the resulting affiliations that develop from it, that form the prototype of all benevolent acts. But because the consequences that Mozi sought to maximize were the act’s effects on the wealth, population and order of the entire state (rather than an aggregate of individual psychological benefits, as in some forms of Utilitarianism), he was deaf to any argument about negative social consequences resulting from a weakening of affiliations. Indeed, the theory of value upon which jian’ai is predicated is materialist in the sense that it does not recognize the value of complex psychological states–which is perhaps one reason that in the twentieth century it attracted the attention of Marxist-influenced writers such as Berthold Brecht.54 From such a materialist perspective, of course, the rites and music practiced by the Ru were a profound waste of time and resources. In the “Jiezang” ໢ ༎  (Frugal burials) chapter, the Mozi argues against elaborate funeral practices that pour a family’s assets into the grave, thereby ‫ޖ‬ၶࣁ‫“ ܮ‬exhausting the households” of poor families and ൳Ծ‫“ ן‬emptying the treasuries” of the nobility. In addition, the “Jiezang” contends, lengthy mourning rituals take farmers out of their fields and officials away from their duties.55 Both the “Fei Ru” and the “Gong Meng” chapters ridicule the Ru for wearing the clothing of the past. “Fei Ru” first summarizes the Ru position as Ѽʪͫ‫ͅح‬Ե೸݈ ˋ “The gentleman must use ancient speech and clothing, and only then will he be benevolent.”56 The Mozi then counters that all ancient 54 Berthold Brecht wrote a play Me-ti: Buch der Wendungen (in Gesammelte Werke, rpt., Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983). Brecht presumably learned about Mozi from Alfred Forke’s 1922 translation Me Ti des Sozialethikers und seiner Schüler philosophische Werke (Berlin: Kommissionsverlag der Vereinigung wissenschafticher Verleger). Secondary work on this influence on Brecht includes Tatlow 1970 and Lazda 1976. 55 In reading “emptying the treasuries”, I follow Yu Yue ‫( ⮙ۥ‬1821-1907) in reading che Ծ as a graphic error for ku ࣗ See Mozi xiangu 6.106. 56 Following Zhang Chunyi, based on the parallel in the “Gong Meng” chapter I read fuguyan ‫ͅح‬Ե as guyanfu ͅԵ‫ح‬. See Mozi jijie 9.345.

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speech and clothing were, at one time, new. In “Gong Meng”, a similar Ru argument is met with the rebuttal that the ancient kings and hegemons used the same speech and wore the same clothes, but differed from each other in terms of their benevolence. Mozi caps his argument by saying that, since the Ru disciple to whom he is speaking is following the rites of the Zhou and not the earlier Xia, ʪ˃ͅ‫ͅۍ‬ ʛ “Your ‘old’ is not really old.”57 In keeping with the general theory of value offered in the Mozi, these arguments attack the utility of ritual and music. In addition to showing that the rites are wasteful, the text also had to argue that the rites do not lead to any benefit that might outweigh this waste. The Mozi does this by painting the rites as inconsistent, and the Ru ritual system as internally contradictory. In this context, the text infers that for the rites to have any utility, the symbolic aspect of ritual must function to support social hierarchies. The “Fei Ru” chapter argues, however, that kinship hierarchies are not accurately reflected in the symbolism of mourning rites. It also points out how the symbolism of ritual sacrifices to the ancestors differs from that of wedding ceremonies.58 These arguments implicitly acknowledge the possibility that rituals might symbolically reinforce social hierarchies, and so might be of some utility to the state. But since the rituals promoted by the Ru are inconsistent, and there are competing ritual precedents that might be adopted as the correct ones, the Mozi concludes that Ru ritual is of no use to society. At times, however, the Mozi embellishes its strict Consequentialist agenda and makes another, somewhat moralistic, argument against the Ru program. It argues that the rites and music appeal to the body, and that rational calculation of the consequences must overcome the enchantments that Kongzi and his followers have woven. The “Fei yue” ‫ ۍ‬ᆪ  (Condemning music) chapter of the Mozi acknowledges the pleasurable effects of music on individuals, but argues that musical performance has no benefit to society: ᓛԽ‫ڈ‬մϯʛ ʤ‫ڈ‬մ΅ʛ Α‫ڈ‬մࠀʛ Ы‫ڈ‬մᆪʛ 57 See Mozi xiangu 9.181 and 12.274. This is probably not phonologically related to Analects 6.25: gu bu gu ⌓ʿ⌓. 58 See Mozi xiangu 9.178-80. An even more interesting accusation of inconsistency is found in the “Gong Meng” chapter argument that the Ru should believe in demons and spirits if they carry out sacrifices to the ancestors. Mozi reasons that sacrificing while insisting that there are no demons and spirits is like ೷‫ܯ‬Щዕ‫ܯ‬ ᔩ “never having any guests yet studying the ritual for receiving guests,” (Mozi xiangu 12.276).

38

CHAPTER ONE ೸ʕШ˃ʿˀ໶̙˃Ֆ ʓܾ˃ʿˀ໗ͺ˃Ѧ While the body may recognize what settles it, the mouth may recognize what it finds sweet, the eye may recognize what it finds beautiful, and the ear may recognize what it finds musical, nevertheless, if we examine above, we find that it does not square with the affairs of the sage kings, and if we measure below, we find that it does not square with benefit to the people.59

The precedent of the sage kings and music’s lack of benefit to the people are both signs that music is of negative utility to the state, while any positive utility to the individual simply does not figure into the Mozi’s calculus. The pleasures of music are representative of the allure of the entire Ru ritual program, whose very complexity tempts ruler and commoner alike. In a speech set in 517 B.C.E. that, while likely apocryphal, is quoted in both the “Fei Ru” chapter of the Mozi and in several second and first century B.C.E. texts, Yan Ying उᏮ counsels Duke Jing ದ of Qi (r. 547-489 B.C.E.) not to enfeoff Kongzi by attacking the latter’s ritual program: ˱‫ݿ‬ୣࣅஙྟ᜴̛̣ ‫ྦྷိף‬Ⴋ̣႞ࣛ ᑪങࡑ˃ᔩ̣Εᄭ ੀᒲേ˃໢̣ᝳ୥ Kong Mo60 (i.e., Kongzi) uses his decorated appearance and refined adornments to bewitch the generation, his playing for songs and drumming for dances to gather followers, his intricate rites for ascending and descending to publicize his ceremonies, and his draining stipulations about hastening and walking with outstretched arms to exhort the masses.61

In this quotation, as in the previous one, the Mozi is implying that there is something almost prurient about the rituals of Kongzi. At one point in the argument against music, the Mozi even quotes the “writings of the ancient kings” to the effect that constant dancing in the palace was 59

Mozi xiangu 8.155. Bi Yuan explains that Mo ‫ ݿ‬is the result of a taboo on the name Kongzi (Mozi xiangu 9.184). 61 Reading guan ᝳ as quan ᘳ, consistent with the variant cited in Mozi xiangu 9.185. Variations on Yan Ying’s speech in the “Fei Ru” chapter are found in Yanzi chunqiu उʪ‫( ߲ݱ‬Spring and Autumn of Master Yan) “Zhong Ni jian Jinggong, Jinggnong yu feng zhi, Yanzi yiwei bu ke” Ϋ͠Գದ˙ದ˙଒ܱ˃उʪ̣޴ʿ̈́ (Zhong Ni was received by Duke Jing, and Duke Jing wished to enfeoff him, [but] Master Yan thought it unsuitable,” 8.205); Shiji “Kongzi shijia” (47.1911); Yantielun 25 “Lunfei” ቈቋ (Discussions of slander, Yantielun jiaozhu 5.299); and Kongcongzi “Jie Mo” ༷ኳ (Interrogating Mozi, 18.30a-34b). The “Fei Ru” chapter is clearly a composite of two different parts: the first attacking the practices and doctrines of the Ru, and the second slandering Kongzi and his disciples. 60

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an offense called wufeng Ҹࡘ “wind (i.e., influence) of shamans.”62 The implication of this set of criticisms about the ritual and musical practices of the Ru is that there is something magical about them, and that the motives of the Ru magicians is to deceive. The use of rites and music by the Ru is instrumental, intended not for some higher purpose but to convert followers and attract patrons. As a result, the Mohists were the most vociferous proponents of the argument that the Ru’s participation in ritual was a charade, one of the general criticisms of the Ru that will be examined in more detail below. There is another major criticism of the Ru offered in the Mozi: an attack on their belief in ming ֡ “fate”. This critique is developed in most detail in “Fei ming”, and also appears in “Fei Ru”, “Gongmeng” and “Lu wen”. The “Fei ming” says that advocates of ming (ming zhe ֡‫ )ږ‬argue that wealth, population, order and lifespan are all predetermined. It also attributes to them the ideas that good and bad fortune, and punishment and reward at the hands of the state, are predetermined. As a result, the “Fei ming” argues, people have no motivation to work or better themselves, to obey laws or restrain themselves. From the perspective of material well-being, then, the advocates of ming are seen as damaging the state’s ability to generate wealth and foster order. The “Gongmeng” and “Fei ming” chapters call this a Ru doctrine.63 What is especially interesting about this characterization of the Ru is that it is at odds with the assumptions behind most of the Ru programs of self-cultivation described earlier in this chapter. After all, if one’s destiny is already written in stone, why bother? Instead, the Analects and other Ru texts appear to advocate a limited notion of ming, in which only certain aspects of one’s life are pre-determined. The idea 62 Mozi xiangu, 8.160. The “Fei Yue” chapter specifically quotes the Guanxing ‫ׇ‬ μ (Official punishments) of the sage-king Tang ೢ of the Shang. Although this text is not extant today, the “Tang xing” ೢμ (Punishments of Tang) is referred to by Shu Xiang ֋ώ in the Zuozhuan ͣ෭ entry for the the sixth year of Duke Zhao ‫ ݲ‬of Lu: ੋЉ෩‫ ݬ‬Щѕೢμ “Shang had a disordered government and so created the Punishments of Tang,” (Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhengyi 43.18a [cf. Legge 1895, v. 3, 609]). According to the Zhushu jinian Сएߺ϶: অ΋ʅʏ͗϶ࡌѕೢμ “In the twentyfourth year of the Zujia reign [of Shang emperor Zai ཛྷ], the Punishments of Tang were renewed” (Jinben Zhushu jinian shuzheng 1.32b [cf. Legge 1895, v. 3, prolegomena, 136]). The Han Feizi directly compares the claims of the Ru to that of wuzhu Ҹই “shaman invocators” (Han Feizi jijie 19.1102-3). 63 In common with the other “core” chapters, there are three extant chapters with the title “Fei Ming”, whose content largely overlaps. See Mozi xiangu 9.163-177. For clear statements that the Ru advocated ming, see Mozi xiangu 9.180, 12.278.

40

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that only some outcomes in one’s life are fixed allows for selfimprovement in other areas. A good illustration of this perspective is provided by Zixia’s quotation of Kongzi in Analects 12.5: АΆЉ֡ ౗඙Ϛ˭ “Life and death come from ming, wealth and honor depend on tian.” Zixia offers these words by way of condolence for Sima Niu ͌ ਠ ̗ after the latter complains about not having brothers. The general thrust of his reply is that although such things are a matter of fate, by cultivating reverence one can connect with others through ritual, so that everyone in the ritual net becomes one’s brother.64 Zixia is making a strong case that while there are areas of life that are determined by factors such as biology, there are also free or malleable aspects. The conception of ming found in third and second century B.C.E. texts is that it determines the avenues of opportunity available to a person: while some capacities and potential outcomes such as wealth and lifespan are a matter of ming, personal thoughts, associations and actions are primarily a matter of individual choice. If the Ru advocated such a limited notion of ming, why does the Mozi portray them as promoting an unequivocal fatalism? It is possible that the Analects passage does not accurately portray the belief in ming at the time of the composition of these chapters of the Mozi, or that there were early Ru factions that believed in a more absolute version of it. Another possibility is that that the followers of Mozi found the notion of limited fatalism logically inconsistent. This latter possibility is implied in the “Gongmeng” chapter when Mozi responds to a paraphrase of Zixia’s above statement about the limited effects of ming by saying that such a picture of fate contradicts the Ru imperative to improve oneself through study. Mozi says that holding both positions at the same time is like: ֡ʆ༖Щ̓ឨ۪ʛ “commanding others to protect [their heads], and also to take off their hats.” Playing on the dual meaning of ming as both “fate” and “command”, the Mozi in effect asserts that there is no tenable position that can reconcile fate and free 64 In the “Minglu” Ҹই (Fate and salary), “Wen Kong” ੕˱ (Questioning Kongzi), and “Biansui” ᎖঄ (Disputing spirit afflictions) chapters of the Lunheng ቈ ፰, Zixia’s words are attributed several times to Kongzi himself (Lunheng jiaoshi 1.23, 9.418, and 24.1009 [cf. Forke 1962, I; 147, 408 and 527]), while in the “Mingyi” ֡໳ (Meaning of Fate) chapter they are attributed to Zixia (Lunheng jiaoshi 2.44 [cf. Forke 1962, I; 136]). Cheng Shude ദዾᅭ argues that most of what Zixia says is a direct quotation of the sage, and that only the final query: Ѽʪщમ̢೷̮ҿʛ “How could a gentleman worry about not having a brother?” is Zixia’s own words (See Lunyu jishi 24.829-33). Here, I read you Љ as you Ί, following a suggestion by Zhang Zhenjun.

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will. At the same time, his response asserts that Ru cosmology does not have a coherent notion of what is outside the human realm.65 For the Mozi, good things happen to good people, and when he attacks the Ru notion of ming, he is, by extension, defending the idea that actions automatically incur retribution or reward. Beyond the particular question of what notions of contingency were advocated by early Ru, the Mozi’s criticism of Ru fatalism throws light on a debate between competing notions of the sacred in the fourth and third centuries B.C.E. A fundamental tenet of the Mohist picture was the belief that tian, through the intermediary guishen ਥআ (demons and spirits), rewarded and punished people based on the morality of their actions, where morality is defined with reference to the Mozi’s particular Consequentialist vision. This vision is outlined in sections 26-8 of the work, “Tianzhi” ˭ӆ (Intention of tian), which argues that court sacrifice was proof that the ancient sage-kings understood that tian required they distribute resources impartially.66 The “Gongmeng” chapter explains that the sage kings of antiquity understood the nature of the reward and punishment meted out by tian: ˙ׂʪᎂʪኳʪ̆ Љ໳ʿ໳ ೷୭ʿ୭ ʪኳʪ̆ ͅ໶̙ߖ̣ਥআ޴আ‫ ا‬Щ޴ၱၰ ੭Љ୭ʿ୭ ‫ݬ̣ݵ‬٢ Щ੢ϯʛ бण߸̣ʓ ߖ̣ਥআ޴ʿআ‫ ا‬ʿ঻޴ၱၰ ੭೷୭ʿ୭ ‫ݬ̣ݵ‬෩Щ੢υʛ Master Gongmeng said to Master Mozi: “There is righteous and not righteous, but not good fortune and bad.” Master Mozi said: “In the past, the sage-kings all took the demons and spirits to be spirit luminances who could give penalties and awards. They incorporated good and bad fortune in their administration, and this was the reason that their government was good and their states secure. From the time of Jie and Zhou (i.e., the corrupt last rulers of Xia and Shang), they all took the spirits and demons not to be spirit luminances, giving neither penalties nor rewards. So (rulers) did not incorporate good and bad fortune into their administration, and this was the reason their government was chaotic and their states were in danger.67 65 Here, Gongmeng’s words are: ௙౗࿕˰ 㒪೸Ϛ˭ ʿ̈́๑८ “Wealth and lifespan are managed by tian and cannot be changed,” (Mozi xiangu 12.275). 66 Mozi xiangu 7.118-23 [cf. Mei 1929, 270-81]. That tian occupies the place of ruler in the ruler/subject hierarchy is indicated by the Mozi’s uncharacteristically droll aside: Ӎ͵྾ႝ˭ʓ˃‫׿‬Ӷ߬ၰ‫˭ؠ‬ʪ‫ږ‬ʛ “I have never heard of tian seeking blessings from the sovereign!” (Mozi xiangu 7.120). 67 Mozi xiangu 12.275. The passage concludes: ‫ݭ‬ζ̙˃ए ʪΠЉ˃̆ ឨ෬ ʛ ̳‫ؠ‬ʪ ʿ୭ ЏԵ޴ʿെ˃Љ႙ ޴െ˃Љቑ “Therefore the writings of the

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CHAPTER ONE

The “spirit luminances” (shenming আ‫ )ا‬in this passage are in effect inspectors from the spirit world who enforce the punishment and reward scheme of tian. The initial statement of the Ru interlocutor Gongmeng implies that while the virtue discourse is real, that of good and bad fortune does not really exist. To understand the notion of xiang ୭ (good and bad fortune), it is only necessary to read Mozi’s response closely. In the context of governing, there are certain actions that accrue the approval of the spirit luminances that periodically inspect the state, pass judgment and dispense justice.68 In this moral universe, the good cannot escape being rewarded and the wicked cannot escape punishment. The Ru, who generally did not accept the notion of good and bad fortune, are by implication no better than the doomed rulers who debauch themselves at the end of the dynastic cycles. These competing notions of the sacred are, in turn, linked to different attitudes to sacrifice and prayer. The Ru support of a limited brand of fatalism was intimately linked to their criticism of the Mohist idea of xiang or fortune as an automatic reward and punishment system. An example of this is in an entry in the Zuo commentary to the Spring and Autumn entry for year 21 of Duke Xi ྫྷ, when Zang Wenzhong Ⴇ́Ϋ objects to human sacrifice as a solution to a summer drought. Zang explains that what would really address the drought would be conservation measures, and then makes a telling observation about the sacrifice of people considered to have special connections with tian: ˭ ଒ଓ˃ ۱ϨˡΆ “if tian desired to kill them, then they would not be alive”.69 The Ru notion of contingency meant that sacrifices could not ancient kings, and also [the works] of the masters, say: “This arrogance, it comes from you. It (means) bad fortune.” Such words mean that bad actions will be punished and that good ones will be rewarded.” Mozi jijie 12.584 argues for the reading Jizi ၹʪ for zi yi ʪΠ, making the beginning of the final paragraph read: “Therefore the writings of the ancient kings, and the Viscount of Ji, say. . .”. 68 An excellent illustration of this use of shenming is the story of the fall of the Duchy of Guo ⨻ in the “Bianwu” ᎖‫( ٵ‬Distinguishing Things) chapter from Liu Xiang’s ᄸ ώ (77-6 B.C.E.) Shuoyuan ი ࠥ (Garden of Persuasions). The story begins with the descent of such inspectors in fifteenth year of the reign of King Hui ౴ of Zhou (i.e., 662 B.C.E.) Because of the Duke’s immorality, the spirits end up destroying Guo four years later. See Shuoyuan jiaozheng 18.458-60. This picture of tian as being committed to interceding in history, central to the Mohist picture, might also be seen as a survival of an earlier notion of the anthropomorphic tian that expresses its will through its ming (both “fate” and “command”). The role of an anthropomorphic tian in early Ru cosmology is a valuable facet of Eno’s 1990 The Confucian Creation of Heaven. 69 See Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhengyi 14.1811 and Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu 390-1 (cf. James Legge 1895, v. 5, 179), with thanks to Scot Brackenridge and Guo Jue for their class presentation on this passage. A similar principle is advocated by Shu Xing ֋፞

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hope to affect conditions in the world, something that would in effect be a means to control tian. Later Ru developed this position in greater detail. The “Tianlun” ˭ቈ chapter of the Xunzi makes this position explicit by attacking the efficacy of such sacrifices. It notes that just because the ceremony of sacrifice and prayer for rain is sometimes followed by rain does not prove that tian is volitional, ‫ݭ‬Ѽʪ̣޴́ Щ Р ּ ̣ ޴ আ ̣ ޴ ́ ۱ φ ̣ ޴ আ ۱ ˛ ʛ  “So the gentleman regards it as pattern (i.e., cultural; wen ́), but the common people regard this as spiritual (i.e., a matter of spirit; shen আ). Considering this the result of pattern is fortunate, considering it the result of spirits is unfortunate.”70 The Xunzi develops the position that there is “no good fortune and bad” and turns the Mozi’s position on its head: when good fortune results from righteousness, it is a matter of culture not spirits. These contrasting moral cosmologies lead to divergent answers to the type of questions elsewhere asked with reference to the issue of theodicy. In the “Gongmeng” and “Lu wen” chapters of the Mozi, Ru interlocutors pose several questions to Mozi. Why, for instance, does someone whose behavior is correct suffer illness? Mozi responds that there are also non-divine causes for bad outcomes, and so not all bad outcomes are punishments for action (but all bad actions do incur punishment).71 This is not quite the same as a world in which success

in his response to the question of what triggered the automatic retribution of five meteorites falling in the Zuozhuan entry for year 16 of the reign of Duke Xi. Shu provides an interpretation but later confides that the meteorites ‫ۍ‬φ˛‫׿‬Άʛ “did not arise from good and bad fortune” but instead were a matter of yin and yang. See Chunqiu Zouzhuan zhengyi 14.1805 and Yang Bojun (1981, 369) [cf. James Legge 1895, v. 5, 170]. 70 See Xunzi jijie 11.316. The Xunzi generally rejects the possibility that natural phenomena might be interpreted as providential. 71 In one “Gongmeng” passage, a student asks Mozi where his reward is for studying with Mozi, and Mozi replies that his scheme demands that all people recognize and promote the worthy, yet the student is busy promoting himself, and so no reward is due him (Mozi xiangu 12.279-80). In the next passage, a student asks Mozi why Mozi has fallen ill despite making sacrifices, and Mozi replies that there are many directions from which a person might fall ill, and that by sacrificing he is only closing one of the myriad gates through which illness might enter (Mozi xiangu 12.280). A third passage from the “Lu wen” finds a disciple asking Mozi why the student has suffered and fallen sick despite serving Mozi and sacrificing to the spirits. Mozi points out the various shortcomings of the student and argues that the student has gotten what he deserved, reiterating the idea that illness might enter many gates (Mozi xiangu 13.288-9). These different etiologies for misfortune resemble what Sir Edward EvansPritchard (1902-1973), in the context of his study of the Azande, called “co-operating causes”.

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and failure are dependent on the opportunities a person encounters.72 In this Ru universe, not all good actions incur rewards (but only good people have a chance of becoming sage rulers). These exchanges illustrate the complexity of the heated debate surrounding the nature of the sacred and patterns of contingency in the fourth and third centuries B.C.E., with the Mohists representing the view that tian acts universally to automatically reward or punish, and the Ru representing the view that tian only determines certain aspects of human life. The contrasts between their underlying cosmologies is a major aspect of disagreement between the Ru and the followers of Mozi in their beliefs about the results of acting out of the virtues. A second perspective from which Ru positions were critiqued was that of the fourth and third century B.C.E. Zhuangzi, today usually labeled a “Daoist” text. In it, the dueling perspectives on tian of the Ru and the followers of Mozi were transmuted into a third, more naturalistic, conception of tian. As with the Mozi, in much of the Zhuangzi the responses of tian are automatic. Yet tian is not intentional. Consistent with the Ru perspective outlined above, tian’s responses do not recognize fortune (“there is no good fortune and bad”). Yet neither do tian’s responses recognize morality (there is also no “righteous and not righteous”). This third notion of tian as a naturalistic order was therefore different from both the Ru and the Mozi conception of tian. 72

A similar question is asked of Kongzi in third and second century B.C.E. texts: why, since he has accumulated benevolence, does he live in straitened circumstances? Kongzi responds by saying that success is a matter of two things: whether one cultivates one’s innate ability and whether one lives in an age when such ability might be recognized.Versions of the same essay on fate are found, attributed to Kongzi, in the “Youzuo” ܰҗ (To the right of the [ruler’s] seat) chapter of the Xunzi and in chapter seven of the second-century B.C.E. Hanshi waizhuan ᓟ༶͙ ෭; an unattributed version was also found at Guodian (c. 300 B.C.E.) and called Qiongda yishi ᇴཥ̣इ (Frustration and Success are a Function of the Age). In the attributed texts, Kongzi is answering a question from his disciple Zilu when both of them were starving. Zilu first recalls a saying that might be a quotation of Mozi: ޴െ‫̣˃ే˭ږ‬ၰ ޴ʿെ‫ే˭ږ‬ ˃̣ၱ “The person who does a good thing is rewarded by tian with good fortune, and the one who does a bad thing is rewarded by tian with disaster,” and then asks why, given all the good things Kongzi has done, he still lives in obscurity. Kongzi cites many examples of wise people who were persecuted and never recognized, and other examples of wise people who were recognized and became officials or even sage kings. The Xunzi summarizes it this way: ˮཀྵʿ ཀྵ‫  ږ‬इ ʛ ቖʿԨ ‫ ږ‬Ӫʛ  “Now, whether or not one meets [with opportunity, or with a sage] is a matter of the age, whether one is worthy or unworthy is a matter of one’s [tian-given] ability.” In Hanshi waizhuan, he concludes: ѼʪੀዕஙԽၷмЩෝմइ “A gentleman works on his studies, cultivates his body, corrects his actions, and then waits for his time.” See Xunzi jijie 20.526-7 (cf. Knoblock, v.3, 249 and 374-5, n.56), and Hanshi waizhuan shuzheng 7.371-75 (cf. Hightower 1952, 227-30).

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As such it formed the basis for a different critique of Ru self-cultivation practices, based on a theory of value that prized a return to the natural order fostered by tian. And, as the Zhuangzi makes clear over and over again, cultivating the Ru virtues interferes with this return. Much of the Zhuangzi, especially the first two of its traditional three sections (i.e., the “inner” and “outer” chapters, numbers 1-7 and 8-18), advocates a return to an innate nature, one imagined to have existed prior to distinctions overlaid by the Ru moral system. The contrast between the natural world and what human beings have imposed on it is expressed in both the Zhuangzi and in the second century B.C.E. Huainanzi by the opposition between tian ˭ and ren ʆ , the “natural” or “heavenly” and the “human.”73 Both texts use analogies involving horses and oxen to define this opposition. In the Zhuangzi, the “Tiandi” ˭ϙ (The heavenly and the earthly) chapter draws the distinction that the ox’s having four legs is the natural Way, but its pierced nose or the harness of a horse is the human Way. The first chapter of the Huainanzi, “Yuandao” ࢍལ (Finding the source of the Way), expands on these examples. The cloven hoofs and horns of the ox, and the mane and undivided hoofs of a horse, are “natural,” while the ox’s pierced nose and the horse’s bridled mouth are human. In both texts, the innate bodily characteristics of these animals are natural, and alterations for the purpose of leading the animals and making them work exemplify the human. The mistake most people make is that they impose human (ren) understanding on the natural (tian). The basic division between the human and the natural is the basis for the Zhuangzi’s criticism that the Ru virtues interfere with a return to the natural. The Zhuangzi’s “Mati” ਠ ᎌ (Horses’ hooves) chapter illustrates this in a way that meshes neatly with the above analogies. It begins by outlining how the basic features of the horse are adapted to their environment: ᎌ̣̈́቟ᓜఆ ̣̎̈́પࡘౖ “With its hooves it can gallop in the frost and snow, and with its hair it can withstand the wind and cold.” These features are part of the ਠ˃ॲ‫“ ׷‬authentic nature of the horse.”74 The legendary horse trainer Bo Le ї ᆪ , 73 Ikeda Tomohisa 池田知久 distinguishes between three different accounts of the relation between the natural and the human in the Zhuangzi, of which the one I outline is closest to the third, concerned with the notion of the natures of different species. Significantly, Ikeda shows how each of these three relations provide grounds from which benevolence and filial piety are attacked. See his “‘Ten’ no tachiba to ‘jinkô’ no hitei” 天の立場と仁孝の否定 (The standpoint of tian and the denial of benevolence and familial piety) in RôSô shisô 老荘思想 (1996, 213-41). 74 Zhuangzi jishi 4b.330 (cf. Graham 1981, 204).

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however, does not understand that nature, and so cuts their hair and trims their hooves, bridling and stabling them, until more than half of them are dead. In his lack of understanding of the authentic nature of horses, Bo Le is like the sage who seeks to teach virtue to human beings. The “Mati” chapter continues by outlining the basic features of human beings that constitute their ગ‫“ ׷‬constant nature”: ᔶЩн ব Щ࡚ “they weave for their clothes, they plow for their food.” To the primitive utopia in which human beings act in accordance with their constant natures comes the sage, whose human distinctions destroy its purity: ˪в ໶ʆ 〣 㓍޴ˋ ⳑ₢޴໳ Щ˭ʓ ֻၝԡ “When it came to the time of the sages, they marched people into the doing of benevolence and stood them on tiptoe for the doing of righteousness, and the people of the world began to have doubts.”75 The sages are, in effect, harnessing the people in the same way the horse trainer altered the natural state of the horses. The argument found through much of the Zhuangzi is that systems of morality of any sort lead people away from their innate natures, and that it is desirable to return people to a simpler psychological state in which they may use the excellences with which they had been originally endowed. The very moral distinctions upon which the Ru program is predicated are, in this view, unnatural and therefore corrupting. Despite this critique of the virtue discourse, some other aspects of the Zhuangzi do not differ much from ideas advocated by some third century Ru. While no single Ru picture of tian is identical with that of the Zhuangzi, critiques of sacrifice and prayer like of those seen above in the Xunzi certainly have much in common with that text.76 Indeed, in parts of the Zhuangzi itself, the term “Ru” is not pejorative, but instead is said only to have become debased in common usage. In the “Tian Zifang” Ήʪ̄ chapter, the positive nature of the term is accentuated by Zhuangzi’s claim to Duke Ai of Lu (r. 494-77 B.C.E.) that, despite the fact that many people in the state of Lu wear Ru round caps and square shoes that symbolize the heavens and the earth, few actually possess the Way. When the Duke makes it a capital crime to wear Ru 75

Zhuangzi jishi 4b.336 (cf. Graham 1981, 205). Ikeda Tomohisa argues that the tian/ren distinction in the Xunzi was imported from the Zhuangzi (1996, 239, n.1). Another similarity between these two texts is that the Xunzi sees the cultural creations of the sage kings as being wei ਨ “human-made” although informed by their understanding of the patterns of tian. These similarities are only some of the ways that, in David S. Nivison’s words, “We can see Hsün Tzu’s thought taking forms that we can understand only if we think of him as having first thought his way through Chuang Tzu,” (1991, 137). 76

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47

clothing without having the Way, all but one person ceased dressing in Ru clothing. Zhuangzi’s response recognizes that one person as the only true Ru in the state of Lu: ̣ኬ੢Щኵ‫ږ‬ɾʆЫ ̈́ᎂϠ̢ “If there is but one Ru in the state of Lu, can this be called ‘many’?” While Duke Ai identified Ru by their clothing, the Zhuangzi argues that a true Ru must possess the Way, and may dress in any kind of clothing. In the “Shuijian” იᄹ (Persuasion about sword-fighting) chapter, when the character Zhuangzi persuades the king of Zhao to give up his passion for sword-fighting, he first appears in Ru clothing, as opposed to the expected sword-fighting clothing. In these passages, the Zhuangzi argues that although Ru clothing is often mistakenly thought to reflect the merit of the wearer, it should be worn only by the person who understands the Way. Since the Zhuangzi is largely a composite text, it would be unwise to take passages that approve of Ru practice and disapprove of Ru poseurs as representative of the entire text. They do show that the text as a whole is not consistently critical of the Ru. At the same time, other sections of the Zhuangzi critique Ru practices in a way that is not at all gentle. In addition to the argument that cultivating the virtues moves people away from their innate nature outlined above, the Zhuangzi contends that Ru practices have become obsolete. In many ways, this argument is similar to the Mozi’s in the “Fei Ru” and “Gong Meng” chapters that any particular pattern from the past (i.e., the ritual system of the Zhou dynasty) could neither be an ideal system, nor even a suitable system, for contemporary society. The Zhuangzi’s “Tianyun” ˭ཡ (Movements of tian) chapter uses the arbitrary nature of the Ru’s insistence on preserving ancient dress as a metaphor for the obsolete nature of their ritual program: ‫ݭ‬ᔩ໳ܾٗ‫ ږ‬ᏻइЩ᜵‫ږ‬ʛ ˑ֊⩐‫ٸ‬Щн̣֟˙˃‫ͫש ح‬ェᛥࣼൾ ၣ̓Щ݈␂ ᝳͅˑ˃୙ ೾⩐‫˃ٸ‬୙̢֟˙ʛ Therefore ritual and righteousness, models and measures, all change according to the age. If today you took a monkey and dressed it in the clothes of the Duke of Zhou, it would certainly chew and claw them to pieces, only happy when it was completely free of them. Looking at the difference between the ancient and the modern, it is akin to that between the monkey and the Duke of Zhou.77

77

Zhuangzi jishi 5c.515.

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The Zhuangzi’s indictment of the preservation of past ritual practice and moral behavior hinges on the notion that customs change over time, and implies that it soon becomes impossible even to understand past practice. This critique is applied to clothing, and also to texts. In a celebrated story from the “Tiandao” ˭ལ (Tian’s Way) chapter, a wheelwright named Bian ‫ ݚ‬observes that the writing of the ancients cannot convey the true meaning of their authors and so is nothing more than their leftover dregs.78 That this degradation of meaning is true of the classics held sacred by the Ru is shown in a short passage from the “Waiwu” ͙‫( ٵ‬External things) with the heading: ኵ̣༶ᔩചࢁ “The Ru use the Odes and ritual in order to rob graves.” There, a Ru quotes the Odes in order to justify taking a pearl out of the mouth of a disinterred corpse.79 These arguments condemn the Ru’s reliance on the rituals and texts of the past, arguing that over time their intended meaning becomes impossible to understand, and the Ru legacy is therefore an easy target for exploitation. The most severe attacks on Kongzi and his followers in the Zhuangzi are found in the “Dao Zhi” chapter, where the Robber Zhi uncompromisingly lampoons both Kongzi and Ru in general. This chapter is likely significantly later than the “inner” chapters, and is classified as one of the “miscellaneous” chapters of the text (i.e., chapters 25 through 33). The attacks on the Ru in this chapter mix the type of substantive criticism seen above, with ad hominem remarks that indict Kongzi and his disciples as hypocrites. When he first finds out about an impending visit by Kongzi, Robber Zhi says: ၒԵ௪გ ϣၳ́‫ ۪˃̈ط۪ ن‬ઘА̗˃঴ Ϡᘂᑢი ʿবЩ࡚ ʿᔶЩн ๓ࢢྦྷд ዣΆ‫˭ਁ̣ ۍݵ‬ʓ˃̟ ՟˭ʓዕʦʿ˫մʹ ϣѕҨҿ Щ⭬ࡧ‫ۓܱؠ‬౗඙‫ږ‬ʛ You embellish your words and create sayings, recklessly quoting Kings Wen and Wu. You wear a cap like the branch of a tree and a belt like the torso of a dead ox. You have many phrases and mistaken theories and so eat what you do not plow, and wear what you have not woven. You wag your lips and drum your tongue, carelessly creating rights and wrongs in 78 See Zhuangzi jishi 13.491. In that chapter’s attack on the authority of past writing, it invokes some of the arguments about the ineffability of truth found in the Laozi Чʪ, such as: ‫ږڈ‬ʿԵ Ե‫ږ‬ʿ‫“ ڈ‬Those who understand do not speak, those who speak do not understand.” 79 See Zhuangzi jishi 26.927-8. It is worth noting that the Ru in question is identified as a “Lesser” Ru, making this less than a blanket condemnation of all Ru. In this way, it is also similar to the self-critiques such as ones in the Xunzi examined below.

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order to delude the rulers of the world and cause the world’s scholars not to return to their foundation. Recklessly acting out filial piety and brotherly duty, you aspire to the riches and honor of a landed marquis.80

This catalog of faults rattled off by Robber Zhi contains within it a harsh critique of Kongzi as a hypocrite. In addition to accusations of exaggeration and freeloading, Robber Zhi argues that the motive for the Ru creation of morality is to “delude the rulers of the world” and that the motive for Ru moral behavior is the acquisition of wealth and power. Later in that chapter, a character named Man Goude ျࠨદ (literally, “Filled with Acquisitiveness”) offers concrete instances of hypocrisy on the part of Kongzi and his disciples. He argues that Kongzi received gifts from the unprincipled Tian Cheng Zichang ΉϾ ʪગ, concluding: ቈ۱ቓ˃ м۱ʓ˃ ۱‫ݵ‬Եм˃શ࣭ዢ‫ؠ‬সˀʛ ʿΠ؅̢ “If in their discussions they looked askance at such people (i.e., immoral patrons), but in their practice they were servile to them, then such a state of having the feelings behind their words and deeds at war with each other in their chests–was it not bizarre?”81 The critiques in the “Dao Zhi” chapter actually agree with the many occasions in the Analects where Kongzi says that in order to determine a person’s motives, it is better to look at the person’s actions than their words. In the case of Kongzi, however, the chapter concludes that his actions reveal his real motives, and therefore that his words are hypocritical. Thus, while the inner chapters present a challenge to any system that attempts to impose virtues on top of innate nature, the “Dao Zhi” relies on an indictment of Ru motivation. 80

Zhuangzi jishi 9b.991-2 (cf. Graham 1981, 235-6). Despite his criticisms of the Ru, Robber Zhi, who feasts on human livers, seems not to be a positive role model. Instead, the point of the chapter is that the Ru are just as out of touch with their basic nature as Robber Zhi, yet the people of the world celebrate the Ru while condemning theives. Elsewhere in the text Robber Zhi is criticized as a person who died for the sake of gain, as opposed to Ru such as Bo Yi їϡ who died for the sake of fame (Zhuangzi jishi 4a.323). In the “Daozhi” chapter, Man Goude makes a similar contrast between Kongzi’s disciple’s quest for fame and Robber Zhi’s own pursuit of profit (Zhuangzi jishi 9b.1005). After he draws attention to the parallels between the “thief” and the Ru, Robber Zhi exclaims: ˭ʓщ‫ݭ‬ʿᎂʪ޴ഞ̞ ЩʂᎂӍ޴ഞ⌳ “Why don’t the people of the world call you Robber Qiu, since they call me Robber Zhi?” (Zhuangzi jishi 9b.996). 81 Zhuangzi jishi 9b.1003-4 (cf. Graham 1981, 240). This is an allusion to the event that began the “Introduction”–the coup d’état in Qi concerning which even Ru sources appear to portray Kongzi’s behavior as less than ideal. Kongzi is implicitly being contrasted to figures such as Shi Tuo who did not expediently resolve their moral dilemma in favor of the option of least discomfort.

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The third of the three texts that critique the Ru is the Han Feizi, which marshals arguments from both the Mozi and the Zhuangzi. While it was mostly composed in the third century B.C.E. and much of it is likely later than both the anti-Ru chapters of those texts and the Ru texts at the center of this study, both its theory of rulership and its critiques of the Ru are continuations of trends that were already established by the late Warring States period. The Han Feizi’s theory of value is most similar to that of the Mozi, in that it recognizes state goods, and is only interested in individuals in terms of their aggregate material welfare.82 To attain the strongest and most stable state, a ruler should apply reward and punishment indexed to a clear set of models (fa ٗ, a term also used to refer to laws) of behavior. These models are enforced using a strict code of penal law and a precise set of assignments for officials. While in the Mozi, rewards and penalties are meted out dependably by tian, it is the ruler that impartially applies rewards and punishments in the Han Feizi. Indeed, the interests of the state and those of the sovereign are fused, and the authority of the “correct” models for behavior derives from the authority of the sovereign. For this reason the maintenance of the sovereign’s authority is tantamount to preserving the governing models, and so a set of techniques (shu ி) for the ruler’s maintenance of authority is also central to the text. While traditional histories record that Prince Fei of Han eventually died as a result of the actions of the king of the state of Qin in 233 B.C.E., the strict penal code and standardization of weights and measures that the Qin promulgated after unifying China a little over a decade later are measures that were largely in keeping with the prescriptions of the Han Feizi.83 From this perspective, the virtues extolled by the Ru were only valuable insofar as they promoted the authority of the sovereign. Ru writers argued that it was through exercise of virtuous governance that the ruler gained the support, on one hand, of the people, and on the other, of tian. The Han Feizi, by contrast, enunciated the general principle that Ֆ ϕ ‫“ ̛ ؠ‬measures depend on the generation”. A 82 Eirik Harris has suggested to me that the contrast is that the Mozi is primarily interested in the collective material welfare while the Han Feizi is concerned with material welfare only as it affects the goal of the survival of the state and the preservation of the ruler’s authority. 83 The rhetorical use of Ru tropes in Qin imperial stele is only one of several aspects of Martin Kern’s The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-huang (2000, esp. 16482) that argues for a more complex account of the Qin deployment of Warring States thought.

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corollary was that ̛୙ ۱Ֆ୙ “when the generation is different, measures must also be different” and so the use of virtues such as benevolence and righteousness cannot always work. Empirically, while rule by the virtues worked for the Ru exemplar King Wen, King Yan ਫ also ruled with the virtues, yet was destroyed by the state of Jing. The Han Feizi concludes that ˋ໳·‫ ͅؠ‬ʿ·‫ؠ‬ˑ “benevolence and righteousness were useful in ancient times, but not in the present.”84 Moreover, it argues that because of particular historical changes, trying to imitate the former kings is doomed to failure. In a famous humorous anecdote, the Han Feizi implies that the success of the former kings was an historical accident: ҭʆЉবΉ‫ ږ‬ΉˀЉद կԻ ᙮दӜᏀЩА ϕᙼմЪЩϭद ኺ౭દկ կʿ̈́౭દ ЩԽ޴ҭ੢ক ˑ଒̣ζ̙˃‫ݬ‬ ٢ະ̛˃ͺ ߖϭद˃ᘝʛ Among the people of the state of Song was a farmer in whose field was a stump. A rabbit ran into the stump, broke its neck, and died. Because of this, the farmer put aside his wooden plow and kept watch over the stump, hoping for another rabbit. But another rabbit was not to be gotten, and he himself became a joke in the state of Song. Today, those who wish to use the governance of the former kings in order to govern the people of this generation, are all engaged in “keeping watch over the stump.”85

Not only is governing through benevolence and righteousness not guaranteed to succeed, but the circumstances behind its initial success will never be repeated. Although the Mozi, Zhuangzi, and Han Feizi have fundamentally different theories of value, they do share some general criticisms of the Ru. Their most basic shared appraisal is that the Ru’s approach to training and ritual is superficial or hypocritical. This view of Ru ritual self-cultivation incorporates both the milder criticism that the meaning of practices is inevitably lost over time, and the more damning historical claim that both Kongzi and later Ru were solely motivated by personal gain. The metaphor used above in passages from the Mozi and the Zhuangzi to make this criticism is Ru clothing, which both texts assert is mistakenly equated with moral excellence. At times, the tone of the criticism goes even further and implies a cynicism on the part of the Ru, as in this passage from the Mozi’s “Fei Ru” chapter: 84 85

Han Feizi jishi 19.1042. Han Feizi jishi 19.1040.

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ˮࢬʜఐΖ ˉᇯ‫ݰ‬Ђ ʨయ‫ݵ‬Ꮂ ʪּߖનદྺ෢࡚ ୘٢ᆚయ Լ̣вԡ ϕʆ˃ࣁႚ ‫ݕ‬ʆ˃௴̣޴ౚ ౗ʆЉయ ʂʨი మ̆ Џн࡚˃ၷʛ In [spring and] summer he begs for wheat and millet. Once the five grains have been harvested, the great funerals follow. The children and grandchildren of the clan all trail along and become sated with drink and food. After having administered several funerals, he has enough to last himself. He depends on others’ households for his fat and relies on others’ fields for his wine vessels. When the rich have a funeral he is very pleased and happily exclaims: “This is the beginning of clothing and food!”86

Such comments paint the early Ru as a classical prototype for ambulance-chasing lawyers, and while comical, also point to the fundamental contradiction between the payment that Ru receive for performing their social functions and Kongzi’s emphasis on not participating in the conventional economy. While there is little hard data on the early social role of the Ru, there appears to have been a shared perception that many Ru performed ritual in a “hollow” way, or out of dubious motives. While the above criticism indicts the motives of specific Ru, a more subtle and substantive criticism of the entire Ru project was also common to two of these early texts: that the project of self-cultivation is hopeless because human behavior is determined by factors outside of individual control. Consider the following argument from the Mozi for moderation in funerals. The thrust of the passage is that without sufficient economic resources, social niceties cannot be maintained. The author argues that the basic bonds at the core of the Ru conception of family and state dissolve under economic stress: ࠜࠨʿԼ ޴ʆҿ‫ ږ‬Ӷմ̮Щʿદʿҿҿͫઅ‫ݏ‬մ̮ԡ ޴ʆʪ‫ ږ‬Ӷմ፶Щʿદ ʿҨʪͫ‫ݏݵ‬մ፶ԡ ޴ʆа‫ ږ‬Ӷ˃ѼЩʿદ ʿ‫׫‬а̝ͫ෩մʕԡ If it were to happen that [food and clothing] were to become insufficient, then one who is a younger brother would seek them from his older brother but would not get them. Instead of feeling brotherly love, the 86 Sun Yirang ࢽ⌞᝖ (1848-1908) suggests the reading of chun ‫ ݱ‬for fu ˮ, which is entirely reasonable since the second clause complements the first with a discussion of what happens each year after the harvest (Mozi xiangu 9.180-1). Zhang Chunyi reads zun ౚ as zun ዸ, a wine-warming vessel (Mozi jijie 9.345). Sun also points out the similarity between the final phrase in this passage and one in the “Ruxiao” ኵं (Efficacy of the Ru) chapter of the Xunzi, about which see below.

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younger brother would necessarily resent his older brother. One who is a child would seek them from his parents but would not get them. The child without familial piety would necessarily resent his parents. One who is a subject would seek them from his ruler but would not get them. The disloyal subject would necessarily revolt against his superior.87

The argument being made is a form of economic determinism. Ru virtues such as loyalty not only cannot withstand hardship, but one’s willingness to play a subordinate role in the ritual hierarchy is predicated on the satisfaction of one’s material needs. In this analysis, the only time that people practice virtuous behavior that requires giving up material advantage is when there is a surfeit of resources. This same line of reasoning is found in the “Wudu” chapter of the Han Feizi, which begins its argument by citing several factors that insure that the future will not be characterized by such a surfeit: people struggle and compete for a living because of population growth combined with a scarcity of goods. The contrast between rich conditions in the past and meager ones in the present is then likened to that between the conditions of abundance after a harvest versus the scarcity after the winter of a famine year. The reason that in the former case people give even passing strangers food, while in the latter they do not give it even to blood relations is ‫ۍ‬୚ਡЭืཫ‫ܯ‬ʛ Ϡ˲˃࿧୙ ʛ “not that people (in one case) distance themselves from their own flesh and blood while (in the other) they care for passing guests, it is rather a matter of the difference in the quantity (of food) in each case.” By implication, the extraordinary conditions of the past that allowed for self-sacrifice will never be repeated. The “Wudu” chapter goes on to reduce the difference between past and present behavior to material conditions: ‫أ˃̣ͅݵ‬৷ ‫ˋۍ‬ʛ ৷Ϡʛ ˑ˃‫ٱ‬࿙ ‫ۍ‬ჷʛ ৷࿥ ʛ “This is the reason that when the ancients were easy about material goods, it was not their benevolence but that material goods were plentiful. Similarly, when people today compete to acquire them, it is not a matter of cruelty but rather that material goods are scarce.”88 Human behavior is determined by the economic situation of the society as a whole, and therefore it is useless to try to mold it at the level of the individual. This second general critique of the Ru program is above all a critique of the efficacy of programs of self-cultivation. That the 87 88

Mozi xiangu 6.110. Han Feizi jijie 19.1041.

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techniques of Ru that are supposed to transform people into gentlemen and sages were based on ideals of behavior that were no longer attainable is an indictment of the ability of the Ru teachings to permanently alter individual conduct. This is why the “Xianxue” chapter of the Han Feizi attacks the teachers of benevolence and righteousness by comparing them to the charlatan who promises to: ՟ ʪͫನЩ࿕ “Make you wise and long-lived, guaranteed!” It argues that since everyone knows that wisdom is innate and lifespan in a matter of fate, they can identify the charlatan’s claims as false. Similarly, the text infers, benevolence and righteousness fall just as far outside human control, and any claim to be able to teach them is just as ludicrous.89 It is important to note that the Zhuangzi, which advocates its own forms of self-transformation, generally does not share this critique of the Ru with the Mozi and Han Feizi.90 The third general critique of the Ru virtue discourse is that even if successful, the cultivation of virtue by individuals runs contrary to the interests of society as a whole. Arguments to this effect are found in all three texts but differ in ways that are consistent with their overall theories of value. The Mozi’s general critique of partiality is in effect a condemnation of Ru virtues, and while the text does enlist particular virtues in support of its own program, the connotations of the virtues are very different from those in Ru texts. Instead, the Mozi argues that Ru partiality runs counter to the interests of the society, judged 89

Han Feizi jijie 19.1099-1100. The Zhuangzi associates poverty with sagehood and frequently portrays material and spiritual wealth as being inversely related. While at times it does hold that economic factors control altruistic behavior, it does not on these grounds abandon selfcultivation. The “Dao Zhi” chapter summarizes the former argument, putting it in the mouth of Wuzu ೷Լ (whose name literally means “Without satiety”). Like the Ru rebuttals to this criticism, the Zhuangzi’s responses to it, spoken by Zhihe ‫֜ڈ‬ “Knowing harmony”, acknowledge that people are subject to corruption by the desire for material goods, and then argue that only by moderating such desires is a person able to become a sage (Zhuangzi jishi 9b. 1008-15). While this does not rebut the argument that people cannot cultivate themselves when they lack subsistence, it does address stronger determinist positions found in the “Wudu” such as: ძᘂ˭ʪ ‫ۍ‬ਢʛ ෻ᒆ ʛ “Similarly, when people lightly declined the position of Son of Heaven, it was not their superiority but that the influence [it promised] was insufficient” (Han Feizi jijie 19.1041). The Zhuangzi repeatedly argues to the contrary, that once desires are curbed, the limitations placed on self-cultivation by the way that economic considerations ordinarily determine behavior are lifted, and in such a case a person who declines the position of Son of Heaven might be doing so despite the position’s promise of “sufficient” influence. The authors of the Zhuangzi would hardly be willing to accept the position that the high-minded hermits it lauds for rejecting offers of kingship were really holding out for a better deal. 90

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

55

according to its own materialist calculus. In keeping with the Zhuangzi’s valuation of the return to innate nature, many of its chapters argue that the inculcation of virtues by the sage kings was a mistake because it imposed a human system over the natural state characteristic of tian. As the “Tianyun” chapter argues, the knowledge the sage kings imposed was ⤄ ‫ ؠ‬ᚳ ㄽ ˃ ҳ  “more poisonous than the tail of a scorpion.”91 Moreover, even if a ruler is able to benefit the state in terms of its material circumstances, as the “Quqie” ᯺⧕ (Breaking into suitcases) chapter argues, this simply invites thieves and even more hardship into the state. The perspective of the Zhuangzi on the effects of the cultivation of individual virtue on society, then, is almost uniformly negative. In the Han Feizi, both the followers of Mozi and the Ru are criticized for their position that the ruler should treat his subjects like a father treats a child. This treatment, it argues, is inappropriate since parents hesitate to apply harsh penalties, and so: ˋ ˃ʿ̣̈́޴٢Π‫ا‬ԡ “it is evident that benevolence cannot be used to carry out good government.” Indeed, instruction through the sanmei ʒ ࠀ “three beauties” of the caring of parents, the actions of neighbors and the wisdom of teachers and elders is bound to fail because: ᜓ‫ืؠ‬ ᛾‫ܩؠ‬ԡ “people grow proud from love, but obedient from fear.”92 For this reason, the Han Feizi argues that while the cultivation of virtue might benefit the individual, it runs counter to the interest of the sovereign and the state. The application of this third critique to governance is most clearly seen in the Mozi and Han Feizi’s assertions that Ru ministers do not act in the interests of the state. The latter text enumerates the ways in which ኵ̣́෩ٗ “Ru use culture to disorder the models” of proper behavior in the state. They disorder them by encouraging people to place family allegiances above those of the state. The Han Feizi labels this ˙ Ԣ ˃ ߟ ࠌ ʛ “the mutual opposition of public and private interests.”93 In the Mozi, the unwillingness of the Ru minister to point out a ruler’s mistakes is criticized. In this telling passage, the Ru interlocutor Gongmeng says that the gentleman is like a bell: he should respond only if struck. Mozi replies that in some cases it it appropriate to make a sound even if not struck, because there are times when speaking to prevent a bad policy is good for both the individual and the 91 92 93

Zhuangzi jishi 5c.527. Han Feizi jijie 19.1051, 1052. Han Feizi jijie 19.1057, 1058.

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state.94 In both texts, the Ru minister is criticized for acting according to a code of behavior that does not transparently reduce to the interests of the state. State interest is understood differently in the Mozi and Han Feizi, but the basis of the criticism of Ru thought is unwillingness to properly prioritize what the Han Feizi calls the two realms of public and private interest. While there are significant differences between the three viewpoints represented in these late Warring States texts, similarities in their criticisms of the Ru indicate general areas in which the Ru were seen as deficient. This does not mean that everyone in fourth and third century China saw the Ru as hypocritical, their ideals as unattainable and their policies as counterproductive, but it suggests their competitors drew on a common fund of criticism. If the strands of the Ru tradition were more than simply the differential development of different aspects of Kongzi’s original philosophy, they must have evolved and interacted with one another and reacted to outside criticisms like these. Indeed, these criticisms represented substantive challenges to the early Ru, and answers to these challenges show up in Ru writing with increasing regularity during and after this period. Faced with these criticisms, parts of the Ru tradition proved extremely responsive. While most Ru were conservative in their insistence on the customs and rituals of the Zhou dynasty championed by Kongzi, their justifications for the maintenance of such practices were often dynamic, and most of the time it was through changes in these justifications that criticisms of Ru practice were answered. Ru responses to the Mozi argued the inadvisibility of adopting the impartial perspective that the Mozi demands, and made the claim that tian did not have an automatic reward system.95 While the Ru criticized the theories 94

Mozi xiangu 12.271-2. One text devoted to “refutations of Mozi” that existed in Han times was the Dongzi ༓ʪ, attributed to a Dong Wuxin ༓೷˻. Now lost, records indicate the Dongzi was a Ru text recording a debate between Dong Wuxin and a follower of Mozi named Master Chan ᚭ on the topic of Chan’s claim that tian, through the demons and spirits, assisted people and rewarded good rulers with increments of nineteen years of life. In the debate, Dong cited historical examples of meritorious rulers who did not live as long as less meritorious ones. This description is found in the “Fuxu” ၰ൳ (Falsehoods about fortune) chapter of the Lunheng. See Lunheng jiaoshi 6.268-70 (cf. Forke 1962, v. 1, 162). For the Dongzi, a moral system must be convincing not because it promises a reward from tian, but because it is a better path for society. Instead of a cosmic reward system, some Ru began to describe how walking that path was simply a matter of developing incipient moral dispositions. This response had something in common with the Zhuangzi, but instead of an innate nature suited to a primitive agrarian utopia, a model of innate nature was developed that included the virtues. In 95

BACKGROUND OF THE RU VIRTUE DISCOURSE

57

of the Mozi for running counter to human nature, they faulted the Zhuangzi’s call for a return to an innate natural state on the grounds that its view of innate nature misunderstood the boundary between the human and the natural.96 Ru responses to the absolutism advocated in this way, the turn to grounding morality in human psychology also served to rebut the second general criticism that external factors determine human behavior. A collection of fragments of the text is found in the discussion of the Chanzi ᚭʪ (Master Chan) in Sun Yirang’s Mozi xiangu (“Mozi houyu, xia” ኳʪ݈გʓ, 71-2). On the granting of additional periods of nineteen years, see Riegel 1989-1990. 96 The Analects contains stylized accounts of encounters between the disciples of Kongzi and agrarians who sought to return to simple lifestyles that serve as arguments against the Zhuangzi’s advocacy of a return to innate human nature. In several episodes in the Analects, Kongzi encounters individuals Benjamin Schwartz has called “protoDaoists”, and through them we have a rare opportunity to see early Ru directly responding to viewpoints similar to some of those in the Zhuangzi. In one episode from the Analects, Kongzi and his disciple Zilu are travelling together in the countryside. They come across two men plowing a field, yoked together in front of the plow like oxen. After passing these men, Kongzi says to Zilu: ఍ᖿʿ̈́Ⴉψ໵ ѳ‫ۍ‬ಡʆ˃ࣛ ႩЩቇႩ ˭ʓЉལ ̞ʿႩ‫أ‬ʛ  “One cannot associate with the birds and beasts. Am I not the same type as those people? With whom, then, should I associate? While the people of the world have the Way, I will not change places with them.” Lunyu jishi 36.1265-71 (18.6, cf. Lau 1979, 150). Kongzi is drawing a distinction about what it means to follow innate nature. Associating (and therefore constructing social relations) with other humans is an essential part of being human. Humans do not live simply like oxen, they are social–even political–animals. (Of course, it might also be argued that these agrarians are not being entirely consistent with the Zhuangzi’s view of naturalness, because the natural state of neither oxen nor humans is to be pulling a plow.) Lau’s translation in this case differs greatly from most other translators. Lau has: “While the Way is to be found in the Empire, I will not change places with him” while Legge (1960, v. 1, 334) is representative of other versions: “If right principles prevailed through the empire, there would be no use for me to change its state.” This contrast reflects a division in the Chinese commentarial tradition as to the object of the verb yi ‫“ أ‬change”. Lau is following the early commentary of He Yan щउ (190-249), who writes that: Եʘ˭ʓЉལ ‫ߖݿ‬ʿႩ‫أ‬ʛ ʴʨЩʆʮ‫ݭ‬ʛ “In all cases, for those among the people of the world who have the Way, all without exception ‘do not change place’, for they themselves are great and others are small.” Legge is following Zhu Xi’s twelfth century commentary: ˭ʓࠜʵͦ٢ ۱Ӎ೷·᜵‫ ˃أ‬͸޴˭ʓ೷ལ ‫ݭ‬଒ ̣ལ‫“ ˃أ‬If the people of the world are already at peace, then there is no use for me to alter them; but it is simply when the people of the world have lost the Way that I would want to use the Way to change them.” A third interpretation, also possible given the scope of yi, appears in the commentary of Huang Kan: ˭ʓʆбύЉལ Ӎʿ̣ Ӎལ‫ שأ‬Πʿ՟‫ש‬ལ‫أ‬Ӎ бύளմ‫׈‬ʛ “Each person in the world has their own Way, and I will neither change mine for theirs, nor replace theirs with mine, for each of us abides with the one that is most suitable” (Lunyu jishi 36.1270-1). On another occasion, the disciple Zilu meets an old man carrying a basket on a stick. The old man observes of him: ͗ᝂʿ෺ ˉᇯʿ˜ “You seem neither to have toiled with your limbs nor to be able to tell one kind of grain from another.” It turns out that the old man is living outside society, and invites Zilu to have dinner with his family. When he returns, Zilu observes to Kongzi: ʿ̦೷໳ ‫˃ͧۂ‬໢ ʿ̈́ᅥʛ Ѽа˃໳ Ϩ˃щմᅥ˃ ଒ᆸմԽ Щ෩ʨࡼ Ѽʪ˃̦ʛ мմ໳ʛ ལ˃ʿм ʵ‫˃ڈ‬ԡ “Not to serve in office is to be without righteousness. The regulation of old and young cannot be abrogated. So how can the righteousness between ruler and subject be

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the Han Feizi were expressed both on the level of social theory, and on the level of historical analysis, for criticism of the short-lived Qin dynasty was often also intended to reflect on the shortcomings of the line of thinking in the Han Feizi.97 These responses were all attempts to deflect the external criticisms of the Ru virtue discourse, but they do not tell the whole story of the effects of these critiques on the Ru. The following chapter examines how a fourth century B.C.E. work developed a systematic moral psychology of the virtues in part to counter some of the external criticisms just introduced. Instead of simply deflecting the critiques found in the Mozi, Zhuangzi and Han Feizi, it adopted elements of outside systems in order to construct some of the basic tenets of the theory of “material virtue”. By doing so, it attracted condemnation from other elements of the Ru community, which nevertheless also show clear signs of having internalized elements of external critiques.

abrogated? Because of the desire to keep one’s body pure they have disordered the most important human relationships. The Gentleman serves in office as a means of putting his righteousness into action. That the Way may not be put into action, is something that he already knows.” See Lunyu jishi 36.1272-9 (cf. Lau 1979, [18.7], 150-1). Kongzi’s response is that it is the responsibility of the official to take office, regardless of whether or not it sullies one’s character. This appears to concede part of the critique of the Zhuangzi, that service entails compromises. But here the claim is that maintaining the proper relationship between ruler and subject, an aspect of righteousness, is an expression of innate nature. It is the fetishization of purity that may lead one to fail to recognize that social relations are an essential part of being human. The Ru respond that their critics do not recognize that cultivating the virtues is needed to develop “natural” social relationships and maintain the hierarchies they embody. 97 Because its critiques are made from a statist perspective, for many Ru the greatest vulnerability of the Han Feizi is its denial of individual goods, and its concomitant lack of psychological nuance. Indeed, by completely ignoring the importance of developing autonomously moral behavior, the Ru see the application of law alone as creating at best a society of rule-followers who never develop any sort of internal moral compass. This is succinctly expressed in Analects 2.3: ʿ̦೷໳ ‫ͧۂ‬ ˃໢ ʿ̈́ᅥʛ Ѽа˃໳ Ϩ˃щմᅥ˃ ଒ᆸմԽ Щ෩ʨࡼ Ѽʪ˃̦ʛ мմ ໳ʛ ལ˃ʿм ʵ‫˃ڈ‬ԡ “Lead them with government, unify them with punishment, and the common people will practice avoidance without a sense of shame. Lead them with virtue, unify them with ritual, and they will not only have a sense of shame but also discipline themselves.” See Lunyu jishi 3.68-70 (cf. Lau 1979, 63). This passage in the Analects attacks the erbing ʅ ‫“ ކ‬two handles” of punishments and reward advocated in the Han Feizi, which it contrasts to the Zhou ideal of ruling by virtue. The former fails to develop the sense of shame needed to lead people to become autonomous moral agents. For this reason, critiques of Ru in the Han Feizi were dismissed as based on naive assumptions about human nature.

CHAPTER TWO

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WUXING ୖٗζ̙Щʿ‫ڈ‬մ஀ [They] generally model themselves after former kings, yet do not understand their system. - The Xunzi ৖ʪ, criticizing a rival Ru faction

Faced with the criticism that their actions were hypocritical and their performance of ritual was hollow, one group of Ru developed a moral psychology that allowed them to give an account of authentic practice. They accepted the possibility that actions might be performed for the worng reasons, but argued that there was something about their performance and actions that was demonstrably genuine. Both the distinction between authentic and inauthentic moral actions and the view that there is a correct way to cultivate the dispositions needed to perform authentic actions are central arguments of a set of texts that emerged from the contentious atmosphere of the late Warring States period. One of them, the excavated Wuxing ˉ м (Five Kinds of Action), is the subject of this chapter. A theory with the same name is criticized in the Xunzi ৖ʪ, a work attributed to the third century B.C.E. ritualist Xun Qing ৖ࢌ (c. 310-c. 238 B.C.E.), as failing to “understand the system” of the former kings. The Xunzi associated this theory with two earlier venerable Ru figures, Zisi ʪ‫݋‬, who has long been identified as the grandson of Kongzi, and a student in Zisi’s tradition named Mengzi (Meng Ke ׂඩ, or Mencius, traditionally. c. 380-c. 290 B.C.E.). These associations raise a number of questions about the provenance of the Wuxing text, and the basis of the Xunzi’s vehement denunciations of fellow Ru. The next three chapters will outline the moral theory developed in works associated with the “followers of Zisi and Mengzi,” explaining how they represent a defense of the virtues that integrated them into models of human psychology and physiology. This discussion is only possible because of the recent discovery of texts that elaborated this response, most importantly the Wuxing, a title that has long been associated with Zisi. This chapter will examine the circumstances of the discovery of the text and then describe its moral psychology with special attention to the issues of authentic moral motivation and the cultivation of virtuous dispositions. Although the origins of the text

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remain murky, the final section of the present chapter attempts to clarify its connection with the “followers of Zisi and Mengzi.” The next two chapters will relate this psychology to the view of the virtues and the body in the Mengzi (chapter three), and then treat the relation between these texts’ models of morality and the related ideal of the transcendent sheng ໶, “sage” (chapter four). The most revealing discussion of the “Zisi and Mengzi” subtradition is a critique of it in the third century B.C.E. work Xunzi. The Xunzi takes Zisi, Mengzi and their followers to task in “Fei shi’er zi” ‫ۍ‬ʏʅ ʪ, a chapter that outlines the main points of pernicious theories held by six pairs of thinkers. It contrasts them to the reliable one associated with the footprints of the ancient sages that could be discovered by attending to the governance of the sage-emperors, and to the righteous acts of Kongzi and Zigong ʪʻ. The Xunzi’s criticism of the followers of Zisi and Mengzi begins with the general reproach that forms the epigram to this chapter, finding fault with their understanding of the systems of the former kings. It continues by listing specific criticisms of their incomprehensibility, ineffectiveness and misappropriation of the name of Kongzi. It reads: ೾೸ЩӪᄶӆʨ ႝԳᕺత क‫צ‬ᕄ௪ი ᎂ˃ˉм ߊᄮཧЩ೷ᘝ ܼᓙЩ೷ი ௻߽Щ೷༱ कྟմᘂ Щ߭๖˃ ̆ ЏॲѼʪ˃Եʛ ʪ‫݋‬੓˃ ׂඩ֜˃ ̛۞˃ກ೾❱ኵ ㋷㋷೸ʿ‫ڈ‬մ‫ۍ׿‬ʛ ཤ֌Щ෭˃ ̣޴Ϋ͠ʪʻ޴৒۹‫̛݈ؠ‬ ‫ݵ‬۱ʪ‫ׂ݋‬ඩ˃໱ʛ Nevertheless, they still are possessed of manifold abilities and strong wills, and have been exposed to a broad variety of things. Taking examples from the past, they created a theory, naming it “Five Kinds of Action” (wuxing). [Their theory] is rare and different, not of a regular category. It is recondite without any explanations, restrictive without any solutions. Relying on elaborateness of language, they reverently intone: “These are the authentic words of the Gentleman!” Zisi sang it and Meng Ke (i.e., Mengzi) provided harmony for it. The stupid among the commonfolk and the ignorant Ru shouted it without understanding what it was it contradicted. As a result, people accepted and transmitted it, erroneously believing that Zhong Ni (i.e., Kongzi) and Zigong1 were prized by later generations on the basis of it.2 This is the fault of Zisi and Meng Ke.3 1 Guo Songtao ௱ศᔚ (1818-1891) notes that later in the chapter Ziyou ʪ೑ is criticized, and substitutes Zigong ʪʻ, who is the figure that the Xunzi considered to be the true heir to Kongzi (Xunzi jijie ৖ʪූ༱ 3.95, 97). 2 There is no widespread agreement on the correct way to read the graphs wei zi hou yu houshi ޴ॖ۹‫̛݈ؠ‬. The Tang commentator Yang Liang ๫᱈ reads it: “[Such people think that Kongzi and Zi You] created this, as a gift to later generations.”

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WUXING

61

This lengthy condemnation makes several different claims about the followers of Zisi and Mengzi: they do not understand the system of the ancients, they falsely attribute their own words to Kongzi, and most significantly, they came up with a theory called the “wuxing”. The theory of the “wuxing” is faulted for being all over the map without adequately explaining its elaborate and portentious language. Nevertheless, it gained considerable currency and was widely (and erroneously) thought to be an elaboration of ideas originally attributed to Kongzi. The Xunzi attacked Zisi and Mengzi with such vehemence that some writers have argued that this section of the Xunzi is spurious. Homer H. Dubs both excised the passage from his translation of the chapter, noting that Xunzi “would hardly stoop to such abuse of these two prominent Confucians as in this book,” and changed the title of the chapter to “Against the Ten Philosophers”.4 In making these changes, he was following the lead of Han Ying ᓟᏮ (c. 200-120 B.C.E.), the compiler of the Hanshi waizhuan ᓟ༶͙෭, who first omitted the passage about Mengzi and Zisi in his re-presentation of the materials. Wang Yinglin ̙ᏻᝈ (1223-1296), in his Kunxue jiwen ҍዕ ߺႝ, cites the absence of the passage in the Hanshi waizhuan as proof the passage was forged and even implicates the third century B.C.E. writers Han Feizi and Li Si Өಡ as the culprits.5 However, as later chapters of this book will demonstrate, of all Han texts, it was the Hanshi waizhuan that most often and most clearly drew on the Wuxing. Wang’s observation about the omission of the Xunzi’s criticism of the “wuxing” theory in the Hanshi waizhuan could be a consequence of the close connection between the texts, a filiation that led Han Ying to edit out this part of the criticism.6 A second problem with Wang’s The Qing philologist Yu Yue ‫( ⮙ۥ‬1821-1907) punctuates it differently, glossing: “The Way of Kongzi and Ziyou doesn’t require Zisi and Mengzi to [make it] valuable. But the uncouth fail to understand this and think that it is because of them that Kongzi and Ziyou gained importance for later generations. Therefore he says: ‘This is the fault of Mencius and Zisi.’” (Xunzi jijie 3.95). Yu Yue’s reading is more convincing because it reconciles the phrase with the following sentence. John Knoblock’s translation, “on account of these theories, Confucius and Zigong would be highly esteemed by later generations,” adopts the same punctuation as Yang Liang. See Knoblock 1988, v.1, p. 224. 3 Xunzi jijie 3.94-5. 4 See Dubs 1973, 90, 94, and 96. 5 Weng zhu Kunxue jiwen ঩ٌҍዕߺႝ 10.15b. 6 The editors of the Siku quanshu zongmu ͗ࣗηएᑧΑ point out that at the time Xunzi was writing, Zisi and Mengzi were not yet seen as sages and worthies, and for this reason it is possible that Xunzi wrote the passage. See Ji Yun ߺ‫( ب‬17241805), et al., eds. Qinding Siku quanshu zongmu ೈ‫ࣗ͗׆‬ηएᑧΑ 91.6a-b.

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conclusion is that, in the next century, Yang Xiong ๫෕ (53 B.C.E.-18 C.E.) clearly attributed the criticism of Zisi and Mengzi to Xunzi: ‫ۍࢌࢽ ̆׻‬ᆚࣁ˃ए ᪐ʛ вʝʪ‫ׂ݋‬ඩ ༾‫ۿ‬ ̆ ѳ‫ ࢌࢽؠ‬ႩԳψ‫ۃ‬Щ୙˽ʛ ા໶ʆ޴ʿ୙ Someone asked: “Sun Qing [i.e., Xunzi] criticized the writings of a number of experts, which was suitable. But when it came to criticizing Zisi and Meng Ke, that was odd.” [Yang] answered: “What is my relationship to Sun Qing? We see the same gate but through different windows. Only when it comes to the Sage is there no difference.”7

Yang Xiong is using a spatial metaphor to describe his relationship with Xunzi, saying that both are followers of the Sage, and in this sense both entered the house through its gate. Once inside, each one occupies a different space and looks out a different window, and so differences of opinion arise. They still look back on the same gate, however, and on the subject of the Sage they agree. While he avoids directly committing himself on the issue of the criticism of Zisi, he also provides evidence that Xunzi’s attack on Zisi and Mengzi was seen as odd in the Western Han–a perception that would have contributed to the omission of the attack from the Hanshi waizhuan. These are good reasons to accept the Xunzi criticism as original and identify the Hanshi waizhuan version as a later revision. At some time since this criticism in the Xunzi was written, specific information about the target of the criticism was lost, leading to wideranging speculation about what sense of the term “wuxing” was being criticized. Until recently, there was really no way to arbitrate the conflicting interpretations.

Excavation of the Wuxing This situation changed in 1980 with the publication of a recently excavated manuscript on silk that was tentatively labeled Wuxing pian ˉмᇺ (Chapter on the Five Kinds of Action). The manuscript was among a set of silk and bamboo texts that were packed into the sides of 7

Fayan quanyi ٗԵηᙲ 12.5. Yang’s use of the alternative graph Sun ࢽ is consistent with the Hanshu listing of the text under the title Sun Qingzi ࢽࢌʪ.

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63

the outer coffin of an underground tomb (numbered as “tomb three”) discovered at Mawangdui ਠ̙੧ in Hunan Province in 1973. Among the bamboo grave inventory slips was one that dated the closure of the tomb to 168 B.C.E., firmly establishing that as the final possible date the texts in the sealed tomb could have been copied. The tomb was one of three discovered at the Mawangdui site that belonged to three members of the same family: Li Cang ѦႺ, a Chancellor of the Kingdom of Changsha who became Marquis of Dai in 194 B.C.E. (tomb two), his wife Xin Zhui Կਆ, the Marquise of Dai (tomb one), and their son (tomb three). Their burial vaults initially contained sets of three nested coffins, along with a variety of grave goods, paintings, and texts–the type of materials that Poo Mu-chou has described as furnishing a living environment that “modelled [the deceased’s] quotidian world”.8 Among the silk texts in tomb three were two scrolls containing versions of the Laozi Чʪ, each of which also contained other texts that had no transmitted counterparts. The Wuxing pian is one of the four manuscripts which follow the jia ΋ version of the Laozi on a scroll that is 24 centimeters tall. The text occupies 181 columns of that 464 column scroll, and is roughly 5400 characters long. It is made up of two sections, with the “classic” section comprising columns 170 through 214 of the Laozi jia scroll, and a partial commentary on that section comprising columns 215 through 350. Even though the commentary follows directly at the end of the “classic”, it begins in midstream, indicating that the two sections were most likely copied at the same time from editions of the texts that were not complete. Aspects of the calligraphy resemble sealscript, and stylistic considerations have caused scholars to conclude it was copied after the fall of the Qin Dynasty in 207 B.C.E. The absence of a taboo on the personal name of the first emperor of the Han Dynasty, Liu Bang ᄸՉ, has led some to argue it was copied before his death in 195 B.C.E.9 In 1993, twenty years after the first version of the Wuxing was excavated, an even older version was found inscribed on bamboo slips in a tomb near Guodian ௱‫ מ‬in Hubei province. The Guodian version of the text is on 50 slips that are 32.5 cm long, and corresponds to the “classic” section of the Mawangdui text only, with no accompanying 8

Poo Mu-chou 1998, 167. For this and other details of the Mawangdui tomb, see the site report Mawangdui Hanmu boshu ਠ̙੧်࿐‫ך‬ए, v. 1, edited by the Guojia wenwuju guwenxian yanjiushi ੢ࣁ́‫ٵ‬Ұ́ͅᙋߧԥ‫( ܮ‬1980, 1-3) and the richly illustrated Mawangdui Hanmu wenwu ਠ̙੧်࿐́‫ ٵ‬edited by Chen Songchang ௾‫ ۂؽ‬and Fu Juyou ఔ ᒃЉ (1992, 1-28). 9

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commentary. The Guodian texts in general are more similar to the received Ru corpus, and the Guodian Wuxing is written in the same script and on the same length and shape of slip as a version of the transmitted “Ziyi” ႗н (Black Robes) chapter of the Liji.10 Lacking slips noting the closure of the tomb, the Guodian Wuxing is harder to date than the Mawangdui version, but it is estimated to have been placed underground by 300 B.C.E., and certainly before 278 B.C.E.11 The Guodian version also assigns a title to the text, as the two characters wuxing are found at the head of the text. By looking at the Mawangdui silk version of the Wuxing together with the Guodian bamboo slip version, a more complete picture of its textual history emerges. In terms of dating, we can be relatively sure that a text titled Wuxing was composed prior to 300 B.C.E., and a commentary to it was likely composed after that date and recopied between 207 and 195 B.C.E. The presence of the text in two Chu tombs over a century apart also indicates that the text was passed down continuously and was probably fairly popular during the third century B.C.E. While there are significant differences between the two versions, it was transmitted across that century in its entirety, and in that time acquired a detailed commentary.12 These facts, together with media on which it was incribed–the longest bamboo slips in the Guodian find, and silk in the Mawangdui find–suggest that the text was seen as an important one.

10 Other texts on slips that measure 32.5 cm are (using the titles given in the 1998 Guodian Chumu zhujian ௱‫מ‬๤࿐Сᔴ edited by Jingmenshi bowuguan): Cheng zhi wen zhi Ͼ˃ႝ˃, Zun deyi ౚᅭ໳ (Reverence for virtue and righteousness), Xing zi ming chu ‫׷‬б̳֡ ([Human] nature emerges from [tian’s] mandate), and Liude ˗ ᅭ (Six virtues). 11 Dating issues are treated in the original site report by the Hubei sheng Jingmen shi bowuguan ೞ̺ߝো‫ۃ‬឴త‫ٵ‬Ꮗ (1997, 47), Li Xueqin Өዕ෺ (1999, 13) and Sarah Allan and Crispin Williams, eds. (2000, 118-20). The last source, an account of the discussions on dating at the International Conference on the Guodian Laozi held at Dartmouth College in May 1998, notes that a final possible date for the closure of the tomb would be 278 B.C.E., the date of the Qin invasion of Chu, which would have resulted in clearer signs of Qin influence than the tomb displays. 12 While the majority view is that the Wuxing was the work of Zisi, Ding Sixin ʀ ͗๘ (2000, 160-8) argues that the text might be the work of a set of thinkers that Wang Chong ̙̭ (27-c.100 C.E.) identifies with the doctrine that ‫׷‬ЉെЉ౱ “human nature has good and bad in it,” in the “Benxing” ʹ‫ ׷‬chapter of the Lunheng ቈ፰: Shi Shi ̛ၭ, Mi Zijian ᦅʪቓ, Qidiao Kai ွᎴළ, and Gongsun Nizi ˙ࢽ ͠ʪ. The fact that Shi Shi is twice quoted in the commentary found at Mawangdui indicates to Ding it is the work of one of his later disciples. Ding’s theory is discussed at greater length in chapter five.

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65

The two editions of the Wuxing share the same general structure, but differ in their ordering of individual sections.13 Following the work of Xing Wen Շ ́ , both editions may be divided into two basic segments.14 The first segment consists of §1-9 (i.e., sections 1 through 9 of the 28 sections of the text as determined by Ikeda Tomohisa) of both editions, and is dedicated to delineating the contrast between goodness and virtue, describing methods for cultivating virtue in the inner mind and emphasizing the crucial influence of the sage. The second segment consists of §10-28 of both editions and includes detailed descriptions of the steps to develop the virtues, the balance between benevolence and righteousness, and a brief discussion of four methods of gaining knowledge. The two editions arrange the second segment’s §10-19 in a slightly different order, so references to these sections will be denoted as either Guodian (cited as “GD”) §10-19 or Mawangdui (“MWD”) §10-19. The complex and, at times, confusing structure of the Wuxing reveals signs that, as old as the text is, it may actually be a composite of even older texts. Despite its title, only some parts of the text treat the five virtues (in standard translation): benevolence (ren ˋ ), righteousness (yi ໳), wisdom (zhi ನ), ritual propriety (li ᔩ), and sagacity (sheng ໶). My own sense is that internal indications support the conclusion that the Wuxing is an expansion of an older text that simply treated the relationship between wisdom and sagacity, and that the older text was rewritten in such a way as to replace “wisdom” with either the term “goodness” or with the series of human virtues “benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom” that together constituted “goodness.” This accounts for two of the major structural elements of the work: the binary pairing of goodness and the more perfect condition of sagehood, and the more complex distinctions between the four human virtues and the fifth perfect virtue of sagacity. While some sections are devoted solely to the contrast between wisdom and sagacity (§2, GD §10, GD §14), other sections are devoted to the serial examination of the three virtues of benevolence, righteousness and ritual propriety (GD §11-13, GD §17-19). Even more telling, 13

There is no consensus on the which version of the “classic” text came first. Xing Wen (1998) argues that the Guodian version represents the original version of the Zisi and Mengzi school, but that differences in the Mawangdui version reflect changes made by followers in the tradition of Shi Shi. Ikeda Tomohisa (1999) suggests that the order of the Guodian version clearly preposes a conclusion, so the order of the Mawangdui silk text is original. 14 See Xing Wen 1998, 59-60.

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several sections appear to be amalgams of these two topics (§1, §5, §6, GD §15, GD §16), some of them containing obvious signs that they are composites, that is, that an original scheme has been filled in to ensure symmetry.15 Given the paucity of evidence, any such attempt at postulating precursors to the Wuxing is, of course, speculative. Annotated editions of both versions of the Wuxing are provided and translated in the the appendices to this book, with the Mawangdui commentary presented in an interlineated form in keeping with the modern convention. For the sake of brevity, in the body of this book the Guodian version is generally cited (albeit sometimes edited in light of a Mawangdui variant), with most divergences between editions and textual difficulties relegated to the appended annotated editions. In the next two sections of this chapter, the two major sections of the Wuxing will be examined by locating them with reference to major issues in the fourth and third century B.C.E. virtue discourse. The focus will be in the Wuxing’s concern with how one “acts from virtue”–that is, acts in a direct and spontaneously moral way. Its moral psychology 15

Both §5-6 and §9 show signs of this amalgamation process. First, the numerous instances of parallelism in §5-6 show signs that the passages surrounding “benevolence” were tacked on to an original that only treated wisdom and sagacity. Second, a comparison of Mengzi 5B1 with Wuxing §9 shows two instances of the Mengzi preserving Wuxing passages before they had been converted from a “wisdom and sagacity” focus. In the first, the distinction between the “human Way” applying to the wise and “tian’s Way” applying to the sage matches that of Wuxing §1, except that in the latter “wisdom” is replaced with “benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom.” The second is the metal bell and jade stone passage, which suggests that the Wuxing’s “goodness to sagacity” was originally “wisdom to sagacity”, consonant with that pairing in other parts of the Wuxing (this passage is the subject of an entire section of chapter four). While these are both strong evidence for an amalgamation hypothesis, establishing a chronological sequence between these the Wuxing and the Mengzi is difficult. With Xing Wen, I think there is evidence that the authors of at least parts of the Mengzi drew on the Wuxing. An example of this is the way that Mengzi 5B1 employs three other ideas from the Wuxing: the term ji da cheng ූʨϾ (§21), the progression from shi ֻ to zhong உ (§8), and three of the four teaching methods outlined in §23. The direct statement of the passage is the first method, then the metaphor (the effect of the metal bell on the jade stone), and then the comparison (wisdom may be compared to . . ., sagacity may be compared to . . .). It is more likely that the Mengzi was synthesizing these disparate passages than that the Wuxing was carving up a passage from the Mengzi into several very different contexts. I say “likely” because it is difficult to know what sort of process was used to compose and transmit the text. In particular, the principle that coherence decreases over time holds for some modes of transmission, but one can easily find counterexamples-some types of revision, abridgement, and editing can impart more coherence on an original text. Yet the use of the four virtues of the “human Way” elsewhere in the Mengzi makes it equally difficult to see why that text would take “benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom” and pare it down to “wisdom” as in 5B1. More likely the Mengzi was working from a text that, like a pre-amalgamation Wuxing, was simply contrasting the wisdom with sagacity.

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answers that question by making the claim that very different virtues may be unified under the umbrella of the culminant virtue of “sagacity”. The examination of the content of the Wuxing in this chapter will focus on the text itself, sketching it independently from related works and from connections drawn from its title or the circumstances of its burial. Following this examination, we will return to the question of how to locate the Wuxing historically, and whether or not it should be identified with the figures Mengzi and Zisi. The Wuxing’s description of an interior cultivation process has much in common with the received work Mengzi, and this similarity is the subject of the third chapter of this book. The way that the Wuxing and Mengzi combine this description with a theory of sagehood based on the possibility of attaining transcendence has important political and historical implications, and this is the subject of chapter four.

Moral motivation in Wuxing §1-9 The Wuxing is unique in its detailed attempt to integrate the virtues into an embodied moral psychology and then to apply this model to various forums of Ru action such as jurisprudence and teaching. In response to critiques of the hypocritical and self-serving nature of Ru ceremony and learning, the issue of the motivation for good actions developed into a central concern for its authors. Since the Ru were condemned for pursuing ritual for the sake of personal gain and for trumpeting the importance of the virtues out of either confusion or a variety of ulterior motives, their challenge was twofold: to posit a set of motives for ritual and virtuous actions that could stand above reproach and develop criteria according to which rites and actions performed out of such motives might be distinguished from those inspired by less noble considerations. These concerns were characteristic of works written in the period Pang Pu ᖦЋ has characterized as the intermediate stage “between Kongzi and Mengzi” (Kong Meng zhi jian ˱ׂ˃෇) when writers sought to create a moral psychology more complex than that found in works attributed to Kongzi. The solutions the Wuxing developed along these lines in turn exerted a strong influence on the development of Ru thought, being especially influential on the Mengzi, the “Zhongyong” ˀ જ chapter of the Liji ᔩ ৩ , and early Han Dynasty readings of the classics of the Odes and Documents. Because the Mengzi and the “Zhongyong” became part of the canon as defined

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by Zhu Xi Ќጞ, (1130-1200 C.E.) in the Song dynasty, the Wuxing also laid some of the groundwork for the Ru revival of that time. Since, generally speaking, moral motivation was a concern of the Analects, an examination of that text may be used to set the stage for introducing the moral psychology of the Wuxing. The Analects, in its characteristically terse manner, distinguishes between actions that might be considered virtuous and the attitudes behind actions. In passages that perhaps date from the late fourth century B.C.E.,16 now in the second chapter of that text, both issues are raised serially: (2.7) ʪ೑੕Ҩ ʪ̆ ˑ˃Ҩ‫ݵ ږ‬ᎂ঻ኙ в‫̘ؠ‬ਠ ߖ঻Љኙ ʿ๖ щ̣Ѥ̢ (2.8) ʪࢬ੕Ҩ ʪ̆ иᘗ ЉՖҿʪ‫ح‬մడ Љ਍࡚ζΆ㊪ ಫ‫̣ݵ‬ ޴Ҩ̢ (2.7) Zi You asked about filial piety. The Master said: “What is meant by filial piety today may be called ‘being able to nourish.’ When it comes to dogs and horses, all of them are able to ‘nourish.’ If (people) are not reverent, on what basis may we distinguish them?” (2.8) Zi Xia asked about filial piety. The Master said: “What is difficult is one’s facial coloration. If there is something to be done, and the younger brother or son shoulders the burden, or if there is wine and food and the elder gets the choice portions–were such things ever taken to be filial piety?”17 16 E. Bruce and A. Taeko Brooks date the second chapter of the Analects to circa 317 B.C.E., on the basis of the presence of “science, family virtues, and a renewed interest in teaching.” As such they argue that it dates to the period after Zijing ʪ՚ had taken over the Confucian school in the state of Lu, when Mengzi’s role had been reduced (1998, 109). This dating is consistent with the presence of concerns about moral motivation that are like those found in the Mengzi. 17 See Lunyu jishi 2.85-88. Most English translations render the pivotal sentence about dogs and horses in 2.7 along the lines of Raymond Dawson: “but even dogs and horses are all able to receive sustinence,” (1993, 6). When D. C. Lau writes: “Even hounds and horses are, in some way, provided with food,” he makes them the object of the verb yang ኙ “to nourish,” or “to assist,” (1979, 64) and follows the Song dynasty commentary of Zhu Xi, who comments that ኙᎂ෢࡚ա֭ʛ ̘ਠ݄ʆЩ࡚ Πࠜኙ ೸ Եʆय़̘ਠ ߖ঻Љ̣ኙ˃ ࠜ঻ኙմ፶Щ๖ʿв ۱Ⴉኙ̘ਠ‫ږ‬щ୙ “yang means to present with food and drink. Dogs and horses depend on people for food, and so it is as if they are nourished, too. This says that when people give fodder to dogs and horses, in all cases they are able to have what is necessary to yang them. If one is able to nourish one’s parents, but does not apply reverence, then there is no difference from nourishing dogs and horses,” (Lunyu zhangju jizhu 1.56). Zhu Xi’s reading historically represents a new tack. Many early commentators follow Bao Xian ̸‫( ܀‬6 B.C.E.-65 C.E.), who writes: ̘̣ϭጺ ਠ̣̩డ ߖኙʆ‫“ ږ‬dogs guard, horses do heavy work, so there is a way in which they nourish people.” The implication here is that even dogs and horses can nourish, making them the subject rather than the object of the verb

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Analects 2.7 makes it clear that providing nourishment for one’s parents is not always an authentic expression of filial piety, because without the quality of reverence one is simply acting as an animal might. Analects 2.8 makes the related point that a younger member of a family may do an elder member’s task or allow an elder first choice of food in an inauthentic manner. This will be apparent from his face, because authenticity correlates with a proper facial appearance (se и). The Analects first establishes a distinction between the proper human performance of nourishing (i.e., with the attitude of reverence) and simply carrying out the act of nourishing. It then provides a means of distinguishing actions done out of proper motives from those done for other reasons. In this way, the two passages from the Analects address concerns resulting from the accusations of hollow ritualism or empty performance outlined in the previous chapter. The issue of “seeming” to be virtuous without actually being so is a concern of many systems of ethics that make the individual the seat of moral decision-making. This would not be the case with the Mozi, which would calculate the merit of the act of feeding one’s parents based on the number of calories the meal contains, even if it was served to them in a trough. For Kongzi, however, actions that result in the same material benefit to one’s parents may have very different moral status. In Kongzi’s time, parental kindness (ci ิ) and filial piety on the part of offspring, which Ren Jiyu έᙜฺ has identified as being at the core of the common virtues inherited by the Ru from the Western Zhou period, were likely already perceived as established virtues.18 By taking the traditional virtue of filial piety, and identifying it not with an action, but with the attitude behind that action, the Analects is directly “nourish.” Bao’s reading has the advantage of making the passage consistent with the common trope that compares human behavior and that of animals, concluding that animals obey similar conventions but are lacking in some vital element, hence it is that element that separates “man from beast.” In his Sishu kaoyi ͗एШ୙, the Qing dynasty commentator Zhai Hao ႜ㒷 (d. 1788 C.E.) points out Analects 2.7’s similarity to a passage in the “Fangji” Ґ৩ chapter of the Liji: ʪˆ ʮʆߖ঻ኙմ፶ Ѽʪʿ๖щ ̣᎖ “The Master said: ‘Lesser people are all able to nourish their parents. If a gentleman is not reverent, how can one tell [the gentleman] from them?’” (see Lunyu jishi 2.86 and Liji jijie 50.1288). Zhai notes further that comparing parents to domestic animals is not something that the Analects would do. This would be a variation on Bao’s reading, saying that animals are able to nourish their own young. Philip J. Ivanhoe has pointed out to me, however, that qinshou ໘ᖿ “birds and beasts” is generally used in such cross-species comparisons rather than domestic animals. For this reason, I have translated the passage so as to leave the object of yang ambiguous and in so doing accomodate both possible objects: “nourish their own young” or “nourish human beings.” 18 Ren Jiyu 1983, 105.

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rebutting views like those found in the later “Dao Zhi” chapter of the Zhuangzi that filially pious actions are performed out of a craven appetite for “riches and honors.” Lee Yearley develops Aquinas’ distinction between seemingly virtuous actions intended to deceive others (the sort that the “Dao Zhi” ascribes to the Ru) and seemingly virtuous actions that have no such selfish motive (such as the “nourishing others” performed by animals) as a difference between counterfeits and semblances of virtues.19 The notion that it is possible to distinguish genuine motivation through the presence of reverence in action, or through a facial expression, addresses both similacra of virtue–providing as it does the equivalent of a direct insight into the mind of the agent. This emphasis on the motivation for action is found at the very beginning of the Wuxing, which extends this distinction between acts popularly viewed as filially pious and acts out of authentic filial piety to the practice of all the virtues. Both editions of the Wuxing begin with the following passage, which contrasts virtuous action that comes from moral considerations with other actions that are not done “out of” virtue: “When benevolence takes form internally, it is called ‘virtuous action.’ When it does not take form internally it is called ‘action.’” [§1.1]20 The text continues by making similar distinctions for the virtues righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom, and sagacity. It then draws a distinction between “virtuous” (de ᅭ) action, and action that is simply “good” (shan െ): “With all five kinds of virtuous action, when they are in harmony it is called ‘virtue.’ When four kinds of action are in harmony, this is called ‘good.’” [§1.6]. The fundamental distinction between virtue and goodness that begins the Wuxing introduces a primary goal of the text, to explore the interrelationship between the virtues in such a way as to outline a specific program for cultivating them. The Wuxing has no strict precedent in the Analects in the way it differentiates two modes of moral action: the good and the

19

See Lee Yearley 1990, 19-20; also the discussion of the Mengzi on 67-72. Because the Chinese text is provided along with a complete translation and notes in the appendices, neither are reproduced here. Section numbers direct the reader to the two editions of the Wuxing and its commentary as follows: GD (Guodian, see Appendix 2), and MWD (Mawangdui, see Appendix 3). Mawangdui edition references are further divided into MWD C (“Classic”, the main text of the Wuxing) and MWD E (“Explanation”, the partial commentary to the Wuxing). When neither MWD or GD is specified, the section number is the same in both editions. In §1, the order of the virtues is different in the MWD version, where it is: benevolence, wisdom, righteousness, ritual propriety, and sagacity. 20

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virtuous.21 The Wuxing additionally sets out to systematize virtuous dispositions in order to clarify the means of developing genuine moral motivation. By grounding this differentiation between types of action in the inner mind, the Wuxing is doing something arguably very different from the Analects: explaining moral action with reference to a descriptive psychology. The Wuxing is a prototype moral psychology in early China, in the sense that many of the distinctions that it draws are found in the Mengzi, and subsequent writing on the subject. The substance of the Wuxing’s psychology is rather complex, and its complexity is in part a reflection of the level of detail required by its approach to systematizing the virtues. The system it elaborates is composed of neatly symmetrical but sometimes obscure chains of causation that describe moral psychological phenomena. It is arguable that these chains do not represent an actual fifth or fourth century B.C.E. understanding of the way the mind worked. Since the Wuxing enumerates the development of the virtues and subdivides each into a set of multi-step processes, the identification of individual steps at times appears to reflect the composer’s need to fill a quota of a set number of stages, and the progression appears forced. Nevertheless, the Wuxing’s nuanced application of psychologistic terminology makes its highly involved description of the stages of self-cultivation unique among fourth century B.C.E. texts. Following the initial distinction between good action and action “out of virtue,” the Wuxing turns to an outline of the mental qualities that develop virtue. Wuxing §2 provides an introduction to linked states of the “inner mind” (zhongxin ˀ˻) that are prerequisites to developing virtue. Here, the word xin ˻ literally refers to the heart, but since it was associated with mental functions, here it is translated as “mind.” These states are: anxiety (you ᅴ), wisdom (zhi ನ), and joy (yue ࣬). Attaining pleasure in one’s inner mind leads to the target stages of settledness (an ϯ), happiness (le ᆪ), and virtue (de). Slips five and six of the Guodian Wuxing trace the stages: Ѽʪʞˀ˻˃ᅴ۱ʞˀ˻˃ನ 21 The Analects draws distinctions between people who excel at particular virtues. Kongzi is asked in the fifth chapter of the Analects whether several people with particular virtues are ren “benevolent.” Philip J. Ivanhoe has pointed out to me that Kongzi never recognizes any living person as ren. In this way, of the two uses of ren used in the Analects, it is the more general ren described by Takeuchi Teruo (1965) that is in some sense congruent to the higher level of sheng “sagacity” in the Wuxing.

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ʞˀ˻˃ನ۱ʞˀ˻˃࣬ ʞˀ˻˃࣬ ۱ʿϯ ʿϯ۱ʿᆪ ۱ʞᅭ If a gentleman lacks the anxiety of the inner mind then he will (also) be without the wisdom of the inner mind. If (a gentleman) lacks the wisdom of the inner mind then he will (also) be without the joy of the inner mind. If (a gentleman) lacks the pleasure of the inner mind then he will be unsettled. If (a gentleman) is unsettled, then he will be not be happy. If (a gentleman) is unhappy, then he will be without virtue. [GD §2.1-2.3]

This passage establishes the pattern of linked states leading to a beneficial outcome, a pattern that is repeated often in the text. The movement from anxiety to happiness is not a process of “cheering up”; rather anxiety is the seed of the inner mind’s pleasure, and leads to settledness, happiness, and acting out of virtue.22 Throughout the text, moral growth through the development of virtue is associated with a relief from externally imposed distress that allows moral decisionmaking to be solely an internal process, yet it originates from an attitude of anxiety and care that might be mistaken for distress. The nuanced account of the genesis of happiness in the inner mind, an account that owes much to the classic Odes, has at its core the idea that reflection is triggered by affective states. The first term in the series of linked states in §2 is anxiety. The Wuxing’s expression “anxiety of the mind” appears over two dozen times in the Odes, often in the context of poems about parting. An example is “Bozhou” ‫ ތ‬ж (Cypress boat, Mao 26), which uses a feminine voice to express a profound grievance and desire to escape: ˻˃ᅴԡ Ϩࢋ⯀н ᎼԵ‫ ˃݋‬ʿ঻ዒ࡙ The anxiety of my mind Is like unwashed clothing. Wordlessly I reflect upon it, Unable to take wing.23 22 Another Guodian text argues that one must find joy in virtue in order to act on it: dai yue er hou xing ݄࣬Щ݈м (adapted from the transcriptions of Xingqing lun ‫׷‬ શቈ in Ma Chengyuan 2001, 220 and Xing zi ming chu ‫׷‬б̳֡ in Jingmenshi bowuguan 1998, 179). The Analects also situates being joyful as being part of the best process of moral learning: ‫ ږ ˃ ڈ‬ʿ Ϩ Ϧ ˃ ‫ ږ‬Ϧ ˃ ‫ ږ‬ʿ Ϩ ᆪ ˃ ‫“ ږ‬To know something is not as good as loving it, and loving something is not as good as finding happiness in it.” Lunyu jishi 12.404 [cf. Lau (1970, 84)]. 23 Waley described this ode as “the song of a lady whose friends tried to marry her against her inclinations,” and translates it: “Sorrow clings to me/Like an unwashed dress./In the still of the night I brood upon it,/Long to take wing and fly away” (1937, 71). Karlgren translates: “The grief of my heart is like an unwashed dress/In the quietude I brood over it, but I cannot rush up and fly away,” (1950a, 16).

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The rise of anxiety is associated with longing, and while it may be painful (cf. “Lüyi” ႋн [Green robes, Mao 27]) it can also inspire the songs themselves (cf. “Yuan you tao” ฏ Љ थ [Peachtrees in the courtyard, Mao 109]). While anxiety is not associated with happiness, it is the beginning of the progression to happiness because it draws one out of one’s complacency. As in “Cypress boat”, anxiety is then a condition that fosters “reflection” (si ‫)݋‬, which, in turn, is necessary for the development of the virtues. These parallels highlight the degree to which the Wuxing’s psychology grows out of the Odes.24 According to the Wuxing, the affective states of the inner mind trigger reflection, but only certain kinds of reflection lead to virtue. The process of reflection is not a variety of abstract moral reasoning, as it is induced by worry and has the connotation of both contemplation and of longing (as in the phrase “reflecting on the ancient” sigu ‫)ͅ݋‬. As such, it is not a monotone process, and it may be done with or without three important qualities–cutting to the essentials (jing ႅ ), circumspection (chang ‫)ۂ‬, and directness (jing ࣜ).25 According to §4, each of these qualities of reflection is a step in the process by which virtue is developed in the inner mind. Cutting to the essentials, circumspection, and directness in reflection are critical for having insight into (cha ࿫), attaining (de દ), and giving form to (xing Ӂ) a thing, respectively. This is succinctly expressed on slips eight and nine of the Guodian Wuxing: ‫݋‬ʿႅʿ࿫ ‫݋‬ʿ‫ۂ‬ʿ [દ ‫݋‬ʿࣜ ʿ] Ӂ ʿӁʿϯ ʿϯʿᆪ ʿᆪʞᅭ If one does not cut to the essence in reflecting (on a thing), one cannot have insight into it. If one is not circumspect in reflecting (on a thing), [one cannot attain it. If one is not direct in reflecting (on a thing),] one cannot give form to it.

24

Moving from section two to four skips section three, which is not an essential part of this discussion. Section three differentiates the novice, called an “aspiring official” (zhi [zhi] shi ˃ [ӆ] ʦ) from the gentleman. A gentleman’s five kinds of action proceed from his interior and are “applied in a timely way” (shi xing zhi इм ˃), an expression that formally echoes Analects 1.1, “practice it in a timely way” (shi xi zhi इ஑˃). On the Wuxing and the Odes, see Jeffrey Riegel 1997. 25 In different versions of Wuxing, these characters are written using orthographic variants. For jing, GD §4.2 has qing ଡ, and MWD C §4.2 has jing ຽ. For chang, GD §4.2 has chang ࡯. For qing, MWD C §4.2 has qing ძ. On these variant readings, see Ikeda 1999, 22-3, n. 13, and Ikeda 1993, 183-4, n. 9-11.

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If one cannot give form to it then one will be unsettled. If one is unsettled then one will be unhappy. If one is unhappy, then one will be without virtue. [GD §4.2-4.3]26

Without these qualities of reflection, the stages that lead to becoming virtuous in section two–settledness and happiness–cannot be reached. Therefore the discussion of the qualities of reflection in §4 is parallel to the discussion of the states of the inner mind in §2. Both discussions describe three stages that lead to settledness and happiness, and then to the development of the virtues. In this way, both the affective states of the inner mind and the seemingly more “cognitive” qualities of the resultant reflection are elements of virtuous action. The parallel processes are: (1) States of the inner mind: anxiety, wisdom, and joy lead to: settledness, happiness, and virtue; (2) Reflection: cutting to essentials, circumspection, and directness lead to: insight into, attainment of, and giving form to virtue. The way these processes are going on in parallel in the Wuxing’s model of the decision-making underscores how different they are from modern distinctions between emotion and cognition. The Wuxing instead highlights a distinction between states of the inner mind and the process by which reflection examines into, gains, and directly forms virtuous action. The two processes are not opposed to one another, but are both normative models of the exercise of two aspects of the mind that work in tandem. The qualities of mind that are needed to develop the virtues each entail a slightly different aspect of reflection. The first is that of jing, a character that sometimes means “essence.” In the context of reflection, it means considering all the relevant factors, but being able to select out the most salient considerations on which to act. The “Ziyi” chapter of the Liji explains what “cutting to the essence” entails in the context of reflection. A gentleman, it says, listens widely, sets many goals, and “cuts to the essence of his thoughts, taking their gist and acting on them” (jingzhi lue er xing zhi ႅ‫ୖ ڈ‬Щм˃).27 Zheng Xuan’s ቷ΁ 26 Here, the clauses in brackets are based on the parallel in line 177 of the Mawangdui edition of the Wuxing. See Ikeda 1999, 23; Wei 2000, 63; Pang 2000, 33. 27 Liji jijie 33.1330 and Jingmenshi bowuguan 1998, 131. In this context, the “Ziyi” quotes a line from the Odes (Mao 152): “The good man, the gentleman/His appearance is unified,” (shuren junzi, qi yi yi ଥʆѼʪ մᄭɾ), a line also quoted in the Wuxing at the beginning of GD §8.1 and MWD C §7.1 in the first discussion of the practice of unifying the self and “attending to one’s solitude.” While the usage is not identical, both the “Ziyi” and Wuxing are interpreting the same line to refer to the reflective concentration of the gentleman. The word lue ୖ here could also be translated as “make a strategy” as in the compound binglue ѡୖ, making the phrase: “making a strategy and acting on it.”

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(127-200 C.E.) commentary to the “Ziyi” explains the phrase in this way: “‘Cuts to the essentials of his thoughts’ means ‘the wellconsidered deliberations among the many’” (jingzhi shu lu yu zhong ye ႅ‫੼ ڈ‬ᅱ‫ؠ‬୥ ʛ).28 Both passages imply that jing is related to attention and perhaps also to the management of perception. The Wuxing explains that such selective attention is required in order to “examine into” what is good or virtuous. It is an important part of examining into the moral qualities of people, and that is how it is used in a story in the “Jiyi” ৩໳ (Records of righteousness) chapter of the Kongcongzi ˱ᓳʪ, a work perhaps compiled by Wang Su ̙ോ (195-256 C.E.)29 In the story, a messenger comes to Kongzi to ask about judging people in the context of making official appointments. Kongzi says that it is very difficult to judge people and that often rulers are led astray because they have too many concerns: “If one has too many deliberations, then one’s thoughts will not cut to the essential,” (duo lu se yi bu jing Ϡᅱ۱ำʿႅ). This explanation of cutting to essentials is very similar to that of Zheng Xuan above. Kongzi continues by noting that if a ruler examines an individual who is difficult to assess without “cutting to essentials”, the ruler is bound to make mistakes.30 The quality of jing, then, is the ability to distill or refine one’s concerns so that only the most well-considered ones become the basis for evaluation or action. Yet “cutting to essentials” alone is insufficient to make a decision on how to act. One’s reflection must also be chang, a term that literally means “lengthy”. In the Xunzi, the term is used to talk about consideration of the long-term consequences of one’s actions. The “Rongru” ဝ৾ (Glory and disgrace) chapter of that text uses the phrase “circumspect (chang) deliberation and looking to the future” (chang lu gu hou ‫ۂ‬ᅱᛐ݈) three times to establish a parallel between the importance of circumspection in the management of one’s resources and in the governance of the state. The Xunzi argues that a person who fails to be circumspect with respect to resources will end up frozen or starved to death in a ditch by the side of the road. By contrast, a person who nurses resources will be able to preserve them into future generations. How much more so, the author reasons, will a ruler who 28 Liji jijie 33.1330. Reading shu ᇈ for shu ੼, as in the “Jie Lao” ༱Ч (Explaining the Laozi) chapter of Han Feizi: ‫݋‬ᅱᇈ ۱દՖ୎ “If reflections and deliberations are well-considered, then one will get to the principle of the matter,” (HanFeizi jijie 6.341). 29 On the Kong Congzi, see Ariel 1989. 30 Kong Congzi 1.12a-b (cf. Ariel 1989, 88).

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understands the distinctions preserved in the classics Odes and Documents and in the Zhou rites and music be able to conserve the state’s cultural and political resources. The prudence and circumspection that arises from such mastery will facilitate the protection of ten-thousand generations (bao wan shi ۘ໗̛).31 By “taking the long view,” the Wuxing argues, one is able to move to the third stage of reflection, which actually allows one to “form” virtue. When reflection is jing (ࣜ as opposed to ႅ), a word originally meaning a narrow “walking path”, there is a directness of thought that does not depend on getting directions or instructions from external sources. For this reason, the term jing can connote an uneven or imperfect road, but can also mean a “direct” or “rapid” one, as in a shortcut that saves time over the main road.32 In some texts jing further connotes a “willfulness” or an “independence” that likely derives from the latter connotations. An example of this usage is from the “Wang zheng” ʞᅮ (Signs of ruin) chapter of the Han Feizi, where a poor military policy is described in this way: ̳࠻֡અ˯ࡌ ᘃϙέϭ˯ౚ ઄վዣ֡ ࣜ޴Щ೷‫׿‬ቁ‫̈́ ږ‬ʞʛ “If one values the commanding generals who dispatch the armies too heavily, and esteems those responsible for guarding the borderlands too much, then they will autonomously supervise and unilaterally issue commands, acting directly (jing) and without making any request [of their rulers]. [A state in such circumstances is] suitable for ruin.”33 In this passage, directness is seen as challenge to the authority of the sovereign. In the context of the moral psychology of the Wuxing, it is precisely that directness, independent of outside influence, that is a beneficial quality of reflection. These three characteristics of reflection are then requisite to the process of acting out of virtue. 31

Reminiscent of the Wuxing, in this section of the Xunzi the ultimate outcome of mastering the Odes and Documents and the rites and music is said to be “bringing happiness to one’s intentions” (le yi ᆪำ). See Xunzi jijie 2.67-9 (cf. Knoblock, v.1, 193-4). A similar use of chang lu appears in a speech by Shu Man ቎੊ in the “Dakuang” ʨς chapter of the Guanzi ၸʪ: ನ‫ږ‬ԥ୎Щ‫ۂ‬ᅱ ԽદѠା “The wise research principles and deliberate on the long-term, so their persons are able to avoid [calamity].” See Guanzi jiaozheng 7.103. As in this Guanzi quotation, section 6 of the Wuxing associates chang with wisdom. 32 In the “Xiushen” ࡸ Խ (Bodily cultivation) chapter of the Xunzi, three approaches to techniques of bodily control are singled out from others: நࣜΊᔩ ந ࠱દࣖ நআɾϦ “None is more direct (jing) than following the rites, none is more basic than getting a teacher, and none is more spiritual than unifying one’s inclinations.” Yang Liang’s commentary explains jing as “rapid” (jiesu ો௥). See Xunzi jijie 1.26 (cf. Knoblock, v.1, 153-4). 33 Han Feizi jijie 5.269.

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The relationship between the virtues and the three characteristics of reflection is developed in §5 and §6. There, reflection that cuts to the essential, is circumspect, and is direct, is associated with the virtues of benevolence, wisdom, and sagacity, respectively. A dearth of these virtues is associated in §5 with the plaint of the “Caochong” ৎᕐ (Grass insects, Mao 14) that describes the anxiety that precedes meeting a gentleman, in contrast to the pleasure that follows it. The progression from each characteristic of reflection to being able to recognize a worthy or a sage, and by doing so to become wise or sage oneself, is the subject of §6. Slips 14 through the beginning of 16 read: ನ˃‫݋‬ʛ‫ۂ ۂ‬۱દ દ۱ʿӄ ʿӄ۱‫ا ا‬۱Գቖʆ Գቖʆ۱΂ и ΂и۱Ӂ Ӂ۱ನ ໶˃‫݋‬ʛࣜ ࣜ۱Ӂ Ӂ۱ʿӄ ʿӄ۱ᑶ ᑶ ۱ႝѼʪལ ႝѼʪལ۱΂ࡖ ΂ࡖӁ Ӂ۱໶ The reflection of the wise is circumspect. If one is circumspect, then one will attain (a thing). If one can attain it, then one will not forget it. If one does not forget it, then one will be clear-sighted. If one is clear-sighted then one will see a worthy. If one sees a worthy then one will have a jade coloration. If one has a jade coloration then one will take give form (to a thing). If it takes form to it, then one will be wise. The reflection of the sage is direct. If one is direct then one can form. If one can give form (to a thing), then one will not forget it. If one does not forget it then one can be sharp-eared. If one is sharp-eared then one can hear the Way of the Gentleman. If one can hear the Way of the Gentleman then one will have a jade tone. If one has jade tone then one will give form (to a thing). If one gives form to it, then one will be a sage. [§6.2-3]

Here, the proper reflection leads to a cascade of abilities that culminate in being able to “mould” (xing ‫ )ܓ‬or “give form” (xing Ӂ)–although the text is unclear about exactly how hearing and seeing lead to this ability. The vocabulary implies the formation of a mental image or perhaps the beginning of an intention. Having brought the reader through the mental states and processes of reflection needed, §6 completes the process by treating virtue formation. It is important to note that virtue formation is not entirely an internal process. In §6.1, the virtue of benevolence is united with a binary pairing of wisdom and sagacity to form a chain that begins with qualities of reflection and ends in the development of those three particular virtues.34 What is particularly significant about §6.2-3 is the 34 The three characteristics of reflection appear to dictate that only three of the five virtues appear in this section-indeed, the description of how “cutting to essentials” leads to benevolence appears to have been somewhat cobbled together, containing as it does

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nature of the intermediate stages between reflection and virtue, which imply that the process entails training the senses in a kind of visual or aural moral differentiation. Specifically, being clear-sighted (ming ‫)ا‬ enough to see a worthy results in having a “jade coloration”–the precursor of wisdom, and being sharp-eared (cong ᑶ) enough to hear the Way of the Gentleman results in having a “jade tone”–prefiguring sagacity. While the text does not clearly explain these terms, they appear to refer to honing one’s senses, being affected by another through those senses, and finally gaining the ability to influence others’ senses. Put another way, acute seeing and hearing allow one to perceive moral exemplars, and then, once grasped, the Way may be propagated to others by the same sensory routes. In both cases, propagating the Way is a matter of having the characteristics of “jade” (yu ΂), which is the outward sign of one who possesses the Way. In other contexts, as we shall see below, self-cultivation explicitly causes an actual physiological change in a person. According to the Guodian Wuxing, one’s jade coloration (yuse ΂и) may serve as a visual template for another’s wisdom, and one’s jade tone (yin ࡖ) may serve as an aural template for another’s sagacity. Whether the associations with sight (ming and se) and sound (cong and yin) are metaphorical or actually implicate a physical process of increasing sensory acuity in is a topic that will be treated at length in chapter four. After the moral psychology of the first six sections, this first segment of the Wuxing leaves aside the description of the human mind to pursue two practical processes necessary to master the “Way of the gentleman”. The first is the need to “attend to one’s solitude” (shen qi du ฻մጤ), a process that §7 argues allows one to “unify” (weiyi ޴ ɾ) the mind. Attending to one’s solitude is an expression found in a number of fourth and third century B.C.E. texts that treat the psychological aspects of self-cultivation, where it is connected with the ability to act solely out of internal motives. For a person who has cultivated virtue, ignoring external distractions ensures that non-moral considerations cannot determine one’s action.35 The Wuxing culls an a passage from section eleven of the Guodian text. In part, this is because the section utilizes the binary pairing of wisdom and sagacity, which are allied with the senses of sight and hearing, respectively. The pairing of wisdom and sagacity also appears in GD 10, 14 and 15, and in none of these cases does it form a tripartite structure with benevolence. That and the fact that yuse ΂и “jade coloration” appears in both GD 6.1 and 6.2 would imply that 6.1 might be a later addition to round out the three qualities of reflection. 35 See Ikeda (1993, 210 and 213, n.11). Shimamori Tetsuo ࣑ಷ࢖ԝ examines six texts which use the phrase “attend to one’s solitude” (1979, 1-14).

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image of a swallow’s grief from the ode “Shijiu” ⢧ྤ (The shi and jiu birds, Mao 152) of the Odes to illustrate a discussion of the authenticity of mourning rites. Slips 17 and 18 of the Guodian Wuxing continue, somewhat elliptically: ঻ࣔЖմЦ ೸ϒ঻в‫ۼ‬ Ѽʪ฻մጤʛ When “one’s feathers are uneven,” only then is one capable of ultimate grief. The Gentleman attends to his solitude. [GD §7.5-6]

Here, the text quotes the phrase ࣔЖմЦ “flap one’s wings up and down” from the ode “Yanyan” ጝጝ (Swallow, swallow, Mao 28) that describes disheveled feathers of a swallow as a metaphor for a woman whose longing brings her to tears. The Mawangdui commentary to the Wuxing passage interprets the reference to “flapping one’s wings” as paying attention to one’s clothing in the context of a funeral, concluding: Եв˖‫˃ږ‬ʿϚ͙ʛ ‫˃ݵ‬ᎂጤʛ ጤ‫ڣږ‬ᝂʛ “This says that the culmination of one’s interior (state) is to not pay attention to one’s exterior (state). This is what is called ‘solitude.’ One who is solitary forsakes the body.” [MWD E §7.6] The commentary argues that at a funeral, by ignoring externals that might stifle grief such as the flapping of a hat in the wind, one may cultivate appropriately reverent feelings. This again shows the importance of reliance on the cultivation of the responses of one’s inner mind at the expense of external distractions or concerns. The “solitude” that the text advocates is the ultimate answer to the issue of moral motivation: by ignoring external concerns, there is no possibility that one’s grief might simply be a counterfeit or a semblance, because no ulterior motives may enter one’s consideration from the outside. This first segment of the Wuxing concludes by leaving the details of the process of virtue formation, and coming, full circle, back to the important distinction between goodness and virtue. In §8, the text stresses the continuous aspect of moral self-cultivation. Slips 18 and 19 of the Guodian Wuxing read: Ѽʪ˃޴െʛ ЉႩֻ ЉႩஉʛ Ѽʪ ˃޴ᅭʛ ЉႩֻ ೷Ⴉஉʛ “When a gentleman performs good acts, there is something with which he begins (shi ֻ) and something with which he finishes (zhong உ). When a gentleman performs virtuous acts, there is something with which he begins but nothing with which he finishes” [§8.1-2]. In some Ru texts, the terms “beginning” and “finishing” refer to stages in the process of self-cultivation. For

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example, in the “Quanxue” ᘳዕ (Encouraging Learning) chapter of the Xunzi, they are used to talk about the proper course of training: ዕ౱ֻ̢ ౱̢உ ̆ մᆚ۱ֻ̢ა໩ உ̢ᜃᔩ մ໳۱ֻ̢޴ʦ உ̢޴໶ʆ ॲጻ ʍʙ۱ʈ ዕв̢ԅЩ݈̊ʛ ‫ݭ‬ዕᆚЉஉ ࠜմ໳۱ʿ̈́ෝ‫ڣڢ‬ʛ Where should study begin and where should it end? The reply: Its procedure begins (shi) with chanting the classics and finishes (zhong) with learning the rites. Its significance begins (shi) with becoming a candidate for office and finishes (zhong) with becoming a sage. If one reliably amasses effort for a long time, then one has embarked on it. Study only stops when one reaches one’s death. So while the procedure of study has a finish (zhong), when it comes to its meaning it cannot for a moment be forsaken.36

In the Xunzi, the progression from “beginning” to “finish” describes the first and last stages of a course of study. In light of this, the Wuxing is probably arguing in §8.1 that good action is within reach of someone who has methodically begun the path of self-cultivation, and has begun to pile up effort. The Xunzi further explains that the growth from scholar to sage occurs when one moves from following a procedure to understanding its meaning, thereby transcending the need for a specific course of study and so becoming capable of learning from everything one experiences.37 It is likely in this same sense that Wuxing §8.2 says of virtuous action that there is “nothing with which it finishes”. One who can act virtuously, then, has a mastery of learning that is not unlike the spontaneous adaptability of the Zhuangzi’s skillful exemplars.38

36 Xunzi jijie 1.11 (cf. Watson 1963, 19, Knoblock 1988, v. 1, 139). Wang Xianqian ̙ζᒣ notes that the standard progression in the Xunzi is from aspiring official to gentleman to sage. The distinction between an aspiring official (shi ʦ) and sage here is very close to the one made in §3 between an aspiring official and a gentleman. 37 Another text that uses this contrast in a similar way is the Xing zi ming chu or Xing qing lun, found alongside the Wuxing in the Guodian tomb. It begins by contrasting the first and last stages of study: ͌(ֻ)‫ڻږ‬શ உ‫ڻږ‬໳ ನ(‫)ڈ‬શ‫঻ږ‬ ̳˃ ನ(‫)ڈ‬໳‫(˖঻ږ‬ঢ)˃ “The beginning is being close to affective dispositions, and the end is being close to righteousness. Those who understand affective dispositions are able to depart from them, those who understand righteousness can enter it,” (a composite transcription based on Jingmenshi bowuguan 1998, 179, and Ma Chengyuan, et al. 2001, 222). The connotation of the second line of this passage is very different from the contrast being drawn in the Wuxing and Xunzi passages, however, in that it does not suggest the life-long aspect of the practice of righteousness (unless it is doing so very elliptically). 38 Two 1997 articles independently make the case for this connection between the Zhuangzi and Ru sagehood, see Scott Cook’s “Zhuang Zi and his Carving of the

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This ideal of perfection is the goal of the Wuxing, and it offers a careful description of the manner in which this tranformation occurs in the mind. Section 9 of the Wuxing ends with a musical metaphor that also draws on the distinction between goodness and virtue. Slips 19 through 20 of the Guodian Wuxing read: ‫ہ‬ᑵЩ΂ࣴ˃Љᅭ‫ږ‬ʛ ‫ہ‬ᑵെʛ ΂ࡖ໶ʛ െ ʆལʛ ᅭ ˭ལʛ ੗Љᅭ‫ ږ‬೸݈঻‫ہ‬ᑵЩ΂ࣴ˃ “A metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate,” is the presence of virtue. “A metal bell sounds,” is good. “A jade tone,” is sage. Good is the human Way, and virtue is tian’s Way. Only with (a person of) virtue may there be “a metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate.” [GD §9.1-5]

The metaphor of the metal bell sounding and the jade stone causing it to vibrate is an important one in the Wuxing. Because this chapter is concerned with a close reading of the moral psychology of the text, the discussion of outer-directed aspects of moral development such as special acuity in hearing and seeing (i.e., being clear-sighted, and being sharp-eared) and the quasi-magical influence of the sage (i.e., being possessed of a “jade” tone and coloration and activating others in the manner of a “jade stone”) in the Wuxing will be postponed until chapter four. The first segment of the Wuxing, then, ranges widely in its exposition of the innate origins of virtue and ways of developing them, but it both begins and ends on the topic of the distinction between goodness and sagacity. The latter is distinguished by several factors that directly speak to the issue of moral motivation. The text begins by saying that sagely virtue is something one “acts out of” rather than “acts out” (§1). The virtues begin with the anxiety of the inner mind (§2), which may be developed through particular modes of reflection so that one is not influenced by outside factors and becomes receptive to virtue (§4, 6). In particular, one must concentrate as if in “solitude” so as to cultivate a disposition that is immune to considerations that arise from outside one’s mind (§7). Then one is receptive to the transformative influence of the sage’s virtue (§8). There are other

Confucian Ox” and Mark Csikszentmihalyi’s “Jia Yi’s ‘Techniques of the Dao’ and the Han Confucian Appropriation of Technical Discourse.”

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important themes explored in this first segment of the Wuxing, but its chief concern is developing a moral psychology that substantiates the claim that a sage acts spontaneously, without being influenced by external considerations. Such a person is, of course, above reproach for acting out of ulterior motives because the person’s actions have become a matter of direct intuitions through following cultivated bodily dispositions. In summary, the first segment of the Wuxing is primarily concerned with moral motivation and with delineating the process behind the formation of virtues. For these reasons, it may be located as part of the Ru response to critiques of the kind outlined in the previous chapter. Since we have little information on the social context of the composition of the text, it is impossible to say with any certainty that the text was part of a reformation movement within the Ru, but its reception in the Xunzi certainly indicates that it was controversial among some Ru of the third century B.C.E. The emphasis of its psychology is on the nature of genuine moral reactions, an idea that negates the possibility of virtuous actions being mere semblances of virtue.

The anatomy of the virtues in Wuxing §10-27 The second segment of the Wuxing is primarily about the virtues considered in isolation from one another. It preserves the general distinction between human and higher virtues, but pays most attention to the stages in developing and applying particular virtues. This segment of the text is concerned with how affective states are connected to the kinds of reflection necessary to develop the virtues, and the behaviors and methods needed to foster that development. The second segment of the text begins39 with three series of five steps that lead to each of the virtues of benevolence, righteousness and ritual propriety. GD §11-13 (MWD §10-12) breaks down the first three virtues in a way that can be schematized as three parallel series: (1) ᜣ, 39

In contrast to the first segment, the original order of the sections in this segment is not known because the two excavated exemplars arrange the same set of sections in very different orders. There has been much debate about whether the “original order” matches the Guodian or the Mawangdui text. Flaws in this debate include a failure to define in what sense there was an “original” order, as well as a failure to take into account the possibility that such an order may have matched neither exemplar. Ikeda 1999 argues that the Mawangdui order is more logically coherent.

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࣬ , ૂ , ፶ , ื , ˋ (Affection, joy, closeness, kinship, caring, benevolence); (2) ‫ڇ‬, ٚ, ‫س‬, ᔴ, м, ໳ (Upright, resistant, decisive, resolute, deliberate, righteous); (3) ხ, ๖, ᘷ, ౚ, ࣣ, ᔩ (Suitably distant, reverent, in awe, respectful, humble, ritually proper). The five steps that result in the virtues of benevolence, righteousness and ritual propriety take a person through stages that are arguably more and more specific and directed to a particular domain of action. Of course, one could also look at this as a six-step process culminating in attaining each virtue, perhaps numerologically distinct from the number of virtues because the processes concern the virtues of the “human Way” as opposed to the quality of sagacity that is “tian’s Way.” As with the virtues outlined in §1, there is no implication that the five steps to these virtues form a cycle that exhausts itself and returns to the first element, as in later understandings of the “five phases” wuxing. Instead, the steps are a progression that leads one to a state in which acting out of a particular cultivated disposition is possible. The five steps to the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, and ritual propriety are revisited in more detail in GD §17-19 (MWD §1416). These three sections provide excellent descriptions of the fourth century B.C.E. understanding of what the virtues entailed. For example, the steps that lead to the virtue of benevolence are described with the following telling details: ᖄиࣅსຈ ᜣʛ ̣մˀ˻ႩʆΟ ࣬ʛ ˀ˻࣬ାት‫̮ؠ‬ҿ ૂʛ ૂЩя˃ ፶ʛ ፶Щፄ˃ ืʛ ื̓մӤืʆ ˋʛ If one’s facial coloration and one’s appearance are warm, then one is feeling affection. Using one’s inner mind in interacting with others, is joy. Enjoying something in one’s inner mind, and then transferring this feeling to one’s elder and younger brothers, is closeness. Feeling closeness and extending it, is kinship. Feeling kinship and treating it as important, is caring. Caring for one’s father, and then secondarily caring for other people, is benevolence. [GD §17.1-5]

The description of benevolence begins with a physical reaction that shows in one’s facial and bodily appearance. From its root in a spontaneous physical reaction, the text traces progressively more intense feelings that are generated as this basic reaction is nurtured

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through one’s natural feelings for brothers, kin, and parents. Taking the result of the fifth step, caring for one’s father, and applying it to people who are not one’s father, is what constitutes benevolence. This same progression is traced for the other two virtues. The seed of righteousness is the “uprightness” that comes from making distinctions solely in one’s “inner mind” and not being influenced by considerations from the outside: ˀ˻ᛂ೸Щ͸м˃ ‫ڇ‬ʛ “Using one’s inner mind to make distinctions, and then acting in the correct manner, is uprightness,” [§18.1]. Ritual propriety, by contrast, begins with the “distance” that derives from interacting with others with one’s “outer mind”: ̣ մ ͙ ˻ Ⴉ ʆ Ο ხ ʛ “Using one’s outer mind when interacting with others, is keeping one’s distance,” [§19.1].40 In each case, the origins of each of the virtues have to do with the application or suppression of the inner mind. In these and other ways, the underlying psychology of the second segment mirrors the main assumptions of the first segment. For example, the link in §6 between the senses of hearing and sight, and the virtues of sagacity and wisdom, respectively, is reprised with some minor variation in GD §15 (MWD §18). In order to be a sage one must not only hear the Way, but know or recognize it: ႝѼʪལ ᑶʛ ႝЩ ‫ ˃ڈ‬໶ʛ “Hearing the Way of the Gentleman is being ‘sharp-eared.’ Hearing and knowing [the Way of the Gentleman] is sage,” [GD §15.1]. Similarly for sight and wisdom: Գ ቖ ʆ ‫ ا‬ʛ Գ Щ ‫ ˃ ڈ‬ನ ʛ “Seeing a worthy is being ‘clear-sighted.’ Seeing and knowing [the worthy] is wisdom,” [GD §15.4]. In the second segment, the rootedness in the body of at least the four virtues associated with the “human Way” is also reiterated. Slips 30 and 31 of the Guodian version relate the “four kinds of action” to goodness: ͗м˃‫֜׿‬ʛ ֜۱ψ ψ۱െ “This is the harmonizing of the four kinds of action. They harmonize and then they are made the same. They are made the same and then there is goodness.” [GD §16.3]. The last 40 The Wuxing goes on to note that “distance” is the basis of “reverence”: ხЩப ˃ ๖ʛ “Keeping one’s distance and being grave, is reverence,” [19.2]. This phrase provides a possible alternative reading for one of the most famous sentences in the Analects, numbered 6.22 and usually understood to say that one should serve the interests of the people, and jing guishen er yuan zhi ๖ਥআЩხ˃ “keep one’s distance from the gods and spirits while showing them reverence” (Lau 1979, 84). “Keeping one’s distance”, in the context of the Wuxing, would mean maintaining formality in one’s interactions with the “gods and spirits” no matter what one’s inner mind might be causing one to feel. In this reading, there is no indication of what D. C. Lau calls Kongzi’s “agnostic” attitude to postmortem existence. Lau writes that “As far as survival after death is concerned, Confucius’s attitude can, at best, be described as agnostic” (1970, 12). See also Csikszentmihalyi 2002a, 149-53.

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six words of GD §16.3 (MWD §19.3) are repeated in §22 in a passage that begins with a description of the hierarchy of the body. Slips 45 and 46 of the Guodian version of the Wuxing read: ЫΑᄪʤ˾Լ˗‫˃˻ ږ‬Ӄʛ ˻̆੗ நಝʿ੗ ᎀ நಝʿᎀ න நಝʿන ݈ நಝʿ݈ ଴ நಝʿ଴ ଠ நಝʿଠ ֜۱ψ ψ۱െ The six (body parts), the eyes, ears, nose, mouth, hands and feet are all slave to the mind. When the mind says: “do this,” none dare but do it. “Do that,” and none dare but do it. “Go forward,” and none dare but go forward. “Go back,” and none dare but go back. “This is profound,” and none dare but take it to be profound. “This is trivial,” and none dare but take it to be trivial. When they harmonize, they become the same. When they become the same, then there is goodness. [§22.1-3]

The primacy of the mind in this passage recalls any number of early Chinese texts that explain how when the mind leads the body, actions will be healthy or moral, but if the body leads the mind, a person will follow desires to a bad outcome. What is interesting is how, based on the parallel in GD §15 (MWD §18), the body parts here appear to be used as an analogy for the way the human virtues need to harmonize in order to become perfected. The part of the analogy that is unclear is what the virtues are “slaves” to, and the answer would appear to be that sagacity is to the mind as the other virtues are to the sense organs of the body. Again, the human Way appears to be in some sense ancillary to the operation of tian’s Way, and the practice of goodness appears to be dependent on the sage. In addition to its basic exposition of a moral psychology, the second segment includes several passages that are independent expositions of the application of the virtues in different areas. Although the relationship between benevolence and righteousness in §20-22 draws on aspects of the description of these two virtues in GD §11-13 and GD §17-19 (MWD §10-12 and §14-16), it differs from the rest of the text in that these two virtues are treated in isolation from others. They are portrayed as a binary pair along the lines of yin and yang and are analyzed with respect to their applications to jurisprudence. Because this binary approach to these virtues is particularly influential in the Han, this section will be treated in more depth in chapter five. Another relatively independent portion is §23, which treats a set of four progressive methods of conveying an understanding of something:

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mu Α (seeing it), yu ఺ (drawing an analogy), pi ᙰ (comparing it), and ji ౦ (predicting it). The second segment ends on the same note as the first segment did, by turning to the important influence of the external “Way of the gentleman” on the development of the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, and ritual propriety. The final line of the Wuxing is: ႝЩᆪ‫ ږ‬Ϧᅭ‫ږ‬ʛ “One who hears the Way and is happy is one who loves virtue” [§25.4]. While it is impossible to know for certain the relation between the two segments of the Wuxing, they share many formal characteristics. Their structures are systematic on several nested levels, in a way that distinguishes them from most texts of the period. In this sense they might appear to fit the Xunzi’s description of them as inaccessible. Yet underlying its rare and different schematizations is a description of the mind, of the process of cultivating the virtues, and of the acting out of those virtues that is also unmatched in other texts of the period. The impulse behind creating such a technically detailed and precise description of the mechanics of moral development attests to the importance that must have attached to the project of locating the origins of moral action in the mind. The fundamental distinction between “acting” good, and authentically “acting out of” virtue was clearly of profound importance to the text’s composer. The argument that the Ru had ulterior motives for preaching virtue is addressed by the Wuxing’s claim that the initial impulse to virtue is internal and not subject to outside concerns. The “psychologizing” or “embodiment” of moral self cultivation implies that genuine virtue cannot be simulated because it is an observable physical process. Considered in isolation, the Wuxing’s moral psychology provides an example of the way ethics and the body were conceived in late fourth century B.C.E. China. In the context of the Ru virtue discourse, the Wuxing provides a way to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic actions, providing a rebuttal to some of the criticisms seen in chapter one. Yet, if this theory is the one that was criticized in the third century B.C.E., this raises the question why the “wuxing” theory became an object of the criticism in the Xunzi.

The identification of the Wuxing and the Zisi myth The fact that two versions of the Wuxing–one with a partial commentary–have been excavated from early tombs in the last several

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decades suggests that it was a widely circulated text in early China. Yet it is not listed in the earliest bibliographies and there are no attributed quotations of it in other early texts. This has sparked intense interest in question, who was the author of the text. The most popular current answer to that question is that Zisi ʪ‫݋‬, the grandson of Kongzi, wrote the Wuxing. Noted scholars such as Li Xueqin Өዕ෺ and Jiang Guanghui ‫ܟ‬ᅩቨ have ascribed not only the Wuxing to Zisi or to his “school,” but have also credited them with the production of a number of other received texts and manuscripts discovered at Guodian.41 These scholars, along with almost all contemporary writers, primarily identify Zisi as the grandson of Kongzi. In this section, I will show why such conclusions are at least in part wrong. In order to make this case, several contentious issues surrounding the identification of the Wuxing must be treated in detail. It is true that these issues are not central to an understanding of the content of the text. The fascinating complexity of the Wuxing and its clear parallels with certain received texts may be appreciated without worrying about who wrote it or why it was condemned and then eventually disappeared from the transmitted record. Nevertheless, much attention has also been paid to the authorship and pedigree of the text, and such considerations do have the potential to situate it with respect to the received tradition. Depending on their tolerance for Sinological detail, readers may choose to read the following short summary and then turn to chapter three, or continue and explore the transmission of the Wuxing and its relation to the evolving biography of Zisi. The first section of this chapter explored the Xunzi’s condemnation of a “wuxing” thesis associated with Zisi and Mengzi. It is unlikely that the condemnation was unconnected to a text entitled Wuxing that has significant overlap with the received Mengzi. But the implications of this connection have not been properly worked out because the Zisi named in the Xunzi is mistakenly identified with the Zisi of later history, 41 Li Xueqin, writing in a special issue of Zhongguo zhexue ˀ੢࢖ዕ (Chinese Philosophy) devoted to the bamboo slips discovered at Guodian, attributes the Wuxing to a Zisi “school” that is also responsible for the Guodian texts “Ziyi”, Liude ˗ᅭ, Cheng zhi wen zhi Ͼ˃ႝ˃, Zun deyi ౚᅭ໳, as well as the “Daxue” ʨዕ and “Zhongyong” chapters of the Liji. Since the publication of Li’s piece, it has become generally accepted that “Cheng zhi wen zhi” is actually two separate texts. Jiang Guanghui has gone further in ascribing those pieces directly to Zisi, along with a number of other works excavated at Guodian, such as Qiongda yi shi ᇴཥ̣इ (Frustration and Success are a Function of the Age), Tang Yu zhi dao ࢑༗˃ལ (The Way of Tang and Yu), and Xing zi ming chu ‫׷‬б̳֡. See Li Xueqin 1999, 15-17; Jiang Guanghui 1999.

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a composite character that resulted from Liu Xiang’s ᄸ ώ (79-8 B.C.E.) efforts to straighten out conflicting references to Zisi and rewrite pre-imperial chronologies. Conflation of several different figures under the single name “Zisi,” and the myriad attempts to iron out the historical contradictions that resulted from it have caused the misapprehension that the pre-imperial Zisi (associated in the Xunzi with the “five kinds of action”) was a blood relation of Kongzi. By untangling the threads of the Zisi myth, it becomes clear that this was not the case and that the connection between Zisi and the Wuxing is not one of simple authorship, but is instead a product of attempts to authorize a particular approach to the teachings of Kongzi. This argument hinges on separating out what the authors of the Xunzi were trying to do by delegitimating the claims of followers of Zisi and Mengzi from what later writers were trying to do by attributing certain speeches, attitudes and ideas to Zisi. These were two very different projects, not least because the connotations of the name “Zisi” evolved as they were being carried out. Let us first turn to the meaning of the Xunzi’s criticisms, and then to the evolution of the figure Zisi. The first question regarding the Xunzi is whether or not the referent of the Xunzi’s criticism of the “wuxing” theory is also the basis of the two recently discovered editions of the Wuxing. In the centuries since the Wuxing disappeared from the record, the meaning of Xunzi’s phrase “Taking examples from the past, they created a theory, naming it ‘wuxing’” appears to have passed out of cultural memory. Commentators on the Xunzi’s denunciation almost never understood the phrase to refer, as it does in the excavated texts, to five kinds of action associated with the five virtues of benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, ritual propriety, and sagacity. The Xunzi’s reference might have been to the title of a text, but no such title appears in the comprehensive bibliography that was part of the Eastern Han Hanshu ်ए. As a result, most commentators identified the Xunzi’s “Wuxing” as a conceptual reference. When the Tang commentator Yang Liang ๫᱈ explained the Xunzi’s use of phrase “Wuxing” he identified it as the wuchang ˉ ગ (five constants): the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, ritual propriety, and trustworthiness (xin ‫)ۑ‬. Later writers generally followed Yang’s lead. In the twentieth century, Zhang Taiyan connected the wuchang with the wuxing that are sometimes translated as “five elements” or “five phases”: shui ̐ (water), huo ̑ (fire), mu ̈ (wood), jin ‫( ہ‬metal), and tu ʥ (earth). Zhang cites Zheng Xuan’s commentary to the “Zhongyong” as an example of the connection

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between the wuchang and the “five phases” wuxing.42 Other writers assumed that the “wuxing” did refer to a text.43 Soon after the publication of the first of the two discoveries of the Wuxing, Pang Pu made the connection between the Mawangdui text and the Xunzi criticism. Pang’s main proofs were 1) the close connection between the use of specialized language in excavated manuscripts and the Mengzi demonstrated by shared passages, which appears to replicate the connection between “wuxing” theory and the Mengzi in the Xunzi’s criticism; and 2) similarities between the systematization of the virtues in the Mengzi and in the Wuxing. Although the view that the Xunzi’s criticism of a “wuxing” theory associated with Mengzi and Zisi refers to the excavated text Wuxing has not been universally accepted, there are strong arguments that both instances of that phrase refer to the same thing. There are two particular areas in which the direct connection between the two has been contested. Did the “wuxing” theory in the Xunzi mean the same thing that the phrase does in the excavated Wuxing manuscripts (i.e., benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, ritual propriety, and sagacity) rather than the wuchang or the “five phases” wuxing? The most cogent criticism of Pang’s analysis has been that of Kageyama Terukuni 影 山 輝 国 . Kageyama argues first that in third and second century B.C.E. texts, the phrase “wuxing” most often refers to the “five phases” and further that there are still other possible meanings besides those elaborated in the excavated Wuxing manuscripts. The word xing was widely used to refer to the external expression of internal states, such as the military wuxing of rou ‫( ݾ‬yieldingness), gang ࢉ (firmness), ren (benevolence), xin (trustworthiness), and yong ۲ (courage) in the Huainanzi “Binglue” ѡୖ (Military strategies) chapter; or the wuxing of filial piety outlined by the disciple Zengzi in the Lüshi chunqiu “Xiaoxing” Ҩм (Filial actions) chapter: zhuang ப (dignity), zhong ‫( ׫‬loyalty), jing ๖ 42 Zhang Taiyan, in his “Zisi Meng Ke wuxing shuo” ʪ‫ׂ݋‬ඩˉмი (An explanation of Zisi and Meng Ke’s ‘wuxing’), a section of Taiyan wenlu chubian ˯٬ ́Ꭸ‫ڶ‬ሆ (1958, 8a). 43 In his Xunzi buzhu ৖ʪ༩ٌ, Liu Taigong ᄸ͓‫( ݤ‬1751-1805) argued that the centrality of the wuchang was so generally accepted by the early Ru that the gloss in Yang Liang’s commentary had to be wrong. Instead, Liu argued, there must have been a “wuxing” theory in the Mengzi pertaining solely to the “five phases” that had been the subject of one of the four chapters that its editor Zhao Qi ღҴ (d. 201 C.E.) admitted to editing out. See Kageyama (1985, 86-7). Another possible argument along these lines would be that the reference is to a second Mengzi text—a “military” text with an emphasis on yinyang thought—which likely made quite a bit of use of the “five phases”. See Hanshu 30.1760.

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(reverence), du ፄ (fidelity), and yong (courage).44 Further, the homology to the wuxing in the political/historical sphere, which in connection with the Warring States writer Zou Yan ㊲࠯ is called the wude ˉ ᅭ , was also a possible referent of the Xunzi’s diatribe. Kageyama points out that two descriptions of Zou Yan in Han dynasty sources link him to the Ru and to the virtues of benevolence and righteousness.45 Taken as a whole, Kageyama’s citations effectively show that there was a wealth of associations with the term wuxing. Kageyama’s second argument builds on an observation by Li Yaoxian Өᙟ̫ that in both the Mengzi and the Wuxing, the five virtues are related in other ways: the virtues of ren and yi are anterior to other sets of virtues, and wisdom and sagacity are singled out as a binary pair independent of the others.46 More recently, Ding Sixin ʀ͗๘ has developed Kageyama’s arguments in a different direction, ultimately arguing that the Wuxing is not connected with Zisi.47 Kageyama does a good job of raising other possibilities for the identification of the term wuxing, but his arguments are all built on the assumption of a rigid distinction between the different meanings of wuxing. If later natural cycles theory is any guide, then the fact that there are distinctions between concrete instances of wuxing in different spheres does not necessarily mean that these are applications of different meanings of wuxing. There are other more specific arguments in favor of connecting the Xunzi’s criticism with texts that have recently come out of the ground. If the overlap between the Hanshi waizhuan and the excavated Wuxing (discussed at greater length in subsequent chapters) is the reason that the Xunzi’s criticisms were expunged by Han Ying, this suggests that Han Ying made the same identification of the Wuxing text with the subject of the excised criticism. Perhaps the most significant point against Kageyama’s arguments is Pang’s original observation that the link between the Mengzi and the phrase wuxing in the Xunzi is confirmed by a number of direct parallels between the Mengzi and the excavated Wuxing texts. More generally, if the subject of Xunzi’s criticism had been a “five phases” wuxing unconnected to the excavated manuscripts, that would mean that it just so happened that there was another theory with the same name that was closely connected to the Mengzi, also now lost. 44

See Huainan honglie jijie 15.515, Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi 14.732 (cf. Knoblock and Riegel 2000, [14/1.3] 303), and Kageyama 1985, 101. 45 Kageyama 1985, 104-5 and 110. 46 Kageyama 1985, 106-9, see also Li Yaoxian 1981. 47 Ding’s arguments are treated at greater length in chapter five.

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These are all reasons to accept Pang Pu’s identification of the “wuxing” in the Xunzi criticism with the excavated Wuxing. Perhaps the clearest reason to identify the excavated Wuxing as the object of the Xunzi’s scorn, however, is the way that the text matches the revisionist position of the Xunzi itself. In the Xunzi, The “base Ru” caricatured in the essay “Fei shi’er zi” ‫ۍ‬ʏʅʪ (Condemning the twelve masters) are members of the traditions associated with three of Kongzi’s disciples: Zizhang ʪઠ, Zixia ʪࢬ, and Ziyou ʪ೑. In each case, the shortcomings of members of the group are evident from their demeanor and speech. Zizhang’s base Ru are described in this way: ҿ‫ۅ‬մ۪ Ḫⷸմᘂ ߮мЩ൘ᒲ “Hats disintegrating, phrases fluid, they walk like Yu and hurry like Shun.”48 The impression of these Ru is of a self-conscious archaicism. By contrast, Zixia’s base Ru could be distinguished by the way they: ͸մн۪ ᄫմᖄи ⎧೸Щஉ̅ ʿԵ “Straighten their clothes and hat, even out their facial coloration and countenance, and modestly go the whole day without speaking.”49 These Ru are concerned with piety, seemingly in juxtaposition to the base Ru of Zizhang. The descriptions of these two pale by comparison to that of Ziyou’s base Ru: ਵኵᅾՖ ೷ฬ࣠Щপ෢࡚ ͫ̆Ѽʪ֣ ʿ·ʍ “Lazy and weak, they shirk participation in affairs. They have neither integrity nor shame, but crave drink and food, and without fail say: ‘Gentlemen never use their strength.’”50 The base Ru of Ziyou are gluttonous and shirk hard work, claiming that exertion is forbidden to the gentleman. These three caricatures may not describe all the followers of these three early disciples of Kongzi, but perhaps show the 48 Lu Wenchao ጰ́ᦞ (1717-1796) likens the phrase dituo ҿ‫ ۅ‬to tuimi ҿᘚ in Huzi’s ౌʪ words to Liezi λʪ in Zhuangzi 7 “Ying diwang” ᏻܹ̙: ϕ̣޴ ҿᘚ ϕ̣޴ٕ‫“ ޟ‬For that reason, he thought he was tuimi; for that reason, he thought he was being buffeted by waves,” (Xunzi jijie 3.104). In that context, Guo Xiang ௱ඐ explains it with the phrase ᜵ˢᏄᘚ “transforming and disintegrating,” reading the phrase as tuimi Ꮔᘚ. See Zhuangzi jijie 3b.305. Yang Liang reads the phrase chongdan Ḫⷸ as chongdan Ԅጓ “light, dilute” and hence “tranquil”. See Xunzi jijie 3.104. Knoblock (1988, v.1, p. 229) reads ci ᘂ as a graphic error for yi ༧ and translates the phrase “their robes billowing and flowing”. It is not clear whether or not “walking like Yu” is related to later stylized performances of the “pace of Yu” (Yu bu ߮Ӵ) in contexts associated with shamanism and healing. 49 Yang Liang reads qie ␂ “satisfied” for qian ⎧. Hao Yixing ਋ᛯм (17571825) reads it as qian ᒣ “modest”. See Xunzi jijie 3.105. 50 Xunzi jijie 3.104. The term yuru ਵኵ is used earlier in the chapter, where Yang Liang says it means: “improperly avoiding the hard work in a given situation”. He is clearly relying on the prior use of the term in the “Xiushen” ࡸԽ chapter: డࠚ˃Ֆ ۱ਵኵᕢ஘ “if there is hard labor then one is lazy and weak, and passes it on so as to get out of it” which is contrasted to డࠚ˃Ֆ۱‫ٱ‬ζ “if there is hard labor then one competes to be the first [to do it]” (Xunzi jijie 1.29). Sun Yirang notes the similarity of this critique with one in the “Fei Ru” section of the Mozi, see Mozi xiangu 9.180.

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particular ways that the practices promoted by each disciple tradition might be exploited or caricatured. These descriptions are followed by the contrasting ideal of a person “who could become a sage” in the Xunzi. Such a person: ѝЩʿ౹ డЩʿ⎗ ‫ࢍׅ‬ᏻ᜵ Їદմ‫׈‬ “When at ease he is not idle, when laboring he is not sluggish. He respects the origin while responding to changes, everywhere attains what is proper.”51 The contrast between the external orientation of the “base Ru”, with their stylized dress and constrained expressions, and the true gentleman explicitly interested in issues of origins and change, and implicitly in the control of his desires, is marked. In both tone and substance, these criticisms are similar to ones found in another section of the Xunzi. The “Ruxiao” ኵं (Efficacy of the Ru) chapter abandons the defense of some aspects of the Ru legacy, and accepts the truth of many criticisms of the Ru as being true of some but not all Ru. As in the “Fei shi’er zi”, “Ruxiao” distinguishes between different levels of Ru, extolling the “great Ru” (da Ru ʨኵ) and attributing many of the same derogatory characteristics to the lower levels of Ru. The “Ruxiao” description of the “common Ru” draws on many of the same charges leveled against the Ru in the Mozi, even while it criticizes such Ru for adhering to a doctrine similar to the Mozi: ௬нଠઘ ༱‫س‬մ۪ ୖٗζ̙ЩԼ෩̛ி ᑢዕᕺᒃ ʿ‫̙݈ٗڈ‬Щ ɾվܾ ʿ‫ڈ‬ාᔩ໳Щଓ༶ए մн۪мਨʵψ‫۞̛ؠ‬ԡ ೸Щʿ‫ڈ‬ ౱ մԵᙯሾიʵ೷୙‫ؠ‬ኳʪԡ ೸Щ‫ا‬ʿ঻Ѥ ֘ζ̙̣ೇา‫ږ‬Щ Ӷн࡚ା ‫۞ݵ‬ኵ‫ږ‬ʛ They wear loose clothes tied with broad sashes, wrapping their head covering loosely.52 They model themselves somewhat on the Former Kings, enough to disorder the techniques of the age. Studying in a mistaken way and raising sundry points, they know neither to model themselves on the Later Kings so as to unify governing measures, nor to place more emphasis on ritual and social obligation and less on the 51

Xunzi jijie 3.104. The concluding phrase qu de qi yi Їદմ‫“ ׈‬everywhere attains what is proper” is the opposite of the phrase qu shi qi yi Ї͛մ‫“ ׈‬everywhere loses what is proper” in the “Qingyu” શ଒ chapter of the Lüshi chunqiu, where the phrase refers to the loss of physical equilibrium in the body when a ruler gives in to his desires. That passage concludes about such a ruler: մ‫ٵؠ‬ʛ ʿ̈́દ˃޴଒ ʿ̈́Լ ˃޴Ӷ ʨ͛Άʹ “[His attitude] towards external things is that he desires those he cannot get, and seeks those that will not satisfy him, and so greatly mistakes the basics of life.” See Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi 2.84 (cf. Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 84). 52 Knoblock reads jie guo ༱‫ س‬as xieluo ᗨᒘ as “crab-snail cap” (Knoblock, v.2, 287-8, n.82). Xie refers to a crab, and luo can be a spiral shell. In the Shuoyuan, Chunyu Kun ଙʝྣ contrasts lowlands suitable for the growing of many kinds of grains to the xieluo ᗨẺ only suitable for growing millet, implying that the earth there is less densely packed (Shuoyuan jiaozheng 6.18a).

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classics of the Odes and Documents. Their clothing and hats, actions and artifice, have become the same as the common people of the age, however they fail to understand its ugliness. Their theories and arguments, discussions and persuasions, have become no different from the Mozi, however they do not understand that they are identical. They extol the Former Kings in order to deceive the stupid and so seek clothing and food from them. . . This describes the common Ru.53

The tropes of this passage are similar to those seen in the “Fei Ru” essay discussed above in chapter one) from the Mozi, and indeed, according to the Xunzi, the common Ru are entirely motivated by material gain. Their emphasis on their archaic dress, a trope seen in the the Mozi and the Zhuangzi, implies a superficial attachment to the ancient customs. Their inability to “unify governing measures” indicates they are not educated enough to perceive differences between the ancient customs and those of the Later Kings (houwang ݈̙). One level higher than the common Ru in the taxonomy of Ru in the “Ruxiao” are the “elegant Ru” (ya Ru ුኵ). Elegant Ru are superior in many ways, including the fact that they: ාᔩ໳Щଓ༶ए “place more emphasis on ritual and social obligation and less on the classics of the Odes and Documents.” Here we see the Xunzi’s internalization of outside critiques of the Ru, and their deployment against what it portrays as renegade Ru. In criticizing numerous Ru subtraditions, the Xunzi privileges those that put public ceremony first and disparages those that place other approaches ahead of it. Unlike the followers of Zixia who silently “even out their facial coloration and countenance”, the great Ru put ritual first. The Xunzi acknowledges that there are multiple aspects of the Ru tradition, saying that not all the sayings of Kongzi or the Duke of Zhou are genuine, and arguing that only the example of the Later Kings is to be followed since the legacy of the Former Kings (xianwang ζ̙) cannot be reliably known.54 Common Ru mistakenly “model 53 Xunzi jijie 4.138-9 (cf. Knoblock, v. 2, 79-80). The excerpted section is particularly similar to the Mozi’s critique above: દִጻԼ̣↍մʤ ۱ಙಙϨʛ Ꮂ մ‫ۂ‬ʪ Ֆմ‫۔‬ཟ ᒃմʕ‫ ܯ‬ᄬ೸ࠜஉԽ˃༘ЩʿಝЉ̧ӆ “If they are able to be put in charge of stored goods sufficient to feed their own mouths, then they are satisfied. They follow their Eldest Master, serve convenient oligarchs, and prize eminent guests. They are content to spend their whole lives as captives and do not dare to have other aspirations.” 54 The former concession allows him to disavow several historical narratives he saw contributing to inconsistencies in the Ru message, and the latter one allows him internalize and thereby neutralize arguments based on the inevitability of degradation of the knowledge of the past. Both these caveats are part of “Ruxiao”, see Xunxi jijie 4.134-7 (cf. Knoblock, v. 2, 77-8) and 4.138 (cf. Knoblock, v. 2, 79). That “Ruxiao” is

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themselves somewhat on the Former Kings” and, along with the “base Ru”, erroneously place the Odes and Documents ahead of ritual practice. This aspect of the Xunzi’s revisionism matches well with the critique of the followers of Zisi, who “rely on elaborateness of language”. It clearly also applies to the discovered Wuxing manuscripts, which rely heavily on a form of Odes exegesis in their arguments. Their content is good example of “singing” words attributed to the former kings, corroborating the identification of the Xunzi’s criticism with the excavated Wuxing. In this light, the Xunzi’s criticism was a part of his project of distinguishing between different threads of the Ru tradition. But it is also important to note what the Xunzi does not say. The Xunzi nowhere identifies Zisi as either the grandson of Kongzi or as the author of the Wuxing. Since, like Mengzi, Zisi “sang” the words of the gentleman, Zisi is understood to have been an interpreter or forger. No direct personal connection to Kongzi is stated or implied. Indeed, it may be argued that if the author of the criticism had thought of Zisi as having a personal connection with Kongzi, then his attack on the authenticity of “wuxing” theory would have had to take that connection into account. Yet this omission is consistent with other works of the period, because in texts written prior to or contemporary with the Xunzi, there is no direct connection made between Zisi and Kongzi. The silence about a direct kinship connection is as characteristic of pre-imperial portrayals of Zisi as the mention of such a connection is in the Eastern Han. Stories about Zisi show that fourth and third century B.C.E. pictures of Zisi are significantly different from portrayals of him in early imperial texts. This is especially significant because there has been a tendency to accept many elements of early imperial identifications and retroproject them on both the partisan positions sketched in the Xunzi, and even on the composition of the Wuxing and other “Zisi texts”. By looking carefully at the development of portraits of Zisi in received and excavated texts, it is possible to separate out the elements of the Zisi myth into several stages of development.55 For readers interested in particular Zisi stories, the first appendix to this volume includes a composite is indicated by the fact that at one point it argues all Ru “model on the Former Kings”, while at another it faults “common Ru” for making that mistakecompare 4.117 (cf. Knoblock, v. 2, 69) to 4.138 (cf. Knoblock, v. 2, 79). 55 Here, I am using the term “myth” not to indicate there was never a person or persons by that name, but rather to emphasize that what we have access is to is not definitive information about his biography, but rather a diachronic slideshow of constructions of that biography. Since this venture requires detours that have little to do with the idea of material virtue, a fuller version will appear in a separate publication.

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translations of the relevant section of Huang Yizhou’s ෦̣֟ (18281899) reconstruction of the lost Zisizi ʪ‫݋‬ʪ text. Here, I will argue that these stories demonstrate that Liu Xiang conflated a number of different identifications of Zisi in the Han dynasty, and that there is little indication that the identification of Zisi as the grandson of Kongzi existed before the Han. The earliest layer of Zisi-related stories is made up of late Warring States texts that use the name Zisi, including references in the Guodian text Lu Mugong wen Zisi ኬጽ˙੕ʪ‫݋‬, the Mengzi, and the Han Feizi. These texts portray Zisi as a minister, almost always to Duke Mu ጽ of Lu. He is both loyal and fastidious about ritual, and above all scathingly direct in his responses to his patrons. The central motif of most of these stories is Zisi’s direct remonstration to Duke Mu about the proper treatment of ministers, a feature that is both held up as an ideal in some texts and vehemently criticized in others. So, in one Guodian text, when Zisi tells Duke Mu that: ‫ݔ‬ၳմѼ˃౱‫̈́ ږ‬ᎂ‫׫‬ аԡ “One who is constant in balancing the lord’s hatreds may be called a loyal minister,” the Duke takes offence.56 It is notable that in none of these stories is Zisi explicitly or implicitly related to Kongzi, either as a disciple or descendent.57 By contrast, in early imperial stories about Zisi, his moral authority is grounded in his direct connection to Kongzi either as his grandson or as a direct disciple. A second layer of stories about Zisi comprises dialogs from the Han collections Liji, Shiji and Kongcongzi. These sources identify the name Zisi either as Kong Ji ˱β, whose expertise in ritual matters such as the fine points of the mourning rites is due to his personal experience with Kong family practices, or as Kongzi’s reclusive disciple Yuan Xian ࢍዙ, whose withdrawal from official service confirms his understanding of Kongzi’s message. In both cases, the locus of authority has shifted from behaviors to a direct connection with Kongzi, and a privileged understanding of his message. The “Jiwen” ৩ ੕  (Recorded Questions) chapter of the Eastern Han Kongcongzi contains dialogs between Zisi and his venerated grandfather. An example finds Kongzi sighing and young Zisi intuiting 56

Jingmenshi bowuguan 1998, 141. For a detailed analysis see Li Chenglu Ө‫݆؀‬ 1999a. 57 There is one story that might be seen as a Warring States exception to this, which is the curious case of “Kong Si” ˱‫ ݋‬in the third century B.C.E. Lüshi chunqiu. This story fits the profile of the Warring States Zisi stories, but the anachronistic nature of the formulation “Kong Si” is evidence that the presence in the story of both the names of Zisi and Duke Mu are later alterations.

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why his grandfather sighed. Zisi repeatedly clasps his hands together in reverence. He then asks his grandfather if the reason is ำʪࢽʿࡸ અ‫ת‬অ̢ ⊤ూ൘˃ལ‫ݒ‬ʿ˪̢ “because you think that if sons and grandsons do not cultivate themselves they will disgrace their ancestors, or because you regret you cannot reach up to the Way of Yao and Shun?” When pressed on the origins of his insight, Zisi says that he thinks back on his grandfather’s statement that: մ̓‫ؾ‬ᒅ մʪͪџ ࠷ம ‫ݵ‬ᎂʿԨ “if the father chops wood, but his son is not able to bear it on his back, this is called ‘unworthy’.” This reassures his grandfather, who praises Zisi by saying: ̛ʿᅥ๣ մџ ‫“ ̢ؤ‬A generation that does not set aside its occupation will succeed in flourishing.”58 This dialog depicts two important things about Zisi. First, he is capable of addressing his grandfather in the ritually correct way and is perhaps as much a prodigy in this area as the young Kongzi had been. Second, Zisi clearly received the endorsement of his grandfather as the member of his generation who represents its best chance for flourishing. The story, then, functions to valorize the name Zisi by connecting it to the venerable name Kongzi and making Zisi his direct descendant. A related set of stories in Warring States and Han texts treat the disciple Yuan Xian, whose style name was Zisi, and these stories appear to have been conflated with stories about Kongzi’s grandson by Liu Xiang. In several third through first century B.C.E. sources, Yuan Xian is portrayed as a disciple concerned with shame (in Analects 14.1), and as a reclusive disciple who understands that it is shameful to accept payment from rulers who do not have the Way.59 Several references in the Western Han indicate that both Kong Ji and Yuan Xian were identified as Zisi during that period.60 Liu Xiang then complicated issues by reworking Yuan Xian style narratives to be about Kong Ji. In the “Lijie” Θ໢ chapter of the first century B.C.E. Shuoyuan, Liu 58

Kongcongzi 1.19b-20a (cf. Ariel 1989, 98 [6.1]). These narratives are found in the “Rangwang” ᝖̙ chapter of the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi jishi 9b.975-7 [cf. Graham 1981, 228-9]); Hanshi waizhuan ᓟ༶͙෭ (c. 150 B.C.E., Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng 1.203-5 [cf. Hightower 1952, [1.9] 19-21]); Shiji “Zhong Ni dizi liezhuan” (c. 100 B.C.E., Shiji 67.2208); and Xinxu ๘Һ “Jieshi” ໢ʦ (c. 24 B.C.E., Xinxu jiaoshi 7.918-24). 60 One example is the Shiji. There, references to Zisi in the “Kongzi shijia” ˱ʪ̛ ࣁ chapter of the Shiji are unambiguously to Kong Ji, who is identified as the son of Kongzi’s son Boyu їఌ, and as author of the “Zhongyong,” (Shiji 47.1946). The references to Zisi in the “Zhong Ni dizi liezhuan” Ϋ͠ҿʪλ෭ chapter of the Shiji are unambiguously to Yuan Xian, inserting “Zisi asked,” and “Zisi said,” in front of the two Yuan Xian dialogs that constitute Analects 14.1, and following this with a dialog between Yuan Xian and Zigong (Shiji 67.2207). 59

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effectively transformed the narrative about a first generation disciple “Zisi” (i.e., Yuan Xian) into one about a second generation disciple “Zisi” (i.e., Kong Ji).61 The reason for Liu’s conflation of these two figures is complicated and has to do with both chronology and canon formation, but this conflation has had an important effect on all subsequent understandings of Zisi. Instead of treating the Zisi who advised Duke Mu of Lu of Warring States stories separately from Kong Ji the grandson of Kongzi in Han stories, despite the difference in their claims to authority, the dominant view has been that the two characters are one. Separating these two threads has interesting implications for understanding the Xunzi’s comments and for the phenomenon of attribution of texts to Zisi in general. First, it calls into question the image of Zisi as a branch on a tree whose trunk is Kongzi. When the Xunzi criticized Zisi and Mengzi, it implies that their interpretation of Kongzi is groundless, a position that might be seen as a partisan attack on the assertion that Zisi had a special connection with Kongzi.62 Perhaps the position of which the Xunzi is critical, seen above to include an emphasis on the Odes and Documents at the expense of ritual, is connected with the practices of reclusion and rejection of material gain associated with Warring States stories about Zisi the blunt advisor of Duke Mu of Lu. There are several aspects of the text of the Wuxing, with its emphasis on Odes exegesis, self-cultivation as if “in solitude”, and the subordination of ritual propriety to a higher ideal associated with tian, that would fit quite well with such a connection. By criticizing the attempt by a Zisi/Mengzi faction to ground their claims in the authority of Kongzi, the Xunzi provides the first record of the shift that culminated in the conflation of diverse Zisi traditions under the banner of Kong Ji in the Han. It is difficult to relate this shift to later attributions of texts to Zisi. The attributions of the “Zhongyong” and “Daxue” ʨዕ chapters of the Liji to Zisi also appear in relatively late texts and so have also been subject to debate.63 The Shiji records that Zisi wrote the “Zhongyong,” 61

Shuoyuan 4.3b-4a. The reason for the Xunzi’s criticism might then have to do with Xunzi’s acceptance of an official position at a feudal court, or might have to do with the political implications of the Wuxing explored in chapter four. This dovetails with the direct and indirect criticisms of positions in the Mengzi that dot sections of the Xunzi. 63 For example, Zhu Xi accepted the idea that Zisi wrote the “Zhongyong” but held that the disciple Zengzi ಫʪ wrote the “Daxue.” In his eyes, these attributions were a vital part of his chronological justification for the centrality of the “Four Books,” based on the idea that each of the four was written in a different generation and represented a 62

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a work that has been transmitted to the present day as chapter 28 of the Liji, and which was elevated to part of the Song canon by Zhu Xi.64 The attribution of the “Zhongyong” also appears in a Suishu ෌ए (History of the Sui) “Yinyue zhi, shang” ࡖᆪӆʕ (Treatise on Music, part 1) discussion of the origins of writings about ritual and music extant in the Jin dynasty. Shen Yue Ӻ߽ (441–513 C.E.) argues that many works were ‫ ۍ‬໶ ʆ ˃ Ե “not the words of the Sage.” Specifically, Shen argues that the Liji “Zhongyong;” Liji chapter 27, “Fangji” Ґ৩ (Records of Dykes); Liji chapter 29, “Biaoji” ‫ڷ‬৩ (Record of Standards); and Liji chapter 31, “Ziyi” ႗н (Black Robes) were taken from the Zisizi.65 Modern scholars such as Jiang Boqian have argued that the attribution of fragments of these chapters to Zisizi in Tang collections and commentaries substantiates Shen Yue’s assertion, but since Shen Yue’s statement came first, this is not conclusive.66 Since Warring States texts generally circulated without authorial attribution, the relatively late association of Zisi’s name with the title of his oeuvre make speaking with certainty about his authorship impossible. Yet it is clear that Shen Yue’s criticism is as stage in the transmission of the Way. So Kongzi’s expression of the Way is in the Analects, followed by Zengzi’s “Daxue”, Zisi’s “Zhongyong”, and finally Mengzi’s Mengzi. See Zhongyong zhangju 15. 64 Shiji 47.1946. 65 Suishu 13.288. The Zisi is a collection that circulated in the Han and later came to be known as the Zisizi (Master Zisi). This collection existed in the late first century B.C.E., or the first century C.E., when Liu Xiang and his son Liu Xin were compiling a bibliography at the directive of the emperor. That bibliography was the basis of the catalog that forms chapter 30 of the Hanshu, which lists a Zisi in 23 pian in the “Ru” subsection of the “Masters” (zhuzi ቂʪ) section, and notes Ϗβ˱ʪࢽ޴ኬᑢ˙ࣖ “his given name was Ji, he was Kongzi’s grandson, and he served as teacher to Duke Mu of Lu,” (Hanshu 30.1724). Some later bibliographies included in standard histories compiled through the 11th century include references to the longer title Zisizi, and the length of the text is given as seven or eight juan rather than 23 pian. Wei Zheng’s ᖒᅮ (580-643) History of the Sui (Suishu ෌ए) lists it as containing seven juan, which were ኬጽ˙ࣖ˱βᆊ “selected by Duke Mu’s teacher Kong Ji,” (Suishu 34.997). Liu Xu’s ᄸນ (887-946) Jiu Tangshu ᕄ࢑ए Older History of the Tang) lists it in eight juan, and as ˱βᆊ “selected by Kong Ji,” (Jiu Tangshu 47.2024) while Ouyang Xiu’s ᆮ෍ࡸ (1007-1072) Xin Tangshu ๘࢑ए Newer History of the Tang) lists it in seven juan, tersely attributing it to “Kong Ji,” (Xin Tangshu 59.1510). Yet whether these references are to the Han Zisi is cast into doubt by Wang Yinglin’s statement in his “Han ‘Yiwenzhi’ kaozheng” ်ᗟ́ӆШᗱ: “Today’s edition is a single juan, is fashioned of the words and actions of Zisi borrowed from the Kongcongzi, and is not the original Zisizi,” (Weng zhu Kunxue jiwen 5.2a). If the Zisizi edition Wang saw in the Song dynasty was derived from the Kongcongzi, this raises the question of whether other medieval citations of the Zisizi had the same origin. 66 Jiang Boqian 1985, 327. In Appendix One, selections 1-3 have parallels in the “Zhongyong”, 5-6 in the “Biaoji”, and 7-9 in the transmitted “Ziyi” (but only partially in the recently excavated version, see notes to selections 7-9).

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much a matter of rejecting the association of the texts with Kongzi as it is an effort to prove an association with Zisi. It is clear that there was a third century B.C.E. debate between those who held that the theory of the “Five Kinds of Action,” and likely the Wuxing text itself, originated with Kongzi, while other sources like the Xunzi said that it was actually created by Zisi and Mengzi. To conclude from the existence of this debate that the grandson of Kongzi wrote the Wuxing, however, is to mistake partisan claims for historical reality. This is not to say that it is impossible that the textual attributions being made in the third century were correct, but rather that there are good reasons to be cautious about accepting them. By outlining patterns in the historical development of the Zisi myth, this section does not claim to definitively solve the riddles of the origin of the Wuxing and the authorship of other early texts associated with Zisi. Instead, it seeks to clarify several questions that must be answered prior to formulating such a solution. First, what is the actual historical relationship between the Wuxing and other early texts? The assumed relationships between grandfather Kongzi and grandson Zisi (and later teacher Zisi and student Mengzi) defines one possible relationship between the texts. But this answer has two major problems. Generally, assuming that the texts in question are the unified and coherent works of particular historical figures is no longer an acceptable approach to Warring States texts. In particular, the historical argument above indicates that the genealogical connection between Kongzi and Zisi was likely a later construction. So the answer to this textual question should not be simply an extension of received biographical guides. A second question concerns the nature of the connection between the characteristics attributed to Zisi in early narratives, and the content of texts attributed to him. As we have seen, there are several different types of Zisi narrative, some that are close to the content of the Wuxing, and others that are not. If the moral psychology of the Wuxing was the product of a Ru position associated with interpretation of the Odes and practices of reclusion and the rejection of payment, this would have significant implications for understanding this strand of the early history of the Ru. The Zisi myth is also connected to the subsequent history of the Ru through the figure of Mengzi. According to the earliest biography of Meng Ke, compiled around 100 B.C.E. by Sima Qian, he was a student of a second-generation student (i.e, menren ‫ۃ‬ʆ, literally “one who

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learned at the gate”) of Zisi.67 In the Eastern Han period, however, several other sources began to assert that Meng Ke was himself a student of Zisi.68 Despite the presence of dialogs between Mengzi and Zi Si in Han texts such as Kong congzi, Qing dynasty scholars such as Zhan Jingfeng གದᄨ (1519-1602) have made detailed studies of the question of the historical relationship between the two early thinkers and on the basis of chronology tend to support the view that Mengzi was at most an indirect disciple of Zisi. Zhan’s conclusions are consistent with the above arguments that Liu Xiang and the Kong congzi had to change the chronology to make stories about an advisor to Duke Mu of Lu and/or first generation disciple of Kongzi called “Zisi” into ones about Kongzi’s grandson Kong Ji. This would also have entailed eliminating a generation between Zisi and Mengzi, which is exactly what happened. A more precise account of the origins of the Wuxing will likely remain elusive because of the difficulties inherent in relating textual attribution and biography. When the Xunzi says of “wuxing” theory that “Zisi sang it and Mengzi provided harmony for it,” it relates the two sages in a sequence. The actual chronological relationship between the Wuxing and the Mengzi may remain impossible to characterize for several reasons, including the myriad problems that arise in trying to compare the ages of excavated versus received texts. Yet the close relationship between the two texts based both on textual parallels and on shared central concerns is undeniable. In the next chapter, many of the same themes about moral motivation and the nature of the virtues seen to be central to the Wuxing will be revisited in more depth, with an eye to showing how the discovery of the Wuxing can clarify and refocus our understanding of the moral theory of one of the cardinal texts of East Asian civilization, the Mengzi.

67

Shiji 74.2343. Ban Gu’s ॗ֣ (32-92 C.E.) Hanshu lists the Mengzi in its bibliography (30.1725) and identifies Mengzi as Zisi’s disciple (dizi ҿʪ). Ying Shao’s ᏻᡣ (c.140-c.204 C.E.) “Qiongtong” ᇴ௢ (Depletion and Rejuvenation) in Fengsu tongyi ࡘ۞௢໳ (Collected Explanations of Popular Customs) also says that Mengzi learned his craft from Zisi (Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu 318). The eighth century C.E. Shiji commentary of Sima Zhen ͌ਠ࠶ (fl. 745) records the suspicion of Wang Shao ̙ᡣ that the accidental insertion of the character ren ʆ altered the meaning of this passage, and instead of being a student of second-generation student (menren ‫ۃ‬ʆ), Mengzi actually studied at “Zisi’s gate” himself (Shiji 74.2344, n. 2). 68

CHAPTER THREE

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY IN THE MENGZI ׂʪ̆ ᅩʥ୥ͺѼʪ଒˃‫׿‬ᆪʿϫା ˀ˭ʓЩΘ‫˃ऺ͗׆‬ͺѼʪᆪ˃‫׷׿‬ʿϫା Ѽʪ‫׷׿‬ᓛʨмʿ̶ାᓛᇴ‫׍‬ʿ๑ା˜‫ݭ׆‬ʛ Ѽʪ‫ˋ׷׿‬໳ᔩನघ‫˻ؠ‬ մΆиʛ⓯೸Գ‫ࡒؠ‬॰‫͗ؠݯࠌؠ‬ᝂ͗ᝂʿԵЩ఺ Mengzi said: A vast territory and many subjects are desired by the gentleman, but are not among the things that bring joy to him. Being at the center of the people of the world and established among them, securing the people between the four expanses, are things that brings happiness to the gentleman, but are not among the things that are part of the nature of the gentleman. What is part of the nature of the gentleman is that even if he carries out an important matter he does not think it elevates him, and even if he lives humbly he does not think it degrades him, all because the correct divisions are fixed. What is part of the nature of the gentleman is that benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are rooted in the mind. This gives rise to a glossy coloration that may be seen in the face. When seen from the back, it is even displayed in the four limbs. The four limbs do not speak, but they convey it. - Mengzi 7A211

As the discussion of wisdom and sagehood developed, giving rise to the systematic moral psychology of the Wuxing, a collection of texts began to cohere around the dialogs of a Ru teacher and advisor centrally concerned with the physiological description of the roots of virtue. Section 7A21 of the fourth century B.C.E. text Mengzi ׂʪ (Master 1 Mengzi zhengyi 13.906. Compare Lau’s (1970, 185-186) translation of the middle section of this quotation: “That which a gentleman follows as his nature is not added to when he holds sway over the Empire, nor is it detracted from when he is reduced to straitened circumstances. This is because he knows his allotted station.” In reading the final section, Yang Bojun (Mengzi yizhu, 309-310) follows the reading of Zhou Guangye ֟ᅩ๣ (1730-1798) in his Mengzi yiwen kao ׂʪධ́Ш and parses the final sentences somewhat differently: “It shows in the face, reflected in the back, and even reaches to the four limbs. From the movements of the four limbs, without having to speak, others can immediately see it.” The reading of the last graph, yu ఺, reflects its use in a similar passage in Mengzi 6B15, where a person’s true intentions are demonstrated on the face and comes out in the voice, er hou yu Щ݈఺ “only then is it conveyed.” An alternative might be to read it as yu ಀ, which, in the “Jiyi” ୯໳ (The significance of sacrifice) chapter in the Liji ᔩ৩ is the physical manifestation of reverence through an even coloring in the face (see note 111 below).

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Meng) describes changes in the face and the body of the person in whose mind the virtues have taken root. In addition to being visible in the way the person carries himself or herself, the person has ⓯೸Գ‫ؠ‬ ࡒ “a glossy coloration that may be seen in the face.” Facial “glossiness” (sui ⓯), which the Han commentator Zhao Qi ღҴ (d. 201 C.E.) explains connotes a complexion that is “moist and lustrous” (runze ᇁጎ) in the manner of jade, recalls the “jade coloration” (yuse ΂и) in the Wuxing.2 The shared use of the metaphor of jade to describe the appearance of the person who has reached the final stage of ethical cultivation is but one of several core ideas about moral selfcultivation and about the relationship between human beings and the natural world that are shared by the two texts. Until the discovery of the Wuxing, however, the Mengzi appeared to be a lonely voice in the early tradition, arguing for an innate disposition to virtue against other texts that saw virtue as something that was, in different ways, learned from outside. Because it sheds light on the ethics of the Mengzi, the newly discovered Wuxing provides a useful window through which to view what is arguably the most influential work of Chinese ethics. After a brief examination of the historical connection between the two texts, this chapter will analyze the way their description of the virtues was linked to the transformation of the body. A look at the role of models of human physiology in the heart of the ethical theory of the Mengzi will show how that text went a step further than the Wuxing in the integration of medical and physiognomic elements into the Ru virtue discourse. In particular, the Mengzi introduces qi (or pneuma, the impossible to translate quasi-physical fluid that in animals also serves as their life force) into the process of cultivating the virtues, and both texts argue that self cultivation results in physical. In this area, the 2 Mengzi zhengyi 13.906 (cf. Lau 197, 185-6) cites Zhao Qi, the Han commentator: иԳ‫⓯ ࡒؠ‬೸ ᇁጎ˃სʛ “The coloration may be seen in his face. ‘Glossiness’ means sleek and lustrous in appearance.” The “Yuandao” ࢍལ (Origin of the Dao) chapter of the Huainanzi uses runze to describe the appearance of water on the earth, in contrast to water in the sky which appears as clouds and rain (Huainan Honglie jijie 1.3, see also a similar use in Shuoyuan xiaozheng 18.448). Runze has several other connotations including the extended meaning of to nourish and enrich. In its only usage in the Mengzi (3A3) it means something like “details” (it is translated as “embellishments” in Lau 1970, 100). When the phrase is used to describe jade, it refers to how it looks from a distance, and connotes a moist appearance. While Zhao’s gloss of the term sui has been most influential in interpretations of the Mengzi, and hence it is translated here as “glossiness,” the term is linked elsewhere to cui ႃ “monochromatic,” indicating uniformity or purity in coloration. See, for example, the discussion of the use of the term in a similar context that links morality to appearance (Fayan quanyi 164, n. 3). In the latter context, it is worth noting that the Fayan moves from a discussion of Mengzi to one of sui to one of jade in consecutive passages.

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concerns of the Mengzi are consonant with those of the Wuxing, and the Mengzi’s integration of theories about virtue and human physiology signals the start of a discourse explicitly concerned with the intersection of ethics and the body. While the historical relationship between the texts is unclear, their common concerns illustrate how excavated manuscripts can shed light on the meaning of transmitted classics.

The Mengzi and the Wuxing Before moving on to an analysis of these specific elements of the Mengzi, it is necessary to first briefly introduce the Mengzi and characterize its relationship to two of the texts already described in some detail, the Analects and Wuxing. The Mengzi, latinized by Jesuit missionaries as Mencius, has been at the core of the canon associated with Kongzi since at least the Song Dynasty, when Zhu Xi Ќጞ (11301200) placed it alongside the Analects among the “Four Books” (sishu ͗ए). It is a collection of dialogues between the fourth century B.C.E. figure Meng Ke ׂඩ (usually known as Mengzi) and his disciples, royal patrons, rivals, and friends, formally modelled on the Analects. The Mengzi was circulating in something like its current form in the Han dynasty, when Zhao Qi edited it down to its current contents.3 The Mengzi is celebrated for its detailed model of human nature (xing ‫ )׷‬and its argument that goodness is a function of the cultivation of innate moral dispositions. Central to its model is an account of the natural characteristics of the mind and its role in that process of cultivation. While the Analects contains very little that might be labelled “psychology,” the explanation of the workings of the mind in the Mengzi provides a psychological blueprint for the development of virtues first laid out by Kongzi. The Mengzi argued that within each 3

Shiji 74.2343. Sima Qian describes the text as comprising seven pian, while the bibliographic chapter of Hanshu ်ए (History of the Han) lists the text in eleven pian (Hanshu 30.1725). The preface attributed to Zhao Qi says that he began with eleven pian, but excised the “outer chapters,” which were titled “Arguments that human nature is good” (Xingshan bian ‫ ׷‬െ ᎖ ), “Explanations of literature” (Wenshuo ́ ი ), “Classic of filial piety” (Xiaojing Ҩ໩), and “Making good government” (Weizheng ޴ ‫)ݬ‬. This left the current seven pian, 14 juan, text. Jiang Boqian notes that Wang Chong mentions that Mengzi wrote “Human nature is good” (Xingshan ‫ ׷‬െ ) (in the “Benxing” ʹ‫ ׷‬chapter of the Lunheng), and conjectures that if the titles are divided up in so as to be consistent with Wang Chong’s citation, the excised chapter titles might actually have been “Arguments about literature” (Bianwen ᎖́) and “Explanations of the Classic of Filial Piety” (Shuo Xiaojing იҨ໩), or “Explanations of arguments about literature” (Bianwen shuo ᎖́ი). See Jiang 1985, 314-5.

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person’s mind were incipient bases of the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. These were the “minds” of compassion (ceyin ౺ᓙ), shame (xiu’wu ஍౱), yielding (cirang ᘂ᝖), and right and wrong (shifei ‫)ۍݵ‬, respectively.4 Since this view will be treated at greater length below, now it suffices to note that the Mengzi’s vision of innate dispositions to developing of virtue differed significantly from that of the Xunzi, both in its conception of the moral direction as well as its view of the very nature of the dispositions.5 As the Song philosopher Cheng Yichuan ദΥʲ (1033-1107) put it, while Kongzi spoke the words “benevolence” (ren) and “will” (zhi ӆ), it was Mengzi who explained them in terms of the relation between benevolence and righteousness, and the cultivation of qi, respectively.6 This neatly encompasses a contrast between the two texts: the Analects’s assemblage of terse conversations was integrated into the Mengzi’s more systematic psychology. The Mengzi has also long been viewed as an attempt to continue the tradition of Kongzi and the Analects. According to Sima Qian’s Shiji, Mengzi: ਂЩႩ໗ఈ˃ࣛ Һ༶ए ࠽Ϋ͠˃ำ ѕׂʪʁᇺ “withdrew and together with the followers of [his disciple] Wan Zhang ໗ఈ, put in order the Odes and Documents and interpreted the intentions of Kongzi. They wrote the Mengzi in seven pian.”7 This, the earliest biographical description of Mengzi, meshes with two Ru attributes criticized by the Xunzi: an emphasis on the Odes and Documents 4

See Mengzi zhengyi 232-6 (cf. Lau 1970, [2A6] 83). For views on the nature of the dispositions in Xunzi’s moral philosophy, see David Wong 1996; Paul Goldin 1999, 1-38; and Kline and Ivanhoe 2000. 6 “Yichuan xiansheng yu,” 4 ΥʲζΆგ͗, in Er Cheng Yishu 272. In another dialogue, Cheng Yichuan notes that Mengzi must have had “heroic qi” (yingqi ࠡम). When asked where such qi manifests itself, Cheng uses the same metaphor of jade to compare Mengzi to Kongzi: ѓ̣˱ʪ˃Ե̍˃ ‫̈́۔‬Գ ̝ϨκႩ̐ႅ‫ۍ‬ʿγ ̍˃ ΂ б‫ݵ‬Љຈᇁ҉Ⴐमඐ ೷்Ϡγᙟʛ “However, if we compare his theories to those of Kongzi, it becomes obvious. It is just like ice and crystal. Both must be said to be bright, but if you compare them with jade, on account of [jade’s] warmth and moistness, and [jade’s] being filled with qi images, [jade] is not as dazzling or bright.” Here, brightness is not necessarily the optimal characteristic, rather the warmth and sleekness of jade are seen as being superior. Elsewhere, Cheng Yichuan pointedly does not identify Mengzi as the “second sage”–rather, it was Master Yan ᖄ (i.e., Kongzi’s disciple Yan Hui ᖄϖ) who was “only a hair’s breadth” away from being a sage such as Kongzi. On one level, by comparing the warmth of jade with the coolness of crystal, Cheng is placing Kongzi firmly ahead of Mengzi in the Confucian pantheon (“Yichuan xiansheng yu, 4”, in Er Cheng Yishu 246; compare “Yichuan xiansheng yu, 1” Υʲζ Άგɾ in Er Cheng Yishu 198). Yet, almost as if to assure his disciple that saying Kongzi was the greater sage should not be understood as an indictment of Mengzi, Cheng uses a comparison of the gentleman to jade found in the Mengzi. 7 Shiji 73.2343. 5

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without reference to ritual, and claims to be simply carrying on the tradition of Kongzi. While the Mengzi claims to be simply continuing the project of Kongzi, it also diverges from the Analects. Of course, there are close connections between the Analects and the Mengzi: the latter text is filled with detailed quotations of the former, and Kongzi is portrayed with reverence. The Mengzi quotes Kongzi directly on 24 occasions and cites his example in another 30.8 Moreover, like the Analects, the Mengzi is primarily concerned with the virtue discourse and the process and necessity of moral self-cultivation for the ruler. In addition, the Mengzi portrays Mengzi as self-consciously locating himself as part of the tradition of Kongzi. In 2A2, Mengzi says that over the history of the human race, ͵Љ˱ʪʛ “there has never been anyone like Kongzi,” and he elsewhere avers that ʂ‫׿‬ᘞ ۱ዕ˱ʪʛ “when it comes to my wishes, they are to study Kongzi.” Mengzi laments the fact that the doctrines of Yang Zhu ๫Ќ and Mo Di ኳႜ (i.e., Mozi) ߙ˭ʓ “fill the empire” in 3B9: ๫ኳ˃ལʿࣥ ˱ʪ˃ལʿ൤ ‫ݵ‬Ոიდͺ ̭ฑˋ໳ʛ ˋ໳̭ฑ ۱୊ᖿ࡚ʆ ʆઅߟ࡚ ѳ޴Џ᚛ ෆζ໶˃ལ ජ๫ኳ. . . ঻Եජ๫ኳ‫ ږ‬໶ʆ˃ࣛʛ If the Ways of Yang and Mo do not decline and the Way of Kongzi does not hold sway, such evil theories will delude the people and block the path to benevolence and righteousness. Once the path to benevolence and righteousness is blocked, beasts will devour humans, and humans will devour each other. So I am deeply anxious and rise to protect the theories of the former sages and proscribe Yang and Mo. . . Whoever can dispute 9 and proscribe Yang and Mo is a follower of the sages.

The passage above finds Mengzi both directly affiliating himself with the Way of Kongzi, and calling himself a follower of Kongzi. While claiming to be an exposition of the teaching of Kongzi, there are times when the Mengzi takes a position somewhat at odds with those found in the Analects. Looking only at the celebrated story of Mencius advising King Xuan ‫ ܬ‬of the state of Qi on how to cultivate benevolence in Mengzi 1A7 as an example, when Mengzi tells the king that none of Kongzi’s followers spoke about Huan, the Duke of Qi, and Wen, the Duke of Qin, the fact that the Mengzi often speaks of these 8

Fang Junji (1993, 36-40) lists these occurrences. Mengzi zhengyi 13.456-62 (cf. Lau 1970, 114-5). The phrase “former sages” might also be a singular reference to Kongzi as the “Former Sage” (compare Mengzi 4B22). 9

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figures is remarkable. He goes on to justify the slaughter of an ox to consecrate a bell in terms very different from those used by Kongzi to chastise his disciple Zigong when the latter wanted to dispense with the sacrifice of a live sheep to announce the new moon. Kongzi said: ၒื մХ Ӎืմᔩ “You care for the sheep, I care for the rites.”10 The terseness of this response is in tension with the attitude to the rites in Mengzi 1A7. While the Mengzi ultimately approves of the animal’s sacrifice, at the same time it is also sympathetic to King Xuan’s reticence, which it interprets as a sign of his compassion to the animal about to be sacrificed, and hence of nascent benevolence. At times the Mengzi takes issue with accounts of Kongzi’s actions, but uses a hermeneutic of respect that denies that he is really disagreeing at all. In one instance, Mengzi observes that if Kongzi had truly done as he was said to have done, щ̣޴˱ʪ “How could he have really been Kongzi?”11 Despite a stated reverence for Kongzi, the Mengzi is not completely consistent with the Analects. Since the Analects is at times quoted in the Mengzi in an unattributed way, inconsistencies may reflect a difference between the understanding of Kongzi’s message at the time of the composition of the Mengzi in the late fourth or early third centuries B.C.E., and the understanding at the time of the composition of the Analects.12 While it is often implicitly accepted that the Mengzi was written as a sequel of sorts to the Analects, the actual relationship between the two texts is potentially much more complex. Scholars have long recognized that there are also a number of significant ways the Mengzi’s ethical picture is different from that of the Analects, and some of these differences may have resulted from particular historical and social changes in the century or so that separated the two writers. Gu Jiegang ᛐንࢉ (1893-1980) argued that many of the doctrines of “kingly government” (wangzheng ̙ ‫) ݬ‬ espoused in the Mengzi derived from the Mozi, and that they were geared to the promotion of the good of the people over that of the aristocracy. As a result, Gu wrote, “Mengzi was not purely a disciple of Kongzi, but rather he reconciled the two schools of Kongzi and

10

Lunyu jishi 6.191-7 (cf. Lau 1979, [3.17] 70). Mengzi 5A8, see Mengzi zhengyi 19.662 (cf. Lau 1970, 147). In Mengzi 5B4 and 5B7, Mengzi’s disciple Wan Zhang points out contradictions having to do with Kongzi. 12 For examples, see Mengzi 3A2 and 3B4. If many passages that were later incorporated into the Analects were circulating among the Ru at the time the time of the Mengzi’s compilation, it could well be that some of the Mengzi’s quotations of Analects actually appeared first in the Mengzi. 11

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Mozi.”13 Gu argued that it was in matters of family regulation and ritual that the Mengzi followed the Analects most closely. In a similar vein, Li Zehou Өጎ۹ has argued that the changes in social structure allowed the Mengzi to go further than Analects in divorcing personal virtue from noble status and arguing for “moral self-restraint as the highest level independent personal quality, something that would have been hard to imagine at the time of Kongzi.”14 These observations underscore the extent to which, despite protestations that it is nothing more than an interpretation of the “intentions” (yi ำ) of Kongzi, the Mengzi represents a significant development of the Analects in both the nuance of its moral psychology and its politics. In terms of the latter two issues, much of the Mengzi may actually draw more closely on the Wuxing. Overlap between the two texts may be seen in their general shared concern with moral motivation and in their shared use of specific phrases and of a taxonomy of the virtues. Recall from the previous chapter how the Wuxing was centrally concerned with the distinction between acting virtuously and acting out of virtue. The Mengzi develops this distinction between seemingly virtuous acts and those reflecting genuine moral motivation at greater length than the Analects. In the Mengzi’s section 7A37 (sometimes numbered as 7A38), the human/non-human animal contrast is invoked to illustrate the distinction between the two kinds of action: ׂʪ̆ ࡚Щͪื ԸΟ˃ʛ ืЩʿ๖ ᖿय़˃ʛ ࣣ๖‫ ږ‬࿱˃͵અ‫ږ‬ ʛ ࣣ๖Щ೷࿧ Ѽʪʿ̈́൳‫ؘ‬ Mengzi said: “To feed somebody without caring is to treat them as a pig. To care for somebody without showing reverence is to tend them as an animal. [In these cases,] respectfulness and reverence must be akin to [the respectfulness and reverence felt] when a gift is going to be presented. While respectfulness and reverence may lack substance, the gentleman disapproves of empty constraints.15 13

See his Handai xueshu shilüe ်̩ዕி͑ୖ (1998, 32). Li Zehou 1990, 40. Of these two views, Li’s formulation is perhaps more balanced. While the Mengzi was clearly written in an atmosphere informed by the criticisms and values of the Mozi, especially in terms of the role of the “people” (min ͺ) in indicating the “mandate” (ming ֡) of tian, the Mengzi’s defense of the virtues is better seen as a Ru response to that atmosphere than as a “reconciliation” between Kongzi and Mozi. This becomes even clearer when parallels between the Wuxing and the Mengzi are considered, because they indicate the extent to which the latter’s selfcultivation picture is related to that of the former’s, and so also to its emphasis on the moral motivation so clearly opposed to the action-based ethic of the Mozi. 15 See Mengzi zhengyi 27.936-937 (cf. Lau, 1970, p. 190). Jiao Xun ೵݇ (17631820) explains that the difference between substantive and empty actions is being 14

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The importance of the attitude informing a right action is characteristic of the Mengzi’s understanding of moral action as a spontaneous expression of cultivated dispositions in the mind. The reference to giftgiving makes it clear that the qualities of respectfulness and reverence are a measure of the proper motivation for action. By contrast, their absence is a sign that an action lacks genuine moral motivation.16 In this way, the contrast between the semblance of moral action and genuine moral action was becoming identified with the distinction between action that solely comes from inside oneself (nei ˖) and that which is determined by factors outside oneself (wai ͙). The Mengzi not only draws on the distinction between acting out of one’s own moral sense versus according to exterior maxims, it goes further by continuously seeking to locate that sense in the body. Following Analects 12.1, the Mengzi contrasts differing sources of motivation using the term you Ί. In a general sense, you indicates the direction or place from which something comes, and hence its extended meanings in the Mengzi include to “follow” a path or road, “from the time of” an event or figure from the past, or “emanating from” a particular location. The Mengzi is particularly interested in locating the illustrated by the corresponding distinction between reverence that begins prior to the presentation of a gift and the reverence that begins when the gift is presented. A concrete example of a gentleman incapable of acting out of empty convention may be found in Mengzi 3B1. The reference to gift-giving is first taken up by Zhao Qi, who comments: ̝ ࣣ ๖ ‫ ږ‬Ϩ Љ ࿱ ‫ ך‬ະ ̣ м ᔩ Щ ͵ ̣ ֡ અ м ˃ ʛ “By respect and reverence it is meant that if a person is bearing (gifts of) silk, it is appropriate that the person present them in a ritually proper way, and never present them after being enjoined to do so.” For respect and reverence, Zhao explains, substance is valued (27.937). Jiao Xun, however, follows the interpretation of Song commentator Zhu Xi. Zhu relies on a contrast between reverence that begins prior to the presentation of a gift and reverence that begins when the gift is presented (Zhu credits this view to the Cheng brothers, see Mengzi zhangju jizhu 13.360). Both readings take the passage to be an indictment of ritual that is carried out insincerely. In this context, the distinction between gong ࣣ “respectfulness” and jing ๖ is explained by Kwong-loi Shun in the following way: reverence “is an attitude of caution, seriousness, and mental attention that can be directed toward people and affairs,” while respectfulness “is a more specific attitude probably having to do with attention to one’s appearance, posture, and the manner [in which] one deals with others,” (1997, 54). Zhao Qi’s comment on the last line is: щ̈́൳‫ࠓؘ‬Ѽʪ˃˻ʛ “How would it be possible to, from emptiness, apply constraints to the mind of the gentleman?” showing Zhao read ju ‫ ؘ‬as “restrain,” contrary to the reading of Jiao Xun (Mengzi zhengyi 27.937). 16 Philip J. Ivanhoe points out that in the Mengzi’s development of the Analects critique of a person who is celebrated for acting according to conventional standards of good behavior, the “fundamental error is looking for some external standard to call the Way and ignoring the true source of the Way–one’s innate moral sense.” See Ivanhoe 2002, 19, referring to Mengzi 7B37 and Analects 17.11. This is also consistent with the rhetorical question that concludes Analects 12.1: ޴ˋΊʴЩΊʆ̢‫“ ۿ‬the doing of benevolence comes from the self, and so [how can it] come from others?”

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origination of moral action, and often uses this term in distinguishing between alternative accounts of the source of the virtues. An example is the Mengzi’s denial of the positions of Gaozi Ѿʪ and Gongduzi ˙௲ ʪ that benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are “welded onto me from the outside” (you wai shuo wo Ί͙᜹Ӎ), and that reverence does not “come from inside” (you nei Ί˖), respectively. This criticism is extended to the followers of Mozi, one of whom, Yi Zhi ϡ˃, appears in Mengzi 3A5. As David S. Nivison explains, the follower of Mozi is won over to the Ru perspective when he is forced to acknowledge that he “has gotten into a mess by accepting guidance from both his [mind] and from a set of doctrines that are unconnected with [it].”17 Nivison characterizes this as the difference between a onesource and a two-source morality, and in the Mengzi the ideal is to heed a single internal source. Indeed, the origin of virtuous action is not just inside oneself, but according to Mengzi 4B19, actions in some way come from the virtues themselves (you renyi Ίˋ໳) located inside oneself. This ability to act out of virtue is the very quality that distinguishes human beings from other animals: ׂʪ̆ ʆ˃‫̣׿‬୙‫ؠ‬໘‫ؠ‬ᖿ‫ږ‬౦ҹ ઝͺ̓˃ Ѽʪϫ˃ ൘‫ؠا‬ઝ‫ ٵ‬࿫‫ؠ‬ʆࡼ Ίˋ໳м ‫ۍ‬мˋ໳ʛ Mengzi said: “What separates human beings from birds and from beasts is minuscule. The common people dispense with it, while the gentleman preserves it. Shun understood the various creatures and had insight into the basic human relationships. He acted out of benevolence and righteousness, and never acted out benevolence and righteousness.”18

Shun’s acting “out of” (you) the virtues is the equivalent of actions coming from “inside of one”, locating the virtues in the body. This is the same basic distinction made in Wuxing §1.1: “When benevolence takes form internally, it is called ‘virtuous action.’ When it does not take form internally it is called ‘action.’” The Mengzi’s internalist account of the origins of virtuous action is shared with the Wuxing. 17

“Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” in David S. Nivison (ed. Van Norden) 1996, 101-4. 18 Mengzi zhengyi 16.567-9 (cf. Lau 1979, 131). Following Jiao Xun, wu ‫ ٵ‬is read as “creatures”, and the sentence is a bridge between a contrast between species and a corresponding contrast between motivations for action. It is important to note that the implication of this parallel is that the actions of animals may be conventionally described as “benevolent” and “righteous”, but genuine moral motivation is something they cannot achieve. This view is consistent with the early commentaries to Analects 2.7. For a general discussion of the relationship between human and non-human animals in the Mengzi, see Ivanhoe 2002, 20-1.

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Beyond this shared concern, the Wuxing and the Mengzi also show significant overlap in terms of their technical vocabulary. The phrases “a metal bell sounding and the jade stone vibrating it” and “good is the human Way, and virtue is tian’s Way” that appear in Mengzi 5B1 have exact parallels in the Wuxing, the former in §9.1-5 and the latter in §1.7 and §9.4 of the Guodian text. This is especially noteworthy since the latter’s appearance in §1.7 is such an integral part of the explanation of the Wuxing’s five kinds of action that it is hard to construct a scenario under which it was copied from Mengzi 5B1 and then pasted in to become the basis of the fivefold taxonomy of the virtues that serves as a linchpin of the Wuxing. Further, a close reading of Mengzi 7B24 even demonstrates how the Wuxing clarifies a mistake that crept into the Mengzi and has been unwittingly passed down for centuries. This passage demonstrates that parts of the Mengzi were written in an atmosphere where the grouping of the five virtues of the Wuxing was already popular. The passage is a response to followers of Mozi that provides a nuanced theory of the relationship between human nature and fate. In the process, the five virtues of the Wuxing are incorporated into a metaphor that relates virtue to the body: ʤ˃‫֍ؠ‬ʛ Α˃‫ؠ‬иʛ Ы˃‫ؠ‬ᑵʛ ᄪ˃‫ؠ‬িʛ ͗‫ؠ˃ڙ‬ϯѝʛ ‫׷‬ ʛ Љ֡ା Ѽʪʿᎂ‫׷‬ʛ ˋ˃‫̓ؠ‬ʪʛ໳˃‫ؠ‬Ѽаʛ ᔩ˃‫ؠ‬ტ̟ʛ ನ˃‫ؠ‬ቖ‫ږ‬ʛ ໶ʆ˃‫˭ؠ‬ལʛ ֡ʛ Љ‫׷‬ା Ѽʪʿᎂ֡ʛ The mouth’s role with respect to taste, the eye’s role with respect to colors, the ear’s role with respect to sounds, the nose’s role with respect to smells, and the four limbs’ role with respect to leisure, are up to human nature, although fate is also involved. The gentleman does not say it is [all a matter of] human nature. Benevolence’s role with respect to the father-son relationship, righteousness’s role with respect to the rulersubject relationship, ritual propriety’s role with respect to the guest-host relationship, wisdom’s role with respect to who is worthy, and the sage’s role with respect to the Way of tian, are up to fate, although human nature is also involved. The gentleman does not say it is [all a matter of] fate.19 19 Mengzi 7B24. See Mengzi zhengyi 28.990-993. Lau (1970, 198-9) reads the passage to emphasize that, in the case of the parts of the body, because there are other factors besides human nature in the their proper functioning, the gentleman does not focus on the single factor such as human nature. The Qing scholar Dai Zhen ᐁ኏ argues that the majority of his Song dynasty precursors, influenced by Buddhists and Daoists to accept views of human nature similar to those found in the Xunzi and those attributed to Yang Zhu, misread this passage in the Mengzi to be about a contrast between the nature as it existed prior to becoming material through qi (ming) and the materialized nature sullied by desires (xing). Zhu Xi’s commentary on Mengzi 7B24, for example, contrasts pure qi, which results in virtuous behavior, with turbid qi, which results in the opposite (Mengzi zhangju jizhu 14.370). Dai sees this as implicit

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The immediate point of this passage is that the gentleman does not focus solely on human nature or fate when talking about the proper functioning of the body, either physically or morally. The 7B24 passage is also particularly rich in similarities to the model of moral development in the Wuxing. First of all, the virtues listed are the same five as in that text, and the association of sagacity with the Way of tian is consistent with the model of cultivating the four virtues and sagacity in the Wuxing text. In the transmitted Mengzi, the word sheng “sagacity” must have been emended to shengren ໶ʆ “the Sage” because its role as a fifth virtue had been forgotten. Just as interesting is the way in which the role of individual virtues in situational contexts is likened to the role of a part of the body in its usual circumstances of use. An example of this analogy would be that a person smells a flower with the nose, just as the gentleman exercises wisdom when seeking to appoint a worthy person to an official position. Once one acquires the potential through one’s nature, and develops that potential through effort, the virtues are embodied in the same way as the sense of smell, and their exercise is just as situationally specific. The direct parallels suggest that parts of the Mengzi were written in an atmosphere colored by ideas found in the Wuxing. Yet the exact nature of the relationship between the Mengzi and the Wuxing is difficult to precisely characterize because there are many areas in which the Mengzi does not match the Wuxing. While the Mengzi’s picture of the virtues is similar to the Wuxing, it also addresses a set of issues outside of the scope of that text’s detailed psychology. This is true both generally with the Mengzi’s lack of emphasis on the culminant virtue of sagacity and specifically in the example of Mengzi 7B24. The passage begins by saying that the body generally works in a certain way, and this is human nature. It is true that occasionally fate intervenes and, say, the eyes are rendered blind. Yet if the gentleman were to describe the functioning of the body as solely a matter of human nature, even though that might be true of the potential for sensory function, it might create the impression that the acceptance of Gaozi’s position that xing is composed of both good and bad elements. Instead, Dai reads Mengzi 7B24 to be saying that the gentleman does not pursue his desires and blame his behavior on his appetites (xing), nor does he fail to use his talents or say he is limited by his endowments (ming). See Mengzi ziyi shuzheng 2.20a-22a. David S. Nivison varies Dai Zhen’s reading when he writes: “doing my duty is something I could think of in either way, but in this case it is wise for me to. . . school myself to think of it as something I do wanting to, rather than because I must” (1996, 136-7). Both the latter readings better fit the expression wei ming ᎂ֡ (“say human nature”) as opposed to wei zhi ming ᎂ˃֡ (“call it human nature”).

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realization of that potential is also a matter of human nature. Similarly, developing the dispositions so as to achieve a mature functioning of the virtues in particular situations is in one sense a matter of environmental factors and hence a matter of fate. It is true that aspects of one’s nature are also an element in whether or not one makes good use of a positive environment. Yet if the gentleman were to say that the skilful application of the virtues is solely a matter of fate, that would be technically untrue and unsound pedagogy. Even though the proper environment creates the potential for developing the virtues, as the foibles of the beknighted monarchs in the Mengzi attest, actualizing this potential is not automatic.20 Thus, the subject of this passage is the relatively complex way in which Mengzi spoke about the virtues, human nature, and fate so as not to give rise to a sense of fatalism and thus discouraging people from developing the virtues. This is a nuanced response to the type of argument examined in chapter one about the Ru’s adherence to the concept of fate. However, this set of concerns never explicitly occurs in the Wuxing. This partial overlap between the ideas in the Mengzi and the Wuxing is perhaps the result of a direct historical connection. The possibility that the latter text was the work of the late fifth and early fourth century figure Zisi was treated in the previous chapter, but the passage from the Xunzi certainly indicates that, in the popular imagination of the third century B.C.E., there was a close connection between the two. While accounts differ as to whether Mengzi’s discipleship was direct or indirect, no matter which is true, as long as one accepts the notion that Meng Ke was a lineage disciple of Zisi, that intellectual genealogy provides circumstantial support for the textual evidence of the influence of the concepts in the Wuxing on those in the Mengzi. Generally, scholars have followed the hypothesis put forward by Pang Pu, who wrote that the Wuxing represents Ru thought “between Kongzi and Mengzi” (Kong Meng zhi jian ˱ׂ˃෇). A minority view is that it represents the stage “between Mengzi and Xunzi”. Yet the reality probably is more complex, especially since each of the texts from which the thought of those figures is imputed is likely layered or 20

That the motive for downplaying fate is at least partly pedagogical is implied by one of the imperatives for a good ruler in the “Qiansheng” ʢ࡝ (A thousand chariots), chapter 68 of the DaDai Liji (Elder Dai’s Record of Ritual) compiled in the first century B.C.E. by Dai De ᐁᅭ: ̣޴೷֡ ۱ͺʿਵ “Act as if there is no fate, and the people will not be indifferent,” (DaDai Liji jiegu 9.157). Perhaps this is also related to the famous and disputed statement about Kongzi’s tactical silence on matters of the Way of tian (Analects 5.13, see also page 164 below).

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perhaps even reflective of distinctive regional, not temporal, characteristics. An example of a more complex alternative is that an early version of the Wuxing based on the relationship between zhi (the wise) and sheng (the sage) predated most of the Mengzi. Because it was associated with the disciple Zisi, Mengzi taught the early version of the text to his own disciples in the fourth century B.C.E. His followers such as Wan Zhang later revised that version of the Wuxing by substituting their teacher’s four “human” virtues for zhi in certain passages, excepts from which became part of the record that was incorporated into the Mengzi as section 7B “Jinxin, xia” ၣ˻ʓ. This more complex theory is at least as consistent with the evidence as any other, and shows the oversimplification inherent in arguments about whether the Wuxing predates or postdates the Mengzi. Yet while the exact chronology of the production of these texts is uncertain, as the remainder of this chapter will demonstrate, the strong affinity between them is undeniable. The sections to follow describe how the Mengzi both implicitly and explicitly assumes a theory of “material virtue.” This assumption is seen most clearly in the way it resolves potential quandaries and explains the mechanics of self-cultivation. In the first case, the Mengzi’s solution to problems of plural or conflicting values is a process of “balancing” virtuous reactions to judge them as “heavy” or “light,” at least metaphorically giving the virtues material dimension. In the latter, the Mengzi identifies the virtues as existing in the quasimaterial dimension of qi, thereby accounting for how the virtues could change a person’s external appearance, accumulating and being exhausted by actions. In this way, the “Zisi and Mengzi” subtradition was able to ground Ru self cultivation practice in a description of the way that practice affects the body so as to generate virtue, and in so doing respond to some of the critiques of the Ru outlined in chapter one.

Problems of plural and conflicting values One particular set of philosophical problems is foregrounded in the Mengzi as a response to challenges to Ru ethics in the late fourth century. This concern may be summarized: “Is there a common currency that allows one to evaluate one virtue in terms of another?” The question of whether there was a “unity of the virtues” in Ru thought was first broached in late fourth century B.C.E. China, when sophists challenged the Ru to give an account that took care of seeming conflicts between courses of action dictated by different virtues. A

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classic case that came to be seen as an instance of such conflicts of virtue is the story of “Zhi Gong” ‫ڇ‬৺ (Upright Gong) in the Analects, which gave rise to a literature on how to reconcile seeming conflicts between virtues. This section will outline the quandary dimension of the Upright Gong story as an introduction to the problem and then outline two related responses to it. The Wuxing arranged the virtues in binary yinyang and five-step wuxing frameworks to resolve such quandaries, while the Mengzi and later texts extended this approach by making explicit the sage’s ability to balance the virtues. In Analects 13.18, the story of “Upright Gong” is an example of a case in which the requirements of the legal system appear to cause a person to act contrary to virtue. Told of an reputedly upright (zhi ‫)ڇ‬ man who testified that own father had stolen a sheep, Kongzi observes: ѳᚎ˃‫ږڇ‬୙‫޴̓ ݵؠ‬ʪᓙ ʪ޴̓ᓙ ‫ڇ‬Ϛմˀԡ In my circle, being upright differs from this. A father would conceal such a thing on behalf of his son, and a son would conceal it on behalf of his father. Uprightness is found in this.21

By ranking the cultivation of the virtue of family loyalty (which later texts link to filial piety) over the sanctity of private property, Kongzi is not denying that stealing is unjust or injurious to social order, but rather arguing that the best path to ending such behavior is inculcating virtue. While the tradeoff is not explicit in the Analects, the passage explores the tension between righteousness (entailing a duty to testify) and the value of maintaining a particular bond between father and son based on filial piety that might lead one to classify the situation as exigent (justifying the abrogation of that duty). Some critics of the Ru argued that one of the ways in which the cultivation of virtue runs counter to the interests of society was that partiality to one’s family carried with it unacceptable social costs. Kongzi was indirectly criticized by legal absolutists who made no secret of their disapproval of what they saw as special pleading on behalf of family members. The “Wudu” chapter of the Han Feizi argues that recognizing such an exigency disrupted the government: ๤˃Љ‫ڇ‬৺ մ̓ᜪХЩᎁ˃χ ̪˄̆ ଓ˃ ̣޴‫ؠڇ‬ѼЩЇ‫ే ̓ؠ‬ Щ໱˃ In the state of Chu there was a certain Upright Gong whose father stole a sheep, and he reported this to a local official. The magistrate said that 21

Lunyu jishi 27.924-6 (cf. Lau 1979, 121).

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[Gong] was to be killed, for although he was upright toward his ruler, he was crooked toward his father. Even though [Gong] had reported it, it was he who was found guilty!22

The writer’s indignation provides an implicit rebuttal to Kongzi’s reading of the situation in the Analects. The execution of Upright Gong for testifying against his father also adds an additional layer. The Han Feizi sees the magistrate’s condemnation of Upright Gong, on the grounds of his betrayal of his father, as Ru confusion over a person’s basic duties to the state. The very idea that reporting a crime to an official is punished is an example of the “Wudu” chapter’s general point that the Ru “use cultural refinement to disorder the models” of behavior, leading society into chaos. In this context, the Han Feizi has a different idea of the connotations of “uprightness” than the Analects. A third variation on this story dates to the time of Han Ying (fl. 150 B.C.E.) and applies what is essentially a compromise between the Analects and Han Feizi in the case of Upright Gong. The Hanshi waizhuan makes the need for a balance between two virtues explicit. In one story, an upright judge named Shi She Δੰ pursues a murderer, only to find that the murderer is his own father. This places Shi She in a terrible dilemma, as he explains to the king: ̣̓Ͼ‫ۍ ݬ‬Ҩʛ ʿмѼ ٗ ‫׫ۍ‬ʛ “To use one’s father to effect good administration is to go against filial piety, but not to act according to my lord’s models of behavior is to go against loyalty.” While the ruler shows lenience (an expression of benevolence), Shi She cuts his own throat for failing to carry out his duty (an expression of loyalty) because of his filial duty to his parent.23 A related analysis occurs later in the same text: ʪ޴፶ᓙ ໳ʿદ͸ Ѽ༽ʿ໳ ˋʿદื ᓛཧˋࣀ໳ ٗϚմˀԡ If one conceals something on behalf of one’s parent, one’s righteousness has not reached to “correctness.” If the ruler executes the unrighteous then benevolence has not reached to “caring.” Although it may go against benevolence and injure righteousness, model behavior (fa) is 24 found in this. 22

Han Feizi jijie 19.1057. Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng 2.235 (cf. Hightower 1952, 53). An earlier version of the story is told about Shi Zhu Δମ in Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi 21.1247-8 (cf. Knoblock and Riegel 2000 [19/2.5], 483) that omits the explicit tradeoff between filial piety and loyalty in the Han Ying quotation above. 24 Hanshi waizhuan shuzheng 4.310 (cf. Hightower 1952, 143-4). It would also be possible to read qizhong մˀ as “in the middle” of two alternatives. Indeed, the 23

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When applied to the case of Upright Gong, this passage implicitly argues for a balance between compassion and duty. For a son, model behavior may entail compromising one’s righteousness out of feeling for one’s parent. For a ruler, model behavior may entail compromising benevolence and executing the son out of a duty to maintain social order. For the Hanshi waizhuan it is the models of behavior, in an abstract sense, that are seen to ideally combine these two otherwise competing virtues. This idea is clearly a Han Confucian alternative to the absolutist conception of law seen above in the Han Feizi. The compromise came to be enshrined in law, when children were exempted from testifying against parents.25 The case of Shi She is a prototypical ethics of virtue quandary–he cuts his own neck to avoid violating one of the models of behavior his roles demand he uphold. Framed in terms of duties, the cases of Upright Gong and Shi She involve the conflicting pulls of one’s duty to state and one’s duty to one’s parent. In terms of the Ru virtue discourse, however, the force of the quandary is only indirectly about the outcomes of actions.26 This is so because they associate neither particular actions nor general principles behind those actions with individual virtues, but only the attitudes that preceded the actions.27 This is not to say that the Ru did not also endorse rules, but as Edmund Pincoffs has noted in his discussion of quandaries: “to grant that rule responsibility is socially essential is not to grant that it is the essence of morality, in that all other moral traits can be reduced to or derived from some form of this one.”28 A child refusing to testify against a parent was not an a priori disloyal action, leaving the door open to an argument that part of moral decision-making is a “balancing” of attitudes that reconciles them prior implication of the translation here is that according to fa, the right way of acting for the ruler is to execute the child for concealing on behalf of the parent, thereby accepting the Han Feizi’s advice. Yet that might well be what a Ru text thinks about fa, and the Hanshi waizhuan is clearly quoting Analects 13.18, where a reading of “in the middle” would be difficult. 25 See Mark Csikszentmihalyi 1999a. 26 As Robert Louden (1984, 229) has observed about virtue ethicists: “[If] one asks [a hypothetical moral exemplar] why he did, or how he knew what he knew, the answer–if one is offered–might not be very enlightening. One would not necessarily expect him to appeal to any rules or principles which might be of use to others.” 27 Michael Stocker (1990, 91-95) argues for a relaxation of what he sees as the Kantian assumption that ethical considerations are necessarily action-guiding. This move (especially with reference to choosing exemplars, see 104-5) is consistent with the presence of non-action-guiding act evaluations in early Ru moral psychology. 28 Edmund L. Pincoffs 1986, 31. Pincoffs’s arguments on the function of rules (he uses the example of the Golden Rule) in character ethics (171-2) are also instructive in this context.

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to action. This is the course implicitly adopted in the Wuxing’s discussion of the “methods” (fang ̄) of two virtues of benevolence and righteousness and explicitly in the Mengzi. Because the sage acts out of a unified attitude that results from balanced virtues, these two texts argue there is really no sense in which he or she is pulled in different directions. The need for a balance between benevolence and righteousness, implicitly called for in the Hanshi waizhuan above, was clearly articulated some two centuries earlier in the Wuxing. It compares the relationship between the two virtues to the dualism of yin and yang: ᔴ ໳˃̄ʛ ੆ ˋ˃̄ʛ ࢉ ໳˃̄ ‫̄˃ˋ ݾ‬ʛ Resoluteness is a method of righteousness, and lenience is a method of benevolence. Hardness is a method of righteousness, and pliancy is a method of benevolence. [GD §20.7-8]

Likening righteousness and benevolence to the binary opposition between hardness and pliancy, the text constructs an analogy between the balance of the virtues and the complementarity of yin and yang. The Wuxing’s explicit call for a balance between the two virtues of benevolence and righteousness is meant to serve as a guide to the proper way to balance the two virtues in a judicial context. The application to judicial decision-making is explicit in the Wuxing: Љʨ ໱Щʨ༽˃ ᔴʛ Љʮ໱Щ௛˃ ੆ʛ “If there is a significant crime and it is severely punished, this is resoluteness. If there is a trivial crime and it is pardoned, this is lenience” [GD §20.3]. In the context of jurisprudence, both severity and lenience have their place, just as in the year the qi of both yin and yang dominate at different times. The word translated here as lenience, ni ੆, literally means “to conceal”. This application of the term in the context of the case of Upright Gong is seen in chapter 59 of the first century B.C.E. text Yantielun ᝩᛆቈ (Discourses on Salt and Iron): ̓͹˃‫ؠ‬ʪ ᓛЉ໱೾੆˃ մʿ଒‫ح‬໱ ၒ “(The attitude of) parents toward their child, even if (the child) is guilty (the parents) will still conceal (ni) them. It is simply that they do not desire that (the child) be punished.”29 In a judicial setting, there is a connection between “concealment” and “overlooking” trivial crimes. An analogy between the dualisms of benevolence/righteousness and 29 Yantielun jiaozhu 10.585, paraphrasing the second century B.C.E. Gongyang commentary to the 15th year of Duke Wen, see Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan zhushu 14.2274, which does not use ni. For the Han institutionalization of lenience in the judicial system, see Hulsewe 1987, and Csikszentmihalyi 1999a.

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yin/yang is also found in the writing of Lu Jia ௿ཋ (d. 178 B.C.E.) and reportedly even in the famous natural cycle theories of Zou Yan ཰࠯.30 The binary pairing of benevolence and righteousness first glimpsed in the Wuxing is, then, one way that seeming contradictions between courses of action dictated by different virtues were arbitrated. This model of the relationship between the virtues is consistent with the basic organization of the Wuxing on another level. That text is organized so as to integrate the four virtues that the Mengzi described as the basic constituents of the moral mind into a fifth, that of sagacity (sheng). The ability to harmonize these virtues was seen to be progressing a step beyond what is merely “goodness” and following the “human Way” to “virtue” and following “tian’s Way.” These attempts at relating the virtues to each other demonstrate the use of metaphors usually associated with Chinese natural philosophy to solve a particular problem in Chinese ethics. Whether this was application of a discourse that already existed, or whether the solution to this philosophical problem provided a paradigm that proved useful in talking about the natural world are questions that are difficult to resolve. It is probably more to the point to observe that these texts simply do not imply a hard and fast distinction between natural philosophy and moral philosophy. They do tell us something important about the moral ideal implicit in these texts, one in which sagacity represents a version of the “unity of the virtues.” Another way that conflicting virtues were harmonized is through the faculty of “moral balance” (quan ᛱ) found in the Mengzi. The prototype ethics of virtue quandary found in the Mengzi occurs when a sophisticated jester-like figure named Chunyu Kun ଙʝྣ poses what he sees as a quandary intended to expose an inconsistency in Mengzi’s ethical thought. He begins by asking Mengzi to acknowledge a section of the ritual code that disallows the touching of 30 On Lu Jia, see Csikszentmihalyi 1997, 63, n. 44. According to chapter eleven of the Yantielun, Zou Yan’s techniques of transformation: ᔏ‫ˋؠ‬໳ “come down to benevolence and righteousness,” see Yantielun jiaozhu 2.150. This observation is echoed in the Shiji’s biographical treatment of Mengzi, which says of Zou Yan: ೸࠱մ ᔏ ̢ͫ̊ˋ໳໢ᄳ Ѽаʕʓ˗፶˃‫ֻ ݯ‬ʛᐥЫ “thus if we summarize what it is they all come down to, we end up at benevolence and righteousness, economy and frugality. The implemetation of ruler and minister, superior and inferior, and the six kin relationships are both their beginning and their source” (Shiji 74.2344). These references suggest that the anology between processes in the natural world and ethical dispositions may have been expanded by Zou Yan, writing after the Mengzi. On the problems in accepting descriptions of Zou Yan, see Nathan Sivin 1995b, part IV. The “six kin relationships” are defined differently in different sources, but include the relationship between parent and child, and that between elder and younger sibling. The word lan ᐥ is explained by Sima Zhen as the source of the Yangtze (lanshang ᐥᕔ).

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hands between women and men during the acts of giving and receiving.31 Mengzi acknowledges the rule, and then Chunyu Kun follows up his original question: ฦງ۱ಕ˃̣˾̢ “Suppose your sister-in-law is drowning, would you rescue her with your hand?” Mengzi answers that he would reach down and pull his sister-in-law out of the water without giving it a second thought. His answer is almost derisive: ฦງʿಕ‫ݵ‬৵॑ʛ ԝʩ૗֌ʿ፶ᔩʛ ฦງಕ˃̣˾‫ږ‬ᛱʛ If your sister-in-law is drowning and you do not rescue her, you are a wild animal. The rites disallow the touching of hands between women and men during the act of giving and receiving, but to rescue a drowning sister-in-law with one’s hand is a matter of moral balance.32

The derision in the reply testifies to the fact that Mengzi sees no meaningful dilemma in the situation. For a critic such as Chunyu Kun, agent-centered and act-centered goods are apples and oranges and mixing the two may lead to contradictions. For Mengzi, there is only one root to moral decision-making, and Chunyu Kun’s question is simply missing the point. The ban on touching is a matter of ritual, but the rescue is a matter of quan ᛱ , a term usually translated as “expediency” as in the modern compound quanbian ᛱ᜵. This term holds the key to understanding the Mengzi’s solution to the problem of plural and conflicting values, and so it is worth going into in detail. The earliest dictionaries explain the character quan refers to the sliding scale of a balance. Most translators see quan as referring to a quality of the situation–it is a moral emergency so one dispenses with the usual niceties. James Legge and Wing-tsit Chan translate the term as “peculiar exigency” and “a matter of expediency,” respectively. A. S. Cua glosses it as “exigency of the situation,” while W. A. C. H. Dobson 31 The ritual standard in question is one of a number that regulate behavior in the home. Later commentaries such as that of Song dynasty scholar Zhu Xi (1130-1200) provide the explanation: ͅᔩ ԝʩʿ፶૗֌ ̣ხѤʛ “One ancient ritual rule was that men and women must not touch when giving and receiving, in order to keep separate and at a distance” (Mengzi zhangju jizhu 7.284). The Qing commentator Jiao Xun clarifies Zhu Xi’s reference, saying that the Liji “Neize” ˖۱ chapter dictates: ԝ ʿԵ˖ ʩʿԵ͙ ‫ۍ‬୯‫ۍ‬య ʿߟ૗዇ մߟ૗ ۱ʩ֌̣Ⱟ մ೷Ⱟ ۱ߖҗ ్˃ Щ ϒ֊˃“The male does not speak about what happens inside the doors and the female does not speak about what happens outside the doors. Except in the case of sacrifice or mourning, they do not exchange objects. When they exchange objects, then the woman uses a square bamboo basket. If one is without a square bamboo basket, then in all cases one of them must sit and lay the object down, and only then will the second take it,” (Mengzi zhengyi 15.520-2 [cf. Lau 1970, 124-5], Liji zhushu 27.8a). 32 Mengzi 4A17, Mengzi zhengyi 15.520-2 (cf. Lau 1970, 124-5).

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say it is “[governed] by overriding conditions.”33 An expedient is an action that is justified by the end, and we must take these translations to be saying that it is the goal of saving a life that justifies breaking the rule. This interpretation implicitly reads the Mengzi as an example of a rule-based ethics. Consider a related quandary in the writings of Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), who painted a picture of a city under siege in order to answer the question, “when is one justified in making an exception to a rule?” In Aquinas’ thought experiment, those outside the walls, running for their lives to reach the gate, are doomed unless their compatriots within break a decree and let them in. He writes: Suppose a seige, then a decree that the city gates are to be kept closed is a useful general measure for the public safety. Yet say some citizens among the defenders are being pursued by the enemy, the cost would be heavy were the gates not to be opened. So opened they are to be, against the letter of the decree, in order to defend that very common safety the ruling authority had in view.34

The solution Aquinas offered comes out of a tradition of theological ethics that posits the existence of a divine lawgiver as the source for morality. Aquinas thought that the Augustinian insistence on the absolute rule of law did not properly take into account particular cases where the law might compel unreasonable action, and believed that “necessity carries a dispensation” from the law. The justification given by Aquinas for dispensing with the letter of the law is centered on knowledge of the intent of the lawgiver, what “the ruling authority had in view,” which occasionally comes into conflict with blind application of the law. The imaginary quandary is resolved differently in the Mengzi for a number of reasons. For one thing, the location of moral decisionmaking is the individual, not the “divine lawgiver.” Instead of divining the intent of an outside authority, the person making the decision reacts according to a set of developed moral dispositions inside himself or herself. This internal aspect is inherent in the use of the term moral balance in the Mengzi, and the traditional commentaries bear this out. These commentaries suggest that the reading of quan as “expedient” misses an important dimension of the Mengzi’s moral theory. Early readings of the quandary of the drowning sister-in-law emphasize the need to avoid a foolish consistency. The earliest extant 33 34

Legge 1895, 307; Chan 1963, 75; Cua 1978, 75; Dobson 1963, 122. Gilby’s translation of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae 1a2ae.96, 6 (1964, v.8, 139).

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commentary, by Zhao Qi, explains the term as ˫໩Щെʛ “to return to jing [warp of a loom, therefore, permanent principle] and do good.” The term fanjing ˫໩ appears in Mengzi 7B37, in a passage that contrasts the constancy of the virtuous with the unreflective inconsistency of those who simply aim to copy the virtuous. The Mengzi stresses that the gentleman ˫໩Щʵԡ “simply returns to jing,” and thereby provides a clear example to the people.35 Later commentaries shed light on the method for resolving quandaries, and indicate that the term quan’s connotation of “balance” was likely intended to be read literally in the Mengzi. The Qing commentator Jiao Xun makes an excellent argument that the term fanjing refers to the ability to make personal sacrifices for the greater good. Citing the use of the term in a historical narrative, Jiao shows that the term was applied to situations where one had to weigh loyalty to a ruler against that of the requirements of office, a quandary not unlike those of Upright Gong and Shi She considered previously. The faculty of quan allows one to make sacrifices, but would not allow one to kill another to save oneself. In this way, quan allows one to Ѥძࡌ “distinguish light from heavy” in a way very similar to the judicial balance seen in the Wuxing above.36 This is consistent with the 35 Understanding this phrase is difficult, in part because fan ˫ can mean both “return” and “oppose.” A passage by Xun Yue ৖࣬ (148-209 C.E.) clearly reads it in the latter way, implying quan is a Confucian affectation inferior to jing, which is paired with the concepts of yielding and simplicity: ᛱ޴ࠝԡ մ౦ʿࠜ໩ ᛂ޴ࠀԡ մ୎ʿ ࠜ஄ ́޴᜼ԡ մˀʿࠜዹ “Quan may be splendid, but its occasions cannot compare with constancy (jing). Skillful argumentation may be beautiful, but its pattern cannot compare with yielding. Elegance may be eye-catching, but its suitability cannot compare with simplicity.” Shenjian Όᜌ (Extended Reflections) 5.24 (cf. Ch’en Ch’iyu 1980, 183-4). However, Xun Yue’s understanding of the term appears to be rather different from the original context of its use in the Mengzi, and so here it is translated as “return.” In the Shenjian quotation, I read ji ౦ as ji ጅ. 36 Jiao Xun explains quan by citing the Gongyang ˙Х commentary to the events of the eleventh year of Duke Huan of Lu (701 B. C.E.) as recorded in the Spring and Autumn. The central figure in those events is Zhai Zhong ୯Ϋ, the Chancellor of the state of Zheng. Zhai is abducted by an official in the state of Song and told to replace an official with one picked by the Song official. The text reads: ୯ΫʿનմԵ ۱ѼͫА ੢ͫʞ નմԵ ۱Ѽ̣̈́Ά‫أ‬А ੢̣̈́ϫ‫أ‬ʞ “If Zhai Zhong did not meet [the Song] demands then his lord would die and the state [of Zheng] would perish. If he met their demands then he could exchange death for life, and his state’s perishing for its existence.” Zhai delays compliance, allowing his ruler to leave and Song’s candidate to replace him. This is clearly a tradeoff of a sort, forcing Zhai in effect to act contrary to the ideal of an official loyal to his superior. His ability to negotiate this decision is seen as a measure of his quan: ͅʆ˃Љᛱ‫ ږ‬୯Ϋ˃ᛱ‫ݵ‬ʛ ᛱ‫ږ‬щ ᛱ‫ؠ˫ږ‬໩ ೸݈Љ െ‫ږ‬ʛ ᛱ˃‫׿‬௎ ‫ڣ‬Аʞ೷‫׿‬௎мᛱЉལ бඛ๑̣мᛱ ʿࣀʆ̣мᛱ ଓʆ̣б Ά ʞʆ̣бϫ Ѽʪʿ޴ʛ “Among the ancients who had quan, Zhai Zhong’s quan was an example. What is quan? Quan is to return to [or oppose] the jing (set principles). Only then can there be good. As for what one sacrifices out of quan, none of it would

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definition of quan in the “Daqu” ʨ֊ chapter of the Mozi: ᔃ‫̣ݣ‬ϫൌ “cutting off a finger to preserve one’s wrist.”37 Both these sources indicate that there is a tradeoff and that a person has to be prepared to “balance” reactions and act directly upon the result. A related sense of “balance” is connoted by quan in several early Ru texts, including the Xunzi.38 There is no issue of the intent of the lawgiver involved, since be sacrificed if one were only avoiding death and destruction. There is a way to applying quan: you cause losses to yourself by applying quan, but do not injure others by applying quan. To kill another to save yourself, to destroy another in order to preserve oneself–[these are things that] the gentleman does not do.” This example makes it clear that quan is not solely a quality of the external situation surrounding an actor, but also has to do with the attitude of the actor in that situation. It is a quality that the ancients had (you Љ), that allowed them to brave personal pain for a less personal good. Another description of this quality or faculty may be gleaned from the Han commentator He Xiu’s щΩ (129-182) subcommentary to the Gongyang commentary. He writes: ᛱ‫ږ‬ၳʛ ‫̣׿‬Ѥძࡌ ‫ۥ‬୯Ϋ‫ڈ‬੢ࡌѼძ Ѽʪ̣ϫ੢֊௧Ѽ˃໱ “Quan is a balance, with which one may distinguish light from heavy. It is a metaphor for Zhai Zhong’s understanding that the state is important and the ruler trivial. A gentleman will resort to the crime of expelling his ruler in order to save the country.” Here, the sacrifice of one’s ruler in order to save the state is justified, even though it is described as a crime. Despite the loss to one’s in-group (and the seeming disregard of loyalty), the faculty of quan served Zhai Zhong such that he was willing to make sacrifices and recognize in which direction the moral course of action lay. See Year 11 of Duke Huan ग, Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan zhushu ‫˙߲ݱ‬Х෭ٌ୚ 5.7b-8a. 37 Mozi xiangu ኳʪ෈ඇ 11.243, a statement that recalls the Mengzi’s 7A26 criticism of Yang Zhu for not being willing to consider such sacrifices. 38 In the Analects the most telling instance is a discussion of recluses in 18.8 that reads: ᅥˀᛱ “in their abandonment they centered the balance,” referring to their choice to retire in the face of the prevailing political turmoil. Benjamin Schwartz argues that such weighing was important in the Analects and in the Spring and Autumn commentaries. He observes: “Since noble men must attempt to act in the world as they find it, they cannot avoid history or at the very least they cannot avoid making complex moral judgements about the tangled flow of events,” (Schwartz 1985, 386). The Xunzi explains the term in a way that implies that “balance” is an interior quality that allows one to judge situations where the right course of action is not clear. Chapter 22 of the Xunzi reads: ʘʆ˃֊ʛ ‫׿‬଒͵྾ႃЩգʛ մ̓ʛ ‫׿‬౱͵྾ႃЩ‫צ‬ʛ ‫ݭ‬ʆ೷ੂЩ ʿ̣̈́ʿႩᛱࡲ ፰ʿ͸۱ࡌፏ‫ؠ‬ή Щʆ̣޴ძ ძፏ‫ؠ‬᪒ Щʆ̣޴ࡌ Џʆ‫̣׿‬ ౰‫ؠ‬ძࡌʛ ᛱʿ͸ ۱ၱ৯‫ؠ‬଒ Щʆ̣޴ၰ ၰ৯‫ؠ‬౱Щʆ̣޴ၱ ЏΠʆ‫̣׿‬౰ ‫ؠ‬ၱၰʛ ལ‫ͅ ږ‬ˑ˃͸ᛱʛ ᕹལЩ˖бዪ ۱ʿ‫ڈ‬ၱၰ˃‫׿‬৯ “In all cases, human beings have never been able to get solely what they desire. They have never been able to reject solely what they hate. So human beings cannot move without the aid of quan. If the scale is uneven then a heavy object will rise up in such a way that people think it is light, or a light object will sink in such a way that people will think it is heavy. This is an example of people being misled about light and heavy. If the balanceweight is not correct then disaster assumes the mask of desirability and people take it to be fortunate, and good fortune takes the mask of evil and people take it to be disastrous. This is an example of the way in which people are misled about good fortune and disaster. The Way is the correct balance-weight from ancient and modern times. If one leaves the Way and internally chooses on one’s own, then one will not know what masks are worn by good fortune and disaster” (Xunzi jijie ৖ʪූ༱ 285-6). By contrast, the Han Feizi (see chapters 46-7) sees quan as the faculty that allows one to apply harsh punishments, justifying this on statist grounds.

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the weighing takes place internally. Rather, the metaphor implies that the virtues are material, and material is measurable. This understanding of quan as an internal “moral balance” is also seen in several other passages in the Mengzi featuring questions about ritual. In one passage, the Mengzi says: ᛱ೸݈‫ڈ‬ძࡌ ܾ೸݈‫ۂڈ‬ഠ ‫ߖٵ‬೸˻޴ߊ ̙ቁܾ˃ It is by balancing (quan) that one knows if something is heavy or light. It is by measuring (du) that one knows if it is long or short. This is true of all things, and especially of the mind. I ask that your majesty measure [your mind].39

The metaphor of measuring is invoked to help a king understand how to weigh his incipient dispositions to benevolence against his understanding of the propriety of a ritual bell consecration. On another occasion, Mengzi is asked whether he would insist on the observance of a certain marriage ritual if it prevented his marriage. He appears to concede that in this case one must violate the ritual standards, but points out that it is a trivial example: ‫ؠࡌہ‬Ц‫ږ‬৴ᎂɾཾ‫ہ‬ႩɾᒻЦ˃ᎂ‫ ۿ‬. . . ֊и˃ࡌ‫ږ‬Ⴉᔩ˃ძ‫ږ‬Щ̍˃ࢯনиࡌ Gold weighs more than feathers, but how could this be true when a clasp of gold is being compared to a cartload of feathers? . . . If you take a case where sexual intercourse is weighty but the ritual is light and compare the two, how could it not be that sexual intercourse is more important?40

A less trivial example would be more interesting, Mengzi implies, one where the balance was not so skewed. In such cases, ritual would take precedence over other strongly felt needs: ⳕ‫ࣁز‬ᐸЩဋմளʪ ۱દ ֳ ʿ ဋ ۱ʿ દ ֳ ۱ અ ဋ ˃ ̢ “If you climbed over the wall separating you from your eastern neighbor and dragged off the girl living there and in so doing acquired a wife, but you could not get a wife if you did not, then would you drag her off?”41 In these cases, the 39

Mengzi 1A7, Mengzi zhengyi 3.74-97 (cf. Lau 1970, 54-9). Mengzi 6B1, Mengzi zhengyi 24.805-9 (cf. Lau 1970, 171). 41 Mengzi 6B1. The desire for li “ritual propriety” is a something Stephen A. Wilson has compared to Charles Taylor’s “second-order desires” (1995, 281-4). This comparison of the relative importance of sexual intercourse and li is extended to one about the desire for them in the commentary on the Wuxing. That text uses images from the Shijing to illustrate a person writhing alone in bed, racked by extreme sexual anxiety. It then asks, rhetorically: Οቂ̓͹˃਴ ޴ቂ ۱ЉАͪ޴˃ԡ Οቂ̮ҿ˃ ਴ Πͪ޴ʛ “If one were beside one’s parents, would one have intercourse? Even under threat of death, one would not do so. If one were besides one’s brother, would 40

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balancing is not between competing virtues, but instead between moral and non-moral considerations. The faculty of quan in the Mengzi is similar to other measurement metaphors that, in the words of the Wuxing, tell “significant” (da ʨ) from “trivial” (xiao ʮ). In order to compare two things, it helps if they exist along a common dimension. Examples of difficult comparisons involve situations in which that common dimension is absent: weighing certainties against chances or salary against integrity. In the Mengzi’s examples, the comparison is not unconnected to the external situation, but neither is it a calculation of the relative consequences of actions. Instead, it is a weighing of internal reactions to the alternative. Cultivated dispositions have a common denominator, implying there is a common physiological basis of virtuous dispositions in the mind. It is the awareness of and ability to observe these dispositions that distinguishes the gentleman from others: Ѽʪ‫̣׿‬୙‫ؠ‬ʆ‫̣ ږ‬մϫ˻ ʛ “The way in which the Gentleman is different from others, is owing to assessing the mind.”42 The kind of assessment requires a person to turn inward and examine his or her motives for action. The Mengzi counsels misguided rulers to “take the measure of his own mind” (du xin ܾ˻).43 The metaphor for measurement is then a common one that comprises a form of self-reflection that is sometimes also a prerequisite for the evaluation of others. The particular word used for selfmeasurement that takes care of conflicting models deriving from multiple roles is “moral balance” (quan) and illustrates the implicit material dimension in the Mengzi’s model of the mind. While an “exigency” is action justified by an end, these examples describe an internal weighing of cultivated dispositions. one have intercourse? Again, one would not do it” [MWD E§25.2]. The concern with such quandaries extends from the Mengzi to the commentary on the Wuxing. 42 Mengzi 4B28, see Mengzi zhengyi 17.595-597. The word cun ϫ in the Mengzi can mean “exist,” “to cause to exist (i.e., preserve)” and “examine” according to Yang Bojun (see Mengzi yizhu 374), although Yang only identifies a single use of the last meaning (4A17, see below). Several early sources such as the Erya (“Shigu” ᙼඇ) use the term as “investigate” (cha ࿫ ), and the use of several metaphors for the measurement of the mind in the Mengzi might suggest that in this and other passages the meaning of “investigate” may have been intended. In the Han writings of Jia Yi ཋ ሼ, the sage king Yao ూ says that he assesses his mind (cunxin) with reference to antiquity, as he applies his will to the impoverished common people (Xinshu ๘ए “Xiuzheng yu” ங‫ݬ‬გ part 1, Xinshu jiaozhu 9.360), and Liu Shipei ᄸࣖ੮ notes, this is quoted in the Shuoyuan (“Jundao” Ѽལ, Shuoyuan xiaozheng 1.5) as assessing his mind with respect to the empire. 43 Mengzi 1A7, compare 2A2. The Hanshi waizhuan makes a similar point about the sage: ໶ʆ̣ʴܾʆ‫ږ‬ʛ “The sage uses himself or herself to measure others.” Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng 3.278 (cf. Hightower 1952, 110).

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As with the balance between the methods of benevolence and righteousness in the Wuxing, the faculty of quan in the Mengzi is also a way to address the issue of the “unity of the virtues.” Martha Nussbaum has noted that: “An important part of a thinker’s account of a single virtue is his view about the relationship to the other virtues. One may hold that they are distinct traits, but somehow imply one another’s presence; or one may hold a stronger unity thesis, that the various apparently distinct virtues are all at bottom a single trait, though called by different names in different contexts.”44 Recently, several writers have weighed in on the presence or absence of a unity thesis in early China. A.S. Cua has argued that there is a version of it implicit in the Xunzi,45 and Lee Sang-Im has argued for a version in both Socrates and Kongzi.46 Alasdair MacIntyre has taken passages such as Analects 14.4: ۲ ‫ ږ‬ʿ ͫ Љ ˋ “A courageous person does not necessarily possess benevolence” to mean that for Kongzi, there was no unity of the virtues. MacIntyre concludes that “Confucianism denies [a western] type of strong thesis about the unity of the virtues.”47 What these approaches have yet to do is compare particular ways of talking about the virtues in detail. While there is no question that the discussions in the Wuxing and Mengzi represents a type of unity thesis, the differences between notions of unity is instructive. The similarities show that for the Wuxing and the Mengzi, MacIntyre’s denial of a strong thesis is misleading. Socrates saw the virtues as being all of the same kind–pieces of gold, rather than different facial features.48 The Wuxing and the Mengzi saw the four human virtues as being of the same kind, and indeed the Mawangdui commentary to the Wuxing refers to the cultivation of each virtue as building the qi of that virtue. The assumption of a common denominator among the virtues gave rise to metaphors of measurement to express the capacity to know which virtue to apply in a particular situation.49 When the sages are spoken of,

44

Nussbaum 1993, 358. Cua 1987. Lee Sang-Im 1999. 47 MacIntyre 1991, 106. 48 Both metaphors are used to describe alternate conceptions of the virtues in the Protagoras. See Protagoras 329D (Guthrie 1956, 61). The metaphor aside, there is considerable debate about exactly what the Platonic idea of the “unity of the virtues” connoted. For a good summary, see Paula L. Gottlieb 1994, 276, n. 6. 49 There are also similar problems that might arise. One possible shortcoming of such a view is found in Nussbaum’s discussion of Protagoras’ view: “A Protagorean legislator can, further, minimize direct conflict between major components of the city’s value system–for example, by structuring civic and religious institutions in such a way 45 46

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however, the topic is how to harmonize the virtues, and it becomes apparent that the gold that their alchemy is trying to attain is the elusive means of unifying them. The unity of the virtues exemplified by the sages allowed them to avoid tradeoffs between benevolence and righteousness in the same way that the dao is able to embody both yin and yang. The Mengzi is not talking about a unity where all are the virtues are apples, but rather one where both apples and oranges may be weighed on the same scale. In the contentious atmosphere at the end of the fourth century B.C.E., described in the first chapter, attacks on the Ru positions from the perspective of other theories of value occasioned the development of models that might integrate conflicting values in just this way. For late Warring States Ru, the question of how one knew when to adopt a particular virtue or exemplar became a problem for their ethics of virtue. The Xunzi and Mengzi had very different ideas of where the analogy to Aristotle’s phronêsis (practical wisdom, or intelligence) resided. In the Xunzi, the Great Ru are able to “categorize” (lei ᘝ ), that is, to spontaneously evaluate the moral significance of phenomena. These Ru have developed a second nature such that: ࠨˋ໳˃ᘝʛ ᓛϚ఍ᖿ˃ ˀ ࠜѤΎ෨ “As long as it concerns the categories of benevolence and righteousness, even among the birds and beasts, they are as if distinguishing black from white.”50 The ability to categorize is in effect an argument against the criticism that the Ru program is obsolete, because the ability to spontaneously evaluate the moral significance of phenomena allows the Ru to perfectly analogize new situations and circumstances to those of past.51 For the Mengzi, the systematization of the virtues allowed for the existence of a measurable dimension that they all shared. Its view that the virtues are measurable on this single scale provides one answer to this challenge to the Ru. The convergence between the discussion of natural cycles theory and ethics was of course not done only to solve problems internal to the Ru tradition. As I will argue, the ability to investigate the mind in the as to prevent confrontation between the unwritten laws of family worship and the decrees of civil government” (Nussbaum 1986, 105). 50 By contrast, the “elegant Ru” are such that: ႝԳ˃‫͵׿‬в ۱‫ڈ‬ʿ঻ᘝʛ “if they have not yet heard or seen something, then their understanding is unable to categorize it.” See Xunzi jijie 4.140 (cf. Knoblock, v. 2, 80). The “small Ru” are contrasted in similar terms: they cannot spontaneously evaluate and act, even though they generally act correctly (4.145, cf. Knoblock, v. 2, 83). 51 The Xunzi argues this explicitly in the “Fei xiang” ‫( ߟ ۍ‬Condemning physiognomy) chapter, see Xunzi jijie 3.81-3 (cf. Knoblock, v. 1, 207-8). A similar view grounds the exegetical schools that grew around the Spring and Autumn.

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Mengzi is related to practices designed to observe and diagnose individuals in technical fields developing outside the court. The right question to ask about its connection with medical and physiognomy texts might not be “Why did ethics and natural philosophy mix so freely in the fourth century B.C.E.?”, but rather “Why do we project a distinction between ethics and natural philosophy back onto the moral physiology of the fourth century B.C.E.?”

The physiognomy and physiology of virtue in the Mengzi One of the most persistent criticisms leveled at the Ru at the end of the fourth century B.C.E. was that of moral hypocrisy. The frequent appeals in the Mengzi to demonstrable signs of virtue might be seen as an integration of materialistic approaches to the body occasioned by this critique. The Mengzi integrates the virtues into a description of human physiology, and as a result the virtues are seen to be subject to the same physical processes that govern the rest of the material (or quasi-material) world. Cultivating the attributes of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom involved an actual physical transformation in the body. This cultivation alters the sage’s interior state (nei ˖), and changes in that state affect external appearance (wai ͙), an assumption common to early Chinese theories of medicine and music. Because the Mengzi’s moral theory shares explanations for how inner states affect external appearance with the early physiognomy texts, such texts offer clues to how to interpret the Mengzi’s account of the effect of self-cultivation on appearance. Prized appearances such as a resemblance to jade were thought to mirror healthy jing ႅ (“essence”) and qi. For this reason, a person’s virtue was observable, especially by examining that person’s eyes. The description that opened this chapter, drawing a distinction between the sage’s appearance and that of a common person, is a case in point. The coloration described in Mengzi 7A21 is a reflection of changes in the mind of the sage brought about through repetition of moral action. The use of phrases such as “glossy coloration” are examples of a trope of jade-like physical appearance serving as a sign of transcendence already well established by the fourth century B.C.E. The locus classicus for this comparison is “Xiaorong” ʮϻ (Small war carriages), a song from the Odes that has been traditionally read as the plaint of a woman longing for her distant husband, stationed at the western border. It contains the line: Ե‫׭‬Ѽʪ ຈմϨ΂ “I long for my

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gentleman, who is warm like jade.”52 Here the term “warm” (wen ຈ) may also connote mildness or gentleness, and in the Han Dynasty the term was specifically associated with a benevolent nature.53 Kongzi quotes the same line of the Odes passage in a dialogue with his disciple Zigong ʪ৸ that appears in the third century B.C.E. text Xunzi. When Zigong asks Kongzi if the reason that the gentleman values jade is because the supply of jade is so limited, the Master feigns shock and horror and then uses the occasion to explain to Zigong the true affinity between jade and the gentleman: ౱ ቘ ‫ݵ‬щԵʛ ˮѼʪ৴ϠЩቓ˃ ˲Щ඙˃‫ ۿ‬ˮ΂‫ ږ‬Ѽʪ̍ᅭା ຈᇁЩጎ ˋʛझЩ୎ ‫ڈ‬ʛ ੥ࢉЩʿ‫ ׌‬໳ʛ ฬЩʿ⢷ мʛ ӜЩʿ ᆌ ۲ʛຨቱՓԳ શʛ Ͽ˃ մᑵଡಙЩხႝ մ̊ቪ೸ ᘂʛ ‫ݭ‬ᓛЉ ̙ͺ˃ᎴᎴ ʿࠜ΂˃ఈఈ ༶̆ Ե‫׭‬Ѽʪ ຈմϨ΂ Џ˃ᎂʛ “That’s just awful, Ci ቘ (i.e., Zigong)! What kind of idea is that? Now, how could a gentleman look askance at one thing just because it is common, and value something else because it is rare? It is really that jade is the thing to which the gentleman compares virtue (de ᅭ). Its warmth, sleekness and lustre–this is its benevolence. Its grain and pattern–this is its knowledge.54 Its hardness, strength, and intractability–this is its righteousness. That it stands upright but does not cause injury–this is its taking action. That it may snap but does not bend–this is its courage. That both it has flawed and correct portions–this 52 Mao 128, Mao Shi zhengyi 6c.369-371. The Mao ̎ preface to this poem, associated with Maogong ̎˙, who served as Erudit under Prince Xian ᙋ of Hejian in the second century B.C.E. Zheng Xuan ቷ΁ (127-200 C.E.) places the narrative of the poem in the reign of King Xiang ᒝ of the state of Qin (Mao Shi zhengyi 6c.369). The “Qin benji” ঎ʹ৩ (Basic annals of the state of Qin) in the Shiji places the conflict between the seventh and twelfth year of his reign, i.e., 771-766 B.C.E. (5.179). Arthur Waley (1937, 111) translates this clause as “gracious as jade,” while Bernhard Karlgren (1950a, 82-3) punctuates the phrase differently: “I am thinking of my lord; how refined he will look, like a jade in those plank huts,” and understands his refinement to stand out like jade only relative to the “foreign tracts” in which he is stationed. 53 See Cheng Junying ദ‫ ࠡ۝‬and Jiang Jianyuan ሢԳ˔ (1991, 341). Some Han dynasty scholars read wen as a jiajie ਪࡪ (loangraph) for the same graph without a water radical, which is defined in the etymological dictionary Shuowen jiezi ი́༱Ϫ (Discussions of phrases and explanations of words, c. 100 B.C.E.) compiled by Xu Shen ்฻, as “benevolence.” The Qing dynasty commentator Duan Yucai ‫΂ޗ‬ൽ (1735-1815) explains that “in all cases when [the former graph] connotes mild, gentle, or warm, it ought to be written as [the latter graph]. When [the former] became commonly used, [the latter] fell into disuse,” (Shuowen jiezi zhu 5a.47a [212]). This appears to be the sense that the Han commentator Zheng Xuan interpreted its usage in “Xiaorong”: ‫׭‬Ѽʪ˃‫ ׷‬ຈ೸Ϩ΂ ΂Љˉᅭ “She longs for her gentleman’s nature, which is warm like jade. Jade has five virtues,” (Mao Shi zhengyi 6c.10a). Yet it is difficult to tell whether wen’s connotation of “benevolence” underlies its use in the Odes, or is a result of that usage. 54 The term li झ (literally, like a chestnut tree) can connote many of the qualities of the tree, including the straightness of its grain.

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is its candor.55 That when struck, its sound issues clearly and may be heard far away, and when dampened, its sound ceases–this is its elegance of speech. So that is why fine ornaments of alabaster cannot measure up to the display of jade.56 When the Odes says: ‘I long for my gentleman, who is warm like jade,’ this is what it is talking about.”57

Here, Kongzi describes the virtues of jade in general, and the benevolent qualities of jade as “warmth, sleekness and lustre” in particular. This description of jade’s “benevolence” combines the two words “sleek and lustrous” used by Zhao Qi to explain the facial “glossiness” of the virtuous gentleman, with the word used for the jadelike warmth characteristic of the remembered gentleman in the Odes. While it is difficult to date the appearance of this text with precision, the presence of variants of this dialogue in the multilayered Liji ᔩ৩ (Record of Ritual), the Guanzi ၸʪ (Master Guan), Liu Xiang’s ᄸώ (77-6 B.C.E.) Shuoyuan იࠥ (Garden of Persuasions), and Wang Su’s ̙ോ (194-256 C.E.) Kongzi jiayu ˱ʪࣁგ (Family Discussions of Kongzi), shows that it was already widely circulated by the early Han dynasty.58 Based on the “Xiaorong” ode from the Odes alone, however, it is safe to say that the connection between jade and the virtues was already established when the Mengzi was composed. What is the nature of the connection between jade and the virtues? Was the link between jade and the gentleman strictly a metaphorical relationship, or was a closer affinity being asserted? While this question is difficult to answer on the basis of the texts just mentioned, there was a tradition in early China that asserted the connection was based on a 55

For the sense of qing શ as “admitting one’s faults” in Dong Zhongshu’s ༓Ϋൗ (c.179-c.104 B.C.E.) “Renyi fa” ˋ໳ٗ (Methods of benevolence and righteousness), chapter 29 of Chunqiu fanlu, see Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 8.255, compare Guanzi jiaozheng ၸʪओ͸ 14.136). 56 Knoblock translates the penultimate line “although the serpentine is carved, the result does not equal the natural marking of jade,” following Yang Liang’s ๫᱈ (fl. 818 C.E.) commentary (1994, 257). It is not clear that zhangzhang ఈఈ refers to the natural state of the jade, and this translation follows Hao Yixing ਋ᛯм (1757-1825), who rejects the natural/artificial reading and instead likens the sentence to the phrase: ‫ݲݲ˃ݶ‬ʿϨ̇˃‫اا‬ʛ “The brightness of the stars is not as great as the brilliance of the moon,” (Wang Xianqian ̙ζᒣ, Xunzi jijie ৖ʪූ༱ 20.536). 57 Chapter 30, “Faxing” ٗм (Models for action). See Xunzi jijie 20.535-6 (cf. Knoblock 1994, v. 3, 257). 58 Versions of this dialogue may be found in the “Pinyi” ໷ ໳ (Visitation ceremonies), chapter 48 of the Liji; the “Shuidi” ̐ϙ (Rivers and Earth), chapter 39 of the Guanzi; the“Zayan” ᕺԵ (Miscellaneous sayings), chapter 17 of the Shuoyuan; and the “Wen yu” ੕΂ (Asking about jade), part of fasicle 8 of the Kongzi jiayu. It is summarized in the “Junzi” (Gentlemen), chapter 12 of Fayan ٗԵ (Model Sayings).

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direct physical resemblance. By examining physiognomy texts, it becomes clear that a jade-like facial appearance was indeed a highly prized characteristic. Physiognomists in early China judged animals and people on the basis of their external physical characteristics. Sometimes, based on a subject’s resemblance to a certain animal, the physiognomist diagnosed characteristics of that animal in the subject–a practice that in European contexts is called theriology. Other times, an association based on shape, color, or some other characteristic led to a different diagnosis. Whether or not practitioners of physiognomy were interested in the question of why there was a link between external appearance and internal qualities, the linkage was clearly important to many of their literary contemporaries. Warring States and Han texts argued that two facial features in particular, the eye and the forehead, were closely connected with the essential character of a person and were effectively windows into that person’s innermost mind. For some physiognomists, it was the eye that had the quality of jade and revealed a person’s inner worth. Several early texts related to physiognomy have been recently discovered, some along the lines of practice manuals and one closer to a literary treatment. In 1985, fifteen bamboo slips, originally excavated at Yinqueshan ჿఅʱ in Shandong province in 1972, were published that date to the reign of Han emperor Wu (r. 141-87 B.C.E.) They include the Xiang gou fang ߟ ‫̄ ٹ‬ (Recipes for physiognomizing dogs) a bare-bones treatment of diagnosing a dog’s desirability based on their physical characteristics.59 In 1988, a Han text on sword physiognomy found at Juyan ‫ ע׍‬was published. These bamboo slips methodically outline the way to tell a “good” (shan െ) sword or blade from one that is “counterfeit” (bi ࿱) based on a number of physical characteristics, including ornamental patterning.60 These two examples are closer to practice manuals, but a third is much closer to a literary treatment. Written on silk instead of 59

For example, three shapes of muzzles are ranked on slip 213: ీ଒Ϩߵ┟ Ўᓩ ψ Ў‫ح‬ᑳ “It is desirable for the muzzle to be straight as a bamboo pole. Next [most desirable] is like that of a goose. Next [most desirable] is a bat.” Wu Jiulong ѹʃᏝ (1985) identifies the following fifteen slips (214 characters) as part of the same “Recipes” text: 208, 213, 221, 242, 261, 271, 302, 315, 374, 889, 899, 1837, 2570, 3788, and 4047. The “Recipes” were found in the western compartment of the outer coffin of tomb no. 1 (see Wenwu 1974.2 for the initial report). Li Ling (2000, 86) notes that while initial reports of the discovery of a Xiang gou jing ߟ ‫ ٹ‬໩ (Dog physiognomy classic) in 1977 at Shuanggudui ᕻͅ੧ in Anhui province have been published, the text itself has not yet been. 60 Fighting cocks and frightened snakes are motifs characteristic of counterfeit swords, which also tend to be coarse, soft, easily get dull, and as a consequence bring bad luck. See Li Ling (2000, 86-87).

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bamboo, the 5200-character text has been given two titles by scholars–Xiang ma jing ߟ ਠ ໩ (Horse physiognomy classic) and Daguang po zhang ʨγॺఈ (Essay on Great Brightness Explained). According to Zhao Kuifu ღථˮ, the entire 5200 characters of this text focuses only on the eyes of horses.61 In the text itself, the center of the eye (probably the iris and the pupil) is compared to jade: ΂ˀʑ(Љ)ຨ 㦈✠(ፏፏ)Ϩീ௤޴㏏. . . ͫࢌ(ඵ)˭ᅭ մႅʂદ In the jade there are flaws, suspended as strands of silk joined to make a thread. . . It necessarily echoes tian’s virtue, and its essence is then obtained.62

The use of the term jing (essence or essential qi) to describe the eye implies that because the eye has the translucence of jade, it can reveal the healthy circulation of qi underneath. Moreover, it says that this is received from tian in the case of the best horses (known in other contexts as tianma ˭ਠ “horses of tian”). There were numerous other kinds of physiognomy practiced in early China, and one of these was human physiognomy. Physiognomy was a way of judging the intrinsic qualities of domestic animals, humans, swords, or even fields and silkworms.63 The methods were not based on 61

Xiangmajing was found at the same tomb as the Wuxing in 1973, and so is at least several decades older than the dog physiognomy recipes, but some scholars believe that a text it quotes simply as Fa ٗ (Method) dates back to the Warring States period. The text is comprised of seven eleven-line pieces of silk, the first two an original text (jing ໩, lines 1-22), the next two a commentary (zhuan ෭, lines 23-44) and the third a set of ancient teachings (guxun ‫ݭ‬ৰ, lines 44-77). See Zhao Kuifu (1989a, 267). Fragments of another text given the title Horse physiognomy classic were found at Xuanquan ᘿ‫ޛ‬ near Dunhuang in Gansu Province in the early 1990’s. 62 It is also possible to read xiang ඵ (xiang ᛏ) “echo” for qing ࢌ. Guo Jue ௱‫ټ‬ has pointed out to me that reading it as xiang ՙ makes the phrase similar to the Mozi ኳʪ “Shangxian” ‫׋‬ቖ chapter’s ˭ՙմᅭ “Tian xiang qi de”. This passage is part of the second piece of silk, columns 20-21 in Mawangdui Hanmu boshu zhengli xiaozu 1977. For a study of this text, see Zhao Kuifu 1989a and 1989b. 63 Ban Gu ॗ֣ (32-92 C.E.) lists nine physiognomy texts in the “Yiwen zhi” ᗟ́ ӆ (Treatise on bibliography) of the Hanshu ် ए (History of the Han). The “Yiwenzhi” contains a category of one hundred and ninety works devoted to algorithms and techniques (shushu ᆚ ி ), which is further divided into six subcategories: astronomy (tianwen ˭́), calendrics (lipu ገᗯ), five phases (wuxing ˉм), milfoil and turtle shell (shigui ⟠Ꮮ), miscellaneous divinations (zazhan ᕺ̀), and methods based on forms (xingfa Ӂٗ)–the last including both geomancy and physiognomy. Among the six texts in “methods based on forms” based on reading topography of land and the physical features of animals and swords, are three text explicitly devoted to physiognomy texts: Xiang ren ߟʆ (Physiognomizing people) in 24 bundles, Xiang baojiandao ߟᘽᄹʋ (Physiognomizing precious swords and blades) in 20 bundles, and Xiang liuxu ߟ˗य़ (Physiognomizing the six kinds of animal) in 38 bundles. There are also three other texts that involve physiognomy among the 18 “miscellaneous

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the spirit world, but rather on an ability to evaluate internal jing and qi.64 The jade-like quality of the eye allowed the physiognomist access to patterns of qi not only to judge horses, but also people. The Xinshu ๘ ए (New Writings) attributed to Jia Yi ཋ ሼ (200-168 B.C.E.) explains the reason the eye has this special quality, which is the reason it is able to see. The Xinshu explains that the eye contains the purest essential (jing) qi, making vision possible by its mixture of reflective and transparent properties. The lustre of the eye makes it like jade: ᜋ‫঻̣׿ږ‬Գʛ Գ‫ږ‬Αʛ ལᅭ‫ٵݯ‬ႅัЩ޴Α ‫ֻ˃ٵݭݵ‬Ӂʛ ˜ ζЩ޴Α ΑϾʛ Ӂʂન ‫̣ݵ‬ʆ˪Љϕ˃Ϛम நႅ‫ؠ‬ΑΑଡЩᇁጎ ࠜᐩ ೷⇪ᔫᕺା ‫঻ݭ‬Գʛ Reflectiveness is why one is able to see, and the part of one that sees is the eye. Of the things that the Way and Virtue bestow upon creatures, it is the essential (jing) and the subtle that make the eye. This is why when creatures begin to take form, the eye is formed at the start of differentiation, and once the eye has developed, then the rest of the form follows. This is the reason that, of all the qi on which a person depends, none is more essential (jing) than the eye. The eye is clear but also glossy and lustrous like it is wet, and does not have fine hairs and dirt mixed in with it. This is why it is able to see.65

divinations” texts: Wu jin xiang yi qi ‫ ن‬໖ ߟ н ዇ (Military prohibitions and physiognomy of clothing and equipment) in 14 bundles, Shen Nong jiaotian xiang tu gengzhong আ འ ૥ Ή ߟ ʥ ব ၲ (Divine Agriculturalist’s cultivation of fields, physiognomizing of earth, plowing and planting) in 14 bundles, and Zhongshu cangguo xiangcan ၲዾႧ‫( ᝓߟس‬Planting trees, storing fruit, and physiognomizing silkworms, reading zang Ⴇ as cang ᕅ) in 13 bundles. See Hanshu 30.1775. A description of jiaotian ૥Ή is given in the ninth treatise of the HouHanshu (“Jisi ୯‫ڋ‬,” part 2), where as part of a sacrificial ceremony to Hou Ji ϒᇱ, youths pantomime “cultivating the fields” by going through the stages from clearing the fields through harvesting and processing the grain (3208). This opens up the possibility that the text was not actually about agriculture but about stylized ritual performances that mime agriculture tropes. 64 Ban Gu writes: [Ӂٗ‫ ]ږ‬ʆ˪˗य़ਡٗ˃ܾᆚ. . . ೾݆Љ‫ۂ‬ഠЩύᅮմᑵ ‫ۍ‬ Љਥআ ᆚб೸ʛ “[Works on methods based on forms use] the measurements and algorithms from bone-centered methods for people and for the six kinds of animal. . . Just as pitchpipes each have a length, and in every case [the length] is proof (zheng ᅮ) to its pitch, [these techniques] are not a matter of the demons and spirits (guishen ਥআ), and their algorithms are so of themselves.” (Hanshu 30.1775) Ban’s contention is that physiognomy was not efficacious because of higher powers, but rather worked “by itself.” As the reference to pitchpipes implies, there was thought to be a natural relationship between external form and internal quality of jing and qi. 65 From the “Daode shuo” ལᅭი (Exposition of Dao and De) chapter of Jia Yi’s Xinshu, see Jiazi Xinshu jiaoshi 8.965-967. This passage is part of a comparison of the eye and the Way, similar in their glossiness and lustre. Wang Zhouming ̙‫ اޝ‬and Xu Chao ࣝඟ also explain that they are both capable of containing the myriad things (1996, 322, n.3). This chapter also contains a description of the six virtues of jade, similar to the above passage in the Xunzi, but with a different set of virtues. Jia notes: “Jade alone reflects (xiang, literally “is an image of”) human virtue,” (Jiazi Xinshu

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This fascinating explanation of sight depends on the properties the eye shares with jade, which result from their common formation from essence and subtle qi. Given this understanding of the eye, it is not hard to see how examining it would allow a physiognomist access to the “virtues” bestowed on a creature by Heaven. Early medical texts agree that the eye is the most transparent site on the body to observe the qi. If the eyes “are dim windows on the soul” for William Blake (1757-1827), then in early China, the eyes were rather accurate windows on one’s qi.66 This is confirmed by references in recently excavated medical texts to ocular exams as a means to diagnose the balance of qi.67 Other texts provide recipes to “brighten” (ming ‫ )ا‬the eyes, a verb used in the same way that “sharpen” is used with reference to eyesight in English.68 The Shiwen ʏ ੕ (Ten questions), also found at Mawangdui, describes the sexual technique of coitus interruptus as resulting in sharpened eyesight and hearing.69 This practice, which Donald Harper calls the cultivation of “penile essence,” results in the concentration of essential qi. The same text describes other ways to brighten the eyes, including breathing exercises to “eat qi,” specifically inhaling daytime qi.70 These texts make it clear that jiaoshi 8.959). On the authenticity of this chapter of the Xinshu, see Csikszentmihalyi 1997 and Svarverud 1998, esp. 129-134 and 145-153. 66 Blake’s “The Everlasting Gospel” reads: “This Lifes dim Windows of the Soul/ Distorts the Heavens from Pole to Pole/ And leads you to Believe a Lie/ When you see with not thro the Eye.” 67 The Yinyang mai si hou ఀ෍঺Аࡵ (Natural signs of death based on the yin and yang vessels), found at Mawangdui, lists five signs of death, the third being: ࡒ෨Α⦻ ඁ૬ ۱मζА “an inky face, startled eyes, looking about wildly, [all signs that indicate] qi has died first.” See Ma Jixing 1992, 309-10, Harper 1998, 219-220. 68 Huainanzi “Jingshen xun” ႅআৰ defines ming “brightness” as: “When the ears and eyes are clear and hearing and sight are penetrating, then this is called ming” (Huainanzi 7.100). References to ingesting substances to improve one’s sight in the Mawangdui medical texts are in Yangsheng fang ኙΆ̄ (Recipes for nourishing life) 25, Taichan shu ࠏ୕ए (Book of Fetal Production), and Shiwen ʏ੕ (Ten questions) 9; Ma Jixing 1992, 726-730, Harper 1998, 351; Ma Jixing 1992, 791-793, Harper 1998, 380; Ma Jixing 1992, 952, Harper 1998, 407. The last advocates eating leeks (jiu ࡕ), said to retain heavenly and earthly qi. Later texts, such as the Heshang gong commentary to the Laozi, seem to use ming to refer to the ability of the eyes to project light outward (and hence visual acuity), a meaning that it is also possible here. 69 Question 3: Ma Jixing 1992, 892 [cf. Harper 1998, 391]. This practice is also recorded in He yinyang ϐఀ෍ (Joining yin and yang) and Tianxia zhidao tan ˭ʓв ལሾ (Discussions of the ultimate Way of the world); see Ma Jixing 1992, 989 and 1025, Harper 1998, 418 and 427. 70 Questions 4 (Ma Jixing 1992, 892, Harper 1998, 396) and 9 (Ma Jixing 1992, 952, Harper 1998, 407). There is another reference to this result, but the placement of the slip is a matter of argument (Ma Jixing 1992, 914, Harper 1998, 405, see also Harper 1998, 396, n.8).

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there is a strong correlation, as there is in general in matters of health and wellbeing, between the conservation and retention of qi and the optimal function of the eye and ear.71 When the transmitted “Yinyang yingxiang dalun” ఀ෍ᏻඐʨቈ (Great discussion of how yin and yang echo images) chapter of the Huangdi neijing suwen ෦ܹ˖໩ছ੕ (Pure Questions about the Yellow Emperor’s Inner Classic) tells us that at age sixty, qi declines, this is the same age that the excavated Tianxia zhidao tan ˭ʓвལሾ (Discussions of the ultimate Way of the world) tells us that eyes and ears will lose their sharpness unless one follows a set of fifteen rules for cultivating qi.72 These references to dietary, sexual, and breathing practices demonstrate the connection between the eye and the healthy circulation of qi. Other texts reveal that it was not only an ideal eye, but also an ideal face that resembled jade. The later Han writer Wang Fu ̙୷ (78-163 C.E.) explains what a physiognomist looks for in a human face using the standard adjectives for jade: ࡒ௰଒ຄͦᇁጎ “In the area of the face, one desires it to be broad and flat, sleek and lustrous.”73 Since the characteristics of jade were also part of the ideal non-human face, the first century B.C.E. Prose-poem “Shen nü” আ ʩ (Spirit woman) attributed to Song Yu ҭ΂ describes the transcendent of the title as: სᕙߙ̣ப᫏˘ ࠦຈᇁ˃΂ᖄ 71 A related example of the adaptation of these medical ideas to the political/ethical discourse (or vice versa) is the description of the “perfected person” in Huainanzi, which argues for the closing off of the senses in order to preserve essential qi, a prerequisite for “brightening” the eye. The “Benjing” ʹ໩ (Basic warp) reads: ႅٚ‫ؠ‬ Α۱մඁ‫ ا‬Ϛ‫ؠ‬Ы۱մ᛾ᑶ ॡ‫ؠ‬ʤ۱մԵະ ූ‫˻ؠ‬۱մᅱ௢ ‫ݭ‬௻͗ᘕ۱Խ೷મ Р໢நࠥ நАநΆ ந൳நߙ ‫ݵ‬ᎂॲʆ “When the essential [qi] fills the eye, vision will be sharp; when it is in the ear, hearing will be acute; when it stays in the mouth, words will be appropriate; when it is concentrated in the mind, reflection will be thorough. Therefore if one closes these four gates, the body will not admit calamity. None of the hundred joints will have sickness. There will be no death, no life, no emptiness and no fullness. This is called a ‘perfected person.’” (Huainanzi 8.120). Here the sharpening of the eyes through proper circulation of essential qi is consistent with the medical texts, but an additional facet is added: the eyes grow sharper but one does not use them to see. For a treatment of this passage in the general context of a discussion of the meaning of jing in the Huainanzi, see Xu Fuguan 1976, 230-243. 72 These two passages are clearly related, in that they both talk about the “Seven deficiencies” (qisun ʁ๑) and “eight benefits” (bayi ʉ८). In the Huangdi neijing suwen, the Yellow Emperor’s minister explains to him that at sixty qi fails to circulate, leading to a variety of ailments. See Huangdi neijing suwen yijie 5.54-55. A rather different set of concerns is outlined under the same label in the Tianxia zhidao tan; see Ma Jixing 1992, 1026 and 1044; Harper 1998, 428 and 432. 73 From the “Xianglie” ߟλ (Examples of physiognomy) chapter 27 in Qianfulun ᆻˮቈ (Discourses of a Hermit). Following Wang Xianqian, pu ຄ is substituted for bo త, see Qianfulun 27.130 (cf. Kinney 1990, 115-118).

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୨ʪ޷մႅऒ˘ ᑈϠࠀЩ̈́ᝳ In appearance rich and full with dignified beauty, Her jade colored forehead about to bloom with warmth and moistness. Her pupils piercing, their essence (jing) distinct, Shining, full of beauty and easily observable.74

In this poem, the characteristics of the “spirit woman” of the title include both a pupil whose essential qi is distinct and a jade coloration. The suggestion that an ideal jade-like appearance was a sign of transcendence is even clearer in another Han period poem, “Yuanyou” ხ೑ (Far off journey), found in the collection Chuci ๤ᘂ (Songs of Chu). In that poem, the narrator’s odyssey to the realms of the immortals brings color to his face: ΂и⫱̣※ᖄ “My jade coloration is vibrant, my forehead lustrous.”75 In the “Shen nü” and “Yuanyou”, the external sign of a “jade facial coloration” (yuse ΂и) signifies the transformation of the body and entry into the realm of the spirits. Attention to appearance of the face is found in some Ru texts but criticized in others. As with the example of the eyes above, the reason for the jade coloration has to do with the circulation of qi. The etymological dictionary Shuowen jiezi ი ́ ༱ Ϫ (Discussions of phrases and explanations of words, c. 100 B.C.E.) compiled by Xu Shen ்฻, defines se и (here translated as “facial coloration”) as “the qi of the forehead.”76 A change in color of the face of the gentleman was particularly suggestive of anxiety and shame. Indeed, in Ru texts se has long been the way one could observe the authenticity of such core behaviors as jing (reverence or awe) and xiao (filial piety). For example, in Analects 2.8, when the disciple Zixia asked about filial piety, Kongzi replies: иᘗ “What is difficult is one’s facial coloration.”77 Likewise, in Mengzi 3B7, the disciple Zilu says of a person who says that he or she agrees before truly being in agreement: ᝳմи௚௚೸ “observe the reddening of their facial coloration.”78 In the Mengzi, sweating or blushing are seen as signs of inauthentic behavior, while the moistness and lustre of jade is a sign of moral transcendence. 74

Wenxuan ́᎚ 19.8a (268). Ma Jigao ਠጻਢ argues that this prose-poem dates to the reign of Emperor Wu ‫( ن‬r. 140-86 B.C.E.) or later (1987, 40). Zhang Zhenjun has pointed out to me that jing lang ႅऒ here might also be qinglang ଡऒ “clear”. 75 Wang Yi’s ̙ධ (fl. 119 C.E.) commentary notes that wan ※ has a variant of yan ណ, “fullsome,” and Hong Xingzu ‫ޞ‬፞অ (1090-1155) glosses it as ze ጎ “lustrous,” (Chuci buzhu 5.244 [cf. Hawkes 1985, 196]). 76 Chapter 9a, Shuowen jiezi zhu 1981, [33b] 431. Here, this could also refer to the qi observable above the top of one’s head. 77 Lunyu jishi 3.88-91 (cf. Lau 1979, 64). 78 Mengzi zhengyi 13.41-5 (cf. Lau 1970, 112).

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The conflation of moral and physical beauty really irked the author of the Xunzi, a text that condemned physiognomy just as it condemned aspects of the Mengzi’s moral theory. The Xunzi pointed out the bizarre appearance of the sage kings–Yao and Shun had double pupils and Kongzi seemed to be wearing an animal-skin mask. It goes on to criticize the dandies of its time who wore elegant clothing, and denigrates the abilities of those who imitated the circulation (xueqi л म) and appearance of young girls, a remark perhaps aimed at Ru who try to cultivate the complexion of a “spirit woman.”79 Nevertheless, the Xunzi’s objections do not quite apply to the theory we have seen outlined in these texts, but were rather aimed at the predictive aspect of physiognomy, and to feigning an ideal appearance. It is possible to distinguish two major theories of contingency in early China: (1) that generalized prognostications may be invariantly applied to a class of like phenomena; and (2) that multiple prognostications could be carried out about a specific subject over time, so that future actions could mitigate negative outcomes.80 The practices that the Xunzi objects to are of the first type, while the texts we have examined have clearly been of the second type, which is also one more generally consistent with Ru texts and with the notion of ming ֡.81 Human beings with a jade facial coloration and clear pupils do not display these attributes all their lives, but they are the result of self-cultivation. This is explicitly stated in Mengzi 7A38: Ӂи ˭‫׷‬ʛ ા໶ʆ ೸݈̣̈́቟Ӂ “Form and facial coloration are a matter of Heaven-given nature. It is only once one has become a sage that it is possible to inhabit one’s form.”82 79

Xunzi jijie 3.75-6 (cf. Knoblock 1988, v. 1, 204-205). This distinction is developed in “Divination, omens, and in between: Ritual and contingency from Wangjiatai to Wang Chong,” a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 22, 2001. 81 This is most evident in the writing of Wang Fu in the Eastern Han. After lauding physiognomy, Wang gives the following caveat: [Ӫ̈] ࠜЉմ቙ ЩʳʿӪ ̈́Ϩщ ‫ݭ‬ʘߟ‫঻ ږ‬ಭմ‫׿‬๨ ʿ঻՟˃ͫв. . . ʢՍ˃ਠ ਡٗᓛճ ͪയʿࠓ “If [wood] contains the right qualities but the worker is unskilled, what may be done? Therefore all physiognomists can come up with a period that a person might reach, but cannot cause him to necessarily reach it. . . With a ‘thousand li’ horse, although its bones may be able, without a riding crop it will not go that far.” Wang argues that there are physical characteristics that predispose people to certain types of destiny, but their individual behavior must also influence their outcomes. See Qianfulun 27.131. 82 Legge translates the last phrase, jianxing ቟Ӂ, as “satisfy the design of his bodily organization” (1895, 472), and Lau as “give his body complete fulfilment” (1970, 191). They are both following Zhu Xi, who writes : ቟Ϩ቟Ե˃቟ Ⴕ୥ʆЉ‫ݵ‬Ӂ Щʿ঻ၣ մ୎ ‫ݭ‬೷̣቟մӁ ੗໶ʆЉ‫ݵ‬Ӂ ೸݈̣̈́቟մӁ Щ೷ာʛ “Jian here is like the jian in jianyan ቟Ե (to fulfill a promise), generally a common person has a form and cannot exhaust its principle, and so is without a means to fulfill this form. Only the sage both has a form and is able to exhaust its principle, and only then can one fulfill one’s 80

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The Xunzi’s indictment of predictive physiognomy was not really applicable to the variety of diagnostic physiognomy that was characteristic of the Mengzi. Nevertheless, it is hard not to view the criticism in the Xunzi as being directed both to the correlation of beauty and moral qualities later seen in the Chuci, and, by association, to any other theory that incorporated physiognomic principles. The link between moral perfection and the sage’s jade-like was perhaps another reason for the Xunzi’s criticism of the Mengzi. Considered against the background of the emerging third and second century B.C.E. physiognomy and medicine, the Wuxing and the Mengzi share a set of common concerns and assumptions with these more popular discourses on physiognomy. First, the Wuxing describes a type of clarity of sight and hearing that is very similar to that identified in the medical texts above as indicative of vigorous circulation of qi. Second, the Mengzi shows direct awareness of the practice of eye physiognomy, and advocates it in 4A15: ϫ̢ʆ‫ ږ‬நԯ‫ؠ‬୨ʪ ୨ʪʿ঻ૐմ౱ সˀ͸۱୨ʪᑈା সˀʿ͸ ۱୨ʪᯇା ᛾մԵʛ ᝳմ୨ʪʆା⏻‫ۿ‬ In assessing another person, nothing is as effective as the pupils. With the pupil, a person is incapable of hiding evil. If what is in a person’s chest is correct, then the pupil will be clear. If what is in a person’s chest

form and not be deficient” (Mengzi zhangju jizhu 13.360-361). This is, however, another instance where the emphasis of Song readings of the text is rather different from earlier ones. Zhao Qi understands the term xingse Ӂи in the first clause of the quotation as pointing to the heaven-endowed physical appearance of men and women, respectively. Males appear severe and respectful and females have a fascinating beauty (yaoli Ңᘰ). Zhao Qi’s comment to the second clause quotes the “Wenyan” ́Ե commentary to the Changes: “Jian is lu ᅟ (to squat, hence “occupy”), and is to inhabit something. The Yi says: ‘[The gentleman] in the Yellow Center (Huangzhong ෦ˀ) comprehends principle.’ Only when the sage, both inside and outside, is patterned and clear, is he is able to use the correct Way to occupy (lu) and inhabit this beautiful form.” Zhao continues to note that the use of the male “form” and not the female “facial coloration” here reflects the priority of “respecting yang” over “restraining yin.” (Mengzi zhengyi 27.937-939). This implies that the perfection of the sage is to fully inhabit his heaven-given form. Zhao’s choice of quotation is likely pointing out the similarity between the way moral beauty functions in the “Wenyan” passage and the “jade-like facial coloration” of Mengzi 7A25. Just as the Mengzi talks of how the glossy coloration “affects the four limbs” (shi yu siti ‫͗ؠݯ‬ᝂ, from Mengzi 7A21), so too does the “Wenyan” describe the interior beauty of the gentleman Ѽʪ෦ˀ௢մ୎ ͸ т ‫׍‬ᝂ ࠀϚմˀ Щဖ‫ ̀͗ؠ‬ച‫ؠ‬Ֆ๣ ࠀ˃вʛ “The gentleman in the Yellow Center comprehends principle. He holds his office and inhabits his body. Beauty is inside of him and flows through his four limbs (chang yu sizhi ဖ‫)̀͗ؠ‬, emitted through his affairs and enterprises. This is the epitome of beauty” (Yijing zhengyi 1.27b, cf. Lynn 1994, 149). Yang Rubin ๫ኵტ argues for Zhao’s reading of the second clause and notes that most Qing commentators use Zhao’s reading (1996, 131-135).

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is not correct, then the pupil will be fuzzy. If one listens to a person’s words and observes their pupils, how can that person hide anything?83

Here, the Mengzi states that the pupils are directly correlated to the “correctness” of the mind and is basically advocating a strategy of eye physiognomy as a type of lie detector. This was not lost on Wang Chong ̙̭ (27-c.100 C.E.), who in his Lunheng ቈ፰ twice refers to Mengzi as a physiognomist. Wang writes that Mengzi ׂ̝ʪߟʆ̣ ୨ʪା ˻ଡЩ୨ʪᑈ ˻ጏЩ୨ʪᯇ “physiognomized a person by the pupils. If the person’s mind was clear then the pupils would be clear, if the person’s mind was cloudy then the pupils would be indistinct.”84 This suggests that, beyond his clear sympathy for the idea that insight into the mind may be gained by observation of the face, it is possible that Mengzi himself taught physiognomy. Whether or not this was the case, the Mengzi’s 7A21 statement that the cultivation of the virtues “gives rise to a glossy coloration that may be seen in the face” makes the same connection that early physiognomy texts did. In particular, the Mengzi associates coloration and wetness of the forehead, as well as movement and tears in the eyes, with the spontaneous excitement of strong feelings in the mind. The text’s primary examples are of reactions of children to the sight of their deceased parents. The Mengzi quotes Kongzi as saying that when a king dies, the exemplary crown prince’s face turns a deep inky black (shenmo ଴ኳ). At the funeral, his eyes and face are particularly expressive of his grief, so much so that others are reassured by this proof of his heartfelt reaction : ˪в༎ ͗̄գᝳ˃ ᖄи˃ૂ ً࢛˃ ‫ږ˹ ۼ‬ʨ࣬ “When it comes time for the burial, people come from all directions to see it. The devastation on his countenance and the sorrow of his crying (leave) the mourners greatly satisfied.”85 Of course, the prince’s reaction is not feigned, and the physical transformation is proof that his reaction is moral and not just semblance of sincerity. A 83 Mengzi 4A15, see Mengzi zhengyi 15.518, especially Jiao Xun’s reading of cun ϫ as cha ࿫ “to investigate” or “to assess.” Contrast Lau 1970, 124. Generally, liang ԯ means “good,” but it can also mean “effective” as with the description of a doctor in the “Bietong” Ѥ ௢ (Distinguishing between levels of Erudition) chapter of the Lunheng: ঻٢Рॣᎂ˃ԯ “A doctor who can cure the hundred illnesses is called liang,” (Lunheng jiaoshi 13.595; compare Forke 1962, v. 2, 101). This sense of liang is also compatible with the Mengzi’s use of liang in the phrase liangzhi ԯ‫ڈ‬. 84 “Benxing” ʹ‫( ׷‬Original nature) chapter, see Lunheng jiaojian 3.98. Compare Forke 1962, v.1, 385. A similar passage is found in the “Yiwen” ѝ́ (Lost writings) chapter, see Lunheng jiaojian 20.659 and Forke 1962, v.1, 279. In the former case, Wang criticizes the practice, but in the latter he appears to agree with it. 85 Mengzi 3A2, see Mengzi zhengyi 10.332 (cf. Lau 1970, 96).

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similar example of spontaneous moral reaction was that of the ancients to the sight of the unburied corpses of their deceased parents. The Mengzi uses a particularly graphic description of this scene, perhaps trying to excite the same spontaneous reaction in the reader: each day when the offspring passed the corpses, ‫ ˃࡚॔ٺ‬ᗦḙַ⣇˃ “foxes were eating them, and flies and mole-crickets sucking at them.” The intended reaction of revulsion follows: the offspring’s մ㆟Љ᭺ ໇Щ ʿඁ ˮ᭺ʛ ‫޴ۍ‬ʆ᭺ ˀ˻ཥ‫ࡒؠ‬Α “forehead beaded with sweat, and eyes looked away so as not to see. It was not the case that the sweating was done for others, but it was the mind within expressing itself upon the face.”86 Again and again, the Mengzi emphasizes a class of reactions that Philip J. Ivanhoe calls “give-away actions” because their spontaneity and directness are seen as proof of their authenticity.87 The classic example of an infant about to crawl into a well contains not one but three denials that a witness would be initially moved by anything other than a spontaneous moral reaction. Anyone’s mind would be moved to fear and sorrow, ‫˖̣׿ۍ‬Ο‫ؠ‬Ᏹʪ˃̓͹ʛ ‫ۍ‬ ‫ ࠱ ̣ ׿‬ᚼ ‫ ؠ‬ඵ ᚎ ‫ ˩ خ‬ʛ ‫ ۍ‬౱ մ ᑵ Щ ೸ ʛ “neither in order to ingratiate oneself with the infant’s parents, nor in order to gain fame among one’s fellow citizens and friends, nor yet because one wants to avoid notoriety.”88 Whatever ulterior motives one might have, the “give-away” reaction is the initial and spontaneous one, and therefore an authentic expression of the mind. Just as the face was the physiognomist’s window into a person’s character, it was also the Mengzi’s means for diagnosing moral reactions in the mind. It is tempting to see this as the appropriation of popular practices and discourse by the Ru, but the picture is not quite that simple. It is true that physiognomy and medicine had demonstrably different social correlates than did advising kings and teaching princes. In his treatment of excavated technical texts, Li Ling Өྒ argues for a fundamental distinction between the conditions of production of the “hundred experts” (baijia Рࣁ) and Ru texts, and those that were produced “before” or “below” those texts.89 Li is certainly right about the social

86

Mengzi 6A5, see Mengzi zhengyi 11.405-407 (cf. Lau 1970, 105). See Ivanhoe’s discussion of give-away actions in the Mengzi (2002, 39-40). 88 Mengzi 2A6. D.C. Lau translates sheng ᑵ to be the sound of the cry of the child, which is possible, although somewhat grisly (1970, 82). This translation follows the Zhao Qi commentary, which reads it as buren zhi shengming ʿˋ˃ᑵϏ “a reputation for not being benevolent,” (Mengzi zhengyi 7.233). 89 Li Ling (2000, 1-31, esp. 14-5). In his introduction, Li argues for a two-tier model wherein the technical arts texts that he studies are identifiable as the forerunners 87

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location of the practices mentioned above. Animal physiognomy was of great economic utility, especially in northern border regions where raising horses had a military objective. Specific recipes on Han bamboo slips for treating equine ailments have been found in the border regions in the Juyan area in Inner Mongolia and at Liushazhui ‫ ޟ‬Ӹ ᅏ northwest of Dunhuang.90 The famous Eastern Han general Ma Yuan ਠ ಕ (14 B.C.E.-49 C.E.) is credited with a great expertise in physiognomizing horses, with writing a text on it, and with casting a bronze model to illustrate the practice.91 An Eastern Han exemplar of such a model was recently excavated in Gansu province, and Hu Pingsheng ࠍͦΆ has argued that these models were important part of physiognomy methods.92 These examples show that many physiognomy texts were consumed primarily by people involved in animal husbandry, often in military contexts. Horse physiognomy is also attested in the Lüshi chunqiu ѻ ̏‫߲ ݱ‬, which identifies ten “excellent practicioners of horse physiognomy.” This includes a certain daughter Li ᄼ who was expert at reading the eyes of a horse.93 Jia Yi, the Han scholar-official whose detailed description of the eye was cited above, appears in a narrative about two scholars going for a trip to diviners’ stalls in the market. Chu Shaosun ჎˲ࢽ (c. 105-c.30 B.C.E.) identifies the presence of a diviner named Chen ௾ who ̣ߟਠΘϏ˭ ʓ “established a name for herself throughout the world on the basis of physiognomizing horses.”94 This Han horse physiognomist, like her early counterpart described in a text composed over a century earlier, was female. The contexts seen above are generally rather different from the ones we associate with the composition of the Mengzi, and with the ceremonially-attired, ritual-conducting Ru portrayed in late Warring States texts. The practice of physiognomy was associated with

of Daoism. The arguments presented in this book indicate the extent to which they also influenced works in the Ru tradition. 90 The Liushazhui recipe is called “Zhima shangshui fang” ٢ਠ෱̐̄ (curing a horse injured by water, or possibly soup recipe for curing a horse) and the Juyan recipe is titled “Zhi matou tichu fang” ٢ਠᏃव̳̄ (recipe for curing a horse whose head sheds tears). See Zhou Tianyou ֟˭೑, et al., 1978, 73. 91 HouHanshu 24.840. 92 See Li Ling 2000, 87 and Hu Pingsheng, 1989. 93 “Guanbiao” ᝳ‫ڷ‬, Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi [20.8] 20.1414. Other received texts show evidence of this practice, including the Zhou li ֟ᔩ, which lists an “assessor of horses” (mazhi ਠ቙) and the Qimin yaoshu ᄫͺ࠱ி, which has a chapter on animal medicine that includes physiognomy. 94 In the “Rizhe liezhuan” ̅‫ږ‬λ෭ (Arranged traditions of the hemerologists), Shiji 127.3221.

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particular social locations–military, agricultural, and commercial–and generally seemed to occupy a different social space than the Mengzi.95 Whatever the nature of the borrowing between the two social groups, the Mengzi argued in a way similar to the technical practitioners that physical changes resulting from the sage’s cultivation of the virtues were a result of material changes in the mind and body. This borrowing or sharing of descriptions of the body from physiognomy and medicine provided a solution to challenges to the authenticity of Ru moral motivation. Reverence in serving one’s parents, grief in mourning, and compassion for others at risk, are all examples of spontaneous expressions of dispositions to morality. If authentic moral motivation may be seen on the face or in the eyes of an actor, if the link between the motivation and the act is transparently expressed, then there is no possible way that the Ru could be seen as hypocritical.

Metaphors for self-cultivation in the Mengzi The Mengzi discusses self-cultivation using two dominant models: agriculture and the accumulation of qi. This section looks at the two models for self-cultivation, with special attention to the role of the quasi-material qi already seen in the last section in theories of human physiology appropriated by the Mengzi. While the role of qi in the resolution of quandaries was largely implicit, there are explicit references to the role of qi in the cultivation of virtue. The first explanation of the “mechanics” of self-cultivation is that a person begins with fledgling dispositions towards the virtues, and, if the environment is suitable, the person is able to nurture these dispositions 95

At the same time, it is not possible, on the basis of the evidence linking the Mengzi to eye physiognomy practices, to say that the technical vocabulary was first in use on the popular level and that it was only later adopted by the Ru. We have seen how criticisms of hypocrisy and selfish motivations on the part of the Ru were significant enough to produce a reaction among the Ru. It is certainly possible that the discourse on transparent virtues developed at court prefigured or influenced the development of a similar discourse in commercial and military circles of early China. The appearance of horse physiognomy in works such as the Zhuangzi, Xiangmajing, and Mengzi could never be considered cases of strict borrowing from the popular level, either, because in no case is the practice described as directly as it is with the bamboo-slip practice manuals, but it is instead used to metaphorically in service of a related set of ideas. This perhaps indicates that a model of mutual influence between the Ru and the technical disciplines celebrated by Li Ling would be the most reasonable one to describe the relation between these disparate social locations. .96 Sarah Allan 1997, 95.

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into mature virtues. The physical changes entailed by the cultivation of the virtues are described using an agricultural analogy. Sarah Allan has argued that “because plant growth and regeneration are the focal point of the concept of wu [‫“ ٵ‬things”], the principles of plant growth are extended from plants to an understanding of all living things, including humans.”96 That the same principles apply to the eyes of people and horses, for example, is a consequence of this shared metaphor. The connection between the technical disciplines and the Mengzi goes further than shared assumptions about the potential transparency of appearances, to its description of the actual mechanism by which the eyes and face reveal underlying virtues. Often the Mengzi describes self-cultivation as “growing” the virtues. The Mengzi holds that there are “sprouts” (duan ၷ) of moral reactions already present in the inner mind, and that the four sprouts in the inner mind may be nurtured to become the four virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom.97 That the four sprouts have an actual physical existence is shown by the statement that ʆ˃ Љ‫͗ݵ‬ၷʛ ೾մЉ͗ᝂʛ “people have these four sprouts just like 97

Mengzi 2A6. D. C. Lau translates duan as “germ,” (1970, 83), James Legge uses “principle,” (1895, 203-4), Philip J. Ivanhoe has “sprout,” (2002, 14), Wing-tsit Chan renders it as “beginning,” (1963, 65), and Chan is followed by Benjamin Schwartz (1985, 267). This variety of translations belies a disagreement between earlier and later commentators about the meaning of the term. Early definitions rely on the form of the character and read it as a depiction of a “sprout.” The Shuowen jiezi definition of the original graph (duan ࠅ) explains that the graph derives from pictorial graphs of the top “living form” and bottom “root” of a plant and indicates its basic biological sense as “the tip” (literally, “forehead,” ti ᖅ) from which a thing begins life,” (Shuowen jiezi zhu 7b.3a-b [336]). Zhao Qi glosses its use in the Mengzi as shou ࡛, literally “head.” The use of terms like “head” and “forehead” in this context probably refer to the “tip” of a growing plant. The Shuowen jiezi commentator Duan Yucai points out that the term is used in the Zhouli description of the duties of the master of the stone chimes (qingshi ጸ̏), where the original graph is used to mean the edges of the chimestone that are rubbed to produce lower tones than rubbing the sides (Qian Xuan 1998, 1118; see von Falkenhausen 1993b, 80-84 for an explanation of the phenomenon). The other commentarial position is to read duan as the key to external knowledge. Interestingly, Legge refers the reader to passages in the Bible about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in the Garden of Eden (Gen. 2.17, 3.5-6) and about the way that wisdom and understanding are hidden in darkness and secrecy from God’s answer to Job (Job 38.36). Both these quotations refer the notion that moral knowledge is exterior to human beings, and indeed he explains duan as “that point outside, which may be laid hold of, and still guide us to all within,” (1895, 203, n. 5). The reason that Legge adopts this externalist reading is that he is following the Song commentator Zhu Xi’s gloss of duan as xu ႖ “clue,” which literally means the end of a thread. Neither the postBuddhist Confucian Zhu, who believed the principles of the universe could be accessed by investigating the pattern of a stalk of bamboo, nor the Protestant missionary Legge, who believed that true knowledge was divine in origin, was completely comfortable with the innatist picture of morality that the Mengzi advocated.

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they have four limbs.” In fact, the Mengzi continually stresses that the biological fact that everyone has a mind is what makes sagehood a possibility for all people at birth. The reader twice comes across the statement that the sage-king ൘ʆʛ ӍΠʆʛ “Shun was a person, and I too am a person.”98 Yet the fact that people begin life with the same sprouts of virtue does not assure they all end up as sages. The problem arises when people lack economic means or suffer from hunger and thirst, and as a result “lose” (fang ‫ )؞‬their original minds.99 This aspect of the Mengzi’s model internalizes the second general critique of the Ru seen in chapter one, that environmental criteria affect one’s ability to act virtuously. Extending the agricultural metaphor, the Mengzi likens the loss of the original moral dispositions to the denuding of a hillside that falls victim to deforestation and overgrazing. A person who has been similarly worn down may appear to have never had virtue: ᓛϫ̢ʆ‫ ږ‬৴೷ˋ໳˃˻‫ ۿ‬մ‫؞̣׿‬մԯ˻‫ ږ‬Π೾‫̈ؠ˃̃؟‬ʛ Even though one has assessed it in another person, could it possibly be the case that they are devoid of a mind of benevolence and righteousness? The means by which the person lost his good mind is like the action of the axes on the trees.100

This quotation begins almost the same way as the passage cited above about the physiognomy of the eye. That passage began, “In assessing another person (cun hu ren zhe ϫ̢ʆ‫)ږ‬, nothing is as effective as the pupils.” This one begins: “Even though one has assessed it in another 98

Variations on this statement are found in Mengzi 3A1, 4B28, 4B32, 6A7 and 6B2. See Mengzi zhengyi 10.320, 17.596, 17.605, 22.763, and 24.816. Compare Lau 1970, 95, 134, 136, 164, and 172. 99 Lacking a constant livelihood (hengchan ‫)୕ݔ‬, a person may lack a constant mind (hengxin ‫)˻ݔ‬, according to Mengzi 1A7 and 3A3 (Mengzi zhengyi 3.93 and 10.333, cf. Lau 1970, 58 and 97). Similarly, people’s minds are injured by hunger and thirst, according to Mengzi 7A27 (Mengzi zhengyi 27.920, cf. Lau 1970, 188). A constant mind is an optimal state, unaffected by deprivation. By contrast, the discussion of the “unwavering” or “unmoved” mind in 2A2 is more concerned with a supernormal constancy of the mind, which is not only not subject to deprivation, but not subject to the lure of excess. The next section of this chapter looks closely at 2A2. 100 Mengzi 6A8, see Mengzi zhengyi 23.775. On the translation of cun as “examine” here, see note 42. D.C. Lau follows Zhao Qi’s commentary when he translates the first sentence as “Can what is in man be completely lacking in moral inclinations?” (1970, 165), a translation consistent with the use of cun as “exist” or “preserve” later in the passage, where atmospheric influences “exist” and the mind’s “preservation” is opposed to its wang ʞ (but not fang ‫“ )؞‬loss.” However, the previous sentence describes the denuded mountainside with the phrase ʆԳմᐦᐦʛ ̣޴͵྾ЉӪା “Everyone see its bald appearance, and so thinks that the mountain never had any trees.” Reading cun as a verb of observation rather than a verb of existence provides a much clearer counterpart to the verb jian Գ, which was clearly intended as a parallel.

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person” (sui cun hu ren zhe ᓛϫ̢ʆ‫)ږ‬, perhaps implying that in the pupils of a person whose virtuous impulses have been uniformly eliminated, the absence of virtue is as obvious as the baldness of the denuded hillside. The Mengzi laments the fact that, while people all will look for a lost dog or chicken, many do not know to look for a lost mind.101 Self-reflection, ritual practice, learning, and the resultant development of the virtues, allow one to avoid this loss and eventually exhibit the appearance and behavior characteristic of the sage. A second description of the mind is glimpsed in a set of passages in the Mengzi that focus on qi rather than on a metaphor of agricultural growth. This model is a very similar to the sprouts analogy: both center on the thriving of the organism and draw on medical texts of the period. The term qi occurs in three passages in the Mengzi, the most striking of which treats different examples of courage. Qi plays multiple roles in the early Chinese understanding of the body. It was both the quasi-physical substance that circulated inside the living body, as well as a dynamic material that accounted for external atmosphere’s effects on that body. As a result, it was both critical to sustaining life and potentially harmful to it. Early medical texts, according to Paul Unschuld, describe qi as “an unavoidable environmental factor, as a physiological necessity, and as a potentially harmful agent.”102 Recent work on oracle bones indicates that of these two kinds of qi, the original use of the term was to describe an external influence allied with early concepts of wind (feng ࡘ) and that its projection into the body was probably a secondary meaning.103 The discussion of qi in early China was not, however, restricted to areas that today we describe as “medical”. In the Warring States and early imperial periods, both senses of the term were being used in conjunction with a view of the proper functioning of the body. External qi was related to internal or humoral qi because they functioned in similar ways and also because external qi could disrupt the body. Qi also provided a physical mechanism by which tian influenced (and, for some Han writers, was influenced by) the human world. The Chunqiu fanlu ‫߲ݱ‬ᑪᛎ (Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn) attributed to Dong Zhongshu ༓Ϋൗ, likens the qi of human affective states to four kinds of qi that effect the seasons: 101

Mengzi 6A11 says that the only way to find a lost mind is the Way of learning. See Mengzi zhengyi 23.786 (cf. Lau 1970, 167). 102 Unschuld 2003, 149. 103 Maekawa Shôzô has shown that oracle bone references to qi had to do with descriptions of the deified forces of wind and earth (in Onozawa 1978, 21-5).

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ʆЉమ݊‫ۼ‬ᆪ ೾˭˃Љ‫̱߲ࢬݱ‬ʛ మ݊‫ۼ‬ᆪ˃вմइЩ଒ചʛ ࠜ ‫˃̱߲ࢬݱ‬вմइЩ଒̳ʛ ߖ˭म˃೸ʛ Human beings have contentment, anger, sadness, and happiness in the same way that tian has spring, summer, autumn, and winter. When contentment, anger, sadness, and happiness arrive at the proper time and want to be expressed, it is like when spring, summer, autumn, and winter arrive at the proper time and want to be emitted–these are both the way they are because of tian’s qi.104

The descent of the qi in each season causes seasonal phenomena that people can observe, in much the same way that the arousal of the qi in one’s nature by external things causes one to react in a way that expresses emotion. Both are an expression of the qi of the tian (tianqi ˭म), a concrete expression of “tian’s Way.” This view of qi coexisted with the medical practices alluded to above, in which altering the balance of one’s qi through ingestion or retention led to beneficial outcomes. In the Eastern Han, Wang Chong records that the “experts in the Way” (dao jia ལࣁ) argue that ࡚म‫ږ‬࿕ЩʿА “those who eat qi will live long and never die.”105 Various groups used qi to explain “invisible” concepts such as action at a distance or disease processes. The application of the idea of qi to the human body was one part of a normative approach to life. It resembled concepts such as xing ‫׷‬ (human nature), which A. C. Graham wrote came to be understood as proper development according to a tian-determined order “in which each thing has its own nature,”106 and dao ལ (Way), the normative picture of the right way to live. If one’s circulation of qi was blocked or one was affected by bad qi, one could not develop properly, while smoothly flowing qi was a sign of health. Qi too was often closely connected to models of moral perfection. Yet while a person who shows no signs of human nature was classed as an animal, qi could be used in a non-normative sense.107 For this reason, qi was used to talk about morality and the good life on a number of different levels. The 104

Chapter 80, “Ru tian zhi wei” Ϩ˭˃޴, see Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 17.465. In his “Dao xu” ལ൳(Dao-related empty statements), Wang criticizes a number of practices in such a way as to preserve a good record of certain Eastern Han popular religious practices. See Lunheng jiaoshi 7.336 (cf. Forke 1962, v.1, 348). 106 Graham 1986a, 20. 107 Benjamin Schwartz (1985, 18) has observed that qi may be both descriptive and normative, both physical and psychic: “We find [in the Zuozhuan] a kind of physicalist language which seems to refer to a sort of circulating fluidum that has the Cartesian attribute of matter as. . . spatially extended, and [qi] may certainly have properties which are in later Western thought attributed to matter. . . It is also clear, however, that [qi] comes to embrace properties which we would call psychic, emotional, spiritual, numinous, and even ‘mystical’.” 105

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role of qi could be crucial to discussions of the body’s potential for embarking on a course of moral self-cultivation, and also to the description of the perfected body. It is used to describe external impediments to the correct perception or comprehension of a situation, and the interior qualities that lead one to respond to certain situations in a certain ways. A telling example of the range of understandings of the term comes from the Guanzi. The influence of external qi is cited in a passage in a chapter in the Guanzi that dates to the late Warring States period: Ոमʈ˖ ͸иʂৣ “When pathogenic qi reaches into one’s insides, then one’s proper facial coloration (se) will decline.”108 A later chapter in the same work explains that this sentence is talking not about catching a cold, but about the effect of the desire for reputation and success on the practice of self-cultivation. It argues that if a person’s internal feelings lack sincerity, then not only will he or she acquire a bad reputation, the person’s self-cultivation practices will also be polluted.109 External “pathogenic qi” is correlated with insincere feelings and an improper countenance. The influence of this external pathogenic qi disrupts the person’s interior state, causing injury to the interior beneficial qi. In other words, the importance of qi was not limited to disequilibrium in areas that today would be called “medical;” qi was also of import in areas considered moral. In the essay “Jiyi” ୯໳ (The significance of sacrifice), a chapter in the Liji, for example, true filial devotion is linked to the presence of harmonious qi. If one tries to describe the relationship between filial piety and harmonious qi in terms of causation, problems immediately arise. Is it the presence of qi 108 This phrase appears in chapter 2 of the Guanzi, “Xingshi” Ӂ෻ (Forms and influences), 2.4. Especially significant from the point of view of this analysis is the fact that when this text is quoted twice in the Wenxuan commentary–to the phrase “pathogenic qi” (xieqi Ո म ) in Sima Xiangru’s ͌ ਠ ߟ Ϩ (179-113 B.C.E.) “Changmen” ‫( ۃۂ‬Tall gate) rhapsody, and the phrase “jade body” (yuti ΂ᝂ) in Mei Cheng’s ‫“ ࡝ـ‬Qifa” ʁച (Seven Stimuli)–the term “correct facial coloration” is replaced with “jade coloration” (16.9b, 34.1a). 109 The explanation of the sentence comes from chapter 64, “Xingshi jie” Ӂ෻༱ (Explanations of “Forms and influence”). There the first clause has xi ᜀ “attack” for ru “enter”, and the passage is explained in terms of trustworthiness and sincerity of one’s inner affective states: ˀશ‫ ༻ۑ‬۱Ϗᚼࠀ “if one has trustworthiness and sincerity then one’s reputation will be good,” otherwise it will be poor. While Luo Genze ᗘघ ጎ attributes the original “Xingshi” (Forms and Influences) chapter to a Warring States period political thinker, he dates chapter 64 to the third century, at “the end of the Warring States period or late Qin, but before unification,” (1966, 6 and 11). Specifically, Luo says that the sentences referred to here are Ru, while other sentences seem to be Legalist, leading him to conclude that chapters 63-67 are “Eclectic” in their orientation. Since the chapter refers to “neighboring states,” (linguo ቶ੢) he argues that it was written before the unification of China (1966, 118-22). See Guanzi 20.330.

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that results in filial behavior, or is it the change in countenance due to the sincerity of the behavior itself? The “Jiyi” argues that a true sign of filial devotion is the maintenance of a countenance of reverence as if fasting (jingzhai zhi se ๖ᄫ˃и),110 indicative of interior harmony. The presence of the proper attitude and the external characteristics of filial piety mutually imply each other: Ҩʪ˃Љ଴ื‫ͫ ږ‬Љ֜म Љ֜म‫ͫ ږ‬Љಀи Љಀи‫ͫږ‬Љੳࣅ Ҩ ʪϨ੭΂ Ϩ֭ߙ ‫ޣޣ‬ᚙᚙ೸Ϩͪఢ Ϩઅ͛˃ ᘷ‫ܩ‬ᛦ‫̣׿ۍ ݘ‬Ֆ፶ʛ Ͼʆ˃ལʛ The filial child’s deep caring is such that (the child) will certainly have harmonized qi. If (the child) has harmonized qi, then (the child) will certainly have a glad countenance. If (the child) has a glad countenance, then (the child) will certainly have a congenial appearance. A filial child is like one who grasps the jade and presents the full vessels, doing so seriously and attentively as if incapable or about to drop them. It is not the case that dignity and respect is the way to serve one’s parents, but rather it is the way of the developed person.111 110 In this binome, the graph usually read qi ᄫ should be read zhai ᓲ, referring to the state of purification that prepares one to enter the liminal state in which one performs a sacrificial ceremony. In his commentary to the Liji “Jiyi” chapter, Zheng Xuan explains zhai ᄫ as zhaizhuang ᄫப(Liji zhushu 47.8b-9a), recalling the famous passage from the “Zhongyong” ˀજ chapter of the Liji: ᄫபˀ͸ Լ̣Љ๖ʛ “Reverent and solemn, exactly correct; [this appearance] is enough to demonstrate one’s reverence” (Liji zhushu 53.13a). Sun Xidan glosses jing as chengjing ༻๖ “sincerely reverent” (Liji jijie 46.1214). The phrase jingzhai is also used by Ban Gu to refer to the proper ritual attitude of Emperor Xuan ‫(  ܬ‬r. 74-49 B.C.E.), who constructed numerous temples to his great-grandfather Emperor Wu and was greeted with favorable omens. Emperor Xuan carried out the sacrificial rites with “reverence as if fasting” (jingzhai), and songs were performed, indicating his filial nature (Hanshu 25b.1249). Chen Zhi ௾‫ ڇ‬thinks one of the songs, with an internal date of 52 B.C.E., was about the descent of immortals to drink the water pooled in the bronze water collectors under the palace eaves, where zhi ‫ ڥ‬fungi had begun to grow (1959, 186). This event mirrored a similar event during the reign of Emperor Wu in 108 B.C.E. that also occasioned the composition of songs (Hanshu 6.193), indicating that the latter day emperor’s sacrifices to the former had the salutary effect of effecting the arrival of spirits in the same way that the policies of the former emperor did. 111 This passage as a whole describes the filial child’s appearance while carrying out a sacrifice. So, for example, when the main text says that the filial child: մන˃ʛ ๖ ̣ಀ “When he begins it, reverence is the means to gladness” and the Kong Yingda ˱ ጼཥ (574-648) subcommentary explains: ಀᎂᖄиຈ֜ “yu means that his facial coloring is warm and harmonious.” Kong’s reading is that when the child enters with the sacrificial offering, ࣅ ს ࣣ ๖ Щ ᖄ и ຈ ֜ “deportment and appearance is respectfully reverent and facial coloring is warm and harmonious.” (Liji zhengyi 47.9a). The comment of the Han commentator Zheng Xuan ቷ΁ (127-200 C.E.) indicates that he sees an affinity between this passage and the Mengzi: ೸۱Ҩʪʿ͛մᏱʪ˃˻ “If this is the case then the filial child has not lost their infant’s mind,”–a clear reference to Mengzi 4B12: ʨʆ‫ږ‬ʿ͛մԺʪ˃˻‫ږ‬ʛ “A great person is one who does not lost their baby’s mind” (Liji jijie 46.1213-4). The echo between cheng Ͼ (here translated as “developed” in deference to Zheng’s reading) and cheng ༻ (“sincerity”), the term

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Filial children who have deep caring for their parents necessarily have harmonious qi. Likewise, harmonious qi is what creates the countenance and appearance that are the hallmarks of sincere devotion. The normative interior state (harmonious qi) exists if and only if the normative exterior state (seriousness and attention) is present. The child’s attitude and that of the adult (or perhaps the “sincere” person) differ because the latter has a different countenance. At the core of the argument in this passage, as in the Mengzi, is that the action of qi is identical with the operation of the virtues–they are simply two ways of discussing the same thing. The Mengzi uses the term qi in both its pathological and beneficial senses, and Mengzi 2A2 allows a glimpse into the background of a theory that explains the way virtue exists materially in the body, and is linked to tian for the sage. The term qi is used in the Mengzi in discussing both external influences on the body and its internal state. In the parable of the denuded mountainside discussed above (Mengzi 6A8), the issue of whether or not “sprouts” of virtue still may grow in a person whose moral dispositions have been worn down is explained in terms of the effects of the “early morning qi” (pingdan zhi qi ͦͲ˃म) and the “night qi” (yeqi ֬म). Turning back to the agricultural metaphor, Mengzi says that even though the person shares exposure to the same early morning qi that nourishes others, because of abnormal likes and dislikes, the person’s daytime acts dissipate it. When this happens repeatedly, the night qi alone is insufficient to preserve the person’s sprouts, and as a result the person seems no different from an animal.112 While this passage chiefly refers to qi that is external to the body, it is just as clear that the internal sense of qi is intended in another Mengzi passage. An exposition of the importance of nurture contains a parallel between the influence of the kind of place in which one lives on bodily qi, and the influence of food on the body.113 Mengzi 7A36 describes Mengzi being startled by the sound and appearance of a prince of the state of Qi. In explaining the significance of appearances, Mengzi says to his disciples that the influence of one’s station in life affects one’s associated with carrying out moral actions in a way that convinces others because one’s qi is felt or observed by them (as explored in the previous chapter) would certainly have been picked up by early readers. 112 Mengzi 6A8, see Mengzi zhengyi 23.775-8 (cf. Lau 1970, 165). Zhu Xi explains that the “early morning qi” is the “clear and bright qi that has not yet come into contact with other things,” (Mengzi zhangju jizhu 11.331). For a discussion of the contrast between dawn and dusk breathing, see the fourth of the Shiwen (Ten Questions), Ma Jixing 1992, 909-11 [cf. Harper 1998, 396]. 113 Mengzi 7A36, see Mengzi zhengyi 27.933-5 (cf. Lau 1970, 191).

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body through qi, a process he likens to the way one’s nurture affects the deportment of one’s body.114 If the qi being referred to was not internal, the parallel would make no sense. It is significant that the verb used to narrate Mengzi’s observation of the prince is wang ૻ, the same word used in conjunction with observing the external qi of the heavens and the atmosphere, and the one used in Mengzi 1A6 when Mengzi observed the that King Xiang of Liang ʿђʆѼ “did not resemble a ruler of the people”.115 While in these two cases qi is used to illustrate particular aspects of his moral theory, in a third case qi was at the center of a more general explanation of the origins of moral reactions. The Mengzi’s theory that the cultivation of the virtues in the mind is dependent on the interior disposition of qi is developed in a complex discussion between Mengzi and his disciple Gongsun Chou ˙ࢽʽ in section 2A2. This section has been called the most difficult to understand passage in the entire Mengzi, as well as the one for which “a place has been accorded to [Mengzi] among the sages of China.”116 Its frequent digressions and difficult language have indeed made it the subject of much disagreement. Yet because it preserves details of a very early account of the role of qi in the moral theory of the Mengzi, and because it is one of the earliest descriptions of the role of qi in accounts of moral development generally, it is worth examining in detail. For this reason, this section of the chapter will examine the three key parts of the Mengzi 2A2 discussion: (1) the immovable mind, (2) the interior location of the virtues, and (3) the nurturing of tian’s qi. In its totality, the passage conceptualizes virtue in terms of qi and suggests that the sage differed from others because the sage’s body contains tian’s qi. The initial subject of the 2A2 discussion is Mengzi’s “unwavering” or “immovable” mind (budongxin ʿੂ˻), an attribute that allows a person to remain steadfast in the face of danger, temptation, or dire straits. The same quality of mind is described in the 139 B.C.E. Huainanzi: 114 Zhao Qi summarized the passage clearly: ׂʪ˃ࠖ Գ̙ʪ˃ᄭ ᑵमਢଘ ʿႩ ʆψ ᒾвᄫ ᎂቂҿʪ శ೸࿁̆‫׍‬ౚ۱मਢ ‫׍‬օ۱मʓ ‫˃׍‬୰ʆमӆ ՟˃ਢଘ ࠜաኙ˃୰ʆӁԽ ՟̭ୣʛ “When Mengzi went to Fan, he saw the deportment of the prince, whose sound and qi were high and clear, and so differed from other people. When he returned to Qi, he sighed and told his disciples that if one dwells among the nobility one’s qi is raised, but if one dwells among commoners, one’s qi falls. The way that [the prince’s] dwelling altered his qi and will causing it to be high and clear, is just like the way that one’s nurture alters one’s bodily form causing it to be full and vibrant” (Mengzi zhengyi 27.933-5 [cf. Lau 1970, 190]). 115 Mengzi zhengyi 3.69 (cf. Lau 1970, 53). 116 On its difficulty, see Yang Zebo 2001, 54. On its central importance, see Legge 1895, 185. Legge adds, a little cattily: “or in immediate proximity to them.”

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ͅ˃ϫʴ‫ ږ‬ᆪᅭЩӄቓ ‫ݭ‬Ϗʿੂӆ ᆪལЩӄ௙ ‫ݭ‬Ѧʿੂ˻ There were those among the ancients who preserved themselves, took pleasure in virtue and forgot about their low rank, so that fame did not cause their will to waver. They took pleasure in the Way and forgot their poverty, so that profit did not cause their mind to waver.117

This passage argues that stability of the will and the mind are threatened by attention to fame and fortune, but may be preserved through self-awareness and cultivating the Way. The same connotations may have been intended in the Mengzi’s use of the phrase budongxin: Mengzi tells Gongsun that his mind has been unwavering since forty and then mentions others who have cultivated an unwavering mind in military contexts. Gongsun, however, is really interested in how Mengzi developed it. While courage (yong ۲) is an important quality in the Mengzi, Mengzi’s response indicates that an unwavering mind is not only of use in a military context, it also results in incorruptibility in the face of a chance to acquire rank and wealth. This particular ability is most closely associated with the virtue of righteousness in the Analects, and indeed the latter part of 2A2 in the Mengzi focuses on acts that come out of righteousness. Before addressing how one attains such a state of mind, however, Mengzi briefly redirects the conversation to a discussion of the ideas of Gaozi Ѿʪ The second part of the 2A2 discussion contrasts competing conceptualizations of the sources of the virtues held by the thinkers Mengzi and Gaozi. The basic difference is that Mengzi sees the basis for the development of an immovable mind as being in the body, while Gaozi, here and elsewhere in the Mengzi, theorizes that the impetus for moral development is external to it. Initially, Mengzi had told Gongsun that cultivating an immovable mind was not that hard, illustrating this claim by observing that Gaozi had accomplished this feat before he himself had. When his pupil Gongsun asks about the difference between Mengzi’s and Gaozi’s immovable minds, Mengzi replies that while he agrees with one aspect of Gaozi’s picture, he also disagrees with another aspect. Mengzi agrees with Gaozi’s statement that ʿદ‫ؠ‬ ˻ ˡӶ‫ؠ‬म “what one cannot find in the mind, one must not look for in qi.” As Yang Zebo ๫ጎٕ has recently argued, when Mengzi agrees with this maxim of Gaozi’s, he acknowledges the validity of Gaozi’s statement, but interprets it in a different way than Gaozi had intended. Yang explains that the reason Mengzi approves it, albeit tepidly, is that 117

Chapter 14, “Quanyan” ཀԵ (Explanations and theories), see Huainanzi 14.248. The verb cun ϫ could be “assess” themselves rather than “preserve” themselves.

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he believes qi cannot flourish without the mind: “From Mengzi’s point of view, the mind is the foundation of the qi. Without it, the qi will have no foundation, and so will have no source.”118 Since qi is what ᝂ ˃̭ “the body is full of”, it would not make sense to talk about it independently of the mind, which we have seen can ཥ‫ࡒؠ‬Α “express itself in the face and eyes”.119 While Mengzi endorses a different reading of “what one cannot find in the mind, one must not look for in qi” based on the physical dependence of qi on the mind, Gaozi appears to have intended the statement to be an intellectualist assertion: mind is the impetus of morality, not qi. This distinction will be even clearer when we return to issue of the origins of morality below. The aspect of Gaozi’s thesis that Mengzi explicitly disagrees with is the idea that the mind is in some way dependent on words or doctrines (yan Ե). Specifically, Gaozi asserts that ʿદ‫ؠ‬Ե ˡӶ‫“ ˻ؠ‬what one cannot find in doctrines, one must not look for in one’s mind.” The accepted reading of this passage is summarized in the influential Song dynasty commentary of Zhu Xi Ѿʪᎂ‫ؠ‬ԵЉ‫׿‬ʿཥ ۱ະ‫ڣ‬໯մԵ Щʿͫ˫Ӷմ୎‫“ ˻ؠ‬Gaozi says that if a doctrine has things in it one does not understand, then one must set it aside and need not turn back and look to its principle in one’s mind.”120 When Mengzi disagrees with Gaozi’s statement, it is not because he sees doctrine as unimportant. Indeed, one of the central claims he makes in this passage is that he is a person who “understands doctrines” (zhiyan ‫ڈ‬Ե). Instead, his objection to Gaozi is that doctrine and mind are not connected in the same way that mind and qi are: there is no sense in which doctrine is the “foundation” of the mind. While Gaozi implies that moral behavior is the internalization of doctrines, Mengzi argues that motives for action arise from the mind, but that this is not always evident to the actor. As Mengzi develops his response, he briefly argues for the existence of a feedback loop between the will (zhi ӆ) and the qi, making it clear that the qi is directly influenced by will, and vice-versa. The example he gives is that when a person stumbles or hurries, it affects the person on a physical level, that is, it affects their qi. But this change in qi may turn back and cause one’s mind to waver (fan dong qi 118

Yang Zebo 2001, 56. See Mengzi 2A2 and 6A5. 120 Mengzi jizhu 3.230. Li Minghui Ө‫ا‬๚ has a very different reading of Gaozi’s position, taking it as equivalent to “only when you understand it in theory should you then look to verify it in the mind,” which is possible, but not consistent with other aspects of Gaozi’s ideas (2001, 131-138). Yang Zebo (2001, 57) counters Li’s grammatical arguments. 119

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xin ˫ੂմ˻), showing that qi can also affect the mind. Since physical changes affect the mind, thinking cannot be solely explained in intellectualist terms as accepting or rejecting maxims. This again contradicts the attempt by Gaozi to separate the mind from the body. The conflict between Gaozi and Mengzi in this passage is consistent with contrasts drawn between the two elsewhere in the Mengzi, with Gaozi attempting to define morality in terms of external rules, and Mengzi responding by insisting on an internalist position. At the end of his explanation in 2A2, Mengzi isolates his core criticism of Gaozi: Ѿ ʪ ͵ ྾ ‫ ڈ‬໳ ̣ մ ͙ ˃ ʛ “The reason that Gaozi has never yet understood righteousness is that he takes it to be external.”121 By contrast, the Mengzi is continually emphasizing the internal origins of the virtues, as with the testimony of King Xuan of Qi in 1A7. King Xuan admits to Mengzi that the root of his action of sparing a sacrificial ox had been opaque to him, until Mengzi explained it to him. He says: ˫ЩӶ˃ ʿદѳ˻ “turning back and examining into it, I did not find it in my mind.” By contrast, Gaozi argues that: ʿદ‫ؠ‬Ե ˡӶ ‫“ ˻ؠ‬a person must not seek something in their mind that they cannot attain as an external doctrine.” For Gaozi, the entire psychological picture developed by Mengzi, with its attention to the will and the qi, is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to morality. The third part of the passage turns away from the comparison with the externalist arguments of Gaozi when Gongsun asks Mengzi to explain what it is that his master is good at–the occasion for Mengzi’s explanation of his nurturing of tian’s qi. Mengzi’s response is uncomplicated. He says: “I understand doctrines, and I am good at nourishing my radiantly bright (haoran ू೸) qi.” This sentence is in many ways the pivot of the entire passage, and the meaning of “radiantly bright” qi is a key to understanding the cultivation of the virtues in the Mengzi. Understanding the meaning of haoran is crucial to describing the role of qi in the Mengzi. The term haoran is difficult to translate, and it is usually understood to be referring to a prodigious and expansive “flood-like” qi that “wells up” and moves one to spontaneous moral action.122 While “flood-like” is one possible reading of the term, most 121

Cf. Mengzi 6A4. When D.C. Lau uses the term “flood-like” (1970, 77) and James Legge uses “vast, flowing” (1895, 189), they are both taking hao in its superlative sense (expansive, tall, deep) advocated by Zhu Xi (Mengzi zhangju jizhu 3.231). This is compatible with the other usage of the graph in the Mengzi, in the context of another’s disrespectful action creating the spontaneous will (zhi) to return home (Mengzi 2B12). The same 122

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early commentators understood it in a fundamentally different manner.123 Zhao Qi glosses the term as the ˭ म “tian’s qi,” emphasizing none of the features associated with flooding. The Qing dynasty commentator Jiao Xun further notes that works associated with Han writers such as Dong Zhongshu and Ban Gu also used the phrase to mean “tian’s qi.”124 These early works all appear to be reading haoran ू೸ as haoran ജ೸ (“radiantly bright”). In a number of early sources, the two versions of hao are used interchangeably.125 According to the Shiming ᙼϏ, the third century C.E. lexicon of Liu Xi ᄸ၍, tian’s qi in the summer is “widely dispersed and radiantly bright”

term is used to describe the qi of the sage in the chapter of the Guanzi that Harold D. Roth translates as “Inward Training,” (Neiye ˖๣), where it is associated with external tranquility and safety from disaster and injury. See Guanzi 16.271 (cf. Roth 1999, 74). 123 An examination of the history of the definition of hao reveals that there has long been a debate over the early meaning of the term. The locus classicus for the reading of “floodlike” for hao is the Shuowen jiezi, compiled by Xu Shen at the end of the first century C.E. There, the character is glossed as jiao ᆹ“pour water on” and explained using a quotation from the “Wu shu” ༗ए: “The floodwaters are haohao” (hongshui haohao ‫)ूू̐ޞ‬. The “Wu shu” (or “Wu Xia shu” ༗ࢬए) is a division of the classic Documents that includes the chapter titled “Yaodian” ూ յ . While Xu’s quotation is not part of the extant Documents, the “Yaodian” does contain both halves of the quotation as part of a somewhat different passage: ೢೢ‫̄̐ޞ‬ఝ ፥፥ᖩʱᒝ௽ ूूຍ˭ “Swollen, the floodwaters cause injury in every direction; agitated, they envelop mountains and cover their peaks; haohao, they inundate tian,” (Shangshu zhengyi 2.19b, Legge 1895, v. 3, 24). It is possible that the longer passage was simply shortened by Xu Shen. In this context, however, his gloss of jiao is not at all clear, and so later commentators have come up with strategies to revise the gloss in light of the full quotation. Duan Yucai has argued that Xu’s gloss is infelicitous: “Jiao is an error for hang ԋ(bank of fog).” Duan has written that hao, hang, and yun ᣟ“torrent” all had the same meaning and sound (Shuowen jiezi zhu 11b, 548), indicating a translation something like “swirling.” Ma Zonghuo ਠ‫ׅ‬Ꮈ (Shuowen jiezi yinjing kao ი́༱Ϫ ˺໩Ш “Yin Shu kao” ˺एШ 1.17) understands it as “permeating.” Both readings are reasonable possibilities in the context of the “Yaodian” passage. 124 Mengzi zhengyi 6.199. Jiao Xun cites Ban Gu’s “Da Bin Xi” ളტ᐀ (Response to Bin Xi) and the “Xun tian zhi dao” ౮˭˃ལ (Following tian’s Dao) chapter of the Chunqiu fanlu. “Da Bin Xi” compares haoran qi to Kongzi’s ӏिෙ˃ӆ “rejecting ambition as passing clouds,” (an allusion to Analects 7.16) something that Jiao argues should parallel “tian’s qi” (see Wenxuan 45.15a). “Xun tian zhi dao” identifies different kinds of qi as with various aspects of tian, and then states: ‫ٵ‬Άߖ඙मЩ‫ڹ‬ኙ˃ “Things that have life all value their qi and welcome and nourish it,” and finally quotes the passage in the Mengzi about haoran qi (Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 16.446). 125 In the HouHanshu text and commentary, several direct references to the Mengzi’s phrase haoran zhi qi are written with the graph hao ജ (See HouHanshu 39.1308 and 39.1321; 58.1878 and 58.1895). The commentary to the “Dazhao” ʨ؈ (Great Summons) poem in the Chuci also notes the variant hao ू for hao ജ (Chuci buzhu 10.2a). While the Wenxuan quotes “Da Bin Xi” with the graph hao ू, the commentary also quotes Xiang Dai’s ෛ‫ ה‬gloss of hao ജ as “white, as haoran ജ೸ tian’s qi,” (Wenxuan 45.15a). From this, Hu Kejia ࠍџࣁ concludes Li Shan’s edition originally used hao ജ (See his Wenxuan kaoyi ́᎚Ш୙, in Wenxuan 8.9b-10a).

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(busan haohao ͥಞജജ).126 Liu’s description of tian’s qi refers to the light of heavenly bodies, recalling depictions of meteorological phenomena as instances of pure qi found in other texts.127 Returning briefly to the link between ethical ideals and conceptions of the body, this “radiantly bright” appearance is a primary characteristic of the sage. One early text about King Wen argues that you can always tell a sincerely virtuous person because their facial appearance is “radiantly bright” because such qi cannot be hidden. A set of principles on observing people’s facial colorations in the “Wenwang guanren” ̙́‫ׇ‬ʆ (King Wen makes appointments to office) chapter of the DaDai Liji ʨᐁᔩ৩, contains this description: ቙иജ೸֣̣ϯ ਨиᑮ೸෩̣ຓ “a truthful facial coloration is radiantly bright (haoran) and firm in its settledness, while a deceitful facial coloration is variegated and chaotic in its agitation.”128 In the DaDai Liji, it serves as a form of lie detector, and the brightness of 126

The original text that Bi Yuan ୘Ӽ(1730-1797) worked with in compiling his commentary Shiming shuzheng ᙼϏ୚ᗱ used hao ജ, which he saw as a common form of hao ᛑ. On the basis of a passage in the “Da Zhao” from the Chuci ๤ᘂ (“Heaven is white and radiantly bright,” Tian bai haohao ˭Ύᛑᛑ), he substitued hao ᛑ. See Wang Xianqian ̙ζᒣ (1842-1918), Shiming shuzheng bu ᙼϏ୚ᗱ༩, 1.20. 127 In the omenological chart “Tianwen qixiang zazhan” ˭ ́ म ඐ ᕺ ̀ (Miscellaneous Divinations According to Heavenly Patterns and Qi Images) excavated at Mawangdui, for instance, the qi of stars and the sun is drawn in red ink, while that of clouds is drawn in black, indicating a differentiation between pure and turbid qi (see Loewe 1994, 191-213). A similar character (also hao) with the ri ̅ (sun) radical means “brightness” and is glossed in Shuowen jiezi zhu 7a.304 as: “The appearance of sunrise.” Duan Yucai notes: “Its meaning is extended to describe all white things. Its character is also changed using the bai Ύ radical to make hao ജ.” There are a number of different meanings for the term “tian’s qi” unconnected to moral behavior in early China. Other meanings include: 1) directly obseved meteorological and astral phenomena such as those King Goujian of the state of Yue believed preceded the fall of a great state in the Wu Yue chunqiu ѹඞ‫( ߲ݱ‬10.1a), for which he built an observatory on Mount Zao Ꮮ so as to “watch tian’s qi and observe tian’s anomalies” (Yuejue shu ඞഽए 8.2a). 2) Yang qi, with earthly qi forming the two types of qi, whose cycles drive annual change in the Yueling (Monthly Ordinances, included in Lüshi chunqiu and Liji); 3) One of six types of bodily qi whose movements are used to explain features of the body in the Huangdi neijin suweng (see Unschuld 2003, 414-20). 128 “Wenwang guanren,” chapter 72 of the DaDai Liji, posits the existence of five kinds of interior qi, with which it associates five affective states: contentment (xi మ), anger (nu ݊), desire (yu ଒), distress/satisfaction (huan ㋽), and anxiety (you ᅴ). When the qi of each of these reactions builds inside of a person, it is impossible to hide it from a person who can “observe facial colorations” (guanse ᝳи). The sixth century C.E. commentary of Lu Bian ጰᛂ explains the phenomenon: Եᓛ଒‫ݭ‬ᓙ˃‫ؠ‬ˀ Щ೷ ֯иԳ‫ݭ ͙ؠ‬ʪࢬ੕‫ؠ‬Ҩ ʪ̆иᘗ “This means that even if one desires to resolutely hide in within oneself, there is no choice but for it to be seen from the outside. This is why, when Zixia asked about filial piety, the Master (i.e., Kongzi) said: ‘What is difficult is the facial coloration,’” a reference to Analects 2.8 (Wang Pinzhen 1983, 10.192). Indeed, the phrase comes from an imperative in Analects 12.20: ࿫ԵЩᝳи “investigating into words and observing facial colorations.”

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tian’s qi is a sign of truthfulness. The same connection with the appearance of brilliantly white qi and sagacity may be seen in other early texts and also in Mengzi 3A4. In that passage, Zengzi ಫʪ uses much the same language to describe his departed teacher. Following Kongzi’s death, when three other disciples propose to serve another as they served Kongzi, Zengzi refuses. The reason for declining was that Kongzi had been exceptionally pure, and no one could again reach such a standard: “As if washed in the waters of the Jiang and Han rivers and then dried in the late summer sun, he was so brilliantly white (haohao ⦶⦶) that none surpassed him!”129 This description of Kongzi is meant to emphasize his purity and therefore his superiority to other would-be sages. The phrase “brilliantly white” is understood by Zhao Qi to mean ߊΎ “very white,” in keeping with the way that the word hao ⦶ is elsewhere used to describe birds and snow.130 In his Qing commentary on the description of Kongzi as “brilliantly white,” Jiao Xun prefers to read the connection as being more metaphorical: ⦶⦶ᎂ˱ʪୣᅭϨ˭ ˃˔मജᣊ “‘brilliantly white’ is describing Kongzi’s thriving virtue as being as flood-like and overflowing as tian’s primal qi.”131 Yet early works like those of Dai De and Zhao Qi understand the connection made in Mengzi 3A4 more literally to say the ideal sage in Mengzi is full of tian’s qi. Just as the filial son’s qi may be seen in his countenance, so too the radiance of the sage’s store of tian’s qi, transparently displayed by a jade countenance, is proof of virtue. Having such pure qi might well lead to the facial “glossiness” (sui ⓯ ) characteristic of the sage, a product of fullness of yang qi. Glossiness is something that the first century C.E. writer Yang Xiong associates with the effulgence of yang qi. After dividing the calendar into 81 “tetragrams” (Michael Nylan’s phrase), Yang describes a period in early June that he calls “glossy”: ෍मḬ⓯ଡ‫ࡌ܀ٵ ا‬γ ۘథ‫ݲ‬ ෍ “Yang qi is consistently glossy, clear and bright. All things are 129

Mengzi zhengyi 11.394 (cf. Lau 1970, 103). Yang Bojun changes “autumn” to “summer” on the basis of the Zhou calendar (Mengzi yizhu 134, n.37). Yang Xiong ๫ ෕ (53 B.C.E.-18 C.E.) borrows this trope from Mengzi (Fayan quanyi [8.10], 129). 130 It is also the color of the stars, and the Jiyun ූᘜ notes that it has the alternative form hao ജ–providing a link to the earlier discussion of tian’s qi. See entry 32 in the Shengsheng ʕᑵseries, see Jiyun 5.10b. 131 Mengzi zhengyi 11.395. Wang Niansun ̙‫( ࢽ׭‬1744-1832) likens the Mengzi’s use of “brilliantly white” (haohao ⦶⦶) to the use of “[dawn’s] brightness (gaogao ‫ل‬ ‫ )ل‬in early sources. Specifically, the Guanzi’s “Neiye” ˖๣ ( Inward Training) uses gao in the description of one of the appearances of human qi: ‫̢ل‬Ϩങ‫(˭ؠ‬16.268) which Roth translates as: “Bright!–As if ascending the heavens” (1999, 48). Here, I have translated hao as “flood-like”, since Jiao uses it with han ᣊ, which is usually used to describe water.

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doubly illuminated by it, and it protects them with shining yang.”132 In medical texts, like the Yinyang mai sihou, yang vessels circulate tian’s qi, while yin vessels circulate earthly qi.133 When Mengzi sees glossiness in the sage’s face, it is like the surfeit of yang qi that expresses the light of the sun, moon, and stars. It is through the theory of qi, then, that two vital aspects of the Mengzi are bound together: the development of the virtues and the changes in the external appearance of the sage. Indeed, the description of the “radiantly bright” qi in Mengzi 2A2, although perhaps somewhat garbled, ties together a number of other important positions on the virtues taken in the Mengzi. When asked to explain “radiantly bright” qi, Mengzi describes it in four brief sentences: (1) մ޴मʛ вʨвࢉ ̣‫ڇ‬ኙЩ೷ࣀ ۱ฑʝ˭ϙ˃෈ (2) մ޴मʛ ਎໳Ⴉལ ೷‫ ݵ‬ኛʛ (3) ‫ූݵ‬໳‫׿‬Ά‫ۍ ږ‬໳ᜀЩ֊˃ʛ (4) мЉʿ␂ ‫ ˻ؠ‬۱ኛԡ (1) Considered as a kind of qi, it is the largest and the strongest. If you nourish it with uprightness and do no injury to it, then it will fill the space between Heaven and Earth. (2) Considered as a kind of qi, it matches righteousness and the Way, without it [the qi] becomes exhausted. (3) It is created from accumulated righteousness, and is not something that may be gotten from copied righteousness. (4) If one’s actions are shameful in one’s mind, then it becomes exhausted.134

Each of these sentences explains an aspect of the Mengzi’s moral psychology in terms of the actions of qi. The first sentence relates “radiantly bright” qi to other types of qi. While all human beings have qi, “radiantly bright” qi is superlative. The fact that it exists on a continuum with other types of qi, however, means that all humans are perfectible. The second sentence explains that this type of qi is the bridge between the virtue of righteousness and the Way. Here, the Way is most likely the “Way of tian”, and tian’s qi is a literal messenger between the two. The third sentence explains how such qi is generated, emphasizing both action over contemplation and authentic action over semblances.135 The final sentence in 2A2 explains how shameful 132 Taixuan jing 3.36. Compare Suzuki Yoshijirô 1964, 196-7; Michael Nylan 1993, 251. Nylan notes that for Yang Xiong, “men ideally achieve the luster associated with unadulterated virtue,” (251, n.4). The meaning of “doubly illuminate” is unclear, but it might have to do with light produced by the internal yang of the viewer. 133 Ma Jixing 1992, 304 (cf. Harper 1998, 219). 134 Mengzi 2A2. Jiao (201-203). Compare Lau (77-78). 135 The latter is a particularly important concern in the Mengzi, which we have seen distinguishes between feeding a person and feeding them with the proper attitude in

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actions can erode any progress made in accumulating advantageous qi. While the relationship between moral action and the development of a variety of tian’s qi in this passage is sketchy, it is an attempt to explain several features of the moral theory of the Mengzi–features that also figure prominently in the Wuxing–in terms of the dynamics of the accumulation and depletion of qi. Mengzi is not the only fourth century text to use qi in its discussion of moral development. Onozawa Seiichi 小野沢精一 has written that the theory of qi in the Mengzi is characteristic of Warring States texts written in the eastern areas of the states of Qi and Lu. Specifically, Onozawa links the Mengzi’s discussion of qi to that found in the “Bai xin” Ύ˻ (Whitening the mind) chapter of the Guanzi.136 The historian Liu Jie ᄸ໢ (1901-1977) first outlined this connection in 1943, starting with a description of the theories of Song Jian ҭ⍣ and Yin Wen ˄́ contained in the “Tianxia” ˭ʓ (World) chapter of the Zhuangzi. The theories are described as ʆӍ˃ኙ ୘ԼЩ̊ ̣ЏΎ˻ “in nourishing others and ourselves, stopping when sufficiency is reached, and in this way ‘whitening the mind’.”137 While the meaning of the term baixin or “whitening the mind” is unclear, Liu connects this chapter with several others in the Guanzi that treat quasi-meditative spiritual disciplines.138 Nevertheless, it is an open question whether the theories of Song Jian and Yin Wen were connected with the chapter of that name in the Guanzi. There are certainly points of similarity, for instance the latter defines the Way in terms related to the sufficiency standard mentioned above: ɾʆ·˃ ʿႝЉኜ ˭ʓм˃ ʿႝʿԼ Џᎂལԡ “If a single person uses it, one does not hear that it is excessive; while if the people of the world enact it, one does not hear that it is insufficient. This is what is called the Way.”139 The “Bai xin” chapter of the Guanzi also, 7A37: “To feed somebody without care is to treat them like a pig. To care for somebody without reverence is to tend them like an animal,” (see above note 15). 136 Onozawa Seiichi 1978. 137 Zhuangzi jiaoquan 33.1323. The description also notes: ૊໗‫̣ٵ‬Ѥܰ޴ֻ გ ˻˃ࣅ ֡˃̆˻˃м “They encountered the myriad things they took ‘distinguishing forgiveness’ as their starting point. When they discussed what the mind accepts, they called it ‘what the mind acts on.’” Following Cheng Xuanying’s Ͼ΁ࠡ (fl. 631-655) reading that the implicit object of rong ࣅ is the wanwu ໗‫( ٵ‬Nanhua zhenjing zhushu 10.611), Wang Shumin understands rong to be “accept” (Zhuangzi jiaoquan 33.1323, n.9). The implication is that the goal was to eliminate sources of action that were not part of the spontaneous reaction to events, especially motives like pride and saving face. 138 In Gushi kaocun ͑ͅШϫ, Liu (1958, 258) describes the current of Song Jian in “Bai xin” as a combination of the ideas of the connection between interior states and external appearance from Mengzi, and the idea of effortlessly matching names to actualities from the Shenzi ฻ʪ. 139 Guanzi jiaozheng 13.225.

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however, elevates a generic Way above tian, and paraphrases the Laozi liberally. Luo Genze ᗘघጎ has argued that it has characteristics of “experts in names” (mingjia Ϗ ࣁ ) writings, and for this reason explicitly disagrees with his classmate Liu Jie. Luo argues that “Bai xin”, along with the two halves of the “Xinshu” ˻ி (Techniques of the Mind) chapter of the Guanzi, promote ruling through quietism and wuwei ೷޴ reactiveness, rather than eliminating pride to benefit the world à la Song Jian and Yin Wen.140 It is worth noting that both these approaches claim to affect the mind so as to avoid conventional behaviors, bringing one closer to the spirit world. Indeed, the first part of “Xinshu” says that if one ൳մ଒ আઅʈ‫“ ڣ‬can make empty one’s desires, then the spirits will enter his dwelling” while ʿᆸ۱আʿள “if not clean, then the spirits will not remain.”141 Whether or not these texts are closely related to the Mengzi, their use of qi to speak of the purification of the mind through eliminating desires is similar to it. The linkage between qi and sagehood found in the Mengzi has several aspects in common with a particular view of the ruler’s ability to become divine found in later texts. The Huainanzi speaks about the possession of tian’s qi by human beings as a prerequisite for attaining the status of a spirit. In “Taizu” ळ૯ (Great Gathering), chapter 20 of the Huainanzi, union with tian allows the sage to rule the world: ‫ݭ‬໶ʆᖩ˭म ‫ ˻˭ؗ‬੭ˀ҉֜ ʿʓᅧ੫Щ࠯͗ऺ ᜵஑‫۞أ‬ ͺˢЩትെ ࠜ‫׷‬ቂʴ ঻̣আˢʛ ༶ˆ আ˃᛾˃ உ̝֜ͦ Therefore the sage takes tian’s qi to his chest and embraces tian’s mind, grasps the center and holds to harmony. Without leaving his courts and halls is able to extend to the four expanses, transforming habits and changing customs. The people transform and move to the good, as if they were born that way. This is the means by which one can transform oneself into a spirit. The Odes says: “Once the spirit listens to this, there may be harmony and peace.”142 140 Guanzi tanyuan 4.84-91. The “Xin shu” chapters may or may not be connected to the 25 pian text Daizhao chen Rao xinshu ݄ඈаᚃ˻ி (Expectant Appointee Subject Rao’s Techniques of the Mind) listed under the subcategory of xiaoshuo ʮი in the Hanshu bibliography. Of it, Liu Xiang ᄸώ (d. 6 B.C.E.) said: “Rao was from the state of Qi, his surname is unknown. During the reign of Emperor Wu, he wrote a book called Techniques of the Mind as an Expectant Appointee” (Hanshu 30.1745). Its contents may well be similar to the chapter in the Guanziof the same name. For a good discussion of these techniques, see Harold D. Roth 1991. 141 Guanzi jiaozheng 13.219. 142 The reference to the Odes is to Mao 165, “Fa mu” Ψ̈. Waley renders this passage: “For the spirits are listening/Whether we are all friendly and at peace,” (1937, 204) while Karlgren has: “When the spirits hearken to them” (1950a, 109, almost identical to Legge 1895, v. 4, 254). Ma Ruizhen ਠສՀ(1782-1853), however, reads shen zhi আ˃ and ting zhi ᛾˃ as parallel imperatives along the lines of “Attend and

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In this passage from the Huainanzi, possession of tian’s qi is a stage in the sage’s identification with tian. This passage is an example of what Michael Puett has called “self-divinization”.143 In To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-divinization in Early China, Puett argues against the view, exemplified by Marcel Granet (and most recently developed by David Hall and Roger Ames), that the ancient Chinese had no “world of transcendent realities”. Puett shows that not only did divinities play a central role in early Chinese cosmology, but that the term shen (spirit) “came to be applied to substances within humans”.144 While Puett is primarily concerned with cosmology, the “Taizu” passage shows how the discourse of self-divinization found in the Huainanzi draws on a similar set of assumptions about the role of tian’s qi in self-transformation.145 The linkage should not be surprising, since the Huainanzi is above all a synthetic text that draws on a myriad of influences. While the first chapter “Yuandao” draws on texts such as the Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Chuci, the “Miucheng” chapter, according to the Yilin ‫ظأ‬, is one of the richest repositories of the writings of Zisi.146 While the Huainanzi introduces new elements into the sagely ideal, the role of tian’s qi is fundamental. Aligning the sage in the Ru tradition with the mysterious nature of the sage in texts like the Laozi and Huainanzi might make this appear to be an appropriation of Ru vocabulary by writers who are concerned with entities such as the “spiritual” or “numinous” (shen). Yet the same notion appears in the Ru works at the center of this study.147 This follow” (Maoshi zhuanjian tongshi ̎༶෭ၺ௢ᙼ 17.11a-b). Whichever reading is correct with respect to the original poem, from the context of the Huainanzi passage, the former meaning was probably intended. See Huainanzi jiaoshi 20.2040. 143 Puett 2002. 144 Puett 2002, 8 and 22, on the Huainanzi see 259-286. 145 Puett correctly notes that although the Huainanzi shares some assumptions about the mechanisms of self-cultivation with texts like the “Neiye” (“spirit and essence are the most refined and most potent parts of this cosmos, and through cultivation humans can increase and concentrate their spirit and thereby come to understand the movements of the cosmos”), but claims a much higher goal (“a full understanding of the entire cosmos, including knowledge of the past and future”). See Puett 2002, 276-7. Here, Puett draws a distinction between discerning fortune and misfortune and knowledge of the past and future, a contrast that texts critical of the superacuity of the sage do not generally make. This might be because they were seen as being on the same continuum, or might have been an effort to tar the former with the more radical claims of the latter. 146 See appendix two, where Huang Yizhou’s reconstruction of the Han Zisi contains a number of passages that appear in some form in the “Miucheng”. 147 In Mengzi 7B25, Mengzi evaluates a person named Master Yuezheng ᆪ͸, saying Yuezheng has reached the level of being “good” (shan െ) and “trustworthy” (xin ‫)ۑ‬, but is not yet “sage” (sheng) and a “spirit” (shen). Specifically, he says: ໶Щ ʿ̈́‫˃˃ڈ‬ᎂআ “One who is a sage but cannot be understood, such a person is called

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suggests that behind the moral claims about the sage in parts of the Wuxing and Mengzi, there is a vision of the sage attaining the extraordinary level of the spirits. In light of the Wuxing, the Mengzi’s grounding of moral psychology in human physiology may be situated within a broader discourse about the nature of virtues. The conceptualization of the virtues as material plays a role in several key aspects of the Mengzi’s moral theory. The use of the metaphor of “balance” in quandary situations is a version of the distinction between “light and heavy” used in the Wuxing to talk about balancing benevolence and righteousness. The Mengzi’s use both of aural metaphors and accounts involving qi to explain the mechanics of authentic moral action is consistent with the Wuxing’s model of the stages of moral development. While it is only possible to speculate on the ultimate reason for the development of the material virtue theory in the Mengzi, in the context of the disputes of the period, the idea that cultivating the virtues results in changes in appearance would certainly provide one answer to the criticism that the Ru ethical pose is hypocritical.148 Yet the ethical aspect of the theory is just one of its dimensions. The next chapter explores the significant cosmological and political implications of the material virtue model of the sage’s reliance on tian’s qi, and argues for a significant rereading of several elements of the early Ru traditions.

a spirit.” See Mengzi zhengyi 28.994-5 (cf. Lau 1970, 199). Jiao Xun argues that shen আhere means “mysterious” and refers to the subtle rulership of the sage kings Yao and Shun. In the “Zhongyong” chapter of the Liji, the apex of self-cultivation is described in similar terms: ‫ݭ‬в༻Ϩআ “Therefore culminant sincerity is to be like a spirit.” See Liji zhengyi 53.4a (cf. Ames and Hall 2001, 106). Finally, this is echoed in the commentary to the Wuxing found at Mawangdui: ʨϾвԡ আЫԡ “When ‘a great gathering together’ culminates, one simply becomes a spirit,” (§E 21.1.4). 148 From a contemporary perspective, it is not necessary to discount the Mengzi’s claim. Certainly, the current attention to mind/body interactions in the context of western medicine might argue for one possible explanation. Another might be based on socioeconomic considerations: the white or jadelike coloration that signifies the presence of virtuous qi might be a result of adequate means to avoid labor in the sun and wind, just as the clear eyes of the sage might be in part a consequence of a superior diet or a lack of intrauterine exposure to diseases or deficiencies that lead to cataracts.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SAGE’S TRANSCENDENT BODY െʆལʛ ᅭ˭ལʛ “Good is the human Way, and virtue is tian’s Way.” - Mengzi 5B1, Wuxing §1.7 and GD §9.4

So far, the descriptions of the Wuxing and Mengzi have concentrated on internalist aspects of their pictures of self-cultivation, what I have respectively characterized as “moral psychology” and “moral physiology”. Yet both texts claim that “Good is the ren’s (i.e., the human) Way, and virtue is tian’s (i.e., the natural) Way” and thereby bring tian, usually rendered into English as “Heaven”, “the heavens”, and “nature”, into the picture. This chapter examines a key component of their moral vision, the claim that there is a transcendent aspect to moral perfection. The word “transcendent” may be understood in a variety of ways, from “surpassing material existence,” to “lying outside of ordinary human experience”. It is rooted in the Latin scandere connoting climbing, perhaps related to the Sanskrit skadati signifying leaping, in combination with the prefix trans “beyond”, “on the other side of”. Here, I will use a generic sense of the term as surpassing the ordinary, 1 so as to be different in kind. This chapter uses “transcendent” in a local 1

While Roger Ames and David T. Hall have argued that Chinese thought is characterized by a lack of the transcendent, their use of the term is closer to the theological sense that rejects the immanence of a deity, that is, transcendence as a denial of divine interference in mundane affairs. The “immanental nature” of Chinese thinking, according to Hall and Ames, is both indicated by the “characteristics of classical Chinese” and “broad cultural conditions,” (1987, 267). Some of their arguments focus on divinities and divine law: “Confucius does not appeal to transcendent beings or principles as the ultimate reference for growth;” (1998, 263). Sections of Thinking from the Han appear to support the denial of a more generic transcendence (e.g., “Confucian religiousness begins from the assumption that there is a continuity and interdependence between tian. . . and the human being,” 1998, 263). However, those sections generally use examples that describe the ideal connection between humans and tian, not the ordinary state of affairs. Thus, the applicability of the term transcendent hinges on the question of whether the Confucian religious ideal is exceptional, or if the sage’s connection with tian is a difference of degree rather than of kind. This chapter argues for the latter, and the interpretation of the Confucian ideal as generically transcendent. For the history of the English of the term, see Murray et al.

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sense to connote the possibility of gaining access to a realm of tian beyond ordinary human experience. As this chapter will show, the claim of the sage’s transcendence has consequences for the both the Wuxing’s model of self-cultivation and Mengzi’s conception of history. In both domains, the sage’s perfection is a product of a connection with tian. This chapter is particularly concerned with the cosmological and political implications of the thesis that the fifth and culminant virtue of sagacity is a matter of tian. It charts the connections between the sage and tian in three areas. First, it situates their common claim that tian is related to both the virtue of sagacity and to the sage within the developing conversation about the relation between the human and non-human realms in early China. Against this background, it then reads the metaphor found in both texts of “the metal bell sounding and the jade stone causing it to vibrate” (jin sheng er yu zhen zhi ‫ہ‬ᑵЩ΂ ࣴ˃) as a key to understanding the sage’s power of cheng ༻ (usually translated as “sincerity”) and of the transpersonal dimension of sagehood. The final section of this chapter shows how this model sheds light on the “five hundred year” theory of the appearance of the transtemporal sage in the Mengzi. The three topics are linked in that they all assume the sage’s exceptionality and implicitly answer the criticism that Ru ideals may become obsolete by arguing that the sage is not tied to particular individuals or specific to particular historical eras.

Nature and the origins of the sage’s culminant virtue Scholars of comparative religion may well recognize the distinction between human virtues and a higher virtue that is, in some sense, supernatural, as descriptive of the Christian separation of the three “theological” virtues of faith, hope, and charity from the four “cardinal” virtues of justice, wisdom, temperance, and courage. The cardinal virtues are the product of natural reason, while the theological virtues are inspired; the product of revelation. In the Summa Theologica of Aquinas, the theological virtues are said to originate in supernatural

1989, 2096. The Kantian use of “transcendent” is again somewhat different, connoting that which is beyond the bounds of human cognition.

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grace, while the cardinal virtues form a natural ethics.2 In this way, Christian ethics posits a porous boundary between the human and divine realms, one that was in part a reconciliation of biologically oriented virtue model of Aristotle and the requirements of postAristotelian religious cosmology. It is possible that a similar hybrid theory resulted in the development of the idea of infused virtue in the Chinese context. After all, the Mengzi constitutes a moral theory that focuses on the four “human virtues” and, while tian is important, the text is usually read as promoting a biologically oriented model of selfcultivation. Parts of the Wuxing that treat the relation between the role of the human and the role of tian in the construction of moral dispositions suggest the possibility that the Mengzi’s picture of the virtues was perhaps only part of a two-level system similar to that of Aquinas. Whatever the origins of the Chinese two-tier model, the relationship between the transcendent realm of tian and human moral self-cultivation is a major aspect of the ethical models in these texts that has yet to be described. Despite such cross-cultural similarities, there also are important differences between the way various cultures divide the human and non-human realms. In the Zhuangzi, the distinction between the level of tian (nature, or, perhaps, “the heavenly”) and that of ren (the human) does not turn on the presence or absence of a divine will, but of a human will. As seen in chapter one, in the Zhuangzi, the horse’s bridle is what moves the horse from the realm of tian to that of ren. The highest form of knowledge is to understand that distinction. According to the “Dazongshi” ʨ‫( ׅࣖ‬The great ancestral teacher) chapter of the Zhuangzi, it is the person who understands both realms who has reached the ultimate state: ‫ ڈ ޴ ׿ ˃ ˭ ڈ‬ʆ ˃ ‫ ږ ޴ ׿‬в ԡ “Highest is the person who understands what it is that tian has done and what it is ren has done.”3 This is not the same as the distinction between revelation and natural reason in medieval Christianity, despite the temptation to read the assumptions of one culture into another.4 Neither is it the same as earlier anthropomorphic Zhou conceptions of 2

For discussions of Aquinas as a virtue ethicist, see Lee Yearley 1990 and James Lehrberger 1993. 3 Zhuangzi jishi 3a.224. A valuable discussion of the term tian in this context is Sarah Allan 1997b. 4 The eminent sinologist Herbert A. Giles did something like that when he translated the same sentence from “Dazongshi” as “He who knows what God is, and what Man is, has attained,” explaining the passage as an allusion to God, “of course as seen through Taoist glasses.” See his Religions of Ancient China (1905, 44). Giles’s translation says a lot about his own glasses.

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tian.5 Instead, the possibility of accessing a level of moral knowledge outside the human realm is particular to late Warring States thinking about the “natural Way” (tiandao ˭ལ). While this seems to be a simple claim, its importance in the context of the development of the Ru response to its critics cannot be overstated. Many commentators have argued that the Analects’s sole mention of the term “Way of tian,” a brief sentence in Analects 5.13: ˮʪ˃Ե‫׷‬ Ⴉ˭ལ ʿ̈́દЩႝʛ, which D. C. Lau translates as “one cannot get hear [the Master’s] views on human nature and the Way of Heaven,” signals a pointed silence about the term.6 The Wuxing’s claim that the sage had a unique understanding of the natural Way likely resulted both from a defense of the notion of ming “fate” and from a response to criticisms that the methods of the Ru were outmoded. One Ru response to the claims such as those in the Mozi and Zhuangzi that the Ru tradition was obsolete was to foreground the notion of a tian whose patterns existed outside of time and of sages whose actions and even whose historical manifestations were always timely because of their access to those atemporal natural patterns. This section briefly examines the genesis of the idea of the “natural Way” and then looks at its close relationship to the ideal of the sage. Both the division between the human realm and that of tian, and the possibility of transcending the human realm, are central concerns in the Wuxing and the Mengzi. In particular, the Wuxing uses the term “natural Way” as a contrast with ordinary or conventional behaviors, both good and bad. In this, it is substantially different from some parts of the Zhuangzi that equate the human way with the artificial, and therefore cast it as an impediment to achieving the normative state of naturalness. The natural Way is also normative, but connection to it is the result of training. Slips 26 and 27 of the Guodian Wuxing state: ႝѼʪལ ᑶʛ ႝЩ‫ ˃ڈ‬໶ʛ ໶ʆ‫˭ڈ‬ལʛ “Hearing the Way of the Gentleman is being ‘sharp-eared.’ Hearing and knowing [the Way of the Gentleman] is sage. The sage knows the natural Way” [GD §15.2]. While “goodness” is associated with the human Way, there is also a level of sagacity that entails knowledge of the natural Way. The one time the 5

In oracle bones, we find the character ling ̪ in a number of contexts but none that are similar to ming. In bronze inscriptions, however, the character ling is used in similar contexts to ming, such as tian you daling ˭Љʨ̪, parallel to the orders given by the ruler. Fu Sinian ఔಡ϶ observes that this is an anthropomorphic tian ˭ (1980, 194). 6 See Lunyu jishi 9.318-23, Lau 1979, 78, and Philip J. Ivanhoe’s exemplary study of the history of interpretation of that passage (2002).

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Mengzi uses this expression is in Mengzi 7B24, a passage that was seen in the last chapter to have a connection to the Wuxing through their common use of the five virtues. There, the term is used to discuss contigency and is implicitly related to fate: ໶ʆ˃‫˭ؠ‬ལʛ ֡ʛ Љ ‫׷‬ା Ѽʪʿᎂ֡ʛ “The sage’s role with respect to the natural Way, is up to fate, although human nature is also involved. The gentleman does not say it is [all a matter of] fate.” This passage has been read as promoting a pedagogy for self-cultivation that assures the learner of the partial efficacy of their efforts. In their discussions of the “natural Way”, both the Mengzi and the Wuxing connect tian with sagehood, bringing them closer to the position of criticisms in the Zhuangzi. The need to bring the human Way in line with the natural Way appears to have been an intellectual trend in the fourth century B.C.E. Many scholars locate the earliest discussion of the natural Way in a speech by Fan Li ࠖᚵ in the “Yueyu, xia” ඞგ ʓ (Discussions of the state of Yue, part 2) chapter of the Guoyu ੢გ. Fan Li was an advisor to King Goujian ˠ቟ of Yue in the first half of the fifth century B.C.E., and later came to be celebrated as a transtemporal teacher in his own right.7 In his capacity as advisor, Fan Li attempted to persuade King Goujian that it was not yet time to attack the state of Wu: ˮ੢ࣁ˃Ֆ Љ‫ ߙݠ‬Љ‫׆‬෯ Љ໢Ֆ ̙̆ ޴ʒ‫֯ ږ‬щ ࿬̆ ‫ږߙݠ‬Ⴉ˭ ‫׆‬෯‫ږ‬Ⴉʆ ໢Ֆ‫ږ‬Ⴉϙ “Now, affairs of state include preserving fullness, settling danger, and administering affairs.” The king said: “How, then, does one go about these three things?” He answered: “One preserves fullness by according with the heavens, one settles danger by according with humankind, and one administers affairs by according with the earth.”8

Fan Li admonished his ruler to follow the natural patterns of the three realms: the heavens, humankind, and the earth. By waiting until a sign 7

Fengsu tongyi ࡘ۞௢໳ chapter 2 “Zhengshi” ͸͛ (Righting errors) records an Eastern Han popular belief that Fan Li was actually an avatar of the ˯Ύ‫ݶ‬ႅ “Essence of Venus”, who earlier had appeared as advisors to great rulers including the Yellow Emperor and the sage-king Yao, as well as in the forms of Lao Dan (i.e., Laozi) and Dongfang Shuo ‫̄ز‬ऐ. See Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu 2.108. 8 Guoyu Wei Zhao zhu 21.1a-b. Wei Zhao ࡔ‫ ݲ‬identifies the internal date as 494 B.C.E., but Asano places it in 496 (1992, 19).

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in the skies appeared or a popular movement arose, the King could follow the patterns of the “natural Way”, which apply just as well to military strategy as they do natural processes like the rotation of the asterisms in the night sky and the growth of living things on the earth. Asano Yûichi 浅野裕一 has argued that the ideas of Fan Li form the basis for later theories of governance based on natural cycles that became what is now called the HuangLao ෦Ч (i.e., Yellow Emperor and Laozi) tradition in the second century B.C.E.9 This tradition of looking at the natural Way seeks to index proper behavior in human society to patterns found outside of that society. In this understanding, tian does not exert a conscious intent on the human world, it simply presents a pattern that may or may not be exploited by the ruler.10 A version of this naturalistic view is found in the third century Ru essay “Tianlun” ˭ቈ (Discussion of Nature) preserved in the Xunzi. The “Tianlun” explicitly criticizes numerous alternative views that held that tian acts intentionally. The Xunzi laments people’s penchant to see natural occurences as omens and portents, and to react to natural phenomena such as droughts with tian-directed actions such as prayers for rain. Such “signs” are never a result of supernatural intention: ‫්̈ݶ‬ᄦ ੢ʆߖ࣡ ̆‫ݵ‬щʛ ̆೷щʛ ‫˭ݵ‬ϙ˃᜵ ఀ෍˃ˢ ‫ٵ‬ ˃ԧв‫ږ‬ʛ When stars fall and trees make strange sounds, all the townspeople are terrified and go about asking, “Why has this happened?” I say: “There is no ‘why’! It is only the changes in the heavens and on earth, the transformations of yin and yang, and phenomena that rarely occur!”11 9

Asano 1992. There are two difficulties with the claim of Fan Li’s primacy in the development of tiandao and HuangLao ideas. First, it is unclear whether the Fan Li passages in the Guoyu really are much earlier than other texts that talk about the three realms and the “natural Way.” Tiandao as a term appears most often in Eastern Han texts like Fayan and Lunheng, and less frequently in Western Han texts like Huainanzi and Chunqiu fanlu. It appears rarely, if at all, in Warring States texts. The exceptions are the Zhuangzi and the Guoyu, early texts where the term appears quite a lot. In the Guoyu, the term is only important in the “Yueyu, xia” and in the Zhuangzi there are three chapters where it appears, chapters 12-14, entitled “Tiandi” ˭ϙ, “Tiandao,” and “Tianyun.” Liu Xiaogan (1994, 72-3) argues that the three chapters are pre-Qin, although the “Tiandi” chapter postdates the Mengzi. Second, as Robin D. S. Yates has pointed out, it is not clear whether fragments attributed to Fan Li actually come from the same source as the Guoyu passages (1997, 288), indicating that the synthetic view attributed to Fan Li in the Guoyu might have been the product of a later writer. Indeed, in his 1928 study (Gushi yanjiu ͑ͅߧԥ) Wei Juxian ሴ႞ቖ argues that “Yueyu xia” is the most recent chapter of the Guoyu, dating to the the later fourth century at the earliest. These arguments indicate that occurences of tiandao in the Wuxing are among the earliest in the extant record. 10 On Fan Li, also see Wei Qipeng ᖒ૧ᘮ (1995). 11 Xunzi jijie 11.313 (cf. Knoblock, v.3, 18).

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Drought is either a reflection of a bad weather cycle or a result of poor agricultural policy, but it is never the hidden work of an anthropomorphic tian.12 Elsewhere in the Xunzi, the concept of “natural procedures” (tianshu ˭ᆚ) is employed to make a similar point to the one in Fan Li’s speech: society should be modeled on the characteristics exhibited in the non-social world. The Xunzi used the idea of natural procedures, also found in Han Feizi and Lüshi chunqiu, to argue that social hierarchy was justified by the existence of hierarchies in nature. Its “Wangzhi” ̙ վ (Kingly Governance) chapter makes this assertion: ˮղ඙˃ʿ঻ߟՖ ղቓ˃ʿ঻ߟ՟ ‫˭ݵ‬ᆚʛ “Now, the fact that two nobles cannot serve one another, and that two commoners cannot employ one another, is a matter of nature’s procedures.”13 The term shu ᆚ , which may mean “number” or “algorithm”, here refers to the order that is observable in the cosmos, and is often used in the context of mantic or proto-scientific techniques based the human exploitation of natural patterns. As with the military advice of Fan Li in the Guoyu, the social blueprint of the Xunzi is based on the ideal of acting in harmony with patterns that exist outside the reach of human beings. As in the Zhuangzi, this blueprint lacks an intentional nature. Yet the distinction between anthropomorphic and naturalistic does not entirely describe the range of possibilities for understanding tian in the early Chinese context. The Wuxing understanding of tian is not obviously anthropomorphic, but is it the same “natural Way” that is found in the texts just surveyed? Li Jinglin Өದ‫ ظ‬has suggested that there is a basic difference between the “Tianlun” chapter of the Xunzi and the Wuxing regarding tian, not so much in terms of their use of the term, but in terms of their understanding of the nature of the relationship between human beings and tian.14 The debate surrounds the question of human perfectibility, and in this debate the Xunzi argues that the two realms of tian and ren are separate. Since the Wuxing unambiguously equates sagacity with the “natural Way,” Li implies it is arguing for a porous relationship between the realms of tian and ren. Li is correct that the Wuxing’s sage is associated with the natural Way, and so it does collapse the distinction between the human and the natural Way to some extent. It is still possible to view the categories as distinct, but see the sage as moving from one category to the other. In either 12 13

See Machle’s in-depth study of the “Tianlun” chapter (1993). Xunzi jijie 5.152 (cf. Knoblock, v.2, 96). For a fuller treatment of tianshu, see Csikszentmihalyi 1994, 166-179. 14 Li Jinglin 1997.

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case, the text explains the cultivation of the virtues in terms of processes and patterns outside human society and so effectively integrates the notion of the natural Way into the virtue discourse. The importance of the natural Way may explain the central, almost numerological importance of the number five in the Wuxing. The Hanshu’s “Luli zhi, shang” ݆ዲӆ ʕ (treatise on the pitchpipes and the calendar, part 1) records that ˭˃ˀᆚˉ “things in tian number five” while ϙ˃ˀᆚ˗ “things on earth number six”, an explanation it correlates, by way of yin yang dualism, to the ten heavenly stems and twelve earthly branches of the sexagenary cycle used in time measurement.15 Similar numerical correlations between tian and the human body are found in Western Han texts like Chunqiu fanlu ‫߲ݱ‬ ᑪᛎ and Huainanzi. In the latter, the “Jingshen” ႅআ (Essence and spirit) chapter notes that tian has wuxing ˉ м (identified by the commentator Gao You ਢმ, fl. 206-213 C.E., as the “five phases” of metal, wood, water, fire, and earth) that are homologized to the wuzang ˉᕅ, or five organs of the human body.16 These correlations indicate that at least by the Han, the number five was correlated with tian. Along these lines, Guo Lihua ௱ ଎ ൡ has argued that the “five phases” and “five kinds of action” meanings of the Wuxing are linked through the use of musical metaphors in the text.17 Yet while these relationships must be inferred, it is the relationship between the natural Way and sagehood that is directly asserted. As an adjective in the Wuxing, the word sheng ໶ connotes a kind of action that is the culmination of the actions associated with the four 15

Hanshu 21a.958-9. The Hanshu treatise further correlates the five notes of the pentatonic scale (gong ࣃ, shang ੋ, jue Դ, zhi ᅮ, and yu Ц) with the wuchang ˉ ગ (five constants) virtues of trustworthiness, righteousness, benevolence, ritual propriety, and wisdom, respectively. In this way it is very similar to Western Han sources that will examined in the following chapter. This set of virtues is the same as the set of virtues in the Wuxing text with the exception of trustworthiness, which appears there as sagacity. 16 Huainan honglie jijie 7.220 (cf. Larre, et al. 1993, 81). The phrase “Tian has wuxing” also appears in Chunqiu fanlu 38 “Wuzing dui” ˉм࿬ (Answers about the Five Phases) and 42 “Wuzing zhi yi” ˉм˃໳ (Significance of the Five Phases). Kongzi identifies this idea as something that was taught to him by Lao Dan Ч‰ (i.e., Laozi) in the numerologically oriented “Wudi” ˉܹ (Five emperors), chapter 24 of the Kongzi jiayu ˱ʪࣁგ. On the basis of the “Zhouyu” chapter of the Guoyu, where the number six is associated with tian “the heavens” while five is associated with earth, Rémi Mathieu has surmised that the association of tian with five was a Han convention (d’Hormon and Mathieu 1985, 280 n. 13). The organs homologized to the the five phases in the Huainanzi are the same ones that are associated with the five notes and the “five virtues” of the Wuxing in the Shiji, a connection explored in the next chapter. 17 Guo Lihua (2000, 258). See also Li Xueqin (1998) and Nathan Sivin (1995b, IV:1-33).

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169

virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. As a noun, sheng has two related meanings. First, it means sagacity, the nominalization of behaving in a sage way. It also refers “the sage,” the ideal of moral and political perfection, whose ability to apply the virtues and the legacy of past sages in a timely way, and to inspire others makes him a breed apart. In the Wuxing, the linkage between the sage and the natural Way was the basis for the argument that the sage had an ability to act virtuously in a way that was appropriate to new times and situations. In the Meno, Socrates states that what unites the virtues is knowledge (epistêmê).18 The culminating virtue of the Wuxing, sagacity, is tied much more closely to perception. In particular, the sage differs from ordinary mortals due to his special aural abilities. As with the Wuxing’s use of the metaphor of resonance to express the nature of the sage’s inspiration, metaphors that deal with sound are often invoked to explain the abilities of the sage. The accepted etymology of the graph translated as “sage” is that the semantic component is er Ы “ear” while the phonetic is cheng Ѻ, an explanation found in the entry for sheng in the Han etymological dictionary Shuowen jiezi ი́༱Ϫ. As Duan Yucai ‫΂ޗ‬ൽ (17351815) explains in his commentary on the entry, the term is often used as a loan word for sheng ᑵ “sound, reputation”.19 This relationship exists on a phonetic level, and, for Han writers at least, the phonetic relationship was proof that the sage was able to inspire others through sound. In the Wuxing manuscripts, sheng “sound” is often written with the graph sheng “sage”, but this is more than a phonetic loan. Their connection is more like the relationship between le ᆪ “joy” and ᆪ yue “music,” two graphs that are visually the same, and whose identity is used as an unstated philosophical argument. This connection is confirmed by a fragment from the second century C.E. Fengsu tongyi ࡘ۞௢໳ that first equates the two terms and then explains the quasiaural abilities that allow the sage to govern in a harmonious way: ໶‫ ږ‬ᑵʛ ௢ʛ Եմႝᑵ‫ڈ‬શ ௢ʝ˭ϙ ଍ဖ໗‫̆ݭ ٵ‬໶ʛ “Sage” is “to sound,” and [hence] “to communicate.” This refers to his hearing a sound and understanding dispositions, communicating with the

18

Meno 87d. See W. K. C. Guthrie (1956, 141). On the issue of whether the answer given in the Meno represents a consistent position for Plato, or for Socrates, see Terry Penner 1992, 127-8. 19 Shuowen jiezi zhu 592.

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heavens and earth, and discerning and fathoming the myriad things. For these reasons, he is called “sage.”20

The connection between sagacity and the possession of an aural ability that allows a person to penetrate the realms of the heavens and earth illustrates that sagehood is a consequence of superhuman perceptions–not of a store of knowledge, nor of an ability to impart simple truths. While the first half of part of the Fengsu tongyi definition of “sage” is unambiguous, the second part might seem to be a nonsequitur. After all, what is the link between hearing and understanding dispositions? The sage’s acuity is what allows the sage to understand qing શ, which in the context of people refers to their affective dispositions, and in terms of circumstances means their propensities at a given moment. These dispositions are incipient manifestations that carry within them a sign of the potential for future events. The ways in which personal endowments and circumstances are determined by tian are the subjects of two other recently excavated texts. The first, found at Guodian and titled Xing zi ming chu ‫׷‬б̳֡ ([Human] nature emerges from [Nature’s] command), was more recently also discovered as part of a related cache of texts now in the possession of the Shanghai Museum, which has been titled Xingqing lun ‫׷‬શቈ (Discussion of nature and affective dispositions).21 That text argues that human nature (xing ‫)׷‬ comes from ming, which is an endowment from tian. This endowment includes one’s likes and dislikes, which are a function of the qi of 20

Attributed to Fengsu tong in Yiwen leiju 20.1a and Taiping yulan 104.1855. This fragment shares quite a bit of language with the “Shengren” ໶ʆ (Sages) section of the first century B.C.E. Baihu tong Ύ‫ڴ‬௢, which reads: ໶‫ ږ‬௢ʛ ལʛ ᑵʛ ལ೷‫׿‬ʿ௢ ‫ا‬೷‫׿‬ʿຖ ႝᑵ‫ڈ‬શ Ⴉ˭ϙϐᅭ ̅̇ϐ‫͗ ا‬इϐҺ ਥআϐφ˛ “‘Sage’ is ‘to communicate’, ‘Way’, and ‘sound’. There is no place the Way does not communicate to, [as] there is no place brightness does not illuminate. By hearing sounds and knowing dispositions, he shares virtue with the heavens and the earth, shares brightness with the sun and moon, shares the sequence of the four seasons, shares the auspicious and inauspicious with the demons and spirits,” (Baihutong shuzheng 7.334 [cf. Tjan, 1949-52, 528]). That passage, in turn, draws on earlier language found in “Wenyan” ́ Ե commentary to the Changes. The “Wenyan” commentary to the hexagram qian ਦ reads: ˮʨʆ‫ږ‬Ⴉ˭ϙϐմᅭ Ⴉ̅̇ϐմ‫ا‬ Ⴉ͗इϐմҺ Ⴉਥআϐմφ˛ “Now, the Great man shares virtue with the heavens and the earth, shares brightness with the sun and moon, shares the sequence of the four seasons, shares the auspicious and inauspicious with the demons and spirits” (Zhouyi zhengyi 1.20a-b). 21 This text is found in Guodian Chumu zhujian, see Jingmenshi bowuguan 1998, 178-84, and Shanghai bowuguan zang Zhanguo Chu zhujian, see Ma Chengyuan, et al. 2001, 220-77. The first title derives from the text itself, and is similar to the opening line ˭֡˃ᎂ‫“ ׷‬Heaven’s command is called nature,” in the “Zhongyong” chapter of the Liji, see Liji zhengyi ᔩ৩͸໳ 52.397.

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171

happiness, anger, grief, and sorrow. Yet these likes and dislikes are unrealized until one encounters external objects that can “take hold” (qu ֊) and generate intentions. It argues that action and the cultivation of moral behaviors may only be understood as a combination of natural propensities in combination with external influences: ‫ہ‬Δ˃ʑ(Љ)໶ (ᑵ)ʛ ͪཾ(Ͽ)ʿᄦ “A metal [bell] or a jade [stone] has a particular sound, but if they are not struck then they do not call out.”22 Each person, as each metal bell and stone chime, has an intrinsic pitch, but that pitch sounds only when the person is “struck” by external things. Because one’s endowment from tian is not solely responsible for one’s behavior, the text argues, study and teaching are necessary. This interplay between tian-determined qualities and the human cultivation of those qualities is a concern of discussions about how to recognize talents and abilities. The combination of natural propensities and external influences is the main subject of third and second century B.C.E. texts that use the term of art xingming zhi qing ‫˃֡׷‬શ “the dispositions of [human] nature and [tian’s] mandate” to refer to that combination. The “Jinting” ᕖ᛾ chapter of the Lüshi chunqiu, for instance, emphasized that the sage king Yao recognized his successor Shun by being able to judge him by using his ears, and so “return” to the dispositions of [human] nature and [tian’s] mandate. Instead of listening to others’ reports about a candidate, one listens to the words of the person and projects how the qualities thus revealed will play out in the future.23 The passage concludes: ‫ݭ‬Գቖ‫ږ‬Щʿᑸ۱ʿ઼‫ ˻ؠ‬ʿ ઼‫˻ؠ‬۱‫˃ڈ‬ʿ଴ ʿ଴‫ڈ‬ቖ‫׿˃ږ‬Ե ʿ୭நʨା “Therefore, if one sees a worthy but is not awed (song ᑸ), then one will not be alert in mind. If one is not alert in mind, then one’s understanding will not be deep. Nothing is as disastrous as failing to deeply understand the words of a worthy.”24 The Lüshi chunqiu confirms the importance of 22

This is a composite transcription based on Jingmenshi bowuguan 1998, 179, and Ma Chengyuan, et al. 2001, 224. 23 The aspect of projecting characteristics into the future is explicit in the “Guanshi” ᝳ̛ (Observing the Age) chapter of Lüshi chunqiu where Liezi (or Zi Liezi ʪλʪ) is poor, but he still does not accept gifts from a corrupt ruler. Things turn out fine for him because the ruler is deposed, indicating that Liezi ζԳմˢ “saw changes in advance.” The text concludes that having already taken action after seeing changes in advance is to penetrate “the dispositions of [human] nature and [tian’s] mandate.” See Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi, 959 (cf. Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 380-1). A detailed study is Sellmann 2002, 199-205. 24 Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi 13.704-5 (cf. Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 292-3). There, Chen Qiyou ௾֮ຢ disagrees with Gao You, and reads fan ˫ as “to oppose” instead of “return”, but the excavated parallel suggests that Gao was right after all. In the quotation, Wang Xianqian reads song as jing “reverent”, but here it might be read as

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recognizing worthies by listening. Since there is a phonetic link between song and cong “sharp-eared,” the word used in Wuxing §6.3 to describe the way one becomes aurally sensitized to virtue, it is possible the two texts are talking about the same thing: the recognition of worthies by sages through acute perception.25 If Yao recognized Shun because his ear was attuned to the intersection between human endeavor and the innate patterns of the natural Way, this was not its only influence on their meeting. The Guodian manuscript Qiongda yi shi (Frustration and success are a function of the age) makes the case that Shun would still be plowing his field if he had not met Yao. Their ཀྵʿཀྵ ˭ʛ “meeting or not was a matter of tian,” but Yao’s acute perception ensured that he made something out of meeting: Љ˭Љʆ ˭ʆЉ˜ ࿫˭ʆ˃˜ Щ‫׿ڈ‬мԡ Љմʆʞմ̛ ᓛቖͪмԡ ࠨЉմ̛ щᘗ˃Љ‫ۿ‬ There is tian and there is the human, and between them is a division. Only by examining the division between tian and the human may one understand their actions. For a particular individual who does not live in the right time, even if worthy the person will not be able to act. If such a person lived in the right time, what problem could the person have?26

As the Zhuangzi noted above, examination into the “natural” and the “human” is the way to understand how these two realms interact. The meeting of Yao and Shun is only one of a number of such fortuitous opportunities discussed in this late fourth century B.C.E. manuscript. The worthies that are recognized come from all walks of life, and one was even recognized despite being bound and placed in a sack! That a person who has cultivated goodness is not recognized, even if they are hidden, can only be because there is no one in power with the ability to recognize them. song ␉ “afraid” or “awed”, if not cong “sharp-eared”. To accept the parallel, one must substitute wen ႝ “hear” for jian Գ “see”. 25 When song is written with the er Ы radical on the left, the Haipian ऺᇺ gives its phonetic as cong, with the same as the phonetic component as cong “sharpeared” (see Morohashi 1955-60, entry 29168). 26 Jingmenshi bowuguan 1998, 145. The last two lines are quoted verbatim in the Xunzi: ˑЉմʆ ʿཀྵմइ ᓛቖ մ঻м̢ ࠨཀྵմइ щᘗ˃Љ “Now, for a particular individual who does not meet his time, even if worthy how can the person put it into practice? If the person meets the right time, what problem would the person have?” See Xunzi jijie 20.527 (cf. Knoblock, v.3, 249).

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Recognition of exceptional potential is not a matter of looking for a particular set of characteristics, because the ideal set changes over time. It is a matter of being able to penetrate external characteristics and recognize the qualities of the person underneath. Both the Guodian text Qiongda yishi and the second century B.C.E. Hanshi waizhuan use the metaphor of the fragrant plants to express the sensory nature of recognizing a worthy person: ˮᚱḉΆ‫˃ظࠝؠ‬ˀ ଴ʱ˃෇ ʆந Գ˃ ‫ݭ‬ʿ‫“ ڬ‬If a lanchi plant grows in a thick forest deep in the mountains, and there is no one to sense it, then it would not have a scent.” The proto-Berkeleyesque question about whether fragrant flowering plants in the forest still smell if no one is there to smell them is very much like the statement in the Guodian Xing zi ming chu above about a musical instrument not making its sound except when struck. Both are talking about the interaction between one’s inner qualities, either innate or cultivated, and external circumstances. The Hanshi waizhuan passage continues by explaining the way in which the sage is able to extend his perceptions to the otherwise imperceptible: ˮዕ‫޴ۍږ‬௢ʛ ޴ᇴЩʿҍ ᅴЩӆʿৣ ζ‫ڈ‬ၱၰ˃ֻ Щ˻೷౰ା ‫ݭ‬໶ʆᓙ‫׍‬଴‫ ׭‬ጤႝጤԳ Now, study is not done to be successful, but rather so that even if one is thwarted, one is not worn out; and even if one is anxious, one’s intentions do not decline. Through foreknowledge of the beginnings of disaster and good fortune, one’s mind will not be confused by such things. Therefore the sage dwells in seclusion and deeply considers, listening in solitude and seeing in solitude.27

Here, sensory acuity leads to the ability to maintain one’s intentions despite difficult circumstances, and even to the ability to foretell future events based on perceiving incipient signs. The alternations between opportunity and the lack of it, an aspect of the theory of fate advocated by the Ru, are the domain of the special knowledge of the sage. The perceptual dimension of sagehood requires honing one’s sensory abilities. The adverbial modifier “in solitude” (du ጤ) is how the Wuxing and some other early texts describe the cultivation of the sage’s extraordinary abilities. In the context of the perception of the 27

Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng (7.6) 371-5 (cf. Hightower 1952, 229). A Zhuangzi parallel tells the same story, and even draws a closely related conclusion. There, the sage has an ability to adapt to good and bad circumstances that either tong ௢ “communicate” or qiong ᇴ “block” the Way. The parallel is found in Zhuangzi jiaoquan 28.1151-2.

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propensities of dispositions, du has usually been understood to mean “unique” or “extraordinary”, as in James Robert Hightower’s translation of duwen dujian ጤႝጤԳ in the Hanshi waizhuan as “unique in their apprehension and insight.” Indeed, in many later texts there is no question that du means “unique.” However, because in this second century B.C.E. passage, the phrase yinzhu ᓙ‫“ ׍‬dwelling in seclusion” implies a concentration akin to that in the Wuxing and its commentary, the use of du in the Hanshi waizhuan perhaps connotes an “inward” sight and hearing that is as if one is alone. This is consistent with the Wuxing’s phrase examined in chapter two, shen qi du “attending to solitude,” implying the sage is able to “listen in solitude” (duwen ጤႝ) and “see in solitude” (dujian ጤԳ). The extraordinary sight and hearing of one sage fosters the ability to recognize a successor sage who can bring good government no matter what age one lives in, and to recognize the “beginnings of disaster and good fortune” in whatever form they may manifest themselves, regardless of the inevitable changes that occur over time. Several texts link an ability to appraise as if “in solitude” to an ability to employ the right example from the past at the right time. In the “Fanlun” Ϳቈ (All-encompassing discussions) essay incorporated into the second century B.C.E. work Huainanzi: Ыʿ‫ڈ‬ଡጏ˃˜‫ ږ‬ʿ̪̈́ቆࡖ ˻ʿ‫ڈ‬٢෩˃຀‫ ږ‬ʿ̪̈́վٗ ͫЉጤႝ˃Ы ጤԳ˃‫ ا‬೸݈঻ዣལЩмԡ ˮभ᜵ࢬ ֟᜵भ ‫߲ݱ‬᜵֟ʒ̩˃ᔩʿψ щͅ˃ન ʨʆѕЩҿʪ ౮ ‫ٗڈ‬٢‫׿‬ΊΆ ۱ᏻइЩ᜵ ʿ‫ٗڈ‬٢˃຀ ᓛ౮ͅ உ෩ Those whose ears cannot appreciate the difference between clear and muddy [tones] should not be allowed to tune the notes. Those whose minds do not know the origins of regulation and disorder should not be allowed to administer the laws. Only if one’s mind has the ears to listen “in solitude” (duwen) and the clear-sightedness to see “in solitude” (dujian), may one take control of the Way and act. Now, the Yin changed the Xia, the Zhou changed the Yin, the Spring and Autumn changed the Zhou. The rites of the Three Dynasties were not the same, so how can one follow the ancient? The great man makes and the disciples follow. By understanding that from which law and governance arises, one can respond to the age and change. If one does not know the source of law and governance, although one follows the ancient, in the end there will be chaos.28

28

Huainanzi jiaoshi 13.1359.

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In this passage, it is impossible to know if the term du means “in solitude” or “unique,” but it clearly implies a special level of sensory acuity. “Following the ancient” is explicitly not just following the rites of a particular dynasty, but cultivating a sense for when to use which of the disparate examples of past ages. While Kongzi acknowledged that the rituals of the three dynasties were different, he concluded that he would “follow [the ritual of the] Zhou” (cong Zhou ન ֟ ).29 By contrast, the emphasis in these materials is on developing a sixth sense for when one should use a precedent from the past, and, as the Huainanzi points out, not uniformly following the rites of a single dynasty. This portrait of the sage influences later writings, both in the Han, and in the famous commentaries of Guo Xiang ௱ඐ (d. 312 C.E.) and Wang Bi ̙౫ (226-249 C.E.)30 It is difficult to know how much of their pictures to read back into the Wuxing and the Mengzi, but it illustrates the success of the later career of the idea that the sage’s powers derived from access to the “natural Way.” Because some Ru texts tied the observation of dispositions into theories of politics, there is more to this portrait than simply a claim to acute sensory ability. In the Wuxing, self-cultivation is both an end in itself, and a means to preparing oneself for the possibility of encountering a sage. By concentrating on one’s inner mind and developing the virtues, one becomes receptive to the sage in a way that, while blinding one to external features, enables one to recognize the same reality regardless of the name it takes. In general, as in the Huainanzi, one is able to understand transformations to the extent that one can recognize the true substance of things before or after they have transformed, as well as apply the correct name to them. In this sense, the sage is very similar to the “great Ru” in the “Ruxiao” chapter of the Xunzi. Earlier, we saw that the difference between “great” and “elegant” Ru relates to the ability to assign categories (lei) to things one has never encountered. This applies to the future as well as the past, 29

“Zhongyong” §28, a composite of several sayings in the Analects (2.23, 3.9, and 3.14). See Zhongyong zhangju 36. 30 The next chapter looks at several Han texts related to the Changes that develop this idea. Guo Xiang argued that the exemplary sight and hearing of the sage was what allowed him to yingshi ᏻ̛ “respond to the age,” and further said that even when the sage was at temple or court, մ˻೷୙‫ؠ‬ʱ‫˃ظ‬ˀ “his mind was no different from as if he were in the mountains and forests.” See Feng Youlan 1986, v. 4, 170-5. Wang Bi responded to the He Yan’s щउ (190-249) argument that sages did not have affective dispositions by arguing, in Tang Yongtong’s ೢ·Ӏ paraphrase, that “although the sages had the five affective dispositions that average people did, the sage’s affective dispositions responded to external things and so [sages] were not of the same kind as other things.” See Tang Yongtong 1983, 254-63, esp. 258.

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according to Kongzi’s disciple Zigong as quoted in Mengzi 2A2: Գմ ᔩЩ‫ڈ‬մ‫ ݬ‬ႝմᆪЩ‫ڈ‬մᅭ ΊР̛˃݈ മР̛˃̙ ந˃঻ཧ ʛ “He had only to see their rites and he understood their government, he had only to hear their music, and he understood their virtue. From the vantage of a hundred generations later he ranked the kings during those hundred generations, and no one could gainsay him.”31 In the Han, the same ability is associated by Wang Chong ̙̭ (27-c.100 C.E.) with the lore of the sage’s ability to hone the senses in “solitude”. In the “Shizhi” ࿧‫( ڈ‬True knowledge) chapter of the Lunheng ቈ፰ (Balanced Discussions), Wang criticizes beliefs which he claims equate the sage with supernatural beings: ኵ‫ږ‬ቈ໶ʆ ̣޴‫ڈۮ‬ʢ๶ ݈‫ڈ‬໗̛ ЉጤԳ˃‫ ا‬ጤ᛾˃ᑶ Ֆգ ۱Ϗ ʿዕб‫ڈ‬ʿ੕бዳ ‫ݭ‬ၳ໶ [໶]۱আԡ The Ru, when discussing the sages, take them to have foreknowledge of the next thousand years, and know about the ten thousand generations past. [The Ru also say sages] have the clear-sightedness to see “in solitude” (dujian) and the sharp-earedness to hear “in solitude.” When affairs occur they can name them, understanding on their own without studying, knowing on their own without asking. So when they apply the term “sage,” their sages are really spirits!32

The doctrines that Wang is finding fault with in the first century C.E. are rooted in the claim of sagely exceptionalism in the Wuxing and to an extent also in the Mengzi and Hanshi waizhuan. In this and the chapter “Zhishi” ‫ڈ‬࿧ (Understanding truth) chapter, Wang repeatedly makes the point that if there is a difference between the wise man and the sage, it is a difference in degree and not in kind.33 The attack is on the idea that the sage is exceptional, and in particular on the notion that Kongzi could know the future. As we will see in the next chapter, the same sensitivity that one develops to the presence of a sage had, by Wang’s time, in some texts become associated with an ability to know the future. This later development of the concepts of the sage’s “clearsighted” and “sharped-eared” sensory acuity, and ability to attend to affairs “in solitude,” need not imply that the Wuxing credited the sage with the ability to see the future. But they do establish that, at the very least, the vocabulary used first in the Wuxing was deployed in the Han Dynasty as part of a claim that the sage’s sensory acuity was different 31 32 33

Mengzi zhengyi 6.217 [cf. Lau 1970, 80]. Lunheng jiaoshi 26.1069 (cf. Forke, v.2, 114). Lunheng jiaoshi 26.1096 (cf. Forke, v.2, 289).

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in kind from that of ordinary people, and resulted in insight into the future. While this may have been an unintended appropriation of Wuxing terminology, there is certainly a strong sense in which that text’s use of the tian versus ren distinction creates a sense of that the nature of the sage was exceptional. Nevertheless, as the next section shows, the metaphor used to express the influence of a sage upon a person who has cultivated a receptivity to virtue also calls into question the idea that there is an absolute separation between the realms of tian and ren. On the level of the cultivation of virtue, the historical existence of sages is what allows wisdom and sagacity to develop inside individuals, effectively allowing the ren realm access to the tian realm. On the political level, tian is both external, determining the opportunities encountered, and, at the same time, internal, allowing one to prepare for the proper opportunity through developing the acuity to recognize a sage. Because the heart of the Wuxing is a rationalization of Ru selfcultivation by grounding it in a detailed moral psychology, the “natural Way” is not only a matter of the observable non-social world, but it is also at the core of the very encounters one has with both the social and non-social worlds. By gaining “insight,” the sage does not abandon the human Way, but is able to additionally follow the natural Way. This is the special form of a claim to transcendence that the texts at the heart of this study make, a claim that is closer to the naturalism of the Zhuangzi. This is not coincidental, because the argument that the Ru’s methods were obsolete is addressed (albeit in a nascent manner) through the claim that a sage’s superior sensory acuity allows them access to a kind of understanding that is outside time. While the specific claim that a sage’s acuity to dispositions allows insight into incipient events is not spelled out in the Wuxing, the connection that text draws between the sage and the “natural Way” is the basis in contemporary and later texts for a model in which the sage is able to adjust to circumstances and act in a “timely” way. In these ways, the Wuxing reflects both a development of new theories of the virtues, and an integration of some of the assumptions of Ru critics. This is nowhere as evident as in the specific account of the role of the sage in self-cultivation in the Wuxing and Mengzi, a topic that is the subject of the next section.

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Being attuned to the Way: the sage and the jade chimestone Is it possible to attain sagehood in isolation, or does it require contact with other sages or their legacies? Although one might be able to act in a ritually proper manner solely by “attending to one’s solitude,” the Wuxing is also adamant that attaining the culminant virtue of sagacity cannot be accomplished alone. On this point the Wuxing might appear to be contradicting itself, because its stress on hearing and seeing the “Way of the gentleman” in §6 appears at first to be valuing an external influence, and in so doing running counter to the rest of the text’s focus on internal factors such as innate dispositions and reflection. This is not a contradiction in the Wuxing because, while the example of the sage is external to one’s body, that example’s effects are experienced internally. Specifically, once one has cultivated one’s own virtue so as to become receptive to the influence of the sage’s virtue, one begins to form virtue within oneself. The Wuxing uses a particular metaphor to explain the influence of the sage on the minds of others. The ability of the sage to effect this kind of internal change in others is explained in terms of the process of resonance: vibrations of large amplitude in a system caused by a relatively small periodic stimulus of the same or nearly the same period as the natural vibration period of the system. The first segment of the Wuxing ends with an account of the transformative influence of a sage that allows one to move from goodness to virtue. The Wuxing’s description of the process begins with a brief contrast between the defined course of study needed to become good, and the unending journey associated with virtue (in §8 and already discussed on pages 79-81). It continues in §9 to invoke a musical metaphor that harkens back to the association of the sage with characteristics of “jade” in §6. Slips 19 through 20 of the Guodian Wuxing read: ‫ہ‬ᑵЩ΂ࣴ˃Љᅭ‫ږ‬ʛ ‫ہ‬ᑵെʛ ΂ࡖ໶ʛ െ ʆལʛ ᅭ ˭ལʛ ੗Љᅭ‫ ږ‬೸݈঻‫ہ‬ᑵЩ΂ࣴ˃ “A metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate,” is the presence of virtue. “A metal bell sounding,” is good. “A jade stone causing it to vibrate,” is sage. Good is the human Way, and virtue is tian’s Way. Only once virtue is present can there be “a metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate.” [GD §9.1-5]

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179

The metaphor of the metal bell sounding and the jade stone causing it to vibrate (jin sheng er yu zhen zhi ‫ہ‬ᑵЩ΂ࣴ˃) is an important one in the Wuxing for several reasons. First, since it is located in the final part of the first segment of the text, it serves as a summation of the description of moral psychology and methods based on that psychology that make up that segment. Second, it furnishes the longest direct parallels between the Wuxing and the Mengzi, and so it is the best place to look for clarification of their historical relationship. Third, its ambiguity has given rise to very different interpretations, and so gives insight into the way both the Wuxing and the Mengzi have been read. Indeed, I will argue below that traditional interpretations have generally failed to fully appreciate the radical claims being made in these texts. Since the Wuxing phrase jin sheng er yu zhen zhi appears in the transmitted Mengzi, there already is a wealth of commentary explaining it. Two plausible readings of the phrase I have translated as “a metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate” (another plausible translation would take er Щ as “but”: “the metal bell sounds but it is the jade stone causing it to vibrate”) have been offered in the context of its appearance in the Mengzi. Before turning to the competing interpretations of Zhao Qi ღҴ (d. 201 C.E.) and Jiao Xun ೵౮ (1763-1820), it is worth introducing the elements of original passage in the Mengzi. In Mengzi 5B1, Mengzi extols Kongzi’s ability to select from the disparate examples of the past, and to turn their examples into a capacity for virtuous action somehow more than the sum of its parts. Mengzi does this by first listing the very different behaviors of three past wise men: Bo Yi їϡ, Yi Yin Υ˄, and Liuxia Hui ‫ގ‬ʓ౴. While their behaviors differed, they were each internally consistent, and suited to their particular historical moments. Then he observes that Kongzi, by contrast, behaved very differently in different situations, leaving the state of Qi quickly after getting evidence of the ruler’s dissoluteness, but dragging his feet when leaving his parents’ state of Lu. The discrepancy between Kongzi’s responses to these two situations shows how he meshes his actions with the circumstances of the moment (shi इ). The passage continues: ˱ʪ˃ᎂූʨϾ ූʨϾʛ‫ہ ږ‬ᑵЩ΂ࣴ˃ʛ ‫ہ‬ᑵʛ‫ֻ ږ‬଍୎ʛ ΂ࣴ˃ʛ‫ ږ‬உ଍୎ʛ ֻ଍୎‫ ږ‬ನ˃Ֆʛ உ଍୎‫ ږ‬໶˃Ֆʛ [For the reason just outlined,] Kongzi is said to have “gathered the great achievements.” To “gather the great achievements,” is “a metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate”. “A metal bell sounding” is the beginning of an inherent pattern, “a jade stone causing it to

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vibrate” is the finishing of an inherent pattern. Beginning an inherent pattern is a matter for the wise, and finishing an inherent pattern is a matter for the sage.34

In this passage, the Mengzi indicates that to “gather the great achievements” (ji da cheng ූʨϾ) is a stock phrase, and glosses it with another such phrase, “a metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate.” The former appears in §21 of the Wuxing, and in the Mengzi it appears to refer back to Kongzi’s being able to act in a manner appropriate to each particular situation. This is the first major disagreement between the commentators. According to Zhao Qi, it meant that Kongzi “gathered together” (ji ූ) the “great Ways of the former sages,” applying situation-specific behaviors of the past sages as appropriate. However, Jiao Xun argues the term da cheng ʨϾ may also refer to the entire course of a musical performance. Jiao says that in this case the term refers to getting the parts of the performance in the correct order, with the metal bell first and the jade stone last.35 This disagreement sets the stage for the fundamental interpretive split on the meaning of the 5B1 passage. In the following section, I will argue that Zhao’s interpretation is more consistent, but that the Wuxing parallel suggests new possibilities that neither interpreter considered. That there is a problem with Jiao’s reading of the passage is suggested by the interpretation of the phrase da cheng. In the Odes, the transformation of people by a gentleman is described as da cheng ʨϾ.36 There and in some recently excavated texts, there is a link between cheng and the power of sincerity to affect others, supporting Zhao’s reading of the 34

Mengzi zhengyi 20.669-75. Since both the bell and stone are associated with tiaoli ଍୎, it could be argued that the latter is the object of the pronoun zhi ˃. 35 Mengzi zhengyi 10.672-3. 36 “Chegong” Ծӣ (Sturdy chariots, Mao 179) uses the term to speak of the sage’s effect on his people: ˃ʪʝ‫ ק‬Љႝ೷ᑵ ˕ԡѼʪ ࣉʛʨϾ “When my master comes back from his tour, it is possible to hear the silence. Indeed, a gentleman; verily, da cheng.” The influence of the gentleman on others–Zhu Xi says the ode is talking about utmost solemnity–is illustrated by the silence that greets the Zhou ruler’s return. Zheng Xuan explains da cheng as bringing about an age of great peace: ʨϾᎂ ࠓ˯ͦʛ “Da cheng means attaining great peace.” See Shijing zhuxi 457. This ode is quoted in the “Ziyi” ႗н (Black Robes) chapter of the Liji, which speaks about deeds growing directly out of words, alongside a passage from the Documents that records how on account of his virtue, King Wen was able to ූʨ֡ʝథ৺ “collect the great mandate in his body.” See Liji jijie 52.1332, and 52.1331 for an instance of the same text using cheng Ͼ for cheng ༻. The Guodian version reads: “In the past the Highest Emperor (shangdi ʕܹ) in Geshen ఝஆ looked down on the virtue of King Wen, and the Great Mandate was concentrated in his person.” The transmitted Liji version reads “fields of Zhou” for Geshen.

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181

term dacheng.37 While the context of the Mengzi quotation may be read to support Jiao’s reading of the term, this is only one of several reasons to reject it. Modern readers have generally followed Jiao in understanding the phrase jin sheng er yu zhen zhi in the Wuxing as “a metal bell sounds and a jade stone vibrates,” signifying the right order of an individual’s self-cultivation process: from goodness to sagacity.38 D. C. Lau translates the phrase: “To do this is to open with bells and conclude with jade tubes,” noting “this refers to music.”39 A problem with this translation, which follows Jiao Xun closely, is that it does not give an account of the object zhi ˃ that follows the “jade stone.” James Legge’s translation is similar: “A complete concert is when the [large] bell proclaims the [commencement of the music], and the ringing stone proclaims its close.” Legge does explain the phrase zhen zhi ࣴ˃ as follows: “‫ہ‬ᑵ and ࣴ˃ are not part of the concert, but the signals of its commencement and close, the ˃ referring to ූʨᑵ [sic].”40 It is possible that zhen zhi means “proclaims [the concert’s] close,” but this is a stretch in reading the word zhen ࣴ,which in modern Chinese can

37

In the Late Warring States Baoshan divinatory materials, following sacrifices to particular deities such as one’s deceased father and the Master of Fate (Siming ͌֡), the reliability of the spirits world is recorded with phrases like: ፶̓‫ݰ‬Ͼ ፶͹‫ݰ‬Ͼ “Dear father was indeed cheng, dear mother was indeed cheng” and the various spirits who had received sacrifices ‫ߖݰ‬Ͼ “all were indeed cheng.” See Hubei sheng Jingsha tielu kaogu dui 1991, 365-6; Liu Xinfang ᄸ‫ ڤۑ‬1993, 210 and 225. In the latter, Liu Xinfang understands cheng to refer to “accomplishment of the sacrificial rite,” (221), however, there are two reasons to read the character as a post facto observation about how the sacrifices to the spirits did in fact lead to good fortune during that year. First, the first sentence is printed on the back of a slip (202), rather than, say, at the end of slip 204. Second, the second sentence is explicit about the fact that the sentence is part of later addendum about the effects of the sacrifices rather than part of original divination: ಭˀʑ(Љ)మ “during the period there was contentment.” Here, and in the “Ziyi,” the spirits are described as cheng in a way strictly compatible with cheng ༻. The realization/maturation connotation of cheng is a result of the agency of spirits, just as the effect of tian brings realization of the Mandate. Similarly, the Baoshan spirits exert their power to protect the person who sacrificed to them, as the Highest Emperor conveyed the mandate to the virtuous Zhou kings. 38 The first reading of this metaphor as related to resonance is Csikszentmihalyi 1998. Wei (2000, 25) and Pang (2000, 44) both explain the term with respect to the proper order in a musical performance. Cook (2000, 128) reads the phrase as “[possess] the tones of bronze and [instill] them [with] the resonance of jade,” explaining the former decay while the latter is the same from beginning to end. This insightful reading has the advantage of dovetailing with Wuxing §8, but like the other interpretations does not explicitly account of the direct object zhi ˃, translating the verb-object phrase zhen zhi ࣴ˃ as “resonance”. 39 Lau 1970, 150. 40 Legge 1895, 372.

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mean to shake, as well as invigorate or animate something.41 Keeping this objection to Jiao’s reading in mind, let us turn to Zhao’s earlier one. The interpretation of Mengzi 5B1 by the Han commentator Zhao Qi is very different. Zhao understands the passage as a whole to be about integrating the great achievements of past sages. When he turns to the metaphor of the bell and stone, Zhao distinguishes between the tone of a metal bell that degrades and is regulated by means of the sound of drums (ge ࡓ “leather” tone), and that of a jade stone which does not degrade so that its “ending and beginning are as one” (zhong shi ru yi உֻϨɾ).42 That the regulation of the inconstant metal bell is the beginning of “inherent pattern” and the constant jade stone the finishing of it, is not explicitly related to the proper order of a musical performance. Compared with that of Jiao Xun, Zhao Qi’s reading of this passage is more consistent with the use of “beginning” and “finishing” in Wuxing §8.1-2 because there the terms refer to stages in the performance of good and virtuous acts, and not stages in a musical performance or the self-cultivation process. The focus of Zhao’s explanation is the contrast between the quality of sound produced by both instruments, one which sounds good at one time but not at another, and the other that sounds good as long as it vibrates. The metaphor may clearly be applied to the distinction between the three wise men and the “timely” sage Kongzi: their actions were appropriate to specific circumstances, while Kongzi’s was constantly appropriate. Where the discovery of the Wuxing allows us to extend Zhao’s analysis of Mengzi 5B1 is through the insight it provides into the relationship between these two sounds. Specifically, the Wuxing’s emphasis on the influence of the sage and its use of terms such as “jade tone” in describing that influence suggest the possibility that the passage is talking about something somewhat different from either interpretation: the musical phenomenon of resonance. In this interpretation, the “metal bell” and “jade stone” refer to the process of one instrument hitting a certain note, and its sound waves causing the other instrument to sound at the same frequency.43 The influence of a moral exemplar on another person is likened to the quasi-magical 41

As Zhang Shuangdi ઠᕻ಼ and Chen Tao ௾ᐤ write (1998, 1053), classical Chinese has two homophones that refer to shaking: zhen ኏ and zhen ࣴ. The latter may be distinguished from the one in the Mengzi passage in this way: “In all cases, those things that shake by themselves are written zhen ኏, but when external objects cause them to shake they are written zhen ࣴ” 42 Mengzi zhengyi 20.672-3. 43 Kenneth J. DeWoskin (1982, 70-98) presents a general treatment of the concept of resonance in Han music theory.

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influence of one instrument (the jade stone) upon another (the metal bell). This musical metaphor is used to describe the transforming effect of virtue in a number of other early texts. In the Wuxing, the occurrence in §9 follows sections that refer to the transformative influence of morally perfected individuals such as §5.3: “Only having seen the gentleman, will the mind necessarily be joyful.” Under this interpretation, the process outlined in §6.3 becomes transparent: “If one is sharp-eared then one can hear the Way of the Gentleman. If one hears the Way of the Gentleman then one will have a jade tone. If one has jade tone then one will give form to it.” Hearing the Way sets off a sympathetic vibration, allowing one to attain and eventually form sagacity. As in the Jiao Xun interpretation of the occurrence in the Mengzi’s use of the phrase “a metal bell sounds and a jade stone causes it to vibrate,” Wuxing §9 is also talking about the self-cultivation process, but the metaphor emphasizes the transforming influence of one virtuous person upon another person, and not orderly stages in the development of one person’s virtue. To show why this is a plausible reading of this phrase, I will make three kinds of arguments. The first is that this reading allows us to make more sense of the rest of Mengzi 5B1. The second is to show how virtue was thought to create a sympathetic moral influence likened to resonance in some later texts. The third will show that “a metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate” is related to the use of the moral term cheng (“sincerity”) in other early texts. Taken together, these arguments suggest the “resonance” reading of the phrase is a reasonable one. Looking at the rest of Mengzi 5B1, the explanation inspired by the Wuxing supports Zhao Qi’s reading of “inherent pattern” (tiaoli ଍୎) as being the process of learning to artfully apply the examples of the past. Zhao’s reading is consistent with the distinction in Wuxing description of the sage: ‫ڈ‬Щм˃ ໳ʛ м˃Щइ ᅭʛ. “To know [the Way of the Gentleman] and enact it is righteousness. To enact it in a timely way is virtue,” [GD §15.3]. Just as the Mengzi extols Kongzi’s ability to mesh his actions with the circumstances of the moment, the Wuxing distinguishes between the human capacity to enact good rules and the sage’s capacity to do so in a timely way. However, Mengzi 5B1’s final comment has proven difficult to understand from any interpretive position: ನ ᙰ۱͢ʛ ໶ ᙰ۱ʍ ʛ Ίࣇ‫ؠ‬РӴ˃͙ʛ մв ၒʍʛ մˀ ‫ۍ‬ၒʍʛ “Wisdom may be likened to art, and sagacity to strength. Coming from being shot from over a hundred paces away, [an arrow’s] reaching [the target] is a

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matter of your strength, but [its] hitting the center is not a matter of your strength.” The problem arises from the final sentence, which is generally understood to say: “but [its] hitting the center is not a matter of your strength.” Because strength is likened to sagacity, this section of the passage has been confusing to commentators, because it appears to say that sagacity is required, but wisdom is what causes the arrow to hit the mark. Zhao Qi valiantly attempted to explain this strange valuation of wisdom over sagacity by arguing that the wise men Bo Yi, Yi Yin, and Liuxia Hui needed a combination of the learnable quality of wisdom and the innate quality of sagacity to hit the target. Zhao begins by differentiating wisdom from sagacity: ̣ನ ᙰΊʆ˃Љӑ͢ʛ ̈́ዕЩ८˃ ̣໶ ᙰΊʍ˃ЉϠ˲ʛ бЉ๨ࡎ ʿ̈́ડᅍ “One may liken wisdom to a person’s possessing a technical art that one may study and improve on. One may liken sagacity to strength’s having a set amount that each person has a limited maximum which may not be pushed higher.” Zhao is attempting to differentiate wisdom and sagacity as reflecting a difference between learned and innate ability. Zhao goes on to extol the “strength” of Kongzi and concludes: ˮࣇხЩв ၒѫ ʍʛ մˀ‫ ږڄ‬ၒ˃͢ʛ “Now, shooting an arrow far and have it reach is a matter of using your strength to the full, and hitting the center of the target is a matter of your art.”44 While this explanation is plausible, it does not connect with his interpretation of the rest of the Mengzi passage. Since neither Zhao nor subsequent commentators had access to the Wuxing, they could not appreciate the Mengzi’s reliance on that text’s model of the way the sage “activates” virtue in others. From this perspective, the final line of Mengzi 5B1 might be read in an entirely different way: the negation fei ‫ ۍ‬in the last clause fei er li ‫ۍ‬ ၒʍ is aimed at the er “your” and not at the li ʍ “strength.” In other words, the passage is not arguing that hitting the target is a matter of art instead of strength (and therefore wisdom instead of sagacity), but rather that it is a matter of someone else’s strength and not your own strength. Since sagacity has a transformative effect on others, a wise man is unable to do sage acts except through the influence of a sage.

44

Mengzi zhengyi 20.672-3. Jiao Xun argues that when Zhao Qi uses the pronoun er ၒ, he is referring to the three wise men Bo Yi, Yi Yin, and Liuxia Hui. Zhao may be drawing on the notion of varying strengths in Analects 3.16: ʪ̆ ࣇʿ̟Ώ ޴ʍʿ ψ߰ ͅ˃ལʛ “Archery does not put highest importance on the (piercing) the leather (target), for strengths are not the same kind.” (Lunyu jijie 6.187-191).

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The metal bell can only resonate at the frequency of the jade tone if there is a vibrating jade stone that agitates it.45 Turning away from the Mengzi, the resonance interpretation is also borne out by passages in later texts that use language from the Wuxing to express the idea that sage can transform others through the activating effect of his or her virtue. The clearest appropriation of Wuxing language that uses resonance as a metaphor for moral transformation is in the first chapter of the second century B.C.E. Hanshi waizhuan ᓟ༶ ͙෭. This passage uses the idea of the bells having a resonance effect on the ruler, his subjects, and even the animals at court: ͅ‫˭ ږ‬ʪͣ [͆] ˉᙽ અ̳ ۱ᆆ෦ᙽ Щ͆ˉᙽߖᏻ˃ ਠᄦˀ݆ ኢ‫ږ‬Љ́ પ‫ږ‬ЉᆚΘ۱ጸӜ ‫ݤ‬۱‫ ྦྷؗ‬мӴˀை Ӝ૰ˀॵ. . . ʈ ۱ᆆⱳტ ̣٢ࣅს ࣅსદ۱ᖄиᄫ ᖄиᄫ۱Яመϯ ⱳტЉᑵ ᖜ኏ਠᄦ ˪჋˒˃ᕐ ೷ʿ‫ע‬Ꮐ̣᛾ Ϛ˖‫΂ߖږ‬и Ϛ͙‫ہߖږ‬ ᑵ . . . ЏԵࡖᆪЉ֜ ‫ٵ‬ᘝߟี ψᑵߟᏻ˃໳ʛ In ancient times, the Son of Heaven had five bells at his left [and right]. If he was going to go out then the “huangzhong” pitched bell was struck and the five bells at his right all responded to it. The horses whinnied in harmony with the pitch, their carriages were in the right formation, and their drivers followed the right procedures. Those who stood bent themselves to the angle of the chimestone. Those who clasped their hands together were as if they were embracing drums. When they walked, they were exactly straight, when turning they were exactly perpendicular. . . [When the Son of Heaven] entered, the “ruibin” pitched bell was struck in order to govern his appearance. Once the correct appearance was obtained, then his coloration was even. Once his coloration was even, then his flesh and skin were settled. When the “ruibin” was given sound, swans took flight and horses whinnied, so that even down to hard-shelled bugs, all without exception craned their necks to listen. Those inside had a “jade coloration”, and those outside were a “metal bell sounding,” . . . This explains the significance of the way that when musical sounds are in tune, different categories of creatures stimulate each other, and things of the same pitch respond to each other.46 45

Mengzi zhengyi 20.674-5. Zhao’s comment is clear about the exceptional nature of Kongzi’s sagacity, but the Mengzi is just as clear about subscribing to the idea of the periodic reappearance of a sage every five hundred years. This is the subject of the last section of this chapter. The “Taizu” chapter of the Huainanzi, explains how the sincerity of the sage is like the mind’s direction of an arrow, which is what causes others to follow him in a way that strength alone cannot guarantee (see below). 46 This section explains an Odes quotation from the “Gaoyang” ধХ (Lambs and sheep, Mao 18). See Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng (1.16) 208-10 (cf. Hightower 245). The word you ͆ “right” is inserted based on Taiping yulan 565.2a. The terms huangzhong ෦ᙽ and ruibin ⱳტ refer to two of the twelve pitches (lü ݆) located to the along the north-south axis. The other ten bells were supposed to be located, half

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The way that the clear tones of the bell of the virtuous ruler cause other bells to resonate (literally) extends to animals and to his officials (figuratively). Most interesting from the point of view of the Wuxing is the Hanshi waizhuan’s appropriation of its terms “jade coloration” and “metal bell sounding”. In one way, these two terms might appear to be used differently here, since, in the Wuxing, “jade coloration” goes with wisdom/“metal bell sounding,” while it is a “jade tone” that goes with sagacity/“jade that causes it to vibrate.” On closer inspection, however, the pure pitch has created the equivalent of wisdom both inside the palace (i.e., the Son of Heaven’s jade coloration) and outside the palace (i.e., the effects on everyone else), or perhaps in the Son of Heaven’s interior coloration (i.e., his body) and his exterior tone (i.e., his speech). It is the bell in this example that is the metaphor for the sage, and the sage’s effectiveness is unambiguously the product of a process that works in the same way that the physical process of resonance does. Indeed, sounding the proper note leads to joy, which in Wuxing §2 and §4 is the precursor state to virtue. This Hanshi waizhuan passage may be seen as an indirect commentary on the Wuxing. A second example is of uncertain age, dating from any time from the Han through the Six Dynasties period. It is from a class of text known as “weft books” or texts ancillary to the classics (weishu ሁए) that were part of the more general category of the “apocrypha” (chenwei ᝘ ሁ) that are introduced and examined at greater length in the following chapter. The Yuexie tuzheng ᆪ փ ࿌ ᅮ  (Music harmony chart prooftext) demonstrates how good government in different areas causes different pitchpipes to respond: Ѽལʿદ ۱෦ᙽࡖʿቆ ᙽࡖʿቆ ۱෦ᙽⱳტ˃݆ʿᏻ “When the Way of the gentleman is not attained, then the tones of the bells will not be in tune. When the tones of the bells are not in tune then the ‘huangzhong’ pitched bell and the ‘ruibin’ pitched bell will not respond.”47 Here, the harmony created by good government actually causes bells of different pitches to resonate. Kenneth Dewoskin uses this example in his general discussion of the importance of the concept of resonance in early Chinese music theory, and argues this passage makes two claims: that there is a direct relation between certain activities and certain pitches, and that remote on each side, on the east-west axis. Related passages in the Han text Shangshu dazhuan ‫׋‬एʨ෭ are discussed in the last chapter of this study. 47 See Yasui Kôzan and Nakamura Shôhachi 556-7. Another work, the Chunqiu ganjingfu ‫ี߲ݱ‬ႅ୷ (Talisman that Echoes Essence [Ancillary to the] Spring and Autumn) describes how the emperor’s performance of ritual at Winter Solstice generates similar responses (Yasui Kôzan and Nakamura Shôhachi 736-7).

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interaction occurs between correlated phenomena.48 In early China, action at a distance was often illustrated by the effect of the transmission of sound through the air. In the second century B.C.E., some texts described how virtue could be inculcated via correct musical tones.49 These examples show how resonance is associated with virtue. While these examples come from early imperial texts, there is also corroboration for this view in Warring States texts, where the process is closely connected with the term cheng ༻. That term is often translated as “sincerity” or “integrity”, although some have recently argued for the translation “creativity”.50 The term itself does not appear in the Wuxing,51 but a phrase from the Wuxing does appear in an early definition that probably was that of cheng. The definition comes from the “logic chapters” of the Mozi. This particular chapter, “Jing shuo, shang” ໩იʕ (Explanation of the classic, part 1) is estimated by A. C. Graham to have been written by the early third century B.C.E.52 In one of that section’s many definitions, the Mozi provides a thumbnail sketch of the process of affecting others through one’s appearance: մӆम˃Գʛ ՟ʆϨʴ ʿ [ͫ] ࠜ‫ہ‬ᑵ΂‫]ࣴ[ ح‬ [The term is defined as:] The appearance of one’s intention and qi, causing others to be like one. It is as unavoidable as a metal bell sounding and a jade stone vibrating.53 48 49 50

Dewoskin 1982, 71. These texts are explored at greater length in chapter five. Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall 2001, 30-5. The translation of “creativity” indeed conveys one aspect of cheng well: the ability to vary the template of past sages in a way that ordinary people cannot. However, current English usage of “creativity” is closely tied to the romantic idea of it as a fixed humoral or “material” endowment, rather than one that needs to be activated by influence of the sages of the past. Because of cheng’s connection with the Way of the sages (past and future) and with adapting that Way to the circumstances of the present, it is much more similar to the understanding of creativity connected to particular social domains advanced by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1996). 51 Unless we take ji da cheng ූʨϾ to actually be ji da cheng ූʨ༻, and so talking about gathering the great influences that constitute the legacy of past sages. 52 Graham 1978, 23. 53 Chapter 42 is an “explanation” of chapter 40, “Jing, shang” ໩ʕ (Classic, part 1), where the definition is simply rong ဝ (splendor), see Mozi xiangu 10.191 and 10.203-4. Sun Yirang ࢽ⌞᝖ already noted that the graph bu ʿ “not” should be read as bi ͫ “it is necessary”. In the translation I have also changed, in light of the Wuxing and all Mengzi parallels, fu ‫ ح‬to zhen ࣴ. Sun’s explanation that a person’s ritual accessories (a metaphor for external appearance) manifest that person’s shi ࿧ “substantive” goodness, needs to be rejected in favor of one in which the final clause is a simile for the transformation that a person’s virtuous qi catalyzes in another who views it. This latter reading is based on the “resonance” interpretation of the metaphor “a metal bell sounds and jade vibrates it” (which fits neatly with the occurrence of qi “pneuma” which is used to explain action at a distance through the medium of air) and

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The definition centers on an ability to transform others through one’s zhi ӆ and qi म, “intention and pneuma,” the same terms used in Mengzi 2A2 to talk about the accumulation of virtue. What is significant here is the way the process is illustrated by the inevitability of “a metal bell sounding and a jade stone vibrating”. While current editions of the Mozi identify this definition as that of the term shi ࿧ “substance”, the work of Luan Tiaofu 㑌ቆԜ has provided evidence that the word cheng was systematically changed to shi as the result of a taboo on the name of Song dynasty emperor Lizong ୎‫( ׅ‬r. 1225-64), Guicheng ඙༻.54 Could cheng then be the sage’s ability to affect others through the power of virtuous qi? Other uses of cheng provide evidence that Luan’s general observation holds in this particular case, and that “sincerity” is the process of affecting others through the influence of one’s essence and qi. The effect of sincerity is explained in terms of influence of sages on those who does good in the “Zhongyong”chapter of the Liji: ༻‫˃˭ ږ‬ལʛ ༻˃‫ ږ‬ʆ˃ལʛ ༻‫ږ‬ʿ۳Щˀ ʿ‫݋‬Щદ નࣅˀལ ໶ʆʛ ༻˃‫ ږ‬ዪെЩ֣੭˃‫ږ‬ʛ “Sincerity” is tian’s Way. “Affected by sincerity” means the Way of human beings. “Sincerity” is making no effort and yet hitting the center, not reflecting and yet attaining. At ease and hitting the center of the Way–this is the sage. “Affected by sincerity” is selecting the good and firmly implementing it.55 on the fact that Sun’s reading depends on the idea that the passage is a definition of the word “substance”, which turn out to be mistaken (see below). 54 Luan 1957, 100. Generally, in the Mozi, the character shi refers to the object identified by a name (ming Ϗ), a signified that is distinguished from its signifier. The term does not fit with its use in moral contexts, a point originally made by Graham, who identifies the character as cheng. See A. C. Graham 1978, 273-4. 55 The passage is found in section 21 of the “Zhongyong” (Zhongyong zhangju 31). Because of the use of cheng as a transitive verb in this passage, adhering to the standard translation of “sincerity” causes infelicities in the translation. Based on the above definition in the Mozi, a verbal use of cheng would refer to the transformation “causing others to be like one”, so I have translated the term cheng zhi ༻ ˃ (“sincerities it”) as indicating the object of the transformation. Guo Yi ௱Ԑ provides a clear analysis of this passage (2001, 595-600), also renaming the latter section of “Zhongyong” as “Tianming” (Tian’s command) and arguing that it is the work of Zisi. Gao Zheng ਢ͸ (1997, 84) has noted the close connection between this passage and Mengzi 4A12: ‫˃˭ ږ༻ݭݵ‬ལʛ ‫ ږ༻݋‬ʆ˃ལʛ в༻Щʿੂ‫˃͵ ږ‬Љʛ ʿ ༻ ͵Љ঻ੂ‫ږ‬ʛ “Hence to be sincere is the Way of tian. To reflect on that sincerity is the Way of human beings. There has neither been a person of ultimate sincerity that did not move (others), nor one who is not sincere who has been able to move (others).” See Mengzi zhengyi 15.508-11 (cf. Lau 1970, 123). This passage is consistent with the idea that the influence of the sage was understood to be an actual physical effect (“shaking” others) of the resonance caused by a sage’s qi. See also Mei Guang 2001.

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There are several reasons to conclude that cheng in this passage is talking about the same process explored above in Mengzi 5B1 and the Wuxing. First, it explains the effect of sincerity by distinguishing between the Way of tian and the Way of human beings, making this a direct parallel to the Mengzi’s explanation of the effect of a jade stone on a metal bell. Even further, the “Zhongyong” is talking about the same distinction at the core of Mengzi 5B1 because it contrasts the spontaneous adaptability of the sage (i.e., Kongzi) with the selection of a good suited to a particular moment (i.e., the three wise men).56 Finally, that the idea of “making no effort and yet hitting the center” clearly links the “Zhongyong” use of cheng to the final comment on an arrow’s hitting its target due to factors other than strength in Mengzi 5B1. The “Zhongyong” parallel supports the case that Luan Tiaofu’s general observation holds in the case of the definition in “Jing shuo, shang,” and therefore that the Mozi defines sincerity as the sage’s ability to transform others through their intention and pneuma. Another piece of evidence linking sincerity to the process outlined in the Mengzi is from a second century B.C.E. text. The Huainanzi “Taizu” ळ૯ chapter associates sincerity with the ability to transform others, linking it to metamorphoses in the natural world: ‫ݭ‬໶ʆኙ˻ நെ‫ ༻ؠ‬в༻Щ঻ੂˢԡ “So in the sage’s nourishing of the mind, nothing is as excellent as sincerity. On attaining the highest sincerity, he or she can then cause transformations.”57 The passage then continues by explaining the way in which the sage causes transformation. As with the “Zhongyong” passage about sincerity, the “Taizu” passage employs a metaphor similar to Mengzi 5B1’s final comment about the arrow hitting the target. Here, it refers to the need for the ruler’s cheng to make laws and regulations effective. Sincerity is needed to make the “arrow” of the laws hit the target of transforming the people’s minds: ˮΓ˃‫ࣇ̣׿‬ხ௖ԕ‫ץ ږ‬ʍʛ մ‫̣׿‬ˀ‫ ږัࢆڄ‬ʆ˻ʛ ቑെ႙ ᆝ‫̪ݬ ږ‬ʛ մ‫঻̣׿‬м‫ ږ‬ႅ༻ʛ ‫ץݭ‬ᓛડʿ঻ጤˀ ̪ᓛ‫ا‬ʿ ঻ጤм ͫбႅम‫̣׿‬Ⴉ˃‫ݯ‬ལ Now, the means by which an arrow can penetrate the rigidity of a distant target is the exertion of strength, but the reason that it can split a hair is

56

The Mengzi 5B1 combination of the notion of sincerity as the influence of the sage on those that do good with the idea of the effortlessness of hitting the target also would indicate that the Mengzi’s fei er li is not talking about the need for a combination of strength and art, as traditional commentators have held, but of the fact that no strength of one’s own is ultimately needed to hit the target. 57 Huainanzi jiaoshi 20.2044.

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human minds.58 What rewards good and punishes evil is governance and edicts. The means by which these may be applied is essential sincerity. Therefore, even if one’s strength is great one cannot hit the target alone, and although edicts are clear they cannot be applied alone. It is necessary to put the Way into effect using what essence and qi has bestowed.59

Essential sincerity needed to back up the application of the laws is linked to the need for essence and qi to put the Way into effect. It is cheng that allows the sage to transform others, affecting them on the level of mind. The way the metaphor of the arrow and the target is used to illustrate the effect of the mind is very similar to Mengzi 5B1, additional evidence for the association of the transformative effect of the sage in that passage and the concept of sincerity. Both passages, then, corroborate the idea that “a metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate” was a stock expression invoked to express the effect of one instrument on another, and more specifically, the effect of a sage on the minds of others. It is the complex of sensory abilities associated with the sagehood that allows the sage to sense and affect others. In the “Zhongyong” chapter of the Liji, the notion of sincerity is explained as the precursor to the ability to evaluate subtle indications of future events: в༻˃ལ ̣̈́‫ ڈۮ‬੢ࣁઅ፞ ͫЉၯ୭ ੢ࣁઅʞ ͫЉҢᘼ Գ̢ ⟠Ꮮ ੂ̢͗ᝂ ၱၰઅв െͫζ‫ ˃ڈ‬ʿെͫζ‫ݭ ˃ڈ‬в༻Ϩআ With the Way of ultimate sincerity, it is possible to have foreknowledge. When a state or a family is about to rise, there are necessarily good omens and auspicious signs. When a state or a family is about to fall, there are necessarily bad omens and inauspicious signs. These may be 58

Wang Niansun ̙‫ ࢽ׭‬argues that the character zheng ͸ was a mistake for ren ʆ, based on the latter variant appearing in other collections and on the contrast with the strength. Liu Wendian and Zhang Shuangdi concur (Huainanzi jiaoshi 20.2045). 59 Huainanzi jiaoshi 20.2045. This passage provides support for the “not your strength” reading of fei er li in Mengzi 5B1. A related metaphor is used in a different context in Huainanzi 7: ‫ۍږࣇݭ‬Γʿˀʛ ዕࣇ‫ږ‬ʿ٢Γʛ “In archery, it is not that the arrow fails to hit the target, but that those who studied of archery did not practice with the arrow,” (Huainan honglie jijie 7.243). There, the metaphor is used to criticize rulers who fail to regulate their passions. The two “Taizu” passages are also central to “Jingcheng” ႅ༻, chapter 2 of the Wenzi ́ʪ, where a more terse version of the same base text appears. Much later, much of the passage appears in juan 8, part 1 of the circa twelfth century Daoist text Beiji Zhenwu puci dushi fachang ̺๨ॲ‫ن‬ಢ ิ ̛ܾ ٗ ᙀ (Orthodox Penance for Universal Compassion and Salvation of the Perfected Warrior of the Northern Pole, CT 815). That text reads: ႅ༻Ӂ̢˖ ͙ॅ‫ؠ‬ ʆ˻ ЏʿԵ˃૥ʛ “Essence and sincerity are formed internally and then externally permeate to the minds of others, this is teaching without words,” (Zhengtong Daozang, v. 567, sec. (ze) 13, p. 7).

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seen in the stalks and shells, and in the movement of the four limbs, so that when good or bad fortune is about to arrive, both the good and the bad will necessarily be known through foreknowledge. Therefore ultimate sincerity is like the spirits (shen).60

In this passage, sensitivity to subtle signs on the part of the sincere person in effect transform their “movement of the four limbs” into human instruments of divination. The above arguments are intended to show that it is plausible that the phrase “a metal bell sounding and a jade stone causing it to vibrate” refers to resonance. Indeed, the Mawangdui commentary to the Wuxing is completely compatible with the reading of the Wuxing passage as talking about resonance. The commentary interprets the expression by identifying the “the highest form of the presence of virtue” (you de zhe zhi zhi Љᅭ‫[˃ږ‬в]) as to “form goodness externally” (xing shan yu wai Ӂെ‫[ )͙ؠ‬MWD E §9.5]. Since this ability to form good cannot refer to the formation of action on the part of a person with virtue, whose actions would not be merely identified as “good,” it is only reasonable to suppose that the commentary refers to the virtuous person’s effect on others. The commentary also explains zhen zhi in a way that is consistent with its usage in Classical Chinese–it is the jade chimestone “activating” the metal bell. The beauty of the metaphor of resonance in the context of the moral theory of the Mengzi is that it reconciles the “external” aspect of tian with the innatist aspects of its theory of moral development. Reading the metaphor as an example of resonance resolves the potential conflict between the text’s emphasis on the physiological basis of selfcultivation and the need to privilege particular Ru methods. After all, if morality is purely internal, would not each person be able to work morality out for themselves? The answer, based on the conceptual metaphor of resonance and on an understanding of the ability of the sage to cause action at a distance, is that the culmination of selfcultivation is an external influence that manifests itself through internal changes. Put another way, self-cultivation is still within the realm of moral psychology, but moral psychology is not entirely a matter of the individual’s mind. For “morally autonomous agents” to become “sagely autonomous agents,” they have to see and hear the Way of the 60

Liji zhengyi 53.4a (Cf. Ames and Hall 2001, 106). This connects back to the transformation of the movement of the four limbs in Mengzi 7A21 quoted at the beginning of this chapter, and also to the claims of foreknowledge associated with sagehood explored in the previous section.

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Gentleman. This is a different solution to the problem of whether morality is internally or externally formed from the one found in the Xunzi, and also differs, at least in emphasis, from the answer given in parts of the Mengzi that focus only on the four “human” virtues. That one’s actions are good and that one trains oneself to be receptive to virtue is a product of self-cultivation, but the activating influence of a sage is still required to act out of virtue. This picture is especially germane to the critiques of the Ru found in the Zhuangzi. A reading of tian as a natural Way that did not include the cultivation of virtue is at the center of the Zhuangzi’s critique of the Ru. The Wuxing’s description of the culminant virtue of sagacity uses tian to claim the sage’s actions are above reproach. In the way, the Wuxing inoculated Ru ethics from emerging critiques such as those found in the Zhuangzi. Another criticism of the Ru, that self-cultivation was antithetical to social good, was addressed by the Mengzi’s historical argument that the great rulers of the past had a shared connection to tian. This contention, and the theory of history that it spawned, are treated in the next section.

The Mengzi’s transtemporal sage In the late fourth century B.C.E., the Mengzi proposed a dispensational theory of the periodic appearance of sages. Because a sage is able to reach an understanding of the true nature of things outside of the superficial transformations they undergo over time, he has effectively joined tian in standing outside of time. We have previously seem related claims, such as the predictive potential of the sage’s sensory abilities, and the “timeliness” of Kongzi. Yet the sage’s relation to politics is nowhere as explicit as in the Mengzi. Since the sage kings of antiquity were acknowledged by almost everyone as the paradigm of good politics, by integrating them into a dispensational model, the Mengzi effectively addressed the question of whether its methods of self-cultivation could assure good government. Chapter one outlined an early view of political legitimacy based on the idea of tianming that emphasized narratives of sages who came from outside the existing power structure and unified the world under their virtuous rule. In Mengzi 4B1, the point is made that the sage can come from any place, and even from any group. Shun was from the Eastern Yi ϡ nation, and King Wen was from the Western Yi nation.

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Despite the fact they lived in different places and ages, દӆм̢ˀ੢ ࠜϐ୷໢ ζ໶݈໶ մಋɾʛ “They were able to attain [their] wills and effect them in the Central States as if they were fitting together two halves of a tally. Earlier sages and later sages, their estimations are one.” The Qing commentator Jiao Xun points out that the “tally” is used in the sense of unlocking a door, of finding the right path to authority.61 This is the same way that it is used in the Xunzi’s “Ruxiao” chapter to describe the ability of the sage to determine the correct measures to apply at a particular time or in a particular place: ࡫‫״ٵ‬᜵ ‫͵׿‬྾ႝʛ ‫͵׿‬྾Գʛ ւ೸৹ɾ̄ ۱ᒃ஀ᘝЩᏻ˃ ೷‫⬮׿‬ѕ ઠٗЩܾ˃ ۱↨೸ࠜϐ୷໢ ‫ݵ‬ʨኵ‫ږ‬ʛ When they meet strange creatures or bizarre influences that have never been heard or seen before, they immediately lift up one corner and so then come up with the kind of management to respond to it and act without hesitation. They extend their models and use them to measure it and so then can act quickly as if joining the two halves of a tally. This is the Great Ru.62

In the Mengzi, as in the Xunzi, the matching of tallies means being able to apply past models to new circumstances as if the models were made for those circumstances. In this context, the longstanding use of fujie ୷໢ “tallies” as a metaphor for perfect communication between tian and the human world is significant. Although the sages come from different backgrounds and places, they all have the same key that unlocks the door to ruling China, and thereby are able to de zhi દӆ, “attain will” or, more literally, “attain aims”. Understanding the past sages, according to the Mozi’s definition above, is a matter of being affected by their qi and zhi. In this way, it is not unlike the observation of qi in the Mengzi analyzed in the previous chapter, a connection already made by Steven Van Zoeren: “the zhi resembles the other hermeneutic significata mentioned above (e.g., the pupil of the eye); it provides a window onto the character of the person observed, a criterion by which character could be judged and future actions predicted in the absence of an overt. . . text.”63 Thus, the sage’s ability 61 62

Mengzi zhengyi 16.537-42 (cf. Lau 1970, 128). Xunzi jijie 4.140-1 (cf. Knoblock, v. 2, 80), cf. Hanshi waizhuan (5.5) 323-5 (cf. Hightower 1952, 165). 63 Here, Van Zoeren is analyzing the use of zhi in Analects 1.11 (1991, 58). Van Zoeren’s analysis of the Odes exegesis has a very perceptive discussion of role of zhi in the hermeneutics of that classic. Given the central role of the Odes in the Zisi and Mengzi subtradition, it is particularly relevant. See “The Odes Articulate Aims” in Van

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to rule is a matter of “hearing the Way of the Gentleman” as described in the previous section, suggesting that “attaining wills” is part of the transmission of authority from one sage ruler to another. Transmission, then, is an important part of the pursuit of sagehood, which cannot be completed in isolation. This begs the further question: who is a possible recipient of the transmission, and is the sage’s exceptional nature pre-ordained? If the sage’s sight and hearing are simply exceptionally acute, it is questionable whether the ideal is “superhuman.” However, if the ideal’s capacities pass a threshold that allows access to a domain of experience that is ordinarily off limits, such as communication with a spirit world, knowledge of the future, or a type of insight that leads to moral or political infallibility, then the term “superhuman” seems apt. In the latter case, there are two possible stories that might be told about the ideal’s exceptional capacities. First, these superhuman capacities were inborn, and the ideal is saintly and so usually in some sense destined to live a life different in kind from the ordinary person. Second, these superhuman capacities were cultivated, and the ideal is holy and so usually the focus becomes the reasons that the holy person was selected from among ordinary people. The aptness of the term “superhuman” is not a problem with the first story, but for the second, it only applies once the subjects transcend their human origins. The model of the worthy and the sage advanced in the Wuxing is also present in the Mengzi, and the former sheds light on the reading of the latter. The extraordinary nature of the sage is accentuated in a historiographical theory advanced twice (in different ways) in the Mengzi. It argues that there is a direct link between the appearance of sages and the cycles of tian. The theory that every five hundred years a sage ruler arises is first related in a dialog between Chong Yu ̭༗ and Mengzi after Mengzi has left Qi in disappointment, his abilities unrecognized. This passage, Mengzi 2B13, reads: ׂʪ̓ᄫ ̭༗པ੕̆ ˮʪࠜЉʿᎈи ೸‫̅ۮ‬༗ႝቂˮʪ̆ Ѽʪ ʿ‫ ˭ݏ‬ʿ˳ʆ ̆ ‫ש‬ɾइ Џɾइʛ ˉР϶ͫЉ̙‫ږ‬፞ մ෇ͫЉ Ϗ̛‫ ږ‬Ί֟Щգ ʁРЉኜ๶ԡ ̣մᆚ۱ཫԡ ̣մइШ˃۱̈́ԡ ˮ˭ ͵଒ͦ٢˭ʓʛ Ϩ଒ͦ٢˭ʓ ະˑ˃̛ ‫ڣ‬Ӎմቇʛ ѳщ ޴ʿᎈ‫ۿ‬ Mengzi left Qi, and while on the road Chong Yu asked him:

Zoeren 1991, 52-79. Another good discussion of the role of “intention” in the reading of written texts in the Mengzi is Geaney 2000.

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“My master seems to have an unhappy countenance. However, on another occasion I heard from the master that ‘the Gentleman neither reproaches tian, nor condemns others.’” “That was one age, this is another age.”64 “After five hundred years, one who rules as true king necessarily will arise, and in between there will also necessarily be one who gives names to the age. It has been over seven hundred years since the Zhou, and so the time has passed if we rely on the number [i.e., it has been over five hundred years]. If we judge according to age, however, [now] is fitting [for a true king to arise, i.e., the age is still going on and we have yet to see a king].” “So tian does not yet desire pacific rule over the people of the world. If it desired pacific rule over the people of the world, then in the present generation, who is there besides me? How could I [then] be unhappy?”65

The five hundred year cycle does not provide an endtime, but is an alternation between order and chaos. As with the four seasons, the prime mover for the cycle is tian. This passage states that the last true kings were those of the Zhou, likely the founders King Wen and Wu, and does not count Kongzi as one of the “five hundred year” sages. A related idea about history comes up in a different chapter of the Mengzi. It is only “related” because although it is also based on the 64

On the meaning of this statement, see Ivanhoe 1988. As Ivanhoe points out, a problem that arises in interpreting this passage is that if Mengzi is denying that he is unhappy, and so saying that Chong Yu’s reading of his face is wrong, then this implies that Kongzi’s statement is still true. But then why does Mengzi say: “That was one age, and this is another age”? In fact, the applicability of Kongzi’s statement to his present situation should have occasioned a comment along the lines of “the more things change, the more they stay the same.” It is possible that Mengzi 2B13 might originally have been an anecdote about Kongzi, rewritten to feature Mengzi. If so, the line about a difference is ages was inserted to distance the events from the Kongzi quotation. 65 Chong Yu’s question refers to Analects 14.35. The term “give names to the age” (mingshi Ϗ̛) is ambiguous. Zhao Qi (see Mengzi zhengyi 9.309-312) understands ming to refer to the Confucian doctrine of “rectifying names” (zhengming ͸Ϗ), and reads the passage as “one who can name [the things of a] generation.” Zhao does not make it clear whether those who can name the things of the generation are supposed to be “in between” the sages, or “during” their reign (the ambiguity of jian ෇ is the problem here), and commentators have read this both ways. Lau (1970, 94) reads it: “One from whom an age takes its name.” Zhu Xi associates these “in between” leaders with the officials who “knew of [the sages] by what they saw,” in Mengzi 7B38. The modern commentator Yang Bojun says that that mingshi refers to “those who assist the one who rules as true king,” (1984, 100). Compare Jia Yi, Xinshu 1.4, “Shuning” ᆚ࿤: б߮ʵʓˉР๶Щೢ৹ бೢʵʓˉРኜ϶Щ‫̙ن‬৹ ‫ݭ‬໶̙˃৹ ʨ̣ˉР޴ߺ б‫̙ن‬ʵʓ ཫˉР๶ԡ ໶̙ʿ৹ щ␄ԡ “From Yu onward it was five hundred years until Tang arose, and from Tang it was five hundred years until King Wu arose. So the rise of the sage-king generally takes five hundred as its era (ji ߺ). Is it not odd that it has already been more than five hundred years since King Wu and no sage-king has arisen!” (Xinshu jiaozhu 1.30).

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number five hundred, it identifies the “five hundred year” sages differently. The final passage in the Mengzi, 7B38, reads: ׂʪ̆ Ίూ൘в‫ؠ‬ೢ ˉРЉኜ๶ ࠜ߮ ६ం ۱ԳЩ‫ࠜ ˃ڈ‬ೢ ۱ႝЩ‫ ˃ڈ‬Ίೢв‫ˉ ̙́ؠ‬РЉኜ๶ ࠜΥ˄ ൥Ќ۱ԳЩ‫˃ڈ‬ ̙ࠜ́ ۱ႝЩ‫ ˃ڈ‬Ί̙́в‫˱ؠ‬ʪ ˉРЉኜ๶ ࠜ˯˙ૻ ಞ‫׈‬ Ά ۱ԳЩ‫˱ࠜ ˃ڈ‬ʪ ۱ႝЩ‫ ˃ڈ‬Ί˱ʪЩգв‫ؠ‬ˑ РЉኜ๶ ̓໶ʆ˃̛ ࠜЏմ͵ხʛ ‫ڻ‬໶ʆ˃‫ࠜ ׍‬Џմߊʛ ೸Щ೷Љ̢ၒ ۱Π೷Љ̢ၒ Mengzi said: “From Yao and Shun to Tang was five hundred and some years. People like Yu and Gao Yao knew of them by what they saw, ones like Tang knew of them by what they heard. From Tang to King Wen was five hundred and some years. People like Yi Yin and Lai Zhu knew of him by what they saw, ones like King Wen knew of him by what they heard. From King Wen to Kongzi was five hundred and some years. People like Taigong Wang and San Yi sheng knew of him by what they saw, ones like Kongzi knew of him by what they heard. From Kongzi to the present time has been a hundred and some years. For us to not be distant from the age of the Sage, and so close to the dwelling of the Sage, yet nevertheless have no one, then there will truly be no one.”66

This account of history also recognizes King Wen as a sage, but it clearly numbers Kongzi among the sages. Zhao Qi tried to reconcile this passage with the statement in Mengzi 2B13 that it had been “seven hundred years” by writing: ˉР๶Щ໶ʆ̳ ˭ལ˃ગ ೸ΠЉ᎛௥ ʿ঻͸ˉР϶ ‫ݭ‬ԵЉኜʛ “A Sage emerging after five hundred years is a constant of the natural Way (tiandao). However it may also be late or early, and so it may not be exactly five hundred years, and so it says ‘and some.’”67 However, there is another possible explanation for the discrepency between the identification of the sages in the two passages. In Mengzi 2B13, Chong Yu attributes a phrase otherwise associated with Kongzi (Analects 14.35) to his conversation partner Mengzi, suggesting that the first passage might originally have been an anecdote about Kongzi that was later rewritten to feature Mengzi. This may explain why Kongzi is not listed among the sages, a possibility with implications for the age of the “five hundred year” theory (although even if the lament of Mengzi 2B13 was once attributed to Kongzi, it does not mean he wrote it.) In either case, Mengzi 7B38 is also interesting because it combines the same dichotomies of the model of sagely influence examined in the previous section: seeing and 66 67

Mengzi zhengyi 29.1034-9 (cf. Lau 1970, 204). Mengzi zhangju jizhu 14.376.

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197

68

hearing, together with sages and worthies. Below I argue that, understood in light of these aspects of the Wuxing, this passage also may mean something rather different from the way it has been read. Beyond setting up a dispensational theory of history, Mengzi 7B38 has long been read as being concerned with how one knows what the sage rulers of the past did. As the language of the passage was appropriated by later writers, the focus is not on periods of order and chaos, but on direct experience (jian er zhi zhi ԳЩ‫ )˃ڈ‬versus secondhand knowledge of the sage (wen er zhi zhi ႝЩ‫)˃ڈ‬. The cycle of sages was used to distinguish between different kinds of historical knowledge: being an eyewitness to the sage, and knowing of a sage second-hand. The exegetical school that produced and used the Gongyang ˙Х commentary to the Spring and Autumn, for example, divides the record of the Spring and Autumn into three ages: (1) the “seen” (jian Գ) age: what had been directly observed by Confucius during the reigns of three of Dukes Zhao, Ding, and Ai of the state of Lu from 541-479 B.C.E., (2) the “heard” (wen ႝ) age: what he had heard from eyewitnesses during the reigns of the Dukes Wen, Xuan, Cheng, and Xiang from 608-542 B.C.E.; and (3) the “transmitted” (chuanwen ෭ႝ) age: what had been passed down from the period of Dukes Yin, Huan, Zhuang, Min, and Xi from 722-609 B.C.E.69 This appropriation of the tropes of seeing and hearing was invoked in part to explain the characteristics of the narration of events in the Spring and Autumn during each period. In the application of this theory of the “three ages” (sanshi ʒ̛) in later generations, these terms refer to successive stages of the degeneration of the sage’s message. The influence of this reading is the dominant one in modern translations.70 Such readings stress the temporal contrast between the two types of knowledge. 68

This reading is supported by the fact that the historian Ban Gu ॗ֣ identifies six worthies beginning with Mengzi as being those people who arose “when a sage did not emerge” (Hanshu 36.1972). 69 The threefold division is part of the Gongyang text, and the dates are supplied by the Eastern Han commentator He Xiu щΩ (129-182), see year 1 of Duke Yin ᓙ in Chunqiu Gongyang jiegu ‫˙߲ݱ‬Х༱ඇ (Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan zhushu 1.23a25a). The late Qing reformer Kang Youwei છЉ޴ adapted these “three ages” of “chaotic” (juluan ᄶ෩), “promoting peace” (shengping ˥ͦ), and “great peace” (taiping ˯ͦ) to his iconoclastic reading of world history. 70 D.C. Lau renders jian er zhi zhi as “knew [him] personally” and wen er zhi zhi as “knew him by reputation.” In James Legge’s translation, the distinction is between those who “saw [those earliest sages], and [so] knew their doctrines” and those who “heard their doctrines [as transmitted], and [so] knew them.” See Lau 1970, 204 and Legge 1895, v. 2, 502.

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If, instead of reading this passage against the Spring and Autumn, it is read against the Wuxing, the meaning changes. In the complex model offered in the Wuxing, the same combination of seeing, hearing, and tian is repeatedly invoked. One example is the exegesis of MWD E §6.3.5: ᑶ۱ႝѼʪལ ལ‫˭ږ‬ལʛ ႝѼʪལ˃ӆЫЩ‫˃ڈ‬ʛ “‘If one is sharp-eared then one can hear the Way of the Gentleman.’ The ‘Way’ is the Way of tian. To ‘hear the Way of the Gentleman’ is to store it in one’s ear and recognize it.”71 Hearing is the cardinal sense, and it is the means to store in one’s mind the intentions of prior sages and thereby access the transtemporal Way of Heaven. By contrast, seeing is connected with worthies. In this light, the Mengzi’s millennial (actually, quingentennial) theory may be read to concern how sight and sound are applied retrospectively to the way one knows a sage. This reading is consistent with the Han commentary of Zhao Qi, which argues that the relevant distinction is between ʨ ቖ Ў ໶ “great worthies and second-rank sages” who assist the sages by continuing to apply fixed policies, and sages who can go beyond the specific policies of past sages by penetrating their actions ̣ࠓմལ “in order to get to their Way.”72 In other words, Zhao reads the passage to be about the ability of the sages to respond to changes in society over time, and to continuously update Ru teachings through their access to a transcendent Way. The conventional reading of the Mengzi is that sages only arise every five hundred years, and that the passage is concerned with the decrease in clarity of their teachings due to the loss of the direct experience of their message. The move from seeing to hearing is read as a decrease in that clarity. The way these metaphors are read in the Wuxing and related texts, however, suggests the passage might be making a different point. In the Wuxing, the ear is actually the means of hearing and recognizing a sage, while the eye plays the same role for wisdom (recall, too, the importance of the “ear” in Yao’s recognition of Shun). As times change and society changes, tian’s qi manifests itself in different ways, but it is a constant pitch that sages alone can recognize. “Hearing” is what sages do with respect to the tone of the previous sages five hundred years before. “Seeing,” by contrast, is what the wise do when they are inspired by the sages. In this reading, the 71 The text of this passage appears in Appendix 3. The use of Gentleman in such contexts is sometimes substituted by “sage,” as in the “Ziyi” chapter of the Liji (Liji jijie 52.1327). MWD E §24.1.2 refers to King Wen’s effect on San Yi sheng, further evidence the Mengzi’s theory is related to the Wuxing’s theory of sages and worthies. 72 Mengzi zhengyi 29.1034-5.

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figures in Mengzi 7B38 fit the following pattern: (1) Way of the sage: (Ancient) Yao and Shun, (Middle) Tang, (Late) King Wen; (2) Those who saw: (Ancient) Yu, Gao Yao, (Middle) Yi Yin, Lai Zhu, (Late) Taigong Wang, San Yi sheng; (3) Those who heard: (Ancient) Tang, (Middle) King Wen, (Late) Kongzi. This pattern reveals that those who “saw” each sage were worthies contemporary with the sage. By contrast, those who heard the sage were not getting a “degraded” message, but were the sages of the next ages who were able to adapt the Ways of the previous sages to their age. This illustrates how the idea that seeing and hearing connote stages of the degradation of the sages’ message does not really fit Mengzi 7B38 itself. Indeed, those who “hear” the message actually are the sages of the following dispensation, and their reception of the message would then be better than those who “see” it. The real situation is one of binary alternation as seen in the other Mengzi passage: “After five hundred years, one who rules as true king necessarily will arise, and in between there will also necessarily be one who gives names to the age.” Indeed, as Zhao Qi notes, Mengzi is here really nominating himself not as a sage, but as a worthy assistant to the sage Kongzi.73 In fact, the relation between seeing and hearing fits the hierarchy between those two senses in the Wuxing, as it does the relation between sages and worthies. That this may have been the sense in which the Mengzi used these terms, and not to signal stages in the decline of the way of the sages, is suggested by a comparison of this passage to Mengzi 5B1 above. The choice of the “seeing” wise men being contrasted with Kongzi in Mengzi 5B1 fits with the order of the five-hundred year sages in 7B38: Bo Yi, Yi Yin, and Liuxia Hui were respective contemporaries of the “hearing sages” Tang, King Wen, and Kongzi. Yi Yin is identified as someone who knew the sage Tang personally in Mengzi 2B2, Bo Yi is identified as a contemporary of King Wen in Mengzi 4A13, and Liuxia Hui is identified as a “friend of Kongzi” in the opening sentence of the “Daozhi” chapter of the Zhuangzi.74 The chances of these three figures coincidentally matching the periodic sages is so small that one must conclude that these three wise men were chosen to conform with the dispensational theory of 7B38. Mengzi 5B1 appears to have raised the examples of these three wise men precisely because they were in personal contact with the sages. Because they literally saw the sages, they were able to (in the words of 2B13) “give names to” their ages. In 73 74

Mengzi zhengyi 19.1037. Zhuangzi jishi 9.990.

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the Wuxing, wisdom is associated with clear-sightedness, and indeed the wise in this passage were able to themselves see and know the sages. By applying the names and methods of the sages, they were applying a fixed template and acting as worthies, as Zhao Qi argued. It is the sages who are able to attain the “wills” of previous sages, and in this way adapt and continue the sagely rule of China. These sages are able to make changes in the template, and their access to the transcendent is what makes the Way of the Ru continuously relevant. The link between the sage and the spirit based on a common connection with tian became the object of criticism in the Han period. The emphasis on the extraordinary abilities of the sage in the Wuxing and the Mengzi may have been one reason for the Xunzi’s attack on the doctrines of Zisi and Mengzi. Despite the difference between the Wuxing and the Mengzi in their relative emphasis on the sage,75 both may be contrasted to the “Tianlun” chapter of the Xunzi. The “Tianlun” concludes that the true sage should not even worry about tian, saying that ੗໶ʆ޴ʿӶ‫“ ˭ڈ‬Only the sage does not to seek to understand tian.”76 The notion that tian sends down a transtemporal sage who is uniquely able to perceive and adapt the intentions of past sages would be a possible object of such criticism, and perhaps might have contributed to the antipathy of the Xunzi to the Wuxing and the Mengzi. In terms of the history of Ru ethics, these developments were a part of an adaptation to concerns about Ru practices becoming obsolete. The response accepted a form of the relativist critiques in the Zhuangzi by positing a quasi-mystical absolute. Because prior sages were examples of the moral ideal that it advocated, any possibility that self-cultivation could result in rulers whose actions might run counter to the interests of the state is ruled out. However, the theory of the five hundred year sage might have unwelcome at the court of the ruling Liu clan once the Han Dynasty had been established, a possibility addressed in the next chapter, which explores the mystery of what happened to the Wuxing in the early empire. 75

This reading also suggests an answer to a fundamental question about the relationship between the Wuxing and the Mengzi. Several sections of the Mengzi have only the four “human” virtues–why? Perhaps because they are the only ones relevant to the person who is not a five-hundred year sage. In the Wuxing, sagacity is associated with sharp hearing, and in the Mengzi’s dispensational theory, sages are able to be moved, through a resonance-like process, by the sages of the past. If the level of sagehood is reserved for such periodic transtemporal figures, people in intervening periods trying to achieve self-cultivation are not be able to attain this ideal. If that is the case, then the cultivation of the four “human” virtues would be their sole concern. 76 Xunzi jijie 11.308-9 (cf. Knoblock 1994, v. 3, 15).

CHAPTER FIVE

MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE ͅ‫ږ‬ੴʆҦʪ ࿩ʿ਴ җʿᘃ Θʿᕠ ʿ࡚Ո֍ ఝʿ͸ʿ࡚ ࣕʿ͸ʿҗ Αʿඁ‫ؠ‬Ոи Ыʿ᛾‫ؠ‬଱ᑵ ֬۱̪ᔤა༶ལ͸Ֆ Ϩ‫ݵ‬۱Άʪ Ӂࣅၷ͸ ʼᅭͫཫʆԡ In ancient times, a woman with child did not lie on her side when she slept, neither would she sit sidewise nor stand on one foot. She would not eat dishes having harmful flavors; if the food was cut awry, she would not eat it; if the mat was not placed straight, she would not sit on it. She did not let her eyes gaze on lewd sights not let her ears listen to depraved sounds. At night she ordered blind musicians to chant poetry. She used right reason to adjust affairs, and thus gave birth to children of correct physical form who excelled others in talent and virtue. - Lienü zhuan λʩ෭ (Categorized Traditions of Women, Albert O’Hara translation)1

Texts such as Lienü zhuan show the influence of the idea that moral behavior could affect the body in early imperial China, even when the behavior was that of an expectant mother and the body in question was in utero. Yet while the complex of ideas based on a link between the body and moral self-cultivation prospered, the Wuxing itself had all but disappeared. When a text such as the Wuxing, alleged to have been extremely popular in the Warring States period, vanishes from the written record, a natural question arises: why did such a text disappear? This is especially curious given the fact of its association with Zisi, who came to be identified as the grandson of Kongzi–surely a work associated with such a person would be valued and preserved? This chapter offers some guesses at the reasons for this disappearance in the course of its examination of the influence of the Wuxing in early imperial China. In the third and second centuries B.C.E., the Wuxing continued to be circulated and exerted significant influence the writings of a number of Han Ru, especially those who specialized in classical exegesis. In these works, the discourse on “material virtue” developed into a new understanding of human nature 1

Albert O’Hara 1945, 23-4.

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that associated virtue with particular types of qi circulating in the body and tried to link demeanor and expression during ritual performance with the internal development of individual virtues. This chapter centers on two examples of this development: the partial commentary to the Wuxing found at Mawangdui and the writings of the scholar and statesman Jia Yi, both likely products of the second century B.C.E. While it is impossible to definitively answer the question of what happened to the Wuxing after its period of initial influence in the early empire, this chapter will conclude with the hypothesis that aspects of its message about the ability of tian to infuse virtues, as well as the resultant extraordinary qualities of the sage, continued to develop outside the Ru tradition. By contrast, once the interests of the Ru became more closely allied with those of the imperial state, because those aspects of the Wuxing’s message were incompatible with official ideology, Ru transmission of the text may have been suppressed.

The Wuxing commentary and the qi of the virtues The most obvious evidence of the transmission of the Wuxing in early imperial China is the presence of a silk manuscript of the Wuxing and a partial commentary in a Han tomb that was sealed in 168 B.C.E. When the Mawangdui tomb contents were first publicized, the presence of a partial commentary attached to the main text was puzzling–did it reflect an autocommentary composed at the same time as the text, or was it an addition to the older text? Both views had proponents. The subsequent discovery of the Guodian Wuxing manuscript, a version without commentary that appears to have been copied before the Mawangdui version, has converted some proponents of the autocommentary theory to the view that the commentary was a later composition. Of course, all theories about “earlier” or “later” versions assume a linear evolution of the text, something that is by no means certain. Whatever the relation between its composition and that of the Wuxing, the Mawangdui commentary is an important work in its own right and provides clues about who read the Wuxing and how they interpreted it. While there is no scholarly consensus on the issue of its affiliation, its conceptualization of the virtues as kinds of qi serves as a bridge between the Zisi and Mengzi subtradition and dominant Han views of human nature as initially neutral and ultimately malleable.

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This section will examine the debate about precursors to the Wuxing commentary, and its relation to Han theories of human nature. Perhaps the most popular current theory about the provenance of the Mawangdui Wuxing commentary holds that it was produced by the “school” of the Warring States Ru named Shi Shi ̛ၭ (perhaps pronounced Shi Shuo) who is mentioned twice in the commentary by the name “Master Shi” (Shizi ̛ʪ). Shi Shi is identified as the author of a Ru text in 21 pian in the bibliographic “Yiwenzhi” ᗟ ́ӆ chapter of the Hanshu ်ए, and is further said to have come from the state of Chen ௾ to become one of the “seventy disciples” of Kongzi.2 In the Lunheng, Shi Shi is associated with the theory that human nature is an amalgam of good and bad tendencies. The Eastern Han writer Wang Chong ̙̭ (27-c.100 C.E.) describes Shi Shi’s doctrines in the following way: ֟ʆ̛ၭ̣޴ʆ‫׷‬ЉെЉ౱ ᒃʆ˃െ‫׷‬ኙЩࠓ˃۱െ‫ ۂ‬౱‫׷‬ኙЩ ࠓ˃۱౱‫ ۂ‬ϨЏ۱‫׷‬ύЉఀ෍ െ౱Ϛ‫׿‬ኙା ‫̛ݭ‬ʪѕኙएɾᇺ ᦅʪቓ ွᎴළ ˙ࢽ͠ʪ˃ࣛΠቈશ‫ ׷‬Ⴉ̛ʪߟ̳ʈ ߖԵ‫׷‬Љെ Љ౱ Shi Shi of Zhou thought that human nature has both good and bad in it. If you raise the good nature, nourishing and so giving rise to it, then the good will grow. If you raise the bad nature, nourishing and so giving rise to it, then the bad will grow. In this way, the nature of each person has yin and yang, and whether it is good or bad depends on which is cultivated. Therefore Master Shi wrote a single pian work called the Yangshu (Writings on Nourishing). The followers of Mi Zijian, Qidiao Kai, and Gongsun Nizi also considered affective dispositions and human nature, and they interacted with Master Shi. They all spoke of human nature having both good and bad in it.3

Wang groups the views of Shi Shi with a set of theories that exhibit the same general tendency to find a mean between the theories of the Xunzi and the Mengzi about the dispositions with which human beings are born. 2

Hanshu 30.1724. Lunheng jiaoshi 3.133 (cf. Forke 1962, v. 1, 384). The Hanshu lists the title Shizi after Qidiaozi ွᎴʪ (Master Qidiao) in 13 pian (attributed to Kongzi’s disciple Qidiao Qi ૧), Mizi ᦅʪ (Master Mi) in 16 pian (attributed to Kongzi’s disciple Mi Buqi ʿᄫ, whose style name was Zijian), and Jingzi ದʪ (Master Jing) in three pian (attributed to a person who seems to be Mizi’s disciple, since it discusses Mizi’s theories). In this case, the grouping of titles in the “Yiwenzhi” list generally matches Wang Chong’s grouping of the thinkers (Gongsun Nizi ˙ࢽ͠ʪ is the third title following the Shizi.) It is worth noting that the two works preceding this group are the Zisi in 23 pian and the Zengzi in eighteen pian. See Hanshu 30.1724. 3

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The Wuxing commentary is consistent with these references to Shi Shi’s theory of human nature in two ways: both see elements of human nature as a binary combination of mutual opposites, and both assume that discussions of human nature and self-cultivation may be reduced to the actions of different kinds of qi in the body. Wang Chong does not directly say that Shi Shi’s theory of a malleable human nature is based on qi theory, but he uses a number of terms that make it clear that qi was the assumed medium. The vocabulary he uses to speak about that theory of human nature, “nourish” (yang ኙ), “give rise to” (zhi ࠓ), and, finally, yin ఀ and yang ෍ , are all parts of the technical vocabulary he uses elsewhere to talk about qi.4 These are legitimate grounds for linking descriptions of Shi Shi and the Wuxing commentary. 4 Wang says of the good or bad nature that one can ኙЩࠓ˃ “nourish and so give rise to it”, and the object of these verbs was often qi. The phrase yang qi ኙम “nourish qi” is used in the Lunheng in connection with the story that in his old age Wang turned to techniques of “nourishing qi”. Wang Chong’s biography records that at about the age of seventy, he wrote a Yangxing lun ኙ‫׷‬ቈ (Discussion of Nourishing One’s Nature) in 16 pian that concerned Ꮕ আ б ϭ “maintaining the spirit and preserving oneself,” while in the Lunheng’s “Ziji” бߺ (Self narrative) chapter the phrase is ኙमбϭ “nourishing qi and preserving oneself.” Whether or not this story is based in fact, there is little question that all the works associated with Wang Chong evince a deep interest in such techniques, and the term “nourishing qi” was certainly part of Eastern Han vocabulary (Wang’s attitude to the such techniques was a complex one. When Wang is critical of the Ru, he generally does not attack the veracity of the Five Classics, but instead the interpretations of the classics and the uncritical attitude of members of interpretive traditions towards them.) Wang also talks about “giving rise to qi” (or perhaps “directing the qi”) in the story of Zou Yan’s ཰࠯ piping: ጝЉԶ म ౖ ʿΆˉᇯ ཰࠯ѿ݆ࠓम ‫ౖݰ‬Ӧ޴ຈ ጝ̣ၲ෧ ෧Άᕙᇈ ռˑϏ˃̆෧Զ “In the state of Yan was a valley where the cold qi was such that the five grains did not grow. Zou Yan blew his tuning pipe to give rise to qi so that the cold changed to hot. From this time on millet grew in the state of Yan, and the millet grew there so abundantly that even today the place is called ‘Millet Valley’”. See “Dingxian” ‫׆‬ቖ (Defining a worthy), Lunheng jiaoshi 27.1109 (cf. Forke 1962, v.2, 136). The term “give rise to qi” here shows how the qi that gives rise to meteorological phenomena operates like the qi that circulates in the body, although Wang elsewhere points out that the two comprise separate, closed systems. In the “Hanwen” ౖຈ (Heat and cold) chapter, Wang debunks the theory that the rise of qi in the ruler through anger or joy can affect the ambient temperature by saying: ˮࣁʆ˃঻ࠓ᜵ ۱మ݊Π঻ࠓम “Now, a common person is also able to give rise to sudden changes [in mood], and so then their happiness or anger should also be able to give rise to qi” (Lunheng jiaoshi 14.627, cf. Forke 1962, v.2, 278). Contrast this to the view of Dong Zhongshu that human qi derives from tian’s qi: ʆΆ‫ ˭ؠ‬Щ֊ˢ‫ ˭ؠ‬మम֊ቂ‫ ݱ‬ᆪम֊ቂࢬ ݊म֊ቂ߲ ‫ۼ‬म֊ቂ̱ ͗म˃˻ʛ “Human beings are born from tian, and derive their changes from those of tian. The qi of happiness is taken from spring, the qi of joy is taken from summer, the qi of anger is taken from autumn, and the qi of sorrow is taken from winter. This is how the four types of qi enter the mind” (“Wang dao tong san” ̙ ལ௢ ʒ [The king establishes communication between the three realms], Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 11.329). This is a version of one of the major Han intellectual debates, which concerned the theory of tianren ganying ˭ʆีᏻ “Tian and human beings mutually respond to one and other”. One side is represented by arguments like

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Ding Sixin ʀ͗๘ has recently gone a step further by arguing that it is just as reasonable to associate the Wuxing, its commentary, and the brief Mawangdui manuscript Desheng pian ᅭ ໶ ᇺ (Chapter on Virtue and Sagacity) with Shi Shi and his followers. Ding writes: In summary, there are possibly two academic lineages on which the Chu slip Wuxing found at Guodian is based. One is is the Zisi and Mengzi academic lineage, taking [the Wuxing] to be a chapter of the Zisizi ʪ‫݋‬ ʪ, which is something that a majority of scholars already agree on. As another opinion, I think that starting from the Chu slip Wuxing found at Guodian, through the silk manuscript of the Wuxing, to the silk manuscript of the Desheng pian, there are consistent traces of the conscious emergence of a line of textual transmission and theoretical development, indicating the transmission of an academic lineage and transfer of an orthodoxy. Considering the Chu slip Wuxing found at Guodian by itself, it is very possibly the work of Master Shi, and the silk manuscript explanation of the Wuxing is the work of his followers. Weighing these two possibilities, I think the latter is closer to the true situation than the former.5

Ding’s suggestion that the composition of the Wuxing not be linked with the criticism of Zisi, Mengzi, and the “Wuxing” theory but rather Dong Zhongshu’s that tian is influenced by events in the human world as found in the “Tonglei xiangdong” ψᘝߟੂ chapter of the Chunqiu fanlu. The other, seen in Wang Chong’s contention that tian does not really care about the actions of people, appears throughout the Lunheng, and is summarized succinctly in the “Bianxu” ᜵ ൳ (Falsehoods concerning influences) chapter of the Lunheng: იԓ᜵˃ࣁ̆ ʆϚ˭ϙ ˃෇ ೾ఌϚ̐ˀԡ մ঻̣мੂ˭ϙ ೾ఌྦྷЩࣴ̐ʛ . . . Џ‫ۍ‬࿧Ֆʛ ਪ՟ॲ ೸ ʿ঻в˭ ఌ‫ۂ‬ɾ˴ ੂ‫̐ؠ‬ˀ ࣴअ਴˃̐ ʿཫᆚ˴ . . . નʓϙʕ᜵ߗ˭ щմਢʛ “Those experts who explain calamities and disasters say: ‘People are in between tian and the earth like fish are in the water. Their ability to influence tian through their actions is like a fish’s hitting the water causes it to move. . .’ This is not really the case. Even to the extent it is true, it is not possible to reach tian. A fish is a foot long, and when it moves in the water it only causes the water to vibrate no further than several feet away. . . From the earth below to influence august tian above, how could anyone be tall enough to do so?” See Lunheng jiaoshi 4.206-7. The balance between yin and yang qi is also discussed numerous times in the Lunheng. These indicate that Wang assumes that the mechanism behind human nature in the theories of Shi Shi is different varieties of qi. 5 Ding Sixin 2000, 167. Ding’s treatment of the provenance of the Wuxing and its commentary is the most complete available. Beginning from the identification of the Wuxing with Zisi, Ding notes that the ideas in the Wuxing are broadly compatible with those of works elsewhere associated with Zisi. He then turns to the Shizi, and compares its content to that of the Mengzi and the Wuxing. He writes that the Mengzi shows an acquaintance with theories of a mixed human nature, such as the one associated with Gongduzi ˙௲ʪ in Mengzi 6A5-6, opening the possibility that Mengzi studied both the Wuxing and the theories of Shizi. The Wuxing, he writes, is also compatible with descriptions of the theories of Shi Shi. See Ding Sixin 2000, 160-72.

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with the work of Shi Shi is still a minority opinion.6 It builds, though, on a reasonable association between Shi Shi and the ideas of the Mawangdui Wuxing commentary. At the very least this association shows that views related to the ones linked to Zisi and Shi Shi are found in the Wuxing and its commentary, indicating overlap between the traditions associated with the two “followers of Kongzi.” Testing Ding’s bold suggestion provides a framework for examining the content of the Mawangdui commentary in more depth. The presence of two direct quotations of Shizi in the commentary is the most concrete connection between Shi Shi and the Wuxing commentary. The quotations of Master Shi in the Mawangdui Wuxing commentary occur in the discussion of the binary balance of benevolence and righteousness in Wuxing §20. There, judicial decisions are explained as a balance between being resolute (jian ᔴ, written as lian ‫ ހ‬in GD §20 and jian ෇ in MWD §20) and being lenient (nuo ੆). The section begins by saying these two tendencies are the forerunners of two traits: being deliberate (xing м) and discriminating the Way (bian yu dao ᎖‫ؠ‬ལ). The meaning of these two tendencies are next related to their judicial application: Љʨ໱Щʨ༽˃ ᔴʛ Љʮ໱Щ௛˃ ੆ʛ “If there is a significant crime and it is severely punished, this is resoluteness. If there is a trivial crime and it is pardoned, this is lenience.” [GD §20.3] In the Wuxing itself, these two tendencies are further homologized to two other binary relationships: the balance between the virtues benevolence and righteousness, and the balance between hard and pliant. Slips 40 and 41 of the Guodian text read: ᔴ ໳˃̄ʛ ੆ˋ˃̄ʛ “Resoluteness is a method of righteousness, and lenience is a method of benevolence” [GD §20.6]. These methods are, in turn, related to the basic dichotomy between hard and pliant: ࢉ ໳˃̄ ‫̄˃ˋݾ‬ʛ “Hardness is a method of righteousness, and pliancy is a method of benevolence” [GD§20.7]. In this way, the Wuxing creates a homology between the qualities of lenience and resoluteness, the virtues of benevolence and righteousness, and the terms pliancy and hardness. The complementary nature of these binary pairs is significant, because it suggests the presence of yinyang thought in the Wuxing text itself. Most scholars date the notion of balancing the binary pairing of 6 Some of Ding’s arguments against the association of the Wuxing with Zisi are flawed. For example, he sees little connection between the notion of cheng and the Wuxing (2000, 167), when chapter four shows that cheng is based on the model of the influence of the sage. However, at other points, Ding suggests the Wuxing reflects either an overlap or a combination of the traditions associated with Zisi and Shi Shi.

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yin and yang to the fourth or third centuries B.C.E.7 Kobayashi Shinmei 小林信明 has pointed out that in several texts now thought to date from the third and second centuries B.C.E., yin and yang are associated with the terms “pliant” (rou ‫ )ݾ‬and “hard” (gang ࢉ), which are related to each other as parts of a cycle.8 The same correlation appears in the Shuogua იֆ (Explaining the trigrams) commentary to the Changes (Yijing ‫أ‬໩ “Classic of Changes” or Zhouyi ֟‫“ أ‬Zhou Changes”): ‫ږآ‬໶ʆ˃ѕ‫أ‬ʛ . . . ᝳ᜵‫ؠ‬ఀ෍ ЩΘֆ ചಓ‫ݾࢉؠ‬ЩΆ̔ ֜ ො‫ؠ‬ལᅭЩ୎‫ؠ‬໳ ᇴ୎ၣ‫̣׷‬в‫ ֡ؠ‬. . . ‫ږآ‬໶ʆ˃ѕ‫أ‬ʛ અ ̣ො‫̣ݵ ୎˃֡׷‬Θ˭˃ལ ̆ఀႩ෍ Θϙ˃ལ ̆‫ݾ‬Ⴉࢉ Θʆ ˃ལ ̆ˋႩ໳ In the past, the sages created the Changes: . . . They observed the alternations of yin and yang and established the eight trigrams. When this was given play in “pliant” and “hard,” the lines were produced. . . In the past, the sages created the Changes: In order to follow the patterns of human nature and ming, they established the Way of tian, and it was called “yin” and “yang”. They established the Way of earth and called it “pliant” and “hard”. They established the Way of human beings and 9 called it “benevolence” and “righteousness.”

The Shuogua displays the same three-level homology seen in the Wuxing. The opposition between “pliant” and “hard” operates on 7

Most scholars distinguish between the use of the terms yin and yang as descriptions of natural phenomena, and the binary pairing of the two as a prototype for the “mutually complementary” balance of opposing forces. Li Hansan Ө်ʒ (1981) places the latter phenomenon in the mid-Warring States period, but discounts the possibility that the Odes reflects this development (see also Graham 1986b, 9). Other scholars have argued that yinyang thought does appear in the Odes, implying that yinyang theory actually began much earlier (see Inoue 1996). It is true that in the Odes, yin most often refers to shade or areas that receive less sunlight such as north side of mountains, and yang to sunshine or sunny places. In the Wuxing, the discussion of resoluteness and lenience is followed by a rhymed couplet from the sacrificial hymn “Changfa” ‫ۂ‬ച in the Odes that reads (in the received version): ʿᙔʿ┰ ʿࢉʿ‫ݾ‬ “Not contending, not anxious/Not hard, not pliant” (Mao 304). In the Mawangdui version of the quotation, the received qiu ┰ “anxious” is written jiu ૤ “relieve, help”. This is similar to the reading of Cheng Junying and Jiang Jianyuan (Shijing zhuxi 1033-9), who follow the Guangya ᅩු gloss of jiu as qiu Ӷ “seek”. This reading establishes the first clause as describing a medium between two opposite courses of action, suitable for the context of the poem’s praise of the sage king Tang. Rou and gang would then exist in the same relationship, in this sense existing in the type of “mutually complementary” relationship that Li Hansan denies exists in the Odes. The context of the quotation at minimum confirms that the Wuxing authors read the poem in that way. 8 Kobayashi Shinmei 1951, 272-301. 9 Zhouyi zhengyi 9.94-95.

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several levels. In their first appearance, the two terms refer to the sixtyfour hexagrams, each with a unique combination of solid (yang) or broken (yin) lines. In their second appearance, they are the earthly manifestation (and hence, given play in the milfoil stalks that are the medium of Changes divination) of what are yin and yang on the level of tian, and what are the virtues of benevolence and righteousness on the level of human beings.10 In this way, the Wuxing text itself may be seen as consistent with the yinyang aspect of the Lunheng’s description of Shi Shi’s theory of “nourishing”. The Mawangdui commentary further explains the binary dualism of the Wuxing by invoking the words of Shi Shi. The first comment is to the main text’s line: ʿ෇ʿм “If one is not resolute, one cannot be deliberate” [MWD §20.1]. Lines 296-7 of the Mawangdui silk manuscript read: [ʿ෇ʿм]: [෇‫ږ‬Ե] ʆм˃ʨ ʨ‫ږ‬ʆм˃೸‫ږ‬ʛ ̛ʪ̆ ʆЉ‫ݔ‬ལ ཥ . . . ෇ʛ ෇۱мԡ [“If one is not resolute, one will not be deliberate.” “Resolute” refers to] the importance of a person’s conduct. Importance is the . . . nature of a person’s conduct. Master Shi said: “Human beings have a constant Way, they penetrate . . . resoluteness. By being resolute, one is deliberate. [MWD §E 20.1.1-3]

The first quotation of Master Shi is marred by an area of decayed silk, but may comment on the binary pairing of resoluteness and deliberateness. Commenting on the next line of the Wuxing, which reads: ʿ ੆ ʿ ᎖ ‫ ؠ‬ལ “If one is not lenient then one cannot discriminate the Way” [MWD §20.2], lines 297-8 of the Mawangdui silk manuscript read: ʿ੆ʿ᎖‫ؠ‬ལ ੆‫ږ‬ԵʆмʮЩ⍆‫ږ‬ʛ ʮЩ࿧ʨ ʨ . . . ˃‫ږ‬ʛ ̛ʪ̆ ‫ڈ‬⍆˃޴⍆ʛ ಡ˙೸દԡ ⍆‫ږ‬ Ϡԡ ˙೸‫˻ږ‬ལʛ 10 A similar set of homologies may be seen in the second century B.C.E. Mawangdui Changes text called Essentials (Yao ࠱), see Deng Qiubo ቸ୍ї 1987, 481 (cf. Shaughnessy 1996, 243). This aspect of the Wuxing also may have influenced Ru writers in the Western Han. In some second century B.C.E. texts, the binary relationship between yin and yang and the two virtues is already present. In the first chapter of his Xinyu ๘გ, Lu Jia ௿ཋ (d. 178 B.C.E.) correlates the virtues of benevolence and righteousness with yin and yang (Xinyu jiaozhu 1.34). Dong Zhongshu explains the three central Confucian relationships in terms of yin and yang (Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 12.350). The connection between “pliant” balanced with “hard” and “benevolence” balanced with “righteousness” in the Wuxing, then, is at its core a kind of yinyang dualism.

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“If one is not lenient then one can not discriminate the Way.” Being lenient is saying that a person’s actions are trivial but they are numerous. If the trivial is in fact important, this importance is. . . Master Shi said: “Knowing when the numerous is numerous, this is the apprehension of public-mindedness.” [MWD §E 20.2.1-3]

The criteria for acting “resolute” and “lenient” in the Wuxing commentary are (1) the importance of a crime that dictates when one should be resolute is ren xing zhi ran zhe ʆм˃೸‫“ ږ‬determined by a person’s actions”, and (2) the rarity of bad conduct dictates when one should be lenient is gong ran ˙ ೸  “public-mindedness”. Shizi’s comments explain the proper considerations that lead to the two attitudes, but are specific to their application to jurisprudence rather than the need for a yinyang style balance. This leads to the odd conclusion that it is the yinyang balance in the main Wuxing text rather than the quotations of Shizi in the commentary that are most similar to the yinyang aspect of Han descriptions of Shi Shi’s theories. The implications of this for the debates about the affiliation of the Wuxing and its commentary are complex. On one hand, this may be seen to support Ding Sixin’s idea that Shi Shi was responsible for the Wuxing itself, and Shi’s school for the Mawangdui commentary. On the other hand, it is also possible that one particular aspect of the theory of the virtues in the Wuxing overlapped with Shi Shi’s theories of human nature, and so the writers of the commentary turned to Shi Shi’s theories of human nature to explain that particular aspect of the Wuxing. Yet there is a core problem with associating the Wuxing and the theory of Shi Shi that casts doubt on both these possibilities. This problem is that there are several different ways that qi might be related to a human nature and the virtues, and the Wuxing and the description of Shi Shi’s theory appear to take two different approaches to the issue. Later writers developed theories of qi and human nature that are consistent with the theories of Shi Shi. Wang Chong described Shi Shi’s theory as: ʆ‫׷‬ЉെЉ౱ “human nature has good and bad in it,” implying that cultivating human nature is a matter of acting on native endowments of good and bad qi, and it is good qi that should be augmented until it completely overwhelms the bad qi. Shi Shi’s view of human nature appears close to that of the Han writer Yang Xiong: ʆ˃‫׷‬ʛ െ౱ପ ࡸմെ۱޴െʆ ࡸմ౱۱޴౱ʆ मʛ‫̣׿ ږ‬ቱെ౱˃ਠʛႩ

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Human nature is a mixture of good and bad. The person that cultivates the good will become a good person, and the person that cultivates the bad will become a bad person. Is qi not the horse that one uses to go towards good and bad?11

The implication of Yang Xiong’s passage is that good and bad qi are on a continuum, but explicitly not a continuum in which the mean between them is ideal. This view is similar to the theory of “nourishing one’s nature” (yangxing ኙ‫ )׷‬described in the Eastern Han Shen Jian Όᜌ: ʘ෍मΆኙ ఀमशଓ ֜మ˃ࣛ մम෍ʛ ‫ ږ׷ݭ‬ઉմ෍Щ஄մ ఀ ෍๨۱ˊ ఀ഻۱ኼ In all cases, yang qi gives life and nourishes, and yin qi destroys and kills. Those that are balanced and happy have yang qi. Therefore, those who nourish one’s nature encourage yang and eliminate the yin. When the yang reaches the utmost limit then one is resistant, and when the yin congeals then one is stagnant.12

Here, absolute yang is perhaps not an absolute good, but a practicioner is supposed to nourish yang qi. These Han views are consistent with the description of Shi Shi’s theory. While influence is difficult to prove or disprove, the differences between such theories of qi and the one implicit in the Wuxing are significant. The implication of the Lunheng description of Shi Shi’s theory is that there is bad qi, perhaps several kinds of bad qi, but the Wuxing and Mengzi talk only about human beings having good qi. The goal of the former is not a “balance” along the lines of yin and yang as in the latter, but rather at least a partial replacement of one type of qi by the other. Finally, the commentary talks about the qi of three virtues, not two as in the theory of Shi Shi. This is not a trivial difference, since the Lunheng points to the existence of several putative Warring States models that use qi to model psychology, and the differences between them were likely subtle. For example, the Guodian text Xing zi ming chu ‫׷‬б̳֡ “[Human] nature emerges from [Heaven’s] command” contends that: మ ݊ ‫ ۼ‬౲ ˃ म ‫ ׷‬ʛ “The qi of happiness, anger, sorrow, and grief is human nature”.13 The need to balance these different kinds of affective qi is attested in a quotation attributed to ˙ ࢽ˃ኙम “Gongsun [Nizi’s] Nourishing Qi” that outlines the harm to the balance of qi that excess or depleted qi in the inner organs can cause, 11 12 13

Fayan quanyi (3.2) 100. Shen Jian 3.17-8 (Cf. Chen Ch’i-yün 1980, 159). Jingmenshi bowuguan 1998, 179, Ma Chengyuan, et al. 2002, v.2, 213-4.

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or that excessive affective dispositions can bring, concluding that: Ѽ ʪ ݊ ۱ ˫ ˀ “when the gentleman gets angry, he returns to the center.”14 In that text, the four affective dispositions of happiness, anger, anxiety, and gladness each have a particular effect on one’s qi. This use of qi to model the “affective dispositions” (qing) is in some ways similar to the reduction of the virtues to qi in the Wuxing commentary. Since there were several theories in circulation that explained human nature in such terms, the differences between the balance of two virtues in the Wuxing and the imperative that good qi must overcome bad in Shi Shi are very significant. Both texts use yinyang dualism, but different dualisms underlie their use of it. These objections do not necessarily disprove Ding Sixin’s view that Shi Shi composed the Wuxing, but they do indicate that the Shi Shi portrayed by Wang Chong does not match the theory of the virtues found in the Mawangdui Wuxing commentary. Turning away from the Wuxing commentary’s possible Warring States precursors to its influence on later texts, the same distinction just examined between a model in which the virtues balance each other and one in which one virtue is maximized is also useful in distinguishing the materialism in the Wuxing commentary from that in early imperial theories of human nature. While the Wuxing commentary shares an association of virtue and internal qi with Han theories that assume human nature is malleable, the difference is their application of this association. The Mawangdui commentary to the Wuxing makes the association between qi and virtue explicit through its explanation of the development of benevolence, righteousness, and ritual propriety in sections MWD §10-12 and MWD §18-19 in terms of the qi of these three virtues. The most sustained discussion appears in the comment to lines 202-3 of the Wuxing: ԳЩ‫˃ڈ‬ನʛ ‫ڈ‬Щϯ˃ˋʛ ϯЩм˃ ໳ʛ мЩ๖˃ᔩʛ “To see [the Gentleman’s Way] and know it is wisdom. To know it and bring settlement is benevolence. To settle and enact it is righteousness. To enact and show respect is ritual propriety” [MWD §19.1]. The commentary explains this in terms of the qi of the virtues on lines 290-2: ԳЩ‫ڈ˃ڈ‬ʛ ‫ڈ‬Щϯ˃ˋʛ ϯЩм˃໳ʛ мЩ๖˃ᔩʛ 14

Գ‫ږ‬. . . ʛ ‫ږڈ‬Ե⸢‫׿‬Գ‫׿ڈ‬ʿԳʛ ‫ڈ‬Ѽʪ‫׿‬ལ Щຟ೸ϯ˃‫ˋږ‬मʛ ‫ݰ‬ϯ˃ԡ Щ. . . ೸м˃ ໳मʛ ‫ݰ‬м˃ԡ Љ߲߲೸๖˃‫ ږ‬ᔩमʛ

“Xun tian zhi dao” ౮˭˃ལ (Following the Way of tian), Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 16.447.

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‫׿‬ϯ ‫׿‬м ‫׿‬๖ ʆལʛ “To see [the Gentleman’s Way] and know it is wisdom.” Seeing is . . . Wisdom is knowing what you have not seen from what what you have seen. “To know it and bring settlement is benevolence.” What knows the Way laid out by the gentleman and warmly finds security in it is the benevolent qi. “To settle and enact it is righteousness.” What, having settled it, applies it in a . . . manner is the righteousness qi. “To enact and show respect is ritual propriety.” What, having applied it, is reverent in a “flapping manner” is the ritual propriety qi. What is settled, what is applied, and what is reverent, are all the human Way. [MWD E §19.1.1-5]

The explanation of the nourishment of the three virtues of benevolence, righteousness, and ritual propriety is based on the presence of a type of qi associated with each virtue. It is important to note that the phrase sheng qi “sagacity qi” does not appear in the commentary, because the context of this discussion, as the last line informs, is the “human Way”. As the Wuxing relates in its first section: െʆལʛ “Good is the human Way” [MWD §1.7], and the qi of the four virtues discussed in MWD §19 constitute human goodness. Sagely virtue, as seen in chapters three and four, is tian’s qi. Thus, the qi of the virtues as seen in the Wuxing commentary are collectively the good (shan െ) part of human nature. There is a progression in the degree to which the virtues are associated with qi in these texts: in the Wuxing any link is implicit, in the Mengzi there is a rudimentary theory, and in the Wuxing commentary the link is explicit and detailed. Some but not all aspects of this theory continued to develop in the Han. Both the notion of virtue infused by tian, and the asymmetry of speaking of the qi of virtues without corresponding negative dispositions are missing from most Han accounts of human nature. Writing in the second century B.C.E., Dong Zhongshu ༓Ϋൗ (195115 B.C.E.) argues that the potential for goodness is inherent, but that humans need education to wake from their apathetic slumber and develop goodness. While the Mengzi’s growth metaphors stress the possible negative effects of environment, Dong’s use of a similar metaphor makes explicit the view that positive environmental effects are required. The “Shencha minghao” ଴࿫Ϗ༙ (Deeply investigating appellations) chapter of the Chunqiu fanlu ‫߲ݱ‬ᑪᛎ (Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn) draws an analogy between human potential and that of a rice stalk:

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213

‫ؠ̍׷ݭ‬Ζ െ̍‫ؠ‬Т Т̳Ζˀ ЩΖ͵̈́η޴Тʛ െ̳‫׷‬ˀ Щ ‫̈́͵׷‬η޴െʛ െႩТ ʆ˃‫׿‬ᙜ˭ЩϾ‫ۍ ͙ؠ‬Ϛ˭‫˖˃޴׿‬ʛ Therefore, human nature may be compared to the rice plant, and goodness may be compared to the rice kernel. The rice kernel comes out of the rice plant, but the rice plant may not be considered to be entirely rice kernel. Goodness comes out of human nature, but human nature may not be considered to be entirely constituted of goodness. Both goodness and the rice kernel are things that humans have inherited from tian and are completed through something that is external, rather than entirely being a matter internal to what tian has created.15

Dong rejects the largely innatist model provided by the Mengzi in favor of one in which both internal and external factors are required. The need to reconcile nature and nurture arguments continued in the very synthetic philosophical atmosphere of the Han. We saw earlier how Yang’s view that “Human nature is a mixture of good and bad”16 accentuated the role of environment and the impact of education on human beings while it rejected the notion that there was a predisposition to morality. A different kind of compromise was struck by Wang Chong in his “Benxing” ʹ‫( ׷‬Basic nature) chapter of the Lunheng: њׂ֣̣ඩԵʆ‫׷‬െ‫ ږ‬ˀʆ̣ʕ‫ږ‬ʛ ࢽࢌԵʆ‫׷‬౱‫ ږ‬ˀʆ̣ʓ‫ږ‬ʛ ಙ෕Եʆ‫׷‬െ౱ପ‫ ږ‬ˀʆʛ ࠜ˫໩ϐལ ۱̣̈́޴૥ ၣ‫ ୎˃׷‬۱͵ʛ I firmly think that when Meng Ke (i.e., Mengzi) said that human nature is good, he was talking about those above the mean. When Sun Qing (i.e., Xunzi) said that human nature is bad, he was talking about those below the mean. When Yang Xiong said that human nature is a mixture of good and bad, he was talking about those around the mean. Where [these writers] return to the norm and accord with the Way, then they may be used in education. As for exhausting the principles of human nature, however, then they may not yet be said to have done so.17

Wang Chong’s attempt at reconciling different visions of human nature in effect rejects any universal notion of human nature defined as “qualities that explain the kind of being that humans are,” instead arguing that past understandings of human nature were each true only of a particular class of human beings. By denying that any of the 15 16 17

Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 10.297-8. Fayan quanyi [3.2] 100. Lunheng jiaoshi 3.142-3.

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previous theorists was right about all human beings, Wang Chong is treading close to the ground already mapped out in the Zhuangzi, which held that any innate dispositions are non-moral in character. These three writers develop successive visions of human nature with diminishing emphasis on predispositions to morality. All three of these Han thinkers speak of self-cultivation in ways that are similar to the “Zisi and Mengzi” texts in the sense that they appear to be based on a materialistic picture of the virtues. At the same time, they no longer speak of innate dispositions to develop particular virtues, but instead of the balance between good and bad tendencies. What should emerge clearly from this comparison is that the authors of the Wuxing commentary and certain Han writers effectively took further steps in the process of naturalizing the virtues. In the Wuxing commentary, virtuous dispositions are described as qi, and the writing of Yang Xiong (and implicitly in other Han works) both positive and negative dispositions are described as qi. While the Mengzi contains a single passage about the qi of righteousness, the Mawangdui commentary to the Wuxing repeatedly refers to that kind of qi, along with the qi of other human virtues. In the Qin and Han, qi increasingly plays the central role in explanations of the Way. Whether or not techniques of “nourishing qi” were applied to moral self-cultivation is not clear. We do know that some Han period received texts like the Huainanzi preserve references to what Yamada Toshiaki 山田利明 has identified as the “spirit transcendence” (shenxian আ̫) traditions from the southern regions of Huainan and Chu. In the “Qisu” ᄫ ۞ (Equalizing Customs) chapter of the Huainanzi, the mantic practitioners Wang Qiao ̙఻ and Chisongzi Ժ‫ؽ‬ʪ are associated with qi manipulation methods that allowed them to: ʕ௢ෙ˭ “rise to the clouds and have communion with tian”.18 However, as Donald Harper has pointed out, the Huainanzi disparages contemporary practicioners of such techniques, and in fact it does so in the very next line: ˑ଒ዕմལ ʿદմኙमளআ Щ‫؞‬մɾϊɾҁ इ⌛इя մ ʿ঻࡝ෙ˥ਪΠ‫ا‬ԡ “Now, those who desire to study their Way (i.e. that of Wang Qiao and Chisongzi) are unable to attain their nourishing of qi or dwelling among the spirits, and have abandoned their inhaling and exhaling, and only sometimes bending and other times extending. It is obvious that they cannot ascend to the clouds or rise up into the distance.”19 The criticism of practitioners of these arts is 18 19

Huainan honglie jijie 11.178 (cf. Larre, et al. 1993, 135). Harper 1998, 114-7.

MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE

215

that they only apply themselves to their techniques in a desultory fashion, and as a result remain tragically earthbound. Another set of criticisms of contemporary practicioners found in the “Yao lue” ࠱ୖ section of the Huainanzi suggests a link between the “five phases” wuxing and the proper use of such techniques: ԵвႅЩʿࢍʆ˃আम ۱ʿ‫ڈ‬ኙΆ˃ጅ ࢍʆશЩʿԵʨ໶˃ᅭ ۱ʿ‫ˉڈ‬м˃ࣔ Those who speak of the most essential but do not trace human spirit and qi to their origins, do not understand the mechanism of nourishing life. Those who trace human affective dispositions to their source without speaking of the virtue of the Great Sages, do not understand the differences among the wuxing.20

The second of these two criticisms is especially interesting since it refers to the wuxing in the context of such practices of “nourishing qi”. The parallel between the “mechanisms of nourishing life” and the “differences among the wuxing” imply that the lost understanding of the inter-relationships between the wuxing, which are here–as in the Wuxing–connected to the sage, makes the understanding (and, presumably, control) of affective dispositions impossible. The brevity of this comment makes it impossible to know whether it is talking about the Wuxing, but it does show that in the Western Han, discussions of moral psychology and mantic arts based on manipulating qi were related. The Wuxing commentary holds an important place in the development of the material virtue discourse, but is different in an important way from related theories attributed to the Warring States figure Shi Shi, and from later Han theories. The difference has to do with the assumptions of their respective pictures of human nature: the picture of the Wuxing commentary looks back to the Warring States views of the Mengzi, while Shi Shi and most Han writers view human nature as malleable. Even Wang Chong advocates a version of Shi Shi’s theory when he argues that past understandings of human nature were each true only of a particular class of human beings, and that some people are born with a good nature and others with a bad one.21 Since it 20

Huainan honglie jijie 21.706. Of the versions of the Han compromise on human nature laid out by Wang Chong, Shi Shi’s is most similar to Yang Xiong’s, although Huang Hui ෦๚ draws a distinction between them (Lunheng jiaoshi 3.133). Yamada Katsumi 山田勝美 (Ronkô 224-5) likens Shi Shi’s theory to that of Gongduzi in Mengzi 6A6: ‫޴̣̈́׷‬െ ̣̈́ ޴ʿെ ‫ن́ݭݵ‬፞ ۱ͺϦെ ܼᄼ፞ ۱ͺϦᆝ “Human nature can be made good 21

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is on Wang Chong’s authority that Shi Shi’s theories are given such antiquity, it is worth asking whether this family of views on human nature actually existed during the Warring States period. If Shi Shi’s advocacy of this Han-style view of human nature was actually what Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger have famously called an “invented tradition”, the integration of qi into discussions of human nature in the “Zisi and Mengzi” texts might be the precursor rather than the competitor to the related vision of human nature popular from the first century B.C.E. on. Yet while it is hard to locate the Wuxing commentary in terms of the history of pre-Qin and early imperial thought, there is no question that early Han exegetes of the Odes were familiar with the Wuxing.

Jia Yi’s development of the Wuxing and Mengzi tradition Treatments of material virtue in the Wuxing and Mengzi exerted a strong influence in the second century B.C.E. Many court writers in the Western Han were associated with newly established positions dedicated to interpreting canonical texts, which in 136 B.C.E. came to be defined as the wujing ˉ໩ or the “Five Classics” of the Ru. The office in the Qin and Han imperial bureaucracy charged with maintaining the official interpretation and transmission of the canon was that of the Erudite (boshi తʦ). Perhaps because the Wuxing was one of the earliest texts to systematically employ the classic Odes, or because that text was associated with those Ru more committed to exegesis of the classics Odes and Documents than to ritual, early Han classical exegetes continued the late Warring States project of tying the five virtues of the Wuxing text into broader correlative frameworks. The writings of the third and second century Erudites Fu Sheng Ϊఢ (c. 245-c. 180 B.C.E.), Han Ying ᓟᏮ (c. 200-120 B.C.E.), and Jia Yi ཋ ሼ (200-168 B.C.E.) all show evidence of the influence of the Wuxing on their treatment of the Ru virtues.22 These works were probably and can be made bad. This is the reason that when Wen and Wu rose up the people liked good, but when You and Li rose up the people liked cruelty,” (See Mengzi zhengyi 22.748-749 [Cf. Lau 1970, 162]). 22 The Shiji records that Fu Sheng was an Erudite under the Qin and retells the story of his secreting a copy of the Documents so as to circumvent the book burning of the Qin. It also notes that Han Ying was made an Erudite under Emperor Wen ́ (r. 179-157 B.C.E.) of the Han (121.3124). Finally, it notes that in his twenties, Jia Yi was made an Erudite by the same emperor (24.2491).

MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE

217

recorded within decades of the time the commentary to the Wuxing was interred in the tomb of the son of the Marquis of Dai in 168 B.C.E. What most references to the Wuxing in texts associated with these Western Han individuals have in common is an attempt to integrate the typology of the virtues into spatial, anatomical, and musical frameworks of the time and in so doing develop the project of naturalizing the virtues. The attempt to formalize the relationship between the physicalized virtues seen in the Wuxing and musical tones was in many ways a continuation of the classical Ru interest in linking self-cultivation and music. In the “Yang Huo” ෍ௗ chapter of the Analects, Kongzi extols the benefits of the Odes in several different arenas of Ru expertise. The Odes makes it possible for one to evoke associations (xing ፞), to survey (guan ᝳ), to mix with groups (qun ໵), and to criticize a ruler (yuan ‫)ݏ‬. These are areas where familiarity with the customs and aesthetics of different states, and an ability to employ the persuasive aspects of the Odes, were useful skills. On a more general level, internalizing the ancient poems of the Odes inscribes hierarchies that allow one to: ᕤ˃Ֆ̓ ხ˃ՖѼ “Nearby serve one’s father, and far away serve one’s lord.” Finally, memorizing the poems themselves fosters knowledge of the natural world through familiarity with their almost zoological catalog of uncommon plants and animals.23 Recitation of the Odes forms one’s character, as in the case of Nan Rong ۷ࣅ, whose Odes recitation, in the words of Hong Zhanhou ‫ޞ‬ ೛ ‫ ۓ‬, was a form of “self-cultivation” that proved Nan Rong’s worthiness to marry Kongzi’s niece.24 These examples show the longstanding connection between self-cultivation practice and internalization of the Odes. What we see in the Western Han writers, however, is a theorization of a connection between specific musical notes and the generation of corresponding virtues in the listener. The notion of a sage who is able to inculcate the virtues in others should be familiar from chapter four’s exploration of the motif of the “jade chimestone” and the theory of resonance, the latter idea already seen to have been present in Han Ying’s Hanshi waizhuan. A related passage in chapter eight of the same second century B.C.E. work carries overtones of the theory that the sage can inspire others to the cultivation of morality: 23

Lunyu jishi 35.1212-3 [Cf. Lau 1979, 144-5]. Hong Zhanhou (2002, 72). A reference to Analects 11.6, see Analects jishi 22.750-751 [Cf. Lau 1979, 106]. 24

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CHAPTER FIVE

ೢѕᚻ ႝմࣃᑵ ՟ʆຈԯЩᅛʨ ႝմੋᑵ ՟ʆ̄ฬЩϦ໳ ႝ մԴᑵ ՟ʆ౺ᓙЩืˋ ႝմᅮᑵ ՟ʆᆪኙЩϦ‫ ݯ‬ႝմЦᑵ ՟ ʆࣣ๖ЩϦᔩ Tang played the hu [melody]. Hearing its gong notes caused people to be warm and excellent, and lenient and great. Hearing its shang notes caused people to be square and upright, and love righteousness. Hearing its jiao notes caused people to be compassionate and love benevolence. Hearing its zhi notes caused people to enjoy nourishing and love giving. Hearing its yu notes caused people to be reverent and respectful and love ritual propriety.25

The sage king Tang’s playing of the tones of the pentatonic scale inspires virtuous behavior in his listeners. Other texts, such as the Guodian text Tang Yu zhi dao ࢑༗˃ལ (The Way of Tang and Yu), celebrate Tang for his ability to transform his people.26 In this passage from the Hanshi waizhuan, the effect of the sage on his people is expressed through the metaphor of the direct influence of musical pitch. This is the same motif as the Hanshi waizhuan’s example of the transformative effect of resonant bell tones previously examined, although here the intent of the metaphor is more obvious because it is a sage who has created the pitch. Further, each of the five tones in the performance works to produce a different pattern of behavior in his listeners. There are other parallels to the Wuxing, such as the use of the terms jing ๖ “reverence” and gong ࣣ “respectfulness,” identified as steps to ritual propriety in Wuxing §19.27 While this passage does address the inculcation of benevolence, righteousness, and ritual propriety, it does not mention wisdom and sagacity. Nevertheless, it represents a Han attempt to correlate specific musical notes to a set of patterns of behavior. This attempt is characteristic of the Han project of synthesizing typologies from different discourses to develop a totalizing cosmology. 25 Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng 8.420 (cf. Hightower 1952, 285). Baihu tong shuzheng 3.95 notes that the same passage appears in the Shuofu იṑ attributed to Liu Xiang’s lost Wujing tongyi ˉ໩௢໳ (Comprehensive Meanings of the Five Classics). 26 Jingmenshi bowuguan 1998, 157. A received example of the relationship between “ruler” virtues and “people” virtues is Analects 2.20. 27 Another similarity is that in Wuxing §17, the first stage in the development of benevolence is: ᖄиࣅსຈ “one’s facial coloration and one’s appearance are warm,” (this warmth is also a characteristic of the appearance of jade). This connection is also made in the Xunzi: ˮ΂‫ ږ‬Ѽʪ̍ᅭା ຈᇁЩጎ ˋʛ “It is really that jade is the thing to which the gentleman compares virtue (de ᅭ). Its warmth, sleekness and lustre are its benevolence.” See chapter 30, “Faxing” ٗм (Models for action), Xunzi jijie 20.536.

MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE

219

In his classic study, A.C. Graham used the term “correlative cosmology” to refer to this project, and numerous writers have followed him in devising charts that graphically lay out the universe of homologies that were worked out between sets of two, three, five, and so forth. Because Graham argues that correlative thinking is different from other modes of thinking, and specifically opposed to “scientific” ways of thinking, I have suggested elsewhere that evolutionary assumptions led Graham to group rather different kinds of sets and correlations.28 Indeed, one important facet of attempts to relate the five musical tones to five virtues is that it reduces the force of the Wuxing’s claim that one virtue is from tian while the others are human. Instead of a fifth term that unites the other four, the five are on the same footing, even if one of them is central. Correlating them further with the five internal organs, as some examples below will do, locates the virtues spatially. It also alters the root metaphor for their cultivation from one of agricultural growth to the filling of containers, a change foreshadowed in the Mengzi. Nevertheless, there is no question that Graham’s general point about the systematizing tendencies of the Han are reflected in Han treatments of the virtues, and the extension of explanations of the virtues in terms of human physiology in the “material virtue” discourse allowed this tendency to come to the fore. The application of natural schema to the cultivation of virtue is seen across the spectrum in the Han. For example, the short essay “Wuxing zhi yi” ˉм˃໳ (Meanings of the Five Phases), attributed to Dong Zhongshu, attempts to explain the virtue of loyalty in terms of the interaction of the “five kinds of action” in the context of the five phases: ‫̈ݭݵ‬ʵΆЩ̑ኙ˃ ‫ہ‬ʵАЩ̐ᕅ˃ ̑ᆪ̈Щኙ̣෍ ̐ ۰‫ ہ‬Щ య ̣ఀ ʥ ˃Ֆ ̑ ၶ մ‫ ˉ ׫‬м‫ ږ‬ʂ Ҩʪ ‫ ׫‬а ˃м ʛ “This is the reason that once wood is born, fire nurtures it; and once metal dies, water stores it. Fire takes pleasure in wood and nurtures it with yang; water conquers metal and buries it with yin. Earth’s serving 28

Graham’s classic work on the subject is his 1986 Yin-Yang and the Nature of Correlative Thinking. The implications of particular Han correlations are important, as I have previously pointed out: “there are meaningful differences between the structure and application of the different sets of correlations used in early China. Yin and yang may be related to each other hierarchically, but they also may enjoy a relationship of equality and mutual dependence. In the context of the Wuxing texts excavated at Guodian ௱‫מ‬, the fifth xing is not of a kind with the other four, but instead is their culmination. The terms of the ganzhi ʸ̀ sexagenary cycle are often likened in early texts to elements of sets that replace each other in dynamic cycles; while the ‘four directions’ are often attached to static spatial arrays. More generally, repeating and nonrepeating sets of correlations carry different metaphorical meanings” (Mark Csikszentmihalyi 2002c, 431).

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fire exerts its loyalty. Therefore the ‘five kinds of action’ are the filial son and the loyal official’s actions”.29 By contrast, the second century B.C.E. “Miucheng” ᑢ ၳ chapter of the Huainanzi attempts to homologize loyalty to the deeds of the gentleman, explaining the cultivation of virtues in terms of the visual and aural effects of the gentleman: ԽѼʪ˃Ե ‫ۑ‬ʛ ˀѼʪ˃ำ ‫׫‬ʛ ‫ۑ׫‬Ӂ‫ੂี ˖ؠ‬ ᏻ‫“ ͙ؠ‬Embodying the gentleman’s words is trustworthiness, and internalizing the gentleman’s intentions is loyalty. Loyalty and trustworthiness are formed inside of one, they stimulate movements that have responses on the outside.”30 These Western Han examples testify to the fact that Han thinkers were trying out different correlations, attempting to come up with a suitable synthesis. While Han writers made a number of different attempts to homologize the virtues to other natural systems, the dominant association of the five musical tones with five of the virtues reveals an attempt to fine tune the link between the effect of music and the cultivation of virtue. Schemes similar to the Hanshi waizhuan’s explanation of the influence of Tang’s melody are found in two sections of the postscript to the “Yueshu” ᆪए (Treatise on Music) in the Shiji, the “Liyue” ᔩᆪ (Rites and music) chapter of the Baihutong Ύ‫ڴ‬௢, and the Gongyang ˙Х commentary to the Spring and Autumn which all make the same case that tones can excite virtues.31 In those and later sources, the relationship between particular tones and virtues is slightly different from the Hanshi waizhuan. Most importantly, one passage from the postscript to the “Yueshu” chapter of the Shiji expresses this connection in a way that exactly matches the virtues of the Wuxing: ‫ੂࣃݭ‬൓Щ֜͸໶ ੋੂ‫ڗ‬Щ֜͸໳ ԴੂԪЩ֜͸ˋ ᅮੂ˻Щ֜ ͸ᔩ Цੂ൐Щ֜͸ನ 29

Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 42.321. Huainanzi 10.324. On the special relationship between this chapter of the Huainanzi and the writings of Zisi, see appendix one. 31 The postscript to the “Yueshu” chapter to the Shiji contains two such lists, one quoted below in the main text of the chapter, while the other follows the framework of the Hanshi waizhuan concerning gong and shang, but associates jiao with ai ren ืʆ “caring for others”, yu with ritual propriety, and zhi with shi ‫“ ݯ‬giving” (Shiji 24.1237). Even though the two passages are in the same Shiji postscript, they are in fact two different schemes for correlating the tones with the virtues. In the Baihutong, gong is associated with being ຈᇁЩᅛ֜ “warm and glossy, and broad and harmonious”, shang with lishi ΘՖ “establishing affairs”, jiao with ci ิ “parental kindness”, zhi with shi, and yu with yuansi ხᅱ thinking far off” (Baihutong shuzheng 3.95). Finally, the Gongyang commentary to the Spring and Autumn entry for year five of Duke Yin ᓙ is generally like the Shiji version with yu as “giving” and zhi as “ritual propriety” (Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan zhushu 3.4b-5a). See also Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu 6.279, n.7. 30

MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE

221

Therefore, gong moves the spleen and harmonizes it to correct sagacity, shang moves the lungs and harmonizes it to correct righteousness, jiao moves the liver and harmonizes it to correct benevolence, zhi moves the mind and harmonizes it to correct ritual propriety, and yu moves the kidneys and harmonizes them to correct wisdom.32

As with the Hanshi waizhuan prototype, each bodily organ is stimulated by one of the five notes to produce a version of one of five virtues. Yang Rubin ๫ኵტ has commented on this chapter of the Shiji: ʆ‫ݵ‬ၲี௢‫ڄ‬ϫϚᝂ . . . Եմ̟ੂ‫׷‬ʂϕʆ˻ճЉॐफ‫ڄ‬ ௢ี঻ʍ “People are a kind of sympathetic object. . . This means that their active nature can excite others’ hearts to have a special sympathetic power.”33 In one sense, the influence of musical tones is a continuation of the idea that the sage, through a “jade tone,” may stimulate virtue in others. It is also the kind of relation between inner organs and dispositions seen in texts such as the Gongsun Nizi fragment examined earlier in this chapter. There, and, implicitly, in this “Yueshu” passage, the mechanism by which each virtue is harmonized is the qi of the corresponding organ. What is particularly noteworthy about this Shiji version of the idea is that the notes are associated with the five virtues of the Wuxing.34 The appearance of the five Wuxing virtues in this context suggests that its model of self-cultivation was still being drawn upon in the middle of the Western Han. The influence of the Wuxing is also seen in a passage that appeared in the lost Han text Shangshu dazhuan ‫׋‬एʨ෭, attributed to the third through second century figure Fu Sheng Ϊఢ but surviving only in fragments, that makes allusions to the same process. The most complete reconstruction of the text is Pi Xirui’s ΏᎧສ (1850-1908) Shangshu dazhuan shuzheng ‫׋‬एʨ෭୚ᗱ, which appears in his Shifutang congshu ࣖΪ੫ᓳए, and is also collected in Du Songbo’s Ӭ‫ ތؽ‬Shangshu leiju chuji ‫׋‬ए㌙႞‫ූڶ‬. The Shangshu dazhuan contains a second passage that uses language specific to the Wuxing. The Li Shan Өെ (c. 630-689) commentary to the Wenxuan ́᎚ twice quotes Fu Sheng as writing: ˭ʓቂ‫ ֟ؠ֡֌ۓ‬நʿ΂ࡖ‫ہ‬ᑵ “The feudal lords of the world received orders from the Zhou, and all were as ‘jade’s tone and metal bell’s sound’”.35 One other time, Li’s 32

Shiji 4.1236. Yang Rubin 1996, 100-1. This is puzzling, but perhaps suggests the Shiji and Hanshi waizhuan both are drawing from an earlier Wuxing-related primary text about music. 35 These two quotations are in the commentary to Cao Zhi’s ૹಿ (192-232 C.E.) “Qiqi” ʁ૧ (Seven Beginnings, see Wenxuan 34.15b) and Wang Bao’s ̙ሸ (d. c. 33 34

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commentary adds the phrase qing zhe ጸӜ “chimestone striking” to make the second clause read: ந ʿ ጸ Ӝ ΂ ࡖ ‫ ہ‬ᑵ “all were ‘a chimestone striking, a jade tone, and a metal bell’s sound.’”36 All these fragments fit well with the “resonance” reading of the influence of sagely virtue in the Wuxing. Fu Sheng is likely saying that the effect of the Zhou on the feudal lords was that of jade vibrating so as to create a corresponding sound in the metal bell.37 Tang Dynasty collections of Fu Sheng’s work clearly read the object of the metaphor as the influence of the sage upon the feudal lords, and so the phrase appears to draw on the the metaphor of the way jade causes metal to sound. Not only is the same language present in fragments of Fu Sheng’s work and in both the Wuxing and the Mengzi, but the passages share a view of the power of the sage to influence others. Perhaps the clearest example of the influence of the Wuxing in the Western Han is found in the writings of Jia Yi. Because of the structural changes already outlined above, the study of the classics in Han China 61 B.C.E.) “Sizi jiang de lun” ͗ʪᒤᅭቈ (The discussion of four masters talking about virtue, see Wenxuan 51.11a). 36 This is in the commentary to Ban Gu’s (32-92 C.E.) “Dongdu fu” ‫ز‬௲ቒ (Rhapsody on the Eastern Capital) in Wenxuan 1.27b. 37 An even more elaborate version is included in the fifth chapter of Pi’s reconstruction, “Luo gao” ީკ (The Luo Announcement), where the influence of Kings Wen and Wu on the feudal lords is discussed. The passage derives from Zhu Xi’s Ќጞ (1130-1200 C.E.) Yili jingzhuan tongjie ᄭᔩ໩෭௢༱ and reads: ˭ʓቂ‫˃ۓ‬ યգන֌֡‫ ֟ؠ‬ЩਂԳ́‫˃ن‬ʰ‫ږ‬ʢʁРʁʏʒቂ‫ߖ ۓ‬நʿጸӜ΂ࡖ‫ہ‬ᑵ΂и “The total number of feudal lords of the world who came forward to receive orders from the Zhou and as they went away viewed the corpses of Kings Wen and Wu was 1,773 feudal lords. For each and every one of them, when the chimestone was stuck, there was a jade tone; and when the metal bell sounded, there was a jade coloration.” See Shangshu dazhuan shuzheng 5.15b (In his commentary to the “Sang daji” యʨ৩ [Funerals, greater record] chapter of the Liji, Sun Xidan ࢽҹͲ comments: Գʰᎂ͵ ᔐइ “Viewing the corpse refers to the time before the body is put in the coffin,” [Liji jijie 44.1179]. See also Ikeda 1993, 197-8. Pi Xirui explains that “jade tone” and “metal bell sounding” refer to the beginning and dying out of the music.) In Zhu Xi’s version, both the phrase qing zhe “chimestone striking” and yuse “jade coloration” have been added to the basic Tang version. There is a difference between the Tang quotations of Fu Sheng’s use of “jade tone” and “metal bell sounding” and the longer Song quotation collected by Zhu Xi. Zhu’s quotation is consistent with later readings of Mengzi 5B1, in the way it explains the musical references to be about the entire course of a musical performance. For example, Jiao Xun says that the term jin sheng er yu zhen zhi refers to getting the parts of the performance in the correct order, with the metal bell first and the jade stone last (See Mengzi zhengyi 10.672-3). Zhu Xi’s reading is similar, arguing that the phrase refers to the course of a musical performance and means shizhong tiaoli ֻ உ଍୎ “Beginning and ending were according to inherent principle,” (Mengzi zhangju jizhu 10.315). Because Late Imperial scholars understood the Mengzi to be talking about the order of a musical performance, Zhu Xi adjusted Fu Sheng’s phrases to be consistent with his understanding of the Mengzi. Chapter four contains a more complete discussion of this phrase and traditional interpretations of it.

MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE

223

was more of a collective enterprise than in the Warring States. Numerous Han developments attest to this: the growth of commentary as an explicitly dialogic exercise, the use of shared titles in the writing of essays, and the convocation of imperially sponsored debates on the meaning of the classics such as the ones at the Stone Canal (Shiqu Δ ೗) Pavilion in 51 B.C.E. and at the White Tiger (Baihu Ύ‫ )ڴ‬Hall in 79 C.E. Because of this, or perhaps in spite of this, the best-known writers of the Han today are those that stand out as particularly iconoclastic when compared to their contemporaries. Jia Yi’s iconclasm is reflected in the ups and downs of his career. He served Emperor Wen first as Erudite and then Palace Grandee (taizhong dafu ˯ˀʨˮ) beginning in 179 B.C.E. After being slandered by other scholars at court, Jia Yi was sent away from the imperial capital to serve as Grand Tutor (taifu ˯ఔ) for the Prince of Changsha. A few years later, he was rehabilitated and served briefly as Grand Tutor for Emperor Wen’s youngest son, Prince Huai ᖩ of Liang before he died at 33 sui.38 Despite his early death, Jia is associated with a large oeuvre consisting of memorials to the throne, poems and essays preserved in the Shiji and Hanshu, and in the 58 chapters of the Xinshu ๘ए (New Writings). The latter work, according to Rune Svarverud’s recent study, was reconstituted based on bibliographical descriptions from a number of Jia Yi-related texts circulating in the Tang Dynasty under other titles.39 Jia Yi’s work as a whole reflects two levels of influence by the Wuxing, directly borrowing its scheme of five virtues, and implicitly accepting many of the “material virtue” discourse’s assumptions. First, the specific arrangement of the five kinds of action in the Wuxing are clearly the inspiration for Jia Yi’s construction of his own system of six kinds of action in a set of related chapters found in the Xinshu called “Daoshu” ལ ி (Techniques of the Way), “Liushu” ˗ ி (Six techniques) and “Daodeshuo” ལᅭი (Explanations of the Way and Virtue). Second, and more generally, the idea of “material virtue” is behind Jia Yi’s general theory of education and ritualization. While this theory may be found in many of Jia Yi’s writings, the view that the virtues should be visible in one’s demeanor and facial expression in any given ritual context is particularly clear in some of his memorials and in the Xinshu’s “Rongjing” ࣅ໩ (Classic on deportment).

38

Shiji 24.2491-503. Rune Svarverud 1998, 80-81. For an overview of scholarship on the text, see Michael Nylan, “Hsin shu” in Michael Loewe, ed. 1993, 161-170. 39

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When Jia Yi was sent to Changsha in 177 B.C.E., he was effectively being banished from the center to the southern periphery of China.40 It was from this time to the end of his life that many scholars think he wrote his more “Daoist” works, by which they mean more consistent with the Laozi and Zhuangzi texts seen as representative of the early entity known as “Daojia” ལࣁ (Lineage of the Way). One reason for this is that the southern part of China had long been associated with the “Daojia.” In addition to Jia’s Laozi and Zhuangzi influenced “Funiao” ㇟఍ prose-poem, thought to have been written in 173 B.C.E., the three chapters “Daoshu”, “Liushu”, and “Daodeshuo” were considered authentic works of Jia Yi by the Qing commentator and Han Studies scholar Lu Wenchao ጰ́ᦞ (1717-1795) because they contain ideas consistent with the “Daojia” of the Han dynasty.41 Indeed, the content of these chapters is very consistent with second century B.C.E. writing about the Dao.42 Even more, there are two additional reasons to think that these chapters date from the last years of Jia Yi’s life, when he was a Grand Tutor for the princes of Changsha and Liang. First, an aspect of the three chapters that is often overlooked is their dialogic form, in contrast to most, but not all, of the rest of the Xinshu. This might indicate that Jia Yi’s dialogs in these chapters are a record of his service as Grand Tutor in Changsha or Liang, as in the other dialogic chapter of the Xinshu, “Xianxing” ζ᎟, where he is in dialog with Prince Huai of Liang. Second, a circumstantial argument can be made that the influence of the Wuxing in these works was a result of his exposure to that text in the south of China. It is reasonable to guess that Changsha was the place where Jia Yi not only was influenced by writings about the Way, but was also exposed to the Wuxing text. When Jia Yi arrived to tutor the Prince of Changsha in 177 B.C.E., Li Cang (d. 186 B.C.E.), who had served as Chancellor of the principality of Changsha and had been enfeoffed as the Marquis of Dai, had been dead and buried at Mawangdui for less than a decade. While Jia tutored the Prince of Changsha, the Marquis of Dai’s son was still alive. Six years after Jia Yi had returned to the capital in 174 B.C.E., the Marquis of Dai’s son was buried and the one known Han copy of the Wuxing was placed in his Mawangdui tomb in 168 B.C.E. If the arguments below are true, that the same chapters of the Xinshu that show the influence of the Wuxing are those thought to have been written after Jia’s time in 40

For the date of 177 B.C.E., see Cai Tingji 1984, 21, n.5. On the dating of the “Funiao” see Cai Tingji 1984, 18. Lu’s thesis is summarized in Zhang Xincheng ઠ˻⥪ 1954, 756. 42 See Mark Csikszentmihalyi 1997. 41

MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE

225

Changsha, then this circumstantial link suggests a neat historical explanation for the shared aspects of the two texts. The Xinshu’s clearest reference to the Wuxing is Jia Yi’s conception of the liuxing ˗м (six kinds of action) in the “Daoshu”, “Liushu”, and “Daodeshuo” chapters. In the Wuxing, four of five virtues are on an equal footing, but the fifth one, sagacity, is on a different level. In the “Liushu,” five virtues are on an equal footing, but a sixth is added as the signification of the harmonization of the five. In other words, Jia Yi’s scheme augments that of the Wuxing with a sixth term in the same way the latter text augmented the four virtues of the mind seen in the Mengzi by making sagacity their culmination. The “Liushu” expands the wuxing list to six: ʆЉˋ໳ᔩನ໶˃м м֜۱ᆪ፞ ᆪ۱˗ Џ˃ᎂ˗м Human beings have the actions of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom, and sagacity. When these actions are in harmony, then happiness arises. With happiness, then there are six. This is why it is called the six kinds of action.43

Jia Yi adds a sixth term to the wuxing, effectively making sagacity a “human” virtue, and “happiness” a transcendent one. Not only is the underlying list and structure of the virtues the same as the Wuxing, the very choice of “happiness” as the sixth virtue comes from the Wuxing. Slips 28 and 29 of the Guodian version of the Wuxing read: ໶ನᔩᆪ˃‫׿‬ΊΆʛ ˉ [м˃‫ ]֜׿‬ʛ ֜۱ᆪ ᆪ۱Љᅭ Љᅭ۱ՉࣁႩ Sagacity and wisdom are that from which the rites and music derive, and this is [what results in the harmonization of] the five [kinds of action].

43 Xinshu jiaozhu 8.316. In Xinshu jiaozhu, the five virtues are the wuchang, with trustworthiness (xin ‫ )ۑ‬instead of the wuxing’s sagacity (sheng ໶). Qi Yuzhang ‫΂ڌ‬ ఈ, in his 1975 Jiazi Xinshu jiaoshi ཋʪ๘एओᙼ, substitutes sheng for xin, following a comment penned by Lu Wenchao in 1784 that in one of his two early editions the text read sheng. The edition was the Jian ܿ edition, probably from the thirteenth century (discussed by Svarverud 1998, 22-3). Before the discovery of the Wuxing, this sort of emendation was probably very common, since the “five kinds of action” wuxing had virtually disappeared from memory. For this reason, it is entirely reasonable to accept Qi’s version. In Xinshu jiaozhu, xing ፞ is twice written yu Ⴉ. Again, Qi Yuzhang’s edition comparison results in a more prescient version, following Lu Wenchao’s text in amending yu to xing and adding a second yu/xing to the phrase ᆪ፞۱˗ “With joy arising, then there are six” (1975, 945-6). Based on the Wuxing parallel, I adopt the first emendation but not the second.

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When harmonized, there is happiness. When there is happiness, then there is virtue. When there is virtue then the states and noble families will follow. [GD §15.6-7]44

Jia Yi borrows the first line’s idea of the harmonization of the “five kinds of action”, which in the context of the entire text clearly connotes the five that Jia Yi identifies. Then he directly copies the phrase he ze yue ֜۱ᆪ “when harmonized, there is happiness” and connects it to the notion of “rising up” (xing ፞) from the end of the same phrase from GD §15.7. Jia Yi appears to have found the only passage in the Wuxing that might be read as consistent with his six-fold system. As with the correlation of the five virtues with the tones of the pentatonic scale in other Han texts, the virtues in the Xinshu are correlated to other sixfold schemes. The “Liushu” also talks about how the ancient kings taught people with the “techniques of the Odes, Documents, Changes, Spring and Autumn, Ritual, and Music (Yue ᆪ).” The text homologizes these six classics to the six yang months and six yin months of the year, six styles of mourning garment and six orders of magnitude in weight measurement. All are correlated to the six li ୎ or “patterns,” which give birth to human virtue, but may also be found in jade. The reason for all these sixes probably has to do with Jia Yi’s need to develop a new cosmological framework that would give special status to the concept of the Way, in something like the same manner that the Wuxing gave special status to sagacity among the virtues and hence to tian. In the Han, as we have seen, the correlation of the wuxing virtues with sets of five (e.g., the five tones) effectively denied the exceptionality of sheng. Jia Yi accepts this change and through his 44 While the end of line 199 and the top of line 200 of the Mawangdui Wuxing text are damaged, the commentary indicates that the Mawangdui version is different from the Guodian version in a couple of ways. First, it reads ˋ ໳ ᔩ ᆪ ‫ ׿‬Ί Ά ʛ “Benevolence and righteousness are that from which ritual and music derive” instead of “sagacity and wisdom” as in the Guodian version. Second, it reads ੢ࣁႩ “the state and noble houses are given it” or “will follow” in the Mengzi’s sense of immigrating to a well-run state instead of Չࣁ፞ “the states and noble houses will rise,” (perhaps the transitive “raise” [virtue] is more appropriate here). The change from guo ੢ to bang Չ is the result of the taboo on the name of Liu Bang ᄸՉ, the first emperor of the Han. The difference between xing ፞ and yu Ⴉ might be a substitution based on visual similarity, since line 289 of the Mawangdui Wuxing commentary explains: ੢ࣁ Ⴉ‫ ږ‬Ե˭ʓ˃Ⴉˋ໳ʛ “‘The state and the noble houses will follow’ is speaking of the people of the world’s following benevolence and righteousness,” [MWD E §18.3]. By contrast, xing makes more sense in the parallel in chapter six of the Hanshi waizhuan: ‫ߖݭ‬፞ˋ໳Щቓ৷Ѧ “As a result, their people all raised up benevolence and righteousness and slighted material goods and profit” Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng 347 (cf. Hightower 1952, 195). See also Shuoyuan xiaozheng 19.487.

MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE

227

addition of a sixth term effectively claimed that the level of the “Way” was exceptional. What the Xinshu chapters “Daoshu”, “Liushu”, and “Daodeshuo” have in common is their assumption that the phenomenal world is ordered by a set of principles that are an expression of such a transcendent Way. The “Daoshu” begins with the following exchange: ̆ ᆚႝལ˃Ϗԡ Щ͵‫ڈ‬մ࿧ʛ ቁ੕ལ‫ږ‬щᎂʛ ࿬̆ ལ‫׿ ږ‬ન ૊‫ٵ‬ʛ մʹ‫ږ‬ᎂ˃൳ մͶ‫ږ‬ᎂ˃ி ൳‫ ږ‬Եմႅัʛ ͦছЩ೷ ௎‫ݯ‬ʛ ிʛ‫׿ ږ‬નվ‫ٵ‬ʛ ੂᎼ˃ᆚʛ ʘЏߖལʛ [It was] said: “I have often heard the name (ming Ϗ) of the Way, but have yet to hear its actuality (shi ࿧). May I ask to what this thing, the Way, refers?” [Master Jia] replied: “This thing, the Way, is what you follow when you associate with the world of things. Its beginning is called the undifferentiated (xu ൳), its endings are called techniques (shu ி). The undifferentiated refers to its essential subtlety; it is plain and ordinary but one cannot act upon it. Techniques refer to that by which one regulates the world of things; the processes of movement and stillness. Both of these are the Way.”45

Jia Yi’s definition of the Way contrasts the “nameless” aspect of the dao, which may not be used in the phenomenal world, with its “namable” techniques that may. Cai Tingji ሣҽφ summarizes the contrast between the two levels of the Way like this: “The undifferentiated is Way’s manifestation in the human mind, and techniques are the concrete application of the Way in human life.”46 The Way is then prior to all distinctions, even that between the level of tian and that of human beings, the cosmological distinction that underlies the Wuxing text. It is impossible to say with certainty why Jia Yi took the number six to be the basis for his structure of the universe, but if his appropriation of the Wuxing is any guide, the reason might as simple as six’s being one more than five. Five was the number of phases in the wuxing (in all senses of wuxing), and was associated with tian. In order to superimpose an order that encompassed both tian and the human world, the level of the Way literally had to be one more. From a historical perspective, this was not the first time such cosmological “inflation” occurred. Wang Aihe has shown that the Shang rulers’ model of the 45 Xinshu jiaozhu 8.302. Several editions have suo dao jiewu ‫׿‬ལ૊‫ٵ‬, which Jiazi Xinshu jiaoshi 919 reads as: “[the principle] according to which one speaks about things.” Here it makes more sense to follow the more common variant which reads suo cong jiewu ‫׿‬ન૊‫ٵ‬, “that which you follow in association with the world of things.” 46 Cai Tingji 1984, 128.

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cosmos, the sifang ͗̄ (four directions) was initially adopted by their Zhou successors. The Zhou began by identifying themselves with the western direction of the four directions, but gradually reoriented the sifang system into a model in which vassal states in each of the four directions surrounded the Zhou polity at the center. This fivefold model became the basis for the wuxing.47 The above comparison of texts suggests that Jia Yi was well aware of the differences between the Wuxing and his new scheme, but being a good exegete, he was able to quote from it in such a way that supported his new cosmology. When it came to self-cultivation, Jia Yi’s understood virtue in a way that was also informed by the theory of material virtue. Specifically, he argued that external features such as speech, demeanor, and expression were all important guides to internal virtue. He justified this by developing a view of ritualization and education that held that performance shaped a person’s dispositions in a permanent way. The importance of appearance and proper ritual performance is most strongly developed in the “Rongjing” chapter of the Xinshu. That chapter begins with a list of outward expressions that include the appearances of the face and of the eyes, styles of speech, ways of sitting and standing. Each expression is divided into four contexts: court, sacrifice, military situations, and grieving. The chapter opens by contrasting the proper expressions of one’s intention in each context. In court, one’s expression is: ଫ೸ଡ̣ᘷ “deeply cool to show one is in awe.” At a sacrifice, one’s expression is: ಀ ೸ ‫“ ֜ ̣ ݋‬gladly reflective to show one is in harmony.” In a military situation, one’s expression is: ‫׹‬೸฾೸ႅ̣ᄼ “irately and hotly energetic to show one is fierce.” In mourning, one’s expression is: ✧೸ู೸ᅴ̣∋ “desolately and worriedly anxious to show one is sorrowful.” The relevance of these expressions is succinctly summarized: ͗ӆӁˀ ͗ и ച ͙ “The four intentions take form internally, and the four expressions are exhibited externally.”48 The claim that one’s external appearances express internal states effectively subsumes ritual under the category of self-cultivation. The existence of visible correlates for proper interior states connects this view of ritual to the theory of moral self-cultivation seen in the Mengzi in chapter three. According to Jia Yi, proper ritual expressions are functions of inner states. Yet the converse is also to some extent true: inner virtue is also a 47

Wang Aihe 2000, 23-74. Xinshu jiaozhu 6.227-8. Yuhazu Kazuyori Ჹ֜ො (1988) has argued that the “Rongjing” and the “Daoshu”, “Liushu”, and “Daodeshuo” chapters together form a set because they use four-fold and six-fold schemes instead of five-fold ones. 48

MATERIAL VIRTUE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE

229

product of ritual practice. This is clear from his description of a system that mothers of unborn princes allegedly had to undergo. The process of of taijiao ࠏ ૥ (fetal education) emphasized limiting in utero exposure to sounds and tastes. The Xinshu quotes an account of the process from the Qingshishi ji ‫̏͑ی‬৩ (Records of Master Qingshi), a lost compendium of popular stories and lore compiled under official auspices. It required that the empress be overseen by three ritual officials during the final three months of pregnancy: ̍ʒ̇‫̙ ږ‬ϒ‫׿‬Ӷᑵࡖ‫ۍ‬ᔩᆪ ۱˯ࣖᆒᆪЩၳʿ஑ ‫׿‬Ӷ೪֍‫ۍږ‬͸֍ ۱˯ࢿம̂Щʿಝຑቆ Щ̆ ʿಝ̣՝̙˯ʪ During these three months, if the sounds the Empress desires are not ritual music, then the Music-master (taishi ˯ࣖ) quells the strings and declares: “I am out of practice.” If the flavors desired are not of the correct taste, then the Grand Sacrificial Butcher (taizai ˯ࢿ) shoulders his ladle and, daring not simmer or blend flavors, says: “I dare not serve this to the prince.”49

The avoidance of sights and tastes that are not “correct” implies that the fetus may be affected negatively either through the mother’s sensations. This same idea is found in a Han obstetrics text found at Mawangdui and called the Taichanshu ࠏ୕ए (Book of Fetal Production). In the context of a discussion of conception and pregnancy between the legendary Xia dynasty sage-emperor Yu ߮ and You Pin ͧᏁ, an advisor whose name literally means “unending progeny,” the influence of world outside the womb on the developing fetus inside is described as neixiang chengzi ˖ඐϾʪ “internal images develop the child.”50 While in the Taichanshu the goals of regulating external sensory stimuli on the pregnant mother are the avoidance of birth defects and the determination of the sex of the child, Jia Yi’s “fetal education” is described as the ኙࣤ˃ལ “Way of nourishing kindness”. The mutual influence of medical theory and moral theory, as seen in the Mengzi, is also evident in the Han theory of “fetal education”. Jia Yi’s memorials to the throne show that the central role of ritual in the cultivation of the crown prince’s virtue did not end at birth. On becoming mature, the emperor enters the “five studies” (wuxue ˉዕ). The Xinshu cites an account of the use of these studies from the now 49 Xinshu jiaozhu 10.390-1. Da Dai Liji ʨᐁᔩ৩ 48 (DaDai Liji jiegu 59-60) contains a parallel passage. 50 Guojia wenwuju guwenxian yanjiushi 1984, v. 4, 136 (cf. Harper 1998, 379).

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lost essay “Xueji” ዕ৩ (Records of the Studies), to describe how each one is correlated with one of the five directions, and is the site of the teaching of a particular moral behavior. In the Eastern Study, the ruler learns to value the virtue of benevolence through practice in extending kindness to others in proportion to their affiliation with him. Jia Yi writes that: Џˉዕ‫ݰږ‬Ͼ‫ؠ‬ʕ ۱Рּኲͺˢ᎓‫ؠ‬ʓԡ “once these five studies are completed above, then the many officials and common people can transform and harmonize below.”51 The training of the ruler, like the cultivation of the virtues and their application by the ruler, was a process with structural parallels to the patterns of the natural world. The correlation of the five directions with the cultivation of virtue is similar to the Han association of the “five kinds of action” with parts of human anatomy or with the tones of the pentatonic scale. An emphasis on attending to appearance in ritual situations and Jia Yi’s belief in the formative powers of ritual are two sides of the same coin. Today, people are wont to see ritual as “hollow” or as part of affecting a pose. Jia Yi’s views might seem naïve if taken to simply be saying that external expressions are signs of inner states. But he is actually drawing on a long tradition of thinking about ritual in which inner states and external expressions mutally affect each other. Precedents for his view certainly include the Wuxing’s account of how the cultivation of virtue produces a “jade tone” and “jade countenance” in the subject, and the use of the nei/wai distinction in the Mengzi’s account of how virtues affect external appearance. In Han works, this bidirectional model of influence between internal and external was often projected back into the Zhou, and understood to have been the basis of Zhou ritual and institutions. In the somewhat fanciful reconstruction of the Zhou bureaucracy known as the Zhouli ֟ᔩ, the office of the Shishi ࣖ̏ is charged with teaching the crown prince the “three virtues” (sande ʒᅭ) and the “three kinds of action” (sanxing ʒм). The three virtues are identified as the “ultimate” (zhi в ), “clever” (min ૨ ), and “filially pious” (xiao Ҩ ). The text describes each virtue as the foundation of a particular valuable behavior: ultimate virtue is the root of the Way, clever virtue is the root 51

Hanshu 48.2248-9, Xinshu jiaozhu 5.184. The effect of the ruler on the people is also the subject of a quotation from the Zuozhuan in Jia Yi’s “Rongjing” chapter of the Xinshu. There, the ruler is able to effect the people on several levels, including: ࣅ ს̈́ᝳ ѕՖ̈́ٗ ᅭм̈́ඐ ᑵम̈́ᆪ “His appearance may be observed, his taking care of matters may be modelled after, his virtuous actions can be imaged, and the qi of his sounds can be enjoyed.” See Xinshu jiaozhu 6.229 and the entry in the Zuo commentary for year 31 of Duke Xiang in Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhengyi 40.24a-b.

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of action, and filially pious virtue is the root of knowing how to oppose what is bad, respectively. The three kinds of action, by contrast, are classified as “filially pious”, “amicable” (you ˩), and “acquiescent” (xun ො). The spheres in which these categories of act are relevant are treating one’s parents with familial closeness, respecting worthies and excellent people, and serving teachers and elders, respectively. The Han commentator Zheng Xuan explains the distinction between the two aspects of the Shishi’s teaching as one between the inner and outer aspects of virtue: ᅭм˖͙˃ၳ Ϛ˻޴ᅭ ‫޴˃ݯ‬м “Virtue and action refer to the internal and the external. If one’s mind becomes virtuous, then one applies this to become action.”52 This distinction is also made in the “Biaoji” ‫ڷ‬৩ chapter of the Liji, which explains why the gentleman wears the clothing that he does: ‫ݭݵ‬Ѽʪ࣠‫ح‬մ‫ح‬Щ೷մࣅ ࣠Љմࣅ Щ೷մᘂ ࣠ЉմᘂЩ೷մ ᅭ ࣠ЉմᅭЩ೷մм ‫ݭݵ‬Ѽʪৣൄ۱Љ‫ۼ‬и ၷ਻۱Љ๖и ΋۩۱Љʿ̈́৾˃и This is the same reason that the gentleman is ashamed of wearing suitable clothes but having the incorrect deportment, of having the correct deportment but saying the wrong things, of saying the right things but lacking the appropriate virtue, of having the appropriate virtue but lacking the proper action. This is the same reason that if the gentleman has on his mourning garments then his facial coloration is sad. If he wears the sacrificial garments then his facial coloration is reverent. If he wears his armor and helmet, then his facial coloration is indomitable.53

The stages of the development of virtuous action are laid out clearly in this passage, which lists the proper countenances for three situations.54 The five layers of the gentleman’s duty here are a mix of things that today are generally thought of as part of radically different categories: suitable clothing, correct deportment, right speech, appropriate virtue, and proper action. Today, many tend to assume that virtue is prior to action, and indeed the passage lists virtue just prior to it. Yet the “Biaoji” also lists clothing, bearing, and speech as prior to virtue. To the extent that the passage is consistent with the assumption that correct 52

Zhouli zhushu 14.1b. Liji zhushu 54.9a-b. The passage goes on the quote the satirical “Houren” ࡵʆ (Greeter, Mao 151) from the Odes: ા (႕) れϚૼ ʿᐩմᑳ ‫ש‬৩ (մ) ˃ʪ ʿ ၳմ‫“ ح‬The pelican is on the embankment,/ Not moistening a wing./ That man there/ Does not warrant his clothing.” See Shijing xinxi 396-9 (cf. Karlgren 1950a, 94). 54 The three situations are three of the four used in Jia Yi’s “Rongjing” chapter–in this case, the addition of the “court” situation may due to the influence of the Han bureaucratic mindset. 53

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action is a product of virtuous dispositions, it is clear that these dispositions are to some extent generated out of the way one dresses, behaves, and speaks. The relationship between virtue and action was not always seen as continuous in early China, or else there would be no need to distinguish between the two. But in these ritual texts, and in works like the “Rongjing” of Jia Yi that model on them, ritual is the medium through which dispositions are transformed first into virtue, and then into action. Jia Yi’s understanding of the way ritual deportment and the cultivation of virtue mutually reinforce each other draws on this model of ritual as the nexus between virtue and action. Indeed, theories of practice developed in early Han Dynasty Ru texts are often predicated on the idea that the transparency of movement, gesture, and facial expression allows the expression of the proper feelings in any given ritual context. This is one way in which the “material virtue” discourse continued well into the Han period through its integration into Ru ritual theory. This view of ritual also reflects the influence of the Xunzi’s theory of ritual.55 Other legacies of the Wuxing, such as the historical view of the sage found in late Warring States and Han texts, however, appear to have become controversial and enjoyed a very different reception in the early imperial period.

Sage and state in early imperial China In the second century B.C.E., a fundamental change in the relationship between the Ru and the state began. As Ru became integrated into the state bureaucracy, their willingness to embrace elements of the Zisi and Mengzi subtradition that might conflict with imperial interests appears to have waned. By examining the reception of the Wuxing’s conception of the intimate relationship between the sage and tian in different kinds of texts in the Han, a distinct pattern emerges. While Ru began to explicitly criticize that relationship and elevate the concept of genealogy over virtue, versions of the Wuxing’s sage appear in a variety of texts associated with challenges to state authority, including the Huainanzi and the Taipingjing ˯ͦ໩ (Classic of Great Peace). The likely reason for the Wuxing’s disappearance is then likely tied to a fundamental change in the social conditions under which Ru texts were 55

See Goldin 1999, 55-82 and Jonathan Schofer, “Virtues in Xunzi’s Thought” (in Kline and Ivanhoe 2000, 155-75).

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233

produced, distributed, and consumed that took place in the centuries after the Qin emerged from the period of contending states to consolidate power and create the unified empire of China in 221 B.C.E. The direct involvement of the centralized state in the production of intellectual and religious writing led to fundamental changes in the contexts and content of writing. The Qin’s view that scholars were a threat to state authority was subtly transformed into a regime of state controls in the Han, and the scholar’s relative independence from the state was no longer desirable to the imperial government. The very story of Kongzi was fundamentally altered, as Mark Edward Lewis has pointed out, to become that of “a brilliant official, rather than a scholar.”56 As a result, the role of the Ru as freelance advisors and keepers of the narratives of legitimacy was transformed into one more akin to the court astrologer who interpreted omens as specific and narrowly targeted diagnoses of the shortcomings of particular policies, mistakes in official performance, and errors of court decorum. With this change came a shift in the self-conception of the Ru. At the end of the Warring States period, the desired outcome of Ru self-cultivation practice was the inculcation of characteristics that made them prized advisors. The common late Warring States motif of the shi ʦ  (potential official) being sought after by the regional lords illustrates the Ru ideal during this period. The lore of shi rejecting the advances of powerful figures became ubiquitous in the late Warring States period and underscored claims to high standards and incorruptibility by the Ru. An example of this lore was the set of stories circulating about Zisi. Various narratives relate his spurning of his patron Duke Mu ጽ of the state of Lu because the duke was not willing to listen to honest criticism, the duke would rather have had Zisi shield him from unpleasant news, or the duke offered gifts in a way that did not show evidence of proper moral motivation. In the latter case, Zisi (also known in some early texts by the first name Ji β) upbraids his lord using a rebuke surely intended to have overtones of Analects 2.7: ˑЩ݈ ‫ڈ‬Ѽ˃̘ਠय़β “From this moment forward I know that my lord feeds me, Ji, as he does his dogs and horses!”57 In rejecting the improper advances of the duke, the portrayal of Zisi borders on the fickle, but it well illustrates the claim to noble authority made by the Ru. 56

Mark Edward Lewis 1999, 221. Mengzi 5B6. Mengzi zhengyi 21.711-9. Another Warring States figure about whom such tales were told was Kongzi’s voluntarily impoverished disciple Yuan Xian ࢍዙ, who in one exchange in the Zhuangzi, shows up the gainfully employed disciple Zigong ʪ৸ in a way that underscores his own incorruptibility. 57

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Besides this connection with the noble shi, Zisi was, of course, also linked by the Xunzi to the propogation of the Wuxing. In the latter text, the term shi appears twice as in connection with the intersection of morality and official service: it occurs on the Guodian Wuxing slip 8: ʦЉӆ‫ؠ‬Ѽʪལ ᎂ˃ӆʦ “A potential official who aspires to the gentleman's Way is called an ‘aspiring potential official’” [§3.2]; and on slips 44 and 45: ‫ڈ‬ЩՖ˃ ᎂ˃ౚቖ‫ږ‬ʛ ݈ ʦ˃ౚቖ‫ږ‬ʛ “One who recognizes and serves worthies is called one who ‘reveres worthies.’ The latter is the potential official’s reverence for worthies” [§21.6-7]. In Warring States texts, the nobility of Zisi is not related to a connection to Kongzi but to the fact that the self-cultivation process had transformed his values. The changing nature of the lore surrounding the figure of Zisi reflects the changing status of the Ru in the early empire, and the different standards of authority in the Qin and Han dynasties. Changes in the social function of scholars, and the construction of a statesponsored academic system, resulted in sponsorship being predicated on a new criterion of lineage transmission that supported a parallel notion of heredity in academic circles.58 This can be illustrated by the way in which Han texts portray Zisi’s authority as no longer solely a function of his impeccable moral standards, but now of his geneaology. In Han works like the “Tangong” ᐐʻ chapter of the Liji ᔩ৩ (Record of Ritual) and the “Jiwen” ৩ ੕ (Recorded Questions) chapter of Wang Su’s late Han Kongcongzi, Zisi’s authority is based on his connection with Kongzi. In the latter source, Zisi portrays himself as maintaining the Kong family “vocation” (ye ๣).59 In such later works, Zisi is regularly referred to as Kong Ji ˱β and located in the Kong family genealogy as Kongzi’s grandson.60 This example of the changes in the way Zisi was portrayed in Han sources may be seen as a metaphor for differences in the nature of textual production, transmission, and valorization. This change in the Ru attitude may be summarized as a triumph of the notion of genealogy. The approach to sagehood in the Wuxing and Mengzi was characteristic of a period in which the Ru were able to select regional lords from whom they saw fit to receive patronage. In 58

See Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan 2004. Kongcongzi 1.19b-20a (Ariel 1989, 98 [6.1]). As suggested in chapter two, the identification of Zisi with the Kong clan did not happen until the time of Liu Xiang, who also began to claim that that Mengzi was a direct disciple of Zisi in order to repair the damage to historical chronology that his identification of Zisi caused. 59 60

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this context, a major reason for textual production was the demonstration and proclamation of the diverse expertises of the group. The Ru promoted a theory of political transfer of power in which succession was determined by de ᅭ  (translated as power, moral charisma, or virtue), rather than genealogy. At times, this contrast was made very clearly, as in the recently discovered Warring States manuscript Rongcheng shi ࣅϾ̏, held at the Shanghai Museum. There, ancient sage rulers of ଡ ᅭ “clear virtue”, who ɾ մ ӆ “unified their wills,” never handed their thrones down to their sons: ਦ ߖʿ૗մʪЩ૗ቖ “They all did not transfer it to their sons but transferred it to worthies.”61 The implications of this Ru text, which, like the Wuxing, was not continuously transmitted to the present, was that hereditary transfer of power was antithetical to good government. The centralization of the empire under the Qin and Han, however, changed the model of patronage and with it the economic underpinnings of the Ru. As a result, state support in the form of official position and recognition of a lineage became necessary for the widespread transmission of texts and practices. Parallel to this change in the role of state support, Qin and Han systematization and classification became the basis for the rapid growth of technical disciplines in areas from divination to astronomy to medicine, and many of these disciplines became the provenance of departments of the imperial bureaucracy like the Yuanling ฏ̪ (Prefect of the Funerary Park) or the Houqi ‫ۓ‬म (Watcher of the Ethers).62 The way that Ru learning became integrated into the government was a cause for lament for some, such as Sima Qian, whose “Rulin” (Forest of Ru) chapter of the Shiji argues that the Ru were being co-opted by government service.63 It is in this atmosphere that the sage and the sage’s relation to tian became a point of disagreement. Two aspects of the potentially subversive nature of the Wuxing and Mengzi’s sage came to be contested in early imperial texts. The first was the claim that the sage had superhuman sensory abilities, and could have foreknowledge of the future. The nature of claims that the sage had exceptional sensory abilities such as being “clear-sighted” and “sharp-eared” cultivated “in solitude” in the Wuxing, and having 61

Ma Chengyuan, et al. 2002, v.2, 250. Both offices served in the bureau of the Taichang ˯ગ (Grand Master of Ceremonies, and the Houqi served under the Taishi ling ˯̪͑ (Prefect Grand Astrologer). See Bielenstein 1980, 18 and 22-3. 63 This reading follows the work of Michael Nylan. See Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan 2003. 62

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foreknowledge in the “Zhongyong” chapter of the Liji, were debated. Many Han texts adapted these motifs to make a related claim that the sage was adept at divination. Others maintained that these terms meant that the sage was different in kind from ordinary human beings. The second is implicit in the claim of the sage’s transtemporal nature. The Mengzi’s theory of the periodic rise of the sage argues that because tian favors the sage, it periodically causes a sage to take control of the world. This claim is explicitly criticized in some Han texts such as Yang Xiong’s Fayan, while being taken up and developed in non-Ru texts. Given that the Wuxing contains the basic grounding of these ideas, it could well be that the social and economic transformation of the Ru negatively affected its chances for transmission. This is not to say that all notions of the sage disappeared. Indeed, a particular claim about the sage’s predictive abilities in Han divination texts is based on earlier understandings of the sage’s ability to read of affective dispositions (qing શ) as signs of the potential for future events. In the discussion of the late Warring States meaning of the sage in chapter four, this claim was explored through the texts Xing zi ming chu (the Shanghai Museum slip version of which is called Xingqing lun) and Lüshi chunqiu. The early Han text Hanshi waizhuan also argues the sage is able to penetrate qing in such a way as to gauge probabilities and so have: ζ ‫ ڈ‬ၱ ၰ ˃ ֻ “foreknowledge of the beginnings of disaster and good fortune.”64 The mechanisms behind such an aptitude are spelled out with precision by Xun Yue ৖࣬ (148209 C.E.) in the “Zayan, xia” ᕺԵʓ (Miscellaneous theories, part 2) chapter of his second century C.E. Shen Jian Ό ᜌ (Extended Reflections): Ϧ౱‫ڣ֊˃ ׷ ږ‬ʛ ࿧Գ‫ ݭ ͙ؠ‬ᎂ˃શၒ “Likes and dislikes are what the nature picks up or rejects. Their substance is manifested externally, and so they are called ‘affective dispositions.’”65 The way one interacts with one’s environment at a particular moment, including one’s emotional reactions to daily situations, was in this way thought to be a bell-weather for the course of such interactions over one’s lifetime. A sage who was specially attuned to the subtle signs that illuminate these interactions was then able to have an understanding of what the future might hold for a particular person. A development of the link between seeing qing and predictive ability is most marked in texts associated with the Changes. The Xici ᗓᘂ commentary to the Changes argues that the natural patterns of the qing 64 65

Hanshi waizhuan kaozheng (7.6) 371-5 (cf. Hightower 1952, 229). Shen Jian 5.26-7 (cf. Ch’en Ch’i-yün 1980, 191).

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of the myriad things influence the casting of milfoil stalks. The Xici explains how in the distant past Fu Xi Ϊᚧ was able to construct the eight trigrams and in so doing communicate with the “spirit inspectors” of tian, and categorize the myriad things on the earth: ͅ‫̸ږ‬ᚧ̏˃̙˭ʓʛ ή۱ᝳඐ‫ࡢ ˭ؠ‬۱ᝳٗ‫ؠ‬ϙ ᝳ఍ᖿ˃́ Ⴉϙ˃‫֊ڻ ׈‬ቂԽ ხ֊ቂ‫ֻݵؠ ٵ‬ѕʉֆ ̣௢আ‫˃ا‬ᅭ ̣ᘝ ໗‫˃ٵ‬શ In the past, the rule of Bao Xi [i.e., Fu Xi] over the people of the world [was as follows]: looking up he observed the simulacra in the heavens, looking down he observed the models of the earth. He observed the patterns on the birds and beasts, and gave himself to what was appropriate for the earth. What was near him he fastened to his own body, and what was distant he fastened to external things. Thereupon he began to make the eight trigrams in order to communicate the virtue of the spirit luminances, and to categorize the affective dispositions of the myriad things.66

The development of the system of divination placed the sage at the intersection between the heavens and the earth, a position from which the sage was able to predict the future based on qing using the system devised by Fu Xi. The same understanding of the privileged place of the sage in the cosmos is found in the Tuanzhuan ᬃ ෭ (Commentary on the judgments) ancillary to the Changes, a text which has been estimated to have been written in the period from the fifth century to the second century B.C.E. In its explanation of four different hexagrams (31 xian ‫܀‬, 32 heng ‫ݔ‬, 34 dazhuang ʨҚ, and 45 cui ൚), the commentary invokes the ability of the sage to observe the world in such a way that the qing of the world becomes visible to him. In the case of heng: ̅̇દ˭Щ঻ʙຖ ͗इ᜵ˢЩ঻ʙϾ ໶ʆʙ‫ؠ‬մལЩ˭ʓˢϾ ᝳմ‫ ݔ׿‬Щ˭ϙ໗‫˃ٵ‬શ̈́Գԡ The sun and moon attained the heavens and so are long able to illuminate. The four seasons change and so are long able to complete. The sage is long on the Way, and when the things of the world transform and complete, he can observe what it is that is constant about them, and the qing of the heavens, the earth, and the myriad creatures all become visible.67

66 67

Zhouyi zhengyi 8.4b, Deng Qiubo 1987, 436. Hexagram 32, Zhouyi zhengyi 4.5a-b.

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Dispositions of situations are in this sense like the affective dispositions of individuals. Both senses of qing are apparent to the sage who is able to mask out the organic changes inherent in the cosmos to understand and project into the future the propensities of a person or thing.68 The model used here is one in which the qi of the sage, like any external stimulus, interacts with the qing of people in such a way as to allow the sage to observe and evaluate the interaction between human nature and external stimuli, and then to transform people. The model explains how a sage can transform the people of a state through the effect of qi, and also how a sage is able to “sound out” others to determine their potential in the future. These divination texts argue that the sage has special access to predictive knowledge of a divinatory kind. The sage’s ability to penetrate the affective dispositions of others allows them, in the same way that Yao did with Shun, to correctly evaluate their potential. This limited power may be contrasted with the idea that the sage has foreknowledge of the future based on a special relationship with tian, a claim explicitly made in some Han texts outside the Ru tradition. This latter claim was directly criticized in some Han Ru texts. The Eastern Han writer Yang Xiong criticizes the idea that the sage is able to “divine” tian: ‫׻‬੕ ໶ʆ̀˭̢ ̆ ̀˭ϙ ࠜЏ ۱͑ʛщ୙ ̆ ̣͑˭̀ʆ ໶ʆ̣ʆ̀˭ Someone asked: “Does the sage divine tian?” [Yang Xiong] answered: 68

In the case of the hexagram xian, which is explained as gan ี “to stimulate,” the meaning of the hexagram is explained in terms of a mutual stimulus and response: ʅमีᏻ̣ߟႩ “Two kinds of qi stimulate and respond as they associate with each other”. On the level of people, ໶ʆีʆ˻ “the sage stimulates the minds of others,” perhaps also via the medium of qi. This allows the sage to ᝳմ‫ ี׿‬Щ˭ϙ໗‫˃ٵ‬શ ̈́Գԡ “observe what it is they have stimulated [in the minds of others], and the qing of the heavens, the earth, and the myriad creatures all become visible.” See Hexagram 31, Zhouyi zhengyi 4.2a. While texts that treated the Changes had the most developed accounts of the sage’s abilities to read affective dispositions, Changes divination was not the only method that the sage could use to do so. The Hanshu treatise on Lüli ݆ዲ “Pitchpipes and Calendrics” makes a similar point about those two techniques: ‫ݭ‬ఀ෍ ˃‫ݯ‬ˢ ໗‫˃ٵ‬உֻ ‫ݰ‬ᘝआ‫݆ؠ‬ѻ ʑ໩ገ̅Հ Щ᜵ˢ˃શ̈́Գԡ “Therefore, change disseminated by yin and yang, the beginnings and endings of the myriad creatures, are all categorized and ordered through the pitches of the [twelve] pitchpipes and are also recorded with reference to the sun and asterisms, and so the affective dispositions of changes may be seen.” The recording of previous astronomical phenomena and the monitoring of qi results in the ability to predict future changes in yin and yang and the myriad creatures (Hanshu 21a.965).

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“He divines tian and earth.” “If this is the case, then how is he different from the astronomer?” “The astronomer uses heaven to divine human beings, and the sage uses human beings to divine tian.”69

Yang’s comment undermines the notion that the sage can have special knowledge of tian. Yang almost seems to echo the observation in the Xunzi’s “Tianlun” that the sage alone is not interested in tian. Wang Chong makes an even stronger case against the sage’s exceptionality in the “Zhishi” chapter of the Lunheng. There, he writes: ˱ʪԳᔮໂั ‫݋‬ᅱ‫ޣ‬ཥ Ӫನࡾࡠ ዘʍʿࡣ ඟⳕࡼമ ЫΑ‫ۍ‬Љ ཥඁ˃‫ڈ ا‬ʆ‫׿‬ʿ‫ٶ˃ڈ‬ʛ ՟໶ʆཥඁხԳ ‫ޣ‬᛾ᆻႝ Ⴉ˭ϙሾ ႩਥআԵ ‫˭ڈ‬ʕϙʓ˃Ֆ ʂ̈́ᎂআЩζ‫ ڈ‬Ⴉʆք୙ ˑЫΑႝԳ Ⴉʆ೷Ѥ ቴՖໂ‫ ٵ‬Ⴉʆ೷୙ ࣔቖɾമၒ щ̣ᎂআЩքഽ Kongzi saw the smallest details, his reflections were penetrating, his ability and wisdom unequalled, his strength never waned, in these ways he excelled the average level. With respect to his ears and eyes, it was not the case that he was clear-sighted enough to see through things, or to know things that other people could not. If a sage could see through things or see great distances, hear through objects or minute sounds, talk with tian and earth, speak to demons and spirits, or know about matters above tian or below the earth, then he could be called a “spirit” and said to have foreknowledge, and different in kind from human beings. Now, his ears and eyes hear and see in the same way as other people, and he encounters affairs and sees things in the same way as other people. He is only a step above a worthy, so how can he be a “spirit” and so be different in kind?70

Wang Chong’s denial of Kongzi’s special sensory abilities and resultant claims to foreknowledge of events is clearly aimed at contemporaries who made such claims. Wang’s denial that sages are exceptional implicitly calls into question some of the basic claims made about the sage’s special connection to tian in the Wuxing and the Mengzi. In the Wuxing, the highest virtue of sagacity is implicitly a result of possessing tian’s qi, and in the Mengzi the sage is able to inspire worthies, appearing every five hundred years (albeit sometimes on the late side). While some Han writers condemned the notion of a special relationship between the sage and tian, this discourse continued in texts on the periphery of the court. 69

Fayan quanyi (8.13) 130. Lunheng jiaoshi 26.1096 (cf. Forke, v.2, 289). In a memorial to the throne, Zhang Heng ઠ፰ recalls a charlatan who claimed to be able to see through (tongshi ‫ޣ‬ඁ) a jade tablet (HouHanshu 59.1912). 70

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In the Western Han, the sage’s ability to communicate with tian is made most strongly in the Huainanzi, and from the end of the first century B.C.E. on, in the complex of texts associated with legitimation and succession including the Taipingjing, the Heshanggong commentary to the Laozi, and early “apocryphal texts.” The Huainanzi was written under the auspices of Liu An ᄸϯ (197-122 B.C.E.), the Prince of Huainan, and in many ways champions regionalist claims that indirectly challenge imperial authority. It lauds the sage’s gift of ζ‫ڈ‬ხԳ “foreknowledge and far-sightedness”.71 The “Taizu” chapter implies that reason for this ability is that the sage has possession of tian’s qi: ‫ݭ‬ʨʆ‫ ږ‬Ⴉ˭ϙϐᅭ ̅̇ϐ‫ ا‬ਥআϐ᝞ Ⴉ͗इϐ‫ۑ‬ ‫ݭ‬໶ʆᖩ˭म ‫ ˻˭ؗ‬੭ˀ҉֜ So “the Great Man shares virtue with tian and earth, shares brightness with the sun and moon, shares numinousness with the demons and spirits, and shares reliability with the four seasons.” Therefore the sage takes tian’s qi to his chest and embraces tian’s mind, grasps the center and holds to harmony.72

Whether Liu An saw himself as the next sage is unknown, but it is fairly well-established that he was executed as a rebel in 122 B.C.E. Griet Vankeerberghen’s recent study of Liu’s claim to moral authority shows him to have been a regional ruler who developed a cosmology that would support his political ambitions.73 The bestowal of authority by tian on the sage is taken up much more strongly in more explicitly anti-state writings. A century after the Huainanzi, the inspiration of tian was reviving the connection between the sage and rulership. The art of interpreting tianyi ˭ำ (tian’s intention) and the argument that the Han was due 71

Huainan honglie jijie 11.369. Huainanzi jiaoshi 20.2040. The quotation is from the Wenyan ́ Ե commentary to the qian ਦ hexagram of the Changes: ˮʨʆ‫ږ‬Ⴉ˭ϙϐմᅭ Ⴉ̅ ̇ϐմ‫ ا‬Ⴉ͗इϐմҺ Ⴉਥআϐմφ˛ “Now, the Great Man combines his virtue with tian and earth, his brightness with the sun and moon, his sequence with the four seasons, his good and bad fortune with the demons and spirits,” (Zhouyi zhengyi 1.20a). The Wenyan commentary to the kun ֪ hexagram goes further to assign the Great Man a role in an automatic punishment system similar to the one advocated by the followers of Mo Di (see chapter one), and by the Taipingjing. Chapter five reads: ‫˭؀‬Щइм ጻെ˃ࣁ ͫЉኜᅯ ጻʿെ˃ࣁ ͫЉኜ‫“ ޕ‬Endowed by tian he acts in a timely manner. Those families who have accumulated good will necessarily have an excess of bounties, those who have accumulated bad will necessarily have an excess of tragedies,” (Zhouyi zhengyi 1.26a). 73 Vankeerberghen 2001. 72

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for a renewal appears to have been developed by Gan Zhongke ΅‫̈́׫‬ during the reign of Emperor Cheng Ͼ (32-6 B.C.E.) Gan’s source of knowledge about dynastic succession was both the study of calendrics and divine revelation. According to Ban Gu, Gan Zhongke fabricated the Tianguan li ˭ ‫ ׇ‬ዲ (Calendar of the Officials of Tian) and Baoyuan taiping jing ̸˔˯ͦ໩ (Classic of Preserving the Essential and Great Peace). Gan claimed that these texts were revealed to him by the perfected “Master Red Essence” (Chijingzi Ժႅʪ), who had, in turn, received them from the “Emperor of tian” (Tiandi ˭ܹ).74 These texts implied that the Han had reached the end of its mandate, and was due to receive it again from tian.75 In 5 B.C.E., a “master of methods” (fangshi ̄ʦ) and former pupil of Gan Zhongke named Xia Heliang ࢬ඘ԯ told Emperor Ai that Emperor Cheng had lost the mandate, as evidenced by his lack of heirs. The good news was that according to the prophecies of Master Red Essence, the Han would “again receive the Mandate” and on this basis Emperor Ai changed his reign title from “Constructing Peace” (Jianping ܿͦ) to “Great Beginning” (Taichu ˯‫)ڶ‬.76 Although these reforms were short-lived, they illustrate the way that the spirit world was believed to have communicated about the nature of tian’s intentions. The notion of a utopian age of “Great Peace” that is the subject of Gan’s book also played an important role in claims to political legitimacy in the Eastern Han.77 74 Hanshu 75.3192. Since there is no internal evidence indicating the intended scope of the chapter titles, it is possible that the two titles Gan received are actually one longer title. Master Red Essence was already associated with immortality and techniques for transforming and “lightening” the body. Qing Xitai ෌Ꮧᵏ enumerates two important new features of Gan’s revelation: 1) It establishes the idea that Heaven’s intent may be conveyed through the spirit world of the perfected to the master of methods, and then may be translated into political authority; and 2) It sets a precedent for the direct intervention of the spirits in affairs of state, rather than simply passing on techniques that may be utilized by master of methodss (1988, v.1, 86-87). 75 Gan’s activities attracted the attention of Liu Xiang, who accused him of the crimes of making false claims about the demons and spirits, and of deluding the emperor and the masses. Gan died in prison, but his students found a more sympathetic reception from Emperor Cheng’s successor Ai ‫( ۼ‬r. 7-1 B.C.E.). 76 Hanshu 11.340, HouHanshu 1b.86. While the HouHanshu does not attribute Xia’s prediction, the Tang commentary of Li Xian attributes this to a text associated with Master Red Essence (HouHanshu 23.799, n. 6), the same source given in the Hanshu passage. The full title of the new reign period was Taichu yuanjiang ˯‫˔ڶ‬અ. 77 According to an 8 C.E. memorial by Wang Mang (Hanshu 99a.4094), Gan’s books were stored by Emperor Ai in the Orchid Terrace (Lantai ᚱႨ), and Michael Loewe has pointed out how well Gan’s ideas were suited to Wang Mang’s claims (Loewe 1974, 282). After the reign of Wang Mang, there is no reference to this exact title, but works with similar titles figure prominently. Prophecies about the renewal of the Han mandate were cited by the supporters of Emperor Guangwu to counter arguments by other contenders that the Liu clan had lost its mandate to rule

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The sage’s ability to understand the intention of tian is also present in the extant version of the Taipingjing.78 One of its sections called the Qu fuhua jue ̓ ि ൡ ோ (Charms for dispelling the empty and superficial) it makes this connection explicitly: ˭ϙ˃‫ۍ ׷‬໶ʆʿ঻ ጤሾ௢˭ำʛ “The natures of tian and earth are such that unless one is a sage, it is impossible in solitude to be told and understand tian’s intentions.”79 Most often, the Taipingjing portrays the sage as an (HouHanshu 23.798). Around 125 C.E., Gong Chong ࣃઉ presented Emperor Shun (r. 125-144 C.E.) with the copy of the Taiping qingling shu ˯ͦଡᄙए (Book of Clear Directions for Great Peace) a “spirit book” combining the discourse on natural categories with shamanistic sayings that his teacher Gan Ji ʸφ had received above the river near Quyang Springs (HouHanshu 20b.1081-1084). In 166 C.E., Xiang Kai ᒝ๥ presented his memorial on HuangLao and Buddha (Futu िઆ), criticizing Emperor Huan (146-168 C.E.) and mentioning the belief that Laozi left China and became Buddha. Xiang later re-presented the Taiping qingling shu to the Emperor (deCrespigny 1976). The term “great peace” was also central to the Yellow Turbans (Huangjin ෦ʷ), a.k.a. Great Peace (Taiping ˯ͦ) movement under the leadership of Zhang Jue ઠԴ in eastern China at the time of the renewal of the sexagenary cycle in 184 C.E. Fan Ye ࠖድ (398-445) connects this movement with Gong Chong’s edition of the text (HouHanshu 20b.1084). 78 The relationship between the Han dynasty “Great Peace” texts–Gan Zhongke’s Baoyuan taiping jing revealed by Master Red Essence in the waning years of the Western Han, Gan Ji’s Taiping qingling shu revealed at Quyang springs prior to 125 C.E., and Gong Chong’s version of the latter text used several decades later by Xiang Kai and Zhang Jue–is unclear. The same may be said for the authenticity of various parts of their descendant text, Wang Ming’s ̙‫ ا‬Taipingjing hejiao ˯ͦ໩ϐओ (Cumulative Compilation of the Classic of Great Peace). Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that aspects of the early imperial “Great Peace” texts are preserved in contemporary compilations of the Taipingjing. The little information about the content of the Han texts comes from the context of their use and brief descriptions offered in the HouHanshu: Gan Ji’s text was in the tradition of yinyang and wuxing writings and contained many miscellaneous sayings of shamans; and Gong Chong’s version taught people to revere tian and Earth and take the wuxing as their basis, and contained methods for promoting the state and ᅩฆ “broadening the succession” (HouHanshu 30b.1080-4). These descriptors apply well to sections of the extant Taipingjing hejiao. Regardless of the ultimate origin of the text, many historians have concluded that while fragments of the Taipingjing only exist in what are likely Tang Dynasty reformulations preserved in the Ming version of the Daoist Canon (Daozang ལᕅ), many of these fragments date back to the Han. In his Zhongguo Daojiao shi ˀ੢ལ૥͑ (History of Chinese Daoism), Qing Xitai comes to this conclusion: “[The Taipingjing] is not the work of a single person, nor was it written at a particular time, but gradually developed over the long period from the end of the Western Han through the reign of Emperor Shun [125-144 C.E.] in the Eastern Han.” (1988, 91). 79 Taipingjing hejiao (50) 174-6, Taipingjing quanshi 358. A separately transmitted work called the Taipingjing Shengjun mizhi ˯ͦ໩໶ѼঐЄ (Secret pointers of the Sage Lord of the Classic of Great Peace) explains one of the many functions of the practice of “guarding the one”: ϭɾ˃ٗ ζ‫˭ڈ‬ำ “with the method of guarding the one [comes] foreknowledge of tian’s intentions” (Taipingjing hejiao 743). The practice of shouyi in the Taipingjing is related to dietetics, and to consuming qi (Taipingjing quanshi 90 and 450). For the evolution of shouyi in later Daoism, see Robinet 1993, 120-38 and Schipper 1993, 130-59.

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intermediary or official of tian, who is, in effect, acting in the world on behalf of tian. The clearest expression of this view of the sage in the Taipingjing is the Dasheng shangzhang jue ʨ໶ʕఈோ (Charms that the Great Sage Exhibits Above), where the sage’s ability to evaluate people is linked to their treatment of people by the tianjun ˭Ѽ (Lord of tian). The very first section of that text explains that the sage’s perception is a result of the production of an illuminating light activated by the qi the sage receives from tian: ાֻʨ໶ᅭ˃ʆ ʂ‫˔؀‬मб೸ႅγߟีੂ ʂ޴ʨ໶ ય‫ڈ‬ະ‫ ݯ׿‬ცϨ˭ำ ʿ͛մ˔म˃ӆ Only when a person starts with much sagely virtue will the primal qi they receive and their natural essence’s brightness mutually stimulate each other, making the person into a great sage. In everything, [the great sage] understands what it is they should do, and thereby follows tian’s intention, never losing the will of the primal qi.80

The sage’s relation to tian in the Dasheng shangzhang jue, despite differences in context, is not so very different from the Wuxing. The primal qi received from tian by an already virtuous person is what causes them to become a “great sage.” The ability of the sage to evaluate people, which in this text is a matter of knowing if they have been good or bad, is a function of their jingguang ႅγ, which Long Hui Ꮭ࣪ describes as “the brightness of the insight of their mental understanding,”81 but which literally is the “brightness of their essence,” which is what early physiognomists knew was most pure in the eye. In the latter reading, the filament in the eye gives off light, similar to the extramission optical theories developed in Europe by Euclid and Ptolemy.82 Finally, with tian’s qi, just as the Mengzi’s sage is able to de zhi દӆ “attain will,” the great sage of the Taipingjing does not lose the yuanqi zhi zhi ˔म˃ӆ “will of the primal qi.” The similarities between the model of the sage in the Wuxing and the one in these Taipingjing texts does not necessarily mean that Daoists were the true heirs of the Zisi and Mengzi tradition, but it certainly does provide an illustration of why the earlier model might have been seen as subversive or threatening to established powers in the Han. Another text in which a similar aspect of the sage is developed is in the Heshanggong ّʕ˙ commentary to the Laozi, a work that likely 80 81 82

Taipingjing hejiao (111) 544-6, Taipingjing quanshi 1072-4. Taipingjing quanshi 1074, n.1. Lindberg 1983, I, 340 and II, 471-4.

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dates to the late second through fourth centuries C.E. There, the idea of du jian zhi ming ጤԳ˃‫“ ا‬clear-sightedness from seeing in solitude” is invoked in three ways, in the explanation of chapters 4, 52, 56, and 58. Chapter 52 of the Laozi incorporates a short definition of ming ‫ا‬, (“clarity” or, as a quality in the Wuxing, “clear-sightedness”). The brief definition Գʮ̆‫“ ا‬seeing the small is called clear-sightedness”, is explained in the Heshanggong tradition: ൧‫ ا͵ڨ‬ၱ෩͵Գ޴ʮ ຖ ೸ጤԳ޴‫“ ا‬When the sprouts of something are not yet clear, and disaster and chaos cannot yet be seen, this is called ‘the small’. To have unique sight in an illuminating manner is called ‘clear-sighted’.”83 The words “illuminating manner” may literally mean one shines light on it, and the commentary appears to say that one’s concentration has the effect of allowing one to see the sprouts of an event before it has yet been set into motion. Again, these texts could well be employing the idea of unique seeing (“in solitude”) according to an extramission optical theory, with du ጤ “solitude” meaning something like “without the assistance of the media” that allow ordinary sense perception. The idea of “shining one’s light” is then perhaps not a metaphor but a literal understanding of another term from the Laozi: guang γ “brightness.” In the context of vision, brightness seems to be understood by the Heshanggong tradition to refer to the sage’s ability to illuminate things with his eyes, in the same way that the Dasheng shangzhang jue argues that essential qi from tian can activate one’s natural essence’s brightness. When chapter 52 of the Laozi uses the phrase ·մγ “use one’s brightness”, the Heshanggong commentary explains that the brightness is a function of the eye: ·մΑγ‫ ͙ؠ‬ඁइ̛˃Ѧࣀ “Use one’s eyes to brighten what is outside onself, and look at the benefits and harms of the current age.”84 Other passages explain this brightness as a result of the sage’s “clear-sightedness from seeing in solitude” (du jian zhi ming). This point is made in the commentary to chapters 4 and 56, but most clearly in that to chapter 58 of the Laozi. The main text reads: γЩʿᔄ “bright but not glaring”, and the Heshanggong tradition commentary reads: ໶ʆᓛЉጤԳ˃‫ ا‬ະϨ ⻔‫ ݴ‬ʿ̣ᔄ෩ʆʛ “Although the sage has clear-sightedness from seeing in solitude, it should be as if dark and hidden, and not disrupt others with its glare.”85 These references show how early Daoist texts 83

Laozi Daodejing Heshanggong zhangju 200. Laozi Daodejing Heshanggong zhangju 200. 85 Laozi Daodejing Heshanggong zhangju 227. In chapters 4 and 56, the Laozi phrase he qi guang ֜մγ (“harmonize one’s brightness”) is explained in similar ways. In chapter 4, the Heshanggong commentary reads: ԵᓛЉጤԳ˃‫ ا‬ະϨ⻔‫ݴ‬ 84

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incorporated some of the characteristics of the sage first seen in the Wuxing, which coined the expression “attend to one’s solitude” in conjunction with a description of exceptional sight and hearing. One final category of texts closely associated with political authority during the Han were the prophetic collecteana of the “apocrypha” (chenwei ᝘ሁ). These are actually a combination of two types of work: “charts and proofs” or prophecy texts (tuchen ࿌᝘) and “weft books” or texts ancilliary to the classics (weishu ሁए). Yasui Kôzan 安居香山 has described the earliest “weft books” as founded on the idea of the unity of tian and humankind, together with a combination of natural cycles theory (i.e., categories like yin and yang or the five phases), omenology, astrology, and spirit and transcendents thought.86 In a similar vein, Liu Zehua ᄸጎൡ has argued that the apocrypha unify the human realm with the world of the spirits, and with that of tian. By this, Liu means that the terminologies that had been applied in the context of the discussions of sagehood and governance, astronomy and omens, and myth and divinity are mixed together without any attempt to make them adhere to logical principles of consistency.87 This is a continuation of the Han synthetic impulse seen above to dominate the writings of Jia Yi. The apocrypha signal a change in the way that legitimacy was debated in the early empire. As the Western Han fell apart in the waning decades of the first century B.C.E., and a general named Wang Mang ̙஧ established the brief Xin ๘ Dynasty (9-23 C.E.), there was a string of auspicious omens that stressed the color yellow and the phase earth, dovetailing with Wang’s claim of descent from the Yellow Emperor.88 His claim was based on the widely shared assumption that the ruling Liu clan of the Western Han, in common with their putative kinsman the sage-king Yao, was associated with the virtue of fire (huode ̑ᅭ). When Wang Mang identified himself with the Yellow ʿະ̣ᔄ෩ʆʛ “This says that even if one has clear-sightedness from seeing in solitude, it should be as if dark and hidden, and should not disrupt others with its glare.” In chapter 56, the commentary reads: ᓛЉጤԳ˃‫ ا‬ະ֜˃՟⻔‫ ݴ‬ʿ՟ᔄ ෩ʆʛ “Even if one has clear-sightedness from seeing in solitude, it should be harmonized to cause it to be dark and hidden, and not cause glare that disrupts others.” See Laozi Daodejing Heshanggong zhangju 14 and 217. A contemporary example of eyes that shine light are those of the cat in Miyazaki’s 宮崎 “Tonari no Totoro” とな りのトトロ. 86 Yasui Kôzan 1987, 46. 87 Liu Zehua 1993, 36-7. Liu demonstrates that the apocrypha present no consistent cosmogony, yet exhibit some similarities such as the “enumeration of the universe.” 88 Hans Bielenstein 1984, 231.

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Emperor and the virtue of earth (tude ʥᅭ), it was because he was arguing that it was time for the phase of fire to give way to the element of earth. It is particularly significant that Wang Mang rested this identification on genealogical claims, and in this sense was basing it on biology rather than morality. The rise of the authoritative nature of omen and prophecy led to the idea that legitimacy was not so much a function of characteristics of a particular person (e.g., the cultivation of virtues in the crown prince), but rather grew out of the identity of that person (e.g., the fact that a person has a certain family name or symbolically significant markings). While the dynamics of identity in the Eastern Han were complex, involving criteria such as divine descent, bodily signs, and the fulfillment of prophecy, the emphasis shifted to such “fingerprint” issues rather than evidence of virtue through ritual mastery. This does not mean that the inner virtues of the ruler ceased to be meaningful, but rather that their role in political legitimation became more clearly subordinate to genealogy. During the power struggles of the 20’s C.E. that led to the “restoration” of the Han dynasty, such apocryphal texts were used by of the faction of Liu Xiu ᄸԣ (Emperor Guangwu γ‫ن‬, r. 25-57 C.E.) for political legitimation. The late Western Han notion of the end (and subsequent renewal) of the Han mandate was recycled by Liu Xiu as he sought to legitimate his own conquest of China following the reign of Wang Mang. Liu Xiu’s first clear use of prophecy was in 22 C.E., when early supporters cited charts and prophecy texts indicating that the Liu clan would rise again and the Li clan would assist them.89 In 25 C.E., while he was wrestling with the issue of whether to declare himself emperor, Liu Xiu was presented with a text called the Chifufu ԺΪ୷ (Red Hidden Talisman), which said he would ചѡࣵʿལ “send out troops to capture those without the Way,” told of clouds in the border regions that resembled dragons fighting in the field, and predicted that fire would rule ͗ʁ˃ᄑ “once four sevens have been reached.”90 While the reference of the four sevens is ambiguous, the omenological symbolism of the clouds clearly implied the arrival of a sage.91 Shortly

89 HouHanshu 1a.2, 15.573. The latter was probably the original reference, since it is part of the biography of Li Tong Ө௢. 90 HouHanshu 1a.21, 15.573, treatise 7.3158, treatise 7.3165. 91 Li Xian offers the explanation that “four sevens” makes 28, which matches the 228 years since the founding of the western Han (HouHanshu 1a.22, n.3). The dragon imagery is clarified by a recently excavated text from Mawangdui. The image of the dragon in the field occurs in the Xiang ඐ, an ancillary text to the classic Changes, that comments on the hexagram kun ֪: “When dragons do battle in the fields, their blood

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afterwards, Liu Xiu declared himself emperor, and continued to resort to such texts as he consolidated power over the next decade. In contrast to earlier rulers whose mastery over sacrificial and ritual practices gave them authority, in the wake of the chaotic warfare at the end of the Xin Dynasty, Emperor Guangwu’s legitimation was largely grounded in prophetic authority, an authority in part tied to the figure of Kongzi. His claims to connections with emperors of the Western Han,92 and emphasis on the lineal descent of Kongzi93 were parts of his claim to authority. This authority was not predicated on a mastery of the virtues outlined by Kongzi, but rather on Guangwu’s identity as the member of the clan that Kongzi had prophecized would have the ability to properly understand and use his esoteric message. The growing dominance of claims of special access to esoteric messages and their eclipse of the virtue discourse in the context of legitimation may be seen in the growing influence of the literature of the apocrypha in the Eastern Han. In this environment, visible correlates of virtue were less important as a proof of morality than as evidence of the ruler’s special link with tian. For example, the spatial correlations incipient in Jia Yi’s memorial about the studies of the five directions in the Western Han were developed more systematically in the apocrypha. One weft text auxiliary to the classic Changes associates East with benevolence, South with ritual propriety, West with righteousness, North with trustworthiness, and the Center with wisdom. As opposed to Jia Yi’s scheme, the associations are not constructed in the service of outlining a process of cultivating morality, but are instead elements in a natural history of the ancient sages’ discovery of the incipient patterns that allowed them to accord with the Way. This text, the Qiankun zuodu ਦ ֪តܾ (Authentic Measure of the Qian and Kun trigrams) goes on the give Kongzi’s (or pseudo-Kongzi’s) explanation of the rationale behind its schematization of the virtues: ‫ݭ‬ལ፞‫ ˋؠ‬Θ‫ؠ‬ᔩ ୎‫ؠ‬໳ ‫ ۑؠ׆‬Ͼ‫ؠ‬ನ ˉ‫ږ‬ལᅭ˃˜ ˭ʆ˃ ᄑʛ ໶ʆ˃‫̣׿‬௢˭ำ ୎ʆࡼ Щ‫ا‬вལʛ is black and yellow.” (Zhouyi zhengyi 1.6, p. 18). For more context with respect to this image in the Changes, see Shaughnessy (1996, 171). 92 Guangwu recreated the sacrificial buildings and rituals first used by Emperor Wu of the Western Han in an attempt to emulate the Yellow Emperor and insure a postmortem apotheosis. See HouHanshu treatise 7.3163. 93 In 56 C.E., Guangwu had a stone inscription carved quoting six prophetic texts that supported his rule, along with allusions to both the writings of Kongzi and to Kongzi’s living descendant. HouHanshu treatise 7.3165-66.

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Therefore, the Way is brought up by benevolence, established through ritual propriety, given its pattern from righteousness, fixed with trustworthiness, and brought to completion with wisdom. These five are the means by which Way and virtue are distinguished, and by which tian and humanity are divided. They are the means by which sages comprehend tian’s intentions, pattern human relationships, and understand the ultimate Way.94

The link between the five virtues of the ancient sages and the binary system based on yinyang dualism that underlies the divination system they established is that both are to some extent incipient in tian. The reason that the Way could be nourished and brought to completion is the presence of the five virtues in the sages. The apocrypha are in some ways the culmination (or nadir) of the development of the “Zisi and Mengzi” material virtue theory, where the presence of external signs became more important as a sign of tian’s endorsement than as evidence of internal transformation. The imperial system attempted to sever the direct link between moral authority and the sanction of tian’s mandate (ming), substituting a standard of biological heredity that privileged the claims of the ruling family. In particular, the imperial court could not have been sanguine about the theory that tian’s ming was evidenced by popular support, a notion grounded in the narratives of the Documents and championed in the Mengzi.95 Sarah Allan explains that the notion that the virtue of a ruler was discernable in the approval of the people led to a notion of authority in which saw “all transfers of rule, both hereditary and nonhereditary, as equally valid manifestations of Heaven’s will or as determined by the allegiance of the people.”96 Such a view of tianming challenged the institution of hereditary transfer of power. In this and other ways, the legacy of the Zhou dynasty was not always compatible with the structures of authority under the early empire. In the apocrypha and in writings associated with Han Daoism, the label of the sage was deployed in a way that was potentially threatening 94

Yasui Kôzan and Nakamura Shôhachi 1994, 10. This quotation is found in Taiping yulan 76.1a-b. A fragment of a related text lists the five virtues of the Wuxing rather than the wuchang, see Yasui Kozan and Nakamura Shôhachi 1994, 119. 95 To take one example, Mengzi 5A5 explains how tian’s ming was evidenced when the sage king Yao presented his non-hereditary successor Shun to the people, and they effectively ratified his choice. It then approvingly quotes the “Taishi” ˯ზ (Great Vow) chapter of the Documents: ˭ඁбӍͺඁ ˭᛾бӍͺ᛾ “Tian sees through what my people see, tian listens through what my people hear,” Mengzi zhengyi 19.643-6. For a more detailed analysis of this passage, see Liu Zehua 1996, 18. 96 Sarah Allan 1981, 31.

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to state authority. Many of the characteristics of the sage’s connection to tian in these writings were the same as in the Wuxing and the Mengzi. While these texts had a clear influence on other writers working in the first century of the Han, signs of that influence quickly begin to wane. There are also some subtle indications that the notion of the sage was perceived as dangerous. For example, when the office of Erudite was brought under stricter control in 136 B.C.E., it was no longer possible to be a government-sponsored expert in the Mengzi, something it had been possible to do under Emperor Wen.97 Mengzi 4B1 (“Shun was from the Eastern Yi nation, and King Wen was from the Western Yi nation. Despite the fact they lived in different places and ages, they were able to attain their wills in the Central States as if they were fitting together two halves of a tally”) became the target of at least one Han Ru writer. Yang Xiong, in the “Wubai” chapter of his Fayan, attacks the Mengzi’s theory of the five hundred year sage: ‫׻‬੕ ˉР๶Щ໶ʆ̳ Љቂ ̆ ూ ൘ ߮ ѼаʛЩՓ ́ ‫̓ ˙֟ ن‬ʪʛЩள ೢ ЩΆ ϕ‫̣צ‬૕գ ᓛʢɾʿ̈́‫ڈ‬ʛ Someone asked: “People say that a sage will appear after five hundred years, is this true?” [Yang Xiong] answered: “Yao, Shun, and Yu were related to each other as rulers and ministers, and arose together. Wen, Wu, the Duke of Zhou, and Kongzi were related to each other as fathers and sons, and lived in the same place. [The time until] Tang, and [until] Kongzi, shows that after several hundred years a sage appeared. To predict future events from those in the past, it is impossible to know whether a sage will appear in a thousand years or will appear in one year.”98

Yang’s response not only rebuts the five hundred year theory, it appears specifically constructed to rebut the argument about the sages in Mengzi 4B1. There, the Mengzi makes the point that the sages Shun and King Wen lived in different places and ages, showing how sages came from radically different places but could all open the door to ruling the Central States. Yang looks at the set of sages who lived in the same age asShun, and points out that sages can live in successive generations. Then he looks at the set of sages who lived where King Wen lived, and points out that sages can live in the same place. It is not hard to read between the lines and see how this rebuttal is geared towards legitimating the rule of a family whose successive generations live in 97 98

Qian Mu 1983, 180. Fayan quanyi (8.1) 127.

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CHAPTER FIVE

the same place. While the Mengzi was still circulated and quoted in the Han, its influence was not nearly as great as it would be in later dynasties. In the Hanshu, when Ni Kuan հᅛ (d. 103 B.C.E.) uses the phrase jin sheng er yu zhen zhi (“the metal bell sounding and the jade stone vibrating it”), it is used to describe the Son of Heaven in a flattering way. After quoting that phrase from the Wuxing and Mengzi, Ni Kuan concludes that the emperor will be able to: ̣ොϾ˭ᅯ ‫ܒ‬໗ ̛˃੪ “thereby follow and complete tian’s celebration, and create a foundation for ten thousand generations.”99 Ni Kuan is not extolling the influence of the transtemporal sage, but instead sycophantically applying the phrase to flatter the current emperor. There are no specific references to the Wuxing, or direct quotations of it, in extant Han texts after the time of Liu Xiang at the end of the first century B.C.E. While arguments from absence are difficult, the Wuxing’s status is perhaps best reflected in the broader change from the five virtues of the wuxing to the wuchang, and the systematic replacement of the virtue of sagacity by trustworthiness. Indeed, that change perhaps speaks more to the changes the Ru underwent in the Han than any other. The popularity of the Wuxing in the Warring States period, and its brief period of influence followed by its disappearance in the middle of the Han dynasty, are perhaps explicable in terms of the reception of its theory of the connection between the sage and tian. Nevertheless, the Mawangdui commentary to the Wuxing, the adaptation of the text to a new system of correspondences by Jia Yi, and the appearance of its model of the sage in later texts, especially those (in Mark Edward Lewis’s phrase) “writing against the state,” testify to the influence the text continued to have in early imperial China.

99

Hanshu 58.2631.

CONCLUSION ʨέ‫˃̙́ ږ‬͹ ᆄέ̏ˀʩʛ ̙ׄੱ޴ϥ ʨέ˃‫ ׷‬ၷɾ༻ப ાᅭ˃м ˪մЉࢷ Αʿඁ౱и Ыʿ᛾଱ᑵ ʤʿ̳ૣԵ ঻̣ࠏ૥ Tairen was the mother of King Wen. She was the second daughter of the Ren clan of the state of Zhi, and King Ji took her as his wife. Tairen’s nature was upright and sincere, and her actions were only virtuous. During her pregnancy, her eyes did not look at those with bad countenances, her ears did not hear those who made licentious noises, and she did not speak proud words. In this way she was able to carry out fetal education. - Lienü zhuan1

The discussion of material virtue is a useful point of entry for understanding why ritual plays such a major role in Chinese ethics. In religious studies, most attention has been paid to the social dimensions of ritual that were first accentuated in the work of Émile Durkheim (1858-1917).2 The claims of the material virtue tradition, however, center on the impact of ritual on the body of the individual participant and on ritual’s role in self-cultivation practice.3 Indeed, Kongzi’s imperative to his disciples about the central role of li (ritual) in moral self-cultivation, quoted at the beginning of chapter one of this book and found in Analects 12.1, is one of the more ominous parts of the text. In the above epigram from the Han dynasty Lienü zhuan, Kongzi’s words are paraphrased as advice for expectant mothers. This shows how behaving in accord with ritual was seen as both good advice for 1

Translation modified from Albert O’Hara 1945, 23. The centrality of ritual in early Chinese ethics has been wthe subject of important work by Herbert Fingarette and Robert Campany. For Fingarette, rite is an utterance, but one which is simply an abbreviation for a whole system of “belief.” He writes that: “Confucius. . . Calls our attention to the entire body of tradition and convention, and he calls upon us to see all this by means of metaphor, through the imagery of sacred ceremony, holy rite” (1972, 7). Campany argues that the third century B.C.E. Confucian writer Xunzi was a theorist of ritual in the same way that Durkheim was. Campany goes on to draw a number of parallels between the two thinkers, concluding that in some respects they “theorized about [ritual] in similar ways and for similar purposes,” (1992, 198). 3 We have seen how in the Wuxing, a person who is truly cultivating the virtues in the inner mind is solitary, even among a crowd at a funeral. For Durkheim, by contrast, “mourning is not a natural movement of private feelings wounded by cruel loss; it is a duty imposed by the group,” (1915, 443) and the origin of the rite is social, not biological. 2

252

CONCLUSION

cultivating virtue and as a way to ensure the proper development of an unborn child. By the Han, ritual’s effect on the body had become so widely accepted that its impact was seen as automatic, an effective cultivation technique even for those in utero. When Jia Yi advocated taijiao ࠏ૥ (fetal education), the reason was that for the fetus, as with a human or potential human at any stage of development, exposure to ritual affected the body physically so as to bring about material changes with ethical import. The past few decades have witnessed increasing academic concern with the body, and the entry of notions of embodiment into discussions of philosophy and history.4 In this context, the material virtue tradition in early China is a valuable historical example and case study of a nuanced view of ethics and the body as two aspects of the same thing. Indeed, the sage with the “jade speech” of the Wuxing, a “glossiness,” and the telltale appearance of the “four limbs” of the Mengzi, fits well into Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930-2002) description of embodiment “turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, 5 walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking.” In this way it provides a 4

One of these tendencies, motivated in part by the theories of the mind emerging from cognitive science, is reflected in work like Lakoff and Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. This work sees itself as attacking what it portrays as fundamental philosophical assumptions that view the mind as independent of the body, such as the view that “reason is. . . independent of perception and bodily movement” (1999, 17). The phenomenological models of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the post-structuralist work of Michel Foucault, and the analysis of gender in the theory of Judith Butler all place the body front and center, and they have brought such concerns into the mainstream in a variety of diciplines (see, e.g., reviews of such influences on history by Carolyn Walker Bynum, 1995, and on anthropology by Thomas J. Csordas, 1999). 5 Bourdieu 1990, 69-70. The notion of “embodiment” as it arises in Bourdieu works well with the “material virtue” tradition in part because the latter is part of the theoretical prehistory of Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Bourdieu owes much to other influences (notably Merleau-Ponty), but in Choses dites (1987, translated as In Other Words, 1990) he acknowledges the direct influence of Mauss on his use of habitus. Talal Asad (1993) has noted the influence of Marcel Granet’s explanation of Taoist “bodily techniques” on Marcel Mauss, dating to their collaboration on L'Année Sociologique in the 1920’s. In 1926, Granet dedicated Danses et Légendes de la Chine Ancienne to his “friend Marcel Mauss.” In his 1934 essay “Les techniques du corps”—a text that prefigures Bourdieu in important ways—Mauss refers to his “friend Granet” who has pointed out Taoist “body techniques”, which, together with Indian yogic practices, influenced his analysis (1934, 22; 1979, 122). Granet’s notion of body techniques was based on Chinese examples such as that of the traditional prince from La civilisation chinoise: “The prince is fed upon essences. By extracting these essences from things at their proper times his diet is so regulated as to embody in him a collection of specific qualities, each suitable to a season, and each also indicative of an orientation,” (1929, 254). The use of Bourdieu’s idea of ritual developing a “cultivated disposition,” to talk about ritual constructing an environment that can impress

CONCLUSION

253

theory of embodied ethics that is both historically prior to and culturally distant from the rigid mind/body dualism against which so much of the current scholarly work is reacting.6 As the connections discussed in the last few chapters between the material virtue theory and canonical works like the Mengzi and Taipingjing make clear, the resultant theory of practice is at the core of many notions of ritual efficacy throughout Chinese history. The material virtue tradition, defined through the set of fourth through second century B.C.E. texts examined in this book, relates virtue to human physiology in a way that explains the effect of practice in terms of concrete physiological changes. A central assumption of its core texts is that authentic moral motivation corresponds to specific bodily states. As the tradition developed, the normative picture of a balance of the virtues was transformed into the imperative to maintain an equilibrium of qi of the virtues. In Mengzi 2A2, this level of perfection is likened to possessing a different type of qi altogether, the qi of tian. In the Warring States and Han periods, the moral ideal was further described as possessing a harmony of the virtues (“sagacity” for the Wuxing and “happiness” for Jia Yi). The connection between the sage and tian established in the Wuxing, and the extraordinary abilities that resulted from it, was behind the dispensational theories of the Mengzi, influenced Han dynasty Daoist texts, and may even have been the reason that the Wuxing disappeared two thousand years ago. This book’s preliminary attempt at historical contextualization of the Wuxing using received texts and biographies has argued for a rejection of a view of “Confucianism” as a univocal tradition or a disembodied philosophy. The notion of the infused virtue of sagacity, while developed in part to address specifically ethical concerns, influenced the development of both a dispensational theory of history and religious views of the sage as semi-divine. The Wuxing’s development of Ru virtue theory was at odds with the views of the writers of other works, such as the Xunzi, the Fayan, and the Lunheng. While the Wuxing was popular in the early third century B.C.E., it appears that it became increasingly controversial as the nature of the Ru changed in the early imperial period. Beyond revisions to the history of early Chinese thought, this account of material virtue theory engages more general issues of the hierarchies “upon the bodies of the participants,” (1992, 98-99) by Catherine Bell, a ritual theorist with expertise in China, brings things full circle. 6 The most authoritative discussions of this dualism in a comparative context is in the work of Nathan Sivin, see especially 1995a, 14-5.

254

CONCLUSION

relation between ethics and conceptions of the body. While the entire study has outlined an ethic that locates the virtues very much in the body, it also has attempted to address the question why this move is made, in other words, what were the factors that led to the naturalization of the virtue discourse in this period? In this work, I have made two rather different kinds of argument simultaneously. On one hand, I have outlined criticisms that arose specifically in the history of Chinese thought to which Ru virtue ethics had to respond. The development of the material virtue tradition at several points was also clearly facilitated by interactions with the burgeoning technical disciplines of medicine and physiognomy. These are local factors, which explain the changes as a result of particular historical dynamics. Indeed, specific challenges to the Ru tradition came from texts such as the Zhuangzi that in many ways have no direct analogy in early western virtue ethics. A more thorough study would reveal that the interaction between the Ru and their critics was not a discrete catalyst for Ru revision, but a continuous process. For example, the comment attributed to Kongzi’s sometime nemesis, sometime doppelganger, Robber Zhi ⌳ in chapter ten of the Zhuangzi reveals familiarity with and disdain for the Wuxing theory of the five kinds of action: ˮϣำ‫ܮ‬ˀ˃ᕅ ໶ʛ ʈζ ۲ʛ ̳݈ ໳ʛ ‫̈́ڈ‬Ѵ ‫ڈ‬ʛ ˜Ҕ ˋʛ ˉ‫ږ‬ʿ కЩ঻Ͼʨഞ‫˭ ږ‬ʓ͵˃Љʛ To know beforehand where things are stored in the house is sagacity. To enter ahead of others is courage. To be the last to leave is righteousness. To know whether or not it is a good idea is wisdom, and to divide the spoils is benevolence. No one has ever become a good thief if one is not prepared in these five ways.7

The view of the sage as thief, and the attendant techniques for attaining thiefhood, are strong proof that this is an early satire on the Wuxing text. Yet the connections between the duality of tian and ren examined in chapter three testify to the fact that many aspects of the material virtue theory drew on or developed against phenomena peculiar to late Warring States and early imperial China. These interactions led to both appropriation of non-Ru elements and the reform of Ru tradition to respond to the criticisms. 7 Zhuangzi jishi 10.346. Aside from the substitution of yong ۲ ”courage” for li “ritual propriety,” (which would also make sense in context) the five virtues are the same as the Wuxing.

CONCLUSION

255

On the other hand, I have also tried to show that there were philosophical reasons for trying to systematize the virtues in this way. First, against the accusation of hypocrisy, the material virtue theory posited the possibility that people were in a sense “morally transparent.” Second, the Ru virtue discourse was increasingly being attacked as leading to apparent quandaries, such as the Mengzi’s exigent situations that might require one to balance impulses arising from different virtues. The Wuxing’s proposal of what was in effect a “unity of the virtues” addressed this problem. The same issue, of course, was important in early Greece, as shown by Socrates’s question in Plato’s Protagoras about whether each of the five virtues has a different essence or whether they “stand for a single reality.” Indeed, even contemporary virtue ethicists such as Martha Nussbaum attempt to generalize local virtues across cultures and thereby rescue premodern virtue theories by grounding particular virtues in a more 8 universal version of human experience. Their recourse to physiological models is a strategy to overcome cultural distance. The developments outlined in this book are then also parallel to tendencies that are found in ethical systems outside of those of early China. Of course, the Wuxing is not alone in occupying a space at the intersection of the local and the universal. Its particular attempt to integrate “human” virtues grounded in qi, with sagacity, which preserves a role for the superlative, super-physiological aspects of the tradition is at once a unique solution that could only have come out of one time and place, and at the same time resonates more universally with solutions found elsewhere. For these reasons, the particulars of the early Chinese material virtue solution should be of great interest today, with the focus on embodiment, non-dualistic views of the mind, and the way practice inscribes values on the person (to say nothing of research into biological components of moral behavior and serotonin as the 8

Martha Nussbaum observes that Aristotle’s method in defining the virtues is “to isolate a sphere of human experience that figures in more or less any human life, and in which more or less any human being will have to make some choices rather than others, and act in some way rather than some other,” (1993, 245). This set of “grounding experiences” are the basis of Nussbaum’s portrayal of Aristotle’s virtues as potentially transcultural -- based on common features of the human experience such as mortality, the body, pleasure and pan, etc. Indeed, the common denominator of the body is increasingly the focus of those who are interested in finding absolutes across different cultures. The acceptance of the capacity for culture to color experience on a fundamental level is being answered by the argument that similar bodies will experience certain primitive states in similar ways, be they “pure consciousness events” that become a glyph for the cross-cultural mystical experience, or common sensory or environmental limitations on experience.

256

CONCLUSION

material basis for happiness). This raises interesting questions about the degree to which this episode in the past might be instructive in the present. In the Han, the Chinese material virtue tradition led to an emphasis on demeanor, on expression, and even on facial coloration while other texts linked it to physiognomy. Does the embodiment of moral qualities necessarily lead to the practice of evaluating people on as unreliable grounds as the judging of a book by its cover? Another facet of Han practice was the denial of certain sensory influences on the person (at all stages of development) and the ritualization of education. Was this a necessary outcome of a concrete link between practice and moral development? Finally, is a view of moral perfection that requires its ideal to undergo a physical transformation into a kind of metahuman a local or a universal aspect of this theory of material virtue? These are questions worth pondering as archaeology allows us to become familiar with an episode of the history of thought that is in some ways much like our own.

APPENDIX ONE

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI This appendix contains a translation of the 50 fragments collected by the Qing scholar Huang Yizhou ෦ ̣ ֟  (1828-1899), constituting chapter six of his Zisizi. 1 ˭֡˃ᎂ‫ ׷‬୊‫˃׷‬ᎂལ ஙལ˃ᎂ૥ What Nature has determined is called human nature. Following human nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called training.1 2 ˭ʓ˃௢ལˉ ‫̣׿‬м˃‫ږ‬ʒ In the world there are five comprehensive Ways, and three means by which to put them into action.2 3 ༶ ‫ؠ‬ጽʿʵ The Odes [says]: “Oh! How solemn and unending.”3 1 These lines are referenced in HouHanshu 43.1464 “Zhu Yue He liezhuan” Ќᆪ щλ෭ and attributed to Zhu Mu’s Ќጽ Laozi-inspired Chonghou lun ઉ۹ቈ. The Tang dynasty Li Xian Өቖ commentary attributes them to the Zisi. These lines are also at the beginning of received “Zhongyong” chapter of the Liji, and are similar to a line of the Guodian Xing zi ming chu ‫׷‬б̳֡ (Jingmenshi bowuguan 1988, 179) and Shanghai Xingqing lun ‫׷‬શቈ (Ma Chengyuan, et al. 2001, 222-3) ‫׷‬б̳֡ ֡ б˭ࡑ “human nature come out of ming, and ming comes down from tian.” 2 Shiji 112.2952 “Pingjin hou” ͦ‫ۓޠ‬. The Tang dynasty Sima Zhen ͌ਠ࠶ commentary attributes this to Zisizi, and notes that it appears in the then current “Zhongyong.” In the “Zhongyong” chapter of the Liji extant today, the five Ways are specified as the five relationships: ruler/subject, father/son, husband/wife, elder/younger brother, and the relationship between friends. The three means are wisdom, benevolence, and courage. The Liji passage concludes: ˭ʓ˃ཥᅭʛ ‫̣׿‬ м˃‫ږ‬ɾʛ “For those people who have attained virtue, there is a single means by which to put it into action.” See Liji zhengyi 52.18b-19a [cf. Chan 1963, 105]. 3 As with passage 1, the topic of this quotation (albeit allusively) is tianming ˭ ֡ “what Nature has determined.” The “Zhongyong” chapter of the Liji quotes the entire couplet from Odes (Mao 267 “Wei tian zhi ming” ા˭˃֡): ༶̆ ા˭˃֡ ‫ؠ‬ጽʿʵ. Waley translates this as “The Charge that Heaven gave/ Was solemn, was for ever,” (1937, 227), while Karlgren translates it as “The appointment of Heaven, oh, it is august and never-ending,” (1950a, 239). The Zheng Xuan ቷ΁ commentary quotes Meng Zhongzi ׂΫʪ as saying: “It magnifies indeed the boundlessness of what Nature has determined, and praises the ritual of the Zhou.” According to Kong Yingda’s ˱ጼཥ (574-648) Maoshi zhengyi ̎༶͸໳ subcommentary (19a.12a-b), Zheng’s Maoshipu ̎༶ᗯ identifies Meng Zhongzi as a younger relative of Meng Ke (i.e., Mengzi) who studied with Zisi and then later studied with Mengzi. The lost Shipu ༶ᗯ is attributed to Zheng Xuan, and versions have been reconstructed in the Tang

258

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

4 ψԵЩ‫ۑ‬۱‫ۑ‬ϚԵ‫ ۮ‬ψ̪Щм۱༻Ϛ̪͙ If one says the same thing (as another), but is trusted, then trust is something prior to words. If one gives the same orders (as another) but they are carried out, then sincerity is something outside of the orders themselves.4 5 Ѽʪʿ̣‫ॣږ঻׿‬ʆ ʿ̣ʆ˃ʿ঻‫ږ‬แʆ The gentleman neither uses what he can do to cause others distress, nor what others cannot do to shame them.5 6 ˭ʓЉལ ۱мЉ‫ط‬། ˭ʓ೷ལ ۱ᘂЉ‫ط‬། When the world possesses the Way then it is actions that have their branches and leaves. When the world does not possess the Way then it is words that have their branches and leaves.6 7æͺ̣Ѽ޴˻ Ѽ̣ͺ޴ᝂ ˻ப۱ᝂࡸ ˻ോ۱Խ๖ʛ The people take the ruler to be their mind; the ruler takes the people as the rest of his body. When the mind is solemn, then the rest of the

from Zheng’s commentary to the Odes, and then in the Qing by Hu Yuanyi ࠍ˔ᄭ, which is the version is today generally known as the Mao Shipu. 4 Huainanzi “Miucheng” ᑢ ၳ (10.156), Wenzi “Jingcheng” ႅ ༻ 2.13a, Zhonglun ˀቈ “Gui yan” ඙ᝀ (Zhonglun jiaozhu 5.68), Yilin ‫ ظأ‬1.2a, Taiping yulan 430.4a. Taiping yulan and Zhonglun read hua ˢ for xing м, along with Huainanzi, which also inserts the graph min ͺ “the people” in each conditional predicate: “the people will find this trustworthy,” and “the people will transform.” The translation could also read “If two people say the same thing and yet (only one) is trusted, then trust is something prior to words. . .” Huainanzi and Taiping yulan supplement this with: ໶ʆϚʕ ͺትϨˢ “When the sage is above them, the people change as if transformed,” where the connotation of hua is that of change that appears to not be the result of outside influence. 5 Yilin 1.2a attributes this to the Zisizi. This sentence is found in the extant “Biaoji,” chapter of the Liji where it is preceded by shi gu ‫( ݭݵ‬Liji zhengyi 54.9a). It follows a quotation of the “Master”: ʪ̆ ˋ˃ᘗϾʙԡ ાѼʪ঻˃ “The Master said: ‘Benevolence has long been difficult to achieve, only the Gentleman is able to do it.’” Legge numbers this as section 22 and translates: “the superior man does not distress men by requiring from them that which (only) he himself can do, nor put them to shame because of what they cannot do,” (1895, 336). 6 Taiping yulan 403.2b attributes this to Zisi (and reads yan Ե for ci ᘂ), and in the extant “Biaoji” chapter of the Liji it is preceded by gu ‫ݭ‬. In “Biaoji” it follows the phrase: ʪ̆ Ѽʪʿ̣ᘂၣʆ “The gentleman does not take words to fully show the man,” and is followed by shigu ‫ݭݵ‬, and several stories about the gentleman not discussing things that he cannot follow up on (e.g., when he cannot put a visitor up for the night, he does not ask him where he is staying). It concludes that ‫ݭ‬Ѽʪ˃૊Ϩ̐ ʮʆ˃૊Ϩᙻ “therefore the gentleman’s associations are like water, and the small man’s are like sweet wine,” and finally quotes the Odes (Mao 198 “Qiaoyan” ͢Ե).

APPENDIX ONE

259

body is cultivated; when the mind is serious, the entire body is respectful.7 7 The Li Shan Өെ (d. 689) commentary to Wang Bao’s ̙ሸ use of the same metaphor in “Sizi jiang de lun” ͗ʪᒤᅭቈ (Essay on the four masters’ discussion of virtue) in Wenxuan 51.12a attributes this to the Zisizi. A passage introduced by the words zi yue ʪ̆ in the “Ziyi” chapter of the Liji (Liji zhengyi 55.13b) contains these two sentences, which, for the purpose of analysis, I number as: (1) the statement of the metaphor, and (2) the first variation on the metaphor. Part (2) has several variants: shu ൗ for xiu ࡸ, rong ࣅ for shen Խ, and the omission of ye ʛ. As a result, part (2) in the received Liji version reads: ˻ப۱ᝂൗ ˻ോ۱ࣅ๖ “When the mind is solemn, then the rest of the body is at ease; when the mind is serious, the demeanor is respectful.” In the received “Ziyi” this is followed by two additional variations on the metaphor: (3) ˻Ϧ˃ Խͫϯ˃ ѼϦ˃ ͺͫ଒˃ “If the mind likes something, the entire body must secure it, and if the ruler likes something, the people must desire it,” and (4) ˻̣ᝂη Π̣ᝂ෱ Ѽ̣ͺϫ Π̣ͺʞ “The mind is the completion of the rest of the body, and suffers along with the rest of the body. The ruler is preserved with the people and is destroyed along with them.” The argument is then illustrated with two quotations: (5) several lines attributed to the Odes, and (6) several lines attributed to the “Junya” Ѽු, a chapter title from the Documents. Comparing these quotations to the extant versions of these classics, only the last three lines of part (5) are part of the transmitted Odes, in “Jie nanshan” ໢۷ʱ (Mao 191), contrasting the cuckoo with the gentleman: ઝͺ̣ Ά ቇ঻‫ ڍ‬੢Ͼ  ʿб ޴͸  ւడ Рּ  “The common people thrive along with him,/ Who can manage to make country flourish?/ If he is not himself upright,/ The common people will be drained.” (The first part of the received Odes quotation is translated below as selection 8). Quotation (6) reads: ࢬ̅ ಧ‫ ۋ‬ʮͺા̆‫ ݏ‬ཊ̱‫ ౖڌ‬ʮͺΠા̆‫“ ݏ‬On summer days when there is heat and rain, the little people only daily complain. In the deep cold of winter, the little people also only daily complain.” The received version of the Documents has a “Junya” Ѽ̖ chapter, widely thought to be spurious, but it does not contain this quotation. Two copies of the “Ziyi” have also been discovered archaeologically, and with respect to this section are very different from the received version of the Liji. Specifically, both the Guodian and Shanghai Museum versions of this section contain parts (1), (3), (4), the last three lines of (5) and all of (6). In other words, except for the part (1), introduced by “the Master said,” it is exactly those sections identified in the Tang as part of the Zisizi that seem to have been added to the “Ziyi” after the text was in circulation at the end of the fourth century B.C.E. (as reflected in the excavated versions of the “Ziyi”), but before the Liji version became fixed (somewhere in the first century B.C.E. to the first century C.E.) While part (1) is identical in the excavated versions of the “Ziyi,” there are significant differences in the other parallel passages. In part (3) the Guodian slips read: ˻Ϧ۱ᝂϯ˃ ѼϦ۱ͺ଒˃ “If the mind likes [something], then the rest of the body secures it, and if the ruler likes [something], then the people desire it.” In part (4): ‫̣˻ݭ‬ᝂٗ Ѽ̣ͺʞ “Therefore, the body takes the rest of the body as its model, and the ruler is destroyed along with them.” In part (5) the first couplet is incomplete: ቇ‫ڍ‬੢Ͼ ʿб޴࠶ ւడРּ “Who grasps the country and brings this about?/ If he does not make himself upright,/ The common people will be overworked.” In part (6) the text is difficult, but reads something like this: ̅๾‫ ۋ‬ʮͺા̆‫ ݏ‬ई̱পຌ ʮͺΠા̆‫“ ݏ‬If each day there are torrential rains, the little people only daily complain. In the deepest cold of entering into winter, the little people also only daily complain.” See Jingmenshi bowuguan 1988, 129. The Shanghai version generally is the same as the Guodian version (although there are several lacunae), but part six has the significant variant: ̅๾‫ ۋ‬ʮͺા̆֡ ई̱প ຌ ʮͺΠા̪̆ “If each day there are torrential rains, the little people only say it is fate. In the deepest cold of entering into winter, the little people also only say it is commanded.” See Ma Chengyuan, et al. 2001, 179-80.

260

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

8æ༶ˆ ‫آ‬ѳЉζ͸ մԵ‫̝ا‬ଡ ੢ࣁ̣࿤ ௲Ն̣Ͼ The Odes says: “In the past we had that former administrator, His words were clear and pure. The states and houses were pacified because of this, The cities and towns were completed because of this.”8 9æʮʆງ‫ ̐ؠ‬Ѽʪງ‫ؠ‬ʤʛ A small man is drowned by water; a gentleman is drowned by his mouth.9 10æิ̓঻࡚ʪʿ঻՟‫ ֍ڈ‬໶ʆ঻՟ʆʿ঻՟ʆͫ࣬ A kind father can feed his child, but cannot make him know what tastes good. The sage can be pleasing to others but cannot cause others to necessarily enjoy themselves.10 11æ੢Љལ̣໳୊Խ ೷ལ̣Խ୊໳ ৖ࣥ‫ݵ‬ʛ When the state possesses the Way then righteousness leads the self. When the state does not possess the Way then the self leads righteousness. This was the case for Xun Xi.11 12æஉ϶޴Ծ ೷ʒ˴˃⍆ ۱ʿ̣̈́ྠ One may build a carriage for an entire year, but if one doesn’t possess a three foot back beam, then one cannot use it to ride.12 8

This passage is not in the received Odes. The Tang dynasty Li Shan commentary to Zhang Hua’s ઠൡ allusion to this (quoting the words ming qie qing ‫̝ا‬ଡ) in the second of two “Da He Shao” ളщᡣ (Responses to He Shao) in Wenxuan 24.12a attributes this to the Zisizi. It also appears in the received “Ziyi” chapter of the Liji shortly following the entry numbered here as passage 7. Legge translates this: “Once we had that former premier,/His words were wise and pure;/The states and clans by him were at rest,/The chief cities and towns by him were well regulated,” (1895, 360). The received version, in addition to this description of people’s response the good ruler, quotes “Jie nanshan” (Mao 191). See passage 7 for a translation. 9 Yilin 1.2a attributes it to the Zisizi. It also appears in the extant “Ziyi” chapter of the Liji (Liji zhengyi 55.10b), where it is introduced by the words zi yue ʪ̆. 10 Yilin 1.2a attributes it to the Zisizi. 11 Yilin 1.2a attributes it to the Zisizi. This passage is very similar to 5. Xun Xi was a Warring States figure from the state of Jin known for advising Duke Xian of Jin. 12 Yilin 1.2a and Taiping yulan 773.5a attribute it to the Zisizi. Huainanzi “Miucheng” (10.155) has ́ ʿ ఢ ቙  ˃ ᎂ Ѽ ʪ  “if pattern does not win over substance, and this is called a ‘gentleman’”, a gu ‫ݭ‬, and this quotation. That version has cun ʭ “inch” for chi ˴ “foot”, xia ᒷ “linchpin” for zhen ⍆ “crossboard”, and quchi ᛓྠ for chi ྠ. Yang Shuda ๫ዾཥ asserts these all come from the Huainanzi, pointing out that the “Renjian” ʆ෇ chapter has a similar statement (see Huainanzi zhengwen 4.94).

APPENDIX ONE

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13æР˻ʿ̈́દɾʆ ɾ˻̈́દРʆ While a hundred minds may not gain a single person, a single mind may gain a hundred men.13 14æѼʹʛ а‫ط‬།ʛ ʹࠀЩ།ࠝ ʹ‫ނ‬۱།ࢅ The ruler is the root, and the ministers are the branches and leaves. If the root is healthy, then the leaves will be verdant, if the root is dried out then the leaves will fall off.14 15æᑪʝᆪ‫ࡌ ږ‬ʝ⽍ ۹ʝ໳‫ ږ‬ᒆʝм Ѽʪψ۱Љᆪ ୙۱Љᔩ Those who are overloaded with music become weighted by anxiety, those who are thick in ceremony become thin in action. If Gentleman are the same then there will be music, if the Gentleman differ then there will be ritual.15 16 Գ‫ۂ‬ʿ঻‫׌‬մи Գ඙ʿ঻ၣմᘂ ᓛЉࡘ‫ ۋ‬ѳʿʈմ‫ۃ‬ʛ A person who, upon seeing an elder, is unable to adopt a deprecating coloration, or who, upon seeing a noble, is unable to complete his speech—I would not enter that person’s doorway even in windswept rain.16 17 Ѽʪ̣˻዗ЫΑ ʮʆ̣ЫΑ዗˻ The gentleman uses his mind to lead his ears and eyes, the small man uses his ears and eyes to lead his mind.17 13 Yilin 1.2a and Taiping yulan 376.5b attribute it to the Zisizi. Huainanzi “Miucheng” (10.158) first has passage 32, then the sentence ൳Щ঻ျ ଜЩЉ֍ ூ ሶᖩ΂‫ږ‬, “To be one who is empty but able to be full, weak tasting but able to have flavor, and shabbily clothed but concealing valuable jade,” and then the quotation beginning with the variant gu liangxin ‫ݭ‬ղ˻ “Therefore [while] two minds. . .”. Here yixin is a pun, meaning both “one mind” and “a unified mind.” 14 Yilin 1.2a attributes it to the Zisizi. Huainanzi “Miucheng” 10.162 has a rhetorically different version of the second half: घʹʿࠀ ‫ط‬།ࠝ‫˃͵ ږ‬ႝʛ “For the root to be unhealthy and the leaves to be verdant, such a thing has never been heard.” It continues the passage with: Љལ˃̛ ̣ʆႩ੢ ೷ལ˃̛ ̣੢Ⴉʆ “In generations when the Way prevails, one gives the person to the state, when the generation does not have the Way, then one gives the state to the person.” 15 Yilin 1.2a and Taiping yulan 565.2b attribute it to the Zisizi. Taiping yulan has wei ֍ “[thick in] taste” for yi ໳Huang Yizhou notes that yi ໳ should be read yi ᄭ “ceremony” (6.3a). I have translated this passage in light of Shiji 24.1187. 16 Yilin 1.2a. 17 Yilin 1.2a. Huang Yizhou says Kongzi jiayu ˱ʪࣁგ 2.10a “Haosheng” Ϧ Ά expands on this and attributes it to Kongzi. There, Kongzi tells his disciple Zilu ʪ པ that: Ѽʪ̣˻዗ЫΑ Θ໳̣޴۲ ʮʆ̣ЫΑ዗˻ ʿ⚿̣޴۲ ‫˃ਂ̆ݭ‬Щ ʿ‫ ݏ‬ζ˃ಡ̈́નʵ “The gentleman uses his mind to lead his ears and eyes, and

262

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

18 ඗ʪ෍ᎂʪ‫ ̆݋‬ѳ‫ܮ֟׭‬અ຃ वًʿ̈́໖ʛ ʪ‫ ̆݋‬೸ˑ̣ɾʆ˃Խᅴ̛˃ʿ٢ Щवًʿ໖ ‫ݵ‬ᅴّ̐ጏЩ ً̣ଡ˃ʛ Bi Ziyang said to Zisi: “When I think that the Zhou court is going to be destroyed, my tears cannot be stopped.” Zisi said: “Yes, but now for a single person to grieve over the lack of good government in the world and for the person’s tears to fall without end is like grieving over the muddiness of the Yellow River and trying to make it clear by crying tears into it.”18 19 ኬጽ˙੕‫ؠ‬ʪ‫ ̆݋‬ѳႝᖦТ෈̏˃ʪʿҨ մмࢯϨ ʪ‫݋‬࿬̆ Ѽʪౚቖ̣ઉᅭ ᒃെ̣ᘳͺ ࠜˮཫм ‫ݵ‬அʆ˃‫׿‬ ᗰʛ аʿ‫ڈ‬ʛ Duke Mu of Lu asked Zisi: “I have heard that a son of the Lan clan of Pang was not filial. What was his conduct like?” Zisi answered: “The gentleman honors the worthy as a means to promote virtue and rewards good actions as a means to encourage the people. If there has been erroneous conduct, this is something of which pedants take note. That is not something about which I know.”19 takes making a stand on righteousness to be acting bravely. The small man uses his ears and eyes to lead his mind, and takes not following to be acting bravely. Therefore it is said: ‘Let them retreat without blaming them, and they will be willing to follow you.’” Shuoyuan იࠥ 16.11a “Tancong” ሾᓳ prefaces this with the phrase: ၱΆ‫ؠ‬଒દ ၰΆ‫ؠ‬б໖ “Calamity is born of desire for gain, and fortune is born from selfrestraint.” 18 Kongcongzi 10 (1.41b; Ariel 1989, 126 [10.13]) includes two short passages: ЏΠʪ˃െำʛ ˮ঻̣ನ‫ڈ̈́ڈ‬Щʿ঻̣ನ‫ ڈ̈́͵ڈ‬υ˃ལʛ “This is also (a sign of) your good intentions. Now, one who is able to use their wisdom to know of things that may be known, but is unable to use their wisdom to know of things that cannot be known, is on a risky course,” after Zisi’s reply ran ೸ “however” and completes the section with examples of “knowing the right time (to act)” (zhi shi ‫ڈ‬इ) and an explanation that the proper conduct in a time of chaos is to wonder about the governance of one’s own body. Yiwen leiju 35.8b and Taiping yulan 387.6b attribute this text to the Shizi ʰʪ, and indeed aside from the fact it it a Zisi dialog, there is no attribution of the passage to the Zisizi. Huang Yizhou follows the latter two texts in excising the Kongcongzi elaborations (adopting the final zhi which is omitted by the Taiping yulan). 19 Han Feizi 38 “Nan san” ᘗʒ (Han Feizi jishi 16.844-7) follows this with a condemnation of Zisi’s lack of responsiveness. Lunheng “Fei Han” ‫ۍ‬ᓟ (Lunheng jiaoshi 10.443-4) picks apart Han Fei’s condemnation as inconsistent with his overall system. On both of these see the discussion in chapter two. Kongcongzi 9 (1.34a; Ariel 1989, 117 [9.3]) substitutes “I have heard that the bright lord’s conduct of governance,”

APPENDIX ONE

263

20 ˙ᄭྭႩʪ‫ ˩݋‬ጽ˙ϕʪ‫݋‬Щࠓ֡଒̣޴ߟ ʪ‫˙̆݋‬ᄭʪЏ‫̣׿‬ʿвʛ Ѽࠜᚄೣ݄ቖ ঢ·մ፼ ᓛሞ࡚෢ ̐ βΠᘞϚʓࡘ Ϩ̣ਢ‫ׇ‬۹໕޴௷ᄞѼʪЩ೷‫˙ ˻˃·ۑ‬ᄭʪನࠜఌ‫̈́ږ‬ʛ ʿၒ ۱ʿⳕѼ˃ࣘ ̝аʿц ʑʿ঻޴Ѽዬߵʓ௷ ̣෱ϭ໢˃ʦ Gongyi Xiu was friends with Zisi. Duke Mu sent the command that he intended to make [Gongyi] Chancellor through Zisi. Zi Si said: “This is the reason that Master Gongyi will not come. If you hungered and thirsted in waiting for the worthy whose plans you could adopt, then even if I had to eat only fresh vegetables and drink only water, I, Ji, would be willing to serve under you. If you are using high office and a hefty salary as a hook to catch a gentleman, but are not of a mind to trust and use him, then if Master Gongyi has the wisdom of a fish it might work. But if not, he will not set foot in your court. Moreover, I am not a clever speaker, and I cannot hold the fishing pole and set the hook for my lord to injure a candidate who preserves his integrity.20 21 ˱‫݋‬ቁм ኬѼ̆ ˭ʓ˃̟Π೾࿥ʆʛ અା˃ ˱‫݋‬࿬̆ ႵႝѼʪ೾఍ʛ Ꮜ۱ᒃ Kong Si asked to depart. The lord of Lu said: “The lords of the peoples of the world are like me. Where are you going to go?” Kong Si replied:

for “the gentleman,” and adds the three phrases: ۱͗̄˃˖੼ಝʿˢ “then in the space between the four cardinal directions, who would dare not change?” after “the people”; ʿ٢մʹЩ੕մཫ “Not to govern the fundamentals yet ask about errors” before “That is not something about which I know”; and notes the ruler’s approval at the end: ˙̆െ “The Duke said: ‘Good.’” 20 Taiping yulan 507.2a attibutes to this text to Huangfu Mi’s ߗԜᒩ Gaoshi zhuan ਢʦ෭. Kongcongzi 9 (1.33a-b; Ariel 1989, 116 [9.1]) adds several passages. It begins ኬʆЉ “Among the men of Lu”; adds ᆻॼ໢ᙐм ᆪལϦͅ ‫ؠݖ‬ဝѦ ʿ Ֆቂ‫[“ ۓ‬Gongyi] deeply polished his integrity and enhanced his actions, he took pleasure in the Way and enjoyed the ancient, was unmoved by fine appearance and gain, and did not serve the feudal lords” after the first mention of Gongyi Xiu, adds the duke’s request: ˙ᄭʪͫჩ࿥ʆ ੉˜ኬ੢ЩႩ˃ɾ “Master Gongyi must assist me. [I will] divide the state of Lu into thirds and present one of them to him” before Zisi’s first statement; and intensifies Gongyi’s refusal by saying ‫ש‬અஉԽ “over his dead body” would he set foot in court.

264

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

“Have you never heard that the gentleman is like a bird? When startled, he flies away.”21 22 ዕ‫̣׿‬८ʼʛ ᙐ‫ྦྷ̣׿‬ʠʛ ѳ྾ܼளЩ଴‫ ݋‬ʿࠜዕ˃௥ ѳ྾₢Щૻ ʿࠜങਢ˃తԳ ‫ݭ‬ොࡘЩ֘ ᑵʿ̶ॢЩႝ‫ږ‬୥ ങ‫ھ‬Щ‫ ݣ‬ᑼʿ̶‫ۂ‬ЩԳ‫ږ‬ხ ‫ݭ‬ఌ࡝‫ ̐ؠ‬఍࡝‫ ࡘؠ‬ৎ̈࡝‫ؠ‬इ Study is the means by which one increases one’s abilities, using the whetstone is the means by which one sharpens a blade. I have stayed in a remote place and thought deeply, but it was not as expedient as study. I have stood on tiptoes to see into the distance, but it was not as effective as climbing to a high place to look broadly. Therefore when shouting in the direction of the wind, though the sound goes no quicker, more people can hear it. When one climbs a hill and gestures, one’s arms are not any longer yet one may be seen from much further away. Therefore fish take advantage of the water, birds take advantage of the wind, and plants take advantage of the seasons.22 23 ʪ‫ؠ׍݋‬ሴ ⱇ௅೷‫ ڷ‬ʅЅЩʃ࡚ Ήʪ̄ႝ˃ ՟ʆ᎝‫ٺ‬Ύ˃༪ ࣡մʿ֌ ϕᎂ˃̆ ѳਪʆʛ ཤ ӄ˃ ѳႩʆʛ Ϩଈ˃ ʪ‫݋‬ᘂЩʿ֌ ʪ̄̆ ӍЉʪ೷ щ‫ݭ‬ʿ֌ ʪ‫ ̆݋‬βႝ˃ ϣႩʿϨ᎝ଈ‫ؠٵ‬ກᏬ βᓛ௙ʛ ʿӇ̣Խ޴ ກᏬ ‫̣ݵ‬ʿಝະʛ When Zisi was living in Wei, he wore coarse coat with nothing on top of it, and in twenty days he ate nine meals. When Tian Zifang 21 Lüshi chunqiu “Shenying” ᅜ ᏻ (Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi 18.1141-47). Kongcongzi 10 (1.43a; Ariel 1989, 127-8 [10.17]) adds two passages: ˙଒ߟʪ‫ ݋‬ʪ ‫݋‬ʿᘞ “The Duke desired to make Zisi his Chancellor, but Zisi was unwilling,” and ends with Zisi concluding ˑѼ‫ݰ‬ၝԡ ʑ̣ʴࡎ˭ʓ˃Ѽ аᜪ޴Ե˃ཫʛ “Now that my lord has doubted me, and also uses himself as the measure to limit the lords of the world, I humbly think it is the fault of his words.” On the odd use of Kong Si (mixing types of names) in Lüshi chunqiu and Zisi in the Kongcongzi, see chapter two. 22 This passage is attributed to Zisi in Shuoyuan “Jianben” ܿʹ (3.9b-10a). A variation on the first two sentences is spoken by Zisi to Zishang in Kongcongzi 6 (1.22b; Ariel 1989, 102 [6.2]), and Yantie lun 21 paraphrases the first line. Xunzi 1 “Quanxue” ᘳዕ (Xunzi jijie 1.1-2) and DaDai liji 64 “Quanxue” (DaDai liji jiegu 54.131) preface the passage with a paraphrase of Analects 15.31: ʪ̆ ѳ྾உ̅ʿ࡚ உ֬ʿ࿩ ̣‫ ݋‬೷८ ʿϨዕʛ “The Master said: ‘I once spent an entire day fasting, and an entire night without sleeping, so as to think. It was of no advantage, and not as good as if I had studied.” The DaDai liji attributes the initial quotation to Kongzi, and the passage that follows it appears to be a continuation of that quotation. They both also conclude with the sentence: Ѽʪ˃Ά‫ۍ‬୙ʛ Щെਪ‫ٵؠ‬ʛ “It is not the case that the gentleman is different at birth, but rather that he is good at taking advantage of external things,” (Xunzi omits the er Щ).

APPENDIX ONE

265

heard this, he sent a person to give a thick coat made of the white fur of foxes. Because he feared that Zisi would not accept it, he told the person to say: “When I lend to others, then I forget about it. When I give something to others, it is like I am casting it away.” When Zisi declined and did not accept them, Zifang said: “I have such things, but you do not—why do you not accept it?” Zisi said: “I, Ji, have heard it said that: ‘Recklessly giving things away is not as good as casting away leftover goods in a ditch.’ Although I, Ji, am poor, I cannot bear taking my body as a ditch. That is the reason why I dare not accept it.”23 24 ʪ‫ ̆݋‬ՖбϏʛ ᑵб֘ʛ სбॱʛ ‫ٵ‬бளʛ ʆб‫ׇ‬ʛ ೷‫ۍ‬бʴ‫ږ‬ Zisi said: “Affairs name themselves, sounds articulate themselves, appearances come into view themselves, things locate themselves, people occupy offices of themselves. Everything, in some way, comes from itself.”24 25 ঻ఢմ˻ ‫ؠ‬ఢʆ̢щ Љʿ঻ఢմ˻ Ϩఢʆщ Being able to master your mind, how does it compare with mastery of others?

23 Shuoyuan “Lijie” Θ໢ (4.3b-4a) does not attribute it. The passage has echoes of Mengzi 5B6. 24 Zhonglun 5 “Guiyan” ඙ᝀ (Zhonglun jiaozhu 5.72) follows with ‫ݏݭ‬ʆ˃ ᎂዑ‫ݏ‬ʵ˃ᎂ௢ “Therefore blaming others is called ‘obstruction’, while blaming oneself is called ‘circulation.’” Yu Yue reads xuan ޳ for xuan ॱ (5.72). Huainanzi “Miucheng” prefaces a similar phrase with the statement: ‫ݏݭ‬ʆʿϨб‫ ݏ‬Ӷቂʆʿ ϨӶቂʴ દʛ “Therefore, blaming others is not as good as blaming oneself, looking for it from others is not as good as looking for it from oneself, and obtaining it,” (alternatively, ᅭʛ “This is virtue.”) It continues: ᑵб͇ʛ სбΕʛ Ϗб֡ʛ ́б‫ׇ‬ʛ ೷‫ۍ‬ʴ‫“ ږ‬Sounds summon themselves, appearances display themselves, names command themselves, patterns govern themselves. Everything is of itself.” The Huainanzi then continues with the phrase ዬኅ̣ջ ዬʠ̣ᐃ щ‫̢ݏ‬ʆ “Whether (a person) wields a spear to pierce, or wields a knife to stab, what blame falls on the person?” and then passage 32 (Huainan Honglie jijie 10.327, see also passage 32 below). Liji “Zhongyong” has Ϛʕтʿ௽ʓ Ϛʓтʿಕʕ ͸ʴЩʿӶ‫ؠ‬ʆ۱೷ ‫ ݏ‬ʕʿ‫ ˭ݏ‬ʓʿ˳ʆ “When he is the superior, he does not treat his subordinates poorly, when he is the subordinate, he is not obsequious to his superiors, he corrects himself and does not look to others. Therefore the superior does not blame tian, and the subordinate does not resent others,” (Liji zhengyi 52.9b).

266

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

When it happens that you are unable to master your mind, how could you master others?25 26 ూԽ‫ۂ‬ʏ˴ ߠʂʉ‫ ۀ‬൘Խ‫ࡒ ˴˗ۂ‬Ꮒ೷̎ ߮ೢ́‫˪ن‬ ֟˙ ෺‫݋‬డ ‫׻‬Ӝᑼૻ෍ ‫׻‬Ԥ☸ ࠌ⎘ ቖ໶Ϛᅭ ৴Ϛს̢ Yao’s frame was ten feet tall, and his eyebrows were of eight colors. Shun’s frame was six feet tall and he had no hair at all on his face. Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, and the Duke of Zhou exerted themselves in their reflection and labored with their bodies. One had broken arms and looked up [at the sun], and another hairless legs and a hunchback. Being a worthy or a sage is a matter of virtue, how could it be a matter of appearance?26 27

կԻ‫ؠ‬ർ Рʆਆ˃ ௘ʆճϫ ʆந˃‫̣ ږۍ‬կ޴͵‫˜׆‬

ʛ ጻկျ឴ ཫʿ঻ᛐ ‫ۍ‬ʿ଒կʛ ˜‫ ݈˃׆‬ᓛჷʿ‫ٱ‬ When a rabbit runs down the street, a hundred people chase it. Even if every greedy person joins in no one would condemn them because the rabbit does not yet have fixed ownership. If rabbits are piled so they fill the marketplace, people passing by would not care to give them a second look. This is not because they don’t want the rabbits. It is because once the ownership is fixed, even a bumpkin would not contest it.27 25

Zhonglun 3 “Xiuben” ࡸʹ (Zhonglun jiaozhu 3.47) prefaces with ʪ‫̆݋‬, appends ‫ ݭ‬ɾ ˴ ˃ Ꭻ Լ ̣ Գ մ ͢ ɾ ̬ ˃ Խ Լ ̣ Գ մ ٢  ‫ ̣ ݵ‬Ѽ ʪ ฻ մ ࿥ ʛ “Therefore a one foot long brocade is sufficient to display one’s artistry, and an eight foot frame is sufficient to display one’s good government. That is the reason that a gentleman attends to his solitude.” The phrase shen qi gua is similar to shen qi du ฻մ ጤ, a term found in the Wuxing and in other fourth through third century texts, some of them associated with Zisi. 26 Jinlouzi ‫ہ‬ᆧʪ 4.34b “Liyan” ΘԵ attributes this to Zisi, and a version also appears in Kongcongzi 7 (27a-b; Ariel 1989, 107-8 [7.2]) in a response by Zisi to Lord of Qi. The term wangyang ૻ෍ (wangshi ૻඁ in the Kongcongzi) appears in several other texts, where it is sometimes written as wangyang ૻ‫“ ޜ‬looking into the distance” or wangyang ૻХ. In the Kongcongzi, Zisi’s point is that inner virtue is more important than outer appearance. 27 Shuoyuan 3.15a-b has Qu Jian ‫ ܿ׌‬of Chu quote this as a proverb in a speech to King Jing ࣣ of Chu about the need to fix an heir apparent among his princes. In both Lüshi chunqiu 17.6 “Shenshi” ฻෻ (Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi 17.1109) and the Tang Dynasty Li Xian commentary to HouHanshu 74a.2383 “Yuan Shao Liu Biao liezhuan” ৥ஂᄸ‫ڷ‬λ෭ it is attributed to the Shenzi ฻ʪ (i.e., the writings of Shen Dao ฻ռ). In the latter, the commentator notes ʪ‫݋‬ʪ ੋѼएՓཛྷ մඅୖψ “Both the Zisizi and Shangjunshu ੋѼए (Writings of Lord Shang) contain this, more or less in the same words.”For the latter, however, the conclusion is about the need to have fixed laws. See Shangjun shu ੋѼए 26 “Dingfen” ‫˜׆‬, Shangjunshu zhuizhi 12.145 [cf. Duyvendak 1928, 331-2, who notes it is also in the first chapter of the

APPENDIX ONE

28

267

ʆ̟бႧ ۱୥፼ʿන Ֆ‫ݵ‬ЩႧ˃ ೾۸୥፼ ٜನ‫ۍ‬ʴ‫ۂ‬

̢ ˮʿ࿫Ֆ˃‫ ۍݵ‬Щ࣬ʆ˃᝿ʴ ⻔நߊା ʿܾ୎˃‫׿‬Ϛ Щ‫ۆ‬ቌӶࣅ ቅநߊା Ѽ⻔аቅ ̣‫׍‬Рּ˃ʕ ͺͪႩʛ ࠜЏʿʵ ੢೷ᘝԡ When the ruler of the people himself gives approval, then a great many plans will not be advanced. In a matter that one considers correct and [the ruler] gives it approval, then this is tantamount to rejecting a great many plans. How much the more so if wisdom is not the strong point? Now, by not examining into the finding of matters to be correct or incorrect, and taking pleasure in others’ praise of himself, no delusion could be greater. By not measuring where principle resides and fawning over the ruler to seek acceptance, no obsequiousness could be greater. If the ruler is deluded and the ministers obsequious, although they reside above the common people, the people will not follow them. No such state has ever survived under such circumstances.28 29 ൘ʿࡑࣕЩ˭ʓ٢ ण߸ʿࡑࣕЩ˭ʓ෩ Shun did not come down off his mat and the world was wellgoverned. Jie and Zhou (i.e., the corrupt last rulers of the Xia and Shang) did not come down off their mats and the world was in chaos.29 30 શ‫ۼ‬Щိ ိͪ‫ۑ‬ԡ մ‫ף‬۱‫ ݵ‬մᑵ۱‫ۍ‬ʛ If one is feeling sadness yet one sings, then the song will not be convincing. Even if the plucking of a string is correct, the sound will be incorrect.30

Yinwenzi ˄́ʪ]. This line of argument is very similar to some in the “Wudu” chapter of the Han Feizi. 28 Taiping yulan 620.1a-b attributes this to Zisizi. Huang Yizhou does not note this, but also appears in Kongcongzi 10 (37a-b; Ariel 1989, 121 [10.4]). 29 Taiping yulan 709.5b, Yiwen leiju 69.1205. Beitang shuchao ̺੫एය 15.2b has the phrase ʿࡑࣕЩ˭ʓ٢ and 133.4b has  ൘ʿࡑࣕЩ٢ ߸ʿࡑࣕЩ෩. Huainanzi “Miucheng” has ‫ݭ‬൘ʿࡑࣕЩ̙˭ʓ‫ ږ‬Ӷቂʴʛ “The reason that Shun did not come down off his mat and the world was well-governed is that he sought it from himself,” and ‫ݭ‬൘ʿࡑࣕЩ˭ʓ٢ णʿʓਙЩ˭ʓ෩ Ⴕશߊ̢͎֘ʛ ೷ቂʴ Ӷቂʆ ͅˑ͵˃ႝʛ “Therefore, Shun did not come down off his mat and the world was well-governed. Jie did not come down off his mat and the world was in chaos. In general, one’s true feelings work better than shouting at people. Not to seek it from oneself but seeking it from others, I have not heard of such a thing ever being the case,” (Huainan Honglie jijie 10.324). Huang Yizhou says the Huainanzi made some changes for aesthetic reasons (to avoid reduplication), and since this passage appears soon after passage 11, they probably all come from “Leide” ஈᅭ chapter of the Zisizi.

268

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

31 ᎂ‫ڇۍ ږ॔޴ٺ‬ʿ‫॔ڈ‬ʛ ‫׬‬દ‫ٺ‬౭͛॔‫ږ‬ʛ When a person calls a hu fox a li fox, if it is not the case that he does not know what a li fox is, it is that he suddenly took in a hu fox at the same time mistaking it for a li fox.31 32 ၸΫ㊫Ꭻʛ ᓛ౱Щങಮ ʪ୕ሀീʛ ࠀЩʿౚ Guan Zhong was as a colorful brocade. Although odious, he still served in court. Zichan was as washed silk. Although beautiful, he was not honored.32 33 30

ˀмጽї˾ࣵ‫ ڴ‬Щʿ঻Άʛ ႵʍᏟЩџʿ঻˪ʛ

Beitang shuchao 106.1a-1b has શᆪЩိ “If one is feeling happy and yet sings” and Kong Guangtao’s commentary quotes the entire passage. Huainanzi “Miucheng” has ‫ۼ˻ݭ‬Щိʿᆪ  ˻ᆪЩ࢛ʿ‫ ۼ‬ˮʪ̆ ୿۱‫ݵ‬ʛ մᑵ‫ۍ‬ʛ. “Therefore, if the mind is in grief then the song cannot be joyous, if the mind in joyful, then the crying cannot be grieving. Now, the Master said, ‘If one plucks, it will be correct, but singing will be incorrect,’” (Huainan Honglie jijie 10.329). Liji “Tangong” ᐐʻ (see passage 42, below) has Zisi saying Ӆ̅ʿᆪ “on the anniversary of a parent's death, he does not listen to music,” and elsewhere in that chapter the following narrative explains what is at stake: ʪࢬ‫ݰ‬ਛయЩԳ ˅˃ഉ ֜˃Щʿ֜ ᅫ˃Щʿ Ͼᑵ ѕЩ̆ ‫͵ۼ‬ӄʛ ζ̙վᔩ Щͪಝཫʛ ʪઠ‫ݰ‬ਛయЩԳ ˅˃ഉ ֜˃Щ ֜ ᅫ˃ЩϾᑵ ѕЩ̆ ζ̙վᔩ ʿಝʿвା “When Zixia appeared after he had finished the mourning period, a lute was given to him. He tried to tune it, but it was out of tune. When he plucked a string, no sound came from it. Standing up, he said: ‘My grief is not yet forgotten. The former kings created the rites, so I dare not exceed them.’ When Zizhang appeared after he had finished the mourning period, a lute was given to him. He tried to tune it, and it was in tune. When he plucked a string, sound came from it. Standing up, he said: ‘The former kings created the rites, so I dare not fail to come up to them.’” The description of the effortless expression of affective dispositions through musical performance recall both the metaphor of the metal bell and jade chimestone, (see also passage 4 above) and passages like 2B7 and 3A5 in the Mengzi where funeral and mourning rites are portrayed as spontaneous reactions to grief. 31 Taiping yulan 912.1b quotes Zisizi. Huainanzi “Miucheng” has the variation: ˑᎂ‫ ॔ٺ‬۱ͫʿ‫ ٺڈ‬ʑʿ‫͵ۍ ॔ڈ‬྾Գ‫͵ͫ ږٺ‬྾Գ॔ʛ ‫ۍ॔ ٺ‬୙ ψᘝ ʛ Щᎂ‫॔ٺ‬۱ʿ‫ݭݵ ॔ ٺڈ‬ᎂʿԨ‫ږ‬ቖ ۱ͫʿ‫ڈ‬ቖ ᎂቖ‫ږ‬ʿԨ ۱ͫʿ‫ڈ‬ʿ Ԩ‫ږ‬ԡ “Those who today talk about a hu-li certainly know neither what a hu is nor what a li is. If it is not that they have never seen a hu, then it must be that they have never seen a li. If the hu and li are not differentiated and are taken to be part of the same category, and they say “hu-li,” then they don’t know what a hu is or what a li is. This is the reason that if a person calls the unworthy worthy, then that person certainly does not know what a worthy is, and if a person calls the worthy unworthy, then that person certainly does not know what unworthy is,” (Huainan Honglie jijie 10.321). 32 Taiping yulan 815.6a (a comment notes this also appears in Kongzi jiayu), Tianzhongji ˭ˀ৩ 49.60a. Kui ㊫ “to offer to a superior” is probably a loan for lai ⾴ (Morohashi 1955-60, entry 27985). Huainanzi “Miucheng” has ‫┛ݭ‬ʪ́Ꭻʛ ᓛ ᓅ ങ ᅧ  ʪ ୕ሀ ‫ ݼ‬ʛ  ࠀ Щ ʿ ౚ  ൳Щ ঻ ျ  ଜ Щ Љ ֍  ூሶ ᖩ ΂ ‫“  ږ‬Therefore [Guanzi] was patterned brocade. Although vile, he was able to ascend the temple. Zichan was washed silk. He was beautiful but not honored. To be one who is empty but able to be full, weak tasting but able to have flavor, and shabbily clothed but concealing valuable jade . . .” (Huainan Honglie jijie 10.327), following this with passage 13.

APPENDIX ONE

269

Count Zhonghang Mu caught a tiger with his hands, and yet he was unable to keep it alive. Probably his strength was impressive, but his ability was not up to the task.33 34 ‫ஂ̏˽ز‬৉˵᎝ࠀϦ ୥ႅ‫ݤ‬ᏛЩʃዖ̣‫ ޟ؀‬ະ‫˃ݵ‬इ໘ ᖿϾ໵ С̈ཤ‫ ۂ‬ལʕීм Щ ʿ‫ݨ‬᎝ ব‫ږ‬ኜな ઁफ़࡛ մိᆪ Щ೷଱ մ࢛‫ۼ‬Щʿᑵ‫ߖ ږ‬вᅭ˃̛ʛ When Donghu [Jizi ׄʪ] brought together the remaining good people from the encampments in the wilds, the many essences saluted him silently, and the nine domains thereby were able to support free circulation. At exactly this time, the animals formed herds, and the bamboo and trees grew. When a person was walking behind another on the roadway, the person would not pick up something the other had dropped. When those who tilled the fields had some excess, they left it at the edge of the field for the night. When songs were sung and music played, they were never licentious. When crying and grieving, they never wept loudly. These are due to it being an age of highest virtue.34 33

Huang reports that Taiping yulan 386 has only the first sentence, while Huainanzi “Miucheng” (10.155) has the entire passage. Gao You’s commentary to the first clause reads: “Count Zhonghang Mu was a minister of the state of Jin. His strength was sufficient to capture a live tiger.” He explains the second clause: “His strength was capable of killing the tiger, but his virtue was not enough to make it submit.” This follows a passage about how the horses and people of the border nations had natural ability and a natural tendency to virtue, but it was only the trainer Zaofu ௪̓ and the ancient sage kings, respectively, who were able to fully bring these out. According to the Zuozhuan commentary to the Spring and Autumn entry for the fifteenth year of Duke Zhao ‫ݲ‬, Zhonghang Mu is the father of the principled Xun Wu ৖ѹ of Jin. This narrative about Zhonghang Mu is not otherwise attested. 34 Lushi པ ͑  says this appears in chapter one of Tianzhongji. Huainanzi “Miucheng” (10.160) has ‫ׄ˽زآ‬ʪ˃̛ ལཔʿ‫ݨ‬᎝ Ъஒኜᔵઁቂफ़࡛ ՟Ѽʪ ʮʆύદմ‫׈‬ʛ ‫ݭ‬ɾʆЉᅯ εͺᎋ˃ ʘਢ‫ږ‬඙մͣ  ‫ݭ‬ʓ˃‫ؠ‬ʕ̆ͣ˃ аᘂ ʛ ʓ‫ږ‬඙մ͆ ‫ݭ‬ʕ˃‫ؠ‬ʓ̆͆˃ Ѽ᝖ʛ “In the past, in Donghu Jizi’s generation, people did not pick up and keep what others had lost on the roads. When a farmer had extra grain, he left it at the corner of the fields. He made the gentlemen and lesser men each attain what was suitable for them. Therefore if one person was favored, the masses were supportive. In all cases, when those in high positions valued a person as an aide, those below them said: ‘make them you aide,’ and the ministers deferred. When those below valued someone’s help, therefore those above them said: ‘make them your helper.’ The ruler yielded to them.” Pei Songzhi ჉‫( ˃ؽ‬372-451) quotes the Xiandi zhuan ᙋܹ෭ in his commentary to the Weishu ᖒए section of the Sanguo zhi ʒ੢ ӆ, chapter 2 “Wendi ji” ܹ́ߺ. In that extended passage, Donghu Jizi is listed first in a set of mythical early rulers over primitive utopias that include Rongcheng ࣅϾ, Dating ʨࣘ Xuan Yuan ৻ᒺ (i.e., Huangdi ෦ܹ), and Hao Xu ქࠈ (2.69). This list is otherwise shortened from one in the Zhuangzi 10 “Quqie” ᯺⧕ (Zhuangzi jishi 4b.357). To “goose walk” (yanxing ීм) is to walk a little behind and to the side of, according to the Liji “Wangzhi” ̙վ a son follows a father, a younger brother goose walks behind the elder brother, and friends walk side by side. Zhang Zhenjun suggests reading ෱ for ᑵ, “when crying and grieving they never did it to excess.”

270

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

35 Ե̏˃ʪཥ‫ؠ‬ᔩ̢ ᙜ̓ψ‫ح׍‬ಭ Does the son of Mister Yan understand the rites? He continued to offer sacrifices to the ancestors, dwelling together with his stepfather, and was in mourning for a whole year.35 36 ׂඩ੕ ‫ٴ‬ͺ˃ལщζ ʪ‫ ̆݋‬ζѦ˃ ׂඩ̆ Ѽʪ˃૥ͺ‫ ږ‬Πˋ໳Щʵ щͫ̆Ѧ ʪ‫ˋ ̆݋‬໳‫̣׿֣ږ‬Ѧ˃ʛ ʕʿˋ۱ʿદմ‫ ׿‬ʕʿ໳۱ʓᆪ ޴ ʛ Џ޴ʿѦʨԡ ‫ ̆أ ݭ‬Ѧ‫ږ‬໳˃֜ʛ ʑ̆ Ѧ·ϯԽ̣ઉᅭʛ ЏߖѦ˃ʨ‫ږ‬ ʛ Meng Ke asked: “In the Way of shepherding the people, what comes first?” Zisi said: “First, you benefit them.” Meng Ke said: “The gentleman’s teaching of the people is simply a matter of benevolence and righteousness. What need is there to speak of profit?” [Zisi] said: “Benevolence and righteousness are certainly what [the gentleman] uses to benefit them. If the superior is not benevolent, then [those below] will not attain [their] places; if the superior is not righteous, then those below will happy to make errors. This is the utmost lack of benefit. Therefore the Yi says: ‘Benefit is the harmonization of righteousness.’ It also says: ‘Benefit is used to secure one’s self so as to promote virtue.’ These are both examples of utmost benefit.”36 35 Tongdian ௢յ 91.497 identifies this as the writing of Wang Su based on the book of Zisi, and instead of fuqi ‫ح‬ಭ has fuzhou ze zi yi da gong ye ‫֟ح‬۱ʪ‫׈‬ʨ̷ ʛ “and wearing the clothing of the Zhou dynasty, then the son is suitable to have great achievements” (fuzhou ‫ ֟ح‬is from Analects 15.11).The term tongju ψ‫( ׍‬literally “dwell together”, but denoting something like “having equal standing in the ritual hierarchy) is defined as follows according to the Liji “Sangfu xiaoji” : య‫ح‬ʮ৩: ᙜ̓ ʿψ‫׍‬ʛ‫ͫ ږ‬྾ψ‫ߖ ׍‬೷̟݈ ψ৷Щ୯մঅヿ޴ψ‫“ ׍‬One who does not live together with one’s stepfather, must have lived together [with him] and they both must be without descendants to officiate [the ceremony]. Then, if they share the finances and sacrifice at [their own] grandfathers’ and fathers’ temples, they are said to ‘dwell together,’” (Liji zhengyi 33). 36 Ma Duanlin ਠၷᒂ, Wenxian tongkao ́ᙋ௢ᣉ 208.1713, Chao Gongwu ऎ ˙ ‫ ن‬, Junzhai dushu zhi ਊ ᓲ ᜃ ए ӆ 3a.3a (omits the second “Meng Ke”). Kongcongzi 6 “Zaxun” ᕺৰ (25a-b; Ariel 1989, 106 [6.10]) omits the word “Way”, and is explicit that the negative effect of the ruler’s lack of virtue is in terms of “those below,” while the other sources are not explicit. This dialogue is clearly related to Mengzi 1A1, which ends with Mengzi asking King Hui of Liang the rhetorical

APPENDIX ONE

271

37 ˮʪ˃૥ ֻͫ‫ؠ‬༶एЩஉ‫ؠ‬ᔩᆪ ᕺიʿႩା For the training of the Master (i.e., Kongzi), it is necessary to begin with the Odes and the Documents, and end with the rites and music. The various disputations do not go with them.37 38 ʪ‫׍݋‬ʝሴ Љᄫ੽ ‫੽ ̆׻‬в ९̓ቂ ʪ‫ ̆݋‬Ϩβ̓ Ѽ ቇႩϭ When Zisi was living in the state of Wei, robbers came from the state of Qi. Someone told him: “The robbers have arrived, why don’t you leave this place?” Zisi said: “If I, Ji, leave, who will guard it alongside the lord?”38 39 ᑢ˙‫ێ‬੕‫ێ‬ᖋྦЭ ʪ‫݋‬ʿ࣬ ʝւʛ ⛎՟‫̳ږ‬ቂʨ‫͙˃ۃ‬ ̺ࡒᇰ࡛ι‫ݛ‬Щʿ֌ ̆ ˑЩ ݈ ‫ڈ‬Ѽ˃̘ਠय़β Duke Mu often made enquiries and sent presents of fresh meat. This displeased Zisi. The final time this happened, he rejected the emissary and had him go outside the main door. Then he faced north, question: ̙Π̆ˋ໳Щʵԡ щͫ̆Ѧ “Your majesty needs simply to speak of benevolence and righteousness, what need is there to speak of profit?” (Mengzi zhengyi 2.43). Wang Chong’s critical notes on Mengzi begin with an allusion to 1A1 that pivots on the definition of profit that Zisi is promoting. Wang asks: щ̣‫ڈ‬ʿ଒ϯφ˃Ѧ Щ ׂʪࣜᘗ̣ௗ৷˃Ѧʛ “How did he know that [the king] did not want the profit of security and fortune, and instead Mengzi refuted him on the basis of the profit of material possessions?” (Lunheng jiaoshi 10.450). Wang goes on to show how, especially in Changes related texts, profit is portrayed positively, and argues that the “the profit of security and fortune” is the outcome of the practice of benevolence and righteousness. Yoav Ariel (1989, 173n35) perceptively points out that this passage probably is an attempt to counter Wang Chong’s criticism of Mengzi, writing “Apparently the author of the Kongcongzi assumed that the reader of Wang Chong’s criticism of the Mengzi, on turning to the Kongcongzi, would realize that Mengzi’s argument was sound because he had been instructed by [Zisi] on this issue and was therefore aware of the distinction between two kinds of profit.” This indicates that this story postdates the Lunheng. Huang Yizhou notes that according to the timelines compiled by Zhou Guangye ֟ ᅩ๣ (1730-1798, author of Mengzi sikao ׂʪ͗Ш) and Zhan Jingfeng གದᄨ (1519-1602, author of Zhanshi xingli xiaobian ག̏‫୎׷‬ʮ᎖), these two could not have met. While some are sources say that Mengzi studied with Zisi’s son, Huang argues that Liu Xiang and Liu Xin ᄸ⑮ (fl. 53 B.C.E.-23 C.E.) accepted a later misunderstanding that Mengzi studied at the “gate of Zisi” rather than with people at the “gate of Zisi.” That, he argues, is why the Lienu zhuan λʩ෭ “Muyi zhuan” ͹ ᄭ෭ (edited by Liu Xiang) and the notes to the Qilue ʁୖ (edited by Liu Xin) are two sources that support the idea that there was a personal connection between Zisi and Mengzi (Zisizi 6.10b-11a). 37 Here, the term liyue ᔩᆪ might also refer to the classics of Ritual and Music. Kunxue jiwen ҍዕߺႝ 7.23a quotes Zisizi; Kongcongzi 6 “Zaxun” (Ariel 1989, 102 [6.1], see also 172, n.5). 38 Mengzi 4B31 (Mengzi zhengyi 17.601-4).

272

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

kneeled and bowed his head, then repeatedly clasped his hands together in reverence, and declined to accept the gift. He said, “From this moment forward I know that my lord feeds me, Ji, as he feeds dogs and horses.”39 40 ᑢ˙‫ێ‬Գʝʪ‫ͅ ̆݋‬ʢ࡝˃੢̣˩ʦ щϨ ʪ‫݋‬ʿ࣬̆ ͅ˃ʆЉԵ̆ Ֆ˃ˆ̢ ৴̆ ˩˃ˆ̢ Duke Mu often granted an audience to Zisi. He said: “In ancient times, [the ruler of] a state of a thousand chariots was able to be friends with a potential official, what do you think of this?” Zisi was displeased, and said: “In ancient times, there was a saying: one ‘employed him.’ How could they have said: ‘befriended him,’?”40 41 ʪʕ˃͹АЩʿయ ‫ۃ‬ʆ੕ቂʪ‫ږآ ̆݋‬ʪ˃ζѼʪయ̳͹ ̢ ̆ ೸ ʪ˃ʿ՟Ύʛయ˃ щʛ ʪ‫ږآ ̆݋‬ѳζѼʪ೷‫͛׿‬ལ ལා۱નЩා ལЙ۱નЩЙ β۱ϯ঻ ޴βʛֳ‫޴ݵ ږ‬Ύ ʛ͹ ʿ޴βʛֳ‫ݵ ږ‬ʿ޴Ύʛ͹ Zishang’s mother died, but he did not perform mourning rites. His disciples asked Zisi: “In the past, did the former gentleman (i.e., your father or grandfather) perform mourning rites for his divorced mother?” [Zisi] said: “Yes, he did.” “Why is it, then, that you did not have Bai (i.e., Kong Bai, Zishang) perform mourning rites for his mother?” Zisi said: “In the past, the former gentleman (i.e., Kongzi) never lost the Way. When the Way prospered, he followed it and prospered. When the Way was obstructed then he followed it and he was also obstructed. How could I, Ji, be capable of that? It was because she was my wife that she was Bai’s mother. When she was no longer my wife then she was not Bai’s mother.”41

39 40 41

Mengzi 5B6 (Mengzi zhengyi 21.711-9). Mengzi 5B7 (Mengzi zhengyi 21.719-25) Liji “Tangong,” part 1 (Liji jijie 7.166-7).

APPENDIX ONE

42

273

ʪ‫ ̆݋‬యʒ̅Щᔐ ʘ‫ؠۈ‬Խ‫ ۑͫ༻ͫ ږ‬ˡ˃Љ࣪ାЫ

ԡ యʒ̇Щ༎ ʘ‫ؠۈ‬ಯ‫ ۑͫ༻ͫ ږ‬ˡ˃Љ࣪ାЫԡ యʒ϶ ̣޴๨ʞ ۱ͪ˃ӄԡ ‫ݭ‬ѼʪЉஉԽ˃ᅴ Щ೷ɾಮ˃મ ‫ݭ‬Ӆ̅ʿᆪ Zisi said: “After three days of performing the mourning rites, the body is brought to the burial site. Whenever something is placed with the body it must be done with sincerity and with trustworthiness. Simply do not make it so there are regrets. After three months of performing the mourning rites, the coffin is buried. Whenever something is placed with the coffin it must be done with sincerity and with trustworthiness. Simply do not make it so there are regrets. After three years of performing the mourning rites, when it is understood to be the extremity of loss, then they are not forgotten. Therefore the gentleman grieves for the remainder of his life, yet does not have a single day of anxiety. Therefore, on the anniversary, he was not happy.”42 ʪ‫࢛˃݋‬ฦʛ޴т ੴʆࡳ⡂ When Zisi wailed over his sister-in-law he acted following relative position, and so his wife led the thrashing about.43 43

44 ಫʪᎂʪ‫ ̆݋‬β ѳ੭፶˃యʛ ̐ᆳʿʈ‫ؠ‬ʤ‫ږ‬ʁ̅ ʪ‫ ̆݋‬ζ̙˃վᔩʛ ཫ˃‫ࡢ ږ‬Щ౜˃ ʿвା‫ ږ‬₢Щ˪˃ ‫ݭ‬Ѽʪ˃੭፶˃యʛ ̐ᆳʿʈ‫ؠ‬ʤ‫ږ‬ʒ̅ ӭЩϒ঻৹ Zengzi said to Zisi: 42

Liji “Tangong,” part 1 (Liji jijie 7.170). Sun Xidan glosses the phrase “with sincerity and with trustworthiness” in these terms: “sincerity is exhausting one’s mind and never being casual about it (wu suo gou ೷‫ ࠨ׿‬is an allusion to Analects 13.3: Ѽʪ‫ؠ‬մԵ ೷‫ࠨ׿‬Щʵԡ “A gentleman’s attitude to speech is this: simply never treat it casually,”) and trustworthiness is being proper with respect to the rites and never going against them (an allusion to Analects 2.5: ׂᛯʪ੕Ҩ ʪ̆ ೷ཧ “Meng Yizi asked about filial piety. The master said: ‘Be without defiance.’”) 43 Liji “Tangong,” part 1 (Liji jijie 7.188). “Thrashing about” (yong ⡂ ) is stamping the feet and jumping, and along with wailing is one of the highest expressions of grieving. Zheng Xuan comments that “acting on the basis of relative position” is wailing that is based on one’s relative distance in relation to the deceased. Sun Xidan notes that in Kongcongzi it says Zisi keened over his sister-in-laws, and the Kong commentary says his elder brother died early and so he had a sister-in-law. He speculates it was either Confucius’s disciple Yuan Xian ࢍዙ or Yan Ji ጝβ, who both had the style name Zisi.

274

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

“Ji, when I handled my parent’s mourning rituals, for seven days no water or liquid entered my mouth.” Zisi said: “As for the institutions and rites of the former kings, those who are excessive must bend down to come near them, and those who fall short must stand on tiptoe to attain them.” Therefore, in managing the mourning rites of a parent, the gentleman does not let water or liquid entered his mouth for three days, at which point he arises only with the aid of his staff.”44 45 ʪ‫˃݋‬͹А‫ؠ‬ሴ ‫ࠜގ‬ᎂʪ‫ ̆݋‬ʪ໶ʆ˃݈ʛ ͗̄‫ؠ‬ʪ ̢ᝳᔩ ʪႵ฻ቂ ʪ‫ ̆݋‬ѳщ฻‫ ۿ‬ѳႝ˃ Љմᔩ೷մ৷ Ѽʪͪмʛ ЉմᔩЉ մ৷ ೷մइ Ѽʪͪмʛ ѳщ ฻‫ۿ‬ When Zisi’s mother died in the state of Wei, Liu Ruo said to Zisi: “You are the descendent of the Sage. The people of the four quarters go toward you to observe the rites. You should attend to it with care.” Zisi said: “Why should I attend to it with care? I have heard that: ‘When he knows the rites but doesn’t have the resources, the gentleman does not perform them. When he knows the rites, has the resources, but it is not the right time, the gentleman also does not perform them.’ Why should I attend to it with care?”45 46 ጽ˙੕‫ؠ‬ʪ‫޴ ̆݋‬ᕄѼ˫‫ͅ ح‬Ⴉ ʪ‫˃̆ͅ݋‬Ѽʪ නʆ̣ᔩ ਂʆ̣ᔩ ‫ݭ‬ЉᕄѼ˫‫˃ح‬ᔩʛ ˑ˃Ѽʪ නʆࠜઅ̶ቂሖ ਂʆࠜઅ්ቂଫ ̌޴ϻ࡛ ʿΠെ ̢ ʑщ˫‫˃ح‬ᔩ˃Љ 44

Liji “Tangong,” part 1 (Liji jijie 7). Qi ₢ is qi α in a loose quotation of this passage in a commentary to the HouHan shu 66 “Chen Wang liezhuan” ௾̙λ෭: ᔩ ৩̆ ʒ϶˃య ̈́౭̓͹˃ࣤʛ ቖ‫ࡢږ‬Щ౜˃ ʿԨ‫ږ‬αЩ˪˃. “The Liji says: ‘A three year mourning period is suitable for repaying your father and mother’s kindness. A worthy bends down in order to come near to it. Those who are unworthy have to stand on tiptoe to reach it.’” (HouHanshu 66.2160, n.4). 45 Liji “Tangong,” part 1. Zheng Xuan explains that while a gentleman would like to attend to it with care, he does not have the time. Sun Xidan argues that early commentators mistakenly equated the rites for the divorced but unmarried mother with those for the remarried mother, something that caused them to misunderstand Zisi’s reply about performing the rites in a timely way as a way of saying he simply did not have the time (Liji jijie 9.220). Qian Mu Ꭵጽ believed that Zisi had an elder halfbrother, and Zisi was actually the son of a concubine (1956, 88.159).

APPENDIX ONE

275

Duke Mu asked Zisi: “Is attending the mourning rites for one’s former lord truly an ancient custom?” Zisi said: “Gentlemen in antiquity advanced others according to the rites and retired them according to the rites. Therefore they had a rite about attending to the mourning rites for one’s former lord. Gentlemen today advance others as if they were going to bounce them on their knees, and retire them as if they were about to fall into an abyss. Not to become the head of a group of soldiers, would this not be good? And so how could they have mourning rites for their former lord?”46 47 ʪ‫˃݋‬͹А‫ؠ‬ሴ ࠸‫ؠ‬ʪ‫ ݋‬ʪ‫ؠ࢛݋‬ᅧ ‫ۃ‬ʆв̆ ઝ̏˃͹А щ޴࢛‫˃̏˱ؠ‬ᅧ̢ ʪ‫ ̆݋‬ѳཫԡ ѳཫԡ ཤ࢛‫ܮ̧ؠ‬ Zi Si’s mother died in Wei. When notice of her death came to Zisi, Zisi cried at the temple. His disciples arrived and said: “A woman from the Shu clan has died. Why is it that you are crying at the Kong clan temple?” Zisi said: “I have erred, I have erred!” Then he went to cry in another room.47 48 ׂʪԾ Meng Ziju48 49 ইጽᎂմֳ̆ ˭ʓЉལ Ӎ⢎ʪը ˭ʓ೷ལ Ӎ࠷ʪᐁ Zhu Mu said to his wife:

46

Liji “Tangong,” part 2. Zheng Xuan explains this in terms of Liji “Sangfu” య ‫ ح‬rules about former lords, but Sun Xidan says Zisi knew this custom had already waned. (Liji jijie 10.266). 47 Liji “Tangong,” part 2 (Liji jijie 10.266). 48 Taiping yulan 363.2a quotes the Shengzheng lun ໶ᗱቈ as saying that the Zisi shu ए (writings) and the Kongcongzi have “Ziju” ʪ‫ ׍‬as Meng Ke’s zi Ϫ or “style name.” Huang Yizhou traces the Kongcongzi identification of Meng’s style name as Ziju to a mistaken reading of the etymology of his given name Ke ඩ: Mengzi ju Kanke, gu ming Ke ׂʪ‫׍‬ҕඩ‫ݭ‬Ϗඩ “Mengzi lived in Kanke, and so he was named Ke,” which might mistakenly be read along the lines: “Meng Ziju, because of Kanke, his given name was Ke.” Based on this misreading, Huang said that Mengzi’s actual style name Ziju ʪԾ was changed to Ziju ʪ‫ ׍‬He cites several Six Dynasties and Tang sources that have the graphically related variant “Ziyu” Ϫᒻ (6.14b-15a).

276

THE RECONSTRUCTED ZISI

“When the Way prevails in the world, I wear things as an apron and you wear things at your waist; when the Way does not prevail in the world, I wear them on my back, and you wear them on your head.”49 50 ࢍዙளኬ‫׍‬ᐼ੬˃‫ ܮ‬ʕးʓᐫ ςҗЩ‫ိף‬ ʪ৸࡝ʨਠ ˀ—Щ‫ڷ‬ছ ৻Ծʿࣅܸ ‫צ‬Գࢍዙ ࢍዙ͸۪⸥ᅟ ӭㄮЩᏻ‫ۃ‬ ʪ৸̆ ᄾ ζΆщॣʛ ࢍዙᏻ˃̆ ዙႝ ೷৷ᎂ௙ ዕལЩʿ঻м˃ᎂॣ ˑዙ௙ʛ ‫ۍ‬ ॣʛ ʪ৸₲ՅЩЉแи Yuan Xian was in Lu. He lived in a house only a few steps wide. Above were leaks and below dampness. He sat erect, strummed and sang. Zigong’s carriage was drawn by great horses, and was purplish blue with white covering. The wide carriage could not fit into Yuan’s narrow lane. So he walked to see Yuan Xian. Yuan Xian straightened his hat and his sandals, used a staff made from the wood of a li bush, and answered the door. Zigong said: “Alas! To see you in such distress!” Yuan Xian responded: “I, Xian, have heard that being without financial resources is called ‘poor.’ Studying but not being able to act on it is called ‘in distress.’ Now I, Xian, am poor, but not in distress.” Zigong hesitated, exhibiting an embarrassed countenance.50 49

Taiping yulan 403.1b has Zhu Mu ই‫ ٴ‬as the speaker. Kunxue jiwen 10.37a says it is a lost text from the Zhuangzi. The use of these verbs recalls Xunzi 10: ᙰ˃‫ݵ‬ ೾՟ளʩᏮᘽग़ ըᘽ΂ ࠷ᐁ෦‫ ہ‬Щཀྵˀʱ˃ഞʛ ᓛ޴˃௬Ⴑඁ ⌛࠱ᆌ⧾ Ѽ ጰֲܵ ΊઅʿԼ̣Ѡʛ. This passage does not mention Zisi, but treats the theme of reclusion in a way reminiscent of Analects 8.13: υՉʿʈ ෩Չʿ‫˭ ׍‬ʓЉལ۱Գ ೷ལ۱ᓙ “When a state is in danger one does not enter it, when it is in chaos one does not dwell in it. When the people of the world possess the Way, then one makes oneself visible. When they do not possess it, then one hides oneself.” 50 Taiping yulan 403.2b-3a. Zhuangzi 28 “Rangwang” ᝖ ̙ (Zhuangzi jishi 9b.975-7), Hanshi waizhuan 1, and Shiji 67.2208 “Zhong Ni dizi liezhuan” have other versions. The Zhuangzi version concludes with Yuan Xian saying: ˮ̛Щм ̍֟Щ ˩ ዕ̣޴ʆ ૥̣޴ʴ ˋ໳˃ᅲ ᒻਠ˃ྟ ዙʿӇ޴ʛ “To act for worldly reasons, to make friends in order to keep up with everyone else, to study for the sake of others, to teach for selfish reasons; the concealment of benevolence and righteousness and the ornamentation of carriage and horses—these are all things I, Xian, could not bear to do.” The Taiping yulan version has xi 〢 for shi ⸥ which the Jin dynasty Li Yi ӨᏅ commentary to the Zhuangzi explains as shoes with the heels worn through from daily use.

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INDEX affective dispositions (qing શ), 170-171, 211, 236-239 ai ื, see caring Allan, Sarah, 142, 163n3, 248 Ames, Roger, 21n21, 159, 161n1, 187n50, 247 an ϯ, see settledness Analects, 13-16, 19, 21, 26-29, 33n47, 40, 49, 57n96, 58n97, 68-71, 103-106, 115, 149, 164, 154n29, 217, 251, 255, 264n22, 307; Ding County version, 30; Analects 1.1, 72n24; 1.11, 193n63, 196; 2.3, 57n97; 2.5, 273n42; 2.20, 218n26; 2.23, 174n29; 2.7, 68, 233; 2.8, 68, 109n18, 135, 154n128; 3.9, 174n29; 3.14, 174n29; 5.13, 112n20; 6.3, 301, 335; 6.22, 83n40, 295; 7.16, 153n124; 8.13, 276n49; 10.1, 334; 12.1, 108; 12.5, 39; 12.20, 154n128; 13.3, 273n42; 13.8, 115n24; 13.10, 113-114; 13.18, 116n24; 14.1, 96n60; 14.4, 124; 15.9, 281; 15.11, 270n35; 15.31, 264n22; 17.11, 108n16; 18.3, 299-300; 18.6-7, 56n96; 18.8 121n38 anxiety (you ᅴ), 71-74, 154n128, 228, 273, 280, 313, 318, 366 apocrypha, 240, 245-248 Ariel, Yoav, 270n36 Aristotle, 8, 255n8 arrow, 183-184, 189-190 Asad, Talal, 252n5 Asano Yûichi 浅野裕一, 341 attaining (de દ), 73 attending to one’s solitude (shen qi du ฻մጤ), 78, 266n25, 287-289, 322323 Baihutong Ύ‫ڴ‬௢, 170n20, 220 Ban Gu ॗ ֣ , 28, 100n68, 131n63, 132n64, 146n110, 153, 152n125, 196n68, 222n36, 241 Bao Xian ̸‫܀‬, 68n17 Baoshan ̸ʱ, 1, 181n37 Baoyuan Taiping jing ̸˔˯ͦ໩, 241 Beitang shuchao ̺੫एය, 267n28-29 Bell, Catherine, 253n5 benevolence (ren ˋ ), 7, 13, 21, 37, 45n73, 46, 51, 53-55, 65, 70n21, 83-

86, 88-89, 103-105, 108-110, 115-117, 123, 124-129, 141, 206-207, 211, 218-219, 221, 226n45, 230, 239, 247248, 254, 258n5, 276n50, 278-279, 283-286, 292, 299-300, 304, 310, 312, 318, 326, 336, 347-348, 350, 353-354, 356-357, 362, 365-367, 370 Bi Yuan ୘Ӽ, 33n47, 38n60, 152n126 Bi Ziyang ඗ʪ෍, 262 Bian ‫ݚ‬, 48 “Biaoji” ‫ڷ‬৩, 98, 230, 258n5, 258n6 Bible, 28, 142n97 Blake, William, 133 Bo Le їᆪ, 45 Bo Yi їϡ, 49n80, 179, 184, 199 Bourdieu, Pierre, 252 Brecht, Berthold, 36 brighten (ming ‫)ا‬, 133, 244 brightness (guang γ), 243-244 Brooks, E. Bruce and A. Taeko, 68n16 Buddha, 24, 242n76 Buddhism, 110n19 Butler, Judith, 252n4 Cai Tingji ሣҽφ, 227 Campany, Robert, 251 canon formation, 13n2 caring (ai ื), 292, 300, 326, 336, 338 Cao Zhi ૹಿ, 222n35 cha ࿫, see insight into Chan, Wing-tsit, 119, 141n97 chang ‫ۂ‬, See circumspection Changes, 136n82, 170n20, 175n30, 226, 237-238, 240n72, 247, 310 Chanzi ᚭʪ, 56n95 Chao Gongwu ऎ˙‫ن‬ charts and proofs, 245 Ch’en Ch’i-yün, 120n35, 210n12 Chen Heng ௾‫ݔ‬, 3n3 Chen Lai ௾գ, 13 Chen Qiyou ௾֮ຢ, 171n24 Chen Songchang ௾‫ۂؽ‬, 63n9 Chen Zhi ௾‫ڇ‬, 147n110 cheng ༻, see sincerity Cheng brothers, 15 Cheng Shude ദዾᅭ, 40n64 Cheng Xuanying Ͼ΁ࠡ, 157n137 Cheng Yichuan ദΥʲ, 104, 128n53

392

INDEX

Cheng zhi wen zhi Ͼ˃ႝ˃, 86n41 chenshu see weft book chenwei, see apocrypha Chifufu ԺΪ୷, 246 Chijingzi Ժႅʪ, 241 Chisongzi Ժ‫ؽ‬ʪ, 214 Chong Yu ̭༗, 194-195 Chonghou lun ઉ۹ቈ, 257n1 Christianity, 24, 163 Chu Shaosun ჎˲ࢽ, 140 Chuci ๤ᘂ, 135, 137, 153n125, 153n126, 159 Chunqiu ‫߲ݱ‬, See Spring and Autumn Chunqiu fanlu ‫߲ݱ‬ᑪᛎ, 129n55, 144, 153n124, 168, 213, 302 Chunyu Kun ଙʝྣ, 92n52, 118-119 ci ิ, see parental kindness circumspection (chang ‫)ۂ‬, 73, 75, 282286, 315-316, 318 classics, 80 clear-sighted (ming ‫)ا‬, 78-79, 81, 8384, 199, 236, 244-245, 285-287, 291, 296, 318, 332, 343, 347 cognition, 74 Confucian, 9, 15-18, 32, 61, 253, see also Ru Confucius, 9, 13, 18, see also Kongzi cong ᑶ, see sharp-eared Consequentialism, 35, 37, 41 constancy (jing ໩), 120n35 Cook, Scott, 80n38, 181n38 correlative cosmology, 219 cosmology, 41, 218 counterfeits, 69 courage (yong ۲), 129, 148, 162, 254, 329 creativity, 186 Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 187n50 Cua, A.S., 119, 124 cutting to essentials (jing ႅ ), 73-75, 127, 131, 282-6, 315-316, 318 DaDai liji ʨᐁᔩ৩, 27n33, 11, 154, 264n22, 294 Dai De ᐁᅭ, 111, 155 Dai Zhen ᐁ኏, 110n19 Dao ལ, see Way “Daoist”, 10, 224, 244 Daoism, 110n19, 139, 249 Dasheng shangzhang jue ʨ໶ʕఈோ, 243-244 Dating ʨࣘ, 269n34 Dawson, Raymond, 68n17

“Daxue” ʨዕ, 87n41, 97 de ᅭ, YKK virtue de દ, see attaining death, 80 deliberateness (xing м), 4n4, 293-294, 301, 304, 329, 339, 352-353 Desheng pian ᅭ໶ᇺ, 205 Dewoskin, Kenneth J., 182, 186 Ding Sixin ʀ͗๘, 64n12, 90, 205, 209, 211 directness (jing ࣜ), 73, 75-76, 285-286, 315-316 dispensationalism, 9, 253 distance (yuan ხ), 83-84, 295, 302, 330, 341 divination, 191 Dobson, W.A.C.H., 119 Documents, 19-20, 26, 68, 76, 93-94, 97, 104, 151n123, 180n180, 216, 224, 226, 248, 258n7, 271 dogs, 129, 144, 233, 271-272 Dong Wuxin ༓೷˻, 56n95 Dong Zhongshu ༓Ϋൗ, 129n55, 144, 153, 204n4, 208n10, 212-213, 219 Donghu Jizi ‫ׄ˽ز‬ʪ, 269 Dongzi ༓ʪ, 56n95 du ጤ, see solitude Du Songbo Ӭ‫ތؽ‬, 221 Duan Yucai ‫΂ޗ‬ൽ, 128n53, 142n97, 153n123, 154n127, 169 Dubs, Homer H., 61 Durkheim, Émile, 251, 251n3 Durrant, Stephen, 33n47 Duyvendak, J.J.L., 266n27 economic arguments, 53 emotion, 74 Eno, Robert, 16n6, 42n68 Erya ၒු, 124n42 essence (jing ႅ), 126, 131-132, 134135, 243 Euclid, 243 expedience, 119-120 extramission optical theory, 243 fa ٗ (model, law), 50, 54 facial coloration (se и), 69, 135, 146, 154, 231, 300, 335, 343 Fan Li ᇷᚵ, 165-167 Fan Ning ᇷ≎, 23 Fan Ye ᇷድ, 242n76 “Fangji” Ґ৩, 68n17, 98 fangshi ̄ʦ, see Masters of Methods

INDEX Fayan ٗԵ, 62, 102n2, 129n58, 236, 249, 253 fate, See ming ֡ father, 83, 114, 260, 300, 336, 362 fetal education (taijiao ࠏ૥), 230, 252 Feng Youlan ෤˩ᚱ, 175n30 Fengsu tongyi ࡘ ۞ ௢ ໳ , 100n68, 165n7, 169-170, 220n31 filial piety (xiao Ҩ), 3-4, 21, 27, 45n73, 49, 53, 100n68, 114-115, 135, 146147, 220, 231, 255 Fingarette, Herbert, 20, 251 fish, 205 five, 168 five phases, 89, 351, see also Wuxing (five phases) Forke, Alfred, 36n54 Foucault, Michel, 24, 252n4 Fu Sheng Ϊఢ, 216, 221-222 Fu Sinian ఔಡ϶, 164n5 Fu Xi Ϊᚧ, 237 funeral rites, 138 Gan Ji ʸφ, 242n76 Gan Zhongke ΅‫̈́׫‬, 241-242 Gao Yao ६ం, 196, 198 Gao You ਢმ, 24n24, 171n24, 269n33 Gaoshi zhuan ਢʦ෭, 263n20 Gaozi Ѿʪ, 109, 110n19, 150-152 Ge Zhaoguang ༏εγ, 18 gift-giving, 108 Giles, Herbert A., 163n4 giving form to (xing Ӂ), 73, 77, 282-3, 285-286, 318-319, 326 glossiness (sui ⓯), 102, 126-128, 252 Goldin, Paul, 232n55 Gong Chong ࣃઉ, 242n76 Gongduzi ˙௲ʪ, 109, 205n5, 216n21 Gongmeng ˙ׂ, 39, 40-42, 55 Gongsun Chou ˙ࢽʽ, 149-152 Gongsun Nizi ˙ࢽ͠ ʪ, 64n12, 203, 210, 220 Gongsun Nizi ˙ࢽ͠ʪ, 203n3, 221 Gongyang ˙ Х Commentary, 23n23, 121n36, 197, 220, 344 Gongyi Xiu ˙ᄭྭ, 263 Goodness (shan െ), 70, 118, 159, 211, 282, 289, 291, 299, 307, 312, 315, 324-326, 350-351, 362 Gottlieb, Paula, 125n48 Graham, A. C., 33n47, 34n48, 145, 187, 219 Granet, Marcel, 159, 252n5

393

Gu Jiegang ᛐንࢉ, 106 Guan Feng ᘕኇ, 34n48 Guan Zhong ၸΫ, 268 guang γ, see brightness Guanzi ၸʪ, 30 Guanzi ၸ ʪ , 76n31, 129, 145-146, 152n122, 155n131, 156-158 guishen ਥআ, 41, 132n64, 239-241, 295 Guliang ᇯૼ Commentary, 23 Guo Jue ௱‫ټ‬, 299 Guo Lihua ௱଎ൡ, 168 Guo Moruo ௱ٖࠜ, 26n30 Guo Xiang ௱ඐ, 91n48, 175 Guo Yi ௱Ԑ, 188n55 Guodian ௱‫מ‬, 1, 30n40, 44n72, 63-66, 70n20, 80n37, 82n39, 86, 170, 205, 210, 258n7, 277-310 Guoyu ੢გ, 65, 167, 168n16 Gushi kaocun ͑ͅШϫ, 156 habitus, 252n5 Haipian ऺᇺ, 172n25 Hall, David, 21n20, 159, 161n2, 187n50 Han Feizi ᓟ‫ۍ‬ʪ, 22-23, 34, 50-51, 5355, 57-58, 75n28, 76, 95, 114-115, 122n38, 262n19, 266n27 Han Ying ᓟᏮ, 3, 61, 90, 115, 216-218 Hanshi waizhuan ᓟ༶͙෭, 3, 5-6, 9, 27n33, 44n72, 61-62, 96n59, 115-116, 124n43, 173-174, 176, 184-186, 218219, 221, 226n45, 236, 276n50, 281, 294 Hanshu ်ए, 28, 29, 35n51, 88, 98n65, 100n68, 103n3, 131n63, 158n146, 168, 203, 223, 230n51, 238n69, 241n74-75, 250, 293 Hao Xu ქࠈ, 269n34 Hao Yixing ਋ᛯм, 91n49, 128n56 haoran ू೸, 152-156 happiness (le ᆪ), 71, 74, 82-83, 101, 144, 169, 180n37, 273, 280, 282-3, 292, 294, 310, 313, 333, 347-348, 371 Harper, Donald, 133, 214 He Xiu щΩ, 23n23, 121n36, 197n69 He Yan щउ, 16n4, 57n96, 175n30 Heshanggong ّ ʕ ˙ Commentary, 133n68, 240, 244-245, 293 Heaven, see tian Hightower, James Robert, 174, 281 Hobshawm, Eric, 216 Hong Zhanhou ‫ޞ‬೛‫ۓ‬, 217 Hong Xingzu ‫ޞ‬፞অ, 135n75 Hong Yao ͩ෉, 369

394

INDEX

horses, 45-46, 134, 139-140, 163, 185, 210, 271-272 Hou Ji ݈ᇱ, 131n63 HouHanshu ်݈ए, 131n63, 139n91, 153n125, 241n75, 257n1, 266n27, 273n43 houwang ݈̙, see Later Kings Hu Kejia ࠍџࣁ, 153n125 Hu Pingsheng ࠍͦΆ, 139 Hu Shi ࠍቱ, 17, 25 Hu Yuanyi ࠍ˔ᄭ, 257n3 Huainanzi ଵ۷ʪ, 24, 45, 89, 102n2, 132n68, 133n71, 149, 158-159, 168, 174, 175, 185n45, 190n57, 190n59, 215, 220, 233, 240-241, 258n4, 260n12-13, 261n14, 265n24, 267n30, 268n31-32, 269n33-34, 323 Huang Hui ෦๚, 215n22 Huang Jinxing ෦න፞, 24 Huang Kan ߗդ, 17, 32, 57n96 Huang Yizhou ෦ ̣ ֟ , 95, 159n146, 257, 261n17, 270n36, 275n48 Huangdi ෦ܹ, see Yellow Emperor Huangdi neijing suwen ෦ܹ˖໩ছ੕, 134, 154n127 Huangfu Mi ߗԜᒩ, 263n20 Huangjin ෦ʷ, see Yellow Turbans HuangLao ෦Ч, 242n76 Hucker, Charles O., 314 human nature, 103, 109-111, 145, 170171, 204, 207, 211-213, 257

jade tone (yuyin ΂ࡖ), 78, 81, 221-222, 285-286, 319 Jensen, Lionel, 17 Jesus, 28 Jia Yi ཋ ሼ , 10, 124n42, 132, 140, 195n65, 202, 217, 223-232, 245, 247, 250, 252-253 jian’ai ࡾื, 35, 336 Jiang Boqian ሢїᆻ, 33n47, 98, 103n3 Jiang Guanghui ‫ܟ‬ᅩቨ, 87 Jiao Xun ೵౮, 107n15, 109n18, 118n31, 121, 138n83, 153, 160n147, 179-183, 184n44, 193, 222n37 Jin Zhuo ईԒ, 293 jing ๖, see reverence jing ႅ , see cutting to essentials and essence jing ࣜ, see directness jing ໩, see constancy Jingzi ದʪ, 203n3 Jinlouzi ‫ہ‬ᆧʪ, 266n26 Jiu Tangshu ᕄ࢑ए, 98n65 Jiyun ූᘜ, 155 Job, 142n97 Johnson, Mark, 252n4 joy (yue ࣬), 144, 253, 280, 285-286, 292, 298, 300, 310, 313, 315, 326, 335-336, 370 Junzhai dushu zhi ਊᓲᜃएӆ, 270n36 jurisprudence, 67, 85, 117, 206, 209 Juyan ‫ע׍‬, 1

Ikeda Tomohisa 池 田 知 久 , 45n73, 46n76, 65n13, 65, 277ff, 311ff inner mind (zhongxin ˀ˻), 70, 74, 81, 84, 278, 313, 335, 338, 341 insight into (cha ࿫), 73, 285-286, 315, 318 intention (yi ำ), 107, 187, 241, 288, 325-326 Ivanhoe, Philip J., 4, 21, 21n20, 35n52, 70n21, 108, 138, 141n97, 164n6, 194n64, 301

Kageyama Terukuni 影山輝国, 89-90 Kang Youwei છЉ޴, 197n69 Karlgren, Bernhard, 73n23, 128n52, 158n142, 257n3, 296, 298 Kern, Martin, 50n83 Knoblock, John, 61n2, 92n52, 128n56, 297 Kobayashi Shinmei 小林信明, 207 Kong An’guo ˱ϯ੢, 16n4 Kong Bai ˱Ύ, see Zishang Kong Ji ˱β, 95-97, 234, see also Zisi Kong Qiu ˱̞, see Kongzi Kong Yingda ˱ጼཥ, 147n111, 257n3 Kongcongzi ˱ᓳʪ, 75, 95, 100, 234, 262n18-19, 263n20-21, 264n22, 266n26, 270n36, 271n37, 273n43, 275n48 Kongzi ˱ʪ, 13-32, 40, 44n72, 48-49, 51, 57n96, 59-61, 69, 70n21, 75, 84n40, 88, 95, 97-99, 104-107, 112114, 129, 135, 138, 153n124, 154,

jade, 78, 102, 104n6, 127-128, 132, 1334, 136, 159, 178, 218n28 jade coloration (yuse ΂и), 78, 81, 102, 128, 285-286, 318 jade chimestone, 66n15, 81, 162, 171, 177-192, 217, 250, 267n30, 290-291, 325-326, 359 jade speech, 252

INDEX 168n16, 175-176, 179, 182, 185n45, 192, 195-196, 198-199, 201, 203, 206, 217-218, 233-234, 239, 247, 251, 254, 261n17, 271, 285, 290, 295, 297, 305, 319, 321, 334, 356, 358 Kongzi jiayu ˱ ʪ ࣁ გ , 3n3, 129, 168n16, 261n17, 268n32 Kunxue jiwen ҍ ዕ ߺ ႝ , 61, 98n65, 271n37, 276n49 Lakoff, George, 252n4 Lao Siguang డ‫݋‬γ, 25 Laozi Чʪ, 165n7, 468n16, 293, 297 Laozi Чʪ, 48n78, 63, 75n28, 133n68, 157, 159, 223, 240, 244-245 Later Kings, 93 Lau, D.C., 68n17, 84n40, 101n1, 110n19, 136n82, 139n88, 141n97, 152, 164, 181, 195n65, 198, 281 le ᆪ, see happiness Lee Sang-Im, 124 Legge, James, 24, 119, 136n82, 141n97, 149n116, 152n122, 198, 258n5 Lewis, Mark Edward, 233, 250 li ୎, see pattern li ᔩ , see rites, Ritual, and ritual propriety Li Cang ѦႺ, 63, 224 Li Hansan Ө်ʒ, 207n7 Li Jinglin Өದ‫ظ‬, 167 Li Ling Өྒ, 130n59, 139, 277ff Li Minghui Ө‫ا‬๚, 151n120 Li Shan Өെ, 222, 258n7 Li Si Өಡ, 61 Li Xian Өቖ, 241n75, 247n90, 257n1, 266n27 Li Xueqin Өዕ෺, 30n45, 87, 168n17 Li Yaoxian Өᙟ̫, 90 Li Yi ӨᏅ, 276n50 Li Zehou Өጎ۹, 106 Liang Qichao ૼ૧ඟ, 33n47 Lienüzhuan λʩ෭, 201, 251, 270n36 Liezi λʪ, 177n23 Liji ᔩ৩, 30n40, 68, 69n17, 75, 95, 97, 118n31, 129, 146, 147n111, 154n127, 160n147, 170n21, 180n36, 188, 190, 222n37, 231, 234, 236, 257n1, 257n2, 257n3, 258n5, 258n6, 258n7, 260n8, 260n9, 265n24, 267n30, 269n34, 270n35, 272n41, 273n42, 274n44-45, 275n46-47, 288, 290, 293, 303, 321, 339 Lin Biao ‫ظ‬ழ, 25

395

Liu An ᄸϯ, 240 Liu Bang ᄸՉ, 63, 226n45, 298 Liu Baonan ᄸᘽ๦, 16n4 Liu Heng ᄸ‫ݔ‬, 3n3, 278 Liu Jie ᄸ໢, 157-158 Liu Shipei ᄸࣖ੮, 124n42 Liu Taigong ᄸႨ‫ݤ‬, 89n43 Liu Xi ᄸ၍, 153 Liu Xiang ᄸώ, 42n68, 88, 95-96, 100, 129, 158n140, 218n25, 241, 250, 270n36 Liu Xin ᄸ⑮, 270n36 Liu Xinfang ᄸ ‫ ڤ ۑ‬, 181n37, 277ff, 311ff Liu Xiu ᄸԣ, 30, 246-247 Liu Xu ᄸນ, 98n65 Liu Zehua ᄸጎൡ, 245, 248n94 “Liude” ˗ᅭ, 87n41 Liuxia Hui ‫ގ‬ʓ౴, 179, 184, 199 liuxing ˗м, 225 liuyi ˗ᗟ, 19 liuyi ˗໳, 346 Loewe, Michael, 30n42, 240n76 Long Hui Ꮭ࣪, 243 Louden, Robert, 116 loyalty (zhong ‫)׫‬, 3-4, 52, 121n36, 220 Lu Bian ጰᛂ, 154n128 Lu Jia ௿ཋ, 118, 208n10 Lu Mugong wen Zisi ኬጽ˙੕ʪ‫݋‬, 95 Lu Wenchao ጰ́ᦞ, 91n48, 224 Luan Tiaofu 㑌ቆԜ, 188 Lunheng ቈ ፰ , 40n64, 56n95, 64n12, 103n3, 137n83, 138, 176, 203, 210, 213, 239, 253, 262n19, 270n36 Lunyu, See Analects Lunyu chen ቈგ᝘, 26n32 Luo Genze ᗘघጎ, 157-158 Lushi པ͑, 269n34 Lüshi chunqiu ѻ ̏ ‫ ߲ ݱ‬, 35n50, 89, 92n51, 115n23, 140, 154n127, 171, 263n21, 266n27, 329 Lynn, Richard John, 293 Ma Duanlin ਠၷᒂ, 270n36 Ma Jigao ਠጻਢ, 134n74 Ma Ruichen ਠສՀ, 158n142 Ma Yuan ਠಕ, 139 Ma Zonghuo ਠ‫ׅ‬Ꮈ, 153n23 Machle, Edward, 167n12 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 124 Maekawa Shôzô ‫ۮ‬ʲોʒ, 144n103 Man Goude ျࠨદ, 49 Maogong ̎˙, 127n52, 288

396

INDEX

marriage, 123 Masters of Methods (fangshi ̄ʦ), 241 material virtue, 5, 112, 219, 223, 228, 251 Mathieu, Rémi, 168n16 Mauss, Marcel, 252n5 Mawangdui ਠ̙੧, 1, 63, 63n9, 64-66, 70n20, 79, 82n39, 89, 130, 133, 154n127, 160, 202-206, 208n10, 211, 229, 247n90, 249, 311-370 medicine, 102, 127-141, 144, 254 Mei Cheng ‫࡝ـ‬, 146n108 Meng Ben ׂඖ, 328-329 Meng Ke ׂඩ, see Mengzi Meng Yizi ׂᛯʪ, 273n42 Mengzi ׂʪ, 6, 59-60, 66, 67n16, 87, 93, 96, 98-99, 103-106, 111-113, 117n30, 136-137, 148-151, 155, 179, 193n63, 194-196, 198-199, 205, 214, 216, 232, 244, 247, 257n3, 270n36, 270n36, 275n48 Mengzi ׂʪ, 6, 9, 33n47, 60-62, 67, 71, 87-90, 95, 100-159, 161-162, 176-177, 182-183, 191-193, 195-200, 203, 205n5, 212-216, 219, 225, 229-230, 232-236, 239, 240n73, 242, 248-250, 252-253, 255, 267n30, 270n36, 287, 294; Mengzi 1A1, 270n36; 1A7, 105, 122-123, 142n99, 150, 178-183, 187, 338; 2A2, 105, 123, 142n99, 147, 148-156, 175, 188, 253; 2A6, 139, 140; 2B2, 199; 2B4, 369; 2B7, 267n30; 2B12, 152n122; 2B13, 194196, 199; 3A1, 142n98; 3A2, 138n85; 3A3, 142n99; 3A4, 154-155; 3A5, 108, 267n30; 3B1, 108n15, 281; 3B7, 135; 3B9, 105; 4A12, 188n55; 4A13, 199; 4A15, 136-137, 138n83, 143n100; 4A17, 118-120; 4B1, 192, 249; 4B3, 362; 4B12, 146n111, 147n111; 4B19, 108; 4B28, 123, 142n98, 364; 4B31, 271n38; 4B32, 141n98; 5A5, 248n94; 5A8, 106n11; 5B1, 65n15, 109, 161, 179-184, 189, 198-199, 222n37, 290, 305, 325-326, 348, 356, 358; 5B4, 106n11; 5B6, 265n23, 272n39; 5B7, 106n11, 272n40, 281; 6A2, 293; 6A4, 151n121; 6A5, 138n85, 205n5; 6A6, 205n5, 216n21; 6A7, 142n98; 6A8, 142-143, 148; 6A11, 144n101; 6B1, 122n40; 6B2, 142n98; 7A21, 101-102, 126, 137n82, 138; 7A26, 121n37;

7A27, 142n99; 7A36, 148; 7A37, 107, 156; 7A38, 136; 7B1, 358; 7B24, 109-111, 165; 7B25, 159-159; 7B31, 358; 7B37, 108n16, 121; 7B38, 195199 Meno, 169 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 252n4 metal bell, 66n15, 81-82, 109, 162, 171, 177-192, 222, 250, 267n30, 290-291, 325-326, 359 Mi Zijian ᦅʪቓ, 26, 64n12, 203 Mizi ᦅʪ, 203n3 ming ֡ (command, fate, mandate), 19, 39-40, 107n14, 110, 136, 170, 192, 207, 248, 257n1, 365-367 ming ‫ا‬, see clear-sighted and brighten Miyazki Hayao, 244n84 Mo Di ኳႜ, 33, 35, 105, 108, 240n72, 306, 336 moral balance (quan ᛱ), 118-124 mourning ritual, 36, 51, 141, 272-275 Mozi ኳʪ, 26n30, 33-43, 50-52, 54-56, 57n96, 58, 69, 92-93, 95, 107, 121, 164, 188, 239 Mu ጽ, Duke of Lu, 274 music, 37-38, 127, 168, 174, 180-182, 186, 229, 261, 271, 298, 347-348, 350 Music (Yue ᆪ), 186, 226, 271n37 mysticism, 145, 255n8 Nakamura Shôhachi 中村璋八, 186n47 Nan Rong ۷ࣅ, 217 natural cycles theory, 126, 244 natural procedures (tianshu ˭ᆚ), 167 natural Way (tiandao ˭ལ ), 164-167, 177, 192, 280, 291, 319, 325, 333, 343-344, 346-347, 370-371 Ni Kuan հᅛ, 250 Nivison, David S., 46n76, 108 Nussbaum, Martha, 125, 255 Nylan, Michael, 155, 223n39, 234 Odes, 3, 15, 26, 48, 68, 72, 76, 78, 93-94, 97, 99, 104, 127-8, 158, 180, 185, 193n63, 206n7, 217-218, 226, 257, 258n6, 259, 260n8, 271, 283, 293, 304, 315-316, 321-323, 348; Mao 1, 364-365, 367; Mao 10, 283; Mao 14, 76, 283, 285, 315-316; Mao 18, 185; Mao 26, 72; Mao 27, 72; Mao 28, 78, 287-288, 321-323; Mao 126, 283; Mao 128, 126-128; Mao 132, 283; Mao 151, 231n53; Mao 152, 78, 287-

INDEX 288, 321-323; Mao 165, 158; Mao 168, 283, 285, 315-316; Mao 179, 180; Mao 191, 258n7, 260n8; Mao 198, 258n6; Mao 217, 283; Mao 235, 298, 348, 364-365; Mao 236, 296-297, 308, 343-344, 364-365, 368; Mao 246, 292; Mao 250, 285; 283 Mao 257, 4; Mao 260, 301-302; Mao 267, 257n3; Mao 304, 207n7, 267n7, 304-5, 352 O’ Hara, Albert, 201 Onozawa Seichi 小野沢精一, 157 Ouyang Xiu ᆮ෍ࡸ, 98n65 Pang Pu ᖦྯ, 67, 89, 90, 112, 277ff, 311ff parental kindness (ci ิ), 69 pattern (li ୎), 226 peachtrees, 73 Pei Songzhi ჉‫˃ؽ‬, 269n34 physiognomy, 102, 127-141, 243, 254 Pi Xirui ΏᎧສ, 221 pig, 107, 156 Pincoffs, Edmund, 116 Pines, Yuri, 16n5 Plato, 7, 169n18, 255 pneumas, see qi म Poo Moo-chou Ⴓᅳϳ, 63 Pound, Ezra, 20 Prince Fei ‫ ۍ‬of Han, 22, 33, 61, 114 Protagoras, 7, 125, 255 Ptolemy, 243 Puett, Michael, 159 qi म, 8-9, 102, 104, 110n19, 113, 131132, 137, 141, 143-160, 187, 193, 202-215, 238n69, 240, 242, 253, 326, 328, 330-331, 347-348, 350 Qi Yuzhang ‫΂ڌ‬ఈ, 225n44 Qian Daxin Ꭵʨ‫ت‬, 29 Qiankun zuodu ਦ֪តܾ, 247-248 Qidiao Kai ွᎴළ, 26, 64n12, 203 Qidiaozi ွᎴʪ, 203n3 Qilue ʁୖ, 271n36 Qimin yaoshu ᄫͺ࠱ி, 140n93 qing શ, see affective dispositions Qing Xitai ࢌҹळ, 241n74, 242n77 Qingshishi ji ‫̏͑ی‬৩, 229 Qiongda yishi ᇴཥ̣इ, 87n41, 172 Qu fuha jue ̓िൡோ, 242 Qu Jian ‫ܿ׌‬, 266n27 quan ᛱ, see moral balance rabbits, 50, 266

397

Ranger, Terrence, 216 reflection (si ‫)݋‬, 73, 286-287, 318-319 ren ˋ, see benevolence Ren Jiyu έᙜฺ, 69 resonance, 178, 182-186, 218, 222, 326 reverence (jing ๖), 20, 69, 76, 83, 89, 107-108, 135, 146, 218, 295, 302-303, 312, 330-331, 341, 347 righteousness (yi ໳), 7, 21, 46, 51, 54, 56, 57n96, 65, 70, 83-86, 88-89, 103105, 108-110, 114, 115-116, 126-127, 141, 156-158, 183, 206-7, 211, 218219, 221, 226n45, 247-248, 254, 260, 276n50, 278-279, 298-299, 302, 304, 310, 328-329, 338-339, 346-348, 350, 353-354, 356-357, 361-362, 365-366, 370-371 rites (li ᔩ), 13, 19, 38, 48, 69, 75, 80, 105, 118, 232, 271, 347-348 Ritual (li ᔩ), 226, 271n37 ritual propriety (li ᔩ), 21, 65, 76, 82-83, 85, 87-88, 103, 108, 110, 127, 140, 211, 217-218, 220, 247-248, 251, 254n7, 278-279, 295, 298-299, 303, 310, 312, 330-331, 341-342, 347, 350, 365, 367, 371 ritualization, 10, 223, 228 Robber Zhi ഞ⌳, 33, 48, 49, 254 Robinet, Isabelle, 242n78 Rongcheng ࣅϾ, 269n34 Rongcheng shi ̏, 235 Roth, Harold, D. 34n48, 152n122, 155n131, 158n140 Ru ኵ, 9, 15-25, 31, 46, 59, 67, 82, 86, 92, 93, 99, 101, 104, 113, 125-126, 135-136, 140, 158-159, 164-165, 173, 191, 193, 199-202, 208n10, 232, 235236, 250, 254-255 sacrifice, 46, 147n110, 231, 246 sagacity, 65-67, 70, 83-84, 88-89, 111, 118, 141, 162, 168, 182-183, 191, 211, 221, 225, 227, 250, 253-254, 278-280, 307, 312-313, 318, 332-333, 344, 347-348, 362 sage, 6, 10, 46, 60, 80, 81, 84, 92, 101, 104n6, 111-112, 125, 142, 158-159, 162, 165, 168, 173, 176, 185-187, 194-200, 215, 232, 235, 237-245, 247-250, 253, 260, 266, 285-286, 291, 296, 298, 315-316, 319, 326, 332, 343-344 Sanguo zhi ʒ੢ӆ, 269n34

398

INDEX

San Yi sheng ಞ‫׈‬Ά, 196, 199, 369 Schaberg, David, 16n5, 24n25 Schipper, Kristofer, 242n78 Schofer, Jonathan, 232n55 Schwartz, Benjamin, 57n96, 122n37, 141n97, 144 se и, see facial coloration Sellmann, James, 171n23, 348 semblances, 70, 79, 82, 85, 108, 138 settledness (an ϯ), 71, 74, 154, 282-3, 292, 318, 347, 350 sex, 123, 133, 366-367 shamans, 17, 39 shan െ, see goodness Shanghai Museum bamboo slips, 27n33, 30n40 Shangjunshu ੋѼए, 266n27, 318 Shangshu ‫׋‬ए, see Documents Shangshu dazhuan ‫׋‬एʨ෭, 186n46, 221-222 sharp-eared (cong ᑶ), 78-79, 81, 83-84, 164, 176, 236, 243, 285-286, 291, 296, 298, 318, 332, 343, 346 sheep, 106, 113-114 shen আ, see spirit Shen Ming Όᄦ, 4n5 Shen Nong আའ, 24 "Shen nü" আʩ, 134 Shen Yue Ӻ߽, 98 Shenjian Όᜌ, 120n35, 210, 236 shenqidu ฻մጤ, see attending to one’s solitude Shenzi ฻ʪ, 156, 266n27 sheng ໶, see sage Shi ̛, Master, 203-211, 353-354 Shi She Δੰ, 115-116, 120 Shi Shi ̛ၭ, 64n12, 65n13, 203-211, 215 Shi Tuo Δ̧, 3-5, 49 Shi Zhu Δମ, 115n23 Shiji ͑ ৩ , 3n3, 33-35, 94n54, 95, 96n59-60, 97, 103n3, 104, 117n30, 128n52, 140n94, 168n16, 217n22, 220-221, 223, 235, 257n2, 276n50, 294, 369 Shijing ༶໩, see Odes Shimamori Tetsuo 島森哲男, 78n35, 288 Shiming ᙼϏ, 153 Shiwen ʏ੕, 133, 148n112 Shizi ʰʪ, 262n18 Shu ए, see Documents shu ி, see technique Shu Xiang ֋ώ, 4n4, 38n62

Shuihudi ၨ‫ڴ‬ϙ, 1 Shun ൘, 5, 20n14, 91, 96, 109, 135, 143, 160n147, 192, 196, 198, 248-249, 266, 358-359, 366-367 Shun Kwong-loi, 108n15 Shuogua იֆ, 207 Shuowen jiezi ი́༱Ϫ, 127n53, 135, 142n97, 152n123 Shuoyuan ი ࠥ , 42n68, 92n52, 97, 124n42, 129, 226n45, 261n17, 264n22, 264n23, 266n27, 285, 320 si ‫݋‬, see reflection sifang ͗̄, 228 silkworm, 131 Sima Niu ͌ਠ̗, 40 Sima Qian ͌ ਠ ት , 29, 94n54, 99, 103n3, 104n234, 235 Sima Xiangru ͌ਠߟϨ, 146 Sima Zhen ͌ਠ࠶, 100n68, 257n2 Siming ͌֡, 181n37 sincerity (cheng ༻ ), 145-147, 153, 160n147, 162, 180, 183, 186-191, 258, 273, 356, 359 Sivin, Nathan, 117n30, 168n17, 253n6 slaves, 85 Socrates, 7, 169, 255 solitude (du ጤ), 173, 176, 236, 244-245 Song Jian ҭ⍣, 157-158 Song Yu ҭ΂, 134 spirit (shen আ), 158-159, 176, 191, 199200, 239, 244, 356-357, see also guishen spirit luminances, 41-42, 236 Spring and Autumn (Chunqiu ‫)߲ݱ‬, 1516, 23, 121n36, 186n47, 197, 220, 226, 302, 344 Stocker, Michael, 116n27 Stone Canal Pavilion, 223 sui ⓯, See glossiness Suishu ෌ए, 98 Summa Theologica, 162 Sun Xidan ࢽҹͲ, 146n116, 222n38, 273n42-43, 274n45, 275n46 Sun Yirang ࢽ⌞᝖, 16n6, 52n86, 56n95, 91n50 Suolu Lu জ㏏㏏, 305-306, 357, 359 Suolu Shen জ㏏੉, 306, 359 Svarverud, Rune, 223 sword, 47 Taigong Wang ˯˙ૻ, 196, 199 Taichan shu ࠏ୕ए, 133n68, 229 taijiao ࠏ૥, see fetal education

INDEX Taiping jing ˯ ͦ ໩ , 233, 240-243; authenticity, 242n77; precursor texts, 242n76, 242n78, 253 Taiping yulan ˯ ͦ ጺ ᚹ , 170n20, 185n46, 248n93, 258n4, 258n6, 260n12-13, 262n18, 263n20, 267n2829, 268n31-32, 269n33, 275n48, 276n49-50 Tairen ʨέ, 251 Takeuchi Teruo, 21n20 Tang ೢ, 31, 39n62, 196, 199, 218, 249, 266, 358-359 Tang Yongtong ೢ·Ӏ, 175n30 Tang Yu zhi dao ࢑༗˃ལ, 87n41, 218 Taylor, Charles, 123n41 technique, 50 theodicy, 43 tian ˭ (Heaven, the heavens, Nature) 10, 19-20, 40-44, 50, 56, 65n15, 83, 97, 107n14, 109-111, 118, 131, 145, 148, 149, 152-159, 161-172, 177-178, 191-192, 194-195, 199-200, 204n4, 207, 227-228, 232, 235-244, 246-250, 253-254, 257n1, 265n24, 291, 297298, 309, 318-319, 322-323, 333, 343-344, 346-348, 365-367, 369 Tian Chang Ήગ, 2-4, 49 Tian Zifang Ήʪ̄, 46, 263-4, 296 tiandao ˭ལ, see “natural Way” Tiandi ˭ܹ, 241 Tianjun ˭Ѽ, 241 tianren gangying ˭ʆีᏻ, 204n4 tianshu ˭ᆚ, see natural procedures tianyi ˭ำ, 241, 242n78, 247 Tianguan li ˭‫ׇ‬ᔩ, 241 Tianwen qixiang zazhan ˭́मඐᕺ̀, 153n127 Tianxia zhidao tan ˭ʓвལሾ, 134 Tianzhongji ˭ˀ৩, 268n32, 269n34 Tongdian ௢յ, 270n35 totoro トトロ, 245n84 transcendence, 161-162, 177 trustworthiness (xin ‫) ۑ‬, 21, 88-89, 146n109, 159, 200, 225n43, 247-248, 250, 273, 335 Tuanzhuan ᬃ෭, 237 tuchen ࿌᝘, see charts and proofs unity of the virtues, 6, 114, 118, 125 Unschuld, Paul, 144 Upright Gong, 113-116, 117, 120 uprightness (zhi ‫)ڇ‬, 83-84, 113, 293294, 301, 328, 338

399

Utilitarianism, 36 Utopia, 46 Van Norden, Bryan W. 5 Van Zoeren, Steven, 193 Vankeerberghen, Griet, 240 virtue (de ᅭ), 70-71, 74, 118, 128, 141, 180n36, 211, 218n27, 232, 235, 237, 266, 278-279, 282, 285-286, 289, 291-292, 298, 310, 312-313, 315-316, 324, 325-326, 333, 347-348, 350-351, 371 virtue discourse, 5 virtue ethics, 4-5, 21 von Falkenhausen, Lothar, 142n97 Waley, Arthur, 72n23, 128n52, 158n142, 257n3, 293, 365 Wan Zhang ໗ఈ, 104, 106n11, 112 Wang Aihe ̙ื֜, 228 Wang Bao ̙ሸ, 222n36, 258n7 Wang Bi ̙౫, 175, 293 Wang Chong ̙̭, 64n72, 103n3, 137, 145, 176-177, 203-204, 209, 211, 213, 239, 270n36 Wang Fu ̙୷, 134, 136n81 Wang Mang ̙஧, 242n76, 245-246 Wang Ming ̙‫ا‬, 242n77 Wang Niansun ̙ ‫ ࢽ ׭‬, 155n131, 190n58 Wang Qiao ̙఻, 214 Wang Shao ̙ᡣ, 100n68 Wang Shumin ̙֋٧, 34n48, 157n137 Wang Su ̙ോ, 75, 129, 270n35 Wang Xianqian ̙ζᒣ, 80n36, 134n73, 172n24 Wang Yi ̙ධ, 135n75 Wang Yinglin ̙ᏻᝈ, 61, 98n65 Wangjiatai ̙ࣁႨ, 1 warm (wen ຈ), 127 Way (dao ལ), 126, 145, 149, 156-157, 183, 186, 190, 193-194, 208, 212, 214, 223-224, 226-228, 245, 248, 257, 258, 275, 280, 296, 310, 319-320, 339, 346-348, 353-354, 362380-371 weft books (weishu ሁए), 186, 245 Wei Juxian ሴ႞ቖ, 166n9 Wei Qipeng ᖒ ૧ ᘮ , 166n10, 277ff, 311ff Wei Xuancheng ࡔ΁Ͼ, 29n38 Wei Zhao ࡔ‫ݲ‬, 165n8 Wei Zheng ᖒᅮ, 98n65 wen ຈ, see warm

400

INDEX

Wen ́, King, 31, 48, 51, 154, 180n36, 192, 196, 199, 222n37, 249, 251, 266, 298-9, 348, 365, 367, 369 Wenxian tongkao ́ᙋ௢ᣉ, 270n36 Wenxuan ́ ᎚ , 27n32, 134n74, 144n108, 153n124, 153n125, 222, 258n7 “Wenyan” ́ Ե , 136n82, 170n20, 240n72 Wenzi ́ʪ, 190n59, 258n4 White Tiger Hall, 223 will (zhi ӆ), 104, 151, 193-194, 243 Wilson, Stephen A., 123n41 winds, 144 wisdom (zhi ನ), 21, 54, 66, 70, 74, 8384, 88-89, 101, 103, 108, 110-113, 127, 141, 183, 198-199, 211, 221, 226, 246-247, 254, 279-80, 282, 283-286, 291-292, 296, 298-299, 312-313, 315316, 332-333, 343-344, 347-348, 350 Wu Jiulong ѹʃᏝ, 130n59 Wu ‫ن‬, King, 20n14, 48, 195, 222n37, 249, 266, 320 Wu Yue chunqiu ѹඞ‫߲ݱ‬, 152n127 wuchang ˉગ, 88, 168, 248n93, 250, 278 wude ˉᅭ, 89 wuwei ೷޴, 158, 326 Wuxing ˉ м , 7-10, 59-100, 101-113, 116-118, 124, 137, 159, 161-164, 167-172, 173, 175-188, 190-191, 197, 199, 200, 210-216, 218, 225-228, 230, 232-236, 239, 242-244, 248-250, 251, 252-255, 266n25; GD (or MWD C equivalents) §1, 65, 70, 81-82, 109, 161; §2, 65, 71-73, 81, 186, 313; §3, 72n24, 79n36, 233; §4, 73-76, 81, 186; §5, 65, b76, 182; §6, 65, 76-78, 81, 171, 178, 183; §7, 78-79, 81; §8, 66n15, 79-81, 178, 182; §9, 65n15, 80-81, 109, 161, 178, 183; §10, 65, 77n34; §11, 65; §12, 65, 241; §13, 65; §14, 65, 77n34; §15, 65, 77n34, 83-84, 226; §16, 65, 84; §17, 65, 82-83, 218n27; §18, 65, 82-83; §19, 65, 8283; §20, 84, 116, 206; §21, 66n15, 84, 179, 239; §22, 84; §23, 66n15; MWD E §6, 282; E §8, 289-290; E §10, 211; E §11, 211; E §12, 211; E §13, 291; E §14, 300; E §15, 293, 305, 359; E §17, 348; E §18, 211, 226n45, 297; E §19, 212, 321, 346; E §20, 208-209, 304; E §21, 160, 321, 335, 356; translation of

GD §1, 278-279; §2, 280; §3, 280281; §4, 281-282; §5, 282-285; §6, 285-287; §7, 287-289; §8, 289-290; §9, 290-291; §10, 291-292; §11, 292293; §12, 293-294; §13, 294-295; §14, 295-297; §15, 297-299; §16, 299-300; §17, 300-301; §18, 301-302; §19, 302-303; §20, 303-305; §21, 305-306; §22, 307-308; §23, 308-309; §24, 309; §25, 309-310; translation of MWD §1, 312-313; §2, 313-314; §3, 314; §4, 314-315; §5, 315-317; §6, 317-320; §7, 320-323; §8, 323-324; §9, 324-326; §10, 326-328; §11, 328329; §12, 329-331; §13, 331-333; §14, 333-336; §15, 337-339; §16, 340-344; §17, 342-344; §18, 345-348; §19, 348-351; §20, 351-354; §21, 354-359; §22, 359-363; §23, 363-368; §24, 368-369; §25, 369-371 wuxing ˉм (five phases), 113, 131n63, 168, 174, 196-197, 215, 219, 242n77, 244-245 Wuxing commentary, 6, 8-9, see also Wuxing under "MWD E" Wuxing pian ˉмᇺ, see Wuxing wuang ˉᕅ (five organs), 168 Xia Heliang ࢬ඘ԯ, 241 xiang ୭ (fortune), 42 xiang ߟ, see physiognomy Xiang ඐ, 247n90 Xiang gou fang ߟ‫̄ٹ‬, 130 Xiang ma jing ߟਠ໩, 129-131, 140n95 Xiang Kai ᒝ๥, 242n76-77 xiao Ҩ, see filial piety Xici ᗓᘂ, 237, 309 xin ‫ۑ‬, see trustworthiness xin ˻, see mind Xin Tangshu ๘࢑ए, 98n65 Xin Zhui Կਆ, 63 xing ‫׷‬, see human nature xing м, see deliberateness xing Ӂ, see giving form to Xingqing lun ‫׷‬શቈ, see Xing zi ming chu Xing Wen Շ́, 65n13, 65, 66n15 Xing zi ming chu ‫ ׷‬б ֡ ̳ , 71n22, 80n37, 87n41, 170, 210, 236, 257n1 Xinshu ๘ए, 124n42, 132, 195n65, 223229 Xinxu ๘Һ, 3n3, 96n59 Xinyu ๘გ, 208n10

INDEX Xu Fang ࣝՎ, 26n32 Xu Fuguan ࣝ౭ᝳ, 134n71 Xu Guang ࣝᅩ, 294 Xu Shen ்฻, 135, 152n123 Xiandi zhuan ᙋܹ෭, 269n34 Xun Qing ৖ࢌ, 59, 61-62, 213, 251 Xun Wu ৖ѹ, 269n33 Xun Xi ৖ࣥ, 260 Xun Yue ৖࣬, 120n35, 236 Xunzi ৖ʪ, see Xun Qing Xunzi ৖ʪ, 9, 27, 43, 44n72, 46, 46n76, 48n79, 51n86, 59-61, 76, 80, 82, 8694, 96, 104, 110n19, 112, 122, 126, 128, 136-138, 167, 172n26, 175, 191193, 199-200, 203, 218n27, 232, 234, 239, 253, 264n22, 276n49, 287, 289290, 297, 324, 362 Yamada, Toshiaki 山田利明, 214 Yamada Katsumi 山田勝美, 216n21 Yan Buke ᎰӴџ, 18 Yan Ying उᏮ, 38 Yan Yuan ᖄଫ, 13, 27, 301, 335, 358359 Yangshu ኙए, 203 Yangxinglun ኙ‫׷‬ቈ, 204n4 Yang Bojun ๫ ї ࣍ , 101n1, 124n42, 155n129, 195n65 Yang Liang ๫ ଘ , 60n2, 76n32, 88, 91n48, 90n49, 91n50, 128n56 Yang Rubin ๫ኵᐠ, 137n82, 220 Yang Shuda ๫ዾཥ, 24n24, 260n13 Yang Xiong ๫෕, 62, 129n58, 155n129, 155, 209, 213-214, 216n21, 236, 238, 249 Yang Zhu ๫Ќ, 34n48, 105, 110n19 Yang Zebo ๫ጎٕ, 150 Yantielun ᝩᛆቈ, 117, 264n22 Yanzi उʪ, 4n4, 30, 104n6 Yanzi chunqiu उ ʪ ‫ ߲ ݱ‬, 4n4, 16n6, 38n61 Yao ࠱, 208n10 Yao ూ, 20n14, 96, 124n42, 135, 160n47, 165n7, 171-172, 196, 198, 246, 248n94, 249, 266, 358-359 Yates, Robin D.S., 166n9 Yasui Kôzan 安居香山, 186n47, 245 Yearley, Lee, 4, 70, 163n2 Yellow Emperor, 24, 242n76, 246, 247n91, 269n34 Yellow Turbans, 242n76 yi ໳, see righteousness yi ำ, see intention

401

Yi Yin Υ˄, 179, 184, 184n44, 196, 199, 358-359 Yijing ‫أ‬໩, see Changes Yilin ‫ظأ‬, 159, 258n4, 258n5, 260n913, 261n14-17 yin ఀ and yang ෍, 85, 113, 116-118, 136n82, 155, 167, 168, 199, 203, 205n4, 206-211, 220, 226, 238n69, 242n77, 245, 247, 297 Yin Wen ˄́, 157-159 Yinwenzi ˄́ʪ, 266n27 Yinqueshan ჿఅʱ, 1, 130 Yinwan ˄ᝯ, 1 Yinyang mai si hou ఀ෍঺Аࡵ, 133 Ying Shao ᏻᡣ, 23n22, 100n68 Yiwen leiju ᗟ́ᘝ႞, 170n20, 262n18, 267n29 yong ۲, see courage you ᅴ, see anxiety You Pin ͧᏁ, 229 Yu ߮, 24n24, 91, 196, 198, 229, 249, 266 Yu Yue ‫ۥ‬ඞ, 36n55, 61n2, 265n24 yuan ხ, see distance Yuan Xian ࢍዙ, 95-96, 233n58, 276, see also Zisi “Yuan you” ხར, 134 yue ᆪ, see happiness yue ᆪ, see Music Yue Zheng ᆪ͸, 159 Yuhazu Kazuyori Ჹ֜ො, 228n49 Zang Wenzhong Ⴇ́Ϋ, 42 Zaofu ௪̓, 269n33 Zengzi ಫʪ, 27, 154, 273 Zengzi ಫʪ, 203n3 Zhai Hao ႜ㒷, 69n17 Zhai Zhong ୯Ϋ, 121n36 Zhan Jingfeng གದᄨ, 100 Zhang Chunyi ઠ ঝ ɾ , 16n6, 36n56, 52n86 Zhang Heng ઠ፰, 239n70 Zhang Hua ઠൡ, 258n8 Zhangjiashan ઠࣁʱ, 1 Zhang Jue ઠԴ, 242n76 Zhang Taiyan ఈ˯٬, 17, 88 Zhang Zhenjun ઠࣴ࠻, 40n64, 269n34 Zhanguoce ዢ੢യ, 16n6 Zhao Kuifu ღථˮ, 131 Zhao Qi ღҴ, 89n43, 102, 108n15, 121, 129, 137n82, 139n88, 142n97, 143n100, 148n114, 152, 155, 180-184, 195n65, 196-198, 200

402

INDEX

Zheng Xuan ቷ΁, 74-75, 88, 127n52, 128n53, 180n36, 231, 257n3, 273n43, 274n45, 275n46, 292, 308, 344, 378 zhi ನ, see wisdom zhi ӆ, see will or intention zhi ‫ڇ‬, see uprightness Zhi ⌳, see Robber Zhi Zhi Gong ‫ڇ‬৺, see Upright Gong zhong ‫׫‬, see loyalty Zhonghang Mu ˀмጽ, 268-269 Zhonglun ˀቈ, 258n4, 265n24, 266n25 zhongxin ˀ˻ (inner mind), 76 “Zhongyong” ˀ જ , 67, 87n41, 88, 96n60, 97, 160n147, 170n21, 175n29, 188-190, 236, 257n1, 257n2, 257n3, 265n24 Zhou ֟, Duke of, 249, 266 Zhou Guangye ֟ᅩ๣, 101n1 Zhouli ֟ᔩ, 140n93, 230 Zhu Mu Ќጽ, 257n1 Zhu Mu ইጽ, 275 Zhu Weizheng Ќ႕Ꭹ, 31 Zhu Xi Ќ ጞ , 68, 68n17, 98, 103, 107n15, 120n31, 136n82, 142n97, 151, 152n122, 186n36, 195n65, 222n37 Zhuang Zhou ப֟, 34n48 Zhuangzi பʪ, 33, 44-51, 53-56, 57n96, 58, 70, 80, 91n48, 93, 96n59, 140n95, 157, 159, 163-164, 167, 172, 176, 192, 199-200, 214, 224, 234n57, 254, 269n34, 276n49-50, 296

Zhushu jinian Сएߺ϶, 39n62 Zichan ʪ୕, 268 Zigao ʪধ, 27 Zigong ʪʻ, 60, 128 Zigong ʪ ৸, 105, 127, 176, 234n57, 276 Zijing ʪ՚, 68n16 Zilu ʪ པ , 27, 44n72, 57n96, 135, 261n17, 358 Zishang ʪʕ, 272 Zisi ʪ‫݋‬, 27, 59-62, 65, 67, 87-100, 112-113, 158, 188n55, 193n63, 200, 201-202, 205-206, 214, 216, 232-234, 244, 247, 257n1, 258n6, 262, 265, 266n26, 267n30, 270n36, 271-273 Zisi ʪ‫݋‬, 203n3, 257n1; see also Zisizi Zisizi ʪ‫݋‬ʪ, 95, 98, 205, 257, 257n2, 258n5, 260n8-13, 261n14, 267n28-29, 268n31, 271n37; translation 257-276 Zixia ʪࢬ, 15, 26, 29, 40, 68, 91, 93, 135, 154n128, 267n30 “Ziyi” ႗н, 64, 74, 87n41, 98, 180n36, 258n7, 260n8, 260n9, 288 Ziyou ʪΊ, 60n1, 68, 91-92 Zizhang ʪઠ, 26, 91 Zou Yan ཰࠯, 90, 118 Zuffery, Nicholas, 18 Zun deyi ౚᅭ໳, 87n41 Zuozhuan ͣ෭, 3n2, 13n2, 16, 39n62, 41, 145, 230n51, 304

SINICA LEIDENSIA 11. Zürcher, E. The Buddhist Conquest of China. The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China 1. Text. 2. Notes, Bibliography, Indexes. Reprint of the 1st (1959) ed., with additions and corrections. 1972. ISBN 90 04 03478 1 12/2. Acker, W.R.B. (tr.). Some T’ang and Pre-T’ang Texts on Chinese Painting. With Annotations. Vol. II. Chang Yen-Yüan. Li tai ming hua chi, Chapters IV-X 1. Translation and Annotations. 2. Chinese text. 1974. ISBN 90 04 03938 4 13. Idema, W.L. (ed.). Chinese Vernacular Fiction. The Formative Period. 1974. ISBN 90 04 03974 0 15. Idema, W.L. (ed.). Leyden Studies in Sinology. Papers Presented at the Conference Held in Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Sinological Institute of Leyden University, December 8-12, 1980. 1981. ISBN 90 04 06529 6 16. Idema, W.L. The Dramatic Œvre of Chu Yu-Tun (1379-1439). 1985. ISBN 90 04 07291 8 17. Hulsewé, A.F.P. Remnants of Ch’in Law. An Annotated Translation of the Ch’in Legal and Administrative Rules of the 3rd Century B.C. Discovered in Yünmeng Prefecture, Hu-pei Province, in 1975. 1985. ISBN 90 04 07103 2 18. Heer, Ph. de. The Care-Taker Emperor. Aspects of the Imperial Institute in Fifteenth-Century China As Reflected in the Political History of the Reign of Chu Chi’i-yü. 1986. ISBN 90 04 07898 3 19. Standaert, N. Yang Tingyun, Confucian and Christian in Late Ming China. His Life and Thought. 1987. ISBN 90 04 08127 5 20. Zurndorfer, H.T. Change and Continuity in Chinese Local History. The Development of Hui-Chou Prefecture 800 to 1800. 1989. ISBN 90 04 08842 3 21. Mansvelt Beck, B.J. The Treatises of Later Han. Their Author, Sources, Contents and Place in Chinese Historiography. 1990. ISBN 90 04 08895 4 22. Vermeer, E.B. (ed.). Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17th and 18th Centuries. 1990. ISBN 90 04 09171 8 23. Ruitenbeek, K. Carpentry and Building in Late Imperial China. A Study of the Fifteenth-Century Carpenter’s Manual Lu Ban jing. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09258 7 24. Idema, W.L. and Zürcher, E. (eds.). Thought and Law in Qin and Han China. Studies Dedicated to Anthony Hulsewé on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday. 1990. ISBN 90 04 09269 2 26. Haar, B.J. ter. The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09414 8 27. Yoshida, T. Salt Production Techniques in Ancient China. The Aobo Tu. Translated and revised by H.U. Vogel 1993. ISBN 90 04 09657 4 28. Huang Chun-Chieh and Zürcher, E. (eds.). Norms and the State in China. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09665 5 29. Blussé, L. and Zurndorfer, H.T. (eds.). Conflict and Accommodation in Early Modern East Asia. Essays in Honour of Erik Zürcher. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09775 9 30. Ming-Wood Liu, Madhyamaka Thought in China. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09984 0 31. Edwards, L.P. Men and Women in Qing China. Gender in the Red Chamber Dream. 1994. ISBN 90 04 10123 3 32. Eifring, H. Clause Combination in Chinese. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10146 2 33. Huang Chun-Chieh and Zürcher, E. (eds.). Time and Space in Chinese Culture. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10287 6 34. Farmer, E.L. Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation. The Reordering of Chinese Society following the Era of Mongol Rule. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10391 0 35. Ariel, Y. K’ung-ts’ung-tzu. A Study and Translation of Chapters 15-23 with a Reconstruction of the Hsiao Erh-ya Dictionary. 1996. ISBN 90 04 09992 1

36. Kwong, L.S.K. T’an Ssu-t’ung, 1865-1898. Life and Thought of a Reformer. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10471 2 37. Hansson, A. Chinese Outcasts. Discrimination and Emancipation in Late Imperial China. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10596 4 38. Sun Xiaochun and Kistemaker, J. The Chinese Sky during the Han. Constellating Stars and Society. 1997. ISBN 90 04 010737 1 39. Declercq, D. Writing against the State. Political Rhetorics in Third and Fourth Century China. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10376 7 40. Engelfriet, P.M. Euclid in China. The Genesis of the First Chinese Translation of Euclid’s Elements Books I-VI (Jihe yuanben; Beijing, 1607) and its Reception up to 1723. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10944 7 41. McLaren, A.E. Chinese Popular Culture and Ming Chantefables. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10998 6 42. Svarverud, R. Methods of the Way. Early Chinese Ethical Thought. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11010 0 43. Haar, B.J. ter. Ritual and Mythology of the Chinese Triads. Creating an Identity. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11063 1 44. Zurndorfer, H.T. Chinese Women in the Imperial Past. New Perspectives. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11065 8 45. Pohl, K.H. Chinese Thought in a Global Context. A Dialogue Between Chinese and Western Philosophical Approaches. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11426 2 46. De Meyer, J.A.M. and P.M. Engelfriet (eds.). Linked Faiths. Essays on Chinese Religions and Traditional Culture in Honour of Kristofer Schipper. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11540 4 47. Ven, H. van de. Warfare in Chinese History. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11774 1 48. Wright, D. Translating Science. The Transmission of Western Chemistry into Late Imperial China,1840-1900. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11776 8 49. Schottenhammer A.(ed.). The Emporium of the World. Maritime Quanzhou, 10001400. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11773 3 50. Jami, C.P. Engelfriet & G. Blue (eds.). Statecraft and Intellectual Renewal in Late Ming China. The Cross-cultural Synthesis of Xu Guangqi (1562-1633). 2001. ISBN 90 04 12058 0 51. Tapp, N. The Hmong of China. Context, Agency and the Imaginary. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12127 7 52. Lackner M.I. Amelung & J. Kurtz (eds.). New Terms for New Ideas.Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12046 7 53. Jing, A. The Water God ’s Temple of the Guangsheng Monastery. Cosmic Function of Art, Ritual,and Theater. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11925 6 54. Zhou Mi ’s Record of Clouds and Mist Passing Before One’s Eyes. An Annotated Translation by A. Weitz. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12605 8 55. B.S. McDougall & A. Hansson (eds.). Chinese Concepts of Privacy. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12766 6 56. K.-H. Pohl & A.W. Müller (eds.). Chinese Ethics in a Global Context. Moral Bases of Contemporary Societies. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12812 3 57. Gulik, R.H. Sexual Life in Ancient China. A Preliminary Survey of Chinese Sex and Society from ca. 1500 B.C. till 1644 A.D. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12601 5 58. Sato, M. The Confucian Quest for Order. The Origin and Formation of the Political Thought of XunZiy. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12965 0 59. Blussé, L. & Chen Menghong (eds.). The Archives of the Kong Koan of Batavia. 2003. ISBN 90 04 13157 4 60. Santangelo, P. Sentimental Education in Chinese History. An Interdisciplinary Textual Research on Ming and Qing Sources. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12360 1 61. Mather, R.B. The Age of Eternal Brilliance. Three Lyric Poets of the Yung-ming Era (483-493). 2003. ISBN 90 04 12059 9 (set)

62. Van Gulik, R.H. Erotic Colour Prints of the Ming Period. With an Essay on Chinese Sex Life from the Han to the Ch’ing Dynasty, B.C. 206-A.D. 1644. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13664 9 (volume one). ISBN 90 04 13665 7 (volume two). ISBN 90 04 13160 4 (set) 63. Eifring, H. Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13710 8 64. Viltinghoff, N. Mapping Meanings. The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13919 2 65. Moore, O.J. Rituals of Recruitment in Tang China. Reading an Annual Programme in the Collected Statements by Wang Dingbao (870–940). 2004. ISBN 90 04 13937 0 66. Csikszentmihalyi, M. Material Virtue. Ethics and the Body in Early China. 2004. ISBN 90 04 14196 0 67. Chiang, S-C.L. Collecting the Self. Body and Identity in Strange Tale Collections of Late Imperial China. 2004. ISBN 90 04 14203 7